Rhetorical Principles in Newman's Present Position and Their Relationship with Those of Aristotle as Outlined in His Rhetoric

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RHETORICAL PRINCIPLES IN NEWMAN'S PRESENT POSITION
AND THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH THOSE OF ARISTOTLE
AS OUTLINED IN HIS RHETORIC

BY

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VITA

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GENERAL INTRODUCTION

The most apparent manifestation of the God-like in man is his ability to speak and write. Through these two mediums he is able to transfer immaterial ideas and concepts to the understanding of his fellow man. Even among the most primitive of peoples a verbal language has always existed. Simple though such a language may be, its primitive sounds and runes raise their creators to a height impossible for lower forms of animals to attain.

Throughout the ages man has constantly improved these mediums; he has invented numerous devices whereby his ideas are fertilized and thus made to bear fruit in human conduct. Through the ages, too, certain men in every language have distinguished themselves as authors who constantly perfect these devices and hence produce expressions as crystalline and beautiful as the lofty thoughts they reflect.

John Cardinal Newman was just such an author in his century. Many times his art as a writer is obscured by his prestige as a thinker, for not only did he say things beautifully, he also had more to say than most men of any age. That his words were stirring is brought out by friend and foe, Catholic and Protestant alike. Matthew Arnold, even after he had enthroned in his heart the goddess of culture and substituted
her books and paintings for the cathedrals of religion, wistfully praised the power of Newman's rhetoric in these stirring lines written some forty years after he had heard Newman preach:

Who could resist the charm of that spiritual apparition, sliding in the dim, afternoon light through the aisles of Saint Mary's, rising into the pulpit, and then, in the most entrancing of voices, breaking the silence with words and thoughts which were a religious music—subtle, sweet, and mournful?¹

It is the aim of this paper, therefore, to analyze the rhetoric of one of his greatest works, a work which Joseph J. Reilly called "the most masterly work which as a man of letters Newman ever produced,"² The Present Position of Catholics in England. The analysis will be made in the light of Aristotle's Rhetoric, not for the purpose of proving that Newman consciously followed the principles formulated in this work, but for the purpose of indicating how these principles shine through the cadenced sentences of The Present Position of Catholics in England. In making this analysis according to the principles of Aristotle, the author of this paper does not intend to imply that Newman was influenced solely by Aristotle, or that Newman was not influenced by other rhetoricians. In the light of the great classical background of Newman and in the light of Newman's own assertions concerning his style,

² Reilly, J.J., Newman as a Man of Letters, 23.
such an assumption would be absurd.

The author does feel, however, that Aristotelian principles of rhetoric do shine not only through the general structure of Present Position but also through Newman's use of certain specific rhetorical devices. He hopes to determine the Aristotelian relationships between these devices and the ideas they clarify. He hopes to account for the over-all simplicity of style resultant from these conscious devices. Finally he hopes to be enabled through such an analysis to help students to better their attempts at becoming effective writers.

He feels that the attempt is worth while since eminent scholars of the past fifty-seven years have in one voice marvelled at and praised Newman as one of the greatest stylists of all times.

Quiller-Couch to his class at Cambridge said of Newman's Apologia:

It is a work so wise, so eminently wise as to deserve being bound by a young student of literature for a frontlet on his brow and a talisman on his writing wrist.

Our own scholar-president, Woodrow Wilson, said of the style of Newman:

Newman's prose is devoid of ornament, stripped to its shining skin and running bare, and lithe, and athletic, to carry its tidings to man.

The praise of innumerable authors could be quoted to justify an analysis of the rhetorical excellence of the author of
Present Position of Catholics in England, but it is better to let this work's rhetoric sing its own praises.
CHAPTER I
RHETORIC AS AN ART

Since Aristotle's Rhetoric will be used as the basis for an analysis of Newman's rhetoric, it is the purpose of this chapter to create a background for this analysis by briefing this masterful work. After familiarizing ourselves with Aristotle's treatment, we will then be able to explore Newman's own views on the subject.

Rhetoric as Aristotle Viewed it.*

Professor George Campbell tells us that all arts have a scientific basis—the great sciences of ethics and theology are the foundations of the greatest of all arts, the art of living. He proceeds along these lines by pointing out that there is no art whatsoever having so close a connection with all the faculties of the mind as rhetoric or eloquence, the art of speaking and writing. He defines rhetoric as "that art or talent by which the discourse is adapted to its end." All the ends of speaking are reducible to four: to enlighten, to please the imagination, to move the passions, or to influence the will.

* Besides the text of Aristotle's Rhetoric, the analyses of J.E. Welldon and Lane Cooper will be used for the treatment of the subject of rhetoric in this section.
1 George Campbell, The Philosophy of Rhetoric, 18.
Since eloquence is defined as the art by which the discourse is adapted to its own end, then it must be concluded that the four ends determine the many types of discourse. Moreover, if the four ends are analyzed, it becomes clear that their objects are faculties of human nature. Now all rhetoricians agree on this conclusion, and all books on rhetoric define their subject in a similar manner. In other words a knowledge of human nature has always determined the success of a great rhetorician.

Aristotle in the most universally acclaimed work on the subject, The Rhetoric, recognized this fundamental principle and based his entire treatise on the conclusions drawn from it. He divides the subject of rhetoric into two principal points: 1. general and special principles; 2. proofs for these principles. He defines rhetoric as "a faculty considering all possible means of persuasion on any subject." Since Newman's Present Position of Catholics in England is primarily the work of an orator, rhetoric will be considered along these lines only. Aristotle follows up his definition by considering all means of persuasion under three headings: 1. deliberative rhetoric; 2. judicial rhetoric; 3. demonstrative rhetoric.

2 Aristotle's The Rhetoric, Book I, Chapter 3, (Translated by J.E. Welldon), 22.
3 Ibid.
4 Ibid.
If an oration is demonstrative, the audience is asked merely to listen. Demonstrative oratory considers events in the present, and its proper office is to praise or condemn. The proper ends or conclusions are honor or disgrace, nobility or shamefulness, as the case may be.5

If an oration is deliberative, the audience passes judgment on that which is to come. The time, then, is the future; the proper offices are exhortation and dehortation; the proper end or conclusion is to prove a thing profitable or unprofitable.6

If an oration is judicial or forensic, then it concerns things of the past; its proper office is accusation or defense; its proper end is to prove a thing just or unjust.7

J. E. Welldon analyzes the above divisions in the following manner:

The deliberative orator employs propositions relating to expediency and inexpediency, the forensic orator propositions relating to justice and injustice, the epideictic8 orator propositions relating to honor and disgrace. These are special topics. But they employ (all of them) propositions relating to possibility and impossibility, the occurrence or non-occurrence of events in the past and in the future, and magnitude both absolute and comparative—these are general or common principles and topics.9

5 Ibid.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 A synonym for demonstrative oratory.
Aristotle continues his development of rhetoric by philosophizing on the different subjects covered by each of the three divisions. He tells us that since the end of deliberative rhetoric is expediency or inexpediency, the writer or orator who is pursuing this end must thoroughly familiarize himself with such subjects as finance, war and peace, defense of the country, imports and exports, and the laws of the country. He then gives his own opinions and judgments of these subjects for the enlightenment of the aspiring young orator. He adds that the deliberative orator must also familiarize himself with the nature of happiness and its consequent activities; he must know what nobility implies; he must appreciate the blessing of offspring; he must realize the duties and privileges of those possessing wealth; he must be cognizant of the values of a good reputation, honor, health, beauty, strength, size, athletic ability, a happy old age, the possession of many good friends, good fortune, and virtue. The deliberative orator must understand the nature of the Good and must be able to compare the relative worths of the different goods available to man. Finally a writer or orator interested in the expediency or inexpediency as ends must know the divisions of and nature of politics. Aristotle divides politics into four branches: Democracy, Oligarchy, Aristocracy, and Monarchy. If the deliberative orator grounds himself and
his audience in all of this knowledge, he should, according to Aristotle, be able to work out proofs that will persuade and impassion this same audience.

For the epideictic rhetorician who is aiming at a demonstration of honor or disgrace, nobility or shamefulness, it is essential that he be well versed in the nature of virtue, vice, nobleness, and shamefulness. Aristotle then gives an extremely thorough treatment of each of these four points.

The forensic orator who is interested in accusation and defense must familiarize himself with the nature of public crime and its many objects, the dispositions of its criminals, and finally with the character and conditions of the victims.10

This summary of Book I of Aristotle's Rhetoric gives some indication of the wealth of material which can be explored by the person setting out on a career of oratory. In the next chapter of this paper an attempt will be made to indicate how these very principles shine through the pages of Newman's Present Position, how Newman's knowledge of the subjects discussed by Aristotle contributes to the general structure of the lectures he gave in the Corn Exchange at Birmingham.

Since the Present Position reflects not only the principles of Aristotelian rhetoric but also the proofs for these principles of Aristotelian rhetoric but also the proofs for these 10

A fuller treatment of this division will be given in Chapter Two of this paper, wherein we shall classify Present Position of Catholics in England as belonging to this category.
principles, it becomes necessary to outline the substance of Book II of the *Rhetoric*, for in this book, Aristotle estab-

lishes and explains these proofs.

According to Aristotle every orator who wishes to be suc-

cessful at his art must: 1. Produce a favorable impression on

his audience, i.e., a favorable impression of his own charac-
ter; 2. Produce a favorable disposition in his audience. He

adds that of these the former is particularly suited to de-

liberative rhetoric, the latter to forensic rhetoric. He then

elaborates on the first rule by discussing the sources of per-

sonal credibility, which are sagacity, virtue, and goodwill

towards the audience. To produce a favorable disposition in

his audience, the orator must know thoroughly the many facets

of the various emotions. Aristotle classifies human emotions

under fourteen headings and analyzes each: a. Anger; b. Placa-

bility; c. Love; d. Hatred; e. Fear; f. Confidence; g. Com-
passion; g. Shame; h. Benevolence; i. Virtuous indignation;

j. Envy; k. Emulation; l. Contempt; and m. Shamelessness.

Aristotle does not stop with the analysis of these emotions;

he goes on to say that if an orator is to insure good will

towards his audience, he must also be familiar with the out-

looks of young people, middle-aged people, and elderly people.

He must also be aware of the accidents of *Fortune*, i.e.,

wealth and power.
And now the orator or writer of rhetoric is ready to begin inventing his proofs. Aristotle introduces us to the subject of proofs by discussing the four topics common to the three kinds of rhetoric. Welldon sums up this discussion in the following manner:

- Possibility---topics tending to show the possibility or impossibility of a thing.
- Facts past----topics tending to show that a thing either has or has not occurred.
- Facts future--topics tending to show that a thing either will or will not occur.
- Degree--------topics tending to show the absolute and comparative greatness or smallness of things.

The word proof, as Aristotle uses it, is another word for rhetorical device; hence his treatment of proofs is an analysis of rhetorical devices. He divides all the rhetorical devices at the disposal of the orator or writer into two general classes, which are the example and the enthymeme. Aristotle then distinguishes two kinds of example: historical parallels and inventions of the rhetorician. These inventions or fables are suited to popular oratory and are easier to find than are historical parallels. Examples, in general, should be used to support the truth of enthymemes, but they may be used too as logical proofs in default of enthymemes. But first it is necessary to discover what Aristotle meant by an enthymeme.

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11 Welldon, op. cit., xxxii.
He defines it as "a species of syllogism, and the most powerful form of rhetorical proof."\textsuperscript{12} This definition he further explains by differentiating it from other varieties of the syllogism. It differs from the syllogism of the dialectic in that "its conclusions may not be drawn from remote premises...nor by the introduction of each particular step in the argument."\textsuperscript{13} He then divides the enthymeme into two kinds: a. The refutative enthymeme; b. The demonstrative enthymeme. As examples of the demonstrative enthymeme he quotes demonstrative enthymemes from different famous Greek orators.\textsuperscript{14} The first example he takes from an oration by Alcidimas:

> If the war is the cause of our present troubles, then it is by means of the peace that we must remedy them.

Or, he gives us another example:

> If justice suffers not to rage against the involuntary authors of our harm, so whoso is constrained to do us good, no thanks are due for services to him.

These lines are variously ascribed to Agathon or to Theodectes. By these examples we can better understand Aristotle's definition of the demonstrative enthymeme: "The demonstrative enthymeme consists in drawing conclusions from admitted propositions."\textsuperscript{15} Perhaps one more example will further clarify his definition:

\textsuperscript{12} Aristotle, op. cit., Book II, Chapter 2, pp. 13-16.  
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 190.  
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 195.  
\textsuperscript{15} Loc. cit.
If falsehood is persuasive in the world, the contrary too must hold, that many things in the world are true, yet unbelievable.\(^{16}\)

He defines a refutative enthymeme as one "which consists in drawing conclusions which are inconsistent with the conclusions of one's adversary."\(^{17}\) As examples of this type he offers the following:

Although he pretends to be your friend, he took part in the conspiracy of the Thirty.

Or:

Although he calls me litigious, it is beyond his powers to prove that I have ever been party to a suit.

Or:

While he has never lent you a farthing, there are actually many of you whom I have ransomed.

In all, he lists twenty-eight instances of enthymemes both demonstrative and refutative. A more comprehensive treatment of the enthymeme will be given in the third chapter of this paper since in that chapter Newman's use of the example and enthymeme in \textit{Present Position} will be discussed.

In order to explain the two different types of examples, Aristotle quotes the following instances. The first is an instance of an historical parallel:

\begin{quote}
Darius came not into Greece till he had first
\end{quote}

\(^{16}\) \textit{Loc. cit.}  
\(^{17}\) All the examples taken from Aristotle, \textit{op. cit.}, Book II, Chapter 2, pp. 195 sq.
subdued Egypt. Xerxes also conquered Egypt first; then afterwards crossed the Hellespont. We ought, therefore to hinder the king of Persia from conquering Egypt.

The following is an instance of the use of the fable:

The horse, desiring to drive out the stag from his common pasture, took a man to assist him, and having received into his mouth a bridle, and a rider upon his back, obtained his intent, but became subject to the man. So you of Himera, (in hope to be revenged of your enemies) given unto Philaris sovereign authority, that is to say, taken a bridle into your mouths; if you shall also give him a guard to his person, that is, let him get on your backs, you become his slaves presently past recovery.

Again, a fuller treatment of the example will be given in the third chapter of this paper; suffice it to say here that the example is an induction and the enthymeme a deduction, and according to Aristotle, "The universal means of demonstrative proof in Rhetoric are examples or enthymemes, and there is no other." 18

Another device which is really a branch of the enthymeme is the maxim. Aristotle defines this device as "a declaration relating not to particulars but to universals, and not to all universals but to such as are the objects of human action and are to be chosen or eschewed in that regard." 19 In other words, if the syllogistic form is done away, the conclusion of an enthymeme or its major premise is a maxim. Welldon analyzes

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18 Aristotle, op. cit., Book I, Chapter 1, 13.
19 Ibid., pp. 184-185.
Aristotle's treatment of maxims in the following manner:

There are four kinds of maxims, for maxims may either have or have not a logical supplement. Maxims have no such supplement:

a. When the maxim is a generally accepted opinion.
b. When it is intelligible at a glance.

Maxims which have a logical supplement are:

a. Parts of an enthymeme.
b. Not parts of an enthymeme but enthymematic in their character, where the reason of the maxim is contained in the words of the maxim itself.

Maxims are appropriate:

a. Upon the lips of persons of years and experience.
b. In contradiction of popular or proverbial sayings.

There are two important uses of the maxim:

a. They are pleasing to a vulgar audience who find in them the generalization, or, as it were, the consumation of their partial experience.
b. They correct the speech with an ethical character when they express moral predilections.20

Aristotle continues the discussion of maxims by stating, "Nor is it right to neglect even trite and commonplace maxims, if they are useful; for their very commonness and general acceptance imparts to them an air of truth, as e.g. if a general exhorts his troops to face an enemy, although they have not first offered sacrifice, by quoting the language of Homer: 'The best of omens is our country's cause,' or to do so against odds by reminding them of 'the even chance of war,' or to destroy the children of their enemies, although they may not have committed any offence, by quoting the proverb, 'Fool he who slays the sire and spares the son.'"21

20 Welldon, op. cit., pp. xxxiii sq.
This brief summary of Book II of Aristotle's Rhetoric gives us an idea of how Aristotle formulated laws to govern the orator's artistic embellishment of the principles laid down in Book I. Book III of the Rhetoric concerns itself principally with a treatise of organization and style of the orator.

The principal graces of prose style according to Aristotle are, first, perspicuity, and second, propriety. Appropriate metaphors and similes bring out this perspicuity, and purity of language, too, adds to it. Aristotle suggests five points to be followed if purity of language is to be achieved:

1. The right use of connecting words and phrases; 2. The use of special names for things rather than class names; 3. The avoidance of ambiguous terms; 4. The observance of the genders of nouns; 5. The correct expression of number. Add to a pure language a dignity of style, and all the proper ingredients for perspicuity are present. But what contributes to this so-called dignity of style? Aristotle mentions seven contributing factors: 1. To employ a definition instead of a simple name of a thing; 2. To avoid any uncouthness of expression by substituting the name for the definition or vice versa; 3. To use metaphors or epithets as means of elucidating the subject; 4. To put the plural for the singular, for example, to say, "Unto Achaean harbors" where there is only one harbor;
5. To repeat the article; 6. To use connecting particles; 7. To describe a thing by negation as, for example, to call a trumpet blast "lyreless music".

The conditions for Aristotle's second prose grace, propriety of style, are 1. That the style should be emotional; 2. That it should be ethical; 3. That it should be appropriate to the subject. These points Welldon analyzes thus:

Language will be emotional if it is angry, indignant, enthusiastic, and so forth according to the subject, and being so, it will command the sympathy of the audience. It will be ethical if it is adapted to the character of a particular class or moral state. It will be appropriate, if it is elevated, humble when the audience is elevated or humble.

Book III is concluded with a treatment of the divisions or organization of an oration. Aristotle divides every oration into four parts: 1. The exordium; 2. The exposition; 3. The proof; 4. The peroration. The exordium, he says, corresponds to a prologue in poetry, or to a prelude in a musical performance.

The exposition should not be continuous but fragmentary in epideictic speeches; it should be evenly divided in forensic speeches; it should be rarely used in political speeches.

For Aristotle's treatment of proofs we will again rely upon Welldon's succinct analysis:

\[\text{Welldon, op. cit., xl.}\]
The proofs should be demonstrative. In forensic speeches, since there are four points on which the issue may turn, viz. the fact, the injury, the magnitude of the injury, and the criminality; the proof should be directed to the particular point at issue.

In epideictic speeches facts must be generally taken for granted, and simplification should be employed to emphasize their moral or utilitarian character.

In political speeches it must be urged that the policy of one's adversary is impossible or unjust or inexpedient, or that it will not have the important results which he anticipates.

Examples are especially appropriate to political rhetoric.

Enthymemes are especially appropriate to forensic rhetoric.

The enthymemes, which should be chosen with discrimination, should not be put forward in a continuous series but intermingled with various other topics.

Enthymemes are out of place in the ethical passages of the speech. Maxims, as possessing an ethical character, should be in both the narrative and the proof.

Political rhetoric is more difficult than forensic as it relates to the future, and the future cannot be known; nor does it equally allow of digressions or appeals to the emotions.

In epideictic speeches eulogies should be introduced by way of episodes.

In default of proofs the speech should be both ethical and demonstrative; in default of enthymemes it should be exclusively ethical.

Refutative enthymemes are more popular than demonstrative.

The reply to the adversary is not a separate branch of the speech. Enthymemes should sometimes by a change of form be expressed as maxims."}

For an effective peroration Aristotle outlines four qualities: 1. To inspire the audience with a favorable opinion of

23 Ibid., pp. xlv-xlvi.
oneself; 2. To amplify or deprecate the subject; 3. To excite the emotions of the audience; 4. To recall the facts to their memory. Comparison, irony, interpolation are all suitable elements of recapitulation, and an asyndeton may form an effective conclusion, as, for example, "I have spoken, you have heard me, the case is in your hands, pronounce your judgment."\(^{24}\)

In this section a synthesis of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* was presented since this treatment will be used as a basis for the analysis of Newman's rhetoric in *Present Position*. Obviously the synthesis is far from comprehensive, and only those points which have a direct bearing on the analysis of Newman's rhetoric were stressed.

**Rhetoric as Newman Viewed it.**

Almost every teacher of rhetoric has based his treatment of the subject on Aristotle's analysis which was briefed in the first section of this chapter.\(^{25}\) Every so-called innovator has, whether or not he was conscious of the fact, merely elaborated on this comprehensive treatment. Every great orator of Greece and Rome shows evidence of following his prin-

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25 The reader is referred to the prefaces of the following recognized works on rhetoric:
D. Bonheurs, *The Arts of Logic and Rhetoric*.
G. Campbell, *The Philosophy of Rhetoric*.
F. Fenelon, *Dialogues Concerning Eloquence in General*.\(^{24}\)
principles. Cardinal Newman himself collaborated with his friend Whately to write a book on rhetoric that would explain Aristotle's Rhetoric. 26 Such a book was written and does explain the principles of the great Greek philosopher. 27

Cardinal Newman admitted that the germ for his Idea of a University lay in the revered pages of Aristotle's Rhetoric. Throughout the Idea of a University references are constantly made to the principles of Aristotle. Indeed, in Newman's treatise on literature he says:

Aristotle, in his sketch of the magnanimous man, tells us that his voice is deep, his motions slow, and his stature commanding. In like manner, the elocution of a great intellect is great. His language expresses not only his great thoughts but his great self. Certainly he might use fewer words than he uses, but he fertilizes his simple ideas, and germinates into a multitude of details, and prolongs the march of his sentences, and sweeps round to the full diapason of his harmony, as if rejoicing in his own vigor and richness of resonance. I say a narrow critic will call it verbiage, when really it is a sort of fullness of heart, parallel to that which makes the merry boy whistle as he walks, or the strong man, like the smith in the novel, flourish his club when there is no one to fight with. 28

Surely this quotation must reflect some of the admiration Newman felt for Aristotle's conception of rhetoric. However, as was already stated in the introduction, this paper does

27 Sister Mariella, loc. cit., 432.
28 J.H. Newman, University Subjects, Discourse II.
not intend to prove a direct influence of Aristotle on the rhetoric of Newman in Present Position. Nor does it attempt to exclude the influence of other authors and rhetoricians on Newman. Such a contention would take no cognizance of Newman's own genius. His own views on style are sprinkled throughout his many works. In his treatment, University Subjects, he has the following to say:

For myself, when I was fourteen or fifteen, I imitated Addison; when I was seventeen, I wrote in the style of Johnson; about the same time I fell in with the twelfth volume of Gibbon, and my ears rang with the cadence of his sentences, and I dreamed of it for a night or two. 29

He also adds emphatically:

The only master of style I have ever had (which is strange considering the differences of language) is Cicero. I think I owe a great deal to him, but as far as I know, to no one else. 30

From the latter admission the great influence of Aristotle may seem to give way to the power of the Ciceronian influence. It might be asked why this paper intends to portray the principles of Aristotle shining through the rhetoric of Present Position. Why does it not concentrate on the Ciceronian influence? Sister Mariella gives the best answer to this query when she says, "Was not the great Cicero profoundly influenced by Aristotle's principles of rhetoric? Could we not analyze his mighty orations and find their form ---

29 Reilly, op. cit., 299.
30 Ibid.
and style complying strictly with the principles laid down by the eminent Greek philosopher?"31 Indeed, it is the application of Aristotle's Rhetoric, or the principles therein, in the works of the great Latin orator and in the works of other writers influencing Newman, together with the rhetorical genius of Newman himself, that produced such a work as Present Position of Catholics in England.

The keynote to Newman's conception of rhetoric lies then in his general classical background. We can gain some idea of the classical impact felt by Newman from his own words:

You will say that Cicero's language is undeniably studied, but that Shakespeare's is as undeniably natural and spontaneous; and that is what is meant when the classics are accused of being mere artists of words...I grant that there are writers of name, ancient and modern, who are guilty of the absurdity of making sentences as the very end of their literary labor...I cannot defend them...I cannot grant notwithstanding that genius may never need take pains---that it never insures failures, and succeeds the second time---that it never finishes off at leisure what it has thrown off in the outline at a stroke...Why may not language be wrought as well as the clay of the modeler? Why should not skill in diction be simply subservient and instrumental to the great prototypical ideas which are the contemplation of a Plato or Vergil?...The mere dealer in words cares little or nothing for the subject which he is embellishing, but can paint and gild anything whatever to order; whereas the artist, whom I am acknowledging, has his great or rich visions before him, and his only aim is to bring out what he thinks or feels in a

31 Sister Mariella, loc. cit., 434.
way adequate to the thing spoken of, and appropriate to the speaker.32

J. J. Reilly adds the following evidence of the classical style of Newman: "Though it be Doric in the Parochial Sermons, Corinthian in Mixed Congregations, and Ionic in the Discourses on Various Occasions, there is unity in his style which is always his and his alone."33

L. G. Miller further adds to Mr. Reilly's statement when he says, "It was Newman's concern to show that style is not something distinct from the man, but that it is or should be closely related or bound up with the writer himself, is so personalized a thing as to be inseparable from him. There is no dividing him between truth and ornament."34

William John Tucker places Newman among the classical stylists when he says, "In speaking of the art of writing, he, Newman advises us to consider not so much the writer's diction as his mental attitude and bearing, the beauty of his moral countenance."35

In reviewing some of the opinions of Newman on general characteristics of style, it becomes fairly evident that the principles of Aristotle outlined in the first section of this

32 J.H. Newman, Idea of a University, Section II, University Subjects, 282.
33 Reilly, op. cit., pp. 273-274.
chapter bear close resemblance to his own opinions on rhetoric. Certainly Newman's idea that rhetorical devices exist only for the fertilization of the thoughts behind them is a key idea of Aristotle's Rhetoric. The very fact that Aristotle spent pages discussing salient human characteristics such as the emotions, the virtues and vices, suggests this point. Certainly, too, Aristotle's explicit instructions on how these devices are to portray each phase of the thought they clarify are reflected in the opinions of Newman just cited.

In the next chapter these Aristotelian reflections will take on a clearer form as we see how the general structure of Present Position can be woven around the principles on oration structure as found in The Rhetoric.
CHAPTER II
ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLES IN THE GENERAL STRUCTURE OF NEWMAN'S
PRESENT POSITION OF CATHOLICS IN ENGLAND

Circumstances Concerning the Delivery of Present Position.

Present Position of Catholics in England is always classified as part of Cardinal Newman's "Defense of Rome" Series. It is primarily the work of a controversialist, and hence its general aim is to persuade. But what occasioned this particular defense of the church of Newman's adoption? What was occurring that caused the chief English defender of the faith to deliver these lectures in the Corn Exchange of Birmingham "sitting at a raised desk and before a picture of St. Phillip Neri"?

We Americans can view the situation in England between 1850 and 1851 much more clearly if we but recall the Al Smith election campaign of 1928. In both instances dormant hatreds of Catholics and their Church were fanned into white-hot flames by so-called papal aggressions. In 1928 the press, abetted by the radio, saw to it that the pope would never reign in "the land of the free." Al Smith became the symbol of Catholicism, and once more the old sixteenth century arguments, dressed up in twentieth century styles, flooded the


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American public.

In 1850 the Roman Catholic Church in England was undergoing a period of renaissance. Newman had completed his successful King William Street Lectures and had delighted even the intellectual critics. Dr. Wiseman, England's Catholic Archbishop, rejoiced over their fame. Hundreds of conversions to the Catholic Church followed. Rome conferred on Father Newman an honorary degree of Doctor of Divinity.

Archbishop Wiseman believed that the time had come for the Church to assert herself. He believed that the Established Church had failed, and that the new hierarchy should claim a Roman victory.

His ambitious plan was interrupted by critics in his own fold, men who feared such a move as rash. Such men as Mr. Wilds and Dr. Maguire succeeded in "alarming Rome."2 Wiseman was called to Rome, but instead of being reprimanded for his hasty attempts, he was given the red hat of the cardinalate. Dizzied by his honor, and ignorant of the Protestant grumblings heard by his critics and by Newman himself, he unwittingly touched off the match that was to enkindle the bitter prejudices throughout the entire British Empire.

As soon as Wiseman had been elevated to the position of Cardinal Archbishop of England, he wrote the famous Pastoral

2 Ibid., 254.
Letter "from out the Flaminian gate" of Rome on October 7 announcing the new hierarchy and the details of its constitution. This was the climax of all the "Roman boasting"; here was the fuel for the inevitable conflagration; words such as these could never be tolerated by the "freedom-loving" Protestants:

Till such time as the Holy See shall continue to govern the counties of Middlesex, Hertford, and Essex as ordinary thereof, and those of Surrey, Sussex, Hants, Berkshire, and Hampshire with the islands annexed as administrators with ordinary...The great work is complete. Catholic England has been restored to its orbit in the ecclesiastical firmament... Truly this is a day of exultation of spirit...3

Naturally Cardinal Wiseman meant these words for his own congregations, but the press got hold of them and slanted them at every Englishman in the land. Old familiar terms were soon heard on the streets: "Down with popery," "Down with tyranny" ---the Pope and Cardinal Wiseman were burned in effigy.

Shakespeare's lines were quoted by the Lord Hugh Chancellor:4

Under our feet we'll stamp thy Cardinal's hat in spite of pope or dignities of Church.

An Anglican minister wrote the following lines which were published in the Christian Times, January 7, 1851:5

Harlot of Rome, and dost thou come With bland demeanor now; The bridal smile upon thy lips, The flush upon thy brow?

3 Ibid.
4 Ibid., 255.
5 Ibid., 256.
The cup of sorcery in thy hand,
Still in the same array
As when our fathers in their wrath
Dashed it and thee away?

No, by the memory of the saints,
Who died beneath thy hand,
Thou shalt not dare to claim as throne
One foot of English land.

Antagonism was at fever pitch; Cardinal Wiseman at last began
to realize what his critics had foreseen; it was up to him to
put down these outbursts, and he attempted to do so in his
famous Appeal to the English People. Newman thrilled to this
noble attempt but realized that something much more funda­
mental was necessary. He knew that the Catholic Church could
never gain by a frontal attack on the Established Church of
England. He advised Mr. Capes, an able lay defender of the
Church, against attacking the Established Church in a series
of lectures that he was to deliver:

I can see as little triumph, then, in the de­
cline and fall of the Established Church as to
take part in the emancipation of the Jews...I
cannot, till the Catholic Church is strong
enough to take its place.6

Mr. Capes followed Newman's advice but had to discontinue
his lectures because of illness. Newman was sorely grieved
at this discontinuance as is evidenced by these words:

I am very sorry to hear of your indisposition
...you must get well for the good of the Church.7

6 From a letter to Mr. Capes, 1850, quoted in Ward, op. cit.,
259.
7 Ibid.
But the lectures were not resumed, and Newman's enthusiasm for the great need grew and grew. Finally he made up his mind to undertake the trying task himself, and on June 30, 1851, the first lecture of Present Position of Catholics in England was enthusiastically delivered and received.

Brief Summary of the Contents of Present Position.

How did Newman cope with the perplexing problems before him? He could not attack the Established Church, for the time was not ripe. What approach could he take, then, to wipe out the smears made by the predominantly Protestant populace? Again his clear mind came to the rescue:

I am neither attacking another's belief just now, nor defending myself...I do but propose to investigate how Catholics come to be so trodden under foot, and spurned by a people which is endowed by nature with many great qualities; how it is that we are cried out against by the very stones, and bricks, and tiles, and chimney-pots of a populous, busy place, such as this town which we inhabit.8

In other words, it was Newman's desire to clear away the very root of the difficulty by showing how ridiculous and false Protestant prejudice was. This was indeed a difficult task; he needed a perfect understanding of English religious prejudice and a perfect knowledge of the psychology of the English people. Here again his classical training came to his

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aid; and here the principles of Aristotle's Rhetoric were to shine through the dignified classical style of his lectures.

But before an analysis of the general structure of Present Position is made according to the rhetorical principles of Aristotle already outlined, it will be necessary to synopsize the contents of this great work.

Present Position of Catholics in England comprises nine lectures which were delivered once a week to overflow audiences. The opening lecture is an attempt to win the favor of the audience. In this lecture Newman, by means of enthymemes and examples, attempts to portray the over-all Protestant view of the Catholic Church. That he was successful in winning his audience was evident by "the peals of laughter audible from outside."9

In Lecture II Newman follows up his brilliant opening survey by ironically taking the principle of tradition, a principle which Protestants bitterly oppose, and showing how this very principle is the sustaining power of the Protestant view. Newman carefully indicates the difference between true and false tradition and then systematically shows how Protestants are guided by the latter type.

In Lecture III Newman turns from the sustaining power to the basis of the Protestant view and declares this basis to be

9 Ward, op. cit., 264.
fable. He quotes from many historians to bear out his contention and again makes his proofs as clear as those for the proposition that two plus two are four.

Since fable is the basis for the Protestant view, then it naturally follows that true testimony is insufficient for Protestant followers. The fourth lecture proceeds logically, step by step, to bring out the truth of this contention.

Again, following a natural sequence, Newman next points out the logical inconsistency of the Protestant view. In this, the fifth lecture, he gives examples of the "one-sided condition of the Protestant intellect."\textsuperscript{10} Based on fable, and sustained on false tradition, the life of the Protestant view is prejudice. Newman in this lecture again unfolds the stories of bloodshed and tyranny that this prejudice effected through the ages.

In Lectures VII and VIII Newman presents undeniable evidence of two obvious Protestant tenets: the Protestants' assumed principles as intellectual ground for their view, and their ignorance concerning Catholics as protection for their view.

Finally in the last lecture Newman sums up his case against Protestant prejudice and outlines the duties of Catholics towards this Protestant view.

\textsuperscript{10} Newman, op. cit., 178.
Even from this brief synopsis the perfect organization of this series of lectures can be noted. If no further analysis were made, the logical progression of the subject could be determined from the titles of the lectures alone. But such a synopsis challenges a closer look into the substance of the rhetoric of Newman; so, in the following section, it is hoped that a careful analysis of the framework of Present Position will bring to light Aristotle's principles of rhetoric discussed in the first chapter.

Analysis of the Over-all Structure of Present Position in the Light of Aristotelian Principles.

Either consciously or unconsciously Newman applied Aristotelian principles of rhetoric to the general framework of Present Position. It will be recalled that Aristotle defined rhetoric as the faculty of discovering all the possible means of persuasion on any subject. He divided rhetoric into three kinds, each having its proper end and methods. Now it was Newman's task to persuade his audience of the fallacy of the Protestant view; his aim or end was to prove conclusively the injustice of the Protestant attack:

I do but propose to investigate how Catholics come to be so trodden underfoot...12

11 See supra, p. 6.
Hence, if the specific properties that Aristotle assigned to his three different types of rhetoric are recalled, it will be seen how readily Present Position fits under forensic or judicial rhetoric. According to Aristotle this kind of rhetoric is divided into accusation and defense; its ends are justice and injustice. Newman in Present Position maintained that he was to investigate the charges or accusations of Protestants against Catholics. His investigations led him to accuse the accusers---his accusation led him to argue the injustice of the Protestant view. But how did Aristotle point the way for the organization of his accusation? What principles did Aristotle recommend for the forensic orator?

Aristotle advised the forensic rhetorician to familiarize himself thoroughly with crime and its objects. But of what crime is Newman accusing Protestantism? He is accusing the Protestants of the crime of bearing false witness against their neighbors:

So is it with the view we take of Popery; its costume is fixed, like the wigs of our judges, or the mace of our mayors. Have not free-born Britons the right to think as they please? We rule popery to be what we say it is, not by history but by act of Parliament; not by sight or hearing but by the national will. It is the will of the Legislature, it is the voice of the people, which gives facts their complection, and logic its course, and ideas their definition.

13 See supra, pp. 6-7.
14 Newman, op. cit., 11
Once the accusation is made, Newman again applies Aristotelian principles and begins analyzing the nature and cause of the crime. He blames this Protestant prejudice on wanton ignorance of the Catholic Church:

Homilies of the Church of England say that 'in the pit of damnable idolatry all the world, as it were, drowned, continued until our age' (that is, the Reformation), 'by the space of above 800 years...so that laity and clergy, learned and unlearned, all ages, sects, and degrees of men, women, and children; of whole Christendom (an horrible and most dreadful thing to think), have been at once drowned in an abominable idolatry, of all other vices most detested of God, and most damnable to men.'

Thus, Bishop Newton says, 'In the same proportion as the power of the Roman empire decreased, the authority of the Church increased, the latter at the expense and ruin of the former; till at length the pope grew above all, and the wicked one was fully manifested and revealed, or the lawless one, as he may be called; for the pope is declared again and again not to be bound by any law of God or man.'

If there be any set of men who are railed at as the pattern of all that is evil, it is the Jesuit body. It is vain to ask their slanderers what they know of them; did they ever see a Jesuit? Can they say if there are many or few? What do they know of their teaching? 'Oh, it is quite notorious,' they reply: you might as well deny the sun in heaven; it is notorious that the Jesuits are a crafty, intriguing, unscrupulous, desperate, murderous, and exceedingly able body of men; a secret society ever plotting against liberty and government, and progress, and thought, and the prosperity of England. Nay it is awful; they disguise themselves in a thousand shapes, as men of fashion, farmers, soldiers, laborers,

15 Ibid., 17.
16 Ibid.
butchers, and peddlers; they prowl about with handsome stocks, and stylish waistcoats, and gold chains about their persons, or in fustian jackets, as the case may be; and they do not hesitate to shed the blood of anyone whatever, prince or peasant, who stands in their way.¹⁷

In other words, Newman, in analyzing the nature of the crime of Protestant prejudice, picks typical cases such as these cited above and attempts to show how absurd the Protestant view is. He does not stop with his observance of how Jesuits are thought of but goes on and cites instances of false opinions on all the religious orders.

Then in Aristotelian fashion, Newman follows this treatment with a rhetorical proof, one of the cleverest in the entire volume. Here Newman's genius for rhetoric, abetted by a keen insight into human emotions, is particularly evident. In his use of this device the true function of rhetoric can be appreciated; in analyzing this device it can be seen that for Newman just as for Aristotle rhetoric is not artifice, that its devices exist primarily for the clarification of the principles behind them. Indeed, we can, by analyzing this historical parallel, understand why Aristotle called these devices proofs. The example of the Russian Prince exciting his people against England is a prose gem often quoted by textbooks of rhetoric for the edification of students; it is an unmistakably clear parallel of Protestant prejudice, the

¹⁷ Ibid.
nature of which Newman had been analyzing. Each detail of this device brings out every feature of the Protestant view. Accordingly, when the strong climax is reached, the entire substance of the first lecture becomes part of the understanding of his audience; the formidable nature of the crime under consideration is exposed, bearing all of its ugly potentialities.

Once the audience is made fully aware of the crime, then, according to Aristotle, the causes or objects of the crime must be analyzed carefully by the forensic rhetorician. This Newman does in Lecture II of Present Position. As a starting point for the seeking out of these causes or objects of crime, Aristotle further suggests that the accuser be fully aware of the causes of human action and lists seven principal motivating dispositions:

1. Chance
2. Nature
3. Compulsion
4. Habit
5. Reasoning
6. Passion
7. Desire

Newman picks two of these, habit and passion, and proceeds to demonstrate how the one working on the other produces the crime under consideration, namely, Protestant prejudice. In the second lecture, therefore, the traditions of English Pro-

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18 Aristotle, op. cit., pp. 74 sq.
testants are exposed, and it is demonstrated how these traditions over a period of years become habit with the English people. Newman uses tradition in the bad sense of the term. He fully realized that Protestants accuse the Catholic Church of relying on tradition, and hence he employs a typical Aristotelian device, namely, the refutative enthymeme.19 In other words, Newman, by distinguishing between the right and wrong types of tradition, defends the Church and condemns the Protestants:

As is the origin, so is the tradition; when the origin is true the tradition will be true; when the origin is false the tradition will be false.20

But what is this tradition that habitualized Protestant thinking? Why did Newman pick habit as the cause of Protestant action against the Catholic Church? Again following the Aristotelian method, Newman first sets up his principles and then his proofs. He turns to history for his principles or causes of Protestant prejudice:

1. English loyalty to the sovereign who is Protestant.
2. Protestantism as the tradition of a gentleman.
3. Protestantism's growth with the flowering of English literature.
4. Protestantism as the tradition of the English clergy.21

For proofs of these principles Newman employs practically

19 See supra, p. 13.
21 Ibid.
every device that Aristotle recommended. Although it is not
the purpose of this chapter to make an analysis of these de-
vices, still it will be necessary to cite examples of a few
of these in order to present a complete picture of the Aris-
totelian influence on the structure of Present Position.

Concerning the proofs for forensic oratory, Aristotle
says:

There is another topic common to forensic or de-
liberative oratory viz., to consider the induce-
ments and discouragements and the motives of
acting or abstaining from action; for these are
the conditions, the presence or the absence of
which renders action desirable or the reverse...22

Hence Newman, in order to bring out how effectively the feeling
of British loyalty to the sovereign conditioned the British
mind to fall into the habit of accepting Protestantism and
condemning Catholicism, turns to history for his proof:

The virgin queen rose to her strength; she held
her court; she showed herself to her people, she
gathered around her peer and squire, alderman and
burgess, army and navy, lawyer and divine, stu-
dent and artisan. She made an appeal to the
chivalrous and the loyal, and forthwith all that
was powerful, dignified, splendid, and intellec-
tual; touched the hilt of their swords, and
spread their garments in the way for her to tread
upon...She was the queen of fashion and opinion.
The principles of Protestantism rapidly became
the standard generally, to which genius, taste,
philosophy, learning and investigation were con-
strained and bribed to submit. In every circle,
and in every rank of the community, in the court,

22 Aristotle, op. cit., 208.
in public meetings, in private society, in literary assemblages, in the family party, it is always assumed that Catholicism is absurd.23

As proof of the second cause for Protestant prejudice, namely, that Protestantism is the tradition of the gentleman, Newman turns to the power of the Aristotelian historical parallel:

We can all understand how the man of fashion, the profligate, the spendthrift, have their own circles, to which none but men of their own stamp and their own opinion are admitted; how to hate religion and religious men, to scoff at principle, and to laugh at heaven and hell, and to do all this with decorum and good breeding, are the necessary title for admission; and how in consequence men begin to believe what they so incessantly hear said, and what they so incessantly say by rote themselves...begin to suspect that after all, virtue as it is called, is nothing else than hypocrisy grafted on licentiousness; and that purity and simplicity are but dreams of the young and theoretical:...it is by a similar policy and by a similar process, that the fathers and patrons of the English Reformation have given a substance, a momentum, and a permanence to their tradition and have fastened on us Catholics, first the suspicion, then the repute of ignorance, bigotry, and superstition.24

Again following Aristotle's topic of considering the inducements and motives for action, Newman, by quoting profusely from the Faerie Queene, Paradise Lost, Pilgrims' Progress, the plays of Shakespeare, the works of Bacon and Sidney, shows how literature, growing with Protestantism, became a powerful weapon against the Catholics in England.

24 Ibid.
Finally he turns to maxims to bring out the truth of the contention that the Anglican clergy's chief concern is to keep the anti-Catholic prejudice alive:

The papists not worship the Virgin Mary...why they call her 'Deipara' which means 'equal to God.'...The pope not the man of sin...why, it is a fact that the Romanists distinctly maintain that 'the Pope is God, and God is the Pope.' Not a Pope Joan...why she was 'John the Eighth, her real name was Gilberta, she took the name of John English, delivered lectures at Rome, and was at length unanimously elected Pope...Jesuits...there are at least twenty thousand in England; and horrible to say, a number of them in each of the Protestant universities, and doubtless a great many at Oscott. Popery preach Christ...no; 'Popery' as has been well said is the religion of priest-craft; for from the beginning to the end it is nothing but priest, priest, priest.25

Thus it has been seen how the bone of Aristotle's Rhetoric takes on the solid flesh of Newman's rhetorical genius. Thus far it has been indicated how closely the structure of Present Position parallels the principles laid down for forensic rhetoric. Before the remaining Aristotelian principles are pointed out in the framework of Present Position, it might be well to summarize what has been said.

The first Aristotelian principle for the forensic rhetorician is the analysis of the nature of the crime. Newman in the first lecture of Present Position analyzes the nature of the crime of Protestant prejudice.

25 Ibid., pp. 79-80.
Aristotle next urges the forensic rhetorician to seek into the causes and objects of the crime, and he discusses seven causes of all human action: chance, nature, compulsion, habit, reasoning, passion, and desire. Newman, after analyzing the nature of the Protestant view, picks habit and passion and shows how a combination of these produced the tradition of the Protestant view. This tradition, then, Newman assigns as the chief cause of Protestant prejudice.

This brings us to Aristotle's remaining principles for the forensic orator:

3. Consideration of the conditions under which people commit crime.
4. Character and conditions of the victims.
5. Conclusion: the injustice of the crime.

It is interesting to see how, consciously or unconsciously, Newman took these remaining principles and applied them to his particular case in the Present Position.

First of all Newman investigates the conditions under which the Protestants persist in their prejudice against Catholics. In the third lecture, therefore, he wants to know, "How is it that Protestantism has retained its ascendancy, and that Catholic arguments and Catholic principles are at once misunderstood and ignored?" He begins this investigation in true Aristotelian fashion by making a bold accusation:

26 Ibid., 84.
Fact and argument have had fair play in other countries; they have not had fair play here; the religious establishment has forbidden them fair play.  

After the accusation is made, the principles are proposed and the proofs brought forward. These principles or conditions under which Protestants persist in their prejudice form the subjects of the ensuing lectures:

Lecture III: "Fable, the Basis of the Protestant view."

Lecture IV: "True Testimony Insufficient for the Protestant view."

Lecture V: "Logical Inconsistency of the Protestant view."

Lecture VI: "Prejudice, the Life of the Protestant view."

Lecture VII: "Assumed Principles, the Intellectual Ground of the Protestant view."

Lecture VIII: "Ignorance Concerning Catholics the Protection of the Protestant view."

Lecture IX: "Duties of Catholics Towards the Protestant view."

In other words, fable, false testimony, logical inconsistency, prejudice, and assumed principles abetted by ignorance are the conditions under which the Protestant crime flourishes.

Aristotle, in his treatment of the conditions under which crimes are committed, further points out:

We believe we are most likely to succeed in committing crimes without incurring any penalty if

27 Ibid.
we are able speakers and men of action and have large forensic experience and if we have a great number of friends and large property. This belief is strongest if we are ourselves in possession of the advantages I have described, but failing this, it exists also, if we have friends or subordinates or associates who possess them, as we are thereby enabled to commit crimes and escape detection and punishment.28

Newman applies this treatment to the conditions under which Protestant prejudice flourishes and builds up his case to ensure the end for which he is striving, namely, to prove the injustice of the crime committed:

Here is the condition of the Court, and of the Law, and of Society, and of Literature, strong in themselves, and acting on each other, and acting on a willing people, and the willing people acting on them, till the whole edifice stands self-supported, reminding one of some vast arch (as times may be seen), from which endures still and supports the huge mass of brick work which lies above it, by the simple cohesion of parts which that same age has effected.29

Newman not only builds his case on the Aristotelian principle that criminals flourish when they are backed by influential friends, but he also weaves in Aristotle's fourth guide for the forensic orator: "Look into the character and condition of the victims of the crime."30 It will be seen in the following analysis how, in bringing to light the falsehood of the Protestant view, he immediately implies or states directly the injury to the innocent victim, the Catholic Church.

28 Aristotle, op. cit., 85.
29 Newman, op. cit., 73.
30 See supra, p. 9.
Newman's first assertion against the Protestant view is that fable, not truth, forms its basis. But these fables are perpetrated by men of influence; hence the Protestant in accusing the Catholic can always point to prominent authors or speakers for his authority. In proof of this condition Newman points out the gross errors purposely made by eminent Protestant historians. Perhaps the most interesting proof of the fallacy of Protestant accounts is his accusation of a Protestant clergyman's tale of seeing a category or rather catalogue of sins posted on the door of the Cathedral of St. Gudule in Belgium. According to this clergyman's story a catalogue of sins with a specification of the prices at which remission of each might severally be obtained is boldly posted on the door. Newman thus gives an example of the conditions under which the Protestant crime flourishes, and also implies the innocence of the victim, the Catholic Church. He proves the absurdity and gross injustice of this particular charge by bringing to light the true nature of this so-called sin catalogue. Dramatically he says:

Now it so happens that on the right hand door of the transept of this church of St. Gudule there really is affixed a black board on which there is a catalogue in the French language of the price to be paid not for sins, but for the use of chairs. The inscription translated runs as follows: 'A chair without cushion, one cent; a chair with cushion, two cents. On great festival days, a chair without cushion, two cents; a
chair with cushion, four cents.\textsuperscript{31}

In this same lecture\textsuperscript{32} there occurs the most striking example of the Aristotelian influence on the plan or structure of Present Position. In summing up arguments against the fallaciousness of Protestant charges, he repeats practically verbatim Aristotle's general principles for forensic rhetoric. He says:

I will therefore briefly consider it an architect's contention that a certain monastic establishment contains space for torture chambers under the heads of--1. The accusation, 2. Its grounds, 3. The accusers, and 4. The accused.\textsuperscript{33}

Aristotle, if we recall, suggested that the forensic rhetorician be concerned with: 1. The crime, 2. Its nature, 3. Disposition of the criminals, 4. The victims. The parallel in this specific instance is too marked to require further comment.

Newman continues his Aristotelian analysis of the conditions under which Protestant lies flourish by citing two instances of accusation made against the Catholic Church by ex-Catholics. The first instance concerns a book by Blanco White, an ex-Jesuit. Newman shows how, because the book on the whole presents a fair picture of the Society of Jesus, it proved a disappointment to Protestants who had been awaiting eagerly

\textsuperscript{31} Ibid., 117.
\textsuperscript{32} Lecture III: "Fable, the Basis of the Protestant View."
\textsuperscript{33} Newman, op. cit., 121.
an expose. The second instance concerns an expose that met with exuberant Protestant approval despite the fact that even Protestant leaders had ascertained how ridiculously false the testimony of this work was. In this "Maria Monk" example, Newman cleverly turns the spotlight from the absurd accusations of a demented woman to the eager and willing gullibility of her Protestant readers. Thus, as Aristotle would have it, this rhetorical proof graphically illustrates the principle behind it.

Newman again follows Aristotle's observation of how power and influence aids the criminal when, in the sixth lecture, he speaks of the logical inconsistency of the Protestant view. He says:

Let us walk abroad with these servants or children, who, by the spirit of Protestantism, have been sent about their business for being Catholics, and we shall see fresh manifestations of its intolerance. Go into the workshops and manufacturies, you will find it in full operation. The convert to Catholicism is dismissed by his employer; the tradesman loses his custom; the practitioner his patients; the lawyer has no longer the confidence of his clients...34

Thus, up to the very end of the lectures, Newman's treatment, his plan and structure, parallels the Aristotelian principles of forensic rhetoric. Finally his case is built on grounds strong enough for his end or purpose to be realized, that is, 34 Ibid., 191.
the gross injustice of the English Protestant's view of Catholics. At this point he wastes no words but sums up his case in an Aristotelian asyndeton:

Such then is Popular Protestantism, considered in its opposition to Catholics. Its truth is Establishment by Law; its philosophy is Theory; its faith is prejudice; its facts are fictions; its reasonings Fallacies; and its security is Ignorance about those whom it is opposing. The Law says that black is white; Ignorance says, why not? Theory says it ought to be; Fiction says it is, and Prejudice says it shall be.³⁵

So that a clearer picture of the Aristotelian principles shining through the general framework of Present Position of Catholics in England can be gained, the following complete chart will parallel Aristotle's principles with Newman's application of them:

**Aristotle's Principles of Forensic Rhetoric:**

1. The nature and number of the objects of crime.

2. Causes of a disposition to commit crime based on causes of all human action:
   a. Chance
   b. Nature
   c. Compulsion
   d. Habit
   e. Reasoning
   f. Passion
   g. Desire

**Structure of Present Position of Catholics in England:**

1. In Lecture I Newman accuses Protestants of the crime of Prejudice. He then analyzes the nature of this crime.


³⁵ Ibid., 371.
3. Disposition of the criminal, conditions under which people commit crime:
   a. Influence of the criminal himself.
   b. Power and property on the side of the criminal.

4. Character and condition of the victims.

5. Conclusion or aim:
   To prove the injustice of the crime committed.

3. Lectures III-VIII:
   Fables
   False Testimony
   Logical Inconsistency
   Prejudice
   Assumed Principles
   Ignorance concerning Catholics
   All the above are perpetrated by influential Protestants and eagerly believed by the masses.

4. Lectures III-VIII:
   Newman refutes each false attack and thus proves the true character of the victim.

5. Conclusion or aim:
   To show how the Protestant view is false and hence by inference prove the injustice of Protestant treatment of Catholics in England.

An attempt has been made, by an examination of the text of *Present Position*, to indicate how the principles of Aristotle's *Rhetoric* are reflected in the structure and plan of these lectures. This reflection, made apparent by the divisions that Newman effected, gives us a partial reason for his success as an orator. The whole reason for his success can be found only in his own rhetorical skill. The final chapter of this paper, therefore, will be devoted to an analysis of Newman's use of the two basic Aristotelian devices of rhetoric, the *example* and the *enthymeme*. 
CHAPTER III

ARISTOTELIAN PRINCIPLES AND CERTAIN DEVICES

USED IN PRESENT POSITION

Thus far the subject matter of this paper has comprised a study of rhetoric as an art and an attempt to point out how Aristotelian principles are reflected in the rhetoric of Newman. It now remains to take the text of Present Position and to examine its rhetorical devices.

In the second chapter the general structure of Present Position was analyzed, and it was noted how Aristotle's rules for the forensic rhetorician shone through Newman's attempt to portray the heinousness of the crime of Protestant prejudice. Only occasionally were hints offered concerning Newman's proofs for the principles contained in his nine lectures. In other words, up to this point only the skeleton or framework of the Present Position has been analyzed. In this chapter an attempt will be made to prove by an analysis of certain rhetorical devices that Newman lived up to the Aristotelian concept of the true rhetorician, namely, "one who possesses the faculty of discovering all the possible means of persuasion on any subject."1

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1 Aristotle, op. cit., 10.
Newman's Use of the Example.

In making an analysis of Newman's use of the device known as the example, a definite pattern will be followed, a pattern based on the following conclusions found in the Rhetoric:

It stands to the thing which is to be proved in the relation not of part to whole nor of whole to part nor or whole to whole, but of part to part, of similar to similar, and is employed when both the example and the thing exemplified fall under the same general head, but the one is more familiar than the other.

The following three questions, therefore, will be applied to an example which is typical in structure of all the examples found in Present Position of Catholics in England:

1. Why did Newman choose this particular device for this particular situation in the text?

2. How does each point in the device clarify each phase of the principle behind it?

3. How does the style of presentation aid the effectiveness of the example?

Newman, it was pointed out, made clear the aim of Present Position in the very first lecture of this work. Rather than tear down the Anglican Church, rather than attack its dogmas, he chose "to investigate how Catholics come to be so trodden under foot, and spurned by a people which is endowed by nature with many great qualities, moral and intellectual."  

2 Aristotle, op. cit., 19.
3 See supra, p. 32.
4 Newman, op. cit., 2.
Newman realized the seriousness of the job before him. He knew that to harangue an already enraged Protestant England would put the Catholics in even more dire circumstances. He knew that the distinct Catholic gains achieved by the Oxford Movement could be nullified easily if the mob spirit were injected into the populace by a Protestant press.

If ever Aristotle's tried and true principles for the forensic orator were to be followed, it was in this situation. That Newman secured the goodwill of his audience is evidenced by the reports of the peals of laughter coming from the Corn Exchange. In the first lecture, then, Newman not only had to state his case but state it in such a way that the accused, some of whom were sitting before him, would feel the accusation to be a just one.

As was pointed out in the summary of the contents of Present Position, Newman slowly built to the assertion that there are two sides to every question, but that through false attitudes only one side of the Catholic question is heard. At the very end of his approach in the first lecture he delivers the famous example of the Russian Count versus the British Constitution in order to clarify his accusation and at the same time win over his audience. It is hoped that an analysis of this example will discover how effectively it accomplishes

5 See supra, p. 29.
6 The Press's reaction to Cardinal Wiseman's pastoral letter discussed in Chapter II, supra., p. 27.
7 See supra, p. 25.
these two aims.

1. Why did Newman choose this particular device for this particular situation in the text?

Not only does Newman in his choice of devices show evidence of applying the Aristotelian principle of producing a favorable disposition in his audience, but he also displays his knowledge of the Aristotelian treatment of this principle, namely, the Aristotelian analysis of the emotions, times of life (youth, the prime of life, age), and accidents of fortune (birth, wealth, power). In other words, Newman in choosing this device displays a profound knowledge of human psychology and especially a complete understanding of the British Protestant mind.

To accomplish his aim of winning over the audience, he prepares their minds by lauding one of their most cherished documents, the British Constitution:

For this purpose I will take the British Constitution, which is so specially the possession, and so deservedly the glory, of our own people; and in taking it I need hardly say, I take it for the very reason that it is so rightfully the object of our wonder and veneration...it is one of the greatest of human works, as admirable in its own line, to take the productions of genius in very various departments, as the pyramids, as the wall of China, as the paintings of Raffaello, as the Apollo Belvidere... It soars, in its majesty, far above the opinions of men, and will be a marvel, almost a portent, to the end of time; but for that very reason it is more to my purpose, when I would show you how even it, the British Constitution, would
fare, when submitted to the intellect of Exeter Hall, and handled by practitioners, whose highest effort at dissection is to chop and to mangle.  

With subject matter so appealing to the British mind Newman plunges into the example itself.

He seized upon an incident that must have been familiar to every Englishman in Birmingham since it had appeared "recently in a morning paper." Its timeliness was unquestioned since the bitter feeling between England and Russia was mounting in preparation for the Crimean War. In fact this particular incident had caused the British minister "to have asked an explanation of the Cabinet of St. Petersburg." Newman need not turn to a parallel of his own making—here was an actual example, recently reported, that served the purpose of summing up and at the same time winning over the audience.

2. How does each point in the device clarify each phase of the principle behind it?

If we recall, Newman had already posed his question early in the first lecture, "Here I am only investigating how it is she (the Catholic Church) comes to be so trodden over and hated among us." He answered this question by saying, "The reason is this, that reasons of state, political and national, --------

8 Newman, op. cit., 25.
9 Ibid., 26.
10 Ibid., pp. 27-29.
11 Ibid.
prevent her from being heard in her defense." Thus rhetorically he states a principle, as Aristotle would call it, and hence must clarify it.

Before Newman plunged into the actual narration of the example, he made certain that the background for it was clearly understood. He made certain that the audience was aware of the fact that the meeting took place under the "sanction of the Czar, on occasion of an attempt made by one or two Russian noblemen to spread British ideas in the capitol." The cast of characters is thus introduced to the audience. The villain is to be the Czar and his henchman, "a junior member of the Potemkin family...who has acquired the title of Bloodsucker." This henchman never saw England, never saw a member of parliament, a policeman, a queen, or a London mob; never read English history, nor studied any one of our philosophers, jurists, moralists, or poets; but who has dipped into Blackstone and several English writers, and has picked up facts at third or fourth hand, and has got together a crude farrago of ideas, words, and instances, a little truth, a deal of falsehood, a deal of misrepresentation, a deal of nonsense, and a deal of invention.

The parallel is complete as to details. The henchman is a typical Protestant such as Waddington or Bishop Newton whom Newman had already accused of Protestant prejudice in preceding pages. We must note, too, that this henchman worked under the sanction of the Czar just as the Protestant spreads his

12 Ibid.
prejudice under the sanction of the English king.

Thus before he begins the example proper, we can note the following parallel conditions:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Principle</th>
<th>Example</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Job of Protestant is to prevent Church from being heard in her defense.</td>
<td>Job of Russian Count was to put down a pro-British movement by a one-sided argument.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reasons of State, political and national, prevent her from being heard in her defense.</td>
<td>Meeting was called in Moscow under the sanction of the Czar.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Those who do not know there are two sides of the question (i.e. the bulk of the English nation) are violent because they are ignorant.&quot;</td>
<td>The Count &quot;never saw England...never read English history, nor studied any one of our philosophers, jurists, moralists, or poets...&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Catholics are treated with scorn and injustice simply because, though they have a good deal to say in their defense, they have never patiently been heard.&quot;</td>
<td>The Czar instructed the governor of Moscow to conspire at the project of a great public meeting which should be open to the small faction of Anglo-maniacs, as well as to the mass of the population.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Thus the stage is set, the cast of characters is introduced, the principle occasioning Newman's use of this devise has been made clear,—all of the Aristotelian conditions for the use of the example have been lived up to; it now remains

Note: All future references from Present Position will be found on pp. 25-41, 43.
to be seen if the example itself "resembles testimony" and hence is "invariably persuasive."13

The Count began by observing that the events of every day, as it came, called on his countrymen more and more importunately to choose their side, and to make a firm stand against a perfidious power, which arrogantly proclaims that there is nothing like the British Constitution in the whole world, and that no country can prosper without it; which is yearly aggrandizing itself in East, West, and South, which is engaged in one enormous conspiracy against all States, and which was even aiming at modifying the old institutions of the North, and at dressing up the army, navy, legislature, and executive of his own country in the livery of Queen Victoria. 'Insular in situation,' he exclaimed, 'and at the back gate of the world, what has John Bull to do with continental matters, or with the political traditions of our holy Russia?'

Here it can be seen how the matter of the example itself must have appealed to an audience already concerned over Russia's antagonistic attitude towards the British. But certainly this same matter must have worked memories of "Harlot of Rome" or "Thou shalt not dare to claim as throne one foot of English land..."14 Thus the subtlety of Newman's approach both won over the audience and yet classed them under the banner of their enemy, the Czar and his henceman. Newman's approach may be simplified in the following way:

You see here your enemies the Russians working up their people against your cherished document, the British Constitution. They are accusing you

13 Aristotle, op. cit., 41.
14 See supra, p. 25.
falsely of greediness and imperialism, yet you
the victims of this Russian falsehood, when you
attack the Church of Rome act in the same manner
...shame on you.

Newman continues the example:

And yet there were men in that very city who
were so far the dupes of insidious propagandists
and insolent traitors to their emperor, as to
maintain that England had been a civilized coun­
try longer than Russia. On the contrary, he
maintained, and he would shed the last drop of
his blood in maintaining, that, as for its
boasted Constitution, it was a crazy, old-fash­
toned piece of furniture, and an eyesore in the
nineteenth century, and would not last a dozen
years. He had the best information for saying
so.

Certainly the audience could not miss the parallel between the
Count's accusation and that of the Protestant historians whom
Newman had quoted earlier in the lecture. In case they had
Newman added:

He could understand those who had never crossed
out of their island, listening to the songs
about 'Rule Britannia,' and 'Rosbif,' and 'Poor
Jack,' and the 'Old English Gentleman;' he
understood and he pitied them; but that Russians,
that the conquerors of Napoleon, that the heirs
of a paternal government, should bow the knee,
and kiss the hand, and walk backwards, and per­
form other antics before the face of a limited
monarch, this was the incomprehensible foolery
which certain Russians had viewed with so much
tenderness. He repeated, there were in that
city educated men, who had openly professed a
reverence for the atheistical tenets and fiend­
ish maxims of John-Bullism.

In the following portion of the example Newman's accusing
finger points clearly at the audience, at the Waddingtons, at
the Protestants whose ideas of the Jesuits he had exposed a few minutes before:

Here the speaker was interrupted by one or two murmurs of dissent, and a foreigner, supposed to be a partner in a Scotch firm, was observed in the extremity of the square making earnest attempts to obtain a hearing. He was put down, however, amid enthusiastic cheering, and the Count proceeded with a warmth of feeling which increased the effect of the terrible invective which followed.

Certainly the British mind reacted patriotically to this matter. Certainly it condemned this Count who would not even give a hearing to a defender of its great Constitution. But just as certainly it perceived the parallel; just as certainly it knew that Newman was saying, "Do you give the Catholic a fair hearing? Do you not 'amidst enthusiastic cheering' stifle a Catholic defense?" Newman proceeds:

He said he had used the words 'atheistical' and 'fiendish' most advisedly, and he would give his reasons for doing so. What was to be said to any political power which claimed the attribute of Divinity? Was any term too strong for such a usurpation? Now, no one would deny Antichrist would be such a power; an Antichrist was contemplated, was predicted in Scripture, it was to come in the last times, it was to grow slowly, it was to manifest itself warily and craftily, and then to have a month speaking great things against the Divinity and against His attributes. This prediction was most literally and exactly fulfilled in the British Constitution.

The persuasive rhetoric was certainly gaining momentum. Here the enemy of the British, the hated Russian, was accusing its revered document of possessing the qualities of the Antichrist.
But again the audience must have squirmed uncomfortably at the parallel. Did not the Protestant accuse the Church of Rome in the same manner? But Newman did not stop here; not only did he show the similarity between the accusation of the Russian and that of the Protestant, but he also showed the similarity between the false evidence for the accusations:

I hold in my hand, continued the speaker, a book which I have obtained under very remarkable circumstances. It is not known to the British people, it is circulated only among the lawyers, merchants, and aristocracy, and its restrictive use is secured only by the most solemn oaths, the most fearful penalties, the utmost vigilance of the police. I procured it after many years of anxious search by the activity of an agent, and the co-operation of an English bookseller, and it cost me an enormous sum to make it my own. It is called Blackstone's Commentaries on the Laws of England, and I am happy to make known to the universe its odious and shocking mysteries, known to few Britons, and certainly not known to the deluded persons whose vagaries have been the occasion of this meeting. I am sanguine in thinking that when they come to know the real tenets of John Bull, they will at once disown his doctrines with horror, and break off all connexion with his adherents.

Now, I should say, gentlemen, that this book, while it is confined to certain classes, is of those classes, on the other hand, of judges, and lawyers, and privy councillors, and justices of the peace, and police magistrates, and clergy, and country gentlemen the guide, and I may say, the gospel. I open the book, gentlemen, and what are the first words which meet my eyes? 'The King can do no wrong.' I beg you to attend, gentlemen, to this most significant assertion; one was accustomed to think that no child of man had the gift of impeccability; one had imagined that, simply speaking, impeccability was a divine attribute; but this British
Bible, as I may call it, distinctly ascribes an absolute sinlessness to the King of Great Britain and Ireland. Observe, I am using no words of my own, I am still but quoting what meets my eyes in this remarkable document. The words run thus: 'It is an axiom of the law of the land that the King himself can do no wrong.' Was I wrong, then, in speaking of the atheistical maxims of John-Bullism? But this is far from all: the writer goes on actually to ascribe to the Sovereign (I tremble while I pronounce the words) absolute perfection; for he speaks thus: 'The law ascribes to the King in his political capacity ABSOLUTE PERFECTION; the King can do no wrong!' -- (groans). One had thought that no human power could thus be described; but the British legislature, judicature, and jurisprudence, have had the unspeakable effrontery to impute to their crowned and sceptred idol, to their doll,—here cries of 'shame, shame,' from the same individual who had distinguished himself in an earlier part of the speech— to this doll, this puppet whom they have dressed up with a lion and a unicorn, the attribute of ABSOLUTE PERFECTION!

Words taken out of context, phrases manipulated to suit the prince's purpose, emotions, asides, to stir the bitter prejudices — all of these tricks are vividly displayed in an increasing crescendo. Here before an English audience already aroused over the activities of Russia, Newman builds up the utter helplessness of the British cause at this mass meeting. He could not help but win their confidence by such a narration. Surely they must have winced when the feeble attempt of a loyal British defender was forcibly put down:

Here the individual who had several times interrupted sprung up, in spite of the efforts of persons about him to keep him down, and cried out as far as his words could be collected, 'You cowardly liar, our dear, good little Queen,'
when he was immediately saluted with a cry of 'Turn him out,' and soon made his exit from the meeting.

And yet, although their sympathy was aroused, Newman never for one moment let them forget the parallel. The same words that rolled out of the mouth of the hated Russian prince surely must have reminded them of the words they heard in their parish churches or read in the Birmingham papers. The similarity could not be missed:

The King can do no wrong. The Queen is absolute perfection...she has no folly, no weakness; if she is the fount of justice, if she is the fount of grace, if she is simply above the law, if she is omnipotent what wonder that they should speak of her as a superior being...Gentlemen, can it surprise you to be told, after such an exposition of the blasphemies of England, that, astonishing to say, Queen Victoria is distinctly pointed out in the Book of Revelation as having the number of the beast! You may recollect that number is 666; now, she came to the throne in the year thirty-seven, at which date she was eighteen years old. Multiply then 37 by 18, and you have the very number 666, which is the mystical emblem of the lawless King!!!

Thus in the example, Great Britain and the audience sitting in Birmingham were the unfortunate victims of a one-sided accusation. The audience was being unjustly attacked and, through the power of Newman's sentences, this injustice was felt keenly not merely realized academically.

Thus, subtly, Newman was giving the English Protestant a taste of his own medicine. He was making the accuser feel the pangs of the accused; he was placing the accused and
accuser in the same category -- he was appealing to their na-
tionality, to their English blood. As Englishmen both Catho-
lies and Protestants were victims of an injustice occasioned
by a hated nation. But the example, the device, once effect-
ing this common ground also increased the guilt of the English
Protestants who were using the same hated weapons on their
English Catholic brethren.

In this way Newman brings out in actual practice the
principle of Aristotle which states:

The magnitude of crime is proportionate to the
magnitude of the injustice which prompts it. 15

Through an example, therefore, taken from an actual newspaper
account, Newman built up each dramatic phase but always im-
plied the parallel. He won over the audience by appealing to
their patriotism but at the same time deftly placed them on
the same level as that of the hated Russian Prince. Again
Newman followed Aristotle by building up to the example 16
which summed up the matter of the first lecture.

3. How does the style of presentation aid the
effectiveness of the example?

Perhaps the chief value of the famous Russian Prince
example just analyzed lies in the fact that it was not pre-
sented as a mere narrative but as an actual speech within a
speech. The narrative unified the example, but the actual

15 Aristotle, op. cit., 45.
16 Aristotle says: "It is proper in default of enthymemes to
make use of examples as logical proofs, these being the
natural means of producing convictions...", 184.
argument in the words of Newman himself not only aroused the sympathy of the audience but also made them conscious of the injustice and lack of logic in the prince's attitude which in reality was the attitude of English Protestants toward their Catholic brethren -- or the attitude of the audience itself.

This combination of narrative and actual argument produced a twofold effect: 1. The narrative placed the audience on the site of the Public Square in Moscow and made it aware of all the events taking place while the Russian Count spoke, in other words, Newman's audience became observers of the insult to their revered constitution; 2. The speech of the Count in the words of Newman made them feel all the more helpless and hence more defiant since they had actually been vicariously transported by the narrative to the scene of the speech.

To see this double effect at work, we need but to look at the following excerpt: The Prince has begun his series of accusations against England by quoting phrases from Blackstone. He says in the words of Newman:

'I open the book, gentlemen, and what are the first words which meet my eyes? 'The King can do no wrong.' I beg you to attend gentlemen, to this most significant assertion; one was accustomed to think that no child of man had the gift of impeccability; one had imagined that, simply speaking, impeccability was a divine attribute; but this British Bible, as I may call it, distinctly ascribes an absolute sinlessness to the King of Great Britain and Ireland. Observe, I am using no words of my own, I am still but quoting what meets my eyes in this remarkable document. The
words run thus: 'It is an axiom of the law of the land that the King himself can do no wrong.' Was I wrong, then, in speaking of the atheistical maxims of John-Bullism? But this is far from all; the writer goes on actually to ascribe to the Sovereign (I tremble while I pronounce the words) absolute perfection; the King can do no wrong! -- (groans). One had thought that no human power could thus be described; but the British legislature, judicature, and jurisprudence, have had the unspeakable effrontery to impute to their crowned and sceptred idol, to their doll.

As the cadenced sentences of Newman build up to the climax, he suddenly interrupts the speech and returns dramatically to the narrative -- "here cries of 'shame, shame,' from the same individual [the British sympathizer] who had distinguished himself in an earlier part of the speech" -- then again to the speech: "to this doll, this puppet whom they have dressed up with a lion and a unicorn, the attribute of ABSOLUTE PERFECTION!" Back to the narrative: "Here the individual who had several times interrupted the speaker sprung up, in spite of the efforts of persons about him to keep him down, and cried out, as far as his words could be collected, 'You cowardly liar, our dear, good little Queen,' when he was immediately saluted with a cry of 'Turn him out,' and soon made his exit from the meeting." 

In this manner Newman transported his Birmingham audience to Moscow and thus heightened the dramatic effect of the hated words of the Russian Prince.

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17 See supra.
All through the rest of the account there is an intermingling of narrative and argumentative effects. All through the Prince's declamation there is evidence of Newman the orator, for even the speech within the speech was prepared with utmost care.

Even the Aristotelian asyndeton was interrupted by an equally effective narrative:

And now, gentlemen, your destiny is in your own hands. If you are willing to succumb to a power which has never been contented with what she was, but has been for centuries extending her conquests in both hemispheres, then the humble individual who has addressed you will submit to the necessary consequences; will resume his military dress, and return to the Caucasus; but if, on the other hand, as I believe, you are resolved to resist unflinchingly this flood of satanical imposture and foul ambition, and force it back into the ocean; if, not from hatred to the English--far from it--from love to them (for a distinction must ever be drawn between the nation and its dominant John-Bullism); if, I say, from love to them as brothers, from a generous determination to fight their battles, from an intimate consciousness that they are in their secret hearts Russians, that they are champing the bit of their iron lot, and are longing for you as their deliverers; if, from a burning patriotism, you will form the high resolve to annihilate this dishonour of humanity; if you loathe its sophisms, 'De minimis no curat lex,' and 'Mali-tia supplet aetatem,' and 'Tres faciunt collegium,' and 'Impotentia excusat legem,' and 'Possession is nine parts of the law,' and 'The greater the truth, the greater the libel'--principles which sap the very foundations of morals; if you wage war to the knife with its blighting superstitions of primogeniture, gavel-kind, mortmain, and contingent remainders; if you detest, abhor, and abjure the tortuous maxims
and pernicious provisions of its habeas corpus, quare impedit, and qui tam (hear, hear); if you scorn the mummeries of its wigs, and bands, and coifs, and ermine (vehement cheering); if you trample and spit upon its accused fee simple and fee tail, villanage, and free socage, fiefs, heriots, seizins, feuds (a burst of cheers, the whole meeting in commotion); its shares, its premiums, its post-obits, its percentages, its tariffs, its broad and narrow gauge.

Although the crescendo of the Russian Prince's speech had reached a crashing finale, Newman interrupted by bringing in the narrative:

Here the cheers became frantic, and drowned the speaker's voice, and a most extraordinary scene of enthusiasm followed. One half the meeting was seen embracing the other half; till, as if by the force of a sudden resolution, they all poured out of the square, and proceeded to break the windows of all the British residents. They then formed into procession, and directing their course to the great square before the Kremlin, they dragged through the mud, and then solemnly burnt, an effigy of John Bull which had been provided beforehand by the managing committee, a lion and unicorn, and a Queen Victoria.

And yet this same audience reliving, through the pictures painted by Newman, the disgusting exhibition of mob violence were actually reliving the same disgusting exhibitions that had occurred in their own land -- Englishmen too were the victims, their own Catholic brethren.

But the animal-like violence of the mob and hence their own guilt was further extenuated by the ironic observation of Newman which summed up the situation:

These [burning in effigy and like demonstrations]
being fully consumed, they dispersed quietly; and by ten o'clock at night the streets were profoundly still, and the silver moon looked down in untroubled lustre on the city of the Czars.

Thus it can be seen how the combination of narrative and argument heightened the effect of the example on the audience.

But certainly Newman's sentence structure cannot be ignored in discussing the effect of the style of presentation on the audience. Certainly the balanced sentences or the periodic ones formed the solid foundation for the deft combination of narration and argumentation just analyzed.

In his sentences the influence of the classical orators especially Cicero is best illustrated. In the sentences of Newman the spellbinding effect of the Russian Prince on the mob is graphically illustrated. Each clause of the periodic sentences is charged with increasing emotion:

If the Queen 'cannot do wrong,' if she 'cannot even think wrong,' if she is 'absolute perfection,' if she has 'no folly, no weakness,' if she is the 'fount of justice,' if she is 'the fount of grace,' if she is simply 'above law,' if she is 'omnipotent,' what wonder that the lawyers of John-Bullism should also call her 'sacred'! 18

Just as such periodic sentences quickened the emotions in the argumentative sections of the example, so in the narrative sections the short stabbing sentences quickly set the scene:

Here cries of 'shame, shame' from the same in- 

18 Newman, op. cit., 34.
dividual who had distinguished himself in an earlier part of the speech...Here the indivi-
dual who had several times interrupted the speaker sprung up, in spite of the efforts of persons about him to keep him down, and cried out, as far as his words could be collected, 'You cowardly liar, our dear, good little Queen,' when he was immediately saluted with a cry of 'Turn him out,' and soon made his exit from the meeting.19

But not only could Newman use the long, periodic sentences to advantage in the speech of the Russian Prince, but he also put to good use the short, clipped ones:

Once more I appeal to the awful volume I hold in my hands. I appeal to it, I open it, I cast it from me. Listen, then, once again; it is a fact; Jezebel has declared her own omnipresence.

Perhaps, however, throughout the entire example no one sen-
tence stands out more vividly than does the final one. After the maze of long periodic, short, clipped balanced sentences had unfolded the narrative and brought the argumentation to its climax, after the alliteration of Latin legal terms mixed with English ones created a tour de force that any reader or especially listener must have thrilled to:

And now, gentlemen, your destiny is in your own hands. If you are willing to succumb to a power which has never been contented with what she was, but has been for centuries...see supra., pp.66-67.

After this amazing mixture of stirring sentences had achieved its purpose, a simple descriptive soft-sounding sen-
tence brought the audience back to reality almost as dramati-

19 Ibid., pp. 30-31.
cally as did the knocking at the gate in Macbeth:

and by ten o'clock at night the streets were profoundly still, and the silver moon looked down in untroubled lustre on the city of the Czars.

But if this sentence is examined more closely other effects come to light. Why did Newman use the phrase, "the silver moon looked down in untroubled lustre?" Is not the contrast of what had gone on before brought out quite vividly by this phrase? But more, is not the folly of all the prejudice (not only that of the Russian Prince but of Protestants in general) made more vicious by the serenity and order of nature? Is not the biblical question, "Why do the nations so furiously rage together" reminiscent of this phrase?

Thus it can be seen how the Aristotelian conditions for the use of the example were applied by Newman. Several more of these examples could be analyzed, but time and space will not permit such an extensive treatment.

Newman's Use of the Enthymeme.

In the first section of this chapter an endeavor was made to portray Newman's adept handling of the first Aristotelian proof, the example. It is hoped that the analysis of the oft quoted Russian Prince illustration indicated a reflection of Aristotelian principles governing the use of this device. In the final section of this study an analysis of Newman's use

20 See supra, p. 18.
of the enthymeme will be attempted. Again it must be noted that this device was chosen because of Aristotle's treatise on rhetorical proofs. Aristotle conceived of only two rhetorical proofs, the example and the enthymeme. He said:

The universal means of demonstrative proof in Rhetoric are examples and enthymemes, and there are no other; hence if it is assumed to be absolutely necessary that whatever is proved should be proved either by syllogism or by induction—and this we see clearly from the Analytics—see Book II, Chapter 23—it is a necessary conclusion that the enthymeme and example are respectively identical with the syllogism and induction.21

This narrow conception of all the rhetorical devices studied in textbooks on rhetoric may appear strange at first consideration. Aristotle, however, clarifies his decision:

It is clear that the proving of a rule in a number of similar instances is an induction in Dialectic and an example in Rhetoric, while the conclusion from certain premises that something else which is different from them results as a consequence of them by reason of their being what they are, whether universally or generally, is called a syllogism in Dialectic and an enthymeme in Rhetoric.22

Now if Aristotle's definition of Rhetoric is recalled, namely, "a faculty of discovering all the possible means of persuasion in any subject," then these two divisions become all-inclusive, for certainly such devices as the fable, simile and metaphor could be considered examples since they "prove

22 Ibid., pp. 13-14.
a rule in a number of similar instances" and all other devices must either do this or draw conclusions from different premises and hence fall under the heading of the enthymeme, viz. maxims.

The example and its exponent devices are not difficult to understand and, as Aristotle said and Newman proved, "speeches which make use of the examples are fully as persuasive as the others." The enthymeme, on the other hand, is not so easy to understand, but as Aristotle says, "entymematic speeches are more applauded." It will be necessary, therefore, before an analysis of Newman's use of the enthymeme can be made, to present a fuller treatment of Aristotle's observations on this device -- a fuller treatment than the one already given in the first chapter of this paper.

Aristotle leads up to his definition of the enthymeme in this manner:

Now the proper subjects of deliberation are such as appear to admit of two possibilities; for if things cannot possibly either have happened or happen or be otherwise than in one particular way, nobody deliberates about them...for what would be the advantage of deliberation? (But the materials of syllogistic and inferential reasoning may be either the actual conclusions of previous syllogisms or propositions which have not been syllogistically proved and at the same time need such proof, as lacking probability. Syllogisms of the first class will be necessarily difficult to follow from their length...and those

23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
of the second class will fail to carry conviction, as the premises on which they rest are neither practically admitted nor intrinsically probable). We conclude then that the enthymeme and example are necessarily applied to such things as are in general indeterminate; the example being an induction and the enthymeme a syllogism, with its constituent parts only few and generally fewer than those of the normal syllogism; for if one of them is well known, it need not be stated as the audience supplies it of its own accord.25

After thus leading up to and then defining the enthymeme, Aristotle gives an illustration of a typical enthymeme. He says:

If we wish to prove that Dorieus has been victorious in a contest in which the prize of victory is a crown, it is enough to say that he has won an Olympic victory; there is no need to add that the prize of an Olympic contest is a crown, as the fact is universally known.26

But it is not enough to know merely the definition of an enthymeme before a comprehensive analysis can be made; Aristotle classified enthymemes into specific categories and suggests specific uses. Since this section will be primarily concerned with Newman's use of this device, it will be essential to understand the various uses that Aristotle suggested, always keeping in mind the general purpose of this paper, that is, to show how Aristotelian principles of rhetoric show through the pages of Newman's Present Position.

Aristotle divides the enthymeme into two species: the

25 Ibid., pp. 15-16.
26 Ibid.
demonstrative and refutative enthymeme. Demonstrative enthymemes are those "which prove that a thing is or is not so and so." Refutative enthymemes are those which draw "conclusions which are inconsistent with the conclusions of one's adversary."

Not only are enthymemes refutative and demonstrative, these refutative and demonstrative enthymemes may be either true or apparent. Aristotle says:

As there may be true syllogisms and syllogisms which are apparent but not true, it follows at once that there are true and apparent enthymemes, because the enthymeme is a species of syllogism.

He then gives topics for both true and apparent demonstrative and refutative enthymemes. He says:

We will proceed then in another way to ascertain some general topics applicable to all subjects alike and to indicate side by side the refutative and demonstrative topics and the topics of enthymemes which are apparent but not real, as neither are apparent syllogisms real ones. And having cleared up these points, we will determine the proper sources from which to bring refutations and objections to bear upon our enthymemes.

A very comprehensive list of topics is given for the true demonstrative enthymeme. Time and space will not permit an exhaustive account of these, but the brief discussion found on pages twelve to fifteen of this paper should be reviewed.

All of these topics, as has already been stated, are topics

27 Ibid., 194.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid., 212.
for true demonstrative enthymemes. The apparent demonstrative enthymeme has also a place in rhetoric, and Aristotle outlines topics that could apply to its use.  

Concerning refutative enthymemes, Aristotle stated:

Again refutative enthymemes do not form a species distinct from constructive. For it is clear that refutation consists either in urging positive proof or in adducing an objection. In the first case we prove the opposite of our adversary's statement. I mean that, if he has proved a particular thing to have occurred, we prove the opposite and vice versa. The distinction then cannot lie here; for the same means are common to both, as in both enthymemes are advanced either to disprove a fact or to prove it. An objection on the other hand is not an enthymeme but as in the Topics the mere statement of an opinion intended to show that the reasoning of our opponent is inconclusive, or that there has been something false in his assumptions.

From this Aristotelian discussion of the enthymeme an analysis of Newman's use of this device can now be attempted. Just as our analysis of Newman's use of the example was based on certain questions; so this analysis will follow certain points related to the nature of the enthymeme. Aristotle again comes to our aid when he says:

It follows in regard to enthymemes as in regard to style that they are clever, if they convey to us rapid instruction. And hence it is that the enthymemes which are popular are not such as are superficial, i.e., such as are perspicuous to everybody and need no research, nor such as are unintelligible when stated, but those which are either apprehended at the moment of delivery,

31 Ibid., 232.
even though there was no previously existing knowledge of them, or which are followed at little intervals by the minds of the audience. For what is virtually instruction, whether immediate or subsequent, takes place in these cases, but not otherwise. These being then the species of enthymemes which are popular, if considered relatively to the meaning they convey, relatively to style they may be considered in respect either of their structure of the single words employed in them. Enthymemes are popular from their structure, if it is antithetical, as e.g. in Isocrates, 'considering the peace which all the world enjoyed as a war against their own private interests,' where there is an antithesis between war and peace; and from their single words, if the words are such as contain a metaphor, and this a metaphor which is neither farfetched nor superficial (for in the former case it is difficult to comprehend at a glance, and in the latter it leaves no impression), or again, if they vividly represent the subject to the eye, as it is desirable that the things should be seen in actual performance and not merely in intention. There are then these three objects to be ever kept in view, viz. metaphor, antithesis, and vividness of representation.

Again he says of the use of the enthymeme:

The enthymemes should not be stated in an unbroken series, but should be intermingled with various other topics; else one enthymeme destroys the effect of another. For there is a limit of quantity in such things, as Homer shows in the line 'Dear friend, thy words are many as a man may speak, being prudent.' 'as many words,' be it observed, not 'such words,' in reference not to their quality but to their quantity.

Nor is it proper to search for enthymemes on all subjects; otherwise you will be acting like some professing philosophers, whose conclusions are more familiar and more credible than the premisses from which they deduce them. And further, avoid the use of an enthymeme in exciting

32 Ibid., pp. 257-258.
emotion; for the enthymeme will either expel the emotion, or, if not, will have been constructed in vain, as simultaneous motions are mutually exclusive, and the one obliterates or else enfeebles the other. Nor again should you resort to an enthymeme at a time when you are seeking to invest your speech with an ethical character; for there is nothing of character or moral purpose in demonstrative argument.\(^33\)

Finally:

Again, you should occasionally change the form of your enthymemes and express them as maxims. Thus the maxim 'Sensible men should patch up their quarrels in the hour of prosperity, as they will then be likely to get the best terms' may be expressed enthymematically in the form 'If it is right to patch up one's quarrels, when it is possible to get the most beneficial and advantageous terms, you should do so in the hour of prosperity.'\(^34\)

Before these questions are proposed, however, a very important point must be cleared up. R. C. Jebb in his *Attic Orators* says:

A misapprehension of Aristotle's meaning of the enthymeme had, as early as the first century B. C. led to the conception of the enthymeme as not merely a syllogism of a particular subject matter, but also a syllogism of which one premise is suppressed.\(^35\)

Indeed, many rhetoricians considered this suppression of a premise an integral part of the nature of an enthymeme. A controversy resulted from this consideration and still is going on. DeQuincy had this to say about the enthymeme:

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33 Ibid., 293.
34 Ibid., 297.
The enthymeme differs from the syllogism, not in the accident of suppressing one of its propositions; either may do this or neither; the difference is essential, and in the nature of the matter; that of the syllogism proper being certain and apodeictic; that of the enthymeme simply probable and drawn from the province of opinion. 36

Since no official decision has been reached on this contention, it is a matter for the author of this paper to draw his own conclusion if any kind of analysis of Newman's use of this device can be attempted.

From the text of Aristotle's Rhetoric, 37 I believe that the words generally and need clear up the difficulty. I believe that an enthymeme may or may not contain a suppressed premise depending on the knowledge of the audience and the discretion of the orator. I do not believe that the argument is important enough one way or the other if we follow Aristotle's main conception of an enthymeme, namely, that it is deductive in nature as contrasted with the example which is inductive.

By way of summary, then, I have come to agree with the following conclusions of James H. McBurney:

1. That the enthymeme is the syllogism of rhetoric occupying in rhetoric essentially the same place that the syllogism occupies in logic.

36 Thomas DeQuincy, Essays on Style, Rhetoric, and Language, pp. 45-46.
37 "An enthymeme is a syllogism, with its constituent parts only few and generally fewer than those of the normal syllogism, if anyone of them is well known, it need not be stated, as the audience supplies it of its own accord." Rhetoric, pp. 15-16.
2. That the premises are probable causes and signs.

3. That these premises are drawn from the topics varying in specificity and exactness from the particular facts of a given substantive field to the most general principles of probability.

4. That these premises may be phrased in language designed to affect the emotional state of the listener, to develop in the audience a confidence in the speaker or to establish a conclusion as being a probable truth.

5. That the inferential process is formally deficient in several of the enthymematic types, and many enthymemes cannot therefore be stated in valid syllogisms.

6. That the rhetorical example may be reduced to an enthymematic form just as scientific induction may be stated syllogistically.

7. That the enthymeme often (but not necessarily) appears with one or more of its three propositions suppressed.38

These conclusions I believe to be sanely derived from Aristotle's treatment of the enthymeme in the *Rhetoric*. I believe that they form the constituent parts of Aristotle's broad description of the value and function of the enthymeme in rhetoric, namely, that it becomes "the body and substance of rhetorical persuasion."39

In light of these findings and conclusions, the analysis of Newman's use of the enthymeme will attempt to answer the

39 Aristotle, *op. cit.*, 42.
following questions:

1. If the enthymeme is demonstrative, does it really prove "that a thing is or is not so and so?" In other words, is sufficient evidence given in the explanation of the premises?

2. If the enthymeme is refutative, do the conclusions "which are inconsistent with the conclusions of the adversary" demonstrate probable truth?

Since the first section of this chapter dealt with an analysis of Newman's use of the example, and since the inductive device chosen attempted to prove in a general way in the very first lecture the false notion of Protestants, the argument in Present Position will be followed chronologically, and the analysis of Newman's deductive rhetoric will begin in the second lecture wherein Newman starts his search for explanations of the Protestant view: "Alas! that he should be inspecting the silks, and the china, and the jewelry of East and West, but refuse to bestow a like impartial examination on the various forms of Christianity."41

His principal thesis in this lecture is contained in its very title, "Tradition, the Sustaining Power of the Protestant View." This very thesis must have been carefully chosen by

40 Ibid., 194.
41 Newman, op. cit., 45.
Newman, just as it was seen how carefully the Russian Prince
example was chosen by him. After all, tradition had always
been on the tongues of Protestants who accuse the Roman Church
as promulgating old wives' tales. The Protestant bases his
religion on authenticated scriptures, whereas the Catholic
bolsters scriptures with tradition. It would seen paradoxical
that Newman, a Catholic, should accuse Protestants of follow-
ing tradition in taking their view of Catholics.

It was necessary, therefore, that Newman define terms at
the very beginning of the accusation:

Take notice, my Brothers, I am not reprobating
the proper use of tradition; it has its legiti-
mate place and its true service. By tradition
is meant, what has ever been held, as far as we
know, though we do not know how it came to be
held, and for that very reason think it true,
because else it would not be held. Now, tradi-
tion is of great and legitimate use as an initial
means of gaining notions about historical and
other facts; it is the way in which things first
come to us; it is natural and necessary to trust
it; it is an informant we make use of daily.
Life is not long enough for proving everything;
we are obliged to take a great many things upon the
credit of others. Moreover, tradition is really
a ground in reason, an argument for believing, to a
certain point; but then, observe, we do not commonly
think it right and safe, on the score of mere
vague testimony, to keep our eyes and ears so very
closely shut against every other evidence, every
other means of proof, and to be so furiously cer-
tain and so energetically positive that we know
all about the matter in question. No; we open
our senses wide to what may be said on the other
side. We make use of tradition, but we are not
content with it; it is enough to begin with, not
enough to finish upon.42

42 Ibid., pp. 46-47.
He also had to clarify what he meant when he said: "It

\[\textit{tradition}\] is not sufficient in reason to make us sure,
much less to make us angry with those who take a different
view of the matter..." He did this when he said:

I am speaking of a single or solitary tradition; for if there be two or three distinct traditions, all saying the same thing, then it is a very different matter: then, as in the case of two or three independent witnesses in a judicial proceeding, there is at once a cumulation of evidence, and its joint effect is very great. Thus supposing, besides the current belief in England, there was a local tradition, in some out of the way district in Ireland, to the effect that a certain family had gained its estates in reward for the share which its ancestor had in the assassination of Charles the Second we should certainly consider it at least a singular coincidence; for it would be a second tradition, and if proved to be distinct and independent, would quite alter the influence of the first upon our minds, just as two witnesses at a trial produce an effect on judge and jury simply different from what either of them would produce by himself. And in this way a multiplication of traditions may make a wonderfully strong proof, strong enough even for a person to die for, rather than consent to deny the fact attested; and, therefore, strong enough in reason for him to be very positive upon, very much excited, very angry, and very determined. But when such strong feeling and pertinacity of purpose are created by a mere single and solitary tradition, I cannot call that state of mind conviction, but prejudice.43

The enthymeme, then, on which the entire substance of the second lecture is based is stated by Newman in this manner:

As is the origin, so is the tradition; when the origin is true the tradition will be true; when

43 Ibid., pp. 48-49.
the origin is false, the tradition will be false. 44

From its very nature it can be seen to be a demonstrative enthymeme with a suppressed minor premise and conclusion. Syllogistically it can be stated: All traditions with false origins are false. The origins of many Protestant traditions are false; therefore, many of the traditions of Protestants are false.

As Wagner in his Handbook of Argumentation states: "Frequently, enthymemematic arguments must be reduced to a chain of syllogisms, or sorites in which, usually, the conclusions of the first syllogism becomes the major premise of the second."

Newman continues his enthymeme in this way:

Protestant notions of the Catholic Church... come to them mainly as a tradition. Therefore, many Protestant notions of the Catholic Church are false.

In other words, this is Newman's deduction:

All traditions with false origins are false. The origins of many Protestant traditions concerning Catholics are false; therefore, many of the traditions of Protestants concerning Catholics are false. Now Protestant notions of the Catholic Church... come to them mainly as a tradition. Therefore, many Protestant notions of the Catholic Church are false.

Now it remains for Newman to gather evidence in support of his premises. The truth of major premise of this sorites, "All traditions with false origins are false," Newman more or

44 Ibid., pp. 51-52.
less takes for granted. He does, however, clarify its meaning by contrast:

There can most surely be true traditions, that is, traditions from true sources; but such traditions, though they really be true, do not profess to prove themselves; they come accompanied by other arguments: the true traditions of Divine Revelation are proved to be true by miracle, by prophecy, by the test of cumulative and collateral evidences, which directly warrant and verify them.45

The seriousness of false tradition is brought out by analogy before Newman begins to prove the minor premise of the first syllogism ⁻which we derived from his enthymeme⁻. He says:

Such⁻true traditions⁻ were not the traditions of the Pharisee—they professed to speak for themselves, they bore witness to themselves, they were their own evidence; and, as might have been expected, they were not trustworthy—they were mere frauds; they came, indeed, down the stream of time, but that was no recommendation, it only put the fraud up higher; it might make it venerable, it could not make it true.46

Enthymematically Newman combines the minor premise of the first syllogism of our sorites with the minor premise of the second syllogism and amplifies both to bring out their seriousness:

Now, of course, a great number of persons will not easily allow the fact, that the English animosity against Catholicism is founded on nothing

45 Ibid., 52.
46 Ibid.
more argumentative than tradition; but, whether I shall succeed in proving this point or not, I think I have at least shown already that tradition is, in itself, quite a sufficient explanation of the feeling. I am not assigning a trifling and inadequate cause to so great an effect. If the Jews could be induced to put to death the Founder of our Religion and His disciples on tradition, there is nothing ridiculous in saying that the British scorn and hatred of Catholicism may be created by tradition also. The great question is, the matter of fact, is tradition the cause? I say it is; and in saying so, observe, I am speaking of the multitude, not dwelling on exceptions, however numerous in themselves; for doubtless there is a certain number of men, men of thought and reading, who oppose Catholicism, not merely on tradition, but on better arguments; but, I, repeat, I am speaking of the great mass of Protestants. Again, bear in mind, I am speaking of what really is the fact, not of what the mass of Protestants will confess. Of course, no man will admit, if he can help it, even to himself, that he is taking his views of the Catholic Church from Bishop Newton, or buckling on his sword against her preachers, merely because Lord George Gordon did the like; on the contrary, he will perhaps sharply retort, 'I never heard of Bishop Newton or of Lord George Gordon—I don't know their names;' but the simple question which we have to determine is the real matter of fact, and not whether the persons who are the subjects of our investigation will themselves admit it.47

After the seriousness of the crime, as Aristotle would have it, is brought out, Newman isolates the combined premises and turns his attention to the latter, that is, the minor premise of the second syllogism of our sorites. He says: "To this point, then, the matter of fact—Do Protestants go by tradition? on which I have said something already, I shall now

47 Ibid., pp. 52-53.
proceed to direct your attention...I answer, without a doubt, it [notion of the Catholic Church] comes to them as a tradition; the fact is patent and palpable; it is huge, vast, various, engrossing; it has a monopoly of the English mind, it brooks no rival, and it takes summary measures with rebellion."48

Thus proceeding from deduction, from a demonstrative enthymeme, Newman must bring out sufficient evidence for such deduction. To bring out this evidence he turns, in true Aristotelian tradition, to induction, to examples, to historical instances in order to prove that "Protestant notions of the Catholic Church...come to them mainly as tradition."

In other words, his original thesis, the title of this lecture: "Tradition, the Sustaining Power of the Protestant View," is clarified by the evidence brought forth to bolster a premise of the enthymeme under consideration. The rest of the lecture, then, is concerned with citing instances of the power of the Protestant tradition. He shows how the king and government of England embody the Protestant tradition, how to be a Protestant is to be a gentleman and to be a Catholic is to be an ignoramus, how these became Protestant traditions, how "Protestanism became, not only the tradition of law and good society, but the tradition of literature also."49 He

48 Ibid., pp. 53-54.
49 Ibid., 67.
shows how "Protestantism is also the tradition of the Anglican clergy." 50

The conclusion of this evidence brought forth to prove that Protestants gain notions of the Catholic Church mainly through tradition comes dramatically:

So it is now; so it was twenty years ago; nay, so it has been in all years as they came, even the least controversial. If there was no call for a contest, at least there was the opportunity of a triumph. Who could want matter for a sermon, if ever his thoughts would not flow, whether for convenient digression, or effective peroration? Did a preacher wish for an illustration of heathen superstition or Jewish bigotry, or an instance of hypocrisy, ignorance, or spiritual pride? the Catholics were at hand. The deliverance from Egypt, the golden calf, the fall of Dagon, the sin of Solomon, the cruelties of Jezebel, the worship of Baal, the destruction of the brazen serpent, the finding of the law, the captivity in Babylon, Nebuchadnezzar's image, Pharisees, Sadducees, Herodians, and Zealots, mint, anise, and cummin, brazen pots and vessels, all in their respective places and ways, would give opportunity to a few grave words of allusion to the 'monstrous errors' or the 'childish absurdities' of the 'Romish faith.' Does any one wish an example of pride? there stands Wolsey; of barbarity? there is the Duke of Alva; of rebellion? there is Becket; of ambition? there is Hildebrand; of profligacy? there is Caesar Borgia; of superstition? there is Louis the Eleventh; of fanaticism? there are the Crusaders. Saints and sinners, monks and laymen, the devout and the worldly, provided they be but Catholics, are heaped together in one indiscriminate mass, to be drawn forth for inspection and exposure according to the need. 51

But now Newman must turn back to the minor premise of the

50 Ibid., 74.
51 Ibid., pp. 77–78.
first syllogism of our sorites. The origins of many Protestant traditions concerning Catholics are false, he must begin his proof of this premise. He begins at the very end of the second lecture; he gives a preview of the evidence that will be brought out in future lectures:

To tell him, at his time of life, that Catholics do not rate sin at a fixed price, that they may not get absolution for a sin in prospect, that priests can live in purity, that nuns do not murder each other, that the laity do not make images their God, that Catholics would not burn Protestants if they could! Why, all this is as perfectly clear to him as the sun at noonday; he is ready to leave the matter to the first person he happens to meet; every one will tell us just the same; only let us try; he never knew there was any doubt at all about it; he is surprised, for he thought we granted it. When he was young, he has heard it said again and again; to his certain knowledge it has uniformly been said the last forty, fifty, sixty years, and no one ever denied it; it is so in all the books he ever looked into; what is the world coming to? What is true, if this is not? So, Catholics are to be whitewashed! What next? And so he proceeds in detail;--the Papists not worship the Virgin Mary! why, they call her 'Deipara,' which means 'equal to God.' The Pope not the man of sin! why, it is a fact that the Romanists distinctly maintain that 'the Pope is God, and God is the Pope.' The Pope's teaching not a doctrine of devils! here is a plain proof of it; Cardinal Bellarmine expressly 'maintains that, if the Pope commanded us to practise vice or shun virtue, we are obliged to do so, under pain of eternal damnation.' Not a Pope Joan! why, she was 'John the Eighth, her real name was Gilberta, she took the name of John English, delivered public lectures at Rome, and was at length unanimously elected Pope.' What! Councils infallible! open your eyes, my brother, and judge for yourself; 'fifteen hundred public women followed the train of the Fathers of Constance.' Jesuits! here are at least twenty thousand in
England; and, horrible to say, a number of them in each of the Protestant Universities, and doubtless a great many at Oscott. Beauty and sanctity of the Popish festivals! do you not know that the Purification 'is the very feast that was celebrated by the ancient pagan Romans in honour of the goddess Proserpina?' The Papists not corrupters of the Scriptures! look into their Bibles, and you will find they read the prophecy in Genesis, 'She shall crush thy head, and thou shalt lie in wait for her heel.' Popery preach Christ: no; 'Popery,' as has been well said, 'is the religion of priestcraft; from the beginning to the end it is nothing but priest, priest, priest.' I shall both weary and offend you, my Brothers, if I proceed. Even absurdity becomes tiresome after a time, and slanders cast on holy things and persons, when dwelt on, are too painful for a Catholic's ears; yet it was necessary for my subject to give instances of the popular views of us and of our creed, as they are formed under the operation of the Tradition of Elizabeth.52

Again dramatically and by means of carefully chosen words the end of the first lecture prepares the audience for what is to occur in the second:

At this very time, in consequence of the clamour which has been raised against us, children in the streets, of four and five years old, are learning and using against us terms of abuse, which will be their tradition all through their lives, till they are grey-headed, and have, in turn, to teach it to their grandchildren. They totter out, and lift their tiny hands, and raise their thin voices, in protest against those whom they are just able to understand are very wicked and very dangerous; and they run away in terror when they catch our eye. Nor will the growth of reason set them right; the longer they live, the more they converse with men, the more will they hate us. The Maker of all, and only He, can shiver in pieces this vast enchanted palace in which our lot is cast; may He do it in His time!53

52 Ibid., pp. 78-80.
53 Ibid., pp. 81-82.
From this preview of what is contained in the second lecture an inference can be made. If Newman can prove that the origins of most Protestant traditions are false and since he has already proved that tradition is the "Sustaining Power of the Protestant View" then surely the persecutions which result from these false traditions are unjust. Remembering Aristotle's principles for the forensic orator, we find that Newman again reflects these to the letter: his main object is to prove the injustice of the Protestant attacks on Catholics.

Again following his original enthymeme: "As is the origin, so is the tradition; when the origin is true the tradition will be true, when the origin is false, the tradition will be false. Newman now brings out evidence to prove that the origins of most Protestant traditions are false and hence that "Fable is the Basis of the Protestant View." Another enthymeme, a refutative one, clarifying the one just cited starts the argument of the second lecture:

Fact and argument have had fair play in other countries; they have not had fair play here; the religious establishment has forbidden them fair play. But fact and argument are the tests of truth and error; Protestantism, then, has had an adventitious advantage in this country, in consequence of which it has not been tried,—as, in the course of years, otherwise it would have been tried, and as it has been tried elsewhere—on its own merits. Instead, then, of concluding that it is true, because it has remained here during three centuries substantially the same, I

54 Title of Lecture II: Present Position.
should rather conclude that it is false because it has not been able during that period to remain the same abroad. To the standing, compulsory Tradition existing here, I ascribe its continuance here; to the fact and reason operating freely elsewhere, I ascribe its disappearance elsewhere.55

Time and space will not permit a treatment of all the instances of false origins underlying Protestant traditions that Newman brings up as evidence in this lecture. Suffice it to say that the original enthymeme is taking its hard, logical toll. Suffice to say that the primary aim of the forensic orator in the Aristotelian sense is certainly being realized; the injustice of the Protestant view of Catholics in England becomes unmistakable to the non-partisan observer. The substance of all the succeeding lectures develops the original enthymeme. After Newman inductively proves that "Fable is the Basis of the Protestant View," he shows in the same way that "True Testimony is Insufficient for the Protestant View."56 He then furthers the argument by discussing the "Logical Inconsistency of the Protestant View."57 Still following the original enthymeme "when the origin of tradition is false the tradition is false," Newman concludes that "Prejudice is the Life of the Protestant View."58

55 Newman, op. cit., 85. Note: this enthymeme will be analyzed later in the analysis of Newman's use of the refutative enthymeme.
56 Title of Lecture IV: Present Position.
57 Title of Lecture V: Present Position.
58 Title of Lecture VI: Present Position.
remaining three lectures then further the argument to its conclusion. Lecture VII deals with "Assumed Principles the Intellectual Ground of the Protestant View;" Lecture VIII is concerned with "Ignorance Concerning Catholics the Protection of the Protestant View." In true Aristotelian fashion, after considering the "disposition of the criminal," Newman discusses "the character and condition of the victims." His last lecture, therefore deals with the "Duties of Catholics Towards the Protestant View."

Thus the power of a demonstrative enthymeme stated at the very beginning of _Present Position_ sustains the entire substance of these lectures. Truly, then, Aristotle's statement that an enthymeme becomes "the body and substance of rhetorical persuasion" certainly is borne out by _The Present Position of Catholics in England._

Thus far only the demonstrative enthymeme has been analyzed. Since Aristotle's treatment of the enthymeme embraces two kinds, the second question of our analysis can be posed:

2. If the enthymeme is refutative do the conclusions "which are inconsistent with conclusions of the adversary" demonstrate probable truth?

Newman in his treatment of the Protestant view poses objections of his adversaries and then proceeds to refute them.

59 Welldon, _op. cit._, xix.
He employs the refutative enthymeme throughout his lectures. One of these has already been cited. In his approach to the evidence proving that fable is the basis of the Protestant view, Newman cites a conclusion that Protestants "would eagerly adopt," namely, that "the Protestant spirit has survived in the land amid so many changes in political and social sciences, because certain political theories were false, but Protestantism is true." This then is a Protestant conclusion. Newman's conclusion, however, is just the opposite. He says:

Instead, then, of concluding that it is true, because it has remained here during three centuries substantially the same, I should rather conclude that it is false because it has not been able during that period to remain the same abroad. To the standing compulsory Tradition existing here, I ascribe its continuance here; to fact and reason operating freely elsewhere, I ascribe its disappearance elsewhere.

These premises and conclusions are based on the major premise which precedes them: "Fact and argument are the tests of truth and error." Actually, then, the evidence bringing out the probable truth of these premises also serves to bring out the probable truth of the demonstrative enthymeme which underlies this refutative enthymeme, namely, that since most of the origins of Protestant traditions are false, most of

60 See supra, pp. 90-91.
61 Newman, op. cit., 84.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., 85.
the Protestant notions concerning Catholics are likewise false. We have then a refutative enthymeme bringing out the truth of a demonstrative enthymeme. But does the conclusion which is inconsistent with the conclusion of his adversaries demonstrate probable truth?

The answer to this question will actually serve as the answer to the second part of the first question on which this analysis is based -- it will serve to answer whether Newman gave sufficient evidence in his explanation of the minor premise of the original enthymeme, viz., many Protestant traditions are based on false origins.

Newman turns to induction for his evidences just as Aristotle suggested. He says:

Trace up, then, the tradition to its very first startings, its roots and its sources, if you are to form a judgment whether it is more than a tradition. It may be a good tradition, and yet after all good for nothing. What profit, though ninety-nine links of a chain be sound, if the topmost is broken? Now I do not hesitate to assert, that this Protestant Tradition, on which English faith hangs, is wanting just in the first link. Fierce as are its advocates, and high as is its sanction, yet, whenever we can pursue it through the mist of immemorial reception in which it commonly vanishes, and can arrive at its beginnings, forthwith we find a flaw in the argument. Either facts are not forthcoming, or they are not sufficient for the purpose: sometimes they turn out to be imaginations or inventions, sometimes exaggerations, sometimes misconceptions; something or other comes to light which blunts their efficiency, and throws suspicion on the rest. Testimonies which were quoted as independent turn out to be the same, or to be contradictory of each other,
or to be too improbable to be true, or to have no good authority at all: so that our enemies find they cannot do better, after all, than fall back on the general reception of the Tradition itself, as a reason for receiving the Tradition; and they find it prudent to convict us of all manner of crimes, on the simple ground of our being notoriously accused of them.64

He then begins to cite typical and serious examples of these false roots or sources. The first example is not a historical parallel but what Aristotle would define as a fable:

If a man presented himself this moment and said to me, 'You robbed a person in the street of his pocket-book some ten years ago,' what could I possibly say, except simply, 'I did not?' How could I prove it was false, even if I took on myself to do so, till I was informed of the town, or the year, or the occasion, or the person on whom the pretended offence was committed? Well, supposing my accuser went on to particulars, and said that I committed the crime in Birmingham, in the month of June, in the year 1840, and in the instance of a person by the name of Smith. This, of course, would be something, but no one would say even then that it was enough; that is, supposing I had to reply to him on the spot. At the very moment I might not be able to say where I was on the specified day, and so I could not repeat as emphatically as I was able, that the charge was utterly untrue. Next, supposing me to ask his reasons for advancing it; --how he knew it was I? did he see me? or was he told by an eye-witness? and supposing he were to decline to give me any information whatever, but contended himself with saying 'that I was shuffling and evasive, for the thing was quite notorious.' And next, supposing I suddenly recollected that, up to the year 1845, I had never once been in Birmingham in the course of my life; yet, on my stating this, the accuser were to cry out that I should not escape, in spite of my attempt to throw dust in his eyes; for he had a

64 Ibid., pp. 88-89.
score of witnesses to prove the fact, and that, as to the exact year, it was a mere point of detail, on which any one might be mistaken. And supposing, on this unsupported allegation, a magistrate, without witness brought, or oath administered, or plausibility in the narrative, in spite of the accuser's character, which was none of the best, in spite of the vagueness of his testimony, were to send me to prison,—I conceive public opinion would say I was shamefully treated. But further, supposing when I was safely lodged in prison, some anonymous writer, in some third-rate newspaper, were boldly to assert that all priests were in the practice of stealing pocket-books from passengers in the streets; and in proof thereof were to appeal first to the notorious case of a priest in Birmingham who had been convicted of the offence, and then to the case of a second priest which was given in detail in some manuscript or other, contained somewhere or other in the royal library of Munich, and occurring some time or other between the seventh and the seventeenth centuries; and supposing, upon this anonymous article or letter, petitions were got up and signed numerously, and despatched to the Imperial Parliament, with the object of sending all priests to the treadmill for a period not exceeding six months, as reputed thieves, whenever they were found walking in the public thoroughfares;—would this answer an Englishman's ideas of fairness or of humanity?65

But all of these instances merely lead up to real historical parallels with which the remainder of this lecture is concerned. He extracts from history and fiction typical Protestant accusations and traces them to their origins. He then examines each point of the origin and proves that each point is false. A typical instance of this is his treatment of the accusation of "a zealous Protestant clergyman."66

65 Ibid., pp. 90-92.
66 Ibid., 115.
His account, given at a public meeting, was to the following effect:--That in the year 1835 when on a visit to Burssels, he was led to inspect the door of the Cathedral, St. Gudule's; and that there he saw fastened up a catalogue of sins, with a specification of the prices at which remission of each might severally be obtained.67

He then explodes this ridiculous accusation with the fact of the case:

Now it so happens that on the right-hand door of the transept of this church of St. Gudule there really is affixed a black board, on which there is a catalogue in the French language of the price to be paid, not for sins, but for the use of these chairs. The inscription translated runs as follows:--'A chair without cushions, one cent (about a farthing); a chair with cushions, two cents. On great festival days; a chair without cushion, two cents; a chair with cushion, four cents.' This board, it may be supposed, our anti-Catholic witness mistook for that abominable sin-table, the description of which so deservedly shocked the zealous Protestants of Faversham.

Two like incidents are treated in like manner and then follows several others which bear out the corollary of the statement that "Fable is the basis of the Protestant View", namely, that "True Testimony Insufficient for the Protestant View." Of these the most famous is his treatment of Maria Monk.

Thus it can be seen that all of the Aristotelian conditions for the demonstrative and refutative enthymemes were fulfilled by Newman in Present Position of Catholics in England. 67 Ibid., 115.
It can also be seen from the above analysis that the enthymeme is "the body and substance of rhetorical persuasion."

That there is a relationship existing between Newman's rhetoric and the principles outlined by Aristotle in his Rhetoric is clear. As Newman himself said in The Idea of a University:

Aristotle in his celebrated treatise on Rhetoric makes the very essence of the art lie in the precise recognition of a hearer. It is a relative art, and in that respect differs from Logic, which simply teaches the right use of reason, whereas Rhetoric is the art of persuasion, which implies a person who is to be persuaded.68

It is not to be inferred that Newman's style of writing bears any relationship to the style of Aristotle. Aristotle is no stylist nor did he pretend to be one. Newman's style is his own and bears only faint relationship to that of certain authors.69 It is hoped, however, that this paper has indicated Newman's application, in his own style, of the rhetorical rules set down by Aristotle in The Rhetoric. The following schema70 is designed to outline this relationship between Newman's rhetoric and Aristotle's principles:


Therefore there is a relationship between Newman's rhetorical principles and those outlined by Aristotle in his Rhetoric

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69 See supra, p. 20.
70 Begin on page 100 and work back to this point.
Aristotle: There are only two rhetorical devices: the example and the enthymeme.

Newman's Use of the Enthymeme

Aristotle: Demonstrative enthymeme must prove that a thing is or is not so and so.

Newman's basic enthymeme; Tradition is false when its origin is false, is proved and a general conclusion is drawn: Persecution of Catholics by English Protestants is unjust.

Aristotle: Refutative enthymeme must prove conclusions that are inconsistent with conclusions of one's adversary.

One example of Newman's use of the refutative enthymeme: Adversary's conclusion Protestantism has survived in England because it is true. Newman's conclusion: It is false because it has not been able during that period to remain the same abroad--I ascribe its continuance here to tradition--I ascribe its disappearance elsewhere to fact and reason operating.

Newman's Use of the Example:

Aristotle: "Example stands to the thing which is to be proved...part to part, similar to similar..."

Newman's Russian Prince Example:

The thing to be proved.

Example

1. Protestant prevents Church a defence hearing.

1. Russian count prevents defense of British Constitution.

2. Reasons of State prevent Church's defense.

2. Czar called meeting.

3. Ignorant Protestants are violent because of ignorance.

3. Count never saw England, etc.

See page 56 of this paper.
Chapter I: Rhetoric as an Art

Chapter II: Aristotelian Principles in the General Structure of Present Position

1. Nature and number of objects of crime
2. Causes of a disposition to commit crime based on causes of all human action—of these, habit.
3. Disposition of the criminal.
4. Character and condition of the victim.

Chapter III: Aristotelian Principles in Certain Rhetorical Devices used in Present Position

1. Nature of Protestant View (Prejudice)
2. Newman picks the Protestant habit or tradition of false Protestant views.
3. Fables, false testimony, logical inconsistency.
4. True character of the Catholics.

Aristotle's Principles of Forensic Rhetoric:

1. Nature of Protestant View
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Periodicals


APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Paul A. Hummert has been read and approved by three members of the Department of English.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

June 4, 1948

Date

James J. Yeung

Signature of Advisor