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The Political Theory of Saint Augustine

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The POLITICAL THEORY OF SAINT AUGUSTINE

A DISSERTATION

SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
OF ARTS AND SCIENCES OF LOYOLA UNIVERSITY
IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT
OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE
DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

By

Brother Hugh Martin, F.S.C.
# Table of Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I</td>
<td>Authority</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II</td>
<td>Law</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III</td>
<td>Property</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV</td>
<td>Slavery</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>143</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI</td>
<td>The Family and Education</td>
<td>169</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII</td>
<td>The Relations of Church and State</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bibliography</td>
<td>243</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Introduction

Purpose; previous political theory, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, others, revelation; Augustine's works, editions thereof; studies on Augustine's political theory, a list; criticism of some available ones; the plan of our thesis.

The discussion on which we are embarking concerns political theory. Webster defines the word political, first as pertaining to polity, or politics, or the management of the affairs of state. Political theory, then, will be a systematic exposition of the principles underlying the state. The following thesis attempts to bring into the political thought of St. Augustine organization and unity. It aims at setting forth Augustine's theory in such a way as to show that all the parts are consistent with the whole, and everything is grounded on the Augustinian idea of human nature. This does not mean that we propose to change the saint's theory but rather that we aim at gathering together the many scattered thoughts of St. Augustine which constitute his political theory and to show how there is a fundamental unity animating his politics. To do this, it has seemed necessary to divide the political theory into a number of topics, topics which are somewhat conventional in such discussions, and to develop each topic by having recourse to the writings of St. Augustine. So it appears that we are breaking up the subject into parts in order to put it together again. But this is no reason for complaint, since our poor human mind cannot apprehend
a subject directly in toto, but must be content with this round-
about process. As Plato remarks "Perfect unity and exactness,
 extending to the whole and every particular of political admin-
  istration, cannot be attained to the full until the discussion
 shall have a beginning, middle and end, and is complete in every
  part". And, we might remark, that in putting together the pol-
  itical theory of St. Augustine we can determine from the way the
  parts dovetail, and fit together, that his theory has a comple-
  teness and unity that recommend it very highly in the history of
  political thought. At the beginning, the work seems almost like
  a jig-saw puzzle--so fragmentary and dispersed are the various
  pieces. But when all is put together there is harmony and a
  beautiful picture is revealed.

To me the problem seems worthy of consideration. Among
  other reasons there is the wide-spread confusion that prevails
today in political thought, with erroneous concepts of state
  gaining currency, and false theories put into practice, with our
unsound ideologies and exaggerated "isms", with nationality and
  blood being set up almost as gods. In such an environment it
  will seem like a breath of fresh air to come in contact with the
serene and solid doctrine of Augustine. Then, too, political
  doctrine and the theory of state is always worth the attention
  of thinking men, since it figures so largely in the welfare of
mankind. It is here that we can readily appreciate the maxim
  that speculative theories tend to become practical realities,
for theories of politics worked out in the sanctums of philos-
ophers eventually force their way into halls of government. And finally, and perhaps chiefly, political theory is worth talking about because it is concerned with reality, and with reality in a very noble form. It has to do with man in so far as he is a political animal.

The political doctrine of St. Augustine merits our consideration and study, because of the greatness of Augustine as a thinker, and because of the valuable teaching he has handed down to posterity. Such is the renown of Augustine that Leo XIII in his Encyclical Aeterni Patris, On the Study of Scholastic Philosophy says:

"But Augustine would seem to have wrested the palm from all. Of a most powerful genius and thoroughly saturated with sacred and profane learning, with the loftiest faith and with equal knowledge, he combated most vigorously all the errors of his age. What height of philosophy did he not reach? What region of it did he not diligently explore, either in expounding the loftiest mysteries of the faith to the faithful, or defending them against the fell onslaught of adversaries, or again when, in demolishing the fables of the academicians or the Manicheans, he laid the safe foundations and sure structure of human science." (2)

The foundations St. Augustine laid in political science are especially safe, we might agree, for if Augustine did not discuss all the questions on politics we find in Plato and Aristotle, he did none the less have a more adequate concept of God and of man on which all politics rests.

The political theory of St. Augustine did not appear suddenly on the horizon of human knowledge, without any foreshadowing in previous philosophy. As a matter of fact political theories
are probably as ancient as human society itself, and very likely go back into pre-historic times. Plato has an interesting conjecture concerning the antiquity of government. According to him, innumerable forms of government have arisen in the course of ages and many times mankind has been largely destroyed through plagues and deluges. And the last recovery of civilization is quite recent. Whatever theories of government these ancient men drew up, we have no means of knowing now, but there are several classical expositions of political philosophy which preceded St. Augustine and which probably influenced his thought. It is not out of place to examine briefly the general outlines of the most important of these theories in order to give the proper setting to the politics of St. Augustine.

In the first place we have Plato. Plato was the first man in the history of Western Philosophy to lay down a formal treatise on government. This he did in his celebrated Dialogues wherein the subject of discourse is treated in a conversational mode between the several characters. In the Statesman, where the Younger Socrates and the Eleatic Stranger are the principal characters, we have political philosophy extolled as a royal science, and government distinguished into six fundamental types. In the Laws the Athenian Stranger engages in an all-day discussion, in which the relation of the individual to the state becomes clear, as the subject is developed. But the most celebrated and the most thorough political system is offered in the Republic, where Socrates discourses throughout a dialogue of ten
books. These three dialogues, Statesman, Laws, and Republic pretty well exhaust the thought of Plato on politics. St. Augustine, especially in his early writings, adopted the dialogue form, as we can see in his short treatise De Magistro (about 384 where Augustine and Adeodatus are the characters, or in the De Musica (387–389) where the Master and the Disciple elaborate the definition of music and inquire into poetic meter, rhythm, and verse. But in most of his philosophic writings Augustine used a plain essay style similar to Aristotle's as far as the form was concerned.

It is easy to see the fundamental difference in outlook between Plato and St. Augustine. The Greek philosopher with his pagan outlook on life had no concept of any authority besides the state and so he made the individual utterly subordinate to the interests of the state, and children the property of the state. Plato is by no means an impious man, on the contrary his Dialogues bespeak great reverence for the gods, and for all that is good and noble, but pagan that he was, he had no conception of a creature, nor of a God as a creator. Necessarily, then, he could hardly fathom the exact place to be occupied by the state in the economy of things. He glorified the state. All human endeavor was directed to the good of the state, and the state itself was for the sake of virtue. Communism, birth-control, outlawing of celibacy, --all were prescribed for the good of the state nor did any higher interests take precedence over the dominion of civil government. It was St. Augustine's concept
of the City of God that offered the most thoroughgoing improvement over Platonic philosophy, an improvement that grounds itself on the Christian concept of man. The difference between Plato and Augustine is fundamentally the difference between paganism and Christianity. But that doesn't mean Augustine found his whole system in the gospel. The fundamental concepts are there, but they had to be systematized, applied to the domain of government, and expanded to their logical conclusions.

Notwithstanding Augustine undoubtedly borrowed many ideas from Plato. He explicitly tells us in the Confessions that he obtained some of Plato's books in a Latin translation, which he read. This was in the thirty-first year of his age. In the City of God the saint discusses the question as to whether Plato got his conceptions concerning God from the Hebrew scriptures. He rather thinks that Plato was not conversant with the Hebrew scriptures since he lived before the time of Ptolomy's Greek translation. He renders homage to Plato in summing up the problem:

"But the most striking thing in this connection, and that which most of all inclines me almost to assent to the opinion that Plato was not ignorant of those writings, is the answer which was given to the questions elicited from the holy Moses when the words of God were conveyed to him by the angel; for, when he asked what was the name of that God who was commanding him to go and deliver the Hebrew people out of Egypt, this answer was given: "I am who am; and thou shalt say to the children of Israel, He who is sent me unto you; (Ex. III, 14) as though compared with Him that truly is, because He is unchangeable, those things which have been created mutable are not,--a truth which Plato vehemently held, and most diligently commended. And I know not whether this sentiment is anywhere to be found in the books of those who were before Plato, unless in that book where it is said, "I am who am; and thou
shall say to the children of Israel, Who is sent me to you."

(9) St. Augustine would seem to think that Plato had the concept of God enunciated in the words "I am who am". But either Augustine was not very conversant with Plato's works, or he is giving them a charitable and somewhat inexact interpretation. Plato had an exalted idea of God but he hardly conceived of him in the uniqueness of the biblical phrase. Along with Plato's god there was necessity, and chance which appear to be independent entities. (10) And the creator of Plato brings order out of chaos but seems to produce the chaos from nothing. In short, Plato is obscure on his idea of god, and in the different dialogues he says different things. Augustine was acquainted with Plato's Republic as we can see from his remark that Plato excluded poets from the ideal republic. He also attributes to Plato the threefold division of philosophy into moral, natural, and rational, and learned from him the notion of incorporeal reality. But yet there were truths that Plato does not express; if he speaks of the divinity of the eternal word, he makes no mention of the humiliation of the Incarnate Word. Augustine found things in the scriptures not found in Plato and we can trace both sources of truth in his political theory.

Another classical treatise on politics before Augustine's day was that of Aristotle. Like Plato, Aristotle wrote a formal discourse on the subject--his Politics. It was a systematic development of the idea of the state, of property, and of forms
of government arrived at by studying all available previous thought on the subject including over a hundred actual constitutions of states. However it seems doubtful whether Augustine was acquainted with Aristotle's theory. He seldom refers to Aristotle and contrasts him unfavorably with Plato as we see in the City of God where he speaks of "Aristotle, the disciple of Plato, a man of eminent abilities, inferior in eloquence to Plato, yet far superior to many in that respect." Augustine was acquainted with at least some of Aristotle's logical works as we learn from the Confessions: "There came into my hands when I was almost twenty years of age, certain works of Aristotle called the ten categories."

Cicero seems to have exerted a marked influence on Augustine's thought, and on his politics in particular. He tells us how in the nineteenth year of his age he was profoundly moved by reading Cicero's Hortensius, an exhortation to the pursuit of philosophy. There are a number of references in the City of God to Cicero's political writings. Thus Augustine comments on the De Republica of Cicero (this work is no longer extant) and examines the definition of a state therein contained. The saint takes ideas from the orations Contra Verrem, and Contra Catilinam which have to do with obscene public spectacles of the Romans. In the Tusculan Disputations Augustine finds Cicero saying that "Homer invented these things, and transferred things human to the gods. I would rather transfer things divine to us."

And the De Divinatione and the De Natura Deorum were also familiar to Augustine and he borrows these thoughts he can use...
from them, and criticizes them when he finds it necessary to differ. In the *City of God* Augustine either refers to Cicero or quotes him directly more than twenty different times, and in several passages he undertakes a lengthy analysis of Cicero’s thought, e.g., when he discusses the necessity of justice in the state which Cicero treats in the *De Republica*. But sometimes he rejects Cicero’s teaching as when Cicero maintained there was no knowledge of future things either in God or man, a position taken in order to refute the Stoics who would attribute everything to the inexorable influence of the stars. But Augustine objects to this opinion saying, "Now, against the sacrilegious and impious darings of reason, we assert both that God knows all things before they come to pass, and that we do by our free will whatever we know and feel to be done by us only because we will it. But more often Augustine agrees with Cicero. For instance he cites approvingly Cicero’s epithet *logomachy* as it was applied to the contentions between the Greek Peripatetics, Platonists, and Stoics and then proceeds to examine if this thirst for contention rather than for truth is not an infirmity of this life not shared by the angels.

(25)

Other philosophers were known to Augustine and more or less influenced his thought, and his politics. They were the epicureans, the stoics, the skeptics, and the neo-platonists. As to the neo-platonism of St. Augustine we find it concisely summarized by De Wulf:
"He owed him (Plotinus) his method of investigation by means of conscience, his exaggerated distinction of sensible and suprasensible, and many isolated doctrines of metaphysics and psychology (the sovereign good, intelligible illumination, the disparagement of sensation, the opposition of soul and body, mystical detachment, etc.) Augustine renounced and combatted in the system of Plotinus, the polytheism of the inferior gods, metempsychosis, and finally and above all monism and emanation." (27)

Neoplatonism, says De Wulf, is perhaps responsible for St. Augustine's tendency to closely associate faith and reason since it, too, had that predelection. All of Augustine's thought and rhetoric converged to a wisdom guided by the famous dual principle: Crede ut intellegas, and intellige ut credas. Another idea so characteristic of Augustine's philosophy which might be traced to the same source is the doctrine concerning the rationes seminales, the seminal reasons. According to this teaching, God had endowed matter at its creation with latent forces constituted according to the eternal ideas in the divine mind. These seminal reasons germinate in matter when proper conditions are realized producing individual things, hence all bodies are produced at the beginning either in complete reality or in embryo so to speak. The chief source for Augustine's thought on this question of seminal reasons is his work on exegesis, De Genesi ad Litteram.

We see then that St. Augustine had at hand the writings of a number of celebrated thinkers. He began his own works from the vantage point of the fourth century A.D., and could examine what had been done before him by Plato, by Cicero, by the Stoics the Epicureans and the Neo-Platonists. And more important even
than these writings, he had the advantage of the Christian revelation, with its great concepts of human nature, of providence, and the nature of God. He made ample use of this latter source as we can see from his numerous quotations from the Gospel, from the Epistles of St. Paul, and from the Old Testament. To be sure his political theory bears the impress of supernatural revelation in his concept of the state and the church, in the greater definiteness he brought to the idea of eternal law, in the relation of the family to the state, the dignity of the individual and in the providential role of civil governments in the unfolding of the divine plan of human destiny. In short Augustine's political theory has an orientation totally different from the theories of Plato and Cicero, from whom he Borrowed. It is his great genius to have applied the new concepts afforded by the Christian dispensation to the old problem of government, and that in a masterly way.

There is in St. Augustine's thought more of a distrust of philosophy than we are apt to find in the system of St. Thomas, and he is prone to attribute more to God and less to the creature. A typical passage manifesting this tendency occurs in the Contra Academicos:

"But there is remaining from many ages and many disputes, as I think, one study of true philosophy. It is not the philosophy of this world, which our Intellects rightly detests, but of another intelligible world. To this lofty knowledge souls blinded by the manifest darkness of error, and stained by the base tendencies of the body would never reach, if the great God... did not come down and take on himself a human body. Souls inspired not only by his pre-
cepts, but also by his example are able to enter into themselves, and without disputation to look up towards their fatherland." (30)

Let us now look into some of the works wherein Augustine's political thought is to be found. First and foremost in point of importance comes his De Civitate Dei. St. Augustine acquaints us with the purpose he had in mind in undertaking this monumental work. We find this purpose in the review he made of all his writings towards the end of his life which goes by the name of Retractations. In this place he also gives a concise outline of the whole work so that it is not out of place to quote it in extenso:

"Rome having been stormed and sacked by the Goths under Alaric their king, the worshippers of false gods, or pagans, as we commonly call them, made an attempt to attribute this calamity to the Christian religion, and began to blaspheme the true God with even more than their wonted bitterness and acerbity. It was this which kindled my zeal for the house of God, and prompted me to undertake the defence of the city of God against the charges and misrepresentations of its assailants. This work was in my hands for several years, owing to the interruptions occasioned by many other affairs which had a prior claim on my attention, and which I could not defer. However, this great undertaking was at last completed in twenty-two books. Of these, the first five refute those who fancy that the polytheistic worship is necessary in order to secure worldly prosperity, and that all these overwhelming calamities have befallen us in consequence of its prohibition. In the following five books I address myself to those who admit that such calamities have at all times attended, and will at all times attend, the human race, and that they constantly recur in forms more or less disastrous, varying only in the scenes, occasions, and persons on whom they light, but, while admitting this, maintain that the worship of the gods is advantageous for the life to come. In these ten books, then, I refute these two opinions, which are as groundless as they are antagonistic to the Christian religion...

"Of the twelve following books, the first four contain an account of the origin of these two cities—the city of God, and the city of the world. The second four treat of
their history or progress; the third and last four, of their deserved destinies. And so, though all these twenty-two book refer to both cities, yet I have named them after the better city, and called them The City of God." (31)

The City of God is a large work filling a whole tome in the Latin foils. In places it becomes quite prolix as Augustine wades through some intricate matter that has but little interest today. But here and there are passages displaying great eloquence or profound wisdom as when the Saint contrasts the earthly and heavenly cities, or shows the emptiness of the glory of the Roman empire. The horizon envisaged in the De Civitate Dei is so vast that if one is not alert, he is apt to be confused by detail, and not appreciate the real significance of the work. But as Marcus Dods says "the toil of penetrating the apparent obscurities will be rewarded by finding a real wealth of insight and enlightenment". As far as political theory is concerned the De Civitate Dei is a real mine from whence much of Augustine's thought can be extracted. The doctrine on the nature of the state, on war, slavery, and law in particular, can be largely culled from this work as we shall see. However there are many things on these subjects that can also be found, and often in a better development, in some of Augustine's other works. Let us look at these.

There is the De Libero Arbitrio, one of his early works, begun at Rome about 388, though not completed until he had become a priest in Africa. This dialogue between the characters Evodius and Augustine was written, as the saint declares, in
order to find from whence evil exists. It is not a long work, filling as it does, only about ninety pages in Migne's Patrology (35) but it contains some very pertinent matter for political theory. Thus chapter six, book one, has the caption, "Eternal law the moderatrix of mankind. The notion of eternal law," and (36) further on we come to a comparison of the lex aeterna and the lex temporaria, which is dealt with in our chapter on law. St. Augustine's idea of divine providence is found to be developed at some length in his two books of the De Ordine. Though he divides the work into two books, we should not conclude that it is lengthy because an Augustinian book is often only the size of an average chapter of a modern book. The whole first book of the De Ordine fills only eighteen pages of Migne's (37) Patrology. This is also one of his early works, written towards the end of the year 386, "in which the great question is deliberated--whether the order of divine providence contains all things good and evil". Though it does not explicitly treat of politics yet the doctrine of divine providence therein contained is bound to have an effect on Augustine's political theory, and for that reason is significant.

In the second book of the Retractations, Augustine reviews the works which he wrote while he was Bishop of Hippo. He informs us that he wrote four books under the title De Doctrina (39) Christiana and in these writings we find a few important passages on laws, showing that civil laws have a claim on our obedience. More important from the standpoint of political
political theory is a pretentious work (grande opus) entitled *Contra Faustum Manichaeum*, a portly venture in thirty-three books.

It is in this source that we find Augustine expounding his views on war, and a few remarks on law. Another large work is his celebrated *De Trinitate*, a very important source in theology that

in philosophy though there are scattered references to political topics. There are other works written during his long episcopate at Hippo, such as the *De Bono Conjugalí*, the *de Genesi ad litteram*, as well as numerous sermons, and letters, all of which contain more or less important political doctrine. All these writings are composed as circumstances and controversy dictated and hence nowhere do we find any formal and deliberately arranged treatise on political theory such as the *Politics* of Aristotle. Yet, for all that, the theory is there in principle and even in many details, and needs but to be assembled and systematized.

We have cast our eye over some of Augustine's writings which are pertinent to political theory and now let us examine the available editions of these same works. In the first place there are the editions containing the original Latin, and foremost among these, from the standpoint of completeness is Migne's Latin Patrology. The *Latin Patrology* is a huge reference work in 221 tomes containing all the available Latin writings of ecclesiastical writers from the dawn of Christianity to the reign of Pope Innocent III in 1215. The Patrology purports to contain the best edition of each author and in the case of St. Augustine it reprints the scholarly edition gotten out by the
Benedictine Monks of the congregation of St. Maur. This edition had appeared in eleven folio volumes between 1679 and 1700. The Benedictine edition in turn had adopted the recension of the theologians of Louvain after comparing it and correcting it with Gallic, Belgian, Vatican, and other codices.

Migne was a French priest (1800–1875) who undertook to publish inexpensive editions of ecclesiastical writings in order to promote scientific scholarship among the clergy. The Latin Patrology was not his only venture, but was the most notable and famous. He also edited a Greek patrology, a set of commentaries on scripture, a collection of theological writings together with editions of important spiritual writers such as Berulle, St. Thomas, and St. Theresa. The great distinction of the Latin Patrology is that it made available a vast store of rare and scattered works, but one of its drawbacks is that the printing is hard to read and at times barely legible. Also it does not always properly distinguish between genuine and spurious works. The works of St. Augustine are contained in volumes 32 to 47 of the Patrology and volume 32 bears the date 1861. There is an index at the end of each volume and there are large indices of subjects, of scriptural quotations, etc. at the end of Augustine's works. And the last four volumes of the whole Patrology contain extensive indices of the entire contents. These, of course, are of great aid in research and were extensively used in compiling this thesis. Migne's Patrology contains all the extant works of Augustine and some spurious works.
as well. These latter are short treatises bearing titles such as De Grammatica Liber, Principia Dialecticae, and the Categoriae Decem. Many of St. Augustine's writings can also be found in such primary sources as the Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum, which is in the process of publication at Vienne, and in the SS. patrum opuscula selecta ad usum prae sentim studiosorum theologiae, edited by H. Hurter in 43 volumes (1868-1885).

In addition there are numerous Latin editions of particular works of St. Augustine such as those of Gustave Combès.

Besides the Latin originals we have many English translations more or less complete. Among the more complete English editions is that edited by Marcus Dods in fifteen volumes, and published by T. & T. Clarke, Edinburgh. This edition is to be had at the Newberry Library and was consulted in preparing our thesis. Its drawbacks are first that it does not contain all of Augustine's works (the De Ordine and the Retractations among others are missing) and second the indices are very unsatisfactory—nothing like those in Migne's Patrology. The City of God was translated by Dods himself and the rest by other scholars. There are numerous editions of the Confessions ranging from the one in Everyman's Library with its cheap binding and unprepossessing aspect, to the more critical T. & T. Clarke edition. A very attractive version though without the 'impedimenta' of critical notes is that of J. G. Pilkington, published by Liveright in New York.

I subscribe to Brother Leo's dictum that "a good book handsomely printed is doubly a work of art", and for that reason I have
little sympathy for these scrawny editions of great classics.

some of the smaller works of St. Augustine (De Libero Arbitrio,
De Quantitate Anima, etc.) are being published by Fr. F.E.
Tourscher in the Latin with an English translation.

Having discussed Augustine's works and the editions thereof, let us examine some of the modern studies of Augustine's doctrine, especially of his political theory. Ueberweg-Geyer lists a number of treatises bearing on political doctrines of the ancient fathers (St. Augustine is one of the four great Latin Fathers of the Church). Thus there are the following: Fr.
X. Funk, Über Reichtum und Handel in Christl. Altertum, 1902;
S. Talamo, La schiavitù secondo i patri della chiesa, 1905; S.
Talamo, Il concetto della schiavitù da Aristotele ai dottori
scholastici, 1908; James Donaldson, Woman, her position and
influence in ancient Greece and Rome and among early Christians
1907; O. Schilling, Reichtum und Eigentum in d. altkirchle lit-
eratur, 1909; O. Schilling, Die Staats- und Soziallehre des
heiligen Augustinus, 1910 (these last two works are commended
by J. Martin in his Dotrine Sociale de S. Augustine, p. 3).
And the following works are more explicitely on Augustine's
political doctrine: C. Mirbt, Die Stellung Augustinus in der
Publizistik des Gregorian Kirchenstreits, 1888; Th. Sommerlad,
"Die wirtschaftliche Tätigkeit der kirche in Deutschland", Bd.
I, 1900, 101-152: Die theoretische Begründung des mittelalters-
kirchlichen Sozialismus durch Augustin; II, 1905, 1033: Die
Kirchlichen/Sozialismus Rezeption des Augustinismus als Program
des fränkischen Staatskirchentums; T. Fortin, Le droit de Propriété dans St. A., 1906; H. Weinand, Antike und moderne Gedanken über die Arbeit, dargestellt am Problem d. Arbeit beim hl. A., 1911; A. Focherini, La dottrina del diritto della guerra da S. A. a Baltazar d'Ayala, 1912; Offergelt, Die Staatslehre des hl. A. nach s. sämtlichen Werken, 1914; Frederich, Der Einfluss der Augustin. Anschauungen von pax, justitia, u. den Aufgaben der Übrigkeit auf die Erlasse und Gesetze d. deutschen Königige u. Kaiser von der Ottonen—bis zur Stauferzeit, 1914; E. Troeltsch s.A. et la répression de l'erreur religieux, 1918. These are all given in the bibliography at the end of Ueberwet-Geyer, Grundriss der Geschichte der Philosophie. Unfortunately none of the foregoing works are available in the libraries in this vicinity, and so no appraisal of them can be given. They are mentioned merely for the sake of completeness, to show what has been done in the modern studies of Augustine's political theories.

There are however several studies on Augustine's politics which were available in the preparation of this thesis and it is our plan to give our estimate of these. First there is the one by Abbe J. Martin entitled La Doctrine Sociale de Saint Augustin published in Paris in 1901. This is a small book in 8 vo. of 262 pages, and as the title indicates it deals with social doctrine. Social doctrine, be it recognized, is not identical to political doctrine. The social sciences deal with special phases of human society, as economics, sociology, politics, ethics, anthropology, ethnology, history, psychology, and comparative phil-
Sociology, or social science in its narrow meaning, is one of these sciences and it considers the origin and function of human groups, whereas political science aims at establishing the grounds for authority, or government, and determining its limits (i.e. by laws). Such topics as labor, the family, slavery, private property, and education more directly fall within the province of social science. On the other hand topics like authority, government, law, and war pertain more to political science. Even though no hard and fast line can be drawn to separate the two sciences, yet it seems that some distinction should be made. Abbe Martin seems not to have made such a distinction but takes up all these topics. The result is a lack of thoroughness in the treatment of the topics of the one science as well as of the other. It also loses the advantage of considering political topics under the formal aspect of political science. That is, there is a certain lack of precision. He treats the state from the social viewpoint and can hardly consider it adequately in its political function of ruling.

His book has four chapters: The Social Institution, The causes which produce prosperity in empires, Social inequality (property, almsgiving), and The Christian society. It is mostly a collection of texts from Augustine's works illustrating the various points of social theory, though by no means is it an exhaustive collection, for many are left out. Abbe Martin interprets the text with his own reflections, and many of his remarks, though briefer than one could desire, show considerable insight.
and grasp of the problems at hand. The book, though wanting greater development is helpful as an introduction to Augustine's thought.

Another book of use to our study was Saint Augustin, a Work in French, by Charles Boyer, S.J. It was published in Paris in 1932 and contains 320 pages. The subtitle classifies it as a work on Christian moralists—texts and commentaries. This is one of a collection being published under the editorship of M. l'abbé Emile Baudin. It deals with Augustine's moral doctrine in general, and necessarily can devote but limited space to topics of interest in political theory. The topic of eternal law is possibly of most interest to us and is fairly well developed. Interspersed throughout the chapters are short paragraphs in fine print wherein the author poses questions for solution, together with a brief analysis of the problem to be dealt with, and this is followed by a text from Augustine which contains the solution. This volume pertains less to political theory than that of L'Abbé Martin.

Angelo Bruculieri, S.J., has a book entitled Il Pensiero Sociale di S. Agostino. Published in Rome in 1932, it is a well organized volume of 338 pages, embracing Augustine's social doctrine in four chapters, under the headings: Property, Labor, the Family, and Religion. Each topic is preceded by a historical approach to the subject under consideration. Thus in discussing slavery he recalls the teaching of Aristotle, of Cicero, and of Holy Scripture, in order to give the proper setting to
St. Augustine's thought. Augustine's doctrine is then gathered from his many writings and choice quotations are offered to the reader, illuminated by a sage interpretation. In English we have an excellent study by John Figgis entitled The Political Aspects of St. Augustine's City of God. As the title indicates, it limits itself to the City of God for its materials, and in particular takes up Augustine's concept of the State, and goes into a discussion of his definition of the state. A short article by A.H. Carlyle on "St. Augustine" appearing in The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Medieval Thinkers, a miscellaneous collection of papers, is significant chiefly because of the interesting criticism it makes on Augustine's definition of the state as found in the City of God. This criticism is discussed and rejected by Figgis in his above-mentioned book.

These are the works which deal with the Political Theory of St. Augustine, which are to be found in libraries. Most are in the Cudahy library at Loyola University, a few in the Newberry Library, and as for the Chicago Public Library, the Crerar Library, and the Deering Library at Northwestern University, they have little or nothing on the subject. The Harper Library at Chicago University has a wealth of material on St. Augustine including various editions of different parts of his works, and ancient manuscripts and codices, modern studies on his philosophy, but curiously enough they have very few of the works on his political philosophy which we have quoted above from Ueberweg, almost none of them, I should say.
so much for our introduction. We now shall undertake to set forth Augustine's political theory. This is contained in embryo in his concept of authority, since whatever else we speak of in political science ultimately is explained in terms of authority. The first topic to be treated in this thesis, therefore, is St. Augustine's doctrine on authority. Authority manifests itself through laws and laws serve to define authority and to apply it to practical civic life. It becomes necessary, therefore, in our exposition of Augustine's political thought to treat of laws as he viewed them. Authority and law are the more theoretical and fundamental topics in this thesis, and the remaining chapters will but apply the principles already implied in these two concepts, to specific subjects, as to property, to slavery, and to war.
Notes

1 Plato, Laws, VI, 768.
3 Plato, Laws, III, 677.
4 Plato, Laws, VII, 804.
5 ibid. V, 738.
6 ibid. V, 740.
7 ibid. IV, 721.
8 St. Augustine, Confessions, VII, IX.
9 St. Augustine, City of God, VII, 11.
10 Plato, Tim. 30.
11 St. Augustine, City of God, II, 14.
12 ibid. VIII, 4.
16 City of God VIII, 12.
17 Confessions IV, 16.
18 ibid. III, 4.
19 City of God II, 21.
20 ibid. II, 27.
22 ibid. IV, 26.
23 ibid. XIX, 21.
For a discussion of these men see what Augustine has to say of their doctrines in the Contra Academicos III, XVII, 37 et seq. There he mentions Polemus, Zeno, Archesilas, Chrysippus, Carneades, Antiochus, Philo, etc.

"S'il lui doit sa méthode d'investigation par la conscience, sa distinction excessive du sensible et du suprasensible, et maintes doctrines isolées de métaphysique et de psychologie (le souverain bien, la lumière intelligible, la dépréciation de la sensation, l'opposition du corps et de l'âme, le détachement mystique, etc.), Augustin renie et combat dans le système platonien, le polythéisme des dieux inférieurs, la métémpsychose, enfin et surtout le monisme et l'émanation."


St. Augustine, Contra Academicos III, XIX, 42.

Multis quidem saeculis multisque contentionibus, sed tamen eliquata est, ut opinor, una verissimae philosophiae disciplina. Non enim est ista hujus mundi philosophia, quam sacra nostra meritissime detestantur, sed alterius intelligibilis; cui animas multiformibus erroris tenebris caecatas, et altiassimis a corpore sordibus oblitas nunquam ista ratio subtilissima revocaret, nisi summus Deus...usque ad ipsum corpus humanum declinaret, atque submitteret; cujus non solum praeceptis, sed etiam factis excitatae animae redire in semetipsas, et respicere patriam, etiam sine disputationum concertatione potuissent.

St. Augustine, Retractationes II, 43. The translation is by Dods in the introduction of his edition of the City of God.

Marcus Dods, City of God introd. p. XV.

St. Augustine, Retract. I, 9, 1.

ibid.

Patrologia Latina v. 32, pp. 1220-1310.

St. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio I, XV.

"in quibus magna quaestio versatur, utrum omnia bona et mala divinae providentiae ordo continet."

Retract. II, IV, 1.


Brother Leo, English Literature, Ginn & Co. N.Y. p. 148.


N. B.: P.L. is an abbreviation for Patrologia Latina, or "Migne's Patrology".
Chapter I: Authority.

Political theory seeks to investigate human society in so far as it is governed by authority. Whatever pertains to government, therefore, is within the province of political science, and first and foremost, must political science study the phenomena of authority, upon which all government rests. What, then, has Augustine to say concerning authority? He says many things, we can immediately answer, and it becomes us now to set forth all these ideas in order. To understand his doctrine on authority, its necessity in human society, its origin, its different manifestations, and the duties it entails—this will be the object of the present chapter. Authority might be regarded as the corner stone of political science, the arm which supports the state, and the bound which describes the sphere of the state.

Augustine lived in a time when authority in the Roman empire was none too strong. Already Rome was beginning to totter. In 410 it was stormed and sacked by the Goths under Alaric. The Vandals invaded Africa in 426 and laid siege to Hippo in 430, the very year of Augustine's death. Then there were the heretics and outlaws who periodically overran Africa and even threatened the life of the Bishop of Hippo. There was the famous controversy which had but recently occurred between St. Ambrose of Milan and the emperor Theodotius over a point of authority. All of these events could not help but direct Augustine's atten-
tion to the question of authority, and in particular impress upon him the necessity for authority. Absence makes the heart grow fonder, 'tis said. Could not this principle have worked out in the case of Augustine, leading him to attach so much importance to authority, to peace and order?

Certainly authority is necessary: Augustine points this out from the fact that all men desire peace, and without authority there can be no peace as even the wicked man knows. "For he sees that peace cannot be maintained unless all the members of the same domestic circle be subject to one head, such as he himself is in his own house." Moreover the rule of authority is so requisite as to be indispensable, and those that would do away with the just rule of God must substitute a rule of their own, unjust though it be. "It is thus that pride in its perversity apes God. It abhors equality with other men under Him; but instead of His rule it seeks to impose a rule of its own upon its equals." And Augustine would regard this demand for authority as a requirement of human nature which even vice cannot extirpate. "It (i.e. perversity) abhors, that is to say, the just peace of God, and loves its own unjust peace; but it cannot help loving peace of one kind or another. For there is no vice so clean contrary to nature that it obliterates even the faintest traces of nature."

The necessity of authority is further manifested by the order and law which obtain in heaven and on earth. Augustine describes how there is an order permeating the world in all its
parts introducing harmony and concord in the family, in the state, between man and God, between the body and the soul, and between the members of the body, and the faculties of the soul. (4)

Now, though Augustine in this passage is speaking of order in the universe, and says nothing directly of authority, yet we must observe that the two concepts are inseparable. Where there is order, there must also be authority, that is to say an agent with power to order. Hence St. Augustine recognizes an order, an authority, in the family, in the state, in man himself—in fact underlying and permeating the universe. So extensive is this order that he will let none escape its influence; no, not even those who cut themselves off from its peace and tranquility. For "inasmuch as they are deservedly and justly miserable, they are by their very misery connected with order. They are not, indeed, conjoined with the blessed, but they are disjoined from them by the law of order". (5)

There is, then, authority ruling the order of all things. But more than that, man participates in this authority and by the law of nature, has power over some creatures. St. Augustine quotes that passage from Genesis defining man's authority. "Let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every creeping thing that creepeth on the earth". But, because of the dignity of the rational nature made to His image, God did not intend that man should have dominion over man, but rather over beasts. And to impart this truth to man, in the beginning the righteous were made shepherds
cattle, not kings over men. If it is true that God did not give man authority over his fellows, how can there be any such institution as a state, or in truth any group whatever? To solve this question we must bring in another of Augustine's principles. We must look for something to account for the fact that here and now man does exercise authority over man.

There is a law in man's nature urging him to live in community with his fellow man and such a life supposes order and subordination of authority. Leo XIII in his encyclical Immortale dei accepts this doctrine saying:

It is not difficult to determine what would be the form and character of the State were it governed according to Christian philosophy. Man's natural instinct moves him to live in civil society, for he cannot, if dwelling apart, provide himself with the necessary requirements of life, nor procure means of developing his mental and moral faculties. Hence it is divinely ordained that he should lead this life—be it family, social, or civil—with his fellow men, amongst whom alone his several wants can be adequately supplied. But no society can hold together unless someone be over all, directing all to strive earnestly for the common good; every civilized community must have a ruling authority.

Authority would thus be founded by implication on man's nature as a gregarious animal. Aristotle calls man a political animal.

St. Augustine expresses this doctrine of man's social nature in several places, as in the City of God where he writes: "We give a much more unlimited approval to their idea that the life of the wise man must be social. For how could the city of God...either take a beginning or be developed, or attain its proper destiny, if the life of the saints were not a social life?"

The social life is just as natural to man as it is to beast...
A Birds:

"What kite, solitary as he is when circling over his prey, does not seek a mate, build a nest, hatch the eggs, bring up the young birds, and maintain with the mother of his family as peaceful a domestic alliance as he can? How much more powerfully do the laws of man's nature move him to hold fellowship and maintain peace with all men so far as in him lies. (11)

So if man has not been given dominion over man as he has over beasts, still the exigencies of his nature as a social animal demand authority.

The desire for peace, and man's common nature leads him to gather together in society. There is still another bond uniting men, namely that of family affection. In fact it was to form this family bond that God created but one single man. "And therefore God created only one single man, not, certainly, that he might be a solitary bereft of all society, but that by this means the unity of society and the bond of concord might be more effectually commended to him, men being bound together not only by similarity of nature, but by family affection." (12) The remembrance of this first parent should serve to preserve the unity of the whole multitude. As a matter of fact the family bond was the chief influence leading to the foundation of cities in the beginning. The first cities were founded by the increase of families so that even in the lifetime of Cain there were sufficient people to form a city. (13) This doctrine of the origin of the human race from a single progenitor is, of course, derived from revelation. It gives to Augustine a viewpoint on human society that the ancient philosophers didn't have. Aristotle recog-
mises that the family is a primary and essential combination of society but he did not try to trace the origin of the family to the very beginning. Plato thought human souls were "created" in the beginning equal in number to the stars.

We have seen that authority is necessary and that its necessity is manifested in different ways: by the desire for peace, by the order to be found in the universe, by man's dominion over beasts, by the unity of man's common nature, and by the bond of family. If we have shown that Augustine considered authority to be necessary, we have not shown how he would attribute it to certain men rather than others. If nobody has dominion over his fellow man by the law of nature, how do kings receive the authority of their office? It cannot originate from the consent of the governed because nobody can confer an another what he has not himself. Clearly all authority comes from God as Augustine shows basing his doctrine on several texts found in scripture. Thus he quotes from St. Paul, "There is no power but from God and those that are are ordained of God". And in the City of God, he writes:

"We do not attribute the power of giving kingdoms and empires to any save to the true God, who gives happiness in the kingdom of heaven to the pious alone, but gives kingly power on earth both to the pious and the impious, as it may please Him, whose good pleasure is always just." (18)

Yet, though authority comes from God, Augustine does not seem to teach that God intervenes directly in human affairs to confer kingly power on certain individuals. That is, he does not teach
The doctrine of the "divine right of kings" in the sense that the king has a special commission from God to rule, as was thought in certain quarters about the time of James II of England. However Augustine admits some action on the part of God—probably best described as his general providence governing all things. Thus the saint proceeds:

"For though we have said something about the principles which guide His administration, in so far as it has seemed good to Him to explain it, nevertheless it is too much for us, and far surpasses our strength, to discuss the hidden things of men's hearts, and by a clear examination to determine the merits of various kingdoms. He, therefore, who is the one true God, who never leaves the human race without just judgment and help gave a kingdom to the Romans when He would, and as great as He would, as He did also to the Assyrians, and even to the Persians, by whom as their own books testify, only two gods are worshipped, the one good and the other evil." (19)

Augustine recognizes that God gives power not only to nations, but even to individuals. His words are somewhat ambiguous and could possibly be interpreted in defence of the doctrine that the divine right of kings is a special commission from God. Let us hear what he says:

"He who gave power to Marius gave it also Caius Caesar; He who gave it to Augustus gave it also to Nero; He also gave it to the most benignant emperors, the Vespasians, father and son, He gave it also to the cruel Domitian...Manifestly these things are ruled and governed by the one God according as He pleases; and if his motives are hid, are they therefore unjust?" (20)

Augustine in other places however recognizes the efficiency of secondary causes and hence he probably means that though God ultimately bestows authority on every ruler, nevertheless God
confers it immediately through second causes. This line of thought is expressed with greater definiteness by Pope Leo XIII when he says, "Authority, no less than society itself, has its source in nature, and has consequently, God for its author". 

In this way the king would hold his power from God, but mediately and not immediately. Surely something depends on human will.

"How, then," asks St. Augustine, "does an order of causes which is certain to the foreknowledge of God, necessitate that there should be nothing which is dependent on our wills, when our wills themselves have a very important place in the order of causes?"

In another place the saint thinks that the selection of kings depends on "the order of things and times", and seems to mean that God in his general providence selects some for kings, without making it a special commission as was the case with the Hebrews, his chosen people. God can arrange circumstances, and guide events so that the selection of a certain man for king can appear to be mere coincidence, or fortune, but even such a procedure is in reality not outside of the providence of God. Such was apparently Augustine's conviction. For we read in the City of God:

"Therefore that God, the author and giver of felicity, because he alone is the true God, Himself gives earthly kingdoms both to good and bad. Neither does He do this rashly, and as it were fortuituously,—because He is God, not fortune—but according to the order of things and times which is hidden from us but thoroughly known to Himself." (23)

Thus the divine will cooperates with the human will in
transmitting authority. Both the good and the wicked strive for power but in either case authority is from God. Thus Augustine quotes Sallust: "For glory, honor, and power are desired alike by the good man and the ignoble, but the former strives outward to them by the true way, whilst the other knowing nothing of the good arts, seeks them by fraud and deceit." The true way, adds Augustine, is virtue. But "in a word human kingdoms are established by divine providence." In another place he mentions the laws of divine providence which could be readily interpreted to mean a general supervision leaving something to human laws and customs, and the natural play of human ingenuity. This is in all probability the sense in which St. Augustine would have it that kings hold their power from God. For God who provides for the harmony, so to speak, of the flower of a plant, or the feather of a bird, and the mutual peace of all the parts—"that God can never be believed to have left the kingdoms of men, their dominions and servitudes, outside of the laws of His providence."

If we trace all authority to God and affirm that every king and every ruler holds his place through the providence of God, the question will be asked whether this refers only to good rulers, or are even the wicked chosen according to divine providence? If human kingdoms are established by divine providence do they also decay and finally perish according to the same providence? In response to the latter question we can point to numerous places where Augustine attributes the downfall of kingdoms and rulers to the providence of God. Thus Radagaisus who
With his horde laid siege to Rome suffered defeat, "Where he was overwhelmed at the nod of the Supreme Majesty". Even wicked emperors rule in accordance with a providential decree. St. Augustine thinks that people get just the kind of a ruler that they deserve; when society becomes perverted rulers gain power who are wicked. Such was the case with the Romans under the rule of Nero:

"But he who is a despiser of glory, but is greedy of domination, exceeds the beasts in the vices of cruelty and luxuriousness. Such, indeed, were certain of the Romans, who, wanting the love of esteem, wanted not the thirst for domination; and that there were many such, history testifies. But it was Nero Caesar who was the first to reach the summit, and, as it were, the citadel, of this vice; for so great was his luxuriousness, that one would have thought there was nothing manly to be dreaded in him, and such his cruelty, that, had not the contrary been known, no one would have thought there was anything effeminate in his character. Nevertheless power and domination are not given even to such men save by the providence of the most high God, when He judges that the state of human affairs is worthy of such lords... it is most unambiguously said of God, that He "maketh the man who is an hypocrite to reign on account of the perversity of the people (Job XXXIV, 30)". (29)

Plato gives prominence in his political theory to a discussion of the different forms of government; monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, tyranny, oligarchy, and mob rule. And Aristotle in his Politics does the same. But St. Augustine makes no mention of these various forms of government. In one place he seems to express the greatest of indifference to the form of government. "For, as far as this life of mortals is concerned, which is spent and ended in a few days, what does it matter under whose government a dying man lives, if they who
do not force him to impiety and iniquity?"

In the eyes of St. Augustine the Roman empire had many commendable features in its government. Especially is this true under some of the Christian emperors, notably under Constantine and Theodosius. He gives Constantine this encomium:

"He reigned for a long period as sole emperor, and unaided held and defended the whole Roman world. In conducting and carrying on wars he was most victorious; in overthrowing tyrants he was most successful." (32)

Theodosius, too, was distinguished as a ruler for his justice and piety. The increase in extent in the Roman empire St. Augustine looks upon as a natural reward for the virtues, the love of glory, and the ambition of the Romans. The hard and rugged lives of the early citizens merited that God should give them dominion over many nations. But from these praises let us not regard St. Augustine as a complacent monarchist, willing to whitewash the Roman empire. For on the other hand he is not loath to castigate the degradation of morals that had crept into the empire and which is now leading to its downfall at the hands of the barbarians.

Moreover of what advantage is this vast increase in the extent of the Roman empire. "Why must a kingdom be distracted in order to be great? In this little world of man's body, is it not better to have a moderate stature, and health with it, than to attain the huge dimensions of a giant by unnatural torments, and when you attain it to find no Rest." So we see that St. Augustine makes little mention of the various forms of authority
such as other philosophers had discussed. He does refer to the Roman republic but makes no comparison as to its merits relative to those of monarchy. Most of his comments concern kings and monarchy, which he recognizes as the most ordinary form of government. He makes mention both of its virtues and of its weaknesses. It is noteworthy that St. Augustine does not express his opinion on democracy although he came in contact with certain democratic tendencies during his life. In his time, for example it was customary in the Church for the bishops to be selected by popular acclamation of the faithful. In this manner Ambrose had been chosen Bishop of Milan. In this manner Augustine himself was marked out for the episcopacy.

St. Augustine, if he does not mention democracy, does at least prefer small kingdoms to large empires.

"Let them ask, then, whether it is quite fitting for good men to rejoice in extended empire. For the iniquity of those with whom just wars are carried on favors the growth of a kingdom which would certainly have been small if the peace and justice of neighbors had not by any wrong provoked the carrying on of war against them; and human affairs being thus more happy, all kingdoms would have been small rejoicing in neighborly concord; and thus there would have been very many kingdoms of nations in the world, as there are very many houses of citizens in a city." (37)

We have discussed authority by pointing out its necessity, its origin from God, and its principal form as viewed by St. Augustine. Something must now be said concerning that character which must underlie all true authority. That character is called justice. Augustine on this point recalls the doctrine of Cicero who posed the Question "whether the republic cannot be
governed without injustice," and quotes with approval the opinion Cicero expresses. "The people he defines as being not every assemblage or mob, but an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of law, and by a community of interests. Then he shows the use of definition in debate; and from these definitions of his own he gathers that a republic, or "weal of the people", then exists only when it is well and justly governed, whether by a monarch, by an aristocracy, or by the whole people." Moreover he goes on to say that if the rule is unjust, the republic is not only blemished, but altogether ceases to be. Augustine however, thinks this opinion is a little too rigorous, and prefers to use a less strict definition of a republic. He grants that there was a "republic of a certain kind" administered by the Romans, but true justice has no existence save in the republic whose founder and ruler is Christ.

Kingdoms without justice are but a mockery, as Augustine makes plain in the City of God where he refers to a story told about Alexander the Great:

"Justice being taken away, then, what are kingdoms but great robberies? For what are robberies themselves but little kingdoms? The band itself is made up of men; it is ruled by the authority of a prince, it is knit together by the pact of confederacy; the booty is divided by the law agreed on. If, by the admittance of abandoned men, this evil increases to such a degree that it holds places, fixes abodes, takes possession of cities, and subdues peoples, it assumes the more plainly the name of a kingdom, because the reality is now manifestly conferred on it, not by the removal of covetousness, but by the addition of impunity. Indeed, that was an apt and true reply which was given to Alexander the Great by a pirate who had been seized. For when that king had asked the man what he meant by keeping hostile possession
of the sea, he answered with bold pride, "What thou meanest by seizing the whole earth; but because I do it with a petty ship, I am called a robber, whilst thou who dost it with a great fleet art styled emperor." (40)

If justice is to underlie authority it supposes certain duties on the part of those who govern. There is the duty of commanding others, which, though it seems agreeable and honorable enough, is however a heavy burden, not without its perils and difficulties. "But in the family of the just man who lives by faith and is as yet a pilgrim journeying to the celestial city, even those who rule serve those whom they seem to command; for they rule not from a love of power, but from a sense of duty they owe to others—not because they are proud of authority but because they love mercy." Some there are who are filled with the desire of ruling because of their delight in human glory. They possess good moral qualities, which although few have these abilities, yet many can judge well of them. Such men strive for power in the true way. But there are others who without possessing requisite qualities, or desiring glory which would restrain their evil conduct, yet seek domination and power.

"But there could be nothing more fortunate for human affairs than that, by the mercy of God, they who are endowed with true piety of life, if they have the skill for ruling people, should also have the power." (42)

Augustine proposes to emperors the duty of ruling not to obtain human glory but rather eternal felicity; it is better to govern their depraved desires rather than any nation whatever; and if they do all these things, not through ardent desire of empty
glory but through love of eternal felicity; "if they prefer to
govern depraved desires rather than any nation whatever", they
are happy. Thus Augustine true to his doctrine that all au-
thority comes from God teaches that to rule is to fulfill a duty
which attaches to authority.

What is the purpose of authority? At what good does it aim?
Taking St. Augustine's doctrine that to rule is to serve, we can
easily see that authority can have for its end nothing other than
the good of the governed, the common good. But in what does the
common good consist? In answer to this question we can extract
from Augustine's writings several notes which characterize the
common good. They might conveniently be summarized under the
headings of union among the members of the state, and of peace.
The saint lets us know how union should exist in the state by
citing certain words of Cicero comparing this union to the har-
mony obtained in beautiful music.

"As among the different sounds which proceed from lyres,
flutes, and the human voice, there must be maintained a cer-
tain harmony, which a cultivated ear cannot endure to hear
disturbed or jarring, but which may be elicited in full and
absolute concord by the modulation even of voices very unlike
one another; so, where reason is allowed to modulate the di-
verse elements of the state, there is obtained a perfect
concord from the upper, lower, and middle classes as from var-
ious sounds; and what musicians call harmony in singing, is
concord in matters of state, which is the strictest bond and
best security of any republic, and which by no ingenuity can
be retained where justice has become extinct." (44)

Augustine has in mind two kinds of union. There is that sought
by the citizens of the earthly city, and that sought by the cit-
izens of the heavenly city. Those who seek for the earthly peace
look for it in the undisturbed possession of the goods of this life, while those who live by faith look for eternal blessings.

However this earthly union is necessary and natural as is seen from the fact that even those of "the heavenly city" do not hesitate to abide by it.

"This heavenly city, then while it sojourns on earth, calls citizens out of all nations, and gathers together a society of pilgrims of all languages, not scrupling about diversities in the manners, laws, and institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and maintained, but recognizing that, however various these are, they all tend to the same earthly peace. It therefore is so far from rescinding and abolishing these diversities, that it even preserves and adopts them, so long as no hindrance to the worship of the one supreme God is thus introduced." (45)

Along with union among the citizens, peace is to be striven for, and is indeed one of the goods which a just authority can secure for us. Even people of the earthly city have a peace which we should aim at. By the earthly city St. Augustine does not mean the state as such, but only those people who make earthly joys the final aim of their lives. However Augustine did apparently think that such people constituted a large portion of the state. "Yet even this people has a peace of its own which is not to be lightly esteemed, though, indeed, it shall not in the end enjoy it, because it makes no good use of it before the end. But it is our interest as long as the two cities are mingled, that we also enjoy the peace of Babylon. And therefore the apostle also admonished the Church to pray for kings and those in authority, assigning as the reason, "that we may live a quiet and tranquil life in all godliness and love (I Tim. II,2)"
peace is such an excellent thing to be attained that St. Augustine says the whole use of things temporal has a reference to earthly peace in the earthly community. Augustine apparently had a very profound esteem for peace, a sentiment which no doubt was augmented by the sense of insecurity that pervaded the entire Roman world during his time. Peace, he defines, as "tranquility of order". There are many kinds of peace; there is the peace of the body which consists in the duly proportioned arrangement of its parts. The peace of the irrational soul is the harmonious repose of the appetites, and that of the rational soul, the harmony of knowledge and action. The peace of body and soul is the well-ordered and harmonious life and health of the living creature. Peace between man and God is the well-ordered obedience of faith to eternal law. Domestic peace is the well-ordered concord between those of the family who rule and those who obey. Civil peace is a similar concord among the citizens. The peace of the celestial city is the perfectly ordered and harmonious enjoyment of God, and of one another in God. From these many varieties of peace we can see that Augustine viewed the state as merely one of many agencies in the divine scheme of things that constitute the hierarchy of peace, bringing harmony to the universe.

And so St. Augustine enumerates many kinds of peace and in showing how it figures so intimately in the well-being of mankind he sums up the case thus:

"God, then, the most wise Creator and most just ordainer of all natures, who placed the human race upon earth as its greatest ornament, imparted to men some good things adapted t
This life, to wit, temporal peace, such as we can enjoy in this life from health and safety and human fellowship, and all things needful for the preservation and recovery of this peace. (49)

This doctrine whereby Augustine puts peace as the object, the aim, and the end of authority is weighty with meaning, and could hardly be over emphasized in times like these. Pope Pius XI, in his encyclical, Ubi Arcano, speaks of this need for a peace which is spiritual and which resembles what Augustine has said: "First and most important of all, for mankind is the need of spiritual peace. We do not need a peace that will consist merely in acts of external or formal courtesy, but a peace which will penetrate the souls of men and which will unite, heal, and reopen their hearts to that mutual affection which is born of brotherly love."

(50)

There is no other good, be it riches, power, or dominion which quite takes its place, and there is no means to secure peace except by just and well founded authority. When St. Augustine insists on a firm foundation for authority—God himself, and then proposes such a noble end for this authority—peace and union—he has linked two potent truths which serve to support each other.

There is an interesting discussion taken up in the City of God about the definition of the state which throws some light on Augustine's view of the relation between authority and the union to be achieved by authority. Since this topic has provoked some controversy among recent expositors of St. Augustine, it will be useful to examine it. According to St. Augustine if we were to accept the definition set down by Cicero in his De Republica, there never was a Roman republic, for Cicero briefly defines a
republic as the weal of the people. And if this definition be true, there never was a Roman republic, for the people's weal was never attained among the Romans. It is not the stronger party which creates rights in a state. Where there is no true justice there can be no right. For that which is done by right is justly done. For the unjust inventions of men are neither to be considered nor spoken of as rights; for even the unjust say that right is that which flows from the fountain of justice, and deny the definition which is commonly given by those who misconceive the matter, that right is that which is useful to the stronger party. Thus, where there is not true justice there can be no assemblage of men associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and therefore there can be no people as defined by Cicero. To utterly discredit Cicero's definition St. Augustine brings in the duty the state has with respect to religion and seems to obscure the distinction between the natural society of the state and the supernatural society of religion.

"And therefore, where there is not this righteousness whereby the one supreme God rules the obedient city according to his grace, so that it sacrifices to none but Him, and whereby in all the citizens of this obedient city, the soul consequently rules the body and reason the vices in the rightful-order, so that, as the individual just man, so also the community of the people of the just, live by faith, which works by love, that love whereby man loves God as he ought to be loved, and his neighbor as himself,—there, I say, there is not an assemblage associated by a common acknowledgment of right, and by a community of interests. But if there is not this, there is not a people, if our definition be true, and therefore there is no republic." (52)

Since the definition of a people (i.e., of a state) given
by Cicero has been found wanting, St. Augustine proceeds to formulate his own definition, and says that a people is an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common agreement as to the objects of their love. St. Augustine's definition of a state has been commented on by a number of writers either for praise or blame. Thus A. J. Carlyle discusses it in an article on St. Augustine appearing in a series of lectures entitled The Social and Political Ideas of Some Great Medieval Thinkers.

When St. Augustine defines a political society as a people joined by common enjoyment of the things it loves, Mr. Carlyle expresses amazement. He paraphrases the definition by saying a political society may be more or less corrupt, but so long as it consists of a multitude of rational beings, associated together in the harmonious enjoyment of that which they love St. Augustine would regard it as a true state or commonwealth. Mr. Carlyle doubts whether St. Augustine realized the enormous significance of what he was saying. Augustine's definition is practically the same as Cicero's but with the element of law and justice left out, and there could hardly be a more fundamental difference since Cicero's whole conception of the state turned on his notion of justice.

Carlyle further adds if Augustine really meant what he said and intended to omit the notion of justice from his concept it would have meant the introduction into the world of a conception of the state which would have gravely modified the whole history of political ideas. Against this view of the state, the writer
quotes Augustine's own example of the band of robbers mentioned above where the Bishop of Hippo seemed to repudiate likening the state to something unjust. So he seems uncertain whether Augustine did want to eliminate justice from his idea of State. If he did Carlyle calls it a deplorable error, going on to say:

"Happily the matter is not important, for if indeed he did make this mistake it had no significance in the history of Christian ideas. It is a notable fact that the passage of St. Augustine is hardly ever quoted at all in later Christian writers. The De Civitate Dei is constantly appealed to in the Middle Ages, and Cicero's definitions of the State are constantly quoted from St. Augustine by medieval writers. But his own attempt to eliminate the conception of justice from the notion of the State is passed over in silence, and I can only say, therefore, that, if it was intended and deliberate it has no significance." (54)

J. N. Figgis takes another view of the problem and defends Augustine's definition saying, "His sense of reality led him to prefer a definition which would include all existing and historical communities, and hamper him as little as possible by an abstract ideal. What is morally right for a nation to do is the same thing. It is another to say, that if it fails to do right, then it ceases to be a nation. You can be human without being humane." He goes on to add that the whole discussion is akin to the way of speaking which judges humanity, not by what it is but by what it should be in the developed notion of humanitas. Figgis censures the custom of putting into the definition of a thing a description of it in its ideal form so that a state comes to mean a perfect state. So long as the heathen in his blindness bows down to idols there will be communities that fall
"Augustine...realized the distinction which exists between a state permeated by justice, and a despotism or a democracy which is still a state though far removed from justice. He saw that a State reduced to its lowest terms, might be a people whose manners are none and their customs beastly—associated for bad ends, yet still a State, because keeping internal peace. Our distinction between legal and moral rights can be derived out of this definition which allows to the community the full rights of a commonwealth, irrespective of its moral character." (56)

(57)
Pere Boyer makes mention of the discrepancy between the definition of a people by Cicero and the definition by Augustine, noting as Augustine defines it, the earthly city is a real city resulting from an accord of wills pursuing common goods. Whether we define a republic with Cicero as the weal of the people of with Augustine as an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by common agreement as to the objects of their love and whether with Cicero we make justice necessary for the state, or with Augustine we admit the possibility of a state even though void of true justice—in either case it depends on our viewpoint. If we define the ideal, then Cicero's definition is right; if we define the state as realized in fact then Augustine has the better definition. Augustine to my mind is a bit severe on Cicero's definition. For the saint says that if Cicero is correct there never was a state that would have satisfied his definition. But to demand an absolute perfection of attainment
would be to discount most of the definitions we have of things and as St. Thomas says, when we speak of a thing we consider it in its perfection—the perfect species—even though there be nothing in existence that has realized the perfection. I think Augustine would be thinking more in accordance with his own philosophy if he would have accepted Cicero's definition, for he held the theory of divine exemplarism according to which things are exemplification of ideas in the divine mind. But the idea of the State is the idea of a State in its perfection, such as Cicero defined, and any imperfection is not essential to the idea but is attributable to the malice of the human will. Cicero then, was justified to my mind in defining the perfect state even if his definition would not apply to states as they are found in its full significance.

But using the definition of St. Augustine that a people is an assemblage of reasonable beings bound together by a common (58) agreement of the objects of their love we find that it does apply more closely to earthly conditions. Thus, in order to discover the character of any people, we have only to observe what they love. Yet, he thinks, whatever it loves, if only it is an assemblage of reasonable beings and not of beasts, and is bound together by an agreement as to the objects of love, it is reasonably called a people; and it will be a superior people in proportion as it is bound together by higher interests, inferior in proportion as it is bound together by lower. If we accept the definition of St. Augustine, the Roman people is a people,
its weal is doubtless a commonweal or a republic. The saint at this point, goes into a discussion of what is the common taste or love of the Romans, and declares that the tastes of the early and subsequent days are not those of the present, but it declined into sanguinary seditions and into social and civil wars, and so burst asunder or rotted off the bond of concord in which the health of people consists. Yet, for all that, Augustine holds that the Romans are a people and their government a republic, but of what kind he tells us by likening them to the Greeks, the Assyrians, and the Egyptians all of whom he characterizes thus:

"For, in general, the city of the ungodly which did not obey the command of God that it should offer no sacrifice save to him alone, and which, therefore, could not give to the soul its proper command over the body, nor to reason its just authority over the vices, is void of true justice." (59)

Over and above this republic as defined by Cicero there is the Christian state which Augustine praises in his letter to Marcellinus. If the Christian religion were to spread it would establish, strengthen, elevate, and prosper the state more than did all the illustrious Romans. This Christian state is not a theocracy like that which obtained among the ancient Hebrews, but a state in which Christian principles influence both rulers and ruled. Thus the very barbarians in the name of Christ spared those who fled to Christian sanctuaries in the destruction of Rome. A civilizing influence such as this had never been attained by pagan worship.
The exalted idea Augustine had of the Christian State is revealed in his portrait of the Christian prince which he presents to our view in the City of God, which is worthy of quotation:

"Nor is it necessary for us to say that certain Christian emperors were therefore happy because they ruled a long time, or, dying a peaceful death, left their sons to succeed them in the empire, or subdued the enemies of the republic, or were able both to guard against and to suppress the attempt of hostile citizens rising against them. These and other gifts or comforts of this sorrowful life even certain worshippers of demons have merited to receive, who do not belong to the kingdom of God to which these belong; and this is to be traced to the mercy of God, who would not have those who believe in Him desire such things as the highest good. But we say that they are happy if they rule justly; if they are not lifted up amid the praises of those who pay them sublime honors, and the obsequiousness of those who salute them with an excessive humility, but remember that they are men; if they make their power the handmaid of His majesty by using it for the greatest possible extension of His worship; if they fear, love, worship God, if more than their own they love that kingdom in which they are not afraid to have partners; if they are slow to punish, ready to pardon; if they apply that punishment as necessary to government and defence of the republic and not in order to gratify their own enmity; if they grant pardon, not that iniquity may go unpunished, but with the hope that the transgressor may amend his ways; if they compensate for whatever severity they may be compelled to decree if their luxury is as much restrained as it might have been unrestrained; if they prefer to govern depraved desires rather than any nation whatever; and if they do all these things not through ardent desire of empty glory, but through love of eternal felicity, not neglecting to offer to the true God, who is their God, for their sins, the sacrifices of humility, contrition, and prayer. Such Christian emperors, we say, are happy in the present time by hope, and are destined to be so in the enjoyment of the reality itself, when that which we wait for shall have arrived." (62)

Leo XIII praises Augustine's idea of the Christian ruler in his encyclical Immortale Dei, in these words: "Admirably according to his wont, does St. Augustine in many passages, enlarge the potency of these advantages (i.e., of Christianity),
nowhere more markedly and to the point than when he addresses the Catholic Church in the following words:..."Thou teachest kings to look upon the interests of their people, and dost admonish the people to be submissive to their kings."

We have developed the topic of authority by treating of its necessity, its origin; how providence chooses rulers; the forms of authority; its foundation; the duties of ruling; the purpose of authority, via: peace, and order; the definition of the state; and finally the ideal ruler. These various aspects of authority help us to arrive at a rather complete knowledge of what authority means in the political theory of St. Augustine. We proceed now to examine how authority is applied in practice, how it functions. That is revealed by a study of law, which is the topic of our next chapter.
Notes: Chapter I

2. *ibid.*
3. *ibid.*
5. *ibid.*
10. *ibid.* XIX, 12.
11. *ibid.* XII, 21.
14. *Politics* I, II.
17. *City of God* V, 21
18. *ibid.*
19. *ibid.*
20. *ibid.*
23. *ibid.* IV, 33.
sallust, In Cat. Xi.

25 City of God V, 12.
26 ibid. V, 1.
27 ibid. V, 11.
29 ibid. V, 19.
30 Plato, Statesman 291.
31 City of God V, 17.
32 ibid. V, 25.
34 ibid. I, 33.
35 ibid. III, 10.
36 ibid. XIX, 21.
37 ibid. IV, 15.
38 ibid. II, 21.
39 ibid.
40 ibid. IV, 4.
41 ibid. XIX, 14.
42 ibid. V, 19.
44 ibid. II, 21.
45 ibid. XIX, 17.
46 ibid. XIX, 26.
47 ibid. XIX, 14.
48 ibid. XIX, 13.
49 ibid.

Cf. ibid., XIX, 21.

Cf. ibid., XIX, 23.


Cf. ibid. p. 51.

Riggs, op. cit. p. 65.

Cf. ibid. p. 64.


Cf. ibid., XIX, 24.

St. Augustine, Epistola 138, 14, P.L. XLI, 531.

Cf. ibid. V, 24.

Chapter II: Law.

In setting forth the political theory of St. Augustine we have attempted to make clear his concept of authority on which all political science rests, and have shown how all authority comes from God since it is demanded by our social nature which is from God. Such is Augustine's thought. Pursuing the subject it now becomes necessary to examine the function of this civil authority and see how it is to be exercised. In other words we must discuss the subject of law, for it is law that regulates the action of authority in states, and defines its limits. What did Augustine teach concerning law; is there some higher code which binds even legislators and rulers? How does the eternal law of God reach down to statecraft to determine what shall be just? And justice itself, in what does it consist? These are some of the questions that come up for answer at this moment, and just as Augustine went beyond the Greek philosophers in grounding authority, so we shall see that he had a more fundamental view of law. His clearer concept of God enabled him to bring law closer to the lowliness of man in the sense that God had a more direct concern with the world and law was the evidence of his intelligible interest in man.

In the first place let us look at Augustine's verbal definition of law—his etymological analysis of the word *lex*. St. Augustine says that the Latin word Lex (law) is derived from
jendus or *elgendus* (choose or select) because in the law are selected those points which they abandon who fall away from what is good.

"Whence indeed Latin authors said that *lex* was derived from *legendus*, that is from *elgendus*. For in these records are collected what he abandons who abandons what is good,"

(1)

However this derivation is far from certain. St. Thomas derives the word *Lex* from *ligandus* (bind), because law obliges to action.

(2)

Scotus gives the same derivation, while Cicero traces *lex* to *legere* because of a similarity of sound. But so much for the etymology of the word, we are more interested in its real meaning.

In defining law we see that St. Augustine avails himself of the words of Cicero, but it appears that he attached a deeper meaning to these same words. Cicero in his *De Legibus* defines law as "the sovereign reason which ordains what is to be done, and forbids what is to be avoided", and by the sovereign reason he means, as appears subsequently, the reason of Jupiter. Augustine adopts this expression and likewise calls law the sovereign reason, and the divine reason. Augustine in this place, calls eternal law not only divine reason but also the will of God, doubtless thinking of law both as a plan of order which pertains to reason, and of the imposition of this plan, or its execution which pertains to will. In this later aspect he went beyond Cicero. But from the fact that Cicero's god was deprived of foreknowledge of human actions depending on free will, it
must follow that there is a certain lack of knowledge in the
ratio divina, the divine reason, and hence the law which depends
thereon is to a degree estranged from the object to which the
law applies. Even human laws are successful in the measure in
which the legislator can forsee their application, and to deny
to God any more foreknowledge than is had by man, is to restrict
his legislative control of the universe. Then too since Cicero
had not the concept of God as unique being, the creator, the in-
telligent personal god who governs his creatures, since he did
not clearly understand these basic concepts it necessarily fol-
low that his law could not have the precise significance that
it was later to attain under St. Augustine. But in spite of all
that, it remains true that St. Augustine did borrow from the De
Legibus of Cicero.

Just as Augustine follows Cicero's definition of law so he
accepts his enumeration of the attributes of law. Law is immut-
able, eternal, and universal; the first two of these attributes
the saint lists in the De Libero Arbitrio where he writes: "That
law which is named supreme reason...can that law be seen to
anyone understanding it, not to be changeless and eternal?...In
order, therefore that I may explain briefly so far as I can by
means of words, a notion of that eternal law which is impressed
upon us:--It is that law by which it is just that all things be
most perfectly in order." And in other places he speaks of the
universality of law, as where he says: "Thus as far as He him-
self becomes his law according to which he judges all things, ad
concerning which no man may judge." It applies to all men by the very fact that they are men, it is coincident with human nature. It regulates the natural order of all things, and even the angels observe it. Though we have noticed that St. August- 

ine follows the thought of Cicero in listing these three attri- 

butes of law—eternity, immutability, and universality—yet they 

are for all that, somewhat obvious and can be observed by any 

thinker contemplating the nature of things, as Augustine himself 

points out, when he asks, "Can that law be seen to anyone under- 

standing it, not to be changeless and eternal?" But even 

though truths are obvious once they are known, they often escape 

us until some one by his suggestion guides our thought along the 

lines that lead to their discovery. Indeed this is the secret 

of all invention.

The immutability of law is brought out vividly by St. Aug- 

(14) 

ustine in the De Trinitate, where he asks by what rules the 

pagans and impious judge of the conduct of men. The impious 

themselves think about eternal things and praise or reprehend 

justly many things in the conduct of men. By what rules do they 

judge except by those in which they see how each man ought to 

live, though they do not themselves live in this manner? Where 

do they see them? Not in their own essence; without doubt they 

see with their mind though their mind is changing while each 

one beholds these unchanging rules. From this we see Augustine 

did not adhere to the modern notion of evolution in moral law, 
or relativity in ethics, or streamlining the decalogue. Even
When human laws change, this alteration, if it be just, is according to the unchanging dictates of eternal law:

"I judge that you see also by consequence that there is nothing in this temporary law just and lawful that men have not derived from this law eternal. For, if this people at one time granted honors in accord with justice, at another time also in accord with justice granted them not, this change (which is temporary and just) is derived from that everlasting law, by which it is right for a well-ordered people to grant honors; for a fickle populace not to grant them." (15)

The eternity of law is shown from its dependence on God, the eternal being. God's counsel and will are unchangeable and as God is eternal the ratio divina or law which rules the universe is eternal. Though the human race was created in time, yet it was effected without any new design or change of purpose on God's part. In the beginning of the world, in pagan antiquity, for the Hebrews, for men of all nations, ages, and times, for all creatures, there is the one eternal law, the expression of the divine counsel in creation.

St. Augustine distinguishes between several kinds of law. The most comprehensive of these divisions of law is the eternal law which applies to every creature, and expresses the divine plan for all creation. It includes every other kind of law, for the other laws are but manifestations of the eternal law and applications of it to particular creatures. The definition of law that Augustine borrowed from Cicero, is in reality his definition of this most general type of law: the eternal law. The eternal law, accordingly, is divine reason, or the will of God commanding that the natural order be kept and prohibiting the
The natural order is nothing else but the order of the universe. And in the *de Libero Arbitrio* he gives another definition: "Eternal law is the supreme reason which always ought to be obeyed". And again "Eternal law is that whereby it is just that all things should be in perfect order". One of these definitions looks more to the formal cause of eternal Law, to use Aristotelian terminology, and the other looks to the final cause.

According to St. Thomas the participation of man in the eternal law of God is called the natural law. Now this concept of natural law, though not proclaimed by St. Augustine with equal precision, is nevertheless found in his writings. We find him saying, for instance in the *Enarratio in Psalmum CXVII*:

"Was not this natural law in force among the people of Israel? Clearly it was, since they too, were men: for they would have been without natural law if they were able to be without human nature." (22)

What St. Augustine meant by natural law can be determined quite readily from what he says of the way in which we know it. It is, he says, naturally engraven on the heart of man:

"Wherefore since the law is naturally engraven on the heart of man who uses free will, by which he is urged not to do to another what he would not have done to himself, accordingly they are violators of duty who do not accept the law given to Moses, concerning whom we read in the Psalm: "I have accounted all the sinners of the earth prevaricators (Ps. CXVIII, 119)". (23)

And again he tells us that before the written law appeared, the eternal law was in the hearts of pious men: "For that law given
the Jews on tablets did not yet exist in the time of Job, but even then there remained the eternal law in the hearts of pious men, from whence that given the people is transcribed." From this latter text the connection between eternal and natural law can be inferred. The natural law is that part of the eternal law which applies to men; it is that part inscribed in men's hearts.

What are we to understand when St. Augustine says that the natural law is engraven on the hearts of men? This phrase keeps recurring in the saint's writings like a kind of refrain serving to impress it on our minds. "The notion of eternal law is impressed on us." "Law is the reason of man naturally inscribed in his heart." This idea of the law being inscribed on the heart of man had already been enunciated by Cicero in his De Republica. Augustine defines what he means by the expression in saying that the human reason interprets the natural law, while the heart is its sanctuary. Reason defines the law and fixes its obligations; the heart attaches itself thereto and preserves it faithfully.

The heart is of course symbolic of the will, and so it is that both the intellect and the will share in this "natural impression of the eternal law." That fact that the natural law is written in the heart of man does not mean that we have an innate idea of it. Though Augustine does explain this knowledge in terms of the divine illumination, which runs through his entire epistemology we need not, and should not identify divine illumination with innate ideas.
When man arrives at the age of reason, according to St. Aug-
(28) stine he perceives in himself this interior illumination which
enables him to discern good from evil, true from false, the just
from the unjust. St. Paul has a text wherein he says: "For when
the Gentiles, who have not the law, do by nature those things
that are of the law; those having not the law are a law to them-
selves: Who show the work of the law written in their hearts,
their conscience bearing witness to them." This doubtless in-
spired and confirmed Augustine in his doctrine of our knowledge
of natural law, for he quotes it a number of times. The doctrine
of St. Augustine on the illumination of the mind by God implies
that every normal man who has the use of reason, perceives the
elementary notions of good and evil—that good is to be done and
evil avoided. Just as there has been bequeathed to us in the
speculative order a natural light which reveals to us the funda-
mental principles of being and of thought, so in the practical
order there has been bestowed on us a natural light which shows
us the fundamental laws of the practical order. In this way just
as we can perceive the absolute character of first principles bef
ere knowing the Absolute Truth on which they are grounded, so
likewise we can understand the absolute character of moral judg-
ment before understanding explicitly the existence of a sover-
eign good and the necessity of tending to this good. In Augus-
tinian thought the concept of eternal law is at the bottom of all
law and to explain how we know the eternal law it is necessary to
give precision to this doctrine on divine illumination.
Besides the natural law there is also the positive divine law which serves to recall to men's minds the natural law which they had neglected. Thus Augustine speaks of natural law as being given to man in three ways: in paradise, naturally implanted, and in writing. The law given in paradise doubtless refers to that given to Adam and handed down by tradition. We need not think of these as three distinct laws, but rather as the same law made known in three different ways as the following text seems to imply: "The law whether given in paradise, or naturally implanted, or promulgated in writing made all sinners violators of duty." The purpose of giving the natural law in writing in the decalogue is recalled by St. Augustine, and he says it was due to man's declining from righteousness.

"But because men by seeking those things which are without, were made strangers to themselves, a written law was given: not because it was not inscribed in their hearts, but because you were fugitives from your hearts, you were seized by Him who is everywhere and called back within yourselves." (31)

This passage leads to the conclusion that this law engraven in the hearts of men can become confused and obscured due to unfaithfulness in observing it. Yet Augustine would not admit that it could become entirely eradicated, for he says: "Lex tua scripta est in cordibus hominum, quam nec uilla quidem delet iniquitas—Thy law is written in the hearts of men, which no iniquity whatever can efface." (32) This is the attitude St. Thomas takes, for he says that the natural law cannot be eradicated from the human heart as far as its universal and most common
principles are concerned, but, "As far as the secondary principles of the natural law are concerned, the law can be effaced from the hearts of men, either because of perverse arguments (in the same way as in speculative matters there are errors about necessary conclusions), or because of wicked customs and corrupt habits, as among some stealing is not counted a sin nor even a vice contrary to nature." (33)

As civilization progresses and social life becomes more complex, there arise many contingencies not regulated by the universal precepts of natural law, and yet there must be a law of some kind to administer order in such cases. Customs arise, and traditions are created that serve to interpret the application of natural law.

"Then there is a right proceeding from custom, feebly indicated by nature, but initiated and fortified by usage, as for instance religion and other virtues of which we have spoken, which, though founded on nature, are implanted more strongly by habit, or those whose use antiquity has consecrated with the approbation of the people, such as agreements, equality, law, and judgments: agreements, when one thing is shared by several; equality, which is the same measure for all; judgment, which is regulated by the decision of one or of several; law, the written rule promulgated before the people for their observance." (34)

This brings us to another division of law, called by St. Augustine temporal law, or human law. This is the application of eternal law to civil government as appears from the following:

"The one who decrees temporal laws, if he is a good and a wise man, consults that same eternal law about which it is not given to any mind to judge; that he might decree according to its unchanging rules, what ought to be commanded or for-
since natural law leaves many things undetermined it devolves upon civil authority to determine how natural law applies to certain exigencies of civil life. This legislation is termed human law or temporal law. Augustine takes cognizance of temporal law and examines what precautions are to be taken in order that it be just, how it applies to good and to evil men, and what is to be done to avenge the law when it is violated. The ideal condition for making just laws according to the saint is that the people be well-ordered and thoughtful and that they be watchful of the common weal, in which everyone values private interest as less worth than common good. That law is rightly made by which the people are permitted to establish civil officials by whom their own, that is, the public welfare is carried on. On the other hand, we see how governments decline from righteousness and St. Augustine's words would have meaning even in our own day. For, if this same people, gradually spoiled, prefers private wealth to public welfare, and holds voting for sale and brought over by those who love honors, were to hand over their own government into the hands of dishonored and shameless men—in that case, asks Augustine, would it not be right that they lose the power of conferring honors? The norm for the justice in the temporal law is to be found in the eternal law. Thus St. Augustine grounds all law ultimately on the eternal law and the divine will. This is evident from a passage where Augustine asks Evodius in the De Libero Arbitrio: "Tell me then, think
that adultery is wrong because the law forbids it?" To which
Eudius responds, "No, surely, it is not wrong because it is
forbidden by law; but therefore is it forbidden by law because
it is wrong." The human law depends on the divine law for its (38)
validity, St. Augustine explicitly says. (39)

In another place in the De Libero Arbitrio the saint
seems to think that the temporal law is for those unhappy ones
who love things temporal while those blessed ones, on account of
the love of things eternal, act under the eternal law. Yet they
who serve the temporal cannot be free from the eternal, from
which we say that things that are just and that are justly var-
ied are derived—but they who adhere to the eternal law by a
good will do not need the temporal. And St. Augustine with his
characteristic mystical tendency exclaims, "The eternal law
therefore orders our love to be turned away from things temporal
and commands it, purified, to turn to things eternal." The
purpose of temporal law according to the saint is that men may
by right possess those things which can be said to belong to us
for time. Men possess these things by that right by which peace
and human fellowship are maintained, so far as can be. The tem-
poral law orders this body and what are called its goods, as
unimpaired health, the keenness of the organic senses, strength,
beauty, and Augustine adds, possibly other things, some neces-
sary for the fine arts; and therefore valued as of more worth,
some of less value. Law also orders liberty, which when true,
belongs only to the blessed and to those who cling to the eter-
But especially does it order that exaggerated liberty, of which men think themselves free who have no human masters, and which they desire who wish to be freed from human masters. And also temporal law orders the city-state which is wont to be held in the place of the parent.

St. Augustine places fear as the moving or compelling force behind temporal law, but he is thinking of the citizen of the earthly city who is not ruled by an other-worldly ideal.

"Of all these things it is difficult to say and long to explain how the law distributes to each one his own...It is enough to see that the power of this law in its exercise does not extend beyond this—that it removes and takes away those things, or any one of those things from him whom it punishes. By fear therefore it compels, and it bends and forces to the end which is its aim, the spirit of the unhappy man for the government of whom it is adapted." (42)

Men keep the law because they fear to lose temporal goods, but if such goods are loved excessively, such an evil is not punished by the state. It punishes only theft or external acts against others—or as the present legal term has it, in foro externo. This last conclusion culminates a long train of reasoning in the dialogue. For Augustine had set himself to determine "how far that law, by which people on earth and states are governed, has the right to be enforced". And he reaches the conclusion that such law applies only to external acts, and hence falls short of the sphere of eternal law.

When the law has been violated, a penal law is invoked to restore the order that has been disturbed by the offense. God himself, declares St. Augustine (44) has made servitude an atone-
t for the violation of the natural law:

"By nature, as God first created us, no one is the slave either of man or of sin. This servitude is, however, penal, and is appointed by that law which enjoins the preservation of the natural order and forbids its disturbance; for if nothing had been done in violation of that law, there would have been nothing to restrain by penal servitude." (45)

Punishment is the means of repairing the law when injured by disobedience and moreover it is a duty to punish wrongdoing. Just as it is not benevolent to give a man help at the expense of some greater benefit he might receive, so it is not innocent to spare a man at the risk of his falling into graver sin. "To be innocent, we must not only do harm to no man, but also restrain him from sin or punish his sin, so that either the man who is punished, himself, may profit by this experience or that others may be warned by his example." (46)

In investigating the purpose for temporal laws, it is well to remember that they are but applications of eternal law. They define what eternal law leaves undefined. Hence it should follow that temporal law would have the same general purpose as eternal law. The purpose of eternal law, or the end it aims at is said by Augustine to be peace and order. "The eternal law is that whereby it is just that all things be in perfect order." (47)

"Nothing can be withdrawn from the laws of the sovereign Creator and from the order by which the peace of the universe is administered." (48) And hence we can say that peace and order is the end of temporal law, and in fact of all law, just as it is the end of authority.
The laws impose upon subjects a duty, even as they impose a duty on the ruler. They impose the duty of obedience and submission. St. Paul had commanded every soul to be subject to high powers and to be subject for conscience sake. Augustine follows this doctrine saying that those of the heavenly city make no scruple to obey the laws of the earthly city whereby the things necessary for the maintenance of this mortal life are administered. Who would presume to say, asks Augustine, that he loves the emperor but hates his laws? For by what sign may the emperor know that you love him, but by the faithful observance of all the laws in all the provinces of the empire. The laws and customs of men are to be obeyed says Augustine in the Confessions:

"But those offenses which are contrary to the customs of men are to be avoided according to the customs severally prevailing; so that an agreement made and confirmed by custom or law of any city or nation, may not be violated at the lawless pleasure of any, whether citizen or stranger. For any part which is not consistent with the whole is unseemly."  

However there is a limit to the obedience due to human laws. For "when God commands anything contrary to the customs or compacts of any nation to be done, though it were never done by them before, it is to be done; and if intermittted it is to be restored and if never established, to be established." But in this case when the laws contradict divine ordinances, they are not just, and hence in the viewpoint of St. Augustine they are not laws at all. For Augustine denies that unjust law is a law in the proper sense of the word. If the law is merely unpopular it deserves submission. The tax laws were especially obnoxious in the time
Augustine due to the exorbitant and ever increasing demands of the part of the government. Though Augustine complained against such an excess calling it "an all-devouring dragon", yet he required the faithful to submit, because a theft at the expense of the public treasury is no less a theft. By submitting to the onerous duties of a citizen the Christian merits an eternal reward. "The Christian people whatever be their condition—whether they be kings, princes, judges, soldiers, or provincials, rich or poor, bond or free, male or female—are enjoined to endure this earthly republic, wicked and dissolute as it is, that as they may by this endurance win for themselves an eminent place in that holy and august assembly of angels and republic of heaven, in which the will of God is the law."

When civil authority commands us to do things that are contrary to the law of God, or when it supports error against the true religion, then is the time for the faithful to refuse what is against the law of God because this is for them a trial and a crown. The pagan laws favoring immorality were of this kind, and of this type also were the laws authorizing the lewd theater or the bloody circus. The principle to act upon in casâ one authority would command what another forbids is to consider the hierarchy of degrees of authority and then obey the superior one. For if the proconsul commanded one thing and the emperor another, who would fail to neglect the first in favor of the second? So if the emperor orders us to do one thing and God orders another, we should similarly prefer God to the emperor.
steadfastly resisting unjust laws against their faith, the Christian martyrs put the law to shame and eventually caused its revocation.

"And our martyrs, when that religion was charged on them as a crime, by which they knew they were made safe and must glorious throughout eternity, did not choose by denying it to escape temporal punishments, but rather by confessing, professing and proclaiming it, by enduring all things for it with fidelity and fortitude, and by dying for it with pious calmness put to shame the law by which that religion was prohibited, and caused its revocation." (63)

Sufferance thus becomes a means of eliminating unjust laws. St. Augustine, however, does recognize that force can sometimes be justified to correct the abuse of wicked laws. In the De Libero Arbitrio, he states that if a depraved people would neglect public interests and deliver the government into the hands of perverse men, it would be right for a just and influential man to take the power away from these people and entrust the government to honest hands. There is then a place for a just revolt though Augustine prefers the moral revolt of sufferance, protestation, and peaceful amelioration of wrongs. This, it can be said, is the mind of Christianity. It is the mind of the Church
Notes: Chapter II.

1 St. Augustine, Quaest. in Heptateuchum, III, XX, P.L. vol. III (of St. Augustine's Works) or vol. 34 (of Pat.), col. 681.
   "Unde etiam legem a legendo, id est ab eligendo latini auctores appellatam esse digerunt. His quodammodo vestigniis colligitur quod ille delinquit, qui bonum derelinquit, et relinquendo a bono cadit."

2 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, Q. 90, a. 1 c.


5 Ibid. I, 6.

6 Ibid. II, 4.

7 St. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio I, 16, P.L. XXXII, 1230.

8 St. Augustine, Contra Faustum XX, 27, P.L. XLII, 418.

9 De Libero Arbitrio VI. English translation with Latin text by Francis Tourscher, Peter Reilly, Phil. 1937. Following selection p. 35:
   "Illa lex, quae summa ratio nominatur...potestne cui-piam intelligenti non incommutabilis aeternaque videri?...Ut igitur breviter aeternae legis notionem, quae impressa nobis est, quantum valeo verbis explicem, ea est qua justum est ut omnia sint ordinatissimae...Neque enim ulla vis ullus casus, ulla rerum labes unquam effecerit ut justum non sit omnia esse ordinatissima." Lib. I, C. VI, n. 15.

10 St. Augustine, De Vera Religione I, c. XXXI, 58, P.L. 34, 148.
   "Ita etiam, quantum potest, lex ipsa etiam ipsa fit, secundum quam judicat omnia, et de qua judicare nullus potest. Sicut in istis temporalibus legibus, quamquam de his homines judicent cum eas instituunt, tamen cum fuerunt institutae atque firmatae, non licebit judici de ipsis judicare, sed secundum ipsas."

11 St. Augustine, Enarratio in Psalmum CXVII, XXV, 1, P.L. 33, col. 681.
   "Numquid autem lex ista naturalis non erat in populo Israel? Erat plane, quoniam et ipsi homines erant: sine lege autem naturali essent, si praeter naturam humani generis esse potuissent."
Contra Faustum, XXII, 27 et seq.

De Libero Arbitrio VI.

De Trinitate XIV; 15, 21.

De Libero Arbitrio I, 6, trans. by Tourscher, p. 37.

City of God XII, 17.

ibid. XII, 14.

Contra Faustum XXII, 27.

De Libero Arbitrio I, 6.

ibid. "Lex aeterna est summa ratio, cui semper obemperandum est."

St. Thomas, Summa Theologiae I-II, Q. 91, a. 2.

Enarratio in Psalmum CXVII, XXV, 4, P.L. IV, 1524, (vol. 35)

"Numquid autem lex ista naturalis non erat in populo Israel? Erat plane, quoniam et ipsi homines erant: sine lege autem naturali essent, si praeter naturam humani generis esse potuissent."

Epistola CLVII, III, 15, P.L. II, c. 681, (vol. 33)

"Prainde quoniam lex est etiam in ratione homines qui jam utitur arbitrio libertatis, naturaliter in corde conscripta, qua suggentur ne aliquid faciat quisque alteri quod pati ipse non vult; secundum hanc legem praevaricatores sunt omnes, etiam qui legem per Moysen datam non acceperunt, de quibus in Psalmo legitur: Praevaricatores aestimati omnes peccatores terrae (Ps. CXVII, 119)."

Sermo LXXXI, 2, P.L. 36, 500.

"Nam lex illa in tabulis data Judaeis nondum erat temporibus Job, sed manebat adhuc lex aeterna in cordibus piorum, unde illa descripta est quae popula data est."

De Libero Arbitrio I, 6.

"Aeterna legis notio nobis impressa est."

ibid. "Lex aeterna est qua justum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima."

"Lex est ratio hominis naturaliter in corde conscripta."

Epistola 157, 15, P.L. XXXIII, 691.

De Spiritu et Ltera 28, 49, P.L. XLIV, 231.

Epistola 157, 15, P.L. XXXIII, 681.

Narratio in Psalmum CXVIII, XXV, 5, P.L. 35, 1574.

"Quoniam lex sive in paradiso data, sive naturaliter insita, sive in litteris promulgata, praeventicatores fecit omnes peccatores terrae."

Narratio in Psalmum LVII, 1 P.L. 35, 673.

"Sed quia homines appetentes ea quae foris sunt, etiam a seipsis exsules facti sunt, data est etiam conscripta lex: non quia in cordibus scripta non erat; sed quia tu fugitivus eras cordis tui, ab illo qui ubique est comprehenderis, et ad te ipsum intro revocaris."

Confess. II, 4.

St. Thomas, Summa Theologica I-II, Q. 94, a. 6.

"Quantum vero ad alia praecepta secundaria, potest lex naturalis delere de cordibus hominum, vel propter malas persuasiones (eo modo quo etiam in speculativis errores contingunt circa conclusiones necessarias), vel etiam propter pravas consuetudines et habitus corruptos, sicut apud quos-dam non reputabantur latrocinia peccata, vel etiam vitia contra naturam."


"Consuetudinem autem jus est quod non leviter a natura tractum aluit, et majus fecit usus, ut religionem; et si quid eorum quae ante diximus, a natura profectum, majus factum propter consuetudinem videmus; aut quod in morem vestutas vulgi approbatione perduxit. Quod genus pactum est, par, lex, judicatum. Pactum est quod inter aliquos convenit. Par, quod in omnes aequale est. Judicatum, de quo aliusjus aut aliquorum jam sententiis constitutum est. Legem jus est, quod in eo scripto, quod populo expositum est ut observet, continetur."

De Vera Religione I, c. XXXI, 58, P.L. III, 148.

"Conditor enim legum temporalium, si vir bonus est et sapiens, illam ipsam consuluit aeternam, de qua nulli animae judicare datum est; ut secundum ejus incommunicables regulas, quid sit pro tempore jubendum vetandumque discernat.

De Libero Arbitrio VI, trans. by Tourscher, p. 33.

Ibid. I, c. III.


Ibid. I, c. XV.

Ibid. I, c. XV, trans, p. 81.

Ibid. I, c. XV.

ibid. I, c. XV.

City of God XIX, 15.

ibid.

ibid. XIX, 16.

De Libero Arbitrio I, 6.

"Lex asterna est qua justum est ut omnia sint ordinatissima."

City of God XIX, 12.

Rom. XII, 1

Rom. XIII, 5.

City of God XIX, 17.

In Epist. Joannis IX, 4.

Confess. III, VIII, 15.

ibid.

cf. De Libero Arbitrio I.

Enarratio in Psalmum 146, 17.

Epistola 96.

City of God II, 19.

Epistola 105, 7, P.L. XXXIII, 398.

City of God II, 4.

ibid. III, 8.


City of God VIII, 19.

De Libero Arbitrio I, VI,
Chapter III: Property

In political theory, after the concepts of authority and law have been fixed, the study next turns to a consideration of certain human institutions in so far as they affect government. There are some customs, or rights, or activities that derive from the very nature of man, or else are consecrated by the authority of ancient usage, which profoundly modify human society, and which government must take into account. Were not these phenomena taken cognizance of by the state it would detract from the security of the body politic, and disturb those peaceful relations which it is the prime purpose of political authority to preserve. The right of private property is one of these institutions which government is charged to uphold, and which has certain claims that no government can ignore. Let us examine, then, Augustine's thought relative to property, and see how he established property rights, and what duties he attached to ownership. We shall develop the subject by noting the two extremes: the excessive love of earthly goods, and the denial of the right of private ownership. Then we shall investigate the foundation of property rights which is the absolute dominion of God and the dependent dominion of man. Next the vices of avarice, usury, luxury, and pride will be dealt with and lastly we examine the duties associated with private property: the duties of the rich and of the poor.
Saint Augustine, on the question of property, as on other points of his political theory, made himself the interpreter of the Christian traditions. Arquillière traces much of Augustinian thought to the inspiration of the New Testament and we can readily see how in his treatment of the question of temporal goods, this remark seems valid. Abbé Martin writes the St. Augustine did not dream of reforming legislation, rather he had a theory on the origin and distribution of wealth. He took society as it existed in his time; he asked not whether society ought to be transformed, or whether in a new social organization there would be opportunity to regulate in another way the distribution of wealth. Many of the questions which in our time, have to be answered by one who discusses the nature of property had not yet arisen in the fifth century. There was not the division of capital and labor, at least it was not so closely drawn and capital had not achieved the importance that came with the advance of industry. Far different were the questions which troubled the mind of Augustine and the Fathers of the Church. He was concerned with imparting to the poor the Christian outlook on life that had come into the world with the gospel. Temporal goods were of small moment alongside the goods of eternity. To the poor, he preached a just resignation; to the rich, that they were the stewards of their wealth rather than absolute masters.

Though the Christians lost all their goods in the sack of Rome by Alaric in 410, but yet asks St. Augustine, did they lose
"Their faith? Their godliness? The possessions of the hidden man of the heart, which in the sight of God are of great price?" Thus does St. Augustine dominate his outlook on property by considerations from eternal truth. He quotes St. Paul to clarify his position. "Godliness with contentment is great gain. For we brought nothing into this world, and it is certain we can carry nothing out...But they that are rich fall into temptation and into a snare, and into many foolish and hurtful lusts which drown men in destruction and perdition." The words of Job in resignation at his loss are quoted as a lesson to Christians: "The Lord gave and the Lord hath taken away, as it has pleased the Lord so it is done, Blessed be the name of the Lord."

Though men have the right of private property, St. Augustine would call to their attention that temporal riches are not true riches but heavenly riches alone are true and take away all need. This is expressed in a sermon:

"Make to yourselves friends of the mammon of iniquity. That is to say the mammon of iniquity ought not to be your mammon. For then you will be able to use unjustly the abundance of earthly things, and thence make friends who will receive you into eternal dwellings, if this mammon is not yours, that is, if you did not think you were made rich thereby. Because your riches which are true riches, which will free you from all need, are not provided by earthly means. But that you may rightly enjoy these, first you must use them well, because they are neither yours nor are they true riches, since wrongly are they called riches." (6)

Further, lest earthly riches be esteemed as something great, God gives them to the good and evil alike, for God does not promise
us such temporal goods as riches, honors, and power.

"Let us see what he (God) has promised us: not earthly and temporal riches, not honors and power in this world; you see all these things are given also to wicked men, lest they be highly prized by the good." (7)

In taking up the study of private property Augustine finds that these are two exaggerations to be avoided: there is, on the one hand, an excessive attachment to temporal goods, and on the other, a denial of the right of their possession. Concerning the first he says: "Charge them that are rich in this world, that they be not high-minded, nor trust in uncertain riches, but in the living God...to do good, to be rich in good works, to give easily, to communicate to others." And from the Gospel: "Lay not up to yourselves treasures upon earth, where the rust, and moth consume, and where thieves break through and steal. But lay up to yourselves treasures in heaven." And St. Augustine expatiates on these thoughts to encourage the Christians in those troublesome times. "If many were glad that their treasure was stored in those places which the enemy chanced not to light upon, how much better founded was the joy of those who, by the counsel of their God, had fled with their treasure to a citadel which no enemy could possibly reach." Augustine has in mind the example of St. Paulinus, Bishop of Nola who voluntarily abandoned his vast wealth. And further on, Augustine castigates those who put more stock in external wealth than in a good conscience, who would rather have good possession than be good themselves. "It grieves them more to own a bad house than a bad life, as if it
man's greatest good to have everything good but himself."

The Manicheans, on the other hand fell into the opposite defect, for they pretended that the faithful ought not possess riches at all, which doctrine Augustine repudiates. Thus in the De Moribus Ecclesiae he says that we ought not forbid the catechumens to have money on the ground that the faithful are not permitted to have it. For there are many who use money as if they used it not. Baptism procures the entrance into a new life, but we ought to take care and not impose on feeble Catholics, with much audacity illusory precepts of perfection. Even these heretics themselves, says Augustine, are found, when observed at close range, to practice many things which they condemn in others. The perfection of religious poverty which the Manicheans would impose on all without distinction, St. Augustine speaks of and regards it as a counsel and not a precept, which was indeed the traditional view.

The right of private property is still a live issue, just as it was in Augustine's day, for it seems that there are never wanting men to oppose this right. Thus Pope Leo XIII in his Encyclical, Rerum Novarum, felt it necessary to defend private ownership. "Man", he says, "precedes the State, and possesses, prior to the formation of any State, the right of providing for the sustenance of his body... private ownership is in accordance with the law of nature."

It was the controversy with the Manicheans, then, which caused St. Augustine to attack this first problem of private pro-
The Manicheans themselves as Augustine maintained (above) preached, but often did not practice, so that their stringent laws became for them a cause of hypocrisy. They laid hard and insupportable burdens on the faithful and in so doing did violence to the doctrine of St. Paul. "Why," says St. Augustine, "do you maliciously state that the faithful, already renewed by Baptism ought not to beget children, and possess fields, and houses and money? Paul allowed it to them. For the doctrine he wrote to the faithful cannot be denied." This defense of the legitimacy of property dates from about the year 390. In his defense of the Catholic practice against the Manicheans his doctrine is set forth plainly:

"Say not that the catechumen are permitted to have wives but the faithful are not permitted to have them; that the catechumen may use money, but the faithful may not. For many there are who use these things as if using them not. And the renewal of the new man is begun by the sacred laver (i.e. by Baptism), and by making progress it is perfected, in some quickly, in others more slowly. In many it brings about a new life if they strive diligently. Indeed the Apostle himself says "Though the exterior man is corrupted, the interior is renewed day by day. (II Cor. IV, 16)" The Apostle says the inner man is renewed day by day that it may be perfected; and you wish that it may begin from perfection. Would that you desired this; but you seek rather, not that you might lift up the weak, but that you might deceive the unwary. No one would have suspected that when you were acquainted with those whom you introduced into your sect, that when they begin to be more intimate with you, they would have discovered many things in you, of which you were blaming others. What a great impudence it is to ask for perfection in the weaker Catholics, that then you might lead astray the inexperienced, and exhibit no more perfection in yourselves than in those whom you would turn away." (16)

In the year 408 St. Augustine in a letter to Vincent, a schismatic bishop of Carthage makes some pertinent remarks on the rela-
of property to civil and divine law.

"Whoever persues you from the occasion of the law of the realm, not with a love for correction, but with the hatred of enmity, displeases us. And no earthly object can be rightly possessed by anybody except either by divine law by which all things are just, or by human law, which is in the power of the kings of the earth. And so you call things falsely which you do not possess justly, and have been commanded by the laws of the realm to give up, and in vain do you say, "We have labored to gather these things", when we read in Scripture, "The just eat of the labors of the impious" (Prov. XIII 22). But nevertheless whoever from the occasion of the law which the kings of the world, serving Christ, have promulgated for the correction of your impiety,—whoever desires covetously your goods, displeases us. Whoever, in fine, holds not through justice but through avarice the goods of the poor or the basilicas of the congregations which you hold in the name of the Church, which belong to nobody but to the true Church of Christ, displeases us." (17)

St. Augustine is here answering a bishop who accused the Catholics and the civil government of injustice in depriving the schismatics of the church property and turning it over to the Catholic Church. There can be no injustice he says if everything is done in accordance with divine and human law, since ultimately everything belongs to God and is administered by the just laws of the land.

Possessions are not in themselves evil, though this rather obvious conclusion had to be explicitly affirmed against the Manicheans. If there is any evil connected with riches, it is from our own bad dispositions. In one of his sermons Augustine gives a method of determining whether one's possession of temporal goods is innocent:

"You say in answer to me: "God knows that I possess in-
But temptation is the proof. For what you possessed was molested and you blaspheme. We were recently suffering such things. What you possess was disturbed, and you were not found as you used to be, and by your voice you show yourself to be different now from what you were yesterday. But would that you might defend what is yours with such clamor and not try to usurp audaciously what is another's. And what is worse may you not be reprehended for claiming what is another's." (18)

Augustine with his supernatural outlook relegated earthly possessions to a very secondary place and reprehends the strife and litigation that people undertake in defense of earthly goods. As he implied in the foregoing passage people who possess property justly are more prone to bear up with its loss than those who have unjust possessions.

"Why, brethren, do we engage in lawsuits over possessions and not rather recite the sacred writings? We think that we have come to the judge. There is strife over possession, and this strife is not according to legal procedure but according to our affections. Finally he who goes to law over the possessions does so that he might exclude his adversary who says: "I wish to possess", and the other answers, "I do not permit it." (19)

St. Paul had similarly spoken against wrangling in court over worldly possessions to the detriment of charity. "Already indeed there is plainly a fault among you, that you have lawsuits one with another. Why do you not rather take wrong? Why do you not rather suffer yourselves to be defrauded?" (20) "If therefore", says St. Paul, "you have judgments of things pertaining to this world, set them to judge, who are the most despised in the church." Whatever evil there is in possessing wealth comes from the evil will of the possessor which doctrine he emphasizes in a
letter written about the year 414:

"Everything which is falsely possessed belongs to another; but that is falsely possessed which one uses wrongly. Therefore you see how many ought to return goods of others if especially there are few to whom they may be returned. Still there are some who, the more justly they may be able to possess these things, the more they contemn them. For no one has justice badly, and no one who does not love justice has it. But money is owned by the wicked wickedly, and by the good in so much the better a manner as it is loved less. But among these there is tolerated the iniquity of the evil possessors, and some things are established between them by civil law; not that thence they may become as those who use things well but that being evil they may be less troublesome. As long as the faithful and pious, of whom all things are just, who either arise from those people, or while in this life among those people are not entangled by their evils but are exercised by them, may arrive at that city where there is an eternal inheritance." (22)

It is from human law that man holds his property rights immediately, though ultimately from the divine law.

"Whence does anyone hold what he possesses? Is it not by human law? For by divine law the earth and the fullness thereof is the Lord's (Psal. XXIII,1): God made the poor and the rich from the same clay, and the same earth supports both poor and rich. Still by human law you say this country estate is mine, this house is mine, this slave is mine. That is by the human law, by the law of the emperors. Why so? Because these human laws through the emperors and kings of the world, God distributed among the human race. You wish us to read the laws of the emperor, and according to these do we treat of country estates? If you wish to possess by human law, we will quote the laws of the emperor: let us see if they decree anything to be possessed by heretics. But what is the emperor to me? According to his law you possess the earth. But take away the laws of the emperor and who would dare to say: "That country estate, or that house, or that slave is mine?" If however in order that things may be held by men, they accept the laws of the emperor, let us recite these laws that you may rejoice because you have even one garden, and may you not impute this to anything but to the meekness of the dove, that even that is permitted to remain to you." (23)
It seems from this passage as if St. Augustine is making property rights depend too much on the law of the land saying that you ought to rejoice that all your property was not taken away and that so much as a garden remains to you. But we must take note that St. Augustine is here addressing himself to heretics and is justifying depriving them of the use of public property as churches etc. For before that Augustine had shown how even human law comes ultimately from God.

Though St. Augustine never took up in detail the investigation of what the right of property consisted in, or on what it rested, he did however, undertake to show that the recriminations of the Donatists against the law which opposed them had no foundation. It is in virtue of the royal deed that property is possessed.

"But what is the emperor to us? But now I have said: we are speaking according to human law. And indeed the Apostle wished to serve kings; he wished to honor kings, and he said: "Reverence your king" (I Peter II, 17). Do not say: "What is the king to me?" What is your property to you? Possessions are held by the laws of the kings. You said, what is the king to me. Do not say your possessions, because you have renounced them to the same human law, according to which your possessions are possessed. But he said, I act according to divine law. Let us read the Gospel; let us see how the Catholic Church is that of Christ." (24)

In several places Augustine has the same thought that possessions are held by the laws of kings which would seem to indicate that he would subscribe to the statement that property rights come ultimately from God to whom all things belong, but it is in the province of kings to interpret and define these rights by legis-
He does not perhaps, express it in these words but surely it is implied in what he has said in the quotations given above. But ultimately, however, it is God who is the distributor of every good as is said in a letter to Boniface. And moreover, God is the sole distributor as Augustine takes occasion to say in commenting on the blessings bestowed on Isaac. "The Lord blessed him, in order that we might know with a sound faith that these temporal gifts, can neither be given nor ought to be hoped for except from God." Everything ultimately belongs to God both what is in our possession and what we do not possess. "What you possess is mine, and what you do not possess is mine; mine are the beasts of the forest which you have not captured; mine are the herds on the mountain which you own, and the oxen which are in your stables. All things are mine because I have created them." In this way St. Augustine with his fine spirituality makes every temporal thing a gift from God, and would reserve to God the right of eminent domain, to use a modern term. Of course this viewpoint is most true but we are so accustomed to take these benefits for granted, that Augustine's way of looking at it seems novel at first--like the world appears to a man who is fitted with a good pair of glasses. In speaking to the rich of this world, the saint makes a practical application of this doctrine showing that they have no absolute dominion over their possessions, but that all things belong to God. The thought is found in one of his sermons:
silver and gold are things not from man but from God. Why do not miserable people understand, what the Lord speaking with Aggeus said: "Gold is mine and silver is mine", in order that he who does not wish to communicate what he has with the indigent, when he hears the precept of doing works of mercy, may understand that God does not command the possessions of the one whom he orders, to be shared, but his owy. And he who bestows something on the poor, should not think he does so with his own goods, lest he be not so much strengthened by the name of mercy as puffed up by the vanity of pride. He says, "Gold is mine and silver is mine, not yours, 0 ye rich of this world Why therefore do you hesitate to give what is mine to the poor or why are you high minded when you give what is mine?" (29)

This is certainly a powerful thought and one well calculated to put the rich in their place. For if they adverted to the fact that in reality all things are God's and that they are but his minions administering his goods they would be more humble and have a more just estimate of themselves.

In the City of God Augustine returns to the same theme and refers to God as most wise Creator and most just Ordainer of all things, who placed human nature upon earth as its greatest ornament, imparted to men some good things adapted to this life; to wit temporal peace, such as we can enjoy in this life from health and safety and human fellowship, and all things needful for the preservation and recovery of this peace, such as the objects which are accommodated to our outward senses, light, the night, the air and waters suitable for us, and everything the body requires to sustain itself, to shelter, heal, or beautify itself. These present blessings, declares the saint, are as a test whereby we win eternal blessings. Every man who makes good use of these advantages suited to the peace of the present mortal condition, shall receive ampler and better blessings, namely, the
immortality, accompanied by glory and honor in an endless life made fit for the enjoyment of God. But, he adds, he who uses the present blessings badly shall both lose them and shall not receive the others.

The right of private property had been discussed by Plato and Aristotle long before. Plato in his Republic had advocated a system of common ownership which he would extend even to a community of wives under the plea that this would conduce to the unity of the state. Aristotle severely criticizes this theory in his Politics where he shows that, "Not to speak of many difficulties inherent in a general community of wives, the reason alleged by Socrates in behalf of such an institution is clearly not a legitimate consequence of his arguments." And further on Aristotle takes up the question of community of property. He is of the opinion that property ought to be common in a certain sense, although in its general character it should be private. And he explains his reasons as follows:

"Thus the division of superintendence will prevent mutual recriminations; and all will succeed better as each devotes himself to his own private possessions, while in practice virtue will render "friends' goods common goods" according to the proverb." (33)

The Philosopher shows with great acuteness the falacies behind the stock arguments for communism which curiously enough, are the same arguments as we hear today. Thought has not advanced much on this topic! Nor, we are tempted to add, on any other. For example, Aristotle says that the community of property has a sort
philanthropic appearance, and the doctrine is largely embrac-
ed by people under the impression that a sort of marvellous uni-
versal love will be its result, especially if one inveighs against
the actual evils of existing policies as arising from a want
of community of property—"such evils as law-suits, trials for
false witness, and the habit of toadying to the rich. All these
evils however, are due not to the want of community of property,
but to the depravity of human nature." (34)

Father Bruculleri notes how the right of private proper-
ty among the Hebrews is affirmed in the book of Genesis. We
read in the twenty-third chapter how Abraham bought a field with
a double cave for four hundred sicles of silver to be a burying
place for Sara, his wife. "And the field was made sure to Abra-
ham, and the cave that was in it, for a possession to bury in,
by the children of Heth." And in Exodus the commandment says,
"Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's house...nor anything that
is his." (37) Clearly the right of private property was affirmed
from ancient times both by the Jews and by the gentiles. In the
new testament, too, the right of property is upheld either ex-
plicitly or by implication as in the parable of the unjust stew-
ard, or the laborers in the vinyard, or the wicked husband-
man, The fathers of the Church, according to Bruculleri,
faithful to the popular traditions, to the holy scripture, and
to gospel teaching, clung to the right of private property and
rejected communism contrary to what some modern writers would
seem to think. (38)
An essential and oft recurring element of Augustine's doctrine on wealth is that of inculcating detachment from temporal goods and the avoidance of avarice. This may perhaps seem like a counsel of perfection and not a necessity, but in the mind of Augustine it is most certainly required for the private good of the wealthy themselves, and for the collective good of society. Avarice is condemned by the strongest arguments in his sermons--instance the following:

"It is exceedingly grave and horrible, that avarice should lay hold of us on earth, when we say: "Our father who art in heaven", (Matt. VI, 9) The desire for whom makes all other things seem vile...These things are for the use of necessity, not an object for love; they are as an abode for the traveler, not an estate of a possessor. Refresh yourself and pass on. Take up your journey, attend to whom you have come: because He who comes to you is great." (42)

Cupidity and charity are opposites, charity restores to us what we have lost through avarice. Though by avarice temporal goods are accumulated, yet on the other hand, spiritual goods, i.e., the favors of the Holy Spirit, are lost. "We regain our wings through charity which we have lost through cupidity. For cupidity is become as the bird lime of our wings; it deprives us of the freedom of the air, that is, of those breathings of the Spirit of God." (43) Saint Augustine here uses the metaphorical language of Scripture to bring out his point. To wean a man from attachment to the riches of this life St. Augustine expatiates on the evils to be endured in our earthly sojourn. This is such a dominant idea with Augustine that it is often denoted by the term Augustinian pessimism--the doctrine whereby the teacher of
Hippocrates emphasizes the deficiencies of our nature, its proneness to vice, its weakness in the supernatural order, its dependence on divine grace, and the innumerable evils it is heir to. Thus in the City of God he says that he is unable to understand how the Stoic philosophers can presume to say that there are no evils of life, and goes on to point out numerous evils:

"The life, then, which is either subject to accidents, or environed with evils so considerable and grievous, could never have been called happy, if the men who give it this name had condescended to yield to the truth, and to be conquered by valid arguments, when they inquired after the happy life, as they yield to unhappiness, and are overcome by overwhelming evils, when they put themselves to death... for the very virtues of this life, which are certainly its best and most useful possessions, are all the more telling proofs of its miseries in proportion as they are helpful against the violence of its dangers, toils and woes." (44)

Do not desire to possess all things through avarice, says St. Augustine, but rather seek this through piety and humility. If you seek in this way you will obtain. For you will have him through whom all things are made and with him all things else. It is not wealth which is evil but the excessive desire of the will. Yet wealth leads to many evils as St. Augustine often points out: it is the mammon of iniquity, the enervation of body and soul; and those desiring riches inordinately are to be reckoned among the reprobate; and earthly riches do not testify power but need. Yet if you remove pride riches will not harm one.

"For he who wishes to become rich, he (St. Paul) says; he didn't say, who is rich, but who wishes to become rich, falls
into temptation and into many foolish and harmful desires, which drown one in destruction and perdition. He loves money, do you not fear this? Money is a good thing; much money is good...pride is the worm of riches. It is difficult for one who is rich not be be proud. Take away pride, and riches will not harm." (49)

Avarice is so diametrically opposed to the whole philosophy of Augustine, to his concept of human nature, to his very moderate estimate of the worth of possessions, in short to his "Augustinian pessimism" that he gives it no quarter. We can readily appreciate his contempt for avarice from some of his castigations of this vice. In a sermon he gives a sententious description of the boundless demands of avarice on one addicted to it: "More money does not close the jaws of avarice but extends them, it does not quench, but kindles. It refuses a cup because its thirst is for a river." (50) And in his commentary on the Psalms (the Latin title is Enarratio in Psalmos) he portrays the mind of a "land grabber." "Whither does greediness for land lead to? You sought farms, you desired to possess land, you excluded your neighbors. Those being excluded, you dispossessed other neighbors; and finally you extended your avarice until you reached to the sea coast. Having attained to the shore, you desire to possess the islands; when you possess the earth, you will perhaps, grasp at the heavens." (51)

Augustine also condemned usury as we see from a letter of his to a bishop of Macedon where he says, "What shall I say of usury, which even the very laws and judges order to be given back? Is he who steals from and robs the rich, more cruel than
"he who takes a farm away from a poor man?" This condemnation of usury was not a doctrine peculiar to Augustine, for Brucculeri refers to ten early ecclesiastical writers prior to the bishop of Hippo, who had written on the same subject. He mentions the following: Apollonarius in the second century, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, S. Cyprian, St. Basil, St. Gregory of Nyssa, St. John Chrysostom, Lactantian, St. Jerome, and St. Ambrose. With such an array of authorities condemning usury we can readily believe that it must have been a considerable evil in those times.

Besides avarice which leads men to amass wealth without limit, there is another vice which offers a temptation to the rich, and one which is a source of great danger—the vice of seeking pleasures and honors which naturally accompanies great wealth. Augustine censures this conduct singling out for special notice those who in order to be esteemed maintained a menagerie of bears and wolves to feed, instead of giving bread to Christ's poor. He must have had in mind some aristocratic Roman in this sermon:

"He seeks honors from vain men; in order to be sought after he exhibits extravagant spectacles to them, spectacles of bad taste; he buys wolves and bears, he puts his money into menageries, while Christ is hungry in his poor. You yourselves consider what we speak of, how many evil deeds men of superfluous wealth perform." (54)

(55)

In the City of God Augustine points out that the real reason behind many of the condemnation of Christianity is that this excessive desire for pleasure is curbed by this religion.
why, says the saint addressing himself to the pagans, in your 
calamities do you complain of Christianity, unless because you 
desire to enjoy your luxurious licence unrestrained, and to lead 
an abandoned and profligate life without the interruption of any 
uneasiness or disaster? For certainly your desire for peace and 
prosperity is not prompted by any purpose of using these blessings 
honestly, that is to say, with moderation, sobriety, temperance, 
and piety; for your purpose is rather to run riot in an endless 
variety of sottish pleasures, and thus to generate from your 
prosperity a moral pestilence which will prove a thousand-fold 
more disastrous than the fiercest enemies. It is noticeable 
here how Augustine links together faults against religion and 
piety on the one side, and civil degradation and even temporal 
 evils on the other. Surely St. Augustine would condemn the attit­ 
ude so current in our times which maintains religion and civil 
government in separate and distinct compartments. For in his eye 
an injury against one power ultimately strikes back at the other. 
In this passage the saint does not mince words in disclosing the 
real principles behind the pagans' supposed zeal for their country 
and analyzes their real motives with penetrating psychology. 

If abundance of wealth leads to moral ennervation and exclu­ 
sive pursuit of pleasure, it soon results in a disastrous con­ 
dition which Augustine depicts in describing the state of affairs 
delighted in by those inveighing against the Christian religion. 

"But the worshippers and admirers of these gods delight 
in imitating their scandalous iniquities, and are nowise con-
cerned that the republic be less depraved and licentious. Only let it remain undefeated, they say, only let it flourish and abound in resources; let it be glorious by its victories, or still better, secure in peace; and what matters it to us? This is our concern, that every man be able to increase his wealth so as to supply his daily prodigalities, and so that the powerful may subject the weak for their own purposes. Let the poor court the rich for a living, and that under their protection they may enjoy a sluggish tranquility; and let the rich abuse the poor as their dependants to minister to their pride. Let the people applaud not those who protect their interests but those who provide them with pleasure." (57)

Augustine makes a very psychological remark when he says that it is difficult for one who is rich not to be proud, and in this pride he makes the whole evil of riches to consist. This thought of course, is clearly expressed in the Gospel, notably in the remark that Jesus made following the interview with the rich young man: "Amen, I say to you that a rich man shall hardly enter into the kingdom of heaven." And Augustine himself refers to the words of St. Paul where he says, "For they that will become rich, fall into temptation, and into the snare of the devil, and into many unprofitable and hurtful desires, which drown men in destruction and perdition. For the desire of money is the root of all evils." It is evident then that the saint's doctrines on property and wealth are inspired by the Holy Scriptures.

Having seen St. Augustine's teaching on the right of private property, on the condemnation of the vices of avarice, usury, and lavish spending, it now remains to investigate his doctrine on the duty that the rich have of coming to the aid of the poor—the duty of alms-giving. Augustine in the first place, set up a sublime motive for giving to the poor—to give to Christ's
"Give to Christ: for Christ has willed to accept this. Give to Christ, and you do not lose. You do not lose if you entrust something to your servant, and do you lose if you entrust it to your Lord? You do not lose if you entrust to your servant what you have acquired; and will you lose if you entrust to your Lord what you have received from the Lord himself? Christ has willed that this need exist, but on account of us. For Christ could feed all the poor whom you see just as he fed Elias by a raven. Still, he took away the raven from Elias that he might be fed by the widow. Therefore when God makes the poor...he tries the rich." (60)

Here is an instance where the argument might be more theological than philosophical--explaining the presence of poverty as a trial sent by God to prove the rich--but in any case it affords a profound insight into the existence of this apparent evil in the world which could hardly be afforded were we to neglect the consideration of the disposition of God who orders all things. It is in cases like this where the Christian Philosopher can reach down to the depths and enlighten us in a way that a Greek thinker would not be in a position to do because he lacks the integrating force that the doctrine of creation and divine providence gives to philosophy. St Augustine while maintaining the right to the possession of property nevertheless affirms certain duties associated with such possession. The rich have the obligation of coming to the assistance of the poor--the superfluities of the rich are the necessaries of the poor.

"Seek what you need and from what take what is sufficient. Whatever remains are the necessaries of others. The superfluous goods of the rich are the necessaries of the poor. Other people's goods are possessed, when Superfluous goods are possessed." (51)
However St. Augustine does not intend that his words should become a stumbling block to the poor who might be led to a false presumption, for he goes on to say that the poor should not take occasion from the fact that Christ puts himself in their place, to think that merely because they are poor they are blessed.

Abbe Jules Martin says on this point: "The poor has no right to imagine that his condition is of itself meritorious, and that it suffices to make of him the poor of which Jesus Christ wished to give us in his own person, the perfect model." This thought is expressed by St. Augustine in a sermon:

"To thee is the poor forsaken, you will be an aid to the orphan. (Ps. IX, 14) Let us seek the poor, let us seek the orphan. Nor is it strange that I should admonish that we seek those whom you notice to be so abundant. Are not the poor everywhere?...But this poor man is to be understood in a higher sense. This poor person is he of whom it is said "Blessed are the poor in spirit..." (Matt. V, 3) There are poor people not having money, hardly finding their daily bread, so in need of the aid and pity of others that they blush not to beg. If of these it was said, "To Thee the poor is forsaken"; what are we to do who are not thus? Therefore, we who are Christians, are we not abandoned to God?" (63)

A proud beggar, thinks the bishop, is abominable and certainly does not share in the Lord's benediction, "Blessed are the poor in spirit," for having nothing to engender pride, his pride is inexcusable.

"Learn therefore to be poor and to be abandoned to God, O my fellow poor. A person is rich, he is proud. For also in these riches, which are commonly called riches, to which this poverty is commonly opposed, in these riches nothing is so much to be feared as the disease of pride. He who has no money, has not abundant opportunities; he has not the wherewith to become proud...Why, therefore, do I praise the humble
poor, who has not the wherewith to become proud? For who would bear with poverty and pride?" (64)

Let not the poor consider that after this life their lot will surely be that of Lazarus who was taken up into Abraham’s bosom, because in addition to poverty other things are required of them—especially humility. Augustine rightly considers pride to be a major evil in society, far more serious than what are commonly called evils.

"You see why, although poor people abound, rightly do we seek for a poor man; we search in a crowd and hardly do we find him. The poor meets me and I seek for the poor. Meanwhile you stretch out your hand to the poor whom you have found. You seek the one you seek, with the heart. You say, "I am poor as was Lazarus;" but this humble rich man does not say, "I am rich like Abraham". Therefore you extoll yourself, he humbles himself. Why inflate yourself and not imitate him. "I", he says, "am poor, I am taken up into the bosom of Abraham." See you not that the poor is received by a rich man? Do you not see how the rich is the one who receives the poor? For if you lift yourself up against those who have money, and deny to them the kingdom of heaven; when perhaps in them is found humility, which is not found in you; do you not fear lest when you die Abraham might say to you, "Depart from me, because you blasphemed me." (65)

Thus it is not often that we encounter a man who is truly poor, for many are poor in fact, but have a great love of riches. The poor man with the avid desire to become rich is liable to all the faults of the rich and none of the rich man’s virtues.

"He is rich, you say, I answer, he is rich. Again you, the accusor, answer and say, He is rich because of iniquity. What if he makes friends of the mammon of iniquity? The Lord knew what he said; he made no mistake when he ordered, "Make friends to yourselves of the mammon of iniquity that they may receive you into everlasting dwellings." (Luke XVI, 9) What if this rich man did so? Already he makes an end of cupidity
he exercises piety. You have nothing, but you wish to become rich; you will fall into temptation. But perhaps you were made poor and needy because you had a patrimony to sustain you and the craft of a competitor has taken it away. I hear you groan, you cry out against misfortune; you sigh about what you would do if you could. Do we see the harvest? All things are full of the harvest as experience shows. Yesterday he was lamenting; today having arrived at better conditions, he seizes another's goods." (66)

We have examined Augustine's thought concerning the vices of the rich and those of the poor; how he condemned the avarice and luxury of the rich, and the envy and rash judgment of the poor; and how he censured most energetically the pride of both rich and poor. Now we proceed to study the duties of rich and poor, and to introduce this subject we shall refer to Augustine's doctrine on the mutual duty that the rich and the poor have in each other's regard. The rich and the poor each have duties to one another and must bear one another's burden.

"Turn now to that precept, "Bear you one another's burdens". For you have the burden of Christ; whence you are to carry with another your own burden. He is poor, you are rich; his burden is poverty; you have no such burden. Take care lest when the poor man beseeches you, you say, "Each one will carry his own burden." Hear this other precept: "Bear you one another's burden". Poverty is not my burden, but the burden of my brother. See that riches be not a greater burden to you. For you have not the burden of poverty but the burden of riches. If you act rightly it is a burden. That man has one burden, you another. Carry it with him and he will carry it with you, and you will bear one another's burden. What is the burden of poverty? Not to possess. What is the burden of riches? To have more than necessary. And both he and you are burdened. Carry it with the one not having much and he will carry it with you having more; that your burdens may be made equal. For if you give to the indigent, you lessen his burden of having little: if you give to him he begins to have; his burden of not having is diminished; and yours is also diminished, which is to have more than there is need. You both walk on the road of God in traversing this life: You
carrying great expenses, he cleaves to you, desiring to be your companion; do not neglect him; do not spurn him; do not abandon him." (67)

This is but another way of saying in the familiar phrase that the rich are merely stewards of their wealth, to use it to promote the welfare of their fellow man. For in Augustine's view there is a brotherhood of man and no one is sufficient for himself but each should, in the words of the Gospel which he appropriates, bear one another's burden.

We can see that St. Augustine did not flatter the poor at the expense of the rich. The duties of rich and poor are mutual and not unilateral. Poverty in itself is neither a merit nor a privilege nor should it set aside the just application of the laws. Pity for a poor man should not prevent the administration of justice in a civil tribunal as St. Augustine expressly says. "Perhaps when we judge we see that justice is on the side of the rich and against the poor, and we think we do right if because of pity we favor the case of the poor though opposed to justice. Pity is good but it ought not to be opposed to justice." (68) In a similar passage he pictures a trial at court between a poor man and a rich person in which manifestly the poor man is in the wrong. It is a natural thing, he says, if one is not learned in the kingdom of God, to pity the poor and out of compassion to give him the case conniving at his injustice. In so doing one safeguards mercy, no doubt, but does injury to justice—whereas in the book of Exodus the sacred writer himself says "Neither shalt thou favor a poor man in judgment." And pursuing his
Augustine makes enlightening comments on the rules to follow in judging between the rich and the poor in order to achieve perfect justice.

"For the rest it is easy to be warned not to make exception of persons in the case of the rich: everyone sees this, but would that every man would do it! The mistake is made under the pretext of pleasing God, if an exception in favor of the person of the poor would be made in judgment, and one would say to God: I favored the poor. You should uphold both mercy and justice. In the first place what kind of mercy did you confer on him whose iniquity you favored? You spared a little treasure, you struck at the heart; this pauper remained bad; and so much the worse as he sees you, a so called just man favor his iniquity...What good therefore, you say, should I do? You should judge first according to the case, you should convict the poor, and beseech the rich. The office of judge is one thing, that of petitioner is another. When the rich man will see that you have preserved justice, that you have not afforded the unjust poor man an occasion to lift up his head, but that you have justly reprimanded his offense, will not that rich man be the more easily persuaded by you to be merciful, who was rendered joyful by your judgment?" (71)

Abbé Jules Martin says that in pagan antiquity there was no need to caution a judge against allowing himself to be unduly swayed by a sentiment of pity for the poor. Such an error did not seem possible to the pagans so that neither Seneca nor Aristotle thought of advocating such a precaution as we have seen Augustine to do. There had been among the Romans revolts of the poor, and Greece had its agrarian laws to control the poor, but with the advent of Christianity the poor were raised to a certain dignity but this might easily be exaggerated and lead to a pernicious illusion. It was against this that Augustine was on his guard. Apparently it was widespread if we are to judge from the words of Abbé Martin. "And since Augustine in a sermon took
great pains to combat this pretension it must have been wide-
spread."

If poverty is not in itself a title to merit, in the view of St. Augustine, neither is it on the other hand to be regarded as a misfortune or an affliction as some think who cry out against the workings of Providence.

"God should not have made the poor, but only the rich; and they alone should live. Why was the poor man made? Why does he live? He reprehends the God of the poor. The better that the poor of God is, the more rich is he in God. That is, let him follow the will of God, and see that his poverty is temporal and fleeting, and that spiritual riches will come to him that can never be taken away. It is possible to answer, dearly beloved, in one word. God made the poor, that he might try man; and he made the rich to try him by means of the poor. And whatever God has made he has made rightfully. And if we cannot see his plan, why he made this or that in such a fashion, let us confide in his wisdom and believe that he made all things well." (74)

Hence if poverty is not an evil, if we look at it rightly it behoves the poor, just as the rich, to submit themselves to the dispositions of providence and to refrain from murmuring. By abandoning themselves to God they mitigate and even transform the hardness of their condition. As Augustine remarks, when speaking (75) of the affairs of empires all things are in the hands of God and Providence cares for everything—so also does it care for the temporal prosperity or adversity of individuals. The Bishop of Hippo explains in the City of God how it is that the goods of this life are distributed so unevenly, saying that if God did not by a manifest liberality confer these on some of those persons who ask for them, we should say that these good things were not
at His disposal; and if he gave them to all who sought them, we should suppose that such were the only rewards of His service, and such a service would make us not godly, but greedy rather, and covetous. And under some beautiful similies he indicates how these sufferings show what kind of stuff men are made of. For as the same fire causes gold to glow brightly, and chaff to smoke; and under the same flail the straw is beaten small, while the grain is cleansed; and as the lees are not mixed with the oil, though squeezed out of the vat by the same pressure, so the same violence of affliction proves, purges, charifies the good, but damns, ruins, exterminates the wicked...So material a difference does it make, not what ills are suffered, but what kind of man suffers them. For, stirred up with the same movement, mud ex­hales a horrible stench, and ointment emits a fragrant odor."

In the Old Testament there is a passage wherein temporal blessings are promised to those who serve God. "And you shall serve the Lord your God, that I may bless your bread and your waters, and I may take away sickness from the midst of thee. There shall not be one fruitless nor barren in thy land: I will fill the number of thy days, etc." These promises, however, says Augustine are to be taken in a spiritual sense, though in the Old Testament for people in those times, they had a literal signification. (77)

(78) These promises, however, says Augustine are to be taken in a spiritual sense, though in the Old Testament for people in those times, they had a literal signification. (79)

There is no legitimate happiness to be derived from the possession of great riches unless it is in accordance with the demands of the social life of man.
"How can your happiness be social, when it torments the happiness of another? When your neighbor begins to enrich himself and follow after you, do you not fear lest he pursue you, and lest he pass you up? Surely you love your neighbor as yourself...I do not speak to the envious, I speak to those that wish others well. I speak to those who wish well to their friends, that they might have as much as themselves; that wish well to the needy, that they too might have as much as themselves; but are unwilling to give them anything of their own. And then do you boast, O Christian, who are a well-wisher? Better than you is the beggar who wishes many things for thee and has nothing." (80)

How much should be given to the poor? Augustine recalls that scribes and pharisees gave tithes of all they possessed, and besides Christians who are more solicitous for their own pleasure than for the wants of the poor.

"What are they going to do with their riches? What do you read? "Let them be rich in good works...Let them easily give, easily share..." You have, and another has not. Share with him and he will share with you...Therefore are they to lose their wealth thereby? "Let them communicate", it is said not let them give all. Let them keep for themselves as much as suffices, let them keep more than suffices. Let us then give some part. What part? The tenth part. The Scribes and Pharisees gave the tenth part (tithes) (Luke VIII, 12). We ought to be ashamed, brethren; They gave tithes, for whom Christ had not yet shed his blood. The Scribes and Pharisees gave tithes: in order that you may not think you do a great work when you break bread to the poor; and hardly is that the thousandth part of your substance. And still I am not reprimanding you for doing this. I am so hungry and thirsty that I am glad of these crumbs. The Scribes and Pharisees gave tithes. What about it? Interrogate yourselves. See what you do, from what abundance you do it; what you give; what you reserve for yourselves, what mercy you show, what you set aside for luxury." (81)

There should be order in alms giving and prudence should govern it as Augustine points out in one of his letters. Is it a greater good, he asks, to provide for the poor with lavish alms than it is an evil to neglect one's own household? Neither
should alms be given in such a manner that anybody could take
scandal therefrom, and one should be careful to keep sufficient
for one's own. Augustine believed that alms-giving should pro-
ceed from the heart, and the love with which we give is of more
avail with God than what we give. If we are compassionate toward
the poor God will reward us even if we have not the means of
helping them. This is far and away from the formalism of much of
our modern charity where there is no personal element but only a
cut and dried "organized charity." "Whence proceeds alms? From
the heart. For if you extend your hand and have no pity in your
heart, you do nothing; but if you are compassionate at heart even
if you have nothing to offer with your hand, God accepts your
alms."

Augustine reverts to the idea of a social good attached to
riches when commenting on the passage of Ecclesiasticus where it
says, "Keep fidelity with a friend in his poverty, that in his
prosperity also you may rejoice." In his sixty-first sermon,
he advises one not to break faith with a friend if he becomes
poor. The Lord made both rich and poor and intended that they
aid one another.

"And who made them both? The Lord (Prov. XII, 2). He
made the rich that he might aid the poor; he made the poor that
he might try the rich." (86)

Jesse James is said to have robbed a stage coach to give a
widow money to redeem the mortgage on her house. St. Augustine
in a sermon speaks of this kind of pious fraud with words of con-
Alms do not render legitimate, goods unjustly acquired.

"But the plunderer of other people's goods says to me: I am not like other rich men. I perform the agapes, I send food to those bound in prison, I clothe the naked, I take in the traveler. Do you think that you are giving? Cease taking and give. The one you give to, rejoices; he from whom you take is sad: which of these will the Lord hear? You say to him to whom you gave: thank you because you have received this. But the other one on his part says to you; I protest to you who have stolen from me. And you keep nearly the whole thing, and give a mite to the other person. If therefore you give to the needy what you have taken from another, God certainly does not like such a deed... Know then thou fool, who wish to give alms with plundered goods, that if you feed a Christian, you feed Christ; but when you rob from a Christian, you rob from Christ." (87)

This is a fair sample of the intimate style Augustine assumes in his sermons where he interjects much dialogue in order to bring out his lesson. It is difficult to convey the same informal tenor of it into English. There are many short sentences, abrupt questions, objections, refutations, and devices of a rhetorician. The old maxim that the end does not justify the means is taken up for discussion in showing that a person may not despoil a pagan to give to a Christian.

"In order to evade the sentence of Christ you propose to despoil a pagan to clothe a Christian. And here Christ will answer you and say, "Even here you do me wrong, when you a Christian despoil me, a pagan, you hinder me from becoming a Christian." And even in this case perhaps you would answer further: "I do not act by hate, but rather by a love of order; and so I rob the pagan that through this hard and salutary lesson I may make him a Christian." I have heard and I believe if you have taken from a pagan, you restore it to a Christian." (88)
naively presents to the auditor. And in his Contra Mendacium (89)
Augustine concedes that it is less of an evil to steal out of
pity, to use the article to help another, than it is to steal out of
covetousness, but in both cases it is evil. Because some sins
are venial and some mortal is that any reason why a venial sin
ought to be committed?

The thought of St. Augustine on the subject of property
might be briefly recapitulated. He finds that there are two ex­tremes that must be condemned: the one is the excessive attach­ment to earthly goods which Augustine refutes by showing the rel­ative insignificance of temporal things, and that the real goods
are eternal; the other extreme is that of the Manicheans who con­demned private ownership, which is rejected by showing the right
of private property is natural. The underlying principle that
gives meaning to Augustine's entire doctrine on private property
is that ownership ultimately belongs to God alone, for he is the
creator, and man holds property only dependently on God. Hence
it is that property though held in accordance with human law is
ultimately founded on divine law. The doctrine of ownership de­pendently on God furnishes Augustine with a powerful argument
against the vices that tend to associate themselves with the abuse
of property; against avarice, usury, luxury, injustice, and pride.
Finally there are the duties attaching to private property; for
the rich the social duty of almsgiving, and for the poor the duty
of respecting the property of the rich and of not regarding alms
as a just debt but rather as a gratuituous gift.
Notes: Chapter III.


Bruculleri quotes the opinion of Adriano Tilgher who considered that Augustinian thought was a terrible dissolver of every form of terrestrial society founded by man.


St. Augustine, *City of God*, I, 10.

I Tim. VI, 6.

Job I, 21.

Sermo L, 8, P.L. 38, 330.

"Facite vobis amicos de mammona iniquitatis, hoc est dicere: Quae mammona iniquitatis est, vestra mammona esse non debet. Tunc enim injuste poteritis uti rerum copia terrenarum, et amicos inde facere, qui vos recipiant in aeterna tabernacula, si mammona vobis ista non fuerit, id est, si non ex ea vos divites fieri putaveritis. Quoniam devitiae vestrae, quae sunt verae divitiae quae ab omni vestrae devitiae liberabunt, non sunt terrenis facultatibus comparandae. Sed ut illis, merito frui possitis, prius istis bene utendum est, quia non sunt divitiae verae nec vestrae, quia injuste dicuntur divitiae."


"Videamus quid (Deus) nobis promisit: non divitias terrenas et temporales, non honores et potestates in saeculo isto: videtis haec omnia dari et hominibus malis, ne magnificentur a bonis."

I Tim. VI, 17.

Matt. VI, 19.

City of God I, 10.

ibid. III, 1.

St. Augustine, *De Moribus Ecclesiae*, I, 35.

e.g. *De Opere Monachorum* c. 22.

St. Augustine, De Moribus Ecclesiae Catholicae I, 78.

"Quid calumniamini, quod fideles jam Baptismati renovati, procreare filios, et agros ac domos, pecuniamque ullam possidere non debeant? Permittit hoc Paulus. Nam quoque negare non potest fidelibus scripsit."

ibid. I, 80.

"Nolite jam dicere, catechumenis licere uti conjugibus, fidelibus autem non licere; catechumenis licere habere pecuniam, fidelibus autem non licere. Nam et multi sunt qui utuntur tamquam non utentes. Et illo sacrosancto lavacro inchoatur innovatio novi hominis, ut perficiendo perficiatur, in aliis citius, in aliis tardius: a multis tamen procedit in novam vitam, si quisquam non inimice, sed diligenter intendat. Ipsa quippe, sicut ait Apostulus, "Etsi exterior homo noster corruptur, sed interior renovatur de die in diem."

(II Cor. IV, 16) Apostulus de die in diem interiorem hominem renovari dicit ut perficiatur, et vos a perfectione multis incipiat. Quod utinam velitis: sed quae potius, non unde erigitis invalidus, sed unde fallatis incautos...Cum vero noverit vestra conscientia eos quos in sectam vestram introcudere, cum vobis familiares jungi coeperint, multa inventuros quos in vestris esse, cum alios accusaretis, nemo suspicabatur; quae tanta impudentia est, perfectionem in catholicis imbecillioribus, quaeerere, ut inde imperitos avertas, et eam nullum modo apud te iis quos averteris exhibere?"

St. Augustine, Epistola XCIII, XII, 50, P.L. 33, 345.

"Quicumque vos ex occasione legis huic us imperalis, non dilectione corrigitendi, sed inimicandi odio persecutur, displicet nobis. Et quamvis res quaeque terrena non recte a quodam possidere possit, nisi vel jure divino, quo cuncta justorum sunt, vel jure humano, quod in potestate regum est terrae; ideoque res vestras false appelletis, quae nec justa estis, frustraque, dicatis, Nos eis congregandis laboravimus, cum scriptum legatis Labores impiorum justi edent (Prov. XIII, 22) sed tamen quisquis ex occasione hujus legis, quam reges terrae Christo servientes, ad emendandum vestram impitatatem promulgaverunt, res proprietias vestras cupide appetit displicet nobis. Quisquis denique ipsas res pauperum, vel basilicas congregationem, quas sub nomine Ecclesiae tenebatis, quae omnino non debentur nisi ei Ecclesiae quae vera Christi Ecclesiae est, non per Justitiam sed avaritiam tenet, displicet nobis."

St. Augustine, Sermo CXXVI, 8, P.L. 47, 694.

"Dicis, et respondes mihi: Et Deus scit quia innocenter possideo. Tentatio probat. Turbatur tibi quod possides, et

Sermo CCCCLVIII, 2, P.L. 36, 1586.
"Quare frater, de possessione litigamus, et non potius sanctas tabulas recitamus? Venisse nos opinemur ad judicem. De possessione contentio est: et haec contentio non litis, sed dilectionis est. Denique litigatur terrena possessiones ad hoc litigat, ut excludat adversarium dicentem, Possidere volo; respondit, Non permitto."

I Cor. VI, 1.

I Cor. VI, 4.

Epistola CLI I, 26, P.L. 33, 665.
"Omne igitur quod male possidetur, alienum est; male autem possidet qui male utitur. Cernis ergo quam multi debeant redere aliena, si vel pauci quibus reddantur, reperiantur: qui tamen ubi ubi sunt, tanto magis ista contemnunt, quanto ea justius possidere poterunt. Justitiam quippe, et nemo male habet, et qui non dilexerit non habet. Pecunia vero, et a malis male habetur, et a bonis tanto melius habetur, quanto minus amat. Sed inter haec toleratur iniquitas male habentium, et quaedam inter eós jura constituuntur, quae appellantur civilia; non quod hinc fiat ut bene utentes sint, sed ut male utentes minus molesti sint: donec fideles et pii, quorum jure sunt omnia, qui vel ex illis fiunt, vel inter illos tantisper viventis malis eorum non obstringuntur, sed exercentur, perveniant ad illam civitatem, ubi hereditatis aeternitatis est."

est ille servus, aut domus haec mea est? Si autem ut ten-
• tantur ista ab hominibus, jura acceperunt regum vultis re-
citemus leges, ut gaudeatis quia vel unum hortum habitis, 
et non imputetis nisi mansuetudine calumbae, quia vel ibi 
vobis permittur permanere?"

St. Augustine, In Joan, Tract. VI, 26, P.L. 34, 1437.
"Sed quid nobis et imperatori? Sed jam dixi: de jure 
humano agitur. Et tamen Apostolus voluit servire regibus, 
voluit honorari reges, et dixit: Regem reveremini (I Petr. 
II, 17) Noli dicere: Quid mihi et regi? Quid tibi ergo et 
possidentur? Per jura regum possidentur possessiones. Dix-
isti, quid mihi et regi? Noli dicere possessiones tuus; 
quia ad ipsa jura humana renuntiasti, quibus possidentur 
possessiones. Sed de divino jure ago, ait. Evangelium re-
citemus; videamus quousque Ecclesia Catholica Christi est."

Epistola ad Bonifacium CCXX, 1, P.L. 33, 996.
Quaest, in Heptat. LXXVI, P.L. 34, 568.
"Benedixit eum Dominus, ut sana fide intelligamus etian 
ista temporalia dona, nec dari posse, nec sperare debere... 
nisi ab uno Deo."

Enarratio in Psalmo XLIX, 17, P.L. 36, 576.
"Mea sunt illa quae non possides, mea sunt ista quae 
possides... Meae sunt bestiae silvae quae tu non cepisti; 
mea sunt et pecora in montibus quae sunt tua, et boves qui 
sunt ad praesaepu tuum. Omnia mea sunt, quia ego creavi 
eae."

cf. Enarr. in Ps. XXXV, 7, P.L. 36, 346.
"Omnia ista bona sunt et munera Dei sunt."

"Aurum et argentum res est non hominis sed Dei. Cur 
non autem miser intellectus, quod apud Aggaeum loquens 
Dominus propter ausa Dixerit: Meum est aurum et meum est ar-
gentum, et ille qui non vult cum indigentibus communi-
care quod habet, cum audit praecepta facienda misericordiae 
intelligat Deum non de re illius cui jubet, sed de re sua 
jubere donari; et ille qui aliquid porrigit pauperi, non se 
 arbitratur de suo facere, ne forte non tam confirmetur 
misericordiae nomine, quam infletur superbiae vanitate? 
Meum est, inquit, aurum et meum est argentum, non vestrum, 
O divites terrae. Quid ergo dubitatis pauperi dare et meo, 
aut quid extollimini cum datis de meo?"

City of God XIX, 13.

Aristotle, Politics II, 2.
He cites Nitti, *Il Socialismo Cattolico*, p. 66, as holding that at the end of the sixth century the Church Fathers esteemed communism to be a more perfect and more Christian form of social organization.

Sermo CLXXVII, 2, P.L. 38, 954.

"Nimis grave est et nimis horribile, ut avaritia nos teneat in terris; cum illi dicamus: Pater noster qui es in coelis (Matt. VI, 9) Cujus desideria vilescunt omnia...Sint haec ad necessitatis usus, non ad charitatis affectum: sint tamquam stabulum viatoris, non tamquam praedium possessoris. Refice et transi. Iter agis, attende ad quem venisti; quia magnus est qui ad te venit."

Enarr. in Ps. CXXXVIII, 13, P.L. 37, 1792.

"Recipiamus pennas per charitatem, quas amisimus per cupiditatem. Cupiditas enim viscum facta est pennarum nostrarum; elisit nos de libertate aeris nostri, id est aurarum illarum Spiritus Dei."

City of God XIX, 4.

Sermo CXLII, V, 5, P.L. V, 781.

Enarratio in Psalmum XXXIX, 1.

ibid. LXXXII, I.

Sermo LXXVIII, IX, 13.


"Nam qui volunt, inquit, divites fieri. Non dixit, qui
divites sunt, sed qui volunt divites fieri, incidunt in tentationem et desideria multa stulta et noxia, quae mergunt homines in interitum et perditionem. Pecunia delectat, istra non times? Bona res est pecunia, bona res est magna pecunia...Vermis divitiarum superbia est. Difficile est ut non sit superbus, qui dives est. Tolle superbiam, divitiae non noc-ebunt."

50 **Sermo L, 6, P.L. 38, 328.**
"Major pecunia fauces avaritiae non claudit, sed extendit, non irrigat sed accendit. Poculum respuunt quia flumen sitiunt."

51 **Emarr. In Ps. XXXIX, 7, P.L. 36, 438.**
"Quo ducit et quo perducit terrena avaritia? Fundos quaerebas, terram possidere cupiebas, vicinos excludebas; illis exclusis, alis vicinis inhiabas; et tamdui tendebas avaritiam, donec ad littora pervenires: perveniens ad littora, insulas concupiscis; possessa terra, coelum forte vis preprendere."

52 **Epistola CLIII, 25, P.L. 33, 565.**
"Quid dicam de usuris, quas etiam ipsae leges it judices reddi jubent? An crudelior est qui subtrahit aliquid vel eripit diviti, quam qui trucidat pauperam fenore?"

53 **Bruculeri, op. cit. p. 47.**

54 **Sermo XXXII, 20, P.L. 38, 203.**
"Quaerit honores ab hominibus vanos; ut autem adipiscatur, exhibit illis ludicra nequitiae, ludicra malae cupiditatis; lupos et ursos emit, donat res suas bestiaris, esuriente Christo in pauperibus. Vos ipsi cogitate quae non tacemus, quanta mala faciant homines de superfluis rebus."

55 **City of God I, 30.**

56 ibid.

57 ibid. II, 20.

58 Matt. XIX, 23.

59 I Tim. VI, 9.

60 **Sermo XXXIV, 6, P.L. 38, 243.**
"Da Christo: Christus enim hic voluit accipere. Da Christo, et non perdis. Non perdis si commendas servo tuo; et perdis, si commendas domino tuo? Non perdis si commendas servo tuo quod acquisivisti; et perdes si commendes Domino tuo quod accepiisti ab ipso Domino tuo? Egere hic voluit"
Christus sed propter nos. Omnes pauperes quos videtis; potuit illos Christus pascere, quomodo per corvum Eliam pavit: tamen et ipsi Eliae subtraxit corvum, ut a vidua posceretur. Quando ergo Deus pauperes facit...probat divites."

Enarr. In Ps. CXLVII, 12, P.L. 37, 1922.

Abbé Jules Martin, Doctrine Sociale De S. Augustine, p. 106
"Le pauvre ne doit pas s'imaginer que sa condition lui procure, par elle même, un mérite, et qu'elle suffit a faire de lui le pauvre dont Jésus-Christ a voulu nous donner, en sa personne, le parfait modèle."

Sermo XIV, 1, 1, P.L. 36, 111-112.
"Tibi derelictus est pauper, pupillo tu eris adjutor (Psal. IX, 14): Quaeramus pauperum, Quaeramus pupillum. Nec mirum sit quod admoneo ut quaeramus, quos sic abundare cernimus et sentimus, Nonne pauperibus plena omnia?...Sed altius intelligendus est iste pauper. De illo genere est iste pauper, de quo dictum est, Beati pauperes spiritu... (Matt. V, 3) Sunt pauperes non habentes pecuniam, victum quotidiam vix invenientes, allentis opibus, misericordia sic indigentes, ut etiam mendicare non erubescant: si de his dictum est Tibi derelictus est pauper; nos quid facimus; qui hoc non sumus? Ergo nos qui Christiani sumus, non sumus Deo derelicti?"

Sermo XIV, 1, 2, P.L. 36, 112.
"Discite ergo esse pauperes et Deo relinqui, O compauperes mei. Dives est, superbus est Nam et in divitiis istis, quae vulgo appellantur divitiae, quibus est contraria vulgaris ista paupertas; in divitiis ergo nihil est sic cavendum quam superbiae morbus. Qui enim non habet pecuniam, non habet amplissimas facultates; non habet unde se extollat...Quid ergo laudo humilem pauperum, qui inde superbit non habet? Quis autem ferat et inopem et superbum"

Sermo XIV, IV, 5, P.L. 36, 114.
superbis contra eos qui habent pecuniam, et negas eos ad regnum caelorum pertinere; cum in eis fortasse inveniatur humilitas, quae in te non inventur: non times ne tibi, cum mortuus fueris, dicat Abraham, Recede a me, quia blasphemasti me.

66 Sermo XIV, VI, 8, P.L. 36, 115.

67 Sermo CLXV, VII, 9, P.L. 36, 899.
"Converte te jam ad illud praeceptum, Invicem onera vestra portate. Habes enim sarcinam Christi; unde portes cum altero onus proprium. Pauper est, dives es: onus illius paupertas est; tu tales onus non habes. Vide ne forte cum te interpellaverit pauper, tu dicas, Unusquisque onus proprium portabit. Hic alterum praeceptum audi: Invicem onera vestra portate. Paupertas non est onus meum, sed est onus fratris mei. Vide ne divitiae sint majus onus tuum. Nam non habes onus paupertatem, sed habes onus divitias. Si bene intendas, onus est. Ille alterum onus habet, tu alterum. Porta cum illo, et portet tecum, ut invicem onera vestra portetis. Quod est onus paupertas? Non habere. Quod est divitiarum onus? Plus quam opus est habere. Et ille oneratus est et tu oneratus es. Porta cum illo non habere, portet tecum plus habere; ut fiant aequales sarcinae vestrae. Si enim dederis indigeniti, minuis illi non habenti onus ipsius, quod erat non habere; se el dederis, incipit habere; minutum est illi onus, quod vocatur non habere; minuit et ipsi onus tuum; quod vocatur plus habere. Duo ambulatis viam Dei in perigrinatione hujus saeculi: tu portabas sumptus magnos superfluos; ille autem sumptus non habebat; adhaesit tibi, comes tuus esse desiderans; noli negligere, noli spernere, noli relinquere."

68 Quaestionum in Heptateuchum II, LXXXVIII, P.L. 34, 628.
"Ne forte cum judicamus, videamus justitiam esse pro divite contra pauperem, et nobis recte facere videamur si contra justitiam pauperi faveamus causa misericordiae. Bona est misericordia, sed non debet esse contra justitiam."

69 Enarr. in Ps. XXXII, 1, 10, P.L. 35, 285.
Enarr. in Ps. XXXII, I, 11-12, P.L. 35, 286.

"Coeterum facile est ut admoveamur personam divitis non accipere; hoc omnis homo videt, atque utinam sic omnis homo faceret! Illud est ubi fallitur, veluti quae vult placere Deo, si personam pauperis in judici occipiatur, et dicat Deo: Favi pauperi, Imo teneres utrumque, et misericordiam et judicium. Primo qualem misericordiam fecisti in eum, cujus iniquitati facisti? Ecce sacello pepercisti, cor percussisti; pauper iste iniquus remansit; et tanto iniquior, quanto te quasi hominem fustum favere vidit iniquitate suae ...Quid ergo, inquis, facerem? Judicarum primo secundum causam, argueres pauperem, flecteres divitem, alius est judicandi, alius petendi locus. Quando te ille dives vederet tenuisse justitiam, non erexisse iniqui pauperis cervicem, sed pro merito peccati sui objurgasse te juste, nonne flecteretur ille ad misericordiam petente te, qui laetus redditus erat judicante te?"

Abbé J. Martin, op. cit. p. 121.

ibid. "Et pour qu'Augustin, dans un Sermon (Le Serm. XIV) ait mis tant d'insistance à combattre cette prétention, il faut qu'elle ait été bien répandue."

Enarr. in Ps. CXXIV, 2, P.L. 35, 1649.

"Non debuit Deus facere pauperes, sed soli divites esse debuerunt; et ipsi soli viverent. Utquid factus est pauper? utquid vivit? Reprehendit Deum pauperum. Quanto melius esset pauper Dei, et dives esset de Deo; hoc est, sequeretur voluntatem Dei, et videret paupertatem suam temporalem esse, et transituram, divitias autem sibi spiritualiores ita venturas, ut nullo pacto possent praeterire...cito autem responderi potest, charissimi. Fecit Deus pauperem, ut probet hominem; et fecit Deus divitem, ut probet illum de paupere. Et omnia quae fecit Deus, recte fecit. Et si non possimus videre concilium ipsius, quare illud sic fecit, et illud sic; bonum est nobis ut subdamur sapientiae ipsius, et credamus quia bene fecit."

cf. chapter two of this thesis on the state.

City of God I, 8.

ibid.

Exod. XXIII, 25 et seq.

cf. Quaestionum in Heptateuchum XCII.

"Quamvis istae promissiones possint et spiritualiter intelligi, tamen cum secundum temporalem hominem felicitatem
intelliguntur, ad Vetus Testamentum pertinent: ubi quanquam praecepta, exceptis his quae in sacramento aliquid significat, eadem ad mores bonos pertinentia reperiantur, promises tamen carnales et atque terrenae sunt."

Sermo de Disciplina Christiana VII, 7, P.L. 40, 673.
"Quomodo enim socialis erit felicitas tua, quam torquet felicitas aliena? Nonne cum coeperit ditescere vicinus tuus et incipere quasi surgeret et ire post te, times ne sequatur te, times ne transeat te? Certe diligis proximum tanquam te ipsum...Non ergo loquor invidis, bene optantibus loquor. Illis loquor qui optant bene amicis, ut habeant quantum et ipsi. Optant bene egentibus, ut habeant quantum at ipsi: sed nolunt eis dare ex eo quod habent. Inde te jactas, homo Christiana, quia optas bene? Melior te est mendicus, qui plura tibi optat, et nihil habet."

Sermo LXXXV, 3-5, P.L. 38, 522.
"De divitiis facturi sunt? Audi quid? Divites sint in operibus bonis...Facile tribuant, facile communicant...Habes tu, non habet alius communica et communicetur tibi...Ergo perdituris sunt res suas? Communicent, dixit; non totum dent. Teneant sibi quantum sufficit, teneant plus quam sufficit. Demus inde quandam partem. Quam partem? Decimam partem. Decimas dabant Scribae et Pharisei (Luca VIII, 12). Erubescamus, fratres; decimas dabant pro quibus Christus nondum sanguinem fuderat. Decimas dabant Scribae et Pharisei; ne forte aliquid magnum facere te putes, quia prangeris panem pauperi; et vix est millesima ista tacultatem tua. Et tamen non reprehendo vel hoc fac. Sic sitio sic esurio ut ad istas micas gaudeam...Scribae et Pharisei decimas dabant. Quid est? Interrogate vos ipsos. Videte quid faciatis, de quanto faciatis; quid detis; quid vobis relinquatis, quid misericordiae impendatis, quid luxuriae reservetis."

Epist. CCLXII, 6, P.L. 33, 1079.

Enarr. In Ps. CXXV, 5, P.L. 37, 1660.
"Unde autem procedit eleemosyna? De corde. Si enim manu porrigas, nec in corde miserearis, nihil fecisti, si autem in corde miserearis, etiamsi non habes quod porrigas manu, acceptat Deus eleemosynam tuam."

Ecclus. XXII, 28.

Sermo XLI, 1.

Sermo XXXIX, IV, 4, P.L. 36, 243.
"Et quis fecit illos ambos? Dominus (Prov. XXII, 2). Divitem unde pauperem adjuvaret; pauperem unde divitem probaret."
Sermo CLXXVIII, IV, 4, P.L. 36, 962.


Sermo CLXXVIII, V, 5, P.L. 36, 963.

"Hic fortasse ut evadas hanc vocem, ne dicat tibi Christus, Vestitus fui et spoliasti me; mutata consuetudine, cogitas spoliare paganum, et vestire Christianum. Et hic respondebit tibi Christus, et dicet, Etiam his parce damnis meis, Cum enim Christianus spolias paganum, impeditis fieri Christianum. Etiam et hic fortasse respondebis adhuc: Ego non odio paenam ingero, sed dilectione potius disciplinae: ideo spolio paganum, ut per hanc asperam et salubrem disciplinam faciam Christianum. Audirem et crederem, si quod abstulisti pagano, redderes Christiano."

Contra Mendacium VIII, 19.
Chapter IV: Slavery.

Slavery is an institution which occupies a place in the theory of government. Indeed, in certain periods of history it forced itself to the very front and was the most burning problem facing civil authorities. We Americans can readily understand how important the question of slavery became in our own country during the first half of the nineteenth century, and how for several decades it was the chief political issue, eventually culminating in the Civil War. Slavery in St. Augustine's time was likewise something to be reckoned with, because it was firmly entrenched in the Roman empire. Augustine, like the other Fathers of the Church, felt called upon to clarify the moral issues underlying slavery. He therefore wrote on the lawfulness of the institution of slavery, and on the duties of masters, and of slaves. His doctrine is influenced by what Scripture teaches on the subject, and contrasts with the teachings of Plato and Aristotle who represent pagan thought on slavery.

Implicit in the Gospel of Christianity is the abolition of slavery, because the doctrines of the brotherhood of man, of the Mystical Body of Christ, and of the equality of all men before God would seem to do away with such a distinction as slave and free. At least in the Christian dispensation there is no satisfactory ground for the justification and maintenance of slavery. Yet for all that, neither Christ nor his apostles after him con-
denied slavery nor did they demand its abolition; on the contrary they even respected the institution of slavery and conformed their actions to its demands. Thus St. Paul in his epistle to Philémon mentions that he is sending Onesimus, a runaway slave, back to Philemon, the master, begging pardon on behalf of the slave, but still recognizing the rights of Philemon: "I beseech thee for my son whom I have begotten in my bonds, Onesimus, who has heretofore been unprofitable to thee, but now is profitable both to me and thee. Whom I have sent back to thee. And do thou receive him as my own bowels. Whom I would have retained with me, that in thy stead he might have ministered to me in the bands of the gospel: but without thy counsel I would do nothing."

Both St. Peter and St. Paul ordered slaves to respect and love their masters and to consider themselves as bound in conscience to serve them. "Servants, be subject to your masters with all fear, not only to the good and gentle but also to the froward". "Servants, obey in all things your masters according to the flesh." "Whoever are servants under the yoke, let them count their masters worthy of all honor; lest the name of the Lord and his doctrine be blasphemed. But they that have believing masters, let them not despise them because they are brethren, but serve them rather because they are faithful and beloved."

From these quotations we see that the apostles respected the duties of slaves to their masters and even ordered their fulfillment in the name of the Lord. Yet before God, as St. Paul says, there is neither slave nor free. "Where there is neither Gentile
circumcision nor uncircumcision, barbarian nor Scythian, bond nor free."  

As Abbé Martin puts it, the apostles did not demand, in the name of any theory, the abolition of slavery. They taught and practised mutual love, the true charity; they accustomed souls to this charity which is quite unlike haughty condescension. In listening to the apostles one could divine that one day all men would have the same dignity and on that day slavery would necessarily disappear. But in the fifth century the influence of Christian charity had not yet abolished slavery. No one as yet demanded its abolition. Doubtless it seemed quite natural to preserve such an ancient institution; slavery, they thought rightly, is not anti-natural. St. Augustine on the subject of slavery thought and spoke like the apostles.

"The Holy Doctor had a clear comprehension and a profound respect for the institutions of society, nor could he countenance an idea favorable to demagogues. Such a danger was not imaginary in the fourth century when the Church had to defend herself against all extremes. Thus the Synod of Gangra, convened probably in 343, made this canon: "If anyone teach slaves to abandon their masters under the pretext of religion, let him be anathema." And a synod of Neocesarea in 314–325 has a similar prescription."  

St. Augustine's attitude towards slavery can hardly be adequately appreciated in this day of ours unless we remember the place slavery held in society in ancient times. The attitude of the Greeks toward this institution is made sufficiently clear by Aristotle who in his Politics undertakes a discussion of slavery. For him slavery was founded, as was the family, private
property, and society itself on the manifest exigencies of nature. Society is divided into two well defined classes—the one born to govern and to engage in liberal pursuits, the other destined to serve—who are as it were naturally slaves. Hence the poet says, "'Tis meet Greeks rule barbarians", implying the natural identity of barbarians or non-Greeks and slaves. "The natural slave", says Aristotle, "is one who is qualified to be and therefore in fact is, the property of another, or who is only so far a rational being as to understand reason without himself possessing it." He attempts to show how the slave is property since he is an instrument though of an animate kind. This subordination of slave to master, the Philosopher considers to be rooted in nature itself, tracing from natural inferiority as to body and soul, as well as a natural fitness for slavery. Yet in addition to natural slavery there is a legal slavery resulting from the convention of law whereby conquests of war are the property of the victor. Aristotle seems to be undecided about the justice of this, saying each side has some reason in its favor.

Plato took a different view and didn't think that such a universal and stable institution as slavery needed any justification. Plato does in numerous passages mention slavery but always in a way to lead one to infer that he, too, considered slavery as a natural part of society. In the Laws he quotes with approval the saying of the poet that, "Far-seeing Zeus takes away half the understanding of men whom the day of slavery sub-
Plato advocated kindness towards slaves saying that it is the uneducated man who is harsh towards them, and that they ought to be more justly treated than equals. Yet as a class he thought slaves were untrustworthy and always inclined to rise against their masters. He recognized a profound difference between the slave and the master which is to be noted in particular in the *Laws* where he discusses the punishment to be meted out to a murderer. A man who kills his slave shall merely undergo a purification or if he kills the slave of another he shall remit double the price to the owner. But if the slave murders the master he shall be delivered over to the kin of the victim who will put the slave to death in whatever manner they please.

Although slavery was not extensive in India or China in ancient times, it did flourish in Assyria, Babylonia, and Chaldeas we can ascertain from the Holy Scriptures. In Egypt too we know slavery existed, for Joseph was sold into slavery in Egypt. In the book of Exodus there are minute regulations dealing with slaves, their term of slavery (six years for a Hebrew), punishments, and so on. St. Thomas Aquinas discusses the question of slavery, asking whether it is according to natural law and answers that slavery is contrary to the first intent of nature but it is not, however, contrary to the second intention. For the natural order is inclined to whatever is good but when one commits sin, nature exacts punishment, and accordingly slavery was introduced as a punishment of sin.
However by the beginning of the fifth century slavery was being modified, and in some manner discouraged under the influence of Christianity. The Theodotian code reveals some of these steps that improved the condition of the slave. Thus it orders that the families of slaves should not be broken up. And according to the disposition of Constantine, the manumission of slaves made in the presence of a bishop in Church received full legal recognition. This question of the manumission of slaves as a church ceremony was brought up in the council of Carthage in 410 at which council Augustine took part. This decree was certainly in accordance with the thought of St. Augustine if indeed it is not actually due to his active influence, for he himself expressed sentiments of a like nature in 416 when he was writing his commentary on the epistles of St. John.

"Therefore, brethren, we read how man was made to the image and likeness of God: and what did God say about him? "And let him have power over the fishes of the sea, and the birds of the air, and of every beast that creeps upon the earth". (Gen. I, 26) Did he say, "Let him have power over men?" "Let him have power", he says. He conferred a natural power. Over whom has he this power? Over "the fishes of the sea, the birds of the air, and all creeping things upon the earth. Why has man natural power over these things? Man has this power because he was made to the image of God. How was he made to the image of God? In intellect, in mind, in the inner man, in so far as he comprehends truth, judges between justice and injustice, knows by whom he was made, is able to know his creator, and can praise his creator." (31)

In the time of Augustine and thereafter, the natural rights of slaves began to be recognized. Constantine had considered the master who in punishing his slave inflicted a mortal wound to be guilty of homicide. (32)
To sum up briefly St. Augustine’s doctrine on slavery let us quote Abbé Martin’s brief digest of it.

"Augustine teaches that the right over a slave is not the same as the right over a horse, and that primarily the will of the creature does not produce slavery, and that the action of the Creator did not institute slavery, but that humanity perverted by sin, practiced war and in war, massacre. Then in place of killing the vanquished they reduced him to slavery. But the church favors manumission. The Church cherishes the slaves: this is not in order to procure them liberty during this life. The Church has higher views. She preaches to masters and slaves the same doctrine, she directs them towards eternity." (33)

In the City of God St. Augustine does not think man should have dominion over rational creatures but only over the irrational. In Genesis God says, "Let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every creeping thing that creepeth on the earth." But, adds the Saint, He did not intend that His rational creature, who was made to His image should have dominion over anything but the irrational creation,—not man over man, but man over beasts. But slavery is the result of sin:

"Righteous men in primitive times were made shepherds of cattle rather than kings of men. God intending thus to teach us what the relative position of the creatures is, and what the desert of sin; for it is with justice we believe, that the condition of slavery is the result of sin. And this is why we do not find the word slave in any part of the Scripture until righteous Noah branded the sin of his son with this name. It is a name therefore introduced by sin and not by nature. The origin of the Latin word for slave is supposed to be found in the circumstance that those who by the law of war were liable to be killed were sometimes preserved by their victors and were hence called servants." (36)
Thus St. Augustine with his very deep sense of the horror of sin, ascribes slavery to the just judgment of God drawn down on unfortunate men by sin. For even when we wage a just war, our adversaries must be sinning; and every victory, even though gained by wicked men, is a result of the first judgment of God, who humbles the vanquished either for the sake of removing or of punishing their sins.

St. Augustine adduces the example of Daniel as a proof that slavery results from sin. Daniel, when he was in captivity, confessed to God his own sins and the sins of his people, and declares with pious grief that these were the cause of the captivity. The prime cause then, of slavery is sin, which brings man under the dominion of his fellow,—that which does not happen save by the judgment of God, with whom is no unrighteousness and who knows how to award fit punishments to every variety of offense. Augustine takes a further view of slavery and extends it to a consideration of the mind or will which might be enslaved for, "Every one that doeth sin is a servant of sin." And thus there are many wicked masters who have religious men as their slaves, and who are yet themselves in bondage; "For of whom a man is overcome, of the same is he brought in bondage." St. Augustine is a past-master at citing Scriptural passages to illustrate his thought. Page after page from his writings is often made up of many such passages woven together by the web of his own thought to bring out the lesson he would teach. If the words from the Bible are not quoted directly,
they are referred to, or transliterated to suit the context. One wonders how the Bishop could have acquired such a ready knowledge of the whole of the Sacred Writings both Old and New Testament as to be able to call upon the multitude of thoughts and incidents therein contained with such ready ease.

Of the two kinds of slavery—that of body and that of soul: (41) the slavery of soul is by far the worse. The kind of slavery that concerns us now is the slavery of the body, which does indeed present an important problem to governments, but if we were to look deeper into the situation we would probably find that the slavery of the soul, i.e., vice, offers a much more vital problem to politics. Beyond question it is a happier thing to be a slave of a man than of a lust; for even this very lust of ruling, says Augustine in the same passage, lays waste men's hearts with the most ruthless dominion. Moreover when men are subjected to one another in peaceful order, the lowly position does as much good to the servant as the proud position does harm to the master. St. Augustine takes note of the words of St. Peter on the duties of slaves and makes their obligations less disagreeable by holding up a heavenly reward.

"The apostle admonishes slaves to be subject to their masters, and to serve them heartily and with good-will, so that, if they cannot be freed by their masters, they may themselves make their slavery in some sort free, by serving not in crafty fear, but in faithful love, until all unrighteousness pass away, and all principality and every human power be brought to nothing, and God be all in all." (43)

Even our righteous fathers had slaves, and by that St. Aug-
refers to the patriarchs of the Old Testament. They exemplified the proper rule that masters should have over their slaves for they administered their domestic affairs so as to distinguish between the condition of slaves and the heirship of sons of the father of the household in regard to the blessings of this life, yet in regard to the worship of God, in whom we hope for eternal blessings, they took an "equally loving oversight of all the members of their household. The name paterfamilias applied to the head of the household, bears testimony that this is in accordance with the natural order. The Latin name paterfamilias signifies not only the father of the family but the head of the whole house-hold, including the slaves. St. Augustine would have the paterfamilias solicitous for the spiritual welfare of his slaves just as of his children:

"Those who are true fathers of their households desire and endeavor that all the members of their household, equally with their own children, should worship and win God, and should come to their heavenly home in which the duty of ruling men is no longer necessary, because the duty of caring for their everlasting happiness has also ceased: but until they reach that home, masters ought to feel their position of authority a greater burden than servants their service." (44)

We see from his writings that St. Augustine was not one to "spare the rod and spoil the child" for if any member of the family interrupts the domestic peace by disobedience, he is corrected either by word or blow, or by some kind of just and legitimate punishment, such as society permits, that he may be the better for it, and be readjusted to the family harmony from which he had dislocated himself.
According to Nourrisson, St. Augustine in his theory of slavery abandoned the view of Aristotle to side with the Stoics. For him slaves were persons and not things. "Not only then did he wish that they be treated as members of the family, and that their emancipation be regarded with favor, but he vindicated their dignity as men and declared slavery to be contrary to human nature. Nevertheless his words are deceiving. For it is, in reality, nature in a state of innocence of which he speaks. What then is a slave? According to ancient usage a slave is one to whom the conqueror gave his life when he might have taken it. Thus, slavery comes from war, war comes from passion, and passion comes from sin. As an expiation or punishment of sin, slavery consequently is found to become legitimate due to sin." Thus according to Nourrisson, Augustine held slavery to be contrary to the primitive nature of man, but justified subsequently by sin. This would make slavery as durable and as necessary as society itself. Nourrisson attributes to the Bishop of Hippo the maxim that slavery is indestructible in the conditions of the present life, and that it would be impious to wish to destroy it. Whether Augustine would acquiesce to this view is doubtful unless we defined what we meant by the present life.

If the present life meant society as it existed in the fifth century, perhaps Nourrisson is correct in ascribing to St. Aug.-matine the opinion that slavery is indestructible. But if the conditions of the present life refer to earthly life in any form and at all times as distinguished from heaven, I think it would
be difficult to prove that Augustine would make slavery last till the end of the world. Augustine does say however that Christ came not to make slaves free but to make them good. Thus in the Enarratio in Psalms he pronounces that the rich are indebted to Christ for putting order into their family. For if Christ found an unfaithful slave he converted him and did not say, "Quit your master, now that you know who is the true master." Perhaps the master is impious and unjust while the slave is pious and just—it doesn't seem right that the just slave should serve the unjust master. But Christ called them servants and he himself was as one who serveth. In his passion Christ, the master, was afflicted by his servants.

Although the law of the Hebrews ordered that all slaves be freed after the sixth year, yet this does not apply to Christian slaves, who are commanded by Apostolic ordinance to be the subjects of their masters lest the law of Christ be blasphemed:

"What was commanded concerning Hebrew servants, that they should serve six years and then be freed—lest the Christian should demand this from their masters, the apostolic authority orders slaves to be subject to their masters in order that the name of God and doctrine be blasphemed. (Eph. VI 5) For that precept is sufficiently shrouded in mystery in that God commanded that the ear of him who should refuse this liberty should be pierced with an awl at the post." (47)

In the Enarratio in Psalms Augustine comments on the duties that men have who have power over servants, which was a common problem in those days.

"A Christian ought not possess a slave as he would a
horse or silver: although the horse may be able to bring a better price than the slave, and much more so with something of gold or silver. But if that slave is brought up more righteously and justly, and more dutiful to God with you as master, than he would by him who desires to buy the slave, I know not if anyone would dare to say that he should be cast off like a garment. For man ought to love his fellow-man as himself, to whom the Lord of all things, as will be shown, has commanded that he love even his enemies.* (48)

It is the superior dignity of the human person that is the foundation of the high estimate that Augustine puts on the slave. This lofty concept of human personality is a feature that distinguishes the philosophy of the Catholic Bishop from the philosophies of the pagan Greeks such as Aristotle and Plato. It is this principle more than any other that explains the difference of the views on slavery that so sets off the Christian thinker from the pagan. Augustine's views are as has been said, inspired by revelation, as his numerous quotations from Scripture easily demonstrate:

"The first and ordinary power that man has over man is that of the lord over the slave. Almost all households have a power of this sort. There are masters and slaves; the names are different; but men and men--these names are the same. And what said the Apostle teaching servants to be subject to their masters? "Servants, obey your masters according to the flesh": because there is a Lord according to the spirit. He is the true Lord and eternal; these however are temporal masters according to time. Walk in the way when you are living in this life; Christ does not wish to make you proud. It happens that you become a Christian and have a man for a master; now you did not become a Christian that you would scorn to serve. When you serve man at the command of Christ, you do not serve the man but him who commanded. And so it is said "Obey your masters according to the flesh, with fear and trembling, in simplicity of heart; not serving the eye as pleasing men, but as servants of Christ, doing the will of God from the heart, with a good will"(Eph. VI, 5-6). Behold he did not make servants free, but bad servants he made good." (49)
This quotation emphasizes the duties of the master toward his slaves as well as it points the duty of the slave toward his master; for it speaks of the same human nature that is common to both, a truth that was often forgotten by the pagans. The master was encouraged to go a step farther by Augustine, and not only treat his slave with humane kindness but even set him free entirely. The manumission of slaves was sometimes made in Church before the bishop. It was the custom in freeing a slave to break tablets on which were contained the memorandum of the purchase and servitude of the slave. The scene is described in one of the sermons:

"Lead your slave, to be manumitted, by hand into the Church. There is silence, your proclamation is read, or a prosecution of your intention is made. You say that you are manumitting your slave because he has always served you faithfully. You thereby you love, honor, and bestow the reward of liberty: you do what you can; you make a free man because you cannot make an immortal."  

Augustine finds that the relation of slave to master can be likened to the relation of the soul to God its master.

"Your God cries out to thee, and in thy servant convicts thee: He says to you in your heart,—you lead your servant from your house to Mine; you wish to recall him from My house free into your house; but why do you yourself serve badly in my house? You give to that one what you can; I promise to you what I can: you free him who serves you faithfully; and I give you eternal life for serving me faithfully. Why do you dispute against me in your mind? Give to your Lord what you praise in your servant. But perhaps you arrogate to yourself so much that you think you are worthy to have a faithful servant since you trained him; and am I not worthy to have as a faithful servant him whom I have created...You break tablets in order to manumit your slave; God does not break your tablet. Your tablets are the Gospel."  

(51)
This duty of caring for the household, that attaches to the position of master, is brought down by St. Augustine to the law of nature. For although a man is to do good to his neighbor whosoever he may be, primarily his care should be of his own household, "for the law of nature and society give him greater access to them and greater opportunity of serving them." "Now, if any provide not for his own and especially for those of his own house, he hath denied the faith and is worse than an infidel." "This", says Augustine, "is the origin of domestic peace, or the well-ordered concord of those in the family who rule and those who obey." In enumerating those of the family, Augustine makes mention of servants who doubtless in his time were slaves. They who take care of the rest, rule,—the husband the wife, the parents the children, the masters the servants. Thus we see that without condemning slavery, St. Augustine's whole thought was to render it more humane and to remove the more odious evils connected with it. The reason for not ordering the abolition of slavery at that time is stated by Rev. Charles Boyer, S.J., in his work, St. Augustin. "Augustine, no more than the other Fathers of the other Fathers of the Church, demanded the abolition of slavery. It would have provoked great disorders to have done away with one of the fundaments of the social order of the time, before provision had been made to replace it."

The Christian master is to treat his slaves not as mere instruments, or as property, but as men. To love other creatures more than one's fellow man is to be enslaved to them, which is
worse than being the slave of man.

"For if man loved man, not as oneself, but as a draft animal, or as the baths, or as a bright and noisy little bird that is, in order to derive some temporal pleasure or convenience therefrom, it must be that he serves not man but what is more disgraceful, he serves a vile and detestible vice, by which man loves man not as he ought to be loved." (55)

The master of the house is charged even with the spiritual welfare of his household, including slaves.

"Everyone therefore in his own house if he be the head thereof, ought to take care, as pertains to the office of the episcopate, of what his household believes, lest any on them fall into heresy: caring for his wife, his son, his daughter, and even his slave because he was bought with a great price. The apostolic discipline placed the lord over the servant, and subjected the servant to the master. (Eph. VI, 5, et Tit. II, 9) But Christ paid the same price for both. Despise not the least of your domestics procuring the salvation of all with great vigilance. If you do these things you will not be unprofitable servants; you will not fear damnation,—so much to be avoided." (56)

It is a form of almsgiving for the master to pardon the servant who has offended in his regard, and on the other hand it is a duty for the master who has wronged his slave to repair the injury. In the Enchiridion de fide we find a passage wherein the bishop pronounces a benediction on the master who forgives his slave, while at the same time correcting the offender.

"He who having the power corrects with a blow, or coerces by some form of discipline, and still forgives from the heart the sin whereby he has been injured and offended, or prays that it be forgiven does an almsdeed. Not only does he confer an alms on him because he forgives and prays, but also because he decrees some punishment; because he places mercy first." (57)
And in one of his sermons the duty of reparation that devolves on an offending master is set forth:

"There are persons of lowly condition in this world from whom if you ask pardon they are lifted up in pride. Yet I say that sometimes a master offends against his servant, because although one is the master and the other the servant, still both are servants of another because both have been purchased by Christ. Although it seems hard, that I should order this, I will command that if by chance a master offends against his servant by unjust quarrels or by striking him; let him say, Forgive me, I beg your pardon. Not because he ought not to do so, but lest he become haughty. What then? Let him repent before the eyes of God, and before the eyes of God let him do penance; and if he cannot say to his servant, because it is not expedient, Forgive me, let him speak a soft word, for a kind word is a request for pardon." (58)

The master has toward his slaves the relation of a paterfamilias, a father of the household who looks out for the bodily and spiritual welfare of his household, slaves included. Yet the master should chastize the slave when necessary even by bodily punishment. And the slaves should be obedient to the master, even to Christian masters, for Christ came not to make slaves free but to make them good. In short St. Augustine discusses the origin of slavery, the relations of master and slave, and the teaching of the Church for both master and slave. The most remarkable point is, that St. Augustine admits slavery can be lawful, and that it is not necessarily immoral. This is indeed a legitimate conclusion from his principle that slavery is a punishment of sin, and is a conclusion resting on sound argument. Nevertheless, it does seem a bit strange to us who have heard so many arguments against slavery, and have read the dark picture of it presented by the historians of our own Civil War.
Bruculeri finds one maxim of the Gospel which logically spells the doom of slavery, viz.: "Quid prodest homini si mundum universum lucretur?"

He makes the following comment anent this point:

"Questa idea fondamentale dell'etica cristiana veniva logicamente a cozzare con l'instituto della schiavitù, che costituiva nel mondo pagano più che la limitazione oppressiva, la negazione recisa della persona umana."

Philemon, 10.

I Peter II, 18.

Col. III, 22.

I Tim. VI, 1-2.

I Tim. VI, 1.

Col. III, 11.

Abbé Martin, \textit{Doctrine Sociale de S. Augustin}. p. 79.

Bruculeri, op. cit. p. 102.

"Il S. Dottore aveva ben netta la comprensione e profondo il rispetto degli'istituti sociali, ne poteva accarezzare idee favorevoli al demagogismo. Ne un simile pericolo era immaginario, nel quarto secolo, quando alcune chiese abberò da ricorrere anche alle estreme sanzioni per defendersene. Così un sinodo di Gangra, raccoltisi probabilmente nel 343, fece questo canone: "Se qualcuno insegna agli schiavi di disprezzare i padroni e di abbandonarli sotto pretesto di religione, anziche servirli con affettuoso rispetto, sia anatema." Anche un sinodo di Neo Cesarea nel 314-325 ha una simile prescrizione."

10 Euripides, \textit{Iph. in Aul}. 1400.

11 Aristotle, \textit{Politics} I-II.

12 Ibid. I, VI.

13 Aristotle, \textit{Politics} I, VI.

"Thus we conclude", says Aristotle, "that any given property is an instrument conducing to life; property as a
whole is a mass of instruments, a slave is an animate property."

Politics I, V.

"Hence wherever there are two classes of persons, and the one are as far inferior to the other as the body to the soul or a beast to a man--and this is the condition of all whose function is mere physical service and who are incapable of anything better--these persons are natural slaves and for them as truly as for the body or for beasts a life of slavish subjection is advantageous."

Politics I, VI.

About this fitness he says: "It is Nature's purpose to differentiate the bodies as well as the souls of slaves and free persons making the former sturdy for the satisfaction of our necessary wants, and the latter upright and suited not to employments of this kind but to political life in both its departments civil and military."

ibid.

In the index to the Jowett translation of the Dialogues thirty or forty such passages are listed.

Plato, Laws VI, 777.

Plato, Republic, VIII, 549 A.

Laws VI, 777D.

Laws VI, 776.

Republic IX, 578 C.

Laws IX, 868.

Brucculeri, S.J., op. cit. p. 89, quotes Wallon, Histoire l'esclavage dans l'antiquité, p. 32, as authority for this statement.

Genesis XXXVII, 36.

Exodus CXXI.

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I-II, Q. 94, a. 5, ad 3

Cod. Theod. Tit, II, XXV, quoted by Brucculeri op. cit. p. 93.

Cod. Theod. IV Tit. VII, 1; Brucculeri, p. 93.
St. Augustine, In Epistola Joannis VII, 6, P.L. XXXV, 2039.


Francesco Brucculeri, op. cit. p. 93.


"En somme Augustin enseigne que le droit sur un esclave n'est pas le même que le droit sur un cheval, et que, primitivement, la volonté du créateur ne comportait pas l'esclavage, et que l'action du Créateur n'instaurait pas l'esclavage, mais que l'humanité pervertie par le péché a pratiqué la guerre, et dans la guerre, le massacre: puis, au lieu de tuer le vaincu, on l'a reduit en esclavage. Mais l'église accueille les esclaves: ce n'est pas pour leur procurer, pendant cette vie, la liberté. L'église a des vues plus hautes: elle prêche aux maîtres et aux esclaves la même doctrine, elle les dirige vers l'éternité."

St. Augustine, City of God, XIX, 15.


City of God, XIX, 15.

Dan. IX.

City of God, XIX, 15.

Jno. VIII, 24.

See also City of God IV, 3, where Augustine says, "The good man although he is a slave is free; but the bad man even if he reigns is a slave."

Dr. (Sermo CCCXLII, 4, P.L. 39, 1503) Here St. Augustine says, "Quanto ergo tutius homo servus esse hominis, quam perversae cupiditatis."
"Quae de servo Hebraeo praecipiuntur, ut sex annos serviat, et dimittatur liber gratis, ne servi Christiani hoc flatigarent a dominis suis apostolica auctoritas jubet servos dominis suis esse subditos, ne nomen Dei et doctrina blasphemetur. (Eph. VI, 5) Illud enim ex hoc satis constat in mysterio praeceptum, quia et pertundit subula ejus aurem ad postem praecepit Deus, qui libertatem illam recusasset."

"Non enim Christianum oportet possidere servum quomodo equum aut argentum: quamquam fieri possit ut majore pretio valeat eque quam servus, et multo magis aliquid areum vel argenteum. Sed ille servus si rectius et honestius et ad Deum colendum accommodatus abs te domino educatur, aut regitur, quam ab illo potest qui enim cupit auferre, nescio utrum quisquam dicere audeat, ut vestimentum eum deberi contenti. Hominem namque homo tamquam seipsum diligere debet, cuab omnium Domino, sicut ea, quae sequuntur ostendunt, etiam ut inimicos diligat imperatur."

"Prima et quotidiana potestas hominis in hominem domini est in servum. Prope omnes domus habent hujusmodi potestatem. Sunt domini sunt et servi; diversa sunt nomina; sed homines et homines paria sunt nomina. Et quid dicit Apostulus, docens servos dominis suis subditos esse? Servi obaudite dominis vestris secundum carnem: quia est dominus secundum spiritum. Ille est verus dominus et aeternus; isti autem temporales secundum tempus. Tu autem ambulas in via, cum vivis in hac vita, non vult te facere superbum Christus. Contigit tibi ut Christianus effeceris, et haberes dominum hominem: non ideo Christianus effectus es, ut dedigneris servire. Cum enim Christo jubente servis homini, non illi servis, sed illi qui jussit. Et hoc ait: Obaudite dominis vestris secundum carnem, cum timore et tremore, in simplicitate cordis, non ad oculum servientes quasi homines placentes, sed quasi servi Christi facientes voluntatem Dei ex animo, cum bona voluntate. (Eph. VI, 5-6) Ecce non fecit de servis libros, sed de malis servis bonos servos."
"Servum tuum manumittendum manu ducis in Ecclesiam. fit silentium, libellus tuus recitatur, aut fit desiderii tui persecutio. Dicis te servum manumittere, quod tibi in omnibus servaverit fidem. Hoc diliges, hoc honoras, hoc donas praecasio libertatis: quidquid potes, facis; facis liberum, quia non potes facere sempiternum."

ibid.

"Deus tuus clamat ad te, et in servo tuo convincit te: dicit tibi in corde tuo, Duxisti servum tuum de domo tua ad domum meam; vis eum de domo mea liberum revocare in domum tuam: tu quare male servis in domo mea? Das illi quod potes promitto quod possum: tu facis liberum servantem tibi fidem; ego te facio sempiternum, si servaveris mihi fidem. Quid adhuc argumentarius contra me in animo tuo? Redde Domino tuo, quod laudes in servo tuo. An forte tibi tantum arroges, ut te dignum putes., qui servum fidelem habeas, quem dicis, Comparavi; et ego non sum dignus., qui servum fidelem habeam, quem creavi... Ut manumittas servum tuum, frangis tabulis ejus: Deus non frangit tabulas tuus. Tabulae tuae Evangelium sunt."

City of God XIX, 14.

I Tim. V, 8.


St. Augustine, De Vera Religione 87, P.L. 34, 161.

"Nam si vel ipsum hominem homo dilexerit, non tanquam se ipsum sed tamquam jumentum, aut balneas, aut aviculam pictam et garrulam, id est, ut ex eo aliquid temporali voluptatis aut commodi capiat, serviat necesse est, non homini, sed, quod est turpius, tam foedo et detestabili vitio, quo non amat hominem sicut homo amandus est."

St. Augustine, Sermo XCIV, P.L. 38, 581.

"Unusquisque ergo in domo sua, si caput est domui suae, debet ad cum pertinere episcopatus officium, quomodo sui credant, ne aliquid ipsorum in haeresim incurrant, ne uxor, ne filius, ne fillia, ne ipse servus, quia tanti est emptus. Disciplina apostolica praeposuit dominum servo, et servum subdit domino (Eph. VI, 5, et Tit. II, 9). Christus tamen pro amobus unum pretium dedit. Minimos vestros nolite contemmere, domesticorum vestrorum salutem omne vigilantia procure. Haec si facitis ergogatis, pigri servi non eritis damnationem tam detestandam non timebis."

St. Augustine, Enchiridion de Fide 19, P.L. XL, 266.

"Qui emendant verbere in quem potestas datur, vel coercet aliqua disciplina, et tamen peccatum ejus, quo ab illo
laesus aut offensus est, dimittit ex corde, vel orat ut ei
dimittatur, non solum in eo quod dimittit atque orat, verum
etiam in eo quod corripit et aliquam emendatoria poena plec-
tit, eleemosynam dat; quia misericordiam praestat."

St. Augustine, Sermo ECXI, 4, P.L. 38, 1056.
"Sunt personae humiles pro ordine hujus saeculi, a qui-
bus si petas veniam, extolluntur in superbiam: hoc est quod
dico; aliquando dominus peccat in servum; quia etsi ille
dominus est, ille servus: ambo tamen alieni servi sunt, quia
ambo Christi redempti sunt. Tamen durum videtur ut hoc
etiam jubeam, hoc praecipiam, ut si forte dominus peccat in
servum suum injuste litigando, injuste caedendo; dicat ille:
Ignosce mihi, da mihi veniam. Non quia non debet facere,
sed ne ille incipiatur superbire. Quid ergo? Ante oculos
Dei poeniteat eum, ante oculos Dei puniat cor suum: et si
non potest servo dicere, quia non oportet: da mihi veniam;
blande illum alloquatur. Blanda enim appellatio, veniae
est postulatio."

St. Augustine, Enarrationes in Ps. CXXIV, 7.
Chapter V: War.

In the political theory of St. Augustine, authority is the keystone supporting the structure of the state, and the end of authority is peace and order, as we have seen. But it sometimes happens that peace and order are infringed upon by the evil passions of man and can only be restored by the use of physical force. The physical violence which civil authority exercises is called war, and so it is readily seen that the topic of war must enter into political theory. There are several works in which Augustine develops his ideas on war. In the long work Contra Faustum he deals with the intrinsic justice of war, a doctrine which fourteen years later he reaffirmed and amplified in a letter to the imperial secretary Marcellinus. The dialogue De Libero Arbitrio justifies the soldier in his profession of arms, and the City of God often recurs to the subject of war, its horrors, its causes, and its purpose. In setting forth the thought of St. Augustine on war we shall first show that war is not intrinsically evil, though peaceful arbitration is a better method of securing justice and should be tried first. Then we shall investigate the causes of war, and show the evils associated with it. Finally the end or purpose of war will be discussed.

The first point concerns the justice of war. Augustine always mindful of Catholic tradition and dogma feels it incumbent upon him in one of his letters to show that the Christian Church
"Wars are waged mercifully by the good, if such a thing is possible, in order that licentious desires having been subdued these vices may be destroyed, which ought by a just rule either be extirpated or restrained. For if the Christian teaching (Christian discipline) had denounced all wars, this would have been told to the soldiers in the Gospel who were seeking the way of salvation—that they should cast their arms away, and withdraw altogether from military service." (2)

If the Church does not condemn war it is because there can be such a thing as a just war. Augustine had to be very precise on this point for there were, in his time, two criticisms leveled at the Christian Church by extremists holding opposite viewpoints. On the one hand there were the Manicheans who accused the Church of favoring war, and on the other hand there were the pagan Romans who chided the Church with weakening the State by its opposition to war. Augustine insists against the Manicheans that wars can be just, and against the pagans he deplores the unhappy necessity of wars and defines the limits of their lawfulness. Thus concerning the Manichean doctrine he writes:

"But because the Manicheans were accustomed to blaspheme John openly, let them hear the Lord Jesus Christ himself, ordering that this tribute be given to Caesar which John says ought to suffice for the soldier. "Render", he says, "to Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and to God the things that are God's." (Matt. XXII, 21) And tribute is given to him that the soldier, necessary on account of war, may receive his pay. He praised the faith of the man who said..."I also am a man subject to authority, having under me soldiers"; he did not ask him to desert." (3)

The Manichean position was skillfully upheld by Faustus a celebrated bishop of the sect, whose reputation for eloquence
and science St. Augustine speaks of in his Confessions. Faustus had published a work in which he attempted to disprove the divine authority of the Old Testament. No book could be inspired, he claimed, which attributed to God the many wars and cruelties we find described in the Old Testament, since all war and violence is evil. One should pardon injuries, not avenge them, and hence war is a crime. This was the status of the problem which presented itself to Augustine. The saint refutes Faustus in his long work Contra Faustum by denying his contention that war is necessarily evil. To condemn war because men therein are killed, men who someday must die anyway, is not the part of a religious man, but the part of a weakling. If war is evil it is not because of the very nature of war, says Augustine, but the manner of conducting it. This is but an application of the dictum restraining one from condemning philosophy because of the errors of philosophers. The desire to maltreat the enemy, cruel vengeance, hatred of peace, savage reprisals, the passion for power, and all like sentiments—these are blameworthy in war. But such evils are imputable to man, and to man alone, who can pervert a justifiable war by his perverted appetites. It is not God who causes these evils, as Faustus failed to see.

War, according to the viewpoint of St. Augustine is an instrument of God's vigilance to restore order into a world that has set aside law. The natural order, the eternal law, which God imposed on the world, is not war but peace. But yet, one should not be astonished that Moses waged war, because he acted
not by cruelty but by obedience, and God in giving such orders was not cruel, but treated men as they deserve. Some wars are just, according to our views, and some are unjust, but all wars, without exception, are fought by the order and permission of God in order to conquer and eradicate pride. This doctrine about war being a chastisement for sin is softened a little in Augustine's letter to Marcellinus written years later when the saint's thought on the subject had become more mellow and mature. Some young men had found the doctrine of forgiving enemies an obstacle to their belief in the Catholic faith, so the Bishop of Hippo was asked to clarify the issue by his friend Marcellinus. Augustine did so and in speaking of war said that, though war inflicts painful blows, yet it restores order and peace to the human family. It rescues man from dishonor ruin and decay, and so when God overthrows whatever maintains us in vice, and takes away what only satisfies our passions, he deals mercifully.

To correct the pagan exaggerated notion of the lawfulness of war Augustine recalls the refining influence that Christianity exerts to discourage war and its horrors. Christianity would soften even the rigors of war if the nations would only adhere to its precepts, writes the bishop in one of his letters.

"If this earthly republic would keep the Christian precepts, war itself would not be waged without benevolence, as then the conquerered might more easily participate in piety and justice. For it is advantageous to one who is held fast by licence in evil doing, to be conquered; since there is nothing more unfortunate than felicity in sinning, which is strengthened by impunity, and which an evil will like an inner enemy augments... Wars, then, are waged mercifully by the good
if such a thing is possible, that these vices may be destroyed, which ought either to be extirpated or repressed by a just power." (11)

But the earthly city on the other hand is a prey to wars and disorder. This city is often divided against itself, he says, by litigations, wars, quarrels, and such victories as are either life-destroying or short-lived. For each part of it that arms against another part of it seeks to triumph over nations through itself in bondage to vice. "If, when it has conquered, it is inflated with pride, its victory is life-destroying; but if it turns its thoughts upon the common casualties of our mortal condition and is rather anxious concerning the disasters that may befall it than elated with the successes already achieved, this victory, though of a higher kind, is still only short-lived; for it cannot abidingly rule over those whom it has victoriously subdued." (12)

Wars are waged for the sake of peace, he tells us, and peace is for the sake of enjoying earthly goods. This peace is purchased by toilsome wars; it is obtained by what is styled a glorious victory. Now, when victory remains with the party which had the juster cause, who hesitates to congratulate the victor, and style it a desirable peace? These things, says the Bishop of Hippo, are good things and without doubt gifts of God. (13)

Does the modern world look upon peace as a gift of God, or does it seek peace solely by human ingenuity. Certainly Augustine sees in it the finger of God and His Providence.

Augustine asks whether it is suitable for good men to wish to rule more widely. For the iniquity of those with whom just
wars are carried on favors the growth of a kingdom, which would
certainly have been small if the peace and justice of neighbors
had not by any wrong provoked the carrying on of war against
them; and human affairs being thus more happy, all kingdoms would
have been small, rejoicing in neighborly concord; and thus there
would have been very many kingdoms of nations in the world as
there are many houses in a city. "Therefore", he says, "to
carry on war and extend a kingdom over wholly subdued nations
seems to bad men to be felicity, to good men necessity."

Cicero in his *De Republica* was of the opinion that a first
rate power would not engage in war except for honor or safety.
In order to define his meaning of safety he says that private
people by death dountries escape exile, prison, scourging, and
all the evils of life. But to states death which seems to eman­
cipate individuals from all punishments, is itself a punishment;
for a state should be so constituted as to be eternal. And so
death is not natural to a republic as it is to a man, to whom
death is not only necessary, but often even desirable. But when
a state is annihilated it is as if the whole world collapsed and
perished. Augustine thinks Cicero said this because he, with
the Platonists, believed that the world would not perish, but he
agrees with Cicero, that a state should engage in war for the
safety which preserves the state permanently in existence, though
its citizens change. Then the question is asked whether the
Saguntines did right when they chose that their whole state should
perish rather than that they should break faith with the Roman
republic. Saguntum was a city in Spain with which Rome had made a treaty of alliance. When Hanibāl laid seige to it, rather than yield to the enemy of Rome it suffered its own destruction. Augustine wonders how Cicero's rule, that war was to be waged only for safety or honor, would apply to this city. Cicero does not say "which of these two is to be preferred, if a case should occur in which the one could not be preserved without the loss of the other". For manifestly if the Saguntines chose safety, they must break faith; if they kept faith, they must reject safety. And here St. Augustine draws the contrast with the City of God where safety can be retained, or rather acquired by faith, but if faith be abandoned, no one can attain it.

In another place he says that a war is lawful when it represses injustice on the part of the enemy. And in the fourth book of the City of God he comes to the same conclusion that a just war supposes the injustice of the enemy. And if by carrying on wars that were just the Romans have raised so great an empire, ought they not worship as a goddess even the injustice of foreigners? "For", he says, "We see that this has co-operated much in extending the empire by making foreigners so unjust that they became people with whom just wars might be carried on, and the empire increased." Injustice, then, stirs up causes of wars.

"Just wars are commonly defined as those which avenge injuries when the nation or city against whom war is to be waged shall have neglected either to punish the wrongdoings of its citizens, or to restore what has been unjustly taken away."
When speaking here of a war to avenge injuries, Augustine seems to be justifying in certain cases, what we today would call an offensive war. However Augustine did not elaborate on the distinction between an offensive war and a defensive war, a distinction so common in our time and yet so obscure. Certainly he would allow the justice of a defensive war, for the right of self-defense is inscribed in natural law. In the City of God he justifies certain wars that the Romans undertook to defend their safety and independence. Thus in theory, we have seen that Augustine pronounces just wars to be the only ones in which the wise man could and should take part. But he does not demand in practice that the citizen and soldier, when war is declared, should reason on the lawfulness of the war.

After having demonstrated that war can be just, it follows that military men are justified in accomplishing the duties of their profession. The words of St. John the Baptist when counseling the soldiers to "do violence to no man; neither calumniate any man; and be content with your pay", furnish basis for this conclusion of Augustine's:

"Otherwise John, when the soldiers came to him baptizing and said, "What shall we do?", should have answered them, "Throw down your arms, desert the army; do not strike, wound, nor kill anybody." But because he knew that when they did these things in warfare they were not murderers but ministers of the law, not avengers of their private injuries, but defenders of public safety, he answered them thus: "Do violence to no man, neither calumniate any man, and be content with your pay." (28)

There are certain exceptions made by divine authority to its own
law, that men may not be put to death, says the saint. These exceptions are of two kinds, he continues, being justified either by a general law, or by a special commission granted for a time to some individual. And in this latter case, he to whom authority is delegated, and who is but the sword in the hand of him who uses it, is not himself responsible for the death he deals. And, accordingly, they who have waged war in obedience to the divine command, or in conformity with His laws have represented in their persons, the public justice or the wisdom of government, and in this capacity have put to death wicked men; such persons have by no means violated the commandment, "Thou shalt not kill." (30)

His thought is concisely expressed in the Latin by a play on words, "Non enim benefacere prohibit militia sed malitia". This might be carried over into the English by the following translation: "The doing of good does not prohibit militarism but malice". Near the end of his life Augustine in a letter to Darius praised the soldiery as fidelissimi bellatores—most faithful warriors. "Faithful warriors are indeed great...by whose labors and perils...the unconquered enemy is overthrown, and quiet is secured for the state and peace for the provinces." (32)

I do not know what thoughts run through the mind of a soldier as he prepares for battle, but as I was reading one of St. Augustine's letters it struck me what excellent sentiments his words could engender in the mind of the Christian warrior who desired to have the right intention. The holy Bishop admonishes the soldier that his very strength of body is a gift of God and
ought not surely to be used against God. And he proceeds with great solidity:

"Think now, when you are armed for battle that this bodily strength of yours is a gift of God. For thus you will think that the gift of God ought not to be turned against God. For when fidelity which has been promised to an enemy against whom war is being waged is to be kept, how much more in the case of a friend for whom the war is fought! The will ought to cherish peace, though war be a necessity, in order that God may deliver it from this necessity and preserve the peace. For peace is not sought that war may be started, but war is declared that peace might be acquired. Therefore be peaceable even in war, that by conquering those whom you fight you may bring them to the utility of peace...And in this way necessity and not desire would destroy the enemy fighting. As violence is meted out to those rebelling or resisting, so mercy is due to those conquered or captured, especially where a disturbance of the peace is not feared." (33)

Not only does Augustine treat of the conduct to be pursued in war but also of the superior excellence of peaceful arbitration as a means of averting armed conflict. In this way to use his own expression, war itself is killed by a word instead of men by a sword. The occasion for his remarks was in the year 429, a few months before his death when he wrote to a certain Darius who was sent as an ambassador to conclude terms of peace. Well might Augustine commend all efforts in the direction of peace, he who in his lifetime had experienced either personally or by hearsay, the dread effects of war. The City of God pictures in a striking manner the horrors that befell Rome in 410 when Alaric pillaged the city and in Africa there was the ever recurring threat of the Vandals who laid seige to Hippo subsequently, five months before Augustine's death. In fact the bishop expired at Hippo during this seige. In this letter, then, he praises the
mission of Darius and wishes him every success.

"Not only are warriors great and glorious who are brave, but also those, --and they have a truer kind of praise--who are faithful, by the labors and dangers of whom, God protecting and aiding, the unconquered enemy is subdued and peace and quiet secured for the state. But it is a greater glory to acquire or obtain peace by peace, not by war; and to kill war itself by words, not men by the sword. For even they who fight if they are good, without doubt seek peace but by means of blood however. But you are sent lest the blood of anyone be sought. And so that to others is a necessity; this to you is a joy. Wherefore, my lord rightly illustrious, and most excellent and dear son in Christ, rejoice in this thy great and true good, and be glad in God from whom you have received that whereby you might be able to receive such a commission." (34)

Among the causes which tend to breed wars, St. Augustine places a difference of language which keeps men apart and prevents a mutual understanding. Two men of different languages when compelled to remain in company have greater difficulty of holding communication than two beasts even of different species. Their common nature is no help to friendliness when they are prevented by diversity of language from conveying their sentiments to one another; so that a man, according to the expression of St. Augustine, would more readily hold intercourse with his dog than with a foreigner. Hence the conquerors try to impose their language on the conquered in the interests of peace.

"But the imperial city has endeavored to impose on subject nations not only her yoke, but her language, as a bond of peace, so that interpreters far from being scarce are numerous. This is true; but how many great wars, how much slaughter and bloodshed have provided this unity? And though these are past, the end of these miseries has not yet come. For though there have never been wanting nor are yet wanting, hostile nations beyond the empire, against whom wars have been and are being waged, yet, supposing that there are no such nations, the very extent of the empire itself has produc-
ed wars of a more obnoxious description—social and civil wars and with these the whole race has been agitated, either by the actual conflict or the fear of a renewed outbreak." (36)

There are also wars caused by the desire of "glory" and "victory". He does not admit that such wars were inspired by anything noble. Tear off the disguise of wild delusion, and look at the naked deeds, and we find that the vice of restless ambition was the sole motive to that social and parricidal war (for Alba was the parent city of Rome). This lust of sovereignty, he goes on to say, disturbs and consumes the human race with frightful ills. Let no man tell me that this was a "great" man because he fought and conquered so and so. Gladiators fight and conquer, and this barbarism has its meed of praise. "But I think it were better to take the consequences of any sloth, than to seek the glory won by such arms." (37)

In addition to the ambition for glory and honor as causes for war, there is the effect of past wars acting as a cause for future wars. One war gives birth to another, says the Bishop, by a concatenation of unjustifiable causes. Thus the wars of Marius and Sulla led to those of Sertorius and Cataline, of whom the one was proscribed and the other brought up by Sulla; from this to the war of Lepidus and Catulus, of whom the one wished to recind, the other to defend the acts of Sulla; and from this to the war of Pompey and Caesar, of whom Pompey had been a partisan of Sulla, whose power he equaled or even surpassed, while Caesar condemned Pompey's power because it was not his own, and yet exceeded it when Pompey was defeated and slain. And Augustine
traces the series thence to the civil wars of Caesar Augustus during whose reign Christ was born.

Though St. Augustine is speaking here of civil wars among the Romans yet while reading these lines written so long ago one thinks of how they apply to this day and age when statesmen are finding the causes of this war of 1940 trace back to the World War of 1914, and that in wars yet further back. This is in the main a matter for historians to settle, but it is interesting to see how St. Augustine regards wars as engendering other wars like poisonous weeds.

Today we hear much of the economic causes of war. St. Augustine, long ago had described the great economic cause of war which is nothing else but the inordinate love of the goods of this world. "But the earthly city...has its good in this world, and rejoices in it with such joy as such things can afford. But as this is not a good which can discharge its devotees of all distresses, this city is often divided against itself by litigations, wars, quarrels, and such victories as are either life-destruction or short-lived." The causes of war we have been enumerating--love of power and glory, and the desire of earthly goods--are of course all causes for unjust wars. They are the causes put in effect by the unjust party in a war. The defense against these evils would render the war just from the standpoint of the other side.

Sherman in his brusque way said "War is hell". St. Augustine had the same thought, if in different words, long ago when
dilating on the evils of war. Even the most legitimate war achieves whatever of good it accomplishes at a great price. The victorious nation extends its influence, it puts an end to great disorders; it establishes greater justice and well-being. But at what price? It must shed blood and make use of violence and even then will the good result remain lasting. "The bounds of the empire have been pushed back, men formerly enemies are now citizens of the same nation: defense is no longer necessary against foreigners, but here civil wars spring up. The wise man, while approving of just wars cannot forget that he is a man; the misery of the vanquished, the injustice which has provoked the war and which led to their defeat cannot leave the wise man insensible. As a consequence if war is an instrument of progress we cannot but deplore that kindlier means cannot be used to achieve the same result St. Augustine cries out against ambition and hate as being the most blameworthy elements in a war, which are more culpable than the deaths of the conquered.

"What is culpable in war? Why do they die; in order that when they are conquerors, they may be subdued by peace? To censure in this way is the part of cowardice, not of religion. The desire for doing harm, cruelty in avenging, an untamed and untameable spirit, savageness in rebelling, the lust for rule, and such like,—these are what are rightly to be blamed in wars. In order that these things in general be punished, wars are undertaken by the good either at the command of God or of some lawful authority, against the violence of the resisting party, when in the order of human affairs it is found that order itself constrains the good to prescribe such a remedy or to obey such prescriptions." (39)

St. Augustine singles out the wars waged by the Romans against the Albans as especially deserving of condemnation. (40) In this
war the victory was decided by a duel between three twin brothers from each side: the three Horatii representing the Romans, and the Curatii, the Albans. So fiercely did they fight that only one of the six survived, and he was one of the Horatii. To this combat, says Augustine, there was added another catastrophe. For as the two nations had formerly been friendly (being related and neighbors), the sister of the Horatii had been betrothed to one of the Curiatii; and when she saw her brother wearing the spoils of her betrothed, she burst into tears and was slain by her own brother in his anger. And at this circumstance Augustine says, "To me, this one girl seems to have been more humane than the whole Roman people...While, then, that maiden was weeping for the death of her betrothed inflicted by her brother's hand, Rome was rejoicing that such devastation had been wrought on her mother state, and that she had purchased a victory with such an expenditure of common blood of herself and the Albans." 

The evils of war are maliciously attributed to Christianity. Through the third book of the City of God, St. Augustine speaks of the innumerable wars that the Romans had engaged in before the advent of the Christian religion, of the disastrous Punic Wars in which so many men perished, of the civil wars engendered by the Gracchi, the sedition of Marcus Drusus, of the civil war between Marius and Sulla. These wars took place before Christianity. This draws from St. Augustine an indignant outcry. "With what effrontery, then, with what assurance, with what impudence, with what folly or rather insanity, do they refuse to
impute these disasters to their own gods, and impute the present disasters to Christ! These bloody civil wars, more distressing, by the avowal of their own historians, than any foreign wars, and which were pronounced to be not only calamitous but absolutely ruinous to the republic, began long before the coming of Christ."

Augustine justifies war against adversaries and defends the profession of arms. He points out the causes that usually lead to war and unfolds the horrors of war. What can be the purpose of such a calamity as war; what could justify it in certain cases? The Bishop of Hippo is quite definite in his answer to this question. War is fought for the sake of peace says St. Augustine for even in the fierceness and disquietude of combat the end is peace, which every nation desires:

"Whoever gives even moderate attention to human affairs and to our common nature, will recognize that if there is no man who does not wish to be joyful, neither is there anyone who does not wish to have peace. For even they who make war desire nothing but victory,—desire, that is to say, to attain to peace with glory. For what else is victory than the conquest of those who resist us? And when this is done there is peace. It is therefore with the desire for peace that wars are waged, even by those who take pleasure in exercising their warlike nature in command and battle." (43)

Every man, according to the Bishop of Hippo, seeks peace by waging war but no man seeks war by making peace. Sometimes conditions might almost seem to belie this truth, giving rise to remarks such as the witticism that "peace has broken out in Mexico." But further on the saint adds that even they who intentionally interrupt the peace in which they are living have no hatred of
The prince, or he who exercises the public power, is the one who decides whether it is necessary to declare war. Thus in the work against Faustus, the Manichean, we read:

"There are certain causes and certain reasons for which men wage wars. That natural order accommodated to the peace of mortals demands that the authority and plan for the undertaking of war belong to the Prince; the soldiers have, in the interest of the common peace and safety, the office of executing the commands of war...Therefore a just man even under an impious king, may rightly engage in war at the behest of the latter, in serving the order of civic peace: for obeying in what is not contrary to the precept of God or if he is not certain on this point, the order of obedience renders the soldier innocent, though the iniquity of commanding would make the king guilty." (44)

The doctrine on war was a most pertinent subject in Augustine's day even as it is in our own. The Vandals were beginning to lay waste Africa during the last years of the saint's sojourn on this earth. In fact Augustine fell ill in his last mortal sickness during the Vandals' seige of Hippo and died during the third month of the seige. The Bishop Honoratus had written to Augustine asking about the proper course for a Bishop to pursue in the dangers and wars then imminent. In particular the question was raised whether a Bishop is allowed to flee in order to avoid persecution. There had been opinions pro and con on this problem. Tertullian for instance (he was then a Montanist) when taking up the issue argues vigorously against an ecclesiastic fleeing from persecution: "Why should God introduce persecution, if He bids us retire from it? This is imputing inconsistency to
And on the opposite side there are the words of Athanasius defending his own flight from persecution at the hands of the Emperor. Flight, so far from implying cowardice, reasons Athanasius, requires often greater courage than remaining. It is a greater trial of the heart. Death is the end of all trouble he who flees is ever expecting death and dies daily.

St. Augustine in taking up the difficulty is confronted with these reasons for each side, and moreover with scriptural texts to bolster up the position of each party. If on one side it was said "Flee from city to city," on the other it was said "He who is not the true shepherd seeth the wolf come and fleeth." The following is from St. Augustine's letter in reply to Honoratus and is quoted from the translation in Cardinal Newman's Church of the Fathers:

"Let such of them, by all means fly from city to city as are special objects of persecution; so that they who are not thus attacked desert not the Church, but give meat to those their fellow servants, who they know cannot live without it. But in a case when all classes--I mean bishops, clergy, and people--are in some common danger, let not those who need the aid of others, be deserted by those whom they need. Either let one and all remove into some fortified place, or, if any are obliged to remain, let them not be left by those who have to supply their ecclesiastical necessity, so that they may survive in common, or suffer in common, what their Father decrees they should undergo."

So in general St. Augustine held that "When the example of flight does more harm than the service of the living does good, it is by no means to be done."

St. Augustine's doctrines on war greatly influenced St. Thomas as we can see from reading the latter's Summa Theologica.
In Part Two: Second part, Question Forty, St. Thomas has a question of four articles on war--De Bello. In the first article, which treats of "Whether it is always a sin to wage war", he quotes Augustine in support of his solution eight times: from one of Augustine's sermons, from the work De Verbis Domini, thrice from Contra Faustum, from the De Sermone Domini in Monte, from the Epistola ad Marcellinum, and from the letter to Boniface (Epist. 189). In some parts of his doctrine St. Thomas finds it necessary to disagree with Augustine, or at least interpret him in a strained sense (e.g. in explaining the theory of divine illumination) but he fully accepts Augustine's doctrine on war. Pope Pius XI in his encyclical on St. Augustine Ad Salutem Human Generalis, written in 1930 for the fifteenth centenary of the saint's death, quotes from Augustine's writings (the reference is not given) showing that war can be lawful. The passage is one of those that Augustine reverts to a number of times wherein he comments on the words of John the Baptist, replying to the soldiers and telling them their duties. The Pope uses this text when discussing the relations of Church and State to substantiate this statement. "It need never be feared by the State that the Church will invade its rights or its prerogatives within its proper sphere, for to the laws of the State from the earliest times the faithful of Christ have submitted obediently, according to the ordinance of the Creator, so that when exposed to persecution of death, they could justly say, "The Princes have persecuted me without cause."(48)
Let us review now what St. Augustine has said on the question of war. War is not necessarily evil, as the Manicheans thought, but is just when it's fought to avenge injustice that could not otherwise be righted, or when it is fought to repel an unjust aggression, since self preservation is nature's first law. However, in all cases peaceful arbitration is preferable and should be tried first. The military profession is lawful as is proven from the words of John to the soldiers, and from the words of Christ himself commanding tribute to be given to Caesar, which tribute was used to support the soldiery. The taking of life in war is not imputable to the soldier but he is merely the instrument of civil authority which in turn is but executing the plan of divine providence to restore order. God orders and permits even war to chastize nations that have rebelled from his law. This is merciful on His part and prevents men from reposing in iniquity. The wise man will engage only in just wars, but if the prince orders him to fight he need reason about the justice of a war when he is in doubt but should obey lawful authority. The prince commanding an unjust war to be waged in this case is guilty, not the soldier who obeys.

The causes of war may be classed as political and economic. Augustine mentions causes of both kinds though he himself does not make this distinction. The political causes are ambition, desire for power and glory, and the craving to avenge past defeats in war. The economic cause is an inordinate love of the goods of this world, to possess which wars are declared and
tribute imposed on subject nations. There are numerous and grave evils that tend to accompany war, though they are not inseparable from it. Such evils are cruelty, hatred of peace, savage reprisals, and the passion for power. Wars are not attributable to Christianity, as history indeed shows from the innumerable civil and foreign wars that harassed Rome before the advent of the Christian religion. The City of God makes this one of its principal themes. On the other hand Christianity softens the rigors of war as can be seen from the clemency accorded even by the barbarian invaders to those who took refuge in Christian Churches.

St. Thomas declares that there are three things required in order that a war be called just, and he bases each one of them on the writings of St. Augustine. These three conditions for a just war are first, that war be declared by lawful authority, second that there be a just cause, and third, that there be a right intention in waging war. St. Augustine had said concerning the first that "The natural order accommodated to the peace of mortals requires that the authority and deliberation for declaring war be in the possession of the princes". Concerning the second condition of a just cause, Augustine says, "Just wars are ordinarily defined as those which avenge injuries." And concerning the third condition about a right intention, we read the following words of Augustine, "Among the true worshipers of God even those wars are engaged in which are waged not for cupidity or cruelty, but with a desire for peace." These three conditions of St. Thomas, though founded on Augustine's thought
... nevertheless not explicitly enumerated by St. Augustine as many conditions demanded for a just war.

One point in his teaching on war where St. Augustine differs from many modern moralists is where he defines the duty of the soldier who is in doubt about the justice of a war. St. Augustine allows a soldier to engage in war if he is in doubt about whether it is just, which is contrary to what a number of our contemporary Catholic writers hold, some even requiring the soldier in such a doubt to refrain from war to the point of preferring imprisonment in a concentration camp. There appeared in Our Sunday Visitor an article on the ethics of war which represented as Catholic doctrine, the teaching that a soldier in doubt about the justice of his cause is morally bound to refrain from fighting. It seemed to me that this was at variance with St. Augustine's words on the subject, and was really not Catholic doctrine at all. I wrote a letter to the editor voicing this opinion. The letter together with a reply by Father Miltner, C. S.C., a philosopher at Notre Dame University, was published in Our Sunday Visitor for March 17. I append the clipping and leave the reader to judge the merits of the case for himself.
Notes: Chapter V.

1 St. Augustine, Epistola 138, P.L. 33.

2 Epistola CXXXVIII, II, 15, P.L. 33, 531.

"Misericorditer enim, si fieri posset, etiam bella gerentur a bonis, ut licentiosis cupiditatibus domitis haec vitio perderentur, quae justo imperio vel exstirpari vel premi debuerunt. Namsi Christiana disciplina omnia bella culparet, hoc potius militibus consilium solutis petentibus in Evangelio diceretur, ut abjicerent arma, seque omnino militiae subtraherent."

3 St. Augustine, Contra Faustum XXII, LXXIV, P.L. 42, 447.

"Alioquin Joannes, cum ad eum baptisandi milites venirent, dicentea, Et nos quid faciemus? responderet eis, Arma abjicite, militiam istam deserite; neminem percutite, vulnerate, prosternite. Sed quia sciebat eos, cum haec militando facerent, non esse homicidas, sed ministros legis; et non ultores injuriarum suarum, sed salutis publicae defensores: respondit eis, Neminem concusseritis, nulli calumniam feceritis, sufficiat vobis stipendium vestrum."

4 Confessioa V, III, 3.

5 Contra Faustum XXII, 74, P.L. 42, 447.

6 ibid. XXII, 75, P.L. 42, 448.

7 ibid. XXII, 78, P.L. 42, 450.

8 ibid. XXII, 74, P.L. 42, 447.

9 ibid.

10 Epistola 138, 14, P.L. 33, 531.

11 ibid.

"Si terrena ista respublica praecpta Christiana custodiat, et ipsa bella non sine benevolentia gerentur, ut ad pietatis justitiaeque pacatam societatem victus facilius consulatur. Nam cui licentia iniquitatis eripitur, utiliter vincitur; quoniam nihil est infelicius felicitate peccantium qua poenalis nititur impunitas, et mala voluntas velut hostis interior roboratur...Misericorditer enim, si fieri potest, etiam bella gerentur a bonis."
12 City of God XV, 4.
13 ibid.
14 ibid. IV, 15.
15 ibid.
16 Cicero, De Republica III.
17 City of God XXII, 6.
18 ibid.
19 ibid. XIX, 7.
20 ibid. XIX, 15.
21 ibid. IV, 15.
22 St. Augustine, Quaestionum in Heptateuchum VI, X, P.L. 34, 781
   "Justa autem bella definiri solent, quae, ulciscuntur
   injurias, si qua gens, vel civitas, quae bella petenda est;
   vel vindicare neglexerit quod a suis improbe factum est, vel
   reddere quod per injurias ablatum est."
23 De Libero Arbitrio I, V, 11.
24 City of God III, 10.
25 ibid. XIX, 7.
26 Contra Faustum Manichaeum XXII, LXXV.
28 Contra Faustum XXII, LXXVI, P.L. 42, 447.
   "Alioquin Joannes, cum ad eum baptizandi milites ven-
   irent, dicentes, Et nos quid faciemus? responderat eis, Arma
   abjicite, militiam istam deserite; neminem percutite, vul-
   nerate, prosterne. Sed quia sciebat eos, cum haec militan-
   do facerant, non esse homicidas, sed ministros legis; et non
   ulteriores injuriarum suarum, sed salutis publicae defensores:
   respondit eis, Neminem concusseritis, nulli calumniam fecer-
   itis, sufficiat vobis stipendium vestrum."
29 City of God I, 21.
30 ibid.
31 Sermo CCCII, 15, P.L. 38, 1391.
Epistola CCXXIX, 2, P.L. 33, 1020.

"Hoc ergo primum cogita quando armaris ad pugnam, quia virtus tua etiam ipsa corporalis domum Dei est. Sic enim cogitabis de dono Dei non facere contra Deum. Fides enim quando promittitur, etiam hosti servanda est contra quem bellum geritur, quanto magis amico pro quo pugnatur! Pacem habere debet voluntas, bellum necessitas, ut liberet Deus a necassitate, et conservet in pace. Non enim pax quasnitur ut bellum exitetur, sed bellum geritur ut pax acquiratur. Esto ergo etiam bellando pacificus, ut eos quos expungas, ad pacis utilitatem vincendo perducas... Itaque hostem pugnament necessitas perimit, non voluntas. Sicut rebellanti et resistenti violentia redditur, ita victo vel capto misericordia jam debitur, maxime in quo pacis perturbatio non timetur."

Epistola CCXXIX, 2, P.L. 33, 1020.

"Magni quidem sunt, et habent gloriam suam, non solum fortissimi, sed etiam quod verioris genus est laudis, fidelissimi bellatores, quorum laboribus atque pauculis, Dei proventis atque opitulantis auxilio, hostis indomitus vincitur, et quies reipublicae pacatisque provinciis comparatur: sed majoris est gloriae, ipsa bello verbo occidere, quam homines ferro; et acquirere vel obtingere pacem pace, non bello. Nam et hi qui pugnant, si boni sunt, procul dubio pacem, sed tamen per sanguinem quaerunt; tu autem ne cujesquam sanguis quaeretur, es missus: est itaque alius illa necessitas, tibi ista felicitas. Proinde, dominz merito illustri et magnificentissime atque in Christo charissime fili, gaude isto tuo tam magno et vere bono, et fruere in Deo unde sumpsiasti, ut talis esse, et talia gerenda susciperes."

City of God XIX, 7.

ibid.

ibid. III, 14.

ibid. XV, 4.

Contra Faustum XXII, LXXIV, P.L. 42, 447.

"Quid enim culpatur in bello? An quia moriuntur quandoque mortuiri, ut domentur in paci victuri? Hoc reprehendere timidorum est non religiosorum. Nocendi cupiditas, ulciscendi crudelitas, implacatus atque implacabilis animus, feritas rebellandi, libido dominandi, et si quae simila, haec sunt quae in bellis jure culpantur; quae pieruneque ut etiam jure puniantur, adversus violentiam resistentium, sive Deo sive aliquo legitimo imperio jubente, gerenda ipsa sus-
cipiuntur a bonis, cum in eo rerum humanarum ordine inveniuntur, ut eos vel jubere tale aliquid, vel in talibus obedire juste ordo ipse constringit!" 

40 City of God III, 14.
41 ibid.
42 ibid. III, 30.
43 ibid. XIX, 12.
44 Contra Faustum Manichaeum XXII, LXXV, P.L. 39, 448. "Interest enim quibus causis quibusque auctoribus homines gerenda bella suscipiant: ordo tamen ille naturalis mortalium paci accomodatus hoc poscit ut suscipiendi belli auctoritas atque consilium penes Principem sit; exsequendi autem jussa bellica ministerium militis debeat paci salutisque communi...Cum ergo vir justus, si forte sub rege homine etiam sacrilego militet, recte possit illo jubente bellare civicae pacis ordinem servans; cui quod jubetur vel non esse contra Dei praeceptum certum est, vel utrum sit, certum non est, ita fortasse reum faciat iniquitas imperandi, innocentem autem militem ostendat ordo serviendi."  

46 ibid. 161.  
47 ibid. 165.  
48 Pope Pius XI, Encyclical Ad Salutem Humanis Generis Quoted from translation in Augustinian Miscellanea, p. 81.  
49 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae II-II, Q. 90, a. 1.  
50 St. Augustine, Contra Faustum XXII, 75.  
51 Quaest. in Heptateuchum VI, X; cf. note 22 in this chapter.  
52 De Verbis Domini 23, 1.  
53 Contra Faustum XXII, LXXV; cf. note 44 above.
Chapter VI: The Family and Education

It might at first appear that a discussion of the family and education has no place in a thesis on political theory, because these pertain to domestic society, whereas that pertains to civil society. There is truth in the remark that the idea of family is a part of social theory, more than of the narrower domain occupied by political science. However there is, to my mind, much justification for the inclusion of a chapter on the family and education in this thesis because of the necessary and very important relations that exist between civil and domestic society. Goldsmith brought out this thought in his "Deserted Village" in the memorable lines:

"Ill fares the land, to hastening ills a prey
Where wealth accumulates and men decay."

In other words, the state may make all the laws it wants, and have all the accouterments of government, but if it has not a sturdy citizenry, a vigorous family life, it is on the wane; it is heading towards extinction. From this it is to be seen how vital a part of political science is the duty of fostering family life. The dictators of the totalitarian states, whatever may be their faults, are not mistaken in the emphasis they attach to the vitality of the family life in building up a strong nation.

In order to conduct itself wisely in its relations with the family however, government must be cognizant of natural laws
governing marriage and domestic society. The state even has the duty to legislate for the protection of the institution of marriage as Pope Pius XI affirms, saying: "From this it is clear that legitimately constituted authority has the right and therefore the duty to restrict, to prevent, and to punish those base unions which are opposed to reason and to nature." This activity of civil government demands that political science have the requisite knowledge to enact suitable legislation. For this reason we include St. Augustine's doctrine on the family. We take up first the three blessings he enumerates in marriage, then the fidelity requisite. This includes a discussion of a controverted question regarding Augustine's attitude towards the toleration of vice.

Next there is a consideration of marriage as a sacrament, and the indissolubility of marriage. The unity of marriage is taken up, followed by Augustine's doctrine showing how Christian marriage has established woman in her rightful position in society. And lastly is a justification of the right of virginity.

That Augustine's treatise on marriage is an important exposition of Christian thought on the subject is evinced from the fact that Pope Pius in his Encyclical on Christian Marriage makes his letter practically a commentary on Augustine's writings, taking the saint's enumeration of the blessings of marriage as an outline for the first part of his Encyclical. He takes the doctrine from Augustine's treatises on marriage: the *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, the *De Conjugiis Adulterinis*, and the *De Bono Conjugali*. To begin let us note that Augustine calls the union
of man and wife the first bond of human society. And from the
fact that the human race proceeds from a single progenitor, the
saint finds an added force of friendship binding society together
on two counts then, the family is a source of unity in the state.

"Since every man is a part of the human race, and human
nature is something social, he has a great and natural good,
and also the force of friendship in this, that God willed to
make all men proceed from one that in human society there
would be not only a similarity of kind, but that men would be
bound together by the tie of blood relationship. And so the
first bond of human society is that of man and wife. God did
not fashion them separately and then unite them, but he form-
ed the woman from the man (Gen. II, 21)" (2)

The concept of marriage which concerns St. Augustine is
marriage as it has been purified and ennobled by Christianity.
The saint treats the subject of marriage in particular in some of
his smaller works. Two of these, the De Bono Conjugali and De
Conjugiis Adulterinis have been edited with a French translation
by Gustave Combès in a small work entitled Problèmes Moraux in
1937. In the first mentioned of these opuscula Augustine lays "
down the necessity of unity in the marriage bond. Just as a
multitude of souls will form a single city in the future life
which will have one heart and soul in God, so also in our days
marriage is the union of one man and one woman. The marriage
tie is indissoluble and as we find in St. Matthew, there is but
one cause which authorizes a separation. The desire of practic-
ing continence by one of the parties does not authorize a separa-
tion, and even a separation on account of the adultery of one
of the parties does not authorize a remarriage. Here we have a
birds-eye-view of points which Augustine develops at length and which we now proceed to examine.

In the first place, the purpose and the benefits of marriage are summarized by Augustine in a way which represents a thorough Catholic doctrine and which is calculated to insure the fundamental strength of the family tie.

"The good of marriage therefore, among all nations and all men is in the begetting of children, and in chaste fidelity. This pertains to the people of God also in the sanctity of the Sacrament, according to which it is not allowed one separating from her repudiated partner to marry another, while her husband is living, even for the purpose of having children, although it is this alone for which the marriage was contracted, nor if that purpose is not attained for which it was entered upon is the nuptial bond dissolved, unless by the death of the husband...The Apostle is witness that marriage is for the purpose of generation: "I will therefore that the younger should marry." And as if it should be asked of him "Why?" he immediately adds, "To bear children, to be the mothers of families." (I Tim. V, 14) To chaste fidelity this pertains: the wife has not power over her body but the husband; and similarly the husband has not power over his body but the wife. To the sanctity of the Sacrament this pertains: that the woman not depart from the man...These are the goods on account of which marriage is good: children, fidelity, and the sacrament." (8)

These three blessings that Augustine attributes to marriage are considered by Pope Pius XI, in his encyclical On Christian Marriage (9) to be a splendid summary of the whole doctrine of Christian marriage. "Now when we come to explain, Venerable Brethren, what are the blessings that God has attached to true matrimony, and how great they are, there occur to Us the words of that illustrious Doctor of the Church whom we commemorated recently in Our Encyclical Ad Salutem on the occasion of the fifteenth centenary of hid Death." Thus the Pope writes, and he proceeds to
quote from Augustine's words found in the passage above.

In his work De Genesi ad Litteram St. Augustine speaks of (10) the law of marriage which was made to honor the natural fecundity and to regulate the disorder of incontinence. According to this law what is good in marriage and what renders marriage good ought never be sinned against. This good is threefold namely: fidelity, the children, and the sacrament,—the same as we have seen in the above quotation. Fidelity demands that outside the bond of marriage, neither party have any relations. The children are to be received with love, nourished with devotion, and educated with religious care. The sacrament requires that the marriage be not broken, and that neither husband nor wife depart to contract an alliance with another, even for the purpose of raising children. In the De Bono Conjugali the Saint condemns divorce in very definite terms, aducing arguments from scripture.

"We now say that according to this condition of being born and of dieing which we know and in which we have been created, the union of man and woman is something good: whose association divine Scripture commends in such a way that it is not lawful for one dismissed from her husband to wed another while her husband lives, nor for a man sent away by his wife to take another unless she from whom he went away be dead. The Lord in the Gospel confirmed the good of marriage (Matt. XIX, 9) not only because he forbade one to dismiss his wife unless because of fornication, but also because he came when invited to the marriage feast." (11)

Augustine was strong in emphasizing the mutual fidelity which husband and wife should have to their marriage vows and he defined what duties were thereby entailed. In fact the De Conjugis Adulterinis was written to answer questions and clear up
an error brought out by a bishop named Pollentius, on the separation of husband and wife and on the Pauline privilege. The second part refutes the arguments of the same bishop on the juridical and moral consequences of adultery. But strangely enough as Father Boyer points out, the authority of St. Augustine is sometimes invoked in favor of the establishment of houses of ill fame. The text relied on is from the De Ordine where Augustine is trying to establish that nothing happens outside the providential order in some way or other.

"What can be called more sordid, what more empty of honor and more full of vileness than harlots, panderers, and the rest of their kind? Take away harlots from human affairs and you shall have disturbed everything by wantonness; put them in place of honorable wives and you shall have dishonored them with disgrace and shame. So therefore this type of men by their morals have a most impure life, and by the laws of order, a very low condition." (14)

From this passage it might be inferred that the state ought to tolerate and regulate vice, to prevent the worse evil of universal disorder. But two observations made by Boyer would seem to amend this view. In the first place, it must be noted that Augustine here brings up a doctrine not taught on its own account, but one spoken of in passing, by way of example. And in the second place the author was as yet but a recent neophite (the De Ordine was written in about 387 before his baptism) and he had not yet acquired the authority that he later gained as Bishop of Hippo. Yet whatever we say it is clear that Augustine was in a pagan environment which had not as yet been refined by Christianity, which may explain why he should quote such an ex-
ample as even having a quasi-legal character. Later in his *City of God* he refers to this legal tolerance of vice in the following terms:

"Lust requires for its consummation darkness and secrecy; and this not only when unlawful intercourse is desired, but even such fornication as the earthly city has legalized. Where there is no fear of punishment these forbidden pleasures will shrink from the public eye. Even where provision is made for this lust secrecy is provided; and while lust found it easy to remove the prohibitions of law, shamelessness found it impossible to lay aside the veil of retirement." (16)

In his work *Contra Faustum* the Bishop of Hippo points out that the conjugal act is for the propagation of children and that all illicit use is condemned by the eternal law of God from which texts Father Boyer draws the following conclusion:

"Hence the thought of Augustine appears clear enough. He does not at all approve the tolerance of vice. The true law which is the eternal law, the law of the heavenly city forbids prostitution. Human laws which consider only goods of this world, the laws of the terrestrial city permit and regulate prostitution; it is an expedient to avoid a worse evil. There is in the disorder this remnant of order without which the disorder itself could not subsist. But if we abandon, as we ought, the ideal of the earthly city and if we subordinated the order of this city to the ideal of the city of God, we can no longer permit that which the divine law forbids." (18)

We refer to Boyer's analysis of this question because he is the only commentator whom we have found to discuss it, though there are others who take it up whose works we did not have access to.

In treating of the goods of marriage which he enumerates in his work, *De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia*, he puts them under three the same as we have found in two other places, namely: children,
fidelity, and the sacrament. Now it is the effect of the sacrament to cause man and woman united by marriage to live together as long as they live, and to interdict separation except for the cause of fornication. This is in truth what is observed in the union of Christ with his Church: living eternally they do not separate by any kind of divorce. "Thus there remains among them living a certain marriage bond which neither separation nor infidelity can take away." St. Augustine vindicated in a special manner the indissolubility of the conjugal bond and wrote a treatise thereon. Augustine's doctrine accords so well with the mind of the Church that Pope Pius XI bases his encyclical On Christian Marriage, on the saint's writings. Pope Pius writes, "But this accumulation of benefits is completed and, as it were, crowned by that blessing of Christian marriage which in the words of St. Augustine we have called the sacrament, by which is denoted both the indissolubility of the bond and the raising and hallowing of the contract by Christ Himself." Augustine, in his sermons, spoke strongly in favor of the doctrine of the indissolubility of marriage:

"You are not allowed to have wives whose former husbands are living; nor you, women, to have husbands whose former wives are living. These marriages are adulterate, not by law of the courts, but by the law of heaven. Nor are you allowed to marry that woman who has been repudiated by her husband, while the husband lives. Fornication alone allows a man to put away the adulterate wife; but while she is living it does not allow him to take another. And neither are you allowed, women, to have as husbands those men from whom their wives have separated: such unions are adulterate." (22)

He speaks of a separation but even that does not give the right
to remarry while the other party is living. This is the same doctrine that the unchanging Catholic Church holds today.

"The pact entered into in marriage is an affair of a certain sacrament to this extent that neither separation makes it void so long as the party lives, and she who has been abandoned commits adultery if she marry another." (23)

Neither is the sterility of one of the parties a cause for divorce:

"The nuptual bond remains even if the children on account of which it was contracted by an evident sterility are not obtained; nor are the married parties, knowing that they will have no children, allowed to separate and unite with others to have children." (24)

Pollentius had objected that to forbid a man to marry, who had put away his wife because of fornication makes the law of Christ something deadly. Augustine discusses the argument in his De Conjugiis Adulterinis showing that to admit this specious reasoning would in effect be to permit adultery.

"But you answer me: 'It is the part of the few to live continently and so they who send away their unfaithful spouses since they are unable to be reconciled, seem to be endangered to such an extent that they pronounce the law of Christ not humane, but death-bringing.' O Brother, how much it pertains to the incontinent to have many complaints, who as you say, pronounce the law of Christ deadly, not humane, And still we ought not pervert or change the law of Christ on account of them...But see how often it would be necessary, were we to admit the complaints of the incontinent, to allow the commission of adultery. For what if by some continual and incurable disease the spouse were kept ill in body so the marriage act were impossible, what if captivity or force separated her so that the husband knows his wife is alive and she is denied to him? Do you think the murmurs of the incontinent ought to be heeded and adultery allowed?...Does not the law of Christ displease the incontinent who wish to dis-
miss troublesome, injurious, imperious, fastidious wives who are loath to render the debt, and to take on others? Now therefore because the incontinence of these shudders at the law of Christ, the law of Christ ought to be handed over to their judgment." (25)

In the same work (De Conjugiis Adulterinis) Augustine refutes the argument of Pollentius who quotes a text of St. Paul to justify divorce. The text is "If her husband die, she is at liberty: let her marry to whom she will." He would give a metaphorical interpretation to this passage, saying that fornication is a spiritual death since it causes the death of the soul. Thence the conclusion would be that divorce would be allowed on account of fornication of one of the parties. But St. Augustine won't admit this interpretation saying that if fornication is a death, it is a death not of the body, but of the soul; but here St. Paul speaks only of the death of the body. But this false interpretation given by Pollentius would open the door to all kinds of evil. St. Augustine sees a logical necessity for each law relative to the marital bond, and the dissolution of any law would spell disaster to mankind precisely because man is man.

"Since if the tie were dissolved by the adultery of one party, that perversity would follow which I have shown ought to be avoided, such that the woman also by undhastity would be absolved from the bond, from the law of her husband." (28)

Catholic theology distinguishes two properties or attributes of marriage, which are essential to the contract, viz: indissolubility and unity. These attributes can be found in Augustine's writings though not enumerated in this precise fashion.
Thus we have noticed, that he speaks of indissolubility under the title of the sacrament, and he includes unity, under the head of fidelity. This latter attribute of unity—the union of one man with one woman—he treats at some length.

"Yet the union of one man with one woman pertains more to the good of marriage and not the union of one man with many women, as is sufficiently indicated by the first divinely appointed conjugal tie, that from thence marriages might take their beginning, when the more honorable example might be attained. With the advance of the human race certain good men were united to good women, one man to several women... still several wives would never have been lawfully united to one husband unless because thereby more sons might be born."

Thus on this point of the unity of marriage St. Augustine grounds his theory on Sacred Scripture, without however omitting to note that it has its basis in the nature of man. Though in patriarchal times polygamy was permitted in order to propagate the human race, still in our time there is a union of one man and one wife.

"But since from many souls one city is to be made of those having one mind and one heart in God...wherefore the sacrament of matrimony in our time is accordingly brought back to one man and one wife. The sacrament of matrimony in its unity in our time signifies that there will be a unity of all of us subject to God in the celestial city."

Thus polygamy is prohibited according to St. Augustine, not because it is evil but because in Christian times it has become a sacrament symbolizing the union of Christ with his Church; that as Christ is one and his Church one, so there should be a union of one husband and one wife. And from many souls there is to be established one future city of those having one mind and heart
in God wherefore on account of the sacrament in our time there
is to be but one husband for one wife.

However if we consider polygamy in itself and absolutely,
we cannot affirm that it is wholly repugnant to natural law in
such a way that it could not at times be allowed for sufficient
motives. This was the case with men of ancient times.

"Among that people, therefore, because it was necessary
that an abundant progeny be produced continuously to Christ,
through the numbers of which people should be prefigured all
things which the documents of the Church ought to have pre-
figured, they had the duty of taking wives through whom the
people might increase, in which people the Church is prefig-"  (31)

In addition to the reason already mentioned based on the symbol-
ical meaning of matrimony as a sign of the union of Christ with
his Church, Augustine gives another reason why polygamy is no
longer allowed--the reason is that it is no longer necessary.
"For then there was a certain necessity of propagation, which
there is not now..."  (32)

St. Thomas shows that polygamy is not opposed to the prim-
ary natural end of matrimony, though it is somewhat opposed to
the secondary end (the family welfare and peace) and it is op-
posed to marriage as a sacrament.

"The plurality of wives neither totally removes nor
impedes the primary end, since one man suffices to fecundate
many wives, and to educate the children born from them. But
the secondary end, if not totally taken away is still much
impeded, since there can hardly be peace in the family when
several wives are united to one husband, because one man can-
not satisfy the wishes of several wives, and because the
communication of many in one duty causes strife; as potters
fight among themselves, and likewise many wives of one hus-
band. It (polygyny) totally removes the third end, because
as Christ is one, so also is the Church one. And accordingly
it appears from what has been said that a plurality of wives
is in a way contrary to the law of nature, and in another way
not." (33)

Though St. Augustine does not condemn polygamy as wholly
opposed to natural law, he does condemn polyandry. "Many women
(34) can be impregnated by one man; but not by many men." And the
reason is that it serves no legitimate purpose of nature since
more children are not thereby born. "Whence if one woman lie
with many men, because from this there can be no multiplication
of offspring, but a frequentation of lust, it cannot be a marriag
(35) but is prostitution."

The position of woman in the family and in society is an
important consideration in any social or political theory, and
St. Augustine has considerable to say in defining this point. To
begin with he notes the position of woman in the economy of the
salvation of the world: how by a woman the human race fell from
its first innocence, and by another woman the savior was born.

"He (Christ) came a man to honor the male sex, and He
was born of a woman to console the female sex as if saying:
"Behold I am born a man, behold I am born from a woman...By
deceiving man the poison was drunk through a woman; in re-
pairing salvation is given to man through a woman." (36)

This furnishes a motive for respecting the feminine sex as Aug-
ustine points out. "In no sex, therefore, ought we to do injury
to the Creator; the Nativity of the Lord encouraged both to hope
for salvation. There is honor to the male sex in the flesh of
Christ; there is honor to the female sex in the mother of Christ.

Moreover man was made to the image of God as Augustine shows in his De trinitate both as to the masculine and as to the female sex. And elsewhere in the same work he asks who would exclude woman from the title of child of God and member of Christ quoting in defense of his thought the words of the Apostle where he says, "For you are all sons of God through faith in Christ Jesus. Whosoever have been baptized, put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, neither slave nor free; neither man nor woman."

Though the woman should cover her head in the Church as St. Paul says, this is not because she is not made to the image of God but Augustine gives it an allegorical significance. Just as there is in man reason which rules and concupiscence which is ruled, so man typifies this reason and his head is uncovered, while woman symbolizes concupiscence and her head is covered.

"What then? have not women this renewal of mind, where the image of God is? Who has said this? But by her bodily sex this is not signified in the veiling of her head. But they signify that part, which woman symbolizes, which can be called concupiscible, of which the mind is the ruler...Therefore because in one man there is mind and concupiscence (the one rules, the other is ruled; the one is lord the other the subject), these are typified in two human beings, man and woman according to corporal sex. The Apostle speaking concerning this sacrament says, the man ought not to be veiled but the woman." (40)

On the question of the authority in the family all nations of antiquity gave the authority to the father and so minimized the authority of the mother as in some cases to reduce her al-
most to the position of a slave. In spite of these exaggerations we can see in this universal practice the working out of the exigencies of human nature in giving the man who is naturally fitted for it the authority. Christianity which, as has often been said, does not supplant nature but rather perfects it, sustained this authority and contributed to strengthen it within bounds.

St. Augustine affirms this supremacy of man in the ruling of the family. "Man ought to rule over woman, nor should he permit her to dominate him; when this happens the home is perverse and miserable." And again he affirms this in listing the hierarchy of authority proceeding from God. "First he (God) subjected all things to himself, then the corporal creature to the spiritual, the irrational to the rational, the terrestrial to the celestial, the feminine to the masculine, the weaker to the stronger, the needy to the rich." This subordination is elsewhere traced by the saint to the "natural order." "There is indeed a natural order in men, such that women serve men, and children their parents, because it is just that the weaker nature serve the stronger." In a letter to Ecidia he recommends this submission of herself to her husband which he speaks of in so many other places saying to her: "If anything seem better to you reverently suggest it to your husband, and follow his authority obediently, as if of your own decision."

Yet if Augustine does uphold the authority of man over woman, this authority is not of such a nature as to lower the dignity of woman. If man rules his wife, yet he himself is to be
governed by wisdom. Even before the fall, the bishop thinks that man was to have authority over woman. "Neither ought we to believe that woman was otherwise before the fall than subject to man, and she a servant to him." But he admonishes men that their authority is not for the purpose of oppressing the weaker sex but rather should they be guided by the laws of a sincere love as the Church teaches: "It (the Church) puts men over their wives, not to degrade the weaker sex, but according to the laws of sincere love." There is a mystical reason why man is the head over woman: "Most appropriately is man the head of the woman, since Christ is the head of man, because he is the wisdom of God." This thought was expressed beforehand by St. Paul.

St. Augustine also treats of the state of virginity which was much misunderstood in pagan times so that it had to be explained and justified, and its value and dignity made manifest to the faithful. He bases his teaching on the words of St. Paul who spoke vigorously on this subject.

"Wherefore the faithful and pious virginity is great and deserving of great honor with God, unless in this time of self restraint, when plenty from all nations are afforded to replenish the number of the saints, lust does not sordidly claim for itself the experience of pleasure, which now the necessity of begetting children does not demand." (49)

Yet if the state of virginity is very noble, Christians who are married are also holy—in exalting the one state, he does not want to cause the other to be despised.

"Because he says, "She who is unmarried, thinks of the things that are the Lord's, that she may be holy in body and
spirit," it is not to be taken in such a way that we should think that a chaste Christian wife is not holy in body. For to all of the faithful it was said, "Know you not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost whom you have received from God." (I Cor. VI, 19) Therefore the bodies of spouses are holy if they are faithful to each other and serve the Lord." (50)

"If we compare these things, it cannot be doubted that chaste continence is better than chaste marriage, though both be good. Yet chastity with pride is not to be preferred to a humble conjugal life. This teaching recalls the statement the Bishop of Paris is said to have made when alluding to the Jansenistic nuns of Port Royal saying, "They are as chaste as angels but proud as devils." Such a state is without esteem as Augustine shows in a number of places. "And I dare to say that those pursuing the conjugal life if they hold to humility, are better than those who are chaste but proud." And again, "A humble spouse is better than a proud virgin, for if she would marry, she would not have a name whence she might be extolled, but would have a rein by which she would be ruled." The obedient spouse is to be preferred to the virgin without obedience: "If therefore we consider the one who remains a virgin but is disobedient, and the other who cannot remain a virgin, but yet is obedient, which shall we say is better?...And if you compare an inebriated virgin to a sober spouse, who would hesitate to pass judgment."

It was precisely this emphasis on chastity and continency and the condemning of marital infidelity by the teachers of Christianity that tended to elevate the dignity of woman in society and furnish one of the bulwarks to the state. In his De Ordine St.
Augustine pronounces a scathing inditement of vice which we have already quoted. So we see the dignity of woman was raised and she was given her rightful place in the home. At the same time Augustine makes her subject to the authority of her husband, just as are children to parents, and he gives his reason: "There is a natural order in men, that women should serve the men, and children their parents, because it is just that the weaker nature serve the stronger."

In brief St. Augustine taught that the family was the first and primary unit of natural society, and that marriage was the safeguard of the family. The two attributes of marriage are unity and indissolubility, and to show this he argues at great length grounding his thought both on the exegencies of human nature and on the doctrine of Christ. Though divorce is never allowed, whether the cause be fornication, sterility, or whatsoever else, yet for fornication a separation without the right to remarry during the lifetime of the other party is permissible.

Several times Augustine enumerates three goods of marriage, which are children, the fidelity of husband and wife, and the good of the sacrament. The sacrament of matrimony is the symbol of Christ's union with his Church. The laws of marriage more than anything else, ennoble woman and restore her to her rightful position in society, and yet keep her in due subjection to her husband. The state of virginity is lawful and in itself is a higher state than that of matrimony though both are good. With these teachings Christianity has elevated the condition of society.
Education

We come now to an important duty of the family: the duty of educating the young. In a broad sense it might be said, I believe, that education is the most basic part of political theory and the one for which all other factors of a political system exist. By education, of course, I do not mean schools, but rather the developing of the powers of man in order that he may perfect himself as far as possible in this life with a view to attaining his eternal end. And in this sense education is prior by nature to the state, to the family, to the Church, to law, to war and peace, to wealth—to all these is it prior because these are for the sake of education, not education for the sake of these. What then, we ask was St. Augustine's concept of education, and how does it fit into his political theory? In the first place, we might note that St. Augustine treated the question fairly completely in some of its aspects but not in all as we shall see.

With the Christian concept of life, came new theories in education which were first put into practice in instructing the catechumens even from the time of the catacombs. The first celebrated school conducted by the Christians was established at Alexandria and flourished under such celebrated masters as Pantedus (circa A.D. 180) and Clement of Alexandria. Other great educators immediately preceding St. Augustine deserve mention such as Origin (185–254), who gave great impetus and splendor
to the school of Alexandria; St. Cyril of Jerusalem (died in 386)
st. Basil the Great (339-379), of whom we possess a discourse,
on the manner of drawing profit from the study of the classics,
st. Gregory of Nazianzen (died about 390); St. John Chrysostom
(347-407), who in various discourses treats fully of education
in the family inspired by the Christian ideal. And St. Jerome
(340-420) who left in two letters—the one addressed to Leta,
the other to Gaudentia—wise suggestions on the education of
women.

When we come to St. Augustine we find that he had much ex-
perience both as a theoretical and as a practical educator. He
had exercised the office of grammarian in his native country and
was professor of rhetoric in Carthage, in Rome, and finally in
Milan. Subsequently he conducted what might be described as an
academy of philosophy in the villa of Verecundius, for about a
year. When he became a priest at Hippo he founded a monastery
and drew up its mode of life and finally as Bishop of Hippo he
was the guiding spirit of the monastic movement of Africa, and
in his own house trained many ecclesiastics from whom there came
a number of bishops. His educational endeavors were not confin-
ed to the spoken word nor to his immediate companions for he
exercised an extensive apostolate by his many writings. His
letters in particular are very instructive and often went into
many pages in order to explain some point of doctrine to his
correspondent—often a bishop, a centurian of the army, a legate,
a heretic, one of the faithful, or some influential cleric—St.
Jerome, for instance.

The parents, St. Augustine says, have the duty of educating their children. He counsels parents to treat their children well, and to think more of the manner of educating them, than of how to keep them amused. The ideal is not merely to have children but to have good children. And in the same work, he chides the Christian who is more sorrowful when his son is at the point of death than he is if he sees him commit some evil deed. The time to be sad he says, is when you see your son do evil, and that is the time to bring him to order, and discipline him. But if in doing this, the son pays no heed, then is the time to weep. For he who lives in luxury is more dead than he who in dying puts an end to luxury. When St. Augustine was giving this counsel he must have been thinking of his own mother, for she exemplified this doctrine. She shed many tears over the conduct of her wayward son. Augustine recognized this very well for he declares in his Confessions that God had stretched forth His hand and raised him from a profound darkness because his mother shed more tears in God's sight than other mothers are wont to shed over the death of their sons. For by her God-given faith she knew that her son was dead. "You have heard her, O Lord," exclaims Augustine, "and have not despised the tears which rolled from her eyes upon the ground wherever she prayed."

St. Augustine's early education in the schools was largely taken up with the pagan classics, a fact which he afterwards deplores.
For who can bear the fact that the man who has not heard of the theft of Daedalus seem ignorant; that he who invented the story not seem a liar, that he who believes it not seem foolish, and that he who asks questions not seem impudent? I am wont to pity our companions who if they do not answer who is the mother of Euryalus, are accused of ignorance; whereas they themselves do not dare to call those asking these questions, vain, foolish, and curious."

In his Confessions he condemns this system of human culture wherein, in order to develop one's mind, it is necessary to be exposed to the error and corruption mingled in the pagan mythologies. Even the most celebrated poets, as Terence, though they have many choice words and a precious style, have by their moral doctrine made it easier to do evil. It is these things that teachers serve up, and if one refuses to quaff of them, he must take a licking.

The education of Rome laid great stress on training the orator because of the importance oratory played in the life of a successful Roman. Augustine himself was a professor of rhetoric for some years before his conversion, but subsequently he lost much of his esteem for this profession and thought that the education and aims of an orator were particularly lacking in solidity. This is clearly brought out in one of his letters wherein Augustine replies to a young Greek student, Dioscorus by name, who had sought his advice on several difficult passages from Cicero. Augustine says that it is far better to be able to communicate to one's auditors sound doctrine than merely to tickle their ears and have the name of a great speaker. There is great solidity of thought in this letter.
"Suppose that you are able to answer when you are interro­
gated, all of the questions which you have asked about. 
Behold already you are called learned and most acute, already 
the voice of Greece praises you to the skies; but you, how­
ever, be mindful of your imperfection, and really earn that 
praise which you desire as an end, in order that you might 
teach those who easily admire unsubstantial things, and who 
flatteringly and avidly hang on your very words, something 
solid and beneficial. But I should like to know whether you 
possess these truths and are able to transmit them. For it 
is ridiculous after having said many superfluous things to 
prepare the ears of men for things necessary, not to afford 
the necessary to those whom you have prepared by the superfluo­
ous; and while learning how to render the auditors attentive, 
it is ridiculous to be unwilling to learn the doctrines to gi­
to those who are attentive. But if you say that you know 
this, and answer that it is the Christian doctrine, which we 
know you place before all things, and in which alone you plac­
the hope of eternal life, then there is no need for the dia­
logues of Cicero or the discordant opinions of others in pro­
curing this doctrine for your auditors. Let those who would 
learn such things from you be attentive to your moral conduct. 
I do not want you to teach anything that will have to be un­
learned to make your doctrine true."(62)

In this same letter is to be found Augustine's estimate of 
the ancient classics as a means of strengthening our faith; he 
was far from contemning pagan learning and he had an especial 
estem for Virgil among the poets (he quotes Virgil twenty-nine 
times in the City of God) and for Plato among the philosophers. 
Thus in the City of God he speaks of the "beautiful lines where 
Virgil seems to express the sentiments of Plato". Or referring 
to the Aeneid he says, "Virgil in his well-known book says..." 
Near the beginning of the City of God he gives a great encomium 
to Virgil and says he is read by all boys, "There is Virgil, who 
is read by boys, in order that this great poet, this most famous 
and approved of all poets, may impregnate their virgin minds, 
and may not readily be forgotten by them, according to that say­
"The fresh cask long keeps its first tang."

Other writers of classic times win Augustine's respect: he calls Gallust "a historian of distinguished veracity", and Cicero "a weighty man and a philosopher in his way". He does find fault with the obscene public games which Cicero as consul sponsored, however. The "perception" of the poet Horace meets with st. Augustine's approval. And throughout his works Augustine shows his familiarity with ancient learning and esteems what has been well said by the ancients. There is the celebrated saying to the effect that if anything has been said well by the philosophers it is to be appropriated from them as from unjust possessors.

"If those who are called philosophers have said anything true and suited to our faith, especially the Platonists, not only are they not to be feared, but these things are to be appropriated from them for our use as from unjust possessors."

Augustine goes on to say that the Egyptians though they practised idolatry and oppressed the Hebrews, yet they did have many fine vases, and ornaments of gold and silver, and garments which the Jews at God's command availed themselves of. So in like manner the doctrine of the gentiles is not all fable and superstition, but contains liberal studies useful in the service of truth, and precious moral precepts as well. This kind of gold and silver, he says, they did not make of themselves but were provided therewith by providence and were making a bad use of it.
so the Christian in forsaking paganism ought to take with him these good things to put them to the service of the gospel. And in a similar passage he says that if the impious mingled superstitions with their music, that is no reason why we should avoid music if it is of help in apprehending spiritual things. Nor need we neglect the study of literature because they say it was invented by Mercury; and because the pagans raised temples to justice and virtue should that turn us away from virtue and justice? The Christian knows that truth from whatever source, belongs to the Lord.

In the "De Libero Arbitrio" Augustine shows that learning is a good thing and if men do evil it is not because they learned to do so but rather because they turned away from learning.

Augustine enumerates in his De Doctrina Christiana the steps leading up to wisdom which are identical to the gifts of the Holy Ghost as enumerated by St. Paul with one exception—instead
understanding as the step immediately preceding wisdom he puts purgation or cleansing of the heart. These are the "grades to wisdom: first fear; second piety; third, knowledge; fourth, fortitude; fifth, counsel; sixth, purgation of heart; the seventh or last step, wisdom." He advocates a knowledge of the scriptures in which there is the precepts and rule of living, but as an aid to the understanding of the scriptures, a knowledge of languages is necessary, and especially Greek and Hebrew. Of course Latin was his mother tongue and he takes it for granted that one know Latin. He must have been addressing clerics in this place for he could hardly have expected so much of laymen.

Augustine distinguishes two kinds of science, that instituted by men, and "the other of those things already finished and divinely instituted". But he adds that the science instituted by men is partly superstition and partly not. That part of human science which is not "luxurious and superfluous is to be cultivated." He mentions history as a worthy study:

"Those things in the temporal order that have transpired are what are called matters of history. They greatly aid us in understanding the sacred Books even if learned in boyhood outside the Church." (77)

However, he censures Greek history quite indignantly, or rather some Greeks who used history to impugn the doctrines of Christ.

"It cannot be denied that I exclude from the usefulness of history, those Greeks as did our Ambrose, toward those calumniating the readers and lovers of Plato; those who dared
to aver that all the doctrines of Christ which are admired and preached, were learned from the books of Plato, since Plato lived long before the coming of the Lord." (78)

The Bishop of Hippo also advocated the study of what we today would call the physical sciences: the study of the nature of animals, of plants, and of inanimate objects—and he had a very practical end in view viz., that this knowledge is useful for solving the enigmas of the Scriptures. These sciences, he takes care to explain, have nothing to do with superstition. We know that people in ancient times looked askance at anyone versed in natural science as if he were under some evil power—such was the lot of Roger Bacon and of Gerbert. But, "It is one thing to say if you drink this common herb you will not get the stomach ache, and another to say you won't get the stomach ache if you hang the herb from your neck. The one is approved as a salutary remedy, the other is condemned as a superstition." (80)

Apparently the ancients weren't so ignorant in their medical knowledge. Many moderns succumb to quackery almost as bad as what Augustine here cites as an example.

Astronomy and the mechanical arts should be known but in the case of the mechanical arts—e.g., medicine, agriculture, and navigation, the knowledge need not be for practice, so much as for judging the meanings of scriptural texts—"that we be not wholly ignorant what the Scriptures wish to imply when they use figures of speech from these arts." Dialectics is also advocated as a course of study, but he cautions against sophism.

"The study of disputation avails much in penetrating and solving
all manner of questions found in the Holy Writings, but quarrel-
ing and juvenile display deceiving the adversary is to be avoid-
ed." He gives an example of a sophism: What I am, you are not
but I am a man. Therefore you are not a man. The fallacy Aug-
ustine explains, consists in taking the first proposition (he
does not use the terms major and minor as true simply, whereas
it is true only ex parte. He proceeds to show that man merely
discovers truth but does not create it: "The very truth of the
conclusions is not made, but discovered and known by men, that
they may be able to learn or teach it; for it is perpetually and
divinely instituted in the nature of things."

The general plan of the De Doctrina Christiana was to pre-
sent an outline of the curriculum for the education of the clerg
and in fact all such treatises of the early Middle Ages were
particularistic and did not apply in general to all children.
"They did not consider what training or education should be be-
stowed on the young child; their schemes were not applicable to
all men, nor did they devote much attention to the relationship
that should exist between teacher and pupil." Later in the
twelfth and thirteenth centuries, however, there began to appear
more comprehensive treatises such as the De Disciplina Scholar-
ium and the De eruditione filiorum nobilium of Vincent of Beau-
vais, and the De regimine principum of Aegidius of Colonna.

Augustine examines the utility of rhetoric and finds that
"this art which is learned more to set forth what we know than
to know other things, ought to be cultivated." (85) Moreover
Oratory is serviceable in the spread of truth especially since error is often armed with this device. "For since the art of rhetoric serves both truth and error, who would dare to say that truth should stand unarmed in its defense against a lying adversary?...Therefore since the faculty of speech is neutral, and is of great service in spreading both truth and error, why is it not used by the zeal of good people to fight for truth, if the evil adapt it for obtaining vain and perverse ends in the service of iniquity and error?" Yet the Christian orator ought to prefer wisdom to eloquence, though wisdom with eloquence is still more serviceable. The entire fourth book of the De Doctrina Christiana is devoted to explaining Christian pulpit oratory, as Augustine himself tells us at the beginning. Many topics are treated: when to preach on subjects difficult to understand, pleasing diction, preparation by prayer, suiting the style to the auditors, using examples from scripture, temperance of speech, etc., etc.

St. Augustine speaking in the De Ordine of the law of God engraven on the heart of man says that those who would advance in the knowledge of it can do so in two ways: by living it and by education, whereupon he offers the following precepts of life by which the young should be guided:

"Youthful students ought to live so as to abstain from venereal things, from glutony, from immodest clothing, from vain games, from torpor and laziness, rivalry, detraction, envy, from ambition of honors and power, and from the immoderate desire of praise." (88)
And while insisting on purity of heart in education, Augustine desires a broad understanding of reality on the part of the intellect. He says the intellect should understand the common thread connecting all the sciences reducing them to a certain unity of truth. He who has this outlook is truly educated and raises his mind towards God.

"If anyone reduces to a single certain and simple truth all the things which are diffused far and wide through so many branches of learning, he is most deserving of the title of erudite. Now he does not seek rashly for that divinity which ought not only to be believed in, but also to be contemplated, understood and retained." (89)

A theory of education is fundamentally a theory of life and if we view it in this way we might say that St. Augustine had an excellent theory of education. His concept of human nature and its relation to God, its last end, is the admiration of all thinking men. But if we consider formal treatises on education we must admit that most of Augustine's work was limited to discussing a program of studies and that for clerics, which teaching we find in the De Doctrina Christiana. Augustine esteemed classical learning but thought it should be expurgated. Greek philosophy, too, should be adopted for the service of the faith and among the Greeks St. Augustine, considered Plato as the best philosopher. The duty of educating children devolves upon the parents. The greatest emphasis in education is to be placed in teaching the doctrines of Christ. However a wide list of subjects for study is indicated: among the languages Greek, Hebrew, and Latin, the "positive sciences", as we call them today,
rhetoric, logic, metaphysics, theology, the practical arts of
nagation, medicine and agriculture—and in fact he had a wide
and varied program calculated to give a man a general culture.

The spiritual benefits afforded by education are best im-
parted to man through the agency of the Catholic Church as Pope
plus XI says in his Encyclical on Christian Education of Youth.
This thought he bases on the words of St. Augustine, which he
esteems so much that he quotes them at length in this famous
Encyclical, and which we will include here as a fitting ending
to our discussion:

"Now all this array of priceless educational treasures
which We have barely touched upon, is so truly a property of
the Church as to form her very substance, since she is the
mystical body of Christ, the immaculate spouse of Christ, and
consequently a most admirable mother and an incomparable and
perfect teacher. This thought inspired St. Augustine, the
great genius of whose blessed death we are about to celebrate
the fifteenty centenary, with accents of tenderest love for
so glorious a mother: "O Catholic Church, true Mother of
Christians! Not only dost thou preach to us, as is meet, how
purely and chastely we are to worship God Himself, Whom to
possess is life most blessed; thou dost moreover so cherish
neighborly love and charity, that all infirmities to which
sinful souls are subject, find their most potent remedy in
thee. Childlike thou are in molding the child, strong with
the young man, gentle with the aged, dealing with each accor-
ding to the needs of mind and of body. Thou dost subject
child to parent in a sort of free servitude, and settest
parent over child in a jurisdiction of love. Thou bindest
brethren by the bond of religion, stronger and closer than the
bond of blood...Thou unitest citizen to citizen, nation to
nation, yea, all men, in a union not of companionship only,
but of brotherhood, reminding them of their common origin.
Thou teachest kings to care for their people, and biddest
people to be subject to their kings. Thou teachest assidu-
ously to whom honor is due, to whom love, to whom reverence,
to whom fear, to whom comfort, to whom rebuke, to whom pun-
ishment; showing us that whilst not all things nor the same
things are due to all, charity is due to all and offense to
none." (90)
Notes: Chapter VI.


   "Quoniam unusquisque homo humani generis pars est et sociale quiddam est humana natura,\'\' magnum habet et naturale bonum, vim, quoque amicitiae: ob hoc ex uno Deus voluit omnes homines condere ut in sua societate non sola similitudine generis sed etiam cognationis vinculo tenerentur. Prima itaque naturalis humanae societatis copula vir et uxor est. Quos nec ipsos singulos condidit Deus et tanquam alienigenas junxit: sed alteram creavit ex altero (Gen. II, 21)."


8. De Bono Conjugali XXIV, 32.
   "Bonum igitur nuptiarum per omnes gentes atque omnes homines in causa generandi est et in fide castitatis: quod autem ad populum Dei pertinet, etiam in sanctitate Sacramenti, per quam nefas est etiam repudio discedentem alteri nubere, dum vir ejus vivit, nec saltem ipsa causa pariendi: quae cum sola sit qua nuptiae fiunt, nec ea re non subsequite propter quam fiunt solvitur vinculum nuptiale nisi conjugis morte...Generationis itaque causa fieri nuptias, Apostolus ita testis est: Volo, inquit, juniores nubere. Et quasi ei diceretur: Utquid? continuo subjicit, filios procreare matresfamilias esse (I Tim. V, 14). Ad fidem autem castitatis illud pertinet: Uxor non habet potestatem corporis sui sed vir; similiter et vir non habet potestatem corporis sui sed mulier. Ad Sacramenti sanctitatem illud: Uxorem a viro non discedere...Haec omnia bona sunt, propter quae nuptiae bona sunt: proles, fides, sacramentum."


ILLUD NUNC DICIMUS, SECUNDUM ISTAM CONDITIONEM NASCENDI ET MORIENDI QUAM NOVIMUS ET IN QUÁ CREATI SUMUS, ALIQUID BONI ÉSSE CONJUGIUM MASCULI ET FEMINAE: CUJUS CONFOEDERATIONEM ITA DIVINA SCRIPTURA COMMENDAT, UT NEC DIMISSAE A VIRO NUBERE LICAT ALTERI, QUAMDIU VIR EJUS VIVIT, NEC DIMISSO AB UXORE LICEAT ALTERAM DUCERE NISI MORTUA FERIT QUÆ RECESSIT. BONUM ERGO CONJUGII QUOD ETIAM DOMINUS IN EVANGELIO CONFIRMavit (MATT. XIX, 9) NON SOLUM QUIA PRODIBUIT DIMITTERE UXOREM NISI EX CAUSA FORNICATIONIS SED ETIAM QUIA VENIT INVITATUS AD Nuptias (JNO. II).

12 E.G., De Bono Conjugali IV, 5; Sermo IX, III, 3; De Conjugiis Adulterinis I, III, et seq.


14 St. Augustine, De Ordine II, IV, 12, P.L. 32, 1000.

"QUID SORDIDIIUS, QUID INANIUS DECORIS ET TURPITUDINIS PLENIUS MERETRICEBUS, LEMONIBUS, CATERISQUE HOC GENUS PESTIBUS DICI POTEST? AUFER MERETRICES DE REBUS HUMANIS, TURBAVERIS OMNIA LIBIDINIBUS; CONSTITUE MATERNA Loco, LABE AC DEDECORE DEHONESTAVERIS. SIC Igitur hoc genus hominum per suos mores impurissimum vita, per ordinis leges conditione vilissimum."

15 Boyer, op. cit. p. 244.

16 St. Augustine, City of God XIV, 18.

17 St. Augustine, Contra Faustum XXII, CLXI.

18 Boyer, op. cit. p. 245.

"LA PENSEÉ D'Augustin paraît donc assez claire. Il n'entend point approuver la tolérance du vice. La loi véritable, qui est la Loi éternelle, la loi de la cité céleste, défend la prostitution. Les lois des hommes qui ne veulent regarder qu'aux biens de ce monde, les lois de la cité terrestre permettent la prostitution en la reglent: c'est un expedient pour éviter le pire. C'est dans le désordre ce minimum d'ordre sans lequel le désordre lui-même ne peut subsister. Mais si l'on abandonne comme on le droit, l'idéal de la cité terrestre et si l'on subordonne l'ordre de cette cité à l'idéal de la cité de Dieu, on peut plus rien permettre de ce que défend la loi divine."

19 De Nuptiis et Concupiscentia I, XII, 14.


"ITA MANET INTER VIVENTES QUODDAM CONJUGALE, QUOD NEC SEPARATIO NEC CUM ALTERO COPULATIO POSSIT AUFFERRE."

22 Sermo CGCXCII, 2, P.L. 39, 1710.

"Non vobis licet habere uxores, quorum priores mariti vivunt: nec vobis, foeminae, habere viros licet, quorum præores uxores vivunt. Adulterina sunt ista conjugia, non jure fori, sed jure coeli. Nec eam feminam quae per repudium discessit a marito, licet vobis ducere, vivo marito Solius fornicationis causa licet uxorem adulteram dimittere; sed illa vivente non licet alteram ducere. Et vobis, feminæ, nec illos viros a quibus per repudium discesserunt uxores eorum, maritos habere conceditur: non licet: adulteria sunt non conjugia."

23 De Bono Conjugali VIII, P.L. 40, 376.

Usque adeo foedus illud initum nuptiale cujusdam sacramenti res est, ut nec ipsa separatione irritum fiat quandoquidem vivente viro, et a quo relicat est, moechatur, si alteri nupserit."


"Manet enim vinculum nuptiarum, etiamsi proles, cujus causa initum est, manifesta sterilitate non subsequatur: ita ut scientibus conjugibus non se filios habituros, separare se tamen vel ipsa causa filiorum atque aliis copulare non licet."


"Sed respondes mihi: "Continenter vávere paucorum est; et ideo qui fornicantes conjuges dimiserunt, quoniam non possunt reconciliari, tantum se vident periclitari, ut legem Christi non humanum, sed feralem pronuntient", O Frater, quantum ad incontinentes pertinet, multas querelas habere possunt, quibus, ut dicis, legem Christi feralem pronuntient non humanum. Et tamen non propter illos Evangelium Christi pervertere, vel mutare debemus... Sed attende quam plura sunt ubi si querelas incontinentium velimus admittere, necesa nobis erit adulteria facienda permettere. Quid sit enim aliquo diuturno et insanabile morbo corporis teneatur conjux quo concubitus impeditur, quid, si captivitas, vel vis aliqua separat, ita ut sciat vivere maritus uxorem, cujus sibi copia denegatur? censesne admittenda incontinentiam murmura, et permettenda adulteria?... Nonne lex Christi incontinentibus displicet, qui uxores litigiosas, injuriosas, imperiosas, fastidiosas, et ad redendam debitum conjugale difficillimas, repudio interposito abjicere volunt, et alteras ducere? Jam ergo, quia istorum incontinentia legem Christi horruit, ad eorum lex Christi arbitrium commutanda est."
27 De Conjugiis Adulterinis II, 4, P.L. 40, 473.

ibid. II, 473.

"Quoniam si per conjugis adulterinum solvitur vinculum, sequitur illa perversitas, quam cavendum esse monstravi, ut et mulier per impudicitiam solvaturo hoc vinculo; quae erit a lege viri."

29 De Nuptiis et Concupiscientia I, IX, P.L. 44, 419.

"Verumtamen magis pertinere ad nuptiarum bonum non unum et multas, sed unum et unam, satis indicat ipsa prima divinitus facta conjuga copula, ut inde connubia sumerent initium, ubi honestius attenderotur exemplum. Progrediente autem genere humano junctae sunt quibusdam bonis viris bonae feminae, singulis plures... tamen plures feminae uni viro nunquam licite jungerentur, nisi in hoc plures filii nascerentur."

30 De Bono Conjugali XVIII, P.L. 40, 387.

"Sed quoniam ex multis animis una civitas futura est habentium animam unam et cor unum in Deum... propterea sacramentum nuptiarum temporalis nostri sic ad unum virum et unam uxorem redactum est. Sacramentum nuptiarum singularum nostri temporis significat unitatem omnium nostrum subjectam Deo juturam in una coelesti civitate."

31 Sermo LI, 26, P.L. 38, 348.

"In illo ergo populo quia oportebat fieri abundantem propagationem usque ad Christum, per numerosositatem plebis in qua praefigurarentur omnia quae praefiguranda erant Ecclesia documenta, habebant officium ducendarum uxorum per quas populus cresceret, in quo populo praeignasset Ecclesia."

32 De Conjugiis Adulterinis II, 12, P.L. 40, 478.

"Erat enim tunc quaedam propagandi necessitas, quae nun non est..."

33 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Supp. LXV, 1.

"Pluralitas ergo uxorum neque totaliter tollit, neque aliquid alter impedit matrimonii primum finem, cum unus vir sufficiat pluribus uxoribus fecundandis, et educandis filiolis ex eis natis. Sed secundarium finem etsi non totaliter tollat, tamen multum impedit, eo quod non facile potest esse pax familia, ubi uni viro plures uxoribus junguntur; cum non possit unus vir sufficere ad satisfaciendum pluribus uxoribus ad votum, et etiam quia communicatio plurium in uno officio causat litem; sicut figuli corrixuntur ad invicem, et similiter plures uxores unius viri. Tertium autem finem totaliter tollit, eo quod sicut Christus est unus, ita et Ecclesia una. Et ideo patet ex dictis quod pluralitas uxorum quodammodo est contra legem naturae, et quodammodo non."
"Plures enim feminae ab uno viro fetari possunt; una vero a pluribus non potest."

"Unde si una concumbat cum pluribus, quia non est hinc multiplicatio prolis, sed frequentatio libidinis, conjux non potest esse, sed meretrix."

"Venit ergo vir sexum praaligere virilem, et natus ex femina sexum consolari femineum, tamquam alloquens et dicens "Ecce natus sum vir, ecce natus ex femina...Decipiendo hominini propinatum est venenum per feminam: reparando homini propinetur salus per feminam."

"In nullo igitur sexu debemus injuriam facere Creatori: utrumque ad sperandam salutem commendavit Nativitas Domini. Honor masculini sexus est in carne Christi; honor feminini est in matre Christi."

"Sic ut vir debet feminam regere, nec eam permettere dominari in virum; quod ubi contingit, perversa et misera domus est."

"Subdit (Deus) primitus omnia sibi, deinde creaturam corporalem creaturae spirituali, irrationalem rationali, terrestrem caelesti, femineam masculinae, minus valentem valentiori, indigentiorem copiosiori."

"Est etiam ordo naturalis in hominibus, ut serviant feminae viris, et filii parentibus, quia et illic haec jus-"
titia est ut infirmior ratio serviat fortiori."

44 Epistola CCLXII, 8, P.L. 33, 1080.
"Si quid tibi forte melius videretur, suggeres viro reverenter, ejusdemque auctoritate tamquam tui capitis sequeris obedienter."

45 De Genesi Contra Manichaeos II, 15, P.L. 34, 204.

46 De Genesi ad Litteram XI, 50, P.L. 34, 450.
"Neque enim et ante peccatum alter factum fuisse decet credere mulierem, nisi ut vir ei dominaretur, et ad eum ipse serviendo converteretur."

47 De Moribus Ecclesiae I, 63, P.L. 32, 1336.
"Tu (Ecclesia) viros conjugibus, non ad illudendum imbecilliorem sexum, sed sinceri amoris legibus praeficis."

48 De Genesi contra Manicheos II, 15, P.L. 34, 205.
"Tunc enim ordinatissime caput mulieris vir est, cum caput viri est Christus, quia Sapientia Dei est."

"Unde enim magnum magnique honoris meritum apud Deum fidelis et pia virginitas habet, nisi quia isto jam tempore continendi ab amplexu, cum ex omnibus gentibus ad implendum sanctorum numerum largissima suppetat copia, percipiendae aordide voluptatis libido non sibi vindicat, quod jam sufficiendae proles non postulat necessitudo?"

50 De Bono Conjug. XI, P.L. 40, 382.
"Quod ergo ait, Quae inuupta est, cogitat ea quae sunt Domini, ut sit sancta et corpore et spiritu, non sis accipientum est, ut putemus non esse sanctam corpore Christianum conjugem castam. Omnis quippe fidelibus dictum est. Nes-citis quia corpora vestra templum in vobis est Spiritus Sancti quem habetis a Deo (I Cor. VI, 19). Sancta sunt ergo etiam corpora conjugatorium, fidem sibi et Domino servantium."

51 De Bono Conjug. XXIII, P.L. 40, 392.
"Res. ergo ipsas si comparemus, nullo modo dubitandum est, meliorem esse castitatem continentiae quam castitatem nuptialem, cum tamen utrumque sit bonum."

52 Sermo CCCLIV, 4, P.L. 39, 1565.
"Et audeo dicere, conjugalem agentes vitam, si tenerent humilitatem, superbis castis meliores sunt."

53 Enarrationes in Psalmos C, P.L. 37, 1280.
"Melius est humile conjugium, quam superba virginitas, si enim nuberet, non haberet nomen unde extolleretur, et haberet frenum guo regeretur."
De Bono Conjug. XXIII, P.L. 40, 393.
"Si ergo proponatur virgo permanusura, sed tamen inobediens, et maritata, quae virgo permanere non posset, sed tamen obediens, quam meliorem dicamus?...Ita si conferas ebrio-sam virginem sobriam conjuge conjugatae, quis dubitet eamdem ferre sententiam?"

De Ordine II, IV, P.L. 32, 1000.

Quaest. in Hept. I, CLIII, P.L. III, 590.
"Est etiam ordo naturalis in hominibus, ut serviant feminae viris, et filii parentibus; quia et illic haec justitia est ut infirmior ratio serviat fortiori."

Enarratio in Ps. CXXVII, 15.

ibid. XXXVII, 24.

Confessions III, XI, 19.

De Ordine II, XIII, 37, P.L. 32, 1012.
"Quis enim ferat imperitum videri hominem qui volasse Daedalum non audient; mendacem illum qui finxerit, stultum qui crediderit, impudentem qui interrogaverit, non videri? aut in quo nostros familiaris graviter miserari soleo, qui si non responderint quid vocata sit mater Euryali, accusantur insitiae; cum ipsi eos, a quibus ea rogantur, vanos et ineptos, nec curiosos audeant appellare?"

Confessions I, XVI, 25.

Epistola CXVIII, II, 11.
"Postremo fac te de omnibus quae a nobis quaeris, interrogatum respondere potuisse. Ecce jam doctissimus atque acutissimus diceris, ecce jam te laudibus in caelum graeculus flatus attolit; tu tantum memento gravitatis tuae, et illam mereri laudem quo fine volueris, ut scilicet eos levi iter levia ista miratos, et benevolentissime atque avidissime jam in tua ora suspensos, gravissimum aliquid et saluberrimum doceas, utrum teneas, et recte tradere noveris, vellem cognosce. Ridiculum est enim cum propterea superflua multa didiceris, ut tibi aures hominem ad necessaria praependur, ipsa necessaria non tenere quibus excisiendis ea superflua praeparaveris; et dum occuparis ut discas unde facias intentos, nolle discere quod infundatur intentis. Sed si hoc te scire jam dicis, idque ipsum Christianam doctrinam esse respondes, quam te omnibus praeponeret novimus, et in ea sola esse praesumere spem salutis aeternae, non opus est ei cognitione dialogorum Ciceronis, et collectione emendicatarum discordantium sententiarum alienarum procurari auditores. Moribus tuis intenti fiant, qui abs te aliquid tale accepturi sunt. Nolo intenti fiant, qui abs te aliquid
tale accepturi sunt. Nolo prius aliquid doceas quod dediscendum est, ut vera doceas."

63 City of God XIV, 3.
64 ibid. XVIII, 15.
65 Horace, Epodes I, 11, 69, quoted in City of God I, 3.
66 City of God I, 5.
67 ibid. II, 27.
69 De Doctrina Christiana II, XL, 60.

"Philosophi autem qui vocantur, si qua forte vera et fidei nostrae accommodata dixerunt, maxime Platonici, non solum formidanda non sunt, sed ab eis etiam tamquam injustis possessoribus in usum nostrum vindicanda."

70 ibid. II, XVIII, 28.
71 De Libero Arbitrio, I, 1. (The translation is from Tourscher's edition, p. 6)
72 De Doctrina Christiana, II, VII, P.L. 34, 39.

"Gradus ad sapientiam: primus timor; secundus pietas; tertius, scientia; quartus, fortitudo; quintus concilium; sextus purgatio cordis; septimus gradus seu finis, sapientia."

73 ibid. II, IX.
74 ibid. II, XI.
75 ibid. II, XIX.

"--alterum eorum quas animadverterunt jam peractas aut divinitus institutas."

76 ibid. II, XXVI.
77 ibid. II, XXVIII, P.L. 34, 55.

"Quidquid igitur de ordine temporum transactorum indicaea quae appellatur historia, plurimum nos adjuvat ad sanctos Libros intelligendos, etiamsi praeter Ecclesiam puerili eruditione discatur."

78 ibid.

"De utilitate historiae, ut omittam Graecos, quantum noster Ambrosius quaestionem solvit, calumniantibus Platonis lectoribus et dilectoribus; qui dicere ausi sunt omnes Domini Nostri Jesu Christi sententias, quas mirari et praedicari
coguntur, de Platonis libris eum didicisse, quoniam longe ante adventum Domini Platonem fuisse, negari non potest! "

De Doctrina Christiana II, XXIX, P.L. 34, 56.

ibid.

"Aliud est enim dicere, tritam istam herbam si biberis, venter non dolebit; et aliud est dicere istam herbam collo si suspenderis, venter non dolebit. Ibi enim probatur contemperatio salubris, hic significatio superstitionis damnatur.

ibid. II, XXX, P.L. 34, 57.

ibid. II, XXXI, P.L. 34, 58.

"Disputationis disciplina ad omnia genera quaestionum, quae in Litteris sanctis sunt penetranda et dissolvenda, plurimum valet: tantum ibi cavenda est libido rexandi, et puerilis quaedam ostentatio decipiendi adversarium."

ibid. II, XXXII, P.L. 34, 58.

"Ipsa tamen veritas connexionum non instituta, sed animadversa est ab hominibus et notata, ut eam possint vel discere vel docere; nam est in rerum ratione perpetua et divinitus instituta."


De Doctrina Christiana II, XXXVII, P.L. 34, 60.

"Haec ars cum discitur, magis ut proferamus ea quae intellecta sunt, quam ut intelligamus, adhibenda est."

ibid. IV, II, P.L. 34, 89.

"Nam cum per artem rhetoricam et vera suadeantur et falsa, quis audeat dicere, adversus mendacium in defensoribus suis inerem debere consistere veritatem?...Cum ergo sit in medio posita facultas eloquii, quae ad persuadendae seu prava seu recta valeat plurimum; cur non bonorum studio comparatur, ut militet veritati, si eam mali ad obtinendas perversas vanasque causas in usus iniquitatis et erroris usurpant?"

ibid. IV, 5.

De Ordine II, XVIII, P.L. 32, 1006.

"Adolescentibus ergo studiosis ejus ita vivendum est, ut a veneris rebus, ab illecebris ventris et guturis, ab immodesto corporis cultu et ornatu, ab inanibus negotiis ludorum, a torpore somni atque pigritiae, ab aemulatione, obtrectatione, invidentia, ab honorum potestatumque ambitionibus, ab ipsius etiam laudis immidica cupiditate se abstineant."
De Ordine II, XVI, P.L. 32, 1015.
"Se quisque...omnia quae per tot disciplinas late varieque diffusa sunt, ad unum quoddam simplex verum certumque redegerit; eruditi nomini dignissimus, non temere jam quae­rit illa divina, non jam credenda solum verum etiam contem­planda, intelligenda atque retinenda."

Chapter VII: The Relations of Church and State.

One of the most vital problems in political theory during Augustine's time, and a question of great moment in the world of today, is the problem of the relation of Church and State. Late ly in our United States this issue has been brought out for discussion, or perhaps for a display of unreasoned prejudice, by President Roosevelt's appointment of Myron C. Taylor as his personal representative to the Vatican. Immediately among our good Protestant neighbors the cry is made denouncing the union of Church and State. The remarks bandied about on this topic seem to indicate much uncertainty, much confusion of thought as to the exact functions of the Church and of the State. And when we come to talk of the relations between the two—where the authority of the one ends and the other begins, what mutual aid and support Church and State should afford each other—to topics on these questions seem to be settled by whim and fancy in many quarters, instead of by a consultation of their foundation in the very nature of things. It will be no small help to us in this juncture to examine the problem as it was solved in ancient times, and in particular in Augustine's time, by St. Augustine himself.

We have examined the nature of authority in general and civil authority in particular, according to the mind of St. Augustin e. We have noted how civil authority is exercised in accor-
dance with law, how it defends itself by war, how it upholds the
structure of human society by safeguarding private property and
the family, and what its attitude is towards certain social in-
stitutions—notably towards slavery. But there is an authority,
an important force in society, about which we have said little,
as yet. Unlike that of the state its empire is spiritual; it
directs not man's body, but his soul. It is the force of relig-
ion. It directs the inner conscience of man and contributes a
powerful stimulus to the practice of even the civic virtues. It
is an important factor in strengthening the framework of the sta-
In all times and in all countries there has been some kind of a
working agreement between these two authorities—the cigel au-
thority and the religious authority. The problem is not new—
nil novum sub sole—it is as old as society itself because it
deals with forces natural to society.

In pagan Greece and Rome, in ancient Egypt and among the
pagan governments in general religion was an adjunct of the state
it was confounded with civil government. Priest and oracles
and vestal virgins, were public servants maintained by the state
and for the state. The decrees of government in turn partook
of the nature of a religious ceremony, accompanied by auguries,
and sacred words. And in certain epochs the emperor was the
pontifex maximus and even the god to be adored. Religion in
short was a public affair not a private matter of conscience.
Plato represents this pagan concept when writing of religion in
his Laws where he orders worship to be given to the Olympian
gods and the gods of the state. And to determine what shall be the religion of the state Plato in his Republic leaves it up to the god of Delphi to determine, but even then seems not to distinguish it from civil authority saying:

"The institution of temples and sacrifices, and the entire service of gods, demigods and heroes; also the ordering of the repositories of the dead, and the rights to be observed by him who would propitiate the inhabitants of the world below--these are matters of which we are ignorant ourselves, and as founders of the city we should be unwise in trusting them to any interpreter but our ancestral deity." (2)

Though in this passage Plato does not arrogate to himself the office of fixing the state religion, yet he manifestly conceived of it as a state institution, and as something essential to the civic wellbeing.

The Jews, being the chosen people under a theocratic rule, made religion the very core of their government. The priests exercised a judicial function and the prophets advised the kings. Long after the sovereignty passed from the Jews their religion remains a unifying force amongst them. In the time of Christ the Jewish people were under the dominion of Rome where the Emperor exercised absolute sway over government and over pagan worship as well. Religion was part of Roman patriotism, and there was union of Church and State in full force. Against this, Christ protested when he made His clear and bold distinction between the two powers saying, "Render therefore to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's". (3)

The whole struggle of the Church during the first three cen-
turias hinged on this very point—the distinction between the
civil authority and the authority of religion. It seemed but
natural for Rome to oppose an institution which appeared to
threaten the very unity of the state, by introducing a religion
at variance with the accepted belief of Rome. Then Constantine
with his Edict of Milan gave the Church the freedom it desired.
In fact he went to the point of making Christianity the state
religion and even began to encumber it with his attentions. At
the council of Nice we see a successful cooperation between
Church and State, where Constantine by his presence lent protec­
tion and importance to the deliberations which settled a knotty
point of doctrine. Soon after, however, Constans his son, yield­
ing to his despotic tendency began to define dogmas, to inter­
fere with ecclesiastical councils, and in general to attempt to
usurp the Church authority for himself. Then came Julian the
Apostate with his short but violent persecution. The Church
endured this trial and emerged to receive the official approval
of Valentinian who drew the line very exactly which separated
his authority from the authority of the Church. He declined to
dispute about dogma but held that to be the affair of the bish­
pops.

The Church later had to vindicate her authority against the
encroachments of other Roman emperors. St. Ambrose, the Bishop
of Milan found it necessary to check the pretensions of the
young Valentinian, telling him that he had no right to pronounce
(4) on dogmas, that he is not above the Church but in the Church.
The empress Justina, who was an Arian, ordered Ambrose in the name of her young son Valentinian II to give up one of the churches of Milan to the Arians. But Ambrose courageously stood by the rights of the Church despite threat of exile. St. Augustine was in Milan at the time and was much influenced by the words of St. Ambrose, and doubtless too, was impressed by his conduct during this conflict between Church and State. Ambrose set forth his answer in bold relief and we shall now see how Augustine was to elaborate on it and perfect it. St. Augustine had the experience and thought of paganism, the truths of Revelation, and the writings of previous Christian Apologists to draw from, as we have shown. These he called upon to contribute to his own doctrine.

The first problem that Augustine had to attack was the precise distinction between Church and State. Man, he tells us, is composed of body and soul, matter and spirit, and the state concerns itself with material interests, and the Church with spiritual.

"For since we are made up of body and soul, and as long as we are in this temporal life, we use temporal goods for our support; it is necessary that in that part which pertains to this life we be subject to powers, that is, to men administering human affairs with a certain dignity. But in that part whereby we believe in God, and are called into His kingdom, we must not be subject to any man." (5)

This fundamental difference between the two powers gives rise to other differences which St. Augustine notes in various works. In the kind of authority exercised, they differ, for the state
is a physical authority, the Church a moral. This difference in turn results in a difference in the extent of their jurisdiction: the state rules the external life, the Church the interior life of man. This is revealed by the type of punishments the Church inflicts on offenders:

"The ecclesiastical discipline ought to be vigilant, and chastise them (the wicked) not only by words but by excommunication and degradation." (7)

And again the state governs a certain determinate people, while the Church extends its authority to all nations. The physical nature of the one authority and the spiritual nature of the other afford a difference in enforcing their control: the state uses the sword, while the Church influences its members by charity and has no means of defence except spiritual penalties. These penalties are excommunication and ecclesiastical disciplinary measures.

From what is said above concerning the distinctions between the two societies, the State and the Church, it follows that in the mind of St. Augustine they were both what modern ethicians call perfect societies. Pope Pius XI in his Encyclical on the Christian Education of Youth applies this term perfect society to the civil society and to the Church. Cronin in his Science of Ethics says that a perfect society is one which is self-contained, the end of which is not contained in any other; or it is one which is self-sufficing, for it can attain its end by its own unaided powers. According to this the Church and the State
must both be classed as perfect societies, since the end of the state was shown to be concerned with man's physical nature and the end of the church was shown to be concerned with man's spiritual side, and these two are distinct, the one pertaining to the exterior, the other to the interior, as Augustine said. The very character of perfect society renders each free and autonomous in its sphere of jurisdiction, and each has claims on its subjects with which the other cannot interfere. This is well brought out, when Augustine says:

"If a Christian believes that he is authorized by his quality of Christian to refrain from paying taxes and tributes or to neglect to render to the powers charged with temporal interests the honors which are their due, he is gravely deceiving himself. Similarly in a contrary sense, if he thinks that he ought to carry his submission to the point of placing his faith under the yoke of those clothed with these high dignities which set them over things of this world, he falls into a greater error. We must keep the just mean which God proscribed: "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's". (12)

And in the City of God Augustine shows that the members of the Church, in religious matters, obey the Church even to the point of becoming obnoxious to the state:

"And as the celestial city..., new that one God only was to be worshipped, and that to Him alone was due that service which the Greeks call latria, and which man be given only to a god, it has come to pass that the two cities could not have common laws of religion, and that the heavenly city has been compelled in this matter to dissent, and to become obnoxious to those who think differently, and to stand the brunt of their anger and hatred and persecutions." (13)

In other words, Augustine considers that the Roman empire has gone outside of its legitimate authority in repressing the Christ
ian religion, because its power is civil and not religious. Hence the Church is a perfect society that can stand up for its rights even against the state. A new concept is brought into the pagan world by Christ, in His celebrated maxim, "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's."

In speaking about the danger of infringing on one another's authority, St. Augustine devotes more attention to the danger of the state encroaching on the authority of the Church. As a matter of historical fact this has proven to be the greater danger, and especially so up to Augustine's time. The holy doctor inquires why it is that the state should persecute the Church: was it because Christ forbade it to render kings their due? because He did not say, "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's and to God the things that are God's?" was it because He Himself didn't pay the tribute with a coin found in the mouth of a fish? or because His precursor hadn't directed the soldiers to do violence to no man and be content with their pay? Was it because one of His soldiers (S. Paul) had not said, "Let every soul be submissive to higher powers", and further on, "Render to every man his due, tribute to whom tribute is due"etc.? Had not the same apostle advised the Church to pray for kings? How then have the Christians offended? What is due that has not been rendered? In what have Christians failed to obey kings? And Augustine ends up with the text from the Psalms, "The kings of the earth have persecuted me without cause".

Even when the state is unjust and wicked, the Church is
submissive in what pertains to its authority. Augustine compares it to Christ who though He was master, was as one who served, and who suffered at the hands of His own servants, for who persecuted Him in His passion if not His own servants? God has founded his Church in such a way that all power in this world should be honored, even by those who are better than it.

"Some potentates are good and fear God; some are bad and do not fear Him. Julian was an infidel ruler, and an apostate, wicked, an idolator: Christian soldiers served the infidel ruler; but when it came to the cause of Christ, they recognized only Him who is in heaven. For if he wished them to worship idols, to offer incense, they placed God before him. However when he said, for your ranks, charge the enemy, they hastened to obey. They distinguished the eternal Lord from the temporal, and yet they were subject even to the temporal lord, for the sake of the eternal Lord."

(15)

And the universal nature of the Church spread throughout the world should convince kings that the empire of Christ is different from that of other kings, and that they have no reason to be jealous or fear that He will take away their temporal power. On the contrary He will give them a kingdom, that of heaven, of which He is the king. As St. Augustine sees it, the Church ever mindful that her destination is heaven, takes the circumstances of earthly conditions and the diversities of governments as incidentals that do not vitally concern her so long as she has liberty to pursue her way. Customs differ according to place and time, laws and governments are not everywhere the same languages vary, but notwithstanding, the heavenly city (i.e., the Church as Augustine clearly means in this place) calls citizens out of all nations to form them into a society of pilgrims
going towards heaven. Here he is viewing the Church as an extra-
national and supra-national society different from any state, and
existing alongside all civil states.

"--not scrupling about diversities in manners, laws, and
institutions whereby earthly peace is secured and maintained,
but recognizing that however various these are they are all
tending to the same earthly peace, "It therefore is so far
from rescinding and abolishing these diversities, that it
even preserves and adopts them, so long as no hindrance to
the worship of the one supreme and true God is thus introduc-
ed." (17)

St. Augustine has clearly established the distinction be-
tween the two powers, the Church and the State. Each has its
sphere of authority secure from the control and interference of
the other, each is deserving of respect and honor from the other.
But is there no further link between them? Are they to be left
severely alone in tight compartments having nothing further to
do with the other? Are Church and State totally separated pow-
ers such as we have in the United States, or is there in the
theory of St. Augustine any provision for an interaction between
them? Here is a problem where St. Augustine's thought runs
counter to what many of our generation are accustomed to take for
granted.

The state receives many important benefits from the Church
which tend to strengthen its foundations. The Church teaches
the people in its many schools the cardinal virtues of prudence,
justice, fortitude, and temperance, but she does not merely
propose them speculatively, but she makes them a principle in
live. (18) By preaching Christ crucified, she raises man from the
mass of iniquity in which he is immersed, and urges her children (19) on to the ideal of sacrifice. In imparting the precepts of the moral law to her children the Church is incidentally promoting the character of good citizenship, which requires the qualities of uprightness, integrity, and respect for authority. As Augustine says, "From the divine precepts spring...the social duties". The doctrine of charity and brotherly love is able to unite men in a strong and peaceful society which is of utmost importance to the state. Addressing the Church the saint says that "you unite citizens to citizens, and in memory of our first parents you unite men among themselves making thereby not merely a society (21) but a fraternity." The various duties fulfilled by the Church which Augustine recounts in his *De Moribus Ecclesiae* are of the greatest value to the state. By making wives submissive to their husbands, and husbands faithful to wives, by instilling in children obedience, in brotherly mutual charity, in slaves fidelity, in kings devotion to the public good, and in the people submission to the king--by these teachings the Church is of immense service to the state. In this amicable way the Church and State can both proceed on their way together neither interfering with the other, and both aiding each other.

There are certain public functions which the Church is interested in because of her solicitude for the unfortunate. The Church is the protector and benefactor of the poor and the goods of the Church are the patrimony of the poor. This was something akin to the thought expressed by St. Lawrence who was com-
manded to hand over to the emperor the riches of the Church. 
pointing to the poor whom he had assembled, he called them the 
riches of the Church. The orphans, too, were under the solicitude of the Church, for "God puts the orphan under the care of the Church to protect it against the wicked". The bishop watches over the orphan after the death of the parents to protect its rights against strangers. Thus in St. Augustine's eyes the Church has in society the function of a benevolent institution, a benefactor of the helpless. Along with her spiritual mission, she aids mankind by the practice of corporal works of mercy.

Another public function that the bishops were called upon to exercise in Augustine's time was that of "defender of the city". Gratian, Theodosius, and finally Honorius appointed the Bishops "defenders of the city". This was an office whose function was to protect the people against the covetousness of the tax collectors, the insolence of officers, and the avidity of judges. He was to represent the people in their difficulties with the magistrates. This duty was not to Augustine's liking. It took up his time and distracted him from his more spiritual duties, and necessitated a certain amount of (as we would say), toady ing to the powers that be. Small wonder that he should say in a sermon to his people at Hippo, "Leave us in peace and do not impose on us this charge, do not submit us to these humiliations." Apparently the people did not heed his request and even reproached him for not interceding for them, to which he calmly replied that he had spoken to the authorities but without
Whatever remonstrances he did make to the rulers were in private for as he himself declared, in the same sermon, he put such little faith in public remonstrances that if it were feasible he would take the faithful aside and speak to them instead of admonishing them in public. This indicates that St. Augustine recognized the limits of the episcopal authority and was adverse to infringing in the domain of civil government. He could offer sage advice and wise counsels when there was opportunity in trying problems, but he had no jurisdiction, nor did he desire any, in civil affairs.

The relation between the Church and the State should be something of an official nature. Religion is not merely a private affair for the citizens, but since the state is a social organism it too should recognize religion. Implied in this principle is the recognition by the state of the true religion, the religion of Christ, the Catholic Church—for certainly Augustine would not consider the state bound to adhere to anything but Christianity. This he says in the City of God: "We say that they (i.e., Christian emperors) are happy...if they make their power the handmaid of His majesty by using it for the greatest possible extension of His worship; if they fear love and worship God; if more than their own they love that kingdom in which they are not afraid to have partners." From these words we see that Augustine did not look upon the religion of the ruler as a purely individual and private activity, but also as part of his public office using his power "for the greatest possible extension of
His worship." This is brought out still more emphatically in a letter to a certain Macedonius, where he says that if he made it his aim in ruling only to insure peace and repose for his subjects, and took no care of whether they worshipped the true God, all his efforts would not serve to produce true happiness.

This doctrine whereby the state should profess the Christian religion gives the Church something of a higher dignity, or emphasizes the more necessary truth that is to be attained in the Church. The Church is not bound to recognize one form of state more than another---she can carry on her mission in all of them, but the state has no such latitude. There is but one true Church, but one truth, and to that the state must adhere in the very nature of things.

The valuable services which the Church renders to the State we have seen, but what services is the state to accord to the Church? St. Augustine did not think that the Church should depend for its financial support on the state. In this he had the example of the Apostles. The necessaries of life were provided for Christ and His Apostles by the people to whom they preached the word of God. Sometimes they received food and shelter, and sometimes money which Judas kept in the common purse. St. Paul taught that it was but just that the faithful should support the ministers of God with bodily things in return for spiritual things, though he maintained himself by his craft of tentmaker. Augustine admired St. Paul for this and he said that if the service of the altar did not suffice to afford a priest his daily
bread, then let him work with his hands. And in his work, De Opere Monachorum he praises St. Paul's example and did he have the leisure he would like to imitate him and earn his bread by manual labor. That this is not an empty wish is proven from the fact that St. Augustine was known for his practice of evangelical poverty, and for his frugal habits, as Possidius his first biographer tells us.

However the priest being occupied with the care of souls is not like the monk, who can engage in manual labor. The secular priest must depend on the faithful for his sustenance. But in this he is not selling the word of the Gospel for his daily bread, rather the faithful give their goods of small value for something of great price. "Christians are powerless to fittingly recompense those who devote themselves to serve them with the charity which the Gospel commands. The saint even suggests how much the faithful should set aside for their contribution to the Church, and proposes that they save up in advance and give a tenth part of their revenue. This fraction was doubtless fixed on by Augustine in accordance with the doctrine in the Old Testament whereby the Jews gave tithes of all they possessed. St. Augustine introduced among his clergy the practice of living in common in order to foster a more active spiritual life and to better practice poverty by having all things in common. Whatever was given to one of the community was put at the common disposal of all. So we see that the financial support of the Church and of her ministers was placed by St. Augustine on the
shouders of the faithful, and the state was to have no hand in it.

There was however, a service of a different kind that the Bishop of Hippo thought that the Church should receive from the state, namely the help of the state in the defense of the faith. This doctrine has given rise to much discussion and to extreme opinions. Some have made out Augustine to be the doctor of the inquisition because of what he said about the use of the secular arm in coercing people into orthodoxy. Let us, then, see what Augustine thought on this important topic. There were several classes of people each embracing some form of error at variance with Christianity. In the first place there was the old pagan worship which in spite of many decrees curtailing it, and suppressing its various manifestations, none the less was still widely practiced in the time of St. Augustine. Constantine had at first put Christianity on equal footing with paganism and later made Christianity the state religion. Other emperors gradually worked for its suppression by withdrawing state support, by revoking privileges for its priests, by abolishing private and later, public sacrifices, until in the time of Augustine it was a proscribed cult as the Theodosian Code plainly reveals.

St. Augustine was inexorable in his condemnation of pagan worship. In the first place he arraigns it as an offense to sound reason. Men learned in the doctrine of the Old and New Testament reproach paganism not because of its temples, its sacrifice, and its priesthood, but because it pays worship to senseless idols.
Against this perversion of spirit Augustine applies the text of Holy Scripture: "They have eyes and see not, they have ears and hear not." (Ps. 113, 5)

"Whence it is easily understood, that the true religion reprehends in the superstitious of the gentiles, not so much the sacrifice itself (for the saints from the beginning offered sacrifices to God) but because the sacrifices were offered to false gods and wicked demons." (33)

The doctrines and practices of the pagans are a subject for Augustine's scorn. Laws seemingly against the pagans are in reality in their favor. No one thinks it an evil to deprive a child of a dangerous plaything and give it a book instead. So it is with God, who makes use of rulers submissive to Him to take away these childish tops of paganism to direct men to something useful. (34)

The City of God resounds with strictures against the folly of pagan worship. The pagan gods did not even suffice to preserve the republic from being ruined by immorality, though the Romans looked upon them as guardians:

"But what is relevant to the present question is this, that however admirable our adversaries say the republic was or is, it is certain that by the testimony of their own most learned writers it had become, long before the coming of Christ utterly wicked and dissolute, and indeed had no existence but had been destroyed by profligacy. To prevent this, surely these guardian gods ought to have given precepts of morals and a rule of life to the people by whom they were worshipped in so many temples, with so great a variety of rights, so many festal solemnities, so many celebrations of magnificent games." (35)

If St. Augustine in theory was firm and severe towards paganism, in practice he was more conciliatory. It is ever the
maxim of the Church to hate error but to love the erring, and
Augustine in his saintly manner applied this quite well as we
see from his letters. Whether he corresponded with Maximus, the
professor of grammar, or with Dioscorus, the student seeking an
explanation of Cicero's writings, or with the noble Volusianus
presenting his doubts on the Incarnation, in all cases Augustine
maintained an air of sincere cordiality and friendship towards
the pagans. He cautioned the faithful against provoking the
pagans by their intemperate zeal. It is better by our prayers
to break the idols in the heart of the pagan, in order that when
they are converted they themselves may invite us to break the
idols which are in their gardens. Many of Augustine's long
letters are written to clear up doubts in the minds of pagans
and to bring them to the true faith. The saint's most celebra-
ted work, the City of God, was undertaken, as he tells us, to
refute the charges made against the Christian religion "by the
worshippers of false gods, or pagans as we commonly call them."

His charity for the pagans did not deter St. Augustine from
jealously censuring their evil customs and rites. The immoral
spectacles enacted in the theaters especially called forth his
disapproval. The Greeks admitted players to positions of honor
and to state offices, but the Romans, by refusing to the poets
the same license in respect of men which they allowed them in
the case of the gods, showed a more delicate sensitiveness re-
garding themselves than regarding the gods. Augustine is glad
to quote some of the pagans themselves who condemned the lewd
theater. Thus Plato, who excluded poets from a well-ordered city was better than these gods who desire to be honored by theatrical plays. The saint sees in the pagan theater not only an enemy to religion and morality but a deleterious influence to the state itself. "The obscenities of those plays which the Romans con-secrated in order to propitiate their gods, contributed largely to the overthrow of public order." The theater was so pernicous that Augustine felt he could give it no quarter, no indulgent tolerance, and praised the laws that suppressed it, and the wisdom of Scipio who opposed its erection.

The question of the relations between Church and State in the defense of the true religion is brought into greater relief when Augustine speaks of heresy than when he deals with paganism. The Old Law did not allow liberty of conscience and prescribed that a heretic should be stoned to death. And Plato in his Laws decreed death for atheists and approved the proscription of religious beliefs not approved by the state. The Roman empire was more tolerant, and seemed to welcome the strange cults of all its conquered provinces, and even admitted them into the imperial city. Apparently the Greeks, too, didn't follow Plato's theory for St. Paul in his discourse in the Aeropagus of Athens remarked on all the gods whose temples and statues he had observed in passing through the streets of the city. The Church was forced to contend for three centuries, however, before she won recognition for her principle of liberty of conscience. She finally achieved success under Constantine. The Edict of Milan granting
religious toleration in reality represented the thought of the Church. Unfortunately however, it was not long before heresy, too, claimed liberty of conscience for its adherents. Arianism, the first great heresy after the granting of religious toleration, even succeeded in winning over to its sect some of the emperors of Constantine's successors and used its liberty to combat the true religion. So once again the Church was compelled—this time in the person of St. Athanasius—to struggle for freedom of conscience.

The Donatist heresy was becoming quite troublesome in the time of St. Augustine. At first it was only a schism arising out of the election of Cecilian to the episcopal chair of Carthage, which election was contested by a number of African bishops headed by Donatus. The Donatist party contested the election on the grounds that the consecrator, Bishop Felix of Aptunga, was a traditor (i.e., one who had delivered up the sacred books and vessels to the heathens during the persecutions) and consequently was unworthy to administer the sacrament of Holy Orders making the consecration of Cecilian invalid. The Governor of Africa, at Constantine's command, examined the case after being appealed to by the Donatists and found the charge against Felix to be false. Pope Melchiades convoking a council at Rome declared in favor of Caecilian, and when the Donatists would not receive the decision, a second council was held at Arles in 314 repeating the former decision, and amplifying it with the declaration that even had Felix been a traditor the consecration
would have been valid since the validity depends not on the virtue of the consecrator but on the sacrament.

Donatus and his party would not be reconciled, and formed a sect of their own, even setting up an antipope at Rome. When imperial decrees of Constantine and his successors outlawed them, they formed fanatical bands and laid waste the countryside, principally in Africa. Julian the Apostate on his accession to the throne restored all the privileges that had been denied them, and delivered over to them many of the churches, thinking thereby to sow dissension within the Church, the better to cause its downfall. So violent did the Donatists become, that their maurading bands, called *Circumcellions*, seized the Catholics often putting them to death while shouting their unusual battle cry, "Praise the Lord". This schism had existed for nearly a century when St. Augustine became a priest at Hippo in 391.

The mind of Augustine underwent a gradual transformation on the subject of heresy and especially Donatism. At first the new bishop adopted a mild attitude seeking to win over the erring Donatists by kindness and friendly discussion. Possidius recounts that at first when Augustine began to preach, the people, both Catholics and Donatists, were so attracted by his learned and convincing discourse. A delegation of the people persuaded St. Augustine to enter into a debate with the Manichean priest Fortunatus which took place with great distinction to Augustine in 392. But this amicable feeling between Catholics and Donatists was not to endure long, for the Donatist clergy becoming
envious of the influence that the young Augustine was exerting on their people forbade them to communicate with him. Several of Augustine's letters of this early period show that he bore an indulgent attitude towards the erring. Thus he writes to Maximin, the Donatist Bishop of Sinitum, to dispute the doctrine of rebaptizing saying that he seeks an occasion to converse "on the slight difference that separates us". A number of letters are preserved from Augustine's correspondence with the heretics with Proculeianus, with Fortunius, and others.

This mild and patient demeanor which Augustine at first bore towards the Donatists began to wear off, however. There was ample reason why the holy bishop should experience a change of attitude. The Donatists were not to be won over nor even rendered peaceful for they redoubled their violence, refused all open discussion with the formidable champion of orthodoxy, and resorted to trickery and deceit. The progress of this change of attitude on Augustine's part, is to be noted in his letters.

There was at this time a certain Donatist named Crispinus who was appointed bishop of Calama, a town neighboring to Hippo. He let it be known that he would be willing to carry on a written disputation with Augustine, but the saint drily replied that he would have no discussion unless by public letters, since the adversary has the habit of reporting inexacty what is said in conversation. And in the same letter he defends the laws of theodosius against the Donatists who deserve, because of their schism, "neither the tolerance nor the Christian gentleness which
guides all our acts".

In 378 a certain Parmenianus, a theologian of the sect wrote a letter which was long circulated surreptitiously among the Donatists. Years later in 400 its errors were brought to the attention of Augustine, and the saint decided to refute it in a lengthy work which appeared under the title *Contra Epistolam Parmenianii*. The Donatists claimed that they were martyrs and the Christians were the persecutors, to which Augustine responded that they were no more martyrs than were the criminals who were punished by the laws of the state. Not everyone who suffers because of religion is a martyr, for the Lord did not say, "Blessed are they that suffer persecution", but "Blessed are they that suffer persecution for justice sake." And then Augustine goes on to show that the civil powers have the right to punish heresy and schism and bases his teaching on the words of St. Paul.

In one place St. Paul speaking of the ruler says: "For he is God's minister to thee, for good, But if thou do that which is evil, fear: for he beareth not the sword in vain. For he is God's minister: an avenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil."

But what, asks Augustine, does the Apostle include among evil deeds that are to be punished—and in answer he refers to another text where St. Paul has a list of the works of the flesh including, "fornication, idolatry, witchcraft, dissensions, sects, murders, drunkenness." From this Augustine concludes that the secular power has clearly the power of dealing with a false and vicious religion. Here we see the first step taken by St. Aug-
ustine in the way of countenancing the repression of heresy by
the civil arm.

The next evidence of Augustine's mind on the subject of
forceable repression of heresy, we find in his letters to Petel-
ian. Petelian, who had been appointed by the Donatists to the
bishopric of Cirta, wrote an abusive letter to Augustine which,
among other things, chided the Catholics with using force to
suppress the Donatists. This occurred about the year 400. The
saint replied to him in several letters, and in great detail in
a polemic entitled Contra Litteras Petiliani. Petelian claimed
that to call upon the government to suppress those dissenting
from Catholic doctrines was an abuse of free will, and was op-
posed to the doctrine of Christ Himself, who said, "No man can
come to me, except the Father, who hath sent me, draw him"
This brought the discussion to the very core of the problem, for
we are not taking into consideration only an external violence,
such as restrains criminals, but of a force that attempts to
fashion the beliefs of the citizens.

To this argument Augustine deftly responds with a question
of his own, "If I should ask you how God the Father draws to
His Son men whom He has left in their free will, perhaps you will
have difficulty to answer my question." And Augustine then
compares the threats the government directs at heretics to those
of a father towards his son. It is like the grace of God which
though turning us away from evil and towards good, yet leaves us
complete free will. The laws against schism, then, are not a
violation of free will but rather they stimulate man to reflect on the reason for his sufferings and to amend his ways. In a reply to Cresconius who had defended Petelian, St. Augustine attempts to show that the laws suppressing heresy do not take away free will. The law does not infringe on liberty, but if man uses his liberty to resist law and to plunge himself into error, the law justly chastizes him. If God has given free will to man he did not wish him to go without reward if he does good, nor without punishment if he does evil.

The Catholic bishops were keeping up an attempt to win over the Donatists by kindness, and in the annual councils of the African bishops which took place in 401 and the next couple of years, resolutions were passed to initiate peaceful overtures towards the schismatics, and to have the bishops attempt to bring them to unity by their preaching. But Augustine tells us in a letter that the Donatists were not to be won over. In fact quite the opposite result transpired when in 404 a number of armed Circumcellions tried to murder several African bishops among them being Possidius of Calama, and Maximin of Bagaia, and even Augustine himself. A council of bishops thereupon was convoked, and the majority favored the total suppression of the heresy by an imperial decree of union. But a minority, with St. Augustine among them, thinking it dangerous to have recourse to such extreme measures of coercion were in favor of putting an end to the violence of the Donatists but at the same time leaving with them the right to exist as a religious sect. The rest
of the bishops were eventually won over to this point of view and
they decided to petition the Emperor Honorius, to have the laws
of Theodosius applied where the Circumcellions had perpetrated
their outrages.

But before the legates could reach Honorius, he had already
been appraised of the crimes of the Donatists and on February 12,
405, published an edict suppressing the sect. All bishops were
to be exiled, and the adherents were to be fined. Those convic-
ted of rebaptism were to be deprived of all their goods, of their
right to bear witness in court, and of the faculty of receiving
bequests. Magistrates neglecting to enforce the decree were sub-
ject to the same penalty. The council of Carthage, convened in
405, pleased with the interest shown by Honorius drew up a mem-
orial of thanks to present to him. The bishops were to write to
the provincial governors to rouse their zeal for Church unity.
And all this was against what Augustine had been advocating but
one year before. St. Augustine in the letter he wrote to the
provincial governor in accordance with the behest of the council
pleaded for lenity, asking that fear rather than actual chastize-
ments be employed as a means of repression.

The application of the imperial decrees abolishing Donatism,
the exiling of their bishops, the return of their churches to the
Catholics, and the fear inspired by the penalties—all brought
about a great wave of conversions to the Church. Augustine at
first dubious, and unconvinced, could not in the end fail to be
impressed by the obvious sincerity of the conversions, so that
he could write that he was forced to renounce his first resolution that no one should be forced into the unity of Christ, but should be conquered only by discourse and reason. But he changed his view, not because convinced by argument, but because the evident force of examples compelled him.

"I yielded to the examples proposed to me by my colleagues. For my first thought was that no one should be coerced to the unity of Christ; that they ought to be driven by words, combated by disputation, and conquered by reason, lest we have them as false Catholics, whom we once knew as undisguised heretics. But this opinion of mine was overcome, not by the words of those contradicting it, but by the examples adduced. For in the first place there was before me my own city, which, although it was largely in the sect of the Donatists, has been converted to the Catholic unity by the fear of the imperial laws." (59)

Many Donatists had long desired to embrace the Catholic faith but were deterred by human respect, or by the force of habit, or by the security they felt Donatism enjoyed, or because of heredity, being born in the Donatist schism. St. Augustine continued even after the enforcement of the laws against the Donatists, to attempt to win them over by peaceable means. His plan was to use constraint softened by charity and his letters of this period reveal him trying to defend the laws of Honorius, showing them to be just. But he was unalterably opposed to putting heretics to death, when they were guilty of no other crime. He wrote to the proconsul, Donatus, asking him to forget about the power of life and death which he had, and heed the requests for clemency that the bishops were making in favor of the accused.

After several years of enforcing these measures of repres-
sion, for some now unknown reason, the Emperor Honorius published an edict in 410 ordering that no one henceforth be obliged to embrace Christianity against his own will. The Donatists took this as a sign of approval and began to resume their way of life. Whereupon the Council of Carthage convened in the same year and sent four delegates asking Honorius to convokve a conference at Carthage to again try the case between the Catholics and the Donatists. This was done and in 411, under the presidency of the tribune Marcellinus, there assembled 286 Catholic bishops and 279 Donatist bishops. Six were chosen to plead for each party, Augustine being the leader of the Catholic disputants. After hearing the debate Marcellinus decided in favor of the Catholics on all points, and Honorius confirmed this decision. Marcellinus was afterward murdered by the Donatists who were deeply chagrined by their defeat.

The renewed force which the civil authorities employed to bring about unity after the Council of Carthage caused large numbers to abandon Donatism. There were however a few die-hards who were at last threatened by the tribune to give up their Church or suffer exile or death. At this a Donatist bishop named Gaudentius resolved to burn himself alive in his church with his adherents rather than submit. St. Augustine wrote him a letter striving to bring him around to better sentiments, and in his work Contra Gaudentium marshalled up the arguments supporting the idea of civil intervention to suppress heresy. The saint interpreta Our Lord's parable of the marriage feast
as applying to this case. The king is Christ; the servants are
the Church; the first invited who did not come are the Jews; the
poor, the blind, and the lame are the nations; those who are
compelled to come in are the heretics and schismatics. So it is
Christ's command compelle intrare that is followed in the force-
able repression of heresy. This final argument of St. August-
ine's is the most definite and categorical that he had used.

In conclusion, then, we can say that St. Augustine had pro-
gressed in his thought from a position unfavorable to state in-
tervention in the repression of heresy, to a position which
distinctly advocated the use of force to bring dissidents to
the "unity of Jesus Christ". But we must also note that in
practice Augustine was mild and conciliatory, and was against
the infliction of death on the heretics who were guilty of no
other offense. Furthermore in speaking about St. Augustine's
theory of civil intervention to preserve the unity of the Faith,
it is important to remark that the great majority of citizens
of the Roman Empire in the fourth and fifth centuries were Cath-
olics, so that there was a unity to be preserved. And also the
state was Christian and had the true faith officially, so that
it was in a position to oppose falsehood. And finally Augustine
though he does justify force, used it more as a threat than in
actual application. However in my opinion much of the effort
made at extenuating St. Augustine's doctrine on civil repressio
is made in deference to modern opinion, and not necessarily be-
cause there is anything fundamentally wrong with the doctrine.
Notes: Chapter VII.

1 Plato, Laws IV, 717.
2 Plato, Republic IV, 427.
3 Matt. XXII, 21.
4 St. Ambrose, Epistola XIII.
   "Cum enim constemus ex anima et corpore, et quamdiu in
hac vita temporali sumus, etiam rebus temporalibus ad sub-
sidium degendae hujus vitae utamur; oportet nos ex ea parte,
qua ad hanc vitam pertinet subditos esse potestatibis, id
est, hominibus res humanas cum aliquo honore administranti-
bus. Ex illa vero parte qua credimus Deo, et in regnum ejus
vocamur, non nos oportet esse subditos cuiquam homini."
6 Augustine shows the contrast between the physical power of
the state and the spiritual power of the Church by comparing
the violence offered the state by armed forces, to the vio-
lence offered the Church by heresy. Both tend to destroy
members but in different ways.
   "Veloces pedes autem ad effundendam sanguinem, etiam
Maximianistas habere dixistis...Intellexisit ergo etiam
spirituali caede animarum sanguinem fundi gladio schismatis,
quod in Maximianio damnastis."
7 St. Augustine, Breviculus Collationes cum Donatistis 16, P.L.
   43, 632.
   "Debeat evigilare ecclesiastica disciplina, ad eos
(e.e., malos) non sohun verbis sed etiam excommunicationibus
et degradnationibus corripiendos."
8 St. Augustine, De Utilitate Credendi XVI, 34-5, P.L. 42, 90.
9 cf. Breviculus Col. cum Don. 16.
10 Pope Pius XI, Encyclical on the Christian Education of Youth,
12 St. Augustine, Expositio Quarumdam Propositionum ex Epist. ad

"Si quis ergo putat quoniam Christianus est, non sibi esse veltigal reddendum, aut tributum, aut non esse exhibendum honorem debitum eis quae haec curant potestatibus, in magno errore versatur. Item si quis sic se putat esse sub- dendum, ut etiam in suam fidem habere potestatem arbitretur eum qui temporalibus administrandis aliqua sublimitate prae-cellit; in majorem errore labitur. Sed modus iste servandum est, quem Dominus ipse praescribit, ut reddamus Caesari quae Caesaris sunt, et Deo quae dei sunt (Matt. XXII, 21)."

13 City of God XIX, 17.

14 St. Augustine, Enarratio in Ps. CXVIII, XXXI, 1, P.L. 37, 1591

"Quid ergo eos Christiani opprinderunt? quod debitum non rediderunt? in quo Christiani non sunt terrenis regibus obsecuti? Ergo terreni reges Christianos gratis persecuti sunt."

15 Enarratio in Ps. CXXIV, 7, P.L. 37, 1654.

"Aliquando enim potestates bonae sunt, et timent Deum; aliquando non timent Deum, Julianus exstitit infidelis imperator, exstita apostata, iniquus, idololatra: milites Christi, non agnoscebant nisi illum qui in coelo erat. Si quando volebat ut idola colorunt, ut thurificarent; praepon-ebant illi Deum: quando autem dicebat, perducite aciem, ite contra illam gentem: statim obtemperabant. Distinguebant dominum aeternum a domino temporali; et temen subditi erant propter dominum aeternum, etiam domino temporali."

16 ibid. 47, 5, P.L. 36, 536.

17 City of God XIX, 17.

18 De Moribus Ecclesiae I, 46, P.L. 32, 1331.

19 Epistola 138, 15, P.L. 33, 531.

20 De Moribus Ecclesiae I, 49, PLL. 32, 1332.

"Ex hoc nascuntur officia societatis homanae."

21 ibid. I, 63, P.L. 32. 1336.

22 Epistola 185, 36, P.L. 33, 810.

23 Sermo 176, 2, P.L. 38, 950.

24 Sermo 302, 19, P.L. 38, 1392.

25 ibid.

26 City of God V, 24.
27 Epistola, 155, 10, P.L. 33, 670-1.
28 I Cor. IX, 11.
29 Sermo 46, 6, P.L. 38, 273.
31 Enarratio in Ps. 146, 17, P.L. 37, 1911.
33 Epistola, 102, 19, P.L. 33, 378.
   "Unde satis intelligi potest, non tam ipsam immolationem (nam vero Deo prisci sancti immolaverunt), sed quod diis falsis et impiis daemoniis immolatur, reprehendi a vera religione in superstitionibus gentium.
34 Sermo 62, 18, P.L. 38, 423.
35 City of God II, 22.
36 Sermo 62, 17, P.L. 38, 423.
37 Retractations II, 43.
38 City of God II, 12.
39 ibid. II, 14.
40 ibid. II, 27.
41 Deut. XIII, 9.
42 Plato, Laws IX, 2.
43 Acts XVII, 23.
44 Possidius, Vita S. Augustini 6.
45 St. Augustine, Epistola 23, 2, P.L. 33, 45.
   "Quaerebam sane occasione loquentem, ut si fieri possit, ea quae parva remanerat inter nos dissensio toleretur; cum ecce ante paucos dies diaconium nostrum Mutugennensem te rebaptizasse nuntiatum est."
46 (cf. Epistolae, 33, 43, 44, etc.)
47 Epistola 51, 1, P.L. 33, 192.
48 Contra Epistola Parmeniani I, 13, P.L. 43, 43.
"Sese audeant cum mali aliiquid patiuntur, veritatis martyrea dicere. Alioquin si quisquis ab imperatore vel ab aedilicibus ab eo missis poenas suit, continuo martyr est, omnes carceres martyribus pleni sunt..."

49 ibid. I, 15.

50 ibid. I, 13.

51 Rom. XIII, 4.


53 Contra Epistola Parmeniani I, 16, P.L. 43, 45.

54 ibid. II, 184, P.L. 43, 317.

"Petil. dixit: Dicit enim Dominus Christus, "Nemo venit ad me, nisi quem Pater attraxerit (Jno. VI, 44). Cur autem vos non liberum arbitrium uniciue sequi permittistis, cum ipse Dominus Deus liberum arbitrium dederit hominibus..."

Aug. respondit: Si tibi proponam quaestionem, quomodo Deus Pater attrahat ad Filium homines, quos in libero dimisit arbitrio, fortassis eam difficile soluturus es. Quamodo enim attrahit, si dimittit ut quis quod voluerit eligat?"

55 ibid.

56 Contra Cresconium 57, P.L. 43, 527.

57 Epistola 98, 7, P.L. 33, 363.

58 Epistola 86, 1, P.L. 33, 296.

59 Epistola 93, 17, P.L. 33, 330.

"His ergo exemplis a colegis meis mihi propositis cessi. Nam mea primitus sententia non erat, nisi neminem ad unitatem Christi esse cogendum; verbo esse agendum, disputazione pugnandum, ratione vincendum, ne fictos catholicos haberemus, quos apertos haereticos noveramus. Sed haec opinio mea, non contradicentium verbis, sed demonstrantium superabatur exemplis. Nam primo mihi opponebatur civitas mea, quae cum tota esset in parte Donati, ad unitatem catholicam timore legum imperialium conversa est..."

60 ibid.

61 cf. Epistolae 93, 105, 118 etc.

62 Epistola 100, 2, P.L. 33, 366.

63 Epist. 204. 64 Contra Gaudentium I, XXV, 28, P.L.43
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