The Meaning and Use of Inscape

John Manning Fraunces

Loyola University Chicago

1940

Recommended Citation
http://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/178

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1940 John Manning Fraunces
THE MEANING AND USE OF INSCAPE

BY

JOHN MANNING FRAUNCES, S.J., A.B.

THESIS PRESENTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE
GRADUATE SCHOOL OF LOYOLA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE
REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF
MASTER OF ARTS
1940
VITA AUCTORIS

John Manning Fraunces, S.J. was born in Birmingham, Alabama, July 24, 1911. His primary education, up to the sixth grade, was received there in St. Clement's parochial school; and finished in St. Gregory's parochial school, Philadelphia, where his family removed in 1922. His secondary education was received in the same city at St. Joseph's College High School between 1925 and 1929. At its completion, he studied for three years at St. Joseph's College, and in 1932 left there to enter the novitiate of the Society of Jesus at Wernersville, Pennsylvania. In 1935 he began the three year course in philosophy at West Baden College, West Baden Springs, Indiana, where the degree of Bachelor of Arts was conferred on him by Loyola University, Chicago, in the spring of 1936. After the completion of his course in philosophy he taught for two years in St. Joseph's College High School, where also he is assigned for the present school year of 1940-'41.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter One</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Two</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Primary Meaning of Inscape</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Three</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The Derived Meaning of Inscape</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Four</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Andromeda (25), 41, and Tom's Garland (42)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Five</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Binsey Poplars (19) and Inversnaid (33)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter Six</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Bibliography | 79 |
Chapter One
Introduction

The vogue which Gerard Manley Hopkins now enjoys may turn upon him, and for a time eclipse his fame. Thompson and Tennyson have suffered such a fate. As always, they have their admirers; but the 'grand enthusiasm' has died, and with it died many devotees. One more exposition of Hopkins may help him along a like way. This possible ill-service also may be joined with the conceit of rating oneself too highly in endeavoring to lay bare the meaning of Hopkins' coinage 'inscape', and to explain how it was used as a principle in the writing of a poem and how it sustains the finished product. For, since Hopkins nowhere gives what may be called a definition of the word, it is necessary that the meaning be inferred according to the contexts where the word is found. This is a dangerous proceeding; yet it must be done, should anyone seek to learn Hopkins' peculiar way of working. We have Hopkins' own word for it that this concept was of great influence in the formation of a poem. Inscape, he writes to Robert Bridges, is what he aims at above all in poetry, and to Canon Dixon he calls it the 'soul of art'. It is spoken of time and again in the Journal in connection with all kinds of beauty, whether the beauty be that of nature or of art. To one reading the Journal
It seems that Hopkins can think only in terms of inscape: through it he studies nature, and through it he works creatively as well. Whoever understands the concept, then, can better understand the poems. Such is the reason why this attempt is made.

There seems to be no reason against saying that inscape was coined by Hopkins. It is not found in the dictionaries, nor do any of the writers on Hopkins suggest a different origin. Moreover, in a letter to Bridges, he speaks of it as "what I am in the habit of calling 'inscape'," and puts it within single quotations. In writing to Dixon he underscores it. Both these small facts indicate that the word is peculiar to him and that he wishes to show this to his friends, lest they waste time searching the dictionaries for something not to be found. The etymology is as easy as the origin. Consulting the dictionary, we see that it is a combination of the prefix in-, meaning 'within, inside', and -scape, which is a 'combining form denoting a specified type of view, or a pictorial representation of such a view'. The type of view which is spoken of is one that 'can be comprehended by the eye in a single glance, or one that can be seen from a single point'. The specified type of view indicates whether the -scape be a landscape, a seascape, or the like. Defining, by way of example, a word that we already know, we see that a
landscape is a portion of land or territory which the eye can comprehend in a single view, or the portion seen from a single point; also, it is the pictorial representation of such a view of land. By analogy inscape can be defined as the internal aspect of a thing which the eye can comprehend in a single view, or from a single point. This is but a nominal definition, far from Hopkins' meaning; yet it is a beginning. Let us try for a more direct understanding of the word by looking at it in some contexts.

Inscape first appears in a set of notes on Parmenides. These notes are made quite difficult, both by the matter, which is Parmenides' notions of Being and Not-being, and by Hopkins' use not only of inscape but also of a number of other words which he either coins or uses in peculiar and personal significances. Two passages, however, give an insight into the meaning of inscape, and for that reason they are quoted.

may roughly be expressed by things are or there is truth. Grammatically it = it is or there is. But indeed I have often felt when I have been in this mood and felt the depth of an instress or how fast the inscape holds a thing that nothing is so pregnant and straightforward to the truth as simple yes and is. (1)

For the phenomenal world...is the brink, limbus, lapping, run-and-mingle of two principles which meet in the scope of everything---probably Being, under its modification or siding of particular oneness or Being, and Not-being, under its siding of the Many. The two may be called two degrees of siding in the scale of Being. Foreshortening and equivalency will explain all possible difference. The inscape will be the proportion of the mixture. (2)
To understand these passages fully, one must understand both Parmenides and Hopkins; and neither task is easy. Yet it seems clear that whatever may be the full meaning of what Hopkins has to say, he is saying at least that inscape has to do with something within the natures of things, that it denotes the internal principle which makes a thing be what it is. Inscape holds a thing fast. It is often said of a picture or a poem or a play that it 'doesn't hold together'; that 'there is nothing in it to hold it together'. I understand Hopkins' remark in this sense. As we apply the phrase to works of art, it is here applied to works of nature. In another place he speaks of a picture in such a way as to bring this same idea to mind. This comment on the picture will be of use later. Here we need only note that whatever holds a thing fast, as inscape does, is something intrinsic, and is so intrinsic that it goes down into the very nature or being of a thing. The same is meant by 'mixture' at the end of the second citation. Mixture of what is not altogether plain. It seems to be the mixture of being and not-being; so that the idea can be paraphrased very nearly thus: In each thing there is a mixture of being and not-being; this mixture is there in a proportion determined by foreshortening and equivalency; out of the mixture which is proportioned by foreshortening and equivalency comes inscape. This paraphrase may not be right, but the passage gives one an inkling, and more than an inkling, that inscape is certainly internal. In other words, it denotes the
essence of a thing.

The observation that 'foreshortening and equivalency will explain all possible difference' indicates that Hopkins had in mind not only an essence which was conceived in its universal aspect without individualizing notes, but an essence which was particularized here and now. Hopkins does not restrict inscape to this meaning; but the fact that he does use it thus is one of the reasons why in the second chapter substantial form and individuality are discussed, and is the reason why this meaning is taken as the primary one.

The Parmenides was written in 1868, probably in the first quarter of the year. In July of the same year Hopkins is in Switzerland for a holiday just before entering the Jesuit novitiate at Roehampton. The diary he begins on this trip and keeps continuously up to the first months of 1875 is the Journal of the "Note-books and Papers." Throughout this journal there is an extensive use of the word inscape. It is a use meant of course for his own eyes, and consequently is not always very clear to us. The records of the Journal are most particularly concerned with beauty. Beauty, he says in the notes on Poetry and Verse, is the virtue of inscape, as eloquence is the virtue of oratory. As will be at once suspected, inscape has here a meaning different from that in the Parmenides, although the new meaning is by no means disassociated from the old. Beauty, which manifests itself
outwardly, is of the nature of a thing and is as deep within as is the nature itself. It flows from, it blooms out of what is within; indeed, it is by means of the outward beauty that we can delve below the surface of things and come to know the beauty which is inward. So from the beauty of man’s body we can know the beauty of his soul, and from the beauty of his actions, the beauty of his will. (3)

On his return from a visit to Wimbledon Common to see the army in maneuvers and a sham fight he enters in the Journal:

-caught that inscape in the horse that you see in the pediment especially and other basreliefs of the Parthenon and even which Sophocles had felt and expresses in two choruses of the Oedipus Coloneus, running on the likeness of a horse to a breaker, a wave of the sea curling over. I looked at the groin or flank and saw how the set of the hair symmetrically flows outwards from it to all parts of the body, so that, following that one may inscape the whole beast very simply. (4)

The little study and practice in drawing that Hopkins had done gave him valuable service in observation of this kind. It either gave to him, or made more sharp that painter’s eye, which can grasp the external forms of things as expressions of something inside, can see how the lines and contours of the body fall into a proportion and a unity under the government of the inward principle. Hopkins notes a painter who had likewise seized these outward forms. He saw it in Briton Riviere’s Apollo, which takes this comment in the Journal.
There are "leopards showing the flow and slow spraying of the stream of spots down from the backbone and making this flow word-in and inscape the whole animal and even the group of them." And in the same picture there is "a herd of stags between firtrees all giving one inscape in the moulding of their flanks and bodies and hollow shell of the horns." (5)

In making this transfer of meaning Hopkins is doing a perfectly natural thing. Although in our process of knowing we rise from what is external to what is internal, so that Hopkins first saw and realized the outward unity of creatures and by this penetrated within, nevertheless the process of the constituting of things goes in the opposite direction. The inward principle determines and produces what is outward. This consideration throws it into prominence and invests it with its great importance. When inscape is used to name this internal principle it is taken in its primary meaning. For so it names that, which so far as the thing is concerned, is its primary part, its essence. Any other meaning is a derived one. The first derived meaning is that in which inscape signifies the external unity and proportion of a natural being. In this sense Hopkins speaks also of the inscape of flowers, trees, clouds, mountains, fields, as well as of that of animals. Other examples of the word in this sense need not be given. There is, besides this first derived signification, another, one step further away from the internal principles of things. In this third sense it means the harmony of parts, that is, the unity of cathedrals, of poems, of music—of all artificial things.
Hopkins speaks of this proportion in a few places, and I give a citation or two.

It is well known of Hopkins that he was interested in painting. He studied pictures long and deeply. Something of what he saw in them is left recorded in the *Journal*. They are principally notes on pictures which he saw at several exhibitions, and are bunched together in the *Journal* in two blocks. Hopkins notes that in a picture of Michaelangelo, a work that he does not identify, there is a "masterly inscape of drapery" (6), and at the same time remarks:

But Mantegna's inscaping of drapery (in the grisaille *Triumph of Scipio* and the *Madonna* with saints by a scarlet canopy) is, I think, unequalled, it goes so deep.

Millais' *North-West Passage* he does not like.

This picture more unsatisfying than the others, want of arch-inscape even to scattering. (7)

It is this comment which was referred to when I was speaking of the expression that a 'thing does not hold together'. We use it mostly of artificial works, if not exclusively of them; and in the same sense we say that the composition of a picture is 'scattered'. For the whole picture must be designed, as well as each object within it; and as Hopkins noted the good designing or inscaping of separate objects within a picture, the stags and the draperies, in *North-West Passage* he sees the lack of a design for the whole, of an arch-inscape. The thought
harks back to an internal unifying principle, for when a painter
is guilty of faulty composition, it is attributed, supposing that
his technique is competent, to a faulty realization of what he
seeks to express. The thing to be expressed is in all works
of art the source of unity.

Since the matter of these citations is painting only, they
are of limited scope. But inscape finds its application in the
other arts, no less than in this, as will be seen. Moreover, the
remarks on painting are enough to show in what sense the third
meaning of inscape is to be taken: it indicates the contrived
unity in a work of art expressing the unity of subject and
theme which are in the artist's mind. In this use the external
unity of the artistic piece corresponds to the external unity of
a natural body; while the artist's conception, which governs the
external unity, corresponds to the internal principle and unity
of the natural body. Thus we find the word in one first, and
two second and derived meanings. Because the primary meaning
goes down into the heart of things, I have been bold enough to
include in this thesis an exposition of certain philosophical
notions. Hopkins himself was very near to forging just such a
link between inscape and the Scotist philosophy of nature, if
I rightly understand an important entry in his Journal. But
even were this not so, there would still be a place for philo-
osophical considerations. The philosophy of nature, Cosmology,
is that study wherein we investigate the ultimate internal causes of natural bodies. It embraces all beings of the corporeal world, with the exception of man, who because of his spiritual soul is treated apart. The object of its study is things which have in them a principle of rest and motion, or in less technical language, but accurately, things which can undergo change. Cosmology, therefore, is the right place to look for a systematic exposition of those notions which the primary meaning of inscape includes.

But the matter should not be dismissed thus shortly. Some reason ought to be shown in the work we have from Hopkins' hand on the strength of which philosophy has a lawful place in the thesis. The slight discussion of music and painting in Chapter Three is well founded. Hopkins mentions both in connection with inscape, and they belong, moreover, in the field of the fine arts with poetry. Not so philosophy. Scotus, who is the 'Subtile Doctor' of the Scholastics, was held in great affection by Hopkins. In his Journal he notes the last time he talked Scotism with Herbert Lucas (8), and also his meeting with 'the only two Scotists in England' (9). He found satisfaction in Scotus' treatment of the very contentious problem, the freedom of the will (10). While he was in his theological studies he writes to Bridges
I can, at all events a little, read Duns Scotus and I care for him even more than Aristotle and more than a dozen Hegels. (11)

His affection was not disinterested. He was enough taken with the Subtile Doctor to connect the great scholastic's thought with his own problems regarding the world of nature. This is said explicitly in two places: once in his Journal, and again in the sonnet Duns Scotus's Oxford, number twenty of the Poems. The sestet of the sonnet runs thus:

Yet ah! this air I gather and I release
He lived on; these weeds and waters, these walls are what
He haunted who of all men most sways my spirits to peace;
Of reality the rarest-veined unraveller; a not
Rivalled insight, be rival Italy or Greece;
Who fired France for Mary without spot.

This sonnet alone affords basis enough for a study of Hopkins' Scotism and its connection with his interpretation of nature. For Hopkins never pretends to an unreality, nor to a sentimentality in his poetry. He never poses, never says a thing to gain an effect unless he heartily believe his saying. If he said that Scotus is 'of reality the rarest-veined unraveller', he meant simply what he says: that to his mind no philosopher untangles the mysteries of creation as well as Scotus.

But he says more. In 1881 he put down some comment on the Spiritual Exercises of St. Ignatius of Loyola. In these comments he closes a long passage on the freedom of the will
with a reference to Scotus and his theory of *ecceitas*, that is, of individuality (12). Almost ten years before, while he was studying philosophy at Stonyhurst, he had made this the 'important entry', in his Journal:

> At this time I had first begun to get hold of the copy of Scotus on the Sentences in the Baddely library and was flush with a new stroke of enthusiasm. It may come to nothing or it may be a mercy from God. But just then when I took in any inscape of sky or sea I thought of Scotus. (13)

In the light of these it seems that matters philosophical become sufficiently licit. That Hopkins makes the connection is clear. How he makes it, we do not know; and so the connections in the thesis cannot be offered as certain expressions of Hopkins' mind. But the latter, although much to be desired, is not essential. It is enough, if by our considerations we are helped gain a more thorough understanding of the term to be coined.

The first meaning, then, is examined philosophically in Chapter Two. The second meaning is omitted as not needful. It is necessary to examine the third, for it is directly pointed to artistic creation. This last makes up Chapter Three.

By way of conclusion, it is noted that inscape is not to be joined with escape. In sound inscape may suggest itself as an antinym to the other word, but the two are not connected etymologically. In its root meaning escape signifies to slip
out of a coat. It is broken up not into e- and -scape, but into es- and -cape. Although in the many connotations of escape there are ideas which might lead one to suspect that inscape is its opposite, these ideas were hardly in Hopkins' mind; for he uses scape both as a noun and a verb, as well as inscape. Scape in Hopkins' sense is not in the dictionaries. He was a thorough student of words, and went back as far as he could in tracing down roots. It is in no way unlikely that in tracing the root of landscape, perhaps, he hit upon this combining form - scape as a term which would well express his ideas of things; and so took it up as a complete term alone, and also combined it with in-. Scape conveys the general idea of putting things into order. The combination is used to signify the internal principle of a natural body, or of a work of art, from which flow unity and beauty; or to signify the outward unity and beauty which show forth the unity and beauty within. This definition will serve as a guide in the analysis to come.
Notes to Chapter One

1) *Note-books and Papers*, p. 98.


3) An exception was taken to this remark as not being always true. This is but too evident. In the cases where it is not true, however, there is an aberration of nature, which results from some impediment to the right course of nature and which does not invalidate the general principle. The principle of gravitation, for instance, is not invalidated by the fact that a book resting on a table does not fall to earth. When nothing prevents nature from acting as it was designed to act, the principle I have stated holds.

4) *Note-books and Papers*, p. 189, entered under 6 April.


10) *Letters to Bridges*, p. 169.


12) *Note-books and Papers*, pp. 317-328. *Haecceitas* is the usual spelling. Hopkins' *acceitas* is one of many variants.

Chapter Two

The Primary Meaning of Inscape

It is interesting to see that Hopkins was fascinated by the aspect of the world which is the root of all Greek philosophy. The poet delighted to see the world change and vary, a delight which is uttered all through his poems. But to the Greek philosopher, change was a knot to be untied. His marvel was the fact that things can change. To the explanation of this phenomenon the Greek genius set itself, until after many false starts and errors it culminated in the realism of Aristotle's philosophy of nature.

How is it that things can change? How is it that the bread we eat goes through our bodies and becomes us? We are not bread and carrots and spinach and soul, bundles of things. We are each of us but one thing, and all the rest have been changed into us. Scotus (1) realized with Aristotle that change could not be, unless being were endowed with two principles (2). Salt, for instance, is one thing; but it can become something else. That fact can be explained only on the ground that salt is a composition of various principles. This substance is salt. That means it possesses certain qualities which make it different from this other substance we call sugar. These qualities, which are known in scholastic terms as perfections, must come from some principle that is in salt. This principle
we call its form. Salt is a comparatively stable substance, but it can lose its qualities and be changed into something quite different, into chlorine and sodium, for instance. These qualities are not lost by virtue of its form, for the form is their source. There must be, then, another principle in salt by virtue of which it can lose its form of salt and take on the forms of sodium, or chlorine, or animals. This principle is called matter.

Thus it is that corporeal beings are said to contain a principle of motion and of rest. They are both stable and variable.

Form and matter are species in the genus of act and potency. Act includes perfection of any kind whatsoever; act in the corporeal world is form. Potency, the correlative of act, is capacity for receiving perfection; in the corporeal world potency is matter, or the capacity for receiving corporeal perfection. Under this latter aspect, matter is a passive potency. For, under this aspect of receiving perfection, matter suffers the influence of a cause, as a result of which it receives the perfection. Even when the cause brings about the loss of some quality, matter receives another in its place. It is acted upon, and so with respect to that which makes the changes and to that which is received, it is passive. Since the cause gives perfection to matter by engendering the form of the perfection in matter, the perfection can be spoken of as coming from both
the cause and the form, although it comes from each differently. The cause, and there is question here only of the efficient or producing cause, is a reason for the perfection; but it is an extrinsic reason, for it is outside the being. Form is the intrinsic reason. These things are the common opinion of all Aristotelians; but Scotus does not agree with certain Scholastics who regard matter as purely a passive potency. The question is whether, although matter is the source of capability for perfection and so must receive the perfection from another, there is any perfection it has in its own right; whether everything that it possesses is conferred upon it by form. Scotus thinks that it must have some positive entity of its own. Matter must have its own actuality; and actuality, the being-real, is of course a perfection. This actuality does not give it specific being; it is not so much as to amount to making matter different in kind in all corporeal beings, as a dog is different in kind from a tree, but it is there.

In order better to understand this actuality of matter, let us consider whether the matter in man is different from that in phosphorus. That man and phosphorus are different is obvious when the qualities of phosphorus and the human being are contrasted. These differences will come from matter, or form, or both. But phosphorus is absorbed by the human body and used to build up its bones, so that what formerly was phosphorus now has new and different perfections, those of the man. It cannot
be said that every entity that belonged to phosphorus has been lost, and that the thing used by the body is totally new. If this were so, we should have creation in the true sense. Something is lost in the change, but something also remains. Matter it is that remains. The change of qualities in phosphorus and the body is to be attributed to the forms of each; so that the form which endowed matter with the qualities of phosphorus gives way to a new form, that of the human body, which comes to endow the same matter with human qualities. These diverse qualities signify a specific difference between phosphorus and man. Scotus concedes that such differences come from the form. The form of phosphorus so disposes matter that it is apt for being taken up into the body. This disposition is the result of a particular form. When, therefore, matter is considered apart from form, it has nothing more than an undetermined actuality. The determination of its actuality by qualities is wrought by form.

In Scotus' view, form as well as matter has its own actuality. In this respect it is similar to matter, but here all likeness ends. Form has, besides actuality, various degrees of perfection which constitute the specific differences between beings. Thus the diversity between calcium, which does not live, and plants, which do, is both the sign and the result of a diversity between the forms. One form endows a being with life; the other cannot. There is, as it were, a
scale of perfections running from non-living matter up to the intellectual life of man's soul, the most perfect form in the corporeal world. It can be said that form as the source of specific perfections has more entity than matter. Its entity is said to be more in a qualitative way, not quantitatively. Matter must not be thought of as having one degree of actuality, while form has two, three, or four. This would be too crude. 'More' describes the greater perfection in kind and determination which belongs to the entity of form; it indicates the apparent truth that the actuality of vegetative life is more perfect than actuality undetermined or unqualified. In so far as form contains the perfections of vegetative life it has more entity than matter, which contains simple actuality only.

Here it will be well to recall that Aristotle sought for and placed these two principles in a body. There was never any thought that matter and form are two complete beings separated from each other, and existing so. They always are joined in a natural body. Technically, a form always informs matter. The Scholastics knew that there is one exception to this, the human soul, which because of its operations independent of matter is spiritual, and can exist apart from matter. All other forms of the corporeal world cannot operate independently, cannot exist apart from matter; accordingly they are called material forms. Such a form always informs matter.
Every material being then is a composite; it is a union of matter and form. The composite is the thing that truly is, the thing that operates and changes. It is permanent also, and the union of form and matter explains not only its instability under the action of an outside force, but also its resistance to the force and its stability in itself. For since it is truly a union, the two principles tend, as it were, to cling together, to adhere, so that an outside influence is required to break the union (3).

We observe that the composite not only is stable, but that it maintains an independent existence, as the bird maintains an existence independent from the tree in which it houses, or as I from you. A being which exists thus is called a substance; opposed to it is an accident, a being which depends upon another for the maintenance of its existence in the way in which the gleaming gray color of silver depends entirely upon the silver for the maintenance of its existence, or as heaviness upon lead. This property of independent existence, a property of great ontological dignity, is consequent upon the union of matter with form. This union is named substantial, and the form which participates in such a union likewise is called the substantial form (4). A specified being is produced in the composite; and if specified, also unified, for unity is the result of joining diverse things according to their mutual relationships. So that, when matter is informed, there arises
a strict unity of being.

Unity is of many kinds. Rheims cathedral is a unit; so is Da Vinci's Last Supper; so is the Fifth Symphony. These, philosophically, are accidental unities, since the unity of each arises out of a certain artificial grouping of accidents such as figure, color, sound. They are not natural bodies. There is another kind, a substantial unity, in the elements, in trees, horses, or any living thing. That substantial unity is more perfect than accidental unity is apparent; for if that unity be destroyed, the whole is destroyed. Such is certainly not the case with accidental unity. Unity, of whatever kind, is near akin to inscape; in Hopkins' words it is the 'virtue of inscape to be distinctive' (5). In philosophy we should say that it is the virtue of form to be distinctive; and one of the distinguishing features whether of form or inscape will be the unity which is communicated to the body; the total body will be distinctive by the manner or skill in which diverse things are joined together within it.

In the meaning of inscape, however, there is more than this substantial unity. Substantial form gives a specified distinction, but it says nothing of individual distinction. The substantial form of humanity in us tells why we are different from non-living things and from other animals; it does not tell why we are different individuals. Our numerical unity is
something other than our specific unity. Inscapé is concerned with the individual if with anything at all. So while it is perfectly true to say that the concept of inscape has in it all that is in the concept of substance, the converse is not. Substance alone is not enough. We must add to substance a principle which individuates the member of the species.

For Scotus a substance was made individual by an entity which may be regarded as being added to the substance over and above its essence. The essence of a substance is the composition of matter and the specific form. Form confers upon the composite those various perfections which make one thing specifically different from another. It is the composite, the whole being, matter and form together, that is a crystal of gold, that lives, that thinks. Consider this essence without any relationship to this or that individual, and it will be seen that there is no reason why an essence, in itself and alone, should be either this or that individual. We do not differ from each other, you and I, by reason of the fact that I am a composite of matter and a spiritual, intelligent soul. This much is possessed as well by you and all men. In Scotus' opinion substances are made individually different by a note (he calls it a formality) which is not included in the general concept of the substance, as one's individuality is not included in the concept of one simply as a man. It has been said that this note is added to substance, as it were, over and above its essence. This is to
be understood as referring to the distinct concepts of substance and individuality. The formality which determines the substance to be an individual is not different from the actual substance, nor from the actual, existing essence. The two are really identical, although the concept of one does not include the concept of the other. When a form informs matter, it carries with it such qualities as make beings specifically different, but at that union there is also conferred upon the composite the quality which causes the individual difference. Thus, as it is the whole composite which is specified, so it is the whole composite which is immediately individualized. It will not do for Scotus that the principle of individuation should be rooted primarily in matter, so that, through the mediation of matter and its principle, form and the composite become individualized; nor will it do that the principle be primarily in form; nor yet is the composite alone sufficient. Individuality is explained by what Scotus calls the ultima realitas entis. Although this reality is not to be regarded as something really different from the existing composite, it stands in a relationship to the composite somewhat as act to potency. Individuation is the result of a form, of some species of act, which for convenience's sake may be looked upon as infusing and embracing the whole composite of matter and substantial form.

Not everyone finds Scotus' notion and explanation of individuality sufficiently clear. Scotus himself admits
difficulties in this respect. The obscurity, be it real or apparent only, may lie partly in the negative approach which Scotus takes towards his theory. He begins by dismissing all current theories on the ground that each one presents certain difficulties under which they cannot stand. He leads himself to his own position by a kind of process of elimination. One must not, however, think that there are no positive reasons for his theory. Among them is the necessity for Scotus of finding an explanation for a direct knowledge of individual being. Many other Scholastics, of whom St. Thomas of Aquin is the most important, had been led by their theories to hold that the intellect does not know individual things directly. St. Thomas' position is that the intellect knows only the form directly, and knows the individual by 'turning to' the sensitive image of the thing in the sense organ. Scotus was convinced that the individual was known directly, and this brought him to a theory in which the principle of individuation embraced the whole composite, was identified with it. It is therefore legitimate to suspect that this point in the Scotist philosophy of nature was particularly appealing to Hopkins. His awareness of individual beauty was remarkably keen, and it was the prime thing he sought for in every artist's work.

He was a poet...full of feeling..., but the essential and only lasting thing left out—what I call inscape, that is species or individually-distinctive beauty of style. (6)
No philosophy could have satisfied this bent of his mind unless it allowed a direct knowledge of the individual, which Hopkins saw so clearly. To the consideration of Scotus' and Hopkins' similar attitudes towards the individual, should be added the fact that when Hopkins says he is 'flush with a new stroke of enthusiasm' and thinks of Scotus whenever he takes in an inscape, he is reading the work in which Scotus treats individuation most extensively, the Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard(7).

We are now in a position to co-relate the notions of substance and the principle of individuation with inscape. The present chapter refers to inscape only in its first meaning, where it names the essence of a thing. Matter and form likewise constitute an essence, although not an individual essence; so that individuality must be added in order to make an equation with inscape. From the explanation of matter and form it is clear that these two principles, as inscape, 'hold a thing fast'; they shape a being into something definite and distinct; they stamp it with its specific character. Add to this the being's individuality, which sets it alone and apart from all other members of its class. Roses differ from violets according to their different inscapes; according to their inscapes roses also differ among themselves. Since the inscape marks upon a being its generic and individual character, it is apparent that it closely resembles the philosophical notions explained; it may even be identical with them.
The crown of all, whether of essence and individuality or of inscape is unity. The unity of the species and numerical unity, and the unity of both when joined, are bound together so tightly here in this concept of inscape that the dissection which has been made in this chapter is artificial, only and can never be natural, although there is in nature a foundation for it. It was done solely to clarify. We looked at the fact that anything, a thrush, let us say, is but one in nature; and this we said is its essence. That a thrush is but one in number flows from its individuation. Essence and the principle of individuation are in concord, so that when form joins with matter to produce a complete being, that being is a unit. Wherever form or individuality has been spoken of 'inscape' may be read according to its various functions. Hence it is the source of all unity, both of nature and of number. This unifying, or inscaping, which is found in the thrush and in all things not made by man, should be imitated in music, painting, and poetry, and in all things made by him.
Notes to Chapter Two

1) Scotus is fundamentally an Aristotelian in his philosophy. He is part, therefore, of a definite current of scholastic philosophy. Not all the Scholastics are Aristotelians, and those who are interpret his notions in a variety of ways. The fund of their ideas on which one can draw is exceedingly rich. It has seemed best to spend time and space on no ideas except those of Scotus, lest a long and difficult chapter be made bulky and confusing. No attempt at anything but a presentation of ideas has been made. A critique of them would be pointless.

2) In scholastic philosophy 'principle' has a wider meaning than its every-day one of 'a settled law or rule of action', as we say: "He is a man of principle." Its meaning is a source or cause from which anything proceeds in any way whatsoever. (cf. Funk & Wagnalls Practical Standard Dictionary.) In this sense its meanings are numerous.

3) The spontaneous decomposition of radium is perhaps best explained in terms of a form which is so complex in its nature that its instability is exceedingly great. Even radium does not decompose instantaneously.

4) Since every perfection is co-related to a form, color, quantity, and all accidents are called accidental perfections and are in beings because of the accidental forms they have received.

5) Letters to Bridges, p. 66.


7) The Commentary forms the greater part of the work called the Opus Oxoniense. Individuation is treated in book II, distinction 3. Numerous references to Scotus on matter and form, and individuation will be found in a book to which this chapter is heavily indebted, Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the XIII Century, Dorothea E. Sharp, Oxford University Press, 1930.
Chapter Three

The Derived Meaning of Inscape

In the second chapter we were concerned with inscape in its primary signification. This signification is of the intrinsic principles of natural objects. In scholastic terms they are called the substantial principles, which together with the principle of individuation constitute an individual substance. The substance is a unit, for these principles are joined together according to certain respects which they have each to the other. We come now to the unity which is commonly meant by Hopkins when he uses inscape. It is the kind found in things made by man, artificial unity. It may also be called accidental unity, but the word 'accidental' is avoided because it is a term which can be applied to the outward unity of both natural and artificial bodies. In natural bodies it is the unity of those notes which our senses grasp; that is, color, shape, size, and the like. Through these the object shows forth its substantial unity. Natural accidental unity is not, in a sense, necessary. A thing can be perfectly one in substance without possessing a unity, or proportion, of accidents, as a dwarfed man. But since the inward unity of substance will express itself in the outward unity of accidents if there be no obstacle in its way, the outward unity scarcely needs any explanation in its own right. We shall, then, go on to speak of artificial
accidental unity; or, as it will be called hereafter, artificial unity.

In every kind of art there is such unity. It is as Hopkins says of inscape, the 'very soul of art' (1). Inscape was perceived by Hopkins to underlie the use of air, or melody, in music, and of design in painting in the production of artificial and artistic unity. These two factors, air and design, are the analogies which Hopkins uses in trying to explain inscape to Bridges.

But as air, melody, is what strikes me most of all in music and design in painting, so design, pattern or what I am in the habit of calling 'inscape' is what I above all aim at in poetry. (2)

Since Hopkins names these two arts in indicating to Bridges the meaning of his coinage, we may well take them for our own examples.

An analysis of music is the most unsatisfying of all analyses. Attempts are made to show in what precisely the unity of a piece of music consists, in what the unity fails; but the results are meagre. Nevertheless the little that we have does help our understanding of the elusive unity of a musical form. (3)

Music may be built up principally of melodies, or it may not. If of melodies, it may consist of a single one or a group; and the latter kind may be of groups of related or unrelated melodies. Since form implies composition, and since composition is the uniting of diverse things, form will be had in music when
the piece is made up of related melodies. The simplest of all such groups or forms is the song form. In this there is a first melody which is reinforced and expanded by a second, and the piece is finished by a repetition of the first. The form is traditionally symbolized by this formula: ABA. The first melody reproduces the emotions of the song's words or illumines the thought. The second melody may be a complement to the first, or a contrast. In either case unity is preserved, for the purpose of the second is to vary the song pleasantly, to fill out the meaning of the first melody, to widen the range in thought or feeling. The repetition then brings us back in a full circle to where we began and so impresses on us the sense of something completed, without which no work of art is good.

In this arrangement of melodies we have a pattern which guides the song. The pattern acts as a framework which is finished off by inlaying it with the melodies. No less than a building, a song is constructed. The principle is noted in the following analysis of form in music.

Every attribute of music, relationships of pitch and rhythm in succession (melody) and concurrently (polyphony and harmony), plays its part in establishing the form of a musical work by creating a series of identities and differences which the ear can recognize. (4)

On construction, building up, the establishing of a pattern is laid the greatest emphasis in the making of a musical form. The criticism 'formless' against such music as the tone poems of
Richard Strauss's have been justified by a real absence of form. It seems simply that the form was new, and so, as it was not familiar, was not perceived.

It is interesting to compare with the foregoing citation a remark which Hopkins made on music in the same respect. In some notes on poetry and verse he has the following:

Music is composition which wholly or partially repeats the same figure of pitched sound (it is the aftering of pitched sound). (5)

The word 'aftering' need not confuse us. As we say a thing is done over and over, Hopkins in one place says it is 'over-and-overed'. Aftering, then, means that the repetitions of the figure come along after the other. Aftering is part of all verse, which is the repetition of certain rhythms; and in music also we have aftering, where it is as much a principle of unity as in verse, and indeed even more so. Hopkins has ten repetitions of a melody in one of the songs he composed. (6)

We theorize and find this simple song form already at hand (7), and it is who look for the secret of the appeal and unity in the arrangement. If we hear the song and we do not question it (I am judging from my own experience), we do not advert to its unity nor do we doubt that unity is there. And the reason for this seems to be that the unity is of such an elementary and, as it were, natural kind that it presents itself without
show as belonging to the right order of things, and that as a consequence it is perceived in the perception of the song and not as a separate thing. We perceive the unified song, not the unity of the song; as in the ordinary course of things we perceive not the color of the leaf, but the colored leaf. This unity of melodies is beheld by us even though we disagree perhaps about what constitutes it, or acknowledge that we cannot hit upon the secret at all.

This much, however, seems to be beyond dispute: that in the elementary song form and its variations there is obviously a pattern in use which has its analogates in other media. The genius who can express in music what he sees, can create a unit according to this formula; and those who are gifted with an appreciation of music or those trained to it, can perceive the unity of the creation.

This simple musical device, the ABA structure, is found almost universally in the chorus parts of 'popular' songs. Although they are hack work, the uninterrupted recurrence of the form shows that it has a general and untiring appeal, and is by nature an effective grouping of melodies. But in the higher musical forms the arrangement becomes greatly complicated. Of these higher forms the sonata, which becomes a symphony if the composition be for an orchestra, seems to be the most perfect. It is a form easy to explain and easy to understand.
Omitting from our consideration variations, since these do not change the fundamental structure, we see that the sonata is constructed out of two melodies which are expounded one after the other so that the hearer may make their acquaintance. This exposition is followed by a development in which the melodies are varied, put into different keys, brought into conflict as it seems. The outcome is the blending of the two melodies together as a unit, called the recapitulation (9). As is apparent, such a structure gives opportunities for rich variations in the melodies; and when the complexities of harmony are added, there is little wonder that to the untrained ear the original melodies seem wholly to be lost.

The fact that it is more difficult to understand a musical phrase or a melody than to understand a sentence or paragraph in our native tongue, or a posture of the body, in no way proves that by music something is not being said, even though it is being said in the most general terms. The material of music, inarticulate sound and rhythm, are means of expression as well as articulate sound, and the sonata and the song forms both show a fairly simple principle of inscaping and so of ordering expression. Through this principle the melodies are brought to bear on one idea, picture, or passion. This dominant listing of all details to one end belongs in some way to all composition in whatever medium. The transfer from one medium to another can be made by a mind that is wide enough to grasp
several fields of endeavor and strong enough to control them. It can be said that Hopkins claimed to have done it.

The unity of a musical work often troubles us when we try to grasp it, but in painting it is not such an elusive thing. Although not everyone can detect the unity at first glance and say 'by this, that and the other thing' the artist has made a unit, yet when it is pointed out it seems to be quite clear and simple. We seem to have something tangible.

Design is the name Hopkins gives to the principle of unity in painting. I have found no one explaining the theory of painting who uses the term, but all speak of composition, arrangement, harmony, and it is evident that all are speaking of the same thing. For the point they wish to make is that the objects to which our attention is directed in a painting must be put into some kind of order. It is necessary for the artist to determine which object is more important, which aspect of each he wishes to be seen, and this demands that the objects be ordered among themselves. Since the painter will not be by when we look at his work, the work itself must point out its own meaning. This is true not only of the things for whose sake the artist paints primarily, but of the background and subordinate details. They too, being part of the picture, help the painter to say his idea and are ordered to the main point of all. When this is done the picture is well composed, it is harmonized, a design has been created.
To repeat, this kind of design is not elusive. When it is made two things happen. One is that the objects of the picture usually fall within, or outline some geometric figure, a circle, a triangle, a square, or a combination of them. Being so linked together they present themselves to the eye as a complete group of things. The other is that one of the objects becomes the center of the picture. This does not mean that it is the exact center, for more often it is not; nor that it is the center of attention. It means rather that the object which is called the center is the point around which the others are grouped, the peg, one can call it, on which they hang. These results of arrangement indicate partly the artist's way of designing so as to build up to his effects. They are not the whole of it. Art does imitate nature; but it is not nature. Although the material is selected from nature, it must suffer precisely that change—it must be selected. Afterwards it is arranged in a very exact order, a thing which nature alone rarely does, so that it will produce a definite impression on the mind through means of what the eye sees. Selection is quite as much a principle of art as arrangement, although it is arrangement in particular with its two major effects which looks to the creation of a design, an inscape.

Part of this matter of arrangements is what is known as the balancing of full and empty spaces. A full space is one that is occupied by an object which is meant to assert itself. In a
landscape, for instance, a house and a clump of trees would be full spaces; the sky and meadow, empty spaces. This process of balancing harks back to that of selection. The artist must decide how much of the landscape he intends to use, and whether the relative prominence of objects as he sees them is in accord with the idea he seeks to utter. Usually the relative prominence of objects just as they are found in nature will not be good in a picture, so some must be suppressed and others heightened. This selection has to be done with a glance forward to the full and empty spaces of the picture, since the objects to be selected are going to occupy them. If a balance between these spaces be struck, the picture is harmonious and well designed.

The geometric figures into which the objects fall, the lines which lead one to the center of the picture, and the balance of the spaces are mingled together almost inseparably. But it is possible to separate them in mind and to give to each an own function. In such a case unity would be attributed largely to the figure the objects fall into; centering of the spectator's attention within the picture would belong to the convergence of lines to the center; and ease and stability would follow on the balance between full and empty spaces. All of these can be summed up in that effect which everyone agrees should come out of good designing: That the eye does not seek to roam outside the picture. It may roam within as much as it likes, passing continuously from one object to another in a very
maze, but if it is not satisfied to remain inside the confines something has gone wrong, the composition is at fault. Inscape should give the mind a like satisfaction.

It is unfortunate that Hopkins does not have much to say explicitly on this matter of the inscaping of a picture. He does, however, have an eye for it, as is shown by his remark that Millais' North-West Passage lacks 'arch-inscape even to scattering' (11). This is but another way of saying that the picture is so poorly harmonized and balanced that the eye is not held within it. The gaze instead is allowed to wander out of the picture; it is scattered. This comment is helpful because it points directly to that desired effect of composition which was mentioned in the foregoing paragraph. The other comments want clarity if the pictures are not at hand to be viewed as we read, so it is best to leave them.

The sketches which are reproduced in the Note-Books and Papers are hardly more useful. The principles we are considering look to the larger aspects of a picture; they govern the presentation of a whole subject. Hopkins sketches are not of such a nature as can serve to illustrate the principles. They show flowers, tree, waves, rocks, most nicely executed, but singly or in chance groups. There is, however, a sketch of a man lying down which shows some obvious design (12). The man's figure falls roughly into a diamond-shape and the lines of the arms and the crossed legs lead up to the apex of the diamond,
which is the center. The attention is first drawn to the book the man holds at the apex, and from this the eye passes to the other parts of the figure. Two other sketches are interesting in this respect. They are North Road, Highgate, and Benenden, Kent. (13) As they are unfinished, it is difficult to make any real criticism, but the objects in North Road are plainly arranged within a triangle, while the Benenden shows thought for full and empty spaces. The quality most noticeable in the sketches is a meticulous love for the smallest details, which are faithfully and elegantly drawn; but habits of this kind are not immediately productive of unity and inscaping.

The flower of pattern in music and composition in painting is unity. If the piece of music is one, the ear is satisfied on hearing it, as the eye is content to be bound within the limits of a picture that is one. A poem too that is well inscased satisfies the mind within the limits it sets. It should give the mind sufficient matter for contemplation. This sufficiency cannot be of such a kind that the mind need bring no associations or memories to the poem, nor can one poem present everything the mind can contemplate; but it can present a whole thing, and this it must do. Lack of wholeness is the most grievous of all artistic flaws, as such a poem as Robert Frost's The Road Not Taken proves. (14) In this poem the roads are symbols and the fact that one was not taken 'has made all the difference'. But the poem produces dissatisfaction because we
have to guess without a name what all this difference was about. The thought is incomplete. The methods of poetry in avoiding like defects finds analogies in many fields, in the constitution of natural bodies, in grouping and relating of melodies, and in the arrangement of lines and spaces in painting. Hopkins applies inscape to all these processes, but most particularly to the workmanship of a poem and its unity. We shall now see whether we can discover the use of these processes.
Notes to Chapter Three

Correspondence with Dixon, p. 135.

Letters to Bridges, p. 66

In this chapter form is used in the common meaning of referring to the external structure of an artificial work.


Note-books and Papers, p. 250.

Correspondence with Dixon, p. 170.

The song form is greatly varied. The most common variation is AABA, which is the form of 'Drink to Me Only with Thine Eyes' and 'Believe Me If All Those Endearing Young Charms'. Others are AAB-A-A and AAABA. On the song form see The American History and Encyclopedia of Music, Irving Squire, vol. on 'Theory', pp. 179-180.

For instance, 'Penthouse Serenade' and 'Can't Help Loving That Man'.

On the sonata form see The American History and Encyclopedia of Music, pp. 194-198. The Common Sense of Music, Sigmund Spaeth, is also good.

How to Study Pictures, Charles H. Caffin, The Century Co., 1905, was very helpful in this matter, especially the Glossary.

See note 7 of The Introduction, p. 14

Note-books and Papers, facing p. 256.

Ibid, facing p. 22.

Chapter Four

Andromeda (25), 41, and Tom's Garland (42).

There is a difficulty which stands in front of us at this point. Hopkins says very plainly that he looks for inscape in a poem, in both his own and others', and that he endeavors to inscape his own work. This is certain. But the most valuable service he could have done, he has not. In none of his letters or notes has he explained what he does when he is at work on a poem. How he inscapes a poem, we do not know. He puts great store by alliterations, rhythms, and stresses in lines of verse; he sought, one may say he fought to catch the right words for the idea. But whether he went about these things in a markedly different way unlike all other poets, it is impossible to say. This is noted lest anyone should think that everything which follows is a presentation of Hopkins' methods of composing. It is not. It is an examination of the results of his labors in order to see whether, as a matter of fact, the poems are inscaped. How he composed, we cannot now know.

To prepare the way for the coming analysis it is necessary to give a summary of the points that will be looked for in each poem, according to which it will be rather simple to determine the presence of inscape in the poems and to judge it.

Every work of art, and especially every poem, which uses language as its medium, must have an intellectual content.
This is demanded by the fact that a complete human nature, with its rational parts at work, produces the work of art, and the fact that the work is offered to the contemplation of another human nature, which exercises both these same parts in its contemplation. This intellectual element is called the theme; if we take a word in its broad meaning, it is the idea. This element is that in a poem which is intellectually knowable, apprehensible; and because in this essential respect it corresponds to the form of a natural body, it will henceforth be called the form of the poem. By 'form', therefore, is not meant the external structure which we signify by the words 'quatrains', 'triolet', 'sonnet'. These externalities always will be denoted by some such word as 'structure' or 'accidental form'. The form proper is that which the artist has to say, which often can be summarized in a simple declarative sentence, for which the artist seeks a medium of expression.

The poet uses language for his medium. He uses the medium par excellence upon which the human race has determined for the expression of thought; for which the human race is best fitted, and which is best fitted to it. This quality of the medium is why poetry especially must have its intellectual element. When the poet wields language and fits it to his thought, he performs an act which is analogous to the union of matter and form. For this reason the medium of a work of art is called its matter; in poetry the matter is language. Therefore, again, when the
matter of a poem is discussed, it will not mean, as universally is meant, the content or thought; it will mean the element which makes the content external, so that the poem can be grasped by the senses, and, through the mediation of the senses, by the mind.

As everything composed of matter and form has accidents, such as color, size, taste, hardness, so a composite of matter and form in the field of the arts will have external characteristics that are comparable to the accidents of a natural body. In painting, by way of example, the external characteristic in which color is involved will not be the color itself, but rather the harmony, contrast, or some like use of color. As regards size, it will not be the size of the painting, nor even the sizes of the objects within the painting, if they are taken separately; it will be the balancing of sizes or masses inside the picture. In a poem these externalities will be the verse-structure, the chosen words, the alliterations, assonances, rhymes; and all of these may be called collectively the accidental forms.

All of this analogy can be expressed briefly in the following proportion: as form, matter and accidents are to a natural body, so theme, medium and expression are to an artificial body.

There is also this further likeness between the two kinds of objects, that as a form shows itself in the accidents, the
vital principle of animals, for example, shows itself in the accident of sensation, so the theme or idea of a work of art shows itself in the expression. In some cases this showing of itself on the part of the idea occurs so spontaneously that the parallel between art-objects and nature-objects becomes almost complete. Witness the efforts of those poets to whom theme and expression have come in an instantaneous flash. It is a fact too that some musicians have heard in imagination fitting melodies upon the first reading of a poem. Usually, however, the poet, who is the producing, or efficient cause, must labor to achieve the union between theme, medium and expression-in-the-medium. Of the poet as a cause there will be occasion to speak later. However great the labor of the poet, the poem should appear to be a union between form and matter which is fitting to both, if not a spontaneous union; and this sense of fitness is a criterion for a good poem. We know, for example, that some poetic ideas fit naturally into the sonnet-structure.

With this transition, let us pass to the analysis of the three sonnets which give this chapter its title.

Andromeda

Now Time's Andromeda on this rock rude,
With not her either beauty's equal or
Her injury's, looks off by both horns of shore,
Her flower, her piece of being, doomed dragon's food.
Time past she has been attempted and pursued
By many blows and banes: but now hears roar
A wilder beast from West than all were, more
Rife in her wrongs, more lawless, and more lewd.
Her Perseus linger and leave her to her extremes?—
Pillowy air he treads a time and hangs
His thoughts on her, forsaken that she seems,
All while her patience, morselled into pangs,
Mounts; then to slight disarming, no one dreams,
With Gorgon's gear and barebill, thongs and fangs.

One can begin analysis with the comment Hopkins sent along
with this poem to Bridges.

I enclose a sonnet on which I invite minute criticism,
I endeavored in it at a more Miltonic plainness and severity
than I have anywhere else. I cannot say it has turned out
severe, still less plain, but it seems almost free from
quaintness and in aiming at one excellence I may have hit
another. (1)

If Bridges gave the 'minute criticism', we do not know what it
is. Hopkins' own criticism is correct. The sonnet is nowhere
quaint; it is not plain; but if we take severe in the sense
that the sonnet is stripped of all excess in words or ideas, it
can be said to be severe; otherwise it is not. Such criticism,
since it looks rather to external qualities, is of least
moment. At all events it is the last thing to be considered,
for the plan is to work outwards from the inside. The theme
or form, then, must be penetrated to at once.

The form is not obvious, for the whole poem is a symbol.
Up until that point where one would ask explicitly: What is
he saying? one might look upon the poem as a retelling of the
Perseus and Andromeda legent; but such an interpretation gives
a very superficial meaning only, if it gives any at all. So
many things are unaccounted for at first sight that it is
necessary to assume that Perseus and Andromeda stand for other persons, or other things. Upon making this assumption it appears that the legend, while remaining substantially intact, has been adapted to certain purposes by the poet; that if we understand 'Time's Andromeda' to be the Church and 'Her Perseus' to be Christ, the poem sparkles with clarity. Those indications of symbolism, as the phrases 'Time's Andromeda' and 'a wilder beast from West', are clothed spontaneously with meaning. A form appears, complete and intelligible,

Andromeda stands for the Church, and Perseus for Christ. The 'rock rude' is the world in which the Church exists, to which, one might say, she is bound for a time. 'Blows and banes' are possibly the persecutions and heresies which have attacked the Church; if one should object to such particularization, they can stand for the trials in general which the Church has undergone. The 'dragon' can be either Satan or some new danger which threatens. In the latter meaning it is the same as the 'wilder beast from West', which I take to signify the Religious Revolt occasioned by Luther, as this was the gravest harm done the Church by the western world. It might also symbolize the heresy of rationalism, which was rife in Hopkins' day; although one would think that if such were meant Hopkins would not have called the beast 'wilder...than all were'. The 'Gorgon' can be Satan or the latest injury over which Christ has been triumphant.
The form can be cast into a simple declarative sentence: The Church is rescued from her perils by Christ. In the expression of this form Hopkins first may have thought of the legend as a symbol; or first he may have had in mind the form, for which he sought and found this symbol. At any rate, the logical process is that the form expresses itself first in the symbol; and then form and symbol together express themselves in the sonnet-structure. We can ignore the matter for the form, since such a form can find clear and complete expression only in the medium of language, and since it was a foregone conclusion that his work of art was to be a poem.

Between the form and that accident which is the external structure of the matter there is that relationship which critics are allowed to call inevitable. The adjective well expresses the sense of fitness or harmony which ought to be perceptible between all the elements of a work of art. The harmony is quite apparent in this poem. For as the sonnet is paired off in its parts, so are the persons of the symbol, the persons of the form, and the ordeal of those persons—suffering and rescue.

If all that has been said can be verified the sonnet is well inscaped.

In its first meaning inscape is the same as form. Going back to the Parmenides we shall recall that the inscape of a thing holds it fast. As it is the form of a natural body which
holds it fast, so it is the form of a poem, the intelligible element, which holds the poem fast. It keeps the poem together. It works matter and externals into a unity, and gives the whole its unity. For, in this very pairing off and antithesis between Christ and the Church, between danger and rescue, there is union. Through His redemptive merits Christ begets souls in the order of grace and salvation. In this He is aided by the Church, which, therefore, from time immemorial has been called fittingly the bride of Christ and the Mother of souls. No greater union than that between husband and wife can be imagined; Christ says they are 'one flesh'. The metaphor we use in speaking of the Church as a bride is apt. At the same time man and woman are diverse, and there is a like diversity between Christ and His Church. The very symbol of the poem, Perseus who comes to rescue Andromeda and take her to wife, presupposes and expresses the union between Christ and the Church which we call a marriage.

From a different point of view the inscape of the sonnet shows another joining of diversities: the passing out of suffering through rescue. The union between the Church and Christ is static; it undergoes no change. This second union, which is complementary to the first is dynamic; its essence is the change from one state to another. Its unity is like that of the true narration wherein is required a succession of states. The heart of such unity is in this: that from one state the persons pass over into another that is logically the counter-
part, complement, or contrast of the first. In the present instance, we have again diversity—between the danger threatening destruction to the Church, and her salvation—and union—the logical connection between suffering and rescue. In any case the connection would be logical, but when there is question of the Church it is not only logical but necessary. For if one looks upon suffering with the eyes of faith and in the order of grace, as Hopkins does, victory of some kind is always the final outcome for those who trust in God; and for the Church victory is the fulfillment of the promise which Christ gave, that the gates of hell shall not prevail against her.

The notion of unity which has been used is taken from St. Thomas, not verbally but essentially (2). It may be described as the joining together of different things, not according to their diversities (for then we have multiplicity and chaos), but according to their relationships one to the other. Christ and His Church, suffering and rescue, are related diversities. They can come into union, and do. Their union in this sonnet is a principle which holds the sonnet fast; it shows design, pattern, inscape.

Inscape in its second meaning has no reference here, since there is no question of the outward unity of a natural body.

In its third meaning it is the externalization of the form. It is the piece of music, the picture, the poem. In a word, the
the externalization is the work of art. We are not in the habit of thinking of a poem as a work of art in sound, although this is actually the case. We speak as if only music were this kind of art-object. But the difference between a poem and a piece of music is that the sounds of one have a meaning arbitrarily fixed to them, while the sounds of the other have not. If the piece of music be a song, the difference is even less. For then there is only the difference between singing and speaking. In the beginning this difference too was not present, if the opinion that originally all poetry was sung be correct. Lyric poetry is so called, we think, because at one time poetry was sung to the music of the lyre. That poetry was meant to be heard and not read, Hopkins always had in mind. He tells Bridges that adverse criticism of *The Loss of the Eurydice* might arise from the fact that the poem was read only, and not heard. As a warning he says:

To do the Eurydice any kind of justice you must not slovenly read it with the eyes only but with your ears, as if the paper were declaiming it at you. (3)

Later he remarks:

...when, on someone returning me the *Eurydice*, I opened and read some lines, reading, as one commonly reads whether prose or verse, with the eyes, so to say, only, it struck me aghast with a kind of raw nakedness and unmitigated violence I was unprepared for; but take breath and read it with the ears, as I always wish to be read, and my verse becomes all right. (4)
This last comment was proven in my own experience, notably in the case of *Spelt from Sybil's Leaves*, when obscurities cleared on the poem's being read to me.

The failure to read with the ears is why Hopkins could so justly stigmatize the conventional rhyming of *love* with *prove* as a mere eye-rhyme. The desire to be read with the ear is why he could dare such outlandish rhymes as *Irish* with *sire* (he Shares (the rhyme stops with the 'sh' of 'shares') (5), as I am, and with *diamond* (6), where the rhymes are almost successful; and as *soon he on* with *Communion* (7), where it is far from successful.

The point is that since poetry is the externalization of a form in sound, the outward inscapes of a poem are inscapes in sound. The sonnet with its fixed design, pattern, or inscape of sound and of rhythm, which is a quality of sound, may have pleased Hopkins so much because of its very fixity and definiteness. Of his fifty-one finished poems thirty-five are sonnets, either in the conventional Petrarshian structure or in some modified structure. In the *Andromeda* the rhythms and rhymes are strong. The division and relation between octet and sestet is well kept. There are powerful assonances and alliterations. This sonnet, which is of his best, is so constructed externally that it can be grasped by the ear. It is therefore successful and good.
These outward virtues one can easily discover for oneself; and so we pass on to the sonnet Forty-One (8)

41

No worst, there is none. Pitched past pitch of grief,
More pangs will, schooled at forepangs, wilder wring.
Comforter, where, where is your comforting?
Mary, mother of us, where is your relief?
My cries heave, herds-long; huddle in a main, a chief
Woe, world-sorrow; on an age-old anvil wince and sing—
Then lull, then leave off. Fury had shrieked 'No lingering! Let me be fell: force I must be brief'.

O the mind, mind has mountains; cliffs of fall
Frightful, sheer, no-man-fathomed. Hold them cheap
May who ne'er hung there. Nor dews long our small
Durance deal with that steep or deep. Here! creep,
Wretch, under a comfort serves in a whirlwind: all
Life death does end and each day dies with sleep.

The lengthy analysis of Andromeda finds its compensation now when the analyses to come can be comparatively brief. The form of this sonnet is mental anguish. While the sonnet can be understood as an expression of spiritual anguish, such a meaning is rather difficult to defend; and it is not necessary. I think that Hopkins would have been more definite had he intended such a form. It is doubtful that he would have personified Fury, as it is not his habit to connect with his religious and spiritual life these purely pagan concepts. Then, even in great spiritual desolation, Hopkins would be the first to realize that there is hope founded on the mercy of God, but this sonnet ends in a mood which can be called resignation at best, and at worst, despair.
The form itself is simple, but in this sonnet it undergoes great elaboration, and becomes quite intricate. The unity of the form can be overlooked because of this elaboration. The details, however, are unified by the explicit expression of mental anguish at the beginning of the sestet. As one follows the poet through the octet, the ideas of pain, comfort, relief, sorrow, cries, the attack of the Fury, crowd upon him in chaos. These things can be unified, but it is not until the sestet begins that unity is given. With the exclamation, 'O the mind, mind has mountains', the relationships of the details are given them. The cries become expressions of his anguish; the pleas for comfort and relief have a reason. The details of the octet fall backward into order as the sestet spreads forward. Whereas in the Andromeda unity is achieved by the balance between a person or state and its counterpart, here it is gotten by spreading the parts of the form fan-like from a center, to which they look back. The unity of the form is the unity of inscape in its first meaning.

Of the outward inscape we note immediately a more impassioned externalization of the form than was found in the Andromeda. The passion appropriately clothes the form, for while in the Andromeda there was a surety for victory which would have made folly of wild utterance, here there seems to be no surety. All is in doubt. So when he does break forth it is rightly into superlatives, questions, gigantic comparisons.
rhetoric of this sonnet, as so often in his work, goes back
the root of the word; it seems to flow, to burst forth.

This chapter will close with Tom's Garland. It is a sonnet
standard structure with two codas.

Tom's Garland:
upon the Unemployed

Tom—garlanded with squat and surly steel
Tom; then Tom's fallowbootfellow piles pick
By him and rips out rockfire homeforth—sturdy Dick;
Tom Heart-at-ease; Tom Navvy: he is all for his meal
Sure, 's bed now. Low be it: lustily be his low lot (feel
That ne'er need hunger, Tom; Tom seldom sick;
Seldomer heartsores; that threads through, prickproof, thick
Thousands of thorns, thoughts) swings through. Commonweal
Little I reckon, lacklevel in, if all had bread:
What! Country is honour enough in all us—lorderly head,
With heaven's lights high hung round, or, mother-ground
That mammocks, mighty foot. But no way sped,
Nor mind nor mainstrength; gold go garlanded
With, perilous, O no; nor yet plod safe shod sound;
Undenizened, beyond bound
Of earth's glory, earth's ease, all; no one, nowhere,
In wide the world's weal; rare gold, bold steel, bare
In both; care, but share care—
This, by Despair, bred Hangdog dull; by Rage,
Manwolf, worse; and their packs infest the age.

The form cannot better be untangled than in Hopkins' long
rib for the poem.

I laughed outright and often, but very sardonically, to
think you and the Canon could not construe my last sonnet;
that he had to write to you for a crib. It is plain I
must go no farther on this road: if you and he cannot
understand me who will? Yet, declaimed, the strange con-
structions would be dramatic and effective. Must I inter-
pret it? It means then that, as St. Paul and Plato and
Hobbes and everybody says, the commonwealth or well ordered
human society is like one man; a body with many members
and each its own function; some higher, some lower, but
all honourable, from the honour which belongs to the whole. The head is the sovereign, who has no superior but God and from heaven receives his or her authority: we must then imagine this head as bare (see St. Paul much on this) and covered, so to say, only with the sun and stars, of which the crown is the symbol, which is an ornament but not a covering; it has an enormous hat or skull cap, the vault of heaven. The foot is the daylabourer, and this is armed with hobnail boots, because it has to wear and be worn by the ground; which again is symbolical; for it is the navvies or daylabourers who, on the great scale or in gangs and millions, mainly trench, tunnel, blast, and in other ways disfigure, 'mammock' the earth and, on a small scale, singly, and superficially stamp it with their footprints. And the 'garlands' of nails they wear are therefore the visible badge of the place they fill, the lowest in the commonwealth. But this place still shares the common honour, and if it wants one advantage, glory or public fame, makes up for it by another, ease of mind, absence of care; and these things are symbolized by the gold and the iron garlands. (O, once explained, how clear it all is!) Therefore the scene of the poem is laid at evening, when they are giving over work and one after another pile their picks, with which they earn their living, and swing off home, knocking sparks out of mudder earth not now by labor and of choice but by the mere footing, being strongshod and making no hardship of hardness, taking all easy. And so to supper and bed. Here comes a violent but effective hyperbaton or suspension, in which the action of the mind mimics that of the labourer--surveys his lot, low but free from care; then by a sudden strong act throws it over the shoulder or tosses it away as a light matter. The witnessing of which lightheartedness makes me indignant with the fools of Radical Levellers. But presently I remember that this is all very well for those who are in, however low in, the Commonwealth and share in any way the Common weal; but that the curse of our time is that many do not share it, that they are outcasts from it and have neither security nor splendour; that they share care with the high and obscurity with the low, but wealth or comfort with neither. And this state of things, I say, is the origin of Loafers, Tramps, Cornerboys, Roughs, Socialists and other pests of society. And I think that it is a very pregnant sonnet and in point of execution very highly wrought. Too much so, I am afraid. (9)

For a complete understanding of the poem, there needs only to be noted further that 'feel that ne'er need hunger' in lines 5 and
6 is an inversion for 'that ne'er need feel hunger'.

The form which Hopkins expounds in this long quotation is admirable. But one sees instantly that something is wrong, and the lengthy crib proves it. But what is wrong? The defect, first of all, is not in the form. There is a fine triple balance between the laborer and the sovereign, their states, and their garlands. The iron garland itself is genuinely imaginative. The elaboration of the form is exceedingly logical and beautiful. The defect, it seems, is that Hopkins has crowded too much into the short sonnet structure. Even with its two codas it cramps the form, and when Hopkins insisted upon forcing the form into the sonnet— which he would not distort—, he distorted the form. He gives us a poem in which he has joined a complicated form to inept externals. That the form can be expressed most lucidly in the matter of the poem, language, both Hopkins and St. Paul have shown, but the matter turns surly— to borrow a word from the sonnet— because into the restricted quantity of the sonnet-structure one cannot pack matter sufficient to carry this particular form with its many details and branchings. (10)

As an instance or two of the distortions which arise from this insufficiency of matter for the form, and which are revealed in the externalization, one may remark that the symbolism of the gold and the iron garlands is quite easily missed. Also, the meaning of 'Country is honour enough in all us.' is not only
difficult, but obscure. For even when one has been told that it means that 'all [members of the commonwealth] are honourable, from the honour which belongs to the whole', on repeating the poem it is necessary to remember from the outside what the sentence means. From the words alone the meaning might be guessed; but it is in no way certain. The words are not, of course, a poetical ambiguity, in which the poet may mean two different things and probably intends the reader to take both. It is a question here either of getting the only meaning, or none at all; and since the only meaning must be arrived at by a guess, the sentence constitutes not merely a difficulty, as I say, but a genuine obscurity. With such important parts of the form unsure and inapprehensible, the poem is a failure.

Before delivering the adverse judgment with finality, the condemned should be allowed to speak for himself. Concerning Harry Ploughman, a poem which seems to bear the marks both of success and of failure, Hopkins speaks of his difficulties. Harry Ploughman was the poem next to be written after Tom's Garland. Both poems are dated from Dromore, (Ireland), September, '87. And indeed it seems that what he has to say of Harry Ploughman can be applied not only to Tom's Garland because of circumstances of time, but also to the whole body of his poetry, because he shows in all of it the same problem which he here explains to Bridges.
Plainly if it is possible to express a sub(t)le and recondite thought on a subtle and recondite subject in a subtle and recondite way and with great felicity and perfection, in the end, something must be sacrificed, with so trying a task, in the process, and this may be the being at once, nay perhaps even the being without explanation at all, intelligible. (11)

One laughs 'sardonically' to think that this crib, as it were, needs a crib. The protasis of this conditional sentence ends with 'in the end', and the apodosis begins with 'something must...'. The 'something' is 'the being intelligible'; that is, intelligibility may have to be sacrificed. Hopkins here shows the extreme difficulty of the task to which he set himself. He exposes his plight appealingly, but the point cannot be conceded, mainly for the reason that without intelligibility subtlety and reconditeness are so much waste. The poet may be difficult, but never obscure; it is unfortunate that Hopkins asks leave to be obscure.

Three sonnets have been chosen because of Hopkins' fondness for this form; and Tom's Garland, because in the consideration of an inscape which has failed, we can see what inscape intends to do and conjecture what will be its effects when successful.
Notes to Chapter Four

1) Letters to Bridges, p. 87.

2) De Sentia, Q. VII. VII, Art. I, ad corpus. Also, I Contra Genes, C. 18, n. 8, n. 1; and Summa Theologica, I, Q. III, art., corpus ad: ad 3, 4 & 5.

3) Letters to Bridges, p. 51.

4) Ibid. 79.

5) Poe The Bugler's First Communion, lines 2-3.

6) That Nature is an Heraclitean Fire, lines 22 & 24.

7) The Bugler's First Communion, lines 5 & 8.

8) The numbers which follow the poems in the chapter headings are given by Bridges in his edition of the poems, and served in CHAN Charles Williams' second edition. Some poems are identified by numbers only, Hopkins not having given titles to them all. Of these, this sonnet is one.

9) Letters to Bridges, pp. 272-274.

10) I am reminded by this defect of that development of the idea of matter and form which deals with the 'minimum naturale'. It is this to this effect, that there is a minimum of matter to which a particular form can be joined, and that this minimum cannot be lessened without causing a change in form, that is, a substantial change. It is to be noted that the external cause of the change is merely the vision of that matter. Similarly, there may be a 'minimum naturale' in the matter of the various arts, a minimum of language, mass, for instance, which if it is lessened does not leave enough matter in which to express themselves. The minimum in each case would vary with the form. Obviously, this and all the other analogies can be pushed too far.

11) Letters to Bridges, pp. 265-266. The whole paragraph, of which this is part, should be read.
Chapter Five

Binsey Poplars (19) and Inversnaid (33)

In the selection of further poems for analysis certain desires have hampered the choice. First, I wished no more sonnets. Then, poems were sought which were as much as possible purely 'nature-poems', that is, poems in which irrational creatures are not considered in their relations to God or man. (To have one without some relationship to the poet at least is impossible.) Lastly, I looked for poems which are short enough to quote. It goes without saying that poems were to be taken from his completed work only. Thus hedged about it seems that these two poems, which are good though by no means his best, are the only possible choices.

Binsey Poplars
fell ed 1879

My aspens dear, whose airy cages quelled,
Quelled or quenched in leaves the leaping sun,
All felled, felled, are all felled;
Of a fresh and following folded rank
Not spared, not one
That dandled a sandalled
Shadow that swam or sank
On meadow and river and wind-wandering weed-winding bank.

O if we but knew what we do
When we delve or hew--
Hack and rack the growing green!
Since country is, so tender
To touch, her being so slender,
That, like this sleek and seeing ball
But a prick will make no eye at all,
Where we, even where we mean
To mend her we end her,
When we hew or delve:
After-comers cannot guess the beauty been.
Ten or twelve, only, ten or twelve
Strokes of havoc unselve
The sweet especial scene,
Rural scene, a rural scene;
Sweet especial rural scene.

The form which Hopkins has here externalized is the failure of men to appreciate beauty. The burst of personal sorrow over the destruction of nature's beautiful things leads him naturally to think that men must be blind and dull-witted not to see what they are doing. They destroy beautiful things so lightly. It is wise that his own feeling, which is an intellectual passion as well as a sensitive, was not let absorb the whole poem; for it is such an emotion as will find few sympathizers, legitimate as it may be. Considering its object, it is too intense for most, although his sorrow in Binsey Poplars is much more under his control than is the same feeling which he records in his Journal in 1873. Hopkins was at Manresa House, Roehampton.

April 8--- The ashtree growing in the corner of the garden was felled. It was lopped first: I heard the sound and looking out and seeing it maimed there came at that moment a great pang and I wished to die and not to see the inscapes of the world destroyed anymore. (1)

It is proper that so painful a grief over the destruction of a mere tree, one might say, should not be the theme of a poem. For, after all trees as any other irrational thing are for the use of man. The more deeply such a pang pierces the more exclusively personal the sentiment becomes, the more it removes
from the common run of men. By subordinating it Hopkins has made of it an introduction to the more common note in the form. So few persons grieve over the killing of beauty because so few realize beauty when they see it. Of this crime, almost all of us are guilty in some degree. Thus banded together we hear the poet lament our failure. Grandly Hopkins has risen out of himself; has seen and captured the universal form; has vaulted over the wall of private sentiment into the world where all men mingle.

Among many other things the inscaping of a poem requires a proportion in which the form shall receive the longest treatment and exposition. The form in *Binsey Poplars* takes scarcely over half the poem's length, so that at first sight it might seem that there is a lack of proportion between the form and the space allotted to it. If one should base one's judgment on a merely physical standard, this would be true; but let it be taken from a psychological aspect, and one will see that the introduction, a long one when the total length of the poem is viewed, serves a dramatic purpose. As we read, we are let look into Hopkins' grief; while we do so, he suddenly turns to charge us with failure to comprehend those things whose destruction has touched his heart. We are brought up short, and are ashamed. We were gazing impersonally at another's sorrow, when we are drawn into the experience and made responsible for it; not actually, of course, but potentially, because we see that we
might have done thivery thing which grieves him. To do this he rightly prepares, led us on to the form he really aimed at. The apparent disproportion becomes in fact the most apt proportion.

The meaning of the form is the first point; the next is the poem's unity. On this question it is necessary to discover whether Hopkins has given relationships to diverse things, not whether they have nations in themselves without the action of the poet. The diversities which make up the essence of the form are grief, beautiful things of nature, their destruction, and failure to appreciate the beauty. A union between these would have to be effected by a deep and clear apprehension of the beauty of those things. This would put order among the parts, and indeed a necessary order. For destruction of beauty, falling upon joy in beauty, begets a spontaneous grief which may be truly called their offspring. This in turn fathers the regret that beauty is so widely unseen. Without fetching-far an explanation, the landscape of this poem can be said to be built up out of the perception of beauty and beauty's chance destruction.

In this paraphrase the poem's form has been put into its simplest terms; but, as always, it is wrought out in some detail and complexity. Hopkins facets the form by individualizing it in the asps, by a description of the living trees in the sunlight, by lamenting in general the killing of growing
things, by a comparison. The development shows nothing extraordinary in the process. But it serves the very useful purpose of clarifying and deepening our perception of the beauty he sees, and consequently of calling forth in us a realization of our failure to see the beauty that we are able so lightly to destroy.

The externalization of this form might logically be expected to take an arbitrary turn. It does. The poem is divided into two stanzas of different and wilful construction. With reference to the verse-structure it becomes impossible, as is not the case with the sonnets, to fashion any criticism out of traditional and established principles for a particular external structure. We can do no more than seek for general excellences, those which all verse ought to have in common, and for the adaptation of the excellences to the form.

The general virtues are obvious enough. For their adaptation, recall that the outward inscapes of poetry are inscapes of sound. We see that in the sounds of this poem there is a delicacy and a mixture of irregularity with regularity which are appropriate to the form. It may be that the thought is now treading ways that lead to the wilderness of purely subjective opinions. Despite this, it seems right to say that such words as 'airy', 'dangled', 'delve', have sounds which are imitative of the lightness of the aspens. The quivering quality which these sounds give the poem make it a long onomatopoeia, and the
irregular patterns of rhyme (perhaps a contradiction), assonances, and rhythm fit well with irregular nature, which is part of the form. They are also adapted to the grief in the form. This grief should be characterized as pathetic rather than tragic. A pathetic grief would have for its object some irrational thing, or, touching rational beings, a calamity which is not irremediable, while a tragic grief would be directed towards an irremediable calamity touching human life. The irreparable disaster, it seems, is always connected either directly or indirectly with the destruction of an actually or potentially great personality, and the destruction itself of such a personality would of course be eminently tragic. This distinction is meant to mark off the difference between a sorrow which in this world can receive its compensation and one that cannot. Frequently we associate some quality of tremulousness with the pathetic emotions, and it is for this reason that the irregularity in sound and rhythms of the externalization is consistent with the grief of the form.

The unity between form, which may be called the internal inscape, and the outward inscape lies in that the diverse things, the ideas and the language, are related to each other as a copy to its original. The flow of the emotion is copied by the flow of the language, and in this imitation irregularity plays the largest part.
Inversnaid

This darksome burn, horseback brown,
His rollrock highroad roaring down,
In coop and in comb the fleece of his foam
Flutes and low to the lake falls home.

A windpuff-bonnet of fawn-froth
Turns and twindles over the brook
Of a pool so pitchblack, fell-frowning,
It rounds and rounds Despair to drowning.

Degged with dew, dappled with dew
Are the groins of the braes that the brook threads through,
Wiry heathpacks, flitches of fern,
And the beadbonney ash that sits over the burn.

What would the world be, once bereft
Of wet and of wildness? Let them be left,
O let them be left, wildness and wet;
Long live the weeds and the wilderness yet.

The form of Inversnaid is almost the opposite of that in Binsey Poplars. Here it is joy in nature, and quite importantly in the wildness of nature. Hopkins preferred the beauty of nature in her wildness to the beauty of nature trimmed and planned. He is writing of something very dear to him. It is with greatest delight that he observes the untamed beauty of mountains and the heedless changing of clouds. There is much of this in his Journal, and some years before the writing of Inversnaid Hopkins had spoken to Bridges of a poem on the same theme, which he said was then in composition.

I have two sonnets soaking, ... and something, if I cd. only seize it, on the decline of wild nature, beginning somehow like this--
O where is it, the wilderness,
The wildness of the wilderness?
Where is it, the wilderness?

and ending--

And wander in the wilderness;
In the weedy wilderness,
Wander in the wilderness. (2)

The poem was never made, unless this be it, but the love of wildness comes up again in many another poem, as Hurrahing in Harvest and The Windhover.

The joy that Hopkins takes in the burn is so obvious that the note of fear which is sounded in the last stanza comes perhaps as a surprise. It would not be so to one who had read of his intention to write on the decline of wild nature, or to one who had read Binsery Poplars; but every reader of the poems cannot expect to be acquainted with these. What of their reaction? Is the note of fear inharmonious? It is not. If one but adverts to that very common trick of the mind by which we think of and fear the dissolution of happiness when in the very midst of happiness, the last stanza is seen to come quite logically. It is a contrast to the form; it lights up the joy, rather than clouds it. As a contrast it has a natural relation to the form, and so unity and order are not broken.

The dread that the world might be bereft of wet and of wildness may justly be put down as part of the form. This was not done because it seems that the poem would remain substantially
intact if this thought were omitted. Such could not be the case if the dread were part of the form, that is, a thought which is essential to the poem. However, the point is not to be insisted upon. It is too trivial to be made a source of disagreement.

The form is externalized in a way that is fundamentally the same as that of *Binsey Poplars*. First comes a description; then the poet's own thoughts. The description in *Inversnaid* is the important thing, which was not so before. So that we may share the poet's joy the beauty of the brook is pictured, and to this is devoted most of his short time. If Hopkins has sufficiently recreated the burn, there is no need to speak of joy; nor does he speak of it. The little that comes from him directly is tinged with fear. The joy, while plain to be seen, is left unsaid. We know it by implication.

First among those circumstances from which we imply the joy is the long and happy description of the burn. This we have just noted. There is next the movement of the verse. It is light and sure. Although there is a great variety of metric feet, the movement is unbroken. The rhythm in its swiftness imitates the burn, and in its flow, the settled emotion of the poet. In this we have a contrast to *Binsey Poplars*. Again, the verse is filled with alliterations and onomatopoeia, this most alliterative of his poems. By this time, one must realize that these are favorite device with Hopkins. They are short and swift at
times; again, as here, they are prolonged. Their power of appealing to the emotions is very great, and that power is called upon here. Their aptness in speaking of a brook is the link which justifies the implication of joy, and which constitutes the harmony between the form and the accidentals.

With the analysis of *Inversnaid* this thesis can be brought to its end. There is no need to multiply instances, since the line which these analyses take has been shown and if more be desired one will find that they are rarely difficult to make.
Notes to Chapter Five


2) *Letters to Bridges*, pp. 73-74.
Chapter Six

Conclusion

This thesis undertook to explain the meaning and use of inscape. The meanings, we find from Hopkins' writings, are three: The internal principles of natural bodies; the external appearances of natural bodies; and the harmony of parts of artificial things. The first and third meanings were amplified and explained in chapters two and three. In the explanation of the third meaning, the intellectual part of an artificial object was not attended to. It was let wait until the second half of the thesis had been entered upon, because it was not necessary to advert to it before that time. Since the intellectual element of artificial bodies corresponds to the internal principles of natural bodies, the two were equated, and the intellectual element spoken of as if it were inscape in its first and second meaning. This is licit; for, although they are not identical in meaning, nevertheless the relation of the idea to the medium in artificial bodies is so like the relation of form to matter in natural bodies that we may call the idea and medium form and matter. To complicate this further, let us look at it from another angle. The principles of external unity in music and painting, which we saw in chapter three, are closely connected with the intellectual part of artificial objects, and this is seen from the tacit assumption that the artist is concerned with
externals because they are the means of his having his say. There is besides a necessity for an intellectual part in art, which is founded on the very nature of the artist and spectator as men. The harmony of parts, therefore, which is meant by inscape in its third meaning, and which inscape strives to produce in a work of art, can be taken as signifying the harmony of all parts, internal as well as external, intellectual as well as sensible. This apparent confusion of meanings is really not so chaotic. They can be simply tabulated as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Meanings of Inscape</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A</td>
<td>The internal principles of natural bodies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(The intellectual part of artificial bodies.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>The external unity of natural bodies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>The harmony of external parts of an artificial body.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>or</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(The harmony of all parts, internal and external, of an artificial body.)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If one accepts the parenthesis under A, the parenthesis is crossed out under C, and the meaning of inscape for works of art is made up out of C and the parenthesis under A. If one accepts the parenthesis under C, it is crossed out under A, and the parenthesis under C is taken for the inscape of works of art. Whichever one does, they come to the same thing in the end.

Finally, according to what was explained in chapters two and three, inscape in its broadest sense, which includes all other meanings, is the principle of unity in a body.
In the second part, the attempt was to show through the analysis of five poems how the intellectual element governs the sensible, how the sensible is appropriated to the intellectual, and how the complete poem becomes a unit because of the harmony of parts, because of the joining of diversities. The most convenient point to which these functions of the intellectual and sensible parts of a poem, or any work of art, can be directed is the efficient cause of the poem, the agent who joins together the diversities.

Every artist has a number of tasks to accomplish in his chosen field. He must learn to understand the medium with which he works: what can be done with it, what cannot; what it can do best. He must learn to control the medium, to be its master. He must learn to express in the medium. And lastly, he must learn to adapt the medium to his own mind and desires. These tasks can be called problems for solution, obstacles to be surmounted, or goals to be achieved. All the tasks will be accomplished by a good artist, and except in the case of the last, the accomplishments of all artists will be much the same. It is in the adaptation of the medium to his own mind and wishes that one artist mostly differs from another. Each one will achieve a peculiar inscaping in the works of art he produces; will achieve that 'individually-distinctive beauty of style' which Hopkins sought.
A distinctive style is commonly thought to be an inevitable and unconscious outcome from the artist's distinctive mind and personality. And this is true in large measure. An artist who sets out deliberately to copy the work of a master will find that no matter how faithful he has been the copy is different from the original. No good artist tries such slavish imitation except as a practice exercise. Yet there are comparatively few who go to the opposite extreme to which Hopkins dedicated himself when he said that "the effect of studying masterpieces is to make me admire and do otherwise" (1). With this ideal, a poet, painter, or musician, who is also a genius, will tap and set free in his art resources hitherto unknown or neglected. He may even form, as they say, a new school.

Hopkins had no intentions of forming a school, although the avowed indebtedness to him of certain contemporary poets may have invested him with that dubious and (thank God) posthumous honor. He did think, however, that many resources of his language had been forgotten and unexploited. He availed himself of these, and a reading of but a few of his poems will show that in their use he had mastered all the tasks which assure the artist's life's work.

Of the tasks it seems that the adaptation of the medium and technique to his own mind and purposes was the hardest. For he found that his intellect was keenly alert to the individuality of things, and he desired to express this individuality in his
poems. His sonnet on individualities, no. 34, praises each creature that like a bell 'finds tongue to fling out broad its name' (2).

Each mortal thing does one thing and the same:
Deals out that being indoores—each one dwells;
Selves—goes itself; myself it speaks and spells,
Crying What I do is me: for that I came. (3)

Hopkins seems to have realized that his marked awareness of the individual thing was unique. When he found a confirmation and logical defense of the positive reality of individuality in the works of Duns Scotus, he seized it happily and made it his own. The reality given to being by matter and form did not impress him, for alone it explains the reality of essence only, and essence only, as we saw in chapter two, is not individualized. It is Scotus' positive individualization of essence by asserting a principle which embraces the whole composite that made his philosophy so congenial to the poet's mind.

Scotus' individuation is a development of, and a complement to the theory of matter and form. Hopkins could not have accepted one without the other. Matter and form had of course been part of his study of cosmology during the period of his philosophical studies in the Society of Jesus at Stonyhurst from 1870 to '73. Scotus' treatment of it he found out for himself during this same time. With this discovery he had a fairly complete statement in scholastic philosophical terms of the inscape he saw in things.
Hopkins' job as an artist was to present inscapes in his poetry. It was to externalize the individual form in an alien matter, to express a theme in a medium. In the Andromeda he externalized the form or inscape of the union between Christ and the Church; in his own soul under its stress of mental anguish. Thee poem, which is the embodiment of a form in matter, is an effect of the cause, and as such has some kind of existence in the poet before its existence outside him. Otherwise, the poet could never externalize a form and so make a poem. One recognizes at once the absurdity of saying that the existence of a poem in the poet is the same as its existence outside him. One would have to say literally that the poet goes about with reams of printed paper within him. The poem's preexistence cannot be called actual; it must be virtual, that is, it preexists in the poet's power, or virtus, of conceiving the form and of externalizing the form in language. (4) Hopkins, as a poet, conceived and externalized reality in terms of inscape.

Language, the matter of a poem, has an actual existence outside the poet before the poem is made. Each poet will use language in a different way, and sometimes, as in the case of Hopkins, it will be a strikingly different way. Nevertheless, when the poet expresses a theme, he is still working on matter already at hand. But the form does not exist outside; it is in the poet's mind as an idea (5). Hence when the poet externalizes the form in matter he is producing a truly new effect, a
new unity, a new joining of diversities. He takes an intellectual, therefore, an immaterial being, his idea, and joins it to a material being, language. The relation between these is the aptitude of language as a medium of thought. Since language is material— to be specific, it is primarily a set of arbitrary sounds and secondarily a set of arbitrary visual symbols—we can state the joining of diversities as a representation in sensible elements of an intellectual thing. In this work the poet is guided by an exemplar, which is the conception of the form as it will appear in its alien matter. A good representation of the exemplar is the poet's aim. It is the work of art.

When Hopkins was the efficient cause this process took place in terms of inscape, for the inscapes of things are their reality. Inscape is their matter, their form, their individuality. His poetry was an attempt to express in a unique and individual way a reality, the reality of a brook or the reality of the state, reality (or, in his own word, reality) of which Scotus was the 'rarest-veined unraveller'. In some instances the effort was botched, notably in Tom's Garland where the inscape of the state is incomprehensible. In other poems it is mature and perfect. The 'terrible posthumous sonnets', four of which "came like inspirations unbidden and against his will" (6), and many other poems, show an extraordinary power of making real in language the inscape of his object. When he had done that, he inscaped his poem.
Notes to Chapter Six

1) *Letters to Bridges*, p. 291.

2) No. 34 of the poems, line 4.

3) *Ibid*, lines 5-8


6) *Letters to Bridges*, p. 221. The 'terrible posthumous sonnets (the term is Bridges') are nos. 40, 41, 44, 45, 46, 47, & 56. It is Bridges' conjecture that from 44, 45, 46, 47 & 56 must be chosen the four which Hopkins says 'came unbidden and against my will'. For the conjecture see the Poems, notes, p. 116. In a note on p. 221 of the *Letters*, Abbott gives a different list to choose from, it seems on his own authority.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anonymous, The American History and Encyclopedia of Music, Irving Squire (no date or place of publication).


St. Thomas Aquinas, De Potentia.

Summa Contra Gentiles.

Summa Theologica.


The thesis, "The Meaning and Use of Inscape", written by John Manning Fraunces, S.J., has been accepted by the Graduate School with reference to form, and by the readers whose names appear below, with reference to content. It is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Father O'Neill                              June 3, 1940
Father Burke                                June 3, 1940