The Concept of Value in Contemporary British and American Non-Scholastic Philosophy

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THE CONCEPT OF VALUE
IN
CONTEMPORARY BRITISH AND AMERICAN
NON-SCHOLASTIC PHILOSOPHY

by
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VITA AUCTORIS

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CHAPTER I

VALUE, THE GREATEST PROBLEM OF MODERN PHILOSOPHY

The first question that the thinking man desires answered about any subject which he may be inclined to investigate is whether his efforts are going to be worthwhile. With regard to the problem of value theory, Doctor Fulton Sheen assures us that there is no danger of exaggerating the place which it holds in the world today. Wilbur M. Urban, an outstanding non-Scholastic valuist, also remarks upon the shift in modern metaphysics from the study of being to that of value. Even more important, however, has been the shift from the theory of knowledge to the theory of value. "Value", which but a few decades ago would have suggested nothing more than a term in economics, is now perhaps the most essential feature of non-Scholastic philosophy. There is no field to which its influence does not extend, and its effects have been everywhere tremendous.

But in no other instance has this influence been so conspicuous as in the field of religion. Here, as we shall see in Chapter VII, its consequences have been of the highest import and have affected the ethical beliefs of our age to their deepest foundations. Religion for the modern theorist is no longer the humble recognition and service of a Supreme Creator and Lawgiver Who mercifully provides for His creatures,
but is now "a faith in the conservation of values". By "faith", however, the modern philosophers do not intend the theological virtue which is the foundation of all supernatural religion, but rather a vague emotional confidence or sentimental opinion. This modern attitude towards God is perhaps the most cogent argument for studying the philosophy of value, since it vitally affects the most important concern of our race.

Our purpose in this thesis is not to discuss all or even many of the various levels in the scale of values, but rather to confine our treatment to the analysis of the fundamental concept of value. Moreover, it will be necessary to limit our discussion to the leading British and American exponents of the theory of value, since an attempt to include a discussion of equivalent continental doctrines would make our work too discursive. Our method of procedure, therefore, will be as follows: first, to present in digest a non-committal exposition of the non-Scholastic theory; secondly, to explain the Scholastic doctrine on value; thirdly, to criticize the scientific and metaphysical origins of non-Scholastic theory in the light of Thomistic principles; fourthly, in the light of these same principles to point out certain inconsistencies and fallacious conclusions of the non-Scholastic theory; and fifthly, by applying the doctrine of non-Scholastic philosophy to another science, namely that of re-
ligion, to show that its consequences are unacceptable and contrary to the evidence of objective reality. Last of all, we shall offer some suggestions concerning the prospective outcome of this all-important problem of value.
FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER I


2. W. M. Urban, "Value Theory and Esthetics", Philosophy Today, p. 54


4. The term "value" has long been employed in economics in several definite senses, as for instance, exchange value, marginal value, price value, etc. For a complete discussion of the economic uses of the term, cf. E. J. Burke, Political Economy, pp. 37-44.
   The fundamental definition of economic value proposed in these pages - namely, "the desirability of the economic utility of an object" - is but a particular application of the general idea of value that this thesis aims to defend.

5. For the effect of subjective value theory on various fields, cf.
   on art: F. J. Sheen, Religion Without God, pp. 263-269 - impressionism and the cult of the indistinct
   on economics: L. R. Ward, Values and Reality, Chapter XIII, "The Value of Money"
   on psychology: R. B. Perry, General Theory of Value - "interest" and motor-affective states of being
   on science: Cf. Footnote 2 to Chap. IV of this thesis
   on sociology: R. W. Sellars, Principles and Problems of Philosophy, pp. 383-490 - Society as value

6. A. Hoffding, Philosophy of religion, p. 6, as quoted by F. J. Sheen, Religion Without God, p. 64
CHAPTER II

DOCTRINES OF THE LEADING BRITISH AND AMERICAN NON-SCHOLASTIC VALUE THEORISTS

The purpose of this chapter is to give a brief, uncritical exposition of the doctrines of the leading British and American non-Scholastic value theorists. I say "uncritical", because we cannot properly evaluate the non-Scholastic theories, until we have discovered some sound norms of criticism in the Scholastic position. Perhaps, the order which is used in arranging these modern theories, may be regarded as a kind of criticism. Without order, however, it would be impossible to make any progress at all. And in this matter order is especially important, since the lack of it is one of the chief difficulties of the non-Scholastic position today. It is a lack so conspicuous that the analysis of the value theory has justly been called a study in confusion. For instance, many of the moderns do not distinguish between value and values and talk of intermediate and secondary values as if these were fundamental. Some of them even go so far as to hold or seem to hold contradictory opinions, which cannot be reconciled if taken literally.

Since we must find some basis of division, the best way of doing this seems to be to consider the facts of the value situation and to draw up our categories according to
them. In the act of valuing, three elemental facts appear to stand out most prominently - the subject who values, the object that is valued, and the relation between them. Therefore, classifying the modern non-Scholastics according to the element wherein they make value reside, we have: the subjective school, which places value primarily in the valuing subject; the relational school, which places it in the relation between, the subject and its object; and the objective school, which places it in the object itself. This last group must be again subdivided into those who mean objective in a sense akin to that accepted by scholasticism and those who either mean subjective or say something that is altogether impossible.

A - Subjective School

1. Ralph Barton Perry

We shall take Dr. Perry as the first and chief representative of the subjective school in America, since he has written so much on the subject of value theory and has enjoyed great influence among his fellow philosophers. His outstanding importance is also demonstrated by the fact that it is his doctrine which is the main object of attack by the leading English-speaking Catholic philosophers in this field.

In his earlier days, Mr. Perry preferred "desire" as the keystone to his theory of value, but about 1914 changed
over to "interest" as the central fact. He tells us that the first problem of value theory is to define the term "value", which he does as follows:

"Value in the generic sense has to do with a certain constant which we may call bias or interest. Value consists in the fulfillment of interest."

It is worth noting that he here uses the words "has to do with a certain constant". These words as yet do not make clear whether "bias or interest" is value or merely has to do with value. In the next sentence the verb "consists" leaves further room for doubt as to just what value really is.

But if his earlier definition of value was tantalizingly vague, Mr. Perry twelve years later clarifies the issue by taking the following definite stand:

"It is to this all-pervasive characteristic of the motor-affective life, this state, act, attitude or disposition of favor or disfavor, to which we propose to give the name of interest. This, then, we take to be the original source and constant feature of all value. That which is an object of interest is invested with value. Any object, whatever it be, acquires value when any interest, whatever it be, is taken in it. In other words, Aristotle was fundamentally mistaken when he said, that a thing's 'apparent good' makes it an object of appetite, so its real good makes it the object of 'rational desire'. By the same token, Spinoza was fundamentally correct when he said that 'in no case do we strive for, wish for, long for, or desire anything because we deem it to be good, but on the other hand we deem a thing to be good because we strive for it.'"

In this quotation are contained the chief features of Mr. Perry's doctrine: its subjective and psychological character, its emphasis on interest or motor-affective atti-
tude as the central fact of all value theory, and its disagreeement with the Scholastic position on good. Elsewhere he also insists in opposition to G. E. Moore that goodness is not an indefinable quality independent of consciousness and explicitly states that there is nothing so precious that its value would not disappear if all needs, likings, and aspirations were extinguished. Moreover, he objects to the old narrow triumvirate of the Scholastics and wishes to substitute "an elastic polytheism for the conventional trinitarianism of the worshippers of the true, the beautiful, and the good," yet, on the same page he tells us that "attitudes of liking and disliking" is a sufficiently broad term to replace the old categories.

In a remarkable part of the General Theory of Value (pages 115-124), Mr. Perry seems to take three different stands on the location of value. He states first, that value is "any object of interest" or "that special characteristic" of the object in which interest is taken; secondly, that value is "the peculiar relation" between subject and object; and thirdly, that valuing is value itself. Passages from these pages could well classify him as subjective, relational, or objective, but assuredly it is difficult to place him in all three simultaneously, unless the term "value" is so broad in his philosophy as to be of little use. However, from the passage previously quoted and from the further discussion of
interest in Chapter VI, we see that Mr. Perry is definitely committed to the psychological and subjective interpretation of value.

While Mr. Perry insists on "interest" as the central fact of value theory, yet he also maintains that its ultimate goal is sociality. "If the fulfillment of one interest is good, the fulfillment of two is better; and the fulfillment of all interests is best." And again he urges us to "cultivate that kind of will that is qualified to bring harmony through its universal adoption". In this social aspect of value, Mr. Perry finds many modern sympathizers, among whom may be mentioned Alexander, Sellars, and Prall.

Lastly, in his treatment of God as a value, Mr. Perry tells us that to "conceive God as a person is both to confuse the meaning of personality and to deny God the right to be Himself", and again that God is a "norm of legitimate aspiration", but not an attained fact. For him, God is a being far exceeding and surpassing man, yet dependent on man's moral effort. As a justification for this finite god, Mr. Perry advances the problem of evil; he prefers a limited deity rather than an infinite God connected with sin and misery.

2. John S. Mackenzie

As typical of those British value theorists who emphasize the subjective character of the problem, let us take
John S. Mackenzie of Cardiff University. Moreover, some of his statements, if considered separately, would offer little grounds for criticism. It is from the aggregate and also from certain sufficiently definite passages that we must classify him.

In his *ultimate Values* Mr. Mackenzie asserts that the central problem of value theory is to answer the question: what is man's chief end? His reply follows a few chapters later, when he informs us:

"The universe may be created by the desire for the Supreme Value, rather than by the propulsion of a supreme Force; and, in this sense, Prof. Alexander may be right in thinking of Deity as at the end, rather than as at the beginning of the cosmic process."

Later on in this same book he assigns the creation and the enjoyment of beauty the only ultimate value. Thus for him value theory shows man as creating and sustaining the deity and the whole universe as well. So much for his idea of God.

But what does Mr. Mackenzie say of value itself? He tells us that "values are primarily felt", that value is "a much more fluid and adaptable expression that good", that value is synonymous with good and truth, but more comprehensive. In a later chapter he takes a definite stand in favor of the subjective interpretation of value. For "it does not seem possible to rest in any purely objective end without some reference to the way in which we are affected by it... we cannot regard anything as intrinsically valuable which we do
not like, or which we cannot bring ourselves to like". And a little earlier he remarks that "not only do things have value, but we value them; and thus we see that there is both a subjective and an objective aspect in the ascription of value".  

If we take a broad view of these last sentences, we may not find a great deal to censure; it is only from the general spirit of his works that we can be fully sure where Mr. Mackenzie stands. Possibly, this situation arises from his very free use of the term "value". For instance, he uses it throughout his Ultimate Values as a substitute for "good, true, end, ideal, motive, subject, object" and like philosophical terms. Such a broad view, of course, does not help to clarify his doctrine.

B - Relational School

1. Samuel A. Alexander

Far fewer than the subjectivists are those philosophers who regard value as residing primarily in the relation between subject and object. Of these the most conspicuous advocate is Prof. S. A. Alexander of Manchester University, who leaves no doubt in our minds as to his opinion.

"In every value", he assures us, "there are two sides, the subject of valuation and the object of value, and the value resides in the relation between the two, and does not exist apart from them. The combination of the subject and the thing which is valued is a fresh reality which is implied in the attribution of value to either. Value as a
'quality' belongs to this compound and valuable things, truths, moral goods, works of beauty, are valuable derivatively from it." 19

In this same section, he also ascribes derivative value to the subject, and then puzzles us by adding (strangely enough!) that this "subjective value so far as it is value implies the existence of objective which is really the only value".20 Of the same tone seems to be an earlier passage, wherein he admits that the object is independent of the mind, but the mind dependent on it.21 However, the purport of these two references to objectivity seems to be that the object exists, though not in a valuable state, previous to the relation of value. For elsewhere Mr. Alexander holds that "the value of the object, its coherence, is not something which is already in the things themselves, but is born along with the act of appreciation... belongs to the object insofar as the valuing subject appreciates it.... as it is possessed by the mind and not outside that relation."22

Of great importance to Mr. Alexander's theory is the sociological character of value, which involves a relation to the collective or standard mind.23 For him value is only the efficiency of a conscious agent to promote the efficiency of society.24 It is "the other or distinctive feature" that is not merely typical, but intrinsically social.

Mr. Alexander's value theory reaches its culmination in his concept of God, which he sets forth at length in his
voluminous Space, Time and Deity. For him valuation at its emergent tip-top is deity, which is "the outcome of the world's movement and in particular, to the extent of their value, of the efforts of human beings". Deity is "in the strictest sense not a creator, but a creature", which must be helped and sustained by the labor of man. Deity, however, must be distinguished from God, who, insofar as he exists (and it is doubtful whether he exists), is the nisus towards deity. At any event this god of Alexander is the result, not the beginning of man's activities; it is finite, emergent, and the product of our valuing.

2. Roy Wood Sellars

The chief exponent of the relational theory of value in America is Dr. Roy Wood Sellars of Michigan. Though he has not written much on the subject, he makes his position clear by endorsing S. A. Alexander's theory in all its fundamental issues. However, he acknowledges that there is something to be said for John Laird's objective view, and admits that it is essentially correct at the level of practical perception, by which Dr. Sellars seems to mean immediate, as opposed to reflex cognition. But on the other hand he is "convinced that reflection forces us later to distinguish between value meanings and the terms of a cognitional type by which we think the nature of the object." This distinction of judgments so as to have a
special emotional class for those pertaining to value is characteristic of most subjective and relational value theorists. Following Mr. Alexander in his attitude towards deity, Mr. Sellars asserts that there can be no absolute eternal standards. He is also very fond of the sociological aspect of value, assuring us that it is society which creates the real values.

C - Objective Schools

The objective school of value theorists must be divided sharply into those who hold a doctrine more or less akin to the Scholastic concept of value and those who, although insisting that value resides in the object, nevertheless explain the facts of experience in such a way as to render them impossible. We shall first consider the most outstanding exponent of this latter class.

1. Wilbur M. Urban

Perhaps after Mr. Perry, Dr. Urban of Dartmouth has of all Americans written the most on this question of value. He has been publishing works on the subject for more than thirty years. In his earlier work, he holds for a comparatively sound objectivity, a position which he later relinquishes. In Valuation, Its Nature and Laws (1909), he describes value as residing in the object as "its funded meaning, its desirability, its
capacity under certain conditions of calling our desire", and he emphasizes this view by repeating it several times. Certainly, this opinion is fundamentally sound. Yet even at this time he shows the beginnings of his later difficulties, for he cannot agree with Meinong that value presupposes the existing object or that feeling of value follows the judgment of existence. However, in this same section, he seems to concede the very point which he finds so inacceptable, when he admits that "there must be the presumption of reality, for without it there can be no attitude towards the object."

Seven years later (1916), we find him with his doctrine of the objectivity of value much more definitely formulated. Here he points out that "value is a wholly unique and irreducible form of objectivity, lying between being and non-being, but itself not a form of being." He admits that such a form of objectivity will involve a new relation, the nature of which is not clear, but he insists that this does not matter very much. He argues in the following apologetic manner:

"It is, to be sure, extremely difficult to hold fast to this conception of value as pure, as a unique form of objectivity, containing no element of being. It is contrary to our own ways of thinking. As we find reality intolera-ble without raising it to the sphere of value, so do we find form of being. Out of this way of thinking arise all the confusion which furnished the starting point of our study and the consideration of which will occupy us in the sequel." Unfortunately, it seems that the confusion which he fears so much never escapes him.
For in a later article of the same year he assures us that value is not a determinant of being, nor existence a necessary presupposition of value. And in his recent work (1926), Mr. Urban is still of the same opinion about value as a unique form of objectivity and finds himself forced to deny value the right to be an objective quality of being.

However strange and untenable his own doctrine of objectivity may be, we find him strongly opposed to the subjective and relational views, which he informs us, are a confusion in terms. Like so many other modern non-Scholastics, Mr. Urban lays great store by the anti-intellectual or affective perception of value, which lies "beyond the ken of knowledge and science," and maintains that "worth experience in its entirety corresponds to a larger world of reality than the limited regions of existence and truth." Though this last quotation might lead one to believe that Mr. Urban is here drawing a nice distinction between being as being and being as good, the general trend of his doctrine scarcely warrants such a favorable interpretation. Unlike others of the moderns, he does not develop a concept of deity, but rather ignores the issue, preferring only to consider value in its more immediate aspect of unique form of objectivity which is not to be confused with existence.
John Laird

Not all, however, of the modern non-Scholastics are for the most part at variance with the Aristolelian concept of good and its modern equivalent value. Especially in Great Britain do we find some whose exposition of value theory places the emphasis on the priority of the object. Of these sound objectivists John Laird stands out preeminent because of his recent work in this field. First of all, he goes to great pains to point out the weakness of the subjective position, especially as it is set forth by Perry and Prall in their motor-affective theory, and also of the pseudo-objective position assumed by W. M. Urban. Moreover, he attacks the modern trend to emphasize the sociality of value to the exclusion of an understanding of its fundamental objective or ontological nature.

But Mr. Laird's work on value theory is not merely negative. Indeed, he sets forth his positive doctrine in very clear terms, assuring us that the "object of excellence" must be the kernel of value theory. Those who reject this view, he informs us, do so either on the assumption that value is purely subjective or on the subsumption of a quasi-objective reality "in order to account for the obstinate and undeniable appearance of objectivity in so many human valuations." His own doctrine he calls the timological theory and maintains
that it cannot be denied without falsifying the evidence of experience.\textsuperscript{48}

3. Dean Inge and Canon O. C. Quick

We shall consider these two English clergymen merely to see that at least among their class a sound opinion of objectivity still seems to linger. Mr. Quick in a brief, but eminently satisfactory article shows that subjective states cannot be the cause of objective existence. Moreover, he cannot understand any distinction between logical judgments and judgments of value. For him all value ceases the moment reality is denied or tampered with, since reality is the only foundation of all value.\textsuperscript{49}

Dean Inge is also of similar opinion, assuring us that any judgment which is not based on existence is quite "in the air". He accurately observes that existence itself is a value, and indeed the most fundamental value, without which all other values would be meaningless.\textsuperscript{50}

4. A. P. Brogan

Returning to the United States, we find at least a few value theorists who accept the normal objective position. At various times Dr. Brogan of Texas University has advanced a doctrine which has many admirable features, of which the most characteristic is its insistence on "betterness" as the univer-
sal value fundamental. By this he means that in every act of valuing there arises a triadic relation of facts wherein one objective value is preferred as better to the other. Whether or not this position can be successfully maintained for all acts of valuing, it certainly must be admitted that the doctrine is strongly objective in the sound sense.

Moreover, Dr. Brogan, in anticipation of the difficulties of some adversaries, shows how even conceptual objects - i.e., those whose existence has not yet been actualized - have nevertheless a foundation in objective fact. He strongly assails the subjective or "definitional" view, which he calls a disguise for feeling, and the pseudo-objective or transcendental view of W. M. Urban, which would place value beyond the realm of experience. He also attacks the modern tendency to distinguish between value judgments and judgments about other things, maintaining that such a distinction is purely gratuitous. "Moreover", he continues, "value judgments logically presuppose judgments about existence or non-existence." His conclusion as to the future value theory is that the old treatment of the problem must be abandoned - i.e., modern philosophy cannot expect solid results so long as it distinguishes between logical and value judgments and sets value over against existence.

John Dewey of Columbia University may be included here in connection with Dr. Brogan, chiefly because he wants to go
on record as endorsing the value theory propounded by that eminent professor from Texas. Mr. Dewey himself does not offer us anything original on the subject. His own remarks on value, scattered throughout various philosophical journals and occasionally introduced into his larger works, are not profound and are sometimes inconsistent with his adhesion to Mr. Brogan's view. Take, for example, his opposing the realm of values to that of reality. This is certainly a strange remark to come from a man holding the sound objective view; perhaps it should be overlooked in virtue of his endorsement of Mr. Brogan's theory. On the other hand, Mr. Dewey repeatedly assails the motor-affective attitude of Perry and Prall as an "unintelligible stand", since liking or disliking, he assures us, cannot constitute existence.

Summary

Many more value theorists could be discussed, especially among those who hold the subjective view; but this is not necessary. By this time we have considered enough representatives of each school to get a general impression of their doctrines. Whenever it was possible, these three points were particularly noted: the definition of value (or some equivalent description), the attitude towards the value situation, and the resulting opinion as to the nature of God. Leaving this non-Scholastic theory for the time, we now pass over to
the Thomistic doctrine on value.
FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER II


2. Loc. cit.

3. R. B. Perry, General Theory of Value, p. 115

4. R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, pp. 331-3


6. R. B. Perry, Present Philosophical Tendencies, p. 334

7. R. B. Perry, General Theory of Value, p. 682

8. Ibid., p. 686

9. Ibid., p. 689

10. Ibid., p. 690

11. J. S. Mackenzie, Ultimate Values, p. 25

12. Ibid., p. 52

13. Ibid., p. 141

14. J. S. Mackenzie, Elements of Constructive Philosophy, pp. 61, 178

15. J. S. Mackenzie, Ultimate Values, p. 95

16. Ibid., pp., 15-58

17. Ibid., pp., 125-6

18. Ibid., p. 95

19. S. A. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, II, p. 302

20. Ibid. p. 303

21. Ibid., p. 105

22. Ibid. p. 243
23. Ibid., p. 240-1
25. S. A. Alexander, Space, Time, and Deity, II, p. 399
27. Ibid., p. 353
28. Alexander's idea of deity and God is very involved and confusing, cf.
   L. R. Ward, Philosophy of Value, pp. 84-87
   F. J. Sheen, Religion Without God, pp. 14-19,
   256-257, 285-286, 295
   F. J. Sheen, God and Intelligence, pp. 51-55 (best treatment)
29. R. W. Sellars, Principles and Problems of Philosophy, p. 449
30. Ibid., p. 443
   cf. also R. W. Sellars, "Cognition and Valuation",
   Philosophical Review, XXXV (1926) p. 139, wherein
   he discusses the various levels of knowledge
32. R. W. Sellars, op. cit., p. 464
33. R. W. Sellars, Introduction to English translation of
   Bougle's Evolution of Values, p. XXXV
35. Ibid., p. 38
36. Ibid. p. 47
37. W. M. Urban, "Values and Existence", The Journal of Philos-
   ophy, XIII (1916), p. 464
38. Loc. cit.
   cit. p. 687
40. W. M. Urban, "Value, Logic and Reality", Proceedings of the
   Sixth International Congress of Philosophy (1926), p. 287
41. Ibid., p. 290
43. Ibid., p. 427
44. J. Laird, *The Idea of Value*, pp. 103-8 and 308-11
45. Ibid., p. 310
46. Ibid., p. 252
47. Loc. cit.
48. Ibid. p. 321
50. Dean Inge, *Outspoken Essays*, p. 271
53. Loc. cit.
54. Ibid., p. 398
55. Ibid., p. 314
CHAPTER III
THE SCHOLASTIC DOCTRINE OF VALUE

Our present task is to consider the Scholastic theory of value. This view, we shall see, has always been on the objective side of W. M. Urban's "great divide" between subjectivism and objectivism. Plato, Aristotle, Boethius, St. Thomas and their whole tradition stand definitely against value or the valuing subject as conferring reality, and hold instead that reality gives the value, because reality is the value. The first philosopher in this tradition was the most taken up with this problem. Aristotle, on the other hand, treated the question only fragmentarily and did not differ essentially from his predecessor. Nine centuries later, Boethius first advanced a fusion of both these ancient views in the medieval doctrine of the transcendentalis. As usual, however, it is to St. Thomas that we must turn for the finest expression of this doctrine wherein truth, being, and good are held to be strictly inseparable, except in thought.

St. Thomas' interest in the question of good and evil - i. e., of value and disvalue - was not merely one of speculation, but very practical also, since certain heresies of his own day demanded definite refutation. Albigensianism - a sect which flourished throughout Southern France and its neighboring countries in the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries - was
a doctrine of non-values, a complete denial and militant rejection of all that optimism, that proper valuation of the universe which characterizes the Catholic tradition, and which was brought to full flower in the Scholastic philosophy of that age. Against this heresy, St. Thomas offers us a satisfactory refutation and an adequate positive doctrine to supplant it. This doctrine so well formulated by the Angelic Doctor has remained the favorite opinion with modern Scholastics, and is most extensively employed by them in their studies of contemporary non-Scholastic philosophers.

So much for the history of the Scholastic view; let us now direct our attention to its content.

A Posteriori Interpretation of Facts of External Reality

The Scholastic method has always been to start with objective existence, and, if possible, to evolve a satisfactory explanation of it. This is to say, Scholasticism is a system based on the facts of external reality, and committed to a posteriori inquiry. It is not a preconceived mold into which facts are poured, or a philosophy which seeks understanding at the expense of objective existence.

What, then, are the irreducible elements of experience, those facts which are the most fundamental in any process of valuing? In that act wherein the subject acquires an object, whether it be an act of cognition, affection, appetition, or
the natural harmonious sequence of all three, these three irreducible elements - Subject, object, and the relation between them - are always present. The question then immediately presents itself: how are these three fundamental facts ordered among themselves? Is the object or the subject prior? And of what nature is the relation between them? The answer to the first question gives us the Scholastic doctrine of objective existence; and that to the second question, the Thomistic theory on the relation of knowledge and valuing to its object.

Priority of Objective Being

For St. Thomas objective being is the first fact and therefore the principle of all knowledge and appetition. For him the object acquired is at least logically prior to the subject. He says: "existent being is the proper object of the intellect"; and again: "that is logically prior which first falls under the observation of the intellect. But the first thing to fall under the observation of the intellect is being, because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it actually exists". In maintaining the priority of objective being, St. Thomas is in perfect accord with the doctrine of Aristotle who unmistakably declares that "the first of created things is existence". In other words, the object must be, before we can know or desire it.

This objective stand of the Scholastics is fundamental
to all sound philosophy and science and is in complete harmony with the facts of everyday life. Those who question the objectivity of knowledge must ultimately return to scepticism. And although space does not permit us to consider the epistemological problem further, it is sufficient to say that nobody can question the priority of being without contradicting himself.

And yet, there is a certain kind of existence which the thinking subject seems to create, which appears to be the product of his mind rather than the object of discovery. There are some things that do not actually exist except in the mind, those things which the subject fabricates for himself without any actual previous contact with external reality. Such conceptual objects have led not a few of our adversaries to argue that at least on this type of being the subject confers value, and endows them with reality. However, thinking or valuing does not make being, but presupposes it. Everyday experience shows us that our thoughts and desires do not shape reality, but, rather, reality shapes us. Now the conceptual being which has caused considerable confusion to some of our adversaries, is none the less founded on objective reality prior to the thought of it. Unless the subject had previously known other objects with characteristics capable of being assembled into a new, compatible, though not yet actually existing, object, then the idea would have no value. The mere fact that the
conceived being does not yet actually exist, is not of great importance. What matters very much is that unless there were other beings previously known by the subject, he could never have conceived this thing as possible.

So far it is clear that being stands first in the order of the three irreducible elements of the valuing process: object, subject, and the relation between them. What, now, is to be said of the second member - namely, the subject? Whether there can be value without a subject, we shall see a little later; but most assuredly without a subject value could not be known.11

Priority of Knowledge Over Desire

The first characteristic of the valuing subject is the fact that its primary action with regard to the valued object or the valuable is not one of affection or seeking, but of thinking. St. Thomas unmistakably informs us that "the intellect first apprehends being, then understands it, and thirdly desires it"; and again: "Knowledge naturally precedes appetite, for truth is more closely attached to being than the good".12,13 In other words, nothing can be sought before it is known. Thought goes before the deliveration of the will and before fulfillment; and the more an action is illumined by the light of thought, the more voluntary and more free it becomes. This Thomistic stand on the priority of knowledge over appetite is
in direct opposition to the theories of those very numerous value philosophers who hold valuing to be a non-mental process, a product of feeling rather than of intellect. The Scholastics cannot understand any merely blind desire of being; for of what value is an object that is not known to be of value? When our adversaries make the affections cognize value, they are merely transferring the work of the intellect to another faculty without justifying the substitution.

Nature of Relation Between Knowing Subject and Its Object

With the establishment of the priority of objective being over the valuing subject, the question at once presents itself as to what is the relation between them. In his answer St. Thomas again differs from the majority of moderns, when he teaches that the real dependence is on the part of the subject and not of the object. He says: "The real dependence is of that which is pointed at the end;" and elsewhere he amplifies this same idea, observing that "the apprehended appetible object moves, but is not moved; the appetite moves and is moved". Such an order of dependence and independence reveals a relation of the mixed variety, real on the part of the subject, logical on the part of the object. Thus St. Thomas clearly indicates that the object acquires nothing intrinsic when the subject values it, but at the most gains a conceptual
something.

Our discussion so far shows us the object as existing first in itself and then in the mind of the valuing subject. Up to this time we have regarded the object as an indifferent thing. We must now consider it not merely abstractly, but as a cause of human action.

The most obvious fact of human life is its activity. From the first moment of his conception until his death, the human being is always acting. But the activity of a living being is not the same as that of inanimate objects. These inorganic units are capable only of transient action, which produces its effect in an exterior subject really distinct from the agent. Living beings, besides producing transient effects, are capable of the higher form of immanent activity, so-called because the change which it produces remains within the living agent. Now so fundamental a fact as immanent activity, which makes itself evident in man's every action, must have a solid explanation; and that is what we are seeking in value theory - namely, just why do men act?

When St. Thomas insists on the priority of knowledge over appetite, he does not mean to exclude the latter, but only to show its natural dependence on the former. Since man acts as a unit in pursuing these several stages of action, the entire active process has been briefly designated as one of appetition or conation. Why the appetitive rather than the
cognitive aspect of the process is given the preference in this key word to the value situation, will become clear as we proceed with our discussion. Our immediate task is to answer the question: why does an object move a man, why does he seek things which he does not now possess? In other words, our present concern is to discover the reason for human activity.

Object as the End and the Good

In the first place, if a man acts at all, he must act for an end or objective to be attained\(^\text{18}\) This is to say, he must have an adequate reason for even beginning to exert his dormant powers, since of themselves these potential forces would have no reason for passing from a state of rest to one of activity. Hence, this objective to be attained is a true cause, a real motive force which moves the agent to undertake any activity. Unless we hold that the end or objective is a true motive force which impels the agent to act, we must attribute the activity of all beings to chance.\(^\text{19}\) Such an opinion, however, cannot explain the regularity and order which is manifested in active beings. Chance may account for an occasional action, but constant repetition of the same activity in view of the same objective to be attained cannot be explained except by the inflowing of a true motive force. By "inflowing" is meant the fact that a real cause exerts its influence on the effect in virtue of some power that it possesses. What
this specific power of a final cause is, will become clear after we have discussed the nature of the object as good.

Now this end, this cause or motive force cannot move the agent towards action in general, but only towards a specific and limited action. Unless the agent is confronted with one determined objective or end, it would remain virtually paralyzed in the face of numerous possible actions. For instance, there is no such thing as "just going" without having some objective in view. Even so-called aimless walking is a movement in one definite direction and not in all directions simultaneously. The mind simply cannot conceive of a vague, purposeless motion towards any number of simultaneous objectives. It is true that in a complex agent, such as man, there may be as many motions as there are faculties. But at a given moment anyone of these faculties can be directed in only one definite line towards one definite end or objective.

Action, therefore, is at least never pointless, but is always aimed at some definite cause of action. This cause we have called end or objective to be attained, or in other words that in which the seeker finds his satisfaction, that being wherein his desire comes finally to rest.

We may now go further and observe more closely the nature of this end or objective to be attained. As is already quite clear, its most conspicuous characteristic is its desirability. Since in the Scholastic system desirability consti-
tutes the essence of good, we may therefore conclude that all action is aimed at good, or at that which is in some way desirable. Thus, the good of the object can be rightly held to be a final cause and true motive force of human activity.

The Relatively and Absolutely Good

At this point, a distinction must be made between the relative and the absolute good. Absolute goodness is that goodness which a thing has in itself; it is the degree of perfection possessed by that being. Obviously it is not this absolute aspect of things which attracts other beings, since they desire other things only insofar as they are serviceable to themselves. On this matter St. Thomas assures us that a being "would not tend towards anything unless there were some use in it for itself." Yet, there is no real difficulty in the relation of the absolute and the relative or particular good, since what in the subject is good to the subject, and therefore absolute, may be also good to another subject, and therefore relative or particular.

The Interesting and the Interested

In connection with the relative good, we may well consider the question of "interest" and its part in the value situation. The popularity which this term enjoys with subjective value theorists makes it highly important for us to
have clear notions about its various correct uses. Putting aside the economic uses of the term, such as "rate of income on investments" or the "investments themselves", we find that even in philosophy "interest" is employed in several widely ranging senses. By some psychologists "interest" is made equivalent to "attention", so that "being interested" means "giving one's attention" to something. Another interpretation would make "interest" a synonym for "concern". Thus we may say that some one has an interest in something - i.e., it is an object of concern or a good for him. In this sense interest is like the useful good (bonum utile). But by far the most common philosophical use of the term is to signify the peculiar attraction of certain objects in virtue of associated pleasurable or painful experiences in the past. Thus we may say that music is interesting to us, because we find pleasure in it. Interest in this sense is equivalent to the pleasurable good (bonum delectabile). These last two uses of the term "interest" as being either the useful or the pleasurable good may be seen clearly from the following examples. A student may have a great interest in mathematics, not because he enjoys it, but because it will be highly serviceable in his professional career. Or again, a child may take great interest in a puzzle game, not primarily because of its utility to him, but because it affords him a very pleasant pastime. Generally, both these interests will be found in the same action in vary-
The important thing for the value philosopher to bear in mind is the distinction between the objective interest and the subjective state whereby the interest is appreciated. Note well that people say that this or that object is interesting (i.e., useful or agreeable) to them. They reserve this word "interesting" for the object, and do not apply it to their desire of that object, (unless they are reflecting upon the psychological characteristics of the act, and in such an event their thoughts about that act would constitute a new interesting object). Without a clearly drawn distinction between the interesting object and the interested faculty that appreciates it, an objective theory of value is impossible.

Is modern value "the good" of St. Thomas?

Now that we have discussed the nature of the object as an end and as a good, the question presents itself as to how far the modern term "value" can be identified with the medieval concept of "the good". According to their answer to this query, modern Scholastics can be grouped into two classes: those who hold that value and good are synonymous, and those who for some reason or other are hesitant in affirming the identity, though they are not very seriously opposed to it. The outstanding representatives of the first class are the European Scholastics DeRaeymaeker, Donat, and Siwek, while in the second class may
be grouped all the American Scholastics who have written in English on the problem, such as Sheen, Bandas, Ward.

DeRaeymaeker leaves no doubt in our minds as to his stand on the question of value, for he assures us that:

"value is essentially the good, according to the Scholastic use of the term; it is reducible to being; it is a property of being, it is being insofar as it is perfective; in one word it is the good." 26

Donat in his turn is equally confident that:

"value is the same as the good, whether this be taken as the relative - i.e., convenient good, or as the absolute - i.e., perfective good...... value is not something merely subjective, but is the objective property of the thing." 27

Quite recently, Siwek has taken a similar definite stand on the identity of value and the good. "Value", he says, "is the formal note of good" and the object to which this formal note of good is referred is "the object of value". 28 He also emphasizes the objective nature of the Scholastic theory of value by insisting that "value is founded on being, because being alone can serve as a necessary complement to the perfection of another being, and because being alone can constitute a true end". 29 Moreover, he tells us that beyond all relative values, lies the absolute value, pure and simple, infinite and necessary. 30

These passages leave no room for doubt as to the attitude of the European Scholastics. They stand definitely for the identification of the modern term value with the ancient and medieval transcendental of the good.
When, on the other hand, we turn to the American authors, we discover a certain hesitancy, which one might call an almost extreme cautiousness. For example, Denis M. Gallagher, in his dissertation on Pringle Pattison's "Idea of God" observes that value is not quite the same as good, but he doesn't develop his argument farther. A more complete opinion is that of Dr. Rudolph G. Bandas, who cautions us that "the modern term 'value' is not to be considered as synonymous with 'goodness'". But here he is referring to the "bonum in se" which is "existentially independent of any value it may have for either a person or thing". Little farther on, he adds: "Value has at best an affinity with the pleasurable good (bonum delectabile) and the useful good (bonum utile) of the Scholastics". And again: "Functional value closely resembles the Thomistic concept of a dynamic bonum: 'Good', says St. Thomas, 'means that towards which appetite tends'".

Dr. Leo Ward, now of Notre Dame University, sounds the same note in his very thorough analysis of the value theory. He ably summarizes the entire discussion in the following paragraph:

"Our own present conclusion is that wherever there is action, there certainly is value.... But unmistakably, there is static value in the mere existent from the beginning, because the existent is the possible aim of action.... Functional value adds the element of being desired.... Such a view of course puts value very nearly into the category of 'good' or bonum. For value, we say, is resident within the existent always, and is functionally there when this is object or is sought. And 'good', says St. Thomas, 'is
anything' - is the thing itself - 'insofar as it can be striven for and is the end of conative action'. . . . This is to make of value a dynamic kind of good. But it is also static and can be considered from a more detached point of view. 36

In these lines is the attitude of the American Thomists accurately epitomized. Dr. Fulton Sheen more briefly sets forth the same ideas in his "Religion Without God", which, since it was in point of time prior to the other English criticisms, and since these other authors did their work at the Catholic University under Dr. Sheen, may well have been their source of inspiration. 37

Without doubt, there is a difference of attitude in the two schools of Scholastic thought, those of the Continent being very certain and explicit, and those of America being hesitant and indecisive. Possibly, the American Scholastics hope that by restricting the use of the term value to the functional good, and even then proceeding with caution, they may be able to avoid the verbal confusion in which this value study abounds. Possibly, also, they may hope to conciliate the non-Scholastic philosophers by not appearing to be too dogmatic. Whatever may be the intentions of the American Scholastics, I think that the method of the European Scholastics is the safer one, since it is expressed in such unmistakable language that it cannot be misinterpreted in favor of a relational or a subjective value theory. In reading some passages from the American authors without careful attention to the context, one
might get the latter misleading impression. Our conclusion, therefore, is that value and good, especially the relative or particular good, are to be taken as synonymous.

Value as the Capacity of An Existent to Be the End of Action

One might next inquire whether a more complete account is possible. Though the inquiry is legitimate, the answer is not easily forthcoming, since the most obvious things are often the hardest to define, and in some cases can only be described. Like being itself, value is so familiar to us that any description of it must appear more involved than the thing described. Since value is the good, then we can describe it with Aristotle as "that which all desire" and with St. Thomas as "that which is serviceable either to itself or to another". Of the modern descriptions, that by Dr. Ward is the clearest and most frequently accepted. He says:

"Value is the capacity of an existent to be the end of action. It is the character or quality of an existent on account of which character or quality the existent is or can be the end of action." 38

This description of value is a very good one, since it briefly indicates the objectivity of value and at the same time emphasizes its dynamic nature. On this point the Scholastic position differs entirely from that of the moderns, who hold that value consists in the subject's attitude and hence the real dependence is in the object.
The fact that the term value might, without violence to reality, be applied to the subject also was not unknown to that greatest of value theorists - St. Thomas, for he clearly explains the proper view as follows:

"Good exists in a thing so far as that thing is directed to the appetitie, and hence the idea of goodness passes on from the desirable thing to the desire itself so that a desire is called good if its object is good."59

In other words, good is applied primarily to the object and derivatively to the subject's attitude. Now since value is that character or quality which makes an object desirable as the end of action, we may with justice apply the term value to the attitude or desire also, provided we keep in mind how value is in the object first and in a proper sense, whereas it is in the valuing subject only derivatively, and in an amalgamous sense.

An excellent suggestion towards solving this problem of the identity of value and goodness is Dr. Ward's admirable advice, that the first important thing is not a theoretical definition of good or of value, but the correct interpretation of reality. The duty of the value philosopher is to discover the data of the value situation and to order it properly. So long as we keep the objective facts in their proper perspective, then to what particular datum we apply the term value is of minor importance. Here again, the sanity of the Scholastic system in accepting reality as it is and then only attempting
an explanation of it, triumphs over other procedures. Even some of their own ranks have realized this superiority of the objective view and have cautioned us not to start with the unanalyzed conception of value and measure reality by it. For this is to assign value blindly a function it cannot perform.

We are now in a position to affix definite meanings to the ordinary terms used in value philosophy. First of all, "value" may be taken as equivalent to the "the good", "the end of action", "the objective to be attained". Thus, everything insofar as it is good, can be said to possess value. "Valuable" should be reserved for the object before any particular agent evaluates it. The same object will be deemed as "valued" after a particular agent seeks it. "Valuing" will serve as a brief descriptive title for the entire active process of conation - i.e., of striving for a value or valuable object. Note well that before a particular agent can evaluate an object, that object must have value. It must possess what Donat calls "that internal characteristic and excellence of the object which is, as it were, an aptitude and dignity on account of which an agent will approve of the object and desire to possess it". For this reason, the transition from valuable to valued cannot be regarded as a conferring of value, but merely an appreciation of something that already exists.
Objectivity of Relative Value

In the preceding pages, we have discussed the good as relative or particular. Now it is very important not to confuse the relative good — i.e., the relative value — of the Scholastic doctrine with value as being constituted only in the relation which results when a subject values something. For the Scholastic system, value when taken in the strict sense and not merely analogously is always objective. The objectivity of relative or particular value can be seen from a simple example — say, a philosophy manual. To a student of philosophy such a manual would have great value as a source of information, but to a student for the time interested only in mathematics it would be worth merely its price of sale. In a sense it is true that at a given moment the philosophy manual has varying degrees of value relative to the students of philosophy and of mathematics. But this is no argument for holding that the student of philosophy confers the value on the manual, or that the manual does not have value before the philosophy student became interested in it. This fact becomes evident when we reflect that no other book would satisfy the particular need of the student of philosophy. The philosophy manual is a particular good because it fills a particular need. If the philosophy student conferred the value, he could do it on the first available book, no matter what be its contents. We should also
note that the philosophy manual has real value for the student of mathematics, if he should ever become interested in philosophy. Relative or particular value, therefore, is not value in the relation, but true objective value as related or communicable to the particular needs of a particular subject.

Evil as Disvalue

In the opening paragraph of this chapter St. Thomas is mentioned as being interested in the problem of good and evil - i. e., of value and disvalue, and of being concerned with the refutation of a philosophy that distorted the true values of life. Apart from its historical significance, the question of evil or disvalue must be given attention in any balanced treatment of value theory. According to the Scholastic explanation, evil is nothing positive, but consists in the privation of good. It is not the mere absence of any good, but is the absence of a good that ought to be present. Thus, not to have blond hair is not an evil, but not to have any hair at all is indeed an evil. Since evil is not something positive, there is no such thing as a supreme evil or disvalue which exists in opposition to the Supreme Value - God. The summation of non-existentss cannot make an existent.

It is important to note that evil or disvalue results only accidentally from the activity of the agent, since every agent acts for the sake of obtaining good. Whenever an agent
seeks what is evil or a disvalue, he does so because he regards that evil as a good for himself here and now. While such an object is in reality only an apparent good or value, nevertheless it could not be sought except insofar as it is desirable as the satisfaction of a need within the agent.  

Agent as Value

The last point to be considered in the Scholastic discussion of value is one which at first sight may seem to be a serious concession to the subjective value theorists. When the Scholastic valuists maintain that in the very same act of valuing an external object, the agent may be said to seek and value himself, they certainly seem to be conceding that the agent actually confers value on himself. In order to answer this objection, we must bear in mind two facts, the first of which is the distinction between immediate and ultimate value. In the Scholastic doctrine the agent is not the immediate value, but only the ultimate value. The immediate value, on the other hand, is the object which satisfies the immediate need of the agent. By drawing a sharp line of demarcation between the immediate and ultimate ends of the valuing process, the Scholastic theory can avoid much of the confusion that exists at present in the non-Scholastic treatment of the problem.

The second and more important fact to be kept in mind is the precise meaning of the phrase "the agent values himself".
In the first place, these words cannot signify that the agent confers value on himself, because he either has the value from the outset of the process, or he hasn't it from the outset. To say that he confers it on himself when he already has it, is to say that he is wasting time. To say that he confers it on himself when he doesn't possess it, is to say that he makes something out of nothing. Precisely, then, what does this expression "agent values himself" mean? Regarded negatively, it states the simple fact that no agent ever aims to defeat his own interests. Regarded positively, it affirms the fact that whenever an agent acts, he always acts for his own well-being - i.e., he acts in order to preserve himself and his kind, and also to acquire new perfections. These new perfections are accidental modifications which help to fill up the void or need that exists in every finite being. The more an agent has of these perfections, the more valuable he becomes to himself and to others also. It is hardly necessary to remark that continued existence is a great value to an agent.

Thus far, we have insisted on the fact that in valuing himself the agent regards himself only as the ultimate value and, in order to fill up the void that is natural to every finite being, must seek immediate values outside his own limited store. Yet, if we reflect on the nature of immanent activity, with which all living beings are endowed, we seem to find instances of actions that run contrary to our theory. For im-
manent activity is defined as the capacity of a living being to perform actions whose entire process remains within the agent. Here, then, we seem to have a case where the agent obtains nothing from the outside. The answer is that in many actions the living agent does not obtain anything from the outside at that particular moment, but merely works over and perfects what it received on some previous occasion. Of itself, immanent activity is merely the use of a capacity which God (and the parents, indirectly) contributed to the agent at the moment of conception. For a time an infant might go on working over the original values conferred upon it at birth; but unless it strove to replenish this original gift with new values from outside, it would not continue to exist very long. The infant, therefore, begins to employ its power of assimilating food values and sense impressions in order to supplant its limited endowments. Once this has been done, these values may be worked over according to the immanent power proper to them - vegetative activity for the food values, and sensation and intellection for the impressions on the senses. But unless the values that result from later immanent activity had somehow originated in the exterior world, there never would be any such activity at all. And so, even the valuing which an agent does of its own well-being is ultimately based on objective reality.

From this fact that man cannot act without seeking his own well-being, absolute altruism is psychologically impossible.
There is no such thing as seeking the good of society to the complete exclusion of one's own interest. Even in the act of seeking the Supreme Value, the agent is working for his own perfection. For the highest external value towards which man can and ought to tend is the glory of God. Yet the acquisition of this glory to God is nothing else than man's beatitude, that stable possession of the highest and most perfect good, that only goal in which man's desires can come finally to rest.

We see now that in every act of conation, several values or levels of value are involved. If we are to establish a sound value theory, we must keep the distinction between them well in mind. First comes the immediate value in the external object - as for example, the warmth of a coat on a cold day. To a man living on the Equator this value may be only a latent one; but it is truly present, as can be seen, if he were to come far north in winter time. Next comes the ultimate value - the well-being of the agent himself. Thirdly, if the agent's life is well-ordered, this act of valuing his own well-being will coincide with the morally imperative act of seeking the Supreme Value-God, Who in turn is the complete satisfaction of all men's seeking. Only the Scholastic system can fit together all these immediate and ultimate, external and internal values so as to explain the facts of the value situation.
Thomistic Scale of Values

Though the purpose of this thesis is merely to treat the fundamental concept of value and not the various levels in the ladder of comparative values, nevertheless a brief indication of the order of values as proposed by St. Thomas will not be out of place here. On several occasions the Angelic Doctor suggests a scale of values, when he mentions three degrees of goods: that of the soul, that of the body, and that of exterior things. In the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, he becomes somewhat more definite:

"The order of good:

"Now the sovereign good is man's happiness, which is the ultimate end for him, and the nearer a thing approaches this end, the higher must it be placed as a good for man.

"The nearest thing to this is virtue (as Aristotle says in the *Ethics*), and everything else that is of use to man in well-doing, whereby he attains happiness.

"After this comes the right disposition of reason, and of the powers subject to it.

"And after this the well-being of the body, which is requisite for facility of action.

"Lastly come those things that are without, which we employ as helps to virtue" - as economic wealth, etc.

St. Thomas is here dealing with the order of values in their relation to the intensity of the corresponding disvalue or evil. Some men invert this order, thinking that financial or corporeal evils are greater. In truth, however, the greatest evil is the loss of the happiness experienced by union with
the Supreme Value, God.

The most interesting, as well as the most important, value in this life is that of moral value, which is commonly referred to as virtue. More particularly, moral value consists in the conformity of one's free acts with the objective order of creatures among themselves and in relation to their Creator. Moral disvalue, on the other hand, consists in the failure of a free act to be conformed with the objective order. Even when a man's conscience is invincibly erroneous, his act is none the less objectively valid, according to the most universal objective norm of always doing the right thing as one sincerely understands it. To attempt to analyze this question of moral value in its relation to modern philosophy would constitute a separate treatise. For the purposes of the present thesis, it is sufficient to note that moral values, like all other values, do not arise from the power of the agent to confer value on reality, but from the inherent good which is in all being independently of any particular agent. In other words, man does not make the moral order, but finds it already formed on the objective relations of creatures among themselves and to their Creator.

Summary

It is now time to recapitulate. The principal features of the Scholastic doctrine are as follows: first, value theory
is not merely a modern development of Scholasticism, but was a problem thoroughly expounded by St. Thomas in the Middle Ages. There are three irreducible elements in the valuing process—namely, object, subject, and the relation between them. In the Scholastic system, the object is prior to the subject and the relation between them shows real dependence only in the subject. While this system insists on the priority of cognition over desire, yet it does not thereby intend to exclude the latter, but only to show its dependence on the former. Indeed, the whole man is a valuing agent that is constantly seeking his own well-being. Though the American and European Scholastics are not in perfect agreement as to the identity of value and the good, it is safe to conclude that value and good are identical. Moreover, to hold that the agent values himself is not to admit that he confers value on himself. Lastly, from the brief outline of the Thomistic scale of values, we see a possible way of making further investigations in the field of comparative values. Thus fortified with an objective concept of value and of the process whereby it becomes useful, interesting, or valuable to man, we may safely proceed to examine the worth of the opinions of the non-Scholastic exponents of value theory.
FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER III


2. Ibid., p. 30

3. Ibid., p. 34

4. M. C. D'Arcy, Thomas Aquinas, pp. 4, 7, 31


6. St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, c. 8, 15, 122, 126, 127 - St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a, 2ae, qq. (For quotations from St. Thomas, the English translation by the Dominican Fathers is excellent.)

7. Ibid., 1a, q.5, a2, corpus articuli

8. Loc. cit.

9. Ibid., a. 1, corp.

10. This thesis, Chap. VII, p. 109

11. Ibid., Chap. III, p. 45 and Chap. VI, p. 84

12. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a, q. 16, a4, ad 2 am


14. St. Thomas, De Veritate, q. 21, a.1, ad 4 am

15. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1a, q. 80, a. 2, corp.

16. G. B. O'Toole, The Case Against Evolution, pp. 176-179

17. L. R. Ward, Philosophy of Value, p. 171

18. St. Thomas, op. cit., 1. a, q. 44, a.4, corp.


20. Ibid., q. 5, a. 1, corp.

21. Ibid., a. 2, corp.

22. St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 3
23. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, 1a, 2ae, q. 8, a2, ad 3 am


25. Loc. cit.

   "Valor ergo essentialiter est bonum, secundum acceptionem verbi scholasticam, et ideo ad ens reducitur; est entis proprietas, est ens in quantum est perfectivum, uno verbo bonum."

27. J. Donat, *Ontologia*, p. 118
   "Valor est idem ac bonum, scil. vel bonum relativum sive conveniens vel bonum absolutum sive perfectum ...... Valor non tantum aliquid subjectivum, sed proprietas rei objectiva est."

28. Paul Siwek, "La Probleme de la Valeur", *Travaux du IX e Congres International de Philosophie*, p. 84 "nous reserverons le mot 'valeur' a la raison formelle du bien; le sujet en qui se reflete cette raison du bien, nous le nomerons tout simplement 'chose ayant une valeur'."

29. Ibid., p. 90
   "La valeur.... se fonde sur l'etre. Car c'est seulement l'etre qui peut donner un complement necessaire de perfection a un autre etre; c'est seulement l'etre qui peut en constituer une fin."

30. Ibid., p. 83


32. R. G. Bandas, *Contemporary Philosophy and Thomistic Principles*, p. 252

33. Loc. cit.

34. Loc. cit.

35. Ibid., p. 261

36. L. R. Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 159


38. L. R. Ward, *op. cit.*, p. 155


41. J. Donat, op. cit., p. 119
"Eo respectu enim tantum exprimitur interna rei proprietas et praestantia tamquam aptitudo et dignitas, ut approbetur et appetatur."

42. St. Thomas, op. cit., q. 14, a. 10, corp.

43. Ibid., q. 48, a. 3, corp.

44. St. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, 8 & 15

45. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, 1a, q. 39, a. 3, ad 2 am

46. Ibid., q. 105, a. 5, corp.

47. Ibid., 2a, 2ae, q. 23, a. 7, corp.
   P. Siwek, op. cit., p. 90

48. L. R. Ward, op. cit., p. 120

49. St. Thomas, *Summa Contra Gentiles*, III, 3

50. Ibid., 7

51. Ibid., 3

52. G. B. O'Toole, op. cit., p. 177


54. While our discussion has been limited to human agents, since they are the most important agents, the same principles may be applied in due proportion to other natural agents - molecule, plant, animal. These units can be said to value themselves, but without being aware of that. (Cf. *Summa Theologica*, 1a, q. 15, a.1, corp.) The tendencies and strivings of such agents are called natural, in opposition to the intellectually guided strivings of human beings.

55. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, 1a. 2ae, q.2, a. 5, corp.
   St. Thomas, 2a, 2ae, q. 104, a. 3, corp.


P. Siwek, *op. cit.*, p. 88

L. R. Ward, *Values and Reality*, p. 259

St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, III, 141
CHAPTER IV

THE SCIENTIFIC BASIS OF CONTEMPORARY NON-SCHOLASTIC VALUE THEORY

The form of the syllogism offers a good method for drawing up criticism of a position. Applying this form along broad lines to the non-Scholastic theories of value, we have for premises the two chief historical origins of non-Scholastic doctrine—namely, the "scientific" approach and the Kantian theory of knowledge. In the present chapter we shall discuss the role of experimental science in the development of value theory. We shall see that value theory borrows from science its current interpretations of human life and the universe in general, as well as a definite method of procedure. In Chapter V we shall treat the second and more important source of non-Scholastic value philosophy—the Kantian theory of knowledge. This fifth chapter will show how value theory inherits from Kantian doctrine its denial of the objectivity of truth, its disregard for substance, and its anti-intellectual temper. After the premises comes the conclusion. Accordingly, Chapter VI will consider the conclusions at which non-Scholastic value theory has now arrived, and will indicate their inadequacy. Chapter VII comes as a sort of corollary after the main syllogism. Of course, if the premises are inadmissible, and the conclusion consequently untenable, naturally the corollaries of non-Scholastic value theory
cannot be philosophically sound. And this we will find to be
the case, when in Chapter VII we apply the tenets of the non-
scholastic doctrine to the ultimate science of God.

Value Theory as Tentative Working Hypothesis

In the first place, science has given a definite method
to value theory, that of the tentative working hypothesis.¹ By
"tentative working hypothesis" is understood the use of a for-
ula because of its utility, whether it be true or not. Dr. Ful-
ton Sheen offers us this clear description of the method:

"The formulae of science are not true, they are merely use-
ful and convenient. They serve for a time, and sooner or later are supplanted by new and other formulae. They are
relative to the advance and the convenience of science."²

Thus, if the electron theory proves satisfactory for experimen-
tation, why should we be concerned to establish its absolute
certainty? When the electron theory or any other hypothesis
fails to explain the phenomena of experiment, only then need it
be modified or dropped entirely.

Naturally, value theorists who have not been able to
work out a satisfactory system of philosophy, would turn with
enthusiasm towards this idea of a tentative working hypothesis.
For this reason many non-Scholastic philosophers do not even
mention the fundamental problem of value at all, but concern
themselves only with immediate and secondary values. These
philosophers ignore the problem of an objective foundation for
their scale of values and are content with a discussion of its present usefulness, whether it be true or not. Yet, this pragmatic approach to the question of value does not arise entirely from the influence of contemporary science. Certainly, however, a doctrine which enjoys great popularity in the field of science, must have influence in the philosophical work of men, such as Alexander, Perry, and Whitehead, who are also deeply interested in science.

The Scientific Interpretation of Value

In the second place, these scientifically-minded valuists not only apply their outlook of the working hypothesis to the philosophy of value, but also tend to interpret their entire philosophy in the light of present-day "scientific" conclusions. Value theory today is often but an echo of current "scientific" opinion, as for instance, of evolution or space-time.

Thus, among valuists we find R. B. Perry assuring us that the theory of value is but a part of the greater scientific movement that has explained the physical world and is now successfully annexing the whole of human life. Moreover, his own particular interest in biology has led him to apply the principle of emergent evolution to the theory of value. S. A. Alexander, in his Space, Time and Deity, has attempted to draw up a complete explanation of the entire universe in terms of a
space-time continuum that is also constantly evolving. According to this theory, all nature is one continuous process of space and time. These two are the elements that generate all things, time being, as it were, the form, and space, the matter. In this evolutionary process, wherein the quality of matter emerges into life and life into mind, mind itself will ultimately emerge into deity, which is "out in front". Value theory itself is but a part of this space-time system and arises from the amalgamation of mind with objects. Following Professor Alexander not only in his value philosophy, but also in the scientific approach to it, R. W. Sellars insists that we must turn to evolution for an answer to the problems of ontology and should regard the living thing as a spatio-temporal system.

This modern tendency to apply the procedure and conclusions of experimental science to philosophy may be called "the fallacy of the uniform method of science". Our present concern with it is to discover in what ways it is an unsound basis for the philosophy of value.

Rejection of the Hierarchy of Sciences

The first error of the uniform method of science is its assumption that all sciences, experimental and speculative, are of equal dignity, and its consequence failure to realize that there exists a hierarchy of sciences, according to their degree of abstraction from sensible matter. Of course, while one can
hardly expect scientists who do not admit the existence of anything but evolving matter, space-time, or the like to recognize the nature of this hierarchy of sciences, nevertheless their oversight does not alter the facts of experience. As usual, we must turn to St. Thomas for an explanation of how science progresses from the physical to the mathematical and finally to the metaphysical order.  

Man in his search for the truth of the inner nature of reality first abstracts from the individual characteristics of things and considers them according to their common sensible qualities. This process gives him the science of physics, which embraces not merely the limited field which is now known by that name, but the whole of the physical sciences. Next abstracting from qualities, he considers matter under the aspect of quantity only, and thus constructs the science of mathematics. Lastly he omits quantity itself in order to consider only being, and thereby evolves the science of metaphysics. In each process the matter is the same (either the material world for physics and mathematics, or the material and spiritual worlds together for metaphysics), but the form in each case is different. In physics it is quality, in mathematics it is quantity, and in metaphysics, being itself.
Fallacy of the Uniform Method of Science

From the failure to recognize a hierarchy among the sciences springs the second error of the uniform method - namely, its application of the principles of a lower science to a higher one. This process we see constantly applied whenever the purely physical theory of space-time or the purely biological theory of evolution is employed to explain the problem of value. Whereas the laws and conclusions of these theories belong entirely to the physical or mathematical orders, inasmuch as they deal with quality or quantity, value philosophy is or should be of the metaphysical order, since it pertains to the nature of being as being. Metaphysics, however, cannot depend upon physics for its principles, anymore than the part can be the explanation of the whole. The more reasonable expectation seems to be that the lower sciences should depend on metaphysics for their first principles, since the principles of metaphysics are the principles of being itself, and the matter of the lower sciences is certainly being, if it is anything at all. Justly, indeed, has St. Thomas named metaphysics the first philosophy, because from it all other sciences derive their ultimate principles.

The insecure position of the uniform method of science is further seen from the impossibility of physical science to escape metaphysical implication. The very denial of the use-
fulness of metaphysics is in itself a metaphysical principle, which may be summed up in the formula that tentative experiment is the only approach to truth. For the modern scientist who favors the uniform method, the inescapable subsumption is that all reality must be interpreted pragmatically and in terms of material being. In order to avoid conceding that physics and mathematics either smuggle in metaphysical principles or assume principles of their own without proof, some value theorists as well as scientists have suggested that by a circular way propositions could be made to depend upon one another and thus prove themselves reciprocally. However, this apparent method of escape is only a vicious circle, wherein the propositions are made simultaneously to serve contradictory and, therefore, philosophically useless roles - namely, those of premise and of conclusion.

In summing up our discussion of the influence of contemporary science on value theory, we see from the works of Perry, Alexander, and Sellars, that it has been very great. However, this confidence in experimental science has not been well founded, since the pragmatic hypotheses and the empirical conclusions of biology, physics, mathematics, and the other natural sciences cannot licitly be applied to the higher metaphysical science of value. What Perry, Alexander and Sellars have failed to realize is that a new natural science (as, for example, a new physics or a new biology) is nothing more than
a new natural science and not a new philosophy of nature. According to their way of reasoning, value theory must change with each advance of natural science. For St. Thomas, however, while the physical sciences may change, the metaphysical basis for them remains ever the same, since this basis arises from the very nature of being itself. Experimental science is indeed an inductive process, while the general philosophy of value must be chiefly deductive. To regard both as belonging to the same order will only result in confusion and ultimately in the rejection of metaphysics. And thus crumbles one of the two historical foundations of contemporary non-Scholastic value theory.
FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER IV

1. F. J. Sheen, Philosophy of Science, pp. 3, 11-14, 16
   L. J. Walker, Theories of Knowledge has a complete discussion of the application of the pragmatic method to philosophy.
   a) pp. 15-18, 123-132, 154-160, 671-675
   b) Chap. 17, 20, 21, 22
   Notice especially:
   a) p. 470 "The Pragmatism of the philosophising scientist...... is, in fact, but a development of the doctrine that the definitions and laws which belong to Physical Theory are only symbolic formulae, figured hypotheses, postulates which are useful, but not true. And this doctrine can only be called 'pragmatic' retrospectively for it existed before Pragmatism proper was invented."
   b) p. 471 "To many scientists, anxious to solve the mystery presented by a daily-increasing multitude of conflicting and seemingly irreconcilable hypotheses, only two alternatives seemed to offer themselves, either Scepticism or a kind of provisional pragmatism. Believing themselves confronted with a choice such as this, many have adopted the latter alternative - i. e., rather than give up truth altogether, they prefer to regard it in Physical Science as a "value".
   c) p. 159 "The objection to the Experimental Theory is not that postulation and experiment is not a fact, but that it is not by any means the only way to knowledge."

2. F. J. Sheen, God and Intelligence, p. 71 In connection with this matter, the whole of pages 71-73 should be read carefully. Notice in particular:
   a) p. 71 "Modern philosophy is a lyric poet of science. By the principle of lyricism is meant that, immediately upon the discovery of any important theory in one science, modern philosophy applies it to its own field whether it is applicable or not."
   b) p. 73 "In a general and broad way the lyricism may be represented as follows:
   I - Empirical Science
   Formulae are convenient; they are not true - but useful."
II - Philosophical Lyricism

A. Philosophical principles, God, eternal verities are useful. Their truth is to be determined by their usefulness. **Pragmatism**

B. Pure thoughts in philosophy are pure formulae - in science are fictions. Man is the measure of truth. **Humanism**

C. The value of the idea, as the value of the scientific hypothesis or formula, is determined by its instrumental or functional efficacy. **Instrumentalism**


4. Ibid., pp. 152-157


6. Ibid., p. 47

7. Ibid., Chap. IX


10. St. Thomas, *De Trinitate Boethii*, q. 5

11. Ibid., q. 5, a. 3


14. Ibid., p. 57

CHAPTER V
THE KANTIAN HERITAGE OF CONTEMPORARY NON-SCHOLASTIC VALUE THEORY

The second and more important historical foundation of current value philosophy is the Kantian theory of knowledge. To Kant value philosophy owes its original impetus as well as its most fundamental premises. Though this quiet, unassuming German scholar set out to reestablish the validity of metaphysics, yet he proceeded in such a way as to make the attainment of this goal impossible. Therefore, when the modern value theorists accept the conclusions of Kantian philosophy, they are building their own doctrines upon the most treacherous of metaphysical sands.

Horrified at the extremes to which Hume’s scepticism had reduced philosophical thought, Kant awoke from his dogmatic slumbers, firmly resolved to restore the validity of objective concepts. But at once he was confronted with an age-old problem. On the one hand there was the sensory evidence of particular phenomena, and on the other hand there was the equally important intellectual evidence of universal concepts. Since the senses do not perceive this universal element, how is it to be explained? Centuries earlier, the Scholastics had worked out a satisfactory solution of the problem, one which Kant, however, did not consider. Instead, he assumed without proof
that the fundamental principles of mathematics are \textit{a priori} and incontrovertible. By applying these mathematical principles to the universal concepts which he desired to save, Kant developed a system of synthetic \textit{a priori} judgments. Since the terms of these judgments are not built upon corresponding facts in external reality, they are purely subjective forms, into which sensory phenomena are to be poured as into a mold. Thus, reality does not shape thought, as St. Thomas teaches; on the contrary, external facts and thought remain mutually separated so that the former are of no use in developing the latter.

\textbf{Subject Creates Value}

That this interpretation of existence has had great influence on current value theory, we need only to recall W. M. Urban\' "unique form of objectivity", which is hardly anything else than a subject mold of thought. Many others, too, have carried this Kantian principle so far as to maintain that value (i. e., the perceptive process of the subject) even creates reality itself.

Of course, if the universal elements in thought are purely subjective, then one can never know whether they have any objects corresponding to them in the world of external facts. This ignorance is not an outright denial of the objective basis for thought, but is indeed a profession of speculative agnosticism with regard to it. Now, if we cannot know the nature
of objective reality, and yet we desire to use certain "facts" of existence, what else remains except to disregard the problem of metaphysics altogether and to consider only the practical value that things may have for us? That Kant himself arrived at this conclusion is shown from the spirit and doctrine of his Critique of Practical Reason, wherein certain moral principles, the objective validity of which he could not theoretically demonstrate, are accepted practically because of their indispensable value. Thus, free will, immortality, and God are not held as theoretically knowable, but only as practical postulates of great value.

Weakness of Kant's Speculative Philosophy

Before proceeding further into the practical aspect of Kantian theory, it may be well to pause here for a moment in order to indicate the weaknesses of his theoretical philosophy. In the first place, Kant gratuitously assumed that the objectivity of universal concepts is metaphysically indemonstrable. St. Thomas, on the other hand, has clearly worked out a system of abstraction, whereby the universal element can be obtained from particular sensible phenomena. In this system the claims of the universal and the particular are reconciled in such a manner as to preserve not only the evidence of the senses, but also the dignity of the immaterial intellect. The necessity of abstraction arises from the peculiar nature of man, who is part-
ly matter and partly spirit. Since it is the immaterial element which cognizes universal concepts, matter in order to be known must be elevated to the level of the spirit by means of abstraction. Moreover, since man obtains all his knowledge somehow through the senses, he must use abstraction in order to obtain any concept at all of purely immaterial beings.

Kant rightfully recognized the necessity of general principles as a foundation for physics. But where he went astray was in assuming that these principles must be accepted a priori from mathematics. For St. Thomas, on the other hand, all that man needs to get started in his philosophizing is the "habitus primorum principiorum spectabilium", by means of which he can afterwards construct the highest science of metaphysics. This habitus is not an innate form, but merely the natural disposition of the mind to recognize first principles (as, for instance, the principle of contradiction) as self-evident. St. Thomas clearly tells us that while the light of this habitus is from the intellect, its specific matter is from the senses.

Moreover, mathematical principles are of little avail for the ultimate explanation of physical phenomena, since they themselves are not ultimate. Mathematical principles as such pertain to quantity alone, and not to being, and therefore, they cannot give us the ultimate reason for things.

Another difficulty under which these synthetic a priori forms labor is their complete lack of contact with reality.
Kantian subjectivism, by exaggerating the function of the immanent faculties of knowledge, deprives itself of any satisfactory standard of criticism. As a result, there is no good reason why the phenomena of experience should be poured into one form rather than into another. The Kantian category of relation, for example, has no more right to mold substance and accident than have the forms of space and time. When Professor Alexander sets out to explain away substance as a space-time continuum, he can find a complete philosophical justification of his theories in the doctrines already advanced by Kant.

**Practical Reason, the Prototype of Value Philosophy**

Returning now to the practical aspect of Kantian metaphysics, we shall see that it has been unquestionably the most outstanding influence on value philosophy and really deserves to be acclaimed as the first systematic subjective theory of value. Though Kant did not employ this term for his system, he obtained substantially the same conclusions as are reached today. Through his speculative philosophy, Kant had eliminated the very concepts which he had set out to reestablish. But if theoretical science could not save these concepts and yet they seemed indispensable to human action, there must be found another way of restoring them. Accordingly, Kant had recourse to a second faculty of the soul - its "practical reason", as he called it.
Now, this practical reason is not the intellect under another name, for then the problem would have been merely a quibble over words. Neither could Kant achieve anything for his metaphysics by attributing cognoscitive powers to the practical reason, since this admission would have contradicted all the previous conclusions of his theoretic philosophy. Hence the perception acquired through the practical reason is not intellectual, but affective or volitional. It is a blind, un­rational seeking after the thing, the objective validity of which can never be known, but must be postulated and felt as valuable. Of course, any "judgments" that are formulated about such value postulates can never be regarded as immediately representing objective being.

To provide for this point, Kant's successors began to evolve a distinction between judgments of existence, which, inasmuch as they deal with the inaccessible objectivity of things, are purely conjectural and useless, and judgments of value, which alone are serviceable to man. Though Herbart, Lotze, Brentano and others all contributed to the development of the distinction, yet it is to Ritschl's efforts that this idea owes its greatest popularity. The Ritschlians sought to divorce theology from speculation by denying the validity of all judgments in the religious sphere, except judgments of value. For them, these value judgments are "conditioned by personal character and experience, unlike the theoretical judgments, in which
methods of reasoning common to all sound minds are applied to the data of perception apprehended by sound sense. Modern logicians who have been at pains to reconcile these existential and value judgments, argue that Nitschel did not intend to exaggerate the separation between reality and value. Yet even these defenders concede that he did not carry out his theory in practice, and that today there still prevails a definite antithesis between the logical and the value judgment.

To appreciate the great extent that this doctrine of the anti-intellectual perception of useful postulates has had on the modern theory of value, one need only to glance through the pages of Perry, Alexander, Mackenzie, Urban and numerous others. Here one will find value constantly referred to as "liking", "affective state", "feeling", "worth experience", "satisfactoriness", etc. In Perry's works, for instance, value becomes the "motor-affective attitude", ever to be interpreted in terms of "interest". For Mackenzie, values exist only "if they are felt", and for Alexander the only approach to deity is through "sentiment". Urban devotes several chapters of his Valuation, its Nature and Laws to establishing the emotional nature of the experience of value. He tells us that all worth experience is feeling and all consciousness of value is at any time our emotional consciousness. Following Nitschel, he accepts the distinction between existential judgments and those pertaining to value. Seth Pringle-Pattison even goes so far as to
maintain that feelings of value are as effective an instrument of reason as is logical investigation. Moreover, according to him, judgments of value are as objective in their own sphere as is a scientific judgment on matters of fact. And these are but a few outstanding examples of the many modern non-Scholastics who have espoused the cause of the Kantian affective, anti-intellectual perception of value. It is now time to investigate whether their confidence in Kant has been justified.

**Practical Reasons as Psychologically Useless**

According to the traditional Scholastic doctrine, the will is indeed a blind faculty, but not in the sense that it has no known object. While the will itself is not the cogniscitive faculty, nevertheless it can receive its object from the cogniscitive faculty or intellect, and therefore, is not blind, in the same sense, as is the Kantian will. For St. Thomas, the act of the will follows the act of the intellect, and is not to be regarded as being in juxtaposition with it. In other words, the reason for seeking always precedes the seeking itself. For Kant, however, since there is no objective reason for appetite, the appetitive faculty must desire and also somehow generate the object of its desire. It must first induce a subjective state and then in some way objectivize this state. Now as we have already seen in Chapter the third, there can never be any action without a definite object as the end or goal of that
action. For without a definite goal, the appetite would tend indifferently in all directions, if it could tend at all. Merely to make the action of the appetite tend back upon itself without any reference to an object is a useless process; for how can an insufficient thing find in itself alone the satisfaction of its insufficiency? It is quite true, however, that the object of the appetite need not always actually exist; it can be a conceptual object, an end to be actualized. But even this kind of goal is impossible to Kantian metaphysics, since conceptual objects have real foundation in external being. Thus the Kantian will, lacking any actual or conceptual term of motion other than its own subjective state, is in reality psychologically useless and metaphysically impossible. It simply cannot act because it has no end in view; and a will that is not active is no will at all. And hence those modern valuists who found their theories upon this doctrine of practical utility, have in reality no reason for philosophizing at all, since they can never have any object to value, except their own insufficient subjective states.

A very simple example will serve to demonstrate the untenable position of this practical value theory. If a hungry man can find no food that is objectively valuable as a satisfaction of his hunger, then there is no use of desiring at all, for certainly the hungry appetite cannot by desiring satisfy itself. For a value philosopher to admit that the objective
thing - food - is capable of satisfying the appetite of hunger, would be to deny in practice what he holds in theory. And furthermore, there can be no escape by insisting that the valuing subject confers value on the object, for if this were true, there never would have arisen any appetite at all. If the unsatisfied subject can confer satisfaction on an object, he can save time and effort by immediately conferring it upon himself.

A third feature of the Kantian theory of knowledge that is of great importance to value philosophy is its agnosticism with regard to the objective existence of substance. Yet Kant himself, aware of the need of a subject in which accidents might inhere, admitted a being as such. But inasmuch as this being as such would be a noumenon, he logically denied to it any objective validity. Of course, a substance that is not objectively valid can never be of any use as a substrate for accidents, if these should happen to be objectively valid. According to Kant, we understand the relation of substance and accident because the mind relates them this way. But one may legitimately inquire as to why the mind relates substance with accident and not with space or time. If there is no objective validity to the relation of substance and accident, it is certainly strange that the mind should always relate these two forms in preference to other subjective combination.
Value as a Quality

This Kantian attitude towards substance has produced a double effect on the theory of value; first, its rejection of the objectivity of substance, and secondly, its consequent acceptance of value as a quality. As for the rejection of substance, we see it in Perry's idea of the soul, wherein he naively assures us that "no one would now think of conceiving the soul as a simple, indivisible, and incorruptible static entity." We see it again in Sellar's concept of the soul as a "stream of ideas", altogether different from the medieval mind-soul. Mackenzie, in his turn, informs us that the notion of substance is no longer in favor with metaphysicians. And Alexander's space-time continuum is nothing else than a strange fusion of acts with their subject of inhaesion.

But if value philosophy drops substance, there is nothing left for it, except to turn to the consideration of qualities, and the one quality which best fits in with the anti-intellectual temper of modern thought is the quality of value. Yet if there is no external substance in which this quality of value can inhere, value cannot be an objective quality. For in such a supposition, the accident of value would be an entity with an essential aptitude for a substance that can never exist. For this reason, the value theorists who reject the objectivity of substance must also sacrifice the objectivity of the quality of
value, and confine themselves to regarding it as a subjective state. This latter assumption, however, is not a solution of the problem of value, since it labors under all the usual difficulties of a subjective position.

Summary

It is now time to sum up the leading effects of Kantian theory of knowledge on current value theory. First of all, Kant, by destroying the theoretical usefulness of metaphysics as a means of establishing the objective validity of truth, made the problem a pragmatic one. Then by describing the practical reason or will as a blind faculty independent of previous cognition of external reality, he rendered the act of valuing psychologically useless. Lastly, by professing agnosticism with regard to the objectivity of substance, he forced value into the category of quality; and since this quality can have no external subject of inherasion, it also becomes a purely subjective form. In this fashion Kant completely separated the problems of being and of good. For him good, if it were objective at all, could not be convertible with being, as St. Thomas holds. As a result, the problem of existence and the problem of value must go along different paths, and the philosophy of value cannot be an explanation of objective experience. And thus, the value theories which are founded on this Kantian rejection of metaphysics (and most of them are founded on it),
must start out without any philosophical basis and must be relegated to the realms of sentiment and emotion.
FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER V

1. It is important to note that Kant was not, strictly speaking, the first value philosopher, though he was the first non-Scholastic to erect the theory of value into a system. Clear, though remote, roots are found in Cartesian Immanence and in the Hobbes-Hume Interest Theory of ethical values.

I - For Cartesian Immanence, cf:
A. Thomas Harper, The Metaphysics of the School, Vol. II, p. 90. Notice in particular "the theory of the French philosopher diverted scientific inquiry from its previous quest of objective truth... Results: Philosophy in no long time came to be identified exclusively with ideology and psychology, till it was finally distilled into a transcendental logic".

B. F. J. Sheen, Religion Without God, pp. 99-100; also Chap. V. Descartes declared in favor of Immanence when he separated intellection from sense experience. Thereby he exalted "the within" or the immanent in man. This explanation of the intellect as independent of sense, is the first step in the long process of ever increasing denial of the transcendent and consequent assertion of the immanent, which eventually developed into the agnosticism and the practical value theory of Kant.

C. L. J. Walker, Theories of Knowledge, pp. 213-214; 291-293 discuss and criticize immance in Kantian philosophy.

II - For a history and criticism of the pleasure or interest theory of ethical values, cf:
A. Michael Cronin, Science of Ethics, Vol. I, Chap. X. In this theory the distinction between good and evil is not founded on the objective order of the universe to its Creator and within itself, but is explained solely on the basis of subjective emotions of pleasure or interest.


2. In order to avoid an excessive number of references the writer here acknowledges his indebtedness for the exposi-
tion of Kantian doctrine to the following sources.


II - F. J. Sheen, God and Intelligence, pp. 9-47; 62-141 consider the non-intellectual approach to reality in general. F. J. Sheen, Philosophy of Science, pp. 5-11, 105-107, 125-127, 154-155 discuss Kant's debt to mathematics and his influence on science. F. J. Sheen, Religion Without God, pp. 156-195, 292-297 discuss the three Critiques, Kant's successors, and his effect on religion.

III - L. J. Walker, Theories of Knowledge is a very readable and lengthy treatment of the Kantian theory of knowledge its subsequent history, and of Scholastic realism.


4. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la, q. 84, a. 6

5. F. H. Bradley, Appearance and Reality, p. 550
D. M. Edwards, "Religion as a Value Experience", Hibbert Journal, April 1930, p. 494
F. C. S. Schiller, "Fact and Value", Proceedings of the Sixth International Congress of Philosophy, 1926, p. 300

6. St. Thomas, op. cit., la, q. 85, a. 1 & 2
L. J. Walker, op. cit., Chap. XIII-XV, in which the development of the universal idea from its origin in the particular external objects is adequately discussed.

7. St. Thomas, Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 66

8. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, la, q. 84, a. 7

9. Ibid., la 2ae, q. 10, a. 1

10. L. J. Walker, op. cit., p. 244

11. St. Thomas, De Trinitate Beethii, q. 6, a. 2


13. Hasting's Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics, Vol. 12, p. 585

15. Hasting's *op. cit.*, Vol. 10, p. 814

M. Picard, *Values Immediate and Contributory*, p. 39

19. For Perry and Mackenzie, cf. quotations in Chap. II


23. A. S. Pringle-Pattison, *op. cit.*, p. 56


25. St. Thomas, *Summa Theologica*, Ia 2ae, q. 9, a. 1


29. J. S. Mackenzie, *Ultimate Values*, p. 27


31. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, Ia, q. 5, a. 1
Our criticism so far has been directed towards demonstrating the insecurity of contemporary non-Scholastic value theory because of its heritage. A doctrine that is lacking in sound origins is not likely to attain correct conclusions. If our investigation is to be complete, we must also consider the theory of value from another viewpoint than that of its historical basis. While the history cannot be entirely separated from the effects which it produces, nevertheless this chapter will emphasize the present status of value theory. This status may well be regarded as a sort of fallacious conclusion to the insufficient historical premises which we have already criticized.

Value Theory, A Veritable Babel of Philosophical Jargon

But before we enter upon the discussion of the present status of non-Scholastic value theory, let us first consider a more important aspect of almost all the non-Scholastic opinions - namely, their promiscuous use of terminology. This excessively free use of terms has unfortunately resulted in an almost hopeless confusion. W. H. Sheldon admits that none of the current theories are based on an unambiguous, non-circular
definition, and George Samtayana cries out in despair at the modern Babel of figurative terms and perverse categories that render cogent thinking well-nigh impossible. In these doctrines the term value is applied indiscriminately to almost anything, whether it be the object, relation, subject, affective state, or any other factor that may enter into the value experience. Take, for instance, Perry's formula that "X is valuable equals interest is taken in X", which may be abbreviated "valuable equals valued". A theory which does not distinguish between the capacity for being valued and its subsequent actualization is certainly destined for serious misunderstanding. Mackenzie, too, can scarcely be expected to avoid grave inconsistencies through an "elastic" term that covers almost every concept in the field of philosophy. Many more examples of this sort of inconsistency and exasperating vagueness could be enumerated, perhaps the worst of which are Perry's three conflicting definitions of value given in Chapter V of his General Theory of Value. However, these typical citations are sufficient for our purpose.

Let us now concentrate our attention on the weakness of the subjective position. For without question the subjective view of value is the most popular among the non-Scholastics who do not favor a doctrine approximating that of Thomism. Furthermore, since both the relational and the pseudo-objective views can be reduced to the subjective position, the refutation of
that line of argument will be tantamount to a defeat of all our adversaries.

One feature of value experience which has made a deep impression on subjective theorists is the ever present fact of a subjective state. Perry, for instance, spends large sections of his *General Theory of Value* in demonstrating how constant interest is in all valuing. Urban, too, even when he is not certain about the "validity of value, nonetheless insists on the ever present act of valuing. Now with these views the Scholastic system can have no quarrel. Certainly if there is a value experience, there is also a subjective state, which is nothing more than the subject's part in the relation between itself and its object. The point on which Scholastics disagree with their adversaries is that the mere presence of a subjective state is of first importance in constructing a value philosophy. When non-Scholastic theorists argue that, since in every value experience a subjective state is present, value itself must be subjective, we retort the issue by pointing out the equally important ubiquity of the object. Thus, all Perry's concern over the constancy of interest ends only in an inconducive stalemate that leaves the discussion to be settled by means of other issues.

Even more important to the subjective school than this emphasis on the presence of a subjective state is its attitude that the agent confers the value on the object. All subjecti-
vists are agreed on this point, whether they are the moderate kind who admit the previous existence of the object or the more radical sort who insist that valuing creates reality itself. Our problem, therefore, is to show that this subjective conferring of value on the object plainly contradicts the evidence of experience.

**Why Agent Does Not Confer Value**

In the first place, one may justly inquire how the valuing subject knows on what object he ought to confer value. According to this theory, previous to the act of valuing, the object does not possess value and therefore, all objects should attract the subject equally or, rather, no object should attract him at all. The dog who seeks a bone to chew upon, should find equal satisfaction in a mouse-trap or an automobile wrench. Yet somehow no dog ever smuggles away an automobile wrench in order to bury it for future reference. Moreover, if a man taking this theory seriously were indifferent about the nature of the object on which he conferred the value of food, someday he might unfortunately confer this value on a huge dose of arsenic. Yet if the value comes only from the desire of the subject, there really should not be any difficulty.

The natural conclusion which one can legitimately expect from the theory that desire confers value on the object is the impossibility of failure. If on the one hand our psychol-
ogical states have power to modify external reality, and on the other the condition of the object makes no difference to the act of valuing, one need only to desire and immediately his wish would be fulfilled. Thus value would become the most perfect and most completely satisfying Aladdin's lamp that could ever be imagined. Failure in such a supposition could arise only from the inability of the subject to induce the proper state of desire in himself. Yet, sad to relate, we can point out in a single day many desires which remain unfulfilled, simply because our subjective state was not equal to the opposition that external reality placed against it. How many people would be poor if riches could be had for the wishing?

Though this criticism may seem very severe, it is nevertheless a logical one. Neither can the subjective valuist escape from it by urging that certain objects are not capable of receiving value. For what difference does the state of the object make when the value comes only from the agent? To concede that certain objects are incapable of being valued is to admit that in others there is an objective capacity for that quality. This admission would scarcely differ from the Scholastic concept of value as the capacity of an existent to be the end of action. Thus, subjective value theory is either a mere misunderstanding due to the too free use of terms, or it is an unwitting confession that the Scholastic philosophy alone explains the data of experience.
In the last chapter we already considered the psychological futility of the subject's conferring value on the object, when he could save time and trouble by immediately conferring it on himself. Our purpose in mentioning it again at this point is to emphasize the argument of the preceding paragraph, and also to show that this subjective conferring of value is a needless multiplication of entities. The strict idealist who holds that value creates the world itself is at least consistent in rejecting a previous existence of reality. But why should he bother to create appearances of objectivity at all?

As the inquiring mind naturally seeks an answer to the beginning of things, one may rightfully expect the subjective value theorist to have an explanation of how the first value originated. According to this theory, it is man who confers the value on the object. But where did man get the faculty of conferring value? Where, indeed, did man come from at all? Are we to believe that man created himself and then generated the power of valuing out of his own need for it? Strange to relate, this is possibly the answer that Perry gives us, when he observes that "the living organism is not merely an organization and an individual, but it somehow acts so as to bring this organization and individuality into existence, or so as to maintain and conserve them". More likely, however, Perry does not mean this passage to be an answer to the question of the ori-
gin of life, but only a suggestion as to the manner of its continuance. For elsewhere he admits that, although he has proposed to himself the question "Where does the world get its shove and go?" he has not yet discovered a satisfactory answer. Mackenzie for his part honestly avows that value theory seems to have begun with pure emptiness and Alexander frankly concedes that quality is the great mystery. R. W. Sellars, on the other hand, does not understand why Mackenzie should be worried about the origin of matter and life. He tells us sincerely that he "cannot - with the best desire in the world - see adequate grounds for the assumption that physical systems are not self-sufficient." For him the fourth dimension, or in other words God, is a needless hypothesis.

A doctrine that professes to deal with ultimates and yet cannot account for the value that is in its own proponents certainly labors under a serious charge. Yet this is indeed the sad condition of subjective value theory. If man confers value, he is the cause of all of it, including any that may be in himself. As a result, we have the great mystery of value originating out of pure emptiness. Scholastic philosophy, on the other hand, has no difficulty with the problem of the origin of the world. It clearly demonstrates the existence of a necessary First Cause, who is the Primum Mover of all other action. From this Supreme Agent value flows into all the objects of his creation. Moreover, God is the Source of all
value, not merely because He is the Creator of all things, but also because from Him alone comes the good which is in every being. Whether man existed or not to evaluate the goodness of objects, this goodness would still be there, since it is one with the existence of things. Homistic doctrine not only places absolute goodness in the object, but also shows how this absolute worth tends to communicate itself to other things by being of value to them. The value of an object is not merely a bonum sibi, but is moreover a bonum alteri. In this way, there is no great gulf between absolute and relative good, and both can be traced back to a self-sufficient First Cause.

Obstinate Reality, the Bugbear of Subjective Philosophy

The untenability of the doctrine that the subject confers value on the object is further seen from the overwhelming difficulty that subjective valuists find in attempting to exclude objectivity from their theories. So great and so constant is the appearance of objective reality in the human mind that Kant himself admitted it to be a transcendental illusion, which the intellect cannot hope to exclude, but which it must nevertheless endeavor to reason away. Turning back to Chapter the Second, we see how Mackenzie at times virtually admits the objectivity which he generally seeks to take from value. Alexander also seems to have the same problem, and Perry openly con-
cedes some sort of value to the object. Laird, on the other hand, belabors the subjective value theorists for their unwilling subsumption of objective excellence, and neatly points out the weakness of a system which somehow cannot avoid leaning on the doctrine of its adversaries.

By way of example, let us consider two passages from Perry's *General Theory of Value* in order to see how the subjective valuists smuggle the objectivity of value back into their theories. On page 30, Perry tells us that he cannot find in the object a distinct quale to which he can attach the term value, and consequently he concludes that there is no such thing. In one sense, Perry is correct, for value is not a quality, if by quality is meant an accident. Value inasmuch as it is good is identified with the total entity of the object. However, let us suppose that there is no objective quale which may be called value. Later on page 124, we find Perry conceding that value is an "object of interest" or the "special character of an object". Then on the next page, he maintains that in order to create a value, one need only to take interest in something. Immediately after this, he admits that his argument is apparently redundant, since one may say that it proves only that objects of value are perceived whenever interest is taken in them. Whereupon he goes to considerable pains to show that the accusation against his position is not well grounded. The whole point of this paragraph is to indicate the way objective value
keeps creeping back into subjective philosophy. According to this theory, there should be no difficulty over objective value, and yet somehow it cannot be gotten rid of.

This attitude has been accurately expressed in a brief article by Leonard J. Russell of Birmingham, wherein at once the method and the weakness of the subjective position are clearly demonstrated. Mr. Russell tells us that "values must function a priori in the building up of experience", even though "we have to force them on reality"; and again, that value is the clue to the nature of the universe, in spite of facts to the contrary. Despite all his desire to force principles on reality he admits that "reality is the potter's wheel against which man must hold himself if he is to be truly moulded". Probably no more definite statement of the subjective cause and its helplessness in the face of external phenomena has ever been uttered by a value theorist. How much better it would be for Mr. Russell, if he were to stop fighting facts and the obstinate appearances of reality, and accepting the inevitable, construct an objective theory based on the evidence of experience.

R. B. Perry, indeed, attempts to reject the objective view as being a pathetic fallacy. He says that objective value may not be harmful "for practical or poetic purposes, but for theoretical purposes it is fallacious". His argument runs as follows: "to suppose that the force of desire lies in the object of desire is precisely as misleading as to suppose that the force
of the explosion lies in the ignition, or that the force of the engine lies in the throttle. If anybody ever explained the objective position in this way, Professor Perry is certainly justified in taking him to task. Assuredly, however, this is not the Scholastic doctrine. Perry's term "force of desire" is not altogether a happy selection, since it may refer either to the intensity of the subjective act of desire or to the capacity of the object to excite that desire. When the Scholastic view places the "force of desire" in the object, it is referring to the object's capacity to be the end of action. Although the object has "force" in the strict sense, it has desire only in a metaphorical one. Perry's difficulty, therefore, may be resolved into a vague use of terminology, which could hardly have arisen in the Scholastic system.

So far in this chapter our concern has been to indicate certain general weaknesses in the subjective position. We shall now consider some special problems of the three leading valuists Perry, Alexander, and Urban.

Inconsistencies of the Interest Theory

Certainly the most convincing condemnation of a man's argument is his own inability to formulate it without contradictions. Since we have already belabored Professor Perry for his three conflicting definitions of value, we shall pass on to a consideration of the most outstanding feature of his theory -
namely, that of interest. According to Perry, interest is a "State, or attitude, or act, or process, which is characteristic of living things, which is unmistakably present in the motor-affective consciousness of man, and which shades away through instinct and reflex to the doubtful borderland of tropism." Briefly, it is the "motor-affective life," of which "value is a function." Though this definition of interest may seem to include the phenomena of vegetative and sensitive life, Perry later informs us that such is not his intention, since only the diverse modes of human behavior can furnish sufficient data for the science of value. Thus interest taken strictly is to be interpreted in psychological rather than a biological sense. This psychological stand of Perry is quite remarkable in view of his earlier approval of the behavioristic interpretation of life, wherein, however, he admits that he is a behaviorist without psychophobia. Perry's reason for rejecting the broader biological interpretation of interest is that with such a view man may feel that life is not worth living. According to him, while the strictly biological interests are concerned with the preservation of the organism through its fundamental life processes, civilized man on the other hand has higher and more cultured interests which he must satisfy. "Any picture of life", the learned Harvard professor poetically assures us, "which represents the organism as trimming sail, stopping leaks, and storing supplies in order to ride the sea, must fail to con-
vey the physiognomy of man. It is characteristic of him to be primarily concerned with the freight that he carries; and to set sail for distant parts rather than merely to keep afloat. It is this creative and adventurous aspect of life for which the narrower biological categories fail to provide.  "29

Unfortunately for Rerry, the very same method that he employs in rejecting the biological interpretation of value may be used against his own psychological view. If the biological interpretation is to be discarded because it may not make life worth living, so also must the psychological interpretation be sacrificed because it may not make civilized life worth liking. Certainly it is of far greater value for a man to be interested in his self-preservation than to like such products of "civilized" society as opium or marijuana. So long as we fail to look beyond mere liking or disliking, we can never hope to find the key to human destiny.

Another great difficulty of this theory of interest is that it makes the problem of value far too narrow. Since interest is to be understood only in terms of human motor-affective life, value theory must necessarily exclude the activity of animals and plants as well as the inanimate tendencies of brute matter. The Neo-Thomistic view, however, has an explanation that is broad enough to encompass all the activity of the universe. According to this doctrine, one inanimate object tends towards another in much the same way as a human being
desires the satisfaction of its appetite. Of course, there is no conscious appetite in the brute matter, but only the material order and tendencies that are placed within it by a Supreme Intelligence, Who wisely ordains the order of the universe. The thought and the will of inanimate and unintellectual nature is from without, the physical process of tending towards its end or goal is from within, but only on account of the extrinsic Mind. For everything in the world, from the gravitational attraction of two molecules on each other up to the noblest desire of the cultured man, value remains in the object and the desire or attraction for it in the subject. In this way scholasticism is able to offer a consistent and complete explanation of the facts of experience. Interest theory, on the other hand, in order to include all grades of being, must either materialize conscious life or merge matter into mind.

Towards the close of his chief work on value, Professor Perry arrives at the remarkable conclusion that "all fully aroused interests are of equal intensity." This statement can be understood in two senses, one of which, however, is tautological. This first interpretation is that a fully aroused interest completely exhausts the capacity of the subject with reference to that interest. Obviously this is not the sense intended, since the predicate of the proposition is a useless repetition of the subject. The second meaning is that the in-
terest taken in one "object of desire" is always equal to that taken in others. Unfortunately, this latter interpretation does not appear to fit the facts, since a man's fully aroused interest in something trivial, say in jade ornaments, can scarcely equal the intensity of his concern over self-preservation.

Another serious difficulty of Perry's theory is that interest in any object should always precede the acquisition of it. Yet such is often not the case in life. For instance, there are many things in which one becomes interested only after he has acquired them. Take the young lad who is forced to study classical music or the high school student who is forced to read good literature. Only after he has acquired great value from these objects does this kind of person become interested, if indeed he ever does so at all. For Perry, however, training endured unwillingly and without at least some enthusiasm can be of no value to the recipient.

The conflict between his subjective theory of value and his realistic exposition of epistemology has occurred to Professor Perry himself, and by way of answer he has called the inference wholly gratuitous. Yet the very explanation of cognition which he offers in defence can be used to refute his theory of value. What he says excellently is that the thing known does not really change because it is known, that it was knowable all the time, that knowable does not equal known. Now, if Perry had only applied this method to value, he would not
have written the formula "X is valuable equals interest is taken in X", nor would he have argued that interest confers a special character on the object.\(^{33}\) This desire to maintain an objective philosophy of cognition and at the same time to hold for a subjective theory of value is but another instance of the difficulty that all subjectivists experience in trying to explain away the undeniable appearance of objective reality.

**Sociological Explanation of Value is Inadequate**

Ferry, Alexander and many others make much of the social nature of value. For them, the individual values must yield to those of society. To Ferry, for example, even the will of two-thirds is sacred, and to Alexander, Sellars, as well as many Continental philosophers society is the standard of mind. Alexander and Sellars even go so far as to suggest that man must now relinquish his hope of a future existence and learn to be content with the mere continuance of human ideals, for there is now to be had the higher satisfaction of furthering the social development of the race. No longer must man seek the preservation of the individual, but that of the species. It is noteworthy that both Alexander and Sellars admit the fact that somehow man must reeducate himself, since this social manner of thinking is not the natural one. Moreover, by means of this socialization of value, Ferry would explain away his difficulties over the equal intensity of interest, for in the
standardizing of value "interest is added to interest in the
same objects and these objects derive augmented value from the
summation of the interests taken in them.

In the first place, Perry's summation of subjective
interests in the external object is not easy to comprehend. But more important are the unsatisfying conclusions that can be reached by this agreement of wills. According to this theory, a trivial thing over which there is a more general concordance of opinion becomes of greater value simply because of that harmony of minds. Over the value of candy, for instance, there is great agreement among all classes, young and old, but over the indissolubility of the marriage tie there is by no means a unanimity of opinion, and moreover, a large section of mankind - children - is scarcely interested in the question at all. Yet according to the sociality view, it would be candy which is of higher value to mankind. This conclusion would indeed be true, if there were no intrinsic values independent of the subjective preference; but it is certainly erroneous in the supposition that there is such objective excellence. Similar examples could be multiplied indefinitely, the only purpose of which would be to show how far the subjective view has strayed from the path of reality.
Subjective Nature of the Relational Theory

At the outset of this chapter we remarked that all the modern theories of value which do not approximate the Scholastic viewpoint can be reduced to subjectivism. Indeed, there are only two theories of value, the objective or Scholastic and the subjective. The good work done in this field by John Laird, A. P. Brogan, and others is only an approach towards the more complete explanation already evolved by St. Thomas and his successors. Now it is not very difficult to detect the subjective element in Professor Alexander's relational theory. According to this doctrine, value does not exist in the object previous to the subject's relation with it, but is born simultaneously with the act of appreciation. But if there is no value prior to the subjective state, then the subject must be said to confer the value. To say that value is only in the subject derivatively is to confuse the issue. The simple fact is that before the act of appreciation comes into being, there is no value. Whether value can be primarily in the relation or not, certainly the value of a relation that depends entirely on subjective activity is not objective. Hence, the relational theory as expounded by Alexander and Sellars is fundamentally the same as the subjective theories of Perry and Mackenzie, and must, therefore, labor under all the basic difficulties of their position.
Subjective Character of Urban's "Unique Form of Objectivity"

The third principal type of non-Scholastic value theory is the so-called objective view of W. M. Urban. In this doctrine Professor Urban wishes expressly to oppose the subjective and the relational views, which he condemns as "the supreme insanity of interest in the unreal". Unfortunately, however, he himself falls into the same error which he so severely criticizes. For him value is "a unique form of objectivity differing from either existence or subsistence"; it is an irreducible form lying between being and non-being. With all due respect to his desire to escape subjectivism, it is very difficult to understand just what this "unique form of objectivity" may be except a subjective act or state. Professor Urban himself concedes that at first we shall be confused by this new way of thinking, since it is contrary to the ordinary way, and that we shall find great difficulty in accepting the concept of objectivity without existence.

Now the facts of external reality give no evidence of a middle between being and not-being. Everything that is must be called being; that which which is not, must simply be called "not-being". Of course, all being is not yet actualized, some of it still lies in potency; but inasmuch as it is even in potency, it must be regarded as real, and therefore opposed to nothing. Since Urban does not admit potential reality in his
unique form, it must remain strictly a subjective conception. Neither can he avoid the dilemma by making this unique form a quality, since qualities are also being secundum quid and postulate being simpliciter as a subject of inhaesion. And so, Professor Urban's own theory of value ultimately develop into "the supreme inanity of interest in the unreal".

Summary

While many more inconsistencies of the non-Scholastic position can be discovered and discussed with profit, yet these outstanding weaknesses are sufficient to establish our argument. Subjective value theory, which begins by laying its foundations on the insecure ground of contemporary scientific method and Kantianism, is not any more fortunate in the condition of its superstructure. Here we find that all the difficulties of the subjective Kantian basis becomes accentuated the farther upward we proceed, until it is quite clear that such a system cannot survive in reality. Between the evidence of the external world and the subjective theory of value the gulf is ever growing wider and wider, so that little hope for an understanding of the problem of value remains to the non-Scholastics unless they abandon their present approach.
2. G. Santayana, quoted in J. S. Zybray's Present Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism, p. 74
5. Ibid., p. 8
7. R. B. Perry, op. cit., p. 157
8. R. B. Perry, The Present Conflict of Ideals, p. 206
9. J. S. Mackenzie, ultimate Values, p. 34
10. S. A. Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, I, p. 321
12. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, Ia, q. 2, a. 3
13. Ibid., Ia, q. 4, a. 2
14. Ibid., Ia, q. 6, a. 2 & 4
15. Ibid., Ia, q. 5, a. 4, ad 2 am
16. Ibid., Ia, q. 6, a. 4
17. C. Frick, Critica, p. 276
21. Ibid., p. 306
22. R. B. Perry, *op. cit.*, p. 70
27. *Ibid.*, pp. 142 & 143
30. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, 1a, q. 103, a. 1
37. R. B. Perry, *op. cit.*, p. 645
38. S. Alexander, *op. cit.*, p. 243
42. *This thesis*, Chap. II, p. 15
CHAPTER VII

VALUE AND GOD

In the three preceding chapters we have seen how non-Scholastic theories of value are insufficient both from the viewpoint of historical premises and also from that of current conclusions. To complete our criticism we ought to apply the principles of subjective value theory to other fields of thought and human endeavor. Since value theory is or ought to be part of general metaphysics, its conclusions should be available as fundamental principles for the other sciences. If on the other hand, the application of these principles to other fields leads to unacceptable consequences, then one may seriously doubt the validity of the principles themselves. In the case of subjective value theory, this discovery will only amount to a third main line of refutation.

Since the purpose of this thesis is to consider the primary concept of value and not the various grades in the scale of values, we shall not concern ourselves here with the proximate standards necessary to art, economics, politics, and other intermediate sciences, but shall leap from the fundamental theory to its explanation of the highest value - namely, God. It is in its explanation of the place that God must hold in the universe that the full consequences of subjective value theory are brought to light. Let us, then, briefly review the various
opinions of the leading subjective valuists, in order to see how completely they have revolted from traditional philosophical thought on the matter of a Supreme Being.

For Perry God is definitely not a person, since to make him such would be to deny him the right to be himself. Assuredly, this opinion places the strangest of possible interpretations on personality. But waiving that point, let us see just what God is. In Perry's theory God is "a harmony of wills" resulting from the fact that persons live in concord. He is indeed a being far exceeding and surpassing man, yet dependent on man for his existence. He is the name of legitimate aspiration, which, however, is not yet actualized. Thus Perry agrees with Alexander that God is an emergent deity. For Alexander, God is in the strictest sense a creature, who is somehow to be distinguished from "Deity". Deity in his system is the next step in the evolution of space-time. In the past matter, life, human mind were all in their turn deity; but now deity is out in front again. God, on the other hand is the whole world as possessing the quality of deity. Just as space is the body with reference to time as the mind, so the world is the body of God and deity is his mind. Mackenzie and Sellars also accept the finite god of space-time. Urban, on the other hand, is non-committal. He does not deny the existence of a Supreme Being, but simply ignores it. Such, then, are the outstanding subjective theories with regard to God. Though perhaps differing
at times in details, they are for the most part in agreement that God is not an Absolute Being, but a finite becoming; that He is not a person, nor even actual, but is strictly provision-al and dependent on man. He is indeed a convenient God, at once emergent, pragmatic, physical, or anything else that the will or, we should rather say, the whim of man desires.

The Modern God, a Kantian Creation

Since we have already indicated the great debt that value theory owes in other respects to Kantian metaphysics, it will be interesting to see precisely what basis the modern idea of God has in that earlier system. From the theoretical philosophy of Kant arises the contemporary tendency to explain our knowledge of God as anti-intellectual and emotional. This attitude is clearly demonstrated throughout the latter part of Alexander's Space, Time, and Deity, wherein the approach to deity is regarded as primarily one of sentiment and imagination. From the practical philosophy of Kant modern valuists derive their pragmatic interpretation of God, for Kant himself declares that the Supreme Being is only an hypothesis and a regulative norm. Those modern philosophers, such as Mackenzie, who wish to exclude God altogether from the field of metaphysics, can justify their stand in the Kantian idea that God is real only insomuch as He is useful. Thus He becomes non-existent for those who cannot find any value in Him. Again, the contempor-
ary anthropomorphic exposition of the nature of God is the
direct result of the Kantian doctrine on the will. Since the
human faculty can never know any spiritual object towards which
it can aspire, it must ever remain on the strictly human level
and God, therefore, will never be greater in dignity than man
himself. Because of its insistence on the non-objective ap-
proach to God, Kantian philosophy is also largely responsible
for the current prevalence of agnosticism, in which anyone's
guess is as good as any one else's, since there would be no ob-
jective control of subjective sentiment and opinion.

The same arguments that were employed in Chapter V to
reject the Kantian groundwork of all metaphysics are equally
applicable to his concept of God and, therefore, need not be
repeated at length. The fundamental fallacy of Kant's whole
system is his gratuitous assumption that the human mind is a
measure, and not a thing measured. To this view St. Thomas and
all his followers stand resolutely opposed, since it inverts
the entire evidence of experience. For Kant the mind projects
empty forms on sense experience and is, therefore, the creator
of its own intellectual perceptions. Scholasticism, on the
other hand, holds that the mind is measured and informed by ex-
ternal reality, which owes its existence, not to men's thinking,
but to a Supreme Being Who is the Creator and Conservor of all
things. For Kant the practical will confers good on objects
according to their value to the subject, as, for example, on
God, Who is needed to give permanence to moral standards. St. Thomas on the other hand maintains that the good which the will discovers in creatures is ultimately a reflection of the Divine Goodness Who made them.

The Fallacy of Inverted Relations

The total consequence of this Kantian groundwork and its contemporary expression in subjective value theory is what Dr. Fulton Sheen aptly calls "the fallacy of inverted relations". According to traditional thought the real dependence in the relation between God and creature is in the creature; but in modern philosophy this order has been inverted so that God becomes the dependent, the provisional time-server of man, thus the earlier theocentric interpretation of religion has yielded to a current egocentric philosophy. To show that this latter concept of the relation between God and creatures is a fallacy, one need only to apply the principle of causality and immediately the untenability of the view becomes evident. Modern valuists must admit that either God or creatures, or more definitely man, is the cause of the other. To deny outright the principle of causality would be to embrace agnosticism and thereby render discussion impossible.

For this reason, subjective value theorists are committed to the position that man is the cause of God. Now what is the consequence of this view? According to its premises,
man comes first and God, if He exists at all, follows from man's efforts. Thus man becomes the creator or in a word, God Himself, which is a complete inversion of the doctrine of Scholastics. It will not help our adversaries to argue that God and creatures exist before man, and that man merely confers value on them. For if God exists before man and all other creatures, He has the power over them, and not they over Him, since He has the power first. Few value theorists have attempted to escape by postulating the previous existence of a valueless God. Rather they frankly admit their inability to explain the origin of things and are content with a limited god at the end rather than at the beginning of the universe. The great difficulty of this doctrine is that, by failing to account for the beginning of things, it makes discussion about their end philosophically useless.

Illogicality of the Pragmatic View of God

The pragmatic view of God makes Him at all times variable and contingent and now and then rejects Him altogether, according to whatever value the individual may find in Him at the moment. Now to treat the concept of God in this way is as illogical as to hold that two and two equal four only now and then. If perhaps for the convenience of my problem, I see fit to make two and two equal five or seven, I may get an answer, but I shall not have any guarantee that my answer is either right or
wrong, and all the probabilities are in favor of its being wrong. Since God is the Sufficient Reason for all things and the ultimate explanation of their origin and final destiny, He is always necessary and invariable. Or there never will come a day when one does not need a sufficient reason for reality.

The illogicality of the pragmatic view of value can be further seen from three possible attitudes that this theory may take with regard to the nature of God. Either God exists all the time, and then utterly to disregard Him now and then because He may not be useful at the moment, is exceedingly rash; or He does not exist at all, and then to be concerned about Him is in one sense hypocrisy and in any sense the height of folly. For why should one be troubled over the power of a non-entity? To say that one should act as if God exists is as hypocritical and as foolish as to say that one should act as if one has one's daily bread. This last attitude may be likened to that of a sick man who is willing to accept his poor relations in secret, but is ashamed to acknowledge them in public, and is indeed a shabby way of smuggling God in through the back door after He has been ejected through the front. Or again, it may mean that man must satisfy his wants with his own imaginings, which is surely a fatal process. The third possibility is that God exists now and then, whenever and howsoever man sees fit to make Him. Since we have already considered the
weakness of this argument, it would seem that the pragmatic attitude of the value theory insofar as it concerns God is not founded on logic or experience.

A great deal today is made of the affective rather than the intellectual perception of God. In one respect this emotional approach is due to Protestant Pietism and in another to a failure to distinguish between confused and reflex knowledge. It is quite true that we do not immediately acquire very clear ideas about the nature of God. But the mere fact that our primitive concept of the supreme Being is quite confused, does not detract from its genuinely intellectual character. As to the emotional nature of perception, a serious difficulty immediately arises when it is applied to God. Emotions vary greatly in kind, frequency, and intensity - both in individuals as well as in society. Such an inconstant element can never provide the permanence and constancy that is required for the concept of the Sufficient Reason of all things, and must, therefore, be abandoned as an explanation of our knowledge of God.

Attempted Sociological Escape from Egocentric Religion

The subjective concept of God is indeed supremely flattering to a man in whom the will to power has grown excessive, since it makes man the hub and center of the universe and its fundamental cause. Yet somehow the human heart rebels at the apothesis of the ego. Even the most selfish men must at times
be dissatisfied with the imperfections and sin in their nature. 

We make such miserable beings as men so often discover themselves to be the acme of achievement is the bitterest irony, from which the human mind rightly revolts. Our limited intellects may not understand many things, but even the simplest savage cannot fail to realize that what he wants in God is something higher and nobler than himself, something towards which his will can aspire.

It is, perhaps, to this desire that the sociological aspect of the highest value owes its popularity. The subjective valuist, not wishing to relinquish his fundamental position, and yet seeking an escape from the narrowness of an egocentric religion, turns towards society as the solution of his problem. Thus, God is not the individual man, but rather the ideal object of an ideal will in which the agreement of even a plurality of society is sacred.

While this theory may be an agreeable evasion of the difficulty, it is certainly not an answer. For as Perry himself admits this unanimity of wills - alas - does not now exist and will probably never be realized. He explains his use of the regretful interjection "alas" by saying that the unanimity ought to exist, because it is so sorely needed. However, the same objection that is urged against the individual's being God, can be applied with greater cogency to the sociological view. Society is nothing more than a collection of imperfect
individuals, the summation of which cannot be better than its separate components. Thus God as divinized society may be a palliative to the subjectivist's conscience, but never a justification of his philosophy.

By showing in this chapter how the application of the subjective theory of value to the notion of God and therefore to that of religion in general leads to unacceptable consequences, we have established a third main line of argument for its rejection. The same method could be employed in analyzing the immediate sciences. However, since the purpose of this thesis is only to consider the fundamental philosophy of value, and since the application of its principles to one science - or, for example, that of religion - is sufficient to demonstrate their logical outcome, it will not be necessary to consider the other sciences in order to establish our argument.
FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER VII

1. Cf. this thesis, Chapter II, p. 9
2. Loc. cit.
4. Cf. this thesis, Chapter II, p. 10
6. S. Alexander, *op. cit.* p. 373
8. Ibid., p. 44
9. St. Thomas, *De Veritate*, q. 1. a. 2
11. Ibid., 1 a, q. 4, a. 2
13. Cf. this thesis, Chapter VI, p. 88; and J. S. Mackenzie, *Ultimate Values*, p. 52
14. St. Thomas, *op. cit.*, 1a, q. 44, a. 4; and 1a, q. 9, al.
16. Ibid., p. 673
17. Ibid., pp. 687-8
CHAPTER VIII

THE FUTURE OF VALUE PHILOSOPHY

Now that we have considered the non-Scholastic theory of value both from the viewpoint of its origin in empirical science and Kantian theory of knowledge, and from that of its present conclusions, as well as its application to the ultimate philosophy of God, the only task remaining for us is to draw some inferences as to its future.

Unfortunately, the prospect for value theory does not at present offer much encouragement. Subjective value philosophy is indeed in a truly sad plight. By failing to account for the data of everyday experience, it puzzles the thinker who is seeking a satisfactory explanation of proximate reality. By professing ignorance as to the origin of the universe, it leaves the question of ultimate reality a profound mystery, which is most distressing to the human mind in its quest for truth. By destroying or perverting the concept of God to such an extent that it is no longer intelligible, it deprives men of the indispensable consolation of religion. By making deity dependent on the will of man, it takes away that Providence towards which the unfortunate creature is want to turn in his hour of misery. As a result, the successful man should tend to overwhelming pride and the unsuccessful man to blackest despair. Moreover, the prospect of a future existence either disappears or is ren-
dered exceedingly vague, since the reality of such a state depends on the power of the valuing subject's will, a will which so often fails in the most ordinary things. Subjective value theory, too, by undermining those ethical sanctions whose value is derived from the absolute justice of a supreme Lawgiver, leads to moral scepticism. Thus, without the penalties of restitution, capital and labor need not fear their excesses, nor need the sinner any longer dread the consequences of his transgressions. The present day unconcern and even contempt for the marriage bond and the duty of providing for the care of children can find its philosophical justification in the subjective attitude of contemporary value theory. Finally, it becomes evident that philosophy is no longer serviceable to the average man for the solution of his problems, since the logical development of the premises of the subjective theory of value will serve only to render life meaningless. Therefore, the only course open to the wise, but "unphilosophical" man is to abandon such idle speculation for the clear light of common sense.

The non-Scholastic position is not, however, utterly hopeless. In the first place, there is a minority of no inconsiderable merit who are strenuously attacking the doctrines of their confreres and are themselves championing same views that approximate Thomism. Among these the most outstanding are John Laird in England and A. P. Brogan in America; but happily
they are not alone in their crusade against subjective or otherwise untenable theories of value. In the second place, the subjective valuists themselves are not satisfied with their own theories. Quite recently, W. M. Urban admitted that the problem still remains unsolved, that the reconciliation between existence and value, for which he so ardently hoped at the conclusion of his earlier work, is not yet in view. Perry, too, frankly acknowledges that his theory is "adjoined on all sides by thickets abounding in monstrous doubts and difficulties", and that he would fain have untangled the many complications which beset his position. Moreover, all of the, have confessed their inability to explain the ultimate origin of things, a question which no sincere thinker can afford to leave unanswered. So long as these non-Scholastics remain free from an attitude of utter complacency in their errors, it is not too much to expect some improvement.

Here is where Neo-Thomism must step in and play the part of wise and experienced guide. Against the uncertainty and obscurities of subjective theory, the doctrine of St. Thomas, scientifically enriched and amplified by its modern protagonists, stands firm and clear. Its principles are thoroughly sane, permanent, and objective in their explanation of the problems of life. These principles are sane because they are not founded on a priori speculation, but on the data of common sense. They are permanent and objective because they
are not based on an emotional evaluation of subjective states of mind, but on a rational exposition of the activity of the external world. Lastly, by offering a satisfactory explanation of the problems of existence and especially of human existence, they afford the mind a haven where it can be secure in its much desired rest.

To subjective value theory, scholastic philosophy can render a second service of the utmost importance, by formulating a fixed terminology for it. If the definite language of the Schoolmen had been applied to modern speculation, W. H. Sheldon would not have been able to complain that all current definitions of value are useless, and George Santayana would not have needed to cry out in despair at the futility of philosophical discussion. In opposition to the Babel of figurative terms and personal fancies, the Scholastic system can offer an established vocabulary that is also capable of sound and ample expansion.

Very encouraging, too, is the fact that modern valuists seem to be genuinely desirous of philosophical relations with Scholastics. Perry on his part deeply regrets the lack of contact between Catholic and non-Catholic philosophy in this country, and sincerely hopes that both sides by speaking out their differences will come to a better understanding of each other. From across the sea Alexander in England voices the same opinion. Indeed, many of the modern non-Scholastics lay the fault
of the unpopularity of Scholastic doctrine chiefly to the attitude of its own exponents. It is, therefore, high time that the champions of Neo-Thomism should no longer be content to enjoy among themselves the satisfaction of their own system, but should also be eager to share it with others who may wish for a better understanding of reality. Perhaps, through a more intimate contact in future discussions with non-Scholastics, Neo-Thomistias can turn philosophy back from its subjective wanderings and once more establish the supremacy of the philosopha perennia of Aristotle and St. Thomas. In that philosophy alone do we see any genuine promise for a theory of value.
FOOTNOTES to CHAPTER VIII


2. R. B. Perry, General Theory of Value, p. VII


4. Ibid., p. 74
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