A Comparison of Schopenhauer's the Art of Controversy with the Dialectic of Aristotle

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A COMPARISON OF SCHOPENHAUER'S
THE ART OF CONTROVERSY
WITH: THE DIALECTIC OF ARISTOTLE

By

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A thesis submitted to the faculty of Loyola University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

Loyola University
Chicago, Illinois
1940
VITA

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CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1
I THEIR PURPOSE COMPARED .................................................. 1
II A COMPARISON OF THEIR DEFINITION OF DIALECTIC ............. 5
III A COMPARISON OF THE BASIS OF DIALECTIC ...................... 17
IV AN INTRODUCTION TO THEIR DIALECTICAL STRATAGEMS........ 24
V A COMPARISON OF THEIR DIALECTICAL STRATAGEMS ......... 29
CONCLUSION ................................................................. 58
INTRODUCTION

My purpose in writing this thesis has been inspired largely by the desire for a more familiar acquaintance with the practical aspects of Aristotle's logical works. For many years I have had an intimate acquaintance and a great appreciation of Schopenhauer's *The Art of Controversy*. The indication of these two facts to my advisor led to the suggestion of a comparative study of the two works.

By the very nature of the case, we have confined our study of Aristotle to the *Topica* and *De Sophisticis Elenchis*. As far as we know there has been nothing whatever written upon the subject of our thesis. Hence commentaries and secondary sources have been of no value, although I have consulted a number of commentaries on Aristotle's logic.

With a few exceptions which have been indicated, I have used Edward Poste's translation of *De Sophisticis Elenchis*. Other quoted references have been taken from the translation by Ross. Bailey's translation of Schopenhauer's *The Art of Controversy* has been used.
Schopenhauer's purpose in writing the Art of Controversy is very briefly dealt with and is stated in an incidental manner. After defining Dialectic as a science mainly concerned with tabulating and analyzing dishonest stratagems, he tells us that what follows in his book is to be regarded as a first attempt to develop a science of Dialectic. To use his own language, "I am not aware that anything has been done in this direction, although I have made inquiries far and wide. It is therefore, an uncultivated soil."

He tells us that his purpose of developing a system of Dialectic must be accomplished by drawing from experience; observation of debates arising from intercourse between men; and by noting the common elements and stratagems employed in the different forms of disputation.

By observing these, he remarks that "we shall be enabled to exhibit certain general stratagems which may be advantageous as well for our own use as for frustrating others if they use them."

This is Schopenhauer's statement of his purpose. It is merely "to find out the common elements and tricks" and "to exhibit certain general stratagems." His work consists in noting and illustrating thirty-eight such dialectical stratagems. We shall endeavor later to see how much of an "uncultivated soil" there was and to observe to what extent
this soil had been cultivated in the writings of Aristotle.

Aristotle's logical works, called the Organon, treat of a great variety of subjects, covering the whole field of logic. Since our study will be based largely on the Topica and the Sophisticis Elenchis, we shall deduce the purpose of his writing from these. In the opening paragraph of the Topica, Aristotle states his purpose: "Our treatise proposes to find a line of inquiry whereby we shall be able to reason from opinions that are generally accepted about every problem propounded to us, and also shall ourselves, when standing up to an argument, avoid saying anything that will obstruct us. First, then, we must say what reasoning is, and what its varieties are, in order to grasp dialectical reasoning; for this is the object of our search in the treatise before us."

Obviously, a method of reasoning from premisses generally accepted about every problem propounded is broader in scope than a mere statement of intellectual frauds. It will be noted here that Aristotle's purpose was a line of inquiry which would enable one to reason from opinions that are generally accepted. This reasoning from generally accepted opinions is what Aristotle calls "dialectical" reasoning, in contrast to demonstrative, contentious, or mis-reasoning.

At the beginning of the Sophisticis Elenchis, Aristotle also gives a statement of his purpose: "We propose to treat of sophistical confutation and those seeming confutations which
are not really confutations, but paralogism: and we thus
begin following the natural order of inquiry." His
natural order of inquiry is as follows: classification of
reasoning; the branches of sophistry; fallacies dependent
on diction and those not dependent on diction. After treat­
ing of the above, he tells us of his further purpose: "We
have expounded the sources of questions and the mode of
questioning in contentious disputation. We have now to
discuss answers and solution and the use of this theory."
What follows then is largely a discussion of the solution of
the various fallacies.

Again we can see that Aristotle's stated purpose was
much broader than merely stating various dialectical strata-
gems. In the conclusion of his work on the fallacies,
Aristotle reviews his purpose. Here he tells us that his
aim was the invention of a method of reasoning on any problem
from the most probable premisses. He explains that that is
the essential task of Dialectic and pirastic. But because
sophistry is near to it, a treatise was annexed to enable one
to defend a thesis without self-contradiction. He further
reviews the fact that in his work he has shown how to arrange
questions and has suggested solutions of fallacies. Then he
makes a statement that he has also dealt with "other matters
pertaining to this system." This, he tells us, was his
"original design."

If we bear in mind that Schopenhauer's purpose was a
mere statement of the various types of intellectual tricks without any reference to a particular form of classification and contrast this with the ambitious aims of Aristotle as stated above, we can easily understand that Aristotle's treatment and purpose was far more extensive. This difference in their purpose accounts for the fact that much of Aristotle's treatment of the stratagems is incidental. In fact, as we shall see later, many of the stratagems found in Schopenhauer are stated in Aristotle as solutions of the fallacy, rather than an explicit statement of the stratagems. It is worthy of note, however, that in the fifteenth chapter of the *Sophistics Elenchis*, where Aristotle treats of arrangement and the tactics of the questioner, there is to be found an explicit statement of many of the common dialectical frauds. We shall see that Schopenhauer takes a number of his suggestions from this chapter.
A COMPARISON OF THEIR DEFINITION OF DIALECTIC

In discussing the relation of Schopenhauer's The Art of Controversy with Aristotle's Dialectic it seems advisable to consider their definition of the idea of dialectic. Schopenhauer explains that the ancients used logic and dialectic as synonymous terms, although λογισμός, "to think over, to consider, to calculate," and διάλεκτική, "to converse," are two very different things.

Schopenhauer further notes that the name Dialectic was first used by Plato; and in the Phaedrus, Sophist, Republic, Book VII, and elsewhere we find that by Dialectic he means the regular employment of the reason, and skill in the practice of it. Aristotle also uses the word in this sense, but according to Laurentius Valla, he was the first to use Logic too in a similar way. Dialectic, therefore, seems to be an older word than Logic. Cicero and Quintillian used them with the same signification.

The use of the words Dialectic and Logic as synonyms lasted through the Middle Ages until recently. Kant in particular used Dialectic in a bad sense as meaning, "the art of sophistical controversy." Though the two terms originally meant the same and since Kant, have again been recognized as synonymous, Schopenhauer notes that Logic has been preferred as having the most innocent designation.

He regrets that the ancient use of the word is such that he is not at liberty to distinguish their meaning. Other-
wise, "I should have preferred to define Logic (from ἀγοράς, "word" and "reason", which are inseparable) as "the science of the laws of thought, that is, of the method of reason"; and Dialectic (from διάλεγμα, "to converse" - and every conversation communicates either facts or opinions, that is to say, it is historical or deliberative) as "the art of disputation", in the modern sense of the word.

After stating his own preference as to the meaning of the words Logic and Dialectic, Schopenhauer states that "logic deals with a subject of a purely a priori character, separable in definition from experience, namely the laws of thought, the process of reason, or the ἀγορά; the laws, that is, which reason follows when it is left to itself and not hindered, as in the case of solitary thought on the part of a rational being who is in no way misled. Dialectic, on the other hand, would treat of the intercourse between two rational beings who, because they are rational, ought to think in common, but who, as soon as they cease to agree like two clocks keeping exactly the same time, create a disputation or intellectual contest. Regarded as purely rational beings the individuals would necessarily be in agreement and their variation spring from the difference essential to individuality; in other words, it is drawn from experience."

For him, therefore, Logic as the science of the process of pure reason should be capable of being constructed a priori, while Dialectic for the most part, can be constructed
only a posteriori. We may learn its rule by experiential knowledge of the disturbance which pure thought suffers through the difference of individuality manifested in the intercourse between two rational beings. We may also learn rules of Dialectic by acquaintance with the means which disputants adopt in order to make good against one another their individual thought, and to show that it is pure and objective. Schopenhauer prefers to call that branch of knowledge which treats of the natural obstinacy of human nature and its results in reasoning, Dialectic. But in order to avoid misunderstanding, he calls it controversial or eristical Dialectic. He observes that "eristic is only a harsher name for the same thing."

Schopenhauer then defines controversial Dialectic as the art of disputing and in disputing in such a way as to hold one's own, whether one is in the right or in the wrong. He illustrates this by noting that "a man may be objectively in the right and nevertheless, in the eyes of the bystanders, and sometimes in his own, he may come off worst." He gives the following example: "I may advance a proof of some assertion and my adversary may refute the proof, and thus appear to have refuted the assertion, for which there may, nevertheless be other proofs. In this case, of course, my adversary and I change places. He comes off best, although as a matter of fact, he is in the wrong."

Schopenhauer attributes this to the natural basis of
human nature. "Our innate vanity....will not suffer us to allow that our first position was wrong and our adversary's right....With most men innate vanity is accompanied by loquacity and innate dishonesty. They speak before they think, and even though they may afterwards perceive that they are wrong, and that what they assert is false, they want to seem to the contrary. The interest of truth....now gives way to the interests of vanity: and so, for the sake of vanity, what is true must seem false and what is false must seem true." Because of the weakness of our intellect and the perversity of our will disputants fight not for truth, but for propositions.

Every man to some extent is armed against intellectual frauds by his own cunning and villainy. He learns this by daily experience and by this comes to have his own natural Dialectic, just as he has his own natural Logic. But his Dialectic is by no means as safe a guide as his Logic. Though false judgments are frequent, false conclusions are rare. It is not so easy for one to think or draw inferences contrary to the laws of Logic. A man cannot easily be deficient in natural Logic, though he may very easily be deficient in natural Dialectic. Natural Dialectic resembles the faculty of judgment, which differs in degree with every man, while reason, is the same. Thus it happens that in a matter in which a man is really in the right, he is confounded or refuted by merely superficial arguments. If he does emerge victor-
iously from a contest it is often owing not so much to the correctness of his judgment in stating his proposition, as to the ability with which he defended it. Schopenhauer says, "Logic is concerned with the mere form of propositions; Dialectic with their contents or matter - in a word, with their substance." Again he says, "To form a clear idea of the province of Dialectic, we must pay no attention to objective truth, which is an affair of Logic; we must regard it simply as the art of getting the best of it in a dispute.... In itself Dialectic has nothing to do but to show how a man may defend himself against attacks of every kind, and especially against dishonest attacks; and in the same fashion how he may attack another man's statement without contradicting himself, or generally without being defeated. The discovery of objective truth must be separated from the art of winning acceptance for propositions; for objective truth is an entirely different matter: it is the business of sound judgment, reflection and experience, for which there is no special art."

Schopenhauer objects to the definition of Dialectic as "the logic of appearance". He says in that case it would only be used to repel false propositions and even when a man has the right on his side, he needs Dialectic to defend and maintain it; he must know the dishonest tricks in order to meet them. Schopenhauer even adds, "He must often make use of them himself, so as to beat the enemy with his own weapons."
He suggests further that "in a dialectical contest we must put objective truth aside, or rather we must regard it as an accidental circumstance, and look only to the defense of our own position and the refutation of our opponent." And again, "No respect should be paid to objective truth, because we usually do not know where the truth lies."

He further elucidates his notion of Dialectic by stating "Dialectic then need have nothing to do with truth as little as the fencing master considers who is in the right when a dispute leads to a duel. Thrust and parry is the whole business. Dialectic is the art of intellectual fencing; and it is only when we so regard it that we can erect in it a branch of knowledge. For if we take purely objective truth as our aim we are reduced to mere Logic; if we take the maintainence of false propositions it is mere Sophistic; and in either case it would have to be assumed that we were aware of what was true and what was false; and it is seldom that we have any clear idea of the truth beforehand. The true conception of Dialectic, is then, that which we have formed; it is the art of intellectual fencing used for the purpose of getting the best of it in a dispute; and although the name Eristic would be more suitable, it is more correct to call controversial Dialectic."

The above is Schopenhauer's definition of Dialectic. We now turn our attention to the consideration of the manner in which it was used by Aristotle. Apparently, Aristotle used
the term Dialectic in a broad sense. It seems that he uses it in one place in the sense of meaning merely the employment of reason, or, as the equivalent of Schopenhauer's definition of logic. In another place he appears to use it in the sense of winning approval or assent from others.

At the beginning of the *Topica* Aristotle remarks, "First then, we must say what reasoning is, and what its varieties are, in order to grasp dialectical reasoning: for this is the object of our search in the treatise before us." He then states the varieties of reasoning as being four in number: (1) demonstrative reasoning, (2) dialectical reasoning, (3) contentious reasoning, and (4) mis-reasonings. He distinguishes them as follows: (1) "It is a demonstration when the premisses from which the reasoning starts are true and primary." (2) Dialectical reasoning is reasoning from opinions that are generally accepted. He defines "generally accepted" as things which are accepted by every one, or by the majority, or by the philosophers. (3) Contentious reasoning consists in starting from opinions that seem to be generally accepted, but that are not actually so; or again, it is contentious reasoning if it merely seems to reason from opinions that are or seem to be generally accepted. (4) Aristotle observes that in addition to demonstration, dialectical and contentious reasoning, there are mis-reasonings that start from premisses peculiar to the special sciences.
These, Aristotle says, may stand for an outline survey of the species of reasoning. He observes, however, that "the amount of distinction between them may serve, because it is not our purpose to give the exact definition of any of them; we merely want to describe them in outline; we consider it quite enough from the point of view of the line of inquiry before us to be able to recognize each of them in some sort of way."

It will be noticed that Aristotle here defines Dialectic as reasoning from opinions that are generally accepted. This obviously is not the meaning Schopenhauer attached to his use of the word. Aristotle's demonstrative reasoning seems to be comparable to what Schopenhauer prefers to call "logic", which has to do with the form of the proposition. The contentious reasoning of Aristotle corresponds to Schopenhauer's term, Dialectic.

In Chapter II of the *Topica*, Aristotle apparently used Dialectic in the sense of discovering truth. "For Dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries." It is to this use of the term Dialectic, that Schopenhauer would differ. For him, Dialectic never aids in the discovery of truth, for truth cannot be attained with certainty before the discussion begins.

In Book I, Chapter XII of the *Topica*, Aristotle distinguishes "how many species there are of dialectical
arguments." These he states as being Induction on the one hand, and Reasoning, on the other. "Induction is a passage from individuals to universals." It is more convincing and clear and more readily learned by the use of the senses. Hence it is more applicable to the mass of men. He says, however, that Reasoning is more forcible and effective against contradictitious people. Here again, Aristotle uses Dialectic in the sense of Schopenhauer's "logic".

In stating the useful elements of Dialectic, Aristotle enumerates three: "intellectual training, casual encounters, and the philosophical sciences." He explains that for purposes of casual encounter, it is useful because when we have counted up the opinions held by most people, we shall meet them on the ground, not of other peoples' convictions, but of their own. In this instance, Aristotle is using Dialectic in the sense of gaining acceptance for one's proposition.

In the Sophisticis Elenchis Aristotle distinguishes in great detail, Dialectic, from Sophistic, Eristic, and Pirastic proof. He tells us that "Pirastic is a species of Dialectic, and probes not knowledge but, ignorance and false pretension of knowledge." He then gives us a distinction between a dialectician and a sophist. He is a dialectician "who regards the common principles with their application to the particular matter in hand, while he who only appears to do this is a sophist." The sophist
elwhere is distinguished by his motive, "for the art of sophistry, as we have said, is a kind of art of money-making from a merely apparent wisdom." Eristic differs from Sophistic in the sense that the sophists seek financial reward. They, both, however, employ the same contentious reasoning, but the master of Eristic aims only at apparent victory, while the sophist aims at the appearance of wisdom. The important thing to note here is that Aristotle distinguishes the dialectician from the sophist on the basis that the conclusions of the dialecticians are true in their form, while those of the sophist only "appear" to be so. This use of Dialectic by Aristotle is quite different from Schopenhauer's use of it.

Schopenhauer deals with Aristotle's use of Dialectic and he states explicitly "Aristotle does not define the object of Dialectic exactly as I have done." He observes that Aristotle fails "to draw a sufficiently sharp distinction" between Dialectic as dealing with propositions according to their truth or merely regarding them according to their plausibility. "The rules which he often gives for Dialectic contain some of those which properly belong to Logic." Again he says, "I am of the opinion, therefore, that a sharper distinction should be drawn between Dialectic and Logic than Aristotle has given us; that to Logic we should assign objective truth as far as it is merely formal, and that Dialectic should be confined to the art of gaining one's
point, and contrarily that sophistic and eristic should not be distinguished from Dialectic in Aristotle's fashion, since the difference which he draws rests on objective and material truth; and in regard to what this is we cannot attain any clear certainty before discussion."

It may help to clarify the matter presented if we give a brief summary of our findings. We have seen that Schopenhauer makes a sharp distinction between Logic and Dialectic. Logic, for him, deals with the laws of thought; it is the process of reasoning; it is concerned with the form of the proposition and objective truth. Dialectic, on the other hand, is the art of winning acceptance for one's views; it is intellectual fencing, experimentally learned and deals not with the form of a proposition but with the matter or substance of the proposition. Schopenhauer notes that the word "eristic" is the same as his use of Dialectic, being only a harsher term. He does not prefer to call it sophistic since that consists in the maintenance of false propositions and is not acceptable because we can't be aware of what is or false.

Aristotle uses the term Dialectic in a much broader sense than merely the art of winning acceptance for a thesis. He defines it in one place as reasoning from opinions that are generally accepted. He suggests, however, that this definition was not expected to be exact, but merely sufficient for his present purpose. Elsewhere, Aristotle suggests that
Induction and Reasoning are species of Dialectic. Again, he indicates that Dialectic is useful for the purpose of the philosophical sciences. Here he is using it as equivalent to Schopenhauer's use of Logic. In addition to the above use of Dialectic by Aristotle, he seems to use it in the sense of merely gaining plausible approval. In other words, for Aristotle the word is used in a broad sense which would cover the meaning of what Schopenhauer called Logic and also Dialectic.
Schopenhauer says that in finding the basis of all dialectic we must consider the essential nature of every dispute. This he endeavors to do by dividing the modes of refutation into two parts. There are two courses that may be pursued. (1) The modes are (1) *ad rem*, (2) *ad hominem* or *ex concessis*. That is to say: we may show either that the proposition is not in accordance with the nature of things, i.e., with absolute objective truth; or that it is inconsistent with other statements or admissions of our opponent, that is, with truth as it appears to him. The latter mode of arguing a question produces only relative conviction, and makes no difference whatever to the objective truth of the matter.

(2) The two courses that we may pursue are (1) the direct, and (2) the indirect. The direct attacks the reason for the thesis; the indirect, the results. The direct refutation shows that the thesis is not true; the indirect, that it cannot be true.

A two-fold procedure is possible in pursuing the direct course. We may either show that the reasons for the statement are false (*nego majorem, minorem*); or we may admit the reasons for premisses, but show that the statement does not follow from them (*nego consequentiam*); that is, we attack the conclusion or the form of the syllogism.

The direct refutation makes use either of the diversion
or of the instance. (1) The diversion. - We accept our opponent's proposition as true, and then show what follows from it when we bring it into connection with some other proposition acknowledged to be true. We use the two propositions as the premisses of a syllogism giving a conclusion which is manifestly false, as contradicting either the nature of things, or other statements of our opponent himself; that is, the conclusion is false either ad rem or ad hominem. Consequently, our opponent's proposition must have been false; for, while true premisses can give only a true conclusion, false premisses need not always give a false one.

(2) The instance. - or the example of the contrary. This consists in refuting the general proposition by direct reference to particular cases which are included in it in the way in which it is stated, but to which it does not apply, and by which it is therefore shown to be necessarily false.

The above is Schopenhauer's framework or skeleton of all the forms of disputation. He says that "to this every kind of controversy may be ultimately reduced." He allows, however, that the whole of the controversy may proceed in the manner described or only appear to do so. In other words, it may be supported by genuine or spurious arguments.

Aristotle states substantially the same thing as above when he enumerates the ways of preventing proof. "There are four possible ways of preventing a man from working his argument to a conclusion. It can be done either by demolishing
the point on which the falsehood that comes about depends, or by stating an objection directed against the questioner; for often when a solution has not as a matter of fact been brought, yet the questioner is rendered thereby unable to pursue the argument any farther. Thirdly, one may object to the questions asked for it may happen that what the questioner wants does not follow from the questions he has asked because he has asked them badly, whereas if something additional be granted, the conclusion comes about. If, then the questioner be unable to pursue his argument farther, the objection would properly be directed against the questioner; if he can do so, then it would be against his questions. The fourth and worst kind of objection is that which is directed to the time allowed for discussion: for some people bring objections of a kind which would take longer to answer than the length of the discussion in hand.

"There are then, as we have said, four ways of making objections: but of them, the first alone is a solution: the others are just hindrances and stumbling blocks to prevent the conclusions." 

We may note that the purpose of Aristotle here is not perfectly parallel with Schopenhauer's discussion of the essential nature of every dispute. There is, however, the fact that Aristotle suggests in this place that one of the modes of refuting an argument is to show that the proposition is not in accordance with the nature of things, or in
other words, attacking the premise, "By demolishing the point on which the falsehood that comes about depends." Poste translates this phrase, "The repudiation of a false premise." This we say, is a parallel to what Schopenhauer calls "the direct refutation (which) shows that the thesis is not true."

Notice that Aristotle himself observes "there are then, as we have said, four ways of making objection: but of them the first alone is a solution: the others are just hindrances and stumbling blocks to prevent the conclusion." These stumbling blocks and hindrances might roughly correspond to Schopenhauer's indirect method of refutation.

In the *Sophisticos Elenchis* Aristotle also gives us the method of disputation. "As solution is either addressed to the proof, or the prover and his questions, or to neither; so questions and proof may be addressed either to the thesis, the answerer, or the time, when the solution requires more time than is allowed, or the questioner has time for a rejoinder."

Here again we find latent in Aristotle that which Schopenhauer has elaborated as the basis of Dialectic. When Aristotle speaks of a solution as being "addressed to the proof", this is what Schopenhauer calls the direct mode of refutation. Likewise when Aristotle speaks of addressing the solution "to the prover" he approximates Schopenhauer's indirect mode of refutation.

Elsewhere in the *Sophisticos Elenchis* Aristotle gives
us in substance what Schopenhauer laid down as the basis of dialectic. He is enumerating the objects aimed at when disputants are "contentious and fight for victory." He lays down five objects: "to confute the opponent, to drive him into paradox, to reduce him to solecism, and to reduce him to pleonasm, that is, to superfluous repetition; or the semblance of any one of these achievements without the reality." Aristotle then adds, "The end most desired is to confute the answerer, the next to show that he holds a false opinion, the third to lead him into paradox, the fourth to land him into solecism, that is, to show that his expression involves a violation of the laws of grammar, the fifth to force him to unmeaning repetition."

Again we note that Aristotle proposes the direct method of refutation: "Show that he holds false opinion"; and the indirect: "To lead him to paradox." Later Aristotle devotes quite a long chapter to the methods of refutation by bringing one into paradox. One of the suggested methods is an excellent example of what Schopenhauer calls the diversion, which he explains as accepting our opponent's proposition as true and then show what follows from it when we bring it with connection with some other proposition acknowledged to be true. Aristotle states this paradox as follows: "Paradox may be elicited by considering to what school the respondent belongs, and proposing some tenet of the school that the world pronounces to be a paradox; for there are such tenets
in every school. For this purpose it is useful to have made a collection of paradoxes. The proper solution is to show that the paradox has no connection with the thesis, as the disputant pretends."

We may conclude by calling attention to the fact that though Schopenhauer does not follow Aristotle in so many words when he gives his basis of Dialectic, yet as we have endeavored to show, Aristotle has in substance what Schopenhauer sets forth in a very lucid manner, that the essential nature of every dispute may be reduced to two modes of refutation, that is, by showing that the proposition is not according to the nature of things, or that it is inconsistent with other statements or admissions of our opponent.

The following schema may help to clarify the matter: Schopenhauer, we may note, proposes a framework or skeleton of all forms of disputation to which every kind of controversy may ultimately be reduced. This, he calls, "The essential nature of every dispute" or "the basis of all dialectic."

Schopenhauer says that there are two modes of refuting a thesis and two courses that may be pursued.

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<th>Two Modes</th>
<th>II</th>
<th>Two Courses</th>
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<td>1. <em>ad rem</em> (proposition not objectively true)</td>
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<td>1. diversion</td>
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<td>2. <em>ad hominem</em> (inconsistent with admissions of opponent).</td>
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Two-fold procedure of the direct course:

1. Diversion \textit{ad rem}
   \textit{ad hominem}

2. Instance (refuting a universal by citing a particular example)

Aristotle has no such framework. He does not explicitly deal with the basis of all Dialectic. Hence one is forced to find some basis of similarity in the incidental remarks of Aristotle. This we have endeavored to do, not by drawing an exact parallel, but by showing that Schopenhauer reduces the basis of Dialectic to two modes of refutation which are the direct or \textit{ad rem}, and indirect or \textit{ad hominem}; and that Aristotle does the same. He expresses the direct method as showing that the opponent "holds a false opinion", and the indirect method by leading an opponent into what he calls "paradox." In other words, both Schopenhauer and Aristotle agree that refutation consists in showing that propositions are contrary to the nature of things or inconsistent with other statements or admissions of one's opponent.
AN INTRODUCTION TO THEIR DIALECTICAL STRATAGEMS

The term DIALECTICAL STRATAGEMS is the term that Schopenhauer uses to describe the thirty-eight fraudulent tricks which can be used to get the best of it in a dispute. Aristotle does not in so many words use the term DIALECTICAL STRATAGEMS, he does, however, speak of "eristic confutation," which is not "genuine but only apparent". And again he speaks of enumerating "the sources of paralogism and frauds of the questioner."

In order to form an adequate comparison of what we shall call their Dialectical Stratagems it will be necessary to outline their procedure. Schopenhauer, with the exception of two introductory chapters, devotes the entirety of his THE ART OF CONTROVERSY to a statement of the various stratagems. These are numbered from one to thirty-eight, and are apparently given in no specific sequence.

Aristotle, on the contrary, has a very systematic arrangement in his Sophistic Elenchis. His opening paragraph tells us "we propose to treat of sophistical confutations and those seeming confutations which are not really confutations, but paralogisms;" and we thus begin, following the natural order of inquiry." As we have already indicated, our attempted comparison of the Art of Controversy with the Dialectic of Aristotle must of necessity make almost exclusive use of the Sophisticis Elenchis, for it is here that
Aristotle treats the logical fallacies.

In this work Aristotle lived up to his purpose in following "the natural order of inquiry." The work may be divided into four parts: (1) Introduction, ch. 1-2, (2) Perpetration of Fallacies, ch. 3-15, (3) Solution of Fallacies, ch. 16-32, (4) Epilogue, ch. 34.

In the Introduction Aristotle expatiates on the distinction of genuine from merely apparent reasoning and confutation. "So proof and confutation are either real or only seem to be such to the inexperienced......Proof is a tissue of propositions, so related that we of necessity assert some further proposition as a consequence. Confutation is a proof whose conclusion is the contradictory of a given thesis."

He tells us "it answers the purpose of some persons rather to seem to be philosophers and not to be, than to be and not to seem; for Sophistry is seeming but unreal philosophy, and the sophist is a person who makes money by the semblance of philosophy without the reality; and for his success it is requisite to seem to perform the function of the philosopher without performing it, rather than to perform it without seeming to do so." He says further that "those who wish to practice as Sophists will aim at the kind of reasonings we have described, for it suits their purpose, as the faculty of thus reasoning
produces a semblance of philosophy, which is the end they propose."

At the end of this chapter he tells us what he expects to do in the following chapters of the book. "The various kinds of sophistical reasoning, the branches of a sophistical faculty, the various elements of the sophistical profession, and other components of the art remain to be examined."

In the next chapter he distinguishes reasoning into four orders: Didactic, Dialectic, Paristic, and Eristic. After this he enumerates the five objects aimed at when disputants "are contentious and fight for victory." In the fourth chapter he observes that "seeming confutations fall under two divisions: those where the semblance depends on language, and those where it is independent of language." Here he enumerates the fallacies dependent on diction, which are six in number. "The ambiguity of a term, ambiguity of a proposition, the possibility of wrong disjunction, the possibility of wrong conjunction, the possibility of wrong accentuation, the similarity of termination." After illustration the use of these, he discusses the seven fallacies that are not dependent on diction. They arise from "the equation of subjects and accidents; from the confusion of an absolute statement with a statement limited in manner, place, time or relation; from an inadequate notion of confutation; from a conversion of consequent and
antecedent; from begging the question; from taking what is not a cause for a cause; and lastly, from putting many questions as one." After illustration the above by examples of each, he observes "for all the fallacies we enumerated may be resolved into offenses against the definition of confutation; for either the reasonings are inconclusive; whereas the premisses ought to involve the conclusion, of necessity and not merely in appearance, or they fail to satisfy the remaining elements of the definition."

In the next chapter he notes that all the fallacies arise from confusion and must be solved by drawing proper distinctions. "In all these the minuteness of the difference creates the deception, for it makes us fail to entirely satisfy the definition of proposition and proof." From here he endeavors to draw the difference between paralogism and sophistic proof. Then follows a long discussion of the distinction between Sophistic, and Eristic, Sophistic and Pseudographic, Scientific and Pirastic proof. Following this he tells us how to show the various fallacies, how to entrap into paradoxes, how to reduce to tautology or pleonasm. Then he discusses the different methods of arranging an argument so as to conceal one's purpose. It is in this chapter that we will find many parallels in Schopenhauer.

In the third section of the treatise he discusses the solutions to various fallacies. He divides them into those
dependent on diction, which are ambiguity and amphiboly; ambiguous division and combination of words; wrong accent; like expressions for different things. The other division, those not depending on diction, are accident; use of words with or without qualification; ignoratio enelchi; petitio principii; the consequent; false cause; many questions.

Thus we have tried to state briefly a comparison of Schopenhauer's and Aristotle's plan of procedure as a background for a more detailed comparison of their Dialectical Stratagems.
A COMPARISON OF THEIR DIALECTICAL STRATAGEMS

I

The first dialectical stratagem of Schopenhauer is the extension or exaggeration of a proposition beyond its natural limits.

"This consists in carrying your opponent's proposition beyond its natural limits; in giving it as general a signification and as wide a sense as possible, so as to exaggerate it; and, on the other hand, in giving your own proposition as restricted a sense and as narrow limits as you can because the more general a statement becomes, the more numerous are the objections to which it is open. The defence consists in an accurate statement of the point or essential question at issue." 1.

The statement of this stratagem is not explicitly found in Aristotle. He does, however, suggest that "sometimes the questioner must attack a proposition different from the thesis by means of misinterpretation if he cannot attack the thesis." 2. He also warns us that "fallacies that omit some element in the definition... must be solved by examining whether the conclusion is contradictory to the thesis, and regards the same terms in the same portion, in the same relation, in the same manner, and in the same time." 3.

II

Schopenhauer's second stratagem is to extend a proposition beyond its natural meaning and then refute the extended proposition. It is a sophism based on homonymy.

"This trick is to extend a proposition to something which has little or nothing in common
with the matter in question but the similarity of
the words; then to refute it triumphantly, and so
claim credit for having refuted the original state-
ment.... This trick may be regarded as identical
with the sophism ex homonymia; it is a confusion of
essentially different things through the homonymy
in a word and hence is an alteration of the point in
dispute." 4.

Aristotle, in Chapter XIX deals with the fallacies
based on homonymia and amphibolia. Here he observes that
"when there is an ambiguity in a term or proposition of
a confutation, the ambiguity sometimes lies in the premisses,
sometimes in the conclusion... When the ambiguity lies in
the conclusion, unless the conclusion is previously denied
by the respondent, there is no confutation.... for confutation
requires contradiction." 5. He suggests that "the thesis
should at starting, be stated with a distinction, if it contains
any ambiguity." He speaks of the ambiguous proposition as
being "true in the answerer's sense, false in the opponent's." He
further notes that "there is a distinction between a
restricted and unrestricted premiss. If a questioner argues
with regard to the distinction, we must contend that he
has contradicted the name, not the reality, and therefore
has not confuted." 6.

III

Schopenhauer's third trick is very similar to the
first two, and the above references to Aristotle apply to
it.
"Another trick is to take a proposition which is laid down relatively, and in reference to some particular matter, as though it were uttered with a general or absolute application; or, at least to take it in some quite different sense, and then refute it." 7.

As Schopenhauer notes, Aristotle suggests an example of this trick which is as follows: "A Moor is black; but in regard to his teeth he is white; therefore, he is black and not black at the same moment."

IV

This stratagem of Schopenhauer is to refuse to admit true premisses because of a foreseen conclusion.

"If you want to draw a conclusion, you must not let it be foreseen, but you must get the premisses admitted one by one, unobserved, mingling them here and there in your talk; otherwise, your opponent will attempt all sorts of chicanery. Or, if it is doubtful whether your opponent will admit them, you must advance the premisses of these premisses; that is to say, you must draw up pro-syllogisms, and get them premisses of several of them admitted in no definite order. In this you conceal your game until you have obtained all the admissions that are necessary, and so reach your goal by making a circuit. These rules are given by Aristotle in his Topica 8:1. It is a trick which needs no illustration." 9.

It will be noted that Schopenhauer points out that the rules of these tricks are to be found in the Topics 8:1. In this chapter, Aristotle suggests that the use of premisses "to conceal the conclusion serve a controversial purpose only; but inasmuch as an undertaking of this sort is always conducted against another person, we are obliged to employ them as
10. well."

Aristotle further tells us that "concealment of one's plan is obtained by securing through pro-syllogisms the premisses through which the proof of the original proposition is to be constructed -- and as many of them as possible. This is likely to be effected by making syllogisms to prove not only the necessary premisses, but also some of those which are required to establish them."

V

In number five Schopenhauer suggests the use of the argument ex concessis.

"To prove the truth of a proposition, you may also employ previous propositions that are not true, should your opponent refuse to admit the true ones, either because he fails to perceive their truth, or because he sees that the thesis immediately follows from them. In that case the plan is to take propositions which are false in themselves but true for your opponent, and argue from the way in which he thinks, that is to say, ex concessis. For a true conclusion may follow from false premisses, but not vice versa. In the same fashion your opponent's false propositions, which, however, takes to be true; for it is with him that you have to do, and you must use the thoughts that he uses. For instance, if he is a member of some sect to which you do not belong, you may employ the declared opinions of this sect against him, as principles." 12.

Aristotle approaches this trick in his discussion of paradox. "Paradox may be elicited by considering to what school the respondent belongs, and proposing some tenets of
the school that the world pronounces to be a paradox."

VI

In this Schopenhauer uses the plan of begging the question.

"Another plan is to beg the question in disguise by postulation what has to be proved, either (1) under another name; for instance, "good repute" instead of "honor"; "virtue" instead of "virginity", etc; or by using such convertible terms as "red-blooded animals" and "vertebrates"; or (2) by making a general assumption covering the particular point in dispute; for instance, maintaining the uncertainty of medicine by postulation of the uncertainty of all human knowledge. (3) If, vice versa, two things follow one from the other, and one is to be proved, you may postulate the other. (4) If a general proposition is to be proved, you may get your opponent to admit every one of the particulars. This is the converse of the second." 14.

Aristotle suggests five ways in which people appear to beg the original question.

"The first and most obvious being if any one begs the actual point, requiring to be shown: this is easily detected when put in so many words; but it is more apt to escape detection in the case of different terms, or a term and an expression that mean the same thing. A second way occurs whenever any one begs universally something which he has to demonstrate in a particular case: suppose (e.g.) he were trying to prove that the knowledge of contraries is one and were to claim that the knowledge of opposites in general is one: for then he is generally thought to be begging, along with a number of other things, that which he ought to have shown by itself. A third way is, if any one were to beg in particular cases what he undertakes to show universally: e.g. if he
undertook to show that the knowledge of contraries is always one, and begged it of certain pairs of contraries: for he also is generally considered to be begging independently and by itself, what, together with a number of other things, he ought to have shown. Again, a man begs the question if he begs his conclusion piece-meal; supposing e.g. that he had to show that medicine is a science of what leads to health and to disease, and were to claim first the one, then the other; or, fifthly, if he were to beg the one or the other of a pair of statements that necessarily involve one another; e.g. if he had to show that the diagonal is incommensurable with the side, and were to beg that the side is incommensurable with the diagonal." 15.

In chapter 27 of the *Sophistici Elenchi*, Aristotle discusses the solution of the fallacy of begging the question. In this place he suggests the following: "In fallacies from begging and assuming the point in issue, if we are aware in time we should deny the proposition, even though it be probable, and say, as we fairly may, that it cannot be granted but must be proved."

VII

This stratagem is the use of the erotematic or socratic method of asking many questions and then concealing the intended conclusion.

"Should the disputation be conducted on somewhat strict and formal lines, and there be a desire to arrive at a very clear understanding, he who states the proposition and wants to prove it may proceed against his opponent by question, in order to show the truth of the statement his admissions. This erotematic, or Socratic method was especially in use among
the ancients; and this and some of the following are akin to it. The plan is to ask a great many widenreaching questions at once, so as to hide what you want to get admitted, and on the other hand, quickly propound the argument resulting from the admissions; for those who are slow of understanding cannot follow accurately, and do not notice any mistakes or gaps there may be in the demonstration." 16.

Aristotle treats of the rules for concealment in the
Topica, Book 8, Chapter 1, to which we have already referred.
In the De Sophisticis Elenchis he tells us that "for a concealment of his purpose arrangement is important to the sophist as to the dialectician." He observes that "length is favorable to concealment; for it is hard to see the mutual relations of a long series of propositions....Quickness facilitates concealment for the answerer has not time to foresee consequences." 17.

VIII

Here Schopenhauer suggests using the trick of making the opponent angry.

"This trick consists in making your opponent angry; for when he is angry he is incapable of judging aright, and perceiving where his advantage lies. You can make him angry by doing him repeated injustice, or practising some kind of chicanery, and being generally insolent." 18.

Aristotle has a very similar suggestion which he states as follows:

"So too, anger and the heat of dispute for any mental discomfiture, puts us off guard. Anger may be produced by effrontery and open attempts to cheat." 19.
IX

In number nine, Schopenhauer suggests transposing questions in order to mask procedure.

"Or you may put questions in an order different from that which the conclusion to be drawn from them requires, and transpose them, so as not to let him know at what you are aiming. He can then take no precautions. You may also use his answers for different or even opposite conclusions, according to their character. This is akin to the trick of masking your procedure." 20.

Aristotle suggests the use of the trick of masking the procedure in a number of places. In Topics, Chapter 8, Book I, he suggests the following method: "Moreover do not state the conclusions of these premisses, but draw them later one after another; for this is likely to keep the answerer at the greatest possible distance from the original proposition. Speaking generally, a man who desires to get information by a concealed method should so put his question that when he has put his whole argument and has stated the conclusion, people still ask, 'Well, but why is that?'" 21

In the Sophistic Elenchi Aristotle deals with the problem of masking procedure in his discussion of how to reduce the questioner to false or paradoxical statement. He says that false or paradoxical statement is obtained by questioning without previous definition of the problem. He says, "Random answers are more likely to be wrong and answers are made at random when there is no point at issue....It is useful to multiply questions....to lead him on to controversial
This stratagem consists of asking the converse of what one actually wants to have admitted.

"If you observe that your opponent designedly returns a negative answer to the questions which, for the sake of your proposition, you want him to answer in the affirmative, you must ask the converse of the proposition, as though it were that which you were anxious to see affirmed; or, at any rate, you may give him his choice of both, so that he may not perceive which of them you are asking him to affirm." 22.

Aristotle has a very parallel suggestion and states it in the following manner:

"If one desires to secure an admission that the knowledge of contraries was one, one should ask him to admit it not of contraries but of opposites: for if he grants this, one will then argue that the knowledge of contraries is also the same, seeing that contraries are opposites. If he does not, one should secure the admission by induction, by formulating a proposition to that effect in the case of some particular pair of contraries. For one must secure necessary premisses either by reasoning or by induction, or else partly by one and partly by another." 23.

XI

Schopenhauer here suggests the assumption of general truths from the admission of particular cases.

"If you make an induction, and your opponent grants you the particular cases by which it is to be supported, you must refrain from asking him if he also admits the general truth which issues from the particulars, but introde it afterwards as a settled fact; for, in the meanwhile, he will himself come to believe that he has admitted it, and the same impression will be received by the audience, because they will remember the many questions as to the particulars, and suppose that
they must, of course, have attained their end."

We find the suggestion of this same stratagem in Aristotle. He says, "Often when the particulars of an induction are granted the universal should not be asked but employed as if granted, for the answerer will fancy he has granted it and so will the audience, as they will recollect the induction and assume the particulars were not asked without a purpose."

XII

Stratagem number twelve suggests the use of suggestive metaphor favorable to one's position, or the use of question-begging epithets.

"If the conversation turns upon some general conception which has no particular name, but requires some figurative or metaphorical designation, you must begin by choosing a metaphor that is favorable to your proposition. For instance, the names used to denote the two political parties, in Spain, Serviles and Leberals are obviously chosen by the latter. The name Protestants is chosen by themselves, and also the name Evangelicals; but the Catholics call them heretics. Similarly, in regard to the names of things which admit of a more exact and definite meaning: for example, if your opponent proposes an alteration, you can call it an innovation, as this is an invidious word," etc. 26.

The writer has been unsuccessful in finding this stratagem stated explicitly in Aristotle. It is, of course, a very evident trick that is used almost instinctively. Aristotle's treatment of Figura Dictionis makes it plain that "we must solve fallacies from similarity of expression by pointing out
the difference of category denoted by similar words." This is not a suggestion of the use of the question-begging epithet, but all fallacies based on figures have at the bottom a subtle petitio principii.

XIII

Number thirteen consists of forcing the opponent to choose between two propositions which are glaringly contrasted.

"To make your opponent accept a proposition, you must give him the counter-proposition as well, leaving him his choice of the two; and you must render the contrast as glaring as you can, so that to avoid being paradoxical he will accept the proposition, which is thus made to look quite probable. For instance, if you want to make him admit that a body must do everything that his father tells him to do, ask him "whether in all things we must obey or disobey our parents". Or, if a thing is said to occur "often," ask whether by "often" you are to understand few or many cases; and he will say "many". It is as though you were to put grey next black, and call it white; or next white, and call it black." 27.

This is expressly found in Aristotle.

"To obtain a proposition you should contrast it with the opposite. If for instance, you want to obtain the premise, that a man should obey his father in all things, you should ask, Should a man obey or disobey his parents in all things; and if you want the premise that a small number multiplied by a small number is a large number, you should ask whether it is a small number or a large number; for if compelled to elect, one would rather pronounce it a large number. For the juxtaposition of contraries increases their apparent quantity and value." 28.

XIV

This sophism is the advancing in a tone of triumph the conclusion as though it had been proved.
"This, which is an impudent trick, is played as follows: when your opponent has answered several of your questions without the answers turning out favorable to the conclusion at which you are aiming, advance the desired conclusion, — although it does not in the least follow, — as though it had been proved, and proclaim it in a tone of triumph. If your opponent is shy or stupid, and your yourself possess a great deal of impudence and a good voice, the trick may easily succeed. It is akin to the fallacy non causae ut causae." 29.

This trick is also to be found in Aristotle. It is stated by him in the following language: "An appearance of confutation is often produced by a sophistic fraud, when the questioner without having proved anything, instead of asking the final proposition, asserts it in the form of a conclusion, as if he had disproved the thesis." 30.

XV

In number fifteen Schopenhauer suggests the impudent trick of submitting a proposition so as to cause the opponent to suspect a trick, and then trying to reduce him to absurdity.

"If you have advanced a paradoxical proposition and find a difficulty in proving it, you may submit for your opponent's acceptance or rejection some true proposition, the truth of which, however, is not quite palpable, as though you wished to draw your proof from it. Should he reject it because he suspects a trick, you can obtain your triumph by showing how absurd he is; should he accept it, you have got reason on your side for the moment, and must now look about you; or else you can employ the previous trick as well, and maintain that your paradox is proved by the proposition which he has accepted. For this an extreme degree of
impudence is required; but experience shows cases of it, and there are people who practice it by instinct." 31.

Aristotle seems to have the same stratagem in mind when he writes as follows:

"It is sophistic, too, when the thesis is a paradox to ask in proposing the premises for the respondent's genuine opinion, as if the thesis was his genuine opinion, and to put all the questions in this shape: it is your real opinion, etc., if the question is a premiss of the proof, the answerer must either be confuted or led into paradox; if he grants the premiss, he must be confuted; if he says it is not his real opinion, he utters a paradox, if he refuses to granted the premiss, though he allows it to be his opinion, it looks as if he were confuted." 32.

XVI

Here Schopenhauer suggests the use of arguments ad hominem or ex concessis.

"Another trick is to use arguments ad hominem or ex concessis. When your opponent makes a proposition, you must try to see whether it is not in some way --if needs be, only apparently--inconsistent with some other proposition which he has made or admitted, or with the principles of a school or sect which he has commended and approved, or with the actions of those who support the sect, or else of those who give it only an apparent and spurious support, or his own actions or want of action. For example, should he defend suicide, you may at once exclaim, "Why don't you hang yourself?" Should he maintain that Berlin is an unpleasant place to live in, you may say, "Why don't you leave by the first train?" Some such claptrap is always possible." 33.
Aristotle also suggests the use of this type of stratagem. "Discrepancies should be developed between the thesis and the tenets either of the answerer or of those whom he acknowledges to be high authorities, or of those who are generally so acknowledged, or of those of his own school, or of those of the majority of people, or of those of all mankind."

XVII

This trick consists in saving the day by advancing some subtle distinction.

"If your opponent presses you with a counter-proof you will often be able to save yourself by advancing some subtle distinction, which, it is true, had not previously occurred to you; that is, if the matter admits of a double application, or of being taken in any ambiguous sense." 35.

Aristotle states the same thing by saying, "And as the answerer avoids immediate confutation by drawing distinctions, so the questioner who forsees an objection that applies in one sense and not in another, should explain that he means the proposition in the unobjectionable sense."

XVIII

Here Schopenhauer indicates how to save oneself from defeat by digressing from the point at issue.

"If you observe that your opponent has taken up a line of argument which will end in your defeat, you must not allow him to carry it to its conclusion, but interrupt the course of the dispute in time, or break it off alto-
gether, or lead him away from the subject, and bring him to others. In short, you must effect the trick which will be noticed later on, the mutatio controversiae." 37.

This trick is suggested by Schopenhauer in several of his stratagems: number twenty-nine, nineteen, twenty-six, and thirty-four.

Aristotle makes the same observation. In speaking of those who are in the process of being confuted, he suggests, "They should also break off their argument and cut down their other lines of attack....One should also lead attacks sometimes against positions other than the ones stated." 38.

XIX

This is another type of stratagem based on changing the subject.

"Should your opponent expressly challenge you to produce any objection to some definite point in his argument, and you have nothing much to say, you must try to give the matter a general turn, and then talk against that. If you are called upon to say why a particular physical hypothesis cannot be accepted, you may speak of the fallibility of human knowledge, and give various illustrations of it." 39.

I have been unable to find this stratagem explicitly stated in Aristotle. There is a similarity in one element, that is, giving the matter a general turn. He warns that any "digressing from the argument in hand" should be anticipated and one must "restrict the bearing" to the subject under discussion.
This trick is an application of the fallacy non causae ut causae.

"When you have elicited all your premisses, and your opponent has admitted them, you must refrain from asking him for the conclusion, but draw it at once for yourself; nay, even though one or other of the premisses should be lacking, you may take it as though it too had been admitted, and draw the conclusion. This trick is an application of the fallacy non causae ut causae." 41.

Aristotle tells us that an appearance of confutation is often produced by a sophististic fraud "when the questioner without having proved anything, instead of asking the final proposition, asserts it in the form of a conclusion as if he had disproved the thesis." 42.

In discussing the fallacy non causa pro causa, he suggests the following as a solution:

"In fallacies where a superfluous proposition is foisted in as the cause of an absurd conclusion, we must examine whether the suppression of the premiss would interrupt the conclusion; and after showing that it does not, we may add that the premisses which really cause it were not granted because they were believed, but because the questioner seemed to wish to use them against the thesis, which he has failed to do." 43.

XXI

Here Schopenhauer suggests the meeting of superficial arguments by counter arguments equally superficial.

"When your opponent uses a merely superficial or sophistical argument and you see through it, you can, it is true, refute it by setting forth its captious and superficial character; but it
is better to meet him with a counter-argument which is just as superficial and sophistical, and so dispose of him; for it is with victory you are concerned, and not with truth." 44.

The writer has been unable to find any parallel to this stratagem in the writings of Aristotle. In fact, it appears to me that Schopenhauer's suggestion isn't wise strategy. In my opinion it would be much better to note the captious and superficial nature of the opponent's argument rather than to lower one's intellectual dignity by resorting to the same superficial reasoning.

XXII

In number twenty-two it is pointed out that one can avoid admitting something prejudicial to his interest by declaring it a petitio principii.

"If your opponent requires you to admit something from which the point in dispute will immediately follow, you must refuse to do so, declaring that it is a petitio principii. For he and the audience will regard a proposition which is near akin to the point in dispute as identical with it, and in this way you deprive him of his best argument." 45.

Aristotle suggests this in a rather indirect way. He speaks of people who think that they must at all costs overthrow the premisses that lie near the conclusion. He remarks that these people plead "in excuse for refusing to grant him some of them (premisses) that he is begging the original question." He adds, "So whenever any one claims to
from us a point such as is bound to follow as a consequence
from our thesis...we must plead the same."

XXIII

Here Schopenhauer makes use of the trick of employing contradiction and contention to irritate a man to exaggeration; then to refute his exaggerated statement.

"Contradiction and contention irritate a man into exaggerating his statement. By contradicting your opponent you may drive him into extending beyond its proper limits a statement which, at all events within those limits and in itself, is true; and when you refute this exaggerated form of it, you look as though you had also refuted his original statement. Contrarily, you must take care not to allow yourself to be misled by contradiction into exaggerating or extending a statement of your own. It will often happen that your opponent will himself directly try to extend your statement further than you mean it; here you must at once stop him, and bring him back to the limits which you set up: "That's what I said, and no more." 47.

This stratagem like number eight and number twenty-seven make use of the weakness a man throw himself open to under strong emotion. Aristotle speaks of angering your opponent in the heat of dispute. He notes that "any mental discomfiture puts us off our guard." 48. Aristotle in this connection, however, does not expressly suggest this as a means of making one exaggerate his statements and then taking advantage of this exaggeration.

XXIV

This trick is similar to number one. It consists in
distorting a proposition and then attempting to refute the distortion.

"This trick consists in stating a false syllogism. Your opponent makes a proposition, and by false inference and distortion of his ideas you force from it other propositions which it does not contain and he does not in the least mean; nay, which are absurd or dangerous. It then looks as if his proposition gave rise to others which are inconsistent either with themselves or with some acknowledged truth, and so it appears to be indirectly refuted. This is the diversion, and it is another application of the fallacy non causae ut causae." 49

Aristotle suggests this stratagen when he remarks that "sometimes the questioner must attack a proposition different from the thesis." 50. He also speaks of a "superfluous proposition foisted in as the cause of an absurd conclusion." 51.

XXV

In number twenty-five Schopenhauer suggests that when one's opponent contradicts a universal statement by an instance to the contrary one must observe whether the example is really true and true in the sense stated and also whether it is inconsistent with this conception.

"This is a case of the diversion by means of an instance to the contrary. With an induction (ἐνταξιάς), a great number of particular instances are required in order to establish it as a universal proposition; but with the diversion (ἐνταξιάς) a single instance, to which the proposition does not apply, is all that is necessary to overthrow it. This is a controversial method known as the instance - instantia, (ἐνταξιάς)."
For example, "all ruminants are horned" is a proposition which may be upset by the single instance of the camel. The instance is a case in which a universal truth is sought to be applied, and something is inserted in the fundamental definition of it which is not universally true, and by which it is upset. But there is room for mistake; and when this trick is employed by your opponent, you must observe (1) whether the example which he gives is really true; for there are problems of which the only true solution is that the case in point is not true - for example, many miracles, ghost stories, and so on; and (2) whether it really comes under the conception of the truth thus stated; for it may only appear to do so and the matter is one to be settled by precise distinctions; and (3) whether it is really inconsistent with this conception; for this again may be only an apparent inconsistency." 52.

This seems not to be precisely found in Aristotle. Of course he speaks of universals as capable of being refuted by an instance to the contrary. He observes that "the universal affirmative is most difficult to establish, most easy to overthrow." 53. But he evidently does not give the rules to be observed when employing this trick, as does Schopenhauer.

XXVI

This stratagem consists in turning the tables and using the opponent's argument against himself.

"A brilliant move is the retorsio argumenti, or turning of the tables, by which your opponent's argument is turned against himself. He declares, for instance, "So-and-so is a child, you must make allowance for him." You retort, "Just because he is a child, I must correct him otherwise he will persist in his bad habits." 54.
The statement of this trick is evidently not to be found in Aristotle.

XXVII

Here Schopenhauer suggests urging the point at which one's opponent becomes angry.

"Should your opponent surprize you by becoming particularly angry at an argument, you must urge it with all the more zeal; not only because it is a good thing to make him angry, but because it may be presumed that you have here put your finger on the weak side of his case, and that just here he is more open to attack than even for the moment you perceive." 55.

Schopenhauer has several stratagems that make us of one's weakness in times of anger: numbers eight, twenty-three, and so forth. As we have observed, Aristotle suggested the use of angering one since the "heat of dispute" brings mental discomfiture and "puts us off guard." This seems to be the nearest approach Aristotle has of this particular stratagem. Apparently he no where suggests urging the point as a sign of weakness.

XXVIII

This consists in the use of the argument ad auditores. It takes advantage of the fact that an explanation would require too much time.

"This is chiefly practicable in a dispute between scholars in the presence of the unlearned. If you have no argument ad rem, and none either ad hominem, you can make on ad auditores; that is to say, you can start some invalid objection, which, however, only an expert sees to be invalid. Now your opponent is an expert, but those who form
audeience are not, and accordingly in their eyes he is defeated; particularly if the audience senses that the objection which you make places him in any ridiculous light. People are ready to laugh, and you have the laughers on your side. To show that your objection is an idle one, would require a long explanation on the part of your opponent, and a reference to the principles of the branch of knowledge in question, or to the elements of the matter which you are discussing; and people are not disposed to listen to it."

Aristotle seems to have this trick in mind when he writes as follows: "Just as it is possible to bring a solution sometimes against the argument, at others against the questioner and his mode of questioning, and at others against neither of these, likewise also it is possible to marshal one's questions and reasoning both against the thesis, and against the answerer and against the time, whenever the solution requires a longer time to examine than the period available."

XXIX

Here it is suggested that one can save himself by changing the subject.

"If you find that you are being worsted, you can make a diversion, that is, you can suddenly begin to talk of something else, as though it had a bearing on the matter in dispute, and afforded an argument against your opponent. This may be done without presumption if the diversion has, in fact, some general bearing on the matter; but it is a piece of impudence if it has nothing to do with the case, and is only brought in by way of attacking your opponent.

"The diversion is mere impudence if it completely abandons the point in dispute, and
raises for instance, some such objection, as "Yes, and you also said just now," and so on. For then the argument becomes to some extent personal. Strictly speaking, it is halfway between the argumentum ad personam, and the argumentum ad hominem." 58.

The exact nature of this stratagem is apparently not to be found in Aristotle, although he does suggest that one can avoid confutation by breaking off their argument and cutting down the line of attack of the enemy. And again, he tells us that "whenever one forsees any question coming, one should put in one's objection and have one say beforehand: for by doing so one is likely to embarrass the questioner most effectively." 59.

XXX

Appealing to authority rather than reason is the substance of this stratagem.

"This is the argumentum ad verecundiam. It consists in making an appeal to authority rather than reason, and in using such an authority as may suit the degree of knowledge possessed by your opponent.

"Every man prefers belief to the exercise of judgment, says Seneca; and it is therefore an easy matter if you have an authority on your side which your opponent respects. The more limited his capacity and knowledge, the greater is the number of the authorities who weigh with him." 60.

Schopenhauer occupies five pages expatiating on this stratagem. He notes that ordinary folks have a deep respect for professional men. He suggests also that since many authorities find respect with the mob, one may quote what
these authorities said in another sense or in other circumstances. In speaking of the appeal to a universal prejudice, Schopenhauer remarks that, "there is no opinion, however absurd, which men will not readily embrace as soon as they can be brought to the conviction that it is generally adopted. He then illustrates the fact that universality of an opinion is not proof.

The part of this stratagem of Schopenhauer that suggests falsifying authority is evidently not in Aristotle. He does, however, suggest that "discrepancies should be developed between the thesis and the tenets either of the answerer or of those whom he acknowledges to be high authorities, or of those who are generally so acknowledge, or of those of his own school, or of those of the majority of people, or of those of all mankind."}

XXXI

This suggested stratagem consists in saving one's self from defeat by declaring oneself to be an incompetent judge.

"If you know that you have no reply to the arguments which your opponent advances, you may, by a fine stroke of irony, declare yourself to be an incompetent judge: "What you now say passes my poor powers of comprehension; it may be all very true, but I can't understand it, and I refrain from any expression of opinion on it." In this way you insinuate to the bystanders, with whom you are in good repute, that what your opponent says is nonsense. Thus, when Kant's Kritik appeared, or, rather, when it began to make a noise in the new world, many professors of the old eclectic school declared that they failed to understand it, in the
belief that their failure settled the business. But when the adherents of the new school proved to them that they were quite right, and had really failed to understand it, they were in a very bad humour.

"This is a trick which may be used only when you are quite sure that the audience thinks much better of you than of your opponent. A professor, for instance, may try it on a student.... It is a particularly malicious assertion of one's own authority, instead of giving reasons." 62.

As far as the writer has been able to discover, Aristotle doesn't have any suggestion of this type of trick.

XXXII

This is a commonly used trick of throwing suspicion upon an assertion by classing it with something to which a stigma is attached.

"If you are confronted with an assertion, there is a short way of getting rid of it, or, at any rate, of throwing suspicion on it, by putting it into some odious category; even though the connection is only apparent, or else of a loose character. You can say for instance, "That is Manichaeism," or "It is Arianism," or "Pelagianism," or "Idealism," or "Spinozism," or "Pantheism," or "Brownianism," or "Naturalism," or "Atheism," or "Rationalism," "Spiritualism," "Mysticism," and so on. In making an objection of this kind, you take it for granted (1) that the assertion in question is identical with, or is at least contained in, the category cited - that is to say, you cry out, "Oh, I have heard that before"; and (2) that the system referred to has been entirely refuted, and does not contain a word of truth." 63.

This particular stratagem is not suggested by Aristotle as far as I was able to discover. He does, however, speak
of solving the fallacy from "similarity of expression by pointing out the difference of category denoted by similar words."

XXXIII

This is a sophism that affirms that something may be all right in theory but not in practice.

"That's all very well in theory, but it won't do in practice." In this sophism you admit the premisses but deny the conclusion, in contradiction with a well-known rule of logic. The assertion is based upon an impossibility: what is right in theory must work in practice; and if it does not, there is a mistake in theory; something has been overlooked and not allowed for; and, consequently, what is wrong in practice is wrong in theory too." 65.

The explicit suggestion of this sophism is apparently not found in Aristotle. He, does, of course, suggest the rule of logic of which this is a contradiction, namely, "From true premisses it is not possible to draw a false conclusion, but a true conclusion may be drawn from false premisses, true however, only in respect to fact, not to reason." 66.

XXXIV

In number thirty-four Schopenhauer suggests the stratagem of urging the point when the opponent avoids the answer and turns the subject.

"When you state a question or an argument, and your opponent gives you no direct answer or reply, but evades it by a counter-question or an indirect answer, or some assertion which has no bearing on the matter, and, generally
tries to turn the subject, it is a sure sign that you have touched a weak spot, sometimes without knowing it. You have, as it were, reduced him to silence. You must, therefore, urge the point all the more, and not let your opponent evade it, even when you do not know where the weakness which you have hit upon really lies." 67.

This is a very self-evident suggestion, but apparently it was not within the scope of Aristotle's treatise to suggest it.

XXXV

This suggestion consists in working upon the will rather than the intellect of one's opponent, or the argumentum ab utilit.

"There is another trick which, as soon as it is practicable, makes all others unnecessary. Instead of working on your opponent's intellect by argument, work on his will by motive; and he, and also the audience if they have similar interests, will at once be won over to your opinion, even though you got it out of a lunatic asylum; for, as a general rule, half an ounce of will is more effective than a hundred-weight of insight and intelligence. This, it is true, can be done only under peculiar circumstances. If you succeed in making your opponent feel that his opinion, should it prove true, will be distinctly prejudicial to his interest, he will let it drop like a hot potato, and feel that it was very imprudent to take it up.

"A clergyman, for instance, is defending some philosophical dogma; you make him sensible of the fact that it is in immediate contradiction with one of the fundamental doctrines of his Church, and he abandons it......" 68.

Schopenhauer devotes quite a bit of space to illustrate
this trick. Here again the explicit statement of this trick is not set forth by Aristotle. There is some similarity, however, between this and one of the methods Aristotle suggests as a means of reducing the opponent to paradox.

"Paradox may be elicited by considering to what school the respondent belongs, and proposing some tenets of the school that the world pronounces to be a paradox."

XXXVI

Here Schopenhauer suggests the use of bombast as a means of bewildering one's opponent.

"You may also puzzle and bewilder your opponent by mere bombast; and the trick is possible, because a man generally supposes that there must be some meaning in words... If he is secretly conscious of his own weakness, and accustomed to heart much that he does not understand, and to make as though he did, you can easily impose upon him by some serious fooling that sounds very deep and learned, and deprives him of hearing, sight, and thought; and by giving out that it is the most indisputable proof of what you assert. It is a well-known fact that in recent times some philosophers have practiced this trick on the whole of the public with the most brilliant success. But since present examples are odious, we may refer to The Vicar of Wakefield for an old one." 70.

Neither was the writer able to find this in the writings of Aristotle.

XXXVII

This trick consists in disproving a faulty proof and then claiming to have refuted the whole position.

"Should your opponent be in the right, but,
luckily for your contention, choose a faulty proof, you can easily manage to refute it, and then claim that you have thus refuted his whole position. This is a trick which ought to be one of the first; it is, at bottom, an expedient by which an argumentum ad hominem is put forward as an argumentum ad rem. If no accurate proof occurs to him or to the bystanders, you have won the day. For example, if a man advances the ontological argument by way of proving God's existence, you can get the best of him, for the ontological argument may easily be refuted. This is the way in which bad advocates lose a good case, by trying to justify it by an authority which does not fit it, when no fitting one occurs to them." 71.

Although this is a common stratagem, Aristotle does not seem to have such a suggestion.

XXVIII

The last stratagem that Schopenhauer suggests is to defend one's self by attacking the disputant himself.

"A last trick is to become personal, insulting, rude, as soon as you perceive that your opponent has the upper hand, and that you are going to come off worst. It consists in passing from the subject of dispute, as from a lost game, to the disputant himself, and in some way attacking his person. It may be called the argumentum ad personam, to distinguish it from the argumentum ad hominem, which passes from the objective discussion of the subject pure and simple to the statements or admissions which your opponent has made in regard to it. But in becoming personal you leave the subject altogether, and turn your attack to his person, by remarks of an offensive and spiteful nature. It is an appeal from the virtues of the intellect to the virtues of the body, or to mere animalism. This is
a very popular trick, because every one is able to carry it into effect; and so it is of frequent application...." 72.

Schopenhauer expatiates at some length upon this trick and brings to a close his *Art of Controversy* by suggesting some of the advantages of controversy and some rules to observe in disputation.

Aristotle apparently makes no suggestion as to the use of the trick *argumentum ad personam*.
CONCLUSION

As we bring this thesis to a close we will summarize and analyze our findings. In our chapter on their definition of Dialectic we observed that Aristotle uses the word in a broader sense than did Schopenhauer who defined it as the art of gaining one's point.

In the chapter on the basis of all Dialectic we noted that Aristotle did not explicitly have a framework to which every dispute could be reduced; but that there was to be found in his writings the two basic principles that Schopenhauer set forth, namely, that the two modes of refutation are to show that a proposition is not in accord with absolute objective reality or that it is not consistent with other statements or admissions of one's opponent.

We observed also that the objects of Schopenhauer and Aristotle were radically different, Aristotle being the much broader and his treatment of the fallacies more general than Schopenhauer who merely gives a collection of dishonest stratagems by which one may be enabled to defend one's self and frustrate others.

A study of their comparative treatment of the stratagems reveals that a large proportion of Schopenhauer's suggested stratagems are either implicitly or explicitly found in Aristotle. It is not an easy matter to determine which stratagems may be classified as explicitly or implicit-
ly in Aristotle, but according to my interpretation I have found that seventeen out of the thirty-eight stratagems of Schopenhauer may be stated as being explicitly found in the writings of Aristotle and six may be considered implicit.

It is noteworthy that thirteen of the seventeen stratagems are treated by Aristotle in the fifteen chapter of De Sophisticis Elenchis. As we have observed, this work is a treatise on the fallacies and not merely an endeavor to enumerate dialectical stratagems. The fifteenth chapter, however, is given to the discussion of "the sources from which fallacies come," or as Aristotle says, "forms of dishonesty in putting questions." It is natural thus to expect that many of the similarities will be found in this chapter. We actually find that with the exception of one insertion, Schopenhauer's stratagems follow the identical sequence of this chapter and in these thirteen stratagems often the language is remarkably similar to that of Aristotle.

Schopenhauer's treatment of these is merely a reproduction and amplification of Aristotle. We must, however, in justice to Schopenhauer, point out that he has a footnote appended to his statement, "This erotematic or Socratic, method was especially in use among the ancients; and this and some of the tricks following later are akin to it," which reads, "They are all free versions of Chapter 15 of Aristotle's De Sophisticis Elenchis."

From this, however, one would not suspect that more than
one-third of Schopenhauer's suggested stratagems could be merely an enlargement of those found in Aristotle and that they would follow almost the identical order. One wonders how Schopenhauer could honestly state in the beginning of his work, "I am not aware that anything has been done in this direction, although I have made inquiries far and wide. It is therefore an uncultivated soil." He refers here, of course, to a collection of dialectical stratagems. He even goes so far as to state in the same connection, "What follows is to be regarded as a first attempt." In the light of the fact that out of his thirty-eight stratagems, seventeen may be found explicitly and six implicitly in Aristotle, it seems strange that Schopenhauer should make the above claims. In other words, of the thirty-eight stratagems, only fifteen are not traceable to Aristotle. Even in many of these there are points of similarity.

The writer does not want to make it appear that Aristotle was the exclusive source of Schopenhauer's The Art of Controversy, but it would seem evident that he made greater use of Aristotle than would appear through the few incidental references that he makes to him.


NOTES

Chapter I


2. Ibid.


Chapter II


2. Ibid.


4. Ibid.

5. Schopenhauer, p. 3.


7. Ibid.

8. Schopenhauer, p. 5.

9. Schopenhauer, p. 10

10. Schopenhauer, p. 11.

11. Ibid.


13. Ibid.


15. Aristotle, *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, Chapter XI.

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid (Translation by Ross)

18. Aristotle, *De Sophisticis Elenchis*, Chapter XI.

Chapter III

2. Topica, VIII, 10
3. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XXXIII.
5. Ibid.
6. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter III.

Chapter IV

1. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter I.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid.
4. Ibid.
5. Poste questions whether the Sophists actually existed or whether it was merely a name attached to those reasoned fallaciously.
6. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter I.
7. Ibid.
8. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter II.
10. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter X.
Chapter V.

1. The Art of Controversy, p. 15.
2. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XV.
5. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XIX.
6. Ibid.
8. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter V.
10. Topica, Book VIII, Chapter I.
11. Ibid.
13. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XII.
15. Topica, Book VIII Chapter XIII.
17. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XV.
19. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XV.
21. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XII.
23. Topica, Book VIII, Chapter I. The same suggestion is also found in De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XV.
25. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XV.
28. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XV.
30. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XV.
31. The Art of Controversy, p. 27.
32. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XV.
33. The Art of Controversy, p. 27.
34. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XV.
35. The Art of Controversy, p. 28.
36. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XV.
37. The Art of Controversy, p. 28.
40. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XV.
41. The Art of Controversy, p. 29.
42. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XV.
43. Op. cit., Chapter XXIX.
44. The Art of Controversy, p. 29.
46. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XVII.
47. The Art of Controversy, p. 30.
48. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XV.
49. The Art of Controversy, p. 31.
50. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XV.
52. The Art of Controversy, p. 31.
54. The Art of Controversy, p. 32.
55. Ibid.
56. The Art of Controversy, p. 33.
57. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XXXIII.
58. The Art of Controversy, p. 34.
59. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XVII (from Oxford edition
   Works of Aristotle, trans. under Ross.)
60. The Art of Controversy, p. 36.
61. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XV.
64. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XXII.
65. The Art of Controversy, p. 42.
66. Analytica Priora, Book II, Chapter II.
69. De Sophisticis Elenchis, Chapter XII.
70. The Art of Controversy, p. 44.
71. The Art of Controversy, p. 45.
72. Ibid.

Conclusion

1. Seventeen explicit stratagems: #3,4,6,7,8,9,10,11,13,14,15,
   16,17,18,19,20,22.
   Six implicit stratagems: #1,2,5,23,24,28.
2. The thirteen stratagems in Chapter 15: #7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20.


5. Ibid.
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The thesis, "A Comparison of Schopenhauer's The Art of Controversy with the Dialectic of Aristotle", written by Fred D. Jarvis, has been accepted by the Graduate School with reference to form, and by the readers whose names appear below, with reference to content. It is, therefore, accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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Dr. Daniel J. Morris.           June 10, 1940