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Toward Intelligence-Led Policing: A Qualitative Study and Assessment of How the Critical Factors of Intelligence-Led Policing Are Perceived by Chicago Police Department's Organized Crime Division (OCD)

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TOWARD INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING:
A QUALITATIVE STUDY AND ASSESSMENT OF HOW
THE CRITICAL FACTORS OF INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING
ARE PERCEIVED BY CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT’S
ORGANIZED CRIME DIVISION (OCD)

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

BY
TOBIN HENSGEN

CHICAGO, ILLINOIS
DECEMBER 2011
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I am humbly aware that the work required to complete this endeavor could not have been accomplished without the assistance of several individuals whose patience and persistence helped me throughout the project. It was Einstein who said that significant problems we face cannot be resolved at the same level of thinking we were at when we created those problems and it was Terri Pigott who demonstrated to me what these words meant. Dr. Pigott mentored and assisted me through several iterations of the concepts I believed worthy of investigation to the point of understanding the holistic nature of research; for that I am deeply grateful. Arup Varma encouraged my work from the beginning and patiently supported me by listening to any number of tedious discussions involving my interests and reasons for this research then tolerantly demonstrating to me the art of addressing the central notions of my research in a less intense, more moderate manner. I wish to thank Kevin DeSouza for meaningful exchanges on the use and my understanding of intelligence products in practical settings. Chris Barlow has been a valuable resource for ideas, critiques, and frequent discussions that improved my understanding of organizations and how they function. I wish to acknowledge and thank the members of the Chicago Police who participated in this project and the University of Loyola Department of Education and Administrative staff who have assisted throughout this endeavor.
To Celeste
The best way to predict the future is to invent it
Peter Drucker
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ABSTRACT

The interest in the use and development of intelligence from information by law enforcement has escalated since the events of 9/11. This dissertation investigates the contemporary phenomenon of intelligence in police work from its real life context and explores the critical factors of the Intelligence-led policing model through an assessment of how these factors are perceived by supervisors and decision makers of the Chicago Police Department’s Organized Crime Division. This is a case study which will use inductive qualitative analysis and assessment on themes derived from semi-structured interviews and observations of police supervisors who are involved in decision-making tasks that require the use of intelligence products.

The extant literature on the use of information in policing and the design of the Intelligence-led policing model is extensive. However, there is little research devoted to any interpretive study which seeks to understand the phenomenon of intelligence in police work through the meaning that practitioners, i.e., police, assign to them. This study presents the basis for further research on the relationship of the critical factors involved in the intelligence-led policing model and how those factors are perceived in a real-life context. The research presents a unique view of comparative factors focused on the complexity of human sense-making as situations emerge and will be developed during the course of this study, which can be of value to future researchers.
CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

Before the summer of 2001 had faded, American law enforcement was forced into the position of dealing with some unpleasant realities. Despite the perception that the Problem Oriented Policing (POP) model of the early nineties worked as an effective tool to strengthen ties between citizens and the police by combining scarce resources to combat a common crime problem, overall, the failure of the criminal justice system continued (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). The POP model is a police response strategy intended to address the causes of specific social and crime disorder problems through the use of analysis, assessment, and feedback in conjunction with the engagement of public and private community groups to resolve common issues. To compound these problems, the dreadful attacks on New York and Washington D.C. and the subsequent anthrax scare exposed the country to unanticipated vulnerabilities in a free society which caught law enforcement unprepared.

The purpose of this case study is to explore a new strategic approach, intelligence-led policing, and examine the relationship between this new approach and police efficiency. Specifically, the study will determine if the intelligence-led policing model contributes to the organizational goals, i.e., crime reduction and investigative efficiencies, over and above that accounted for by existing practices of the Chicago Police Department’s Organized Crime Division.
The specific research questions addressed are:

1. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to police efficiency in addition to that accounted for or perceived through current practices in the Organized Crime Division of the Chicago Police Department?

2. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to the organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department beyond that accounted for or perceived by current practices of the Department?

3. How does intelligence-led policing present a separate construct from existing police practices used by the Organized Crime Division?

Intelligence-led policing may be defined as an approach which emphasizes information gathering, from a variety of sources, and information sharing and collaboration among authorized agencies to establish strategic solutions to combat crime (Ratcliffe, 2008). This concept involves arrangements of joint participation among law enforcement agencies to solve problems ‘that cannot be achieved, or achieved easily, by single organizations’ (Agranoff and McGuire, 2001 p.296). Beyond the ways in which information is shared and used to develop intelligence, Intelligence-led policing is a managerial tool used by decision-makers to plan and implement focused strategies. Rather than reacting to an incident driven agenda, e.g., calls-for-service, intelligence-led policing proactively focuses on known criminals and their activities with the intention of anticipating and defeating the opportunity for criminal activity before it happens.

The interest in intelligence-led policing (ILP) has escalated dramatically among the members of the American law enforcement community since the events of 9/11. The Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States
stressed that significant failures to share information between law enforcement agencies charged with national security tasks contributed to the country’s vulnerability (The 9/11 Commission Report, 2004). A year later, the inability of law enforcement agencies to coordinate information contributed to the terror perpetrated by the ‘Beltway sniper.’ In both instances, information relative to on-going investigations which might have contributed to the aversion or avoidance of catastrophe was available to various law enforcement agencies but because the mechanism for a coordinated sharing plan for use in directing and sharing resources was lacking, that information was not used efficiently and the consequences proved dire. The development of intelligence related to a particular person or circumstance is the first casualty when information is not shared.

The extant literature on information management, the development of intelligence from information, and knowledge management is extensive and multi-tiered. Information is the basis on which groups organize their components, connect them, mobilize them, and leverage them in a collective setting toward common objectives (Churchman, 1971, Ackoff, 1981). While the private sector has been the main beneficiary of this body of work, challenges to the way the public sector manages scarce resources has compelled them to investigate new options in the ways information may be used and transformed to intelligence for leveraging and maximizing those resources. Intelligence-led policing provides one of these options.

Existing models of policing demonstrate reactive and investigative approaches to crime rather than a preventative approach (Weisburd & Eck, 2004). Under this arrangement, police are driven by ‘calls for service’ or the occasional response to an on-view crime which serves the perception, though not the actual practice, of an increased
police presence. Routine follow-up investigations contribute to the myth of a ubiquitous, efficient police presence as, for example, when the news media present scenes of scores of police converged at the scene of a crime following a major criminal incident. Although it may be reassuring to see a police presence on the scene in response to crime, the question of what might have been done to prevent the crime must always be considered.

In conventional police work, the use of ‘intelligence’ is traditionally restricted to use on a case-by-case basis for the purpose gathering information and supporting prosecutions under an arrangement which is better defined as investigative-led intelligence (Cope, 2004). This practice contributes to the misunderstanding of the meaning of intelligence so that practitioners often use the terms ‘information’ and ‘intelligence’ interchangeably so that an investigator may assume she is ‘collecting intelligence’ when in fact she is gathering information.

Simply put, intelligence is information which has been subjected to meaningful analysis (USDOJ/BJA 2006). Analysis is the process of reducing complex information to a simpler form. Products of analysis may become intelligence. Intelligence forms the basis for actionable knowledge, i.e., activities in support of a directed mission. Currently, literature related to the process and products of intelligence as they relate to the public sector is scant (Wise, 2002, 2006).

Under former police Superintendent O.W. Wilson, the Chicago Police Department was transformed, in the late sixties, to an agency in which ‘progressive, preventive patrol’ served as the mantra that drove all preliminary police activities (Chu, 2001). Wilson believed that a police presence, in and of itself, was the greatest deterrent to criminal activity. George Kelling, who co-authored the 1982 Atlantic article ‘Broken Windows’
and contributed significantly to the advent of community policing, provided research from a Kansas City study which concluded that random patrol had little effect on crime prevention (Kelling, 1972). Others go further and maintain that the inference of police having a substantial, broad, and independent impact on crime is a myth, regardless of strategies or tactics used (Eck & Maguire, 2000).

Over the past decade, technology has provided our society the means to join previously dissociated groups for the purpose of coordinating activities that advance productivity; not all of the opportunities available are lawful ((NJSP, 2006). Agencies in law enforcement are aware they must engage in the effort to keep pace with the changing communications environment in which the criminal element is more agile and quick to respond. The use of the Internet, disposable cell phones, and counter-intelligence tactics, such as providing misinformation to distract police, give criminals a distinct advantage over the police who, as an organization, are slow to adapt to changes in the environment. A current practice among gang members is to post pictures of themselves, weapons, and narcotic paraphernalia on open source Websites like U-Tube and MySpace. The Gang Investigations Unit of the Chicago Police Department was unable to access these sites from police computers because of restricted use policies until 2008. Intelligence-led policing, as a strategy, focuses on the involvement of decision-makers to provide the tools necessary to obtain source information by establishing exceptional policy.

In February of 2008, the newly appointed Superintendent of the Chicago Police Department, Jody Weis, stated that the Department would seek new ways and methods to increase police efficiency. Among the methods he cited was ‘Intelligence-driven policing.’ The research in this project will be based on interviews, both structured and in
depth, with command staff personnel and supervisors of the Chicago Police Department’s Organized Crime Division (OCD) which oversees the activities of the Department’s Gang Investigation, Narcotics, and Intelligence Sections. The interviews will focus on the respondent’s perspective of the meaning and use of intelligence as it is used within the Chicago Police Department, their experience in the use of intelligence, and their position on which features of existing practices are, or may prove to be, most salient in the use of intelligence in police work.

The results of this study will be of interest to law enforcement practitioners, students of criminal justice, and academic researchers. Both local law enforcement and state intelligence agencies have an interest in this research because it has implications on the efficient use of resources as well as on whether the model presented can contribute to the effectiveness of existing strategies. How information is used is directly related to how, or if, it is relayed; information which is relayed and not used is useless (Shannon and Weaver, 1947). Students of criminal justice must be made aware that the needs of law enforcement is changing and future of the criminal justice system requires skills involving knowledge management, analysis, and an ability to demonstrate critical thinking skills. Because Intelligence-led policing is a relatively new strategy, researchers have the opportunity to expand on the knowledge base related to the concept and to further test its validity. Overall the research presented is intended to contribute to current law enforcement practices by examining the relationship and purpose of information collected, the type and extent of analysis conducted, and whether organizational benefits may be derived from Intelligence-led policing. Conclusions from this research are
expected to be applicable to the use of Intelligence-led policing throughout the Department.

Limitations

Data used in this research will be collected from interviews. The sample size is representative of the population of supervisors of the Chicago Police Department’s Organized Crime Division (OCD), who are charged with tasks involving the use of intelligence processes and products. The OCD is comprised of three sections; Gangs, Narcotics, and Intelligence.

A pilot case study will be conducted prior to administering formal interviews. This is a formative step intended to refine the relevant questions used in later data collection. Yin (2009) maintains Pilot studies can be useful for the purpose of concept clarification prior seeking IRB approval. The selection of participants in the pilot case study will be from OCD supervisory personnel who will not be included in the actual research and will address basic methodological issues related to the logistics of the proposed field inquiry. Additionally, responses to the pilot case study will be compared to a continuing review of relevant literature on intelligence-led policing. This approach supports the notion that the subsequent study will reflect on contemporary theoretical issues as well as issues which are case specific.

Interviews related to this research will be administered following the introduction of the interviewer and an explanation the purpose for interviews by the Chief of OCD. Personnel to be interviewed are assigned to different ‘watches’ (schedules) covering three shifts each day with rotating day-off groups. When possible, interviews will be conducted at the interviewee’s principle place of business.
The sample size used in this research is derived from the population of supervisors within the Organized Crime Division’s (OCD) Gang Investigation, Narcotics, and Intelligence Sections. At the highest level, the Chief of the unit represents the fourth highest ranking officer on the Department followed by the Deputy Chief and three Section Commanders. Additionally, fifteen lieutenants assigned to OCD will be interviewed.

**Definition of Terms**

Analysis: the ability to reduce complex information to a simpler form for examination on solutions intended to resolve more complex problems in support of possible decisions.

Collaboration: the work of two or more agencies that provide resources and expertise with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, respond, or defeat threatening, criminal or terrorist activities.

Data: a general abstract descriptor which is initially unbiased.

Intelligence-led policing: a management philosophy in support of optimal resource allocation based on the understanding of the operating environment.

Intelligence Process: a method for managing the flow of data across the horizontal and vertical levels of government in order to integrate information and analysis, develop intelligence, and provide decision-makers with the options required to develop actionable knowledge.

Information: data that has been synthesized and is biased.

Intelligence: information to which value has been added through analysis.

Intelligence Community: Fourteen (14) U.S. agencies responsible for intelligence activities necessary for national security, headed by the Director of Central Intelligence.
State and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies: Fifty (50) state and two hundred (200) tribal Indian law enforcement agencies which function below the federal level and above local law enforcement level.

Local Law Enforcement: any of the estimated 800,000 sworn officers representing agencies below the state level.

Fusion Centers: state agencies charged with developing and managing intelligence based on information received from federal, tribal, and local law enforcement partners.
CHAPTER TWO
LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter provides a review of the literature related to the concept of intelligence-led policing and its effect on police management, operations, effectiveness, and efficiency. The goals of this review are not to be exhaustive but rather to point out seminal themes under study by scholars of intelligence-led policing and its use in law enforcement. In the extant police literature, intelligence-led policing, as a phenomenon, has not been fully explored or theoretically developed (Hale, Heaton, Uglov 2004; Oakensen, Mockford, and Pascoe, 2002). The practitioner literature, however, represents an extensive and growing collection of articles that detail various aspects on the interest and use of intelligence-led policing as a strategic tool in police work. Cooper (1984) suggests that a literature review should be used as a means to an end, and not as an end in itself. The literature review addresses questions about the topic that needs to be studied. Given this purpose in literature reviews, the research objectives of this study are: (1) to explore the definitions and use of information and intelligence currently existing within the context of existing police models and (2) to uncover critical factors employed by the newest model of intelligence-led policing which may serve to enhance the Chicago Police Organized Crime Division in attaining goals related to crime detection and prevention. Each of these issues is important from scholarly and practical perspectives.
Existing studies on the use of intelligence in law enforcement fall into two general categories. The first involves definitions of intelligence in policing and how, as a resource, intelligence products are managed by organizations. The second examines intelligence as a process and is concerned with the development of source information and whether it contributes to organizational objectives.

In the first instance, the management of intelligence, studies consider the product environment related to intelligence including resources, ownership, exchanges, and the impact or feasibility for action based on intelligence (IACP, 2002; White, 2004; GIWC, 2005; Osbourne, 2006). Two major concerns regarding the use of intelligence in law enforcement involve sharing of the products which result from intelligence work and issues of civil rights. The protection of citizen’s rights in gathering and sharing information by law enforcement is strictly outlined by the guidelines in the Code of Federal Regulations (28 CFR 23) which provides the basis for police policy. The tenets of 28 CFR 23 preclude gathering information on individuals who are not the subject of a criminal investigation. Gundhus (2005) addressed obstacles to sharing information between agencies and observed that no standard practices exist. Sheptycki (2004) described a list of ‘organizational pathologies’ that were problematic to the internal and external flow of intelligence requiring managerial intervention to correct. Research by Jaranpaa and Staples (2001) found positive associations between individual beliefs regarding information/intelligence ownership and the ability to exchange products of intelligence between and among organization members. These issues will be addressed later in this research.
In the second instance, the process of intelligence creation is examined from a perspective on data collection, the analysis and development of information, the relevance and meaning of information in the context of crime, the synthesis and creation of intelligence which is appropriate to criminal activity, and the dissemination of the intelligence products to decision makers in order to generate action (Osborne, 2006; IACP, 2002; Clark and Eck, 2005; Desouza and Vanapalli, 2005; Brodeur and Dupont, 2006; de Lint, O’Connor, and Cotter, 2007; Ratcliffe, 2008). In its simplest form, intelligence is recognized as information to which analysis has been applied (Carter, 2004; NJSP, 2005). The distinction in the types of analysis used in intelligence-led policing and other police models will be discussed throughout this research. Analysts are the ‘knowledge workers’ within an organization. Drucker (1959) first postulated the use of ‘knowledge workers’ within organizations as those individuals who work primarily with information to develop and uses knowledge in the workplace. Nicholl (2004) emphasized the need for a strong analyst-client relationship if the information under analysis is expected to be converted to intelligence and subsequently, actionable knowledge. Actionable knowledge represents intelligence products on which policy makers determine strategic plans and the allocation of resources necessary to implement the strategy. This notion is crucial to the intelligent-led policing model which emphasizes the requirement that the intelligence conveyed must fit within the boundaries of the resource limitations and capabilities (Simon, 1983) of the organizational client (Ratcliffe, 2008).

The purpose of this study is to assess the perception of police supervisors on the critical factors employed by the model of intelligence-led policing. Additionally, current
practices in the use of intelligence by the Chicago Police Department’s Organized
Crime Division will be examined.

The research questions which will be addressed in this study are:

1. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to police
   efficiency in addition to that accounted for existing practices?
2. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to
   organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department in addition to that
   accounted for by existing practices?
3. How does intelligence-led policing present a separate construct from those of
   existing police practices?

The Policing Paradigms

The traditional paradigm of local law enforcement fosters reactions to information
provided voluntarily, uses ex post facto arrests and trial governed by rules of evidence,
and protects the rights of citizens as part of a tactical approach (Carter, Deutsch, Zelikow,
1998, p.82). The importance of this statement emphasizes that (1) police response to
crime is reactionary; a crime must have occurred before it is investigated and (2)
information used by police is provided voluntarily from sources other than the police, for
example, from witnesses, victims, or from offenders. In this instance, the apprehension of
the offender, i.e., the arrest is the primary goal of investigative methods. This approach,
and the scope of local law enforcement, changed dramatically following the events of
September 11th.

The extant literature on law enforcement indicates there is a new trend in policing
which fosters aggressive, active intelligence gathering with the intention of anticipating
threats in advance of any criminal activity by planning preventative actions against suspect targets as part of a strategic approach which encourages the development and allocation of resources as part of policy planning. Carter, Deutsch, Zelikow (1998) suggest this approach is similar to methods used by federal intelligence agencies. The principle distinction between traditional policing and the new model is the strategic focus on the use of intelligence to drive police strategies through risk assessment. Risk assessment takes into account threats, vulnerabilities, and consequences posed by the risk in anticipation of actions. It is important to note that this risk assessment strategy does not replace tactical investigative techniques; rather it complements them.

The development of intelligence for use in the police environment is complex and subject to a variety of interpretations as supported in the literature (Gill, 2000; O’Shea and Nicholls 2003; Cope, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2008). As a concept, intelligence-led policing was originally articulated in the U.K. as an operation strategy to reduce crime based on the crime trends developed through the use of information generated from a variety of sources (Ratcliffe, 2008). It has evolved as a business model in which the analysis of crime information results in the development of intelligence products to serve decision makers as the foundation to determine priorities, resource allocation, and subsequent actions by law enforcement i.e., intelligence-led policing drives police strategies. As a police strategy, intelligence-led policing builds on, and indeed borrows from, the tenets established a decade ago under the philosophies of Community Oriented Policing (COP) and Problem Oriented Policing (POP) (Skogan, 2006; BJS, 2006). The rational for exploring and later implementing these alternatives to traditional police methods arose for two reasons which were not directly related to intelligence. First, until the late ’60s,
there was the societal perception that the police represented order and served a real purpose by legitimizing the barrier between the legal standard and crime (Wood and Shearing, 2007). This perception eroded during the political and civil upheavals which carried into the ‘70’s during which police activities were often interpreted in terms of a fascist-like reaction of suppression in response to individuals or groups who sought, sometimes violently, to express their Constitutional guarantees. Secondly, traditional police methods which centered on reactive or investigative responses to crime seemed incapable of containing or impacting a rising crime rates (Ratcliffe, 2008). The combination of these factors contributed to a revaluation of police procedures, including alternative programs, on how best to (1) reconnect with citizen-stakeholders and (2) contribute more effectively to strategies for crime reduction through the use of information and the development, through the analysis of information, of intelligence.

The Relation Between Intelligence-led and Other Policing Strategies

Conventional policing strategies operate on the assumption that greater detection leads to more arrests which, in turn, serves as a deterrent to crime. Assuming there were realistic measurements to establish equilibrium, such a strategy might function but, in reality, criminal activity outpaces the criminal justice system’s ability to keep it in check. The criminal justice system entails all processes related to crime from detection, arrest, prosecution, and conviction; the ‘crime funnel.’ Ratcliffe (2008) notes for every 1,000 crimes committed, less than 8 percent are detected and less than 1 percent result in prison sentencing. For the purpose of this research, we focus on the detection phase and how information leading to intelligence is instrumental in contributing to the criminal justice system’s process.
For police, the detection of crime is accomplished in two ways; it is reported by a victim or witness source or, it is viewed ‘on scene’ (in progress) by law enforcement. The former represents the majority of crimes detected. As part of the paperwork involved, crimes are indexed and cataloged in the United States, by two principle methods. The first is Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) system which was initiated in the late ‘20’s and taken over by the FBI in the early 30’s (Foster, 2004). The second, the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS), involves an extension of the UCR method and includes greater detail.

Twenty-eight years after the introduction of the UCR program, the FBI produced its first national aggregate of crime totals (Pattavina, 2005). The system relies on local law enforcement to self report criminal activity which is then categorized by a UCR classification number and archived. UCR numbers indicate the type of crime committed, for example, 0110 is a homicide, 041A is a battery committed with a firearm, and 0430 is a battery committed with another dangerous weapon. UCR classifications are also applied to the location in which the crime took place so that 304 will indicate a crime took place in the street while 290 would indicate the crime took place in a residence. The UCR classification system is the most widely used method employed by law enforcement today and crime data gathered from 93% of the nation’s population is represented in the annual report entitled Crime in the United States (Maltz, 1999).

The main function of the UCR classification method is to ‘count incidents of crime’ and store them in order to monitor crime trends, a task for which the system is limited (Biderman and Lynch, 1991; Maltz, 1999). For example, the UCR system includes a hierarchy mechanism which requires the reporting of only the most serious crime in
instances were multiple crimes are committed. A Loyola study in Chicago (Block and Block, 1992) demonstrated that homicides were often the end result of other crimes, such as robberies which went unreported under the hierarchy rules. UCR numbers are self reported by local law enforcement and therefore subject to under-reporting. Under reporting occurs for two reasons; first, crimes occur without ever being reported and second, there are times when reported crimes are reclassified through the discretionary police practice known as ‘killing crime’ in order to downplay the severity of a crime problem. For example, a burglary which is a Part I Index crime against property may be reclassified as a theft, a ‘lesser crime’ not part of the Part I index. The motivation for killing crime varies but when it is employed, it serves to distort the overall crime picture and, in some situations, make an area appear to have fewer types of crimes than are actually occurring. Without scrutiny, such activity serves to defeat the purpose of information and subsequently intelligence.

The UCR system was intended as a ‘summary based’ method for collecting data on reported crimes. The system did not allow for information related to dates or victim demographics thereby limiting its value in use for in depth analysis or efficient policy making decisions. By the late to mid-eighties, The FBI addressed these concerns and introduced the National Incident Based Reporting System (NIBRS) to correct some of the deficiencies inherent in the UCR system (Pattavina, 2004; Foster, 2005). The NIBRS system is more eclectic in its approach to the criminal incident which is defined as an offense or offenses as committed by and offender or offenders acting in concert at the same time and place (FBI 1998). Additionally, information related to victims, multiple offenders, property classifications, and categories which included crimes against society,
e.g., narcotics trafficking, in addition to crimes against people or property. Because NIBRS functions as part of a standardized Records Management System (RMS) which is provided with data from local jurisdictions, there are strict compliance standards for users who must adhere to design requirements. As a result of the NIBRS program, local jurisdictions are able to perform analysis of information on criminal activity and police response that contributes to a broader perspective which is helpful in two principle areas. First, crime data may be examined on a larger scale than would be available at just the local level. Research by Faggiani and McLaughlin (1991) and Faggiani, Bibel, and Brensilber (2001) tied incidents of narcotics trafficking across multijurisdictional areas which demonstrated a previously undetected regional problem that impacted non-contiguous localities. Second, effective analysis prepares policy makers to make more informed decisions. The work of Faggiani et al (2001) led to memorandums of understanding between cooperating agencies to better address regional drug problems. Similarly, tracking the police response domestic violence incidents in which arrests were, or were not made led to policy changes in procedures and subsequent legislation involving domestic violence (Pattavina, 2004). NIBRS demonstrated that for the first time, local law enforcement could use advances in technology that enhanced the ability to collate large amounts of data for analysis related to criminal activity and transform it to useful information upon which actionable intelligence could be used effectively to proactively address crime issues.

Analysis of situational data from the NIBRS system relied on reported incidents of crime. Kelling and Wilson (1982) and Kelling and Cole (1996) argued that because other factors, many affecting ‘quality of life issues,’ contribute to information on the conditions
that result in crime, law enforcement should strengthen ties with the community to expand their sources of information. Government support of this notion led to various models which collectively became known community policing.

Under the Clinton Administration, a number of initiatives were begun at the federal level to bolster the criminal justice system including the Community Policing Competitive grant program (COPS Program) to put 100,000 police officers on the streets in community policing programs (Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994). Nationally, local law enforcement agencies competed for billions in federal funding in order to subsidize hiring provided they subscribed to policing strategies which involved community input and the use of defined problem solving models. Problem solving requires the identification of a community concern and an exchange of information related to the concern. As with conventional policing, community problems were incident driven but are more generalized, e.g., a focus on abandoned buildings that provided the venue for illegal activities such as prostitution or narcotics use. In addition to arrest and service data that was available to law enforcement, police would work with the community and other agencies to access additional types of information such as property ownership records, utility information, and other demographics in order to analyze conditions surrounding criminal activity and access alternative solutions to a problem beyond arrests.

Both Problem Oriented Policing (POP) and Community Oriented Policing (COP) rely on gathering information, often from local community groups or Beat Officers, in order to expose and correct underlying or endemic causes which contribute to disorder problems, including any conditions that support crime. Both POP and COP were
promoted and advanced as policing strategies but in practice were more tactical and focused on specific problems. As such, the use of information or intelligence used in the practice of these strategies, when successful, served to address specific problems which Tilley (2003) believes served to satisfice communities, i.e., provide the best solution, or one that was ‘good enough’ (Simon, 1996), without resolving the problem. Under conditions of ‘satisficing,’ for example, conditions of crime might be eliminated in one area simply because it relocated in another area. Information or ‘intelligence’ in this instance is restricted to situational data for tactical crime support which differs from the broader sense of intelligence analysis used in intelligence-led policing.

Community Oriented Policing

In practice, community oriented policing is difficult to define as it is based on the intention that police must confer and consult with public stakeholders regarding operational matters in order to be effective (Bennett, 1994). Mastrofski, (2006) suggests that because community objectives are so varied and fluid, community policing can not be evaluated effectively because of its all-things-to-all-people character. Harcourt (2004) studied Chicago’s Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS), a variation of community policing, and argued that no quantifiable results were ever produced by the program. This is likely related to the that fact that goals of community policing were most often ‘measured’ in terms of community satisfaction and a perception that police were actively participating in activities that addressed community-driven concerns (Tilley, 2003). In some ways, the effects of community oriented policing may be compared to the effects on behavior during the Hawthorn experiments at the Westinghouse facility in Chicago (Mayo, 1949). There, the response in participant behavior to a change in the environment
related more to the attention given the participants rather than as a result of the change itself (Landsberger, 1959). From the information and intelligence perspective, COP-like programs provided sources of data which had previously not been used. Because of the ties established through community-police relations, associative data related to problem analysis was used as a foundation for intelligence based action and policy. This provided a new way in which police were required to consider available, though previously unused, information sources for situational analysis.

Problem Oriented Policing

Like COP, POP involves the identification and analysis of specific crime and disorder problems, in order to develop an effective response. Unlike COP, POP places the police, rather than the community, in the position of deciding which problems should be addresses. Oliver and Bartgis (1998) concluded that the practices of Problem Oriented Policing are actually an integral part of Community Policing. This observation serves to blur the distinction between the two programs (Scott, 2000). However, programs such as these indicate the implied necessity on the part of the police to seek non-traditional methods for doing their jobs and represent a beginning in seeking alternative solutions to conventional policing methods. Problem-identification and problem-solving however, represent different ends of the same spectrum; while it is easy to identify a concern, it is another matter to resolve the concern.

Bynam (2001) contends that police are better at identifying problems than solving them, a simple but important observation. Problem Oriented Policing represents a first step towards intelligence-led policing as it employees an analytical lens through which conditions or participants in crime are specifically viewed and research and assessment
are emphasized as part of a continuing problem solving process. This point provides the main distinction between Community Oriented and Problem Oriented Policing as while it is a common practice for police agencies to store volumes of data there was never direct attention given to use of the data for analysis beyond its evidentiary, case-by-case use.

Problem Oriented Policing introduced a simple problem solving method which was developed in conjunction with the pioneering research that created POP as a model (Goldstein, 1979, 1990). Eck and Spellman (1987) suggested an analytical approach to problem solving that was applied to identifiable police problems which were then examined through four steps: scanning, analysis, response, and assessment (SARA). For the first time in policing, solutions and assets were regarded as part of a process in the comprehensive analysis on a problem in which feedback and assessment were vital.

Traditional policing strategies and tactics involve mobilizing resources and operations, without question, in response to achieving a goal and outcomes were measured in terms of immediate results or ‘performance indexes,’ such as arrests, citations issued, or contacts initiated (Smith, 1995; Scott, 1998; Tilley, 2004). Without a mechanism for assessment, these conditions present a numbers-game that resulted in an interesting paradox. Because police are tabulating or ‘counting’ results rather than assessing the impact of their actions based on situational analysis, the conditions creating the problem simply relocate as opposed to being resolved (O’Shea and Nicholls, 2003; Foster, 2002); this is known as ‘moving crime.’ Additionally, a reliance on ‘performance indicators’ requires decision makers to focus on internal performance rather than external problems (Scott, 1998; Tilley, 2004; Ratcliffe 2008). If a problem area is saturated for
enforcement for any period of time, supervisors become concerned by the fact that numbers fall off as an operation progresses without regard to the changing conditions brought on by an increased police presence. Bichler and Gaines, (2005) maintain that such ‘single phase’ solutions to crime problems tend to involve increased police presence for complex problems affecting areas and crime prevention for specific sites facing single-crime problems. Social problems involving police solutions are complex and in addition to reaction, may involve analysis, further study, and feedback. A key feature of organizational learning suggests the variables under investigation should be scrutinized, assessed, and evaluated in order to transform large problems into smaller, attainable objectives (Argyris and Schön, 1974).

Research on the use of analysis in police work indicates that police managers preferred their analysts to focus on tactical outcomes or in support of the investigative process (O’Shea and Nicholls, 2003). Under such arrangements, analysis is intended to maximize the impact of enforcement and is directly tied to offender identification and apprehension on a case-by-case-basis (Cope, 2004). This is understandable. Under existing practices Police supervisors and managers are tied to the current and existing condition of crime which they are expected to immediately address through standards of traditional and acceptable practices. While analysis would help to focus, possibly drive, police initiatives, it is the consequences of existing managerial decisions that have a direct impact on the analytical processes used in policing (Gill, 2000).

With a rise in the use of technology during the late ‘90s, both POP and COP began applying tools like Geographical Information Systems (GIS) to data. GIS systems use mapping programs to spatially render data. Spatial rendering is the visual representation
of data used in graphs, computer assisted diagrams (CAD), or maps (Foster, 2005; Pattavina, 2007). Advances in computer technologies allowed desktop computer users to integrate data and mapping through the technique of geocoding, a process that transforms latitudes and longitudes into points on a map. This feature proved useful to problem solving and analysis since it allows the user to ‘layer’ information (data of interest) related to areas of concern onto maps. The ability to layer information on maps meant that a variety of variables e.g., crime data, proximity data related to other social problems, business data, or building data, could be viewed at one time although the data may come from different sources. Previous theories on crime, notably rationale choice theory (Clark, 1997; Clark and Eck 2003) and routine activity theory (Felson, 1998; Felson and Clark, 1998) could be examined spatially in greater detail. Rationale choice theory maintains criminal acts occur when specific conditions, e.g., lack of a police presence, exist. Routine activity theory holds that victims are often the habit of routine which an offender may study and use to his advantage. Both theories focus on the conditions which contribute to the opportunity for crime and may be analyzed in order to rationalize the ‘why’ as well as ‘where’ crime occurs or develop as trends. It should be noted that in the nineties a combination of practices and hybrid programs using elements from previous problem solving models were employed by many law enforcement jurisdictions.

In Chicago, the Chicago Alternative Policing Strategy (CAPS) was implemented citywide among twenty-five police Districts in 1994 and was based on the premise that police alone lacked the resources to solve the city’s crime problems but might serve as a conduit between the community and other city agencies in an effort to resolve quality of
life issues which contribute to crime. The CAPS model differs slightly from the COPS approach to problem solving in that it incorporates an element of a strong organizational buy-in which includes the condition of accountability on the part of District Commanders. These notions were similar in concept to the CompStat approach which was developed by the New York Police Department and will be discussed later in this section.

Following the provisions of a pamphlet entitled ‘Together We Can’ police Districts developed Beat Teams and Beat Team Meetings under police supervisors. All Districts are divided into nine to twelve Beats (depending on the District size). Beat Team meetings are held once a month at which time citizens are encouraged to attend and present concerns to the police Beat Team. Concerns generally centered on quality of life issues including matters related to neighborhood maintenance such as street lighting, clean up, graffiti removal, or tree trimming. Beat Teams acted as conduits to other City agencies to address such concerns. The Beat Team Meeting agenda and the procedures for holding the meetings are under the exclusive control of the police. A commercially available GIS application, MapInfo© was employed to a limited extent for mapping problem concerns. The application some experience with database management although the CAPS program provided no training in the use of databases. CAPS identified ‘computerized crime-analysis’ as one of the program’s objectives though training beyond fundamental problem identification was never achieved.

While the COPS program measured success in terms of community satisfaction with the job done through police driven initiatives, CAPS emphasized centralized oversight by the Department in order to audit practices and to review the participation of District rank
and file. CAPS required a Departmental reorganization and a call for decentralized prioritizing of problems at the District level, but a ten year review of the CAPS program by Northwestern University maintained the program suffered from too little training, a lack of analytic capacity, and a lack of organizational commitment (Skogan, 2004). Such limitations were reflected in the solutions provided through the CAPS program and CAPS successes were often reported in terms of community satisfaction with a police presence to a crime issue affecting a neighborhood. For example, the installation of ATM machines within police Districts was seen as a CAPS success because it was presumed citizens would be safer making cash withdrawals while in a police facility. Although this type of activity centers on methods to deflect crime, once implemented, there are no provisions for feedback or follow up on information as to whether the steps taken significantly impacted crime.

At the same time COP-like programs were being initiated, William Bratton, Commissioner of the New York City Police Department (1994-1996), is credited with taking the analytical approach to crime reduction a step further by integrating police practices with a management style that stressed supervisory accountability as policy. The process he designed required supervisors to aggressively use statistical data on crime as a means to pinpoint ‘hot spots’ of criminal activity in order to develop tactics and counter-active measures to fight crime. This process has become known as Compstat.

Compstat

The literature devoted to the origins and development of Compstat is considerable (Kelling and Coles, 1996; Bratton, 1998; Silverman, 1999; McDonald, Greenberg, and Bratton, 2001). Compstat is intended to be an internal managerial tool in which middle
management i.e., commanders, would be held accountable for the ‘management of crime’ within their respective areas of influence (Ratcliffe, 2008). In New York, the Police Commissioner William Bratton (1994-1996), restructured his Department’s organization so that tactical requisites, including the flow of intelligence and resources, would be made available to specifically address issues of crime. Ratcliffe (2008) notes that data provided to commanders is more properly defined as ‘information’ rather than ‘intelligence’ and this distinction will be addressed in depth in the ensuing section. The seminal difference that distinguishes the Compstat model from other police problem solving approaches is that it successfully combined managerial and technical resources through a process of organizational change (Moore, 2003; Silverman, 2006); the issue of managerial buy-in was not an option, it was an imperative.

In support of his commanders, Bratton mandated the timely delivery of crime related data and instituted twice-a-week meetings to review tactics and progress his commanders were experiencing on specific crime problems or issues involving ‘hot spots,’ the geographic areas of concern. Based largely the decline in the homicide rate, Bratton’s Compstat model was heralded as an effective deterrent to crime and adopted, in various forms, by other law enforcement agencies country wide (Silverman 1996; Remnick, 1997; Gurwitt, 1998; Mass, 1998; McDonald, 1998). A key component of Compstat involved the spatial representations of crime in specific areas. This required the conversion of data to points on a map which so that changes could be plotted for specific date ranges and displayed visually during Compstat meetings. Levitt (2004) maintains there were other factors at work which may have contributed to the perceived and actual reduction in crime that New York experienced under Bratton’s plan and is skeptical that
Compstat alone was responsible. During the same time period, and without a program like Compstat, Los Angeles and Washington D.C., experienced crime reduction on par with New York when the size of the respective departments is factored in (Thompson, 1997). In addition to a new police strategy, for example, stricter gun laws, additional police officers, the strong economy of the 90’s and changing demographics may have contributed to a decline in the crime rate in New York, as well as in the Nation (Moore, 2003; Levitt, 2004). While it is widely accepted that a variety of conditions can contribute to conditions of crime, Compstat represented a ‘strategic control system’ intended to gather and disseminate information on crime as well as to track police efforts to impact crime (Weisburd, Mastrofski, Greenspan, and Willis, 2004). It is unlikely that Compstat alone was responsible for all reported drops in crime but it is also unfair to look at broad societal changes which may have contributed to crime reduction in order to detract from what Compstat established. The Compstat model was founded as a strategic management tool that determined how data and information is managed through crime analysis of specific crime data in order to develop intelligence on crimes and to influence policy maker decisions related to resource allocation within police precincts. The idea of executive buy-in to a strategy supported from the top by Mayor Giuliani and coupled with the use of analytical tools to develop an efficient intelligence system is an important precedent to intelligence-led policing.

Chicago Police Community Oriented Police Initiative

As discussed earlier, the Chicago CAPS program was strictly modeled after the federal COPS program for developing a community-police bond. Concurrently, Chicago also employed Compstat-like methods in which information on crime was used to
develop intelligence that could be used in support of police operations. The Chicago Police Department implemented the Deployment Operations Center (DOC) in 2003, a unit charged with generating intelligence obtained through analysis of violent crime reports from throughout the City which was then dispersed among the city’s twenty five police Districts. The DOC efforts were aided by the development of the Illinois Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis system (I-CLEAR), an interactive database system which allowed officers to mine data from all police records through District terminals. As with Compstat, regular DOC meetings were conducted at headquarters to review operational progress on citywide violent crime. In 2007, the Department instituted the Crime Prevention Information Center (CPIC) to specifically address violent crime reduction and homeland security terrorist threat assessments (CPD 2007 Annual Report). The CPIC provides continuous assessment of data received from the field including data received from stationary cameras deployed throughout the city.

In 2008 the DOC meeting was modified slightly in order to focus on specific Districts during a weekly designated Crime Analysis Review (CAR) accountability meetings. During DOC and CAR meetings the only crimes addressed involved homicides and incidents of aggravated batteries in which victims were wounded or killed by handguns. This rationale was based on an intention to develop strategies to drive down gun related violence.

At these meetings the unit commanders of the focus Districts are required to explain and defend activities initiated to curb street level violence. Despite the restructuring and technology employed by the Department, both violent crime and homicides in 2008 have increased in Chicago when compared to the previous year’s numbers. This may indicate
that Compstat-like programs, while useful as a concept, fails as a construct as most of the literature dealing with Compstat relates only to program implementation and not to the results of the program (Moore, 1995). In reviewing the literature related to crime strategies, two common themes recur but are overlooked; (1) while crime analysis, to some degree takes place, analysts themselves actually assume the role of technicians who retrieve data produce maps that pinpoint hotspots (Osborne, 2006) and (2) the focus of each strategy is on an event or location, not the persons involved in the criminal act.

As part of the original COPS initiative, prosecutors were asked to "focus on the offender, not simply the specific offense, and impose individualized sanctions [such as] conflict resolution, treatment, counseling, and recreation programs" (Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994). Analysis in the use of Compstat in three cities suggested that some data is ‘invisible’ as Compstat focused on locations, not people, and included no mechanism for tracking individuals involved in crimes, such as domestic violence, who were likely to become repeat offenders (Willis, Mastrofski, Weisburd; 2003). In practice, ‘pointer systems’ such as the Drug Enforcement Agency’s (DEA) National Drug Pointer Index (NDPIX) have proven useful as a tool that identifies offenders who may be the subject of multiagency investigations since 1997 (Foster, 2005). Such indicators are often important to law enforcement to avoid embarrassing conflicts which can arise when two agencies, one federal and one local, for example, are investigating the same target. McDonald and Boland (2003) conducted a John Hopkins study which concluded the practices of the best police executives consistently used data for strategic decisions and integrated aspects from each of the existing strategies (COP, POP, Compstat) without regard to labeling successes under one enforcement approach.
Pattavina (2005) contends that through experimentation, the most effective policing results from integrating the strategies of COP, POP, and Compstat systematically and scientifically. It was the integration of best practices among the three strategies combined with the notion that a "focus on the offender, not simply the specific offense” might provide a better solution which remained unanswered under existing strategies that led to the concept of intelligence-led policing.

Intelligence-led Policing

One COPS office report first referenced “intelligence-led strategy” as a method that allowed decision makers to place resources where they would have the most impact on crime in 1994 (Gest, 2005, 2007). Since then, there has been considerable debate as to whether the notion of intelligence-led policing is actually an extension of existing problem oriented policing strategies. Several authors interpret Compstat, for example, as a tool that evolved from community policing because the methods used in each of the models were non-traditional (Daniels and Smith, 2001; Carter, 2004; Clarke, 2006). A similar argument considers intelligence-led policing to be grounded in the Compstat approach and, by association, to the earlier models of POP and COP which are considered to be proactive in that they seek to discover and inspect elements which may contribute to conditions in support of crime rather than relying on conventional police response to, and subsequent investigation of, a crime after the fact (Dannels and Smith, 2001).

Ratcliffe (2007) believes intelligence-led policing (ILP) resembles a hybrid model which includes elements of problem oriented policing and Compstat as intelligence-led policing involves the some of the analytical features of the former and the executive buy-
in of the later. Unlike either of the earlier models, ILP intentionally focuses on how key individuals are related to intelligence products which may have been derived from key incident analysis and requires intelligence analysis as a whole rather than specific crime analysis related to events. Earlier models devoted to crime prevention are restricted as they depend on limited data available from available sources. The ILP task requires that agencies be linked to other authorized law enforcement groups for additional information resources.

The element that connects each of the precursors to intelligence-led policing is the various use of analysis on many data sources to derive a better understanding of the circumstances surrounding criminality and to apply analysis to prolific offenders. An over reliance on law enforcement as the dominant sources of information related to incidents presents real limitations to effective intelligence analysis. Each step in the evolution of policing has required a better understanding of why all-source information and the development of intelligence related to crime incidents is important. All-source information is based on the collection of data from as many sources as possible in order to compensate for deficiencies related to single sources while benefitting from combined information as a whole (Lowenthal, 2006). All-source information includes information provided from confidential informants or from surveillance. Clark and Eck (2004) point out that an important step in intelligence-led policing is to emphasize the distinction between crime analysis (crime data) and intelligence analysis (all-source data).

At its current stage, intelligence-led policing is considered to be a managerial model for policing intended to disrupt, reduce, and prevent offender activity by combining criminal intelligence and crime analysis in order to direct resource decisions which are
focused on serious repeat offenders (Ratcliffe, 2008). This moves the focus and use of intelligence work from the realm of ad hoc case work to a larger field involving strategic planning and resource allocation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Standard model of policing</th>
<th>Community policing</th>
<th>Problem-oriented policing</th>
<th>Compstat</th>
<th>Intelligence-led policing</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Easily defined?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Fairly easy</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Fairly easy, but still evolving</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Easily adopted?</td>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>Difficult</td>
<td>At the technical level, but managerially challenging</td>
<td>Managerially challenging</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Orientation?</td>
<td>Police administrative units</td>
<td>Neighbourhoods</td>
<td>Problems</td>
<td>Police administrative units</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hierarchical focus?</td>
<td>Top down</td>
<td>As appropriate for the problem</td>
<td>Top down</td>
<td>Top down</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Who determines priorities?</td>
<td>Police management</td>
<td>Community concerns/demands</td>
<td>Police management from crime analysis</td>
<td>Police management from crime intelligence analysis</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Target?</td>
<td>Offence detection</td>
<td>Crime and disorder problems, and other areas of concern for police</td>
<td>Crime and disorder hot spots</td>
<td>Prolific offenders and crime problems, and other areas of concern for police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criteria for success?</td>
<td>Increased detections and arrests</td>
<td>Satisfied community</td>
<td>Reduction of problem</td>
<td>Lower crime rates</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Expected benefit?</td>
<td>Increased efficiency</td>
<td>Increased police legitimacy</td>
<td>Reduced crime and other problems</td>
<td>Reduced crime and other problems</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Generalized characteristics of five policing models (Ratcliffe 2008 ppg 72-23)

The resources devoted to intelligence-led policing are focused on prolific offenders and their criminal associations including affiliations, assets, and equipment employed in criminal enterprises. The central precept of intelligence-led policing is to focus on and incapacitate ‘criminal leaders’ who are initially identified by the fact that they have
extensive criminal records or occupy seats of authority in the hierarchy of gang structures (Flood, 2004).

The Relation Between Intelligence and Information in Policing

The research involving the meaning and use of intelligence is considerable and is growing (Odom, 2003; Johnson and Wirtz, 2004; Lowenthal, 2006, Masse, O’Neil, and Rollins 2008; Ratcliffe, 2005, 2008). Since the events of 9/11, interest in developing an understanding of the benefits of reliable intelligence has escalated. The goal of this review is not to be exhaustive, but rather to point out critical themes studied scholars in the context of intelligence and specifically intelligence-led policing.

The notion of ‘intelligence’ has always been within the police lexicon. The challenge to today’s law enforcement environment is that the concept and use of intelligence in policing has remained relatively unchanged since the inception of modern policing in early 19th century London when the Scotland Yard constabulary were charged with the primary responsibility of preventing crime (Mayne, 1829; Ratcliffe, 2008).

Existing practices regard intelligence in policing as a tactical instrument rather than either a process or product. Intelligence as a concept is an abstract idea and is generally defined by terms of usage, leading to predictable confusion as meaning is literally transformed by an activity which allows for several interpretations. For example, too often the word ‘intelligence’ is used interchangeably, and incorrectly, with the word ‘information.’ Information obtained from surveillance is commonly referred to as ‘intelligence’ because it is germane to an on-going investigation. Without the benefit of analysis, it is difficult to determine if such information is relevant to other investigations. It is possible, for example, that analysis of surveillance might reveal, as often happens,
that other law enforcement agencies are involved in the same investigation without any of the parties being aware of the other’s presence. Intelligence represents a special case of information and knowledge that has been analytically refined into a product that is operationally actionable in relation to an organization’s interests (Desouza and Vanapalli, 2005). Table 2 provides examples of data derived from police records to distinguish between information and intelligence. Erikson and Haggerty (2001) maintain the police obsession for reporting data, as with information listed below, does little more than drive internal audits and create redundancy, leaving little time for analysis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Information (related to an incident)</th>
<th>Intelligence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Criminal history or driving record</td>
<td>• Analyst report with conclusions based on the diverse information subjected to research methods which can be articulated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Case Reports</td>
<td>• Analysis of trends with conclusions based on variables subjected to statistical methods</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Informant statements</td>
<td>• Predictive analysis based on the assessment of information using regression on the elements of past experience</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Vehicle registration information</td>
<td>• Estimates on income from a criminal enterprise based on market and trafficking analysis of illegal commodities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Behavioral observations by an investigator or surveillance team</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Financial transaction records</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Travel records</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2. Carter, David L., (2004), Law Enforcement Intelligence, US Department of Justice, Office of Community Policing, p.11

In order to develop information into intelligence analysis is always required. Methods of analysis vary and the desired product, i.e., intelligence derived from analysis must be defined before analysis begins. As Table 2 indicates, intelligence is obtained after the analysis of information has been accomplished for a specific purpose. Predictive analysis, for example, is accomplished through the process of linear regression to provide
intelligence that will infer the likelihood of future events based on past experience. This technique is useful in the analysis of crime related to burglaries patterns in specific areas. Intelligence products used in policing include tactical and strategic intelligence.

Today’s technology has made it easier to gather and organize data which may be synthesized into information. This step is necessary as data, per se, should always be regarded as unbiased while information, to qualify as information, must be biased. Information represents data which has been synthesized, manipulated, processed or organized so as to present and contribute to specific, situational knowledge (Desouza and Hensgen, 2004). Information is then collected as the currency that produces intelligence (Carter, 2004).

The Chicago Police Department has effectively demonstrated the ability to collect data which is then disseminated through a variety of channels. From an operational perspective, some of this data is converted to information and presented by the Deployment Operations Center (DOC) through Deployment Intelligence Bulletins (DIBs) which recount calls for service or from the Detective Division’s Analysis Section as Detective Alerts that focus on possibly related crime patterns. In its present state, each of these products demonstrates that the dominant crime analytic activity is more a technique involving counting crime and providing unfiltered offender information to field operations personnel (Carter, 2004). This underscores a fundamental weakness in local law enforcement when crime analysts are required to continue to "count” crime far more often than they "analyze" it (O’Shea, 2003). Such practices represent the distinction between the ‘push-pull’ strategies commonly referred to in business literature. Push models are dependent on organizations getting the right resources to the right place at the
right time while pull models provide access to appropriate resources as needed (Hagel, 2005). In practice, law enforcement’s push-approach does not work well in practice in part because officers are required to act on communicated information, rather than intelligence, in response to dynamic or changing incidents (Higgins, 2004).

The Relation Between Analysis and Intelligence in Policing

The existing literature provides a number of ‘intelligence-cycle’ models intended to outline the relation of information and intelligence which leads to policy decisions and actionable knowledge (Odom, 2003; Johnson and Wirtz, 2004; Ratcliffe, 2008; Desouza and Hensgen, 2004; Masse, O’Neil, Rollins, 2008). Intelligence-cycle models are intended to demonstrate how empirical data received from a variety of sources is qualitatively channeled to information. It is information that is then analyzed through the lens of semantic (interpretive) and semiotic (contextual understanding) phases to determine its value as intelligence.

Intelligence-led policing subscribes to a 3i concept model which focused on three conditions and is intended to provide analysts and policy makers with an understanding of the relation between the sectors of the criminal environment, crime intelligence analyst, and the decision makers (Ratcliffe, 2008). The three conditions contributing to the ILP model reflect on the importance to holistically interpret, influence, and impact all sectors of the model in order to be successful. The New Jersey State Police adopted this model as an integral part of its intelligence-led policing initiative started in 2006 (NJSP2006). The model’s sectors are intentionally non-specific in order to avoid confusion as to the roles represented as they often vary. It is not uncommon for investigations to conclude at one phase while being continued at another at which time
the roles of the decision makers, analysts, or targets may change. The model emphasizes the activities within intelligence-led policing must be in concert; the elimination of impact (through action) despite interpretation through analysis or influence on decision makers to devote resources as the result of intelligence defeats the intent of intelligence-led policing.

Figure 1. The 3i model of ILP (Ratcliffe 2008 p 110)

Intelligence models, regardless of their format, are used to process data to information, information to intelligence, intelligence to knowledge, and knowledge to action. The heavy work related to the products of intelligence rest with the analyst who is required to sort through data in search of information of use by a specific audience. An analyst may be called on to provide incident specific intelligence for use in a tactical mission, to prioritize concerns within a region for an operational mission, or to provide intelligence assessments related to risks and resources requirements for large strategic missions (Scott, 2003). Police analysts are traditionally called upon to provide “criminal intelligence,” a product predicated on known data or information maintained in police files and related to activities which have been recorded in incident reports or arrests.
Crime analysis may use the products of police intelligence but requires data from multiple agencies, often outside local or regional jurisdictions, in order to be effective (Boba, 2005). Efficient crime analysis requires practitioners to have a wide range of skills that include technical and theoretical expertise, be self-directed, have an understanding of criminology and public administration, and insight into police operations (O’Shea and Nicholls, 2003; Osborne, 2005; IICA, 2005). Because the requirements for an efficient analyst are often found among personnel outside of law enforcement, the most important skill for an analyst to manage is the understanding the relationship between themselves and the decision makers (Nicholls, 2004).

The Chicago Police Organized Crime Division Perception of Intelligence

The Organized Crime Division (OCD) of the Chicago Police Department is comprised of three sections Gangs, Narcotics, and Gang Enforcement. In 2009 the Gang Enforcement section was created as the main tactical planning and operational arm of the OCD while the Gang and Narcotic sections operate with teams assigned to specific areas of the city. As such, Gang Enforcement oversees the activities of the three hundred personnel that make up the OCD. Additionally, Gang Enforcement co-ordinates, with local commanders, tactical operations involving an additional three hundred personnel assigned to the five Area Gang Teams located throughout the city. Teams are comprised of a set number of officers who are involved with incident investigations. For the Gangs section, incident investigations entail activities surrounding street level violence e.g., recent shootings or homicides, in which known gang members are involved. Narcotics section personnel focus on investigations involving street level narcotics trafficking. Both
sections rely on evidentiary materials obtained from surveillance techniques that are conducted physically or electronically.

In February of 2008, a new Superintendent was appointed for the Chicago Police Department. The individual chosen to lead the Department is a former Supervising Agent from the FBI who has suggested that among the new strategies he will adopt is one which is focused on the notion of ‘intelligence-based policing.’ Prior to and during the city’s budget hearings of 24 October 2009, the Superintendent referenced ‘intelligence-based policing’ as the basis for solutions to existing crime problems:

We need to focus on intelligence-based policing. We are not in a time when we can just throw more officers out throughout the city; we have to put officers on the right spots, we have to make sure they are addressing the right gangs.

Shortly after assuming control of the Department, the new Superintendent ordered OCD personnel to refrain from making non-essential arrests and to focus on collecting ‘intelligence’ related to the leadership among Chicago’s most active street gangs. Beyond this directive, there were no specific provisions on what constitutes intelligence or how materials or information collected by OCD personnel would be used, shared, or distributed. What is known is between the spring and fall of 2008, organizational changes intended to make the Department more effective have had no impact on homicides and the rate at which street level violence has escalated compared to previous years. In Chicago, whether the practices and products of intelligence-led policing can make a difference on crime, especially violent crime, are unknown. It is important that changes which will to occur under the new police administration be separated from problems associated with inefficiencies that endure through an ineffective belief system, a cultural problem which underscores the need for maintaining the status quo (Chakravorti, 2003).
Many of the critical factors associated with intelligence-led policing may provide a method which serves to impact existing crime conditions while steering the Department away from traditional response driven belief systems.

The next chapter outlines the methodology used in this research while examining the rationale behind the on-going dynamics related to current changes in the OCD. The data provided from interviews will be categorized as the basis for reporting results. The purpose of this research, as currently perceived, is to clarify the boundaries between the phenomenon of intelligence use in police work and real-life context by accessing police supervisor’s perception of the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing as a management tool intended to enhance the effectiveness of tasks related to intelligence processes used to address crime.
CHAPTER THREE

METHODOLOGY

This chapter describes the methodology to be used to conduct this research and is outlined according to specific sections. The first section describes the research strategy and rational for the methodology selected. Section two describes sampling used in anticipation of interviews with participants in the study. Section three describes the procedures related to data collection and is followed by the final section which provides an overview of the research plan to be used in this study.

The research design for this project is based on case studies involving the use of intelligence products and processes in policing by Chicago’s Organized Crime Division (OCD).

In the extant police literature devoted to information gathering and sharing and the use of intelligence products and processes, as a phenomenon, the notion of intelligence-led policing has generated considerable interest. The Chicago Police Department has recently been restructured with particular attention and reorganization given to the Organized Crime Division with the specific direction of the Department’s Superintendent to employ ‘intelligence-driven’ police methods. The OCD is directly involved with the investigation of gang crimes involving street level violence and with criminal narcotics activities that fund on-going criminal enterprises. As a crucial part of the strategies and
tactics used to address these issues, the OCD is dependent on current and accurate intelligence products to enhance their operational effectiveness.

As currently perceived, the purpose of this research is to clarify the boundaries between the phenomenon of intelligence use in police work and real-life context by accessing police supervisor’s perception of the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing as a management philosophy intended to enhance the effectiveness of tasks related to intelligence processes used to address crime.

Intelligence is the product of information and analysis and has recently been considered as the basic tool for a management model that directs policing strategies rather than merely supporting policing tactics. This study investigates the contemporary phenomenon of intelligence in police work from its real life context and explores critical factors in the model of intelligence-led policing through an assessment of how these factors are perceived by supervisors and decision makers of the Chicago Police Department’s Organized Crime Division.

**The Research Strategy**

This research involves case studies which will be subjected to inductive qualitative analysis and assessment on themes derived from semi-structured interviews and observation of police supervisors involved in decision-making tasks that require the use of intelligence products and processes. Interviews will be conducted with 12-17 supervisors, as content experts, on the use of intelligence processes, from the three
unit sections of OCD (Gang Enforcement, Gang Investigations, and Narcotics). Critical factors are derived from literature review and will be modified during the process of in-depth interviews and comparative, inductive analysis.

The difficulty in this research centers on the meaning of intelligence (processes and product). An emphasis will be made to provide insight into the experiences and motivations which drive intelligence related practices as well as to examine the perceived measure of success attributed to these practices in police work and the activities which result through the use of intelligence.

The researcher contends the intelligence related practices by which supervisors develop and define their critical tasks contribute to the effectiveness of their missions and ultimately to the understanding and perception of the use of intelligence in police work, particularly in crime prevention. If supervisors understand and define intelligence related activities in a manner which differs from those required for a predictive or proactive response, emergent, rather than desired consequences are likely to impact their effectiveness. The researcher intends to introduce insight on the practice of an Intelligence-led Policing strategy for the purpose of investigating whether supervisors perceive the critical factors of ILP as useful to current intelligence related police tasks. This research will incorporate semi-structured interviews with supervisors of the OCD and insight on the topic of Intelligence-led Policing drawn from the extant literature and existing practices outside the CPD.
Research Methods

This study is oriented in qualitative research. Qualitative research has been described as a naturalistic study conducted through prolonged contact with ‘field’ situations which typically reflect the everyday life and the explicit and implicit rules that govern that life (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The approach in this research is through case studies that represent the in-depth study of instances of a phenomenon in a natural context from the perspective of participants involved in the phenomenon (Gall, Gall, and Borg, 2003). Yin (1994) defines case studies as empirical (observable) inquiry that investigates a phenomenon in a natural setting when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are unclear. An overriding feature of qualitative case studies involves the flow of events, observations, data collection which continue to emerge during the research (Miles and Huberman, 1994). This research, which investigates the use of intelligence in police work from within a Division of the Chicago Police Department, meets the criteria for case studies. Case studies are considered ‘naturalistic’ when they represent naturally occurring, ordinary events. In addition to the choice of method, a review of sociological and anthropological literature related to research methods was conducted (Geertz, 1973; Yin, 1994; Wenger, 1998; Gall et al 2003).

The primary method for data collection in this research involves semi-structured interviews used to refine and develop an understanding of how respondents view the use of intelligence in police work as well as to examine existing practices involving sources, meanings, and analytics related to the use of intelligence used by police.
Interview questions using this method are initially semi-structured but allow for open-form questions to be added in order to obtain additional information (Gall et al, 2003). This method is best suited for this research as more structured methods of interviews can preclude the opportunity of probing for deeper understanding of the matter under investigation (Miles and Huberman, 2004). The use of semi-structured interviews allow for responses to be classified according to the focus of the interview while the aspect of open-form provides for more sustained dialogue between the researcher and interview participants which leads to more contextual information and the possibility for more insight into the phenomenon being explored. Semi-structured interviews will be conducted to collect data from key informants, i.e., supervisors, who have specialized knowledge of how intelligence in police work is developed and used. The questions developed for this interview are provided in Appendix III which represents an interview guide for the interview sessions. Specifically, this research investigates whether the model of Intelligence-led Policing will be perceived by OCD decision makers as an effective strategy to combat crime related problems beyond those of the existing practices. This research will focus on what, how, and when tasks related to the use of intelligence, as a phenomenon, are managed by supervisors within the OCD. Descriptions will be based on naturally occurring data provided through participant observation and interview of what is routine and ordinary in police tasks requiring intelligence products. The interconnectivity of subject categories and activities from this research will be drawn to study how they are layered together and relate to the complexity of the phenomenon of intelligence use in policing.
Gall et al (2003) emphasize the important requirement of entry to properly identified sites and as well as the necessity to work with ‘gatekeepers’ who authorize permission to allow research interviews to take place. The Chicago Police Department is a quasi-military organization divided into bureaus. The Organized Crime Division (OCD) is a subset of the Bureau of Investigative Services and is managed by a Chief, Deputy Chief, and three commanders who oversee the Gang, Narcotics, and Intelligence units. During the initial stages of this study, the researcher outlined the intention and requirements to interview to each of these respective personnel within the Command Staff and was encouraged to proceed. A series of Command changes took place following the granting of required permission during which all of the key personnel of the Command Staff of OCD was reassigned. The major Command changes effecting OCD occurred in October and were repeated in November. Although this has been problematic, it represents the challenge of readdressing the intention of this research to the new chain of command.

The notion of access in existing literature is often brief and skimmed over, in part because it is presumed; it is mentioned here as part of the anticipatory phase of the research development.

Sampling

The sampling for this research is purposeful and represents management-supervisory personnel from within the Organized Crime Division (OCD) who have experience with the use of current intelligence products and results related to those products. These personnel are from three sections of the OCD: Gangs, Narcotics, and Gang Enforcement. These personnel are directly impacted by any benefit derived from the use of intelligence
products. The OCD is comprised approximately three hundred personnel who are managed, at the decision making level, by seventeen (17) supervisors of the rank of lieutenant or above. Optimally, the researcher expects to conduct between ten (10) and fifteen (15) sets of interviews from this sample. When appropriate, the researcher may interview sergeants from OCD management because they work closely with decision makers in designing and implementing intelligence strategies. Sampling is based on selecting a portion of the population that is representative of the entire population under study and is comprised of individuals who represent the entire population in terms of specific characteristics (Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Specifically, this research explores the concept of the meaning and use of the intelligence phenomenon in police work by the Organized Crime Division (OCD). The subjects for sampling in this study are purposive and based on reputational case selection as selected personnel possess special insight into how intelligence processes are managed within the specific setting of the OCD.

In this research, administrative, operational, and tactical supervisors of the Department’s Organized Crime Division are interviewed. Supervisors include sworn police personnel above the rank of sergeant who participate in administrative, operational, and tactical tasks. Exempt rank members i.e., the Chief, the Deputy Chief, and Commanders are involved in strategic decisions effecting the Division operations. Personnel of this rank are selected on their respective experience and demonstrated ability to lead in accordance with Department guidelines. The lieutenants and sergeants are responsible for the tactical execution of operations in accordance with the Division’s strategic vision. Personnel at this level of management succeed to their rank based on
standardized Department promotional testing and are assigned to the Organized Crime Division at the discretion of the exempt ranks. This sample provides a cross section of police engaged in intelligence work from a variety of perspectives. Exempt rank members, for example, have generally been involved in a number of positions throughout their careers and have a good sense of Department protocols and how to manage within the system while sergeants may have as little as five years on the Department, are less articulate in their explanations of strategic decisions and are more focused on tactical results. For this study, the subjects selected for interview are ‘observational choices.’ Observational choices contribute to theory in that the facts they present in interview are used to analyze patterns and relationships associated with the concept under study (Miles and Huberman, 1994). This sampling allows for a broad range of perspectives and rich feedback about the use of intelligence by police.

**Data Collection**

Data collection represents an on-going process that commences during the anticipatory design phase of quantitative research and continues beyond the initial interview phase; it is emergent and developing as data collected at one point can be used for other data activities (Gall, et al, 2003). Data used in this research is provided from interviews with key personnel who have direct knowledge related to the use of intelligence in policing. The knowledge contributed from these sources is founded in their explicit and tacit experiences. Explicit experiences provide the general knowledge base related to individual backgrounds and contribute to the ‘how’ interviewees succeeded to their respective positions in the OCD. Tacit experiences are specific to the
individual and provide personal perspectives, including subjective insight and intuition, and contribute to the subject’s perception of meaning (Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995). The formative data collected from interviews on the use of intelligence in policing contribute to thick descriptions, i.e. statements which recreate a situation (use of intelligence in policing), as much of its context as possible, while providing meaning or intentions inherent to the situation (Gall, et al, 2003; Miles and Huberman, 1994; Geertz, 1973).

Data collection will be conducted ‘on-site’ at the offices of the Organized Crime Division. Authorization for interviews will be part of the anticipatory phase in data collection and comes from the exempt rank personnel of the OCD. The physical site at which interviews will be conducted is the police facility housing the OCD offices; a multi-storied office building with secured access provided by on-duty officers and biometric locks to which the researcher must obtain permission for entry. Interviews will be conducted in meeting rooms or in supervisor’s offices; meeting rooms are preferable as they provide fewer possibilities for distraction. The interview calendar will be arranged according to supervisor schedules and take into account furloughs (vacation periods) and watch assignments (days or afternoons).

In addition to interviews, secondary sources of information will be used in this study. These sources include documents, direct observation, existing statistics, and physical artifacts. Documents include open source material from newspaper articles related to changes in Departmental organization and strategies and non-classified administrative policy documents. Documents are useful in making inferences about events (Yin, 1994; Stakes 1995). Direct observations provide first hand experience related to a working
environment and exhibited behaviors. The inspection of existing physical artifacts, including those of technology, used for the acquisition or development of intelligence provides insight into organizational practices.

Interviews will be tape recorded. Prior to interview, the subjects will be provided documentation related to issues of anonymity, confidentiality, and the manner in which recordings are maintained, stored, and eventually discarded. These measures are important and help to gain the confidence of the respondent in order to minimize any possible undesirable effects of having the interview recorded (Gall et al, 2003). Potential respondents will be provided with an informed consent document, a written outline which summarizes the aims of this research, how interviews will be conducted, the benefits and risks of participation, how results will be reported, and how confidentiality of the information provided in interviews will be maintained. Confidentiality will be maintained by using coded numbers rather than names for record identification. Identifiable references to other persons during interviews will be masked in documents produced from interviews. Because the decision to participate in this research is voluntary, potential respondents will be advised they have the option to withdraw from interview at any time.

Interview sessions are expected to last approximately forty minutes during which time questions from the interview guide will be covered. Tape recording speeds the interview process because it eliminates extensive note taking and may be studied in greater depth as tapes provide a complete verbal record which can not practically be obtained from note taking (Gall et al, 2003). Tape recordings will subsequently be
transcribed fully to facilitate data analysis. Based on the researcher’s work related experience, the interviewer expects that forty minutes of recording will require approximately four hours of transcription. The amount of data collected per case will include that which is necessary to address questions raised in interview and sufficient enough to exhaust source information or saturate categories which emerge.

Existing observational research literature discusses the relationship between the observer and those observed and borrows the terms emic and etic from the field of anthropological studies (Pike, 1967; Geertz, 1973; Galls et al, 2004; Miles and Huberman, 1994). Each term relates to accounts of the researcher’s perspective and descriptions of data related to an observed group with emic descriptions accounting for actions, beliefs, or viewpoints of an individual group member (native) to whom an action has meaning while etic descriptions accounting for the viewpoints and beliefs of an outside observer who interprets meaning. In this study, the researcher enjoys a distinct relation from both perspectives in that he has participated as an actor within the group and has insight into the procedures and language used in the context of police culture. Concurrently, the researcher’s educational experiences provides an opportunity to observe the group as an ‘outsider’ with viewpoints and beliefs, based on an academic review of the relevant literature, as a criteria, related to the use of intelligence in policing which is applicable, in a more general sense, to the law enforcement community.

Data Analysis

The structure of the interviews in these case studies will provide the basis for coding through the responses to each question as they indicate patterns in information. Patterns
provided through interview assist in developing themes that are either manifest (empirical) or latent, i.e., subject to later categorization related to the phenomenon of intelligence use in police work. Themes for coding will be developed as patterns are uncovered, within and across data, which helps organize information and the interpretation of the phenomenon under study. Information will be coded as developing themes are qualified by causal relationships. Consistency in judgment on the part of the researcher will be the basis for of thematic reliability. Where useful, some statistical analysis will be used to determine theme and coding validity.

Data collected for this research will be analyzed using categorical protocols and presented in accordance to their fit as various police intelligence components. The essence of content analysis is the coding of documented evidence and nested messages into categories (Gall et al, 2003). Interviews are used to improve the conceptualization of police intelligence components by contributing to attribute lists and categories for each of the components and these components are coded as criteria for data analysis. This involves the organization of data into categories. A category is a construct which refers to certain phenomenon present within the context of a study while a construct is inferred from an observed phenomenon, e.g., co-operation (Gall et al, 2003). Categories are unique but can be subdivided according to the properties and dimensions found during analysis. Miles and Huberman (1994) use an analogy of categories to bins that contain many discrete events or recorded behaviors. The interrelationship of these bins helps construct a conceptual framework. Coding involves the analytical processes through which data are fractured, conceptualized, and integrated to form theory (Strauss and
Corbin, 1998). In this research, recorded responses to interviews will be analyzed deductively to obtain discrete, key themes that are relevant and specific to individual categories. The inspection and analysis of the content provided through interview will reveal messages within the content itself. Thematic code analysis will be used to inspect themes which emerge during analysis of interviews for the purpose of gauging the frequency of themes and similarities between users in use of themes.

Data to be analyzed will be structured using a pre-defined coding template developed in accordance with accepted guidelines (Miles and Huberman: 1994; Gall et al, 2004). Codes will be constructed from definitions related to intelligence use by police, its components, and critical factors or activities related to the components of the use of intelligence in policing. Critical factors include, for example, the use of analysis techniques associated with developing intelligence from information, sources of information, and technologies used to refine information from data. Categories will be determined deductively from expected responses of the police use of intelligence before data is applied. Data collected from sources will then be examined inductively for evidence in order to assign the data to categories. Accordingly, relevant information from interviews or other sources, e.g., documents, will be allocated to a code. This process is repeated for each category assigned to the data. One question representing a segment of an interview might be coded as an instance involving multiple categories. For example, a response to a question on the value of intelligence in policing might reveal that the respondent is unclear on what constitutes intelligence, who administers intelligence activities, and is content to accept data that is routinely provided as intelligence by the
Department because she believes the cycle is unbreakable and has provided data that can be coded in several categories such as meaning, information sources, and management actions. Once data are coded they will be analyzed for properties or dimensions that indicate patterns such as when specific or similar responses occur. Additionally, analysis may indicate that the conclusion of one case can provide information which needs to be replicated in other cases leading to literal replication to ‘fill-in the blanks’ that helps explain the conditions under which a particular phenomenon is likely to be found. For each individual case, the report should indicate how and why a particular behavior was, or was not, demonstrated. Across cases, reports will indicate the extent to which this replication logic was used and why, in such instances, case results could be predicted (Yin 2003). The researcher will use a second coder for coding purposes during a review of a sample pilot interview in order to check for consistency in interpretation and analysis. It is expected that during this phase, additional categories may be uncovered while others may be revised.

As multiple sources related to the police use of intelligence will be examined in this study, data types may be compared for corroboration or ‘bracketing’ in the research findings (Miles and Huberman, 1994). The result of multiple instances of the same or very similar findings from different sources, especially while using different methods of analysis, lends itself to reliability (though not validity) of the study. This is a function of good data collection when it is verified and checked against other data. Miles and Huberman (1994) state that corroborating methods are sometimes referred to as
triangulation and explain that such results come from the practice of good analytical
induction.

Concerns for validity and reliability are addressed by methods used in data collection
and analysis. Validity related to the interview instrument will be accomplished by having
two police supervisors who are not involved in interviews review the document. Under
these conditions, validity means simply that data sought should represent what we expect
them to represent. Additionally, these supervisors may be asked to participate in pilot
studies in order to access timing expectations or to add to and refine the interview
instrument before it is administered. Construct validity will be obtained through cross
checking the multiple sources of data previously discussed and by having key
respondents review drafts of written findings. Explanations provided during data analysis
are expected to contribute to the content validity of this study.

Reliability issues are concerned with the accuracy and comprehensiveness of
collected data and relates to the expectation that anyone investigating the data provided
would find the same phenomenon existing in the same or similar settings. A study’s
internal reliability is strengthened by consistency in the administration of the research
protocol or methods and through robust documentation to support them (Yin, 1994).

In addition to the listed sources of data in this research, information from field notes
made during interviews will be added to the descriptions. This can uncover similarities in
phases, thematic relationships, isolated patterns of behavior and action, or generalization
which contribute to formalized knowledge on the use of intelligence in police work.
At the conclusion of the empirical phase of this dissertation, the concept of intelligence in police work will be refined in accordance to the data collected and analyzed from interviews and relevant documents. Additionally, data collected in interview related to the construct on the critical factors of intelligence-led policing will be examined.

**Research Plan**

Table 3, presented at the end of this chapter, represents an outline of the research plan used in this study. This plan involves the interview of between eight and fourteen supervisory personnel from within the Chicago Police Department’s Organized Crime Division in order to provide exploratory support on the use the phenomenon of intelligence use in policing as well as assessment data. Additionally, the critical practices related to the use of intelligence in policing will be investigated. The selection of sample is purposeful and in order to capture an array of interpretations, observations, and practices in intelligence used by police while providing a degree of consistency for cross interview analysis. The single criteria involved in the selection of this sample is that supervisors have a minimum of three years experience in the use intelligence products used for policing or five or more years experience is tasks related to the processes associated with the use of intelligence in policing. Formal educational requirements for this group will generally require a minimum if a bachelor’s degree, in any discipline, because that stage of education is required for rank. Several of the prospective respondents have attended advanced training sessions which cover an array of administrative and tactical subjects related to police operations.
How this Research will be Accomplished

The first requirement for the initiation of this project involves permission of the co-operating institution, i.e., the Chicago Police Department. Permission to conduct this research is required for two principle reasons. First, it is a requirement of the Institutional Review Board (IRB). Secondly, the Department, as an organization, requires a standard of due diligence which, as a concept, involves the activities in this research so as to comply with provisions for a certain standard of care, i.e., a degree of prudence to which this research will be bound. In this instance, it is reasonable to expect the Department be concerned with its own image as well as that of sworn personnel who may participate in this study.

In January of 2009, the researcher met with the current Chief of Organized Crime to present the concepts, as currently perceived, involved in this project as well as to discuss the feasibility and interest of his section for the proposed research. The researcher learned the OCD was particularly interested in developing their capacity for using intelligence processes but operational responsibilities and considerations had precluded their ability to pursue this interest in a timely manner. A brief description of this project was forwarded to the Department’s legal affairs division and subsequently to the Department’s research and development section. In March of 2009, the research and development section requested a copy of the actual proposal as well as a copy of the IRB approval page.

This presents a minor dilemma or Catch-22 in the process as the IRB requires a letter of co-operation from the Department which, in turn, requires a copy of IRB approval prior to issuing a letter of co-operation. The researcher expects this problem to be
resolved administratively after discussing the situation with his Committee Chair. This issue is presented in this section as it illustrates a phase of the dissertation process which is crucial and must be addressed before the intended methodologies of research may be applied; it is a principle key to access for academic and the intended research population.

Silverman and Marvasti (2008), note that the point of qualitative research is to say a lot about a little. Qualitative research begins with thorough descriptions; in this instance, data that describe the use of intelligence process and products and their associative behaviors from the perspective of OCD practitioners themselves. One key example is the manner in which intelligence products are informally shared within an agency. Qualitative studies have emphasized that informal sharing of information, rather than information sharing through more formal structured channels, is a social behavior that indicates a lack of faith or purpose in current information exchange systems. Descriptions in qualitative research are intended to be ‘rich’ in detail and ‘thick’ in description to provide insight into the social and physical settings in which the generation and use of intelligence occurs as well to describe the social and individual factors which influence behaviors.

The use of semi-structured questions provides an opportunity for respondents to communicate, in their own words, and based on their own experience, answers to what, when, and how, activities related to intelligence gathering and sharing occurs.

Prospective respondents will be told in advance the expected duration of the interview sessions. A Pilot interview which lasted forty minutes indicated the session could be completed within one hour. Interviewees will be given the opportunity to review a
consent form which explains their participation is voluntary and confidential and that the interview will be digitally recorded. Participants must sign-off on the consent form prior to interview. The researcher will also maintain notes related to observations during the interview.

**Research Techniques**

Completed interviews will be transferred to a secure computer under the exclusive control of the researcher. Once the transfer is completed, the original recording will be erased from the recording device. Each interview will be stored in a computer file identified by a random code generated by a computer program. A copy of the code-identified interview will then be digitally stripped of all information related to the interviewee’s identity. This copy will be electronically sent to a transcribing service from which the researcher has a confidentiality agreement.

The researcher will use Qualrus™ software to store, code, retrieve, and analyze completed interviews. This software assists in organizing and identifying patterns within the coded data and observations. Data is coded according for properties or dimensions that indicate patterns or emergent themes. Information from secondary data sources, e.g., policy documents or existing statistics, will be combined with interview data and used with this software in support of the focus and triangulate on data of this assessment study.

The research plan and observational guide illustrated in Figure 3 is intended as an initial guide to this research for the purpose of proceeding in a structured fashion. Observations produce background data related to the setting in which interviews will take
place. The guide includes the goals and, as currently perceived, the expected results of this study.

Table 3: Research Plan and Observational Guide

| Aims and Objectives: (Note aims refer to the overall results this study intends to achieve while objectives include specific activities use to achieve the aim.) | 1. To obtain a practitioner’s insight on the construct of intelligence use in policing tasks by members of a population representing supervisor/decision makers of the Chicago Police Department’s Organized Crime Division.  
2. Determine what the practitioners are trying to accomplish and how they are doing it.  
3. Elicit the attributes of the components of intelligence as they relate to and are used in police tasks.  
4. Explore the definition of intelligence in policing as a construct.  
5. Examine the attributes of intelligence used in policing tasks as defined through this study.  
6. Explore the evidence presented through observation for indicators or themes related meaning and behavior involving intelligence related tasks in policing.  
7. Assess how the critical factors of Intelligence-led Policing are perceived by members of the Chicago Police Department’s Organized Crime Division (OCD). |
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unit of Analysis</td>
<td>Based at the organizational level; individuals involved in the development and definition of the intelligence process employed by the OCD.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Number of Cases</td>
<td>Eleven (11)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Type of Replication</td>
<td>Literal: the same or similar results are expected from each interview (Yin 1991)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Data Collection</td>
<td>Semi-structured interviews with supervisors of the OCD who are experienced in the use of intelligence activities in policing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Triangulation</td>
<td>Documents and data on intelligence practices of the OCD or in relevant literature on the use of intelligence policing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connections</td>
<td>Observe the relationship between the setting and personnel involved with intelligence work in policing to determine whether change is likely to occur.</td>
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| Expected Results | 1. Examine the opportunity for refining the concept of intelligence as it applies to police work.  
2. Prepare a refined list of attributes for the components to be used in policing.  
3. Examine whether the critical factors of Intelligence-led Policing, as perceived by supervisors of the OCD can contribute to their objectives for strategic planning. |
An overriding objective of this study is to provide a tool which serves as the basis for continued research. The notion of intelligence in policing will be a critical concern for future law enforcement agencies; it is not a question as to if or when steps towards a robust and routinely used information management system, unique to police needs, and dedicated towards the development of intelligence work will be as common as squad cars.

Several companies are currently managing existing business software products to conform to police needs, especially in the field of analysis. IBM®, for example, is in the process of acquiring software companies whose products involve applications for predictive modeling. Such software is useful in business but can be refined for police uses in managing the huge amounts of data that law enforcement agencies collect.

In addition the private sector’s interest in developing analytic tools for police, several universities are involved in developing curriculum and applications centered on the needs for analysis and analytics in the public sector. Dr. Dave Carter of Michigan State has designed a degree program for analytics for use in the public sector and been involved with initiatives to promote the use of analysis in police work. Dr. Jerry Ratcliffe of Temple was instrumental in assisting the New Jersey State Police move to an intelligence-led approach for all their work while continuing to champion the business model for Intelligence-led policing.

As fiscal restraints hinder hiring and contribute to lay-offs among police agencies, law enforcement is compelled to work smarter. Intelligence-led policing may prove to be a good place to start.
CHAPTER FOUR
RESEARCH

This chapter describes the research conducted and is organized in the following sections: a description of and rationale for the interviews and questions used in this multi-case study, the coding methods employed, and the analysis of additional questions generated through the exploratory investigation involved in this research.

Qualitative research and analysis begins with descriptions (Patton, 1990, 2006; Yin, 2004). The initial phase of this section focuses on descriptions while interpretations of these descriptions and observations appear later in this chapter.

This general case, supported by the case interviews, is provided with the general public interest in mind. The extant literature on Intelligence-led Policing provides a number of ‘how-to’ guides but does not address express viability as to whether the model is generalizeable for agencies which may wish to learn of or adopt the model. From a practical sense, this study has underlying national implications for police agencies as a ‘starting point’ i.e., for considerations which must be addressed prior to committing to the changes that are required to adopt an Intelligence-led Policing model as a tool intended to anticipate and prevent crime at any jurisdictional level. Since 2001, many agencies have adopted variations of intelligence gathering-sharing models to augment the services related to national security with the assumption that local law enforcement would benefit
as a by-product of such endeavors. The issues related to such a notion will be addressed in the subsequent chapter.

For this research, a computer assisted qualitative data analysis software (CAQDAS) program was used to facilitate the use of qualitative data. After reviewing several software applications available for this task, the researcher chose the Qualrus™ program to assist in managing the unstructured data from interviews which required analysis. As a qualitative research tool, the program falls into a category of products used for CAQDAS such as ATLAS™ and NVivo™. Each of these programs allows the researcher to collect and group qualitative data which may then be coded, categorized, linked, and tested for relationships.

Qualrus™ employs case-based reasoning which is centered on the premise that the coding of text segments can be facilitated by identifying comparable segments (those similar to the segment being coded) in order to adjust codes of the comparable text segments to indicate differences between them and the segment being coded. The practice of case-based reasoning is similar to, for example, when lawyers employ case law to apply reason about new cases based on similar cases from past court decisions.

The practice of coding a case study is an arduous task. Coding the data collected through case study interviews is a technique that aids in the identification of the concepts and will be discussed in greater detail in the Interview section of this chapter. Coding of text segments requires the constant and repeated review of the all data collected from each interview; it is a dynamic and fluid process. Case-based reasoning requires code revisions so that codes are in agreement, i.e., so that they may be grouped in categories
which relate to specific characteristics within coded text segments. This process is similar to pattern matching.

Permission to conduct interviews was received from the Chicago Police Department’s Legal Affairs Department on 29 October 2009. Upon receiving this authorization, potential interviewees were contacted via an e-mail list provided by personnel of the Department’s Organized Crime Division. Each respondent received the same solicitation (Appendix B). In all, seventeen supervisory personnel, the majority of who were of the rank of lieutenants and above (90%) were invited to participate in this study. In response to this solicitation, eleven respondents committed to interview. Interviews were arranged to accommodate the schedules of the respondents and were held at the respective offices of each respondent during November 2009. Access to the secured location where the interviews were to be held was pre-arranged between the respondents and the researcher.

Each interview began with the researcher providing potential respondents with Consent to Participate forms (Appendix C) that outlined the purpose of the interview, the steps which would be taken during interview, and informed each respondent that their participation was voluntary and confidential. The researcher provided a copy of the confidentiality agreement (Appendix D), signed by Superintendent Jody Weis, authorizing this research project. As a condition of proceeding with the interview, each respondent was required to sign and date the consent form given them. One hundred per cent of the respondents complied with the conditions of the form and consented to be interviewed for this research study.
The Pilot Study and Interview Protocol Adaptation

Prior to conducting the formal interviews that provided the data used for this project, the researcher conducted a Pilot Study with Organized Crime Division (OCD) supervisory personnel who were not intended for inclusion in the actual study. The formative aspect of the Pilot Study allowed the researcher to develop a focused, more relevant line of questioning that assisted in the clarification of the project’s conceptual design. For example, during the Pilot Study it became apparent that some of the language used in the interview questions required clarification for a common understanding between the respondent and the interviewer. When the interviewee was asked for an explanation of the role of ‘criminal intelligence’ among practices within the OCD, the response indicated the interviewee believed ‘criminal intelligence’ meant intelligence activities conducted by criminals, a practice more generally referred to as counter-intelligence.

During the Pilot Study, empirical observations demonstrated that terms such as ‘intelligence’ and ‘information’ were commonly used interchangeably without a distinction while activities involving ‘analysis’ and ‘incident counting’ were perceived as merely different descriptions of the same process. In order to avoid this type of confusion during the actual interview sessions, the researcher modified the questioning protocol to provide concept definitions of terms prior asking questions which would include any specific term. These changes allowed the researcher to adapt the interview protocol to better suit the requirements of the interviewees so that they would be more comfortable
with the terms being discussed and less likely to feel they were being ‘tested’ on terminology with which they were unfamiliar.

As a result of the Pilot Case, the researcher gained additional empirical insight as to how the issues under study should be presented during the actual interview sessions. This insight, coupled with the continued review of the pertinent extant literature, contributed to the relevancy of interview protocol used in this study.

**Interviews**

Eight of the focused interviews were conducted at various locations within a century old building that once served as a huge commercial office complex. The original occupants had relocated and the property was acquired by City which, in turn, made the property available for City agencies. The remaining interviews were conducted at other police facilities from which the respondents conducted their respective duties.

The individual offices of the respondents at the main building were arranged at the core of the building so that none of the offices had any windows. Throughout the complex, walls were painted halfway up in an industrial light blue-grey color and then a pale cream from where the grey ended up to the ceiling. The floors were tiled throughout the office areas in a commercial grade light blue and off white vinyl composition tile arranged in a checkerboard pattern. Offices were furnished with modular desks, metal file cabinets in black, grey, or beige and a variety of mismatched desk chairs. It is apparent that overall, most of the furnishings that populate the building and offices of the main buildings where interviews were conducted are second-hand and worn; they were
‘contributed’ from other City agencies or departments whose budgets had allowed for new furnishings.

Offices were frequently ‘personalized’ by the respondents. In some cases, an interviewee’s office contained a television tuned to a local news channel. Many offices displayed artifacts from other police agencies; one popular collection with many of the responding supervisors included headgear of both National and International police agencies. Often, these were mementos from agencies with which the respondent had worked or trained. Other trappings that adorned many of the offices included sports items reflecting a respondent’s allegiance to local teams with northsiders favoring the Cubs and southsiders favoring the Sox. Pictures on display in some of the offices were consistently of two types; familial, showing kids and vacation shots or professional, showing respondents, often at award presentations, with high-ranking Department members from the current or past administrations. While the majority of those interviewed held college degrees and 23% of the respondents held graduate degrees, no diplomas were displayed in any of the respondent’s offices.

The interview protocol (Appendix A) used for this research was based on a focused interview approach during which a conversational manner is used while asking open-ended questions to corroborate the practices of the respondents who are engaged in the use of intelligence to accomplish their respective police tasks. This research used a question-and-answer format to report on the responses from this multiple-case study by using the same question set to cover the case study from the perspective of individual
respondents. This is done purposefully to fuse and integrate responses from all the interviews and arrange them around the topics presented by the interview protocol.

This initial question served a number of purposes. Without qualifying what is meant by the term ‘intelligence’ the respondents are open to provide insight on their perspective of the importance and, if applicable, the use of ‘intelligence’ in accomplishing police tasks. The interviewee’s perception is an important element of the interview as perception directs the respondent’s response.

The researcher contends the intelligence related practices by which supervisors develop and define their critical tasks contribute to the effectiveness of their missions and ultimately to the understanding and perception of the use of intelligence in police work, particularly in crime prevention. If supervisors understand and define intelligence related activities in a manner which differs from their peers or those required for a predictive or proactive response, emergent, rather than desired consequences are likely to impact their effectiveness. Emergent consequences included those which were not anticipated.

Responses to the first question provided broad insight into how the supervisors interpret the concept of intelligence in police work. The term ‘intelligence’ can refer to either a process or a product and, in either instance, involves the management of information. For example, the development of intelligence through analysis is an important part of the Intelligence-led Policing model. The responses to the first question provide the starting point for an interpretation on whether the supervisors are comfortable with the use of the term ‘intelligence’ being used in conjunction with police work.
The excerpts from interviews below state the main theme of individual responses to the interview protocol questions and are intentionally provided in this format for this section. This format allows the reader to make immediate cross-comparisons for each question posed. A complete set of respondent answers is provided in Appendix E. Responses to the questions below are followed by a brief analysis of the response. An interrater reliability analysis using the Cohen’s Kappa statistic was performed to determine consistency among codes and appears in Appendix F.

**Data Corpus**

One issue of qualitative research which is a source of discussion concerns how much data should be coded (Saldana, 2009). One approach is to code everything, all recorded fieldwork, so as not to miss some nuance which may contribute to a better understanding and insight into the social meaning of the phenomenon under study. Others contend that only the most salient sections of the data require coding. This research will endeavor to code portions of the data which are of necessary and sufficient quality to address the research questions.

The first set of questions is explanatory and uses an analytical technique to establish pattern matches among the responses in order to build an explanation about the case. A concept is an idea which develops from, and is applied to, a specific set of circumstances. The idea that intelligence can be used in policing may be established through interviews that directly address whether the term ‘intelligence’ is part of the police lexicon. The interviews provide empirical, experiential facts which represent phenomenon. Explaining the phenomenon of ‘intelligence in police work,’ requires the development of causal links
about what is happening (Yin 2009). These links will provide the basis for recommendations in the next chapter. Pertinent responses will be grouped as themes identified throughout the interviews. Themes are developed from the context of the responses and can be identified by a use of common word repetition, comparative contrasts among and between statements which relate to common experience, elements of social control (hierarchies) and work related conditions, or through missing information that is lacking and which might otherwise provide more meaning to a response. All responses are provided in Appendix E.

**Intelligence as a Concept in Policing: Developed Themes**

Respondents were asked about the role of intelligence in police work. Theme 1 developed from respondents who inferred intelligence is part of what they did.

I think police work is intelligence, I think if you're out there and you got to figure out who did what or you're investigating a crime, you got to base it on intelligence. I mean even stopping a car is going to take a certain level of intelligence whether that comes from your training or whether it comes from what you did that night or who you talked to earlier, who you stopped earlier, I think police work and intelligence are one and the same.

Source: 11062184

Intelligence is used by us, here in gangs to set up to go after the gang members in the hierarchy of the gangs and go after what we perceived to be the number one priority in the city of Chicago, homicides and shootings. Intelligence is what we gather off the street, it's what we gather from analysis, it's what we gather from informants, it's what we gather everything put together we discuss it and we come up with an action plan after that.

Source: 11042566
The above responses provide insight into an important issue which impacts the development of intelligence in police work; the perception that all police work, including data or information gathering, equates to intelligence. The data collected through cases of reported crime or through confidential sources, including surveillance, can contribute to ‘information’ if it fits the specific interest of the individual doing the collection; otherwise it remains data which will not be used. Until information is analyzed, it remains information, not intelligence.

In order to illustrate this notion, let us assume you are going to see a movie but are undecided as to which movie to see. You open a Web browser which links you to a number of sites including finance, sports, news, and entertainment. Likely, you will select and click-on ‘entertainment.’ The other links are intentionally ignored at this time and represent data in which you have no interest at this time. The ‘entertainment’ link takes you to a variety of other links which provide information on movie reviews, locations, and times. Because this data is useful to you, it has become information. Nothing in this process, thus far, has involved or produced an intelligence product which would influence you to act upon which movie you may eventually choose as additional steps are required to complete that process.

Similarly, in Organized Crime, separate reported incidents of homicides would have to be filtered so that incidents involving domestic violence, which would be handled by a unit from the Detective Division, are separated from those involving gang related street violence that would represent data of ‘informational interest’ to the OCD.
Theme 2 developed from respondents who inferred a better use of intelligence could only benefit the OCD, down the line…

I perceive it for the future to be something that is going to be necessary. Generally, right now, intelligence is maybe more put to the side and the old-fashioned style of police work is more prevalent.

Source: 11028961

Intelligence trickles down from the person who has the information to the people that need to get the information. And it could be as basic as a roll call. If you want to pass the information to the troops in the field and then they will have knowledge of what's going on…

Source: 11058231

The function of intelligence should be the mainstay of--on investigations task to the Organized Crime Division. I believe the collection of raw intelligence and the ability to turn it into actionable intelligence in police work is lacking at this time.

Source: 11105904

Gathering information and analyzing it and then trying to come to some sort of an agreement between individuals as to what may be occurring or what may be the reality of what's occurring and then getting that. Once you get that intelligence, just making sure that it's sent back out to the people that helped, you know, you collect it and analyze it all.

Source: 12257484

The respondents recognize a need for intelligence to assist in their tasks but there is the perception that the present ability to use and develop intelligence in the OCD is not fully developed or possibly lacking. Each of the respondents indicate they are aware that the development of intelligence is a process which generates a product that might ‘trickle down’ to users and that as part of the process it would be beneficial to take something ‘raw’ and convert it to something ‘actionable.’ The comment that ‘intelligence is maybe more put to the side and the old-fashioned style of police work is more prevalent’ may infer that accepted practices in police work serve to inhibit the adoption of new approaches intended to develop an intelligence mechanism. This is
not to say that accepted practices serve as inherent inhibitors to new approaches, rather the fundamental principles of andragogy, i.e., adult learning, suggest adults are more comfortable with the initial way they learn tasks and must be motivated to learn new ways of doing old tasks in a manner which provides near-immediate results.

Theme 3 developed from respondents who inferred conceptually, intelligence as a function has value but where that value fits in the overall scheme of police work is currently unclear.

You see the function of intelligence is to more efficiently focus the resources on the problem—in a problem—individuals and problem areas that would most benefit from the use of the resources.

I believe that the function of intelligence in police work is critical. I see it as a method to prevent and to solve crimes. I also see it as a method of keeping the community and officers safe from any type of harm. So, the function of intelligence in being able to gather it and what is raw intelligence that you need to put out there to the extreme of analyzing it and producing it into an analytical form is critical in police work.

Intelligence in police work is a valuable assets, in order to continue to combat the different crimes that occurred within the city of Chicago within any municipality you want to need to continually gather intelligence and then follow up to ensure that you keep the crime level down.

Intelligence enables investigators and even patrol officers to develop relationships in obtaining information which can lead us to make significant arrests, to develop informants, to be more effective in their performance to their duties especially within police relationships lead investigators to get information they normally wouldn't be able to obtain by normal patrol activities, i.e. driving around, responding to calls, and keeping the public at a distance rather than utilizing their eyes and ears in the street are much more effective than the police officers.
The responses in theme three tend to be circular in that the expressions presented can only be supported by repeating themselves in different forms. Responses that explain ‘intelligence in police work’ by providing examples rather than defining the terms indicates circular responses. Lack of a clear definition of the function of intelligence serves to confound an understanding of how the concept works in police tasks. The responses do provide insight as to why a functioning intelligence process may be important to police work.

Each of these responses identifies the benefit of an intelligence function as something to focus resources and develop methods for exchanging information. One comment infers OCD investigators can become ‘much more effective’ through the use of intelligence because they lack the ability to interact with the public in the same manner as patrolmen from whom information may be obtained. This statement avoids the function of intelligence in police work and speaks to separate roles on the Department.

The Qualrus application gauges reliability using Cohen’s Kappa coefficient to establish a measure of association and per cent of agreement between two or more codes on the same individual objects (responses). Codes used in the first question include ‘Intel Defined,’ ‘Intel Function,’ and ‘Intel Use;’ Kappa ($\kappa$) = 0.53, 84% indicating moderate agreement and high degree of association among the three terms and the question.

Theme 4 developed from respondents who inferred intelligence is used and applied as part of their regular work.
It's actually used effectively. There are different types of intelligence that we use for different types of investigations. I think we have the tools and the resources to use the intelligence that we have and I think that helps to successfully complete investigations.

Source: 11028961

Intelligence is that information that stirs you in a way to handle the problem, whether that's analysis is same last year at this time because it's a holiday; Latin Kings always shoot somebody, that is intelligence. Intelligence can also be what we found out from a guy we did a search warrant on last night that they're going to do today, so could it be applied in the Organized Crime Division? Absolutely! And that's how it's done here now and it can be applied. I was in the Detective Division, we used intelligence there, maybe not as much as you do here, but intelligence there was interviews; where as here it's a combination of a lot of things.

Source: 11042566

Intelligence is probably used in the Organized Crime Division more effectively than in the rest of the department. We get intelligence and information from confidential clients that we disseminate immediately or used for individual attacks on problem area where that intelligence could be used specifically. As opposed to patrol, that information doesn't get out as quickly. We're kind of setup to disseminate information and intelligence based on gangs, everything from hierarchy to anniversary dates where violence is to be possibly perpetrated as a result of retaliation…

Source: 11087163

From my experience, information is obtained based on that information; different steps have taken to follow up on that information in order to reach a desired end. If it's information on a drug location, it's getting that information, following up on that information and then tried to take down that drug location. If it's a gang offender, the information comes in and follows up on that information in order to remove that gang offender from the street. So, it's applied on a regular basis--intelligence has always been applied on a regular basis.

Source: 1148753

One is that it helps direct our investigations. We also use intelligence to identify who our investigations will be directed against. We don't randomly start investigations at whoever comes along. We use intelligence to find out who is the core of certain problems, who is running certain locations with criminal activity, you know, who runs the dope area, who's the boss. In the Organized Crime
Division, we tend mostly to go after the higher level criminals, gang bangers, narcotics dealers, as well as the most violent once. That's who we focus on. You need intelligence to give you that information. To A: Know who to go after and B: How's your best way to start investigation to actually get into these people so you can arrest them.

Source: 11247602

Each of the above responses in theme four indicates the respondent believes intelligence activities are important to their work and each provides an example of the use of intelligence. Each example is unique which infers there is no standardized practice for developing or classifying intelligence. Intelligence is referred to as ‘everything from (gang) hierarchies to anniversary dates’ or ‘interviews’ which serve as the basis for broad informational items. In the most basic form, intelligence is not developed until varied information sources can be associated. Throughout these responses, intelligence and information are used interchangeably.

Theme 5 developed from respondents who inferred a need for an intelligence process is recognized but it has not been fully implemented.

It's one of the biggest tools that we, that our units drives up. I mean, we work on and of intelligence, we work of information, intelligence, and then we try to prioritize from the intelligence that we gathered which would be consistent in particular cases that we're working. And then if that particular intelligence or information that we have doesn't pertain to the case that we're working on, we can't work because we don't have the manpower to prioritize then we'll get the intelligence or information onto the patrol and other units here.

Source: 11058231

Generally, it's been my experience that raw intelligence is disseminated and it's done timely and it's not in a good fashion to respond to impending acts of violence. However, this raw intelligence is not collated or indexed.

Source: 11105904
I believe that it's not only the collection of information from various sources, whether they be confidential informants, looking at past case reports, speaking to regular beat officer or tactical officers that work in that--in a certain area. Gathering information (and) analyzing it and then trying to come (up with some) sort of an agreement between individuals as to what may be occurring or what may be the reality of what's occurring and then getting that. Once you get that intelligence, just making sure that it's sent back out to the people that helped, you know, you collect it and analyze it all.

Source: 11257484

Respondents recognize that steps towards developing intelligence are in use within the OCD but also indicate additional steps may be required to develop the intelligence that is required from information sources. Each of these respondents refers to the dissemination of intelligence and is concerned with developing a useful intelligence product. The inference is the OCD lacks a suitable process for developing uniform intelligence which could be distributed according to standard practices.

Theme 6 developed from respondents who inferred a need for an intelligence process is necessary but is currently lacking.

I think it's imperative--I mean everybody uses intelligence especially when they're thinking about organized crime. If you're looking into longer term investigations, we're looking at better targets, we have to use intelligence.

Source: 11062184

We won't be able to effectively operate unless we're able to speak to people, to develop information, to develop relationships with informants because informants can go on locations and see things and do things that police officers cannot do. Specifically, going to residences, going to businesses, you know, sampling narcotics, doing all the things, buying narcotics, all the things that, you know, an undercover police officer wouldn't be able to do.

Source: 11234773
These responses emphasize the need for an intelligence process as an aid to investigation without trying to define how an intelligence process works in their units. This tenor in these responses infers a very real need for an intelligence process in OCD which is currently lacking. There is an emphasis on the types of investigations in which the OCD is involved, i.e., ‘longer term investigations’ and work which involves going ‘undercover’ which underscore the need for developed intelligence for specialized work.

Codes used in the above question include ‘Intel Defined,’ ‘Intel Applied,’ and ‘Practice;’ Kappa ($\kappa$) = 0.46, 92% indicating moderate agreement and a high degree of association among the three terms and the question.

Themes 7 through 9 were developed from respondent’s perception as to whether or not there was a Department definition of intelligence in police work.

There is a definition. However, I think there are several definitions. One of that is employed by the Deployment Operations Center, which is actually classified under, I believe its 28 CFR Part 23. There were some training bulletins issued. However like, do I think that there’s one standardized definition that everyone follows right now, the answer is no.

Source: 11105904

I know there’s a general order that mentioned intelligence in them, but I think, basically, we use the term intelligence as like the common definition.

Source: 11247602

Is there a formal definition? I believe there is. I'm not actually aware of it, but I think, I believe there is.

Source: 11234113

The above respondents believe there is a Department definition of ‘intelligence’ but are specifically uncertain of what it might be. This infers the respondents have not been
provided a standardized working definition for ‘intelligence.’ The respondents are correct in indicating the word intelligence is used in a number of Department policy documents but, in fact, the word is never defined. This can be problematic when addressing issues related to intelligence in policing. By contrast, if an officer believes he has probable cause to affect an arrest, he can refer to a codified set of definitions or statutes in support of an action. One response references 28CFR23 (Code of Federal Regulations) which provides federal guidelines to police engaged in intelligence collection. Many OCD supervisors know of intelligence processes and applications because of prior military experience with specialized units.

I am not of aware of definition by the Department of intelligence. The people that know what they're doing on this department know what the hell intelligence means. Other people think intelligence is sheet that they get to make their exams look better. Intelligence to us is what's going to help us stop the things what we're working on. So, yes, I think we all have our own opinion about what it is, but it's basically what it is.

Source: 11042566

If there is, I'm not aware of it.

Source: 11062184

There's no formal definition.

Source: 11087163

These respondents know of no Department definition of ‘intelligence.’ One of the unique qualities of successful officers and supervisors within the OCD is their ability to function within parameters that defy strict definitions. In contrast, academicians must rely on a common set of strict definitions as are part of the language to prove concepts. In this sense, an acceptable definition for ‘intelligence’ is important to assist to develop
processes which have real situational applications. Similarly, a Department definition of intelligence would likely prove useful.

There is a definition, I really don't know it. I think when people think intelligence I think they also think like technology. They kind of go hand-in-hand; I don't know if there is a specific definition and I don't think the Department has ever used it.

Source: 11028961

That word is thrown on a lot--intelligence, you know, my definition of it is intelligence, you know, if you get the information through intelligence it's going to lead to activity because smarter police officers that are out there are more focused that have knowledge on what's going on. Knowledge gives you power, it's going to give you the ability to--if you put knowledge and intelligence together, it's going to lead to activity--quality activity. It's not going to be, you know, to go out locked up every mope on the street. That's just great. That's good, the definition.

Source: 11058231

Okay, my recollection is that there may exist a document, a department policy for one unit and that's the Deployment Operations Center which the document spelled out the responsibility of being the central depository for intelligence. And in that document, it defined intelligent and what it meant. So, it was specific for that unit in a--whether or not everybody in the whole department was trained on that concept to carry that as a broad definition is another subject.

Source: 11129230

I don't know the Department's definition, and if there is one, to be perfectly honest.

Source: 11257484

It's always a part of the job, but it's just was not describe or carried out in that manner.

Source: 11148753

The majority of respondents remained uncertain as to whether a Department definition of ‘intelligence’ existed. Several of the respondents infer that if such a
definition exists, it was never emphasized. The inference is that while these responses are less emphatic than the ‘No,’ a formalized Department definition of the term intelligence is not employed by members of the OCD. This suggests an intelligence process is lacking. Because ‘intelligence’ is regarded as ‘part of the job’ some variation in an approach to the use of intelligence exists but none is standardized.

Seventy two (72) percent of the respondents to the above question were either uncertain or denied there is a Department definition for the term intelligence. Codes used in the above question include ‘Intel Defined,’ ‘Dept Defined,’ and ‘Governance;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.94, 97% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.

Theme 10 developed from respondent’s perception of what contributes to intelligence in policing.

My experience is you can never ever get more intelligence than you get from the actual people on the street, that are going to be the ones doing it, seen it, no words can be done. Interviews and human beings are the best intelligence in the world. I wish we could have the satellites… which I would push forward these little cameras in the sky that they use in the military. But I think that some of the mistakes we've done is rely too much on that.

Source: 11042566

Just good old fashioned police work you stop the guys, just talking to guys, it's being out there on the street. There's a certain level of computer work or we can look at stuff out on our other needs and figuring stuff out but I think most--the most powerful intelligence you're gonna get is the stuff you want out on street

Source: 11062184

...it's information that was obtained by the officers-in-charge and everybody and, generally, from CI, from self investigation and then narrowing that information down and then acting upon it.

Source: 11148753
Going out there and interact with the community, talking to people, speaking to other officers, maybe from the tactical teams or from patrol division, developing informants. When an arrest is made, every time an arrest is made, there’s an opportunity to gather more intelligence to possibly develop an informant or possibly just to gather more information on a certain occasion or a certain target.

Source 11234773

Basically, our intelligence is obtained for the most part by human intelligence. It always has been, but actually, in recent years, there’s been a big push for officers and investigators assigned to the Organized Crime Division to develop more and more human intelligence sources. A, you get more; you get information in intelligence faster. B, you get, you could get it off of different people if you had multiple sources.

Source: 11247602

The reference to ‘human intelligence’ or information from sources such as informants is used throughout these responses. It is worth noting the military has specialized units within their Intelligence Section which work on developing intelligence from multiple sources, e.g. SIGINT is intelligence derived from signal interception, OSINT from open source, and HUMINT from human intelligence are examples. ‘Human intelligence’ is a type of information which must be vetted before it develops into intelligence.

Practitioners in OCD are very experienced in the routine of collecting, vetting, and employing information collected on the street. This represents the first stages in developing an intelligence process.

Theme 11 developed from respondent’s perception that the use of specialized equipment contributes to intelligence tasks.

Again, we have equipment technology that we use to further our investigations. I would say that's how we contribute to intelligence for OCD.

Source: 11028961
The respondent infers technical equipment contributes to generating intelligence products within the OCD. Technologies employed in the intelligence process are tools which serve to facilitate the development of intelligence through a process. The use of technology as a practice to expedite in the collection of information can be useful but should not regarded as crucial to developing an intelligence product.

Theme 12 developed from respondent’s perception that training and development of investigative techniques used by personnel contributes to intelligence tasks.

We have trained and we have increased officers awareness in conducting debriefings of offenders as to what their knowledge in is and also historical information possessed by offenders or witnesses, whereby before that wasn't normally done. The other thing that we are doing in Gang Enforcement Unit, we're trying to close an intelligence gap and one of the ways we did that, and this isn't direct correlation, just youth violence committed upon or by high school members that are affected by street gangs. We have started weekly and daily tactic with school resource officers to determine what is occurring inside the school.

Source: 11105904

…smarter police officers that are out there are more focused that have knowledge on what's going on. Knowledge gives you power, it's going to give you the ability to--if you put knowledge and intelligence together, it's going to lead to activity--quality activity.

Source: 11058231

Well, I think there's a lot of practices. First of all, we definitely develop cases, especially drug cases, and we--out of those cases we develop information whether it's through wire-taps or traditional street conspiracy cases or whether it's through search warrants. So there's information that are particular to each case that's being developed because you're actually targeting different gangs so you're targeting different intelligence for each different gang. But, I think one of the practices that I think is critical is the debriefing of individuals when they're arrested. I mean, the raw intelligence that we can gather from one individual and then, obviously, apply it through analysis and collaborated through other information is critical.

Source: 11129230
Well me, myself, my detective, and a lot of my section, I kind of look for the strongest people from each district, here, and the Gang Enforcement Section. I talk to them, probably, on a day-to-day basis and then I also, I have some key individuals, like strong individuals within the districts that I reach out to, regularly. I try to weekly, but it's, because it's--Area 2's so vast in the amount of gang and the violence that occurs throughout the city. It's just, it's virtually impossible, you know, to stay on top of a lot of stuff, but I, but I do have key people in each of the districts that I can, you know, count on as far as providing accurate information.

Source: 11257484

The respondents above indicate experience and training are critical practices required to contribute to intelligence used by the OCD. The respondents also recognize that it is important to have ‘smarter police’ and ‘strong individuals’ who are likely self-motivated by the interest to develop intelligence through a variety of techniques. The processes required for developing intelligence, including analysis, triangulation of sources used in debriefings, and abstract thinking are techniques more easily taught to those who want to learn them.

The majority of the responses to Question 4 involve direct officer contact with potential sources of information and techniques used in gathering information. There are no specifics regarding the storage and dissemination of such information. Codes used in the above question include ‘Intel Development,’ ‘Intel Defined,’ and ‘Practice;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.83, 95% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.

Theme 13 developed from respondent’s perception of the Superintendent’s statement that the Department needed to focus on ‘intelligence-driven policing.’

Well, I think it's crucial, I mean, to be perfectly honest, I mean, in especially now
with resources and not only physical and personnel resources seem to be dwindling.

Source: 11257484

I think he's realizing that, you know, that we do have a shortage of manpower and we have to work smarter. We just can't, you know, and he said this before, that arrests are going to mark the crime down. It's going to be arresting the right people.

Source: 11058231

If I was the Superintendent, I would say the same thing. You better be using intelligence-led policing because first of all, you can't go back to the old ways, where it's heavy handed. And have people fear you, I mean, at some ways that would be nice, but intelligence will help you get around bad corners, so I believe that statement in intelligence-driven policing is because that's the wave of today and the future.

Source: 11042566

Where the intelligence is used on specifically to attack the, the biggest problems that the department has with the limited resources and to get that intelligence out and to be acted on effectively. So, in the past that hasn't really been the way the Department operated.

Source: 11087163

The respondents interpret the Superintendent’s comments in two ways both related to change; better use of resources and a need to be forward thinking and openness to new approaches. Each response is a reflection on the status of the conditions in the policing environment. The Chicago Police Department has reduced manpower levels from over 12,000 to under 10,000 during the past few years. As the same number of officers is required to man routine patrol positions, fewer are available to be placed in specialized units like the OCD. Specialized units are required to make more efficient use of the resources they have as well as to seek innovative alternatives in policing in order to maintain their effectiveness.
Theme 14 developed from respondent’s perception that while the statement was the right thing to say the Department needs a concerted, realistic effort to move forward in the use of intelligence in policing.

I think that's the statement for the future. I think it's something that needs to be put into place now amongst recruits that start; that can work your way through. I think it's going to be important because our numbers are dwindling and if we don't have enough bodies out there, we are going to need other resources or ways to be more efficient to get what we need to get upon investigations.

Source: 11028961

My interpretation is that we need to use more technology in developing our tactical strategies and operations for areas that are experiencing some high rates of violence or gang violence, or drug activity that leads to gang violence and shootings.

Source: 11129230

Well, I believe it speaks for itself that officers have to be smarter. They have to have contacts within the community because that information can be acted on a timely fashion, much more so than being reactive. An officer can be proactive rather than taking a report about a person doing a robbery or selling drugs. An officer, if he has intelligence and he's developed informants and they're in contact with the community and say, “Well, this guy is going to sell drugs or this guy's going to do a robbery”, that officer can act before that action takes place.

Source: 11234773

Yeah, I think it's a correct statement. I think the Department does focus on intelligence-led policing. I think it has for a few years, but it could always be pushed up to higher and higher levels and become more and more efficient. I mean under Phil Cline, they started the Deployment Operations Center which is basically the first step in intelligence-led policing where it was the information gathering section for the Department and then it spit out an analyzed and vetted intelligence report, so, but I think we can always ramp it up and with this time of less police officers, than we've had in the past, you have to do everything you can to make the Department more efficient.

Source: 11247602

Responses that speak of the ‘future,’ ‘more technology,’ ‘if he has…,’ and ‘ramp it up’ infer the respondents have some notion of an ‘intelligence-driven policing’ but perceive more support is required to advance the concept. Each of these respondents
provides an interpretation of what is needed which indicates that ‘intelligence-driven policing,’ as a practice, has not been formally presented to them as supervisors.

Theme 15 developed from respondent’s perception the Superintendent’s statement is mere rhetoric; there’s no substance to it.

I would agree with it but it sounds like a catch phrase and sounds like a buzzword more than he believes in anything, you know.

Source: 11062184

The biggest aspect of--I'm talking about intelligence-driven policing--is it says that information has to be exchange back and forth and I'm not saying that happened in the manner that would show. So, sometimes it seems a little hollow.

Source: 11148753

The respondents regard the use of the term ‘intelligence-driven police’ in a statement by the Superintendent as positional rather than substantive. Positional statements reflect on opinion as much as they do policy. A statement by a Chief Executive that the organization needs to focus on a particular path may mean that the organization has not begun on that path.

The biggest aspect of--I'm talking about intelligence-driven policing--is it says that information has to be exchange back and forth and I'm not saying that happened in the manner that would show. So, sometimes it seems a little hollow.

Source: 11148753

Codes used in the above question include ‘Intel Defined,’ ‘Weis Statement,’ and ‘Perception,’ Kappa (κ) = 0.81, 96% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.

Theme 16 developed from respondent’s perception on whether intelligence or information was more important in their decision making in police work.

I'm going to say it's a combination of both maybe leaning a little more towards information and how we derive that information. However, at anytime you're going to act that information, you want to back it up with some type of tangible intelligence; meaning, you know, say for instance if you look at some of the utility checks, maybe some law enforcement databases that will help you assist in the
finding of that under. So I think it would lean a little more towards information but intelligence is definitely important as well.

Source: 11028961

I believe it's at both. I got to say information is probably, you know, that's primarily what we work of because information is something that my people are on the street getting right now. They call me they say X, Y and Z's are going to happen. I don't care what some reports some guy ran on of the computer says, at that point, I know it's going to happen. If it gets enhanced by what the computer says or the computer will spit out that you know last year when I used that thing earlier the Latin Kings always shoot somebody on this date. Well, geez! If somebody told me last night that they're going to shoot somebody today and I see a raw dated intelligence that we have in the last 5 years that happens on that day, yeah. It enhances it.

Source: 11042566

I think a combination of both. Some recent information that comes in that's coupled with the intelligence that you already have, I mean, now you get some validity to the information that you got and the intelligence that you have and then you can--it can pitch a hole in those structure to what you're doing in your particular investigations.

Source: 11058231

I think both. Sometimes I'll get some information and it might be, it's raw, well I'll call that raw intelligence without it being analyzed or collaborated. So I think I kind of, depending on the situation, my reaction in decision making would be contingent on the situation. Obviously, you know, timing--if you're under time constraints, you need to make a decision on it and the more time, the more obviously, you can analyze and collaborate. In my experience, you know, it's just, based on your time and rotation of what you can do with it, whether if it's just raw information, then you go with it. If it's, you've got time to analyze it and explain it and come out with an intelligence report on it, I mean, that's the way to go.

Source: 11129230

Some of them are both, it starts off as information and you start acting on it and as you start acting on that information, that's your analysis and now it becomes intelligence and you move all along with that phase that it goes. So, it's a little both, like it start up the information and it will form an analysis and then that analysis becomes intelligence.

Source: 11148753

Well, I mean it's probably 50-50 at the supervisory level. Very often, we are tasked with going to a location based on information from the community groups, politicians, different commanders, Hey, I have information they're selling drugs
here,” are political, they're not really intelligence-led. Intelligence-led would be more appropriately defined as where someone from the street level tells us, “Hey, they're selling drugs here. This is the guy who's doing it. This is how he does it. This is where he lives; this is the kind of car he drives. These are the hours of operation, something along those lines.

Source: 11234773

The above question begins with a simple definition of intelligence as information that has been subjected to analysis. The definition allows the respondents to distinguish between these words which are commonly and erroneously interchanged as meaning the same thing.

Well over half of the responses immediately replied that information and intelligence contributed, in combination, to the answers they required for decisions. The majority of these responses continued their answers by providing varied descriptions on how information contributed to their decisions without providing specifics as to analysis. One response explained that time constraints require information to be used more often than intelligence; this infers consideration of the fact that the analysis process takes time. The use of a functional intelligence process mechanism, such as ILP, within the OCD would allow for intelligence and information to be used concurrently. Only one response, ‘information…coupled with intelligence that you already have,’ suggests that existing intelligence may be used in conjunction with ‘recent information’ to provide answers for decision making.

Theme 17 developed from respondent’s perception that decisions they make are driven by intelligence.

Intelligence without a doubt because like you said you can get the best information. You got to CI (confidential informant) that tells you, “I got 57 kilos in the garage and it's over here.” You got to analyze, “Why the fuck would this guy know where
57 kilos are?” You know what I mean. So, yeah, you got to use--you got to analyze your own information. I'm sorry.

Source: 11062184

The respondent provides an example of *ad hoc* analysis of provided information in order to develop an intelligence product. The question ‘why’ begins the analytical process to introduce a number of variables related to the information on the location of an unusually large amount of contraband.

Theme 18 developed from respondent’s perception that decisions they make are driven by information.

On a daily basis on information comes into play for immediate acts from street level informants, but the intelligence drives more our unit on, as a investigative unit for long term investigations to get to the top players in the gang, or for narcotics the top distributors of narcotics that are responsible for the bigger picture. But that would be a more long term. But that intelligence is extremely useful to get to the top.

Source: 11087163

My decisions and tactical decisions on where to deploy officers in relation to a gang conflict mostly comes from information. The reason that we have to, most of it is based upon information is because we've got newer climate where it is sort of like a doctor that practices defense medicine. The fear of being chastised for not following up on information, as ridiculous as it may be, did likelihood of you being chastised for not following up on it is great. However the life, as far as launching investigations, complex investigations, that is usually based on intelligence and not a mere single piece of information.

Source: 11105904

Well I think that the formula, information plus analysis equals intelligence, I think that makes sense because you could take all the information in the world, and I get a lot of information that's just not, has not been corroborated or even looked into when it's just garbage information. So, if I were just, you know, cc that information as all my bosses do, they'd send me something and then they send it out to everybody in the world, and then we're supposed to believe that as gospel.

Source: 11257484
Information represents data that has been captured by a user because it is of interest to them. The respondents are specific on why information is important for answers to their decisions; they are similarly specific in assessing that information provides the basis for building intelligence. Two of the respondents indicate that ‘daily basis’ work and ‘tactical’ decisions initiate the process of developing intelligence.

Codes used in the above question include ‘Decisions,’ ‘Value,’ and ‘Intelligence Use;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.62, 90% indicating substantial agreement and a high degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.

Theme 19 developed from respondent’s perception that analysis in the OCD is limited and underused. Respondents were provided with a definition of analysis as a method for reducing complex information to simpler terms. Crime analysis was defined as a method of joining disparate information through association and relations.

I really don't think there's a high level of emphasis that's put on crime analysis within Organized Crime Division. I think we're probably the closest thing there is to like the crime analysis but I--you know, we have specific information and outlets that we get that information from but crime analysis is not a high priority. At least that's how I see it the Organized Crime Division.

Source: 11028961

I mean it's useful. It's kind of taken in context. You can't streamline--you can't always streamline the intelligence that you get. You can't look at every dope dealer with the red shoes and [0:03:26 incomprehensible] on a Tuesday and say, We got a trend here. You know what I mean? There's definitely--into the DOC [0:03:34 incomprehensible] that's quite often where they just streamline it and they'd say, "Well, there's three different gang deals here. You should loss me this gang cop." Wait a minute, you forgot that this gang is fighting each other for the same dope spot and Hooky here is fighting with Beau and he just grabbed her sister's ass and shot it. You know what I mean, so you lose a lot if by streamlining it, you know.

Source: 11062184
Crime analysis is extremely important but the problem is on a, on a lot quick level the analysis is slow coming in and a lot of times we have to put pins on the problems without correct analysis of what caused the problem. 

Source: 11087163

Well, in the Organized Crime Division, we don't have per se our own intelligence, I mean I'm sorry, analysis group such as the DOC, but each team and each officer that's assigned to investigations in the Organized Crime Division does analyze their information as it pertains to their investigation in their cases. That information and analysis does go to the bigger cause of the whole department at some point and also depending on the urgency of it. If it's urgent, we do what's called an IBDR (Intelligence Based Deployment Recommendation).

Source: 11247602

The respondents use analysis to a degree but the process is described as incremental rather than flowing and is called for when situations warrant the use of analysis.

Respondents indicate that without analysis, the wrong or incomplete decisions are can occur. Urgency related to some particular instance is mentioned as a reason to gather and begin the analysis of information because the OCD lack “per se our own intelligence.”

Theme 20 developed from the respondent’s perception that the ability to use more analytics would be beneficial.

Well, sure crime analysis will make it easier for us. It would--we most certainly have to know being an organized crime where the next shooting is going to take place, where the next big dope deal might take place, where the next K meeting is going to take place. That's all stuff that we need to know, so when you say complex information, I don't know what that means exactly but what I'm thinking, what you're saying complex information is a bunch of different information brought into the middle and deciphered. So, yeah, I'm sure complex, little things add up as big things later on.

Source: 11042566

Analysis will be the most useful, I mean you can get a better picture of what you have in the past and then sort of get what you might need to do. An example would be you have an area and it's something historical about that every year, something comes off at the same time, so if you're looking back it past trends and you looking million things, the pressure building in this area, okay and it's building to this around the same time, okay that's analysis that you've already done, you know.
That might be a potential area that we need to focus on in order to prevent something can happening. And to elaborate a little bit further about the crime count, we look at the total number as they come in, but the total number sometimes may not be the overall big picture of it, it maybe a high number but of that total high number if only a small percentage are gang related, that's what we are looking at, what's gang related, what's going to cause more problems down the line. If we have a high number of homicides and where large percentage are domestics those are sometimes hard to prevent. We have our domestic aspect and then we deal with it, but the ones we're really focus on are the ones that is going to cause more problem, those gang-related incidents.

Source: 11148753

Both respondents agree that the use of an analytic feature would be beneficial to the OCD; the inference is this feature is currently lacking. The analytic portion of ILP is a key feature of the model which contributes how information is managed and used and is intended to supplement, not replace, existing practices.

Theme 21 developed from the respondent’s perception that they employ analysis regularly in our work and tasks they perform.

I think it's--we get a tremendous amount of analysts of what's going on, in particular, this information on what's going on and we've got to prioritize on how we deal with the analyzed information that we get. You know, we've got to--because we don't have--we got our own guys. I got 76 guys on the street. Understand, we've got to prioritize what the intelligence that we're getting them and we got intelligence from patrol, we got intelligence from the back, from Leo's guys, we got informal meetings that we have and that's information shared. We shared electronically. We try to do better job of--if it's a high priority where it's not going to compromise any of our investigation and has to do with public safety. We're going to electronically get that out immediately to the districts into the back and Deputy [00:05:48 Incomprehensible] when he was--because we were doing it, we weren't tracking it.

Source: 11058231

The function of crime analysis in organized crime or at least in my, in our position it is to--is a valuable tool to determine what the unlawful specified activity, albeit gang is involved in so that we can develop a strategy to combat it. Some gangs may be involved in just trafficking narcotics. Some are involved in burglary, some are
involved in robbery. That is why we use crime analysis in that area to determine what they do.

Source: 11105904

Well I think, I'll give you an example of how I'll use crime analysis. If we see an area with a lot of shootings and we need to go and take a deeper look into it, we will start analyzing the crime in using all the, what I would call the indicators that may exist out there that can be the red flags you get--number of our narcotics arrest over a 30-day period, number of calls for service. Other residual crimes involving narcotics, it can be after specific person caught, okay? Man with a gun caught. All the other information will give you a crime analysis. That based on intelligence working those two together will give you an idea of what type of narcotics operation is set in that location, geographically.

Source: 11129230

A lot of these guys, even if there's nothing promised to them, you know, whether be a profit or something along those lines, they're still willing to talk about certain things. Just because, “Hey, you know, I'm tired, you got me, what do you need to know?”” And they--they fill in a lot of blanks and a lot of those blanks we had heard about in the past. So now, we have like two or three independent sources that are--we're gathering this information and now it's strengthening, you know, of the intelligence and the crime analysis aspect of this stuff.

Source: 11257484

Crime analysis is a key component of what we do, specifically, we are--one of our many tasks is to reduce violence, it's one of our primary tasks, to reduce violence. Mostly, gang members or people involved in violence, the percentages speak for themselves, are involved in other illicit activity. Although, they're--they may not shoot somebody everyday, they sell dope everyday because that's their source of revenue and often--quite often times, the conflicts, which is the heart of the violence, you know, revolves around narcotics. Therefore, we often focus our investigations in areas in an effort to reduce the violence. It will take out some of the higher ranking drug dealers, and then conflict is eliminated.

Source: 11234773

The above respondents provide examples of how analysis is used by detailing tasks and then relating separate individual processes that involve information exchanges.

Information exchanges are critical to the analysis (reducing complex information to simpler terms) leading to intelligence but ‘crime analysis’ involves the ‘dot-connection’ phase of developing intelligence. Two responses refer to either ‘red flags’ or
corroboration of information through different sources as techniques useful to their crime analysis. These techniques are useful in testing the validity of information which may be used in conjunction with crime analysis to further the development of intelligence.

Codes used in the above question include ‘Analysis,’ ‘Crime Analysis Function,’ and ‘Perception;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.79, 95% indicating substantial agreement and a high degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.

Theme 22 through 24 were developed from the respondent’s perception on whether there tasks are driven in response to ‘counting crime,’ using analysis to determine trends or patterns, or some combination of both.

I use both. I'll tell to you that crime counting, the reason why that is always important because numbers don't lie. If you are going to show me a sheet with 20 people shot at a 3-block radius, there's 20 people shot there. Now, I go into the next statement, “Why did that happen?” Counting is just a way to help you get an analysis, to me that's spotting the problem, now what do we do to find out what's causing it. So, crime counting is always going to be used because that's what they hold you accountable for. If you are commander of a district and they count that your numbers are up, well, they're going to hold that against you; so you are going to analyze what those numbers really mean and then figure it out why it's having another attack.

Source: 11042566

Well, you know, I think I just mentioned all the various factors and I think they all--I think the relationships between all of them would mean more to me when I look at, you know, reporting the facts and the analysis of what's going on. So, I think that I will look at the relationship between arrest, calls for service, shootings, looking at the time they're happening, the day they're happening, so I think it would be important to relate them all and how they, what's causing what to happen. So there's a relational analysis that's being done.

Source: 11129230

Yeah, obviously, the--we don't really rely too much on crime counting. I think, you know, the bosses are very concerned with that. We're not too concerned with
that too much. What we're more concerned with as I've--several questions earlier like, "Hey, what's linking perhaps a spike in violence to a certain area?"
The lately certain commercial, you know, we had a several homicides recently in the last couple of weeks right on the same corner that what's happening and while we're finding out it's several different Latin gangs. Both the victims were Latin Kings but one was a Latin Dragon and one was a Cobra it seems that. But we know that a lot of these boundaries are, you know, intersecting over there, we're trying to get to the root cause as to, you know, what may have spurned that. So you know, although our numbers, you know, we are always concerned with numbers in trying to keep the numbers down, we're--we're concerned with trying to look at a certain area, analyzing that area, see what the spike may be, seeing who the principal individuals that are involved with the whole thing and then trying to create some sort of a strategy to, you know, related to what's going on.

Source: 11257484

Each of these respondents uses crime counting, to some degree, as an indicator of where analysis may be required. Crime counting relates to all reported crime that can be classified under Uniform Crime Reporting (UCR) standards; codes provided for particular crime categories. The above respondents provide examples of how they might use analysis in relation to counted crime; each response is slightly different which infers there is no standard analytic procedure.

Theme 23 was developed from the respondent’s perception that analysis is more useful for determining associated crime trends than merely crime counting.

I would say analysis would probably more useful, patterns, relationship or trends that exist because that--if you have that specific information, you could put yourself in a position to--to get in front of things. Meaning, say you have a burglary pattern and you know--you know the pattern, maybe some of the relationship to some of the offenders and what time they are predictably heading, now you can put your surveillance teams or, you know, whatever together to be in those areas to try to work that area with that information in order to--to make an arrest so you can potentially clear the pattern. You know, numbers--raw numbers related to events--numbers are just numbers. If you're talking analysis, that would be more important.

Source: 11028961
I think the analysis to raw numbers, you can look at in particular areas but you got to analyze that with the intelligence that you have in those particular conflicts in those particular areas. Now, say like you send in officers [00:08:11 Incomprehensible]. I mean, you can see that there's a lot of shootings going on in that particular area right now. But, you know, that's our frame, but now you got to double a little further into who are the culprits that are causing it and you got to know the players from both sides and then disseminate that information because it might be a domestic.

Source: 11058231

Analysis is the most useful without a doubt. Unfortunately, the Department often uses the raw numbers in particular from a weekend deployment based on the following week is from raw numbers and not from real analysis.

Source: 11087163

Analysis will be the most useful, I mean you can get a better picture of what you have in the past and then sort of get what you might need to do. An example would be you have an area and it's something historical about that every year, something comes off at the same time, so if you're looking back it past trends and you looking million things, the pressure building in this area, okay and it's building to this around the same time, okay that's analysis that you've already done, you know. That might be a potential area that we need to focus on in order to prevent something can happen. And to elaborate a little bit further about the crime count, we look at the total number as they come in, but the total number sometimes may not be the overall big picture of it, it maybe a high number but of that total high number if only a small percentage are gang related, that's what we are looking at, what's gang related, what's going to cause more problems down the line. If we have a high number of homicides and where large percentages are domestics those are sometimes hard to prevent. We have our domestic aspect and then we deal with it, but the ones we're really focused on the ones that are going to cause more problem, those gang-related incidents.

Source: 11148753

I would say the analysis portion when it comes out, is more important to us because there's a lot of crimes that are committed that are not directly involved or not directly related to the mission of the Organized Crime Division. You know, if it's a domestic related murder or something along that line, it's not something that we generally are involved in. We're involved with gang and organized criminal activity and the murders and violence that stems from that type of activity. So we would need the analyzed version so that we would know what caused the murder and also, what, where, and also if there's a propensity for more violence to follow because our job is stop that additional violence as fast as we can.

Source: 11247602
The above respondents have an understanding of why the analysis of raw numbers is important to decision making. The terms ‘patterns, relationships, or trends’ ‘applied to raw numbers’ describes the products developed through analysis and demonstrates an appreciation for the value of analysis. The expression ‘raw numbers’ is used repeatedly in these responses to describe the items on which the Department focuses as well as to contrast the need of the OCD for an analysis process.

Theme 24 was developed from the respondent’s perception that crime counting is important because it shows where the crime is occurring without analysis.

Yeah, you know what, I guess it would--before they would find the most useful is the all time pin boards. It sounds crazy but it still could matter. I know all they may have it on the DOC thing, too, but to see it on the wall with a little pin that says, “There's armed robbery here. There's an armed robbery here that he uses color-coded with this is night time, this is day time.” You know what I mean and that's probably more counting than analysis but that just visually.

Source: 11062184

Crime counting, in my eyes, is you always measure what you get. If you measure something, you're going to get that result. Crime counting, as far as how we apply our resources, is not a basis that we use all the time. We do use analysis because that's the only effective way to understand what's happening. To be told that there's a hundred armed robberies that means nothing unless it's the same modus operandi, same description of offenders, same types of property that was taken, maybe even different associations. That's what you need it to use.

Source: 11105904

First, like calls for service is a resource that we use. In many calls for a specific area, they are selling drugs, selling drugs, we have a crack hotline that people can call in anonymously, and that information is also collected. Like homicides, if every batteries, we look at those numbers that determine if the root cause of that spiking violence are those numbers, is from a narcotics problem, like a conflict. We can assign investigators to go out to that location to try to initiate narcotics investigation.

Source: 11234773
Each of the above respondents refers to crime counting as useful as an indicator which may indicate trends. A major concern with crime counting is ‘unreported crime,’ i.e., criminal incidents which occur and are not reported to the police for a variety of reasons. Crime reporting is closely tied to ‘calls for service’ which represent calls made to the police for service. Often police initiatives are predicated on circumstances in which clusters of reported crime appear to be congregated in one vicinity or ‘hot spot.’ Resources committed to ‘hot spots’ often result in the elimination or reduction of crime in a designated area. Most often, this does not mean that crime has been eliminated but rather that it has been moved to another location. Without the ability to analyze crime that has merely been counted, the practice of responding to ‘hot spots’ is reactive rather than preventive. A principle feature of ILP is it is intentionally designed to prevent crime.

Codes used in the above question include ‘Counting vs. Analysis,’ ‘Source,’ and ‘Intel Development;’ Kappa ($\kappa$) = 0.91, 98% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. The high $\kappa$ in this instance reflects on the fact the responses to Question 8 infer the practice of ‘counting’ is accepted as a base standard for focusing in types of crime clusters but analysis is important for the type of tasks conducted in the OCD.

Theme 25 was developed from the respondent’s perception that criminal intelligence is used all the time in the OCD. Respondents were informed that criminal intelligence is developed from a variety of information sources.

Alright, how criminal intelligence--criminal intelligence is what we live off of everyday that is what our job is in gangs. Gangs are using intelligence gathered
from gang members, search warrants, arrests, anything we can, what we see in cameras, if we had cameras, whatever we can to gather intelligence for the Organized Crime Division, where we can say, "Okay, everyday this gang deals a lot of dope on this corner and/or having shootings around there, obviously, someone is trying to move in on their dope dealing." So, we know by the numbers of arrest in that area and by analyzing that, that's what probably is causing the problem and then we got to get on physical intelligence from people to say that, "Yeah, so and so just got out of the joint and he wants his spot back." That's how we use it here. That's only one way of many.

Source: 11042566

Criminal intelligence in the Organized Crime Division is used very effectively because as the information often has the chance to be vetted before someone acts on it. It can often be a more long term or someone can develop a plan to use that information and then to verify that information as opposed to tactical street level analysis of information.

Source: 11087163

Concerning criminal intelligence as a product, this unit and even though it's only around a year, has started to develop a number of different products. Concerning the enforcement, just stop the proliferation of street gangs. Some of these products that we developed are description of gang membership, rosters and hierarchies of which are then made and distributed to the district commanders. And other product that we developed is a Weekly School Report. And that's based upon our interviews with all the high schools within an area and information is collated, not necessarily analyzed its raw information that is put forth, so everyone understands what is happening within the schools. We also generate what is called the Weekly Gang Conflict Report, which is a report that's developed through multiple sources, not only through crime reporting. Abstracts from different investigations that analyze motive but also street sources and information coming from confidential informants and what has spiked a gang conflict into the use of violence or if it's just a historical conflict with another street gang.

Source: 11105904

Yeah, absolutely. I mean, constantly it's a--of things are evaluated. We do, our Commander has implemented that we do a weekly report pertaining to our top 10s to keep people, somewhat focused. Because a lot of times, we're being pulled in many different directions but it keep us focused, you know, on our top 10s because that is a priority for us. Now, not saying we're the only ones who are keeping files on it. I mean, obviously, there are some certain individuals in some
of these areas where there is some high amounts of violence occurring that we also gather, you know, intelligence on also.

Source: 11257484

Well, in the Organized Crime Division, we use it in 2 different ways. We have various units in the Organized Crime Division. Some are investigative units that conduct investigations more of a long-term nature and that would be units such as the gang investigations section and narcotics section. But we also have another unit, the gang enforcement section which is more of a street level enforcement type unit directed at gang activity. So, and that's actually, by design, because in my opinion, to effectively combat violence and combat gang and narcotics but you have to hit it at multiple levels. You can't just focus on the top guys. You can't just focus at the bottom guys. You've got to focus on all. We use the analyzed intelligence to help us direct maybe where a long-term investigation might take place. But we also use the shorter version information sources where to direct the Gang Enforcement Section because they respond to immediate threats and they do very short term missions in areas that have high propensity for gang related or narcotics related violence.

Source: 11247602

It's of use because it tells you, given within the file, it's who, it's where, it's when and it provides the link from the past to the future, so that as people come along they can see, they can follow along somebody that might be out there, what is their modus operandi? What do they do? How they are doing it? So you have to build it and you have to maintain it, but you also have to make sure everybody's looking at it, to be aware what's there, so you can follow along as you go along. It's information--because you want to make sure you don't lose information, it was just--if all the intelligence is just with one person and that person moves on then anybody coming along behind they got to do now, start from scratch in order to rebuild that intelligence.

Source: 11148753

Much of what is described in the above responses relates to types of files on information maintained at various locations which may be disseminated depending on various conditions. There are ‘Weekly School Report(s),’ ‘Weekly Gang Conflict Report(s),’ or ‘description(s) of gang membership, rosters and hierarchies’ which are shared. Such examples of ‘criminal intelligence’ are based on an interpretation of the unit preparing the information and represent broad examples of accepted information. The
information described has a shelf-life and can be dated as changes to that type of information occur frequently. Information sources are generally represented as vetted documents which may be referenced.

Theme 26 was developed from the respondent’s perception that Criminal intelligence, developed from information, is used on a limited basis in our work

I think there is a bit of it. I don't think it's a huge emphasis but I think that it's on a case-by-case basis with each supervisor with each team as well. So, my point being is that, you know, when I talked about like the burglary pattern and stuff like that--that's analytical information that you want to put together. Criminal intelligence, you know, that's--I really wouldn't say that we use a lot of it but I mean I think analysis is probably more--more appropriate.

Source: 11028961

We got many sources of information. We got to keep a confidential informant files down at the District. I mean, we've got paid informants as well as unpaid informants. I mean, we've got information from witness interviews, from offender interviews. And it’s just where they're stored. Unfortunately, a lot of the information--the best information is stored in, you know, kept in one of these guys which stay in the back of their head. It's from an interview with somebody in the back seat of the car. Those are the guys that are going to provide the most information. You know and again, you got to weed it out because some of it is self-serving, like they're giving you information to benefit themselves but others are more truthful. You've got to check the validity of it.

Source: 11058231

Well, the way I would perceive it to be used is drug intelligence reports, for example. How certain groups are, you know, they're trafficking, you know, their drugs at certain methods. The numerous trends, like one of the things that I saw developing over time was the use of, you know, we won't have street corner conspiracy cases so now the drug dealers had to change their operations. So, some of the drug dealer's starting to do phone services; you call them and they will drive up and say meet me at this corner and I'll deliver it. So we need it to, you know, that intelligent would be good because when people talk about it, then we can get out that information on how that operation exist and how it works. So you get different type in which you've seen is also trends. Now, here might be a trend is people going back to the old system of selling dope out of their houses or at the garages instead of standing on the corner and selling dope. So you know, drug intelligence reports are good. Gang methods like I talked about what gangs do. They torch cars for initiations. They might be torching police vehicles or
policemen’s (personal) cars (depending) on their initiation or conducting shootings, or whatever it is. But that information's important to get out there not only because it tells you something about the gang and what a certain gang trend is in terms of initiation but it also gives an officer safety flavor to it, report to it.

Source: 11129230

If an officer gets information that a target, John Smith, is selling drugs, he doesn't go off within the floor and ask every officer in the narcotics unit, [00:09:25 John's this,] or John Smith's selling drugs. That information is developed by him as he about--as he, you know, he may do his own investigation, do surveillance. He may say, “Okay, John Smith is a very high level drug dealer.” That information could be passed on to a team that works that type of level of drug dealer as opposed to a street guy. But the very import--it’s best that we have to look at clearing house for information that comes in off the street, no we're not?

Source: 11234773:

Many of these respondents indicate that the best criminal intelligence resides with the officers involved in cases. This is the argument for maintaining a process for developing intelligence from sources that can be available to a wider audience. In its current state, as criminal intelligence resides with individuals, if they are promoted, resign, are transferred or otherwise unavailable, the intelligence may be difficult to retrieve. ILP provides the process for analyzing and storing criminal intelligence products which are received on a current basis so others can determine if the products are useful to them in a timely fashion. Codes used in the above question include ‘Value,’ ‘Criminal Intelligence,’ and ‘Perception;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.82, 97% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. Most respondents perceive the product of criminal intelligence developed from sources as something that is archived for distribution while others perceive information sources for developing current criminal intelligence on a more fluid, current, and changing basis.
Theme 27 was developed from the respondent’s perception on how information sources are ultimately tied to the product of criminal intelligence.

Very important. Lot of the cases that we do work which, you know, are long-term investigations are derived from these specific things and, you know, putting together, going after the worst of the worst, the most violent and use the surveillance, informants, debriefings and all of that towards--working towards an investigation. So, within the Organized Crime Division it's a--it's probably critical.

Source: 11028961

Well, that's easy. Informants give us information, we check and see if it's by debriefing other people, if it's perfect or real information, with most certainly, if they tell us this is going to happen and this car is going by you. We can survey the area and see. Get all works together, it's hand in hand you can't have intelligence, unless you put all that stuff together.

Source: 11042566

The information sources are often used long term and often used very effectively to--can also be a sharing with other jurisdictions. The information source can be as such that we can actually start an operation as long as we can vet it.

Source: 11087163

Somehow, it's instrumental and you know, there's a lot of--where there's intelligence and, for instance, what's going on with the task force over at [location] We learned from prisons that our guy just got released from jail. So, therefore, I mean, there's--we know because he's got a history and we got intelligence on him. We know that there's going to be a spike in crime because prior to his incarceration, he was responsible for eight to ten murders. So, I mean that intelligence derived from The analyst and when you look at the map, you see a spike and had you not get the intelligence from The analyst or some of the guys here that track that person, particular person or target, you would not know why spike is there because he just got released.

Source: 11105904

Everything we do is based on informants and surveillance, whether it be human or electronic surveillance such as wire taps and hand registers which is the tracking of phone calls or who people are calling, that's all intelligence, really when you break it down. And that is what we use to build cases against people and also, we use it to make our decisions on what the step in our investigations are. And then again, on a gang enforcement section which is more of a street level mission driven unit, we use information sources also so we know where to direct that manpower and where they can go to effectively stem violence. We also use the
information sources in all the units to conduct search warrants and other activity of that nature.

Source: 11247602

Information sources are varied and information may be obtained from case reports, interviews, surveillance, or exchanges between individuals working the same case.

Each of the respondents describes the importance of connecting information sources to investigations but a process for connecting source information to an overall criminal intelligence file is not described.

The term ‘long term investigation’ is used to describe complex cases which may take a year or more to resolve. Most often these types of cases involved other agencies and most often those agencies are federal. It is not uncommon for federal partners to maintain criminal intelligence processes as they draw information from OCD officers. For example, the FBI uses a ‘Pin-Point’ data base which tracks informant handlers by area. If information is required, an agent can locate the handler who will contact his informant to possibly verify current information. A broader ILP system could allow for this type feature to be available to specialized CPD units.

Theme 28 was developed from the respondent’s perception that they currently lack a uniform intelligence process that can be applied to all cases on which they work.

They are completely unrelated without the information sources. We would not be able to develop criminal intelligence work for the unit. As an example though, information that comes in the unit based upon an activity by a gang is usually verified by a confidential informant or other sources and then it provides a basis for generating intelligence products.

Source: 11058231

I'd say that's what drives your activity. You know, confidential informants also know where the hot cars are gonna get dropped off or who's selling dope over here or who committed the murder. Surveillance, even you follow that murderer
around and you forgot where he's going and he's gonna do it again and case works maybe, well, you can use some of the reports almost like the pin board or yes, say, “These guys are shooting back and forth. I know these guys and then we better go and check out that corner.”

Source: 11062184

…case by case analysis. I mean, if information developed by a team through the course of investigation they get information that, it could lead to suburban drug deal or it could lead to a see a target outside, operating outside the United States.

The supervisor, his duty is to then develop either an information report or put in a supplementary report. That information is reported to our analyst here. She would--she reviews all those reports and determines, "Oh, a target of interest was picked up on this investigation." That target was also of interest to a DA group, that information, we will now be forwarded.

Source: 11234773

Each respondent identifies the use of information sources and relates how, under certain circumstances, that information may be tied to criminal intelligence, depending on the case. Confidential informants are mentioned as one information source which can be tied to others. One respondent refers to an analyst who reviews case and supplementary reports from a variety of sources to develop intelligence that is shared in specific instances.

Theme 29 was developed from the respondent’s perception that they require more experience and training in the use of associating information with criminal intelligence.

Well, you know, it varies to you know, again, it comes down to the experience and the supervision that each of the gang teams or narcotic scenes or the lieutenant who supervises them has, because you definitely need to connect the surveillance activity with the confidential information you have in debriefings to fit in all the pieces of the puzzle of any type of criminal activity or any intelligence that you want to put together. So, I see them as pieces of the puzzle. You've got to put them together. You've got to analyze if it's right. I'll give you a very good example. You know, years ago, I was part of the old intelligence section where we had an analytical group and all we did was analyze reports coming in from all the different intelligence squads, alright? All the different
intelligence squads did not know what everybody was working on except the analytical group. We were to sort out all the information and run numbers and do background checks on people and so forth. And then we would sit down with the supervisor and tell him what we're seeing based on his surveillance and his case. And then if we see a connection with another case, we would tell him talk to this sergeant about your guy because there's a connection with his case and your case, alright? So, it's more like a centralized analytical group, but I guess you've got to have somebody that has the experience to do that. So trainings are really important to do that so I think that's probably work. There's a lack of training to make that. So you rely on experience, okay?

Source: 11129230

Update--is a good word--that information, it goes back to what the definition of your intelligence source of information. It's all information put together is intelligence, it's what's going to keep you going now and in the future and so there is a direct link between all the information that's gathered and the all information that's filed and stored for all the work that this unit does. To know what [00:11:51 Jay-jay] did last year and the time that Jay-jay has gotten what area did they did frequent, it is all there so someone might come along, they're going to seek some during the time on the street but they also have a source of information. A source of intelligence that they can go back and look that's going to help them to know that Jay-jay, he make frequent this area all the time but a lot of times, he goes on here for a certain times. So, it's there, there is a direct link and they're connect.

Source: 11148753

We can't keep a very running file around them. We chart though, any kind of stuffs with contact cards, C.I. information, several that we've taken down. That's--some of the individuals have gotten into that individual source. It's always kind of like girlfriends, cars, properties…I mean, constantly it's a--of things are evaluated. We do, the Commander has implemented that we do a weekly report pertaining to our top 10s to keep people, somewhat focused. Because a lot of times, we're being pulled in many different directions but it keep us focused, you know, on our top 10s because that is a priority for us. Now, not saying we're the only ones who are keeping files on it. I mean, obviously, there are some certain individuals in some of these areas where there is some high amounts of violence occurring that we also gather, you know, intelligence on also.

Source: 11257484

The respondents emphasize work done to maintain and review information for associations between sources which should be tied to criminal intelligence files. One of the respondents emphasizes experience while another suggests training might be an
appropriate way to teach the development of criminal intelligence based on source information. Each respondent indicates they the basis for understanding how criminal intelligence might be developed. One response infers it is likely that several groups keep the same or similar information. An ILP process would collect all source information from those groups for analysis and development of intelligence which could be shared by all. Codes used in the above question include ‘Information Source,’ ‘Criminal Intelligence,’ and ‘Practice.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.40, 92% indicating fair agreement and a high degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. Fair agreement is indicated based on the variety of ways information sources are handled by these respondents.

The above question addressed whether information sources were tied to criminal intelligence files in the OCD. The following question asks if there is a mechanism in place to draw associations or relations between the information collected through analysis. Associations may include, for example, people, vehicles, cell phones, or financial records related to a particular person of interest.

Theme 30 was developed from the respondent’s perception that personnel are in place to handle work related to the analysis of intelligence used to derive associations.

You know, like (an Officer) called me, a week and a half or two weeks ago, he said that there was a guy that was arrested, [00:11:49 name deleted] for two bombs over at 13th and Keeler that's supposed to be, you know, the bars bail was over there looking for him because he had some items with both before he was incarcerated and he wanted them to bail him out. And if he wasn't there, then he told them to, told the people that we're there to make a phone call and get him out in 5 minutes. He didn't show up so ten minutes later there's two people who were shot. I had (our analyst) check on this person they got caught [00:12:15 Incomprehensible] over there on a car chase with the police, you know, where is he at, what's going on with the guy. She found out, you know, give me a file on
him and with all the information, the particulars, where he was currently at in the county. I got that information and passed it to (an officer who is at) Area 4 and I said, “Whoever this guy--this guy may have some information on this conflict. So, that information goes back and forth and I might asked her to do things where I'm learning say at the meeting, or I'm learning at--from say some of our contacts in the federal government, DEA, from the DEA informers who say, “Looks like there's something going on over here because of A, B, or C” and then I'll go to the analyst and say, "Hey, is there any validity or can you work up on these people?" And she'll work up the people and it would be disseminated to the appropriate area--the team that works on it.

Source: 11058231

Okay, let's do it one at a time. Who does it? I have five gang detectives working in five areas, okay. They should be working on intelligence. They do intelligence reports to me weekly. There's a gang intelligence report for each area done by the gang detective, weekly. It goes on all the shootings and homicides of anything in narcotics, big whacks (shootings), anything like that. Intel that was brought off the street and he does report, so we have a weekly report no matter what.

Source: 11042566

Okay, there is one person that I know of that does double duty between both sections, between 189 and 193. That person reports it. The intelligence-based for incidents just causes when a policeman is shot at or incidents like that. They are just causes that come across. Usually I could get it by email and it's pretty much shared throughout the Organized Crime Division but there's only one person that actually does that.

Source: 11028961

Our analyst here is [name deleted], she's very--she has contacts with almost every law enforcement agency operating in Illinois and actually with the federal agencies. She is pretty much our clearing house. We are--I'm not saying we operate an island because no one does. We do share information with our outside agencies, but a lot and often times that information is kept close to the vest because of sensitivity. You can't just forward it. It's not like around robbery crew. Narcotics is its own separate--because the information is so sensitive, you have the informants' identities, you have, you know, officers, infiltrating groups. That information can't really be shared.

Source: 11234773

The respondents indicate analysis used to draw associations between individuals and information tying them other information which may yield intelligence is handled in at least two ways. In the first instance, several individuals, sometime involved with other
agencies, pool their collective information for possible associations. In the second, more prevalent instance, one person has the responsibilities for collecting information from divergent sources and analyzing it for possible associations. Both examples illustrate the use of analytics for a tactical purpose where answers are required quickly. In a broader strategic arrangement, criminal intelligence developed through ILP could provide ready access to associations already established as an on-going process.

Theme 31 was developed from the respondent's perception that task of analysis is assigned to different personnel as needed.

I think every member of organized crime is responsible for at least a little bit of that. We have the IBDRs, those Intelligence-based Deployment Recommendations and I give every single one of my guys do one those. So, they get information like that this guy is gonna go shoot this guy or these guys are at war with this guy. If it's hot information, it's e-mailed right away and it's disseminated right away to the districts and usually that decisions either by (our) Lieutenants or the Commander and if--and when anybody can call one of those, anybody from the lowest senior police officer can say, "I got good information. There's gonna be a shooting and let's disseminate it to everybody."

Source: 11062184

It's done by each individual area by the team that connects to the area. The storing is a problem where it's often not retrievable. Sometimes that information is there but its old or it hasn't, there's no quick way to get your hands on it. Our analyst does a great job of connecting the dots on the overall picture by using databases that the officers started using or don't have the access to and sometimes putting everything together from another unit making an arrest that they are not aware of. Connecting aliases where an individual doesn't have the time to make that kind of analysis or an analyst can bring it all together and analyze it often more effectively than the officers themselves.

Source: 11087163

Right now from what I see, each individual officer does analysis and if they draw some part of analysis, they do and then from there they do a paper work which is forwarded up that chain of the unit looking, see if questions are asked if there's something else--it's seems something might be missed and from there, then it's
filed in a--by one of the administrative staff where it could be access by mostly everybody.

Source: 11148753

The above responses indicate that groups of individuals are tasked with determining which associations exist based on available information. Importantly, each of the respondents demonstrates a reliance on someone to do analysis which underscores the need for analysis in the work being done. There is some indication that at least one analyst has access to database information which may not be available to investigators.

Theme 32 was developed from the respondent’s perception that they lack the capacity for in depth crime analysis.

I could comment on this--the Organized Crime Division lacks a central intelligence unit that would take all the difference intelligence products from narcotics, organized crime, gang enforcement, and even the vice division. And since there’s no central location or an intelligence collection manager to review the added information, our use of criminal intelligence is lacking.

Source: 11105904

Well, I see a continuous room for great improvement. Again, you know, strategic direction of department is based on planning, in budget, and where do you want your money to be put at in terms of its function and tactical operations. So, to reduce violence, we were more committed to making arrests, not gathering intelligence. I think there's got to be a major shift in moving towards investing in people that can analyze, investing in technology that can make the collection of information a lot more easier and a lot easier to collect from everyone instead of just a few people. You can collect it from--if you got one squad working on gangs you might get some reports. But if you get a hundred people out in the same area working, you have the chances of collecting a hundred pieces of information but you have the right technology in place.

Source: 11129230

Well, I'm--I oversee it I guess. I'm pretty much, I don't--I don't have the luxury of having like analysts, quite frankly. Of my gang detectives and myself, and I would say some of my stronger sergeants, we're the ones that are primarily involved with this whole thing.

Source: 11257484
Yeah, we do a lot of that with the associations and connections. We do various data bases we have like with Penlink and there's also units that HIDTA helps us a lot in our investigations when we start, we do the things I mentioned earlier like Pen registers or getting phone numbers where we identified people and we could give them the information and they'll do the link analysis and show us how people are related and they'll come up with a spider web type graph and you could see who's related to who via who they're calling or who might have joined real estate ventures together, things like that that's off of an internet based sources and anything that they could throw in there to develop those connections. As far as in-house, most of our stuff, unfortunately, it's stored on paper still in the Gang Investigations Section. We've been striving, and I can get into it more later, but we've been striving to try to get a Gang Investigations Section database done where all of our gang investigation reports go into and it could be later data mined and mined for any kind of information on persons of interest. On the other hand, we do send most of our GIS supplementary reports which are trying to do.

Most respondents are optimistic about their future ability to use more analysis to develop the associations between existing criminal intelligence and information. Respondents indicate paper based reports are common while use of digital applications capable of linking information is restricted to specific software, e.g., Penlink, which is a law enforcement tool used to track phone records. One respondent uses another agency, HIDTA (High Intensity Drug Traffic Areas) to help with developing associations between persons of interest and other information.

Overall, the respondents are keenly aware of the value of associations which can be drawn by tying information sources and developing intelligence. As a tool, ILP make use of vetted criminal intelligence that can be used to develop associative links with persons, places, and things. Codes used in the above question include ‘Analysis,’ ‘Source Evaluation,’ and ‘Cohesion;’ Kappa (K) = 0.79, 95% indicating substantial agreement and a high degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.
The next section specifically addresses the notion of Intelligence-led Policing (ILP).

Prior to presenting the questions in this section to the respondents, each was provided with a definition of Intelligence-led Policing as provided by Jerry Ratcliffe, a professor from Temple University who has done extensive world-wide research on police practices and is the author of the text Intelligence-led Policing (Appendix G)

**The Notion of Intelligence-led Policing used by the OCD: Developed Themes**

Theme 33 was developed from the respondent's perception that the concept of ILP would be useful; we use parts of it now, and it could save us on resources.

Yeah, I believe that it could be useful. You know, obviously, the people that do the work still got to go out there and, you know, do the old-fashioned police work and do what needs to be done for investigation-wise. But being able to pinpoint direct and to focus on major offenders and to give a little more direction for the activities and associations by--come out with that information is--it could be quite a bit of a shortcut to you having to do that information and research yourself.

Source: 11028961

Well, in one word, absolutely. We do it now. That is what we do. We do intelligence-led policing. We do not have the luxury to have unlimited resources manpower. As you all know, you looked on TV. So we have got to be smarter and more effective. We got to surgically take people out, take areas out and the gangs out. That's what we do, we have been doing it. Reading this, obviously the person who wrote it has done it himself or he wouldn't be able to write this or he's a good person of seeing at work but that is exactly what we do on organized crime. That's how we do it; we couldn't do it any other way.

Source: 11042566

Yes, and actually, I think that the department, as I said earlier, does do some of this already... We also have, in a federal level, with mostly the Organized Crime Division, a main 21 list. Main 21 are the main 21 worst people in the city; gang bangers, drug dealers, it's usually based along either a high-managerial position in a gang or narcotics organization or if not of a high-managerial position, an extremely vital character. Okay, we also have a system called the Trap System which is Targeted Repeat Offender Apprehension and Prosecution System. And that's basically a joint venture with the state's attorneys office where our top 11 districts for public violence submit names of their 10 worst subjects, much along like the lines of the top 10 or top 21. And what that does is when no subjects' are
arrested, they notify states attorney and the state's attorney is assigned to that case and stays with it. And that state's attorney is assigned to that area to make sure that that subject doesn't slip through the cracks on a minor offense. He gets taken, he's prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. But in short though, yes, I mean I believe the concept is useful to any Police Department. You can't random-in this day in age and with limited resources, you cannot randomly just do random preventive patrols and hope to come across something to prevent crime. You have to have at least a good portion of your police department directed at known targets and known conflicts.

Source: 11247602

Absolutely; I mean, this is basically targeting to the right people. I mean, one of the great reductions of crime strategy is getting the right people off the street. I mean, you go back historically in this unit, I mean, we tried to attack the right people, you know, they have to [00:14:56 watch] and trigger town up in the 5th District. I mean, they got the right people and, you know, hence, crime reduced. Now, they're reduced and probably prevented a number of crimes and then you got the new breed [00:15:11 Incomprehensible] based conflict but you know the mark in them. I mean, you target the right people. You take the right people out of the equation. You've got to prevent crime, you've got to prevent future crimes because, I mean, you know, they're just basically the urban serial killers.

Source: 11058231

Absolutely; I think that the analysts are the key to pulling the data together in connecting crime intelligence and coming out with a report that would leverage all our human resources and we talked about the analysts using technology in using information, leveraging our human resources to be more strategically focused and obviously more efficient and obviously putting our officers at the right place at the right time at the right spot.

Source: 11129230

Yeah, I think there's some place for that. You know, I think everybody's, you know, set business model on-- the civil service type thing, everybody gets a little hinkty about that. But I think there's something to be said for, it's like, you know, let's get some information, let's get some viable targets, you know, and let's see what we could do to take these people out and thus, you know, create a better atmosphere, better community. And like I said, we've had some success, I think recently this year. A lot of it wasn't really, you know, by GES, but a lot of it was through like let narcotics know this is what we got…

Source: 11257484
Importantly, each of the respondents interprets some value in the tenets of ILP as an aid to supplement their existing work. Most infer ILP would be most important in identifying the ‘right people’ or targets on which to focus the attention of an investigation. The largest gangs in Chicago, the Latin Kings and Gangster Disciples, are comprised of tens of thousands of members; because of scarce resources available to the OCD, focusing on the right individuals for investigations is critical.

Theme 34 was developed from the respondent’s perception that an analytical approach can not provide the types of answers required for the OCD on any type of regular basis.

Again, I think it should be everybody. I think it should be the beat cop should be able to use it and should be able to come up--I mean, I know some great guys who never got out of the blue uniform who would pull you over and say, "Hey, I got a guy that is saying this is going on or that's going on," or "I just saw somebody doing this over here. You might wanna keep an eye on it." And it should go all the way up and really it should be about the information sharing is important as just the intelligence gathering. You know, did you read the book "Moneyball?" It's about Billy Beane and the Athletics and it's basically he's the first baseball manager that starts to use all these stats and he's first to come up with the on-base percentage within the status sessions and he took a team that they didn't think was getting anywhere, all the way, you know, just short of the World Series but what you can't account for is the heart of the policeman, the guy that's out there. You can put all the stats in. You can put all the--you can flood them with intelligence but the guy is not gonna stop somebody. The guy is not gonna talk to somebody. It's not gonna make a difference.

I think that some of these crime analysis theories (are) the flavor of the day. The bottom line is you still have to have officers out on the street interacting with people. I've never seen anyone sitting in their office and making arrests. Obviously, it's trendy and it's a way to justify people's positions. It's just a way to justify the planning for research. What I mean, I'm a little bit old school. I still believe in the fact, I mean a combination of the theory is more effective than the total embracing of, you know, everything has been researched down to the last. The bottom line is you still have to go out there in police cars and stop cars, stop...
people, interact with people, and that information's going to come from the street.

Source: 11234773

These respondents feel the best information and intelligence is developed from what is learned on the street rather than from new concepts or policing models. In absolute terms, this observation is not without merit and should continue to be observed. An important point to emphasis is ILP, by definition, is not intended to replace anything that in use that currently works; it is intended to supplement existing practices. In this sense, ILP is different from other policing models such as Community Oriented Policing which is intended to permeate all aspects of policing and become ingrained in the culture of the department involved with the program.

Theme 35 was developed from the respondent's perception that the concept of ILP should be applied on a Departmental scale rather than just among top decisions makers as a method to prevent, not merely react to crime.

Oh, heartily. As noted by Ratcliffe, we do not have strategic management of information within. It's whoever has that information, they do pass it on. However, it does not provide a coordinated approach to the problem. Each time I send information help, if it goes to the district commander, there may be a gang conflict, they respond that information by putting resources and thereby trying to stop it, not eliminate it, as an example.

Source: 11105904

I believe it is in terms of that issue over the Department and to this unit. This is a more formalized description of what is already done and then moving towards a more formalized description it will actually probably find and ease some of the processes that are already in existence. From what I know about detective--I think it would be useful not only for Detective Division but also for the patrol also. So it would be used, I think, it would be used for the Department as a whole.

Source: 11148753
Overall, the respondents perceive the definition and concept of Intelligence-led Policing as something that would be beneficial to their work. Of interest among the respondents is the notion of using analysis to a greater extent and having a central archive on criminal intelligence which might be used by everyone. Respondent who were concerned about the effectiveness of the ILP model as a practical tool perceived it as a passing fad or would rather continue to work using traditional methods. Codes used in this question include ‘ILP,’ ‘Concept Use,’ and ‘Practice;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.52, 95% indicating moderate agreement and a high degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.

Theme 36 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to who decides both strategic and tactical objectives for the unit and whether supervisors have any discretion in the process.

Well, if I'm going to use like a case as an example, I've been fortunate enough to be a decision maker in strategic objectives because I've had some experience doing that before. However, you know, it still goes up to process. I mean, you still have the lieutenant, you still have the commander, you still have to run everything by them. However, I've been fortunate enough where I've been able to be the decision maker and determine of strategic objectives on different things.

Source: 11028961

I'll give them the message of what I want done and how to do it. They, on a daily basis as we just with this last phone call, are going to make decisions on how to actually get it done. I'll give them the objectives then they're going to do their strategic objectives on how to get it.

Source: 11042566

As far as our unit--as far as our investigations go, the sergeants ultimately are controlling the investigation. They're making the decisions. Once a month we have a meeting with the sergeants and lieutenants and we tackle all the particular cases. We got a particular case to work it out or there's particular conflict that
we're working on and I like to have a meeting because they're feeding what they're doing and they're proposing their strategies.

Source: 11058231

(Decision makers) got to be careful about over information, you can't throw everything at the lawn and see what's gonna stick and then like DOC giving you a 30-page report and half of it is about neighbors. Now, I don't even do give a (expletive deleted) about that. Where is this guy? What kind of--what gang is he in, who he shot at before and you never get anything. I know all you get is an Accurant report that says he applied for a credit card in 1972, you know.

Source: 11062184

So, I think the decision makers, even though I say it starts with the supervisors, but I think if you take a look at it really, the officers that are working in these cases, the intelligence officers, that's why they're called intelligence out there they're gathering their intelligence in the street level. Fundamentally, really key into developing all these tactical intelligence which then allows the upper level person to look at it strategically plan what the goals, the overall goals of going after a particular gang.

Source: 11129230

It'd be the Command Staff. I mean it would be the Chief, myself as the Deputy Chief, and then, you know, Commanders and staff. But as a department, obviously, it'll be the Superintendent and then his executive staff, which will be the deputy superintendents and the assistant superintendents.

Source: 11247602

Because the structure of the Chicago Police Department is quasi-military it is not unusual that the responses to this questions are expressed in terms of span of control as determined by rank. The above respondents infer they have latitude in both strategic and tactical decisions but this latitude is clearly subject to approval along the chain of command which relies on subordinates to provide workable intelligence and information.

Theme 37 was developed from the respondent's perception that decisions on strategic objectives are made by the highest ranking member involved with the case.

Right now the deputy superintendents are the decision makers on allowing each unit to have some latitude and there is still some tactical latitude but often the areas of deployment even for our unit are focused on what was initially put down
by deputy superintendent and it can be actually multiple deputy, superintendents and they're trying to protect the most critical areas of the city.

Source: 11087163

The decision makers for establishing policies is the Senior Command Staff that has to determine the strategic objectives. The Senior Command Staff, which would guide us and I'm going to use the term management-based objectives. Once we know their objectives, then we as mid-level supervisors could establish the goals to meet those objectives. The tactical decisions will solely rely at this level on.

Source: 11105904

The overall decision makers right now for the most part, it sets at the commander level and above; that's the formal decision makers. Well, it's actually the Captain, the watch commanders and in some units you actually have sergeants, who are actually--that are--they has some aspect of being the decision maker also.

Source: 11148753

I could make recommendations, you know, and whether or not they want it, they listen to those recommendations. That's fine, you know, in most cases, they do, quite frankly 'cause they rely on people that are, you know, like I rely on people that are on the loose ground type of thing. They are the ones that are closest to the stuff they can taste it and feel it, you know. And so, I mean, I'm providing, you know, targets to like interviews in trying to along those lines and then, you know, gather enough information to people who are subordinates and stuff and filter this to other the people and say like, "Hey, this might be a little bit bigger than what we can do, but this is what we got, this is what phone numbers we have, this girlfriend's cars we got, here you go," you know, and we hear from them periodically back and forth from working...

Source: 11257484

The above respondents specifically cite the chain of command structure within the Department as the basis for decision making. These responses indicate the presence of a strong organizational structure that is responsible for decision making. There is the inference that many of the respondents believe their input contributes to a formal decision making process but ultimately strategic decisions are determined by higher ranking officers.
Theme 38 was developed from the respondent’s perception that strategic, sometimes tactical, decisions are influenced and indeed made by sources outside of the unit.

If at tactical level it's the Deputy Superintendent (or) the Chief of the OCD.
Source: 11234773

This respondent inferred that tactical decisions are made at the highest levels of the OCD. This response is an exception to the other responses provided which infer decision making is based on the information or intelligence available to high ranking supervisors.

Codes used in the above question include ‘Coupling,’ ‘Decisions,’ and ‘ILP.’ Kappa ($\kappa$) = 0.85, 95% indicating almost perfect agreement and a high degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.

Theme 39 was developed from the respondent’s perception that decision makers would benefit from the tenets described in ILP.

Seventy-five (75) percent of the respondents answered ‘yes’ or ‘absolutely’ to this question inferring the use of an ILP model would be of use to the decision makers who they had previously identified. Their complete responses may be found in Appendix E.

Theme 40 was developed from the respondent’s perception that already Intelligence-led Policing is already being conducted by members of the OCD.

I think we already have some work done. We have the top 21 meeting. We have, I mean we have written a number of avenues to share information. Oh, we have about different avenues to share information which is really, dramatically changed in the last--I have been here in the past 19 years, so it's been, it's changed dramatically as far as exchanging of information between agencies; but then, within our own agencies, within shared agencies, within the federal agencies, county, law enforcements.
Source: 11234773
We do it now. Like most certainly benefit, they do it now that is how they do their job. That is why they're better than most.

Source: 11042566

Absolutely, I think that's what this--we do this all the time.

Source: 11058231

Each of the respondents recognize the values of the tenets described in the definition of ILP and each infers they employ at least some of the characteristics of ILP in their present work. These responses allude to information sharing which is critical to police work but shared information implies some lack of ownership in the exchange. The products developed from ILP are ‘owned’ by those who develop information into intelligence for decision makers to construct specific strategies.

Codes used in the above question include ‘ILP,’ ‘Concept Use,’ and ‘Practice;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.57, 88% indicating moderate agreement and a strong degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.

Theme 41 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the use of the critical activities outlined in the definition of ILP such as the increased use of analytics and a focus on prolific offenders to direct strategies are important in decision making that direct strategies.

Eighty-three (83) percent of the respondents were in agreement that the critical factors as outlined in the definitions of ILP would benefit strategic direction and subsequent decisions. The previous question asked whether the tenets of ILP would benefit decision makers while this question addresses the use of ILP in forming directed strategies.
Theme 42 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the critical activities presented by ILP should be used at all levels of the Department for aiding in decisions and not restricted to the exclusive use by high level decision makers to direct strategic objectives.

I think our objectives are really stated in a general form that we are given a certain task. We are some--we're given still some leeway, you know, to develop strategies because somebody downtown can't tell me, “You have to have to get undercover buy in to this guy.” They can't tell us that because they don't, you know, unless they're going to put some shit on it, go out there and try to do it because it's not going to work.

Source: 11234773

I think it should be intended for the use by decision makers as well as operational people because it depends on, you know, I mean, decision makers, I think it should be expanded a little bit 'cause when you're going a little bit lower than the guys who aren't making the big decisions, there's still people that are doing the investigations or missions on a little bit of a lower level, but they still need to know the intelligence and the information that make their missions or investigations successful as opposed to just like I read this to mean by decision makers, the people are going to decide where manpower's directed and things like that, where once the manpower's directed to a place, they should have more access to all that intelligence also.

Source: 11247602

The ILP is specifically presented as a management tool to assist high level decision makers in forming effective strategic plans. The respondents above believe ILP could benefit decision makers at the operational level for tactical use.

Codes used for the above question include ‘ILP,’ ‘Concept Use,’ and ‘Resources;’ Kappa (K) = 0.64, 88% indicating substantial agreement and a strong degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.

The following questions are intended to solicit responses about the organizational culture of the Department and how it impacts the Organized Crime Division.
Organizational behavior can determine whether the Department is willing to buy-in to innovational changes such as ILP or are content to remain with the status quo. This section investigates the respondent’s use of data management technology as well as the organizational support of technology intended to promote efficiency. Additionally, methods of information exchanges, formal and informal networking, suggestions for improving on existing information systems, and the roles of individuals involved in the process of developing intelligence are discussed.

**Organizational Intelligence Practices in the OCD; Developed Themes**

Theme 43 was developed from the respondent’s perception that OCD members have or share a lot of useful technology.

We have a lot of technology solutions. We have a lot of technology. You know, Excel, Microsoft, you know, law enforcement databases such as Accurint, LexisNexis but I don't really have access to it anymore, LEADS 2000 I had access to, FinCEN (Financial Information--Financial Information Network). So, yeah, organized crime as opposed to the Patrol Division or whatever, yeah, we have far superior access to it.

Source: 11028961

I-CLEAR system, Crystal Reports, Accurint; I mean, we utilized a number of--right now, we’re in the process of--and a lot of this is, you know, the Crystal (Reports) is the tracker activity, which I don't judge a team by their activity, I judge a team by their investigations. I mean the quality of it.

Source: 11042566

I've got to speak at this level. I can't to the level of the Deployment Operation Center (DOC) that receives some of our intelligence products. But currently, right now, aside from data mining certain databases, to determine information, the information that we have or the tools that we have are usually used to prepare reports for transmittal later on. Some officers use commercially available products such as Microsoft Excel, PowerPoint to get briefings. However, there is no central database to input or index intelligence data for later retrieval, which is important when it comes to feeding that information. Is it a single source or is it coming from multiple sources.

Source: 11058231
I think I-CLEAR is used. We use a lot of state and federal databases. We use our task forces that are in access to databases in their particular agency, whether it's DEA or the FBI or if it's IRS. So they've got databases that we can use. The only caveat I would make is sometimes that their confidential on ongoing cases, we cannot produce any intelligence often to cases are actually terminated. We use also our Department's CPIC (Crime Prevention Information Center).

Source: 11129230

There are references to a number of technologies in these responses which infers there is no universal process in the OCD for managing data through the use of technology. Using a variety of applications to manipulate common data can result in difficulties when the data must be retrieved by others who may not have the privilege required to access the same application. Some of the software mentioned in the respondents is for presentations or reports, not specifically for data management; Crystal Reports© is a page assembler which requires accessing data fields from a database for reporting purposes. Both LEADS 2000 and I-CLEAR are law enforcement data marts which allow end users to retrieve ‘flat file’ data, which is data on a particular individual or event without any analysis. There are features in I-CLEAR that allow a user to connect a subject of interest with related files recorded under the same record number so if an individual is arrested with a second person, that person’s name can be retrieved within the same file. Other applications mentioned by these respondents are used to retrieve a subject’s financial or phone record information. Intelligence work would begin after this type of information had been retrieved. Use of other agency databases or files, including those which may be available from CPIC, places the user in a subordinate role which can restrict access to the information required because the date, information, or intelligence sought belongs to another group.
Theme 44 was developed from the respondent’s perception that there is a need for more ‘useable’ technology at our level.

Now we do send a lot of those reports up the chains who DOC, who want--they are keeping it somewhere, God knows where. But when some of the gang members stop them, they get dead and the girl who does see the stuff on the narcotics side. We send her all sorts of stuff but really it'd been--it's almost a problem of too much information. Yeah, you can have every single GD on the computer but you got to know if they're in the California Jackson GDs or New Orleans, right.

Source: 11062184

I've got to speak at this level. I can't to the level of the Deployment Operation Center that receives some of our intelligence products. But currently, right now, aside from data mining certain databases, to determine information, the information that we have or the tools that we have are usually used to prepare reports for transmittal later on. Some officers use commercially available products such as Microsoft Excel, PowerPoint to get briefings. However, there is no central database to input or index intelligence data for later retrieval, which is important when it comes to feeding that information. Is it a single source or is it coming from multiple sources.

Source: 11105094

Storing and receiving. Well, email is used for a lot of transmitting but the storage and pulling out the information from information that has already been archived is the most difficult part because the technology is lacking. There was good intelligence that was put in last year that is no longer in our fingertips.

Source: 11087163

The question addresses technology but the first two responses above infer that the Deployment Operations Center (DOC) manage the intelligence processes, including the technology, to provide intelligence products to the OCD. This can be problematic as the first respondent indicates concerns on whether the products provided through the OCD address OCD concerns as well as whether the amount of data received from the DOC results in ‘information overload.’ In either case, there is an apparent disconnect between the types of intelligence products required by the OCD and those delivered by the DOC.
The second and third response infer the lack of technology that could make data collection, information indexing, and a broad form for dissemination of intelligence more efficient. The analytic phases of ILP are provides one method that could assist with these concerns.

Theme 45 was developed from the respondent’s perception that despite available technology, most work in accomplished in the form of paper reporting on status rather than on analytical summaries.

Right now, it's still a manual review, a manual store and a manual transfer of information. The information comes in and it's reviewed on paper, it's transmitted on paper and stored on paper. So, that's what we are--I think that's what we are right now. And this is probably more true while on the follow up question, I know we are in the process of looking at a technology-based system, that is one where we allow for a good review--to be able to review any information on a technological-based system and then also storing that information.

Source: 11148753

I have a district gang book that I started as soon as I like, two years ago because when I took over as the gang Lieutenant from Area 2, there was nothing really--the annual gang book when my predecessor, I'm like, “Let me see your gang book” and then there was nothing. And I'm like, “Hey, you have got to be kidding me.” And me, I'm like old school or something like that when I used to grab the old graph inside our section to get pictures and put stuff together, but I've, you know, you got to have at least something and it has to be modified. You know, I would say quarterly, so that, that I started. We just finished that now. All my guys have a copy for every district in the area. We basically just have them in the Word Perfect.

Source: 1125784

The responses above infer that despite available technology, files used for collection and review of data related to information is done through manual processes. Codes used in the above question include ‘Intel Use,’ ‘Technology,’ and ‘Data management;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.57, 81% indicating moderate agreement with a strong degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. This indicates the respondents
understand the benefit of technology in data management but commonly use different, unrelated methods or approaches to achieve their results. The strength of an ILP model would assist to focus OCD members on the same methods for the collection, retrieval, and dissemination of intelligence products.

Theme 46 was developed from the respondent’s perception that there are specific technical applications which are of more benefit for required tasks.

I think Accurint®. I think they use--I mean they use because they try to track people. So, they're tracking people and they're tracking their associates. You know, these I-CLEAR tracking targets, tracking associates. I mean, the key is, you know, whatever database that we have that we can track targets and their associates and then try to make connections and you might not be able to get target A, but in order to get target A, you might have to go down to one of its other wings, you get target B because he's going to give you target A. So, you've got to look at the big picture that, you know, builds on the case, working up the chain to get the ultimate target that you want.

Source: 11058231

Technologies, we web mapping we can use that it shows again I talk to you earlier--I'm lucky that that is usually run for me and given to me but we can not forego the fact that if I had to do in my own I'd come in, I get on a computer I'd do the web mapping and see where all the shootings were. I'd looked at last night's DOC analysis report of where all the homicides happened, where all the shootings happened and when I see certain area I know what gang is in that area because we had already met all the gangs on the computer. We use all that and I'll say, “Wow! These all happened in the GD area of the 7th District” and what factions in the GDs then I can say, Wow! These were the guys that were fighting last week. They must got back with each other and finished it off.

Source: 11042566

The tech--I mean, information-wise, I mean, Accurint® is something that we use that's now very important. You know, I use a lot of the phone stuff I-CLEAR obviously has probably used that on a daily basis for just about everything. Mug shots, you name it, calls for service, you know, suspects searches, arrest photos, arrest identifiers, associates, gang associates from arrest, multiple--multiple. It's basically our hub for what we do.

Source: 11028961
We use I-CLEAR Data Warehouse and because we're homicide and violent crime driven, almost everything is on the CLEAR system for all reports. We do just tons of stuff from all reports, you know.

Source: 11062184

We use I-CLEAR for most of my quick information but I use the spreadsheets Excel, in particular, cause I can show a quick analysis, gangs, violent incidence in an easy readable formats that somebody wants it right away immediately.

Source: 11087163

Word Perfect; Word just boom all are in there--it's the dude's name, nickname, last known address and IR number. But, it's pretty extensive and it's done by, you know, gang and by what area which they operate. Absolutely, to get any kind of further information, Accurint, graphs. You may use Accurint every so often, our gang detective has access to that and then I have a couple of my sergeants who have the LEADS 2000. They utilize that a little bit too.

Source: 11257484

The respondents cite more than one half dozen different software applications used to access or manage data source information. Several respondents mention the use of I-CLEAR (Illinois Citizen and Law Enforcement Analysis and Reporting System) which is a system that integrated an Illinois State Police design with Chicago Police records in 1994 (http://www.isp.state.il.us/media/pressdetails.cfm?ID=165). Because the system has been in existence for nearly twenty years, it is understandable that supervisors who were exposed to it early in their careers would still want to use it. It is of some interest to this researcher that only one respondent mentions the use of spatial GIS (Graphic Information Systems) technology as a data management tool as mapping is often a critical factor in seeking solutions to crime problems associated with specific areas. Accurint® is third party software used to track individuals through public records and requires a licensing fee. Because respondents indicate they use different technologies for various reasons,
there is the inference that not all captured information is shared with other interested or authorized parties. The ILP model employs analysis personnel who may use any or all of the applications mentioned to produce intelligence products that would be available for wider consumption in the OCD.

Theme 47 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the OCD often relies on the technology of other agencies to accomplish our intelligence tasks.

One of the best things we have, actually, when you go back to intelligence and sources, is we have a system that basically, I think the Feds started it but we have it now, called, I believe it's called Pinpoint.

Source: 11247602

Something that, I mean, at that level, Upper level investigators have resources like pen registers, tracing, or wire taps. They're handled here or at the Federal level.

Source: 11234773

I don't find any one particular thing more beneficial because as I come across with, as I find out about I try to utilize it more. I used I-CLEAR quite a bit. LEADS I used some but not as often. When I come across the spreadsheets or database, I like to see what's there to see and got to utilize it, see what's going to be beneficial, in the format that it is in. Because one aspect of my training on databases like Access, Excel it's not a formal training it's more self learned. So, I like to see how can I utilize that information: one, to store it; two, to transmit it and to review it and transmit it.

Source: 11148753

The a--do I find any particular form of data or information management technology more beneficial? No. You need example, I-CLEAR is data mining, which can give you information spread over a period of time. However, it does not provide any linking ability that I'm aware of. LEADS 2000 is strictly a data mining process. The desktop tools that we use spreadsheets or any other databases are used for the development of an intelligence product to share, not necessarily for analytical needs.

Source: 11105904
Two respondents mention the use of applications which are supported at the federal level for their work. This occurs in long term investigations when OCD works with federal partners who have analysts and/or applications not generally available to the OCD. This infers these tools or skills are not currently available for the OCD’s exclusive use. Later responses admit no formalized technology exists for managing data and they are required to explore the use of desktop programs in order to fashion applications for their immediate needs.

Codes used in this question include ‘Intel Use,’ ‘Technology,’ and ‘Data management;’ Kappa (κ) = 0.57, 81% indicating moderate agreement with a strong degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.

Theme 48 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the OCD uses information management technologies mostly for report generation.

For report generation by far…

Source: 11028961

All of my staff use them for report generation, to regurgitate, you know, reports that they’re calling from up above. I read every report that comes through and I make notes on it and I got a file in my computer and all the information that comes in, I try to keep track of it, sure.

Source: 11058231

Report generation… The analysis part probably comes from--we would use it more for the analyzing when you're actually going into the investigation and you need to put a definition on what's happening here, what's happening in there and all of that it's just report generation.

Source: 11062184

Unfortunately, we’re using more for report generation (than) for actual analysis because the analysis links aren’t there. They're giving me who, what, when and where and not a why.

Source: 11087163
I could pretty much say that they are used only for report generation. Unless an officer is directed to providing the analysis or snapshot or synopsis of information, then that is usually generated for report, too.

Source: 11105904

Right now, more so for report generation as things are develop as we go along there will be just as usual for both aspect but right now, it's more so for report generation.

Source: 11148753

Right now, the stuff we have is better for report generation. Not as good for analysis.

Source: 11247602

Sixty-four (64) percent of the respondents maintain the existing data management tools they use are intended for report generation and not analytics. This suggests the analytic phase of an ILP model is not available to them. The need for reporting is an essential part of the information exchange process but the products delivered through reporting, without the benefit of analytic scrutiny, are often quite generalized. A central function of ILP is to use analytics to reduce complex information to a simpler form.

Theme 49 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the OCD uses available technologies for both report generation and analysis.

I use it for analysis more so than anything else.

Source: 11234773

I used it for analysis but some people use it for report generation I mean, there's report generation going up to the chain of command so they know what's going on but we're the ones who put the soldiers on the street, we put the cops on the dots, we analyze it and use it that way. It's used for both.

Source: 11042566

I think both. I mean, I think it will work both ways.

Source: 11257484
I think it's more for analysis, quite frankly. Well, I don't know. I think there's an equal benefit here. I mean we're putting stuff together but we're also utilizing it for analysis, both so--I--we utilize in both…

Source: 11257484

Respondents who interpret existing data management as more useful for analysis or some hybrid which incorporates analysis and report generation are less emphatic in their responses than the group included in the previous theme (47). There is an inference that based on generated reports; analysis may be conducted at another level within the Department.

Codes used in the above question include ‘Info Use,’ ‘Data management,’ and ‘Concept Use.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.67, 85% indicating substantial agreement with a strong degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. The strength in agreement among the responses is indicated by responses in both themes (81%) which refer to reporting.

Theme 50 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to who decides whether new or available technology would benefit the OCD to facilitate their tasks.

The Chief; but it's not widely, not every team has it, right. I think, every team needs to have actually the same type of resources. You know, it's like anything that cost money and-- You know it's just like Accurint cost money.

Source: 11234773

It varies. The bottom line is most things fall to the final decision, especially if it's going to cost money, to the chief in the Organized Crime Division. In his absence, it will be the Deputy Chief. But some things like ECSO training and things like that, we could just approve when they go through. But for instance, the gang intelligence database that we would like completed, you know, that had to go all the way to the Chief and signed off by him 'cause it, you know, it has to be funded. So, he's the funding source.

Source: 11247602
That would come out of our front office, more than likely. If I wanted somebody specifically trained, I would go through the front office to find out who the contact person would be. But more than likely that stuff that, you know, we would get maybe a memo or, you know, we have five openings for LEADS 2000, submit a name and, you know, we'll put a name in there and see if they can go through. If I wanted somebody for something specific, like for ECSO, Electronic Covert Surveillance Officer training, which is the work on wire taps and we are working on that type of investigation, those classes only come up twice a year, I would try to get my guys into it right away because a lot of our cases are driven towards that type of investigations.

Source: 11028961

The respondents focus is on training for existing technical applications, e.g. ESCO or LEADS 2000 which are task specific and may contribute to any existing data management system. These responses do not refer to new or available technology, for example, mapping solutions that might facilitate some of the OCD tasks. There is the inference that these respondents are familiar with processes requiring requests for training on existing technologies but less familiar with requests for new technology which might facilitate their work.

Theme 51 was developed from the respondent’s perception that in order to get what is needed in the way of technology often requires recourse rather than a direct approach or process.

Budget; it’s all about money. That's why we don't have--that's why we have Accurint® which is good for some things but we lost Reference USA® which is better for like phones and stuff. We'd love to have both of them but it's, you know, money.

Source: 11062184

I should decide that. I should decide what my people need to get their job done and I'm saying that in a way it's not to pick on anybody in our Department but some people might have a reason that somebody can get out on something or might be a financial reason but if you're telling me to get the job done, I should be able to tell which one you should use. And that should my ability and maybe I
should have a budget for that, and I could decide which way should I go rather than have somebody sticking something down my throat that we can't use; Gang sites were restricted. It took a letter through the chain of command to the superintendent where a phone call to superintendent himself, to make it happen.

Source: 11042566

The above respondents infer there may be a need for new or available technology to facilitate their tasks but organizational internal inhibitors make direct requests complicated. The first response indicates a key technology was lost because of budget restraints. Managers should always expect budget implications may be tied to any request for resources. Exploring grant or other funding options should be considered before making resource requests of the organization. The second response infers there may be times when interdepartmental groups provide technology solutions which are of little or no value to the end users in OCD. The reference to ‘restricted gang sites’ involves OCD computers being blocked from You Tube and other social networking Internet sites which are commonly used by gangs to communicate information. Requests to correct this condition were commonly turned down but the Information Services Division of the Department until the Superintendent intervened. The ILP model presents an independent analytics group which would have more flexibility in the choices and uses of new and available technology intended to facilitate the types of tasks required by the OCD.

Theme 52 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the OCD must rely on approval for technology requirements they require from outside unit.

Unfortunately, we can request new or available technology but because of the bureaucracy at the department usually just one unit, the Informational Services Unit, seems to have a control of the actual acquisition of those--of those analysis tools.

Source: 11087163
That is through, I believe, Research for Development Information and Services Division that decides what technology can be available to us. However, I will say that very seldom is the end user consulted on what they need in order to develop an intelligent product.

Source: 11105904

Well, some of the technology would be at my level approving it, ECSO training usually. Some of the other one I would have to go to another, from my bureau to another bureau like the Bureau of Administrative Services, which by department policy oversees all our technology. Obviously, certain technology that they maybe confidential that they will not have control over which can be in-house, and what I would basically do is hire their consultants to conduct, you know, who would scope out the requirements of our database and then we'll have a consulted through Information and Services come over and build that database for us.

Source: 11129230

Right now, that decision is probably more so of the Deputy Chief level. As things become available, it he (who) contacts our Commander and lets him know this is available that we need this--by certain people, but I think that is--that the decision or the search and everything is up to Deputy Chief (or the) Deputy Chief level on the DOC.

Source: 11148753

Each of the above respondents (36%) infer that requests for new or existing technology which may facilitate the tasks of the OCD must be approved by other groups outside the OCD. ILP could flatten this organizational dependency by providing tools required and shared for analysis as well as for the development of an accepted data management system.

Overall, approximately 20% of all responses to question 13d infer that budget, rather than need, is the overriding consideration as to whether new or available technology would be made available to facilitate the tasks of the OCD.

Codes used in this question include ‘Training Development,’ ‘Data Management,’ and ‘Coupling.’ Coupling refers to the relation of control when two or more groups work
together. Kappa (κ) = 0.57, 93% indicating moderate agreement with a strong degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.

Theme 53 was developed from the respondent’s perception that requests for intelligence products are most effectively handled through formal channels.

I know from the Patrol Division, at least, when they're looking for information or they need to request from us, they do that IDSSR, which is the Interdepartmental Support Service Request Form that we'll do--that they will send. They will come to us. We take an action on it and then, you know, we send it back or whatever our action is.

Source: 11028961

Well, the formal stuff, the CPIC stuff that comes over, the BlackBerry which is what they give you every single shooting in real time. Interviewer: CPIC that stands for... Respondent: I don't really know.

Source: 11062184

Respondents provide examples of their interpretation of formal methods for handling requests regarding intelligence products. Both examples are specific either in response to requests of the OCD from the Patrol Division or incident driven in response to an event provided through the Crime Prevention Information Center (CPIC).

Theme 54 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the process for requesting intelligence products is most effectively handled through informal channels.

We can give out 75 percent and sometimes it can help everybody working on it or some people would think you can give out nothing just because you're not supposed to.

Source: 11042566

It's informally we called it the round table and basically we go, we discuss the current conflicts from each particular area. It's a short meeting and it's not--you got either [00:28:08 Incomprehensible] or you did oversee it but then it's in put where I bring, you know, I try to tell my people to bring something to the table to share in a particular conflicts that are going on with the most particular areas and then bring targets that won't compromise any of our investigations and share that
information so we can get out. And the Mobile Strike Force, they put together for
their roll calls, they put together, you know, from this and from other information,
you know, for their troops, they put together a quick PowerPoint that will show
them the list of main targets and what's going on. Those are--I think we get the
best information and leaders got area meetings, there are maybe 21 meetings, you
know, the DOC, just to be perfectly honest, I think that's one least productive
meetings because as you sit you're trying to--I think it's a waste.

Source: 11058231

Often informal; sometimes just as informal as a phone call where my unit can, in
myself or a supervisor sergeant, can access it or possibly just give them the
information that they have right at their fingertips. Informal request or formal
requests are often slow and not, the dissemination through a formal chain of
information is not...usually as not as efficient. Often our informal network is
probably the most used.

Source: 11087163

Most of the processes are informal and they are developed through the
relationship of officers working because of the sensitivity of the information.
However, in the leadership level, or a level where one is responsible or held
responsible for the combating gang crime, there is no computerized network that I
can go to and pull up additional intelligence from either gang investigations,
narcotics, or even sometimes the 9th District Tactical Officers, unless I call over
there and verbally ask them, "What do you have on this?" And even that, you get
a verbal report you don't get any written reports.

Source: 11105904

For me, as far as gathering information, I find I like the informal. We have
((coughs)) excuse me, the monthly gang strategy meeting. Which is, you know, I
try to get people advanced notes on it. Sometimes, the better officers, sergeants,
or lieutenants are able to attend but, you know, we have our own lives and stuff
so, you know, I try to make like avail myself to or my gang detective or some of
our sergeants to their schedules you know, so let's plan on your schedule, I'll get a
cup of coffee and I'm here if you're nearing stuff up, so I can pick their brains if
you will. Now as far as getting information out there, I can do that on like you
know, Thursday night, Friday morning I'm sending up my weekly gang report.
Quarterly, I'm sending out to my newly revised, you know, gang books per each
areas. I send them electronically, you know, and if I found out that's not I don't
throw out stuff there to people.

Source: 11257484
Although much of what is developed through a data management system related to intelligence may be considered restricted, informal exchanges seem to be an effective method to exchange information and the most current data in a timely fashion, according to the respondents. Informal networks of communication are generally built on trust and experience among those who share and this notion is reinforced throughout these responses. It is unlikely that use of the ILP model would displace the importance of informal networking but it could provide a common and reliable method to strengthen informal exchanges as the same information would be available to authorized personnel through a standardized system.

Theme 55 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the process for requesting intelligence products is most effectively handled using both formal and informal processes.

Mostly, the formal function of it would just come through the chain of command. That does happen periodically. We'll get a request from, be it the Superintendent or Deputy Superintendent or other divisions or units in a Police Department asking for intelligence on a certain issue, about what we have on it, what's causing rash of shootings, and there's some informal requests also. A Commander from a district might call the Commander of gang investigations or might call the Commander of gang enforcement and ask him for what they know about a certain incident or what's going on in a certain area. So it's both.

Source: 11247602

They're both, they both have their own, you know. Informal is obviously based on personal relationships where a specific District Commander who maybe a friend of mine or have friends here to hand me some help here. We just try--we can definitely kind of--obviously you can go through official department channels. It knows problems will be addressed. However, sometimes, you could do it in a more timely fashion.

Source: 11234773
Formal, you have both processes. Formal is that—every report that's generated is passed up to chain requesting this information or whatever from whatever unit. The informal process act having some time on the job, you need to know different people and you know people in certain units. You can call and said, “Hey, I need this and can you send it to me? And that can work just as well.

Source: 11148753

The respondents infer both informal and formal networks are used to manage requests for intelligence products but place the emphasis in their answers on informal exchanges.

Codes used in the above question include ‘Human Processes,’ ‘Information Exchange,’ and ‘Data Management.’ Kappa (\(\kappa\)) = 0.66, 84% indicating substantial agreement with a strong degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.

Theme 56 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to whether formal or informal networking is most effective in getting access to information or intelligence products which may be necessary to accomplish their tasks.

I'd say informal. Yeah. I guess it would depend more or less in what you're looking for. I mean, what you're trying to get. Formal, I mean, yeah, it gets done but, you know, it's easier informally, I think.

Source: 11028961

Informal networks are more useful to me. Formal are nice. Formal I need it if you don't formal—you got to remember not everybody (who) scores twenty points gets ten rebounds per game. You know what I mean? Informal stuff we can pass on to each other, you know what I mean. The formal stuff there is some people I get three points a game from and I don't get a rebound. They need to know everyday the formal process. And if I'm away for a few days or something, thank God there is formal process because I'm picking up the report of what happened the last three days. So you mostly certainly need a formal process and the better you make that, the stronger everybody is but the informal is the one that's going to take the guy from getting a B to an A.

Source: 11042566

To be honest, informal…

Source: 11058231
Informal without a doubt…

Source: 11062184

Unfortunately, I have to say informal…

Source: 11087163

Yeah, I mean like I can make a phone call you know, and perhaps that's something happen for me. I like informal.

Source: 11257484

Fifty-five (55) percent of the respondents state informal channels for communicating information are most useful. In the previous question, several respondents eluded their preference for informal methods of exchange on intelligence products because informal channels were based on experience and trust in those with whom the exchanges occurred. There is the inference no standardized, accepted method for the exchange of intelligence products exists and a reliance on trusted associations through an informal network is reasonable to expect.

Theme 57 was developed from the respondent’s perception that incident timing determines which type of channel, formal or informal, is pursued.

I think informal networks are most useful when you need real-time information immediately. I believe formal networks are more beneficial as if when you are developing long-term goals or strategies to combat, like gang crime.

Source: 11105904

Well, it depends. You know, if I have a lot of time, I go formally and most cases that I get involved and if somebody wants something from me, I've got to do it informally.

Source: 11129230

I will have to say informal because you can get something right away without having go through all the red tape. When you have to go through that formality it could be a week to a couple of month.

Source: 11148753
Well, probably both. I mean the formal function of it gets out to more people. I mean if you use the formal, if you consider that we send our intelligence and information to the DOC, which is a formal process, and then the DOC then sends it out to the whole Department, then it's very useful. But the informal has its place also. I mean for faster, quicker results a lot of times.

Source: 11247602

These responses stress the need for timeliness to requests for information or intelligence products. In the dynamic police environment, timing in response to a request for information or intelligence can be critical.

Codes used in the above question include ‘Human Processes,’ ‘Networking,’ and ‘Practice.’ Kappa ($\kappa$) = 0.52, 94% indicating moderate agreement with a strong degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. Overall, responses to this question fell into two themes and were nearly evenly split between. Questions in the preceding section asked whether the respondent felt informal or formal channels of communication were useful to them and the responses included either ‘informal’ or some hybrid of formal and informal. None of the respondents replied formal channels were important to their information exchanges. This infers the respondents have no universally structured process for uniform formal information exchanges which the ILP model could provide as an information management process.

Themes 58 through 60 were developed from the respondent’s perception that organizational dependencies determine which tasks will be accomplished first.

Yeah, yeah, I think it does. Yeah, it would--what we do, obviously, is a little different in OCD or at least in gangs is--is that, you know, we can direct our and pick and choose our own investigations. However, directives come down all the time that, you know, we need to adhere to this. We need to do this. We need to do this and you're basically ordered to do that.

Source: 11028961
I've got the flexibility but we're focus on getting violent targets that are causing the crime and trying to prevent them for doing further crimes by incarcerating them. And also, by getting information from the information we're deriving, you know, if we stray from that, you know, if I see a team or somebody's going out making ten bag dope arrest in the corners, you know, is it for or are we doing it to get court time, for overtime or are we doing it because we're trying to listen that information because it is happening in that particular. I think we've all got to realize our roles that, you know, the superintendent has tasked us with each, you know, job.

Source: 11058231

As far as tactical decisions, I probably exercise almost all flexibility as in the deployment of forces to stop crime. There are some organizational dependencies within the department and when I say that, if I'm speaking of, we do coordinate with the Mobile Strike Force and Tactical Response Unit and what areas we will be in. However, we have different missions once we are in that area. You know, mobile strike force does aerial and we continue to focus on the members of these street gangs. I would say it's probably 50 percent reactive and then 50 percent proactive. We deploy our forces almost daily and intelligence product, you know, there is a gang, you know these guys were fighting the night we've put our cars in that area as a proactive measure or if there is a string of shootings, we then go in there as a reactive measure to stop any retaliatory shootings.

Source: 11105904

Well, I think that's a strategic planning of the Department focusing on gangs and drugs. It really lays out our strategic plan, okay? And so the tactical decision making is pushed down to Control Division level of the commanders and the Area Deputy Chief [00:36:56 incomprehensible] and then we connect to what they need. If they have a problem on a certain corner that's related to violence and drugs, then we will then work with them to develop our plans, our tactical operation with DOC. So we are in constant collaboration with the Patrol Division in supporting what they need because they're ultimately facing these problems without the resource they really need to have to build cases towards these gang members.

Source: 11129230

Yeah, there is some--we're getting a lot of stuff, I mean in Area 2, you know. And I don't know if it's just me, great. But we're responsible for the watch to school dismissals everyday of the week. Interviewer: School dismissals? Respondent: Two of them. Interviewer: Okay. Respondent: I have to tie up two teams Monday through Friday to watch that. They have to be part of an Area 2 initiative in the direction of [0:36:46 west Jackson] to make sure officers are working in certain areas with [00:36:50 Incomprehensible] primarily, the north end of the 4th District, 3rd District and the 6th District to generate activity there.
I have to be part of the surgical strike force mission on Friday nights and Saturday afternoons and Saturday nights where a designated team work in a District from a certain time frame to be part of a patrol unit force that generates activity in those certain areas. I have to designate guys to work in the burglary mission recently. Four of my guys to work at burglary mission in the 4th District. So I mean, I'm getting a lot of patrol that is dictating our course of action.

Source: 11257484

The above respondents clearly have tactical responsibilities for the tasks to which they are assigned but these tasks are often provided to them by an outside authority and ‘incident driven’ without regard to any larger perspective. ILP focuses on prolific offenders but can be tailored to focus on ‘incident causes’ with an intention to expand the situational awareness of a particular problem in order to prevent, rather than merely react, to conditions.

Theme 59 was developed from the respondent's perception that OCD’s only dependencies are focused on their mission to curb street level violent crime and murders.

Okay. Well here. Let's be realistic here, this is the real answer. Real answer is, what is the city of Chicago trying to cut down on? Burglaries? Stolen cars? Narcotics? Violent crime! Homicides and shooting, and if you want to be more succinct, homicides, so I know that. I've been told that, I know what I need to do with my people. If I get homicides down, that is going to be the answer. So, what is sent by our leader is to get homicides down and do everything we can to do that. That's what we'll do. If they change it, then we'll change how we do it. But give me what you want done, what do you want done? You want homicides down. Good. Thank you. We're going to step back and we'll make that happen.

Source: 11042566

At the tactical level, we have almost, not that autonomy, but to an extent, we determine on how we do our job. They tell us, very often time, where to go or who to target. But how we do that, unless someone wanted to put their name on affidavit and search warrant, you know, that's not going to happen. I mean, having had the [00:29:05 incomprehensible] come and say, "Yeah, I'll serve the warrant." You know, if he let us to say, you know--they'll based on the--they're--they want all the time is they don't want to tell me how to build the car. As far as, yeah, because it's undercover work and people, especially outside the Organized
Crime Division, they're not quite sure how that works and what the legalities and the process, the tactical decisions had to be made, they pretty much leave that up to us.

Source: 11234773

These respondents infer that despite the rhetoric or authority driving their assignments, they have a solid grasp on what can or should be done, they represent the content experts upon whom others rely to get the job done, and their core competencies and skill sets afford them the best opportunity to complete what is required. The notion of ILP, in addition to other available resources, would complement this type of responses provided above by including an analysis of the reasons why certain activities take place so strategies to prevent those activities might be implemented as a preventative measure.

Theme 60 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the OCD has general autonomy in deciding their own tasks.

No. I think we're different since because we're self-generating--you come up with your own work product and as long as you're producing, that's what your bosses want to see. I mean I call the shots on my team but it's because I have good bosses, too, and they're happy with the work we do

Source: 11062184

Who calls all the shots, that's actually the Commander but he is trusting enough that--if I make a decision and say, “We're going to go this way,” it's going to be a major issue because he knows the fact that I made the decision, but most of the it I keep him informed, let him know this is what we got, this is what I'm having them do and it will go from there.

Source: 11148753

Well, its, at my position now, I have a pretty lot of flexibility 'cause I would be a little bit higher up on, you know, the higher up you go, you sure can make more decisions, and the lower you go sometimes you've got to get your decisions approved. I mean operationally, I would say, you know, the Chief sometimes has some say, directs us for certain things.

Source: 11247602
Our deputy superintendent does call the shots but in organized crime, because of the long term investigations and often the quick--the quick violence acts that we might have to act on based on intelligence or information confidential informants our midlevel--midlevel supervisors can make the call. Often, the lieutenant will make the call and it will be reported to later. We're probably the most flexible in the department probably--probably nowhere in the Department is any body is flexible as an organized crime.

Source: 11087163

Each of the above answers demonstrate the respondent’s conviction that their decisions and actions are in line with what their supervisors expect and they, in turn, rely heavily on the support of their subordinates on who they place a high degree of trust. Despite the described autonomy of these supervisors in handling the tactical aspects of their assignment, there is the inference their overall missions are directed to them by a higher authority. The higher authority decision makers would benefit from the ILP model which focuses on prolific offenders whose contribution to street level crime often provides the force driving behind a number of tasks in which members of the OCD are involved. ILP assists greatly in providing answers to ‘why’ certain criminal activities occur.

Codes used in the above question include ‘Data Management,’ ‘Human Processes,’ and ‘Decisions.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.72, 90% indicating substantial agreement with a strong degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question

Theme 61 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to who is responsible for ensuring intelligence work is being accomplished.

Good question; probably my administrative sergeants, for here in the office, my administrative sergeant. Out in the areas would be the lieutenants would be ultimately responsible to make sure it's put on that way and then their sergeants would make sure what the lieutenants wanted done which is what I like done get
done. Just say the chain of command.

Source: 11042566

The lieutenants and sergeants are mainly the frontline supervisors. I mean, they're--you don't have to oversee, look over the shoulder because they know what's expected and they do a great job and have the knowledge of what was going on a particular area and they're focused on what they have to do.

Source: 11058231

I would have to (say), for me in our level; I would go to the Commander of each of the sections.

Source: 11129230

The supervisors and probably most of the commanders of each unit; you know, and that heads down to their lieutenants, usually the lieutenants and their commanders.

Source: 11247602

The above responses infer no consistent chain or procedure for maintaining an intelligence process throughout the OCD. Members of different ranks who participated in this study often rely on subordinates to monitor intelligence processes as they relate to specific cases. This also indicates no formal method for developing or monitoring intelligence tasks is recognized by those interviewed.

Theme 62 was developed from the respondent’s perception that there are internal checks and balances in place to ensure that intelligence tasks are being done.

I think everybody got to be responsible. If you're not responsible for doing your work especially in a unit like this then you shouldn't be here.

Source: 11062184

Because the--when I go to access a particular area or a gang that a particular unit--or a particular team might be responsible for the most recent intelligence and if that intelligence isn't lacking or there are no reports filed, then I would know that the supervisor in that particular area is lacking and make sure…

Source: 11087163
Unfortunately, the person responsible would be the first line supervisor and then it would go all the way up to the lieutenant and ultimately to the commander and up through to the Department. However, since the Department has not formalized any program or standardized any reports on intelligence or make many strict definitions on what they will accept or what they won't accept, or even decide the difference between information, it normally falls on the individual officer who's out there doing the interviews. He takes it as far as he wants or he ends it immediately.

Source: 11105904

I think we all are, from each Officer in a unit, making sure that something is being done, all up to the commander. I think everybody is part of the unit, is part of that.

Source: 11148753

I guess, me from here, you know. I kind of like try to pull it off together the best I can, you know. And like I said, I couldn't do without some of my sergeants--something they're the ones that do the yeoman's work, at least get the guys out there and engaged, keeping them focused. You know, and the, they've been very helpful.

Source: 11257484

Yeah, one guy handles here that helps out with the entire division, but primarily for of gangs and narcotics. And they also have an analyst to, you know. And (one guy) is, actually he's working with the violence side of it and the gang--the gang hierarchies. However, often times they hold information because their source around here is always narcotics, even the ones that are, the murders out there, the high level gang leaders that they also dope.

Source: 11234773

The above responses infer a system based on self reporting in that one or more individuals, including some of the supervisors interviewed, provides information related to intelligence which may be pooled for consensus before it is vetted and considered useful. This type of process may be used as needed but would be centered on specific cases and teams and the products developed would be restricted for their exclusive use.
Codes used in this question include ‘Task,’ ‘Oversight,’ and ‘Practice.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.64, 97% indicating substantial agreement with a strong degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.

Theme 63 was developed from the respondent’s input as to whether they had suggestions to improve on current intelligence practices within the OCD.

One of the things that always seems to happen, at least for us, is there’s always the last-minute report that needs to be done, that needs to be done yesterday. I don't know if there’s any type of scheduling that they can put together by dates where you'd be able to meet those reports, but it just seems to me that a lot of the reports that you have to complete are always a reaction to something that either happened out on the street or a question that was post to maybe the higher-ranking officer that couldn't be answered because he didn't have all the information. Now it levels, it comes down to your level and you have to put all that together.

Source: 11028961

Well, I think perhaps maybe some sort of database, you know, cataloguing a lot of stuff, you know, where we can--where things could be permanently stored, you know, by district, whether be our--like maybe done on a daily basis, whatever GES report was done in that district for that day could be stored there and then maybe somehow cross-referenced to like location within that district. I think that would be helpful.

Source: 11257484

The biggest issue and the biggest item I think that would be a boon to this organization in this division as well as probably other departments to get the gang intelligence database up and running and functional.

Source: 11247602

Each of the above respondents interprets a need for a central repository which may be kept current and accurate and from which information is readily available. These responses infer that such a system does not currently exist.

Theme 64 was developed from the respondent’s perception that more analysis should be integrated with regular tasks on a more regular basis to be better informed.
Yeah and to do it better… Yeah, and scout ourselves and do better because the more you throw out the guys, “Okay, let's do this mission. Let's do this mission because it's going to prevent this crime. Well, let's analyze as a team, as the managers, what's working and let's do it better as, you know, what could we do to do it better.

Source: 11058231

Theme 66 was developed from the respondent’s perception that more training and the use of more or better technology should be encouraged for use in OCD work.

We can always use additional resources, technological and otherwise. We're always running around for, you know, we can't even get any YouTube or MySpace when you're talking about murder. Yeah, we could always use--what's the Coplink® you're talking about, we don't have that. Right, and we use Reference USA®, yeah. We can use that again and a more accessible LEADS 2000 would be nice and we have two guys that are qualified because it's such a pain the ass.

Source: 11062184

That's definitely additional training, resources, and technology all three would be a benefit. The technology is lacking with the retrieving the information and that's probably biggest glitch and our resource--our current resources are sometimes our informational services has provided us with are outdated and not easy to use on a level for the police officers. We're definitely lacking the analytical end.

Source: 11087163

There's a lot of suggestions and recommendations. One of this refers to training of individual officers. They'll do what you ask them to do but however, they need to be trained on historical debriefings with gang members as opposed to just what's happening now and then and documenting that. The paradox to that though is that once it's documented, it usually goes into a file and showed among those team members unless it's something that warrants bringing facts to the Deployment Operations Center. The practices, there needs to be a database where the information is standardized to go into, and when I say standardized, specific fields that need to be addressed because garbage in is garbage out.

Source: 11105904

Yeah, I, you know, when I look at, I think there's got to be more strategic planning for intelligence, in general, for the whole division. I mean more of the plans, strategic plans and it starts with where do we, what are we, what's our goals as a Division and how does each section play a part and what are the commonalities in terms of developing technology. So, I think developing a
formal organizational function of intelligence team or unit that are build behind having the technology and the training as analyst, I think that's really critical that the Organized Crime Division can share all these information through all the three sections internally. And if necessary, share it externally when needed, you know? But I think it's got to be done strategically and it's got to be done with some planning because in order for that to happen, we have to, you know, remember that we need to develop, you know, policy, look at it legally and look at some of the legal issues and some of the technology that has to be developed and has to be funded to be developed, too.

Source: 11129230

Training is always a benefit, as much training as we could possible get that's possible to send somebody to. I think it should always be there. And it's going to move to next question, we have deal our technological capabilities as we go along also. I think we are somewhat—we're fortunate enough to have our own computer support here in this unit, that sometimes we don't have to depend on Information Services because they are slow in responding to certain things, but I think we are also—misfortune that we are still limited in our technology capabilities by the location on which we are. The capabilities of the equipment that they placed here, there is still a limitation on some of what the equipment can do. And part of that comes with my—there are aspects that the financial need can be meet but the overall financial need is one that have to come from a bigger source.

Source: 11148753

Training resources and (making) technology available in the field rather than (just) in the office; that to me is—is key.

Source: 11234773

The above respondents emphasize the need for training on existing or new technologies which could help them with their tasks. Many of the respondents also emphasize the need for structured means of information collection, maintenance, and access which would make their duties more efficient. There is an inference in some of the responses that OCD would rather be less dependent on outside units which provide or direct their information and intelligence processes.
Codes used in this question include ‘Improvement,’ ‘Concept Use,’ and ‘Tasks.’

Kappa ($\kappa$) = 1.00, 100% indicating perfect agreement with an extremely high degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. The exceptionally high degree of agreement and association may be related to the fact that each of the respondents has ideas on how tasks can be managed more efficiently and each is more than willing to discuss their ideas. This researcher sees valid and important information in the respondent’s suggestions to question 13i and will infer this may the first time these respondent’s have been asked for this type of input.

Theme 67 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to whether they knew of any Department plans to improve the management of intelligence processes within the OCD.

No, I'm not aware of anything. Source: 11028961

I'm not. Source: 11062184

No... Source: 11105904

The responses to the above question were brief and self explanatory.

Theme 68 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to whether requests to improve the management of intelligence processes have met with any success.

Well, (the Commander) wants our computer people to put together a program that would put all of organize crime on the same page and what we've done, what we are getting done and to keep track of what we've done and what we're going to get done. They want it all and all of organized crime; every unit that is in organized crime (should be able) to be able to do it. Source: 11042566
We are constantly requesting new and improved tools as just as where Accurint® is one of our basic tools that we need to improve tools because they're lacking. Sometimes the information is old, faulty.

Source: 11087163

I know one thing we've worked on recently in the Department, as a whole, we're working on is trying to get a, is getting the Clear system available to the Blackberries. There are a lot of supervisors and people on the street have in both the Organized Crime Divisions as well as the Patrol Divisions so you could actually maximize the ability to run names and get information on the street. We have a lot of trouble with PDTs (Personal Data Terminals) over the years.

Source: 11247602

Personal Data Terminals (PDTs) are in-car computers which, more accurately, serve as modems and should eventually be replaced with actual in car wireless computers. The value of data received via any mobile device is useful for preliminary field inquiries and may serve as information that can contribute to intelligence based system. Two of the respondents infer existing or promised tools which contribute to data management and criminal intelligence are lacking or promised as forthcoming. There is the inference that a standardized model for data collection, analysis, retention, and access is lacking and despite requests for assistance in such matters from other units within the Department, positive responses are either slow or non existent.

Theme 69 was developed from the respondent’s perception that they often try and develop the products we need for intelligence work by ourselves; sometimes based on what we hear is available or know is used by others.

There's a computer technology that's out there, as a matter of fact, we have officers that are working to build it and get it set up that it be able to utilize by the whole unit. Filemaker®, it's storing... It's for storage, for review and for transmitting. Office information will be able to be placed on it and within this system that there will be able to view a little more easily than what it is now.

Source: 11148753
I mean—I rather base our request for, you know, updated technology, training, they're building an investigator to be able to handle the entire investigation himself rather than having one too much outside resources. So, I mean, training's first, specifically, the technology, definitely. I mean, the Deputy is a very strong advocate for us as far as getting training equipments the best we can. We probably have the best within the department we had probably, the best since we pay for ourselves.

Source: 11234773

Well, we were developing some databases for gang intelligence and collecting information from gang members. We felt that that model can then apply to narcotics as well as the vice control section and can be, you know, general intelligence report and not only gangs, but narcotics and also organized crime activities such as gambling, prostitution, and stuff like that. So, we were in the process of developing that.

Source: 11129230

Two of these respondents infer the development or current or existing technologies may assist them in their tasks. Filemaker® is an inexpensive simplified database product, developed by Apple™ which manages fundamental data management without requiring the user to be familiar with any programming languages. It is likely the Department would benefit from a database system that is more robust although such systems might require specific training. Properly trained analysts employed with ILP know the best tools to use and how to best deploy them so they benefit the organization and not just a few users.

Codes used in this question include ‘Data Management,’ ‘Improvement,’ and ‘ILP.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.95, 99% indicating near perfect agreement with a strong degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. The question posed by13j involved knowledge of any proposed plans to benefit the management of intelligence products within the OCD. While several ‘experiments’ are mentioned, no
single standardized method has been embraced by the OCD; alternative solutions will continue to be investigated.

Theme 70 was developed from the respondent’s perception as to whether the critical factors of ILP could contribute to the effectiveness of the OCD beyond the degree of effectiveness currently achieved from existing practices.

We already employ intelligence work in what we do but if ILP provides a better method, it is probably something we could consider. Like I said earlier, and we are doing an intelligence-led policing but I have learn one thing on this job you can always do it better if there's a better outline or better way to do it. I most certainly know that everyday you can do things better. I believe that we will continually get better doing intelligence-led policing whether be in the analysis way or ways of gathering information.

Source: 11042566

Yeah, generally, I would say that if we had more intelligence-led policing, meaning we have more analytical discussions then we have more people that were looking at things analytically for us, would it be more effective to our section? Yeah, I definitely think it would be. Sometimes, you know, that type of direction is a shortcut to, you know, sitting people down for a week trying to come up with an address or a location or whatever. If you had somebody that have those--that information, those skills that can look for those types of things and somebody you can connect with, I think yeah, it would definitely--it would definitely be more effective.

Source: 11028961

Yeah, there's always a room for improvement.

Source: 11058231

Yeah, I guess it would help but I think it would help more just to explain and define what it is the coppers that are going to work for me. Just that they're doing it all right. These guys are already doing it. They're already intelligence-based police work which I kind of said before. That's just good police work. Sure, it would be fine to say, “All right, well, take this column and this column and see how they match.” But like I said, you got to use common sense and he gotta take that gut instinct. You can't completely take away when the hair stand in the back of your neck when you pull over a car. There's something there. Maybe you don't even know what it is yet but--and probably it's intelligence based, you just
don't know what it is. Its certain gut feeling you can't get rid off. You just can't be analytical.

Source: 11062184

The intelligence-based policing would definitely, we use it to a great deal, but by bringing into the department it would-further what we do because our information from the entire Department, intelligence would be more effective if we had a system in place.

Source: 11087163

Absolutely; I think that, through the interview here today, we say that we're utilizing some of that already and I think that, you know, I think better cataloging of some of these information and then, like you would tell earlier the querying would be easy, the ability to query on things would be helpful, but there, too, I think, a lot of that can go down, like the district law enforcement level, too. And let's give them a part of this whole thing 'cause they're the, you know, boots on the ground type of guys.

Source: 11257484

Well, because, I mean, narcotics section is always been an investigative unit and the core, the core of our success is based on informants, which is to--and that to me is intelligence-led. We are led by our informants in my investigations and by [00:32:32 undercover] operations where we infiltrate specific groups. You know, and that starts at the street level. It starts with the, you know, every single officer here has the ability to just to go on an undercover vehicle to go out there for five months and initiate the investigation. Since narcotics is unique since that we--that we create our own investigations. We're not like handed investigation; we create our own and that to me is the core of intelligence-led policing.

Source: 11234773

In summary, these responses continue to emphasize the notion that the Department as a whole and OCD in particular, employ Intelligence-led Policing. This is based on the fact that much of what is accomplished by the OCD involves information management that is focused on tactical resolutions involving specific cases; the process is sometime referred to as doing good police work. Several respondents note that anything that could improve on their ability to use analysis and manage information in a better fashion would
be helpful. There is an inference the majority of these respondents see ILP as a model intended to replace existing information practices in the OCD rather than as a tool intended to enhance current practices.

Theme 71 was developed from the respondent’s perception that the tenets of Intelligence-led Policing could contribute to the OCD’s efficiency beyond what is currently accomplished using existing practices.

Yeah. I think that it would be, number one, you know, it increase the tactical levels of our department in the execution of a strategic plan if they have that information. It's leveraging your resources a lot more efficiently if you have, if you say, “Okay, you know, we got four people working where are you going to put them at?” We put them in the area where more likely all the crime is happening and you give them the intelligence of what type of vehicles are involved or people involved. You know, so you're leveraging all that for tactical use. And then on the strategic level, I think, you know, it helps with strategic planning.

Source: 11129230

Yes. I believe the concept of intelligence-led policing would greatly enhance the efforts of the Organized Crime Division and make it more effective based upon, you know the cliché, "Knowledge is power."

Source: 11105904

Anything that will improve--that wants to help along is going to put the role effectively. There's nothing I can say. One thing, in particular, I can say that would do it but I think as we go along as it was develop and this is one with strategy. It would improve overall effectiveness as we go along as everybody tends to use to it. If this is the basic strategy although, like I said, we essentially already do it but now we are going to formalize it, there might be some little, I don't call it missteps but it will be a process that we have to go through in order to make sure we fall within that formalized strategy.

Source: 11148753

Yeah. I believe that if the concepts are good and I think that we do use them for the most part of like anything. We could always get better at it. Yeah, it's the concept is a solid concept in my opinion. Anytime that you (can be) forearmed, so to speak. Anytime you have as much knowledge as you can about a particular decision you have to make, you're bound to make a better decision.

Source: 11247602
The above respondents infer the use ILP could improve the management of information and intelligence processes for the OCD. Whereas the previous respondents to this question emphasized intelligence in policing is already a practice, the above respondents have a clearer understanding that ILP model represents a process intended to enhance and otherwise build on what has already been developed.

Codes used in the previous question include ‘Value,’ ‘Preference,’ and ‘Concept Use.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.71, 91% indicating substantial agreement with a strong degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question. Respondents to this question see the value in the ILP concept through having a more manageable information and intelligence system although many confuse their overall perception of what constitutes intelligence with the distinctions provided in the ILP model.

Theme 72 was developed from the respondent’s perception that if ILP were introduced to the OCD and did not take from available resources, whether the critical factors of the model would be beneficial to the unit.

Yeah, I'd like to have an analysis, like I said it's just every team. Just to do the, not just the PowerPoint but more like, yeah, all the intelligence stuff like--I mean every time we need the backgrounds on these guys and stuff like that, I would want to have that, just to keep the rest of the guys on the street because if I can spend--the least time I can spend behind a computer, the better. And my detectives, I'd rather have them on the streets working than filling out an IBDR but I understand that we have to that but it would be nice.

Source: 11062184

You want to participate on anything that's going to improve effectiveness. Sometimes even though it would be a drain you have to look at what's is going to be the advantages for the future and if this is going to be an advantage for us as
we go along into the future, most definitely we want to participate.

Source: 11148753

That would be great. I mean, I would love to have a couple of analysts. One girl I had was really good. She hurt herself but she'll be coming back next year. But, yeah that would be outstanding. I mean, I'd participate as long as it's, like you said, it doesn't--it's not going to drain on available resources or my time or anything like that.

Source: 11257484

I'm not really sure what the question means exactly, but I would be happy to lend my participation in an initiative and try it and see if we can make it work and make the Department work better divisionally.

Source: 11247602

Responses to this question were universally supportive of accepting and using the ILP model provided it did not tax their existing resources. Most responses were simply ‘Absolutely’ or ‘Yes’ and the above responses are slightly more elaborate. Supervisors like the idea of having trained analysts available to do work which would otherwise place a drain on existing personnel. Most respondents perceive the application of the ILP model as something that would complement or add to their unit’s effectiveness.

Codes used in the previous question include ‘Preference,’ ‘Value,’ and ‘Data Management.’ Kappa (κ) = 0.82, 96% indicating near perfect agreement with a strong degree of association among the three terms and the responses to the question.

Respondents were strongly in agreement that given the opportunity to participate in the use of the ILP model, they would take advantage of the opportunity.

Each of the themes identified in this section could provide the basis for additional research on police practices. It is clear that many of the responses which contributed to these themes reflected on a variety of interpretations as to how intelligence processes are
managed within the OCD. This variety indicates there is little consensus with regard to methods used to manage intelligence while on the other hand there is sufficient consensus to indicate alternatives to assist the current intelligence practices.

The following chapter will address research findings and conclusion. Initially, the three research questions will be answered within the context of the case study. Other topics will include the refutability and generalizability of involved in this research, issues of perception, language, and meaning as they apply to this research, unanticipated findings, and implications for future research on the topic of Intelligence-led Policing.
CHAPTER FIVE
FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

This chapter presents an overview of the significant findings from this study. The initial section addresses the primary research questions of how the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to police efficiency in addition to that accounted for existing practices and whether the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing can contribute to organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department in addition to that accounted for by existing practices. Additionally, other topics which resulted from this research provide a basis for future research and will be discussed.

This research has provided a strong foundation for answering the questions posed in Chapter One:

1. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to police efficiency in addition to that accounted for by current practices in the Organized Crime Division of the Chicago Police Department?

2. How can the critical factors of intelligence-led policing contribute to the attainment of organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department beyond that accounted for by current practices of the Department?

3. How does intelligence-led policing present a separate construct from existing police practices used by the Organized Crime Division?
The benefit from this research is intended to add insight to the generalizability of the Intelligence-led Policing strategy for scholars, practitioners, and decision makers interested in the use of intelligence in police work.

Findings

Limitations

The lack of detailed understanding of the relationships between intelligence and decision behavior remains an obstacle to a more refined impact analysis. Because some statistical methods may be applied to examine the issue of validity in coding schemes, a second limitation, predicated by available data, may be the anticipated problem of multi-collinearity among responses. This is expected as respondents work in a quasi-military organizational environment in which shared meanings are common. Further, characteristics associated with decision making behavior do not operate independently and are more likely to be found together. The generalizability derived from this research may be used for topics of future reference, some of which will be discussed in this Chapter. Question numbers in the following section refer to the question protocol in Appendix A.

Research Question 1

Responses in interview from this research infer there is the perception among the supervisors interviewed that the practices outlined in the tenets of Intelligence-led policing would benefit the members of the Organized Crime Division in terms of efficiency. Efficiency, for the purpose of this research, means the facility with which a task is conducted and completed without wasting time, effort, or resources.
I would say that if we had more intelligence-led policing, meaning we have more analytical discussions then we have more people that were looking at things analytically for us, would it be more effective to our section? Yeah, I definitely think it would be. Sometimes, you know, that type of direction is a shortcut to, you know, sitting people down for a week trying to come up with an address or a location or whatever. If you had somebody that have those--that information, those skills that can look for those types of things and somebody you can connect with, I think yeah, it would definitely--it would definitely be more effective.

Source: 11028961

Responses to whether the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing could contribute to efficiency in the Organized Crime Division are positively supported throughout this research (overall responses to: 12a $\kappa = 0.52$, 95%, 12d $\kappa = 0.64$, 88%, 13j $\kappa = 0.95$, 99%, 14 $\kappa = 0.71$, 91 %). A number of respondents indicated their impression that Intelligence-led policing was already being practiced within the OCD; the consequences of this impression will be discussed in more depth later in this Chapter. None of the respondents dismissed the concept of ILP as unimportant to their work.

Yeah, I believe that it could be useful. You know, obviously, the people that do the work still got to go out there and, you know, do the old-fashioned police work and do what needs to be done for investigation-wise. But being able to pinpoint direct and to focus on major offenders and to give a little more direction for the activities and associations by--come out with that information is--it could be quite a bit of a shortcut to you having to do that information and research yourself. (Question 12a)

Source: 11028961

Intelligence-led policing is defined as strategy for decision makers whereby intelligence is developed through analysis in order to focus resources on prolific offenders with an intention to prevent crime from occurring. The critical factors included
in the definition that was provided to the respondents reflect that Intelligence-led policing involves the use of analytical resources for the purpose of maintaining criminal intelligence files on specific targets in order to develop associations and links to criminal networks and activities. This process requires (1) the management of centralized archives to the extent that varieties of informational records can be archived, reviewed and analyzed, (2) trained analysts to develop intelligence, and (3) a method for regularly disseminating intelligence for decision makers. Several respondents inferred, as in the example below, that existing OCD processes would be more efficient if they were automated.

I think better cataloguing of some of this information and then, like you would tell earlier the querying would be easy, the ability to query on things would be helpful, but there, too, I think, a lot of that can go down, like the district law enforcement level, too. And let's give them a part of this whole thing 'cause they're the, you know, (boots) on the ground type of guys. (Question 14)

Source: 11257484

There is the inference that parts of the Intelligence-led policing model are in use by some supervisors within the OCD.

Yes, and actually, I think that the department, as I said earlier, does do some of this already... We also have, in a federal level, with mostly the Organized Crime Division, a main 21 list. Main 21 are the main 21 worst people in the city; gang bangers, drug dealers, it's usually based along either a high-managerial position in a gang or narcotics organization or if not of a high-managerial position, an extremely vital character. Okay, we also have a system called the Trap System which is Targeted Repeat Offender Apprehension and Prosecution System...that's basically a joint venture with the state's attorney’s office where our top 11 districts for public violence submit names of their 10 worst subjects, much along like the lines of the top 10 or top 21. And what that does is when no subjects' are arrested, they notify states attorney and the state's attorney is assigned to that case and stays with it.
And that a state's attorney is assigned to that area to make sure that that subject doesn't slip through the cracks on a minor offense. He gets taken; he's prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. But in short though, yes, I mean I believe the concept is useful to any Police Department…in this day in age and with limited resources, you cannot randomly just do random preventive patrols and hope to come across something to prevent crime. You have to have at least a good portion of your police department directed at known targets and known conflicts. (Question 12a)

Source: 11247602

In the above response there is the inference that data collection is accomplished on specific criminals for investigative purposes. Tracking the activities of high profile career criminals who are actively engaged in current criminal activities is one aspect of Intelligence-led policing and is useful in developing information for analysis. Dilemmas may easily arise in the arrangement described by this response and center on who ‘owns’ the information that is to be developed. Both the federal '21 list' and the State’s Attorney ‘top 10’ lists are developed by agencies other than the Department’s OCD.

The individuals provided on the respective lists are included based on other agency analysis without benefit of the criminal intelligence files that would be useful to the OCD. Additionally, the OCD often develops information on the individuals which is forwarded to outside agencies but there is no formal feedback mechanism to indicate whether or how such information is used. For example, members of the OCD may develop and provide information that an individual on one of the lists has fled out of the country. When updated list appear from other agencies and the same individuals appear, there will be some question as to how information provided was managed or whether it was considered important. For specific internal use, beyond what is shared, intelligence
developed through the processes of Intelligence-led policing within the OCD would benefit that unit’s efficiency.

Yes…to some extent we try to do that now through information sharing but the--a more formalized structure would be absolutely a benefit. (Question 12c)

Source: 11087163

As a supplement to existing practices, the use of the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing can contribute to police efficiency in addition to that accounted for by current practices in the Organized Crime Division (12c \( \kappa =0.57, 88\% \)).

Research Question 2

The organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department are summarized in the Department Mission Statement which reads:

The Chicago Police Department, as part of, and empowered by, the community, is committed to protect the lives, property, and rights of all people, to maintain order, and to enforce the law impartially. We will provide quality police service in partnership with other members of the community. To fulfill our mission, we will strive to attain the highest degree of ethical behavior and professional conduct at all times.

The Mission Statement of the Chicago Police Department provides an overview of the core values which govern how the organization expects to operate. Intelligence-led policing can compliment these values by providing a guide that enhances the quality of police services offered to the community through raising the level of professionalism within the Department. Professionalism in this context refers to the skills and competencies expected of Department members engaged in the duties for which they are trained. The tenets of Intelligence-led policing require participants to be proficient with data management tools which will require officers to become involved in continuing
professional development, a process that affords officers the opportunity for learning techniques and new skill sets beyond those learned through regular police training.

Well, I see a continuous room for great improvement. Again, you know, strategic direction of department is based on planning, in budget, and where do you want your money to be put at in terms of its function and tactical operations. So, to reduce violence, we were more committed to making arrests, not gathering intelligence. I think there's got to be a major shift in moving towards investing in people that can analyze, investing in technology that can make the collection of information a lot more easier and a lot easier to collect from everyone instead of just a few people. You can collect it from--if you got one squad working on gangs you might get some reports. But if you get a hundred people out in the same area working, you have the chances of collecting a hundred pieces of information but you have the right technology in place. (Question 11)  

Source: 11129230

The notion of professional development is a concept that, in practice, would provide officers the means for training that may be required to advance the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing. Training that facilitates the use of the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing could be provided in much the same way that professional development courses are offered to teachers who are interested in strengthening their skills beyond any level of previous training or education.

Training is always a benefit, as much training as we could possible get that's possible to send somebody to. I think it should always be there. And it's going to move to next question, we have deal our technological capabilities as we go along also. I think we are somewhat--we're fortunate enough to have our own computer support here in this unit, that sometimes we don't have to depend on Information Services because they are slow in responding to certain things, but I think we are also--misfortune that we are still limited in our technology capabilities by the location on which we are. (Question 13j)  

Source: 11148753

I believe that if the concepts are good and I think that we do use them for the most part of like anything. We could always get better at it. Yeah, it's the concept is a solid concept in my opinion. Anytime that you you're (forearmed), so to speak… anytime you have as much knowledge as you can
about a particular decision you have to make, you're bound to make a better decision. (Question 14)

Source: 11247602

A common component of the Chicago Police Mission Statement, and the critical factors of Intelligence-led Policing, involves the notion of ‘maintaining order.’ As a concept, ‘order maintenance’ in society defines the purpose of having a police department; as a practice there is a distinction between the ‘order maintenance’ mentioned in the Chicago Police Mission Statement and the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing. The Chicago Statement makes no reference to crime prevention while the principle intention of Intelligence-led policing entails crime prevention as its goal.

Respondents throughout this study infer there is a need to train personnel in the techniques which contribute to the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing. This is a positive indication that tenets of Intelligence-led Policing would contribute to the attainment of the organizational goals of the Chicago Police Department beyond that accounted for by current practices of the Department.

Yeah, generally, I would say that if we had more intelligence-led policing, meaning we have more analytical discussions then we have more people that were looking at things analytically for us, would it be more effective to our section? Yeah, I definitely think it would be. Sometimes, you know, that type of direction is a shortcut to, you know, sitting people down for a week trying to come up with an address or a location or whatever. If you had somebody that have those--that information, those skills that can look for those types of things and somebody you can connect with, I think yeah, it would definitely--it would definitely be more effective. (Question 14)

Source: 11028961
Research Question 3

The construct of current police practices within the OCD is grounded in investigative procedures which require a crime to have been committed before it can be investigated.

Initial crime reporting begins with the preliminary report, done by a patrol officer; a beat cop. Depending on the severity or the time of commission of the crime, if an arrest is not immediately affected, the report is forwarded to the Bureau of Investigative Services (BIS) for assignment to a detective. The detective does some rudimentary research to become familiar with the victim(s) and crime circumstances and possibly to ascertain whether the crime being reported is part of a trend related to similar instances. Based on the collection of evidence and witness or victim interviews, the detective may develop enough information to start building a case against an offender. If the information is insufficient, the case may be suspended, i.e., not pursued pending new leads, but the case is not ‘cleared.’ Cleared cases are those in which an arrest is made or otherwise closed for exceptional circumstances such as the victim’s decision not to pursue the case. In any case, if the circumstances of the crime involve narcotics, street violence involving guns, or homicide, the case information will also be provided to the Organized Crime Division.

Because the Organized Crime Division works exclusively with incidents of street level violence and narcotics, which are often related, the unit has a broader perspective on citywide crime and can focus additional resources on an investigation. The overall effect of their activity can and does impact a criminal type of activity (drugs, weapons sales, homicide) but the focus of the OCD endeavor is to resolve the issue at hand through arrest and move on to the next case. It should be noted that the current OCD teams are
very successful at what they do and currently lead all other city police units in arrests for
the cases in which they are involved.

In contrast, Intelligence-led policing involves a focus on known prolific offenders,
sometimes referred to as career criminals, who have demonstrated, based on past actions,
their intention to perpetuate criminal activity. Although entire organizations, e.g. New
Jersey State Police, have adopted the Intelligence-led policing model as a standard of
practice, the model is intended to supplement, not replace, existing police practices. This
is an important distinction when compared among other policing programs and supports
that fact that Intelligence-led policing presents a different construct from practices
currently employed by the OCD.

To illustrate this contrast, a number of policing models have been advanced to meet a
perceived change in the role of policing in modern society. Most notable was the push for
Community Oriented Policing (COP) over the past twenty years. The COP program was
intended to be adopted as a philosophy that permeated every aspect of policing. Such is
not the case with Intelligence-led policing which instead is provided as a management
tool to augment existing police practices without reinventing the organization. The
benefit of an Intelligence-led policing over existing practices centers on the contention
that with the correct tools and methods there are instances when it is possible to interrupt
criminal activities to the extent that the possibility for future crime is eliminated and
thereby prevented.
Other Considerations

Refutability and Generalizability

Karl Popper (1963) maintained that in addition to evidence in support of the scientific method (and research) being necessary and sufficient it must also be subject to the notion of refutability. Refutability contends that inductive inference limits, rather than aids, the creation of knowledge in that the scientific method establishes universal knowledge based on empirics which may be useful in order to corroborate findings among theories but should not alone be used to determine knowledge because the process is subject to falsification. Falsification is established when one exception to an accepted standard is discovered thereby changing the universality of the standard; a common illustration entails the discovery of the black swan. Often, in defense of inductive methods, Occam’s razor which maintains in complex matters, the simplest solution is likely to be more correct (than others) is employed.

This study emphasizes the roles of language, relations, and motivation in the postmodernism tradition and includes a rejection of the assumption that objectively, what is observed represents something which can be universally accepted. However, this research does effectively bring forth a wide range of phenomena based on a few simple postulates derived from a model of codified observations. The methodology can easily be used as the basis of further research. In this research, examples derived through interviews reveal there is a disconnect between the intention and use of intelligence, as defined by the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing which lend themselves to
policing tasks, and the actual processes, as they are understood and used by members of the OCD, to develop intelligence products for use in policing tasks.

Language and Meaning

The critical factors of Intelligence-led policing include a definition of intelligence. When the Department of Justice (DOJ) issued its manuals on Intelligence-led policing (http://info.publicintelligence.net/IntelLedPolicing.pdf) it was very specific in making distinctions between terms that would be used to describe the concept. ‘Intelligence,’ according to the DOJ, is ‘produced after collected data is evaluated and analyzed.’ Further, the DOJ manual explained that the process of analysis, while aided by some software, required trained individuals to synthesize information materials into a manageable, easily understandable form for presentation to decision makers. Other authors, notably Ratcliffe (2007), have contributed to the notion that success in developing useful products from the Intelligence-led model depend on a complete understanding of the terms. The principle reason for emphasizing what is meant by the development of ‘intelligence’ is to avoid confusing it with the development of information ‘information’ which is common in police work. Until information is subjected to analysis, it remains little more than data of interest. When analysis begins to tie associations among and between information, the intelligence process begins. In contrast, the definition for ‘intelligence’ by the Chicago Police is a more elusive. The term ‘intelligence’ is referenced in General Orders which serve as the policy directives for the Department, but the term ‘intelligence’ is never defined.
I don't know the Department's definition, (or) if there is one, to be perfectly honest. (Question 3)

Source: 11257484

If there is a definition, I really don't know it. I think when people think intelligence I think they also think like technology. They kind of go hand-in-hand; I don't know if there is a specific definition and I don't think the Department has ever used it. (Question 3)

Source: 11028961

In response to whether respondents were aware of a Department definition for ‘intelligence,’ responses were uniformly in agreement as to whether a definition existed or, if there was a definition, whether it was used. (Q3. $\kappa =0.94, 97\%$).

The researcher contends the intelligence related practices by which supervisors develop and define their critical tasks contribute to the effectiveness of their missions and ultimately to the understanding and perception of the use of intelligence in police work, particularly in crime prevention.

If supervisors understand and define intelligence related activities in a manner which differs from those required for a predictive or proactive response, emergent, rather than desired consequences are likely to impact their effectiveness. Emergent consequences arise from the failure to regard a sufficient number of variables prior to the implementation of a program; some of these variables may be unknown while others are ignored.

The Intelligence-led policing model provides well defined terms and direction as to the methods and steps required to provide intelligence products that can assist decision makers establish strategic plans. Current use of the same or similar terms used by the Chicago Police Department gives rise to a wide range of interpretations.
Intelligence is probably used in the Organized Crime Division more effectively than in the rest of the department. We get intelligence and information from confidential clients that we disseminate immediately or used for individual attacks on problem area where that intelligence could be used specifically. As opposed to patrol, that information doesn't get out as quickly. We're kind of setup to disseminate information and intelligence based on gangs, everything from hierarchy to anniversary dates where violence is to be possibly perpetrated as a result of retaliation. (Question 2)

Source: 11087163

The above response addresses effectiveness in the use of intelligence by the OCD. The language combines the terms of intelligence and information together and states that such products are disseminated immediately. From a tactical perspective, this is method does work well in investigations. Once data is used in this fashion, it has a tendency to decay and without provisions for archiving, it may be lost entirely over time. The above example illustrates how the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing would contribute to the efficiency of current OCD practices but also provides the basis for future research on the use or limitations of language, meaning, and understanding that can result in disconnects between what is intended from a method of practice and what is delivered in practice.

Disconnects in What is Expected from Intelligence

The perception of what constitutes intelligence or how it could be used is dependent on the direct experience or education of most supervisors rather than on any literal definition provided by the Department. Some of the supervisors interviewed have
military training that included work in the field of intelligence. Each of the supervisors interviewed is committed to the task of reducing street violence to the fullest extent possible given the resources at their disposal. Most work long and irregular hours and all are immersed in finding ways to improve the Division’s efficiency and effectiveness. This includes managing equipment and manpower resources involving work schedules which function on a 24/7/365 basis.

The supervisors themselves are accountable to others who are higher in the chain of command and serve as the decision makers who determine the overall strategies for the Department. Based on these strategic decisions, rank and file supervisors are tasked with the responsibilities produce, i.e., provide quantitative indicators in support of strategic decisions. Quantitative indicators of a successful strategy are generally measured by (1) arrests and (2) reductions in crime. The tactics used to achieve results are discretionary on the parts of tactical supervisors.

Okay. Well here. Let's be realistic here, this is the real answer. Real answer is, what is the city of Chicago trying to cut down on? Burglaries? Stolen cars? Narcotics? Violent crime! Homicides and shootings and if you want to be more succinct, homicides; so I know that. I've been told that, I know what I need to do with my people. If I get homicides down, that is going to be the answer. So, what is sent by our leader is to get homicides down and do everything we can to do that. That's what we'll do. If they change it, then we'll change how we do it. But give me what you want done, what do you want done? You want homicides down. Good. Thank you. We're going to step back and we'll make that happen. (Question 13g)

Source: 11042566

The ability of the Organized Crime Division to successfully accomplish the tasks delegated to them has never been at issue. At issue is whether models such as
Intelligence-led policing can contribute to the units overall effectiveness by augmenting the effect of current practices. If buy-in to a new approach or concept is to occur for an organization, it must begin from the top. In organizations, when the message from top management is clear, consistent, and persistent, members of the organization are able to form a better picture of what is expected of them.

In an article for the Chicago Magazine (2009) which focused on technology used in policing, the Chicago Police Superintendent stated he wanted to continue to push the concept of intelligence-led policing, using real-time information to guide police resources and be able to develop ‘intelligence that allows us to take action and move resources with the ultimate goal of being able to get ahead of the crime.’ Subsequently, in a CBS report, the Superintendent stated, “We've been harping on intelligence-led policing and the best source of information, I would think, is the actual victim who was shot” (cbs2chicago.com/local/police.jody.weis.2.1056999.html). Neither of these descriptions conforms to the definition, nor the purpose, of Intelligence-led policing. Disparities as to what constitutes Intelligence-led policing by a chief executive can send a mixed message to those who are expected to be engaged in the program.

I would agree with it (the concept of ILP) but it sounds like a catch phrase and sounds like a buzzword more than he (The Superintendent) believes in anything, you know. (Question 5)

Source: 11062184

I think that some of this crime analysis theory is the flavor of the day. The bottom line is you still have to have officers out on the street interacting with people. I've never seen anyone sitting in their office and making arrests. Obviously, it's trendy and it's a way to justify people's positions. It's just a way to justify the planning for research. What I mean, I'm a little bit old school, I still believe in the fact, I mean a combination of the theory is more effective than the total embracing of, you know, everything has been
researched down to the last. The bottom line is you still have to go out there in police cars and stop cars, stop people, interact with people, and that information's going to come from the street. (Question 12a)

Source: 11234773

Anthropologist Claude Levi-Strauss (2004) noted that among primitive populations, to be able to explain anything, one had to be able to understand everything. This statement applied to the abilities of primitive populations to cope within the limits of their knowledge and serves as the basis of myth. The notion is contrary to the scientific approach but is used at times by organizations to dismiss objections to weak or spurious planning. Organizational program designs may be weak as a result of what Herbert Simon (1998) described as bounded rationality, which maintains that organizational decisions are restricted by the information they possess. In both examples, members of organizations or cultures which advance incomplete programs are required to align their understanding of new programs in order to collaborate in program implementation. When this occurs, disconnects between intention and implementation pose a viable threat to the new program.

Intelligence-led policing was initially introduced to the Department by Phil Cline. The program centered on a Deployment Operations Center (DOC) to serve as the clearing house for specific reported crime related information. All reports of major crimes involving shooting victims and homicides which occurred in the city were forwarded to the DOC for review. Conceptually, Detectives assigned to the DOC were expected to review these cases, ascertain if patterns or common constancies existed, and compile reports based on their observations. The process was ad hoc; the majority of the reports generated were limited to only the initial information received, and the emphasis of the
DOC centered on providing as much information as possible to as wide an audience as possible.

I think the Department does focus on intelligence-led policing. I think it has for a few years, but it could always be pushed up to higher and higher levels and become more and more efficient. I mean under Phil Cline, they started the Deployment Operations Center which is basically the first step in intelligence-led policing where it was the information gathering section for the Department and then it spit out an analyzed and vetted intelligence report, so, but I think we can always ramp it up and with this time of less police officers, than we've had in the past, you have to do everything you can to make the Department more efficient. (Question 5)

Source: 11247602

Members of the OCD contribute greatly to the information which the DOC receives. Because they represent a specialized plain clothes (not uniformed) group which travels through Chicago in unmarked vehicles of various descriptions; they would ordinarily not be recognized as police. Without detailing the particulars, it must be noted that much of their work is covert. Based on their assignments, these officers provide regular reports to the DOC. Many of those interviewed had reservations about the value of the ‘intelligence’ they received in return.

It's informally we called it the round table and basically we go, we discuss the current conflicts from each particular area. It's a short meeting ...those are--I think we get the best information and leaders at Area meetings, there are maybe 21 meetings, you know, the DOC, just to be perfectly honest, I think that's one least productive meetings because as you sit you're trying to--I think it's a waste. (Question 13e)

Source: 11058231

Now we do send a lot of those reports up the chains to DOC, who want...they are keeping it somewhere, God knows where. But when some of the gang members stop them, they get dead and the girl who does see the stuff on the narcotics side. We send her all sorts of stuff but really it's been--it's almost a problem of too much information. Yeah, you can have every single GD on the computer but you got to know if they're in the California Jackson GDs or
When a separation between the intention and the use of a program such as Intelligence-led policing begin, weaknesses attributable to disconnects can occur. Disconnects are apparent when two groups within the same organization work to complete the same tasks without either being aware of any benefit the other might provide towards accomplishing the common task. The possibility of disconnects may be reduced through strengthening the bonds of communications when tasks are focused on common goals. The tenets of Intelligence-led policing provide one method for strengthening communication bonds.

There is the inference in law enforcement that because a strategy is implemented which requires subscription to a particular plan that all involved are (1) privy to the tools required to execute the strategy and (2) have an understanding of what is to be accomplished through the strategy. The reasons for organizational disconnects that occur because one or both of these assumptions is missing is worth further study.

The Issue of Ownership, Latency, and Entropy

In addition to the practices involved with the development of intelligence are concerns of ownership of information. Investigative procedures used to develop information are based on training and experience. During the investigative process, which involves the collection of evidence, including interviews, information is gathered for the unique purpose of establishing a case. A case is intentionally developed to provide sufficient and necessary information and evidence which can be used to identify and seek
prosecution of the offender. The progress of an individual case is determined by an investigator who manages information according to how it is perceived as being related to the case. In this sense, the investigator demonstrates the initial phase of developing intelligence from data in that from all data available, the investigator parses what is of interest, vets sources, and disregards anything that remains. In doing so, the investigator becomes vested in all the case-related information, i.e., there is ownership.

The exchange of information that may become intelligence can involve several persons and multiple agencies along both horizontal and vertical organization hierarchies. Horizontally, information is passed to other detectives on a team within the Division or, in some cases, the OCD analyst. Under specific instances, for example if information indicates there is an immediate threat to life, a recommendation for action, involving several teams, is initiated and general information is be distributed to command staff outside of the OCD. The same information may be passed vertically to outside agencies when it involves active cases in which there is collaboration. As long as the OCD has sole control of the information, there is ownership.

Well, in the Organized Crime Division, we don't have per se our own intelligence, I mean I'm sorry, analysis group such as the DOC, but each team and each officer that's assigned to investigations in the Organized Crime Division does analyze their information as it pertains to their investigation in their cases. That information and analysis does go to the bigger cause of the whole department at some point and also depending on the urgency of it. If it's urgent, we do what's called an IBDR (Intelligence Based Deployment Recommendation). (Question 7)

Source: 11247602

When collaboration with other agencies along a vertical hierarchy occurs, information from the OCD becomes co-mingled with similar information obtained at the other level.
The use of information by different agencies can be for different purposes and is related to agency responsibilities. For example, local authorities seek information leading to arrests while federal agencies may want the same information to strengthen an existing case for prosecution at a later date.

In relying on ‘outside’ information, the notion of ownership becomes compromised to varying degrees. As mentioned earlier, the OCD often works in conjunction with other agencies representing federal or state interests. Because agencies often work to develop cases on the same individuals, OCD members are unlikely to be surprised by the individuals identified by outside agencies as ‘top ten’ targets. Most often, these individuals represent persons who were originally introduced to the outside agencies by the OCD. But the ‘same’ information can assume different forms because of two factors which consistently effect information and intelligence that is passed back and forth between agencies; those factors are latency and entropy.

Latency is a condition of delay between a time when information is gathered and when it is dispersed. Information is more current for OCD members who are actively engaged with street sources but the information may lose value during the time it takes to reach other agencies. Entropy is the often referred to as a state of ‘disorder’ in information but is more aptly represented as data which is ‘lost’ during the course of transmission between the sender and receiver. Effects of entropy are evident in information exchanges between analysts and end users, between agencies, and between departments within the same organization. The ability to establish a centralized
intelligence process deters the effects of both latency and entropy in that it can truly serves as a real time center.

I could comment on this--the Organized Crime Division lacks a central intelligence unit that would take all the difference intelligence products from narcotics, organized crime, gang enforcement, and even the vice division. And since there's no central location or intelligence collection manager to review the added information, our use of criminal intelligence is lacking.

(Question 11)  
Source: 11105904

(Decision makers) got to be careful about over-information, you can't throw everything at the lawn and see what's gonna stick and then like DOC giving you a 30-page report and half of it is about neighbors. Now, I don't even do give a (expletive deleted) about that. Where is this guy? What kind of--what gang is he in, who’s he shot at before and you never get anything. I know all you get is an Accurant report that says he applied for a credit card in 1972, you know… (Question 12b)  
Source: 11062184

The effects of ownership of information are most evident in the results produced from actionable intelligence. Actionable intelligence is that from which a specific tactical engagement results usually leading to arrests. A longitudinal study in the ways the same information is used by different law enforcement agencies is worth further study. Implication on the future of policing, Intelligence-led programs, evidence-based policing would benefit from further research into the manner and methods used by police for managing and developing intelligence products in order to bring more standardization processes into play.
Implication on the Future of Policing, Intelligence-led Programs, and Further Research

This research has provided a microcosm on some of the concerns that will impact the future of policing as it strives to provide required services while faced with dwindling resources. At the time of this research, well over half of the Police Departments in the United States have been forced to reduce the size of their departments because of budgetary restraints; for many departments this reduction has included layoffs. If this trend continues, future United States models for policing will require agencies to work in assistance or, in agreement, through instruments of mutual aid between departments. Under such agreements, geographically adjoining agencies combine resources to address mutual problems which might otherwise prove unmanageable if each agency were left to their own device. These types of regional arrangements are relatively new in the United States but are common in Europe, especially with Interpol. Most commonly, mutual assistance is provided in the form of information and intelligence exchanges.

Current problems involving in exchanging and maintaining information and intelligence revolve around interoperability. Several departments have their own methods for collecting and archiving information which can not be easily transferred to others.

For example, the United States Navy has, since 2003, been involved with project LinX, a law enforcement information exchange program intended to connect states to a common crime and incident database in order for the Navy to avail itself of information which it deems important. Each of the states involved in the project shares the common characteristic of having at least one shoreline border. There are technical skills required to
set and maintain this application and the purpose of collection is to aid the Navy in protecting U.S. Shores. Similar program designs intended to strengthen intelligence ties between local and regional law enforcement agencies should be vigorously explored.

To date, no one application is used universally by local and regional law enforcement agencies to share or maintain intelligence files. Certainly data is collected, but the steps required for developing intelligence rests with human analysis, not applications or software. Analysts often serve as an information buffer between strategists and tacticians and can provide an important input to both. Decision makers can articulate to analysts the focus of an intended strategy so that the value in meaning from the data collected can be established and passed to those who will implement programs.

In addition to the logistics involved in developing a strong Intelligence-led policing design for agencies, there are certain environmental dynamics which will dramatically affect the ways in which the Department will use the tools required for Intelligence-led policing in the near future. Chicago’s fiscal problems affect how many new officers will be hired for the next police classes (2011-12). Current estimates indicate 450 officers will be eligible to retire during this time while plans for new hires provide for approximately 200 positions. Although this may appear as a losing proposition in terms of attrition, many of the new hires will represent a generation, the ‘Y Generation,’ that is generally adept at, and familiar with, communication devices, media devices, and digital technologies; this dynamic could positively impact the future of programs like Intelligence-led policing. The ability to manage and understand the use of technology
prior to being introduced to the tenets of programs can enhance progress in the development of intelligence centers.

**Unanticipated Findings**

The interviews conducted for this research focused first on the research questions as to whether the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing could serve to make the duties of Chicago’s Organized Crime Division more efficient. The Intelligence-led policing model emphasizes the use of analytics to transform information to actionable intelligence. Actionable intelligence is information that has been distilled through the process of analysis and serves as the basis for making decisions on how resources will be used. In addition to structured responses, additional issues related to the development of useful intelligence products within the OCD came to light.

**Technology and the Development of Intelligence**

Although the use of technology was addressed at the conclusion of the interviews, many of the respondents introduced the topic during their responses to questions related to the concept of intelligence. This infers respondents perceived a strong bond between the notion of intelligence and technology.

My interpretation is that we need to use more technology in developing our tactical strategies and operations for areas that are experiencing some high rates of violence or gang violence, or drug activity that leads to gang violence and shooting. (Question 5)  

Source: 11129230

I think when people think intelligence I think they also think like technology… (Question 3)  

Source: 11028961
Technology is a tool. In an age of ubiquitous computing, the tools most used by society are devices which provide instant access to information that helps manage our affairs. Technology tools can be represented as hardware, e.g., computers, cellular devices including GPS equipment, cameras, etc., or software including database applications, tracking applications, or camera analytics. Many of the tools available in today’s technology arsenal can help manage decisions but the tools themselves do not make decisions.

The Importance of Analysis

Decision makers required to review large amounts of information within finite time frames need assistance in sense-making to avoid being overloaded. Such assistance is provided through the use of analysts. Several respondents indicated the importance in using an analyst.

Our analyst does a great job of connecting the dots on the overall picture by using databases that the officers started using or don't have the access to and sometimes putting everything together from another unit making an arrest that they are not aware of. Connecting aliases where an individual doesn't have the time to make that kind of analysis or an analyst can bring it all together and analyze it often more effectively than the officers themselves (Question 10)

Source: 11087163

So, therefore, I mean, there's--we know because he's got a history and we got intelligence on him. We know that there's going to be a spike in crime because prior to his incarceration, he was responsible for eight to ten murders. So, I mean that intelligence derived from the analyst and when you look at the map, you see a spike and had you not (gotten) the intelligence from The analyst or some of the guys here that track that person, particular person or target, you would not know why the spike is there, because he just got released. (Question 10)

Source: 11105904
I think that the analysts are the key to pulling the data together in connecting crime intelligence and coming out with a report that would leverage all our human resources and we talked about the analysts using technology in using information, leveraging our human resources to be more strategically focused and obviously more efficient and obviously putting our officers at the right place at the right time at the right spot. (Question 12a)

Source: 11129230

In response to the changing needs in government agencies for the need of qualified analysts, several academic institutions are providing advanced degrees in analytics and research based instruction centered on the development of police intelligence processes. Michigan State’s Dr. David Carter offers graduate programs specifically designed for training in police intelligence. Several institutions provide similar courses which focus on the use of analysis to develop intelligence products.

The Importance of Training as a Resource to Develop Intelligence

When asked what resources could improve the intelligence processes used by the OCD responses centered on improving or obtaining additional software, training, and teamwork among investigators (Q13i. \( \kappa =1,00\ 100\% \)). The inference was that additional software and training of investigators could aid in the implementation of Intelligence-led policing. None of the responses indicated that trained analysts, civilian or sworn, might be recruited from within the ranks of the Department or from universities to assist in implementing the use of Intelligence-led policing.

Intelligence-led policing is one method for law enforcement to focus on critical tasks necessary to deal with crime issues. Technologies that provided assistance with geographical information systems, databases, or social network designs can assist the
managers who use Intelligence-led policing but technology should not be interpreted as
the solution to the complex and difficult process of making hard decisions.

Respondents were specific as to which technologies were used but less clear on
which technologies could be used to manage the information or data which was
retrieved. Trained analysts are often familiar with the types of technology required to
enhance meaning from information. For example, products such as CopLink® or i2®
are software applications that accept data from a variety of sources and multiple
jurisdictions to link associations among suspects. To aid decision makers more
attention should be given to the use of trained analysts, techniques of critical thinking,
statistical testing for significance, and mission specific experience. Mission specific
experience involves the competencies of individuals as content experts when dealing
with a specific crime related problems.

Other Considerations

Respondents were aware that technology played into developing intelligence products
but felt disenfranchised from the decision process in selecting which products were
available or could be most useful to them in their tasks. As a result, a variety of software
applications available are restricted to specific users while others are underused because
investigators lack training and are compelled to rely on the data interpretation of other
agencies.

That is through, I believe, Research for Development Information and Services
Division that decides what technology can be available to us. However, I will
say that very seldom is the end user consulted on what they need in order to
develop an intelligent product. (Question 13d)

Source: 11105904
Conclusion

Since the events of September 11th, 2001, local law enforcement has been asked to assume additional responsibilities for which they were not prepared; responsibilities which involved information sharing and exchanges that tied to expanded regional or federal interests. Since that time, there has been an accelerated attempt to join information sources along guidelines presented through federal agencies. Local law enforcement became aware of the wide variety of tools and programs which could be used to serve their own interests. Intelligence-led policing may serve as one of those tools.

This research determined to a high degree the respondent’s believe there is value in the critical factors of Intelligence-led policing (Q14. $\kappa =0.71$, 91%). Additionally, if provided so that the program could be implemented without draining existing resources, respondents were similarly in agreement that it would a provide benefit to the duties required in their tasks (Q15. $\kappa =0.82$, 96%). The respondents were equally in agreement that there were no immediate plans to enhance existing intelligence processes within the OCD (Q13j. $\kappa =0.95$, 99%).

Changes in the law enforcement have always been slow and often in reaction to changes in the environment in which they serve. The experiences related through interviews in this study demonstrate the Chicago Police and the OCD are aware that changes are necessary in order to maximize resources and to function more efficiently; an important step in realizing why change is necessary. Implications from this study indicate the OCD, a unit called upon to implement Department strategies, realize new approaches
intended to enhance, not replace, current practices, are welcome. Intelligence-led policing is one such approach and if the critical factors involved can be fully integrated with existing investigative procedures, the abilities of the Department’s OCD will be enhanced beyond the level of detecting and interceding in street level violence to the point at which crime prevention becomes a realistic and attainable goal.
APPENDIX A:

QUESTIONS PROTOCOL
INTERVIEW GUIDE and PROTOCOL

Description: The following interview is being conducted as part of a research study examining the concept of intelligence and its use in police work. A concept is an idea that serves as the basis for a hypothesis or ‘best guess’ for a solution. As a term, intelligence can mean different things to different people. All responses to the questions posed are strictly confidential and protected by protocol. There are no right or wrong answers to the questions asked in this interview.

Interview Code No.: 

Intelligence as a Concept in Policing

1. Generally, how do you perceive the function of intelligence in police work?

2. How is intelligence used or applied in the Organized Crime Division (OCD)?

3. Is there a Department definition for intelligence and its use by the Department?

4. Based on your experience, what practices contribute to intelligence in policing for the OCD?

5. How would you interpret the Superintendent’s statement that the Department needs to focus on ‘intelligence-driven policing’?

6. Information + Analysis = Intelligence. Do you believe most of the answers you require for your decisions are based on intelligence or on information?

7. Analysis is a process in which complex information is reduced to a simpler form so decision making is easier. How would you perceive the function of crime analysis in the Organized Crime Division?

8. ‘Crime counting’ involves the reporting of raw numbers related to events while ‘analysis’ involves the use of those same numbers to determine if patterns, relationships, or trends exist. Which do you use most and which would be most useful to you?

9. Criminal intelligence is a product or file of analysis that is developed from information sources. How would you perceive the use of criminal intelligence in the Organized Crime Division?

10. How are information sources (surveillance, Confidential Informants, case reports, debriefings, etc.) connected to criminal intelligence work for the unit?
11. **Intelligence analysis** takes the products of crime intelligence and studies them for associations or connections. How would you perceive the role of intelligence analysis in the Organized Crime Division (i.e., who does it, how is it reported, where is it stored, and how is it shared)?

The Notion of Intelligent-led Policing use by the OCD

**Intelligence-led policing (ILP) is defined as a business philosophy and management tool in which data analysis and crime intelligence are used to focus on prolific offenders to develop an objective decision making framework to facilitate crime reduction through strategic management and effective enforcement.** Its purpose is to direct operations with the intention of preventing crime.

12. ILP has been adopted by a number of law enforcement agencies as a strategy to use their limited resources more effectively. In theory, it maintains that more can be done towards crime reduction by using analysts to provide decision makers with intelligence products to direct policing strategies with a focus on major offenders, their activities and associations, rather than by reacting to incidents as they occur. ILP is not intended to replace existing practices.

   a. Do you believe this concept may be useful to the Department, in general, and more specifically, to your section?

   b. From your experience, who are the ‘decision makers’ that determine strategic objectives?

   c. In your opinion, decision makers (would or would-not) benefit from practice of ILP?

   d. Do you agree with the list of critical activities outlined in the concept of ILP, that is, an increased use of analytics and intelligence products about prolific offenders for decision makers to direct strategies?

   e. As a police supervisor, are there critical activities or functions that you would like to add to this definition?

   f. Are there critical activities or functions that you would like to modify in this definition?

   g. Are there critical activities or functions that you would like to delete from this definition?

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1 Ratcliffe, Jerry (2008), Intelligence-led Policing, Portland, Willan Publishing p.182
Organizational Intelligence Practices in the OCD

13. Generally, within the Organization of the Department, and your section specifically:

a. What technology solutions are currently available to manage data and information activities for existing police intelligence units of OCD?

b. Do you find any particular form of data or information management technology more beneficial to your work than others? What technologies do you use most?

c. On the whole, do you perceive the current data and information management technologies more useful for report generation or analysis?

d. Who determines whether new and available technology can be obtained for your section in order to facilitate their tasks (for example access to LEADS 2000, ECSO training, CopLink training)?

e. What human-processes or networks, formal or informal, are in place to manage requests for intelligence products for your section, including requests for data or information from other units, Divisions, or Agencies?

f. Based on your experience, do you find formal or informal networks to be most useful?

g. In your opinion, are there common organizational dependencies within the Department or the Division which determine on which tasks members of your section will focus?

h. Who do you see as responsible for ensuring that the tasks related to intelligence work for your section are being preformed under current practices?

i. Based on your experience, do you have any suggestions or recommendations for improving how the existing intelligence practices within your section might be managed?

j. Are you aware of any plans to improve the execution and management of the components which contribute to intelligence products used in your section?

14. Can you generally comment on whether you believe the concepts of intelligence-led policing would contribute to the overall effectiveness of your section, over and above that accounted for by existing practices?
15. If presented with the opportunity to participate in the process of Intelligence-led Policing so that the program would not drain on your available resources, would you want to participate?
APPENDIX B:

SOLICITATION TO PARTICIPATE
To: Supervisors
Organized Crime Division (OCD)
Gangs, Narcotics, Gang Enforcement Units

From: Tobin Hensgen
Graduate Student
Loyola University Chicago

Subject: Recruitment of Interview Subjects for Participation in a Research Study

The undersigned is a retired member of the Department and formerly detailed to the Organized Crime Division. As part of a dissertation process, the undersigned is currently seeking supervisors from the Gang, Narcotics, and Gang Enforcement sections of OCD to participate in interviews, which will be recorded, related to the development of intelligence processes and use of intelligence products which are required for police tasks. Additionally, participants will be provided with information related the strategy of Intelligence-led policing (ILP), a new policing model, and asked for their input/perception as to whether ILP complements current practices. There are no ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ answers to any of the information discussed in interview but your input is extremely important to this research.

The required research complies with the standards of the Institutional Review Board (IRB) to ensure and to protect the rights and welfare of the subjects who participate and complies with requirements of Legal Affairs, Research and Development, and the Chief of the Organized Crime Division.

Participation in this research is strictly voluntary and the time required for interview, which will be conducted on OCD premises, is less than forty-five minutes. Each interview is strictly confidential; interviews are electronically stripped of identifiers and coded prior to transcription with a focus on what is said, not who said it.

Thank you for your consideration and cooperation. Interested parties should contact me directly via e-mail or at the phone listed below. Should you have any questions regarding this request, feel free to contact me or my dissertation advisor:

Tobin Hensgen (CPD retired)
Loyola University Chicago
Graduate Student
(773) 704-9075
E-mail: thensge@luc.edu
maxim11311@gmail.com

Dr. Theresa Pigott
Loyola University
820 N. Michigan Ave. Rm. 1118
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312.915.6245
E-mail: tpigott@luc.edu

Questions regarding the rights of research participants may be addressed to the Loyola University Chicago Compliance Manager at (773) 508-2689.
APPENDIX C:
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN RESEARCH

Project Title: Toward Intelligence-Led Policing: A Qualitative Study and Assessment of How the Critical Factors of Intelligence-led Policing are Perceived by Chicago Police Department's Organized Crime Division (OCD).

Researcher(s): Tobin Hensgen, Graduate Student, Department of Education

Faculty Sponsor: Dr. Terri Pigott, Department of Education, Research Methodologies

Introduction:
You are being asked to take part in a research study being conducted by Tobin Hensgen for a dissertation under the supervision of Dr. Terri Pigott in the Department of Education at Loyola University of Chicago.

You are being asked to participate because as a supervisor within the Organized Crime Division you have experience with the use of intelligence in police work.

Please read this form carefully and ask any questions you may have before deciding whether to participate in the study.

Purpose:
The purpose of this study is examine whether the critical factors of intelligence-led policing can contribute to the effectiveness and efficiency of the Organized Crime Division above and beyond that achieved through existing practices.

Procedures:
If you agree to be in the study, you will be asked to:

- Participate in an interview. The procedure for this interview involves interviews with supervisors of the Organized Crime Division (OCD) including supervisors from OCD's three sections, Gangs, Narcotics, and Gang Enforcement. Each section has a unique perspective on intelligence and its use in investigations. Supervisors have experience and the advantage of determining which resources are most useful in developing intelligence and how intelligence can be used to benefit the team, the case, or the mission of the OCD.

- While the general theme of the interview involves practices in the use of intelligence, the questions posed are not intended to elicit right or wrong answers. The questions used in interview specifically address what intelligence is meaningful, where its use is most effective, who is responsible for developing intelligence, when has intelligence proved useful, and how intelligence contributes to investigations.

- The interviews will be conducted at Homan Square, and when possible, at the office of the supervisor being interviewed. The interview is expected to run approximately...
forty five (45) minutes. Because the interviews must be transcribed for the purpose of this research, interviews will be tape recorded. The confidentiality of participants is a requirement of this research and is addressed in the confidentiality section below.

**Risks/Benefits:**
There are no foreseeable risks involved in participating in this research beyond those experienced in everyday life.

There are no direct benefits to you from participation, but the results from the collective interviews may be helpful to law enforcement agencies, researchers, and others who employ intelligence as a tool to make decisions regarding resource allocations.

**Confidentiality:**

- All information gathered during interviews will remain strictly confidential. The process involved in this research is monitored by the institutional review board (IRB) of Loyola, a committee formally designated to approve and review research with the intention of protecting the rights of research participants.

- Information gathered is under the exclusive control of the researcher. Interview responses will be coded so that no names or identifiers appear in transcribed reports. This phase of coding is a method used to assign random numbers to interviewees so they may not be identified. This research is intended to focus on responses and not individuals. Responses themselves are further coded by breaking them into categories such that any one category represents the interview answers of many respondents.

- This study is not intended to elicit any reportable information, i.e., questions used in the interview will not touch on specific investigations or cases.

- Tape recordings of interviews are under the exclusive control of the researcher. The interviews will be stored electronically on a secure computer under the control of the researcher. Upon the completion of this research, all recordings will be destroyed.

**Voluntary Participation:**
Participation in this study is voluntary. If you do not want to be in this study, you do not have to participate. Even if you decide to participate, you are free not to answer any question or to withdraw from participation at any time without penalty. Your decision to participate has no bearing on any current or future relationship you have with the researcher.

**Contacts and Questions:**
If you have questions about this research project or interview, please feel free to contact me at (773)-704-9075 or via e-mail at thensge@luc.edu or maxim11311@gmail.com or
you may contact my faculty sponsor, Dr. Terri Pigott at (312)-915-6245 or e-mail at tpigott@luc.edu. Additionally, if you have questions about your rights as a research participant, you may contact the Compliance Manager in Loyola’s Office of Research Services at (773) 508-2689.

Statement of Consent:
Your signature below indicates that you have read and understood the information provided above, have had an opportunity to ask questions, and agree to participate in this research study. You will be given a copy of this form to keep for your records.

Participant’s Signature

Date

Researcher’s Signature

Date
APPENDIX D:

CONFIDENTIALITY AGREEMENT (NDA)
NON-DISCLOSURE OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION AGREEMENT

between

THE CHICAGO POLICE DEPARTMENT

and

Loyola University Chicago
(hereinafter called the Requestor)

The Requestor agrees to the following conditions in order to obtain from the Chicago Police Department (hereinafter called the CPD) the collection of data for the purpose set forth in the Requestor's letter dated 1 March 2009.

1. Requestor agrees that any disclosure of the following information supplied by the CPD to the Requestor shall be subject to the conditions of this Agreement:

(A) Information obtained during interviews with CPD members assigned to the Organized Crime Division. These interviews will be used as part of a case study on intelligence-led policing. The interview sample will include, but not necessarily be limited to, supervisory personnel in the Organized Crime Division.

(B) Any supporting documents obtained for the case study. This supporting information is limited to publicly accessible administrative documents.

2. Unless conclusively demonstrated in the Requestor's application that access to information containing individual names or specific addresses is indispensable to the purpose of the Requestor, and approved by the CPD, access to the identities of the individuals or addresses shall be prohibited. For this request such access has been:

APPROVED X DISAPPROVED

3. The Requestor will collect, receive, store and use all information covered by the terms of this Agreement in strict compliance with federal and state laws and regulations, and all rules, procedures and policies of CPD which are in force and applicable during the period in which the Requestor has access to the information.

4. The Requestor acknowledges the confidential nature of the criminal justice information supplied and agrees that disclosure to anyone not directly identified in the approved application in any manner that allows the identification of the individuals whose records have been obtained from the CPD is totally prohibited under any circumstances.
5. The CPD may require that all copies of the information disseminated under this request be returned or destroyed once the use described in the application has been completed. In this case the information shall be:

   RETURNED ____________ DESTROYED _____ X _____

6. Upon completion of the project referenced in the application, the Requestor shall certify in writing that all copies of the information provided under this request have been destroyed or returned as required by Item 5, above.

7. Personnel assigned by the Requestor who will have access to the information requested are:

   Tobin Hensgen, Graduate Student, Loyola University Chicago
   Dr. Terri Pigott, Professor, Loyola University Chicago

8. The Requestor has assigned Tobin Hensgen as the official custodian who shall be responsible for the maintenance, care and security of all information supplied under this Agreement.

9. The CPD may monitor, audit and review the Requestors program activities and policies to ensure compliance with the requirements of this Agreement.

10. Nothing in this Agreement creates any obligation on the part of the Chicago Police Department to provide information. With or without cause, CPD retains the right to require the immediate return or destruction of all copies of the information obtained under this Agreement, take such actions as it deems appropriate to protect the security and privacy of this information and enforce the terms of this contract, and refuse any future requests for criminal information from the Requestor.

11. In order to conceal the identities of persons whose records are supplied to the Requestor, the Requestor agrees to:

   A. use the information furnished under this Agreement only for the purpose described in the Requestors application to CPD;

   B. replace the name and address of any record subject with an alphanumeric or other appropriate code where possible.

   C. restrict access to all data supplied by CPD to those employees whose responsibilities cannot be accomplished without such access as described in the application to CPD, but in no event to any employee not listed in paragraph seven above;

   D. store all data received from CPD in secure locked containers; and
E. refrain from copying any data not absolutely necessary for the use identified in the application or its security and retain such data only so long as is necessary to conduct the program described in the application to CPD.

12. The Requestor agrees that any publication of the data shall contain the following attribution of the data to CPD: "This data was provided by and belongs to the Chicago Police Department. Any further use of this data must be approved by the Chicago Police Department." The Requestor agrees to insert in the preface of any report citing data analysis conducted pursuant to this Agreement, whether published or unpublished, a disclaimer by CPD of the analysis as well as the conclusions derived as follows: "Points of view or opinions contained within this document are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the Chicago Police Department."

13. Requestor agrees that the City of Chicago shall not be liable and that the Requestor shall indemnify and hold the City of Chicago and its employees and officers harmless for any and all claims, suits, causes or action, damages, or the like or for the cost incurred in any adjudication or settlement of the foregoing, including, but not limited to, attorneys fees and costs, which may arise from any alleged use or misuse of documents provided by the City of Chicago pursuant to this Agreement, or by any negligent or willful and wanton act or omission on the part of the Requestor.

14. The Requestor agrees to pay CPD the sum of $0, the cost of preparing the information requested under this Agreement to be used as specified in Appendix A of this agreement.

15. This Agreement will be effective for twenty-four (24) months from the date of execution upon the signature of the Superintendent of Police. This agreement may only be extended upon written approval from the Superintendent of Police.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the parties hereto have caused this agreement to be executed by their duly authorized representatives:

Requestor(s)

By: Tobin Hensgen  
Date: 8/7/09

Tobin Hensgen  
Graduate Student  
Loyola University Chicago

By: Terri Pigott  
Date: 8/6/09

Dr. Terri Pigott  
Professor  
Loyola University Chicago

Chicago Police Department

By:  
Date: 8/15/09

Jody P. Weis  
Superintendent of Police  
Chicago Police Department
APPENDIX E:

LIST OF RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
<th>Question</th>
<th>Response</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11028961</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I perceive for the future to be something that is going to be necessary. Generally, right now, intelligence is maybe more put to the side and the old-fashioned style of police work is more prevalent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11042566</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Intelligence is used by us, here in gauges to set up to go after the gang members in the hierarchy of the gangs and go after what we perceived to be the number one priority in the city of Chicago, homicides and shootings. Intelligence is what we gather off the street, it’s what we gather from analysts, it’s what we gather from informants, it’s what we gather everything put together we discuss it and we come up with an action plan after that.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11058231</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Intelligence trickles down from the person who has the information to the people that need to get the information. And it could be as basic as a roll call. If you want to pass the information to the troops in the field and then they will have knowledge of what’s going on and it won’t lead to the areas of concern that you talk about at say at roll call. For example, when I was at Seven I was the last commander, you go to roll call the next day and the second watch and they didn’t know that there was battle in the field, that the whole block came out of 57th and Elizabeth, unless you told them, unless you put out the key players and you know. So, you had to pass that information and then, in addition to that, we would do strategic [00:01:36] incomprehensible mission over that area. And we would [06:01:39] incomprehensible over there and police presence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11062184</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I think police work is intelligence, I think if you're out there and you got to figure out who did what or you're investigating a crime, you got to base it on intelligence. I mean even stopping a car is going to take a certain level of intelligence whether that comes from your training or whether it comes from what you did that night or who you talked to earlier, who you stopped earlier, I think police work and intelligence are one and the same.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11087163</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>You see the function of intelligence is to more efficiently focus the resources on the problem—in a problem—individuals and problem areas that would most benefit from the use of the resources.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11105904</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>The function of intelligence should be the mainstay of—on investigations task to the Organized Crime Division. I believe the collection of raw intelligence and the ability to turn it into actionable intelligence in police work is lacking at this time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11129230</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I believe that the function of intelligence in police work is critical. I see it as a method to prevent and to solve crimes. I also see it as a method of keeping the community and officers safe from any type of harm. So, the function of intelligence in being able to gather it and what is raw intelligence that you need to put out there to the extreme of analyzing it and producing it into an analytical form is critical in police work.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11148753</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Intelligence in police work is a valuable asset, in order to continue to combat the different crimes that occurred within the city of Chicago within any municipality you want to need to continually gather intelligence and then follow up to ensure that you keep the crime level down.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11257484</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>I believe that it's not only the collection of information from various sources, whether they be confidential informants, looking at past case reports, speaking to regular beat officer or tactical officers that work in that—in a certain area. Gathering information on analyzing it and then trying to come sort of an agreement between individuals as to what may be occurring or what may be the reality of what's occurring and then getting that. Once you get that intelligence, just making sure that it's sent back out to the people that helped, you know, you collect it and analyze it all.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>11234773</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Intelligence enables investigators and even patrol officers to develop relationships in obtaining information which can lead us to make significant arrests, to develop informants, to be more effective in their performance to their duties especially within police relationships lead investigators to get information they normally wouldn't be able to obtain by normal patrol activities, i.e. driving around, responding to calls, and keeping the public at a distance rather than utilizing their eyes and ears in the street are much more effective than the police officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11247602</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>Well, I think that the function of intelligence in police work is basically the life blood of any proactive type of police initiatives or police work.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>11028961</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>It's actually used effectively. There's different types of intelligence that we use for different types of investigations. I think we have the tools and the resources to use the intelligence that we have and I think that helps to successfully complete investigations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11042566</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Intelligence is that information that stops you in a way to handle the problem, whether that's analysis is same last year at this time because it's a holiday; Latin Kings always shoot somebody, that is intelligence. Intelligence can also be what we found out from a guy we did a search warrant on last night that they're going to do today, so could it be applied in the Organized Crime Division? Absolutely! And that's how it's done here now and it can be applied. I was in the Detective Division, we used intelligence there, maybe not as much as you do here, but intelligence there was interviews; where as here it's a combination of a lot of things.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11058231</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>It's one of the biggest tools that we, that our units drives up. I mean, we work on and of intelligence, we work of information, intelligence, and then we try to prioritize from the intelligence that we gathered which would be consistent in particular cases that we're working. And then if that particular intelligence or information that we have doesn't pertain to the case that we're working on, we can't work because we don't have the manpower to prioritize then we'll get the intelligence or information onto the patrol and other units here.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11062184</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>I think it's imperative—I mean everybody uses intelligence especially when they're thinking about organized crime. If you're looking into longer term investigations, we're looking at better targets, we have to use intelligence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11087163</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Intelligence is probably used in the Organized Crime Division more effectively than in the rest of the department. We get intelligence and information from confidential clients that we disseminate immediately or used for individual attacks on problem area where that intelligence could be used specifically. As opposed to patrol, that information doesn't get out as quickly. We're kind of setup to disseminate information and intelligence based on gangs, everything from hierarchy to anniversary dates where violence is to be possibly perpetrated as a result of retaliation...</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11105904</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>Generally, it's been my experience that raw intelligence is disseminated and it's done timely and it's not in a good fashion to respond to impending acts of violence. However, this raw intelligence is not collated or indexed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11129230</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>I think it's used in several different ways. We use it to, again, you know, to get information out as an officer safety bulletin, we get it to use, to share information about how gangs operate, how, you know, if we're looking for somebody, somebody's wanted, we'll get an intelligence bulletin on a wanted person. These are probably just some fundamental ways of intelligence being applied in the Organized Crime Division. Again, you know, what can we have the different sections of you know, when you have your intelligence, gang intelligence and narcotics division, and you have your vice division, I think that all those divisions can share information intelligence from liquor establishments can talk to people in gangs in terms of what gang members are hanging out in what taverns. I think in Organized Crime we should probably pull so much information that can probably work not only work within our division but also help in other divisions such as bomb and arson for example.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11148753</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>From my experience, information is obtained based on that information; different steps have taken to follow up on that information in order to reach a desired end. If it's information on a drug location, it's getting that information, following up on that information and then tried to take down that drug location. If it's a gang offender, the information comes in and follows up on that information in order to remove that gang offender from the street. So, it's applied on a regular basis—intelligence has always been applied on a regular basis.</td>
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</table>
Respondent  | Question | Response
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11257484 | 2 | Well, I think it's two-fold. I mean, there's some intelligence and obviously, I mean, I was what I've alluded to before, as far as getting all that information out. It's what I think we'd--we'd hear or do somewhat more--mostly in the Gang Enforcement Section because we still have very close ties to--to the Patrol Division. So, I think a lot of it, this stuff that I do, and then--and that I was big, a big proponent of it--anything that I gather, I want to make sure they get out. But now, being a part of OCD, obviously, there are some sensitive aspects to certain things where we can't send the stuff out there. So, I mean, you have to weigh information, you know, as long as no one's going to get hurt or anything like that. And if it's an ongoing investigation or trying to work up the food chain to as, so to speak, I mean, added intelligence is kept, you know, in-house, whereas the rest of it, I try to get out there.

11234773 | 2 | We won't be able to effectively operate unless we're able to speak to people, to develop information, to develop relationships with informants because informants can go on locations and see things and do things that police officers cannot do. Specifically, going to residences, going to businesses, you know, sampling narcotics, doing all the things, buying narcotics, all the things that, you know, an undercover police officer wouldn't be able to do.

11247602 | 2 | One is that it helps direct our investigations. We also use intelligence to identify who our investigations will be directed against. We don't randomly start investigations at whoever comes along. We use intelligence to find out who is the core of certain problems, who is running certain locations with criminal activity, you know, who runs the dope area, who's the boss. In the Organized Crime Division, we tend mostly to go after the higher level criminals, gang bangers, narcotics dealers, as well as the most violent ones. That's who we focus on. You need intelligence to give you that information. To A: Know who to go after and B: How's your best way to start investigation to actually get into these people so you can arrest them.
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<th>Respondent</th>
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<tr>
<td>11028951</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>There is a definition, I really don't know it. I think when people think intelligence I think they also think like technology. They kind of go hand-in-hand; I don't know if there is a specific definition and I don't think the Department has ever used it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11042566</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>I am not of aware of definition by the Department of intelligence. The people that know what they're doing on this department know what the hell intelligence means. Other people think intelligence is neat that they get to make their exams look better. Intelligence to us is what's going to help us stop the things that we're working on. So, yes, I think we all have our own opinion about what it is, but it's basically what it is.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11058231</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>That word is thrown on a lot--intelligence, you know, my definition of it is intelligence, you know, if you get the information through intelligence it's going to lead to activity because smarter police officers that are out there are more focused that have knowledge on what's going on. Knowledge gives you power, it's going to give you the ability to--if you put knowledge and intelligence together, it's going to lead to activity--quality activity. It's not going to be, you know, to go out locked up every morn on the street. That's just great. That's good, the definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11062184</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>If there is, I'm not aware of it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11087163</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>There's no formal definition.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11105904</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>There is a definition. However, I think there are several definitions. One of that is employed by the Deployment Operations Center, which is actually classified under, I believe it's 28 CFR Part 23. There were some training bulletins issued. However like, do I think that there's one standardized definition that everyone follows right now, the answer is no.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11129230</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Okay, my recollection is that there may exist a document, a department policy for one unit and that's the Deployment Operations Center which the document spelled out the responsibility of being the central depository for intelligence. And in that document, it defined intelligent and what it meant. So, it was specific for that unit in a--whether or not everybody in the whole department was trained on that concept to carry that as a broad definition is another subject.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11148753</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>It's always a part of the job, but it's just was not describe or carried out in that manner.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11257484</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>I don't know the Department's definition, and if there is one, to be perfectly honest.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11234773</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>Formal definition? I believe there is. I'm not actually aware of it, but I think, I believe there is.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11247602</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>I know there's a general order that mentioned intelligence in them, but I think, basically, we use the term intelligence as like the common definition.</td>
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## Responses to Questions by Interviewee

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<tr>
<th>Respondent</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11028961</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Again, we have equipment technology that we use to further our investigations. I would say that's how we contribute to intelligence for OCD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11042566</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>My experience is you can never ever get more intelligence than you get from the actual people on the street, that are going to be the ones doing it, seen it, no words can be done. Interviews and human beings are the best intelligence in the world. I wish we could have the satellites in the flying little, which I would push forward these little cameras in the sky that they use in the military. But I think that some of the mistakes we've done is rely too much on that.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11058231</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Smarter police officers that are out there are more focused that have knowledge on what's going on. Knowledge gives you power, it's going to give you the ability to—if you put knowledge and intelligence together, it's going to lead to activity-quality activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11062184</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Just good old fashioned police work you stop the guys, just talking to guys, it's being out there on the street. There's a certain level of computer work or we can look at stuff out on our other needs and figuring stuff out but I think most—the most powerful intelligence you're gonna get is the stuff you want out on street</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11087163</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>...our guys disseminate information that is immediate that needs to be acted on. All the information is archived for, for look up later basically just by the unit. It's not available to everybody.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11105904</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>We have trained and we have increased officers awareness in conducting debriefings of offenders as to what their knowledge was and also historical information possessed by offenders or witnesses, whereby before that wasn't normally done. The other thing that we are doing in Gang Enforcement Unit, we're trying to close an intelligence gap and one of the ways we did that, and this isn't direct correlation, just youth violence committed upon or by high school members that are affected by street gangs. We have started weekly and daily tactic with school resource officers to determine what is occurring inside the school.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11129230</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Well, I think there's a lot of practices. First of all, we definitely develop cases, especially drug cases, and we—out of those cases we develop information whether it's through wire-taps or traditional street conspiracy cases or whether it's through search warrants. So there's information that are particular to each case that's being developed because you're actually targeting different gangs so you're targeting different intelligence for each different gang. But, I think one of the practices that I think is critical is the debriefing of individuals when they're arrested. I mean, the raw intelligence that we can gather from one individual and then, obviously, apply it through analysis and collaborated through other information is critical.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11148753</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>...it's information that was obtained by the officers-in-charge and everybody and, generally, from CI, from self-investigation and then narrowing that information down and then acting upon it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11257484</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Well me, myself, my detective, and a lot of my section, I kind of look for the strongest people from each district, here, and the Gang Enforcement Section. I talk to them, probably, on a day-to-day basis and then I also, I have some key individuals, like strong individuals within the districts that I reach out to, regularly. I try to weekly, but it's, because it's—Area 2's so vast in the amount of gang and the violence that occurs throughout the city. It's just, it's virtually impossible, you know, to stay on top of a lot of stuff, but I, but I do have key people in each of the districts that I can, you know, count on as far as providing accurate information.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11234773</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Going out there and interact with the community, talking to people, speaking to other officers, maybe from the tactical teams or from patrol division, developing informants. When an arrest is made, every time an arrest is made, there's an opportunity to gather more intelligence to possibly develop an informant or possibly just to gather more information on a certain occasion or a certain target.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>11247602</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>Basically, our intelligence is obtained for the most part by human intelligence. It always has been, but actually, in recent years, there's been a big push for officers and investigators to sign to the Organized Crime Division to develop more and more human intelligence sources. <strong>A</strong>, you get more, you get information in intelligence faster. <strong>B</strong>, you get, you could get it off of different people if you had multiple sources.</td>
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</table>
### Responses to Questions by Interviewee

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<tr>
<td>11028961</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>I think that's the statement for the future. I think it's something that needs to be put into place now amongst recruits that start, that can work your way through. I think it's going to be important because our numbers are dwindling and if we don't have enough bodies out there, we are going to need other resources or ways to be more efficient to get what we need to get upon investigations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11042566</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>If I was the Superintendent, I would say the same thing. You better be using intelligence-led policing because first of all, you can't go back to the old ways, where it's heavy handed. And have people fear you, I mean, at some ways that would be nice, but intelligence will help you get around bad corners, so I believe that statement in intelligence-driven policing is because that's the wave of today and the future.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11058231</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>I think he's realizing that, you know, that we do have a shortage of manpower and we have to work smarter. We just can't, you know, and he said this before that arrest are going to mark the crime down. It's going to be arresting the right people</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11062184</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>I would agree with it but it sounds like a catch phrase and sounds like a buzzword more than he believes in anything, you know.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11087163</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Where the intelligence is used on specifically to attack the, the biggest problems that the department has with the limited resources and to get that intelligence out and to be acted on effectively. So, in the past that hasn't really been the way the Department operated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11105904</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>I have not seen the Superintendent's statement on intelligence-driven policing. However, if it's subscribed to the definition and to the policies that Ratcliffe proposed in his book.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11129230</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>My interpretation is that we need to use more technology in developing our tactical strategies and operations for areas that are experiencing some high rates of violence or gang violence, or drug activity that leads to gang violence and shootings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11148753</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>The biggest aspect of— I'm talking about intelligence-driven policing—is it says that information has to be exchange back and forth and I'm not saying that happened in the manner that would show. So, sometimes it seems a little hollow.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11257484</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Well, I think it's crucial, I mean, to be perfectly honest, I mean, in especially now with resources and not only physical and personnel resources seem to be dwindling.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11234773</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Well, I believe it speaks for itself that officers have to be smarter. They have to have contacts within the community because that information can be acted on a timely fashion, much more so than being reactive. An officer can be proactive rather than taking a report about a person doing a robbery or selling drugs. An officer, if he has intelligence and he's developed informants and they're in contact with the community and say, &quot;Well, this guy is going to sell drugs or this guy's going to do a robbery&quot;, that officer can act before that action takes place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11247602</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>Yeah, I think it's a correct statement. I think the Department does focus on intelligence-led policing. I think it has for a few years, but it could always be pushed up to higher and higher levels and become more and more efficient. I mean under Phil Cline, they started the Deployment Operations Center which is basically the first step in intelligence-led policing where it was the information gathering section for the Department and then it spit out an analyzed and vetted intelligence report, so, but I think we can always ramp it up and with this time of less police officers, than we've had in the past, you have to do everything you can to make the Department more efficient.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Response</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>11028961</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>I'm going to say it's a combination of both maybe leaning a little more towards information and how we derive that information. However, at anytime you're going to act that information, you want to back it up with some type of tangible intelligence; meaning, you know, say for instance if you look at some of the utility checks, maybe some law enforcement databases that will help you assist in the finding of that under. So I think it would lean a little more towards information but intelligence is definitely important as well.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11042566</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>I believe it's at both. I got to say information is probably, you know, that's primarily what we work of because information is something that my people are on the street getting right now. They call me they say X, Y and Z's are going to happen. I don't care what some reports some guy ran on of the computer says, at that point, I know it's going to happen. If it gets enhanced by what the computer says or the computer will spit out that you know last year when I used that thing earlier the Latin Kings always shoot somebody on this date. Well, geez! If somebody told me last night that they're going to shoot somebody today and I see a raw dated intelligence that we have in the last 5 years that happens on that day, yeah. It enhances it.</td>
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<td>11058231</td>
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<td>I think a combination of both. Some recent information that comes in that's coupled with the intelligence that you already have, I mean, now you get some validity to the information that you got and the intelligence that you have and then you can--it can pitch a hole in those structure to what you're doing in your particular investigations.</td>
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<td>11062184</td>
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<td>Intelligence without a doubt because like you said you can get the best information. You got to see I that tells you, &quot;I got 57 kilos in the garage and it's over here.&quot; You got to analyze, &quot;Why the fuck would this guy know where 57 kilos are?&quot; You know what I mean. So, yeah, you got to use--you got to analyze your own information. I'm sorry.</td>
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<td>11087163</td>
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<td>On a daily basis on information comes into play for immediate acts from street level informants, but the intelligence drives more our unit on, as an investigative unit for long term investigations to get to the top players in the gang, or for narcotics the top distributors of narcotics that are responsible for the bigger picture. But that would be a more long term. But that intelligence is extremely useful to get to the top.</td>
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<td>11105904</td>
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<td>My decisions and tactical decisions on where to deploy officers in relation to a gang conflict mostly comes from information. The reason that we have to, most of it is based upon information because we've got newer climate where it is sort of like a doctor that practices defense medicine. The fear of being chastised for not following up on information, as ridiculous as it may be, did likelihood of you being chastised for not following up on it is great. However the life, as far as launching investigations, complex investigations, that is usually based on intelligence and not a mere single piece of information.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
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<td>I think both. Sometimes I'll get some information and it might be, it's raw, well I'll call that raw intelligence without it being analyzed or collaborated. So I think I kind of, depending on the situation, my reaction in decision making would be contingent on the situation. Obviously, you know, timing--if you're under time constraints, you need to make a decision on it and the more time, the more obviously, you can analyze and collaborate. In my experience, you know, it's just, based on your time and rotation of what you can do with it, whether if it's just raw information, then you go with it. If it's, you've got time to analyze it and explain it and come out with an intelligence report on it, I mean, that's the way to go.</td>
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<td>11148753</td>
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<td>Some of them are both, it starts off as information and you start acting on it and as you start acting on that information, that's your analysis and now it becomes intelligence and you move all along with that phase that it goes. So, it's a little both, like it start up the information and it will form an analysis and then that analysis becomes intelligence.</td>
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<td>11257484</td>
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<td>Well I think that the formula, information plus analysis equals intelligence, I think that makes sense because you could take all the information in the world, and I get a lot of information that’s just not, has not been corroborated or even looked into when it’s just garbage information. So, if I were just, you know, cc that information as all my bosses do, they’d send me something and then they send it out to everybody in the world, and then we’re supposed to believe that as gospel—</td>
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<td>11234773</td>
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<td>Well, I mean it’s probably 50-50 at the supervisory level. Very often, we are tasked with going to a location based on information from the community groups, politicians, different commanders, Hey, I have information they’re selling drugs here,“ are political, they’re not really intelligence-led. Intelligence-led would be more appropriately defined as where someone from the street level tells us, “Hey, they’re selling drugs here. This is the guy who’s doing it. This is how he does it. This is where he lives, this is the kind of car he drives. These are the hours operation, something along those lines.</td>
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<td>11247602</td>
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<td>Well, I would say I can’t answer it one or the other. I would say both. Intelligence and information are the definitions, in my opinion, are close. You know, some of our intelligence tends to be the by-product of more, you know, analysis. But, we use both. I would say a lot, I can’t really differentiate between the two because we use information operationally and for day-to-day activities. We use intelligence in this form of the definition for a longer-term plan as far as where we’re going to target and where we’re going to start our investigation and who we’re going to go after.</td>
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<td>11028961</td>
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<td>I really don't think there's a high level of emphasis that's put on crime analysis within Organized Crime Division. I think we're probably the closest thing there is to like the crime analysis but I—you know, we have specific information and outlets that we get that information from but crime analysis is not a high priority. At least that's how I see it the Organized Crime Division.</td>
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<td>11042566</td>
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<td>Well, sure crime analysis will make it easier for us. It would—we most certainly have to know being an organized crime where the next shooting is going to take place, where the next big dope deal might take place, where the next K meeting is going to take place. That's all stuff that we need to know, so when you bring complex information, I don't know what that means exactly but what I'm thinking, what you're saying complex information is a bunch of different information brought into the middle and deciphered. So, yeah, I'm sure complex, little things add up as big things later on.</td>
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<td>11058231</td>
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<td>I think it's—we get a tremendous amount of analysis of what's going on, in particular, this information on what's going on and we've got to prioritize on how we deal with the analyzed information that we get. You know, we've got to—because we don't have—we got our own guys. I got 70 guys on the street. Understand, we've got to prioritize what the intelligence that we're getting them and we got intelligence from patrol, we got intelligence from the back, from Leo's guys, we got informal meetings that we have and that's information shared. We shared electronically. We try to do better job of—if it's a high priority where it's not going to compromise any of our investigation and has to do with public safety. We're going to electronically get that out immediately to the districts into the back and Deputy [00:05:48 incomprehensible] when he was—because we were doing it, we weren't tracking it.</td>
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<td>11062184</td>
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<td>I mean it's useful. It's kind of taken in context. You can't streamline—you can't always streamline the intelligence that you get. You can't look at every dope dealer with the red shoes and [00:03:26 incomprehensible] on a Tuesday and say, We got a trend here. You know what I mean? There's definitely—into the DOC [00:03:34 incomprehensible] that's quite often where they just streamline it and they'd say, &quot;Well, there's three different gang deals here. You should lose this gang cop.&quot; Wait a minute, you forgot that this gang is fighting each other for the same dope spot and hooly here is fighting with beau and he just grab her sister's ass and shot it. You know what I mean, so you lose a lot if by streamlining it, you know.</td>
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<td>11087163</td>
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<td>Crime analysis is extremely important but the problem is on a, on a lot quick level the analysis is slow coming in and a lot of times we have to put, put pins on the problems without correct analysis of what caused the problem.</td>
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<td>11105904</td>
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<td>The function of crime analysis in organized crime or at least in my, in our position it is to—is a valuable tool to determine what the unlawful specified activity, albeit gang is involved in so that we can develop a strategy to combat it. Some gangs may be involved in just trafficking narcotics. Some are involved in burglary, some are involved in robbery. That is why we use crime analysis in that area to determine what they do.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
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<td>Well I think, I'll give you an example of how I'll use crime analysis. If we see an area with a lot of shootings and we need to go and take a deeper look into it, we will start analyzing the crime in using all the, what I would call the indicators that may exist out there that can be the red flags you get—number of our narcotics arrest over a 30-day period, number of calls for service. Other residual crimes involving narcotics, it can be after specific person caught, okay? Man with a gun caught. All the other information will give you a crime analysis. That based on intelligence working those two together will give you an idea of what type of narcotics operation is set in that location, geographically.</td>
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<td>11148753</td>
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<td>Well that's gathering back information that officers obtained regularly from the CI or from just from citizens and conversations when they encounter them in the street, then following up on it that is our crime analysis.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11257484</td>
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<td>A lot of these guys, even if there's nothing promised to them, you know, whether be a profit or something along those lines, they're still willing to talk about certain things. Just because, &quot;Hey, you know, I'm tired, you got me, what do you need to know?&quot; And they—they fill in a lot of blanks and a lot of those blanks we had heard about in the past. So now, we have like two or three independent sources that are—we're gathering this information and now it's strengthening, you know, of the intelligence and the crime analysis aspect of this stuff.</td>
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<td>11234773</td>
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<td>Crime analysis is a key component of what we do, specifically, we are—one of our many tasks is to reduce violence. It's one of our primary tasks, to reduce violence. Mostly, gang members or people involved in violence, the percentages speak for themselves, are involved in other illicit activity. Although, they're—they may not shoot somebody everyday, they sell dope everyday because that's their source of revenue and often—quite often times, the conflicts, which is the heart of the violence, you know, revolves around narcotics. Therefore, we often focus our investigations in areas in an effort to reduce the violence. It will take out some of the higher ranking drug dealers, and then conflict is eliminated.</td>
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<td>11247602</td>
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<td>Well, in the Organized Crime Division, we don't have per se our own intelligence, I mean I'm sorry, analysis group such as the DOC, but each team and each officer that's assigned to investigations in the Organized Crime Division does analyze their information as it pertains to their investigation in their cases. That information and analysis does go to the bigger cause of the whole department at some point and also depending on the urgency of it. If it's urgent, we do what's called an IBDR (Intelligence Based Deployment Recommendation).</td>
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## Responses to Questions by Interviewee

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<td>11028961</td>
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<td>I would say analysis would probably more useful, patterns, relationship or trends that exist because that—if you have that specific information, you could put yourself in a position to—to get in front of things. Meaning, say you have a burglary pattern and you know—you know the pattern, maybe some of the relationship to some of the offenders and what time they are predictably heading, now you can put your surveillance teams or, you know, whatever together to be in those areas to try to work that area with that information in order to—to make an arrest so you can potentially clear the pattern. You know, numbers—raw numbers related to events—numbers are just numbers. If you're talking analysis, that would be more important.</td>
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<td>11042566</td>
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<td>I use both. I'll tell you that crime counting, the reason why that is always important because numbers don't lie. If you are going to show me a sheet with 20 people shot at a 3-block radius, there's 20 people shot there. Now, I go into the next statement; &quot;Why did that happen?&quot; Counting is just a way to help you get an analysis, to me that's spotting the problem, now what do we do to find out what's causing it. So, crime counting is always going to be used because that's what they hold you accountable for. If you are commander of a district and they count that your numbers are up, well, they're going to hold that against you; so you are going to analyze what those numbers really mean and then figure it out why it's having another attack.</td>
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<td>11058231</td>
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<td>I think the analysis to raw numbers, you can look at in particular areas but you got to analyze that with the intelligence that you have in those particular conflicts in those particular areas. Now, say like you send in officers [00:08:11 inaudible]. I mean, you can see that there's a lot of shootings going on in that particular area right now. But, you know, that's our frame, but now you got to double a little further into who are the culprits that are causing it and you got to know the players from both sides and then disseminate that information because it might be a domestic.</td>
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<td>11062184</td>
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<td>Yeah, you know what, I guess it would—before they would find the most useful is the all time pin boards. It sounds crazy but it still could matter. I know all they may have it on the DOC thing, too, but to see it on the wall with a little pin that says, &quot;There's armed robbery here. There's an armed robbery here that he uses color-coded with this is night time, this is day time.&quot; You know what I mean and that's probably more counting than analysis but that just visually—.</td>
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<td>11087163</td>
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<td>Analysis is the most useful without a doubt. Unfortunately, the Department often uses the raw numbers in particular from a weekend deployment based on the following week is from raw numbers and not from real analysis.</td>
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<td>11105904</td>
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<td>Crime counting in my eyes are you always measure what you get. If you measure something, you're going to get that result. Crime counting, as far as how we apply our resources, is not a basis that we use all the time. We do use analysis because that's the only effective way to understand what's happening. To be told that there's a hundred armed robberies that means nothing unless it's the same modus operandi, same description of offenders, same types of property that was taken, maybe even different associations. That's what you need it to use.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
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<td>Well, you know, I think I just mentioned all the various factors and I think they all—I think the relationships between all of them would mean more to me when I look at, you know, reporting the facts and the analysis of what's going on. So, I think that I will look at the relationship between arrest, [00:12:23 in-call] service, shootings, looking at the time they're happening, the day they're happening, so I think it would be important to relate them all and how they, what's causing what to happen. So there's a relational analysis that's being done.</td>
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Respondent: 11148753 
Question: 8
Response: Analysis will be the most useful, I mean you can get a better picture of what you have in the past and then sort of get what you might need to do. An example would be you have an area and it's something historical about that every year, something comes off at the same time, so if you're looking back at past trends and you looking million things, the pressure building in this area, okay and it's building to this around the same time, okay that's analysis that you've already done, you know. That might be a potential area that we need to focus on in order to prevent something can happening. And to elaborate a little bit further about the crime count, we look at the total number as they come in, but the total number sometimes may not be the overall big picture of it, it may be a high number but of that total high number if only a small percentage are gang related, that's what we are looking at, what's gang related, what's going to cause more problems down the line. If we have a high number of homicides and where large percentage are domestics those are sometimes hard to prevent. We have our domestic aspect and then we deal with it, but the ones we're really focus on are the ones that is going to cause more problem, those gang-related incidents.

Respondent: 11257484 
Question: 8
Response: Yeah, obviously, the—we don't really rely too much on crime counting. I think, you know, the bosses are very concerned with that. We're not too concerned with that too much. What we're more concerned with as I've—several questions earlier like, "Hey, what's linking perhaps a spike in violence to a certain area?" The lately certain commercial, you know, we had a several homicides recently in the last couple of weeks right on the same corner that what's happening and while we're finding out it's several different Latin gangs. Both the victims were Latin Kings but one was a Latin Dragon and one was a Cobra it seems that. But we know that a lot of these boundaries are, you know, intersecting over there, we're trying to get to the root cause as to, you know, what may have spurred that. So you know, although our numbers, you know, we are always concerned with numbers in trying to keep the numbers down, we're—we're concerned with trying to look at a certain area, analyzing that area, see what the spike may be, seeing who the principal individuals that are involved with the whole thing and then trying to create some sort of a strategy to, you know, related to what's going on.

Respondent: 11234773 
Question: 8
Response: First, like calls for service is a resource that we use. In many calls for a specific area, they are selling drugs, selling drugs, we have a crack hotline that people can call in anonymously, that information is also collected. Like homicides, if every batteries, we look at those numbers that determine if the root cause of that spiking violence are those numbers, is from a narcotics problem, like a conflict. We can assign investigators to go out to that location to try to initiate narcotics investigation.

Respondent: 11247602 
Question: 8
Response: I would say the analysis portion when it comes out, is more important to us because there's a lot of crimes that are committed that are not directly involved or not directly related to the mission of the Organized Crime Division. You know, if it's a domestic related murder or something along that line, it's not something that we generally are involved in. We're involved with gang and organized criminal activity and the murders and violence that stems from that type of activity. So we would need the analyzed version so that we would know what caused the murder and also, what, where, and also if there's a propensity for more violence to follow because our job is stop that additional violence as fast as we can.
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<td>11028961</td>
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<td>I think there is a bit of it. I don't think it's a huge emphasis but I think that it's on a case-by-case basis with each supervisor with each team as well. So, my point being is that, you know, when I talked about like the burglary pattern and stuff like that, that's analytical information that you want to put together. Criminal intelligence, you know, that's—I really wouldn't say that we use a lot of it but I mean I think analysis is probably more—more appropriate.</td>
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<td>11042566</td>
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<td>Alright, how criminal intelligence—criminal intelligence is what we live off of everyday that is what our job is in gangs. Gangs are using intelligence gathered from gang members, search warrants, arrests, anything we can, what we see in cameras, if we had cameras, whatever we can to gather intelligence for the Organized Crime Division, where we can say, &quot;Okay, everyday this gang deals a lot of dope on this corner and/or having shootings around there, obviously, someone is trying to move in on their dope dealing.&quot; So, we know by the numbers of arrest in that area and by analyzing that, that's what probably is causing the problem and then we got to get on physical intelligence from people to say that, &quot;Yeah, so and so just got out of the joint and he wants his spot back.&quot; That's how we use it here. That's only one way of many.</td>
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<td>11038231</td>
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<td>We got many sources of information. We got to keep a confidential informant files down at the District. I mean, we've got paid informants as well as unpaid informants. I mean, we've got information from witness interviews, from offender interviews. And it just where they're stored. Unfortunately, a lot of the information—the best information is stored in, you know, kept in one of these guys which stay in the back of their head. It's from an interview with somebody in the back seat of the car. Those are the guys that are going to provide the most information. You know and again, you got to weed it out because some of it is self-serving, like they're giving you information to benefit themselves but others are more truthful. You've got to check the validity of it.</td>
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<td>11062184</td>
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<td>It's what drives any kind of operation that comes out of here. Anything we do is—it has some intelligence-based. I mean it's—you hear something and you got something for us or something, you got to look at this guy and you go out and take care of it, you know.</td>
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<td>11087163</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>Criminal intelligence in the Organized Crime Division is used very effectively because as the information often has the chance to be vetted before someone acts on it. It can often be a more long term or someone can develop a plan to use that information and then to verify that information as opposed to tactical street level analysis of information.</td>
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<td>11105904</td>
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<td>Concerning criminal intelligence as a product, this unit and even though it's only around a year, has started to develop a number of different products. Concerning the enforcement, just stop the proliferation of street gangs. Some of these products that we developed are description of gang membership, rosters and hierarchies of which are then made and distributed to the district commanders. And other product that we developed is a Weekly School Report. And that's based upon our interviews with all the high schools within an area and information is collated, not necessarily analyzed its raw information that is put forth, so everyone understands what is happening within the schools. We also generate what is called the Weekly Gang Conflict Report, which is a report that's developed through multiple sources, not only through crime reporting. Abstracts from different investigations that analyze motive but also street sources and information coming from confidential informants and what has spilled a gang conflict into the use of violence or if it's just a historical conflict with another street gang.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
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<td>Well, the way I would perceive it to be used is drug intelligence reports, for example. How certain groups are, you know, they're trafficking, you know, their drugs at certain methods. The numerous trends, like one of the things that I saw developing over time was the use of, you know, we won't have street corner conspiracy cases so now the drug dealers had to change their operations. So, some of the drug dealer's starting to do phone services; you call them and they will drive up and say meet me at this corner and I'll deliver it. So we need it to, you know, that intelligent would be good because when people talk about it, then we can get out that information on how that operation exist and how it works. So you get different type in which you've seen is also trends. Now, here might be a trend is people going back to the old system of selling dope out of their houses or at the garbage instead of standing on the corner and selling dope. So you know, drug intelligence reports are good. Gang methods like I talked about what gangs do. They torch cars for initiations. They might be torching police vehicles or policeman cars is up in their initiation or conducting shootings, or whatever it is. But that information is important to get out there not only because it tells you something about the gang and what a certain gang trend is in terms of initiation but it also gives an officer safety flavor to it, report to it.</td>
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<td>11148753</td>
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<td>It's of use because it tells you, given within the file, it's who, it's where, it's when and it provides the link from the past to the future, so that as people come along they can see, they can follow along somebody that might be out there, what is their modus operandi? What do they do? How they are doing it? So you have to build it and you have to maintain it, but you also have to make sure everybody's looking at it, to be aware what's there, so you can follow along as you go along. It's information--because you want to make sure you don't loss information, it was just--if all the intelligence is just with one person and that person moves on then anybody coming along behind they got to do now, start from scratch in order to rebuild that intelligence</td>
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<td>11257484</td>
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<td>Yeah, absolutely. I mean, constantly it's a--of things are evaluated. We do, Commander Smith has implemented that we do a weekly report pertaining to our top 10s to keep people, somewhat focused. Because a lot of times, we're being pulled in many different directions but it keep us focused, you know, on our top 10s because that is a priority for us. Now, not saying we're the only ones who are keeping files on it. I mean, obviously, there are some certain individuals in some of these areas where there is some high amounts of violence occurring that we also gather, you know, intelligence on also.</td>
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<td>11234773</td>
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<td>If an officer gets information that a target, John Smith, is selling drugs, he doesn't go off within the floor and ask every officer in the narcotics unit, [00:09:25 John's this,] or John Smith's selling drugs. That information is developed by him as he about--as he, you know, he may do his own investigation, do surveillance. He may say, &quot;Okay, John Smith is a very high level drug dealer.&quot; That information could be passed on to a team that works that type of level of drug dealer as opposed to a street guy. But the very important--it's best that we have to look at clearing house for information that comes in off the street, no we're not?</td>
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<td>11247602</td>
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<td>Well, in the Organized Crime Division, we use it in 2 different ways. We have various units in the Organized Crime Division. Some are investigative units that conduct investigations more of a long-term nature and that would be units such as the gang investigations section and narcotics section. But we also have another unit, the gang enforcement section which is more of a street level enforcement type unit directed at gang activity. So, and that's actually, by design, because in my opinion, to effectively combat violence and combat gang and narcotics but you have to hit it at multiple levels. You can't just focus on the top guys. You can't just focus at the bottom guys. You've got to focus on all. We use the analyzed intelligence to help us direct maybe where a long-term investigation might take place. But we also use the shorter version information sources where to direct the Gang Enforcement Section because they respond to immediate threats and they do very short term missions in areas that have high propensity for gang related or narcotics related violence.</td>
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<td>11028961</td>
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<td>Very important. Lot of the cases that we do work which, you know, are long-term investigations are derived from these specific things and, you know, putting together, going after the worst of the worst, the most violent and use the surveillance, informants, debriefings and all of that towards—working towards an investigation. So, within the Organized Crime Division it's a—it's probably critical.</td>
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<td>11042566</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>Well, that's easy. Informants give us information, we check and see if it's by debriefing other people, if it's perfect or real information, with most certainly, if they tell us this is going to happen and this car is going by you. We can survey the area and see. Get all works together, it's hand in hand you can't have intelligence, unless you put all that stuff together.</td>
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<td>11058231</td>
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<td>They are completely unrelated without the information sources. We would not be able to develop criminal intelligence work for the unit. As an example though, information that comes in the unit based upon an activity by a gang is usually verified by a confidential informant or other sources and then it provides a basis for generating intelligence products.</td>
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<td>11062184</td>
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<td>I'd say that's what drives your activity. You know, confidential informants also know where the hot cars are gonna get dropped off or who's selling dope over here or who committed the murder. Surveillance, even you follow that murderer around and you forgot where he's going and he's gonna do it again and case works maybe, well, you can use some of the reports almost like the pin board or yes, say, &quot;These guys are shooting back and forth. I know these guys and then we better go and check out that corner.&quot;</td>
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<td>11087163</td>
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<td>The information sources are often used long term and often used very effectively to—can also be a sharing with other jurisdictions. The information source can be as such that we can actually start an operation as long as we can vet it.</td>
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<td>11105904</td>
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<td>Somehow, it's instrumental and you know, there's a lot of where there's intelligence and, for instance, what's going on with the task force over at [location] We learned from prisons that our guy just got released from jail. So, therefore, I mean, there's—we know because he's got a history and we got intelligence on him. We know that there's going to be a spike in crime because prior to his incarceration, he was responsible for eight to ten murders. So, I mean that intelligence derived from The analyst and when you look at the map, you see a spike and had you not get the intelligence from The analyst or some of the guys here that track that person, particular person or target, you would not know why spike is there because he just got released.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
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<td>Well, you know, it varies to you know, again, it comes down to the experience and the supervision that each of the gang teams or narcotic scenes or the lieutenant who supervises them has, because you definitely need to connect the surveillance activity with the confidential information you have in debriefings to fit in all the pieces of the puzzle of any type of criminal activity or any intelligence that you want to put together. So, I see them as pieces of the puzzle. You've got to analyze if it's right. I'll give you a very good example. You know, years ago, I was part of the old intelligence section where we had an analytical group and all we did was analyze reports coming in from all the different intelligence squads, alright? All the different intelligence squads did not know what everybody was working on except the analytical group. We were to sort out all the information and run numbers and do background checks on people and so forth. And then we would sit down with the supervisor and tell him what we're seeing based on his surveillance and his case. And then if we see a connection with another case, we would tell him talk to this sergeant about your guy because there's a connection with his case and your case, alright? So, it's more like a centralized analytical group, but I guess you've got to have somebody that has the experience to do that. So trainings are really important to do that so I think that's probably work. There's a lack of training to make that. So you rely on experience, okay?</td>
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Update—as good word—that information, it goes back to what the definition of your intelligence source of information. It's all information put together is intelligence, it's what's going to keep you going now and in the future and so there is a direct link between all the information that's gathered and the all information that's filed and stored for all the work that this unit does. To know what JJ Jay-Jay did last year and the times that Jay-Jay has gotten what area did they did frequent, it is all there so someone might come along, they're going to seek some during the time on the street but they also have a source of information. A source of intelligence that they can go back and look that's going to help them to know that Jay-Jay he make frequent this area all the time but a lot of times, he goes on here for a certain time. So, it's there, there is a direct link and they're connect.

We can't keep a very running file around them. We chart though, any kind of stuffs with contact cards, C.I. information, several that we've taken down. That's—some of the individuals have gotten into that individual source. It's always kind of like girlfriends, cars, properties— I mean, constantly it's a—of things are evaluated. We do, Commander Smith has implemented that we do a weekly report pertaining to our top 10s to keep people, somewhat focused. Because a lot of times, we're being pulled in many different directions but it keep us focused, you know, on our top 10s because that is a priority for us. Now, not saying we're the only ones who are keeping files on it. I mean, obviously, there are some certain individuals in some of these areas where there is some high amounts of violence occurring that we also gather, you know, intelligence on also.

The case by case analysis. I mean, if information developed by a team through the course of investigation they get information that, it could lead to a suburban drug deal or it could lead to a see a target outside, operating outside the United States. The supervisor, his duty is to then develop either an information report or put in a supplementary report. That information is reported to our analyst here. She would—she reviews all those reports and determine, "Oh, a target of interest was picked up on this investigation." That target was also of interest to a DA group, that information, we will now be forwarded.

Everything we do is based on informants and surveillance, whether it be human or electronic surveillance such as wire taps and hand registers which is the tracking of phone calls or who people are calling, that's all intelligence, really when you break it down. And that is what we use to build cases against people and also, we use it to make our decisions on what the step in our investigations are. And then again, on a gang enforcement section which is more of a street level mission driven unit, we use information sources also so we know where to direct that manpower and where they can go to effectively stem violence. We also use the information sources in all the units to conduct search warrants and other activity of that nature.
## Responses to Questions by Interviewee

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<td>11028961</td>
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<td>Okay, there is one person that I know of that does double duty between both sections, between 189 and 193. That person reports it. The intelligence-based for incidents just causes when a policeman is shot at or incidents like that. They are just causes that come across. Usually I could get it by email and it's pretty much shared throughout the Organized Crime Division but there's only one person that actually does that.</td>
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<td>11042566</td>
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<td>Okay, let's do it one at a time. Who does it? I have five gang detectives working in five areas, okay. They should be working on intelligence. They do intelligence reports to me weekly. There's a gang intelligence report for each area done by the gang detective, weekly. It goes on all the shootings and homicides of anything in narcotics, big waxes, anything like that. Intel that was brought off the street and he does report, so we have a weekly report no matter what.</td>
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<td>11058231</td>
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<td>You know, like (an Officer) called me, a week and a half or two weeks ago, he said that there was a guy that was arrested, [00:11:49 name deleted] for two bombs over at 13th and Keefer that's supposed to be, you know, the bars ball was over there looking for him because he had some items with both before he was incarcerated and he wanted them to bail him out. And if he wasn't there, then he told them to, told the people that we're there to make a phone call and get him out in 5 minutes. He didn't show up so ten minutes later there's two people who were shot. I had (our analyst) check on this person they got caught [00:12:15 incomprehensible] over there on a car chasing with the police, you know, where is he at, what's going on with the guy. She found out, you know, give me a file on him and with all the information, the particulars, where he was currently at in the county. I got that information and passed it to (an officer who is at) Area 4 and I said, &quot;Whoever this guy--this guy may have some information on this conflict. So, that information goes back and forth and I might asked her to do things where I'm learning say at the meeting, or I'm learning at--from say some of our contacts in the federal government, DEA, from the DEA informers who say, &quot;Looks like there's something going on over here because of A, B, or C&quot; and then I'll go to The analyst and say, &quot;Hey, is there any validity or can you work up on these people?&quot; And she'll work up the people and it would be disseminated to the appropriate area--the team that works on it.</td>
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<td>11062184</td>
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<td>I think every member of organized crime is responsible for at least a little bit of that. We have the IDDRs, those Intelligence-based Deployment Recommendations and I give every single one of my guys do one those. So, they get information like that this guy is gonna go shoot this guy or these guys are at war with this guy. If it's hot information, it's e-mailed right away and it's disseminated right away to the districts and usually that decisions either by Joe or Scott or Lieutenant or Commander and if and when anybody can call one of those, anybody from the lowest senior police officer can say, &quot;I got good information. There's gonna be a shooting and let's disseminate it to everybody.&quot;</td>
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<td>11087163</td>
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<td>It's done by each individual area by the team that connects to the area. The storing is a problem where it's often not retrievable. Sometimes that information is there but it's old or it hasn't, there's no quick way to get your hands on it. Our analyst does a great job of connecting the dots on the overall picture by using databases that the officers started using or don't have the access to and sometimes putting everything together from another unit making an arrest that they are not aware of. Connecting aliases where an individual doesn't have the time to make that kind of analysts or an analyst can bring it all together and analyze it often more effectively than the officers themselves</td>
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<td>11105904</td>
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<td>I could comment on this--the Organized Crime Division lacks a central intelligence unit that would take all the different intelligence products from narcotics, organized crime, gang enforcement, and even the vice division. And since there's no central location or an intelligence collection manager to review the added information, our use of criminal intelligence is lacking.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
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<td>Well, I see a continuous room for great improvement. Again, you know, strategic direction of department is based on planning, in budget, and where do you want your money to be put at in terms of its function and tactical operations. So, to reduce violence, we were more committed to making arrests, not gathering intelligence. I think there's got to be a major shift in moving towards investing in people that can analyze, investing in technology that can make the collection of information a lot more easier and a lot easier to collect from everyone instead of just a few people. You can collect it from--if you got one squad working on gangs you might get some reports. But if you get a hundred people out in the same area working, you have the chances of collecting a hundred pieces of information but you have the right technology in place.</td>
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<td>11148753</td>
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<td>Right now from what I see, each individual officer does analysis and if they draw some part of analysis, they do and then from there they do a paper work which is forwarded up that chain of the unit looking, see if questions are asked if there's something else--it's seems something might be missed and from there, then it's filled in as--by one of the administrative staff where it could be access by mostly everybody.</td>
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<td>11257484</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Well, I'm--I oversee it I guess. I'm pretty much, I don't--I don't have the luxury of having like analysts, quite frankly. Interviewer: Okay. Respondent: Of my gang detective and myself, and I would say some of my stronger sergeants, we're the ones that are primarily involved with this whole thing.</td>
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<td>11247602</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>Our analyst here is [name deleted], she's very--she has contacts with almost every law enforcement agency operating in Illinois and actually with the federal agencies. She is pretty much our clearing house. We are--we're not saying we operate an island because no one does. We do share information with our outside agencies, but a lot and often times that information is kept close to the vest because of sensitivity. You can't just forward it. It's not like around robbery crew. Narcotics is its own separate--because the information is so sensitive, you have the informants' identities, you have, you know, officers, infiltrating groups. That information can't really be shared.</td>
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| 11247602   | 11       | Yeah, we do a lot of that with the associations and connections. We do various data bases we have like with Penlink and there's also units that HIDTA helps us a lot in our investigations when we start, we do the things I mentioned earlier like Pen registers or getting phone numbers where we identified people and we could give them the information and they'll do the link analysis and show us how people are related and they'll come up with a spider web type graph and you could see who's related to who via who they're calling or who might have joined real estate ventures together, things like that that's off of an internet based sources and anything that they could throw in there to develop those connections. As far as in-house, most of our stuff, unfortunately, it's stored on paper still in the Gang Investigations Section. We've been striving, and I can get into it more later, but we've been striving to try to get a Gang Investigations Section database done where all of our gang investigation reports go into and it could be later data mined and mined for any kind of information on persons of interest. On the other hand, we do send most of our GIS supplementary reports which are trying to--
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<td>11028961</td>
<td>12a</td>
<td>Yeah, I believe that it could be useful. You know, obviously, the people that do the work still got to go out there and, you know, do the old-fashioned police work and do what needs to be done for investigation-wise. But being able to pinpoint direct and to focus on major offenders and to give a little more direction for the activities and associations by--come out with that information is--it could be quite a bit of a shortcut to you having to do that information and research yourself.</td>
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<td>11042566</td>
<td>12a</td>
<td>Well, in one word, absolutely. We do it now. That is what we do. We do intelligence-led policing. We do not have the luxury to have unlimited resources manpower. As you all know, you looked on TV. So we have got to be smarter and more effective. We got to surgically take people out, take areas out and the gangs out. That's what we do, we have been doing it. Reading this, obviously the person who wrote it has done it himself or he wouldn't be able to write this or he's a good person of seeing at work but that is exactly what we do on organized crime. That's how we do it; we couldn't do it any other way.</td>
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<td>11058231</td>
<td>12a</td>
<td>Absolutely. I mean, this is basically targeting to the right people. I mean, one of the great reduction of crime strategy is getting the right people off the street. I mean, you go back historically in this unit, I mean, we tried to attack the right people, you know, they have to [00:14:56 watch] and trigger town up in the 5th District. I mean, they got the right people and, you know, hence, crime reduced. Now, they're reduced and probably prevented a number of crimes and then you got the new breed [00:15:11 incomprehensible] based conflict but you know the mark in them. I mean, you target the right people. You take the right people out of the equation. You've got to prevent crime, you've got to prevent future crimes because, I mean, you know, they're just basically the urban serial killers.</td>
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<td>11062184</td>
<td>12a</td>
<td>Again, I think it should be everybody. I think it should be the beat cop should be able to use it and should be able to come up—I mean, I know some great guys who never got out of the blue uniform who would pull you over and say, &quot;Hey, I got a guy that is saying this is going on or that's going on,&quot; or &quot;I just saw somebody doing this over here. You might wanna keep an eye on it.&quot; And it should go all the way up and really it should be about the information sharing is important as just the intelligence gathering. You know, did you read the book &quot;Moneyball'? It's about Billy Beane and the athletics and it's basically he's the first baseball manager that starts to use all these stats and he's first to come up with the on-base percentage within the status sessions and he took a team that they didn't think was getting anywhere, all the way, you know, just short of the World Series but what you can't account for is the heart of the policeman, the guy that's out there. You can put all the stats in. You can put all these--you can flood them with intelligence but the guy is not gonna stop somebody. The guy is not gonna talk to somebody. It's not gonna make a difference.</td>
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<td>11087163</td>
<td>12a</td>
<td>Yes. As to a great extent we use that focusing on major players now as a part of organized crime. It's—I believe that's one of the most effective tools is focusing on prolific players. There's sometimes a fight between that and reacting to incidence and that's, so it needs to come from the top.</td>
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<td>11105904</td>
<td>12a</td>
<td>Oh, heartily. As noted by Ratcliffe, we do not have strategic management of information within. It's whoever has that information, they do pass it on. However, it does not provide a coordinated approach to the problem. Each time I send information help, if it goes to the district commander, there may be a gang conflict, they respond that information by putting resources and thereby trying to stop it, not eliminate it, as an example.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
<td>12a</td>
<td>Absolutely. I think that the analysts are the key to pulling the data together in connecting crime intelligence and coming out with a report that would leverage all our human resources and we talked about the analysts using technology in using information, leveraging our human resources to be more strategically focused and obviously more efficient and obviously putting our officers at the right place at the right time at the right spot.</td>
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<td>11148753</td>
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<td>I believe it is in terms of that issue over the Department and to this unit. This is a more formalized description of what is already done and then moving towards a more formalized description it will actually probably find and ease some of the processes that are already in existence. From what I know about detective—I think it would be useful not only for Detective Division but also for the patrol also. So it would be used, I think, it would be used for the Department as a whole.</td>
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<td>11237484</td>
<td>12a</td>
<td>Yeah, I think there's some place for that. You know, I think everybody's, you know, set business model on— the civil service type thing, everybody gets a little hinky about that. But I think there's something to be said for, it's like, you know, let's get some information, let's get some viable targets, you know, and let's see what we could do to take these people out and thus, you know, create a better atmosphere, better community. And like I said, we've had some success, I think recently this year. A lot of it wasn't really, you know, by GES, but a lot of it was through like let narcotics know this is what we got—</td>
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<td>11234773</td>
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<td>I think that some of these crime analysis theory is the flavor of the day. The bottom line is you still have to have officers out on the street interacting with people. I've never seen anyone sitting in their office and making arrests. Obviously, it's trendy and it's a way to justify people's positions. It's just a way to justify the planning for research. What I mean, I'm a little bit old school, I still believe in the fact, I mean a combination of the theory is more effective than the total embracing of, you know, everything has been researched down to the last. The bottom line is you still have to go out there in police cars and stop cars, stop people, interact with people, and that information's going to come from the street.</td>
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<td>11247602</td>
<td>12a</td>
<td>Yes, and actually, I think that the department, as I said earlier, does some of this already... We also have, in a federal level, with mostly the Organized Crime Division, a main 21 list. Main 21 are the main 21 worst people in the city; gang bangers, drug dealers, it's usually based along either a high-managerial position in a gang or narcotics organization or if not of a high-managerial position, an extremely vital character. Okay, we also have a system called the Trap System which is Targeted Repeat Offender Apprehension and Prosecution System. And that's basically a joint venture with the state's attorneys office where our top 11 districts for public violence submit names of their 10 worst subjects, much along like the lines of the top 10 or top 21. And what that does is when no subjects' are arrested, they notify state's attorney and the state's attorney is assigned to that case and stays with it. And that state's attorney is assigned to that area to make sure that that subject doesn't slip through the cracks on a minor offense. He gets taken, he's prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law. But in short though, yes, I mean I believe the concept is useful to any Police Department. You can't random—in this day in age and with limited resources, you cannot randomly just do random preventive patrols and hope to come across something to prevent crime. You have to have at least a good portion of your police department directed at known targets and known conflicts.</td>
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<td>11028961</td>
<td>12b</td>
<td>Well, if I'm going to use like a case as an example, I've been fortunate enough to be a decision maker in strategic objectives because I've had some experience doing that before. However, you know, it still goes up to process. I mean, you still have the lieutenant, you still have the commander, you still have to run everything by them. However, I've been fortunate enough where I've been able to be the decision maker and determine of strategic objectives on different things.</td>
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<td>11042566</td>
<td>12b</td>
<td>I'll give them the message of what I want done and how to do it. They, on a daily basis as we just with this last phone call, are going to make decisions on how to actually get it done. I'll give them the objectives then they're going to do their strategic objectives on how to get it.</td>
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<td>11058231</td>
<td>12b</td>
<td>As far as our unit—as far as our investigations go, the sergeants ultimately are controlling the investigation. They're making the decisions. Once a month we have a meeting with the sergeants and lieutenants and we tackle all the particular cases. We got a particular case to work it out or there's particular conflict that we're working on and I like to have a meeting because they're feeding what they're doing and they're proposing their strategies.</td>
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<td>11062184</td>
<td>12b</td>
<td>(Decision makers) got to be careful about over information, you can't throw everything at the lawn and see what's gonna stick and then like DOC giving you a 30-page report and half of it is about neighbors. Now, I don't even do give a (expletive deleted) about that. Where is this guy? What kind of—what gang is he in, who he shot at before and you never get anything. I know all you get is an Accurant report that says he applied for a credit card in 1972, you know</td>
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<td>11087163</td>
<td>12b</td>
<td>Right now the deputy superintendents are the decision makers on allowing each unit to have some latitude and there is still some tactical latitude but often the areas of deployment even for our unit are focused on what was initially put down by deputy superintendent and it can be actually multiple deputy, superintendents and they're trying to protect the most critical areas of the city.</td>
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<td>11105904</td>
<td>12b</td>
<td>The decision makers for establishing policies is the Senior Command Staff that has to determine the strategic objectives. The Senior Command Staff, which would guide us and I'm going to use the term management-based objectives. Once we know their objectives, then we as mid-level supervisors could establish the goals to meet those objectives. The tactical decisions will solely rely at this level on.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
<td>12b</td>
<td>So, I think the decision makers, even though I say it starts with the supervisors, but I think: if you take a look at it really, the officers that are working in these cases, the intelligence officers, that's why they're called intelligence out there they're gathering their intelligence in the street level. Fundamentally, really key into developing all these tactical intelligence which then allows the upper level person to look at it strategically plan what the goals, the overall goals of going after a particular gang.</td>
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<td>11148753</td>
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<td>The overall decision makers right now for the most part, it sets at the commander level and above; that's the formal decision makers. Well, it's actually the Captain, the watch commanders and in some units you actually have sergeants, who are actually— that are—they has some aspect of being the decision maker also.</td>
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<td>11257484</td>
<td>12b</td>
<td>I could make recommendations, you know, and whether or not they want it, they listen to those recommendations. That's fine, you know, in most cases, they do, quite frankly 'cause they rely on people that are, you know, like I rely on people that are on the loose ground type of thing. They are the ones that are closest to the stuff they can taste it and feel it, you know. And so, I mean, I'm providing, you know, targets to like interviews in trying to along those lines and then, you know, gather enough information to people who are subordinates and stuff and filter this to other the people and say like, &quot;Hey, this might be a little bit bigger than what we can do, but this is what we got, this is what phone numbers we have, this girlfriend's cars we got, here you go,&quot; you know, and we hear from them periodically back and forth from working...</td>
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<td>11234773</td>
<td>12b</td>
<td>If at tactical level it's the Deputy Superintendent (or) the Chief of the OCD.</td>
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<td>11247602</td>
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<td>It'd be the Command Staff. I mean it would be the Chief, myself as the Deputy Chief, and then, you know, Commanders and staff. But as a department, obviously, it'll be the Superintendent and then his executive staff, which will be the deputy superintendents and the assistant superintendents.</td>
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<td>11028961</td>
<td>12c</td>
<td>They would. Absolutely.</td>
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<td>11028961</td>
<td>12c</td>
<td>I think you'd benefit from it. I can't see why you wouldn't. You know, any more information that could be used to further what you're doing through intelligence-led policing is—it's going to be beneficial.</td>
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<td>11042566</td>
<td>12c</td>
<td>We do it now. Like most certainly benefit, they do it now that is how they do their job. That is why they're better than most.</td>
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<td>11058231</td>
<td>12c</td>
<td>Absolutely, I think that's what this—we do this all the time.</td>
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<td>11087163</td>
<td>12c</td>
<td>Yes. To some extent we try to do that now through information sharing but the--a more formalized structure would be absolutely a benefit.</td>
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<td>11105904</td>
<td>12c</td>
<td>It's my opinion they can't do their job unless they have intelligence-led policing.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
<td>12c</td>
<td>They would. Absolutely.</td>
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<td>11148753</td>
<td>12c</td>
<td>They would benefit, they would benefit to have that and that's the strategy, that's the direction that we are all going in.</td>
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<td>11257484</td>
<td>12c</td>
<td>I think they would benefit, yeah.</td>
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<td>11234773</td>
<td>12c</td>
<td>I think we already have some work done. We have the top 21 meeting. We have, I mean we have written a number of avenues to share information. Oh, we have about different avenues to share information which is really, dramatically changed in the last—I have been here in the past 19 years, so it's been, it's changed dramatically as far as exchanging of information between agencies; but then, within our own agencies, within shared agencies, within the federal agencies, county, law enforcements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11247602</td>
<td>12c</td>
<td>Sure. I mean anytime you have more information or intelligence on any subject, ever, you're bound to make a better decision.</td>
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Responses to Questions by Interviewee

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<tr>
<td>11028961</td>
<td>12d</td>
<td>It's kind of a long drawn-out definition, I think it's--yeah, I would agree with the definition. I think it's a little choppy in how it's put but, yeah, it is about you know decision makers being able to direct strategies, sure.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11042566</td>
<td>12d</td>
<td>Absolutely. Yes, yes. The reason why it's you got almost break this down to, when you're talking about that there is a difference the way looking at me to my men, but when you say could my guy use this absolutely. The more intelligence I get, the better decisions I make.</td>
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<td>11058231</td>
<td>12d</td>
<td>Yes</td>
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<tr>
<td>11087163</td>
<td>12d</td>
<td>Yes .Yes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11105904</td>
<td>12d</td>
<td>Yes .Yes.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
<td>12d</td>
<td>Well, yeah. I think decision makers, as we defined it, I kind of define a multiple level of decision makers, so I think that yes. They own it, you know, and it's their intelligence, they should be part of developing the strategy. So, I think it just gets broader and broader. I mean, it gets a little bit, when you start looking at its strategic, implemented strategic and tactical decisions, you know, it might require other people to get involved because it might require funding to do certain things or it might require at least some type of de-confliction, too, with other agencies to make sure we're not doing the same thing and wasting resources and being redundant with the same targets.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11148753</td>
<td>12d</td>
<td>It's intended for use by decision makers. Yes, it is. But to add to that, I would say, it's to be used by everybody.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11257484</td>
<td>12d</td>
<td>Yeah. The strategies that are outlined here, like one through five, those are things we all touched on. I agree with all of those things. The only thing is that there's a lot of times there's different bureaus that are doing the same, sort of like it seems somewhat the DOC area, the areas so that--kind of doing the same things a little bit. We are all exchanging informations, I think, pretty well, better than I've experienced in the past.</td>
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<td>11234773</td>
<td>12d</td>
<td>I think our objectives are really stated in a general form that we are given a certain task. We are some--we're given still some leeway, you know, to develop strategies because somebody downtown can't tell me, &quot;You have to have to get undercover buy in to this guy.&quot; They can't tell us that because they don't, you know, unless they're going to put some shit on it, go out there and try to do it because it's not going to work.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11247602</td>
<td>12d</td>
<td>I think it should be intended for the use by decision makers as well as operational people because it depends on, you know, I mean, decision makers, I think it should be expanded a little bit 'cause when you're going a little bit lower than the guys who aren't making the big decisions, there's still people that are doing the investigations or missions on a little bit of a lower level, but they still need to know the intelligence and the information that make their missions or investigations successful as opposed to just like I read this to mean by decision makers, the people are going to decide where manpower's directed and things like that, where once the manpower's directed to a place, they should have more access to all that intelligence also.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11028951</td>
<td>13a</td>
<td>We have a lot of technology solutions. We have a lot of technology. You know, Excel, Microsoft, you know, law enforcement databases such as Accurint, LexisNexis but I don’t really have access to it anymore, LEADS 2000 I had access to, FinCEN (Financial Information–Financial Information Network). So, yeah, organized crime as opposed to the Patrol Division or whatever, yeah, we have far superior access to it.</td>
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<td>11042566</td>
<td>13a</td>
<td>I-CLEAR system, Crystal, Accurint. I mean, we utilized a number of--right now, we're in the process of--and a lot of this is, you know, the Crystal is the tracker activity, which I don't judge a team by their activity, I judge a team by their investigations. I mean the quality of it.</td>
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<td>I-CLEAR system, Crystal, Accurint. I mean, we utilized a number of--right now, we're in the process of--and a lot of this is, you know, the Crystal is the tracker activity, which I don't judge a team by their activity, I judge a team by their investigations. I mean the quality of it.</td>
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<td>11062184</td>
<td>13a</td>
<td>Now we do send a lot of those reports up the chains who DOC, who want--they are keeping it somewhere, God knows where. But when some of the gang members stop them, they get dead and the girl who does see the stuff on the narcotics side. We send her all sorts of stuff but really it'd been--it's almost a problem of too much information. Yeah, you can have every single GD on the computer but you got to know if they're in the California Jackson GDs or New Orleans, right.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11087163</td>
<td>13a</td>
<td>Storing and receiving. Well, email is used for a lot of transmitting but the storage and pulling out the information from that has already been archived is the most difficult part because the technology is lacking. There was good intelligence that was put in last year that is no longer in our fingertips.</td>
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<td>11105904</td>
<td>13a</td>
<td>I've got to speak at this level. I can't to the level of the Deployment Operation Center that receives some of our intelligence products. But currently, right now, aside from data mining certain databases, to determine information, the information that we have or the tools that we have are usually used to prepare reports for transmission later on. Some officers use commercially available products such as Microsoft Excel, PowerPoint to get briefings. However, there is no central database to input or index intelligence data for later retrieval, which is important when it comes to feeding that information. Is it a single source or is it coming from multiple sources.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11129230</td>
<td>13a</td>
<td>I think I-CLEAR is used. We use a lot of state and federal databases. We use our task forces that are in access to databases in their particular agency, whether it's DEA or the FBI or if it's IRS. So they've got databases that we can use. The only caveat I would make is sometimes that their confidential on ongoing cases, we cannot produce any intelligence often to cases are actually terminated. We use also our Department's CPIC (Crime Prevention Information Center).</td>
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<tr>
<td>11148753</td>
<td>13a</td>
<td>Right now, it's still a manual review, a manual store and a manual transfer of information. The information comes in and it's reviewed on paper, it's transmitted on paper and stored on paper. So, that's what we are--I think that's what we are right now. And this is probably more true while on the follow up question, I know we are in the process of looking at a technology-based system, that is one where we allow for a good review—to be able to review any information on a technology-based system and then also storing that information.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11257484</td>
<td>13a</td>
<td>I have a district gang book that I started as soon as I like, two years ago because when I took over as the gang Lieutenant from Area 2, there was nothing really—the annual gang book when my predecessor, I'm like, &quot;Let me see your gang book&quot; and then there was nothing. And I'm like, &quot;Hey, you have got to be kidding me.&quot; And me, I'm like old school or something like that when I used to grab the old graph inside our section to get pictures and put stuff together, but I've, you know, you got to have at least something and it has to be modified. You know, I would say quarterly, so that, that I started. We just finished that now. All my guys have a copy for every district in the area. We basically just have them in the Word Perfect.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11234773</td>
<td>13a</td>
<td>We need—we need more portable devices in the field. Laptops, Info-Cop, the ability for officers to run name checks and license plates, name checks, and associate, running associates from the field much more so than from inside the office operating trackers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11247602</td>
<td>13a</td>
<td>Well, in Narcotics Section, we have FileMaker, but that basically keeps information on narcotics ongoing missions and tends to be mostly just numbers, like you know, amounts of activity as opposed to intelligence as far as who’s doing what...it’s like a database basically. And it’s used to store all of the general information from narcotics, how much is stored, how much narcotics was recovered, you know, things along that line.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11028961</td>
<td>13b</td>
<td>The tech—I mean, information-wise, I mean, Accurint is something that we use that's now very important. You know, I use a lot of the phone stuff. I-CLEAR obviously has probably used that on a daily basis for just about everything, Mug shots, you name it, calls for service, you know, suspects searches, arrest photos, arrest identifiers, associates, gang associates from arrest, multiple—multiple. It's basically our hub for what we do.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11042566</td>
<td>13b</td>
<td>Technologies, we web mapping we can use that it shows again I talk to you earlier—I'm lucky that that is usually run for me and given to me but we can not forgo the fact that if I had to do in my own I'd come in, I get on a computer I'd do the web mapping and see where all the shootings were. I'd looked at last night's DOC analysis report of where all the homicides happened, where all the shootings happened and when I see certain area I know what gang is in that area because we had already met all the gangs on the computer. We use all that and I'll say, &quot;Wow! These all happened in the GD area of the 7th District&quot; and what factions in the GDs then I can say, Wow! These were the guys that were fighting last week. They must got back with each other and finished it off.</td>
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<td>11058231</td>
<td>13b</td>
<td>I think Accurint. I think they use—I mean they use because they try to track people. So, they're tracking people and they're tracking their associates. You know, these I-CLEAR tracking targets, tracking associates. I mean, the key is, you know, whatever database that we have that we can track targets and their associates and then try to make connections and you might not be able to get target A, but in order to get target A, you might have to go down to one of its other wings, you get target B because he's going to give you target A. So, you've got to look at the big picture that, you know, build on the case, working up the chain to get the ultimate target that you want.</td>
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<td>11062184</td>
<td>13b</td>
<td>We use I-CLEAR Data Warehouse and because we're homicide and violent crime driven, almost everything is on the CLEAR system for all reports. We do just a ton stuff from all reports, you know</td>
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<tr>
<td>11087163</td>
<td>13b</td>
<td>We use I-CLEAR for most of my quick information but I use the spreadsheets Excel, in particular, cause I can show a quick analysis, gangs, violent incidence in an easy readable formats that somebody wants it right away immediately.</td>
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<td>11105904</td>
<td>13b</td>
<td>The a—do I find any particular form of data or information management technology more beneficial? No. You need example, I-CLEAR is data mining, which can give you information spread over a period of time. However, it does not provide any linking ability that I'm aware of. LEADS 2000 is strictly a data mining process. The desktop tools that we use spreadsheets or any other databases are used for the development of an intelligence products to share, not necessarily for analytical needs.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
<td>13b</td>
<td>I use the I-CLEAR a lot to analyze information. I'll give you a good example. One of the situations we had with the [00:28:57 fentanyl] crisis in Chicago. We used technology to network where we had most of our people being treated by the Fire Department, for example we were able to lay where people were found unconscious and even people that died through the overdoses. And that would give us an idea of how to respond and then we use e-mail to alert us when something happened. And we'll take the e-mail and send it out to narcotics squad who would go out there because in most cases, we would have the street selling dope that didn't know it was mixed with fentanyl and people were dying from it or just falling off from it. And so we would be able to transmit that information, get the squads, teams, narcotic teams to go ahead and begin arresting the dealers around the store and we started to debrief them.</td>
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<td>1148753</td>
<td>13b</td>
<td>I don't find any one particular thing more beneficial because as I come across with, as I find out about I try to utilize it more. I used I-CLEAR quite a bit. LEADS I used some but not as often. When I come across the spreadsheets or database, I like to see what's there to see and get to utilize it, see what's going to be beneficial, in the format that it is in. Because one aspect of my training on databases like Access, Excel it's not a formal training it's more self learned. So, I like to see how can I utilize that information: one, to store it; two, to transmit it and to review it and transmit it.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11257484</td>
<td>13b</td>
<td>Word Perfect. Word just boom all are in there—it's the dude's name, nickname, last known address and IR number. But, it's pretty extensive and it's done by, you know, gang and by what area which they operate. Absolutely, to get any kind of further information, Accurint, graphs. You may use Accurint every so often, our gang detective has access to that and then I have a couple of my sergeants who have the LEADS 2000. They utilize that a little bit too.</td>
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<td>11234773</td>
<td>13b</td>
<td>Something that, I mean, at that level, Upper level investigators have resources like pen registers, tracing, or wire taps. They're handled here or at the Federal level.</td>
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<td>11247602</td>
<td>13b</td>
<td>One of the best things we have, actually, when you go back to Intelligence and sources, is we have a system that basically, I think the Peds started it but we have it now, called, I believe it's called PinPoint. And what PinPoint does is when we develop a confidential informant, his information is entered into the Pinpoint computer system. If we have an incident or a series of incidents in an area, we could go into the pinpoint system. It's kept at the confidential section downtown though, in OCD headquarters. Individual officer cannot enter it.</td>
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## Responses to Questions by Interviewee

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<td>11028961</td>
<td>13c</td>
<td>For report generation by far.</td>
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<td>11042566</td>
<td>13c</td>
<td>I used it for analysis but some people use it for report generation. I mean, there's report generation going up to the chain of command so they know what's going on but we're the ones who put the soldiers on the street, we put the cops on the dots, we analyze it and use it that way. It's used for both.</td>
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<td>11058231</td>
<td>13c</td>
<td>All of my staff use them for report generation, to regurgitate, you know, reports that they're calling from up above. I read every report that comes through and I make notes on it and I got a file in my computer and all the information that comes in, I try to keep track of it, sure.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11062184</td>
<td>13c</td>
<td>Report generation. The analysis part probably comes from—we would use it more for the analyzing when you're actually going into the investigation and you need to put a definition on what's happening here, what's happening in there and all of that it's just report generation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11087163</td>
<td>13c</td>
<td>Unfortunately, using more for report generation and for actual analysis because the analysis links aren't there. They're giving me who, what, when and where and not a why.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11105904</td>
<td>13c</td>
<td>I could pretty much say that they are used only for report generation. Unless an officer is directed to providing the analysis or snapshot or synopsis of information, then that is usually generated for report, too.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
<td>13c</td>
<td>I think both. I mean, I think it will work both ways</td>
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<td>11148753</td>
<td>13c</td>
<td>Right now, more so for report generation as things are develop as we go along there will be just as usual for both aspect but right now, it's more so for report generation.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11257484</td>
<td>13c</td>
<td>I think it's more for analysis, quite frankly. Well, I don't know. I think there's an equal benefit here. I mean we're putting stuff together but we're also utilizing it for analysis, both so—I—we utilize in both</td>
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<tr>
<td>11234773</td>
<td>13c</td>
<td>I use it for analysis more so than anything else.</td>
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| 11247602   | 13c      | Right now, the stuff we have is better for report generation. Not as good for analysis.
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<td>11028961</td>
<td>13d</td>
<td>That would come out of our front office, more than likely. If I wanted somebody specifically trained, I would go through the front office to find out who the contact person would be. But more than likely that stuff that, you know, we would get maybe a memo or, you know, we have five openings for LEADS 2000, submit a name and, you know, we'll put a name in there and see if they can go through. If I wanted somebody for something specific, like for ECSO, Electronic Covert Surveillance Officer training, which is the work on wire taps and we are working on that type of investigation, those classes only come up twice a year, I would try to get my guys into it right away because a lot of our cases are driven towards that type of investigation.</td>
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<td>11042566</td>
<td>13d</td>
<td>I should decide that. I should decide what my people need to get their job done and I'm saying that in a way it's not to pick on anybody in our Department but some people might have a reason that somebody can get out on something or might be a financial reason but if you're telling me to get the job done, I should be able to tell which one you should use. And that should my ability and maybe I should have a budget for that, and I could decide which way should I go rather than have somebody sticking something down my throat that we can't use. Gang sites which were restricted. It took a letter through the chain of command to the superintendent where a phone call with superintendent, himself, to make it happen.</td>
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<td>11058231</td>
<td>13d</td>
<td>Up both, you know, do reports and do request. Normally, we get what we ask for, you know, ECSO training. I'll determine what--I try to balance the team's participation so that every team has about the same amount of people that are ECSO trained.</td>
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<td>11062184</td>
<td>13d</td>
<td>Budget. It's all about money. That's why we don't have--that's why we have Accurint which is good for some things but we lost Reference USA which is better for like phones and stuff. We'd love to have both of them but it's, you know, money.</td>
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<td>11087163</td>
<td>13d</td>
<td>Unfortunately, we can request new or available technology but because of the bureaucracy at the department usually just one unit, the Informational Services Unit, seems to have a control of the actual acquisition of those--of those analysis tools.</td>
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<td>11105904</td>
<td>13d</td>
<td>That is through, I believe, Research for Development Information and Services Division that decides what technology can be available to us. However, I will say that very seldom is the end user consulted on what they need in order to develop an intelligent product.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
<td>13d</td>
<td>Well, some of the technology would be at my level approving it, ECSO training usually. Some of the other one I would have to go to another, from my bureau to another bureau like the Bureau of Administrative Services, which by department policy oversees all our technology. Obviously, certain technology that they maybe confidential that they will not have control over which can be in-house, and what I would basically do is hire their consultants to conduct, you know, who would scope out the requirements of our database and then we'll have a consulted through Information and Services come over and build that database for us.</td>
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<td>11148753</td>
<td>13d</td>
<td>Right now, that decision is probably more so of the Deputy Chief level. As things become available, it he contact our Commander and lets him know this is available that we need this--by certain people, but I think that is--that the decision or the search and everything is up to Deputy Chief. Deputy Chief level on the DOC.</td>
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<td>11257484</td>
<td>13d</td>
<td>I think, that standards does [00:33:40 incomprehensible] trying to get this stuff, this access to these things then and also have some intensive trainings. Interviewer: Okay. So as training comes up, he'll make you aware and if you have people that are available. Respondent: Correct. Well, we make people available because you know, I think training is essential.</td>
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<td>11234773</td>
<td>13d</td>
<td>The Chief. But it's not widely, not every team has it, right. I think, every team needs to have actually the same type of resources. You know, it's like anything that cost money and-- You know it's just like Accurint cost money.</td>
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<td>11247602</td>
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<td>It varies. The bottom line is most things fall to the final decision, especially if it's going to cost money, to the chief in the Organized Crime Division. In his absence, it will be the Deputy Chief. But some things like ECSO training and things like that, we could just approve when they go through. But for instance, the gang intelligence database that we would like completed, you know, that had to go all the way to the Chief and signed off by him 'cause it, you know, it has to be funded. So, he's the funding source.</td>
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<td>11028961</td>
<td>13e</td>
<td>I know from the Patrol Division, at least, when they're looking for information or they need to request from us, they do that IDSSR, which is the Interdepartmental Support Service Request Form that we'll do—that they will send. They will come to us. We take an action on it and then, you know, send it back or whatever our action is.</td>
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<td>11042566</td>
<td>13e</td>
<td>We can give out 75 percent and sometimes it can help everybody working on it or some people would think you can give out nothing just because you're not supposed to.</td>
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<td>11058231</td>
<td>13e</td>
<td>It's informally we called it the round table and basically we go, we discuss the current conflicts from each particular area. It's a short meeting and it's not—you got either [00:28:08 Incomprehensible] or you did oversee it but then it's in put where I bring, you know, I try to tell my people to bring something to the table to share in a particular conflicts that are going on with the most particular areas and then bringing targets that won't compromise any of our investigations and share that information so we can get out. And the Mobile Strike Force, they put together for their roll calls, they put together, you know, from this and from other information, you know, for their troops, they put together a quick PowerPoint that will show them the list of main targets and what's going on. Those are—I think we get the best information and leaders got area meetings, there's maybe 21 meetings, you know, the DOC, just to be perfectly honest, I think that's one least productive meetings because as you sit you're trying to—I think it's a waste.</td>
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<td>11062184</td>
<td>13e</td>
<td>Well, the formal stuffs, the CPIC stuff that comes over, the BlackBerry which is they give you every single shooting in real time.</td>
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<td>Interviewer: CPIC that stands for, Respondent: I don't really know.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11087163</td>
<td>13e</td>
<td>Are often informal. Sometimes just as informal as a phone call where my unit can, in myself or a supervisor sergeant, can access it or possibly just give them the information that they have right at their fingertips. Informal request or a formal request are often slow and not, the dissemination through a formal chain of information is not usually as— Interviewer: Efficient. Respondent: Definitely not as efficient. Often our informal network is probably are the most used.</td>
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<td>11105904</td>
<td>13e</td>
<td>Most of the processes are informal and they are developed through the relationship of officers working because of the sensitivity of the information. However, in the leadership level, or a level where one is responsible or held responsible for the combating gang crimes, there is no computerized network that I can go to and pull up additional intelligence from either gang investigations, narcotics, or even sometimes the 9th District Tactical Officers, unless I call over there and verbally ask them, “What do you have on this?” And even that, you get a verbal report you don't get any written reports.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
<td>13e</td>
<td>Well, when I look at the law enforcement, our partners, we kind of haven't formally, you know, we have our task forces that we can request a report from them. We've got the DEA, FBI, we've got ATF, we have a number of federal task forces that are in place, and in terms of working with other units or other divisions, well, informally I can get it done but that takes time, but for only to cut down the time, I would just personally call the head of these agencies or the people that are in chargéd of managing them. For example, HIDTA if I wanted something I'd pick up the phone and call the Deputy Director and say, “This is what I need. Can you get it over to me? No problem.” They would e-mail it to me right away. So, you know, DEA, talking to your friend with Intelligence, pick up the phone, talk to your DEA SAC, you know, the SAC involved and they would get it done for me. So again, you know, and it was very rarely did I have to do that but it was there for me to do it and reach out to.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11148753</td>
<td>13e</td>
<td>Formal, you have both processes. Formal is that—every report that's generated is passed up to chain requesting this information or whatever from whatever unit. The informal process act having some time on the job, you need to know different people and you know people in certain units. You can call and said, “Hey, I need this and can you send it to me?” And that can work just as well.</td>
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For me, as far as gathering information, I find I like the informal. We have (coughs) excuse me, the monthly gang strategy meeting. Interviewer: Okay.
Respondent: Which is, you know, I try to get people advanced notes on it. Sometimes, the better officers, sergeants, or lieutenants are able to attend but, you know, we have our own lives and stuff so, you know, I try to make like avail myself to or my gang detective or some of our sergeants to their schedules you know, so let's plan on your schedule, I'll get a cup of coffee and I'm here if you're nearing stuff up, so I can pick their brains if you will. Now as far as getting information out there, — Interviewer: Yeah. Respondent: — I can of more do that on like you know, Thursday night, Friday morning I'm sending up my weekly gang report. Quarterly, I'm sending out to my newly revised, you know, gang books per each area. I send them electronically, you know, and if I found out that's not I don't throw out stuff there to people.

They're both, they both have their own, you know. Informal is obviously based on personal relationships where a specific District Commander who maybe a friend of mine or have friends here to hand me some help here. We just try—we can definitely kind of—obviously you can go through official department channels. It knows problems will be addressed. However, sometimes, you could do it in a more timely fashion.

Mostly, the formal function of it would just come through the chain of command. That does happen periodically. We'll get a request from, be it the Superintendent or Deputy Superintendent or other divisions or units in a Police Department asking for intelligence on a certain issue, about what we have on it, what's causing rash of shootings, and there's some informal requests also. A Commander from a district might call the Commander of gang investigations or might call the Commander of gang enforcement and ask him for what they know about a certain incident or what's going on in a certain area. So it's both.
### Responses to Questions by Interviewee

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<td>11028961</td>
<td>13f</td>
<td>I'd say informal. Yeah, I guess it would depend more or less in what you're looking for. I mean, what you're trying to get. Formal, I mean, yeah, it gets done but, you know, it's easier informally, I think.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11042566</td>
<td>13f</td>
<td>Informal networks are more useful to me. Formal are nice. Formal I need it if you don't formal—you got to remember not everybody score twenty points get ten rebounds per game. You know what I mean? Informal stuff we can pass on to each other, you know what I mean. The formal stuff there is some people I get three points a game and I don't get a rebound. They need to know everyday the formal process. And if I'm away for a few days or something, thank God there is formal process because I'm picking up the report of what happened the last three days. So you mostly certainly need a formal process and the better you make that, the stronger everybody is but the informal is the one that's going to take the guy from getting a B to an A.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11058231</td>
<td>13f</td>
<td>To be honest, informal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11062184</td>
<td>13f</td>
<td>Informal without a doubt.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11087163</td>
<td>13f</td>
<td>Unfortunately, I have to say informal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11105904</td>
<td>13f</td>
<td>I think informal networks are most useful when you need real-time information immediately. I believe formal networks are more beneficial as if when you are developing long-term goals or strategies to combat, like gang crime.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11129230</td>
<td>13f</td>
<td>Well, it depends. You know, if I have a lot of time, I go formally and most cases that I get involved and if somebody wants something from me, I've got to do it informally.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11148753</td>
<td>13f</td>
<td>I will have to say informal because you can get something right away without having go through all the red tape. When you have to go through that formality it could be a week to a couple of month</td>
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<tr>
<td>11257484</td>
<td>13f</td>
<td>Yeah, I mean like I can make a phone call you know, and perhaps that's something happen for me. I like informal.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11234773</td>
<td>13f</td>
<td>They're both, they both have their own, you know, place. Informal is obviously based on personal relationships where a specific District Commander who maybe a friend of mine or have friends here to hand me some help here. We just try—we can definitely kind of—obviously you can go through official department channels. It knows problems will be addressed. However, sometimes, you could do it in a more informal fashion.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11247602</td>
<td>13f</td>
<td>Well, probably both. I mean the formal function of it gets out to more people. I mean if you use the formal, if you consider that we send our intelligence and information to the DOC, which is a formal process, and then the DOC then sends it out to the whole Department, then it's very useful. But the informal has its place also. I mean for faster, quicker results a lot of times.</td>
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<td>11028961</td>
<td>13g</td>
<td>Yeah, yeah, I think it does. Yeah, it would--what we do, obviously, is a little different in OCD or at least in gangs is--is that, you know, we can direct our and pick and choose our own investigations. However, directives come down all the time that, you know, we need to adhere to this. We need to do this. We need to do this and you're basically ordered to do that.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11042566</td>
<td>13g</td>
<td>Okay. Well here, let's be realistic here, this is the real answer. Real answer is, what is the city of Chicago trying to cut down on? Burglaries? Stolen cars? Narcotics? Violent crime? Homicides and shootings, and if you want to be more succinct, homicides, so I know that. I've been told that, I know what I need to do with my people. If I get homicides down, that is going to be the answer. So, what is sent by our leader is to get homicides down and do everything we can to do that. That's what we'll do. If they change it, then we'll change how we do it. But give me what you want done, what do you want done? You want homicides down. Good. Thank you. We're going to step back and we'll make that happen.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11058231</td>
<td>13g</td>
<td>I've got the flexibility but we're focus is getting violent targets that are causing the crime and trying to prevent them for doing further crimes by incarcerating them. And also, by getting information from the information we're deriving, you know, if we stray from that, you know, if I see a team or somebody's going out making ten bag dope arrest in the corners, you know, is it for or are we doing it to get court time, for overtime or are we're doing it because we're trying to listen that information because it is happening in that particular. I think we've all got to realize our roles that, you know, the superintendent has tasked us with each, you know, job.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11062184</td>
<td>13g</td>
<td>No. I think we're different since because we're self-generating--you come up with your own work product and as long as you're producing, that's what your bosses want to see. I mean I call the shots on my team but it's because I have good bosses, too, and they're happy with the work we do.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11087163</td>
<td>13g</td>
<td>Our deputy superintendent does call the shots but in organized crime, because of the long term investigations and often the quick--the quick violence acts that we might have to act on based on intelligence or information confidential informants our midlevel--midlevel supervisors can make the call. Often, the lieutenant will make the call and it will be reported to later. We've probably the most flexible in the department probably--probably nowhere in the Department is any body is flexible as an organized crime.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11105904</td>
<td>13g</td>
<td>As far as tactical decisions, I probably exercise almost all flexibility as in the deployment of forces to stop crime. There are some organizational dependencies within the department and when I say that, if I'm speaking of, we do coordinate with the Mobile Strike Force and Tactical Response Unit and what we'd be in. However, we have different missions once we are in that area. You know, mobile strike force does aerial and we continue to focus on the members of these street gangs. I would say it's probably 50 percent reactive and then 50 percent proactive. We deploy our forces almost daily and intelligence product, you know, there is a gang, you know, these guys are fighting the night we've put our cars in that area as a proactive measure or if there is a string of shootings, we then go in there as a reactive measure to stop any retaliatory shootings.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11129230</td>
<td>13g</td>
<td>Well, I think that's a strategic planning of the Department focusing on gangs and drugs. It really lays out our strategic plan, okay? And so the tactical decision making is pushed down to Control Division level of the commanders and the Area Deputy Chief [00:36:56 incomprehensible] and then we connect to what they need. If they have a problem on a certain corner that's related to violence and drugs, then we will then work with them to develop our plans, our tactical operation with DOC. So we are in constant collaboration with the Patrol Division in supporting what they need because they're ultimately facing these problems without the resource they really need to have to build cases towards these gang members.</td>
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11148753
13g
Respondent
Question
Response
Who calls all the shots, that's actually the Commander but he is trusting enough that--
if I make a decision and say, "We're going to go this way," it's going to be a major
issue because he knows the fact that I made the decision, but most of the time I keep
him informed, let him know this is what we got, this is what I'm having them do and
it will go from there.

11257484
13g
Yeah, there is some--we're getting a lot of stuff, I mean in Area 2, you know. And I
don't know if it's just me, great. But we're responsible for the watch to school
dismissals everyday of the week   Interviewer: School dismissals?   Respondent:
Two of them.   Interviewer: Okay.   Respondent: I have to tie up two trains Monday
through Friday to watch that. They have to be part of an Area 2 initiative in the
direction of [00:36:46 Ansel Jackson] to make sure officers are working in certain
areas with [00:36:50 incomprehensible] primarily, the north end of the 4th District,
3rd District and the 6th District to generate activity there. I have to be part of the
surgical strike force mission on Friday nights and Saturday afternoons and Saturday
nights where a designated team work in a District from a certain time frame to be
part of a patrol unit force that generates activity in those certain areas. I have to
designate guys to work in the burglary mission recently. Four of my guys to work at
burglary mission in the 4th District. So I mean, I'm getting a lot of patrol--
Interviewer: Alright.   Respondent: --that is dictating our course of action.

11234773
13g
At the tactical level, we have almost, not that autonomy, but to an extent, we
determine on how we do our job. They tell us, very often times, where to go or who
to target. But how we do that, unless someone wanted to put their name on affidavit
and search warrant, you know, that's not going to happen. I mean, having had the
[00:29:05 incomprehensible] come and say, "Yeah, I'll serve the warrant." You
know, if he let us to say, you know--they'll based on the--they're--they want all the
time is they don't want to tell me how to build the car. As far as, yeah, because it's
undercover work and people, especially outside the Organized Crime Division,
they're not quite sure how that works and what the legalities and the process, the
tactical decisions had to be made, they pretty much leave that up to us.

11247602
13g
Well, its, at my position now, I have a pretty lot of flexibility 'cause I would be a
little bit higher up on, you know, the higher you go, you sure can make more
decisions, and the lower you go sometimes you've got to get your decisions
approved. I mean operationally, I would say, you know, the Chief sometimes has
some say, directs us for certain things
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<td>11028961</td>
<td>13h</td>
<td>My immediate supervisor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11042566</td>
<td>13h</td>
<td>Good question. Probably my administrative sergeants, for here in the office, my administrative sergeant. Out in the areas would be the lieutenants would be ultimately responsible to make sure it's put on that way and then their sergeants would make sure what the lieutenants wanted done which is what I like done get done. Just say the chain of command.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11058231</td>
<td>13h</td>
<td>The lieutenants and sergeants are mainly the frontline supervisors. I mean, they're-- you don't have to oversee, look over the shoulder because they know what's expected and they do a great job and have the knowledge of what was going on a particular area and they're focused on what they have to do.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11062184</td>
<td>13h</td>
<td>I think everybody got to be responsible. If you're not responsible for doing your work especially in a unit like this then you shouldn't be here.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11087163</td>
<td>13h</td>
<td>Because the--when I go to access a particular area or a gang that a particular unit—or a particular team might be responsible for the most recent intelligence and if that intelligence isn't lacking or there are no reports filed, then I would know that the supervisor in that particular area is lacking and make sure--</td>
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<tr>
<td>11105904</td>
<td>13h</td>
<td>Unfortunately, the person responsible would be the first line supervisor and then it would go all the way up to the lieutenant and ultimately to the commander and up through to the Department. However, since the Department has not formalized any program or standardized any reports on intelligence or make many strict definitions—on what they will accept or what they won't accept, or even decide the difference between information, it normally falls on the individual officer who's out there doing the interviews. He takes it as far as he want or he ends it immediately.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
<td>13h</td>
<td>I would have to, for me in our level, I would go to the Commander of each of the sections.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11148753</td>
<td>13h</td>
<td>I think we all are, from each Officers in a unit, making sure that something is being done, all up to the commander. I think everybody is part of the unit, is part of that.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11257484</td>
<td>13h</td>
<td>I guess, me from here, you know. I kind of like try to pull it off together the best I can, you know. And like I said, I couldn't do without some of my sergeants-- something they're the ones that do the yeoman's work, at least get the guys out there and engaged, keeping them focused. You know, and the, they've been very helpful.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11234773</td>
<td>13h</td>
<td>Yeah, one guy handles here that helps out with the entire division, but primarily for of gangs and narcotics. And they also have an analyst to, you know. And (one guy) is, actually he's working with the violence side of it and the gang— the gang hierarchies. However, often times they hold information because their source around here is always narcotics, even the ones that are, the murders out there, the high level gang leaders that they also dope.</td>
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<td>11247602</td>
<td>13h</td>
<td>The supervisors, probably most of the commander of each unit. You know, and that heads down to their lieutenants, usually the lieutenants and their commanders.</td>
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<td>Respondent</td>
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<tr>
<td>11028961</td>
<td>13i</td>
<td>One of the things that always seems to happen, at least for us, is there's always the last-minute report that needs to be done, that needs to be done yesterday. I don't know if there's any type of scheduling that they can put together by dates where you'd be able to meet those reports, but it just seems to me that a lot of the reports that you have to complete are always a reaction to something that either happened out on the street or a question that was post to maybe the higher-ranking officer that couldn't be answered because he didn't have all the information. Now it levels, it comes down to your level and you have to put all that together.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11042566</td>
<td>13i</td>
<td>Sure, I think there's better ways all the time. We start from scratches. We start from the bottom. Made decisions at first that probably worked the best and as we went along, it is like, I think, trial and error.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11038231</td>
<td>13i</td>
<td>Yeah and to do it better. Yeah. And scout ourselves and do better because the more you throw out the guys, &quot;Okay, let's do this mission. Let's do this mission because it's going to prevent this crime. Well, let's analyze as a team, as the managers, what's working and let's do it better as, you know, what could we do to do it better.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11062184</td>
<td>13i</td>
<td>We can always use additional resources, technological and otherwise. We're always running around for, you know, we can't even get any YouTube or MySpace when you're talking about murder. Yeah, we could always use—what's the Coplink you're talking about, we don't have that. Right, and we use Reference USA, yeah. We can use that again and a more accessible LEADS 2000 would be nice and we have two guys that are qualified because it's such a pain the ass.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11087163</td>
<td>13i</td>
<td>That's definitely additional training, resources, and technology all three would be a benefit. The technology is lacking with the retrieving the information and that's probably biggest glitch and our resource—our current resources are sometimes our informational services has provided us with are outdated and not easy to use on a level for the police officers. We're definitely lacking the analytical end.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11105904</td>
<td>13i</td>
<td>There's a lot of suggestions and recommendations. One of this refer to training of individual officers. They'll do what you ask them to do but however, they need to be trained on historical de briefings with gang members as opposed to just what's happening now and then and documenting that. The paradox to that though is that once it's documented, it usually goes into a file and showed among those team members unless it's something that warrants bringing facts to the Deployment Operations Center. The practices, there needs to be a database where the information is standardized to go into, and when I say standardized, specific fields that need to be addressed because garbage in is garbage out.</td>
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<td>11129230</td>
<td>13i</td>
<td>Yeah, I, you know, when I look at, I think there's got to be more strategic planning for intelligence, in general, for the whole division. I mean more of the plans, strategic plans and it starts with where do we, what are we, what's our goals as a Division and how does each section play a part and what are the commonalities in terms of developing technology. So, I think developing a formal organizational function of intelligence team or unit that are build behind having the technology and the training as analyst, I think that's really critical that the Organized Crime Division can share all these information through all the three sections internally. And if necessary, share it externally when needed, you know? But I think it's got to be done strategically and it's got to be done with some planning because in order for that to happen, we have to, you know, remember that we need to develop, you know, policy, look at it legally and look at some of the legal issues and some of the technology that has to be developed and has to be funded to be developed, too.</td>
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<td>11148753</td>
<td>13i</td>
<td>Training is always a benefit, as much training as we could possibly get that's possible to send somebody to. I think it should always be there. And it's going to move to next question, we have deal our technological capabilities as we go along also. I think we are somewhat--we're fortunate enough to have our own computer support here in this unit, that sometimes we don't have to depend on Information Services because they are slow in responding to certain things, but I think we are also--misfortune that we are still limited in our technology capabilities by the location on which we are. The capabilities of the equipment that they placed here, there is still a limitation on some of what the equipment can do. And part of that comes with my--there are aspects that the financial need can be meet but the overall financial need is one that have to come from a bigger source.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11257484</td>
<td>13i</td>
<td>Well, I think perhaps maybe some sort of database, you know, cataloguing a lot of stuff, you know, where we can--where things could be permanently stored, you know, by district, whether be our--like maybe done on a daily basis, whatever GES report was done in that district for that day could be stored there and then maybe somehow cross-referenced to like location within that district. I think that would be helpful.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11234773</td>
<td>13i</td>
<td>Training resources, technology available in the field rather than in the office. That to me is--is key.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11247602</td>
<td>13i</td>
<td>The biggest issue and the biggest item I think that would be a boom to this organization in this division as well as probably other departments to get the gang intelligence database up and running and functional.</td>
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<td>11028961</td>
<td>13j</td>
<td>No, I'm not aware of anything.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11042566</td>
<td>13j</td>
<td>Well, he wants our computer people to put together a program that would put all of organize crime on the same page and what we've done, what we are getting done and to keep track of what we've done and what we're going to get done. They want it all and all of organized crime. Every unit that is in organized crime to be able to do it.</td>
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<td>11058231</td>
<td>13j</td>
<td>I think we can—we think ourselves and we, as a unit, we adapted and adjusted to what were confronted with them and just try to improve on a daily basis it's, you know—you have 24 years in the job you're in or the number of years in your job, I think you learn something everyday in this job.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11062184</td>
<td>13j</td>
<td>I'm not.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11087163</td>
<td>13j</td>
<td>We are constantly requesting new and improved tools as just as where Accurint is one of our basic tools that we need to improve tools because they're lacking. Sometimes the information is old, faulty.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11105904</td>
<td>13j</td>
<td>No...</td>
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<tr>
<td>11129230</td>
<td>13j</td>
<td>Well, we were developing some databases for gang intelligence and collecting information from gang members. We felt that that model can then apply to narcotics as well as the vice control section and can be, you know, general intelligence report and not only gangs, but narcotics and also organized crime activities such as gambling, prostitution, and stuff like that. So, we were in the process of developing that.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11148753</td>
<td>13j</td>
<td>There's a computer technology that's out there, as a matter of fact, we have officers that are working to build it and get it set up that it be able to utilize by the whole unit. Filemaker, it's storing... It's for storage, for review and for transmitting. Office information will be able to be placed on it and within this system that there will be able to view a little more easily than what it is now.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11257484</td>
<td>13j</td>
<td>(This response is combined with the previous response.)</td>
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<tr>
<td>11234773</td>
<td>13j</td>
<td>I mean—I rather base our request for, you know, updated technology, training, they're building an investigator to be able to handle the entire investigation himself rather than having one too much outside resources. So, I mean, training's first, specifically, the technology, definitely. I mean, the Deputy is a very strong advocate for us as far as getting training equipment's the best we can. We probably have the best within the department we had probably, the best since we pay for ourselves.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11247602</td>
<td>13j</td>
<td>I know one thing we've worked on recently in the Department, as a whole, we're working on is trying to get a, is getting the Clear system available to the BlackBerries. There are a lot of supervisors and people on the street have in both the Organized Crime Divisions as well as the Patrol Divisions so you could actually maximize the ability to run names and get information on the street. We have a lot of trouble with PDTs over the years.</td>
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<td>11028961</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Yeah, generally, I would say that if we had more intelligence-led policing, meaning we have more analytical discussions then we have more people that were looking at things analytically for us, would it be more effective to our section? Yeah, I definitely think it would be. Sometimes, you know, that type of direction is a shortcut to, you know, sitting people down for a week trying to come up with an address or a location or whatever. If you had somebody that have those—that information, those skills that can look for those types of things and somebody you can connect with, I think yeah, it would definitely—it would definitely be more effective.</td>
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<td>11042566</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Like I said earlier, and we are doing an intelligence-led policing but I have learn one thing on this job you can always do it better if there's a better outline or better way to do it. I most certainly know that everyday you can do things better. I believe that we will continually get better doing Intelligence-led policing whether be in the analysis way or ways of gathering information</td>
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<tr>
<td>11058231</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Yeah, there's always a room for improvement</td>
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<td>11062184</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Yeah, I guess it would help but I think it would help more just to explain and define what it is the coppers that are going to work for me. Just that they're doing it all right. These guys are already doing it. They're already intelligence-based police work which I kind of said before. That's just good police work. Sure, it would be fine to say, &quot;All right, well, take this column and this column and see how they match.&quot; But like I said, you got to use common sense and he gotta take that gut instinct. You can't completely take away when the hair stand in the back of your neck when you pull over a car. There's something there. Maybe you don't even know what it is yet but—and probably it's intelligence based, you just don't know what it is. Its certain gut feeling you can't get rid off. You just can't be analytical.</td>
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<td>11087163</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>The intelligence-based policing would definitely, we use it to a great deal, but by bringing into the department it would en-further what we do because our information from the entire Department, Intelligence would be more effective if we had a system in place.</td>
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<td>11105904</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Yes. I believe the concept of intelligence-led policing would greatly enhance the efforts of the Organized Crime Division and make it more effective based upon, you know the cliché, &quot;Knowledge is power.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>11129230</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Yeah. I think that it would be, number one, you know, it increase the tactical levels of our department in the execution of a strategic plan if they have that information. It's leveraging your resources a lot more efficiently if you have, if you say, &quot;Okay, you know, we got four people working where are you going to put them at?&quot; We put them in the area where more likely all the crime is happening and you give them the intelligence of what type of vehicles are involved or people involved. You know, so you're leveraging all that for tactical use. And then on the strategic level, I think, you know, it helps with strategic planning.</td>
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<td>11148753</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Anything that will improve—that wants to help along is going to put the role effectively. There's nothing I can say. One thing, in particular, I can say that would do it but I think as we go along as it was develop and this is one with strategy. It would improve overall effectiveness as we go along as everybody tends to use to it. If this is the basic strategy although, like I said, we essentially already do it but now we are going to formalize it, there might be some little, I don't call it missteps but it will be a process that we have to go through in order to make sure we fall within that formalized strategy.</td>
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<td>11257484</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Absolutely. I think that, through the interview here today, we say that we're utilizing some of that already. Interviewer: Yes. Respondent: And I think that, you know, I think better cataloging of some of these information and then, like you would tell earlier the querying would be easy, the ability to query on things would be helpful, but there, too, I think, a lot of that could go down, like the district law enforcement level, too. And let's give them a part of this whole thing 'cause they're the, you know, woods on the ground type of guys.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Respondent</td>
<td>Question</td>
<td>Response</td>
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<tr>
<td>11234773</td>
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<td>Well, because, I mean, narcotics section is always been an investigative unit and the core, the core of our success is based on informants, which is to—and that to me is intelligence-led. We are led by our informants in my investigations and by [00:32:32 undercover] operations where we infiltrate specific groups. You know, and that starts at the street level. It starts with the, you know, every single officer here has the ability to just to go on an undercover vehicle to go out there for five months and initiate the investigation. Interviewer: Alright. Respondent: Since narcotics is unique since that we—that we create our own investigations. We not like handed investigation we create our own and that to me is the core of intelligence-led policing.</td>
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<td>11247602</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>Yeah. I believe that if the concepts are good and I think that we do use them for the most part of like anything. We could always get better at it. Yeah, it's the concept is a solid concept in my opinion. Anytime that you have your forearm, so to speak. Anytime you have as much knowledge as you can about a particular decision you have to make, you're bound to make a better decision.</td>
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Responses to Questions by Interviewee

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<th>Question</th>
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<td>11028961</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Yeah, absolutely.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11042566</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Yes... Yes, I mean that's what we just talked about. If that's going to make us better, why not do it.</td>
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<td>11058231</td>
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<td>I think we do already in some extent. Passing information but as long as we're trained, because, you know, we have limited resources... Yeah, always welcome...</td>
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<td>11062184</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Yeah, I'd like to have an analysis, like I said it's just every year. Just to do the, not just the PowerPoint but more like, yeah, all the intelligence stuff like--I mean every time we need the backgrounds on those guys and stuff like that, I would want to have that, just to keep the rest of the guys on the street because if I can spend--the least time I can spend behind a computer, the better. And my detectives, I'd rather have them on the streets working than filling out an IBDR but I understand that we have to do that but it would be nice</td>
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<td>11087163</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Yes, absolutely.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11105904</td>
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<td>Absolutely.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11129230</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Yes.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11148753</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>You want to participate on anything that's going to improve effectiveness. Sometimes even though it would be a drain you have to look at what's going to be the advantages for the future and if this is going to be an advantage for us as we go along into the future, most definitely we want to participate.</td>
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<td>11257484</td>
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<td>That would be great. I mean, I would love to have a couple of analysts. One girl I had was really good. She hurt herself but she'll be coming back next year. But, yeah that would be outstanding. I mean, I'd participate as long as it's, like you said, it doesn't—it's not going to drain on available resources or my time or anything like that.</td>
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<td>11234773</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>Sure. I mean, I would in a perfect world.</td>
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<td>11247602</td>
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<td>I'm not really sure what the question means exactly, but I would be happy to lend my participation in an initiative and try it and see if we can make it work and make the Department work better divisionally.</td>
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APPENDIX F:

COHEN'S KAPPA OF INTERRATER RELIABILITY
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APPENDIX G:
DEFINITIONS
DEFINITIONS

Analysis: the ability to reduce complex information to a simpler form for examination on solutions intended to resolve more complex problems in support of possible decisions.

Collaboration: the work of two or more agencies that provide resources and expertise with the goal of maximizing the ability to detect, prevent, respond, or defeat threatening, criminal or terrorist activities.

Data: a general abstract descriptor which is initially unbiased.

Intelligence-led policing: a management philosophy in support of optimal resource allocation based on the understanding of the operating environment.

Intelligence Process: a method for managing the flow of data across the horizontal and vertical levels of government in order to integrate information and analysis, develop intelligence, and provide decision-makers with the options required to develop actionable knowledge.

Information: data that has been synthesized and is biased.

Intelligence: information to which value has been added through analysis

Intelligence Community: 14 U.S. agencies responsible for intelligence activities necessary for national security, headed by the Director of Central Intelligence.

State and Tribal Law Enforcement Agencies: Fifty (50) state and two hundred (200) tribal Indian law enforcement agencies which function below the federal level and above local law enforcement level.
Local Law Enforcement: any of the estimated 800,000 sworn officers representing agencies below the state level.
REFERENCES


VITA

Prior to attending Loyola, the author received his undergraduate degree from the University of Pittsburgh and subsequently earned a Masters in Public Administration (1997) and an MBA (1999) from the Illinois Institute of Technology while employed with the Chicago Police Department. He has contributed articles on information management to a number of journals and magazines and is co-author of Managing Information in Complex Organizations. The author is currently an Assistant Chief with the New Haven Police Department.