Spain in the Mississippi Valley and the Iowa Country

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SPAIN IN THE MISSISSIPPI VALLEY AND THE IOWA COUNTRY

by

Lawrence A. Doll

A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts, in History, at Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois.

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VITA

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CHAPTER I

EARLY EXPLORATIONS AND SETTLEMENTS IN THE LOWER MISSISSIPPI VALLEY BY SPAIN

The formal history of the Mississippi Valley can be said to have its beginning with the invasion of that region by the Spaniard, Hernando de Soto. While he is quite generally credited with having been the first white man to set eyes on the great river that drains this vast area of land, it is probable that the ill-fated Narváez expedition came rather close to the river's mouth. A leader of indomitable will and unswerving purpose, De Soto, a conquistador, had already won his spurs on the west coast of South America when Spain first began her inroads on that continent. Having been a member of Pizarro's expedition against Peru, he had acquired a considerable amount of booty from these sources and had retired to Spain to live a life of ease and contentment. He had married the Castilllan dame of his choice and proceeded to surround himself with every luxury. Apparently, then, his reasons for once more subjecting himself to the hardships of the New World were his inordinate ambition coupled with a desire for increased riches.

Among the few survivors of the Narváez expedition was one, Alvar Núñez Cabeza de Vaca, who probably contributed heavily toward De Soto's decision to have another try at the New World adventure. De Vaca had spent the years 1528 to 1536 wandering about what is now the southwestern part of the United States and in Mexico before finally returning to Spain. He related wondrous tales he had heard of the tremendous riches of gold and silver existing in this region. Sooner or later such stories reached the ears of
De Soto and his imagination soon began to function. He was anxious to conquer new tribes, gain wealth and perform deeds that would surpass those of Cortes in Mexico and Pizarro in Peru. Imbued with such hopes and ambitions, he applied to the King for a concession to carry out his scheme. On April 20, 1537, the concession was granted and according to its terms De Soto was appointed to the government of the Island of Cuba and was required to conquer, in person, the land of Florida and to occupy the same within a year, erect fortresses and carry over at least five hundred men as settlers to hold the country. 1

After some time spent in picking his men and organizing the group, De Soto led his expedition from Spain in the following year, 1538, landing first at Santiago and then proceeding to Havana. From here the expedition set out for Florida on May 18, 1539, arriving at the Bay of Espiritu Santo seven days later. At this time the group was composed of five hundred and seventy men, two hundred and twenty three horses, in five ships, two caravels and two pinnaces. 2

With the line of march followed by De Soto, this paper is not concerned. 3 Suffice it to say that after long months of marching, during which De Soto and his men endured extreme hardships and many discouraging battles with the natives, the expedition arrived at the Mississippi River, near the present site of Memphis. This feat appears to make De Soto the first European to view that majestic body of water, at least from that distance inland.

1. Justin Winsor, ed. Narrative and Critical History of America, Boston and New York, 1886, II, 245. The manuscript of this concession is preserved in the Hydrographic Bureau at Madrid.
2. Ibid., 245.
Wandering at the mighty turbid stream, with its strange looking fish and the trees, which having been uprooted some distance above, came floating down the muddy waters, a crossing was finally made at the lowest Chickasaw Bluff. 4

Once attaining the west bank of the river, De Soto continued his March northward in quest of the provinces of Pacaha and Chisca, these having been reported as abounding in gold. From Pacaha, expeditions were sent out in all directions. One of these likely approached the Missouri River but learned nothing of it. Finally despairing of ever finding the coveted treasures of gold and silver, De Soto moved southward, roaming about the vicinity of the Arkansas and Red Rivers, at last entering the town of the cacique of Guachoyanques, at the mouth of the Red River. Here De Soto fell victim of the fever, succumbing on May 21, 1542, his followers burying him in the great river which he had called the "Rio Grande". The remnants of the expedition attempted to reach Mexico by land under the direction of Luis de Moscoso. Failing in this, they returned to the river, floating down the Mississippi in some self-constructed brigantines, eventually reaching the Spanish settlement at Tampico.

Thus one phase of the early Spanish explorations in the lower Mississippi Valley came to an inglorious end. The expedition is significant in that it gave the Indians of this region "their first taste of European conquest. The next intruders, the Anglo-Saxons, not hunting gold but land,

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4. Winesor, Ibid., 251. Louis Houck, History of Missouri, Chicago, 1908, I, 99, argues that the crossing was effected below the mouth of the St. Francois River. All of these arguments are superseded by "The Final Report of the United States De Soto Expedition Commission" which places the point of crossing near Sunflower Landing which is about twenty-five miles south of Friars Point. See "Final Report," 234-247.
changed the Spanish practice of piecemeal destruction to wholesale. It contributed some knowledge of geography and of the Indian societies. This contribution, however, was very limited for no great pains were taken either to note the topography or the language of the various tribes. It did, however, afford conclusive proof that this particular region contained no rich kingdom and afforded little inducement for settlements.

De Soto was not alone in being stirred by the fantastic tales of Cabeza de Vaca, for at the same time he was roaming about the lands of Arkansas, in his fruitless search for wealth, another expedition was moving in on the same region and for identical purposes but from a different direction. This expedition was under the direction of Coronado, who had left Compostela on February 23, 1540, with the avowed intention of discovering the fabled Seven Cities of Cibola. It took only a short time, however, to convince him that no such cities existed and that the nearest approach to a Cibola was a group of pueblos of the Zuñi Indians. Moreover, any thoughts that he might have entertained of finding great stores of gold were soon dissipated.

After sending several scouting expeditions in various directions from these pueblo settlements, word was finally received of a wealthy settlement still farther to the east and called Quivira. With renewed hope, Coronado and his entire band set out in search of this new land, eventually crossing the Arkansas River and reaching the Kansas of today. This paper is not concerned with attempting to establish the exact location of Quivira. Many articles have been written and various opinions have been advanced as to its

exact location. It is enough to say, as far as this paper is concerned, that the expedition at least touched the fringe of the Mississippi Valley and that, like De Soto, Coronado failed to find the fabulous wealth that had been expected. Neither did he find the Seven Cities of Cibola. In their stead he encountered a great deal of native barbarism. Consequently, he returned to Mexico as rapidly as possible, not only a disappointed man but in utter disgrace at having failed to accomplish his main objective.

Thus it was that the second phase of early exploration and conquest in the Mississippi Valley, by the Spaniards, came to an abrupt end, with much learned about what was not to be found in the central lands. That the two great conquistadores were within reach of one another at one time or other is not improbable. Winsor tells us that Coronado actually heard of his countryman and sent him a letter; but the messenger failed to find the De Soto party. Had fate decreed that the two men should meet, quite a different story might have resulted.

With the failure of these two expeditions, Spanish activity in the Mississippi Valley came to a temporary halt and was now confined to the mines and missions of Mexico and our southwest and to the occupation of Florida and Georgia. The primary objectives of these early expeditions into the Valley were to find gold and silver and to conquer the natives. Both objectives failed for the precious metals were conspicuous by their absence and the

7. There is an exhaustive twelve volume project on, "The Coronado Country", in the making, to be published by the University of Arizona in conjunction with the University of New Mexico. This work is to commemorate the deeds of Coronado and will likely be published this year (1940).

8. Winsor, Ibid., II, 292. The "Report of the De Soto Expedition Commission" points out that, while the routes of Coronado and De Soto may have come close, the two men were never within hundreds of miles of each other.
natives just could not be conquered. Some of the land might have been pro-
fitably tilled but Spain was not particularly interested in expanding her em-
pire, especially in such an aggressive manner. With the recent discovery of
gold and especially silver in Mexico, there was no reason to display any fur-
ther interest in the Valley proper save as a means of defense for her wealthy
kingdom to the south. Thus her interest in the Mississippi and its adjacent
lands consisted for some time of nothing more than a series of attempts to
occupy the land against intruders.

So it was that the spirit of adventure was not permitted to die
with De Soto. Between the years 1544 and 1557 several attempts were made to
occupy Florida and the Gulf region. Father Olmos suggested missionary work
in Florida as well as along the Rio Grande and in the Mobile Bay Country.
Fray Luis Cancer attempted missions about Tampa Bay but was murdered by the
natives. Father Canillas wrote to the king of the advantages of Mobile Bay
as a base to conquer the interior, as did also the Archbishop of Mexico.
Even the Viceroy of Mexico, Velasco, urged conversion of the Gulf region.9
To all such suggestions the king remained adamant. Finally, due to a report
that Frenchmen were approaching Florida to buy Indian "gold, pearls, martin
skins and other things", Philip II changed his mind and ordered the Viceroy
of Mexico to appoint a governor of Florida to organize and administer the
area. For this undertaking Velasco chose Don Tristan de Luña, who after
wandering about for some time eventually set up a colony at Mobile Bay. It
was, however, abandoned by his successor, Villafañe, in 1561. Thus while

Quarterly, 936-938, gives a brief but fine survey of these early attempts
at occupation.
10. Ibid., 937-938.
the traditional Spanish advance into the lower Mississippi Valley was con-
tinued and several attempts were made to occupy it, little real attention was
given to the lower Valley proper.

While Spain remained somewhat inactive in the lower Valley, the
next century and a half witnessed a considerable amount of activity through-
out the entire Mississippi Valley by the French. The impetus came from the
north and worked south toward the Gulf, having been started by the discovery
of the river by Jolliet and Father Marquette in the name of France. It is
not improbable, however, that the coureur du bois had become acquainted with
the Upper Valley some years earlier.

In 1682, just nine years after the French discovery of the river,
La Salle sailed to the mouth of the Mississippi and took formal possession
of the entire Valley, in the name of France, and bestowed the name of Louisi-
ana upon the entire region.

After his voyage down the river, La Salle returned to France to
gain the permission of the king to erect his forts and develop the fur trade.
It was while in France that he was made a partner to a new scheme whereby a
fort might be built close enough to Mexico for an attack on the Spanish mine
therein. This scheme had previously found no place in his original plans.

In 1684 La Salle returned with a party, making an original landing at Mata-
gorda Bay, Texas, but eventually moving the colony inland to the Garcitas
River and about five miles below its mouth. A series of expeditions to find

11. Jean Delanglez, Some La Salle Journeys, Chicago, 1939, 43-61, gives
definite proof of the priority of Jolliet and Marquette in the discovery
of the Mississippi.
12. Ibid., 65-99, is a critical study of the projected La Salle-Penalosa
scheme in which the author interprets, very clearly, the schemes of such
men as Bernou and Seignelay.
13. Herbert E. Bolton, "The Location of La Salle's Colony on the Gulf of Mex-
ico", Mississippi Valley Historical Review, II (Sept., 1915), 177-178.
the Mississippi followed and on the fourth of these La Salle was murdered. By 1689 the balance of colony had been wiped out by an Indian massacre. So ended the first attempts of the French to colonize the lower section of the Valley. La Salle's occupation of Matagorda Bay is significant in that it later became a basis of the claim of the United States to Texas. It also aroused the Spaniards to defensive moves into Texas, as will be seen shortly.

Failure of the La Salle colony did not put an end to the French exploration of the southwest. There was perennial interest in a passage to the South Sea and the French frontier was always willing to listen to tales of Spanish treasure. The couriers de bois were ever led west in their future trading operations. The result was that in this section the traders from Canada roamed far and wide at an early date. Before 1688 a Canadian is known to have reached the Rio Grande and by 1694 such traders were well established among the Missouri and Osage Indian tribes. In addition to such dangers there was always the possibility of French piratical raids in the Gulf region, on Florida and even on Mexico itself, whose mines were a lodestone for all foreigners. Also, a fort such as La Salle's would definitely bisect the Spanish control of the Gulf region from Florida to Mexico.

The Spanish officials of New Spain had from time to time heard of the various activities of the French in the vicinity of the lower Valley. As the French menace grew, however, and the actual danger to their possessions developed and increased, these officials began to realize that some definite steps must be taken to arrest the French advance and to establish an actual claim to the territory which they always looked upon as rightfully

belonging to the Spanish Crown. Once the seriousness of the French menace was
fully realized, Spain decided the time was at hand when she must not only oc-
cupy but control the lower portion of the Valley as well.

The Spanish frontier had begun to move northward from New Spain some
years earlier and this move was inevitable as well as natural. As the mines
of Mexico became exhausted, the search for new mines went ever onward and, for
the most part, northward. Consequently, the first moves were outside of the
Mississippi Valley proper. They had begun as early as 1581-1585, when such
men as Rodriguez and Espejo led expeditions into the land of the Pueblo In-
dians. Others followed suit and resulted in the settlements of New Mexico by
Cóate and Santa Fe by Peralta. 15

From Santa Fe the lines of advance spread out in all directions,
with the principal ones leading to the north and northeast and one going east
into Texas. Still another line of advance from Mexico led to the establish-
ment of Nueva León. As was the custom, the missionaries were the pioneers in
these advances. By 1670 the frontier had been pushed as far as Coahuila,
from whence the missionary work extended across the Rio Grande River, under
the direction of the Franciscan, Juan Larios. The work of Father Larios
brought the Tejas Indians, living afar to the east on the Louisiana border,
to the attention of the officials of New Spain. 16

Meanwhile, expeditions were moving to the east, toward Texas, from
the missions of New Mexico. The first lure in this direction was the Jumano

15. Thomas, After Coronado, 5-7, for a complete survey of these early move-
ments. See also, Bolton, Spanish Explorations in the Southwest, New York
1916, 135-160.
Indians. By 1650 the land of the Tejas, some fifty leagues beyond the border of the Jumano, was reached. Pearls were now discovered on the Nueces River and so a new lure to the east attracted some. Further progress in the eastward advance, however, seems to come to a temporary end by 1659.

The next expedition of importance came in 1683 at which time Juan Domingo de Mendoza, together with Fathers López and Zavala moved north as far as the San Clemente River. The expedition is significant inasmuch as it became a basis for future attempts to occupy the region with soldiers and missionaries. Nothing was done immediately, however, for just at this time the French menace on the Gulf coast became the all-important interest.

That the news of La Salle’s expedition was startling to both Spain and Mexico goes without saying. From the latter point there came prompt action; for almost immediately there began a series of counter expeditions against the French. Four of these were by sea and five by land and all had the common purpose of finding La Salle.

The water expeditions accomplished little. Those by land, all of which were under the direction of Alonso de León, were somewhat successful. The third expedition discovered the actual existence of Frenchmen in Texas, while the fourth, in 1689, found the remains of the La Salle colony. On the return trip a conference was held with the chief of the Nasedache Indians. This chief informed León and Father Massenet, who had accompanied Leon on this final expedition, that missionaries would be most welcome by his

17. Bolton, "The Jumano Indians in Texas, 1650-1771", Texas State Historical Association Quarterly, XV, 71-74, for a good account of these Indians.
18. "The Itinerary of Mendoza", Bolton, Spanish Explorations, 314. The full itinerary gives a detailed account of Mendoza’s expedition as well as the farthest point north reached by him.
The Spaniards now had a two-fold reason for advancing into Texas. First there was the danger of the French. To this was now added the possibility of a rich missionary field among the Tejas Indians. In 1691 León and Father Massenet embarked on the fifth of the original land expeditions. Primarily it was to establish missions among the Indians, although it was also expected to retard the French advance. The party moved on to the La Salle settlement, which, incidentally, was burned by Father Massenet, and thence north and to the east. The goal was reached on May 22, with the establishment of the mission of San Francisco de Los Tejas. This was the beginning of the Spanish settlement in the land called Texas, as well as the end of the career of León.

There was still to be one more expedition into Texas before the close of the century. This one got under way in 1691, and was directed by Captain Domingo Terán. It had for its motives the four-fold purpose of strengthening the existing missions, building new missions, looking for and seeking out any Frenchmen or other foreigners, and learning as much as possible about the country and the natives. The immediate objective was the Cadodacho Indians and the destination was reached with little difficulty. Terán, however, did little to fulfill his instructions. By 1693 the missionaries were forced to abandon their work in the region and Spain once more

19. Bolton, Spanish Explorations, 348, for a brief account of these explorations. For the complete story of the missionary building and occupation of Texas, the reader is referred to the works of Carlos Castañeda, Our Catholic Heritage in Texas, 1519-1936, Austin, 1936, 1938, I, II, and III.

seemed ready to leave the territory, at least temporarily. This abandonment was to last for approximately twenty years. In the meantime, possession of the land reverted to the savage tribes.

Meanwhile Spain had become temporarily interested in establishing herself on the other side of the Mississippi River and in the vicinity of Florida. Pensacola Bay became the center of activity and the object was to control the mouth of the great river as well as the entire Gulf region. This region had become a bone of contention between Spain and France and even Great Britain, to a limited extent, ever since La Salle’s ill-fated attempt to colonize the mouth of the Mississippi. We are told that the settlement of Pensacola Bay might seem but "an insignificant incident in that dramatic interplay of national aspirations. Yet, for a short period at least, possession of this seaport was deemed of paramount importance and possibly a key position of the whole Gulf region." And so, the race between Spain and France for occupation was on, and as far as Spain was concerned this occupation became but the other half of the two-fold plan to control the Gulf region and combat the French menace, made so obvious by La Salle.

The man eventually chosen to establish the settlement at Pensacola Bay was Don Andrés de Arriola y Guzman. His instructions required him to begin the work of fortification immediately upon arrival; if the French were

22. Irving Leonard, "Don Andrés de Arriola and the Occupation of Pensacola Bay". New Spain and the Anglo-American West, Lancaster, 1932, I, 81-82. See also, William Edward Dunn, "Spanish and French Rivalry in the Gulf Region of the United States", University of Texas Bulletin, (Jan.20,1917) who points to Andres de Pez as the man most intimately associated with the early movement to occupy Pensacola Bay. Although his scheme was strenuously opposed by the Marquis La Granja, Pez and Dr. Carlos de Sigüenza y Góngora were appointed to lead an exploring expedition to the bay. On their recommendations Arriola’s expedition was commissioned.
already in possession he was to dislodge them in a general engagement if his forces were adequate. If the French were found to be too well entrenched he was to return to Vera Cruz until further measures could be decided upon. Arriola was apparently none too enthusiastic about the plan from the very beginning and adverse weather encountered on the way chilled what little enthusiasm he had managed to generate.

The expedition left Vera Cruz on October 15, 1698. About a week later, and apparently unknown to the Spaniards, a French expedition under Iberville left Brest. And so the race for occupation of the northern shore of the Gulf was on in earnest. Arriola's expedition arrived at Pensacola Bay on November 21 and found the place already occupied by Captain Juan Jordan de Reina who had arrived a few days earlier with an expedition from Havana.

On the morning of January 26, 1699, Iberville reached the Bay and discerning the Spanish ships in the fog, anchored some distance away. There was an exchange of notes between the two commanders, each trying to find out as much about the other without telling too much about himself and his own plans. Finally on January 29 the French ships sailed away in the direction of Mobile Bay, much to the relief of Arriola.

During his entire stay at Pensacola Bay, Arriola seems to have done nothing to encourage a permanent settlement. His reports were filled with the most discouraging notes and he kept trying to be relieved of his duties. Finally, he was granted permission to return to Vera Cruz, arriving there in August of 1700. Irving Leonard appraises his work in the following manner:

23. Leonard, Ibid., 91.
24. Ibid., 91.
25. Ibid., 92-93.
26. Ibid., 94-101. See also, Dunn, Ibid., 181-183.
"All unwillingly and against his better judgment he had been the involuntary instrument in establishing the exceedingly weak hold which Spain had tardily seized on this disputed borderland... Pensacola Bay was for sometime to remain the possession of Spain as a sort of bulwark against the encroachment of the French colony and, perhaps, proved a weak but effective barrier to French expansion into Spanish Florida. Thus Don Andrés de Arriola may have unwittingly and unintentionally performed the most lasting of all his services to the Spanish crown." 27

Thus while Spain, for a few years, concentrated her efforts in occupying Florida and the region east of the Mississippi, she had paid little attention to Texas and the country immediately to the west of the river. This comparative inattention was short lived, however, for in the meantime the French busied themselves in an effort to establish control of the mouth of the river. In 1699 the great Iberville had established a settlement at Biloxi, shortly to be moved to Mobile. From here, French influence spread among the Indians on both sides of the river. About 1705 it is said that a French officer from Louisiana had traversed the country of Texas as far as Coahuila. In 1713 the French governor of Louisiana, Cadillac, authorized Louis St. Denis to visit the old Spanish missions to the west to purchase stock. This visit was not for political encroachment, as the Spaniards might have thought, but rather to open commercial relations with the Spanish settlements. The boldness of St. Denis, however, awakened the Mexican authorities to a realization of how easily that territory might be lost.

As a consequence, on December 2, 1716, a junta de guerra was held in Mexico to consider Spanish interests in Texas. The value of the province, the danger of the French encroachment, and the urgent importance of occupying the region on a secure basis were set forth in their strongest light.

27. Ibid., 101-102.
Accordingly, it was decided to strengthen the military force, to send a better class of soldier-settlers, to adopt strict measures of precaution against contraband trade, to establish a new mission nearer Coahuila than there already existed, and to send a competent governor to rule over Texas and Coahuila. 28

The first effort to carry out the recommendations cited came the same year, 1716, when Captain Ramon led an expedition across the Rio Grande into the country of the Asinai, and built four missions near the Neches and Angelina rivers. A short time later a mission was established at Los Adaes on the Red River and not far from the French settlement of Natchitoches. 29

In 1718 and just a few months before the founding of New Orleans, a base was established at San Juan, midway between New Spain and Los Adaes. The same year a settlement consisting of a mission and a presidio was founded at San Antonio, under the direction of Father Olivarres.

Spain had at last occupied eastern Texas. Yet her hold on the region was not to remain undisturbed. Within a short time Spain and France were at war in Europe and the effects were felt by the territories each controlled in the New World. The French soon moved into Spanish territory from Natchitoches, then by way of the Red and Arkansas rivers, while still other groups moved on toward New Mexico by way of the Platte and Missouri rivers. 30

Spain protested such activities and even took some steps to halt them, such as

29. The Spanish missionaries have often been accused of practically inviting the French into Texas in order to arouse Spain to create missions there. This was especially true of Father Hidalgo. For an account of his letters to the French governor at New Orleans, see Bolton, Athanase De Mezières, Cleveland, 1914, 35, 36.
30. Thomas, After Coronado, 36, for a survey of French thrusts into Spanish territory.
the usual building of missions, sending of small re-enforcements of soldiers, arresting those who penetrated for illicit trade when this was deemed necessary, and similar actions. Always, however, she refrained as much as possible from actual attack and this, in spite of the fact that the French were effectively blocking the overland routes of the Spaniards. So valuable were the alliances made with the Indians that it may be said that at almost any time the French might have sufficiently aroused the Indians to drive Spain completely out of the region. Especially was this true around Los Adas and Natchitoches, where the two groups lived in comparative harmony, once the European wars were over. The Spaniards could not, therefore, afford to use any more forceful methods with the French.

With the close of the Seven Years' War, France was removed from North America. By treaty she had turned over all of Louisiana to Spain in 1762. The latter now had under her control not only the mouth of the Mississippi and the adjacent lands, but the shores of the entire Gulf of Mexico as well. Aside from occasional small skirmishes over trade privileges, France no longer worried Spain in America. Almost immediately, however, a new and more annoying menace reared up and made its presence felt. This was the determined English advance along the Mississippi Valley to take the Indian trade away from Spain.
CHAPTER II

SPANISH CONTROL OF NEW ORLEANS AND LOUISIANA TERRITORY

When the French inhabitants of Louisiana were informed of the fact that their "homeland" had been ceded to Spain, they were considerably disturbed. Frenchmen in this territory held little love for the Spaniards and so it was only natural that they should protest the move. Almost immediately they made representations to the French government but all seemed to fall on deaf ears for their protestations were in vain. Despite their failures, however, they began to feel that the treaty cession would not be carried out; and their feelings were founded on circumstances which seemed exceptionally favorable to their wishes. The treaty calling for the transfer of the lands from France to Spain had been signed late in 1762. Sometime later the French governor, D'Abbadie, had been instructed to turn over the colony to the first Spanish officer who should present himself with the necessary powers. Came the Spring of 1765 and still no Spanish official had put in his appearance. The colonists, therefore, could hardly be blamed for their belief that Spain was not intending to take over Louisiana.

The hopes of these loyal French settlers were soon to be shattered. On July 10, 1765, word came from Havana that Don Antonio de Ulloa had arrived at that point and would shortly proceed to New Orleans for the purpose of taking over the former colony. What a discouragement this must have been to the French settlers. But once again they were buoyed up in their hopes, for months passed and Ulloa had not put in his promised appearance. The people
naturally began to feel that the treaty of cession was nothing more than a sham, announced in order to conceal some diplomatic maneuver.

But once again these high hopes were to be blasted, for on March 6, 1766, Ulloa landed at New Orleans. With him were two companies of infantry under the command of Don Pedro Piernas. The reception accorded Ulloa could hardly be expected to be an enthusiastic one for his appearance was the unwanted answer to their hopes. We are told that he "was received with dumb respect".  

The new governor certainly did not follow his instructions by showing his powers and taking formal possession of the colony. Although the inhabitants of the colony prevailed upon him to show his credentials and take over control of Louisiana, he steadfastly refused to do so. Neither did he proclaim Spanish rule, as might be expected. On the contrary, he left the French Commandant, Aubry, in office and command and ruled through him. The French Superior Council continued to function and actually assumed more authority than it had previously enjoyed, although much of this was made necessary because of the situation.  

As has been stated, Ulloa ruled through the medium of Aubry and began to restrict the rights of the people, particularly with reference to the commerce of the colony, and it was not long until there was a popular response in the form of objection to such rule as well as further demands that Ulloa show his credentials and take over the actual rule of the colony.

It would be well to consider the condition of the colony at the time it was ceded to Spain by the French. At that time the population was

estimated variously from 8250 to 11,500, over half of whom were negroes. The chief occupations were the cultivation of rice, indigo and tobacco; grain in limited amounts, flour being imported; stock raising being followed on a very small scale. In 1762 the trade in indigo amounted to about 82,000 pounds. This, however, was ruined by the transfer to Spain for the French market, for the commodity was not cut off. The lumber exports to the French West Indies for the eight previous years had amounted to 180,000 livres annually, the return cargoes being made up of sugar and liquors. The fur trade was a rather important industry also. The finances, however, were in a deplorable state. Paper money was about the only form of currency and this had little or no value.  

To add to this state of economic confusion, Ulloa, on September 6, 1766, issued his Royal Schedule pertaining to commerce. According to this schedule, the trade of Louisiana was confined to six ports of the peninsula, namely, Seville, Alicante, Carthagena, Malaga, Barcelona and Coruna. All trade, moreover, was to be carried on in Spanish built vessels, owned and commanded by the king's subjects. Any vessel sailing to or from Louisiana were prohibited from entering any other port in the Spanish dominion of America, except in case of distress, and they were then subjected to strict examination and heavy charge.  

A subsequent schedule of 1768 gave several exemptions to the commerce of Louisiana, however.  

The issuance of this schedule was the first attempt that Ulloa made to carry out his orders. However, well-intentioned it may have been, the act


only succeeded in arousing or stimulating the ill will of those classes in New Orleans whose interests were affected. These people cherished their freedom of commerce with the French Islands and with the savage nations, as well as illicit trade with the English. Prosperity, in fact, the very life of the colony, depended upon such commerce. How natural, then, the resentment toward Ulloa for his action, and the increased demands that he show his powers.

Despite the repeated demands of the Superior Council that he publish his commission and take actual command of the colony, Ulloa persistently refused. Finally, becoming enraged at his refusals to take charge, the colonists rose up in opposition and petitioned him to leave the colony. This he did with apparent willingness late in the Fall of 1768. The colony was now left with no ruling authority from Spain and only the old Superior Council to take charge of affairs.

This situation did not last for long. On July 24, 1769, New Orleans was thrown into violent commotion by the news that a formidable Spanish Fleet had made its appearance at the Balize; that General Alexander O'Reilly was the officer in charge and the person in whom the court of Madrid had vested authority to take possession of Louisiana; and that he brought with him such large forces that any resistance or attempt at such would be useless.

Within a short while, O'Reilly had dispatched an envoy to the French commander, Aubry, informing him by means of a written communication

6. Documents containing the charges lodged against Ulloa by the colonists are printed in Aloe Fortier, History of Louisiana, Paris, 1904, I, Ch. XI; the petition is in Charles Gayarre, History of Louisiana, New York, 1854, II, 367-383.
7. Winston, loc. cit., 195, points out that the exact date of departure is open to question.
the object of his mission and requesting him to take all necessary measures
to facilitate the transfer of Louisiana from France to Spain and the "execu-
tion of the designs of their respective sovereigns". O'Reilly took actual
possession of the colony on August 18.

Meanwhile, the new governor proceeded to investigate the recent up-
rising which ended only with the withdrawal of Ulloa from Louisiana. The in-
formation which he sought was not difficult to obtain, for it was given freely
and readily by Captain Aubry, who had been more or less in charge of Louisiana
since the death of D'Abbadie. From Aubry, O'Reilly found out who had been
the leaders of this revolt as well as the grounds for their actions. We are
told that Aubry wrote a black page in the history of the lower Mississippi
Valley. He secretly noted and observed the actions as well as the utterances
of the ringleaders of the incipient revolt, preparing to interpret the same
in terms of treason and rebellion when the opportunity came. He turned in-
former, as it were, for his own ends and on his own countrymen. For that
reason, much of the blame for what followed should be given to Aubry rather
than O'Reilly. The latter was entirely unacquainted in the colony. He had
to turn to someone for his information and as Aubry had been more or less in
charge of affairs he was the natural one to whom O'Reilly should turn. Once
the investigation was completed, those involved were brought to trial and of
the leaders who were found guilty of the charges placed against them all save
one were put to death, imprisoned or exiled. O'Reilly has been charged with
duplicity in this affair and this seems to be unfair to him. Several members

   The author has very fair and impartial account of O'Reilly's activities
   in chapters IX and X. See also his History of Louisiana for a more de-
tailed account.
of the old Superior Council begged leniency and to those he stated that he did not know anything of the colony nor of its people. He told them that he would make a thorough examination into all the events and that he could be depended upon "to do all good possible, with great pleasure, and no ill that might not be very much justified, nor likewise necessary." Certainly, such a statement would give little reason to suspect ulterior motives.

Late in the Fall of 1769, O'Reilly proceeded to abolish the old French Superior Council and in its place he established a new unit of government which he called the Province of Louisiana. In effect, this creation made Louisiana a Spanish possession in fact as well as in name. For the old Council, he substituted a cabildo which was composed of six perpetual regidores, two ordinary alcades, and attorney-general-syndic, and a clerk. Over all, the governor would preside in person.

One of O'Reilly's first acts was to take a business survey of the colony as well as a census of New Orleans, the latter being executed with great accuracy. The report of the commerce showed that the exports of the province during the last year of its subjection to France were as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Value</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indigo</td>
<td>$100,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deer Skins</td>
<td>80,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lumber</td>
<td>50,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Naval Stores</td>
<td>12,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rice, Peas, and Beans</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tallow</td>
<td>4,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>$250,000</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

An interlope trade with the Spanish colonies took away goods worth **60,000**
The colonial treasure gave bills on the government in France for **360,000**
So that the province afforded means of remittance for **$670,000**

11. Winston, loc. cit., 197. For the full reply of O'Reilly see Louisiana Historical Quarterly, V (Jan., 1922), 17.
12. Dart, loc. cit., 272-274, is of the opinion that O'Reilly overstepped his
"Few merchant vessels came from France, but the island of Hispaniola carried on a brisk trade with New Orleans, and some vessels came from Martinico. The King's vessels brought whatever was necessary for the troops, and goods for the Indian trade. The indigo of Louisiana was greatly inferior to that of Hispaniola; the planters being quite unskilful and unattentive in the manufacture of it; that of sugar had been abandoned, but some planters near New Orleans raised a few canes for market."  

With respect to the census, the report showed 468 houses, with a population of 3,090. Of these, 1902 were free persons, 31 of whom were black and 68 of mixed blood; there were 1,225 slaves, and 60 domesticated Indians. 

In a sincere effort to encourage settlers to come to Louisiana, the Spanish government offered to every family coming to settle in the province a tract of six or eight arpents, in front, on the Mississippi, with a depth of forty. There were, of course, conditions attached by which the settler agreed to improve the land as much and as rapidly as possible. 

The rule of O'Reilly has been described as that of one who rules with an iron hand. In all probability, such a description comes from the manner in which he avenged the revolts and the leaders of such revolts that had occurred under Ulloa. In all fairness to O'Reilly, however, it can be conceded that despite these atrocities, and others perhaps, he did give the colony of Louisiana a fairly good government. Certainly, he was anything but popular with his subjects. Yet he studied the interests of the colony and in many ways advanced the material prosperity of it. This was especially true of the finances, which had been in a deplorable condition both at the end of

authority. He questions the right of the governor to "destroy private law and legal rules of the conquered territory."

13. Ibid., 205.
French domination and under Ulloa. Moreover, as has been noted, it was under O'Reilly that arrangements were made so as to attract settlers to Louisiana; and such emigration from Spain resulted in quite a substantial increase in population. By the end of 1769, however, he had fallen into disgrace with the home government, resulting in his removal as governor. On October 29, 1770, having delivered the government of the province to his successor, Don Louis de Unzaga, O'Reilly left New Orleans for Spain. 16

When Unzaga entered upon his duties as governor of Louisiana province, he found above all else that the commerce of the colony had decreased immensely. Unquestionably this was due to the ill-advised policy of Spanish restrictions as laid down by the royal ordinance of Ulloa. Even though a subsequent royal schedule, as of March 23, 1768, exempted from duty all exports and imports between Louisiana and the six named ports of the peninsula, this exemption related only to merchandise, whether foreign or Spanish. At the same time, however, the exportation of either specie or produce was burdened with a duty of four per cent. That such restrictions aided in the decline of commerce seems to be well indicated by the fact that merchants of New Orleans complained of the restrictive system as being very oppressive. They could not procure, from the six ports named, the goods and merchandise they wanted nor could they dispose of their own produce there. Their chief product seems to have been indigo, and Louisiana indigo was not wanted in Spain as a superior quality was easily obtained from other places. Their furs and peltries were hard to sell and still harder to preserve in such a warm climate; timber and lumber were far too expensive to transport. They also

complained that the British engrossed all of the trade of the Mississippi. This last complaint, as will be seen, was to become a very definite menace to the Spanish hold on Upper Louisiana, at a later date. In order to aid the colonists of the province in building up their trade, Unzaga winked at these regulations and restrictions. For this he might be looked upon as an "enlightened" ruler.

Without attempting to enumerate the long list of governors whom Spain sent to the Louisiana province or to carry to a further point the control of New Orleans by Spain, this particular era may be closed with the statement that Unzaga ruled the province, and apparently well, until July 10, 1776, when he was succeeded by Don Bernard de Galvés.

Meanwhile, the question might well be asked "What had Spain been doing in so far as establishing her rightful claim to the upper portion of the province is concerned?"

In March of 1767, Ulloa, despite the fact that he had not published his commission and had steadfastly refused to take over the province from the French, sensed the necessity as well as the importance of controlling the upper portion of the Mississippi Valley and Louisiana province. During this period of uncertainty he sent an expedition from New Orleans up the Mississippi under the command of Captain Don Francisco Ruiz. The purpose of the expedition was to build two forts at the mouth of the Missouri River, in an effort to keep the British out of Upper Louisiana. This became the first official act of Spain looking to the occupation of this section of the province. The first of these forts was to be built on the north side of the Missouri River and was to be named "Carlos Tercero el Rey". The second was

to be built almost opposite the first, and on the south side of the river, and it was to be named "El Principe de Austrias, Señor Don Carlos". According to the instructions given to Rui by Ulloa, the object of the expedition is the preservation to his majesty of the royal domains that belong to him; and to maintain with the savages the same good relations and accord that the French have been able to preserve. This is the whole affair, and is all that is of the moment.18

That Ulloa realized the importance of having two forts built at the mouth of the Missouri River seems very evident. He took every possible precaution that nothing would go wrong and that his plans would not be frustrated by the English. That the object of the expedition be not divulged nor its success jeopardized, secret instructions for Rui were dispatched by Ulloa, and under separate cover, to the French commandant of the Illinois, St. Ange.19

Upon his arrival at the mouth of the Missouri, Rui was soon to perceive the impracticability of attempting to build a fort on the north bank of the river. The spring floods in that area inundated the land to a depth of eight or nine feet. As it was impossible to carry out the original instructions, it was decided to hold a "council of war" to determine what should be done. This "council" was held on October 2, 1767, at St. Louis, this post having been established three years earlier by the French trader and merchant, La Clede. It was decided to change Ulloa's instructions to erect forts on either side of the Missouri, and instead to build the principal fort on the south bank and merely a block house on the north bank.20

18. Louis Houck, Spanish Regime in Missouri, Chicago, 1909, I, 1-19, for the full translated text of Ulloa's Instructions to Rui.
19. Ibid., I, 20-28, for the full text of Ulloa's secret instructions to Rui, which were transmitted to St. Ange.
Rui made little effort to do any more than govern those within his immediate command and this he seems to have done rather poorly. As a result, the upper portion of the Louisiana province was left largely in the hands of the French until 1770. Meanwhile Rui, being a harsh commander, was having extreme difficulty holding the respect of his troops. A considerable amount of trouble resulted from this situation, so there was little else for Ulloa to do but remove him from his office. This was done without further ado and in his place was appointed one Don Pedro Piernas. Piernas received the forts from Rui on March 10, 1769, and hardly had the transfer been made when he received a letter from Ulloa, dated as of October 30, 1768, ordering him to evacuate the place and turn it over to St. Ange. This he did, and after settling a few affairs that needed attention, he proceeded to New Orleans, arriving at that city on October 31, 1769.

By the time Piernas had arrived in New Orleans, O'Reilly had been made governor of the Louisiana Territory to succeed Ulloa. Piernas, therefore, made a full report to the new governor and was promptly re-appointed governor of the Illinois country. He was also appointed to hold the office of Lieutenant-Governor "Of the village of San Luis, San Genevieve, the district of the Missouri River, and the part of the Ylimiue which pertain to me created." This appointment was confirmed by a decree of the king, dated August 17, 1772.

Piernas returned almost immediately to St. Louis, reaching the village on May 20, 1770, at which time he received possession of Upper Louisiana.

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21. Ibid., I, 33, 34. This information is contained in a letter from Ulloa to the Marquis Grimaldi, Spanish Minister of Foreign Affairs, in explaining the dismissal of Rui and the appointment of Piernas as his successor.
22. Ibid., I, 110, for the full text of this decree. See also Houck, History of Missouri, I, 297, 298.
formally from St. Ange. He then proceeded to carry out the instructions for governing St. Louis and St. Genevieve as given to him by O'Reilly. According to these instructions he was to make the domination of Spain loved and respected. Moreover, it was to be his duty to

"administer justice promptly, impartially, and according to the law, and to foster and protect commerce; to maintain the greatest possible harmony with the English and to punish promptly all excesses committed by any subject of Spain within English territory or any insult offered the English while navigating the Mississippi. Friendly relations are to be cultivated with the Indians, and no injustice is to be practiced with them. The Lieutenant-Governor is not to permit any trader among the Indians unless the commandant has good reports concerning his conduct. No monopoly or right to exclusive trade is to be given for any reason. Traders are required to make exact reports to the Lieutenant-Governor of the condition of the various tribes among whom they carry on trade. Anyone not giving such exact reports would not be permitted to return. The Lieutenant-Governor was always to impress upon the Indians the good intentions of the Spaniards. He is to see that there be no Indian slaves and that those Indians at San Luis and San Genevieve receive good treatment and a just price for their furs and other articles." 23

When Spain took formal possession of Upper Louisiana in 1770, St. Louis was already six years old. Its population consisted of about five hundred souls and there were one hundred and fifteen houses, one hundred of which were made of wood and the remaining fifteen of stone construction. The principal currency of the village was furs and peltries. 24 Three years later, in 1773, Piernas took a census of St. Louis and St. Genevieve. The results of this census showed that St. Louis contained 444 whites, of which 285 were male and the remainder female, and 193 slaves, 88 being female and 105 male.

In St. Genevieve there was a population of 400 whites and 276 slaves, having about the same proportion of males and females as St. Louis. This would seem to indicate that the upper portion of the Louisiana province, especially that section about the two named villages, had grown and developed fairly well during these three years. Much of this growth can be directly attributed to the kindly rule given to the province by Piernas. We are told that his administration was so kindly that the French soon became reconciled to the change in dominion. As a result of his kindliness, there developed a very friendly feeling between the French and the Spaniards. His mild government and liberal land grants soon attracted other settlers, even from Canada and Lower Louisiana. 25

The benevolent rule of Piernas continued until 1775. On May 20 of that year, Don Francisco Cruzat arrived at St. Louis to succeed him. Cruzat had been appointed by Governor-General Don Luis de Unzaga, who, by this time, had replaced O'Reilly as governor at New Orleans. It appears that Cruzat continued the good work commenced by Piernas and even went further in his efforts to carry on friendly relations with the Indians of the upper section of the Mississippi Valley. Within two years he indicated that he had developed friendly contacts with the tribes who roamed about the present states of Missouri, Kansas and Iowa, as well as with many who inhabited the territory of the English. In a detailed report to the new governor of New Orleans, Don Bernardo de Galvez, dated November 15, 1777, Cruzat accounted for practically all Indians in Spanish territory and many outside of the Spanish domain who came to St. Louis with furs and peltries and received presents from the Spanish officials there. This report gave an approximate number of warriors of

each and every tribe, a full description of the furs they brought to the vil-
idge, as well as a notation as to their general habits and temperament and
their attitude, whether friendly or not, to the Spanish cause. This report in
part reads as follows:

1. Little Osages - composed of three hundred fifty or four
hundred warriors whose location is one half league from
the shore of the Missouri River and eighty five leagues
from St. Louis. Their chief occupation is hunting,
which is very profitable to the fur trade.

2. Misuris - composed of about two hundred warriors who
live on the banks of the Missouri and eighty six or
eighty seven leagues from St. Louis. The chief occu-
pation is hunting which is very valuable to the fur
trade since they bring about eighty or ninety packs of
furs annually.

3. Tribe of the Cances [Kansas] - contains about three
hundred fifty warriors and live about one hundred fifty
leagues from St. Louis and about fifty leagues from the
Misuris on that same river. From their hunt they pro-
duce about one hundred eighty to two hundred packs of
furs annually.

4. Tribe of La Republica [Republic] - includes about three
hundred fifty or four hundred warriors and live about
two hundred twenty leagues from the village and one
hundred ten from the shores of the Missouri River.
They bring skins of beavers, buffaloes and otters, and
some packs of deerskin to this post.

5. Hotoes [Ota] - about one hundred warriors living two
hundred twenty leagues from the village and on the
Plata River. They bring in deer and beaver skins.

6. Tribe of the Panis [Pawnee] - five or six hundred war-
rriors living fifteen leagues from the Hotoes on a small
stream branching off from the Plata. They bring in
skins of beaver, buffalo and otter. This is the tribe
from whom we receive the best treatment.

7. Tribe of the Majas - four hundred fifty or five hundred
warriors living about thirty five or forty leagues over-
land from the Panis tribe, on a small tributary to the
Missouri and about sixty leagues from the mouth of the
Plata River. They hunt beaver, deer, buffalo, and stag.

8. The Big Osages - about eight hundred warriors who live
about one hundred leagues from the village by water or
one hundred ten overland, and on the banks of a river
emptying into the Missouri and about one hundred forty
leagues in length. Great profits result to the fur
trade from them, for they bring in about five hundred
or five hundred fifty packs of deerskins.
9.  **Bayous** [Iowa] - two hundred fifty warriors who live eighty leagues up the Mississippi on the shores of the Des Moines River. There is no profit from their hunt for they trade with the English.

10.  **Sioux Tribes** - innumerable; they live on the meadow-lands of the Mississippi in the Spanish district, about two hundred thirty leagues from St. Louis. There is no profit from their hunt, for they trade with the English who enter by way of the Des Moines River by way of the Fuzch district.26

Among the tribes which generally came from the English district to receive presents at St. Louis, according to the report, were the Menominee, Foxes, Sauk, Winnebago, Mascouten Tribe, Kickapoo, Potawatomi, Ottawa, Sau-teur, and the tribe of the Peoria and Kaskaskia.

The writer has been unable to determine whether this report made by Cruzat was a true and reliable one or whether it was created as a result of hearsay or, perhaps, even as a product of his imagination. If it can be taken at face value, however, the report would indicate that these Indians, for the most part, were well inclined to the Spaniards and in a general way very friendly. While it would also show that the Spaniards were dealing rather successfully with the Indians covering a vast territory, it also shows that the English were invading the Spanish district and taking away a considerable amount of profitable fur trade that rightfully belonged to Spain.

Without going into detail concerning the work of the Lieutenant-Governors who followed Cruzat, it will be enough to say here that Cruzat was succeeded in 1778 by Don Fernando de Leyba, only to return to St. Louis in the same official capacity in 1780. He was followed this time by Don Manuel Perez, in 1788, who in turn was succeeded by Don Zenon Trudeau in 1793.

Finally, in 1799, came the last and possibly the most popular of all the governors of St. Louis, Charles Dehault Delassus. 27

[27] Don Fernando de Leyba, who became lieutenant-governor of St. Louis in 1778, has been described as a weak, avaricious, and incompetent official. It was during his regime that St. Louis was attacked by the English. See Finkelnburg, "Under Three Flags," Missouri Historical Collections, III, 1911, 215. A careful study of the "Leyba Papers" contained in the American Historical Review, XLI (Oct. 1935), 92-112, would refute such an estimate of the man. These letters indicate very clearly the friendly relations that were maintained between Leyba at St. Louis and George Rogers Clark at Cahokia. They also show the extreme interest of Leyba and other Spanish officials in the American cause, an interest that was so great that Leyba not only pledged his own personal fortune to aid the Americans but succeeded in persuading other St. Louis inhabitants to do likewise.
CHAPTER III

A SHORT SUMMARY OF EXPLORATIONS UP THE MISSOURI RIVER

With St. Louis under the control of Spain after 1770, it was not long before the little post began to develop into a center of trade activity for the upper portion of the Spanish possessions. Spanish traders and merchants began to take up residence here and establish the hub from which their influence was soon to radiate in a northerly and westerly direction, following the course of the Missouri and Mississippi rivers and their tributaries. The advance from St. Louis along these rivers was more or less simultaneous and, in each case, was for identical reasons, namely, to wrest the valuable trade in furs and peltries with the Indians from the English traders, who seemed to be over-running the Spanish possessions.

During the early years of rule over the Upper Louisiana territory, Spain made very slow progress up the Missouri River from St. Louis. Her officials as well as her colonists in this region seemed to be content with developing their trade with the Indians of the immediate vicinity. As this was developed, some time was also spent in fortifying the frontier against the inroads of the British. They were doing their utmost to prevent the British, who were particularly active in the Iowa-Minnesota country, from entering the Spanish territory and from engaging in trade with the Indians. Despite their vigilance and extended efforts, Englishmen found their way into this region, gradually pushing themselves and their influence southward and westward. By necessity then, Spain was not only forced to advance northward up the Mississippi River, but also in a westerly direction. The natural route from St.
Louis for this latter movement was by way of the Missouri River and its tributaries. Progress was necessarily slow and was accompanied by complaints from the subjects of both countries.

England, according to the Treaty of Paris, had received from France a vast tract of land east of the Mississippi and north of the Gulf of Mexico. She had been temporarily restrained from occupying the land of the Illinois country because of the great Indian uprising led by Pontiac. By 1767, however, she was more or less successful in occupying the territory and at once her traders became active in the region. Almost immediately these men began to complain that the Spaniards, in conjunction with the old French inhabitants and traders, were eating up the profits of the Indian trade. This trade she claimed as rightfully belonging to her subjects. In this respect the claims were more than likely justified. However, we are told that the British were ever ready to scrap a piece of paper in the interest of developing trade and thus enriching her coffers. History seems to bear this out quite well. As neither England nor her subjects rarely hesitated to cause irritation and loss in trade to the Spaniards, it was not long until the British traders began to infest the country west of the Mississippi River, the International boundary line of that period. Hence the Spanish government was soon to hear loud complaints from its traders of the unlawful and illegal activities of the British and the resultant dwindling of the profits which rightfully belonged to these traders. Such activities spurred the Spaniards on to belated action resulting in an increase of their posts in the lower Missouri and Upper Mississippi regions.

In his treatise pertaining to the Anglo-Spanish Rivalry on the Missouri, Mr. Abraham P. Nasatir points out that the Revolutionary War had no direct effect upon the Missouri Valley but that it was indirectly responsible for the progress of the Spaniards up the Missouri. The close of the war left the Upper Mississippi Valley a virtual economic monopoly in the hands of the British. Accordingly and with this advantage they were almost sure to follow the lines of the fur trade into the region west of that river and which belonged to Spain. It seems that practically nothing had been done to break this monopoly, or even check it to any extent, during the terms of either Cruzat or Perez, as lieutenant-governors of the Spanish Illinois country. As will be noted in a later chapter, many letters had been written back and forth, urging the erection of forts at strategic points along the Mississippi, particularly at the mouths of the Des Moines and St. Peter's rivers. For some time, however, Spanish officials remained in their lethargic state and nothing beyond the letter-writing stage materialized. To some extent perhaps Spain can be excused for her delay, for at the time she was engaged with some rather serious intrigues in the lower portion of the Mississippi Valley. Then, too, financially she was in none too good straits. To build an effective string of forts meant the outlay of a considerable amount of money, which she did not have. As there seemed to be no immediate danger that the British would take over the complete possession and occupation of Upper Louisiana, she could not be blamed too much in preferring, for reasons of economy, to overlook all requests for aid in that direction until such danger might become more imminent.

Eventually, however, there developed a new period of activity in the

2. Ibid., 363.
Missouri River region. Undoubtedly the steady increase in British competition in that vicinity may be said to have forced much of this new activity on the part of Spaniards. It also seems to be true, however, that an increasing number of Spanish traders in St. Louis began to crowd the trade among the known tribes of Indians who resided in the lower Missouri Valley. Thus, by virtue of their own trading activities, the Spanish traders were practically forced to spread out in search of new tribes with whom they might barter. Just what they would find in this direction they had no idea, for as late as 1785 Spain knew little, accurately, of the Missouri River above the Platte. In a general way they probably realized that it cut the Rocky Mountains, possibly somewhere above the Rio Bravo, and were more than likely convinced that it had its origin somewhere in the new kingdom of Mexico. Beyond that, however, their knowledge of this region was very slight. Thus, once they started to move in that direction, it was bound to be a slow and laborious process, for they not only had to feel their way in so far as the topography of the area was concerned, but it was also necessary to win over these strange Indian tribes. As the latter already had had contact with the English, such a job was not to be an easy one.

The Spanish traders had early become acquainted with the territory within the close proximity of St. Louis and had carried on some trade with the natives of that vicinity. Such activities would not carry them to any great distances westward from St. Louis. It was not until 1787 that any authorized expedition to the land near or beyond the present limits of western Iowa is made known. In that year Joseph Garreau, who was then only twenty-three years of age, was supposedly sent by Don Andrea Fogot la Garciniere, of St. Louis,

3. Ibid., 363
to hunt and trap on the upper Missouri River. Two years later, Juan Munier discovered the tribe of Ponca Indians living on the Niobrara River. He petitioned the Spanish government and obtained the exclusive right to trade with these Indians. It must be remembered that when Piernas became Lieutenant-Governor of Upper Louisiana, in 1770, among other things he was not to permit the monopoly or grant exclusive rights of trade for any reason. Such a grant as cited above would most certainly argue against the general Spanish policy. By this time, however, the English menace in this vicinity had become uppermost in the minds of the Spanish officials. Spain was in no position herself to develop such trade to its fullest extent, nor does it seem that she was particularly interested in such enterprises as a means of enriching her coffers. If, then, she could hold the upper portion of Louisiana, if for nothing more than a buffer, she must have realized that it might be prudent to overlook some of these past given instructions. At any rate, such grants and monopolies were given on several occasions in the years to follow. In August of 1790 Jacques D'Eglise obtained a license to hunt on the Missouri, and, in his meanderings, more than likely became the first Spanish subject to reach the Mandan and Taysene Indian villages via the Missouri River.

While developing his contacts with the Mandans, D'Eglise received "authentic" information from a Frenchman, Menard, who had lived among these Indians for fourteen years, that they were in constant communication with the British. These latter had been sending traders from their posts which were

4. Ibid., 366
5. Ibid., 365. Also Houck, Spanish Regime, II, I-3.
6. Nasatir, Ibid., 366. Also, Nasatir, "Jacques D'Eglise on the Upper Missouri" and documents pertaining to "Spanish Exploration of the Upper Missouri," Mississippi Valley Historical Review, XIV (June, 1927), for a more complete story of the wanderings of Jacques D'Eglise.
located only fifteen days' journey due north. Moreover, the Mandans were apparently in communication with New Mexico, for they had Mexican saddles and bridles for their horses. D'Eglise spent some time among these Indians and attempted to convince them of the greatness and superiority of the Spanish government, and this was accomplished with some measure of success. He promised to establish a trading post in their country and then returned to St. Louis in October of 1792, where he rendered a report of his findings to the Lieutenant-governor, Zenon Trudeau. The following spring he, together with Joseph Garreau, started on a return journey to the country of the Mandans. This expedition failed due to the hostility of the Sioux and Arikara Indians. Garreau remained among the latter tribes but D'Eglise returned to St. Louis to face his creditors, Monsieur Collell and Joseph Robidoux, who were making demands upon him. He then petitioned for the exclusive trade with the Mandan and Taysenne Indians. This he was refused, for just a short time previous to his petition a similar grant had been given to a newly formed company known as "The Company of the Explorers of the Upper Missouri". This company has been referred to by a number of titles, and for the sake of convenience it will be hereafter known as the "Missouri Company".

Meanwhile, British traders and other subjects who had come to the Mississippi Valley were beginning to spread out through the Iowa country, along the Missouri, and even into the country of the Mandans. Moreover, their numbers were increasing. Their presence on the west bank of the Mississippi as well as in the interior created a constant menace as well as a

7. Nasatir, "Anglo-Spanish Rivalry on the Upper Missouri," loc.cit., 366, 367. This company originated in the Fall of 1793. The rules were drawn up on May 5, 1794, and were accepted and inaugurated on May 12, being accepted by the general Government the following July 18. See Houck, Spanish Regime, II, 148. Also, Nasatir, "The Formation of the Missouri Company,"
decided dwindling of profits to the Spanish traders, few though they may have been, who were operating in this territory. We are told that these profits from the Indian trade often amounted to between one hundred and three hundred per cent, but by 1793 had been reduced to a mere twenty-five percent. Little of this trade to the Spaniards had, before this time, come from the Mandan country, but since the English had also penetrated to the south and along both the Missouri and Mississippi rivers, they were influencing the Indians of those regions as well. There is no wonder why the Spanish traders and officials were anxious to place themselves in the good graces of the natives, thus hoping to overcome if not eliminate the English influence. Not only were the British snatching great quantities of the valuable Indian trade but they were also actually underselling the Spaniards in their own territory. Something had to be done about this. The English had to be taught to respect the international boundary lines and remain in their own "backyard". Friendly negotiations along such lines had proved fruitless, for while the British were ever willing to negotiate they were just as willing to scrap the paper on which the negotiations were written. There seemed but one course left and that was to ascend the Missouri River and establish acquaintances with these tribes. By establishing friendly relations with these tribes it was hoped that they would carry on their trade with the Spaniards. Consideration was even given to the possibility of stirring the Indians to a point of attack against the British. Thus, with the creation of a fear of loss of investments, it was hoped that the Canadian traders would hesitate to cross the Anglo-Spanish frontier.

To carry out such a plan with any degree of success would almost of necessity require large scale operations with sufficient capital behind the project. Thus it was that "The Missouri Company" had its beginning on October 15, 1793, under the directorship of Jacques Glamorgan. The company was to have its headquarters at St. Louis and as it was to operate in the interests of the Spanish traders by furnishing an economic obstacle to their enemies and competitors, it had the authorization of the governor at New Orleans, Baron de Carondelet. Its task was to explore the Upper Missouri and to develop the trade with the Indians of that region. The chief general agent of the company was eventually to become James Mackay, a native of Sutherlandshire, Scotland, and a former employee of the British Northwest Company. He had emigrated to Canada in the days when the Northwest Company was in its infancy and had been employed on some of the more venturesome undertakings. This company had been organized chiefly as a competitor of the old Hudson's Bay Company. Ostensibly it was to undertake the task of finding a western sea, but Alexander McKenzie and Mackay, while proving this interest more or less sincere, had also given their employers a fine opportunity to enter the region west of the Mississippi. When, subsequently, occasion and opportunity arose for the transfer of his services to the pay of Spain, Mackay merely "swelled the evidence Spanish officials had gathered to the effect that Anglo-Americans, destitute of local attachments, easily shift their allegiance and for a time at least exhibit unstinted loyalty to hereditary national foes". 9

In the main, the preliminary activities of the Missouri Company were directed against the British, who, through the Hudson's Bay Company, had long

traded with the Assiniboine and by 1793 had established posts among the Mandans. The first real expedition of the new Spanish trading company got under way as quickly as possible in an effort to strike at the British. It left St. Louis on June 7, 1794, with Jean Baptiste Truteau as the leader. The expedition was commissioned to proceed to the Mandan villages and there to build a fort and establish an agency. It was given ample authority for action, fixing prices, and for the regulation of trade. Such authority can hardly be interpreted in any other light save to be used as a weapon against the underselling tactics employed by the British traders. The expedition was instructed to note carefully all streams that entered the Missouri and to mark their distances either from St. Louis or from the Mandan villages. The leader was to keep a record of all knowledge and information that might come to him concerning the Indian nations and in particular the Shoshonean tribe. He was to gain information relative to the distance to the Rocky Mountains, and was at all times to maintain friendly relations with Indians, especially those beyond the mountains.

It seems that an ulterior object of the expedition was an attack and destruction of Hudson's Bay Company posts in the Mandan country. In this respect, it was a decided failure, for somewhere along its course the expedition under Truteau "had been diverted from its course and deprived, in consequence, of the opportunity for anticipated demolition." This fact, together with the knowledge that said posts had been constructed by the Hudson's Bay Company, angered Mackay, the ex-"Nor'wester", no little. The activities of the rival English company had always been obnoxious to Mackay and now that an excellent opportunity to deal it a disastrous blow had been diverted he was

additionally angered. Consequently, in 1795 he himself led an expedition up the Missouri to the villages of the Oto and from thence to those of the Omaha. In this vicinity he established a trading post for the Missouri Company. It is believed by many that the funds for this expedition were furnished by Andrew Todd upon the urgency of Pemoca. If this was the case, we are told that there is little reason to wonder at the extraordinary zeal with which Mackay chided the Oto, Omaha, and Pemoca Indian tribes because of their commercial dealings with the objectionable English. The men of the Hudson's Bay Company, with their goods of so vastly superior quality, were trading in the valley of the Platte, and Andrew Todd's uncle, most significantly, was an influential partner of their rivals at Montreal.\footnote{Ibid., 430, 431.} The northernmost terminus of Mackay's expedition is not certainly known; but he did send John Evans in 1796 to destroy the English fort at the Mandan, and he himself did not return to St. Louis in 1797.

Thus far nothing has been said to indicate what progress, if any, was being made by private individuals not connected with the larger commercial companies. To be sure, there was a minimum of such activity; at least there is little information available that would indicate otherwise. The activities of one man, however, must at least be mentioned. That man is, of course, Manual Lisa, who is said to be the only Spaniard of consequence to enter what is now the State of Iowa.

According to an inscription found on a tombstone in Bellefontaine Cemetery in St. Louis, Manuel de Lisa was born at New Orleans on September 8, 1772. His father, Christoval, had come to Louisiana with General O'Reilly. The younger Lisa had been at New Madrid as a trader and from there had come to
St. Louis. On September 5, 1791, and in the presence of Governor Trudeau, had entered into a trading contract with Joseph Robidoux. The following year, in a petition to Governor Trudeau, dated at St. Louis, July 16, 1799, and signed, Manuel de Lisa, he asks for a grant of land. This petition reads as follows:

"Don Manuel de Lisa, merchant of New Orleans, for the present in this town (St. Louis, with due respect represents to you that being his intention to establish himself in this country with his family, which is now ascending the river in boat of his own, therefore the petitioner wishes to obtain a concession for 6000 arpens of land in superficies on the banks of the River Missouri, in a place where may be found some small creek emptying into said river, in order to facilitate the raising of cattle, and, with time, to be able to make shipments of salted, as well as dried meat, to the capital...."

At the same time, he made a similar petition for his elder brother, Don Joachim. Both petitions were granted by the governor, and many years afterwards these grants were confirmed by Congress.

It would seem that Lisa had other ideas and desires for receiving a grant of land besides those mentioned in his petition to the governor. It was neither farming nor cattle raising that brought him to Missouri. Undoubtedly he had designs on the trade in furs and peltries of the region. This seems well indicated by the fact that in 1799 he made a rather vigorous protest to the governor concerning the monopoly of such trade which was held by the Missouri Company, and in which the governor himself was interested. In this protest he states that:

13. This contract is in the Archives of the Missouri Historical Society at St. Louis.
"the trade in peltries, the sole and only resource which for a long time has supported the commerce of this country, being forbidden to the greater part of the citizens, must necessarily involve the ruin of the merchants, who cannot hope to make a return to the metropolis, since they were deprived of the only commodity which they could introduce there."16

He goes on to point out that the monopoly has greatly diminished the fur trade and paralyzed commerce, and that if the fur trade were left free there would be an abundance of business and a greater consumption of merchandise. Apparently this protest was meant to be considered as a petition for a grant to the fur trade, or at least a portion of it. There seems to be no evidence to show that the governor ever gave his consent to this petition.

In his petition for a grant of land for his brother, Lisa gives as a reason why the grant should be made that his brother wishes to follow him "and settle himself in the same place where the petitioner's residence has to be". Just why Lisa's residence had to be in Missouri has, of course, been the subject of much speculation.17 Certainly it would have placed him in the midst of the furtrading activities, so it might not be too great a risk to assume that that is what he was after. At a later date he did receive a grant to trade with the Osage Indians.

It hardly seems possible that Lisa was the lone individual who had designs on the lucrative Indian trade. That there was profit in such enterprise had already been indicated. Undoubtedly there were many private traders, such as Lisa, who coveted grants to trade with the Indians on their own initiative. Perhaps some such grants were given by the Spanish government.

Aside from the meager information pertaining to the activities of Lisa, there

17. Ibid., 239.
is little to substantiate any claims to a great deal of such private enterprise.

That Spain made such meager attempts actually to settle the upper Louisiana territory and thus make fast her claim to that region and its wealth seems to lend considerable credence to the impression that she did not want particularly to colonize this section. To be sure, settlement and development of the region was the surest means of combating the English menace. To accomplish this meant great manpower and this she did not have, at least in amounts great enough to spare. She was also short of funds, an essential requisite in any such undertaking. Hence, when a group of men would offer to form a company and were financially capable to back up such a venture, it was only natural that the government would permit such an organization to undertake the risks and expenses involved. It was hoped that such a company would combat successfully the English influence among the Indians. Then too there were instances when the Spanish officials were themselves either directly or indirectly interested in some of these companies. Therefore, to give the company the "go ahead" signal would be protecting their own investments and the possibility of profits. Whether such practices were legal or ethical is beside the point; the practices were more or less common.

The fact that Spain from the beginning was none too eager to take control of the vast Louisiana territory from France cannot be overlooked. She had vast possessions in the southern continent and also in Mexico. From these sources she was supplied annually with gold and silver that prevented

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18. Arthur S. Aiton, "Diplomacy of the Louisiana Purchase," *American Historical Review*, XXXVI (July, 1931), 701-720, throws a new light on this subject pointing out that Spain was desirous of obtaining control of Louisiana to be used as a buffer for her valuable southern possessions.
her from becoming wholly bankrupt. Of these possessions, New Spain and the mines of New Mexico were in constant danger. To prevent attacks by the English, either from the sea or by land, California was occupied about the same time that Spain came into possession of Louisiana. The French had already exposed the possibility of penetrating into this wealthy region by way of Texas. Now there appeared the additional threat of attacks on New Mexico by the English and this time via Upper Louisiana. For safety's sake it then became imperative that Spain concentrate her work of colonizing in and near the mining region. She was satisfied not to extend such activity into the upper portion of the Mississippi Valley; rather, to occupy it and thus minimize the possibility of English entry to the treasured land of Mexico was the momentous program. No time, money or men need be wasted to develop a land which, save for furs, had yet to prove its worth. Furs just were not in her line of endeavor.
CHAPTER IV

SPAIN MOVES TOWARD THE UPPER MISSISSIPPI AND THE IOWA COUNTRY

While the attention of the Spanish officials was thus only slightly occupied with pushing Spanish control westward by way of the Missouri River, a similar move was taking place in the upper Mississippi Valley proper. Again activity spread from St. Louis as the hub and led northward into the land of modern Iowa. These moves cannot, however, be considered as separate attempts of the Spanish officials to oust the English, for they took place at the same time and, in a sense, were rather closely connected. Each was merely a part of vast but none too well developed plan to wrest control of Upper Louisiana from the British. This plan eventually developed into an effort to check rather than completely eliminate the advance of the latter into Louisiana and from there, possibly, into the more valuable lands of New Mexico and New Spain. The move toward the Iowa country seems to have received the first impetus and although it might appear to be less well organized, the results were just as important.

Before going into the more interesting details of the story, it might be well to pause momentarily and survey the earlier history of the Iowa country and casually record the early explorers' impressions of the land.

The first recorded landing of white men upon modern Iowa soil was June 25, 1673. This was accomplished by the memorable pair, Jolliet and Father Marquette. Having floated down the Mississippi River from the present site of Prairie du Chien, Wisconsin, they were well on their epochal journey of dis-
covery and exploration when they landed somewhere in the southern part of the state. The exact landing spot is disputed, for there are those who claim it was made in the vicinity of the mouth of the Des Moines River. The more commonly accepted theory is that these men landed at a point somewhat farther north and where the Iowa River empties into the Mississippi. At any rate, the landing was more than likely caused by the sudden appearance, on the west bank of the river, of the footprints of men, together with a narrow beaten path which led into the fine prairie. Bringing the little expedition to a halt, they followed this path for some distance inland until it eventually led them into the midst of an Indian settlement. Much to their surprise and, no doubt, satisfaction as well, they were received in a very friendly manner by the natives. The pipe of peace was passed about freely and in due time they were invited to partake of a rather sumptuous meal consisting of three or four "courses". After spending the night in the near vicinity and assuring the Indians that their mission was purely a peaceful one, they were permitted to go their way. Thus did the first white men set foot on Iowa soil.

It should be noted and remembered that in their journey down the river and along the Iowa shore, Jolliet and Marquette did not encounter evidence of human life until they had almost reached the southern extremity of the state. This is not altogether strange for we are told that the Iowa of this period was quite deserted of Indians and that only two tribes of Illinois - the Peouara and the Moinguena - inhabited the west bank of the Mississippi. Moreover the Indians of Iowa belonged to two cultures, namely, the nomad Siouan composed of the Iowa, Sioux, Oto, Missouri and Winnebago, and

the sedentary Algonquian made up of the Foxes, Saki, Mascouten, and Potawatomis. These two cultures were in constant conflict and may be a reason for the sparse settlements within the Iowa territory. The interior could well have been used, then, as a combination hunting and battle grounds.

It was not long after the memorable voyage of Jolliet and Marquette that this region was visited by French Missionaries, who worked among the Indians on both sides of the Mississippi. They were followed by the traders who soon developed the all-important fur trade. By 1700, due to wars with the Fox Indians, the French had been driven from the Mississippi boundary of Iowa and so got into the interior to carry on the fur trade around the Missouri and Big Sioux rivers. As early as 1696 or 1697 the trading company, Rouen-La Rochelle, was dealing with the Sioux (Mascouten and perhaps Iowa) along the lower Missouri River and by 1704-1705 was carrying on a fur trade much higher up on this river. No later than 1757 packages of deer, bear and beaver skins were being brought in. Nor were these French traders confining themselves only to trade in furs, for it seems not unlikely that Frenchmen were working the lead mines on the eastern side of the Mississippi, in the vicinity of the present site of Galena, Illinois, as early as 1720. In this respect, Philip Francis Renault was the prime mover. With the loss of Fort Frontenac in 1758, the French were forced to turn to New Orleans, both as a port of outlet and as a stronghold to their claims west of the river. As a result of this forced move they proceeded to secure all of the trade possible from the Upper Mississippi region.

2. Irving B. Richman, Iowa to Iowa, Iowa City, 1931, 27.
3. Ibid., 87.
4. Rufus Blanchard, The Discovery and Conquests of the Northwest, Chicago, 1880, 141, 142.
Such was the situation when Spain came into possession of Louisiana through the secret treaty of Fontainebleau as of December 3, 1762. What did this cession mean to Spain? In the first place it meant the acquisition of New Orleans and its immediate neighborhood containing possibly 10,000 people. In addition, it was to receive the vast undefined territory west of the river. Beyond this it is doubtful if Spain herself had anything more than a vague idea of its meaning. She had looked upon the Mississippi Valley as her rightful heritage by virtue of the expeditions of De Soto and Coronado, but had done nothing to make good the claims until the French suddenly appeared in the vicinity of Texas. Now she found herself in complete ownership, through this act of France, of the territory she had always considered as hers.

That Spain, even at this time, did not fully realize the potential value of her new possessions seems to be indicated by the fact that she did nothing about the upper section for some time after. Then, as if she suddenly awakened to the possibilities, she began to take an active interest. The first indication of Spanish interest in Upper Louisiana came in 1767 when the governor of New Orleans, Ulloa, sent an expedition up the river under the direction of Captain Don Francisco Ruiz. The purpose of this expedition was to build two forts at the mouth of the Missouri River with the idea of keeping out English intruders. This was the first official act under the new Spanish government, looking to the occupation of Upper Louisiana. From here the interest, not too rapidly spread to the north.

It was some time, then, before Spain began to administer control not only over the settlement at St. Louis but also in the region beyond - that area that was later to be known as Iowa. During the interim a number of Anglo-

saxons made their appearance in the Valley. As early as 1760 English colonists from the Atlantic coast had reached the Mississippi and within four years time a number of others were looking for trade from Wisconsin. Among the first of these to reach the Valley was Jonathan Carver of Connecticut. He finally arrived at Prairie du Chien in the year 1766. Almost immediately he crossed the Mississippi to the Iowa side and settled on the "Yallow River," according to his own map. He established a small camp here and it seems that he remained in the region for about two years, being engaged in the fur trade. While here he made several excursions into the surrounding territory. While Carver was more or less active in the vicinity of Prairie du Chien, other English traders were penetrating into the heart of the Iowa country, probably in the region about the Des Moines River. Nor were they confining themselves merely to Iowa, for many of them reached the Missouri River. It is likely that this threat of the English stirred the Spaniards to immediate action, for by now they had begun to realize the value of the fur trade of this region and they were anxious to hold onto it.

As has been noted, Anglo-Saxons began to make their appearance in the Valley in rather large numbers between the time Spain gained control of Louisiana and the date on which she began to administer over the upper region. Furthermore, it has been noted that these traders were moving about in the interior of the Iowa country, frequently penetrating beyond the present boundaries of this state. From Michilimackinac, agents of the merchants of Montreal and other trading posts dispatched traders by way of the Fox-Wisconsin

route to Prairie du Chien. From here they spread in all directions in search of the valuable fur trade. Many of these operated in the Iowa country, ascending the Iowa, Skunk, and Moines rivers, even penetrating as far as the Omaha, Oto, and Pawnee Indian villages along or near the Missouri and in the vicinity of the mouth of the Pike River. Some even went so far as to descend the Mississippi River to the Illinois country where they also traded with the Spanish merchants at St. Louis. Naturally, these English traders were doing their utmost to win the patronage of all the upper Indian tribes, including the Sack and Fox, who were now dwelling in villages on the Upper Mississippi. This seems to be indicated by the fact that in June of 1777, a Spanish official entered into negotiations with the English commandant relative to the surrender of ten Missouri prisoners held by the Indians of the Upper Valley. The Spanish commandant, Cruzat, at St. Louis, reported at this time that the Sack and Fox tribes of four hundred and three hundred warriors respectively, were well inclined toward the Spanish and more favorably disposed toward the Spanish and French traders than to those of the English district, notwithstanding the more liberal presents of the English; that the "Hayuas" Ioways [i.e., Ioway] of two hundred and fifty warriors dwelt eighty leagues from St. Louis on the shores of the Muen [Moen] River, but their hunts brought no money into the Spanish pockets, as they carried on trade with merchants "who are introducing themselves into the river from the English district"; and that the Sioux, two hundred and thirty leagues away, also bartered their furs for English goods brought to them by way of the Muen River through the district.

In 1770 the Spanish Governor of Upper Louisiana, at St. Louis, complained to his superior, Bernardo de Galvez, of New Orleans, that the Fort San Carlos at the mouth of the Missouri had outlived its usefulness for the English were now penetrating to the Missouri River by way of the Des Moines and that the only advisable way to keep the English traders out of that region would be to build a new fort on the Des Moines River. Galvez answered, some time later, that the Crown could not spare a garrison of two hundred and fifty men for the purpose, but that he would lay the plan before the king. Meanwhile, he charged the governor of Upper Louisiana to endeavor to keep the English out and see that they "do not entice our Indians". But despite these admonitions, the British trading company, The Mackinac Company, reached the Indian tribes of Spanish Louisiana in the Iowa country, especially those along the Des Moines River, by 1784.

That such activities by the English brought forth bitter protests from the Spaniards would only seem natural, for they surely were violations of international law. But protests were of no avail, or so it seemed, as the English continued to exert influence wherever and whenever possible in their relentless efforts to secure the lucrative trade from the Indians. They had a decided advantage over the Spaniards in that they had better and more plentiful supplies. Furthermore their own government allowed them to continue their money-making endeavors. Actually, it appeared that the English government was encouraging these traders in the work of extending British influence and prestige among the natives beyond the Mississippi, in territory which

9. Ibid., 359, 360.
10. Ibid., 361-364; see also, Louis Houck, Spanish Regime in Missouri, Chicago, 1909, I, 166.
technically belonged to Spain.

It cannot be assumed that the Spaniards remained idle while the English were busy acquiring the trade of the Indians. Protest after protest was registered, but it was soon learned that more aggressive action was necessary. There appears, however, to be no concerted action on the part of the Spaniards against the Anglo-Saxon intrusion. They seemed content to complete one move and then more or less sit back and rest awhile before continuing with the next move. As has been pointed out, this began officially in 1767, when Captain Rui was commissioned to build two forts at the mouth of the Missouri River, one on either side. Once the forts were built, Rui was charged with the duty of preventing the English from crossing the river, in an attempt to carry on trade with the savage tribes. At this time, and during the next two years, the Indian tribes resorting to the Spanish settlements at St. Louis for trade and presents were the Iowas, Sioux, and Sauk and Foxes. As these same tribes inhabited the Iowa country, such an order can only be construed as an attempt to keep the English out of this territory.

Little more seems to have been done by the Spaniards in their efforts to win the fur trade of Upper Louisiana from the English until about 1794. In the meantime, English "corruption" of the Indians in the Upper Valley continued and the Spanish officials frequently and loudly protested. They pleaded with their superiors to give them money and men with which to protect the northeastern frontier of the provinces of Spain in America. To keep the

british out of their territory, the Spaniards desired and even demanded the erecting of forts at the mouths of the St. Peters and Des Moines rivers. Jacques Clamorgan, in the name of the Missouri Company, drew up a contract whereby he was to construct forts at the mouths of the Skunk, Iowa and Des Moines rivers in return for which he was to receive the exclusive trade of the Upper Mississippi Country. In addition to forts, it was necessary to patrol the Mississippi River for at least three to six months each year, in order to keep the English traders from entering the Spanish territory. A similar type of patrolling was also found to be necessary on the Missouri River. 12

The Spanish governor of New Orleans, Baron de Carondelet, supported such ideas and urgently advocated the proposals before the Spanish Court. This is indicated by the fact that he proposed an extensive plan to fortify the river from New Orleans to its source. To protect the merchants of St. Louis and to secure them in an immense fur trade with the Missouri River nations against English subjects from Canada, he proposed and recommended a strong stockade. With reference to the Iowa country he urged the following:

A fort garrisoned by fifty men on the St. Pierre [St. Peter's] River, which is one hundred and twenty leagues from St. Louis, and another fort on the Des Moines River, forty leagues from the said St. Louis, could entirely cut off all communications of the English with the savage nations of the west bank of the Mississippi, and of the Missouri - a trade so rich, that ... the London companies which engage in it do not fail to reap profits of a hundred per cent.

If the two forts above mentioned were established, many settlers would flock to their vicinities, both from our settlements and from Canada, and the banks of the Ohio. Within a few years they would have several posts in these districts more populous than that of St. Louis at present, and could serve to

12. Nasatir, "Angle-Saxon Rivalry," loc. cit., 338. I have been unable to find the date on which Clamorgan drew up his contract to build the above mentioned forts.
to protect the part of Louisiana higher on the Missouri from usurpation of the English and Americans...13

Unfortunately, agreeing with the ideas of the traders and recommending plans for fortifying the river was one thing, while getting results in the form of the completed projects was quite another. In carrying out such projects, money was indispensable, and money at this time was extremely scarce, as Spain had a war on her hands which was rapidly using up any surplus fund she might have had. Furthermore, Upper Louisiana, up to this time at least, had not made possible any great returns to the Spanish treasure and consequently she was somewhat reluctant to invest any great sum in what could only be considered as a non-paying enterprise. The Spanish government, therefore, did little to impress the English-Canadian subjects with the strength of Spain's rights in the territory west of the Mississippi. 14

About the same time, Americans and Indians of Lower Louisiana were beginning to cause worry to the Spanish Governor-General. Spain, at this time, claimed the territory on both sides of the Mississippi River for the first three hundred miles north of its mouth. This region had attracted a rather large number of settlers from the eastern states of the United States. These settlements were separated by wide stretches of wilderness and their only prospects of markets or access to the commerce of the world were through the territory claimed by Spain. Moreover, their navigable rivers all led to the Mississippi and this was in the control of Spain. Hence a loud clamor for the free navigation of the river was sent up by them and to these demands Spain did not wish to surrender for by so doing she would weaken her hold on all of


Louisiana. With this worry plus the refusal of the Spanish government to aid in the building of forts in the Upper River territory, and the constant fear of English attacks in Upper Louisiana, Carondelet decided to take matters into his own hands and adopted a rather old Spanish custom of fighting fire with fire, thus, he attempted to ward off threats to the British settlers and their effects upon the Indians by encouraging settlers to cross the river into this land and thus keep it from being occupied by the English. Such settlers would, of course, have to pay allegiance to the Spanish government. In view of the troubles caused by such settlers in Lower Louisiana, this would appear to be a rather foolish policy. It is possible, however, that he overlooked this phase of it in his burning desire to wrest the valuable Indian fur trade from the English and, at the time, offer more sure protection to Spain's southern provinces. Any rate, it must have appeared wise to be a logical method to use, for he had no time in attempting to make sure it effective once the opportunity presented itself.

The possibilities of this territory as an agricultural region had not been developed and it offered a valuable trade in furs and Indian goods which would not only take away from Canada profits, corn and the like, but would divert the traffic down the Mississippi River to New Orleans, thus enhancing the profits of the Spaniards and increasing the revenue and commerce of Spanish Louisiana. It is apparent that there was no dearth of attractions for possible settlers who were willing to submit themselves to the Spanish law. Nor does it seem that this was asking too much in return for the possibilities of wealth that existed. At least Carondelet must have felt that he had a good talking point, for he seems to have been interested in the purpose of

15. Ibid.,
making Louisiana a better, stronger and more valuable province of Spain.

The opportunity for Carondelet to test the value of his policy and to put into use came in the year 1794 and in the person of one Andrew Todd, a young and robust Irishman who had formerly been associated with Glamorgan in the Missouri Company. In that year Todd applied to the Governor-General of New Orleans for the exclusive right to trade with the Indians residing north of the Missouri and Ohio Rivers. In his request for such a grant he also asked that he be permitted to obtain supplies from Canada. In addition, he was to be given a reduction of from fifteen percent to six percent in the import and export duties at New Orleans, upon goods necessary for carrying on such a trade with the Indians. The grant was given, seemingly without hesitation. Carondelet hoped that Todd's competition with the English traders from Montreal would drive the latter out of Upper Louisiana and the Iowa country. Todd had also proposed that he would enlist young Canadians who would remain in the Spanish settlements. Such a proposal met with the approval of Carondelet, for by it the population of the Upper Country would be increased, thus adding strength to the Spanish cause, and that was exactly what the Governor-General desired. Within two years Don Andreas sent vast quantities of goods up the river from New Orleans to this northern territory and in return many furs and peltries were shipped down the river for export trade at New Orleans. Thus in a short space of time a considerable amount of success was being realized through the operation of the plan. It was, however, destined to be short lived, for in 1796 two things happened that put an end to it, at least temporarily. Todd, while at New Orleans completing some business, was stricken with the dreaded yellow fever and died. About the same time war broke out between Spain and England. Thus the English and Canadian traders
were once again alone in the field and the Spaniards were forced to institute new means in their attempts to control the fur trade with the Indians.

An opportunity to establish settlements in Upper Louisiana similar to the one presented by Todd came to the Spaniards in 1796. This time it presented itself in the person of one James Mackay, a Scotchman who was associated with the newly formed Spanish Commercial Company of St. Louis. In that year Mackay made a voyage of discovery for the Spanish Commercial Company up the Missouri River. His findings were reported as follows:

"The traders of the River Monigona [Des Moines] have sent twelve horses laden with goods to trade with the Pawnees [Pawnees] and the Layas [Pawnees] on the Chate [Platte] River. The caravan crossed the Misuri [Missouri] in the month of last December. I would be glad to be able to deal them a blow on their return."17

It seems logical to believe that the traders referred to in this report of Mackay's were the English who had been giving the Spanish officials a considerable amount of trouble in their dealings with the Indians. Whether Mackay was given the permission to "deal them a blow", as requested, the writer has been unable to determine.

Private traders with small log cabins or stockades, no doubt, were fairly numerous at this early date but there is little information available as to their importance in the general Spanish scheme. None of these apparently were given outright grants of land by the Spanish government. So far as is known from the information available, the Spaniards seem to have made only three outright grants of land during this period of years when they were in

16. Ibid., 340. See also Van der Zee, "Fur Trade," loc. cit., 366. Efforts to overcome English influence with the Indians by means of giving grants and by settling, in the Missouri Valley, have been indicated in Chapter III.
control of the Upper Mississippi Valley. The first of these was made in 1796
to a French-Canadian trader, Julien Dubuque. Of the three grants, this one to
Dubuque apparently was the largest, extending from the "little River Maquan-
quitois" or Little Maquoketa, as far south as the Mesquabysnonques (or the
Tetes des Morts) and about nine or ten miles in from the Mississippi River.
The second grant was made to Louis Honore, sometimes called Tesson, and con-
sisted of about 6073 acres at the head of the Des Moines Rapids, and where a
large Sauk village stood. The third and last Spanish land grant went to
Basil Giard in the year 1800. This grant consisted of about 5760 acres of
land along the west bank of the Mississippi, in Clayton County, and just across
the river from the trading post of Prairie du Chien. Despite the fact that
these appear to be the only actual grants of land made to individuals by the
Spanish government, many settlers came to this region without such grants.
Furthermore, the Spanish officials at New Orleans and at St. Louis encouraged
such settlements, for they provided admirable means by which the Upper Valley
could be protected from the possibilities of English invasion. Not only did
these emigrants come from Kentucky, Tennessee and other parts of the United
States, but many European French, escaping the storms of the French Revolu-
tion, arrived in Upper Louisiana at this time. It is said that Upper Louisi-
ana gained close to two-thirds of its population by this policy of the Spanish
officials. At any rate, when the United States later took over Louisiana

18. Edith Rule and William J. Peterson, "True Tales of Iowa, Mason City, 1932,
43,54. For the text of Dubuque's petition for the land grant as well as
the grant made by Baron de Carondelet see American State Papers, Public
Lands, III,678. The petition may also be found in United States Supreme
Court Reports, 16 Howard, 222. For a literal translation of this petition
see Jacob Van der Zee, "Early History of Lead Mining in the Iowa Country,"
Iowa Journal of History and Politics, XIII, (January, 1915) II.
she reaped the benefits of this policy for she found the land pretty well settled.

With all of this migration to Upper Louisiana, it should be noted that few Spaniards were included in the movement. The population, for the most part, remained primarily French with a number of English and Americans scattered about. Of the early American settlers of the Upper Mississippi Valley, Daniel Boone, who remained in the vicinity of the Missouri River, and Israel Dodge, who settled near the post of St. Genevieve, are the most outstanding. There seems to be only one Spaniard who distinguished himself by enterprise and adventure. This was none other than the active and indefatigable fur trader, Manuel Lisa, who spent many winters in the wilderness, and was foremost in extending trade among the Indians upon what is now the western border of Iowa and among the Blackfoot and Crow Indians of the Big Horn Mountains. Even the greater portion of his activities took place in this region after the Upper Valley came under the control of the United States.

It has been indicated that Spain was at least mildly interested in that portion of Upper Louisiana that constitutes modern Iowa and her interest was of a two-fold nature. She realized, although perhaps vaguely, the possibilities of trade in furs with the Indians and she was interested in holding it for her own traders, not desiring to share it in any respect with the intruding British. Perhaps it would be better to say that this interest was displayed almost exclusively by the Spanish officials of New Orleans and St. Louis, but as these men were representatives of the Crown, it can be inferred that Spain herself was mildly and indirectly interested. The extent of the interest is indicated, to some extent, by the attempts made to populate the

area with Spanish subjects and thus to overcome English influence with the Indians.
CHAPTER V

SOME SPANISH ACTIVITIES IN THE IOWA COUNTRY

It has been indicated that the Spanish officials were doing as much as possible to offset the influence of the English over the Indians of the Upper Mississippi Valley. These efforts were, to a great extent, directed at the establishment of settlements within this region with the hope of occupying it and in this manner keeping out the English. But such activities did not constitute the entire Spanish program. In some rare instances it took on military aspects.

Spanish officialdom was ever fearful of the possibility of an English attack coming down the river from the direction of Canada. This is shown by the fact that on November 22, 1796, Baron Carondelet, then Governor of New Orleans, wrote a letter to Lieutenant Governor Trudeau of the Spanish-Illinois country, as the region west of the Mississippi was often referred to. In this letter Carondelet cautioned Trudeau to be on the watch for a possible surprise attack by the English on the Spanish-Illinois country. He even went further than to merely give a warning. He passed on to Trudeau full authority to act in a hostile manner against any and all British subjects who might be upon the Missouri or Upper Mississippi rivers. Such action could be taken without a declaration of war, and the same rule could apply to the Missouri Company in the extension of its privilege. Furthermore, Carondelet promised that he would send enough reinforcements to put St. Louis in a state of defense.¹

Certainly it does not seem to be stretching the imagination too far to infer from these instructions that Spain valued the Upper Valley and would do everything within her power to retain control of it, even to carry on a war with the British if it became necessary.

Carondelet was making no idle promise when he agreed to send reinforcements to St. Louis; nor did he lose any time in making good this promise. On November 26, just four days after he had written his plans and instructions to Trudeau, Lieutenant Colonel Carlos Howard was dispatched to St. Louis to act as military commandant for the Spanish-Illinois country. Among other instructions to Howard was a command for him to send an expedition out to explore the shores of the Mississippi from St. Louis north to the mouth of the St. Peter's River, and to destroy any canoes he might find.\(^2\) It must be assumed here that Carondelet referred to the destruction of canoes belonging to the English or those Indians who were possibly allied with them.

These instructions of Carondelet were not long in being carried out, for shortly after the arrival of Howard at St. Louis, Lieutenant-Governor Trudeau dispatched Louis Honoré Tessson on an expedition as far north as the post of Prairie du Chien. This was the same Tessson who later received a Spanish Land Grant on the Des Moines River in what is now Lee County, Iowa. The purpose of this expedition was twofold. In the first place, Tessson was to mingle among the inhabitants of Prairie du Chien and to come into possession of as much information concerning the English and their plans as he possibly could. At the same time, he was to work among the Indians along the way and to make every effort to win their allegiance to the Spanish cause.\(^3\)

\(^2\) Ibid., 342. For full text of the lengthy instructions given by Carondelet to Col. Howard, see Missouri Historical Society Collections, III, 71–91.

\(^3\) Ibid., 344.
Tesson remained in the vicinity of Prairie du Chien for some weeks and while there he made the acquaintance of a French-Canadian, Julien Mombuc [Dubuque], to whom a section of land had but recently been granted and who lived opposite Prairie du Chien. On May 23, 1797, Tesson left Prairie du Chien and reported to Howard at St. Louis. In his report he spoke of having met Mombuc and had charged him with the mission of keeping a sharp lookout for any English movement that might appear suspicious, and to send immediately to St. Louis any information of the slightest movement on the part of the English or the Indians. Included in his report to Colonel Howard was the rather pertinent information concerning two English traders named Gillespie and Crawford. According to the information acquired by Tesson, these men had passed themselves off as Americans and as such had penetrated the Iowa country in the vicinity of the Des Moines River, trading with the Indians of this locality. In the act of carrying on their trade with the Indians they had hauled down a Spanish flag. Furthermore, these two men were making plans to return to this region for purposes of trade with the Indians, either at the end of June or the beginning of July of that same year. Hearing of this, Howard immediately sent out an expedition to intercept and capture them.

The expedition which Howard dispatched to the Iowa region was under the direction of a man named Metzenger and consisted of one swift galiot, which was rather heavily armed. A short time before, one Bernardo Molina had been ordered to patrol this region in a galiot. In order to facilitate

4. Ibid., 347. For a recent work on Prairie du Chien, see Peter Lawrence Scanlan, Prairie du Chien: French, British, American, Menasha, Wisconsin, 1957. The first six chapters give an especially interesting account of the activities of this little trading post before 1800. See also, Daniel S. Durrie, Annals of Prairie du Chien, a paper read before the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, December 26, 1872.

5. Ibid., 347.
matters and to induce the Sauk and Fox Indians to attack by land while the gunboat attacked by water, Tesson was asked to accompany the expedition. The reason for including Tesson seems to rest in the fact that he had become rather friendly with these two tribes. This, in turn, is borne out by the fact that upon his arrival at Prairie du Chien on the expedition previously mentioned, he was taken prisoner by the English and it was the Sauk and Fox who came to his rescue.

It might be well to pause here momentarily and trace the steps taken by Tesson. Actually very little is known concerning him, and it is not improbable that if and when further knowledge is uncovered it will make an interesting story. It was either during the course of this last-mentioned expedition or shortly thereafter that he decided to settle down on a tract of land near the rapids of the Des Moines River, in what is now Lee County. Zenon Trudeau, the Lieutenant-Governor at St. Louis, gave him permission to settle within the Territory of the Sauk and Fox, upon 7056 arpents of land. The site chosen by Tesson constitutes the present town of Montrose, Iowa. Following is a portion of the grant made by Trudeau:

"Mr. Louis Honore is permitted to settle at the head of the rapids of the River Des Moines, and having effected his establishment he will write to the Governor General to obtain concession of a suitable area in order to validate said establishment, and at the same time to make him useful in the trade in peltries in that country, to watch the savages and to keep them in the fealty which they owe his majesty; his conduct in this respect is to serve him as a recommendation to be favored by the government in such a way as to let him have the benefit of whatever he may do to contribute to the increase of the commerce in which he is to participate; and in that respect he will be permitted to treat with all the savages who dwell upon that bank of His Majesty's domain and to permit no other trader

6. Ibid., 347.
as competitor except he have a passport signed by our hand. 7

Under the conditions of this permit, Tesson built cabins, cultivated a small patch, planted an orchard of apple trees, and lived upon his claim from 1798 until 1805. The actual grant was made as of March 30, 1799. It would seem that Tesson either chose a poor tract for his claim or else he himself was a very poor trader, for he soon lost title to his land. Sometime during the years between 1798 and 1805 his estate was sold under an execution and came into the hands of an assignee by the name of Joseph Robidoux. In the year 1810 Thomas F. Riddick came into possession of the estate and as a result of the transaction he believed that he had a full title to a square league of land. His heirs in 1839, however, were able to establish title to only six hundred and forty acres. This is said to constitute the oldest land-title document in the State of Iowa. 8

To return once again to the Spanish activities on the Mississippi River and in the Iowa region, a short time after the departure of the expedition under Metzenger, Trudeau was able to report to the Governor General at New Orleans that the nations of the Mississippi were behaving well. "The Indians," he said, "were jealously guarding the entrance to the Des Moines River and every Britisher who attempted to enter would be repulsed." Moreover the Lieutenant-Governor reported that he received an ambassador from the Indians once a month. He did, however, bemoan the fact that the presents which he was able to give the Indians, in order to keep them in a friendly mood, were far from being satisfactory or sufficient in amounts, particularly on account of the lack of traders and especially of the powder which is to them

8. Ibid., 370. See also, American State Papers, Public Lands, III, 345.
This complaint on the part of Lieutenant-Governor Trudeau, concerning the quality as well as the quantity of presents with which to carry on satisfactory negotiations with the Indians, was only one of many of a similar nature that were constantly being made. The situation proved to be a constant source of irritation to the Spaniards in their dealing with the Indians, for the English traders were ever able to make a deeper and more lasting impression upon the natives by virtue of their ability to supply them with greater quantities of trinkets, not to mention the fact that they were more attractive and of a better quality. Nor is the situation confined merely to the negotiations with the Indians of the Iowa country. All through the story of the Spanish-Indian relations of the Upper Mississippi Valley, and their attempts to counteract the English influence, similar references are made and complaint heard. While such a condition might appear a purely trivial one, to the casual observer, it is conceivably one of the major reasons for Spanish failure to rid Upper Louisiana of British traders. In attempting to assign a reason for such a condition, it must be remembered that Spain frequently found herself at war with England and could spare neither the men necessary to carry on a successful trade with the Indians nor the money with which to purchase presents so vital to favorable Indian relations. In this respect, England had a distinct advantage and she was not averse to making use of it.

Nevertheless, the Governor General at New Orleans, Carondelet, instructed Trudeau that he must keep the Indians of the Upper Mississippi region in this good disposition, even though there was an acknowledged scarcity of provisions. In the face of the conditions mentioned above, one can hardly.

feel but that this was asking Trudeau to perform the impossible. Being a faithful Spanish official, it appears that he carried on as well as might be expected - even better, perhaps.

At least one or two more examples of English intrusion into the Iowa country, to carry on their unlawful trade with the Indians, should be cited. It must also be mentioned that these intrusions did not stop with the Iowa country. Indians dwelling to the west of the Missouri River, like the Oto and Pawnee, were sought out by the English traders. In his "Spanish Regime in Missouri", Louis Houck makes known that in 1795 some English traders from the Des Moines crossed the country with a pack train of twelve horses. Four years later, in 1799, one Jean Baptiste Faribault became very active in Iowa land, in the vicinity of the Des Moines River. Faribault had spent a very successful year of fur trading in northern Illinois and he was called upon by a Mr. Gillespie of the Canadian fur-trading company known as the North West Company. Gillespie instructed Faribault to construct a post some two hundred miles above the mouth of the Des Moines River. This he did in 1799, the post being known as Redwood. With the assistance of an older interpreter, named Deban, Faribault carried on a very successful business with the Indians for about five years. The region where he was stationed abounded with bear, otter, deer, and other wild animals and was the favorite resort of the Sioux band, of Sauk and Fox, the Ioway, and other tribes.

From the preceding paragraphs it might easily be assumed that Spain

See also, H. H. Sibley, "Memoir of Jean Baptiste Faribault," Minnesota Historical Collections, III, 171.
was having no success whatsoever in combating the English influence. True
enough, the traders representing the English were penetrating into the Iowa
country. Their intrusions, as we have seen, carried them even beyond Iowa and
into the vicinity of Missouri. Moreover, they were following the Missouri
River west towards its source and into the country of the Mandans. These lat-
ter incursions were being made by way of southern Minnesota, following the St.
Peter's river, and through the northern part of Iowa. All were made in spite
of the many Spanish protests as well as the counter moves by traders and tra-
ding companies under the control and direction of the Spanish officials. That
Spain has some success against the British and that her actions began to tell
upon the English is, perhaps, best indicated by a letter which was written on
July 9, 1797, by an English storekeeper at St. Joseph, Michigan, to a friend,
Joseph Ow. The writer of the letter was Thomas Duggan, and in part it reads
as follows:

"This Spring our Traders in the Mississippi were nearly
pillaged by the Saques [Sac] and Renards [Fox] headed by
some traders of St. Louis with authority from the Spanish
Commandant of that place, fortunately for our traders a
party of Sioux were at La Prairie du Chien which overawed
the other Indians and their property was saved."12

If nothing else, this letter would seem to indicate that the acti-
vities of the Spaniards in alliance with certain tribes of the Indians of the
Upper Valley were causing the British traders some concern. To what extent
the latter were worried is difficult to ascertain. Certainly it was not
enough to cause them to bring a halt to their incursions into the territory
that rightfully belonged to Spain.

In a none too complete manner, it has been pointed out, with some

12. This letter may be found in full in Michigan Pioneer Collections, XX, 522,
523. Also in Wisconsin Historical Collections, XVIII, 457.
little success it is hoped, that the traders and officials of both Spain and England were waging a rather furious struggle for the trade of the Indians as well as the control of the land of the Upper Mississippi Valley and the Iowa country. It might rightly be wondered what such trade meant to the individuals concerned in the struggle, in dollars and cents. Considered in terms of modern business enterprise, it might be looked upon as being none too profitable in view of the risks involved. Yet, to the promoter of the late eighteenth century, it represented quite a fortune. *We are told that the annual return from the trade in furs in the region of the St. Peter's River amounted to something like nine thousand pounds in Halifax Currency. 13 In 1800 Napoléon sent a secret agent, Perrin, to examine the resources of Louisiana. The report of this agent showed that in that year the value of furs, robes and peltries taken on the waters of the Upper Mississippi was equal to 1,200,000 livres tournois, or $240,000 of that day. In 1804 Major Stoddard stated that the fur trade at St. Louis averaged in the neighborhood of $205,000 annually for the fifteen years preceding the purchase of Louisiana by the United States. 14 It should be remembered that this trade came from a vast and far-reaching territory and that, due to the more or less continuous drives by the traders of both Spain and England against one another, such trade was interrupted many times, occasionally coming almost to a standstill. Had the traders been able to carry out their endeavors, free of such frequent interruptions and without the constant necessity of keeping a weather eye on their alien competitors, such activities might well have been far better organized. Systematic expenditure of energy is a virtue whose importance cannot be overlooked in even the

most insignificant venture and is almost invariably in direct ratio with the success attained. Certainly, it is difficult, and at times impossible, to organize properly in the face of constant interruption. Applied to the fur trade of the Upper Mississippi Valley, it is a simple matter to discern reasons why this trade had to be somewhat limited. In the sole hands of either Spain or England, it could easily have developed immeasurably. This should not be taken to mean, however, that the trade was not good nor that there did not exist a keen rivalry.

In retrospect, let it be said that Spain took over control of the vast region of land west of the Mississippi River when France's regime in that territory ended in 1760. Included in it was the vast Iowa wilderness. To the land on the east bank of the river England retained title and claim. From that date then, England and Spain became the combatants in the great struggle for the Indian fur trade. The Spanish subjects of Louisiana, the most of whom were Frenchmen, were pitted in an unceasing struggle against the English subjects who came from Canada and the Atlantic seaboard colonies. All were vitally interested in the vast American wilderness which, even at that time, offered abundant commercial opportunities. About all one needed was a measure of ambition and the willingness to endure the sufferings and hardships which invariably accompany the pioneer and frontiersman. We are told that the rivalry between the traders of England and Spain,

"was as keen as any today. The Mississippi River region and its native inhabitants appealed to the speculative business men of that day as a field worthy of vigorous exploitation. And, so life in the upper portion of the Great Valley became little more than a contest between traders, some of whom conveyed furs eastward to Montreal and New York, while others floated packs to St. Louis and New Orleans before final shipment for manufacture"
England's claim to ownership of the land east of the Mississippi was comparatively short-lived. After the American Revolution, she was forced to give up any claims that she had to that territory. However, by the terms of the treaty of peace, her subjects were still permitted to retain their trading privileges in the American territory. Thus English traders were permitted to move freely about the eastern shores of the Great River. This was a most important provision, insofar as Spain was concerned. With Englishmen trading, unchecked and unhampered, on the east banks of the Mississippi, it was indeed a simple matter for them to cross the river into Spanish territory. So it became necessary for Spain to use every possible means to check this advance and to retain not only the valuable Indian trade but the land as well.

What these means amounted to has been variously indicated by a number of examples. As to the success accomplished, this may be interpreted in different ways. Regardless of what conclusions one may arrive at, one point stands out rather clearly, and that is that the English traders always persisted in their efforts to continue trading with the Indians. Spanish officials tried every means at their disposal to discourage this intrusion. Private enterprise was encouraged in an effort to populate the land sufficiently and thus counteract British influence. In this respect, there were the private land grants given to such men as Dubuque, Giard, Tesson, Lisa and others. Commercial companies were created for the purpose of persuading the Indians to carry on their trade with the Spaniards exclusively, as in the case of the company formed by Andrew Todd as well as the officially sponsored Missouri

Company. In one instance at least, and as early as 1720, an expedition was sent all the way from Santa Fe for the purpose of establishing a military post in the Upper Mississippi Valley as a barrier to further encroachment of the French (and more than likely the English as well) in that direction. There are varying stories of this expedition, but the general idea seems to have been to form a complete and permanent settlement, self-sustaining as far as possible, from the beginning. The Mississippi River and many of its tributaries were patroled from time to time in a determined effort to keep out the alien "invaders". Forts were built on some of the more important tributaries as well; and yet the net result was little or nothing.

Whether it was because of a poor choice of methods, a general lack of interest in Louisiana by the Crown, or some other reason that caused this seeming failure to control the Upper Mississippi Valley completely, is not the important thing right now. In spite of it all, English traders were rather successful in evading Spanish vigilance and entered Spain's territory, almost at will. They came by way of the St. Peter's River, in the Minnesota country, to the west. They entered by way of the Des Moines River and thus gained access to the heart of Iowaland. Nor were they content to remain there, for many of them crossed that river and actually penetrated Missouri, making profitable contacts with the Pawnee, Oto and other Indian tribes who resided in that vicinity. From here they found their way up the Missouri River toward its source, as well as its main branch, the Platte.

Why were the English traders so persistent in their attempts to penetrate Spanish Louisiana? It appears that the answer to such a question rests not so much in the spirit of conquest as in the individual selfishness

and greed for wealth from the fur trade. To some extent, at least, it would seem that this same spirit pervaded the minds and hearts of some of the Spanish traders. This is best indicated in the plea made to the governor by Manuel Lisa in 1799, and which has already been cited. Certainly the spirit of lust and the desire for wealth were in the air and affected the subjects of both sides as well. Men were as greedy for wealth in those days as they are today. In this respect, mankind has changed very little.

That the activities of the traders had telling effects upon the Indian is not hard to comprehend. His whole general character was greatly transformed in many ways. To Mr. Jacob Van der Zee we are indebted for a most interesting survey of the economic life of the West and its effects upon the Indian. In his observations he sums up the situation in the following manner:

"... such were the main features of western economic life in the last quarter of the eighteenth century. The spirit of commercial enterprise was in the air; the furs and skins of the wild animals of the forest, river and prairie meant big profits for those bold enough and energetic enough to visit the haunts of the Indians. The native inhabitants, once content to hunt with bows and arrows and thus procure such foods and skins as they needed for personal comfort and adornment, had gradually become the white man's tool, helping to satisfy the white man's lust for wealth and getting in return such articles as appealed to their child-like fancy. To aid in the general transformation of the Indian character the traders had long supplied the Indians with guns and ammunition, all sorts of merchandise, and, last but not least, with liquor."17

There can be little left to the imagination when one begins to formulate an answer to the question as to why the traders of both countries were so anxious to retain the friendship and good will of the native Indian. He was useful only in so far as he was able to contribute to the trader's wealth.

CHAPTER VI

THE LEAD MINES OF EASTERN IOWA AND THEIR IMPORTANCE TO SPAIN

No story in connection with the early history of Iowa would be complete without reference to the lead mines and the lead industry as developed by the immortal Julien Dubuque. He placed the industry on a keel not even with the vaunted fur trade but certainly second only to it. While the fur trade was the vital factor in the struggle between Spain and England, for control of Upper Louisiana, it did not constitute the sole source of wealth. Much was gained from the labors in the lead mines which were found along the bluffs and hills of the west bank of the Mississippi, especially those in and near the present city of Dubuque. These mines, operated by the Frenchman, were soon to establish themselves as the richest and most valuable. South of the Dubuque mines, some few hundred miles, and in the Missouri country, were located several more valuable lead mines. There were still more directly across the Mississippi from those worked by Dubuque. These were in Illinois and in the vicinity of the Galena River. All of these mines, with the exception of the last named, came into the possession of Spain after 1760, when the French regime in the Mississippi Valley came to an end. While lead never fully supplanted the fur trade in importance, it soon became another very valuable medium of exchange by which trade in the Upper Mississippi Valley was carried on.

It is not improbable that the Indians had known of the existence of many of these mines for quite some time. However, it was to be a Frenchman
who was first to bring them to the attention of the white man; and even then it was accomplished only through the medium of a group of Indians. The Frenchman was the early trader and bush-ranger, Nicholas Perrot, one-time French Commandant of the West. We are told that sometime during the year 1690 a party of Miami Indians came to Perrot with the request that he build a trading post in their country to the south of the Wisconsin River. As a token of their good will they made him presents of some beaver skins and "a piece of ore which came from a very rich Lead Mine ... on the banks of a stream which empties into the Mississippi". After some consideration, it seems that Perrot agreed to comply with the request of the Indians within twenty days.

It appears quite evident that lead existed at this time on both sides of the Mississippi and undoubtedly it was known, at least by the natives. Sometime after the visit by the Indians, Perrot, in voyaging on the Mississippi River, noted the presence of the ore on both banks.

There seems to be quite a difference of opinion as to whether Perrot built his trading post on the west bank of the Mississippi near the mouth of Catfish Creek, in Iowa, or on the banks of the Galena River, sometimes called the Fever River, to the east in Illinois. This much seems quite certain, however, namely, that he was the first European to mine lead in this region. At any rate, he established a series of mines in the vicinity, named "Perrot's Mines", and such was the beginning of the lead mining industry in the Upper Mississippi Valley. From this time on, lead was to be another medium of exchange for the traders of this region. Moreover, it was returned to the Indians in the form of bullets for their guns.

2. Ibid., 3.
While Perrot made every attempt to keep the news of his newly discovered wealth a secret, such was impossible for any great length of time. Slowly but surely the knowledge of the great lead deposits leaked out and was spread among other French traders. Despite the fact that such knowledge became more or less common, actual mining activities and operations by Frenchmen were extremely limited during the first half of the eighteenth century. The absence of such activities was due to the Fox Indians. The Sauk and Fox tribes were a distinct menace to all French traders and the enemy of all Indian tribes in the Upper Valley. As a consequence of such hostility, the French found it quite impossible to take advantage of their newly discovered wealth. It would have been very hazardous and unsafe to attempt to work the ore deposits. As a result, then, the mines were "forgotten" for some years.3

Just how long the "Perrot Mines", in the wilderness of Iowa, remained idle or were "forgotten" is difficult to say. The mining industry did not begin to take on the appearance of a profitable enterprise until Julien Dubuque made his appearance in the latter third of the eighteenth century. This does not mean, however, that the mines had been completely abandoned for all those years. There seems to be ample evidence to back up the claim that Spaniards had worked these mines some years before Dubuque took them over, possibly not later than 1780. In this year, an Anglo-Indian attack on the Spaniards at St. Louis failed largely because two French traders, Galve and Ducharme, caused the desertion of the Sauk Indians, from whose mines they had for some time derived great profit.4 Again, when Dubuque went into the Iowa country for the purpose of working his mines, he found substantial roads built.

3. Ibid., 4.
4. Ibid., 7. See "Letters of Lieutenant Governor Patrick Sinclair to General Haldemand," Wisconsin Historical Collections, XI, 151, 152, 155, 156.
for the transportation of ore. These the Indians told him had been made by
Spaniards. Unfortunately, there is little or no information available con-
cerning the extent of these early mining operations.

Sometime during the year 1760, the Fox Indians, who had just recent-
ly moved from Wisconsin to the Iowa country, discovered and opened a rich de-
posit of lead on the west banks of the Mississippi River, some distance below
the trading post at Prairie du Chien. A short time later, at this little fron-
tier trading village, an incident of unusual significance occurred. In the
presence of several witnesses and at a full council of ten Fox chiefs and
braves, the French-Canadian trader, Julien Dubuque, received written permi-
sion to operate the lead mines in their territory. By this pact Dubuque re-
ceived a virtual monopoly of the lead mines in the Iowa country, and through
his efforts leadmining became a profitable enterprise. The pact is of suffi-
cient importance to be presented in this paper, and reads as follows:

"Transaction of the council, held by the Foxes, that is to
say the chiefs and braves of the villages, with approbation
of the rest of their tribe interpreted by Mr. Quinantotaye,
delegated by them, in their presence and in ours undersigned,
namely that the Foxes permit Julien Dubuque, called by them,
The Little Night, to work the mine until it should please
them to retire from it and then without any restriction. Be-
sides they sell to him, and release to him the whole bluff,
and the contents of the mine discovered by the wife of
Peosta to which no white man nor savages can lay claim with-
out the consent of M. Julien Dubuque, and in case he finds
nothing in it, he shall be empowered to seek wherever he may
like and work quietly without anyone's being able to disturb
him nor cause him damage in his work. Thus we the chiefs
and the braves by the votes of all our villages, have agreed
with Julien Dubuque, selling and delivering to him from this
day on as it is mentioned above in the presence of Frenchmen
who are listening to us and are witnesses of this act.

5. R. G. Thwaites, "Notes on Early Lead Mining in the Fever (or Galena) River
Region," Wisconsin Historical Collections, XIII, 1895, 250.
At Prairie du Chien, in full council, September, 1788.

Bapt. Pierre, his X mark.
A. La Austin, his X mark.
Blondeau de Quienan, his X mark.
Antagna
Joseph Fontigny, witness.

With the success of Dubuque, the value of the lead mines of the Upper Valley was forcibly brought to the attention of the Spanish officials. Here was another means of wealth and a commodity that could well be turned into valuable trade. Furthermore, it offered a new possibility by which settlers might be lured to this region, thus strengthening the Spanish hold upon Upper Louisiana. A sufficient number of prospective miners and settlers brought to this territory might well serve as a satisfactory bulwark against English encroachment. As encouragement to individuals, the Spanish government offered to anyone who might discover a mine the privilege of a grant of land of sufficient extent to embrace it; or such an individual person was at liberty to occupy and work it, provided he rendered one-tenth of the produce to the crown. While there were undoubtedly individuals who were willing to take advantage of such an offer, there seems to be no record of any actually making settlements in Iowa, with the exception, of course, of Dubuque.

Dubuque had the uncanny knack of winning his way into the hearts of the Indians. He learned their language and their superstitions, and by means of artifices of magic conjurations they looked upon him as an idol, calling him The Little Night (La Petite Nuit). By playing upon their childlike superstitions, he was able to force the Indians to do his will. It is related that on one occasion when they were reluctant to do his bidding he threatened to...

call down the wrath of the evil spirits upon them by setting fire to the river. Sending some of his men upstream a short distance, he had them pour oil on the waters. Allowing a sufficient length of time to elapse, he gave the Indians a final chance to do as he wished. When they refused he boldly stepped forth and applied a lighted torch to the stream. Believing he had supernatural powers, the Indians hastily bowed to his will. Many stories of a similar nature have been told concerning Dubuque's strange power over the Indians, but as the purpose of this paper is not biographic there is no need to spend time in relating them.

Through this ability to make friends with the Indians and to hold a sort of power over them, the French-Canadian learned a great deal of valuable information concerning the lead mines in the territory of the Fox tribe. As a result, he visualized great possibilities of exploiting the ravines and bluffs of so vast an area for his own enrichment. The Indians had guarded their secret very closely against white invasion and Dubuque was one of the few, if not the only one of this particular period, who knew of the vast riches in Iowa and the surrounding territory adjacent to the Mississippi. It might be wondered why he became the exception. The answer might well be found in the fact that he was a Frenchman, and, as such, the Indians felt that he as well as all Frenchmen were willing to keep the fur regions intact, something the Americans, and especially the English, had never done.

Having received a monopoly on the lead mines from the Indians, Dubuque soon removed from the village of Prairie du Chien to the region of

7. For accounts of Dubuque's life see, M. M. Ham, "The First White Man in Iowa," Annals of Iowa, II, Third Series; Hoffmann, Antique Dubuque, Chapters 6-9; Franklin T. Oldt, History of Dubuque County Iowa, Chicago, 19, 31, 46, 391; Benjamin Gue, History of Iowa, I, Chapter 10.
some time in an effort to induce settlers to move to the Upper Valley in order to protect that region from English invasion. Certainly here was one answer to his prayers; a request for a sizable grant of land in the very region where settlers were needed. But there was a question in Carondelet's mind as to whether he could comply with this request and make the grant. Two years earlier, in 1794, the governor had given to Andrew Todd the exclusive right to trade with the Indians north of the Missouri and Ohio Rivers. Thus it was necessary for him to turn to Todd and secure the latter's permission before acceding to the request of Dubuque. Todd answered that he could see no reason why the request should not be granted, provided "that the grantee shall observe the provisions of his Majesty relating to the trade with the Indians; and that this be absolutely prohibited to him unless he shall have my consent in writing". Accordingly, and with these restrictions, the grant was made and completed as of November 10, 1796. The grant stretched for some twenty-one miles along the west banks of the Mississippi River, from the mouth of the Little Maquoketa, near the present city of Dubuque, to the Tetes des Morts and for some nine miles inland. It is not unlikely that if and when Dubuque found it expedient to go beyond these bounds he did not hesitate to do so.

In "memory of the government to which he now belonged", Dubuque gave the name of "Les Mines d'Espagne" to his newly acquired possessions. The term is oft times confusing to readers of the history of this section of the Louisiana Territory and is frequently taken as designating only the Spanish mines. In reality there were many acres within this grant that were non-productive in mineral ore.

II. American State Papers, Public Lands, III, 676, contains Dubuque's Petition, Carondelet's answer from Todd, and the Grant of November 10, 1796.
Thus it was that by the simple process of making a grant of several thousand acres of land to one individual who was not a native Spaniard, the Spanish officials were given a measure of safety against the despised English traders who were intruding in Spanish territory.

Once his grant was made secure, Dubuque set about in earnest to work the mines therein. To the lead he also added a considerable trade in furs with the Indians and through the combination he waxed wealthy, despite the fact that through bad business sense he eventually lost it all. Twice each year, once in the Spring and again in the Fall, he left the scenes of his labors and with some of his French employees in charge of boat-loads of lead and peltries, sailed down the Mississippi to St. Louis. Frequently he was accompanied on these trips by Fox chiefs and warriors. Together they would float down the current of the great river to the one great emporium of the west. Here, it seems, his semi-annual visits created a considerable sensation. It has been related that balls were given in his honor, and that the leading men showered attentions upon him. It appears that he carried on much of his trade in St. Louis with Auguste Chouteau. A clerk in the latter's store has described Dubuque as a man "well below the usual stature, of black hair and eyes, wiry and well-built, capable of great endurance, and remarkably courteous and polite, with all the suavity and grace of the typical Frenchman". In exchange for lead, furs, and deerskins, Dubuque obtained a great variety of articles and trinkets for his Indian customers.12

It would indeed be a difficult task to measure accurately the amount of wealth that came into the possession of Dubuque through his dealings with the Indians. In a statement to Major Zebulon M. Pike, on September 1, 1805,

12. Van der Zee, "Early Lead Mining in Iowa," loc. cit., 21, 22.
he claimed that his mines on the west side of the Mississippi extended over a tract of territory "twenty-eight or twenty-seven leagues long and from one to three broad"; he said that he made from twenty thousand to forty thousand pounds of lead annually, all of it pigs. It is quite probable, however, that this was an under-estimate, for he evidently did not view with favor this evidence of American curiosity about his affairs. 13

Thus far only the mines under the control and direction of Julien Dubuque have been discussed at any length, for these were the only ones of importance within the present bounds of the State of Iowa. They were not the only mines, however, which were to be found in the Upper Louisiana country and which came under the jurisdiction of the Spanish officials. Several rich and valuable deposits of lead were discovered more to the south and in Missouri. All, however, produced a very high grade of ore and in great quantities. For a true and accurate account of the number and value of such lead mines, we can do no better than to turn to the description of Major Amos Stoddard. He tells us for example that,

"It is doubted whether the lead mines in Louisiana, both as to number and capacity, and purity of their treasure, are not superior to those of any other country. No mines of this nature, at least of any consequence, have been discovered below the Arkansas; those with which we are acquainted, and which are worked, are situated in Upper Louisiana. In these regions various lead mines have been discovered; but the number and value of them cannot be ascertained with any precision.

These mines are found on both sides of the Mississippi, more than four hundred miles above the mouth of the Missouri... Mineral lead is in such plenty that fragments of it are scattered about in some of their Indian villages; and it is considered of no more value than the same quantity of coarse granite or limestone rock." 14

14. Major Amos Stoddard, Sketches, Historical and Descriptive, of Louisiana, Philadelphia, 1812, 393, 394.
As a consequence of the ease with which the lead was found and mined and as a result of the great quantities of it, its manufacture was performed in a rather careless manner. Naturally then, great quantities of it must have been wasted. Machinery that might be used in mining and manufacturing the ore was very limited; that which was available was so expensive that it rarely paid to install it. Moreover, the known machinery had hardly reached a point of perfection that it would save enough lead to warrant its installation. Despite the rather crude and awkward methods used in working the mineral, the profits from it were great enough to satisfy the manufacturers. At no time, with the possible exception of the Dubuque mines, were they worked regularly. This was probably due to the fact that the lead was available in such quantities and that it required such little labor to obtain it. Continuing the narrative of Major Stoddard, he tells us that due to the water the mines could only be worked for a small portion of the year, in some places, this being from about the first of August until the latter part of November. During this period great numbers of miners put in their appearance at St. Genevieve, digging and disposing of the mineral and receiving, in payment, goods and other articles for the support of their families. He goes on to say that frequently miners working for themselves under the Spanish regime would take out as much as thirty dollars per day, for weeks at a time. The owner of one mine, employing some twenty-five men during these four months, grossed as much as twelve thousand six hundred dollars at the rate of nine dollars per hundred weight. The cost of his labor for this period amounted to three thousand six hundred fifty dollars, leaving him a net profit of eight thousand nine hundred fifty dollars. 15

15. Ibid., 395, 396.
With profits such as these, it is rather difficult to understand why more care was not taken in working these rich mining areas. Had they been worked methodically and to their full extent and had industry and competent knowledge of the lead been combined in proper proportions, it is not unlikely that almost any amount could have been prepared for market, and an extremely profitable industry might have been developed in this region. It would appear that the Spanish officials overlooked a fine opportunity, not only to develop a lucrative business, but to firmly establish themselves against the intruding English in Upper Louisiana. Certainly the supply was in no danger of being depleted and with the European wars going on, with their end nowhere in sight, the price of lead was bound to remain high. With Spain in control of the greatest source of the lead supply, she was in a fine position to refill her treasury. With this added money, it would have been a much simpler task to provide the protection to the Upper Valley for which the inhabitants of that region were clamoring.

Partially worked as were the mines during this period, the Major gives us a fine picture of half-developed industry in the following passage:

"There is no way to ascertain the quantity of lead annually manufactured in Upper Louisiana, but it must be more considerable than a mere superficial observer would be willing to admit. The mines in this quarter supply several Indian tribes, as also the extensive settlements on both sides of the Mississippi, and those on the Ohio and its waters. In addition to this, large quantities of lead are sent to New Orleans and Pittsburgh, where part of it is consumed; the remainder finds its way to the Atlantic and European markets. The want of capital and the still greater want of industry among the inhabitants on the Mississippi, especially the Creoles, operate as powerful checks to the manufacture of lead. When necessity compels them, they will labor with great spirit till the means of a few months' subsistence are obtained; they will then retire and indulge their indolence till necessity again urges them to resume their laborious occupations. Even the few capitalists
in the country, who purchase mineral and manufacture lead, complain of this as an obstacle to their success; they are obliged to wait for the moment when the victims of poverty and want deposit with them the fruits of their exercise.\textsuperscript{16}

The above citation would seem to be an answer, in part at least, as to why the lead mines of the Iowa country and the Upper Mississippi Valley were not fully developed into the profitable industry which apparently was possible.

In all probability, the richest mineral known in the country was procured from two mines situated on the west bank of the Mississippi, some five hundred miles above the mouth of the Missouri and owned and operated by the Frenchman, Julien Dubuque. As has been noted, he opened these mines for what was then known as large-scale production, in 1788. It has been pointed out that, in order to safeguard his holdings, he had these mines, as well as others in the vicinity, covered by a "complete grant" from the Spanish government in 1796. The grant embraced a tract of 169,344 arpents. When the United States took over Louisiana from the French, that government recognized this grant as valid although a few years later the decision was reversed. The mineral found within the bounds of this great tract of land was, as in other places, in veins. From one of these mines the yield was eighty-four pounds of pure lead to each hundred weight of mineral; from the other it was even greater, being ninety-two pounds. The average yield from other mines in the Upper Valley was only in the neighborhood of seventy pounds of pure lead per hundred weight. Despite the richness of these two particular mines in the possession of Dubuque and due to the careless methods used in smelting it, it is doubtful if more than seventy-five pounds were realized.\textsuperscript{17}

From his possessions, Dubuque managed to amass a rather sizable

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., 398.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 397.
fortune, although it is doubtful whether the exact amount of his wealth will ever be known. When he first came into possession of the mines, he had vision of great wealth and power. This vision was only partly realized, for while he made money, he also lost it almost as rapidly. He was by no means a good business man and as a result he slowly but surely lost all.

During the course of his trading with his friend, Auguste Chouteau, the St. Louis merchant, Dubuque became rather heavily indebted to the latter. In an effort to settle this debt he turned over a good portion of the southern part of his possessions to Chouteau for slightly over ten thousand dollars. A few years later, when the United States came into possession of this region, Chouteau and his heirs made many efforts to prove the validity of the Spanish grant which had been given to Dubuque. All of their efforts were fruitless, however, as the United States government refused to recognize this grant, despite the fact that such recognition had been given at an earlier date. In a similar fashion, Dubuque lost the balance of his possessions to other creditors so that by the time of his death in 1810 he had practically nothing of his once vast fortune. The Indians then took over his land and many who later tried to establish a rightful claim to sections of that territory met with no success.

Dubuque worked into the Spanish scheme of things rather nicely, although the officials of the latter government seemed to hesitate in taking advantage of his efforts. He had settled in a portion of Spanish territory which had been clamoring for settlers in order to keep out the English. He appears to have cooperated with the Spanish government and officials in every way possible. The merchants of the Spanish emporium of St. Louis certainly profited from his business and in turn the Spanish government itself shared proportionately. He worked his lead mines and at the same time kept the Spanish
officials at St. Louis well informed concerning the activities of the English in that section of Iowa. He not only brought the value of the lead mines to the attention of officials, but showed conclusively that they could be developed into a profitable industry. It can well be wondered why Spain, although knowing these things, did so little about the matter. It may be that the mistake consisted of making the grants to individuals entirely too extensive and so by trying to be over-generous in her efforts to attract settlers to Iowa-land she permitted that policy to defeat her very aims. In the case of Dubuque for example, the grant consisted of well over a hundred thousand arpents along the west banks of the Mississippi. This tract contained all of the known rich lead mines of Iowa and so by its extent kept other settlers out of that region. The same reasoning may be applied in the case of the grants made to Tesson and Giard. If Spain were to keep the English traders out of that region, she could not expect three men to do the task.

Regardless of what conclusions one may attempt to draw, the fact remains that Spain made little or no effort to colonize the upper portion of Louisiana beyond those mentioned above. In the light of recent evidence, presented by Arthur S. Aiton, there can be little doubt but that Spain was desirous of receiving Louisiana in the first place. It was to be used as a buffer against possible French intrusion into Texas and Mexico and might be used well for the same purpose in regard to the British traders. This point is well stated by Abraham Nasatir when he says that,

"Louisiana was strategically located for the purpose of defending the dominions of Spain in North America. In the first place, it served as a barrier against the British traders."

18. Arthur S. Aiton, "Diplomacy of the Louisiana Purchase," American Historical Review, XXXVI (July, 1931), 701-720. This excellent article throws new light on the Louisiana transfer from France to Spain and should be read by...
who threatened the mineral wealth of New Mexico. Moreover, in order to prevent incursions from the west into the same region by sea and by land, California was occupied at almost the same time as was Louisiana. British activity in steadily penetrating the "unknown west" of present day Canada; the virtual monopoly of the trade with the Indians of the upper Mississippi-Missouri regions; all such aggressions aroused the fear among the Spanish officials that the British might effect a conquest of the rich kingdom of New Mexico from the north, or might penetrate the "valuable Spanish territory lying along the Pacific slope" - abundant cause for fear being given by the activities of Carver, Pond, Ducharme, the North West Company's agents, Todd, La Rocque, Mackenzie and others, ... 19

From this, it might well be concluded that Spain was more than willing to be satisfied with Louisiana merely as a protection to her more valuable possessions to the south.

Before leaving our story, it would be well to point out what, if any, lasting influence Spanish possession of Upper Louisiana had upon the Upper Valley in general and the Iowa country in particular. This can be done quickly and without much difficulty. North of St. Louis, any such Spanish influence is practically non-existent. Today, in the State of Iowa, there is little or nothing to indicate that Spain ever controlled that region. The only exception to this would be the fact that certain modern land titles, in the southern part of the state and in the vicinity of the mouth of the Des Moines River, may be traced back to the Spanish land grant given to Louis Honore Tesson. Actually, there are no records of any real settlements by Spaniards within the limits of the present State. The only Spaniard of any importance in Iowaland was the trader, Manuel Lisa, and he never settled there. The settlement of Julien Dubuque, near the present city which bears his name, ... 19

was made under a Spanish land grant but no one was ever able to establish a just claim to it afterwards. Of Dubuque's enterprise and his influence on the surrounding territory, about all that remain are his grave and marking stone, located a short distance to the south of the city, and an occasional yawning shaft of a deserted mine.

So it can be said that while Spain possessed the Iowa country and was interested in it for its commercial value and for its strategic position as a protection to her more valuable dominions to the south and west, she never did much to improve it. As a result, the Iowa of today is destitute of anything that might be called Spanish influence or tradition.
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