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The Hartford Convention: Its Effect Upon the Federalist Party

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THE HARTFORD CONVENTION: ITS EFFECT UPON THE FEDERALIST PARTY

By

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VITA

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CHAPTER I.

New England Opposition to the War of 1812

The unrelenting efforts of the New England states to prevent the national government from entering into a war against England in 1812, and their determined efforts to secure peace once the war had begun, culminated in the Hartford Convention. This celebrated convention, though rendered ineffectual by the Treaty of Ghent, had an outcome totally unexpected by its Federalist constituents, which turned the rest of the country against the 'treasonable' gathering and resulted in the ultimate downfall of the Federalist party.

The reasons for the declaration of war primarily affected the New England states, and they resented the administration which insisted upon avenging their interests against their will, starting its punishment of England by an embargo that throttled the commerce of the eastern states and exposed their people to extreme privation. The administration further alienated the New England states by favoring the French government against the English, and of the two countries the New Englanders distinctly considered France the more offensive to their commerce. The Berlin and Milan Decrees of Napoleon, promulgated in December, 1806, had declared Britain to be in a state of blockade, and in August, 1807, it was announced that the vessels of neutral America would be seized for violations. This, coupled with the French restrictions on trade with her colonies, was more
obnoxious to the New Englanders than the British blockades, impressments, or Orders in Council, since the British restrictions still left loopholes for some fairly lucrative trade. Thus, while Jefferson and Madison smiled at France and frowned at England, the northern commercial groups shouted their disapproval, becoming more and more disgusted with a government which claimed to be protecting their interests, while its every act frustrated them further.

The question of British impressment of American sailors loomed large in the eyes of Jefferson and Madison. When England become involved in war with France, her sailors in foreign employ were ordered home to serve on British men-of-war. Many of these were reluctant to obey, as they plainly preferred the well-paid American service rather than the poorly-paid, semi-slavery under British command. The very similarity in the language and dress of the two nations immediately opened the way to much misunderstanding, since English nationals relied on the likeness to support their claims that they were American citizens. Naturally, abuses resulted, intentional and unintentional, when American shipping, stopped by British men-of-war, was stripped of its 'British subjects', including violently protesting American sailors. But impressment had no terrors for New Englanders, in comparison to a war against Britain; John Lowell voiced the northern viewpoint:

The northern and middle states, who are now united in opinion, possess 3,000,000 of inhabitants, considerably more than did the whole United States at the time of the Declaration of Independence. — They are a body of freemen, distinguished for their industry and virtue. They are the owners of nearly two third parts of all the tonnage of the United States, and furnishes, probably three fourths of all the native seamen. They
are totally opposed to a war for the privilege of protecting British seamen against their own sovereign. They know, from their own experience, that this subject of impressment is a mere instrument, wielded by men who are utterly indifferent about the suffering of the sailors or the merchants.1

The affair of the Leopard and the Chesapeake brought the matter of impressment to a head in the United States. On June 22, 1807, the commander of the British line-of-battle ship Leopard stopped the American frigate Chesapeake, and demanded the persons of certain British deserters whom they claimed were on board. When the commander of the Chesapeake refused to comply, the British ship opened fire, and forcibly removed one British subject as well as three Americans. When the news of this incident reached the States, Federalists and Republicans alike were ready for war to avenge the dishonor done the American flag. The Essex Junto, wishing to embarrass Jefferson in his seeming desire for hostilities, were the only group which was inclined to condone the act, defending the British point of view; the majority of the Federalists, however, including such prominent members as John Quincy Adams and Harrison Gray Otis, broke away from the Junto and joined the popular clamor against the outrage, more interested in revenge than in causing the war-party discomfiture. Jefferson lost his chance to declare war at this point when the country was united against the British, and in the course of his hesitation the issue lost its importance.

Morison, in his Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, considers Jefferson's lack of decision a definite mistake in view of subsequent events:

1. A New England Farmer, (John Lowell), Perpetual War, the Policy of Mr. Madison, Boston, 1812, 5.
Looking back on 1807 from a period of Hague conferences and arbitration treaties, Jefferson's moderation and restraint at that trying period seems most commendable. But the sequel proved that none of his expedients could prevent a war, which might far better have come in 1807, with the entire nation up in arms over the insult to its flag, than in 1812, after one section of the Union had been led by four years of commercial restriction into an attitude of violent disaffection.¹

On July 2, 1807, Jefferson retaliated by closing the American ports to British men-of-war, which resulted in a begrudging apology from Great Britain, and an offer of reparation on terms which left the United States no alternative but to refuse. By this time the New England states were unconcerned over the impressment and irritated over the closure of ports; the rest of the coast, however, lost none of its ardor. On August 3, 1807, John Rutledge of Charleston wrote to Otis in Massachusetts,

You are so cool & dispassionate a people in Boston that you seem to have escaped the passion which enflames us, in consequence of the outrage on one of our frigates. Altho' I deprecate war quite as much as any of my friends can, yet, I think, a War (even with Great Britain) would prove more honourable prosperous & safe, & less costly, than a state of Peace in which a foreign Nation is to exercise the right of searching our National Ships. The general business of impressing American seamen was to be sure not worth mooting — where G. Britain has in her service one of our sailors we have twenty of hers on board our Merchantmen, & this is so well known in that section of the Union where Mariners & navigation belong (New England) that complaints have ceased. The complainingcome from Virginia, where there are neither sailors nor ship, & where this is contrived to aliment & concentrate the angry passions fleeting through our Country against G. Britain, Altho' this disgraceful Spirit had brought upon us our present deplorable condition, & this miserable state is chargeable to the Errors & Vices of those Empirics who administer our government, still my friend we must support this government. With our Commerce so extended as it is, & our Keels fretting every sea, we must have a navy; & that will be impossible if our Ships of War are to be searched — we must kick against this & fight against it, & fight as we should pro Aris & focis....²

² Ibid., "John Rutledge to Otis, Charleston, August 3d, 1807", 284.
Great Britain answered the American closure of ports by tightening the restrictions contained in the Orders in Council. The first Orders, issued in January, 1807, had forbidden neutrals to maintain coastwise commerce between French or allied ports; the second Orders, issued the following December, forbade all direct trade between the United States and continental Europe, unless the cargoes were first landed in Britain and duty paid. To add insult to injury came word of the proclamation of October, 1807, which gave full indorsement of impressment. Embargo seemed to Jefferson the only fitting retaliation short of war.

The Embargo, which went into effect in December, 1807, was an extremely unpopular, as well as futile, gesture. Its main effect was practically to exterminate the American merchant marine, which was forbidden to carry on any foreign commerce whatsoever, and its coastwise trade was likewise hampered by "burdensome restrictions". Its avowed purpose was to protect American shipping from capture and at the same time force France and England to meet the terms of the United States by depriving them of American produce; in both instances it failed completely. While ships were protected commerce was ruined, and France and England merely looked elsewhere for their markets. Added to this was discontent of the people affected, for the sudden removal of their source of income [alleviated only a little by smuggling] resulted in producing conditions of extreme poverty in the coastal towns. New England could hardly be expected to react kindly to the government which was allowing it to starve because of a measure which carried with it only disadvantage. It 1829 Otis wrote,

To the embargo imposed in December, 1807, nearly all the delegation of Massachusetts was opposed. The pretexts for impos-
ing it were deemed by her citizens a mockery of her suffering. Owning nearly one-third of the tonnage in the United States, she felt that her voice ought to be heard in what related to its security. Depending principally on her foreign trade and fisheries for support, her situation appeared desperate under the operation of this law, in its terms perpetual. It was a bitter aggravation of her sufferings to be told that its object was to preserve these interests.1

John Howe, a British spy, scathingly disposed of Jefferson's embargo in the following letter home:

This country [America] has long both rulers and people entertained an idea, that Great Britain and her Colonies, particularly her West India Colonies, could not do without them. And so fully was Mr. Jefferson possessed with that idea, that he conceived his foolish embargo measure, would inflict such an injury on us, as would soon compel our Government, to give up the order relative to seamen, the respective orders, founded on the Milan decree to punish without enquiry any of our Officers whose conduct they saw fit to call in question, and in short that it would compel the nation to relinquish its sovereignty on the Sea, and to become as contemptible as they would delight in rendering her. In this expectation, and to cooperate as far as they dared with Bonaparte, in his attempts to destroy the commerce of England this Embargo was laid....But every mischief Mr. Jefferson calculated, as it respected Great Britain, has been averted, and the whole pressure of this mighty evil is every day operating with increased effect on this devoted Country, and will each day bring its effects closer home to him and his coadjutors....

They appear much mortified here, when I tell them, that we consider the Embargo a great blessing in Nova Scotia, and that we think the Bill should have been entitled "An Act for the better encouragement of the British Colonies in America".2

It was at this point that John Quincy Adams alienated himself from the Federalist party by declaring his approval of the embargo. As a consequence, Massachusetts in the elections of June, 1808, refused to support him.

for re-election to the Senate, and Adams retaliated by resigning when the Massachusetts Legislature approved the anti-embargo resolutions. It was the opinion of John Quincy Adams, however, which influenced Jefferson to repeal the embargo, since Adams had expressed the opinion that its continuance would be met with "forcible resistance" and possibly by civil war.\(^1\)

Gore describes the rebellion brewing in Boston as a result of the embargo in a letter to Rufus King of New York:

"The people of our Country are suffering extremely and must soon be reduced to absolute wretchedness; I mean that portion of them, who have hitherto subsisted by navigation, & especially by the fisheries. They are obliged to depend on charity for food and fuel. In Beverley & Marblehead this is manifestly the case. In the latter 2000 dollars has been borrowed by the Town to relieve the necessities. In the former, private contributions have become very heavy: one Gentleman told me he had already given to men, heads of families, more than 50 cords of wood in quantities of 2x4 feet....This same person said many others in that Town had already given away much greater quantities in proportion to their means. In Cape Ann they have continued to send their fish to market. In Portland, they have in several instances, set the Officers of Customs at defiance & sent their vessels to sea. Military companies are now marching Eastward, it is said, for Salem & Marblehead for the purpose of preventing violations of the Embargo, or, in the words of the Resolutions, to put the Country in a state of Defense. Genl. Strong, who has been here, thinks the people will soon require the influence of good men to Repress or guide their zeal in opposition to the National Government.\(^2\)"

But the actual repeal of the embargo and the substitution of a non-intercourse act toward Britain, in no way decreased the bitterness of the New Englanders toward the national government. Its ill-effects could not be

\(^{1}\) Adams' charges are more fully discussed in Chapter III.

\(^{2}\) Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, V, ed. Charles R. King, "G. Gore to R. King, December 8, 1808", G.P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1898, 110-111.
overcome immediately, as this excerpt from a contemporary sermon affirms,

The painful sensations of the Embargo are still felt. Federalists, such as they were, through the instigation of their directors, could parade in the street before the Governor's house in Boston; to request of him relief, under the pressures they felt, from the embarrassments of our trade, as if he controlled the Councils of foreign Nations and the acts of Congress. This federal movement, had its influence in stirring the People up to the resistance of the laws; when as the federal writers said, they were famishing with hunger, and at the same time, to represent the distress of the Embargo, in all its shapes, they said, the rich produce of the Country, was perishing in the barns of the Farmers, and in the store houses of the Merchants, for the want of a market. They said that distress and famine had pervaded not only the humble cottages of the poor, but the splendid edifices of the rich.

The war-like tone of the administration was daily becoming more and more pronounced. In New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Georgia, Kentucky, and Tennessee the militia was preparing for possible conflict. In political circles the Federalist anti-war party showed increased strength in the spring elections in New York and New England, but they were still a minority with the South and West seemingly eager to rush headlong into a war for which the country was pitifully unprepared. The Federalists, in desperation, now launched upon a course totally unexpected by their constituents, and, as Henry Adams comments, "their behavior, contradicting their own principles, embarrased their friends still more than it confused their enemies." Throwing reason to the winds, they approached the British minister, astonishing him by the lengths to which they were prepared to go, to save their commerce; Foster wrote home:

1 Solomon Aiken, The Rise and Progress of the Political Dissention in the United States. A Sermon, Preached in Dracut, May 11, 1811, It Being the Annual Fast, Haverhill, 1811, 17.
The Federal leaders make no scruple of telling me that they mean to give their votes for war, although they will remain silent in the debates; they add that it will be a short war of six or nine months. To my observations on the strange and dangerous nature of such a policy, they shrug their shoulders, telling me that they see no end to restrictions and non-importation laws but in war; that war will turn out the Administration, and then they will have their own way, and make a rapid peace with Great Britain.

On February 1st, two Federalists whose names were not included in his report, paid him a voluntary and unsolicited visit, in which they advised him what course to suggest to his government to pursue, in order to overthrow the administration, secure New England leadership in the country, and thus cement friendly relations with Britain. Foster's report reads as follows,

The sum of these suggestions was that we should neither revoke our Orders in Council nor modify them in any manner. They said this Government would, if we conceded, look upon our concessions as being the effect of their own measure, and plume themselves thereon; that they only wanted to get out of their present difficulties, and if we made a partial concession they would make use of it to escape fulfilling their pledge to go to war, still however continuing the restrictory system; whereas if we pushed them to the edge of the precipice by an unbending attitude, that then they must be lost, either by the disgrace of having nearly ruined the trade of the United States and yet failed to reduce Great Britain by their system of commercial restrictions, or else by their incapacity to conduct the government during war. These gentlemen declared that they were for war rather than for the continuance of the restrictory system, even if the war should last four years. 2

On March 9, 1812, Madison again showed his desire to secure declaration of war against Britain. He placed before Congress certain papers which he had been inveigled into buying from John Henry, a British spy, pur-

1 Ibid., 172.
2 Ibid., 173.
porting to contain evidence of treason brewing in the New England states. Unable to sell these documents either to his employer, Governor Craig of Canada, or to the British government, Henry found a market in Madison who was casting about for some means of retaliation to the rebellious New Englanders. Madison, aided and abetted by Monroe, purchased the papers for $50,000, having persuaded Henry to relinquish his original demand for $125,000. The Federalists, remembering their visit to Foster, were alarmed when they learned the circumstances, for Henry had travelled through the New England states and had been entertained in some of the best homes, while unknown to them as a spy. Madison formally presented the material to the House, saying,

"I lay before Congress copies of certain documents, which remain in the department of state. They PROVE, that at a recent period, whilst the United States, notwithstanding the wrongs sustained by them, ceased not to observe the laws of peace and neutrality towards Great Britain, and in the midst of amicable professions and negotiations, on the part of the British government, through its public minister here, a secret agent was employed, in certain states, more especially at the seat of government in Massachusetts, in fomenting disaffection to the constituted authorities of the nation; and in intrigues with the disaffected, for the purpose of bringing about resistance to the laws, and eventually, in concert with a British force, of destroying the Union, and forming the eastern part thereof into a political connexion with Great Britain."

However, the documents were inconclusive and contained no more damaging statements concerning New England 'treason' than they published daily in their local papers. It seemed that Madison had paid out fifty thousand American dollars in salary to John Henry that the British government should have paid, all for a quantity of harmless conjectures which, it could safely

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be assumed, were probably exaggerated as much as possible to secure favor from the spy's employers. The Federalists snickered openly; Sullivan wrote,

It is amusing that Mr. Madison should have paid an ingenious Irishman fifty thousand dollars, for an attempt to render a service to the object of his hatred, England. Still more amusing that all he got for his money, was a faithful picture of Jefferson and himself, drawn by a British painter.¹

On April 1st, Madison recommended an embargo to last sixty days; this measure was, of course, recognized as a preliminary gesture to an actual declaration of war. The Senate, to delay things a bit, extended the measure to ninety days.

Madison was renominated in May for the presidency, and easily secured his re-election; he was opposed by the Federalist candidates, Clinton and Ingersol. Though he carried the electoral votes of Vermont and Pennsylvania, it was significant that the large and wealthy states of New York and Massachusetts voted against him, thus demonstrating their opposition to his war policy.

Madison's message of June 1st was markedly hostile to England, citing as it did her various provocative acts against the United States, and recommending that definite action be taken. The message was referred to a committee whose report was of much the same tenor. When the House was asked to authorize a declaration of war, the issue met with violent opposition, only to be passed by a vote of 79-49. In the Senate the bill also met with trouble: the anti-war group held up the vote for two weeks, suggesting alternative measures of letters of marque or reprisal, and the arming of merchant shipping. But the Senate, like the House, passed the bill

¹ Ibid., 290.
by a majority of six votes (19-13). The President immediately ratified the action and the country was at war. Concerning the congressional vote, Henry Adams states,

Hardly one-third of the members of Congress believed war to be their best policy. Almost another third were Federalists who wished to overthrow the Administration; the rest were honest and perhaps shrewd men, brought up in the school of Virginia and Pennsylvania politics, who saw more clearly the evils that war must bring that the good it might cause, and who dreaded the reaction upon their constituents....By force of will and intellect the group of war members [Clay, Calhoun, Cheves and Lowndes] held their own, and dragged Congress forward in spite of itself.1

Sullivan asserted that the vote of the House proved the war to be the will of the South and West, to protect the interests of the protesting North:

In the House of Representatives the whole numbers of members was 128; of these 79 voted for the war; and of these (79,) 62 resided south, and 17 north of the Delaware. The Senate consisted of 32 members, 19 of whom voted for the war, and 14 of these resided south of the Delaware; and 5 of the 19, north. Putting together the war members, of both branches, residing south of the Delaware, viz. 62 and 14, they make 76; which is four short of half of the whole number in both branches. Thus the war may be said to have been a measure of the south and west, to take care of the interests of the north, much against the will of the latter. The whole number of members of both branches residing north of the Delaware was 68, of whom only 21 voted for the war.2

John Lowell expressed the opinion of New England succinctly,

Five years of successive commercial restriction, was found ineffectual; it made us grow leaner to be sure, but we were strong and able to survive it. Our persecutors had not patience to endure our lingering death; they therefore got up the guillotine of a maritime war, to cut off our heads at a stroke.3

1 Henry Adams, History of the United States of America, VI, New York, 1890, 170.
3 A New England Farmer (John Lowell), Perpetual War, the Policy of Mr. Madison, Boston, 1812, 4.
In the meantime England had changed her policy and had developed a more tolerant view of the protests of the United States. She had no desire to engage in war with the States when she was struggling to defeat Napoleon. Sullivan thought that the United States government deliberately insisted on maintaining its hostile attitude:

Between the 4th of March, 1809, when Mr Madison became President, and the 18th of June, 1812, when war was declared, England seems to have desired sincerely, to compromise the controversies with this country, and to avoid conflict. Mr. Erskine, a very young man, and not of much experience, was British minister here, on the 4th of March. An arrangement was made with him. It was said at the time, that Mr. Madison knew, or might have known, that he had exceeded his authority. This arrangement was disavowed in England, and Erskine recalled. He was succeeded by Francis James Jackson, whom the administration found so much to be displeased with, that all communication was cut off with him, and, as it was then thought, offensively, and with the design to keep open the controversy. He was succeeded by Mr. Foster, who was equally unsuccessful. He remained here till war was declared.¹

Two days before the declaration of war, a motion was made in the British House of Commons by Lord Brougham that the Orders in Council be revoked, insofar as they affected American vessels. There were two reasons why such a move would be expedient at that time: Napoleon had, at least on paper, withdrawn the Berlin and Milan decrees, and it had been repeatedly said that the British government would remove its Orders if Napoleon would his; also, the fact that they were then engaged in heavy struggles with France hardly encouraged detailing needed troops and ships to America. Accordingly, four days after the American declaration of war, the Orders in Council, with the stipulation that America cease its hostile acts, were re-

pealed, but too late to avert the catastrophe. When the news reached America it had no other effect but to place the reasons for declaring war on the weaker claim, impressment. Only the Federalists upbraided the government for carrying on a war when the main issue had been conceded.

The members of the House who had opposed the war issue were not to be silenced. It had been hoped by members of the administration that the actual declaration of war would unite the country against the common foe. In this they were to be sadly disappointed. The minority in the House made issue of the fact that they were called into secret session to discuss the war, and thirty-four of the forty-nine members who had voted against the declaration issued a pamphlet embodying an official protest to the secret session and the inadequacy of the war claims:

The momentous question of war, [stated the Pamphlet] with Great Britain, is decided. On this topic, so vital to your interests, the right of public debate, in the face of the world, and especially of their constituents, has been denied to your representatives. They have been called into secret session, on this most interesting of all your public relations, although the circumstances of the time and of the nation afforded no one reason for secrecy, unless it be found in the apprehension of the effect of public debate on public opinion; or of public opinion on the result of the vote.

Except the message of the President of the United States, which is now before the public, nothing confidential was communicated. That message contained no fact, not previously known. No one reason for war was intimated, but such as was of a nature public and notorious. The intention to wage war and invade Canada had been long since openly avowed. The object of hostile menace had been ostentatiously announced. The inadequacy of both our army and navy for successful invasion, and the insufficiency of the fortifications for the security of our seaboard, were, everywhere, known. Yet the doors of Congress were shut upon the people. They have been carefully kept in ignorance of the progress of measures, until the purposes of administration were consummated, and the fate of the country sealed. In a situation so extraordinary, the undersigned have deemed it their duty by no act of theirs to sanction a proceeding so novel and arbitrary. On the contrary,
they made every attempt in their power to attain publicity for their proceedings. All such attempts were vain. When this momentous subject was stated, as for debate, they demanded that the doors should be opened.

This being refused, they declined discussion; being perfectly convinced, from indications too plain to be misunderstood, that, in the house, all argument, with closed doors, was hopeless; and that any act, giving implied validity to so flagrant an abuse of power, would be little less than treachery to the essential rights of a free people. In the situation to which the undersigned have thus been reduced, they are compelled reluctantly to resort to this public declaration of such views of the state and relations of the country, as determined their judgment and vote upon the question of war.1

The main object for declaring war they disposed of in these words,

The claim of Great Britain to the services of her seamen is neither novel, nor peculiar. The doctrine of allegiance for which she contends is common to all the governments of Europe. France, as well as England, has maintained it for centuries. Both nations claim, in time of war, the services of their subjects. Both by decrees forbid their entering into foreign employ. Both recall them by proclamation.

No man can doubt that, in the present state of the French marine, if American merchant vessels were met at sea, having French seamen on board, France would take them. Will any man believe the United States would go to war against France on this account?

The claim of Great Britain pretends to no further extent, than to take British seamen from private merchant vessels. In the exercise of this claim, her officers take American seamen, and foreign seamen, in the American service; and although she disclaims such abuses, and proffers redress, when known, yet undoubtedly grievous injuries have resulted to the seamen of the United States. But the question is, can war be proper for such cause, before all hope of reasonable accommodation has failed? Even after the extinguishment of such hope, can it be proper, until our own practice be so regulated as to remove, in such foreign nation, any reasonable apprehension of injury?2

1 An Address of Members of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, to their Constituents, on the Subject of the War with Great Britain, Boston, 1812, 3-4.
2 Ibid., 7-8.
On July 15th a meeting of protest against the war was held in Faneuil Hall in Boston, and on the same day a similar group met in Middlesex County in Massachusetts. August 6th saw a "rebel" convention in Boston, and in that same month a convention in Worcester. All echoed the sentiments of John Lathrop, who exclaimed, "A war so unpopular, as the present war appears to be, cannot be supported."¹

The administration met its first difficulty of the war in the attempted conscription of New England militia. On April 10, 1812, before war had been declared, but obviously in expectation of it, Congress had authorized Madison to "require of the executives of the several states and territories, to...organize, arm, and equip...their respective portions of one hundred thousand militia."² Congress also authorized the President to appoint the general officers who would have charge of military organization and campaigns. To their other provisions they added that the President might call the militia into service "in all the exigencies provided by the constitution." This clause gave the Federalists a loophole to dispute the demands of the national government.

On the strength of the grants of Congress, Secretary of War Eustis wrote the governors of the various states, and directed them to prepare their militia. On June 22, at the behest of the President, General Dearborn wrote, among others, Governor Strong of Massachusetts and Governor Griswold of Connecticut, requesting that Massachusetts produce forty-one

¹ John Lathrop, The Present War Unexpected, Unnecessary, and Ruinous, Boston, 1812, 15.
² Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, Boston, 1833, 234.
companies, of which fourteen were to be artillery, and 27 infantry; of Connecticut he requested five companies, two of artillery, and three of infantry. Here the General made a grave error. For the forty-one companies requested of Massachusetts, he required only two of their officers, lieutenant-colonels where, as claimed by Dwight, Massachusetts had the right to appoint a native major or general, since she was asked to provide what amounted to an army division. From Connecticut no officers whatsoever were desired, and Connecticut, forming a battalion, had the right to be commanded by a major. To add to the irritation of the two states, their militia were ordered by the General to report to the command of United States officers in various parts of their own states as well as in other New England sectors. Immediately Connecticut and Massachusetts questioned the constitutional right of the President to call out the militia, since the "exigencies provided by the constitution" were not present in the existing situation.

Governor Strong of Massachusetts called together the Legislature in special session in October, 1812, and addressed them, in part,

The Constitution of the United States declared, that 'Congress may provide for calling forth the militia to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, and repel invasions,' and the act of Congress of April 10th, 1812, authorizing a detachment of 100,000 of the militia, empowers the President to 'call into actual service any part, or the whole of said detachment, in all the exigencies provided by the constitution.' From these clauses in the constitution and the law of April 10th, the President derives his authority to call the militia of the state's into actual service; and except in the exigencies above mentioned, he can have no authority by the constitution to do it. But there was no suggestion, either in the letter from the War Department, ... or in those from General Dearborn, that this state or Rhode Island [where Dearborn proposed to send some Massachusetts troops] was

1 Ibid., 248.
invaded, or in imminent danger of invasion; or that either of the exigencies recognized by the constitutional laws of the United States existed....

I have been fully disposed to comply with the requirements of the constitution of the United States and the laws made in pursuance of it, and sincerely regretted that any request should be made by an officer of the national government to which I could not constitutionally conform.¹

The governor of Connecticut made a similar speech to his council, who emphatically corroborated his sentiments:

This board is not informed that the requisition of General Dearborn, said to be in pursuance of that of the Secretary of War of the 12th of instant June, is grounded on a declaration made by the President of the United States, or notice by him given, that the militia are required to execute the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections, or repel invasions, or that the United States are in imminent danger of invasion. As none of the exigencies recognized by the constitution and laws of the United States are shown to exist, this board deem his excellency the Governor to be, of right, the commander in chief of the militia of this state, and that they cannot thus be withdrawn from his authority.²

Both states accordingly began to raise militia in defense of their own territory. Needless to say, their attitude was extremely irritating to Madison, who saw no way to make them conform. However, New England's militia frequently submitted to United States command, particularly after the invasion of Washington and parts of Maine. But throughout the war, the soldiers of New England persistently refused to march outside United States boundaries, and in some instances, outside those of their respective states. Madison complained to Gallatin of the poor cooperation he was receiving from the militia:

¹ Ibid., 241-243.
² Ibid., 246.
The enlistments for the regular army fall short of the most moderate calculation. The Volunteer Act is extremely unproductive. And even the militia detachments are either obstructed by the disaffected governors or chilled by the Federal spirit diffused throughout the region most convenient to the theater. [re. the expedition to Montreal] I see nothing better than to draw on this resource as far as the detachments consist of volunteers, who, it may be presumed, will cross the line without raising constitutional or legal questions.1

At length, aggravated to the extreme with New England’s lack of cooperation, the government withdrew, in 1814, all financial aid for the sustenance of their state militia. Dwight complained that the states concerned had to pay taxes, yet received no financial considerations in return:

In 1814, when invasions had actually occurred, and depredations were threatened along the New England coast, and those states were left to depend exclusively upon their own means of defense, while the burdens arising from the military arrangements for their own security were becoming more and more severe, at such a moment, when the legal pecuniary demands of the government were fully exacted, the supplies and pay of the militia were withdrawn by the orders of the national government, and the whole weight of supporting them was, in a petulant fit of resentment, thrown upon the states.2

The general popularity of the President was demonstrated in Boston’s reception of the news of the capture of Washington. The National Eagle of August 31, 1814, held up its hands in horror:3

HORRIBLE DEPRAVITY. When the news of the CAPTURE OF WASHINGTON reached this town, SOME OF THE LEADING FEDERALISTS openly expressed their GRATIFICATION, mingled with a REGRET, that the PRESIDENT was not involved in the DESTRUCTION of the CAPITOL!4

2 Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, Boston, 1833, 288.
3 Twenty-six years later, this paper tried to deny that such an incident had taken place, only to have their own files quoted to them.
4 Boston Morning Post, Extra, August, 1840, 2.
Financially too, the government had trouble enlisting any support from New England. The attitude, "It's Mr. Madison's war -- let him pay for it!" was the prevalent spirit in the northern states, and thus the richest section of the Union refused its much needed support. The empty treasury had not bothered the President when he declared war, and he had gone ahead over the protest of wealthy New England; therefore he might look elsewhere for money. The Middle States consequently had to bear the brunt of the war; Gallatin described the extent of their sacrifices,

The floating debt, consisting of outstanding Treasury notes and temporary loans unpaid, amounted, on the 1st of January, 1815, to eleven millions two hundred and fifty thousand dollars, about four-fifths of which were also due to the Middle States... The banks made advances beyond their resources, either by their own subscriptions or by enlarging their discounts in favor of the subscribers. They, as well as several wealthy and patriotic citizens, displayed great zeal in sustaining the government at a critical moment, and the banks were for that purpose compelled to enlarge their issues.¹

New England, forced to industry by the restrictive system of the government in imposing embargoes and non-importation acts, had found a ready market in the rest of the country for her products. With no English goods available, specie flooded into New England's coffers, where, as far as the war effort was concerned, it stayed. Gallatin estimated the amount of specie in the New England banks to be,²

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Amount</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>June, 1811</td>
<td>$1,709,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; , 1812</td>
<td>3,915,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; , 1813</td>
<td>6,171,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot; , 1814</td>
<td>7,326,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In his financial report Gallatin noted that,

² Ibid., 283.
The circulating capital of the United States, which must supply the loans required in time of war, is concentrated in the large cities, and principally north of the Potomac. The war was unpopular in the Eastern States; they contributed less than from their wealth might have been anticipated; and the burden fell on the Middle States. The proceeds of loans (exclusive of Treasury notes and temporary loans) paid into the Treasury from the commencement of the war to the end of the year 1814 amounted to forty-one millions ten thousand dollars.

Of that sum the Eastern States lent...

New York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, and...

the District of Columbia...

The Southern and Western States...

Not content with merely refusing to aid the government during the war, the New England states actually supported the enemy, buying British bonds at a discount, and supplying them, for a price, with food for their Canadian forces; Sir George Prevost, the British commander, wrote to Lord Bathurst in England in August, 1814:

Two thirds of the army in Canada are at this moment eating beef provided by American contractors, drawn principally from the States of Vermont and New York. This circumstance, as well as that of the introduction of large sums of specie into this province, being notorious in the United States, it is to be expected Congress will take steps to deprive us of those resources, and under that apprehension large droves are daily crossing the lines coming into Lower Canada.

The national government made the mistake of trying to finance the war by loans, only to be secured at high interest, rather than to risk popularity by exacting heavy taxes from the people. The Olive Branch, enumerating the faults of the administration, considered this its most outstanding lapse:

1 Ibid., 284.
The last and perhaps the most grievous and unpardonable error of the democratic party -- an error, pregnant with baleful consequences to the finances and credit of the country, was, depending on loans for the support of the war, and deferring the imposition of taxes adequate to erect the superstructure of public credit upon. This arose from the miserable and pernicious dread of forfeiting popularity, and losing the reins of government -- a dread often the parent of the most destructive measures. The consequence of this highly reprehensible error was, that the loans were made to very considerable loss, and that the public credit of the nation was most lamentably impaired.¹

In the summer of 1814 the war itself finally approached the borders of Massachusetts. The British had already captured parts of Maine, but now caused alarm in Massachusetts by the capture of Castine, a small town at the mouth of the Penobscot. Headquarters at Boston received the added communication that the British intended to make further advances, and the need for adequate and prompt defense became increasingly evident. Since the national government had withdrawn all financial aid to the eastern states, the New Englanders were left to face the issue as they might. Accordingly, Governor Strong of Massachusetts assembled the legislature, with this explanation for his action,

Since your last adjournment such important changes have taken place in the state of our public affairs, and the war in which we have been unhappily involved has assumed an aspect so threatening and destructive, that the Council unanimously concurred with me in opinion that an extraordinary meeting of the Legislature was indispensable.²

On the 7th of October the legislature of Massachusetts voted 222 to 59 on a resolution that the Governor's handling of the defense of the

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¹ M. Carey, The Olive Branch; or, Faults on Both Sides, Philadelphia, 1815, 76.
² Theodore Lyman, A Short Account of the Hartford Convention, Taken from Official Documents and Addressed to the Fair Minded and Well Disposed to Which is Added an Attested Copy of the Secret Journal of That Body, O. Everett, Boston, 1823, 5.
state be approved. On October 13th, the group authorized the governor to raise a militia of ten thousand men for the defense of the state, by a vote of 252 to 71. And on October 16th the famous fifth resolution, authorizing a convention to be held at Hartford, passed the legislature by a vote of 260 to 90. The resolution read:

Resolved, That twelve persons be appointed as delegates from this Commonwealth to meet and confer with delegates from the other New England States, or any other, upon the subject of their public grievances and concerns; and upon the best means of preserving our resources; and of defense against the enemy; and to devise and suggest for adoption by these respective States such measures as they may deem expedient; and also to take measures, if they shall think it proper, for procuring a convention of delegates from all the United States, in order to revise the Constitution thereof, and more effectually to secure the support and attachment of all the people, by placing all upon the basis of fair representation.  

Lyman recorded the votes of the various counties of Massachusetts on this resolution to refute charges that a small majority influenced the people to support such a convention; he states,

These votes are recorded, and as we are not disposed to allow the democratic papers to call the proceedings of the people of this State at that time the work of sorry factions, cabals, and intrigues, we shall give the votes of the counties of Massachusetts Proper in detail as they appear upon the Journals of the House....

The county of Suffolk gave 32 yees and 0 nays.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>County</th>
<th>Yea</th>
<th>Nae</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Essex</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middlesex</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norfolk</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plymouth</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bristol</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Barnstable</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worcester</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampshire</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hampden</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

1 Ibid., 6.
The county of Franklin gave . . . . . . . . 20 yeas and 2 nays
" Berkshire . . . . . . . . 14 " 8 "

226 yeas and 67 nays

We have taken the votes of the House of Representatives as expressing more emphatically the voice of the people, and it appears that three quarters of all the citizens of this Commonwealth were, in 1814, in favor of the Hartford Convention."

In such manner the celebrated Hartford Convention came into being.

It was the direct result of what New England considered governmental oppression and neglect, and the answer to the demand of the people for relief.

The resolution once passed that a convention be held to discuss the sorry plight of the New England states, the Massachusetts Governor and legislature prepared to contact the other states to secure their approbation and attendance.

1 Ibid., 6-7.
CHAPTER II

The Opening of the Convention

The approach to the Convention that the New England states now felt to be necessary for their survival under enemy attacks and the supposed indifference of the United States government, was accomplished by a letter sent by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts to the governors of the different states, inviting them to appoint delegates to the proposed convention at Hartford. The letter itself was written by John Phillips, president of the senate of Massachusetts, and Timothy Bigelow, speaker of the house. The purpose of the convention and the objects it had in view to accomplish became the meat of many a heated controversy, and the suspicion that somewhere in its structure lurked the seeds of separation and disaffection from the Union made the name 'Hartford Convention' a lasting stigma on all who had part in it. Nevertheless, this letter which each governor of his respective state received, was safely couched in terms which, while suggesting alteration of the existing policy, yet spoke respectfully enough of the Union:

The general objects of the proposed conference are, first, to deliberate upon the dangers to which the eastern section of the Union is exposed by the course of the war, and which there is too much reason to believe will thicken round them in its progress, and to devise, if practicable, means of security and defense which may be consistent with the preservation of their resources from total ruin, and adapted to their local situation, mutual relation and habits, and not repugnant to their obligations as members of the Union.1

1 Theodore Lyman, A Short Account of the Hartford Convention, Taken from Official Documents and Addressed to the Fair Minded and the Well Disposed to Which is Added an Attested Copy of the Secret Journal of That Body, Boston, 1823, 9. (Hereafter referred to as, Lyman, A Short Account of the Hartford Convention, pp.)
Theodore Dwight in his History of the Hartford Convention, claimed that

The great object of the states, then, in calling a convention, was, to confer on the practicability of devising means of security and defense — that is, to perform the task which the national government had thrown upon them in 1812, and which had been left upon them down to the time of appointing delegates to meet in convention, and which had now become so imperative that there was no room to avoid it.¹

In the actual report of the Convention the delegates confessed themselves to be "naturally led to a consideration...of the [immediate] dangers and grievances which menaced" them, and that they, at the behest of the people of their various states, had in view "suggesting means of present relief"; in addition, the delegates stated that it was their purpose also to consider grievances "of a more remote and general description, in the hope of attaining future security."²

Upon the passing of the resolution by the Massachusetts House authorizing the calling of a convention to meet at Hartford, and the appointing of delegates to attend, the aforementioned letter was dispatched to the various states, and from Connecticut and Rhode Island came immediate and vigorous response. Delegates were appointed by these three states and also by the two counties of Cheshire and Grafton in New Hampshire, and by the county of Windham in Vermont. It was disappointing to the leaders in Massachusetts that a full representation of the New England states was not obtained, but

² The Proceedings of a Convention of Delegates from the States of Massachusetts, Connecticut, and Rhode Island; the Counties of Cheshire and Grafton in the State of New Hampshire; and the County of Windham in the State of Vermont; Convened at Hartford in the State of Connecticut, December 15, 1814, Hartford, 1815, 6.
those states which did respond did so with enthusiastic popular approval, further indorsed by the Federalist victories in the subsequent congressional elections.

It was with some misgiving, then, that President Madison looked forward to the convention, for reports were about that a reconstruction of the Federal Union under the dictates of New England might not be improbable. The whole enterprise seemed to take the aspect of a conspiracy, accentuated by the utter secrecy which enveloped its proceedings. But it must be noted that the delegates appointed by the various states, while very prominent Federalists, yet represented the more conservative faction. Had New England at this time been less careful of her choice of delegates, then the convention might well have become a radical weapon, and sedition, if not actual secession and civil war, might reasonably have resulted. The exclusion of Josiah Quincy from the convention is particularly noticeable in this respect. He was highly prominent in the Federalist party, but held extreme views as to what should be the role of New England at this time. Therefore his omission from the chosen delegates would indicate their desire for moderation — their policy was definite in demanding reform, yet, as they always maintained, they desired that reform to take place within the Union. That they knew their power at this stage of the war is needless to repeat.

From Massachusetts came George Cabot, Nathan Dane, William Prescott, Harrison Gray Otis, Timothy Bigelow, Joshua Thomas, Samuel Sumner Wilde, Joseph Lyman, Stephen Longfellow, Jr., Daniel Waldo, Hodijah Baylies, and George Bliss; Connecticut delegated Chauncey Goodrich, John Treadwell, James Hillhouse, Zephaniah Swift, Nathaniel Smith, Calvin Goddard, and Roger
Minot Sherman; Rhode Island sent Daniel Lyman, Samuel Ward, Edward Manton, and Benjamin Hazard; New Hampshire, Benjamin West and Mills Olcott; and Vermont, William Hall, Jr. Of these men Otis later said, when defending the lawful intentions of the convention, that they fairly represented whatever of moral, intellectual, or patriotic worth is to be found in the character of the New England community; that they retained all the personal consideration and confidence which are enjoyed by the best citizens, — those who have deceased, to the hour of their death; and those who survive, to the present time.

None could question the characters of the men involved in the convention; John Quincy Adams made no aspersions against their integrity, but held instead that there were other persons of worth in Massachusetts who held opposite opinions to these men, yet who were not in attendance or represented therein. It might be well at this point to insert some references concerning the characters of the delegates, particularly of the group from Massachusetts, who were dominant in the convention. The following excerpt from a confidential letter written just before the convention by John Lowell, is lengthy but pertinent; Lowell wrote,

For measures of wisdom and prudence, to be considered and adopted in common times of tranquillity, perhaps the choice could not have fallen on more suitable persons than those selected from our State.

Whatever they propose will be received with great respect by the people; and the boldest measures would be considered prudent, if suggested by them.

But they are not calculated for bold measures. Mr Cabot is undoubtedly the wisest man in our State, or among the very wisest. ...He is a very practical man, well acquainted with everything which concerns the best interests of a nation; but Mr Cabot has

been always a desponding man as to our public affairs, and their downward course has confirmed his opinions. He hardly thinks the temporary preservation of the State worth the effort, and he is most reluctantly dragged in like a conscript to the duty of a delegate. He has no confidence in the possibility of awakening the people. He will not, therefore, be in favor of any measures which will disturb our sleep. So at least I fear; for I cannot find out from him what his opinions are.

Mr Otis is naturally timid, and frequently wavering -- today bold, and tomorrow like a hare trembling at every breeze. It would seem by his language that he is prepared for the very boldest measures; but he receives anonymous letters every day or two threatening him with bodily harm. It seems the other party suspect his firmness. He is sincere in wishing thorough measures; but a thousand fears restrain him.

Bigelow is really bold on the present question, has a just confidence in the power of Massachusetts, sneers as he ought to do ...at all the threats of vengeance of the other States; and, if he was well supported, I have no doubt that measures of dignity and real relief would be adopted.

Prescott is a firm man, but extremely prudent, and so modest that he will too readily yield his own opinions to the counsels of others whom he respects. I think he will give his aid to measures calculated to procure solid redress.

Mr Dane you know. He is a man of great firmness, approaching to obstinacy, singular, impracticable; and, of course, it must be uncertain what course he will take. Honestly, however, inclined.

Mr Wilde, of Kennebec, is a very able man, but one of very great caution and prudence. He lives among a people naturally bad and violent; and I should fear that his counsels may be influenced by that circumstance.

These are the men who will have the greatest influence in our delegation.

It is to be regretted that we had not chosen two or three such persons as Daniel Sargent, William Sullivan, and Colonel Thorndike. I do not know that we have among the delegates a single bold and ardent man. I know it will be said that such men are not the fittest for counsel. That is perhaps true in common times; but in times of great trouble they are often the most proper, and, indeed, the only ones fit to direct and manage affairs.

I should fear that the Connecticut delegation, though extreme-
ly respectable, was of much the same character.

If it is that expedient that nothing decisive should be done, then it is to be regretted that so respectable a Convention was called, because it tends to degrade and disgrace the members and the people who sent them.

But, if effectual measures were in contemplation, it is in my judgment to be regretted that some few more active and resolute men were not elected.1

Both Theodore Lyman and Theodore Dwight devote much space in their respective books to the defense of the characters of these men. Their integrity was indeed unquestionable, however slight the bearing it might have had on their views regarding secession at that stage of affairs; but it might be fairly successfully maintained that their word could be accepted when they declared that no such alternative entered into the arguments of the delegates or Journal of the convention, particularly since no shred of evidence existed to the contrary.

But the inviolable secrecy which surrounded the proceedings of the convention fanned the suspicions of the rest of the country to no small degree, especially in view of the fact that Mr. Madison's emissary, sent to report on the gathering, was not permitted to attend. Added to this was the glaring fact, that though the report of the convention was published widely, its secret journal was not disclosed until 1820. The reason for this delay was explained by Dwight,

When the Convention adjourned on the 5th of January, 1815, it was supposed that it might be necessary for them to hold a second meeting. With that expectation, when they adjourned, they did not think it expedient to remove the injunction of secrecy under which

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1 Ibid., "Lowell to Pickering, Boston, December 3, 1814"; 411-412.
the members had been laid at the commencement of the session; and the journal was sealed, and placed for safe keeping in the hands of the President. When it was found that it was not likely to be published, the charge of meditated sedition and treason was repeated in every quarter.  

This omission, however, continued to expose the convention to intensive abuse, and when the journal finally was published, it was done in an attempt to vindicate the members and the states concerned from the stigma which enveloped the Hartford Convention.

The first act of the convention upon assembling on December 15, 1814, was to elect unanimously George Cabot President; Theodore Dwight, not a member, was chosen as Secretary. The second step was to appoint a committee on rules and order, and of their report subsequently submitted and approved, the following narration, as indicated above, became the cause of endless speculations and considerable calumnious insinuations.

The most inviolable secrecy shall be observed by each member of this Convention, including the Secretary, as to all propositions, debates, and proceedings thereof, until this injunction shall be suspended, or altered.

A committee of five, Goodrich, Otis, Lyman of Rhode Island, Swift, and Dane, were appointed "to inquire what subjects will be proper to be considered by this Convention"; their report was given on Saturday, December 17, and was thereupon discussed. Another committee of five, Smith, Otis, Goddard, West, and Hazard, was then appointed "to prepare and report a general project of such measures as it may be proper for this Convention to adopt". This being returned, it was discussed and amended, and Prescott and Dane were add-

1 Theodore Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, Boston, 1833, 381.
2 Theodore Lyman, A Short Account of the Hartford Convention, 24.
ed to the committee to arrange the final draft. The points of discussion as outlined in the journal of the convention were,

1. That it will be expedient for this Convention to prepare a general statement of the unconstitutional attempts of the Executive Government of the United States to infringe upon the rights of the individual States, in regard to the militia, and of the still more alarming claims to infringe the rights of the States, manifested in the letter of the Secretary of War, and in the bills pending before Congress, or acts passed by them, and also to recommend to the Legislatures of the States, the adoption of the most effective and decisive measures, to protect the Militia and the States from the usurpations contained in these proceedings.

2. That it will be expedient, also, to prepare a statement, exhibiting the necessity which the improvidence and inability of the General Government have imposed upon the several States, of providing for their own defense, and the impossibility of their discharging this duty, and at the same time fulfilling the requisitions of the General Government; and also, to recommend to the Legislatures of the several States, to make provision for mutual defense, and to make an earnest application to the Government of the United States, with a view to some arrangement, whereby the States may be enable to retain a portion of the taxes levied by Congress, for the purposes of self defense, and for the reimbursement of expenses already incurred, on account of the United States.

3. That it is expedient to recommend to the several State Legislatures, certain amendments to the Constitution of the United States, hereafter enumerated, to be by them adopted and proposed.

   1. That the power to declare or make war, by the Congress of the United States be restricted.

   2. That it is expedient to attempt to make provision for restraining Congress in the exercise of an unlimited power, to make new States, and admit them into this Union.

   3. That the powers of Congress be restrained in laying embargoes, and restrictions on commerce.

   4. That a President shall not be elected from the same State two terms successively.

   5. That the same person shall not be elected President a second time.
6. That an amendment be proposed, respecting slave representation, and slave taxation.

The remainder of the convention was spent in discussion of these points and in preparation of the Report, and immediately upon the adjournment of that body on January 5, 1816, the Report was published and widely circulated. Two copies of it were sent to the Governor of each state -- one for his private use, and one to be placed before the State Legislature. Of the report Dwight remarks that,

The expectations of those who apprehended it would contain sentiments of a seditious, if not of a treasonable character, were entirely disappointed...Equally free was it from advancing doctrines which had a tendency to destroy the union of the states. On the contrary, it breathed an ardent attachment to the integrity of the republic.

And the report of the convention does reiterate most emphatically the regard of New England for the Union and its complete loyalty to it; nevertheless, it proceeded to point out, with elaborate and efficient argument, the various places wherein the administration and the constitution of the United States failed in their regard. The powers of the national government regarding the calling out of militia were discussed at length. The fact that the authority of the national government on this point was constitutionally restricted to 'executing the laws of the Union, suppressing insurrections and repelling invasions' gave New England grounds to dispute the use of the militia for "Mr. Madison's War", since it could not be classified strictly under one of these headings.

1 Ibid., 29-30.
2 Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, 380.
It follows conclusively, [states the Report], that for all general and ordinary purposes, this power [of calling the militia] belongs to the states respectively, and to them alone. It is not only with regret, but with astonishment, the convention perceive that under the color of an authority conferred with such plain and precise limitations, a power is arrogated by the executive government, and in some instances sanctioned by the two houses of congress, of control over the militia, which if conceded will render nugatory the rightful authority of the individual states over that class of men, and by placing at the disposal of the national government the lives and services of the great body of the people, enable it at pleasure to destroy their liberties, and erect a military despotism on the guins.¹

Additional New England grievances were, as outlined in the Report,

First. -- A deliberate and extensive system for effecting a combination among certain states, by exciting local jealousies and ambition, so as to secure to popular leaders in one section of the Union, the control of public affairs in perpetual succession. To which primary object most other characteristics of the system may be reconciled.

Secondly. -- The political intolerance displayed and avowed in excluding from office men of unexceptionable merit, for want of adherence to the executive creed.

Thirdly. -- The infraction of the judiciary authority and rights, by depriving judges of their offices in violation of the constitution.

Fourthly. -- The abolition of existing taxes, requisite to prepare the country for those changes to which nations are always exposed, with a view to the acquisition of popular favor.

Fifthly. -- The influence of patronage in the distribution of offices....

Sixthly. -- The admission of new states into the Union formed at pleasure in the western region, has destroyed the balance of power which existed among the original States, and deeply affected their interest.

Seventhly. -- The easy admission of naturalized foreigners, to

places of trust, honour or profit, operating as an inducement to the malcontent subjects of the old world to come to the States, in quest of executive patronage, and to repay it by an abject devotion to executive measures.

Eighthly. — Hostility to Great Britain and partiality to the late government of France, adopted as coincident with popular prejudice, and subservient to the main object, party power. Connected with these must be ranked erroneous and distorted estimates of the power and resources of those nations, of the probable results of their controversies, and of our political relations to them respectively.

Lastly and principally. — A visionary and superficial theory in regard to commerce, accompanied by a real hatred but a feigned regard to its interests, and a ruinous perseverance in efforts to render it an instrument of coercion and war.1

But the delegates did not rest the entire blame for existing conditions upon the administration, though it is obvious from the above that they desired an end of the 'Virginia dynasty' and a more liberal policy in regard to their commercial interests. "It is not conceivable," continued the Report, "that the obliquity of an administration could, in so short a period, have so nearly consummated the work of national ruin, unless favored by defects in the constitution."2 Consequently, the Report proceeded to make the following recommendations to the legislatures of the states represented at the Convention, and added certain amendments to the constitution to be proposed to the national government:

THEREFORE RESOLVED,

That it be and hereby is recommended to the legislatures of the several states represented in this Convention, to adopt all such measures as may be necessary effectually to protect the citizens of said states from the operation and effects of all acts which have been or may be passed by the Congress of the United

1 Ibid., 17-19.
2 Ibid., 19.
States, which shall contain provisions, subjecting the militia or other citizens to forcible drafts, conscriptions, or impressments, not authorized by the constitution of the United States.

Resolved, That it be and hereby is recommended to the said legislatures, to authorize an immediate and earnest application to be made to the government of the United States, requesting their consent...to be empowered to assume upon themselves the defense of their territory against the enemy; and a reasonable portion of the taxes, collected within said States, may be paid to the respective treasuries thereof, and appropriated to the payment of the balance due said States, and to the future defense of the same....

Resolved, That it be and hereby is, recommended to the legislatures of the aforesaid states, to pass laws...authorizing the governors or commanders-in-chief of their militia to make detachments from the same, or to form voluntary corps,...and to cause the same to be well armed, equipped, and disciplined, and held in readiness for service; and upon the request of the governor of either of the other states to employ the whole of such detachment or corps, as well as the regular forces of the state, or such part thereof as may be required and can be spared consistently with the safety of the state, in assisting the state, making such request. to repel any invasion thereof which shall be made or attempted by the public enemy.

Resolved, That the following amendments to the constitution of the United States be recommended to the states represented as aforesaid, to be proposed by them for adoption by the states legislatures, and in such cases as may be deemed expedient by a convention chosen by the people of each state....

First. Representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this Union, according to their respective numbers of free persons, including those bound to serve for a term of years, and excluding Indians not taxed, and all other persons. [that is, Negroses].

Second. No new state shall be admitted into the Union by Congress, in virtue of the power granted by the constitution, without the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses.

Third. Congress shall not have the power to lay any embargo on the ships or vessels of the citizens of the United States in the ports or harbours thereof, for more than sixty days.

Fourth. Congress shall not have power, without the concurrence of two-thirds of both houses, to interdict the commercial
intercourse between the United States and any foreign nation, or
the dependencies thereof.

Fifth. Congress shall not make or declare war, or author-
ize acts of hostility against any foreign nation, without the con-
currence of two-thirds of both houses, except such acts of hostil-
ity be in defense of the territories of the United States when ac-
tually invaded.

Sixth. No person who shall hereafter be naturalized,
shall be eligible as a member of the senate or house of representa-
tives of the United States, nor capable of holding any civil
office under the authority of the United States.

Seventh. The same person shall not be elected president
of the United States a second time, nor shall the president be
elected from the same state two terms in succession.1

The Report closed with the further provision for another conven-
tion, should their requests be ignored or the war not end. Three commission-
ers were dispatched to Washington with the report of the Convention, only to
find on their arrival that peace had just been declared and their cause
thereby rendered ridiculous. The general rejoicing which followed the Treas-
ty of Ghent was augmented still more by the great American victory over the
British at New Orleans, the news of which arrived very shortly before that
of the conclusion of peace. The fact of this triumph, so coincident with
peace, warmed the hearts of the people toward the administration for what
they considered brilliant handling of the war. The fact that the reasons
for which war had been declared were not even mentioned in the treaty of
peace was overlooked by all in the heat of victory, and the Hartford Conven-
tion became the object of general contempt for opposing the policy of the
government. Concerning this situation Dwight comments bitterly,

1 Ibid., 25-27.
The flush of feeling which this victory [New Orleans] occasioned, drew the public attention away from the treaty of peace, and the vast expense of treasure and blood which the war had given rise to; and the administration and their devoted friends, with their usual skill, turned it to their own account. As a never-failing source of profit to the leaders of the party in power, the public resentment was excited against the opposers of the war, and particularly against the New England states, and the Hartford Convention became the theme of universal calumny and reproach. Not being able to find anything to justify this virulence in the report, it was alleged with as much apparent confidence as if it had been known to be a matter of fact, that although the report itself contained no evidence of treason, or even of sedition, yet the history of their secret proceedings, whenever they should be made public, would disclose an abundance of proof of the existence of both. 1

But the secret journal had been sealed and given for safe keeping to George Cabot at the close of the convention, and when it was found that it was not going to be published, heated charges of treason and sedition were flung at the New England participants. It was indeed a mistake that the Journal was not published immediately, for when it did come out, it was so harmless a document that it could not convince the country that it was authentic, and as a consequence it did little or nothing to restrain the tide of resentment against the Hartford Convention.

1 Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, 381.
CHAPTER III

The Post-Convention Period

However adversely the Hartford Convention was to impress the rest of the country in years to come, immediately upon its adjournment and the publication of the Report, the general reaction was one of relief. The National Intelligencer, semi-official voice of the Madison administration, while still somewhat dazed over the apparently harmless conclusions of the delegates, issued the following rather passive comment:

Certain it is, that the proceedings are tempered with more moderation than was to have been expected from the contemporaneous exposition, in the Eastern papers, of the views and objects of the Convention. A separation from the Union, so far from being openly recommended, is the subject only of remote allusion. If the object of calling the Convention really was to propose separation from the Union, they appear to be determined to effect it peaceably, if they can.1

The Federalists too, seemed very much pleased with the results of the convention. In Massachusetts the General Court referred the report of the convention to a committee which studied it thoroughly and brought back on January 25th the following appraisal:

The Committee entertain a high sense of the wisdom and ability with which the convention of delegates have discharged their arduous trust; while they maintain the principle of State sovereignty, and of the duties which citizens owe to their respective State governments, they give the most satisfactory proofs of attachment to the Constitution of the United States, and to the national Union.2

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2 Ibid., 160.
In the meantime the national government had passed a bill authorizing the raising and maintaining of state troops at its own expense, for which action the Federalists took to themselves the credit. Regarding this turn of events, Gore, then senator from Massachusetts, reported back to Governor Strong,

My dear Sir,

The bill for State troops has passed the House with an amendment to the only section interesting to us, said not to be important.

The result of the Hartford Convention is here, and affords satisfaction to most, if not to all, — to some, because they see not the point nor consequence of the recommendation as relates to taxes.

The gentlemen had a difficult task, which, according to my poor judgment, they have executed with wisdom and discretion.¹

On January 19th, Dr. Logan wrote his opinion of the Convention to Pickering,

I have with pleasure perused the proceedings of the Hartford Convention. The prudence and magnanimity of that body does the greatest credit to its patriotic spirit, and may afford a rallying point to our distracted country. It appears nothing of wisdom can be expected from our public councils at Washington.²

Even Pickering, who had been an extremist in his views, was satisfied with the results of the Report. In his letter to Lowell, written January 23rd, he said,

I think the report of the Convention bears the high character of wisdom, firmness, and dignity. They have explicitly pronounced sentence of condemnation upon a miserable administration, and, stamped as it is with the authority of a body of men so eminently distinguished, that judgment cannot fail of making a just impression where it is needed. They have made a declaration of principles the landmarks by which the Legislatures and the people may direct their course. And they have, in terms that none can mistake, and which our rulers, whatever for a time they may ef-

1 Henry Cabot Lodge, Life and Letters of George Cabot, Boston, 1878, 559-560.
2 Ibid., 560.
fect, will not venture to disregard, manifested a determination to apply those principles in corresponding measures, when the future conduct or neglects of the government shall require their application.1

But the hapless committee which had been sent to Washington with a copy of the recommendations, met as they were on their arrival with the news of peace, were exposed to the liberal ridicule of their opponents. Ridicule hardened into contempt under the hands of the Democrats, who turned the situation to their own account and convinced the country that treachery and treason had been the keynotes at Hartford. That connection with the Hartford Convention marked the political ruin of all concerned in it, is a false conclusion, as many of those men held political offices thereafter, but their participation in it did make them a mark for the insinuations of their opponents.

There were many ardent Federalists, who, after peace had been declared, were not quite willing to abandon opposition to the administration and who wished to continue to thwart the national government in every move it made. Otis, however, led the greater part of the Federalist party in an infinitely wiser course. His biographer states that

He perceived, within the first year of peace, that the Republican party, having absorbed every Federalist principle of permanent value, did not intend to use its power to the detriment of New England's sectional interests, and that under these circumstances there could be no object in withholding Federalist support from Madison and Monroe.2

In the Columbian Centinel of December 26th, 1818, Otis definitely declared

1 Ibid., 562.
his stand in the course of a discussion on Massachusetts' war claims:

As at present "all's well," — and the measures of government are favorable not less to the interests of your part of the Union than to the rest; as a due disposition has been manifested to provide for the great interests of navigation, the fisheries and manufactures, and you have no cause of complaint, I think the oftener your Governor, your Legislature, your able essayists, and your great and good men, shew a readiness to approach the national government, to give it just credit for what it deserves, and to support its measures, the more effectually will they baffle the wiles of those who wish that collisions may be eternal, wear off the edge of prejudices, and reconcile their opponents to the merit of their claim.¹

Otis was senator from Massachusetts from 1817 to 1822, and this position was made especially difficult for him since suggestions from Massachusetts were generally accepted with poor grace, and because he was continually open to attacks in debate upon his own and the treason of his state. This attitude led him to assume the defense of the Hartford Convention, and under the pseudonym 'One of the Convention'² he began what was to become first of many vindications of that body. The fact that the secret journal had not yet been published added fuel to the various attacks on the members of the Convention, and it was to accomplish its publication, therefore, and to defend the integrity of those concerned, that Otis became involved in political controversy. His first step was to consult the surviving members of the group and to obtain their consent to the publication of the journal.

To each delegate, then, he sent the following letter,

Dear Sir: It has occurred to me that justice to the States represented in the late Hartford Convention seems to require that the private journal of their proceedings should be deposited in some place to which access may be had by any person disposed to give

¹ Ibid., 202.
² Ibid., 215.
them publicity. You need not be informed of the disposition of a numerous class, to impute to that Convention projects that would not bear the light, and to produce if possible a general opinion that the things which are seen afford no clue to the unholy mysteries of our conclave. While as individuals we regard these efforts with unconcern, we ought not perhaps to be indifferent to the effects of an erroneous public opinion on this subject upon the present age and posterity; if the mere unvarnished journal would be sufficient for its correction. Mr. Cabot, Mr. Prescott, and other members in this vicinity concur in these sentiments, and if you should be content that we may make such a disposition of that journal as may be thought best for the object here expressed, I request of you the favor to signify your acquiescence by a line to Mr. Cabot with convenient dispatch.

Signed, _______ 1

In due course consent was received from all concerned (except from two members, who made no reply at all), and a copy of the journal, together with an explanatory letter, was sent to the National Intelligencer for publication. Perhaps the biggest mistake the delegates made was not to publish the journal immediately after their object (termination of the war) had been attained; but it seems almost as glaring an error to have published it so many years later, especially in view of the fact that it contained nothing more incriminating than had already appeared in the Report. While this situation could not have injured them any more than the Report, had it been published immediately, when it did come out it was the more damaging because of its innocence, and from all sides came the charge that it was not the true record. Doubts of the veracity of the journal of a necessity impugned the word of George Cabot, who had presented it with a certificate of its integrity:

1 One of the Convention, Letters Developing the Character and Views of the Hartford Convention, Washington, 1820, 5.
I, George Cabot, late President of the Convention, assembled at Hartford, on the fifteenth day of December, 1814, do hereby certify, that the foregoing is the original and only Journal of the proceedings of that Convention; and that the twenty-seven written pages, which compose it, and the printed report, heretofore published, comprise a faithful and complete record of all the motions, resolutions, votes, and proceedings, of that Convention. —And I do further certify, that this journal has been constantly in my exclusive custody, from the time of the adjournment of the Convention, to the delivery of it into the office of the Secretary of this Commonwealth.

Boston, November 16, 1819.

George Cabot

Of course, the other members of the Federalist party flew to the defense of Cabot's character, as well as those of the other members of the convention. William Sullivan, Theodore Lyman, and Theodore Dwight particularly devote a portion of their books to this object. Said Dwight,

Mr Cabot was a man of the highest respectability for understanding, integrity, and talents. He had more reputation to lose than scores together of those who would impeach his veracity can lay claim to or boast of. His declaration on any subject would have been taken for truth, wherever he was well known, with as much confidence as if it had been sanctioned by the most solemn oath. Here it is impeached [by assertions that the journal was falsified] by nothing but the unsupported assertions or suggestions of political partizans — men without manners, without principles, and of course without reputation.

In 1831, Roger Minot Sherman, a member of the convention, testified under oath in a libel case, that

There was not, to the best of my recollection, a single motion or subject of debate, but what appears in the Journal.... I believe I know their proceedings perfectly, and that every measure, done or proposed, has been published to the world.

Dwight himself testified in the capacity of a 'disinterested witness' con-

1 Lyman, A Short Account of the Hartford Convention, 35-36.
2 Dwight, History of the Hartford Convention, 403-404.
3 Ibid., 404.
cerning the veracity of the journal, which he, as Secretary, had compiled:

But if a disinterested witness should be kept back, who might be produced, an inference might be drawn by some caviller, from that circumstance, unfavorable to the character and conduct of the Convention. Such a witness is the author of this work — the Secretary of the Convention; and he feels it a duty which he owes to truth, and the characters of as respectable, patriotic, and virtuous a body of men, as ever were collected on any occasion, to say, in the most positive and unhesitating manner, and with all the solemnity which the nature of the case requires, that the JOURNAL AND THE REPORT OF THE CONVENTION, CONTAIN A FULL, COMPLETE, AND SPECIFIC ACCOUNT OF ALL THE MOTIONS, VOTES, AND PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONVENTION.¹

Thomas Jefferson was the unwitting cause of another long and heated controversy on the already much-disputed designs of the Hartford Convention. In a letter to William Giles, written December 25, 1825, Jefferson mentioned an interview with John Quincy Adams, in which he stated that Adams had informed him that certain citizens of Massachusetts had engaged in treasonable negotiations with the British, and that the repeal of the embargo would be absolutely necessary to win back those who were inclined toward disunion. The letter reiterates that Jefferson was none too sure of his statements, since the events had become confused in his mind over that period of time, and that the impressions he relates are "the best exertion of a waning memory that he could command". Nevertheless, this communication to Giles was the first log on the fire of a lengthy battle on the ever-fertile subject of New England's deportment during the war. Said Jefferson's letter:

He [John Quincy Adams] spoke, then, of the dissatisfaction of the Eastern portion of our confederacy with the restraints of the embargo then existing, and their restlessness under it; that there

¹ Ibid., 405.
was nothing which might not be attempted to rid themselves of it; that he had information of the most unquestionable certainty, that certain citizens of the Eastern States (I think he named Massachusetts particularly,) were in negotiation with agents of the British government, the object of which was an agreement that the New England States should take no further part in the war then going on; that, without formally declaring their separation from the Union of the States, they should withdraw from all aid and obedience to them; that their navigation and commerce should be free from restraint and interruption by the British; that they should be considered and treated by them as neutrals, and as such might conduct themselves towards both parties, and at the close of the war, be at liberty to rejoin the confederacy.

He assured me that there was eminent danger that the convention would take place; that the temptations were such as might debauch many from their fidelity to the Union; and that, to enable its friends to make head against it, the repeal of the embargo was absolutely necessary.

...However reluctant I was to abandon the measure (a measure which, persevered in a little longer, we had subsequent and satisfactory assurance, would have effected its object completely), from that moment, and influenced by that information, I saw the necessity of abandoning it; and, instead of effecting our purpose by this peaceful weapon, we must fight it out, or break the Union. I then recommended to my friends to yield to the necessity of a repeal of the embargo, and to endeavor to supply its place by the best substitute in which they could procure a general concurrence.

I cannot too often repeat that this is not pretended to be in the very words which passed; that it only gives faithfully the impression remaining on my mind....¹

The publication of this letter led John Quincy Adams to authorize a statement which appeared October 21, 1828, in the National Intelligencer, in which article it was said that Jefferson had surely erred, since at the time the supposed conversation had taken place, Adams was not in the country.

The article asserted that,

In August, 1809, Mr. Adams embarked for Russia, nearly three years before the Declaration of War, and did not return to the United States till August, 1817, nearly three years after the conclusion of peace. It was impossible, therefore, that Mr. Adams could have given any information to Mr. Jefferson, of negotiations by citizens of Massachusetts with British agents, during the war, or with relation to it.

The interview which Mr. Jefferson referred, continued the National Intelligencer, took place on March 15, 1808, in which conference Mr. Adams had only mentioned the embargo indirectly, and New England's efforts to obtain its repeal were not in any way discussed. But both knew that the Governor of Newotia had written to 'a person in the State of Massachusetts' in the summer 1807, before the embargo had been instituted, and from that incident, coæd with 'other facts' and with the known resistance of Massachusetts to administration, "Mr Adams and Mr Jefferson drew their inferences, which subsequent events doubtless confirmed." But these inferences neither had communicated to the other, and no other confidential interview had taken place between them during the administration of Jefferson. However, some letters which Adams had written to Giles after he (Adams) had resigned his seat in the Senate in May, 1808, warned that a continuance of the embargo would meet with "forcible resistance, supported by the Legislature, and partly by the Judiciary of the State", and that if the national government should to end the resistance by force of arms, a civil war would undoubtedly ensue, in which event "he had no doubt the leaders of the party would secure cooperation with them of Great Britain." Adams had further

1 Correspondence Between John Quincy Adams, Esquire, President of the United States, and Several Citizens of Massachusetts Concerning the Charge of a Design to Dismove the Union Alleged to Have Existed in That State, Boston, 1829, 6.
2 Ibid., 6-1.
asserted in these letters that he had "unequivocal evidence, although not provable in a court of law" that it had been their object for some time to secure severance with the Union, and that in the case of civil war they would assuredly turn to Great Britain for the necessary aid.

That Jefferson had seen these letters, Adams never knew, but he believed that he had read them and had thus come to confuse them over a period of years with the conversation of March, 1808. Adams "certainly had no objection", continued the article, "that they should be communicated to Mr Jefferson; but this was neither his intention nor desire."

But the publication of Jefferson's letter and Adams' response were not destined to go unchallenged, for they evoked from New England a demand for proof of the charges made, and began the celebrated and brilliant controversy between the Massachusetts Federalists and John Quincy Adams. It will be remembered that these events occurred in 1828, and the controversy resolved itself not so much around the letters as around the more heinous Hartford Convention, as being the culmination of the treasonable tendencies of New England.

Adams had no desire to become involved in any dispute with the New Englanders, but they demanded that he prove his statements or retract them. The following letter was sent him, consequently, dated November 26, 1828:

The undersigned citizens of Massachusetts, residing in Boston and its vicinity, take the liberty of addressing you on the subject of a statement published in the "National Intelligencer" of the 21st of October, and which purports to have been communicated or authorized by you... [Then follows a summary of Adams' statements as outlined above].

The object of this letter, therefore, is to request you to

1 Ibid., 8-9.
First, Who are the persons designated as leaders of the party prevailing in Massachusetts in the year 1808, whose object, you assert, was, and had been for several years, a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of a separate confederacy? and, --

Secondly, The whole evidence on which that charge is founded.

It is admitted in the statement of the charge that it is not provable in a court of law, and, of course, that you are not in possession of any legal evidence to maintain it. The evidence, however, must have been such as in your opinion would have been pronounced unequivocal by upright and honorable men of discriminating minds; and we may certainly expect from your sense of justice and self-respect a full disclosure of all that you possess.

A charge of this nature, coming as it does from the first magistrate of the nation, acquires an importance which we cannot affect to disregard; and it is one which we ought not leave unanswered.¹

H. G. Otis
Israel Thorndike
T. H. Perkins
Wm. Prescott
Daniel Sargent
John Lowell
Wm. Sullivan

Charles Jackson
Warren Dutton
Benj. Pickman
Henry Cabot
Son of the late George Cabot
C. C. Parsons
Son of Theophilus Parsons, Esq. deceased
Franklin Dexter
Son of late Samuel Dexter

Hoping to conciliate the injured Federalists, Adams wrote a letter explanatory of his motive in authorizing the statement which had appeared in the National Intelligencer, assuring them that his intention had not been to offend them personally, nor the memory of their fathers who had taken part in the Hartford Convention:

...The statement authorized by me, as published in the "National Intelligencer," was made, not only without the intention, but without the most distant imagination of offending you or of injuring any one of you; but, on the contrary, for the purpose of ex

pressly disavowing a charge which was made before the public, sanctioned with the name of the late Mr. Jefferson, imputing to certain citizens of Massachusetts treasonable negotiations with the British government during the war, and expressly stating that he had received the information of this from me. On the publication of this letter, I deemed it indispensably due to myself, and to all the citizens of Massachusetts, not only to deny having ever given such information, but all knowledge of such a fact....

Adams closed his letter with an appeal to let the matter end there, but such was not the design of Otis and his friends. In their names Otis undertook to prepare a very clear and masterly defense of the purposes and proceedings of the Hartford Convention, which was published under the title, "Appeal of Massachusetts Federalists to the Citizens of the United States, dated 28th January, 1829."

The Hartford Convention had been attacked principally on the grounds that it was an unconstitutional body, assembled in secret, to plot seditious and treasonable action against the Union. Otis in the 'Appeal' defended it on each point. The legality of the Convention he based on the peoples' right of petition:

...It will not be doubted that the people have a right, "in an orderly and peaceable manner, to assemble to consult upon the common good," and request of their rulers, "by way of addresses, petitions, or remonstrances, redress of the wrongs done them, and of the grievances they suffer." This is enumerated in the constitution of Massachusetts among our natural, essential, and unalienable rights....

If all the citizens had the right, jointly and severally, to consult for the common good and to seek for a redress of their grievances, no reason can be given why their legislative assembly, which represents them all, may not exercise the same right in their behalf.2

The unlikeliness of a secret agreement for disunion or any other 1. Ibid., 'Reply of John Quincy Adams to the Letter of Massachusetts Federalists, dated 30th December, 1828', 50.
2 Ibid., 'Appeal of Massachusetts Federalists to the Citizens of the United
treasonable action, Otis discounts by what might seem a rather weak premise: the fact that the meeting was prepared for openly, attended by the fanfare of the press:

If...there had been any secret plot for a dismemberment of the Union, in which it had been desired to engage the neighboring States, the measures for that purpose, we may suppose, would have been conducted in the most private manner possible. On the contrary, the resolution of our legislature for appointing their delegates, and prescribing their powers and duties, was openly discussed, and passed in the usual manner; and a copy of it was immediately sent, by direction of the legislature, to the governor of every State in the Union.

That report — which was published immediately after the adjournment of the convention, and was soon accepted by the legislature — holds forth the importance of the Union as paramount to all other considerations....

As a further proof that the efforts of the convention were legal and loyal, Otis emphasized the point that the government of the United States approved and passed in Congress one of the most important issues which concerned the New England States — the power to maintain and organize state troops, to be paid by the national government and used within the state or in an adjoining state. "Had this act of Congress passed before the act of Massachusetts for organizing the convention," declared Otis, "that convention never would have existed."

Otis and his colleagues were luckily spared the pain of reading Adams' reply to this apologia. His rebuttal was a bitter and personal at-

States, dated 28th January, 1829,' by Harrison Gray Otis, et al, 81-82.
1 Ibid., 85.
2 Ibid., 86.
tack upon him and upon the convention. It was written upon Adams' return to Quincy after having left Washington in what seemed to him disgrace and the ruin of a valuable career. He was irritated, too, by the various petty attacks made upon him by his enemies, and it was in a spirit hardly conducive to generosity that he wrote the lengthy answer to the New England Federalists. On its completion, however, Adams' friends advised him to suppress it, filled as it was with bitter denunciations of Otis, and since also it would not be salutary to the public good "to revive the memory of Northern schemes of resistance to national authority, at a time when the Union was staggering under the shock of similar projects in South Carolina and Georgia."¹ Says Henry Adams,

He [Adams] suppressed the publication; and it was not long before the patriotic course of Mr. Otis, at the time of the nullification excitement, led Mr. Adams to rejoice at the suppression, and to look upon Mr. Otis with more kindly eyes.²

Relating to the suppression of Adams' 'Reply', Morison states,

This course was wise, for the document, though conclusive as to the existence of a disunion plot in 1804, and an able presentation of the conspiracy theory of the Hartford Convention, fails to bring forward a single fact sufficient to justify an impartial historian in accepting that theory as correct.³

Otis was much elated, however, at Adams' supposed silence, and he construed this to mean that he had finally vindicated himself and his fellow members of the convention from the charges which had faced them continuously since its adjournment, but which never before had come from so high an authority. It was only in 1877 that Henry Adams at last felt it possible

² Ibid., vii.
to release Adams' 'Reply'. He made this decision upon finding in Henry Cabot Lodge's publication of the *Life and Letters of George Cabot*, an impartial treatment of the period, an indication that the old hates had subsided, and that the editing of Adams' harsh aspersions, would not reopen the issue save in historical circles. He deleted from the manuscript, however, those passages which were purely a personal attack on Otis and which had no bearing on historical evidence; yet, as he explains, certain of the passages which are untouched because of their historical value, are equally as damaging to Otis as those omitted.

John Quincy Adams was convinced that, under the secrecy of the convention, and in view of the hostile attitude of New England to the administration, there certainly existed unlawful designs against the Union. Concerning the character of the Hartford Convention he wrote,

The Hartford Convention...was not a committee of a legislative body discharging merely the duties of making a public report of their doings to the constituents; and the attempt to so represent them can have no other object than to disguise their real character, which was that of an unconstitutional congress of members from the five New England States, appointed partly by feeble majorities of three of the legislatures, and partly by not more factious county conventions, -- all consisting of the most inveterate adversaries to the administration of the government of the United States, then struggling with all the difficulties and dangers of a formidable and desolating foreign war.

The fact that the right of petition rested in the people themselves, not in a delegation, was not missed by Adams:

[Otis] must not...in undertaking to show "the constitutional right of a State to appoint delegates to such a convention", place it upon the ground of the constitutional "right of the people to

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petition" the government for the redress of grievances. This is a right reserved by the Constitution of the United States, and by the Constitution of Massachusetts, to be exercised by the people in their primitive capacity; and, far from being delegated to the legislature, cannot be assumed by them without a usurpation of the right of the people themselves.¹

It was the opinion of Otis, however, that the situation necessitated the handling of the petition by delegates rather than by the people themselves, since, as he said, "in the state of distress and danger which then oppressed all hearts, it was to be apprehended...that large and frequent assemblies of the people might lead to measures inconsistent with the peace and order of the community."² He further concluded that if each one of the States had the right of individual appeal to the central government, surely several states of the same conviction might "consult together for the same purpose"...and that "the only mode in which they could consult each other was by a mutual appointment of delegates for that purpose."³

That the convention was a violation of the Constitution, Adams was convinced. He based his second argument on this reasoning:

There is another difficulty, too, which Mr. Otis must get over, when he undertakes...to defend the lawfulness of that assembly: it is that provision of the United States which, in express terms prescribes, that "no State shall, without consent of Congress, enter into any agreement or compact with any other State. Art 1, §10. There is a previous provision, in the same section, that no State shall enter into any treaty, alliance, or confederation. This, indeed, is positive and unqualified....A compact, by the force of the terms, imports a written engagement. An agreement may be written or verbal, formal or informal. The object of the...Constitution...is to forbid them all...because every such agreement or compact to which the Congress representing the whole Union would not give their consent, must, in its nature, strike at the vitals of the Union itself. Since the existence of the Constitution of the United States, the Hartford Convention is the only

¹ Ibid., 254.
² Ibid., "Appeal to the Citizens of the United States," by H.G. Otis, 82.
³ Ibid., 83.
instance in which this provision has been substantially violated.\footnote{Ibid., "To the Citizens of the United States," by John Quincy Adams, 255-256.}

A weakness in Otis' defense, which did not pass unnoticed by Adams, was that the actual report of the Hartford Convention had much less to do with petition than it did with suggested amendments to the constitution:

\begin{quote}
Petition for them? No; but elect twelve delegates to go to Hartford, and there consult... with other representatives from the other states... not about petitioning for redress of grievances, but about amendments to the Constitution of the United States.\footnote{Ibid., 254.}
\end{quote}

However ably Adams' repartee disposed of the good intentions of the delegates at the Hartford Convention, its conclusions were still theoretical and unproven. Morison evaluates his deductions briefly:

\begin{quote}
Adams' general thesis can be sustained only by the most unfair twisting of the plain meaning of the Report, which threatened ultimate secession, it is true, in case the causes of New England calamities became "radical and permanent." But no statesman or party of the ante-bellum period of our history failed at some time or other to regard secession as a measure of ultimate resort against sectional oppression. Within five years of the date of the Hartford Convention, threats of secession were heard from the Southern Democrats on the floor of Congress; within ten years the Governor of Kentucky threatened secession if the Supreme Court attempted to enforce its decisions.\footnote{Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, II, 158.}
\end{quote}

Henry Cabot Lodge defends, on Adams' own ground, the constitutionality of the Hartford Convention, as opposed to his charge against it:

\begin{quote}
If, by the Hartford Convention, certain States entered into an "agreement or compact," they violated the Constitution in so doing. But they did nothing of the kind. The delegates were appointed to "confer with each other, and devise means for their common defense." They were to pave the way for a possible future "agreement or compact," but they were to make none themselves. The States are not forbidden to confer and offer recommendations to the several Legislatures, and this has been done in several instances by commissioners. Moreover, there must be some binding
\end{quote}
force in order to make an agreement or compact, and here there was none. No State was in any way bound by anything said or done at Hartford; and this, of itself, shows the non-existence of any "agreement or compact." The authority intrusted to the President to call the Convention together again could not alter the character of the body as at first appointed. They had power merely to recommend to their several Legislatures, who might accept or reject their recommendations as they pleased. The States were at full liberty to confer. This was all that was done at Hartford, and the Convention was therefore strictly within the letter of the Constitution.¹

What the Convention might have been is an extremely fertile, but purely speculative, topic. It might reasonably have led, considering the condition of the country and its crying need for the full cooperation of its citizens, to the ready submission of the national government to New England's demands for their sectional well-being; or it might have sent its constituents reeling into secession and civil war, at a time when the government was so hard pressed by the war with Britain. The possibility of New England's establishing a separate peace with Great Britain might have ceased to be only a phantom to disrupt the ease of the administration, and have become a real threat to national security. It is, of course, impossible to make any positive conjecture as to what might have occurred had the war not ended so opportunely, but after a study of the situation, one is inclined to agree with Henry Cabot Lodge that nothing radical would have been attempted immediately:

That Convention was the exponent of a strong separatist feeling. The bare fact of its existence proved the strength of the separatist forces at work in the community. Yet the men who went to Hartford used these separatist forces to maintain the Union. In short, they said plainly to the general government, "unless you

¹ Henry Cabot Lodge, Life and Letters of George Cabot, 521.
alter your present policy, a dissolution of the Union will ensue." They intended to coerce the administration by threatening them with separation. If their threat was attended to, the Union would be saved; if not, it is mere conjecture whether the Federalists would have pushed matters to extremity. They were determined men, ...and the worst might have been feared....Yet the policy of the Convention was one of delay; and they might and probably would, if there had been occasion, have protracted still further any thing like open resistance....For while the threat of separation is clearly expressed in the report, and the existence of separatist feeling is recognized in plain terms, the wish for an immediate movement in that direction is deprecated and rejected.¹

Morison, too, defends the Convention's calm but firm handling of the crucial situation that it was delegated to confer upon:

The Report was an attempt both to satisfy enraged New England, and to persuade or frighten the rest of the country into bringing the war to a close, and treating New England more justly in the future. It is more noteworthy for what it does not, than for what it does, recommend....[It] was, on the whole, the most temperate and statesmanlike document that ever issued from a sectional movement in the United States.²

¹ Ibid., 517-518.
² Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, II, 156-159.
CHAPTER IV

The Fall of the Federalist Party

While the Peace of Ghent was received with wild rejoicing in the New England states, the post-war condition of this section of the Union was anything but salutary. Whatever vestige or pretense of agriculture New England maintained was sadly outclassed by the newly cultivated lands of the West, and commerce, her mainstay, now faced ruin in the restored intercourse with Britain. Her arts of smuggling and piracy had sustained her during the war, but peace, however welcomed, brought with it the competition of a profusion of cheap articles from long established commercial houses of Great Britain. Whereas the war had stimulated 'infant industries', its end augured their ruin, and the next few years saw a migration westward of bankrupt New Englanders. Politically too, New England was prostrate; as mentioned previously, the nation as a whole maligned her for the course she had studiously followed in opposing the administration in its war policy, and as a consequence New England and its Hartford Convention became the scapegoats of the post-war reaction. Connection with the convention or even with Federalism spelled disqualification in national politics, but in state affairs the political scene, at least for the time being, remained unchanged.

In 1816, the Republicans, surprisingly enough, took steps to protect the infant industries of the New England states. Lynch, in his book *Fifty Years of Party Warfare*, says,

The tariff of 1816, while duties were not high, was deliberately framed to give protection to new industries. The Federalist party had never become interested in a protective tariff policy. In the House, the bill was carried by eighty-eight to fifty-four.
In the Senate, the bill passed by a vote of twenty-five to seven. Party lines did not hold in either house, but, among those who voted affirmatively, Republicans far outnumbered Federalists. The responsibility for this first protective tariff must be placed on Republicans as Federalists were too few to carry any measure. Madison approved the measure on April 27, 1816.1

This was one of the means employed by the Republicans to secure the control in the Federalist strongholds—the Federalist leaders of every political crime, and on the side out-federalized Federalism. They were particularly interested in securing to themselves the support of the New England mercantile group:

The Republican Party started out as a combination of agrarian interest groups, but its leaders realized that its permanent safety required that the mercantile interests be detached from its opponents. To wean away the mercantile interests, the Republicans abandoned the principles for which they had stood in 1800, reversing themselves and out-federalizing the Federalists. The purchase of Louisiana, the incorporation of the second Bank of the United States, and the adoption of a protective tariff following the War of 1812, were all evidences of the change in party beliefs. This policy succeeded; and after the election of 1816, the Federalist Party ceased to be a factor in national politics. Discredited by its tactics during the War of 1812 and gradually deprived of the support of the mercantile interests, it had no place in the political field and soon died.2

The state governments in New England, Delaware, and Maryland were predominantly Federalist at the close of the war, and in New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia and North Carolina they held a powerful minority. The zealous efforts of the Democratic propagandistic campaign managed to discredit Federalism in all these states by 1819, with the exception of Massachusetts, where Federalists remained at the helm until 1823.3 But the Federalists con-

tributed to the weakening of their own ranks by a party schism in 1815. This was probably to be expected in view of the situation in which they were placed as a result of the Hartford Convention and their attitude toward the war; those who could not stand the criticism of the irate country repudiated the convention and the course of their state during the war and hastened to ally themselves with the administration; still others refused to back the national government in any way, opposing its every policy; but the majority of the Federalists followed the course of Harrison Gray Otis and attempted to restore good feeling in the national family circle, lending support to government projects, but actively maintaining their own Federalist tenets in local affairs.

In 1816, then, when the time came for the nomination of a successor to Madison, Otis urged the Federalists to support Monroe instead of wasting their votes on Rufus King of New York. Though they did not follow his suggestion in 1816, by 1820 Otis managed to secure their corroboration of Monroe's second term. Gore, writing to King in 1822, mentioned Otis' part in influencing the Federalist vote for the administration:

...The Gentleman [Otis], to whom your letter alludes, did all in his power to promote the first Election of Mr. Monroe. Although he failed then, at the second choice, he succeeded to insure him a unanimous vote....

King himself was inclined to agree that the only Federalist course was to join forces with the better half of the Republican group; in May, 1816, he wrote to Edward King:

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1 Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, IV, ed. Charles R. King, 'C. Gore to R. King, June 2, 1822', New York, 1898, 474.
...So certain are the Effects of the requisite Arts of Democracy, and so effectually prostrate is Federalism, that I have no kind of Expectation, that the latter can again be in favor.

The course remaining for Federalists, is to adhere to the integrity of their Principles; and they being out of the question as a rival Party, and the Republicans, so soon as this is understood, being sure to divide among themselves; the Federalists will be able to assist the true interests of Freedom & of Justice, by giving their influence to the least wicked Section of the Republicans.

Except this service, and it will be a valuable, as well as disinterested and honest one, I know of none, which federalists can render.¹

Since few seemed inclined to compete with Monroe for the presidency, it looked as though the caucus nomination would be practically an election. The only other outstanding Republican candidate was William H. Crawford of Georgia who also had a considerable following. When the caucus met on March 16th, Clay, realizing the unpopularity of the caucus form of nomination, moved that it was "inexpedient" to hold such a nomination. This motion was defeated, as was another by John Taylor of New York, that caucus nominations be discontinued. The result of the balloting was sixty-five votes for Monroe as opposed to Crawford's fifty-four. Daniel Tompkins of New York received the nomination for vice-president. Lynch describes the Federalists' stand in the election:

While no candidates were officially named by Federalists, it came to be the understanding that Federalist electors should support King for the presidency. This great man qualified as a candidate to be beaten but he received no notification. No great effort was made to bring about the selection of Federalist electors, but Massachusetts, Connecticut and Delaware supported King. In Rhode Island, still a Federalist state, no contest took place, and Monroe electors were named.²

¹ Ibid., R. King to Edw. King, May 21, 1816', 537.
² William O. Lynch, Fifty Years of Party Warfare (1789-1837), Indianapolis, 1931, 251.
The consensus was that Monroe was as good as elected, so there was little or nothing to be gained from fighting him. This was the last time the Federalists entered a presidential candidate.

The country as a whole was in favor of the nominees, but a storm of disapproval was directed against the method of nomination. McKenzie describes the situation as follows:

Meetings were held in many sections to condemn not so much the nominations of the caucus but the system of nominations itself. Obviously, the caucus had nearly nominated candidates that the country could not have accepted, for neither Crawford nor Snyder was generally popular. But it was equally obvious that the caucus system was endangering the check and balance system of the federal government by making the presidential candidacy depend upon Congress. Moreover, it was clear that the party was returning to the Virginia-New York combination and to the Virginia dynasty, a policy that had been bitterly condemned before and that excluded all but one state from the privilege of furnishing a chief magistrate. Had the protesting elements been able to concentrate their strength upon one candidate, the campaign might have been a more serious one. But effective opposition was not possible and popular discontent cooled down.

The election took place on November 5, 1816, and the votes as counted the following February 12th totaled:

For President,
- James Monroe, of Virginia: 183
- Rufus King, of New York: 34

For Vice-President,
- Daniel D. Tompkins, of New York: 183
- John E. Howard, of Maryland: 22
- James Ross, of Pennsylvania: 5
- John Marshall of Virginia: 4
- Robert G. Harper of Maryland: 3

1 Governor Simon Snyder of Pennsylvania received thirty votes out of 115 cast for nomination of the vice-president.
Nineteen States voted, and there was no record of the popular vote.\footnote{National Conventions and Platforms of All Political Parties, 1789-1905, ed. Thomas Hudson McKee, Friedenwald Company, Washington, 1906, 18.}

McKenzie comments on the Federalist action in the election:

The Federalist electors divided their vice-presidential votes among four men, John Howard of Maryland receiving twenty-two votes. Three Federalist electors in Maryland and one in Delaware did not attend the Electoral College and so failed to cast their votes. The result simply confirmed publicly the complete disintegration of the Federalist Party.\footnote{McKenzie, Party Government in the United States, 90.}

Whatever bad feelings had lingered on after the War of 1812 were greatly diminished by a tour of New England which Monroe made in 1817. Otis had foreseen the value of such a gesture in consolidating and cementing the new-found feeling of nationality that had grown out of the years of peace. Christopher Hughes in a letter to Monroe told him of Otis' conviction of the good feeling such a tour would produce, and as a consequence Monroe declared his intention to visit the New England states. Not since the time of Washington had a President toured the East, and the citizens awaited the event with keen anticipation. Both the Federalists and the Democrats made lavish preparations. Otis was nominated as the head of a committee to welcome the President to Boston, as well as plan for his entertainment during his stay. The Democrats, decidedly unwilling to let the Federalists have all the glory, appointed a similar committee, planning to intercept the President on the way and thus frustrate all the elaborate Federalist plans. Otis, however, went them one better and met the President's entourage at Providence three days before it was expected in Boston, delivering the following greeting,
Sir--You are now arrived within the limits of Boston, and these gentlemen are a Committee appointed to welcome your approach, and escort you to your lodgings. Upon your arrival there, they will avail themselves of your permission, to express to you, in a more formal and respectful mode, than can be done here, the assurances of the unfeigned satisfaction which the citizens of Boston realize in the honour you have been pleased to confer upon them by this visit.¹

Having disposed of the amenities, the committee fell in with the Presidential procession and proceeded to Boston, meeting on the way the rival Democratic receptionists. In the brief diplomatic skirmish which followed, the Otis committee won the day because of its official character, and the crestfallen Democrats returned home out-smarted. The President proceeded to his lodgings, where he was more formally welcomed in a speech which drew flattering comparisons between his visit and that of Washington. He replied in kind, and throughout his visit received many evidences of Federalist loyalty and respect. Morison comments on the good feeling the visit provoked,

A few days after the President's departure from Boston, the Sentinel made some pleasant comments on his visit under the heading "The Era of Good Feelings," a phrase that was later applied to the eight years of Monroe's administration. Modern historians have objected to the term as inaccurate. The period of Monroe, they argue, was one of bad, not good feelings, because the Republican party was breaking up into personal factions. But the mere fact that James Monroe had been received with open arms at Boston was sufficient indication that a great change had been wrought in party relations....The party press apparently had established a truce, except during the month preceding an election, and even then its tone was calm compared to that of war time.²

The presidential campaign of 1820 resolved itself about three issues, the Compensation Act which had altered congressmen's salaries from six

¹ See S. Putnam Waldo, The Tour of James Monroe, President of the United States, Hartford, 1818, 128.
dollars a day to $1,500 a year; internal improvements; and last and most important, slavery. The question of slavery had arisen with the application of Missouri for statehood, and the decision was thereby forced upon Congress as to whether or not she might be admitted as a free or a slave state. Of course the issue caused a great deal of debate between North and South, resulting in the famous compromise. McKenzie describes the situation and Monroe's reaction to it:

No other local issue had caused so much passionate oratory, so much recrimination, and so much defense. Most of the Northern representatives of both old parties united in denying Missouri admission as a slave state. Most of the Southern members were equally intent on demanding Missouri's admission as a slave state. Monroe wisely held aloof from the controversy. Even had he committed himself to one side or the other there is no likelihood that he would have failed of reflection. The time was too short to organize serious opposition to him. As it was, in Pennsylvania alone was an electoral ticket in opposition to Monroe nominated, a ticket based upon the grounds that Monroe was the candidate of the slavery party.1

In 1820, then, Monroe was re-elected without opposition; no candidates were presented by the Federalists. The situation was oddly unsuited for any organized campaigning:

The time was not ripe for Clinton, Clay or any other leader ambitious to become the chief executive to compete with the President. Crawford, who had given Monroe a close race in the congressional caucus of 1816, was content to bide his time in 1820. There was no need for Republicans to nominate candidates, but General Samuel Smith issued a call for a congressional caucus. Much opposition developed against such a meeting. Only about fifty members responded and nothing was done.2

One electoral vote kept the election from being unanimous. William Plumer of New Hampshire, not approving of the tactics of Monroe, felt it his duty

2 Lynch, Fifty Years of Party Warfare, 273.
to cast his vote elsewhere, and as a consequence John Quincy Adams, much to his embarrassment, received one electoral vote.

It is interesting to note in the electoral votes of Massachusetts how the two parties, Federalist and Republican, had blended:

After vacancies [in the Massachusetts Electoral College] had been filled, it consisted of eight Federalists and seven Republicans....All 15 electors voted for Mr. Monroe but divided on the Vice Presidency, the 8 Federalist votes going to Mr. Stockton of New Jersey....The total electoral vote was 231 for Monroe, 1 for John Quincy Adams; and 218 for Daniel Tompkins for Vice President. The other vice-presidential votes were scattered among four men, the Federalist votes in Massachusetts going for Stockton.1

The second term of Monroe saw the Federalists lose control of the state governments in the few places where they still had been uppermost. Sometimes the Federalists had it in their power to decide an issue where two Republicans were fighting it out, but their weakness was becoming increasingly evident. Only in local elections did they present candidates; in state and national affairs their sun had set.

When it was seen that the Federalists were no longer a menace in national affairs, the Republicans, as had been predicted by Rufus King, bickered among themselves. "Personal, group, and sectional interests," comments McKenzie, "conflicted and the resulting cliques and factions fought for control of the party. The Era of Good Feeling produced no new party but it permitted the development of issues that were to bring about a new alignment."2

To return to the State of Massachusetts and Harrison Gray Otis,

2 Ibid., 91.
Boston in 1821 was finally about to receive a charter qualifying her to be
called a city, and Senator Otis was approached with a view to securing his
consent to the nomination for first Mayor. Since 1784 there had been five
occasions on which this change had been urged, but the people of Boston had
clung to the "town-meeting" form of local government. Upon the recommenda-
tions of a committee of thirteen appointed to study the matter, however, the
Bostonians agreed by popular vote to alter the now out-moded system. Otis' term as senator from Massachusetts was almost over, and discouraged as he
was over the unhappy position in which he was placed as a result of the Hartford Convention, he was glad of the opportunity to run for Mayor rather than
to terminate his career in retirement. Morison, his biographer, is of the
opinion that Otis had hopes of obtaining the governorship at a future date,
and that he may have regarded the mayoralty as a "convenient stepping-stone"
to that more exalted position. But unfortunately for the much harried Otis,
there arose in Boston at this time a movement which became known as the 'Mid-
dling Interest'. This faction constituted the "bone and sinew of the party",
mechanics and shopkeepers who banded together against the Federalist party
because they felt themselves ignored when political plums in the forms of of-
ices or nominations were handed out, because their particular interests were
overlooked, and because there existed in Boston a law against wooden build-
ings over ten feet high within the city limits, which restriction irritated
them considerably. Otis, noting the tide of opinion even from the distance
of Washington, wrote hastily to Sullivan to investigate this faction and try
to reassure them, but they were already too late, and the Middling Interest
proceeded to support Josiah Quincy for Mayor. This was indeed an embarrass-
ing situation for Otis. He had explicitly stated when accepting the nomination that he wished to compete with no other Federalist who might be put up, preferring to withdraw and allow him an uncontested field. The Federalists, besting Quincy by five votes (175-170) in the balloting, managed to secure the nomination for Otis, but the Quincy followers refused to recognize defeat. The vote was so close that the Middling Interest claimed it was not binding, while some even went so far as to declare that 'illegal voting' had secured the nomination. As a result the Middling Interest acted as a separate group and nominated the not-unwilling Josiah Quincy for mayor. Needless to say, the Federalists were angry and alarmed by the unexpected developments, and rather than follow the instructions of Otis, who as yet knew nothing of this outcome, they girded themselves for the battle, and, to quote Morison, "there resulted the undignified spectacle of a United States Senator and a distinguished ex-member of Congress competing for a mayoralty."  

Otis was informed of the strange course of events by Thomas Perkins:

My dear friend,

You will probably have been advised from your son of the course which things have taken here. Quincy has thrown himself into the hands of the "Middling or Medling Interest" and has suffered himself to be put up as the Mayor. I had decided upon the course it was incumbent on me to pursue and went to the caucus, with the intention of making the declaration which I was bound to do under your instructions, that is, not to suffer your name to be put upon the list of Candidates against any one of the federal party who might be started for the Mayoralty. This was however done, in a manner highly creditable to him, by your son....

Your friends decided that if upon the canvass you had a majority of voices you must be supported by the party. You had the majority, and you will be voted for on Monday. Harry having made

1 Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, II, 239.
the declaration in your behalf it leaves you at perfect liberty
to withdraw yourself if you think proper, if elected -- but which
I hope will not be the case. Quincy has done himself up, by the
course he has pursued. If he gets the Mayoralty, his own friends
will not suffer him to hold his place on the Bench, with which he
has expressed himself as being particularly well pleased....¹

However, when the votes were counted neither Otis nor Quincy had
received a majority. Otis secured 1,384 votes, and Quincy 1,736; 580 votes
were scattered. Both candidates were subsequently withdrawn, and John Philip-
lips, a Federalist who suited the Middling Interest, became first mayor of
Boston by a practically unanimous vote.

Within a month Otis resigned his seat in the Senate. This dis-
grace at the polls in his home town humiliated him to such a degree that he
felt he could no longer remain in the more exalted position of senator.
But he did not retire for very long, because in 1823 the Federalists were
looking about for someone to nominate for governor.

Massachusetts, the stronghold of Federalism, had been continuous-
ly maintaining its perogatives by electing Federalists year after year for
the position of Governor. The following chart² indicated the majorities by
which they secured the elections from the conclusion of the War until the
downfall of the party:

¹ Ibid., 'Thomas Handasyd Perkins to Otis, Boston, April 5, 1822', 251-252.
² Morison, Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, II, 240. (Figures up
to 1820 include Maine.)
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<tr>
<th>Year</th>
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<td>1815</td>
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Brooks would probably have been elected indefinitely had he chosen to run and lived long enough, but in 1822 he reached the age of seventy, and decided to retire. Otis, who once before had declined nomination for the governorship now mentioned the wish to be again approached. The desire to erase his previous defeat in the elections for mayor prompted Otis to try for the higher office. The Federalists were only too glad to gratify him, in spite of the fact that his losing the mayoralty of Boston might indicate a turn in the tide of Federalism as personified by him. In opposition to Otis the Republicans nominated the thrice-defeated Dr. William Eustis, a man who had had a distinguished career as Secretary of War under Madison, Minister to Holland after the War of 1812, and besides had the added distinction of having fought in the Revolutionary War. Naturally, the first thing the Republicans did was to vilify the much beleaguered past of poor Otis. On this point Morison states,

Otis proved to be a vulnerable candidate. He was wealthy, at a time when Massachusetts was already sufficiently democratic to look on that fact as disqualification for office; he had voted for Burr in 1801; he was a proprietor of the Charles River Bridge;
he had argued against free primary schools. The Boston Statesman appealed to the orthodox clergy for influence and votes on the ground that Otis was a Unitarian, "addicted to habitual profane swearing," and because he was "one of the corporation of Harvard University, which is well known to be devoted to the propagation of a particular creed, and to have exerted an undue and highly prejudicial influence to depress other literary institutions, and other denominations of Christians." He had invited John Henry, the British spy, so it was reported, to dine at his house. He had voted on both sides of the Missouri question, and his vote against the Tariff Bill of 1820 showed that he was no friend to domestic manufacture. And most heinous of all, he was a leader of the treasonable Hartford Convention.

So it happened that even in his own state Otis was to hear charges that the convention which met in her defense was a treasonable and disgraceful mark on her record, as well as personal dishonor to himself. Morison continues,

The term Hartford Convention had no such terrors for the people of Massachusetts as it had for the rest of the Union. They knew its history too well to believe the absurd charges brought up against it, and they had kept the party responsible for it in power for eight years. But they were unwilling to vote for a candidate simply to vindicate it....The Sentinel opened the campaign, on February 19, with a series of questions and answers on the Hartford Convention; the Federalist Central Committee issued a pamphlet justifying it (Lyman's Short Account); and the Federalist press overflowed with apologetic literature.

Otis' supporters wasted too much time vindicating the Hartford Convention before the people who had supported it, and the opposition so successfully tore down Otis' career that the belated reminders of his patriotism, how long and hard he had labored as Senator to secure the Massachusetts War Claims, as well as counter-attacks on Eustis, had no avail. Eustis was elected governor with over 4,000 votes to spare, and Otis, completely crushed, went into retirement.

1 Ibid., 241-242.
2 Ibid., 242-243.
He [Eustis] carried not only every county that had ever gone Democratic, but even hide-bound Essex and Hampden, which thereby repudiated Federalism for the first time since the original division of parties.¹

The victory of Eustis lost their last state to the Federalist party, which then entered into a "period of final dissolution". Eustis added insult to injury, when, in his inaugural address, he gave a bitter criticism of the war policy of the Federalists. Though Otis was requested to run for governor in 1824, he refused, contenting himself with publishing his "Letters in Defense of the Hartford Convention and the People of Massachusetts" before the election, with appropriate remarks on the tactics of Governor Eustis. After 1824 the Massachusetts Federalists were unable to present any more candidates for governor.

The use of the congressional caucus system was once more attempted for the nominations in the presidential campaign of 1824. Sixty-six members of Congress, out of a total of 261, presented themselves on February 14, 1824, to take part in the nominations; their selections, on the Republican ticket, were William H. Crawford of Georgia for President, and Albert Gallatin for Vice-President. To their resolution that these two men be nominated as the national candidates, they appended this explanation:

In making the foregoing recommendation, the members of this meeting have acted in their individual characters as citizens; that they have been induced to this measure from a deep and settled conviction of the importance of the union among Republicans throughout the United States, and as the best means of collecting and concentrating the feelings and wishes of the people of the Union upon this important subject.²

¹ Ibid., 243.
Gallatin was chosen to run with Crawford in the hope of strengthening Crawford's chances by thus enlisting the support of Pennsylvania. Unfortunately for their plans, the question of Gallatin's citizenship was brought up; he had lived in the country since 1780, but it was held that he had not been in residence when the Constitution was adopted. Gallatin was therefore compelled to defend himself against this charge throughout the initial campaign, and in the following October he withdrew entirely from the ticket. In any case his chances were slight, as Calhoun, who had withdrawn his name from the list of presidential candidates, had been jointly selected by the 'anti-caucus' group for the vice-presidency. The caucus itself was a failure since there existed at the time no outstanding parties, and the presidential campaign became instead a "personal contest" in which Henry Clay of Kentucky, John Quincy Adams of Massachusetts, William H. Crawford of Georgia, and Andrew Jackson of Tennessee, fought for supremacy.

To add to the general excitement, it was evident that a majority would not be polled for any one of these candidates, and that the final election would rest with the House of Representatives, to which group only three of the names could be presented. The Federalist position in the campaign was embarrassing:

With their national organization gone and their state machine rapidly disintegrating, individual Federalists had either to support their fellow citizens, John Quincy Adams, for the presidency in the fall of 1824, or have no party at all....Those who were interested in the new manufactures of Massachusetts could overlook his personal antagonisms and appreciate his national position, his agreement with Henry Clay on an "American System" of internal improvements and high tariffs. They were materially interested in high tariffs. On that account, they could endure the association with Adams.
Other Federalists, however, could not join with Adams. Theodore Lyman, Jr., whose father had been intimately associated with the Essex Junto, was a Federalist member of the state legislature. Francis Baylies, of Taunton, Congressman for the Bristol district, had been identified with the Hartford Convention movement. Such Federalists as these turned away from their former associates, who were now leaning toward the "national" or conservative wing of the Republican party, and drew closer to those Republicans who objected to Adams... Everything political was in a welter of uncertainty. No one knew how new party lines would eventually be drawn. Prominent individuals, however, began to associate together in opposition to their fellow citizen, Adams.¹

Adams was anything but popular as an individual; his demeanor was cold and not conducive to earning friends. Besides the conservative Federalist opposition, there also confronted him that of the "old" Republicans who favored Crawford. These, adhering to the strict construction policy of the old Jeffersonian Democracy, were opposed to high tariffs and internal improvements; and the southern members of this faction were further alienated from Adams because he had opposed slavery at the time of the Missouri Compromise.

Nevertheless, Adams carried his own state by an overwhelming majority. Crawford upset the hopes of his faction by becoming too ill to participate in the election, and, as Darling says, "the issue became simply a question of Adams' popularity with his fellow citizens." He continues,

Scarcely one-half of those [citizens of Massachusetts] who had voted in the Spring election for governor cast their ballots for presidential electors in November. If those who stayed away favored someone else over Adams they did not care enough to go to the polls. Massachusetts appeared to have abandoned partisan divisions for the moment to acclaim its illustrious son.²

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¹ Arthur B. Darling, Political Changes in Massachusetts, 1824-1848, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1925, 41-42.
² Ibid., 45.
The elections took place on November 2, 1824, with twenty-four states voting. In six states, Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, New York, South Carolina and Vermont, the legislature still held the authority to choose the electors; but in the other states a popular vote was taken, and the results of this vote are the first recorded for a presidential election.

Andrew Jackson, Democrat, 155,872
John Quincy Adams, Coalition, 105,321
William H. Crawford, Democrat, 44,282
Henry Clay, Republican, 46,587

Total, 352,062

The electoral vote, as counted on February 9, 1825, gave a majority to no candidate, and the three names submitted to the House were Andrew Jackson, who had received 99 electoral votes; John Quincy Adams, 84 votes; and William H. Crawford, 41 votes. Clay lost mention before the House by only five votes. John Calhoun received the vice-presidency by a majority of 182 votes with his nearest competitor, Nathan Sanford of New York, receiving only 30.

McKee describes the House election:

Accordingly, the same day, February 9, 1825, the Senate having retired, the House immediately proceeded to elect a President. A roll-call showed that every member of the House except Mr. Gannett, of Virginia, (who was) sick at his lodgings in Washington, was present. Mr. Webster, of Massachusetts, and Mr. Randolph, of Virginia, were appointed tellers. The House conducted the election according to the rules already adopted, and on the first ballot John Quincy Adams was chosen. The votes of thirteen states were given to him, those of seven to Jackson, and of four to Crawford. The Speaker declared Mr. Adams elected, and notice of the result was sent to the Senate.3

1 McKee, National Conventions and Platforms of All Political Parties, 21.
2 Defect in the type of MMS.
3 Ibid., 22-23.
The following table, (Page 77), which indicates the votes of the states, is especially interesting in view of the charge of a 'deal' between Clay and Adams. The accusation was that Clay, defeated in the electoral vote by a small margin, had it well in his power to turn the election by giving his support to the candidate of his choice, and that knowing this, he had supported Adams to his own personal gain. Clay was approached by members of all three factions, but finally chose to side with Adams, and though the House, after careful investigation, found no evidence of a deal, yet the accusation was strengthened by Adams' appointment of Clay to the position of Secretary of State.

The possibility of collusion between Adams and Clay, however circumstantial, yet supplied the opposition with an abundance of fuel for the next campaign. Jackson himself stated three years later that a Congressman of Clay's faction had told him of the arrangement, offering him Clay's support on the same terms. McKenzie gives an interesting analysis of the situation:

A comparison of the votes in the Electoral College with those in the House of Representatives shows some interesting facts. Where Adams had carried only the electoral votes of New England and divided those of New York, Delaware, Maryland, Louisiana, and Illinois, he obtained the three Clay States of Kentucky, Missouri, and Ohio, and the Jackson States of Maryland and Louisiana in the House vote. And unquestionably the Clay influence gave him the vote of New York. Where Crawford had carried the electoral vote of only two States, Georgia and Virginia, and had divided the votes of Delaware, Maryland, and New York, he kept Georgia and Virginia in the House, carried Delaware clearly, and won North Carolina away from Jackson. Where Jackson had had a plurality in the electoral vote, he now was in second place in the House vote, with Adams, second in the Electoral College, elected President. It looked like a deal. And because it looked like a deal Adams was doomed to defeat four years later, for Jackson's friends were aroused. The new democracy of the West was to speak in protest
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>STATES</th>
<th>J. Q. Adams</th>
<th>Andrew Jackson</th>
<th>Wm. H. Crawford</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alabama</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Connecticut</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delaware</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Georgia</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Illinois</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indiana</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kentucky</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Louisiana</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maine</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maryland</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Massachusetts</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mississippi</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missouri</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Hampshire</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Jersey</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New York</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Carolina</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ohio</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pennsylvania</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rhode Island</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Carolina</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tennessee</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vermont</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>--</td>
<td>--</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Virginia</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>87</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During this period Congress was politically divided as follows:¹

**Nineteenth Congress**

Senate — 38 Democrats, 10 Whigs —— —— —— —— Total, 48
House — 79 Federalists, 134 Democrats —— —— " , 213

**Twentieth Congress**

Senate — 37 Democrats, 11 Whigs —— —— —— —— Total, 48
House — 85 Federalists, 128 Democrats —— —— " , 213

¹ Ibid., 23-24.
against Eastern domination and deals. It began speaking as soon as the House vote was announced; it continued to speak for many years after Adams was defeated for re-election and Jackson had assumed the Presidency. 1

Thus, from the moment Adams received the presidency in 1825, the bitter campaign of 1828 was launched to obtain his downfall. "No story," says McKenzie, "was too preposterous if it could make votes against Adams." Jackson was immediately nominated for the presidency (October, 1825) by the legislature of Tennessee; this action was prompted by Jackson's declaration that he was in favor of a constitutional amendment which would place the election of the president directly into the hands of the people. Accordingly, Jackson resigned his seat in the Senate and the campaign began in earnest, with the avowed purpose to avenge the hero of New Orleans for what his supporters considered an unfair defeat at the hands of Adams.

Adams was at a disadvantage from the first. He had difficulty in reassuring the different factions which had supported him, besides the added obstacle of the barrage of propaganda hurled at him from the moment that he stepped into office. Lynch describes his predicament:

Adams needed and received the aid of certain Federalists in the House when chosen President, but it is doubtful whether the Federalist contingent in the Adams party proved to be an asset or a liability. It is certain that Adams wished his Administration to be regarded as Republican. He had assured Webster and Warfield that he would not proscribe Federalists should he become President, but he had no intention of giving prominence to the members of the party from which he had separated in 1808.... The Federalists of New Hampshire were anxious to support the Administration but they found the President to be cold and unresponsive. The Republicans of that state who joined the Adams party, including Governor John Bell, feared the effects of an alliance with the Federalists. Each section of the party of Jefferson wished to retain the character and names of the Republican party. Webster sadly told Adams,

that "each kept up the same tone of hostility toward the Federalists as in the days when there was a Federal Party."¹

In 1828, then, the political parties took on a definite character which was to identify them throughout several subsequent presidential elections. The Democrats nominated Andrew Jackson for President and John Calhoun for Vice-President; the National Republican Party (later the Whig Party) supported John Quincy Adams for re-election, and Richard Rush of Pennsylvania for vice-president. Lynch regards this choice of Rush as a definite mistake on the part of the Adams faction, since the prospective southern vote was thus alienated by the nomination of two men from non-slaveholding states:

It is true that both Jackson and Calhoun were from the South, but each had a large degree of popularity in the North while the same cannot be asserted of either Adams or Rush in regard to the South. Of the western states whose House delegations helped to make Adams President in 1825, every one chose Jackson electors in 1828. Not even Kentucky, Clay's own state, stood by the Administration.²

The Federalists and the Hartford Convention were again berated and abused in this campaign of 1828. Both sides decried affiliation with them, and both sides likewise accused the other of alliance, secret or otherwise, with the traitors.

The Federalists played in this contest the unhappy role of scapegoats, the ownership of which each side attempted to force upon the other. The Boston Statesman, a typical blackguarding Jackson sheet, supported by the hungry office-seeking element in the Democratic party, attempted to prove that John Quincy Adams was a Hartford Convention Federalist in disguise, and that his candidacy was a Federalist plot to revive the "reign of terror"

¹ Lynch, Fifty Years of Party Warfare, 352-353.
² Ibid., 355.
of the elder Adams. During the month before election day its pages became fairly spotted with "Hartford Convention" in italics and capitals. At the same time the Statesman, had for its only ally in the Boston press the Jackson Republican, which was founded and edited by Theodore Lyman, Jr., a great-nephew of Timothy Pickering, and author of the Short Account of the Hartford Convention. ... It is needless to say that in its pages all references to the Hartford Convention are carefully avoided. The conservative Adams press in Boston, remembering its past, was also tender of old Federalist issues until a week before the election, when the President forced its hand. On October 29 he published in the National Intelligencer, in reply to certain imputations against his motives for deserting Federalism, that in 1808 the object of Massachusetts Federalist leaders "was, and had been for several years a dissolution of the Union, and the establishment of a separate confederation." Boston was still gasping for breath over this startling announcement when it learned that Daniel Webster, one of Adams' most eminent supporters, was about to bring a libel suit against Theodore Lyman for casually mentioning him in the Jackson Republican as one of the former Federalist leaders whom the President intended to impugn.

A more complicated political situation it would be difficult to imagine. One Jackson paper was accusing Adams of Federalism; Adams was charging the Federalists with treason, and an Adams Federalist was suing a Jackson Federalist for implying that he was among the traitors.1

This unexpected action on the part of Adams so aroused the Federalists of Massachusetts that they withdrew their support from his party and nominated instead their own ticket, naming Otis and Prescott as their choice. This resulted in a meager response of 156 votes which were secured only in Boston. In spite of his last minute charge, Adams obtained the majority vote in his state, only to lose to Jackson in the final accounting.

The election took place on November 4, 1828, with twenty-four states voting; only in South Carolina were the electors selected by the legislature. The popular vote accorded to Jackson 647,231 votes, as opposed to Adams' 509,097. Connecticut, Delaware, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, ---

New Jersey, Rhode Island and Vermont gave their full quota of electoral votes to Adams and Rush; while Maine, Maryland, and New York were divided. Jackson received 178 electoral votes in all; Adams, 83. Calhoun took the vice-presidency with 171 electoral votes, as opposed to Rush's 83, Georgia having delegated seven votes for this office to William Smith of South Carolina.

During this period Congress was politically divided as follows:

**Twenty-First Congress**

Senate -- 38 Democrats, 10 Whigs -- Total, 48
House -- 142 Democrats, 71 Whigs -- " , 213

**Twenty-Second Congress**

Senate -- 35 Democrats, 13 Whigs -- Total, 48
House -- 130 Democrats, 83 Whigs -- " , 213

Thus, with the elimination of the Federalists in the twenty-first Congress, the once illustrious party lost every vestige of organization and became a legend, to be recalled when derogatory material was needed in election campaigning. The Federal Party had lost control of state affairs in 1825; in local interests it had held on until its extinction in 1827. But the eleventh hour ticket of presidential electors in 1828, headed by Otis, was, as Morison affirms, "the last ticket ever voted for that bore the name of the once powerful party of Washington and Hamilton."2 The Hartford Convention, called to rescue the New England states from national oppression, had resulted instead in the ruin and condemnation of the outstanding and powerful party which controlled their affairs. Not even the gradual blending of the Federalists into the parties of the day saved them from

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1 McKee, National Conventions and Platforms of All Political Parties, 26.
occasional blasts of criticism for their supposed treason in 1815. Their existence was thus commemorated, however negatively, for some years, and the National Republican (Whig) Party which they had joined during Adams' administration, received liberal and repeated attacks for harboring 'Hartford Convention Federalists.'

Even in 1942, one hundred and twenty-seven years later, the cry "Hartford Convention" still rings in Easternears. Rebuked by Major Karl Detzer of the office of the undersecretary of war, for their hysterical fears that Chicago was half-heartedly supporting World War II, an editorial from the maligned city retorted:

Maj. Detzer should tell the people of the east that in the west there never was anything resembling a Hartford convention to consider secession of the eastern states from the Union, at the very time the nation was fighting the War of 1812.\footnote{Chicago Sunday Tribune, "The Slave of the Lamp", May 31, 1942, I, 10.}
CRITICAL ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES

1--SOURCE MATERIAL.

Valuable comments on conditions in New England before and during the war, and the Eastern reaction to them were secured from such accounts as that of A New England Farmer, (John Lowell), Perpetual War, the Policy of Mr. Madison, Boston, 1812; Solomon Aiken's The Rise and Progress of Political Dissention in the United States, a Sermon, Preached in Dracut, May 11, 1811, It Being the Annual Fast, Haverhill, 1811; John Lathrop's The Present war Unexpected, Unnecessary, and Ruinous, Boston, 1812. The opinions of the minority in the House of Representatives on the vote for a declaration of war against England, were obtained from the pamphlet published by this group, entitled An Address of Members of the House of Representatives of the Congress of the United States, to their Constituents, on the Subject of the War with Great Britain, Boston, 1812.

The English opinion of Jefferson's Embargo and its effects upon Great Britain was secured from a very interesting and satirical report of the British spy, John Howe, edited by the American Historical Review, XVII, MacMillan Company, London, 1912. The Olive Branch; or, Faults on Both Sides, Philadelphia, 1815, written by M. Carey during the war, was an interesting attempt to bring about harmony between Federalists and Republicans by showing the failings of each. The reception of the news in Boston of the capture of Washington became the subject of accusations against the Whig party in the Harrison campaign (1840), and the account of the incident which had been published by the National AEgis was quoted in the Boston Morning Post, Extra, August, 1840.


The first publication of the secret journal was contained in Letters Developing the Character and Views of the Hartford Convention, by One of the Convention, (Harrison Gray Otis), Washington, 1820. Theodore Lyman, writing in defense of the Convention, also included a copy of the journal in his A Short Account of the Hartford Convention, Taken from Official Documents and Addressed to the Fair Minded and Well Disposed to Which is
Added an Attested Copy of the Secret Journal of That Body, Boston, 1823. Theodore Dwight's History of the Hartford Convention, Boston, 1833, is especially valuable for its quotations from state records and prominent individuals involved in the controversy. William Sullivan's Familiar Letters on Public Characters and Public Events, Boston, 1834, contains pertinent studies of the period. Charges of treason against the Hartford Convention instigated by John Quincy Adams are found in their original form in Correspondence Between John Quincy Adams, Esquire, President of the United States, and Several Citizens of Massachusetts Concerning the Charge of a Design to Dissolve the Union Alleged to Have Existed in that State, Boston, 1829; Documents Relating to New England Federalism, edited by Henry Adams, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1877, contains the aforementioned documents as well as a quantity of other pertinent material.

2--BIOGRAPHY.
A biography especially helpful to a knowledge of this period, was Samuel Eliot Morison's Life and Letters of Harrison Gray Otis, Federalist, 1765-1848, I, II, Houghton Mifflin and Company, Boston, 1913, since it contained not only the life of this important leader of the Convention, but also many documents related to the period. The Life and Correspondence of Rufus King, V, VI, edited by Charles R. King, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1898, was liberally supplied with source material. The Life and Letters of George Cabot, by Henry Cabot Lodge, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston, 1878, gave an interesting and reliable account of the views of the President of the Convention.

3--COLLECTED CORRESPONDENCE AND SPEECHES.

4--SECONDARY MATERIAL.
Henry Adams' History of the United States of America, VI, VII, Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1890, was particularly valuable for its footnotes, as well as quoted documentary evidence on the aid given to England by the Eastern States during the war. Thomas Hudson McKee's National Conventions and Platforms of All Political Parties, 1789-1905, Friedenwald Company, supplied a statistical record of the voting in the various elections. Specialized studies of party development of exceptional quality were William O. Lynch's Fifty Years of Party Warfare (1789-1837), Bobbs-Merrill Company, Indianapolis, 1931; Charles W. McKenzie's Party Government in the United States, Ronald Press Company, New York, 1938; and Arthur B. Darling's Political Changes in Massachusetts, 1824-1848,