The Indians of the North and Northwest in the American Revolution, 1775-1783

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THE INDIANS OF THE NORTH AND NORTHWEST

IN THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION

1775-1783

by

Brother Michael Gach

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
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VITA

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INTRODUCTION

The story of the American Indian has formed an integral part of the "romance of the frontiers" and, in an intricate way, influenced the shaping of American life. The freedom, opportunity, and rugged individualism sought by the first pioneers to venture amid the hardships of living within the "savage lands," formulated the spirit of life which is called AMERICAN. It is inevitable that depredations dominate the history of the frontiers because they are the climaxes in the adjustment of the old and new ways of life. Modern literature depicts the natives as always with a tomahawk in one hand and the scalping knife in the other--the white man as ever on the alert, shooting or fleeing the barbarities of the blood-thirsty savages.

It is true there were conflicts and much bloodshed but that was not the general rule of conduct of the Indians toward the pioneers. It was only when the rights and persons of the natives were violated that they rose in self-defense, and only when the white men began to arouse them against other white men did the warfare of the savages, as we know, it come into existence. While the French and English were at war on the continent, the colonial governments of each brought the spirit of hatred to America and in subsequent conflicts, the Indian was bribed to scourge the possessions of the opposite side. Being by nature easily influenced to war and already harshly treated by both sides, the Indians readily cooperated. As the hostility between the contesting factions increased the savages became more barbarous and it wasn't long
before all of the white men living on their lands had become their enemies. At the eve of the Revolution only a few of the tribes could be trusted and savage assaults on the frontier settlements were frequent and filled with atrocities. General dissatisfaction had spread among them for the settlers that had moved far into their territory. Boundary disputes and petty strife left their position unsettled and they sought a justifiable reason to drive the frontiersmen from their lands.

Seeing the possibilities of using the savages to an advantage in quelling the revolting colonies in the same manner as they had used them in the French and Indian War, the British were only too happy to further arouse their hatred for the settlements in the North and Northwest. The purpose of this thesis is to determine to what degree the warfare of both sides in the American Revolution was influenced by the savages. That the Indians participated in the war is certain from their very position, but to what extent both sides used them and in what capacity they acted, the reasons the tribes aided either faction, just how much time and effort was expended to combat their participation, and how they influenced the outcome of the war, has been given little place in the literature of the Revolution. It is proposed here to answer these issues and to show that it was not only the enemy of our nation's freedom that had recourse to their aid but that the colonists did their utmost to use them and did use them.

Chronological order of the events of the war has been followed as far as possible, except in the last chapter where the campaigns in the far West have
been treated as a unit. The whole war in the West was essentially a separate campaign without too much bearing on the events in the routine of the tide-water conflicts. As far as possible the military operations of the main armies have not been considered unless they give light on the activities of the Indian participation or help explain subsequent uses of the savages. Those instances of purely Indian directed forays against either party in the war not forming or being an actual part of the war have been left out altogether.
CHAPTER I

BRITISH EFFORTS TO GAIN INDIAN FAVOR AND SUPPORT

In most of the accounts of the American Revolution against the Mother Country, the struggle along the tidewater settlements occupies far too great importance in comparison to the little attention given to the savage insurrections on the frontiers. As it will later be seen, these barbaric uprisings formed an integral part of the British effort to suppress the rebels and they were long and industriously occupied in preparing the tribes to act with them ere hostilities took the form of armed conflict.

Already the colonists had sown the seeds of hatred among the natives for themselves by their process of westward expansion, taking home hunting lands from them, thereby disrupting tribal boundaries; pushing some tribes back upon others, causing conflicts among them; settling in the choice valleys depriving them of the best grazing and farming soil; and one group making a treaty with them that other groups would not agree to nor keep. Either to the Indians' antagonism for these frontiersmen was manifested in unorganized raids and in a timid, secretive manner. Needing only the extra incentive of a patron to sponsor or authorize their cause, they readily leagued themselves to the British to begin their work of revenge, extermination, and re-possession in their own savage way. For the British they were a useful, yet treacherous and distrustful, ally that could be employed to keep the frontier militias from joining the colonial army and even cause the rebels to deploy
part of the much needed forces from the East to save themselves from destruction from the rear.

The signs of an ensuing conflict, arising from the uneasy reception of the British policy of tax legislation on the colonies, was long prevalent in Great Britain and among her officials abroad. Knowing this, they were anxious for an Indian war to afford an excuse for the presence of a large standing army in America. The Stamp Act Congress of October 7, 1765, Boston Massacre of March 5, 1770, and the Boston Tea Party of December 16, 1773, were examples of the ever growing distrust and violence toward foreign controls and domination. The Royal governors and other officials, who were bearing the brunt of the colonists' disaffection, began to seek the only immediate source of aid available to protect their cause, i.e., the favor and support of the Indians. The first opportunity for British intrigues to win their favor and alienate them from the colonists presented itself during the so-called Lord Dunmore's War of 1774. Dunmore, the governor of Virginia, had been suspected of having had a secret understanding with the Indians, looking to the almost certain results of the commotions that were being agitated all around him. In July, 1774, Michael Cresap, one of his followers and a British hireling, made a number of the savages intoxicated, then murdered them from ambush and scalped them. For this deed Dunmore sent him a letter of thanks. Because of this, all the tribes became angry, fearing this was the first step of the plot to


2Ibid., 4, I, 406.
take their lands which were being sought for the officers of the regular army. Moves were made in Virginia and around Pittsburg to fortify the colonial possessions against these aroused tribes.  

The Indian agents of the British first played a double role in the colonies. Being citizens of the colonies, yet employed by the King, their duplicity was natural as long as the revolutionary movements had not assumed the form of independence. Strong suspicions were early entertained that the agents of the New York and Pennsylvania areas were endeavoring to win the consent of the Six Nations "to take up the hatchet" against the colonies in the event of open hostilities. Of the three agents, Colonels Butler, Claus, and Johnson, the last named was the most influential. Thayandenega, alias Joseph Brant, was his secretary and a ceaseless worker for his cause. Notwithstanding his former friendship for Mr. Kirkland, the faithful missionary to the Oneidas, Brant was apprehensive of the influence he would exert on his charges to draw them from the interests of the Crown and show favor to the colonies. The wily chief accordingly attempted to obtain the removal of Kirkland from his station by preferring charges against him to Guy Johnson. However, the Oneida Nation rallied to his defense and Johnson had to desist.  

In a letter to the Continental Congress, Kirkland accused Johnson of removing all the missionaries from among the Indians until after the Congress had finished its session. Kirkland further charged that Johnson and the others

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3Ibid., A Letter to the Philadelphia Delegates, 4, I, 505.

had suspected him of interpreting to the Indians the deliberations of the delegates, which was in opposition to the purposes of the Indian agents.\(^5\)

Apparently the activity of Johnson among the savages was well known to the people of Johnstown and Fort Schuyler. They showed it in their conduct toward him. He became doubtful of his personal security in the light of their organizing to protect themselves by raising fortifications about their personal holdings and enlarging the local militia. From his home in Guy Park on May 20, 1775, he sent a petition to the magistrates of Tyron, Schenectady, and Albany, "to protect his person from the populace who fear he is intending to make the Indians of the Six Nations destroy the inhabitants."\(^6\) Upon the reception of this petition, the committee of Tyron in return accused him of trying to intimidate the county by fortifying his estate, keeping a number of Indians and well-armed men with him, stopping and searching travelers upon King's Highway, and stopping their communications with Albany. They also charged him with forcing the Mohawks to sign the letter which these latter purportedly had sent to the Oneidas, as though they were the ones urging them to come to his aid.\(^7\) In the letter, it was stated that:

...We Mohawks are obliged to watch him constantly. Therefore we send you this intelligence that you shall know it and Guy Johnson assures himself and


\(^6\)Ibid., Petition to Magistrates of Tyron, Schenectady, and Albany, 4, II, 661-662.

\(^7\)Ibid., Resolutions of Committee of Tyron County, May 21, 1775, 4, II, 665.
depends upon your assistance. He believes not that you will assent to let him suffer at the hands of the people of Boston.  

In the Palatine district Johnson was also urging the Indians to oppose the settlers to such an extent that they proposed to use force to open communications along with the Canajoharie district. The Massachusetts Congress found he was taking particular pains to arouse the Six Nations by telling them the colonists were designing to fall upon them to cut off their source of supplies and separate them from their hunting grounds and the other tribes. In the report to their delegates at Philadelphia they wrote, "We have open enemies before our faces and treacherous foes at our backs." In spite of the universal knowledge and resultant terror of his policies, Johnson wrote to the Tyron County committee on June 5, 1775, a denial of writing the Mohawk letter to the Oneidas and any efforts on his, or his aide's, part to set the Indians in disfavor toward the colonies. He even went so far as to ask for a suppression of any rumors to that effect. Obviously from his attitude he did not realize how little he was trusted and how closely the Americans were watching him. Even while making these denials he was found, under secret orders from Gage, arranging with three thousand warriors to take up the hatchet against the frontiers. Johnson, as well as Gage and Governor Carleton, were receiving their instructions concerning the employment of

8Ibid., Letter Mohawks to the Oneidas (Translation), 4, II, 665.
9Ibid., Committee of Palatine to the Albany Committee, 4, II, 666.
10Ibid., Massachusetts Congress to New Hampshire Congress, 4, II, 1003.
11Ibid., Letter to Tyron Committee, 4, II, 911.
savages directly from the English government.\textsuperscript{12}

In planning the campaign of 1776 the Indians were to play an important role and constitute a branch of the British army. The orders of the British ministry to Johnson in 1775 to hire as many tribesmen as he could get led to the downfall of the long-standing and powerful Iroquois Confederacy; for some of the Nations hesitated to follow him and preferred to withdraw from the league.\textsuperscript{13} In May, 1775, Charles Johnson, the leader of a scouting party sent toward Canada by the New Hampshire Provincial Congress at Exter to view the Indian problem, reported that a large body of Indians were on the west side of Lake Champlain, waiting for further orders from Governor Carleton of Quebec. These were to be joined by others that were being recruited by the governor before taking any action.\textsuperscript{14} Immediately the Provincial delegates obtained depositions from a number of the local inhabitants regarding the conduct and activities of Carleton. Taking these to Philadelphia, where thirty chiefs were assembled in a council with the committee of that locale, they heard the full designs of Carleton and Johnson to force the northern tribes in a war against the colonies for seizing Forts Ticonderoga and Crown Point. The chiefs were undecided as to their future conduct, but they made promises to remain neutral and not to allow any of their warriors to molest the settlers.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12}Ibid., Earl of Dartmouth to General Gage, 4, III, 6.

\textsuperscript{13}Ibid., Dartmouth to Gage, 4, III, 6.

\textsuperscript{14}Ibid., Report of Charles Johnson to New Hampshire Congress, 4, II, 869.

\textsuperscript{15}Ibid., New Hampshire Delegates at Philadelphia to New Hampshire Provincial Congress, 4, II, 670.
At this time there were no tribes gained as a unit by either side, although groups of Indians were found in both armies. It was only toward the end of 1776 that complete tribes began acting as units in the war. In 1775 there appeared small bands of savages who were either hired or terrorized to work for the soldiers. Many were employed because of their knowledge of the territory and their value as lookouts. One British soldier in writing to London claimed that the employment of a body of 1,500 or 2,000 Indians would be attended by many advantages:

They could secure the British troops from all kinds of surprise by scouting the woods for many miles around and could distinguish objects in the forest three or four times the distance of an European. Also at night could give the foot soldiers rest from the fatigue of long marches by standing guard. Most of all they could be used to gain passage of an army through other Tribe’s territory and spread terror among the colonists by being loosed upon them prior to the advance of the Regulars.16

To keep the favor of a tribe was a task which had to be accomplished by continually giving the Indians presents. Carleton was anxious to win the fierce warriors of the Caughnawagas to act as guides and aid the Army. He gave them gifts daily for a month and on May 20, 1775, two Regular officers of the Twenty-sixth Regiment applied to them for a party to go with the soldiers on a hunt to the south and east of the St. Lawrence and Sorrel Rivers. They did not stop there but pressed the Indians farther on the course until they arrived at Cohass where they were told to interrogate the inhabitants, pretending they were on a hunt. The townsmen, alarmed at the

equipment and questions of the British, warned the Indians of the situation. Once again in the woods, the Indians demanded to know the real reason for this trip and were told that they were reconnoitering a passage for an army to march to the assistance of the British in Boston. Wondering where the forces were coming from, they were told that it was waiting in Canada to be joined by the Indians in the Upper Castles. They were also told that, after they had marked the trails, the Caughnawagas would be looked upon as enemies of the colonists so they might as well join the other tribes and march on Boston. The British were successful in arousing the tribe against the enemy but lost them for active service for the time being by trying to trick them in this way, without first consulting their Sachems.

Underestimating the Indian mind was for a while the British Army's greatest fault in acquiring their aid. Many attempts were made to pay them to start fighting and then to continue on their own without further pay. This proved fruitless; so the Crown was repeatedly applied to for more supplies and presents to give the natives. The Indian agents tried to impress the Regular officers that the Indians would not be of much service unless they knew that there was to be an adequate store of rewards and a dependable group to distribute them. Accordingly the task of doing this was entrusted to the agents. In June, Johnson received three thousand pounds sterling from England to secure supplies and pay the Indians for their services. In order to make the savages feel they could depend wholly upon the British for aid of

18 Ibid., Dr. Wheelock to New Hampshire Congress at Exter, 4, II, 1542.
any kind, they were invited to an elaborate council to be feasted and shown the might of the Army. Everything was done to extol the Regulars and show that the colonists were beggardly and miscreants.19

Governor Carleton realized that the campaign from the north had to move smoothly through the territory inhabited by these tribes or be a failure before it reached its objective; so he spent every means to gain them. He hired St. Luc La Corne, who showed every barbarity possible during Dunmore's War (for which the British "sainted" him), to force the issue with the tribes and lower Canadians.20 Among his stratagems of tyranny to gain success in this mission was the hanging of two Canadians and several Indians in an area that refused to let anyone join the service of the oncoming troops.21 From every sector reports flooded in to the Continental Congress of the pressure being applied to the Indians by Johnson and Carleton and their hired recruiters.

After a council with some of the chiefs of the Six Nations at Albany, a delegation of minor chiefs was dispatched to the Canadian Indians to tell them the results of the peace conference with the twelve colonies. When they arrived, they found Johnson had already equipped one hundred warriors from various tribes; but these were anxious to learn of the Albany affair before leaving to join the Regulars. After hearing the delegation, they realized La Corne and Carleton had filled them with lies regarding the Six Nations and

19 Ibid., Richard Montgomery to General Schuyler, 4, III, 797.

20 Ibid., James Easton to Massachusetts Congress, 4, II, 919.

21 Ibid., Letter to a Gentleman in Hartford, 4, II, 1135.
revolted against Johnson. Schuyler's offer of a conference with the seven chiefs of Canada at Isle-aux Noix was accepted before the warriors dispersed. Johnson was very embarrassed and tried unsuccessfully to take the delegates prisoners in order to use them as hostages and to avoid losing all of the Seven Nations. Later he did succeed in taking another group of messengers on a similar mission and took them to Montreal where they were court-martialed. Their tribes were ordered to act with the British to save them.

From New York on June 25, 1775, Washington, acting as Commander-in-Chief, ordered Schuyler to take measures to halt the work of Johnson and take him into confinement if it would not prejudice the Indians against the colonies. The sentiments of the savages toward the agents did not warrant such action on his part at this time and he found extreme difficulty in devising means to keep the English from them; for he had no funds for paying them the large sums they were now being offered to work for the Regulars. He was not even able to supply his own men, much less pay or give blankets and food to the natives. All around him, tribes were being assigned tasks to perform by the agents. Several towns along the Oswegachie were making 2,000 snowshoes for Stuart of the Middle Department. They had been instructed to forego laying in their winter supplies and to bring their own snowshoes with them in the fall when they delivered the others, for the Regulars would

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22Ibid., Journal of the Indians of Six Nations Sent by the Albany Commissioners to the Caughnawagas and Seven Tribes of Canada, September 30, 1775, 4, III, 1275-1276.

23Ibid., Letter to a Delegate of Continental Congress, 4, II, 1060.

feed and winter them. This would keep the Indians in favor with the English during the remainder of the summer and give them some hope of a means of survival during the winter months. When actual combat came to that area, they would be more inclined to enter the war and influence other tribes to do the same.

In spite of all the endeavors of the zealous agents, they had not gained an appreciable number of Indians to form a part of the army. Only the Caughnawagas joined as a tribe in Canada to help defend Montreal. They were threatened with the loss of their land and possible extinction if they refused; so they had no alternative. General Arnold found them very indifferent in their alliance with the British when he went through, and they were still refusing to arm until nine of their men would be released from "other service." The other tribes did not consent to fight but "would prefer to sit by and watch the two white people fight it out." Schuyler, in his report to Congress, claimed the number of Indians siding with the enemy was increasing, but as yet he was able to keep the tribes from moving to their support. Even some of the Oneidas, friends of the colonies, were leaving for Canada.

In the New York and Pennsylvania Departments Butler was impressing the natives with the power shown by the British in previous wars and was using some of their rebel tribes as an example of how the colonies sprung up and now

25 Ibid., Edward Buckman and Seth Wales to Colonels Bailey and Hurd, 4, II, 1042.
27 Ibid., Colonel Benedict Arnold's Report to the New York Congress, 4, III, 495.
28 Ibid., General Schuyler to Continental Congress, July 3, 1775, 4, II, 1123.
were resisting the Mother Country. After he aroused their sentiments, which were bitter toward the renegade tribesmen, he appealed to them to aid him in chastising those who were now living on the land of the Indians. All those who would volunteer were put on a boat that was docked at the site of the council and sent immediately to Canada. Once they were away from their families and chiefs there was little danger of them being counseled as to the folly of their act. Then too in this manner the most war-like members of the tribes were gained without the burden of having the whole tribe to supply and support. Gathering together warriors of many Nations and fashioning them into an army or roving bands to form raiding parties was a clever idea at first but was later to prove a hazard within the army. When going through their home territory, the Indians would fight for their own people; and while on special missions, fierce contests of jealousy among them took place, much to the discomfort of the Regulars. It was during Burgoyne's campaign from Canada that such an incident occurred. As the army approached Fort Edward, Lieutenant Jones, one of the former commanders of this outpost before the war began, planned to steal his wife from his home close to the Fort before the siege. Recruiting the assistance of one of the bands of Indians under his command, he promised them a quantity of liquor for her safe delivery. Another chief, hearing of the reward, and the choice of another to perform the deed, became angered and set out to meet the returning warriors. A conflict ensued. The jealous chief, seeing his braves were losing, struck the wife of Jones from her horse and scalped her. After delivering the scalp

29 Ibid., Rev. S. Kirkland to General Schuyler, 5, I, 867.
to Jones he tried to flee but was captured. Burgoyne ordered the execution of the survivors of both parties who participated in the mission as an example to the other groups.30

Stuart was at this same time active in exciting the Six Nations to prepare them to fall in with the Regulars that were to march up from the south. General Gage had instructed him to have them in readiness to ravage the settlements just as the forces approached his district.31 He became so hated by the colonists on the frontier that he appealed to the committees of several of the colonies for protection and made strong denials of urging the savages to fall upon the settlements.32 This appeal was fruitless, especially to the Carolina Committee which had just received a deposition from Jonathan Clark that Alexander Cameron of the South Department, acting under the same instructions as Stuart from Gage, had held a meeting of the Cherokee tribes at which four hundred assembled. After telling them how the Americans were abusing the king and killing his army, he appealed for aid to prepare for the landing of the Regulars. The whole assembly set up a "war-whoop" as a sign that they approved of the discourse and agreed to wage war against the Carolinas. They also promised to join the forces and fight as long as the British needed them—even far to the north.33

31Ibid., Joseph Habersham to P. Chiffelle, 4, II, 1007-1008.
32Ibid., John Stuart, Superintendent of Indian Affairs to Committee of Intelligence of South Carolina, 4, II, 1681.
33Ibid., Deposition of Jonathan Clark to South Carolina Committee of Safety, 4, III, 217.
Such hostility was aroused in the colonies by the dealings of the agents among the Indians that the lives of every English official became imperiled. Lord Dunmore fled from his position as Governor of Virginia and with a number of others set up his headquarters on a ship off Tucker's Mill. From there he conducted his affairs with the men who were among the tribes. It was from this point, while awaiting support from the Regulars, that he instigated a series of scattered attacks on the frontiers from Fort Pitt to the Carolinas. His object was to keep the war spirit burning among them and influence them to pillage the settlements for their supplies until the big drive started.\(^34\)

These depredations led the local governments to begin a round-up of all British Agents of Indian Affairs in the early part of 1776. The first ones seized were John Smyth, Allan Cameron, and John Connally who were conducting an Indian council near Fort Pitt. They were delegates from the Central and Southern Departments trying to unify the northern activities with the disruptions already organized in their territories. Taken to Philadelphia, they wrote to Congress for release. Smyth and Cameron disclaimed their part in indiscriminately bringing the savages against the colonists, but Colonel Connally said that "political opinion and a sense of duty and gratitude, too powerful to be combated, instigated me to action."\(^35\)

Toward the close of 1775 and the first few months of the new year, the effects of the action of the Agents began to cause points of bitter controversy in the British Parliament. The reports of Gage, Carleton, and Johnson

\(^{34}\)Ibid., 4, IV, 131-140, also Ibid., 4, V, 70.

\(^{35}\)Ibid., Messages read to Congress, April 30, 1776, 4, V, 1120-1121.
were strong in demanding supplies for Indian trade and presents, and from them came the belief that most of the tribes were in favor of and actually aiding the rebellious subjects. In Lord North's Prohibitory Bill of November 20, 1775, to close trade with almost all American ports during the rebellion, he tried to defend the use of the savages, which policy was a horror to all society in England. In it he stated:

As to means of conducting the war, there never was any idea of raising or employing the Negroes or the Indians, until the Americans themselves had first applied to them; that General Carleton did then apply to them; and even then it was only in defense of his own Province.36

Shortly after, the House of Lords began proceedings on the "Petition of Congress to the King," which had been delivered by Mr. Richard Penn and Mr. Lee before that house. The Lord of Oxford described the futile efforts of the regular army and how the Irish and Canadians were unresponsive in their duty to aid. Regarding the Indian problem he concluded:

That Ministers knew this to be undeniably true that the Indians had been tampered with. A trial of skill had been made to let the Savages, in the back settlements, loose on the Provincial subjects of Great Britain. Barbarous as was the measure and cowardly as was the attempt, it failed of the wishes for success. Savage Indians were not quite so callous to the feelings of humanity as British Ministers.37

Fears were also expressed in the House of Commons that not much support could be expected of the Indians since the French were leaning toward the colonial cause. Since few Anglicans had worked among the tribes, the Catholic

36Ibid., Lord North's Prohibitory Bill, 4, VI, 187.
37Ibid., Proceedings on the Petition of Congress to the King, 4, VI, 133.
had taken steps for calling to their assistance more tribes. Propriety would allow them to pursue the same measures. Accompanying the report was a promise of a shipload of a large assortment of goods for presents and ammunition to be given to the natives who would sign for service.40

Upon the reception of this approval from the ministry, the agents held a series of councils with the tribes and used every means possible to force the issue with them. Until now it had been a policy of keeping the savages from joining the colonists and as much as possible to gain the service of the warriors without involving whole tribes in the controversy. They had aroused the Indians against the colonial agents and in every way prevented all whites from traveling in their territory. In some instances troops were used to guard the Indian villages so neither they nor the colonists could arrange councils.41 At a Great Council in Montreal of all the Canadian tribes, Johnson presented each chief with a "war-belt and hatchet" which they accepted. One of the chiefs of the Six Nations who was also invited to attend, took a large belt with a flaming hatchet depicted on it; but on his return he was persuaded by General Schuyler to deliver it up to him. The chief claimed he had not eaten, drunk, or sung the war song with Johnson, but that the others had eaten heavily and were drunk when they made the treaty with Johnson.42 Just how reliable this chief's report of the conference was is

40 Ibid., Lord Dartmouth to General Sage, 4, III, 6.


42 Ibid., General Schuyler to President Hancock, 4, IV, 260.
hard to discern but Schuyler sent a full account of it in a letter to John Hancock, the President of Congress, as his official report on the Indian affairs in the north.

From the latter part of January, 1776, the Canadian tribes were found to be for the cause of the British and were in every conflict waged in the far north. One method the English fort commanders used to assure themselves of retaining their support was to sell them only small quantities of powder to hunt with, and that only upon solemn promises to join the Regulars. The St. John's and Passamaquoddy tribes were forced by hunger to appeal to Washington for supplies and powder to preserve their neutrality, but the British had the trails blocked to their villages. Even if transportation were available he could have done little to aid them for they had depended upon the British for these items until now, as had the colonists. With the ports closed and the cessation of British trade by the Prohibitory Bill, the colonies were at a loss to provide enough powder to supply their own militias much less give it to the Indians. Bounties were being offered to those who would start manufacturing powder and Congress was paying a high price for all private supplies turned in.

While Johnson was conducting the conference at Montreal, Butler was gathering one at Niagara. Those tribes that wished to remain at peace with both sides and with their own people sent a delegation of thirty Oneidas and Mohawks to Schuyler to get permission to go to Niagara and bring Butler back.

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to his home in the Mohawk country. They feared he would not only win many of their own men to join the Regulars but would cause a major war between the Indians themselves since he had already caused so many dissensions among the tribes. Schuyler, seeing the harm that would result from such an act, felt it safer to dismiss the delegation by telling them to use all their powers to dissuade their brethren from following Butler. Other delegations were formed among the friendly nations and were sent to Niagara and the tribal headquarters with speeches to warn the Indians to stay away from the council.

It was not only the British agents that were working for the success of Niagara but many Tories were also active within the colonies. Alexander McKee, the head of a committee operating around Fort Pitt, was arrested; and, in his deposition to gain a parole, admitted that many Tories in New York and Pennsylvania had formed organizations to gather funds to sponsor Indian activities and that some of them were going from tribe to tribe making speeches to win their support. On the same day McKee was arrested, February 29, 1776, the colonial agent who was holding him received a letter that was intercepted before it got to McKee. It contained a formal invitation from Colonel John Butler asking him to be present at the Indian council at Niagara to use his influence as a Tory leader for His Majesty's cause among the assembled tribes. While Butler was holding this council, he was in-

44 Ibid., General Schuyler to President Hancock, 4, IV, 1131.
45 Ibid., 4, IV, 1136. (No heading available)
46 Ibid., Speech of Richard Butler to Warn Indians against Attending Niagara Conference, 4, V, 819.
47 Ibid., Colonel John Butler to Alexander McKee, 4, V, 818.
formed of another in session by the colonists at Onondaga with the Oneidas. He sent the sachem of the Quigogas with a party to reprimand the Oneidas for listening to the offers made to them. A special threat of war was made by the sachem for delivering up the hatchet given to them by the British when they were at Montreal. Butler demanded that they help open the territory to allow him to carry on his work among the tribes if they wished to be forgiven for attending this council and to get any more supplies. The Oneidas' reply was filled with a number of weak excuses and half promises. They accused him and the Council of Niagara as the source of the renewed disunity among the Six Nations.48

These two councils completed the disruption of the Iroquois Confederacy and split the Six Nations to such an extent that they were unable to reorganize even in the face of the bloody massacres that were to befall them before the turn of the century. They also broke up the remnants of the Treaty made by the Six Nations on September 1, 1775, in which they promised to stay out of any fighting between the two White peoples.49

When the colonists were preparing for another council which was to include the Indians of Canada and the Six Nations, Butler and Johnson sent the Mohawks from tribe to tribe spreading false reports as to the intentions of the colonies and carrying news of the gains of the British Army. Among the most influential bits of propaganda found by Mr. Kirkland was that the Indians were to be slaughtered once the British were beaten and driven from the con-

48 Ibid., James Deane to General Schuyler, 4, V, 768-769.
49 Ibid., 4, III, 479. (No Heading Given)
This fate would seem a logical conclusion to the Indian mind and alienate them from any sympathy for the colonial cause; for they had experienced nothing but Indian wars and loss of hunting grounds in every mile westward that the colonies had expanded. The recent wave of expansion after the French and Indian War was still cramping them and the Western Tribes were yet irradiated over the tribes that had been pushed back into their territory. This particularly cooled their affiliation for the frontiers and assured the British forts in the West of more cooperation from the hitherto hostile savages.

From Lake George, Mr. Kirkland wrote General Schuyler of the effects the Mohawks had accomplished by June 8, 1776:

He (Butler) has by threats and proffers made through the Mohawks, prevailed upon the greater part of the Senecas, Cayugas, and Onondagas to renounce the cause of the Colonies and engage on the King's side as they call it. By the last accounts from Niagara, upwards of 100 have enlisted into the King's service and are now acting against us. The war-hatchet has been sent to the Chippewas and Ottowas, and some other tribes have accepted it also.

Colonel Johnson in the meanwhile was under orders from General Howe to wait until this wave of enthusiasm among the tribes calmed down before starting on his campaign through their home territories to enlist their services. By allowing the first fervor to cool, he could find those who were sincere in the pledges they had made and determine what was necessary to hold the others who had accepted the hatchet only because most of the tribes of their Nation had

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50 Ibid., Rev. S. Kirkland to General Schuyler, March 12, 1776, 4, V, 770-774.
51 Ibid., Rev. S. Kirkland to General Schuyler, June 8, 1776, 4, VI, 764.
done so. Joseph Brant and several officers in disguise were sent among the Six Nations to study their activity and judge what would be necessary to prepare them to cooperate with Howe's military movements. Johnson was to follow with a group of Indians Howe promised from his own army who were to testify as to the marks of success of the British; after these had spoken, the supply of presents was to be distributed and the tribe taken to join the Regulars. In this way not only the main body of the army was filled but a large force of auxiliaries was formed to scout and pillage on all sides of the march.

As 1776 came to a close the Indian Departments of the British cannot be distinguished from the activities of the Regular Army. The agents for the most part became military leaders and led the Indian elements in all the major campaigns. After many fluctuations of affiliation the savages found that the greatest immediate returns for their services could be obtained from the British and accordingly all previous promises to the colonies were abandoned. Efforts to win and hold their favor and support continued through the whole war until 1783; but by the eve of 1777 the major portion of them had cast their lot with the English. From the start, the successes of the Regulars and the unorganized efforts and failures of the colonists did much to attach them to the royal cause. Treaties previously made with the rebels were quickly forgotten when the victorious red-coats prepared to fall upon the center of the colonies in conjunction with the drives from the North and South. The tribes were called together and issued weapons and ammunition

52 Ibid., Colonel Guy Johnson to Lord George Germain, November 25, 1776, 5, VII, 839.
with orders to pillage and scourge the scattered settlements while the Regulars concentrated on the forts and other strongholds. Supplies were meted out to them at the start while they acted as a branch of the army in their home territory, but once aroused to the heat of battle, to plunder, and to carnage, they continued their terror in surrounding districts after the Regulars moved on to the next objective. It was only those who formed a part of the permanent ranks that received regular pay and supplies. The Mickmaacs of Nova Scotia stayed in the forces as a tribe and were for the most part led by British officers although some of their own chiefs held Regular commissions.53

CHAPTER II

COLONIAL EFFORTS TO WIN THE FAVOR OF THE INDIANS

From the start, the British bargainings with the Indians were intended to win Indian aid in suppressing the rebellious colonies. This was not the case with the colonial committees, the Continental Congress, or the local militias; they had long experienced fury and fickleness of the savages in war and had lately felt the terror of the aroused tribesmen. The whole existence of the settlements on the frontiers had been dependent on efforts to keep the battle-flame smudged and the warriors from organizing in war. Every means possible had been expended to placate them each time they saw cause in minor incidents to ravage and plunder the communities. Especially after Dunmore's war the problem of easing them back to their former life of hunting or farming was uppermost in the colonial relations with them. The missionaries among them played an important role in this policy and the local governments handled most of their affairs through these men.

Hence it was with much concern that even the tidewater settlements viewed the conduct of the British agents at the outset of the rebellion. The peace and prosperity that followed the conquest of Canada was being endangered by the very ones that had aided in the quelling of the Indian depredations and attacks on the frontiers. Those who had pushed far into the wilderness to establish flourishing posts beyond the original fortifications found those who had promised them protection from possible savage attacks were now arous-
ing those same savages to fall upon them. Yet whatever Congress did until 1776 was always aimed to retain the Indians in strict neutrality, even to the point of refusing many of the offers of various tribes and groups to assist the forces of Washington. It is true that in Massachusetts a group of Stockbridge or River Indians had been enlisted to serve as minutemen by that colony since they were living among the original settlements. In the Provincial Congress on April 1, 1775, before the encounter at Lexington and Concord, a formal address was presented to this tribe thanking them for their faithful service. Henry Gardner, the Receiver-General, was directed to give each of them a blanket and a yard of ribbon.  

1 Except for this act of a provincial congress, no universal official permission was given to enlist the active support of the Indians until May 25, 1776.

As offensive allies, the Indians were of greatest importance to the British for they occupied the frontiers and could be used to harass the Americans in the rear in order to draw off their strength from the seaboard; while to the Americans, they could be of no use except as neutrals. Bearing this in mind it can readily be seen why Congress made treaties of friendship or of neutrality and why the British sought to break them. To defend the frontiers against the Indians thus allied to the British and at the same time meet the call of Congress for war on the seaboard was a tremendous task for the colonies. No colony was put to a more severe test than Pennsylvania with the long line of border settlements made after the conquest of Canada from the French. It was wracked with boundary disputes with Connecticut and Virginia,

1 Ibid., Resolutions of Massachusetts Congress, 4, 1, 1347.
and had a heterogeneous population, and a militia that volunteered in the face of their conscientious scruples against war. New York had its Mohawk Valley settlements interspersed among the Six Nations; Virginia, its Ohio Valley, too far distant to guard against the Western Tribes; but Pennsylvania had its Delaware, Wyoming, West Branch, Juanita, and Ohio Valleys exposed to both the Western and Northern Tribes.

The first movement for obstructing communications between the Northern and Southern governments would necessitate the British crossing Indian territory to demolish Fort Pitt and close the settlements of western Pennsylvania, so naturally most of the rumors and fears of an Indian war came from that area.² The internal civil strife raging in Westmoreland and Augusta counties was disturbing the Indians for they were receiving the brunt of this discord-and condition. On many occasions they were ready to pounce on both factions for pushing them around. It was during Colonel Plunkett's expedition to this district that indications of an Indian war were strongest because of the unstable traffic on their border-lands and the hostility of the rival traders.³

The year 1776 brought nothing more than rumors and suspicions of Indian uprisings against the frontiers of the North and Northwest. None of the forays perpetrated were more than incidental attacks by small bands of hired Indians to spread the fever of war. The British were preparing the savages to be ready in spirit to join the Regulars when the time came for the big campaigns of conquest. Nevertheless the colonists were not overly anxious in their

²Ibid., 4, III, 1661.
apprehension of the progressive moves the agents were using among them. They set about employing every means at their disposal to keep the tribes neutral and win their friendship. For as Colonel Bayley told the New Hampshire Assembly, "If the Indians are our friends and trade with us we need no soldiers." To remove any cause the Indians might have to rightfully rise against the colonies, a number of the Committees of Safety voted severe punishment to anyone that molested the Indians coming in for trade or even showed hostility to roving bands passing through the farming areas. This measure made it difficult for those who were in districts not patrolled by militias. They had to wait until attacked before taking steps to ward off the small bands of natives that were wont to burn, murder, and pillage for the sake of plunder. To have recourse to the assemblies or to the chiefs of the erring tribe was not only useless but involved time and lives. The policy had always been to fire upon the Indians every time they crossed into colonial holdings and pursue them for punishment. Without this fear of chastisement, the Indians became bolder, and each settlement had to fortify against them.

When the threat of the British descending from the north with the aid of Canadians and Indians became more than just a rumor, Reverend Mr. Eleazar Wheelock wrote to Governor Trumbull on March 16, 1775, from Dartmouth College that he had sent James Dean as a missionary among the tribes of lower Canada. Having a mastery of the Caughnawaga tongue and being an adopted member of that

4Ibid., Colonel Bayley to New Hampshire Assembly, 5, III, 1081.
5Ibid., Resolution of Augusta County, Virginia, Assembly, 4, II, 614.
tribe, Dean was to "renew and brighten the chain of friendship and keep the fires burning that lately commenced between the tribes and this Seminary."

He was also on a tour to recruit more students for the school since only ten Indians were there at the time. By educating their children and keeping some missionaries among them, it was hoped to influence the tribes from joining the British if and when they did come down that way. Wheelock was strong for sending Dean among the Six Nations in New York to enlist them to the aid of the colonies when the British passed through their territory, for he had found them in a war-like mood and surmised they were aiming to join one side or the other as soon as the opportunity presented itself. Dean, having been raised by the Six Nations, would have greater power over them than anyone the British could send to them. Apparently he was sent among them, although he admitted he had no authority to enlist their aid in war, yet the day before the battle of Lexington he received a letter from Governor Trumbull thanking him for his aid in winning the Six Nations to colonial friendship in spite of the work of Johnson and Butler.

Colonel Marius Willett, who fought in the French War, urged that the aroused spirits of the Six Nations be placated and promised Congress to put forth all their efforts to conciliate the Indians' mood. He advocated the best supply of Indian goods be procured and that some highly qualified person, deputized as the Superintendent of Indian Affairs, follow him into that

6Ibid., Rev. Eleazer Wheelock to Governor Trumbull, 4, II, 152-153.
7Ibid., Dr. Wheelock to Governor Trumbull, 4, II, 210.
8Ibid., Governor Trumbull to Rev. Wheelock, 4, II, 339.
territory to finish the work he would begin there. If he found them determined for war he intended to enlist them for, as he reasoned, "If they will be fighting for somebody, they may be better fighting for us than against us." 9

In April John Hancock, President of Congress, wrote a lengthy letter to the tribes of Indians in Stockbridge asking them to assemble in a council of their own to establish a firm basis for their friendship toward the colonies. After two days they replied that they owed it to the colony in which they resided to stay active friends; when the colony first began they protected it from the other tribes, but once it outgrew them in size it took care of them. They offered their services to win other tribes from the British and to fight with the army. If they were to be used in war, chief sachem Solomon Ukhaunauwanmut requested that they be allowed to use "Indian fashion"; for they would be useless otherwise.10 This nation, having lived and associated so closely with the colonists, was one of the few that remained faithful during the whole war. The British resented the position they took as messengers to the other tribes and had word spread through all of the Indian villages to take any of the Stockbridge prisoner if they came near. On June 22, a group was caught dealing with the Six Nations. Taken to Montreal they were court-martialed and condemned to be hanged.11 This act proved to be the undoing of much of the work done by the British agents; for a number of the

9"Colonel Marius Willett to General Schuyler," Fort Schuyler, April 29, 1778, MSS in Ayer Collection, Newberry Library, Chicago.

10American Archives, Speech of Captain Solomon, April 11, 1775, 4, II, 315.

11Ibid., Extract of a Letter to a Delegate in Continental Congress, 4, II, 1060.
tribes sent messages of friendship to the Stockbridge and their colonial allies. Solomon, the King of the Nation, visited the Mohawks who not only encouraged him to join the rebels, but also gave him a belt promising they would hold five hundred men in readiness to join him on the first notice of hostilities by the troops in Boston. The offer was accepted and an Indian post was kept near Boston to run with the news as soon as the Chief wanted help. By the time action began the agents had induced the Mohawks to withdraw their generous offer.12

Much consternation spread through the Penobscot Indians when Captain Goldthwaite ordered the fort in their country abandoned in order to use the soldiers stationed there with the regular army. These Tribes were not only exposed to the ravages of the larger nations but were without a place to secure powder and supplies. Enoch Freeman requested the Massachusetts Congress to open the trade to that point and use these Indians as an outpost against any Canadians or Indians harassing the colony from that direction.13 Upon hearing the disaffection of these tribes for the British, the Congress passed a resolution appointing Captain Stone, Colonel Warren, and Mr. Sullivan as a committee to study the expediency of taking measures of raising several companies among them to patrol the borderland.14 After studying the situation they gave a favorable report to the Congress and presented a letter that

12 Ibid., Letter to Pittsfield, Mass. to an Officer in Cambridge, 4, II, 546.
13 Ibid., Enoch Freeman to Massachusetts Congress, 4, II, 514.
14 Ibid., Resolution in Massachusetts Provincial Congress, May 12, 1775, 4, II, 800.
should be taken there to begin the council. The committee was ordered to instruct Mr. John Lane to carry the letter to the tribes and enlist a full company in the service of the colony.

Other rumors of the growing dissatisfaction among the Northern and near Western Indians over Johnson's efforts to force them into war spurred all the central Committees of Safety to send men among them to dissuade them from falling on the settlements. The Tyron Committee sent several delegations of prominent citizens to explain in detail the cause and nature of the dispute between the mother country and the Americans. These missions did much to counteract the influence of the British to cause an immediate Indian war which, if aroused at this time when the colonies were so unorganized, undoubtedly would have overwhelmed them and caused the loss of the war. They kept the Indians studying the moves of each side and wondering what the whole controversy was about. Their place of importance in the dispute became more and more apparent to the Indians as the quest for their services increased and it was more noticeable that they were looking for the more favorable bargain before casting their lot with either side. The fur traders and Coureurs du Bois had put the Indians on the offensive and taught them to be wary in all their dealings with the White men. This was now being displayed in the "hard-to-get" policy they adopted as each faction bid higher and higher for their

15 See Appendix I.
17 Ibid., Committee of Palatine District of Tyron County to Albany Committee, 4, II, 666.
services. In this spirit they were able to refrain from declaring sides and were free to change affiliation when personal gain saw fit. That the Indians had more love and loyalty for the colonists than for the British is easily seen from their recourse to the colonial magistrates when they doubted the British word.

In the latter part of May, 1775, Johnson was giving reports to the Mohawks that uprisings in New England were being directed against his tribesmen in that quarter. Little Abraham, their chief, went to the assemblies of Schenectady and Albany to check these rumors before taking action. He declared he had no intention of joining either side; but, if either of them abused his people, he would be forced to protect them and thereby aid one side.18 Luckily the magistrates were clever enough to pacify the chief. With Johnson living in their midst and being in a warlike mood with some of their warriors already in Montreal, they would have given unfavorable example to all of the Six Nations to begin war, if the rumors were really true. This event occurred just after Johnson's letter, purportedly written by the Oneidas to the Mohawks, had been delivered.

To supplement the achievements of the delegations that had been sent to the various tribes to explain the nature of the colonial dispute with Great Britain, Ethan Allen sent a letter to the Four Tribes (Hocnowagoes, Swagaches, Conesadaugans, and St. Francois) with whom he had dwelt and hunted. In detail he showed how the King's Army had killed their good friends at Boston and how the colonies wanted to do away with that enemy to again enjoy the

18Ibid., Little Abraham to Magistrates of Schenectady and Albany, 4, II, 842.
friendship of the Four Tribes. He complained that he had to fight, and that
he might have to pursue the enemy from Crown Point through their territory:

...Ye know my warriors must fight, but if you our brother
Indians do not wish to fight on either side while we are
in your land, we will still be friends; and you may come
and hunt in our woods and come with your canoes in the
Lake, and let us have venison at our Forts on the Lake;
and have rum, bread and what you want and be like brothers.
I have sent Winthrop Hoit to treat with you in our behalf
in friendship; you know him for he too has lived with you
and is now your adopted son...He will tell you about the
whole matter more than I can write.19

As Colonel of the Green Mountain Boys and holding fame as an Indian fighter,
Allen did much to urge the local committees to foster friendship with the
Indians. He himself went from tribe to tribe holding conferences and found
them willing to stay out of war if it was possible. He used Captain Abraham
Nimham as his interpreter with those whose language he did not speak.20 Among
the strategies that he recommended to Congress to win the acclaim of the
savages was to make a sudden push against Canada.21 This would eliminate the
tribes of Canada from possible war and render a treaty of neutrality more
feasible among the other neighboring Indians, for this was still the policy
of the colonies.

Since there had not been duly appointed colonial agents among the Indians
while the British were in charge, there was no set policy of handling the af-
fairs with them when the War began. Nor were there many men who had sufficient

19Ibid., Ethan Allen to the Four Tribes, May 24, 1775, 4, II, 714. See
Appendix III.

20Ibid., Ethan Allen to New York Congress, June 1, 1775, 4, II, 892.

21Ibid., Ethan Allen to Massachusetts Congress, June 9, 1775, 4, II, 939.
experience to handle this delicate diplomacy. Each colony directed its own business among them, choosing men who had been captives and adopted by some motherly squaw into the tribe. These men knew the language and customs of particular nations but understood little of the doings or sentiments of other tribes. Their manner of speaking to them usually followed the theme of the Watertown Provincial Congress instructions to their newly appointed agent:

...That of praising their wisdom and courage, thanking them for their past friendship, and definitely blaming the English for the past bloodshed among them and of again starting bloodshed among the Colonies which would soon be followed by a massacre of the Indians.22

The lack of men to reach the many branches of the major Nations aroused complaints that the colonies were inactive concerning the Indian situation while they were in such an undecided state of mind. The frontiersmen were afraid of losing the support of all the tribes since the British were particularly active among these lesser tribes. Enoch Freeman, the head of the town of Falmouth, wrote to Congress that a large number of scattered tribes met on the Andracoggin River to consult which side to take. They could not agree and he petitioned for a delegate or some Indians to be sent up to influence them to remain neutral.23 In Stockbridge it was voted in the Assembly that the Selectmen of the Village form a committee to forward belts and ammunition with messengers to all these tribes, especially the Moheakounuck. Fifteen pounds was drawn from the treasury to finance this mission.24

22 Ibid., Watertown Congress to Agent among Moheakounuck Tribes, 4, II, 938.
23 Ibid., Extract of Letter from Enoch Freeman, 4, II, 700.
24 Ibid., Resolutions of Massachusetts Congress, June 8, 1775, 4, II, 1397.
shire the Committee of Conway became suspicious of the heavy Indian traffic through their holdings and asked the Colony's Congress at Exeter to send extra men to strengthen the militia. Their object was to keep a group of scouts in the woods to observe the movements of the numerous British deputy agents that had appeared among the Indians. A full company of men arrived and were assigned to use all their efforts to keep the tribes neutral.25

Shortly after the capture of Ticonderoga and Crown Point by Benedict Arnold and Ethan Allen, they took over the negotiations with the Indians. Allen in his report said that the savages as well as the Canadians, except the Noblesse, appeared very friendly; Arnold in a similar account stated that the tribes were determined not to aid the King's forces. They had a law making it punishable by death for anyone to leave the tribe to fight the colonists. Five chiefs urged Arnold to march into Canada for they were disgusted with the policy of the Regulars.26 The Penobscots appealed to him for aid and protection from the British who were taking their timber and closing their commissary because of their friendship for the colonist's militia. They offered their services and had a band of warriors ready to join the army of Arnold.27

John Lane, who had been among the other branches of the Penobscots and the St. Francois, returned with favorable reports of his work. He was accom-

25 Ibid., Committee of Safety at Exeter to Committee of Conway, 4, II, 979.
26 Ibid., Benedict Arnold to Continental Congress, 4, II, 976. Also Ethan Allen to Continental Congress, Ibid., 732-733. The same was written to Governor Trumbull by Arnold and Allen, June 13, 1775, Ibid., 977.
panied by a chief who went to the Massachusetts Congress with a pledge of friendship and neutrality. 28 Although many of the tribes were avowing their allegiance to the rebels at this time, the Stockbridge, Penobscot, part of the Oneidas and St. Francois were the only ones who kept their word all through the war. These tribes lived within the eastern colonies and had ceased the life of roaming for that of farming. They were for the most existing from their crops and the supplies they could get from the colonists in return for work.

Farther to the north, Colonel Bailey held a council among the Indians favoring Great Britain that Governor Carleton was preparing to aid Burgoyne. They were determined to fight in the war and it was useless to ask for neutrality or just passive friendship. Becoming disgusted with their obstinacy, he gave them their choice of three plans that he laid before them: if they would join the colonies, he would take all that wanted to go with him to the colonial army; if they preferred to remain in the north, they could go to Canada to spy on the British and Indians for which he would pay each forty shillings, a blanket, and a coat, the same as if they went to join the army; finally, he threatened them with annihilation if they or any of their lesser tribes fought against the colonies. 29

It was the zeal of Joseph Brant and his master, Johnson, that had so disposed these Indians to enter the war. This occurred at the time Johnson

28 Ibid., Falmouth Committee to Massachusetts Congress, 4, II, 1005. See also, John Lane to Massachusetts Congress, Ibid., 942.
29 Ibid., Address of Colonel Bailey to the Northern Indians, 4, II, 1070.
feared the settlers were plotting to take his life and asked for personal protection. The New York Congress had granted him the aid he asked, in spite of their knowledge of his activities. They were praised for the move by the New York delegates to the Continental Congress; from the temper and customs of these tribes, they would have great concern if any of their Council Fires were meddled with and would have gone to extremes if Johnson's person were harmed. 30

It being impossible to molest the British agents in their appointed territory, it became more and more evident that the only way to impress the Indians with the power and possibilities of success was to march against Canada. Final decisions on this act were reached when Colonel Bailey informed Congress that the northern Indians were being forced to take up arms and were persecuted or threatened if they did not join the Regulars. 31 To learn further of the movements of Carleton at Montreal and the plans of Quebec before starting the campaign, Bailey accepted the proffered services of the Indian chief, Lewee, as a spy. Making frequent trips up there with a part of his seasons' furs, he was able to find the plan of the Regulars to march against Ticonderoga. On subsequent trips he inspected the whole camp at Montreal and learned from the Indians about Quebec. 32

In the Articles of Confederation, adopted July 21, 1775, Article X and XI deal with the Indian question. It was forbidden any colony to engage in

31 Ibid., Jacob Bayley to New York Congress, 4, II, 1134.
32 Ibid., Edward Buckman and Seth Wales to Colonels Bailey and Hurd, 4, II, 1041-1042.
an offensive war with any Indian tribe, so that the Indians, and particularly the Six Nations, could be obtained in both an offensive and defensive alliance. In order to organize the whole frontier from Canada to Georgia in Indian affairs the Second Continental Congress was addressed by the New York Delegates by a petition from the Provincial Congress:

Policy will teach the Ministers of Britain to light up an Indian War on our frontiers, that we may be driven for protection to embrace their terms of slavery ....We submit to your consideration whether it is proper to leave the management of the many Tribes of Indians entirely in the hands of persons appointed by the Crown. If it be not, then you will best be able to determine the remedy for this evil, and whether it will not be both politic and just to nominate a Continental Superintendent of Indian affairs.

By July 12 the Congress had initiated measures to provide permanent colonial agents in all the main Indian centers. The frontier was divided into three Indian Departments: the Northern, Middle, and Southern. The Northern extended down to include the Six Nations and all Nations to the North; the Southern began with the Cherokees and all tribes South; the Middle embraced all tribes between these two, and the Westlands. Three commissioners were provided for each the Middle and Northern Departments and five for the Southern Department. General Schuyler, Oliver Wolcott, and Timothy Edwards were appointed to the Northern and later received two assistants to act in

33 Ibid., Articles of Confederation Towards a Perpetual Union, July 21, 1775, 4, II, 1887.
Canada: Benjamin Franklin, Patrick Henry and James Wilson were charged with the Middle Department, with George Morgan later assigned to the West; the Southern Department Commissioners were responsible to the South Carolina Committee of Safety and were appointed from among its own members.36

These commissioners were to keep a close watch on the Nations in their Departments and to seek alliances with them. In order to gain or retain Indian friendship it was their responsibility to see that arms and ammunition for hunting were made available to them and that the commissaries were placed in appropriate places. If the King's superintendents acted as to stir up the Indians, they were to be seized by the head of the Department and brought to Congress.37 For the support of the Departments in hiring agents and procuring supplies and presents for the Indians, Congress allocated the sum of $10,000 to each.38 These commissioners were to take complete charge of all dealings between the Indians and the Army or the Colonies.

Washington had been careful to follow the previous orders of Congress to seek only the friendship and neutrality with the Indians.39 After the Departments were formed, he had recourse to them even when the Indians came directly to him with their offers or wants. Later that autumn he was approached by the Penobscots who, being out of powder, represented to him that if he could not supply it to them they would have to accept that which was being offered

38 Ibid., Declaration of South Carolina Provincial Congress, William Henry Drayton, President, 4, IV, 58.
39 Ibid., General Washington to General Schuyler, 4, III, 213.
by the British to gain their friendship and dependence. He appealed to the Northern Department through Stephen Moylan for two barrels of powder to be taken from the stock of the Committee of Public Safety at Newburyport if necessary. The stand he had taken regarding Indian neutrality became embarrassing to him when Ogaghragighti, the highest chief of the Onondaga Nation, appealed to him for permission of his Nation to begin war on the British. The chief requested a commission for himself in the Colonial Army and assured Washington he had nearly five hundred men waiting for the march against the enemy. Washington asked time to consider the matter and sent a letter to Schuyler for his advice. He feared the expense they would be to the Department, yet he realized they would not remain idle and would surely join the battle then raging at Montreal in spite of their recent rift with the Regulars. Schuyler in his reply found it difficult to determine what should be done. He advised him to try subtly to get rid of their offer which would be much more preferable than employing them. The expenses of the Department were at a limit trying to keep the tribes neutral and he feared it would be three times as great once they considered themselves in colonial service. He made clear to Washington that such a small group would be more expensive proportionately than with several thousand, so they were to be told to act as emis-saries among the other tribes until he saw fit to gather a whole army of

40Ibid., Stephen Moylan to Committee of Newburyport, 4, III, 1429.
41Ibid., Address of Ogaghragighti Chief Spokesman of Sachems and Warriors of Caughnawaga Nation to General Washington, 4, IV, 893.
42Ibid., George Washington to General Schuyler, January 27, 1776, 4, IV, 893.
While the siege of St. Johns and Montreal was giving the Indians reports of colonial power and showing that the stories of Johnson and Carleton, regarding the total lack of supplies by the enemy, were unfounded, Congress urged the Departments to hold conferences with their Nations. This was a favorable time to bind more securely the neutrality and friendship already professed by some tribes and to gain others who were in favor with the British just to be on the winning side. In the south the British kept the Cherokees in a long council, so little could be done with them. It was in that council that they agreed to take part in the drive to the north. Schuyler, in his section, tried to again unify the Six Nations and restore the Iroquois Confederacy at Albany. Some of the chiefs abruptly left the assembly when asked to sign the treaty of neutrality. The Senecas, Delawares, Shawnees, and Wyandots were still for the British but did not want to enter the fight as yet. The treaty was accepted by some of the Nations; but, as a whole, the council was a failure. Had the Confederacy been re-established, the Indians would have remained neutral; but Johnson was too active and used Joseph Brant too effectively for unity among them. In the Middle Department little success was likewise experienced. Meeting at Fort Pitt the commissioners found that Butler and Johnson had drawn most of the tribes to the Royal cause. A secure treaty was made with the Ohio Indians in spite of all Governor Hamilton had

44 Ibid., Jonathan Clark, sworn before William H. Drayton, 4, III, 217.
directed from Detroit to set them against Virginia.\textsuperscript{46} The tribes of western New York and Pennsylvania were still bitter against the new settlements that had entered their lands, and were the hardest to deal with; for their aim had always been to regain this territory. Johnson had little to do to arouse them to refuse the treaty.

Hearing of the poor results of the Indian conferences, Congress became alarmed and feared the loss of even the friendly tribes. In December they passed a resolution not to deny the entrance into colonial service of the St. Francois, Penobscot, Stockbridge and St. Johns Tribes if they made another request. When the necessity arose to use them, they were to be given presents and the colonies in which they resided were to take means of supplying the commissioners with extra funds.\textsuperscript{47}

Accordingly the Massachusetts House of Representatives provided a tradesmaster to reside in Machias to supply the St. Johns and Passamaquoddy with ammunition and such articles of goods as they needed.\textsuperscript{48} Mr. Stephen Smith was put in charge of the post and four hundred pounds was voted to be paid out of the treasury to finance the project. He was empowered to purchase anything the Indians would try to get from the British if he did not supply it to them.\textsuperscript{49}

\textsuperscript{46}Ibid., Richard Henry Lee to General Washington, 4, II, 1542. See also, C. H. Sipe. The Indian Wars of Pennsylvania. The Telegraph Press, Harrisburg, Pa., 1929, 509.

\textsuperscript{47}Ibid., Resolutions of Continental Congress, Dec. 2, 1775, 4, II, 1940.

\textsuperscript{48}Ibid., Resolution of Massachusetts House of Representatives, Feb. 12, 1776, 4, IV, 1444.

\textsuperscript{49}Ibid., Resolution of Massachusetts House of Representatives, Feb. 14, 1776, 4, IV, 1450.
John Dean was among the Indians at Onondaga during the siege of Boston from March 4-17, 1776. From the reports he gave them of colonial success and the city's ultimate fall he was able to estimate their true sentiments toward the colonies. When told of the reduction of the Regular's position some of the Six Nations expressed vexation and disappointment, while only a few showed signs that they appreciated the removal of the British. He had to bargain heavily to keep a great number of warriors from departing to aid Johnson to regain Boston. Schuyler heard of the work of Dean in this conference to quell the Six Nations and petitioned John Hancock to urge Congress to dispatch a large amount of supplies to him at Albany. He felt the next move of the Indians would be to ask for a conference with him to find out if the colonies were now able to give them better terms than the British were offering. Since he was without presents to give them, he feared they would leave in disgust before he could speak to them. As he had anticipated, a message came to him on March 18 from the chief sachems with a note from Dean asking for a meeting. Dean encouraged him to confer with the Six Nations, "especially as the hatchets (which the humane Johnson dispersed among them) are still in their hands, and some of their people are considerably influenced by the Senecas who have ever been unfriendly to the colonies." When the conference was held, Schuyler found them very unreceptive and distrustful. He appealed to them to stay neutral since it would not be long before the colonists had

50 Ibid., Journal of John Dean while at Onondaga, 4, V, 1103.

51 Ibid., General Schuyler to John Hancock, 4, V, 91.

52 Ibid., James Deane to General Schuyler, 4, V, 769.
driven the British from America as Washington had done to those at Boston. He told them that the French, their former protectors, were now in league with the colonists and had 7,000 warriors at Martinico. Nothing seemed to warm them to his side and many doubted the fall of Boston. Schuyler even offered free passage for all the sachems to Boston and New York to prove his statements and show that Johnson was lying to them. All was to no avail, for they departed without signing a treaty or smoking the pipe of friendship.53

Seeing it was no longer possible to bind the Indians together or maintain them in the state of neutrality, moves were inaugurated in all parts to take them into colonial service. They were restless for war as a result of the bargainings of both factions and now it was at the point of either fighting with or against them. All British agents were ordered to be seized in order to stop their influence, and Congress sent an approval of the arrest of Cameron, Smyth, and Connally, with an order to send them under guard to Philadelphia.54 Complying with the order of Congress, General Sullivan sent Colonel Dayton to seize Sir John Johnson and then to continue on until he took James Gray, John Munroe, Thomas Swords, Captain McAlpine, Hugh Munro, Mr. J. Clyde, and Isaac Mann. While taking these men, Dayton was cautioned to see that his men did not insult or abuse either the agents or the natives while in Indian territory; for one act of rudeness by an American soldier might involve the whole country in a war with the savages.55 The situation was becoming

53Ibid., General Schuyler to Six Nations at Albany, 4 V, 771.
54Ibid., John Hancock to Committee of Frederick, Md., 4, IV, 216.
55Ibid., General Sullivan to Colonel Dayton, 4, V, 493.
very tense and it was a great risk to take the agents; but apparently the colonists figured the number of Indians they would lose by removing the agents would not be as great as the evil of letting them stay among them. In the northwest the Indians held a conference in protest against the removal of the agents, at which Colonel John Butler presided. They claimed the colonial traders sent out by James Wilson were overcharging for their supplies which they had been getting from the British for almost nothing. Richard Butler, an interpreter spying for the colonies, secretly petitioned for an immediate shipment of ammunition and presents to be sent to them; for John Butler was implying that the rebels did not trust the Indians, and therefore would not give them anything to fight with.\textsuperscript{56}

Washington sent Colonel Hazen to Congress to give the Delegates a full understanding of the perilous conditions of the Indian situation. In the letter to Hancock, introducing Hazen, he stated "that the time is past to expect neutrality from them," and asked Congress if it would not be better to immediately engage all of them possible in the service. The problem was becoming acute; and, if advisable, he recommended a siege to be made on Niagara and Detroit with the use of the unfriendly Senecas, which he hoped might change their sentiments.\textsuperscript{57} Congress, acting on Washington's proposals, appointed a committee of commissioners to study the cause of the general unrest among the Indians and form a plan, however costly, to restore harmony and prevent an outbreak against the colonies. Messages were sent to all the tribes in the

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., Richard Butler to James Wilson, 4, V, 816.

\textsuperscript{57}Ibid., General Washington to President of Congress, 4, V, 985.
three Departments, and George Morgan was appointed as commissioner to the far middle-west to hold a conference with the Shawanees, Mingoes, Delawares, and Miamis.58

By April 24 a resolution was passed to send an expedition to Detroit to reduce the fort and capture Governor Hamilton. All traders were forbidden to go into Indian territory without a special license from the commissioner of the area, and new low prices were established on all goods. George Morgan was delegated to distribute a ton of powder to the friendly Indians to convince them that they were still trusted by the colonies.59 During this session, John Adams wrote to General Gates concerning his distaste of the use of the Indians:

...It is said they are very expensive and troublesome confederates in war, besides the incivility and inhumanity of employing such savages with their cruel, bloody dispositions, against any enemy whatever. Nevertheless such have been the extravagancies of British barbarity, in prosecuting the war against us, that I think we need not be so delicate as to refuse the assistance of the Indians, provided we cannot keep them neutral.60

Schuyler assured Congress that there was little time yet to elapse before the Indians would fall into a general uprising. He had one hundred fifty sachems waiting for him at Albany and the others would await their return before going into battle. He promised to hold them until Congress sent word as to the next step he should take, especially regarding the Senecas and Cayugas who were

58Ibid., Resolutions of Continental Congress, 4, V, 1663.
59Ibid., Report Read in Continental Congress, April 24, 1776, 4, V, 1686.
60Ibid., John Adams to General Gates, April 27, 1776, 4, V, 1091.
bitter against him. 61

While passing time until their reply arrived, he arranged with General Sullivan to amass all the troops around Albany to pass in review before the chiefs. They were amazed at the regularity and order of the forces and much surprised at the numbers, which the Tories had industriously propagandized to consist of only three companies. 62 The reply of Congress was a great disappointment to Schuyler. He expected definite word as to what to tell the chiefs, but instead he was informed of the two objects they had in view: "The protection and assistance of our Canadian friends, and, securing so much of that territory as may prevent any communication between our enemies and the Indians." At this information the sachems left in disgust. 63

The lack of cooperation of the Congress with the commissioners and generals seemed to cost the colonies heavily in Indian affairs in such crucial moments as this. Had the commissioners been able to act with some power when the occasion presented itself many of the tribes could have been won. Congress was being cautious and held the final decisions within their control in both military and Indian questions.

Morgan arrived at Pittsburg on May 16 and found Hamilton was gathering the Indians for a council at Detroit. He proceeded to the Shawanee towns to prevent their attendance at the council and began arranging for his meeting. 64

61 Ibid., General Schuyler to President of Congress--Referred to Messrs. Livingstone, Jefferson and Adams, 4, V, 1181.
62 Ibid., General Schuyler to General Washington, 4, VI, 416.
63 Ibid., Resolutions of Continental Congress, 4, VI, 1679.
64 Ibid., Report of Morgan to Congress, 5, II, 514.
William Wilson, a trader who accompanied Morgan, extended an invitation to the other tribes to assemble at Fort Pitt on September 10 to consider a treaty. Receiving an invitation from the Wyandots, Wilson with three companions, visited their village opposite Detroit to deliver the speech and belt sent by Morgan to the chiefs.65 No incident better illustrates the situation the commissioners on the frontiers were forced to cope with than Wilson's reception by Governor Hamilton. Hamilton, having expressed the desire to speak with him in a friendly manner, accompanied the chiefs to Detroit. Seizing the speech of Morgan to the Indians, he pompously declared that the people that sent it were enemies and traitors to his king and that he would prefer to lose his right hand rather than take one of them by the hand. Tearing up the speech and cutting the belt to pieces, he then spoke to the assembled Indians on a tomahawk belt. White Eyes, Chief of the Delawares, who had accepted Wilson's invitation to Fort Pitt was ordered to leave the city. Wilson was likewise directed to leave at once, receiving a parting word from the Governor which was well calculated to excite fear among the frontiersmen and enthusiasm for the British cause among the Indians.66 In reporting the affair, Wilson thus quoted Hamilton's remarks:

...He would be glad if I would inform the people on my return of what I had seen; that all of the Indians I saw there at the Treaty were of the same way of thinking; and that he would be glad if the people would consider the dreadful consequences of going to war with so terrible an enemy and accept the King's pardon while it

65Ibid., Report of Morgan to Congress, 5, II, 515.
66Ibid., Report of Morgan to Congress, 5, II, 518.
could be obtained.... That an army of 2,000 men were
landed in Canada and had driven the rebels entirely
out of that Government and were pursuing them to the
southward with the completest train of artillery
that ever came out of Europe on any occasion; and
that the King's triumph was well assured. 67

On June 3, 1776, the Continental Congress expanded its resolution of
May 25, as to the use of Indians, by sending Washington an order to enlist up
to two thousand natives for the campaign in Canada. 68 No particulars were
sent as to the mode of recruiting and engaging them. Washington in writing
to Schuyler advised him to devise measures as he saw fit; and, if a smaller
number than was ordered would fill the necessity, to employ the minimum need-
ed. At the same time he urged him to fill all vacancies in the army from the
local militias so there would be no urgent need to take so many savages. 69

On June 13, Schuyler held a meeting of all the commissioners of his
department at Albany and read the order of Congress to them. A special com-
mittee was formed by Schuyler, Volkert Douw, and Timothy Edwards to draw up
the terms for employing the Indians. The following resolutions were sent to
Washington for approval:

1. That two companies to consist of a Captain, two
   Lieutenants, three Sergeants, three Corporals
   and seventy five Privates be raised out of the
   Mohekander and Connecticut Indians and march with-
   out further orders to Lake George by way of Albany.

2. If the number of Indians be insufficient, White

68 Ibid., Minutes of Meeting of Commissioners of Northern Department at Albany,
   June 3, 1776, 4, VI, 914.
69 Ibid., General Washington to General Schuyler, 4, VI, 742.
men of the area be used but not exceeding one-third the number of Indians.

3. The pay, provisions, and billet money be the same as is now given the Troops in the service of the United Colonies.

4. That the Committee of Stockbridge and Mr. Edwards be requested to appoint such officers, either White or Indian, for the Stockbridge Company as they deem best qualified for the service.70

Schuyler was doubtful whether such terms would pass the scrutiny of Congress but acknowledged to Washington that it was impossible to get any of the eastward tribes on better conditions. He also feared approval of his issuing warrants for the money necessary to sponsor the project. To the westward he was not able to make any impression on the tribes with these terms. Even the friendly Oneidas refused to leave their own territory.71 After much soliciting in his own Department Schuyler became dejected over the results, of which he was confidently expecting great success. He informed Washington that so far from having been able to procure 2,000 Indians to join his army, he would be extremely happy if he could keep them from acting against him.72

The Indian situation now became one of the principal worries of Washington. The lack of success in gaining the friendship and support of the savages caused a fear among his men for the safety of their families in exposed areas and was no doubt the reason for so few from the frontiers coming to join his forces. Hoping to overcome the objections of some of the tribes, he requested

70Ibid., Resolutions of the Meeting of Commissioners of Northern Department, June 13, 1776, 4, VI, 914.
71Ibid., General Schuyler to General Washington, June 15, 1776, 4, VI, 912.
72Ibid., General Schuyler to General Washington, 5, I, 816.
permission from Congress to use the Indians wherever he saw fit or in the places they wanted to be of service.\textsuperscript{73} To disconcert him further, a rumor reached him that the savages were to be given a bounty of ten pounds for every British prisoner taken at Niagara; yet he had not been informed by any authority to pay the natives who were coming to him with hostages. He appealed to the delegates for a more immediate communication on acts passed that would influence his relations with the tribes.\textsuperscript{74}

Schuyler too, was becoming nervous over the vacillating action of Congress; and from Fort George informed John Hancock that he was moving to Fort Stanwix to erect a fortification there and that he was forming a definite policy in dealing with the Indians. He aimed to use every means possible to find which tribes were set to act against the colonies and to make those that professed friendship declare once and for all what stand they would take in the conflict.\textsuperscript{75}

Benedict Arnold was also putting pressure on the tribes around Montreal. In a council at Caughnawaga the St. Francois, Caughnawaga, and Canassadagas gave him the hatchet they had accepted from Carleton the previous year, and they professed a friendship that was likely to lead to aiding his army. At the time they wished to remain neutral until the other tribes in the Department became settled. The Oswagatchie pretended they had no authority to give up the hatchet and were told that an army would march against them if they

\textsuperscript{73}Ibid., General Washington to President of Congress, June 8, 1776, 4, VI, 757.
\textsuperscript{74}Ibid., General Washington to President of Congress, June 9, 1776, 4, VI, 768.
\textsuperscript{75}Ibid., General Schuyler to President of Congress, June 8, 1776, 4, VI, 762.
preferred war to joining the colonial forces.\textsuperscript{76}

John Sullivan found the most bitter tribe against him at Sorel was the Roundorks, who refused to meet him in a council and had sent a petition to Carleton to join his army. Since there were only fifty able warriors in the tribe and these were hated by the friendly Indians, Sullivan dispatched a force of savages under one of his capable officers to conquer them.\textsuperscript{77} Apparently the Indians in Canada were playing cleverly to keep out of trouble and knew the colonists needed their help too much to force them too far in their decision. While the British were in control of that area they cooperated with them; and now, since the rebels were in command, they again change sides just far enough to be able to return to their former status if circumstances should require.

Hearing of all the activity in the Northern Department, and the measures being taken by those who were doubtful of the sentiments of Congress in the steps they were taking, the Delegates passed a resolution on June 17:

That General Washington be permitted to employ the Indians whom he may take into the service of the United Colonies, pursuant to a resolution of Congress of the 25th of May last, in any place where he shall judge they will be most useful; and that he be authorized to offer them a reward of $100 for every commissioned officer and $30 for every Private soldier of the King's troops that they shall take prisoners in the Indian country or on the frontiers of the Colonies.\textsuperscript{78}

\textsuperscript{76}\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, Benedict Arnold to Major-General Schuyler, June 10, 1776, 4, VI, 977.

\textsuperscript{77}\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, John Sullivan to General Washington, June 8, 1776, 4, VI, 1036.

\textsuperscript{78}\textsuperscript{Ibid.}, Resolutions of Congress, June 17, 1776, 4, VI, 1712.
Upon receiving this full authority to engage the Indians in any territory, Washington urged Schuyler to use the bounty offered as an inducement not only to hire the united service of a tribe but also to obtain the friendly elements in hostile groups to harass the British. He promised them prompt payment of the allowances upon the delivery of each prisoner alive. 79 But regarding the policy previously enacted by the commissioners of raising companies of Connecticut and Mohawkandar Indians, he warned him not to act until further authorized to do so. For he considered the resolution of Congress was meant for those of hostile character or of doubtful friendship which would not include these tribes who were inhabitants of a colony and permanent residents among the Whites. 80 Washington was correct in his interpretation of the resolution; for several days after his letter to Schuyler he received a copy of a directive from John Hancock which was being sent to Governor Trumbull:

Honorable Sir: The Congress being informed by a letter from General Washington, that General Schuyler and the other Commissioners of Indian affairs had come to a determination of taking into Continental service and pay the Mohegans and Stockbridge Indians, I am directed by Congress to request you will give order to have a stop put to raising them as soon as possible; and that no proceedings be had by the Commissioners till further direction from Congress. 81

The reason given was that they were considered in the same light as the colonists and that the resolution pertained only to those who did not live among

79 Ibid., George Washington to General Schuyler, June 20, 1776, 4, VI, 992.
80 Ibid., General Washington to General Schuyler, June 24, 1776, 4, VI, 1053.
81 Ibid., President of Congress to Governor Trumbull, 4, VI, 1065.
It was during the deliberations and committee work on the Declaration of Independence that Congress took time to pass these final resolutions to employ the savages. Notwithstanding their denunciation of the British in this document for enlisting the aid of the Indians, they granted Washington full permission to use them against the British; and they offered them a liberal reward for prisoners, with no orders to control their manner of obtaining such captives. In the Declaration of Independence they accused the King:

He has excited domestic insurrection among us and has endeavored to bring on the inhabitants of our frontiers the merciless Indian savages, whose known rule of warfare is indistinguishable destruction of all ages, sexes, and conditions.82

On July 8 another resolution was passed giving Washington power to call forth and engage into service as many of the St. Johns, Nova Scotia, and Penobscot tribes as he could get. He was recommended to ask the Massachusetts Bay General Court to aid in this task and was promised reimbursement for all expenses incurred as a consequence.83 Accordingly he wrote to the Colonial Assembly for at least five or six hundred fully equipped warriors. Their term of enlistment would be for two or three years unless discharged before their term was completed. He urged the Assembly to try to hire them for less than colonial army pay if their avowed friendship would permit a reduction. Since there was a dearth of arms, those signing up were to bring their firelocks.84 The Assembly held a special meeting at which it was agreed that 500

82Ibid., Declaration of Independence, July 2, 1776, 4, VI, 1260.
83Ibid., Resolutions in Congress, 5, I, 193.
84Ibid., George Washington to Massachusetts Assembly, July 10, 1776, 5, I, 192.
warriors would be taken from the St. Johns and Mickmack Tribes. These with 250 colonists to be enlisted would form one regiment. The field officers were colonials and the other commissioned officers, half Indian and half colonial. Each Indian was allowed a rifle-shirt, a blanket, and a pair of shoe buckles or moccasins.85

A conference was called at Boston, and Washington's petition was read to the assembled chiefs of the St. Johns. They were satisfied with the terms, and from each chief was obtained the number of men he had and how many he could give. The Greater St. Johns had sixty men and promised thirty for service; the Winsors had fifty and promised twenty; Miramichi and Rechibucts, eighty, and promised ten; Lehive, sixty, and promised fifteen; and Gaspee fifty, and promised twenty-five.86 This number fell short of what was expected, for there was hope of all the warriors joining. The chiefs of the eastern tribes met outside Boston and were also favorable to the plan.

After signing the treaty they accompanied five of the members of the assembly to where their tribes were gathered. James Bowdrin accepted some of the warriors and immediately marched off to New York with them, in hope of more firmly enforcing the treaty and encouraging their whole tribes to join sooner than they had promised.87 Out in the German Flats, General Schuyler was having little success. The Senecas and Cayugas rendered his whole council

85Ibid., Resolutions in Massachusetts Assembly, July 13, 1776, 5, I, 323.
86Ibid., Minutes of Meeting with Indians in Boston Meeting House, July 16, 1776, 5, I, 845.
87Ibid., James Bowdoin to General Washington, July 30, 1776, 5, I, 836.
unruly, and he did his best to get a faint promise of neutrality from the rest but failed. He wrote to Hancock that he sincerely wished the council could be ended for "the consumption of rum and provisions is incredible; it equals that of an army of 3,000 men, although only 1,200 Indians are here." 88

Washington, seeing how few tribes showed even friendship, petitioned Congress to allow him to hire the Stockbridge and other local Indians. On August 2, Congress granted his request "for the protection of these tribes as well as aid to the Colonies." 89 Mr. Edwards was sent to enlist them and they were allowed to choose where they wished to fight. Some of them joined the northern army, while others preferred to serve under the Commander-in-Chief. 90 Since these tribes were so closely related to the Six Nations and had connections with the Indians of Canada and some of the western tribes, they were used as emissaries for a while among them to enlist as many of the young men as they could draw away from British service. They sent belts and wampum as far west as the Shawnees on the Ohio. Their efforts were respected by those tribes but only a scattered few joined. 91 These recruits with those previously enlisted were banded together to form a heterogeneous army which later became more bothersome than they were worth in campaigns. Such groups could not be trusted to operate alone due to jealousy and tribal differences and had to be incorporated into the army as soldiers. They were distrusted and resented.

88 Ibid., General Schuyler to John Hancock, August 1, 1776, 5, I, 715.
89 Ibid., President Hancock to General Washington, 5, I, 725.
90 Ibid., General Washington to General Schuyler, 5, I, 1084.
91 Ibid., John Sergeant to Continental Congress, Nov. 27, 1776, 5, III, 869.
by the ordinary soldier for the true nature of the savage often caused disas-
ter even in the heat of battle.

The Massachusetts Assembly had sent Major Shaw out to try to enlist more
tribesmen to fill Washington's order for five hundred or more. His success
was no better than the first efforts to raise an army. Mr. Powell, the
president of the Assembly, complained to Washington that the desertions among
the group already enlisted were increasing in number; for the warriors were
fond of visiting their families very often. Since he had no authority to
grant them leaves, he was forbidding them to go anywhere until Washington
arrived. This angered the Indians, and to overcome the necessary wait and
the objections they had to march to the colonial army, Powell purchased
wagons to convey them lest most of them desert to their families.92

With the close of the year 1776 all hope of averting war with the Indians
had disappeared. The accession of the savages' interest to the cause of Great
Britain was then complete. The efforts of Johnson and Carleton in the north,
and Hamilton in the west, aided by abundant gifts and supplies from abroad,
had wooed the natives from the poverty-threatened colonies. The wealthy
Tories, too, had done their share to bring the shadow of destruction upon
their fellow refugees from European tyranny. It was certain the frontier
settlements would be one line of murder and conflagration once the regular
army began marching south, using the indians to spread terror in advance and
on the flanks of their sieges.

Strenuous efforts with continued feeble results were made by Congress and

92Ibid., Massachusetts Council to General Washington, Nov. 26, 1776, 5, III,868.
the Indian commissioners to enlist remnants of tribes that were left behind when Johnson called his savage army together. This was a costly venture but every warrior gained for combat or withheld from British service meant much to the weak and terrified frontiers with their small militias. When two delegates of the Shawanee Tribes, the Wentissica and Pellawa, were leaving the Pennsylvania Convention in September, they were given a belt and letter to their Nation and each was presented with a personal gift of twenty dollars to stay in good faith toward their benefactors. At the same time, Congress paid Jacob Fowler of the Montauk Tribe $120 to wander among the Mohawk and Oneida Nations to spread sentiments of friendship for the colonies among those who were to remain at home. The deputy commissioners of the Middle Department were ending a council at Pittsburg and sent their bill of expenses amounting to 13,464 71/90 dollars. After all the feasting was over and the Indians were weary of the speeches, only a few of the smaller tribes of the Nations present considered signing the friendship pact presented to them; none of them promised to join the Colonial forces; and many quickly departed to Johnson who was waiting for them a short distance to the north.

In the south a severe warning was being given to all tribes as to what to expect if they joined the British. The army marched through the Cherokee and Creek country, burning all their settlements and destroying their food supplies. Washington sent Major Shaw among the Passamaquoddy and St. Johns

93 Ibid., Proceedings in Pennsylvania Convention, 5, II, 46.
94 Ibid., Resolutions in Continental Congress, 5, II, 1362.
95 Ibid., Treasury Committee Report, Dec. 4, 1776, 5, III, 1598.
Indians to tell of the devastation in the south and won from them a more firm renewal of their support. 96

As the war progressed the colonial leaders found they had gained hardly enough Indians to defend the tribal holdings within the Colonies, much less a sufficient number to guard the border settlements from the inroads of the hostile tribes. It was left to the local militias and townsmen to try to ward off the savages sent by the British in an effort to draw to the frontiers a part of the colonial forces to facilitate the operations of Howe and Burgoyne in the tidewater area.

96 Ibid., General Washington to Passamaquoddy and St. Johns Indians, 5, III, 1404.
CHAPTER III

INDIAN WARFARE IN THE NORTH

In 1763, after the conquest of Canada by the British and colonial forces, Indian depredations fostered between the French and British on the frontiers came almost to a standstill. The colonists, relieved from the constant savage raids, saw many enterprising settler begin to emigrate into more western and northern wildernesses. New towns were formed along streams and rivers, far distant from the protection of the old forts, in fertile lands that a short time before had been inhabited only by hostile savages.

The most important and extensive settlements that were made at this time were in the valley of the Connecticut River above Charlestown, then called the Upper Coos. Little interest was taken in this area until 1763 since it was the principal thoroughfare of the French and Indian attacks on the Massachusetts and New Hampshire frontiers. North and Western New York and most of Pennsylvania was offered in liberal land-grants to new settlements and northern European immigrants flocked to the German Flats. New forts in this territory were few in number and seldom would the tidewater governments provide a militia to guard the interests of these frontiersmen. It is true the British maintained small forces of Regulars at Fort Pitt, Niagara, Stanwix, Montreal, Quebec, etc., but these were for the protection of the interests of the Crown and only engaged the Indians when assaults were made on the forts or on trade units. Since there were only occasional raids by bands of plundering Indians
and not organized warfare, it was left to the settlers to band together for mutual aid when threatened. These frontier settlements bore the brunt of most of the Indian participation in the Revolutionary War while the British Army concentrated on the colonial forces in the tidewater area.¹

The education and enlistment of the Indians in the "modernized" units of warfare began long before any signs of rebellion appeared in the colonies. As early as 1755 they were commissioned as captains and lieutenants in the British army. After a period of living with the soldiers, they were deputized to form units among the Indians to perform the duties of the British forces.²

These Indians released the British soldiers from many routine tasks and used savage barbarity to quell savage barbarity where the Trade Lords were suffering a loss because of the disturbances of peace. When the tenor of colonial sentiment showed that rebellion was imminent and showed that war could not be avoided, these auxiliary troops formed the nucleus of the army Johnson and Carleton were to build up of savages. They were gathered at the forts to supplement the forces that remained to defend these strongholds when the Regulars were mustered to form invasion units. Others who had served for a time were organized into small groups to begin harassing the frontier militias. Colonel Williams met a band of the latter on his journey from Fort Pitt to Boonesborough in December 1774. They attacked in British fashion; and after killing several colonials, they dispersed. King Cornstalk disclaimed any

¹Trumbull, 151 et seq.
part in the attack and placed the blame on the agitation of the British
agents.³

Upon arrival of additional troops at Boston, the resentment of the popu-
lace became openly hostile. General Gage sought to repress their indignation,
and Samuel Adams used this as a cue to arouse the colonies to unite more firm-
ly to overthrow the tyranny gradually closing in on them. He linked this new
insult to Boston to the threat of an army of Canadians and Indians that was
rumored to be ready to march as soon as the season permitted, to massacre all
those who stood in their way and carry the children away as hostages.⁴

The terror which this propaganda caused showed that the colonists con-
sidered the threatened invasion more than just a rumor. Shortly after the
firing upon Lexington and Concord, reports of Indian forces gathering in
lower Canada began to pour into Provincial Congresses. Scouting parties were
kept among the Indians and in the woods to garner the aims of the British and
find to what extent the Nations were cooperating with them. Centers for or-
ganizing Indian volunteers were discovered in various places, from which they
were sent to Carleton in Canada. One scouting party came upon four or five
hundred Indians on the west side of Lake Champlain waiting for the march
north. Indian scouts were roaming in the woods to ambush any colonials who
might discover and try to negotiate with the recruits.⁵ Those tribes that

³American Archives, Colonel Williams to Proprietors of Boonesborough, 4, IV, 560.
⁴Ibid., Samuel Adams to a Gentleman of Virginia, 4, II, 18.
would not leave their land, yet favored the Regulars, were hired to build canoes and were allocated extra powder for their services. The Massachusetts Congress at Watertown was petitioned for protection in May, 1775 from such a group of hired Indians who, because of poor crops, were threatened with starvation. With the extra ammunition, they were expected to plunder the possessions of the colonists for provisions in accordance with the edict of the Governor of Halifax for all tribes to rise against the Rebels.6

Many of the colonists were, from the start of the rebellious movement, adverse to breaking with Great Britain or entering any hostility against the mother country. Those who tried to remain neutral were met with the Patriotic Party's principle, "Whoever is not for us is against us," and were forced into one camp or the other. The stigma of "Tory" was branded upon the Royalists and every means was used to ferret them out for public dishonor and disfranchisement. Sufferings of all sorts drove many of them to the protection of the Regulars in Canada. Once there, they were formed into a regiment under Colonel Peters (from the Coos country) and were delegated to instigate Indian war along the Connecticut River settlements. They were also to cooperate with the Natives in other Tory strongholds.7 Complaining of the Tory activity in his own college, Dr. Eleazer Wheelock at Dartmouth claimed that unless Governor Trumbull took stern measures, the Tories would soon have the northern tribes at war. They were already molesting his Native students,

6Ibid., Petition of John Sawyer and Thirty-six Others to the Massachusetts Congress, 4, II, 580.
7Trumbull, 153.
causing some of them to flee to their homes. He believed that General Gage was directing the Tories in their use of the Indians. In order to forestall the sending of Savages to Canada, Benedict Arnold posted men along the Lake to destroy all the vessels found there. From Crown Point he reported to the Committee of Safety that every batteau and sloop had been burned, and there was no longer any means for the British to ship Indians to Carleton, or for the Tories to flee to Canada.

Seeing the activity of the British in enlisting the Savages, the Rebel leaders began using their services whenever possible, although they had no authority to do so. When the order from Congress to destroy Ticonderoga and to withdraw the forces from that post was published, the people of New Hampshire appealed to have the order rescinded. The Indians had been hired to scout the woods around the fort and were keeping the hostile tribes from attacking the settlers. Once the fort was demolished, the friendly bands would withdraw and leave the area open to forces of Tories and Indians from all sides. Arnold, in his campaign against Crown Point and later against Montreal, used these tribes both in combat and in removing the wounded from the field of battle.

While the attack on Boston was in progress, the Rebel forces were en-

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8 American Archives, Dr. Eleazer Wheelock to Governor Trumbull, May 13, 1775, 4, II, 582.


10 Ibid., A petition Read in Congress, June 2, 1775, 4, II, 895.

11 Joseph Ware, Journal of an Expedition Against Quebec in 1775 Under Colonel Benedict Arnold, Joseph Ware III, Pub., Thomas Paine, Boston, 1852, 10.
camped on Bunker Hill. Indians were used to kill the enemy sentinels at night. In an orchard below Prospect Hill all the British guards were killed before an early morning attack. These were most probably Stockbridge Indians; for a number of them had enlisted as regular soldiers and were paid by the Massachusetts Congress for their services in the summer of 1775. Cooperating with the Stockbridge were some of the Over-Lake Indians, who were paid to bring information to Congress concerning the affairs of the Regulars and Tories in their plans about New York. Knowing the terror of the Regulars for the suddenness and savagery of Indian attacks, the frontiersmen, in imitation of the raiders on the tea ship in Boston Harbor, sometimes garbed themselves as savages to march against scouting parties of Regulars. Michael Cresap, who later changed affiliation, organized a group of nearly two hundred settlers from the distant Ohio Valley and in full war-paint joined a small band of Indians to ravage the small forces of Regulars and Indians on the line of Northern outposts.

The threats of Johnson to descend from the North with Indians and Tories kept the Colonies in a constant state of alarm. The ever growing numbers of savages reported going north caused Washington to weaken his forces to supply some protection to the most exposed places. The Tyron Committee discovered


14 Ibid., Benjamin Harrison to General Washington, July 21, 1775, 4, II, 1697.

15 Ibid., Extract of a Letter to a Gentleman in Philadelphia, August 1, 1775, 4, III, 1.
that Joseph Brant and Walter Butler were conditioning the Indians to fall upon the inhabitants below Little Falls in the planned campaign to divide the colonies in two parts.16 Guy Johnson was at Oswego on July 15, 1778, supplying the 1,200 warriors gathered there with provisions for a long march.17 A short time later he arrived there with five hundred more, a part of which he sent to join the Regulars in Canada to strengthen the northern salient of the campaign.18 Schuyler dispatched Major Brown with scouts to find how far these bands of Johnson’s had descended on their proposed march. Nowhere had the main body reached below 45° latitude, but the woods were filled with Regulars leading small units of savages on scouting and sentinel work.19 Without Schuyler’s leave, one of his scouting parties under Captain Baker penetrated far into Indian territory where they discovered boats of Caughnawagas with apparent hostile intent. Attempting to fire upon them, Baker was killed; and in the ensuing struggle, several of the Indians were shot. This event led many of that tribe to depart for active service with the British army for whom the group was scouting.20 Ethan Allen sent a message of apology to the chiefs of the Caughnawagas for this incident, and he demanded to know why their warriors were taking up arms against the colonies. Two of their

16Ibid., Tyron County Committee to Committees of Schenectady and Albany, July 13, 1775, 4, II, 1666.
18Ibid., Samuel Mott to Governor Trumbull, Aug. 3, 1775, 4, III, 18; also, James Livingstone to General Schuyler, Aug. 3, 1775, Ibid., 468.
20Ibid., General Schuyler to Commissioners of Indian Affairs, Aug. 31, 1775, 4, III, 493.
chiefs later arrived at his camp to plead that it was contrary to the wishes of their sachems that some of them had departed to join the Regulars. Yet nothing was done by the tribe to prevent more acts of open hostility near their villages. Several weeks later a part of Montgomery's army was ambushed, and it was necessary to kill a number of the marauders before they fled.

In September, part of the forces marching north to take Montreal passed one of the centers where the Indians were being assembled. Near St. Johns, Major Hobby, marching to the left and in advance of the main body, was beset by Indians and Regulars. After a fierce conflict with heavy losses, the savages retreated to the large body of waiting Indians and Regulars. Hobby did not give chase but warned the other units of the danger. Captain Tyce, a Tory, was mortally wounded in the battle.

While Montgomery was laying siege to St. Johns and on his way to capture Montreal, Washington planned another campaign against Quebec in answer to the many pleas to take all of Canada and end the threat of an Indian invasion from the North. On September 14, he commissioned Colonel Benedict Arnold to command a detachment of continental troops from Cambridge, with two companies of Pennsylvania riflemen and Morgan's famous sharpshooters, on an attack upon Quebec. They were to go by way of the forests of Maine to the Kennebec and Chaudiere Rivers. As a last instruction, Arnold was warned to be very careful in restraining his own troops, and especially the Indians in the other groups.

21Ibid., Ethan Allen to General Schuyler, Sept. 6, 1775, 4, III, 742.
23Ibid., General Schuyler to John Hancock, (Read Sept. 18, 1775), 4, III, 669.
accompanying him, from all acts of cruelty which would disgrace the American arms and irritate more tribes to rise against the colonial forces.24

During the perilous journey along the Dead River, the army came upon an Indian camp that was found to be a group of spies stationed there by Carleton to watch the movements of the army that was long expected to march that way. Word had already been sent to the next post and a friendly squaw warned Arnold that Carleton had a great number of Mohawks along the Chaudiere River to ambush and destroy his forces. Most of the young men from the surrounding tribes had left to join Johnson, and the leader of this camp held a commission from Carleton.25 Due to the cold, sickness, starvation, and fatigue the forces were sorely depleted as they neared the objective. The Colonial Committees sought to enlist as many Indians as possible to supplement Arnold's ranks. These recruits were given a month's pay in advance with all the supplies they asked for and, under colonial leaders, marched to Canada.26 For messages and correspondence with Schuyler, the St. Francois Indians were used as directed by Washington all during this campaign.27

While Arnold was getting set for his attack, Montgomery was occupied in his fifty-day siege of St. Johns and Ethan Allen was storming Montreal. Allen having crossed the river from the south depended on Colonel Brown to strike

from the north at the same time. Brown failed to arrive. After ascertaining Allen's strength, Carleton sent out forty Regulars and five hundred Indians to attack him. Forced to retreat, Allen found that the savages kept pace with his forces on both flanks and were fast reducing his army. Without Brown to support him, he had to bargain for a suitable surrender. As a British officer was talking to him, several frenzied Indians began to assault him for his personal belongings. The officer had no control of the savages, and only by throwing the officer between himself and them did Allen escape death.28 This ended Allen's career as a soldier during the remainder of the war; for he was shipped as a prisoner to England, and subsequently to New York where he was given a parole.29 Among the Indians in this battle, the Caughnawagas were the most numerous. When six of the chiefs from Montreal came for a talk with Colonel Seth Warner at La Prairie two days later, he upbraided them as spies and demanded to know what excuse they had to offer for appearing in the battle against Allen after they had signed a treaty of friendship so recently with the colonies. They claimed that Carleton had made them drunk before the attack and drove them to capture Allen; but now they wanted to peacefully return to their Nations.30

Montreal was abandoned until the conquest of St. Johns was completed.

28 Ethan Allen, A Narrative of Colonel Ethan Allen's Captivity Near Montreal on September 25, 1775 to His Exchange on May 6, 1778. Pub. by John Mycall, Newbury, 1780, 12.

29 Ibid., 15, et seq.

30 American Archives, Colonel Seth Warner to General Montgomery, Sept. 27, 1775, 4, III, 953.
Hearing of the defeat of Allen, Montgomery prepared for an attack by Carleton, which did take place on November 2. The forces of Carleton, numbering nearly eight hundred, mostly Indians, were severely beaten by the three hundred and fifty colonists. Colonel Bedel led his "considerable body of Indians" in the assault on the attacking British. On the next day, St. Luc La Corne made the last thrust against Montgomery with five hundred men who were mostly Canadian Noblesse, about one hundred of them being Indians. He also was forced into a confused retreat, and St. Johns was safely in the hands of the Rebels. By November 12, Montgomery marched his men into Montreal, and at the same time Arnold was crossing the St. Lawrence to storm Quebec. Much to Arnold's surprise, the defenders of the city were waiting for him, and had destroyed all the canoes on Point Levi. The number of canoes he had with him, and the forty carried by the tribesmen who had just joined him, were not near enough to take all his men across the river at once. Advancing to the gates with his wornout Army, he summoned the garrison to come out for a battle or surrender. Not getting a reply, he had no other alternative but to wait for Montgomery to join him. On December 31, the attack began; but Carleton, who had slipped into the city a few days before, successfully warded off the besieging forces. Montgomery was almost in the city when he was killed; and

31 Ibid., Colonel Bedel to New Hampshire Committee of Safety, Oct. 27, 1775, 4, III, 1208.
32 Ibid., 4, III, 1207.
34 Ibid., Colonel Arnold to General Montgomery, Nov. 8, 1775, 4, III, 1634.
Arnold was carried from the field seriously wounded. The attack failed and reinforcements of Indians drove the colonists a safe distance from the fort.35 Nantis and Sabatis, two brothers and leaders of fierce bands of warriors, participated in this battle. Nantis was wounded and captured, but Carleton freed him, giving him abundant gifts for his men. These two leaders and their men stayed with Arnold that winter; and, at the fall of Montreal to the British, retired with him to Crown Point.36

Washington saw in the loss of Canada a greater advantage for Carleton to win all the Indians there and assemble such a force among them as to bring complete disaster in the north.37 Hancock wrote that an Indian war was inevitable and asked Congress to prepare for a long siege.38 Schuyler lost no time in trying to offset a general uprising among the savages. He aroused the other Nations to send a severe reprimand and a threat to the Mohawks for their part at Quebec and demanded that those of that Nation return immediately to their tribes.39 Some immediate success was gained with them; but in January 1776, when he sent an army towards St. Johns to quell the Tories, they met the soldiers and were haughty at the idea of them passing through that territory. After the commanders explained that this was not a breach of

36 John J. Henry, Campaign Against Quebec in 1775. William Greer, Lancaster, 1812, 75.
38 Ibid., John Hancock in Congress, Jan. 20, 1776, 4, IV, 784.
peace nor the closing of the path to the west, the Mohawks allowed them to continue. In return, the Mohawks asked for letters to admit them to the meeting of Schuyler and Sir John Johnson at which the recent demands of the other Nations on the Mohawks were to be discussed. The whole issue was settled by negotiations at the conference and they did not choose to rise in a general war.40

Sir John Johnson seeing the plight of the Tories and the lack of haven for them from the insults of the Patriots, began to build a fort around his home, Johnson Hall. He was not entering the war, but could not bear to see his friends maltreated while he had it in his power to protect them with the use of the many Indian friends he had acquired while he was chief Indian agent. Keeping 300 natives scouting the woods while many more aided in the erection of the stockade, he was soon able to invite the "King's people" to his sanctuary. With the promise of a large body of Indians on guard against a surprise attack and the Scotch militia of Skenesborough to defend them from inside the walls, he soon had the more select Tories gathered there.41 Feeling that this move on the part of Sir Johnson was a part of the planned invasion from the north, Schuyler determined to expel him from the Tyron County area. As an answer to this affront from the colonial commissioner, Sir Johnson sent word to the settlements that, since John Collins was raising a company of savages to put him from his home, he had sent word to the waiting Indians in the north and had received a reply that within six weeks time they

40 Ibid., General Schuyler to President of Congress, 4, IV, 819.
41 Ibid., Affidavit of Jonathan French, 4, IV, 668.
would fall upon the back settlements and later join the main body that was preparing to cut the frontiers from the tidewater colonies. This threat was verified by Godfrey Shaw, who, meeting with some of the more hostile Mohawks at Caughnawaga, was told by them that within six weeks time the Yankees would dance and that they would scalp, kill, and burn them. They revealed that the Cherokees were coming with Colonel Croghan by way of Niagara and Fort Stanwix to plunder from the west to Schenectady. Schuyler wished to invest Niagara before Butler could assemble the Indians there for this purpose. With Niagara in the hands of the frontier militias, he was assured that the less interested tribes would remain neutral and the others would fear to undertake the campaign without a place to fall back to for supplies. His plan was to have the Indians themselves overthrow the British and have Congress buy all the King’s provisions that they did not want. To have a colonial army march against the Fort would bring the Indians to the help of the British, since it was their main source of supplies. This plan did not go beyond the discussions in Congress; for the constituents feared the use of Indians in this manner, and had not as yet given any general permit for hiring them in actual combat.

Late in April, General Arnold ordered Colonel Bedel with four hundred men to take post on a point called Cedars, forty-three miles above Montreal.

42 Ibid., Deposition of Asa Chadwick sent by Schuyler to Congress, Mar. 6, 1776, 4, V, 196.
43 Ibid., Godfrey Shaw’s Testimony in Tyron Court, Mar. 25, 1776, 4, V, 770.
44 Ibid., General Schuyler to President of Congress, Feb. 15, 1776, 4, IV, 1156.
on the St. Lawrence, to prevent any shipping of goods to the Upper Country. He was also to guard the main army against surprise from the Indians who were being deployed there by the Regulars. When information of Bedel's movements reached the British, they dispatched an army under Captain George Forster to dislodge him. This force was composed of forty Regulars, one hundred Canadians and five hundred savages of the Mohawk and Caughnawaga Tribes under Joseph Brant, the great Thayandenega of the Six Nations. 45 Major Butterfield was paralyzed with fear when he saw the savages attack and, against the wishes of his men, surrendered immediately. Although he had been fully supplied with ammunition by Bedel, he succumbed to the threat of Forster of falling into the hands of the Indians if he gave any resistance. 46 Major Sherbourne with his hundred troops set out from Montreal on May 16 to join Bedel. On May 20, he was within four miles of Cedars not knowing what had taken place there. Just as he saw the first signs of Indians, an ambushed group set up a wild cry pouring among his outnumbered and fatigued ranks. After an hour of slaughter, he attempted to retreat only to find himself surrounded and more savages were joining the battle. He was forced to surrender to the mercy of the Indians. One Seneca chief was among the natives slain and his tribesmen greatly mourned him on the trip to Cedars, showing hatred for the prisoners for his loss. 47


46 Ibid., 57. Bedel fled with the excuse of going for reinforcements when he heard of Forster's coming. American Archives, 5, I, 1594.

47 Ibid., 58.
From Sorel, Arnold was also making his way toward Cedars, but on the way heard of the fate of Butterfield and Sherbourne. About twelve miles north of Montreal he was joined by the First Regiment of Pennsylvania and two other groups. The Indians, hearing of his approach, came out to attack; but, upon seeing the additional forces, withdrew. Arnold pursued but upon crossing the river was met by the entire force of Forster and was forced to retire to St. Anns. From there, he sent some Iroquois and Caughnawagas from his army to Cedars to demand the surrender of the prisoners with a threat to sacrifice every Indian and burn all of their towns if they did not comply. Their answer was that they would kill all the prisoners if they, or their homes, were molested. Lieutenant Parke was sent by Forster to inform Arnold that the Indians were beyond his control, and he proposed to release all the prisoners "through dictates of humanity" if they would never bear arms against the King again and if an equal number of His Majesty's troops were released in exchange.48 During the night the savages, in rage over the death of the Seneca chief, tortured and abused at least six of their captives until they died. Before this, they had barbarously butchered twenty others for the same reason.49

Apparently Arnold accepted Forster's terms; for, in an investigation by Congress on the surrender at Cedars on July 10, he was severely censured for

48 American Archives, Samuel Chase and Charles Carroll to John Hancock, May 27, 1776, 4, VI, 591.
49 Ibid., Account by an Officer at Cedars, 4, VI, 598.
giving over prisoners he did not have and for usurping powers reserved to Congress alone.50

Various reports were made concerning the number of Indians used in this incident. General Carleton, reporting to Lord Germaine, said only a small body accompanied the Eighth Regiment.51 Captain Wilkinson writing to General Greene judged the force to contain over a thousand savages.52 Schuyler in his report to Washington stated that a part of the Eighth Regiment, supplemented by about 170 Indians, took part in the assault on the colonial forces at Cedars.53 It cannot be accurately ascertained just how large the body of Indians actually was; but apparently the savages did all of the fighting, for nowhere does Arnold, Butterfield, Sherbourne or Bedel make reference to the Regulars in the attacking groups. They seem to have directed the Indian leaders and remained at a safe distance. Arnold, in his censure of Forster, observed that it appeared very extraordinary to him that he could direct the Indians to go out to fight and send them to deliver the prisoners in the exchange, but could not restrain them from the brutal massacres they made on the captives before the exchange took place.54 On July 30, Congress ordered Major Butterfield and all the other officers that surrendered to the enemy at Cedars to be court-martialed.55

50Ibid., Report in Congress by the Investigation Committee, July 10, 1776, 5, I, 1572.
51Ibid., General Carleton to Lord George Germaine, May 25, 1776, 4, VI, 576.
52Ibid., Captain Wilkinson to General Greene, May 24, 1776, 4, VI, 566.
53Ibid., General Schuyler to General Washington, May 26, 1776, 4, VI, 578.
54Ibid., General Arnold to the Commissioners, May 27, 1776, 4, VI, 596.
55Ibid., Resolutions in Continental Congress, July 30, 1776, 5, I, 1594.
After Arnold's failure to take Quebec, he remained nearby to protect colonial interests. The following spring, Sullivan and Wooster were appointed to conduct the campaign in that area. In the meantime, Carleton was rebuilding his army and received a large contingent of Hessians. Not only was he able to hold Quebec, but recaptured Montreal and forced the Americans to retire to Isle Aux Noix. He did not press the attack further but kept them surrounded by Indians in ambush, making it almost impossible to communicate with the colonies. The party under Carleton, after taking Montreal, made an assault on the Caughnawagas that had not joined his forces. After their rout and defeat, they appealed to Sullivan for assistance; but he had more than he could handle in warding off the Indian ambushes to keep an orderly retreat. He appealed to Schuyler for more troops to be sent under Colonel Dayton and a number of armed vessels to control the north end of Lake Champlain. General Putman sent five ships with some Indian sharpshooters and urged Schuyler to do everything possible to aid the Caughnawagas, for they were very valuable to the colonial interests in the north. While Sullivan was on a trip to Ticonderoga and Point Au Fer, a party of his officers and men ventured a mile below Isle Aux Noix to a friendly French home without their arms. Ambushed Indians attacked the house and killed twelve officers and men in an orgy. The remainder were taken to Montreal with the other prisoners.

56Jones, 95.
57American Archives, General Sullivan to General Schuyler, 4, VI, 610.
58Ibid., General Putman to Schuyler, June 1, 1776, 4, VI, 671.
59Ibid., John Sullivan to General Schuyler, June 24, 1776, 4, VI, 1202.
taken from time to time. Along the way they were constantly abused, and a
number of them were scalped at the direction of a Scotchman named McDonald,
who led the captors.60

All through the colonies and especially among the military leaders it
was acknowledged that the preliminary plans of the British were completed and
the decisive blow to separate the colonies was not far off. The activity in
the north showed where the first conquest would be directed, and the rebel
forces began to move into position to fortify for the attack.

In the south, Mr. Stuart, the British Superintendent of Indian Affairs,
made an address to the frontier inhabitants in which he told them that a
force of Regulars was to land in West Florida. They were to march through
the Creek Territory to the Chickasaws where at least 500 warriors of each
Nation would join them. Passing on to the Cherokees, who also promised to
join them, they were to take possession of the frontiers of North Carolina and
Virginia. At the same time His Majesty's forces were to land at Charleston
and make a diversion on those inhabitants, then join the southern drive. To-
gether they would meet with the invasion from the north. Those frontiersmen
who cooperated were to be unmolested, but those who did not would be at the
mercy of the Indians.61 When an attested copy of this fell into the hands of
the Virginia Convention, the alarm was sent to all the other colonial assem-
blies and to Congress.62 Panic spread in the wake of this address, and from

60Ibid., Extract of a letter from Crown Point, July 3, 1776, 4, VI, 1253.
61Ibid., Letter to Frontier Inhabitants by Mr. E. Stuart, May 18, 1776, 4, VI, 497.
62Ibid., Debate in Virginia Convention, June 7, 1776, 4, VI, 1554.
every frontier settlement came appeals for a standing army. The Indians were closely watched and an increased movement among them from place to place was noticed. Signs of war fever became openly manifest and no matter what the colonists did, most of the Indians would not firmly pledge friendship or neutrality. Johnson and Carleton wielded powerful influence in the Mohawk Valley and were using every effort to organize both Indians and Tories for the great blow at the center.

Seeing that Guy Johnson was becoming one of the principal characters in the coming events, Colonel Drayton was sent to Johnstown to take him a prisoner. Upon arrival, he found that he had fled with a number of Highlanders. While there Drayton saw two bodies of over twenty-five Indians marching to Johnson-Hall. General Schuyler at Fort George was approached by some Mohawks who inquired of the commander of Ticonderoga, saying they wished to see him. After wandering around for a while, they departed by another route westward toward Johnson-Hall. Schuyler later found these were but a part of a series of Indian spies blazing the trail for Carleton's siege of that territory. In the German Flats early in June, a plea was sent for assistance against a large number of far east Indians who had arrived at Oneida and were joined by another group to march down to that area. All the forts had barely enough troops to defend their positions; so no help was sent.

Wave after wave of disaster began to roll over the settlements as the

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63 Ibid., Colonel Drayton to General Sullivan, May 19, 1776, 4, VI, 511.
64 Ibid., General Schuyler to General Washington, May 24, 1776, 4, VI, 564.
65 Ibid., Frederick Bellinger to Colonel Fred Fisher of the Mohawk District, 4, VI, 796.
drive from the north got under way and the British landed at New York. General Burgoyne, in command of the forces in Canada, was accompanied by a large body of Indians and refugees, who scoured the countryside plundering and scalping without regard for sex, age, or occupation. At Sorel, Colonel Wayne attacked a flank of the oncoming force; but it withdrew from the site towards the main army. Only the Indians remained, but these would not come into open fight. They continued to harass Wayne from ambush; but he, fearing to meet too large a body, withdrew from the area with his small force.66 By June 19, Burgoyne had possession of St. Johns. There Carleton joined him; and, in the report of the progress of the campaign to Lord Germaine, he told of the burning of the city.

The aid given by the Indian elements in the regular corps, and those used to flank the main conquering force, was indispensable. The latter groups were loosed to spread terror and confusion in the neighboring settlements, while the former attacked the main objective in advance of the Regulars.67 Since Washington did not at this time have the permission of Congress to use the Indians in combat, he ordered Schuyler to use the Oneidas around Fort Stanwix to keep the army informed of the movements of the Indians in that area so as to keep the main force in active combat against the plan to split the colonies along the Hudson River.68 Later in the month, however, he was granted the full use of Indians wherever he wished. Until then it was the

66 Ibid., Extract of Letter from Sorel, June 12, 1776, 4, VI, 827.
67 Ibid., General Carleton to Lord Germaine, June 20, 1776, 4, VI, 1003.
68 Ibid., General Schuyler to General Washington, June 17, 1776, 4, VI, 1003.
act of local officials and subordinate officers in using Indians for any purpose whatever. When the colonists first used Indians officially, they were to be held as reserves and act as scouts. Washington sent General Artemus Ward from Boston to Ticonderoga to prepare for the British attack against New York from the north. One of his regiments was of Mohican and other Indians under Captain Ezra Whittlesey. As a means of identification in battle, the Indian allies of the colonists were given blue and red caps to wear. In conflict and about the camp they became so disorderly and were so undisciplined that they had to be sent home. So much criticism was aimed at the use of the Hessians in the war that a suggestion was made to General Gates to retaliate by turning these Indians against them, and by this means to so terrify them that they would quit the war. This was not done; but the mercenary army was found quite ineffectual in the battles where Indians were used, even as allies of the British. Great numbers of them are known to have deserted for this reason.

While General Howe was laying siege to New York, the Regulars from the north were progressing very slowly. Their main objective seemed to be to keep the rest of the north in confusion and on the alert as to where they would strike next. This policy forced all the militias to stay at home, and even large forces of the colonial army had to be kept away from Howe's siege.

69 Jones, 136.
70 American Archives, William Gordon to General Gates, June 23, 1776, 4, VI,1041.
71 Ibid., Extract of a Letter Received at Williamsburg, Va., August 20, 1776, 5, I, 1077.
The Tyron County, being so large, had to divide its militia into four parts and still keep a portion of the army to protect its frontiers from the ravages of the Indians. It lay open to most of the Nations Johnson had aroused, and was the passage to Oswego, Niagara, Oswagatchie and other parts likely to be attacked. 72

Being free to carry the war to all sides, the Indians not in the regular corps roved all through the north in search of plunder. Before the War began this spirit had been inhibited because all the Whites were against them. Now it was given full rein, for they could always fall back on the Regulars if they met too much opposition. Colonel Hartley's forces were subjected to this near Crown Point when a number of his men of the Sixth Batallion were murdered and scalped. The next day he found a house filled with Indians, presumably the families of those on raids. These had plenty of arms and revealed that they were a part of the chain of lookouts along the lake at the mouth of the Sable River to direct attacks on all who passed that point. 73

The regiment under Colonel Richardson were attacked near Dewett's Corner by Indians who were led by Tories and traitors. The Tories of that area were informing the Indians as to what places to attack. 74 Governor Trumbull blamed the loss of Canada and the invasion from the north, as well as the temper of the savages, to the poor behavior of the colonial troops. Their disorder, discontent and clamor for provisions and wages lessened their unity and was

72 Ibid., General Committee of Tyron to New York Congress, 4, VI, 1136.
73 Ibid., Colonel Hartley to General Arnold, July 10, 1776, 5, I, 208.
74 Ibid., Francis Salvador to William H. Drayton, July 18, 1776, 5, I, 406.
weakening their power, even in the face of the loss of the war in this campaign. He was collecting a force of Indians at Lebanon and found that the Senecas were cooperative although many of their Nation were with the British. 75

The whole middle north was a scene of Indians on the warpath. The Indian war, so long feared by Congress, was gradually spreading. Oswego was strengthened by three regiments of Regulars at the beginning of August, and Butler made Niagara an Indian base of operations. From here the natives were sent to spy on the German Flats where General Schuyler was holding a Conference with the Six Nations. 76 At this Conference Schuyler was upbraiding the Indians for all their activity in the British forces in spite of their pledge of neutrality a short time before with him at Albany. Not all the Nations present were guilty, but the majority had aided Johnson escape Drayton and the communications through most of their lands were being disrupted. He told them that he would give them one last chance to remain neutral; if they were sincere, the colonies would forgive them. Some of the chiefs begged forgiveness although many of their tribesmen were with Butler at Niagara. Others said they had no power to decide the question and abruptly left the assembly. 77

The lure for many of the Indians joining the British was the premiums granted to them. They could live from the supplies of the Regulars besides the ordinary pay they received while on campaigns. General Carleton agreed

75 Ibid., Governor Trumbull to William Williams, July 26, 1776, 5, I, 606.
76 Ibid., Lt. McMichael to General Schuyler, Aug. 2, 1776, 5, I, 816.
77 Ibid., Schuyler to Indians at German Flats, Aug. 8, 1776, 5, I, 1036.
them the same as the other Indians were receiving--one dollar a day for scalping and five dollars for each scalp. They were assigned to kill every Tory or Whig around Dorchester that refused to join the war, and their families were not to be spared. It was not only the Indians that were enticed by the reward for scalps, the Tories too preyed upon the victims of battles for the same purpose. During Burgoyne's retreat before Gates, William Weeks discovered Tories as well as Indians lurking in the woods taking the scalps from fallen colonists, Tories, and in many instances Regulars as well, just to get the premium offered by Burgoyne. Many of them had women's and children's scalps hanging at their sides.

This employment of the savages by the British was a great contrast to the colonial use of them in the north. There was a premium offered for prisoners, it is true, but nothing was given for scalps by the military or civil leaders. When Morgan heard that some of the friendly warriors of the Six Nations were bringing a number of prisoners to their town, he hastened there to prevent the usual punishment and insult administered as they were brought before the tribe. Halting them outside the village, he demanded custody of the British and gathered all the head men of the local tribes of the Shawanees and Delawares to join him in his orders. While holding the prisoners under Indian guard, another party of Shawanees returning from the Cherokee country came to him with scalps taken from Tory settlers. He cen-

78 Ibid., Constant Church, an Indian Chief of Conet Tribe, to Captain Rd O. Lyman, Sept. 8, 1776, 5, II, 268.

ured them for their conduct, but the Chief warrior blamed it on the foolish young men. In Washington's General Orders of September 13, posted at Saw Mills, he commanded Colonel Brewer to keep a close watch on the Independent Company of Indians headed by the Stockbridge. Their conduct in battle was not to be savage, and all prisoners were to be kept out of their hands. In order to better supervise and distinguish the allied tribesmen, he ordered that they be made to wear the blue and red cap in combat.

While the colonists were struggling to stem the onslaught of the British drive by enlisting as many Indians as they could find that manifested friendship, the enemy had all the Indians they wanted. All through the north, tribes were awaiting the arrival of the Regulars to begin their part in the campaigns. Even the Caynawaga, Canausadaga, and parts of the St. Francois were favoring the British over service for their former friends, the settlers. With these overwhelming forces against them, the colonists were experiencing the darkest days of the war, with losses reported on every front during the summer and fall of 1776.

American Archives, Report by George Morgan, Aug. 15, 1776, 5, I, 137.

Rare instances of Colonial approval and pay of scalping did occur, as for example the Resolution in the South Carolina Assembly on Friday, Sept. 27, 1776: "That in the opinion of your Committee, as an encouragement to those who shall distinguish themselves in the war against the Cherokees, recommend the following rewards, to wit: For every Indian man killed, upon certificate thereupon by the Commanding Officer and the scalp produced as an evidence thereof in Charlestown, by forces in the pay of the State, 75 pounds currency; for every Indian man prisoner, 100 pounds like money; for every other prisoner, 80 pounds like money." Ibid., 5, III, 33.

Ibid., General Orders of Washington and Staff for Sept. 3, 1776, 5, II, 476.

Ibid., Colonel Hurd to President Ware, Aug. 7, 1776, 5, II, 148.
Not only on land did the Rebels find the savages in the enemy ranks, but also on the water. When Colonel Guy Johnson was on his way to join the forces in New York, he made a report to Lord Germaine of his trip on the seas and the activity of the colonial navy. His passage was successful in spite of the many attacks, and he praised the work of the Indians on board his vessel in the use of small arms in the battles. They saved the ship from being boarded several times.

On Lake Champlain, General Arnold was continually harassed by the Indians who kept their canoes and batteaus hidden by day, but who during the night prowled about the water in the midst of the fleet intercepting the dispatch and supply boats. Near Isle-de-Motte, the "Liberty" was on a cruise away from the fleet when near the shore a Frenchman signaled to be taken aboard. Not trusting him, the captain ordered all on board to prepare for an ambush. Suddenly the ship was surrounded by Indians in canoes and the Canadians and Regulars fired from the shore. Being well prepared, the ship escaped with little damage or loss. That night nearly three hundred savages in canoes passed the fleet. When the fleet was attacked by the British close to Schuyler's Island, the enemy landed a large number of Indians on the island and on each shore. These kept an incessant fire on the Americans; disabled vessels, therefore, could not go to shallow waters, nor the men in the water reach safety. The Penobscots declined to go with Washington since

Ibid., Colonel Guy Johnson to Lord Germaine, Aug. 9, 1776, 5, I, 865.

Jones, 149.

American Archives, General Arnold to General Gates, Sept. 21, 1776, 5, II, 440.

Ibid., Benedict Arnold to General Schuyler, Oct. 12, 1776, 5, II, 1038.
they wanted their men at home for the attack daily expected from the Canadian Indians. They did agree to act as rangers along the St. Lawrence against the Indians in canoes. These Vikings of the British made raids on the settlements along the tributaries and fled to the main stream before they could be caught.

Thomas Spenser was secretly approached by a group of Indians and told that the Regulars and seven hundred Indians in canoes were planning to make a drive down five rivers to destroy all the whites living along those paths, and then retire to Oswego. They wanted all their friends to move away before the attack. The Massachusetts Congress ordered a guard of Indians under Josiah Brewer to watch the Penobscot River and prevent any Indians from making canoes for the British. The Mohawk River was one of the paths most vulnerable and the most needed by the enemy. Sir John Johnson with six hundred Regulars and Indians from twenty-two tribes gathered to sweep down on the many towns and settlements along its path. The hostile Indians sent the friendly Oneidas an invitation to join the march and threatened to attack them first, not sparing the life of even a child if they refused. From Niagara a Mohawk Chief wrote to his brother in the lower Mohawk Valley that their policy of war was fixed by the Governor of Canada, and that the reason they had not as yet acted to destroy the settlements there was that some of their

87 Ibid., Thomas Fletcher to Massachusetts Bay Council, Aug. 16, 1776, 5, I, 991.
88 Ibid., Thomas Spencer to Colonel Dayton, Sept. 4, 1776, 5, II, 247.
90 Ibid., General Herkimer to General Schuyler, Oct. 25, 1776, 5, III, 577.
tribe still lived among the Bostonians. At the meeting in Niagara, the Ottawas, Chippewas, and others voiced disappointment when the commander proposed to take Ticonderoga first and then the Upper New York towns, instead of loosing them upon the lower towns. They planned to finish at New York then join other forces to burn the frontier settlements.91

Toward the end of October, the unexpected in Indian warfare occurred. A large group of colonial Indians with their lieutenant were captured by the British near Ticonderoga. They were put in irons and with other prisoners, given over to the savages to be butchered for sport that night. Contrary to Burgoyne's expectations, they were released by the would-be slaughterers and treated kindly. After a council with the captives, the British Indians agreed to return home if the colonial warriors would do the same. The next day most of both groups departed.92 A party of Oneidas pursued the deserting Indians but were given the understanding that their Nation would be ravaged if they continued to molest those who did not care to stay in the war. The Onondagas seemed to be the leaders among those who left the British.93

As winter neared, the Indians that had gone north to fight with the Regulars became dissatisfied and refused to stay with Carleton at Lake Champlain. They retreated from Crown Point and Johnson went with them in an effort

91Ibid., Aaron Kononaron (a Mohawk) to his Brother David, Oct. 28, 1776, 5, III, 770.
93Ibid., R. Yates to General Schuyler, Oct. 31, 1776, 5, III, 585.
to hold their attachment to the British. 94 Among the disaffected were the Messisagnes, a clan of the Hurons and a part of the Six Nations under the command of Colonel Daniel Claus and Joseph Brant. 95 General Howe sent a Proclamation to raise three companies among them to stay in their own territories of Schoharie, Stichook, and Coxahie to act as a defensive barrier to any colonial action there in advance of the arrival of the Regulars. The New York Committee of Safety sought a means to win these tribes to offset his plans; for it was apparent they were just being reorganized to be incorporated into the campaign again, as soon as the British reached their villages. 96

The campaigns of the year 1777 were formed to accomplish the aims of the first blow at the center colonies which had failed. From the Declaration of Independence to the end of 1776, the British had little to show for all the work they had done. It is true they saved Canada from the colonists, and Howe had taken Manhattan from Washington, but the army of Washington, which six months before had been regarded as captured and dispersed, still balked and threatened them. Even a year after the Independence, the colonials were able to shift reinforcements with ease where and when needed; while the Regulars, holding the northern and southern ends of the Hudson Valley line, found even communications difficult. Hence the plan for the summer and fall was to have an army come from the west, converging with the ones from the

94 Ibid., General Gates to General Schuyler, Nov. 5, 1776, 5, III, 526.
95 Stone, Orderly Book of Johnson, 2.
96 American Archives, New York Committee of Safety Proceedings, Nov. 6, 1776, 5, III, 289.
BURGOYNE'S INVASION
1777
north and south to form a mighty force with which to crush the centers of colonial power and thereby to divide and conquer.

Early in the summer, Burgoyne set sail on Lake Champlain and made camp on the shores of Lake Bouquet by June 17, to incorporate the four hundred Indians waiting for him there into his army. Two days later the Ottawas and other allied tribes under Luc La Corne joined him. These were for the most part the Indians that had caused Braddock's defeat a few years earlier. Burgoyne employed them for their vicious practices of war—a point which he stressed to them in a long speech, emphasizing they were going out for war, and not for the sake of pillage or plunder, while there was any of the enemy in the area. Later Burgoyne made the mistake of mixing these trained warriors with the five hundred Indians already in his forces. They all fought well at the beginning of the campaign but soon became more interested in the possessions and scalps they could accumulate than in the war. When most needed, they did not render the services he expected, and they began to disband and go home when they had sufficient loot. Burgoyne never acted to regain their confidence, no doubt fearing the harm they could do in his ranks if they became disaffected with his pressure on them. From the time they began to depart, his men began to lose confidence in their success. The plans of this campaign depended much on the continued help of the savages; but when they left in great numbers, as the opposition stiffened, Burgoyne himself succumbed to timidity, and surrendered on October 7, 1777, to a force smaller

than his own.98 The potentialities of this Indian force had not been underestimated by Burgoyne; for William Weeks in Gates' army opposing him wrote, "One hundred Indians in the woods do us more harm than one thousand British troops."99

Howe set out with his army to take the city of Philadelphia; but, being closely watched by Washington, was forced to retreat to Staten Island. Later, however, Howe did go to Philadelphia and took it, September 27, 1777. The Indians played an insignificant part in this part of the war, and it is presumed that no great number of them was used. No doubt the units that had served under Washington in his previous campaigns acted as a part of his army. In the forces sent to aid Gates in his fortification at Bemis Heights, there were groups of savages; for in the opposing armies in the Battle of Freemans Farm, which broke Burgoyne's effort to join Howe, Pausch of the Hanan Artillery mentions the Indians of both sides plundering the dead on the battle field the morning after the fierce nightfall assault by the colonists. In writing to the German Prince Duke of Brunswick, he manifests his horror of the scalps brought in by the British savages.100 The Regulars used the Indians between the First and Second Battles of Freeman's Farm to reconnoitre for safe passage every time they moved troops.101

98Ibid., Appendix XII, 359.
99Bingham, From William Weeks with Gates' Army, Aug. 6, 1777, 15.
101Ibid., 161.
After the defeat of Burgoyne at Saratoga, the Indians that had been held in the north section at the various centers to act in concert with each phase of the campaign were free to loose their war-roused passions on the poorly defended border settlements. In the Susquehanna Valley about a hundred miles due west of New York, at Wyoming, occurred an outstanding example of this uncontrolled barbarity. The Tories, who had suffered the intense patriotism of this settlement in 1775, had been expelled from their homes and suffered the loss of all their personal property. The local tribes that had been the victims of the constant civil wars between the Susquehanna Company and the frontiersmen had lost heavily in property rights and were seeking revenge. The Tories organized these embittered Indians and, with the aid of those savages released from Burgoyne's army, began ravaging the surrounding communities; and in July they fell upon Wyoming.102 This outpost was in complete isolation, with the nearest settlement on the Delaware River sixty miles away, and Sunbury to the south was at an equal distance. The Mohawks and Senecas, with a number of other tribes of the Six Nations, occupied all of the upper branches of the Susquehanna, which made them only an hour's sailing distance from the settlement.103 As signs of danger grew in intensity, early in 1778 the people of Wyoming petitioned Congress for protection; but no consideration was given the plea, since the war elsewhere was too important. The people then asked their own men to leave the army and come home, which they did in considerable numbers, with Colonel Zebulon Butler as their leader.

The enemy began to assemble at Tioga; and among the Tory and British element was Colonel John Butler, a cousin of Zebulon Butler, who tried to organize the Indians. He was known to be blood-thirsty, and was feared by the colonists as more inhumane than Joseph Brant. Stone says Brant not only denies being at the massacre, but the other chiefs whom he questioned, who were there, say Brant and his Mohawk followers did not engage in the assault. Many other accounts place him as the central figure in the affair, but there is no contemporary account that places him elsewhere at the time. Colonel Claus, in a letter the latter part of June, does not mention Brant as the leader of the Indians, a fact which he surely would state, for Brant was highly regarded by him. Claus, trying to prove this atrocity of Wyoming was an act of Indian impetuosity and not a part of the British army's plans, says the old king of the Senecas, Sakayenguraghton, assembled his warriors at his town of Canadasega without calling upon any white person to join them. However Colonel John Butler, eager to join, marched there and demanded to command; but the old king ignored him and reserved the office for himself. That Butler had no control of the savages and that the powerful Brant was not there is seen in the conduct of the Indians in the massacre following the capitulation of the fort under Butler's terms. Colonel Dennison, seeing the savages pillaging and ravaging, told Butler to keep his terms, but Butler

104 Alfred Mathews, The Story of Three States (volume XXXI of Scribners, April 1902), "Wyoming Valley and the Massacre there." 41.

105 Stone, History of Wyoming, 192.

106 Acts of Congress, Colonel Claus' Letter, June 1778, XI.
waved his hands impatiently saying, "I can do nothing with them." Just then an Indian rushed upon Dennison, grabbed his cloak and hat roughly, not caring for the presence of Butler who was conversing with him.107

When the old chief had his forces organized to make the attack, they descended the river in canoes, stopping to destroy everything on the way. The whole chain of forts along the valley—Pittston, Wintermoots, Stewarts, Jenkins, and Fort Forty, were reduced and the Tories and settlers alike were murdered. The whole unit advanced along the high bank of the river with a swamp to their left. It was through this swamp that the Indians crept to flank the American troops that were drawn down the narrow passage by the slow retreat of the Tories upon the attack. Seeing the Indians, Colonel Zebulon Butler ordered his men to turn and fire; but they, misunderstanding him, rushed to retreat. In the melee that followed, many of them were killed while some took to the river and swamp, only to run into more savages. The remainder surrendered.108 The prisoners were taken before "Queen Esther," Catherine Montour, where the massacre actually began. This half-breed was reputed to have been the daughter of one of the French Governors of Canada and after an education in New York and Albany, had mingled with the cultured there for several years. Now the widow of a chief and infuriated by the recent loss of her kindred and only son, she sought revenge against the colonists whom she blamed for her misfortunes. Swaying her followers to the utmost barbarity

107Ibid., XLIX.

from the start of the campaign, she became the actual leader of the Indian portion of the army.\textsuperscript{109} Placed before this mad Queen on their knees in a circle around a large rock, (later to be appropriately called "Bloody Rock"), the prisoners saw the beginning of their fate. Each time around the rock in her "War-Dance" she emitted a savage cry as she drove her hatchet into one of their heads. Escape was almost impossible, for a warrior stood behind each victim, yet Hammond and Elliot escaped to tell of the horrors of the massacre.\textsuperscript{110} In all, over three hundred men were killed; and there remained over one hundred and fifty widows and three hundred children after many were carried away. Leaving Wyoming, the Indians dispersed in small groups roving up and down the valleys destroying and scalping.\textsuperscript{111}

This massacre was the origin of General Washington's order, commissioning General Sullivan to march west to lay waste the whole land of the Six Nations. There was very little security for those who returned to the valley that winter or the following spring; for the Indians scouted the outskirts of the settlements in bands searching for scalps, prisoners, and plunder. Several times they appeared in large numbers and in March 1779, Captain Spaulding's Fort was surrounded by two hundred fifty Indians and many painted Tories. After their attack was repulsed, they destroyed all the surrounding property leaving only charred remains at every farm. In the beginning of April, Major Powell leading a detachment of troops near Wyoming was attacked

\textsuperscript{109}Mathew, 419.

\textsuperscript{110}Priest, 20.

\textsuperscript{111}Mathew, 559.
from ambush while trying to drive one of the bands from the area. Towards the end of June, General Sullivan arrived with his large army; but the Indians did not leave the country. As he marched toward the Mohawk valley, they lurked on his flanks; and after he passed, they defeated the Pennsylvania Regiment.\footnote{Stone, History of Wyoming, 203 et seq.}

Farther down the Susquehanna River near King's Bridge, Lieutenant-Colonel Semicoe at the head of the officers of the Queen's Rangers (a group of American Tories) was patrolling the Hessian Guards when they were ambushed by sixty Stockbridge Indians. These natives had joined the colonial forces during, and as a result of, the Wyoming Massacre; and they were following the tactics of the other tribes. The ambush was a failure and forty of the Indians were killed. Among them was Nimham, a chieftain that had been to England and had been feted by the royalty. As he lay wounded, he urged the others to flee, after which he wounded Semicoe. These Indians had fought bravely, but not with the intent to kill; for they were after the bounty Washington had promised for live prisoners. They pulled the cavalry from their mounts and tied them to trees while they went after the others.\footnote{John G. Semicoe, A Journal of the Operations of the Queen's Rangers. (First printed by Author, Exter, 1787). Bartlett and Welford Co., New York, 1844, 15.} With so many of the savages on the war-path and so much booty to be had, very few of them remained in the organized armies. The British being able to pay higher premiums retained a sizable force during the latter years of the war, but the colonies had only a few of the most loyal and dependent tribes in...
their forces. The Stockbridge served during the whole war with Washington and the Penobscots guarded their own lands and the annexed forts. Colonel Marius Willett found the Oneidas and the Tuscoras willing to help his troops while he was in their lands, and they were very favorable to the colonial cause. The Six Nations were unanimous in warring against the Americans and would not consider talking to him in a council. Parts of the Mingoes and some of the families of the Onondagas still wanted to keep their friendship with him in 1778.114

During the summer of 1780, Colonel Van Schaick of the Continental Army took post at Fort Schuyler, the most important stronghold on the frontier, with power enough to resist a large force of Indians. In May, reports of Johnson's intentions to again ravage the north from Canada with his Indian hordes caused whole settlements, which were not able to obtain aid, to move down the country. Alarmed at this and fearing all the settlements above Albany and west of Schenectady would be abandoned, General Ten Broeck's brigade was ordered north to meet the invasion. Five full regiments were placed in Tyron County to await news of where Johnson and his savages would strike. In the meantime, Sir John Johnson proceeded down Lake Champlain to Crown Point with four hundred Tories and two hundred Indians to meet the other tribes that were to join him.115 Descending through the woods from Crown Point to the Sacondaga River, he entered Johnstown on May 21. Dividing his

114 MSS Willett, Willett to General Schuyler, April 29, 1778.

army in two parts, he directed a systematic scourge of all the surrounding settlements. The first night his savages and Royal Greens fell upon Caughnawaga where not even his most intimate friends were spared. Major Van Vrank eluded the enemy and was able to give warning to some of the people in nearby villages, a few of whom escaped in the river. Johnson's stealthy manner of pillaging in the dark and burning all the houses while the occupants were asleep terrified the whole north. Retiring to Johnstown after his first phase of attacks was completed, he found the colonial militia was getting too strong for his force, so he took his remaining family treasures and fled toward Canada.116

Again in the early fall these marauders struck from the north down the Schoharie and Mohawk Valleys. The hostile parties that infested this region were usually led by those Tories who had been forced to leave and who were inflamed with revenge. The wealthy freeholders around Shawangunk and the neighboring flat lands seemed to be particularly hated by them. Their mansions were burned and pillaged and their families murdered by Indians and former neighbors that they knew well. These raiding groups were numerous and it was hard for an army to catch up with any particular one. After laying waste to some of the isolated settlements, the Tories would settle on the captured land and have the appearance of peaceful frontiersmen by the time they were discovered. The Indians would either join another party or settle nearby with their families and become informers against other raiders or the

colonists, just to avoid war with whatever group came that direction. 117

Early in October, huge forces under General Carleton, Major Walter Butler, and Joseph Brant besieged Fort George and Fort Ann which were garrisoned by local militia. Reducing these, Carleton proceeded to Schohary, laying waste all the provisions of the settlers and burned White Creek, from which all the inhabitants had fled. 118 Colonel Willett invested these forces near Currystown where they were plundering the mansions. Attacking the Indians in the rear guard, he caused general confusion to break out, and the whole body fled before the inferior numbers. 119 On October 16, he again came upon a major part of the same army headed by Majors Moss and Butler near Warrens-brush. The ensuing battle lasted until after dark, when the Indians fled. For two weeks he pursued them, with only minor skirmishes breaking the chase. Finally on October 30, they were cornered at Canada Creek, where the losses of the British and Indians were severe. Major Butler was among the slain. Of this victory Willett wrote:

This affair was so severely felt that during the whole of the campaign of 1782 no considerable force in one body ever appeared; bodies of Indians by scattering and appearing in small parties gave much trouble, but never attempted anything to cause serious alarm nor was there any single instance from the affair when Butler was killed until the peace, sufficient to cause alarm. 120

117 Hough, Lieutenant-Colonel Jensen to DeWitt Clinton, 69.
118 Ibid., 95-111.
119 MSS Willett, Account of the Campaigns of 1779 and 1782 in New York by Colonel Marius Willett. (No place or date given)
120 Ibid.
This Major Walter Butler was the son of Colonel John Butler and was once imprisoned at Albany for his activities among the savages during the first months of the war. Granted a reprieve and freed on a parole by those who knew his family intimately, he soon made his escape with their aid. In the winter of 1777-1778, he led the Indians from Niagara in the massacre and burning of Cherry Valley. Willett was the judge advocate when he was condemned to death as a spy and agitator among the savages, and again the commander when he was killed at Canada Creek.\textsuperscript{121}

While Willett was in pursuit of Moss and Butler, General Rensselaer conducted a campaign against the other branch of the enemy that had gone toward the Mohawk Valley. On October 19, at Nose, near Fort Rensselaer, he came upon the enemy. Colonel Harper patrolled the south side of the river with a company of Indians, while the main army attacked. The Indian company in the center of the main army under their native leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Louis Cook, fought most of the battle. By not using all of his men, Rensselaer allowed the enemy to escape. Later he was tried in a military court for this action but was found to have acted wisely.\textsuperscript{122} A part of the troops was sent to intercept the fleeing Indians and British. Being too far behind to stop them, their harassing did not give them time to carry out much destruction or keep much baggage and artillery. Joshua Drake set out to destroy their boats on Lake Onondaga, but when he arrived most of the force


\textsuperscript{122}Hough, \textit{Testimony of Court of Inquiry}, Oct. 19, 1780, 166.
was already embarking. In his retreat to the camp of Rensselaer he was at-
tacked by five hundred savages who were enraged at the destruction he had
perpetrated against one of their settlements. Only two of his men escaped
death from the ambush. Continuing the campaign against this branch of the
invasion force, the army was joined by Colonel Dubois with three hundred
levies and sixty Oneida warriors. At Fox Mills on October 30, while Willett
was investing the other part of enemy at Canada Creek, General Rensselaer
defeated the main force in a fierce all day battle. Leaving all their pos-
sessions, the British forded the river at dusk and escaped north. The Indi-
ans broke into small bands leaving the army to carry on raids as those under
Butler had done.

The great northern invasion was ended, but in its wake lay a line of
destruction from the head of Lake George far into the fertile Mohawk Valley.
This was the last of the campaigns in the north in which the Indians played
an important role. Many conjectures have been made to offer an explanation
of why the British launched such a campaign in this area after the defeat of
Burgoyne at Saratoga but there are no conclusive findings based on contempo-
rary evidence. Washington, writing to the President of Congress on October 21,
1781, says: "It is thought, and perhaps not without foundation, that this
incursion was made upon the supposition that Arnold's treachery had succeed-

123Ibid., Letter of Captain J. Laurence to Colonel Samuel Drake, 130.
124Ibid., Governor Clinton to George Washington, Oct. 30, 1780, 145.
A few days previously, Governor Clinton expressed the same idea in a letter to Washington, surmising: "This enterprise of the enemy is probably the effect of Arnold's Treason."  

125 Ibid., 119.  
126 Ibid., Governor Clinton to George Washington, Oct. 17, 1780, 115.
CHAPTER IV

INDIAN WARFARE IN THE NORTHWEST

In most of the charters granted to the colonies from the earliest days of American settlement, England gave them land rights from ocean to ocean. Actually only the coastal fringe along the Atlantic, ending at the foot of the Allegheny Mountains, was by right hers to settle. The Treaty of Paris of 1763 brought under English sway the Western lands for the first time. In this treaty, France ceded Canada and the territory as far west as the Mississippi to Great Britain. After forming governments in part of it, the King of England reserved the major portion as "Crown Lands." The latter included the Northwest Territory, the region above the Great Lakes, and that from the Alleghenies to the Mississippi River. The Indians were given free rein here and were expected to be as friendly and as cooperative as they had been under the French. Since the British regarded the natives as repulsive and distrustful, the only dealings they had with them centered about the furs brought in for trade. The French had treated the Indians fairly, mixed with them, and through the zeal of religion sought to elevate their mode of life and teach them the rudiments of brotherly love. The colonists were forbidden to enter this area for it was reserved "for the trade and commerce of the kingdom" and also "for the exercise of that authority and jurisdiction which was conceived

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necessary for the preservation of the Colonies in due subordination to a de-
pendence upon the mother country."²

The Quebec Act of 1774 extended the boundaries of Canada in the terms
of the old French claims, with the Ohio River as the southern limit and the
Mississippi as the western boundary, including in Quebec what was afterwards
to be known as the Northwest Territory in 1787.³ Lord Dunmore's War was the
result of this continued encroachment of white settlers on this area in
spite of the many treaties with the Indians to give them free hunting grounds
there. A trail had been blazed from the Monongahela through the western
lands of Pennsylvania to the Ohio River which reached to the mouth of Wheeling
Creek. The island in the river at this point made a convenient place for a
settlement and a fort. The Indians were irritated by this crowding process
and, maddened by the "fire-water" obtained at the settlements, made frequent
attacks on those who settled in this frontier. The border disputes arising
from the several colonial claimants of this land further aroused the tribes
and brought a distrust among them for those in the disputes.⁴ In the far
west the British did not have sufficient troops to undertake military opera-
tions on a major scale. The forts they held at Detroit, Kaskaskia, Vincennes,
Cahokia, etc., were garrisoned with only enough Regulars to protect the trade
interests of the Crown against roving bands of savages or irate frontiersmen.

²American Archives, 4, VI, 1013.
³Poole, 687.
⁴Reuben G. Thwaites and Louise P. Kellogg. Documentary History of Lord
Yet they had one source of invaluable aid—these very same natives whom they despised—if they could manage them correctly. These they used during the war with a reckless disregard for all considerations of humanity. Agents and half-breeds alike went through the woods inciting assaults on the frontier inhabitants. This left no discrimination between combatants and non-combatants, and as a result, those in the frontiers who had no responsibility for the revolt in the east and probably had no intentions of entering into it were, by force of self-preservation, precipitated into a more bloody and ruthless conflict than those who actually began the hostilities. Even before the battle of Lexington, moves in the west were tending to involve the savages in the war on either side. At the beginning of the Revolution the power of the Johnsons held all of the Six Nations on the side of the Crown, except the Oneidas and the tribes under the influence of the New England missionaries.

The Indians in general were incapable of understanding the issues involved in the war, but Joseph Brant had some idea of the situation and looked upon it with Tory eyes. He became a devoted leader for the British and rallied to his side all the chiefs he could muster for war and imbued them with his own Tory feelings. In the eastern and central colonies the Tory spirit was strong in places but for the most part those who were devoted to the British cause were forced to flee their homes and seek protection from the Regulars. Many joined the Johnsons and Butler who had their headquarters at

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Niagara with Brant and the Mohawks as their protectors. These Tories soon became leaders among the Indians and their records show that they took less pains than the barbarous Thayendena to prevent useless slaughter; and some atrocities of their perpetration have never been outdone in the history of savage warfare.6

In the first days of the conflict the principal interest of the Indians in the war was the continuation of their supplies and trade. They had been living well from the transactions they made with the forts and the frontiersmen. To ease their minds in this regard, when the British were trying to gain exclusive trade rights with the Indians by placing their agents over Fort Pitt, the Virginia legislature advocated the erection of a new post at Kittanning with such supplies that Fort Pitt could be abandoned by the colonial traders among the Indians.7 At the Albany council in August, 1775, the Six Nations showed little interest in the war but demanded that the communications by Fort Stanwix be kept open and said that whichever side closed the post to them would become an enemy of their Nations.8 Another fear of the natives of the northwest was the loss of all their land to the victor of the warring powers. From the establishment of the Ohio Company in Virginia and the Ohio Valley, and the recent efforts of the Susquehanna Company to purchase their tribal holdings at the Onondaga council by getting them drunk and through


7 *American Archives*, Arthur St. Clair to Governor John Penn, July 17, 1774, 4, I, 549.

bribery, they distrusted any movements of the whites in their territory.\(^9\) Captain James Wood was sent by the Committee of Pittsburg to an Indian council nearby, and from there to other cities of the Wyandots, Tawas, Mingoese, and Shawanees to dispel the idea from their minds that the colonies were seeking new lands in this war. He also explained to them that this was a dispute with England, that the Indians had no part in it, and that Dunmore was not interested in their welfare, but in the possible aid they could give in the conflict.\(^{10}\)

The British, sensing the disaffection among the tribes toward both sides because of land fears, expended every means to use the past history of the settlers as a means to alienate them from the colonists. The agents were detailed to form an army of savages for their security and have them operate with Regulars at the advanced posts on the frontiers. When the plans were being formed for the drive to divide the colonies, Mr. Gibson was commissioned by Connally to prepare the Ohio Indians to act with the Regulars in obstructing the communications between the northern and southern governments by way of the western lines. Governor Hamilton of Detroit organized other savage bands from his area and sent them to aid Gibson.\(^{11}\) It is evident that the Shawanees were waiting for the landing of the Regulars at Charleston to begin


\(^{10}\)Ibid., Captain James Wood to Committee of Pittsburg, Aug. 1775, 4, III, 76.

\(^{11}\)Ibid., Mr. Gibson to Major Connolly, Nov. 3, 1775, (intercepted letter), 4, III, 1661.
their part in the campaign for they were holding in bondage all their tribesmen that showed friendship for the patriots. They were also receiving scalp bounties from the British agent Cameron after their frequent raids towards the seaboard settlements. The Cherokees to the south were moving nearer Kentucky, and the Mingoes, Toawahs, and Delawares were holding war councils.¹²

When the Mohawks were reprimanded by the northern Commissioners early in 1776, for trying to stop all colonial trade to the west, they sent a warning to Albany telling the colonists to keep their army home for their warriors were for the British and all the tribes were of the same mind with Sir John Johnson. All the Mohawk chiefs threatened to go to war if they were molested by the rebels.¹³ Schuyler, hearing of the danger fomenting on the western frontiers, hastened to Albany from Fort George to take measures for preserving peace there.¹⁴ He held a conference with all the northwestern tribes, at which Chief Kiashuta of the Mingoes acted as the spokesman for the Indians. In his address to the commissioners this chief stated:

We will not suffer either the English or the Americans to march an army through our territory. Should either attempt it, we shall forewarn them three times from proceeding; but should they persist, they must suffer the consequences. I am appointed by the Six Nations to the care of this country, that is to the care of the Indians on the west side of the Ohio River, and I desire you will not think of an expedition against Detroit, for we

¹²Ibid., James Crestwell to W. H. Drayton, July 27, 1776, 5, I, 610; Ibid., 5, I, 112.
¹³Ibid., Mr. Bleeker to the Mohawks, Jan. 15, 1776, 4, IV, 682.
¹⁴Ibid., Schuyler to General Putman, June 3, 1776, 4, IV, 692.
will not suffer an army to march through our country.\textsuperscript{15}

Although this was as much as saying that these Delawares, Mingoess, and Shawanees, as well as others of the Six Nations, desired only strict neutrality, yet at the same time they were making this profession, a party of Mingoess tried to capture and kill some of the American Indian agents. Meanwhile some of the Shawanees were on their way down to the Cherokees to deliver a war-belt proffered by the British.\textsuperscript{16} Apparently Johnson and Carleton inspired this speech to forestall any army from interfering with the work they were doing among these Indians and no doubt they were fairly confident of the alliance of all these tribes to aid in all the British moves they were planning.

On September 18, 1776, Butler landed at Oswego and immediately started plans for attacking the frontiers in five places—German Flats, Ruby, Mohawk Valley, Delaware River, and Susquehanna River. He sent messages to all the Indian villages, asking them to remain neutral, even though most of his forces was composed of savages. In spite of his request many of the warriors started to march to Oswego to join him.\textsuperscript{17} Two days after his message was received, the "White-Skin" Chief of the Oneidas dispatched runners to Fort Schuyler to warn the militia that Sir John Johnson had also arrived at Oswego with another large force of Indians and Tories. These two armies were preparing to lay siege to the Mohawk Valley to cut off the fort from the other

\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Ibid.}, Kiashuta to the Commissioners, July 6, 1776, 5, I, 36.
\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, 5, I, 36.
\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}, Letter of William Johnston, Sept. 18, 1776, 5, II, 385.
settlements. A body of 1,500 Chippewas and Ottowas were waiting at Tuscarawas while a party of Potowatomies attacked the settlements west of Pittsburgh. The Mingoes, Wyandots, and Lower Caughnawagas had assembled at the Kiskapoo town. This latter group was joined by roving bands of plunderers and their leader, Pluggy, took command of the whole group. Groups of the chiefs of these assembling tribes often approached Fort Pitt under the pretext of consulting the colonial Indian commissioners, but actually were trying to spy on the defenses of the garrison. When they asked for a council in the fort, the commander of the militia assembled all his troops and called all the other forces of the area to the fort. He had them all march in parade before the chiefs to show them that the stronghold was well fortified and ready for any sudden attack. The chiefs left the council with a changed attitude toward the whole plan of the British.

This amassing of Indian forces in the northwest was part of the preparations for the great drive from the north by General Carleton. Most of the activity in this sector was closely associated with the "Dark days of the Revolution" that were then being experienced by Washington in the east. Although there were no major operations in the back settlements with the use of these Indians at this time, yet the whole territory was harassed by small bands of Indians seeking plunder and scalps. The presence of such a large force of warriors necessitated the deployment of a part of the eastern Army

18Ibid., Elias Dayton to General Schuyler, Sept. 22, 1776, 5, II, 859.
19Ibid., Northern Commissioners to Committee of Congress, Sept. 25, 1776, 5, II, 512.
there, which considerably weakened the defenses along Lake Champlain and
around New York and Boston. There were not enough troops available to
strengthen every fort and as a result the Indians easily evaded punishment.
The savages always knew where this wandering army was situated and directed
their attacks at some distant point. 21

Morgan, the agent of the west, tried to hold a council with some of the
tribes gathered by Johnson and Butler, but found them unfriendly to any
colonial overtures. It was at this time that his deputy, Wilson, went to
Detroit against the warnings of Chief White-Eyes of the Wyandots and Chief
Cornstalk of the Shawanees, only to have his speech and belts torn up by
Hamilton and his person insulted before the very Indians he was trying to
impress. 22 Morgan himself did get some of the lesser tribes among the Dela-
wares, Munsies, Mohicans, and Shawanees to promise peace with the Americans;
and toward the latter part of November, had them act as emissaries among the
other tribes in an effort to get them to move up to the Seneca country. 23
Very little was accomplished by these tribes; for the British had planned
well in gaining this force of warriors and were giving them an abundant sup-
ply of goods for their attacks on the settlers in the Western Pennsylvania,
Maryland, and Virginia frontiers. This preliminary scourge was preparing for
the spring offensive of 1777 to facilitate the drive of St. Leger to join the

21 Ibid., General Lee to Edmund Pendleton Aug. 2, 1776, 5, I, 95; and Major
22 Ibid., Report of William Wilson to Commissioners, Sept. 26, 1776, 5, II,
515-518.
23 Ibid., Colonel Morgan to President Hancock, Nov. 8, 1776, 5, III, 600.
forces of Burgoyne and Howe in the east. These assaults also helped to arouse
the war-spirit among all the Indians and served to keep them busy until need-
ed for the campaign.24 The Wyandots across the Ohio River were of little
help to Wilson when he tried to get the whole nation to make a treaty with
the colonies. Hamilton had previously tried to enlist them but when he saw
they were divided in their allegiance he spread dissension among them and
took those who favored the Crown to Detroit.25

Captain Tice and Joseph Brant passed down the Hudson to the Susquehanna
in December on their way to Niagara. They carried dispatches to all the
Indian nations from General Howe. On their way through the Mohawk country
they ordered all the savages to leave their homes and follow them.26 Arriving
at Niagara they made known to Butler that the Virginians were building a fort
on the Ohio above Fort Pitt. A group of warriors was sent there and the fort
was destroyed.27 Other bands of savages were directed against the back sett-
tlements of Virginia to ravage the frontiersmen that had fled there to escape
the previous summer's proposed drive from the south. These had driven their
cattle into the wilderness to avoid having the British take them. The Indians
burned all their houses, scalped all the families, and took all the cattle
north to supplement their winter supplies.28

26 Ibid., J. Trumbull Jr. to Governor Trumbull, Dec. 30, 1776, 5, III, 1500.
27 Ibid., 5, III, 1500.
It was in the latter part of the spring of 1777, that the western settlers began to experience the full fury of organized Indian warfare. The raids from the west extended even across the mountains, and the people in what is now Bedford, Blair, and Huntington counties found themselves no more secure than those in Northumberland and Westmoreland. The settlers there had to defend themselves unaided and those who neglected to avail themselves of the forts generally paid for their folly at the most unsuspected times. Even those in the forts had very few supplies and could not get to their widely separated farms for grain and food. Bodies of Indians were constantly observed around Fort Stanwix and those colonists who dared venture to their homes were killed and scalped. Constant patrols were sent out to keep the savages at a safe distance and orders were issued that only large groups of armed men could leave the fort. By the middle of July, the hovering bands became so numerous and bold that even marching troops were attacked with heavy losses. As the time for St. Leger's drive neared the hostility of the savages increased. An Oneida half-breed, Thomas Spencer, who had been sent to Canada as a spy, attended the British council at Cassassenny with the Indians. Colonel Claus announced the final plans for the expedition against the Mohawk Valley and urged the Indians to join since its success was assured. The four hundred Regulars at Oswego under St. Leger, with the Indians already in that vicinity, were to proceed to the Mohawk Valley by way of Oneida Lake and Wood Creek. The warriors around Fort Stanwix were to aid in the reduction of that post and then join the main force which had in view a junction with

William Willett, 46.
Burgoyne when he arrived at Albany. The attack on Fort Stanwix (also called Fort Schuyler) formed the major part of the campaign of St. Leger. On the march, the Indians spread far to the north and south of the main army to lay waste the crops and property, and vent their savagery on the settlers that had taken their lands. The whole force of St. Leger consisted of 1,700 Regulars and Indians. The advance force of the main body was formed of Indians marching in five columns. The right and left flanks were protected by the roving bands of savages which did not form a part of the army itself. When nearing the fort the Indians refused to march into the clearing for the attack but proceeded cautiously into the bushes and fired from ambush. Even a week later Lieutenant Bird reported to his General that no savages would advance in the open with his men. Since simultaneous attacks were being waged on nearby posts, St. Leger set his headquarters about nine miles from the fort. Just before Lieutenant Bird invested the fort, the force of one hundred fifty defenders with only a few provisions and very little ammunition was reinforced by Lieutenant-Colonel Mellon with two hundred men and two ships of supplies. As Bird approached Stanwix, St. Leger sent Brant and his corps of Indians to begin the siege. St. Leger promised to move his Regulars nearer the conflict, for he told Bird, "It will prevent the barbarity and carnage which will ever obtain where

30William Stone, Campaign of Burgoyne and the Expedition of Colonel Barry St. Leger. 139-140.
31Ibid., From a Colored Design Captured from St. Leger depicting the Posts of Each Party on the March, 153.
32Ibid., 167.
Indians make so superior a part as in your detachment." In a letter dated October 16, 1777, Colonel Claus, reporting on this part of the campaign to Secretary Knox, says:

On the 24th of July, General St. Leger mentioned my going was chiefly to quiet the Indians with him who were very drunk and riotous; Captain Tice, who was the messenger, informed me that St. Leger ordered the Indians a quart of rum apiece and that they were beastly drunk and it is not in the power of any man to quiet them. Soon after, finding the Indians were unwilling to proceed, St. Leger came away from Solomon Creek with the Eighth and thirty-fourth Regiments and only about two hundred fifty Indians.

After several days of the siege, St. Leger sent a manifesto into the fort for the garrison to surrender and save themselves from the Indians; otherwise he would not promise them security if they continued fighting. He was very distressed by their determination to hold the fort. The battle recommenced as soon as the gates opened to allow the British emissary to return to St. Leger. The Indians, from behind bushes, fired on the men who were raising the parapets and it was only after the sharpshooters on raised platforms shot many of the nearer savages that they were able to close the gates again. The aim of the defenders was to concentrate on the Indians in hope that they would flee so an attack could be made on the Regulars, but every time they shot one Red-Skin another would start firing from behind the same bush. At night the savages, who were about a thousand in number, would completely encircle the fort and commence their weird war-cries which would

34Stone, Johnson's Orderly Book, Colonel Claus to Secretary Knox, Oct. 16, 1777, 78.
continue at intervals all night.35

As soon as the attack of St. Leger on the fort became known in Tyron County, General Herkimer ordered his militia to go to its aid. On August 5, he camped at Oriskany with his men officered by Colonels Klock, Vesscher, and Cox. Herkimer planned to force a passage to the fort while General Gansevoort’s forces from Oriskany made a drive toward the enemy’s headquarters to divert their attention from Herkimer. Colonel Willett was chosen to lead this diversion force. Having advanced only two miles, Herkimer’s advance guards were killed and the woods rang with savage war-whoops. The whole force had marched into a formidable ambuscade. St. Leger had heard of Herkimer’s position and sent a division of Johnson’s Greens under Watts, the Rangers under Butler, and most of the Indians under Brant to intercept his approach. It was the clever Brant that so chose his position as to allow the whole militia, except Colonel Vesscher’s regiment, to march into the circle of death before it was aware of the presence of the savages. Firing from behind trees on the confused and disorganized troops, the Indians took a heavy toll among them until a blinding storm gave the militia a chance to reorganize. Herkimer had received a leg wound and urged his men to stand, two behind a tree to foil the savages who had been waiting until a militia-man would fire then rush upon him with a hatchet while he was reloading his musket. As soon as the storm broke this new system severely cut into the ranks of the unsuspecting natives. Just as the Greens and Rangers were approaching, dressed in the garb of colonials, the Indians had begun a retreat to tighten their weak-

35 Stone, Campaign of Burgoyne and the Expedition of St. Leger. 171.
ened ranks. Perceiving the ruse the Greens and Rangers were staging, the embittered frontiersmen made a sudden attack, at which the Indians fled in wild confusion. The British, finding themselves abandoned by the Indians fell into a disorderly retreat, leaving their dead and wounded among the fallen savages on the field.36

Referring to a manuscript narrative of Frederick Scammons, who was scouting during this battle, Stone says the Indians were very reluctant to join in this battle and that many were drunk. The Senecas were sent only to look on and "smoke their pipes," but had to fight for their lives. The Indians lost over two hundred braves and many more were badly wounded.37

While Herkimer's force was fighting the Indians, Colonel Willett followed through with his diversion and made a sudden attack on the camp of Johnson. Everyone within fled in wild confusion and the few Indians there fled into the woods without fighting. All the British papers and the possessions of both the Indians and British fell into the hands of Willett. St. Leger, who was across the river at the time with his men, tried firing on him but was too far away to do any harm, or prevent him from gaining entrance into the fort.38 The following day, August 6, 1777, Major Ancrom was permitted to come into the fort under a white flag to speak for St. Leger. He told them that the British could no longer restrain the Indians from ravaging the surrounding settlements or the fort; for they were anxious to vindicate their

36 Ibid., 174-180.
37 Ibid., 185.
38 Ibid., 194.
fallen chiefs and warriors slain by Herkimer's army and to regain their loot taken by Willett. Willett laughed at this proposal for he saw that the British now feared the savages falling upon themselves or leaving for home. Another appeal was directed to the people of Tyron county to acknowledge defeat and allow British occupation of the fort, promising that no Indians would be permitted to enter it if the frontiersmen would surrender immediately. Willett escaped from the fort in time to warn the people of the position of the British and their fear of the savages.\textsuperscript{39} Shortly after Colonel Butler was captured and the same day the news of the approach of General Arnold's army to relieve the fort reached the enemy. The Indians, already disaffected because of the lack of success of the Regulars to reduce Fort Stanwix, disbanded and fled. St. Leger, finding that the "mulish obstinacy," as he termed it, of the garrison could not be easily overcome, quit the siege on August 22. He had been there for twenty days and had accomplished nothing to show for the heavy losses in his ranks.\textsuperscript{40}

Part of the reason for the precipitous flight of the Indians and Regulars, to the extent of leaving their tents standing and all the equipment on the field, was due to the arrival of a half-wit Tory whom Willett had sent to the camp with the story of extremely large forces he had seen marching in that direction. Several Indians had joined the half-wit and had great sport in terrifying St. Leger's savages by their descriptions of the oncoming army.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{39} Ibid., 202.

\textsuperscript{40} Stone, \textit{Johnson's Orderly Book}, 96.

\textsuperscript{41} Stone, \textit{Campaign of Burgoyne and the Expedition of St. Leger}, 216.
Johnson, in his Orderly Book entrances for this campaign, accused St. Leger for the lack of success in the siege for he had refused to take more Regulars with him from Oswego. St. Leger belittled the number and bravery of the defenders of the fort and took only five hundred soldiers with the Indians. Only forty days rations were issued to the whole force for the entire march to Albany.\textsuperscript{42}

It is believed that it was not alone the Americans that St. Leger feared when he took flight. The savages were completely out of his control by that time and they were making no distinction between ally and foe in their quest for scalps to get rewards, and loot. Stone, quoting from the British Universal Magazine, says:

\begin{quote}
The Indians plundered several boats belonging to their own army; robbed officers of whatsoever they liked. Within a few miles of the camp they first stripped off the arms and afterwards murdered with their own bayonets all those British, German, and Tory soldiers who were separated from the main army.\textsuperscript{43}
\end{quote}

Much of this desire for scalps was due to St. Leger's own planning which had gone awry, and for which he acquired no distinction in his profession. Although he was evidently an accomplished scholar and a polished gentleman, he encouraged Indian and Tory atrocities while on this expedition by offering, in general orders, twenty dollars for every scalp brought to him.\textsuperscript{44} The savagery vented upon the Mohawk Valley during the years 1777 and early 1778,

\textsuperscript{42}Stone, Johnson's Orderly Book, Johnson's Orders of the Day, July 17, 1777, 82.

\textsuperscript{43}Stone, Campaign of Burgoyne and the Expedition of St. Leger, 217.

\textsuperscript{44}Stone, Johnson's Orderly Book, 45.
where Brant was continually present and the presiding genius, was more severe and barbarous than that perpetrated against Wyoming Valley. In Wyoming the women and children were spared but at Cherry Valley no sex or age was free from the scalping knife.

The departure of St. Leger from Stanwix in complete rout brought to an end the great plan to conquer the north and west in one concerted blow by the three armies converging near Albany. It did not, however, end the troubles for the frontiersmen in and about Stanwix. The Regulars returned later for numerous sieges, and the Indians made continuous assaults on the surrounding smaller settlements to destroy homes, crops, and cattle. Starvation continually faced the inhabitants and it was almost impossible to smuggle supplies into the fort. By 1780, Brant had laid waste everything as far as Schenectady and Stanwix was almost an isolated post. On September 23, of that year, six hundred Regulars ended a six week siege of the fort by taking the whole garrison captive.45

The British-sponsored ravages of the western New York and Pennsylvania tribes on the frontiers, especially in the Wyoming, Cherry, and Mohawk Valleys, aroused the colonial army to stage an invasion of this area to chastise the savages for their deeds and to render them incapable of further depredations by completely destroying them. In August, 1778, when the settlers began to return in numbers to the Wyoming Valley, immediate plans were prepared for an offensive against the remaining Indians in that area. A force under

45Hough, The Northern Invasion of 1780, Rivington's Gazette, Sept. 23, 1780, 81.
the command of Colonel Hartley ascended the river as far as Queen Esther's Dominion and laid waste all the houses, crops, and supplies of the tribal settlement. Very little opposition was encountered for most of the warriors were further west with the British. This force continued its path of destruction until late in October when it returned to Wyoming.46 In February, 1779, General Clinton, hearing of another raid being planned by the British and Indians against the Mohawk Valley, marched from Albany to Schenectady where he ordered Colonel Van Schiack's regiment, the fifth of the New York line, to proceed to Caughnawaga. The presence of this army averted the proposed attack, but the duplicity of the Onondaga tribes seemed to require a severe course of punishment as an example to the other Nations. Accordingly, on April 19, a party of five hundred men selected from Van Schiack's force and the units of General Gansevoort's army under Colonel Willett and Major Cochran, left Fort Stanwix with orders to destroy all the surrounding Indian villages, burn their supplies, and kill every native they found. On the afternoon of the following day they had reached the outlet of Oneida Lake where they left their boats under guard and marched as quickly as possible toward Onondaga. Their approach was discovered a little too soon to make the attack a complete surprise but many of the savages fell before they were out of the village. A part of the army gave chase while the remainder set about burning the three villages. Large stores of grain and food were burned, about one hundred fire-arms confiscated, and the entire supply of ammunition taken.

Their swivel and council houses were torn down and their horses and cattle killed. The thirty-three prisoners taken were brought to Fort Stanwix on April 24, when the victorious forces returned home.47

In Washington's general orders of May 8, Van Schaick was highly praised for this expedition and the Commander-in-Chief stated that it was a pleasure to announce to the army the total destruction of the Onondaga headquarters without the loss of a man.48 While Van Schaick's force was centering its activity on the settlement itself, a body of Indians under Lieutenant McLellan and Ensign Hardenburg was attacking smaller Indian villages around Onondaga. These natives had volunteered to accompany the army but did not want to be a part of it. They drew provisions for twenty days before they left and were out for a longer time than the main force. They had at first been refused permission to go but, since they persisted and were friendly Oneidas and Tuscaroras, they were permitted a part in the expedition to avenge the wrongs done to their tribes by the Onondagas.49

These forays against the western Indians formed a part of the great campaign Washington was preparing against all the western tribes. On March 4, he wrote to Governor George Clinton of New York, secretly informing him of the proposed revenge on the Indians and asked him what number of frontiersmen and rangers he could furnish for the contingent of troops necessary. Remem-

48Ibid., General Orders of May 8, 1779, at Middlebrook, 21.
bering the glory General Gates acquired in the defeat of Burgoyne and putting aside his haughty conduct on the banks of the Delaware in 1776, and his part in the Conway cabal which almost brought rebellion within the colonial army during the "dark days of the war," Washington offered him the command of this expedition. Gates roughly refused and Major General Sullivan was chosen in his place. The instructions given by General Washington to General Sullivan show what aims he had in view to effectively accomplish this campaign: "The immediate objects are the total destruction and devastation of their settlements...It will be essential to ruin their crops now in the ground and prevent their planting more." 50

To Gates he had already written, "The object will be effectively to chastise and intimidate the hostile Nations; to cut off their settlements, destroy their next year's crops and do every other mischief which time and circumstances will permit." 51 To Sullivan he also wrote, "The country must not merely be overrun but destroyed...You will listen to no overture of peace before the total ruin of their settlement is effected." 52

The Confederacy of the Six Nations and their power over the other tribes of the northwest and their participation in the horrors vented on the frontiers, at the instigation of the British, during the first years of the war warranted this harsh treatment. The Iroquois Nations consisted of the Senecas, Oneidas, Cayugas, Mohawks, Onondagas, and Tuscaroras who claimed the western lands of Pennsylvania, New York, and as far south as the Carolinas.

51 Ibid., 3.
52 Ibid., 4.
The strength of their warriors numbered over 1,200 and associated with them were two companies of the Royal Greens and a small force of Tory militia. Some of these latter were painted as Indians to avoid detection in battle. As soon as Sullivan accepted the command of the expedition, he designed the operations to subjugate these forces. A division of troops was to operate directly against the Munsies and a part of the Senecas on the upper waters of the Allegheny streams. Colonel Daniel Brodhead was assigned to lead this force. Another body of 1,700 men under Brigadier-General James Clinton was ordered to proceed by way of Otsego Lake and after destroying every village there, to join General Sullivan. The principal army organized under Sullivan at Wyoming consisted of three brigades, totaling 3,500 men; Brigadier-General Enoch Poor's New Hampshire brigade; Brigadier-General Edward Hand's Pennsylvania Brigade; and Brigadier-General William Maxwell's New Jersey brigade.53 On June 12, 1779, this army began to collect at Wyoming and the men were anxious to start on their mission to render the Indians incapable of ever rising again against the colonists and to make them sue for a bitter peace.54 The Stockbridge Indians offered their services as guides for the first part of the march and obtained the help of the friendly Oneidas and Tuscaroras once the army entered the heart of the Indian territory.55 General Clinton accepted the offer of twenty-five of the Oneida warriors to join his army but

53 Ibid., 6-7.
55 Rogers, 28.
requested that the remainder act as guides.\textsuperscript{56}

While the forces were assembling at Wyoming there seemed to be little fear among the local Indians of what was to come; for they continued to commit depredations in the near vicinity. A short distance away on the road to Easton, a family settlement was attacked; and, after burning the buildings and killing the men, the savages took the women and children away as prisoners.\textsuperscript{57} A few days later, as a part of the militia was descending along the Delaware River, an ambuscade fell upon them at Tackawack a few miles above Minisink. Out of the one hundred forty, only twenty escaped and the rest were killed or taken prisoners.\textsuperscript{58} Since the army was not yet united and the men were put on inactive assignment none of them were permitted to avenge these bold acts of the savages. Had any group been sent out against these Indians it would have held up the whole group from starting when the word came, or it would have left a small unit behind to become the prey of the Indians who always followed in the wake of an army to gather loot and pick up the stragglers for the scalp bounty.

By August 6, Colonel Brodhead had finished his salient to the north against the Senecas and Muncy tribes. In his official report to General Washington he traced his expedition and gave its results. After proceeding to Canawago, which he found deserted, he burned the town and marched to the upper Seneca villages. The Indians fled before him leaving all their posses-

\textsuperscript{56}Ibid., 61.
\textsuperscript{57}Ibid., 41.
\textsuperscript{58}Ibid., 70.
Boundary line between Iroquois Confederation and colonial settlements agreed upon at the Treaty of Fort Stanwix 1768
sions behind. After destroying five hundred acres of corn and burning the village he advanced to Yoghrooswago. He estimated that over $30,000 worth of plunder was captured at this place. Coming back by another route, all the towns were burned and crops destroyed in his path. Along the way he was met by the chiefs of the Delaware, Huron, and Masquichee tribes who wished to make a treaty with him. He refused to speak with them at that time with the excuse that he had no authority to receive their overtures and he told them to try again at a future date. Leaving them, he proceeded to the place where he was to meet General Sullivan, and he did not cease to burn their other towns on the way. 59

The New Jersey brigade of the main army reached Queen Esther Flats, a few miles from Tioga, on August 9. Colonel Procter, by direct command of General Maxwell, burned the town of Newtychanning, firing on the Indians as they tried to escape the inferno. 60 The light troops of the Pennsylvania brigade, following a northwest course, marched from Weesanking, which they destroyed, to the upper plains. Along the paths and in the towns they found many bows on which the Indians had dried scalps. 61 An advance party of this brigade which was opening a road for the army, was attacked by eighty-five Senecas under their chief, Kayingwaurto. The guard for this advance group struck the Indians from the rear, causing them to flee. They left their dead


60 Stryker, 19.

61 Rogers, 94. See post, Appendix II.
on the field, and among the slain was their chief. The following note was found in his clothing:

This may certify that kayingwaurto, the Sanake Chief has been on an expedition to Fort Stanwix and has taken two scalps, one from an officer and a corporal that were gunning near the fort, for which I promise to pay at sight $10, for each scalp. Given under my hand at Bucks Island,

John Butler, Colonel and Sup't of the Six Nations and allies of His Majesty.62

The night before Sullivan’s forces were to enter the large Indian city of Chemung, Sullivan issued an inspiring speech to his men which every officer read while the men ate. He reminded them that:

...We are against a secret, desultory, and rapid foe seizing every advantage and ready to avail themselves of every defeat on our part. Should we be so inattentive as to give way before them, they follow the unhappy fugitives with all the cruel and unrelenting hate of prevailing cowards and are not satisfied until they slaughter all their opponents.63

Arriving at Chemung the next morning they found the city abandoned. This beautiful town was the pride of the Indians and was their principal source of supplies. The soldiers set all the storage houses afire and destroyed everything of value. General Hand’s brigade requested to press on to Newton. A short distance away they fell into an ambush of the Indians who were watching their city burn. After repelling the savages, General Hand turned his men

62 Simms, 578.

This was supposedly the scalp of Captain Greg and a corporal who were outside Fort Stanwix shooting pigeons and were scalped by the Indians. Captain Greg lived to tell of his experiences. Ibid., 578.

toward New Chemung a few miles away where they destroyed four large cornfields and burned a thousand bushels of stored corn and a large building of potatoes. Here the soldiers built a new fort and called it Fort Sullivan. As the army approached Newton on August 29, Sullivan discovered an Indian ambush ahead of him. In a council of war he decided to first attack the breastwork of logs, camouflaged with newly cut branches, extending the half-mile from Baldwin Creek to the mountains before trying to enter the city. The howitzers and cannon opened the battle, while Hand's brigade was sent up to make the frontal attack. General Poor took his brigade three miles around the mountain to attack the left flank and rear of the Indians. The cannons were to distract the savages from this move by Poor. General Clinton followed Poor around the eminence and Colonel Ogden moved to the extreme left to prevent flanking by the enemy when Poor's men made their assault. Several fierce attempts were made by the savages to silence the heavy guns which were taking a heavy toll among them, but Hand's forces repulsed them. When Poor surprised the unsuspecting natives from the rear they tried to gain the mountain but seeing this well protected they fled in all directions amid the shots of the colonists.

The Tory and Negro taken prisoner claimed the whole force consisted of four hundred savages and some Tories. Butler, Brant, and McDonald had prepared this scheme to defeat Sullivan's force and save Newton from being burned.

64 Ibid., 104. Also, Stryker, 21.
65 Stryker, 24.
66 Cook, Journal of Major John Borrowes, 44.
Sullivan in his official report, estimated the Indians at 1,500, saying that the two prisoners were ignorant of any part of the opposing force other than their own.67 This Battle of Newton took place on what is now the site of the city of Elmira, New York.

After destroying all the villages around Newton, the army marched through the Konowhola settlement which they also burned. As they approached Lake Conesus, the front guard was again attacked by the Indians from ambush; but when the main body joined in the battle they fled. Two friendly Oneidas were captured by the savages but when they found that they were young chiefs they scalped them.68 On September 1, Sullivan cautiously came to the edge of the woods at Catherine Town during the night in hope of destroying the whole body of Indians in the morning. But when dawn came, he found the place deserted. An old squaw of the Cayuga Nation found in the forest told him that after the battle at Newton the Indians came running to this place in confusion and told their wives that they were conquered and must fly. She said they told her that many were killed and the greater portion of them had been wounded. Butler had arrived after them and had tried to make them return to fight, but the warriors revolted against him and fled with their families. Sullivan checked the story of the alleged losses with the number of dead left on the battlefield and the number of wounded taken to Tioga by Brant and he found that the losses to the Indians was severe.69 The army

kept a north-northwest route and each day came upon small straggling parties of Indians lurking around the abandoned towns. The troops continued to burn every building they found and to take all the plunder they could find. They killed every Indian who showed any sign of hostility or the desire to flee.70 Swinging to the west, the avenging colonists started on their return journey. About midnight on September 14, Lieutenant Boyd took his men to reconnoiter some Indian villages to the right of the line of march, using an Oneida chief as a guide. Giving pursuit to a small band of savages that tried to ambush them they were drawn into the enemy camp. At dawn Boyd found himself near an Indian castle surrounded by Butler and his Tory militia with the Indians. He staged a desperate defense but was too outnumbered by the four hundred savages that had joined the battle. Those men that were not wounded tried to flee but fourteen riflemen and all the guides were killed. Boyd and a corporal were taken prisoner and later tortured and slain.71 Sullivan crossed the Genesee River and came upon Chenesee Town, the largest he had yet found. On entering the outskirts of the town, the men discovered the bodies of Boyd and the corporal in a mutilated condition. They had been tied, whipped, nails torn out, extremities cut off, numerous darts stuck in their flesh, and had been partly skinned. The enemy had fled before the army arrived.72 This luxurious town with its castle formed the capitol of the Seneca Nation. Two thousand men were detailed to destroy the corn in the fields along the river,

72 Ibid., Lt. Erskuries Beatty Journal, Sept. 15, 1779, 32.
and others helped burn the 20,000 bushels stored in the huge granaries. Just before leaving the next day the troops first set fire to the two-story red dressed-log council house and then put the torch to the whole town. Sullivan announced to his men that the immediate objects of the campaign had been accomplished and that the army would return to Tioga there to disperse for their home territories. On the way to Tioga, the Cayuga settlements were ravaged.73

This had been a glorious campaign for the men who took part in it, and they were hailed as the heroes of the west on their return. The Indians, when first informed of the contemplated expedition, laughed at what they supposed to be the folly of an organized army attempting to traverse the wilderness to drive them from their lairs, but now they felt the pang of destruction it left in its wake. On October 14, 1779, Congress passed a resolution to extend to Generals Washington and Sullivan the congratulations of the colonies for this expedition which brought such revenge upon the savages for being so influenced by the British as to ravage the settlements. A day of general thanksgiving for this success was set for the second Thursday in December.74

Stone, in editing Johnson's Orderly Book, included in the volume the life of Johnson by J. Watts de Peyster who was on the campaign against Oriskany. In this work de Peyster calls Sullivan's expedition:

...A disgrace to developing civilization. It calls forth some of the most scathing condemnations ever

73 Stryker, 29.

penned by historians. When White men scalp and flay Indians and convert the skins of the latter's thighs into boot-tops, the question suggests itself: which were the savages, the Continental troops or the Indians. It is scarcely an exaggeration to say that for every Indian slain and Indian hut consumed in this campaign, 1,000 White men, women and children paid the penalty; and it is almost unexceptionally admitted that the indistinguishable hatred of the Red-skins for the United States dates from this raid of Sullivan. 75

In the reference to the skins of the Indians used as boot-tops, de Peyster was evidently referring to the entry made by Lieutenant William Barton in his journal for August 30, 1779:

Monday 30: At the request of Major Piatt I sent out a small party to look for some of the dead Indians. Toward noon they found them and skinned two of them from the hips down for boot-legs; one pair for the Major and the other for myself. 76

Simms in his History of Schoharie County, commenting on Sir John Johnson's devastations in the northwest in 1780, remarks:

Thus was revenged the destruction of the Indian possessions in the Chemung and Genesee Valleys the year before by General Sullivan; Which, had they a historian, would be found no less gloomy a picture. 77

The center of British power and influence in the northwest became Detroit where Henry Hamilton was the governor. The Indians had been stunned but not rendered incapable of again rising after the assault by Sullivan. It was at Detroit that they were reorganized and aided to continue their pillage, mur-

77 Simms, 587.
der, and destruction of the frontiers of Pennsylvania. The Wyandots from Sandusky, a river flowing north through Sandusky Bay into Lake Erie, were enlisted in the interests of Great Britain. To them Hamilton joined the Wyandots, Shawnees, and other tribes on the Scioto and Miami Rivers to form what had been the Iroquois scourge of upper New York.78

General Lachlin McIntosh of the Continental Army took command of Fort Pitt on September 17, 1778, and was determined to reduce Detroit because of the Indian activities across the Ohio River. As a preparation for this venture he marched across the river and built Fort McIntosh, the first military post of the United Colonies beyond the frontier settlements on the west side of the Ohio. Congress, fearing the expense of laying siege to Detroit, ordered him to proceed against the Indian villages. The destruction of these, Congress felt, would be more effectual in chastising the savages than the capture of Detroit. Proceeding with a thousand men, toward the Wyandot towns on the Upper Sandusky, he built Fort Laurens at Bolivar in present Ohio. Leaving Colonel Gibson with one hundred fifty men to defend this post, he took another route back to Fort Pitt to destroy all the Indian supplies he could find and to wait until spring to finish the campaign. However, in January, 1779, several hundred Indians and British invested Fort Laurens and after a six-week siege had reduced the garrison to the verge of starvation. Only when the savages were out of supplies did they leave. McIntosh, hearing of the dire straits of the defenders, marched to their aid with seven hundred

men and was able to hold the fort against the many assaults made against it that spring and summer. Unable to carry out his plan of destruction beyond this point, the general ordered the fort abandoned and burned in August, thereby ending the first campaign against the Indians at Sandusky.\textsuperscript{79}

The aim of the Indian agents at Fort Pitt was to keep the surrounding tribes, especially those to the west, in strict neutrality all during the Revolutionary War. John Neville claims that only the western Delawares were still in that status during the first campaign against Sandusky, and it was only through the strenuous efforts of George Morgan and the Moravian missionaries that they were held in check that long.\textsuperscript{80} By the Spring of 1782, these Delawares were so hard pressed by the British and so often ravaged by the other tribes of the northwest that they joined the Indian confederacy and only a few families remained neutral. Colonel Brodhead, who had succeededMcIntosh as commander of Fort Pitt, hearing of their change of affiliation, organized an expedition against them. Crossing the Ohio, he marched to Gnadenhuetten, their principal town on the Muskingum (now Coshocton, Ohio). On April 19, 1782, he surprised the Indians and burned their town, killing all who did not succeed in escaping. After doing the same to all the surrounding villages he returned to Fort Pitt with a few of the friendly families. The three villages of "Christian Indians" which were spared by the troops did not choose to leave and were soon after massacred by the British sav-

\textsuperscript{79}\textit{Ibid.}, 6-7.

\textsuperscript{80}\textit{Ibid.}, 311.
During this campaign, Colonel Williamson's company, that had frequently seen and experienced the barbarity of marauding bands of savages, became uncontrollable for its leaders. Neither age nor sex was considered in the slaughter they performed. This surprise attack taught the Indians a lesson in vigilance and from this time on they kept spies around every settlement to judge by the actions of the frontiersmen the time of another attack which they suspected would follow soon. There was not a public place from Fort Pitt to Grave Creek below Wheeling, Virginia, on the Ohio River that was left unguarded.

In May of the same year a campaign was planned against the Wyandots and their confederates. The volunteers for this expedition assembled at Mingo Bottom and were divided into small groups, each choosing its own captain by ballot. The men in each group knew each other and were in small enough units to operate easily in Indian warfare. Upon counting the votes for their Colonel on May 24, they found Crawford received 235 and Williamson 230. The

Hekewelder, who worked as a missionary among these tribes, also disclaims that these Moravian Indians on the Muskingum were always the enemies of the colonists. They were followers of agricultural pursuits and often saved colonial prisoners from the other tribes by petition or purchase without asking recompense. They were driven from their homes by other warriors from the British side because they wouldn't fight the Americans. It was only to preserve their families that they sided with the British, having no intention of fighting. John Hekewelder, A Narrative of the Mission of the United Brethren among the Delaware and Mohegan Indians. McCarty and Davis Co., Philadelphia, 1820, 7.


Hekewelder, 336.
next day they set forth for the heart of the Wyandot country under Crawford. The Wyandots were the most powerful of all the savage allies of the British in the west. They were in close alliance with the Delawares and the Shawanees who were also numerous. This power of the Wyandots came not from their numbers, but from their superior intelligence. They were far more advanced than any other tribe due to their intimate association with the French for many years; and they had also done much trading with the British since 1763.

Their houses were well built, though gaudily furnished and their treatment of prisoners was civil. Sudden death was given if merited but they were untiring in battle and in the pursuit of their foe. When they were drawn into alliance with the Regulars and loosed upon the settlers, their head chief or sachem was Pomoacan, usually called the "Half King." As the tempo of the western war increased, this chief left Brownstown to join his brother Billy Wyandot at Sandusky. Just before Crawford arrived the Wyandots had moved eight miles down the river and were joined by the Delawares. Captain Pipe, the chief of the Tymochee Delawares, was the most bitter of all the savages against the colonists. His grievance dated back to Pontiac's War of 1764 when he had been taken prisoner as a spy by Bouquet. He resented such treatment to a chief of the Wolf Tribe of the Delawares and, as soon as the Revolution began, he had joined the Half King and had done most of the ravaging of the border settlements.

84 Butterfield, 77.
85 Ibid., 163.
86 Ibid., 162.
87 Ibid., 169.
Upon reaching the Wyandot town, Crawford's men found it had been uninhabited for some time, and none of the men knew of the removal of the families to Sandusky. The chain of spies, set out by the wary natives after the surprise attack on the Muskingum had been watching the movements in the border towns and had given advance warning of the path of this march. While Crawford was preparing to move north to within twenty miles of the village of The Pipe, the Delaware chief began his march with two hundred braves to a position two miles west of Half King's camp, where the Wyandots were assembled under their war chief Zhausshotok. At the same time two hundred Shawnees were headed for the same rendezvous. Those already assembled were to halt the march of the Americans until assistance arrived. Word had also been sent to Arentz de Peyster, the military head of Detroit, who immediately dispatched a large force of Butler's Rangers to their aid. The Wyandots and Delawares had hidden their squaws and children in a deep ravine before they formed for the battle. When they were arranged for the ambush, Captain Matthew Elliot arrived to take command of the Indians. He was a welcomed leader by the Wyandots and Delawares, for he had lived among them for several years and spoke both their languages. Among the ambushed savages was one white man of infamous character, Simon Girty, who had been captured while a

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88 Hekewelder, 337.
89 Butterfield, 172.
90 Ibid., 173. Also, Hekewelder, 336.
91 Ibid., 178.
92 Ibid., 17.
boy during the French and Indian War and raised by the Senecas. A one time friend of Crawford's, and a leader in Dunmore's War, he deserted the colonial cause when General Hand failed to give him a coveted captaincy. With him had deserted twelve others, two of whom, Matthew Elliot and Alexander McKee, were now with him among this army waiting for Crawford. Girty organized most of the persecution that was suffered by the Moravian missionaries whom he suspected of keeping the Indians from joining the British. After taking them from their missions, he sent them to Detroit under the guard of a Frenchman. Hekewelder was among the group. It was while Girty was checking the conduct of the Frenchman toward the captives that the Muskingum massacre had occurred.

Not finding the Indians in their town, some of Crawford's men wished to return home rather than fall into an ambush while searching the woods for them. In a council of war, Crawford and Zane (an Indian strategist) reasoned that since they had not recently met any Indians they were collected in a large body in the near vicinity to resist an attack. The leaders agreed to march for the remainder of the afternoon and then return home if they did not find traces of the savages. Just as the march began the scouts brought news of the Indians. The advance guard had reached an open plain almost surrounded by a heavy forest. At the far end they saw the full force of Delawares preparing to make an attack. Crawford rushed his forces to the edge of

93 Ibid., 182.
94 Hekewelder, 333.
95 Butterfield, 202.
96 Ibid., 206.
the plain just as the savages were approaching in the tall grass. In the
conflict that followed, the volunteers were equal to the Indians in the hand
to hand fighting that was used. The battle was fierce and the Indians with-
drew, knowing that the Shawanees would soon join them. The next morning the
conflict was at long range until the British Rangers came with the Shawanees.\textsuperscript{97}
The colonists were by this time in the center of the plain, but with the in-
crease in the enemy forces there was danger of being completely surrounded.
Crawford ordered a retreat between the camps of the Delawares and the Shawa-
nees to a safer position beyond the woods. Major McLellan engaged the two
forces of savages during the retreat to allow time for the main body under
Crawford to become organized. The Indians, thinking this diversion by the
larger part of the army was just a ruse, did not attack it in full force, but
their assault broke the unity of the marching men and they kept in pursuit
until they reached the edge of the forest. When the colonists halted to re-
organize in one of the nearby towns, they found Crawford was among the miss-
ing leaders and the men told of McLellan falling wounded in his part of the
diversion. Williamson took command of the army.\textsuperscript{98} In the retreat, most of
the baggage had been lost, and many men had been killed from the rear and
flanks.\textsuperscript{99} Crawford's horse had given out and he had asked several of his best

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{97}John Knight, Dr., \textit{Narrative of the Expedition Against the Indians with an}
\textit{Account of the Execution of Colonel Crawford, and the Escape of Dr. Knight}
\textit{and John Stover from Captivity in 1782}. Ames Parker Co., Andover, 1798.
Also, Butterfield, 205.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{98}Butterfield, 217.}

\footnote{\textsuperscript{99}Nekewelder, 338.}
\end{footnotes}
THE REVOLUTIONARY WAR IN THE WEST

This Map is reproduced from Atlas of American History, by James Truslow Adams, with the kind permission of Charles Scribner's Sons.
friends to stay with him. Dr. Knight, two old men, and Captain Biggs re­
mained with their commander and when some well-known Indians ambushed them, 
Crawford ordered Knight hold his fire. The other members of the group 
escaped but Crawford and Knight were taken by these Delawares of the Wingenim 
Tribe to the Indian camp where they found eleven other men previously cap­
tured. Simon Girty at first promised to free them, but then had their 
faces painted black and ordered them taken to the camp of the Shawanees.

Knight describes the trip to the Shawanees thus:

The Colonel and I were kept between the chiefs but 
the other eleven prisoners were ahead with the band of 
Indians. Ever so often we saw one of them laying on 
the road tomahawked. Every Indian we met struck us 
with their fists or sticks. Girty told the Colonel 
(Crawford) they intended to burn him. The Indians took 
their guns and fired the powder against his burning 
body and took sticks from the fire and poked him. The 
squaws poured burning embers on him and while he was 
still alive they scalped him. His scalp was repeatedly 
thrown in my face and they shouted 'Your great Captain.' 
I was taken away at that point but the next morning saw 
only a part of the charred bones of Crawford in the 
ashes of the fire.

Knight was securely bound and placed in the custody of one of the savages 
during the pursuit of the fleeing colonists. One morning, while his captor 
was putting wood on a fire, Knight knocked him into it and fled with his 
rifle. Twenty-one days later he arrived at Fort Pitt to relate the experi­
ences of the fateful conflict. Hekewelder says that "Crawford was made to

100 Knight, 7-10.
101 Ibid., 13-14.
102 Ibid., 17.
suffer double torture for being in the company of Williamson and upon him the Indians fashioned their greatest barbarity. ¹⁰³

On the afternoon of June 6, the retreating army was attacked along a tributary of the Scioto River. The riflemen fired into the ranks of the oncoming savages a volley which temporarily broke the assault. A heavy rainstorm gave the disorganized frontiersmen a chance to resume their flight, but the scattered bands of savages followed them, taking every advantage of their disorderly state. Williamson, knowing his army would soon be captured part by part if they continued as a mob, proved his rank by again restoring order without stopping the retreat. ¹⁰⁴ In trying to elude the encircling Wyandots and Shawanees, the men were forced to plunge into a swamp. The whole unit was again broken into small groups and was at the mercy of the savages who hunted them down and killed many. The Indians seemed anxious to take as many prisoners as possible for that night's entertainment and torture. Colonel Paul was among those taken but managed to escape in the general confusion aroused by the other prisoners during the night when they fought those leading them out to be tortured. Eight of his men who were escaping with him were killed in the attempted flight. ¹⁰⁵ The harassing Indians followed the army for forty miles but did not make an attack when it halted to make a camp. From then on, only an occasional shot was fired at the colonists, and the savages satisfied themselves with the weakened men who fell out of ranks.

¹⁰³ Hekewelder, 338.
¹⁰⁴ Butterfield, 233.
¹⁰⁵ Sherrard, 20.
and lagged behind. Marshall wrote of the failure of the campaign on June 11, 1782, and a few days later the men were disbanded. This expedition had lasted twenty days and had accomplished nothing to account for the great loss of lives.106

During the remainder of the summer of 1782, the whole frontier of this area was continually molested by lurking bands of these same Indians. Hanna Town was burned and families were repeatedly attacked. Groups of the men who had been with Crawford continued to hunt the savages and forced them out of certain districts with heavy losses to the Indians.107 Since Crawford's campaign and these groups of avengers and their operations were not directed from the Colonial Army Headquarters or considered a part of the organized warfare of the colonies, the government refused for a while to grant pay or compensation to those who suffered losses and fought in the conflict. Later, however, Congress voted payment to be made to those who gave rations to the volunteers and granted pensions to the families of those who fell in battle. This expedition became recognized as a part of the War of the Revolution since the Indians fought were acting as agents of the British in their depredations in this area.108

In September, 1782, the frontiersmen were again aroused to organize another expedition to relieve the area from the ever-increasing boldness of the Delawares and Shawanees. Meetings were held in every settlement and the

106 Butterfield, 239.
107 Ibid., 264.
108 Ibid., 247.
residents were assessed, according to the value of their estates, to finance an army. The British were frequently seen in the assaults made by the savages and their raids were reaching as far down as Wheeling. Word of the end of the war came before this campaign of volunteers thus financed could be undertaken. 109 Further punishment for the ravages perpetrated against the settlers between the Allegheny Mountains and the Ohio River waited until the army of the newly victorious United States marched there before the turn of the century.

* * * * *

In the far northwest, the colonies had little dealing with the wilderness posts which were inhabited mostly by the French who had been permitted to stay among the Indians after the Peace of Paris, 1763. Few settlers had penetrated into this vast wilderness, that was poorly charted and was the sole concern of the British trade interests which maintained a few garrisons at some of the French towns. Nanchez, Kaskaskia, and Cahokia on the Mississippi River, Vincennes on the Wabash, and Detroit on Lake St. Clair sufficed to represent the sovereignty of George III, and the British exercised a very dubious control over the wild tribes that roamed the primeval forests. The commanding approach to this territory was Fort Pitt, from which, through the Ohio River and its tributaries, an army could penetrate with comparative ease to any part of the vast Mississippi Valley. It was over the ownership of this fort that civil war between Virginia and Pennsylvania had been raging for several years before the hostilities commenced with Great Britain. Disputes

109 Ibid., 276.
of this type over this, and other strongholds along the rivers, led the Indians to become dissatisfied with the settlers and to have recourse to the British for dependable service. When the Revolutionary War broke out, it was natural for these tribes to join the cause of the Crown and to operate with the Tories and Regulars. During the years 1776-1777, Colonel Henry Hamilton, the British commander at Detroit and principal administrator of the far west, busied himself with plans to overcome the disruption among the tribes caused by the Lord Dunmore's War and to prepare the savages for a concerted drive against the exposed frontiers. When the assaults against Wheeling, Harrodsburg, and Pittsburg showed the designs of a major campaign originating from around Detroit, the colonies moved to make a counter blow. Their intent was not the conquest of the west, but rather the disruption of the efforts of Hamilton.

In the autumn of 1777, George Rogers Clark returned to Virginia from the Kentucky territory, after having settled the dispute between Virginia and the Henderson Company. He had assured the new settlements a freer existence and now was trying to obtain a government for them and some means of defense against the Indians. Finding the country as a whole in an alarming situation because of the British activity among the Indians on the frontiers, he began encouraging a campaign into the Illinois country with a blow that would equal the recent overthrow of Burgoyne on the Hudson. He had sent spies


111 Ibid., 22.
into the backcountry without giving them any idea of his purpose, and from
the data they gave him he formed a plan by which he hoped to check Hamilton
with one sudden drive. He wrote to Patrick Henry that the British garrison
had been removed from Kaskaskia to strengthen the forces at Detroit and
Niagara, and that the French were not strongly attached to the British, in
spite of their fear of the colonial frontiersmen. In December, 1777, he
presented his complete plan of invasion to Governor Henry and won his immedi-
ate approval. Not long after he had the support of Thomas Jefferson, George
Mason, and George Wythe, members of the Governor's council. The charter he
received permitted him to offer a bounty of 300 acres of the colony's land to
all who would join in the expedition. The whole plan was kept secret, for
Virginia had an empty treasury and a reluctant tax paying populace. Clark
was commissioned a Lieutenant-Colonel and authorized to raise seven companies
of fifty men each from anywhere in Virginia. He was advanced 1,200 pounds
sterling in depreciated currency and given an order for the commanding off-
cer of Fort Pitt to supply him with the necessary boats, ammunition, and
supplies. According to strict interpretation of his orders he was out
only in defense of Virginia, but in a private letter from Patrick Henry dated
January 2, 1778, he was directed to hasten with this force for an attack on
the post of Kaskaskia. In this letter, Henry asked him to treat the whites

112 James Alton James, Ed., George Rogers Clark Papers 1771-1781. Illinois
State Historical Library, "Virginia Series, VIII," Springfield, 1912,
George Rogers Clark's Diary, 32.

113 ibid., Patrick Henry to Clark, 34.
humanely if they showed any attachment for the State of Virginia.\textsuperscript{114} Nothing is mentioned as to the treatment of the Indians, or on what terms a peace should be established with them. These warriors were hated by all the frontiersmen, and their massacres in Kentucky were unlimited in barbarity. The men on the expedition had joined for the sole purpose of chastising these savages, and there could be no mercy expected from them when they met the Indians.

Evidently Clark did not at this time share with anyone his secret thought of continuing on to take Detroit once he had finished his conquests in the Illinois country.\textsuperscript{115} By May 12, he had selected his army, secured his supplies, and set out for the Ohio Falls. At this point he first revealed the mission he was leading the men on, and he received a great ovation from his troops. They were eager to reach their destination and after six days marching were in sight of the Fort of Kaskaskia. While one division surrounded the fort, Clark took another through the unlatched gates and followed their guide, John Sanders, to the quarters of Governor Rochéblave. The entry of the fort was a total surprise to the inhabitants and not a shot was fired to get the surrender of the post. The people were terrified at the sight of the frontiersmen filling the settlement; and, according to the letter Clark wrote to Mason, "giving all for lost, their lives were all they could dare beg for, which they did with the greatest fervency; they were willing to be slaves to

\textsuperscript{114}Clark, Patrick Henry to Clark, Jan. 12, 1778, 96.

\textsuperscript{115}Clark's Papers, Clark to George Mason, Nov. 19, 1779, 116.
save their families."116 This fear had been instilled in the frontier French by the British in the same manner as had been done among the Indians. When Clark had explained the cause of his mission and had promised freedom to the people and their Church, they willingly took the oath of allegiance to Virginia.117 Major Joseph Bowman led thirty mounted men against the other surrounding Illinois towns, which were likewise surprised and took the oath of allegiance without the necessity of fighting. At the same time other groups took Prairie du Rocher, St. Phillippe, and Cahokia. Father Gibault, a French missionary of Kaskaskia, seeing the lack of hostility among the frontiersmen, went to Vincennes with Dr. Laffort to gain the support of that post for the Americans. On August 1, they returned with the news that the American flag was floating over the fort.118

The period of enlistment of the men Clark brought with him had expired, and they were restless and anxious to return. Clark knew that without reinforcements it would be difficult to hold what he had gained when the British and Indians would make an effort to dislodge him; if any of his men left now he would be forced to withdraw altogether. The main dissatisfaction among the troops was the lack of supplies due to the difficulty of Clark in getting his bills of credit honored. Finally a shipment of goods arrived from New Orleans and with plenty of provisions offered them, they agreed to stay with

116 Ibid., Letter to Mason, 120.
117 Clark, 30. Also in Letter to Mason, Clark’s Papers, 121.
118 Ibid., 31.
him. Being assured of the friendship of the French and an ample source of supplies, Clark turned his attention to the task of pacifying the Indian tribes. Those in the vicinity of Kaskaskia offered to treat with him immediately on any terms of peace. At Cahokia, the effort to obtain a suitable peace treaty was more difficult. The Indians there did not trust the frontiersmen and doubted the change in alliance of the French. Many tribes came to the council—some traveling from 500 miles away. The principal tribes represented were the Chippewa, Ottowa, Potawatomi, Sauk, Fox, Miami, Puans, Ojibway, and chiefs of many of the lesser tribes from the head waters of the Mississippi and the Great Lakes region. Clark was stern with all these chiefs and dictated his own terms to them. When five chiefs were suspected of being in the plot designed to kidnap him at night and take him to Detroit, he expelled them from the meeting. Within five weeks he had made treaties of peace with twelve tribes and had their promises to recall all their warriors from the service of the British.

When the news of the victories of the rebels in the west reached Detroit, Hamilton prepared an expedition to regain the captured posts. Agents were sent among the Wabash, Miami, and Shawanee Indians with liberal presents to arouse them against the colonies. The Ottowas were feasted by the highest British officials to counteract the work Clark had done among some of their groups. By October, thirty Regulars, fifty volunteers, and 400 Indians began the 600 mile journey. After seventy-one days marching, they captured the

119Clark's Papers, Letter of Clark to Pollock, 330.
120Ibid., Letter to Mason, 125.
spies of Captain Helm who was in command of Vincennes. The force was within three miles of the fort before Helm knew of their coming. Panic seized the French at the sight of the British and they deserted Helm, leaving him but a single soldier with which to guard the fort. Resistance was useless, and he forthwith surrendered.121 Clark was at a festive ball given in his honor at Prairie du Rocher when the news of Hamilton's occupation of Vincennes reached him. He set out for Kaskaskia immediately and by morning had the defenses of that city ready for the attack he expected Hamilton to make. On January 27, 1779, Francois Vigo, a Spanish trader came from Vincennes and told Clark of the defenses of Hamilton. After a council of war with his officers, Clark decided to make an attempt to recapture the fort. Preparations were made and a company of volunteers under Captain McCarthy from Cahokia took a position near the fort to wait for the main army. One hundred thirty men volunteered to accompany Clark.122 On February 5, the armed galley "Willing" under Lieutenant John Rogers set out to take a position just below the fort to prevent any boat from descending the Wabash River; for it was surmised that, in case of defeat, the British and Indians would attempt to escape by this route.123 The following day, Clark and his volunteers marched out of Kaskaskia on a journey through plains flooded chest high by the swollen streams. His men and Creole Indians had no supplies to take, and there was no game

121 Ibid., Hamilton's Report of his Proceedings, Nov. 1776 to June 1781, 177.
122 Clark, Major Bowman's Journal, Jan. 27, 1779, 98.
123 Clark's Papers, Orders of Clark to John Rogers, Feb. 3, 1779, 100.
left in the area.\textsuperscript{124} When approaching the fort, Clark tried a little deception to try to impress the Indians in the fort with Hamilton that a huge army was marching against them. With a slight elevation between them and the city, the army was marched to and fro with only their flags showing above the rise each time as they approached a larger hill. Toward nightfall a letter was sent into the city proper warning all friendly citizens to remain in their homes and those who wished to fight to go into the fort with the "Hair-buyer General" and fight like men or be killed as spies. No difficulty was encountered as the troops marched into the city under cover of darkness.\textsuperscript{125}

Fifty men were detailed as guards in the city, while the rest went to the aid of the Creoles, friendly Indians, and volunteers from Cahokia that were already storming the fort. Constant firing all night silenced the cannon, and early in the morning Clark demanded Hamilton to surrender. The commander refused, saying his Indians were "not disposed to be awed into any action unworthy of British subjects." Two more hours of firing was directed at the fort before Captain Helm was sent out to ask for an honorable surrender. Clark sent him back with directions to Hamilton that if the fort did not come to subjection within thirty minutes, no terms would be possible. Hamilton agreed to meet Clark in the nearby French Church. The only terms Clark would consider were a total and unconditional surrender of the fort and all the possessions within it. Finally Hamilton agreed.\textsuperscript{126}

\textsuperscript{124}Clark, Major Bowman's Journal, Feb. 23, 1779, 103.

\textsuperscript{125}Clark's Papers, Letter to Mason, 141. Clark, 159.

\textsuperscript{126}Clark, Major Bowman's Journal, 166. Clark's Papers, Mason Letter, 143.
Hamilton were drawing up the capitulation, a party of Indians, previously sent out by Hamilton to take scalps and prisoners from around the Ohio Falls area, came toward the fort by way of the hills behind the city. The frontiersmen, hearing of their approach and the mission they had been on, went to attack them. In the battle most of the savages were killed. The six taken prisoners were paraded before the fort and then tomahawked and thrown into the river as an example to the Indians in the fort. After Hamilton surrendered on February 24, 1779, he was taken as a prisoner to Williamsburg, Virginia, with a number of his higher officers where he remained until the war ended. In March, those left in the fort that would take the oath of fidelity were released to go to Detroit. On March 15, some representatives of the Piankishaws, Peaurians, and Miamis came to the fort to ask for protection and to promise peace with the Americans. Captain Helm, the head of the civil matters of the town was appointed the superintendent of Indian affairs and received the treaty of these tribes.

Leaving Vincennes for Kaskaskia, Clark and his men noticed that each Indian camp they passed was freshly abandoned. The Indians still distrusted the frontiersmen and had spies constantly shadowing each move the army made. The Delawares near Vincennes continued to be arrogant, and after several raids by them in keeping with some boasts they made to Clark, he ordered the army to make war on them. All their towns were destroyed and all the warriors not


128 Ibid., Major Bowman's Journal, March 20, 1779, 164.
killed in battles were brought to the fort to be slain. The squaws and children were turned over to other tribes. The tribal sachems of the Delaware nation came to Captain Helm to ask for peace, but he told them that only Clark could grant them such a favor. When they approached Clark with the matter, he refused them any consideration because they had betrayed the trust he put in them when they had so recently signed a treaty with him and now had broken it. After several days of persistent petitioning, he made a vague promise of another treaty if they could persuade any of the neighboring tribes to act as a security for their future good behavior. Helm called an Indian council, and the Piankeshaws offered to accept the guardianship of the tribe. This ended the Indian warfare in this quarter.129

The summer activities of Clark's army kept the other British posts confused and uncertain as to their security. Toward the fall, the commander of Michilimackinack sent an expedition by way of St. Joseph to drive the traders out of northern Illinois, for they were suspected of being scouts. While this force of British and Indians were on their way up the river, one of their scouts reported the approach of the American army. The Indians, who composed the major portion of the force, immediately fled from the British saying that they had been invited on the expedition to see the battle between the two armies and not to fight. The Regulars and Tories were depending on the Indian support and had to withdraw.130 This untrustworthiness of the savages increased as the war progressed and showed the caution with which they entered

129 Ibid., Clark's Memoirs, 298 et seq.
130 Ibid., Clark's Memoirs, 301.
new conflicts. When the odds were evidently against the side on which they were fighting, they fled to avoid the harsh treatment of the previous examples they had heard of or had seen. Then too, the early bargainings they had manifested to make sure they were on the winning side were still being used by each tribe. As the news of Sullivan's campaign in western New York and Pennsylvania was reaching beyond Detroit, all the tribes began to be more hesitant in assaulting the colonists.

Clark's principal ambition in his campaign to the west was the reduction of the fort at Detroit. For this purpose he kept spies going to this British post disguised as traders and spared no efforts to win from the British the Indians that came within the Illinois territory.\(^\text{131}\) The messages he sent to the Nations directly allied to Detroit were cleverly devised to neutralize any acts on the part of the British which might be made to stir them up for new expeditions against the colonies. He told them that it was of little consequence to him whether they chose a war, or a peace, belt; for the greatest glory of the frontiersmen was in war. These men were in search of enemies; and, since the British soldiers were no longer able to meet them in battle, they would just as soon fight Indians. Those tribes that did not lay down their weapons at once were threatened with extermination. In this bold manner he was able to secure the neutrality of several thousand warriors.\(^\text{132}\) Having done all the work he thought necessary among the savages, Clark issued a call for volunteers to march with him against Detroit. The most recent

\(^{131}\)Ibid., Mason Letter, 146.

\(^{132}\)Ibid., Mason Letter, 149.
reports he had about the garrison there showed it was poorly defended and
that this was the most favorable time to besiege it. But his hopes for a
victory over the whole west had to be abandoned for the time, since only
thirty Kentucky volunteers arrived for the expedition. Many more were needed
to supplement his small force for this task.133

Early in 1780, the Shawanees and their allies among the Fox, Sioux,
Menominee, Sauk, and Winnebago tribes again became very troublesome along the
Ohio. On June 23, Colonel Bird lead 500 of these warriors with some Tories
against the inhabitants around the mouth of the Licking River. The settle-
ments were taken by surprise and almost everyone was taken prisoner. All the
homes were pillaged and the owners were made to carry their own possessions
to the Indians' camp.134 With the intention of investing the whole Illinois
territory in concert with two other armies that were coming by other paths,
Bird proceeded toward the Ohio by way of the Maumee and Miami Rivers. Upon
reaching the Ohio, he heard that an army of colonial reinforcements had ar-
vived at The Falls. The fear of the return of Clark to join this new group
forced Bird to begin his retreat toward Detroit without joining the other
two smaller forces. He attacked all of the settlements in his line of march
and was unable to restrain the blood-thirsty savages in the massacres they
perpetrated. The prisoners previously taken and the new ones acquired at
each post attacked, were mercilessly slaughtered during the long marches be-
tween settlements.135

133Ibid., Clark's Memoirs, 300.
134Stone, Life of Brant, II, 71.
135Clark's Papers, 136.
Clark began at once to organize an expedition of retaliation against the Shawanees for this and other ravages directed from Detroit. On August 2, 1780, he set out with 1,200 men for Old Chillicothe. On arrival at this principal town, he found that the savages had departed shortly before. After burning the buildings and destroying the cornfields, he began to search for the savages. Several miles beyond the town he was attacked by about 200 warriors from ambush. They slowly retreated to ambuscades, which they had previously erected when their spies had discovered his plan of march, and they gradually drew Clark's forces to the Picqua towns. Here they had a large stockade and 1,500 warriors, under Simon Girty and his brother, waiting for the attack. Clark used the cannon he had captured from the British at Vincennes to force the Indians out of the stockade and to make an attack on his troops. The battle lasted from dawn until after dark. The next morning only the Shawanees remained, the Delawares, Mingoes, and Wyandots having fled through the cornfields under the cover of darkness. A short time after the battle was renewed, the Shawanees also dispersed; but Clark did not think it wise to give pursuit with his small force and the great number of wounded. The stockade and town were burned, and two days were spent destroying their supply of 800 bushels of grain and 1,000 acres of corn in the fields. After returning to Chillicothe for a rest, he marched to Licking where he disbanded his army. The frontiersmen had taken no prisoners; but from those prisoners that later escaped from the Indians, Clark learned that the savages reformed their ranks ten miles from Picqua as they had planned and waited for him to
attack again. They had their squaws and children nearby, and if again over-
come were intending to sue for peace rather than try to flee without their
families.\textsuperscript{136} While Clark had been away, the Chickasaws and Choctaws under a
Scotchman had laid siege to Fort Jefferson, a protection he had made before
he set out. The troops from Kaskaskia marched against these tribes and re-
pelled the assault.\textsuperscript{137}

At the close of this campaign, Clark was again free to think of his
plans to capture Detroit. Jefferson was also eager to complete the destruc-
tion of the British power over the Indians in this sector in order to with-
draw the forces from the west. The decisive battles being planned in the
east would need all the manpower the colonies could muster.\textsuperscript{138} In order that
any question of rank might not interfere with complete exercise of authority
by Clark, Jefferson urged Congress to bestow a continental commission on him
through the Commander-in-chief. Under the existent rule the army was forbid-
den to grant such rank to officers in State regiments. However, on January
22, 1781, Clark was made a special Brigadier-General of “the forces to be em-
bodied on an expedition westward of the Ohio.”\textsuperscript{139} The cabals between the
leaders of the forces sent to his assistance in the previous expeditions
often caused long delays, and in some cases the loss of many lives. Clark

\textsuperscript{136}\textit{Ibid.}, Clark to Thomas Jefferson, Aug. 27, 1780, 453. Also \textit{Ibid.}, Henry
Wilson’s Campaign against the Shawaneees, 476.

\textsuperscript{137}\textit{Ibid.}, John Montgomery to Clark, Sept. 22, 1780, 456.

\textsuperscript{138}\textit{Ibid.}, Thomas Jefferson to Clark, Dec. 25, 1780, 485.

\textsuperscript{139}\textit{Ibid.}, Clark to Thomas Jefferson, Jan. 18, 1781, 495.
was helpless to solve the difficulty since many of these leaders held the same rank as himself.140

When this new expedition was publicized, Colonel Brodhead promised full support from the garrison at Fort Pitt.141 But he later began to fear an attack on his post from Niagara and Detroit by the British and Indians. At the time, the Delawares were agitating for a general savage war; and he refused to allow the regiment of Colonel John Gibson to join Clark, even though Washington had ordered it sent to his aid.142 It was at this time that the laurel-seeking Brodhead carried out his expedition to lay waste the Delaware towns in the spring of 1781. Clark, in the interim of communications with Washington to secure sufficient troops, collected the necessary supplies for an army of 2,000 men, at the cost of $2,000,000 in depreciated currency.143 Finally realizing that he could not get the number of troops he desired, he set out for Louisville with only 400 men which was hardly enough to guard the boats of supplies. In spite of the small force, he was determined to make some demonstration against the Indians. He dispatched a part of his abundant supplies to Fort Pitt, which was then undergoing a siege, and then proceeded toward Fort Wheeling in Indiana, where he expected to get more recruits.144

All of Clark's preparations for this campaign had been reported to Detroit by

140 Ibid., Clark to Thomas Jefferson, Mar. 27, 1781, 516.

141 Ibid., Brodhead to Clark, Feb. 24, 1781, 501.

142 Ibid., Brodhead to Clark, Mar. 19, 1781, 514.

143 Ibid., Clark to Thomas Jefferson, Aug. 4, 1781, 578.

144 Ibid., Clark to Thomas Jefferson, Aug. 4, 1781, 578.
roving bands of Indians. Elaborate preparations were made at the fort to withstand his assault, and the Indians were gathered nearby when the rumors became more numerous.145 The belief in these rumors was likely made stronger by the attack Colonel Brodhead carried out against the Delawares above Fort Pitt. But when the true situation of Clark was learned, the British acted to prevent the further strengthening of the frontier settlements and halt the march of Clark any farther north. The Rangers with 300 Indians under Captains Thompson and McKee were sent toward the Ohio to waylay Clark.

Another force of Indians and Tories at the same time surprised the Pennsylvania volunteers under Colonel Laughery, who were descending the Ohio to join Clark. Laughery had arrived at Fort Wheeling on August 16, a few hours after Clark had left. He immediately selected eight men to carry a letter to Clark to tell of his arrival and to ask what his orders were to be. These men were captured by Brant and from the letter he was able to know Laughery's strength and the route he intended to follow. The attack was well planned by the clever Thayendenaega. He allowed the larger forces of Clark to pass him and the next day fell upon the unsuspecting volunteers as they disembarked from their boats about ten miles below the mouth of the Big Miami River to eat and gather grass for their horses. When attacked, Laughery's men sought refuge in their boats and tried to cross the stream, but were driven back into the water by the savages. The Indians pursued the boats in their canoes and killed most of the men. Only forty were taken prisoner.146 Laughery was

145Ibid., Deposition of James Ballinger, Aug. 6, 1781, 582.

killed by a Shawanee several hours after the battle as he was sitting on a log surrounded by Brant and his warriors. He was scalped before he died. 147

The prisoners were entrusted to a drunken party of Indians by Brant to be taken to Montreal. A part of them lived to be delivered up to General Spike, and on May 26, 1782, Anderson escaped to bring the news of Laughery's death to the Virginia legislature. 148

After joining Thompson and McKee, Brant proceeded to within twenty-five miles of The Falls in hope of completing the blow with the defeat of Clark. Clark, however, was discouraged with the results of his efforts and was disbanding his force at the fort. His men had received no pay for several years and the inhabitants of the area would not give him any more supplies. The Indians hearing that he was not going to continue his expedition, refused to besiege the fort. They broke up into small groups and began to ravage the frontier settlements from the Illinois country to the line of forts in Pennsylvania. The Regulars, without support or a source of supplies, returned to Detroit before the severity of winter came upon them. 149

During the winter and summer months this succession of Indian raids well nigh devastated Fayette and Jefferson counties. Ammunition and provisions were scarce, and the settlers sought the protection of the forts or fled to the stronger settlements. John Floyd, writing to Clark, stated: "There is scarce one fort in this county but once a month seems upon the eve of breaking for want of

147 Ibid., Testimony of James Kean of Laughery's Company, August 25, 1843, 21.
149 Ibid., Letter of Fred Haliman to Lord Germaine, Oct. 23, 1781, 12.
men to defend it."\textsuperscript{150} And to Jefferson he wrote: "Indigent widows and orphans make up a great part of the inhabitants of this county who are bereaved of their husbands and fathers by savages."\textsuperscript{151}

Despite his previous futile attempts to reduce Detroit and bring the savages to submission, Clark again started preparing plans for another expedition for this purpose late in September, 1781. This time he wanted to direct all his power against the savages, with the hope of forcing the British at Detroit to surrender willingly when their allies were defeated.\textsuperscript{152} He proposed two possible routes for this campaign to cripple the Indian strength. The easiest route was up the Miami River against the Shawnees and Delawares, the other up the Wabash against the Great Lakes tribes. Clark himself preferred the latter course because it would bring him against the greatest bodies of savages at once, and he was prepared to risk everything in a single stroke. The terror spread by these tribes caused the evacuation of Fort Jefferson, and the people were contemplating a similar act at Vincennes. The situation of the Indians was such that he felt they were in as desperate a condition as he and the settlers were.\textsuperscript{153} When informed by Colonel Arthur of the events in the east and the probable surrender of the British there in a few months, he wrote: "I wish we could carry our arms to the banks of Lake Erie before a cessation would take place...The advantages that would accrue,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{150}Clark's Papers, John Floyd to Clark, April 26, 1781, 543.
\item \textsuperscript{151}Ibid., John Floyd to Jefferson, April 16, 1781, 530.
\item \textsuperscript{152}Ibid., Arthur Campbell to Clark, Sept. 3, 1781, 595.
\item \textsuperscript{153}Ibid., Clark to Kentucky Commissioners, Sept. 5, 1781, 596.
\end{itemize}
could add Canada to the Union."\textsuperscript{154}

The decisions of the Virginia and Kentucky Commissioners were against Clark's favored route and only half-hearted in regard to the Miami way. They suggested for him to put off the expedition until the following spring, reasoning that he would have a hard time getting men to leave for the winter and that the Indians were already suspecting an attack and would have all their supplies hidden from him. The commissioners commended him for all the work he had already rendered to the frontiers and proposed that he help provide adequate defenses for the settlers in the event of major savage raids during the winter.\textsuperscript{155} With this final decision on his hopes of winning Detroit, he became dejected; and, in writing on October 1, 1781, to Thomas Nelson, the new governor of Virginia, he said:

\begin{quote}
I have lost the object that was one of the principal inducements to my fatigue and transactions for several years past--my chain appears to have run out. I find myself enclosed with a few troops in a trifling fort and shortly expect to bear the insults of those who for several years have been in continual dread of me.\textsuperscript{156}
\end{quote}

Clark's last years were spent in poverty and obscurity at his sister's home near Louisville. He died in 1818.\textsuperscript{157}

The British influence in the Indian ravages in the far west continued even after the surrender of Cornwallis on October 19, 1781. This area did not

\textsuperscript{154}Ibid., 176.

\textsuperscript{155}Ibid., John Todd to Clark, 599. Also Joseph Crockett's Report, Sept. 6, 1781, 601.

\textsuperscript{156}Ibid., Clark to Thomas Nelson, Oct. 1, 1781, 608.

\textsuperscript{157}Fiske, II, 109.
have peace until all the forts were in the hands of the colonies and the Indians had to depend on them for all their wants. Nearly a year after the surrender, 500 savages, led by Regulars, Tories, and Canadians, attacked Briat's Station. On August 18, 1782, Colonels Todd and Trigg and Major Harland joined Daniel Boone in collecting 176 men to chastise these same Indians. They met the foe in a bend of the Licking River and in the ensuing battle Todd, Trigg, Harland, and Boone's son were killed with sixty-seven of their men. The remainder of the force retreated to the station. They afterward learned that, when the Indians counted their dead, they found they had lost four more than the frontiersmen; and forthwith delivered four of the prisoners to their young braves to be slaughtered. Colonel Logan was only one day's journey from the battle, and his forces would have turned the tide of the contest.158

The forts built during the war provided the frontiersmen with places of refuge and seemed to be an inspiration to the many new settlers that crowded the land offices to purchase Illinois property or claim the bounty land promised for their services in the war. The increase in population somewhat halted the savage depredations, and the forts in the more isolated areas were made too strong for them to take without the support of the British. It was not many years, however, until an offensive war had to be waged against them in an effort to push all the tribes across the Mississippi River to guarantee

permanent peace to new states forming beyond the Ohio River.

* * * * *

After Washington and Greene had successfully drained the power of Cornwallis in the south, there was virtually a complete cessation of hostilities along the tidewater area. The assaults of the savages under the direction of the British in the near northwest did, however, continue. The garrisons at Point-au-Per, Oswagatchie, Niagara, Detroit, and Oswego continued their activities as though they were in a war apart from the eastern armies. The attacks directed from Oswego were the most prominent after the forces from Detroit and Niagara had their setbacks during the campaigns launched from Fort Pitt and those made by Clark. In February 1783, Washington wrote to Colonel Marius Willett, assigning him to undertake an expedition against Oswego and giving him full instructions as to the purpose of the attack.159

Colonel Willett, having hired Captain John and two other Oneidas to act as guides, set out with his army. They crossed Oneida Lake on the ice the night of February 9, and by the next evening were within four miles of the fort. Their success depended upon a complete surprise of the enemy, for the weather was inclement and the troops were exhausted. During the night the guides led the army astray, and Willett was on the verge of entering an Indian encampment before he discovered his position. Whether this "error" of the guides was performed on purpose or merely a misjudgment on their part is hard to discern, but the attack had to be abandoned. After a few skirmishes with the Indians, the troops returned to Fort Rensselaer. Willett turned his men over

to the fort commander and went to Albany where he heard the official proclamation of peace read by the town clerk at the city hall.\textsuperscript{160} Although this effort to dislodge the British from Oswego was a failure, it merited its leader a highly commendatory letter from Washington, dated March 5, 1783. The Commander-in-Chief considered the fear Willett instilled in the savages was well worth the expense and hardships of the expedition.\textsuperscript{161}

The surrender of Cornwallis at Yorktown, October 19, 1781, ended the organized hostilities of the Regulars in the American Revolution. Provisional articles of peace were signed at Paris by the representatives of the United States and Great Britain on November 30, 1782; and an armistice was agreed upon, January 20, 1783. The news of the provisional peace and the armistice reached the colonial army headquarters in Philadelphia on March 23, 1783. Both were sanctioned by Congress by April 11. Exactly eight years after the commencement of the war at Lexington, General Washington formally closed the Revolution by his "Proclamation of the Cessation of Hostilities" on April 18, 1783. The final "Treaty of the Peace of Paris" was signed September 3, 1783, and was ratified by Congress January 14, 1784.

In spite of Von Steuben's command to Quebec on August 13, 1783, to order all forts still garrisoned by the Regulars evacuated, the British refused to move, saying they had no orders from an authoritative source for them to leave their posts. Lieutenant-Colonel William Hull made an application for the forts in July 1784, and John Adams tried again two years later with no

\textsuperscript{160}Ibid., 93.

\textsuperscript{161}Ibid., General Washington to Colonel Marius Willett, Mar. 5, 1783, 149.
better success. The reason for the British staying in the strongholds was obvious. They tried to keep the news of defeat from the Indians as long as possible for there were too many savages in their service that were entirely dependent on them. They also feared they would be assailed by all of the Six Nations and western tribes if they prepared to leave, for their failure to regain the tribal lands. Their forces were too weak to withstand an attack by the savages they had long employed to ravage the settlements. The traders and Tories were making the situation worse by telling the Indians that the natives were completely neglected in the treaty; that all Indian territory had been ceded to their enemies, the Thirteen Colonies; and that their personal security and all their hunting grounds were now in the hands of the frontiersmen. These rumors had the opposite effect of the intentions they were meant to accomplish. The Indians came, demanding for some explanation from the fort commanders as to why they did not win the war as they told the Indians they were doing all along. Seeing their plight, the British began to pose evasively as the sole protectors of the savages in their unhappy condition. Had they acted otherwise and started to leave, the savages, still eager for battle, would have begun an uncontrolled massacre. Another reason for the delay in removing the troops was the lucrative fur trade that England had made flourish around the forts in the northwest. This would cease as soon as the Regulars abandoned their control of the forts. The Loyalist and Tory elements that had sought refuge with the British army and led many of the assaults of the Indians were insistent on the retention of these posts by the Regulars. These unhappy victims of colonial success were wanted by their
former compatriots as traitors, and the Indians would not offer them protec-

The principal garrisons of Regulars in the United States after the sur-
render of Cornwallis were: New York, which was evacuated November 25, 1783; 
Point-au-Fer, Dutchman's Point, Oswagatchie, Oswego, and Niagara all in the 
State of New York; Detroit, and Michilimackinac, in Michigan; and Presqu' 
Isle near the shore in Lake Erie. 163

On July 11, 1785, Joseph Harmer wrote to Major-General Knox, the Secre-
tary of War, that three principal chiefs and twenty-five representatives of 
surrounding tribes came to Fort Pitt asking for a council. Cornplanter, 
their spokesman, had the original articles of the Treaty of Stanwix given to 
the Indians at the end of the war. At the end of his speech, Cornplanter 
said the terms were burdensome to the tribes and they wished to deliver them 
back to the new government. 164 Apparently the British from Niagara and 
Detroit were still trying to arouse the savages against the Confederated 
States by impressing on their aboriginal minds that the Indians were becoming 
slaves to the conquerors of the British, while the British themselves had 
never been conquered. The speech was devoted to the hardships the Iroquois 
were suffering because of their boundaries. Proportionately they had as much 
land as the other Nations, but what evidently irked them was their inability

162 Howard L. Osgood, The British Evacuation of the United States. (Privately 
Printed), Rochester, New York, 1895, 5 et seq.
163 Ibid., 5.
164 Ebenezer Denny, Military Journal of Major Ebenezer Denny Under General 
Anthony Wayne May 1, 1781 to May 31, 1795. Historical Society of Penn-
to have recourse to the posts held by the Regulars. On his arrival from London, Joseph Brant spread further dissension with the news he disseminated that the King of England had not ceded any Indian lands to the Americans. With this report, all the local governments were approached by the savages for a discontinuation of the limitations placed on them.\textsuperscript{165} The Treaty of Fort McIntosh, which had been concluded with the Shawnees, had to be explained to them again because of the discontentment they were showing. The boundary lines designating the lands allotted to the various Nations were pointed out to them on a map. When they expressed great disapproval of this system, the commissioners told them that they and all the other tribes who had joined the British to "take up the hatchet" against the frontiersmen, shared the loss of the war along with the Regulars and had to cede all their holdings to obtain peace. They were told that they were fortunate in being permitted to remain on any part of the territory they had forfeited by war. Efforts were made at this council to change the Indians from the idea that only the British could give them fair treatment and the supplies they needed. The savages left the post in a bad humor but did not make any attempts to force their opinions on the issue, for they feared the power of the United States. This dissatisfaction continued in the form of active resistance to the normal settlement of the northwest as long as the British remained.\textsuperscript{166} After they left the forts, the American Army took measures to finish the work of subordinating the Indians which could not be done during the perilous days of the Revolution.

\textsuperscript{165}Ibid., July 16, 1785, 215.

\textsuperscript{166}Ibid., Jan. 22, 1786, 272.
CONCLUSION

The political and territorial disputes of the frontier settlers among themselves and with the tidewater governments gave the colonies very little mutual grounds for forming a strong bulwark against the power of the British as the omens of probable hostility grew. The threat of Indian depredations had many times in the history of the American settlements been the signal for the formation of strong bands of unity in spite of all divergent ideals. Now once again this threat was lurking from the west as the British agents spread among the savages to agitate for war, and the dissensions from politics, religion, social and economic aims, and nationality motives were laid aside while the thought of a common defense was planned. Therefore, while Johnson, Carleton, Butler, and the other agents were striving to bring greater strength to more readily subdue the rebels, they were indirectly, yet positively, preparing the colonists to make a more united and firmer defense than would have been possible without the threat of the Indian assaults.

By the participation of the Indians in the war, the colonists could, at the same time that they were gaining their independence, punish the savages for the continual ravages of the frontiers and prepare the west lands for further settlement. The north and northwest frontiersmen gave inestimable service to the eastern forces by engaging the savage forces that otherwise would have spread slaughter and devastation throughout the borders of the colonies themselves. Even with all the support they gave some of the savage
Depredations reached far into the more settled areas, and at times the Indians were so much in control that the Allegheny Mountains formed the westernmost frontier boundary. Without the militias that guarded the forts the eastern forces would have had to provide troops for this purpose, thereby weakening the defenses against Howe.

Both the British and the colonies spent much time and money in their efforts to win the aid and support of the various tribes, and they both likewise suffered greatly from the part they played in the opposing forces. Had it not been for the extensive means the British used to obtain the use of the Indians and the numbers of them that they employed from the start of the war, it is quite certain that the colonists would have been satisfied to keep the savages neutral and never allowed any of them to join their service for combat. As it was, the British had so aroused the flame of war among them that it became the principle of either fighting with them or against them. Although the idea of placing a savage in battle against a regular soldier was distasteful to the colonists, they had recourse to this policy; and the Indians rendered them much service in the conflicts in which the British employed the like assistance.

Most of the tribes and individual warriors that fought with the colonial forces were those that lived within a colony or had been intimately associated with a group of white men. These were of a more civilized nature than those that acted with the Regulars. For the more distant tribes, the settlers represented the cause of the loss of their hunting grounds and the source of
all their troubles. Anxious to remove these pioneers, they willingly entered the conflict and acted without any controls on their barbarity. Most of the savages used by the British did not form an integral part of the organized army but ravaged almost at will, while those on the side of the rebels formed units within the larger forces and were always under control. There are no instances recorded in which colonial authorization was given to any band of warriors to go on expeditions without a larger portion of soldiers to accompany them, but most of the assaults directed from Oswego, Niagara, Detroit and posts in Canada were executed with the Regulars forming only a minor fraction of the army. This being the case, the atrocities perpetrated by the British allies far outnumber those of the colonial tribes in proportion to the numbers used.

The value of the use of the savages in the war is without doubt in favor of the British. Although they were of much assistance to them, yet the fear they had of them, the untrustworthiness they manifested when most needed, and their independence caused many of the most carefully planned campaigns to fail; and it would not be going too far to say that the British lost the war as a result of employing so great forces of Indians, and depending so heavily on their support. The colonists on the other hand, while holding the savages at bay, did not undertake any action until they were sure of their strength and of the disadvantages of the enemy. Their caution was an outgrowth of all their other experiences with the Indians. After having drained the power of the main army on the seaboard, time and men were allotted to the destruction of the power of the savages on the frontiers.
The possibilities of the outcome of the war, had the Indians chosen to unite and to fight as a body both the opposing forces, belongs in the realm of conjecture; but with their methods and numbers they were of the decided majority. The Indians, being of a primitive mind, did not realize that, by dividing and aiding both sides, they were bringing inevitable destruction upon themselves. As it was, they were actually aiding those who, once the war was over, would turn on them for their lands. The previous conflicts and the gradual encroachments of the settlers from the start of the colonies should have taught them this, but they had to learn it the hard way by having everything taken from them a few years after the war was over.
CRITICAL ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES

SOURCE MATERIAL

1 MANUSCRIPT--ARCHIVES--COLLECTIONS.
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William Stone, Ed. and Trans., Journal of Captain Pausch of the Hanau Artillery, Joel Munsell's Sons, Albany, 1886, gives the distaste of the Hessians for the use of the savages and is an official report, for the most part, to the Duke of Brunswick of the part the unit took in Burgoyne's Campaign.

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APPENDIX I

A Letter of Congress to the Eastern Indians.
May 15, 1775.\(^1\)

Brothers, the great wickedness of such as should be our friends, but are our enemies, (we mean the ministry of Great Britain) have laid deep plots to take away our liberty and your liberty. They want to get all our money; make us pay it to them when they never earned it; to make you and us their servants, and let us have nothing to eat, drink, or wear but they say we shall and prevent us from having guns and powder to kill our deer and wolves and other game or to send to you for you to kill your game and get skins and furs to trade with us for what you want. But we hope soon to be able to supply you with both guns and powder of our own making.

We have petitioned to England for you and us and told them plainly we want nothing but our own, and don't want to hurt them; but they won't hear us, and have great ships and their men with guns to make us give up, and kill us, and have killed some of our men; but we drove them back and killed a great many of their men. The Englishmen of all the colonies from Nova Scotia to Georgia, have firmly resolved to stand together and oppose them. Our liberty and your liberty is the same. We are brothers, and what is good for us is for your good; and we by standing together shall make those wicked men afraid and overcome them all and all be free men.

Captain Goldthwait has given up Fort Pownall to our enemies. We are angry at it and we hear you are angry with him and we don't wonder at it. We want to know what you, our good brethren, want from us of clothing or warlike stores and we will supply you as fast as we can. We will do all for you we can, and fight to save you at anytime and hope none of your men or the Indians of Canada will join our enemies. You have a great deal of good influence on them. Our good brothers, the Stockbridge Indians all join us and some of their men have enlisted as soldiers, and we have given them that have enlisted, each one a blanket and a ribbon and they will be paid when they are from home in the service, and if any of you are willing to enlist we will do the same for you.

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\(^1\)American Archives, 4, II, 610-611.
We have sent Captain John Lane to you for that purpose, and he will show you his orders for raising one company of your men to join with us in the war with your and our enemies.

Brothers, if you let Mr. John Preble know what things you want, he will take care to inform us and we will do the best for you that we can.
APPENDIX II

From the Boston Chronicle: Boston, March 12, 1782.
Extract of a Letter from Captain Gerrish, of the New England Militia, Dated March 7, 1782.

The peltry, taken in the expedition will, you see, amount to a great deal of money. The possession of this booty at first gave us pleasure; but we were struck with horror to find among the packages eight large ones containing scalps of our unhappy country folks, taken in the last three years by the Seneca Indians from the inhabitants of the frontiers of New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Virginia and sent by them as a present to Colonel Haldimand, Governor of Canada, in order to be by him transmitted to England. They were accompanied by the following curious letter to that gentleman:

'May it Please Your Excellency:
At the request of the Seneca Chiefs, I send herewith to your Excellency, under the care of James Boyd, eight packages of scalps, cured, dried, hooped, and painted with all the Indian triumphal marks of which the following is invoice and explanation:

No. 1. Containing forty-three scalps of Congress soldiers, killed in different skirmishes; these are stretched on black hoops, four inches in diameter; the inside of the skin painted red, with a small black spot to note their being killed with bullets. Also sixty-two of farmers killed in their houses, the hoops red; the skin painted brown and marked with a hoe; a black circle all around, to denote their being surprised in the night; and black hatchet in the middle, signifying their being killed with that weapon.
No. 2. Containing ninety-eight of farmers killed in their houses, hoops red; figure of a hoe, to mark their profession; great white circle and sun show they were surprised in the daytime; a little red dot, to show they stood upon their defense and died fighting for their lives and families.
No. 3. Containing ninety-seven scalps of farmers, hoops green, to show that they were killed in their fields; a large white circle with a little round mark on it for the sun to show that it was in the daytime; black bullet mark on some, a hatchet on others.

No. 4. Containing 102 of farmers, mixed of the several marks above; only eighteen marked with a yellow flame, to denote their being prisoners burnt alive, after being scalped, their nails pulled out by the roots, and other torments; one of these latter is supposed to be of an American clergyman, his band being fixed to the hoop of his scalp. Most of the farmers appear by the hair to have been young men or middle aged men; there being but sixty-seven very grey heads among them all; which makes the service more essential.

No. 5. Containing eighty-eight scalps of women, hair long, braided in Indian fashion, to show they were mothers; hoops blue; skin yellow ground, with little red tadpoles, to represent, by way of triumph, the tears or grief occasioned to their relations; a black scalping knife or hatchet at the bottom, to mark their being killed by those instruments. Seventeen others, hair very grey; black hoops; plain brown color; no mark but the short club or cassetete, to show they were knocked down dead or had their brains beat out.

No. 6. Containing 193 boy's scalps, of various ages; small green hoops; whitish ground on the skin, with red tears in the middle, and black bullet marks, knife, hatchet, or club, as their death happened.

No. 7. Containing 211 girl's scalps, big and little; small yellow hoops; white ground; tears, hatchet, club, scalping knife.

No. 8. This package is a mixture of all varieties above mentioned, to the number of 122; with a box of birchbark, containing twenty-nine little infants' scalps of various sizes; small white hoops; white ground; no tears, and only a little black knife in the middle, to show they were ripped out of their mothers before birth.

With these packs the Chief sends to your Excellency the following speech, delivered by Coneiogatchie in council, interpreted by the elder Moore, the trader, taken down by me in writing:

Father, we send you herewith many scalps, that you may see we are not idle friends.---A Blue Belt.

Father, We wish you to send these scalps over the water to the Great King, that he may regard them and be refreshed and that he may see our faithfulness in destroying his enemies, and be convinced that his presents have not been made to an ungrateful people.---A Blue and White Belt with red tassels.

Father, attend to what I am now going to say; it is a matter of much weight. The King's enemies are many and they grow fast in number. They were formerly like young panthers; they could neither bite nor scratch; we could play with them safely;
we feared nothing they could do to us. But now their bodies are
come big as an elk and strong as a buffalo; they also have
gotten great and sharp claws. They have driven us out of our
country for taking part in your quarrel. We expect the Great
King will give us another country that our children may live
after us and be his friends and children as we are. Say this
for us to our Great King. To enforce it give this belt.—A
great White belt with blue tassels.

Father, We have only to say further, that your traders
exact more than ever for their goods; and our hunting is less-
ened by the war, so that we have fewer skins to give for them.
This ruins us. Think of some remedy. We are poor; and you have
plenty of everything. We know you will send us powder and guns,
and knives and hatchets; but we also want shirts and blankets.
---A little White Belt.

I do not doubt but your Excellency will think it proper
to give some further encouragement to those honest people. The
high prices they complain of, are the necessary effect of the
war. Whatever presents may be sent for them through my hands,
shall be distributed with prudence and fidelity. I have the
honor of being your Excellency’s most obedient and most humble
servant.

John Crauford.
APPENDIX III

Letter of Ethan Allen to the Four Tribes, viz., Hocna-wagoes, Swagaches, Canesadaugans, and Saint Fransawas.1

Headquarters of Army,
Crown Point,
May 24, 1775.

Loving Brothers and Friends: I have to inform you that George the Third, King of England, has made war with the English colonies in America, who have ever till now been good subjects; and sent his army and killed some of your good friends and brothers at Boston, in the province of the Massachusetts-Bay. Then your good brothers in that province, and all the colonies of English America, made war with the King George, and have begun to kill the men of his army, and have taken Ticonderoga and Crown Point from him and all the artillery, and also a great sloop which was at St. Johns, and all the boats in the Lake, and have raised and are raising two great armies; one is destined for Boston and the other for fortresses and in the department of Lake Champlain, to fight the King's troops that oppose the colonies from Canada; and as King George's soldiers killed our brothers and friends in time of peace, I hope, as Indians are good and honest men, you will not fight for King George against your friends in America, as they have done you no wrong and desire to live with you as brothers. I always was a friend to the Indians, and have hunted with them many times, and know how to shoot and ambush like Indians, and am a great hunter.

I want to have your warriors come and see me and help me fight the king's Regular Troops. You know they stand all along close together in rank and file and my men fight so as Indians do, and I want your warriors to join with me and my warriors, like brothers, and ambush the Regulars; if you will, I will give you money, blankets, tomahawks, knives, paint, and anything that there is in the army, just like brothers; and I will go with you into the woods to scout; and my men and your men will sleep together, and eat and drink together and fight Regulars since they killed our brothers; and will fight against us; therefore I want our brother Indians to help us fight; for I know Indians are good warriors and can fight well in the bush. You know it is good for my warriors and Indians too to kill the Regulars because they first began the killing of our brothers in this country without cause.

Ye know my warriors must fight, but if you our brother Indians do not fight on either side, we will still be friends and

1American Archives, 4, II, 714.
brothers; and you may come and hunt in our woods, and come with your canoes in the lake and let us have venison at our forts on the lake and have rum, bread, and what you want and be like brothers.

I have sent our friend, Winthrop Hoit, to treat with you on our behalf in friendship; you know him, for he has lived with you and is your adopted son, and is a good man. Captain Nimham, of Stockbridge, is with him, and he will tell you about the whole matter more than I can write. I hope your warriors will come and see me.

So I bid all my Indian brothers farewell.

Ethan Allen,
"Colonel of the Green Mountain Boys."
APPENDIX IV

An estimate of the Indian Nations employed by the British in the Revolutionary War, with the number of warriors annexed to each Nation—By Captain Dalton, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the United States, who after several years a prisoner arrived at Philadelphia, where he published the following account:¹

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Nation</th>
<th>Warriors</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Choctaws</td>
<td>600</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chickasaws</td>
<td>400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cherokees</td>
<td>500</td>
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<tr>
<td>Creeks</td>
<td>700</td>
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<tr>
<td>Plankeshaws</td>
<td>400</td>
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<td>Oniactmaws</td>
<td>300</td>
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<td>Kickapoos</td>
<td>500</td>
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<td>Munsies</td>
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<td>Delawares</td>
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<td>Shawanees</td>
<td>300</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mohicans</td>
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<td>*Oneidas</td>
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<td>Muskalthe</td>
<td>250</td>
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<td>Reniers or Foxes</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puyon</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sokhie</td>
<td>450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abinokkie</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Warriors 17,690

*The Rev. Kirkland says there were 410 souls before the war, and that 120 joined the enemy.

#In 1783, Kirkland estimated the whole number of fighting men in the Seneca tribe at 600.

The thesis submitted by Brother Michael Gach has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

April 19, 1946
Signature of Adviser