A Comparative Analysis of Two Philosophies of Art: Jacques Maritain: Art and Scholasticism ; John Dewey: Art as Experience

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A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF TWO PHILOSOPHIES OF ART

Jacques Maritain: ART AND SCHOLASTICISM

John Dewey: ART AS EXPERIENCE

A THESIS
Submitted to the Faculty of
LOYOLA UNIVERSITY
CHICAGO
ILLINOIS
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements
for the
Degree of Master of Arts

by
Henry G. Geilen
1938
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CHAPTER I
THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY OF JOHN DEWEY

This chapter will confine itself to a presentation of John Dewey's philosophy and will make no attempt to evaluate it. This task will be reserved for Chapter VII.

For a clear understanding of his philosophy, it might be well to start by presenting his picture of "classical" philosophy and the character of its shortcomings as he conceives them. He argues that this philosophy was the accidental outcome of the antecedent experiences of primitive man in trying to adjust himself to a world of alien forces. These antecedent forces became fixed in myths and religious practices which were then later transformed by the Greeks into the logical forms of philosophy, creating the two categories of Mind and Matter, Theory and Practice.

THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN MIND AND MATTER
An historical accident

*  

Primitive man who lived in a world of peril sought security in two ways: (1) By inventing arts - PRACTICE. He made utensils and tools, built shelter, wove garments, used fire, planted fields, established associated life, etc. (2) By propitiating the powers which surrounded him - THEORY. He made supplications, offered sacrifice, performed ceremonial rites,
engaged in magic cults, etc.

Since practice dealt with the ordinary and theory with the extraordinary, practice was felt to be inferior to theory.

**PRACTICE**

Thought is uncertain as judgment and belief in matters of action and can never attain more than a precarious probability. It deals with individualized and unique situations which involve change, in which the plans of man are subject to frustration by alien forces.

**THEORY**

Thought deals with certainty; for through thought it was considered possible to hope for self-transcendence in the grasp of universal Being and thus have the consolation of certainty which is not entangled with wavering fortunes of the overt act. In the early history of man this assurance was provided by myths and religious beliefs.

Philosophy, as a Greek creation, inherited this realm which Religion and Myths had been concerned with and the form ceased to be that of the story told in imaginative and emotional style and became that of rational discourse observable to the canons of logic. The geometry of Euclid doubtlessly gave the Greeks their clew to logic. This along with the elimination of grosser superstitions made possible the ideas of science and a life of reason. This attitude fixed the conception of the two categories of reality - change and fixed
1. THE REALM OF PRACTICAL ACTIVITY (Change) is empirical, particular, material, probable, and contingent; in which practical judgment attempts an understanding to deal with an inferior region of being in which change rules and in which the resulting product is only BELIEF and the most that can be asserted is that things are "so and so" upon the whole, usually.

2. THE REALM OF TRUE BEING (Fixed Reality) is thought, universal, immaterial, certain, and self-sufficient; in which the office of knowledge is concerned with the disclosure of the Real in itself, of Being in and of itself and produces KNOWLEDGE which to be certain must relate to that which has antecedent existence or essential Being. What is known is antecedent to the mental act of observation and inquiry.

In this manner Greek philosophy fixed the basic pattern of man's quest for certainty through knowledge.

"The perfect and complete is rational thought, the ultimate "end" or terminus of all natural movement. That which changes, which becomes and passes away, is material; change defines the physical. At most and best, it is a potentiality of reaching a stable and fixed end. To these two realms belong two sorts of knowledge. One of them is alone knowledge in the full sense, science. This has a rational, necessary and unchanging form. It is certain. The other, dealing with change is belief or opinion; empirical and particular; it is contingent, a matter of probability, not of certainty...." 1.

1. Dewey; The Quest for Certainty, p. 20.
This framework of philosophic thought later became embedded in Christian Theology and through revelation and reason, formed the basic pattern for philosophic thought until the scientific revolution of the 17th century. It is said that one can find in Greek philosophical efforts the embryonic character of all modern patterns of philosophical thought. But aside from such a fact it can be said that the abiding Greek philosophy of a more enduring and persistent character was that of Plato and Aristotle, in which there was a division of mind and matter, theory and practice, an inferior order and a superior order, a lower and a higher reality, knowledge and belief, change and permanency, knowledge and action. It was this organization with which John Dewey finds fault and which the scientific revolution came into conflict with.

THE SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTION

(What it was and what its effects were on philosophy)

The scientific revolution of the 17th century effected a great modification of this system of classical philosophy by carrying the scheme of demonstrative knowledge through mathematics over to natural objects which gave it a validity that produced a rivalry between spiritual values, guaranteed by the older philosophies, and the conclusions of natural science. A mathematical science of nature couched in mechanistic terms claimed to be the only sound natural philosophy.
"The work of Galileo was not a development, but a revolution. It marked a change from the qualitative to the quantitative or metric; from the heterogeneous to the homogeneous; from intrinsic forms to relations; from esthetic harmonies to mathematical formulae; from contemplative enjoyment to active manipulation and control; from rest to change; from eternal objects to temporal sequence. The idea of a two-realm scheme persisted for moral and religious purposes; it vanished for purposes of natural science." 2.

Hence the older philosophies lost alliance with the natural knowledge and support that had been given to philosophy by them. Philosophy then made an effort to solve this conflict of interests by a succession of theories regarding the nature of knowledge, some of which are as follows:

**SPINOZA**

He thought to obtain from science a conclusive demonstration of the perfection of Being. Nature was to be one with mind. There was in his philosophy a complete interdependence of all things according to universal and necessary law—an idea which he found to be the basis of natural science 3. and the goodness of Nature was attributed to God.

The experimental trend of science, as distinct from its mathematical strain, was in conflict with Spinoza's unquestioned faith that the logical order and connection of ideas is one with the order and connection of existence. The same weakness would hold in the case of the philosophy of DESCARTES

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2. Ibid., p. 95.
3. Ibid., pp. 54 & 55.
who attempted to find the locus of absolute certainty in mathematical terms within the knowing mind.

**KANT**

The philosophy of Kant was a further attempt to reconcile the idea that the realm of ends and values authoritative for conduct was that of the revealed will of God; and in which the claims of reason are supreme with that of the knowledge of nature. For this purpose he made a two-fold division of territory between the objects of cognitive certainty and those of equally complete moral assurance. His failure was to so show successfully how these two fields could have a natural basis of contact and interaction.

**HERBERT SPENCER**

His doctrine that universal evolution is the highest principle of the physical world is just another phase in seeking certainty - Good in reality - towards which the evolution is moving.

John Dewey cites the theories of these philosophers, among others, to show that conflict and confusion are the inevitable results of the division of the world, into two kinds of Being, one superior, accessible only to reason and ideal in nature, the other inferior, material, changeable, accessible to sense observations. In the former case knowledge is contemplative and in the latter it is operative. This situation as the result of an historical accident has led philosophy into endless confusion and fruitless activity, as well as an impasse.
In connection with the modern findings of science. To re-establish itself philosophy must reconstruct itself on the basis of rationalizing the possibilities of experience; in other words it must become operative and experimental.

"The division of the world into two kinds of Being, one superior, accessible only to reason and ideal in nature, the other inferior, material, changeable, empirical, accessible to sense-observation, turns inevitably into the idea that knowledge is contemplative in nature. It assumes a contrast between theory and practice which was all to the disadvantage of the latter. But in the actual course of the development of science, a tremendous change has come about. When the practice of knowledge ceased to be dialectical and became experimental, knowing became pre-occupied with changes and the test of knowledge became the ability to bring about certain changes. Knowing, for the experimental sciences, means a certain kind of intelligently conducted doing; it ceases to be contemplative and becomes in a true sense practical. Now this implies that philosophy, unless it is to undergo a complete break with the authorized spirit of science, must also alter its nature. It must assume a practical nature; it must become operative and experimental." 4.

"Philosophically speaking, this is the great difference involved in the change from knowledge and philosophy as contemplative to operative. The change does not mean the lowering in dignity of philosophy from a lofty plane to one of gross utilitarianism. It signifies that the prime function of philosophy is that of rationalizing the possibilities of experience, especially collective human experience." 4.

Newton claimed to have arrived at his science empirically, but being influenced by the intellectual conceptions of classical philosophy, he postulated mass, time, space, and motion as absolutes. He arrived at this position of establishing these

unobservables by means of reasoning from observable data and not by methods in keeping with experimental science.

As a consequence, Einstein, in looking for a hypothesis to explain the empirical results of the Michelson-Morley experiment on light, undermined Newton's position in regard to absolutes. The discovery of the Heisenberg's principle of "indeterminancy" further weakened the possibility of Science dealing with unchangeable substance having properties fixed in isolation and unaffected by interaction.

"Heisenberg's principle compels a recognition of the fact that interaction prevents an accurate measurement of velocity and position for any body, the demonstration centering about the role of the interaction of the observer in determining what actually happens." 5.

"He showed that if we fix, metrically, velocity, then there is a range of indeterminateness in the assignment of position, and vice-versa. When one is fixed the other is defined only within a specified limit of probability. The element of indeterminateness is not connected with defect in the method of observation but is intrinsic." 6.

The importance for John Dewey of these two advances of scientific theory, is that they show in science at least, that the idea of absolutes in classical philosophy cannot be the objects of knowing. Science on the other hand makes progress through knowing the operations of fixed relations in the element of change in phenomena.

It has accomplished this by not studying things in their "qualitative" aspects but by reducing them to data and

6. Ibid. p. 203.
considering things as termini of natural "events."

"by 'data' is signified subject-matter for further interpretation; something to be thought about. Objects are finalities; they are complete, finished; they call for thought only in the way of definition, classification, logical arrangements, etc." 7.

"Water as an object of science, as H₂O with all the other scientific propositions which can be made about it, is not a rival for position in real being with the water we see and use. It is, because of experimental operations, an added instrumentality of multiplied controls and uses of the real things of everyday experiences." 8.

Knowing in this case becomes a matter of control of operations for the sake of achieving events. Knowing is experimental and is a matter of control of consequences on the basis of control over known operations in which knowing is a participation in the situation finally produced. In short it is instrumental and within nature. These two words, instrumental and within nature are very important in locating the nature of John Dewey's philosophy. Instrumental indicates that knowing is the means for promoting growth and not final values. And - Within nature - explains his effort to confine what is knowable to man and the operations of man in his mental operations, to a natural, and not a supernatural agency. For John Dewey, life is the problem of an organism in relation to an environment in which it must maintain a successful adjustment.

Failure to do so means extinction. Therefore, what is worth

8. Ibid, p. 106.
knowing for man are those relations which will enable him to survive and to grow in the capacity of giving greater meaning and therefore greater success to the process.

"Knowing is seen to be a participant in what is finally known. Moreover, the metaphysics of existence as something fixed and therefore capable of literally exact mathematical description and prediction is undermined. Knowing is, for philosophical theory, a case of specially directed activity instead of something isolated from practice. The quest for certainty by means of exact possession in mind of immutable reality is exchanged for search for security by means of active control of the changing course of events. Intelligence in operation, another name for method, becomes the thing most worth winning." 9.

From this point of view "action" is raised to a matter of equal dignity and importance with thinking, for only as things are done, does knowledge arise. For the proof and realization of knowing is in the successful outcome of an operation which in its outcome reveals new "data". This furnishes the basis for new operations and new controls, values and meanings. As has been pointed out, this conception of knowledge discounts the need for absolutes and universals represented partially in things, which the mind in its operation must abstract, or in some other manner produce. For John Dewey, the philosophy which made that a necessity, was an unfortunate accident of history as the Greek thinkers, who gave rational form to a quest for certainty that was antecedent in the life of the primitive man, did so before science was available as a means of knowledge or control.

Discounting the values outside of nature, which according to Dewey were merely the product of the fallacious formulation of the problem of knowing of classical philosophy, he is faced with the task of showing how sensation, perception, thinking, logic, ideas, universals, values, and meanings, etc. are possible in the realm of "experience," as exemplified by the methods of science in the realm of nature with no reliance, connection or obligations to the supernatural. For him, knowing which operates within nature in science, has proven itself as the only kind of knowing possible to man because it has proven the impossibility of knowing absolutes in science as postulated by classical philosophy. By this act of upsetting the theory of absolutes in science it discounts the theory of absolutes in general, and therefore, the only valid kind of knowledge for man is that which he has about operations within nature.

To follow his explanation of this kind of knowing, we will have to start with his description of what "experience" is. "Experience" is an undertaking that transforms a problematic situation into a resolved one. Only the individual things which are the fruits of intelligent action have in them intrinsic order and fullness of qualities.

"We have an experience when the material experienced runs its course to fulfillment. Then and only then is it integrated within and demarcated in the general stream of experience from other experience. A piece of work is finished in a way that is satisfactory; a problem receives its solution; a game is played through; a situation, whether that of eating a meal, playing a game of chess, carrying on a
conversation, writing a book, or taking part in a political campaign, is so rounded out that its close is a consummation and not a cessation. Such an experience is a whole and carried with it its own individualizing quality and self-sufficiency. It is an experience." 10.

John Dewey resolves his problem of "experience" within nature, as the basis of knowledge and action, by stating that mind and matter are two aspects of behavior instead of being identified as two separate categories which must in some manner breach the gap between themselves. He feels that the separation between mind and matter is unnecessary and the reason he advances for his opinions is best expressed in his own words.

"I think that the habit of regarding the mental and physical as separate things has its roots in regarding them as substances or processes instead of functions and qualities of action." 11.

Having established the fact that mind and matter are but two aspects of behavior in nature, as stimulus - response of "experience," it becomes necessary for him to explain how all the operations of a rational being are but modes of this phenomenon.

Matter is not an entity. It is the character of a natural event in its sequential order 12. and MIND expresses the character of a natural event in its meanings and its logical connections and dependencies. It is an organized system of

10. Dewey, Art as Experience, p. 35.
*meaning of which CONSCIOUSNESS is the immediate awareness of *meaning.

"There is an obvious difference between mind and consciousness; meaning and idea. Mind denotes the whole system of meanings as they are embodied in the workings of organic life; consciousness in a being with language denotes an awareness or perception of meanings; it is the perception of actual events, whether past, contemporary or future, in their meanings, the having of actual ideas...Mind is contextual and persistent; consciousness is focal and transitive." 13.

SENSATION

John Dewey holds that sensations are not parts of any knowledge but are merely the stimuli for an act of inquiry which will bring about an adjustment with the environment. They are merely stimuli to reflection and inference. 14.

PERCEPTION

Perception furnishes the problem for knowing by referring the present to its consequences. It is something to be known not an object of knowledge. It selects from the mass of presented qualities those which throw light on the nature of the problem with a view to making them the basis of the problematic situation. 15., 16.

Imagination is the gateway through which meanings derived from previous experiences enter into a relation with the

*The term meaning as used in this context will be fully explained later.

present situation. It is also the method by which an enactment of the means - consequences can be tried out without the organism getting involved in any overt action. 17., 18.

**INTUITION**

To explain this phenomenon, Dewey establishes a field of "organic activities and receptivities" which are natural to the organism and which are subconscious in their character, but which unconsciously give us the "immediate qualitative feel" of rightness or wrongness about our conscious selections of data and meanings to be used in successfully resolving our problems. Between the purely subconscious operation of these organic activities, and our conscious field of operation is a meeting ground of the two, called the "fringe" which is the field of operation of intuition.

"Apart from language, from imputed and inferred meaning, we continually engage in an immense multitude of immediate organic selections, rejections, welcomings, expulsions, appropriations, withdrawals, shrinkings, expansions, elations, and dejections, attacks, wardings off, of the most minute, vibrantly delicate nature. We are not aware of the qualities of many of or most of these acts; we do not objectively distinguish and identify them. Yet they exist as feelings and qualities and have enormous directive effect on our behavior. If, for example, certain sensory qualities of which we are not cognitively aware cease to exist, we cannot stand or control our posture and movements. In a thoroughly normal organism, these "feelings" have an efficiency of operation which it is impossible for thought to match. Even our most highly intellectualized operations depend upon them as a "fringe" by which to guide our inferential

17. Dewey; *Art as Experience*, p. 272.
18. Dewey; *Experience and Nature*, p. 29.
movements. They give us our sense of rightness or wrongness. Formulated discourse is mainly but a selected statement of what we wish to retain among all these incipient starts, followed by ups and breaking off. These qualities are the stuff of "intuitions" and in actuality the difference between an intuitive and an analytical person is at most a matter of degree of relative emphasis. The "reasoning" person is one who makes his "intuitions" more articulate, more deliverable in speech as explicit sequence of initial premises, jointures, and conclusions." 19.

**REFLECTION**

Reflection in John Dewey's theory is not a going back to an earlier more certain form of knowledge. It is not an "identification" with something else that is known immediately or intuitively. It is rather consulting what is already known to get our bearings in a new situation, the outcome of which, as in the case of the Michelson-Morley experiment, may be something which causes men to revise what they thought they previously knew. This was the case in the experimental discovery that the velocity of light remains the same when measured either with or against the direction of the earth's surface. It is essential for the construction of a hypothesis which will result in a successful resolution of a problematic situation. 20.

**MEMORY**

Memory is our awareness of the values and meanings contained in our past experiences. 21.

19. Ibid., pp. 299-300.
INTELLIGENCE, JUDGMENTS, and REASON

Intelligence is the capacity to estimate the possibilities of a situation and to act in accordance with this estimate. It involves the selection and arrangement of means to effect consequences and with a choice of what we take as our ends. Whenever intelligence operates, things are judged in their capacity of signs of other things. It consists in grasping relationships. 22.

Reason is experimental intelligence, conceived after the pattern of science. 23.

MEANING- IDEAS- THOUGHT

It is also advisable to treat these three items together because of the close interrelation of their operations. In fact they are merely ways of designating how nature operates; the operation being one interrelated whole of which the various names we give to certain phases of the operation merely brings into relief certain elements that we wish to observe more closely, like the "close-ups" in a moving picture. According to Dewey we cannot mark off certain operations in nature to give them existential character of distinct individuality without falling into the error of forming the rigid categories of classical philosophy which distinguished certain operations as belonging to matter and change, and certain others as belonging to mind and permanency.

22. Dewey; The Quest for Certainty, p. 213.
23. Dewey; Reconstruction in Philosophy, p. 5.
Meaning is a method of action as a means to a shared consummation that two people and an object can have in common. It is something that becomes a property of behavior, and secondarily a property of objects. It constitutes the intelligibility of acts and things.

"Thus every meaning is generic or universal. It is something common between speaker, hearer, and the thing to which speech refers. It is universal also as a means of generalization. For a meaning is a method of action, a way of using things as means to a shared consummation, and method is general, though the things to which it is applied are particular. The meaning, for example of portability is something in which two persons and an object share. But portability after it is once apprehended becomes a way of treating other things; it is extended widely. Whenever this is a chance it is applied; application ceases only when a thing refuses to be treated in this way...

It would be difficult to imagine any doctrine more absurd than the theory that general ideas or meanings arise by the comparison of a number of particulars, eventuating in the recognition of something common to them all. Such a comparison may be employed to check a suggested widened application of a rule. But generalization is carried spontaneously as far as it will actually go. A newly acquired meaning is forced upon everything that does not obviously resist its application, as a child uses a new word whenever he gets a chance or as he plays with a new toy. Meanings are self-moving to new cases. In the end, conditions force a chastening of this spontaneous tendency. The scope and limits of application are ascertained experimentally in the process of application." 24.

Meanings are possible because of "tools" which enable an action to be carried out. In this sense language and communication become most important "tools." Man is enabled to use the

24. Ibid, p. 188.
"tool" of language, to enact action without resorting to overt action. In this manner he is able to widen the scope of the possibilities of his activity. Language as symbols further widens man's sphere of action when these symbols become more exacting in locating the more important aspects of the many possible meanings attached to a given word. This process of refining and purifying words to a more confining aspect of meaning is a process of abstraction which reaches its highest form of usefulness when the abstraction reaches a stage where it is an identifying form of its own and can set up relationship with other things because of its liberated state. This is the case when water is designated as H2O. The term H2O permits a wider range of relationship with other things than that enjoyed by its term water. This is basically the explanation that Dewey gives for mathematical terms which were originally identifying terms for such overt action as counting, keeping tally, noting transactions, etc. When the process involved reached the stage of abstraction and number was the means of connecting previously unrelated events and objects, mathematics became an operation capable of being carried on apart from immediate overt action with a series of new relationships with other events which enormously increased the power of man to deal with nature.

"To pass over in science the human meanings of the consequences of natural interactions is legitimate; indeed it is indispensable. To ascertain and state meanings in abstraction from social or shared situations is the only way in which the latter can be
intelligently modified, extended and varied. Mathematical symbols have least connection with distinctively human situations and consequences; and the finding of such terms, free from esthetic and moral significance, is a necessary part of the technique. Indeed, such elimination of ulterior meanings supplies perhaps the best possible empirical definition of mathematical relations. They are meanings without direct reference to human behavior. Thus an essence becomes wholly "intellectual" or scientific, devoid of consummatory implication; it expresses the purely instrumental with reference to the objects to which the events in question are instrumental. It then becomes the starting point of reflection that may terminate in ends or consequences in human suffering and enjoyment not previously experienced. Abstraction from any particular consequence (which is the same thing as taking instrumentality generally), opens the way to new uses and consequences." 25.

**UNIVERSAL**

Is a relation of means consequence which defines an operation apart from the instance in which it receives overt objectification, although its meaning is found only in that actualization. 26.

**ESSENCES**

"Essence is never existence. It is the distilled import of existence. In it, feeling and understanding are one." 27. It is the meaning which has extensive and recurrent consequences. When potential consequences are important and repeated they form its defining and identifying form. 28.

26. Dewey; The Quest for Certainty, p. 163.
IDEAS

Consciousness may be considered the operation and "ideas" the result of that operation. They are the result of the grasp of meaning in its state of re-direction, re-adaptation or re-organization in the process of thinking. An Idea is the signifying of a meaning by bringing to a sharp focal form a meaning as a part of the whole context of meaning - which is Mind. It is the process of attending to a particular meaning.

THOUGHT

Thought is a mode of direct overt action in which the problematic situation has been carried over into a resolved one. It is not a specific power but consists of the procedures intentionally employed to resolve a problem. It is by this very nature, experimental.

"Thought and reason are not specific powers. They consist of the procedures intentionally employed in the application to each other of the unsatisfactorily confused and indeterminate on one side and the regular and stable on the other. Generalizing from such observation, empirical philosophy perceives that thinking is a continuous process of temporal re-organization within one and the same world of experienced things, not a jump from the latter world into one of objects, constituted once for all by thought." 29.

"But the constructive office of thought is empirical— that is, experimental. "Thought" is not a property of something termed intellect or reason apart from nature. It is a mode of directed overt action. Ideas are anticipatory plans and designs which take effect in concrete reconstructions of the antecedent conditions of existence." 30.

29. Ibid, pp. 67-68.
Mathematics as an operation of reasoning has long been pointed to as proof of the existence of a special property called mind because it was able to carry on its operations without any seeming relation to material things for its development. This seemed to be self-evident proof of the fact that man as a reasoning animal had the capacity of an operation that was not material in its character and therefore spiritual in its nature. This division into categories of Mind and Matter is what Dewey calls the "illusion" of classical philosophy and he takes the occasion in his discussion of logic to show that mathematical logic is an operation entirely within nature, having its dependencies on overt action, or to state it another way, through "experience," as he has defined "experience." It will be well at this point to let John Dewey speak for himself.

"The distinction between physical and mathematical conception may be brought out by noting an ambiguity in the term "possible." Any idea as such designates an operation that may be performed, not something in actual existence. The idea of the sweetness of, say, sugar, is an indication of the consequences of a possible operation of tasting, as distinct from a directly experienced quality. Mathematical ideas are designations of possible operations in another and secondary sense previously expressed in speaking of the possibility of symbolic operations with respect to one another. This sense of possibility is composibility (able to exist together) of operations, not possibility of performance with respect to existence...Its "non-incompatibility" (unopposed in character) indicates that all developments are welcome as long as they do not conflict with one another, or as long as restatement of an operation prevents actual conflict. It may be composed with natural
selection, which is a principle of elimination but not one of controlling positive development." 31.

EMOTION

Emotion is the resulting condition of responsive behavior in its immediate quality, when we are confronted with the precarious as a problem to be resolved. It marks off the even tenor of existence when it is uncertain of the present situation in regard to its issue. 32.

KNOWLEDGE

It is inevitably clear from the presentation of the previous material, what the nature of "knowledge" is in John Dewey's philosophy. It is the outcome of "experience," which is the experimental method applied to problems which arise from the necessary adjustment that an organism, endowed with reason, has to make with its environment. Science made its progress by being able to establish control of results by its knowledge, not of things as such, but of established relationships in the elements of change in phenomena. The advance in science which discredited Newton's physics because it postulated "substances" as time, matter, and space and motion, along with the theory of indeterminancy of Heisenberg, makes it clear to John Dewey that the theory of absolutes has to be abandoned; and the only thing that man can know are the fixed relations of change, and that this knowledge is one of growth gained

31. Ibid, pp. 159-160.
32. Dewey; Experience and Nature, p. 390.
with the result that all values in the moral, social and religious field are subject to guidance, growth, and development through the use of the experimental method in conjunction with the higher aspirations, ideals and hopes of man. Further, all the operations of mind and the higher aspirations, ideals, and hopes of man are within nature. They are phases of nature similar to that of physical phenomena, but on a higher plane.

"Hopes and fears, desires and aversions, are as truly responses to things as are knowing and thinking. Our affections, when they are enlightened by understanding, are organs by which we enter into the meaning of the natural world as genuinely as by knowing, and with greater fullness and intimacy. This deeper and richer intercourse with things can be effected only by thought and its resultant knowledge; the arts in which the potential meanings of nature are realized demand an intermediate and transitional phase of detachment and abstraction. The colder and less intimate transactions of knowing involve temporary disregard of the qualities and values to which our affections and enjoyments are attached. But knowledge is an indispensable medium of our hopes and fears, of loves and hates, if desires and preferences are to be steady, ordered, charged with meaning, secure."

"Affections, desires, purposes, choices are going to endure as long as man is man; therefore as long as man is man, there are going to be ideas, judgments, beliefs about values. Nothing could be sillier than to attempt to justify their existence at large; they are going to exist anyway. What is inevitable needs no proof for its existence. But these expressions of our nature need direction, and direction is possible only through knowledge."

35. Ibid, p. 297
36. Ibid, p. 299.
Being intellectually honest John Dewey must accept the inevitable conclusions of his philosophy of "experience," which finds all human acts and destiny within nature. This makes it necessary for him to deny the supernatural character of religion and therefore to deny the idea of God. Religion for him becomes that character of "experience" which is the contemplation of the consummation of our process of knowing with our higher aspirations and ideals.

"Understanding and knowledge also enter into a perspective that is religious in quality. Faith in the continued disclosing of truth through directed cooperative human endeavor is more religious in quality than is any faith in a completed revelation...But faith in the possibilities of continued and rigorous...There is such a thing as faith in intelligence becoming religious in quality." 37.

The chief purpose in making this short, but I hope complete, survey of John Dewey's philosophy is to furnish the background for evaluating his philosophy of Art. This survey has disclosed, I am sure, that "Experience" is the occasion for all human values, and in which therefore his explanation of Art must be looked for.

CHAPTER II

THE BASIC PHILOSOPHY OF JACQUES MARITAIN

* Jacques Maritain is a follower of the philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas and so the task of this chapter will be to present the broad outlines of St. Thomas Aquinas' philosophy. Since his philosophy, unlike that of John Dewey's, follows a "classical" pattern it might be sufficient to present it in chart form with some remarks in summation rather than to present it in essay form.

* GOD

There is proof of the existence of God. (S. T., I., q. 2, a. 2)

He is the FIRST CAUSE AND FINAL CAUSE (S. T., I. Q. 1, a. 2)

God's will the cause of things (S. T., I., q. 19, a. 4)

Four Causes

1. Final Cause
2. Formal Cause
3. Efficient Cause
4. Material Cause
He created
(S.T., I., q. 90, a. 2)
Prime Matter (Potentiality) joined to certain forms (ACT) resulting in a hierarchy in nature
(S.T., I., q. 18, a. 1, ad 2um)

1. inorganic - lack of movement
2. living organisms - vegetative - movement
3. animals - motor and sensitive - self-movement
4. man - motor, sensitive, and intellectual
5. angels - spiritual (acts independent of matter)

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**MAN**

Composed of

**BODY** and **SOUL**

Material and spiritual - the first principle of life
(S.T., I., q. 75, a. 3)
(S.T., I., q. 75, a. 1)

With certain

**POWERS OF THE SOUL**
(S.T., I., 2. 77, a. 1-4)

I. **INTELLECTUAL**
(S.T., I., q. 79, a. 1-13)

II. **APPETITIVE**
(S.T., I., q. 80, a. 1-2)

Sensitive and Intellectual
(S.T., I., q. 81, a. 1-3) (S.T., I., q. 82, a. 1-5)
Irascible and Concupiscible
(S.T., I-II, q. 23, a. 1-4)

WILL

Passions of

**FREE-WILL**
(S.T., I., q. 83, a. 1-4)

1. Love and Hatred 1. Hope and Despair
2. Desire and Aversion 2. Fear and Daring
3. Pleasure and sadness 3. Anger
(S.T., I-II, q. 25, a. 4)
HOW THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OPERATE

in the
1. PRACTICAL ORDER
   (S. T., I., q. 79, a. 11)
   (for the sake of something else)

   MAKING (Arts)
   What reason establishes in
   external things
   (S. T., I., q. 79, a. 11)

   ACTION (Morality)
   What reason establishes
   in the act of our Will
   in the use of our Freedom
   (S. T., I., q. 79, a. 11)

   The ultimate end is the first principle
   in practical matters
   (S. T., I., q. 1, a. 2)

2. SPECULATIVE ORDER
   (for its own sake)
   (S. T., I., q. 79, a. 1)

   Kinds of Knowing
   (S. T., I., q. 79, a. 1)

   1. Faith: assent to Truth as revealed by God (S. T., II-II, q. 8)
   2. Understanding: a gift of supernatural light and is the
      immediate grasp of Truth
      (S. T., I., q. 79, a. 9. ad 4um)
   3. Science: which produces knowledge demonstratively by
      attributing causes (S. T., I., q. 79, a. 9)

   Process of Knowing
   (S. T., I., q. 84, a. 1-8)

Mind

| Sensations - pure sense stimulation |
| Perception - recognition |

Body

Sensations

Idea

Image

Memory

Judgment: which determines that the form apprehended is good.
Reasoning is a process of passing from the known to the unknown.
We know a thing in a more or less vague way at the
beginning (general concept) and more distinctly as
we become more acquainted with it we make it more universal

The universal is an abstraction from the phantasm (image) by the
acting intellect as the known is in the knower according to the
mode of the knower, therefore, the material object must be known
immaterially in the mind.
HOW THE APPETITIVE POWERS OF MAN OPERATE

SENSITIVE POWERS

Passion accompanies bodily changes which makes it an act of the Sensitive Powers

\[ \text{PASSION} \rightarrow \text{PATIENT} \]

What it does to the patient

Is also given a form - LOVE.

This form is a principle of action which produces some action on the part of the patient towards the object.

\[ \text{PATIENT} \rightarrow \text{HABIT} \]

Is a quality which is the disposition in the faculty which facilitates the principle in action.

Habits are formed by acts.

\[ \begin{array}{c|c|c}
\text{Good} & \text{Bad} \\
\text{Suitable to human nature} & \text{Vice-discordant from human nature} \\
\end{array} \]

\[ \text{VIRTUE} \rightarrow \text{DESIRE} \]

Implies a perfection of a power.

A moral habit is a habit that one uses well.

\[ \begin{array}{c|c}
\text{Intellectual virtues} & \text{Science} \\
\text{Moral virtues} & \text{Wisdom} \\
\text{Theological virtues} & \text{Understanding} \\
\end{array} \]

Joy is in the possession of the object (when good)

Sorrow is in the possession of the object (when evil)
Anything is knowable in so far as it is actual (made up of matter and form); that which is potential in so far as it is potential, but not prime-matter since it is purely potential (S. T., I., q. 14, a. 3, ad 3um)

Intellect is potentiality and is made actual through knowing
Intelligence is a possession of the truth not a process
Opinion is belief
Knowledge is certainty
Essence is the definition of a thing
(De Ente et Essentia, c. 1)

Philosophy to understand what is immediate in experience in the light of first principles.

Metaphysics philosophy which goes beyond all material conditions.

Theology has GOD for its subject matter, deals with revealed truth.
(S. T., I., q. 1, a. 1, ad 3um)

Every agent of necessity acts for an end. Things which have no knowledge tend towards their ends as the result of their nature which is as disposed. The end of everything is its own perfection. Ends are principles of human action.

There are two kinds of Action.
Transient Action proceeds from agent to something outside himself.
Immanent Action is for the good of the agent.
(S. T., I., q. 3, a. 2, ad 3um)

GOOD
(S. T., I., q. 5, a. 5)
1. Is that which everything desires and everything is good in so far as it is perfect.
2. The Good is present in the Will as Knowledge
3. Truth is the same as knowledge
4. Truth is the only thing which satisfies the intellect.
5. The ultimate happiness of man is found in his intellect, and leads to

WISDOM (immanent action)
(S. T., I., q. 1, a. 6)
which is knowledge of the First Cause and is the life most proper to man since it is basically intellectual. The ultimate happiness of man is found in his intellect which is

BEATITUDE
(S. T., I., q. 3, a. 8)
which is the contemplation of wisdom for its own sake and is the ultimate happiness for man as a creature possessing reason.
CHAPTER 3

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART OF JOHN DEWEY

Since John Dewey states that the life of man is within nature in the form of "experience," it will be in "experience," as he has defined that term that his explanation of Art must be looked for. As stated in Chapter I, "experience" is not just a matter of undergoing and reactions, but consists in resolving a problematic situation into a successful outcome. In this process man is first aware that a problem exists; second, he forms a hypothesis for the solution of the problem, and third, he proceeds to act on the basis of the hypothesis and then evaluate its outcome. In this process of "experience," what is called Art is a certain condition attending the "experience" and therefore, there is no fundamental difference between art and "experience." Art is a quality that permeates experience.1. It is in the rhythmic movement from change to stability in experience which locates the esthetic. Life is a stream of change, but the esthetic is not a passing, fleeting thing, as "there abides the deep-seated memory of an underlying harmony, the sense of which haunts life like the sense of being founded on a rock."

"Life grows when a temporary falling out is a transition to a more extensive balance of the energies of the organism with those of conditions under which

1. Dewey; Art as Experience, p. 46.
it lives....the world is full of things that are indifferent and even hostile to life; the very processes by which life is maintained tend to throw it out of gear with its surroundings. Nevertheless, if life continues, and in continuing it expands, there is an overcoming of factors of opposition and conflict; there is a transformation of them into differentiated aspects of a higher powered and more significant life...Here in germ are balance and harmony attained through rhythm. 2.

The esthetic is the happiness and delight which comes at the moment of equilibrium, when the problematic situation has arrived at successful and intentional adjustment of the organism with its environment. It is an especially illuminating moment where the past meanings, present meaning and future meanings connected with the event add to the quickening of the "here and now." 3.

Art is a resting in the conscious resolution of the problematic. The scientist who is also interested in this same situation, is however, interested not in the same way. The scientist is interested in the resolution, but does not rest in it as the artist does. 4.

There is also no difference between Fine Art and Useful Art. It is a distinction which is extrinsic to the esthetic. Some things which were once the objects of use, may now be museum pieces, such as the Greek vases, which were originally

3. op. cit., p. 18.
4. op. cit., p. 15.
objects of every day use. Things are esthetic in the degree to which "the whole creature is alive and in which he possesses his living through enjoyment of an 'experience' which will contribute directly and liberally to an expanding and rich life." When a thing is merely useful it fails to employ the whole creature and fails to be an "experience." An "experience," as John Dewey uses the term, is one in which the whole creature operates to produce an expanding and enriched life; and for a thing to be merely useful means that it has not used the full resources of man.

"It is this degree of completeness of living in the experience of making and of perceiving that makes the difference between what is fine or esthetic in art and what is not. Whether the thing made is put to use, as are bowls, rugs, garments, weapons, is intrinsically speaking, a matter of indifference." Art is intellectual in the degree to which it orders the means to the end. In the preceding pages the words, artistic, and esthetic have been used in connection with the description of "experience." Our language does not provide a word which would combine the two, although that would be very useful in this situation. Artistic refers to the production and the esthetic to that of perceptions and enjoyment. It expresses the consumer's point of view rather than the producer's.

Art is also a process of selection of the means for the desired end. In that sense art can never be "imitation" of the

visual appearances of things, but is a creation which must select significant phases of things and order them to suit the purpose of a work of art. The process of selection is an interesting problem, for it requires the right selection of the means for the end in view, and is accomplished by means of a process which is difficult to define, and which might be called "a hunch." This "hunch" is also facilitated by the intensity of the emotion called out by the problematic situation. Esthetic experiences are emotional, but only in the sense that emotion is something which colors "experience" and is not something apart from it." 8., 9.

The term "emotion" must be further specified because the usual notion of emotion is that of something complete within itself and the outcome of an action, whereas according to Dewey it is an implication in a situation which is in suspense. When the implications in the suspense are great, they draw out meanings from the depths of our experiences which gives to the resulting act greater value and greater unity. 10.

Selection in art is from the meanings in past experiences; and when these are integrated with the new situation it creates the spontaneous element of the new production.

"The spontaneous in art is complete absorption in the subject matter that is fresh, the freshness of which holds and sustains emotion." What is expressed will be neither the past events that have exercised

8., 9. op. cit., p. 42.
10. op. cit., p. 67.
their shaping influence nor yet the literal existing occasion. It will be, in the degree of its spontaneity, an intimate union of the features of present existence with values that past experience have incorporated in personality. Immediacy and individuality, the traits that mark concrete existence, come from the present occasion; meaning, substance, content, from what is embedded in the self from the past." 11.

The quality of spontaneity in the meeting of the old and the new is what John Dewey calls "Intuition." 12.

In this connection it is also interesting to note that in his book: THE QUEST FOR CERTAINTY, p. 160, he refers to the ability to have an "intuition," as a kind of wit which is even more productive than thought.

Are is not a "truth" which has for its purpose use in other inquiries. "It is rather a signification of the integration of parts." 13. This integration of parts is what John Dewey calls the "form" of an experience.

Art is creative in the sense that the material of the natural world which is taken by the self, is assimilated and returned to the world in the form of a new and individualized expression. This expression can also become a part of those who perceive it, when they bring to it their own funded meanings of "experience," and recreate the work for themselves. In this sense, art is spoken of as being "universal," and is achieved by means of the "form" of the work of art.

11. op. cit., pp. 70-71.
12. op. cit., p. 266.
13. op. cit., p. 55.
"Form" is esthetic when it is freed from the local and limited meanings of an object and becomes the more deliberate unity of the organization or "design" of those elements which carry any event, object, scene or situation to its own integral fulfillment.

"Form is a character of every experience that is an experience. Art in its specific sense enacts more deliberately and fully the conditions that effect unity. Form may then be defined as the operation of forces that carry the experience of an event, object, scene, and situation to its own integral fulfillment." 14.

Art is, thus, that which produces a higher degree of unity in "Experience" and therefore gives it greater meaning. By this position John Dewey maintains the consistency of explaining all phenomena of life as occurring within nature. Art is but another way of experiencing the common world and its fullness in a fuller and more intense way and technique becomes the individual discovery of the proper relationship of means and ends.

While every work of art has its immediate quality, due to its unity; yet after this first experience of it, we are conscious of its larger unity with a wider sphere of reality. Thus while being a unit, with a distinct experience of its own, it also has the capacity for greater meaning in the totality of all possible meanings.

"We are, as it were, introduced into worlds beyond this world which is nevertheless the deeper reality of

14. op. cit., p. 137.
the world in which we live in our ordinary experiences." 15.

The esthetic experience is conveyed by the medium of "form", a word which implies an integration, through relations, of color, light, line, and space. This is the language of art and is common to the various plastic Arts. A knowledge of these principles of art does not result in the understanding of a work of art, but on the other hand a work of art is more likely to be known if we have an intellectual appreciation of these principles. It helps to prepare the ground for understanding.

As has been previously stated, art is not "imitation." That is, it does not attempt to literally reproduce the appearance of things but discovers in them, elements that are suited to its purposes. The selection of the appropriate elements in things is a process of "abstraction," which appears at times to amount to a transformation.

This effect is the result of its removal from its former context, or because certain effects are desired it may be "stepped up," like a "close-up" in a "movie." It is this factor of abstraction which makes it so difficult for persons who are accustomed to natural appearances in things, to accept them in their new environment. Art, especially modern art, sometimes, looks unreal and strange to them, not to say queer.

Some further characteristics of the esthetic form are continuity, cumulation, conservation, tension, and anticipation. 16. op. cit., p. 195.
They provoke a rhythm, of resolution and problem - and problem and resolution, etc. This rhythm is also a character of nature itself. "The terms 'natural law' and 'natural rhythms' are synonymous." 16.

In this explanation of the character of an esthetic experience there has been no mention of beauty. This is because Dewey considers it "properly an emotional term," 17, which he suggests not using, because the same idea is better expressed in the full explanation of "Art as Experience."

In addition to "rhythm" as an element of the esthetic, "balance" is a further defining condition. These two ideas are phases of the same organization of energies. Rhythm is "concerned with movement, with comings and goings, rather than arrivals." 18. Symmetry (balance) is concerned with intervals that define rest and relative fulfillment."19.

Besides the factors already mentioned as parts of the common substance of art there is space-time and volume. 20. The arts are all one in the sense that they have a common substance. They are distinguished in the sense that some medium is more appropriate in a given experience than some other. This factor permits us to speak of some experiences as dramatic, poetic, architectural, etc.

16. op. cit., p. 149.  
17. op. cit., p. 129.  
18. op. cit., p. 179.  
19. op. cit., p. 179.  
20. op. cit., p. 213.
"In art as an experience, actuality and possibility or ideality, the new and the old, objective, material and personal response, the individual and the universal, surface and depth, sense and meaning, are integrated in an experience in which they are all transfigured from the significance that belongs to them when isolated in reflection. Of art as experience it is true also that nature has neither subjective nor objective being; is neither individual or universal, senuous nor rational. The significance of art as experience is, therefore, incomparable for the adventure of philosophic thought." 21.

In regard to what is legitimate subject-matter for art, Dewey seems to think that anything which is a matter of interest to the artist qualifies as being legitimate. The artist is conditioned only by sincerity. What would give offense to Prudence is insincere. In conclusion it may be well to restate the fundamental conditions of art, namely, that it is a quality permeating experience.

"Art is a quality that permeates an experience; it is not, save by a figure of speech, the experience itself. Esthetic experience is always more than esthetic." 22.

**Summary**

1. Life for man is **within nature** as experience.
2. Art is a quality that permeates experience.
3. Science and Art are parts of the same problematic situation; a) Science is interested in the resolution of the problem. b) Art rests in the resolution.
4. There is no distinction between the Fine and Useful Arts.
5. The esthetic is the happiness and delight which comes at the

moment of equilibrium in the successful termination of a problem.

6. Art is intellectual as it orders means to ends that are planned for. It is not "truth."

7. "Intuition" is the way in which it selects the "means."

8. Integration of past meanings with the current problem gives art a spontaneous quality.

9. Art is not "imitation"; the process of selection is one of "abstraction."

10. "Technique" is the discovery of the proper means.

11. Art involves Balance, Rhythm, Space-Time and Solidity.

12. "Form" is the name given to the unified whole and is governed by principles common to all the arts.

13. Art is complete within itself, while at the same time a relationship to the universal is present.
CHAPTER 4

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ART OF JACQUES MARITAIN

The method of explaining the Philosophy of Art of Jacques Maritain will be, first, to locate it in the framework of the philosophy of St. Thomas; and then to describe its character and operation. For this purpose it will be well to restate that part of the framework of Chapter 2, which gives the location of art and which, in a measure, also describes its basic character.

HOW THE INTELLECTUAL POWERS OPERATE

1. PRACTICAL ORDER
   for the sake of something else

   MAKING (Arts)                      ACTION (Morality)
   What reason establishes in          What reason establishes in
   external things                     the act of our Will in the
                                         use of our Freedom.

The ultimate end is the first principle in practical matters.

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2. SPECULATIVE ORDER
   for its own sake

Kinds of Knowing

1. Faith: assent to truth as revealed by GOD.

2. Understanding: A gift of the supernatural light in the immediate grasp of truth.

In this framework, Art is located in the Practical Order as Making.

"Art belongs to the Practical Order. Its orientation is towards doing, not to the pure inwardness of knowledge." 1.

"The sphere of Making is the sphere of Art, in the most universal meaning of the word." 2.

Art is divided into two kinds, Fine Arts and Useful Arts. The Useful Arts are those which are done for the sake of something else. The making of a compass, for example, is not for its own sake, but finds its justification in helping to keep a ship on its course, while Fine Art is something made for its own sake alone. The Ancients did not make this distinction between the useful and the fine; they classed art as Servile and Liberal. The Servile Arts were for them those which required corporal labor and the Liberal those which did not. Sculpture and painting, under this classification, were considered Servile, while music, logic and arithmetic among others were listed as Liberal. During the medieval period the artist was simply looked upon as Artisan who worked for the common faith. The Renaissance on the other hand started the movement of isolating the artist from the common social life of society and set him in search of beauty as an activity in itself.

Maritain, however, has made it clear that the distinction between the Fine Arts and the Useful Arts is not what Logicians call an "essential" division, but derives its character from the

1. Jacques Maritain; Art and Scholasticism, p. 4.
2. op. cit., p. 7.
end pursued. Art can pursue both ends at the same time.

The difference between the Fine Arts and Useful Arts is that the Fine Arts possess beauty.

**ART AND BEAUTY**

Beauty was defined by St. Thomas as that which gives pleasure on sight, i.e., joy in knowledge of the object known, not of knowledge.

"It is of the nature of the beautiful that the appetite is allayed by the sight or knowledge of it." 3.

Beauty delights the mind because it possesses three factors:

1. Integrity, because the mind likes being.
2. Proportion, because the mind likes order and unity.
3. Clarity, because the mind likes intelligibility.

"Beauty is the splendor of forms shining on the proportioned parts of matter." 4.

The beautiful is not a kind of truth because it is connected with the intelligibility of things; rather, it is a kind of good which results from a vision of the truth which is a delight that produces love.

"---Contemplating the object in the intuition which sense has of it, the mind enjoys a presence, enjoys the radiant presence of an intelligibility which does not reveal itself to its eyes as it is." 5.

Beauty as has been stated before is a kind of good and not a kind of truth even though its operation concerns the intelligible. It is a good because "the function of beauty is to

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3. *S. T.*, I-II, q. 27, a. 1, ad 3um.
4. op. cit., p. 25.
5. op. cit., p. 169.
gratify desire in the mind, the faculty of enjoyment in the faculty of knowing." 6.

"The beautiful and the good are the same as regards the subject: they have the same foundation, namely, form and the good is therefore commended as beautiful. But they differ in concept. For the good, strictly speaking, regards the appetite, that being good which all things desire; and therefore it partakes of the nature of an end, for the appetite is as it were a sort of movement to the thing. The beautiful, however, concerns the force of knowledge, for things are said to be beautiful when they give pleasure at sight—The beautiful is the same thing as the good, differing only conceptually." 7.

This knowledge in the object known is a matter of intuition. It is a matter of the senses and the intellect. In the matter of the senses it relates only to sight and hearing. 8. The senses are a necessary part of the experience because man's intuition is only made possible by knowledge derived from the senses. It is important to understand this matter of art as an intuitive experience which utilizes the senses and the intellect in a manner which is not of the process of reasoning or thought, except secondarily. Maritain has phrased this problem with extreme clarity in the following quotation:

---"To understand this, we must conceive that it is the mind and the sense combined, or, to use such an expression, the intellectualized sense, which gives rise to aesthetic joy in the heart. It is thereby clear that the mind has no thought—unless secondarily and reflectively—of abstracting from sensible particulars, in the contemplation of which it is fixed, the intelligible reason for its joy;

6. op. cit., p. 167.
7. op. cit., p. 168.
8. op. cit., p. 23.
it is also clear how the beautiful can be such a marvellous tonic for the mind, without developing in the least its power of abstraction or reasoning, and that the perception of the beautiful is accompanied by that curious feeling of intellectual fullness through which we seem to be swollen with a superior knowledge of the object contemplated though it leaves us powerless to express and possess it by our ideas or make it the object of scientific analysis."--- 9.

While this last sentence would make it seem that reason can play no part in our comprehension, yet an explanation of the principles in art can help to create a disposition for the enjoyment, although the final act of enjoyment must be a matter of "intuition."

Beauty is transcendental and tends to carry the soul beyond creation in the realm of the spirit. Only some of the works of art make beauty their end and are called Fine Arts as distinct from the Useful Arts which are for the sake of something else.

Fine Art, however, remains in the realm of Making and the artist has the difficult task of selecting and arranging forms in matter to apprehend the transcendental quality in beauty. In this process he eliminates in many cases the irrelevent details of the visual appearances of things and exaggerates others in order to construct the vision of his aesthetic intuition. This is always a trial for the artist as the earth bound forms of the objects of nature defeat, by this very fact, the possibility of doing justice to the realm of the spirit. Unlike

those who know the freedom in the joy of the contemplation of Wisdom, the artist suffers the knowledge of the feebleness of his means - matter subjected to certain rules of art. This furnishes a problem for the artist, for the rules are "the high concealed ways by which Art itself, the working reason goes to work, and every artist is well aware that if this intellectual form ceased to dominate his matter, his art would be a mere sensual confusion." 10.

"The same technique may be given to the whole collection of these rules; but on condition of amplifying considerably and elevating the ordinary meaning of the word "technique." For it is a question not of material process only, but also, and chiefly, of the ways and means of proceeding in the intellectual sphere which the artist uses to attain the end of his art. Such ways are determined, like paths laid out before through a tangled thicket. But they have to be discovered. And the most closely approximating to the individuality of the work spiritually conceived by the artist, art strictly personal to him and discoverable by one individual only."11.

A work of art is thus "creative" and when a given result is obtained in "technique" as the result of discovery it is the property of that work only, for to repeat it in the work of another or in another work is to destroy it. This is the case in what is called "academic art." It is this trait of "individuality" in the works of art which further alienate the artist from the populace. It sets him apart as somewhat queer because of a failure to speak in the conventional term with which they are conversant. But the nature of a work of art sets the problem

10. op. cit., p. 39.
11. op. cit., p. 176.
for the artist and once he has found its solution there can be no compromise even though it make him the subject of misunderstandings. This problem also brings us to a discussion of Art and Prudence. In the light of our fuller understanding of the demanding necessities in the production of a work of Fine Art, it becomes evident that the artist cannot compromise the expression of his art in the interest of Prudence. Art's only obligation to the rightness of the thing expressed in keeping with the demands of its logic.

"Art, therefore, keeping Making straight and not Action, remains outside the line of human conduct, with an end, rules, and values, which are not those of the man, but of the work to be produced. That work is everything for art,—one law only governs it—the exigencies and the good of the work." 12.

Skill is only a "material and extrinsic condition", as the rightness of a work of art resides in the logic of the work in the mind of the artist.

"Art operates for the good of the work done, ad bonum operis, and everything which diverts it from that end adulterates and diminishes it." 13.

Because of the self-sufficient and autocratic dominations of the character of a work of art, because the rightness of a work of art is in a manner of speaking non-moral, there is often a conflict in the mind of the artist between his Art and Prudence. Maritain suggests that the proper reconciliation of this conflict can be brought about by a proper "humiliation"

12. op. cit., p. 7.
on the part of the artist to "make him as it were unconscious of his art, or if the all-powerfulunction of wisdom imbued everything in him with the repose and peace of love." 14.

Art, unlike Prudence, perfects the mind "without presupposing the correctness of the Will." In other words it is outside the moral sphere in one sense, since as a virtue, art cannot be an evil. This would be a contradiction. Art as art never makes a mistake.

"And therefore it is not a necessity of art that the artisan work well, but that he turn out good work; there would, however, be a greater necessity that the product of the art perform its function well, that a knife, e.g., should cut well, and a saw, saw well, if the peculiarity of these was to act and not rather be passive, because they have no control over their acts." 15.

While "the sole end of art is the work itself and its beauty"---, for the man working, the work to be done of itself comes into the line of morality and so is merely a means." 16.

While art is sovereign in its own field the artist as having his destiny in Beatitude is subject to morality and therefore his art is subject to a higher and, the final good of man. In a Christian there is no conflict, because what would give offense to man, as a Christian, and so in man himself, as a Christian, is resolved the possible conflict between Art and Prudence.

14. op. cit., p. 15.
15. S. T., I-II, q. 57, a. 5, ad. lun.
16. op. cit., p. 74.
"A work of art which is an offense to God offends him too, and having nothing left where-with to give delight, at once loses in his eyes all reason for being beautiful." 17.

"Here the testimony of a poet who was so jealous an artist as Baudelaire is of the highest interest. His essay on 'The Pagan School', vividly describing what an error it is for a man to address himself to art as his supreme end, concludes as follows: 'The uncontrolled appetite for form impels the artist to monstrous, unknown disorders. Absorbed by the fierce passion for whatever is beautiful, comic, pretty or picturesque, for there are degrees, ideas of what is right and true, disappear; the frenzied passion for art is a cancer which eats up everything else. And as the definite absence of what is right and true in art is tantamount to the absence of art, the man fades away completely; excessive specialization of a faculty ends in nothing. I can understand the rage of the iconoclasts and the Mohammedans against images. I admit all the recourse of St. Augustine for the overweening pleasure of the eyes. The danger is so great that I can forgive the suppression of the object. The folly of art is on a par with the abuse of the mind. The creation of one or other of these two supremacies begets stupidity, hardness of heart and unbounded pride and egoism." (Baudelaire, L'Art Romantique) 18.

This matter of Art and Prudence is a highly important one as can be inferred from the previous quotation from Baudelaire, and if I might digress for a moment from the main topic of this Chapter, I would like to call attention to its relation to practice in Art Education. There is at the present moment of writing quite a vogue for "self-expression" and "creative expression" in art education, as its most important product.

17. op. cit., p. 76.
18. op. cit., p. 218.
In the light of what has been previously said on the matter of Art and Prudence it can be easily seen that "self-expression" in art can become a potential moral evil, not so much in the nature of the kind of art produced, as in the fact that it is likely to produce excessive individualism, in which a child is taught to prize himself above any other good. In this sense then, the topic of Art and Prudence is a highly important consideration in the discipline of "self-expression", which in itself is not productive of evil, but is rather a necessary expansion of the mind in the direction of perfecting the moral end of human efforts. This sin of the isolation of art from other values in life seems to be productive of another sin, the sin of vanity, in which the artist attempts to transcend his earthly limitations by finding an abstraction in art forms that will discount all reliance on human experience as a contingent character of his expression, and makes his symbols of such purity as to be the direct informers of the transcendental sphere of existence.

Since the artist is also a man as well as an artist, and as a man, Prudence, in the interest of his highest good, takes precedence over any other kind of good. And again, as a Christian, the artist, by that very fact, will not conceive a good in the field of art which will not square with his highest good. In an age, however, which has lost in large measures its discipline of a Christian life, Art has assumed the
attitude of being a law unto itself, and the conflict of Art and Prudence presents a real problem. Even among the artists of strong integrity the line of demarcation between these two interests has been difficult to find and even more difficult to keep.

In summing up the Philosophy of Art of Jacques Maritain, we can say that Art is:

1. **Making** in the **Practical Order**.
2. Conditioned only by the good of the work itself and therefore outside the sphere of morality as a work of Art.
3. Art is however subject to Prudence by the fact that while art is its own justification the artist as man is subject to the higher demands of **Morality**.
4. That there are two kinds of Art
   a. **Useful** - for the sake of something else
   b. **Fine** - for its own sake

Fine art differs from Useful art inasmuch as Fine art possesses **Beauty** which is an end in itself.

**Beauty** is that which gives pleasure on sight and is a kind of good which is known by a kind of "**Intuition**." This "**Intuition**" is an intellectual grasp of the **vision** of truth as
a knowledge of the splendor in truth not of truth. To create this beauty the artist selects and arranges the forms of visual appearances of things to conform to his aesthetic perception. This is a process of abstraction, which must however not deny the sense experience of things of which it is a part. Beauty is a kind of supernatural light cast on things apart from their individual existence, but none the less, attached to them. Beauty is a transcendental which delights the mind because it possesses

1. Integrity, because the mind likes being.

2. Proportion, because the mind likes order and unity.

3. Clarity, because the mind likes intelligibility.

The rules of Art are the proper ordering in the mind of the conditions necessary to attain the end of a work of art. They are the individual discovery of the artist as dictated by the needs of the work of art. They are inflexible and inevitable.

5. Lastly, Art is a necessary good because it perfects a habit of the mind, and as such it perfects man in the direction of his final end in Beatitude.
It may seem strange, that two theories of art, one based on a philosophy wholly within nature, and one which includes a destiny beyond nature, could have much in common. But owing to the fact, that art as a human achievement, has a very unique and distinct character of its own, it is possible to recognize very definite traits, irrespective of how these traits may be accounted for. For instance, both theories agree that:

1. Art is a creation, and not an imitation of nature.
2. Creation involves the process of abstracting.
3. It necessitates "Intuition" in its production. Although the character of it would be described differently in the two theories, yet in both of them, it has a certain "gratuitous" quality.
4. It has "Form", although the definitions of it would be slightly different in the two philosophies.
5. It is Intellectual, but is not "Truth" as such.
6. It has an Individuality which is infallible in character, being governed only by the needs of the occasion.
7. It produces "Delight."
8. Skill is extrinsic to a work of Art.
9. Technique is a process of organizing the means toward the end.
10. "Academic Art" is mere repetition of an original path
of discovery in Art.

11. It is a means of enlarging the intellectual horizon of man.

This is quite a respectable list of common factors, for two such divergent philosophies to have. Among other things it indicates the distinctive and observable nature of Art. For in spite of the natural conflict of these two opposing philosophies, it has largely succeeded in maintaining an independent reality of its own, however the destiny of man may be conceived.
CHAPTER 6

IN WHAT THEY DIFFER

The two theories of art differ, as one would expect, in those points which are the immediate consequences of the two basic theories of philosophy on which their explanation of Art rests.

1. For John Dewey, Art is a quality that permeates "experience" and is wholly within nature, while for Jacques Maritain, it is a vision of the truth in its transcendental character which is apprehended by and through the sensible. In this matter we have the most striking difference between these two theories of Art, because it reflects the most important divergence between the two basic philosophies on which the art theories rest.

2. There is also a possible disagreement about the distinctions of Fine and Useful Arts. Dewey finds no cause for making such distinction. If a thing is merely useful, it is because it fails in its perfection as an "experience." Every "experience" that is complete, whether it involves an object of use, or otherwise, is esthetic if it is a complete "experience."

Maritain, on the other hand, divides art into two kinds, Useful and Fine. The Useful Arts being those which are done for the sake of something else, while Fine Art is something made for its own sake.

As I pointed out in a previous chapter, I think that it is possible to say, that in Maritain's philosophy, the useful
object could have a Fine Art aspect. For besides being made to serve a use, the object might also be considered as possessing a perfection of design which could constitute an interest in itself. (fine art). This interest would not necessarily detract in any way from its perfection as an object of use. It would simply be a more imaginative treatment of the object.

For Maritain, the element which gives the character of Fine Art to Art, is "Beauty", which is a "kind of splendor shining on matter." Dewey, on the other hand, mentions Beauty, as being only the description of an operation for which another term would be better, since the word Beauty has too many mystical connotations attached to it. He would prefer to speak of Beauty simply as "Art in experience."

Art and Prudence also present a problem to be resolved, as Art, which has no responsibility outside of the good of the work made, may use as its subject-matter something which might be in conflict with the moral good of man. Maritain solves the difficulty, by pointing out the impossibility of such a conflict in an artist who is also a Christian, since a lesser good (Art) cannot take precedence over the greater good in the life of man (Beautitude). What would give offense to God in a work of Art would necessarily give offense to the artist, as a Christian. Dewey does not speak specifically of this problem, except to infer that an offense in this matter implies
imperfection in "experience," and therefore could not be an acceptable resolution of a problem.

2. Intuition has been previously spoken of as an element which the two theories have in common, subject to certain reservations. The common element in this situation was mentioned as having a certain "gratuitous" quality. This means that in both cases intuition is not the product of an obvious effort of thought, but that it enters the scene as something in the nature of a gift. Dewey, however, qualifies this by his reliance on the funded meaning of our previous "experiences" while Maritain postulates it as a gift on understanding, using this word as it has been defined in Chapter 2.

4. They both speak of "delight" as one of the products of a work of Art, but again with a certain difference very similar to the one described in the preceding paragraph.

The differences which have been listed in this chapter are irreconcilable as they are the immediate consequences of the two basically different philosophies.
CHAPTER 7

CONCLUSIONS

Since both of the theories of Art, which have been presented in the pages of this thesis are logically correct in themselves, final justification of them must be looked for in the basic philosophical foundation on which they rest. This means weighing the merits of John Dewey's theory of Instrumentalism, with the Scholasticism of Jacques Maritain. They are opposing points of view in Philosophy and they can't both be right. Etienne Gilson in his book "The Unity of Philosophical Experience", page 293, defines the basic philosophy of William James by these words:

"William James was elaborating a pragmatic conception of knowledge, where ideas were not true, but became true in proportion to their practical verification."

This description will also serve to define John Dewey's position in philosophy and his theory of art, which rests for its validity on this philosophy, will have to share in the fortunes which criticism can level against this philosophical point of view. If John Dewey's fundamental philosophy of "Experience" is found wanting, the same fate automatically attaches itself to his theory of art in so far as it is directly affected by it.

This task of evaluation is not a simple one and could easily become the subject of another independent piece of research. Since, however, it falls partly within the scope of
this performance to say something about this problem, it may be well to sketch one of the important features of such a criticism, as a basis for deciding the relative merits of the two art theories of this thesis.

The chief criticism that can be leveled against John Dewey's philosophy of experience, is that it does not include all of Reality. No matter how satisfactorily one makes the explanation for a part of Reality, it can never stand by itself alone. At best, it can only be a fool's paradise, for that part of Reality which it denies or neglects, will be its undoing; for the mind of man is so constituted, that it will not be satisfied with partial answers.

"by his very nature man is a metaphysical animal." 1.

"Man's reason demands some answer to the questions that are forced upon him concerning the meaning and purpose of life; hence, Philosophy arises as an attempt to answer the questions by going back to the ultimate causes of things. Philosophy cannot give man the assurance that revealed religion can; but, whereas religion gives only the facts regarding the meaning and purpose of life, Philosophy tries to explain them. Among the divisions of Philosophy, Metaphysics is that part which goes beyond all the material conditions of reality, by abstracting from them, and derives from being-as-such the truth of Metaphysics. Then, will depend the reliability of all Philosophy. Scholastic Metaphysics is founded on Aristotle as interpreted by the thinkers of the Middle Ages." 2.

1. Gilson; The Unity of the Philosophical Experience, p. 307.
Aside from Dewey's statement that we can know only those things which we can control in overt action, he seems to find it a matter of further proof, that a concern with reality beyond nature, is beyond the reach of man's knowledge because of the endless confusion and conflict which such an effort has produced. It does not seem to occur to him that this conflict might only be evidence of the difficulty of the problem, not its impossibility.

"If such is the ultimate teachings of philosophical experience, the spectacle of so many blunders, ending invariably in the same scepticism, is more suggestive of hope than discouragement. Far from being a science long since exhausted, metaphysics is a science which has as yet, been tried by but few. What passed by its name was almost always something else, and it is better that we know it; that is, if we are to realize that misadventures which regularly befall that something else are wholly unrelated to the true nature of metaphysics." 3.

The most important part of reality which John Dewey excludes from his philosophy is "the final cause." He will admit of nothing except that which is within nature and he resolves the explanation of all happenings in these terms. The difficulty of this position is outlined in the following quotations:

"The existence of final causes is denied or ignored by all Mechanistic philosophy, that is, by all philosophy that attempts to explain reality in terms of mere matter and force. Final causality is not capable of measurement in mechanical units. Its equivalent cannot be found in energy expended or in work done. Yet to omit final causality from our account of reality is to leave an important side of reality unexplained. Efficient causes acting on

matter (the origin of which Mechanistic philosophy does not and cannot explain) can alter matter and be a sufficient reason for the existence of new combinations of matter. But reality is more than combinations of matter and energy. In the course of the changes that take place in nature, single beings arrive at the perfection that is suitable to them and in achieving this perfection they work out the order of the universe. Unguided causes cannot account for such results. Unless the result achieved was foreseen and intended, we should be compelled to call it accidental; but what is accidental cannot be the regular and uniform effect of the working of a cause. Therefore the foreseeing and intending of an end is necessary for the explanation of reality.4.

Further analysis of the philosophy of John Dewey would reveal many other difficulties of his position, but for the purpose of this thesis, this basic failure to account for all of Reality will have to suffice for the conclusion, that his theory of Art cannot merit the approval that can be given to that of Maritain's whose basic philosophy essays the interpretation of the sensible world in terms of the total Reality.

John Dewey's theory of Art, aside from its earthbound limitations, is a very complete and intriguing account of this subject. It is a well integrated explanation of all the conditions attending a work of Art and aside from the necessity of placing it wholly with nature, with its attending consequences, it bears a close resemblance to the theory of Jacques Maritain. I find John Dewey's position regarding the Fine and Useful Arts, especially important for the reasons which were given in Chapter 3. All in all, his theory of art, in all the

ramifications that his explanation of it takes, is a very illuminating and scholarly approach to the problem. It also has the merits of a simple and direct account, of a field which has suffered much at the hand of many philosophers who have shrouded their explanations of it in a nebulous fog of pseudo-mystical qualities which totally unfits it as a possibility in everyday living. They practically deny its benefits to all but a select few who have the leisure and the peculiar propensities to understand and enjoy it. In this world of esthetic nonsense, John Dewey's point of view is a welcome breath of fresh air.

As has been stated before, John Dewey's theory of art suffers in explanation but not as much in operation, except perhaps in regard to Prudence. In Maritain's theory, the higher good of man, as present in the conscience of a Christian, would prevent the pitfalls of evil in art. In the art theory of John Dewey evil productions in art are subject only to the control of the ideals of man as founded in nature. As the discipline is entirely dependent on the moral strength and integrity of the individual, it will suffer the limitations of human strength. Even in those of noble stature, in character, the limitations in moral strength of earth born forms will not prove sufficient to guide and direct the destiny of this noble form of human expression.

"Created good is not less than that good of which man is capable, as of something intrinsic and inherent to him; but it is less than the good for
which he is capable, as of an object, and which is infinity." 1.

"Since every creature is subject to the laws of nature, from the very fact that its power and action are limited; that which surpasses created nature cannot be done by the power of any creature." 2.

It is for this reason that Maritain's theory of art in its noble simplicity and fullness of value must be considered superior.

1. S. T., I-II, q. 2, a. 5.
2. S. T., I-II, q. 5, a. 7.
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The thesis, "A Comparative Analysis of Two Philosophies of Art," written by Henry George Geilen, has been accepted by the Graduate School with reference to form, and by the readers whose names appear below, with reference to content. It is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Daniel J. Morris, Ph.D.  June 8, 1938
Joseph Le Blanc, Ph.D.  June 9, 1938
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Joseph McLaughlin, S.J.  June 19, 1938