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Evidences of Stoic Philosophy in Horace's Satires and Epistles

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EVIDENCES OF STOIC PHILOSOPHY IN HORACE'S
SATIRES AND EPISTLES

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June, 1935

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Loyola University.
VITA AUCTORIS

William Francis Fay, S.J., was born at Chicago, Illinois, April 7, 1910. He received his elementary education at St. Catherine's Grammar School. He attended St. Ignatius High School, and was graduated from there in June, 1928. In September, of the same year, he entered the Novitiate of the Society of Jesus at Milford, Ohio. He continued his undergraduate work at the College of Arts and Sciences of Xavier University at Milford, Ohio. He then went to St. Louis University, receiving the degree of Bachelor of Arts in June, 1933. After spending a year in graduate study at that University, he came to West Baden College, and has spent the last year in graduate study in the School of Philosophy and Science of Loyola University.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## Part I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>The Philosophy of Horace</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Part II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>The Stoic Sapiens</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III.</td>
<td>The Stoic Stultus</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV.</td>
<td>Stoic Virtue</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V.</td>
<td>Stoic Wisdom</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI.</td>
<td>Stoic Apathy</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII.</td>
<td>Stoic Control of Passions</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII.</td>
<td>Stoic Catalogue of Passions</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX.</td>
<td>Stoic Doctrine of &quot;A Life</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Consistent with Nature&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>X.</td>
<td>Stoic Doctrine of &quot;All</td>
<td>67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Crimes are Equal&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

## Part III

### Conclusion

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I.</td>
<td>Stoic Manner of Dialogue</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II.</td>
<td>Summary and Conclusion</td>
<td>74</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Appendix</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A.</td>
<td></td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B.</td>
<td></td>
<td>82</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C.</td>
<td></td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Bibliography | | 84 |
| Notes        | | 87 |
PART THE FIRST

CHAPTER I

THE PHILOSOPHY OF HORACE

What was Horace's philosophy of life? What school did he follow? Which set of philosophical principles did he choose to be guided by? Did the pleasure-granting teachings of a degenerated Epicurean sect suit his easy-going character? Or rather, was his enthusiasm drawn by the hard and fast principles of the Stoic school? These are questions that scholars have delighted to discuss for centuries. It would seem to be a paradox that a man of Horace's genius should present such a problem in his philosophy. Why does he not make it clear that he is a disciple of either Zeno or of Epicurus, or perchance of some other master? The answer to the riddle is quite simple. Horace, like most Romans, was too practical to be guided by a hard and cold set of philosophical principles. Religion might have stirred his enthusiasm, but philosophy, especially since it did not satisfy him in his search for truth, did not. An Eclecticism is very evident in his writings. Although he favored Epicurean-
isn early in life, then gradually cast off that system, and finally adhered more or less to the Stoic creed, still through it all, he remained perfectly independent in his Eclecticism.

For a thorough understanding of his philosophy, let us briefly consider his early training and the effect that it had on his character. A glimpse at the youthful philosopher will aid us in solving the problem. Horace's philosophical training may be considered under a twofold aspect. Using the term "philosophical training" as meaning the training in the philosophy of life as well as the instruction of various academies, Horace's philosophy was learnt both at the feet of his father and as a disciple of various masters in Athens.

He confesses his indebtedness to his father for teaching him the real philosophy of life:

"Atque si vitiis mediocribus ac mea paucis mendosa est natura, aliqui recta, velut si egregio inspersos reprehendas corpore naevos, si neque avaritiam neque sordes nec mala lustra objiciet vere quisquam mihi, purus et insons, ut me collaudam, si et vivo carus amicis; causa fuit pater his;"

This is a confession in the form of a boast. It was from his father that Horace learned in what true wisdom and virtue consisted. Later on, he would be influenced by the fundamental ethics of the different schools of philosophy, but it is evidently to his father that he attributes the strong
fibres of his moral character. It was he who taught him the real way of virtue much better than the haughty theorists of the Stoic school did in later days. It was probably the training of his father too, that made him a philosopher of common sense, who abhorred useless speculations and spent his time on philosophy only in so far as it vitally affected the lives of men. H. Fowler briefly treats this period of Horace's early life:

"His father exercised personal supervision over the boy's education, accompanying him to the school, and calling his attention to what went on about him, pointing out the evil effects of bad conduct, and giving him practical advice."2

With this fundamental training in ethics to build upon, Horace went to Athens in 44 B.C. to take up the formal study of philosophy. No longer resting upon the support of his father, he began that search for a philosophy of life that is so evident in his writings. Although, as we shall see, he would never be rapt to the seventh heaven of philosophical and metaphysical speculation, nevertheless his quest of a guiding philosophy of life was an earnest one. We can see him listening to, weighing in the balance, and finally rejecting one by one, the popular philosophies of the day. D'Alton notes his interest in the ethical side of philosophy and the manner in which moral questions enter into his later writings:
"Horace, since his days at Athens, had always been a student of philosophy. We have seen the influence of his early education upon his mind, and the moral vein that runs through his Satires. He tells us in one interesting passage in those early years, that when he retired to the country and gathered his friends round the festive board, it was not the merits of the latest theatrical dancer they discussed, but loftier questions, such as the sufficiency of virtue for happiness and the nature of the Highest Good."

Like most Pagans, he was searching in the dark for the truth that had not as yet appeared on the horizon. His conscience was continually telling him that in themselves some acts were right and some wrong, and that therefore there must be some norm that dictates the essential difference. He concluded that he should be guided by some set of principles. Being of a naturally noble character, his search was earnest and thorough. And being a sincere character, he was unbiased in his search. However, the result was not very satisfying in its definiteness. His own words bear clear witness to the fact that he vaunted his detachment from any particular school:

"Vive, vale! si quid novisti rectius istis, candidus imperti; si nil, his utere mecum."

Fairclough's translation is superb:

"Live long, farewell. If you know something better than these precepts, pass it on, my good fellow. If not, join me in following these."
Fundamentally then, it is the Eclecticism in his philosophy that is most pronounced. This doctrine that instructed one to choose and reject tenets of various philosophical systems according to one's reason or conscience seemed to be perfectly suited to his temperamental but withal, serious character. Horace confesses his own Eclecticism forcibly and convincingly in the following passage, in which he seems to consider himself too broad-minded and sceptical to be cramped by belief in any single school of philosophy:

"Ec ne forte roges, quo me duce, quo lare tuter; nullius addictus iurare in verba magistri, quo me cumque rapit tempestas, deferor hospes. nunc agilis fio et morsor civilibus undis, virtutis verae custos rigidusque satelles; nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor et mihi res, non me rebus, subiungere conor."

Throughout his writings, he maintains this stand. Although here and there in his works we see glimpses of adherence to one particular school of philosophy, it is his Eclecticism that is most evident and convincing.

He was, like most men, given to many moods. The sunshine of one day would most certainly be followed by the gloom of the next. The philosophy of to-day would perhaps be fitting for tomorrow, and perhaps it would not. Although essentially a philosopher of practical life and of common sense, rather than of paradoxes, syllogisms and precepts, he was inevitably forced to swear at least feeble allegiance to
one school of thought, without at the same time surrendering his proud independence of all philosophical systems. His young and pleasure-loving spirit was drawn by the hedonistic tenets of the followers of Epicurus. But, in more sober moments, when his heart was satiated with thoughts of wine and song, it was to the more serious doctrines of Zeno that he turned.

Stoicism and Epicureanism were the two most prominent doctrines of philosophy during Horace's time, and as we shall see, it was principally in the tenets of these two schools that he was interested. Stoicism, founded by Zeno, based its ethics on the theory that virtue was the only and highest good. Therefore, pleasure, riches, health and other things that man ordinarily seeks for himself, were not to be considered good nor to be sought for as good. Epicureanism, as it was first conceived by Epicurus, taught that ethics was nothing else than the art of making life happy. According to him, it followed logically from this principle that only that is good which affords pleasure, and only that is evil which affords pain.

In Horace's early years, it was probably the Epicurean doctrine, if any, that captured his heart. Surely, the invitation to enjoy life, without at the same time bidding him to do serious evil, was more tempting to him than the princi-
pies of Zeno, which would have him stand aloof from the world and scoff at all pleasures. However, his tendency to be drawn by the precepts of Epicurus in his early years must not be interpreted as meaning that he was a follower of the degenerated school of Epicurus. After the death of Epicurus, some of his disciples, in attempting to salve their smarting consciences, degraded the genuine doctrine of Epicurus to suit their needs. Their master had taught that the genuine philosopher will avoid those pleasures that disturb his peace of mind; but they enlarged upon his fundamental principle so as to include every kind of vice. From this arose the school of "epicures", a school whose "Summum Bonum" was professedly sensuality and the absence of any kind of pain and inconvenience.

During this time there was really no serious conflict, for it was not until Horace became more mature in mind that Stoicism had a chance to enter into his life. Not only was his youthful spirit jarred by the austerity of some of the Stoic principles, but his common sense also told him that fundamentally, some of these tenets should be met with ridicule rather than allegiance. In the analysis of the Stoic philosophy in his Epistles and Satires, it will be noted how he satirizes the Paradoxes of the Stoics. He took great pains to mock the gravity and make sport of the doctrines of the
Stoic teachers of Rome.

However, he was not always to remain a youthful upbraider of the tenets of Zeno. As the years rolled on, he became more conscious of the seriousness of life and seemed to read a deeper meaning into the Stoical doctrines. His proud boast of independence is still in evidence, but a more favorable leaning is very noticeable. We shall see this very clearly when we compare his early and later treatment of the Stoic doctrine. H. Fowler's distinction between the Odes and the Epistles neatly expresses his change of character:

"The Odes are the works by which he will always be best known and to which he owes his great fame as a poet, but nowhere so fully as in the Epistles does he disclose his kindly and genial, yet serious views of life as they ripened with his advancing years."  

Sellar, in commenting on the second Satire of the second book, has this to say concerning his awakening sympathy with the Stoic doctrine:

"The pronounced Epicureanism of the first book is no longer apparent.... He shows at the same time a truer understanding of the attitude of Stoicism, though he still regards the personal peculiarities and literary pedantry of its professors as legitimate objects of satire."  

It would be impossible to assign any definite date for his supposed conversion to the Stoic creed. In all probability it did not come as a result of a sudden turn of events
nor a sudden realization of the worth of that doctrine, but rather followed upon sober speculation and deep reasoning. On the other hand, Rand has the following suggestion:

"In one of his walks he (Horace) observes the scientific impossibility of thunder from a clear sky, and records in consequence, what some sober scholars call his conversion to the Stoic faith."9

The statement "sober scholars" would seem to indicate that this view is also that of other competent scholars.

To attempt to analyze a man's motives for changing his sympathy with a creed is very difficult. It is especially difficult in Horace's case, because as we have seen, his sympathy or interest in one sect of philosophy is neither whole-hearted nor complete. However, upon close study, it is quite possible to assign a variety of probable reasons for his new interest in the Stoic creed.

The first motive might be, as we have hinted above, a more natural appreciation of the Stoic doctrine, a result that would possibly follow with his advancing years. He was more serious then, and was more likely to abandon the things of a child, and view life from a very serious angle. His interests in life, because of his very personality, could not sour, but they could have a much more serious leaning. After a more careful examination, he was perhaps better able to view the real, practical, and uplifting side of the Stoic school as
it really existed. With this attitude of mind he would cease to be influenced by the derision which the reputation of the Stoic Paradoxes won for the exponents of that school.

Perhaps the most potent of all the influences that had to do with his inclination to follow and preach the doctrine of the Stoics in his later days in preference to the Epicurean tenets, was his interest in his fellow man. His usual common sense must have told him that if he really wanted to help his countryman by his writings, the Epicurean doctrine was not the best weapon he could use. Warde Fowler says on this point:

"Though capable of doing men much good in a turbulent and individualistic age, it (the Epicurean doctrine and religion) did not, and could not do this by establishing a religious sanction for conduct. The Epicurean gods were altogether out of the conscience of the individual."¹⁰

Warde Fowler's treatment of the Epicurean religion and philosophy would seem to indicate that Horace was very logical in attempting to teach the doctrine of Zeno rather than that of Epicurus. Later in the same chapter this noteworthy critic describes how profitable the teaching of the Stoic creed would be for the Roman people.¹¹ It is true that reference is made to the modified code of Paenetius, but since that code was founded on the fundamental set of Stoic principles, the same would apply to the Stoic doctrines of the
time of Horace.

However, during our investigation of the Stoic philosophy in the Satires and Epistles, a warning of Grant Showerman should be heeded. This critic is of the opinion that the term "philosophy" is misleading, especially in Horace's case. It would seem to suggest books and formulae and externals, which for the poet was the dead philosophy of ink and paper. His "philosophy" was rather the philosophy that would guide his life and that of other men.12

After this preliminary treatment of his philosophy, let us examine in detail just how much of the Stoic doctrine he did use in his Satires and Epistles. With the exception of his treatment of the Stoic Paradoxes, in the main, it is of the serious Horace that we get a fleeting glimpse in the light of his Stoic philosophy. We see a poet who gloried in his independence of thought, who satirized the Stoic thought in his earlier works, only seemingly, because of various influences, to arrive at a deeper appreciation of that sect at a later date. Throughout these works there are reminisences of the philosophy of Zeno. It will be our purpose merely to examine these allusions by a perfectly objective method, not attempting to prove thereby that he was in fact a Stoic.
PART THE SECOND

CHAPTER II

THE STOIC SAPIENS

The Sapiens of the Stoic school was nothing more than a metaphysical, abstract person, who was a perfect embodiment of the principles taught by the Stoic sect. An ideal was held before the followers of Zeno, towards which all were encouraged to strive. If a man were to follow out faithfully and conscientiously the dictates of this school, he himself would become a Sapiens in a greater or less degree. The Paradox of the Sapiens rested firmly on the principle that virtue is sufficient for happiness and that man should be indifferent to external circumstances. Diogenes Laertius describes the Sapiens as a man who is subject to neither pain nor pleasure; who has perfect self-control; who alone is rich and happy, because the goods of the soul are most valuable; who alone is beautiful and attractive; who alone knows how to obey and to govern; finally who is a king. As we shall see, it was against these paradoxical vaunting that Horace wrote. D'Alton says:
"All these paradoxes of Stoicism were hard sayings, not relished by Horace nor his contemporaries. It is little wonder that the poet directs the keenest shafts of his satire against the Sapiens, that absurd creation of the Stoic school. Even in later years, when he arrived at a better appreciation of the tenets of the Stoics, he could never be quite reconciled with their sage."14

In our examination of the evidences of Stoic philosophy in Horace's Satires and Epistles, the Loeb edition, translated by H.R. Fairclough will be used.

Sat. 1. 3. 124-142

This passage is typical of the irony that Horace employs when treating of the Stoic Sapiens. The title "magnorum maxime regum", which Morris translates as "Your Most Gracious Majesty", is indicative of his gentle sarcasm.15 Morris also has this note on "sutor:"
"This particular illustration which tends to make the whole doctrine ridiculous, was selected partly with reference to the store of Alfenus, partly to illustrate the dogged persistence with which the Stoics defended their paradox even in its most extreme applications."16

Sat.1.4.115-116

Sapiens, vitatu quidque petitu sit melius, causas reddet tibi:

Horace simply states here the supreme virtue of the Sapiens, that is, to know what to seek and what to avoid.

Bury says concerning this passage:

"The Sapiens would appear to be a man who, while eschewing evil, can keep his sanity and behave rationally in the avoidance of all selfish excesses, particularly those that arise from miserliness; he would refuse to become the slave of such harmful passions as luxury, ambition, and superstition, and would train his mind to have a right judgment in all things."17

Sat.2.2.107-111

O magnus posthac inimicis risus! uterne ad casus dubios fidet sibi certius? hic qui pluribus adsuerit mentem corpusque superbum, an qui contentus parvo metuensque futuri in pace, ut sapiens, aptarit idonea bello?

Horace refers here to the quality that every Sapiens must possess, to wit, perfect resignation to external things, being content with little. The clever comparison between the
man who has indulged himself and the Sapiens who has controlled himself is described as follows by Fairclough:

"Which of the two, in face of changes and chances, will have more self-confidence, - he who has accustomed a pampered mind and body to superfluities, or he who, content with little, and fearful of the future, has in peace, like the wise man, provided for the needs of war?"

Sat.2.7.83-88

Quisnam igitur est liber? sapiens, qui imperiosus, quem neque pauperies neque mors neque vincla terrent, responsare cupidinibus, contemnere honores fortis, et in se ipso totum, teres atque rotundus, externi ne quid valeat per leve morari, in quem manca ruit semper Fortuna.

Lejay sees the similarity between this passage and one of Lucilius: "Non dumtaxat erit sapiens, iam haec omnia habebit: formosus, dives, liber, rex, solus et est rex." 13

Among all of Horace's references to the Stoic Sapiens, this is the most complete, the most cleverly drawn, and perhaps, the most sincere. D'Alton has an explanation for the lack here of the irony and sarcasm which is so noticeable when he treats of the Sapiens in other sections of his Satires and Epistles. Referring to this passage, he says:

"The picture of the Sage is there so finely drawn, that some have been inclined to take it as evidence of Horace's awakening sympathy towards Stoicism. Pos-
sibly the poet's hostility is not so marked here as it is in the other Satires, but it would be difficult to discover any sign of seriousness of purpose in his treatment of the paradox. We must remember that the picture of the Sapiens is drawn by the enthusiasm of a recent convert to Stoicism, nor must we overlook the delicate irony of the Satire as a whole. 19

Epist.1.1.59-64

At pueri ludentes, 'rex eris', aiunt, 'si recte facies', hic murus aeneus est, nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa. Roscia, dic sodes, melior lex an puerorum est nenia, quae regnum recte facientibus offert, et maribus Curiis et decantata Camillis?

This allusion of Horace means that according to the Stoics, he will be king who "does right." We shall consider a portion of this passage under the topic of "Stoic Virtue."

Epist.1.1.106-108

Ad summam: sapiens uno minor est Iove, dives, liber, honocratus, pulcher, rex denique regum, praecipue sanus, nisi cum pituita molesta est.

Here we have a taste of the pure humor of Horace. After a pedantic description of the Stoic ideal, a description that could hardly be more flattering, he ends up with "nisi cum pituita molesta est", which Morris renders "except for an occasional cold in the head." 20 The contrast is indeed perfect if we consider that the Sapiens is described by Horace
as being deficient to Jove in power, in being wealthy, free, respected, beautiful, and a king of kings. The description of this wonderful person is balanced with "a cold in the head", a state that usually renders the person sluggish, uncomfortable, and anything but agreeable company.

Epist.1.7.22-23

Vir bonus et sapiens dignis ait esse paratus nec tamen ignorat quid distent aera lupinis.

Horace is referring to an indispensable attribute of the Sapiens, namely the power to distinguish between what to choose and what to eschew. According to Zeller, this was the fundamental principle of the Stoic doctrine. 21

Epist.1.10.8-10

Quid quaeris? vivo et regno, simul ista reliqui quae vos ad caelum effertis rumore secundo, utque sacerdotis fugitivus liba recuso;

The exultant "vivo et regno" is a cry of triumph of the Stoic Sapiens, for he lives a life that is as happy as that of a king, a life that is free from all worry and independent of all care. In his praise of life in the country in preference to life in the city, Horace evidently could think of no other expression than this Stoic one, to convey
his feelings of exultation. D'Alton cites this passage as indicative of the fact that Horace was well acquainted with Stoic authors and consequently steeped in Stoic phraseology.22

Epist.1.15.42-46

Nimirum hic ego sum, nam tuta et parvola laudo, cum res deficiunt, satis inter vilia fortis: verum ubi quid melius contingit et unctius, idem vos sapere et solos aio bene vivere, quorum conspicitur nitidis fundata pecunia villis.

Horace uses the Stoic Sapiens in line forty-five, "vos sapere et solos aio bene vivere" but twists the meaning of the expression. Instead of attributing "goodness", "apathy", or some other cardinal virtue of the Stoic school to this Sapiens, Horace ironically suggests that the "good and wise man" might be one, in the words of Fairclough: "whose invested wealth is displayed in garish villas."

Epist.1.16.17-20

Tu recte vivis, si curas esse quod audis. Iactamus jam pridem omnis te Roma beatum; sed vereor ne cul de te plus quam tibi credas, neve putes alium sapiente bonoque beatum.

The thought of the passage is contained in the line "sed vereor ne putes alium sapiente bonoque beatum", translated by Fairclough; "but I fear that you may think that someone other than the wise and good man can be happy."

Either sincerely or ironically, Horace reiterates the Stoic
maxim that only the wise and good man is happy.

Epist. 1. 16. 73-79

Vir bonus et sapiens auderit dicere: 'Pentheus, rector Thebarum, quid me perferre patique indignum coges? 'Adimam bona' 'Nempe pecus, rem, lectos, argentum? tollas licet.' 'In manicis et compedibus saevo te sub custode tenebo.' 'Ipse Deus, simul atque volam, me solvet.' Opinor, hoc sentit 'moriar.' mors ultima linea rerum est.

Horace describes for us the Sapiens of the Stoics. The principles underlying the ideal of the Stoics in this passage state that virtue consists in complete apathy towards all things. According to them, nothing matters because we all die sooner or later. What then, is the use of becoming emotional concerning possessions and riches? Fairclough's realistic translation brings out the Stoic thought so clearly that it bears quoting:

"The truly good and wise man will have courage to say: 'Pentheus, lord of Thebes, what shame will you compel me to stand and suffer?' 'I will take away your goods.' 'You mean my cattle, my substance, couches, plate? You make take them.' 'I will keep you in handcuffs, and in fetters, under a cruel jailer.' 'God himself, the moment I choose, will set me free.' This, I take it, is his meaning: 'I will die.' Death is the line that marks the end of all."
PART THE SECOND

CHAPTER III

THE STOIC STULTUS

The *Sapiens* of the Stoics was their ideal human being. He was the quintessence of all that a Stoic should be, that is, virtuous, wise, and apathetic under all circumstances. He alone was right and just. As the Stoics went to extremes in erecting for themselves a model that attempted to cast the ethics of every other school aside, so their conception of the rest of the world as "foolish and mad", was vain and almost childish. If a man, according to them, was not a *Sapiens*, he was unequivocally a *Stultus*. The very name suggests that he was a man of very scanty mental equipment and of very little intellectual development. But it was rather the moral side of the "*stultitia*" that the Stoics stressed, namely, proneness to vice and misery. According to the Stoics, with the exception of their *Sapiens*, the whole world was filled with people who were simply wicked and mad. It is in this connection that Horace wrote the second Satire of the Third Book, which is literally filled with examples of a mad and
foolish world. D'Alton, in speaking of Horace's Stoicism, mentions this feature of the Stoic school:

"The Wise Man, as we saw, possesses Wisdom and Virtue, while all who are not 'Sapientes' are confirmed sinners, slaves to vice, fools; and for the Stoics, all fools are mad. As even on their own confession the Sage had hardly ever been realized among mortals, they were reduced to the absurd conclusion that mankind at large is hopelessly sinful and corrupt."23

Bury gives us the explanation of the terms "stultus" and "insanus" as Horace used them:

"Usually stultus and insanus are given in contradiction to sapiens, e.g., 'Virtus est vitium fugere et sapientia prima stultitia caruisse.'"24

Horace, as we shall see, has several references to this Stoic tenet.

Sat.l.1.61

At bona pars hominum decepta cupidine falso....

"Bona pars hominum" - Horace has reference here to the people outside of the Stoic cloister. These people are "stulti" enough to be deceived by a foolish and blind impulse, not employing that wisdom which the Stoic Sapiens should always use when it is a question of virtue.

Sat.l.3.76-77

Denique, quatenus excidi penitus vitium irae, cetera item nequeunt stultis haerentia....
The hopelessness of the plight of the Stultus is cleverly brought out in this passage. The foolish are to be pitied indeed, for their proneness to vice is firm and last- ing. Concerning this passage Lejay says: "la vertu dépendant de la connaissance, suivant la théorie stoïcienne (et aristotélicienne) stultus s'oppose naturellement à sapiens."25 And Fairclough: "In fine, since the faults of anger, and all the other faults that cleave to fools cannot be wholly cut away...."

Sat.1.3.139-140

Et mihi dulces ignoscent, si quid peccaro stultus, amici....

Horace, in a mild use of the word, seems to include himself, because of a minor fault or two, among the poor and downtrodden Stulti. He pleads for indulgence from his friends. Lejay's criticism of this passage is practically the same as that of the above passage: "Stultus - opposé ironiquement à sapiens."26

Sat.1.4.25-32

Quemvis media elige turba;
aut ob avaritiam aut misera ambitione laborat.
hic ruptum insanit amoribus, hic puerorum;
hunc capit argenti splendor; stuptet Albius aere;
hic mutat merces surgente a sole ad eum quo
vespertina tepet regio; quin per mala praeceps
fertur uti pulvis collectus turbine, ne quid
Horace dilates on the vagaries of the *Stultus*. Morris says:

"Ob avaritiam...ambitione: the variation in construction is intentional and is carried still further in the following lines - hic...insanit, hunc capit, stupet - until the last craze, the absorption in business, is reached; this, as a most conspicuous and widespread folly, is given full treatment in 29-32."27

Epist.1.2.14-16

Quidquid delirant reges, plectuntur Achivi.
seditione, dolis, scelere atque libidine et ira Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra.

The Trojan war furnishes the poet with a good example of the Stoic "mad world." Morris' translation of the passage is as follows: "Every folly of the chiefs involves the people too, and it is all a mad world, within Troy and without."28

Epist.1.14.13-14

Stultus uterque locum immeritum causatur inique:
in culpa est animus, qui se non effugit unquam.

Horace makes reference to the Stoic *Stultus*. The person is foolish, because like the rest of the "mad world" he is never content with his lot, and is continually eager to change it. This discontent follows upon anyone who does not enjoy the philosophical temperament of the *Sapiens*. 
The Stoics insisted on the principle that man must subject himself to the course of nature. From this tenet follows their fundamental doctrine concerning the "Summum Bonum", which is, in plain words, nothing else but virtue. Since, according to them, the "Summum Bonum" consists in virtue, it follows logically that only the virtuous man can be happy. It is a truism that all men seek happiness. Therefore, virtue should be the one and only aim of man's existence, all other things being ordered and regulated by this supreme norm. If on the one hand only those things are good which are virtuous, it follows that on the other, only those things are evil which are not virtuous or are not conformed to nature. This Stoic tenet is summarized very neatly by Diogenes Laertius. Horace shows himself an exponent of this simple but fundamental truth time and again. Concerning his treatment of Stoic virtue, Duff says:

"Though he closes his epic with a
quip at the self-sufficiency of the Stoic pedant (rich, free, exalted, handsome, king of kings in short, sound above all except when troubled by a cold!), he proves by his insistence on virtue that his teaching is more Stoic than Cyrenaic.30

Sat.l.4.67-68

At bene si quis
et vivat puris manibus, contemnat utrumque.

Horace, discoursing on poetry, introduces the example of two poets who are "rauci male cumque libellis." "But who", he continues, "should fear them?" Answering in the negative, he simply states in a jovial manner that the man of upright life, the man of virtue may scorn them both.

Sat.l.4.129-131

Ex hoc ego sanus ab illis,
perniciem quaecumque ferunt, mediocribus et quis ignoscas vitiiis teneat.

Horace pays tribute here to the training of his father. He valued this training to a high degree because it freed him from the vices that would bring disaster. As the Stoics insisted on virtue, they also insisted on freedom from vice.

Sat.l.6.62-64

Magnum hoc duco,
quod placui tibi, qui turpi secernis honestum
non patre praeclaro, sed vita et pectore puro.
How should a patron choose his clients? Should wealth, noble birth, personality be considered? Quite on the contrary! Horace praises Maecenas because he has won his favor on the merit of his virtue alone, the prime requisite of a true Stoic.

Sat.1.6.65-84

Atque si vitiis mediocribus ac mea paucis mendosa est natura, aliqui recta, velut si egregio inspersos reprehenditas corpore naevos, si neque avaritiam neque sordes nec mala lustra objiciet vere quisquam mihi, purus et insons, ut me collaudem, si et vivo carus amicis; causa fuit pater his; ......................

........................
quid multa? pudicum,
qui est primus virtutis honos, servavit ab omni non solum facto, verum opprobrio quoque turpi:

Here again we have a beautiful thanksgiving offering of Horace to his father for schooling him in virtue. His father merits this praise not because he afforded his son an education that would procure for him wealth and a good name, but one that would train his son to virtue. Or, in the words of Fiske: "Horace owes to his father, not a lofty social position, but a pure life and a pure heart."31

Sat.2.6.73-76

Utrumne
divitiis homines an sint virtute beati;
quidve ad amicitias, usus rectumne, trahat nos;
et quae sit natura boni summumque quid eius.
Horace discusses in this Satire the fundamental questions of ethical philosophy. The question of virtue, as representing the doctrine of the Stoic school concerning the "Summum Bonum", is mentioned. The cleverness of the sentence "utrumne divitiis homines an sint virtute beati" should be noted.

Epist.1.1.17

Virtutis verae custos rigidusque satelles;

In this Epistle, addressed to Maecaenas, Horace describes his plan of life and in doing so swears allegiance to this Stoic tenet of virtue.

Epist.1.1.41-46

Virtus est vitium fugere et sapientia prima stultitia caruisse. vides, quae maxima credis esse mala, exiguum censum turpemque repulsam, quanto devites animi capitisque labore; impiger extremos curris mercator ad Indos, per mare pauperiem fugiens, per saxa, per ignis:

An exhortation in which Horace persuades men to be as ambitious and fervent in their search for true virtue as they are in seeking for wealth and honors. This is preceded by a simple exposition of Stoic virtue in line forty-one: "virtus est vitium fugere et sapientia prima stultitia caruisse."
Vilius argentum est auro, virtutibus aurum.  
'0 cives, cives, quaerenda pecunia primum est; virtus post nummos!' haec Ianus summus ab imo producit, haec recintunt iuvenes dictata senesque, laevo suspensi loculos tabulamque lacerto.

"Of less worth than gold is silver, than virtue gold." This is Fairclough's excellent rendition of the passage. To the Stoic, virtue was all. As we saw in the preface to this chapter, virtue was the one and only means of obtaining happiness. Therefore, all distractions from this lofty purpose should be shunned, because they are apt to draw the Stoic away from the quest of virtue. How earnestly this is expressed by these simple comparisons of Horace: "vilius argentum est auro, virtutibus aurum."

Epist.1.1.60-61

Hic murus aeneus esto,
nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa.

A pure conscience is a barrier and defense against all evils. The Stoics prided themselves on living behind a stalwart barrier of this kind. As long as the conscience was unsullied, virtue might reign, what else mattered? Sellar, in speaking of this Epistle, says:

"The first Epistle, addressed to Maecaenas, is introductory to the rest, and is intended to show the efficacy of philosophic culture in subduing the lower nature.... The spirit of his philos-
ophy in this Epistle is more Stoical than Cyrenaic, as in the often-quoted text: 'hic murus aeneus est, nil conscire sibi, nulla pallescere culpa.' But with characteristic irony, like that which he uses in concluding the second Epode, he sums up his doctrine with the Stoical paradox, which he ridicules in one of his earliest Satires, that the wise man is rich, free, beautiful, a man of rank, a king of kings."32

Epist.1.2.37-43

Nam cur quae laedunt oculum festinas demere; si quid est animum, differs curandi tempus in annum? dimidium facti coepit habet; sapere audite incipe! qui recte vivendi prorogat horam, rusticus expectat dum defluat amnis; at ille labitur et labetur in omne volubilis aevum.

We should not wait until the day of reckoning to start upon the road of virtue, because it is the work of a lifetime. "Well begun is half done." Horace compares the procrastinator in this matter to the poor bumpkin who waits for the river to run dry.

Epist.1.2.70-71

Quod si cessas aut strenuus anteis, nec tardum opperior nec praecedentibus insto.

Anthon summarizes the thought of this passage as follows:

"If thou wilt run the race of wis..."
dom with me, let us run together; for if thou stoppest or endeavorest to get before me, I shall not wait for thee, nor strive to overtake thee. When we enter the lists of virtue, to wait for those behind is indolence, too earnestly to pursue those before us is envy."\textsuperscript{33}

Horace again bespeaks his philosophic mind with a reference to the Stoic conception of virtue.

\textit{Epist.\textbf{1.6}.15-16}

\begin{quote}
\textit{Insani sapiens nomen ferat, aequus iniquō, ultra quam satis est virtutem si petat ipsam.}
\end{quote}

In this passage Horace reiterates the words of the preceding passage in which, acting the Stoic, he advises moderation even in the search of virtue.

\textit{Epist.\textbf{1.6}.28-30}

\begin{quote}
\textit{Si latus aut renes morbo temptantur acuto, quare fugam morbi. vis recte vivere: quis non? si virtus hoc una potest dare, fortis omissis hoc age deliciis.}
\end{quote}

Remedies are sought for diseases. Horace recommends Stoic virtue as the proper remedy for the ailments of the soul. Fairclough renders the Stoic thought very accurately:

"If your chest or veins are assailed by a sharp disease, seek a remedy for the disease. You wish to live aright (and who does not?); if then, virtue alone can confer this boon, boldly drop trifles and set to work."
If however, one does not have confidence in virtue to cure the soul of its troubles, Horace ironically advises a zealous quest after other remedies. His irony is proof of his faith in virtue as the one and only medicine that will bring happiness.

Horace here simply states the fundamental doctrine of the Stoics, — that virtue is above all else. How fittingly that is expressed in the verse: "vel quia cuncta putas una virtute minora."

Horace would make sure that the Stoic notion of virtue was well understood. That man is not good and honest whose testimony wins at law, nor is that slave virtuous who never ran away for fear of being flogged. No, virtue consists
in hating vice, - how truly in harmony with the Stoic doctrine!

Epist.1.16.65-70

Nam qui cupiet, metuet quoque; porro qui metuens vivit, liber mihi non erit umquam. perdit arma, locum virtutis deseruit, qui semper in augenda festinat et obruitur re. vendere cum possis captivum, occidere noli: serviet utiliter:

Fairclough renders the thought of the passage in this fashion:

"The man who sets his heart on money is a creature of desires and fears. He is a deserter from the cause of virtue. You might treat him as a prisoner or put him to death, yet he may make a useful slave."

This is a good example of Horace's contempt for men who do not seriously attempt to live up to the standards of virtue.

Epist.1.17.26-27

Aut, si non odit, regit ac veluti pia mater plus quam se sapere et virtutibus esse priorem vult.

Analogous to his praise of his father for training him in virtue, Horace cleverly inserts into an argument a hymn of praise for the "universal" mother, whose chief aim is to teach her son the way of virtue.
Virtutem doctrina paret naturane donet.

Fairclough translates: "Does wisdom beget virtue, or does Nature bring her as a gift?" This is a simple reference of Horace to the Stoical doctrine that virtue is founded on wisdom.

Seneca, the famous Stoic teacher of Rome, has this to say concerning virtue: "Quamdiu virtus salva fuerit, non senties quidquid absesserit."
PART THE SECOND

CHAPTER V

STOIC WISDOM

Perhaps the best and clearest exposition of wisdom as it was understood by the Stoics is had in the famous poem of Cleanthes, translated by W.H. Porter:

"But Zeus, all-bountiful! the thunder-flame
And the dark cloud thy majesty proclaim:
From ignorance deliver us, that leads
The sons of men to sorrow and to shame.

Wherefore dispel it, Father, from the soul
And grant that Wisdom may our life control,
Wisdom that teaches thee to guide the world
Upon the path of justice to its goal."35

As we have seen, virtue was the "Summum Bonum" of the Stoics, the norm according to which everything must be desired or eschewed. We will now consider the evidences in Horace's Satires and Epistles of this necessary attribute of the "Summum Bonum" - wisdom. Since the "Summum Bonum" consisted in living according to the just conception of nature, and this constituted the virtue of the Stoics, the power of distinguishing good from evil in the law of nature was cultivated. This power, according to Diogenes Laertius, was wis-
According to Zeller, the virtue of the Stoic has its positive and negative aspects. Negatively, it is freedom from emotions; positively, it is rightly ordered reason. The matter is subordination to the general law of nature, the manner is self-control. Zeller defines this self-control with the word "rational." To be "rational" one must possess some degree of wisdom. He then continues to say that virtue is knowledge and vice is ignorance. Though all virtue is based on knowledge, the Stoics do not place knowledge above practical activity. Knowledge is only a means towards rational conduct. With these words of explanation, let us see how clearly Horace proposes these tenets of the Stoic school.

Horace is speaking here of his desire to drop all occupations and devote his entire self to the pursuit of philosophy, which is here, according to Morris, figurative for wisdom. Lines twenty-five and twenty-six, as translated by Fairclough, show clearly the estimate that Horace has of this virtue and wisdom "which profits all alike, - the poor, the rich, but, if neglected, will be harmful alike to young and old."
Epist. 1. 1. 41-44

Virtus est vitium fugere et sapientia prima
stultitia caruisse. vides, quae maxima credis
esse mala, exiguum censum turpemque repulsam,
quanto devites animi capitisque labore;

According to Enfield, Horace introduces this striking
passage, the true definition of Stoic wisdom, in order to
satirize the quibbles, paradoxes and fallacies of some of the
Stoic teachers. Many of the teachers of the day spent their
time in composing meaningless syllogisms for the sake of
philosophical vanity. Horace then, simply states, in the
language of Fairclough, that "to flee vice is the beginning of
virtue and to have got rid of folly is the beginning of wisdom".

Epist. 1. 2. 17-22

Rursus quid virtus, et sapientia possit,
utile proposuit nobis exemplar Ulyssem:
qui domitor Troiae, multorum providus, urbes
et mores hominum inspexit, latumque per aequor,
dum sibi, dum sociis reditum parat, aspera multa
pertulit, adversis rerum immersabilis undis.

A good example of wisdom is set before us in the char-
acter of Ulysses. In this instance Ulysses is a perfect speci-

ci

men of the Stoic ideal. He was surrounded on all sides by
base pleasures, but scorning the allurements, he held himself
aloof. Horace would have us believe that this power of
Ulysses was generated by "virtus" and "sapientia." In other
words, his exemplar had the discerning power, in this particular case, to distinguish between what was good for him and what was bad. We have an echo of the opposite of the Stoic Sapiens in "quae si cum sociis stultus cupidusque bibisset." Ulysses was a regular model for the Stoics when they wished to portray "sapientia." Seneca uses him as an example of this virtue of the Stoics. 40

Epist.1.3.25-29

Quod si frigida curarum fomenta relinquere posses, quo te caelestis sapientia duceret, ires, hoc opus, hoc studium parvi properemus et ampli si patriae volumus, si nobis vivere cari.

Morris translates the first three lines of this passage as follows:

"If you could bring yourself to give up the practice of treating your soul with the cold-water bandages that your anxieties wrap around you, you would follow where philosophy would lead." 41

Duff summarizes this Stoic thought of Horace:

"Wisdom is the supreme business of life and it vexes him to watch the waste of human energy; so much eagerness is shown for gold, so little for goodness." 42

Epist.1.11.25-27

Nam si ratio et prudentia curas, non locus effusi late maris arbiter aufert, caelum, non animum, mutant, qui trans mare currunt.
D'Alton elucidates the motif of this passage:

"Closely bound up with this doctrine of virtue is another Stoic idea which appears frequently in the Epistles, that virtue and its consequent, happiness, are largely a thing of the mind. The rich man, on whom fall the pleasures of wealth, seeks relief by change of scene, but, as Horace puts it, 'coelum non animum mutant, qui trans mare currunt.'" 43

Epist. 2. 2. 141-144

Nimirum sapere est abiectis utile mugis
et tempestivum pueris concedere ludum,
ac non verba sequi fidibus modulanda Latinis,
sed verae numerosque modosque ediscere vitae.

There is perhaps, no other passage in the Satires and Epistles in which Horace is more earnest in his encouragement of seeking after wisdom. His language is not fiery and verbose, but his quiet "abiectis utile nugis" demonstrates very readily his sincerity in attempting to make other men sincere with themselves. He would convince us that good sense does not consist in making verses, and arranging words in poetic harmony, but in regulating our actions according to the better harmony of wisdom and virtue. Morris would have us believe that "sapere" is the underlying thought of the Epistles, that is, that Horace has given up the writing of poetry and has turned to the study of philosophy. 44
A true Stoic must cultivate a supreme apathy of indifference to all things. He must possess his own soul in passionless calm, not allowing himself to be disturbed by anything external, encouraging others to do likewise. It is in this state of passionless calm alone, that perfect happiness and virtue can be attained. The apathy of the Stoics was cultivated in regard both to things over which man has no control, and those over which he has control. The former, which we will consider first, includes the workings of fate and destiny in daily life. The latter, which we will consider next, includes the emotions and passions, which have to be controlled if man wishes to live in peace and true happiness.

The Stoics were in the true sense of the word, determinists, that is, it was a tenet of their school that every action is determined by "ferreo fato." Accordingly, since man has no power over the workings of fate and destiny, he does the next best thing, namely, he renders himself wholly indif-
ferent or apathetic to whatever may befall him. Seneca develops in detail the many things that may disturb man, such as death, sorrow, despair, and illness. His advice in this matter is perfect apathy, because fortune cannot be opposed:

"Adversus hos casus muniendi sumus. Nullus autem contra fortunam inexpugnabilis murus est; intus instruamur. Si illa pars tuta est, pulsari homo potest, capi non potest." 45

Zeller says that mingled with this proud defiance of fortune, the Stoics practiced a stern contempt of pleasure, pain, and external things in general. 46 From this practice arises the modern word "stoical." This attitude of mind consisted in a sort of cold disregard to everything except virtue. This phase of apathy is expressed in the famous phrase of the Stoics, "nil admirari", used by Horace.

Sat.1.9.50-52

Nil mi officit, inquam ditioc hic aut est quia doctior; est locus unicusque suus.

Fairclough translates as follows: "It never hurts me, I say, that one is richer or more learned than I. Each has his own place." Horace portrays here the Stoic idea of being perfectly satisfied with ourselves, not worrying about what other people may possess. In this way the Stoic would be able to possess himself in great calm and peace, not allowing himself to be disturbed by envy, jealousy, or any other emotion.
Sat.2.2.125-127 and 135-136

Saeviat atque novos moveat Fortuna tumultus:
quanta hic immineuer?

Quocirca vivite fortes;
fortiaque adversis opponite pectora rebus.

Concerning this thought, Bury states that Horace is very sincere in his admiration of the ideal of Stoic resignation in the face of adversity. Lejay, commenting on this perfect representation of the Stoic tenet concerning adversity, says:

"Le sens ne doit pas être rendu d'une manièere exclusive. Le paysan ne sépare pas la vigueur corporelle de la vigueur morale. Un régime sain donne l'une et l'autre et permet de narguer la fortune adverse. Il n'y pas de vrai malheur pour gens que se portent bien. En voulant donner un sens purement moral à la conclusion et en y introduisant l'idée du courage à supporter l'adversité, on fausse complètement, dans un sens philosophique et à demi chrétien, la rude sagesse du paysan italien."48

Epist.1.1.18-19

Nunc in Aristippi furtim praecepta relabor,
et mihi res, non me rebus subiungere conor.

Fairclough remarks on this passage: "Aristippus founded the Cyrenaic school, which taught that a man should control circumstances, not be controlled by them." In the light of this interpretation, this passage is an expression of Stoic apathy as we have described it. Although this is here ex-
pressly stated as the doctrine of Aristippus the Cyrenaic, the passage is nevertheless common to Stoic principles also. Horace simply refers to the attitude a man should take towards the turns of fortune.

Epist. 1.1.47-48

Ne cures ea, quae stulte miraris et optas, discere et audire et meliori credere non vis?

Horace is again referring to the apathetical manner in which a Stoic should view the world around him. If a man allows himself to "marvel at" everything he sees, his soul will be in a continual turmoil.

Epist. 1.1.65-69

Isne tibi melius suadet qui 'rem facias, rem si possis, recte, si non, quocumque modo, rem,' ut proprius spectes lacrimosa poemata Pupi, an qui Fortunae te responsare superbae liberum et erectum praesens hortatur et aptat?

The Stoic thought is quite clear. Horace suggests that he gives the better method of obtaining peace and happiness who advises a stern defiance of fortune, than he who advises a continual search for wealth. Wealth here is personified by the occupation of the front row of seats at the theatre.

Epist. 1.6.1-2
Nil admirari prope res est una, Numici, solaque quae possit facere et servare beatum.

There is contained in this passage the famous "nil admirari" of the Stoics. Concerning this term, D'Alton says: "Now, we find in Horace an echo of the doctrine of 'apatheia' in the well-known phrase, 'nil admirari.'" Fairclough translates: "'Marvel at nothing' - that is perhaps the one and only thing, Numicius, that can make a man happy and keep him so."

Epist.1.6.9-14

Qui timet his adversa, fere miratur eodem quo cupiens pacto: (parvo est utroque molestus, improvisa simul species exterret utrumque) gaudeat an doleat, cupiat metuatne, quid ad rem, si quicquid vidit melius peiusve sua spe, defixis oculis animoque et corpore torpet?

This is an echo of the Stoic "nil admirari" of the introduction to this Epistle.

Epist.1.6.17-23

I nunc, argentum et marmor vetus aeraque et artes suscipe, cum gemmis Tyrios mirare colores; gaude quod spectant oculi te mille loquentem; gnarus mane forum et vespertinus pete tectum ne plus frumenti dotalibus emetat agris
Mutus et (indignum, quod sit peioribus ortus) hic tibi sit potius quam tu mirabilis illi.

Horace is but developing the theme expressed in the preceding passage, using ironical examples. In the intro-
duction to this Epistle, Fairclough has the following note:

"This 'apatheia' of the Stoics is a philosophic calm, a composure of mind and feeling, a freedom from exciting emotions, which ancient philosophy regarded as the 'Summum Bonum.'"

Fairclough's translation of lines eighteen and twenty-three bring out Horace's irony in his treatment of "nil admirari." Line eighteen: "'marvel' at gems and Tyrian dyes;" line twenty-three: "lest you 'marvel' at him rather than he at you."

Epist.l.10.30-31

Quem res plus nimio delectavere secundae, mutatae quatient.

Fairclough translates: "One whom Fortune's smiles have delighted overmuch will reel under the shock of change." Not only should the Stoic meet any adversity wholeheartedly, he should also not trust fortune too much when she favors him. He should, in other words, be indifferent or apathetic under all circumstances. Seneca has a parallel passage concerning the way a Stoic should act when fortune smiles upon him.

"Rectus atque integer corrigit prava fortunae et dura atque asper ferendi scientia mollit, idemque et secunda grate excepit modesto et adversa constanter ac fortiter."50

Epist.l.10.31-32
Si quid mirabere, pones invitus.

A repetition of the Stoic maxim - "nil admirari."

According to the principle of being apathetic, the Stoic should not seek outward possessions beyond due bounds. In fact, the Sapiens should be truly independent and hold himself aloof from external possessions. Horace would seem to give the underlying reason for this Stoic injunction, or rather explain the principle underlying it. It would consist in this, - if a person is too attached to external possessions, his soul would be in a state of turmoil if any reverse should force him to relinquish his treasure. This emotional state is just what the Stoic should avoid if he is to cultivate true apathy.

Epist.1.11.29-30

Quod petis hic est,
est Ulubris, animus si te non deficit aequus.

The Stoic, if he is to look upon the external world with perfect calm, must possess a well balanced soul. He must be able to choose what is good and eschew what is evil. Concerning this passage, D'Alton says: "'Animus si te non deficit aequus,' a re-echo of the Stoic doctrine of 'apatheia.'" 51

Epist.1.17.9-10
Nam neque divitibus contingunt gaudia solis, nec vixit male, qui natus moriensque feuellit.

Fairclough translates: "For joys fall not to the rich alone, and he has not lived amiss who from birth to death has passed unknown." A Stoic should be perfectly calm, not seeking to place himself before the eyes of the people. He should be perfectly content if he is able to spend his life in peace, unknown and unheralded. In this state he would be able to control his emotions in perfect apathy.

Epist. I. 18. 111-113

Sed satis est orare Iovem, qui ponit et aufert, det vitam, det opes; aequum mi animum ipse parabo.

We have here an echo of "animus aequus", which sums up quite well the Stoic principle of perfect apathy. According to Horace, nothing else matters if only Jove will grant life and means. These granted he will look upon things, like a true Stoic, with a well-balanced mind.

Concerning this "nil admirari", an expression so indicative of the Stoic apathy as portrayed in Horace, Duff has the following remark:

"'Nil admirari.' To this feverish restlessness he (Horace) returns in a later Epistle, one where he advocates as the secret of happiness the principle of caring for nothing - the principle of 'nil admirari' - a philosophic calm in which Epicureanism and Stoicism might be reconciled."
PART THE SECOND

CHAPTER VII

STOIC CONTROL OF PASSIONS

Stoic happiness was of a negative rather than of a positive character. Zeller explains it as consisting in an independence and peace of mind which was the result of self-control in regard to passionate pleasure and desire.\(^{53}\) Stoic apathy was the weapon that was to produce this control of the passions. The Stoics were very logical in this tenet. If a man was to be free from all disquietude and care, he must not only resign himself to the workings of fate and destiny, but he must moreover, control those turbulent forces within himself. This is a hearking back to the Stoic fundamental principle of virtue, which states that man must subject himself to the law of nature, or reason. Now, according to them, emotions and passions are unreasonable and irrational. Does not then, a man become virtuous by overcoming his irrational impulses? D'Alton is evidently convinced of the sincerity of Horace's Stoicism on this point:

"But having taken 'apatheia' as the great essential for happiness, the Stoics
were naturally led to deal carefully with the question of the passions, and to enter into that minute analysis of them, which is such a striking feature of their system. The Stoics regarded the passions as diseases of the soul, and we find in Horace a reflection of the same idea.\textsuperscript{54}

In the next chapter we will point out this catalogue and analysis of the passions that the Stoics strove to overcome, as found in the Satires and Epistles of Horace, but it is here our purpose to examine only those passages in the Satires and Epistles in which Horace, when speaking of controlling the passions, seems to take on the guise of a Stoic. Horace's treatment of this subject is well summed up in his own words, "animum rege."

\textit{Sat.}2.\textit{7.}17-19

\begin{quote}
Quanto constantior isdem in vitiiis, tanto levius miser ac prior ille qui jam contento, jam laxo fune laborat.
\end{quote}

In this Satire, Horace's slave Davus expatiates on the views of Crispinus the Stoic. This is stated later on in the same Satire: "manum stomachumque teneto, dum quae Crispini docuit me ianitor edo." Davus, in true Stoic fashion, taking advantage of the licence afforded to slaves of that day, discourses on the various passions and vices with which men are afflicted. How contrary this yielding to passions is to the conception of the real and true Stoic, whose sole interest should be virtue! Horace concludes the introduction in true
ironical style in the lines quoted above, wherein he says that he is more consistent with reason who gives himself entirely to vice, "laxo fune", that he who daily shifts from the path of rectitude to evil, "contento fune."

Sat. 2.7.73-82

Tolle periculum; iam vaga prosiliet frenis natura remotis. tune mihi dominus, rerum imperiis hominumque tot tantisque minor, quem ter vindicta quaterque imposita haud umquam miseram formidine privet? adde super dictis quod non levius valeat; nam sive vicarius est, qui servo paret, uti mos vester ait, seu conservus; tibi quid sum ego? nempe tu, mihi qui imperitas, aliis servis miser atque duceris ut nervis alienis mobile lignum.

Davus likens the person who is ruled by passions to a puppet - "mobile lignum." What then, would the Stoic advise, in order to attain virtue, and be perfectly happy? Davus enunciates the principles of Crispinus - "tolle periculum: iam vaga prosiliet frenis natura remotis." Horace uses a very delicate artistry in his description of the passions: - Davus, the slave, is upbraiding his master by telling him that as he is the lord over his slave, so are his passions lord over him. No, a Stoic must not be subject to his passions, he must be lord over them, and thus be of "aequus animus."

Sat. 2.91-94

colla iugo. 'Liber, liber sum.' dic age! non quis
urget enim dominus mentem non lenis et acris 
subiectat lasso stimulos, versatque negantem.

Davus, after mentioning a particular passion that holds men tightly in its grip, takes upon himself the duty of a Stoic teacher and urges his master to free himself - "eripe turpi colla iugo." He then vividly describes how powerful the passions are when not controlled.

Epist.1.2.15-16

Seditione, dolis, scelere atque libidine et ira 
Iliacos intra muros peccatur et extra.

Horace, in this letter to Lollius, relates that he is reading Homer's Iliad, paying especial interest to the Trojan war. In the third line of the Epistle he says that he is of the opinion that Homer is a better ethician than either Chrysippus or Crantor: "quid sit pulchrum, quid turpe, quid utile, quid non, planius ac melius Chrysippo et Crantore dicit." Like a true Stoic, Horace agrees with Homer that unbridled passions were the fundamental cause of the Trojan war. If Paris, Atrides, Achilles and the other chiefs had controlled their passions according to the principles of the Stoics, this dreadful series of crime and carnage would never have happened.

Epist.1.2.24-26

Quae si cum sociis stultus cupidusque bibisset,
We have seen that Ulysses, a regular model for the Stoics, was used by Horace to portray the perfect wisdom of the Stoic school. Continuing this theme, Horace describes the fate that would have been Ulysses’ if he had indulged his passions as his comrades had done.

Epist.1.2.34-37

Et ni poscess ante diem librum cum lumine, si non intendes animum studiis et rebus honestis, invidia vel amore vigil torquebere.

In this passage Horace strikes boldly into the field of psychology. In keeping with the Stoic doctrine, the passions are the result of unrestrained emotions. When not kept at bay, these passions will keep the soul in a continual turmoil. Horace prescribes a suitable remedy - honorable studies and interests.

Epist.1.2.55-63

Sperne voluptates; nocet empta dolore voluptas. semper avarus eget; certum voto pete finem. invidius alterius macrescit rebus opimis; invidia Siculi non invenere tyranni maius tormentum. qui non moderabitur irae, infectum volet esse, dolor quod suaserit et mens, dum poenas odio per vim festinat inmulo. ira furor brevis est; animum rege; qui nisi paret imperat; hunc frenis, hunc tu compesce catena.
This is a sincere warning of Horace against leaving the passions go unchecked. After reciting the pitiful plight of the covetous, envious and ill-tempered, he closes with "animum rege; qui nisi paret imperat; hunc frenis, hunc tu compesce...

Epist. 1.2.64-68

Fingit equum tenera docilem cervice magister ire viam qua monstrat eques; venaticus, ex quo tempore cervinam pellem latravit in aula, militat in silvis catulus. nunc adbibe puro pectore verba puer, nunc te melioribus offer.

In ending this Epistle, Horace, the Stoic teacher, uses an example to drive home his lesson. The age old lesson of early training producing the real lasting results is treated in the example of the young colt and the young hound. Then, in like manner, ought a young boy listen to his elders and drink in the words of wisdom concerning the control of the passions.

Epist. 1.3.33-36

Seu calidus sanguis seu rerum inscitia vexat indomita cervice feros? ubicumque locorum vivitis, indigni fraterneln rumpere foedus, pascitur in vestrum reditum votiva iuvenca.

Horace is inquiring about the state of the friendship existing between Munatius and Florus. In doing so he simply makes reference to the passion of anger. How thoroughly the
Stoic abhors this vice is expressed in the words of Fairclough: "Yet, whether hot blood or ignorance of the world drives you both, wild steeds with untamed necks...."

Epist.1.6.10-11

Pavor est utrobique molestus, improvisa simul species exterret utrumque.

The Stoic doctrine of which Horace here makes mention, is based on the principles that passions must be controlled. If a man allows himself to be tossed about by passions, what will become of that calm that a true Stoic should cultivate?

Epist.1.10.24-25

Naturam expelles furca, tamen usque recurret, et mala perrumpet furtim; fastidia victrix.

When are the passions subdued? The Stoics were of the opinion that constant vigilance was required to keep them in check and maintain the soul in true internal peace. Horace was evidently of the same mind, for he likens the passions to the workings of nature, which become very unruly if not carefully guarded. Fairclough's translation:

"You may drive out Nature with a pitchfork, yet she will every hurry back, and, ere you know it, will burst through your foolish contempt in triumph."

Epist.1.10.34-43
Cervus equum pugna melior communibus herbis pellebat, donec minor in certamine longo imploravit opes hominis frenumque recepit; sed postquam victor violens discessit ab hoste, non equitem dorso, non frenum depulit ore. sic qui pauperiem veritus potiore metallis libertate caret, dominum vehet improbus atque serviet aeternum, quia parvo nesciet uti. cui non conveniet sua res, ut calceus olim, si pede maior erit, subteret, si minor, uret.

Horace, with his usual love and delicate choice of examples, compares the person who gives into passion to the bridled horse. Just as the horse cannot dislodge the rider from his back and the bit from his mouth, so the avaricious man never will be free from himself. Horace, like a true Stoic, lays particular stress upon the havoc that the passions cause to the interior spirit. The Stoic should be above all, calm and self-possessed. The Stoic should, in other words, be master of himself. This is impossible if he is a continual prey to his passions.

Epist. I. 16. 63-66

Qui melior servo, qui liberior sit avarus, in triviis fixum cum se demittit ob assem, non video; nam qui cupiet, metuet quoque; porro, qui metuens vivet, liber mihi non erit umquam.

Again Horace discusses the agony of the passionate man. His life is filled with worry and anxiety. The Stoics, when they proposed their model, the Sapiens, attributed to him the first requisite of a true Stoic, the gift of liberty.
This liberty should be interpreted as the liberty of spirit rather than of the body. It is this that Horace refers to when he says: "porro, qui metuens vivet, liber mihi non erit umquam."
PART THE SECOND

CHAPTER VIII

STOIC CATALOGUE OF PASSIONS

In the two preceding chapters, where we examined Horace's treatment of "Stoic Apathy" and "Stoic Control of Passions" we saw that he was a rather earnest apostle of that school in regard to the doctrine of self-control. Horace would have men restrain themselves, and moderate their emotional impulses, lest they destroy the "aëquus animus", a spirit of ease and independence that every Stoic should assiduously cultivate. In those sections the treatment was of a general character. Here we will point out the passages wherein Horace explicitly mentions the vices that a true Stoic should avoid. Perhaps nowhere else in his works does he put on the garb of a Stoic ethician more than in these passages. His earnestness cannot be denied. For clearness' sake we quote D'Alton again:

"But having taken 'apatheia' as the great essential for happiness, the Stoics were naturally led to deal carefully with the question of the passions, and enter into that minute analysis of them, which
is such a striking feature of their system... Horace, moreover, in true Stoic fashion, gives us in several passages a catalogue of the passions, and at times goes into a rather minute analysis of them. The Stoics regarded the passions as diseases of the soul, and in Horace we find a reflection of the same idea."55

Cicero in his De Finibus treats at some length the Stoic view of the passions. We quote briefly from that work to elucidate our point:

"Moreover the emotions of the mind, which harass and embitter the life of the foolish.... Let us accept the term 'emotion', the very sound of which seems to denote something vicious, and these emotions are not excited by any natural influence. The list of the emotions is divided into four classes, with numerous subdivisions, namely, sorrow, fear, lust, and that mental emotion which the Stoics call by a name that also denotes a bodily feeling, 'pleasure', which I prefer to style 'delight', meaning the sensuous elation of the mind when in a state of exultation; these emotions, I say, are not excited by any influences of nature; they are all of them mere fancies and frivolous opinions. Therefore the Wise Man will always be free from them."56

However, for clearness' sake we will take the classification that Fairclough suggests, and under these headings arrange the principal instances of each vice as they are found in the Satires and Epistles. In the introduction to Sat. II, III., in speaking of the sermon of Stertinius, the Stoic sage, Fairclough makes the following divisions for the
"The sermon of Stertinius may be divided into four parts, dealing with avarice, ambition, self-indulgence, and superstition, all of which are phases of madness."

Horace was especially earnest in his denunciation of avarice in his Epistles. Perhaps he was of the opinion that this was the root of all evil, for most of his arrows of satire are aimed at the people who are continually searching after more and more wealth. As a Stoic teacher, he would have them be satisfied with their present possessions and maintain an independence of all external things.

Avarice

Sat.1.1.23-101

Ille gravem duro terram qui vertit aratro, perfidus hic caupo, miles nautaque per omne audaces mare qui currunt, hac mente laborem sese ferre, senes ut in otia tuta recedant, aiunt, cum sibi sint congesta cibaria: (28-32)

Quid iuvat immensum te argenti pondus et auri furtim defossa timidum deponere terrae? (41-42)

"Populus me sibilat; at mihi plaudo ipse domi, simul ac nummos contemplor in arca." (66-67)

Denique sit finis quae rendi, cumque habeas plus, pauperiem metuas minus et finire laborem incipias, parto quod avebas, ne facias quod Ummidius quidam. non longa est fabula; dives ut metiretur nummos; ita sordidus, ut se non umquam servo melius vestiret; ad usque supremum tempus, ne se penuria victus opprimeret, metuebat. at hunc liberta securi divisit medium, fortissima Tyndaridarum. (92-100)
Sat. 1.1.108-120

Illuc, unde abii, redeo, nemon' ut avarus, se probet ac potius laudet diversa sequentes, quodque aliena capella gerat distentius uber, tabescat, neque maiori pauperorum turbae comparat, hunc atque hunc superare laborat. (108-112)

Epist. 1.2.44-55

Quaeritur argentum puerisque beata creandis uxor, et insultae pacantur vomere silvae: quod satis est cui contingit, nihil amplius optet. non domus et fundus, non aeris acervus et auri aegroto domini deduxit corpore febris, non animo curas; (44-49)

Epist. 1.7.32-39

Ne te longis ambagibus ultra quam satis est morer, ex nitido fit rusticus atque sulcos et vineta crepat mera, praeparat ulmos, immoritur studii et amore senescit habendi. (32-35)

Epist. 1.10.44-46

Laetus sorte tua vives sapienter, Aristi, nec me dimittes incastigatum, ubi plura cogere quam satis est ac non cessare videbor. (44-46)

Epist. 1.18.96-100

Num te semper inops agitet vexetque cupidō, num pavor et rerum mediocriter utilium spes. (98-99)

Epist. 2.2.26-31

Luculli miles collecta viatica multis aerumnis, lassus dum noctu stertit, ad assem perdiderat: post hoc vehemens lupus, et sibi et hosti iratus pariter, jejunis dentibus acer, praesidium regale loco decepit, ut aiunt, summe munito et multarum divite rerum. (26-31)

Epist. 2.2.145-154

Quocirca mecum loquor haec tacitusque recordor:
si tibi nulla sitim finiret copia lymphae, narrares medicis: quod, quanto plura parasti, tanto plura cupis, nulline faterier audes? (145-148)

Et cum sis nihilo sapientior ex quo plenior es, tamen uteris monitoribus isdem? (153-154)

Epist. 2.2.155-179

Sic quia perpetuus nulli datur usus, et heres heredem alterius velut unda supervenit undam, quid vici prosunt aut horrea? quidve Calabris saltibus adiecti Lucani, si metit Orcus grandia cum parvis, non exorabilis auro? (175-179)

Ambition

Sat. 1.6.127-130

Haec est vita solutorum misera ambitione gravique; his me consolor victurum suavius ac si quaeestor avus pater atque meas patruusque fuissent. (127-130)

Self-Indulgence

Sat. 1.4.111-128

Sat. 2.7.46-67

Sat. 2.7.95-115

Superstition

Sat. 1.8.1-50

Cum mihi non tantum furesque feraeque suetae hunc vexare locum curae sunt atque labori, quantum carminibus quae versant atque venenis humanos animos; has nullo perdere possum nec prohibere modo, simul ac vaga Luna decorum
protulit os, quin ossa legant herbasque nocentis. 
(17-22)

In two passages Horace describes and specifies the vices and emotions that we have classified in the "Stoic Catalogue of Passions." In order to bring out Horace's earnestness as an ethician, Fairclough's excellent rendition of these two passages is also presented:

Epist.1.1.33-40

Fervet avaritia miseroque cupudine pectus:
sunt verba et voces, quibus hunc lenire dolorem 
possis et magnam morbi deponere partem. 
laudis amore tumes; sunt certa piacula, quae te 
ter pure lecto poterunt recreare libello. 
invidus, iracundus, iners, vinosus, amator, 
nemo adeo ferus est, ut non mitescere possit, 
si modo culturae patientem commodet aurem.

"Is your bosom fevered with avarice and sordid covetousness? There are spells and sayings whereby you may soothe the pain and cast much of the malady aside. Are you swelling with ambition? There are fixed charms which can fashion you anew, if with cleansing rites you read the booklet thrice. The slave to envy, anger, sloth, wine, lewdness, - no one is so savage that cannot be tamed, if only he lend to treatment a patient ear.

Epist.2.2.205-216

Non es avarus: abi. quid? cetera iam simul isto 
cum vitio fugere? caret tibi pectus inani 
ambitione? caret mortis formidine et ira? 
sonmia, terrores magicos, miracula, sagas, 
nocturnos leures portentaque Thessala rides? 
natale grate numeras? ignoscis amicis?
lenior et melior fis accedente senecta?
quid te exempla iuvat spinis de pluribus una?
vivere si recte nescis, decede peritis.
lusisti satis, edisti satis atque bibisti:
tempus abire tibi est, ne potum largius aequo
rideat et pulset lasciva decentius aetas.

"You are no miser. Good! What then? Have all the other vices taken to flight with that? Is your heart free from vain ambition? Is it free from alarm and anger at death? Dreams, terrors, - of magic, marvels, witches, ghosts of night, Thessalian portents, - do you laugh at these? Do you count your birthdays thankfully? Do you forgive your friends? Do you grow gentler and better, as old age draws near? What good does it do you to know how to live aright, make way for those who do. You have played enough, have eaten enough and drunk enough. 'Tis time to quit the feast, lest, when you have drunk too freely, youth mock and jostle you, playing the wanton with better grace."
"A life consistent with nature." This is the fundamental doctrine of the Stoic school, upon which the whole edifice of Stoic ethics rests. This doctrine has a twofold aspect, namely consistency with nature itself, and consistency with each individual rational nature. Arnold describes the first as consisting in the regulation of individual lives according to the general movement or all pervading principle of the universe, to which the particular strivings should be subordinated. The second, in the words of Davis, consists in harmony with each rational nature, which is nothing else but virtue, independence and peace of mind. Diogenes Laertius describes both:

"Again, living virtuously is equivalent to living according to the experience of the actual course of nature.... And this is why the end may be defined as life in accordance with nature, or in other words, in accordance with our human nature as well as that of the universe, a life in which we refrain from every action forbidden by the law common to all things...."
And this very thing constitutes the virtue of the happy man and the smooth current of life, when all actions promote the harmony of the spirit dwelling in the individual man with the will of him who orders the universe.  

D'Alton says:

"Horace's language in the Epistles is frequently interwoven with Stoic phraseology. One phrase, 'vivere convenienter naturae', springs at once to our attention. This, though borrowed by the Stoics from the Old Academy, was made one of the cornerstones of their own system." 

Although this is the fundamental doctrine of the Stoics, Horace makes few direct allusions to this tenet. It should be understood however, that this tenet is so bound up with the Stoic doctrine of virtue that it is necessarily included in a treatment of that aspect of the Stoic school. 

Sat.1.1.49-51

Vel dic, quid referat intra naturae finis viventi, jugera centum an mille aret?

Horace has here a simple reference to "vivere convenienter naturae", using the example of a man seeking to possess great farmlands instead of interesting himself in the one thing necessary in the mind of a Stoic - "vivere convenienter naturae." Note the striking parallel in a passage of Seneca:

"Ergo in homine quoque nihil ad rem pertinet, quantum aret, quantum
faeneret, a quam multis salutetur, quam pretioso incumbat lecto, quam perlucido poculo bibat, sed quam bonus sit. Bonus autem est, si ratio ejus explicata et recta est et ad naturae suae voluntatem accommodata. Haec vocatur virtus, hoc est honestum et unicum hominis bonum."

Epist. 1.1.27-32

Restat ut his ego ipse regam solerque elementis. non possis oculo quantum contendere Lynceus, non tamen idcirco contemnas lippus iniungui; nec quia despères invicti membra Glyconis, nodosa corpus nolis prohibere cheragra. est quadam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra.

Horace develops a simple thought here. Every man should be satisfied with the gifts nature has bestowed upon him: "restat ut his ego ipse regam solerque elementis", and "est quadam prodire tenus, si non datur ultra" explain the Stoic conformity to the gifts of nature. This tenet resembles in no little way the Christian principle of conformity in the matter of "talents."

Epist. 1.7.96-98

Qui semel aspexit, quantum dimissa petitis praestent, mature redeat repetatque relicta. Metiri se quemque suo modulo ac pede verum est.

This is a repetition of the thought contained in the passage above. However, in speaking of conforming oneself to nature in the matter of gifts, Horace is here speaking of external possessions. This passage fittingly draws the Stoic
conclusion that to continually attempt to better one's station in life is folly, and to "metiri se quemque suo modulo ac pede" (really, individual nature), is wisdom.

Epist.1.10.12-14

Vivere naturae si convenienter oportet, ponendaque domo quaerenda est area primum, novistine locum potiorem rure beato?

Horace speaking in praise of the country life as opposed to life in the city, demonstrates how the life in the country is more likely to conduce to "vita conveniens naturae."
PART THE SECOND

CHAPTER X

STOIC DOCTRINE OF "ALL CRIMES ARE EQUAL"

Perhaps this was one of the most ludicrous tenets of the Stoic creed. It taught that no matter what the offense against the law might be, since it is a swerving from the way of righteousness, the gravity of the offense was equally serious in any case. In other words, an action was either right or wrong - all human acts were classified in these two categories. If a man committed a minor offense he should receive the same treatment that a more guilty culprit should receive. Likewise, since virtue was a conformity to nature, there were no norms nor degrees, - simply a man was either virtuous or he was not. Diogenes Laertius sums up this doctrine very briefly:

"It is one of their (Stoic) tenets that sins are all equal; so Chrysippus in the fourth book of his Ethical Questions, as well as Persaeus and Zeno. For if one truth is not more true than another, neither is one falsehood more false than another, and in the same way, one deceit is not more so than another, nor sin than sin. For he who is one
furlong from Canopus and he who is a hundred furlongs away are equally not in Canopus, and so too, he who commits the greater sin and he who commits the lesser are equally not in the path of right conduct." 62

The same matter is treated in De Finibus. 63

Horace is very outspoken in his denunciation of this principle. It is only in the Satire that we will treat in this chapter that he makes distinct reference to it. His satire is superb and his description of the idiocy of this doctrine perfect. The examples he uses have a very modern ring to them, and again show Horace's deep insight into human nature. No doubt he realized how ridiculous it would be for men to follow out this doctrine in ordinary life. Horace was in search of a practical philosophy of life, — some of the Stoic tenets appealed to him, but this one certainly did not. Thus it meets with his sharp and clever satire. Wight Duff's description of this doctrine was probably the result of a similar view concerning the Stoic doctrine of "All crimes are equal."

"Its paradoxes (those of the Stoics) adumbrated unattainable ideals. Its notion of the unchangeable condition of virtue and its rigid equation applied to the ethical value of all other acts made moral progress look impossible." 64

Sat. 1.3.68-124

This passage comprises a continued dissertation on the Stoic doctrine of "All crimes are equal." Since irrelevant matter enters in here and there, only those lines are quoted
which bear distinct reference to, or describe this Stoic principle that Horace wishes to satirize.

Sat. I. 3. 76-83

Denique, quatenus excidi penitus vitium irae, cetera item nequeunt stultis haerentia, cur non ponderibus modulisque suis ratio utitur, ac res ut quaeque est, ita suppliciis delicta coercet?

si quis eum servum, patinam qui tollere iussus semesos piscis tepidumque ligurierit ius, in cruce suffigat, Labeone insanior inter sanos dicatur.

96-98

Quis paria esse fere placuit peccata, laborant cum ventum ad verum est; sensus moresque repugnant atque ipsa Utilitas, iusti prope mater et aequi.

115-123

Nec vincet ratio hoc, tantundem ut peccet idemque qui teneros caules alieni fregerit horti et qui nocturnus sacra divum legerit. adsit regula, peccatis quae poenas inroget aequas, ne scutica dignum horribili seetere flagello. nam ut ferula caedas meritum maiora subire verbera non vereor, cum dicas esse pares res furta latrociniiis et magnis parva mineris falce recisurum simili te, si tibi regnum permittant homines.

Horace's homely example, in the words of Fairclough, neatly puts to rout the argument of the Stoics:

"Nor will reason ever prove this, that the sin is one and the same to cut young cabbages in a neighbour's garden and to steal by night the sacred emblems of the gods."

In the next line he gives his own suggestion for the amendment of this doctrine. In the words of Fairclough: "Let us have a rule to assign just penalty to offences, lest you
flay with the terrible scourge what calls for the strap."

Enfield, in speaking of Horace's reference to the Stoic doctrine of "All crimes are equal", says:

"Every virtue being a conformity to nature, and every vice a deviation from it, all virtues and vices are equal. One act of beneficence or justice is not more so than another; one fraud is not more a fraud than another; therefore there is no difference in the essential nature of moral actions than that some are vicious and others virtuous. This is the doctrine Horace refers to when he says: 'nec vincet ratio hoc...""
PART THE THIRD

CHAPTER I

CONCLUSION

STOIC MANNER OF DIALOGUE

As we have seen, the Satires and Epistles are literally filled with phraseology borrowed from the Stoic school. Also, in various places in his Satires and Epistles we saw glimpses of Horace's use of the Stoic manner of argumentation. In order to round out our topic, we submit a brief formal treatment of this subject here. Satire II, III., is a perfect example of this mode of argumentation as employed by the Stoic teachers of the day.

Although in many places Horace seems to have a sincere regard for the doctrines of Zeno, it is very noticeable that he had no sympathy for the disciples that came after him. His ridicule of the airs and manners of the Stoic preachers of his day is exemplified very well in this Satire. In Satire II, VII., Horace has his slave Davus play the part of the Stoic preacher and expatiate on the evils of the day. But in this Satire, the
words of Stoic wisdom are placed in the mouth of the well known philosopher of the Stoic school, Stertinius. The Stoic teachers were famous for their meaningless arguments and paradoxical statements. Stertinius would seem to represent them all.

Since Horace has the Stoic sage Stertinius holding the floor, it is only natural that he should be enunciating Stoic tenets. This is easily the most Stoical of all the Satires. From beginning to end it treats of the Stoic doctrine that all men are mad and afflicted with diseases and vices, excepting of course, the Sapiens.

Using the usual dialogue form that was employed by the Stoics, Horace has Stertinius develop his doctrine by laying emphasis on the interrogative form and repetition. By examining the Satire closely and reading Lejay's commentary on this Satire, it is quite evident that these two points are essential to the Stoic manner of dialogue. Both of these forms of argumentation or preaching are admirably suited for putting forth the particular matter of Stoic teaching here treated, - "the vices of the day."

In references to the interrogative form, this would seem to be the method: First the general thesis is presented, much like the major premise of a syllogism. If this is admitted, a deft question is asked which calls for a logical answer. If the answer follows the rules of logic, the teacher
has his pupil or opponent "in the net." Lejay, in speaking of the interrogative form, has this remark: "Cette forme interro-
rogative est choisie souvent, comme on le voit, pour une autre partie de l'argumentation, l'application de la thèse au vicieux." And on the same page, he says: "Ces questions avec 'qui' se retrouvent dans des passages d'autres satires ou le sujet fait soupçonner l'influence de l'argumentation stoï-
cienne." Following this discussion Lejay cites the following examples of this manner of argumentation as found in Horace's Satires and Epistles:

Sat. 2. 7. 96
Qui peccas minus....?

Sat. 2. 7. 105
Qui tu impunitior....?

Epist. 1. 16. 63
Qui melior servo, qui liberior sit avarus....?

The other quality that is so essentially characteris-
tic of the Stoic manner of dialogue, is repetition. The Stoic teacher not only attempted to drive his point home by preach-
ing, he also attempted to lodge it securely in his hearer's brain by means of constant repetition of the same point. This, according to Lejay, would consist of a series of entymemes, which would be strung together in order to emphasize the point
declared by the repetition. In this connection he uses the following example from Horace:

Sat. 2. 3. 220-223

Er quo ubi prava stultitia, hic summa est insania; qui sceleratus et furiosus erit; quem cepit vitrea fama, hunc circumtonuit gaudens Bellona cruentis.

Lejay then sums up very neatly the Stoic use of repetition: "Les stoïciens aimaient à répéter la même idée, mais la répétition sert ici à préciser de plus en plus."

CHAPTER II

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The Epistles were written at a later date than the Satires. It is only logical then, that we investigate and see whether or not Horace depended as much on the Stoic school for his philosophical conceptions in the later works as in the earlier ones. A simple exposition of the number of reminiscences in the Satires and Epistles show that in the Epistles the number is more than double the number found in the Satires. However, of itself, this would not prove anything conclusively concerning Horace's philosophy of life. It might simply mean that as time went on he was more conversant with Stoic teaching, and was able to insert more skilfully snatches of Stoic philosophy into his writings. Nevertheless, upon examination, the profuse number of sincere references to Stoic
teachings in the Epistles as compared with the relative scarcity in the Satires clearly shows that the sincerity of Horace's treatment of these teachings was increasing by leaps and bounds.

After the Satires and Epistles have been examined, if we should attempt to draw any conclusions concerning the philosophy of Horace, the reminiscences of Stoic teaching alluded to in the foregoing pages would fall naturally under three heads: a) Simple references to Stoic philosophy; b) Ironic treatment of Stoic tenets; c) Perfect sincerity in the treatment of Stoic philosophy. Section "a" should be ignored in this discussion. Sections "b" and "c" should cast some light on the subject. What is the result of this analysis?

It is in the Satires that Horace treats of the Sapiens of the Stoics, and of their tenet of "All crimes are equal." Both of these teachings are met with the sharpest irony he could muster. Although it is true, that even after his supposed conversion to the Stoic code, he never could be quite reconciled to the concept of the mythical quintessence of all that was good and holy in that body of teachings, and to the doctrine of "All crimes are equal", it is in the Epistles that Horace waxes eloquent in his treatment of true Stoic principles. This treatment is noticeable primarily under the headings that we have analyzed: "Virtue", "Apathy", "Wisdom", "Passions", and "Catalogue of the Passions."
It is not to be thought however, that the Satires contain only ironical references to the Stoic doctrine. Many passages, as has been noted in the foregoing pages, show a deep sincerity for the Stoic set of principles. On the other hand, note the clever irony of the treatment of the Sapiens contained in this passage of the Epistles:

Epist.1.1.106-108

Ad summam: sapiens uno minor est Iove, dives liber, honratus, pulcher, rex denique regum; praecipe sanus, nisi cum pituita molesta est.

In his treatment of "Virtue", "Apathy", "Wisdom", "Passions", and "Catalogue of the Passions", Horace is, without a doubt, an ethician of the highest grade. Like Seneca, he not only studied and examined the Stoic creed, he also attempted to preach it to his fellow men, that they might profit by it. H. Fowler says of Seneca:

"Seneca is the most complete exponent of the Stoic philosophy as it developed at Rome. He is not so much a speculative thinker as a giver of practical advice for the conduct of life. Like most, if not all, the Roman Stoics, he is a preacher and teacher; and as such he is of the highest interest and importance."69

How similar is Horace's treatment of some of the Stoic principles in the Satires and Epistles!

It was perhaps this insistence upon the teaching of ethical principles that led Professor Ullman to say that Horace has served as "Professor of Ethics" in all the colleges
of the occidental world for two thousand years. He also says in the same article that Horace was not interested in the speculative but only the ethical aspect of philosophy. This criticism is in accord with what H. Fowler remarks in our quotation above, concerning the attitude of Seneca, the Stoic of Stoics, towards philosophy.

WAS HORACE A STOIC? This would be a very difficult question to answer. In the first place, it would be illogical to prove that point in the affirmative, simply on the basis of reminiscences of Stoic doctrine appearing here and there in his works. This would not be a valid proof even if Horace did take on the guise of a true Stoic teacher or disciple now and then.

Secondly, it would be difficult to prove the point negatively, that is, to use Horace's ironical treatment of certain Stoical tenets as convincing evidence that he was not a Stoic. This accumulation of data is counterbalanced, or rather overwhelmed, by evidence of a directly contradictory nature in his later writings.

Thirdly, in the introduction, by quoting Horace's own words, we learned that he professed himself to be an Eclectic, the follower of no particular school of philosophy.

Fourthly, it is not the purpose of this analysis of the Stoic philosophy in Horace's Satires and Epistles to prove that Horace was a Stoic. Although the evidence is of a pro-
fuse nature, consisting in numerous references to that school, and couched in a very sincere language, and would seem to indicate a serious leaning toward that school, these data would by no means prove that point. It was merely our purpose to investigate the Satires and Epistles of Horace in order to see to what extent he drew from the Stoic school for his philosophic teachings. Our next step was to point out, classify, arrange in an orderly manner, and illustrate how these references were reminiscences of Stoic teachings. Each particular Stoic tenet was explained in order that the similarity between Horace's reference and the Stoic source might be noted more easily. After compiling the facts we found that these two works were literally filled with Stoic teachings. It was also noted, that because of the greater number of references and the greater sincerity in the Epistles, Horace's pose as a true Stoic teacher is more forceful and convincing in the latter works.

Finally, however, in reference to the last point, the evidence of a more noticeable leaning towards the Stoic school in the Epistles, which were written at a later date would seem to strengthen the conclusions of the commentaries quoted earlier in the analysis. These commentators would seem to be of the opinion that Horace was partially converted to the Stoic sect in later life, having spent his earlier years in contemning and scorning this school. But nevertheless, he maintained his
independence of thought and made no definite choice of any school of philosophy. This is nothing but a hearking back to Horace's own boast of Eclecticism. It would be fitting to end this discussion and analysis with Fairclough's rendition of this often-quoted boast:

"Do you ask me, perchance, who is my chief, in what home I take shelter? I am not bound over to swear as any master dictates; wherever the storm drives me, I turn in for comfort. Now I become all action, and plunge into the tide of civil life, stern champion and follower of true Virtue; now I slip back stealthily into the rules of Aristippus, and would bend the world to myself, not myself to the world."72
APPENDIX A

EXPLANATION OF OMISSION OF SAT.I,II., AND II,III

In view of their sensational character, and in keeping with a discreet sense of propriety, Sat.I,II., and II,III., have been omitted in this analysis. The tone of these Satires is rude and coarse, in keeping naturally, with the subjects treated therein. Their nature shows more adaptability for the feature page of a modern newspaper than for the collection of literary gems that Horace can justly boast of, and which we have just examined. Each of the two Satires deals with the "follies" of mankind, the subject that we have treated in both a general and particular way. Horace groups the "follies" that most men are afflicted with under the four headings that we suggested in our treatment of that subject. Therefore, although an analysis of them is not had here, a brief general summary of their contents is not only in keeping with our topic, but also very proper. Since, however, only Sat.II,III., is a striking example of Stoic treatment of philosophy, more time will be devoted to its description.

Sat.I,II: - This Satire is based on the topic that most men are victims of extremes. Adultery and its concomitant vices are depicted in a most lurid and degrading manner. Horace is hardly to be commended for this chef d'œuvre. It
is to be doubted whether or not it would, because of its sensational and rude tone, have any real ethical value.

Sat. II, III: This Satire is based on the Stoic paradox that all the world is mad, with the exception of the Sapiens. To make the tone all the more sensational, the principal speaker of the dialogue is Stertinius, a Stoic sage. Stertinius proceeds to discourse on the theme that the whole world is mad. According to the Stoic doctrine, as we have already seen, this madness consists in a proneness to vice that the Sapiens is not guilty of. Stertinius develops his theme, using avarice, ambition, selfishness, self-indulgence and superstition as the main instances of this almost universal madness among men. Fairclough's translation of the entire Satire is very vivid, and demonstrates very well the logicality of omitting it in a formal analysis of this kind.
APPENDIX B

THE PARADOXES

In the treatment of Horace's references to the Stoic Paradoxes, the arrangement of the Paradoxes as Cicero treated them*, has been employed:

1. Virtue is the only good. All other things are not good because cupidity is never satisfied.

2. A man who is virtuous is destitute of no requisite of a happy life.

3. All misdeeds are in themselves equal, and good deeds the same.

4. Every fool is a madman.

5. The wise man alone is free, and every fool is a slave.

6. The wise man alone is rich.

As has been noted in the preceding pages, the references that Horace makes to the Stoic Paradoxes in his Satires and Epistles have been many and various. Therefore, the following plan has been adopted in order that any confusion in classification might be avoided:

Paradox 1 and 2 comprise Part II, Chapter IV
Paradox 3------comprises Part II, Chapter X
Paradox 4------comprises Part II, Chapter III
Paradox 5 and 6 comprise Part II, Chapter II

APPENDIX C

DOUBTFUL REFERENCES TO STOIC DOCTRINE IN THE
SATIRES AND EPISTLES

Part II, Chapter II., — Stoic Sapiens
Epist.1.7.37-38
Epist.1.16.40-43
Epist.2.2.128
Epist.1.19.21-22

Part II, Chapter III., — Stoic Stultus
Sat.1.6.97
Sat.2.6.29
Sat.2.7.95
Epist.1.6.15-16

Part II, Chapter IV., — Stoic Virtue
Sat.1.3.42
Sat.2.1.68-70
Sat.2.7.102-103
Epist.1.2.51-54
Epist.1.8.4.

Part II, Chapter VI., — Stoic Apathy
Epist.1.18.23-32
Epist.1.18.98-99
Epist.2.1.93-118
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10. Warde Fowler, p. 359.


18. Lejay, p. 92. Lucilius inc. 134 M., 810 B.

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42. Duff, p. 529.
44. D'Alton, p. 134.
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64. Duff, p. 393.
65. Enfield, p. 199.
66. Lejay, p. 359.
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68. Lejay, p. 360.
69. H. Fowler, p. 182.
70. Ullman, p. 258.


The thesis, "Evidences of Stoic Philosophy in Horace's Satires and Epistles," written by William F. Fay, S.J., has been accepted by the Graduate School of Loyola University, with reference to form, and by the readers whose names appear below, with reference to content. It is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.


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