A Philosophic Solution of the Problem of Human Destiny

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A PHILOSOPHIC SOLUTION OF
THE PROBLEM OF HUMAN DESTINY

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A Thesis Submitted To Loyola University
In Partial Fulfillment Of The Require-
ments For The Degree Of Master Of Arts.
Vita Auctoris

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CHAPTER I
Introductory

There is no limit to the range of man's intellect. He can think of what is possible and what is impossible with equal facility. He can buildup whole systems of thought on either of these; and, by a mysterious dispensation of Providence, he can believe and act upon the impossible. No other explanation will account for the phenomenon where man denies the deepest truths of his being, unless we realize that his mind is "capacious of all things." So it is with immortality. Historians tell us that of all the truths which are the common possession of every people, two especially are most widespread and deeply rooted in the hearts of men: "There is a God Who is the Supreme Lord of creation;" and "There is an endless life after death, where the good are rewarded and the wicked punished." And yet, men have dared to deny both of these truths. The substance of the study which follows will be to presuppose the first of these and to prove the second. Our proof will be more than an attempt to show how reasonable it is to believe in man's immortality; it will be a convincing demonstration from reason that we must admit a life after death if we are to retain confidence in the first principles of human knowledge.
CHAPTER II

History Of The Problem Of Immortality

We might go through the whole history of philosophic thought, from Thales down to our own day, and review what the outstanding speculators in each century held and taught on the question of Man's future life. But that would be too detailed for our present purpose. Our study of the problem is itself a speculative treatise. By way of historical introduction, we shall be satisfied with quoting and commenting on a few representative men who have dealt with our problem at different stages in the progress of human thought.

Plato is the first of these. His writings are filled with proved and unproved statements on the reality of man's immortality. At times he seems to waver between conviction and belief, but even then we may interpret his mind in favor of conviction on the strength of other passages in his works. A typical instance of his wavering attitude occurs during Socrates' closing speech to the jury. Nothing moved by the sentence of death, the condemnation actually encourages him to vent his mind on the insignificance of death and the hope of an eternal life.

'What would not a man give, o Judges, to speak with the great leader of the Trojan expedition, or Odysseus,
or Sisyphus, or numberless others? What infinite delight in conversing with them and asking them questions. In another world they do not put a man to death for asking questions. For, besides being happier than we are, they will be immortal, if what is said is true.' 1

His record of a conversation between Socrates and some Athenian friends in the dialogue *Phaedo* clearly shows how certain Plato must have been that immortality is proveable to reason.

'Socrates: Then death attacks a man, the mortal portion of him may be said to die, but the immortal retires at the approach of death and is preserved safe and sound.

Cebes: True.

Socrates: Then, Cebes, beyond question, the soul is immortal and imperishable, and our souls will truly exist in another world.

Cebes: I am convinced, Socrates, and have no further objections to make.

Simmias: I have nothing more to say either; nor can I see any reason for doubting about the matter after what has been said. Still, I cannot help feeling a bit uncertain when I think of the greatness of the subject and the feebleness of man.

Socrates: Yes, Simmias, that is well said; and I may add that first principles, even when they appear certain, should be carefully considered. Then, when they are satisfactorily ascertained, you may follow the course of the argument with a sort of hesitating confidence in human reason. However, once the argument is perfectly clear, there will be no need for any further inquiry.' 2

Perhaps Aristotle was too intent on man's present life to give much attention to what becomes of his soul after death. The Philosopher's realism is in strange contrast to the idealism of Plato. It is no wonder, then, that Aristotle should confine almost his entire study of the ideal part of man, his
rational soul, to the limits of an earthly existence. His references even to the possibility of a life after death are rare. The whole of his De Anima contains perhaps four statements on the separate existence of the human intellect, all of which allow of contradictory interpretation.

We have a good example of Aristotle's uncertainty in two passages of his Nichomachean Ethics, which are only six books apart from each other but very difficult to reconcile.

In the third book, he is discussing the problem of "choice-making" and eliminating, one by one, the claims that choice is appetite, anger, wish, or a kind of opinion. After dismissing the first two, he continues:

'But neither is it wish, though it seems to be near it; for choice cannot be related to impossibles, and if anyone said that he chose them, he would be foolish; but there may be a wish for impossibles, as for immortality.'

Then, in the tenth book, he is describing the nature of happiness and showing how true happiness must consist in a life of contemplation. He leaves no room for any doubt here.

'If the attributes of intellectual activity are found to be self-sufficiency, leisureliness, and such freedom from fatigue as is possible for man, and all the other attributes of blessedness; it follows that it is the activity of the intellect which constitutes complete human happiness - provided it be granted a complete span of life, for nothing that belongs to happiness can be incomplete.

Such a life as this, however, will be higher than the human level: not in virtue of his humanity will a man achieve it, but in virtue of something within him, as it were, divine. And as much as this something is superior to his composite nature, by so much is its activity superior to the exercise of other forms of virtue. If, then, the intellect is something divine in comparison...
with man, so is the life of the intellect divine by comparison with his human life. Nor ought we to obey those who enjoin that a man should have man's thoughts, and a mortal the thoughts of mortality; but we ought, as far as possible, achieve immortality and do all that man may to live in accord with the highest thing within him; for, though this be small in bulk, in power and value it surpasses all the rest.'

The coming of our Lord divides the lives of the pagan and the Christian Plato almost to a year. Plato was born 427 years before Christ; St. Augustine died just 430 years after Christ. And if we were looking for some doctrine of philosophy to epitomize the differences between Paganism and Christianity, we could hardly find a better instance than the dogma of immortality. St. Augustine advances many arguments, founded on reason, to prove that man's soul is indestructible. Two complete treatises on the Immortality and the quantity of the Soul, are catalogues of such arguments. However, when he comes to rationalize on these reasonings, we are permitted to read what seems to be his true mind on the question.

One book before the end of his lengthy tractate on the Holy Trinity, St. Augustine approaches the problem of man's happiness. He first points out how inconceivable is real happiness without the element of permanence. Then he makes an important observation on the possibility of a natural proof for immortality.

'All those who already are or who sincerely desire to be happy, cannot help wishing to be immortal. A man is certainly not leading a happy life if he is deprived of what he wants; consequently, no life can be truly
beatific unless it is everlasting.

It is no small problem, though, to decide whether human nature alone arrive at the knowledge of what it spontaneously conceals is desirable. Once Faith enters in, that Faith which is in those to whom Jesus has given to become the sons of God, then no further question is possible. Granted that many penetrating thinkers have tried, through years of careful speculation, to solve the problem of human immortality by arguments drawn from reason, and that they were able to conclude to the immortality of the soul alone, still, they never proved that this life of happiness is stable and therefore truly beatifying. Their reasonings led them to say that the soul returns to the miseries of this life after attaining beatitude, but even those who knew better and believed that the soul remains, cleansed and bodiless, in endless happiness, yet had such unreasonable ideas about the eternity of the world that they equivalently denied their original doctrine about the soul.

Our Faith, on the other hand, promises us that the whole man, body and soul, will be immortal and so, truly happy. It is a promise which does not rest on the reasonings of men but on the authority of God. 1 3

There are nine centuries between St. Augustine and St. Thomas. In this time, the problem of a philosophic solution of immortality must have cleared itself of a great many obscurities because in St. Thomas' mind there is no hesitation about a reasoned answer to the question: "Is man's soul incorruptible?" He gives no less than eleven arguments in one chapter of the Summa against the Gentiles. Some of the strongest of these are commentaries on Aristotle, where he interprets the Philosopher's words on the possibility of certain forms continuing to exist after the dissolution of the composite.

\textquote{Aristotle}'s words clearly show that, although he called the soul a form, yet, he never claimed that it was not subsistent and consequently corruptible. Aristotle excluded the intelligent soul from the
The whole investigation which follows will be largely based on the arguments of St. Thomas. It is sufficient, therefore, to indicate here only how sure he was of the question on rational grounds. Later on, we shall see how far he went to prove not only the possibility but the fact of an eternal life. A certain fusion of his proofs will be necessary to bring out his complete doctrine on the matter. St. Augustine will also so frequently asked to illustrate and exemplify some principle which St. Thomas gives without explanation.

And now, just before entering on the inquiry itself, we can profitably read a few lines from Fr. Suarez to realize how convinced Scholastic philosophers have become, since St. Thomas' day, on the doctrine of man's immortality.

'I deny the assumption that we have no certain proof for our immortality. And more than that, there are many and convincing proofs which establish immortality. Some of them, which show that the soul is immaterial and therefore immortal, are taken from the operations of the speculative intellect. Others are drawn from the acts of the practical intellect - especially in the remorse of conscience, the dictate of conscience to act morally against the rebellion of the flesh and to chastize or even expose the body to death, if need be. Still different arguments are found in the affections of the will, which can have no rest except in God, which fears, by the sheer impulse of its nature, the punishment in an after-life, and desires that happiness which it does not find on earth.'
CHAPTER III

Nature And Effects Of Quantity In Bodies

If we could understand, by a kind of intuition, the nature of a spirit, we should not have to go beyond a paragraph to solve the problem of this treatise. As a matter of fact, we have no really intuitive knowledge of anything in this world; although our nearest approach to this is the knowledge that we have of material bodies. If we knew what a spirit is, as easily and completely as we know the nature of a body, we could immediately say that even when these two are united into one substance, the spirit is so independent of the body that, whatever happens to the latter, the former will remain substantially unaffected.

As is is though, all our first hand information is about bodies. Our earliest experience has been with material, concrete realities. Everywhere around us, whatever we touch, see, or hear is matter and body. The marvel is that we should ever have come to know anything else than "the bulk of bodies."

In the course of our study, we shall discover that just this power to attain to that knowledge of things other than bodies gives us the clearest insight into the nature of spiritual beings.

At the outset, we might simply call a spirit something that is bodiless, and then go on to describe the activities of a
spirit like the human soul. Our description would describe but it would not prove the character of man's destiny. We need more than a description of spiritual substance to see how man attains his destiny and why he must attain it in one way and no other. Consequently, we may not assume the radical denial of identity between matter and spirit, but must investigate whether there is a difference between them at all and whether it is so great that each reality is capable of existence apart from the other.

There is a clue to the method of our investigation in calling a spirit something bodiless. Let us first understand clearly and exhaustively the nature of a body and then, if we come upon an entity which shows nothing bodily in its makeup, we are beginning to handle the substance called a spirit.

Offhand, there seems to be an endless difficulty in trying to get a clear notion of the ultimate nature of matter or body - understanding by its ultimate nature, the last physical constituent which is common to every body. There is such a variety of corporeal things. No two of them have the same shape, weight, or color. Some are very large. Most of them are too small to be seen by the naked eye. Then, too, we are so well acquainted with them that whatever they have in common is liable to escape us because our practical use of material things depends rather on knowing their surface differences than their inner sameness.

But here, as anywhere in the study of philosophy, we must start from experience and then, by classifying the data found,
induce a general principle to account for this experimental information. Fortunately, we can begin by relying on the correct notion which people have about bodies. Let us call this a spontaneous common consent on what constitutes a body, or one of those natural judgments demanded for the basis of all knowledge which must be unmistakable if even the lowest savages are to be credited with rational convictions.

Accordingly, we begin by examining as many and different kinds of things as possible which are generally called bodies. We are not concerned here with any source of movement or generation which these bodies may possess and by reason of which we consider them living. The concentration is upon bodies as such - physical, natural, solid bodies. And what do we find?

The vast bulk of the visible universe falls under this classification. A few feet below the crust of the earth, organic life is rarely found, and then only in water, where oxygen may be had at least in solution. So again, a few feet above the surface of the earth, lifeless matter - synonymous with our present definition of body, is the only kind of reality known to experimental science.

There is no need detailing a long list of these different species of bodies and stripping them of their uncommon properties until we have analyzed down to what they share in common. The analysis is too easy. All bodies have quantity. Stone, minerals, water, atmospheric ether, magnetic waves,
radionuclides - all have quantity, i.e., all of them show one or more quantitative properties which will be more clearly described later on. This truism is variously expressed by St. Thomas.

'True body is found to contain anything except by quantitative commensuration. 1... A body is a divisible, continuous thing. 2... Every body has three dimensions, length, breadth and depth.' 3

However, it is well to keep in mind that this peculiar property common to all bodies does not make them what they are. Quantity does not, in itself, constitute a body. A measurable unit of matter, say a crystal of quartz, is not a body because it has the properties of size, weight and surface. These can all be made to vary under certain conditions while the substance, that is, the homogeneous, self sufficient unit, will remain the same. The only inference we draw at this point is that wherever we find a body we shall invariably find quantity; and what is more important, wherever we have quantity we always have either a body or at least something bodily.

Although it is not strictly necessary for the advance of our proof, we might use this common property to formulate a good definition of bodily substance. On the basis of a constant experience that certain substances are never, naturally, without a common accident, we may logically argue that these substances have a natural aptitude or demand for this accident. In the prevailing order of things, they cannot exist without it. And all the substances that we call bodies are bound up with
quantity in exactly this way. Allowing that quantity is only an accident, nevertheless we have a perfect right to define bodily substance as any self subsistent unit which is bound up with quantity. St. Thomas comes close to giving us the definition in so many words when he compares quantity with corporeal substance.

'Of all the accidents, quantity is the nearest to a substance.' 4

We are not particularly interested, though, in formulating a definition for bodily substance. We wish only to understand the intimate nature of quantity and see how inextricably linked it is with every physical body.

Philosophers have never really tried to define quantity because it is such a primary thing. If ever "to see is to know" was true, it certainly is in this case. Still, we shall better appreciate how much the concept of quantity includes by reviewing some of the ways in which the reality of quantity manifests itself. Any one of these "modes of quantity" is a double index: first to the inherence of quantity in a substance and then, to the nature of the substance itself.

The most generic form which quantity assumes is extension or continuousness, which again is better described than given what philosophers call a real definition. Aristotle has left us most of the standard descriptions. Here is one of them:

'By continuousness or extension, I mean: capable of being divided into parts that can in their turn be
divided again, and so on, without limit.' 5

An extended thing, therefore, is a stretched or drawn out something which is disposed to being divided into a theoretically infinite number of parts. We may look upon extension as the passive or receptive side of "separation into parts". So that while a substance is still actually one and undivided but divisible, it is said to be extended or continuous.

Now, when we consider the quantified substance as capable of division into parts and concentrate on this characteristic alone, we are treating the divisibility which accompanies quantity. Without quantity, there is no division in bodies. St. Thomas makes this absolute.

'When quantity is removed, every substance becomes indivisible.' 6

So true is this that, given the same species of natural body, limestone, for example, unless this body possessed quantity we could never duplicate two individuals of the same substance anywhere in the universe. A crystal of this substance would be an isolated entity, completely different in nature and properties from every other mineral rock. St. Thomas is simply stating an obvious fact when he observes that material bodies of the same chemical nature are multiplied as individuals by the accident of quantity.

'Quantity, which gives dimensions, is the only thing which, by its nature, causes the multiplication of individuals in the same species of natural substances.' 7
Aristotle describes a third effect of quantity upon the substance quantified, which follows close upon the first two mentioned.

'That is really peculiar to quantities is that we compare or contrast them in terms or on grounds of equality. One solid is equal to another; another, per contra, is unequal. Of nothing save quantity can we affirm these two terms; so that our calling something equal or unequal is the mark, above all marks, of quantity.' 8

How necessarily this trait is linked with whatever is quantified may be judged from St. Thomas' statement that

'...measure is that by which the quantity of a thing is recognized.' 9

Finally, Aristotle suggests two more features of quantity which are not so important as the preceding but which may help us to grasp the "substance" of an unquantified and spiritual nature; whatever can be measured does not allow of contraries or degrees:

'Quantities never have contraries, for, what is not understood by itself but must be further referred to some standard, how can that have any contrary? Supposing we admit that Great, Small and the like are contraries; then it follows that the same subject at one and the same time allows of contrary properties, and things will be contrary to themselves. How often it happens that the same thing is as much great as small. Compared with one thing it is great, compared with another it is small.' 10

So also, quantified entities can never be spoken of as more or less:

'Quantity in no wise admits of degrees. Take "two cubits long," for example; this never admits of any gradations.' 11
CHAPTER IV

Presence Of Quantity In Bodily Effects

So far, we have considered only the quantitative nature of a bodily substance and have seen that it has dimensions, mass, and parts which are infinitely divisible. This was the inductive side to our investigation of matter. Now we shall start back from the general principle to find some of the implications it involves.

Since every material substance possesses quantity and every being functions according to its own peculiar nature, we are justified in looking for quantity in every effect that a body produces. This need not mean that all the properties of quantity will be discoverable in every bodily effect. A cause does not have to exhaust its powers when it produces something. We should be satisfied to find even one "tell-tale" mark of quantity to say that, whatever other influences entered into the making of an effect, if there is a quantitative tinge to it, one influence in its production was quantified. No other explanation would account for even a trace of quantity.

It must be quite clear by now where we are leading all these discussions; towards the point where we can show that there is an effect produced in the world of visible reality which bears none of the marks of quantity. The effect in question is human thought, in every stage of its abstraction from the limitations of time and space.
In the meantime, though, we have to firmly establish the fact that there is quantity not only in every body as a substance, but also in every product in whose making a body has had its share. We need not stop to examine the obvious fact that every activity of a "pure body" has quantitative properties. Another name for this kind of activity is energy, where the axiom on the conservation of energy in a closed system immediately suggests itself. Every body emanation - synonymous with energy, has a measureable weight and size; or, at least its transit through space allows us to measure its movement. About the passive properties of gross bodies, it is enough to recall such standards as liter, gram, and centimeter, to admit the quantitative character of a body in its receptive capacity.

The real problem, however, has to do with the nature of those activities which do not proceed from a "pure body." Do the operations and products of living bodies also exhibit quantitative properties? And, may we, therefore, conclude that even when a body is activated from within, i.e., from an interior source of power which philosophers call the vital principle, still, the lifeless or inert part of their being intimately shares in the activity?

We must give a deal of attention to this vital principle or soul of an organism, if we wish to fully distinguish it from the vitalized principle or body proper. St. Thomas proves in one paragraph that this vital principle: 1) is not a body,
2) is without quantitative parts, 3) unites the separable, physical parts of the organism into a homogeneous unit or substance.

'Every body is divisible. And whatever is divisible demands something to hold together and unify its parts.'

By parts here, we should understand all the varieties of chemical compounds that go to form the physical makeup of a body, in every grade of life. In general, they will be carbon, calcium compounds, water, and mineral salts of different kinds. What St. Thomas is arguing for is a sufficient reason to explain the marvelous coherence of a gomeration of uncommon physical ingredients into a common whole with a common purpose.

'If the soul were a body, it would itself need something to bind its parts into a unit, and then this other something would be the soul. We can appreciate how indispensable this binding force is, when we see a body begin to disintegrate the moment it loses its soul. For the sake of argument, let us suppose that the soul is a body and that what "homogenizes" the soul is something divisible. Well, we still cannot be satisfied until we come down to an indivisible and bodiless principle which explains the unity of an otherwise ununified mixture of parts. This indivisible thing will be the real soul - unless we want to admit the impossible solution of an infinite series of unifiers and unified.'

In his commentary on the second book of Aristotle's De Anima, St. Thomas goes to some length to show just what the soul is in its varying grades of perfection. The difficulty arises from the fact that physical bodies are differently unified to form different classes of living beings. He proposes the difficulty to himself:

'Since the soul, which is the source of life or move-
ment, determines the vegetative, sensitive and intellectual properties in different organisms, the question is whether each of these capacities is the whole soul or only a part of it.'

This question has an important bearing on the relation between mind and human soul, whether the two or identical or not.

'The vegetative faculty in organisms capable only of growth and nutrition, as in plants, is the whole soul. However, in organisms which have growth and sensation, the vegetative and sensitive powers are each only a part of the soul. In general, therefore, those living substances which possess only one of the above capacities, identify this capacity with their souls. But when an organism has several of these energies, any one of them is rather a part of the soul than the soul itself; with this reservation, that the soul in question is called after its highest vital energy.'

This classification of organisms agrees with our daily experience. Hence, the search for quantity in the operations of organic substances is simply restricted to plants, animals, and men. We need hardly more than mention the evident measurable properties of vegetative functions. The very fact that the highest activity of a plant soul is upon the quantity of the plant should be enough reason to show how completely dependent this vital principle is upon the body it animantes. Early in the Summa, St. Thomas describes life in general:

'The name, "life," is taken from a certain external property possessed by certain things, namely, the capacity for self movement.'

Then, in the De Anima, he explains the vital movement in plants:

(Vegetative movement is) 'the movement or change in which the bulk of a body is increased or decreased in all directions.'

Clearly, a vegetative soul is so bound to the physical body it
vitalizes that its whole effect is spent on the body itself. Not only is there a "tinge of quantity" in the operations of such a soul, but their entire sphere of activity is limited to regulating the mass or bulk of the plant.

The vital principle in animals requires more careful attention. In animals as in plants, the soul is the origin of that spontaneous activity which makes for the continued perfection of the body it animates. Even a superficial examination of animal organisms will tell us that they need a superior kind of soul because of the greater complexity and delicacy of their bodily structure. But let us not be misled on this point. So far as the physical body of animals is concerned, the most that their souls can do for it will be to keep this body in organized existence, nourish, make it grow, and allow it to reproduce its kind. In reality, we cannot separate the animal soul from its body, but we can easily distinguish the purpose which its body and soul serve in relation to each other.

Though we might give some proofs to show that the vital principle of an animal fulfills the purpose of its existence when it "does all it can" to preserve and perfect the body united to it, this will not be necessary to develop our argument. We shall be satisfied to analyze only the means which a sensitive soul uses to attain its purpose. Even less, we shall examine only the best means at its disposal for any traces of "bodily adulteration" and make our conclusions accordingly.

Observation tells us that sensation is the highest func-
tion of the vital principle in animals. Through sensation, an animal can find the food, and find or make the shelter it needs to preserve and perfect itself and its species. We know quite well the nature of sensation in general. Conscious experience and the study of animal habits tell us that sensation means some kind of reception of things from the outside. In passing, we may say that the things received through sensation are always representations of individual bodily entities. But more of this later on. For the present, we are considering sensation only as the best means that an animal can use to fulfill the end of its existence.

If we can show that sensation, for all the "tenuousness" of its product, the sensible species, is still a bodily thing, then we are in a position to investigate the typically human function of abstract thought. Aristotle gives a short description of the sensitive process, in his De anima.

'With reference to sensation in general, we must understand that a sense is capable of receiving into itself sensible forms without their matter.' 6

Aristotle further explains that a sensible image or form is taken in...

'just as wax takes into itself the mark of a ring without its iron or gold. It receives into itself a gold or bronze impression, but not as gold or bronze. In like manner, a sense is impressed by every object that possesses color, flavor, or sound - not in so far as each of these objects bears a given name, but in so far as it has such and such a quality. The organ of sense is fundamentally that in which this power of being impressed exists. It has, therefore, an identity with the object that makes the impression, but in the mode of its expression it is different.' 7
We may, then, define sensation with Aristotle as: the assimilation by a bodily organ of the significance or form of a thing without its matter. The important phrase in this definition is, "without its matter." What does this mean?

We have already seen that every body and bodily product carries with it the distinguishing property of quantity, and this quantity which it always involves in its makeup. When Aristotle speaks of sensible species as the images of things without their matter, does he mean to exclude quantity from sensation? Experience tells us that sensation is free from its stain or quantity. This property is so imbedded in even the faintest picture of the imagination, that no amount of refinement can remove it and still allow the image to remain a true sensation.

But the Philosopher and St. Thomas want to tell us something positive by the formula, "without its matter." It is this: the form which enters in sensation is not the kind of form that enters in a process of change like heating or magnetizing; the animal does not just passively receive a sense image but actively cooperates in its acquisition; and finally, the sensible species is not such a substantial or accidental form as predisposed matter might receive in the natural process of generation. An animal is no less an animal, with all its perfections of color, size, weight, and capacities for improvement, even before it has had a single sensation.
Coming back to the quantitative element in sensation: what are some of the evidences for this identifying mark of bodiliness? Experience, as we said, is the final judge in these matters. St. Thomas reduces our experience to a principle:

'The existence which a thing has in the state of sensation is without matter, but not without individuating, material conditions...'

among which the most distinctive is quantity.
CHAPTER V

Absence Of Quantity In Human Thoughts

Where should we go to be convinced that man's thoughts are untouched by quantity? No amount of philosophizing will convince us. But better than trying to prove by any process of reasoning that our thoughts have no quantity, we can see the phenomenon taking place in our minds. A bit of self reflection is all that we need.

We might go through such a process of self examination with any idea on which we chose to focus our attention. But a more effective way will be to follow St. Augustine and his friend Evodius in the analysis they made together at Cassiacum, where the problem of the quantity of the soul was under investigation.

Evodius is on the third of his seven questions on the nature of the soul. He has already been satisfied on: "Where did the soul come from?" and "What is the soul made of?" He is now asking: "How large is the soul?" While listening to the answer he receives, we can make the introspection necessary to understand the unquantified property of our thoughts.

Augustine: First, I will show you that there are men, things which we cannot say are nothing and yet, you will not find in them any of those spatial qualities that you are looking for in the soul. So true is this, that you.
will not only admit the soul to be something although it
has no length or other dimensions, but you will agree
with me that a soul is to be considered as much more
noble as it has none of these properties.

Evodius: Follow any order you wish, I am ready to
listen and learn.

Aug. Thank you. But first I want to make sure that I
shall not be trying to teach you what you know already.
This tree here - I'm sure you'll admit it is not simply
nothing.

Evod. Naturally.

Aug. Well, then, what about justice? Are you equally
ready to admit that justice is something even better than
the tree we are sitting under?

Evod. Why, of course; there is no comparison between
the two.

Aug. You are very agreeable. But see what your admiss-
on means. If we say that this tree is worth less than
justice - less beyond every measure of comparison, and you
granted that the tree is not nothing, should we conclude
that justice itself is nothing?

Evod. That would be stupidity.

Aug. It certainly would. Although, perhaps the only
reason you said this tree was something is because it has
length, thickness, and solidity, and that if these were
taken away the tree would vanish into nothing?

Evod. So it seems to me.

Aug. And justice - which you claimed was not nothing,
or rather, that it was something far more excellent than
the tree... does justice have any length?

Evod. I can't even conceive justice as something
long, thick or the like.

St. Augustine goes on for a while, showing his friend that
the human soul may well be something real even though it has
none of the gross properties of size and shape. His argument
so far is only by analogy. For our present problem we are
taking only the references to abstracted ideas, where these are
analyzed for their freedom from quantity.

A few minutes later, the two men reach a point in their
argument where length, width and depth are practically, but
not quite, denied of the soul. St. Augustine wants to clinch
Perhaps we shall be more convinced of this fact after we carefully investigate these three notions of length, breadth and depth. I should like to have you do now is to get an idea of length, no more, just length, without any thickness to go with it.

Evod. Sorry, I can't do it. No matter how fine the object I try to imagine, a spider's thread, for instance, it always has some length, breadth and third dimension. Whatever these qualities are, I have to admit they are there.

Aug. Your answer is quite correct. However, since you already understand that these three things are found in a spider's thread, I can assume you have distinguished between them and know how they differ from one another.

Evod. True enough. I must know how they differ, otherwise, how could I say that the thread has all of them?

Aug. Therefore, with the same intellect with which you distinguished these properties — once they are mentally separated, you can conceive length all by itself. Only one provision is necessary; that you don't at the same time imagine some kind of body, because no matter what the body is, it will invariably have these qualities. What I am asking you to conceive is an unbodily something. Taken alone, length can be grasped only by the mind; it cannot be found in any body.

Evod. I see.

Aug. And so, if you tried, as it were, to mentally split this length lengthwise, you could not do it. Or, if you could, it would not be mere length but a long body that also had some width.

Evod. Very true.

Aug. Accordingly, we may give this sheer length a name, the name ordinarily given it by mathematicians, and call it a line.

Evod. Give it any name you please. I'm not interested in the names of things once the things themselves are perfectly clear.

Aug. That's right. I not only heartily agree with your attitude but urge you not to remain satisfied with the name of anything until you have penetrated to the reality behind it.
CHAPTER VI

The Intellect - An Independent Substance

Constant experience testifies to the absence of quantity in our thoughts, no matter what object they represent. The fact that our thoughts are never unassociated with some quantified or extended image does not affect their "substantial" simplicity. There are many ways in which we can prove that thoughts and extended images are absolutely distinct realities.

1. Deep, internal, intuitive conviction tells us that the idea we see in our minds is not the same thing as the simultaneous image we see in our fancy.

2. An identical idea may be in the mind with successively different phantasms in the imagination.

3. The same phantasm may be in the imagination with successively different ideas in the mind.

4. We simply know that the objective reality represented by the idea is unlimited by space and time. In St. Thomas' phrase:
   "As is clear from experience, the intellect can know universal realities."1

Whereas, the objects depicted by the fancy are numerically isolated in space and time.

'The imagination deals with single entities.'2

5. We also know, by a kind of unlearnt intuition, that many a reality represented by an idea cannot possibly have
any body to it. Consequently, the quantitative likeness of such an object would be superfluous. Why should the representation which leads us to know a thing include any "misleading" and unnecessary marks of identification?

From here on, the task of proving the spirituality of the soul ought to be easy. We have before us a phenomenon that demands explanation: a real, "mentally tangible" something, which is so different from everything else in the world of bodies that we do not even look for an account of its existence from whatever is the least bit bodily.

To begin with, thoughts are evidently the effects of some power residing in the human organism. We have already seen that every organism below the human has a body which is so united to another reality, the source of life, that the two together form a marvelous compound capable of organized and at times more than human self-movement. However, we also saw that, regardless of how delicate or complex this vital activity became, it could always be identified by one property in the effects produced - these effects were always somehow quantified.

Then we came to investigate the human composite of physical body and vital principle. Again, many of the products were easily measureable in terms of size, shape, and mass - until we came to thought. Here we found a reality, just as real as the tree in St. Augustine's narrative, which was absolutely devoid of measureable or divisible parts. The reality was simple - integrally, quantitatively, simple. And the question remains: now is this strange
effect produced?

There is no need trying to explain this unquantified product as the effect of man's body alone. Even though,

'Among all bodies, the noblest is the body of man.'

still, as a body,

'...it contains nothing, except by quantitative commensuration.'

Hence, any effect it generates, will necessarily be quantified.

But an explanation in terms of man's soul as a bundle of nutritive and sense powers is equally unsatisfactory. Allowing that the vital principle of an animal is not the body it vitalizes, yet, the mere nobility of this source of life does not save it from depending upon the body for its existence. The following inference is evident: Human life and activity are synonyms. Human life and existence are synonyms. And then we see that not a single activity of an animal soul - not even the highest, is unstained by the marks of quantity. Sensation, which is the peak of animal productivity, in every instance shows signs of having passed through a vat out of which it always came dyed with some color or quantity. Consequently, as the animal soul operates in virtue of its union with a body, so it lives and so it exists. Given a body, it can do all three - operate, live, and exist; deprived of a body, it cannot operate or live, because it has ceased to exist. St. Thomas traces this quantitative adulteration of the sensitive process to its physical source:

'Sensation is a power which resides in an organ of the body.'
What should be our conclusion about thoughts and the faculty of thought? There must, of course, be some special faculty to account for the production of abstract ideas. If two functions as closely allied as hearing and vision are different enough to demand different faculties, how much more so the functions of feeling and intellect? Objects specify faculties. And the objects of sensation and of thought - the final perfection or productions in which their activity terminates, are too far apart to be compared. As Evodius told St. Augustine about justice and the tree, "There is no comparison between the two."

Thoughts are not material things; they are not solid, three-dimensional bodies that can be weighed and measured. But neither are sensations. Very well, both of them are the products of something more than a gross body. But thoughts are much finer in their "texture" than this. They not only have no mass - something common to all mere bodily energies, but they have not even the semblance of mass about them. And here they are alone. Sensations have not the bulk of matter in them, but they do have all the semblance of matter in their extension, divisible parts and measureability. They acquired this semblance while passing through an organ of the body.

We can, therefore, formulate a good definition of the faculty of thought by simply denying it the distinctive feature of sensation. St. Thomas is paraphrasing Aristotle in this formula:

'The intellect is an immaterial (cognoscitive) power which is not the faculty of a bodily organ.'
Or, in other words:

'The intellectual principle, which is called the mind or intellect, has an independent operation in which the body has no share.' 6

So far, we have isolated only the intellectual faculty, which philosophically we call an accident. But the argument can be advanced further:

'Since nothing can operate independently unless it is self-subsistent, according to the maxims that operation flows from actual being and that everything functions proportionate to its nature - the conclusion is that the human soul, which is called the intellect or mind, is something bodiless and is self-sufficient in existence.' 7

A certain amount of explanation is necessary to see why man's intellect may be taken to mean his soul. We should understand that St. Thomas uses the word "intellect" or "mind" in two different senses; first, as the bodiless faculty which produces and receives abstract thoughts, and then, as the ultimate substantial principle in which this faculty inneres. According to the first sense, he applies the name "mind" in its strict definition; according to the latter, his use of the term is more suggestive and free.

We can summarize in a few sentences the findings just made on the intellect. There must be a principle capable of independent existence, when experience shows that it is independent in its operations. The peculiar independent activity in question is the production of thought, attributed to a power we call the intellect. Now, it seems most proper to designate the whole substantial source of an activity by its highest function.
And we do this when we call the human soul, the mind. Not every vital human activity proceeds from the soul alone; nutrition and sensation, for example, are mediated through the body as a necessary cause which shares in their production. When the human soul is detached from its body, these functions will be impossible. All that will remain in the soul after this detachment, is the capacity for nutrition and sensation - without the capacity ever being realized unless the soul should re-vitalize another body.

What is the relation between these lower vital powers and the faculty of thought? We have already reasoned to the possibility of a separate existence for the intellectual part of a man's nature. Can we rightly call every power in man below his intellect and will, a bodily power? And may we argue that all these interior faculties will remain perfectly sterile after soul and body separate because there will be no body through which they can operate?

To the first question, the answer is: the intellect uses the lower powers of life only as a convenient aid, while the soul animates the body. It can freely operate without real causal dependence upon them because experience shows that it does. Whatever is, in the present, can be in the future - provided the conditions remain the same.

To the other question, the answer is simply: yes, only the intellectual part of man's soul is of such a nature that it can go on living an independent life whether it is joined to a body
or not. Only this part of his being is truly spiritual. Consequently, only the mind of man is capable of continued existence after the crisis in this life called his death. The only question remains whether or not the mind, or substantially, the soul, will actually enjoy this privilege for which its nature has disposed it.
CHAPTER VII
Possible Annihilation Of The Soul

Francis Suarez quotes St. Gregory in a universal definition of death:

'Death occurs when there is a separation of one thing from another.' 1

Accordingly, when a man dies, a cleavage takes place between his body and soul. We know very well what happens to the devitalized body after the soul leaves it. But the soul, as we shall see in a moment, goes on exercising its noblest functions just as though nothing had taken place. The capacity for continued existence which we attributed to it, is never frustrated; if it were, we should have to deny a root principle of human knowledge: the principle of sufficient reason.

Our argument can be reduced to a sentence: Since the human soul is capable of immortal life, it will actually live immortally if there is sufficient reason why it should not be annihilated.

There is a passage in St. Thomas which summarizes Scholastic teaching on the absolute power of God to annihilate any of His creatures. It is necessary for a clear understanding of what follows:
'It is not impossible, in the sense of implying a contradiction, that creatures should simply not exist. Otherwise they would have existed from all eternity. Likewise, God does not produce creatures under any constraint of His nature, so that His power would be determined to the existence of a creature. It follows, then, that it is not impossible for God to reduce things to non-existence, since He does not have to give them existence originally - except on the supposition that He foreknew and preordained to keep them existing perpetually.'

The last clause in this passage is the link in our proof for immortality. In the light of His divine wisdom and goodness, we can easily see that God would never blot out of existence what He had predestined to live eternally. All we need do, is to find some clear evidence for such a predestination in the case of man's soul. And we have it from the most reliable witness available - the soul herself, testifying about herself.

Philosophers call this testimony which proves the soul's demand for an endless life, the ethical argument. More simply, it is nothing else than the universal human desire for perfect happiness. The universality of this desire is not immediately evident; nor does it have to be. It is enough for us to realize that, individually, we are all hungering for beatitude. The wonder is that men should ever come to deceive themselves that this hunger can somehow be satisfied before death. But God has anticipated our weakness in this matter. In their present fallen state, few men could have convinced themselves of the futility of trying to sate their hunger for happiness.
in sixty years. For this reason, God has vouchsafed to remind us of this truth by special revelations, in order to make us believe what we should hardly have come to know by ourselves.

But one thing at least does not require revelation to make us conscious of it - the beatific desire itself. From the dawn of reason to his last moment, a man is literally lured through life by this prospect of an immortal life of happiness.

St. Augustine has a great deal to say about this inborn appetite for beatitude. In his treatise on the Holy Trinity, he first observes how unmistakable this desire is and then proceeds to explain its nature, gradually leading his reader to conclude with him what must be the single reality in the universe in which the desire finds rest.

'Instead of saying what he did, supposing the poet Ennius had said: 'All of you wish to be happy and none of you wishes to be sad.' He would then have been voicing a truth which no one can deny even if he wants to. Whatever else a person may wish to keep secret, there is no hiding this desire which is as commonly experienced as it is universally observed.

The marvel is, however, that although this desire is so widespread, it should be so varied in its manifestations. The mystery, therefore, is not that someone somewhere does not want to be happy, but that there really exist people, and a great many of them, who do not know what happiness is. If everyone understood the true nature of happiness, we should not have the spectacle of men trying to find it in the exercise of their minds or the pleasure of their bodies. What no one denies, though, is that a life of beatitude means a life of those things which in his present experience he most enjoys.'

Before going any further with the quotations, we ought to reflect for a while on what this desire for beatitude means as an evident mark of God's designs on human nature. We have seen
up to now that there is in man a certain portion of his being which is unaffected by death; that this portion does more than give him life - that it is life. Therefore, his noblest activities of knowledge and love are sure to continue after his body corrupts, if only there is something to restrain the annihilation of his soul by God.

With St. Thomas, we say that God will not reduce anything to non-existence once He has predestined it to immortality. The mere capacity of a thing for perpetual life will not insure its actual fulfillment. No less is true with the human spirit. Its independent operation in the thought process clearly argues to its ability to subsist alone and without a body. But will it really do so? It is not enough to say that God could not originally have made a spiritual substance unless He had destined it to an immortal life. The glory He receives in a single act of man's adoring love would more than explain why God should wish to create an intelligent being like the human soul. We have now only to see whether a spiritual substance positively demands immortality.

The capacity for eternal life in man's soul naturally moved us to look for some divine promise that it would be fulfilled. We found this promise in our natural desire for perfect happiness. Beyond this point there is no need for further proofs. The fact is clearly established that the human soul will continue living into eternity. If there is any doubt about
the "eternal element" in beatitude, we have only to analyze the concept as it comes up to us from consciousness. Permanence is indispensable to the complete notion of happiness. In one place, St. Thomas goes so far as to identify the desire for beatitude with the desire for eternity.

'A natural desire cannot possibly be frustrated. And man naturally wants to live forever. We can prove this by a kind of syllogism: Existence is something which every being desires... However, man conceives by his intellect not only present existence as animals do, but existence without qualification... Man will, therefore, enjoy in his soul the life of eternity which his mind anticipates.'
CHAPTER VIII

Man's Destiny - The Possession Of God

There had to be an obvious implication in what was said on the desire for beatitude which convinced us that our souls not only can but will be independent of future time. The implication was that this desire is not realized by anyone before his death. St. Thomas epitomizes this common experience:

'Everyone is agreed in calling beatitude some kind of perfect good. And we may define the perfect good as that which contains no admixture of evil; like a perfectly white object is one that shows no traces of black. But man, in his present state, cannot be entirely free from evils; not bodily evils such as hunger, thirst and cold - nor spiritual evils. There is not a man living who is not, at least sometimes, disturbed by his inordinate passions, who is not occasionally deceived or, at any rate, fails to understand what he would like to know or, finally, who must remain content with a vague opinion on important truths which he would like to comprehend with certainty.'

One problem is still left us. We have to fully examine the nature of happiness. This examination is, of course, with a view to foretelling what kind of life the human spirit will lead after its detachment from the body. We are entirely justified in isolating and analyzing the single concept of happiness and then applying our findings without any restrictions of time and place. Essences and natures are eternal things. What is essential to happiness today, in even one man, is essential to
happiness in all ages and places and beyond measureable distances and times.

however, instead of beginning a step by step synthesis of the elements of happiness and then fusing them together into a definition, we shall assume the definition, analyze its contents, and in this way come to an unusually full understanding of the life of a separated spirit.

In a short essay he wrote several months before his conversion, St. Augustine defines the nature of happiness from its positive and negative side.

'To be happy is simply not to be in want or, in other words, it means to be wise.' 2

Although we might take either viewpoint and be correct in doing so, the positive definition he gives is more suggestive.

To be happy is to be wise. To be beatifically happy is to be wise to the limit - where the limitation is measured for each man according to the plans of Providence upon his soul.

It is certainly evident that perfect joy must consist in the possession of something extremely good, without the least danger of losing it. But the character of this extremely good thing and the way in which it will be possessed - these have not been evident to many of the best minds in history. According to St. Augustine's definition, a person is happy because he possesses wisdom. What, then, must perfect happiness be? when calling a man wise, we mean to say that he holds in his mind some extraordinary and exalted truth. What must be the nature
of the truth whose possession not only makes a man wise and therefore happy, but so completely fills his mind with wisdom that his wealth is enough to last him for eternity?

To understand the nature of this exhaustive truth which begets beatitude, we shall go back to where St. Augustine must have begun in his own investigation. St. Thomas' close reasoning will show us that happiness and wisdom are really synonymous.

'When we love a thing for the sake of something else, this other object must be loved only for itself because we cannot assume an endless series of objects desired by the natural appetite, where each thing is desired for the sake of another beyond it but none for itself. To make such an assumption is equivalently to deny that man has a natural desire at all.'

since experience and reason tell us that an appetite remains unmoved until its attention is focused upon one object.

'Now, if we analyze all the practical sciences, arts and human faculties, we shall find one thing common to all of them; without exception, they are desired and used only for the sake of something above themselves. Their objective is not knowledge itself but some kind of function or operation.

Speculative sciences, on the other hand, are valued for and in themselves. Their objective or end is knowledge itself and this end is exclusively theirs, since among all human endeavors no other activity but is a means to something higher than itself - except speculative reflection. Consequently, since practical pursuits are directed and subordinated to the meditative, every action that a man performs naturally subserves the contemplative powers of his mind.'

This analysis of human desires is based on the solid principle that every organized entity or substance created by God is a veritable hierarchy of powers, each contributing in turn to a power above it, and the whole series contributing to
the advantage of the organized substance itself. Man is no exception to this axiom of created natures. We need hardly more than a few facts from experience to recognize this hierarchy of faculties within him. St. Thomas presumed on these facts for the tracing of man's powers that he gave us in the preceding paragraph. The highest human activity belongs to the highest human faculty, which experience again tells us is the mind in its purely reflective capacity.

'The life which is proper to man, as man, is the life of the mind. It is man's reason which ultimately makes him what he is.' 4

However, we may consider the reason or mind in two ways: either by itself or in its influence upon other faculties.

'Taking man's reason in its influential phase, we call certain actions rational because the reason draws them out and guides them after they are drawn out of potency; but when we say that there is some activity in man which is rational by its very nature, we mean that its perfection is reached in the reasoning or thinking process itself. Only this latter operation is strictly rational because whatever is named from its own nature is prior to that which is named from another thing that affects it. Now, since happiness is man's highest good, it must necessarily consist in a human activity which is essentially and not just "influentially" intellectual. Before all else, therefore, happiness is a life of contemplation rather than of external activity, and consists in the exercise of man's reason or intellect rather than his will (or any other power) under the guidance of reason.' 5

It does not really matter whether men in general would agree with Aristotle's analysis of happiness. All will agree that happiness is the possession of the highest conceivable good, but the agreement dissolves just as soon as men begin to identify this highest conceivable good. Only those who are
specialists in the anatomy of human faculties are in a position to declare dogmatically on man's highest possession. Faculties are powers, and powers are vessels whose "size" and "shape" determines how much of what kind of perfection will flow into the soul. Hence, in declaring that man's intellect is alone disposed to receive the most of the best goodness which a man can acquire, we are declaring an inference that is not drawn from the experience of men but from the experience of man as he appears to the minds of Aristotle, and Sts. Augustine and Thomas.

We are near the end of our investigation. Taking up St. Augustine's definition once more, since happiness is the enjoyment of wisdom and perfect happiness is its perfect enjoyment, we have only to discover the nature of that ineffable object the mental possession of which produces in turn wisdom, enjoyment and perfect happiness.

The intelligible object of beatific wisdom must be a personality. We are easily, almost instinctively, sure of this - at least after reviewing the disproportion between how much can be known about persons and about all other things in the universe which are less than personal. Then we are given a choice of three ways of identifying this personality.

We may go through the varying grades of personal beings until we find one whose nature is so exalted that to understand him is to know every other person and non-person in the world. Or we may concentrate our attention only on the faculty of human thought, separate its powers, and then decide what single object
is so utterly knowable that to have it enter the mind is to surfeit the mind's capacity for knowledge. Or, finally, we may look back into our mental experience and recall every person, human and more than human, living and dead, about whom we had every thought. Which of these reflections was accompanied by the keenest pleasure? Once again, we are privileged to say that the personality who caused us the greatest pleasure in thinking of him, is the same one whom we shall contemplate for eternity. After all, our minds are not changed at death, except for the better.

Whatever knowledge is most deeply enjoyable on earth will also be the most enjoyable after death. The depth of joy will certainly be increased for each species or kind of knowledge, but the proportion between the knowledges themselves will remain the same.

We may follow St. Thomas towards identifying the most knowable personality, according to the first of these ways.

"Intellectual activities are not only first recognized by the objects which are known, but they are also specified or graded according to these objects. Consequently, an intellectual operation is as much more exalted as the object perceived is more perfect; so that, the most perfect kind of intellective means the understanding of the most perfectly knowable being, which is God." 6

And why is God the most knowable? Because He is infinitely actual. The mind can perceive nothing else than actuality. Truth or wisdom is the indwelling of being in the mind. Wisdom is simply "being" in a mental state.

The second possible way of learning who the personality is that will give us eternal happiness, is to examine our faculty of thought. Examining the reach of its powers, we can decide on
some one object whose very nature is sufficient to replete the intellect with knowledge. When Aristotle observes that:

'Man's intellect is of such a character that it becomes all things.'

he is telling us that there is absolutely no intelligible reality which our minds cannot receive and become perfected by.

The question is, which one among these infinitely numerous realities can so fully satisfy the intellect that any further "speculation" is no longer desired because it is no longer necessary. Suarez gives the answer in a short reference to St. Gregory Nazianzen.

'Of all intelligible things, at the highest summit is God, in Whom every desire simply comes to a standstill and is made immovable. No mind, however comprehensive or inquisitive can be carried anywhere beyond Him. It never can nor ever will conceive any object higher than Him in sublimity. This is the extreme of all things that can be striven for; when we reach Him, every yearning of our speculative souls comes to a perfect rest.'

The last means we have of knowing whom we shall contemplate after death, is to compare our past mental experiences until we find one that was the most enjoyable. We can say beforehand that the object of our thoughts during this reflection must have been some personal being. But the proof stops here. The secrets of the mind are known only to each man himself and to those very few with whom he is willing to share them. Therefore, everyone must be his own judge in this matter and depend on the experiences of others only to the extent of confirming his own unborrowed convictions.
St. Augustine had the fortune to taste many, if not most, of the joys possible to a man on earth. And then he was blessed with the ability to relate his experiences so clearly that we seem to be hearing ourselves instead of him, when we read what he says:

"Wretched is the man who knows all other things and does not know Thee. But happy is he that knows Thee, though he does not know these. And if he should know both them and Thee, he is not the happier for knowing them, but is happy only because he knows Thee."
CHAPTER IX

Epilogue

By way of epilogue, we can profitable make a few observations on the study of immortality that we have just finished.

First of all, there is the question of method. Throughout the thesis, no more than passing reference was made to the Scholastic doctrine on matter and form, which seems to underlie any proof for the spirituality of the human soul. Offhand, it seems to be impossible to prove the soul's spiritual nature without proving not only that it has no quantitative parts but also no essential parts, i.e., no matter and form. Dissolution is the separation of parts previously united. Consequently, unless we prove that the soul has no parts like matter and form, how can we prove that it will not dissolve? That we have done was simply not to advert to this obvious fact that the human spirit has no essential composition, in the accepted Scholastic sense of the term. Spirituality ultimately means complete independence of gross matter. We should never have believed that such an independence was even possible, if the evidence of internal consciousness had not undeceived us. And the process of intellection gave us all the evidence we needed. The unquantified character of our thoughts was enough to show that some self sufficient cause produced them; a cause that was
not even restricted to channeling its products through an organ of the body.

What is still more important is the nature of the proof itself. Is our proof strong enough to be called metaphysical? By a metaphysical proof, we should understand the conviction which arises from evidence founded on the unchangeable natures of things. Yes, our proof is a metaphysical one. The reason for this is the fact that throughout the investigation we never once went outside the limits of the soul. All our analyses were made upon the soul alone. And we finally discovered that there are two essential elements demanded by the very nature of a soul as it exists in man: absolute freedom from bodily influence in life and operation and, an innate desire for perfect happiness. Reflective experience gave us both these conclusions; both of them are equally drawn from our immediate consciousness. Both must, therefore, be equally involved in any possible deductions on the soul. The two together form, as it were, a definition of the soul from which every reasoned inference should flow among which is the inference of our thesis, that the spirit of man lives eternally in the contemplation of God.
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The thesis, "A Philosophic Solution of the Problem of Human Destiny", written by John Anthony Hardon, S.J., has been accepted by the Graduate School with reference to form, and by the readers whose names appear below, with reference to content. It is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Rev. Paul V. Kennedy, S.J., Ph.D. May 31, 1941
Rev. Stewart E. Dollard, S.J., Ph.D. June 4, 1941