Modal Entities in Suarez

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MODAL ENTITIES IN SUAREZ

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Loyola University.
VITA AUCTORIS

Thomas Mortimer Downing, S.J., was born at Cincinnati, Ohio, May 11, 1915. After attending St. Marys Grammar School, Cincinnati, Ohio, he entered Purcell High School of the same city, whence he was graduated in June, 1933. Entering Milford Novitiate of the Society of Jesus the following autumn, and finishing there four years of ascetical and classical training, he transferred to West Baden College, West Baden Springs, Indiana, where he matriculated in the College of Arts and Sciences of Loyola University, and received from that school, in 1938, the degree of Bachelor of Arts.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Table of Contents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter I</td>
<td>Definition of a Mode and an Explanation of the Terms of the Definition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter II</td>
<td>Proof that the Modes Exist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter III</td>
<td>Types of Modes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chapter IV</td>
<td>Practical Applications of the Modes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>65</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

PLACE AND IMPORTANCE OF THE M O D E S I N S U A R E Z I A N M E T A P H Y S I C S

To any student interested in the modes of Suarez one of the first problems that presents itself is, just what is the place and importance of the modes in Suarez' Metaphysics? This immediately brings us to disputed ground. On both sides of the question we are presented with authorities of great weight. The problem itself involves several other disputed questions.

To evaluate the importance of the modes it would help to know whether Suarez had a philosophical system of his own in which these modes have their place, or whether his works are merely a commentary on St. Thomas.

Suarez mentions in the Introduction of his *Disputationes Metaphysicae* that he is commenting on Aristotle. He gives an index to the twelve books of Aristotle's *Metaphysics* and the places in his work where references are made to Aristotle. However, a study of the works of Aristotle, St. Thomas, and Suarez will show that Suarez meant to be a commentator of Aristotle in the wide sense. As he himself says, he will use only as much of the *Metaphysics* of Aristotle as will be helpful as a groundwork for Theology. This he does. He uses Aristotle as a stepping-stone to comment on the subject of metaphysics. However, Aristotle is merely a first stepping-stone, as it were, for he does not strictly follow the order of the Philosopher, and also brings in many commentators of Aristotle who have preceded him. A glance at the Commentary of St. Thomas on the
Metaphysics of Aristotle will show that his work is strictly a commentary on that piece of philosophy. He follows closely the order of Aristotle, often commenting on him word for word.

This much must be prefaced to show that although Suarez mentions in his introduction that he is commenting on Aristotle, those who say that he is also a commentator of St. Thomas, have a foundation for their opinion.

If Suarez' work is, then, a commentary on St. Thomas, the place of the modes will be relatively unimportant, for he will be following the system of the Angelic Doctor. If, however, he has developed a system of his own, the modes would be independent of any other system and their importance greatly increased.

This then is the disputed question: has Suarez a commentary on St. Thomas, or has he in his work of commenting on Aristotle developed a system of his own?

Ueberweg in his History of Philosophy seems inclined to the former view when he ranges Suarez as a commentator of St. Thomas.

Of the later Thomists the most prominent was Francis Suarez who died in 1617. 1

In a footnote, speaking of Scholasticism, Weber in his History of Philosophy says:

The most distinguished among its Post-Renaissance representatives is Francis Suarez of Granda a follower of St. Thomas. 2

Glenn, when treating of those who in the 16th century carried on the tradition of Scholasticism, draws up a list of those who follow Thomism. Under the Jesuits he has listed Suarez. 3
Bartmann openly speaks of Suarez as a commentator of St. Thomas.

Nommons dan L'ordre des Jesuites, les commentateurs de la Somme Theologique de S. Thomas qui continuait d'etre le manuel dans des ecoles: Francois Suarez.

Pitted against this view we have other outstanding scholars taking the opposite opinion.

This is what De Wulf has to say on the problem:

Suarez is also the most eclectic of the Spanish philosophers. His philosophy is an original interpretation of the scholastic doctrines. In order to constitute it, he borrows a great deal of material from Thomism, but departs from it in important questions. Accordingly, he is not "the faithful commentator on the Angelic Doctor" which posterity was pleased to call him. To show this it suffices to enumerate some of the principal theses in his metaphysics and psychology. Contrary to St. Thomas, Suarez rejects the real distinction between essence and existence;... In psychology we may confine ourselves to pointing out that under the influence of Nominalism he allows to the intellect the power of obtaining a direct knowledge of the individual.

Miller in his History of Philosophy using as his authority the learned Jachieu in an article entitled, "L'eclectisme Suarezien" gives this opinion:

Suarez is clear and explicit in exposition, and makes a careful study of all important authors who have written on the question he treats. Some of his theses are a return to pre-Thomist philosophy. Suarez not infrequently replaces the metaphysical proofs of St. Thomas by others founded on principles of more limited application and extension and by arguments drawn from experience.... The influence of Suarez was far-reaching, not only because he abandoned old Aristotelian order of the subject matter in favor of that which is now in common use, and proposed a form of eclecticism which made a wide appeal, but also because of his clear and simple exposition of metaphysics.

Jaccard in his Fifty Years of New Scholasticism seems to intimate that Suarez was more than just a commentator on St. Thomas when he asks:
Was he (Thomas) the only Scholastic philosopher to be followed? Was it possible to prefer on certain questions the teaching of other Scholastics as Bonaventure, Duns Scotus or Suarez?8

With such great names on both sides of this question it is hard to make a decision. If we take the position of those who say Suarez was ex professo a commentator on St. Thomas, we are yet presented with the further question: did Suarez in spite of himself develop a system of philosophy? Did he by his wide diversion from, and disagreement with, St. Thomas establish a system of his own? Here again the authorities disagree. Some say, like those quoted above# that although the Doctor Eximius disagrees with St. Thomas, he remains a commentator of his works and is wholly dependent on his system. Those of the other opinion argue that Suarez might have wanted to be but a commentator of St. Thomas, yet the wide divergence which he makes with his great predecessor forces him into a system of his own. Perhaps the most convincing argument that we have for the latter view is that taken from Klinke in his Historiae Philosophiae:

Ceterum, ut ex epistola Suaresii ad Generalem Mutium Vitelleshi ex anno 1617 apparat, consilium ei erat completum cursum systematicum totius philosophiae componere, et quidem probabiliter sequendo eandem methodum quam in Disputationibus Metaphysicis tenuit.9

If this problem were settled, then we might ask what place the modes have in this system. Are they as basic to Suarez as Act and Potency are to St. Thomas? Here again we have a divergence of opinion. At one extreme we have Hoenen who calls the modes unintelligible. This he states in the minor of his proof # Ueberweg, Weber, Bartmann, Glenn.
that ubi does not consist of a *modus intrinsecus realis praevius* ex quo resultat contactus cum loco.

Atqui modus intrinsecus praevius contactui locali supponitur ad rationem reddendam propinquitatis et distantiae, quae in se sunt clarae dum ipse modus intelligi nequit.\(^{10}\)

A Perez Goyena in his article on Suarez in the Catholic Encyclopedia lists the twelve chief principles in his system. Among these the modes are not included. There are others, who while not denying the importance of the modes, claim other things are more basic in Suarez' metaphysics. Geny states that Suarez' analogy of attribution is his fundamental doctrine: "Tota eius metaphysicae theoriae analogiae entis pendere videtur."\(^{11}\)

However, in pursuing the pages of the *Disputationes Metaphysicae* the frequent use of the modes is striking. The mere numerical frequency of them demands that they be considered important. Many authors, although they do not explicitly state it, yet implicitly imply that the modes of Suarez are at least essential to his system because of their wide and varied use. T. Pesch, for example, devotes a thesis in his *Logica Maior* to prove their existence:

Non sine ratione affirmant, esse in rebus modos physicos sive reales, qui a rebus modificatis, quibus insint, distincti sint distinctione reali minore.\(^{12}\)

Urraburu\(^{13}\) and Lossada\(^{14}\) devote several pages to the explanation of the mode and apply it to the other categories.

It is, indeed, disappointing to have to leave the problem here, but it is sufficient for one who wants to study the modes
themselves to know that their place and importance in Suarezian metaphysics is a disputed one. We hope, however, by the evidence of our study to advance the theory which admits that the modes are at least intelligible, and to show from Suarez' frequent use of them that they are essential to an understanding of his metaphysics.

Let us proceed then to this study of the modes. Suarez first makes mention of the modes in treating the modal distinction. To have a full understanding of them we must first study this distinction.

THE MODAL DISTINCTION

Between the two main distinctions of being, real and rational, some philosophers have seen the need for a mean. Scotus postulated his distinctio formalis a parte rei. To Suarez this proposal seemed inadequate, so he postulated his modal distinction.

Secunda sententia est, dari in rebus quamdam distinctionem actualem ante intellectum, quae proinde non est rationis, sed major illa, neque etiam est tanta distinctio quanta est realis inter rem et rem. Haec sententia communiter tribuitur Scoto. Suarez explains why he rejected Scotus's distinction and offered his own.

There exists in nature independently of the operation of the mind an actual distinction in created things, he says, but this distinction is not so great as that which is found between two separate entities. This distinction may be called real in the general sense of the term in as much as it is in the actual order
and is not purely an extrinsic denomination that issues from the intellect. To distinguish it, however, from the greater distinction -- *major distinctio realis* -- it is called an imperfect distinction or, more properly, a modal distinction. The reason for this latter name is that this distinction always intervenes between a thing and its mode. To call this distinction a formal distinction, as Scotus does, is not to Suarez' liking, since it seems to him the term is equivocal. He proceeds to give his reasons. The formal distinction is sometimes applied to things that differ by reason of their essence; moreover even individuals of the same species can be called formally distinct since they have their formal individual entities. Thus a formal distinction is of wider extension and can be greater than the mean distinction. Also, the formal distinction can be a lesser distinction and this is the more common as it is frequently applied to formalities conceived in a state of precision by our intellect and consequently where we have a purely mental distinction.

*Nihilominus censeo, simpliciter verum esse dari in rebus creatis aliquam distinctionem actualem, ex natura rei, ante operationem intellectus, quae non sit tanta, quanta est inter duas res, seu entitates omnino distinctas, quae distinctio, quamvis generali vocabulo possit vocari realis, quia vere est a parte rei, et non est per denominationem extrinsecam ab intellectu, tamen ad distinguendum illam ab alia majori distinctione reali, possumus illum appellare, vel distinctionem ex natura rei, applicando illi tanquam imperfectiori generale nomen, vel proprius vocari potest distinctio modalis: quia versus satur semper inter rem aliquam, et modus eius. Nomen autem distinctionis formalis non ita mihi placet, quia est valde aequivocum; saepe enim convenit rebus realiter distinctis, quatenus inter se diversas unitates formales, et ita etiam formaliter differunt. Imo et individua eiusdem speciei, quatenus distinctas habent unitates formales individuas, dici possunt formaliter...*
distingui... Sic ergo distinctio formalis latius patet, et major esse potest quam distinctio ex natura rei, de qua nunc loquimur. Aliunde vero etiam potest esse minor, et ita est communior, quia frequenter applicatur ad rationes formales, ut conceptas et praecisas per intellectum nostrum, et tunc illa distinctio non transcendit gradum distinctionis rationis.¹⁶

For these reasons, then, our author excludes Scotus's denomination of such a mean distinction. He calls it rather a modal distinction for the reason given above, namely, because it designates the distinction between a thing and its mode.

The modes are the bases in reality for this modal distinction. It cannot be understood without a thorough study of the modes. We will now proceed to this study.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION

16. Ibid., n. 16.
At the outset we must realize that Suarez was not the first to use the modes. Other eminent philosophers before him such as Durandus, Aegidius, and Fonseca seem to have admitted them. Suarez gives as a confirmatory argument that the modes exist, the fact that these men postulated them.

However, Suarez was the first to popularize the modes and to use them extensively in his works. The question is what did they mean to Suarez?

The word mode is a queer mappable that conjures up many different phantasms in our minds. In our day it has quite a variety of meanings. The English dictionary gives seven different definitions. In Suarez' day the word also had various shades of meaning. To avoid any confusion the philosopher gives examples of modes which are frequently used by other philosophers, but which do not have the meaning he attaches to the word in this study. Here are some of the things a mode is not.

When one concept determines or limits another in any way,
we call it a mode of the latter. Thus, if there is no real
distinction between the determining and the determined thought
object, the mode is called a metaphysical mode; e.g., as rational-
ity is of animality in man. This word is especially applied
to those modes by which a being or accident is determined to the
most universal genus. Neither is this word taken in that gener-
al sense in which every determination is wont to be called a
mode. Nor in the sense in which the fixed limitation of any
finite thing is its mode according to its measure. In this sense
it is used by St. Thomas when quoting from St. Augustine: Modus
est quem mensura praefigit. Again, created things are all "modes
of being;" and the various aspects of a creature may be called
"modes" of creatures; as abaleitas is a mode of every created
being, or as quantity has the mode of inaleitas as regards a
substance. In none of these senses do we use the word "mode" in
this thesis.

...inhaerentiam, appellamus modum quantitatis, non quidem
illa generali significacione, qua omnis qualitas solet
modus substantiae appellari, ut ait D. Thomas, I,2, q.49,
art. 2. Neque etiam illa generali loquendi ratione, quo
omne contrahens vel determinans solet appellari modus
contracti; sic enim rationale dici potest modus animalis,
et specialiter solet haec vox applicari ad illos modos,
quibus determinatur ens vel accidens ad genera general-
issima. Neque etiam sumitur haec vox in illa general-
itate, qua modus dici solet omnis determinatio, vel lim-
itatio praefixa unicoique rei finitae juxta mensuras eius,
ut eodem loco notavit D. Thomas ex Augustino, lib. 4,
Genes. ad litteram, cap. 3, dicente: Modus est quem
mensura praefigit. 2

By a mode Suarez did mean: the ultimate determination of an
entity, which is itself not an entity and yet not nothing,
rather it is a positive reality which if it exists must determine an entity, since a mode is not able to exist separately.3

From the pen of other authors interpreting Suarez we have a variety of definitions of the mode.

Lossada says the following is a suitable enough -- satis idonea -- description of the mode.

Realis et ultima determinatio condistinctae a se indiffer- entiae ad aliquam denominationem rei existentis propriam.4

Urraburu after rejecting many other definitions gives this one:

Entitas vel realitas a subjecto realiter distincta cuius totum esse consistit in ultima determinacione rei ad aliquam munus obeundum vel ad aliquam realem denominationem actu habendam, sine qua saltem in individuo sumpta, res eadem potest existere absolute.5

Nolan in his treatise on the modes gives these two points as making up the nature of the mode:

1. The ultimate though real determination of a reality.
2. It does not add a new entity but merely modifies a preexisting entity.6

T. Pesch in his thesis on the modes defines them thus:

Modus realis describitur aliquid positivum afficiens ipsam rei entitatem, cuius est modus, per seipsum dando ei aliquid, quod est extra rei entitatem ut determinans dumtaxat statum et rationem existendi eius, non tamen addens illi propriam entitatem novam, sed solum modificans praeeexistentem.7

Bittle in his Ontology has this to say about the mode:

A 'mode' is the actual determination of a being which is indifferent toward this or that determination, but without the mode adding a new entity to it through the modification. It is of such a nature that it confers no new entity upon its subject and is distinguished from 'nothing' through and in its subject only; the subject can exist without a particular mode, but the mode cannot exist outside the subject which it modifies. A 'mode' is
more than a mere logical being, and as such is more than a fabrication of the mind; it really affects the subject, independent of the mind, by determining the indifferent subject to a definite manner of being or existence.8

One last authority's description of the mode may be added:

(A mode) is some positive reality which so affects another and distinct reality as to determine the latter proximately to some definite way of existing or acting, to which the latter is itself indifferent; without however adding to the latter any new and proper entity other than the said determination.9

This galaxy of definitions from reliable authorities has been presented to assemble in one work the outstanding definitions of the mode. However, let us go back to the first definition which was taken from the Disputationes Metaphysicae, and which uses the words of Suarez himself. If we inspect this definition and take it phrase by phrase its meaning will become clearer.

TERMS OF THE DEFINITION EXPLAINED

a. The ultimate determination of an entity. Creatures because they are finite are very weak. Therefore when they are in the act of causing, actu primo proximo e.g., to being in place, ubi, they need an ultimate determination or mode. This mode removes the indifference which a body has for being here or there, in this position or that, etc. For instance, inherence is called a mode of quantity because it is something affecting it, and as it were, ultimately determining the state and essence of the quantity's existence.

Cum creaturae sint imperfectae, ideoque vel dependentes vel compositae, vel limitatae, vel mutabiles secundum varios status praesentiae, unionis, aut terminationis,
indigent his modis quibus haec omnia in ipsis compleantur.  

... appellatur inhaerentia quantitatis modus eius, quia est aliquid illam afficiens, et quasi ultimo determinans statum, et rationem existendi eius.  

b. A mode itself is not an entity and yet is not nothing. This is true because the essence of the modes seems to consist in this that they themselves are not sufficient to constitute a being or entity in the real order of things, but intrinsically demand that they actually determine some entity, without which they are in no way able to exist. A mode is not really an entity unless by an entity is meant whatever is not nothing. Nor is a mode an entity, if by entity is meant that which does not demand that it always be united to another, and secondly if it is united to something it must be united by means of a mode distinct from itself. It is here that we best see the imperfection of the mode, for the mode has just the opposite properties. First, it must always be connected with another; second, it is immediately united to an entity without the means of another mode, as sessio is to one sitting, unio to things united.  

...modum hunc non esse proprie rem seu entitatem, nisi late et generalissime vocando ens, quicquid non est nihil; tamen sumendo entitatem pro illa re, quae ex se et in se ita est aliquid, ut non postulet omnino intrin-sece et essentialiter esse semper affixam alteri, sed vel non sit alteri unibilis, vel saltem uniur non possit, nisi medio aliquo modo a se ex natura rei distincto, modus non est proprie res seu entitas, et in hoc eius imperfectio optime declaratur, quod semper esse debet affixus alteri, cui per se immediate unitur sine medio alio modo, ut sessio sedenti, unio rebus unitis.  

c. Rather a mode is a positive reality which if it exists must determine an entity. That is, even before the operation of
the mind there are in created things real modes which are distinct from their entities and determine the entities through themselves by giving the created things something which is over and above their whole essence.

Suppono in rebus creatis, praeter entitates earum, quasi substantiales, vel radicales (ut ita dicam) inveniri quosdam modos reales qui et sunt aliquid positivum, et afficiunt ipsas entitates per seipsos, dando illis aliquid, quod est extra essentiam totam, ut individuam, et existentem in rerum natura.  

This, then, is a mode: that which ultimately determines a reality, while at the same time it does not add a proper entity of its own, but only modifies a preexisting one. Of itself it is not sufficient to constitute a being or entity in the real order, but intrinsically demands that it actually affect some entity without which it is in no way able to exist. It is not a being: it is not nothing: it is a reality.  

Suarez gives an analogy to show just what is the nature of the mode. Light depends on the sun. This dependence, however, is something other than the light and the sun. We could understand how both the light and the sun might continue without the light's dependence on the sun on the supposition that God were to deny his concursus to the sun for producing light, while at the same time He conserved in existence by His own power both the light and the sun. The mind, however, cannot conceive this dependence of the light on the sun to be an entity wholly distinct from the light itself because, firstly, by this dependence as through a medium the cause exerts its influence on the effect;
and secondly, this entity could otherwise be separated from its subject, at least by the absolute power of God, which is unintelligible. Therefore we conclude this dependence is a mode of light which has a transcendental relation to its subject. Therefore, there are in created entities modes modifying these entities, whose reason for existing consists in this that they themselves, of themselves, are not sufficient to constitute a being or entity in the real order of things but are intrinsically ordained to actually modify some entity without which they can in no wise exist. 15

Lossada, the best commentator on Suarezian metaphysics, 16 gives this example:

Take Peter sitting in his chair. The sittingness of Peter is a reality; it is not simply nothing or a fiction of the mind that Peter is in this state. Moreover it is distinct from Peter; otherwise Peter could not exist unless he were sitting. It also really modifies Peter, since sittingness is the ultimate determination that places Peter in this condition. And finally the fact that sittingness cannot exist by itself is shown in this, that it could not be conceived if Peter himself does not exist. This and similar determinations, of things themselves indifferent to one or another function, are real physical modes. 17

We conclude this chapter with two examples given by a modern American philosopher.

Place a coin on the table, with its face downward; and then reverse it, with its face upward. There is a real difference of position here, and it really affects the coin, independent of all thought; but the different positions add no new entity to the coin as such. You cannot separate this position of the coin from the coin itself; the coin is indifferent to various positions, but each position gives a definite mode to the coin. Or, take a lump of modeling clay and shape it, first into a sphere, and then into a cube. This shaping merely shifts the
outer limits or boundaries of the quantity of the clay without adding any new entity to the quantity itself: the shape (sphere, cube, cone, etc.) is nothing but a 'mode' of the quantity (extension) of a body, in as much as it gives determination to this quantity which, of itself, is indifferent to various shapes. These shapes, though, are distinct, because they differ among themselves and actually modify the subject.
NOTES TO CHAPTER I


2. Ibid., n. 17.

3. Ibid., n. 17, 18, 19.


11. Ibid., n. 17.

12. Ibid., n. 19.

13. Ibid., n. 17.

14. Ibid., n. 17, 18, 19.

15. Ibid., n. 17, 18.


CHAPTER II

PROOF THAT THE MODES EXIST

That these modes which Suarez postulates actually exist can be proved a priori and by induction. First we will take the proof from induction.

In examining the things of this world Suarez found the need of postulating modes. In considering, for instance, the accident of quantity two things can be noticed: (1) the accident may be viewed in itself just as it exists with all its essential properties. If we look at quantity in this way, it is as it would be, detached from the subject of its inherence, a table for instance. If it were separated from the table, it would still keep all of its essential properties. This same accident may be considered from another point of view, namely, its actual inherence in the table. The quantity which before was considered in itself now has something new. It has in fact a new mode of existence. This inherence actually adds something new to the quantity, gives it the ultimate finishing "fashion," as Father Harper says, of its existence. It does not add any new entity to the entity of the quantity, but previous to any operation of the intellect, it modifies the preexisting state of the quantity. This function Suarez calls a "mode."

Hoc patet inductione: nam, verbi gratia, in quantitate, quae est in substantia, duo considerari possunt: unum est, entitas ipsius quantitatis: aliud est unio seu actualis inhaerentia eiusdem quantitatis cum substantia. Primum vocamus simpliciter rem quantitatis, includentem quicquid est de essentia quantitatis individuae, et in rerum natura positae, quod manet et conservatur, etiamsi quantitas a subjecto separatatur, et impossibile est conservari
illa rem numero, quae est haec quantitas, quin includat hanc essentiam quantitatis cum sua intrinseca individuazione, et actuali esse.... appellatur inhaerentia quantitatis modus eius, quia est aliquid illam afficiens, et quasi ultimo determinans statum, et rationem existendi eius, non tamen addit illi propriam entitatem novam, sed solum modificat praexistentem. 1

It may be objected that this mode is an entity in itself. On closer examination it will be found that this is not so. The problem may be looked at negatively. It is impossible for the modes to be an entity because then there would result an infinite series. First, there is the mode which unites the quantity and the substance; then, this mode (which in the supposition is an entity) would need something by which it in turn would be united to the substance and quantity, just as the original quantity needed a mode to unite it to the substance, and so to infinity.

In reality, however, inherence does not need another union. Its very essence is to unite. Inherence is not, therefore, an entity which inheres but only a certain mode which of itself is the reason for the union or inherence.

If we take the example of the quantity and the table, we can see that this is true. The inherence by which the quantity is joined to the table could never exist separately by itself. This fact, that it is able to affect only the quantity which it is uniting to the table, proves that it has not its own entity. A form which has its own entity never determines a thing ultimately in the way in which this mode does.
Nam quod novam entitatem proprietam non afferat, vix potest in dubitationem venire, quia si esset nova omnis entitas, non posset esse actualis unio inter quantitatem et subjectum, sed ipsa potius indiget, quo subjecto uniretur et quantitati, sicut quantitas ipsa indiget inhaerentia, qua subjecto uniatur. Quod si inhaerentia non indiget alia unione vel inhaerentia qua uniatur vel inhaeret, ideum est quia ipsa per se non afferet proprietatem, quam inhaeret et uniatur, sed est tantum quidam modus, qui per se est ratio unionis et inhaerentiae. Cuius signum etiam est, quia haec inhaerentia habet talemodum essendi, ut per nuilam potentiam esse possit nisi actu conjuncta ei formae, cuius est inhaerentia, et quod haec inhaerentia numero non potest afficere seu potius unire nisi hanc numero formam, cui est veluti affixa, qui modus afficiendi numquam reperitur in his formis vel rebus, qui proprietas ex se habent entitates.

Now for the a priori proof.

Suarez upon studying reality was impressed with the weakness and imperfections of creatures. Accidents depending on substances, incomplete substances depending on each other, and the continual flux of things made him look a priori for something which would give an ultimate determination to these creatures which of themselves they did not have.

This view was not new or startling for the Thomist had also realized this weakness of creatures and postulated essence and existence to do his determining.

Upon further reflection it was found that the thing which brought about these effects of union, limitation, composition, etc., could not result from something which of itself was an entity. Yet, clearly it was not nothing. Eodes, then, must be postulated to explain these effects.

A priori autem esse videtur, quia, cum creaturae sint imperfectae, ideoque vel dependentes, vel compositae, vel limitatae, vel mutabiles secundum varios status
praesentiae, unionis, aut terminationis, indigent his
modis quibus haec omnia in ipsis compleantur. Quia nec
per entitates omnino distinctas hoc semper fieri necesse
est, imo nec commode intelligi potest: neque etiam fieri
potest per id, quod sit omnino nihil, et ideo saltem
requiritur modus realis. 5

On these two proofs Suarez rests the reality of his modes.
T. Pesch in the thesis on the modes gives a fuller proof.

Real modes exist (1) if there is no contradiction in the
concept or nature of the modes; (2) if there is a reason which
a priori demands that there be modes; (3) if many of the acci-
dents which are found in this universe of created things are not
able to be explained unless real modes are postulated.

Fr. Pesch then proceeds to take each of these points in
turn and proves them.

(1) There is no contradiction. There is no repugnance since
accidents in their very concept are so weak that they are not
able to be conceived nor exist unless as modifications of real
beings.

(2) There are certain reasons which persuade us that real
modes do exist in things: (a) Creatures, since they are finite,
changeable and indeterminate, need these various modes. (b)
Moreover, the order in nature especially postulates that there
be this grade of being in things. Thus, besides the Esse actu
in se and a Se, which is the divine Esse, this scale of being
is found: (i) Esse which is actu in se but nevertheless not a
se; this is substance. (ii) Esse actu in another being; this is
a real accident. (iii) Esse actu by modifying another; this is
a mode. (iv) Esse actu with respect only to another; this is a
(v) \textit{Esse} in potency only; this is a possible.
(vi) \textit{Esse} which can exist objectively in the mind only; this is an \textit{ens rationis}. (c) Just as an absolute and necessary being from its very nature demands that it be sufficient unto itself, since it is immutable, so the very nature of created things and contingent beings demands that they be themselves under every aspect mutable.

Thus, substances themselves not only by their nature have generation and corruption, but also as long as they last in their \textit{esse substantiale} they are changed again and again in their \textit{esse accidentale}, so that in substances not only real accidents come and go, but moreover even the substance with its accidents is subject to many and almost continual changes. Especially is this true with regard to space and time through local motion. Hence we learn that all things placed in this visible world are in perpetual motion. But no local motion would be real unless these modes were real which are called \textit{ubilocationes fluentes}, and \textit{quandocationes fluentes}, which are continually coming and going in things.

Fr. Pesch proves his third point, namely, that many accidents cannot be explained without postulating the modes.

(3) There are many things in nature from which we can conclude to the reality of the modes.

(a) First of all from the changes in things. Certainly we experience in ourselves and in things outside of ourselves various and continual changes. But where there is change there is
newness; where there is newness there is either the receiving of a habitus not yet had, or the loss of a habitus. Therefore, there is no true change in a thing except when it either loses or newly acquires something which intrinsically affects that thing in the real order. But no part of a thing is ever changed by nothing, or by an ens rationis. Therefore every real true change in a thing is able to be conceived only as a true and real distinction which intercedes between the subject of the change and that which is lost or gained. It is not possible, however, universally to affirm that that which recedes or is acquired is always an entity properly speaking whether substential or accidental.

Fr. Pesch then gives a few examples of this latter type of change, such as bending a finger in which the fundament and term of this relation make no loss or gain to the entity of the finger. Therefore, he concludes, nothing is left but to say that in this type of change there is constantly a going and coming of different modes.

(b) The second argument is taken from the true efficacy of causes. In every true efficient cause it is required that something be produced which before was not. But very often we see a cause act which neither produces any substantial nor accidental entity. If therefore it does not produce a mode it does not produce anything. Now that we have established the reality of the modes, we may take up an important phase of them: the division into Accidental and Substantial modes.
NOTES TO CHAPTER II


2. Ibid., n. 18.

3. Ibid., n. 19.

CHAPTER III

TYPES OF M<<D<<ES

The modes fall naturally into three types: a substantial mode of being, an accidental mode of being, and an accidental mode of being which falls under a predicament other than that of which it is a mode. Each of these will be explained in order. But before taking them up a difficulty which arises as soon as there is mention of different types of modes must be cleared up. How can a mode be a substance or an accident when it has already been said that it is not a being? One may argue -- substance and accidents is a complete division of being; but modes have no proper entity; therefore they cannot be included in this division.

This, nevertheless, is false. For Aristotle and other philosophers tell us that many things are numbered among the accidents which are only modes of being, as figure, place, and others of this kind.

That this is so is clear, because a really complete division of being is composed of created and uncreated being. This embraces on the one hand uncreated being, and on the other whatever is not nothing, that is, whatever has some real essence or formality in the real order. Therefore, created being includes everything which is either not altogether nothing and is outside of God. The modes, however, are not nothing, but have a real essence which is proportioned to themselves. Therefore, they are either substance or accidents.
Primum est, an modus entis qui ex natura rei distinguitur ab illa re, cuius est modus, sub hac divisione comprehendatur, et ad quod illius membrum pertineat. Et quidem propter argumentum factum existimare quis posset, hos modos non contineri sub diviso huius divisionis, et ideo necessarium non esse ut aliquod ex membris dividentibus illius conveniat. Hi enim modi non habent propriam entitatem et realitatem, et ideo neque entia dici possunt, sed solum modi entium; cum ergo divisum huius divisionis sit ens, non complectitur hos modos, et ideo nec accidentia erunt, nec substantiae. Verumtamen hic modus dicendi falsus est, nam constat, ab Aristotele, et aliis philosophis, multa inter accidentia numerari, quae solum sunt modi entium, ut figura, ubi, et alia huiusmodi; de quibus suis locis videbimus. Et ratio est, quia ens creatum prout absolute distinguitur ab increato, complectitur quidquid non est nihil, sed aliquam realem essentiam, seu formalitatem habet in rerum natura; hoc enim totum complectitur ens creabile transcendentaliter et in tota sua latitudine sumptum; ergo etiam ens creatum ambit omnia quae non sunt omnino nihil, et extra Deum sunt; hi autem modi reales non sunt nihil, sed suas reales essentias habent sibi proportionatas; continentur ergo sub diviso huius divisionis.¹

Having proved that modes can be either substance or accidents, it can now be determined under which of these categories the various nodes fall.

The division of the modes is a natural one; substantial and accidental modes. Thus, whatever is a mode of a substance is a substantial mode, whatever is a mode of an accident is an accidental mode. As an example of the former: the mode of union between the matter and form is itself a substance and is called a substantial mode. We shall see more about this mode when we treat of the practical application of the modes. The inheritance of the quantity in the table is an example of the absolute accidental mode. In general the modes come under the same category as those things of which they are modes. This cannot be said universally, for there is the third type of mode which we have.
mentioned above, namely those modes which do not partake of the essence of the thing which they modify. This type is applied to the accidents of ubi, tempus, situs, habitus, actio, and passio. They are modes of some complete substance or one of the absolute accidents, yet form a peculiar predicament of their own.

Aliter ergo dici potest, hos modos entium revocari ad genera rerum quarum sunt modi, et cum quibus habent realem identitatem, ita ut modus substantiae revocetur ad substantiam, et sit substantia saltem incompleta; modus vero accidentis sit accidens, et ad illud genus accidentis revocetur, in quo fuerit ipsum accidens cuius est talis modus. Sed neque haec sententia in universum verum habet; nam, licet interdum ita contingat, quod modus rei participet illam rationem substantiae, vel accidentis, quae est in re cuius est modus, non est autem hoc semper verum; nam figura est modus quantitatis, et tamen non participat rationem quantitatis, sed qualitatis, et similiter Ubi est modus quantitatis vel substantiae, et tamen nec est substantia, nec quantitas, sed peculiare genus ac predicamentum constituit.  

Now that it has been seen where the modes of being ought to be placed, each division can be taken more in detail. Let us begin with the mode of a substance.

It is known that everything which constitutes or goes to make up the essence of a substance is itself a substance. But a mode which modifies a substance partakes of the essence of that substance. Therefore, a substantial mode is itself a substance. That, for instance, which gives the ultimate determination to "ironness" is a substance and is called a substantial mode. This is so because a complete substance is an unum per se and is composed of nothing but substances or substance. This same reasoning holds good for incomplete substances. A mode which modifies an incomplete substance is itself an incomplete
For the incomplete substance is just the imperfect existence or part of an actual substance. Suarez gives the example of matter and form: take the union of matter with substantial form, or of form with matter. Each is of itself ordained to make up a complete substance, and is intrinsically included in the composite substance. Therefore the union of matter with form is a substantial mode. This is why a substantial mode is a substance and not an accident.

...nam substantia completa, cum sit ens per se unum, et in suo genere absolutum non nisi ex substantia vel substantiis constat: quidquid ergo intrinsecce concurrit ad constitutionem substantiam saltem incompletam esse nescesse est. Item substantia incompleta nihil aliud est, nisi vel substantia ista in aliquo esse imperfecto, vel id quod est pars, seu complementum substantiae; ergo omnis modus, qui ita concurrit ad constitutionem substantiae, est substantia incompleta, seu modus substantialis, et non est accidens.

The next type is the accidental mode. That mode is accidental which supposes the thing of which it is a mode, is a complete substance. If we take the example of the table, it will be seen why this is true. The table with its matter and form is a complete substance. Once it is complete as a substance, all the other things added to it, such as its color, shape, position, etc., are but accidents. Now the modes which are identified with these accidents must also be accidents. Thus the inherence of quantity in the table is something added to the table after it is a complete substance, and therefore this ultimate determination of the extension of the table is an accident. It already supposes the completion of the substance. Modes of this type are accidental modes.
De ratione accidentis est ut supponat subjectum suum; ergo modus, qui non supponit, sed complet substantiam non est accidens. Atque hinc patet ratio alterius partis; nam postquam substantia jam est plene in suo generere constituta, quidquid ei additur, sive sit res, sive modus, est accidens eius; sed modus qui nullo modo spectat ad complementum substantiae, ex se supponit illam plene constitutam in suo generere; est ergo accidens eius. Major constat, tum ex communi ratione accidentis, tum etiam quia si modus adveniens substantiae non est accidens, sed aliquid substantiale, ergo complet amplius, et quasi magis integrat ipsum substantiam cuius est modus; ergo talis modus non supponit substantiam plene constitutam; ergo si eam sic constitutam supponit talis modus, non erit substantialis, sed accidentalis.

This can be made clearer by two examples given by Suarez. In angelic substances which are already complete as subsistent beings we find a mode of ubi. This is not a substantial mode, because when the ubi of the angel is changed there is no substantial change in the angel. The ubi does not pertain to the constitution or complement of an angelic substance.

Or again, theologians speak of the sacramental presence of the Body of Christ in the Eucharist as being placed under the genus of local presence. This presence is an accidental mode of that Body because in no way does it pertain to the substantial composition of It.

In this division of the modes we now treat the third kind. It is the type of mode which does not fall under the same category as the accident which it modifies. That this is true may easily be seen by applying the same rule here which was given above for the distinction between a substantial and an accidental mode. As with the substance its mode was substantial when it was of the essence of the subject or helped complete it; so
here when a mode helps an accident carry out its formal effect, and partakes of the essence of the accident, it is called an absolute accidental mode. But if, as we saw above, the mode which modifies the substance supposes that the substance is already complete, it is an accidental mode of that substance. So here, if the mode supposes the accident which it modifies is complete, then of itself it has a peculiar nature of its own and constitutes a new predicament. This mode modifies the subject either by its own efficiency, or by means of some other accident.

Ex dictis facile respondere est ad aliam partem,... quando modus, qui est accidentis, reducatur ad aliiud genus accidentis, vel novum genus constituat. Eadem enim fere regula, quam de modis substantialibus tradidimus, applicanda hic est. Nam interdum accidentalis modus solum est ad complementum alterius accidentis, seu ad exercendum effectum formalem eius, et tunc modus accidentalis non constituit novum genus seu praedicamentum accidentis, sed ad illud reducitur, ad cuius complementum pertinet; nam in eo genere quid incompletum est. Quando vero modus accidentalis non spectat ad complementum, vel constitutionem alterius accidentis, sed per sese peculiari modo afficit substantias, vel immediate, vel medio aliquo accidente, tunc per se habet peculiarem rationem accidentis, et novum praedicamentum, vel proprium genus alicuius praedicamenti constituit.7

Suarez gives an example of each of these two modes. (1) It can be seen when an accidental mode falls under the same predicament as the accident of which it is a mode. Thus, the inherence of quantity in a substance is a mode really distinct from quantity since in the Eucharist it is separated from quantity. This mode, however, does not constitute a new predicament but is reduced to the predicament of quantity because it intrinsically constitutes quantity and helps quantity to exercise its formal effect. The same can be said for the inherence of quality.8
(2) It can be seen when a mode falls under a predicament other than that of which it is an accident. Figure, although it is a mode of quantity is not contained under the predicament of quantity, but belongs to the genus of quality. Likewise ubi is another mode of quantity which constitutes a new predicament. The reason for this is that such modes do not add to the formal effect of quantity nor to its integrity or constitution, but have a new and special way of affecting quantity.

The general rule for these three types can be summed up thus: just as that which composes or completes a substance is an incomplete substance, whether it be a part or a mode of the substance, so whatever completes or perfects an accident is an incomplete accident whether it be a part or a mode of the accident. But if a mode is an accident, and is neither a part nor a complement of another accident, it is necessary that it have a distinct manner of affecting the substance. This is enough to constitute a new genus of accident, because in its own order it is a complete accident. Nor can it be placed under any other genus.

Ratio item generalis fere tacta est; nam quoad priorem partem eadem est ratio proportionalis in accidentibus, quae est in substantia; nam sicut id, quod componit, aut integrat substantiam, est incompleta substantia, sive sit pars, sive modus eius, ita quod complet vel integrat aliquod accidens, est quid incompletum in eo genere accidentis, sive sit pars, sive modus eius. Quoad posteriorem autem partem ratio est, quia si modus est accidentalis, et non est pars, vel complementum accidentis in suo esse, necesse est ut habeat proprium modum afficiendi accidentaliter qui proprium genus accidentis ad quod revocetur, tanquam quid incompletum in eo ordine.
One reading this thesis may perhaps be bewildered at the use of the terms "modal accident," and simply "accident," e.g., of quantity. In treating the subject a distinction is made between the two. One is called modal accident and the other absolute accident. This distinction has already been mentioned implicitly. An absolute accident is an entity, that is, one which has its own independent existence, e.g., quantity, which does require a mode of inherence in order to determine a substance. A modal accident, however, is a mode, i.e., one which does not have its own entity, but which does not require a mode of inherence, but is of its essence inhering. If it does not inhere it does not exist.

An absolute accident which has a proper entity really distinct from substance has by reason of its intrinsic essence aptitudinal inherence in a substance. A modal accident, however, which is only a mode of being, essentially includes not only aptitudinal but actual inherence or union with that of which it is a mode.

A further distinction made between these two will help to clarify the difference between them. Modal accidents exercise their formal causality in a manner distinct from absolute accidents. First it will be proved that modal accidents do exercise formal causality. We shall take again the example of the table. It has the accident of quantity which exercises its formal effect of extension, and this accident is a being which could exist by itself. But moreover it has other accidents such as its shape
and position. These accidents are not the same as the accident of quantity. They are something distinct, for they cannot exist separated from the table. The point is, these modes independently of the other accidents do exercise a formal causality. They are really actuating their subject. Therefore, they exercise real formal causality. Suarez puts the matter as follows:

Modal accidents which do not possess their own entity, distinct from the entity of another, exercise (1) a formal causality, and (2) this in a manner distinct from that of absolute accidents. That they exercise formal causality is shown from induction. Thus figure is the form of a thing which has shape. Yet figure is not a thing but a mode of a thing. Also position and local presence formally modify the subject, for they determine a man as seated, standing, or present. Yet these also are only modes of the man and not distinct entities. Hence these modes really modify the subject and form with it an accidental composite. The subject intrinsically depends on the accidents as on a proper constituting act, while the accidents depend on their subject as on a material cause. Therefore modal accidents exercise formal causality in their subjects.¹³

The second part of the assertion, namely that modal accidents exercise a formality different than that of absolute accidents may be proved in this way: there is one deficiency of entity common to all accidental forms, in that according to the order of nature they cannot exist by themselves, but postulate a subject of inherence. But the absolute accidents have
this deficiency not in their accidental beings, but from the impossibility of a purely actuating form existing without actuating. Such accidents are qualities. But, the modes, on the other hand, cannot be separated de potentia absotua from their subject, simply by reason of their deficiency in even accidental being. They are mere fashion, so to say, of being; yet real. In this they differ in the manner of exercising their formal causality, since it is not distinct from themselves but is intrinsically and essentially included in their being.

If we return to the example of the table: another proof that modal accidents exercise their causality in a different way from absolute accidents can be given. It consists in the fact that the inherence of the quantity in the table does not need another mode of union distinct from itself. Where the union is not distinct from the inherence then neither is the causality, and in this they differ from the absolute accident.

Nam haec accidentia, cum non sint res distinctae, sed modi tantum, non afficiunt subjecta mediante aliquo modo unionis ab ipsis distincto ex natura rei, per quem eis uniantur, sed seipsis immediate conjunguntur...

Unde fit in his formis modalibus causam ipsam formalem non distinguiri a sua causalitate actuali, quia causalitas formae, non est aliud ab unione actuali formae ad subjectum; ergo ubi non distinguitur unio a forma, nec causalitas distinguiri potest. Cuius etiam signum est, quia huiusmodi formae modales non possunt manere in rerum natura, nisi actu causantes suos effectus, etiam per potentiam Dei absolutam; non enim potest manere sessio nisi constitutae sedentem, etc.; quod in universum de modis est in superioribus demonstratum, scilicet conservari non posse separatos a rebus quas modificat; non possunt autem eis esse conjuncti, quin eas afficiant formaliter; non possunt ergo actu esse quin actu causent.14

It may be noted that in the triple division of the modes
into (1) substantial modes, (2) modes of absolute accidents, and (3) accidental modes, a further difference may be seen between a mode and an accident. The mode may be found in all the categories, hence its transcendental character; whereas the accident is divided off from substance.

This explanation of the difference between these two types of accidents brings to a close the description of the modes in general. A few objections placed against them may be examined.

At this late part of the work it does not seem necessary to rid the reader of any prejudices against the modes. However, because they are the particular scorn and object of derision of modern non-scholastic philosophers, for completeness' sake, a refutation of this prejudice taken from Fr. Harper will be given:

In the interest of Truth, what can it matter whether there be a special class of Accidents that are absolutely incapable of being separated from their Subject, or not? Do not all these divisions and subdivisions savour rather of logical subtlety and of hairsplitting, than of solid and profitable knowledge?...(To answer this) let us apply it to a subject of vital consequence,-- the essential constitution of man. Every man is constituted of a soul and a body. But how is he constituted of these two elements? What is the nature of such constitution? For the formation of a man, is it enough that there should be a human soul and an inanimate body, side by side? Of course not, you will answer; the two must be united. --Most true; and what is that union? Is it something, or nothing?-- You reply, Of course it is something; because, without it, the body and soul would not become a man. -- Well, then, Is it a Substance or an Accident? -- It cannot be a substance, will be the answer; because it cannot stand by itself. But it cannot be an accident either; for then man would be a man by accident. Besides, I can conceive an Accident to be separable from its Subject. As a fact, in Mathematics I do so conceive of Quantity. But a union without any things to unite, is inconceivable. Therefore it is neither Substance nor Accident.-- What is it, then? --I cannot say.-- Suppose we call it a Mode. Surely, this is a truth not wholly unimportant in its way. At
all events, it is a truth; and as such cannot be accounted a mere 'verbal dispute.'

(1) The usual objection that well-intentioned philosophers see against the modes is the fact that the predicament of relation is sufficient to explain most of the cases where a mode is postulated.

This does not hold, for such a relation could neither be rational nor real. It could not be a rational relation because this is simply a form which is dependent on the mind, whereas the modes are real forms. Neither could the modes be a real relation, because such relations imply a respect of one to another. But the mode of local motion, for example, is more than the mere respect of one body to another. Furthermore, a real relation requires an existing term whereas the modes can be had without such a term. For, if there existed but one body in the world, this body would be able to possess the mode of local motion without the need of a term. The answer to this objection is a much disputed idea, namely whether the ubi of a thing is intrinsic or extrinsic to it. If the latter is true, and this is what St. Thomas holds, then, there certainly could be no local motion if there were only one body in the world. But if the former is true, namely that the mode is intrinsic, then it would be possible to have the mode of local motion with only one body. For further reference to this question the reader may consult Urruburu's Ontology, #426, where he presents an answer touching on the dispute.
(2) Another difficulty seems to arise when the mode of inherence of quantity or quality in substance is mentioned. It is often argued that since the essence of an accident is to inhere in a substance, the addition of the mode of inherence is unnecessary. It must be remembered that, as we mentioned in the discussion of modal and absolute accidents, actual inherence is not of the essence of an absolute accident but has of its essence only aptitudinal inherence. This is why there is need of postulating a mode, -- in order to render the accidents (of quantity and quality) as actually inhering.

(3) It seems that with the modes we have the anomaly of an infinite series. Thus, e.g., if matter and form are not formally determined to union by themselves, but need a distinct union which is a mode and if this union, since it is said to be a real entity, will in turn need another union in order that it might be united to the matter and form, and that in turn will need another third union, etc. The result will be an infinite series.

In reply it may be said that this objection would be true if it were not of the very essence of the modes to unite.16

(4) It is hard to understand why modes, if they are really distinct, cannot be separated from their subjects.

In reply it may be said that, although things which are separable are distinct still it does not follow that all things that are distinct are separable. This latter is true of the modes. And even if a subject is able to exist without a determined mode, a mode nevertheless is not able to exist without a
subject because it is essentially affixed to and is a modification of that subject. It may further be said that the mode should not be considered as something alien to its subject which effects an intrinsic determination in a thing by acting in it. A mode is rather an intrinsic determination which determines a subject not through efficient but through formal causality.

(5) A mode is said to determine creatures which of themselves are indetermined. Now certainly the mode would itself then have to have some kind of a determination. We have then a most imperfect finite thing being in itself a determined thing. Therefore it should not seem repugnant that a substance or an absolute accident of itself, without any added mode should be already determined. If this were so, then the subjects of modes are able to have their determinations of themselves, and there is no need of superadding modes.

Reply: this perhaps would be true, if there were not real changes in created things, which occur neither through substance nor the absolute accident. Since, however, there are innumerable modal changes continually occurring in things, it seems clear that these things are of themselves not able to be determined.

(6) It is not only unnecessary but even repugnant that the determination which an existing essence needs, in order that it might be, or that it be such a thing with this or that affection, should come to the essence through something distinct from itself.

In reply it must be remembered that modes are not necessary to the existence of a thing. Rather they are determinations and
affectations of preexisting things.

In answer to the second part of this objection, namely that it is repugnant that an existing essence should be individuated by means of something distinct from itself, it may be said that this does not hold, if of its very nature the essence is indifferent.\textsuperscript{20}

As with any subject, so with the modes, a study of the objections placed against it will make the subject clearer. If the reader wishes further material on this, he may find it in the sections of Urraburu, Pesch, and Lossada cited in the footnotes.\textsuperscript{21}

The objections must be left, however, to take up in the next chapter a study of some practical applications of the modes.
NOTES TO CHAPTER III


2. Ibid., n. 14.

3. Ibid., n. 15.

4. Ibid., n. 16.

5. Ibid., n. 15.

6. Ibid., n. 15.

7. Ibid., n. 13.

8. Ibid., n. 19.

9. Ibid., n. 19.

10. Ibid., n. 19.

11. Ibid., Disp. XXXII, Sect. 2, n. 9.

12. Ibid., n. 10.

13. Ibid., Disp. XVI, Sect. 1, n. 21.

14. Ibid., n. 22.


17. Ibid.


19. Ibid.


CHAPTER IV

PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE MODES

This chapter will study the various places in the *Metaphysics* where Suarez makes application of his modes. Its purpose is rather expository than definitive. Nor does the chapter propose to give a complete exposition of the doctrine involved, but rather to show how in these particular instances Suarez uses the modes.

The first application of the Suarezian modes will be the modal union of matter and form. This can best be understood by answering a difficulty against it. In the composite, how many unions are there? Suarez says that in his opinion it is very probable that there is only one mode, and that is the mode of the form.

The basis for this opinion is the function of the form with respect to matter. Matter is changed only when the form attaches itself to or recedes from the matter. If the form, then, is responsible for the change, it also must be through the form that the union of form with matter is brought about. This being so, there need be only one mode of union, that of the form. The opinion can be made clearer by two examples. If a once handsome column which is resting on a solid base is completely destroyed, we do not say that the base is thereby destroyed. So, too, if a piece of wood becomes warm there are not two changes in the wood, one in the heat's entering the wood, the other in the union of
the wood to the heat. There is only one change, and this consists in the introduction of the heat into the wood.1

The point may be more fully explained on the part of matter, by showing the probability that the matter has no distinct mode of union. A mode of union is one which unites two extremes, as the body and the soul into one person. For this union, one simple mode of union, that of the form suffices. This is verified in nature, for we never find a form which has this mode of union without its having matter attached to it. Since, then, there is only one mode of union, if it is shown that this mode belongs to the form, it will follow that the matter has no distinct mode of union. Suarez proves this latter point by showing the functions proper to matter and form. Whenever there is a change in nature, the natural agent is terminated proximately and formally in the form. The whole efficacy of the cause is exercised on the form, either in educing it from the matter, or in uniting it to the same. Therefore, whenever there is something produced anew it is the form which is the formal term of the cause. The function of the matter is to act as a subject, either receiving the form, or passively allowing the form to be educed from its own potentiality.

The mode of substantial union, in like manner, does not directly affect the matter by a special mode, but is itself directly and formally terminated in the form, uniting the form to the matter, and producing in the matter union, inherence or information. Therefore, the matter is not the thing which changes, for
it is rather of the essence of matter to remain invariable. It changes only by reason of the form which it receives or is deprived of. Therefore Suarez concludes that since there is need of only one mode of union, which is that belonging to the form, matter has no distinct mode of union with the substantial form.

Another famous mode of Suarez' is the substantial mode of subsistence. We can treat the subsistential mode only in summary form.

Personality, says Suarez, does not consist in some positive entity, rather it is a substantial mode which completes and terminates a nature and renders it incommunicable. Personality, or rational subsistence, then, may be defined as the ultimate
termination of nature in the order of existence, and not of essence. It will further clarify this theory of personality, to define what Suarez means here by existence. To exist for a being is simply to have its entity outside its causes. As long as existence is not determined, it is incomplete and is not able to have the nature of subsistence. It is the function of the mode of personality or subsistence to terminate the otherwise incomplete nature of existence and complete the nature of the created substance, in order to give it the proper character of personality. Why is this mode said to be in the order of existence and not of essence? By essence here is meant the radical operative principle which we usually express when we give the definition of a thing. According to its esse entia a nature may be complete and have no need of a mode to determine it in this order. However, as we said above, a nature according to its existence is not complete and requires this mode to determine it, giving it that last note of incommunicability, which is the ultimate reason for giving to a rational supposition the name of 'person.' Here, then, is the order of these three notes in the constitution of the note of personality: first, a nature has its essence, complete in its own order, requiring no further termination; then it immediately needs existence to make it a being in act. Finally, it requires the mode of personality which is the ultimate term of a nature according to its existence. The last named is the function proper to personality.
...personalitas non sit proprie terminus aut modus naturae secundum esse essentialia, sed secundum esse essentialiae ipsius naturae... existere ex se solum dicit habere entitatem extra causas seu in rerum natura... subsistere dicit determinatum modum existendi per se et sine dependentia a sustentante; ... Igitur quamdiu existentia non est terminata per modum existendi in se et per se, adhuc est incompleta et in statu quasi potenti, et ideo ut sic non potest habere rationem subsistentiae.... Tunc igitur existentia naturae substantialis erit complete terminata, quando fuerit affectamodo existendi per se; hic ergo modus complet rationem subsistentiae creatae; ille ergo habet propriam rationem personalitatis, seu suppositalitatis. Ideoque merito dicit esse terminus, aut modus naturae secundum esse essentialiae, quia secundum esse essentialiae, jam natura est omnino completa, neque indiget alia determinatione, praesertim cum jam supponatur contracta usque ad indiciationem et singularitatem; sic igitur concepta secundum esse essentialiae proxiime ac immediate indiget existentia, qua fiat ens actu; postquam vero est essentia in actu, solum indiget modo existendi in se ac per se; hic ergo ultimus est terminus naturae secundum existentiam eius, et hoc est proprium munus suppositalitatis.3

A further example of the Suarezian mode is the much discussed one of creative dependence.

Creation is limited and dependent. This dependence of creation is a special substantial mode. It is called substantial because it is nothing other than the substance in the state of becoming. That this notion is possible Suarez proves from a parallel with motion. Motion is not placed among the predicaments because it is reduced to the predicament of its term. This is so because motion is only a thing on the way to its termination. A thing in this state is not related to its term as to a form but as an imperfect thing to a perfect thing. So creation, since it is on its way to a substantial term, is reduced to the predicament of substance. It is not reduced to the predicament of passio, as some say, because creation does not have a term
from which it comes; it is not a subject. To the proof of this latter statement Suarez next turns his attention.

When we think of the becoming of nature, we naturally conceive it as prior by nature to its actual existence. But it must be cautioned that to do this we must conceive this becoming not as in a subject, but as it were, in itself. This is not impossible. In fact, in this concept there is contained what is meant by the mode of creative dependence. For at the same moment in which creation becomes, it actually exists. This it does not as in a subject but according to a special relation by which becoming is related to actual existence. Therefore, in reality the priority of nature of becoming to its term is not required, since becoming does not require true causality but only termination. A comparison may be made with heat in water.

Heating is both in water which is made hot and in the heat which does it. In water the heating exists as in a subject of inhaesion, and presupposes the water. But the heat exists in the becoming hot as in a formal term to which it tends. Therefore the becoming hot does not presuppose the heat, but brings it along with itself, and really, is identified with it. So creation does not presuppose a subject but its becoming is identified with it.

Thus, the dependence of creation, since the relation to a subject is taken away, cannot be reduced to the predicament of passio. There is left only the relation to its term which is actual existence, and this is a substance. In this relation we
find the dependence not as in a subject, but in a special way, as a mode of it.4

Suarez gives credence also to those who say that creation may be reduced to the predicament of action. At least he says that this is a probable opinion, but the first theory seems to be the truer. Quae responsio est probabilis, sed prior verior videtur.5

Another interesting use of the mode is the predicament, ubi. Suarez radically differs from many other philosophers in his explanation of this predicament. He devotes an entire Disputation to it, going through thirty-three folio pages to urge his point. Suarez has a style of his own. He states the opposite opinions, refutes each one in turn, then proposes his own theory.

There is presented here only the essential positive part of Suarez' theory on the mode of ubi. To obtain these bare essentials it will be necessary to pick them out from various parts of the Disputation. The subject will be treated in the following manner: first, it will be proved that the mode is intrinsic to its subject; secondly, that it is distinct from its subject; thirdly, that the formal effect of the mode makes its subject to be here or there.

It will be proper, first, to give a definition of ubi. Ubi is a real intrinsic mode of a thing, by which it is placed somewhere and through which it is said to be here or there. This mode results, not from its surrounding surfaces but from a cause which constitutes a thing to be in place. Suarez proves that this
mode is real from the fact of local motion. When a person is said to be in a hallway or in a room there is some reality con-
formable to the person expressed. This reality of a person is not just a fiction of the mind for this was true even before the intellect perceived it. But when the person walks from the room to the hallway a different reality must be expressed. Yet in this change nothing of real entitative value is lost to the person except the reality of being in the room or in the hallway. Suarez calls this reality the mode of ubi.

Dico ergo primo, esse in quolibet corpore proprium quendam modum intrinsecum, ex natura rei distinctum a subst-
stantia, quantitate, et allis accidentibus corporis, a quo modo essendi formaliter habet unaquodque corpus esse praesens localiter alicubi, seu ibi, ubi esse dicitur. Probatur, quia om corpus dicitur esse hic vel illic, his vocibus significatur aliqui reale conveniens tali corpori, tum quia a parte rei id est verum sine ullo mentis fictione, tum etiam quia illui potest ac-
quiri et amitti per mutationem realem; motus enim localis, realis mutatio est, et tamen per illum non amittitur, nec acquiritur, nisi esse hic vel illic; tum etiam quia hoc ipsum esse hic vel illic, est conditio necessaria ad ac-
tiones reales, vel passiones, et censetur esse fundamen-
tum relationum realium. 6

Suarez strengthens his position by giving a further explana-
tion of the reality of the mode, ubi. First he gives an exposi-
tion of his doctrine without adding here a proof for his conten-
tion.

When we say that someone is in a hallway or a room we do more than predicate something extrinsic to the person. To change from one place to another is a real change. For if a body were to change only its extrinsic denomination when it moves from one place to another, its change would be similar to the way extrinsic
Denominations change in God when He is said to be in various creatures. When a body varies this way it changes intrinsically. It is Suarez' contention, then, that in local motion there is an intrinsic change. This seems to contradict Aristotle and also St. Thomas when he says,

\[ \text{mobile secundum locum non est in potentia ad aliquid intrinsicum, in quantum huiusmodi, sed solum ad aliquid extrinsicum, scilicet ad locum.} \]

Urraburu answers the difficulty by distinguishing. It is true that local motion is not a change in an absolute accident, but it is an intrinsic change in a modal accident.

Suarez' then gives a proof to show that \textit{ubi} is not something extrinsic. His aim is to show that the \textit{ubi} of a body does not depend on the superficies which surround it. His doctrine may be made clearer by several examples.

If a person were to swim in a river upstream, the surface which surrounds him would be constantly changing. We may also suppose that at the rate he is swimming he is not able to progress upstream; he is exerting just enough energy against the current to stay in the same place. Everyone would admit that although the superficies are constantly changing, the swimmer has not changed his \textit{ubi}. Or, again, we may take the example of a man who is to dine out. He goes to his room and there changes from his work clothes to his formal attire. The superficies of the would-be-diner have changed, but he has not changed his \textit{ubi}.

Those who hold that the \textit{ubi} of a body is something extrinsic would reply to these examples that the \textit{ubi} must be determined by
some distant object which is immovable. In the case of the swimmer, the banks of the river, in that of the diner, the room in which he dresses. To make this distinction, however, they are obliged to abandon their theory which says that the ubi is obtained from the contact of the immediately surrounding bodies.

Just as all the superificies which surround a man may change and yet allow him to keep his original ubi, so, also, may he keep the same superificies and yet change his ubi. Thus, if a man were in a room on the first floor of a building he would have a definite ubi with the walls, ceiling and floor of the room being the superificies. If this room were to move to the fifth floor, as happens in an elevator, he would still have the same superificies, but no one would doubt that his ubi had changed. Another example would be that of a man driving in an automobile. As the driver well knows he has the same superificies of the automobile the entire trip, yet no one would deny that he has changed his ubi when he goes from New York to Chicago.

Therefore, concludes Suarez, the ubi of a body cannot come from the things which extrinsically surround a body, but must be something which is intrinsic to the body. In confirmation Suarez states that if the extrinsic surroundings of a body and its ubi were identical it would not be possible to keep one and lose the other. But since in reality it is possible to lose one and not the other, ubi must be more than the extrinsic surroundings of the body. There is nothing left then, says Suarez, but to hold that the mode of ubi exists in the body itself, and
affects the body through a true union or identity with it.

Rursus hoc ipsum reale, quod his vocibus subest, esse hic, vel illic, non est aliquid mere extrinsecum illi corpori, quod hic vel ibi esse dicitur, neque in sola denominatione extrinsecum consistere potest. Quod patet, primo, quia per mutationem solius denominationis extrinsecae non mutatur res realiter; nam etiam in Deo variatur denominatio extrinsecæ, quæ dicitur esse in hac vel illa creatura, et tamen non propter Deum mutatur; sed corpus si nunc sit hic, et postea alibi, intrinsecæ et realiter mutatur; ergo non variatur in illo sola denominatio extrinsecæ, sed aliquid intrinsecæ in ipso existens; illud ergo significari dicimus illis vocibus, esse hic vel illic. Secundo, quia si esset aliquid extrinsecum, maxime esset corpus circumdans, seu superficies eius ultima; sed hoc non; ergo. Probatur minor, quia, licet varietur corpus circumdans, nihilominus corpus ibidem manet ubi antea erat, nec quer illam variationem corporum, aut superficierum circumdantium, mutatur realiter corpus circumdatum. ... Ergo converso res, quae erat hic, alibi constituitur, etiam si esset superficie eiusdem corporis circumstantis circumscriptur. Ergo illud in quo intrinsecæ consistit esse hic vel alibi, non est sola illa denominatio extrinseca proveniens a corpore circumscriptente. Non si mutatur circumscriptio, et manet idem esse hic, ergo aliquid aliud est hoc, esse hic, quam extrinsecum circumscriptio; nam si esset idem, non posset unum amitti, et aliud retineri. ... relinquatur ergo hunc modum esse intrinsecum corpori aliubi existentem, id est, in ipso existentem, et afficiens illud per veram unionem vel identitatem cum illo.7

The last point which Suarez wishes to prove is that this mode is of its nature distinct from its subject and the other accidents in the subject. This can be seen from an example. When a man moves from one room to another he has a different ubi. But he can still keep all the other accidents which he has such as quantity, quality, etc. On the other hand, the man could remain in the room and lose many of the accidents which he had before and yet keep his original ubi. Thus, the ubi of the man can change which shows that it is at least modally distinct from the
subject. The other accidents can change, and yet the ubi re-
 mains, which shows that ubi is, also, at least modally distinct
from the other accidents.

Ex quo facile probatur hunc modum esse distinctum ex
natura rei a subjecto, quantitate et caeteris acci-
dentibus ipsis, quia hic modus potest acquiri et perdii,
nulla alia mutatione facta in subjecto, neque in quan-
titate, sed caeteris qualitatisbus suis. Nam per mu-
tationem localem acquiritur hic modus, et amittitur
alis eiusdem ordinis, non facta mutatione in aliun
alia re, per ac lemmundo; ergo ex eodem signo recte
concluditur distinctio ex natura rei, saltem modalis;
impossible est enim intelligere mutationem reales in
alius aliai, quin per eam aliam realem acquirat, si
sit mutatio positiva, vel amittat, si sit privativa;
motum aeterni localis, quia in corporibus semper est
ex uno termino positivo in aliun, utrumque necessari
inclusit; id est, quod de novo et realiter acquiritur
mobili, non potest non esse saltem modaliter distinctum
ab illa quae aeterna habebat.

The third point Suarez wishes to prove is that the formal
effect of this mode is to constitute a subject in a determined
place. Although it is not possible for created things to be with-
out some abidation, they do not of themselves determine this. It
is rather of their nature to be wholly indifferent to whether
they are in one place or another. If of themselves they could de-
termine to be in one place rather than another they would not be
able to be anywhere else. Nor is it enough to determine them
that both the creatures and a determined place should co-exist,
for both the creatures and the place could actually exist and
yet the creatures involved not be present in this certain place.
They need something rather which of its very nature will deter-
mine them to exist in this place rather than in another. This is
the formal effect of the mode ubi, to take away this indifference
and formally constitute a body to be present in a determined place.

Suarez makes his point clear by several examples.

Quod vero formalis effectus huius praesentiae seu modi sit constituere eum subjectum hic vel illic, facile etiam probatur ex Ciotic, quia quamli res conservat in se hunc modum praesentiae, semper ibidem monet, ubi prius erat, etiamsi vel aliae mutentur circa ipsam, ut declaraturum est in exemplo arboris existentis in fluente, vel ipsumnet in aliis aliis accidentibus mutetur, ut in colore, aut colore, et simulibus. Et e converso, mutato hoc modo praesentiae, desinit res ibi esse ubi antea erat, etiamsi nulla alia mutatio fiat, nec in habenentibus, nec in adjacentibus rebus, ut etiam declaratur est exemplo hominis qui in navis defertur; ergo signum est proprium effectum formalis taliis modi praesentiae, esse alicubi constituisse rem cuius est modus, Secundo, quia per motum locales per se primo acquiritur vel amittitur hic modus praesentiae, ut declaratum est, et amplius constabit ex dicendis. Sed quod per mutationem locales primo acquiritur, vel amittitur, est esse hic vel illic...ergo hic modus est quo formaliter constituitur res alicubi.9

Closely related to ubi is the predicament situs. In fact, it is its very affinity to ubi which makes it hard to explain.

Situs in ordinary language is taken to mean the posture or way in which a thing is situated, as when a body is said to be seated, lying down, or before or behind, etc. In philosophical language it has a technical meaning and, indeed, constitutes a special predicament. It may be defined as the position or order of parts of a body in place. From the position which the parts have, the whole body gets its situational denomination, as standing, sitting and the like. A difficulty arises in declaring what the difference is between situs and ubi. To Suarez they are only rationally distinct, for both modes are lost or acquired with local motion.
The rational distinction consists in this, that when we speak of \textit{ubi} we consider it as placing a thing here or there with a certain distance or nearness to another place; when we speak of \textit{situs} we consider it as only bestowing situational figure on a body. We usually observe this rational distinction in our ordinary speech. We speak of a man who is sitting in an automobile and being carried to another place as changing his place, but not his position. So, also, we say a man changes his position if he crosses or uncrosses his knees, but we do not say that simply by doing this he has changed his place.\textsuperscript{10}

 Suarez sums up with this conclusion: therefore \textit{situs} is a certain situational disposition or local arrangement of the whole resulting from an ubicacion of its parts. This disposition, although it is not in reality distinct from \textit{ubi}, yet may be conceived in the fashion of a certain kind of distinct form. It has nevertheless, a distinct mode of denomination and predication. This is enough to make a predicamental distinction between the two.

\textit{igitur dicendum censeo, formam situs, quae dat denominationem huius praeedicamenti, esse ipsummet ubi sub diversa ratione conceptur, ita ut, sicut ad distinguendum actionem et passionem sufficit distinctio rationis, ita hic sufficit inter situm et ubi. Consistit autem distinctio rationis in hoc, quod ubi ut sic solum dicit illum modum quatemus constituit rem praeuentem alicubi.\ldots\ At vero situs ut sic dicit illum modum ut denominatrem rem sit dispositionem in se, dispositione quaedam resultante ex locali coordinacione partium. In qua denominatione non attenditur ratio praesentiae, nec ordo ad spatium proprium, sed ordo partium inter se; ordo(inquam) non prout dicit relationem praeedicamentalem, sed prout est fundamentum eius.\ldots Est ergo situs quaedam dispositione situalis seu localis consurgens in toto ex}
tali partium ubicacione; quae disposition, quamvis in re
non sit aliquid distinctum ab illo modo qui est ubi, a
nobis tanen concipitur per modum cuiusdam formae distinc-
tae, quae diversum modum denominationis et praedicationis
habet, quod sat is est ad distinctionem praedicamentalem. 11

With this predicament, the examples of Suarez' application
of the modes are brought to a close. His use of them is not con-
fined to the ones presented in this work. Rather his application
of them is spread throughout his metaphysics. They form, as it
were, a thread which runs from beginning to end, from the most
trivial to the most profound of his philosophical doctrines. It
can be seen, then, how important is a knowledge of the modes for
an understanding of Suarezian metaphysics.
NOTES TO CHAPTER IV


2. Ibid.


4. Ibid., Disp. XX, Sect. 4, n. 27.

5. Ibid., n. 28.


7. Ibid., n. 15.

8. Ibid., n. 16.

9. Ibid., n. 17.


CONCLUSION

In conclusion a word may be said about the place of Suarez in the History of Philosophy. In his own day he enjoyed a remarkable popularity. This is the more surprising since today outside the Jesuit Order he is hardly known. In the phrase of his contemporaries he was the "prodigy and the oracle of the age."1 The 3,000 folio pages of his Metaphysics was started when he first began to teach philosophy and was only published in 1597.2 It seemed to be the book Europe was waiting for. In a short time this gigantic work had gone through twenty editions.3 Not only in his native Spain was Suarez popular but also in Protestant Germany.

The Protestant philosopher Heereboord calls him the Pope and Prince of all the metaphysicians.4 Many of the early modern philosophers read and were delighted with his works. Descartes, Leibniz, Spinoza, and Schopenhauer were readers of his Disputationes Metaphysicae. Protestant John Harvard bequeathed to the newly-founded college in America bearing his name, a library in which were numbered the works of Suarez.5

After enjoying this period of recognition Suarez seems to have lost prestige as a popular philosopher. In our own day, however, several scholarly men have tried to awaken an interest in his Metaphysics. Geny claims that no one in the modern era has a more complete and thorough treatment of scholastic philosophy.6 DeWulf says of Suarez, "he has undoubtedly one of the ablest, fullest and clearest repertories of scholastic metaphysics."7

While Fr. Brodrick puts it more bodily saying,
Indeed in this line (metaphysics) he proves to have the most comprehensive and subtle mind of any man since St. Thomas, and his great treatise, Disputationes Metaphysicæ, still stands without a peer on the bookshelves.

Canon Sheehan gives fulsome praise to Suarez' works and holds out high hopes to young philosophers when he says,

The student who someday will take down Suarez' Metaphysics and give it to the world in strong, resonant, rhythmical English, will be one of the intellectual leaders of his generation.

In his own day, then, and in ours the Doctor Eximius has won the praise of thinking men. In the late 16th Century he seemed to be trying to reconcile experimental science with metaphysics. Perhaps his way of looking at one will in the future fit in better with the advances of the times.

Clare Biedl in her essay, "Suarez and the Organization of Learning" in the Jesuits Thinkers of the Renaissance makes the suggestion that this great Spanish Jesuit was more abreast of the times than his fellow philosophers when he postulated the theory that we get the individual first. In this way he was making an attempt,

to broaden the concept of science so as to allow it to include not only the universals of the speculative sciences but the singular as well on which science was working.

Could it be that in some future day Suarez' interpretation of reality will bring us closer to explaining the baffling facts of Metaphysics, Could it be that even at this date he is ahead of the times.

If this is so, that Suarezian philosophy will once again come into vogue, surely and understanding of the nodes will be
most essential. For Mahieu thinks that the principle which furnishes the basic unity of Suarez' philosophy is the way in which he conceived the unity of the composite, that sort of loose unity which could be saved only by the modes.11
NOTES TO CONCLUSION


4. Heereboord, Meltematà, (as quoted by Clara Riedl, op. cit., p. 3).


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The thesis, "Modal Entities in Suarez", written by Thomas M. Downing, S.J., has been accepted by the Graduate School with reference to form, and by those readers whose names appear below, with reference to content. It is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Father Kennedy
October 26, 1940

Father Dollard
October 30, 1940