The Yakima Indian War: 1855-1856

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THE YAKIMA INDIAN WAR:
1855-1856

by
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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

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LIFE


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INTRODUCTION

The months that bridged 1855 with 1856 saw the close of a long period of violence.

The Crimean War had just ended after the butchery, mutilation, or destruction by disease of half a million men. Producing a few heroic figures (the chief by all odds Florence Nightingale), it had lifted to prominence many more who were decidedly unheroic. While hardly weakening the despotism of St. Petersburg, it had strengthened the barbaric tyranny of the Turk. Austria had its foot more firmly than ever on the necks of Hungary and Venetia; the petty despots of the German states bore their sway with unimpaired arrogance . . . in France the unprincipled usurper of the Napoleonic throne strutted more tyrannously than before. 1

In the United States the situation was no less depressing.

The materials were being laid in Kansas during 1855 for a smoulder of civil war which, as armed bodies of men began entering the Territory from various parts of the Union, would flare in 1856 into a crackling blaze. 2

This year also witnessed the decline, but by no means the death, of the Know-Nothing Party with all its bigotry and intolerance. Blinding jingoism cheered William Walker's despicable invasion and conquest of Nicaragua with his gang of human derelicts.

History neither flows nor ebbs in a vacuum, whether it be on the international, national, or regional level. To this general rule the Pacific Northwest was no exception. The war-torn decades from 1847 to 1877 were the

2 Ibid., 380.
logical outcome of preceding years of mounting tension between Indian and whites. Association of the two races began with the dawn of the Nineteenth Century when fur traders crossed the Rocky Mountains. In less than half a century posts of the Hudson's Bay Company dotted the country west of the Rockies and with only occasional opposition from indigenous tribes, the Company had pursued a policy of strict commercial enterprise without interference in tribal matters. Indians came to think that these white men had no designs on their lands, their hunting or fishing places.

This desirable state of affairs was disrupted by the steady trickle of American emigrants that became a flood before the end of the 1840's. Newly arrived families simply squatted on land hitherto roamed-over by the Indians. At first, resistance to the white tide was sporadic and mostly a fight between individuals. The Cayuse War of 1847, however, gave common expression to the accumulated grievances of the tribes in the eastern portions of present-day Washington and Oregon, and the western part of Idaho.

Although the Indians perpetrated the massacre of Dr. Marcus Whitman, his wife, and twelve others at the Wailatpu Mission; and the white volunteer troops did hang the alleged Indian leaders of the uprising, the close of the Cayuse War did not cure the festering complaints of the natives. White men continued to exploit them, to cheat them, and treat them as less than human. Above all else, white men persisted in taking their lands. The nomadic life to which they were accustomed became increasingly difficult as more and more settlers took the Indian's possessions without giving in return compensation of any kind.

Neighboring tribes began to regret their previous refusal to join
in the Cayuse attempt to blot out the white plague. Nothing had been gained by tolerating the whites for more than a decade. Restlessness spread through the country as the hope of uniting the Indians against the whites grew stronger by the day.

The whites made one more full-scale effort to solve the problem and dissipate the widespread antagonism. Washington Territory was created on 2 March 1853, and Isaac Ingalls Stevens of Massachusetts appointed Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs for the new Territory. In the closing days of 1854 Stevens undertook the negotiation of treaties by which the Indians would sell their title to the greater part of the country and retire to specified districts designated as reservations. The Yakima, Cayuse, Walla-walla, and Nez Percé tribes signed such a document at Walla Walla Council Grounds, Washington Territory, 9 June 1855.

It will be sufficiently clear from the chapters to follow, that these tribes signed the treaty only to gain time for the war of extermination which they had determined upon. They planned to continue gathering supplies of all kinds, including the harvest of 1855, and after snow was on the ground and the rivers frozen, they would fall upon the settlements and kill every white person in the Oregon Country. Such was the Yakima War in theory. Fortunately for the settlers, the conspiracy was never put to the acid test by launching the attack as planned.

This apparently insignificant stand of a gallant tribe against the on-rolling whites has a peculiar fascination. The war was sufficiently restricted geographically to make possible a satisfactory study of its military phases, while the factors inducing war were localized and on a scale small
enough to admit of careful scrutiny. The Indian policy, if it may be honored with that title, of the United States stands out in sharp miniature; and the heart-rending efforts of courageous Indians to preserve their native land despite hopeless odds constitute a moving chapter in the story of America's "Century of Dishonor."
CHAPTER I

BEFORE THE STORM

"I was much and agreeably disappointed in the appearance of the country," Captain James J. Archer told his mother in far-away Baltimore.

I had been informed that after the middle of April it never rained—that the whole route of our march lay through an arid sterile plain without trees or grass.1 Archer was neither the first nor the last white man unprepared for the surprising diversity inescapably apparent throughout the length and breadth of the interior country. The mountains and valleys, rivers and plains that comprise the setting for our narrative were those found east of the Cascade Mountains, and contiguous to both banks of the Columbia River as it thrust itself from out the mountain strongholds of New Caledonia and sought the Pacific Ocean more than six hundred miles distant. To the east the region stretched as far as the Snake River country, and southeast until it touched the Umatilla River. A modern map designates the lands under discussion as the eastern portion of the State of Washington, northern and northeastern Oregon, and western Idaho. Isaac I. Stevens estimated the number of acres at 39,215,460 when he negotiated with the Indians for the purchase of this district in 1855.2 Some faint notion

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1 Archer to his mother, Camp on Nachess River, 8 June 1856. The Archer Letters are preserved by the Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland. This deposit hereinafter designated as MD.

2 "Estimate of the No of acres acquired by treaty stipulation,
APPROXIMATE AREA

AFFECTED BY HOSTILITIES
of the country's expanse is grasped from the fact that the 10,828,800 acres eventually taken from the Yakima tribe alone, represents 16,920 square miles of territory.  

No one phrase can describe the country with its towering mountains, rolling hills, fertile valleys and arid plateaus; its violent, plunging streams and modest, insignificant rivulets. Each feature of the land would play a role in the fateful year of 1855-1856. Major Granville Haller's men were cut off from water, wood and forage while in sight of all three; Major Gabriel Rains led his dejected men through the mountain passes choking-up with snow and swept by bone-piercing winds; Colonel George Wright might fret helplessly, but the streams continued to rise and the spring floods kept him immobile while Indians bedeviled the Army with taunts and insults from the

e tc." Records of the United States Senate, 35th Congress, 1st Session, Confidential (Washington and Oregon Treaties). This MS is preserved in the files of the National Archives, Washington, D. C., Legislative Services Division. This deposit hereinafter designated as LS.

3 Stevens to Manypenny, Council Ground, Camp Stevens, 14 June 1855. This letter is preserved in the National Archives, Washington, D. C., Natural Resources Division, files of the Washington Superintendency of Indian Affairs, Miscellaneous Letters Received. This deposit hereinafter designated as Wash. SIA, Misc. Letts. Recd.

4 Granville C. Haller was born in York, Pennsylvania, on 31 January 1819, and was commissioned second lieutenant in the Fourth United States Infantry on 17 November 1839. He served throughout the Seminole War, and during the Mexican War he participated in the capture of Mexico City. His gallantry and meritorious conduct brought two brevets as captain, and later as major.

5 Gabriel James Rains was born in Craven county, North Carolina, 4 June 1803, graduated from West Point in 1827, and began his tours of duty on the western frontier. In 1861 he resigned from the United States Army to accept a commission as Brigadier General in the Confederate forces. In June, 1864, he was made Superintendent of the Confederate Torpedo Bureau.
opposite bank of the Naches River. 6

This vast territory was the unfenced homeland of a dozen Indian tribes long before the white man's coming. They sought their few necessities of life wherever they abounded and took them wherever they were found. The tribes whose names figured prominently in the major portion of the present narrative were the Yakima, Klikitat, Nez Percé, and Wallawalla, all of the Shahaptian linguistic group; and the Cayuse who were Wailatpuans closely allied in speech with the neighboring Nez Percé. 7 The close similarity of cultures existing between these tribes helps explain their later widespread cooperation against the hated whites. A common linguistic root and contiguous geographical location explains, in great part, their almost identical peculiarities in all essential aspects.

At the very outset, the question of population presents itself to anyone studying the Indians of the past century. To determine with complete satisfaction the exact number of Indians living in the interior on the eve of the war is impossible. Their nomadic habits made of an accurate census nothing more than an honest estimate. 8 Two years before hostilities began Major

6 George Wright was born at Norwich, Vermont, on 21 October 1803. His military career was varied and distinguished by his service in Wisconsin (1822-1824), Missouri (1826-1828), and on the northern frontier during the Canadian disturbances, 1837-1838. Before coming to Oregon in 1856, he had fought in the Seminole War, 1840-1842, and in the Mexican War, 1846-1847. He drowned on 30 July 1865, when the Brother Jonathan sank off the coast of southern Oregon.

7 F. W. Hodge (Ed.) Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico, Two Parts, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1912. This standard work is used throughout the present dissertation as a guide for the spelling of Indian words.

8 Gibbs to McClellan, Olympia, W. T., 4 March 1854. The MS of Gibb
Benjamin Alvord put the number of Yakima at one thousand and five hundred, of whom three hundred and fifty were warriors; and their neighbors, the Klickitat, were three hundred strong one year prior to the outbreak.

The Yakima were rich, proud, haughty, and unfriendly to Americans though they had made several cordial gestures. From the white man's point of view, it was particularly necessary that the Yakima be genuinely well-disposed since the new road from Puget Sound to Fort Walla Walla would pass through the Yakima Valley. "Their country was to become a thoroughfare for the Whites, and it was very important that a proper impression should be made,

Report is preserved among the McClellan Papers in the Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C. This deposit hereinafter designated as LC. Printed in Reports of Explorations and Surveys, to Ascertaint the Most Practicable and Economical Route for a Railroad from the Mississippi River to the Pacific Ocean, I, 402-434. This work hereinafter designated as Railroad Surveys.

9 Benjamin Alvord "Report," Fort Dalles, 17 July 1853, in 34th Congress, 3rd Session, House Executive Document No. 76 (Serial Set No. 906). Hereinafter printed government documents are cited once in complete form, and then by their Serial Set designation.

10 Gibbs to McClellan, Olympia, W. T., 4 March 1854, LC; Printed in Railroad Surveys, I, 402-454.


12 Ibid; Gibbs to McClellan, Olympia, W. T., 4 March 1854, LC; Printed in Railroad Surveys, loc. cit.; D'Herbomez à Brouillet, Attanem, Camp des Yakama, 28 août 1854. Dellanoy Copies preserved in the Archives of the Diocese of Seattle. These copies were made by Reverend Joseph Dellanoy in October, 1923. He found an old trunk in Vancouver, Washington, containing the papers of Monsignor J. B. A. Brouillet, among which is an invaluable series of letters written by the Oblates of Mary Immaculate from, and concerning the Yakima Mission. More recent diligent searching has failed to re-discover the original letters of which these are copies. Hereinafter this deposit is designated as S.

13 Alvord, "Report," Fort Dalles, 17 July 1853, in Serial Set No. 906; Gibbs to McClellan, Olympia, 4 March 1853, LC; Printed in Railroad Surveys, loc. cit.
and a friendly understanding established." Difficulties did arise quickly from the Indians decided reluctance to participate in the debatable advantages of the white people's civilization.

A moment's thought suffices to grasp the reason for the Indians' readiness to possess themselves and their goods in peace. They had enjoyed a simple life generations before the advent of the whites. Their wives and women picked berries that grew in wild profusion during season; in the lower prairies they dug the camas root and prepared it for use; surplus stores of dried berries and powdered camas root they traded "for fish, smoked clams and the roots which their own territory" did not furnish. The men caught salmon at the Cascades and the Dalles of the Columbia. These were processed in various ways by the women to furnish their greatest staple of food. Life was pleasant, at least for the men. They hunted in the shaded mountains during the greater part of the summer, and the winter months of almost complete inactivity were spent in the moderate climate of the valley.

Settled, sustained cultivation of the land was foreign to their way of life. They much preferred the relaxed program outlined above, which allowed them to punctuate their seasonal travels for food with occasional tribal festivities. The end of the strawberry and whortleberry season in the mountains was the occasion of an annual horse racing meet between the Yakima and Kittitas.

14 Gibbs to McClellan, Olympia, 4 March 1854, LC; Printed in Railroad Surveys, loc. cit.; Stevens to Manypenny, Washington City, D. C., 16 September 1854, in 33rd Congress, 2nd Session, House Executive Document No. 1 (Serial Set No. 777), 392-457.
15 Ibid.
16 Ibid.
A horse of proved reputation is a source of wealth or of ruin to his owner. On his speed he stakes his whole stud, his household goods, clothes, and finally his wives. And a single heat doubles his fortune, or sends him forth an impoverished adventurer. The interest is not however confined to the individual directly concerned; the tribe share it with him, and a common pile of goods of motley description, apportioned according to their ideas of value, is put up by either party, to be divided among the backers of the winner. 17

Indians are accused of being inveterate gamblers, but whether or not this vice, in its extreme form, was due in part to the influence of the whites is of little consequence in a description of their actual state at the dawn of the hostile years. Gibbs made an interesting reflection regarding the general topic of traits indigenous to the Yakima, when he reported:

Very few characteristic features remain among these people. Their long intercourse with the Hudson's Bay Company and of late years with the Americans has obliterated what peculiarities they may once have had nor is there any essential difference in their habits or manners from those of the tribes adjoining them. They use for the most part, the arms and utensils of the Whites, and the gun has superseded the bow. The pails and baskets constructed from the bark of the cedar, saddles and fishing apparatus are their principal articles of domestic manufacture, and even of such things, it is almost as common to find the imported substitutes. 18

Gibbs gives credit to the Hudson's Bay Company for persuading the Indians to plant small vegetable gardens, and to this extent turning them to the cultivation of the soil.

The Yakima were generally considered much superior to the river and coast tribes who had been in contact with the whites for many years and managed to become quite universally corrupt and degenerate as a result. The

17 Ibid.

18 Ibid., George Gibbs was a member of the large group organized and led by Stevens in 1853, to explore and survey a northern railroad route from St. Paul, Minnesota, to the Pacific. Although Gibbs was one of Stevens' trusted associates in the beginning, he eventually leagued himself with the faction bitterly opposed to the Governor's proclamation of Martial Law.
interior tribes retained a greater respect for other's property, and with a strange twist of morality, which permitted polygamy, they guarded their married women. 19 This precise point of personal chastity for the unmarried, and unwavering fidelity to one wife was a great stumbling block to the conversion to Christianity for many of the Yakima. Kamaikahan, most influential of the Yakima chiefs, was known to be deeply impressed by the Oblate Missionaries at the Yakima Mission, 20 going so far as continually to advise other Indians to receive Baptism, 21 while he remained unbaptized and living with five wives. 22 The same was true of the other chiefs and principal men of the Yakima. Skloom, brother of Kamaikahan, 23 loved polygamy, 24 as did yet another brother, Shawawai, who had five or six wives; 25 and old Teias, admittedly a great and true friend of the whites, was never baptized because he preferred women to his eternal salvation. 26

19 Ibid.

20 McClellan to Stevens, Camp on the Wee-nas, 22 August 1853, Wash. SIA. Misc. Letts. Reed.

21 Chirouse à Ricard, Ste Croix de Simkoue, 12 Janvier 1849, Archives Deschatelets, Oblates of Mary Immaculate, Scolasticat Saint-Joseph, Ottawa, Ontario. This deposit hereinafter designated as OMI.

22 Chirouse à Ricard, Ste Rose des Cayouses, 28 Fevrier 1854, OMI.

23 G. O. Haller, "Diary of Winnas Expedition beginning August 16, 1855," 29 September 1855, MS, Northwest Collection, University of Washington Library, Seattle, Washington. This deposit hereinafter designated as UW.

24 Chirouse à Ricard, Ste Croix de Simkoue, 12 Janvier 1849, OMI.

25 Ibid.

26 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 22 Fevrier 1856, S.
George Gibbs remarked that Kamaiakan, Owhi, and other Yakima chiefs adopted some of the external forms of Catholicism but there appeared to be a taint of hypocrisy in the devotion displayed by the Indians. Still in all, the chiefs manifested flashes of unexpected integrity, as one incident related by McClellan proved.

I will mention that some days ago I issued, in my last camp, some six days rations, to two guides that I had engaged, for some reason or other they remained behind--Today Kamaiacan came to this camp and brought with him the rations in question--Saying that as these men had done nothing for me, they did not deserve the rations. All this was done by his own volition, & not in consequence of any demand of mine.

Another incident sheds light on the fundamental honesty of Kamaiakan. He had ordered one hundred and fifty lashes each, for two men guilty of using insulting language to two of the Chief's wives. Later in the day, he asked Father Charles Pandosy, O. M. I., Catholic priest at Yakima Mission of St. Joseph on the Ahtanum, if the punishment was just. Pandosy's negative reply sent Kamaiakan hastening back to the Indian camp where he insisted that he be given one hundred lashes by way of retribution for his unjust judgment.

27 Gibbs to McClellan, Olympia, 4 March 1854, LC; Printed in Railroad Surveys, loc. cit.

28 McClellan to Stevens, Camp on the Wee-nas, 22 August 1854, Wash. SIA, Misc. Letts. Recd.

29 Charles Marie (né Louis John) Pandosy (1826-1891), was born at Marseilles, France, 21 November 1826. He entered the Oblates and was ordained in Oregon at Fort Walla Walla, 2 January 1848. Pandosy worked among the Yakima Indians until war forced him to transfer his attention to the tribes near Colville. In 1859 he founded a mission at Anse du Sable, on the east shore of Lake Okanogan in British Columbia. There he died on 6 February 1891.

30 Joseph Joset "Recollections of Rocky Mountain Mission Indians," MS, Jesuit Historical Archives, Oregon Province, Mt. St. Michael's, Spokane, Washington. This deposit hereinafter designated as MSM.
These glimmerings of noble traits were not sufficiently frequent to nourish the hope that the Yakima were grasping Christianity. Father Casimir Chirouse, O. M. I. had painted a depressing picture of the Yakima in 1849, when he wrote that:

They are not good, much is wanting to them. They are like all savages, that I have known up to the present, liars, cheats, treacherous, fickle, lazy, corrupt, and lastly, all the vices are deeply imbedded in their very roots.

Five years later, years that witnessed tireless work by the priests, Chirouse dejectedly confessed that:

Kamayarken has five wives, and all the other Chiefs are good for nothing, absolutely nothing. There are a few poor Indians who are a little better when they are near the priest, but when far away, since there is not a single Chief to support them, they very quickly become bad, even worse than before.

To the southeast of the Yakima, lived their future allies, the Wallawalla. They numbered about eight hundred souls, or two hundred and fifty warriors according to Alvord's estimate made in 1853. By the time Gibbs traversed their country in 1854, smallpox ravaged their camps and reduced their numbers to six hundred. The Wallawalla refused to join their neighbors, the

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31 Eugene Casimir Chirouse (1820(?)-1892), was born at Bourg du Peage near Valence, S. France. He entered the Oblates and was ordained by A. M. A. Blanchet at Fort Walla Walla, 2 January 1848. He labored among the Yakima and Cayuse tribes, and later with the Indians on Puget Sound, where he established a mission for the Snohomish at Tulalip. After spending some time on Vancouver Island and on the lower Fraser, he retired to British Columbia and died at New Westminster, 28 May 1892.

32 Chirouse à Ricard, Ste Croix de Simkoue, 12 Janvier 1849, OMI.
33 Chirouse à Ricard, Ste Rose des Cayouses, 28 Fevrier 1854, OMI.
35 Gibbs to McClellan, Olympia, 4 March 1854, LC; Printed in Railroad Surveys, loc. cit.
Cayuse, in the violent outburst of 1847 which is remembered chiefly because of the massacre of Dr. Marcus Whitman, his wife, and twelve others at Wailatpu Mission.36 This apparent aversion towards leaguing themselves with other tribes in any war on white settlers gave to the Wallawalla the reputation of being friendly to the whites.37 Despite the known fact that the Indians were well-armed, well-mounted, and wealthy by reason of their many horses,38 the Americans seemed to rely on the influence of the Hudson's Bay Company,39 and the restricted power of the old Chief, Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox or Yellow Serpent, to keep the Wallawalla neutral.40 These Indians were notorious for stealing from the whites,41 and whatever power Yellow Serpent had was wielded in favor of evil, if we judge from the following:

He built a spacious lodge where all the gamblers may gather and, in person, he presides over the games and other abominations spoken and done in this infernal place.42

The time came when the Americans would admit that Chirouse was a superior judge of Yellow Serpent's character. This chief may have been old.

36 Marcus Whitman (1802-1847) was born in Rushville, New York. In 1823 he began "to ride" with Dr. Bryant of Rushville, and graduated from Fairfield, New York, medical college on 24 January 1832. Shortly thereafter, Whitman took up the practise of his profession in Wheeler, New York, a small village. Here he lived until he set out with Parker in the spring of 1835.

37 Alvord, op. cit.

38 Ibid.

39 Ibid.

40 Gibbs to McClellan, Olympia, 4 March 1854, LC; Printed in Railroad Surveys, loc. cit.

41 Ibid.

42 Chirouse à Ricard, Ste. Croix de Simkoue, 12 Janvier 1849, OMI.
but he was one of the triumvirate made up of Kamaikan, Leschi, and Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox.

Further to the east and the south were the Nez Percé and Cayuse. Except for their common tongue, there was no marked similarity in the conduct of these neighbors. The Cayuse were openly hostile to American settlers from the very beginning; while the Nez Percé refused to participate in the Cayuse War of 1847, and boasted that no white man's blood was ever spilled by them. This latter tribe counted five hundred warriors; while measles, smallpox, and venereal diseases had reduced the Cayuse to a mere one hundred fighting men. Both tribes were famed as riders and owned great numbers of horses. Several years before war began, Chirouse described the Nez Percé and Palouse as "the most wicked of all the savages surrounding me." Time would prove him correct, rather than Alvord who believed that the Nez Percé had preserved intact the good accomplished by the Protestant missionaries.

These, then, were the native inhabitants of the land.

Contact between Indians and whites in the interior country dated from the advent of the fur traders. The Yakima country was surrounded by fur trading posts almost three decades before waves of white emigrants swept over the land. This furnished interesting proof that the Indian was willing to do business with white people, but white settlers were a totally different matter.

43 Alvord, op. cit.
44 Ibid.
45 Ibid.
46 Chirouse à Ricard, Ste Croix de Simkoue, 12 Janvier 1849, OMI.
47 Alvord, op. cit.
Fort Nez Percé or Walla Walla was built in 1818 by the Northwest Company near the confluence of the Columbia and Snake Rivers. After the merger of this company with the Hudson's Bay Company in 1821, the post continued in operation until its destruction by Yellow Serpent and his Wallawalla during the first flurry of the Yakima War. North of the Yakima was Fort Okanagan, established by David Stuart in 1811 while acting as agent for John Jacob Astor's Pacific Fur Company. This post, near the mouth of Okanogan River, passed into the possession of the Northwest Company when American interests were sold at the beginning of the War of 1812, and later was added to the Hudson's Bay Company establishments following the merger with the Nor'westers. Closer still to the northern extremity of the Yakima country, Fort Colville was erected in 1825 by order of Chief Factor John McLoughlin, as part of the Company's expanded operations in the Columbia district. This same year McLoughlin began work on Fort Vancouver (to the southwest of the Yakima), a post that attained fame not only as the distribution depot for all Company goods, but as a social center under the refined direction of McLoughlin. The final link in the chain of trading posts ringing the land of the Yakima, was built to the west, on Nisqually Bay, by Archibald McDonald in 1832 and began operating as a permanent establishment the following year. North, south, east, and west were Hudson's Bay posts to which the interior tribes had ready access to trade their furs for Hudson's Bay guns, powder, calico, and trinkets that held a positive fascination for the unlettered savages.

Small wonder that later travellers found Indians wearing the garb of white men, and frequently remarked that the natives were well-armed with

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48 Gibbs to McClellan, Olympia, 4 March 1854, LC; Printed in Railroad Surveys, loc. cit.
Fort Nez Perce or Walla Walla was built in 1818 by the Northwest Company near the confluence of the Columbia and Snake Rivers. After the merger of this company with the Hudson’s Bay Company in 1821, the post continued in operation until its destruction by Yellow Serpent and his Wallawalla during the first flurry of the Yakima War. North of the Yakima was Fort Okanagan, established by David Stuart in 1811 while acting as agent for John Jacob Astor’s Pacific Fur Company. This post, near the mouth of Okanogan River, passed into the possession of the Northwest Company when American interests were sold at the beginning of the War of 1812, and later was added to the Hudson’s Bay Company establishments following the merger with the Nor’westers. Closer still to the northern extremity of the Yakima country, Fort Colville was erected in 1825 by order of Chief Factor John McLoughlin, as part of the Company’s expanded operations in the Columbia district. This same year McLoughlin began work on Fort Vancouver (to the southwest of the Yakima), a post that attained fame not only as the distribution depot for all Company goods, but as a social center under the refined direction of McLoughlin. The final link in the chain of trading posts ringing the land of the Yakima, was built to the west, on Nisqually Bay, by Archibald McDonald in 1832 and began operating as a permanent establishment the following year. North, south, east, and west were Hudson’s Bay posts to which the interior tribes had ready access to trade their furs for Hudson’s Bay guns, powder, calico, and trinkets that held a positive fascination for the unlettered savages.

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48 Gibbs to McClellan, Olympia, 4 March 1854, LC; Printed in Railroad Surveys, loc. cit.
the Hudson's Bay rifle. We shall see that unfounded and unproved charges were made against the Company, but the initial reaction of the Americans toward the influence exercised by the British traders, was uniformly favorable. Alvord considered that:

the course of the Hudson's Bay Company has been undoubtedly very beneficial to the Indians of Oregon, teaching them agriculture, introducing ploughs and bees, and in training them to boating, herding, and various kinds of labor . . . . Acting in good faith themselves, they have exacted good faith and good discipline from the Indians, and prevented the introduction of spirituous liquors.

The vanguard of McClellan's surveying party found nothing reprehensible in the conduct of the English, as is clear from the admission that:

The familiarity of the Company's officers with the Indians and their usages, of course gives them a certain influence, but there is no evidence that this has ever been used unfairly or that since the conclusion of the treaty they have ever endeavored to prejudice them against our government.

Another regular channel of intercourse between the Indians and whites was the established missions of various Protestant denominations, and those of the Catholic Church. More than a decade passed after the first Protestant missionary reached the Oregon country, before the foundation of a permanent mission in the heart of the Yakima country, and this was erected by Catholic priests. However, the years intervening supplied adequate opportunity for the Yakima to fall under the indirect influence of this special kind

49 Alvord, op. cit.
50 Ibid.
51 George B. McClellan became commander in chief of the Union Army, 1 November 1861, and retained the post until 11 March 1862.
52 Gibbs to McClellan, Olympia, 4 March 1854, LC; Printed in Railroad Surveys, loc. cit.
of white man. The Methodist missionaries, Jason and Daniel Lee, with three companions, built their first mission sixty miles from the mouth of the Willamette River in 1834. It was the beginning of a genuinely impressive missionary effort on the part of the different Protestant bodies. Making the gruelling trek overland by wagon, oxcart, and on horseback, or around Cape Horn by boat; the missionaries poured into Oregon until 1840 when high tide was reached with ninety souls, including children come to toil throughout the Oregon country. The Methodists easily surpassed the other Protestant churches in personnel and money expended on this venture, although the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions was responsible for the three most famous missionary couples sent to Oregon; Marcus Whitman, Henry Spalding, Elkanah Walker and their respective wives.

The Methodists built missions at the Dalles of the Columbia, at Clatsop near the mouth of the Columbia on its north bank, a short-lived establishment at Nisqually, besides the original mission of Jason Lee in the Willamette Valley. The American Board, representing the Congregational, Presbyterian, and Dutch Reformed Churches, supported Whitman at Wailatpu in

53 Henry Harmon Spalding (1803-1874) was born in Steuben county, New York. He received his education at Western Reserve College and Lane Theological Seminary. On 13 October 1833 he married Eliza Hart of Holland Patent, New York.

54 Elkanah Walker was born in North Yarmouth, Maine, and was educated at Kimball Academy, New Hampshire, from which he went into the Bangor Theological Seminary, where he studied for three years. After his work among the Spokane tribe, he settled on Tualatin Plains in the Willamette valley in 1848, where he became a leading citizen. He died on 21 November 1877.
the Wallawalla and Cayuse country, Spalding at Lapwai among the Nez Perce, and Walker's Tshimakain Mission among the Spokane.

Missionary priests of the Catholic church entered upon their work in this farthest frontier later than the Protestants. Not until 1838 did Fathers Francis Norbert Blanchet and Modeste Demers accompany the Hudson's Bay brigade from Lachine to Fort Vancouver. They established St. Paul's Mission in the Willamette Valley in January of the following year. Thus, while Blanchet and Demers set to work in the Willamette, Elkanah Walker was establishing his mission in the Spokane country. Two years later, 1840, Peter John DeSmet, the most publicized of the Jesuit missionaries in the far west, crossed the Overland Trail to examine the possibilities for missionary

55 Clifford M. Drury, Marcus Whitman, M. D., Pioneer and Martyr, Caldwell, Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1937, passim.

56 Clifford M. Drury, Henry Harmon Spalding, Caldwell, Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1926, passim.

57 Clifford M. Drury, Elkanah and Mary Walker, Caldwell, Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1940, passim.

58 Francis Norbert Blanchet (1795-1883), archbishop of Oregon City, was born at St. Pierre de la Riviere du Sud, province of Quebec. He and Modeste Demers arrived at Fort Vancouver in November, 1838. In 1866 he assisted at the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore and also at the Ecumenical Council at the Vatican in 1870. He resigned his See in 1881, and died two years later.

59 Modeste Demers (1809-1871) was born at St. Nicholas, County of Levis, province of Quebec; studied at the Seminary in Quebec, and was ordained in 1836. He accompanied F. N. Blanchet to Oregon in 1838, and worked as a missionary until his consecration as bishop of Vancouver Island in November, 1847. He moved his See to Victoria in 1851. Demers was present at the Second Plenary Council of Baltimore, and returned to Victoria where he died in July, 1871.

work among the Indian tribes of the interior of the Oregon country. Across the plains and by ocean voyage the missionaries came to Oregon. The Jesuits founded missions among the Flathead, the Chaudiere, the Kalispel, and the Coeur d'Alene before 1847. Moreover, they established St. Francis Xavier Mission in the Willamette Valley, besides visiting most of the tribes between the Bitter Root Mountains and the Cascades.

Missionary effort among the Yakima proper, began in 1847 with the arrival at Fort Walla Walla of five Oblates of Mary Immaculate who came from Marseilles, France, at the earnest pleading of Francis Norbert Blanchet, newly-consecrated Archbishop of Oregon City. These five Oblate pioneers, Fathers Pascal Ricard and Eugene Casimir Chirouse, Charles John Felix

61 Peter John DeSmet, S. J. (1801-1873), was a Fleming. In 1840 he made an exploratory journey as far as the sources of the Missouri, and in the following year founded St. Mary's Mission, south of present Missoula, Montana. Until 1845 he was Superior of the Jesuits in the Oregon country, and aided these missions in many ways until the day of his death, 23 May 1873, at St. Louis University, St. Louis, Missouri.

62 The advent of the Oblates is narrated excellently in William Lyle Davis, S. J., "Mission St. Anne of the Cayuse Indians, 1847-1848" (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation, Department of History, University of California, 1943.)

63 Pascal Ricard (1805-1862), born at Allauoh, a few miles northeast of Marseilles, on 16 May 1805. He joined the Oblates in 1827 and was ordained in 1831. In the Oregon Country, Ricard was the founder of St. Rose's Mission among the Yakima Indians, and of St. Joseph's Mission among the whites and Indians, four miles below New Market (Tumwater, Washington), in June, 1848--on the site of present Olympia. He returned to France in June, 1857, and died at Notre Dame des Lumieres on 9 January 1862.
Pandosy, George Blanchet,64 Oblate seminarians, and Celestin Verney65 a lay brother, crossed the Oregon Trail with A. M. A. Blanchet,66 Bishop of Walla Walla, Father J. B. A. Brouillet,67 and Mr. Louis Rousseau.68 They hardly reached the security of the Hudson's Bay Company's Fort Walla Walla than Brouillet started his missionary work with the Cayuse. It was inopportune, to say the least, since he began on 27 November 1847, and the Cayuse killed Dr. Whitman two days later, thus opening the Cayuse War.

64 George Blanchet (1818-1906) was born at Dauphine, France, 3 November 1818. When he arrived at Walla Walla in 1847 he was still a scholastic and so skilled in the management of temporal affairs that his ordination was put off until 1872. He planned and helped to build all the Oblate chapels and missions in Old Oregon and British Columbia that were erected during his lifetime. He was ordained at Stuart Lake, and died at Williams Lake, 17 November 1906.

65 Celestin Verney was an Oblate lay-brother who arrived in Oregon with the pioneer group of 1847.

66 Augustin Magliore Alexandre Blanchet (1797-1887), born at St. Pierre de la Riviere du Sud, Quebec; studied at the Seminary in Quebec, and was ordained on 3 July 1821. He was consecrated bishop on 27 September 1846 and crossed the Overland Trail to Oregon in 1847. The bishop of Walla Walla was transferred to the new See of Nisqually on 31 May 1850, from which Blanchet resigned in 1879, and lived in retirement until his death on 25 February 1887.

67 Jean Baptiste Abraham Brouillet (1813-1884) born in Lower Canada, made his studies at the Grande Seminaire in Montreal, where he was ordained on 27 August 1837. He accompanied A. M. A. Blanchet to Oregon in 1847 (St. Anne's), but was forced to withdraw in the following February. In 1860 he went to Washington, D. C., in the interest of Catholic Church properties in the diocese of Nisqually, and of the Catholic missions in the Far West. He was thus occupied until his death in 1884.

68 Louis Pierre Godefroy Rousseau (1823-1852) was born at St. Henri de Lauzon, Quebec, educated in college at Nicolet from 1841-1845, transferred to Seminary at Montreal in 1846, whence he accompanied A. M. A. Blanchet. Ordained at St. Paul on the Willamette, 20 February 1848, and went to the Dalles as a missionary. Died of cholera on the Empire City, en route from San Francisco to New York, 24 July 1852.
As one would expect, war brought to a temporary halt all missionary activity in the back country. Before the Catholic missionaries retreated to the Willamette Valley to wait out the storm, Chirouse and Pandosy were ordained priests at rites solemnized by Bishop Blanchet on 2 January 1848, in a common room at Fort Walla Walla.69 The ordination ceremony ended at seven o'clock in the morning and five and a half hours later the Bishop, the new priests and the other survivors of the Wailatpu murders . . . "in all a group of some eighty people, were en route to the lower settlements."70 Any reopening of the interior would find the Oblates with two more priests ready to make up for what the war cost in retarded advancement of the Catholic missions.

Although the Cayuse War dragged on for two years, fighting reached the stage of sporadic raids by the summer of 1848. This atmosphere of quiescent hostility was eagerly grasped and the Oblates returned to their stations among the Yakima, going so far as to dedicate a new mission, St. Joseph's of the Ahtanum, 6 July 1848.71 This place was the scene of eight years of strenuous labor, disappointingly barren of tangible results, and eventually saw the disheartened missionaries abandon the unresponsive and ungrateful Yakima.72

69 Davis, op. cit., 208.
70 Ibid., 209.
71 "Memoire du Père Ricard sur les origines des missions de l'Oregon," Missions de la Congregation des Missionnaires Oblats de Marie Immaculee (Marseille, Veuve Marius Olive 1862- ) 11 (1912), 165. This publication hereinafter cited as Missions.
72 D'herbomez à de Mazenod, Olympia, 22 Août 1857. OMI; also, in
The years prior to the Yakima War, depressing though they were as far as missionary work was concerned, were not completely wasted; or, how explain the frequent encomiums of the good accomplished by the priests?\textsuperscript{73} In the course of this narrative, we shall have occasion to read of the repeated help given to American settlers and officials by the Oblates in the Yakima country, whether it was a question of the best trail to follow over the mountains,\textsuperscript{74} or a matter of negotiating peace with the Indians.\textsuperscript{75}

An interesting judgment was passed by Alvord when he remarked that the Catholic missions have no doubt exercised a softening and beneficial effect upon the Indians. But from Protestant missionaries, I suppose, they have learned more practical and useful arts, including the cultivation of the soil.\textsuperscript{76}

George Gibbs was temperate in his opinion, and might have found some of the missionaries in accord with his report that the influence of the existing

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73 Chirouse à Ricard, Ste Croix de Simkoue, 12 Janvier 1849; Chirouse à Ricard, Ste Rose des Cayouses, 28 Février 1854, OMI; D'Herbomez à de Mazenod, Olympia, 22 Août 1857, OMI, OMI-r.

74 Alvord to McClellan, Dalles, 21 June 1853; Gibbs to McClellan, Olympia, 4 March 1854; Mowry to McClellan, Olympia, 28 January 1854, LC; Printed in Railroad Surveys, loc. cit.

75 Wright to Jones, Camp on the Upper Columbia River, W. T., 9 July 1856. National Archives, Washington, D. C. War Records Division, Records of the United States Army Commands. This deposit hereinafter designated as RUSAC.; Printed in 34th Congress, 3rd Session, Senate Executive Document No. 5 (Serial Set No 876); Also, in William N. Bischoff, S. J., "The Yakima Campaign of 1856," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 196-198.

missions

is to a certain extent beneficial in preserving peace between the tribes as well as settling private quarrels. Beyond a very small number, however, their control over individuals is limited. They have unquestionably inculcated principles of honesty and morality, which in some cases perhaps have taken root but have essentially failed in accomplishing any great and lasting improvement.77

This praise, together with the defense of the missionaries by certain Indians, when government agents asked for complaints against the priests, was some small reward for the years devoted to the natives by the Oblates.78

The fur traders and the missionaries had led the way to the Northwest without creating insoluble trouble. True, there was mutual adaptation required, but mounting tension between the races awaited the arrival of white people bent upon permanent settlement. Americans on the Atlantic seaboard, in the Old Northwest, and beyond had known of Oregon for many years without much thought of moving west. The United States were young and filled with youthful dreams of a better world that diligent search certainly would discover. Hardy souls—foolhardy, some said—braved the vast plains and forbidding mountains to seek a new home, a new start, a new life on the banks of the Columbia. These venturesome ones made only a ripple on the deep reservoir of hopeful people, no more than a trickle of emigrants crossing the unmapped prairies. Then, the panic of 1837 devastated the more populous centers of America. Common citizen's stable, orderly life collapsed, forcing many to turn away from what was no more, toward what might be at the end of the overland trail.

77 Gibbs to McClellan, Olympia, 4 March 1854, LC; Printed in Railroad Surveys, loc. cit.
78 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 22 Fevrier 1856. S.
People talked of Oregon, button-holed anyone claiming to know the way, or what was there when you arrived. Hundreds became fiercely interested in an almost unknown region that until recently was the sole property of fanatics and dreamers. The trickle became a stream, the stream a torrent pouring over the parched prairies that must be crossed before reaching the promised land. The arrival of about one thousand souls in the Great Emigration of 1843 signified unmistakably that a mass migration was under way. Thousands more would come within the next decade and a half to find land and a livelihood.

Difficulties on a small scale sprang up as soon as the travel-worn emigrants squatted on lands, previously roamed-over by the Indians from time immemorial. Settlers were welcome in Oregon, but no provision had been made for their permanent residence. Land had been no cause for trouble since the traders were merchants, not large-scale farmers; the missionaries had received parcels of land from the Indian chiefs whose people they came to christianize. The flood that inundated the country with people bent on settling down not for God, not for furs, but to raise a family, constituted a threat to the Indians which they were quick to recognize. More and more settlers made it increasingly hard for the Indians to lead their accustomed nomadic lives. They were being hemmed-in, exploited, cheated, and treated like low-grade animals. Above all else, white men were taking their lands,

79 The history and drama of The Oregon Trail are superlatively re-captured in Irene D. Paden's two books, The Wake of the Prairie Schooner (New York, Macmillan, 1943), Prairie Schooner Detours (New York, Macmillan, 1949).

80 "Memoire du Fere Ricard sur les origines des missions de l'Ore­gon," Missions, 1L (1912), 76.
stripping them of their possessions without compensation of any kind. These festering grievances burst into the open for the first time on a widespread scale during the Cayuse War, 1847-1850.

Profound acumen was not required to realize that this situation must not continue indefinitely. Instead of improving, conditions deteriorated further by the passage of the donation act of 27 September 1850, which granted to every white settler or occupant of the public lands, American half-breeds included, over eighteen years of age, and a citizen of the United States, or having declared his intention according to law of becoming such, or who should make such declaration on or before the first day of December 1851, then residing in the territory, or becoming a resident before December 1850 . . . 640 acres to a married man, half of which was to belong to his wife in her own right, and 320 acres to a single man, or if he should become married within a year from the 1st of December 1850, 320 more to his wife, no patents to issue until after a four years' residence.81

This generous law meant that settlers could occupy any portion of the public domain, once they filed their claims and complied with the other conditions demanded by the statute. Very inconsiderately, the Indians persisted in their contention that they owned the land, since no bargain had been struck through which they relinquished their property rights. Thus arose the dangerous condition of whites claiming lands before the law that Indians maintained the law had no power to bestow.

It would be wrong to think that no effort was made to extinguish Indian title to the land. A commission to make treaties with the Indians in Oregon entered upon its duties in April, 1851. The three commissioners,

John P. Gaines,82 Alonzo A. Skinner,83 and Beverly S. Allen concluded six treaties with tribes living in the Willamette Valley, before word reached Oregon that Congress had dissolved all special Indian commissions, and transferred to the superintendent the power to make treaties.84

Anson Dart, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Oregon, took up the chore of making agreements. Between June and November, 1851, Dart concluded thirteen treaties with as many tribes in Oregon Territory, for approximately six million acres of land, at an average cost of not over three cents an acre.85 To these treaties must be added that by Joseph Lane with the Rogue River Indians in May or June, 1850. There were twenty treaties, of some description or other, between the whites and the Indians, none of which was ratified by the United States Senate before Isaac I. Stevens set out for the Pacific Northwest.

Washington Territory was created 2 March 1853, and Isaac Stevens of Massachusetts, was appointed Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs, besides his appointment as chief of the survey of a northern railroad route to the Pacific. Although his triple capacity occasioned great quantities of instructions, we are concerned with those pertaining to relations with the Indians. The exploring and surveying party was ordered to collect all possible data on the tribes living between Minnesota and the Pacific. Their numbers,
location, disposition toward the whites, and anything of possible help in formulating future policy, must be reported to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. There was no mention of Stevens making treaties with the tribes, his contribution was that of an observer and reporter.

The next year, 1854, Stevens returned from Washington, D.C., whither he had gone to plead for the completion of the railroad survey, with more definite instructions and powers concerning Indian affairs. He was told to attempt a unification among the Indians by gathering individual bands into tribes, and concentrating these tribes on reservations set aside for the exclusive use of natives. The ideal result he must strive to attain was a combination of all Indians under six or eight treaties. The general tone of the instructions was that Stevens should obtain the greatest possible concessions from the Indians, with a minimum outlay on the part of the United States Government. They were not orders easily executed, but they had the virtue of being orders, which the Governor proceeded to carry into effect on his return to the Territory.

Stevens reached Olympia in the beginning of December, 1854, delivered his message to the Legislative Assembly on 5 December, and summoned a meeting of the "Commission to Hold Treaties with the Indian tribes in

86 Manyponny to Stevens, Washington City, D.C., 9 May 1853, Wash. SIA, Letters from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs; George L. Albright, Official Explorations for Pacific Railroads, (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1921).

87 This explains the lengthy reports on Indian tribes that were published in Railroad Surveys.

Washington Territory and the Blackfoot Country" to discuss and formulate an outline of his proposed treaties. Stevens, James Doty, George Gibbs, H. A. Goldsborough,89 and Frank Shaw90 were members of the commission which did the preliminary work of selecting topics for consideration in the forthcoming negotiation.91 There would be reservations for the Indian signatories of the treaties; money paid for the lands ceded by the tribes, the rate of compensation settled upon was ten dollars for Chiefs, seven dollars and a half for sub-chiefs, and five dollars for each tribal member to be remitted in annual installments decreasing at the rate of five percent per annum; slavery was abolished, liquor was excluded from the Reserves, and "Tribes may punish offenders of their own Tribe for any offence committed according to their own Laws."92 These headings, with the others in the proposed program, were sufficiently satisfying for Stevens to inform George Manypenny, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, of the treaty tour planned for the spring.93

Before spring came, the energetic Executive had practised with four Coast nations in as many treaties. The Treaty of Medicine Creek was signed

89 H. A. Goldsborough was a brother of Louis M. Goldsborough, commander of the Massachusetts, which was in the Sound in the spring of 1850 making an examination of the shores with reference to military and naval reservations, and the security of commerce. When the Massachusetts left in July, 1850, H. A. Goldsborough remained at Olympia and became a resident of the Territory.

90 Benjamin F. Shaw was born in Missouri and in 1844 began farming a piece of land near Vancouver, Washington Territory.


92 Ibid.; 10 December 1854.

93 Stevens to Manypenny, Olympia, 21 December 1854, Wash. SIA, Letters Received.
on 26 December 1854; that of Point Elliott, 22 January 1855; of Point-No-Point, 26 January; of Neah Bay, 31 January; and a council on the Chehalis River, which accomplished nothing before Stevens adjourned the futile meetings 2 March 1855.94 These sessions gave him invaluable experience in the difficulties likely to arise during his major tour among the interior tribes, roaming from the eastern slope of the Cascade Mountains to the headwaters of the Missouri. Why the Governor was concerned particularly with bringing peace to these tribes will appear in the next chapter. Let it suffice to remark now, that his careful plans for the spring and summer of 1855 give the distinct impression that he understood fully that peace throughout the Territory would stand or fall with his success or failure with the tribes beyond the Cascade range.95

In January, 1855, with his request to General John E. Wool, commanding the Department of the Pacific, for one company of troops as an escort to the Blackfoot Council scheduled to convene early in July, the Governor began preparing for his great sortie into Indian diplomacy.96 He was anxious to confer with Joel Palmer,97 Superintendent of Indian Affairs in Oregon, who was


95 Durieu à Ricard, Attanem, 28 Mars 1855, OMI; Stevens to Palmer, Steamer Belle, Columbia River, 12 April 1855, National Archives, Washington, D. C., Natural Resources Division, The Oregon Superintendency of Indian Affairs, Letter Books, D: 205. This deposit hereinafter designated as Ore. SIA

96 Stevens to Wool, Olympia, 3 January 1855, RUSAC.

97 Joel Palmer was born near the foot of Lake Ontario, Canada, in 1810. When a boy he went to Pennsylvania, removing afterward to Indiana, where he was a large canal contractor and then a farmer; being also a member
one of the three Commissioners appointed to treat with the Blackfeet. Stevens wanted to have a thorough understanding regarding the Indians common to Oregon and Washington as well as the Blackfeet. Despite Palmer's hurried trip to San Francisco in order to get some drafts cashed because Oregon was entirely devoid of coin, he managed to join Stevens before the council with the Yakima opened.

The advance agent of the treaty talks, James Doty, was on the move from 20 January until the beginning of May, 1855. He visited the Yakima, Wallawalla, and Nez Percé always explaining, answering questions, and trying to render the Indians receptive to the forthcoming council in the Walla Walla Valley. Besides his personal visits, expresses were sent to the special Indian agents and missionaries as far away as Colville in the north, and the Bitter Roots to the east. Doty deserves much more credit than he usually receives; for the meeting on the Walla Walla could scarcely be imagined without the efficient advance work of the young secretary of the treaty commission.

of the legislature in the winter of 1844-1845. The excitement on the boundary question was then at its height, and influenced him to go to Oregon. He returned to the States in 1846 to bring out his family.


99 Ibid.


101 Doty to Stevens, Walla Walla Valley, Treaty Grounds, Camp Stevens, 22 May 1855, The National Archives, Washington, D. C., Natural Resources Division, Records of the Office of Indian Affairs, Treaty Talks and Treaties. This deposit hereinafter designated as ROIA. This document is actually the journal kept by Doty and contains daily entries of the various occurrences. For the sake of brevity, the above form of citation is employed.
Full two weeks before the Governor reached the spot selected by Doty for the gathering,102 Father Anthony Ravalli, S. J.103 arrived from Coeur d'Alene Mission to lend a hand to the officials.104 When Stevens dismounted at the camp site, toward evening of 21 May,105 after being delayed by the high water of John Day's River, he found all in readiness for the meetings except for the non-arrival of many of the Indians.106 The Nez Percé appeared in strength, about two thousand and five hundred members of the tribe, on 24 May;107 three hundred Cayuse "came in whooping and singing in the Indian fashion" at dusk of 25 May.108 One of the Cayuse, Etienne Coualratimani, carried a letter of introduction from Chirouse, Oblate missionary at the

102 Ibid.

103 Anthony Ravalli, S. J., famed as priest, doctor, architect, and artist, was born 16 May 1812 in Ferrara, Italy. He reached Oregon 31 July 1844 to spend forty years, less the three lived at Santa Clara College, California, among the Indians of the Jesuit Rocky Mountain Mission.

104 Doty to Stevens, Walla Walla Valley, 22 May 1855, ROIA, Treaty Talks and Treaties.

105 Ibid.

106 Lawrence Kip, "The Indian Council at Walla Walla; May and June 1855; a Journal," Sources of Oregon History (Eugene, University of Oregon, 1897), 8; Kip's "Journal" was partially reprinted in The Washington Historian, II (1901). The book was originally issued in a private printing under the title, Indian Council in the Valley of the Walla Walla (San Francisco, 1855), and has become excessively rare. Lt. Lawrence Kip, Third Arty., (1836-1899) was visiting in the Northwest at the time of the Walla Walla Council. Lt. Archibald Gracie, a classmate at West Point, invited Kip to accompany the troops assigned as an escort to Stevens.

107 Ibid., 11.

108 Ibid., 12.
As Chirouse sent Etienne as an interpreter, so Father Joseph Menetrey reached the Council Grounds with Joseph, the Coeur d'Alene guide requested of Ravalli by Doty. Chirouse left his Cayuse Mission, Pandosy his station with the Yakima, and Menetrey his place among the Coeur d'Alenes, to attend the sessions, which opened on Monday morning, 28 May 1855, with only the Cayuse, Wallawalla, and Nez Percé in attendance. That same morning At 11 A.M., Kamaiakun, [Kamaiakan] Owhi, and Skloom, Yakima Chiefs, came to the council ground; they had been greatly delayed on the road by continued heavy rains and consequent high water in the streams.

The Yakima Chiefs attended the deliberations with great fidelity beginning with those of 29 May. Throughout the stifling hot days to
follow, Stevens explained

the objects had in view by the government in proposing to treat with
them. They continued to attend from day to day, and Governor Stevens
stated to them fully the terms of the treaty he proposed to conclude
with them; the amount to be paid for their lands, and the manner of pay-
ment; the extent of the reservation to be set apart for them, and that,
upon the reservation he wished to place the Yakimas, the Colvilles, the
Pisquose, and Okinakawes, and the bands on the Columbia river below the
mouth of the Umatilla, as low down as the mouth of the Cowlitz river.118

After these explanatory discourses had been in progress six days,
Kip noted a growing hostility of some Indians, especially the Cayuse, toward
the whites.119 Another two days, 8 June 1855, and "it seemed as if we were
going on charmingly and the end of all difficulties was at hand."120 These
two drama-packed days, 8 and 9 June, are grippingly set down in Lansdale's
Diary:

June 8 Fri. Council met at 11 A. M. Better Counsels prevail today; new
propositions were made to Cayuses & W. Wallas,—they are to have a
reservation on Umatilla, to this they consent. The Yakimas yet stand out
a little. Many little speeches were made by several chiefs today.

June 9th Sat. All possible influences were made to operate upon
the Yakimas last night & a bargain was made. Council met at 12M. It
was supposed all the treaties would be signed today, but the Comm[ission-
ers] made the mistake of sending for Looking Glass, and Old Chief, just
arrived from "buffalo country," and he kicked the fat all in the fire;
and after many maneuvers, sunset came & no treaty signed—Council ad-
journed till Monday morning. After sunset the Yakimas & others on north-

Robertson Coe Collection of Western Americana, Yale University, New Haven,
Conn. This deposit hereinafter designated as COE.

118 "Official Proceedings of the council held at the council ground
in the Walla Walla Valley, with the Yakima nation of Indians . . . May 28,
1855—June 9, 1855," ROIA, Treaty Talks and Treaties; Printed for 34th Con-
gress, 1st Session, Senate Executive Document No. 30, CONFIDENTIAL, LS.

119 Kip, op. cit., 18.

120 Ibid., 23.
side of Columbia signed their treaty and we have no doubts as to the others.121

Lansdale failed to mention that Looking Glass made a short violent speech as soon as he reached the Council Grounds, just before the Council adjourned on 8 June. This performance cause the wary Indians to stir restlessly, and prepared them for his strong speech of 9 June that almost broke up the meeting completely.122 At this eleventh hour Looking Glass nearly succeeded in changing a treaty talk into a massacre of the peace commission. That some Indians were party to such a plot before they ever met at Walla Walla is certain enough;123 and that this Nez Percé Chief was one of the moving spirits in the war party is equally well-founded.124 The treaty commissioners had some misgivings over the possible violent reaction of the Indians to the proposed purchase of their lands. The known existence of this Indian resentment had motivated Stevens' stopover at Fort Dalles "to request a small body of troops to be sent on to meet him at the Council ground. . . ."125 Hence, this flare-up of last-minute opposition must not have genuinely surprised the Governor.

121 R. H. Lansdale "Diary," 8 June 1855, MS, COE. Richard Hyatt Lansdale was born in Maryland in 1812, but raised in Ohio, and moved to Indiana, then to Illinois, and finally to Missouri in 1846. In 1849 he came to Oregon via California, entering the Columbia in October. He was first auditor of Clarke County, and first postmaster north of the Columbia River. He practised medicine at Penn Cove on Whidbey Island until December, 1854, when Stevens appointed him Indian agent.

122 Kip, op. cit., 23.

123 Durieu à Ricard, Attanem, 12 Avril 1855, OMI.

124 G. O. Haller, "3rd Expedition into the Yakima Country," Tuesday, 1 July 1856, MS, Diary, UW.

125 Kip, op. cit., 7.
The session of 9 June terminated most unsatisfactorily for the Americans, only to have Kamaiakan and the other chiefs under his sway come to Stevens' tent that evening to sign the Treaty. 126 This was truly amazing. The Yakima chief told the Governor in the morning, before the session opened, that he was tired of all the talk. "He wished the papers written so that he might sign them today and go home; this was all." 127 Whatever the true explanation of this volte face, the consensus among Americans was that Kamaiakan decided more time was needed to prepare for war and the easiest way to gain it was by signing the Treaty. 128 In any case, the treaty with the Yakima "was then duly witnessed and the council with the Yakima declared adjourned sine die." 129

Monday morning, 11 June, the council met.

Governor Stevens opened it with a short speech, at the close of which he asked the Chiefs to come forward and sign the papers. This they all did without the least opposition. 130

There, followed the distribution of presents, none of which Kamaiakan would accept personally, but whose allocation among the Yakima he superintended. 131

126 "Official Proceedings of the council held at the council ground in the Walla Walla Valley, etc.," ROIA, Treaty Talks and Treaties; Printed for 34th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Executive Document No. 30, CONFIDENTIAL, LS.

127 Ibid.

128 D'Herbomez à Ricard, Mission de S. Joseph pres d'Olympia, 25 Août 1855, OMI, OMI-r; Durieu à Ricard, Mission des Yakimas, 30 Septembre 1855 s.

129 "Official Proceedings of the council held at the council ground in the Walla Walla Valley," etc., ROIA, Treaty Talks and Treaties; Printed, etc. cf. Note 103, supra.

130 Kip, op. cit., 24.

131 "Official Proceedings of the council held at the council ground in the Walla Walla Valley, etc.," cf. Note 106, supra.
Before nightfall some of the Indians departed for their homes, and the Americans set about preparing for the long trip to Fort Benton, at the headwaters of the Missouri River.132

Stevens had established peace on paper and negotiated the cession of 16,920 square miles of territory,133 about twenty-two million acres, now legally opened for white settlement, once the Treaty was ratified.134 Perhaps anyone as determined to accomplish his purpose, as Stevens clearly was, would allow self-deception to ignore the extreme reluctance and "considerable opposition on the part of the Indians" to making the treaties.135 Nor, could he be expected to know that the Treaty, so painfully arrived at, would gather dust in Washington, D. C., until its ratification by the Senate on 8 March 1859.136

The treaty party spent four days, 12 to 15 June, bringing up the work of the Council, writing letters, packing, etc.137 and got under way for

132 Lansdale, "Diary," Monday, 11 June 1855, COE.


134 Lansdale, "Diary," loc. cit., COE.


137 Lansdale, "Diary," 12-15 June 1855, COE.
Fort Benton on 16 June. 138 They stopped at Coeur d'Alene Mission for a brief visit but did not tarry. 139 Three weeks later, 17 July, Stevens concluded a treaty with the Flathead, Kootenay, and Upper Pend d'Oreille. 140 A misunderstanding 141 was responsible for Stevens commanding 142 Father Adrian Hoecken, S. J. to attend this council. 143 Although Stevens gave no hint of dissatisfaction with the Flathead Treaty, Hoecken unburdened himself to a fellow Jesuit missionary, Joset: 144

138 Doty to Stevens, Walla Walla Valley, 22 May 1855, ROIA, Treaty Talks and Treaties.

139 Lansdale, "Diary," 25 June 1855, COE; Doty to Stevens, Walla Walla Valley, 22 May 1855, ROIA, Treaty Talks and Treaties.


141 Hoecken had gone to the council grounds selected for the proposed meeting on 4 July 1855, only to learn that the Governor had not yet arrived. (Hoecken à Joset, Mission des Têtes-plattes, 1 Août 1855; Hoecken à Congiato, Mission des Têtes-Plattes, 10 Janvier 1856, MSM). He felt impelled to return to his mission immediately owing to five or six children being seriously ill with a type of cholera. (Ibid.) Upon Stevens' arrival he sent the peremptory order to Hoecken.

142 Stevens to Hoecken, Council Ground, St. Mary's Valley, 11 July 1855, Wash. SIA, Misc. Letts. Recd.

143 Adrian Hoecken, S. J., was born 18 March 1815 in Tilburg, North Brabant, Holland, and had come to the Rocky Mountain missions in 1844. Until his recall to Missouri in 1861, he worked among the Kalispel Indians on the lower Pend d'Oreille River and in the Bitter Root Valley after 1854.

144 Joseph Joset, S. J., one of the pioneer missionaries, born 27 August 1810, in Courfaivre, Switzerland, had reached the Rocky Mountain missions in 1844. Before his death, 19 June 1900, he worked among many of the interior tribes between the Bitter Roots and the Columbia. At the time Hoecken wrote the letter here cited, Joset was at St. Paul's Mission, on the Kettle Falls of the Columbia.
What comedy and tragedy in that whole council--too long to narrate. Briefly, not one-tenth was understood; for Ben Kyser spoke the Flathead language very poorly and translated the things into English also very poorly. A Treaty was made, they say. The Indians say nothing. ... \[145\]

The Governor's party pushed east from the Flathead Council grounds, on 16 July, and encamped near Fort Benton eight days later.\[146\] As soon as Stevens and Palmer met Alfred Cummins, Superintendent of Indian Affairs for Nebraska, the Commission selected to treat with the Blackfeet was complete. The third member put in his appearance on 1 August, and the trio settled down immediately to the interminable weeks of negotiating that finally closed with the signing of the Blackfoot Treaty on 17 October 1855.\[147\] This portion of Stevens' treaty tour is relevant to the story of The Yakima War only as an explanation of why the Governor was hundreds of miles away from the territorial capital when war broke out.

Stevens left Fort Benton on 28 October,\[148\] intending to conclude treaties with the Lower Pend d'Oreille,\[149\] Kalispel,\[150\] and Coeur d'Alene while en route back to Olympia.\[151\] Literally, everything changed overnight.

\[145\] Hoecken à Jéset, Mission des Têtes-Plattes, July, 1855, MSM.
\[146\] Doty to Stevens, Walla Walla Valley, 22 May 1855, ROIA, Treaty Talks and Treaties.
\[147\] Ibid.
\[148\] Ibid.
\[150\] Stevens to Hoecken, Camp on Missouri near Fort Benton, 28 August 1855, Wash. SIA, Misc. Letts. Recd.
On the evening of the 29th Mr. Wm H. Pearson with an express from Olympia reached our camp bringing the startling intelligence that the Yakima Indians had broken out into open war, murdered their Agent A. J. Bolon, and several other white men on their way to the mines near Fort Colville, and declared a war of extermination upon the Whites.

This news caused great consternation among the successful peace-makers. It appeared that their recent efforts were collapsing behind their backs like houses built of straw. Instantly the leisurely return to the settlements changed into a forced march for the whole group. The undiluted courage of Stevens in pressing man and beast through winter-cloaked mountain passes, across snow-covered plains, into country thought to be in complete control of murderously hostile Indians, has few parallels in the history of the Pacific Northwest. However, for the purpose at hand, we need only know that he managed to reach the comparative safety of the Camp of Oregon Mounted Volunteer troops in the Walla Walla Valley on 20 December 1855.

The outbreak of war startled and alarmed the spunky Governor. But

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152 Doty to Stevens, Walla Walla Valley, 22 May 1855, ROIA, Treaty Talks and Treaties.

153 Stevens to Manypenny, Walla Walla Valley, 22 December 1855, ROIA; Printed in 34th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Executive Document No. 46 (Serial Set No. 821); Stevens to Wool, Walla Walla Valley, 23 December 1855, The National Archives, Washington, D. C., War Records Division, Office of the Adjutant General, Letters Received. This deposit hereinafter designated as AGO.; RUSAC; Printed in 34th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Executive Document No. 66 (Serial Set No. 822); Also, Printed in, Message of the Governor of Washington Territory Also the Correspondence with the Secretary of War, Major Gen. Wool, The Officers of the Regular Army, and of the Volunteer Service of Washington Territory, (Olympia, Edward Furste, 1857), 133-139. This work hereinafter designated as Gov. Mess.; Stevens to Jefferson Davis, Olympia, 19 February 1856, AGO, Letters Received; Printed in Serial Set No. 822.

154 K. B. Mercer, "Diary," 20 December 1855, MS, COE.
what puzzles a modern reader is that an alliance between the tribes existed and was not known; "and yet it extended from the Sound to the Umpqua--from one side to the other of the Cascade Mountains."\textsuperscript{155} This was strange, and becomes stranger still as we study the many evident signs of the storm that was brewing.

\textsuperscript{155} "Special Message of the Governor, delivered in joint session of the Council and House of Representatives of Washington Territory, Monday, January 21, 1856," in \textit{Serial Set No. 822}.
CHAPTER II

GATHERING CLOUDS

That the Indians east of the Cascade Mountains launched a desperate attack aimed at the extermination of the white settlers in this region should amaze no one. The outbreak was long in coming, for the seeds were planted with the first white man who settled on Indian land. There were some subscribers to the opinion that

the notions, habits, and moral relations of the Indians and Whites are so diametrically antagonistic that it is simply impossible for them to live side by side for many years without contentions.\(^1\)

This favorable attitude toward an "irresistible conflict" theory was pungently expressed forty years after the event, by the remark that it was "The same old tale--encroachment of a superior upon an inferior race."\(^2\)

It is idle to speculate on the possible result of some other policy than the one actually pursued by the white people in regard to settlement on Indian lands. We know war was the fact and our task is to examine the genesis of the outbreak.

Anyone reading the contemporary documents of nearly a century ago is

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1 Glisan, R., Journal of Army Life, 29 April 1856, (San Francisco, 1874).

at a loss to explain the apparent surprise of so many people at war's beginning in 1855. To us it seems that many causes and factors were clearly present and repeatedly reported from several quarters to various interested parties. Adequate warning was given, without receiving the attention it deserved.

The broad outline of Indian affairs east of the Cascade Mountains is not greatly different from that which prevailed from the moment white men started on their way westward. Indians carried on persistent opposition, with occasional flurries of violent outburst, that bloomed in massed ranks of armed natives. Relentlessly the white tide moved to the west, sometimes lapping at the edges of Indian country, sometimes rushing over the border in flood tide.

War was not new to the people between the Bitter Root and Cascade Mountains. Dr. Marcus Whitman, his wife and twelve others had been murdered at the Wailatpu Mission on 29 November 1847 by the Cayuse Indians. 3 Five hundred volunteers under command of Colonel Cornelius Gilliam campaigned against the Cayuse until 15 September 1848. 4 The tribes were cowed but unconquered. Not until the Indian leaders were hanged on 3 June 1850 was this war closed.


4 Cornelius Gilliam led one of the large companies in the emigration of 1844. Previous to this, his life is sketchily known. He served in the Black Hawk War, in the Seminole War, acted as a minister for a time, and was a sheriff in Missouri. During the Cayuse War he shot himself accidentally on 20 March 1848.
In view of the many and unsubstantiated charges made at a later date, it is especially interesting to find an exchange of letters regarding the settlement of claims of the Hudson's Bay Company against the United States Government for supplies furnished the volunteers under Gilliam. The last payment of $1,044.84, on an original claim of $4,164.39, was made in April, 1855.

Even while these loose ends of the Cayuse War were being trimmed off, the Hudson's Bay men were reporting further out-croppings of native unrest. Dugald Mactavish wrote on 2 September 1854 from Vancouver that, some Indians about twelve or fifteen miles distant from the Company's Establishment at Boise in the Snake Country—had attacked a party of immigrants from the States this season, and murdered eight men—and had taken prisoners three women and several children—and carried off all their property.

The massacre of the Ward party, to which reference is made here, was avenged by a command of twenty-six regular troops and thirty-nine volunteers under Brevet Major Granville Haller, U. S. A. This mixed force invaded the country of the Winneste Indians, killed a few, and recaptured the clothing and other

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5 Sir George Simpson to Archibald Barclay, Lachine, 30 December 1853; Peter Skene Ogden to Archibald Barclay, Vancouver Fort, 27 February 1854; Peter Skene Ogden to Archibald Barclay, Vancouver Fort, 21 July 1854; Dugald Mactavish to Archibald Barclay, Vancouver Fort, 21 April 1855. Hudson's Bay Company Archives, Beaver House, London. This deposit hereinafter designated as HBC.

6 Mactavish to Barclay, Vancouver, Washington Territory, 2 September, 1854. HBC. Dugald Mactavish (1817-1871) was joint-manager, with Chief Factor Peter Skene Ogden, of the Hudson's Bay Company's Oregon Department, 1853-1854, and was sole manager from 1854 to June, 1857.

7 In August, 1854, a party of twenty-one persons led by Alexander Ward of Kentucky was almost wiped-out by the Indians near Fort Boise.
property taken from the ill-fated emigrants. In July, 1855, Haller was sent
with more than one hundred and fifty men further to chastise these Indians.
This time he succeeded in having hanged several of the Indians over the
graves of their victims and managed to kill as many Indians as they had
killed of the whites, besides capturing old men, women and children.9 As we
shall see, it was on his return from this second expedition to the Snake
River Country, that Haller was to assume a more prominent role in history.

This entire year of 1854-1855 was marked by increasing unrest amongst
the tribes and growing apprehension on the part of the whites. Mactavish
continued to show concern for Hudson's Bay Company property at Boise.10 Less
than a month later, 6 October 1854, Charles Ogden, postmaster at the Company's
Boise Fort was accused of trading ammunition with the Indians who were mur-
dering the emigrants.11 The newspapers in Portland began calling for the ex-
pulsion of Hudson's Bay men from the country and for the destruction of their
establishments.12 This refrain will be heard again before peace finally re-
turns.

Mactavish took immediate steps to quell the journalistic berating
of the Democratic Standard. His next letter to Sir George Simpson on 20

8 Haller, G. O., The Dismissal of Major Granville O. Haller of the
Regular Army, of the United States, by order of the Secretary of War, in
Special Orders, No. 331, of July 25th, 1863. Also, A Brief Memoir of His
Military Services, and A Few Observations. Paterson, N. J., 1863. 35.

9 Ibid., 36.

10 Mactavish to Barclay, Vancouver, W. T., 21 September 1854; Mac-
tavish to Sir George Simpson, Vancouver, 21 September 1854. HBC.

11 Mactavish to Barclay, Vancouver, 6 October 1854. HBC.

12 Ibid.
October 1854, carried a strong recommendation to abandon the posts in the Snake Country. His reason was cogent enough—the probable impossibility of avoiding trouble with the Indians or the whites in the country's unsettled conditions. Moreover, he sent instructions by Mr. William Sinclair to Fort Hall to stop all trade in arms and ammunition.

I have further deemed it advisable to instruct Mr. Pambrun to stop the trade of arms and ammunition at the Post at Walla Walla. Events proved that Mactavish was no alarmist. Five days after writing this letter he received word direct from Charles Ogden at Boise which confirmed his fears. After Haller withdrew his command from the Snake country, the Indians assumed such menacing airs that Ogden was convinced they intended to take the Fort, murder him and his men. As a matter of fact, neither Mactavish's nor Ogden's fears were realized, for the latter was safely at Vancouver in the spring of 1855.

Momentary safety for the Hudson's Bay men at Boise did not mean the end of the deep-rooted complaints of the Indians. There were reports of trouble much closer to the future theatre of war. Major Gabriel Rains at Fort Dalles, O. T., found himself faced with an urgently delicate situation arising from a white man wounding a powerful member of the Umatilla tribe.

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13 George Simpson (1786(?)-1860) became Governor-in-Chief of the Hudson's Bay Company's North American operations in 1826.

14 William Sinclair (1827-1899) was clerk in charge of the Hudson's Bay Company's Fort Hall, 1854-1855, and "disposable in the Oregon District" during 1855-1856.

15 Mactavish to Simpson, Vancouver, 20 October 1854. HBC.

16 Mactavish to Barclay, Vancouver, 4 November 1854. HBC.

17 Mactavish to Barclay, Vancouver, 6 March 1855. HBC.
The Indians were threatening to retaliate and burn down the Agency buildings.1

A bloody trial of strength was avoided by the recovery of the wounded man and by a prompt display of force made by Rains.19

This widespread hatred of the Indians for the whites most certainly was known—and well known. The desire of the tribes to keep white settlers out of Indian country and off Indian lands was simply a commonplace fact that apparently impressed no one deeply enough for them to make serious attempts to avoid the obvious consequences.

As early as April, 1853, Pandosy raised the alarm in a letter to Father Toussaint Mesplie, Catholic priest at the Dalles.20

The clouds are gathering upon all hands, the winds begin to lower, the tempest is pent up ready to burst. . . .

Through the whole course of the winter I have heard the same thing—that the Cayuse and the Nez Perces have united themselves for war. . . . I will recount to you what they say. All the Indians on the left bank of the Columbia, from the Blackfeet to the Chenook, inclusive, are to assemble at the Cayuse country. All on the right bank, through the same extent of country, are to assemble on the Simcoe (on the Yakima) including those from Nisqually and its vicinity.21

Pandosy goes on to say that he is not convinced that the plot is as universal as these remours would make it. The tribes have never united so closely in their history. Moreover, so extensive a conspiracy could not organize without

18 Rains to Cooper, Fort Dalles, 2 January 1855, RUSAC.

19 Rains to Cooper, Fort Dalles, 2 February 1855. RUSAC.

20 Father Toussaint Mesplie was a student cleric when he arrived in Oregon with Archbishop F. N. Blanchet in 1847. Three years later he was ordained priest and began his missionary labors at St. Peter's Church, the Dalles.

the noise of it reaching Mesple at the Dalles. By way of ending, he remarks that Shawawai,

one of the small Chiefs in our neighborhood, has given away some horses to a great number of Indians, with what object I do not know; but it had the appearance of raising followers to go and revenge on the Blackfeet the death of some of their people killed by the latter.22

These dire forebodings were sent on to Major Alvord, commander at Fort Dalles, and to Gregory Gazzoli, Jesuit missionary among the Coeur d'Alenes.23 Pandosy failed to warn his own religious confrere, Casimir Chirouse, O. M. I., priest at the Mission of St. Anne among the Cayuse.24 Chirouse denied the existence of any plot among the Indians or that any extensive danger for whites should be anticipated.25

Alvord took more stock in the report and had circulars posted on all doors at the Dalles warning the whites to be on their guard since the Indians were planning to unite in one place and kill all whites above the Dalles, then all in the Willamette Valley, then at Nisqually, etc.26 Furthermore, he recommended to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs the prompt negotiation of treaties to extinguish the Indian title to lands, in Washington and Oregon Territories, east of the Cascade Mountains.27

This letter had unlooked for consequences. Alvord was accused of

22 Ibid.
23 Father Gregory Gazzoli, S. J., arrived in Oregon in August, 1847.
24 Chirouse à Ricard, Ste. Anne des Cayouses, 15 Mai 1853, OMI.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
being an alarmist, failed to obtain his promotion and was removed from command at the Dalles. Nor did the writer of the letter escape. Pandosy was admonished by his superior, Pascal Ricard, C. M. I., for indulging in rhetoric and fancy writing rather than stating the actual state of affairs in simple terms. Pandosy's reply admits the charge has more than a little foundation for the letter sent to the Dalles... was written without reflection, with most unpleasant consequences for the Oblates who were ashamed of it and above all for Major Alvord who lost his rank or at least his appointment and with this, all the respect of officers and men. Well, that letter was written in about ten minutes.

One interesting point in this letter is his failure to retract anything said in the warning. He admits his choice of words was ill-advised, but there is no apology for reporting the rumours then current.

In recent years this idea of an Indian conspiracy has been questioned. However, the varied and constant reference to such a plot found in the documents of several years makes it difficult to discount all these witnesses. The usual estimate made by the whites of the time, was that "The Indian war has been in contemplation for over three years by the Klickatats, [sic] Yakimas and Walla Wallas."
The long, unbroken thread of Indian antagonism to the advance of the whites is unmistakably discernible throughout these years. It has been seen in the chapter on the Yakima Treaty that some agreement between the tribes was in force before and during the negotiations in the Walla Walla Valley. The fundamental problem at this point of our study is to determine why the Indian opposition continued to fester and finally burst forth in bloody violence.

Pandosy may have been accused of flowery writing in his letter of April, 1853, to Mesplie, but no one can say this about one blunt statement he made. "The cause of this war is, that the Americans are going to seize their lands." 33

The same sentiment is echoed in Alvord's report of 17 July 1853, where he pleads that the Indian title to land be extinguished by treaty before further settlements are made.

As many of the whites are not settling among them upon the bare suffrancel of the Indians, and intrusions are likely to lead to collision and bloodshed. 34

This letter brought disrepute upon Alvord, even though he would be supported by similar representations made by his successor in command at Fort Dalles, Major Gabriel Rains. Less than a year after Alvord's fruitless recommendations, Rains reported that

the time has arrived when it becomes necessary to determine the question of peace or war between the citizens of the United States and Indian

34 Benjamin Alvord, Report, 17 July 1853, Serial Set No. 906.
tribes on this frontier, east of the Cascades and west of the Rocky Mountains. 35

He made this statement because of the periodic complaints of the Indians that whites were locating on their lands against their will, and without respect to their individual possessions, or property, or priority of title. 36

Some of these squatters were good citizens, but such was not the case with all. The Indians protested that they suffered lawless violence, injury and murder by some of the whites who came among them. 37 The common practise of settlers taking their small potato patches, was clearly wrong, and should be stopped. Before long the Indian would have not an inch of soil for his own use. 38

The closer war came, the more persistent were references to the question of land. Not quite seven months before his death at the hands of a party of Yakima, Indian sub-Agent A. J. Bolon repeated the warning that ther will be trouble. They say that thar is a number of White men agowing to settle in thare country and that the Whites invariebly select the farms of the Indians for thare claims and that the Indians object to for they want those farms to rais thare Potatoes and Pius appon. I fear that thare will be trouble unless settlers are kept out until threatys are made. 39

Unfortunately he was misled by Skloom, the great Yakima Chief Kamaikan's brother, into thinking the Indians were ready and willing to part

35 Rains to Townsend, Fort Dalles, 29 January 1854, in 35th Congres, 1st Session, House Executive Document No. 88, (Serial Set No. 924.)
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Floyd Jones to Townsend, 15 October 1853, in Serial Set No. 906.
39 Bolon to Stevens, Fort Dalles, 28 February 1855. Wash. SIA. Letters Received, (Central District).
with their lands so long as a treaty was signed first. 40 A quasi-agency was set up in the districts of Skloom and Shawawai, an uncle of Kamaiakan, whence blankets were distributed to the members of these bands because their chiefs had agreed to American settlement. 41 This whole arrangement was abortive, for the simple reason that Kamaiakan the most influential chief at the time, would not follow the example of his relatives and refused point-blank and has completely broken off with his brothers. . . . Camaiarken is putting himself in condition to war on the Americans. They want his lands and they will not get them, he says, except over his dead body. 42

This rigid determination to retain possession of their lands--their homeland--is abundantly clear. Even after war began, the peaceful occupancy of their forefather's haunts was of prime concern. After the Indians repulsed the troops under Haller, they had Pandosy remind the Americans for them, that we were peaceful friends of the Americans, that we never thought of war; but the way the Governor spoke to us while we were with the Cayuse irritated us and we decided on a general war that would only stop with the complete disappearance of all the natives or of all the Indians.

If the Governor had said to us: my children I ask you for a piece of land in each tribe for the Americans but the land, your country is always yours, we would have given willingly what you asked and we would have lived with you as other brothers. But it was taken from us by handfuls and we were thrown out of our native land, into foreign territory, in the midst of an enemy nation (for between ourselves, we are

40 D'Herbomez à Brouillet, Attanem, Camp des Yakamas, 28 Août 1854, S. Father Louis D'Herbomez, O. M. I., led the second group of Oblate missionaries that arrived at Olympia in August, 1850. He spent one year in Olympia studying the Indian dialects, and near the end of summer, 1851, he was sent to the Yakima Mission, where he spent three years before returning to Olympia. In 1857 he succeeded Ricard as Superior of the Oblates in Oregon, and later became the first vicar-apostolic of British Columbia.

41 Durieu à Ricard, Attanem, 28 Mars 1855. OMI.

42 Ibid.
enemies) in a place where the people had only enough to eat for themselves. Then we said: now we know perfectly the attitude of the Americans.43

The more honest white settlers admitted at the time of the war, and later, that the question of land underlay the restless agitation of the tribes. "Its origin was the unwillingness of the Indians to have their lands intruded on."44 Kamiakin and Piu-piu-mox-mox well knew the prejudice of their race against American settlement and American appropriation of territory."45 The official report of J. Ross Browne, who was sent by the Interior Department to examine the causes of the war, changed the words but not the notion when he informed the Commissioner of Indian Affairs that "the war is the natural result of emigration and settlement."46

There is little doubt that the main cause of the war was the preempting of land by the whites. However, there were other factors that contributed to the strife and made even more difficult the ultimate solution of the situation. Since land was the fundamental issue one might conclude that treaties entered into by the United States and the tribes, for the extinguishment of Indian title to the land would be the obvious answer. Certainly this was Governor Isaac Stevens' compelling motive in negotiating the series of

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43 Yakimas to the American Authorities, 7 October 1855. S.

44 George Gibbs to James Swan, Fort Vose, Port Townsend, 7 January 1857, in Swan, James G., The Northwest Coast; or, Three Years' Residence in Washington Territory, New York, 1857, 426.

45 Elwood Evans, "The Causes of the War," typescript, Washington Historical Society Archives, Tacoma, Washington. This deposit hereinafter designated as T.

treaties noted in the previous chapter. The automatic success of treaties was not to be. Whether or not this policy of negotiating for Indian lands would have avoided all fighting is an idle question for the simple reason that history took another path.

Anson Dart, as Superintendent of Indian Affairs, had entered into a treaty with the Willamette Valley Indians of Oregon in 1851. By the time Andrew Bolon and James Doty visited the Yakima in 1853 and 1854 to ascertain their dispositions regarding the sale of their lands by treaty, the Willamette Treaty still was unratified by the United States Senate. On the other hand, all the tribes knew full well that the whites had been settling the treaty lands with great rapidity, while none of the subsidies, tools, schools or teachers promised to the Indians in payment, were forthcoming. Whatever might be said in justification of individual settlers who were guilty of nothing more than taking advantage of the Donation Act of 1850, it is no less true that the Indians could only conclude that treaties were held in low repute by white men. To understand the attitude of the Indians concerning these treaties, one must remember their well-founded suspicion that the pittance promised in the one treaty of which they knew anything would never be paid.

When Stevens concluded the Treaty with the Yakima, Cayuse, Walla­walla, and other interior tribes on 9 June 1855, he was unwittingly adding fuel to the smoldering fire of resentment. Although the Governor has been bitterly criticized for his Indian policy and especially for the treaties, the blame is not so readily centered on one person.

47 Ibid., Also, G. O. Haller, "The Indian War of 1855-1856," typescript, UW.
First, he was executing instructions given to him as Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs of Washington Territory. The policy followed in his district did not differ in any marked degree from that in force throughout the period of frontier expansion. Moreover, the authorities in Washington and Governor Stevens were not the only officials convinced of the wisdom of obtaining title to Indian lands by treaty. Major General John E. Wool suggested that,

from all I can learn or have seen in relation to the Indians and their peculiar situation in regard to the White inhabitants, treaties ought to be made with them, and if driven from their lands and hunting grounds in order to preserve them from starvation, some allowance or remuneration should be made them.

In view of the subsequent bitter feud between Wool and Stevens this letter is amazing.

Justice does not allow the condemnation of Stevens for the failure of the pacts as though he alone were responsible. Even before the treaty talks were held with the Yakima, some men were telling the Indians that, they will be banished to the Arctic, i.e., to a land where the sun never shines, where eternal night reigns. Others tell them they will be given a corner of land, but hemmed in by an enclosure and every Indian who goes over this barrier will be taken, put in chains and put in prison.

These words made sense to the Indians and could only intensify their misgiving.


49 Wool to Cooper, San Francisco, 14 March 1854. National Archives War Records Division, Records of the Headquarters of the Army, Letters Received, 1854. This deposit hereinafter designated as RHA.

For the viciousness of other whites Stevens cannot be held accountable, but what he did personally is another matter.

The greatest single blunder he made was in bringing together the Nez Perces, Walla Wallas, Yakamas and others into one council, and cramming a treaty down their throats in a hurry. 51

There were other mistakes, too, such as believing Kamiaikan when he said he spoke for the Klikitat. These Indians accounted for approximately one-half of those signing the treaty of 9 June, yet they had given Kamiaikan no authority to treat for them. They were not at the council, and some of them knew nothing of it. 52 Other Indians thought the reservations set up by the treaty were too small; or they did not have enough tillable land; or they were ruined by the wagon road cutting through the richest part of their reservation. 53 The fact of Indian discontent with the treaties can hardly be doubted by any fair-minded person. 54 Nor was the dissatisfaction restricted to the Yakima, as may be concluded from Joset's warning that

much irritation prevails among Indians all over the country, and I advise not to trust too much the peaceable show; for Indians naturally dissimulate, make a secret of their feelings, but I heard enough to be able to say with certainty a great deal of irritation prevails. 55

Joset did not know that his words were too late; the war had begun. Land,

51 Gibbs to Swan, Fort Vose, Fort Townsend, 7 January 1857, in Swan, op. cit., 428.
52 Dennison to Nesmith, Dalles, 15 March 1858, Ore. SIA. Letts. Recd
53 Ibid.
54 Wool to Thomas, Benicia, 19 October 1855; Rains to Cooper, Fort Vancouver, 3 October 1855, RUSAC, Letters Sent.
55 Joset to Stevens, Coeur d'Alene Prairie, 14 October 1855, Wash. SIA. Misc. Letts. Recd.
treaties and less important factors had finally brought on the blood-letting.

With the known background of suspicion, anxiety, and antagonism between Indians and whites, the discovery of gold at the mouth of the Pend d'Oreille river in the spring of 1855 was particularly inopportune. Dugald Mactavish's estimate that gold fever would bring three thousand miners before the end of September was incorrect. But word of the new find spread rapidly and disrupted normal life in the territories of Oregon and Washington.

"Almost all the settlers in the upper part of Oregon, and in Washington Territories, have started for the mines." Workers left from the lumber camps. In general, those not forced to stay, set-off in pursuit of quick wealth. At the moment, when the fewest possible whites in Indian country would have contributed most to an uneasy peace, gold brought them in droves. Many of these prospectors were undesirables who should not have been loose in hostile country.

Some long-standing complaints were not reiterated. The wiser Indians knew perfectly well that rum had brought sickness and disease. Some of the chiefs had taken stringent measures to stop the traffic, and this for reasons of self-preservation.

56 Dugald Mactavish to W. G. Smith, Vancouver, 23 June 1855. HBC; G. O. Haller, "Kamiarkin in History," MS, B.

57 Mactavish to Smith, Vancouver, 30 June 1855. HBC.

58 Mactavish to Smith, Vancouver, 5 September 1855. HBC.


60 Keller to Foster, Teekalet, W. T., 5 August 1855; Keller to Foster, Teekalet, W. T., 19 August 1855, COE.

61 Bolon to Stevens, Olympia. 30 September 1854. Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd., (Central District).
In this same report, Bolon expressed his conviction that any interference with Indian women would lead to bloodshed. There is no great secret that certain whites regarded Indian women as nothing more than playthings, and some Indian husbands consistently prostituted their own wives and daughters. Girls not twelve years of age, and boys not fifteen were under treatment for venereal diseases. This does not make a pretty picture, but it gives some notion of the treatment meted out to the Indians by their civilized and civilizing white brothers.

Yet, other causes were alleged by various groups to explain the war. The Catholic priests at the Yakima Mission were accused of sympathizing with the Indians. Employes of the Hudson's Bay Company and former employes of the Company were supposed to be stirring up the tribes and arming them. This charge was leveled in spite of the care taken by Company offici-

62 Ibid.
63 Demers à Ricard, Victoria, 20 Juillet 1855, OMI; "Life and Character of L. F. Thompson," Typescript, T; Atkinson to Treat, Oregon City, 19 October 1857, Archives of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass. This deposit hereinafter designated as A.
65 Stevens to Tinkham, Olympia, 12 December 1853, in Railroad Surveys, I, 617; Stevens to Manypenny, Olympia, 1 November 1856, Serial Set No. 876.
66 Kip, Lawrence, Army Life on the Pacific: A Journal of the Expedition Against the Northern Indians, the Tribes of the Coeur d'Alenes, Spokanes, and Pelouzes, in the Summer of 1858. New York, 1859, 12.
als to inform the Americans of Indian unrest, and the order to stop all trade in arms and ammunition. Probably the best deduction from rumours that Mormons incited and armed the Indians against the Americans, is the statement that these "charges were of a nebulous nature and were, of course, without material evidence."  

One Indian Agent was of the opinion that the tribes had heard that Stevens and his party were massacred by the Blackfeet and concluded to the universal overthrow of the whites.

The causes and factors in the strife were legion and it depended on personal prejudices, affiliations or opinion to place the emphasis. The whole situation might be summed up as follows:

whilst acts of brutality, between the two races, are usually the proximate causes of most of the disturbances, yet there are predisposing agents behind all these. Such, for instance, on the Northwest Coast, as the donation laws of Congress, giving away to white settlers—half-breed Indians included—all of the most valuable lands in the Territories of Washington and Oregon, without first extinguishing by treaty the possessor rights of the aborigines.

It is obvious that this chain of events could not continue indefi-
Some white people cast avaricious eyes on Indian possessions, and hoped to take their valuable herds of horses by bringing on war. Kamaiakan perceived the dangers to his own tribe. He understood clearly the logic of events "if the white settlers were permitted a foothold in his own dominions, and he resisted all attempts of the whites to locate on his lands." This clear-visioned chief now began to organize opposition to the insatiably acquisitive whites. He betook himself among the Palouse to work with greater freedom because Owhi and Teias did not want war. Every day the missionaries saw "bands of Palous and Nez Perces passing the Mission going to his camp to plot, and get ready." The priests were at a loss to know what they should do under the circumstances.

If we advised the Governor of the blow prepared for Walla Walla, the natives would chase us out or perhaps do worse; if we did not advise the Governor, he would accuse us of conspiring with the Indians, and Mr. Bolon would be right.

Since it was not certain that Kamaiakan would attack Stevens during the negotiations at Walla Walla, and since the missionaries had no part whatever in the scheme, they decided to keep silent. What actually transpired at the treaty talks has been seen elsewhere.

73 Charles Stevens to Levi Stevens, Astoria, 10 March 1856, LC.
74 G. O. Haller, "The Indian War of 1855-1856," Typescript, UW.
75 Durieu à Ricard, Attanem, 12 Avril 1855. OMI.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
78 Ibid.
Two months after the treaty with the Yakima was signed, George Gibbs warned Stevens of great unrest among the Indians. Kamaiakan was the moving spirit and the Nisqually tribe under Leschi had become very ill-disposed. The following month, Nathan Olney, Indian Agent at the Dalles, Oregon, received confidential information of the disposition of the Yakima and other Indians on the North side of the Columbia to commence a war on the Americans. This only confirmed the representations made by Colonel J. P. Anderson, delegate-elect to Congress from Washington Territory, on his return from the Colville mines.

The tempo of the story now accelerated considerably. Whatever the final outcome, the Indians began unmistakable opposition to white encroachments. The days of patient suffering were ended. One white was killed by the Indians near the mines; and Henri Mattice of Olympia was found dead on the trail to Seattle with his baggage undisturbed beside him. Pandosy maintained that this slaying had nothing to do with the intended uprising, but was due to Mattice's detestable personal conduct. He had criminally assaulted


80 Olney to Haller, Fort Dalles, 16 September 1855. RUSAC.

81 J. Patten Anderson of Mississippi was appointed United States Marshall and directed to take the census, under the terms of the bill establishing the Territory of Washington. Anderson and his family arrived in Puget Sound early in July, 1853. Two years later he was elected delegate to Congress from Washington Territory.

82 Haller to Withers, Fort Dalles, 16 September 1855. RUSAC.

83 Ibid.

84 G. O. Haller, "The Indian War of 1855-1856," typescript, UW.
the daughter of Teias and vengeance was taken upon him by Qualchen, the high-
spirited nephew of the victim.85 At any rate, this counted as one more mur-
der in the accounts kept by the white men, and it was so reported.86 On 14
September, Messrs. Walker and Jamison were shot from ambush while crossing
the Cascades.87 There seemed to be no rest from the grisly reports. Mason
was writing again on 24 September.

I have received positive information that 3 American citizens have been
murdered by Yakima Indians on the eastern side of the Cascades, while
going to the Colville mines.88

Mason, acting-Governor of the Territory while Stevens was engaged
in treaty talks with the Blackfeet,89 asked Rains to send a detachment into
the Yakima country to discover the murderers of Mattice, learn if there had
been other murders, punish the guilty, and protect those still on the trails.90

Two days later, 24 September 1855, Mason asked Captain Maurice Maloney for a

85 Ibid.

86 Mason to Rains, Olympia, 22 September 1855. Archives of the
State Library of Washington, Olympia, Washington. This deposit hereinafter
designated as OLY.; Printed in Gov. Mess., 156; Mason to Stevens, Olympia,

87 Mason to Rains, Olympia, 26 September 1855. OLY. Printed in

88 Mason to Maloney, Olympia, 24 September 1855. RUSAC; OLY.

89 Charles H. Mason was born at Fort Washington on the Potomac, but
grew up in Providence, Rhode Island, after his father's death in 1837. Mason
graduated from Brown University in 1850, was admitted to the bar in 1851, and
came to Washington Territory with Stevens' survey party in 1853.

90 Lucullus V. McWhorter, "The Bolon Tragedy as Narrated by Sul-lil:
Sole Survivor and Eye-Witness," Typescript, T: published as, Tragedy of the
Wahk-Shun. Prelude to the Yakima Indian War, 1855-1856. Eye-witness Account
of the Killing of Indian Agent Major Andrew J. Bolon, Together with Story of
locating the Place of his Death, Regional Indian Legends, and Definition of
detachment to administer punishment to the Yakima for killing three Americans, and to furnish protection to any citizens still in the interior.\textsuperscript{91}

Matters were critical by this time. Pandosy made a hurried trip to Olympia to inform the Governor that Kamaiakan was stirring up the Indians. The priest spent four days in the capital city, 22 September to 26 September, discussing affairs with the authorities.\textsuperscript{92} Later, Mason said that Pandosy told him on this occasion that Owhi was responsible for all the outrages.\textsuperscript{93} As a matter of fact, Pandosy did not make this statement,\textsuperscript{94} but George Blanchet had in a subsequent meeting.\textsuperscript{95}

While Pandosy was in Olympia closeted with the Governor, the final blow was struck by the Indians that ended the guerrilla fighting and brought open warfare. Andrew J. Bolon, sub-Indian Agent, was among the Spokane when word reached him of the death of Mattice. He set out for the Yakima mission and arrived there at one o'clock on Sunday afternoon, 23 September 1855. His purpose was to question Owhi about the death of Mattice. Since the chief was in the mountains, Bolon did not tarry at the mission but departed for the Dalles at three o'clock.\textsuperscript{96} He told Father Paul Durieu that he hoped to reach the Dalles by Monday morning.\textsuperscript{97} His last act was to leave a letter instruct-

\textsuperscript{91} Mason to Maloney, Olympia, 24 September 1855. RUSAC; OLY.
\textsuperscript{92} George Blanchet to Mason, Olympia, 7 December 1855. S.
\textsuperscript{93} Mason to Ricard, Olympia, 4 December 1855. S.
\textsuperscript{94} Blanchet to Mason, Olympia, 7 December 1855. S.
\textsuperscript{95} Blanchet à Brouillet, Olympia, 21 December 1855. S.
\textsuperscript{96} Durieu à Ricard, Mission des J'akamas, 30 Septembre 1855. S.
\textsuperscript{97} Father Paul Durieu, O. M. I., arrived at the Yakima Mission in
With this he rode off to his death.

Shortly after ten o'clock the next morning he overtook a party of Yakima on their way to the Dalles for dried salmon. He rode along through the cold, rainy morning with the Indians and finally stopped to lunch with them. Bolon shared his food with the natives, and later, as he stood warming his hands at the big fire they had made,

Wah-pi-wah-pi-lah, the strong man, dropped quickly and caught the white man by the legs and jerked him to the ground. So-qiekt and Moshale jumped on him, each catching an arm, Moshale on the right. The white man cried out: "Do not kill me! I did not come to fight you"... Stah-kin grabbed his beard, pulled back his head and called: "Hurry!" So-qiekt threw him a knife and Stah-kin cut the white man's throat. He struggled a short time and then lay still; the blood running from the big knife wound. The murderers buried his body beneath a partially undermined pine tree. His white horse was led away from the camp, shot and cremated.

This Indian account of Bolon's death has the advantage, and disadvantage, of having been narrated by an old man who was present at the killing when he was a boy of fourteen. Other accounts are surmises written by whites who were not aware of the tragedy until it was over.

January, 1855, only to depart in November of the same year when the Americans looted and burned the Mission. He spent many months with Pandosy in the vicinity of Colville, but by 1857 he was working among the Puget Sound Indians in 1890 he was made first bishop of New Westminster, British Columbia.

98 Ibid.

99 L. V. McWhorter, "The Bolon Tragedy," Typescript, T; McWhorter, Tragedy of the Wahk-shum.

100 Ibid., this list of the murderers agrees with a notation in Haller, "Diary Winnass Expedition," 5 September 1855. MS. UW.

101 Ibid.; Palmer to Cain, Dalles, 3 October 1855, HBC.
The long delay in returning to the Dalles had caused some uneasiness over Bolon's safety among the officials. This apprehension occasioned the letter sent to Durieu by Father Peter Richard asking for information regarding Bolon.102 In his answer, Durieu gives us the little information which we have of Bolon's last visit.103

Meanwhile a Yakima woman reached Nathan Olney's ranch near the Dalles with the particulars of his death.104 This meant war.

102 Father Peter Richard, O. M. I., arrived in Oregon in 1854, and was assigned to the Cayuse Mission.

103 Durieu à Richard, Mission des Yakamas, 30 Septembre 1855. S.

104 G. O. Haller, "The Indian War of 1855-56." Typescript. UW.
CHAPTER III

THE STORM

Other white men had been killed during the weeks preceding that fateful September day on which the Indians chose to do away with their tall, red-bearded sub-Agent, Andrew J. Bolon.1 These previous ambushes caused much fear and bitterness in the white settlements, but the slaying of the thirty-three-year-old farmer from Pennsylvania was in another category.2 This man was a member of the first Legislative Assembly of Washington Territory; he was appointed special agent for the Indians living between the Bitter Root and Cascade Mountains;3 and by actually talking with the interior tribes he was considered by many as the best informed Territorial official on the topic of Indian affairs east of the Cascade Mountains.

Not long after his appointment as special agent, Bolon went into the Yakima country for extended conversations with the natives. He heard

1 L. V. McWhorter, "The Bolon Tragedy," Typescript, T; Printed in L. V. McWhorter, Tragedy of the Wahk-Shun, etc.


67
Teias express the hope that the Great Father in Washington would come to a perfect understanding about their lands before the whites took them. So long as a distinct agreement was made before settlement by the whites, Bolon reported that the other Chiefs, Owhi, Shawawai, Skloom, and Kamaikan were willing to allow settlement of their lands. Teias and Skloom told the Agent there had been a war council of the Nez Perce which ended with the Lower Nez Perce in favor of peace, and the Upper Nez Perce advocating war. Skloom attended the council as Kamaikan's representative, and reported that the Indians had adjourned in order to lay up a two-year supply of buffalo meat. They had enough powder and ball, already in their possession, to kill

4 "Te-i-as, an old Chief, beloved and respected by all the tribes, presided over the Swan-wanck-pah tribe." G. O. Haller, "Kamiarkin in History, MS, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley, California. This deposit hereinafter designated as B.

5 Bolon to Stevens, Olympia, 30 September 1854. Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd., (Central District).

6 "Ow-hi (or Owhigh) was the War Chief (Captain) of the Swan-wanck-pah; but owing to Te-i-as' extreme old age, he appears in this war as the principal Chief of this tribe." Haller, "Kamiarkin in History" MS, B.

7 "Sow-wau-way, a brother of Kamiarkin, was also a prominent man among these Indians. It was his son, Mish-shele (Michael) whom, report at the time, says, shot Major Bolon, the U. S. sub-Indian Agent." Ibid.

8 "Sklu-hum, brother of Kamiarkin, was the War Chief (Captain) of the Sim-qua." Ibid.

9 "Kamiarkin was recognized by the tribes North of the Dalles as the head Chief, among several principal chiefs. His people called themselves, Sim-qua. . . ." Ibid.

10 Bolon to Stevens, Olympia, 30 September 1854. Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd., (Central District).

11 Ibid.
all the emigrants crossing the plains. 12

Skloom's torrent of free information was not restricted to land and war, to the exclusion of other topics. He informed Bolon that the Catholic priests were responsible for the suspicions entertained of the whites by the Indians. This subtle talk of the wily chief convinced the Agent that the priests used all their persuasive power against settlement of the country, and did their best to prejudice the Indians against the whites. 13

After volunteering these great quantities of instruction, which were relayed almost gleefully by Bolon, Skloom, Teias, and Shawawai all declined any presents offered by the Agent. 14 One would expect Bolon to be at least a little puzzled by such conduct on the part of supposed friends—apparently he was not troubled, even slightly.

This talk of a grand council of the Cayuse, Nez-Percé, Pend d'Oreille Coeur d'Alene, and part of the Palouse, to the number of two thousand and five hundred brought a withering reply from D'Herbomez who was camped with the Yakima on the Ahtanum. Skloom's description of a council "is a pure lie. I am willing to bet my head on the falsity of these words," he wrote. 15 Even more,

These natives and these different tribes are not assembled in a great council, and it must be that Mr. Bolon is very simple and knows these Indians very inadequately, especially his friend Sklom, not to see that Sklom is trying to make him swallow something. . . .
I assure you I cannot keep from chuckling when I hear these lies and big talk of Sklom. How an ordinary savage, with no power among his own people, suddenly decides to become an important person. He wants to summon to his tribunal all the Chiefs of the different tribes and make them listen to reason! If I were to tell this to the Indians they would laugh until they split and ask me if it were possible that there could be an American too stupid to see through such fairy tales.16

D'Herbomez wrote this letter, which was in reality an extended apologia of the conduct of the missionaries among the Yakima, on the advice of Mr. R. R. Thompson, Indian Agent at the Dalles.17 Thompson heard Bolon talk when he returned from his visit among the Yakima, and was alarmed by what he heard. It was commonly noised about the settlement that many promised they would swim in the blood of Catholics. Prior to fomenting trouble for the missionaries in the white settlements, Bolon and Mr. Daniel Bradford had made a proposition to the Indians, "That the priests will not remain in the country, the Americans will get rid of them."18 This kind of talk would rouse anyone to self-defence, and with the very existence of the missions at stake, D'Herbomez continued his explanation of the points raised by Bolon.

The agent listened as Sklom accused the priests of sending Kamaikan to the mountains until the officials had left the country; he was interested to hear tales of business deals made by the missionaries; in free moments he advised the natives to demand payment from the missionaries for whatever they did for them; and he introduced them into the mysteries of

16 Ibid.
17 Ibid.
certain card games for gambling.¹⁹

The fighting D'Herbomez did not shrink from a single one of these charges or activities. That the priests influenced or advised Kamaikan not to sell his lands, simply was not true. "What do we care whether he sells his lands or not," asked the priest.²⁰ Nor was the alleged commercial activity of the missionaries any more difficult to explain. When they arrived in the Yakima country they had traded some of their cattle for horses to use in visiting the Indians. Instead of slaughtering and eating the cattle they brought it seemed wiser to obtain horses for use in their work, thus limiting their personal food to salmon, roots, etc.²¹ D'Herbomez was indignant over Bolon's advice to the Indians that they make the priests pay for everything they got. For instructing the natives in the Commandments and the morality of the Gospel, for civilizing them at the price of our sweat, our journeyings, our labor, our health, and our lives, "What do we get in return from the Government?" queried the missionary.

Nothing. What do we get from the natives? Also, nothing. They give us nothing without making us pay. This doesn't surprise us coming from savages who are not wise enough to appreciate the beauty and the cost of the devotion of those who are sacrificing their health and their life for them. But, it does amaze us to have Mr. Bolon teaching them a lesson in ingratitude by telling them, "give nothing to the priests, or if you give something to them, make them pay a good price."²²

D'Herbomez considers Bolon's card-playing lessons adequately censured by a remark of Kamaikan in reference to this phase of the Agent's visit.

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¹⁹ D'Herbomez à Brouillet, Attanem, Camp des Yakamas, 28 Août 1854.
²⁰ Ibid.
²¹ Ibid.
²² Ibid.
He says he loves us. He is a liar. Does he not know that gambling is a source of disputes, fights, and murder among us? If he loves us, why does he want to tell us—strike you! kill you! and teach us card games for gambling? 23

Throughout his investigation, Bolon depended on Skloom and other Indians of similar ilk, for his information. He asked no one else, nor did he give the missionaries a chance to defend themselves 24 against attacks made by men of poor repute among the Indians themselves. 25 The divergent views, therefore, resolve themselves into a question of believing a man, ignorant of the Indian language, who relied for his knowledge upon a highly suspect Indian. 26 Or, we must put our trust in the evidence presented by missionaries who were not visiting the tribes, but were living in their midst, building a house, tilling fields, and were in a vastly superior position to know the true state of affairs. 27

Bishop Magloire Blanchet had so much confidence in D'Herbomez's familiarity with the situation that he made a formal demand upon Stevens for the removal of Bolon. 28 The request was made for these reasons: Bolon had confided in the most disreputable members of the tribe; he had encouraged gambling; he manifested toward the missionaries an attitude quite offensive

23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
26 D'Herbomez à Brouillet, Attanem, Camp des Yakamas, 28 Août 1854. S.
27 Chirouse à Ricard, Ste. Rose des Cayouses, 26 Mai 1854. OMI.
to them and not what they would expect from an agent of the Government; and by his general conduct had lost the confidence of the good people among the savages. 29

Stevens delayed replying until the Bishop decided that the Governor had "found these serious charges unworthy of your consideration." 30 Under the circumstances, Blanchet planned to forward the allegations to officials in Washington, D. C., 31 which was done two days later. 32 No matter how much provocation Stevens gave for the Bishop's suspicions this hasty transmittal of the charges to higher authorities was a mistake. Blanchet's notice of his proposed appeal to higher officials, crossed with the Governor's answer to the request for Bolon's removal. Stevens admitted the gravity of the accusations against his agent, but asked Blanchet to specify more exactly and furnish proof of Bolon's alleged incompetency. 33

Faced with Blanchet's recourse to Washington, Stevens hastened to send a letter of his own to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs. After repeating the accusations made by Blanchet against Bolon, the Governor insisted there was not a shred of proof supporting them. He expressed his desire of investigating the whole affair to determine whether prejudice against Bolon

29 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
33 Stevens to A. M. A. Blanchet, Olympia, 21 December 1854. ROIA.
was at the bottom of the charges, whether there had been any violation of the Intercourse Law by the priests impeding a government official in the discharge of his duties; whether the charges as filed were true. In this latter contingency, he expressed his readiness to suspend the offending agent.34

While the Bishop and the Governor were writing to Washington, the Superior of the Oblate Missionaries, Pascal Ricard, answered the charges made by Bolon against the priests.35 Ricard told Stevens that,

Our priests East of the Mountains follow the same plan as we do here on the Sound. Hence, Mr. Bolon's accusations must be based on the false reports of malicious natives. Our position does not permit us to tell the savages to sell their lands; much less would we tell them, do not sell your land. Our occupation is religion and we leave temporal matters to the government officials.36

Ricard did not rest content with this general denial, but developed the thought further when he reassured Stevens that,

We cannot tell them openly to sell their lands, but what we do tell them is equivalent to this. We want them to settle down to the cultivation of the arts and the soil, for it is quite clear that their wandering life is the greatest obstacle in the path of the result we desire—to make these people rational and, with God's grace, good Christians. Fear not, then, Governor, that the priests work against the great and noble plans of the Government. All that we desire is that when the Government realizes its plan of establishing schools for the Indians, if for special reasons it does not entrust the direction of these institutions to the missionaries themselves, at least it will assign to married and God-fearing men.37

Meanwhile, plans for the official trip into the Yakima country mentioned by Stevens in his letter of 14 January, to George Manypenny, took

34 Stevens to Manypenny, Olympia, 14 January 1855. ROIA.
35 Ricard à Stevens, St. Joseph pres d'Olympia, 2 Mars 1855. Wash. SIA. Misc. Letts. Recd.; S.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
definite form. James Doty, Bolon, Dr. R. H. Lansdale, and two helpers left the Dalles, on 6 March 1855. They went first to Walla Walla to arrange for the reception and storage of goods, thence they proceeded to the winter camp of the Yakima. The small party reached the mission on Palm Sunday, 1 April, during the procession preceding High Mass. Doty paid his respects and was entertained by Pandosy until Durieu finished the ceremonies. "Afterwards the whole tribe shook hands with them" but this hospitable reception was not a true portent of what would follow.

Doty was occupied until 3 April in trying to find the chiefs of the tribe. Teias and Kamaikan were in the vicinity of Ahtanum, and riders were sent to bring Owhi, Shawawai, and Skloom for a meeting at Doty's camp on the plain.

Doty reported to the Governor that the five chiefs agreed to a council at Walla Walla during the next month. He admitted that only four of


39 Durieu à Ricard, D'Attanem Chez les Yakamas, 28 Mars 1855, OMI; Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 22 Fevrier 1856. S.


41 Durieu à Ricard, D'Attanem Chez les Yakamas, 28 Mars 1855, OMI; Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 22 Fevrier 1856. S.

42 Ibid.


44 Durieu à Ricard, D'Attanem Chez les Yakamas, 28 Mars 1855, OMI; Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 22 Fevrier 1856. S.
the chiefs expressed an earnest desire to hear what Stevens had to discuss with them. This was Doty's delicate admission that Kamaiakan was not wildly enthusiastic and everything connected with this preliminary meeting showed that Kamaiakan was no venal devotee of the white man's civilization.

He came a long time after the others. The day before, he stated openly that he did not want to go. Finally, when he did come, he camped more than a mile from the Agent's tent. They invited him in without effect— he did not go.

Lest there was any doubt regarding his position, the Chief made himself extravagantly clear on the following day when he approached Doty's camp with all his people under arms. This time he entered the tent, but spoke only twice: when the place of the council was discussed, he was vehement in his desire that it convene at Walla Walla; . . . and when the Agent offered presents, Kamiakin stated that he wanted nothing and walked out.

All the others refused to accept the proffered gifts. Teias' people returned on the next day and carried off their presents, but this was only after Pandosy told them that they were rather silly to refuse the gifts, after agreeing to sell their lands.

About the only cheerful note in the entire proceedings was the unfailing assistance rendered to Doty by Pandosy. The priest had talked to


46 Durieu à Ricard, D'Attanem Chez les Yakamas, 28 Mars 1855, OMI, Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 22 Fevrier 1856. S.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

Indians; and although preparations for Easter kept him from visiting Doty's camp, he advised the Agent of Owhi and Shawawai's attitude, by means of a letter. The Governor's aide was honest enough to express "his pleasure at seeing our savages better dressed and neater than all the others, and above all, more refined and candid." There was more than a grain of poetic justice in these accolades, if one remembers that Bolon was with Doty while the missionaries were still defending themselves in letters to the Governor. The council with the Yakima which Stevens jubilantly announced after receiving Doty's report, and actually convened in the following month, has been described in a previous chapter.

The purpose of the present pages is to show that the temper of the Indians had not unexpectedly burst forth in bloody hostility. Surely there was adequate grounds for expecting trouble with the Indians, if the whites had only observed what was constantly before their eyes. As far back as 1853, Pandosy warned of an Indian plot to exterminate the whites; Bolon's annual report of 1854 was optimistic, but some attention should have been given to

50 Pandosy a Doty, Attanem, 3 Avril 1855, Archives of the Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin. This deposit hereinafter designated as WISC.

51 Durieu à Ricard, D'Attanem Chez les Yakamas, 28 Mars 1855, OMI, Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 22 Fevrier 1856. S.


53 Pandosy to Mesplie, Mission in Yackimaw Country; April, 1853, in Serial Set No. 929.

54 Bolon to Stevens, Olympia, 30 September 1854. Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd., (Central District).
D'Herbomez and Durieu's more somber letters. That a less sanguine view was not the sole property of the priests is clear from a letter written by Cushing Eells to Mr. S. B. Treat, Secretary to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions. The Board had asked Eells for his opinion regarding the reestablishment of Protestant missions among the interior tribes. He wrote:

At present the door does not appear to be open. I may be under a mistaken apprehension, but my opinion is that there is not sufficient protection for life and property to warrant the locating mission families in the Nes Perces country. This I believe to be the general opinion of the intelligent Christian portion of the community.

It is possible to object that all these evidences of dissatisfaction appeared before Stevens negotiated the Treaty of 9 June 1855, at the Walla Walla Council Grounds. Unfortunately, the Treaty brought no appreciable change in the tone of letters written by close observers of the times. Six weeks after the treaty was signed, D'Herbomez went off on a routine visit among the Indians. "Because we were passing close to the military camp, and because of the widespread rumour that the Indians wanted to declare war on the Americans," one of the Chiefs asked the priest to assure the officers and

55 D'Herbomez à Brouillet, Attanem, Camp des Yakamas, 28 Août 1854,

56 Durieu à Ricard, D'Attanem Chez des Yakamas, 28 Mars 1855, OMI; Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 22 Fevrier 1856, S.

57 Cushing C. Eells was born in Massachusetts and came to Oregon in 1838. He worked among the Spokane Indians with Elkanah Walker and like the latter, settled in the Willamette Valley in 1848. He was one of the moving spirits in building up Pacific University at Forest Grove, Oregon, and was largely responsible for the establishment of Whitman College at Walla Walla. In 1875 Eells returned to his missionary work with the Spokanes.

58 Cushing Eells to S. B. Treat, Hillsboro, O. T., 6 January 1855,
men that although the others would declare war, neither he nor his people would take up arms. 59 This may be named the August warning. A month later, Pandosy rushed to Olympia to warn acting-Governor Mason that the interior country was ready to explode. 60 While he was still in the capital, his prophecy came true—the interior country did explode.

It is now possible to piece together a fairly complete account of what happened immediately before the formal outbreak of war. Bolon was in the Spokane country awaiting the return of Gov Stevens from the Blackfoot council when he was informed by Spokane Garry the Chief of the Spokanes that the Yakimas had killed eight men on their way to the Pend Oreille mines and that they intended to wage war against the whites—he determined immediately to proceed to the Yakima country and ascertain the truth of the reports—he accordingly proceeded to the Dalles. . . . 61

After his departure from the Dalles for the Yakima Mission, Tuesday, 18 September, 62 nothing more was heard from or about him until news of his death seeped through to the settlement. 63 He expected to be gone three days, but his continued absence plus several Indian reports of his death, caused great concern at the Dalles. 64 To end the suspense, Mesplie sent a personal messenger to the priest at the Yakima Mission "informing him of the reports

59 D'Herbomez à Ricard, Mission de S. Joseph près d'Olympia, 25 Août 1855, OMI; OMI-r.
60 Durieu à Ricard, Mission des Yakamas, 30 Septembre 1855, S.
64 Palmer to Stevens, Portland, 6 October 1855, Wash. SIA. Misc. Letts. Recd.
and making inquiries upon the subject."65 This messenger returned with Durieu's letter to Father Ricard,66 containing the brief narration of Bolon's two-hour visit at the Mission on Sunday, 23 September; whence he departed at three o'clock in the afternoon, to keep a rendezvous with death.67

Rumours and reports of Bolon's death brought in their wake a wave of panic and of planning. It was confusing because no single, definite statement of the time and place of the Agent's death could be made, except by Indians whom the whites were slow to believe. Since the settlers were sure only of the fact that they had enemies, but knew not whence would come the next blow, their preparations for attack were disorganized. Charles Mason, acting-Governor of the Territory, requisitioned troops from the U. S. Army to sweep through the Yakima country. Lt. William A. Slaughter, with forty soldiers and the necessary number of packers left Fort Steilacoom on 28 September 1855.68 These men were to cross the Cascade Mountains from the west side, to cooperate with eighty-four men ordered into the field from Fort Dalles.69

The troops were under orders to ascertain the fate of Bolon, and to punish the Indians for their supposed unwarranted slayings of white men.70 Mason considered the two forces, "ample enough, I should think, to do all that can be

65 Ibid.
66 Ibid.
67 Durieu à Ricard, Mission des Yakamas, 30 Septembre 1855, S.
68 Mason to Stevens, Olympia, 3 October 1855, Wash. SIA. Misc. Letts. Recd.
69 Rains to Mason, Fort Vancouver, 29 September 1855, OLY.
70 Ibid.
HALLER'S EXPEDITION
How wrong he was will appear shortly.

While the army was rushing troops into the field, civilians threw themselves into the work of building ramparts around the settlements. No issue of Olympia's newspaper, The Pioneer and Democrat, appeared for 5 October because the printers were occupied, as were their fellow-citizens, in building defences against an anticipated Indian attack. One might judge that few escaped the spreading terror when the place and time of Ricard's will is noted—Olympia, 6 October 1855. Reports circulated widely that the Yakima chiefs were persuading, cajoling, and threatening the other Indian tribes to induce them "to join in a general rising against the Americans." The resulting excitement among the tribes was matched by the uneasiness pervading the white population.

This was the setting in which Haller's punitive expedition against the Yakima set out from Fort Dalles. Orders for the expedition were issued on 30 September 1855. It was planned to campaign for about three weeks with two companies, I and K, Fourth Infantry. Two thousand rations of sugar, coffee, rice, and soap, one thousand rations of flour, hard bread, and pork

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71 Mason to Stevens, Olympia, 3 October 1855, Wash. SIA. Misc. Letts. Recd.
72 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 3 October 1855, S.
73 Pascal Ricard, "Testament," Olympia, 6 October 1855. OMI-r.
74 Maclavish to W. G. Smith, Vancouver, 10 October 1855. HBC.
75 Palmer to Cain, Dalles, 3 October 1855, HBC.
76 Orders No. 78, Fort Dalles, O. T., 30 September 1855; Haller to Townsend, Fort Dalles, 1 October 1855, RUSAC.
were taken along. Sufficient pack animals and one civilian packer for every six animals were provided by the Quartermaster and Commissary of the Regiment. Haller sent a copy of these orders to his superior office, Major Gabriel Rains, at Fort Vancouver, Headquarters of the District. This office responded by ordering Haller to take only one, not the projected two, companies on the expedition. The commander at Fort Dalles in turn, wrote an immediate reply giving further reasons for the wisdom of his action, and presumed that his superior officer would approve.

Most of the following day, 2 October, was spent in bringing up to date his various reports; the Post Returns, Company Returns, Accounts of Property, and Quarterly Returns of Ordnance were in order by midnight. Earlier in the day, Haller ordered his troops over the River and by sunset, when the little steamer that had been towing them sprang a leak, all except ten horses were safely across the stream, and a number of the men were left to cross in the morning. This was done, and the march got under way on 3 October 1855; one hundred and two fighting men, three officers, one medical officer, and the

77 Ibid.

78 Haller, "Journal of a scout in the Yakima Country, October, 1855," 30 September 1855, MS, UW.

79 Ibid., 1 October 1855.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid., 1 October 1855; 2 October 1855.

82 Ibid., 2 October 1855.

83 Palmer to Cain, Dalles, 3 October 1855, HBC.
requisite number of civilian packers were off on their mission of vengeance. 84

Some days before setting out from Fort Dalles, Haller engaged Old Tice to journey into the Yakima country as a spy. 85 To all intents and purposes he had evanesced until the soldiers encamped at the end of their first day's march, 3 October. The old Indian was no bearer of good tidings when he did appear in the camp.

He corroborated the killing and burning of Major Bolon and horse, and stated the number of warriors collected together in the Yakima valley were so immense, that it was not possible for him to indicate in numbers the greatness of the host, but he urged the return of Haller's command to the Dalles without delay until reinforced, asserting that it would be out of the power of the soldiers, with double their present force, to escape destruction, if they once encountered Kamiaken's warriors. 86

The old man's adamant refusal to join the command as a guide, lent emphasis to his warning.

Haller did not turn back, but during the following two days

the column advanced . . . with guards deployed in front, and rear, and on both flanks, as is usual, without incidents worthy of notice until the sixth day of October. . . . 87

About three o'clock on this Saturday afternoon, as the troops picked their way down the trail leading to Toppenish Creek, they met the Indians. 88 Although the soldiers had found what they were looking for--Indians; the sequel was not exactly according to plan.

84 Granville O. Haller, The Dismissal of Major Granville O. Haller, etc., 37.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Haller, "Journal of a scout in the Yakima country, October, 1855," 6 October 1855, MS, UW.
Immediately following this first contact was a brief lull which afforded an opportunity for the troops to refill their canteens, emptied on the hot march.\textsuperscript{89} This task was interrupted by the war-whoops of Indians across the creek that made it possible to guess their position and approximate number, "and enabled the soldiers to assault their positions intelligently and vigorously."\textsuperscript{90} The fight continued until nearly dark, with a round or two from the howitzer and a full-scale charge finally clearing out the Indians from the brush along the opposite bank of the creek.\textsuperscript{91} The Indians killed one soldier and wounded eight; two gravely, four seriously, and two slightly.\textsuperscript{92} The fact of the Indians being stunned by "the sudden use of the howitzer, which sent a death-dealing mass of lead and iron into their ranks,"\textsuperscript{93} was of meager help to the soldiers as they "encamped without wood or water or grass and prepared for night attack."\textsuperscript{94} The attack did not materialize, although a few Indians hovered on the fringe of the camp throughout the night.\textsuperscript{95}

Daylight was not cheer-laden. A study of their camp revealed that "there was no wood nearer than the brush and trees on the banks of the Toppnish, which we had reason to believe sheltered Indians, to prevent our animals

\textsuperscript{89} Haller, "The Indian War of 1855-56," Typescript, UW.

\textsuperscript{90} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{91} Haller, "Journal of a scout in the Yakima country, October, 1855," 6 October 1855, MS, UW.

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{93} Interview with Old Tumwater, in Early Klickitat Valley Days, (Goldendale, Washington, The Author, 1938.)

\textsuperscript{94} Haller, "Journal of a scout, etc.," 6 October 1855.

\textsuperscript{95} Ibid.
from reaching the water.\textsuperscript{96} The wounded were relatively safe from enemy fire, thanks to a deep pit in the army camp. This did not bolster the spirits of the able-bodied men who found themselves completely exposed to the gaze of the Indians encamped a safe distance away, on the crest of a ravine.\textsuperscript{97} The soldiers, in turn, from their camp watched the Indians continually approaching and spreading around the camp. Hour after hour they saw an almost unbroken stream of reinforcements joining the Indians. "Squads of five or six, sometimes eight, ten, fifteen, twenty, or so many that, between the number and dust, could not be determined."\textsuperscript{98} Without wood, water or pasture the little group saw themselves about to be overwhelmed by sheer numbers, against which they could send a mere peppering of musket shots.

Throughout this day the Indians edged closer and closer to the soldiers' camp, but always behind rifle pits made of hastily piled rocks. Their fire was not indiscriminate, their patience inexhaustible, their alertness never-failing, thus managing to fray the nerves of Haller's untried recruits. Before the day was far advanced, the Major expressed alarm.

because recruits fire eternally without aim or mark, the ammunition will not last long. ... We have killed several Indians. The long range rifle is of little account, it can hardly be loaded after the first fire and the ball lets part of it remain in it.\textsuperscript{99}

Time was not in favor of the soldiers. Haller guessed that five

\textsuperscript{96} Haller, "The Indian War of 1855-6," Typescript, UW.

\textsuperscript{97} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{98} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{99} Haller, "Journal of a scout, etc.," Sunday, 7 October 1855.
hundred Indians, "perhaps double that," were around the camp. Later months saw the figure revised upward on the strength of Pandosy’s statement that "their numbers at this moment were fifteen hundred men, and, if they wished it, they could soon have had two thousand men." Probably this last round number was in Haller’s mind many years later when he noted that, "Father Pandosy in a letter to Major Haller said Kamiarkin had 2,200 warriors by count, many came from his allies, whose tribal names he enumerated." It probably made little difference to the beleaguered camp whether there were one thousand and five hundred or two thousand Indians opposing them. Quite obviously there were far too many to conquer, or to allow an unimpeded withdrawal. Haller began "thinking of a retreat before a retreat becomes impracticable."

Towards sunset of 7 October, the Indians drew back from the firing line, thus relaxing the tight ring around the camp.

Relieved from the presence of the enemy, preparations were made to return to Fort Dalles. By the time the animals were packed, the pickets called in, and the details for front and rear guards were told off, darkness had set in.

In pitch-black darkness the whole command groped its way up the zig-zag trail leading to the top of the mountain. Very soon after starting,

100 Ibid.
101 Haller, "The Indian War of 1855-56," Typescript, UW.
102 Haller, "Kamiarkin in History," MS, B.
103 Haller, "Journal of a scout, etc.," Sunday, 7 October 1855, UW.
104 G. O. Haller, "The Indian War of 1855-56," Typescript, UW.
the animals and the forty men acting as rear guard became separated from the remainder of the weary group. Had the Indians realized what was happening almost under their noses they would have been extremely unhappy. Not only were the soldiers escaping, but with their small number divided into two smaller groups because of unfamiliarity with the terrain, poor guidance, and impenetrable darkness, the escape was all the more humiliating to the natives. This first march halted once the head column reached the timber line on the Assum Trail where the wounded were lifted from their horses, fires lighted, and a few hours of sleep obtained, the first in two days. The Indians saw the fires burning on the slope above the supposed camp of the soldiers and thought they were kindled by reinforcements coming to the rescue of Haller; the separated rear-guard saw the same fires and concluded that they marked the camp site of still more Indians. This explains why the army command was not reunited until the afternoon of the following day, 8 October 1855.

At dawn, the head column resumed the retreat. They went along unmolested until they reached the top of high land, where it was comparatively level. At long last, the Indians understood what was happening, and began a running battle that lasted several hours. Slowed down by the necessity of caring for the wounded, bothered by constantly fouling muskets, delayed by rapidly tiring animals, Haller decided this was the time to send for help.

105 Haller to Dryer, Camp No. 4, Heights of the Pesco River, 7 October 1855. This letter is among the Wool Papers in the New York State Library, Albany, New York. This deposit hereinafter designated as W; a copy of the same document is in RUSAC.
106 G. O. Haller, "The Indian War of 1855-56," Typescript, UW.
107 Ibid.
108 G. O. Haller, "Kambarik in History," MS, B.
Between 10 and 11 A. M., Cut-Mouth John, faithful Cayuse Indian scout, was sent to the Dalles with an urgent appeal for assistance. After outlining his critical position, Haller closed the despatch with these words:

I cannot urge too much dispatch, in a party of Old Soldiers joining me soon, as the inexperience of the Recruits, and the want of Officers has greatly added to the difficulties of making an impression on these Indians to our advantage.

This message was in the proper hands at Fort Dalles by sundown, thanks to Cut-Mouth John's record ride at an average speed of "full eight miles to the hour."

Meanwhile, the men fought on doggedly until their trail led them near to a narrow strip of woods which projected into the prairie. Here they stopped to "clean the muskets, replenish the cartridge boxes, and give the soldiers a rest." The Indians started grass fires hoping to burn out the soldiers, but promptly lighted counter-fires stopped this hazard. Then the savages started fires crawling in the thick pine needles on the ground, and tried to advance under cover of the heavy smoke screen. This was more success...
ful because it brought the Indians dangerously close to the sentinels. To
put an end to these seriously annoying antics, an assaulting party charged
the woods in which the Indians lay hidden.

The charge was most effective; the startled Indians darted from their
lurking places into the prairie, where they could run the faster and see
about them, followed by musketry firing but harmless. The scare, how­
ever, was complete, and from that time no enemy was seen, and the further
march to Fort Dalles was unmolested.

Two soldiers were killed and several wounded in this closing skirmish. The
troops that returned to Fort Dalles were not conquering heroes flushed with
victory. Four of their comrades lay buried in Indian country, and the seven­
teen wounded made a fitting escort for the body of the gallant Quartermaster
and Commissary Sergeant James Mulholland which was brought back to Fort Dalles
for burial.

Lieutenant Edward H. Day had been designated as "Reserve to the in­
vading Battalion in case of necessity." Accordingly, he, with fifty men,
left Fort Dalles on 9 October 1855 to help Haller's riddled command.
The
Regulars were accompanied by the First Regiment, Oregon Mounted Volunteers
who shared the march, "through snow, sometimes three feet deep, and a bitter
cold wind."

Ultimately, this relief force did no more than escort Haller's

114 Ibid.

115 Ibid. G. O. Haller, The Dismissal of Major Granville O. Haller
etc., 39; Shaw to Mason, Dalles, 13 October 1855, OLY.; Mactavish to Smith,
Vancouver, W. T., 23 October 1855, HBC.

116 Orders No. 78, Fort Dalles, O. T., 30 September 1855, RUSAC.

117 Cain to Mason, Cascades, 9 October 1855, OLY; Rains to Curry,
Fort Vancouver, 9 October 1855, RUSAC. Letts. Sent.

118 T. J. Small to T. A. Woods, Jefferson City, Mo., 15 January
men on their dismal return to the Dalles.

Haller's repulse by the Indians caused immediate repercussions in the military and non-military spheres of activity. The military matters will be seen in the next chapter, as they constituted the prologue to Rains' expedition against the Yakima. In spite of the fact that Haller's expedition was really nothing more than a skirmish, without significance in military history, this victory of the Indians had almost instantaneous and widespread effects in Washington and Oregon Territories.

The Catholic missionary labors were suspended on a temporary basis that became permanent as far as the Oblates of Mary Immaculate were concerned. Pandosy returned from his visit to acting-Governor Mason in Olympia, and found the Indians were in the midst of their fight with Haller. The natives forthwith put the priest under protective custody "so as to have an Interpreter and Scribe, to write communications to the White authorities, if necessary." Pandosy wasted no time before describing to the Indians the frightful consequences of war, and the advantages of peace with the Americans. His words carried enough weight to elicit a request from the savages that he write out and send their proposals to the soldiers. After explaining the intense grievance they held toward the Americans for taking

1899, in Oregon Native Son, May, 1899; Shaw to Cain, Dalles, O. T., 8 October 1855, OLY.

119 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 19 Octobre 1855, S.

120 G. O. Haller, "Kamiarkin in History," MS, B.

121 The Yakima to the American Authorities, Attanem, 7 October 1855, S.

122 Ibid.; Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 19 Octobre 1855, S.
their lands, the Indians proposed that,

If the soldiers and the Americans, after they have read the letter and taken notice of the reasons that brought us to strike, wish to retire and negotiate amicably, we shall agree to put down our arms and give them a piece of land from the different tribes, provided they do not oblige us to exile ourselves from the land of our birth. Otherwise, we are determined to let ourselves be cut to pieces, and if you conquer us, those guarding the camp where our women and children are, will put them to death rather than see them fall into the hands of the Americans to be made playthings of by them.\textsuperscript{123}

The messenger who carried this letter was too late to catch Haller before he was well on his way back to the Dalles.\textsuperscript{124} A few weeks later, Rains found the letter on the table in the missionary’s house when his men reached that place in the course of their search for the Indians.\textsuperscript{125}

This role of peacemaker was worthy of highest praise, but Pandosy’s Superior, Ricard, was of the mind that the times were not propitious for him or Durieu to stay at the Yakima Mission.

On account of rumours that are current and a letter that I have just received from Mr. Brouillet, I want to tell you to retire, until such time as good order can be re-established. You will be able to resume the work of your mission. ... Do not associate with the warring savages under the pretext of furnishing them spiritual help. Since they wanted war in spite of you, let them prosecute it without you. I feel sorry for your good Christians, but greater good does not allow that you stay with the Yakamas.\textsuperscript{126}

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\textsuperscript{123} The Yakima to the American Authorities, Attanem, 7 October 1855
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\textsuperscript{124} Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 19 Octobre 1855, S; G. O. Haller, "The Indian War of 1855-56," Typescript, UW.
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\textsuperscript{125} Rains to Kamiakin, Roman Catholic Mission, 13 November 1855, Wash. SIA. Misc. Letts. Recd.; AGO. Letts. Recd. 1856; Serial Set No. 906; Frances Fuller Victor, The Early Indian Wars of Oregon compiled from the Oregon Archives and other Original Sources with Muster Rolls. (Salem, Frank C. Baker, 1894.) 430-431.
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\textsuperscript{126} Ricard à Pandosy ou Durieu, Olympia, 12 Octobre 1855, S.
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Ricard included in this letter minute instructions regarding the disposal of whatever was at the Mission. They were to bring to the Dalles everything they could, especially things used for religious ceremonies. All supplies, crops, and stock were to be sold, if a chance presented itself. 127 There was not the slightest doubt that the Yakima Mission was being abandoned, at least, for the time being.

Trouble arose in getting these orders delivered to the missionaries in the war-torn interior. Ricard forwarded his original letter to Brouillet with the request that "you . . . see they get it by some trustworthy man leaving for the war." 128 This letter, so far as we know, was never delivered to Pandosy or Durieu. A week later, Ricard took "advantage of the departure of the troops from Steilacoom to write to our Fathers and to urge again that they return here as soon as possible, if they can do it." 129 This letter also went undelivered simply because Maloney never reached the Yakima Mission.

Quite unknown to worried Ricard, the Mission was effectively closed and the missionaries busily engaged in other pursuits, and this perforce. How this happened and whither it led the staff belongs to the next chapter.

The other people deeply affected by the outbreak of hostilities were the hitherto non-belligerent Indians. The hour of decision was upon them! With which side would they take their place? Express riders sent among the tribes by the Yakima offered inducements to those who joined them; those

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127 Ibid.
128 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 12 Octobre 1855, S.
129 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 19 Octobre 1855, S.
130 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 9 Novembre 1855, S.
who refused were threatened with the extermination of all male adults, and the enslavement of their women and children. The forced enlistment of allies was carried on vigorously, not only by Yakima, but by their good friends, Leschi among the Nisqually tribe, and Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox with the Wallawalla. Simultaneous with this effort of the Yakima in quest of allies, went counter activities of the Americans to keep as many as possible neutral. Immediately after hostilities began,

Agent J. Cain visited the Cowlitz Country, assembled the whole tribe together (then about 450 in number) and induced them to give up their arms and ammunition and go upon a temporary reservation until quiet should be restored amongst the tribes then in hostile array. These results were of some importance at the time, but probably the most far-reaching consequence of Haller's invasion and retreat was the initiation of war before the Indians were fully prepared, "and before the snow and ice of winter could aid them in their grand effort." The consensus among the whites was that the Indians had planned

131 Palmer to Manypenny, Dayton, O. T., 9 October 1855, Wash. SIA. Letter Books, D: 308; J. P. Keller to Charles Foster, Teekalet, W. T., 11 November 1855, COE.

132 James McAlister to The Superintendent of Indian Affairs, Nisqually Bottom, 16 October 1855, OLY.

133 Shaw to Stevens, Vancouver, 10 February 1856, Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd. (Central District); Serial Set No. 876; Gosnell to Stevens, Olympia, 31 December 1856, UW; Printed in Washington Historical Quarterly, XVII (1925); Shaw to Mason, Dalles, 18 October 1855, OLY.

134 Cain to Nesmith, Vancouver, 9 November 1856; Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd., (Western District). J. Cain was agent in charge of the Indians on the north side of the Columbia River from Vancouver to the land opposite the Dalles.

135 G. O. Haller, "The Indian War of 1855-56," Typescript, UW.
to begin in the Yakima Country first and draw all the troops in that
direction and thus enable the Nesquallys & White Rivers to fall on the
settlements and massacre the unprotected inhabitants and burn all the
property. 136

This scheme was spoiled by Haller's premature appearance in the Yakima country
and by Maloney's failure to join Rains in his sweep through the hostile land.
Maloney's place in this picture will become clear in the chapter to follow.

No matter what the Indians had scheduled, no matter how much or how
little the troops might have done in different circumstances, the fact of
Haller's defeat was a hard, blunt fact. The incident had precipitated a war
for which neither Indian nor white was genuinely ready. 137 Time favored the
whites, with the much greater resources of the Regular Army behind them if
needed. This was of little consolation at the moment which saw each settler
peering behind every tree and bush expecting to find a murderous Indian laying
in wait for him. To know that thousands of fellow-citizens would come to
fill the places vacated by massacred settlers was no help to those faced with
the immediate prospect of being one of the dead. The only solution was to
chastise the hostile Indians. Haller's defeat, a defeat of an avenging angel,
must be avenged.

136 Shaw to Stevens, Vancouver, 10 February 1856, Wash. SIA. Lett.
Reod. (Central District); Serial Set No. 876.

137 (U. E. Hicks) Yakima and Clickitat Indian Wars, 1855 and 1856.
Personal Recollections of Capt. U. E. Hicks, (Portland, Himes the Printer,
1886.)
CHAPTER IV

THE AVENGER IS AVENGER

Word of Haller's defeat brought in its wake a rush of hysterical activity. Reason fled before terror-ridden emotion, as the people in the settlements tried to find someone to blame for the debacle; tried to organize volunteer battalions to stem the Indian onslaught they were certain was imminent; undertook to build defence works—and all these simultaneously. Unreasoning fear, not common sense, was the watchword of the day. Some people were saying on the streets of Olympia that "they ought to hang Father Ricard together with his priests."¹ Probably not every wife in her kitchen was fully aware of how closely the Catholic priests, from their first days in the Territory, had cooperated with Territorial authorities. However, no responsible official in the settlements could have been ignorant of the conduct of the missionaries. Ricard had this in mind when he reminded acting-Governor Mason:

You should know that in April 1853 the priests among the Yakamas gave notice to the Major at The Dalles of a plot that was being hatched and then nothing followed. You should not forget that I had G. Blanchet talk to the Governor before he left. Finally, you should have still fresh in your memory what one of the priests among the Yakamas told you only about fifteen days ago.²

¹ Ricard à Mason, Olympia, 12 Octobre 1855, S.
² Ibid.
The reason for this pointed narration was not to pass the time of day. Ricard asked the Governor to inform the public of "the conduct of the priests here and East of the Cascades." If the correct position of the priests was better known among ordinary people, it might help sweeten the bitter feeling nourished against the missionaries by some citizens. With the same object in view, Ricard sent another letter to Brouillet, Vicar General of the Diocese of Nisqually, which contained information identical with that sent to Mason. When this request for a public testimonial regarding the character of the priests was presented to Mason, he told Brother George Blanchet that for a few stupid remarks it was not necessary to take such precautions. He contented himself with declaring that the civil authority had received from the priests all the information that could be expected and desired. Although the acting-Governor did promise to write a few lines to dispel Ricard's fears, it was a matter of record that his efforts ended with the verbal interview. Two months later this fact would be called to his attention, after Ricard's fears had been more than adequately realized.

In the meantime, the priests stayed at their mission near Olympia. They were not ignorant of the feeling against them, although they would have been even more uneasy had they read Joel Palmer's sly innuendo:

the Father with his household who has resided for several years at the Yakama Mission still remains secure in the heart of the enemy country.

3 Ibid.
4 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 12 Octobre 1855, S.
5 Ricard à Mason, Olympia, 1 Decembre 1855, S.
6 Ibid.
7 Palmer to Manypenny, Dallas of the Columbia, 26 October 1855.
What was implied concerning their fellow priests in the heart of the hostile country, caused no less concern to those at St. Joseph's Mission near Olympia. It was quite clear that all the frenzied people were not confined to Oregon. That the weeks immediately following the outbreak of war were not easy for the priests near Olympia, may be deduced from Ricard's description:

We did not carry on like the others; we stayed quietly at home but our calm ended by making us afraid. We feared that some ill-disposed person or some fool would start saying we were in league with the savages. But, thank God, our neighbors and the old settlers have taken our side from the beginning and we are no longer under cover. We have borne arms, given advice and encouragement, and have gained more than lost in the eyes of the public.8

The serenity of the missionaries mentioned in this letter was not typical of the times. There was danger, but the common practise of giving way to terror-laden frenzy only increased the peril.9 So much had to be done that the wild reactions of the unprepared citizenry are understandable. Volunteers were raised,10 the country scoured for arms,11 block houses erected in almost every place,12 families fled from their farms to the towns and military posts,13 normal business came to a standstill,14 nerves tautened by fear were

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9 Ibid.
10 J. P. Keller to Charles Foster, Teekalet, W. T., 1 November 1855, COE.
11 Ibid.
12 Keller to Foster, Teekalet, W. T., 11 November 1855, COE.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
snapped by reports and rumours of families being murdered in their cabins. It took time for calm judgment to reassert itself. Gradually, people on the west side of the mountains assumed an attitude of armed wariness. Each town was a military camp, with its volunteer soldiery ever on the alert. 

The butcher, the baker, and the blacksmith masquerading as strong, fearless fighters may appear slightly ridiculous today, unless we recall the circumstances of almost a century ago. Regular troops were not present in countless hordes. The citizens tried to prepare themselves according to information that reached them from all and sundry sources. They had no grounds for doubting that one Nisqually chief went off in great haste over the Cascades to obtain recruits among the Klikitat; another chief went north in search of allies; the Puyallup Indians had enlisted the aid of the Nisqually tribe by giving them twelve horses and some squaws; while the Snoqualmie tribe refused ten horses and some squaws proffered by the Puyallup. These vigorous efforts to spread the war were recognized in Army circles, as well as by the townspeople. It was reported officially that,

The Indian war has become general, and a combination for purposes of hostilities to the whites been formed, on a scale which those most intimately acquainted with Indian character have hitherto believed impossible. Upon the east of the Cascade Range, it may now be assumed that every Tribe in Washington Territory, as far as the Rocky Mountains, is engaged in the war, with the exception of the Flatheads, the Spokane, Pen d'Oreilles, and part of the Nes Perces, and that, even of them, a great many of the young men are with the Yakamas.

15 Keller to Foster, Teekalet, W. T., 1 November 1855, COE.
16 Kate Blaine to her Sister, [Sharon] Seattle, 22 November 1855, Typescript, COE.
17 Report to Stevens, on board "Decatur," 13 November 1855, OLY.
18 Withers to Cooper, Fort Vancouver, 12 November 1855, RUSAC.
Lieutenant John Withers estimated the total number of warriors in the field at from three to five thousand. It makes little difference what Headquarters' strategists later said about the whole matter, at the time the readily available evidence convinced the frightened civilian and military population that this was a struggle against extermination. Survival demanded that Haller's repulse be avenged.

Signs of alarm caused by initial Indian success were widespread among the civilian population of Oregon and Washington. If it was any help, the ordinary people could console themselves with the knowledge that civil and military officialdom was equally apprehensive. Even before Haller's command dragged itself back to the Dalles, urgent messages and measures had been set afoot by his call for help. "It is all important," wrote B. F. Shaw, "that we strike a decisive blow at once the other bands only wait for success on the part of the Indians to join them in great numbers." Rains was "determined to prosecute war among the Yakamas until they are all killed or until they abandon their country."21

The same day that Lt. Edward Day left the Dalles with the relief column for Haller's command, 9 October 1855, Rains issued his Order No. 17, to the effect that,

The Yakimas, Klikitats and other Indians having commenced hostilities by killing their Agent, and having appeared in arms to murder our citi-

19 Ibid.

20 Shaw to Cain, Dalles, O. T., 8 October 1855, OLY.

21 Brouillet à Ricard, Vancouver, 8 October 1855, S.
sens in defiance of the power of the United States, and having joined issue in battle with more than 100 troops checking their advance further into the public domain, the whole force of the District will be immediately called into the field to meet and subdue the foe.22

In another letter, written on the same day, Rains told Governor Curry of Oregon about the reinforcement sent to Haller.23 However,

As this force is questionable to subdue these Indians, the Yakimas, Klikatats, and maybe some other bands, I have the honor to call on you for four companies of Volunteers. . . .24

While Rains sought troops from Oregon, Cain forwarded Shaw’s letter to Mason with his own plea that, “All the force that can be sent in the field is absolutely necessary for Haller’s preservation.”25

Four days after these desperation messages, the situation had changed. Haller was safely back at the Dalles with the survivors of his battered companies.26 Attention was then diverted from extricating the embattled soldiers, to organizing a sizable force to get even with the Indians for the casualties inflicted upon hapless Haller. An advance contingent of ninety men reached the Dalles by boat in the evening of 12 October,27 which

22 Order No. 17, Fort Vancouver, 9 October 1855, RUSAC.

23 George Law Curry was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 2 July 1820. In 1843 he moved to St. Louis, and there joined with Joseph M. Field and other theatrical and literary men in publishing the Reveille. In 1846 he came to Oregon. He lived to see Oregon pass through the trials of her probationary period and attain maturity as a state. Curry died on 28 July 1873.

24 Rains to Curry, Fort Vancouver, 9 October 1855, RUSAC. Letts.

25 Cain to Mason, Cascades, 9 October 1855, OLY.

26 Shaw to Mason, Dalles, 13 October 1855, OLY.

27 Ibid.
was only three days after Rains appealed to Curry for Volunteers, and one day after the Governor's official call for Volunteers. The next day one hundred additional men reached the Dalles, while the newly-appointed commander of the ten companies of Volunteers requested by Curry, was enroute to the seat of war. The organization and operations of the Oregon Mounted Volunteers is treated in a chapter devoted to this phase of the war. Here, Colonel J. W. Nesmith's departure for the battle area is mentioned as an added indication of the seriousness with which the uprising was viewed. The arrival of yet another group of sixty Volunteers brought their total number at the Dalles to some three hundred men, two hundred and fifty of whom were mustered into service, outfitted, and transported within a week's time.

The flurry of activity thus exhibited by the civilian authorities was matched by Major Rains' attempts to increase his force of Regulars. Lieutenant R. S. Williamson, engaged in surveying a trail from California to Washington Territory, was camped near Fort Vancouver when word of Haller's defeat reached Rains, whose headquarters were at the Fort. Williamson was informed that

28 Rains to Curry, Fort Vancouver, 9 October 1855, RUSAC, Letts. Sent.
29 Barnum to Zieber, Portland, 15 October 1855, in Serial Set No. 906; Curry to Jefferson Davis, Portland, 24 October 1855, RUSAC, Letts. Sent.
30 Shaw to Mason, Dalles, 13 October 1855, OLY.
31 Nesmith to Deady, Portland, 13 October 1855, ORE.
32 Shaw to Mason, Dalles, 18 October 1855; Cain to Mason, Dalles, 18 October 1855, OLY.
the lives of our citizens, and even the safety of the military being in question—the services of every available man are required for the emergency—the body of 18 Dragoons brought over as your escort to this post, we are therefore obliged to detain for the time being: A kind of force most required.33

Rains could not bear the thought of eighteen mounted men occupied in guarding a mere surveying party. These Dragoons symbolized the extent of the Major's alarm, which was bitterly criticized several months later by General John E. Wool, commanding the Department of the Pacific.34 While Rains was collecting every able-bodied soldier already near the scene of action, more noteworthy assistance hurried from California. Captain E. O. C. Ord and "B" Company, Third Artillery, were ordered to "embark on board the Steamer Columbia for Fort Dalles, O. T., and report to Major Rains, Fourth Infantry, for service in the field against the Indians.35 Six days later, 23 October, they were aboard the Columbia when she touched briefly at Fort Orford in southern Oregon.36 Company "B" reached the Dalles on the morning of 28 October.37

The days between Haller's return and Rains' departure were not spent in idle expectancy of the seventy-five man reinforcement under Ord. One week after making his requisition upon Governor Curry for Volunteer companies,38 Rains was at the Dalles superintending preparations for the expedi-

33 Rains to Williamson, Vancouver, 10 October 1855, AGO. Letts. Recd., 1856.
34 Mackall to Rains, Benicia, California, 30 August 1856. AGO. Letts. Recd., 1856.
35 Special Orders No. 86, Benicia, 17 October 1855, RUSAC, Special Orders, Department of the Pacific.
37 Waman Hembree, "Diary," 28 October 1855, Typescript, T.
38 Rains to Curry, Fort Vancouver, 9 October 1855, RUSAC. Letts. Sent.
...tion into the Yakima country. As the Volunteers poured into the Dalles, spoiling for a fight with the Indians, they became impatient with Rains' meticulous organization of his force. He wanted to preclude the smallest possibility of another defeat. To do this he was so cautious in his preparations that ample opportunity was afforded every Indian to learn what was afoot and prepare to meet him with a superior force or to escape. Some Volunteers never expected Rains to do anything.

This judgment upon the Major was unfair. He did something, even though it was not much. On the evening of 16 October, the disposable force of United States soldiers at the Dalles went down the Columbia River as far as the mouth of the Klikitat to establish a depot. Twenty-four hours later "Major Rains sent up an express... from Klickitat river for the Steamer 'Wasco' which immediately went down & brot up the troops & landed them opposite us on the other side of the River." The subtle strategy of these cruises on the Columbia is difficult to understand. It could have been, of course, nothing more complex than the bare fact that Rains had changed his mind. The only result of these travels was the establishment of an army encampment, Camp Yakima, on the north side of the Columbia; and to leave the Volunteers in their camp, near Fort Dalles, on the south bank of the River.

39 Shaw to Mason, Dalles, 16 October 1855, OLY.
40 Rains to Townsend, Camp Yakima, 22 October 1855, RUSAC.
41 Shaw to Mason, Dalles, 16 October 1855, OLY.
42 Shaw to Mason, Dalles, 16 October 1855, OLY.
43 Cain to Mason, Dalles, 18 October 1855, OLY.
44 Ibid.
Rains settled down to thirteen days of worried waiting. His call
on Curry for four companies of Volunteers had been answered by the Governor
raising ten companies to operate independently of the United States Army.
Since this number of men far exceeded the competency of a Major's command,
Rains was unhappy over the manner selected by the Governor to supply the
armed strength requested. There is a strong suspicion that Rains closely re-
sembled a disappointed adolescent when he remarked that,

I think it probable this force of volunteers will be defeated if they
go as determined, and as they come so unprepared to take the field that
it probably will be a month or more by their own statements, before they
can take the field, and meanwhile the Indians may ravage the country.45

Before he had stirred a foot away from Camp Yakima, the Major received un-
solicited support for his ultra-conservative insistence on perfect preparation
before moving to the attack. Captain H. D. Wallen, who was later described
as an "old fogey" by a fellow officer,46 expressed his opinion that,

Major Rains is in a very critical position and I fear that he has not
called for sufficient additional force. The Indians are variously es-
timated at from two to four thousand, they are fortifying themselves at,
or near, Major Haller's battle ground, and will give our troops much
hard fighting.47

Later events would show that Rains was neither in a critical position, nor
would the Indians give the troops much hard fighting.

The arrival of Ord with his contingent of troops on 28 October, re-
moved the final excuse detaining the expedition. Previous to his departure,

45 Rains to Townsend, Camp Yakima, 22 October 1855, RUSAC.
46 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Vancouver, 10 April 1856; Archer to his Mother, Fort Vancouver, 13 May 1856, MD.
47 Wallen to Townsend, Portland, 24 October 1855, RUSAC.
the rank-conscious Major had soothing balm poured over his wounded vanity when Mason visited Camp Yakima to confer upon him "the rank of Brigadier General of Washington Territory volunteers." His troops, his supplies, and his newly-acquired dignity were all that Rains needed to ready him for battle.

Monday, 29 October 1855, was the day Haller, now commanding Company "I," Fourth Infantry, moved from Fort Dalles to join the Regulars in camp on the opposite side of the Columbia. On the following day, 30 October, the Army began to break up camp and took up their line of march on 31 October. Three hundred and sixty-five officers and men, consisting of parts of Companies "G," "H," "I," and "K" of the Fourth Infantry; "L," "M," and "B," of the Third Artillery; "C," and "E," of the First Dragoons, began the rapid march. One thing was sure: all the disposable force was in the field as Rains' Order No. 17 of 9 October 1855, said they should be. Left at Fort

46 Withers to Cooper, Fort Vancouver, 12 November 1855, RUSAC; RUSAC. Letts. Sent.; Walker to Mix, Olympia, 3 November 1855, ROIA.

49 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, under Major Rains, 4th Infy.," Monday, 2 October 1855, MS, UW.

50 Withers to Cooper, Fort Vancouver; 12 November 1855, RUSAC; RUSAC. Letts. Sent.; A. H. Sale, "Indian War Recollections," Oregon Native Son, (May, 1899), 333.

51 Rains to MacFeely, Fort Vancouver, W. T., 4 January 1856, RUSAC. MacTavish to Smith, Vancouver, W. T., 7 November 1855, HBC.

52 Rains to Cooper; Fort Vancouver, 1 December 1855, AGO. Letts. Rec., 1856.

53 Withers to Cooper, Fort Vancouver, 12 November 1855, RUSAC; RUSAC. Letts. Sent.
Dalles was Lieutenant B. D. Forsythe as "the only officer at the post for duty." Moreover, still other reinforcements and supplies were ordered for the troops beginning to campaign north of the Columbia. Company "D," Fourth Infantry, was to proceed without delay to Fort Lane, O. T., to relieve Company "E," First Dragoons, which was to join Rains at Fort Dalles, or wherever he might be. Company "M," Third Artillery, was to leave the Praesidio in San Francisco for Fort Vancouver on board the next steamer. More horses, more mules, more ammunition, and thirty days rations for one thousand men were to be sent by the next steamer from San Francisco to Fort Vancouver.55

Other than the unpleasantness of the cold weather,56 nothing marred nor signalized the expedition until the third day of marching when two Indians swooped into camp and drove off twenty-five horses and five mules.57 Lieutenant Phil Sheridan and his Dragoons took out in hot pursuit, but without success.58 To fix the blame for losing these animals would demand several official letters during the dreary winter months ahead, which frontier army officers appear to have filled-in by filing complaints and charges against

54 Administration Proceedings, Fort Dalles, O. T., 31 October 1855, MS, COE.

55 Special Orders No. 89, Benicia, 1 November 1855, RUSAC, Special Orders, Department of the Pacific.

56 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," Friday, 2 November 1855, MS, UW.

57 Rains to MacFeely, Fort Vancouver, 29 December 1855, RUSAC.

58 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," Saturday, 3 November 1855, MS, UW.
each other. The two Indians had been visiting two supply caches on the Klikitat River, and happened onto the horses whilst returning to their own people. The trail from the caches left by these two Indians, with due allowance for the assistance of an Indian prisoner, helped Rains find the caches, take what he wanted and burn the rest. He estimated that ten thousand pounds of dried and powdered salmon were found, not to mention tools, hatchets, matting, etc. Twenty pack animals, some loaded with almost four hundred pounds, were brought back to camp and the various items were given to friendly Indians or soldiers, as the case might be. This haul was a severe blow to the hostiles.

Colonel J. W. Nesmith, with four hundred and eighty-five Oregon Mounted Volunteers, set out early in the morning of 3 November to join the

59 Rains to MacFeely, Fort Vancouver, 29 December 1855; MacFeely to Rains, Fort Vancouver, 30 December 1855; Rains to MacFeely, 4 January 1856; MacFeely to Wool, Fort Vancouver, 4 January 1856; MacFeely to Wool, Fort Vancouver, 6 January 1856; Rains to Wool, Fort Vancouver, 7 January 1856, RUSAC; Wool to Thomas, Benicia, 19 January 1856, AGO. Letts. Recd., 1856.

60 Rains to Mason, Yakima Camp No. 4, W. T., 4 November 1855, OLY; Rains to Curry, Yakima Camp No. 4, W. T., 4 November 1855, Office of the Adjutant General, Oregon State Militia, Salem, Oregon. This deposit hereinafter designated as SO.

61 Ibid.

62 Ibid.

63 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," Saturday, 3 November 1855, MS, UW.; G. O. Haller, "Kamiarkin in History," MS, B.

64 Ibid.

65 Rains to Curry, Camp Yakima No. 4, W. T., 4 November 1855, SO; Rains to Mason, Camp Yakima No. 4, W. T., 4 November 1855, OLY.

66 Ibid.
Regulars. Relations between the two forces were cordial enough, certain.

between Haller's Company "I" and the Volunteers, who exchanged three cheer
as the march got under way on Tuesday morning, 6 November 1855. In the

course of the next day's march of twenty miles, the cooperating troops man-
aged to capture eighty head of horses, as well as one cow and calf. By

evening of 8 November the soldiers reached the south side of the Yakima
River. Across the stream they could see small parties of Indians who ex-
amined the soldiers with an interest matched only by the soldiers' inspecti

of the natives. Since Rains was off on a private reconnoitering jaunt, the
other officers asked Haller to give orders. Ordinarily, as ranking offi-
cer, he would have satisfied their request, but his present position was not
ordinary. He commanded the expedition whose defeat was supposedly being
avenged by the present body of men. Moreover, personal relations between
himself and Rains were not the best. Under these circumstances he decline

67 Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE; Rains to Coop-
Fort Vancouver, 1 December 1855, AGO. Letts. Recd., 1856; Waman Hembree,
"Diary," 4 November 1855, Typescript, T; Published in Washington Historical
Quarterly, XVI (1925), 276; G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout
into the Yakima Country, etc.," Monday, 5 November 1855, MS, UW; Rains to
Mason, Camp Yakima No. 4, W. T., 4 November 1855, OLY; Rains to Curry, Camp
Yakima No. 4, W. T., 4 November 1855, SO.

68 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yaki
Country, etc.," Tuesday, 6 November 1855, MS, UW.

69 Waman Hembree, "Diary," 7 November 1855, Typescript, T.

70 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yaki
Country, etc.," Thursday, 8 November 1855, MS, UW.; G. O. Haller, "Kamiarkin
in History," MS, B; Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE.

71 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yaki
Country, etc.," Ibid.

72 Ibid.
the responsibility of ordering an attack, and contented himself with leading an advance along the river bank. 73

Rains returned shortly and was present when the soldiers and Indians began exchanging shots over the stream. 74

Efforts were made by the foot soldiers to get across, but the water of the river was intensely cold, the rocky bottom slimy, the swift current tripped the men off their feet, so that one man of Co. L. 3rd Arty, and one of K Company Infty, were drowned. 75

At this juncture the Oregon Volunteers arrived, in answer to an urgent message from Rains. 76 They forded the swift stream and charged the Indians who retreated up the hillside. 77 Directly behind 78 the Volunteers were Sheridan and his nineteen Dragoons, 79 who crossed over the river on the flank of the Indians and helped scatter them for the time being. 80 The very day that saw Volunteers cooperating with the Regulars in a way that left nothing to be desired, Lt. John Withers chose to remind Mason that,

73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 G. O. Haller, "Kamiarkin in History," MS, B.
76 Ibid.; Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE; G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc." Thursday, 8 November 1855, MS, UW.
77 A. H. Sale, op. cit., 33a.
78 There is some difficulty in establishing priority to the honor of having crossed the river first. Phil Sheridan took the distinction for himself. Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General United States Army, 2 Volumes, New York, Charles L. Webster & Company, 1888. I, 57. Other witnesses say the Volunteers opened the passage and were followed closely by Sheridan. Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE; or imply this order of events, A. H. Sale, loc. cit.; G. O. Haller, "Kamiarkin in History," MS, B; G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," Thursday, 8 November 1855, MS, UW.
79 A. H. Sale, loc. cit.
80 G. O. Haller, "Kamiarkin in History," MS, B.
I consider it necessary that Major Rains should either have the hearty cooperation of all the Volunteers in the field, or that one or two more Companies of Regulars should be sent up; the former result cannot be anticipated, it is truly to be hoped that the latter may be insured within the next two days.81

What was disturbing Withers when he wrote this letter is difficult to surmise. Over half the men with Rains were Volunteers who certainly were cooperating heartily. It could very well be that Withers' distant station at Fort Vancouver made it hard for him to know what he was talking about since he had no way of learning what was actually happening in the field.

Without further interference from behind the lines Rains reached "the plain immediately south of the Butte and range that lies on the right bank of the Attanham Creek, near where it enters the Yakima River."82 Here "the Indians had built stone walls across the road and had otherwise fortified themselves, the object of the move being to bring on a general engagement."83 As soon as Rains saw the Indians posted on the heights "of the gap in the range of hills through which flows the Yakima,"84 he "halted his Battalion, to allow the Volunteers the compliment of opening the fighting."85 "Captains Cornelius, Hembree, and Bennett, with their respective companies, proceeded in advance and rapidly drove the Indians from the plains and the brush which skirted the river, to the positions they had previously

81 Withers to Mason, Fort Vancouver, 3 November 1855, OLY.
82 G. O. Haller, "Kamiarkin in History," MS, B; G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," 9 November 1855, MS, UW.
83 A. H. Sale, op. cit., 335.
84 Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE.
85 G. O. Haller, "Kamiarkin in History," MS, B.
fortified on the Buttes.\textsuperscript{86}

Lt. Phil Sheridan and his nineteen Dragoons also took part in this sweep through the sagebrush.\textsuperscript{87}

Once the Indians had retreated to the safety of their stone breastworks, the pursuers thought it prudent to send back for the howitzers.\textsuperscript{88}

Lieuts Piper and Day, of the Artillery came promptly upon the ground and fired a few shots; but such was the elevated position of the enemy that the shells could not be thrown to reach them.\textsuperscript{89}

Instead of pressing the entrenched natives that same afternoon, both Regular and Volunteer troops pitched their camps at the base of the Buttes,\textsuperscript{90} out of range of the Indians’ desultory fire, but near enough to observe plainly their menacing and tantalizing exhibitions of contempt.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{86} Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE; A. H. Sale, loc. cit.; G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," 9 November 1855, MS, B.

\textsuperscript{87} A. H. Sale, loc. cit.; Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, I, 58.

\textsuperscript{88} Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE; A. H. Sale, loc. cit.; G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc." 9 November 1855, MS, UW.

\textsuperscript{89} Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE. Another account of this incident has the howitzer being fired from the back of a mule, and then with devastating effect, from a trunyon made of poles. One Indian conspicuously attired in a red blanket and riding a white horse was blown over the parapet. Allegedly the braves scattered precipitously, as a result of their comrade’s theatrical performance. (A. H. Sale, op. cit., 336.)

This narrative is suspect on at least three scores: no one else mentions a performance remarkable for its ludicrousness; Lieutenant Hazelton, had no known connection with the Third Artillery; if the warriors were scattered so successfully, it is unintelligible why the whites did not occupy the bluff immediately without bothering with a later attack that afternoon.

\textsuperscript{90} G. O. Haller, "Kamiarkin in History," MS, B; Nesmith to Curry; Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE; G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," 9 November 1855, MS, UW.

\textsuperscript{91} Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, I, 59.
Even though Rains declined offers of Sheridan\textsuperscript{92} and Haller\textsuperscript{93} to chase the Indians, he did allow the soldiers "to go to the foot of the great Butte, and practise with their fire arms, at the Indians on the Butte."\textsuperscript{94} This kind of target practise, plus continued abuse hurled at the soldiers by the Indians on the hilltop, fired tempers on both sides. 

... by an inexplicable concert of action, and with a serious breach of discipline, a large number of men and many of the officers broke en masse from the camp with loud yells and charged the offending savages.\textsuperscript{95} "The hill was thus cleared,"\textsuperscript{96} and the only sign of enemy fire was a bullet hole through both flannel shirts, just below the left armpit, of Sergeant McGarvey.\textsuperscript{97} After lighting a big bonfire,\textsuperscript{98} the spectacular attackers retired from the hill,\textsuperscript{99} thus leaving it to be reoccupied by the Indians.\textsuperscript{100}

\textsuperscript{92} Ibid., Phil Sheridan achieved fame in the Civil War for his series of victories in the Shenandoah Valley, especially for that at Cedar Run on 19 October 1864. He was commander in chief of the army from 1 November 1863 until 5 August 1868, the day of his death.

\textsuperscript{93} G. O. Haller, "Kamiarkin in History," MS, B.

\textsuperscript{94} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{95} \textit{Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan}, I, 60.

\textsuperscript{96} G. O. Haller, "Kamiarkin in History," MS, B.

\textsuperscript{97} G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.,," 9 November 1855, MS, UW.

\textsuperscript{98} Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE.

\textsuperscript{99} \textit{Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan}, I, 60.

\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.; Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE; A. H. Sale, loc. cit.; G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.,," 10 November 1855, MS, UW.
Saturday morning, 10 November 1855, the camp was astir early. The first chore of the day was to dislodge the Indians, once more behind their stone piles. Captain Hembree's Company "E," Oregon Volunteers, and Captains Wallen and Russell with their Companies of Regulars accomplished the feat without great trouble. This skirmish ended in death for one Indian at the hands of the Volunteers. It was to the everlasting glory of the Regulars that their scout, spy, and guide, "Cut-Mouth John," ran down a lone Indian astride a lame horse and killed him. And with this infamous incident the fighting phase of Rains' expedition is closed. Eight hundred and fifty men managed to kill two Indians, one of whom met death because his old horse could not keep up with the retreating natives.

This sudden withdrawal of Kamaiakan's men, left "Major Rains with the impression that they had gone to meet Capt. Maloney's small command, which he (Major Rains) had ordered to join him in the Yakima Country."  

101 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.;" 10 November 1855, MS, UW.

102 Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE; A. J. Hembree had been a member of the Oregon Legislature, the House of the Representatives and a loyal supporter of Governor Lane of Oregon.

103 Ibid.; G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.;" 10 November 1855, MS, UW.


106 G. O. Haller, "Kamiarkin in History," MS, B; Maloney to Mason, Camp Connell, 6 November 1855, OLY.
The strategy was to catch the Indians between Rains' troops coming from the south, and Maloney's command approaching through the Naches Pass of the Cascades, from the west. In accordance with these orders, Maloney took seventy-five men from Fort Steilacoom, added to these the command of Lt. Slaughter, and a Company of Volunteers commanded by Captain Gilmore Hays. He spent a week collecting the force, and four days on the march from Steilacoom to the Naches River, where he encamped on 28 October 1855. An express overtook him at this camp with news that Rains was unable to take the field for another week or two.

I have also got information that there are from two to three thousand Indians well armed, and determined to fight in my front, and, after considering the matter over, have concluded that it is my duty to return to Steilacoom.

Maloney then explains his course of action by adducing these reasons:

first, my force is not sufficiently strong to fight them, and protect the animals and provisions which I have along with me; secondly, if I advance I must meet them, as there is no point before me before I get into the plains where I can Camp and defend myself & animals where I will not be cut off from communication both in front and rear by high water before you can get into the enemies Country; thirdly, In accordance with your orders I started with thirty days provisions, I have been out twelve days and therefore have only eighteen days provisions, which would be out before my command could join yours; there is already snow

107 Maloney to Rains, Camp on Naches River, 29 October 1855, OLY. Gilmore Hays was a native of Kentucky, but was residing in Missouri when the gold discoveries in California enticed him to leave. Returning to Missouri, he led a train of emigrants to Oregon in 1852, and in 1853 settled on the Des Chutes River near the head of Budd Inlet. At the close of the Yakima War he returned to Missouri, only to move again to Idaho in 1863.

108 Ibid.

109 Ibid.

110 Ibid.
upon the mountains, and there is every reason to believe, that in three or four days it will close the road from here to Steilacoom, and also raise the Nachess River, so that it will prevent communication between this place, and the Yakima plains.\footnote{111}

To these considerations, Hays, commanding the Volunteers, added another very practical fact that there was no grass for the horses, so they could not stay where they were.\footnote{112}

While Maloney and Hays thus wrote to their respective Superiors, the Ranger Company organized in Olympia suffered defeat by the Indians on White River.\footnote{113} Two white men were killed, and eighteen "were confined in a log house at White River surrounded by Indians."\footnote{114} The Indians had taken advantage of the absence of the troops. Maloney was convinced that, "if I had fallen back two days sooner the murders would not have taken place."\footnote{115}

As it was, he realized that his section of the Territory clearly was not immune from serious Indian attacks, so he sent word to Rains that not one man could be spared from the lands west of the Cascade Mountains.\footnote{116} This report was also Maloney's attempt to dispel some of the gloom cast over Olympia by the disaster on White River.\footnote{117}

The brief story of Maloney's futile gesture toward cooperation with

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{111}{Ibid.}
\item \footnote{112}{Hays to Mason, Camp Turn Back, 30 October 1855, \textsc{OLY}.}
\item \footnote{113}{"Journal," Nisqually House, 30 October 1855, \textsc{MS}, \textsc{H}; Photostatic reproduction in \textsc{LC}, and \textsc{UW}.}
\item \footnote{114}{Ibid., 31 October 1855.}
\item \footnote{115}{Maloney to Mason, Camp Connell, 6 November 1855, \textsc{OLY}.}
\item \footnote{116}{Ibid.}
\item \footnote{117}{W. H. Wallace to Moore, Olympia, 11 December 1855, \textsc{T}.}
\end{itemize}
the main expedition into the Yakima country has been set forth as it happened. At the time, Rains knew nothing about Maloney's fate, except his absence when he was expected to be present. Hence, as soon as Rains passed through the gap between the Two Buttes, in pursuit of the Indians who had taken full advantage of his ultra-conservative actions to escape with their families and their possessions, he became genuinely concerned over Maloney's whereabouts.118

The expedition debouched onto the plains of the upper Yakima Valley and spent the day of 10 November scouring the country for stray animals, skirmishing with Indians who were a rear guard for their rapidly vanishing brethren.119 Late in the afternoon the soldiers encamped about two miles east of the Catholic Mission.120 Falling snow on the following morning121 did not prevent the two hundred and fifty Oregon Volunteers under Nesmith, and the much over-worked nineteen Dragoons commanded by Sheridan,122 from proceeding in the direction of the Nachess Pass, to afford such assistance as Capt. Maloney might require against the large body of hostile Indians supposed to have concentrated in that direction to oppose the entrance of that command into the Valley.123

118 A. H. Sale, loc. cit.; G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," 11 November 1855, MS, UW.

119 Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE.

120 Ibid.; G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.;" 10 November 1855, MS, UW.

121 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," 11 November 1855, MS, UW.

122 Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE; G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," 11 November 1855, MS, UW.

123 Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE.
Nesmith and Sheridan rode through the unrelenting snowstorm until their advance was blocked by the drifts. The exhausted and sick men rejoined Rains at the Mission in the afternoon of 13 November 1855. They had travelled forty miles without hearing or seeing any sign either of Maloney, or of the Indians.

While Sheridan and Nesmith had been looking for Maloney, the troops in camp were busily ransacking the Mission. "Cut-Mouth John" appears to have led the parade of looters that infested the deserted Mission beginning Sunday morning, 11 November 1855.

An officer and some soldiers went ahead first to open the door of the Father's house, but their surprise was great when they found no fathers; but only a gloomy silence; a fire smouldered in the hearth watched by a cat or two and the clock of the house was running as if the masters had left a little before. Some pigs were in the piggery and appeared to have been fed recently.

On a table in the priests' house, Rains found a letter written by Pandosy; it was in English, dated 7 October, and in the name of Kamaiakan, first Chief of the Yakima. The reply to this letter, penned by Rains, belongs two days

124 Ibid.; Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, I, 64.
125 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," 13 November 1855, MS, UW: Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE.
126 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," 13 November 1855, MS, UW.
128 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," 11 November 1855, MS, UW.
129 Mesplie à Ricard, Dalles, 20 Novembre 1855, S.
130 Ibid. Mesplie erroneously dates the letter 6 October. Pandosy did not write it until after the Indians met Haller's command on 6 October. (Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 19 Octobre 1855, S). The one known copy among the Dellenoy Copies bears the date, 7 October 1855.
later in the sequence of events. Before that departing gesture, the Regulars and the Volunteers were guilty of more memorable conduct.

"Such articles as were suitable were used by both the U.S. Troops and Volunteers." 131 This innocuous sentence was Nesmith's official reference to the thorough pillaging of the Mission by the troops. If we believe Sheridan, there was nothing of great value taken because the Indians had plundered the buildings at the outbreak of hostilities, leaving only "a considerable herd of pigs . . . " 132 Fortunately for the sake of truth, Haller set down in his "Memorandum," what passed his tent on that Sunday. He saw

2 wagons loaded, hauled by camp with vegetables & things on them. I saw one Vol pass by with the Priest's scarf (or whatever it is called) around his neck & hanging down. I saw Capt. Ord's animals go by with a large robe (Buffalo) on one side, & lots of bags & Lt. Randolph says they are Capt. Ord's. He'd picked up the robe in the chapel. The Chapel & house has been completely rifled of their contents. 133

Sunday's haul included "Buffalo robes, Bear skins, & wolf skins & c.&c., besides vegetables. Rains gave orders that only eatables were to be taken, yet the house is fairly being cleaned out." 134

This noteworthy day's work was only a prologue for Monday's stellar performance.

At the mission today a number of valuable caches were discovered in which guns, powder, clothing, vegetables, & c were deposited. There

131 Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1865, ORE.

132 Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, I, 63.

133 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," 11 November 1855, MS, UW.

134 Ibid.
were 14 bags flour, 5 cases wine, & other things raised.135

The men discovered the offensive half-keg of powder while they were stealing potatoes from the Mission garden.156 The powder and the account book found in the house were all the proof needed that the missionaries had been secretly arming the Indians.

This book contains daily entries of Pandosi's transactions with the Indians, and clearly demonstrates the indisputable fact that he has furnished the Indians with large quantities of ammunition, and leaving it a matter of uncertainty whether gospel or gunpowder was his principle [sic] stock in trade.137

We shall see very shortly that Nesmith was either ignorant of the facts, blinded by hysteria, or trying to whitewash the sequel to the discovery of the account book and the partially-full powder keg. "The building, which was a pole and mud hut, was accidentally burned," wrote Nesmith.158 The manner of this accident is graphically delineated by Sheridan:

A large heap of dry wood was quickly collected and piled in the building, matches applied, and the whole Mission, including the priest's house, was soon enveloped in flames, and burned to the ground before the officers in camp became aware of the disgraceful plundering in which their men were engaged.139

Nesmith's notion of an accidental fire was novel, to say the least!


136 Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, I, 63.

137 Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE.


139 Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, I, 63-64.
The destruction of the Mission put an end to Catholic missionary activities among the Yakima for a decade. Because this was a serious blow, delivered for allegedly good reasons, it deserves careful study. Why there was so much made of the caches that were found near the Mission is hard to explain rationally. At the end of the letter written by Pandosy, in Kamiakan's name, "said several things in French in his own name. He informed the troops that he had hidden certain valuable items in definite spots in the ground..." The obvious conclusion is that Pandosy wanted the troops to find the buried items, including the gunpowder. If the missionaries had been arming the Indians, there is no conceivable reason why they troubled themselves with burying the powder keg in the potato patch, instead of simply distributing it among the hostiles. The obvious inference, which Sheridan got immediately, was that the powder "had been buried in the garden by the good father to prevent the hostile Indians from getting it to use against the whites." Not all who were involved in the campaign showed this much common sense. The Volunteers chose to interpret the gunpowder as part of the indisputable proof of insidious machinations carried on by Pandosy against the settlers. These misguided patriotic zealots, cursed him and swore that if they could catch him they would hang him in spite of all law, human and divine, and in this kind of rage they burned


141 Mesple à Ricard, Dalles, 20 Novembre 1855, S.

142 Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, I, 63.

143 Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE.
the mission completely. 144

Fair-minded scholars have come to agree with Sheridan and not with Nesmith, regarding the potato patch powder keg. However, the unseen evidence of the vanished account book has been another matter. Nesmith claimed that this book left "it a matter of uncertainty whether gospel or gunpowder was [Fandosy's] principle [sic] stock in trade." 145 This charge has stood through the years for lack of contradictory evidence, or for lack of the evidence on which it was originally based—the account book. Re-discovered documents now make possible an analysis of this major alibi for burning the Mission. 146

The very presence of the account book, along with Fandosy's letter of 7 October and other papers, in the mission house when it was sacked by the Regular and Volunteer troops on 11 November 1855, should have been adequate proof that the missionaries feared nothing that it might contain. It would have been very simple to burn an incriminating document. For anyone to explain the presence of the account book in the house when the soldiers arrived, by saying that the priests fled before the unexpected troops, is untenable.

144 Ibid.
145 Ibid.

146 The odyssey of the account book is of some interest. It was taken by Rains at the time of the Mission's destruction (Nesmith to Curry, Dales, 19 November 1866, ORE.), forwarded to General John E. Wool, Commanding the Department of the Pacific, who asked Father J. B. A. Brouillet, Vicar-General of the Diocese of Nesqually, to translate all the passages in the book pertaining to arms and munitions (Brouillet to Wool, Vancouver, 5 December 1855, W). The original account book, in French, is still lost; but the original translation of the extracts was found by the writer in the possession of Mr. H. V. Button, Waterford, New York, in October, 1948. The Wool Papers were subsequently sold to the New York State Library, Albany, New York, where they are at present (Button to Bishoff, Waterford, New York, 22 December 1948).
Four days before the troops camped near the Mission, Pandosy and Durieu drew up two distinct copies of a detailed inventory of what they left "either in the houses, or in hiding places, or on the mission grounds." This list of the Mission's possessions makes interesting reading, but it is cited here as genuine proof that the missionaries did not flee precipitously. They took reasonable measures to insure the safety of the property about to be abandoned. These careful lists, compiled before the troops reached the gap into the upper Valley, explode the theory that the account book was forgotten by hastily departing missionaries.

A quiet examination of the book brings to light no "indisputable fact that he [Pandosy] has furnished the Indians with large quantities of ammunition." This account book extends from 1852 to the 22nd of October 1854, a period of nearly three years, and it shows that during that period, the following amount of ammunition and arms has been purchased by the Mission and a part of it distributed to the Indians.

After translating the passages referring to arms and ammunition just as they appeared in the book, Brouillet summed up the extracts:

we find that during the period of three years, 95 pounds of powder only have been purchased by the Mission, viz: 10 pounds at one time and 10 pounds at another time during the first year; and 75 pounds in the second year, besides 1 double-barrelled gun, 5 rifles, and 4 bags of shot.

147 Pandosy et Durieu, "Déclaration et Attestation," Attanem, Mission des Yakamas, 6 Novembre 1855; Pandosy et Durieu, "Déclaration et Attestation," Attanem, Mission des Yakamas, le six Novembre 1855, Archives of Holy Rosary Scholasticate, Ottawa, Ontario. This deposit hereinafter designated as HR.
148 Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE.
149 Brouillet to Wool, Vancouver, 5 December 1855, W.
150 Ibid.
Brouillet then gave a minute summary of the amount and form of ammunition distributed to the Indians during the nearly three-year period.

Powder: \( \frac{3}{5} \) pounds in boxes, and 1668 musket loads averaging at least 50 to the pound, giving a total amount of \( 36\frac{1}{2} \) pounds.

Shot: 718 loads besides \( 2\frac{1}{2} \) pounds.

Caps: 1165

Balls: 442

Arms: 3 rifles, 3 pistols, 1 sword and 1 bowie-knife.

Which gives 12 pounds of powder, 239 loads of shot, 338 caps, 147 balls, 1 rifle & 1 pistol for each year.\(^{151}\)

It need only be added that Pandosy had taken ten pounds of powder to the Mission in July, 1855.\(^{152}\) This made the total figure a not impressive, 105 pounds of powder. If one were to grant, for the sake of discussion, that ten pounds of powder were given to the Indians in 1855, it would hardly constitute a major contribution to a force of hostiles never estimated at less than five hundred,\(^{153}\) and sometimes as high as five thousand.\(^{154}\)

One hundred and five pounds of powder, minus the half-keg in the garden, was certainly no cause for wonder when it is well known that the priests depend upon it for a part of their living, travelling expenses, payment of daily services from the Indians and the occasional presents which they owe to the Chiefs, according to the common custom of the whites who live among them.\(^{155}\)

\(^{151}\) Ibid.

\(^{152}\) Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 12 Decembre 1855, S.

\(^{153}\) G. O. Haller, "Journal of a Scout in the Yakima Country, October, 1855," 7 October 1855, MS, UW.

\(^{154}\) Withers to Cooper, Fort Vancouver, 12 November 1855, RUSAC; RUSAC, Letts. Sent.

\(^{155}\) Brouillet to Wool, Vancouver, 5 December 1855, W.
Brouillet was not wasting his time, for his was the pleasure of reading Wool's reassuring words that "I agree with you in the opinion that no importance should be attached to the fact of the small quantity of powder issued to the Indians in the course of three years by Father Pandosy." 156

There was little glory to be shared by eight hundred and fifty men who had marched and skirmished through two weeks of winter weather to plunder, pillage, and burn an abandoned mission. In two letters written on the very day of the burning, Rains does not mention the fact; 157 nor in his brief official report to Headquarters of the Army is there so much as a hint of what transpired. 158 Haller described vividly the sack of the mission, but omitted specific mention of its being destroyed by fire. 159 Only Sheridan uses the word "disgraceful" in reporting the incident; 160 while Nesmith stands alone in his lame defense of what took place. 161

There was not much left to do after the mission was destroyed. Rains composed a fiery reply to the letter of 7 October written for Kamaiaikan by Pandosy. This famous reply promised the Chief that

We will not be quiet, but war forever until not a Yakima breathes in the

156 Wool to Brouillet, Vancouver, 8 December 1855, W.
157 Rains to Curry, Yakima Camp No. 11, 12 November 1855, SO; Rains to Mason, Roman Catholic Mission, Yakima Camp No. 11, 12 November 1855, in Gov. Mess., 163.
158 Rains to Cooper, Fort Vancouver, 1 December 1855, AGO. Letts. Recd. 1856.
159 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," 11 November 1855, MS, UW.
160 Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, I, 63-64.
161 Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE.
in the land he calls his own—the river only we will let retain this name, to show to all people, that here the Yackimas once lived.162

By the close of his letter, Rains was scaling the slopes of poetry with this prophetic outburst:

You, a few people, we can see with our glasses a long way off while the Whites are as the stars in the Heavens or leaves of the trees in the summertime. Our warriors in the field are many as you must see, but if not enough, a thousand for every one man will be sent to hunt you out to kill you, and my kind advice to you, as you will see, is to settle yourselves among the Indian tribes more peaceable and there forget you were ever Yakimas.163

This great unburdening "was done up in silk oil cloth & addressed to Kam-i-a-kin Ty-hee and in the corner the initials (S. O. B.)."164 The letter was then hung on a pole165 to be picked up by the Indians who were close enough to be seen through the soldiers' glasses.166 Coming from a man who had led eight hundred and fifty soldiers into the field to kill two hostiles, engage in some glorified cattle-rustling and legalized plundering, this paternal concern sounds like something out of Gilbert and Sullivan.

The whole force dallied for two more days. Tuesday, 13 November, Haller went to the headquarters tent where Lieutenant George H. Mendell showed
When he returned to his own quarters he found a great many pictures, crucifixes, & c&o, left in my tent by Priv. Moore, 3d, a Rom. Catholic, to be turned over to Father Mesplie. I amused myself assorting them & packing them up.

This testimonial to the good sense of an obscure enlisted man, ends the stay of the troops in the neighborhood of what had been the mission of St. Joseph on the Ahtanum.

Through six inches of snow, the troops moved as far as the Simcoe Valley on 15 November 1855, where they stopped long enough to burn a house and other property of Kamaikan. The following day Haller took his good friend Nesmith to revisit the scene of Haller's repulse by the Indians on 7 October. Captains Hembree and Bennett of the Volunteers, and others were present for this guided tour. The remains of Herman and Regan, who were killed in the fight on 7 October, were found scattered around on the ground, and after collecting them (the skulls, & spinal column & some few bones) I returned & told Capt. Russell also Maj Rains, when I was asked to send for them and directions given to bury them with funeral honors. They were intered just at twilight & Maj. Rains read the burial service when the escort fired 3 vollies over their graves.

167 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," 13 November 1855, MS, UW.

168 Ibid.

169 Ibid.

170 Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE.

171 Ibid.

172 G. O. Haller, "Memorandum connected with a Scout into the Yakima Country, etc.," 16 November 1855, MS, UW.

This was a grim reminder that full-scale battles of massed enemies were not necessary to effect fatalities.

With sick and wounded men on litters slowing their progress, with horses broken down and enfeebled by the deepening snows that blocked the trails, the soldiers hastened as rapidly as possible toward the Dalles. A great part of the command paused on the Klikitat River to take advantage of the good grass still available, while the Volunteer vanguard pushed on toward the Dalles which were reached in the evening of 19 November 1855.

Again Kamiarkin had the great satisfaction of seeing the Whites withdraw from his domains—this time an overwhelming force—without sustaining any serious loss of life among his braves.

Haller's criticism of his commanding officer was supported with embarrassing bluntness by the Volunteers. Shaw stated frankly that, "Major Rains knows nothing." Col. Crosbie, Washington Territorial Volunteers, acknowledged openly his inability to "refrain from saying it is extremely unfortunate that Major Rains had anything to do with the expedition."

Rains returned, along with the Volunteers, as far as the camp on the Klikitat River.

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174 Rains to Cooper, Fort Vancouver, 1 December 1855, AGO. Letts. Recd., 1856.

175 Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE.

176 Ibid.; Shaw to Mason, Dalles, 19 November 1855, OLY; Mesplie a Ricard, Dalles, 20 Novembre 1855, S.

177 G. O. Haller, "Kamiarkin in History," MS, B.

178 Shaw to Mason, Dalles, 19 November 1855, OLY.

179 Crosbie to Mason, Portland, 21 November 1855, OLY. H. R. Crosbie was aide to Stevens during the Yakima War.
25 miles north of Fort Dalles, where we were erecting a Block House, where it was intended to station a Company for the winter, my further intention was, before the severe cold of winter set in, to show our force at Walla Walla, when we were ordered in to Fort Dalles, O. T., terminating our campaign on the 24th November, by order of the Commanding General of Department of the Pacific.\textsuperscript{180}

Before Rains came to rest at Fort Dalles, a considerable group of his erstwhile companions in arms, the Oregon Volunteers, were on their way to help smother the flames of war raging in the Cayuse Country. Nesmith had sent Captain Alfred V. Wilson in command of "Companies A, G, & K., amounting to about 180 men to reinforce Maj Chinn."\textsuperscript{181} That the need for help was critical, was clear from the letter written by Chirouse to Brouillet:

The whole country is on fire. Slaughter, murders & war are all that is pant for and heard of. The Walla Walla Indians have pillaged and smashed everything in Fort Walla Walla. All the American houses in our country have been plundered and burned; nobody killed as yet, as all have left except the Canadians. But today the Walla Wallas have to go and attack the Dalles, & all the Canadians start enroute for Colville. All apprehend lest the Walla Wallas would come to slaughter them during the night or the day. A great number of the Cayuses are for the war; but, 'O Providence! all our Christian or baptized Indians, except two or three, are for peace, and are determined to run away with me to the Nez Perces country, where all is quiet still. Tomorrow, if it please God, we will all start together, i. e., ourselves, the Canadians & our baptized Indians, to go and spend the winter with the Nez Perces. I do not refuse to leave, in spite of the sacrifices and losses which I must undergo, because I know full well that our lives are in danger every day where we are. Next spring, if the war should continue, we will go to the Jesuit Fathers (Rooky Mountains), and there we will wait for your orders. Father Richard, brothers Leo & Janin and I, are all still living, but I do not know for how long more. The hostile Indians call us the children of the Americans, the slaves of the soldiers, and seek to exterminate us. Pray therefore for us.\textsuperscript{182}

\textsuperscript{180} Rains to Cooper, Fort Vancouver, 1 December 1855, AGO. Letts.\textsuperscript{\texttrademark} 1856.

\textsuperscript{181} Nesmith to Curry, Dalles, 19 November 1855, ORE.

\textsuperscript{182} Chirouse à Brouillet, Cayouses, 16 Novembre 1855, S; Translation by Brouillet in W.
The total destruction of the buildings, crops, and other possessions of the priest at the Cayuse Mission is sufficient proof that his fears were solidly founded. Chirouse was not the only one fearful for his very life. Narcisse Raymond appealed for help on the grounds that, "Serpent Jaune daily threatens to burn our houses and to kill us, and he is not the only enemy we have to dread." The military phases of this sector of the war are explained in the chapter dealing with the Oregon Mounted Volunteers.

The fate of the Yakima Mission was known soon enough, but that of the missionaries was uncertain for several weeks. Pandosy, Durieu, and Surel watched as their Mission was burned by the Americans, and then retreated to the Northeast. For eight excruciating days they followed the bank of the Columbia until they found refuge with the Jesuit missionaries at Colville. Word finally reached Olympia that the nomadic trio met Stevens while he was passing through the Spokane country on his hurried return from the Blackfoot

183 "Schedule of the property of E. C. Chirouse lost during the Indian War of 1855-56," MS, HR.

184 Narcisse Raymond to Commander in charge coming to Fort Walla Walla, Walla Walla Valley, 14 November 1855, AGO. Letts. Recd. 1856.

185 Pandosy à D'Herbomez, Saint-Joseph d'Esquimalt, 25 Avril 1862, OMI. Surel, an Oblate lay-brother, came to Oregon with Father Louis D'Herbomez in 1850.


188 Ibid.
Pandosy was in good health, but Durieu was not completely recovered from the serious illness of which he complained while yet among the Yakima. Pandosy gave proof of his vitality by baptizing Oliver Desautel, at St. Regis Mission, on 31 January 1856.

These facts are clear today, but were not at the time. There was even a rumour that Pandosy had been killed. It was not until 14 February 1856 that Ricard received a letter from his with the news that Durieu was better and that Pandosy himself was busy. Two months later, the two stranded priests told Ricard that they had received no letters from him, and asked for instructions. Eventually, Durieu returned to Olympia; Pandosy was with Wright’s expedition but came back to Colville once the troops began building Fort Simcoe. The Oblates of Mary Immaculate were forced to abandon the Yakima Mission by the animosity of the whites, and the dispersal of the Catholic natives.

189 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 24 Janvier 1856, OMI, S; Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 1 Fevrier 1856, S.

190 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 1 Fevrier 1856, S.

191 Durieu à Richard, Mission des Yakamas, 30 Septembre 1855, S.

192 "Liber Baptismorum, Missionis Sancti Francisci Regis, 1852-1866," 31 January 1856, MS, MSM.

193 Demers à Ricard, Victoria, 19 Decembre 1855, OMI.

194 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 14 Fevrier 1856, S.

195 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 16 Avril 1856, S.


197 Ibid.
The destruction of the Catholic missions in the interior and the
exodus of the missionaries themselves, did not satisfy some people in Olympia.
The intense feeling against the priests was so deep-rooted in certain quar-
ters that as far back as 12 October, Ricard reminded Mason,

I thought it necessary to write to you asking you to give notice to the
public in order that all should know the conduct of the priests East as
well as West of the Cascades regarding the civil authority each time
they learned that some danger threatened the safety of the people. 198

Mason disposed of the request on this occasion, by giving Brother George
Blanchet, O. M. I., verbal assurance that a few stupid remarks did not neces-
sitate the precaution of a public declaration of the missionaries' loyalty. 199

Seven weeks after this summary dismissal, Ricard was writing to Mason once
more about the same baseless hatred shown toward the Catholic priests. Now,
he was fortified with the inescapable example of the plundered and burned
Yakima Mission:

What I ask is that for the honor of the priests, your own and that of
the government you reveal the truth and reprove what was done. . . . 200

The tone of Mason's reply was curt, almost insulting, as he notified Ricard
that,

It is not the business, or the province of the Executive of this Terri-
tory, to publish through newspapers, statements in reference to any par-
ticular class or sect. As far as my duty, and within my power, your
letter admits, that I did by word of mouth, state that I had received
information from the priests as to difficulties brewing in the Yakima
Country. . . . 201

198 Ricard à Mason, Olympia, 1 December 1855, S.
199 Ibid.
200 Ibid.
201 Mason to Ricard, Olympia, 4 December 1855, S.
Mason went on to promise that he would communicate with Ricard again, if any
official information regarding the burning of the Yakima Mission was re-
ceived. The priest, however, learned that

Mr. Mason had boasted in the presence of certain people that he had
answered me, that he was not the one who had asked the priests to come,
that it was not his business to take sides in our favor, etc.

Small wonder that Ricard expressed his distaste for two-faced people:

There was worse to come. House Bill No. 17, "An act to prevent
Aliens acting as teachers or Missionaries, among the Indians of Washington
Territory," was actually debated by the Legislative Assembly of the Territory
on 18 January 1856. The bill was a vicious thing from its preamble to the
final period of Section 7. To cloak his bigotry with the shielding garment of
decency, Mr. O. B. McFadden informed the readers of the proposed measure:

Whereas the History of Oregon and Washington, shows conclusively that
the influence of aliens as teachers and Missionaries among the Indians,
has been productive of much mischief; and has seriously affected the
interest of American settlers.

Therefore, to secure peace and quiet, to prevent further misunderstand-
ing and difficulty, to impress upon the Indians the superiority of our
government, over all other influences, and for the mutual safety of
whites and Indians, it is provided as follows:

Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of
Washington, that it shall not be lawful for any person, not a citizen of
the United States, either native born, or by virtue of perfected natural-
ization, to act as teacher or missionary to, or for any Indian or Indians
within this Territory.

202 Ibid.
203 Ricard a Brouillet, Olympia, 24 Decembre 1856, S.
204 Ibid.
205 Ricard a Brouillet, Olympia, 24 Janvier 1856, S; OMI.
206 "An act to prevent Aliens acting as teachers or Missionaries,
among the Indians of Washington Territory," Dellanoy Copies, S.
This attempt to legalize intolerance was soundly defeated by rollcall on 22 January 1856. Three delegates voted in the affirmative, and twenty-six were against the proposed law. Although this unmistakable manifestation of justice reassured the priests, the mere phenomenon of the proposal being drafted, debated, and voted upon, frightened them.

The missionaries were not alone in adapting themselves to the changed circumstances brought on by the war. Twice within a period of seven weeks the United States Army, together with a very respectable force of Volunteer troops, failed to impress the Indians, let alone defeat them. Perhaps the winter months would afford an opportunity for the baffled and bedraggled men to devise a more successful plan of campaign. The presence of General Wool and his staff at Fort Vancouver, by the time Rains encamped on the Klikitat River and began to build a blockhouse, may be taken as a measure of the importance now attached to the successive failures against the Yakima. Wool reached Fort Vancouver from San Francisco on the night of 16 November 1855, after a nearly disastrous voyage aboard the Steamer California. The old ship limped along on the last part of her trip.

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207 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 24 Janvier 1856, S.
208 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 1 Fevrier 1856, S.
209 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 12 Janvier 1856; Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 24 Janvier 1856; Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 1 Fevrier 1856, S.
210 Townsend to Wool, Fort Vancouver, 28 November 1855, W.
211 Rains to Cooper, Fort Vancouver, 1 December 1855, AGO. Letts. Recd. 1856.
212 Withers to Mason, Vancouver, 16 November 1855, OLY; Wool to Thomas, Fort Vancouver, 17 November 1855, RUSAC. Letts. Sent.
in a disabled state, having burst one of her flews, which set her on fire, and burnt about 3 or four hours, while crossing the bar (of the Columbia River), and then after running about half way up to town (Astoria, Ore.), she anchored, having a very strong ebb tide, and when she brot up she snapped the cable and lost her anchor, and then threw out the other, and then, the steam (what little they war able to make) could not keep her from draggin her anchor almost to the bar again, and would probably have been lost, had not flood tide set in, and helped them up to town. 213

Aboard the California besides Wool and a group of officers, were fifty-four Regular troops under command of Captain E. D. Keyes. 214 Wool must have listened to Withers' suggestion that this company proceed to Steilacoom rather than to join Rains, 215 because the General ordered Keyes and his company to reinforce Fort Steilacoom immediately. 216 On the bleak, showery Saturday of 24 November, the California reached Steilacoom. 217 This action was Wool's tacit admission that the Indians might choose to attack the settlements during the winter-long lull in active campaigning.

Wool also sent Major E. D. Townsend to inspect the troops and equipment at Fort Dalles. Townsend reached Fort Dalles in the evening of 24 November, 218 the same day Keyes and Company "M," Third Artillery, reinforced Steilacoom, and on the following morning carefully inspected the troops at

213 Charles Stevens to his Brother and Sister, Astoria, 9 November 1855, LC.


215 Withers to Mason, Vancouver, 16 November 1855, OLY.

216 Wool to Thomas, Fort Vancouver, 17 November 1855, RUSAC. Letts. Sent.

217 "Journal of Nisqually House," Saturday, 24 November 1855, MS, H; Photostatic Copy, LC and UW.

218 Townsend to Wool, Fort Vancouver, 28 November 1855, W.
He found the arms and accoutrements all in good service condition; their clothing was worn out, some of the men being ragged and without shoes, "while others were clad in hunting shirts instead of coats."220

The 19 horses of Lieut. Sheridan's detachment are very old, having come to this Country with the Rifle Regiment in 1849. They are now suffering from the long march with Lieutenant Williamson's party and the subsequent campaign of Major Rains. They will require care for at least two months, to be fit for service.221

Townsend found the men of the companies generally healthy in appearance. The only exceptions were the many suffering from sore feet and the twelve men in the hospital, one of whom had lost his arm by amputation.222 This confidential report gives adequate grounds for the reflection that the whites, as much as the Indians, needed time for various wounds to heal.

The Inspecting Officer expressed his opinion that no effective field operations could be undertaken during the winter season. In the event that Stevens decided to enlist the help of the Nez Perce Indians against the hostiles, Townsend thought "it would be well to have a command of about a hundred Mounted men, ready at the Dalles to move forward to co-operate with him."223 The final recommendation of the Major was that two posts should be established; one in the Simcoe Valley near Haller's battle ground, and the other near the Blue Mountains. These would control all the Indian tribes of Washington Territory.224 Some of the suggestions, with Townsend's idea that

219 Ibid.
220 Ibid.
221 Ibid.
222 Ibid.
223 Ibid.
224 Ibid.
the war should be run from Headquarters and not by officers in direct command of troops, set the pattern for Wool's future conduct.225

While these matters of policy kept Headquarters busily engaged, lesser links in the chain of command were not resting. Two friendly chiefs informed Haller,

of the existence of several Caches of provisions and of Canoes which belong to Indians of the Deschutes and John Day's Rivers, who have been induced to join our enemies. They have also provided me with Guides who can point them out.226

Lieutenants Day, Dearing, thirty-eight men, and several Indian guides left the Dalles on 12 December. They scouted up the Deschutes River for twenty miles and along the Columbia as far as the mouth of John Day's River.227 The five day search unearthed five canoes and twelve caches which held an estimated six tons of dried salmon.228 Everything taken was either destroyed, given to friendly Indians, or brought back to Fort Dalles.229 The episode furnished a painless and profitable diversion for some of the men in winter quarters.

More interesting as an example of what injured vanity and idle hours can do to otherwise fairly intelligent men, was the rash of charges filed against officers by brother officers. Haller opened the spectacle with his request

225 Ibid.
226 Haller to Townsend, Fort Dalles, 11 December 1855, RUSAC.
227 Day to Turner, Fort Dalles, 18 December 1855, RUSAC; Haller to Nesmith, Fort Dalles, 16 December 1855, ORE.
228 Haller to Townsend, Fort Dalles, 18 December 1855, RUSAC.
229 Day to Turner, Fort Dalles, 18 December 1855, RUSAC.
that a Court of Inquiry may be convened, as early as practicable, at
this Post, to investigate the facts connected with the loss of Ordnance
and Ordnance Stores, and other public property, by the Troops under my
Command, in the Yakima Country, W. T., during the 6th 7th and 8th of
October, 1855, and report the facts, and their opinion whether any or
no blame attaches to me for said loss, or the failure of said expedition. 230

A Court was ordered to assemble at Fort Dalles on 12 December 1855 "or as soon
thereafter as practicable." 231 The Court could not meet until Lt. Day, who
was appointed to serve on it, returned from his scout up the Deschutes River. 232
Then, the date for assembling the Court was changed to 18 February 1856, but
it never convened owing to constantly recurring obstacles. 233 Haller failed
in this attempt to squelch the criticisms of his fiasco in the Yakima country.

Captain E. O. C. Ord now preferred charges against Rains 234 at a
most inopportune moment—while he was eagerly preparing to prefer charges
against Haller. 235 None of these written rantings was ever dignified by
trial before a Court Martial, so they remain as nothing more than indications
of military jealousy, almost feline in its viciousness.

From the realm of unproved accusations, the disgusting search for
a scapegoat was transferred to the public press. Here again, Haller set the

230 Haller to Townsend, Fort Dalles, 4 December 1855, RUSAC.
231 Special Orders No. 100, Fort Vancouver, 8 December 1855, RUSAC. Special
Orders, Department of the Pacific.
232 Haller to Nesmith, Fort Dalles, 16 December 1855, ORE.
233 Special Orders No. 7, Benicia, 25 January 1856, RUSAC. Special
Orders, Department of the Pacific.
234 Thomas to Wool, New York, 15 February 1856, RUSAC; Haller to
Nesmith, Fort Dalles, 16 December 1855, ORE.
235 Rains to Mason, Fort Vancouver, 10 December 1855, OLY.
pace by having his version of the 6 October debacle printed in The Oregonian, Extra for Monday, 15 October 1855. This letter was made public without permission of his superior officer and before Haller's official report of the expedition was submitted. In doing this, he laid himself open to a charge of violating paragraphs 291 and 292 of General Regulations of the Army. The amusing thing about all this was the publication of a letter of Rains to Mason in the same offensive Weekly Oregonian. While Rains was studying Paragraphs 291 and 292 with an eye to applying them to Haller with undiluted strength, he saw one of his own letters in the paper. Posthaste he asked Mason if he was responsible for the broadcast reproduction of a private letter, and even suggested that some low fellow had purloined the communication from the mail, "since there was not time between the writing and publishing for it to reach you." The newspaper campaign got into full swing with the unexpected appearance of a letter written by Major General John E. Wool to the Editors of The National Intelligencer, Washington, D. C. Wool's letter of 2 April 1856, appeared in the issue of The National Intelligencer for 3 May 1856. Haller composed a phrase by phrase refutation of the General's printed attack, and had it published for immediate perusal in T. J. Dryer's, Oregonian, 16 August 1856.

A blanket analysis of this whole interchange may be made by saying

236 Ibid.
237 Ibid.
238 Haller to Nesmith, Fort Dalles, 21 July 1856, ORE.
that the accused was blamed for the reverses suffered at the hands of the Indians, while the rebuttals were invariably taken up with the denial of all allegations and an attempt to shift the responsibility elsewhere. Since no new information is divulged in these bitter backerings, they are important as revelations of the fundamental pettiness of their authors.

Certainly there was precious little to be proud of in these ineffectual doings of the preceding months. The whites had gone blustering into the Indian Country twice within as many months, and twice had managed a shame-faced withdrawal. They set out to smother the fires of war, which were as undimmed when Rains stole back to the Dalles, as when he marched to fight the Yakima. The whites came to put down once and for all the least sign of resistance by the Indians, but nothing was accomplished except to embolden the Indians, and show them that they are a match for equal numbers of White soldiers. They have greatly the advantage now and perhaps they will be able to keep it.

Affairs were bad in October, but by the end of the year they were much worse. The Indians were uncowed, the country was devastated, the white settlers had abandoned their claims and moved to the settlements seeking safety in numbers, the missions were ash heaps and the missionaries wandering refugees, the officers of the troops were involved in demoralizing backbiting, and the troops wrestled with their bewilderment over the strange turn events had taken. Grim determination marked the renewed preparations for yet another expedition.

239 Congiato a De Smet, Ste Claire, Calif., 29 Novembre 1855, in Collection de Precis Historiques Malanges Litteraires, Scientifiques VII (1856), 149.

240 Kate Blaine, to Sharon, Seattle, 18 December 1855, Typescript.
against the elusive foe. This time there must be no mistakes, no underestimation of the enemy and no defeat.
CHAPTER V

AN OFFENSE TURNED DEFENSE

Haller was repulsed; Rains took three hundred and fifty Regulars and three howitzers on a prolonged walk of three hundred miles into the Yakima country, with nothing to show for his efforts except a few ineffectual skirmishes with the Indians.¹ The contest up to this point was undeniably in favor of the natives.

Major General John E. Wool, commanding the entire Department of the Pacific, came from Headquarters at Benicia, California, to take charge of the campaign in person. He arrived at Fort Vancouver on 17 November 1855, and was still there when Rains' return to Fort Dalles was reported.² Wool set wheels in motion for an immediate occupation of Indian country to cut them off from their sources of subsistence, fish, cattle and horses.³ A critical inspection of the troops and supplies at his disposal, however, forced the conclusion that such an ambitious scheme was impossible. Haller's expedition into the Snake River country, his ill-fated venture against the Yakima, and

¹ Wool to Thomas, Fort Vancouver, 13 December 1855. RUSAC. Letts. Sent.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid.
Rains' more recent excursion had exhausted men and animals. He planned, under these circumstances, to send what troops were fit for service to occupy the Walla Walla Valley as soon as they could be put in the field.  

Twelve days later all was cancelled. Snow had fallen, the streams frozen, supplies were enormously expensive, so talk of a winter occupation was changed to plans for a spring campaign. In his previous communication Wool maintained that with an additional force of at least a regiment

I have no doubt I will be able, in a short time to either conquer the Indians in Oregon and Washington or compel them to sue for peace or abandon their country.

Unknown to him, the request for more troops was being answered two days after he wrote his letter. The newly organized Ninth Regiment of Infantry composed of twenty-five commissioned officers, seven hundred and thirty-six rank and file, and two medical officers, under command of Colonel George Wright, embarked at Fort Monroe, Virginia, on Saturday, 15 December 1855. At six o'clock in the evening the Steamer St. Louis got under way, en route to Oregon by way of Aspinwall and Panama.

Just as the setting sun of 23 December framed the green mountain ranges rising from the sea at Aspinwall, the St. Louis stood four miles off

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4 Ibid.


6 Wool to Thomas, Ft. Vancouver, 13 December 1855. RUSAC. Letts. Sent.

7 Taylor to Cooper, Fort Monroe, Va., 17 December 1855. RUSAC; Wright to Thomas, Steamship "Oregon," Bay of Panama, N. G., 26 December 1855.

8 Wright to Cooper, Fort Monroe, Va., 15 December 1855; RHA. Taylor to Cooper, Fort Monroe, Va., 17 December 1855. RUSAC.
shore to await the next day. They landed next morning at nine o'clock and took the cars for Panama. The cool, dustless ride of four hours was a pleasant interlude that ended with immediate embarkation on the Oregon for Archer's Company I, and on the Golden Age for the three companies, C, D, and E. Christmas Day was spent in getting settled in the cramped quarters made available, the only note of festivity being some Mum's Champagne given to the regiment by Colonel Charles Ferguson Smith before its departure from Fort Monroe.

They were northbound by 26 December and on the morning of 12 January 1856 landed in San Francisco. Four days later, still aboard the Oregon, half of the regiment left for Fort Vancouver. After a rough voyage, except for one evening, they entered the Columbia River at ten o'clock on the morning of 20 January 1856. By eleven o'clock that night the Headquarters Staff, Band and six companies of the Ninth had reached Fort Vancouver safely.

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9 J. J. Archer to his Mother, Steamer St. Louis, 23 December 1855, MD.

10 Archer to his Mother, Steamship "Oregon," Panama Bay, Christmas Morning, 1855, MD.

11 Archer to his Brother, Steamer "Oregon," Panama Bay, Christmas Day 1855, MD.

12 Ibid.

13 Archer to his Mother, San Francisco, 16 January 1856, MD.; Wright to Thomas, Steamship "Oregon," Harbor of Acapulco, Mexico, 3 January 1856. RHA.

14 Ibid.; Wright to Thomas, Steamship "Oregon," Bay of San Francisco, 16 January 1856. RHA.

15 Wright to Thomas, Fort Vancouver, 21 January 1856. RHA. Letts. Reed., 1856.
Lt. Col. Silas Casey, with the remaining four companies, was following one day behind, aboard the Steamer Republic.\textsuperscript{16}

The immediate problem was to get the troops under shelter. Fort Vancouver had permanent quarters for three or four hundred men, and in anticipation of the arrival of the Ninth Infantry orders were given that "The building occupied as a church at Vancouver will be immediately changed and altered into quarters for troops expected at this post."\textsuperscript{17} This helped a little, but by far the greater portion of the regiment were forced to pitch their tents on a chilled parade ground covered with two inches of snow.\textsuperscript{18}

Four days later flooring for the tents was in place and everyone was as comfortable as possible.\textsuperscript{19}

Although the troops settled down to six weeks of inactivity, their commanding officer could not say the same of himself.

I have been constantly engaged since my arrival at this post, in preparing the troops for an early campaign. Requisitions for supplies have already been forwarded; the subsistence stores will be required at the earliest moment practicable, especially the hard bread.\textsuperscript{20}

\hspace{1cm}
\hspace{1cm}

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., Silas B. Casey was born in East Greenwich, Rhode Island, graduated from West Point in 1826, and for ten years served on the Great Lakes and frontier. Like many other men in the Department of the Pacific, he fought the Seminoles in Florida, was outstanding in the Mexican War, and returned to take a prominent role in the Civil War.

\textsuperscript{17} Special Orders No. 4, Fort Vancouver, 11 January 1856. RUSAC, Department of the Pacific, Special Orders.

\textsuperscript{18} Archer to his Mother, Fort Vancouver, W. T., 25 January 1856, MD.

\textsuperscript{19} Archer to his Brother, Bob, Fort Vancouver, W. T., 28 January 1856, MD.

\textsuperscript{20} Wright to Jones, Fort Vancouver, 10 February 1856. RUSAC.
Every step he took, every effort he made to hasten compliance with Wool's order to take the field without delay was maddeningly impeded. The Steamer Republic catching fire twenty-five miles off Port Orford jettisoned a large quantity of ammunition consigned to Vancouver. The California was almost lost by fire off the Columbia River bar and had to throw overboard several more tons of powder.

About the middle of February, Wright began shipping to the Dalles the supplies he had on hand, with hopes of concentrating his troops at the same place before the middle of March and of advancing into the Walla Walla country as soon as practicable. There was, however, but one small steamer, the Belle, operating from Vancouver to the Cascades and it could not handle all of Wright's baggage with ease.

Nevertheless, he adhered to his intention of not going into Indian country with a small force, such as would invite an attack, with any prospect of success; but on the contrary, steadily to pursue them, until we can make them see and feel our power.

Haller was turned back by an overwhelmingly superior force of the enemy, and Rains went into the hostile country much too late in the season for an extended campaign. Now Wright was determined to have the men, the supplies and the time to do the job with finality and dispatch.

21 Glisan, op. cit., 28 February 1856.
22 Charles Stevens to Levi Stevens, Astoria, 10 March 1856. LC.
23 Wright to Jones, Fort Vancouver, 1 March 1856. RUSAC.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
By 2 March 1856, Lt. Col. Steptoe was writing "I go up the river and you and Stone must visit me this summer. I will have a Wallah Wallah served up for breakfast every day." The troops got under way for the interior on the morning of 7 March, with the departure from Vancouver of two companies. Three days later, five additional companies followed to join the two companies of the Fourth Infantry, one of the First Dragoons and one of the Third Artillery already at Fort Dalles. Wright and his staff accompanied the troops moving up on 8 March, and reached his new Headquarters three days later.

Except for the troops being closer to the Indian country, the overall picture remained unchanged. The slow transportation of stores from Fort Vancouver made it impossible to go further. "Our wagons, mules, subsistence and stores of various kinds, absolutely necessary, are still on the way." Wagons were essential and they had to be dismantled before they were put aboard the Mary that pleyed between the Cascades and the Dalles. Not only

26 Steptoe to W. T. Sherman, Fort Vancouver, 2 March 1856. LC. Edward Jenner Steptoe (1816-1865) was born in Virginia, and graduated from West Point in 1837. During the war with Mexico he was made a brevet-major on 18 April 1847 for gallantry at Cerro Gordo, and lieutenant-colonel on 13 September 1847 for gallantry at Chapultepec. After service in New York, Utah, and Washington Territory, he resigned his commission on 1 November 1861, and died four years later at Lynchsburg, Virginia.

27 Archer to his Mother, Fort Vancouver, 7 March 1856. MD.

28 Archer to his Mother, Fort Vancouver, 11 March 1856. MD.

29 Wright to Jones, Fort Dalles, 12 March 1856. RUSAC.

30 Ibid.

31 Archer to his Mother, Fort Dalles, 16 March 1856. MD.
but mules and other property were stacked up for ten days at the
upper landing of the Cascades because the steamer could not tow the flat-boat
against the easterly wind blowing down the Columbia. Wright had all his
troops ready but only part of the necessary ammunition. In sheer despera-
tion, one hundred and forty horses and mules were driven by land from the
Cascades and arrived at Fort Dalles "in a sad condition--most of them without
shoes and a large number unable to move." A few days before, the long-
awaited hard bread reached Vancouver only to be found in large part useless.
It was old, poorly packed, and had been carelessly handled, with the result
that eleven thousand pounds were declared totally unfit for issue.

While all these misfortunes were befalling Wright, time also was
running out on him. He was short of rations, his transportation crippled, and
his supply of ammunition less than he desired; but he could delay no longer.
"I must march tomorrow, as the waters are beginning to rise, and I apprehend
some difficulty in crossing the streams." With five hundred men, one com-
pany of Dragoons, one of Artillery and six companies of Infantry, Wright de-
parted for the Walla Walla country on the morning of 26 March 1856.

32 Wright to Jones, Fort Dalles, 15 March 1856. RUSAC; Archer to
his Mother, 12 March 1856, MD.
33 Wright to Jones, Fort Dalles, 12 March 1856, RUSAC.
34 Wright to Jones, Fort Dalles, 25 March 1856. RUSAC.
35 Ibid., also, John Withers to H. C. Hodges, Fort Vancouver, 31
March 1856. RUSAC.
36 Wright to Jones, Fort Dalles, 25 March 1856. RUSAC.
37 Wright to Jones, Camp at the Cascades of the Columbia River,
W. T., 4 April 1856. RUSAC; Printed in 34th Congress, 1st Session, House Ex-
ecutive Document No. 118 (Serial Set No. 859).
The command had with it one six pounder, three mountain howitzers with ammunition, and thirty thousand rations of subsistence plus ten days' rations issued in advance. 38 This first day they marched to Five Mile Creek, and encamped. 39 At ten o'clock that night an express reached them from Haller, commander at Fort Dalles, informing them of the Indian onslaught upon the Cascades. 40

Transportation snarls were the greatest single factor delaying the departure of the command until 26 March—nor was there any apparent solution to the vexatious problem. Military supplies were shipped by river boat up the Columbia as far as the Cascades. Here at the lower landing of the troublesome rapids all freight was taken off the steamers and put aboard flat boats that were then towed upstream for three and a half miles. At this middle point goods were loaded onto a tiny railroad whose wooden rails skirted the edge of the River for a mile and a half, terminating at the upper landing. Cargo again was loaded aboard the small steamer running to the Dalles. 41 Not only was this five mile portage a bottleneck causing exasperating delays in transporting supplies, but it was also of the greatest strategic importance in any military operation in the interior. Wright was not blind to the fact that the Indians could seriously cripple any effort against them by holding the Cascades. On his first trip up the Columbia he reported that,

38 Wright to Jones, Fort Dalles, 25 March 1856. RUSAC.
39 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Cascades, W. T., 30 March 1856. MD
40 Wright to Jones, Camp at the Cascades of Columbia River, W. T., 4 April 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 859.
41 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Cascades, W. T., 30 March 1856. MD
owing to the exposed condition of our stores at the Upper Landing of the Cascades, I have determined to post a company there temporarily: from that point, detachments can be sent up and down the river with great facility, and give general protection to our lines of communication.\textsuperscript{42}

In the meantime, Wool had arrived at Vancouver and ordered two companies (one of which had been assigned by Wright to guard the Cascades) to reinforce Casey at Fort Steilacoom.\textsuperscript{43} This left only eight men, "who were posted at a block house at the head of the flat boat navigation, to guard the pass of the Cascades."\textsuperscript{44} Whether Wright lost sight of the importance of guarding the Cascades, or took the action by Wool as a declaration that larger garrisons were superfluous, is not clear.\textsuperscript{45} The fact is, he left for Walla Walla with almost no one protecting his line of communication.

It was not hard for the Klikitat Indians to keep abreast of Wright's preparations and report on them regularly. Apparently the Indians decided that the soldiers would leave on 24 March, thus putting themselves too far away to help in case the Cascades were attacked.\textsuperscript{46} This crowning negligence of the Indian spies saved the attack from being even more disastrous than it was.

There was a strong wind blowing straight down the Columbia, but nothing else disturbed the bright clear dawn of 26 March.\textsuperscript{47} The few settlers

\textsuperscript{42} Wright to Jones, Fort Dalles, 12 March 1856. \textit{RUSAC}.

\textsuperscript{43} Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Cascades, W. T., 30 March 1856. \textit{MD}.

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{46} J. H. Herman, "The Cascade Massacre," Oregon Native Son (May, 1899), 495; Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Cascade, W. T., 30 March 1856. \textit{MD}.

\textsuperscript{47} F. M. Sebring, "The Indian Raid on the Cascades," \textit{Washington
at the Cascades anticipated nothing different from the routine that was theirs ever since large military shipments began moving up the River. Some of the men were working on the two new railroad bridges, while another party was vainly trying to tow a loaded barge away from the lower landing; one of the soldiers from the middle blockhouse sauntered off to buy a canteen full of whiskey at the upper landing, and one of his companions was chopping wood on the hillside nearby. At eight o'clock in the morning, the idyllic scene was shattered by the sound of gunfire.

There were three points in the five mile stretch along the River that were occupied, and therefore objects of attack; the lower landing, the middle blockhouse and the upper landing. Hence, the attack on, and the defense and relief of the Cascades must be studied from a threefold viewpoint.

**UPPER LANDING**

The first warning of the Indian attack came with the shots and crackle

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Historical Quarterly, XIX (1928), 100.

48 L. W. Coe to Putnam Bradford, Cascades, W. T., 6 April 1856, B; Copies in CRE. and COE; Printed in Oregon Native Son (May 1899), 497.

49 F. M. Sebring, loc. cit.


51 Ibid.

52 J. H. Herman, op. cit., 495.
of their guns at eight o'clock in the morning of 26 March 1856. All the settlers fled to Bradford and Bishop's store, leaving their homes, their stock and everything they owned to the vengeance of the Yakima who lined the bluff above the store. During the initial confusion in the store, James Sinclair, Hudson's Bay Company factor at Fort Walla Walla, was killed instantly as he stood in the open door watching the Indians on the heights. With reasonable swiftness the store was prepared for siege. Fortunately nine United States guns and ammunition for them were left there an hour earlier by Jehu Switzler to be shipped to Fort Vancouver. These were issued to the able-bodied men and proved to be the salvation of all who survived.

Coe took charge of the first floor; Dan Bradford of the second; and Alexander superintended the defenses from the garrett, which was the critical spot. Holes were cut through the roof so the defenders could fire at the Indians on the overhanging cliffs, while others poured brine from the pork barrel on the roof fires started by the hot iron, pitchwood, and firebrands thrown from above. Rocks rained down on them made the defenders wary, and an occasional boulder shook the whole building alarmingly.

53 L. W. Coe to Putnam Bradford, Cascades, W. T., 6 April 1856, B; Typescript, ORB and COE; Printed in Oregon Native Son (May 1899), 495.
54 Ibid.
55 Ibid.; Mactavish to W. G. Smith, Vancouver, 5 April 1856. HBC. Mactavish to Peers, Vancouver, 31 March 1856, copy, UW.
56 L. W. Coe, op. cit., 497.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid., 498.
59 Ibid.
When the attack opened the Steamer Mary was tied-up in Mill Creek below the store. With no steam in her boilers, she was an inviting prize for the attackers. One Indian was shot on her gangplank by Buckminster, ship engineer; and another was shot from the hurricane deck by little Johnny Chance.

Fires were soon started under her boiler and steam was rising. After sufficient steam to move was raised, Hardin Chenowith ran up into the pilot-house, and, lying on the floor turned the wheel as he was directed from the deck below.

The Mary was off to the Dalles for help, only a little distance behind the Wasco, which had been tied-up across the river, on the Oregon side, and had cast off her lines earlier to race for the Dalles.

The long vigil at the store now began. By the end of the first day the Indians had burned down the saw mill, lumber yard, and new warehouse on the island off shore. There were forty embattled men, women and children in the beleaguered house. Eighteen were already wounded, and James Sinclair's body was there to remind them of Indian marksmanship. George Watkins lay on the bank of the river, within sight of his family, dying of a terrible wound and of exposure. Jesse Kempton was wounded while driving an ox team from the saw mill, as was Jimmy Watkins. B. W. Brown and his wife were killed at the saw mill and their stripped bodies thrown into Mill Creek. Henry Hagar was shot down in Watkins' house and his body burned. Jacob White, Montour, Norman Palmer and Calderwood were either killed instantly or died of wounds received while working near the mill. All this added up to an impressive score for

60 Ibid., 499.
61 Ibid.
62 Ibid., 498.
63 Williams, op. cit., 505.
The second day passed with each man constantly alert and shooting at every shadow on the bluff. That night the Indians burned down Sheppard's house, and the night was made light until four o'clock in the morning by Bush's blazing home. The great feat of these tense hours was the filling of two barrels of water by the Spokane Indian who had been travelling with James Sinclair. One of the last acts of the weary defenders before the sun rose was to slide Sinclair's now offensive body down the bank into the river.

MIDDLE BLOCKHOUSE

The evening of 25 March was pleasant enough for Sergeant M. Kelly and his detail of eight men assigned to guard the head of flat boat navigation and the beginning of the wooden railroad. Six of the nine spent the whole night drinking whiskey toddy and trading army stories with an old German, Herman Kyle, who claimed to be one of Blucher's Waterloo veterans. When the attack opened the next morning, only the cook, Sheridan, Owen McManus, and Robert Williams were near the Blockhouse. Lawrence Rooney was up the hill chopping wood when the Indians captured, hanged and beat in his face with an axe. Frederick Bernard had gone to the upper landing for

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64 L. W. Coe, _op. cit._, 498.
65 Ibid., 499.
66 Williams, _op. cit._, 502.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.; T. C. English, "Return of Killed and Wounded," Camp at The Cascades, 6 April 1856. RUSAC; OLY.
Although shot through both legs while returning to the blockhouse, he managed to reach there that night. The same Jehu Switzler who left the nine guns at Bradford's store an hour before the attack began, spent the siege in the middle blockhouse.

Before the soldiers and civilians could gather in the Blockhouse the Indians had captured Rooney; they shot young Jake Kyle about one hundred yards from the Blockhouse where he lay for several hours writhing in agony before he died; and Owen McManus, shot in the groin during the opening fusillade, died a few days later in the hospital at Fort Vancouver. George Griswold relied too much on his close friendship with the Cascade Indians and instead of fleeing for safety when the attack started, he stood in the open shouting and waving his arms. He was killed by an attacking Yakima or one of the renegade Cascade.

Once the initial onslaught was over, the siege of the middle blockhouse was not as difficult as the fighting at the upper landing. The close fighting ended when fourteen rounds of canister shot and a few shells were loosed against the Indians from the six-pounder. The Indians were driven back into the woods far enough for Williams to run across the clearing to Griswold's house where he found a pan of doughnuts and a ham. At the close

69 Williams, op. cit., 502.
70 Ibid., 503.
71 Ibid., 502.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid., 503.
74 Ibid.
of this first day the most pressing need was for water.

On the second day, 27 March, the Indians kept watch from the woods and prevented the besieged from quenching their thirst. The problem was partially solved by Williams and Houser volunteering to go to the Palmer brothers saloon at the foot of the hill near the river. There they found "one dozen bottles of English porter, one decanter of brandy, the same of whiskey and wine, and a small box full of oyster crackers." These items supplied all of their needs except surgical aid. More important, by nightfall of the second day they could at least hear the shooting of Lt. Phil Sheridan's rescuers.76

LOWER LANDING

George Johnson was trying to organize a boat crew of Indians to begin the day's work of moving freight, when Indian Jack ran up to tell him that the Yakima were attacking the Blockhouse. The news was not far ahead of the shots, but sufficiently in advance to let Bill Murphy give warning to the settlers.78 The women and children boarded the small schooner at the landing in an incredibly short time and went sailing down the river.79 This expeditious escape explains why no one was killed here, and only Tommy Pierce wounded as he clambered aboard the boat.80

75 Ibid., 504.
76 Ibid.
77 L. W. Coe, op. cit., 499.
78 Ibid., 500.
80 L. W. Coe, op. cit., 500.
The Indians vented their pent-up hatred by destroying property at the lower landing. George Johnson's, S. M. Hamilton's, F. A. Chenoweth's, Allen's, Bradford's, and Bishop's houses were plundered and burned. 81 The wharfboat, with considerable government freight, was left to the mercy of the Indians because there was insufficient ammunition at the landing to carry on a defense. 82

As they drifted down the river, the refugees met the Steamers Belle and Fashion running as squarely abreast as a well trained span of horses. On being apprised of the situation both boats went about instantly, the Fashion taking us in tow for Portland and the Belle stopping at Vancouver where she was boarded by Lieut. Sheridan and forty soldiers and headed again for the Cascades. 83

RELIEF

The massacre at the Cascades assumes proportions much beyond those of a mere incident, owing to its serious and widespread repercussions. This is clear as we follow the events leading to the relief of the beleaguered people at Bradford's store, the middle blockhouse and the recapture of the lower landing. We have seen that Colonel Wright's belated expedition got under way on the morning of 26 March, marched to Five Mile Creek and encamped. 84

82 L. W. Coe, op. cit., 500.
83 F. M. Sebring, op. cit., 101.
84 Wright to Jones, Camp at the Cascades of Columbia River, W. T., 4 April 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 859.
At ten o'clock that night, an express from Haller with word of the attack on the Cascades reached Wright. 85

I determined on the instant, to make a retrograde movement--The night was intensely dark, and I could not march until day-break. Arriving at Fort Dalles at 8 o'clock in the morning of the 27th of March, I found both of the small Steamers at that place. 86

Immediately he embarked with Companies A, E, F, and I of the Ninth Infantry, a detachment of twenty-three Dragoons of Company "E," First Regiment, and a detachment of Company "L," Third Artillery, with two mountain howitzers, one on each boat. 87 With about two hundred and fifty rank and file aboard, the boats cast-off. 88 At nightfall they stopped at Wind River, ten miles from the Cascades. Although the troops left their baggage behind them to speed their return, 89 nothing could accelerate the boilers of the Mary which were damaged in the previous day's hectic escape.

Both steamers were on the way by four o'clock on the morning of 28 March, and by dawn were gliding into Mill Creek. 91 The Mary struck a rock fifty yards off shore, and for ten minutes furnished a perfect target for the

85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
87 Ibid.
88 Ibid.; Archer to his sister, Nannie, Cascades, W. T., 30 March 1856. MD.
89 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Cascades, W. T., 30 March 1856, MD
90 Wright to Jones, Camp at the Cascades of Columbia River, W. T., 4 April 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 859.
91 J. H. Herman, op. cit., 496.
Indians on the landing. Once the boats touched shore the soldiers poured fanwise into the woods, driving the Indians before them. The people in the store were freed and about fifty horses and mules and some stock were recaptured, but no Indians killed or taken.

No sooner were the Indians driven back from the store, than Wright organized a force of two companies of infantry, a detachment of dragoons, and a detail to man the howitzer, all under command of Lt. Colonel Edward Steptoe, to advance to the Blockhouse, and from there to the lower landing. Actually, succor had come from below, unknown to Wright. Since the morning of 27 March, the Indians laying siege to the Middle Blockhouse and holding the lower landing were much harrassed by Lt. Phil Sheridan, forty Dragoons and some ten volunteers. Simpson, an Indian, had carried the alarm to Vancouver when the attack first began on 26 March.

Sheridan left Fort Vancouver "at 3 o'clock on the morning of the 27th of March," and reached the lower landing about nine o'clock the same morning to find all the houses burned down or in flames. The troops landed

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92 Wright to Jones, Camp at the Cascades of Columbia River, W. T., 4 April 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 859.

93 Ibid.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.

96 L. W. Coe, op. cit., 500.

97 Ibid.

98 P. H. Sheridan to Wright, Camp Lower Cascades, W. T., 5 April 1856. RUSAC.
a short distance below the portage and skirmished with one hundred and fifty

to two hundred Indians who had come down to drive them off. Two Indians were
killed and one soldier, Private Thomas McGrath, lost his life in the encoun-
ter. 99

To have attempted to gain the Blockhouse, three & half miles distant over
a country uneven, rocky, and covered with dense underbrush, with the
small party that would have been left me after leaving a guard with the
Boats, I did not deem advisable, so I took up a position about two hun-
dred and fifty yards on my left, and determined to garrison there until
more troops arrived. 100

Both sides settled down to a day of intermittent shooting, which ended with
the Indians retiring at sundown. Whereupon, Sheridan ordered his men to em-
bark and the boat to anchor in mid-stream, where they got some much needed
sleep. 101

On the following morning, 28 March, Sheridan undertook to relieve
the blockhouse by a complicated maneuver. He landed all his troops on the
south bank of the river, then took a detachment of ten volunteers in a Hudson's
Bay Company bateau, to recross the south channel of the River to the south
side of Bradford's Island. 102 Thus screened from the sight of Indians on the
Washington shore, the small group with the aid of some old squaws captured on
the Island, pulled the boat over the rough water. 103 Meanwhile, the troops on

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99 P. H. Sheridan to Lt. Col. T. Morris, Cascades, W. T., 30
March 1856. RUSAC.

100 Sheridan to Wright, Camp Lower Cascades, W. T., 5 April 1856.
RUSAC.

101 Ibid.

102 Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan, General United States Army,
2 Volumes, New York, 1888, I, 77.

103 Ibid., 79.
Lieut. Sheridan's fight for the relief of the
Block - House at the Cascades of the Columbia in 1856.

Explanation
a. Point of landing from Steamer.
b. Route of crossing to South side of river.
c. Route of crossing to Island.
d. Route by which the boat was pulled up.
e. Crossing again to South shore.
f. Crossing to Block House.
g. Route of troops marching up on South side of river.
h. Route to the Island to attack the Indians.
the south bank of the River had worked their way along undetected to a point opposite the northern end of the Island. The small band on the Island, here crossed back to the south bank of the river to rejoin the others, and the combined party proceeded along to a place across from the blockhouse. As rapidly as possible, all the men were ferried across the Columbia and landed below the beleaguered blockhouse. Thus it was that Steptoe met another force of saviours as he reached the blockhouse from the east. Sheridan reported to Steptoe, and was ordered to return to the Island to arrest the camp of Indians fleeing from Steptoe as he continued his march to the lower landing.

About daylight of 28 March, the Fashion returned from Portland with forty citizen volunteers aboard. They came too late to help, but these would-be heroes were not easily dissuaded from displaying their prowess. Sheridan had captured ninety men, women, and children whom he was holding under orders from Colonel Wright. The volunteers persisted in their preparations to shoot all of them, until Sheridan bluntly told them that every prisoner would be protected against any attack.

104 Ibid., 80.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
107 Sheridan to Morris, Cascades, W. T., 30 March 1856. RUSAC.
108 Steptoe to English, Camp at the Cascades, 29 March 1856. RUSAC.
110 Sheridan to Morris, Cascades, W. T., 30 March 1856. RUSAC.
111 Sheridan, Memoirs, I, 83.
At ten o'clock on the evening of 28 March, Wallen with thirty-seven men reached the Cascades aboard the Belle from Vancouver to reinforce Sheridan. 112 This assistance was unnecessary so Wright ordered Wallen's command back to Vancouver. 113 By nightfall of 28 March, the whole line of the portage was reoccupied by United States troops. 114 Steptoe left a fresh garrison at the Blockhouse, then marched about one mile toward the lower landing where he "came unexpectedly upon a party of Yakimas who fired & retreated rapidly toward the hills." 115 This final skirmish cost the life of Private Thomas Boston and of one Indian. 116 Two Indian women and two children were captured; fifty horses and mules taken and a number of caches discovered that contained "all the stores & personal property of the hostile party." 117

This ended the fighting but the task of repairing the damage remained. Wright ordered a military commission to examine approximately one hundred and fifty men, women and children taken into custody at the Cascades, on the Washington side, and two from John Day's River in Oregon. 118 Of the the Commission found the Chief Chinnowith & nine men guilty of "aiding assisting & cooperating with the hostile Indians in the attack on the

112 Wallen to Hodges, Fort Vancouver, 31 March 1856. RUSAC.
113 Ibid.
114 Wright to Jones, Camp at the Cascades of Columbia River, W. T. 4 April 1856. RUSAC.; Printed in, Serial Set No. 859.
115 Steptoe to English, Camp at the Cascades, 29 March 1856. RUSAC.
116 Ibid., T. C. English, "Return of Killed and Wounded," Camp at the Cascades, 6 April 1856. RUSAC.
117 Steptoe to English, Camp at the Cascades, 29 March 1856. RUSAC.
118 Wright to Jones, Camp at the Cascades of Columbia River, W. T., 5 April 1856. RUSAC., Printed in Serial Set No. 859.
Casades," and sentenced them to be hung—One of the convicted I have reprieved, the others, eight, besides the Chief, have been executed.119 Before the old Chief died by gunfire, the rope failing in its grisly function, he offered ten horses, two squaws and a little something to every "tyee" of his life. He "said he was afraid of the grave in the ground, and begged to be put into an Indian dead-house."120

Wright's prompt action was probably necessary, but nothing could explain away the most detestable incident of the whole bloody affair at the Cascades. When he left Vancouver on 8 March, Wright was accompanied by "several Indians as guides, amongst the rest, an Indian by the name of Spencer, entirely devoted to our cause and of undoubted fidelity."121 After his hasty recall to the Cascades because of the Indian attack, he gave a pass to Spencer's party, consisting of three men, two women, and a child to go to Fort Vancouver.122 While en route from the Cascades to the lower landing, three and a half miles away, the entire party disappeared.123 Thirteen days later, 17 April, the bodies of all six were discovered a short distance from the road between the Blockhouse and the lower landing.124

Lt. Sheridan reported that all had been strangled, and the young

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119 Ibid. Kanewake was reprieved on the scaffold. L. W. Coe, op. cit., 501.

120 L. W. Coe, op. cit., 500.

121 Wright to Arnold, Camp at Cascades, 18 April 1856. RUSAC.

122 Ibid.

123 Ibid.

124 Sheridan to Wright, Camp Lower Cascades, 18 April 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 859.
A party of armed white men was allegedly following the Indian family when they passed the Blockhouse on the last day they were seen alive. In a supplementary report Sheridan named as members of the party S. M. Hamilton, H. W. Baughman, S. Vandevere, W. M. Wilson and probably Finley. Baughman was at the lower landing with George Johnson when the opening attack sent the whites fleeing to the schooner and their small boats; Hamilton's house was burned down; and Finley, with George Watkins and Bailey survived the harrowing experience of reaching the safety of Bradford's store from the island on which these three were building the new warehouse. These men were aroused enough to revenge themselves upon any Indian. Sheridan forwarded with his original report, a gauntlet found near the bodies which may have served as an excellent clue. Wright, the ruthless dispenser of justice to Indians, showed not the same courage in dealing with murder by whites. No further action was taken.

The consequences of what should have been a minor military problem of retaking a vitally important portage, were endless. The entire settlement at Hood River "left their homes and marched in single file to the river, where we met the canoe and started on our lonely journey." This incident typifies

125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 Sheridan to Wright, Camp Lower Cascades, 18 April 1856. RUSAC.
128 L. W. Coe, op. cit.
129 Sheridan to Wright, Camp Lower Cascades, W. T., 18 April 1856, RUSAC.
130 H. C. Coe. A Mid-night Flight--A Reminiscence of the War of 1856. Typescript, CRE.
the terror and the consternation that gripped the settlements. Governor Curry was troubled by rumors that first reached him at Salem. He told Stevens, "Command me at any time in any way."\(^{131}\) Two days later he informed Stevens that the Oregon and Washington Volunteers really deserved the credit for relieving the middle blockhouse.\(^{132}\) We saw that news of the attack brought a company of volunteers from Portland.\(^{133}\) These businessmen, working men and mechanics made up yet a second company of seventy men that organized in five hours, from eleven o'clock in the morning to four on the afternoon of 28 March.\(^{134}\) They were too late to fight, but their spirit was manifestly strong. Excitement was so rampant that men away from the scene of action were sending reassuring letters to those at home. Thomas Cornelius counseled his wife:

> You need not suffer any uneasiness from Indians from this way all though it was the Yackimas & the Clickitats that done the mischief but I met them on the other side of Simcooe Mountain & it was them that I had the fight with. But we gave them a good start toward the north.\(^{135}\)

One of the truly startling results of the attack on the Cascades was the universal panic it precipitated at Fort Vancouver, military headquar-

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131 Curry to Stevens, Salem, 27 March 1856. OLY.

132 Curry to Stevens, Portland, 29 March 1856. OLY.

133 David Blaine to Saron, Portland, 27 March 1856. COE; A. B. Hume to Stevens, Steamer Fashion, 27 March 1856. OLY.

134 Hathaway to Stevens, Vancouver, 29 March 1856. OLY.

135 Cornelius to his wife, Florentine, Dalles, 17 April 1856, H. Thomas R. Cornelius came to Oregon in the emigration of 1845 and was soon prominent in the early affairs of the district. He was a colonel in the volunteer forces, senator from Columbia, Clatsop, Tillamook, and Washington counties, and a member of the first board of directors of the Oregon Central Railroad.
ters of the district. The settlers were certain that Indians were massed
back of the Fort and intended to attack once their position at the Cascades was
secure. 136

Vancouver has been very badly "stampeded"—All the settlers, for many
miles around, have abandoned their farms and houses, and come in with
their families for protection—They are living in tents which have been
supplied by the Qr Master. The Stampede pervaded even the garrison—

nearly all the ladies having, by the encouragement of certain old fogies
of officers, run off one night to the stockade of the Hudson Bay Company. 13

Only four women refused to join the exodus. 138 Mrs. H. D. Wallen took this
occasion to visit San Francisco for several weeks; 139 and one other family
thought it opportune to visit Portland. 140

What is called Fort Vancouver, thus, presented the remarkable spectacle
of the families of citizens flying to it, and the families of officers
flying from it for protection. 141

Archer finished his letter with the statement that,

The stampede is happily now over—the old fogies and even the ladies are
getting a little ashamed of themselves, and a few of the boldest among
the former are returning to their farms. 142

If the Indians had slaughtered Wright's entire command they could
not have stopped his advance more effectively. Archer's Company "I," Ninth

136 B. McFadden to Stevens, Fort Vancouver, 31 March 1856. OL.
137 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Vancouver, 10 April 1856. MD
138 Mrs. Chiffelle, Mrs. Brown, Mrs. Dent, and Miss Crawford.
Archer to his Mother, Fort Vancouver, 12 April 1856. MD.
139 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Vancouver, 10 April 1856;
Archer to his Mother, Fort Vancouver, 13 May 1856. MD.
140 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Vancouver, 10 April 1856. MD
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid.
Infantry, was ordered back to Fort Vancouver, two full companies of the Fourth Infantry, thirty-five men of the Third Artillery, and twenty-five of the First Dragoons were left at Fort Dalles,143 with the remaining units of the Ninth being divided between the Cascades and Fort Steilacoom.144 With his forces dispersed, a demoralized populace at his back, and his communications badly disrupted, it is no cause for wonder that Wright admitted,

I have been compelled to suspend the projected advance to the Walla Walla Country; and confine my movements to the North of the Columbia River—In fact, the war is now confined to the country of the Yakima and Washington Tery, so far as we are concerned.145

"Thus endeth for the present the Walla Walla Expedition."146 It had been a journey into nowhere!

143 Wright to Jones, Camp at the Cascades of Columbia River, W. T., 5 April 1856. RUSAC, Printed in Serial Set No. 859.

144 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Vancouver, 10 April 1856.

145 Wright to Jones, Camp at the Cascades of Columbia River, W. T., 5 April 1856. RUSAC, Printed in Serial Set No. 859.

146 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Vancouver, 10 April 1856.
CHAPTER VI

IN SEARCH OF A FOE

The business of picking up the pieces and salvaging everything possible from the disaster now occupied Wright's full attention. He ordered Captain Winder to construct a blockhouse at the lower landing,¹ while he himself supervised the construction of another blockhouse at the upper landing.² In the midst of the "stampede," construction of two blockhouses at Fort Vancouver was begun.³ Wright took courage from the belief that as soon as we can build the Blockhouses, and allay the alarm and general consternation which has prevailed for several days, along the river, I am in hopes that confidence will be restored, and our troops will then be ready for any movements in advance.⁴

Once the blockhouses at the Cascades were well started, he returned to Fort Vancouver where he spent several days awaiting the arrival of General

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¹ Wright to Jones, Camp at The Cascades of Columbia River, W. T., 4 April 1856. RUSAC., Printed in Serial Set No. 859.

² Ibid.

³ Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Vancouver, 10 April 1856. MD: McFadden to Stevens, Fort Vancouver, 31 March 1856. OLY.

⁴ Wright to Jones, Camp at the Cascades of Columbia River, W. T., 5 April 1856. RUSAC., Printed in Serial Set No. 859.

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Wool from San Francisco. The steamer arrived, 12 April. In the afternoon of the next day, Wool and Wright, with members of the General's staff, left Fort Vancouver for an inspection of the Cascades and Fort Dalles.

Brevet-Lieutenant Colonel George Nauman, Inspecting Officer, submitted a glowing report on his findings. The lower Cascades was garrisoned by sixty-eight persons, under command of Winder, who was conducting the military affairs pertaining thereto "with skill and vigor." One sergeant and nine privates were at the middle blockhouse. Here, Nauman thought another six pounder or twelve pounder howitzer should be added to complete its means of defense. A minute inspection of the camp at the upper Cascades on 17 April elicited nothing but praise. There was an aggregate of two hundred and fifty-six men and two mountain howitzers with an abundant supply of ammunition at this point. Facilities for transporting supplies to these posts were perfectly adequate.

Fort Dalles received a "very minute and detailed examination and inspection" on 18 April. Steptoe was "found discharging his duties vigilantly, 

5 Archer to his Mother, Fort Vancouver, W. T., 12 April 1856. MD.
6 Ibid.
7 Morris to Palmer, Fort Vancouver, 15 April 1856. Ore. SIA. Letts Recd., 1856.
8 Nauman to Jones, Fort Vancouver, 25 April 1856. RUSAC.
9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
Two hundred and ninety-one army personnel plus eighty-six civilian employees were stationed here. Nauman was quite satisfied also with the supplies of all kinds available at Fort Dalles; ammunition of every description was adequate, there were four hundred and ninety-three serviceable horses and mules, and five hundred pack saddles ready for issue. "There is, in short, in depot, everything necessary to fit out an expedition in the least likely to start from this point."

All doubts were resolved by this tour. Wool sailed away to San Francisco, leaving no one in mourning over his departure. Wright prepared for an immediate campaign into the country of the Yakima. Ten days after Nauman's inspection, Wright was ready to cross the river to morrow with Comps. "E" 1st Dragoons, "L" 3rd Art; "K" 4th Infy and "A" & "C," 9th Infy - I have three Mountain Howitzers and provisions for fifty days - I shall muster on the Klikatat, when you will again hear from me.

The campaign started prosaically enough with the command crossing the Columbia River on 28 April, according to plan. Although the ensuing

13 Ibid.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
16 Archer to his Mother, Fort Vancouver, 30 April 1856. MD.
17 Wright to Jones, Camp at Fort Dalles, C. T., 27 April 1856. RUSAC; AGO; Printed in Serial Set No. 859; Robie to Stevens, Dalles, 27 April 1856, OLY; Archer to his Mother, Fort Vancouver, 30 April 1856, MD.
18 Wright to Jones, Camp "Klikatat" W. T., 25 miles N. E. of Fort Dalles, 1 May 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Wm. N. Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign of 1856," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 170.
march is not mentioned in military history, it really should be for two reasons: the completeness with which it was reported, and its complete futility. Wright spent a long summer in search of a foe whom he never quite brought to bay. No one can accuse him of failing to try, or of making a half-hearted effort.

Three day's march brought the troops twenty-five miles N. E. of Fort Dalles. Already they knew that marching in drenching rain was not only unpleasant but added immeasurably to their work. Ropes were attached to the Mountain Howitzers to keep them from upsetting on the side-hills. When they made camp at three o'clock on the afternoon of 30 March, there was nothing appealing about the next leg of their journey. The snow-blocked trail over the mountains was clearly visible.

Before following the trail that was used by Haller in October 1855, Wright sent Captain David Russell, with a company of dragoons, to examine it and ascertain whether or not, I could pass over with the Command. Capt. Russell returned at three o'clock this afternoon, and reports the snow about two feet deep; and extending between two and three miles; that there are only two bad places, which can be made practicable for the passage of the Troops, artillery and pack animals, by first crossing with the Dragoons; and possibly requiring the use of the spade.

This report was all Wright needed. Five o'clock next morning saw the command on its way. To save time and with hopes of surprising Kamaiakan,

19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
Topographical Sketch
of
Ed. G. Wright's
Expediton in the Yakima Country
they struck into the mountains. 23

After a severe march of seventeen miles, over mountain trails, and frequently through snow, varying from two to twenty feet in depth; I succeeded in passing all our troops, artillery, baggage & pack train, in safety over the northern slope. 24

As they encamped at the end of the first day of marching in the mountains, the men found little comfort in the hail and snow storm that lasted through the long hours of the night. 25 The following morning they were on the trail again by eight o'clock. Seven more trying miles were behind them by the time Wright ordered a halt at one o'clock in the afternoon. 26 They found some indications of horses having been here, "probably several days since." 26 Thus far not an Indian was seen.

Early on the morning of 4 May the whole command took up the line of march,

passed over a high range of Mountains, and made a rapid descent into the valley of the To-pinish, and encamped about a mile in advance of the point where the Indians attacked Major Haller. 27

That afternoon, four Indians were seen afar off. What followed would be repeated many times before the summer ended. Wright sent out several parties of dragoons to capture at least one or two of the Indians for questioning.

23 Ibid.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
the attempt was futile. From now on, each day's march was marked by the sight of a few Indians in the distance who simply vanished on the closer approach of the soldiers.

When not looking for Indians, the dragoons were scouring the country for timber. To erect blockhouses at all the crossings, as he wanted to, would require real timber which was a scarce item in the dry plains east of the Cascade Mountains.

Wright planned to move northward to the Naches River on 7 May. He did; but only after the Indians had thrown a real scare into him by attacking and setting fire to the prairie surrounding the camp. The troops were routed out of their blankets at eleven o'clock at night to chase Indians and put out the flaming plain. The fire was extinguished and the Indians vanished.

As the soldiers were packing, preparatory to marching on the next morning, "the Indians appeared in large numbers on the crest of the long range of hills in our front." The dragoons charged the Indians who fired one shot.

28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
32 Wright to Jones, Camp on "Council Creek" 7 miles North of the Yakima Mission, W. T., 8 May 1856. RUSAC; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 175.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
"and then fled in every direction." 35

The pattern of the campaign took shape at this juncture. Indians followed the columns at a distance or from the top of the surrounding hills. Whites advanced; Indians retreated. The troops encamped; so did the Indians. Always close by, the Indians remained just out of reach. 36

The other distinguishing mark of the campaign was talking. Talking with Indians, trying to catch Indians to talk with them, attempting to get Indians to talk among themselves, were great time consumers. This phase of the struggle began with the first contact made by a party of friendly Indians sent in advance which succeeded in conversing with a few of the hostiles. 37 Wright endeavored to induce some of the warring Indians to come to him for more detailed talks, but with no success.

They made various excuses; they said there was no Chief with them; and that they were afraid to hold any communication with me, or come into my camp; as they might be blamed for so doing, by their Chiefs. 38

When the troops were seven miles north of the Yakima Mission, the Indians admitted that Skloom was with a large body of natives across the creek. This subordinate chief, however, refused to meet Wright in person lest his acts be disapproved by the other chiefs. 39 He sent word to the Colonel that a messenger had been sent to Kamaikan. Five Indians came into

35 Ibid.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid.
the military camp at four o'clock on that same afternoon, 7 May, with a message from their leader. The great chief would visit Wright as soon as Owhi and the other chiefs arrived. 40

Between 4 o'clock and sunset, I received several messages from Kamiakin & Skaloom, expressing the greatest friendship for us, and a very great desire for a permanent peace. 41

Thursday, 8 May, saw messengers and messages flying back and forth between Kamiakan and Wright, but no meeting took place. This day it was Young Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox who was allegedly responsible for preventing the conference by his non-appearance in the Indian camp. 42

The troops broke camp at three o'clock in the morning of 9 May, forded the creek, crossed a high range of hills, and encamped on the flood-swollen Naches. 43 No sooner had their march begun than messengers arrived from Skloom and Shawawai, proposing an interview. Wright answered that he would meet them in his camp on the Naches. Throughout the day Indians hung on the fringes of the marching regiments: close, but not too close. When Wright encamped on the banks of the flooding river that afternoon, he found the Indians on the other side of the stream. 44 There was no use fretting over the situation, since he would now have more than a month for his talks. 45

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
43 Ibid.
44 Ibid.
45 Wright to Jones, Camp on the Na-Chess River, W. T., 11 June 1856. RUSAC: Printed in Senate Executive Document No. 5, 34th Congress, 3rd
River was too high to allow fording.

Wright sent word that he was ready to receive Skloom and Shawawai. Instead of proposals for peace, back came the messenger with a report of the Indian council he saw and heard on the other side of the river.46 Young Pu-Pu-Mox-Mox appeared to take the lead in the discussions, and the greatest deference paid to him by the assembled Chiefs—Pu-Pu-Mox-Mox said that he did not know what reliance to place on the word of the White Chief, who said that his heart was good: that they had been deceived before, and his father lost his life; and finally, he said that he was now a poor man, that he was on foot, had given away all his horses to the Indians between this & Colville, and that he was prepared for a general war during the summer.47 Throughout this tirade, and a subsequent speech of more moderate tone, Kamiakin "did not seem to have much to say, he seems bound to act in accordance with Pu-Pu-Mox-Mox, & to yield to him in everything."48 On the heels of his own messenger, came two Indians sent by the chiefs to Wright, with a more conciliatory message than the one they knew he received from his man.49 In spite of this friendly gesture, he now determined that the peace negotiations should be brought to a close and accordingly said to the messenger, "go back to Kamiakin, and say to him, that no messengers of his will be received by me, unless he is desirous of making peace—that all Indians found approaching my camp will be fired upon.50

Session, (Serial Set No. 876); Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 186.

46 Wright to Jones, Camp on the Na-Chess River, W. T., 9 May 1856. RUSAC; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 178.

47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.
This strong talk was rather amusing, when one remembers that Wright was completely stopped by the flood waters of the Naches. All he could do was sit on the bank and watch the Indians on the opposite side.

Kamaikan responded to Wright's brusque message by sending two men with the information that the "assembled Chiefs had at last, all agreed to make peace, and that probably they would come to my camp on the next day." 51 Wright reacted to his latest development by increasing the precautions for the safety of his camp and animals. 52

Early the next morning no peace party approached the soldiers' camp, although "a large party was seen crossing the hills on the other side of the river, and moving off North toward the Wenass." 53 No message, no Indians, no chiefs came to Wright as he whiled away the whole day gazing on scattering Indians. 54 That evening, 10 May, Joe, a Klikitat Indian from Kamaikan's camp, sneaked over to warn him of an Indian attack planned for that night or the next day. 55 It did not materialize.

These interminable delays, from talks and high water, forced Wright to conclude "that we shall have to make a long campaign of it; if beaten at one point, the Indians will retreat North, where they have many very strong

51 Wright to Jones, Camp on the Na-Chess River, W. T., 11 May 1856. RUSAC; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 179.

52 Ibid.

53 Ibid.

54 Ibid.

55 Ibid.
Obviously, he decided also that a long pursuit would require a much larger force. Besides, he was now convinced that one thousand and two hundred Indians were massed in front of him. Hence, he ordered Steptoe, commanding Fort Dalles, to join him with "all the disposable force on the Columbia River;" similar orders were sent to the Cascades and Fort Vancouver. Moreover, he asked for another company of dragoons that were needed desperately for chasing well-mounted Indians over wide expanses.

The express reached Vancouver a little before daylight on 15 May, and within four hours Archer had his Company "I" ready to board the boats for the trip to Fort Dalles. The next day Archer continued up the River, and was joined by Winder's Company "F" which had been garrisoning the Cascades. At dawn of 17 May the troops reached Fort Dalles to report to Steptoe who was in command of the four company reinforcement ordered by Wright. All the soldiers had six days of enforced idleness while the Quartermaster was

56 Ibid.
57 Ibid.
58 Archer to his Mother, Camp on Na-Chess River, 8 June 1856. MD; Robie to Stevens, Dalles, 12 May 1856; Cushman to Stevens, Vancouver, 15 May 1856; Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 18 May 1856; Stevens to Ford, Olympia, 18 May 1856; Hathaway to Stevens, Vancouver, 15 May 1856, OLY; Maotavish to Smith, Vancouver Fort 26 May 1856. HBC.
60 Archer to his Mother, Camp on Na-Chess River, 8 June 1856. MD.
61 Winder to Jones, Camp Cascades, 16 May 1856. RUSAC.
62 Archer to his Mother, Camp on Na-Chess River, 8 June 1856. MD.
63 Jordan to Jones, Fort Dalles, 24 May 1856. RUSAC.
organizing the pack train. 64

With four companies, Co. "I," Fourth Infantry, Co. "F," "G," and "I" Ninth Infantry, two hundred and forty effective men, Steptoe crossed the Columbia and encamped eight miles from the River. 65 Here another day was spent waiting for the supply train to come up. 66 Finally, on 24 May the entire force started. The five day journey was no more than a pleasant hike through new country, with serious trouble restricted to Archer's killing of two rattlesnakes on the banks of the Toppenish. 67 They reached Wright's camp on the Naches at about 10 A. M., 29 May 1856. 68 Instead of five companies being incapacitated by the flooding river, there were now nine.

By the time Steptoe arrived with the reinforcements, Wright had been at the Naches one day short of three weeks. During the two weeks of waiting for Steptoe's arrival, Indians were seen daily "on the hills opposite our camp, watching our movements." 69 Then, towards evening of 15 May, many Indians were discovered crossing the distant hills, and approaching the opposite bank of the river, which at this place is above half a mile wide, intersected by islands covered with a dense growth of willows and cotton wood--After some delay, our friendly Indians learned from three on the other side, that they desired to have a talk and that some of the Chiefs had arrived, and that all of them would soon reach their camp. 70

64 Archer to his Mother, Camp on Na-Chess River, 8 June 1856. MD.
65 Jordan to Jones, Fort Dalles, 24 May 1856. RUSAC.
66 Archer to his Mother, Camp on Na-Chess River, 8 June 1856. MD.
67 Ibid.
68 Ibid.
70 Wright to Jones, Camp on the Na-Chess River, W. T., 18 May 1856. RUSAC; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 182.
Several unsuccessful attempts were made by the Indians to cross the river. At last, they gave up for the night, with a promise to try again early on the following morning.\textsuperscript{71}

In the course of 16 May, Young Owhi, son of the chief of that name, crossed over the river to visit Wright.

This young man is of some note, & wields great influence over the young men & warriors of the nation. He came over to my Camp, and talked freely, and appears determined to put a stop to the war.\textsuperscript{72}

At noon on 17 May, Owhi was conducted into camp about noon, and although a little timid at first, it soon wore off--He expresses a great wish to stop this war, and a great friendship for the white people. After a long, and very satisfactory talk, he said that he would go over to his camp, and send "Old Te-i-as."\textsuperscript{73}

That same evening, Old Teias, "the firm and true friend of the white people," succeeded in crossing the river. Wright received him with great cordiality and assured him of his perfect safety while in the camp. Once his confidence was restored by these signs and words,

Te-i-as spoke well, he remarked that he was a poor man, that he was not a great Chief, but that he had always been the fast friend of the Whites, and had always exerted his influence to preserve a good understanding between his people and ours.\textsuperscript{74}

The old chief gave Wright to understand that he would hold a council with the other chiefs as soon as he returned to their camp. Moreover, Wright received

\textsuperscript{71} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{72} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{73} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{74} Ibid.
the distinct impression that all the chiefs would agree with whatever Teias suggested.75 Someone must have been mistaken about something, somewhere along the line, because Wright heard nothing more from across the stream.76

No shots were being fired, but interest in Wright’s activities was high among certain people. Governor Stevens ordered Benjamin Shaw to communicate with Wright and offer the services of the Washington Territorial Volunteers.77 This offer was made;78 and was refused by Wright, who was certain "that the U. S. Troops now with me, and those en route to join me, are amply sufficient for present operations in this country."79

With the arrival of Steptoe on 29 May, the combined commands numbered more than five hundred men, with literally no place to go until the river returned to its banks.80 Furthermore, the spokesmen for the Indians had disappeared completely and mysteriously since the encouraging session of 17 May. These circumstances combined to form the peculiar situation of a large body of men wanting to fight Indians in Indian country, with no place to go, nothing to do, and no one to talk to.

75 Ibid.

76 Wright to Jones, Camp on the Na-Chess River, W. T., 30 May 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876, Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America (1949), 183.

77 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 20 May 1856. OLY.

78 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 22 May 1856. OLY.

79 Wright to Shaw, Camp on the Na-Chess, 27 May 1856. OLY.

80 Wright to Jones, Camp on the Na-Chess River, W. T., 30 May 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 184.
Later on, the mystery of the vanishing Indians became absolutely clear. They knew there was bitter antagonism between the regular troops and the Territorial authorities. Once Wright was lulled into a sense of false security, Teias and Owhi sent messengers to Stevens in Olympia to learn how they would be treated should they decide to move to the west side of the Cascade Mountains and put themselves under his protection. Stevens told the two messengers to return to Teias and Owhi, and invite them and all friendly Indians to come, with their women and children, to the prairie above the falls of the Snoqualmie, and submit unconditionally to the justice and mercy of the government.

Stevens was sufficiently impressed with these overtures made by the Indians that he sent Fitzhugh and Simmons to represent him in case the Indians came to Ranger's prairie above Snoqualmie Falls. At the same time, the Governor entertained suspicions that Kam-i-a-kan had gone to hunt up recruits. That Solome & Sohooway have remained as a blind to his designs to watch Te-i-as and Owhi & amuse Col. Wright on the Na-Chess.

Whether or not this surmise was correct must remain a moot point. The record shows that these negotiations, if such they may be called, came to naught. Fitzhugh admitted bluntly "that the mission you were pleased to entrust to Col. Simmons and myself has turned out a perfect failure."

81 Stevens to Manypenny, Olympia, 31 May 1856, in Serial Set No. 876.
82 Stevens to E. C. Fitzhugh, Olympia, 4 June 1856, in Gov. Mess, 337.
83 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 5 June 1856; Tilton to Shaw, Olympia, 5 June 1856, OLY.
84 Ibid.
85 Fitzhugh to Stevens, Holme's Harbor, W. T., 20 June 1856, in
In casting about for reasons to explain this failure, Fitzhugh lets much blame fall on Wright for "entertaining the Indians over the other side of the mountains, besides feeding the tyees, making them presents, etc."\textsuperscript{86} He also accused Wright of preventing the Indians from surrendering to Territorial officials by leading them to think better terms would be forthcoming from the Army. In the final analysis Fitzhugh agrees with Stevens' impression that they only wished to gain time and information. I believe that Owhi and Te-i-as, and some of the sub-chiefs of their band would have surrendered unconditionally to government, but for the inducements held out to them by Col. Wright, that they could treat with him on better terms, and save all their people. As things now are, they will have to be well thrashed before they will treat.\textsuperscript{87}

Wright was impatiently idle on the Naches while all these scurrying about were in progress behind his back. Some of his officers whiled-away the interminable days by riding over the countryside.\textsuperscript{88} Lieutenant Lyman Bissell was given the task of bridging the river during the first part of June.\textsuperscript{89} "With no tools but axes and no material but green poplar saplings and rope mule halters," he completed a very substantial bridge\textsuperscript{90} by 11 June.\textsuperscript{91}

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{88} Archer to his Mother, Camp on Na-Chess River, 8 June 1856. MD.
\textsuperscript{90} Archer to his Mother, Camp on Na-Chess River, 8 June 1856. MD.
\textsuperscript{91} Wright to Jones, Camp on the Na-Chess River, W. T., 11 June.
Before Wright could put his new bridge into use and begin pursuing Indians again, the Indians came for more talks.92 A party of natives, numbering thirty-five men, with a chief at their head, visited Wright's camp. They had been "living high up in the mountains, on the branches of the Na-Chess,"95 and did not consider themselves "under the authority of any of the Great Chiefs of the Yakima Nation."94 This was the first of a series of visitors who came on the eve of the bridge's completion.

Two advance riders reached the bridge from Owhi with news that the chiefs of the Yakima would be in on the morrow, 9 June.95 This day saw Choos-kun and a party of fifteen of his Indians from the vicinity of Priest's Rapids,96 come to visit Wright.97 The Chief was carrying a letter to Haller

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92 Haller, "3rd Expedition into the Yakima Country," Monday, 9 June 1856, MS, Diary, UW.

93 Wright to Jones, Camp on the Na-Chess River, W. T., 11 June 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 188.

94 Ibid.

95 Ibid.

96 "The person who stood foremost in all these introductory ceremonies, was a tall, meagre, middle-aged Indian, who attached himself very closely to us from the first moment we saw him. He was called Haqui-laugh, which signifies doctor, or rather priest. . . . We named the place "Priest's Rapid," after him." Alexander Ross, Adventures of the First Settlers on the Oregon or Columbia River: Being a Narrative of the expedition fitted out by John Jacob Astor to establish the "Pacific Fur Company;" With an account of some Indian tribes on the coast of the Pacific. London, 1849, 134.

97 Ibid.; Haller, "3rd Expedition into the Yakima Country," 9 June 1856. MS, Diary, UW.
from Pandosy; and another letter from Pandosy to Wright. From Haller, the priest asked help in recovering his manuscript of the Yakima language from George Gibbs. This Haller promised to do. 98 To Wright the missionary reported on the dispositions of the Indians for peace and asked permission to re-open his mission. To this latter request, the Colonel had no objection. 99

Besides Choos-kun, Wright received deputations, headed by Chiefs, from several other smaller bands. They have had nothing to do with the war, thus far, and do not wish to be involved in it. . . . I have made perfectly satisfactory arrangements with all these Indians. 100

The important group of chiefs, long-sought for, still longer-awaited, camped across the river on the evening of 9 June. 101 Owhi, Teias, and Kamai-akan sent the most friendly messages, declaring that they would fight no more, and that they were all of one mind, for peace. 102 Wright's only reply was to insist that they come and see him; which Owhi and Teias did a little later.

. . . we had a long talk, about the war, its Origin, etc. Owhi, related the whole history of the Walla Walla Treaty, and concluded, by saying that the war commenced from that moment, that the Treaty was the cause of all the deaths by fighting since that time. 103

98 Haller, "3rd Expedition into the Yakima Country," 10 June 1856. MS, Diary, UW.

99 Wright to Pandosy, Camp on the Na-Chess River, W. T., 10 June 1856. RUSAC, Letts. Sent.

100 Wright to Jones, Camp on the Na-Chess River, W. T., 11 June 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 156.

101 Ibid.

102 Ibid.

103 Ibid.
After Wright pointed out the utter folly of continued war and the manifold blessings of peace, all those present

fixed upon five days as the time to be allowed for the Indians all to assemble here, prepared to surrender everything which has been captured or stolen from the white people, and to comply with such other demands as I may then make. 104

This meeting made Colonel Wright jubilant. He could now explain everything and everyone's actions to his own satisfaction. Although Kamiaikan had not crossed the river for the meeting, he was friendly and determined on peace, and Wright was convinced that the Indians would have to come to him because of his great power. Even Leshi, a thorough-going hater of whites, was all for peace, according to Wright. 105 Added to this cup, brimful of joy, was the fact that his bridge was finished and waiting in case further pursuit of the Indians was necessary. 106

All plans were for nothing. Wright waited a week, not five days, for the Indians, but they did not return. 107 His announcement of the completion of the bridge was premature for, "after bridging the main stream, a dense undergrowth of six hundred yards had to be cut through, and five or six smaller bridges made." 108 During this final drive to finish the bridge, he

104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
107 Wright to Jones, Camp on the Yakima River, W. T., Kittitas Valley, 20 June 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 189.
108 Ibid.
learned of the negotiations which the Indians had been carrying on with Stevens for almost three months. There was nothing else to do except hit the trail again.

Eight companies, four hundred and fifty rank and file, crossed the Naches on the new bridge, in the morning of 18 June and marched North over a broken country, nine miles, and encamped on the We-nass. Yesterday (19 June) morning I marched at sunrise, and still pursuing a northerly course, crossed two ranges of mountains, over a very rocky & steep trail, where the Mountain Howitzer had to be dismounted & packed, and arrived in this valley (17 miles) at 2 P. M. On our march we saw no Indians.

To guard the depot on the Naches, Wright left three companies of the Ninth Infantry under command of Steptoe. The force in the field was almost undiminished in strength owing to Major R. S. Garnett joining the command on 13 June with Companies "B" and "K," Ninth Infantry.

Thus far the campaign had taken no toll of men, but long marches were wearing out equipment and supplies. As he started off once again, Wright reported that

My men are much in want of some articles of clothing especially shoes, stockings & overalls. I pray that the Quarter Master below may be able to keep a supply on hand—Shoes, particularly those pegged, last but a few days, marching on sharp rocks.

109 Ibid.
110 Ibid.
111 Archer to his Mother, Camp on Na-Chess River, 20 June 1856. MD.
112 Wright to Jones, Camp on the Yakima River, W. T., Kittitas Valley, 20 June 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 189.
113 Ibid.
The campaign resumed its guise of a hunting, not a fighting expedition. The troops had not "seen the first sign of an Indian, that wanted to be killed. Yesterday [20 June] our Dragoons saw two but they ran like young Partridges and could not be caught."  

Four days in the Kittitas Valley brought no special news and no Indians, despite active scouting parties. The twenty-third of June was another marching day whose twelve miles were just finished at three o'clock in the afternoon when an Indian was captured. He told Wright that a party of Indians was a short distance ahead of the soldiers. The Colonel expected to reach the Indian encampment within an hour, so with half of the command, about two hundred and twenty-five rank and file, the pursuit began at once. Instead of three miles, it proved to be nine; instead of reaching the peaceful fishers at four o'clock, it was five-thirty; instead of the Indians being on the same side of the river as the troops, they were on the opposite bank.  

Net result--one man and one woman captured, and two hundred and twenty-five men dog-tired at 9:30 P. M. after marching thirty-four miles that day.  

One may think Wright was stupid, long-suffering, blind, duped, or any one of several other things. No one can ever accuse him of lacking persistence. He heard that Kamaikan, Owhi, and Teias, with their people, were

114 Haller to Shaw, Camp on the Yakima River, Kittitas Valley, Washington Territory, 21 June 1856. OLY.


116 Ibid.
on the other side of the mountains to his north. Over the mountains he would go, for he was determined to pursue these Indians, and push them to the last extremity. They are all in a state of great alarm, and have spies out on all the trails, to give them timely warning of our approach. If I do not overtake them, I can destroy their fishing traps, and harass them so much, that I think they will find it to their interest to surrender. They may elude me this summer, but in the winter, they cannot live in the Mountains. I can grant them no terms now, but an unconditional surrender.

Here, on the upper reaches of the Yakima, near Snoqualmie Falls, Wright was in for more talks. Some Indians came into camp with salmon, one of them it appears came from Owhi's camp who reports that the Indians had two spies out who saw us go up to the fishery, and had gone over to the Indians to report, that we had taken these Indians as Prisoners and then hung them, and he was sent over to see if it was true. He found however it was false.

This Indian also brought word that Pandosy was in Owhi's camp, and might get into the military camp on the 28 or 29 June. Haller expressed the hope that the Father may be able to interpret the Indian's conduct for us, establish confidence between the soldiers and them and the restoration of peace follow quickly. If so, Hurrah! I am tired of our masterly inactivity.

The Indian's guess proved to be correct. About noon on Monday, 30 June, Pandosy, Choos-kun and some fifty Indians were met by Haller and

117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 Haller, "3rd Expedition into the Yakima Country," Friday, 27 June 1856. MS, Diary, UW.
120 Ibid.
121 Ibid.
escorted to Wright's tent. They came directly from the camp of Kamaiakan, Owhi and Teias. Pandosy told the Colonel that a large number wanted to come in, but Kamaiakan's threats prevented them. The priest reported, further, that Kamaiakan was organizing a war party to attack Wright's camp in the Kittitas. That the last vestige of delusion was ripped away by this information, may be concluded from Wright's outburst in his report.

This has been the policy of Kamiakin ever since my arrival in this country. To keep alive the war party he uses all the arts of deception and falsehood, that he is master of—But his influence is on the wane; his young men are beginning to fall off—Notwithstanding his pretended anxiety to attack us, they see him constantly retiring before our troops. I must push him to the last extremity, and break the charm.

Wright broke his line of thought at this point to report the arrival of a messenger from the Indian camp with news that Kamiakin has passed the Columbia River, and Ow-hi has accompanied him: the latter, it is reported went only after his family, and would then return to the camp, where Te-i-as was remaining.

Many fatiguing days on the trail plus several bitter disappointments made Wright wary. The peace party agreed to betake themselves and their families anywhere he would designate, but no Indians had come in as yet. The Colonel, therefore, was only waiting on the upper Yakima until the supplies from below reached him. "I did not deem it prudent to advance from this

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122 30 June 1856. Ibid.
123 Wright to Jones, Camp on the Upper Yakima River, W. T., 1 July 1856. RUSAC; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 192.
124 Ibid.
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
point, without a good supply; such as would justify me in pursuing the Indians for eighty or a hundred miles." 127 The Indians had instilled sufficient respect for their ability to resist that Wright wanted no retrograde movement for supplies "which would have been regarded by the Indians as a retreat." 128

Perhaps the slight turn for the better, taken by recent events, emboldened Wright more than his actual position warranted. At any rate he enlivened 1 July considerably by the seizure and imprisonment of Kitsap, a nephew of Choos-kun. 129 After weeks of spreading the word that any Indian was absolutely safe in coming to his camp to discuss peace, Wright fastened onto this prominent person from west of the mountains. Choos-kun, whom Wright could never suspect of disloyalty, had pledged his word for his nephew's safety. Just such incidents brought the Indians to distrust thoroughly any white man. Pandosy and William McKay hurried to Wright's tent to explain the situation. Their efforts were rewarded by Kitsap being released. Haller still entertained misgivings over the rash conduct of the Commanding Officer. He was convinced Wright had spoiled the opportunity of proving to the Indians that they were really safe when they came into the soldier's camp. The chance to confide his innermost thoughts to his diary could not be resisted. Haller was of opinion that

Gen'l Wool had now better shut up about the arrest of Peo-pec-mox-mox, for then he was opening a negotiation to gain the ruin of the troops, but here the established sanctity of a visitor has been violated and

127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Haller, "3rd Expedition into the Yakima Country," Tuesday, 1 July 1856. MS, Diary, UW.
perhaps confidence destroyed.130

Besides jeopardizing what little solid progress had been made, Wright was also gaining much information from the Indians who came to see him. He learned the Indian explanation of why they failed to appear after five days, as agreed upon,131 to parley on peace, when Wright was on the Naches River.132 Their messengers from Stevens, they said, brought his warning that they would be hanged if they came near Wright's camp.133 The Colonel did not vouch for the authenticity of the story, but he did complain, and not without cause, that

This double negotiation which has been in progress has exceedingly embarrassed me. It has had its effect upon the Indians, and tended greatly to prolong this war. It is indispensably necessary that the war against these Indians, should be exclusively in the hands of but one individual—otherwise we cannot expect a favorable termination of the difficulty.134

Wright could save time and effort by not indulging in these idle dreams. It was clear that the United States Army had no intention of abandoning its efforts to win the Indians; since many people were convinced Indians must be conquered and not negotiated with, there were no solid grounds for anticipating an early dissolution of the Volunteer forces. The truth is that more than one person thought it looked

130 Ibid.

131 Wright to Jones, Camp on the Na-Chess River, W. T., 11 June 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 186-188.

132 Wright to Jones, Camp on Upper Yakima River, W. T., 1 July 1856 RUSAC; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 193.

133 Ibid.

134 Ibid.
a little bit funny to see Col. Wright, with Infantry, moving slowly along over these vast plains after Indians as well mounted as the finest American cavalry—and then when he does come up with them, losing the golden opportunities in vain attempts to talk them into peace—it reminds me of some of my early efforts to catch robins with fresh salt. The advocates of a more bloody policy rather subscribed to the opinion that, the officers and soldiers of all the forces may as well run their heads against a tree—as to coax Indians to treat—My doctrine . . . would be to shoot and hang without regard to treaty or treaties, until by their entreaties they should sue for mercy.

The strange fact is that neither parleys nor violence, had accomplished anything, thus far, except to put four hundred and fifty United States troops deep in the mountains of Washington Territory.

The country where the troops were now camped was wild, unexplored and unmapped. Friendly Indians had described the almost impassible trails which lay to the north, but Wright ordered the command to cross the Yakima and strike into the mountains east of north. The first two days, 3 and 4 July, brought no particular hardship, though progress was slow because of repeated crossings and recrossings of the stream. Early on 5 July the march was resumed and

We began to experience some of the difficulties, which our Indian guides had enumerated. The mountains are very high, the trail frequently obstructed by masses of fallen trees, which had to be removed by a pioneer

135 Archer to his Mother, Camp on Na-Chess River, W. T., 4 July 1856.
137 Wright to Jones, Camp on the We-nat-cha River, Northern Washington Territory, 7 July 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 195.
138 Ibid.
party. Again the trail runs along the side of a mountain, with barely room for a single animal, and occasionally the stones & gravel yielding to the pressure, a mule with its pack would roll down the precipice.\footnote{139} Twelve miles of this was adequate for one day. The next day was worse, until they struck a stream "and following its bed and crossing it frequently at last ascended a high mountain, which overlooks this valley, into which I descended and encamped at 1 P. M."\footnote{140}

While the troops were descending the dividing ridge "between the Pis-hostin and Wenatshu Rivers" they met Pandosy and Choos-kun.\footnote{141} Only by the priest's assurances were the Indians induced to remain in the vicinity until Wright's arrival.\footnote{142} A large number of Indians with their families, were on the other side of the river, fishing. After I had encamped, the Chiefs and a number of warriors came over to have a talk. They appear to have no fears, and seem willing to do all I may require.\footnote{143}

At this place, Wright definitely was treating with the peace party. They confirmed the flight of Kamaikan and Owhi across the Columbia River.\footnote{144}

\footnote{139} Ibid. Later, rumour had it that gold was discovered on the We-nat-cha when one of these slipping mules uncovered a vein of ore. Matthew Burns to The Editor, Camp Mill Creek, 23 September 1856, printed in Oregonian, 4 October 1856.

\footnote{140} Ibid.

\footnote{141} Haller, "3rd Expedition into the Yakima Country," Sunday, 6 July 1856. MS, Diary, UW; Wright to Jones, Camp on the We-nat-cha River, Northern Washington Territory, 7 July 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," \textit{Mid-America}, XXXI (1949), 196.

\footnote{142} Ibid.

\footnote{143} Wright to Jones, Camp on the We-nat-cha River, Northern Washington Territory, 7 July 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," \textit{Mid-America}, XXXI (1949), 196.

\footnote{144} Ibid.
Teias and his family were in Wright's camp; Choos-kun gave tangible proof of the present disposition of the natives by returning about fifteen mules, some of which were captured from Haller's ill-fated expedition of the previous October, while others were taken from the Volunteer forces.\textsuperscript{145}

Pandosy, Haller, and Major Pinkney Lugenbeel spent most of the next day, 7 July, visiting the various parties of Indians camped in the neighborhood. They saw Choos-kun, Leschi, Nelson and Kitsap. The latter three were notorious Puget Sound Indians. These Indians joined Pandosy and the army officers in a visit to Kamaiakan's people, then crossed the river and spent some time with Owhi's band, before seeing the scattered groups under Teias.\textsuperscript{146}

The Indians were assembled at Wright's tent when Pandosy and his companions returned from their day's work. Haller heard nothing interesting in the speeches in progress so he engaged Teias in a pleasant conversation. Whatever was said on this occasion must have upset the old chief for by next morning he had vanished. "It is supposed he had fled from fear of the treachery of the Whites."\textsuperscript{147}

Wright conquered no one, yet his days on the We-nat-cha were not exactly wasted. True, Kamaiakan, Owhi and Teias slipped through his fingers, but their people stayed behind. This meant that about six hundred men, women and children submitted to him, by the very fact of remaining at the fisheries

\textsuperscript{145} Haller, "3rd Expedition into the Yakima Country," Sunday, 6 July 1856. MS, Diary. UW.

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid. Monday, 7 July 1856.

\textsuperscript{147} Ibid. Tuesday, 8 July 1856.
No more could be expected.

At sunrise on 9 July the soldiers and the Indians began the hazardous task of traversing the trail on the south bank of the We-nat-cha.

Previous to marching I made arrangements for the Indians with their families and baggage, to follow immediately in rear of our pack train; with a Company of Infantry & Detachment of Dragoons as rear guard. It was nearly 9 o'clock before all the Indians could get off. They probably have a thousand horses, and extended some five miles. With their women and children, of course they move slow.149

Many of the natives were allowed to remain at the fisheries; still others were permitted to travel by another trail. Wright's principal object was to carry off "the large mass of the Yakima nation, and locate them permanently, and beyond the possibility of their being operated upon by their former Chiefs."150 In this, he was successful for the moment.

The biggest obstacle he had overcome was the deep-rooted fear of Indians for whites. Wright convinced these people that his was the power and the will to protect them from insult and injury.151 Not only would he be forced to protect them from Volunteer forces who were loose in the Territory and not under army authority, but providing food was also his problem since he was taking the natives from their fisheries, their root and berry country.152 Time would show that the task was no small one.

148 Archer to his Mother, Camp on the Na-Chess, Washington Territory, 18 July 1856. MD.

149 Wright to Jones, Camp on the Upper Columbia River, W. T., 9 July 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 197.

150 Ibid.

151 Ibid.

152 Archer to his Mother, Camp on We-nass, 31 July 1856. MD.
The first day of this mass migration ended on the west bank of the Columbia River, at the mouth of the We-nat-cha. In the midst of Wright's understandably exuberant report from this camp, he admits with great honesty that

In all my operations recently, the aid I have received from Father Pandosy, has essentially contributed to our success. He has great influence with these Indians, and has exerted himself, both night & day, in bringing matters to their present state.153

Pandosy accompanied the Indians on their enforced trek to the Columbia, thence south into Kittitas Valley.154 By the time they reached this familiar country, everyone involved in the project had begun to grasp the fact that marching with over five hundred Indians, and "a much larger number of horses and cattle," supplied no lasting solution to the situation.155 Wright chased these Indians for many weeks before they agreed to follow him. Now he was issuing two hundred and fifty pounds of flour each day to keep them under his immediate control.156 Mere mathematics spelled-out the impossibility of continuing the present policy indefinitely: there was not enough flour.157

His idea was to use the large group with him as a nucleus, around

153 Wright to Jones, Camp on the Upper Columbia River, W. T., 9 July 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 197.

154 Haller, "3rd Expedition into the Yakima Country," Thursday, 10 July 1856. MS, Diary, UW.

155 Wright to Mackall, Camp on Yakima River Kittitas Valley, W. T., 18 July 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 198.

156 Ibid.

157 Ibid.
which all the scattered bands would gather in the fall.\textsuperscript{158} "A new government must be erected, which will unite all their hearts, and place them in deadly hostility to the refugee Chiefs."\textsuperscript{159} With this system in operation, the whole country should be given to the Indians.

They require it; they cannot live at any one point for the whole year. The Roots, the Berries, and the fish, make up their principal subsistence; these are all obtained at different places, and different seasons of the year; hence they are frequently changing their abodes, until fall, when they descend from the mountainous districts, and establish themselves in the lower valley for the winter.\textsuperscript{160}

To safeguard the gains made, as well as the utopia suggested, the country must have a military post; Wright recommended a spot in the Simcoe Valley as the most "eligible."\textsuperscript{161} Before taking up the story of this new post, which was the only lasting thing to come out of Wright's campaign of 1856, it must be noted that his personal conviction was "that the war in this country is closed."\textsuperscript{162} How profoundly wrong he was may be deduced from a statement of his two years later that, "The war is closed."\textsuperscript{163} This he said in 1858, at the close of the campaign against the Indians in the Spokane country. Thus, it took another distinct war before the Colonel's prophecy

\textsuperscript{158} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{159} Wright to Jones, Camp on the Upper Columbia River, W. T., 9 July 1856. \textit{RUSAC}; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," \textit{Mid-America}, XXXI (1949), 198.

\textsuperscript{160} Wright to Mackall, Camp on Yakima River, Kittitas Valley, W. T., 18 July 1856, \textit{RUSAC}; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," \textit{Mid-America}, XXXI (1949), 199.

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{163} Wright to Mackall, Fort Vancouver, 30 September 1858. \textit{AGO}.
of peace became a reality.

There were, however, several loose ends demanding attention before the present deceptive peace took its misleading form. Wright sent messengers to the Klikitat inviting them to meet him at the Yakima Mission on 25 July. He would demand the surrender of the three friendly Cascade Indians who joined in the attack on The Cascades before fleeing for safety among the Klikitat.

Wright immediately set about occupying the country. Garnett, with four companies, was left to garrison Fort Na-Chess; while Lugenbeel with Company "A," Ninth Infantry, was ordered to Fort Dalles to assume command of that post. A Lieutenant and seventeen men were to be sent to occupy the blockhouse at the upper Cascades, and Winder received orders to occupy the blockhouse at the lower landing of the Cascades. Another detachment of thirty men was assigned to guard the party, under Lt. George Derby, who were building the military road. The small blockhouse at the middle Cascades I have ordered to be abandoned, on the representations of Capt. Winder; that it is entirely unnecessary; and that the people living there, keep the party of soldiers drunk all the time. Even his best men cannot be relied upon.

An ignominious fate for the site of the courageous defense made by Sergeant Kelly and the eight Privates during the attack on The Cascades 26 March 1856!

Wright was too busy for sentimental reflections. He left Kittitas

164 Wright to Mackall, Camp on Yakima River Kittitas Valley, W. T., 18 July 1866. RUSAC; AGO; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 201.

165 Ibid.

166 Ibid.
July and marched south. A party of Nisqually Indians visited him during the two days he spent at Fort Na-Chess. According to their agreement, the Klikitat came to Wright's camp on the Ahtanum Creek on the afternoon of 26 July. They delivered up the three Cascade Indians upon demand. He, in turn, freed them after a minute examination had established their innocence of any part in the murders at the Cascades. The cowed natives agreed to restore "all property in their possession belonging to the white people," and they acquiesced to several other conditions imposed by Wright.

With all these accomplishments to his credit, Wright could summarize his career as "a great pacificator," thus:

Since I have been in this country, I have marched over its entire length and breadth, from the Dalles, north to the We-nat-cha; and all the rivers have been examined, from the mountains to the Columbia River. I have seen all the Indians and they are now living only at points which I have designated, either near Military stations, or higher up on the streams, to enable them to gain subsistence. They are all at this moment, very happy, and fully convinced that their true policy is to abstain from war, and remain forever our friends.

He may have had a few companions in his unreserved jubilation over


168 Wright to Mackall, Camp on the A-tah-nam Creek, W. T., 27 July 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 204.

169 Ibid.

170 Ibid.

171 Wright to Mackall, Camp on the A-tah-nam Creek, W. T., 25 July 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 203.
the results, but more than one person admitted it had been an unusual camp-
aign.

We have been engaged in one of the most extra-ordinary campaigns, I will hazard the remark, ever known in Indian Warfare. I believe peace has at last dawned upon us, without our striking a blow. 172

Archer echoed the same notion when he wrote to his Mother,

The Indian troubles seem to be healed and all the lately hostile tribes have at last come to terms. Many are of the opinion that it was necessary to have fought and severely beaten the Indians, before negotiating, in order to render the peace durable. I am strongly inclined to this opinion myself. However sufficient troops will remain in the country to prevent another combination of the tribes and ensure their good con-
duct. 173

These glowing remarks do not prepare one to meet the actual situa-
tion that existed in the country so recently traversed by "the great pacifi-
cator." On the one hand, some Indians continued to avail themselves of Wright's overtures for peace; a large band of Kittitas Indians encamped across from Fort Dalles, 174 a group of the Toppenish returned to their home-
land from the Wenatcha River country, 175 and twenty men, women and children from Priest's Rapids, led by Pandosy and Choos-kun, came into Haller's camp on the Yakima River. 176 The priest's mobile existence, as he worked for peace, may have irked his religious superiors, 177 but he was indispensably

172 Haller to Nesmith, Fort Dalles, O. T., 21 July 1856. ORE.
173 Archer to his Mother, Camp on Yakima River, Washington Terri-
tory, 16 August 1856. MD.
174 Lugenbeel to Wright, Fort Dalles, 3 August 1856. RUSAC.
175 Haller to P. A. Owen, Camp on Yakima River, 4 August 1856.
176 Haller, "3rd Expedition into the Yakima Country" 7 August 1856.
177 Demers à Durieu, Victoria, 22 Aout 1856. OMI.
helpful to the army men and was always hospitably received.\textsuperscript{178} On this oc-
casion he prolonged his stay to three weeks, during which time he used Haller's
quarters almost as his own.\textsuperscript{179}

While the talks were in progress on the Yakima, Wright was doing
even greater things at Fort Dalles. He arranged to remove all the Indians
near Fort Vancouver and the Cascades to the Yakima country.\textsuperscript{180} This transfer
of some three hundred natives was completed without incident and they were
settled at the fisheries on the White Salmon River.\textsuperscript{181}

Despite all this, it was necessary to convince the whites that the
peace was real. Trouble from the Spokane and Colville need not be antici-
pated, according to Durieu, because they had no salmon.\textsuperscript{182} Pandosy believed
that Owhi and Teias regretted leaving their country and were not in favor of
continued war.\textsuperscript{183} Meanwhile, Garnett was looking for a better camp site on
the Yakima River in case it was true that "Kamiaken had commenced his hostili-
ties or would soon resume them."\textsuperscript{184} Moreover, Wright finally determined to

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{178} Haller, \textit{op. cit.}, Friday, 8 August 1856; Sunday, 10 August
1856; Friday, 15 August 1856. MS, Diary, UW.
\item \textsuperscript{179} Ibid. Thursday, 28 August 1856.
\item \textsuperscript{180} Wright to Mackall, Fort Dalles, 17 August 1856. RUSAC.
\item \textsuperscript{181} Wright to Mackall, Fort Vancouver, 8 September 1856. RUSAC.
\item \textsuperscript{182} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{183} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{184} Haller, "3rd Expedition into the Yakima Country," Monday, 28
July 1856. MS, Diary, UW.
\end{itemize}
It is difficult to reconcile the actions with the reports. The distinct impression is given that no less a personage than Wright suspected this of being a peace that was no peace.

Steptoe's command was ordered to abandon Fort Na-Chess, and proceed to Fort Simcoe. Supplies from Fort Dalles were brought up, "to enable the Troops here to begin at once to build huts for the Winter."186 Archer's Company "I" left their camp on the Yakima on 10 September187 and reported to Garnett at Fort Simcoe on 13 September.188 All troops in the region were concentrated at the new post for the winter, after Haller was ordered to abandon the Kittitas Valley on 15 September.189

Wright had chosen a strategic spot for the fort.

In front of us is an open plain to the Yakima River, and both up and down that River, there is a good trail over a level country; one leading to the Selah & Kittetas, and the other in the direction of the Walla Walla. On the To-pon-ish, there is oak and cottonwood; and at a distance of four miles West of us, there is an abundant supply of the best of pine timber accessible with wagons.190

185 Wright to Mackall, Camp on the To-pon-ish Creek, W. T., 3 August 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 206.

186 Ibid.

187 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Camp on Attanam River, W. T., 12 September 1856. MD.

188 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Sim-co-e, W. T., 14 September 1856. MD.

189 Haller, op. cit., Monday, 15 September 1856.

190 Wright to Mackall, Camp on the To-pon-ish Creek, W. T., 3 August 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 206.
When Archer reached Simcoe he found everybody "busy making bricks, cutting timber, digging foundation and working at building quarters." Before winter closed in, they had to finish two of the company buildings and one house in which all the officers would live. Completion of the more elaborate over-all plan of the post could await the leisure of spring.

The race against winter was in real earnest a month later; parties were in the woods each day "cutting down trees, hewing logs, sawing lumber, making shingles, etc." Six days later, we detect a note of urgency as Archer writes,

> We are still busily engaged in preparations for the winter which is rapidly closing in upon us. The hills 6 miles to the South & 2 miles to the West have been covered with snow for the last two days.

It was possible the quarters would be occupied by 10 November, if necessary supplies from Fort Dalles reached the builders. As a matter of fact, two companies got under cover on 31 November; two more moved into quarters a week later; and the officers were housed by 13 December 1856.

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191 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Simcoe, W. T., 14 September 1856, MD.
192 Ibid.
193 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Simcoe, W. T., 14 October 1856, MD.
194 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Simcoe, W. T., 20 October 1856, MD.
195 Ibid.
196 Archer to his Brother, Bob, Fort Simcoe, W. T., 2 December 1856, MD.
197 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Simcoe, W. T., 14 December 1856, MD.
We did not get in a day too early--2/3 of the men of my Company were frost-bitten before they got in ... & nearly all the officers including myself are more or less frost-bitten. 198

With a roof over their heads, and five feet of snow on the ground, 199 the officers and men settled down to their "Siberian exile." 200 Their respite was short-lived. 201 The day after the officers moved into their quarters, two men, exhausted from hunger and fatigue and badly frost-bitten, reached the post. 202 They were with the pack train that started for Fort Dalles on 7 December. The snow and cold forced them to abandon one hundred and twenty horses. Two had returned to Simcoe, while the other packers trudged on snowshoes to Fort Dalles. 203 This serious loss shattered any lingering doubt the garrison had regarding its total isolation.

Two weeks later came another, and more frightening, experience. Two days after Christmas, Pandosy sent a warning from the Selah Fisheries that Kamaikan, Skloom and Shawawai "had crossed the Columbia River with a large party of Walla Wallas, Peluses, Spokanes & Nez Perces and were advancing to attack the Post." 204 No attack on the post took place, although events did prove that Pandosy's alarm was well-founded. Twenty-five miles down the

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198 Ibid.
199 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Simcoe, W. T., 5 January 1857. MD.
200 Archer to his Mother, Camp on the Na-Chess, Washington Territory, 18 July 1856; Archer to his Mother, Camp on Yakima River, Washington Territory, 16 August 1856. MD.
201 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Simcoe, W. T., 5 January 1857. MD.
202 Ibid.
203 Ibid.
204 Ibid.
valley were twenty horses and fifty head of cattle in charge of four herders and a guard of six soldiers from Fort Simcoe. As soon as Pandosy's message reached the Fort, twenty men were dispatched on sleds to bring back the herd. The reinforcement reached the cattle camp thirty-six hours after Skloom and fourteen companions had driven off the stock and captured Fred White, the chief herder.

George Gibbs was probably correct in his judgment that the war east of the Cascade Mountains, "directed by Colonel Wright, has been a perfect farce."

205 Ibid.
206 Ibid.
207 White to Woodruff, Columbia River, 2 February 1857. RUSAC.
CHAPTER VII

HELP FROM OREGON

The frontier wrought many changes in the living habits of the early emigrants to the Oregon country. One of these was the informal, undefined bond linking each to his neighbor, especially when danger or misfortune threatened. Even in normal times there was an unspoken realization of the need for united strength among aliens in an unfriendly land. With due allowance for selfish motives, there remains no adequate explanation of the instantaneous measures taken by the people of Oregon to help their fellow settlers in Washington against the aroused tribes, except this unconscious feeling of a common peril. We know that the Indians throughout both Territories of Oregon and Washington were seething with discontent, but actual war broke out first in Washington Territory, and Oregon immediately rendered neighborly help. Fear of hostilities spreading across the Columbia injected some self-interest into the succor dispatched from Oregon. This uneasiness of the Oregonians was shared by others such as Nathan Olney, Indian Agent at the Dalles, who was convinced that the Indians in the Walla Walla and Umatilla Valleys were "about to join in the war commenced upon the Whites on the Northside of the Columbia and others." 1 He asked for a military escort from Fort

1 Nathan Olney to The Settlers in the Walla Walla and Umatilla Valleys, Fort Walla Walla, 12 October 1855. AGO.; James Sinclair to The Officer Commanding U. S. Military Division, Fort Walla Walla, 12 October 1855. HBC.
Dalles and advised the settlers to hold themselves in readiness to go as soon as the troops arrived. 2

The day after this warning, Olney received four hundred lbs of Gun-
powder and 1,008 lbs of ball from James Sinclair of the Hudson's Bay Company's Fort Walla Walla.

Said ammunition has been destroyed by my authority--thrown into the Columbia River before proper witnesses to prevent its falling into the hands of the Indians under the critical circumstances now existing. 3

It is clear that Olney took a serious view of events subsequent to Bolon's murder. He expected more trouble which was the common, though not universal, expectation. Charles McKay, who owned a farm on the Umatilla River, thought there was no danger of the Wallawalla or Cayuse joining the Yakima. 4

Governor Curry of Oregon clearly disagreed with McKay for, without official word of Haller's defeat, or an official request for help, he told General E. M. Barnum of the Oregon militia to be prepared to muster troops into the volunteer force. 5 One day after Haller's battered command found haven at Fort Dalles, Curry called out one regiment, of ten companies, under command of Colonel J. W. Nesmith. 6 Two days following the Governor's proclamation of 11 October 1855, 7 Nesmith was on his way to the seat of war. 8

2 Ibid.
3 Olney, "Receipt," Fort Walla Walla, W.T., 13 October 1855, HBC.
4 Thompson to Palmer, Dalles, 14 October 1855, Ore. SIA. Letts.
5 Curry to Barnum, at home, near Butteville, 10 October 1855, in Frances Fuller Victor, The Early Indian Wars of Oregon, 438-439. E. M. Barnum was appointed adjutant-general of the Oregon Militia in April, 1854.
6 Nesmith to Deady, Portland, 13 October 1855, ORE.
7 Barnum to Zieber, Portland, 15 October 1855, Serial Set No. 926.
8 Nesmith to Deady, Portland, 13 October 1855. ORE.
Meanwhile, Barnum issued orders for the purchase of necessary supplies. As an indication of the gravity of the situation, the quantity of items to be purchased is informative. The buyers were ordered to obtain,

1,000 horses and mules; 400 saddles and bridles; 100 pack-saddles and rigging; 2,000 pounds buck shot; 2,000 pounds Beck’s rifle powder; 3,000 bar lead; 100 revolvers; 100 pounds percussion caps; 3,000 powder flasks and shot pouches; 10 coils lasso rope. Forage for 30 days for all animals procured; also stationary, as required by the several departments of this regiment.

Also,

1,500 heavy blankets; 1,000 heavy flannel shirts; 1,000 pairs pants; 1,000 pairs shoes; 1,000 pairs socks; 200 iron or tin 6-quart camp kettles; 200 tin 2-quart coffee pots; 1,000 tin plates; 1,000 tin pint cups; 1,000 sheath knives; 200 tin 8-quart pans; 25 camp tents; 50 axes, with handles, 100 hatchets, with handles.9

All the ammunition, and one-half of the horses, mules, saddles, and other supplies were to be forwarded to the Dalles with all possible speed, and the remainder put in depot at Portland.10

The very next day, 16 October, Barnum instructed the newly-authorized regiment to establish,

its base of operations at the Dalles of the Columbia, and with all possible despatch enter the enemy’s country, secure indemnity for the past, and conquer a lasting peace for the future.11

Furthermore, the regiment was counselled to take great care

not to confound the friendly with hostile Indians; but unmistakable evidence of friendship will be required of any of the Indians within the field of the regiment’s operations, or they will be treated as confederated with those openly in arms. As far as possible, under the circum-

9 Barnum to Zieber, Portland, 15 October 1855, in Serial Set No. 906.
10 Ibid.
11 Barnum, General Orders No. 4, Portland, 16 October 1855, in Ibid.
stances of the case, respect will be payed to the property of the enemy, and the campaign conducted to a successful issue with that humanity which should characterize a brave and powerful people in the infliction of merited chastisement upon a treacherous and a savage foe. 12

These sentiments were laudable, but we shall see that a good part of the history of the Oregon Mounted Volunteers was devoted to proving that many of them paid not the slightest attention to the Governor's indisputably noble intentions.

The mad rush to muster-in troops and start them on their way to the wars was precipitated by the call for help made upon Curry by Rains, after Haller's repulse at the hands of the Yakima. Curry was asked to furnish four companies of volunteers to serve under Rains' command. 13 Instead, he called into the field a regiment of Volunteers to cooperate with the United States Army but under their own commander. According to Curry, "the increased seriousness of the Indian rising" determined him to increase the number of troops from four to ten companies. 14 He explained the distinct military organization under Nesmith by advising Rains that,

It is wholly impracticable to induce citizens of Oregon to enrol for service in the suppression of any Indian hostilities under the organization prescribed by the Rules & Regulations of the U. S. Army. 15

The U. S. Army, in the guise of General Wool, would do its best to make Curry, Stevens and all volunteers eat these words.

For the time being everyone was too busy organizing the troops to

12 Ibid.
13 Curry to Rains, Portland, 16 October 1855. RUSAC, Letts. Sent.
14 Ibid.
15 Ibid.
bother about seeming trifles. Fortunately, the peril of the times did not destroy their sense of humor, and the urgency of the situation allowed an occasional quip. If subsequent records did not prove that the campaigning of the Oregon Volunteers was no holiday, one might be misled by Nesmith's pleasantries concerning the war. He believed himself to be perfectly safe since he has provided himself with a keg of the best whiskey and one pound of fine gun-powder. In case the whiskey gives out (which is highly probable considering the number of dry friends the Col. has) before he reaches the Dalles, I am under orders to exchange the pound of powder for two or three quarts of whiskey, and when the latter shall be consumed, unless some friend reinforces the stores, you may look for the campaign to close. 16

This banter could not conceal the strenuous measures in operation to put an army into the field. Curry called for volunteers on 11 October; ten days later Hembree's company marched on board the little steamer Gazelle and was towed by the Fashion and Multnomah "some twelve miles above Fort Vancouver." 17 Nesmith ordered a party of thirty-nine men under Captain Orlando Humason to drive in all the stock they could find in the vicinity of the Dalles. He even offered to pledge his personal holdings in the Willamette Valley to obtain transportation and supplies. 18 Such extreme efforts bore fruit in the form of two hundred men expected at the Dalles from Salem and Portland on 24 October, with approximately the same number expected on the following night. 19 All that delayed their departure into the Indian country

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16 Farrar to Deady, Cascades, 19 October 1855. ORE.
17 Waman Hembree, Diary, 21 October 1855, T; Printed in Washington Historical Quarterly, XVI (1925), 274.
18 Shaw to Mason, Dalles, 24 October 1855, OLY.
19 Ibid.
the transportation snarl at the Cascades, which checked them until 2 No-
vember. 20

When one recalls the brevity of time that elapsed between Curry's proclamation and the crossing of the Columbia by Hembree's company, 31 October 1855, 21 one cannot fail to recognize the tireless energy of the men in responsible positions. Since the Oregon Volunteers crossed the Columbia and went into the Yakima country as auxiliaries of the U. S. Army under Rains, the present writer has described their activities in the chapter on the Rains' Expedition. There it was seen that the Oregon Mounted Volunteers and the U. S. Army succeeded in burning the Catholic Mission on Ahtanum Creek; permitted the Indians to scatter in safety before the on-plodding troops; and returned to the Dalles by 19 November 1855. 22 The troops returned, but the war went on.

So far as anyone knew, the main body of Indians had fled across the Snake River into the homeland of the Palouse Indians. 23 After reorganization of the Volunteers, which saw Nesmith resign and Thomas Cornelius elected Colonel of the Regiment, the chase was resumed. 24 Besides the four companies of Volunteers which were raised in time to cooperate with Rains, two additional companies under Major M. A. Chinn and Colonel James Kelly (mustered too late

20 Ibid.


22 Cornelius to his Wife, Whitman's Station, 19 November 1855, H.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid.
for the Yakima campaign) were operating along the Umatilla River. Hence it was, that the veterans freshly returned to the Dalles, set out anew to the east in pursuit of their slippery foe.

The first intimations of what would be the battle of the year for the Volunteers, were contained in a despatch from Chinn to Nesmith asking for reinforcements to dislodge one thousand Indians under Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox that were in front on Chinn's one hundred and fifty man command on the Umatilla. Nesmith sent seventy men on 21 November, one hundred on the next day, and asked Wool to furnish artillery to rout the opposing force. This latter favor was bluntly refused on the score that he had "no authority either to employ or to receive volunteers in the service of the United States." Wool's refusal of assistance hampered, but did not destroy, the determination of the Volunteers to fight Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox, a chief of hardly less importance than Kamaiakan. This Wallawalla Chief had threatened the settlers in the valley, destroyed their property, pillaged the Hudson's Bay Company's Fort Walla Walla, and with a thousand men was blocking the road.

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25 The Umatilla River rises in the Blue Mountains, flows northwestward, and enters the Columbia at Umatilla, on the Oregon-Washington boundary.

26 Nesmith to Wool, Dalles, 21 November 1855. RUSAC. Letts. Sent.

27 Ibid.

28 Wool to Nesmith, Fort Vancouver, 24 November 1855. RUSAC.

29 Shaw to Stevens, Vancouver, 10 February 1856. Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd. (Central District); Printed in Serial Set No. 876.

30 Narcisse Raymond to Commander in Charge coming to Fort Walla Walla, Walla Walla Valley, 14 November 1855. AGO. Letts. Recd., 1856; Dugald Mactavish to Wm. G. Smith, Vancouver, 24 November 1855. HBC; K. E. Mercer,
on the south side of the Walla Walla River. \textsuperscript{31} To conquer, capture, and kill Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox would provide acceptable balm to spirits wounded by the escape of Kamaiakan and his people.

The job of finding the wily Wallawalla Chief fell to Kelly's Oregon Volunteers. The search was not difficult, neither was it prolonged.

On the morning of the fifth of December 1855 Colonel Kelly dividing his command, sent a detachment of men up the Walla Walla River under command of Major Chinn. While he with about two hundred men left in search of Pu Pu Mox Mox' Camp, marched over to Touchet River. There found his camping place but he had left. After discussing the Propriety of further searching we decided to follow up the stream still further. Had gone but a short distance, when we saw Pu-Pu-Mox-Mox approaching in the distance accompanied by about 60 armed Indians bearing the flag of truce. \textsuperscript{32}

The Chief stated that he wanted to settle all the difficulties without fighting. The property taken or destroyed by the Indians would be paid for in full. \textsuperscript{33} This information elicited nothing more from Kelly than a cool rejoinder that,

he had come up there for the purpose of fighting and if [Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox] did not surrender himself and arms that he could leave our command with his white flag, then he might expect us to fight him. \textsuperscript{34}

The old chief together with six of his companions surrendered as prisoners of war. Kelly put the prisoners under guard, and immediately asked Chinn for a reinforcement of seventy-five men. He expected to make demands that the Indi-

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{31} Ibid. The Walla Walla River is a small rapid stream entering the Columbia from the east at present Wallula. \\
\textsuperscript{32} Layton to Farrar, Dalles, O. T., 18 June 1856. ORE. \\
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid. \\
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
On the morning of 6 December one of the prisoners was sent out to bring in the Indians hovering about the camp. This messenger never returned, and the whites claimed later that he was sent with orders for the women and children to be removed and preparations made for battle. At any rate, the command moved further up the Touchet until a second messenger sent to persuade the Indians had no more success than his predecessor. His failure convinced the whites that such entreaties were futile. By sunset Kelly met Chinn at the mouth of the Touchet, and before night fell, he had outlined his peace terms to Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox: the surrender of all arms, ammunition, and stock held by the Indians. Once again the prisoners were secured safely for the night and camp made. On the morrow some had a date with destiny.

Indians appeared on the hills in front of the Volunteer camp even before the command was ready to march. Kelly once again sent a messenger to invite them to surrender themselves and their arms. This they refused to do. Instead, they demanded their chief and warned the whites to proceed no further up the Walla Walla River or else it meant war. It appeared that was
About 8 o’c we left camp on our way up the Walla Walla River. Had not moved more than 3/4 of a mile when the Indians fired at two men who were driving some loose cattle. Orders were given to charge on them which were immediately obeyed. Here commenced a running fight of 10 miles in which a few of our men were wounded. After chasing in pursuit of them 10 miles, our horses began to fail and the Indians began to increase in number. By this time the command was all up to a place now called Fort Bennett.42

The battle lasted four days as the Volunteers gradually fell back upon the Walla Walla.

It was a genuine Indian fight, the hostiles creeping upon us in the shelter of the hollows or skulking or lying flat behind clumps of sagebrush, while much of the time we could use our horses to no advantage, but had to fight on the ground and behind bushes, the same as the Indians.43

Finally, on the morning of 10 December, a party was ordered to attack the Indians who had gotten possession of the Volunteer trenches during the night.

A hot firing was kept up for five or six hours when the Indians were routed, and all were driven far above their camping ground.44

This running battle on the Touchet was not a victory without cost. Five Volunteers, including Captain Charles Bennett, were killed.45

The loss of the enemy in killed during the four days, I estimate at about 75. 39 dead bodies have already been found by the Volunteers, and many were carried off the field by their friends and comrades, so that I think my estimate is about correct. The number of their wounded must of course be great.46

42 Ibid.
44 Layton to Farrar, Dalles, O. T., 18 June 1856. ORE.
46 Kelly to Farrar, Camp Bennett, 14 December 1855. Typescript. ORE.; Printed in Oregonian (Portland, Oregon) 5 January 1856.
The real defeat of the Volunteers, took place in their camp, not on the battleground. Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox and his five companions had been held as hostages since Wednesday, 5 December. At the close of a hard day's fighting (7 December) which included the death of four Volunteers and a ten mile chase after the Indians, Kelly was asked what should be done with the prisoners.

His reply was to tie them. In attempting this the prisoners tried to make their escape. One drew a butcher knife and stabbed a man in the arm. Pu Pu Mox Mox undertook to seize a gun from a Mr. Warfield. Whereupon said Warfield struck him such a blow on the back part of the head that knocked him to the ground. He then raised to his knees when a second blow from the same gun brought him to the ground again. Several guns were discharged at him and his life was soon ended. All the others were killed excepting one who did not resist or show fight.47

This account of the death of Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox was copied from Layton's journal and suffices as an example of the Volunteer's side of the story. Two attitudes regarding the incident were assumed as soon as news of it spread; one maintained Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox was insincere in surrendering to the whites and guilty of gross duplicity. This, plus his attempted escape, made his death justifiable.48 There were some, however, who would agree with Wool that "the Volunteers barbarously murdered Piu-Piu-Mox-Mox whilst under the sacred protection of a flag of truce."49 Nor have years united the divided

47 Layton to Farrar, Dalles, O. T., 16 June 1856. ORE.
48 Kelly to Farrar, Camp Bennett, 14 December 1855. Typescript, ORE. Printed in Oregonian (Portland, Oregon) 5 January 1856; Haller to Townsend, Fort Dalles, 11 December 1855. RUSAC; Layton to Farrar, Dalles, O. T., 18 June 1856. ORE; A. H. Sale, op. cit., 336; Shaw to Stevens, Vancouver, 10 February 1856. Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd. (Central District); Printed in Serial Set No. 876; T. J. Small to T. A. Small, Jefferson City, Mo., 15 January 1899, in Oregon Native Son (May 1899), 32.
49 Wool to Palmer, Benicia, 7 February 1856; Bonnycastle to Palmer, Vancouver, 12 January 1856, ORE. SIA. Letts. Recd. 1856.
To defend the murder of the hostages without trial demands a certain
surrender of integrity, but to explain this shameful deed is possible. A
study of the documents makes it reasonably clear that Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox was
delaying for time when he surrendered and most probably intended to continue
fighting. Furthermore, the battle on 7 December was dominantly in favor of
the whites except for the death of their very popular and much-beloved Ben-
ett. The heat of battle, the death of Bennett, and the Indians tantalizingly
shaking scalps of white men in their faces had brought the craving for revenge
to fever pitch. Under these circumstances, it is not difficult to under-
stand why the fury of the Volunteers was vented on the hostages.

The sequel to Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox's slaying was absolutely indefensible,
inexcusable, and inexplicable for allegedly civilized men.

Yesterday [13 December] Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox was taken up by Dr. Shaw and
his ears cut off and today he has been taken out and subject to further
indignities. How the whites must have feared and hated him, not to resist the urge to take
parts of his dead body as souvenirs. No matter how one views the proceedings,

50 Amos Underwood to T. A. Wood, White Salmon, Washington, 16 Jan-
uary 1897. Typescript, ORE.; T. C. Elliott, "The Murder of Peu-Peu-Mox-Mox,"
Oregon Historical Quarterly, XVI (1915), 123-130; Clarence L. Andrews, "War-
Field's Story of Peo-Peo-Mox-Mox," Washington Historical Quarterly, XXV (1934),
182-184; J. F. Santee, "The Slaying of Pio-Pio-Mox-Mox" Washington Historical
Quarterly, XXV (1934), 128-132.

51 Amos Underwood to T. A. Wood, White Salmon, Washington, 16 Jan-
uary 1897. Typescript, ORE.

52 K. B. Mercer, Diary, 14 December 1856, COE. Probably the eyes
were torn from their sockets in the body. (Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 24
Janvier 1856. S.)
the impression is inescapable that fighting so-called savages made savages out of the fighters.

Although the Volunteers rejoiced in breaking-up the stronghold of the Indians and preventing their concentration they could take little comfort from the position in which they now found themselves. Even before the battle on the Touchet the weather was leagued against them, with six inches of snow on the ground since 24 November and it has been colder than ever I saw it in Oregon the Thermometer has been as low as twenty seven degrees below zero our horses is al bound to dy if the snow lyes on much longer.

A full week before meeting the Indians, the last beef ration was issued; flour supplies were non-existent for all companies except the two from Fort Henrietta, and the men were in desperate need of clothes as protection against the freezing weather. Threadbare pants, one shirt, one old coat, one slouch hat, and shoes without socks were not sufficient covering. No wonder, then, that Kelly used his final report of the engagement on the Touchet to "earnestly ask that supplies may be sent forward to us without delay."

53 A. H. Sale, op. cit., 337.
54 Cornelius to his Wife, Whitman's, 27 November 1855. H.
55 K. B. Mercer, Diary, 1 December 1855. COE.
56 Kelly to Farrar, Camp Bennett, 14 December 1855. Typescript, ORE; Printed in Oregonian (Portland, Oregon) 5 January 1856.
57 Victor, The Early Indian Wars, 453.
58 Kelly to Farrar, Camp Bennett, 14 December 1855. Typescript, ORE; Printed in Oregonian (Portland, Oregon) 5 January 1856.
The men were cold and hungry, which meant they were discontented.\textsuperscript{59} Kelly had no food to quiet their restiveness, so he made a gesture toward bettering their lot:

Major Chinn and Captain Wilson went to look for a new camping place this place has become a perfect hog hole for there is enough beef entrails and dead Indians lying around this place to breed a pestilence if the weather was warm enough.\textsuperscript{60}

More than a month passed before a pack train from the Dalles arrived in camp with provisions.

It gave new life to the camp as we could once more have full rations of bread and coffee a thing we had not enjoyed since the 13 of November.\textsuperscript{61}

The command was out of flour, sugar, coffee, salt, and tobacco, so the newly-arrived four thousand lbs. of flour revitalized the dispirited troops. It also gave Cornelius grounds for thinking, that we will not get out any more this winter if the different departments does ther Dutys from this on hour horses is gone in. We will have to change the name of hour forses from OMV to Raged-Dis Mounted Volunteers.\textsuperscript{62}

Cold weather kept the troops inactive;\textsuperscript{63} Chinn, their commanding officer, was hated by every man in the Regiment;\textsuperscript{64} food was in short supply—the situation was dangerous.\textsuperscript{65} Men with empty hands and empty stomachs explain the next chapter in infamy of the Oregon Volunteers.

\textsuperscript{59} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{60} K. B. Mercer, Diary, 14 December 1855. COE.
\textsuperscript{61} Ibid., 17 January 1856. COE.
\textsuperscript{62} Cornelius to his Wife, Camp Mill Creek, 18 January 1856. This letter is owned by Mr. Jerome Peltier, Spokane, Washington.
\textsuperscript{63} Victor, The Early Indian Wars of Oregon, 453.
\textsuperscript{64} Farrar to Deady, Camp Mill Creek, 19 January 1856. ORE.
\textsuperscript{65} Mercer, Diary, 1 December 1855. COE.
From the very beginning of their operations in the field the Volunteers conducted themselves quite differently from well-disciplined troops. Even before Rains' expedition was actually in enemy country he expressed his misgivings concerning a report that some of the Oregon Volunteers, proposed to go ahead on their own hook & pay themselves with plunder. How far this feeling is rife I am unable to say, but fear it had much to do with the state of things here, actually leaving me nothing certain to depend upon, but the regular Troops under my Command. 66

Almost three months in the field, two of which were lived through on short rations and in bitter cold, certainly did nothing to improve matters. Finally, the friendly Indians could stand spoliation by the Volunteers no longer without protest. Chirouse described their plight in a letter to Mesplie and asked him to relay the message to Wool. He wanted the general to know that,

We thought ourselves saved, and relieved from embarrassment by the victory of the whites, and the flight of the savages, but have been greatly mistaken. The Volunteers without discipline, without orders, and similar to the madmen of the revolution, menace us with death every day. They have already entirely despoiled of their provisions the inhabitants of the country, and the Indians, who have so nobly followed the advice of Mr. Palmer to remain faithful friends of the Americans. 67

The devoted priest went on to explain that the continued theft of horses and cattle from the friendly Indians had made them indignant,

at conduct so unworthy of the whites who have made them so many promises, to respect and protect them if they remain faithful friends. I am very sure if the volunteers are not arrested in their brigand actions, our Indians will save themselves by flying to the homes of their relations the Nez-Percé, who have promised them help, and then all the Indians of Oregon would join in the common defence until they be entirely exterminated. 68

66 Rains to Townsend, Camp Yakima, 22 October 1855. RUSAC.
67 Chirouse to Mesplie, Tamalinla, 15 January 1856. AGO. Letts.
68
This letter went far; Mesplie sent a translation to Joel Palmer who forwarded a copy to Wool with the reluctant agreement that, "The picture may be strongly drawn, but unfortunately for the character and reputation of our troops, I fear it is too true." Still another copy went to George Manypenny, Commissioner of Indian Affairs.

Prior to forwarding copies of the Chirouse letter, Palmer had received adequate confirmation of the charges alleged therein, from a report of R. R. Thompson, which stated that,

Late news from the Walla Walla valley gives an account of the most shameful treatment of the settlers and friendly Indians, their property is taken and wantonly destroyed for no reason, other than that the volunteers have power to do it.

There is no discipline or order in the camp, if the settlers protest to the useless destruction of their property their lives are threatened.

A week after Thompson's alarm, George Gibbs told Stevens that "the state of things above" was very threatening. "More hounds of Oregon Volunteers are bent on attacking the Nez Perces & Cherouse is exerting himself to keep the Indians quiet."

These reported delinquencies of the Volunteers were so much grist for Wool's mill. He promised Palmer that four companies of Regulars would be

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69 Palmer to Wool, Portland, 27 January 1856. RUSAC; AGO. Letts. Recd., 1856; Ore. SIA. Lett. Bk, E, 26; Printed in Serial Set No. 876.

70 Palmer to Manypenny, Dayton, O. T., 11 February 1856, in Serial Set No. 876.

71 Thompson to Palmer, Dalles, 20 January 1856. Ore. SIA. Letts.

sent into the Walla Walla country, with one of these companies given the task of protecting the friendly Cayuse Indians from the Volunteers. He took this occasion to express the hope "that the Volunteers will leave the country and return to their homes." Of course, these uncomplimentary letters about the Oregon Volunteers made possible another thrust at Stevens with the remark that,

at no time were volunteers required, or in any sense of the term necessary, for the defence of the inhabitants of Oregon, from the depredations or barbarities of Indians occupying the country east of the Cascade mountains.

Spring brought no improvement. The best information coming to Wright proved that "the presence of volunteers in the Walla Walla Country, during the last two months, has been highly injurious; and tended to increase the number of our enemies." By the time he was ready to march into the Yakima country, he would have more exact knowledge of these wanton attacks on friendly Indians by individual Oregon Volunteers. The day before Wright departed, Agent Thompson reported that some Volunteers fired on friendly Indians who were fishing on the Oregon side of the Columbia River. This incident motivated Wright's sharp note to Governor Curry:

Under these circumstances & presuming that you still retain authority over the Oregon Volunteers, although at present beyond your Territorial

73 Wool to Palmer, Benicia, 7 February 1856, Ore. SIA. Letts. Recd. 1856.
74 Ibid.
75 Wool to Stevens, Benicia, 12 February 1856, in Serial Set No. 82.
76 Wright to Jones, Fort Vancouver, 1 March 1856. RUSAC.
77 Thompson to Wright, Dalles, 26 April 1856. RUSAC.
jurisdiction, I have to request that they may be withdrawn from the
country on the north side of the Columbia River. 78

No change was effected in the plans of the Volunteers by all these letters
from Regular Army men, but their attitude was made abundantly clear.

The much-abused Indians took time, months before, to review the
entire question of their treatment. They reminded Stevens very pointedly of
his assurance that the President sent him and Palmer to be the Indian's father,
to protect them, their children, and to secure their happiness. 79 For their
part, they were to be friends with the Americans.

When some "bad Indians" broke their promise of friendship, many
others continued as friends and helped the whites in many ways. Because they
"had remained as firm as rocks, to the friendship that had been promised"
them, the American Chiefs
told us they took us under their protection, and that they would watch
that no Indians or whites would do us any wrong--They told us to return
to our own places not far from the volunteers, so as to be protected. 80

Protection was one thing they did not receive. Although,

Capt Cornelius, Mr. Shaw, Capt Lord, Sergeant Grim, all our other friends
neglect nothing to protect us, and do all they can for our good, but it
appears that a great number of volunteers have heads harder than an In-
dian. They trample under foot the advices, the orders, and the repri-
mands of their good & just chiefs--and follow no rule, but that of in-
justice, rapine, and ingratitude--if they have any bad chiefs, enemies
of public order, with hearts full of bitterness, not of charity, it is
these they love and whose order they punctually obey, because they are
in accordance with their own depraved inclinations--You have seen our

78 Wright to Curry, Fort Dalles, 27 April 1856. RUSAC; AGO. Letts.
Recd., 1856.

79 The Indians to the Governor, n.p., February, 1856. Ore. SIA.
Letts. Recd., 1856.

80 Ibid.
merits—You will see our reward. 81

This flood of criticism directed against the Volunteers was occasionally excused, but no lengthy defense was made until several months had elapsed. For example, Nathan Olney, Indian Agent, was accused of trying to steal three hundred captured horses. Volunteers did not wait to learn if he was guilty or not, but snatched at the chance to say that if any Indian Agent could steal wholesale they ought to be permitted to help themselves to a few horses whether claimed by friendly Indians or not. 82 The fact that Olney proved himself innocent of the accusation made no difference. 83 An official, categorical, and sweeping denial of all charges against the Volunteers was finally made by Cornelius on 13 June 1856. 84 This apologia resorts more than once to such phrases as "unqualifiedly false," "no relationship with truth," "a malignant falsehood," and similar expressions. 85 It was well and good for Cornelius to attempt a thorough whitewashing of the antics of the Volunteers, even though Chinn deemed it necessary to issue "a written order against taking Indians horses the cause why this order was given was that some of the men was meddling with the horses of friendly Indians." 86

81 Ibid.
84 Cornelius to Curry, Portland, O. T., 13 June 1856, Serial Set. No. 906.
85 Ibid.
86 K. B. Mercer, Diary, 1 January 1856. COE.
Once the troops again became active, what was a genuinely critical situation simply vanished. The documents show that Cornelius was trying to get supplies for his men a few weeks after they encamped, following their encounter with the Indians on the Touchet. On 1 February 1856 he requisitioned the Regimental Commissary for large quantities of various supplies. Another extensive requisition for armaments, ammunition and other articles necessary in the field, was made the same day on the Regimental Quartermaster.

87 34,000- thirty-four thousand pounds of flour  
3,600- thirty-six hundred pounds of sugar  
1,800- eighteen hundred pounds of coffee  
1,000- one thousand pounds salt  
1,000- one thousand pounds of soap  
300- three hundred pounds of candles  
100- one hundred pounds of saltpeter  
1,000- one thousand pounds of tobacco  
50- fifty pounds of pepper (in the grain)  
50- fifty pounds of mustard  
300- three hundred pounds of rice  

Cornelius to J. F. Miller, Camp Mill Creek, 1 February 1856. Preserved in the manuscript files of the Northwest Room, Spokane Public Library; Spokane, Washington. This deposit hereinafter designated as SPO.

88 200- two hundred pr boots  
300- three hundred pr shoes  
350- three hundred and fifty pants  
500- five hundred pr socks  
25- twenty-five pr blankets  
300- three hundred hickory shirts  
250- two hundred and fifty overshirts  
50- fifty undershirts  
75- seventy-five coats—not capots  
150- one hundred and fifty hats  
200- two hundred pr drawers  
4- four reams good paper (two foolscap two letter.)  
1- one gross of pens  
½- one half pound wafers  
48- four doz pen-holders  
1- one gross small envelopes  
1- one gross large envelopes  
100,000- one hundred thousand percussion caps  
2,500- twenty-five hundred musket caps
While Cornelius requisitioned supplies for his force, word came from William Craig in the Nez Percé Country, that "Kamiakin's force had been reinforced by 300 Indians from the coast and that they contemplated crossing the River and attacking us in the valley with a force of from 1000 to 1200." If Cornelius wanted encouragement, this report satisfied the need. A brief four days later he told his wife, "ther is new recruits coming up soon and as quick as they get hear we

10,000- ten thousand musket cartridge
10,000- ten thousand rifle cartridge
200- two hundred pounds Kentucky rifle powder
400- four hundred pounds bar lead (not shot)
20- twenty good rifles
10- ten doz butcher knives
20- twenty pistols - revolvers
50- fifty tents
100- one hundred camp kettles
300- three hundred tin cups
50- fifty fry pans
200- two hundred large spoons
100- one hundred small size sash ropes
25- twenty-five pack saddles
20- twenty chopping axes
25- twenty-five half axes
100- one hundred lasso ropes - not tarred
400- four hundred pr horseshoes, ready for nailing on
50- fifty pounds horseshoe nails
6- six horseshoe hammers
6- six horseshoe rasps
6- six pair nippers
2- two blank books, large size, for Regtal Order Books
12- twelve memorandum books, largest size
50- fifty memorandum books, ordinary size
100- one hundred lead pencils, best quality

Cornelius to Robert Thompson, Camp Mill Creek, 1 February 1856. SPF

89 K. B. Mercer, Diary, 2 February 1856, COE. William Craig was born in Greenbriar county, Virginia, in 1810. He entered the service of the American Fur Company in 1830 and for ten years gathered furs for his employers. When the fur companies broke up, about 1840, Craig came to Oregon and settled at Lapwai not far from Henry Spalding's mission.
will cross snake river & give Camiackin a fight & then I expect to come home but I dont se as I can come sooner & do justice to my self & coun-

try.90

Within the week, over four hundred men were en route to bolster his command.91 At the end of February, Lieutenants William Myers and W. H. Wright were dispatched into the Nez Perce country to purchase "300 good, serviceable riding horses:"92 they were back in a week with forty-two horses.93 Thus, with plenty of supplies requisitioned, but not delivered; with an adequate number of horses ordered, but not obtained; Cornelius decided to campaign.

Nine o'clock in the morning of 9 March 1856 was the hour set for the Regiment to take up the line of march towards the enemy's country.

Throughout the campaign it is hoped and expected that officers & soldiers will bee obedient to orders preserve a kindly disposition toward each other & strive to win a noble triumph over our common enemy thus silenc-
ing forever the faults statements of those persons who are interested to defaime the reputation of the Oregon Volunteers.94

The expedition was indecisive and filled with hardship because of short rations. They started for the Snake River from Walla Walla, marched fifty miles, and crossed the River twenty-five miles above its mouth. Here they met a party of Indians whom twenty men pursued for twenty miles, killing three, taking one boy a prisoner, and capturing two hundred head of horses.95

90 Cornelius to his Wife, Whitman's Station, 6 February 1856. H.

91 Curry to Stevens, On Board Multnomah, Fort Vancouver, 11 Febru-

ary 1856. OLY.

92 Special Order No. 42, Camp Cornelius, 27 February 1856. SPO.

93 Cornelius to his Wife, Camp Cornelius, 6 March 1856. SPO.

94 General Order, Camp Cornelius, 8 March 1856; Cornelius to his Wife, Camp Yackimah, 3 April 1856. SPO.

95 Cornelius to his Wife, Camp Yackimah, 3 April 1856. SPO.
This minor success whet their desire for bigger conquests. One-fourth of the whole number of men in the respective commands, some two hundred left the camp twenty-five miles up the River at 6 A. M. on 13 March, travelled down the stream to its mouth and then up the Columbia for fifteen miles until opposite the mouth of the Yakima. Two Indians were killed while fleeing across the Columbia, but the rest of the natives escaped.

There followed several quick thrusts in different directions, all being futile attempts to find a concentration of Indians large enough to engage in real battle. A sixty mile ride to the mouth of the Palouse River met with no Indians; seventy-five miles further up the Columbia to Priest's Rapids were no more fruitful. In a staff meeting held at Priest's Rapids it was decided to come down the Columbia as far as the mouth of the Yakima, there to await the subsistence rations that Lieutenant R. S. Coldwell had been sent to obtain from the encampment near Fort Walla Walla. With their arrival at the Yakima, the Volunteers had marched three hundred miles, killed

96 General Order, Camp Snake River, 12 March 1856. SPO.
97 Cornelius to his Wife, Camp Yackimah, 3 April 1856. SPO.
98 General Order, Camp Snake River, 12 March 1856. SPO.
99 Cornelius to his Wife, Camp Yackimah, 3 April 1856. SPO.
100 Ibid.
101 General Order, Camp Priest's Rapids, 26 March 1856. SPO.
102 A. J. Hembree to Joel Hembree, Camp Yackamah, 2 April 1856, in Washington Historical Quarterly, XVI (1925), 283.
103 Ibid.
104 Special Order, Camp Columbia River, 29 March 1856. SPO.
five Indians, taken one boy prisoner, captured two hundred head of horses, and eaten only horsemeat for the final two weeks of the march. 105

The five companies that swam their horses across the Columbia and stood poised at the mouth of the Yakima were a sorry looking lot. They abandoned the hunt on the upper reaches of the Columbia because their "horses got so much wore down" that they had to give up. 106 These same jaded animals and seriously underfed men were ordered to move at 9 A.M. on 6 April 1856. 107

Exuberance is one word that cannot refer to the dejected order that, the command will take up the line of march through the Yakima country the exhausted condition of the men and animals in the command the extenuated number of our own force and the character of the country we have to penetrate demands that the order of the line of march from day to day should be rigidly that no officer or soldier be permitted to leave camp or the ranks while the command is on the march without an order to such effect that every neglect of duty on the part of the horse and camp garde should be promptly reported. 108

Once across the Columbia, the Volunteers marched south along the River's bank for twenty miles and encamped opposite Fort Walla Walla. It was here that they

barbequed, smoked and dried the meat from a number of oxen that could not be driven back to the Dalles. With this supply of meat we started after the Indians up into the Yakima country. . . . 109

105 Cornelius to his Wife, Camp Yackimah, 3 April 1856, SPO; A. J. Hembree to Joel Hembree, Camp Yackamah, 2 April 1856 in Washington Historical Quarterly, XVI (1925), 283.

106 Hembree to Hembree, Camp Yackamah, 2 April 1856 in Ibid.

107 General Order, Camp opposite Fort Walla Walla, 6 April 1856, SPO.

108 Ibid.

109 William D. Stillwell, "Account of the Fight, on April 10th, 1856, during the Yakima Indian War, On the Yakima River, where Captain Hembree was killed." Tillamook, Oregon, 24 May 1918. Typescript, ORE.
There were 241 men in the force that left this encampment on the morning of 9 April. 110

Very early the next morning ten Volunteers, including Captain A. J. Hembree, were sent out to scout the hills overlooking the camp, near the junction of the Yakima River and present-day Cold Creek. 111 When they reached a spot less than a mile and a half from the foot of the hill, 112 about one hundred Indians set upon them. 113 The skirmish lasted some five hours, with the net result that Hembree was killed, scalped, and stripped, and one Volunteer was wounded. 114 Cornelius maintained that ten or twelve Indians were killed; 115 Thompson reported four Indian casualties; 116 while Hathaway heard of only three dead Indians from the fray. 117 The confusion concerning casualties was of a pattern with the lack of certainty regarding the size of the opposing Indian force: Stillwell recalled the number as being a strong one hundred; 118 Cornelius told his wife there were three hundred Indians present. 119

110 Cornelius to his Wife, Dalles, 14 April 1856. H.
111 William D. Stillwell, "Account of the Fight, etc." Typescript, ORE.
113 Stillwell, "Account of the Fight, etc." Typescript, ORE.
114 Ibid.
115 Cornelius to his Wife, Dalles, 14 April 1856. H.
117 Hathaway to Stevens, Vancouver, 15 April 1856. OLY.
118 Stillwell, "Account of the Fight, etc." Typescript, ORE.
119 Cornelius to his Wife, Dalles, 14 April 1856. H.
This skirmish, as its predecessors were and its successors would be, was indecisive. The Indians were driven from the field, but not defeated. One must admit that this campaign did little more than prove the stamina of the Oregon Volunteers. If mere suffering could win wars, it was a victory for the Volunteers. The fight had not been against Indians, as much as it had been against hunger. Cornelius confided to his wife,

We have had a little of the hardest times for something to eat that I ever had in all my days. I think the Redgt has eaten about 100 head of ind. horses and some of them were poor & their backs too sore to ride. They were some of the boys that were very much discouraged while others stood it like men. But I think that there are some of them that will never risk themselves far from home any more after they get out of this.121

The Colonel appeared to concur with those who had no immediate plans for further involvement in Indian wars. He told his wife,

You may rest assured that I will be at home by the first day of May & will there remain for awhile shure & if they want me to fight Inds they must bring them to me.122

In his next letter he announced his plans to leave the Dalles on 20 April, "& I will make the governor a tender of my resignation & if he will except I will come hom & let him fight his own Inds & if not I will tuff it out."123

Cornelius was not alone in his dampened ardor for ferreting out Indians on a diet of horsemeat. Farrar felt strongly that,

Horse flesh as a diet I prefer not to have much of; but I can and did live upon it for some two or three weeks. We have had a hard time, and

120 Ibid.
121 Cornelius to his Wife, Dalles, 17 April 1856. H.
122 Ibid.
123 Cornelius to Wife; Dalles, 19 April 1856. SPO.
have traversed some of the most infernal country that was finished late in the evening of the sixth day of labor mentioned in the sacred text.\textsuperscript{124}

Quite naturally, news of the horsemeat fare reached more ears than those of Mrs. Cornelius. The wave of indignation sent the big politicians scurrying in search of a scapegoat. Curry, Stark, and Bush tried to shift the blame for the starving Volunteers onto Cornelius. Such gross unfairness stirred Farrar to inform Mathew Deady, another prominent politician of the day, that,

It is wrong, & will recoil on the heads of those who lend themselves to the dissemination of any such unjust and wholly false imputation against Col Cornelius. The sole fault rests on Curry & on the QM&C in the field.\textsuperscript{125}

During these exchanges on the higher level of command, the Volunteers were camped on the north side of the Columbia, five miles back from the river, across from the Dalles.\textsuperscript{126} This camp was assaulted by a party of thirty Indians,\textsuperscript{127} who succeeded in stampeding and driving off upwards of three hundred horses and mules.\textsuperscript{128} Only a week before, fifty Indians attacked the animals near Fort Henrietta and in the process of driving off thirty head of animals, managed to kill and scalp one man.\textsuperscript{129} It was the second time they had struck Fort Henrietta.\textsuperscript{130} For people so many times reported dead,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{124} Farrar to Deady, Camp Dalles, 2 May 1856. ORE.
\item \textsuperscript{125} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{126} Robie to Stevens, Dalles, 29 April 1856. OLY.
\item \textsuperscript{127} Thompson to Palmer, Dalles, 1 May 1856. Ore. SIA. Letts. Recd.
\item \textsuperscript{128} Robie to Stevens, Dalles, 29 April 1856. OLY.
\item \textsuperscript{129} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{130} Haller to Nesmith, Dalles, 12 May 1856. ORE.
\end{itemize}
repulsed, or driven under cover, the Indians displayed great vitality. This continued pester ing of the whites by Indian raids could hardly be allowed to go unchallenged, if even a semblance of prestige was to be preserved. Thus, the presence of two hundred warriors on the headwaters of John Day's River caused yet another burst of activity among the Volunteers. Major Davis Layton knew Captain F. N. P. Goff was en route to reinforce the Washington Territorial Volunteers in the Grand Ronde, so he requested a detachment of troops to assist in the projected scout up John Day's River. Goff was of opinion that he could not leave his train, until I arrive at Walla Walla. I find that there is too much stock to guard for me to take a force of eney importance from the division so I will have to decline the contemplated scout up John Day's River.

Layton went ahead with the scout, which resulted in his finding four or five hundred Indians on the headwaters of the River. This discovery was more than he thought prudent to handle without help, since he had but seventy-five men. In response to Layton's new appeal for aid, Goff set out with sixty-eight men on 6 July 1856. They joined Layton at about noon on 9 July, "but the Indians had taken the hint and left two or three hours previous."

131 Rownall to Layton, Dalles, O. T., 21 June 1856. ORE.
132 Goff to Layton, John Days River, 26 June 1856. ORE.
133 Goff to Shaw, Camp 4 miles above Fort Henrietta, 5 July 1856. OLY.
134 Goff to Shaw, Camp Mill Creek, 26 July 1856. OLY.
135 Goff to Shaw, Camp 4 miles above Fort Henrietta, 5 July 1856. OLY.
136 Goff to Shaw, Camp Mill Creek, 26 July 1856. OLY.
137 Ibid.
The pursuit started on the morning of 11 July and lasted one week. Six days of this week may be described as a large-scale walk along John Day's River that brought them to camp at midnight of 16 July on the summit of the Blue Mountains. Actually, half of the command had gone ahead over the mountains, rather than delay for Goff who had become violently ill on 13 July.

When all were reunited at the head of Burnt River on 17 July, they learned that the advance guard had battled the Indians from the evening of 15 July until 5 P.M. of 16 July. Two Volunteers were killed, and one wounded in the leg; the Indians lost seven killed. And yet again, the Indians melted away into the mountains. There was nothing very glamorous about this fizzling finish of the Oregon Volunteers as a fighting force.

Ever since Wright began organizing his expedition into the Yakima country, Governor Curry showed increasing readiness to have done with Indian fighting. Two weeks after Cornelius returned from the Yakima, Curry suggested to Stevens that,

the regulars be let take the offensive & Maintain it if they can. The Volunteers scoured the whole country without finding Indians except a

138 Ibid.
139 Ibid.
140 Ibid. Wilson to Layton, Camp Estes, Burnt River, 16 July 1856. ORE; Lugenbeel to Wright, Fort Dalles, 27 July 1856. RUSAC. Burnt River in Union County, Oregon, flows south-eastward and enters the Snake at the Idaho-Oregon boundary in lat. 44°20'.
141 Goff to Shaw, Camp Mill Creek, 26 July 1856. OLY.
142 Ibid.
skirmish.143

Curry seized upon Wright's movement into the Indian country as an opportunity to recall the Volunteers.

This was a fortunate opportunity as the men were becoming restless, indeed clamorous for their discharges. They have been in service since October 11, 1855.144

Moreover, the Governor took measures to transfer to Lt. Col. Morris, commanding Fort Vancouver,

a quantity of horses, mules and horned cattle, captured from the enemy on the northern frontier in part, and in part original purchases for the use of the Volunteer Service of the Territory, which the exigencies of that Service no longer require.145

Morris did not need the stock at Fort Vancouver, so he referred Curry's offer to Wright.146

The Oregon Volunteers had been disintegrating gradually since April, so the official disbanding on 11 July 1856 affected relatively few. Layton was told:

Believing that the US Troops together with the WT Volunteers now in the field sufficient to afford protection to the settlers East of the Cascade Mountains, you are hereby directed upon the receipt of this order to proceed with your Command to the Rendezvous opposite Portland by way of the Cascade Mountains, there to be discharged.147

The contribution made by the Oregon Volunteers to the cause of

143 Curry to Stevens, Portland, 28 April 1856. OLY.
145 Curry to Morris, Portland, 13 May 1856. RUSAC.
146 Morris to Curry, Vancouver, 16 May 1856. RUSAC.
147 General Order, Dalles, 11 July 1856. ORE.
East of the Cascade Mountains, if computed in terms of casualties inflicted on the Indians, was not great. It must be kept in mind, however, that the mere presence in the field of this restless prowling army of poorly disciplined men constituted a never absent threat to the Indians. If the volunteers did no more than worry the Indians to death, they gave very real help to their neighbors in Washington Territory.
CHAPTER VIII

CITIZEN SOLDIERS

Three fighting forces, the United States Army, Oregon Mounted Volunteers, and the Washington Territorial Volunteers, carried on the war against the Indians. To unsnarl the story of their operations would be hopelessly complicated if they had not campaigned with a minimum of cooperation. In an earlier chapter we saw the one exception to this policy of independent groups operating independently, when the Oregon Mounted Volunteers filled an important role in the expedition under Major Rains. Quite legitimately, therefore, we may study the citizen soldiers of Washington Territory as a unit separate from the United States Army. As the story unfolds it will be clear that the Army and the Territorial Volunteers came together only to disagree.

Although the Volunteers attained the condition of a military force only after Indian hostilities began, the seeds of the organization were planted a full year before the need was urgent. While Governor Stevens was in Washington, D. C., defending explaining, and promoting the final reports of his surveys of the northern railroad routes,¹ he took time to inform Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War, that the militia had not been organized in

¹ Hazard Stevens, The Life of Isaac Ingalls Stevens, Boston, 1901, I, 425.
the Territory. However, he promised that efficient steps would be taken during the coming winter of 1854.

Stevens then asked the Secretary if it was possible in these circumstances to have placed in depot at Fort Steilacoom, under the commanding officer, subject to requisition of the Territorial government, "1000 stand of arms, 100,000 cartridges and a few revolvers." Sincere plans were not sufficient. Before Government arms could be supplied legally, the rolls of the effective militia in the Territory had to be in the hands of the Secretary of War.

The task of organizing the Territorial militia fell to George Gibbs. About the only qualification he had for the position given him, was a readiness to learn. He asked the Adjutant General of the United States Army, Colonel Samuel Cooper, for information regarding military organization and all phases of military theory and practice. With Brigadier-General Gibbs borrowing beginner's text books on strategy and tactics, one is not surprised by the slow formation of the militia. The eve of the Walla Walla council saw Washington, D. C., officials ready to deliver two thousand muskets on requisition of the Governor of the Territory. These were in addition to the regular annual quota of Washington Territory, "which commences with the present year 1855, and is equivalent to 137 muskets."

3 Davis to Stevens, Washington, D. C., 18 August 1854, in Ibid., 61.
4 Gibbs to Cooper, Olympia, 12 February 1855. RUSAC. Letts. Sent.
5 Ibid.
6 Craig to Cooper, Washington, D. C., 3 May 1855. RUSAC. Letts. Sent.
Haller's defeat by the Yakima and Klikitat, 6 to 8 October 1855, put an end to further procrastination. Rains ordered all disposable Regulars into the field and called upon acting Governor Charles H. Mason for two companies of volunteers. The prompt affirmative response to this request was the first of many rapid-fire actions.

Mason promised that one company would report to the Commanding Officer at Fort Vancouver; the other he ordered to Fort Steilacoom to serve under Maloney. It was taken for granted that the Army would furnish transportation and subsistence for the Volunteers. Rains was asked to state how much reliance could be placed on Fort Vancouver to supply munitions, etc., to the Volunteers ordered to organize there. From Maloney at Fort Steilacoom, Mason asked for all muskets and accoutrements that could be spared.

These letters were not in vain. Mason received official assurance that,

So soon as the Company of Volunteers from this County is organized, and mustered into service, it will be armed and equipped, and furnished with subsistence and transportation.

Two days later, 19 October, Charles Eaton was "authorized and re-

7 Mason to Rains, Olympia, 14 October 1855. OLY.
8 Ibid.
9 Mason to Rains, Olympia, 14 October 1855. OLY; Printed in Gov. Mass., 161.
10 Ibid.
11 Mason to Maloney, Olympia, 15 October 1855, OLY.
12 John Withers to Mason, Fort Vancouver, 17 October 1855. OLY.
quested, as soon as possible, to form a company of rangers. 13

It will be the duty of such Company to range along the face of the Cascade Mountains on the western side, to keep a sharp look out upon the various trails, and intercept any communication that may be carried on between the Indians on the East and those on the West side of the Mountains. 14

Eaton was later ordered to report to Maloney at Fort Steilacoom; 15 likewise, as Company D, Washington Territorial Volunteers, under William H. Wallace sent to strengthen Maloney's command. 16

Hardly more than a month after Rains called for Volunteers, the Territorial authorities could take pride in very genuine achievement. Company "A," under Captain William Strong, was with Rains in the Yakima country; Hays' Company "E" occupied Chambers Prairie, west of the Cascades; W. A. L. McCorkle and Company "G" were guarding the passes of Lewis River to intercept all communication between the hostiles on the East and those west of the Cascades; Company "H," under C. C. Hewitt, was established at the forks of White and Green Rivers; Captain I. N. Ebey's Company "I" was stationed at Port Townsend with orders to prevent communication between hostile Indians and those

13 Mason to Charles Eaton, Esq., Olympia, 19 October 1855. OLY. Charles H. Eaton (1818-1876) was an emigrant of 1843. He was born in Oswego county, New York, 22 December 1818, removing to Ohio at an early age, whence he came to Oregon. In the Yakima War he was commissioned Captain and organized the Puget Sound Rangers. In 1856 he moved to Tenalout Prairie, and to the Yakima Valley in 1870, where he operated a stock farm until his death on 19 December 1876.

14 Ibid.

15 Tilton to Eaton, Olympia, 9 November 1855. OLY.

16 Tilton to Wallace, Olympia, 9 November 1855. OLY. William H. Wallace (1811-1879) was born in Miami county, Ohio, 17 July 1811, whence he moved to Indiana, and in 1839 to Iowa, where he served in both branches of the legislature. He came to Washington Territory in 1853.
Rapid recruiting such as this was fraught with a thousand maddening
details not found in the records of the Regular Army. W. B. Affleck’s finan-
cial condition was such that he requested a furlough of some days duration to
afford him an opportunity of caring for personal affairs. If Mason could
not accede to this request, the petitioner asked for an honorable discharge
from the Volunteers. Although the term of enlistment for the Volunteers
was three months, when a neighbor represented the special difficulties attend-
ing his case it was not easy to treat him as a man who made soldiering a ca-
reer. By the same token, you could not expect Frank Akins to understand the
forms and formalities necessary before he could collect ten dollars for bring-
ing two horses from Cowlitz Landing to Monticello for Mason. These incidents,
and there will be others, merely exemplify the special problems connected with
the formation of an army from strictly civilian personnel.

For supplies, there was a scramble. Help was sought and received
from, of all places, the United States Navy. Lt. Wm. Pease, U. S. N., loaned

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17 General Orders No. 2, Olympia, 13 November 1855. OLY. I. N.
18 Affleck to Mason, 20 November 1855. OLY.
19 Ibid.
20 Akins to Mason, Monticello, 8 November 1855. OLY.
Tilton two twelve pounder guns with grape shot, from the Revenue Cutter "Jefferson Davis." This commonsense decision to help the hard-pressed settlers brought nothing but trouble to Pease.

I had much to contend against at San Francisco, in consequence of my having assisted in the present Indian war, notwithstanding, my mind was not changed, and I am now ready to do the same for the citizens of this territory as I ever had, and if granting a little aid to the inhabitants in protecting them from the ruthless hand of the savage, with a government vessel, has become a crime, then let me go "whistling down the wind."

Captain I. I. Sterritt practically stripped the U. S. Sloop of War Decatur of such arms and ammunition as he could spare which were given to Mason. A month later, the Captain was asking for the return of his small arms so he could man and arm his boats in case of emergency.

These naval officers were not alone in taking unusual steps to grant effective aid in these extraordinary circumstances. James Douglas, Governor of Vancouver's Island, was asked for as many arms and as much ammunition as he could spare. Moreover, it would be an added favor to forward the munitions in a Hudson's Bay Company ship, whose very presence in Puget Sound would impress the Indians. Douglas purchased fifty stand of arms,

21 Pease to Tilton, Revenue Cutter "Jeff Davis," at Steilacoom, 31 October 1855, in Gov. Mess., 108.


23 Ibid.

24 Mason to Keyes, Olympia, 28 November 1855, OLY.

25 Tilton to Douglass, Olympia, 1 November 1855 in Gov. Mess., 100; Washington Historical Quarterly, VIII (1917), 297.

26 Ibid.
ten barrels of gunpowder, and a supply of ball from the Hudson's Bay Company at Victoria.27 The guns represented one-half of the supply of arms in the whole Colony at that moment.28 Part of these supplies were sent immediately aboard the Traveller. Two weeks later, Douglas allowed the Company's steamer Otter, to partially unload her cargo at Victoria and then used her to carry the remainder of the ammunition to Tilton. Douglas did ask that the Otter be sent back in a few days, since her presence was particularly advisable in the unprotected British settlements.29

Despite wild words in the newspapers and widespread private suspicions entertained about the nefarious activity of the British, and especially of the Hudson's Bay Company, there were sufficient straight thinking men in the Territorial Legislature to acknowledge help received. On 18 December 1855, it was

Resolved by the Legislative Assembly of the Territory of Washington, That as representatives of the people, we tender to his excellency, James Douglass, Governor of Vancouver's Island, our acknowledgements for the services he rendered us, by furnishing arms and ammunition to the Executive of this Territory, in the present Indian War.30

The other sources of help are more usual but not less interesting, for it appears that supplies were furnished only after great adventures in the


28 Ibid.

29 Douglass to Tilton, Victoria, V. I., 19 November 1855, in Gov. Mess., 102; Washington Historical Quarterly, VIII (1917), 299.

business of keeping army regulations. One prize example began as an innocent postscript to a letter of George Gibbs. He told Tilton

I am just informed that a portion of the Territorial arms have arrived on the California. Please to send me word what disposition the Governor desires to be made of them.31

The arrival of the arms quota was extremely opportune. That is to say, it was opportune until the squabbling began. The military storekeeper at Fort Vancouver, Theodore Eckerson, refused to release any of the arms because of a faulty bill of lading.32 Gibbs tried to induce him to release one thousand stand of arms, one-half of the quota, but a dispute over the freight charges for carrying them from Vancouver to Olympia stopped these negotiations. It was an army mistake that they were unloaded at Vancouver, and the Territorial officials were not keen on becoming involved in the serious difficulties and extraordinary expense of transporting them overland.34 Rather than reload the arms onto a United States transport for shipment to Steilacoom or Olympia, as suggested by Mason,35 a duplicate shipment of territorial arms was made from San Francisco direct to Olympia.36

This novel manner of economy touched off a flurry of letters. Shortly after the guns reached Vancouver and his initial refusal to deliver the

31 Gibbs to Tilton, Fort Vancouver, 16 November 1855, OLY.
32 Gibbs to Tilton, Fort Vancouver, 19 November 1855, OLY.
33 Ibid.
34 Mason to Ordnance Officer or Quarter Master at San Francisco, Olympia, 26 November 1855, OLY; Printed in Gov. Mess., 151.
35 Ibid.
36 Eckerson to Gibbs, Vancouver Depot, 1 December 1855, OLY.
Territorial quota because of the faulty bill of lading, Eckerson began filling Mason's requisitions for munitions with the understanding that this would be deducted from the stand of two thousand territorial arms tied up at Vancouver Depot. Soon the bickering over shipping papers and freight charges would end, thus making it a simple matter of transferring accounts to keep the storekeeper's records correct.

The duplicate shipment of arms sent direct to Olympia, meant Eckerson was now personally responsible for $2,635.05 worth of supplies advanced to Gibbs from the original quota which had become army property and as such had to be accounted for by Eckerson. Since he released the supplies to

37 Gibbs to Tilton, Fort Vancouver, 19 November 1855, OLY.

38 Money value of issues of Arms, &c to the Territory of Washington, on account of the quota due from, the General Government.

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Gibbs as a favor and "without a shadow of either law or regulation to justify me," he asked that two hundred and three muskets and appendages be sent from the territorial arms so he could keep his books in order.39 Furthermore, he asked Mason to explain the emergency to J. P. Anderson, Delegate to Congress from Washington Territory, so his conduct would be understood by Army officials in Washington, D. C.40

All of the storekeeper's forebodings were adequately realized.

Headquarters of the Department of the Pacific at Benicia, California, in the person of Colonel Ripley of Ordnance, disapproved Eckerson's issue of arms.41 With this official reprimand, the storekeeper's position became critical. In an all-out attempt to extricate him from the toils of army retribution, for a perfectly commonsense departure from ordinary procedure, Gibbs urged Mason to replace the two hundred and three muskets without delay, and he asked the acting Governor to explain the whole incident to Anderson who could defend Eckerson's conduct before the War Department in Washington. Gibbs also intended to give Anderson all necessary information.42

8 Arm Chests @ $2.00 $ 16.00
12 Ammunition Packing Boxes @ 75¢ 9.00

Total Value $2,635.05

EQUAL to
203 Muskets & Appendages, @ $13.00

Enclosure, Eckerson to Mason, Fort Vancouver, 2 December 1855; Eckerson to Mason, Fort Vancouver, 2 December 1855; Eckerson to Gibbs, Vancouver Depot, 1 December 1855, OLY.

39 Eckerson to Gibbs, Vancouver Depot, 1 December 1855, OLY.
40 Eckerson to Mason, Fort Vancouver, 2 December 1855, OLY.
41 Gibbs to Mason, Fort Vancouver, 3 December 1855, OLY.
42 Ibid., Eckerson was later recommended for promotion to the rank of Major. (George Wright to U. S. Grant, Sacramento, 17 December 1864. H.)
The "Eckerson Incident" will have to serve as one specific example of many similar instances which make a reader wonder whether he is viewing tragedy or comedy. Rains was in the field; the acting Governor was trying to raise more troops; the whites thought the Indians were coming from all directions to attack the settlements; and two thousand stand of arms lay idle because some clerk had made a mistake!

So long as the Volunteers were serving under Army officers, the Army took care of feeding, clothing, and arming them. But from the moment Wool visited the battle area and learned of the Volunteers mustered into the service of the United States by Rains, their days were numbered. The first to go was William Strong's Company "A" when Rains informed his companion of the Yakima expedition, "I am directed without qualification to have your Company mustered out of the service of the United States by the Major Gen Comdg Department of the Pacific." Also, to be mustered out was Capt. Newell's Company of Scouts.

A few weeks later, notice was given to the other Companies of Volunteers by Captain E. D. Keyes' warning that he had no instructions, and there was no law permitting him to assume command of, and furnish supplies to, Volunteers. Hence, at the expiration of the first three months of their

43 Mason to Keyes, Olympia, 24 November 1855, OLY.

44 Rains to Strong, Fort Vancouver, 12 December 1855; Strong to Mason, Vancouver, 14 December 1855, OLY.

45 Gibbs to Tilton, Fort Vancouver, 13 December 1855, OLY.

service he would have to sever all official connection with them.47

This news elicited an immediate response from Mason, who pointed out that it was highly doubtful whether the four companies of Volunteers could be supported without the help of the Army. Therefore, on the expiration of their terms they would be disbanded.48 On 20 February 1856, they were.49

The initial attempt at organizing Volunteers was marred by wrangling and confusion. Part of this was chargeable to panic consequent upon unpreparedness for the universal attack by the Indians thought to be imminent; part was owing to obscurely drawn fields of jurisdiction; part lay in ignorance of the real objectives of the war; and part arose from the bitter antagonism between Wool and Stevens. Viewed from any angle, it was not a pretty picture.

To this complex situation, Stevens returned on 19 January 1856.50 The long trip from the Blackfoot country, in the dead of winter, had in no wise lessened his profound determination to war against the Indians. His newly acquired conviction of the futility of negotiating with the tribes stands out in his unvarnished declaration that,

My plan is to make no treaties whatever with the Tribes now in arms, to do away entirely with the reservations guaranteed to them, to make a summary example of all the leading spirits, and to place as a conquered people, under the surveillance of troops the remains of these Tribes on

47 Ibid.
49 Tilton to Rains, Olympia, 20 February 1856, OLY.
50 Stevens to Jefferson Davis, Olympia, 19 February 1856, AGO. Letts. Recd., 1856; Printed in Serial Set No. 822.
Reservations selected by the President, and on such terms, as the Government in its justice and mercy may vouchsafe to them. 51

The wide divergence of opinions held by Wool and Stevens in respect to the Indians has been seen above. Stevens wanted to fight them; and Wool was adamantly determined that no help to Volunteers would be forthcoming from the Army. The only course left open to Stevens was to recruit his own army and send his own expedition into the field. He did.

This particular portion of our story resolves itself into an account of the activities of one man, Isaac I. Stevens. Perhaps he was not likeable, but his energy and devotion to what he considered his duty was nothing, if not amazing. The day following his safe return to Olympia, he was planning to visit the country about Puget Sound to satisfy himself as to the true state of affairs. 52 At the same time he expressed his resolve,

to call out a force of Volunteers and establish them in the heart of the Indian country and I earnestly trust that the most cordial spirit of co-operation may exist between the regulars and volunteer troops. 53

The Governor was anxious to begin operations as soon as possible,

Otherwise the Territory will be starved out from inability of the farmers to put in their crops, and the spirit of disaffection may spread among Indians, at the present time friendly. 54

In his dual role of Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs of Washington Territory, Stevens worked at a killing pace. He summoned his

51 Stevens to Manypenny, Walla Walla Valley, 22 December 1855, ROIA Printed in Serial Set No. 821.
52 Stevens to Captain Floyd, Olympia, 20 January 1856, OLY.
53 Ibid.
54 Ibid.
trusted assistant, James Doty, to "come to Olympia as early as possible. I am starting an expedition against the Indians here, and soon shall start one against the Indians East of the Cascade Mountains." C. P. Higgins was authorized "to raise a full company of Mounted Volunteers, organized as the Dragoons of the U. S. Service, for operations East of the Cascade Mountains." They were to rendezvous at Vancouver. The emergency recruiting under Mason had been hectic enough, but it was almost serene compared to Stevens' task.

On one day the subject of recruits occupied the governor's attention, the next day Haller was telling Stevens of the surrender of a body of Klikitat Indians and asking for instructions regarding their ultimate fate; and within the week, Stevens sent Mason to Washington, D. C., as a special

55 Stevens to Doty, Olympia, n. d., OLY. Doty's promising career was shattered within six months. He received orders to proceed to Montgomery's, inspect the troops, give the necessary orders for the march towards the Yelm, assign wagon guards, etc., and return to Stevens to report his findings. (Tilton to Doty, Olympia, 2 March 1856, WISC.) Instead of carrying out his orders, Doty "remained at Steilacoom from Tuesday [4 March] to yesterday in an almost helpless state of intoxication," which brought his immediate dismissal from the public service. (Stevens to Doty, Olympia, 8 March 1856, OLY.) The unfortunate young man shot himself through the head, 27 June 1856. (Corliss to Nesmith, Olympia, 27 June 1856, Walker to Nesmith, Olympia, 27 June 1856, Wash. SIA. Misc. Letts. Recd.) The author has been unable to discover a satisfactory explanation of the breakdown of this truly capable public servant.

56 Stevens to Higgins, Olympia, 27 January 1856. OLY. C. P. Higgins was born in Ireland in March, 1830, and received his business education in the United States. He served five years in the United States Army, receiving his discharge in time to join Stevens' surveying party of 1853. In 1860 he settled in Hellgate Valley, near the present site of Missoula, Montana, and engaged in trade. In 1865 he founded the city of Missoula.

57 Ibid.

58 Haller to Stevens, Cascades, 25 January 1856. OLY.
messenger to explain the critical condition of affairs in the Territory.\textsuperscript{59}

There was, also, a chance that a personal representative could undo the harm done by Wool's persuasive letters to influential people in Washington. Actually, this constant stream of apparently disconnected problems, all had bearing on the war.

Stevens poured out his energy, for the most part, on matters directly and unmistakably pertaining to the projected campaigns. All information that came to him only strengthened his contention that the Indians must be conquered first, and treated with later. Almost on the eve of his command that Shaw organize an expedition against the Yakima, Stevens received word that,

the supposed friendly Indians are keeping a line of communication open from Vancouver to the Yakima Country--They are constantly travelling backwards and forwards (with passes) as we believe for the purpose of furnishing the Indians secreted in the Mountains with ammunition of which they appear at all times to command an abundant supply from Vancouver.\textsuperscript{60}

Four days after this communication was written, the conferences, plans and correspondence took tangible shape. Stevens appointed Shaw Assistant Quarter Master and Commissary General of the Washington Territorial Volunteers.\textsuperscript{61} By giving him power to issue his own certificates for all purchases, Stevens hoped to avoid delay in the procurement of "supplies, transportation, animals, etc." needed for the expedition east of the Cascades."\textsuperscript{62}

\textsuperscript{59} Stevens to Manypenny, Olympia, 29 January 1856, in Serial Set No. 821.

\textsuperscript{60} Achilles to Stevens, Lewis River, 13 February 1856. OLY.

\textsuperscript{61} Stevens, to Shaw, Olympia, 17 February 1856, OLY.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
This appointment of Shaw, with "full powers to organize the volunteers on the Columbia River," was announced to the company commanders engaged in recruiting their men.63

Stevens informed authorities in Oregon of Shaw's appointment,64 and expressed the hope that the cordial cooperation which had existed between the two Territories until then would continue.65 He was anxious to "finish the war before those who have been so backward shall be able to take the field."66 This statement is one of the few thrusts made by Stevens at the dilatory tactics of the United States Army under the direction of Wool.

Stevens threw himself into the supervision of the intended campaign. No detail was too small for his attention. He had instructed Shaw, to organize at Vancouver 200 mounted Volunteers who will push to Walla Walla with all possible dispatch, there establish a depot and leave a small party to guard it, and then push forward to Yakama Mission, taking with them a large supply of provisions and ammunition. At that point they can establish a post of considerable strength and be in a position to act efficiently against any Indians in that valley.67

This brief outline of the campaign was given to Governor Curry, but the orders to Shaw left little to his imagination or ingenuity. He was to send forward all his supplies to the Dalles; from there they should be sent to the mouth of the Deschutes River; whence, mainly by boats, he would ship

63 Stevens to Mason, Olympia, 17 February 1856. OLY.
64 Stevens to McCown, Olympia, 17 February 1856; Stevens to Curry, Olympia, 17 February 1856. OLY.
65 Stevens to McCown, Olympia, 17 February 1856. OLY.
66 Stevens to Curry, Olympia, 17 February 1856. OLY.
67 Ibid.
He was ordered to procure one hundred and fifty days' rations for two hundred men, as well as ox teams for transportation, fifty horses for packing, and boats for carrying freight and for the ferry to be established at Walla Walla.

The idea of these boats seems to have captivated Stevens. James Sinclair of the Hudson's Bay Company was hired as consultant regarding transportation of supplies "but especially regarding 5 boats of 12000 lbs burthen each." Notwithstanding the proffered five hundred dollar per month salary,

68 Tilton to Shaw, Olympia, 17 February 1856. OLY.

69 SUBSISTENCE for 200 MEN for 150 DAYS will be 30,000 Rations. Composition as follows.

1 lbs Pork
1# flour

Each Man per day
4 oz Beans
2 oz sugar
1 oz Coffee

Will amount to lbs of Pork 30,000
do Flour 30,000.
do of Beans 7,500
do of Sugar 3,750
do of Coffee 1,875

\[
\begin{array}{c}
30,000 \\
30,000 \\
7,500 \\
3,750 \\
1,875 \\
73,125 \\
73,125
\end{array}
\]

2 quarts of Salt to each 100 Rations 900 lbs
4 \" of Vinegar do do do 2,400 or 300 Galls.
4 lbs of Soap do do do 1,200
1\f of Candles do do do 450

\[
\begin{array}{c}
4,950 \\
\text{lbs} \ 78,075
\end{array}
\]

Amount Freight to be transported 1bs as above. Say Forty Tons.

Enclosure, Tilton to Shaw, Olympia, 17 February 1856. OLY.
Sinclair would not agree to work for Shaw until he heard from Dugald Mactavish, Chief Factor of The Company at Vancouver.72

Stevens' subordinates did not share his enthusiasm for water-borne freight. Hathaway seriously doubted the wisdom of boats, if enough animals and wagons could be obtained.73 Animals and wagons were indispensable at the Cascades, and for the haul from the Dalles to the mouth of the Deschutes, thus making of the five boats merely another problem to harass an already overburdened Quarter Master.74 Shaw also must have remonstrated against the boats, for Stevens wrote to him, "Employ either boats or wagons as you may think best but in any event decide quickly as to your choice."75

This incident serves as good proof that Stevens meant what he wrote to Hathaway;

I wish distinctly to state that every officer who takes responsibility shall be sustained by me in the prosecution of the war. And I wish it distinctly understood that I expect every officer connected with the expedition to make every effort to prosecute the war with vigour.76

To Shaw, the Governor simply stated, "go ahead and take all responsibility and you will be sustained."77 Later on we shall see that Stevens stuck by his word.

72 Hathaway to Stevens, Vancouver, W. T., 24 February 1856. OLY.
73 Ibid.
74 Ibid.
75 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 20 February 1856. OLY; Printed in Gov. Mess., 235-236.
76 Stevens to Hathaway, Olympia, 17 February 1856. OLY.
77 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 20 February 1856, OLY; Printed in Gov. Mess., 235-236.
After giving full powers to Shaw to obtain supplies for the expedition, Stevens confined himself to merely counseling Shaw.

But be sure and have enough. Better have one year's supply on hand at the close of the expedition sold at a discount, than allow our people to want food for one day. We hope to close this war in a few weeks, but we must not be behind Kam-ai-a-kun, who swears he will fight for 5 years.78

A two-front attack against the Indians was planned; one force of volunteers based at Muckleshoot Prairie or White River on the west side of the Cascade Mountains; Shaw's command would build and occupy blockhouses in Walla Walla and Yakima Valleys, east of the Mountains. The theory was that,

If the forces on White River are successful in that region, 100 men will join you from there by the Nachess Pass or the Sno-qual-mie.

But if the enemy should cross the Mountains from the Yakama we shall expect to be strengthened by your command should you find no enemy to encounter or leave in your rear.79

The Southern Battalion, two hundred strong commanded by Shaw, was ordered to leave twenty-five men to garrison the blockhouse and storehouse at Walla Walla, and another twenty-five man detachment to occupy the station at the Yakima Mission.80

If you start with 200 men this will leave you 150 for operations in the field. I am convinced that with this number you can strike a blow in the Yakima Country. But should you meet with serious difficulty; I am equally well convinced that you can hold good your position at the Yakima Mission, until we shall come to your assistance. But we on this side are hard pressed, we may want you when the snow passes off to come across the Mountains.81

78 Ibid.
79 Tilton to Shaw, Olympia, 17 February 1856. OLY.
80 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 20 February 1856. OLY; Printed in Gov. Mess., 235-236.
81 Ibid.
Only the closest communication between the two forces would render possible the successful execution of this plan. Information must be freely exchanged by means of Indian spies whom Shaw would employ. How important these spies were in the thoughts of Stevens may be gathered from his explanation that,

By occupying the Yakama Country I mean to have such control of the Yakama Country that you can send Indian spies over to me on the White River Country giving me all the facts in reference to the operation of the Indians in that quarter so I can decide whether to cross the mountains to strike them.

Shaw started gathering men and supplies for his expedition. Very quickly, Hathaway reported satisfactory progress in obtaining the necessary items. "At present," he wrote, "we have probably 2 months supplies for 200 men on hand and of some items more than that."

Not everything went so smoothly; it was hard to find good men for hire because the Army was "employing and engaging all the men they can at prices varying from $75 to $125 per month." To meet this competition, Hathaway offered four dollars per day and rations.

The real puzzle was in finding munitions. Shaw asked Wright to supply one hundred Sharp's Rifles, or if they could not be had, "substitute the common U. S. Percussion Rifles and ammunition to correspond. Also about

82 Ibid.; Tilton to Shaw, Olympia, 17 February 1856. OLY.
83 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 18 February 1856. OLY; Printed in Gov. Mess., 234-235.
84 Hathaway to Stevens, Vancouver, W. T., 24 February 1856. OLY.
85 Ibid.
86 Ibid.
50 Colt's Revolvers with ammunition for the same."87 Wright refused the request on the score that he had "no authority to make the issue."88 Next, Shaw enlisted the services of Colonel A. P. Dennison, Oregon Territorial Volunteers, to purchase one thousand pounds of Rifle powder and other supplies, in San Francisco.89 As the date of departure came nearer, Stevens appealed directly to Head Quarters of the Department of the Pacific for a ton of rifle powder.90 This request was refused by Wool.91 Nor did the General content himself with refusing to issue powder from the U. S. Government stores; when Tandler & Co., of San Francisco, asked him if they would be safe in selling $20,000 worth of goods to H. C. Crosbie who was making purchases "on account of the present Indian War in that Territory,"92 he directed his Aide to reply that the Commanding General,

knows of no war in Washington Territory, in which Governor Stevens is engaged, as there are sufficient United States Troops in the Territory

87 Shaw to Wright, Vancouver, 21 February 1856. OLY.
88 Wright to Shaw, Fort Vancouver, 21 February 1856. OLY.
89 1,000 pounds Rifle Powder
    2,000 " Lead
    50 Kentuckey Rifles
    50 Navy Size Revolvers
    20,000 Government Caps for Musket
    Also of Commissary Stores
    20 Barrels dried apples
    100 Kegs syrup 5 gal. each.
    2,000 Candles
Hathaway to Dennison, Portland, 12 April 1856. OLY.
90 Ripley to Stevens, Benicia, Calif., 29 May 1856. OLY.
91 Ripley to Crosbie, Benicia, Calif., 11 June 1856. OLY.
92 Tandler & Co. to Wool, San Francisco, 29 July 1856. AGO. Letts.
to quell Indian Hostilities. Any contract that Governor Stevens may make under these circumstances will be illegal, and in his opinion will not be sanctioned by congress.93

Fortunately for the citizen soldiers not all military personnel were so stupidly prejudiced as to deny the very existence of an Indian uprising. Lt. James Allen, U. S. N., furnished fifteen pounds of rifle powder to the Volunteers, "thus leaving only a pound or two on board" the U. S. Coast Survey Steamer Active.94 He also transported four hundred stand of Territorial muskets to San Francisco where he put them on board the mail steamer for shipment to Portland.95 This roundabout manner of forwarding the guns was unavoidable because of the difficulty of crossing the bar of the Columbia at this season of the year.96

Hand in hand with the search for rifles and rations, went the enrollment of recruits. Shaw was exhorted to continue enlisting men for his battalion.97 Canadians from Vancouver's Island were enlisted and sworn in;98 Goff enlisted discharged Oregon Volunteers in Portland; Lt. Thomas Wait recruited and purchased arms in Polk, Oregon.99 As quickly as Goff could organ-

94 Alden to Tilton, "Active," Seattle, 3 March 1856. OLY.
95 Tilton to Hathaway, Olympia, 10 March 1856; Stevens to Hathaway, Olympia, 16 March 1856. OLY.
96 Alden to Tilton, "Active," Seattle, 3 March 1856. OLY.
97 Tilton to Shaw, Olympia, 10 March 1856. OLY.
98 Fitzhugh to Stevens, Bellingham Bay, 28 February 1856. Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd., (Bellingham Bay).
99 Goff to Shaw, Portland, 17 May 1856. OLY.
ise his troops he was under orders to proceed to the Dalles and encamp outside the town, and there await further directions.\textsuperscript{100}

The original plan, it will be recalled, was to push up men and supplies to the Dalles as soon as they were obtained. From the Dalles the troops and baggage were to go to Walla Walla, build a blockhouse and storehouse, leave a guard of twenty-five men, and thence to the Yakima Mission where the procedure would be duplicated. The force in the field would immediately establish close communication with the Volunteers west of the Cascade Mountains; the plan being to afford or receive reinforcements, as events might necessitate.

All these careful designs were thoroughly jumbled by a series of Indian attacks launched upon the settlements at the end of February. No one was killed, but much stock was driven off and alarm was widespread on the west side of the Cascade Mountains.\textsuperscript{101} To quiet fear and buttress the defenses, Shaw's Southern Battalion was ordered back to Puget Sound.\textsuperscript{102} Supplies already at the Dalles were to be stored there, while only riding horses and some pack animals should be brought back with the troops returning to the Sound.\textsuperscript{103}

It was a painstaking task to arrange the expedition into the Yakima country; now it was no simple slight-of-hand trick to reverse the direction

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{100} Stevens to Goff, Olympia, 18 May 1856. OLY.
\item \textsuperscript{101} Stevens to Jefferson Davis, Olympia, 9 March 1856, in Gov. Mess., 70; Serial Set No. 822.
\item \textsuperscript{102} Tilton to Shaw, Olympia, 13 March 1856. OLY.
\item \textsuperscript{103} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
of men and supplies. Robie had barely finished arrangements for storing
supplies which were still in transit to the Dalles, when the Battalion was
recalled from a campaign not yet begun.104 All pack horses, except one hun­
dred allocated to Puget Sound, were left in depot on the Columbia;105 fifty
tonsof oats were ordered sent to Olympia; three months' supply of oats for
the animals in depot was to be left on the Columbia; fifty tons must be pur­
chased and stored for emergency before the Battalion left the Columbia.106

This proposed retrograde movement surely puzzled the men concerned
with its execution. They saw unmistakable signs of Indian hostility much
closer to themselves than Puget Sound; nearly two hundred head of horses were
taken from "15 mile Creek" by hostile Indians during the two weeks preceding
the order to abandon the interior.107 Moreover, an empty supply train return­
ing from the Volunteer camp at Walla Walla was captured near Wild Horse
Creek;108 no provisions, ammunition, or men were lost: only the animals.109

Stevens himself appears to lack some of his customary self-assurance
in handling the changed situation. Three days after summoning the Southern

104 Robie to Stevens, Dalles, 14 March 1856. OLY. A. H. Robie
was a native of Genese county, New York. He came to the Northwest with
Stevens' exploring party in 1853. After the Yakima War, during which Robie
was Quartermaster for the Volunteer troops at the Dalles, was put in charge
of the Indians at the Dalles. In 1860 he moved to Idaho and became identified
with the early growth of that region. Death overtook him on 26 July 1878
while he was pursuing the Bannack Indians.

105 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 16 March 1856, OLY.

106 Ibid.

107 Robie to Stevens, Dalles, 14 March 1856. OLY.

108 Ibid.

109 Shaw to Stevens, Vancouver, 20 March 1856. OLY.
Battalion to Puget Sound, he consulted Shaw on several topics related to the war. What did Shaw think was the plan of the Indian's campaign? How long would the Oregon Mounted Volunteers remain in the field? If the Oregon Volunteers withdrew, would the Regulars be able to handle the job? Was it probable that the Regulars could effectively occupy the Yakima country and prevent the Indians from receiving reinforcements once the snow disappeared from the mountain passes, at the end of May?

In reply to these queries, Shaw expressed his conviction that the six hundred Regulars were anxious to meet the Indians; but in view of only one company being mounted, they could do little else except repel attacks and establish posts. Their number was adequate to hold the Yakima country, but their usefulness would "depend on their officers knowing enough about the country to block the passes." Shaw thought it wise for the Regulars to occupy the country and have bands of Volunteers roaming over the land to make the Indians fear for the safety of their own homes.

How much or how little Stevens and Shaw agreed in these matters makes no difference, because the hostile natives managed to muddle the whites once again. The Indian attack on the Cascades, 26 March 1856, effected an order from Stevens, countermanding his of 13 March. Thus, the Southern Battalion was not to leave the interior "till matters are more fully developed."

110 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 16 March 1856. OLY.
111 Ibid.
112 Shaw to Stevens, Vancouver, 20 March 1856. OLY.
113 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 29 March 1856. OLY.
We saw in another place that the turmoil caused among the whites by the Cascades massacre was perfectly ludicrous, except for the unreasoning terror from which it sprang. At any rate, once the initial fright vanished, new plans were formulated. Major J. J. H. Van Boekelin was appointed to make a scout of the Naches Pass to gather information on the whereabouts of the enemy, and to determine how much snow was on the Pass. 114 After reporting to Tilton what he learned, Van Boekelin was under tentative orders to concentrate his entire command at or near Snoqualmie Falls, and from this point to guard Snoqualmie Pass. Naches Pass was left to the Regular force which was considered adequate. 115 Part of the same operation was Shaw's advance up the Nisqually River as far as the tributaries of the Yakima. 116 All these dreams collapsed when Van Boekelin begged-off from the assignment, because his available force was too small, and the flooding streams made impossible any crossing at the fords. 117

Some good news did manage to find Stevens at this time. Governor Curry of Oregon sent optimistic assurances that Lane's bill for an appropriation of three million dollars would pass Congress, thereby bringing desperately needed financial relief to the Territories. 118 George Manypenny, Commissioner of Indian Affairs, informed Stevens a few weeks later that

114 Tilton to Van Boekelin, Olympia, 14 April 1856, OLY. James Tilton was adjutant-general of the Washington Territorial Volunteers during the Yakima War.

115 Ibid.

116 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 15 April 1856, OLY.

117 Tilton to Van Boekelin, Olympia, 17 April 1856, OLY.

118 Curry to Stevens, Portland, 12 April 1856, OLY.
The appropriation of $300,000 for "restoring and maintaining the peaceable disposition of the Indian Tribes on the Pacific" has been, by the President, placed at the disposal of the Secretary of the Interior to be applied, under his direction to the object stated at the time of appropriation. 119

Stevens was authorized to draw upon this appropriation for ten thousand dollars per month. He asked power to draw fifteen thousand dollars per month since,

It must be borne in mind that I am actually feeding, in whole or in part, 5350 Indians. That the number will probably increase, that the expenses of Expresses are very heavy and that I have to take the responsibility of incurring expenses when it is a question of peace or war. 120

Although Crosbie was tussling with General Wool and merchants in San Francisco trying to purchase supplies for the Volunteers, he found time to report that

"Congress has passed an appropriation of $420,000 to defray the expenses of Indian hostilities in Oregon and Washington Territories." 121

One must not conclude that the mere mention of these very respectable sums meant that money was no longer a problem. The next chapter will indicate clearly that financial questions always plagued Territorial officials. Some money appropriated by the Federal Government was not paid out for twenty years. 122 When supplies were needed most, so was money to pay for them. Very early in the war Territorial scrip was issued, which would be redeemed when

119 Manypenny to Stevens, Washington City, 19 April 1856, Wash. SIA. Letts. from Comm. of Ind. Affs.

120 Stevens to Manypenny, Olympia, 31 May 1856. ROIA.

121 Crosbie to Wallace, San Francisco, 9 May 1856, UW.

the United States Government supplied funds to pay for the war. This expedient of printing regional money caused endless difficulties. Prices went up because merchants considered it a gamble that the Federal Government would redeem the scrip; others began buying the scrip at a heavy discount from legitimate holders as an out and out speculation; claim agents eventually made a nice living from collecting on this desperation money, and these relatively few leeches furnished the foundation for Wool's repeated charge that speculators were chiefly responsible for the continuance of the war. 123

A more immediate effect of the shortage of cash was the constant scramble for provisions and ammunition from whomsoever would part with goods and take scrip in payment. Throughout the years of Indian unrest, always someone was accusing the Hudson's Bay Company of working against the Americans. 124 Yet, this same Company not only sold great quantities of supplies to the Volunteers but, more than once, did genuine favors for the Americans. The lengths to which British colonials went in cooperating with their American neighbors, was exemplified nicely by James Douglas in February, 1856.

Stevens told Douglas, "We need powder, lead, sugar, coffee, pork, clothing, candles, soap, etc." 125 Three weeks later a confidential messenger was sent to Victoria by Stevens to purchase, on the faith of the United States government, ten or fifteen thousand dollars worth of Indian goods for distri-

123 Wool to Thomas, Benicia, 3 September 1856. AGO. Letts. Recd., 1856; Wool to Thomas, Benicia, 19 October 1856, in Serial Set No. 876.

124 Kate Blaine to D. B. Blaine, Seattle, 20 February 1856. COE.

125 Stevens to Douglas, Olympia, 7 February 1856, in 35th Congress, 2nd Session, House Executive Document No. 72 (Serial Set No. 1006).
bution among friendly Indians. Apparently the merchants of Victoria did not share Stevens' faith in the United States government, for they would not sell supplies on the strength of this altruistic trust. Douglas, thereupon, used his own personal money to purchase a quantity of sugar, coffee, blankets for troops and a supply of gunpowder. How the British governor would be reimbursed, was left up to Stevens entirely.

It should be kept in mind that the Hudson's Bay Company never claimed to be anything but a commercial enterprise carrying on business for a profit. This fact explains the growing caution with which the Company filled orders from the Volunteers. On the last day of March, 1856, Mactavish told Dr. William Tolmie at Nisqually House, "I think your stock of goods is too small to admit your making sales to any extent to the Quarter Master or Commissary General of the Territorial Troops." The day after this polite command was written, the staff at Nisqually House was "very busy in Store supplying a Govert of W. T. order for Goods." Less than two months later, Mactavish elaborated on his previous instructions, by telling Tolmie,

I would not allow any discount to Governor Stevens on his bill for Indian goods mentioned by you. Our stocks throughout this Territory are now very short without the prospect of a further supply. I therefore beg of you to be careful how you dispose of such goods as you may have on hand as there must be a pressing demand for the same at remunerating

126 Stevens to Douglas, Olympia, 29 February 1856, in Ibid.
127 Douglas to Stevens, Victoria, V. I., 7 March 1856, in Ibid.
128 Ibid.
129 Mactavish to Tolmie, Vancouver, 31 March 1856, UW.
130 Journal of Nisqually House, 1 April 1856. MS, H; Photostatic copy in LC and UW.
prices, immediately the difficulty with the interior Indians ceases.\textsuperscript{131} Perhaps this "business is business" attitude of Mactavish explains the bitterness with which Stevens lumped together the three enemies of the Americans: the Indians, the Catholic missionaries and the Hudson's Bay Company.\textsuperscript{132} The last mentioned he considered the "arch enemy."\textsuperscript{133}

Why Stevens felt this way has never been explained adequately. The Hudson's Bay Company invariably responded to his call and appeared to be his final source of supplies when all others failed him. A similar story might be told of the Catholic missionaries upon whom Stevens admittedly relied heavily. One possible explanation of the Governor's conduct toward these two groups may be found in their sincere disagreement with certain aspects of his policy toward the Indians. This hypothesis is made probable by many incidents in Stevens' career. At the close of the Walla Walla Council, June, 1855, Dr. R. H. Lansdale, who was closely associated with Stevens, remarked in his diary that, "I think our Gov. not only arbitrary, which is somewhat necessary at times, but a little tyrannical, which is never necessary."\textsuperscript{134} Like many strong characters before and since his time, Stevens was prone to consider his position the only correct one regarding the Indians, the war, or anything else.

It may be also that his apparent testiness was rooted in nothing more unusual than overwork with its consequent fatigue. Not only were matters

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{131} Mactavish to Tolmie, Vancouver, 26 May 1856. UW.
\item \textsuperscript{132} Mactavish to Smith, Vancouver, 23 October 1856. HBC.
\item \textsuperscript{133} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{134} Lansdale, Diary, 15 June 1855. MS, COE.
\end{itemize}
of policy, of strategy, and of finance brought to him, but sooner or later the annoying minutiae of citizen soldiery crossed his desk. DuFenney did not stay long enough in the Quartermaster Department to pay for the clothes he had drawn, consequently he had no pay due. 135 John Richardson decided to leave the employ of the Quartermaster Department after being hired at the personal request of Quartermaster General W. W. Miller. 136 Three Volunteers feared that the Territory could not pay her debts so they decided to go home. 137 Major H. J. G. Maxon promised six men in his company that each of their wives would receive one ration of subsistence per diem as long as the men remained in service. 138 Private Joseph Brannan and Joseph Lake killed the Indian prisoner Mowitch on his way to be tried by a Military Court sitting in Seattle. 139 Tilton asked Shaw to

induce Lake quietly to take his trial, for the purpose of getting us right before the opposition: Wool and all their people.

Brannan & Lake have killed "Mowitch" & the only thing we care about the matter is the effect it will have upon the appropriations if it is said such things are permitted by the Comder in Chief—no notice taken of the matter. 140

135 Armstrong to Hathaway, Camp Montgomery, 9 May 1856. OLY.

136 Armstrong to Weed, Camp Montgomery, 16 May 1856. OLY.

137 Armstrong to Miller, Camp Montgomery, 17 May 1856. OLY. W. W. Miller was a native of Kentucky but had spent his youth in Missouri and Illinois, coming to Washington Territory in 1852. He was appointed surveyor of customs by the President, and Quartermaster General of the Volunteers by acting-Governor Charles Mason.

138 Hathaway to Shaw, Vancouver, 22 March 1856; Tilton to Hathaway, Olympia, 14 April 1856. OLY.

139 Tilton to Henness, Olympia, 17 May 1856. OLY.

140 Tilton to Shaw, Olympia, 18 May 1856. OLY.
It is crystal clear from this letter, marked PRIVATE, that Wool's constant carping had made Stevens very sensitive, and not above the basest motives for demanding "justice."

Behind these innumerable interruptions and petty disturbances, preparations for the expedition continued. Not Wool, not lack of money, not the incessant squabbles of civilian soldiers were able to dishearten Stevens. Jared Hurd was given detailed instructions concerning the best method of moving the Volunteers to the Walla Walla country. As an example of the Governor's manner of outlining an operation, this letter may be quoted with profit.

I learn unofficially that at the Dalles, there are twenty three ox teams, 80 yokes of oxen, some forty horses, all in good order.

You will use every exertion to increase the train to thirty wagons, and ninety yokes of oxen, but not at the expense of delaying the movement of Capt. Goff's command.

By sending forward sufficient Salt say 2,000 lbs, you need only have about one half of the meat ration in reaching the Walla Walla, there will be oxen in the train fit for beef, they will soon fatten, and the main reliance will be fresh and Salt Beef.

There should be quite an excess of small rations, for with fresh meat, the usual ration of flour can be considerably reduced and the supplies sent out with the train will answer not only for Capt Goff's command and the Nez Perce auxiliaries but also for troops crossing the Cascades, in case such an expedition be determined upon.

It is hoped you will be able to send forward at least the following supplies,

20,000 lbs flour
8 to 10,000 lbs Bacon
2,500 lbs. coffee
5,000 " sugar
5,000 " ---beans, soap, candles,----
2,000 " salt

There should be tools for a Block House and ---, say 20 axes-
3 broad axes- 2 cross cut saws- 2 hand saws- chisels- drawing knives-augurs-nails- screws &c

There should also be a special kit of tools for the repair of wagons
Isaac I. Stevens

N. B. You should make your calculations for transportation at the rate of 1600 lbs per wagon. 141

A few days later word sped through the Territory that Wright's much vaunted force was in trouble on the Naches. 142 He was not in immediate danger but he could neither advance nor retreat safely. 143 Stevens warned one Volunteer commander,  "Especial vigilance must be shown on the Cowlitz. When Wright breaks the enemy, their small parties will endeavor to strike our settlements." 144

Shaw was ordered to alert his baggage train and three companies of horsemen in case it was decided to carry the war to the east side of the Cascades. 145

Meanwhile a council of officers "of the central & Southern Battalions" was called at Camp Montgomery, "to take into consideration the expediency of a movement across the Mountains." 146 They unanimously concluded that the expedition was highly necessary for the following reasons:

1st. Our crossing the mountains with our horses will force Col. Casey to remain here with his foot or rather it will devolve the neces-

141 Stevens to Hurd, Olympia, 11 May 1856. OLY. Jared S. Hurd was born in New York, and came to Olympia in 1852 or 1853 from California. He was a civil engineer and surveyor who served as a Lt. Colonel in the Washington Territorial Volunteers during the Yakima War.

142 Robie to Stevens, Dalles, 12 May 1856; Hathaway to Stevens, Vancouver, 15 May 1856; OLY.

143 Cushman to Stevens, Vancouver, 15 May 1856; Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 18 May 1856. OLY.

144 Stevens to Ford, Olympia, 18 May 1856. OLY.

145 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 18 May 1856. OLY.

146 Shaw to Stevens, Camp Montgomery, 21 May 1856. OLY.
sity of protecting the settlements on him.

But if we remain here until he starts, then we will be forced to remain and protect the settlements, while he will march a force of footmen into a country where horsemen are alone needed, thus rendering both forces inefficient.

2. The Yakimas are the ruling power in this war among the Indians and hence the necessity of breaking their main body, before we can attack them in detail.

3. Col. Wright with his footmen, can not follow them if he does whip them.

4. By remaining here we can never know what our enemy is doing one hundred and fifty miles off.

5. The volunteers must make a fight before going out of service.

6. With the troops that are left, we can with good management effectually protect the settlements, that is if any force can protect them.

7. It is necessary to have depots of provisions in the Yakima Country before winter.

8. The enemy on this side of the Mountains has been repeatedly defeated, whilst on the other side he has never been checked.147

This advice of his officers was received with misleading calm by Stevens. His direct reference to their recommendation was confined to a simple statement that, "I am well assured therefore, that should it be decided to make the movement, it will be cordially responded to."148 The actions taken were more heartening. Miller, for some days, "had been vigorously preparing the transportation and supplies to be in readiness for the movement."149

A week later, 28 May 1855, Shaw was directed to "use every exertion to have your force ready to move from Montgomery's by way of the Sno-qual-mie Pass into the Yakima Country in six days."150 While awaiting Captain W. W. DeLacy's report on the practicability of moving over the Snoqualmie Pass, Shaw

147 Ibid.

148 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 21 May 1856. OLY.

149 Ibid.

150 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 28 May 1856. OLY.
spent his time preparing the command to move. From Tilton he requested "400 lbs Rifle powder, 1,000 lbs Lead, 50,000 gun caps--of all sizes"; he informed Captain B. Henness that "You will git ready your Company for the Movement over the Mountains in three or four days if possible. I wish to git the men all together before starting"; also, he asked for the "two Clickatat spies now in Olympia." His request was futile because these Indians departed the previous day, bound for Snoqualmie and the futile negotiations with the tribes on the eastern side of the Mountains.

DeLacy reported to Shaw that it was impracticable to cross Snoqualmie Pass by wagon road. He determined to "push the wagon train to the foot of Natchess Pass with the provisions, load the pack animals with forage and cross there without further delay," unless contrary orders were sent. Instead of disagreeing, Stevens approved the movement over Naches Pass. The decision was made, at long last.

There followed some last minute instructions; Shaw was empowered to draw upon Stevens for money not exceeding $1,500, if needed, to settle accounts at the Dalles. Now that the course was determined upon, the governor was

151 Shaw to Tilton, Fort Hicks, 2 June 1856. OLY.
152 Shaw to Henness, Fort Hicks, 3 June 1856. OLY.
153 Tilton to Shaw, Olympia, 5 June 1856. OLY.
154 Shaw to Tilton, Fort Hicks, 5 June 1856. OLY.
155 Ibid.
156 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 5 June 1856. OLY.
157 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 8 June 1856. OLY.
anxious for Shaw to push ahead "with all your energy and endeavor, if possible, to start on Tuesday [10 June 1856]." As a matter of fact, it was 13 June before Shaw got under way to "remove the war from the Sound and Lower Columbia, by driving the Enemy across the Columbia." With unprecedented good luck, the command lost only one horse, had no serious accidents, was through the Pass and encamped on the Wenass within a week. They discovered no signs of Indians, much less any fighting force of hostiles. The Volunteers reached the vicinity of Wright's Camp, fourteen miles away, a week after the collapse of his peace talks with the Indians. Shaw received no information at all from Wright, but he was brought up-to-date on recent serio-comic proceedings by a letter of Haller and conversation between Haller and Shaw's messenger, Mr. Coffey. Wright was not impeded in his plodding pursuit of the hostiles by the Volunteers. Any previous offer of assistance made to the Regular Army

158 Ibid.
159 Tilton to Stevens, Olympia, 16 June 1856. OLY.
160 Stevens to Shaw, Reynier, 10 June 1856. OLY.
161 Armstrong to Miller, Camp on Wenass, 22 June 1856. OLY.
162 Shaw to Tilton, Camp on Wenass, 22 June 1856. OLY.
163 Armstrong to Miller, Camp on Wenass, 22 June 1856. OLY.
164 Ibid.
165 Haller to Shaw, Camp on the Yakima River, Kititas Valley, W. T. 21 June 1856. OLY.
166 Shaw to Tilton, Camp on Wenass, 22 June 1856. OLY.
167 Haller to Shaw, Camp on the Yakima River, Kititas Valley, W. T. 21 June 1856. OLY.
by the Volunteers had been rebuffed. As early as 9 April 1856, Lt. Huger asked permission for Captain Kelly's Mounted Rangers to cooperate with the Regular forces "in the protection of the people of this Territory."168 Shaw's later offer of assistance was politely refused by Wright.169 To tell the truth, his steady resistance to all these advances, seems to have made Wright pleased with himself.170

Be that as it may, Shaw viewed these previous refusals as final and did not bother Wright with another offer.171 Instead, the Volunteers rested on the Wenass for two days before resuming their march to the Walla Walla. Only old signs of Indians rewarded the searching eyes of the troops as they went down the Wenass almost to its mouth, through the Yakima Valley, fording Ahtanum Creek and Naches River, thence directly across the hot, dusty plains till they struck the Columbia at about the mouth of the Umatilla River.172 Here, the command swung to the North, along the Columbia.

While descending a hill towards the bank of the River, 30 June 1856, they spied four Indians paddling along in two heavily loaded canoes.173 Shaw tried to induce them to come to us, but finding that they would not, ordered the men to fire on them, in hopes of driving them from their

168 Huger to Wright, Vancouver, 9 April 1856. OLY.
169 Wright to Shaw, Camp on the Nachess, 27 May 1856. OLY.
170 Wright to Mackall, Camp on Yakima River, Kittitas Valley, W. T. 18 July 1856. RUSAC; AGO; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Wm. N. Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 200.
171 Shaw to Tilton, Camp Opposite Fort Walla Walla, 1 July 1856. OLY.
172 Ibid.
173 Ibid.
The Indians were forced to abandon one canoe, but no one was hurt or captured in the encounter. Exactly a week before, 23 June, Wright and two hundred and twenty-five men had marched thirty-four miles to capture one old man and one old woman. If it were not for the fact that Shaw would soon vindicate himself as an Indian fighter, we might conclude rashly that there was little to choose from between Regulars and Volunteers as players in a comedy of errors.

In spite of Goff's arrival at the Dalles three weeks before, he had not reached Walla Walla prior to Shaw.

As soon as Capt. Goff arrives I "intend to send for the Chiefs of the Nez Percés, and some other Indians, probably Spokanes, and also send scouts out, and by them I shall undoubtedly find out in what direction the hostile Indians have really gone. My own opinion is that they have scattered all over the valleys of the Upper Columbia about Okinigane, Priests Rapids, Pelouse Country, &c and probably some of them may go to the buffalo country." About the only part of this plan carried into effect was the determination to await Goff's arrival. He was delayed by two of his men receiving serious burns in a Fourth of July Celebration held near Fort Henrietta.

174 Ibid.
175 Ibid.
177 Cushman to Miller, Dalles, 12 June 1856. OLY.
178 Shaw to Tilton, Camp Opposite Fort Walla Walla, 1 July 1856. OLY.
179 Ibid.
180 Goff to Shaw, Camp 4 miles above Fort Henrietta, 4 July 1856. OLY.
When Goff finally joined the waiting command, Shaw made a scout from his camp on Mill Creek, near present day Walla Walla, to the southeast toward the Grand Ronde country. The trails in this direction were reconnoitered, and the services of "Captain John" secured as guide.181

The expedition started at dark on the evening of 14 July 1856, with the majority of the command, consisting of six companies, viz: Lt. Williams, Lt. Thomas Wait, Capt. Bluford Miller, Capt. B. L. Henness and Maj. H. J. G. Maxon, in all one hundred and sixty men and officers, besides the pack train with ten days' rations. They marched all night, so as to get into the mountains before daylight, so that the dust could not be discovered. We took a trail only travelled by Indians, and but little frequented by them lately. We arrived in the Grand Ronde Valley on the evening of the 16th, and camped on a branch of the Grand Ronde river in the timber, sending spies in advance, who returned and reported no fresh sign.182

Nothing extraordinary marked the beginning of the next day, 17 July, which would end in glory for Shaw. He left Blankenship of the Central Battalion, Miller of the Southern Battalion, and W. W. DeLacy to take up the line of march for the main valley. Shaw went ahead to reconnoitre, accompanied by Maxon, Michael Marchmean, Dr. M. P. Burns and "Captain John."

After proceeding about five miles, we ascended a knoll in the valley, from which we discovered dust arising along the timber of the river.

181 Shaw to Tilton, Camp on Mill Creek, 24 July 1856, in Gov. Mess. 42. The Grande Ronde River rises in the Blue Mountains and enters the Snake about twelve miles from the extreme northeast corner of Oregon. It is about one hundred and seventy miles long and flows through a very fertile and pleasant valley of the same name. This valley, about twenty miles long and eighteen miles wide, was a noted halting place on the Oregon Trail.

182 Ibid. Major Pinckney Lugenebeel had reported to Wright that Shaw's command numbered 325, not one hundred and sixty. (Lugenebeel to Wright, Fort Dalles, 27 July 1856. RUSAC.)
the Indians had re-captured many of the animals which were taken by the Volunteers at the start of the fight. More serious was the information that Maxon had crossed the river with a small party, "and was engaged with the enemy, and wanted assistance." Wait and Williams were sent immediately with a relief detachment but returned after dark without finding Maxon. At daylight, 18 July, Miller with seventy men search the entire valley. One of their men was killed and another wounded while chasing some Indians, but no Maxon! That same night, Shaw took Henness and sixty men on a scout across the mountains. They found the body of one of Maxon's men, Tooley, the site of Maxon's camp and nothing else.

The second day after the battle, 19 July, Maxon was calmly awaiting Shaw's return to their original camp on Mill Creek. He thought Shaw had gone to the Powder River. The day following the fight he saw Miller's scouts but thought they were Indians hunting his trail. He concluded, therefore, that he was cut off from the command and the only prudent course was to return to Mill Creek. 188

187 Ibid.

188 The whole incident was the climax to a series of difficulties with Maxon and his company. Since 20 June, when he was placed under arrest by Shaw, Maxon and his company marched separately, in open disobedience, and were for all practical purposes in mutiny. Stevens asked both Shaw and Maxon to solve their problems, but at all times the Governor promised his full support to Shaw, as Commanding Officer. Shaw to Maxon, Camp on Yakima, 20 June 1856; Kemp to Shaw, Camp Yakima, 26 June 1856; Maxon to Stevens, Camp Walla Walla, 1 July 1856; Shaw to Tilton, Camp Opposite Fort Walla Walla, 1 July 1856; Maxon to Shaw, Camp Opposite Walla Walla, 1 July 1856; Armstrong to Miller, Camp on Columbia River, 1 July 1856; Stevens to Carter, Olympia, 10 July 1856; Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 10 July 1856; Shaw to Stevens, Mill Creek, 26 July 1856. OLY. Shaw to Stevens, Mill Creek, 26 July 1856. OLY; AGO. Letts, Recd., 1856.
With the re-appearance of the vanished party, Shaw could safely assess the results of the encounter. He reported that in the initial attack the command captured and afterwards destroyed about 150 horse loads of lacamas, dried beef, tents, some flour, coffee, sugar, and about 100 pounds of ammunition and a great quantity of tools and kitchen furniture. We took also about 200 horses, most of which were shot, there being but about one hundred serviceable animals.189

... It is impossible to state how many of the enemy were killed. Twenty-seven bodies were counted by one individual, and many others we know to have fallen and been left, but were so scattered about that it was impossible to count them. When to these we add those killed by Major Maxon's command on the other side of the River, we may safely conclude that at least forty of the enemy were slain, and many went off wounded. When we left the valley there was not an Indian in it, and all the sign went to show that they had gone a great distance from it.190

Three Volunteers were killed and four wounded.191

While Shaw was galloping after Indians, burning their supplies, and shooting their horses, far to the north Wright had finished his campaign. He was returning with more than five hundred natives who were using two hundred and fifty pounds of his flour each day.192 The contrast was obvious and furnished ample grounds for the exultant tone of the messages exchanged by territorial authorities. "We were all delighted by your brilliant success at Grande Ronde," Tilton told Shaw.193 The U. S. Army officers at Steilacoom

189 Shaw to Tilton, Camp on Mill Creek, 24 July 1856, in Gov. Mess. 46; Serial Set No. 906.
190 Ibid.
191 Mathew P. Burns to Tilton, Camp Mill Creek, 24 July 1856, in Ibid.
192 Wright to Mackall, Camp on Yakima River, Kittitas Valley, W. T. 18 July 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 199.
193 Tilton to Shaw, Olympia, 3 August 1856. OLY.
gave Shaw great credit and drew comparisons between his brilliant success and the inane folly of Wright. Even Finckey Lugenbeel reported to Wright that Shaw had completely routed the Indians.

Although Shaw's defeat of the Indians was not decisive in the sense that a formal surrender of the tribes resulted, nonetheless it did much to bolster the morale of the Territorial officials. Before news of his success reached the settlements, Shaw was given detailed instructions on how to economize on rations, how to cut down the number of men under his command, how to send home the discharged Volunteers without undue expenditure of money. Victory changed all this. The prospect of a good crop on the Sound brought Tilton's promise to Shaw that,

We have ample supplies to keep you going for the next 6 months. You may be assured that the W.T. Volunteers will not be allowed to want for any supplies as soon as there is anything in the Territory.

Flushed with the news of victory, Tilton reassured Shaw that the two hundred men in his command whose terms of enlistment would soon expire, would be replaced by those recruited in response to a new proclamation. Ten days later these plans were countermanded by a letter of Stevens which announced that,

No more troops will be raised. Col. Wright is about pushing four companies to the Walla Walla under the command of Lieut. Col. Steptoe.

194 Tilton to Stevens, Olympia, 1 September 1856. OLY.
195 Lugenbeel to Wright, Fort Dalles, 27 July 1856. RUSAC.
196 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 21 July 1856. OLY.
197 Tilton to Shaw, Olympia, 3 August 1856. OLY.
198 Ibid.
They move on the 20th instant and are expected to reach their place of destination on the 30th. You will issue the necessary orders to disband all the men raised under my recent proclamation. 199

It would be pleasant to narrate that the Volunteers smugly relinquished the field they conquered, to the United States Army to garrison. Such was not the case. By the time the Volunteers went home to their families and farms, the bloom of conquest was withered.

The first humiliation administered to the whites by the Indians was amazing in its brazenness. Lt. Albert Gates was in command of a twenty-three man escort guarding the pack train en route from the Umatilla to Walla Walla Valley. 200 John Scott's pack train had ten men and the animals needed to carry thirty-three pack loads of supplies for the troops and friendly Indians. 201 About nine o'clock in the morning, 28 August, the train was ambushed by one hundred or one hundred and fifty Indians near the crossing of the Walla Walla River, only ten or twelve miles from the Volunteer camp. Within sight of headquarters, the battle see-sawed throughout the day. Each moment, the surrounded soldiers expected the noise of gunfire would rouse their comrades and bring immediate relief. 202 A wearisome day without food or water, the rapidly diminishing ammunition supply, the defiant Indians under cover of darkness creeping stealthily within fifteen and twenty yards of their lines, were all factors in the decision to abandon the train. The Volunteers sneaked

199 Stevens to Tilton, Vancouver, 13 August 1856. OLY.
200 Gates to Shaw, Walla Walla Valley, 31 August 1856. OLY.
202 Gates to Shaw, Walla Walla Valley, 31 August 1856. OLY.
past the Indian sentries at eleven o'clock that night and reached the safety of camp in the morning.203 The whole train was left behind.204 There must have been jubilation among the Indians as they combined these eighty horses with the fourteen cut off from this same train when at Butter Creek three days previously.205 Gates and his companions consoled themselves with the meagre fact of having no one killed, only two men and one horse wounded.206

To make matters worse for the defeated Volunteers, Stevens was in the Valley at the time to renew peace talks with the Indians. He liked nothing that he heard about the setback, and its possible consequences worried him. The blame for losing the train was spread among several people, including Goff and Williams for failing to take the positions assigned them by Shaw, but Stevens' final word was, "the pack train should not have been abandoned."207

203 Ibid.

204 Captured by the Indians, also, at Walla Walla River Aug. 28th 1856, as follows, viz: 46 horses branded W. T., 34 pack saddles and ropes, 42 pr. Pack Saddle blankets and 21 private or individual sleeping blankets owned by the following named persons, viz: .... Also the following Commissary Stores viz:

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<tr>
<th>2200</th>
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<td>30</td>
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<td>H. B. Pants</td>
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| 48     |        | Und. Shirts.

Armstrong to Shaw, Fort Mason, 1 September 1856. OLY.; R. H. Lansdale, 30 August 1856, Diary. MS, COE.

205 Ibid.

206 Gates to Shaw, Walla Walla Valley, 31 August 1856. OLY.

207 General Orders No. 6, Head Quarters, W. T. V., Fort Mason.
Worse yet, in view of his impending talks with the tribes, was the certainty that, "The affair will be bad in its effects upon the Cayuse, Walla Walla, and tribes thence in the direction of the Dalles."208 Gaiety did not run riot when the news reached the settlements. On the contrary,

Great mortification is felt here on account of this loss, which nobody blames Shaw for—but everyone fears will seriously embarrass the making of a Treaty, as those engaged in the assault, or their friends, will be inflated thereby & may want to keep the battle up.209

Later events showed the wisdom of these dire prophecies.

Governor Stevens was present in the Walla Walla Valley by no accident. We know he planned to return for further talks with the interior tribes, because as early as 24 April he asked Wright to furnish an escort of one company.210 A general council was called of all the tribes "occupying the country from the Blue Mountains to the 49th Parallel, and from the Main Columbia to the Bitter Root Mountains."211 Stevens,

invited the Tribes in arms against the Whites to come to that Council—the terms being unconditional submission and the giving up of murderers and instigators to war to punishment.212

The main object of the council, however, was to strengthen and confirm the friendship of tribes, who had not broken into hostility.213
Upon his arrival in Walla Walla Valley, 23 August, Stevens sent expresses to the Nez Percé, Spokane, Colville and Coeur d'Alene announcing his presence.214 Ravalli relayed the message to the tribes and accompanied them to the council. Stevens hoped to impose his terms on the Indians if Ravalli was there to help him.215 What really happened will appear shortly.

It was evident before long that the original date set for the council, 26 August, would not be met.216 Reports flowing into the Governor's hands revealed that much uneasiness was current among the interior tribes.217 With the exception of the Nez Percé, Stevens admitted that, "a little thing may precipitate all the remaining tribes into war."218 To attract these natives away from the brink of war to a peace conference was a nerve-straining business. Uncertainty was the keyword describing the entire affair. Before the bands began arriving, Stevens was dependent upon reports of Ravalli and other friendly people in the interior for all information concerning the probable success of the meeting.219 The actual eve of the council's opening found Stevens appealing to Steptoe to move his command from Mill Creek to the Council Ground. The request was refused by Steptoe for several reasons: it had reached him at nine P. M. after his camp was made; he did not consider the

214 Ibid.
215 Ricard a de Mazenod, Olympia, 21 November 1856. OMI; OMI-r.
216 Stevens to Manypenny, Dalles, 18 August 1856. ROIA.
217 Stevens to Samuel Swartwout, Walla Walla Valley, W. T., 31 August 1856. OLY; Printed in Gov. Mess., 123.
218 Ibid.
219 Ibid.
council opportune and thought it should be adjourned; and his instructions from Wool did not authorize him to act as guard for Stevens' party.220 With antagonism between the whites unchanged, and enmity between Indian and whites increased, the council opened on the following day, 11 September 1856.221

Assembled for the opening session at 11 A. M., were representatives of the Nez Percé, Cayuse, Wallawalla, Des Chute, John Day's and Palouse tribes.

The first day was confined to a lengthy speech by Stevens in which he repeatedly affirmed his friendship toward the Indians, and reiterated his request that they express their grievances bluntly.223

Hardly were the talks begun on the next day, when Stevens' desire for straightforwardness was abundantly satisfied. Tum-Neh-How-Lish, a Cayuse, spoke for many as he asked,

Why are you talking to us? I have a head to think, a heart to feel, and breath in my body; I am equal to you. For that reason, as we are equal, I do not know why you are to tell me what to do.224

This was only the beginning. Through the long afternoon, until almost sundown, the Indians unburdened themselves.225 What the Governor heard

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220 Steptoe to Stevens, Camp on Mill Creek, 10 September 1856, in Gov. Mess., 177.

221 "Official proceedings of a council held in the Walla Walla Valley, Washington Territory, by Isaac I. Stevens, Govr and Suprt of Indian Affairs, W. T., 11 September to 17 September 1856. MS, ROIA.

222 Ibid.

223 Ibid.

224 Ibid.

frightened him, and he made no attempt to conceal his alarm from Steptoe to whom he turned again for military protection. 226 "One half of the Nez Perces and all the other tribes, except a very few persons, are unmistakably hostile in feeling," Steptoe was told. 227 For this reason,

I particularly desire you to be present today, if your duties will permit, and I will also state that I think a company of your troops is essential to the security of my camp. 228

Steptoe still had no time for the council. He was busy preparing his winter camp; and much valuable property, recently unloaded and still lying on the ground, required everyone of his men to guard it. 229 He did send the company of dragoons to escort Stevens' party to the Army camp in case the governor desired to come. 230 He did not so desire.

An additional five futile days were spent in useless talking before Stevens adjourned the council, 18 September. 231 Steptoe finally attended the session of 17 September long enough to satisfy himself that no good was effected by assembling the tribes. 232 Stevens also conceded that the council had failed but he charged his failure to the want of support received from

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226 Ibid.
227 Ibid.
228 Ibid.
229 Steptoe to Stevens, Camp on Mill Creek, W. T., 15 September 1856, in Gov. Mess., 178-179.
230 Ibid.
231 Steptoe to Wright, Camp on Mill Creek, 16 September 1856, in Serial Set No. 876.
232 Ibid.
the Regular Army,233 and from Ravalli.234 Doubtless, the Hudson's Bay Company would have been added to make it a trio of enemies, if Stevens had read Macavish's report that

Governor Stevens went up there lately, with the view of making a treaty, with the Nez Perces and other tribes in that region, but has now returned without doing any good.235

Stevens thought the council was a failure; Steptoe was sure it was a great blunder; the missionaries knew it was labor in vain; and the Indians proved it was a fiasco. The natives were not content that the governor depart quietly for some soothing refuge in which to let his wounded soul heal. Soon after his large train was under way, 19 September, the day following the close of the council, a large group of Indians fell upon the erstwhile negotiators about three and a half miles from Steptoe's camp. Stevens stopped on a small stream to await help before opening fire on the estimated two hundred and fifty natives facing him.236

By the time Stevens' call for help reached Steptoe, he was ready for some assistance himself. The Indians burned-off all the grass near his

233 Ibid.

234 Ricard à de Mazenod, Olympia, 21 Novembre 1856. OMT; OMI-r. Charles Joseph Eugene de Mazenod (1782-1861) was born of a noble family in southern France; went into exile in Italy during the Revolution. Upon his return to France at the turn of the century, he studied for the priesthood and was ordained at Amiens on 21 December 1811. Soon after, he gathered a small group of missionaries to preach in the vernacular. Out of this group grew the Congregation of Oblates of Mary Immaculate. De Mazenod succeeded to the See of Marseille in 1857, continuing as Superior General of the Oblates until his death in 1861.

235 Macavish to Smith, Vancouver, 8 October 1856. HBC.

236 Stevens to Steptoe, (Walla Walla Valley, 19 September 1856), in Serial Set No. 876.
camp, and in this way forced him to send his horses quite a distance to pasture. If he sent the dragoons to save Stevens they could not guard the horses of the command.

Besides that, the company could not return to me for some time, and the Indians would probably turn all their attention to the few men left with me. I have no block houses and shall expect to be annoyed much. 237

Steptoe had no intention of abandoning the governor to his fate, so he suggested that,

Under these circumstances, you do not think I had better use your train and move with you to the Umatilla, or some point beyond, where you would be safe from molestation, and I could find grass abundant? If I had my train I would not hesitate a moment, but would join you in the morning with my whole command rather than part with the only mounted men I have. What do you think of returning to this camp tonight or in the morning, taking my baggage up in your waggons, and our moving together? 238

Stevens thought the suggestion of moving to the Umatilla good, but it is impossible for me to move back without assistance. We have around us about 300 Indians. Send your dragoons and a portion of Fletcher's company as soon as possible, and I will go back to your camp. 239

The reception of this message at 11 P. M. ended all dilly-dallying. Steptoe immediately dispatched Lt. Henry Davidson with half of his company, a howitzer under Lt. John Turner, and fifteen riflemen under Lt. Nathaniel Wickliffe, with orders to attack the Indians surrounding the governor, and bring him back to camp; which duty was handsomely performed, and the whole party returned about four o'clock in the morning of 20 September. 240


238 Ibid.

239 Stevens to Steptoe, 9½ P. M., 19 September 1856, in Serial Set No. 876.

240 Steptoe to Wright, Fort Walla Walla, W. T., 20 September 1856,
The combined forces pooled men, animals and tools to erect a strong blockhouse in two days. The new outpost was garrisoned by Crawford Fletcher's company and a detail under Lt. Alexander Piper in charge of the howitzer. Here all the baggage was stored before Stevens and Steptoe marched for the Umatilla at 10 A.M., 23 September.

Stevens was beyond molestation, and Steptoe had his "grass abundant" on the Umatilla by 26 September. One might remark that their passage bore slight resemblance to that of a conquering horde.

The presence of Steptoe and his four companies, three of infantry and one of dragoons, is the only fact yet to be explained in connection with this final phase of the fighting war. Shaw's victory in the Grand Ronde country; the shame of abandoning the pack train, to the Indians; and the collapse of Stevens' meetings made this almost exclusively an operation of the Washington Territorial Volunteers. How and why the Regular army was on the scene just before the curtain descended on the closing act needs some elucidation.

In the middle of July, while he was still collecting his entourage of Indians along the We-nat-cha River, Wright received orders from Wool to occupy the Walla Walla Valley. It was 17 August before Wright reported the departure of Steptoe and four companies to establish a post in the Walla

241 Steptoe to Wright, Camp on the Umatilla, 26 September 1856, in Ibid.; Archer to his Mother, Fort Simcoe, 3 October 1856. MD.

242 Wright to Mackall, Camp on the To-pon-ish Creek, W. T., 3 August 1856. RUSAC; Printed in Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 200.
Walla country. This disposition of troops practically completed Wool's plan of occupation for the Indian country. Wright was satisfied that quiet could be maintained "with four camps at Walla Walla, four in the Sim-oce Valley, one at the Cascades, and two at this place [Fort Dalles]."  

Wright saw to the forwarding of twenty-five thousand "rations of subsistence to Walla Walla with a good supply of Quartermaster & Medical stores." These were intended for Steptoe's use while he executed the orders to erect temporary buildings for the winter. He reached the Valley on 5 September 1856, and was taken up immediately with the job of guarding the supplies then arriving from Fort Dalles. He was honestly busy carrying out his own orders during Stevens' council. Wool, moreover, specifically forbade him to help or associate with the governor, as commander of a military expedition. This explains Steptoe's adamant refusal to send troops to the council, or to participate in any of Stevens' activities until it became a question of survival.

The withdrawal of Steptoe to the Umatilla to find grass for his horses, put a stop to any impressive occupation of the country. Fletcher's company in the hastily constructed blockhouse was the sole symbol left to remind the brooding tribes of the military might of the United States.

A month passed before Wright reached Walla Walla to personally

243 Wright to Mackall, Fort Dalles, 17 August 1856. RUSAC.
244 Wright to Mackall, Fort Dalles, 19 August 1856. RUSAC.
245 Wright to Mackall, Fort Vancouver, 24 August 1856. RUSAC.
246 Steptoe to Wright, Fort Walla Walla, 20 November 1856. RUSAC.
247 Ibid.
select the site for a winter station. He chose a spot on Mill Creek, "a few miles lower down than the Block House, where the grass is good, & the view over the country more extensive." As soon as the location was determined upon, the troops were put to work erecting temporary quarters. The blockhouse, storehouses, hospital, and company huts were well along by 30 October and would be finished within ten days; the huts for the officers would be completed by 20 November.

Actually, Wright spent most of his time talking to the Indians during his stay at Walla Walla. His reports for this period have an elusive overtone of glee at the constant criticism levelled at Stevens and the Treaty of 1855, by the Indians in their interviews with Wright. We know that he considered the recent council an unfortunate fact. With this admitted prejudice against Stevens' Indian policy, one can see Wright agreeing with the Indians as they blame the war on the treaty of 9 June 1855, or on the wanton conduct of Shaw's Volunteers. Wright would solve all problems and bring peace to the land, by having the entire management of Indian affairs in the hands of the War Department.

248 Wright to Mackall, Camp on Walla Walla River, O. T., 16 October 1856. RUSAC.

249 Ibid.

250 Wright to Mackall, Camp Fort Walla Walla, O. T., 30 October 1856. RUSAC; AGO, Letts. Recd., 1856.

251 Wright to Mackall, Fort Walla Walla, O. T., 30 October 1856. RUSAC; AGO, Letts. Recd., 1856.

252 Wright to Mackall, Camp at Fort Walla Walla, O. T., 31 October 1856. RUSAC.

253 Wright to Mackall, Camp at Fort Walla Walla, 31 October 1856. RUSAC.
The interest of the Indians, alike with that of the Government demand it--The Indian Department cannot control the Indians without the aid of the Military--The latter can perform all the duties of the Ind. Dept. The Indians will be much better satisfied--They will not be embarrassed by conflicting counsels--They will know what to rely upon.

This final pronouncement of the "great pacificator" did nothing to change the official attitude of the Federal Government but the ideas expressed by him were put in practise during the ensuing winter. The army was in winter garrison at Fort Simcoe in the Yakima country, the Cascades of the Columbia, Fort Dalles, and at Fort Walla Walla, which meant that the army was in charge. Wright reported everything quiet in his district by 4 December 1856. His subordinate, Steptoe, displayed more uneasiness over existing conditions, when he wrote,

I am not at all satisfied as to the peace status at present existing between us & the Indians, generally. My conviction is that no little tact & management will be necessary to maintain it next summer. Certain influential men amongst them continue to harangue & will not suffer the minds of the better disposed to be at rest. You may rely upon one thing, a strong well appointed force here and a firm, kind conciliating course can alone prevent an outbreak.

Steptoe probably had no intention of penning a classic summation of a year's operations, but he did. The United States Army, under Wright, had pursued the Indians into the mountain fastnesses of the north; the Volunteers, under Shaw, pursued, killed and scattered the Indians in the south; the army and the Volunteers had driven the Indians into hiding in the west; and Steptoe was speculating on a fresh outbreak when the snow was off the trails! Appar-

254 Wright to Mackall, Camp at Fort Walla Walla, O. T., 31 October 1856. RUSAC.

255 Wright to Mackall, Fort Dalles, 4 December 1856. RUSAC.

256 Steptoe to Wright, Fort Walla Walla, 5 December 1856. RUSAC.
ently, he was not one of those who supposed the Indian war was nearly over. Instead of a huge, terrifying orgy of mass blood-spilling marking the end of the Yakima War, it closed ingloriously on a note of indecision, hesitation, doubt and suspense.

257 Charles Stevens to his Sister, Emma, Astoria, 6 July 1856. LC.
CHAPTER IX

RESTLESS CALM

Peace settled over the Indian country— a peculiar seething, restless calm supplanted open warfare. Nothing had been settled except the fact that organized bands of armed Indians were no longer prowling about. In this uneasy atmosphere the military, civil, and religious forces in the Territory assumed their changed roles. The Army was occupying the enemy country with garrisons in the Walla Walla Valley, at Fort Dalles, Fort Simcoe, the Cascades, Fort Vancouver, Fort Steilacoom, to mention the posts of greater importance. To further complicate matters, and as added proof that the recent war had taught the whites little or nothing, the military men initiated an Indian policy of their own. The whites, singly and collectively, had failed to conquer the Indians; yet the civil and military authorities now put in operation distinct, un-coordinated methods of treating with the tribes. This senseless working at cross-purposes helped precipitate the recent war, so there was no reason for anticipating better results from a continuation of the identical stupidity.

It will be recalled that one result of Wright's expedition in search of a foe was the construction of Fort Simcoe as a military post in the heart of the Yakima country. 1 When the soldiers were in the midst of their feverish

1 Wright to Mackall, Camp on the To-pon-ish Creek, W. T., 3 August

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race to finish Fort Simcoe and get under cover before winter set in. Shaw, as a representative of Stevens, travelled into the Yakima country to gather what information he could in reference to the disposition of the Indians towards the whites. This trip of a civilian Indian agent, through country claimed by the Army as its domain, occasioned Shaw's recommendation to Stevens that the only solution of the Indian problem lay in the establishment of reservations by the government. "This way the object of the Government will be shown practically, and gradually the Indians taught to consider the reservations as their home." This opinion, of course, had motivated Stevens from the beginning of his tenure as Superintendent of Indian Affairs; it had been vigorously opposed by the Army. The unchanged attitudes of the two white parties gave promise of nothing but trouble, at a time when cooperation against a common enemy was indispensable.

Every white man was deeply interested in the whereabouts of the vanished Indian chiefs. They were leading no armed warriors at the moment, but the whites would sleep better at night if they knew where the chiefs were and what they were planning. Kamaakan was supposedly in the Nez Perce country revenging himself upon the members of that tribe who escorted Stevens on 1856, RUSAC; Printed in William N. Bischoff, S. J., "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 206.

2 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Simcoe, W. T., 20 October 1856, MD.

3 Shaw to Stevens, Olympia, 20 December 1856. Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd., (Central District).

4 Ibid.

his return from the Blackfoot Council in December, 1855. William Craig, Indian agent for the Nez Percé, considered it time well spent to check the movements of Kamaiakan since he was convinced that Indian affairs "are as far or further from being settled than last Spring." Wright had sent word to the Nez Percé that they were not to harbor Kamaiakan nor any other of the hostile chiefs. The Nez Percé chief, "Looking Glass," assured Steptoe that Kamaiakan had been an uninvited guest of the Nez Percé for two days, and only two days. Perhaps it helped the morale of the army to know that the man they could not capture or conquer had become a wandering fugitive.

Precisely what transpired during these months is practically impossible to determine. Slight indications cropped-up, but scarcely ever with sufficient continuity to form the basis for any solid deductions. A month or so after Skloom had run off the cattle belonging to Fort Simcoe and taken prisoner the chief herder, Fred White, three men from Skloom's camp came into Fort Simcoe to surrender themselves. They said they had been driven off by Skloom. "They also said Skloom was abandoned by most of his men, and had broken up his camp." Was this true? Were these men sincerely disaf-

7 Ibid.
8 Wright to Mackall, Fort Dalles, 4 February 1856. RUSAC.
9 Ibid.
10 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Simcoe, W. T., 5 January 1856. MD; White to Woodruff, Columbia River, 2 February 1856. RUSAC.
11 Woodruff to Wright, Fort Simcoe, 10 February 1856, RUSAC.
12 Ibid.
fected toward Skloom or were they spies? Should they be treated as prisoners, as hostages, or as enemy agents? No one at Fort Simcoe could say for certain.

There was also Kamaiakan's release of White, the chief herder.13 Was this a friendly gesture; or did fear of reprisals dictate this seeming magnanimity? Kamaiakan let word drop that he intended to surrender himself in the spring, but Skloom and Owhi talked differently.14 "Looking Glass" told Steptoe that Kamaiakan had been among the Nez Percé for two days;15 Craig told Stevens that Kamaiakan was still visiting the Nez Percé.16 The situation was utterly confusing. To make preparations was time ill-spent since there was nothing tangible to prepare for. The army did ban any further settlement of whites in the country "East of the White Salmon River & North of the Columbia in Washington Territory & East of the River Des Chutes in Oregon."17 All white people within these limits were to be removed, except the agents of the Hudson's Bay Company, the miners near Colville, and those who settled under terms of the Donation Law.18 The military thus took a firm stand for a conciliatory policy toward the Indians, by recognizing the existence of Indian country which was not open to indiscriminate settlement by


14 Ibid.

15 Wright to Mackall, Fort Dalles, 4 February 1856, RUSAC.


18 Ibid.
The three officers actually commanding garrisons in the Indian country were of one mind in toning down demands that those guilty of killing Bolon and Mattice be surrendered before any talk of peace be entertained. Wright thought it would be poor "policy to demand the murderers of Bolon at this moment, especially since we have not the power to enforce it;"¹⁹ Steptoe advised an attitude of hands-off in the matter of demanding the murderers;²⁰ Garnett was persuaded that a formal or unconditional demand for the surrender of the alleged criminals,
or any attempt at their capture, could but have the effect of unsettling our relations with the Indians, and imbuing them with a feeling of distrust in our faith and professions of friendship.²¹ Garnett intended, therefore, to encourage the chiefs and the Indians to visit Fort Simcoe freely;
to treat them kindly, talk freely with them and satisfy their just complaints; to make no formal unconditional demand for the surrender of the murderers, nor any attempt to capture them . . . .²²

It was hoped that this approach would result in the Indians realizing the necessity of punishing the men who killed Bolon and Mattice. Thus, the supposed criminals would receive just punishment which would satisfy the whites, and the Indians would be content because the culprits were dealt with according to Indian law and not subjected to the great indignity of being tried in the white man's court.

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¹⁹ Wright to Garnett, Fort Dalles, 7 August 1857, RUSAC.
²⁰ Steptoe to Mackall, Fort Walla Walla, 12 August 1857, RUSAC.
²¹ Garnett to Mackall, Fort Simcoe, 15 August 1857, RUSAC.
²² Ibid.
While the United States Army spent the year waiting quietly for peace, other agencies were carrying on talks with the Indians. Owhi sent word to Mr. A. P. Dennison, Indian Agent at the Dalles, that he would like to talk with him. The agent went to White Salmon to see the war chief of the Yakima but nothing came of the meeting. Next we learn that Skloom presented himself at Fort Simcoe to express his readiness to give up the murderers of Mattice, Bolon, and any others. No one was actually surrendered. As they had in war, so now in peace the Indians took advantage of the white's complete lack of organization to keep the situation bordering on the chaotic. The various visits, talks, and negotiations between whites and Indians raise an interesting question: what would have happened if an agreement of any kind had been concluded with the military men, or with the Oregon authorities, or with Washington Territorial officials? Would any combination of two groups have recognized and respected a settlement made by the Indians with one of the three white parties competing for peace?

This speculation is idle in view of the war that disrupted all plans directed toward peace. Steptoe, with one hundred and fifty-eight men, left their camp in the Walla Walla Valley, 6 May 1858, for a scout through the Spokane country. The Coeur d'Alene, Palouse, and Spokane Indians met

23 Dennison to Nesmith, Dalles, 10 July 1857, Ore. SIA. Letts. Recd., 1857.
26 Craig to Nesmith, Walla Walla, 20 May 1858, Wash. SIA. Letts.
Steptoe's column and defeated it in the Palouse country on 17 May 1858. Vigorous steps were taken immediately to punish the new hostiles. General N. S. Clarke left Headquarters of the Department of the Pacific at Benicia, California, and came to Vancouver to superintend the organization of a punitive expedition under command of Wright. There were seven hundred men with Wright when he took the field, 7 August 1858. Indian resistance cracked under the one full-scale charge, and the running battle of fourteen miles which occurred on Spokane Plains, 5 September 1858. The hostiles were thoroughly scattered, eight hundred horses captured and shot, and on 17 September, Wright presented for signing by the Indians the "Preliminary articles of a Treaty of peace and friendship between the United States & the Coeur d'Alene Nation of Indians."  

Mention is here made of the Coeur d'Alene, Spokane, and Palouse

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28 Mactavish to Smith, Fort Vancouver, 21 June 1858; Mactavish to Smith, Vancouver, 28 June 1858, HBC.

29 Wright to Josette, Camp on the Spokane River, W. T., 10 September 1858, MSM; Printed in Bischoff and Gates, op. cit., 175; Grahame to W. G. Smith, Vancouver, 20 September 1858, HBC.

War, which would demand a separate volume for itself, only because it explains how Wright happened to capture two long-sought Yakima chiefs. Owhi entered Wright's camp, 22 September 1858, and was put in irons.\(^{31}\) Wright sent word to the Indian camp that Owhi would be hanged unless his son, Qualchen, surrendered within four days. Two days later, 24 September, the son rode into the military camp, only to be hanged within an hour after his appearance.\(^{32}\) About ten days later, Owhi was killed while allegedly attempting to escape. It had taken two years for the whites to apprehend these two prominent Yakima whose main crime was that of defeating or eluding three distinct expeditions sent against them.

Kamaiakan, however, continued to refuse the hospitality of the whites. His presence was reported from Fort Owen,\(^ {33}\) in present day western Montana, and in the spring of 1859 he surrendered to John Owen, Indian Agent for the Flatheads.\(^ {34}\) The once powerful Chief asked to see "his white father and the big soldier chief & have a fair honest talk."\(^ {35}\) He joined Owen's party as far as Walla Walla "when becoming alarmed as to his safety made his escape on the night preceding my [Owen's] departure for" Salem.\(^ {36}\)

\(^{31}\) E. D. Keyes, Fifty Years Observation of Men and Events Civil and Military, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1884, 276.

\(^{32}\) Ibid.

\(^{33}\) Owen to Nesmith, Fort Owen, W. T., 2 February 1859, Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd., (Flathead).

\(^{34}\) Owen to Nesmith, Camp on Spokane River, 7 May 1859, Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd., (Flathead).

\(^{35}\) Ibid.

\(^{36}\) Owen to Geary, Salem, 31 May 1859, Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd., (Flathead).
had changed so greatly by 1860 that Dr. R. H. Lansdale, Indian Agent among the Yakima, sought out Kamaiakan in the eastern portion of the Spokane country to ask him to act as head chief of the Yakima. Kamaiakan was cordial to Lansdale but refused positively to assume the office given to him by the Treaty of 9 June 1855. The truth of the matter was that no Indian capable of rallying the Yakima and inaugurating a settled life for them, had been found. Faced with Kamaiakan's refusal to fill the role, Geary "appointed Spencer, a Klickatat, to be temporary head chief of the Yakima nation, to serve until a permanent head shall be regularly chosen" ... If there was any humor left in Kamaiakan, he must have smiled at the peculiar twist events had taken. He was still being hunted by the whites, but now it was to obtain help from him. Despite big talk to the contrary, Kamaiakan remained the only chief with influence among the Yakima to put in operation the now-ratified Treaty of 9 June 1855. A. A. Bancroft, Indian Agent for the Yakima, made another undisguised attempt to woo Kamaiakan's favor in 1864. He sent a party of men with one hundred and fifty dollars worth of presents for the chief, as well as promises of help in building a house, improving a farm, and an annual salary of five hundred dollars. As on previous occasions, Kamaiakan spurned the gifts and the promises. This consistent refusal to par-


ticipate in the new order was Kamaiakan's most successful defiance of the Americans. His people were broken and prostrated, not from cowardice, but from lack of supplies and sheer exhaustion. No matter what the whites had done to the Tribe, they never succeeded in destroying the symbol of a proud, determined but hopeless struggle to preserve liberty--Kamaiakan. He died quietly (about 1880) in his camp, among the friendly Palouse, where he lived during the last fifteen years of his life.\(^{41}\)

There was one other major change brought on by the post-war contact of the army with Indian affairs. General N. S. Clarke honestly admitted that the Spokane War in the summer of 1858 had made him change his views regarding Stevens' treaties. Instead of persisting in his opposition, he now urged the Federal Government "to confirm them and throw the Country open to settlers."\(^{42}\) Stevens concluded the Treaty with the Yakima on 9 June 1855, at the Walla Walla Council Grounds. The agreement was not ratified by the Senate, but for three years was conveniently pigeonholed. It was read and referred to the Commissioner on Indian Affairs, 9 August 1856.\(^{43}\) More than a year and a half elapsed before the Treaty was referred to the Commissioner a second time,\(^{44}\) and another six months slipped away before it was reported out without amendment by the Commissioner.\(^{45}\) The agreement was at long last ratified in the

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\(^{41}\) A. J. Splawn, KA-MI-AKIN Last Hero of the Yakimas, Portland, Oregon Historical Society, 1944, 122.

\(^{42}\) Clarke to Nesmith, San Francisco, 3 November 1858, Ore. SIA. Letts. Recd., 1858.


\(^{44}\) Ibid., 12 January 1858, X, 287.

\(^{45}\) Ibid., 4 June 1858, X, 438.
senate on 8 March 1859, by a vote of thirty-nine to eight, with the great Henry Clay casting one of the negative votes. 46

This chronology helps explain the new-born and continued interest manifested by the whites in regard to Kamaiakan. The ratified treaty was useless without a highly respected Indian chief to implement the agreement. The efforts to win over Kamaiakan were sterile, as we saw, in spite of the fact that military and civil agencies devoted themselves to the undertaking. This failure was typical of the projects essayed by a frontier fighting force become administrator of Indian affairs. The venture of the Army into Indian affairs had not been marked by signal success. Two years of enlightened policy culminated in another war which reconverted the military to the system of negotiating treaties and establishing reservations for the Indians. This was one of the very points included among the causes of the Yakima War, so all were back where they started. The Indians began to live under terms of the ratified treaty because there was nothing else to do, and the whites did likewise for the same reason. The Army had not conquered the Indians in battle; nor had it made them see the advantages of living as wards in a land that had been their own. The soldiers could take credit for harrassing the Indians into conformity, but never into surrender.

The effects of the Yakima War were more widespread and easier to discern among the civilian population of the Territory. The history of the war is shot through and through with references to the terror induced among the citizens by their fear of an Indian attack on the settlements. Block-

46 Ibid., 8 March 1859, XI (1888), 86.
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houses were built, 47 men stood watch through the night, 48 people abandoned their farms and fled to the towns, 49 and suspicion was rife even among former friends and neighbors. 50 Out of this welter of immediate consequences of the war, Stevens' declaration of Martial Law deserves more than passing mention.

Some white people on the west side of the Cascade Mountains stayed on their farms throughout the summer and winter of 1855 without being molested by the Indians. 51 This immunity from attack and the fact of these men having Indian wives made them suspect. 52 Stevens ordered all foreign born residents on the south side of Nisqually Plains to proceed to Fort Nisqually or Fort Steilacoom. 53 Henry Smith, Gravelle, Easton, LaTour, Ross, and Charles Wren were all removed to Fort Nisqually 54 where they were supplied with the necessities of life by the Hudson's Bay Company, on the written request of Stevens. 55 The prisoners soon returned to their farms on the plea that their

47 Wright to Jones, Camp at the Cascades of Columbia River, 5 April 1856, RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 859.
48 Kate Blaine to [Sharon], Seattle, 22 November 1855, Typescript, COE.
49 Archer to his Sister, Nannie, Fort Vancouver, 10 April 1856, MD.
50 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 9 Novembre 1855, S.
51 Tilton to Hurd, Olympia, 20 February 1856, OLY.
52 Ibid.
54 Tilton to Hurd, Olympia, 2 March 1856; Stevens to H. J. G. Maxon, Olympia, 18 March 1856, OLY.
stock would die of neglect, etc. Near the end of March, H. J. G. Maxon arrested Wren, L. A. Smith, Henry Smith, John McLeod, and John McField, and sent them to Fort Steilacoom to be guarded by United States soldiers.56 Two days after their arrival "Frank Clark and W. H. Wallace, two lawyers from Steilacoom, espoused their cause and prepared to sue out a writ of habeas corpus for their release."57 To forestall this action, the Governor proclaimed martial law in Pierce Country, 3 April 1856.

Stevens has never been accused of cowardice, even by his bitter enemies, nor did he flinch under the storm of abuse that now burst over him. He was thoroughly convinced of the necessity of the measure he had taken, and satisfied that his was the legal power to suspend habeas corpus in the perilous times then facing the Territory.58 He insisted that martial law be enforced,59 and pushed arrangements for the prisoners' trial before a military commission.60

Three attempts were made to convene regular sessions of the courts, only to be stopped by the intervention of Territorial Volunteers acting under


57 Ibid., Frank Clark was born at Bighampton, New York, on 10 February 1834. After studying law at Lowell, Massachusetts, he came to Washington Territory in 1852 and settled at Steilacoom.

58 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 18 May 1856, OLY.

59 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 29 April 1856; Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 6 May 1856, OLY.

60 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 4 May 1856; Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 6 May 1856; Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 15 May 1856; Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 20 May 1856, OLY.
orders of Stevens. Chief Justice Edward Lander presided at the regular ses-
sion of court in Steilacoom on the morning of 7 May 1856.

as soon as court was called Colonel Shaw, with a file of volunteers, entered the room, arrested the judge and his clerk, and took them, together with the court records, to Olympia. A day or two later both were liberate.d.61

A week later, Lander presided over court in Thurston County, in defiance of a proclamation of martial law for this county, issued by the Governor the day before court was convened. The first business transacted was a summons addressed to Stevens to appear and show cause why he should not be penalized for contempt, to which the Governor made no reply. Lander then issued a warrant, which was also disregarded. The following day, 15 May, an attachment was issued and a posse sent to bring the contumacious Governor into court. He did not surrender, nor offer to accompany them, and they made no attempt to take him by force.62 Very shortly a detachment of mounted volunteers rode into town, led by Bluford Miller, and upon hearing of their arrival, Lander adjourned court.63 The Chief Justice was taken into custody and detained at Camp Montgomery until 26 May.

Associate-justice Francis A. Chenoweth opened court on 23 May at Steilacoom in open disregard of the Governor's proclamation. This time the matter almost got out of hand. The judge gathered about him a goodly num-

61 Snowden, op. cit., III, 488. Edward Lander was a native of Salem, Massachusetts. In 1838 he graduated from Harvard College, and entered law school. He took up the practice of law in Essex county, Massachusetts, but moved to Indiana in 1841.

62 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 18 May 1856, OLY.

63 Snowden, op. cit., 490.
citizens to protect the court on its second day in session, 24 May. Lieutenant Curtis, with about thirty volunteer troops from Camp Montgomery, arrived to put an end to the proceedings. Realizing that resistance might be offered he sent for re-inforcements, and while waiting for them, Lt. Colonel Silas Casey reached town from Fort Steilacoom. The stage was set for a miniature civil war, but Casey managed to persuade all parties that the wise course was to allow the court to function without interruption. Chenoweth immediately issued an attachment for the arrest of Shaw who was hailed into court, "but, as he refused to produce the prisoners, he was ordered into the custody of the marshal to be held without trial."64 In the July term of court, Lander fined Stevens fifty dollars for contempt, thus putting an end to this remarkable display.

By the time Chenoweth ordered Shaw's detention, the cause of all the fuss had disappeared. The prisoners had a hearing before a military court at Camp Montgomery, which ruled "that the offense charged constituted treason, and it was without authority to try them."65 Wren and McLeod were eventually tried and acquitted for lack of evidence.66

As soon as the military court ruled that the "offense charged con-

64 Ibid., 492; F. A. Chenoweth was born in 1819, in Franklin county, Ohio, and admitted to the bar in Wisconsin in 1841. He came to Oregon in 1849 and settled on the north side of the Columbia River near the Cascades. In 1852 he was elected to the legislature by Lewis and Clarke counties.

65 Ibid., 493.

stituted treason" and bound Wren and McLeod over for trial, Stevens had attained his object. He abrogated martial law, and ordered the release of Lander. The incident is an illuminating example of the pure pertinaciousness that marked Stevens when he was convinced of the wisdom or necessity of an action. Once involved in the dispute it became supremely important to him. "The Commission for the trial of the prisoners, is the crisis of the War on this side. It must go on at all hazards," he told Shaw. The distinct impression that he was backed by the majority of the people in his fight with the judiciary, confirmed him in his determination to finish what he started.

This general public support waned somewhat after the crisis passed. Stevens took up the fight to defend his conduct and vindicate his motives with energy equal to that displayed during the dispute itself. It was a bare-knuckled contest to keep from being recalled as governor. His apparent fall from grace had the good effect of revealing his real friends, in contrast to those who were friendly while he was in power. For many weeks rumours and reports relative to his removal from office were circulated.

67 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 24 May 1856, OLY.
68 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 18 May 1856, OLY.
69 Ibid.; Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 20 May 1856, OLY.
70 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 5 June 1856, OLY.
71 Walker to Stevens, Olympia, 8 August 1856; Miller to Shaw, Olympia, 20 August 1856, OLY.
72 Tilton to Stevens, Olympia, 1 September 1856; Miller to Shaw, Olympia, 2 September 1856; Tilton to Stevens, Olympia, 8 September 1856; Tilton to Stevens, Olympia, 18 September 1856, OLY.
The group opposed to Stevens, led by Lander and Kendell, were disgusted by President Pierce’s failure to remove the Governor from office.73 His friends rejoiced over Pierce confining his action to reprimanding Stevens for his proclamation of martial law,74 but not dismissing him from office.75

Although violent public indignation meetings were held against Stevens,76 vicious and grossly slanderous things said and written about him,77 and a strong resolution condemning his action passed by the Territorial Legislative Assembly,78 he survived. The same body passed a "Memorial" on 16 January 1856, asking that the offices of Governor and Superintendent of Indian Affairs be separated.79 Not only did Stevens surmount all these schemes of his enemies, but managed to get himself elected Territorial delegate to Con-

73 Tilton to Stevens, Olympia, 18 September 1856, OLY.

74 W. L. Marcy to Stevens, Washington, 12 September 1856, in 34th Congress, 3rd Session Senate Executive Document No. 41. (Serial Set No. 881).

75 Tilton to Stevens, Olympia, 5 October 1856, OLY.


77 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 5 June 1856, OLY; A Brief Notice of the Recent Outrages Committed by Isaac I. Stevens Governor of Washington Territory, Olympia, 1856.

78 "Joint Resolution Relative to the Proclamation and Enforcement of Martial Law over the Counties of Pierce and Thurston," 16 January 1857, in Laws of the Territory of Washington, Containing, Also, Memorials, Passed at the Fourth Annual Session, Begun and Held at Olympia, December 1, 1856, And of the Independence of the United States, The Eighty-Second, Olympia, Edward Furste, 1857, 86.

79 Ibid., 94.
gress in 1857. The majority of the people liked the courageous governor well enough to elect him as their representative in Washington. 80 He must have taken a certain amount of pardonable satisfaction in thus confounding those who would have enjoyed nothing more than seeing him defeated and disgraced.

There was another class of people in the Territory unable to count any gains from the war—the Catholic missionaries. Nesmith's Volunteers took care to leave nothing at the Yakima Mission except a heap of ashes, which symbolized perfectly the destroyed hopes and plans of the priests. 81 Less than a year after the wanton destruction of the buildings, even the gardens and wheat fields were deserted and trampled down. 82 Pandosy and Durieu retreated with the Indians as they eluded Rains' expedition, and reached St. Paul's Mission on the Kettle Falls of the Columbia River 83 after eight days. 84 Here the missionaries rested from their journey 85 and recuperated from their


81 Pandosy à D'Herbomez, Saint Joseph d'Esquimalt, 25 Avril 1862, OMI.

82 Aroher to his Sister, Nannie, Camp on Attanem River, 12 September 1856, MD.

83 Joset ad Beckx, Colvile, Ex Missione S. Pauli, 7 Maii 1856, SJ-


recent diet of roots and berries. 86 Their safe arrival at the Jesuit missionaries' establishment was reported to Ricard, and the other anxiously awaiting Oblates at Olympia, 87 but no letter from Pandosy reached his Superior until February, 1856. 88 Through the spring the exiles lived at St. Paul's. 89 During July and August Pandosy worked tirelessly to bring peace to the country by cooperating closely with Wright who was seeking the Indians in the northern reaches of Washington Territory. 90 For the remainder of the year, Pandosy and Durieu lived with one camp of the Yakima simply because the Mission was a shambles. 91 The well-disposed Christian Indians had left their homeland for the Dalles, Colville, or Nisqually. 92 The warmongers among the tribes resented the priests for their unrelenting efforts for peace, 93 while the soldiers, busy building Fort Simcoe, held the missionaries suspect al-

86 J. M. O'Sullivan, "History of Yakima," Typescript, MSM.
87 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 24 Janvier 1856, OMI, S.; Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 1 Fevrier 1856, S.
88 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 14 Fevrier 1856, S.
89 Ricard à Brouillet, Olympia, 16 Avril 1856, S; Joset ad Beckx, Colville, Ex Missione S. Pauli, 7 Mai 1856, SJ-r; Demers à Ricard, Victoria, 7 Juillet 1856, OMI.
90 G. O. Haller, "Diary of 3rd Expedition into the Yakima Country," 6 July 1856, 28 August 1856, MS, UW; Wright to Jones, Camp on the We-nat-cha River, Northern Washington Territory, 7 July 1856, RUSAC; Printed in William N. Bischoff, S. J., "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-America, XXXI (1949), 195.
92 D'Herbomez à de Mazenod, Olympia, 22 Aout 1857, OMI, OMI-r.
93 D'Herbomez à de Mazenod, Olympia, 22 Avril 1857, OMI, OMI-r.
though they would be tolerated as long as they acted as unpaid spies for the whites.  

Atmosphere such as this was hopeless for missionary work. Hence, in response to their request for directions, Pandosy and Durieu were ordered to abandon the Yakima Mission. About the beginning of April, Pandosy returned to St. Paul's at Colville and Durieu went to Olympia with Brother Surel, where they joined Chirouse, Richard and Brother Janin who had returned from the Cayuse Mission. This action by the Oblates, without consulting Bishop A. M. A. Blanchet of Nisqually, elicited an unavailing letter of protest from the prelate. D'Herbomez was thoroughly convinced of

94 D'Herbomez à de Mazenod, Olympia, 22 Août 1857, OMI, OMI-r.

95 Ibid.


97 Ibid.

98 D'Herbomez à de Mazenod, Olympia, 22 Avril 1857, OMI, OMI-r.


100 D'Herbomez à de Mazenod, Olympia, 22 Avril 1857, OMI, OMI-r; Chirouse à Charpeney, Mission des Snohomish, 15 Février 1860, in Rapport sur Les Missions du Diocèse de Quebec, etc., (Mars, 1861), 163.

101 Notice Historique et Statistique sur la Congregation des Missionnaires Oblats de Marie Immaculee et Compte-Rendu de l'Année 1857-1858, (Marseille, Marius Olive, 1858), 20-21. Janin was an Oblate lay-brother who had come to the Oregon missions with Father Louis D'Herbomez in 1850.

102 D'Herbomez à de Mazenod, Olympia, 22 Août 1857, OMI, OMI-r.

103 A. M. A. Blanchet à D'Herbomez, Vancouver, 10 Août 1857, in D'Herbomez à de Mazenod, Olympia, 22 Août 1857, OMI, OMI-r.
the wisdom of closing the Mission and had no intention of jeopardizing the lives of his men in country to which real peace had not returned. 104 The Mission was closed, and closed it would remain. Durieu, Chirouse, and the other men recalled to Olympia set to work among the Indians and whites around Puget Sound. 105 Pandosy lived a full life during the next two years, laboring among the tribes near St. Paul's at Kettle Falls and the Coeur d'Alene attached to Sacred Heart Mission. 106

These Missions were under the care of the Jesuits, which meant that Pandosy, no matter how fruitful and appreciated his work was, could not be perfectly content. He wanted the satisfaction and the challenge of a more personal mission field. His desire was fulfilled on the night of 8 October 1859 when he "reached the spot chosen for our new mission. It is a large valley on the left shore of Lake Okanagan about half-way up the lake." 107 This move into New Caledonia was the end of the trail, the end of the Yakima War for the Oblate Missionaries.

That the economic structure of the Territory underwent a severe shaking up as a result of the war was to be expected. Ordinary business came

104 D'Herbomez à de Mazenod, Olympia, 22 Août 1857, OMI, OMI-r.

105 Fitzhugh to Simmons, Bellingham Bay, 21 September 1856, Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd., (Bellingham Bay); Paige to Stevens, Kitsap Reservation, 31 October 1856, Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd., (Kitsap Reservation); Fitzhugh to Stevens, Bellingham Bay, 4 November 1856, Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd., (Bellingham Bay); Stevens to Ricard, Olympia, 10 November 1856, OMI, OMI-r.

106 Pandosy à D'Herbomez, Mission des Coeurs d'Alene, Août, 1857, OMI.

107 Pandosy à D'Herbomez, Anse au Sable, 9 Octobre 1859, OMI.
to a standstill as everyone turned his efforts to the problem of survival. Before the end of the war Wool would accuse the civil authorities and private speculators of starting and continuing the war for reasons of personal gain, a charge without proof if applied to the citizens in general. Certain ones did unload worn-out horses, surplus beef, and flour at fancy prices to the United States Army and to the Volunteer forces; and without frequent examples of personal property and money lost in supporting the war, credence might be given to the tales of speculation. The war actually did swallow up much of the capital of the country--has dried up some of the fountains of productive wealth in our midst. Much of the surplus property of the country of the past year, instead of being exchanged for cash and such goods as our people are compelled to import for their own consumption, has been exchanged for a class of paper commonly termed war scrip, the remote and uncertain time of repayment causes wise and shrewd financiers to shrug their shoulders and look doubtful and hesitate.

There was a shortage of coin in the Territory before the war ever

108 Keller to Foster, Teekalet, W. T., 11 November 1855; David Blaine to [Sharon], Portland, 19 March 1856, Typescript, COE.

109 Wool to Thomas, Benicia, 19 October 1856, in Serial Set No. 876, 1856.

110 Wool to Thomas, Benicia, 3 September 1856, AGO. Letts. Recd., LC.

111 Charles Stevens to his Brother, Levi, Astoria, 10 March 1856, COE.

112 David Blaine to Sharon, Portland, 19 March 1856, Typescript, COE.

113 Keller to Foster, Teekalet, W. T., 6 July 1856, COE; (George Collier Robbins), "The Pioneer Reminiscences of George Collier Robbins," Typescript, MSM, Printed in Pacific Monthly, XXVI (1911).

114 The Western Standard, San Francisco, Saturday, September 13, 1856.
started, so the resort to regional scrip was not surprising.\textsuperscript{115} The heavy drain put on the territorial resources of food, animals, and manpower raised prices to an exorbitant level for those times, thus making necessary the issuance of some kind of tender to carry on trade. War Scrip was, in reality, a printed promise of the Territorial Government to redeem this paper with legal money which was expected from an appropriation by the United States Congress.\textsuperscript{116} When formal war ended there was $909,067.20 in scrip outstanding.\textsuperscript{117} This staggering sum, for an as yet meagerly developed frontier territory, represented the cost of the war in money, advanced by the citizens of the Territory. It also constituted a serious financial hazard, since no inconsequential part of the liquid assets of individuals was frozen until such time as the Federal Government saw fit to assume the obligation of paying debt incurred in the suppression of Indian hostilities. This war debt rapidly acquired the stature of a crippling blow to the Territory's economic life, for reasons we shall examine in a moment. Before sketching the history of the war debt, it will be interesting to note the effects of war-borne inflation on the lives of ordinary people.

Two separate military organizations bidding against each other for supplies and services, not only induced shortages, but pushed up prices to astronomical heights. Requisitions for one hundred pack animals, one hundred

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{115} Palmer to Stevens, Portland, 23 April 1855, Ore. SIA. Letts. Recd., D: 198.
  \item \textsuperscript{116} Wool to Thomas, Benicia, 3 September 1856, AGO. Letts. Recd., 1856.
  \item \textsuperscript{117} Miller to Stevens, Olympia, 29 November 1856, OLY; Printed in Gov. Mess., 50-54.
\end{itemize}
tons of oats, or for forty thousand pounds of flour, four thousand pounds of coffee, eight thousand pounds of sugar, and five thousand pounds of bacon quickly wiped out readily available surpluses at reasonable prices. Field expeditions furnished other examples of the great burden placed on the sparsely settled territory. Three hundred and fifty men, forty-five wagons, one hundred and forty-two pack animals, twenty-seven packers, fifty thousand gun caps, one thousand pounds of lead, and four hundred pounds of rifle powder, not to mention the food required, meant money when there was only scrip. The supply of labor was even less plentiful. According to an official estimate in 1855, the year war began, there were one thousand and seven hundred white adult males in Washington Territory. This limited population had to fill the ranks of the Territorial Volunteers, try to raise crops to fill the requisitions of the Army and Volunteer forces, and satisfy the demands of both for non-military employees as packers, guides, herdsmen and the like. The result could have been foretold: Army and civil authorities scrambled to attract the available men, and this at ever-increasing cost. Finally, four dollars a day and rations was the accepted opening offer. What sounds like small change today, was a princely recompense in 1856.

118 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 16 March 1856, OLY.
119 Stevens to Shaw, Olympia, 21 July 1856, OLY.
120 Annual Message of the Governor, 1857, Olympia, 1857.
121 Shaw to Tilton, Fort Hicks, 2 June 1856, OLY.
123 Hathaway to Stevens, Vanouver, W. T., 24 February 1856, OLY.
The mushrooming military forces in the Territory went hand in hand with the real or anticipated spread of Indian disaffection. At the close of 1856 there were 1,584 United States troops fighting or garrisoning the Oregon Country; a number that had swelled to 2,199 a year later. Increased numbers of troops entailed a great deal of military construction work, building new or enlarging already established posts. For example, the new post of Fort Walla Walla accounted for $3,917.55 in 1857 and $11,416.12 during the next year; Fort Simcoe was more striking with an increase in expenditures for construction from $245.00 in 1856 to $13,101.41 in 1858. The story was repeated at all points in the country, with Fort Vancouver and Fort Dalles requiring much larger amounts than other establishments. The result of this building boom was to raise the price of lumber to eighty dollars per thousand feet, and the wages of a good carpenter reached eight dollars a day. People without the financial resources of the United States Army, found it unwise or impossible to build under these circumstances.

A complete account of the financial settlement of the expenses and claims arising from the Yakima War would demand a distinct monograph. A period of more than twenty years, and material filling hundreds and hundreds of pages would be required.


125 Ibid., 123.

126 Loc. cit.


of pages would go into the story. Expenditures made by the army in the prosecution of the war, although sizeable, would demand scarcely any attention because they were paid from routine appropriations made by Congress for military affairs. The sustained effort made by citizens of Oregon and Washington Territories to collect for their services as Volunteer soldiers, for food and merchandise sold to the Territorial troops, or for property damaged or destroyed in the war was a complex process of almost twenty-five years duration.

In the beginning all was simple, as Congress passed a law on 18 August 1856, which provided

That the Secretary be directed to examine into the amount of expenses necessarily incurred in the suppression of Indian hostilities in the late Indian war in Oregon and Washington by the Territorial governments of said Territories. . . . 129

A Commission of three was to examine the amount of expenses incurred in the maintenance of the volunteer forces engaged in the war, including pay of volunteers. 130

The Commission of Indian War Expenses in Oregon and Washington Territories, comprised of A. J. Smith, Captain, U. S. Army, Rufus Ingalls, Captain, U. S. Army, and Lafeyette Grover, later Governor of Oregon and United States Senator from Oregon, spent nearly a year examining the accounts of "expenses necessarily incurred" in the war. The Commission's final report, 10 October 1857, allowed $1,481,475.45 as the total expense assumed by the

130 Ibid.; Sir George Simpson to Mactavish, Lachine, 1 December 1856, HBC.
It is important to note that this sum was reached after a painstaking examination of each voucher; after extensive visits to familiarize themselves with the extent of the hostilities; and after careful scrutiny of current prices for labor, property, and supplies.\textsuperscript{132} As far as was humanly possible, the sum mentioned in the Commission's report was just, and deserving of highest regard by official circles in Washington.

Months before the report so much as reached Washington, Wool had crystalized opposition against any effort Territorial officials might make to obtain compensation. His reiterated charge that the war was the occasion of a giant fraud to enrich Stevens and other authorities in Washington Territory had prejudiced seriously the prospect of a successful hearing for any suggestions, despite the fact of their being made by a neutral Commission.\textsuperscript{133} Six months before this report was submitted, let alone read, Wool told a former companion,

He, [Joseph Lane of Oregon] nor all Oregon & Washington to back him, can influence Congress to go against myself or any statement I have made in regard to the Indian War in those Territories.\textsuperscript{134}

The unfortunate truth is that the old, vindictive braggart was correct.

The report by the Commission was turned over to the Third Auditor of the Treasury Department who sat quietly at his desk in Washington and

\textsuperscript{131} A. J. Smith, Rufus Ingalls, Lafeyette Grover to John B. Ford, Fort Vancouver, W. T., 10 October 1857, in 35th Congress, 1st Session, Senate Executive Document No. 24 (Serial Set No. 924).

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{133} Wool to Thomas, Benicia, 3 September 1856, AGO. Letts. Recd., 1856; Wool to Thomas, Benicia, 19 October 1856, in Serial Set No. 924.

\textsuperscript{134} Wool to Hardie, Troy, N. Y., 5 April 1857, LC.
rewrote the amounts to be paid to the claimants. For instance, Urban Hicks narrated that,

The pay finally allowed by the government was, to the private soldier or volunteer, $18 per month and rations; to commissioned and non-commissioned officers, the same as allowed the regular army, but no clothing. Many of the men in my company were more in debt to the government for clothing than their pay amounted to at the end of their service.135

This recipient of governmental largess took a negligible seven years of correspondence to collect a pittance,136 quite unlike George Collier Robbins who remarked bitterly that,

I made up my mind, after losing $20,000 and waiting for years without interest on the remainder, that when Uncle Samuel had any more Indian wars to fight he might furnish the soldiers and pay for the equipment himself.137

There appeared to be no exceptions to the expensive, nerve-racking task of wresting a settlement from the Federal Government. The Oblate Missionaries asked $10,000 indemnity for property lost at the Yakima Mission,138 and five years later they were still in the throes of assembling documents to prove their right to the amount claimed.139 The Hudson's Bay Company came off no better. George Simpson informed the Commissioner of Indian Affairs, George Manypenny, that the Company looked to the United States Government for indem-


136 Ibid.


139 Pandosy & D'Herbomez, Saint-Joseph d'Esquimalt, 25 Avril 1862, OMI.
nity for losses sustained at the various posts throughout the Indian Country ravaged by war. Nearly three years later Simpson was made aware of the quantities of war scrip held by the Company for supplies furnished to the Volunteer forces, and ordered it shipped immediately to Hudson's Bay House at Lachine. He wanted to be in possession of the Company's proof that their claim, then pending in Washington, D. C., was legitimate. The indiscriminate examples supply adequate grounds for the assertion that those profiting financially from the Yakima War belonged to that special breed of men known as claim agents. Their specialty and their livelihood stemmed from claims against the Government which they collected for a handsome fee, or bought at monstrous discounts, from the original claimants, as an outright gamble that the United States Government would eventually keep faith with the little people. Most little people could not afford to wait.

The failure of the Army in their self-appointed role of peacemakers has already been mentioned as one of the sequels to the Yakima War. A quick glance will show that the activities of the Indian Agents was equally ineffectual. After Haller's defeat, Rains' markedly barren expedition, and before Wright's trek through the Indian country, the storm signals were still aloft. William Craig, Indian Agent in the Nez Perce country, asked for and received information from Father Ravalli, S. J., missionary among the Coeur d'Alene. "It seems to me," Ravalli wrote, "too much improbable that our Indians should

140 Simpson to Manypenny, Hudson's Bay House, Lachine, Near Montreal, 20 November 1856, ROIA.
141 Simpson to Tolmie, Lachine, 17 March 1859, Typed Copy, COE.
142 Ibid.
remain in their own way inactive, having before them the example of the neighboring tribes, for many reasons. 143

1st because they sympathised naturally with the red people and the evil of the other nations becomes communicated to this people. 2nd because for the natural suspicion of the Indians they think that after the subjugation of the neighboring tribes, the white people will turn the present friendship, into open hostility, when strengthened by victory. 3rd because the mines of gold at Colville will allure too many Americans this spring, and they will come armed proportionally to meet danger and consequently for the suspicions of both parties, the least occasion will be the beginning of massacre and war. 4th because Gov Stevens with his determination of coming this spring, for the treaty, and with competent force will give body to the false suppositions of the Indians that he came for deceiving and killing the Indians, and I shall not be astonished if his arrival is the signal of hostility. 144

This warning of a spread of hostilities to the east went unheeded. Ravalli was a prophet without honor, though subsequent events vindicated his judgment of the true state of affairs. Stevens did come for the treaty and the Indians attacked his party after the profitless talks were adjourned; 145 and nearly three years elapsed before Wright conquered the Coeur d'Alene, 146 as Ravalli foretold would have to be done unless circumstances altered.

Late summer of 1856, after Wright's search for a foe, was the time


144 Ibid.

145 Stevens to Steptoe, Walla Walla Valley, 19 September 1856, in Serial Set No. 876; Steptoe to Stevens, Camp, 19 September 1856, in Gov. Mess., 179-180; Stevens to Steptoe, 9½ P. M., 19 September 1856, in Serial Set No. 876; Steptoe to Wright, Fort Walla Walla, W. T., 20 September 1856; Steptoe to Wright, Camp on the Umatilla, 26 September 1856, in Ibid.; Archer to his Mother, Fort Simcoe, 3 October 1856, MD.

chosen by the Army officers to proclaim the end of the war,\textsuperscript{147} while the
Indian Agents on Puget Sound were apprehensive of another war,\textsuperscript{148} or con-
vinced

that unless the Treaties are ratified and we enter upon the performance of their stipulations within eighteen months, it will not be safe for a white family to live within the limits of the Puget Sound District.\textsuperscript{149}

The passage of time brought nothing to reassure the whites. The news from
the interior indicated renewed hostilities during the summer of 1857,\textsuperscript{150} and
when summer came there was "much restlessness amongst the Indians," caused
by the miners at Colville.\textsuperscript{151} It is difficult to suppress the reflection
that Ravalli really knew of what he wrote when he penned his letter to Craig
a year and a half before the facts came to pass.\textsuperscript{152} And yet, the picture was
not clear. The army and the Indian agents and the missionaries agreed that
hostilities were likely to flare-up at any moment; nevertheless, they divided
into factions over the question of what was required for permanent peace.

\textsuperscript{147} Heller to Nesmith, Fort Dalles, O. T., 21 July 1856, ORE.;
Archer to his Mother, Camp on Yakima River, Washington Territory, 16 August
1856, MD; Wright to Mackall, Camp on the A-tah-nam Creek, W. T., 25 July 1856,
RUSAC; Printed in Serial Set No. 876; Bischoff, "The Yakima Campaign," Mid-
America, XXXI (1949), 203.

\textsuperscript{148} Fitzhugh to Simmons, Bellingham Bay, 20 September 1856, Wash.
SIA. Letts. Recd., (Bellingham Bay).

\textsuperscript{149} Simmons to Stevens, Olympia, 29 December 1856, Wash. SIA. Letts.
Recd., (Puget Sound).

\textsuperscript{150} Thompson to Hedges, Dalles, 16 February 1857, Ore. SIA. Letts.
Recd., 1857.

\textsuperscript{151} Steptoe to Mackall, Fort Walla Walla, 3 June 1857, RUSAC.

\textsuperscript{152} Ravalli to Craig, Coeur d'Alene Mission, 24 January 1856, Wash.
The Agents and the missionaries favored the ratification of Stevens' treaties, while the army thought this policy the one most certain to bring immediate war. As was true in the beginning, so now at war's end, confusion was supreme. A second war converted the army to the idea of treaties.

There had been much suffering on both sides, great losses and damage sustained by Indian and white, tremendous energy and activity expended by all parties; but in vain. The Yakima War is a study in futility.

153 Simmons to Stevens, Olympia, 29 December 1856, Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd., (Puget Sound); Yantis to Nesmith, Salem, 7 December 1857, Wash. SIA. Letts. Recd., (Central District); Joset ad Beckx, Dalles, 6 Septembris 1856, SJ-r.

154 Steptoe to Mackall, Fort Walla Walla, 19 October 1857, RUSAC; Ore. SIA. Letts. Recd., 1857.

155 Clarke to Nesmith, San Francisco, 3 November 1858, Ore. SIA. Letts. Recd., 1858.
CRITICAL ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES

More and more attention is being given, in recent years, to the history of the Pacific Northwest. It is, so to speak, a newcomer to the field of United States history. This is, of course, as it should be since the land west of the Rocky Mountains and north of California was undeveloped, little known, and nearly despised until rapidly shifting contemporary events drew the eyes of the nation to the Pacific slope. Perhaps some will be surprised to learn that this farthest frontier possesses a life's story replete with nobility, glamour, and courage, with chicanery, selfishness, and drabness, not unlike the origins of any given section of America.

There is one unexpected feature of research on a topic such as the Yakima Indian War--the disheartening way manuscript sources are scattered, not only from Berkeley to Baltimore, but even beyond the Atlantic. How this came about is readily understood after a moment's reflection upon the varied people who adopted the Oregon Country as their home or place of business. The Hudson's Bay Company officers in America wrote to their headquarters in London; the missionaries reported to Rome, Montreal, St. Louis, Marseilles, and Quebec if they were Catholic priests; or if they were Protestants, to Boston; whilst Army records eventually found their way into files of the War Department; and ordinary folk sent letters to relatives in Maine, New York, Maryland, or wherever their dear ones might be.
The problem of discovery is further complicated by the growing interest in Western Americana on the part of private and institutional collectors. Armed with knowledge plus desire and abetted by money, some of the most helpful documents for a study of the West have come to rest in the East. An outstanding example is the William Robertson Coe Collection of Western Americana in the Sterling Memorial Library of Yale University. A researcher will consider even worse, the strange twist in circumstances that brought a single letter concerning the Oregon Mounted Volunteers into the Manuscripts Room of The New York Public Library; or two very useful letters—one genuinely important—bearing on the Yakima War that lie hidden in the rich collections of the Wisconsin Historical Society in Madison. Instances of this kind could be repeated indefinitely, but enough has been written to illustrate the difficulty.

Any search for documents ultimately entails personal investigation by the searcher. However, in the past forty years there have appeared not a few lists, guides, handbooks, and calendars of manuscripts that have, at least, the virtue of stirring one's curiosity or kindling the hope that where there is much, perhaps a little on the Yakima War is buried in the mass. Two guides of this kind are Robert B. Downs, Resources of New York City Libraries, Chicago, American Library Association, 1942; and Karl Brown, A Guide to the Reference Collections of the New York Public Library, New York, New York Public Library, 1941.

The number of bibliographies of various government bureaus, departments, and offices is large, with some of them giving a general notion of the character of materials preserved in these public institutions. D. W. Parker,
Calendar of Papers in Washington Archives Relating to the Territories of the United States, Washington, Carnegie Institution, 1911, is still useful despite many—if not all—of the documents described by him now being in the National Archives. Parker’s, Guide to the Materials for United States History in Canadian Archives, Washington, Carnegie Institution, 1913, is practically as valuable as the day it was published because Americans are less familiar with the major manuscript deposits in the Dominion of Canada.


The actual manuscripts pertaining to the Pacific Northwest and still found in that part of the country have received some publicity. John Van Male, Resources of Pacific Northwest Libraries, Seattle, 1943, is an excellent introduction to the collections, especially of the smaller institutions. In a class by itself is Charles W. Smith, A Union List of MSS in Libraries of the
Pacific Northwest, Seattle, University of Washington, 1931. Private institutions and societies are second only to private collectors, in their extreme reluctance to divulge the full quality and quantity of their documentary holdings. Reasons for this attitude must be sought in the realms of personalities and policy, without lessening the researcher's chore one bit. Hence, it is pleasant to meet an exception such as the excellent Guide to the Manuscript Collection of the Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon Historical Society, 1940; or, August A. Barth, "Guide to Materials for the History of Indian Missions of the Trans-Mississippi West . . . in the Archives of St. Louis University" (Unpublished M. A. Thesis, St. Louis University).


Forty years ago the American Historical Association sponsored a project of publishing in their Annual Reports, descriptions of manuscript records preserved in the capitals of the several States. The Annual Report 1908, Vol. I, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1909, contains a description of the State records preserved at Olympia, Washington. This notice appeared so long ago that it and the documents described have been frequently overlooked.

Each of the research tools mentioned above is helpful, but there is not a single one of them that may honestly replace personal search. They are
aids; not substitutes.

MANUSCRIPT SOURCES.

Certainly one of the finest collections of letters pertaining to the Presbyterian Missions in the Northwest is the series of reports and private communications sent to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, and now preserved in The Houghton Library of Harvard University. Here one finds the written legacy of these courageous men and women, with particularly fine sources for the missions' foundation, and a few interesting letters of Cushing Eells sent in response to the American Board's inquiry concerning the opportuneness of re-opening the Protestant Missions.

Granville O. Haller's "Kamiarkin in History," with its more mature judgment by the protagonist of his antagonist, has come to rest in The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley. Here, also, is the best single letter concerning The Cascades Massacre, 26 March 1856, that L. W. Coe sent to Putnam Bradford a fortnight after the tragedy.

The William Robertson Coe Collection of Western Americana, Sterling Memorial Library of Yale University, compels every student of the history of the West to include this deposit in his list of materials. The rare books merit careful attention, but the MS Diary of an ordinary rank and file Oregon Mounted Volunteer, K. B. Mercer, must be noted. Mercer gives unvarnished revelations of the day to day existence of life in the field; while the Keller Letters are some of the best sources of information for the effect of the Yakima War on the commercial life of Washington Territory.

Many years ago scholars began to appreciate the indescribable
wealth of materials in the archive of the Hudson's Bay Company, Beaver House, London. The close union between employees of the Company maintained by letter, an integral part of Hudson's Bay policy from the beginning, has resulted in an amazing fount of history. The letters of James Sinclair, Charles Ogden, Angus McDonald, Dr. William Tolmie, and other Company Traders to Dugald Mac- tavish, Chief Factor at Fort Vancouver record the slightest stirrings of the interior country. In his reports to the Secretary in London, Mactavish relays these observations of his subordinates and adds his own. The role of the Company during the Indian hostilities can be fully understood only with the help of these revealing documents.

In the strange inexplicable way historical documents have of turning up in the most surprising places, the invaluable "Declaration et Attestation," Pandosy and Durieu drew up at the Yakima Mission on 6 November 1855, was found in the files of Holy Rosary Scholasticate, Ottawa, Ontario. The two separate copies, not identical, of this inventory of the Mission constitute the best contemporary evidence of the material advance achieved by the Oblate missionaries before the destructive visit by the whites on 14 November 1855.

How the MS Journal of Nisqually House, the Hudson's Bay post nearest to the seat of the Washington Territorial Government, found its way to the Huntington Library, San Marino, California, and not to the Hudson's Bay Company in London, would probably be a fascinating tale in its own right. The same great research center has custody of the Cornelius Letters which happen to be of considerable value in any study of the activities of the Oregon volunteer troops.
Not only as a surveying expedition in search of a northern railroad route to the Pacific, but as a purveyor of ethnological, linguistic, and cultural information, the party of George B. McClellan, that worked through the Yakima country in 1854, was important. Among the McClellan Papers in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress most of these records are found. A few Hardie Papers in this same Division give excellent insight into the character of Major General John E. Wool, to whom Hardie served as aide.

The Maryland Historical Society, Baltimore, Maryland, possesses two items relating to the Pacific Northwest; a fragment of the McParlin Diary kept at Fort Vancouver by an Army doctor but with no bearing on the Yakima War; the second item is a book in which are pasted the Archer Letters. Captain James Archer came to the Northwest with George Wright and the Ninth Infantry in January, 1856. He prided himself in never letting a mail depart from the Pacific without a letter from him to his mother, brother, or sister in Baltimore. The resultant series of letters gives one of the finest imaginable pictures of Indian hostilities and their aftermath during Archer's four year tour of duty in the Oregon Country. Because these letters are private, personal, and intimate they serve as an excellent counterbalance to the official reports of the campaigns in which Archer participated.

If one has done work in The National Archives, Washington, D. C., no description is necessary; if one has never been there a description is useless. The process of picturing documents--important manuscript sources--in terms of tons in weight, or feet of shelving space staggers the imagination. The mere chore of learning one's way about the labyrinthian building may take a week. This, too, gives some notion of the huge amount of official records
kept by this agency of the government. The Natural Resources Division cares for most of the manuscripts pertaining to Indian Affairs. The Oregon Superintendency Papers, the Washington Superintendency Papers, the Records of the Office of Indian Affairs which include the records of treaty talks and treaties, all are in this section. Care must be exercised, however, lest important materials be passed-over because we think a certain Division of the Archives as an unlikely place to find them. For example, the complete documentation for Stevens' "Treaty Tour 1854-1855" must be sought in the obvious, Records of the Office of Indian Affairs, in the State Department Division, in the Legislative Services Division, and in the Cartographic Division.

Stevens' letters to W. Marcy, then Secretary of State, concerning the Indians and Indian treaties came under the State Department because official Washington could not quite decide whether or not the Indians should be negotiated with as foreign nations. Treaty ratification is a prerogative of the United States Senate which means that the official copy of the Treaty with the Yakima, 9 June 1855, and the official map accompanying the Treaty when submitted for consideration is now in the Legislative Services Division. All the while, the letters and reports to supply necessary background to the treaties are in the Superintendency Papers, as well as the earlier maps that are filed in the Cartographic Division. Where quantity tends to dull one's appreciation for specific items, the War Records Division still manages to impress the researcher with its magnitude and completeness. A report missing from the Records of United States Army Commands files, can usually be found in those of the Office of the Adjutant General. These two sections of the War Records Division assuredly have the bulk of the materials concerning the part played
by the Army in the Yakima War. The incomparable series of communications detailing almost every step of Colonel George Wright's campaign of 1856 is found in the Commands Records with the exception of Wright's letter to Mackall, 3 August 1856, that is in the Adjutant General's files. The field map of the expedition is in the Cartographic Division. Letters written by Wool to his commanding officer, General Winfield Scott, are in the Records of the Headquarters of the Army and furnish much information on Wool's attitude toward the Indian outbreak as well as the Territorial authorities engaged in suppressing hostilities. There is little factual data about the frontier army not available somewhere in the War Records Division, whether this be in Post Returns, Regimental Returns, Muster Rolls, or the Records of the Chief of Ordnance.

The jump is wide from The National Archives to the Manuscripts Room of The New York Public Library, with its one letter of Allen to Murray, Camp Mill Creek, 24 August 1856, that adds a chip of information on the Oregon Volunteers.

The history of the Washington Territorial Volunteers rests in the seventy-four bundles of documents in the State Library, Olympia, Washington. There was no prominent civilian official in Washington Territory during 1855-1856 not represented in these papers. The packets labelled Stevens, Mason, Tilton, and W. W. Miller are large, and filled with the story of the citizen army.

A reconstruction of the history of the Catholic missions in the area affected by the Yakima War demands materials from widely scattered deposits. Sprinkled through the Superintendency Papers in the Natural Resources
Division of The National Archives is a surprisingly large number of letters penned by the Oblate and Jesuit missionaries living among the tribes east of the Cascade Mountains. The bulk of the missionaries' letters, however, must be sought elsewhere. One of the very finest collections, and certainly indispensable for any topic in which the Oblates were involved, is the Archives Deschatelets, Scholasticat Saint-Joseph, Ottawa, Ontario. Although the Archives was formed in rather recent times, there is no document bearing on Oblate history and known to exist, that does not elicit the persistent efforts of the staff to obtain and add it to the collection in some form; be it microfilm, photostat, or typed copy. That much material on the Oblates is not in the Archives Deschatelets may be charged to the fact that it has been rediscovered but recently. The Dellanoy Copies in the Archives of the Diocese of Seattle is a good instance of Oblate materials being passed by for many years. These copies constitute the most important single block of testimony regarding the activities of the missionaries during the unsettled years that preceded the closing of the Yakima Mission. What happened to the original letters, after Father Joseph Dellanoy made his copies in October, 1923, is one of the unsolved mysteries bedeviling contemporary research scholars in the Catholic history of the Pacific Northwest. Smaller quantities, but rich in contents, are the Oblate documents kept at the General's Curia in Rome. In this place was found Pascal Ricard's "Last Will and Testament" drawn up on 6 October 1855 in Olympia, which lends force to the deduction that Ricard really thought the impending clash between Indian and white would be one of extermination. With the Joseph Papers and the original Baptismal Register of St. Paul's Mission at the Kettle Falls of the Columbia, found in the Historical
Archives of the Oregon Province, Mt. St. Michael's, Spokane, Washington, it is now possible to trace with some accuracy Pandosy's movements after the Yakima Mission was abandoned. Small details are added from mentions made of the Oblates in a few Jesuit Letters in the Jesuit General's Curia in Rome. One lone Pandosy letter in the James Duane Doty Papers at the Wisconsin Historical Society, Madison, Wisconsin, supplies further confirmation of Pandosy's consistent cooperation with the American authorities. The other isolated item in the Doty Papers is a letter from Tilton to Doty, Jr., Olympia, 4 March 1856, sending him on his last mission before his summary dismissal from public service by Stevens. Recently the George Gibbs Papers have taken their place in Wisconsin's distinguished manuscript collections, but documents covering the war years in Washington Territory are the only ones missing. Part of this lacuna is filled by Gibbs' writings included among the McClellan Papers in the Manuscripts Division of the Library of Congress. Slight intimations of war's effect on the economic life of the Territory may be found in letters and chronicles written by pioneer Sisters of Charity of Providence, in the Archive of the Sacred Heart Province, Mt. St. Vincent, Seattle, Washington.

We saw that the major part of known Cornelius Letters is in the Huntington Library, San Marino, California. There is, moreover, a Cornelius Letter Book containing copies of his letters and orders to his Regiment, in the Northwest Collection of the Spokane Public Library, Spokane, Washington. The letter Cornelius wrote to his wife, Florentine, on 18 January 1856 from Whitman's Station, is owned by Mr. Jerome Peltier, Spokane, Washington.

The fate of the manuscripts left by Granville O. Haller is hardly less interesting than that of the Cornelius materials, or those of the
Catholic missionaries. Peer of Haller collectors is easily the Northwest Collection, University of Washington, Seattle, Washington, with its original Diaries of Haller's various expeditions into the interior country, either as commander or subordinate. Kept with these Diaries is his typescript, "The Indian War of 1855-1856." Some opinions expressed in this latter item are also found in Haller's, "Kamiarkin in History," in the University of California's Bancroft Library. A small number of personal letters written to J. W. Nesmith remain in the Oregon Historical Society, Portland, Oregon.

The Nesmith Papers, Layton Papers, and odd letters in the Deady Papers belonging to the Oregon Historical Society, contain much of the doings of the Oregon Mounted Volunteers. These files joined to those in the office of the Adjutant General of the Oregon Militia, Salem, Oregon, (if we keep in mind the scattered Cornelius Papers) supply the sources for the history of the Oregon Volunteers.

The Washington Historical Society, Tacoma, Washington, has no collection of major importance, although its files of varied individual speeches, letters, reminiscences, memoirs, and the like has an occasional bit of information not found elsewhere.

The importance of the Wool Papers in the State Library, Albany, New York, cannot be exaggerated for anyone studying the period dealt with in this dissertation. If nothing more than Brouillet's translation of the Yakima Mission's "Account Book" was found among them, they would be of cardinal importance. The truth is that any analysis of U. S. military activity on the Pacific Coast, during Wool's tenure as Commanding General of the Department of the Pacific, will be forced to take cognizance of this collection.
To complete this description of the manuscript sources it should be noted that nothing of consequence on the subject of the Yakima War was found in the following deposits: Archives of the Archdiocese of Portland, Oregon; Archives of the Archdiocese of Montreal; Archives of the Archdiocese of Quebec; Archives of the Archdiocese of Ottawa; Public Archives of Canada, Ottawa; Archives of Laval University, Quebec City; Archives of the Province of Quebec, Quebec City; Museum of the American Indian, Heye Foundation, New York City; Missionary Research Library, New York City; State Archives, Denver, Colorado; University of Colorado, Boulder, Colorado; State Library, Cheyenne, Wyoming; University of Wyoming, Laramie, Wyoming; University of Denver, Denver, Colorado; L'Union Saint-Jean Baptiste d'Amerique, Woonsocket, R. I.; Minnesota Historical Society, St. Paul, Minn.; San Francisco Public Library, San Francisco, Calif.; United States Military Academy, West Point, N. Y.; William Andrews Clark Memorial Library, University of California at Los Angeles; American Catholic Historical Society, Philadelphia, Pa.; The Mariner's Museum, Newport News, Va.; American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass.; Presbyterian Historical Society, Philadelphia, Pa.; New York Historical Society, New York City; Thomas Gilcrease Foundation, Tulsa, Oklahoma; Archives of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints [Mormons], Salt Lake City; State Library, Sacramento, California; St. Louis University Archives, St. Louis, Mo.; Southwest Historical Museum, Los Angeles, California; Yakima Historical Society, Yakima, Washington; Yakima Pioneer Association, Yakima, Washington; Office of the U. S. Indian Agent, Toppenish, Washington; Eastern Washington Historical Museum, Spokane, Washington; University of Montana Library, Missoula, Montana; Montana Historical Society, Helena, Montana; Idaho Histori-
PRINTED SOURCES.

The first of the printed sources is the vast amount of material emanating from various departments of the United States Government. This confusing welter of publications has occasioned one whole book, Lawrence F. Schmeckebier, *Government Publications and Their Use*, Washington, Brookings Institute, 1936, that is most helpful in orientating the student in a highly specialized bibliographical field. Thirty-five years ago Katherine B. Judson placed all future scholars of Northwest history under a debt of gratitude for her, *Subject Index to the History of the Pacific Northwest and of Alaska as found in the U. S. Government documents . . . 1789-1881*, Olympia, 1913.

Any projected historical work touching upon the Indians of the Far West must make use of appropriate volumes in the *Serial Set*, for here appear the annual reports of the Secretary of War, of the Navy, and of the Interior. The reports are not infrequently brief, but the enclosures and documentary exhibits accompanying them swell one year's presentation to several hundred pages. *Thirty-Third Congress, Second Session*, *House Executive Document No. 1* (*Serial Set No. 777*), has one letter Stevens sent to George Manypenny, Washington City, 16 September 1854. When Stevens forwarded his Treaty with the Yakima of 9 June 1855, for presentation to the U. S. Senate, this august body ordered a sufficient number of copies of the Treaty printed for the use of legislators. Thus came into being the printed, but unpublished, *Thirty-Fourth Congress, First Session*, *Senate Executive Document No. 30, CONFIDENTIAL.* Stevens wrote an extended report to George Manypenny, Walla Walla Valley,
22 December 1855, outlining his Treaty Tour of 1855 after the close of the Yakima Council, and narrating his remarkable dash from Fort Benton on the Missouri to Walla Walla Valley where he found the Oregon Volunteers on the alert against the warring Indians. This long letter is printed in Thirty-Fourth Congress, First Session, Senate Executive Document No. 46 (Serial Set No. 821); and a similar communication sent to General John E. Wool, Walla Walla Valley, 23 December 1855, with Stevens' biting attack on the General for refusing to assign troops to escort the governor through hostile country, appears in Thirty-Fourth Congress, First Session, Senate Executive Document No. 66 (Serial Set No. 822). The official story of the Cascades massacre is found in Thirty-Fourth Congress, First Session, House Executive Document No. 118 (Serial Set No. 859); and a goodly portion of Wright's Yakima Campaign of 1856 may be reconstructed from his reports in Thirty-Fourth Congress, Third Session, Senate Executive Document No. 5 (Serial Set No. 876). The prelude to war was found in Pandosy's letter to Mesplie, Yackimaw Mission, April 1853, in Thirty-Fifth Congress, First Session, Senate Executive Document No. 40 (Serial Set No. 929); Benjamin Alvord's "Report," Fort Dalles, 17 July 1853, in Thirty-Fourth Congress, Third Session, House Executive Document No. 76, (Serial Set No. 906); and Rains to Townsend, Fort Dalles, 29 January 1854, in Thirty-Fifth Congress, First Session, House Executive Document No. 88, (Serial Set No. 924). The much abused Hudson's Bay Company received some vindication in the Stevens-Douglas Correspondence in Thirty-Fifth Congress, Second Session, House Executive Document No. 72, (Serial Set No. 116). The uncertainties of treaty ratification may be ferreted out of The Executive Journal of the Senate, X, 1856-1858, Washington, Government Printing Office, 1887; XI,
There are other printed sources that originated in the Territories affected by the war and because of an informality more prevalent in the official life of a frontier region, betray feelings then current. Acts of the Legislative Assembly, of the Territory of Washington, Passed at the Third Regular Session, Begun and Held at Olympia, December 3, 1855, And of the Independence of the United States, The Eighty-First, Olympia, George B. Goudy, 1856, and Laws of the Territory of Washington, Containing, Also, Memorials, Passed at the Fourth Annual Session, Begun and Held at Olympia, December 1, 1856, And of the Independence of the United States, The Eighty-Second, Olympia, Edward Furste, 1857, are fundamental to any analysis of legislative action during the war. The Message of the Governor of Washington Territory Also the Correspondence with the Secretary of War, Major Gen. Wool, The Officers of The Regular Army, and of the Volunteer Service of Washington Territory, Olympia, Edward Furste, 1857, is supremely important for its documentary defense of Stevens' conduct in regard to the Regular Army, the Indians, foreign settlers, and Martial Law. The latter action precipitated the publication of the Proceedings of a Meeting of the Bar, 3d Judicial District, Washington Territory on the Arrest of the Hon. Edward Lander, Chief Justice of Said Territory and John M. Chapman, Clerk of the District Court, By an Armed Force Under Orders of Gov. Isaac I. Stevens, Steilacoom, May 7th, 1856; and of the vitriolic A Brief Notice of the Recent Outrages committed by Isaac I. Stevens Governor of Washington Territory, Olympia, May 17, 1856. During the post-war years and the protracted efforts to collect claims against the Federal Government, interested parties were kept informed through ephemeral printed items.
such as the Speech of Hon. Isaac I. Stevens, of Washington Territory, on the Indian War Expenses of Washington and Oregon, Delivered in the House of Representatives, February 21, 1859, Washington, Lemuel Towers, 1859; Statement of the Oregon and Washington Delegation in regard to The War Claims of Oregon and Washington, n. p., (1859); individuals combined to publicize their grievances in a Memorial to Congress by the Indian War Veterans of the North Pacific Coast, Salem, Moores Brothers, 1886; and claim agents made use of the printed word and the misfortunes of others to further a cash realization on their speculation. Two good examples of this propaganda are: B. F. Dowell, The petition of B. F. Dowell and Others, Asking Pay for Two Companies of Oregon Volunteers, and their Expenses, Called into Service in 1854, Jacksonville, Ore., Oregon Sentinel, 1869; and B. F. Dowell and Anna E. Dowell, The Heirs of George W. Harris, and Mary A. Harris, Indian Depredation Claimants. VS The Rogue River Indians, Cow Creek Indians and the United States, Washington, 1887.

This kind of material was always slanted to the main object of collecting the claims, but some useful information not infrequently found its way, almost by accident, into these histrionic outpourings.

The value of autobiographies, memoirs, and reminiscences is in direct proportion to the proximity in time and place to the events, of the narrator. General George Crook His Autobiography (Martin F. Schmitt, Edit.), Norman, University of Oklahoma, 1946, can only be discounted because Crook had little to do in the Yakima War, although he was in the vicinity at the time. R. Glisan, Journal of Army Life, San Francisco, A. L. Bancroft, 1874, is in reality a published diary with countless penetrating remarks made by a keenly observant man; Granville O. Haller, The Dismissal of Major Granville O. Haller
of the Regular Army, of the United States, by order of the Secretary of War, in Special Orders, No. 331, of July 25th, 1863, Also, A Brief Memoir of his Military Services, and A Few Observations, Paterson, N. J., The Daily Guardian Office, 1863, contains a fine summary of the Yakima War based, as it is, on Haller's copious diaries, journals, and memoranda still available in the Northwest Collection of the University of Washington. Similar assurance may be placed on Lawrence Kip, Army Life on the Pacific: A Journal of the Expedition Against the Northern Indians, The Tribes of the Coeur D'Alenes, Spokanes, and Pelouzes, in the Summer of 1858, New York, Redfield, 1859; Kip's, Indian Council in the Valley of the Walla Walla, San Francisco, 1855, which was reprinted later as, "The Indian Council at Walla Walla; May and June 1855: a Journal," Sources of Oregon History, Eugene, 1897; and partially reprinted under the same title in The Washington Historian, II (1901), 163-172. Belonging to this category of superior recollections are the Personal Memoirs of P. H. Sheridan General United States Army, II Vols., New York, Charles L. Webster & Co., 1888; Theodore Winthrop, The Canoe and the Saddle, Klalam & Klickatat, To which are now added His Western Letters & Journals (J. H. Williams, Ed.), Tacoma, 1913; and Thomas Stowell Phelps, The Indian Attack on Seattle January 26, 1856, Seattle, Farwest Lithograph & Printing Co., 1932.

Other personal jottings, helpful if employed with care, deserving of mention are: Yakima and Clickitat Indian Wars, 1855 and 1856, Personal Recollections of Capt. U. E. Hicks, Portland, Himes, 1886; George Hunter, Reminiscences of an Old Timer, 4th Edit., Battle Creek, Michigan, Review and Herald, 1889; E. D. Keyes, Fifty Years' Observation of Men and Events Civil and Military, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1884; and Ezra Meeker, Pioneer Reminiscence.
of Puget Sound; The Tragedy of Leschi, etc., Seattle, Lowman & Hanford, 1905.

L. V. McWhorter, Tragedy of the Wahk-Shum, Prelude to the Yakima Indian War, 1855-56. Eyewitness Account of the Killing of Indian Agent Major Andrew J. Bolon, Together with Story of locating the Place of his Death, Regional Indian Legends, and Definition of "Yakima," Yakima, L. V. McWhorter, 1937, in the absence of anything better, represents the only source stemming from the Indian participants in the struggle.

Frequency of use diminishes not a whit the value of Charles J. Kappler (Ed.), Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties, IV Vols., Washington, Government Printing Office, 1904-1929, in any study of relations between Indian and white; nor does repeated use shrink the classic stature attained by Alexander Ross, Adventures of the first settlers on the Oregon or Columbia River: Being a narrative of the expedition fitted out by John Jacob Astor to establish the "Pacific Fur Company"; With an account of some Indian tribes on the Coast of the Pacific, London, Smith, Elder and Co., 1849, as a chronicle of the Oregon Country when Indians were the Many and whites the Few.

Less extensive, but extremely valuable for their contents, are items appearing in various serial publications. A prize example is "Memoire du Père Ricard sur les origines des missions de l'Oregon," in Missions de la Congrega- tion des Missionnaires Oblats de Marie Immaculée, "Marseillels, Marius Olive, 1862-__), IL; or the letter of Chirouse à Charpeney, Mission des Snokomish, 15 Fevrier 1860, in Rapport sur Les Missions du Diocese de Quebec et Autres Missions qui en Ont ci-devant fait Patie, Quebec, J. T. Brousseau, 1861, Mars, 1861. Not a few of the more important official documents have been printed or edited for wider circulation, as is true of "Drawings by George Gibbs in

Regional periodicals and historical journals are rich in published personal writings. The excellent summary of conditions at the end of the Yakima War composed by Gosnell for Stevens, Olympia, 31 December 1856, was printed in the Washington Historical Quarterly, XVII (1926), 289-299; and Abbie J. Hanford's "Reminiscences of the Indian War of 1855. Narrow Escape of Seattle from Destruction," The Washington Historian, II (1901), 113-122.

of the Indian War of 1855-56," Washington Historical Quarterly, XV (1924),
XXVI (1911), serves as good proof that documents solely dependent on man's
memory for their authority demand careful use. Robbins simply did not remem­
ber correctly, as is adequately clear from records contemporary with the event.
Cyrus H. Walker, "Reminiscences of the Yakima War," Oregon Native Son, (May,
1899), 447-448; George Iman, "Early Days at the Cascades," Washington Histori­
cal Quarterly, XVIII (1927), 261-265; A. H. Sale, "Indian War Recollections,"
Oregon Native Son, (May, 1899), 210-214, 259-261, 332-337, 387-391, 491-494;
F. M. Sebring, "The Indian Raid on the Cascades in March, 1856," Washington
Historical Quarterly, XIX (1928), 99-107; Robert Williams, "The Attack at the
Cascades in 1856. An account by an Ex-Soldier of the Defense at the Middle
Block House," Oregon Pioneer Association, Transactions 1880 (Salem, 1881),
40-44; this was repeated without great change as, "The Cascade Massacre,"
Oregon Pioneer Association, Transactions 1896 (Portland, 1897), 71-90, and
again in a symposium of J. H. Herman, L. W. Coe, Robert Williams, "The Cascade
Massacre," Oregon Native Son, (May, 1899), 495-505; and as a final addition
to these pioneer accounts, one must mention the letter of T. J. Small to T. A.
Wood, Jefferson City, Mo., 15 January 1899, Oregon Native Son, (May, 1899),
31-33.

SECONDARY WORKS.

Fortunately there are a few reasonably complete bibliographies to
guide the student delving into Pacific Northwest history. Probably the least
known of these is M. Bernad, Bibliographie des Missionnaires Oblats de Marie

Casual perusal of the above mentioned bibliographies suffices to convince the most hesitant that books on Northwest history make a list of monumental length. The comments to follow will be concerned with books touching the Yakima War, directly or indirectly, and with nothing else.

both authors include the fruit of their personal observations regarding the
Indian fighting. Robert Ballou, *Early Klickitat Valley Days*, Goldendale,
Washington, The Author, 1938, is the work of an amateur enthusiast who has
incorporated the recollections of aged Indian survivors of the uprisings.

Passing reference is made to certain factors in the history of the
Northwest for which satisfactory authority is found in other works, published
and unpublished. The work of the Presbyterian missions is well told by Clif-
and the same author's *Marcus Whitman, M. D., Pioneer and Martyr*, Caldwell,
Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1937. The incidental part carried by the Jesuit mis-
missionaries is dealt with in William N. Bischoff, S. J., *The Jesuits in Old
Oregon, 1840-1940*, Caldwell, Caxton Printers, Ltd., 1945; and the story of
the Oblate Missionaries is elaborated by William Lyle Davis, S. J., "Mission
St. Anne of the Cayuse Indians, 1847-1848," (Unpublished Ph. D. Dissertation,
Department of History, University of California); Gabriel Dionne, O. M. I.,
"Histoire des Methodes Missionnaires Utilisees par les Oblats de Marie Immacu-
lee dans l'Evangolisation des Indiens du "Versant Pacifique" au Dix Neuvieme
Siecle" (Unpublished M. A. Thesis, Dept. of History, University of Ottawa,
1947); William H. Gurney, "The Work of Reverend Father J. M. R. Le Jeune,
O. M. I.," (Unpublished M. A. Thesis, Department of History, University of
British Columbia, 1948); George M. Waggett, O. M. I., "The Oblates of Mary
Immaculate in the Pacific Northwest of U. S. A., 1847-1878," in *Etudes Oblates
VI*, (1947), 7-88; Theophile Ortolan, O. M. I., *Les Oblats de Marie Immaculee
durant le premier siecle de leur existence*, IV Vols., Paris, Libraire des
Annales, 1915, and Achille Rey, O. M. I., *Histoire de Monseigneur Charles-
Joseph Eugene de Mazenod Evêque de Marseille Fondateur de la Congrégation des Missionnaires Oblats de Marie Immaculée, II Vols., Rome, Maison Generale, 1928.

One of the most hazardous fields of study extant in the realm of scholarship is that pertaining to Indian history because an Indian's notion of supreme humour is to fool a white man. There are known cases of Indians going to elaborately extreme lengths to inflict marvelous hoaxes upon a well-meaning white investigator. This jealously guarded vestige of Indian independence, his tribal history, must induce caution in anyone using allegedly Indian sources. Heister Dean Guie, *Tribal Days of the Yakimas*, Yakima, The Republic Printing Co., 1937, is insignificant enough to be a fine souvenir pamphlet of a local museum. No one has yet managed to supersede F. W. Hodge (Ed.), *Handbook of American Indians North of Mexico*, 2 Pts., Washington, Government Printing Office, 1912, with its concise, accurate information. The organization of the National Archives with its copious drawers of manuscripts has reduced Alban W. Hoopes, *Indian Affairs and Their Administration with Special Reference to the Far West 1849-1860*, Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, 1932, to nothing more than an introductory volume on the topic. Harlan I. Smith "Archeology of the Yakima Valley," Museum of Natural History, *Anthropological Papers*, VI, Washington, 1910, has the virtue of preserving archeological remains as they were forty years ago, thus forty years nearer to their pristine condition. A confusing mixture of personal recollections, interviews with Indians, and inadequately documented history has been perpetuated in A. J. Splawn, *KA-MI-AKIN, Lost Hero of the Yakimas*, Portland, Ore., Kilham Stationery and Printing Co., 1917; Revised Edition, Portland, Oregon Historical Society, 1944.

The little known history of water-borne transportation in the Oregon Country is narrated by Randall V. Mills, Stern-Wheelers Up Columbia, Palo Alto.

PERIODICAL LITERATURE.


Indians and Indian affairs have always bulked large on the horizon


What can be said about the Mormons in the Pacific Northwest has been well stated in William B. Smart, "Oregon and the Mormon Problem," *Reed College Bulletin*, Portland, Oregon, XXVI, (1948), 41-62; and from a Mormon viewpoint by John V. Bluth, "The Salmon River Mission. An account of its Origin, Purpose, Growth, and Abandonment," *Improvement Era*, III, (1900), 801-815, 900-914, Thomas Hull, Salt Lake City, Utah.

APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by William Norbert Bischoff, S.J., has been read and approved by five members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

June 2, 1950

[Signature of Adviser]