1942

The Agent Intellect in Franciscan Philosophy from Alexander of Hales to Roger Marston

Margaret M. Curtin
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses

Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
Curtin, Margaret M., "The Agent Intellect in Franciscan Philosophy from Alexander of Hales to Roger Marston" (1942). Master's Theses. 126.
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/126

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1942 Margaret M. Curtin
THE AGENT INTELLECT IN FRANCISCAN PHILOSOPHY
FROM ALEXANDER OF HALE
TO ROGER MARSTON

by

MARGARET M. CURTIN

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF
THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER
OF ARTS IN LOYOLA UNIVERSITY

August, 1942
Margaret Mary Curtin was born in Chicago, Illinois, January 3, 1918. She received her elementary education at St. Agnes Grammar School, was graduated from Mercy High School in 1936, received her certificate in teaching from Chicago Teachers' College in 1940, and completed work for her B.E. degree in 1941. She received her Ph.B. degree from Loyola University, Chicago, in June, 1940. Since that time she has been employed by Loyola University, first as an assistant and later as a fellow in the Department of Philosophy.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Chronological Table</td>
<td>i</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I - Alexander of Hales</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II - Roger Bacon</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III - St. Bonaventure</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV - John Peckham</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter V - Roger Marston</td>
<td>85</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter VI - The Agent Intellect in Franciscan Philosophy</td>
<td>113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>127</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### CHRONOLOGICAL TABLE

The following table of dates has been taken from Maurice De Wulf's *Histoire de la medievale philosophie*. Pages cited with the names of the Franciscans concerned refer to the pages on which the historical treatment will be found in Mr. De Wulf's work.

<p>| | | |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1.</td>
<td>Alexander of Hales, (pp. 104-111)</td>
<td>1170/80-1245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.</td>
<td>Roger Bacon, (pp. 269-281)</td>
<td>1210/15-1292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.</td>
<td>St. Bonaventure (pp. 112-125)</td>
<td>1221-1274</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4.</td>
<td>Roger Marston (pp. 240-3)</td>
<td><em>a l'époque de ses études à Paris</em>, 1269 and 1272; died 1303</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5.</td>
<td>John Peckham (pp. 222-225), circa</td>
<td>1240-1292</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

Franciscan philosophers take their place in the history of philosophy as adherents to the tradition established in Christian philosophy by St. Augustine. Their philosophy, Platonic and Neo-Platonic in inspiration, draws its principles from an Augustinian philosophy which, because of the theology which guided the development of this philosophy and because of the metaphysical principles which served as ancillary premises to theological-philosophical conclusions, Franciscan philosophy differs from the Aristotelian philosophy introduced into the schools of the West by the Jews and the Arabs.

When Aristotelian philosophy was brought to the schools of the West and was made to harmonize with Christian thought, a struggle between Christian traditionalists and Christian 'innovators' ensued. The Franciscans knew that if tradition were to survive, it must cope successfully with 'innovative philosophy.' Now, maintaining 'the old' and refuting 'the new' demanded of these men a familiarity with and a knowledge of the terms used in both philosophies. As a result, there is in Franciscan thought, as

evidenced in the writings of Duns Scotus, a fusion of Augustinian tradition with new opinions.

In the Arabian and Jewish interpretations of Aristotle, the schoolmen found matter for unending discussions. Some problems, as presented in Arabian and Jewish commentaries under the cloaking of Aristotelian terms, such as the eternity of the world, were not consonant with Catholic teaching. Likewise there was a tendency to credit many new doctrines to the poorly translated texts of Aristotle, and to make the texts susceptible of many differing interpretations.

This making susceptible of differing interpretations may be accomplished in regard to the disputed texts of Aristotle's De Anima. In this work, it

---

2Ibidem, p. 60: La philosophie de Scot, qui apparait dans les dernières années du XIIIe siècle, est issue d'un alliage de la tradition franciscaine avec un ensemble de vues nouvelles. Elle clôt cette brillante série de systèmes.

3Ibidem, p. 52: Dans l'interprétation de mainte théorie d'Aristote, les philosophies arabes et juifs, principalement Avicenne et Averroès, ont servi des guides, et leurs commentaires ont fourni matière à d'interminables discussions.

4Ibidem, p. 53: Diverses causes ont motivé ces sévérités de la censure ecclésiastique. D'abord les théologiens s'émeurent de certaines doctrines aristotéliciennes qui contredisent le dogme (p.ex. l'éternité du monde), des commentaires arabes qui accentuent ces théories sous le couvert d'Aristote, de la tendance à rattacher toutes sortes de doctrines nouvelles à des textes mal traduits et susceptibles d'interprétations divergentes.
is a question whether the agent intellect is a faculty of the human soul or a being separated from the human soul essentially and substantially secundum esse et substantiam. It cannot be conclusively gathered from the texts what Aristotle specifically means by the terms intellectus agens et possibilis. The texts leave some latitude so that a commentator is in a position to offer various interpretations. But surely, such a procedure is not so much the exact statement of the Philosopher's meaning as it is the interpretative meaning given to the same words, (or at least to words similarly spelled), by the commentator. For this reason, it is no surprise to find philosopher reading Aristotle so as to conclude with the Psalmist:
Signatum est lumen vultus tui super nos, Domine. It is likewise no surprise to find them, in the guiding light of their own metaphysics, drawing varying meanings from terms and propositions of Aristotle.

And so it is that the bringing of terms from one system of thought to another, and the use of these terms in another metaphysics, in the effort to adapt and conform, and, perhaps, thereby to save, and to harmonize these with the writings of the saints—especially with the writings of St. Augustine—has developed in the Franciscan school itself differing opinions. The several meanings given to the Aristotelian term intellectus agens by the Franciscans account for the problem set forth in this paper, namely, is there a common approach or a common treatment of the problem of the agent intellect among the Franciscans?
CHAPTER I
ALEXANDER OF HALES

Alexander of Hales, the first Franciscan to occupy the chair of philosophy at Paris, and the principal figure of a long line of theologian-philosophers, is credited with a work which well could be called Summa Minorum, or Franciscan Summa. In this Summa, Hales has made use of nearly all the philosophical works of Aristotle, but this does not prevent him from abandoning Aristotle on some important questions. Alexander reserves a preponderant place for a number of Platonic and Augustinian theories.

Alexander relies strongly upon St. Augustine for his metaphysical theories and the philosophy developing from them. This reliance is mentioned by

1Maurice de Wulf, Histoire de la philosophie médiévale, p. 20: Les premiers maîtres dominicains furent Roland de Cemone et Jean de S. Gilles; le premier franciscaine fut Alexandre de Hales.
Ibidem, p. 104: Alexandre de Halès est le chef de file d'une longue série de théologiens-philosophes qui enseignèrent à l'université, en qualité de titulaires d'une chaire franciscaine.
2Ibidem, p. 105: ... et la compilation inscrite sous le nom d'Alexandre put s'appeler la Summa Minorum, ou la Somme des franciscains.
3Ibidem, p. 106: Il utilise presque toute l'œuvre philosophique d'Aristote, dont le crédit, vers 1231, commençait à monter, et il n'a pas peu contribué à son succès décisif, ce qui ne l'empêche pas de critiquer Aristote, et de l'abandonner sur des questions importantes. ... En même temps, il réserve une place prépondérante à nombre de théories platoniciennes et augustin niennes provenant de la scolastique du XIIe siècle...
his editors in the Prolegomena to his Summa,⁴ and is stressed by Alexander himself when he says that it is better to believe Augustine and Anselm than Aristotle.⁵

The Irrefragible Doctor attempts to follow faithfully the teaching of St. Augustine regarding man's knowledge in via,⁶ maintaining that cognition of God is so impressed on the rational mind and its evidence shines forth so strongly, that the existence of the First Being, even without the influence of grace, cannot remain unknown.⁷ Likewise, maintaining the stress laid by St. Augustine on the dignity of the human soul,⁸ Halensis rejects the Neo-Platonic and Arabian position that between the human soul and its God, there are several beings interposed, or that there are intermediary intelligences needed.⁹ Besides these doctrines, there is also a treatment of knowledge in the eternal reasons, as well as an attempt to reconcile Augustinian and

⁵Ibidem, pp. xxxix-xl: Dico quod plus oredendum est Augustino et Anselmo quam Aristoteli.
⁶Cf. St. Augustine, De Videndo Deo, Epist. 147. c. 3, n. 8 (PL 33, 600); Ibidem, cc. 2,16, mn. 7, 38 (PL 33, 599, 613).
⁷Vide, Alex. of Hales, Summa Theol., tome 1, n. 14, p. 33.
⁸Alexander of Hales, Summa Theol. Prol. p. xxxi: Alexander Halensis docet quod cognition Dei in mente rationali ita impressa est ac tanta evidentia fulget ut existentia Entis Primi, etiam gratia non influente, ignorari non potest...
⁹Cf. St. Augustine, De Vera Relig. c. 55, n. 113 (PL 34, 172); De Gen. ad Lit., n. 60 (PL 34, 243); 83 Quaestionum, q. 51, nn. 2 et 4 (PL 40, 33).
⁰Cf. Alex., Summa Theol., n. 20, ad 3, p. 31.
Aristotelian philosophy.\textsuperscript{10}

Taking as the three principal methods of dividing the \textit{intellectus humanus}, the methods of St. Augustine, Aristotle and Blessed John Damascene, Hales considers that that of St. Augustine is superior to the other two. Augustine has given a division into \textit{ratio}, \textit{intellectus}, and \textit{intelligentia}.\textsuperscript{11} This division of the mind acceptable to Hales is the one to which at least the terms, if not the meanings of the terms, of the Aristotelian division will be subordinated and applied.

The Philosopher's division is that of material, possible and agent intellect. The material intellect knows the species in the phantasms, and the separable possible intellect knows the species abstracted by the agent intellect.\textsuperscript{12} Blessed John Damascene's division divides the soul into intellect, mind, and opinion, besides sense and imagination.\textsuperscript{13} Damascene explains that from sense there arises the passion or feeling, which is called imagination. From imagination, there arises opinion. Then the mind making a decision regarding opinion, judges truth, whence the faculty of judging, because it de-

\textsuperscript{10}De Wulf, \textit{loc. cit.}, p. 108: En psychologie, Alexandre tente de fusionner les doctrines d'Aristote et Augustin.


\textsuperscript{12}Tbidem, p. 446: \textit{Philosophus vero dividit in intellectum materialem, qui cognoscit species in phantasmatibus, et intellectum possibilem separabilem, qui cognoscit species abstractas, et intellectum agentem. Cf. De Anima, III, 5.}

\textsuperscript{13}Alex. \textit{Summa Theol. loc. cit.}, p. 446: Secundum Ioannem Damascenum dividitur in intellectum, mentem, et opinionem: has enim enumerat cognitivias praeter sensum et imaginationem.
cides, knows and judges, is called mind.14

These three divisions are not identical to one another. Each differs, because the point of view from which each is determined is different. Augustine's division is made according to differences of intelligible forms, whether those forms be of the composite or the complex, that is whether those forms be of the spirit separated or the spirit separable from the organic body. Damascene's division concerns the differences of these same beings as they are comprehended under the condition of composition or complexity. Therefore, neither of these divisions is reducible to the other.15

Further, the intellectus of the Augustinian division is not understood in the same way as the intellectus of Damascene's. The intellect described by St. Augustine is a cognitive power of separated created forms, even without complexity, (that is, without corporeal matter); whereas the intellect described by Damascene is understood as being the cognitive power by which determined truth is known by means of a pre-judgment of the mind belonging to creatures composed of corporeal matter and form.16 Hence, we are to con-

14Ibidem: Unde dicit quod "per sensum animae constituitur passio quae dicitur imaginatio, ex imaginatione vero fit opinio, diende mens diudicans opinionem, sive vera sit sive falsa, iudicat veritatem; unde mens a metiendo et ex cogitando et iudicando dicitur; quod autem diuditum et determinatum est, recte dicitur intellectus.

15Ibidem, num. 368, p. 447, Sed Contra, b: Praeterea, divisio Augustini videtur esse secundum differentias formarum intelligibilium sine compositione vel complexione, divisio vero Ioannis Damasceni secundum differentias earum in quantum cum compositione vel complexione accipiantur; ergo neutra est ad alteram reducibilis.

16Ibidem, p. 448, ad 1: Ad primum, quod intellectus in divisione Augustini non est secundum eundem modum acceptus secundum quem in divisione Ioannis Damasceni. Nam intellectus, secundum Augustinum, est vis cognoscitiva formarum creatorum separatuarum ut sine complexione; intellectus autem, secundum Ioannem Damascenum, in quantum cognoscitur veritas determinata in
clude that intellect as defined by Augustine is broader in application, for,
whereas Damascene defines the faculty of a being which knows the spiritual
and the spiritual conjoined to matter, Augustine defines the faculty of not
only such a being, but also of being which is by its nature wholly separable
from body and the conditions of body.

In these same divisions, mind (mens) does not have the same meaning.
According to St. Augustine, mind is the supreme faculty of the soul; but ac-
cording to Damascene it is merely a power for discerning truth from
falsity. Nor does the term 'intelligence' connote the same thing for
these two philosophers. Augustine teaches that intelligence is the highest
power of the soul extending itself to the contemplation of God. For
Damascene, it is the power which understands truth with the certitude of
truth. Lastly, the Augustinian term ratio is not to be equated with
Damascene opinio, for ratio is the power which through cognition attains
to the forms abstracted from bodies and the accidents of bodies.

17 Ibidem; Similiter nec mens utroque similiter accipitur. Nam non est mens
secundum Ioannem Damascenum idem quod mens secundum Augustinum, supremum
in anima, sed est vis diudicans ad discernendum veritatem a falsitate.
18 Ibidem; Unde non est idem quod intelligentia, quae est, secundum Augustinum,
vis suprema extendens se ad Dei contemplationem.
19 Ibidem; p. 448, Solutio: Est enim accipere verum cum quadam admixtione
falsitatis, et sic dicitur opinio, vel cum discretione veritatis a falsi-
tate, et sic est mentis, vel cum certitudine veritatis, et sic dicitur
intellectus.
20 Ibidem, ad 1: Nec opinio est idem quod ratio; nihilominus tamen secundum
quod ratio attingit complexiones, sic dicitur opinio esse in ratione ... 
ratio vero secundum primam divisionem Augustini, est vis quae attingit per
cognitionem formas abstractas a corporibus et corporum accidentibus.
Thus St. Augustine's division is not reducible to Damascene's, nor is Damascene's reducible to Augustine's. Damascene's explains the progress of reason from the habit of principles or principles to the habit of conclusions. Augustine's explains knowledge of the external world by means of ratio, knowledge of the divine by intelligentia, and knowledge of the uncreated and the created, as well as knowledge by the created world of spirits, by the intellectus. Now Damascene's is not contrary to Augustine's; yet it is not the same as Augustine's. Rather, his treating of truth obtained of intelligible forms by beings of mixed or complex natures, that is by corporeal beings endowed with reason is contained in St. Augustine's, which treats of the cognitive faculty of spiritual beings in general.

Now, let us consider the relation between Augustine and Aristotle. It

21Ibidem, num. 380, ad 3, p. 459: Alias vero differentiae, quas ponit Damascenus, attenduntur secundum progressum intellectus sive rationis ab habitu principii vel principiorum ad habitum conclusionis.
Ibidem, p. 448, ad I-1. In ad primum: ratio vero, secundum primam divisionem Augustini, est vis quae attingit per cognitionem formas abstractas a corporibus et corporum accidentibus.
Ibidem: Nam intellectus, secundum Augustinum, est vis cognitiva formarum creatorum separatarum ut sine complexione... intelligentia, quae est, vis suprema extendens as Dei contemplationem.
Ibidem, num. 377, Solutio ad finem: ratio vero est circa formas intelligibiles inventas in rebus sensibilibus... intellectus autem formarum intelligibilium creatorum separatarum a sensibilibus; intelligentia vero divinorum.
22Ibidem: Aliae vero divisiones respiciunt veritatem formarum intelligibilium in complexione entium.
cannot be maintained that the threefold division offered by Aristotle corresponds to the three differences of powers maintained by Augustine. Augustine's division is distinguished according to different intelligibles in grades of greater or less nobility or spirituality. What this means is understood when we consider that the uncreated intelligible is nobler than the created; and that among created intelligibles, that which is separated from corporeal forms is nobler than that conjoined to such forms. It is upon differences of intelligibility or nobility that Augustine divides. But Aristotle's division has to do with differences arising from the functions of one power of abstracting. Hence the power described by Aristotle is constituted for abstraction, and it is thus an abstracting power and a power comprehending the abstracted forms. From this it is clear that the differences of intelligibility assigned in the Philosopher's division are regarded from a comparison to abstractible forms, whereas Augustine's, in treating of the intelligibles qua abstractibles and of intelligibles qua intelligibles, takes into account those of the Philosopher and more. 25

25 Alex. of Hales, Summa Theol., p. 447, II-2: Sic vero diceret quod intellectus sub iis tribus differentiis respondet tribus differentiis virium quae ponuntur ab Augustino, hoc non est verum. Nam illae tres differentiae, quas ponit Augustinus, distinguuntur secundum intelligibilia differentia in nobilitate maior vel minori: nobilius enim est intelligibile increatum quam creatum, intelligibile vero creatum separatum a formis corporalibus quam illud quod est in corporibus. Differentiae vero posita a Philosopho attenduntur secundum differentias omnium ad abstractionem pertinientium: est enim vis habens ea a quibus fit abstractio et est vis abstrahens et est vis formas abstractas comprehendens, et ita differentiae intelligibilium, assignatorum a Philosopho, attenduntur secundum comparationem ad formas abstractibiles, differentia vero Augustini ad formas has et alias; non ergo secundum unum modum accipiuntur.
In order that we may have a clearer notion of the differences between the Augustinian and the Aristotelian divisions, let us consider the relation between the *intellectus* and abstraction. Abstraction is concerned with abstractible intelligibles. Hence, there cannot be abstraction of such as the form of the angelic intelligence, of the forms of the sciences, or of the forms of the virtues which are in the soul. The limitation of abstraction to abstractible intelligibles marks the limitation of the Aristotelian intellect; the Augustinian intellect (*intellectus*), on the other hand, is not hemmed in by the boundaries of abstractible intelligibles, but is free to consider the whole range of intelligibles as well as abstractible intelligibles.26

There is still another difference between these divisions. Augustine has posited *ratio* (reason), by which man judges of those things external to him. *Ratio* includes both the material intellect and the possible intellect which Aristotle has assigned to the rational creature. Thus *ratio* for St. Augustine, or the material and the possible intellect for Aristotle, knows intelligible forms as they were accepted into the phantasms or as they are

26Ibidem, ad II, 1-2: Ad illud quod obicitur de divisione Philosophi respectu divisionis primae quam ponit Augustinus, dicendum quod non simili- ter accipitur in utraque divisione. Nam abstractio currit secundum formas secundum se abstractas, sicut est forma intelligentiae angelicae, vel formas scientiarum aut virtutum quae sunt in anima, sed circa formas intelli- gibilis abstractibiles. Et propter hoo, cum intellectus in divisione Augustini accipatur circa formas secundum se abstractas, in divisione vero Philosophi formas abstractibiles, patet quod non similiter accipitur in- tellectus utroque.
accepted from the phantasms. 27 Thus, because the rational creature, according to the Philosopher's division, must accept the species abstracted by the agent intellect from the phantasm, 28 and because separated intelligible forms are no means abstractible, the possible intellect can never receive knowledge of such separated intelligible forms from the agent intellect. 29 In this case, too, the limitations imposed on the rational soul by Aristotle's theory of abstraction are evident. In the division proffered by Augustine there is no such limitation, because Augustine clearly maintains that the mind, even when considering itself, considers a spiritual being, nobler than the body which it inhabits; that the mind goes above itself, to that beyond itself, and that is God. 30

Having determined that the traditional division of St. Augustine is

27 Ibidem: In divisione ergo Augustini ratio continebat intellectum material- 
em et possibilenum prout cognoscent formas intelligibiles vel in phantasmat-
ibus vel a phantasmatibus acceptas.
28 Ibidem: Intellectus autem duplicem habet actum: Habet enim unum actum res-
pectu formarum abstrahendarum, et ille est abstrahere...
29 Ibidem: intellectus vero possibilis nihilominus recipiet cognitionem ab 
agente a parte altera, scilicet formarum intelligibilium separatarum.
30 Ibidem, ad I, 1: Unde non est idem quod intelligentia, quae est, secundum 
Augustinum, vis suprema extendens se ad Dei contemplationem. 
Ibidem, num. 370, p. 450, III, Solutio: Cum autem dicitur quod "intelli-
gentia immediate supponitur Deo," loquitur de eo quod est supra animam 
rationalem. Ea vero quae sunt intra, sicut sunt scientiae et virtutes et 
quod ipsa anima se ipsam cognoscit, quia non est necessae similitudinés 
alias ab intelligibilibus pervenire ad intellectum, ideo non computantur 
in vi separata, sed cognoscuntur a vi in qua nata sunt esse, cum enim ani-
ma ipsam scientiam vel artem habeat apud se, quae necessitas est habere 
similitudinem separatam ab intelligibili? Sed in aliiis rebus intelligibil-
ibus oportet habere similitudinem, qua intellectus iuvetur ad hoc quod int-
elligibile fiat actu intellectum.
superior to that of both Damascene and Aristotle, knowing that it is different from the innovative division of Aristotle but that at the same time that the Aristotelian division is one not to be treated lightly. Halensis pays close attention to the Augustinian and the Aristotelian systems and their relations to each other as they describe the powers of the rational soul. Our Franciscan realized that the intelligent creature endowed with sense powers needed abstraction. It was, therefore, necessary to accept the Aristotelian division into material, possible, and agent intellect. At the same time Christian philosophy and Christian dogma taught that there are beings for the knowledge of which abstraction was not needed, indeed, would not suffice. This truth demanded a theory of knowledge which would explain knowledge of these separated beings. Such a theory had been formulated by St. Augustine and had been accepted by Christians back through the centuries up to Alexander's time. That was the divine illumination theory. Now, in order to achieve a synthesis between two systems arising from differing cultures, and in order to explain adequately the knowledge had by the rational creature, a definite problem of the agent intellect is present. What is the part played by the intellect in abstraction, and what is the role assigned to it by a theory holding to illumination abstraction? To solve this problem in the terms of Alexander, let us study the Aristotelian divisions as they are handled by Alexander.

The first of the Aristotelian divisions to be considered by Halensis is that of the material intellect. This intellect possesses the sensible

31Vide nota 12.
species in the phantasm, where preparation for further spiritualization of the species takes place. The intelligible species, therefore, is not immediately taken up by the agent intellect, when the object of intellection exterior to the knowing soul is first presented. The first 'degree of abstraction' must take place in the senses, after which the 'higher degrees' occur. Hales concludes that, therefore, it is necessary to admit a material intellect.

This intellect alone is not sufficient for the perfection of man, as it is for the perfection of the brute. The brute has the material intellect, not as a 'lower possibility' to a nobler perfection, but as a perfection itself. As regards the rational soul, however, we must hold that the material intellect is a 'lower possibility', which, when realized, leads to a nobler perfection.

---

Summa Theol., p. 448, ad II, 1-2: sed quia istae (i.e. quae sunt sine materia) non indigent abstractione ad hoc ut intelligantur, aliae vero indigent.
32Ut supra.
34Ibidem, p. 451, sub Solutio: intellectus vero materialis habet species in phantasmatis quas possible est abstrahi per intellectum agentem, ut uniantur cum possibili.
37Ibidem: Ad quod dicendum quod ille intellectus materialis, de quo loquitur Commentator, qui habet species in phantasmatis, in hoc differt a phantasia quod phantasia habet phantasmata, non ut possibilia ulterius ad actum alicuius potentiae intellectivae; sic enim est in brutis; bruta enim habent hanc vim tamquam perfectionem, non ut possibilem ulterius ad nobilioriorem perfectionem. Unde, sicut sensus brutalis non dicitur universalis neque per se neque per accidens sed solum singularis, sensus
The acceptance, so far, of divisions of the intellect, and the acceptance of a material intellect itself not sufficient to perfect man, is expressive of a plurality of powers of the soul. The material intellect, since it is so closely allied to that of the brute, seems to be concerned with things of a material and a perishable order. It can be felt, although it has not yet been expressed, that this intellect is not the only intellect possesses by man, for in a teleologically governed universe every creature must reach its end, that is what is perfective of the creature. Now what is the creature’s perfection is, evidently knowledge, and the material intellect being but a 'lower possibility' the soul must have more than one power. Thus, it is clear why the material intellect is but, as it were, a stepping stone to further perfection.

Before delving into the explanations concerning a possible intellect, Alexander first shows us its place in the hierarchy of intellects in the rational soul. That possible intellect has present to it the form which is essential to the soul itself, and in this it differs from prime matter.

vero humanus est utriusque, scilicet universalis et singularis, ita contingit in vi interiori ut sit phantastica habens phantasmata secundum quod huiusmodi, non ut possibilia ad species abstrahendas ad intellectum; intellectus vero materialis habet species in phantasmatis, quas possibilis est abstrahi per intellectum agentem, ut uniantur cum possibili. Sic ergo necesse fuit ponere intellectum materialem.


Ibidem. ad 2: Ad secundum vero dicendum quod non est simile de materia prima omnino et de anima rationali quod hoc habet rationalis intellectum possibilem. In hoc autem est simile quod, siquit materia prima est possibilis respectu formarum in esse, ita intellectus possibilis possibilitatem habet respectu formarum sive specierum in cognitione. In hoc autem est
It is not to be supposed, however, that this is an intellective part of the soul similar to the intellective faculty of the angel. The angel has a possible intellect only in the sense that it is receptive of illumination from on high. That intellective part of the soul which is joined to the sensible part of man is called possible inasmuch as it may be actuated through the medium of the sense operations. 

The operation proper to the possible intellect is that of taking up the intelligible forms abstracted from the sensible species in the phantasms, or as Hales calls it, the material intellect. The possible intellect, so-called because it is in potency to knowing, does not de se

---

dissimilitudo quod materia prima nullam habet formam de se praeter ipsam ipsum capacitatem; intellectus autem possibilis habet aliquam, quia ipsum formam essentialem ipsius animae, quae est aliquid in se: unde materia prima non reflectitur super se.

39Ibidem. num. 372, p. 452, ad 2: dicendum quod non est simile de parte intellectiva animae et parte intellectiva angeli. Haec enim quae est in angello, separata est a parte sensibili: unde non habet possibilem nisi dicatur possibilis, id est receptibilis illuminationum a Summo, sed habet partem sibi sufficientem ad cognoscendum ea quae nondum sunt cognita ab ea. Pars ergo intellectiva in anima quae coniuncta est parti sensibili, ex illa parte est possibilis et sufficientiam habet ex agente et viribus praebabilibus sensilibus, ut educetur de potentia ad actum. Vires enim sensibiles praeparant formam intelligibilam ut sit conveniens abstractioni, intellectus vero agens actu abstrahit eam et unit cum possibili. Sic ergo completur intellectus possibilis in receptione specierum intelligibilium a phantasmate abstracterum.

40Ibidem. num. 371, p. 451, sub Solutio: intellectus vero materialis habet species in phantasmatibus quas possibile est abstrahi per intellectum agentem, ut uniantur cum possibili.

Ibidem. num. 368, ad 2, p. 448: sed cum intellectus possibilis, de quo loquitur Philosophus, accipit formas simplices abstractas a phantasmatibus.

41Ibidem. num. 372, p. 452, Solutio: altera vero, scilicet possibilis, est ex parte suae materiae, qua est potentia ens respectu cognoscibilium quae flunt in ea.
take up the species from the phantasm. This is clear from what Aristotle
has taught, for he says that nothing is educed from a material potency to
act unless by that which is already in act. Now, the possible intellect
in its own genus is regarded as a material potency. Therefore, it must be
reduced to act by that which is already in act. Thus, in the rational soul,
the possible intellect is reduced from its potentiality by the active pow-
er of the soul, the agent intellect.42 It is as regards the possible in-
tellect's being brought from its potency to the intellective act of union
with the intelligible species that there is a need for the acting intellect.
In this way the intellective part of the soul, conjoined to the sensible
powers which prepare the intelligible forms for abstraction, is joined to
these preparatory virtues and suffices to make possible intellect pass from
the potency of knowing to the actuality of knowing.44 And so, the possible
intellect and the agent intellect are two different powers of the soul, and
are its constitutive principles.44

42Ibidem., no. 372, p. 451, sect. I, 1: Quae autem sit necessitas ponere has
duas differentias, habetur a Philosocho. 1. Dicit enim quod nihil educitur
de potentia materiali in actum, nisi per id quod est in actu; sed intellec-
tus possibilis dicitur possibilis in suo genero potentia materiali; non er-
go educitur in actum nisi per id quod est in actu; illud autem est potentia
agens; erunt ergo duae differentiae.
Vide notae 38, 39, 40.
43Vide notae 38, 39, 40.
44Ibidem., no. 372, p. 452: Solutio: Ad quod potest dici quod intellectus
agens et intellectus possibilis sunt duae differentiae in anima rationali,
quarum una scilicet, intellectus agens, est ex parte formae ipsius animae,
secundum quod est spiritus, altera vero, scilicet possibilis, est ex parte
suae materiae, qua est potentia ens respectu cognoscibilium quae fiunt in
ea...
Vide nota 39, lines 7-16.
In virtue of their being constitutive principles, it is said that the agent intellect issues from the form of the soul, and by reason of its form the soul is understood to be spirit; the possible intellect issues from the matter of the soul, and by reason of this the soul is understood to be in potency to knowables. The soul, then, despite its spiritual nature, is not exempt from the universal law binding the creature to the creator, for it is, as is every article of creation, a composite of matter and form.

In the treatment of the intellect by Alexander the commingling of Augustinian and Aristotelian terms is obvious. The agent intellect, which for both Alexander and Aristotle is more remote from matter than the material or possible intellects, is not simply more abstract, but it is that by which the rational soul is 'spiritus'. The possible intellect, closer than the agent to material conditions, is not potential by reason of this proximity. It is 'possible' because it is in potency to the intelligible object. Those who would say that it is a possible intellect only in virtue of its being conjoined to the body are in error, for the rational soul in the next life has an intellectus agens et possibilis, just as has the rational soul in this life, and verily, in patria there is separation from and not conjunction with a body. Possibility means simply a potency to know.46

45ut supra.
46Vide notae 38, lines 5-16:39, lines 4-16. Alexander of Hales, Summa Theol. no. 372, p. 452, Respondeo: Ex illa vero parte qua habet hanc perfectionem cognoscibilium ad quamdam similitudinem Primi, ex illa est intellectus agens; quae pars, cum obviaverit formae intelligibilis in phantasmate existenti, abstrahit eam ut sit actu intellecta, et ex illa parte quan nondum
The work performed by the agent intellect is that of abstracting the sensible species from the phantasm. The nature of its work is determined by the nature conferred upon it. Now, the nature of the agent intellect is such that it has within itself a certain natural light, in virtue of which it is in act with regard to intelligibles. This it has from the very beginning, since it is an immaterial substance separated essentially from the body. Thus although the agent intellect is conjoined to the body, it is separated from it, and is above the body's activities; whereas the possible intellect is simply separable, but not separated, from the body. In this manner of speaking, the rational soul knows the species abstracted from the phantasm, which manner of knowing is a medium between knowing in the phantasm and knowing species in every way separated from the phantasm.
Because it has within itself this certain natural light, the agent intellect is called a spirit. But spirit is that which is above the intellect, supra intellectum. Now, since some intelligibles are supermental, might not knowledge be had because of a super-mental agent? Alexander says that the agent is said to be in act, not because it knows all forms from the beginning, but because it is illuminated by the First Agent. This illumination is given, not as regards all forms, but only as regards certain forms, and when it (the created agent intellect) is illuminated, it perfects the possible intellect in that way, that is as regards these given forms. Therefore, it is not necessary that the agent intellect be a power above the soul.

What does Alexander mean when he says that the agent intellect is illuminated as regards certain forms? Evidently, he means that the agent intellect, being the power of a limited intelligence is itself limited. Now, why is the agent intellect limited in respect to some forms, or why is it not illuminated in respect to all forms? Are we to conclude that the angel could influence or move the human soul in its cognitive acts? It seems not, for the interposition of any creature between God and the rational soul is not to be admitted. In fact, such a possibility is expressly denied.

49 Ibidem., no. 381, p. 460: Respondeo: Respondeo quod sensus spiritualis fundatur in natura spirituali, quia spiritus est super mentem, scilicet secundum quod anima secundum intellectum dicitur spiritus, non in natura spirituali per gratiam vel per gloriam...

50 Ibidem., no. 372, p. 452, ad 1: Ad id vero quod obicitur quod aliqua intelligibilia sunt supra intellectum et ita oportet quod cognitio fiat per agentem qui est supra intellectum: dicendum est quod agens non dicitur esse actu, quia omnes formas a principio intelligit, sed ab agente primo illuminatur, et iam non respectu omnium, sed respectu quorumdam formarum, et cum illuminatus perficit etiam possibilem illo modo.
by Halensis. 51

If the human agent intellect is illuminated as regards some form, and no intermediary nature is allowed to illuminate it as regards other forms, should it then be said that it, or that God is the agent intellect as regards these other forms? It is not easy to answer this question. The agent intellect, as part of the rational soul, is limited to the conferring of some forms only upon the possible intellect; but we must bear in mind that Alexander has averred that it is not necessary to posit a power supra-mental in nature nor an agent intellect separated from the soul substantially. 52

Then, it might be said that the Irrefragible Doctor holds that there are agent intellects, (and in the light of this, the question asking what is left to human agent intellect is answered), and one uncreated agent intellect, God, (and then the question has not been answered).

If divine intervention is to be granted in the Halensian system, we are able to gather some notion of the nature of this intervention from Hales' use of the classic analogy of light and the sense of sight. He tells us that light is the effective cause of vision, but remains unknown to us in its own nature as such. Analogously, the eternal light or the uncreated agent intellect is the effective cause of our intellectual vision, but it in itself remains unknown to the rational creature and is known only in its

51 Ibidem., tome 1, no. 20, ad 3, p. 31: Dicit Augustinus quod nulla est interposita natura inter mentem et Deum, ut scilicet sit aliqua substantia intellectualis velut angelus, per quam formetur et perficiatur ipsa mens, quemadmodum philosophi mentiti sunt, dicentes intelligentiam humanam educi in actum et perfici per intelligentiam anglicam.
52 Vide notae 50 et 51, et 47, lines 4 sqq.
reflections in the intelligible objects of creation. 53 This is all we can conclude from the texts of Alexander, and it is all we may conclude without perverting or changing the doctrine of Alexander. The question whether God is the immediate First Agent Intellect in our knowing, or whether He is immediate in the sense that every agent intellect must be first enlightened as regards only certain forms is an open one.

For a reason other than that intelligibles are supermental some have held that the agent intellect is separated secundum esse et substantiam from the possible intellect. They argue that just as in sense knowledge the sense is not perfective of itself, because the sense needs light, both interior and exterior; so in intellectual knowledge the rational soul need light which is interior and exterior to it, so that the potentially intelligible becomes the actually intelligible. 54 This is the position brought into philosophy by the Arabs.

Without mentioning any names, Alexander rejects this position. This analogy, that as in sensation the illuminative light is outside the sense of

53 Summa Theol., tome 1, no. 20, ad 1, p. 31: Videtur lux se ipsa effective, non tamen seipsa materialiter, hoc est in seipsa, id est in sua spiritualitate et absolutione naturae suae, sed in alia, ut in aere, vel colore. Eodem modo lux aeterna in praesenti videtur seipsa, non tamen in se ipsa, sed in creatura, quae est quasi medium materiale deferens ipsam lucem ad intellectum.

54 Ibidem., tome 2, no. 372, p. 451, sect. 1: Praeterea, sensus non se ipsum perficit in sentiendo, sed indiget luce interiori et exteriori; ergo nec intellectus similiter; erit ergo unum aliquid in anima quod est per modum lucis, ut sicut lux potentia-colores facit actu sentiri, ita quid in anima quod potentia-intelligibilia perducit ad hoc ut actu intelligentur ab intellectu possibili.
sight and separated from it, so in intellection the illuminative light is outside of and separated from the possible intellect, does not carry. It is not necessary that the agent be a separated substance, for the soul, as has been said, is a spirit having within itself a certain natural light from the creative principle. Further, Alexander says, God being the First Light and the soul being His similitude, it is reasonable that the soul's light be a natural light, for the Creator would not fashion the rational soul to His own image but what He would give it some perfection as regards knowing.

Hence, because the perfection proper to the intellection soul is intellection, because the soul has in it from creation an activity by which it achieves its own perfection (Alexander seemingly implies here that secondary causes are efficient in their own order of secondary causality), and because the intellection soul is the image of God and a deflector of the eternal light to the human intellect, Alexander will not accept the Jewish and Arabian interpretations of the Philosopher. Alexander has taken into his system the tradition of Augustine and fused with Aristotelianism. Reason for retaining Aristotelian terms in Augustinian metaphysics is seen in Hales' meaning of the word 'separatum'. Analysis of

55 Vide nota 47.
56 Ibidem., p. 452, Solutio: non enim videtur quod ita condiderit animam rationalem ad imaginem suam quin ei dederit perfectionem aliquam respectu cognoscibilium.
57 Ibidem., no. 337, p. 410, Respondeo 2-3: Abundat autem anima rationalis in hoc quod est imago Dei secundum hoc quod sicut Deus movet et gubernat universum, sic et anima movet et gubernat suum universum.
58 Vide nota 53.
this term reveals that separatum may pertain to that 'separated in act', and this means the soul; or 'that separated in intention', and this does not belong to the rational soul, for the rational soul has an intention to the body. This two-fold meaning of separatum suggests the two-fold activity of the Aristotelian intellect. The first activity of the intellect is abstraction, which is made necessary by the soul's intention to the body. The other activity is that which the intellect exercises as regards knowledge of separated forms, which the soul has by reason of its being separated in act from the body.

Hales found it essential then, to retain the Aristotelian division as an explanation of knowledge had by way of sense experience. Aristotle qua Aristotle, however, could not be incorporated into his system of thought, for he found the Philosopher's division incomplete. The Augustinian division, being complete, offered a satisfactory explanation of intellectual powers and knowledge. The Aristotelian division pertains only to those forms which enter into knowledge by way of abstraction from the sense phantasm, whereas Augustine's division pertains to those forms and also to...
Those forms entering into their knowledge by way of simple intelligible forms. Augustine's division accounts for knowledge had of beings not only separable but also separated from bodies and from the conditions of bodies, and is thus a satisfactory explanation of knowledge, whether it be knowledge of the corporeal world, of created spirits, or of God and the eternal reasons; but the Philosopher's division accounts for knowledge had of that part of nature conjoined to bodies and to the conditions of bodies.

With a grand sweep Alexander cleared away the problem of the separated intelligence, but with more labor and difficulty he combined the novel doctrines of Aristotle with the traditional ones of Augustine. By combining these he was able to say that Augustine had given an account of Divine Light and created images (or created lights) and that Aristotle had given an account of a First Agent Intellect and created agent intellects. Hales seems to have taken the position that the agent intellect, pars animae, is of the soul itself, is created from nothing, and is, therefore, not from or of the substance of God. Reluctant to abandon Augustine and tradition, Hales foists upon the illumination theory Aristotelian abstraction, so that that power which in Aristotelian terms is an abstractive power and in Augustinian is an illuminative one, in Halesian terms is an illuminative-abstractive power. The source of this power which the created agent intellect manifests is the Light whose image it is, the Light after which it is fashioned,

the Light which fashioned it in creation. Nevertheless, because the soul is thus fashioned and is an image of the Divine Light, it is not to be concluded that the created agent knows immediately the First Agent Intellect. What must be said is that the soul in via cannot know God save through a medium.63

Finding both a distinction and a harmony between tradition and innovation, this Franciscan Master attempted and achieved to his own satisfaction, a synthesis of Augustinian metaphysics and Aristotelian terminology. Alexander's own doctrine is an account of a multiplicity of illuminations from one Light, of a multiplicity of agent intellects from one Agent Intellect, of agent intellects illuminated by the First, and of agent intellects illuminative of possible intellects because of their illumination by the First.

63 Vide nota 53.

Ibidem, tome 1, no. 20, p. 31, Respondeo: In praesenti non est cognoscere Deum sine medio. Utrum autem in futuro possit cognosci sine medio aliquo, alias inquiretur.
CHAPTER II

Roger Bacon

Because philosophy is not alien to, but contained in, Divine Wisdom,\(^1\)

Roger Bacon attempts to harmonize the teachings of the saints with those of the philosophers. Difficulties in this endeavor arise as well from poor knowledge of Latin and Greek\(^2\) as from faulty and untrustworthy translations of Aristotle.\(^3\) Besides, the available texts of the Philosopher are few in comparison with the number he actually wrote,\(^4\) and there is a neglect of

---

\(^1\)Roger Bacon, *Opus Majus*, 2,3, vol. 1, p. 35: Quod autem philosophia non sit aliena a sapientia, sed in ipsa conclusa, manifestandum est.

\(^2\)Opus Tertium, 23, p. 73: Deinde agressus sum partem secundum, in qua ostendo quod una sola est sapientia perfecta, ab uno Deo data uni generi humano propter unum finem, scilicet vitam aeternam quae in sacris litteris tota continentur, per ius tamen canonicum et philosophicam explecanda. Nam quicquid est contrarium sapientiae Dei vel alienum, est erroreum et inane; nec potest humano genere valere.

\(^3\)Cf. Op. Ter., c. 23.


\(^5\)Ibidem., p. 473: Pauca quidem utilia habemus de philosophia in Latino. Nam Aristoteles fecit mille volumina, ut legitimus in vita sua, et non habemus nisi tria quantitatis notabilis; scilicet Logicalia, Naturalia, Metaphysicallia; ita quod omnes aliae scientiae, quas fecit, desunt Latinis, nisi quod aliquos tractatus et parvos libelllos habemus de allis scientiis; pauco valde...
such masters as Alexander Hale.\textsuperscript{5} The discrepant translation of Aristotle has caused present-day philosophers (those of the thirteenth century, for Bacon) to err seriously on the question of philosophical and theological importance - the nature of the agent intellect.\textsuperscript{6}

Since Bacon wants to establish a harmony between the teachings of the Saints and those of the philosophers, and since St. Augustine has given to the philosophers of his tradition a theory of knowledge having as its initial and concluding terms Divine Illumination, St. Augustine is important in Bacon's synthesis, - as Bacon's own words give testimony. It being impossible to give here anything resembling an even nearly adequate exposition of Augustine's theory, a brief summary of those points which concern the problem at hand will have to satisfy.

St. Augustine has given stress to the dignity and the nobility of the human soul by holding that between the soul and God, not even an angelic interposition is necessary. While it is true that the rational soul is not God, it is equally true that there is no creature closer to God:

"Quemadmodum fatendum est animam humanam non esse quod Deus est: ita praesumendum nihil inter omnia quae creavit, Deo esse propinquius."\textsuperscript{7} When the soul knows truth, it knows it because God enlightens the soul, just as the sun does our eyes. This does not mean that St. Augustine denies angelic

\textsuperscript{6} Op. Ter., 23, p. 75.
\textsuperscript{7} St. Augustine, De Quantitate Anima 34, 77 (PL 32,1077)
influence to the rational soul. Augustine has said that the angelic influence is similar to the opening of a window through which the sun is shining. But it is only in the uncreated Light and the eternal rules that the created spirit knows truth.

St. Augustine's search for truth is a search for God. His proof for the existence of truth becomes another proof for the existence of God. Truth is not the soul which knows it, nor is it inferior to the knower. It is greater than and above the mind comprehending. Since there can be nothing interposed between the human soul and God, truth must be God. Nearness to truth is nearness to God; nearness to God is nearness to truth.

The soul's relation to God is such an intimate one that the knowledge the soul has of truth must come directly from God Himself. All truth must have God as its source. Hence philosophic truth as well as truths of faith will be a manifestation of Him, Truth Itself.

---

8St. Augustine, En. in Ps. 118, 18, 4 (PL 37,1553): Deus itaque per seipsum, quia lux est, illuminat pias mentes ut ea quae divina dicitur vel ostenduntur, intelligent. Sed si ad hoc ministro utitur angelus, potest quidem aliquid agere angelus in mente hominis, ut capiat lucem Dei, et per hanc intelligat; sed ita dicitur intellectum dari homini, et quasi, ut ita dicam, intellectuare hominem, quemadmodum quisquam dicitur lucem dare domui, vel illuminare domum, cui fenestram facit; cum eam non sua luce penetret et illustret, sed tantummodo aditum quo penetretur et illustretur, aperiat.

9Ut supra.

10St. Augustine, De Lib. Arb. 2, 15, 39 (PL 32,1262): Tu autem concesseras, si quid supra mentes nostras esse monstrarem, Deum te esse confessurum, si adhuc nihil esse superius. Quam tuam concessionem accipiens dixeram satis esse, ut hoc demonstrarem. Si enim aliquid est excellentius, ille potius Deus est; si autem non est, iam ipsa veritas est.

Guided by this Augustinian tradition, Roger Bacon tried to solve the problem of the agent intellect. First he considers that the mistakes into which several teachers and philosophers of his own day have fallen serve as warning that the nature of the agent intellect is one about which grievous errors may center. The philosophers, Bacon says, speak of active and possible intellects. The possible intellect cannot of its unaided self acquire knowledge. Its knowledge, then, must be received through the agency of another.

It is in regard to what is known as the agent or acting intellect that many philosophers have made their mistakes. The agent intellect is that which reduces the possible intellect to an intellect in act. The possible intellect, as an intellect in act, is not the active intellect to which these philosophers have reference, for it is not to be supposed that the possible intellect in act is the acting intellect. The difference between the two intellects is well-marked. Bacon holds that the acting intellect is indeed that intellect which influences the possible intellect, by conferring upon it the light which it lacks of itself, the light whereby it actually attains to knowledge.

12 Opus Maj. 2, 5: anima vero humana dicitur ab eis possibilis, quia de se est impotens ad scientias.

13 Ibidem., Causae autem, quare sancti affirmant quod quaerimus et figuratum fuisse declarant, possunt assignari; prima propter hoc quod ubicumque invenitur, Christi indicatur secundum sententias et auctoritates superius allegatas. Idcirco quamvis aliquomodo veritas philosophiae dicatur esse eorum; ad hanc tamen habendam primo lux divina influxit in animos eorum et eosdem superillustravit; "Illuminat enim omnes homines venientem in hunc mundum," sicut dicit Scriptura; cui sententiae philosophi ipsi concordant. Nam ponunt intellectum agentem et possibilem; anima vero humana dicitur ab
Theologians, as well as philosophers, have made serious errors regarding the nature of the agent intellect by averring that the agent (acting) and the patient (possible) intellects are one in substance. This position holds that the agent intellect is part of the human soul; whereas Alfarabi, Avicenna and Aristotle all hold that the agent intellect is a substance, intellectual in nature, separated 'secundum esse et substantiam' from the possible. Indeed, all the greater philosophers have held this opinion. The errors made by others in this respect have been due, no doubt, to the faulty translations of the philosopher. However, a good and holy interpreter could manage to grasp the truth of the texts, because the text is not so faulty but that it could be correctly interpreted. Hence, the Christian interpreter is in a position to rectify and refute the false doctrines read into the texts of Aristotle.

Aristotle had begun with the postulate that in every operation there is something which exercises causality in the order of efficient cause, and something which receives that action. In every intellectual operation, eis possibilis, quia de se est impotens ad scientias et virtutes, et eas recipit aliunde. Intellectus agens dicitur, qui infulit in animas nostras illuminans ad scientiam et virtutem; quia licet intellectus possibilis sit dicit agens ab actu intelligendi, tamen sumendo intellectum agentem ut ipsi summunt, vocatur influens et illuminans possibilem ad cognitionem veritatis.


150p. *Ter.*, c. 23, p. 75: Nec est ita mala quin possit a bono et pio interprete satis de plano exponi, et probari per textum suum ibidem et alibi.
therefore, we must concede that there is something which is the efficient cause and something which is the recipient of the activity conferred by the efficient cause. When, then, the soul is enlightened, it must be granted that an agent outside the soul has conferred a spiritual light on it.\(^\text{16}\)

Bacon concedes that it is true that Aristotle did not in so many words say that 'since there is in every nature something which acts, and something which suffers, so it will be with the soul,'\(^\text{17}\) but Bacon does not allow that one may force the text to mean that both agent and patient principles will be in the soul.\(^\text{18}\) This is certainly not what the

16Ibidem., pp. 75-6: Volens igitur Aristoteles ostendere quod ad effectum scientiae et intellectus duo requirantur, agens scilicet, quod est illuminans, et materia patiens seu recipiens illuminationem, probat hoc per similis in omnibus. Nam in omni effectu et operatione duo requiruntur, efficiens et materia recipiens actionem efficientis; et non solum in naturalibus, sed in artificialibus, ut artifex ad materiam in quam operatur, et lux ad visum et colores videndos pro exemplo naturalis. Et cum in omnibus sic sit, erit ita a parte animae et in operatione intelligendi. Unde oportet quod anima humana sit nata recipere illuminationes ab agente, et quod aliquod agens in animam concedatur, qui illuminet eam per quoddam lumen spirituale, sicut lux solis visum.


18Ibidem: Et hoc concludunt quod agens et patiens erunt in anima, et quod sint duas partes animae; quod est impossibile et contra Aristotelem Ibidem.

Cf. Appendix A,
Philosopher meant, as his words and his examples show. All Aristotle intends to show is that in every operation, whether in natural or artificial things, acting and passive principles are needed, and when he says 'sic est in anima' he really means 'sic est in operatione animae.' That this is what he means is evident from the examples he uses to illustrate his meaning. The same relation applies to the soul as applies to the artist and his material, or as to light and colors. Clearly the carpenter is distinct by reason of his essence from the materials on which he works, and surely the sun is not the color which it illuminates. 19

Understanding the text of Aristotle as it should be, and supported in this interpretation by Avicenna, 20 whom he holds in high regard, 21 Bacon states that the active intellect is separated substantially from the possible. 22 This is not all that Bacon tells us of the nature of the agent intellect. This separated intellect is incorruptible as regards its being and its substance. In this it differs from the possible which is incorrupt-

19 Op. Ter. c. 23, p. 76: Nam exempla declarant quod non vult dicere nisi quod duo requiruntur ad operationem animae, sicut ad omnem operationem naturae et artis. Unde quod dicit 'sic est in anima' intendit quod sic est in operatione animae, secundum quod exemplificat dicens, 'ut artifex ad materiam,' et 'lux ad colores.' Certe carpentator est extra materiam secundum suam essentiam, et non sunt artifex et materia partes eiusdem rei, nec lux solis et color quem illuminat.


21 Ibidem, p. 78: Deo hic testimonia uni praeferuntur; et tamen Averroes non plane discernit contrarium, et Avicenna fuit major eo, et praecipuus imitator Aristotelis, et dux ac princeps philosophiae post eum.

ible as regards its substance, but not as regards its being, since it must suffer separation from its body. Aristotle has also said that the agent intellect is always in act, and this possible neither for the human soul nor the angel, but for God alone. The acting intellect is, therefore, God Himself.

The proof from authority may be considered by the advocate of scientific observation a weak one, but Bacon holds in high regard the aforementioned authority of Alpharabi and Avicenna and he now cites that of William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln. William, Bishop of Paris, assembled the university of Paris to reprove them, to dispute with them, and to disprove their tenet that the acting and passive factors were parts of the soul. Robert of Lincoln and Friar Adam Marsh hold and

---

23 Op. Maj. 2, 5, p. 39: Et Avicenna quinto de anima et decimo metaphysicis idem docet, necon ipse philosophus dicit, 'Quod intellectus agens est separatus a possibili et immittus.' Item vult quod intellectus agens sit incorruptibilis secundum esse et substantiam, quoniam dicit ipsum differre a possibili penes incorruptionem, sed possibilis est incorruptibilis secundum substantiam, et corruptibilis secundum esse, propter separationem ejus. Ergo agens secundum esse et substantiam erit incorruptibilis; qua propter non erit pars animae, quoniam tune secundum esse suum in corpore corrupetur, quando separatur; et dicit quod se habet ad possibilem sicut artifex ad materiam, et sicut lux solis ad colores.

24 Op. Ter. c. 23, p. 76: Et praeterea versus finem capituli docet quod intellectus agens est separatus a possibili secundum substantiam et secundum esse, et quod anima scit, et semper est in actu; et hoc non est creatura, sed solus Deus.


26 Ibidem: Et omnes sapientes antiqui, et qui ad huc remanserunt usque ad remanserunt usque ad tempora nostra, dixerunt quod fuit Deus.

26 Ibidem, pp. 74-5: Sed falsum est quod agens sit pars animae. Nam hoc est penitus impossible, sicut ibi ostendio per auctoritates et rationes sufficientes. Et omnes sapientes antiqui, et qui adhuc remanserunt usque ad tempora nostra, dixerunt quod fuit Deus. Unde bis venerabilem
establish this same position. In fact, the majority of philosophers hold that the acting intellect is separated by essence from the possible intellect.

Moreover, faith and reason may be adduced in support of this conclusion. St. Augustine says that in all its principal illuminations the rational soul is subjected to God. In the illumination of the human mind the angel may exercise some influence, but God is the principal influence. God is as the light of the sun shining through a window, while the angel is as one who opens the window. Principaliter God is the acting intellect, the source of light and truth; secundario the angel can be the agent intellect.

antistitem Parisiensis ecclesiae, dominum Guilleilmum Alvernensem congregata universitate coram eo, reprobare eos, et disputare cum eis; et probavit per aliquas rationes, quas ponimus, quod omnes errorerunt.

27 Ibidem. Dominus vero Robertus episcopus Lincolnensis, et Frater Adam de Marisco, majores clerici de mundo, et perfecti in sapientia divina et humana, hoc idem firmaverunt. Unde quando per tentionem et derisionem aliqui minores praesumptuos praequererunt a fratre Adam, "Quid est intellectus agens?" respondet, "Corvus Eliae"; volens per hoc dicere quod fuit Deus vel angelus. Sed noluit exprimere, quietans et non propter sapientiam quaesierunt.

28 Op. Maj. 2, 5: Et sic intellectus agens secundum majores philosophos non est pars animae, sed est substantia intellectiva allia et separata per essentiam ab intellectu possibili.

Since Bacon's position is that the intellectus agens is God, the intellectus possibilis must be the human soul, for it is the human soul which God illuminates. His premise reduces the whole of human individuality, of human personality, to the possible intellect. This position makes the human soul of itself impotent in the acquisition of its own knowledge. This conclusion is precisely stated when he says that the human soul "de se est impotens ad scientiae et virtutes," and "Intellectus agens illuminat possibilem et facit scire."

The possible intellect, identified as the human soul, born to receive illuminations from the agent, receives God-given truth, and knows only in the uncreated truth and eternal reasons. Even though the source of the truth known is divine, the intellectus possibilis, when it knows, knows naturally. If we consider the example Bacon gives of a young boy who is

Ibidem, p. 74: Et intellectus possibilis voactur qui est in potentia ad scientiam, et non habet eam de se; sed quando recipit species rerum et agens influit et illuminat ipsum, tunc nascitur scientia in eo; et hoc est verum.
31 Ut supra.
32 Communium Naturalium, p. 298.
33 See # 30.
34 Op. Ter. c.24, p. 79: Deinde probo tota sapientia philosophiae data est a Deo.
given his choice between two apples, we can see that the operation of this light leads to an easy and natural operation on the part of the possible intellect. The boy, he says, will take the nicer apple, because "sine difficultate et labore" he reasons that the nicer is the better, and what is better is to be chosen. Therefore, the nicer being the better apple, it is to be chosen. Just that easily and by means of argumentation, naturally the boy makes his choice. 37

We can see, then, Bacon's position on the question of the agent intellect of Aristotle and the Divine Illumination of St. Augustine. His position makes the two doctrines to mean the same thing. The agent intellect is God; Illumination is from God. Always the operation of the agent is on the possible. As was already noted, the possible intellect de se is not capable of knowledge. It receives the species of things, undergoes the action of the agent, and is illuminated by it. Thus it is that knowledge is born in the soul. 38

37Op. Ter. c. 28, p. 103: Ergo de necessitate puer arguit sic apud se: quod est pulchrius est melius; et quod est melius est magis eligendum: ergo pomum pulchrius est magis eligendum. Et tamen nescit quid vocetur argumentum; ex quo concludit auctor quod homo arguit a natura sine difficultate et labore. Et hoc patet per rationem: quia omnis homo reddit causas et rationes dictorum, et factorum suorum, et rerum aliarum, in quibus excitatus est. Sed hoc fieri non potest nisi per argumentum; quin argumentum facit fidem de re dubia per assignationem causae et rationis. Sed quod omnibus notum est, noscitur naturaliter. Quod enim omnibus individuis eiusdem speciei convenit, oportet, quod naturaliter eis conveniat: ut gemitus infirmorum, et latratus canum, et calefactio ignum; et sic de omnibus patet. Et Aristotles non dicit, ut patet quinto Ethicorum,10. (Underscoring ours.)

38Op. Ter. 23, p. 74: Nam omnes modern dicunt quod intellectus agens in animas nostras, et illuminans eas, est pars animae, ita quod in anima sunt duas partes, agens scilicet et possibilis; et intellectus possibilis vocatur qui est in potentia ad scientiam, et non habet de se; sed quando recipit
The human intellect, or possible intellect, receives its knowledge from without. It is acted upon and receives enlightenment from the agent intellect. "Anima vero humana dicitur ab eis possibilis, quia de se est impotens ad scientias et virtutes, et eas recipit aliunde. Intellectus agens dicitur qui influit in animas nostras illuminans ad scientiam et virtutem; quia licet intellectus possibilis dici agens ab actu intelligendi tamen sumendo intellectum agentem ut ipsi sumunt, vocatur influens et illuminans possibillem ad cognitionem veritatis." A statement very similar to this appears in the **Communium Naturalium**. The agent intellect is again represented as illuminating the agent intellect: "Intellectus agens illuminat possibilem et facit scire." Likewise in the **Opus Tertium** he says that the human soul is adapted to receive illuminations from the agent intellect: "anima humana sit nata recipere illuminationes ab agente."

In each statement Bacon's words reveal that he considered the operation of the agent intellect to be directly exercised on the possible. This is rather different from St. Thomas, for St. Thomas refers to the action of the agent intellect as an abstractive one, and one directing its efficacy to abstracting the universal from the singular as it is found in the phantasm. But this theory belongs to the 'moderns.' For Bacon, the soul does not make

---

40 **Communium Naturalium**, p. 298.
41 **Op. Ter.** 23, 75.
the universal. 43

The harmonizing of two metaphysics, not so much contrary to one another as they are different, has resulted in the assigning to the agent intellect a role unique in the acquiring of philosophic knowledge. And since God illuminates human souls in their knowing of the truths of philosophy, it is evident that their work is not alien to divine wisdom: "our igitur Deus illuminaverit animas eorum (i.e. humanorum) imperciendis veritatibus philosophiae, manifestum est quod eorum labor non est alienus a sapientia divina."

43Communium Naturalium, II, 3,8,10, p. 102: Vanissimum est dicere quod anima facit universale.
CHAPTER III

ST. BONAVENTURE

St. Bonaventure tried to surmount the difficulties presented to philosophers on the advent of Aristotelianism. His philosophy openly centered in God, because he is Augustinian in inclination as well as in tradition, is a defense up to the very end of the fundamental doctrines of the ancient school, and a disapproval of the innovations of St. Thomas. His philosophy, then is not so much a synthesis of tradition with novelty, as it is an attempt at a fuller explanation and a more complete expression of Augustinian thought.

As might be expected, St. Augustine figures largely in his writings, principally because Augustine has given to his disciples a theory of illumination and an explanation of the relations between the Creator and his creatures, which is in closer harmony to the answers which Bonaventure was seeking from philosophy than any other. Augustine stressed the doctrine that God illumines the soul of man. In this there is an emphasis on the

1Maurice De Wulf, Histoire de la Philosophie Medievale, p. 114: L'étude de Dieu est le centre de la philosophie Bonaventurienne; car il est Augustinien par inclination autant que par tradition.

2Ibidem: Bien qu'il ait défendu jusqu'à la fin les doctrines organiques de l'ancienne école et qu'il ait dénoncé les innovations de Thomas d'Aquin, il n'est pas engagé dans les polémiques véhémentes qu'elles suscitent.

dignity of the human soul, and there is a stronger emphasis, when we realize that Augustine said that between the soul and God there is no need of any other being, angelic or otherwise. This nearness of the soul to God has its implications and explications in the doctrine of how we know the truth. Truth is above the soul, independent of it, and greater than it. Now, there being nothing above the soul itself save God, Truth must be God Himself. In Augustinian thought, Truth is always a manifestation of God or God Himself. Truth being that, and the relation between God and the human soul being so close, the knowledge of truth to which the soul attains must be a knowledge coming from God. This is true of all truth, whether it be truth demanded by Christian dogma or by philosophy. All truth is known in the uncreated Light or in the Eternal Reasons.

How St. Bonaventure defended this tradition and yet coped with the prob-

4St. Augustine, De Quan. An. 34, 77 (PL 32, 1077): "Quamadmodum fatendum est animam humanam non esse quod Deus est: ita praesumendum nihil inter omnia quae creavit, Deo esse propinquius. Cf. De Vera Relig. c.55, n. 113; c. 44, n.92 (PL 34, 172 & 159) De Trin. XI, c.5, n.8 (PL 42, 990 sq.)

5St. Augustine, De Lib. Arb. 2,15,39 (PL 32,1262): Tu autem concesseras, si quid supra mentes nostras esse monstrarem, Deum te esse confessorem, si adhuc nihil esse superius. Quam tuam concessionem accipiens dixeram satis esse, ut hoc demonstrarem. Si enim aliquid est excellentius, ille potius Deus est; si autem non est, iam veritas est.


7Ibidem, En. in Ps. 118,18,4 (PL 37,1553): Deus itaque per seipsum, quia lux est, Illuminat pias mentes ut ea quae divina dicuntur vel ostenduntur, intellegant. Sed si ad hoc ministro utitur angelo, potest quidem aliquid agere angelus in mente hominis, ut capiat lucem Dei, et perhanc intelligat.
lems offered by Aristotelianism is given in his epistemology, and particularly in his doctrine on the agent intellect. Man, the creature composed of body and soul, is rational in virtue of the powers of his soul. That the body of man is a compositum is not questionable, but is the soul?8 The rational soul must be composed of matter, because it both moves and is moved.9 Some say that the rational soul has no matter, but that it is a simple spirit. Because we must admit that the rational soul can suffer, and act, and be changed from one property into another, it is not enough to say, as those who maintain that the soul is a simple spirit do, that the soul is a composite of quo est and quod est, but we must admit that there is in the rational soul a composition of matter and form.10 Then, as in the doctrine of Alexander, the human soul is not made from the substance of God.11

9 Ibidem, p.11: Conclusio: Anima rationalis habet materiam, cum intra se habeat movere, et moveri, fundamentumque existentiae retineat, et sic hoc aliquid.
10 Ibidem: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod circa hoc diversi diversa opinati sunt. Quidam enim dixerunt nulam animam, nec rationalem, nec brutalem, habere materiam, quia spiritus sunt simplices; animam tamen rationalem dixerunt habere compositionem ex quo est, et quod est, quia ipsa est hoc aliquid, et nata est per se et in se subsistere. Sed cum planum sit animam rationalem pati posse, et agere, et mutari ab una proprieitate in aliam, et in seipsa subsistere, non videtur quod illud sufficiat dicere, quod in ea sit tantum compositio ex quo est, et quod est, nisi adatur in ea esse compositio materiae et formae.
11 Ibidem, d.17,a.1.q.1, page 8: Conclusio: Anima human non est creatá ex Dei substantia.
Ibidem: Sed cum Deus nullius sit pars constitutiva propter suam summam perfectionem et absolutionem, positio haec fuit stulta et errone.
That the rational soul has a material and a formal principle is evident enough for Bonaventure, and his acceptance of the terms act and potency show that he was ready to reconcile opposing views. The meanings, however, given to those terms seem to vary. The terms have been applied to man's intellect, so that philosophers speak of an agent and a possible intellect. The Arabian philosophers say that the agent intellect is a separated substance and the possible intellect is the human soul joined to the body. This places the agent intellect in one substance and the possible in another. Some say that the human soul is enlightened by the tenth intelligence and that the agent intellect is a substance under God. But this is a false and erroneous opinion, for no created substance has the power of illuminating and perfecting the soul, properly understood. This position perils Augustine's doctrine that between the human soul and God nothing is interposed. The need of a separated intelligence would contradict this.

Others of these hold that the agent intellect is God Himself. They base their opinion on the words of St. Augustine and St. John. In several places Augustine has said that God is the Light which illuminates us, the Teacher Who instructs us, the Truth which directs us. John has written "erat lux

---


13Cf. St. Augustine, En. in Ps. cxviii, serm. xviii, (PL 37,1553).
They seem to argue that if it is God who illuminates us, why can't God be the active intellect, and thus the direct light of the human soul? Even though this might be true and consonant with Catholic faith, still there is given to the human soul a power proper to it, a power for knowing; just as to other creatures there is given power for other operations peculiar to them. So, although God is the principal agent in the activity of each creature, He gives to each an active power of its own through which it operates its own proper activity. To the rational being, therefore, God had given, not only a possible intellect, but also an acting one. It is not reasonable then to hold that the rational soul is the possible intellect only and that the agent intellect is a substance other than the soul. Each intellect is in the soul, one no less than the other.

St. Bonaventure acknowledges that these doctrines receive verbal support.

\[\text{St. John, I, 9.}\]

\[\text{II Sent. d. 24, p. 1, a. 2, q. 4, sub opin. 1 (tome 3): Alius modus intelligendi est, quod intellectus agens esset ipse Deus, intellectus vero possibilis esset noster animus; et iste modus dicendi super verba Augustini est fundatus, qui in pluribus loquis dixit et ostendit quod Lux quae nos illuminat, Magister qui nos docet, Veritas quae nos dirigat, Deus est, iuxta illud Joannis. Erat lux vera, quae illuminat omnem hominem, etc. Iste autem modus dicendi, etsi verum ponat et fidei Catholicae consonum, nihil tamen est ad propositum, quia cum animae nostrae data sit potestia ad intelligendum, sicut aliis creaturis data est potentia ad alias actus; sic Deus, quamvis sit principalis operans in operatione cujuslibet creaturarum, dedit tamen cuilibet vim activam, per quam exiret in operationem propriam; sic credendum est indubitanter quod humanae animae non tantummodo dederit intellectum possibilem, sed etiam agentem, ita quod uterque est aliquid ipsius animae.}\]
in the writings of St. Augustine and St. John, but he has made no admission that the doctrine expressed by the Arabians and that of St. Augustine and St. John are the same. Instead, he states simply his own position, granting that to the human soul there are two factors; one an active virtue, the other a passive one; and that if we seek a regress to the ultimate we may allow that God is the principal source of all operations.

As for the second doctrine which states that the material and formal principles are in the human soul: since the soul is a compound of matter and form it may be said that the agent intellect is a power of the formal part the soul, and the possible intellect a power of the material part of the soul. This position identifies the possible intellect with the soul's matter and the agent intellect with its form. This, for Bonaventure, is not a guarantee for harmony with truth. The material power, since it is purely passive and but the matter of the soul, could be in all things in which there is found a material principle. Pure receptivity and passivity would characterize the possible intellect. What happens then to the spontaneity of the human soul which St. Augustine has always recognized as belonging to the human soul? Further, such a potency, considered as matter and as purely passive receptivity, ought not to be called intellect.

16Cf. Alexander of Hales, c. 1, notae 34, 35, 36, 37.
17Loc. cit., p. 174: Secundum modus dicendi, quo scilicet dicitur quod different sicut duae potentiae, duplunci potest intelligi, ut uno modo false, alio modo vere. Unus modus intelligendi et dicendi est, quod intellectus possibilis sit potentia pure materialis, quae inest animae ex parte sae materiae; intellectus vero agens sit potentia pure formalis, quae inest animae ex parte sae formae. Et hic modus dixi videtur fundari super verba Philosophi, qui dicit quod intellectus possibilis est, quae est omnia fieri; intellectus agens, quod est omnia facere, sicut contingit in forma et
A second interpretation of the second doctrine is that the intellectus agens et possibilis are two different intellects bestowed on one substance. The agent is referred to as the form, and the possible as the matter, because the agent intellect is ordained to abstracting the species and the possible to receiving and taking them up unto itself. Now, the possible intellect is not purely passive (as matter would be); rather it has the power to turn to the phantasm, and with the help of the agent intellect to receive it. Neither is the agent intellect purely active, for it must receive help in order to understand things; that help comes from the species which is united to the intellect after being abstracted from the phantasm. In short, the possible intellect is not purely passive, for it has an operation and an initiative of its own; neither is the agent intellect purely active, for it receives some help from the species in understanding. Hence, the agent cannot know without the possible, nor the possible without the agent. One act of knowing requires for its completion the concurrent action of the two intellects. 18

materia reperire. Sed hic modus dicendi non consonat veritati: si enim intellectus possibilis esset potentia pure passiva, et se teneret ex parte materiae, in omnibus posset poni, in quibus est reperire materiale principium. praeterea, sicut oculus non dicitur visus, sic talis potentia non debet emi intellectus.

18 Ibidem, p. 175: Alius vero modus intelligendi est, ut dicitur quod intellectus agens et possibilis sint duas intellectus differentiae datae uni substantiae, quae respiciunt totum compositum. Appropriatur autem intellectus agens formae, et possibilis materiae, quae intellectus possibilis ordinatur ad suscipiendum; intellectus agens ordinatur abstrahendum: nec intellectus possibilis est pure passivius, habet enim supra speciem existentem in se phantasia se converta, et convertendo per auxilium intellectus agentis illam suscipere, et de ea judicare. Similiter nec intellectus agens est omnino in actu: non enim potest intelligere aluid a se, nisi
Bonaventure's position does not eliminate sense knowledge or extramental knowledge. It is, rather, an attempt to explain knowledge of things of the world, of the soul itself, and of what is above the soul, so that natural knowledge is protected and the natural operation of a knowing subject explains knowledge had in via. The terminology is Aristotelian, but the content is Augustinian. To fully determine his position let us consider the remaining possible interpretations of the factors of the rational soul.

It might be said that the agent and the possible intellects are one and the same intellect, differing only in comparison. This position is based upon the fact that the soul is agent, when considered in se, and possible when considered as united to the body, to phantasms, or to the phantasia. But this deviates from the truth, because the separated soul has an agent intellect, the possible. Therefore, the separated soul, despite the lack of the body, has an agent and a possible intellect. Conjunction to a body cannot, then, account for a possible intellect. 19

19 Ibidem, pp.175-6: Quartus autem modus assignandi differentiam inter possibilem et agentem, quo scilicet differunt sicut potentia absoluta et comparata, dupliciter habet intelligi. Uno modo, ut intelligatur quod una omino et eadem est potentia intellectus agens et possibilis, differens comparatione sola, ut agens sit prout est in se considerate, possibilis vero prout uniter corpori, et phantasmatis, vel phantasiae. Et hic modus dicendi videtur fundari super verba Philosophi, qui vult quod intellectus agens semper est in suo actu; possibilis vero aliquando sic, aliquando non. Quod enim anima lassetur, et perturbetur in actu intelligendi, hoc est ex conjunctione sui ad corpus. Sed hic modus ponendi deficit a veritate: quoniam anima separata habet intellectum quo est omnia facere, habet etiam intellectum quo est omnia fieri; ergo habet agentem et possibilem, etiam cum separata est; ergo intellectus possibilis non inerat ei solum ex conjunctione sui cum corpore.
Dependence on body, or anything associated with bodily conditions, such as phantasms, or phantasia, cannot be the reason for holding that there is a possible intellect. The interdependence and the interaction of one intellect with another is what is needed to explain this demand.

It is evident that Bonaventure has used in his explanation the same terms which St. Thomas Aquinas used in his, but instead of the special traits which St. Thomas saw for each intellect and according to which he distinguished them, Bonaventure sees that the two intellects are really two phases of the same operation, the operation of knowing. For Bonaventure, the agent intellect partakes of the passivity of the possible, and the possible partakes of the activity of the agent. Aristotle in the third book of his De Anima has said that the agent and the possible intellects are two different intellects, one which abstracts the species from the object, the agent; and the other the one which receives the species, the possible. This position, Bonaventure says, is true.20

If others want to interpret the doctrine of the agent intellect as meaning that our intellect has in itself an innate, habitual cognition of universals, they are not interpreting in a manner harmonious with the real meaning of the Philosopher. Aristotle has said that the soul is created as

20Ibidem, p. 175: Et iste modus dicendi versus est, et super verba Philosophi fundatus: dicit enim agentem et possibilern esse duas differentias intellectus; unde sicut duo intelligimus necessario in medio, ad hoc quod abstrahat species ab objecto, videlicet lucem et diaphaneitatem, ita quod per unum abstrahit, et per aliud defert et suscipit; sic et in pro- posite conformiter potest intelligi, ita ad unum actum hase duo concurrere, ut hoc sine illo non habeat operationem suam complete.
a tabula rasa, not that it has knowledge as an innate habit, but that it acquires knowledge in the medium of sense and experience.21

The third possibility might also mean that the intellectus agens differs from the intellectus possibilis as habit differs from power, not that the acting intellect is purely habit, but that it is a power with a habit (potentia habitualis). This is probable and is consonant with Catholic doctrine and the texts of philosophers. Dionysius says that intellectual substances are lights (lumina). Therefore, the perfection and the completion of the intellectual substance is spiritual light (lux). From this it is concluded that that power which belongs to the soul because of its intellect, is a certain light (lumen) in it. Therefore, the Psalmist says: Signatum est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine.22

21Ibidem: Et hic modus ponendi fundari videtur super verba Boetii, qui dicit quod summam retinens singula perdit; quod voluerunt aliqui intelligi sic: quod intellectus noster dicatur habere apud se cognitionem universalium habitualem innatam, aliquin non posset per virtutem suam, abstrahendo etiam a sensibus et a phantasmatibus, facere intellectum possibilem actu intelligentem: omne enim quod deducit alterum de potentia in actum, est ens in actu. Sed iste modus dicendi verbis Philosophi non consonat, qui dicit animam esse creatam sicut tabulam rasam, nec habere cognitionem habitum sibi innatum, sed acquirere mediante sensu et experi­entia.

22Ibidem, pp. 175-6: Alius modus dicendi est, ut dicatur intellectus agens differre a possibili, sicut habitus a potentia: non quia agens sit pure habitus, sed quia est potentia habitualis. Et iste modus dicendi probabilis est et verus, et super verba philosophica et catholica fundatus. Verum enim est secundum Dionysium, quod substantiae intellectualis, eo ipso quod intellectualis substantiae, lumina sunt: ergo perfectio et complementum substantiae intellectualis lux est spiritualis: igitur illa potentia, quae consequitur animam ex parte intellectus sui, quoddam lumen est in ipsa; de quo lumine potest intelligi illud Psalmi: Signatus est super nos lumen vultus tui, Domine.

Cf. Psalm, 4, 7.
This lumen the Philosopher seems to have known as the intellectus agens, Bonaventure thinks, for Aristotle says in De Anima III that that intellect to which action belongs is a certain habitus, such as light, for in some way light makes colors in potency to be colors in act. Just as the eye of a cat has not only the power of taking into itself the species through a light medium, but also the power of making the species in itself thru the nature of a light placed within it: so the intellect by its nature can take in the species or, by the power of the light naturally inserted in it, it may make the species in itself.23

This interchangable use of the terms lumen (an Augustinian term) and intellectus agens (an Aristotelian term) equates Augustinian illumination with Aristotelian abstraction. This interpretation, which makes the words of the Philosopher coincide with the words of the Psalmist is acceptable to Bonaventure. Accepting this position, Bonaventure assigns to the soul act and potency, both of which are proper to it. The soul's potency to know can be, and is, realized by the actual factor, the intellectus agens or lumen. Intellectual operations are operations within the soul and natural to the soul.

Because of creation, the rational soul is the image of God naturally.24

23Ibidem; Et hoc lumen videtur Philosophus intelleterisse esse intellectum agentem: dicit enim quod ille intellectus, quo est omnia facere, est sicut habitus quidam ut lumen: quodam enim modo lumen facit colores potentia, actu colores, sicut habetur in libro III de Anima. Hujus autem simile potest ponir in oculo cati, qui non solum habet potentiam suscipiendi in se speciem per naturam perspicui, sicut alii, sed eiam potentiam faciendi in se speciem per naturam luminis sibi inditi.
By its very nature it has acting and passive factors, which belong to it instrinsically, each of which needs the other for the completion of its own proper act. The words of Dionysius which would have us endowed with an intellect known as a lumen or created light, or Augustine’s words that we see in a light, and the words of Aristotle, assigning to the created mind an agent intellect, are taken to mean the same. To complete the solution to the problem of the agent intellect, we must see how that created light (agent intellect) operates under Divine Illumination, or how Divine Illumination operates on it.

The agent intellect in the rational soul is not God, because the spiritual Light which is God is most simple and is not able, therefore, to be the perfection of things of different natures. However, since God is almighty, He is able to produce and to make a created light which in some way conforms to Himself. This created light is not self-sufficient, even after it has been produced, for it needs the influence of the highest Light - the Light creative -. Thus, the human soul, which has its own proper light (a created light) in itself, by which it is completed, is both produced and conserved by the eternal Light.  

notandum est, quod quaedam est similitude per convenientiam omnimodam in natura, et sic una persona in Trinitate est alterius similis; quaedam, per participationem alicuius naturae universalis, sicut homo et asinus assimiliatur in animali; quaedam vero secundum proportionabilitatem, sicut nauta et auriga conveniunt secundum comparisonem ad illa quae regunt; quaedam est similitudo per convenientiam ordinis, sicut exemplatum assimilatur exemplari. Primus enim duobus modis nulla creatura potest Deo assimilari; secundis duobus modis omnis creatura assimilatur; sed illa, quae assimilatur magis de longinquo, habet rationem vestigii; illa vero quae de proximo, habet rationem imaginis: talis autem est creatura rationalis,
The relation of the created to Creator is expressed in the dependence of created on Creator, of light on Light. This dependence is found in knowledge of the truth to which the rational soul attains. St. Bonaventure tells us that it is God who illuminates us, that the lumen (created light) receives its light from the Lux (the uncreated light). Altho stated in general terms, one cannot but recognize that this illumination occurs in every activity of the created. Indeed, it is not just a concurring illumination; it is from creation a producing one, and from then on a conserving one. Thus, it is found in the chief activity of man, that of knowledge and intel lecting.

The human mind, naturally inclined to Truth, knows truth. This is the necessary and eternal truth. Now, when it knows with certitude, does it

25 Ibidem, d. 17, a.-l, q.l, (tome 2), pp. 9-10: Ad illud quod objicitur, quod Deus est lux spiritualis, dicendum quod non est simile de luce spirituali, et corporali omnino. Lux enim spiritualis quae Deus est, cum sit simplicissima, non potest esse perfectio rerum diversarum naturarum; cum autem sit omnipotentissima, potest producere et facere lucem creatam aliquo modo sibi conformem: quae tamen sibi non sufficit, etiam postquam producta est, nisi adsit ei summae lucis influentia. Et sic intelligendum est in ipsa anima humana, quod ipsa habet lucem propria, sicut creatam, per quam completur, quae a luce aeterna et producitur et conservatur.

26 In Hexameron, Sermon IV, (tome 9, Peltier, Ed) p. 50: Ergo veritas indicat, quod mens nostra fertur naturali inclinatione ad veritatem.
know in the light of the eternal truth itself? There are three ways to interpret the phrase "knowing in the eternal reasons". In one way it is said that the doctrine means that the eternal truths are the whole and sole 'ratio' of our knowledge of things. That would fail to distinguish between knowledge in via and knowledge in patria, knowledge in the proper genus and knowledge in the Word, science and wisdom, nature and grace, reason and revelation. This interpretation is not acceptable.

Another way would have it that 'knowing in the eternal reasons' means that a certain influence of the eternal reasons is exercised in the soul. This does not mean that the eternal reasons are in se attained to, but only that their influence in the soul is. This, however, is insufficient. It falls far short of the demands expressed in the words of Augustine, who insists that the soul is regulated by eternal reasons, which are above the soul, not in the soul. Therefore, to say that the soul, in knowing in the eternal reasons, does not go beyond an influence of the uncreated light is wrong.

27De Humanae Cognitionis Ratione Sancti Bonaventurae, Quarrachi ed., p. 49: Supposito, quod rationes aeternae sint realiter indistinctae in divina arte sive cognitione, quae est scutere, utrum quidquid scitur a nobis certitudinaliter, cognoscatur in ipsis rationibus aeternis.

28De Hum. Cog. Ration. p. 61: Ad praedictorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod omne quod cognoscitur certitudinaliter, cognoscitur in luce aeternarum rationum, hoc tripliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, ut intelligatur, quod ad certitudinalem cognitionem concurrerit lucis aeternae evidentia tanquam ratio cognoscendi tota et sola; et haec intelligentia est minus recta, pro eo quod secundum hoc nulla esset rerum cognitio nisi in Verbo, et tunc non differret cognitio viae a cognitione patriae, nec cognitio in Verbo a cognitione in proprio genere, nec cognitio scientiae a cognitione sapientiae, nec cognitio naturae a cognitione gratiae, nec
It might be mentioned here that although St. Bonaventure’s reason for rejecting this second interpretation of the doctrine is based on authority and is for that reason weak, and perhaps naive, he has reference to the Augustinian doctrine that between the human soul and its creator no other being intervenes, not even an influence of the Creator. 31 Refusal to accept even an influence is a strong manifestation of the dignity conceded to the...
rational soul in Augustinian-Franciscan philosophy.

If we consider an influence, we then ask, what might that influence be? Is it the general concursus which God gives to all creatures? If it is general then God is in no greater sense the giver of wisdom than He is the giver of fruitfulness to the land. If it is a special concursus, then it is grace. Hence, it follows that all knowledge is infused, and that there is no innate or acquired knowledge.32 This makes the position unacceptable to Bonaventure.

Between the positions which state that the eternal reasons are the whole and sole ratio of our knowing and that when we know in the eternal reasons we know in an influence of the eternal light, there is a via media. This position, though last to be treated, is not the least; it is the position which Bonaventure accepts. The via media states that in certain knowledge the eternal reasons are required as regulative and motive ratio, not, to be sure, as sole ratio in all its clarity, but along with the created ratio. The eternal reasons are known in part by us in this life.33

32Ibidem: Praeterea, illa lucis influentia aut est generalis, quantum Deus influit in omnibus creaturis, aut est specialis, sicut Deus influit per gratiam. Si est generalis; ergo Deus non magis debet dici dator sapientiae quam fecundator terrae; nec magis ab eo diceretur esse scientia, quam pecunia. Si specialis, cuiusmodi est in gratia; ergo secundum hoc omnis cognitione est infusa et nulla est acquisita vel innata: quae omnia sunt absurda.

33De Hum. Cog. Rat. pp. 62-3: Et ideo est tertius modus intelligendi, quasi medium tenens inter utramque viam, scilicet, quod ad certitudinalem cognitionem necessario requiritur ratio aeterna ut regulans et ratio motiva, non quidam ut sola et in sua omnimoda claritate, sed cum ratione creatae, et ut ex parte a nobis contuita secundum statum viae. Et hoc est quod Augustinus insinuat decimo quarto de Trinitate, capitolo decimo quinto: "Commemoratur impius, ut convertatur ad Dominum, tanquam ad eam lucem, qua etiam, cum ab illo averteretur, quodam modo tangebatur. Nam hinc est, quod et impii cogitant aeternitatem, et multa recte reprehendunt.
The nobility of knowledge and the dignity of the knower are such that they require the 'regulative and motive ratio' of the eternal reasons, that somehow the mind attain to the eternal laws and the incommunicable reasons. Certain knowledge demands immutability on the part of knowledge and infallibility on the part of the knower. The created truth is not immutable, nor is the created light infallible, since both were created and brought from non-being into being. Certain knowledge, requires, therefore, that there be a recourse to that truth in all ways immutable and stable, and to that Light in all ways infallible. Again, if we consider that things have being in the mind, in their own proper genus, and in the eternal art, and that of these three only the one in the eternal art is immutable, we will be led to conclude that certainty requires by its very nobility that we attain to the eternal reasons.

recteque laudant in hominum moribus.

34Ibidem, p. 63: Ubi et subdit, quod hoc faciunt per regulas, quae scriptae sunt in libro lucis illius, quae veritas dicitur. Quod autem mens nostra in certitudinali cognitione aliquo modo attingat illas regulas et incommutabiles rationes, requirit necessario nobilitas cognitionis et dignitas cognoscentis.

35Ibidem: p. 64. Nobilitas, inquam, cognitionis, quia cognitione certitudinalis esse non potest, nisi sit ex parte scibiliis immutabiltas, et infallibilis ex parte scientis. Veritas autem creata non est immutabilis simpliciter, sed ex suppositiones, similiiter nec lux creaturae est omnino infallibilis ex propria virtute, cum utraque sit creata et prodierit de non esse in esse. Si ergo ad plenam cognitioem fit recursus ad veritatem omnino immutabilem et stabilem, et ad lucem omnino infalliblem, necesse est, quod in huianmodi cognitione recurratur ad artem supernam ut ad lucem et veritatem: lucem, inquam, dantem infallibilitatem scienti, et veritatem dantem immutabilitatem sciibili. Unde cum res habeant esse in mente, et in proprio genere, et in aeterna arte, non sufficit ipsi animae ad certitudinalem scientiam veritas rerum, secundum quod esse habent in se, vel secundum quod esse habent in proprio genere, quia utroque sunt mutabiles, nisi aliquo modo attingat eae, in quantum sunt in arte aeterna.
The dignity of the knower points to this same conclusion. The rational spirit has a superior and an inferior part. The inferior is deliberative in actions. It is not self-sufficient, but requires the superior. The superior, or 'higher part of man' by which the rational spirit is the image of God, inheres in the eternal reasons. Through these men judges and defines in certain knowledge. This knowing with certainty and inherence belongs to the rational spirit by reason of its dignity and nobility as image of God.

From the mind of God, according to the exemplarism of the Divine Art, to the created object, to the mind knowing with certitude in the Eternal Laws, Truth makes its way. God, the origin of all that is, in the order of knower and of knowables, is needed to account for the certainty with which the human soul is imbued. The circle, the symbol of perfection, exemplifies the perfect circuit made by Truth in its egress from its center to its bounds, reaching the limits, but always remaining aloof from them; returning from them, but always being with them to maintain them in their limitedness.

36 Cf. St. Augustine, De Trin. XII, c. 12, n. 17 (PL 42, 1007); Ibidem, cc. 2 et 3 (PL 42, 999).

37 De Hum. Cog. Rat., p. 64: Ipsum etiam requirit dignitas ex parte scientis. Cum enim spiritus rationalis habeat superiorem portionem rationis et inferiorem, sicut ad plenum indicium rationis deliberativum in agendis, non sufficit portio inferior sine superiori: sic et ad plenum rationis indicium in speculandis. Haeo autem portio superior est illa, in qua est imago Dei, quae et aeternis regulis inhaerescit, et per eas, quidquid definit certitudinaliter, judica et definit; et hoc competit ei, in quantum est imago Dei.
And so the whole round world is every way Bound with gold chains about the feet of God.

Let us go to the truth of things which the created spirit attains to by means of the similitudes of the things abstracted from the phantasms. These similitudes are proper and distinct reasons (rationes) of knowing. Without these the created soul would not be sufficient in itself for knowing the light of the Eternal Reasons, even in this life. Truth, in things knowable with certainty and in beings knowing certitudinaliter, requires the Eternal Light. Knowing by means of similitudes abstracted from phantasms would not be sufficient for the soul in this life because the soul is the image of God. Even abstraction requires help from the Immutable and the Infallible. Reason shows this, and the Authority of Augustine expressly asserts that in all certain knowledge the eternal truths are attained.

Sense certitude comes from the fact that the operative power is naturally bound to a determinate object. Intellectual certitude cannot come

---

38 Ibidem, p. 65; Rursus, quia non ex se tota est anima imago, ideo cum his attingit rerum similitudines abstractas a phantasmato tanquam propias et distinctas cognoscendi rationes, sine quibus non sufficit sibi ad cognoscendum lumen rationis aeternae, quamdiu est in statu viae, nisi forte per specialem revelationem hunc statum transscenderet, sicut in his qui rapiuntur, et in aliquorum revelationibus Prophetarum.

39 Cf. St. Augustine, De Lib. Arb. II, cc. 9 et 10 (PL 32,1255); Ibidem, c.12, (PL 32,1259); De Trin. XIV, c. 15, (PL 42,1052)

40 De Hum. Cog. Rat., p. 65: Concedendum est igitur, sicut rationes ostendunt et Augustini auctoritates asservunt expresse, quod in omni certitudinali cognitione rationes illae cognoscendi a cognoscente attinguntur, licet aliter a viatore et aliter a comprehendente, aliter a sciente et aliter a sapiente, aliter a prophetante et aliter a committer intelligente, sicut iam patuit et patebit in obiectorum solutione.
in this way, since the intellectual power is free to know all. Moreover, intellectual certitude must come from something not having this natural alligation to a determinate object, but it must come through something having liberty without the defect of mutability and fallibility. Such freedom cannot come from the created mind, since by reason of its having been educed from nothingness it is not infallible or immutable. This can be found only in the ratio of the eternal reasons, for freedom from mutability and from fallibility is the 'ratio' of eternal Truth, to which the image must have recourse as to the fount of all certitude.  

To understand the inadequacy of the sensible abstractions let us consider the process of abstraction. The sensible species of the object present themselves to the sense organ. In this organ they are received as phantasms. Without interruption, the species as phantasm, is brought to the imagination. In this process, the corporeal power is as a passive power, while the imagination is as an active one. That kind of abstraction found in the imagination does not rise above that abstraction found in the particular sense. When the species (now intelligible) comes to the intellect a new

---

41 Ibidem, pp. 66-7, ad 11: Ad illud quod obicitur de sensu, dicendum, quod non est simile de certitudine sensus et intellectus. Certitudo enim sensus venit ex alligatione potentiae operantis per modum naturae circa aliquid determinatae. Certitudo autem intellectus non potest venire ex hac parte, cum sit potentia libera ad intelligendum omnia; et ideo oportet, quod veniat per aliquid non habens alligationem, sed libertatem sine defectibilitate mutabilitatis et fallibilitatis; et talis est lux et ratio sempiternae veritatis: et ideo ad illam recurritur ad fontem omnis certitudinis.
kind of abstraction is there required, and that is a new kind of light. It is true that the sense and the imagination are themselves powers, passive and actual, but they are not the powers of the intellect. The intellect needs more an active power distinct from the possible than imagination or sense need an active power. This is an account of the rational soul's gaining of knowledge (scientia) of a thing. And it is correct as far as it goes and as it is explained by the Philosopher. But it is not an account of the ultimate and universal truth which the soul reaches. The ultimate and universal is explainable only if the Eternal Rules regulate and move—only if the Eternal Light illuminates.

Such is the part the Eternal Verities play in all knowledge that is certain. Regulative and motive cooperation, even, in via, must be had. It should be noted that the Eternal Light does not account for the operation and the activities of the human soul, for the soul may turn either to or from God. But the eternal light does account for the truth known, the reason why it is attained, and how it is reached.

42 In II Sent., d. 24, p. 1, a. 1, q. 4, ad 2 (tome 3) pp. 176-7: Ad illud quod obicitur de imaginatione, quod non differt potentia activa et passiva, dici potest quod magis differt, quam in intellectu, quia organum corporali, in quo recipiuntur phantasmata est ei loco potentiae passivae; ipsa vero vis imaginaria est loco potentiae activae. Aliter potest dici, quod non est simile, quia cum species defertur a sensu usque ad imaginationem, non exit genus abstractionis, quae quidem fuit in sensu particulari: sed cum species pervenit ad intellectum, novum genus abstracionis ibi exigitur, et alium genus luminis: ideo magis indiget potentia activa distincta a possibili ipse intellectus, quam imaginatio vel sensu.

43Cf. I Sent. 16, un. 2, fund. 1, (tome 1).
St. Bonaventure has developed the doctrine of Augustinian illumination so that he has retained for the knowing creature, its own proper natural activity and its dignity and nobility as image of God. At the same time he has demanded that the creative, providential, conservative and illuminative power of God be exercised on the creature. Divine illumination functions somehow; quemadmodo, attaining to the divine reasons. No intermediary being allowed, it is hard to explain how the creature operates naturally. Is the cooperation perfect or imperfect? All that can be gleaned is that the cooperation and the attainment is as perfect and as direct in this life as it can be.

Considering knowledge as Truth, as does St. Bonaventure, what must we say is the principal course of man's knowledge? Is it the object presented by way of species to the intellect, or by the light of the acting intellect, or by the uncreated Light? It seems that it must be said that Truth is in the mind as an effect of the divine Light, and that the Eternal Reasons are the cause, ultimately, of the knowledge had. The object is cause only insofar as the eternal Light is the source of its truth; the created light is cause, but it is cause only insofar as the Eternal Light is the source of all light.

Bonaventure's treatment of the agent intellect makes the created agent intellect just so powerful in its own right that the efficacy of the Divine Light in human understanding is hard to determine. On the other hand, Divine Illumination is so necessary that the rational soul cannot exercise its cognitive powers to attain certitude without help from God. To the acting in-
The intellect he has assigned abstraction of species, but this function is not sufficient to explain certitude. The formal necessity of Truth requires that the intellect be guided and controlled by the principle of eternal Truth. The activity of the agent intellect is thus once limited and unlimited in its proper activity of abstraction, for it receives knowledge of sensible things in the fashion of limitation implicit in all created beings, and yet it reaches to certain knowledge in the unlimited eternal light. Again, it is limited, because it must depend upon the possible intellect, so much so that it cannot be said that it abstracts, if the possible can not be said to receive the species. While then, we may call the agent and the possible intellect two different intellects, we must remember that the concurrent action of the two is necessary for one act of knowing. Unity of knowledge seems to demand that. We must also remember that, although we have examined their activities as being separate from one another, they are not separate, but are really two phases of one operation. Interdependent action characterizes the activities of the two.

The created light which Bonaventure thinks Aristotle knew as an agent intellect cannot achieve perfect knowledge, even though the human spirit by its nature is endowed with faculties proper to the activity of knowing. Humblest human knowledge, howsoever fragmentary, needs, by reason of its dignity and its nobility, the immutable object and infallible knowledge.

44 Vide notae 18 et 20.
45 Vide nota 20.
46 Vide notae 18 et 20.
47 Vide nota 27.
Truth itself. It is this necessity which defies us to define the content of intellectual knowledge, and it is this which presents us with difficulty when we try to define, or adequately describe, the role of the agent intellect in Bonaventure's epistemology.

The agent intellect is used by Bonaventure to explain how the human spirit reaches knowledge by the efficacy of its own nature, for by reason of its nature as image of God it has a cognitive, efficient power. However, because the truth which it attains is above it, and greater than it; and because no intervention between God and His creatures is possible, the soul knows Truth only because it attains to it, that is, it goes above itself in some way. It is noted that at the moment Bonaventure explains the natural efficiency of the creature, he has no more to do with a division of intellects; he no longer considers the human spirit as being endowed with an intellectus agens et possibilis, but from then on considers only the human mind, the anima humana, the human spirit. The role of the agent intellect seems to be a role symbolizing the activity natural to an image of God; and that is all.
CHAPTER IV

John Peckham

John Peckham's philosophic texts prove that he is fervent for Augustinian tradition.¹ This simple historical fact allies Peckham with others of his time, the medieval Augustinians, who adhere to Christian tradition. He brings 'back 'en bloc' current Augustinian ideas for all those who concern themselves with metaphysics and natural philosophy.² His psychology follows closely that of St. Bonaventure.³ These preliminary notes make unnecessary a restatement of the Augustinian principles which Peckham, St. Bonaventure, and others who follow in the same Augustinian tradition have held.

Before stating his own position Peckham gives in the manner of his day, the positions which he deems worthy of consideration and refutation. Opinions, many of which are erroneous, have been offered for our consideration by the philosophers.⁴ One of these opinions holds that there is one agent

¹Maurice De Wulf, loc. cit., p. 222: Les textes philosophique édités prouvent que Pecham un adepte fervent de la scholastic traditionelle.
²Ibidem, p. 223: De mêm, il reprend en bloc les idees augustiniennes courantes pour toute ce qui concerne la metaphysique et la philosohie de la nature.
³Ibidem; La psychologie de Pecham serre de près celle de Bonaventure.
⁴John Peckham, Quaestiones tractantes de anima, Beitrage, XIX, 5-6, 1918, edited by P. Hieronymus Spettmann, O.F.M., Quaestio V, Respondeo, line 15, p. 65: Sciiendum (est) quod in ista quaeotione plures reperiuntur errores philosophorum. (Hereafter references to Peckham's work will be indicated by Quaestio.)
intellect for all, an agent intellect which cannot be united to us except by the material intellect. Aristotle had said that the agent intellect knows all actually. These men interpret him as follows: The material intellect is called the possible, and is the one which at times knows and at other times does not. Now, it does not both know and not-know unless it is considered with reference to individual things. But as regards the consideration of species, it always knows the same. Hence, when the acting intellect is considered as regards some one individual, there is at times understanding, but at other times there isn't. But absolutely, the acting intellect always knows. This is the position of Averroes. 

This position is not tenable for Peckham. He maintains that material intellects, that is possible intellects, are numbered according to the number of individuals. This dismisses the possibility of one material intellect for all. Now, if the acting intellect does not always know in act as regards this individual, Peckham asks, in what way might the acting intellect become intellecting in act as regards that individual? To answer this question

5Ibidem, lines 16-27: Fuerunt enim quidam ponentes intellectum possibilem esse unum in omnibus secundum numerum, nec ipse solum sed etiam intellectum agentem, qui non copulatur nobis nisi per intellectum materialem, ut dicunt hunc esse unum. Et quod dicit Philosophus eum intelligere omnia in actu; exponunt possibilis (et qui) intelligit quandoque et quandoque non intelligit, (hoc non facit) nisi respectu individuorum singularum; simpliciter autem in respectu speciei semper intelligit hic idem. Similiter dicunt de intellectu agente, quod respectu unius individui aliquius inventur quandoque intellectus et quandoque non. Sed semper inventur intelligere, cum acceptus fuit simpliciter. Idem enim est modus in actione duorum intellectuum. Haec Averroes.
we would have to grant either another agent intellect, as regards this and other individuals, know continuously and always.\(^6\)

Others have held that the possible intellect is immaterial. Consequently, since it is substantially free of all matter, it is not the esse of a particular being. Therefore, it is not the perfection of man in the same way that the sensitive soul is the perfection of man, but equivocally.\(^7\) The basis of this doctrine is destroyed by the fact that although the possible intellect is free of corporeal matter, it is not free of spiritual intelligible matter.\(^8\) This is what Augustine has said in *Contra Manichaeum*.\(^9\) The possible intellect is, therefore, immaterial through the exclusion of transmutable matter; but it has something similar to matter through which it is a 'this', by which there is a principle of individuation in separated sub-

\(^6\)Ibidem, lines 28-33: Sed ista posito in praecedenti reprobata est, ubi ostensum est quod numerantur intellectus materiales (secundum) numerum individuorum. Amplius: Si intellectus agens non semper intelligat in actu respectu huius individui, quaero qualiter fiat actu intelligens respectu eius? Et erit dare agentem alium aut necesse est primum respectu huius et aliorum intelligere continue et semper.

\(^7\)Ibidem, Quaestio IV, lines 23-6, p. 49: Primo dico fundamentum sumsit in substantia intellectus possibility ponendo intellectum possibilem immateriali et per consequens ab omni materia substantialiter absolutum et per consequens non esse aliquid entium particularium et per consequens non esse perfectionem hominis eodem modo quo anima sensitiva sed aequivoce.

\(^8\)Ibidem, lines 27-28: Hoc igitur primum fundamentum multipliciter eluditeur, tum quia quamvis careat materia corporali privata, non tamen materia spirituali intelligibili.

\(^9\)Cf. St. Augustine, *Contra Manichaeum*, I,6 (PL 34,178, n. 10)
stances.  

It cannot, therefore, be held that the possible intellect is absolutely immaterial. On the contrary, it must be admitted that it has in it something similar to matter. Even the Commentator has admitted that the intelligible has something similar to matter and something similar to form. As he says that in some way the sensible is divided into matter and form, so it is necessary that the intelligible be divided into parts similar to those two (i.e. to matter and form). This being so, there is no need or reason for holding that there is one intellect, possible or agent, for all men. Indeed, the need of matter and form, the principles of individuation, in the intelligible as well as the sensible, demands more than one intellect for all men.

Avicenna and his followers have held that there is one created agent intellect for all. In a similar manner Avicenna has held that the soul of the world influences all human souls. Thus, since it influences all human souls in the act of knowing, it is separated intelligence. It is impossible

10 Quaestio IV, lines 3-5, p. 50: Ergo est immaterialis per exclusionem materiae transmutabilis, sed habet aliquid simile ipsi materiae, per quam est hoc, per quam est distinctio naturalis in substantiis separatis, ut ipse dicit.

11 Ibidem, lines 32-5, p. 49: Et ipse etiam Commentator fatetur, quod habet aliquid simile materiae et aliquid simile formae, sicut dicit quamadmodum sensibile esse oportet dividii in consimilia his duobua, scilicet aliquid simile formae et aliquid simile materiae.

12 Ibidem, lines 1-2, p. 51: Amplius nec materia est tota causa individuationis, cum materia ponatur una in multis; sed complementum individuationis est a forma.
that any separated or conjoined substance, (even if it existed), influence all intellects, or even two different ones. Thus, if it is the agent as regards one, it cannot at the same time be the agent as regards another.\textsuperscript{13}

On the strength of this argumentation, Peckham rejects the second position.

The third position is that which holds that there are individual agent intellects, in the light of which the many see. These holding this position say that one power of the soul is an acting intellect (which is the soul’s active part); and another (which is as the material part of the soul) is the possible intellect.\textsuperscript{14} They adhere to this because Aristotle has said that in everything there is that which is in potency, and like to matter; and that which is cause and agent, and like to form. But contrary to this in-

\textsuperscript{13} Quaestio V, lines 33-41, p. 65 to p. 65, lines 1-2: Alii fuerunt - sicut Avicenna et sui - ponentes pluralitatem intellectuum materialium, sed intellectum agentem esse unum et creatum. Iuxta quod ponit Avicenna animam mundi influere super omnes animas humanas, docens VI Naturalium: "Addiscere non est nisi inquirere perfectum aptitudinem coniugendi se intelligentiae agenti, quousque fiat ex ea intellectus." Sed quia substantiae separatae nihil agunt nisi per intentionem, impossibile est eas cognitione naturali simul pluribus intendere. Impossibile est aliquam substantiam separatam vel coniunctam, si esset super omnes, immo nec super duos diversos cadere. Item, angelus adest, ubi operatur. Et ista si esset agens (respectu unius), non posset simul esse agens respectu alterius.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibidem, lines 3-9, p. 66: Ideo terto modo sunt ponentes quod singuli intellectus agentes, in quorum lumine vident singuli et multi. Et isti dicunt potentiam animae esse intellectum agentem, partem scilicet eius activam, partem autem eius quasi materiam eius esse intellectum possibilem. Et hoc est quod dicunt Philosophum dicentum, quoniam sicut in unoquaque est aliquid quod est potentia et quasi materia et aliud quod est causa et agens.
terpretation of the Philosopher are his own words which state that the agent and the matter are never in the same thing. 15

From this it follows that the agent intellect is to the material intellect as art to its material and as the mover to the moved. It is impossible, therefore, that this agent intellect of which the Philosopher speaks, be a part of the soul, since it is, as the Philosopher himself has said, abstract, unmixed, and impassible. In its own substance it is activity and knowledge in act. It does not at all times know and at others not-know. Were it to be said that the soul does have the active faculty as one part of itself and the passive as another, it would at the same time have all knowledge because of the acting intellect and all ignorance because of the passive. And since knowledge issues from the conjunct of soul and body, (for even greater reason will there be no knowing in the soul according to one part, since not knowing is not there as regards the other part.) Hence, it is impossible that any natural light, that is any created individual agent intellect

15 Cf. Aristotle, De Generatione Animalium, I, 21, 729b9-12 (McKeon edition of Basic Works of Aristotle, p.676): For, if we consider the question on general grounds, we find that, whenever one thing is made from two of which one is active and the other passive, the active agent does not exist in that which is made; and, still more generally, the same thing applies when one thing moves and another is moved; the moving thing does not exist in that which is moved.

Quaestio V, lines 9-10, p.66: Sed contra: agens et materia nunquam coincidunt in idem numero secundum Philosophum.
could give to the human intellect the act of knowing.\textsuperscript{16}

There is a fourth position which says that God perfects every human intellect and constitutes it in the act of knowing, not \textit{per se} but by some created light.\textsuperscript{17} To prove this position its advocates quote St. Augustine who said that the mind sees in an incorporeal light of its own genus.\textsuperscript{18} But to say that the soul sees in an incorporeal light of its own genus is to say that it sees in a created light. However we must note that such light is called a light of its own genus, only in the sense that it is spiritual. But the Light and the Reasons in which all things are seen are incommutable and eternal.\textsuperscript{19} Wherefore, Augustine has said that is not my truth nor your

\textsuperscript{16}Ibidem, lines 11-26: Item sequitur quod agens se habet ad intellectum materialem sicut ars ad materiam et sicut movens ad motum, immo sicut lux ad diaphanum secundum Commentatorem. Nulla autem forma se habet ut artifex respectu materiae suae. Impossibile ergo est intellectum agentem, de quo loquitur Philosophus, esse partem animae, cum sit - ut ipse dicit abstractus, immixtus neque possibilis et est in sua substantia actio et scientia in actu atque (idem) est cum re, neque intelligit quandoque et non intelligit etc. Est ergo in anima intellectus hic agens sicut motum in moto, cum tamen ipsa anima habeat aliquid activum, sed non aliquid, de quo verae sunt praedictae proprietates. Quod si esset, esserem simul omnia scientes secundum unam partem et omnia nescientes secundum aliam partem. Quod est impossibile. Cum enim intelligere sit coniuncti ex anima et corpore, multo magis nullum erit intelligere animae secundum unam partem, quod non sit ei scire secundum aliam. Impossibile (ergo) est Luciferiam naturalem posse intellectum humanum constituere in actu intelligendi.

\textsuperscript{17}Ibidem, lines 27-9: Ideo est quarta positio dicens quod Deus perficit omnem intellectum et in actu constitutus intelligendi non per se, sed per aliquod lumen creatum.

\textsuperscript{18}Ibidem, lines 29-34: Quod etiam probare se credunt per verbum Augustini dicens 'Credendum est, inquit, mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse naturam, ut rebus intelligentibus naturali ordine disponente tota mente sio ista videa in quandam sui luce generis incorporeas, quemadmodum oculus carnis videt quae in hac corporea luce circumadiacent.' Haece Augustinus. Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, c. 15,n.24 (PL42,1011).

\textsuperscript{19}Quaestio V, p.66,lines 34-9: Dicas quod anima videt in luce generis ergo in
truth, but the incommutable truth in which all things are known, so that it is as a private and public light. It is secret by reason of the object, and public as the ratio of knowing. Having considered the possible positions which one could adopt, Peckham concludes that it is not by means of either a created light or lights, or by means of an intellect or intellects that the human soul knows intellectually. The human intellect knows in the uncreated light itself. Intellectual activity is then made to be dependent upon God. Peckham, backed by the authority of Augustine and Anselm, is not perturbed by this conclusion, and decisively adds "omnis operatio est a Deo." This operation

luce creatae. Sed quod lux sui generis appellatur, non dictur (nisi) quia spiritualis est. Sicut patet ex praecedent capitulio, ubi dictur quod illa lux et rationes, in qua omnia videntur, incommutabiles sunt et sempiternae. 20


Anselmus: De Concord. Prae. et Praed., c. 7 (PL 158, 517): Quicquid aliquam habet essentiam, a Deo est"; De Conceptu Virg., c. 5 (PL 158, 438).
coming from God is the perfection of the act and the doer.²⁴ Such human operations as sensing and moving are from God as an efficient power only;²⁵ whereas intellectual operations depend on Him as the light which enlightens.²⁶

Does this mean that by sole reason of the illuminating power of God the human soul knows? It seems not, for Peckham has said that knowing demands something on the part of the rational soul which is apt to know truth, and something on the part of the incommunicable light.²⁷ Recognizing that the soul in itself has something of the nature of an agent intellect Peckham does allow that the agent intellect, as it is part of the soul, moves the other part, (that is the passive part or the intellectus possibilis). This movement is not a direct attainment of truth but it is a movement by which the possible intellect is transformed into the similitude of all things, and brought to the light. The activity here ascribed to the rational soul requires for its completion an agent and a possible intellect. Intellectual

²⁴Quaestio V, lines 9-15, p. 67: Ad cuius intelligentiam notandum quod omnis operatio est a Deo. Et operatio est perfectio operationis vel operantis. Sed quaedam est perfectio operantis in esse primo, quaedam in esse secundo intra terminos naturae. Iuxta quod perfectio hominis dicitur esse consideratio veritatis. Quaedam autem est perfectio in esse secundo supra terminos naturae. Et ita convenit in ordine efficienti ad finem supernaturalem per directionem bonitatis.

²⁵Ibidem, lines 14-5: Igitur primi generis operationes humanae sicut motus et sensus, sunt a Deo secundum rationem potentiae efficientis tantum, rationem non tantum potentiae efficientis, sed secundum rationem lucis refugentis.

²⁶Ibidem, lines 20-1: Operatio autem intellectualis est ab ipso secundum rationem non tantum potentiae efficientis, sed secundum rationem lucis refugentis.

²⁷Ibidem, p. 68, lines 3-8: Ratio autem huius quod principaliter intenditur est quod intelligere non illustretur solum ab illa luce, (sed) sumitur aliquid a parte etiam naturae animae rationalis, a parte etiam ipsius lucis incommutabilis, a parte inquam animae rationalis, quae nata est ad cognitionem veritatis. Quaestio VI, p. 75, ad 4: Ad quartum dicendum quod intellectus agens,
activity cannot terminate in this activity exercised by the soul; for as Peckham maintains, the rational soul (which is rational because it attains truth) reaches a certitude accountable for only by an incommutable light, a first and eternal reason.

Augustine has spoken of superior and inferior reason. Let us consider whether this is the agent and the possible intellect of which Aristotle has spoken. The agent intellect of which the Philosopher speaks is not a part of the soul; it is God, the light of every mind, the light in which all is known. Of Him alone can those properties, of which the Philosopher speaks, be predicated. God only is unmixed, impassible, and always knowing. Of Him alone can it be said that His substance is His action.

secundum quod est pars animae, non dirigit aliter quam, ut dictum est, transformando intellectum possibilem in similitudinem rerum intelligibilium et movendo ipsum ut applicetur lumini. Illarum igitur rerum conceptio est intellectus possibleis. Et hoc secundum vim passivam. Illustratio autem earum est secundum vim activam agentis, partim creati, partim increati.

28Ut supra.
29Ibidem, line 8: Quia hoc est rationale, quod poest test veritatem cognoscere.
30Ibidem, Quaestio V, p. 61, Argum 5: Item, si ratio est creatae, secundum quam iudicatur esse, sicut debet, quaero de ratione ista: Quae, per quam alia videtur esse recta? Aut enim per se est recta - et tunc increata; aut ex alio videtur recta - et tunc aut ibitur in infinitum, aut pervenientur ad primam et aeternam rationem, per quam et in qua omnis rectitudo videtur.
31Ibidem, p. 73, Respondeo: Dico quod divisio intellectus per agentem et possibilem et rationis per superiorem et inferiorem, quamvis sit divisio eiusdem, non tamen per differentias eiusdem generis et rationis. Intellectualis siquidem agens, de quo Philosophus loquitur, non est usquequaque pars animae, sed Deus est, sicut credo, qui est lux omnium mentium, a quo est omne intelligere. Ipse enim solus est, cui conveniunt omnes proprietates illae nobiles, de quibus loquitur Philosophus. Quia est immixtus, impassibilis et semper omnia intelligens, cuius substantia est sua actio.
The agent intellect of which Aristotle speaks and which Peckham says is God, cannot (because it is not entirely part of the soul) be the superior reason of which St. Augustine has spoken.

Other considerations on the agent intellect will lead to this same conclusion. According to all wise men the agent intellect is not united with higher or lower things except by the possible intellect. Contrarily, the possible intellect does not move itself, so that it is not turned to the higher light except by the agent intellect. The Commentator has said that the proportion of the agent intellect to the possible is a proportion of the mover to the matter moved. Further, the Commentator has said that the material intellect can be perfected by material forms. But it is more befitting its dignity that it be perfected by non-material forms, by illumination descending from a higher light. For these reasons, Peckham says, it must be granted that the intellectus agens is not the same as superior reason, but that it is itself an active power which perfects both reasons. The material intellect is said to be the possibility (potentiality) of either reason.


33 Ibidem, Quaestio VI, lines 15-16: Intellectus autem possibilis natus est utroque, et a superiori et ab inferiori, illustrari. Unde Commentator: 'Intellectus materialis natus est perfici per formas materiales. Sed dignior est, ut est natus perfici per formas non materiales, i.e., certe
This then is the interpretation which we are to give to the words of St. Augustine: The illuminating light of which he speaks is the uncreated eternal light, and that uncreated light is the separated agent intellect. The uncreated agent intellect is the perfection of superior reason only as it is the object of that reason. The created agent intellect has a certain light, but that light resembles an active power (vim activam) while the higher reason, as apprehending the uncreated light, is as a passive power (vim eius passivam). This is to say that inasmuch as the soul has its own natural light, it has a certain active power proper to itself. But higher reason, as power apprehending the uncreated light which is its object, is really a passive power, because the activity in this case belongs to God and the passivity to the higher reason apprehending. It should be noted that although activity is not posited of higher reason in this case, pure passivity is not either. The passivity is rather a passive power. Hence it cannot follow that the superior and the lower reasons of which Augustine has spoken are the same as the acting and possible intellect of which the Philosopher has spoken.35

Peckham has determined that the Aristotelian division into possible and

per illuminationes a superiori lumine descentes.

34Ibidem, lines 18-20: Concendum igitur quod non est idem intellectus agens cum ratione superiori. Sed est ipsa vis activa, quae perficit utramque rationem. Et intellectus materialis dicit utriusque rationis possibilitatem.

35Ibidem, ad 2: Ad secundum (dicendum) quod lumen illud, de quo Augustinus loquitur, est lumen aeternum increatum. Quod non est rationis superioris perfectio nisi sicut objectum. Et istud lumen increatum est intellectus agens separatus. Unde non sequitur quod sit idem ratio superior quod agens. Amplius: Intellectus agens creatus aliquod lumen habet. Sed illud
agent intellect is sufficient to explain intellectual activities. Inasmuch as the role assigned to the agent intellect is that of illuminating the possible intellect, we may consider the agent intellect as either part of the rational soul or as God Himself, "the true Light which enlighteneth every man." As pars animae, the agent intellect moves the possible, not so that the rational soul knows truth, but so that the possible intellect is transformed into the similitudes of intelligibles and so that it is brought in contact with the eternal light. Its function stops there. Inasmuch as the agent intellect is God, it completes and perfects the insufficient operation flowing from the activity exercised by the created agent intellect. It is only after the Uncreated completes and perfects the action begun by the created that the rational soul knows.

Now we ask whether the eternal light is the reason for knowing whatever is intellectually known in via. Augustine holds that all things are seen in the eternal light. Some have interpreted this to mean that all are seen in a light of the agent intellect, which is a likeness of the eternal light. This, however, is contrary to what Augustine has said in the De Libero Arbitrio, II, 9. There he shows that this light is one, and is not a part of the nature of the intellect which understands. In several other

respicit vim activam; ratio autem superior, ut apprehendens, vim eius passivam. Unde non sequitur.


37 Ibidem, p. 180: Dicunt aliqui, quod verbum Augustini, quod dicit, omnia videri in luce aeterna, intelligendum est sic: id est in luce intellectus agentis, quae est expressa similitudo lucis aeternae. Contra:
places Augustine has shown the divine character of the source of our understanding and knowing. 38

Peckham maintains that in all intellectual knowledge the uncreated light is someway attained. 39 It is the ratio of knowledge after the fashion of a light which gives illumination in all certain knowledge. God by reason of his immediate power is the immediate cause of the natural operation of every agent. By reason of His goodness, He is the cause of every meritorious act as such; and so, too, as light and wisdom, He is the cause of every intellectual act and every operation of truth. God induces into every operative power the being of the operation; into knowledge its evidence and certitude; and into the rational will, its efficacy of meritorious action. 40

This does not exclude the natural, created intellectual light. Just as with the bodily eye there are three factors; the natural light of the eye, the solar light, and the presence of the object; so in the present case there is the created, imperfect light of the intellect, the over-shining uncreated light, and the possible intellect grasping the intelligible species. 41 The created light of the soul is not of itself sufficient for

Augustinus probat secundo de Libero Arbitrio. Deum esse, per hoc, quod lumen illud, in quo omnia videmus, est unum non numeratum in omnibus intelligentibus, ad nullius naturam pertinens; siout patet intuenti.

38 Cf. St. Augustine: Epistula ad Nebridium, 13, n. 4
De Trin. X, c. 5, n. 11
De Trin. XII, c. 2, n. 2
De Confess. XII, c. 25, n. 35
In Evan. Joan., c. 4, Tract. 15, n. 19
De Lib Arb. c. 5, n. 13
intellectual knowledge. When intellectual knowledge is attained, that is when the three necessary factors concur, does the created light see directly the uncreated? The created light does not see it; it sees by it and through it. In this life the eternal light cannot be seen by the Creature, nor can it be the direct object of the created light. Rather it is the uncreated light which shows up the truth of intelligibles, just as the solar light is attained by sight insofar as it is diffused over visible things.

40 Ibidem, pp. 180-1: et est ratio per modum luminis ostendentis omnis certae cognitionis intellectualis. Sicut enim Deus secundum rationem potentiae causa est immediata omnis operationis naturalis cuiuscumque agentis, immediata, inquam, et mediata, quantum ad essentiam actionis; sicut etiam secundum rationem bonitatis causa est cuiuslibet operationis meritoriae, in quantum meritoria est; ita secundum rationem lucis et sapientiae causa est omnis operationis intellectualis et omnis intelligentiae veritatis. Influit igitur potentiae omni operanti esse naturam operationis; influit praeterea cognitionis evidentiam et certitudinem; influit voluntati rationali efficaciam meritoriae actionis.
41 Ibidem, p. 181: Nec tamen per hoc excluditur lux creatas intellectus naturalis; sed sicut in oculo corporali tria concurrunt ad cognitionem, scilicet lumen naturale oculi, et lumen caeli, et praesentia objecti, ita est in proposito; quoniam est tibi lumen intellectus creatum, sed imperfectum, et lumen increatum supersplendens, et intellectus possibilitis apprehendens speciem intelligibilum.
42 Ibidem, ad 1, ad finem: Dico igitur, quod lumen creatum animae sufficit pro intellectuali cognitione.
43 Ibidem, p. 184, ad 4: Aliae sunt rationes cognoscendi, quae non sunt objecta, sed tantum media in alterium ducentia, sicut species rerum sensibilium; et non innotescunt, nisi in quantum ducent in alia; et sic se habet lux aeterna, quae non est in via objectum mentium humanarum; sed lumen tantum ostendens veritatem intelligibilium; sicut lumen solare non attingit visus, nisi in quantum superfunditur rebus visibilibus.
The human intellect grasps the intelligible species. Through species, imaginary or spiritual and intellectual, it knows. The imaginary species is first imprinted upon the sense and then on the soul. It is that by which the thing which is present is seen, and the thing which is absent is known. The species is the ratio of knowing sensibly when the object is present, and it is the ratio of knowing spiritually or imaginatively when the object is absent. This species is in the soul, for the object of which it is the species is not the soul, just as the stone is not in the soul, but the species of stone is in the soul. The intellectual species is twofold; one at the very peak of the intelligence, another in the treasury of intellectual memory. This latter intellectual species is of six sorts: abstracted, innate, impressed, expressed, 'reliota' and 'collecta.'

---

44 Videnote 41.  
45 Quaestio VIII, pp. 84-85, lines 1-5: Ad primam questionem dicendum quod intellectus dicitur relative ad intelligibile, i.e. ad rem intellectam. Intellectus autem intellectualiter refertur ad intelligibile et non econtra. Necesse est ergo, ut cum intellectus fit intelligens de non intelligente, quod fiat aliqua mutatio circa intellectum per quam refertur. Quod esse non potest nisi per similitudinem ipsum determinantem ad cognoscendum, secundum tamen quod quaedam est species imaginaria vel spiritualis, quaedam intellectualis.  
46 Ibidem, p. 85, lines 6-11: Dico imaginarium, quae imprimitur in sensu, deinde in spiritu. Per quam res videtur praesens, et cogitatur absens. Et re praesente est ratio cognoscendi sensibiliter, re absente per motum a sensu factum est ratio cognoscendi spiritualiter vel imaginaria. Et haec species ita est in anima, quod non res cuius est. Lapis enim non est in anima, sed species lapidis.  
47 Ibidem, lines 12-16: Alia est species intellectualis, sive quae est in acie intelligentiae, sive quae est in thesauro intellectualis memoriae. Et haec intenditur sex modis. Est enim quaedam secundum quasdam species abstracta, quaedam innata, quaedam impressa, quaedam expressa, quaedam reliota, quaedam collecta.
The abstracted species is that which is taken up from the imagination and united to the intellect. This abstracted species is merely the species of corporeal things.\textsuperscript{48} The innate species is a concreated notion of the soul, and is a species naturally inserted in us.\textsuperscript{49} In a way this innate species might also be an impressed species,\textsuperscript{50} for the impressed species befalls the soul in time, either from an angle or from God.\textsuperscript{51} We know separated substances because the angles imprint on our souls their similitudes, and to be thus impressed is to know. These are the reason of Avicenna.\textsuperscript{52} The words of Augustine also substantiate the impression of species by God.\textsuperscript{53}

The expressed species or similitudes (Peckham uses the terms 'species' and 'similitude' interchangeably) is the similitude of all those things which are eternally or essentially in the soul. This species expresses the

\textsuperscript{48}Ibidem, lines 17-19 et 26: Dico abstractam quae ab imagine haurituret paulatim, donec intellectui uniatur...et haec species abstracta est tantum corporalium.

\textsuperscript{49}Ibidem, lines 27-28: Dico speciem innatum notionem animae concreatam, sicut dicit Damascenus, cap. I, quod cognitio existendi Deum omnibus ab ipso naturaliter inserta est.

\textsuperscript{50}Ibidem, lines 29-33: Et haec vocatur aliquando notio impressa, sicut dicitur VIII De Trin. cap. 5: "Neque in omnibus donis, quae commemoravi, alio alio iudicaremus melius, nisi esset nobis impressa notio ipsius boni."

\textsuperscript{51}Ibidem, line 1, p.86: Impressam dico quae animae ex tempore accidit, sive ab angelo sive a Deo.

\textsuperscript{52}Ibidem, lines 2-4: Ab angelo sicut dicitur in III Metaph. Avicenna: "Quod nos scimus de substantiis separatis, est quia nos imprimimur ab eis, quod enim nos imprimemur ab eis, hoc est nos scire eas."

\textsuperscript{53}Ibidem, lines 4-6: Et sic etiam cognoscitur Deus per similitudinem. Unde De Trin. IX, cap.11: "Cum Deum novimus, fit aliqua similitudo Dei illa notitia."

similitude in the intelligence when the soul or the mind in se is known.\textsuperscript{54}
The 'reliqua' similitude is the species of those things which were essentially in the soul, and which, although they cease to exist, leave some vestige in the soul. This can be seen in the movements of the soul. When these movements are present they are known and felt, but even after they have departed, they leave something behind in the soul. The 'something' is the reliqua or abandoned species.\textsuperscript{55} The 'collecta' or collected similitude is the species which accounts for the notions one has of such things as justice, so that even though he does not have justice residing within him he is able to gather unto himself the notion of it.\textsuperscript{56}

From this it follows that things intelligible per se, spiritual beings, if they are essentially and efficaciously in the soul, are known by species expressed in the intelligence; they are not known through abstracted species, for abstracted species come to the intellect by way of sense and imagination and are the species of corporeal things only. All other intellectual things

\textsuperscript{54}Quaestio VIII, lines 8-10; p. 86: Dico similitudinem expressam sicut omnia quae sunt aeternaliter in anima vel essentialiter, exprimunt sui similitudinem in intelligentia, cum actu intelligentur et ipsa anima vel mens in se ipsa.

\textsuperscript{55}Ibidem, lines 18-20: Dico autem similitudinem reliquam, sicut ea quae essentialiter fuerunt in anima, om esse deficiunt, aliquod vestigium in anima reliquunt. Sicut de animi affectionibus patuit.

\textsuperscript{56}Ibidem, lines 25-7: Dico collectam similitudinem sicut ex regulis iustitiae, etiam non habens iustitiam, potest aliquam sibi iustitiae solligere notionem.
are known through innate, impressed, 'reliquia' or 'collecta' species. The rational soul knows through the species above enumerated. The precise manner in which these species are in the soul or on the soul, or how God and the angels do impress the human soul cannot be gathered from the texts available. It cannot be conclusively said either that the soul of itself or with the help of the uncreated light forms the species. What Peckham has said is that the uncreated agent intellect (if that is what the power proper to the soul is to be called) is a power formative of species and judicative of things. Does the uncreated light illuminate the created light (which of itself operates imperfectly) or the species (whether in the sense faculty in the soul, or in the intelligence?). Or does it illuminate the possible intellect which grasps the species?

---

57 Ibidem, p.86, lines 34-5 to p. 87, lines 1-3: Igiter res intelligibiles per se seu spirituales non intelliguntur per species abstractas, sed si sunt essentialiter et praeessentialiter in anima cognoscuntur per species in intelligentia expressas. Alia vero omnia intellectualia cognoscuntur per similitudines vel innatas vel impressas vel relietas vel collectas.

58 Ibidem, p. 87, ad 4: (sed qua) intellectus cognoscit rem vere similitudinem, necesse est quod appetitus tendat in rem ipsam, (non in similitudinem). Caritas ergo per similitudinem cognoscitur a re differentiam.

59 Quaestio V, p. 68, in answers to objs, n.5: Ad objectum de intellectu agenti dico quod anima aliquem habet in se activum, sicut virtutem formativam speicerum, sicut etiam virtutem judicativam scilicet rerum.

60 Quaestio VI, p. 75, ad 5: Ad quintum (dicendum) quod ratio superior illustrat inferiorem non virtute vel luce (sua) sed virtutis increatae, quae est eius obiectum. Intellectus autem agens creatu aliquo modo illustrat virtute propria, quamvis imperfecte.

61 Vide notae 46, 47, 48, 49, 54, 55, 57.

62 Vide nota 33.
To answer this question it must be remembered that the three concurring factors must be on hand in every act of knowledge. (See p. 9, note 35). Now, when the human soul knows, it cannot be that the human soul knows because of its own created light and because of the incommutable eternal light. The created agent intellect moves and directs the possible intellect by transforming it into the similitude of intelligible things and by moving it so that it is brought closer to the first light. Therefore, the conception of intelligible things belongs to the possible intellect, and this is as it is a passive power of the soul; whereas the illuminating of those things is an active power of an agent, belonging partly to a created agent and partly to the uncreated agent. 63

Passivity characterizes the power allotted to the possible intellect. The spontaneity characterizing the rational soul in Augustinian philosophy is reserved for the created agent intellect, the agent intellects illuminate intelligible things so that they are taken up in their species by the possible intellect. The illuminating of the intelligible species by the light eternal and created is not sufficient for the assuming of the species by the possible. The created light must move the possible intellect so that it is brought close to the light uncreated. The drawing close to the eternal light, the knowing in the eternal reasons, consummatesthe act of knowledge by the rational soul.

Does this position destroy the natural activity of the rational soul, Is

63 Vide nota 27.
its power limited or destroyed? The soul's own two-fold activity, i.e., a power formative of species and a power judicative of things, pertains to the human soul; but the act of knowing, the act of going the necessary step beyond judgment to certain truth, pertains to the illuminative divine intellect. The power of the rational soul is the power (potential) through which the soul is born to transform itself into the similitudes of all intelligible things. If this power (vis) is called an agent intellect, which is a kind of created natural light, then it differs essentially from the possible intellect, as a power from a power, not as a faculty from a faculty. The power (vis) is one of the diverse powers of the same faculty (the potency to truth), just as in the same organ there can be the different powers, e.g., in the eye there are the powers of gleaming and acuteness. In

64 Vide nota 59.
65 Quaestio VI, ad 5, p. 75: Ad quintum (dicendum) quod ratio superior illustrat inferiorem non virtute vel luce sua sed virtutes increatae, quae est eius obiectum. Intellectus autem agens creatus aliquo modo illustrat virtute propria, quamvis imperfecte.
Quaestio V, line 25, p. 66: Impossibile (ergo) est lucem aliquam naturalem possit intellegendus humanum constituisse in actu intelligendi.
Ibidem, p. 67, line 6: Igitur fatendum est quod intellectus humanus videt, quacumque intellectualiter cognoscit, in ipso lumine increato.
66 Quaestio VI, p. 73, lines 22-4: Quod dico potentiam illam, per quam nata est se in omnium intelligibilium similitudinem transformare.
67 Ibidem, lines 24-6: Haeo igitur vis, si appellatur intellectus agens - quae et habet aliquid luminus creati naturalis differt essentialiter ab intellectu possibili, sicut vis a vis, non sicut potentia a potentia.
68 Ibidem, lines 26-27: Credo enim quod sunt diversae vires eiusdem potentiae sicut in eodem organo oculi differunt splendor et perspicuitas.
Some way this created agent intellect operates by its own proper power, but it functions imperfectly. The action of the uncreated light is needed for the perfection of the created actor and its act.

Peckham does not hesitate to declare that the agent intellect is God, that that light is the light in which all know and by which all things are known. Neither does he hesitate to say that the rational soul has a power proper to its nature. But he does hesitate to admit that the power proper to the agent intellect can be predicate of the human intellect or that there can be a created agent intellect. If we went to call the powers of forming species and judging things the power of a created agent intellect, we may. The activity of the created agent intellect is the expression of a proper yet an imperfect power. In order to explain the attainment of certain truth adequately, we must say that a natural agent or natural light cannot constitute the human intellect or be the sole manner of explaining the operation of the human intellect, in the act of knowing. Hence, Peckham concludes that an agent intellect which surpasses and is the cause of all created ones; an agent intellect of which the created ones are images, must

9 Ibidem, p. 75, line 18, ad 5: Intellectus autem agens creatus aliquo modo illustrat virtute propria, quamvis imperfecte.
0 Vide notae 33, 41, 27.
1 Ibidem, Quaestio V, Vide nota 69.
be and must be ever-present in all certain knowledge. That agent intellect is God.

Clearly, Peckham does not give us a created agent intellect as efficacious in its own nature as does St. Thomas. He did, however, seem to realize the need of a natural power in the human soul. He would not grant, though, that this power could achieve all that the philosophers had asked of the agent intellect; rather from the point of view of immutable truth, an eternal agent intellect was demanded. It is readily seen that the problem of certain knowledge did not present itself to Peckham in terms of the need of a natural power of the rational soul, but in terms of accounting for the attainment of and the possession of unchanging truth by mutable creatures. The only way for Peckham to reach an agreement with the terms of his own problem was to say that the agent intellect was not natural to the soul, was not part of the soul, but was God Himself. But in another way he has come to terms with the problem by holding that the agent intellect as part of the soul differs from the possible. The function assigned to the agent intellect as it is pars animae is not such that the anima rationalis is completed in the intellective act. The agent intellect transforms the possible intellect into the similitude of intelligible things and so moves the passive intellect that the soul is brought to the Light. It is by the conferring of light from the light upon the human soul, that the soul is brought to the state of knowing. The immutable and eternal truth is not given by the intelligible objects, nor by the agent intellect or the passive intellect, nor by divine illumination. Certainly, it cannot be said that
divine illumination alone is the efficient cause of the rational soul's knowing, but rather that the rational soul, the intelligible objects and the Divine light are all in their own way efficiently causal.

There is expressed in Peckham's doctrine the interaction and interdependence of one intellect on the other, that is of the possible on the acting and of the acting on the possible, such as is found in St. Bonaventure's. There is a dependence of the possible on the actual, a dependence which is evident in the transforming of the possible by the agent into the similitude of all intelligible things, and in the moving of the possible by the agent so that the possible is brought to the eternal light, and which is not found in Bonaventure. The created acting intellect, in its turn, is dependent upon the first light as the source of its natural illuminative power.

Peckham's words give evidence to dependence, and interdependence; to action and to interaction; to a dependence of natural knowledge on divine. Thus, although he gives us a kind of created agent intellect, he gives us one not active in its own right and nature; hence, an acting intellect able to know only by means of God, the First and Eternal Reason of all Knowledge.
CHAPTER V

Roger Marston

Roger Marston, John Peckham's disciple ranges himself alongside those who hold to pure Augustinism. His dependence on St. Bonaventure, and above all on Peckham, shows clearly his adherence to the classic doctrines of Franciscan metaphysics, theology, and psychology. He accepts, as do Alexander of Hales, St. Bonaventure, and John Peckham, the Aristotelian division into agent and possible intellect, crediting Aristotle as the source of the terms 'possibilis intellectus et agens.'

These terms, he remarks, have been variously interpreted, but he thinks it is far better to hold that the agent intellect is distinct from the possible, for by this distinction all contrarieties, whether of philosophers or of teachers, will be solved; rather than shamelessly to declare that Aristotle denied in every sense that the agent intellect is a substance separated from the soul by its essence.

---


3Quaest. III, p. 259: longe melius est intellectum agentem distinguere, qua distinctione omnes contrarietates seu Philosophorum seu magistrorum solvantur, quam impudenter denire quod Philosophus omni sensu negaverit intellectum agentem esse substantiam separatam ab anima per essentiam.
From ancient times experts in philosophy have taught both that the agent intellect is a separated created intelligence, and that it is a part of the individual rational soul, and that it is God. They teach that the intellect is said to be agent from its act of illuminating the possible intellect. In another way, and necessarily incompletely, it is said to be agent as it is part of the soul. Finally, it is agent as it illuminates and perfects the soul completely and principally, and in this way it is a separated substance; in fact, God Himself.  

This last is the position which Marston adopts, not only because it will remove the contrarieties between teachers and philosophers, but because the properties which the philosophers assign to the agent intellect are such as are proper only to the uncreated light which illuminate our intellect.  

The properties assigned by philosophers to the agent intellect are, in St. Augustine, attributed to the uncreated Light.

---

4 Quaest. III, p. 259: Experti enim in philosophia ab antiquo praedictas sententias docuerunt. Intelleotus enim agens secundum quod dicitur ab actu illuminandi ipsum intellectum possibilem, aliquo modo, licet incompleta, dicitur esse pars animae, sicut perspicuitas naturalis in oculo et naturalis quidam fulgor, quo potest sibi medium aligualiter illustrare, sicut potest quod in oculo leonis et oati sunt fulgor et perspicuitas partes quaedam ipsius organi. Sed secundum quod intellectus agens dicitur ab actu illuminandi complete et principaliiter est substantia separata, Deus ipse, ut possint ab objecto immutari.  

5 Quaest. III, p. 259: Et ad istud sentiendum moveor et proprietatibus intellectus agentis, collectis philosophicis documentis, quae lumini increato conveniunt intellectum nostrum illustranti.
Some teachers⁶ say that in order that we may know, the eternal light produces no 'special' effect, but exercises only the common providence by which it looks after things generally. These say that Augustine would have us see all these things in the first truth, because we see in a light derived from this first truth, that is, in a natural light of our own mind. This derived light is part of the soul, and we see all things in this derived light, so they say, just as we see all things in the sun because we see in a light derived from the sun.⁷ This teaching, however, is not consonant with the teaching of Augustine. Augustine intends that the truth which I see is not my truth, since it is from the First Truth, the Truth in which I see all. Likewise, the truth which you see is not your truth, because it is from the Truth common to both you and me. Now, the position which adopts an interpretation of Augustine holding that we see in a light derived from the First, and that this derived light is in my mind, and that this light is mine, St. Augustine denies on account of the common truth which belongs to neither you nor me but is common to both. It seems that

⁶Cf. St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 12, a. 11, ad 3; q. 72, a. 4; q. 84, a. 6; q. 88, a. 3, ad 1; St. Bonaventure, In II Sent. d. 24, p. 1, a. 2 q. 4.  
⁷Marston, Quaest, III, Respondeo, pp. 252-253: Patet hic opinio Magistrorum dicentium quod lux aeterna nihil agit per se ipsam speciale praeter communem providentiam, qua res communiter administrata hoo ut intelligamus; et, ut dicunt, ideo vult Augustinus, nos omnia didere in prima veritate, quia videmus in luce at eadem veritate derivata, in naturali videlicet lumine mentis nostrae, quod est pars animae, sicut dicimur omnia videre in sole, quia videmus in lumine a dole derivato.
Augustine intends more than these men say he does.  

Again Augustine has said that the superior part of reason is that which turns to contemplating the eternal reasons, while the interior deals with things temporal. Therefore, it seems that, since these portions are distinguished, the higher should see in the rules above it those things which it comprehends. Now, if it is said that higher reason sees in those rules because it sees in a certain light of its own derived from those rules, then it could be said that inferior reason sees in the eternal rules above the mind because it sees in a light derived from them. This interpretation, however, is not in harmony with the words of Augustine. He definitely assigns two offices to reason, and requires two modes of knowing: cognition in a superior light and cognition in the treatment of things temporal.

---

8Quaest. III, p. 253: Istud non videtur posse stare cum intentione Augustini, in loco praedicto, in libro videlicet Confessionum. 

Ibidem: Nam, sicut patet ibidem, ipsi intendit invehere contra illos qui asserebant illud quod ipsi apprehendebant verum in dicto Moysi; In principio creavit Deus caelum et terram, esse intentionem legislatoris, et non illud quod alius verum in eadem sententia capiebat. Intendit ergo quod veritas, quam ego video, non est mea, cum sit a prima Veritate, in qua ego video, et similiter veritas, quam tu vides, non est tua, quia est a communi mihi et tibi veritate. Sed si veritatem, quam video,ideo dicere videre in luce aeterna, quia video in mente mea a luce aeterna derivata, posset hae veritas dici mea, sicut ipsa lux mentis meae dicitur mea. Hoc autem negat Augustinus propter communem lucem, in qua videmus ego et tu, ergo videtur quod plus intendat quam ipsi dicant. 

Ibidem, pp. 255-56: Patet igitur quod dicentes omnia videre in lumine aeterno, quia videntur a lumine ab ipso derivato, doctrinam Augustini pervertunt, trunoactas eius auctoritates, antecedentibus et consequentibus praetermissis, in quibus Sancti intentio plenius in hae materia elucscit. 

Cf. St. Augustine, De Confessione XII, c. 25, n. 34, (PL 32,839) 

9Cf. St. Augustine, De Trin. XII, c. 12, n. 17 (PL 42,1007); Ibidem, cc. 2 et 3 (PL 42,999) 

10Marston, Quaest. III, p. 253: Item, Augustinus, De Trinitate XII, c. 12
Let us consider the argument given for the existence of God in Augustine's *De Libero Arbitrio*. In this argument Augustine has shown that no intermediary is interposed between God and His creatures. Thus, if there is anything above the mind, that is God. What is true of God, is true of truth. Truth may be compared to the objects of the senses of sight and hearing, which at once are one in themselves and common to many, and yet by their very nature belong to none of the 'many'. As it is with the visible and the audible, so it is with truth, which *in se* is one, and still is generally known by many. Truth, therefore, because it is known by many, cannot pertain to their natures. Augustine thus proves that that truth in which incommunicable truths are known, because it is ever-present to be contemplated by those wishing, cannot be of the nature of the rational

*dicit quod superior portio rationis dicitur quae intendit aeternis rationibus consulendis, inferior vero portio dicitur quae negotiatur in istis temporalibus dispensandis; ergo cum in hoc distinguantur superior portio et inferior, videtur quod superior portio in regulis supra se videat illa quae cernit. Si tu dicas quod ideo videt in regulis illis, quia in videt aliqua luce mentis suae ab illis regulis derivata, eadem ratione posset dici quod ratio inferior videt in aeternis regulis, quae sunt supra mentem, cum videat in aliqua luce ab illis regulis derivata. Hoc tamen non est secundum doctrinam Augustini supra dictam concedendum, cum penes tales cognitionem in superiori lumine et temporalium dispensatione duo rationis officia gementur.*

*1 Cf. St. Augustine. *De Lib. Arb.* II, cc. 5-11 (Pl 32,1242).*
Besides, truth is greater than the individual soul, and is above it, for it is that truth in which all other truths are seen. Hence, truth is greater than the particular soul. Since there is nothing greater than the soul except God, truth must be God Himself.\[13\]

\[\text{12 Marston, Quaest. III, pp. 253-4: Item Augustinus, De Libero Arbitrio, in libro II, nititur, quantum potest, et hoc valde subtiliter, probare Deum esse; cuius intentio a cap. 5 usque ad medium II capituli succincte accepta talis est; si aliquid est supra mentem nostram, necesse est quod hoc sit Deus. Hanc consequentiam supponit ex adversario, et probat antecedens per exempla varia in sensibus particularibus, docens diffuse quo modo idem visibile potest totum videri a diversis, et similiter somus idem audiri a multis, quamvis alio informentur sensus diversorum; sicut omnes audiunt illud verbum quod dico, quamvis alius et alius recipiantur in auribus singulorum unum tamen verbum dico, quod a singulis auditur. Illud autem quod pluribus est commune, ad nullius naturam potest pertinere. Unde veritas istis duobus sensibus comparatur, non autem gustui vel tactui vel olfactui, quia non potest idem simul tangi vel gustari vel olfieri a diversis, sicut videri et audiri potest idem a multis. Verum igitur, quod a pluribus intelligitur, non potest ad alicuius ipsorum naturam pertinere. Nunc enim non posset ab eis idem intelligi, sicut nec idem gustatur a diversi vel tangitur, quia gustabile ad naturam transit gustantis. Haec autem veritatem eadem numero a pluribus intelligitur, sicut 'quod duo et tria sunt quinque', quamvis per aliam et aliam comparationem, quae fit a diversis; sicut eadem quidditatem intelligi ego definiendo hominem, quam intelligit alius consimiliter definiendo, per aliam tamen speciem cognoscit ipsae et ego. Hoc igitur probato, quod eadem veritatem intelligunt diversi, probat ulterior Augustinus, versus finem c. 9 et in principio 10, quod veritas, in qua vera incommutabilia cernuntur, non est aliquid animae, per hoc quod ipsa praesto est omnibus veritatem volentibus intueri; et idcirco non potest pertinere ad alicuius mentis humanae naturam, sicut superius exemplificavit de visu et auditu. Cf. St. Augustine, De Lib. Arb. cc. 9-10 (Pl. 32, 1255).\]

\[\text{13 St. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio 2, 15, 39 (Pl 32, 1262): Tu autem concesseras, si quid supra mentes nostras monstraremus, Deum in esse confesserum, si adhuc nihil superius. Quam tuam concessionem accipiens dixeram satis esse, ut hoc demonstrarem. Si enim aliquid est excellentius, ille potius Deus est; si autem non est, iam ipse veritas est.}\]
The light which is superior to all is not inferior to the soul, because then the soul could judge of it. But we do not judge of it, we judge according to it; it is in this light that we see all truths. We say that '7 and 3 are 10,' and we know this to be so and that it ought to be so, just as we know not only what kind are our bodies and our souls, but what they should be according to the incommutable truths which we comprehend. Now, this light in which we behold all and according to which we judge, could not be equal to the mind or in the mind, because those things which we behold in common are incommutable. Nothing immutable subsists in a mutable thing. It is evident that the human mind is mutable, for at times it glimpses more and at other times less of this light. How then, can it be held that this light could be in the soul? It is certainly evident from this argumentation, that the incommutable light is not in the mutable soul, and is above all not merely equal to it.


15 Marston, Quaest. III, p. 255: Nec potest lux praedicta, in videmus vera communiter, esse aequalis mente aut in mente, sicut probat consequenter, quoniam illa, quae videmus communiter, sunt incommutabilia; mens vero nostra mutabilis est, eo quod praedictam lucem a liquando plus, aliquando minus videt. Manifestum est autem quod nihil immutabile subsistit in re mutable.
In each and every argument taken from Augustine, Marston reaches the conclusion that in the light above our minds we know all things with certitude,\textsuperscript{16} that the light in which we see all things in common is God.\textsuperscript{17} The Augustinian principles,\textsuperscript{17} that between God and the rational soul not even an angelic intermediary is needed and that we do not judge of the eternal rules but according to them, are most clearly contained in Marston's premisses and conclusions.\textsuperscript{18}

It cannot be, he holds, that people would judge of injustice and evil in human conduct, unless they see how one ought to live according to rules

\textsuperscript{16}Ibidem, p. 256: Praedictam enim deductionem, qua ostenditur quod in luce aliqua supra mentem omnia certitudinaliter cognoscamus, idem Augustinus ponit, De Trinitate XIV, c.15, docens quo modo inusti et mali multa recte reprehendunt ad mores pertinentia.

\textsuperscript{17}Cf. St. Augustine, De Vera Relig. c.44, n. 92; ibidem, c.55, n.113 (PL 34, 172, 159); 63 Quaestitionum, q. 51, n.2 et 4 (PL 40,32); ibidem, q. 53, n.2 (PL 40,36); De Trin. XI, c. 5, n. 8 (PL 42,990).

\textsuperscript{18}Marston, Quaest. III, p. 255: Ex quibus concludit Augustinus quod illud in quo communiter vera cernimus, Deus est, ex hypothesi habita in principio sua deductionis, videlicet quod, si aliquid supra mentem nostram, ipsum est Deus. Nam lux praedicta, ex quo est ipsa mente inferior nec aequalis, ut jam superior demonstravit, necesse est quod sit ipsa mente superior. Ibidem, pp. 256-7: Unde dicit (Augustinus) sic: Quibus ea regulis judicant, nisi in quibus vident quemadmodum quisque vivere debeat, etiamsi nec ipsi eodem modo vivant? Ubi eas vident? Et probat consequenter quod nec in natura sua eas vident nec in aliquo habitu mentis. Dicit enim sic: "Neque enim in sua natura eas vident, cum procul dubio mente ista videantur eorumque mentes constat esse mutabiles, has vero regulas immutabiles videant quisquis in eisdem et hoc videre potuerit; nec in habitu mentis sueae cum illae regulae sint iustitiae, mentes vero eorum constat esse iniustas."
neither of their own natures nor in their minds. Here we must distinguish between what the soul sees in itself and what it sees in the eternal light. It is certain that what it beholds in itself, it beholds in a natural light. But if we are to give Augustine's words their true force we must say that, as regards immutable truth, it is necessary that one should see in an eternal light, and not only in a natural light or a light derived from the eternal.

In this last treatment Marston seems to give us a kind of created agent intellect. Then there are two lights, which we may consider: one, a natural light, being in and of the mind knowing; the other, an uncreated light, being neither in the mind nor of the mind, being in fact, God Himself.

The natural light of the mind may be considered a 'lumen derivatum' of the uncreated, but in itself it is not sufficient for the attainment of any but temporal truths. The uncreated lux, the eternal reasons above the mind by which the mind can judge, is needed to account for those truths which one and all know certitudinaliter. The two fold aspect of cognition demands this, for there is cognition which concerns deduction made from laws which

19But supra.
20Ibidem, p. 257: Item, De Trinitate XIV, c. 7: "Id agunt litterae, quae /de/ iis rebus conscriptae sunt, quas res duce ratione invenit veras esse lector, non quas veras esse credat, sed veras esse etiam ipse invenit sive apud se sive in ipsa mentis luce veritate." Ecce quod Augustinus distinguit inter cognitionem rerum quam anima in se ipsa videt et quam videt in luce asterna. Certum est autem quod illa quae videt in se ipsa, videt in lumine naturali, quam vocant praedicti lumen derivatum a luce asterna; ergo necesse est quod aliqua videat in luce asterna, ita quod non solum in lumine naturali, alioquin inculcati verborum esset dicendo quod ipse lector vera cernit sive apud se sive in ipsa mentis luce veritate.

Cf. St. Augustine, De Trin. XIV, c. 7, n. 9 (PL 42, 1045).
are above the mind and is thus made in a superior light; and there is knowledge which concerns the treatment of things in time, and this knowledge is achieved in a created light. But the superior aspect demands the illumination given only in the eternal light. This, indeed, is the teaching of Augustine, who says that those things which man finds manifested merely in himself are changed by time, and he cannot convince another man of them by reason, but the other man must take his word for it. However, regarding those things which are comprehended in a common light, one mind when it knows them, agrees to them: and another man, if he wishes, may know the same thing. Thus, there is knowledge which the human mind has by believing, and, consequent on that believing, it knows; there is also knowledge which it has and which is immediately recognized as truth common to all. This knowledge is a seeing in veritate ipsa.

21 Vide #10.
22 Marston, Quaest. III, p. 257: Quae vero sint illa quae mens cernit in se ipsa tantum et quae in luce aeterna, docet idem Augustinus, De Trinitate IX, c. 7.
Cf. St. Augustine, De Trin. IX, c. 6, n. 9 (PL 42,965).
23 Marston, Quaest. III, p. 257: Quae vero sint illa quae mens cernit in se ipsa tantum et quae in luce aeterna, docet idem Augustinus, De Trinitate IX, c. 7, dicens quod illa quae videt homo in se ipso tantum, per tempora variantur, nec potest alium de eo quod intelligit certificare, sed necesse habet alius sibi credere, affirmanti se intelligere hoc vel illud. Illa vero quae in commune luce cernuntur, non oportet credere auditorem, sed statim cum intelligit, constat sibi quod alius, si vult, intelligit illud idem.
On the authority of Augustine alone, Marston refutes the position which states that the agent intellect is a part of the soul. On this same authority he proves the existence of the First Truth in which all other truths are seen by using an analogy between the objects of the senses of sight and hearing and truth common to all. From the Augustinian proposition which maintains that what is above our minds is God, He deduces that the light above our minds and in which we comprehend is God. Again from St. Augustine's words he shows that there is a two fold activity of the mind: activity concerned with cognition in a superior light (which has to do with truth common to all); and an activity concerned with cognition of things temporal (and which has to do with truth not common to all but particular to the subject knowing). Now the truth common to all is superior to the knowing ones; hence it is God. Finally, Marston shows that the eternal rules are those according to which we judge, but of which no one judges. These rules come from God, and since they are that according to which we judge, they are that according to which we know. They, as immutable truth, do not pertain to the nature of the soul knowing. It is by means of these arguments that Marston has been able to conclude a doctrine of the agent intellect, which for him, is consonant with that of St. Augustine. Indeed, he cannot see how any other doctrine could be in harmony with that of the Saint's and without fear that the opposite might be true, he firmly holds that there is but one light, an uncreated light.

in which we behold all truth certidinaliter. 25

After determining the first and last source of certitude to be God, Marston considers the terms which he has borrowed from Aristotle for incorporation into an Augustinian metaphysics. The agent intellect, so called because it illuminates the possible, sufficiently and completely, 26 he believes is the uncreated light. 27 The complete and sufficient illumination conferred by the agent intellect requires that the agent intellect be separated by its essence from the possible. 28 This is the interpretation which Alpharabi, Avicenna, and many others have put on the words of Aristotle. 29 Besides, the philosopher's words seem to indicate that, for he has said that the agent intellect is separated from the possible secundum esse et substantiam and that the agent differs from the possible as regards incorruptibility. The possible is incorruptible in substance,

26 Ibidem, p. 258: Sumendo namque intellectum agentem prout dicitur ab actu illuminandi possibilem, non qualicumque illustratione, ut volunt omnes, sed pro eo quod sufficienter et complete illuminat possibilem.
Cf. Aristotle, De Anima III, c. 5.
28 Marston, Quaest. III, p. 258: sed pro eo quod sufficienter et complete illuminat possibilem, necesse est dicere quod sit substantia separata per essentiam ab intellectu possibili... .
but not in esse; whereas, the agent is incorruptible as regards both.\textsuperscript{30} Moreover, Aristotle says\textsuperscript{31} that the agent intellect is to the possible as the artisan to the materials which he fashions, or as the light of the sun to colors. Moreover,\textsuperscript{32} the efficient cause and the matter on which it works are not found in the same subject. The efficient cause, i.e., the artifex, must be separated from the matter on which he works according to his essence. The Philosopher had also said\textsuperscript{33} that the light of the sun banishing darkness from colored things is separated from these things by its essence. The separation and the activity analogous to the examples given and belonging to the agent intellect, is proper to neither the angelic intelligence nor the rational soul, but to God alone.\textsuperscript{34}

Marston has strongly enough concluded that the agent intellect is God. His interpretations of Aristotle, Augustine and medieval Augustinians have emphasized his position. However, Marston does not resign the problem at this point. He considers, as does St. Bonaventure, whether the agent

\textsuperscript{30}Ibidem: Neanon et ipse Philosophus videtur vel quod "intellecutus agens est separatus a possibili secundum esse et substantiam, quoniam dicit ipsum differre a possibili penes incorruptionem; possibilis autem incorruptibilis est secundum substantiam, quamvis corrupatur secundum esse", in quantum corruptitur quodam interius corrupto.

The editor notes that Aristotle's words as quoted by Marston are taken from Bacon's \textit{Opus Majus}, 2, 5 (edited by Bridges, III, 45 sq.). Vide then, Appendix A, p.

\textsuperscript{31}Cf. Aristotle, \textit{De Anima}, III, c.5; St. Thomas, \textit{Summa Theologica}, I, q.89, a.1; St. Bonaventure, \textit{II Sent.}, d.19, a. 1, q. 1, ad. 3.

\textsuperscript{32}Cf. Aristotle, \textit{Physics} II, c.8.

\textsuperscript{33}Ut supra: notae 30, 31.

\textsuperscript{34}Marston, \textit{Quaest.} III, pp. 258-9: "agens autem incorruptibilis est et secundum substantiam et esse". Dicit etiam quod intellectus agens "se
intellect could be an influence of the uncreated light. From what has been said regarding the uncreated truth or the light in which all see truth, it is clear that it is common to all. The immutable nature which belongs to truth requires that in some way incommutable truths must be attained. Something more and above the phantasms or the abstracted species must constitute the human mind in its act of knowledge. That that 'something' is any influence of the eternal light differing from it, or something on the part of the mind itself distinct from the eternal light, Marston cannot believe. He reasons that the eternal light makes a certain active impression in the human soul, from which there is bequeathed to the soul a certain passive impression, the formal principle of incommutable truth; just as the image, when imprinted on the wax, leaves behind a certain likeness in the wax, by which, if the wax had cognitive power, it could know the image itself. This is just what the Psalmist wished to say, when speaking of the way in which our mind is fashioned after that light, he says: "Signatum est lumen vultus tui super nos." Now lumen vultus is none other than the light of the eternal truth, according to

habet ad possibilem sicut artifex ad materiam et sicut lux solis ad colores. Artifex autem est extra materiam in quam agit, et separatur per essentiam per eadem', cum efficiens et materia non coincidant, secundum Philosophum II Physicorum, 'Similiter lux solis, expellens tenebras a coloribus et aliis rebus, separata est ab eis per essentiam. Dicit etiam quod intellectus agens scit omnia semper et in actu, quod nec animae rationali nec angelo convenit, sed soli Deo.

Ibidem, p. 263: Unde necesse est aliquid ultra phantasmata vel species abstractas ponere in mente nostra, quo attingamus aliquid incommutabiles veritates: quod non credo esse aliquid influentiam lucis aeternae differentem ab ea nec aliud a parte mentis nostrae distinctum realiter ab eadem. Nam lux aeterna, irradians mentem humanam, quandam
which light is bestowed on our intellect through the image impression. 36

Thus with St. Bonaventure, Roger Marston concludes that the agent intellect is not an influence of the eternal light, but is the eternal light itself, God.

St. Augustine has said that the angel could be the cause of knowledge in the rational soul. 37 He thereby grants to the angel an illuminative power, but it is power proportionate to the nature manifesting it, and hence, it is a limited power and is not the same as the illuminative power of God. Augustine maintains that the light conferred on the created being by God is as the sun shining through a window; whereas the light conferred by the angel is as the opening of that window. Again he has said that the God-given light is to the soul as the light of the sun is to the eye, and that the angelic light is as the light of the stars. This shows that the angelic light is not precisely what Marston has said is the

Impressionem activam facit in ea. . .

36Ibidem: Unde sicut quando videmus unum sensibile visibile, alia specie et alia informatur oculus tuus et meis, sic et per aliud, quod est in mente mea, video veritatem incommutabilem, et tu per aliud vides eadem. Unde necesse est aliquid ultra phantasmata vel species abstractas ponere in mente nostra, quo attingamus aliquid aliqualiter incommutabiles veritates; quod non credo esse aliquam influentiam aeterneae differentem ab ea nec aliquid a parte mentis nostrae distinctum realiter ab eadem. Nam lux aeterna, irradians mentem humanam, quamdam impressionem activam facit in ea, ex qua derelinquitur in ipsa passiva quaedam impressionem formalem principium est cognoscendi veritates incommutabiles, sicut sigillum, quando imprimitur in cera, derelinquit quoddam vestigium in cera, quod si cera haberet virtutem cognitivam, posset ipsum sigillum cognoscere. - Et hoc est quod voluit Psalmista, loquens de illa luce, quo modo mens nostra ab ipsa quodam modo sigillatur: Signatum est, inquit, lumen vultus tui super nos; quia enim vultu res cognoscitur, lumen vultus non est aliud quam lumen Veritatis aeternae secundum quod offeretur intellectui nostri per sigillativam impressionem.
agent intellect. Now, knowing beforehand that our Franciscan will adhere to a strict interpretation of the words of Augustine, we may not preclude that he will grant, without specification and careful examination of terms and possibilities, that angelically conferred illumination is the work proper to the agent intellect. Indeed the wording of the question itself is not so much that of a positive possibility as is that of a mere probability. To answer the question 'Whether the human soul is illuminated by God alone', he gives three ways in which the angel could perform this operation.

In the first way the angel could effect cognition in us by operating on our bodies, which the soul perfects and informs. Every movement of the soul produces something in the body, and thus movement made in the body is caused by the soul. If the movement remains in the body, it is in its turn the cause of similar knowledge in the soul, just as anger is the cause of burning animosity and burning animosity is the reason why we are easily angered. Now, the angel could rouse these movements in us by a natural power, from which movements it could somehow provoke thought.

Cf. Psalm 4, 7; St. Augustine, De Trin. c. 15 (PL 42,1052); Contra Faustum XXVI, c. 5 (PL 42,482); St. Thomas, Summa Theol. I, q. 84, a. 5, Respondeo.

Vide c. 2, nota 8.


Cf. St. Augustine, Ad Nebridium, Epist. 9 (PL 33,72); St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, q. 111, a. 3-4.
in us. If the angel could cause such motions in the body, which are the occasion of the soul's knowing according to the aforementioned mode, the angel could even in some way induce illumination and cognition by doing something about the body which the soul would perfect. 40

In a second way, the angel could illuminate the soul by moving the spirit itself or the sensible soul, which serves and ministers to the intellect. 41 The knowledge thus bestowed by the angel is the type which,

40 Marston, Quaest. IV, pp. 280-1: Dico igitur quod angelus potest in nobis cognitionem aliquo modo efficere operando circa corpus nostrum quod anima perficit et informat. * omnis animi motus aliquid facit in corpore, sicut patet ad sensum in motibus irae et tristiae et gaudi et ceteris huiusmodi, qui apparent in vultu talium motuum passionibus agitati. Et sicut iste motus in factus in corpore causatur ab anima, sic potest, si maneat in corpore, esse animae causa iterato consimilis cogitationis, sicut ira est causa creamenti fellis et fel iterum est causa cur faciliter irascimur. Isto autem motus, in corpore causatos ab anima, potest angelus tam bonus quam malus ex naturali potestate diversimode contractare et agitare, ex quibus motibus sic agitatis ingeruntur nobis aliquando cogitationes. * * * Cum igitur angelus posset motiones tales causare et efficere in corpore quae sint animae occasio cognitionum secundum modum praetactum, potest etiam in anima aliquo modo illuminationem et cognitionem inducere aliquid agendo circa corpus ipsum quod anima perficit.

41 Ibidem, pp. 282-3: Utrum vero ista argumenta verum concludant, nescio. Hoc credo quod sustinere volens quod angelus possit aliquod phantasmata in imaginatione producere, faciliter illis responderet. Nam quod dicit in principio quod, 'si in angeli potestate esset tale phantasmata producere, tunc posset caecum nativitate facere cognoscentem colores et de eisdem iudicare', istud non sequitur. Quamvis enim tale phantasmata in imaginatione esset, oporteret quod sciret illud esse phantasmata coloris, ad hoc quod per illud colorum cognosceret, sicut homini ingerere posset spectaculum mulieris, qui tamen munquam aliquid vidisset; habens igitur tale phantasmata bene illud adverteret, messiens tamen quod mulieris esset. Tali autem coloris phantasmata in imaginatione existente, posset angelus vel per exteriorum locutionem vel interiorum docere habentem tale phantasma quod illud esset phantasma coloris. Ex quo patet quod non sequitur, si angelus tale phantasma in imaginatione formaret vel per eius adminiculum in ea fieret, quod propter hoc caecum posset de coloribus facere disputantem, nisi aliqua doctrina angeli
for example, one blind from birth would have of color, or one not having
seen the city of Alexandria would have from a description of that city
given him by another. If one says that such an implanting of species in
the phantasm or such an inducement of knowledge could not be, Marston
agrees. But, he adds, if an image, such as the image of color in one blind
from birth, is present, then, without a doubt, the angel could show man,
either by telling him of it or by teaching him, the likeness of this
color not perceived by sense.42

In a third way the angel could cause illumination in the soul by
bringing light into it. This light is a dispositive principle and in a
certain way the reason for knowing things other than the light, but not
the reason for knowing the light itself; just as light in the medium is
not objectively known by the sense unless it is known to what extent it is
spread over with color.43 Some do not hold this opinion, but they do hold

superveniret menti vel spiritui, docens cuius esset illudphantasmate. -
Et haec omnia confirmantur per Augustinum /De/ Trinitate VIII, c. 10,
dicentem sententialiter: "Cum audisset a multis de Alexandria qualis
esset, finxi in animo meo talem cicitatem. Quem imaginem si ex animo
meo proferre possem ad oculos hominum qui Alexandriam viderunt, profecto
aut omnes dicerent, 'non est ipsa', aut si dicerent: 'ipsa est', multa
mirarer, atque ipsam intuens animo meo, id est imaginem quasi picturam
eius, ipsam tamen esse nescirem, sed eis crederem qui visam tenerent.

42Ibidem, p. 284: Quod si dicas mihi talem imaginem nullam posse cognitio-
nem inducere, dico quod verum est per se; sed si talis imago esset ibi,
posset absque dubio angelus homini ostendere, vel loquendo vel alia
docendi, quod ipsa esset huius coloris imago.

43Ibidem, p. 291: A simili posset dici in propositio quod angelus lumen
in animam influit, quod est dispositivum principium et quodam modo ratio
cognoscendi alia et non se ipsum; sicut etiam lumen in medio a sensu
objective non cognoscitur nisi quatemus est coloribus superfusum.
the opinion that nothing is moved or effected unless by that which informs it. To this objection Marston offers another of their opinions, that something could be the form of another in its being or in its operation; just as, according to them, God is the form of the beatified intellect, because the divine essence is that which the beatified soul knows. Perhaps one could say that the soul is moved intelligibly by the presence of the angelic light, although the light is not present to the soul as to a subject, informing it in its being, as an accident is in its subject; but as something informing another to movement. Hence, in this way an angelic light could inform the intellective power of the soul, so that it could help it or so that it could render illumination to the intellect; although it does not inform it as an accident informs its subject.

These arguments lead to the conclusion that the angel could illuminate the human soul (assuming illumination to mean any showing forth or disposition thereto) either by moving the body or the interior sensitive

45Cf. St. Thomas SCG III, 51; de Verit. q. 12, a. 6; Summa Theologica I, q. 12, a. 2.
46Marston, Quaest. IV, pp. 291-2: Tertium similiter non videtur multum efficaciter concludere, maxime contra illos qui sunt opinionis contrariae. Nam quando dicit quod 'nihil operatur nec efficitur clarius nisi per illud quod ipsum informat,' responderi posset secundum illos quod aliquid potest esse forma alterius in essendo vel in operando, sicut, secundum ipsos, Deus est forma intellectus beati in patria in operando, quia essentia divina est illud quo intellectus beatus cognoscit Deum, ut dicunt. Et Eodem modo forsan posset dici quod anima clarior efficitur ex prae sentia luminis angelici, quamvis ipsum lumen non sit in anima ut in subjecto informans ipsam in essendo, ut accidens subjectum, sed sicut aliquid aliud informat in operando. Unde potest tale lumen potentiam animae intellectivam informare ut adiuvans ipsam vel praebens et illuminandi intellectum, quamvis non informat ipsum ut accidens subjectum.
powers, or even by moving the soul itself by operating about it and pressing into it.\textsuperscript{47} However, all that Marston says concerning the angelic light, he says by way of opinion, and not by way of assertion. (This is evident, throughout the whole of the text treating of the conferring of angelic light, in the stressed use of the verb 'posse'.) The final determination of the problem, Roger leaves to those wiser than himself, to whose sage judgment he humbly submits.\textsuperscript{48}

In the Marstonian system it is not definite that the agent intellect is an angel; that it could be an angel, is possible; that it is God is absolute. Now, we ask, what is the operation proper to the agent intellect? In Quaestio III, Marston says that the agent intellect is agent because it sufficiently and completely illuminates the possible.\textsuperscript{49} Again it is said to be agent (and God also) because it principally and completely illuminates the possible.\textsuperscript{50}

\textsuperscript{47}Ibidem, pp. 299-300: Concedendum est ergo quod angelus illuminare potest animam, sumpta illuminatione, ut praetactum est, pro manifestatione quacumque et dispositione ad illuminationem, tam agendo circa corpus quam circa vires interiores sensitivas quam etiam circa ipsam mentem operando et influendo in eam.

\textsuperscript{48}Ibidem, p. 300: Hoc tamen, quod dixi de lumine naturali angeli, quod per ipsum posset animam illuminare, opinendo solum, non asserendo, simplicibus proposui, ut praeberem materiam cogitandi, sapientioribus determinandum reliqui, quorum iudicio in hac materia humiliter me submitti.

\textsuperscript{49}Ibidem, Quaest. III, p. 258: Et hanc lucem credo Philosophus vocavit intellectum agentem. Sumendo namque intellectum agentem dicitur ab actu illuminandi possibilem, non qualicumque illuminatione . . . sed pro eo quod sufficienter et complete illuminat possibilem.

\textsuperscript{50}Ibidem, p. 259: Sed secundum quod intellectus agens dicitur ab actu illuminandis complete et principaliiter, est substantia separata, Deus ipse.
to make all things known. The soul which knows all things knows them in
the eternal light, not that it knows the light itself by looking upon it,
but that the light is the reason and the principle for the knowing of
other things.51

In this same general vein Marston maintains that God illuminates our
souls,52 and that the agent intellect illuminates the material intellect.
But in a more specific manner he adds that it illuminates the material
intellect so that it receives intelligible species.53 Quoting the
Commentator he says that the agent intellect is to the material intellect
as light to the eyes; and as light is the perfection of the eyes, so the
agent is the perfection of the material intellect. And, as in some general
way light makes potential colors actual, so the agent intellect makes
intelligibles in potency to be actual, so that the material intellect is
able to receive them.54

51Ibidem, Quaest. IV, p. 290: Nam, sicut patet ex praecedente questione
\textit{i.e.} Quaetio III/ anima omnia quae cognoscit, in lumine aeterno
cognoscit, non tamen ipsum lumen cognoscit intuendo, sed ut ipsum est
ratio et principium ad alia cognoscendum.

52Ibidem, Quaest. III, p. 260: Nam quod Deus solus animam nostram
illuminet. . .

53Ibidem, Quaest. III, p. 259: Circa cognitionem incomplexorum intellectus
agens illuminat materialen, ut possit recipere species intelligibles. . .

54Ibidem, pp. 259-60: Et de istic duabus operationibus intellectus
agentis dicit Commentator, super III De Anima, in illo \# Et sic non
habebit naturam, in fine commenti, sic loquens: "Debes scire quod
respectus intellectus agentis ad istum intellectum est respectus lucis
ad diaphanum, et respectus formarum materialium ad ipsum est respectus
colorum ad diaphanum. Quemadmodum enim lux est perfectio diaphani, sic
intellectus agentis perfectio materialis; et quemadmodum diaphanum non
movetur a colore nisi quando lucet, ita iste intellectus non recipit
intellecta nisi secundum quod perficitur per illum intellectum.
Here there is noted an interchangeable use of the terms 'possibilis' and 'materialis', seemingly indicating that the meaning of the terms is the same. There is noted, too, the use of the Aristotelian terms 'actual' and 'potential', but these are used as regards potency and act on the part of the things known. That which is potentially intelligible becomes actually so by the illuminative power of the agent intellect. What about the subject which was potentially in the state of knowing, and then after being illuminated actually is in that state? Marston maintains that in the knowing of an immutable proposition something is as the matter, and this is what is in the phantasm and in the species, both of which are in the intellectual memory. Another, the formal element is the evidence of the infallible truth which it attains to the eternal reasons. Therefore, it is proper to consider such incommutable truths either according as they are represented in the species or in the eternal reasons.55

From the point of view of the object known, there is act and potency, inasmuch as what was potentially intelligible becomes actually so under the influence of the eternal light. The potential factor resides in the object known, or in the species and in the phantasm. The actual factor

55Ibidem, p. 262: Sciendum est quod in cognitione propositionum immutabilium aliquid est quasi materiale, apprehensio scilicet extremorum, puta totius et partis, et hoc est phantasmatis vel speciebus, quae sunt in memoria intellectuali; aliquid est formale, videlicet veritatis infallibilis evidentia, quae ex hoc habetur completive quod rationes aeternae aliqualiter attinguntur. Igitur talia incommutabilia convenit considerare vel secundum quod represeantantur in speciebus vel secundum quod represeantantur in rationibus aeternis.
resides in the possible or material intellect and in the object only after the potential has been realized by the agent operating on it. This education from potency to act seems to give the object known a sort of derived actuality. From the point of view of the knowing subject, the material factor is what is in the phantasms or the species. The formal factor is not the knower, as one might expect, but it is the evidence of the infallible truth which the knowing spirit has within itself in virtue of its having somehow attained to the eternal reasons. The knowing subject, it seems, is the occasion of the actualization of potential knowledge by the Eternal Light.

Strong as has been Marston's insistence on God's being the agent intellect, he has admitted that the soul may be illuminated incompletely by an agent intellect which is part of the soul.56 The activity exercised by this created agent intellect, (if that is what it is to be called), is incomplete and insufficient. It can not account fully for the attainment of immutable truth by the image of God. The eternal rules are needed necessarily for the genesis of truth in the creature. God is the light in which it knows. He is the source of truth which it finds. God is the artificer fashioning the possible intellect, the human soul, after Himself, the exemplar of Truth. God is the agent, the soul is the matter; He draws forth from its darkness the soul He has produced in creation by making its

56 Vide nota 4.
knowing in potency to be knowing in act. Creatively, conservatively, providentially, God is the efficient cause of the image's knowledge; naturally and co-operatively the image is the material cause. Thus perfect knowledge is achieved only in God.

In detail Marston has given an account of four operations specific to the agent intellect. By the light of this intellect the soul is made luminous, phantasms are discerned, propositions are made generally understood, and conclusions are drawn. Should the reader be tempted to assign these operations to a created intelligence, he is stopped by the conclusion which holds that these operations are in the highest degree and rightly proper to God Himself.\(^57\)

The proof of the first activity of the agent intellect is contained in the words of St. Augustine.\(^58\) In his 83 Various Questions, question 53, he has said that it is God only who illuminates our minds. Similarly in many other texts he has said that God only is above our minds, and that no creature is interposed between God and the rational soul.\(^59\) Hence, we

\(^{57}\) Marston, Quaest. III, p. 260: Ex iam dictis apparet manifeste quod quator sunt operationes intellectus agentis; nam suo lumine illustratur anima, discernuntur phantasmata, communicantur theorematum, declarantur ex principiis elicitum. Haec autem summa et proprie conveniunt ipsi Deo.

\(^{58}\) Cf. St. Augustine, 83 Quaestionum, q. 51, nn. 2 et 4, (PL 40, 32 sq.); q. 53, n. 2 (PL 40, 36); De Vera Relig. c. 55, n. 113; ibidem, c. 44, n. 92 (PL 34, 172, 159); et De Trin. XI, c. 5, n. 8 (PL 42, 990).

\(^{59}\) Marston, Quaest. III, pp. 260-1: Nam quod Deus solus nostram illuminet, dicit Augustinus, 83 Quaestionium, quaest. 53: "Quaedam," inquienia, Deus facit "per se ipsum, quae ipso solo digna sunt, sicut illuminare animas." Et, De Vera Religione, dicit: "Inter mentem nostram, qua illum intelligimus Patrem, et veritatem, id est lucem interiorem, per quam illum intelligimus, nulla interposita creatura est." Et huiusmodi sententiae pleni sunt libri Augustini.
must conclude that God enlightens our minds. That phantasms are enlightened and made known by the eternal light, the light of the agent intellect, has its proof also in the words of Augustine.\(^{60}\) The words of this same saint show too that the darkness of the phantasy is imbued with imperturbable eternity.\(^{61}\) Likewise, Augustine's words show that the propositions are beheld in the eternal light.\(^{62}\) Now, the making known of propositions concerns self-evident principles, and one cannot deny that it is in the immutable truth, which is neither yours nor mine, but the common possession of all, that all things are understood.\(^{63}\) Finally, the

\(^{60}\) Cf. St. Augustine, *de Trin.* IX, c. 6, n. 11 (PL 42, 967); *Ibidem,* IX, c. 3, n. 3 (PL 42, 962); *De Civ. Dei* 1, V, c. 9, n. 4 (PL 7, 151-2)


\(^{62}\) Cf. St. Augustine, *De Lib. Arb.* II, c. 10, n. 28 (PL 32, 1256); *Ibidem,* c. 12, n. 53 (PL 32, 1259)

\(^{63}\) Marston, *Quaest.* III, p. 261: *Item,* quod in lumine aeterno videantur theorematæ, hoc est propositiones per se notae, probat Augustinus diffuse, *De Libero Arbitrio,* lib. II, c. 9, et in fine concludit: Quapropter nullo modo negaveris incommutabilem veritatem, quam non possis dicere tuam vel meam, sed omnibus incommutabilia vera cernentibus, tamquam miris modis secretum et publicum lumen, praesto esse ac se praebere communiter.
conclusions from self-evident principles are drawn in the uncreated light or the eternal reasons. The youth interrogated on principles and conclusions in geometry, draws the proper conclusions, not because he is removing the veil of forgetfulness, but because his mind is subjected to the eternal reasons, and he thereby sees in what way conclusions are to be drawn from first or evident principles. 64

The agent intellect is not strictly speaking the created agent intellect, nor yet an influence of the uncreated light; but it is the uncreated light itself. This conclusion is, it seems, an accommodation of the doctrines of the Arabian philosophers and of Aristotle to the doctrine of St. Augustine. The uncreated intelligence is separated secundum esse et substantiam from the possible intellect of the rational soul, as Avicenna had said the created intelligence of Arabian philosophy is separated from the human soul; and as Aristotle had said the agent intellect was separated from the possible in a manner similar to the separation of the artist from the materials which he fashions. Being unable to allow that any created intellect could be separated in this fashion from the soul knowing, and that any created intellect could so

64 Ibidem, pp. 261-2: Tandem quod in lumine increato eliciantur ex principiis conclusiones, petet ex eodem Augustino, De Trinitate II, c. 14, ubi dicit: "Cum pervenitur, quantum fieri potest, ad rationes aeternas, non in eis manet ipse perventor, sed veluti acies ipsa reverberata repellitur et fit rei non transitoriae transitoria cogitatio, qua/transiens per disciplinas, quibus ereditur animus, memoriae commendatur, ut sit quo redire possit, quae cogitur inde transire." Hoc idem patet in capitulo sequenti, ubi diffuse docet quod puer, consequenter interrogatus de principiis et conclusionibus geometricis, vera respondet, quia mens eius, aeternis subjecta rationibus, in ipse luce videt quo modo ex principiis conclusiones eliciuntur.
operate on the mind of man that the four operations described above are attributable to it, and being unwilling to admit any intermediary between the rational soul and its model, Marston could but say that the enlightened mind makes its way to the hidden recesses of truth only in the light of the eternal rules. In the light of these rules the human soul knows, not in virtue of infallibility of truth in itself, but in virtue of the characteristics which mark the agent intellect as being the uncreated Truth itself.

The problem of the agent intellect presented itself to Roger Marston in much the same manner that it had presented itself to his predecessors. Marston's solution to the problem, however, differs from those of Alexander and Bonaventure, and more closely resembles the solution given by John Peckham. Bonaventure was willing to admit that there is an agent intellect which is part of the soul, just as long as natural knowledge is safeguarded and is not confused with 'special knowledge divinely given', and just as long as tradition can thereby cope with the growing popularity of Aristotelianism. Peckham, on the other hand, was less emphatic in maintaining the double agent intellect. He did grant that as the agent intellect moves the soul by transforming the possible intellect into the similitudes of things intelligible and by moving it so that it is applied to the eternal light, it is part of the soul.65 But such activity is merely preparatory for the complective activity of the uncreated agent intellect. This, too, is the position maintained by Marston, who does not

65 Vide c. 4, nota 27.
stop to consider the Aristotelian terms of potency and act as they regard the knowing subject himself, but only as they regard this subject in his knowing of immutable truth, the formal principle of which is the eternal light and the passive principle the receiving created intelligence.

God, then, is a light proportionate not to a created light but to the immutable light which the created light recognizes in all its acts of certain knowledge. God is the light of the mind, above the mind; on the mind, but not in it; superior to it and not equal to it. God prepares in His creative act an image, worthy to reflect truth and light; a creature ever seeking truth and needing it in all its acts; a creature, who when it knows, knows through Truth, and by Truth, and in Truth. The impotence of the creature and the omnipotence of the Creator indicate the conditions, both necessary and sufficient for human knowledge. And just as God is the initial term in the soul's search for truth, so He is the final term in the finding of it. Truth or knowledge comes from God and returns to Him, coming forth again from Him as the immutable source of the creature's knowledge. It is identical with God as regards its essence. It clothes with a new and superior mode of being the mind which It elucidates with actuality of knowing, the mind which It fashions after Light and which It draws ever to Itself.
CHAPTER VI

THE AGENT INTELLECT IN FRANCISCAN PHILOSOPHY

The Franciscans we have studied take their place as adherents to, and upholders and interpreters of, Augustinian tradition. As followers of St. Augustine, they are immediately established in a philosophic tradition other than that from which St. Thomas received his inspiration.

These followers of St. Francis of Assisi were conditioned by time and circumstances in such wise that they found it impossible to advocate tradition without in some way coming into contact with the novel doctrines of Aristotle. Contact with this 'new philosophy' meant that the Franciscans must defend their own position which the new philosophy threatened to replace. Need it be said that contact with Aristotle resulted in an infiltration of, at least, and Aristotelian terminology, and in some cases an infiltration and commingling of Aristotelian terminology and metaphysics with Augustinian?

The answers given by the Friars to the problem of the agent intellect testify to the depth of the penetration and to the strength of the grafting of the old on the new. These answers, given by way of interpretation of Augustine in terms of Aristotle and of Aristotle in terms of Augustine, are all the possible answers which could be proffered, and all of them bear resemblances to the philosophies of both St. Augustine and Aristotle.

This should be evident in the brief account rendered of the
Franciscans' views of the intellectual activity of the agent intellect. We have described the cognitive operation proper to this intellect in terms of the Franciscans themselves. We now ask if we can set forth one doctrine which in itself is genuinely Franciscan and which can be understood as being representative of the school itself. Our answer is negative. All possible answers have been proposed, and yet, not any one of them may be considered the climax and the final solution representative of Franciscan thought. It seems that no matter what the approach to the problem, no matter what the solution, the resourcefulness of Augustine is never exhausted. No one answer is sufficient to embody the fulness of Augustinian philosophy.

Now, a positive answer we might offer to the question asked ourselves could be formulated thus: Our Franciscans, guided by the same Christian theology and philosophy, but strongly influenced by the meanings which they themselves assigned to philosophic terms, seem to follow two general trends. Some of them, desirous of establishing and maintaining the sovereignty and supremacy of God, teach that the agent intellect is God. Others, seeking to establish that man, created to the image and likeness of God, must be endowed with faculties proper to a rational nature; and at the same time desiring to explain how a finite being may attain to immutable truth, say that there are created agent intellects and an uncreated agent intellect.

Alexander of Hales solved the problem by saying that God, the First Agent Intellect, created agent intellects, the activity of which was such
that intellection in the human soul could take place. This appears as a leaning on the words and the metaphysics of Aristotle, but it should not for that reason lead us to believe that Alexander is as Aristotelian as is, for example, St. Thomas of Aquin. Alexander's interpretation served to maintain that the human intellect always remains an intellect, that is a creature imaged after and imaging the Eternal Truth; and that God, the First cause in the order of Being, is the First cause in the order of Truth. Thus, although there are created agent intellects and even though these intellects operate efficiently in their own natural order to illuminate possible intellects, they can do so only in virtue of having received enlightenment from the First Agent Intellect. And, as Hales has said, these created agents are able to bring light to possible intellects only as regards some forms, and not as regards all forms, and this ability is conferred upon them in creation.¹

Now, following Aristotle, Alexander has taught that as regards the rational soul, the agent intellect and the possible intellect are its constitutive principles, but following Augustine he has said that the agent intellect is an illuminative power receiving light from on High and relying upon Eternal Truth Itself for the knowledge which it comprehends, just as the creature depends upon the creator for its creation.

Roger Bacon's approach is as markedly Aristotelian as Alexander's. He, however, found it hard to say that the agent intellect was part of the

soul. He holds, as does Hales, that the soul is a certain capacity for intelligibles, but he cannot say with Alexander that the rational soul has any de se efficiency for realizing and perfecting this capacity.

Indeed, all that Bacon will grant is that the human soul is the possible intellect, which needs an agent intellect, none other than God, to bring it forth from its potency to act.1

The very fact that necessary truth exists and that necessary truth cannot have as its source the mutable and contingent natures of creatures, and the obvious fact that finite minds know this necessary truth, requires and demands that creative truth which brought the rational soul from the state of nothingness to the state of real being, in some way continuously intervene to bring the creature across the measureless gulf from time to eternity, from the contingent to the necessary, from the mutable to the immutable. This explains why the rational soul, or possible intellect, needs an agent intellect which is God, to actualize its capacity for truth.

Any notion entertained by Bacon regarding created agent intellects was not seriously retained. This impetuous philosopher tells us that if we want to consider the rational soul as being actualized after enlightenment by God we may, but worthy of note is this: The human soul, educed from potency to act as regards intelligibles is still but an actualized possible intellect, and its thus being educed is not sufficient reason or warrant

1Cf. Chapter II, pp. 33-34; note 38, p. 46.
for our supposing that it is an agent intellect. Thus, there are not agent intellects, but there is an Agent Intellect, and the human soul is the intellectus possibilis as it functions actively and passively.

In Bacon's teaching the well-worn and oft-quoted texts of Aristotle are literally interpreted. The Philosopher has said in his De Anima that the agent intellect is related to the possible as the sun to the eye, or as the artisan to the materials he fashions. Now Bacon feels that he must interpret Aristotle in just the way Aristotle reads. Then, who can doubt that the sun is separated in its very being from the eyes receiving its light, and who is there to deny that God, the light of the mind, is separated from the mind irradiated with the brilliance of His Truth? Alexander, whom Bacon refers to as one of the neglected masters, had not found it necessary to abide by the words of Aristotle in just that way. He says that this analogy of the sun to the eye and of God to the mind is not needed; for surely, he argues, the soul would not have been created to the image of God but what God would have conferred upon it some perfection for the performing of its own proper operations. For Hales the human intellect supplies by its own activity something in the nature of efficient causality for perfecting itself, while for Bacon, God must be not only the Creator, but also the Ruler of the intellect and the cause of knowledge, and hence of truth, attained to and possessed by the human

3 Vide Appendix A, p. 126.
The other Franciscans treated in this paper follow closely the tradition established by St. Bonaventure. In their works we find not just the teacher-student and master-disciple trend, but likewise a doctrinal development growing out of the conclusions of one into the premisses of another. These mendicants of the Bonaventurian tradition, and Bonaventure himself, know and use the Aristotelian division of the intellectual powers. St. Bonaventure teaches, as Halensis had too, that there are both active and passive factors in every human soul, and consequently an acting intellect and a passive intellect. These principles constituting the rational soul are used by this Franciscan inasmuch as they serve to explain how the human spirit achieves knowledge by way of abstraction, or how knowledge of bodies is had. But, they are discussed when the Seraphic doctor describes how indubitable truth is possessed by a human intellect.

By having recourse to St. Augustine's theory of divine illumination St. Bonaventure found the solution to the perplexity of how a finite mind could grasp the immutable nature of stable truth from the fleeting things of time. His application of this theory was not the ready one which Bacon had used, but a careful and detailed interpretation of the implications entailed in all the possible uses of this theory. Always having before him the dignity of the image created to reflect and to know divine truth, and knowing that immutable truth needs as its source an immutable nature,

\[\text{Cf Chapter III, pp. 57-60.}\]
and realizing too that the created image does know for certain, Bonaventure refused to concede that the Eternal Rules are the whole and sole 'ratio' of the creature's knowledge.\(^5\)

Further, natural knowledge must be distinguished from infused knowledge; nature must be always credited with operations exercisable by it in relation to, but without being completely dependent upon, supernatural. At the same time God must be regarded as the first source of being, of Truth and Knowledge, of Light. So without saying that God was the sole reason for intellectual activity of the human reason, as Bacon had said in his synthesis of Christian and Greek philosophies, Bonaventure concludes that in all acts of certain knowledge two orders are needed: there must be on the part of the creature knowing, a created, contingent, temporal, finite order; and on the part of the intelligible there must be an uncreated, necessary, eternal, infinite order of Truth. And this explanation is in line with the teaching which came to Bonaventure from Alexander of Hales.

According to Bonaventure, the human soul must in 'someway' attain to the Eternal Verities or to the Divine Ideas in the Eternal Art. For this reason, just as Bonaventure says that in every cognitive act of the human intellect the interdependent and interoperative activity of the two principles constituting the human intellect is needed, so in every

\(^5\)Ibidem, and also note 28, p. 50-51.
intellection of true and certain knowledge the interaction of the temporal and eternal orders of Truth are necessary.

Bonaventure, in following his own considerations of the Christian and the Pagan, allows for created agent intellects, but finds necessary an uncreated Light. Bacon, bent upon rectifying faulty and poor translations of the Philosopher, decides and insists that the agent intellect can be none other than God. Hence, although Alexander, Bacon and Bonaventure were faced with the same perplexity, namely that of accounting for the knowledge of the unalterable by the changable, and although all had at their disposals the philosophies of Augustine and Aristotle, Alexander and Bonaventure give to the problem an answer differing greatly from Bacon's. Where they would safeguard the natural causality of the rational creature and bestow upon it from the beginning a dignity specifically befitting its nature, Bacon would give to God the natural created efficient causality. And where they would have an illumination protective of the autonomy of reason, Bacon would give us one reducing it.

Between Bonaventure and Bacon, there is another difference to be noted. Both consider the agent intellect and the possible intellect as the formal and material principles of cognition. Now, St. Bonaventure remarks that if the agent intellect is not part of the soul, and if the possible intellect is as the matter, then the 'anima rationalis' is reduced to the possible intellect, and therefore, to the material principle. If Bacon had read this he would probably have nodded in approval, because, for Bacon,
the rational soul and the possible intellect are the same. But Bonaventure
still anxious to preserve something besides passivity to the human soul
and anxious to safeguard the Augustinian principle of the spontaneity of
the soul, says, that if this is our conclusion, then we might as well
believe that anything having a material principle must have this same
possible intellect, and then indeed, why do we call one a possible
intellect and the other matter? 6

Acting and passive factors are necessary to explain the actions of
creatures who know-not and then know. This premise Peckham had inherited
from Aristotle by way of Bonaventure, but his treatment of the active
factor draws from Bonaventure's consideration of the nature of the Eternal
Reasons a little more of the nature of a uncreated agent intellect than
is understood in Bonaventure. In the soul itself, certainly, there must
be an active and a passive principle, because it is the soul which knows.
And, Peckham says that the agent intellect, as it is part of the soul,
transforms the possible intellect into the similitudes of intelligibles
and moves the possible intellect so that the intellect is brought to the
light conferring illumination from above. So, the created intellect,
agent and possible, is ordered to Creative Light, as to the origin and the
end of the incommutable truths which it grasps.

Now, this created agent intellect is more efficacious in its
operations than is the intellectus possibilis which Bacon had defined as

6Ibidem, pp. 50-51 and note 17, pp. 42-43.
the human soul; still it is not so efficacious as the created agent intellect described by Alexander and Bonaventure. Peckham, interpreting Aristotle's words in much the same way that Bacon had, holds that properly speaking the agent intellect must be God. This does not mean that Peckham holds that the sole cause of knowledge in the creature is God or that the creature is merely the material cause, but rather that God so cooperates in the intellectual operation by which the creature attains truth, that the creature is enabled to reach and grasp immutable truth. Since every operation is from God, the created intellect depends upon and is suspended from God as the Light which enlightens. Wherefore, rather than exclude the created agent intellect, Peckham's position includes it and the intelligible object as well. However, the created agent intellect cannot exercise its proper functions without the more-than-providential, the more-than-conserving cooperation of God, the enlightening light which is truly and really the agent intellect.7

Not so clearly defined is the created agent intellect described by Marston, Peckham's student. For him the created agent intellect is a created light, a light derived from the uncreated light. That this created agent intellect is not readily concluded from the text. However, his treatment of the 'lumen derivatum' is such that one is reminded of the

7Chapter IV, notes 16, 31, and 34.
created agent intellect in Peckham's treatise. Marston does not here assign a specific function to the created light, but he does maintain that this derived light is not self-sufficient in the attainment of truth.

Marston considers the human intellect as a created light derived from the uncreated light, and he thereby treats of two lights. The function of this created light is known in virtue of the distinction between what the soul sees in itself and what it sees in an eternal light. What is seen in itself it sees in a natural light, but it cannot be that immutable truth is seen in this same light. Rather we must say with Peokhmn that the soul regards immutable truth in the eternal light, which is the equivalent of saying that the soul knows in the Eternal Reasons, or that the soul in 'someway' attains to the Eternal Rules. So, from the Marstonian conclusions, it is understood that the agent intellect inasmuch as it sufficiently explains the attainment of eternal truth and simply natural, created truth, is God.8

Now, not only do Marston's conclusions lead to this, but his interpretations of Aristotle do also: The Philosopher has said that the agent intellect is separated 'secundum esse et substantiam' from the possible; that the agent intellect is incorruptible as regards both esse and substance; that the agent intellect is to the possible as the artist to the materials upon which he works; or as the light of the sun to colors. All these are comparable, neither to the rational soul nor to the angel, but to God Himself. Therefore the agent intellect is God.9

8Chapter V, notes 4, p. 86; 5, p. 86; 28, p. 96; 22, p. 94.

9Ibidem.
It is possible from all this to say that Marston resembles Peckham both in his generous tributes to the uncreated and in his limitations to created natures. In his considerations that the created intellect is efficacious he resembles the other Bonaventurians. His limiting and reducing of the creature's causality in the order of knowledge and his acknowledgement of the creature's need of Divine intervention in its intellectual activity, define the development which progresses from one philosopher's doctrine to another. Alexander's need of an Eternal Light becomes more pronounced in Bonaventure's 'someway' attainment of the Eternal Rules. This taken over by Peckham stressed the need of the Eternal Light by the created Agent intellect. Marston so worded the arguments for it that one could not help but feel that much more is granted to the nature of the First Efficient in the order of the creature's activity than is granted to the nature supposedly endowed with its own proper activities and the means of exercising them. Marston, taking this attitude from his master, gave still more to the causal action of divine light and less to God-imaged beings.

All these Christian philosophers were seeking a place for Augustine's divine illumination, which would in harmony with the current theory of Aristotle's abstraction. Thus they tried to declare at one and the same time that knowledge came from God, (and thus had its source in what is above the soul), and that knowledge had a natural order. In a doctrine of this kind, of course, the problem is the part left to the created
intellect, and more specifically to the created agent intellect. All
that can be said regarding the foundation natural to human knowledge in
terms of an Augustinian metaphysics has been said by these men, all of
whom are constantly recalling that eternal truth is the source of
irrefragible rational truth, that the eternal light is the source of
all created intellectual light. Truth above the mind, truth on the mind,
truth irradiating the mind, is the principle and the fount of human
wisdom. Without the interposition of any object, divine truth permeates
and completes created truth, thereby perfecting the human intellect.
Divine truth, being the First Truth in the order of Truth, is the first
cause of knowledge itself.

Let it be said that these Franciscans, guided by Augustine in their
interpretations of philosophic doctrines, are all agreed, despite the
broad surface differences in their solutions, that God is supra intelli-
gentiam sive humanam vel angelicam, that God is separated as the infinite
from the finite, as the eternal from the temporal, as the changeless from
the changing; He is separated, in the Latinized words of Aristotle,
secundum esse et substantiam. All the Friars seem to maintain that
complete truth requires more than that the creature know. The created
intellect must in some way know in the completeness, in the fulness, and
in the richness of the Eternal Verities. And so, although in the main
their common doctrines were taken from Augustine and Aristotle, it must be
held that in this description of Franciscan views of intellectual activity
there is not given a closed theory of knowledge.
APPENDIX A

We have not been able to find a text of Aristotle's De Anima, III, 5, which fits precisely the quotations of Roger Bacon. In lieu of that we have thought it best to give the translation given by Pirotta in his edition of the Commentary of St. Thomas on the De Anima, which text Pirotta attributes to Wm. of Moerbecke. In this we have at least a contemporary text.

ARISTOTLE: De Anima, III, c. 5, Bkkr. 430a 10-26
(Pirotta: Com. S. Thomae Aquinatis in Aris-
totelis Librum De Anima, III, lect. X; Taurini, 1925)

Quoniam autem sicut in omni natura est aliquid, hoc quidem materis
unicuique generi, hoc autem est potentia omnis illa, alterum autem causa
et factivum, quod in faciendo omnia, ut ars ad materiam sustinuit, necesse
et in anima has esse differentias. Et est intellectus hic quidem talis
in omnis fieri, ille vero in omnia facere, sicut habitus quidam, et sicut
lumen. Quodam enim modo, et lumen facit potentia existentes colores, actu
colores.

Et hic intellectus separabilis, et impassibilis et immixtus,
substantia actu ens. Semper enim honorabilius est agens patience, et
principium materia.

Idem autem est secundum actum scientia rei; quae vero
secundum potentiam, tempore prior in uno est. Omnino autem neque tempore.
Sed non aliquando quidem intelligit, aliquando non intelligit.
Separatus autem est solum hoc, quod vere est. Et hoc solum
immortale et perpetuum est.

Non reminiscitur autem, quia hoc quidem impassibile est;
passivus vero intellectus, est corruptibilis, et sine hoc nihil intelligit
anima.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BIBLIOGRAPHY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Alexander of Hales:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Anselm, St.:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Patrologia Latina</em>, vol. 158.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Aristotle:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>De Anima</em>: Versio Antiqua; in Pirotta: S. Thomae Aquinatis, In Aristotelis Librum de Anima Commentarium; Taurini, 1925.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Augustine, St.:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bacon, Roger:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>J.S. Brewer: <em>Opera Quaedam Haecetenus Inedita</em>: London, 1859.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>R. Steele: <em>Opera Haecetenus Inedita</em>: 7 fasc. Oxford, 1926. (fasc. 1 et 2 used.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Bonaventure, St.:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>De Humanae Cognitionis Ratione</em>: Anecdota Quaedam S. Bonaventurae et nonullorum ipsius Discipulorum; Quarrachi, 1883.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>De Wulf, Maurice:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Gilson, E.:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The <em>Philosophy of St. Bonaventure</em>, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1940.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Marston, Roger:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Peckham, John:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Quaestiones tractantes de Anima</em>, in Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Baeumker and V. Hertling, Munster, 1916-1918, vol. 19, bund xix, Heft, 5-6; edited by Dr. P. Hieronymus Spettmann, O.F.M.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Roehmer, J.:</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>La theorie de l'abstraction dans l'ecole franciscaine d' Alexandre de Hales a Jean Peckham; in Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age, 1928, vol. 3.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>