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The Knowledge of the Separated Soul in the Philosophy of St. Thomas

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THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL

IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS

by

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VITA

Mother Louise Lundergan attended the Sacred Heart grammar school, Memphis, Tennessee, and Saint Ignatius grammar school, Chicago, Illinois. She attended the Academy of the Sacred Heart, Lake Forest, Illinois for four years, received her B.A. degree from Barat College, Lake Forest, Illinois, and a teacher's certificate from the Kenwood Normal Training school, Albany, New York. Since then she has been employed in teaching English and Latin at the Academy of the Sacred Heart, Chicago, Illinois.
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THE KNOWLEDGE OF THE SEPARATED SOUL

IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF ST. THOMAS

The difficulty in solving the problem of the knowledge of the separated soul in the Philosophy of St. Thomas arises from St. Thomas' conception of the nature of the soul and its union with the body. He maintains, as we shall see further on, that the soul needs the body, and that it is natural for the soul to understand by turning to the phantasm which is in a corporeal organ. This need of the soul to be united to the body proceeds from the very nature of the soul itself. For one who held that the union of soul and body is not required by the nature of the soul there would be no difficulty in explaining how the soul knows when separated from the body. St. Thomas attributes such an opinion to Plato, interpreting Plato's doctrine on the union of soul and body thus:

\[
\text{De Anima, q.un.a.1.}
\]

In such a doctrine the question of the knowledge of the separated soul is easily solved, for just as the sailor is naturally quite independent of the ship in so far as his action is concerned, so too would the soul be independent of the body in carrying on its proper operation. Instead of having to turn to phantasm in order to understand, the soul would be able to under-
stand intelligible things simply. St. Thomas points out:

\[\ldots\text{quod ista quaestio difficultatem habet ex hoc quod anima, quarum est corpori conjuncta, non potest aliquid intelligere non convertendo se ad phantasmata, ut per experimentum patet. Si autem hoc non est ex natura animae, sed per accidentem hoc convenit ei, ex eo quod corpore alligatur, sicut Platonici posuerunt; de facili quaestio solvi posset. Nam remoto impedimento corporis, rediret anima ad suam naturam, ut intelligeret intelligibilia simpliciter, non convertendo se ad phantasmata, sicut est de aliis substantiis separatis.}\]

\[\text{Sum.Theol., I.q.89.a.1., c.}\]

Such an opinion cannot stand however, for it at least implies that the union of soul and body is not for the good of the soul, as it would seem that the soul understands better out of the body than in the body. St. Thomas holds that the union of soul and body is natural to the soul, and that whatever is natural to a thing is good for that thing.

\[\text{Videtur etiam sequi ex hac opinione quod unio animae ad corpus non sit naturalis: nam quod est naturale alicui non impedit ejus propria operationem. Si igitur unio corporis impedit intelligentiam animae, non erit naturale animae corpori uniri, sed contra naturam; et ita homo qui constituitur ex unione animae ad corpus, non erit aliquod naturale: quod videtur absurdum.}\]

\[\text{De Anima, q.un.a.15., c.}\]

In another place St. Thomas quotes from \textit{Eccles.}, vii, 30.

\[\text{Deus fecit hominem rectum.}\]

He then continues;

\[\text{Haec autem fuit rectitudo hominis divinitus instituti, ut inferiora superioribus subderetur, et superiora ab inferioribus non impediretur. \ldots}\]

\[\text{Sum.Theol., I.q.94.a.1.}\]

Therefore the union of the soul with the body is for the good of the soul.
Matter that is, exists for the sake of the form, not form for the sake of matter. In rejecting the opinion that the union of soul and body is not for the good of the soul St. Thomas gives the following argument:

...secundum hoc non esset anima corpori unita propter melius animae, quia secundum hoc pejus intelligeret corpori unita quam separata; sed hoc esset solum propter melius corporis: quod est irrationabile, cum materia sit propter formam, et non e converso.

Sum. Theol., I.q.89.a.1.,c.

St. Thomas states clearly the difficulty to be found in his own position on the question of the union of soul and body. If, as experience proves, the soul when united to the body can understand only through the body, how can the separated soul understand anything?

Si autem ponamus, quod anima ex sua natura habeat ut intelligat convertendo se ad phantasmata, cum natura animae post mortem corporis non mutetur, videtur quod anima tunc naturaliter nihil possit intelligere, cum non sint ei praesto phantasmata ad quae convertatur.

Sum. Theol., I.q.89.a.1.,c.

The separated soul cannot understand by innate species, for it has no such species to which it can turn. As the separated soul no longer has sense imagination, it cannot understand by species abstracted. It cannot understand by species once abstracted and now preserved for in that case the soul of a child would understand nothing, for it has no preserved species. Nor can the soul be dependent on species infused by God, for that would not be of nature but of grace.

Sed non intelligit per species innatas, quia a principio est sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum; neque per species quas tunc abstrahat a rebus, quia non habet organa sensus et imaginationis, quibus mediantibus species intelligibiles abstrahuntur a rebus; neque etiam per species prius
abstractas et in anima conservatas, quia sic anima pueri nihil intelligeret post mortem; neque etiam per species intelligibiles divinitus influxas: haec enim cognitio non esset naturalis, de qua nunc agitur, sed gratiae. . .

Sum. Theol., I.q.89.a.1., obj.3.

St. Thomas further develops the fact that the separated soul cannot be dependent on species formerly abstracted and now preserved in the soul. Not only would the souls of children understand nothing after death, but adults would be unable to know anything more than they know on earth, which view cannot be accepted.

. . . species receptae prius, et conservatae non sufficiunt ad cognitionem quam necesse est ponere in anima separata, tum propter animas puerorum, tum propter hoc quod multa erunt cognita ab anima separata quae nunc non cognoscantur a nobis, ut poenae inferni, et alia huiusmodi.

De Ver. q.19.a.1., c.

St. Thomas offers a solution to the difficulty in the question of the knowledge of the separated soul by pointing out that each thing's mode of operation follows its mode of existence. Since the soul has one mode of existence when united to the body and another when separated from it, it follows that the soul has a different mode of operation when united to the body than when separated from it, the nature of the soul remaining the same. Thus when united to the body, the soul understands by turning to the phantasms which are supplied by means of bodily organs. When separated from the body, the soul understands by turning to things that are simply intelligible, that is, by participated species which the soul shares with the angels, though in a lesser degree. While these participated species arise from the Divine Light, it does not follow necessarily that this mode of understanding
is unnatural to the soul, for God is the author of the influx of the light of nature as well as the light of grace.

\[\text{... anima separata ... intelligit ... per species ex influentia divini luminis participata, quam anima fit particeps, sicut et aliae substantiae separatae, quamvis inferiori modo. Unde tam cito cessante conversione ad corpus, ad corpus, ad superiora convertitur. Nec tamen propter hoc cognitio vel potentia non est naturalis: quia Deus est auctor non solum influentiae gratuiti luminis, sed etiam naturalis.} \]

\[\text{Sum.Theol., I.q.89.a.1.ad Sum.}\]

Now to be united to the body is natural to the soul, while to be separated from it is contrary to the soul as form, as is said in the \textit{Summa Theologica}.

\[\text{Si enim animae naturale est corpori uniri, esse sine corpore est sibi contra naturam, et sine corpore existens non habet suae naturae perfectionem.} \]

\[\text{(I.q.118.a.3.)}\]

In another place it is said:

\[\text{Est igitur contra naturam animae absque corpore esse. Nihil autem quod est contra naturam, potest esse perpetuum.} \]

\[\text{Sum.Cont.Gent., IV.79.}\]

As form, it belongs to the very nature of the soul to be united to the body. Not being in itself a complete specific nature, the soul requires the body. Since, however, the soul is an intellectual principle, its highest and most proper operation is to understand.

\[\text{... intelligere est maxima et propria operatio animae.} \]

\[\text{De Anima. q.un.a.15}\]

For an intellectual substance, to exist is to know and will. Therefore, the soul will continue to know even when separated from the body. Because of the weakness of its intellectual power, the soul, unlike angels, receives
its most perfect knowledge by abstracting from the phantasm which exists in a corporeal organ. The separated soul, while able to carry on its proper operation, which is to know, will gather its knowledge by turning to objects which are simply intelligible. This mode of knowledge is beyond, but not contrary to, the nature of the soul. Thus:

- -modus operandi uniuscujusque rei sequitur modum essendi, cum unitur corpori, et cum fuerit a corpora separata, manente tamen eadem animae natura. - -Anima igitur secundum istum modum essendi quo corpori est unita, competit modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata corporum - - cum autem fuerit a corpore separata, competit ei modus intelligendi per conversionem ad ea quae sunt intelligibilia simpliciter, sicut et aliis substantiis a corpore separatis. Unde modus intelligendi per conversionem ad phantasmata est animae naturalis, sicut et corpori uniri; sed esse separatam a corpore est praeter rationem suae naturae; et simpliciter intelligere sine conversione ad phantasmata est ei praeter naturam. - -

Sum Theol., I q. 89 a 1 c.

A second difficulty arises here. Since it is better to understand by turning to the simple intelligible objects, and since nature is always directed towards the better, why does not the soul understand naturally by this mode? This difficulty can be answered by considering that although in itself it is better to understand by turning to the simple intelligible objects, for the soul this mode of understanding is less noble. This is because the soul is the lowest of intellectual substances and the farthest from the Divine Light through which the intellective power exists. In its principle this light is one and simple, but the more the creature departs from its first principle, the more the light is broken up, just as with light
rays diverging from the sun. God, by His one Essence, understands all; superior intellects understand through fewer and more universal forms than do inferior intellects. This is because of the greater efficacy of the intellectual power in the superior intellects. The human soul, which is on the horizon of the spiritual and material worlds, has the least intellectual power, and consequently is the least capable of embracing more universal forms. The soul must then get its most perfect knowledge through forms less capable of embracing many objects, that is, through forms abstracted from individual material things. It follows then, that for the human soul, knowledge acquired through universal forms would be vague and confused. A similar case is seen among men of different intellectual ability. Those who have better intellects understand through more universal forms; while those who have inferior intellects, in order to have perfect knowledge, must have each particular explained to them.

.. .in cognitivis aliquis qui est elevatioris intellectus, ex paucis principiis penes se retentis habet in promptu procedere ad varias conclusiones, ad quas pervenire non possunt qui sunt hebetioris ingenii nisi per varias inductiones, et per principia particulariter coaptata conclusionibus.

De Ver., q.8,a.10.,c.

St. Thomas states his argument thus:

Considerandum est igitur quod etsi intelligere per conversionem ad superiora sit simpliciter nobilior quam intelligere per conversionem ad phantasmata; tamen ille modus intelligendi, prout erat possiblemus animae, erat imperfectior. Quod sit patet: In omnibus enim substantiis intellectualibus inventur virtus intellectiva per influentiam divini luminis; quod quidem in primo principio est unum et simplex; et quanto magis creaturae intellectuales distant a
primo principio, tanto magis dividitur illud lumen.
et diversificatur, sicut accidit in lineis a centro
egridentibus. Et inde est quod Deus per unam suam
essentiam omnia intelligit. Superiores autem intel-
lectualium substantiarum etsi per plures formas
intelligent, tamen intelligunt per pauciores et magis
universales et virtuosiiores ad comprehensionem rerum,
propter efficaciam virtutis intellectivae quae est in
eis. In inferioribus autem sunt formas plures, et
minus universales, et minus efficaces ad comprehen-
sionem rerum, in quantum deficient a virtute intel-
lectiva superiorum. Si ergo inferiores substantiae
haberent formas in illa universalitate in qua habent
superiores, quia non sunt tantae efficaciae in intel-
ligendo, non acciperent per eas perfectam cognitionem
de rebus, sed in quadam communitate et confusione...  

Sum. Theol., I.q.89.a.l.c.

Since the difficulty of the question concerning the knowledge of the
separated soul arises from the very nature of the soul, in order to solve
the problem it will be necessary to consider the doctrine of St. Thomas on
the nature of the soul and its union with the body. It will then be clear
that the human soul, although incomplete in itself and requiring to be united
to the body, is yet a subsisting thing, and in virtue of this subsistence is
capable of existing without the body. But for the intellectual soul, to
exist is to know and will. Consequently, the separated soul will be able to
understand without reference to objects existing in corporeal organs. Diff-
iculties arise concerning the mode of operation proper to the separated
soul, but St. Thomas offers a solution to these.
CHAPTER I

In the doctrine of St. Thomas the human soul is an immaterial subsistent thing, the substantial form of the human body. It is the first principle of life in the body and therefore it cannot itself be a body: for to be a principle of life does not belong to a body as such, otherwise every body would be a principle of life. That any body is a living thing or a principle of life or of activity is due to a first principle of life which is not itself a body, but the act of a body. The eye is a principle of activity, but it is so only in virtue of the soul and when the body is no longer animated by the soul, the eye loses its power.

... anima dicitur esse primum principium vitae in his quae apud nos vivunt. ... Manifestum est enim quod esse principium vitae, vel vivens, non convenit corpori ex hoc quod est corpus: aliquin omne corpus esset vivens, aut principium vitae. Convenit igitur alicui corpori quod sit vivens, vel etiam principium vitae per hoc quod est tale corpus. Quod autem est actu tale habet hoc ab aliquo principio, quod dicitur actus ejus. Anima igitur quae est primum principium vitae, non est corpus sed corporis actus...

Sum Theol., I.q., 75.a.1.c.

Further, since the human soul is the principle of intellectual life and has its own proper activity which is not the activity of an organ, it must be not only incorporeal but also something subsistent, as St. Thomas says:

... necesse est dicere id quod est principium intellectualis operationis, quod dicimus animam hominis, esse quoddam principium incorporeum et subsistens...

Sum Theol., I.q., 75.a.2.c.
At the same time it belongs to the very nature of the soul to be united to the body.

...necesse est dicere, quod intellectus, qui est intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani corporis forma.

Sum.Theol., I.q.76.a.1.c.

Concerning the question of the subsistence of the human soul St. Thomas takes a middle course between two extremes; on the one hand that the soul is not a subsistent thing, and on the other that the soul is a complete specific nature in itself. He has to meet the objection that the human soul is not subsistent and this particular thing, and that the term, this particular thing, can be said only of that which is composed of soul and body. Thus it is objected:

Videtur quod anima humana non sit aliquid subsistens. Quod enim est subsistens, dicitur hoc aliquid. Anima autem non est hoc aliquid, sed compositum ex anima et corpore. Ergo anima non est aliquid subsistens.

Sum.Theol., I.q.75.a.2.ob.

The second opinion regarding the subsistence of the soul is that the soul is not only something subsistent but that it is in itself a complete specific nature. Plato is one St. Thomas has in mind as holding this opinion. Thus for both St. Thomas and Plato the soul is something subsistent, but the term, something subsistent, is not understood in the same sense by both philosophers.

According to St. Thomas' interpretation, Plato holds that the soul is not only something subsistent, which St. Thomas also holds, but that it is a complete specific nature, which St. Thomas does not admit. St. Thomas gives
the following as Plato's doctrine:

...posuit Plato quod anima humana non solum per se subsisteret, sed quod etiam haberet in se completam naturam speciei in anima esse, dicens hominem non esse aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, sed animam corpori adveniendam. ...

De Anima, q.un.a.1.

In order to make clear his own stand on the question of the subsistence of the human soul St. Thomas distinguishes between the two senses in which the term, this particular thing, may be taken. In one sense anything that is not an accident or a material form can be called this particular thing; while in the second sense only wholes are subsistent and those things which are parts of wholes are excluded. Thus, whiteness or the form of an apple cannot be called this particular thing in any sense, since neither has any existence apart from its subject. A hand can be called this particular thing in the first sense but not in the second, for a hand, even when separated from the body is a this something, yet it is but a part of the whole body. The soul likewise can be called this something in the first sense, but in the second only that which is composed of soul and body can be called this particular thing.

...hoc aliquid potest accipi dupliciter, uno modo pro quocumque subsistente, alio modo pro subsistenti completo in natura alicujus speciei. Primo modo excludit inhaerentiam accidentis, et formae materialis. Seundo modo excludit etiam imperfectionem partis. Unde manus posset dici hoc aliquid primo modo, sed non secundo modo; Sic igitur cum anima humana sit pars speciei humana, potest dici hoc aliquid primo modo, quasi subsistens, sed non secundo modo; sic enim compositum ex anima et corpore dicitur hoc aliquid.

Sum.Theol., I.q.75.a.2 ad lum.
In another place St. Thomas gives the following:

...unde etiam nec hoc aliquid dici potest si per hoc aliquid intelligatur hypostasis vel persona, vel individuum in genere aut specie collocatum. Sed si hoc aliquid dicatur omne quod potest per se subsistere, sic anima est hoc aliquid.

De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a.2.ad 16um.

In refuting those who hold that the human soul is not something subsistent St. Thomas first shows that the soul can neither be a body nor operate through a bodily organ, and that as the act of a body it must have an operation of its own, which operation belongs only to a self-subsisting thing. Since the soul is capable of knowing all material things, it can have no matter in its own nature. This is because the presence of any matter in the soul would impede the knowledge of all other things, just as to a man with fever all things taste bitter, being affected by the bitter humors of the tongue. Moreover, to know is not the act of any body. Since therefore the soul is an intellectual principle, it must have an operation in which the body has no part. Now in order to have an operation apart from the body, the soul must be something subsistent, as is clear from the following.

...impossibile est quod intelligat per organum corporeum, quia natura determinata illius organi corporei prohiberet cognitionem omnium corporum; sicut si aliquis determinatus color sit non solum in pupilla, sed etiam in vase vitreo, liquor infusus ejusdem coloris videtur.

Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium, quod dicitur mens, vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari nisi quod per se subsistit; non enim est operari nisi entis in actu. Unde eo modo aliquid operatur quo est; propter quod non dicimus quod calor calefacit, sed calidum. Relinquitur igitur
St. Thomas opposes the opinion that the human soul is not only something subsistent but that it possesses in itself a complete specific nature. For the soul, he says, is that through which the body has life, and since life is the existence of living things, it follows that it is through the soul that the body has its existence as a human body. Now that through which anything has existence is its form, therefore, the soul is the form of the body. Because the soul is the form of the body, it is through the soul that the body gets its species, that is, its existence as a human body. But if the soul were in the body as a sailor in a ship, it could not give the body or the parts of the body their species. The presence of the sailor does not give existence to the ship, nor does his absence deprive the ship of its species. The ship is still a ship whether the sailor is in it or not, and the sails are sails whether the sailor is furling or spreading them or not. But when the soul has left the body, the body is no longer a human body except equivocally, nor is the eye in the dead body a human eye except in an equivocal sense. Besides in this case death, which is the separation of soul and body, would not result in the substantial corruption of anything. Sailor and ship are still sailor and ship whether separated or not. Their union was accidental and their separation affects nothing substantial. Nothing remains then except to admit that the soul is a this something; not as if it had in itself a complete specific nature, but because as form of the body it perfects the nature of man. And so it is both a form and a
Nanifestum est enim id quo vivit corpus, animam esse; vivere autem est esse viventium: anima igitur est quo corpus humanum habet esse actu. Huiusmodi autem forma est. Est igitur anima humana corporis forma. Item si anima esset in corpore, sicut nauta in navi, non daret speciem corpori, neque partibus eius; cuius contrarium appareat ex hoc quod recedente anima, singulae partes non retinet pristinum nomen nisi aequivoce. Dicitur enim oculus mortui aequivoce oculus, sicut pictus, aut lapideus, et simile est de aliis partibus. Et praeterea si anima esset in corpore sicut nauta in navi, sequetur quod unio animae et corporis esset accidentalis. Mors igitur, quae inducit eorum separationem, non esset corruptio substantialis; quod patet esse falsum. Relinquitur igitur quod anima est hoc aliquid, ut per se subsistere, non quasi habens in se completam speciem, sed quasi perficiens speciem humanam ut forma corporis; et sic similiter est forma, et hoc aliquid.

De Anima, q.un.a.l.c.

St. Thomas' stand on the question of the subsistence of the human soul might be summed up as follows:

...anima humana non est hoc aliquid sicut substantia, completam speciam habens, sed sicut pars habentis speciem completam, ut ex dictis patet.

De Anima, q.un.a.l. ad 3um.

Since the soul is the form of the body, it cannot be said that man is a soul making use of a body, nor that the soul is man. The soul itself is not a complete species, but is a part of the human species, and matter, the body, is the other part of the species. St. Thomas interprets Plato as holding that the soul is man, and that the soul makes use of the body as man makes use of clothes.

...Plato posuit quod homo non sit aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore, sed quod ipsa anima utens corpore
sit homo; sicut Petrus non est aliquid compositum ex homine et indumento, sed homo utens indumento.


In meeting this opinion St. Thomas points out the two ways in which the statement, the soul is man, may be taken. He says that while man is a soul yet any particular man, as Socrates, is not a soul only but is composed of soul and body. Taken in the strict sense, that man is man only as this particular man, the soul cannot be called man. All natural things are made up of matter and form. Neither the matter nor the form possesses in itself a complete specific nature, and in man neither the body nor the soul alone can be called man. This is evident since the nature of anything can be known by its proper operation, for whatever performs the operations proper to a thing is itself proper to that thing. If then man were a soul all the operations of a man could be attributed to the soul alone, without reference to the body. Now some of the operations proper to man, such as feeling, cannot be attributed to the soul alone, but to the compositum, as is said:

...quaedam potentiae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad subjectum, ut intellectus et voluntas. ...Quaedam vero potentiae sunt in conjuncto sicut in subjecto, sicut omnes potentiae sensitivae partis et nutritivae.

*Sum. Theol.*, I.q.77.a.8.c.

It must then be admitted that the soul is not man, but what is composed of soul and body is man.

...quod animam esse hominem dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo, quod homo sit anima, sed hic homo non sit anima, sed compositum ex anima et corpore, ...Alio vero modo potest intelligi sic quod etiam haec anima sit hic homo; et hoc quidem sustinere posset, si poneretur quod animas sensitivae operatio esset ejus propria sine corpore: quia omnes operationes quae attribuuntur homini,
convenirent soli animae. Illud autem est unaquaeque res quod operatur operationes illius rei; unde illud est homo quod operatur operationes hominis. ...sentire non est operatio animae tantum. Cum igitur sentire sit quaedam operatio hominis, licet non propria, manifestum est quod homo non est anima tantum, sed aliquid compositum ex anima et corpore.

Plato vero ponens sentire esse proprium animae, ponere potuit quod homo esset anima utens corpore. 

Sum. Theol., I. q. 75. a. 4. c.

Since then the soul is not itself a complete specific nature but needs the body to complete it, and since matter exists for the sake of form, it is necessary to seek in the soul itself the reason why it is united to the body. Now the perfection of the soul consists in the knowledge of truth, which truth it attains through the intellect; but the soul is so constituted that it must be united to the body and thus receive knowledge of sensible things from the things themselves. Experience proves that the soul understands by turning to the phantasms which are supplied by the body. Thus for its own sake the soul must be united to the body.

Ultima perfectio animae humanae consistet in cognitione veritatis, quae est per intellectum. Ad hoc autem quod perficiatur anima in cognitione veritatis, indiget uniri corpori: quia intelligit per phantasmata, quae non sunt sine corpore. Ergo necesse est ut anima corpori uniatur ut forma, et sit hoc aliquid.

De Anima, q.un.a.l.c.

The human soul is the lowest among the intellectual substances and is not naturally gifted with the knowledge of truth as are the angels; therefore the human intellect must gather its knowledge from material things. In order to do this the human soul must have not only the power of understanding but also the power of feeling. This power of feeling is exercised in the
action of the senses, and cannot be performed without a bodily organ. It is
evident that a man deprived of one sense has no knowledge of the proper ob-
ject of that sense; for example, a man born blind has no idea of color.
Such would not be the case were the soul able to understand without turning
to the phantasm. It is clear then that the soul, for its own sake, must be
united to a body that can serve as an organ of sense.

...cum materia sit propter formam, et non e converso;
ex parte animae oportet accipere rationem, quae debeat
esse corpus cui unitur; ... dicitur quod anima non solum
est corporis forma et motor, sed etiam finis. ... manifestum
(est) quod ideo naturale est animae humanae corpori uniri,
quia cum sit infima in ordine rerum sensibilium; non habet
anima humana intelligibiles species sibi naturaliter in-
ditas, quibus in operationem propriam exire possit, quae
est intelligere, sicut habent superiores substantiae intel-
lectuales; sed est in potentia ad eas, cum sit sicut tabula
rasa, in qua nihil est scriptum, ut dicitur. ... Unde oportet
quod species intelligibiles a rebus exterioribus accipiat
mediantibus potentiiis sensitivis, quae sine corporeis or-
ganis operationes proprias habere non possunt. Unde et
anima humana neesse est corpori uniri. Si ergo propter hoc
anima humana unibilis est corpori, quia indiget accipere
species intelligibiles a rebus mediantane sensu; necessarium
est quod corpus, cui anima rationis unitur, tale sit ut
possit esse aptissimum ad representaendum intellectui
species sensibiles, ex quibus in intellectu intel-
ligibiles species resultant. ...

De Anima, q'un.a.8.c.

It does not follow from this that the soul needs the body in the sense that
it operates through a material organ, but rather, the body supplies the
material with which the soul works.

... corpus requiritur ad actionem intellectus, non
sicut organum quo talis actio exerceatur, sed ratione
objecti; phantasmata enim comparatur ad intellectum sicut
color ad visum. Sic autem indigere corpore non removet
intellectum esse subsistentem; aliqvin animal non esset
aliquid subsistens, cum indigeat exterioribus sensibi-
It is necessary then that the soul be united in some way to the body. Not can this union be an accidental one, for in that case man would not be one substantially, but only accidentally, and consequently neither understanding nor feeling could be attributed to man properly, for understanding is not proper to bodies, nor feeling to intellectual substances.

\[ \text{Quodl., a.7a.9.} \]

It remains, then, to consider the nature of this union.

St. Thomas maintains that man is differentiated from other beings of the animal genus by his rationality, which he has in virtue of his intellectual principle. Since difference is derived from form, it follows that the intellectual principle is the form of man. He says:

\[ \text{De Anima, q.un.a.l.c.} \]

And in another place:

\[ \text{Sum.Theol., I.q.76.a.l.c.} \]
Moreover the soul is the first thing by which the body lives, because it is
the first principle of all man's acts, as feeling, local motion, etc. Since
anything acts in virtue of its form, the intellectual soul must be united to
the body as its form. Thus:

\[ \text{necesse est dicere, quod intellectus, qui est}
\text{intellectualis operationis principium, sit humani}
\text{corporis forma. Illud enim quo primo aliquid}
\text{operatur, est forma ejus cui operatio attribuitur;}
\text{sicut quo primo sanatur corpus, est sanitas, et quo}
\text{primo scit anima, est scientia; unde sanitas est forma}
\text{corporis, et scientia est forma quodammodo animae. Et}
\text{hujus ratio est, quia nihil agit nisi secundum quod}
\text{est actu. Unde quo aliquid est actu, eo agit. Mani-
\text{festum est autem quod primum quo corpus vivit, est}
\text{anima. Et cum vita manifestetur secundum diversas}
\text{operationes in diversis gradibus viventium, id quo}
\text{primo operamur unumquodque horum operum vitae, est}
\text{anima. Anima enim est primum quo nutrimur, et sentimus,}
\text{et movemur secundum locum, et similiter quo primo intel-
\text{ligimus. Hoc ergo principium quo primo intelligimus,}
\text{sive dicatur intellectus, sive anima intellectiva, est}
\text{forma corporis.} \]

\text{Sum.Theol., I.q.76.a.l.c.}

In this doctrine St. Thomas has to meet the objection that the human
soul cannot be united to the body as form, for such a union would imply that
the intellect has a determinate nautre, and would therefore be unable to
know all things, which is contrary to the nature of the soul. Any power or
faculty exercised through a corporeal organ is limited; as sight is exer-
cised through an organ, the eye, and the object of sight is necessarily
limited to color. Moreover, any matter in the soul would impede the know-
ledge of all other things, as is the case when liquid placed in a colored
glass appears to be colored. The objection is true in its conclusions, but
it does not affect the question at hand. Although the soul is united to the body as form, this union does not affect the proper operation of the soul. The act of understanding itself, is in no way exercised through the body.

St. Thomas says:

... anima sit forma corporis secundum essentiam animae intellectualis, non tamen secundum operationem intellectualem.

De Anima, q.un.a.9.c.

While the soul requires the body and is united to it as form, yet the soul is not a purely material form, submersed in matter, as are non-intellectual forms.

Non autem oportet substantiam intellectualis esse formam materialem, quamvis esse ejus sit in materia,

... non enim est in materia sicut materia immersa, vel a materia totaliter comprehensa, sed alio modo...


St. Thomas answers the objection in the following manner:

... virtus intellectualis non est virtus alicujus organi corporalis, sicut virtus visiva est oculi: intelligere enim est actus qui non potest exercari per organum corporale, sicut exercetur visio. Sed in materia est, in quantum ipsa anima, cujus est haec virtus, est corporis forma.

Sufficit enim ad hoc quod homo possit intelligere omnia per intellectum, et ad hoc quod intellectus intelligat omnia immaterialia, et universalia, quod virtus intellectualis non est corporis actus.

Sum.Theol., I.q.76.a.1.ad l.

It might seem that as the human soul and body are not of the same genus the soul could not be united to the body as its form, the soul being in the genus of incorporeal substances and the body corporeal. It must be remembered that matter and form make up one thing; now if the soul is the form of
the body, the result will be one substantial thing, the composite, man.

Neither the soul, although a subsistent thing, nor the body, is in itself a complete specific nature. Each requires the other; the body must be actualized by the soul, and the soul, as form, must animate a body suited to it. Diversity of genus in no way impedes this union, and it is only in virtue of this union that one can speak of species or genus, for the soul gives to the body its species, and the body completes the specific nature of the soul.

Averroës attempted to explain the union of soul and body through the intelligible species, saying that as the intelligible species were in both the phantasm and the passive intellect, they served as a link between the body, in which the phantasm is, and the passive intellect, which is in the soul. Although it is true that the intelligible species are in both soul and body as was said, yet this cannot serve as the union between soul and body, for it does not explain how the act of the intellect would be the act of the man. This will be seen when one considers that phantasms are to the intellect what colors are to the sense of sight, proper objects. Now the species of phantasms are in the passive intellect as the species of color are in the sight. The colors, images of which are in the sight, may be in a glass window, but we cannot say that the window sees. The window in which the colors are is merely seen. It follows then that the phantasms which
are in corporeal organs may be known by the intellect, but it does not follow that man knows; rather, he or his phantasms are known, as the colors in the glass were seen. St. Thomas answers Averröes in the following manner:

Hanc autem unionem Commentator ... dicit esse per speciem intelligibilem; quae quidem habet duplex subjectum, unum scilicet intellectum possibilem, et aliud ipsa phantasmata, quae sunt in organis corporeis. Et sic per speciem intelligibilem continuatur intellectus possibileis corporis hujus vel illius hominis. Sed ista continuatio vel unio non sufficit ad hoc quod actio intellectus sit actio Socratis. Et hoc patet per similitudinem in sensu, ex quo Aristoteles procedit ad considerandum ea quae sunt intellectus. Sic enim se habent phantasmata ad intellectum, ... sicut colores ad visum. Sicut ergo species colorum sunt in visu, ita species phantasmata sunt in intellectu possibili. Patet autem quod ex hoc quod colores sunt in pariete, quorum similitudines sunt in visu, actio visus non attribuitur parieti; non enim dicimus, quod paries videat, sed magis quod videatur. Ex hoc ergo quod species phantasmata sunt in intellectu possibili, non sequitur quod Socrates, in quo sunt phantasmata, intelligat; sed quod ipse, vel ejus phantasmata intelligantur.

Sum. Theol., I.q.76.a.1.c.

St. Thomas has to meet the objection that the soul is not the form of the body, but is united to the body as motor. This objection can easily be answered. A motor does not confer species on the thing moved. If, then, the soul be united to the body as motor the soul would give motion to the body, but would not give it species; therefore the separation of soul and body would not result in the corruption of the body. But the parts of the body, eyes, hands, etc., are such actually only in virtue of the soul. The soul cannot be united to the body as motor only.

Mobile non sortitur speciem a suo motore. Si igitur anima non coniungitur corpori nisi sicut motor mobili, corpus, et partes eius non consequuntur species ab anima. Abeunte igitur anima, remanebit corpus, et partes eiusdem speciei. Hoc autem est manifeste falso: nam caro,
et os, et manus, et huius modi partes, post abscessum animae non dicuntur nisi aequivoce, quam nulli harum partium propria operatio adsit, quae speciem consequitur. Non igitur unitur anima corpore solum sicut motor mobili...


Moreover the action of the motor can be attributed to the thing moved only as to an instrument, as the action of a carpenter to a saw. Understanding could then be attributed to Socrates only as to an instrument. This implies that one understands through a corporeal instrument, which cannot be accepted.

...actio motoris nunquam attribuitur moto nisi sicut instrumento, sicut actio carpentarii serrae. Si igitur intelligere attribuitur Socrati, quia est actio motoris ejus, sequitur quod attribuatur ei sicut instrumento; quod est contra Philosophum ... qui vult quod intelligere non sit per instrumentum corporeum.

Sum. Theol., I.q.76.a.1.ad 3um.

Again, the essence of man is composed of matter and form. The intellect is not the matter, therefore unless it be the form it is outside the essence of man. Then the intellect would be to the man as motor to the thing moved. Now the act of the intellect remains in the agent and does not pass into something else, as the action of heat, for example, passes into the thing heated. The act of understanding could not be attributed to man simply by reason of his being moved by his intellect, any more than the action of the motor can be attributed to the thing moved.

...cum Socrates sit quoddam individuum in natura, cujus essentia est una, composita ex materia et forma, si intellectus non sit forma eius sequitur quod sit praeter sentiam ejus; et sic intellectus comparabitur ad totum Socratem sicut motor ad motum. Intelligere autem est actio quiescens in agente, non autem transiens in alterum, sicut calefactio. Non ergo intelligere potest attribui Socrati propter hoc quod est motus ab intellectu.

Sum. Theol., I.q.76.a.1.
If the intellect be united to Socrates as motor, that is, as a part of Socrates in the sense that a hand is a part, the action of the intellect cannot be attributed to Socrates. Although we can attribute the action of a part to the whole, as the action of the eye to man, yet we cannot attribute the action of one part to any other part, strictly speaking. Thus, we do not say the hand sees because the eye sees. Therefore we cannot say Socrates understands because the intellect understands.

...actio partis attribuitur toti, ut actio oculi homini; numquam tamen attribuitur alii parti, nisi forté per accidens; non enim dicimus, quod manus videat, propter hoc quod oculus videt. Si ergo ex intellectu, et Socrate sit unum, actio intellectus non potest attribui Socrati. Si vero Socrates est totum, quod componitur ex unione intellectus ad reliqua quae sunt Socrates, et tamen intellectus non unitur aliis quae sunt Socrates nisi sicut motor; sequitur quod Socrates non sit unum simpliciter, et per consequens nec ens simpliciter, sic enim aliquid est ens, quo modo et unum.

Sum.Theol., I.q.76.a.1.c.

St. Thomas holds that the intellectual principle is the form of man and for this reason man understands. The proper operation of man as man is to understand, and in this he surpasses all other animals. A being derives its species from its form, and since its form is the principle of operation, it follows that the intellectual soul is the form of the body. Among forms we find some more, some less, noble. The higher the form the less it is merged in matter and wholly compassed by it. The form of a plant surpasses that of a metal and has an operation above that of a metal. The form, or soul, of an animal is superior to that of a plant, and surpasses the purely vegetative soul in its power of operation. The human soul is the highest of forms and
is more excellent than matter, having a power and operation in which matter has no share. This power is the intellect.

Relinquitur ergo solus modus quem Aristoteles ponit. . . quod hic homo intelligit, quia principium intellectivum est forma ipsius. Sic ergo ex ipsa operatione intellectus apparat quod intellectivum principium unitur corpori ut forma.

Potest etiam idem manifestari ex ratione speciei humanae. Natura enim uniuscujusque rei ex ejus operatione ostenditur. Propria autem operatio hominis, in quantum est homo, est intelligere; per hanc enim omnia alia animalia transscendit . . . in hac operatione, sicut in propria hominis, ultimam felicitatem constituit. Oportet ergo quod homo secundum illud speciem sortiatur quod est hujus operationis principium. Sortitur autem unumquodque speciem per per propriam formam. Relinquitur ergo quod intellectivum principium sit propria hominis forma.

Sed considerandum est, quod quanto . . . forma est nobilior, tanto magis dominatur materiae corporali, et minus ei immergitur, et magis sua operatione, vel virtute excedit eam; unde videmus quod forma mixti corporis habet aliam operationem, quae non causatur ex qualitatibus elementaribus. Et quanto magis proceditur in nobilitate formarum, tanto magis invenitur virtus formae materiam elementarem excedere, sicut anima vegetabilis plus quam forma elementaris, et anima sensibilis plus quam anima vegetabilis. Anima autem humana est ultima in nobilitate formarum. Unde in tantum sua virtute excedit materiam corporalem, quod habet aliquam operationem et virtutem in qua nullo modo communicat materia corporalis, et haec virtus dicitur intellectus.

\[\text{Sum. Theol., I.q.76.a.1.c.}\]

The objection has been raised that it is unfitting that the immaterial, intellectual soul be united to the material body as form, since matter is proportionate to the form.

. . . non enim forma est propter materiam, sed materia propter formam.

\[\text{De Malo, q.5.a.5.c.}\]
To answer this difficulty it must be remembered that in the intellectual order the intellectual soul holds the same place that prime matter holds in the material order, that is, the lowest in its sphere. Prime matter is potentiality; it has a capacity to receive forms. The soul likewise is capable of receiving forms. Knowledge is a form of the soul, and the soul is not naturally gifted with species necessary for its proper operation, which is to understand. The intellect is analogous to uninformed matter, or to a tablet on which nothing is written. In order to be informed the soul must abstract intelligible species from exterior things, which operation presupposes the action of the sensitive power. Now this sensitive power cannot exist without corporeal organs. Therefore, it is necessary for the immaterial soul to be united to a body most suited to its needs, that is, provided with various organs. St. Thomas makes this clear:

Est . . . manifestum, quod ideo naturale est animae humanae corpori uniri, quia cum sit infima in ordine intellectualium substantiarum, sicut materia prima est infima in ordine rerum sensibilium; non habet anima humana intelligibilem species sibi naturaliter inditas, quibus in operationem proprium exire possit, quae est intelligere, sicut habent superiores substantiae intellectuales; sed est in potentia ad eas, cum sit sicut tabula rasa, in qua nihil est scriptum. . . Unde oportet quod species intelligibiles a rebus exterioribus accipiat mediantibus potentiis sensitivis, quae sine corporeis organis operationes proprias habere non possunt. Unde et animam humanam necesse est corpori uniri. Si ergo propter hoc anima humana unibilis est corpori, quia indiget accipere species intelligibiles a rebus medianti sensu; necessarium est quod corpus cui anima rationalis unitur, tale sit ut possit esse aptissimum ad repraesentandum intellectui species sensibiles, ex quibus in intellectu intelligibiles species resultent. Sic ergo oportet corpus cui anima rationalis unitur, esse optime dispositum ad sentiendum. Sed cum plures sint sensus, unus tamen est qui est fundamentum aliorum, scilicet
tactus, in quo principaliter tota natura sensitiva consistit... Cum igitur corpus cui anima rationalis unitur, debeat esse optime dispositum ad naturam sensitivam necessarium est ut habeat convenientissimum organum sensus tactus... Corpus cui anima rationalis unitur, cum debeat esse convenientissimum ad sensum tactus, oportet quod sit maxime reductum ad medium per aequalitatem complexionis.

De Anima, q.un.a.8.c.

St. Thomas answers a second objection, that the intellectual soul, as the highest of forms, should not be united to a corruptible body. He recalls the definition of a soul, the first act of a natural organic body having life potentially.

...anima est actus primus corporis physici organici potentia vitam habentis.

Sum Theol., I.q.76.a.5.c.

As act or form the soul must be united to a corporeal body. In any matter two conditions are to be found, one which is chosen as suitable to a particular form, and another which is inherent in the matter itself. For example, a saw must be made of hard matter in order that its proper function, cutting, may be carried on. Consequently, a workman chooses iron as the most fitting material for a saw. Iron, by its nature, is subject to decay. That the iron will rust in no way implies that it is unsuitable material for a saw. Now the proper operation of the intellectual soul is to gather its knowledge from individual, material things. In order to do this the soul must have not only the power of understanding, but also the power of feeling. Since feeling is proper to organic bodies capable of being animated, the soul must be united to such a body. All matter is by its nature subject to corruption. Thus the human soul should be united to the body because the body is poten-
tially sentient. The fact that the body is corruptible does not affect the
suitability of such a union, any more than the corruptibility of the iron
made it unsuitable material for a saw.

\[\text{id quod consequitur materiam, dupliciter accipi potest; uno modo secundum quod congruit formae; et hoc est quod agens eligit in materia; alio modo non secundum quod congruit formae, immo forte repugnat etiam formae et fini, sed est ex necessitate materiae; et talis conditio non est electa vel intenta ab agente; sicut artifex qui facit serram ad secandum, quaerit ferrum, quia est materia apta ad formam serrae et ad finem ejus propter suam duritiem. Invenitur tamen in ferro aliqua conditio secundum quam ferrum non habet aptitudinem nec ad formam nec ad finem, sicut quod est frangibile vel contrahens rubiginem vel aliquid huiusmodi, quae sunt impeditiva finis; unde non sunt electa ab agente, sed magis ab agente repudiarentur, si esset possibile. \] 

\[
\text{Sic ergo homini est aliquid naturale secundum suam formam, ut intelligere, velle et alia hujusmodi; aliqua vero sunt ei naturalia secundum suam materiam, quod est corpus. Corporis autem humani conditio dupliciter considerari potest; uno modo secundum aptitudinem ad formam; alio modo secundum id quod consequitur in ipso secundum necessitatem materiae tantum. Secundum aptitudinem quidem ad formam, necessarium est corpus humanum esse ex elementis compositum, et medie complexionatum. Cum enim anima humana sit intellectiva in potentia, unitur corpore ut per sensus accipiat species intelligibiles, quibus fit intelligens actu. \] 

\[
\text{Autem sequitur ex necessitate materiae quod sit corruptibile, secundum hanc conditionem non habet aptitudinem ad formam, sed magis repugnantiam ad formam. Et quidem omnis corruptio cujuscumque rei naturalis, non est secundum convenientiam ad formam.} \]

De Malo, q.5.a.5.c.
CHAPTER II

Since the soul is united to the body in order that it may carry on its proper operation naturally, it might be well to consider the mode of this operation before considering the soul's mode of operation when separated from the body. With regard to the objects of the soul's knowledge St. Thomas holds that the soul knows corporeal things which are beneath it, itself and the things contained in itself, and immaterial substances above it. With regard to the first group, material things, St. Thomas maintains that the soul knows them through the intellect. He thus opposes mere sensism, phenomenalism, and scepticism regarding the exterior world.

Early philosophers knew only material things and held the material alone to be real. These philosophers, as Heraclitus and Empedocles, observing that bodies are in a state of perpetual flux taught that certain knowledge of their nature is impossible. One cannot know the nature of a thing that is perpetually changing. Plato, St. Thomas says, agreed that things of sense are constantly changing, but he wished to avoid the error that certitude regarding the nature of things is impossible. In order to do this he built up his doctrine of ideas. While admitting the constant change in things he maintained that singular, sensible things are what they are in virtue of their participation in another genus of beings, separated from matter and movement and consequently from change. These beings, separate
from material conditions, he called species or ideas. The soul, he taught, does not understand material things themselves, but rather, it understands the separate ideas or species of these things. For him the material world was unreal and not the object of true knowledge. St. Thomas rejects such a doctrine on the grounds that since the species or ideas are apart from time and motion, any knowledge of movement is excluded, and such knowledge is proper to physics. He likewise says that simply because one has a knowledge of the separate species or ideas it does not follow that one can form a judgement concerning sensible things. Plato's error was the result of his believing that the form of the thing known had necessarily to be in the knower and in the things known in the same manner or mode. He went beyond the earlier philosophers in recognizing the immaterial, and observing the immateriality, universality and immobility of the form of the thing known as it is present in the intellect, he concluded that the things themselves must have an existence free from matter and change. This is not necessary however, for a thing received in a subject is present in that subject according to the mode of the subject, not according to the mode of the thing received. Even in sensible things this is seen, for, as St. Thomas points out, whiteness can be in one thing in a greater degree of intensity than in another, according to the capacity of the receiver. Likewise the form of a thing can be present in its subject under the conditions of materiality, changeability, and individuality. The form of an apple is present in the apple under such conditions because of the nature of matter. But that same
form is present in the intellect in a different mode because the intellect is immaterial. Thus:

.. .Forma autem hujusmodi potest considerari dupliciter: uno modo secundum esse quod habet in cognoscente; alio modo secundum respectum quem habet ad rem cuius est similitudo. Secundum quidem primum respectum facit cognoscentem actu cognoscere; sed secundum respectum determinat cognitionem ad aliquod cognoscibile determinatum. Et ideo modus cognoscendi rem aliquam, est secundum conditionem cognoscentis, in quo forma recipitur secundum modum eius. Non autem oportet quod res cognita sit secundum modum cognoscentis, vel secundum modum illum quo forma, quae est cognoscendi principium, esse habet in cognoscente: unde nihil prohibet per formas quae in mente immaterialiter existunt, res materiales cognosci.

De Ver. q.10.a.4.c.

St. Thomas refutes Plato’s doctrine as follows:

Videtur autem in hoc Plato deviare a veritate; quia cum aestimaret omnem cognitionem per modum alicujus similitudinis esse, credidit quod forma cogniti ex necessitate sit in cognoscente, eo modo quo est in cogito. Consideravit autem, quod forma rei intellectae est in intellectu universaliter, et immaterialiter, et immobiliiter; quod ex ipsa operatione intellectus apparat, qui intelligit universaliter, et per modum necessitatis cujusdam. Modus enim actionis est secundum modum formae agentis. Et ideo existimavit quod oporteret res intellectas hoc modo in seipsis subsistere, scilicet immaterialiter et immobiliiter. Hoc autem necessarium non est; quia etiam in ipsis sensibilibus videmus, quod forma alio modo est in uno sensibilium quam in altero; puta cum in uno est albedo intensior, in alio remissior; et cum in uno est albedo cum dulcedine, in alio sine dulcedine. Et per hunc etiam modum forma sensibilis alio modo est in re, quae est extra animam, et alio modo in sensu, qui suscipit formas sensibilium absque materia, sicut colorem auri sine auro. Et similiter intellectus species corporum, quae sunt materiales et mobiles, recipit immaterialiter et immobiliiter secundum modum suum; nam receptum est in recipient per modum recipientis.

Dicendum est ergo quod anima per intellectum cog-
noscit corpora cognitione immateriali, universali et necessaria.

Sum. Theol., I.q.84.a.1.c.

In maintaining that the soul knows material things through the intellect and not through its own essence, St. Thomas is opposing the crude application of the maxim: Like is known by like, as it is found in Empedocles. Empedocles and the early philosophers taught that, as like is known by like, the soul, in order to know all material things, had to have the same nature common to all. Therefore, they taught that the soul is composed of the four elements and that it knows fire because it has fire in its make-up, earth because of earth and so on. All the soul's knowledge would thus be material and there would be no distinction between sense and intellect.

St. Thomas points out that if the assertion, like is known by like, be taken in this sense, and the soul knows fire because of the fire in its own make-up it follows that fire outside the soul should know fire, which is ridiculous. Moreover, it is not the matter, but the form, which makes a particular thing to be what it is. It would then be necessary that not the matter only, but also the form of each individual thing be in the soul. Thus the soul would have to be not only earth, fire, etc., but also bones, flesh, and all things. This cannot be admitted. These early philosophers failed to distinguish between the material and the immaterial and between sense knowledge and intellectual knowledge. In the doctrine of St. Thomas materiality and intellectuality are in inverse ratio. Thus things which are wholly material, immersed, as it were, in matter and entirely compassed by it, are incapable of receiving any form but their own. A stone is a stone.
and nothing more. While remaining a stone, it has no potentiality with regard to other forms and consequently can have no knowledge. Beings which are provided with senses are capable of receiving forms other than their own while they retain their own form, and consequently have sense knowledge. But because the senses operate through corporeal organs the objects of sense knowledge are necessarily limited. Vision is exercised through an organ, the eye; and the eye is capable of receiving only the form of color. Moreover, the senses receive forms materially, and not just subject to material conditions. The intellect on the other hand, is immaterial and because it does not operate through a material organ, it is not subject to the limitations that affect the senses and consequently is capable of receiving the forms of all things. It is a capacity, a blank sheet on which anything is written. It is not limited by matter and receives the forms of things immaterially, although subject to material conditions. St. Thomas agrees with the early philosophers that for the intellect to know all things through its essence it would be necessary that all things be in its essence actually. He disagrees with their application of the doctrine. The intellectual soul does not actually contain the forms of all things. It is potentially all things in as much as it is capable of receiving the forms of all sensible things in virtue of the sense and of intelligible things in virtue of the intellect. It is proper to God alone that His Essence should comprise all things immaterially and He alone, therefore, understands all things through His Essence.
Relinquitur ergo quod oportet materialia cognita in cognoscente existere, non materialiter, sed magis immaterialiter. Et hujus ratio est, quia actus cognitionis se extendit ad ea quae sunt extra cognoscentem. Cognoscimus enim etiam ea quae extra nos sunt. Per materiam autem determinatur forma rei ad aliquid unum. Unde manifestum est quod ratio cognitionis ex opposito sed habet ad rationem materialitis. Et ideo quae non recipiunt formas nisi materialiter, nullo modo sunt cognoscitiva, sicut plantae. Quanto autem aliquid immaterialius habet formam rei cognitae, tanto perfectus cognoscit. Unde et intellectus, qui abstrahit speciem non solum a materia, sed etiam a materialibus conditionibus individuantibus, perfectius cognoscit quam sensus, qui accipit formam rei cognitae sine materia quidem, sed cum materialibus conditionibus. Et inter ipsos sensus visus est magis cognoscitiva, quia est minus materialis. Et inter ipsos intellectus tanto quilibet est perfectior, quanto immaterialior.

Ex his ergo patet quod si aliquis intellectus est qui per essentiam suam cognoscit omnia, oportet quod essentia ejus habeat in se immaterialiter omnia; sicut antiqui posuerunt essentiam animae actu componi ex principiis omnium materialium, ut cognosceret omnia. Hoc autem est proprium Dei, ut ejus Essentia sit immaterialiter comprehensiva omnium, prout effectus virtute praexistent in causa. Solus igitur Deus per essentiam suam omnia intelligit; non autem anima humana, neque etiam angelus.

Sum. Theol., I.q.34.a.2.c.

The immaterial presence of the corporeal thing in the intellect is what St. Thomas calls the species. The question then arises, Whence is this species? Is it innate? If not, in what manner does the soul acquire it?

St. Thomas rejects the doctrine that the soul knows through innate species. Just as the senses gather knowledge through sensible things, and the imagination receives its material from the senses, so the intellect gets its knowledge through the phantasm. This phantasm is not innate but is sup-
plied by means of the corporeal organs.

\[ \ldots \text{videtur esse tota philosophorum doctrina, quae sensus a sensibilibus, imaginationem a sensu, intellectum a phantasmatis accipere fatetur.} \]

\textit{Quodl.}, 8.q.2.a.3.c.

The objection has been raised that, since men and angels have understanding in common, the intellectual soul, like the separate substances should understand through innate species. St. Thomas answers, saying that while men and angels have understanding in common, men have not the same perfection of intelligence as the angels, just as lower grades of bodies, which merely exist, have not the same degree of perfection as higher bodies. Or again, just as a weaker eye is blinded by intense light in which a stronger eye sees clearly, so the intellectual soul would be blinded, as it were, by species proper to a higher intelligence.

Plato held that man's intellect is filled with intelligible species, and that, man has forgotten his natural knowledge of all things because of his union with the body. St. Thomas refuses to accept such a doctrine on the grounds that, first, things naturally known are not forgotten, and secondly, that those deprived of the use of a sense are found to be without knowledge of the things that sense could perceive. The blind man has no idea of color. This would not be true if man had an innate idea of all things.

\[ \ldots \text{sed hoc non videtur convenienter dictum, primo quidem quia si habet anima naturalem notitiam omnium, non videtur esse possibile quod hujus naturalis notitiae tantam oblivionem capiat, quod nesciat se hujusmodi scientiam habere. Nullus enim homo obliviscitur} \]
Plato held that the forms of material things subsisted by themselves without matter, and are participated in both by our intellect, with the result that the intellect has knowledge of the thing participated in; and by corporeal matter to the effect of existence. According to St. Thomas' interpretation, Plato likewise held that these participated ideas remain immovably in the soul, and it is these separate ideas, not sensible things, that cause our knowledge. The sensible objects merely rouse the soul to consider what it had knowledge of from the beginning. This doctrine makes learning to be a kind of remembering or recalling.

...posuit Plato enim quod sensibilia non sunt disponeuntia animam ad recepiendum influentiam formarum, sed solum expergescentia intellectum ad considerandum ea quorum scientiam habebat ab exteriori causatum. Ponebat enim quod a principio a formis separatis causabatur scientia in animabus nostris omnium scibilium; unde addiscere dixit esse quoddam reminisci...  

Plato, in trying to avoid the error that certitude is impossible, developed a doctrine in which it is impossible to account for the union of soul
and body. If the soul knows by innate species, it has no need of turning to
the phantasm, and consequently has no need of union with the body. St.
Thomas rejects the doctrine on this very point, for it goes back to the idea
that the union of soul and body is not for the good of the soul, but for the
good of the body alone; form, that is, exists for the sake of matter.

Unusquisque bene judicat quae cognoscit, et horum
est optimus judex... Sed... per mentem ista
inferiora judicantur. Ergo haec inferiora materi-
alia per mentem intelliguntur.

Per sensum non cognoscimus nisi materialia. Sed
cognitio mentis a sensu oritur. Ergo et mens naturales
res cognoscit.

De Ver., q.10.a.4.c.

St. Thomas opposes any theory of innate ideas in the following passage:

Sed secundum hanc positionem sufficiens ratio
assignari non posset, quare anima nostra corpori
uniretur. Non enim potest dici, quod anima intel-
lectiva corpori uniat propter corpus; quia nec
forma est propter materiam, nec motor propter
mobile, sed potius e converso. Maxime autem
videtur corpus esse necessarium animae intellecti-
vae ad ejus propriae operationem, quae est intel-
ligere; quia secundum esse suum a corpore non de-
pendet... Si autem dicatur, quod indiget anima
nostra sensibus ad intelligendum, quibus quodam
modo excitetur ad consideranda ea quorum species
intelligibiles a principiis separatus recipit, hoc
non videtur sufficere; quia hujusmodi excitatio non
videtur necessaria animae, nisi in quantum est con-
sopita (secundum Platonicos) quodam modo, et ob-
liviosa propter unionem ad corpus; et sic sensus non
proficerent animae intellectivae, nisi ad tollendum
impedimentum quod animae provenit ex corporis unione.

Sum.Theol., I.q.84.a.4.c.

He concludes:

Unde dicendum est, quod species intelligibiles, quibus
anima nostra intelligit, non effluunt a formis separatis.

St. Augustine, who was imbued with Platonic doctrines, took up this point of Plato's teaching, namely that the intelligible species by which our soul understands are derived from separate forms. He did not accept Plato's doctrine that the forms of things exist per se, in a world apart. He substituted, as St. Thomas points out, the eternal types of all things existing in the Divine mind.

Sunt namque ideae principals formae quaedam, vel rationes rerum stables atque incommutables, quae ipsae formatae non sunt, ac per hoc aeternae ac semper eodem modo sese habentes, quae in divina intelligantia continentur. Et cum ipsae neque oriantur, neque intereant; secundum eas tamen formari dicitur omne quod oriri et interire potest, et omne quod oritur et interit. Anima vero negatur eas intueri posse, nisi rationalis, ea sui parte qua excellit, idest ipsa mente atque ratione, quasi quadam facie vel oculo suo interiore atque intelligibili. Et ea quidem ipsa rationalis anima non omnis et quaelibet, sed quae sancta et pura fuerit, haec asservit illi visioni esse idonea: id est, quae illum ipsum oculum quo videntur ista, sanum, et sincerum, et serenum, et similem his rebus quasi videre intendit, habuerit. Quis autem religiosus et vera religione imbutus, quamvis nondum possit haec intueri, negare tamen audeat, imo non etiam profiteatur, omnia quae sunt, id est, quae cumque in suo genere propria quadam natura continentur, ut sint, Deo auctore esse procreata, eoque auctore omnia quae vivunt vivere, atque universalem rerum incolimitatem, ordinemque ipsum quo ea quae mutantur, suos temporales cursus certo moderamine celebrant, summi Dei legibus contineri et gubernari? Quo constituto atque concesso, quis audeat dicere Deum irrationabiliter omnia condidisse? Quod si, recte dici vel credi non potest, restat ut omnia ratione sint condita. Nec eadem ratione homo, qua equus: hoc enim absurdum est existimare. Singula igitur propriis sunt creata rationibus. Has autem
Thus, while Plato held that matter becomes a stone by participating in
the idea stone, and by participating in the same idea our intellect has
knowledge of a stone, St. Augustine held that all things are made in accord-
ance with the eternal types existing in the mind of God, and the intellectual
soul knows these things in the types. St. Thomas accepts the doctrine of
St. Augustine, but he states clearly that it is not at all the same as
Plato's theory. Plato apparently held that mere participation in the idea
resulted in knowledge, but St. Thomas holds that not only the intellectual
light within us but intelligible species derived from things themselves are
required in order that we may have knowledge of material things. Just as
in the physical order there must not only be light but there must also be
colored objects for the eye to see, so too in the intellectual order there
must be intelligible species.

The intellect knows material things, but there are two ways in which
one thing is said to be known in another. Firstly, a thing may be known in
an object which is itself known. Thus in looking in a mirror one sees
images of things reflected therein. The things are known through the mirror.
In its present life the soul cannot know all things in the eternal types according to this mode. The reason is that in this life the soul does not see God in Whom the eternal types are. Secondly, one thing may be said to be known in another as in a principle of knowledge. In this sense one might say that we see in the sun what we see by the light of the sun. It is in this sense that the human soul knows all things in the eternal types. The intellectual light in us is a participated likeness of that uncreated light which contains the eternal types. By our participated likeness in the Divine light all things are made known to us, but this intellectual light is not sufficient that we may know material things. There must also be the intelligible species derived from the things themselves. Were the intellectual light alone sufficient for a knowledge of material things man could know, without research and investigation, the natures of material things, their origin and development. Such is not the case. Therefore, although man knows material things in the eternal types, he does not know them without the intelligible species abstracted from the things themselves.

...dicendum est quod aliquid in aliquo dicitur cognosci dupliciter. Uno modo sicut in objecto cognito, sicut aliquis videt in speculo ea quorum imaginem in speculo resultant; et hoc modo anima in statu praesentis vitae non potest videre omnia in rationibus aeternis; sed sic in rationibus aeternis cognoscunt omnia beati, qui Deum vident, et omnia in ipso.

Alio modo dicitur aliquid cognosci in aliquo sicut in cognitionis principio; sicut si dicamus quod in sole videntur ea quae videntur per solem; et sic necesse est dicere quod anima humana omnia cognoscat in rationibus aeternis, per quarum participationem omnia cognoscimus. Ipsum enim lumen intellectuale, quod est in nobis, nihil
Since the intelligible species are required that we might have knowledge of material things, the question arises whether intellectual knowledge, too, is derived from sensible things. St. Thomas takes a middle course between the doctrine that all knowledge is caused by impressions made on the senses by sensible objects, and that which maintains that the intellect is in no way dependent on the senses or sensible things for its knowledge, but receives its knowledge solely from separate intelligible forms or ideas.

Democritus, failing to distinguish between sense and intellect, held that all knowledge is effected by the impression made on the senses by sensible things, that is, by a discharge of images.

Democritus enim posuit quod nulla est alia causa cujuslibet nostrae cognitionis, nisi cum ab his corporibus quae cogitamus, veniunt, atque intrant imagines in animas nostras, ... Democritus posuit cognitionem fieri per idola et defluxiones ... quia tam ipse Democritus ... non ponebat intellectum differe a sensu. ...

This leaves no place for intellectual knowledge and cannot be accepted. Although it is true that our knowledge originates in the senses yet it can go far beyond mere sense knowledge.

... scientia nostra a sensu oritur.

Moreover, the immaterial could not affect the senses by a discharge of images, yet knowledge of the immaterial is proper to man. Therefore, were Democritus'
opinion correct, nature would have failed to provide man with means of acquiring the knowledge proper to him. This cannot be accepted.

Natura nihil . . . deficit in necessariis.

De Ver., q.10.a.6.

Plato held that the intellect is not dependent on the senses nor on sensible things, but rather, that it receives its knowledge from separate intelligible forms, or ideas. St. Thomas interprets him as holding that, not the sense, but only the sensible organs were affected by the sensible. According to Plato neither intellectual nor sensible knowledge proceed exclusively from sensible things. The sensible things merely rouse the sensible soul to the sentient act, and the senses rouse the intellect to the act of understanding, without in any way causing the intellectual act. Thus the sensibles merely cause the soul to recollect, as it were, knowledge which it possessed previously, and which had been dulled or forgotten because of the union with the body. St. Thomas rejects this doctrine likewise because it makes the union of soul and body to be at least useless, and nature does nothing in vain.

Natura nihil facit frustra . . .

De Ver., q.10.a.6.

St. Thomas gives Plato's doctrine as follows:

Plato . . . posuit intellectum differre a sensu, et intellectum quidem esse virtutem immaterialem organo corporeo non utentem in suo actu. Et quia incorporeum non potest immutari a corporeo, posuit quod cognitio intellectualis non fit per immutationem intellectus a sensibilibus, sed per participationem formarum intelligibilium separatarum, . . . Sensum etiam posuit virtutem quandam per se operantem. Unde nec ipse sensus, cum sit quaedam vis spiritualis, immutatur a sensibili-
accepting in part both the doctrine of democritus and plato, st. thomas agrees that the impression of the sensible on the sense causes the act of the sensitive part, not by a discharge from the sensible but by an operation of some sort. he agrees with plato that the impression produced by the sensible does not suffice to cause the intellectual operation, something nobler being required. but st. thomas does not accept plato's doctrine that the intellectual operation is caused merely by participation in the ideas. for st. thomas the nobler thing required is the acting intellect which makes the phantasm of the sensible thing intelligible in act by abstraction of the intelligible species. intellectual knowledge is then caused partly by the senses, for it is through the senses that the phantasms are provided, and these are the material with which the intellect works. however, intellectual knowledge is not caused wholly by sensitive knowledge and can far surpass sensible knowledge. thus:

secundum hoc ergo ex parte phantasmatum intellectualis operatio a sensu causatur. sed quia phantasmata non sufficiunt immutare intellectum possibilem, sed oportet quod fiant intelligibilia actu per intellectum agentem; non potest dici quod sensibilis cognitio sittotalis et perfecta causa intellectualis cognitionis, sed magis quodam modo est materia causae.

sum.theol., i.q.84.a.6.c.
And again:

...scientiam mentis nostrae partem ab intrinseco esse, partem ab extrinseco, non solum a rebus a materia separatis, sed etiam ab ipsis sensibilibus.

De Ver., q.10.a.6.c.

Since intellectual knowledge can surpass sensitive knowledge it might seem that the intellect can actually understand through the intelligible species without turning to the phantasms. St. Thomas holds, however, that there are two indications that the intellect, in order to understand actually, must turn to the phantasm. First, the intellect does not operate through a corporeal organ and therefore it would not be impeded or hindered in its act by the lesion of some bodily organ unless this act implies the operation of some power that does require a corporeal organ for its operation. In the case of lethargy a man is no longer able to understand things of which he formerly had knowledge. Memory requires the act of a corporeal organ, and the intellectual act obviously requires the memory since it is impeded in its operation when the memory fails. Now the phantasms of things known formerly are stored in the memory, so it follows that the intellect must turn to the phantasms in order to understand. Secondly, in attempting to understand something one makes use of examples from which he forms phantasms and thus examines, in a manner, the thing he desires to understand. Moreover, in order to understand incorporeal things of which there are no phantasms, one compares them with sensible things from which phantasms can be formed. The reason for this is that the proper object of the human intellect, which is united to the body, is a nature existing in individual, cor-
poreal matter, as, for example, this stone or this horse. Now the intellect cannot directly apprehend the individual as such; this is done through the senses and imagination. Therefore the intellect must turn to the material representation of the individual, that is, to the phantasm, in order to perceive the universal nature, stone or horse, existing in the individual. Plato, on the other hand, considered the proper object of the human intellect to be the natures of sensible things existing apart from material conditions.

In his doctrine there was no need of the phantasm.

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impossibile est intellectum nostrum secundum praesentis vitae statum quo passibili corpori conjungitur, aliquid intelligere in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata. Hus autem ratio est quia potentia cognoscitiva proportionatur cognoscibili. Unde intellectus Angeli, qui est totaliter a corpore separatus, objectum proprium est substantia intelligibilis a corpore separata; et per hujusmodi intelligibile materia cognoscit. Intellectus autem humani, qui est conjunctus corpori, proprium objectum est quidditas sive natura in materia corpori existens; et per rerum aliqualem cognitionem ascendit. De ratione autem hujus naturae est quod in aliquo individuo existat, quod non est absque materia corporali; sicut de ratione naturae lapidis est quod sit in hoc lapide, et de ratione naturae equi est quod sit in hoc equo, et sic de aliis. Unde natura lapidis, vel cujuscumque materialis rei, cognosci non potest complete et vere, nisi secundum quod cognoscitur ut in particulari existens. Particulari autem apprehendimus per sensum et imaginationem; et ideo necesse est ad hoc quod intellectus actu intelligat suum objectum proprium, quod convertat se ad phantasmata, ut speculetur naturam universalem in particulari existentem. Si autem proprium objectu, intellectus nostri esset forma separata, vel si formae rerum sensibilium subsisterent non in particularibus, secundum Platonicos, non oporteret quod intellectus noster semper intelligendo converteret se ad phantasmata.
Since the intellect must turn to the phantasm in order to understand, a suspension of the sensitive powers would hinder the judgment of the intellect. To understand this it is only necessary to recall that the proper object of the intellect is the nature of a sensible thing, as stone or horse, and in its present state whatever the intellect understands it knows by comparison to sensible things, as was said. The intellect itself cannot directly apprehend the individual, sensible thing. It knows sensible things through the senses which do directly apprehend the material thing. Consequently when the senses are suspended the intellect cannot know the nature of things and for this reason cannot form a perfect judgment of them. This is because the source of knowledge is cut off from the intellect and not because the act of judgment is exercised through a corporeal organ.

... judicium intellectus non dependet a sensu hoc modo, quod actus iste intellectus per organum sensibile exercetur. ...

De Ver., q.12.a.3.ad 3um.

Thus:

Manifestum est autem quod non posset esse perfectum judicium fabri de cultello, si opus ignoraret; et similiter non posset esse perfectum judicium scientiae naturalis de rebus naturalibus, si sensibilia ignorantur. Omnia autem quae in praesenti statu intelligimus, cognoscuntur a nobis per comparationem ad res sensibiles naturales. Unde impossibile est quod sit in nobis judicium intellectus perfectum cum ligamento sensus, per quem res sensibiles cognoscimus.

Sum.Theol., I.q.34.a.8.c.

Since the phantasm is necessary in order that the intellect in its present state may acquire knowledge, the question arises, in what manner does the intellect make use of the phantasm? Does the intellect understand by
abstracting the intelligible species from the phantasm? If so, is this abstraction the work of the acting intellect? Again, is the species abstracted what the intellect understands or that whereby it understands?

For St. Thomas, intelligibility is in inverse ratio to materiality. Only in so far as a thing can be abstracted from matter and material representations or images can it be understood.

\[ \text{"sicut res sunt separabiles a materia, sic circa intellectum sunt."} \]

Ergo oportet quod materialia intelligantur inquantum a materia abstrahuntur et a similitudinibus materialibus quae sunt phantasmata.

Sum. Theol., I.q.85.a.1.c.

Because the phantasm is a material representation of an object it cannot make an impression on the possible intellect, which is immaterial, and therefore it cannot be understood by the intellect. It is only when the acting intellect throws light on the phantasm and abstracts from it the intelligible species, free from conditions of materiality and individuality, that the possible intellect is informed or understands. The intellect can be informed only by an immaterial representation of an object, that is, by a form abstracted from the phantasm representing an individual material thing. The reason for this is that the soul is united to a body and therefore has as its proper object a nature existing in corporeal matter, and yet, because the intellect is immaterial and "like is known by like" the intellect can be impressed or informed only by the immaterial. Therefore it is necessary that the proper object of the intellect be represented in an immaterial manner.

The senses apprehend directly the material things and by means of the senses
the phantasm is produced. Thus the intellect understands a thing otherwise than it is, in the sense that the form of the thing known is present immaterially in the intellect, while that same form is present materially in the thing known. However, since the intellect understands the thing known as it is in itself this mode of understanding implies no falsehood, as St. Thomas shows. He distinguishes between the two ways in which abstraction may occur, first, by composition or division; and second, by simple and absolute abstraction. According to the first mode we may understand that one thing does not exist in some other, or that it is separate from it. For the intellect to abstract from one another things that are not really abstract from one another would imply falsehood. Thus to consider a triangle without three angles or to say that color does not exist in a colored object would be false. According to the second mode however the intellect may abstract things which are not really abstract from one another, without falsehood. Thus it is possible to consider color apart from a colored glass, since glass is not essential to color. Those things which belong to the species of a thing can be thought of apart from individualizing principles which do not belong to the notion of the species. One can, for example, consider man apart from the tall, white man, since tallness and whiteness do not belong to the notion of the species man. It is according to this second mode that the intelligible species is abstracted from the phantasm. The nature of the species, that is, is considered apart from those individual qualities represented by the phantasm. In speaking of the object of our knowledge and the intellect's mode of understanding St. Thomas says:
And,

The intelligible species abstracted from the phantasm is that whereby the intellect understands rather than what it understands. It is through these species that the intellect is able to understand objects outside the soul. The intelligible species are to the intellect what the sensible species are to the senses. Now the sensible species are that whereby the senses perceive an object. The sight sees by a likeness of the visible thing, yet it is not the likeness, but the exterior thing itself which is seen. So too the intelligible species are that whereby the intellect understands, rather
than that which is understood. Were these species that which and not rather
that whereby the intellect understands there could be no science. This is
because science is concerned with things outside the soul, and the intellect
must be able actually to know these external things and not merely the in-
telligible species which exist only in the soul.

Moreover a faculty can judge only of what it knows. If it knows only
its own impression as such, it can judge only of that. Consequently if
sight perceived only its own impression, one whose vision is faulty might
perceive red to be brown, while one with good vision would perceive red as
red. Since each judges according to what he perceives both opinions would
be true. The same would hold for the intellect. It must be concluded that
the sensible species is that whereby the sense perceives an exterior object
and the intelligible species that whereby the intellect understands.

... phantasmata se habent ad intellectum nostrum sicut
sensibilia ad sensum, ut colores, qui sunt extra animam,
ad visum; unde sicut species, quae est in sensu, abstrah-
tur a rebus ipsis, et per eam cognitio sensus continuatur
ad ipsas res sensibles; ita intellectus noster abstrahit
speciem a phantasmatibus, et per eam cognitio eius quodam-
modo ad phantasmata continuatur. Sed tamen tantum interest
quod similitudo quae est in sensu, abstrahitur a re ut ab
obieto cognoscibili, et ideo res ipsa per illam similitu-
dinem recte cognoscitur: similitudo autem quae est in in-
tellectu, non abstrahitur a phantasmate sicut ab obieto
cognoscibili, sed sicut a medio cognitionis, per modum quo
sensus noster accipit similitudinem rei quae est in
speculo, dum fertur in eam non ut in rem quamdam, sed ut
in similitudinem. Unde intellectus noster non directe ex
specie quam suscipit, fertur ad cognoscendum phantasma,
sed ad cognoscendum rem cujus est phantasma; sed tamen
per quandam reflexionem reedit etiam in cognitionem ipsius
phantasmatis, dum considerat naturam actus sui, et speciei
per quam intuetur, et eius a quo speciem abstrahit, scili-
cet phantasmatis; sicut per similitudinem quae est in visu
a speculo accepta, directe fertur visus in cognitionem rei speculatae; sed per quamdum reversionem fertur per eamdem in ipsam similitudinem quae est in speculo. Inquantum ergo intellectus noster per similitudinem quam accepit a phantasmate, reflectitur in ipsum phantasmata, a quo specimen abstrahit, quod est similitudo particularis, habet quamdam cognitionem de singulari secundum continuationem quamdam intellectus ad imaginationem.

De Ver. q.2.a.6.c.

The object represented by the intelligible species is understood primarily, somewhat as a person looking into a mirror sees himself primarily and the mirror reflecting the image only secondarily. The intelligible species is itself understood but only secondarily. This is because a man is able to reflect upon himself and not only does he understand but can, as it were, see himself in the act of understanding and see also that whereby he understands. By its act the intellect understands exterior things, the intelligible species serving as the matter with which the intellect works. Now action may be of two kinds: one of which remains in the agent, as to hear or to know; the other passes from the agent into an external object, as to heat or to saw. Every action proceeds from some form, and whether the act remain in the agent or passes from the agent into an external object, the form from which the act proceeds resembles the object. Thus heat passes into another and the heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated. So too, sight sees by the likeness of the visible thing, and the intellect is informed by the likeness of the thing understood, that is, by the intelligible species. It thus knows things by means of the intelligible species.

Et ideo dicendum est quod species intelligibiles se habet ad intellectum ut quo intelligit intellectus: quod sit patet. Cum enim sit duplex actio, . . . una
quae manet in agente (ut videre et intelligere), et altera quae transit in rem exteriorem (ut calefacere et secare); utraque fit secundum aliquam formam. Et sicut forma secundum quam provenit actio tendens in rem exteriorem, est similitudo objecti actionis (ut calor calefacientis est similitudo calefacti), similituer forma secundum quam provenit actio manens in agente, est similitudo objecti. Unde similitudo rei visibilis est secundum quam visus videt; et similitudo rei intellectae, quae est species intelligibilis, est forma secundum quam intellectus intelligit. Sed quia intellectus supra seipsum reflectitur, secundum eadem reflexionem intelligit et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit. Et sic species intellecta secundario est id quod intelligitur; sed id quod intelligitur primo, est res, cujus species intelligibilis est similitudo. ...

Sum. Theol., I.q.85.a.2.c.

Because the phantasm is necessary for the intellectual act in the soul's present state of union with the body, intellectual knowledge is in a way dependent on, since it arises from, sensible knowledge. Now with regard to both time and space sensible knowledge of the more common precedes knowledge of the less common. Thus a sound heard afar off is first perceived to be a noise, and as one approaches, to be a voice, then the voice of a man, until finally the words uttered are distinguished. Likewise, a child can distinguish man from not-man before he is able to distinguish this man from that man. Sensible knowledge proceeds from less to more perfect knowledge, and this indistinct knowledge is a state between mere potentiality for knowledge and complete knowledge. This same holds for intellectual knowledge as well as for sense knowledge. Thus the knowledge of the universal is first in our intellectual cognition. The reason for this is that the intellect proceeds from potentiality to actuality, from an incomplete act to a perfect one.
The incomplete act is indistinct, confused knowledge of a thing, while the perfect act is distinct, determinate knowledge of the object. Confused knowledge is knowledge of an object without knowledge of the parts contained in the object. To know these parts also, is to know the less common and constitutes distinct knowledge. To know animal only as animal is to know it indistinctly; whereas to know rational or irrational animal, man or horse, is to know animal distinctly. It is thus the intellect knows the universal, or more common, before the singular and particular.

\[\ldots \text{ in cognitione nostri intellectus duo oportet considerare.} \]

Primo quidem, quod cognitio intellectiva aliquo modo a sensitiva primordium sumit. Et quia sensus est singularium, intellectus autem universalium; necesse est quod cognitio singularium quoad nos prior sit quam universalium cognitio. Secundo oportet considerare quod intellectus noster de potentia in actum procedit. Omne autem quod procedit de potentia in actum, prius pervenit ad actum incompletum, qui est medius inter potentiam et actum, quam ad actum perfectum. Actus autem perfectus ad quem pervenit intellectus, est scientia completa, per quam distincte et determine res cognoscuntur; actus autem incompletus est scientia imperfecta, per quam sciuntur res indistincte sub quadam confusione. \[\ldots \text{sensus exit de potentia in actum, sicut intellectus; idem etiam ordo cognitionis apparat in sensu.} \]

Nam prius secundum sensum djudicamus magis commune quam minus commune, et secundum locum et secundum tempus: secundum locum quidem, sicut cum aliquid videtur a remotis, prius apprehenditur esse corpus quam apprehendatur esse animal; et prius apprehenditur esse animal quam apprehendatur esse homo, et prius homo quam Socrates vel Plato; secundum tempus autem, quia puer a principio prius distinguuit hominem a non hominem, quam distinguat hunc hominem ab alio homine; et ideo pueri a principio appellant omnes viros patres, posteriui autem determinat unumquemque. \[\ldots \text{Et hujus ratio manifesta est, quia qui scit aliquid indistincte, adhuc est in potentia ut sciat distinctionis principium, sicut qui scit genus, est in potentia ut sciat differentiam.} \] Et sic patet
The human intellect, unlike the angelic or Divine intelligence, acquires knowledge by composition and division of the parts of the object known, proceeding from less to more perfect knowledge. The angelic and Divine intellect have their perfection at once, and consequently have entire knowledge of a thing at once, by simply understanding the essence of the thing. The human intellect, resembling things which are generated and corruptible, passes from potentiality to actuality. Now intellectual knowledge originates in the senses, which perceive the accidents of a thing. The proper object of the intellect however is not the accidents, but the essence or quiddity, the substance of a thing.

Proprium . . . obiectum intellectus est quod quid est, idest substantia rei . . . Igitur quicquid intellectus de aliqua re cognoscit, cognoscit per cognitionem substantiae illius rei: unde in qualibet demonstratione per quam innotescunt nobis propria accidentia, principium accipimus quod quid est . . . Si autem substantiam alicuius rei intellectus cognoscat per accidentia, . . . quod accidentia magnam partem conferunt ad cognoscendum quod quid est; hoc est per accidentes, inquantum cognitio intellectus oritur a sensu, et sic per sensibilium accidentium cognitionem oportet ad substantiae intellectum pervenire. . . .

separating the nature of the thing from its accidents necessarily implies differentiating and comparing. The human intellect first understands something about its object, as its nature, and later the properties and accidents, proceeding thus from one composition and division to another, reasoning until it arrives at complete knowledge.

... cum enim intellectus humanus exeat de potentia in actum, similitudinem quamdam habet cum rebus generabilibus, quae non statim perfectionem suam habent, sed eam successive acquirunt. Et similiter intellectus humanus non statim in prima apprehensione capit perfectam rei cognitionem; sed primo apprehendit aliquid de ipsa, puta quidditatem ipsius rei, quae est primum et primum objectum intellectus; et deinde intelligit proprietates et accidentia, et habitudines circumstantes rei essentiam. Et secundum hoc necesse habet unum apprehensum alii componere, et dividere, et ex una compositione et divisione ad aliam procedere; quod est ratio-cinari.

Sum. Theol., I.q.85.a.5.c.

The object of the intellect is the quiddity of a natural thing. Now all natural things are composed of matter and form. The matter is the principle of individualization, but matter is repugnant to intelligibility, as was said. It seems evident then that the intellect knows the universal directly but that it cannot know the singular directly.

... intellectus noster nunc cognoscit per species a rebus acceptas, quae sunt abstrahactae a materia, et omnibus materiae conditionibus; et ideo non potest cognoscere singularia, quorum principium est materia, sed universalia tantum...

De Anima, q.un.a.20.

In abstracting the universal from the phantasm the mind leaves aside all the properties and accidents which make the object to be this particular man or horse. The intellect understands directly the universal form man, for
example, as man, not as Socrates or Plato. However were the intellect unable to go further and in some manner know also the matter which is intrinsic to the object, its knowledge would be inadequate. Although through the mental concept alone the intellect is unable to distinguish one particular man from another, yet by turning to the phantasm which is a representation of the singular the intellect is able to know, indirectly, the singular individual thing.

\[...\] mens nostra singulare directe cognoscere non potest; sed directe cognoscitur a nobis singulare per virtutes sensitivas, quae recipiunt formas a rebus in organo corporali; et sic recipiunt eas sub determinatis dimensionibus, et secundum quod ducunt in cognitionem materiae singularis. Sicut enim forma universalis ducit in cognitionem materiae universalis ita forma individualis ducit in cognitionem materiae singnatae, quae est individualitionis principium. Sed tamen mens per accidentem singularibus se immiscet, inquantum continuatur viribus sensitivis, quae circa particularia versantur. Quae quidem continatio est dupliciter. Uno modo inquantum motus sensitivae partis terminatur ad mentem, sicut accidit in motu qui est a rebus ad animam; et sic mens singularare cognoscit per quandam reflexionem, prout scilicet mens cognoscendo objectum suum, quod est aliqua natura universalis, redit in cognitionem sui actus, et ulterius in speciem quae est actus sui principium, et ulterius in phantasmata a quo species est abstracta; et sic aliquam cognitionem de singulari accipit. Alio modo secundumquod motus qui est ab anima ad res, incipit a mente, et procedit in partem sensitivam, prout mens regit inferiores vires; et sic singularibus se immiscet movente ratione particulari, quae est potentia quaedam individualis quae allo nomine dicitur cogitativa, et habet determinatum organum, in corpore, ... Universalem vero sententiam quam mens habet de operabilibus, non est possibile applicari ad particularem actum nisi per aliquam potentiam mediam apprehendentem singulare. ... De Ver., q.10.a.5.c.
In order to understand things the mind is able to abstract from sensible images the likeness of external objects, and by means of the likeness to understand the objects themselves. Now the likeness by which the intellect understands is the form of the intellect. The intellect is also able to understand itself, but since it understands nothing without a sensible image, it is in understanding exterior things that it understands itself.

\[\ldots\text{intellectus humanus etsi se ipsum cognoscere possit,}
\]
\[\text{tamen primum suae cognitionis initium ab extrinseco sumit:}
\]
\[\text{quia non est intelligere sine phantasmata.}\]

\[\text{Sum. Cont. Gent., IV. 11.}\]

As the intellect cannot understand exterior things through its essence, so neither can it understand itself through itself.

\[\text{Impossibile est autem dici quod per se ipsam intelligat de se quid est.}\]

\[\text{Sum. Cont. Gent., III. 46.}\]

The intellect can know only what is actual, as pure potentiality is unknowable. Thus the intellect cannot know primary matter, which is pure potency. It is only when the matter is informed that it becomes intelligible. The human intellect, as was said, is analagous to primary matter since it is a capacity for forms, and, like prime matter, until it is informed or made actual it is unknowable. Now it is through the intelligible species that the intellect is informed and becomes actual, and it is only then that it itself can be known to itself. Thus it is not through its essence, but through its act, that the intellect knows itself.

That the intellectual soul does not know itself through its essence can be shown in several ways. Since all men have souls if the soul knew itself
through itself it would follow that all men would know the nature of their soul. But this is not the case. Likewise, if the soul were known to itself through its essence it would be naturally known. Now in those things which are known naturally, as the whole is greater than its parts, error is impossible. There could then be no error regarding the nature of the soul. Yet there is error, so the intellectual soul does not know itself through its essence, but through its act.

Si anima per se ipsam cognoscit de se quid est; omnis autem homo animam habet: omnis igitur homo cognoscit de anima quid est; quod patet esse falsum.

Cognitio quae sit per aliquid naturaliter nobis inditum, est naturalis, sicut principia indemonstrabilia, quae cognoscuntur per lumen intellectus agentis. Si igitur nos de anima scimus quid est per ipsam animam, hoc erit naturaliter notum. In his autem quae naturaliter nota sunt, nullus potest errare: in cognitione enim principiorum indemonstrabilium nullus errat. Nullus igitur erraret circa animam quid est, si hoc anima per se ipsam cognoscet: quod patet esse falsum, quum multi opinati sint animam esse hoc, vel illud corpus, et aliqui numerum, vel harmoniam. Non igitur anima per se ipsam cognoscit de se quid est.


The intellectual soul understands itself through its act and not through its essence.

Intellectus autem humanus se habet in genere rerum intelligibilium ut ens in potentia tantum, sicut et materia prima se habet in genere rerum sensibilium, unde possibilis nominatur. Sic igitur in sua essentia consideratus se habet ut potentia intelligens. Unde ex seipso habet virtutem ut intelligat, non autem ut intelligatur, nisi secundum id quod fit actu. . . Sed quia connaturale est intellectui nostro secundum statum praesentis vitae quod ad materilia et sensibilia respiciat. . . consequens est ut sic seipsum intelligat intellectus noster, secundum quod fit actu per species a sensibilibus abstractas per lumen intellectus agentis,
The intellect is superior to sense because it is capable not only of knowing other things, but of knowing itself also, and of distinguishing between itself and what it knows, between self and things outside self. The senses are capable of sense knowledge, but not of intellectual knowledge because they cannot reflect on self and perceive that they know.

Est igitur supremus et perfectus gradus vitae qui est secundum intellectum, nam intellectus in seipsum reflectitur et seipsum intelligere potest.

It is because the intellect knows itself and thus is able to distinguish between itself and what it knows or what is not itself that it can have intellectual knowledge.

Since the intellectual soul, while united to the body, is able to understand only by turning to phantasms it follows that immaterial substances, of
which there can be no material representation, cannot be understood by the intellect. The soul understands itself only indirectly and through its act as was said:

Ex objecto enim cognoscit suam operationem, per quam devenit ad cognitionem sui ipsius...  
De Anima, q.un.a.3.ad 4.

The reason for this inability of the soul to understand immaterial substances lies in the weakness of the soul's intellectual power, for in themselves the immaterial substances are more intelligible than are material objects. The intellect in the presence of such substances is, as it were, blinded by the very intelligibility of such beings.

...difficultas intelligendi res illas accidit ex nobis, non ex illis: nam intellectus noster se habet ad manifestissima rerum sicut se habet oculus vespertilionis ad lucem Solis.  

The possible intellect in this life can be informed only by species abstracted from phantasms, and since there can be no phantasm of a separated substance the intellectual soul cannot know such beings.

Non est igitur intellectus possibilis in potentia nisi ad illa intelligibilia quae sunt facta per intellectum agentem...Cum ergo substantiae separatae non sint factae in actu per intellectum agentem, sed solum materialia; ad haec sola se extendit possibilis intellectus. Non igitur per ipsum possimus intelligere substantias separatas.  

However, since the intellectual soul is able to understand itself indirectly, and since it is itself an immaterial subsisting thing, it can by analogy have some inadequate knowledge of the separate substances.
Since the soul is unable to know separate substances either through itself or through its knowledge of material things, much less is it able to know God directly and as the First Object of its understanding. The reason is that no abstracted species can adequately represent either separate substances or God, and in the present life the soul cannot know things which are not thus represented.

Menti igitur nostrae in statu viae non potest convenire visio Dei per essentiam secundum primum modum. Mens enim nostra naturali cognitione phantasmata respicit quasi objecta, a quibus species intelligibles accipit. unde omne quod intelligit secundum statum viae, intelligit per species a phantasmatibus abstractas. Nulla autem species huiusmodi sufficiens est ad representandum divinam essentiam, vel etiam cuiuscumque alterius essentialiae separatae; cum quidditates rerum sensibilium, quarum similitudines sunt intelligibles species a phantasmatibus abstractae, sint alterius rationis ab essentis substantialium immaterialium creaturum, et multo magis ab essentia divina. Unde mens nostra naturali cognitione, quam in statu viae experimur, nec Deum, nec Angelos per essentiam videre potest. De Ver., q.10.a.11.c.
CHAPTER III

Since the union of soul and body is natural to the soul and since while this union exists the human soul has a real, though extrinsic, dependence on the body a difficulty arises concerning the knowledge of the separated soul. If, so long as the soul is united to the body, the phantasms are necessary for the intellectual operation, can that operation be carried on when the phantasms no longer exist?

The intellectual soul, the substantial form of the human body, is an immaterial subsisting thing, as was shown. Being immaterial it is consequently incorruptible, for matter is the principle of disintegration.

... anima humana omnino est immaterialis; quod patet ex hoc quod rerum species immaterialiter recipit. Ergo anima est incorruptibilis.

De Anima, q.un.a.14.c.

When therefore, the material body is corrupted the soul will remain uncorrupted, separated from the body. This can be shown in several ways.

A thing is received in another according to the mode of the recipient. Now forms of things are received in the possible intellect in as much as they are intelligible in act; and they are intelligible in act in so far as they are immaterial and universal and consequently incorruptible. The possible intellect is therefore incorruptible and since the possible intellect is part of the human soul it follows that the human soul is incorruptible.
Intelligibile est propria perfectio intellectus: unde intellectus in actu, et intelligibile in actu, sunt unum. Quod igitur convenit intelligibili, inquantum est intelligibile, oportet convenire intellectui inquantum, huiusmodi: quia perfectio, et perfectibile sunt unius generis. Intelligibile autem, inquantum est intelligibile, est necessarium, et incorruptibile: necessaria enim perfecte sunt intellectu cognoscibilia; contingenti vero, inquantum huiusmodi, non nisi defici-enter, habetur enim de eis non scientia, sed opinio: unde et incorruptibilium intellectus scientiam habet, secundum quod sunt incorruptibilia, inquantum scilicet sunt universalia. Oportet igitur intellectum esse incorruptibilem.

II Cont. Sent., 55.

And again:


II Cont. Sent., 79.

The acting intellect makes the intelligible to be intelligible in act, which intelligible is incorruptible. In this act of abstracting the intelligible the acting intellect is the agent and that which is rendered intelligible in act is the patient. Since the agent is more noble than the patient,

... agens est honorabilius patiente. ...

Sum. Theol., I.q. 84.a.6.c.

it follows that the human soul, of which the acting intellect is the light, is incorruptible.

Faciens est honorabilius factu. . . Sed intellectus agens facit actu intelligibilia. . . Quum igitur intelligibilium actu, inquantum huiusmodi, sint incorruptibilia, multo
fortius intellectus agens erit incorruptibilis. Ergo et anima humana, cuius lumen est intellectus agens, ut ex praemiscis patet.

II Cont. Gent., 79.

The proper object of the intellect is the intelligible which is necessarily incorruptible, for things are intelligible and incorruptible in so far as they are immaterial.

... sicut res sunt separabiles a materia, sic circa intellectum sunt.

Sum. Theol., I.q.85.a.1.c.

Now the intellect actually understanding is one with the object actually understood.

... intellectum in actu est intellectus in actu, in quantum similitudo rei intellectae est forma intellectus.

Sum. Theol., I.q.85.a.2.ad 2um.

Since the intelligible is the proper perfection of the intellect and perfection and perfectible are proportionate it follows that the intellect must be incorruptible.


II Cont. Gent., 79.

The human soul as was said is the form of the body. Now a form can be corrupted in three ways: through the action of its contrary, as heat is destroyed by the action of cold; or through the corruption of its subject,
as the power of vision is destroyed with the corruption of the eye; or through the defect of its cause, as light is lacking in the air when the sun, which is the cause of that light, is not present. The human soul cannot be destroyed in any of these three ways. It cannot be destroyed through the action of its contrary for there is nothing contrary to it, since even contraries are not such as present in the soul.

Nor can the human soul be corrupted through the corruption of its subject, for the soul is a form not dependent on the body according to its being. Nor can it be destroyed through the defect of its cause, for the soul can have none but an eternal cause. Consequently the human soul is incorruptible.

Similiter autem neque per corruptionem sui subjecti: . . . quod anima humana est forma non dependens a corpore secundum suum esse. Similiter autem neque per deficientiam suae causae: quia non potest habere aliquam causam nisi aeternam. . . Nullo igitur modo anima humana corrumpi potest.

II Cont.Gent., 79.

Similiter etiam anima intellectiva, cum habeat operationem vitae sine corpore, est subsistens, . . . et ita sibi debetur esse et fieri; et cum immaterialis substantia, non potest causari per generationem, sed solum per creationem a Deo. Ponere ergo anima intellectivam a generante causari, nihil est aliud quam ponere eam non subsistentem, et per consequens corrumpi eam cum corpore. . .

Sum.Theol., I.q.118.a.2.c.
Moreover, the human soul, being a subsisting form has existence of itself independently of the body. In this it differs from accidents and purely material forms, which cannot exist apart from their subjects. Now existence follows upon form, and a thing exists in as much as it has a form. Thus the body informed by the soul is said to exist, and once it is deprived of its substantial form it cannot be said to exist as a human body. A subsisting form has existence of itself and whatever belongs to a thing in virtue of itself cannot be separated from it. Thus roundness belongs to a circle, and because of the very nature of a circle cannot be separated from it. If therefore a circle were a subsistent form it could not cease to be other than round. Since existence belongs to the soul in this way the substantial soul cannot cease to exist.

Respondeo dicendum, quod neceesse est ommino anima humana incorruptibilem esse. Ad cujus evidentiam considerandum est, quod id quod per se consequitur ad aliquid, non potest removeri ad eo; sicut ab homine non removetur quod sit animal; neque a numero quod sit par vel impar. Manifestum est autem quod esse per se consequitur formam; unumquodque enim habet esse secundum propriam formam; unde esse a forma nullo modo separari potest. Corruptur igitur composita ex materia et forma per hoc quod amittunt formam ad quam consequitur esse. Ipsa autem forma per se corrupti non potest; sed per accidens corrupto composito corrupitur, in quantum deficit esse compositi quod est per formam; si forma sit talis quae non sit habens esse, sed sit solum quo compositum est. Si ergo sit aliqua forma quae sit habens esse, neceesse est illam formam incorruptibilem esse. Non separatur esse ab aliquo habente esse, nisi per hoc quod separatur forma ab eo; unde si id quod habet esse, sit ipsa forma, impossibile est quod esse separatur ab eo. Manifestum est autem quod principium quo homo intelligit, est forma habens esse in se, et non solum sicut quo aliquid est... Relinquitur ergo quod principium intellectivum quo homo intelligit, sit forma habens esse; unde neceesse est
It is in virtue of its being an immaterial substance that the human soul is both incorruptible and intellectual. Therefore the soul cannot cease to be, nor cease to be intellectual, even when separated from the body. Now a form which has no operation of its own apart from the matter it informs cannot exist apart from that matter. Thus heat or the form of an apple cannot exist apart from their subject. But the human soul is not such a form for even while united to the body it has an operation in which the body does not share, namely understanding.

This power of understanding is the soul's highest and most proper operation and cannot be separated from the soul.

St. Thomas answers the objection that since the human soul cannot understand without turning to the phantasms, the separated soul, having no such phantasms to which it can turn, will be unable to understand. The phantasms are necessary to the soul in union with the body because in that state the soul does not participate in the intelligible species as do separate substances, but must receive species abstracted from the phantasms.
Thus the soul is dependent on the phantasms for material with which to carry on its operation, but it is in no way dependent on the body in the exercise of this operation. Consequently the separated soul can understand if in some way it can be provided with intelligible species. Now while united to the body the soul understands itself, indirectly it is true, yet not through a phantasm of itself but through its act. Since the soul, whether present in the body or separated from it, will always be present to itself it will be able to understand if by some means it is actual.

\[\ldots \text{mens ipsa sicut corporearum rerum notitias per sensus corporis colligit, sic rerum incorporearum per semetipsam. Sed ipsa semper sibi prassens erit.}
\]

\[\text{De Ver.}, 19.a.1.c.\]

The intellectual soul is unable to understand without the phantasm because its union with matter renders it passive. But anything which is passive because of its union with matter is rendered active by its separation from that matter. A form which can exist apart from the matter it informs is active and not passive. Thus heat is both active and passive because of its union with matter. If however, it were possible for the form heat to exist without matter it would be active and not passive. Therefore the separated soul, being no longer united to the body and consequently no longer passive, will be able to understand at least itself without receiving species from exterior objects, that is, abstracted species.

\[\text{Sicut aliquid ex coniunctione ad corpus materiale redditur passivum ita per separationem ab eodem redditur activum; calidum enim et agit, et patitur propter coniunctionem caloris ad materiam; si autem esset calor sine materia, ageret, et non pateretur.}\]
Ergo et anima per separationem a corpore redditur omnino activa. Sed quod potentiae animae non possunt per se ipsas cognoscere sine exterioribus objectis, hoc eis competit inquantum sunt passivae. Ergo anima per separationem a corpore poterit per se ipsam intelligere, non accipiendo ab aliquibus objectis. 

De Ver., 19.a.1.c.

This is because the end of the intellective power is not to know the phantasm, but rather, to know the intelligible species. Now although the proper end of a thing is always the same yet nothing prevents a thing from realizing its end from different points in different modes or states of existence. Thus the proper end of the power of vision is to see color and of the power of hearing to hear sound. If then, color be wanting to the eye the proper operation of the power of sight cannot be carried on. Likewise, if sound be wanting the proper operation of the power of hearing cannot be carried on. Now the phantasm is not the object of the intellect in the same way that color is the object of the power of sight, but rather the intellect, so long as the soul is united to the body, finds its proper object in the phantasm. This object is the intelligible species.

Manifestum est enim quod finis potentiae visivae est cognoscere colores; finis autem potentiae intellectiva non est cognoscere phantasmata, sed cognoscere species intelligibiles, quas apprehendit a phantasmatibus, et in phantasmatibus secundum statum praesentis vitae. Est igitur similitudi quantum ad hoc ad quod aspicit utraque potentia, non autem quantum ad hoc in quod utriusque potentiae conditio terminatur. Nihil autem prohibet secundum diversos status ex diversis rem aliquam ad suum finem tendere. Finis tamen proprius aliquus rei semper est unus. Et ideo licet visus nihil cognoscat absque colore: intellectus tamen secundum aliquem statum potest cognoscere absque phantasmate, sed non absque specie intelligibili.

Sum. Theol., III. q. 11. a. 2. ad 1um
Now intelligible species may be divided into two classes. First are the forms of material things which exist in a more material way in the things known than in the knower, and are abstracted from things in order that they may be rendered intelligible. These are called abstracted species. Secondly are those forms which exist in a more simple way in the things themselves than in the knower. These are called impressed species.

Sciendum tamen est, quod non semper species per quam aliquid cognoscitur, est abstracta a re quae per ipsam cognoscitur; sed tunc solum quando cognoscens accipit speciem a re; et tunc haec species accepta, est simplicior et immaterialior in cognoscente quam in re quae cognoscitur. Si autem fuerit a contrario, scilicet quod res cognita immaterialior sit et simplicior quam cognoscens; tunc species rei cognitae in cognoscente non dicitur abstracta, sed impressa et influxa. . .

De Anima, q.un.a.17.a.ad 4um.

Thus the soul is naturally perfected in two ways, either by knowledge received from sensible things or by knowledge received from superior spiritual substances. Once the intelligible species through which the soul receives its most proper and distinct knowledge are no longer available because of the soul's separation from the body, the soul will be able to understand through the impressed species. Nor is this mode of understanding contrary to the nature of the soul even though it is above it, as was said.

An indication that the separated soul will be able to understand without the phantasm is found even in the soul's present state of existence. Thus, while united to the body the soul is better able to carry on its proper operation when withdrawn from excessive care of the body. The more a man is occupied with things of sense the less is he concerned about im-
material things and the less apt is he for intellectual pursuits. It would seem that just as objects are the more intelligible as they exist in a more immaterial way, so too the intellect is more capable of understanding the more it withdraws from material cares and occupations.

Likewise the intellectual operation can sometimes be carried on with an extraordinary independence of matter, as in dreams and ecstasy, when the senses are not acting. When the intellect is not being provided with phantasms through which it can receive intelligible species, and is, as it were, blank, it would seem to be subject to the influence of superior beings and to be informed by them. Thus men sometimes can receive through the influence of superior substances knowledge which surpasses the ordinary knowledge received through abstracted species.

Thus while united to the body the soul tends towards inferior things and
receives its knowledge from inferior things. But when freed from the body the soul tends towards superior things and likewise receives knowledge through their influence.

Manifestum est enim quod anima humana corpori unita aspectum habet ex unione corporis ad inferiora directum; unde non perficitur nisi per ea quae ab inferioribus accipit, scilicet per species a phantasmatibus abstractas; unde neque in cognitionem sui ipsius neque in cognitionem aliorum potest devenire, nisi in quantum ex praedictis speciebus manuducit, ut supra dictum est. Sed quando jam anima erit a corpore separata, aspectus ejus non ordinabitur ad aliqua inferiora, ut ab eis accipiat; sed erit absolutus, potens a superioribus substantiis influentiam recipere sine inspectione phantasmata. . .; et per hujusmodi influentiam reducetur in actum. . .

De Anima, q.un.a.17.

This is because the intellectual soul is on the boundary of the corporeal and incorporeal worlds and as it is drawn towards the material it is withdrawn from the consideration of the immaterial, while as it withdraws from the corporeal it more nearly approaches the incorporeal and is more influenced by separate substances.

Anima in sui separatione a corpore, recipit influxum specierum intelligibilium a natura superiori, scilicet divina, secundum naturalem ordinem, quo experimur quod anima humana quanto magis a corporeis sensibus abstrahitur, magis potest esse particeps superioris influxus; sicut patet in dormientibus et alienatis, qui etiam quaedam futura praevident.

Quodl., III, a.9.a.21.c.

And again:

. . . anima humana sit in confinio corporum, et incorporearum substantiarum, quasi in horizonte existens aeternitatis, et temporis, recedens ad infimo appropinquit ad summum: unde et quando totaliter erit a
corpore separata, perfecte assimilabtur substantiis separatis quantum ad modum intelligendi, et uberius influentiam earum recipiet. Sic igitur etsi intelligere nostrum secundum modum praesentis vitae, corrupto corpore, corrumpatur, succedet tamem alius modus intelligendi altior.

II Cont. Gent., 81.

Thus in dreams one can receive knowledge concerning the future through the influence of separate substances.

Utrumque autem melius potest fieri in dormientibus quam in vigilantibus, quia anima vigilantis est occupata circa exteiiora sensibilia: unde minus potest recipere subtiles impressiones vel spiritualium substantiarum, vel etiam causarum naturalium. . .

Sum. Theol., II II; q. 172. a. 1. c.

If the soul united to the body can be thus influenced by separate substances it would seem that the separated soul, wholly unimpeded by the body, would be even more open to such influence.

Now the manner of the activity proper to a thing corresponds to the mode and nature of its substance. An intelligence subsisting apart is by itself, away from any body. Therefore its intellectual activity will be conversant with objects not based on anything corporeal. The soul's nature is not changed by its separation from the body, but its mode of existence is changed so its mode of operation will be different also. The separated soul will be a substance subsisting apart from matter and its intellectual activity will be like that of separate substances.

. . . anima separata per suum intellectum recipit species intelligibiles per modum superioris substantiae. . .

De Anima, q. un. a. 20. ad 17um.
Now in referring to the separate substances St. Thomas says:

Modus operationis propriae alicuius rei proportionaliter respondet modo substantiae, et naturae ipsius. Substantia autem separata est intellectus per se existens, non in corpore aliquo. Operatio igitur intellectualis eius erit intelligibilium quae non sunt fundata in aliquo corpore. Omnia autem intelligibilia a sensibilibus accepta, sunt in aliquibus corporibus aliquiditer fundata, sicut intelligibilium nostra in phantasmatibus, quae sunt in organic corporeis. Substantiae igitur separatae non accipiunt cognitionem ex sensibilibus.

II Cont. Sent., 96.

Because inferior things are not ordered to inferiors the separated soul will no longer be ordered to material representations in carrying on its proper operation. It will understand in a way suitable to its mode of existence, that is, by turning to participated species, sharing with separate substances the influence of the Divine Light. However our intellect stands in such pressing need of particular detailed likenesses that for every distinct object of knowledge it requires a distinct likeness in itself. It knows each different specific nature by a different intelligible species. Thus through the more universal idea "animal" the soul has only an indistinct idea of "rational" and "irrational." Therefore because of its weakness the soul is provided with two powers, sense and intellect, in order that it may know what superior intellects know by a single power, intellect.

Intellectus autem noster, quia infimum gradum tenet in substantiis intellectualibus, adeo particulatas similitudines requirit quod unicum cognoscibili proprio oportet respondere propriam similitudinem in ipso: unde per similitudinem animalis non cognoscit rationale, et per consequens nec hominem, nisi secundum quid. Similitudo autem intelligibilis, quae est in substantia separata, est universalioris virtutis ad plura repra- sentanda sufficiens; et ideo non facit imperfectiorem
cognitionem, sed perfectiorum: est enim universalis
virtus ad modum formae agentis in causa universalis,
quae quanto fuerit universalior, tanto ad plura se
extendit, et efficacius producit. Per similitudinem
igitur unam cognoscit et animal, et differentias
animalis, aut etiam universaliori modo, et contrac-
tiori secundum ordinem substantiarum praeditarum.
II Cont.Gent., 98.

Although the knowledge of the separate substances is not proportionate to
the intellectual soul it does not follow that the soul can have no knowledge
from the influx of these substances, but only that this knowledge will be
confused and imperfect.

... anima separata per suum intellectum recipit species
intelligibiles per modum superioris substantiae, in qua
virtute cognoscitur quod homo duabus virtutibus, scilicet
sensu et intellectu, cognoscit.

De Anima, q.un.a.20. ad 17um.

And:

... quod ex hoc quod scientia substantiarum separatarum
non est proportionata animae nostrae, non sequitur quod
nullam intelligentiam ex earum influxu capere possit;
sed solum quod non possit capere perfectam et distinctam...

De Anima, q.un.a.15. ad 21um.

Because the soul is the lowest of the intellectual substances this mode of
understanding is not natural to it simply but only in so far as the soul is
separated, and it will receive the emanation of the intelligible light in
the lowest mode. This corresponds to understanding the phantasm made in-
telligible in act.

Haec autem cognitio, ut cognoscet praedito modo sub-
stantias separatas, est sibi naturalis, non simpliciter,
sed in quantum est unita, non competit sibi.

De Anima, q.un.a.17. ad 2um.
Since independence of matter makes a thing to be a proper term of intellect it cannot be that the different mode of understanding follows from the difference in intelligible species; but rather, the difference comes from the mode of existence of the separated soul, because operation follows from mode of existence. Thus the intellectual operation is not diversified by the intelligible species, whether these species are received from the phantasms or from some other thing.

.. diversus modus intelligendi non provenit ex diversitate specierum, sed ex diverso statu animae intelligentis. *Sum. Theol.*, I. q.89.a.6.ad 2um.

.. operatic propria animae est intelligere intelligibilia actu. Nec per hoc diversificatur species intellectualis operationis, quod intelligibilia actu sunt accepta aphantasmatibus vel aliunde. *De Anima*, q.un.a.15.ad 10um.

Moreover, to view a thing intellectually belongs to the potential intellect which forms the mental concept from the intelligible species and thus understands.

*Intellectus enim* possibilis est in actu perfecto secundum species intelligibiles, cum considerat actu. .. *II Cont. Gent.*, 74.

Since this intellect is in potentiality to universal being it can be informed by intelligible species, whether abstracted or impressed, and thus made actual.

While united to the body the soul has one mode of understanding, by turning to the phantasm. Separated from the body it will be able to understand by means of impressed species,
... anima, cum est corpori unita, si haberet species innatas, per eas posset intelligere, sicut intelligit per acquisitas. Sed licet sit perfectior in natura sua tamen propter motus suos corporeos et occupationes sensibles retinetur ut non possit ita libere conjungi substantiis superioribus ad recipiendum influxum earum, sicut post separationem.

De Anima, q.un.a.15. ad 13um.

nor will this be the only mode by which the soul will understand. Since the knowledge acquired in union with the body is not destroyed by death the soul will be able to know what it formerly knew, to know that is, through species which it received while united to the body. Likewise the soul will see the separate substances and thus both know them and the species of things in them. Thus the separated soul will know by three modes.

Ex quibus colligi potest quod anima post mortem tribus modis intelligit: uno modo per species quas recipit a rebus dum erat in corpore; alio modo per species in ipsa sua separatione a corpore sibi divinitus infusas; tertio modo videndo substantias separatas, et in eis species rerum intuendo. . .

De Ver., 19.a.1.

The soul will be able to understand through species formerly received in the body.

Habebunt etiam animae separatae determinatam cognitionem eorum quae prius hic seiverunt, quorum species intelligibles conservantur in eis.

De Anima, q.un.a.15.c.

Since knowledge resides in the intellect, which is incorruptible, it cannot be corrupted through the corruption of its subject. Nor can knowledge be corrupted through its contrary, for there is nothing contrary to the meaning of intelligible things. Since forgetfulness has no place in the separated
soul knowledge formerly acquired cannot be destroyed in this way. Nor can the knowledge in the separated soul be destroyed through a false argument.

Manifestum est autem quod per corruptionem subjecti scientia quae est in intellectu humano, corrumpi non potest; cum intellectus sit incorruptibilis, . . . Similiter etiam nec per contrarium corrumpi possunt species intelligibiles quae sunt in intellectu possibili; quia intentioni intelligibilium nihil est contrarium, et praecipue quantum ad simplicem intelligentiam, qua intelligitur quod quid est. Sed quantum ad operationem qua intellectus componit et dividit, vel etiam ratiocinatur, sic inventur contrarietas in intellectu, secundum quod falsum in propositione, vel argumentatione est contrarium vero. Et hoc modo interdum scientia corrumpitur per contrarium, dum scilicet aliquis per falsam argumentationem abducitur a scientia veritatis. . . . Sed hoc non habet locum in anima separata. Unde dicendum est quod habitus scientiae secundum quod est in intellectu, manet in anima separata.

Sum. Theol., I.q.89.a.5.

This knowledge alone however would not suffice:

. . . anima post mortem intelligit per aliquas species. Potest quidem intelligere per species quas in corpore acquisivit, quamvis illae usquequaque non sufficiant. . . .

De Ver., 19.a.1.ad 10um.

The soul would be unable to know any more than it knew on earth were it limited to species acquired here, and the souls of children would have no knowledge, neither of which can be admitted. Now since understanding cannot be accomplished without a certain receiving of impressions the separated soul will be dependent on impressions received from separate substances, and because the soul existing apart from the body is itself a separate substance this mode of understanding is fitting.

Actus autem proportionatur ei cujus est actus.

Sum. Theol., I.q.12.a.3.c.
A thing can be natural according to one mode of existence and not natural according to another. Thus water in a solid state, ice, does not tend to rise, while water existing in the form of steam does tend to rise. Likewise, what is not possible to the soul in one state of existence is possible to it in another, and its mode of knowledge differs according to its mode of existence.

Unic enim et eidem rei est aliquid contra naturam, et secundum naturam secundum eius status diversos, eo quod non est eadem natura rei dum est in fieri, et dum est in perfecto esse. . . sicut quantitas completa est naturalis homini cum ad perfectam pervenerit aetatem, esset autem contra naturam puero, si in perfecta quantitate nascerceretur. . .

De Ver., 13.a.1.ad lum.

Since the soul is a separate substance and like is known by like it will know separate substances.

. . . Similitudo est causa cognitionis.

De Ver., q.8.a.7.c.

The soul is intelligent because it has a passive capacity for all being. The more material a thing is the less capable is it of having knowledge. Thus things which merely exist, as a stone, can have no knowledge for they cannot receive another form while retaining their own. Sentient things are capable of receiving some forms while remaining themselves and are thus capable of some knowledge. The human intellect, being immaterial, is able to receive the forms of all things, to know all things.

Inter perfectiones autem rerum potissima est quod aliquid sit intellectivum: nam per hoc ipsum est quodammodo omnia, habens in se omnium perfectiones. . .

I Cont.Gent., 44.
Consequently the object of the intellect, whether in the body or separated therfrom, is reality; its function is to grasp reality.

Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est quod quid est.

II Cont. Gent., 56.

Naturae autem intellectuales maiorem habent affinitatem ad totum quam aliae naturae: nam unaquaeque intellectualis substantia est quodammodo omnia, inquantum totius entis comprehensiva est suo intellectu. . .

III Cont. Gent., 112.

Even while united to the body the soul's knowledge extends to whatever is subject to the light of the active intellect, namely the natures of material things. Now in this life the soul is aided by the body, but it is at the same time enveloped by the body and prevented from receiving the influence of separate substances. Since the soul's nature is not changed by its separation from the body the object of its knowledge will be all being and it will be more capable of receiving knowledge of all being in the universal.

Est autem aliud genus potentiarum animae quod respicit adhuc universalius objectum, scilicet non solum corpus sensibile, sed etiam universaliter omne ens.


Being separated from the body the soul's intellectual activity will be conversant with objects not based on anything corporeal,

. . . substantiae separatae non accipiunt intellectivam cognitionem ex rebus sensibilibus.

II Cont. Gent., 96.

Since the knowledge which man acquired in this world will not be destroyed after death,

. . . notitia eorum quae homo in hoc mundo scit, non tollitur post mortem.

De Anima, q.un.a.15.c.
and since this knowledge was of things below the soul, material things, it follows that the soul will be able to know at least some material things. Moreover, forms which are higher possess those which are lower. Just as bodies which are living have the lower form of mere existence and those which have sensation are necessarily living, while those which have rational knowledge are necessarily sentient, the higher always including the lower forms in a more excellent manner. So too, the likenesses of inferior things are found in superior beings in a more excellent way.

Now whatever a lower power can do a higher power can do. Since the soul united to the body is able to know material things it must be admitted that the separated soul will likewise be able to have such knowledge, for its mode of existence is higher when separated. Likewise separate substances which are superior to the soul can know material things.
The knowledge which the angels have of material things is not drawn from the material things themselves, but rather, from actually intelligible species of things which are connatural to separate substances.

The possible intellect of the separated soul is in potentiality to all things intelligible, and is made actual through the influence of separate substances which are in act in respect to all intelligible things. Therefore the separated soul can understand all natural things.

Again, whatever understands that which is more intelligible understands that also which is less so. Since the separated soul understands itself and separate substances which are more intelligible than material things it must also be able to understand material things.
Although the separated soul can know all natural things yet it does not follow from this that the soul knows all singulars. Angels know singulars both as to their universal and their individuating principles, since it knows them by universal forms, a kind of participated similitude of the Divine Essence which is the cause of universal and individuating principles.

Sicut enim a Deo profluxerunt res, ut in propria natura subsisterent; ita ex divina sapientia profluxerunt formae rerum in substantias intellectuales, quibus res intelligerent.

De Anima, q.un.a.18.c.

Now the angelic intellect has perfect knowledge through such species, knowing not only the specific natures but also singulars contained in the species. However the separated soul, although like the separate substances in its mode of operation, is unlike them in its intellective power. Consequently the soul knows the specific natures of things confusedly, and it knows only those singulars to which it has some determinate relation. It will know some singulars therefore and not others.

.. animae separatae non solum cognoscunt species, sed individua; non tamen omnia, sed aliqua; et ideo non oportet quod sint in ea species infinitae.

De Anima, q.un.a.18.ad 7um.

Since to know a thing in the universal only is imperfect and incomplete knowledge the soul is not perfectly reduced to act, but is in potentiality to knowledge of some things.

.. quod anima separata habens universalem cognitionem scibilium naturalium, non est perfecta reducta in actum; quia cognoscere aliquid in universali, est cognoscere imperfecte et in potentia. ..

De Anima, q.un.a.18.ad 14um.
The reason for this is that the separated soul, being inferior to the separate substances, cannot perfectly know them, and consequently does not clearly see all those things known by these superior intellects.

\[ \text{De Anima, q.un.a.18. ad lum.} \]

Now even while united to the body the intellectual soul has knowledge of singulars, indirectly it is true, and by reflection. Thus, it considers its act and the intelligible species which is the principle of its operation, and finally comes to the consideration of the material representation of the object and knowledge of singulars, and first of all of those of which it received knowledge while united to the body.

\[ \text{De Anima, q.un.e.20.c.} \]

It cannot however know singulars in the same mode as when united to the body.
sunt phantasmata. Sed haec reflexio compleuri non potest nisi per adjunctionem virtutis cognitativae et imagina-tivae, quae non sunt in anima separata; unde per modum istum anima separata singularia non cognoscit. De Anima, q.un.e.20.c.

Superior separate substances are able to have knowledge of singulums because their intellectual power is proportionate to the universality of forms existing in them, and consequently they know the species of all natural things existing in a genus and all singulums contained in the species. But the power of the separated soul is proportionate to those forms abstracted from material things. Thus the soul will not be able to know all natural things completely and distinctly, but it will be able to know those singulums to which it has been determined by previous knowledge, or by some special affection or aptitude.

anima separata non cognoscit omnia naturalia, etiam secundum species, determinate et complete, sed in quadam universalitate et confusione; unde nec species influxae sufficiunt in eis ad cognitionem singularium, quorum singularium; ad quae anima habet aliquem ordinem specialem vel inclinationem, sicut ad ea quae petitur, vel ad ea ad quae afficitur, vel quorum aliqua impressiones et vestigia in ea remanent. Omne enim receptum determinatur in recipiente secundum modum recipientis. Et sic patet quod anima separata cognoscit singularia; non tamen omnia, sed quaedam. De Anima, q.un.e.20.c.

In answering the objection that because the soul while united to the body can know singulums only through the senses and not directly, the separated soul will be unable to know singulums at all, St. Thomas points out that the separated soul will be, in a way, like superior separate substances and able to receive from them influx of intelligible species,
through which it will know singulars. The soul united to the body will not be free to receive such species, not because its nature is different when separated, but because it is in a sense, cut off by the body from receiving such influence.

De Anima, q.un.a.20. ad 15um.

Thus both the separated soul and the soul united to the body will be able to know singulars, but according to different modes. The separated soul, having a mode of existence superior in itself, will know singulars according to a superior mode, though one less perfect for the soul.

It is objected that the act of knowledge acquired here cannot remain in the separated soul because to consider what was previously known is an act of the memory and memory is destroyed together with the corruption of the body.

Videtur quod actus scientiae hic acquisitae non maneat in anima separata. . .corrupto corpore, anima neque reminiscitur, neque amat. Sed considerare ea quae prius novit, est reminisci. Ergo anima separata non potest habere actum scientiae quam hic acquisivit. 

Sum.Theol., I.q.89.a.6.

It must be remembered that the memory which will be destroyed at the death of the body belongs to the sensitive part of man, but memory considered as the power of retaining species exists, not in any corporeal organ, but in the intellectual part for,
Those things which were previously understood are preserved in the intellect, and are not destroyed by the death of the body. St. Thomas meets the further objection that in this present life the soul cannot understand by intelligible species without turning to the phantasm, and since the intelligible species cannot have greater power in the separated soul than in the soul united to the body, when there are no phantasms to which it can turn, understanding through species here acquired is impossible.

In replying to this objection St. Thomas points out that in any action two things must be considered, first, the species, which is determined by the object and secondly, the mode, which is determined by the power of the agent. Thus, that an object is seen by the eye is due to the species of the object in the eye, but that it is seen clearly is due to the perfection of the visual power. Now the intelligible species remain in the separated soul as was said, consequently the soul will know what it formerly knew. But as the mode of existence of the separated soul is different its mode of operation will likewise be different, and consequently it will not need the phantasm.
impossible est intellectum nostrum secundum praesentis vitae statum quo passibili corpori conjungitur aliquid in actu, nisi convertendo se ad phantasmata.

Sum. Theol., I.q.84.a.7.c.

... in actu est duo considerare: Scilicet speciem actus, et modum ipsius. Et species quidem actus consideratur ex objectio, in quod actus cognoscitivae virtutis dirigitur per speciem, quae est objecti similitudo; sed modus actus pensatur ex virtute agentis; sicut quod aliquis videat lapidem, contingit ex specie lapidis, quae est in oculo; sed quod acute videat, contingit ex virtute visiva oculi. Cum igitur species intelligibiles maneant in anima separata. ... status autem animae separatae non sit idem sicut modo est; sequitur quod secundum species intelligibiles hic acquisitas anima separata intelligere possit quae prius intellexit; non tamen eodem modo, scilicet per conversionem ad phantasmata, sed per modum convenientem animae separatae. Et ita manet quidem in anima separata actus scientiae hic acquisitae, sed non secundum eundem modum.

Sum. Theol., I.q.89.a.6.

It is further objected that since habits produce acts similar to those whereby they are acquired and the acts whereby the habit of knowledge is here acquired are not adapted to the separated soul, no act of knowledge here acquired can be produced by the separated soul. It is true that in the present life the intellect acquires the habit of knowledge by turning to the phantasms, which it cannot do when in a separate state of existence. But since habits produce acts similar in species but not necessarily similar in mode to those acts whereby the habits are acquired, the objection does not hold.

... actus per quos acquiritur habitus, sunt similes actibus quos habitus causant, quantum ad speciem actus, non autem quantum ad modum agendi. Nam operari justa, sed non juste, id est delectabiliter, causat habitum justitiae politicae, per quem delectabiliter operamur.

Sum. Theol., I.q.89.a.6.ad 3um.
Since the separated soul understands in a mode suited to it as existing apart from the body, things which were impediments to its understanding while united to the body will no longer be so. Thus while the soul was in the body in order for it to carry on its proper operation the sense and the sensible object had in some way to come into contact. This contact might be impeded by local distance. An object afar off, for example, would not be seen clearly and consequently could not be known distinctly. Now the sensible faculties by which the phantasms are produced do not remain in the separated soul. Since local distance is an impediment only in so far as the senses are concerned it follows that the impediment no longer exists when the soul no longer requires the senses.

And:

manifestum est in eisdem quod localis distantia cognitionem animae separatae impedire non potest. Localis enim distantia per se comparatur ad sensum, non autem ad intellectum, nisi per accidens, inquantum a sensu accipit: nam sensibilia secundum determinatam distantiam movent sensum; intelligibilia autem acti,
secundum quod movent intellectum, non sunt in loco, cum
sint a materia corporali separata. Cum igitur substantiae
separatae non accipiant intellectivam a
sensibilibus, in eorum cognitionem distantia localis
nihil operatur.

II Cont. Gent., 96.

Did these sensitive powers remain the soul, as some have said, local distance
would be an impediment.

Dicunt etiam, quod sunt duplices potentiae sensitivae;
quaedam quae sunt in ipsa anima principium interiorum
actuum; et instantem in anima separata, corpore
destructio cum suis actibus; quaedam vero sunt principia
exteriorum actuum, quae sunt in anima simul et corpore,
et peremunt corpore, peremunt. Sed haec positio stare
non potest.

De Anima, q.un.a.19.c.

Thus the soul will understand without the aid of the senses and like separate
substances will be indifferent to what is near or far.

. . .quod intellectus indiget auxilio sensus secundum
statum imperfectae cognitionis, prout scilicet accipit
a phantasmatisbus; non autem secundum perfectionem cog-nitionis modum, qui competit animae separatae; sicut
homo indiget lacte in pueritia, nam tamen in perfecta
aestate.

De Anima, q.un.a.19.ad 19.

Because local distance does not impede the knowledge of the separated soul
it does not follow that distance of time does not impede it. Rather dis-
tance of time does impede this knowledge, for the soul cannot know future
things naturally. One cannot argue from distance of space to distance of
time for what is locally distant actually exists, but what is distant in
time does not actually exist and consequently is unknowable.

. . .quod distantia secundum locum sunt in rerum natura,
et participant aliquam speciem, cujus similitudo est in
The future can be known in two ways, first, in its cause, as one can know that an oak tree will come from an acorn, or that an eclipse will take place in the future.

... dupliciter possunt futura cognosci: uno modo in seipsis, alio modo in suis causis. In seipsis quidem a nullo cognosci possunt nisi a Deo: cujus ratio est, quia futura, prout futura sunt, nondum habent esse in seipsis; esse autem et verum convertuntur; unde cum omnis cognitio respiciens futura in ratione futuri, cognoscat ea in seipsis.

De Malo, q.16.a.7.

and,

... unumquodque hoc modo cognoscitur in aliquo quo est in eo. Quaedam igitur futura in causis suis proximas determinata sunt hoc modo, ut ex eis necessario contingant, sicut Solem oriti eras; et tales effectus futuri in suis causis cognosci possunt.

De Ver., q.8.a.12.

In this way the soul, whether present in the body or separate from it, is able to know the future. Secondly, the future can be known in itself, and in this manner even casual and chance events can be known.

... apparet quod Deus non entium notitiam habet; non tamen omnia non entia eamdem habent habitudinem ad eius scientiam; ea enim quae non sunt, nec erunt, nec fuerunt, a Deo sciuntur quasi eius virtuti possibilia. Unde non cognoscit ea ut existentia aliqualiter in se ipsis, sed existentia solum in divina potentia; quae quidem a quibusdam dicuntur a Deo cognosci secundum notitiam simplicis intelligentiae. Ea vero quae sunt praesentia, praeterita, vel futura nobis cognoscit Deus secundum quod sunt in potentia sua, et in propriis causis, et in se ipsis: et horum cognitio dicitur notitia visionis. Non enim Deus rerum quae
apud nos nondum sunt, videt solum esse quod habent in suis causis, sed etiam illud quod habent in se ipsis, inquantum eius aeternitas est praesent sua indivisibilitate omni tempori; et tamen esse uniuscumque rei Deus cognoscit per essentiam suam: nam sua essentia est repraesentabilis secundum multa quae non sunt, nec erunt, nec fuerunt: ipsa etiam est similitudo virtutis cuiuslibet causae, secundum quam praexistantunt effectus in causis: esse etiam cujuslibet rei quod habet in se ipsa, est ab ea exemplariter deductum. Sic igitur non entia cognoscit Deus, inquantum aliquo modo habet esse vel in potentia Dei, vel in causis suis, vel in se ipsis; quod rationi scientiae non obsistit...


And:

Deus futura contingentia sciat. . .

I Cont.Gent.87.

This knowledge of future things belongs to God alone however, and is not naturally possible to any created intellect. The intellectual soul, like all created intellects, can understand only by species. Now things not yet existing have no nature whereby they can be likened to species existing in the mind of separate substances and known. Therefore Angelic intellects cannot know the future in itself, much less can the separated soul.

Species quae sunt in intellectu Angeli, quantum est de se, aequaliter se habeant ad praesentia, praeterita, et futura; tamen praesentia, praeterita, et futura non aequaliter se habent ad species. . .; quia ea quae praesentia sunt, habent naturam per quam assimilantur speciebus quae sunt in mente Angeli; et sic per eas cognosci possunt. Sed quae futura sunt, nondum habent naturam per quam illis assimilantur. Unde per eas cognosci non possunt.

Sum.Theol., I.q.57.a.3. ad 3um.

Species quae sunt in mente Angeli, non se habent aequaliter ad praesentia, et futura: quia illa quae sunt praesentia, sunt similia inactu formis in Angelis
existentibus, et sic per ea possunt cognosci; illa vero quae sunt futura, nondum sunt similia; et ideo per formas praedictas non cognoscuntur. • •

De Ver., q.8.a.12. ad lum.

Since local distance does not impede the knowledge of the separated soul, as was said, it might seem that these souls know what takes place on earth.

Videtur quod animae separatae cognoscant ea quae hic aguntur.

Sum. Theol., I.89.a.3.c.

This does not follow however, for it is not local distance which prevents the separated soul from having knowledge of what takes place here, but rather the soul's mode of existence impedes such knowledge. The soul has knowledge of those singulars to which it is in some way determined, either by knowledge acquired in union with the body or by Divine ordinance. The soul existing apart from the body has existence as a separate substance and is not determined to corporeal things, things, that is, of this world. Therefore it cannot naturally have direct knowledge of what happens here.

... animae separatae non impediuntur a cognoscendis quae sunt hic, propter loci distantiam; sed quia non est in eis tanta efficacia intellectivae virtutis, ut per species influxas omnia singularia cognoscere possint.

De Anima., q.un.a.20. ad Sum.

This is because a thing is received according to the disposition of the thing receiving it, and the separated soul is in no way naturally disposed to receive directly knowledge of this world.

... animae vero separatae non possunt cognoscere per hujusmodi species nisi solum singularia illa ad quae
QUODAMmodo determinantur vel per naturalem habitudinem, 
vel per divinam ordinationem; quia omne quod recipitur 
in aliquo, recipitur in eo per modum recipientis. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.89.a.4.c.

Animae autem mortuorum secundum ordinationem divinam 
et secundum modum essendi segregatae sunt a conver-
satione viventium, et conjunctae conversationi spiritu-
tualium substantiarum quae sunt a corpore separatae;
unde ea quae apud nos aguntur, ignorant. 
Sum.Theol., I.q.89.a.3.c.

But just as the soul can know singulars indirectly so too can it receive 
indirect knowledge of what happens in this world. Being a separated soul 
it can know and consequently receive knowledge from other separated souls.
Thus the soul can have some knowledge of the affairs of this world.

Possunt etiam facta viventium non per seipsos cognoscere, 
sed vel per animas eorum qui hinc ad eos accedunt, vel 
per Angelos seu daemones, vel etiam Spiritu Dei reve-
lante. . . 
Sum.Theol., I.q.89.a.3. ad lum.

The objection has been raised that the separated soul cannot know 
separate substances. Since the soul joined to the body is more perfect 
than the separated soul and yet is unable to understand separate substances, 
it would seem that the separated soul would be still more incapable of such 
knowledge.

... anima unita corpori est perfectior quam separata, 
ut videtur; quia quaelibet pars perfectior est unita 
toti quam separata. Si igitur anima unita corpori 
non potest intelligere substantias separatas, videtur 
quod nec a corpore separata. 
De Anima, q.un.a.17.c.

Although it is true that the soul united to the body is more perfect accord-
ing to its nature than separated, yet the separated soul is more perfect as
regards its intellectual operation. Consequently the separated soul will be more capable of understanding separate substances than is the soul united to the body. Moreover, independence of matter makes a thing to be a proper term of intellect, and the separated soul, free from the weight of the body, has nothing to impede its knowledge, consequently it will be able to understand other separated souls and even superior separate substances.

Si autem substantiae separatae intelligunt ea quae sunt per se intelligibilia, ut est ostensum. ...per se autem intelligibilia sunt substantiae separatae, immunitas enim a materia facit aliquid esse per se intelligibile, ...sequitur quod substantiae separatae intelligent sicut propra objecta substantas separatas. Unaquaque igitur et se ipsam, et alias cognoscet.

II Cont. Gent., 98.

Moreover, even while united to the body the soul understands itself, though indirectly,

...anima nostra se ipsam cognoscit...

De Ver., q.8.a.6.c.

Since the soul united to the body understands only through the phantasm it is unable to understand itself directly, as there can be no phantasm of the soul. The separated soul, reduced to act through the influence of separate substances, will understand itself through itself, and will know those things having the same nature and mode of existence as itself.

...anima humana alio modo cognoscet seipsam cum fuerit separata; et alio modo nunc...

De Anima, q.un.a.17. ad 9um.

Further, like is known by like, thus, separated souls, having the same nature and mode of existence will be able to know one another.
Again, likeness is the cause of knowledge.

Again, likeness is the cause of knowledge.

Since the separated soul can understand material things much more is it able to understand separated souls, for it is of the same nature as they.

Every separate substance understands what is above itself and what is below itself, according to its mode of existence.

Consequently after the death of the body, the soul, being itself a separate substance, will be able to understand in a measure superior separate substances. Although the separated soul understands itself through itself, it will not be able to understand separate substances through itself, but rather, through impressed species. Moreover the angels are superior to the human intellect and therefore will not be perfectly understood so far as the natural knowledge of the soul is concerned.

The angels know themselves and other angels through impressed species existing in the angelic intellect. Since the intellectual power of the angels is proportionate to these species, the knowledge thus acquired is perfect.
 unicuique Angelo impressa est ratio suae speciei secundum esse naturale et intellectuale simul, ita scilicet quod in natura suae speciei subsisteret, et per eam se intelligeret; aliarum vero naturarum, tam spiritualium quam corporalium, rationes sunt ei impressae secundum esse intellectuale tantum, ut vide- licet per hujusmodi species impressas tam creaturas corporales quam spirituales cognosceret.

Sum. Theol., I.q.56.a.2.c.

The intellectual soul, being inferior to the angels, has imperfect knowledge of them according to this mode however.

. . . anima separata intuendo directe essentiam suam, cognoscet substantias separatas secundum influentiam receptam ab eis, vel a superiori causa, scilicet Deo; nam tamen ita perfecta cognoscet substantias separatas naturali cognitione, sicut ipsae cognoscunt se invicem. . .

De Anima, q.un.a.17.c.

Just as the soul is unable to know itself through its essence, so too is it unable to know separate substances through its essence. Rather, the soul knows what is above it through impressed species.

The separated soul can know not only itself and other separated souls, and superior separate substances by natural knowledge, but it can also know God.

. . . homines per sua naturalia Deum cognoscere possunt. . .

Sum. Theol., I.q.56.a.3.c.

However, as the soul is incapable of perfect knowledge of separate substances it is even more impotent with regard to knowledge of God.

Virtus autem divinae essentiae, qua est intelligibilis, excedit intellectum angelicum, et ommem intellectum creatum, secundum hoc quod est cognoscitivus: veritas enim divinae essentiae, qua cognoscibilis est, excedit lumen cuiuslibet intellectus creati, quo cognoscitivus est. Et ideo impossibile est quod aliquis intellectus
creatus divinam essentiam comprehendat, non quia partem aliquam eius ignoret, sed quia ad perfectum modum cognitionis ipsius pertingere non potest.

De Ver., q.8.a.2.c.

As matter without form is wholly unknowable so, inversely, infinity of form not limited by matter is supremely knowable.

...infinitum quod se tenet ex parte materiae non perfectae per formam, ignotum est secundum se, quia omnis cognitio est per formam; sed infinitum quod se tenet ex parte formae non limitatae per materiam, est secundum se maxime notum. Sic autem Deus est infinitus. ...

Sum.Theol., I.q.12.a.1.ad 2um.

But the human intellect is proportionate to the lowest intelligible forms, natures of material things, and is incapable of attaining naturally to an adequate knowledge of God, Who exceeds every kind of knowledge.

...Deus. ...est supra omne existens in quantum est suum esse. Unde ex hoc non sequitur quod nullo modo possit cognosci; sed quod omnem cognitionem excedat; quod est ipsum non comprehendi.

Ibid., ad 3um.

Cognitum autem est in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis. Unde cujuslibet cognoscentis cognitio est secundum modum suae naturae. Si igitur modus essendi alicujus rei cognitae excedat modum naturae cognoscentis, oportet quod cognitio illius rei sit supra naturam illius cognoscentis.

Sum.Theol., I.q.12.a.4.c.

Therefore unless the soul have the light of Glory it cannot see the Essence of God.

...Non igitur potest intellectus creatus Deum per essentiam videres, nisi in quantum Deus per suam gratiam se intellectui creato conjungit ut intelligibilem ab ipso.

Ibid.
quamvis intellectus noster sit factus ad hoc quod videat Deum, non tamen ut naturali sua virtute Deum videre possit, sed per lumen gloriae sibi infusum. Et ideo omni velamine remoto nondum oportet quod intellectus Deum per essentiam videat, si lumen gloriae non illustretur: ipsa enim carentia gloriae erit divinae visionis impedimentum.

De Ver., q.10.a.11. ad 7um.

The separated soul no longer understands by turning to the phantasm so the question arises, does the acting intellect by which the intelligible species are abstracted remain in the soul? If so, what is its function?

St. Thomas answers that the acting intellect does remain in the soul because it is natural and what is natural remains.

De Ver., q.19.a.1. ad 8um.

Whatever operations of the soul are performed without a corporeal organ are in the soul as both their principle and subject. The acting intellect is not subjected in the compositum, but rather belongs to the soul alone as its subject. It must, then, remain in the separated soul.

De Ver., q.19.a.7. ad 6um.

And:

omnes potentiae animae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad principium. Sed quaedam potentiae comparantur ad animam solam sicut ad subjectum, ut intellectus et voluntas; et huiusmodi potentiae necesse est quod maneant in anima, corpore destructo.

Sum. Theol., I.q.77.a.8.c.
There must be in man's nature an active and a potential intellect, neither of which can be separated from the soul of man.

Now the function of the acting intellect which is most stressed is its making the potentially intelligible to be actually intelligible. However a further function of the acting intellect is suggested. Supposing the phantasms to be made actually intelligible by a separate acting intellect it would still be necessary that the human soul have some active power drawn from that Separate Intellect by which the soul could make things intelligible actually.

Now what is actually intelligible does not need to be made more intelligible.
Were this power of the acting intellect merely to render actually intelligible what was already intelligible it would seem superfluous. Yet the acting intellect is natural to man and nature does nothing in vain.

St. Thomas points out that two things are necessary for intellectual vision, power of sight and union of the thing seen with the faculty of vision, vision being made actual only when the thing seen is in a certain way in the seer.

\[ \text{ad visionem tam sensibilem, quam intellectualem, duo requirentur, scilicet virtus visiva, et unio rei visae cum visu. Non enim fit visio in actu, nisi per hoc quod res visa quodammodo est invidente.} \]

Sum. Theol., I.q.12.a.2.c.

In another place St. Thomas maintains that through the possible intellect the separated soul will receive species from superior separate substances and through the acting intellect it will have power of understanding.

Operatio intellectus agentis et possibilis respicit phantasmata secundum quod est anima corpori unita. Sed cum erit anima a corpore separata, per intellectum possibilis respiciet species effluentes a substantiis superioribus, et per intellectum agentem habebit virtutem ad intelligendum.

De Anima, q.un.a.15.c.

Now the possible intellect is that whereby the soul understands,

\[ \text{intellectus possibilis est quo intelligit anima.} \]

De Anima, q.un.a.3.c.

yet the potential intellect must be made actual and nothing potential can render itself actual, but must be made actual by what is in act. Then this power by which the soul can become actually knowing must be something in the soul itself, and not the work of an outside agent. This is because no agent
works except by some power which is formally in the agent as a constituent of its being.

Nihil operatur nisi per aliquam virtutem, quae formaliter in ipso est... II \textit{Cont.Gent.}, 76.

The impression of the intelligible species upon the potential intellect must in some way be brought about by the action of a power in the soul, for St. Thomas points out that the intellectual operation cannot be effected in us through the mere impression of some superior beings.

...non tamen ita quod intellectualis operatio causetur in nobis ex sola impressione aliquarum rerum superiorem... \textit{Sum.Theol.}, I.q.84.a.6.c.

St. Thomas likens the acting intellect to a kind of light and he says that through the acting intellect the soul will have the power of understanding, as was said.

Unde et virtus intellectualis creaturae lumen quodam intelligibile dicitur, quasi a prima luce derivatum, sive hoc intelligatur de virtute naturali, sive de aliqua perfectione superaddita gratiae, vel gloriae. \textit{Sum.Theol.}, I.q.12.a.2.c.

It would seem that the acting intellect has a function beyond abstracting the intelligible species from the phantasm, and making them to be actually intelligible. Making them actually intelligible might be taken in two senses, first in regard to the phantasm, making it to be intelligible in act:

...intellectum agentem facit phantasmata a sensibus accepta intelligibilia in actu per modum abstractionis cujusdam. \textit{Sum.Theol.}, I.q.84.a.6.c.
Secondly, in regard to the potential intellect, by effecting the union of the intelligible species with the possible intellect, so that the possible intellect can actually understand. This might account for both the expression:

\[ \ldots \text{per intellectum agentem habebit virtutem ad intelligendum.} \ldots \]

\[ \text{De Anima, q.un.a.15.c.} \]

and:

\[ \ldots \text{sed forte ad praebendum lumen intelligibile intelligenti.} \ldots \]

\[ \text{Sum.Theol., I.q.79.a.3.c.} \]
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Father McCormick  
Dr. O'Neil  
Dr. Le Blanc  

December 18, 1940  
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