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The Moral Doctrine of Mo-Tze

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J. M. J.

THE MORAL DOCTRINE OF MO-TZE

BY

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PRIEST OF THE ARCHDIOCESE OF

NANKING, CHINA

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL OF

PHILOSOPHY OF LOYOLA UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO IN PARTIAL

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MAY, 1948
VITA

Augustinus Tseu was born in Han-Kow, Hu-Pei, China, on September 1, 1913, of Catholic parents.

He was graduated from St. Ignatius College, Zi-Ka-Wei, Shanghai, China, June 1930; and received the degree of Bachelor of Arts and Sciences.

He entered the Seminary of the Sacred Heart, Zi-Ka-Wei, Shanghai, September 8, 1930. There he studied Latin and also attended classes in Chinese literature at Aurora University.

From September, 1933 to June, 1935 he underwent two years of the so-called 'experiment' according to the rule of the Diocese of Shanghai which is under the administration of the Jesuit Fathers. He spent his 'experimental' years in teaching biology, geometry and French at Kuang-Ch'i High School, Song-Kiang, Kiang-Su.

In September, 1935 he was sent to Rome to the Pontificium Collegium de Propaganda Fide, where he obtained the degree of "Baccalaureatus in Philosophia" in July, 1937 and that of "Licentiatius in Sacra Theologia" in July, 1941.

He was ordained priest by His Eminence Pietro Cardinal Fumasoni-Biondi, Prefect of the S. C. De Propaganda Fide, on the Feast of St. Mathias Apostle, February 24, 1941.

In August, 1941, he was transferred to the Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C., and enrolled in the Graduate School of Philosophy. He received the degree of "Licentiatius in Philosophia" on May 30, 1942.
He has been a student at the Graduate School of Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois since September 1942. But, because of the fact that he is also in charge of the Chinese Catholic Mission in Chicago, his studies require a much longer time than the regularly needed two-year period.
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INTRODUCTION

The time has definitely come for the nations of the world to revise their old-fashioned and inaccurate notions about a great people which represents almost one-fifth of the entire human race.

After eight long years of heroic and almost incredible courage and firmness in their self-defensive resistance against a mechanically much more powerful aggressor, the Chinese people have undoubtedly merited an important place in the new, peaceful world that the United Nations Organization promises us.

It is a matter of fact that China, since she was forced to have her doors opened to the invading European powers, has been bitterly exploited, ill-treated, underestimated, and despised. In one word, she has been misunderstood and forced to live at the mercy of powerful nations as their unofficial colony. Father Thomas Ryan, S.J., has tenderly but meaningfully written these following words in his popular booklet, China through Catholic Eyes:

The story, however, of the coming of modern life to China is not pleasant reading, for it is a story of conflicting rights and of might used to decide them, of western aggressions and of attempts to exploit China, and it contains many unhappy episodes that are now best forgotten.... all are agreed that many things happened which all nations now regret. 1

1 China through Catholic Eyes by Rev. Thomas Ryan, S.J., New York, 1941. (The first edition of this booklet was printed in Hong-Kong, China, 1939.)
However, thanks to God, things are finally changed for the better. "When the greedy flames of war inexorably spread in the Pacific following the perfidious attack on Pearl Harbor, Malaya and lands in and around the China Sea, and one after another of these places fell, the pendulum swung to the other extreme." 2 The world began to admire the successful resistance of China and to realise suddenly that the ability and spirit of a great people had for centuries been misunderstood and underestimated. China was named in the original "Big Four" and has become one of the leaders among the United Nations although practically speaking she is not yet ready for such a position.

To quote the words of China's war-time Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek, this sudden and rather unexpected rise of China is due to the fact that "a weak nation standing up against a strong has set up a record unprecedented in the annals of modern warfare," so that "the whole world recognizes our position as champion of international justice and understands the value of our spiritual strength." 3 The source of this "spiritual strength" is to be found in the spirit of the people. Concerning this matter, we wish to cite the opinion of two well-known French authors, Paul Janet and

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2 Words of Madame Chiang Kai-Shek, quoted from her address to the U.S.A. Congress, February 26, 1943. Copied from the Chicago Sun, Feb. 27, 1943. The Chicago Tribune also had the entire text published. (same date.)

3 Quoted from For five full years An Address to the Chinese people on July 7, 1942. Confer: All we are and all we have, a collection of Chiang Kai-Shek's speeches translated into English and published by the Chinese News Service, Rockefeller Center, New York City. A copy of it has been given to the Library of the Graduate School of Loyola University of Chicago.
Gabriel Seailles:

The history of Ethics has, apart from the light which it throws on Philosophy in general, an interest particular to itself. For, whilst Metaphysical theories are often the work of man not in close contact with practical life, the Ethical theories of a Philosopher, on the contrary, give nearly always an ideal interpretation of the custom and moral of his age.

Moralists are in a sense the legislators of nations, for they in truth dictate laws to the nobler mind, whose ideal of conduct is not bounded by the narrow limits of mere legality. Ethical systems, no less than legal codes, have for their foundation, as Plato says, not "rocks and oaks, but the customs of the State." (Rep. Book VIII, Ch. 2). And far more clearly than philosophy and science they reveal to us the character and spirit of the nation to which they belong.

Agreeing with this opinion, we are convinced that a new and objective knowledge of the Chinese spirit must be based on accurate and scientific knowledge of the teachings of China's authoritative moralists. Thus, under the positive suggestion and encouragement of Rev. Father John J. Wellmuth, S.J., then Chairman of the Department of Philosophy at Loyola University of Chicago, we have undertaken as the topic of our dissertation the moral doctrine of Mo-tze, one of China's most original and most influential moralists, whose teachings are respected even more than those of Confucius by the present-day rulers although Confucius is the only Chinese philosopher well known to the western world.

The practical influence of Mo-tze's teachings on the philosophy of life in our modern China is to be seen in the similarity of the principles of the "New Life Movement" 5 with the doctrine of Mo-tze. The outstanding courage of our people in resisting a powerful enemy for eight long years is at least partially due to the teachings of Mo-tze which insisted on an all-out resistance to any aggressive power. 6 Manual labor is no more despised by the intellectual class as, according to the opinion of Confucius, it should be. 7 Other characteristic points of Mo-tze's teachings such as simplicity in funeral, economy in expenditures, universal love, condemnation of offensive war, and anti-fatalism 8 are in conformity with the "New Life Movement", which is, according to its authors, a kind of moral Renaissance.

Although, as a matter of fact, Mo-tze is practically unknown to the Western public, he is nevertheless not ignored by Western sinologists. As can readily be seen from the bibliography given at the end of this essay, quite a few books about Mo-tze have already been written in different European languages. However, a study from the Scholastic standpoint of Mo-tze's teachings as a whole and of his complete moral system is still

5 "The New Life Movement" 新生活運動 initiated by Chiang Kai-Shek in 1933. We shall discuss later the influence of Mo-tze upon it.
6 Mo-tze maintained "resistance to the last man" as we may see in his last twelve chapters which deal with warfare.
7 Mo-tze did manual works himself and emphasized the value of labor in human life as we shall see in our discussion. Confucius considered manual labor as a low profession and not fit for intelligent people.
8 We shall explain all these points later in our dissertation.
lacking. The work of Mr. Mei Yei-pao entitled Motze, the neglected rival of Confucius \(^9\) is perhaps so far the most complete and extensive discussion on the matter. Nonetheless, it is still incomplete from the viewpoint of Scholastic philosophy, and besides, it is an extensive expose for those who can not read the original text of Mo-tze in Chinese rather than an intensive discussion of the philosophical value and qualities of Mo-tze's doctrine as a whole system of ethical teaching. The work of Madame Alexander David entitled Le Philosophes Meh-ti et l'idée de solidarité \(^{10}\) is a quite elaborate comparison between Mo-tze's doctrine of Universal Love and the Christian idea of solidarity. It is of course a special essay on a particular point of Mo-tze's teachings. Besides, the criterion used in the comparison is rather sentimental than philosophical. Other works in European languages are merely booklets whose purpose, as is often explicitly acknowledged by their authors, was to introduce Mo-tze to Westerners by way of a brief outline of his life and his teachings.

On the other hand, Chinese authors have so far offered little in the way of properly philosophical studies on Mo-tze's doctrine; their efforts have been rather directed at elaborate discussions concerning the life of Mo-tze and the authenticity of his works as we possess them in the present day. And because of their lack of proper knowledge in Western philosophy, especially Scholastic philosophy, their criticism of Mo-tze is generally based either on common sense or on Confucian tradition. A few have tried to adopt the views of modern pragmatic schools, and thus make Mo-tze a

\(^{9}\) Published by Probatain, London, 1934. The work is done under the sponsorship of the School of Philosophy of the University of Chicago.  
\(^{10}\) Published in London, 1907.
pragmatic or utilitarian; this interpretation we shall demonstrate to be rather a superficial judgment.

The doctrine of Mo-tze, especially his teaching on Universal Love, is quite similar to teachings of Christian philosophy, namely the Scholastic philosophy which is the traditional treasure of the Holy Catholic Church. It is regrettable that no Catholic philosopher has ever undertaken the task of discussing this similarity by means of a thoroughgoing analysis of Mo-tze's doctrine. This is what we intend to try in these pages. It little matters to us whether this proves to be a wholly successful attempt, for we shall be satisfied if our essay will provide help for some brilliant Catholic philosopher in working out a really valuable treatise on this matter. Such would be definitely a great help for the preaching of the Holy Gospel in the new post-war China, since a deep knowledge of Chinese moral philosophy is the key to the mass conversion which must be based on intellectual conviction and not on charitable works alone. The root of the present Catholicism in China was planted by Father Matteo Ricci, S.J., solely on an intellectual basis. This was possible because of the fact that Father Matteo had provided himself with a deep knowledge of the teachings of Chinese moralists. It is quite regrettable that this policy was not faithfully followed by the later missioners. 11

Finally, we wish to express our deepest gratitude to Dr. John McKIan whose patience and zeal in directing our research and in correcting our broken English knows no limit.

11 For more details on this matter, confer China through Catholic Eyes by Father Thomas Ryan, S.J. (See above note 1.)
CHAPTER I

PRELIMINARY NOTIONS ABOUT MO-TZE

Since the topic of our dissertation is, generally speaking, quite unfamiliar to the Western public or even probably to their scholars, we believe that a condensed expose of the fundamental knowledge concerning Mo-tze and his time is indispensable.

Thus, we shall devote our first chapter to complying with this important "conditio sine qua non," endeavoring to furnish the requisite information as briefly as possible. Though our points must be completely and critically proved, we must necessarily be concise, so that, to quote St. Gregory the Great, "Quatenus ejus expositio ita nescientibus fiat cognita, ut tamen scientibus non sit onerosa". 1 We dare hope it may prove not only "non onerosa", but may possibly be considered pleasant reading. For that reason, rather than burden the text we have included much of our materials in foot-notes.

In the interests of clarity and precision, we have arranged this introductory chapter under four subheadings, as follows:

A) Biographical Notes.
B) Authenticity of his Works.
C) Background of his Teachings.
D) Characteristics of his Doctrine.

* * *

1 Quoted from "Homilia in Evangeliiis" Homilia 13.
A) BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

"It is necessary to know the man and his time, before his teaching can be appreciated in its strong and simple verity." With these words, perhaps as an apology, L. Adams Beck opens a very long, but poorly authenticated, account of the life of Confucius in his popular work, The Story of Oriental Philosophy. The quotation expresses a sound principle; here, however, it is our intention only to present some important biographical details concerning Mo-tze as a means of acquainting our readers with him.

Very little positive information is available concerning Mo-tze. The scarcity of written documents has resulted in various estimates as to the span of his life, agreement existing only in a limitation of this period to the interval between 550 B.C. and 300 B.C. The most logical deduction from available evidence would establish his birth at about 480 B.C., and his death at about 400 B.C. In any event, it appears certain that Mo-tze lived during the period between Confucius and Mencius.

3 The most respected authorities on this matter are Liang Chi-Ts'ao and Hu-Shih 戴震. The former stated that Mo-tze was born between 468 and 459 B.C. and died between 390 and 382 B.C. (Conf. A Critical Study of Mo-tze, Shanghai 1921, in the appendix.) The latter asserted that Mo-tze was born between 500 and 490 B.C. and died between 425 and 416 B.C. (Conf. An Outline of Chinese Philosophical History. Shanghai, 1928, Chapter VI, Section I, page 147, 11th Edition.) Most Western writers followed the opinion of Dr. Hu-Shih. This is probably due to the fact that Hu's work has been translated into English.
4 Confucius died 479 B.C.; Mencius, the greatest of all Confucianists, was probably born 372 B.C. (certainly not earlier than 375 B.C.). However, the time between those two philosophers, that is, the period during which Mo-tze lived, may extend from approximately thirty years before the death of Confucius until approximately thirty years after the birth of Mencius. For, according to the custom of that time, no one was likely to make public appearances before he was nearly thirty years old.
in our opinion, is correct, despite the fact that very ancient documents seemingly assert otherwise. 5 Our conclusion is based upon the following simple facts: Confucius made no mention of Mo-tze, whereas Mo-tze severely criticised Confucius' doctrines; in like manner, Mo-tze fails to mention Mencius, who, in defending Confucianism, violently attacked Mo-tze's teaching as heretical and harmful to the morals of the people. 6 This, we believe, is adequate proof that the three philosophers were not strictly contemporaneous, and it likewise helps to determine their chronological sequence.

There is no evidence which might offer a clue as to Mo-tze's genealogy. The Chinese word "Mo", which literally signifies "black ink", does not necessarily designate his proper family or surname. It is, quite possibly, merely a nickname, given him in a fashion similar to the custom of many countries. 7

5 According to the famous Chinese historian Sze Ma-Ch'en (145-186 A.D.), some authorities or some documents of his time stated that Mo-tze was a contemporary of Confucius. (Conf. "She-Kee" by Sze Ma-Ch'en). However, according to Dr. Pei-Yuan, the famed editor of the latest official text of Mo-tze, some ancient authorities have shown that Mo-tze was rather a contemporary of Mencius. These two opinions cause a difference of more than 200 years in the life period of Mo-tze.

6 Conf. "Book of Mencius" Book III part 2, also Book VII part 1, English translation by James Legge. (See bibliography)

7 According to the custom of the time, it was not necessary to call a wise man by his surname. The typical example of this would be the well-known naturalist-philosopher Lao-tze, whose family name was "Lee", 老. Yet, he was never called "Lee-tze". The word "Lao" mans "old". This name was therefore very likely given to him in the later years of his life. Now, the word "Mo" 莫 which means "black ink" might be a surname given to our philosopher because of his dark complexion. (Conf. Text of Mo-tze Ch. 48). Mr. Hu Wei-tchen, a modern Chinese author, has even suspected that Mo-tze was not Chinese but rather an Indian because of his darker complexion and also because of the peculiarity of his doctrine of Universal Love. However, this opinion was immediately rejected by all authorities. Nevertheless, as a matter of fact, the word "Mo" as a family name is very rare even in ancient China. There is no such name nowadays.
"Tze" is a title of respect, bestowed in ancient China upon distinguished wise men; it is virtually the equivalent of the term "Doctor" in modern English. His personal or given name was "Ti". Were the English manner of address to be used, our philosopher would probably be called Tze Ti Mo, (as, for instance, Dr. John Jones.) The Chinese custom, however, reverses this process thus, Mo Ti Tze; and for brevity, Mo-tze. (i.e. Dr. Mo).

Also in this regard, many variations are found in the spelling of his name by Western sinologists, resulting from different pronunciations of the alphabetic letters in different European languages, and the different accents and even pronunciations in different regions in China for the same Chinese

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8 The Chinese word "Tse" 了 originally meant "the son". Then it became an honorary title given by the King to certain lower ranking officials of the court (practically the equivalent of the English title of "Sir"). But, with the spirit of reverence towards the scholars who were becoming more and more influential in society during the later period of the Chou dynasty, this title was given by the people to all learned wise men of the time. It was not exactly an equivalent of the English term "philosopher" as many a Western author has believed, but it was commonly given to the members of many kinds of learned professions, such as that of physician or architect. Mencius has mentioned, for instance, a certain Kung Sui-tze, was just a famous carpenter. It could be said that this title of "Tze" resembles very much the modern American title of "Doctor", except that in ancient China there were no formal graduations nor examination to obtain such a title. It was rather bestowed by the people (vox populi).

9 In Chinese 了 "Ti". No special meaning.
word, i.e. written character. 10 Throughout our dissertation, we shall use "Mo-tze". This spelling undoubtedly represents the ultimate in phonetic accuracy which can be attained in rendering the official Chinese national pronunciation into English. 11

Mo-tze's birthplace was, most likely, in the state of "Lu". 12 That

10 This is because Mo-tze is not as popular as Confucius and Mencius in the Western world. S. Holth has suggested a Latinization of Mo-Ti as "Micius". But it has not yet been accepted by Western authorities. There are more than a score of different names (or rather different spellings) given to our philosopher by Western authors. In order to give an idea of the confusing situation, we cite some of them as samples: Micius (by Holth); Mo-Ti (by Vacca); Mo-tze (by Long); Mo-tseu (by H. Maspero); Meh-Ti (by David); Mo-tzu (by Latourelle); Mih-tzi or Mak (by W. Turner); Meh-tze (by Rosney); Mih-teih (by Cognati, in his pamphlet: "Un socialista cinese del Vto secolo Av C." which is unfortunately not available in this country); Mi-tze (by Harlez); Me-tzi and Mek-tik (by Hirth); Conf. bibliography for their respective works. However, it is easy to recognize our philosopher even under so many different names because of his doctrine of universal love and his opposition to the Confucianists' school.

11 The official Chinese national pronunciation "tse" is an improved Peikinese (that is what the American public calls Mandarin) scientifically set up by a group of specialists and scholars in their effort to unify the different pronunciations in different Chinese provinces. The Government of the Republic of China has officially adopted it as the standard pronunciation to be taught in all schools. As is well known to most Western scholars, technically speaking, China has no dialects, since the written language is the same everywhere; but the pronunciation varies locally to such an extent that an oral conversation is almost impossible between people from distant regions.

12 China was at that time divided into many feudal states. The state of "Lu" was also the birthplace of Confucius and of Mencius. This state is now a part of the province of Shan-Tung in the Chinese republic. However, there is another opinion which claims that Mo-tze was a native of the state of Sung. The famous historian Sze Ma-Ch'en (115-186 A.D.) recorded that our philosopher was a government official of the state of Sung. In the text of Mo-tze (chapter 51), we read that Mo-tze had saved the state of Sung from the invasion of its larger neighbor state Chi'u. At any rate, the majority of Chinese scholars as well as historians would willingly assert that Mo-tze was a native of "Lu". Dr. Hu-Shih (conf. op. cit. Ch. VI, sect. I, see above note 3) asserted that the State of Lu is most likely Mo-tze's birth place. T'ang Ching-Kao in his Selected Text of Mo-tze with Notes and
he studied under a disciple of Confucius may be judged from his deep knowledge of Confucian doctrine and most especially, of the tenets of Confucius' direct disciples. However, he thoroughly disagreed with Confucianism, and bitterly criticized it as wrong in principles and harmful in practice. 13 Accordingly, he founded his own school of philosophy to promulgate his ideas. Mo-tze stated that he offered no new set of doctrines, but merely developed explanations of the traditional teachings of the ancient Sage Kings. 14 This, incidentally, was the favorite claim of all wise men of

Introduction (Shanghai, 1934) 3rd Ed. in the Introduction.) cited two ancient documents and two medieval ones that stated Lu as Mo-tze's birth place, while on the other hand, he also pointed out one ancient document and three medieval ones which have asserted that the state of Sung was Mo-tze's birth place. T'ang himself favored Lu. Most authors simply state that the birth place of our philosopher was Lu, but notice immediately that there are some documents which recorded Sung as Mo-tze's home state. For instance, Ts'ai Shan-Ssu in his The Philosophy of Life according to Lao-tze and Mo-tze (Shanghai, 1935, page 47). Still other authors, considering the matter as practically unimportant, do not even mention the birth place of Mo-tze. For instance, Ts'ai Huan-Fei in his History of Chinese Moral Philosophy (Shanghai, 1937, Chapter I, section 10; page 45).

13 According to the book of Huai Nan Tze (about 200 B.C.), Mo-tze studied under a Confucian teacher, and he was well versed in the Confucian philosophy, rites and practices. (for English reference conf. S. Holth). As to his criticism against Confucianism, read the original text Chapter 39, which is entitled "Anti-Confucianism"; the same title has been given to Chapter 38; however, the text of this chapter (38) unfortunately was lost. Mo-tze also criticized Confucian practice in Chapter 49.

14 The ancient sage kings, practically worshipped by the Chinese people of that time, and considered exemplars of saintliness and wisdom, are: King Yao; King Seng; King Yu; which is incidentally a particular favorite of Mo-tze; King T'ang; King Wen; King Wu; and the Great Duke of Chou; (from about 2100 B.C., age of King Yao, to about 1100 B.C., time of the Great Duke of Chou). Almost every wise man (except Lao-tze, who apparently criticized the teachings of the ancient Kings), of the time before and after Confucius, has positively appealed to the sacrosant authority of these ancient sage kings in order to prove the orthodoxy and consequently the value of his own teachings. Such appeals appeared very often both in the works of Confucius and those of Mencius.
the time, including Confucius and Mencius.

Like many of the other wise men of the age, Mo-tze journeyed throughout the feudal states of China,\textsuperscript{15} preaching his doctrine to every one. In particular, he sought out those in authority, hoping that, by instructing them, he might terminate successfully the increasingly grievous crises of his time.\textsuperscript{16} He supplemented his preaching by an exemplary mode of living; his personal virtues and political courage won for him thousands of faithful followers and this made possible the founding of his great school,\textsuperscript{17} which became, at a time, even more influential than the school

\textsuperscript{15} China was then divided into many feudal states (see above note 12). Confucius, Mencius and other wise men of that time all travelled throughout these feudal states teaching their doctrines.

\textsuperscript{16} These crises are described by Mo-tze as very alarming in all fields of human activity—political, social and economic. However, he pointed out that the moral crisis should, as a necessary consequence, directly cause a crisis in the economic, social, political and international orders. We may see the expression of this opinion of Mo-tze throughout the original text of his works. (Conf. Original Text of Mo-tze, Chapters 11, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 26, 27, 28, and 32).

\textsuperscript{17} The school of Mo-tze, which is opposed to the school of Confucius, was distinguished by its very strict organization under a dictator-like leader called "Ch'eu Tze "ataka" (i.e. the leader). Some writers have even considered this school a religion and have compared its head with the Pope of the Catholic Church. Dr. Hu-Shih\textsuperscript{15}(conf. op. cit. Ch. VI Sect. 4, page 17h) stated: "Mo-tze was an earnest religious world-savior, founder of religion....If Mohism had been placed in circumstances similar to those of medieval Europe, it certainly would have been able to develop a religious government, of which its 'Chu-Tzu's would have taken the place of the Pope". This English translation of Hu-Shih's statement is quoted from Micius, A Brief Outline of His Life and Ideas, (Shanghai 1935) a booklet by S. Holth, who quoted Dr. Hu in order to support his own statement which reads as follows: "The Mohist sect had a politic-religious character. The head of the sect was called Chu-Tzu, an office resembling that of the Pope's in the Roman Catholic Church." (op. cit., page 21)
Unlike the Sophists, and some of the ancient Chinese philosophers, who regarded the teaching of wisdom as merely an honorable and lucrative profession, Mo-tze realized, as did Socrates, that it was rather a fulfillment of a duty to mankind, having almost the status of a divine mission.  

18 A frank statement about the situation was made by none other than Mencius himself, who is often called by Western authors the Plato of Confucius. In his own words Mencius asserted: "The doctrine of Mo-Ti and that of Yang-Tzu (the archegoist) covered all the world; so that the people of the world, if they do not accept the teaching of Yang-Tzu, will certainly follow the doctrine of Mo-Ti." (Quoted from James Legge translation, Book III, Chapter 2, section 8.) In many other instances, Mencius has made similar statements which imply that the school of Mo-tze was more popular and more influential than that of Confucius.  

19 Mo-tze's frugality in seeking material contribution for his teachings may be illustrated by the following passage of the original text:  

"After Mo-tze had paid Kung Shan Kuo a visit, Kung Shang Kuo recommended him to the lord of Yeuh. The lord of Yeuh was greatly pleased, saying to Kung Shan Kuo 'Sir, if you can induce Mo-tze to come to Yeuh and instruct me I shall offer him five hundred Li square of land lying in the former state of Wu'. Kung Shan Kuo promised to try, and so fifty wagons were made ready to go to Lu and welcome Mo-tze. Kung Shan Kuo told him 'When I tried to persuade the lord of Yeuh with your principles, he was quite pleased and said to me that if I could induce you to come to Yeuh and instruct him, he would offer you five hundred Li square of land lying in the former state of Wu'. Mo-tze said to Kung Shan Kuo: 'As you observe it, what is the intention of the lord of Yeuh? If the lord of Yeuh will listen to my word and adopt my way, I shall come, asking only for food according to the capacity of my stomach and cloth according to the stature of my body. I shall just be one of the ministers. What is the use of any commission? On the other hand, if the lord of Yeuh will not listen to my word and adopt my way and I shall
In personal appearance, he was described by his disciples as being of dark complexion, thin, and negligently clothed. He ate and drank frugally, and, in general, led a very mortified life. 20 He labored with his own hands to provide the necessities for his existence, thus teaching by his own example the necessity and the value of labor, which was an important point of his economic doctrine. 21 No hardship was too great for him to undertake.

20 Conf. the original text, Mei translation, Chapters 47 and 48. Also Chuang-Tze wrote in his book, only a few years after the death of Mo-tze, that Mo-tze and his disciples, "wear short serge jackets and straw sandals, and toil day and night without stopping, making self-mortification their end and aim." (Conf. The Book of Chuang-Tze, Chapter 33, quoted from H. Giles' translation, London, 1926, see bibliography).

21 Again, we wish to use the testimony of Chuang-Tze, who was a contemporary of the direct disciples of Mo-tze. Chuang-Tze has described the extremely labor-loving spirit of Mo-tze as follows:

"Mih-tzu (after H. Giles' translation) argued in favor of his system as follows: 'Of old, the great Yu (one of the ancient sage kings) drained off the flood of waters, and caused rivers and streams to flow through the nine divisions of the empire and the part adjacent thereto, three hundred great rivers, three thousand branches, and streams without number; with his own hands he plied the bucket and dredger, in order to reduce confusion to uniformity, until his calves and shins had no hair left upon them. The wind bathed him, the rain combed him; but he marked out the rations of the world, and was in every truth a sage. And because he thus sacrificed himself to the commonwealth, ages of Mihists (disciples of Mo-tze) to come would also wear short serge jackets and straw sandals, and toil day and night without stopping making self-mortification their end and aim and say to themselves, 'If we can not do this, we do not follow the Tao (i.e. doctrine) of Yu, and are unworthy to be called Mihists'." (quoted ibidem. The translator, H. Giles, is Professor of Chinese at Cambridge University, England.)
in furtherance of his principles. On one occasion he journeyed by foot for ten days and ten nights to reach a certain powerful ruler, who was about to attack a small neighboring state. Mo-tze arrived at the palace of this ruler almost completely exhausted, with blood flowing from his worn feet, but successfully persuaded the ruler to abandon this aggressive war. 22

In addition to his scholarly knowledge, Mo-tze was also a mechanical engineer of the first class. He invented several types of mechanical equipment, suited only to the defense of cities, not for the purposes of attack. 23 Thus, not only in theory, but in practice as well, he did his utmost to abolish aggressive warfare, which was, in his own opinion, the chief cause of social and moral crises of his time.

The place and manner of his death is unknown.

22 Conf. original text of Mo-tze Chapter 51. That Mo-tze had worn out his feet, and had to tear out a piece of his jacket in order to give first aid to his bleeding feet, is recorded in the document named Selected Classics 經ší. In completing the narration of this event the Commentary on the Selected Classics is considered by scholars to be a trustworthy document.

23 Conf. the original text of Mo-tze, Chapter 51 and sqq. to the end of the book. Mei did not translate these final chapters, and there is no English translation as yet. But, at any rate, Mo-tze had, in those twelve final chapters, explained his plans for a defensive war which included many mechanical devices as well as technical military strategy.
Very probably Mo-tze wrote some books, though there are none extant. The so-called Book of Mo-tze inherited by posterity, is evidently the work of his disciples; it gives no indication of the master's personal participation in composing it. In its original form, it must have

24 The above mentioned document, the Selected Classics (see above note 23) and another document named Selected Ancient Historical Facts, both recorded that Mo-tze went to Yin (name of a city) and offered books to King Wei. The king accepted the books, and having read them he exclaimed: "These are good books". We noted that both documents have recorded this fact in exactly identical words. This shows that they may both depend on a more ancient document or simply that the later one of them copied the former. At any rate, they are both quite trustworthy documents. One may also notice that the documents did not state that Mo-tze was the author of those books, but it can be supposed so, since usually no one in ancient China, particularly no philosopher, would present a king with books written by someone else.

25 This book is generally known under the title Mo-tze; it was the custom of ancient China that the books were called after the name of their authors. Thus, the names "Men-tze", "Chuang-tze", "Huai Nan-tze" and "Mo-tze" may indicate the books or their authors, or even if the book is written by disciples, the master's name is nevertheless used for the identification of the book; for the book contains the teachings of the master. In order to make it more explicit in English, we have referred to the book as the book of Mo-tze or the text of Mo-tze instead of simply saying Mo-tze as we do in Chinese.

26 This is because at that time the custom was that disciples published their records on the teachings of their master only after the death of the master. Such was the case of Confucius and Mencius. Thus, as an obvious consequence, the books of those ancient masters were always written in the third person (i.e. referring to Mo-tze's teaching in an indirect style beginning with "Mo-tze said:").
contained at least seventy-one chapters, 27 possibly even more, of which the text of fifty-three chapters has survived to our days. The arrangement of material is as follows: The chapters are generally grouped in sets of three, each set devoted to one point of Mo-tze's teachings, and each chapter presenting the summary of that point. Thus each set of chapters contains three summaries, more or less similar, of the same point of Mo-tze's doctrine. The exact reasons for this peculiar and unique arrangement are unknown. One opinion is that the contents are actually the works of three disciples, as each of them made an individual record of Mo-tze's teaching, and these records later were combined into a single book. Another opinion holds that, during the later division of Mo-tze's followers into three different sects, each sect in transcribing a then existing account of Mo-tze's doctrines, made some alterations in the original work, and the extant text, which we possess now, is merely the compilation of the three transcriptions. We favor the latter opinion, for we believe that the text as a whole book is obviously written by one and the same hand; its literary style is more than similar, it is one and the same throughout. Had it been written by three different hands, it seems to us that a difference rather

27 According to the General Index of Literature of the Han Dynasty 漢書篇卷, the text of the Book of Mo-tze contains 15 books divided into 71 chapters. We would like to note that the term chapter is not universally used by Western authors to indicate the divisions of the original text of Mo-tze. For example, H. Maspero called them "sections", while Wilhelm Richard called them "books". However, generally speaking, the Chinese term  篇 is translated "chapter" and  书 is translated as "book". Thus Mencius had 7 books; and so Mo-tze had 15 books with 71 chapters. Recently, some Chinese scholars stated that the original text of Mo-tze must have had even more than 71 chapters. This, according to us, is quite possible and even quite probable because of the persecution of She-Wang-Ti. (See below note 30).
than an identity of style would be the logical result, as in the case of
the four Gospels. 28

It is quite important to mention, at this first opportunity, that the
existing text is not equally valued as to authenticity in the case of each

28 This matter is brought out by only a few authors. It is unnoticed or
rather considered as of little importance by many authoritative writers
so that they do not even mention it. For instance Dr. Hu-Shih, Liang
Chi-Ts'ao, Ts'ai Yuan Bei. Among the Westerners Henri Maspero is the
only one who has ever discussed it. T'ang Ching Kao (conf. op.
cit., page 5, see above note 12) favored the first opinion on this
matter. Watanabe, professor of Chinese Philosophy at University,
Japan, favored the latter opinion. (Conf. his Introduction to the
History of Chinese Philosophy, Shanghai, 1926, page 133.) We favor
the latter opinion because if we study the differences existing between
three analogical chapters we find that they consist chiefly in the fact
that one chapter may contain a statement or an episode from the life
of Mo-tze which the other failed to record and vice-versa. But whenever
a statement or an episode is recorded by both or by all three chapters,
we notice that the same description, same construction of sentences,
and even the same words are often used. Henri Maspero, the noted
French sinologist, has noticed this similarity of style; however, he
has wrongly stated that the text was therefore written by Mo-tze
himself. Against this opinion we have critical reasons unanimously
supported by all Chinese scholars and almost all Western authors alike.
Nevertheless, Maspero's opinion merits a quotation thereby:

"Ils (les 53 sections) sont si nettement du même
style, de la même main, et ce style est si particulier,
qu'il est impossible de ne pas admettre qu'ils représentent
les écrit du Mo-tséu lui-même.... Il faut évidemment
y voir les réductions dissemblables appartenant aux
trois écoles entre les quelles les disciples du
Mo-tséu se partagerent au III ième siècle."

(quoted from La Chine Antique, by Henri Maspero, Paris, 1927, page 475.)
Against Maspero's belief that Mo-tze wrote these chapters himself, we
have the unanimous opinion of all Chinese writers. In fact, we can not
find a single Chinese author who has doubted that the extant text of
Mo-tze was written by his disciples. Maspero is really the only one
who made such a daring statement. Chinese authorities on this matter
further point out that some of the chapters were not even written by
the immediate disciples of our philosopher, dating these chapters at
about two centuries later. (Conf. Hu-Shih, op. cit., page 151 and sqq.)
We shall discuss this point in the immediately following text and will
bring out the classification of Dr. Hu.)
of the extant 53 chapters. By authenticity, we do not mean that the text is necessarily written by Mo-tze himself; we only intend to assert that it is reliable as representing faithfully the authentic teachings of Mo-tze.

Modern authorities, after careful studies, have found good reasons to suspect the objective value of certain chapters. As usual in matters of this kind, unanimous agreement as to the exact number and nature of the chapters believed spurious cannot be obtained. However, most authorities would consent easily to the following general classification, made by Dr. Hu-Shih.

Class A text, believed authentic; that is, written by direct disciples of Mo-tze.

Chapters 8 to 39, and 47 to 61. A total of forty chapters.

Class B text, believed less authentic; that is, probably written by the disciples of disciples of Mo-tze.

Chapters 40 to 45. A total of six chapters.

Class C text, believed spurious; that is, probably written by later followers of Mo-tze, either at the very end of the Chou dynasty or at the beginning of the Han dynasty.

Chapters 1 to 7. A total of seven chapters. 29

Since authenticity of source is recognized as a necessary condition to the acceptance of any material as genuine, this general classification is quite important as a determinant of the genuine doctrine of Mo-tze.

29 Conf. Hu-Shih (op. cit., page 151 and sqq.) We remark here that in addition to the fifty-three chapters of text, we also have the titles, but not the contents, of the following chapters: 22, 23, 24, 29, 30, 33, 34 and 38. Thus our readers will not be surprised to find that the total number of chapters from chapter 8 to 39 and from chapter 47 to 61 is only forty chapters.
Other factors, too, must be considered in this particular matter, as even the most authentic chapters must have suffered some alterations in expression, if not in substance because of the many transcriptions necessary for preservation during that long period of more than twenty centuries.

Of prime importance is the lethal menace to strict authenticity occasioned by the notorious persecution of scholars and ruthless destruction of books during the dictatorship of She Wang Ti, first Emperor of the Ch'in dynasty. Like Adolph Hitler, this extremely fascist-minded Chinese Emperor ordered all books other than those which dealt with merely empirical sciences, such as mathematics, medicine and agriculture, to be burned. Thus, the "Book of Mo-tze", (possibly the last ten chapters, dealing with war strategy and war equipment were spared) no doubt shared the same fate as the books of the other ancient philosophers including those of Confucius. Consequently, serious alterations could hardly have been avoided, considering the obstacles encountered by those engaged in the work of restoration during the early

30 She Wang-Ti (221 B.C. to 210 B.C.) (duration of his dictatorship). Some historians believed that it was from the name of this dynasty, "Ch'in", that the European name "China" or "Chine" has been given to the Middle Kingdom, as we Chinese call our nation " país " . If this is true, it implies necessarily that Europe had known the existence of China as early as before 200 B.C. For the Ch'in dynasty lasted merely a few years after the death of She Wang-Ti. As a matter of fact, it was the shortest dynasty in Chinese history. She Wang-Ti's son, who succeeded him as the Great Emperor of Ch'in, was killed by a revolutionary army formed by the people.

31 On the tenth of May, 1933, many books, including the Holy Bible, were condemned by the Nazi leader and publicly and officially put to flames. This was She Wang-Ti's futile attempt to destroy all political theories and ideas contrary to his absolute dictatorship. For most of the Chinese ancient books, such as the book of Mencius and that of Mo-tze, do contain democratic ideas. We will show this later in our dissertation.
period of the Han dynasty. No matter how well-intentioned the efforts at restoration, accuracy would surely suffer, considering the means available at that time for restoring the books. 32

However, the restored text of Mo-tze obviously still contained -- as we noticed above -- seventy-one chapters. Further, by reason of its anti-Confucian attitude, the book of Mo-tze was almost constantly listed in the official Index Librorum Prohibitorum of various dynasties. This probably caused the loss of nineteen chapters, and may also have caused alterations in the text of the remaining chapters.

Nevertheless, despite these many misfortunes, it is generally believed, and not without critical reasons furnished by most scrupulous research, that the extant text still contains faithfully what is essential in Mo-tze's original doctrines.

32 During the persecution of She Wang-Ti, all of the most famous books of ancient China, including the five canonical books, were destroyed. All people were forced to turn over their books or fragments of books to the government. The whole army was sent out in quest of books. A house to house search was ordered. Whoever dared to conceal a condemned book was subjected to the death penalty. The scholars were mass-murdered; most of them, according to trustworthy tradition, were buried alive. The restoration of ancient books was accomplished, during the Han dynasty through the mutilated codes and fragments, (probably consisting of pieces of bamboo or terra cotta, for these were the most common materials for books of that time; only wealthy people could afford a silk roll or mouton skin for writing papers) which were found in double walls or other kinds of secret places. Nevertheless, most of the works were restored chiefly by the tenacious memory of some very aged scholars who survived the persecution. Thus, for example, the "Book of Confucius" was dictated by a ninety-year old scholar named Ho Seng iy, who was at that time almost completely blind, and also hard to understand because of his total lack of teeth. However, according to the tradition, his own daughter and a group of young scholars did succeed in obtaining a complete dictation from him, and thus with the help of recovered fragments, they restored the "Book of Confucius". Similar difficulties can be expected in restoring the work of Mo-tze. But we have no positive tradition to construct a story for it.
In 1784 A.D., a public edition was officially published with the explicit approval of imperial authority. This edition was carefully annotated under the direction of Dr. Pi-Yuan, a distinguished scholar and a member of the Imperial Academy, and it was immediately recognized among the intellectual milieu as the outstanding edition. Hence, it is naturally the basic reference source of our discussion.

In 1894, Seng I-rang, an authority in ancient literature, wrote a very thorough and critical commentary of the Book of Mo-tze, based on the text as contained in the above mentioned edition of Pi-Yuan. To the present day, this commentary is considered the best ever written on the text of Mo-tze, and possesses incomparable authority in determining the original meaning of obscure passages in the text.

Recently, in 1929, an English translation of the text of Mo-tze was made by Dr. Mei Yei-pao. Since it is the only existing English translation, we

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33 Because of the imperial prohibition, the work of Mo-tze was not allowed to reach the public; however, private transcriptions or even printings were always permitted to the scholars. For, the prohibition of imperial authority (after She Wang-Ti) never intended to exterminate any prohibited books, but merely prohibited their public selling so that they would not be easily reached by the public as such. But, the scholars could always keep the copies they had and were permitted even to give them to their friends to be transcribed. In fact, in the imperial palace itself there was a library containing copies of those prohibited books just in order to preserve them. The reason for which the Book of Mo-tze was finally released from the Index was not given by imperial authority.

34 This commentary is available only in Chinese. Therefore in many instances we could not use its great authority in proving points during our discussion. However, we are glad to learn that Mei Yei Pao, the English translator of Mo-tze's text, has explicitly acknowledged that in many instances he has consulted Seng's commentary.

35 The Ethical and Political Works of Mo-tze by Mei Yei-pao; (A. Probatain, London & New York). Accomplished under the auspices of the school of philosophy of the University of Chicago. It is not a complete translation of the entire works of Mo-tze. Therefore, the translator has cautiously adopted a very well chosen title. For he did not translate the five chapters dealing with logical principles and formulae, and also the last eleven chapters.
gladly used it for the quotations needed in our discussions. However, in a few instances (indeed, very few) we deemed it necessary to change some words of the given translation in order to bring out more clearly the exact intended meaning of the original text. We shall give sufficient reasons for every change in such instances. Our technique in this matter will be: 1) consider the context of the same translation; 2) refer to the translation of the same passage of the original text that is translated and published by some Western authors either in English or in other European languages. Most Western authors, writing about Mo-tze, have translated a few more or less important passages from the original text whenever they wished to quote Mo-tze directly. Thus, we eliminated the necessity of referring directly to the original Chinese text.

We also know of the existence of three different translations of the major part of Mo-tze's work in French, Italian and German; however, unfortunately, they are not available in this country at the present time. 36

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36 We found these works through the bibliography of books we consulted in our dissertation. METI, des Sozialetikers und seiner Schuler Philosophiche Werke, by Alfred Forke, Berlin, 1922. Un Sicialista Cinese del Vo Secolo (av. C) Mih-Teih, by Salvatore Cognetti de Martiis, Roma, 1888. (partial translation.) Mitse, L'Amour Universel. (French translation of the three chapters on Universal Love) by C. De Harlez, to be found in Giornale della Societa Asiatica Italiana, Vol. IX, pages 81 to 126. (We regret that we do not know the place and the date of the publication of the Giornale.)
C) THE BACKGROUND OF HIS TEACHINGS

As no doctrinal system is believed to be born over night, it is most useful to know the background which at least contributed to the birth of that doctrine. This is particularly true in discussing the teachings of Mo-tze, since his teachings were developed precisely in order to furnish remedies for the disorderly situations found in the social and economical fields of his time.

The Chou Dynasty (from 1122 B.C. to 255 B.C.) was the longest and probably the most splendid in China's forty-five centuries of history. But, at the time of its decline, the Emperor was only nominally the supreme ruler of the Country. In the so-called period of Spring and Autumn there were many feudal states virtually independent. Here, we wish to quote the description of that time written by L. Adams Beck:

China at that time was a collection of small kingdoms under one more or less nominal head, the sovereign. The vassal states under him were held on feudal tenure, as they had doubtless been from the earliest time which can be traced. Wu Wang, the great ruler, had thus divided the empire, like Napoleon placing his own relations on the minor thrones,—a system well enough at the time, but as family ties weaken, unlikely to last.

37 The Period of Spring and Autumn (from 722 B.C. to 481 B.C.), was a later period of the Chou dynasty. It is so-called because the Annals which recorded the history of that period were named the Books of Spring and Autumn. "גמ". They were written, or rather composed, by Confucius (for this, we have the explicit testimony of Mencius) and named by himself. Probably by this name Confucius meant The Books of Years, or The Books of Ages, or, as some authors believed, The Book of Changing Facts; that is, The Books of History.
It ended, as such a system must, in disunion among the several states and disloyalty to the sovereign, who practically ruled only insofar as his own character and power enabled him to do; that was often to a very limited extent, and the state of China at the birth of Confucius was one of rapine and turbulence. Not only were the states often at war among themselves, but powerful families in some of them disputed the rule with the princes, just as in the Wars of the Barons in England. 38

This passage describes the turning point between the "Period of Spring and Autumn" and the "Period of the Warring States." 39 Mo-tze lived at the beginning of the latter period. Hence he felt that he could not discuss problems of speculative philosophy in a peaceful, closed garden like the Academy of Plato. He was convinced that he must teach a practical doctrine to all the people, especially to the rulers of the people, in order to save the world in its great crisis. And he was so conscious of the need that he did not hesitate to criticise severely the doctrine dominant in his time, i.e. Confucianism, because it was, in his judgment, unable to save the world. 40

Probably, as we have already noted, Mo-tze had studied under a disciple of Confucius. He knew very well the literature and history of his time;
this is evident from the many quotations from the ancient books, and the
citations of historical facts which are abundantly found in his eloquent
teachings. What made him great, however, was his very correct understanding
of the empirical value of a doctrine; he believed that a true doctrine cannot
be impracticable. We shall discuss this point at length later on; here,
however, we should like to point out that this practical tendency, which causes
his doctrine to be looked upon as an utilitarian system, is not the essential
characteristic of his doctrine, although many scholars, including some of the
Christian authors, have considered Mo-tze as a utilitarian or socialist,
and even as a communist.  

There is also a question, agitated by quite a few Chinese scholars, as to

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\[41\] For instance, Wilbur H. Long, a Protestant writer, stated: "If Mo-tze
based his philosophy on the metaphysical doctrine of moral and humanitarian
Providence, he nevertheless kept one eye on practical social welfare. In
technical terms he was a eudaeministic utilitarian holding that the
wellbeing of humanity is the end of moral, social and political life. A
pragmatic practicalism is also characteristic of his thought." (Conf.
his booklet Mo-tze, China's Ancient Philosopher of Universal Love, Peiping,
1934, pages 33 and 34. Also Joseph A. Edkins, another Protestant writer,
stated that Mo-tze based his doctrine of universal love "upon political
utility while Our Saviour rests the obligation to love on religious and
moral grounds....The Christian is to love in obedience to the will and in
imitation of the example of God....Our Chinese Philosopher knew nothing of
such an origin for his favorite principle." (Conf. his "Notice of the
character and writings of Meh-tse", article in Journal of the North China
Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, London, May 11, 1859.) We shall cite
more authors and discuss the matter later in our dissertation. Very
recently, A. P. Sorokin, in his Crisis of Our Age, called Mo-tze a
utilitarian. (see third edition, page 262.) As to the title "communist",
Conf. Wilhelm Richard's A Short History of Chinese Civilization, page 151
(see bibliography). Also quite a few Chinese authors, for example,
Shang Nai-Hsiš, have considered Mo-tze a communist. (Conf. his A
Brief History of Chinese Thought, Shanghai, 1930.)
the source of Mo-tze's doctrine. But, this is, in our opinion, a question of rather little importance, since Mo-tze knew all the doctrines and almost all the sciences and opinions of his time. Having such an ample knowledge, Mo-tze formed, by examining the root of the social and moral crises of his time, a system of ethical principles which he thought to be absolutely true and therefore practically capable to restore order and prosperity to the confusing world if sincerely accepted by the people. 42

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43 Fang Hseu-Tseu has written a book entitled The Source of Mo-tze's Doctrine (Shanghai, 1935). Many other authors have discussed this matter in their works or articles. Some of them even believed that Mo-tze must have had some knowledge of ancient Indian philosophy, and from it adopted his altruism. However, serious authorities such as Liang Chi-ts'ao, Hu-Shih (their authority is respected by Western writers, for instance by H. Williamson, who, in his Mo-Ti, a Chinese Heretic, Tsi-Nan, China, 1927, testified: "Professors Liang Chi Ts'ao, Hu-Shih and Chang Ping-ling are amongst the better known moderns who are giving considerable thought to Mo-tze's Philosophy." conf. page 11.) all denied that Mo-tze or any Chinese at that time could have known anything about Indian philosophy. (Conf. op. cit., above note 2.) As to Mo-tze's ample knowledge of all the sciences at his time, that is an obvious fact for whoever reads his works, since our philosopher has cited frequently almost all the ancient books, poetic verses as well as historical events. Moreover, his ample knowledge in architecture and mechanics is sufficiently demonstrated in the last ten chapters of his book.
D) THE CHARACTERISTICS OF HIS DOCTRINE

Certainly the most characteristic point of Mo-tze's teachings is the doctrine of "Universal Love". This is, as we have already noted, the distinctive characteristic of the school of Mo-tze. But, it is not less certain that the ultimate foundation of his entire doctrinal system, as proposed in the original text, was the doctrine of the "Will of Heaven" which we shall discuss at length in the second chapter of this dissertation.

Another characteristic of his teachings, as many authors have already pointed out, is the logical connections between his eloquent arguments which unite all his teachings into a single and well-organized body of ideas so intimately chained to each other that if one should be convinced of one point of his teachings, one would be forced by a series of logical inferences into acceptance of the entire system of Mo-tze's philosophy.

A strong and almost exaggerated tendency to emphasize the practical value of moral principles is also an obvious peculiarity of his teachings. He was

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43 There are three chapters of the original text of Mo-tze entitled "On the Will of Heaven" (chapters 26, 27, and 28.) According to the text, literally interpreted, it is clear that the "Will of Heaven" is for Mo-tze the ultimate basis of morality. Nevertheless we must engage ourselves in a long and laborious discussion on this matter because quite a considerable number of authors have believed that this is only a verbal formulation of Mo-tze's doctrine, whereas the real ultimate basis of his moral principles was "utility" or "social welfare". Hence, according to them, Mo-tze was really a utilitarian or a socialist.

so anxious on this point that he solemnly declared: "How can there be anything that is good but not useful?" Hence, he is criticised by many modern scholars, both Chinese and Western, as a utilitarian. However, further studies will reveal that Mo-tze's basic idea was not the utilitarian principle; therefore, he is not to be considered as a utilitarian or pragmatist.

Some modern authors, on the other hand, have accused Mo-tze of being a superstitious preacher because of the importance he has given to the "Will of Heaven" and also to the realistic power and influence of spirits and ghosts, which to our modern mind, are merely matters of a superstitious belief popular among primitive peoples. We shall discuss the subject later. Here, we only wish to point out that Mo-tze was rather unique among all ancient Chinese philosophers in emphasizing the worship of spirits and ghosts.

However, it seems that there is no mysticism in Mo-tze's teachings. Despite the fact that spirits and ghosts received attention, he kept a very unusual silence on the future life of human souls. We may say that Mo-tze

45 Conf. original text, Chapter 16, Mai translation. The real meaning of these words of Mo-tze will be explained in the second chapter of our dissertation.

46 Mo-tze dedicated one point of his teachings to the promotion of worship of spirits and ghosts. There are three chapters on this subject (chapters 29, 30, and 31.) However, only one of these three has survived to our day, chapter 31.

47 Some authors have believed that Mo-tze was really a superstitious person and believed sincerely in those almost incredible stories about spirits and ghosts which are recorded in his teachings. But others tried to prove that Mo-tze did not believe in spirits and ghosts, but only used them in his teachings inasmuch as they are really useful in order to prevent people from doing evil things. We shall give our opinion on this point in the following chapter.

48 No ancient Chinese philosopher has explicitly spoken about the future life of human souls. But here we consider Mo-tze's silence unusual because he explicitly asserted the survival of the human soul and yet offered no details as to the conditions of future life after death. Moral sanctions, for Mo-tze, are limited entirely to this present life. The only sanction after death is historical, i.e., a good or bad reputation in history.
even ignored mysticism or spiritualism in the strict sense of the word. The relation between God and men is according to him merely a very natural one, intelligible to natural reason and thus reached by the same without supernatural assistance from outside. His favorite comparison was that the relationship between Creator and his creatures is similar to that between the Father and his own son. Any further relation such as revelation, contemplation, ecstasy or some kinds of physical commixture of natures is absolutely alien to him. This kept him strictly in the rank of philosophers without his entering the field of mysticism.

Mo-tze was a moralist, although his knowledge actually extended to every field of science, his philosophy is almost exclusively moral philosophy. He had very little to do with metaphysics, strictly so-called. Socrates, as we are told by Xenophon and Aristotle, was interested only in human affairs, and other problems would interest him only inasmuch as they might be subservient to his interest in man. So with Mo-tze. Philosophy is for man, and not vice-versa. This is likely the attitude of Mo-tze towards all sciences.

Mo-tze's entire teachings were summed up by himself in ten points, which constituted the main body of the original text of Mo-tze. The names of these ten points were given by Mo-tze himself, and were used by his disciples as the titles of chapters. As we have pointed out above, the chapters are

49 Conf. original text, Chapter 27 and 28, Mei translation.
50 The chapters dealing with logical formulae, as we noted above (see page 14, Class B text), are probably of later date. These being counted out, we will immediately realize that the philosophy of Mo-tze is entirely within the realm of ethical doctrine. The last ten chapters of the original text are obviously not philosophical.
51 See above, page 12.
grouped in sects of three, and each set devoted to one point of Mo-tze's teachings, with each chapter presenting the summary of that point, so our readers will find that in the main body of the original text of Mo-tze a common name is given to every three chapters which explain that particular point of Mo-tze's teaching. We list these ten points of Mo-tze's doctrine with their corresponding chapters numerically marked according to the English translation of Dr. Mei: 52

Point I: "Exaltation of the Virtuous" explained in Chapters 8, 9, and 10.

Point II: "Identification with the Superior" explained in chapters 11, 12, and 13.

Point III: "Universal Love" explained in chapters 14, 15, and 16.

Point IV: "Condemnation of Offensive War" explained in chapters 17, 18, and 19.

Point V: "Economy in Expenditures" explained in chapters 20, 21, and 22. 53

Point VI: "Simplicity in Funerals" explained in chapters 23, 24, and 25. 54

Point VII: "Will of Heaven" explained in chapters 26, 27, and 28.

Point VIII: "Worship of Spirits and Ghosts" explained in chapters 29, 30, and 31. 55

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52 See above page 17. In the original Chinese text, the chapters were not called by numbers.
53 The text of Chapter 22 is lost to us. (See above page 14, note 29)
54 Chapters 23 and 24 were lost.
55 Chapters 29 and 30 were lost.
Point IX: "Condemnation of Music" explained in chapters 32, 33, and 34. 56

Point X: "Anti-fatalism" explained in chapters 35, 36, and 37.

These ten points are to be explained by Mo-tze and consequently by his disciples to the common people and especially to the rulers of the states according to the actual situation of that given state where the teaching of Mo-tze's philosophy is to be done. In sending his disciples to teach all nations, Mo-tze told them:

Upon entering a country, one should locate the need and work on that. If the country is upset in confusion teach them "Exaltation of the Virtuous" and "Identifica­tion with the Superior". If the country is in poverty, teach them "Economy of Expenditures" and "Simplicity in Funerals". If the country is indulging in music and wine, teach them "Condemnation of Music" and "Anti­fatalism". If the country is insolent and without propriety, teach them "Reverence of Heaven" and "Worship of the Spirits". If the country is engaged in conquest and oppression, teach them "Universal Love" and "Condemna­tion of Offensive War". Hence Mo-tze said 'One should locate the need and work on that'. 57

We must notice that these ten points were divided by Mo-tze (in his speech quoted above) into five parts or categories. The first part was planned to promote a good political order; the second, to promote a good economic order; the third, to promote a good moral order; the fourth, to serve as the basis of morality; and the fifth, to promote a peaceful inter-state relationship, which might indeed be easily applied to our present international relations.

56 Chapters 33 and 34 were lost.
57 Conf. original text, chapter 49, Mei translation. This chapter is recog­nized by all authorities as one of most authentic. (see above, page 14).
Finally, also worthy of special note is a very strange and seemingly preter-natural tendency in his teaching of "Universal Love". He was for this reason severely criticized by almost all wise men of ancient China. Most violent of all undoubtedly was Mencius, the Plato of Confucius. Mencius has openly condemned the doctrine of Universal Love of Mo-tze as a heretical teaching which is even against the nature of man. Really, we should admit that man has very little natural motive to love all his fellowmen as universally as Mo-tze wanted, that is, to love them without any discrimination. Hence, as we shall see later, Mo-tze did not base this doctrine upon any natural tendencies or any human authority, but positively and directly upon the "Will of Heaven", the Will of the Creator and common Father of all human beings. However, this still did not make his doctrine super-natural, since the "Will of Heaven", according to Mo-tze, is not given to us by revelation; he asserted that our natural reason is able to reach the following conclusion: "It is the Will of Heaven that we must love all our fellow men universally."

58 This term is used by modern theologians to indicate what is neither strictly natural nor exactly super-natural. For example: the black magic operated by the power of evil spirits. Here, we adopted this term because Mo-tze evidently did not base his teachings on revelation and, on the other hand, we realize that the idea is somewhat a little above the natural tendency of human beings. This is why Mencius considered it against human nature.

59 Considering Confucius as the Socrates of the Orient, many Western authors called Mencius the Plato of Confucius, because of his great effort in expanding and explaining the Confucian doctrine.

60 Conf. Mencius, Book III, part 2, and Book VII, part 1, James Legge translation. (See bibliography)

61 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapters 14, 15, 16, 26, 27, 28.

62 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapters 26, 27, 28. We shall discuss this point at length in the following chapters of this dissertation.
Summarizing all that we have said in this section, we may regard the following points as the characteristics of Mo-tze's doctrine:

1) Logical coherence of all parts.
2) Strong practical tendency in moral principles.
3) Frugal and altruistic tendencies in practice.
4) Theistic basis as ultimate foundation.

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Thus, closing our first chapter, we believe that we have furnished quite sufficiently some indispensable preliminary notes which will serve our readers as a prospectus of the doctrine of our philosopher, Mo-tze, before entering into the philosophical discussion properly so-called.
CHAPTER II
THE BASIS OF HIS MORAL DOCTRINES

A) THE PROBLEM OF MORALITY IN ANCIENT CHINA PRIOR TO MO-TZE

The most basic problem in moral philosophy is certainly the problem of morality. One who denies the real existence of a spiritual quality which is called "morality" consequently denies the real existence of moral philosophy. For morality, according to the scholastics, is a special quality which is attributed to human acts, and by which the human act is called a moral act. ¹ Thus, the world of human thinking can be divided into two opposite groups: the moralists and the amoralists. The division would apply to Orientals as well as to Occidentals, to the ancients as well as to the moderns.

Among the early Chinese thinkers there were no amoralists strictly speaking, except perhaps Lao-tze, whose influence was of relatively little

¹ We may cite the definition of "morality" taken from one of the most commonly used scholastic text books: "Moralitas definiri potest: habitudo actuum humanorum ad regulam honestatis, vel: illa proprietas, vi cujus actus humanui honesti vel turpes dicuntur." (quoted from Summula Philosophiae Scholasticae, by J. S. Hickey, O. Cist. Dublini, 1911, Vol. III Editio septima, page 291.) Hickey also quotes Wayland's statement in Moral Science (page 24) "Moral philosophy proceeds upon the supposition that there exists in the action of men a moral quality; that is, that a human action may be either right or wrong." (see ibidem, page 293, note i.)
importance. Generally speaking, the existence of a "morality" as a specifically distinctive characteristic of human acts is universally admitted. However, the problem of morality which deals with the "quidditas" of the norm of morality, i.e., the norm of good and evil in morals, was rather neglected.

2 We said: "perhaps except Lao-tze", because, as we shall see later, even literally according to the Tao Te Ching (the work doubtfully attributed to Lao-tze), Lao-tze was not to be considered as simply an amoralist, although many modern authors have considered him to be so. Dr. Hu-Shih, former ambassador to the U. S. A., and a distinguished modern scholar, asserted that Lao-tze's teaching is "absolutely destructive" in morals and anarchical in politics. (Conf. his: An Outline in Chinese Philosophical History, page 52.) Dr. Ts'ai Yuan-bai, former minister of Education of the Republic of China, has considered Lao-tze's doctrine an "equalization of good and evil", so that there would be no distinction between them. (Conf. his: History of Chinese Moral Philosophy, page 33. (See bibliography for further information.) Our reason for not considering Lao-tze as an amoralist strictly speaking will be explained later on when we shall discuss Lao-tze's teachings. As to the negligible influence of Lao-tze's teaching, it is a matter of fact admitted by almost all authors. This is because of the unanimous silence about Lao-tze's teaching among all ancient Chinese books. Confucius, who is reported as once having been a disciple of Lao-tze, never mentioned a word of the teachings of Lao-tze. Mencius, who was an eager attacker of all heterodox doctrines (i.e., doctrines that are different from the teachings of Confucius) has failed completely to mention Lao-tze. And, Mo-tze, who criticized Confucianists as unbelievers, inasmuch as they practically do not believe that God is an intelligent being, would have had a furious argument against the naturalistic teachings of Lao-tze, if the teachings of the latter were known at Mo-tze's time. The complete silence of these three wise men positively proves that the influence of Lao-tze's naturalism was virtually non-existent among the people of ancient China. According to Mencius, there were only three different doctrines which had influence in the world of his time; he said: "Those who are not satisfied with the doctrine of Mo-tze and are ready to renounce it will certainly follow the doctrine of Yang-tze. And those who are not satisfied with the doctrine of Yang-tze and are ready to desert it will certainly follow the doctrine of Confucius." (Conf. Mencius, Book VII, part 2, J. Legge translation.) However, even though he had no influence on the common people, Lao-tze might have influenced Mo-tze, who knew almost all doctrines of his time. This is why we still wish to present Lao-tze's teachings.
(although not intentionally) by the ancient Chinese until the time of Mo-tze, who was probably the first man to discuss the problem of morality in the Far East.

Nevertheless, as we look into the history of philosophy, we shall realize more and more fully that no great school of thought has ever been entirely independent of or isolated from preceding or contemporary systems. Hence it is helpful to extract the views of some of the leading thinkers of that time before we present the theory of our philosopher, Mo-tze.

Thus, we present:

1) The Ancient Sage Kings
2) Lao-tze
3) Confucius
4) Yang-tze

1) THE ANCIENT SAGE KINGS

This term, i.e. the ancient sage kings, which was already in use before the time of Confucius, was made very popular and authoritative by Confucius, Mo-tze, and Mencius, because they all anxiously asserted the conformity of their doctrines with the teachings of those venerable sage kings as a strong proof of the orthodoxy and nobility of their teachings. The term "ancient sage kings" indicates a series of famous rulers of ancient China, who were considered the ideal (i.e. exemplary) rulers and teachers of the people. This list includes: King Yao, King Seng, King Yu, King T'ang, King Wen, King Wu,
and the Great Duke of Chou or Chou Kung. 3

According to the Canonical Books 4 of Ancient China, these ancient sage kings all believed in the existence of a personal God, Whom they called "Shang Ti", 5 which meant "The Emperor of Above". And since they also believed

3 Conf. above, page 6 and note 14 of first chapter. The first three—Yao, Seng, and Yu—were immediate successors on the throne of China; but they were not related to each other. They were chosen for the throne by their respective predecessors. King Yu founded the Dynasty of Hsia, 舜, the first dynasty of China, which was ended by the revolution of Duke T'ang, 舜, who became the Emperor and founder of the dynasty Yen, 尧, which was ended, in its turn, by the revolution of Wu-Wang and the great Duke of Chou, co-founders of the great Chou Dynasty (1122 B.C. to 255 B.C.) 周朝.

4 Those so-called Canonical Books were always considered by the Chinese of all time, even until very recently, as sacred and somewhat infallible. There were five of them, so they are called in Chinese "五經". The surname "Canonical Books" is given to them by Western authors. They were collected, compiled and edited by Confucius, based upon ancient official historical records of the Imperial Court and other popular documents, both in poetry and prose. Confucius claimed he was not the author of these books but only the editor of them. He called himself "a transmitter and not a maker, believing and loving the ancient." (Quoted from J. Legge translation of the Analects of Confucius, Book VI, chapter 3.)

5 In Chinese "上帝". Western authors are all agreed that by this term the ancient Chinese meant a personal God, although the attributes of such a God are not well defined as in Christian Philosophy. For instance, Rev. Father Paul Geny, S.J., professor of philosophy at the Pont. Gregorian University, Rome, stated: "Veteres Sinae in summitate rerum ponebant Deum unicum, omniperfectum, personalem, a mundo distinctum, quem Shang-Ti vocabant. Postea sermo fuit etiam de Tien (quod nomen coelum significat) qui initio videturuisse numen in coelo residens, probabilius ipse Shang-Ti novo nomine designatus." (Conf. Brevis Conspectus Historiae Philosophiae, Romae, 1932.) Protestant writers also agree on this point. For instance, S. Holth, speaking particularly on the belief of the people at the time of Mo-tze, said: "One brief word must be added about the religious belief of that time. The original notion of a Supreme Being, sovereign on High, Shang-Ti or the Heaven, Tien, has apparently not degenerated, but the tendency towards animism was increasingly manifested among the religionists of the period. It seems to have been a common assumption that only the Sovereign on High possesses power to govern the world, to reward the righteous and to punish the wicked. In him was no change. He will exalt and bless the good, but the guilty will not escape his judgment. Nothing can happen contrary to his will. (Conf. Micius, A Brief Outline of his Life and Ideas, Shanghai, 1935.) References on this particular point, that is the idea of God among ancient Chinese, are quite abundant. Here we only name a few more specific works:
that His residence is in the heavens, they referred to Him as "Heaven". Eventually, because of the great respect due to the holy name of "Shang Ti", the term "Heaven" became much more frequently used to indicate God. They believed that this personal God ruled over all humanity and would inevitably reward the righteous and punish evildoers. Consequently they taught the people to worship Heaven and do good. This has been repeatedly established by Confucius, Mo-tze and Mencius, either by directly quoting the original text of the ancient documents or by representing it as a commonly known fact vividly depicted by their personal eloquence. To cite an example, Confucius has quoted the King T'ang as saying while he offers a propitiatory sacrifice


c) L'idee de Dieu dans la Philosophie religieuse de la Chine, a booklet by Leon Louis Rosny, Paris, 1899.


e) The Quest of God in China, by Frederik O'Neill, New York, 1925. The author asserted firmly that the "Shang-Ti" of ancient China is a personal God. (Conf. page 75 and sqq.)


Even atheistic modern scholars such as Dr. Hu-Shih and Ts'ai Yuan-Bai (see above note 2) have asserted that the "Shang Ti" or "Heaven" of the ancient Chinese is a personal God having free will and power to rule all humanity. (Conf. Hu-Shih: An Outline of Chinese Philosophical History, Shanghai, 1928, Chapter II, pages 35-42. Ts'ai Yuan-pei: History of Chinese Moral Philosophy, Shanghai, 1937, Chapter II, pages 7-8.)
on behalf of his people:

I, the child Le, presume to use a dark-colored victim, and presume to announce to Thee, O Most Great and Sovereign God, that the sinner I dare not pardon; and Thy minister, O God, I do not keep in obscurity. The examination of them is by Thy Mind, O God. If in my person, I commit offences, they are not to be attributed to you the people of the myriad regions. If you in the myriad regions commit offences, these offences must rest on my person. 6

Having such a belief, the ancient Chinese, like primitive people elsewhere, did not bury their consciences which told them what was good and what not good. However, neither did they explicitly inquire about the existence or about the essence of an objective norm of morality prior to and consequently independent of the human conscience, which is, according to modern ethical science, the subjective norm of morality. The problem of morality is, of course, not concerned with the subjective norm but the objective norm of morality. In other words, the problem of morality is to find out what is the objective norm of morality.

The ancient Chinese did observe that the simple and unreflective judgment of an individual person's conscience is not infallible in its dictum; hence, people must be taught to use (i.e., in our scientific language, to form) their conscience rightly, and this is precisely the task of the rulers and scholars. Thus, as a matter of fact (even though there were no explicit statements), according to these Sages, the science of ethics ultimately is

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6 Quoted from the translation by James Legge, translator of the canonical books and all the books of Confucius and Mencius. (Vol. I, Book XX, chapter 1, The Analects of Confucius.) However, in order to understand fully the meaning of this passage, one must possess an adequate knowledge of the customs and mentality of the ancient Chinese. For the translation is very literal. We regret that there is not enough space for us to explain every detail.
based on the experiences and reasoning of wise men. In other words, the norm of morality (objectively speaking) is human reason, taken not individually, but rather as an elaborated common agreement of the wise, not without regard to historical experiences.

This is very similar to that we call "common sense", which is considered by many modern thinkers as the only ultimate norm of morality, but which the ancient sage kings of China did not consider an exclusively ultimate norm of morality. It is even probable that they did recognize the existence of a Divine Law which must be (if they had such scientific terms) the objective and absolute norm of morality; that is to say, the norm of the subjective norm of morality which is our conscience. Here we are not merely guessing, since by the very fact that they did believe in reward and punishment by "Shang-Ti", they must have believed implicitly in the existence of a Divine Law according to which "Shang Ti" judged His human subjects. Moreover, there are a number of sentences in the text of the Canonical Books that either presuppose or even explicitly state the existence of a Divine Law. For instance, in the 

She-Ch'ing:

Te sent down calamities on the Hea dynasty. The ruler of Hea increased his luxury. He would not speak kindly to the people and became utterly dissolute and lost to all intelligence. He was unable for a single day to rouse himself to follow the path marked out by Te. 7

Here, the term "Te" is a synonym of "Shang-Ti". In the She-Ch'ing we often find "Te" instead of "Shang-Ti" for reasons required by poetry; for "She-Ch'ing" consists of a collection of ancient popular poems and songs which

7 Quoted from J. Legge translation as used by himself in his The Notion of the Chinese Concerning God and the Spirits," Hong-Kong, 1892 (page 101). Italics ours.
were selected and re-edited finally by Confucius with the purpose of educating the common people in morals. 8

Incidentally, Mo-tze has also cited the Canonical Books in confirming his theory of the "Will of Heaven":

Mo-tze not only established the "Will of Heaven" to be the standard; it is also the theme of an ode in the "Ta Ya" among the books of the ancient Kings: "God said to King Wen: 'I cherish your intelligent virtue. It was not proclaimed with much noise or gesture. It was not modified after the possession of the empire. Instinctively and naturally submissive to God's scheme.' This is to proclaim that King Wen used the "Will of Heaven" as a standard and was submissive to God's scheme." 9

Although the original full meaning of this passage of the She-Ch'ing is quite obscure and confusing, (for modern critics believe that there were missing words in the extant text) we may be sure that the author of this ancient ode believed that all men, including the king, must be submissive to the scheme arranged by God. We believe that Mo-tze has given us a correct interpretation of the originally intended signification. Thus, according to the Canonical books, man must follow the "path" marked out by God, or, in other words, he must be submissive to God's scheme. This should be a sufficient acknowledgment of the existence of Divine Law.

Despite such expressive statements, we cannot conclude definitely that the ancient Sage Kings of China asserted that the ultimate norm of morality is the law of "Shang-Ti". The reason is that they did not have such a clear

8 We said "re-edited finally" by Confucius because the book was edited and re-edited with additional materials several times long before Confucius. Confucius was its last editor, giving us its present contents. As to the purpose of his work in editing She-Ch'ing, Confucius said himself that there were 300 hymns in the She-Ch'ing, but that its purpose may be expressed by one sentence, that is, do not think evil. (Conf. Analects, Book X.)

and scientifically precise notion about the value of an objective, absolute norm of morality, and they were not conscious of a necessity of a deeper discussion on the matter. Such a task was reserved for a later thinker, to be performed by our philosopher Mo-tze, the preacher of the "Will of Heaven."  

2) LAO-TZE

Lao-tze, an early contemporary of Confucius, was perhaps the man nearest to amoralism in ancient China. We decline to make an absolute statement, since Lao-tze did not speak clearly enough to let us decide positively, or rather he did not express his mind definitely; for it is quite possible that he had no definite theory of his own. Besides, it is not our purpose here to discuss at length the doctrine of Lao-tze, whose influence was little noticeable among the ancient people of China, although probably it might have influenced Mo-tze in some way, since our philosopher's ample knowledge could hardly permit him to ignore it.

In our opinion, Lao-tze might be called a naturalist, somewhat like

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10 As to Mo-tze's doctrine on the "Will of Heaven", it will be the subject of our discussion in the next section. Here, at the end of this section, we wish to recommend a few books in Western languages for further studies on the teachings of the Ancient Sage Kings.

"China" (an article in the Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics) by W. Gilbert Walsche; La Chine Antique, by Henri Maspero; Sur le pretendu monotheisme des anciens Chinois, by Maurice A. Courant; Vestiges des principaux dogmes chretiens tires des anciens livres chinois, by Pere J. Henri De Fremare, S.J.; The Development of Chinese Conception of Supreme Being; by B. Schindler; Moral Tenets and Customs in China, by Leon Weiger; Filosofie e religione della Cina, by Giovanni Vacca (in Enciclopedia Italiana, under article CINA, Roma, 1930). (See bibliography for further information on these books).
Jean Jacques Rousseau, because he stated that whenever man acts according to nature, his action is perfect. A perfect action is neither good nor bad; for, Lao-tze did not approve the use of these terms, i.e. good and evil. He considered the idea of distinguishing good from evil unnatural, because such an idea, he said, is not innate in our minds, but is invented by ancient pseudo-wise men. People are taught to conceive the difference between good and evil, and are taught to call certain things good and others, evil. If they were not taught to do so, they would not be able to conceive the meanings of the terms "good" and "evil". Without such a pseudo-knowledge, Lao-tze continued, man would be happier, for he would act according to nature only. Now, the pseudo-knowledge and the pseudo-education given to the people by those so-called wise men has turned them from their natural innocence. When man turned away from nature, he was corrupted; therefore, Lao-tze accused the ancient wise men of corrupting the people and leading the world to disorder.

Lao-tze also considered the conception of "good" and that of "evil" are strictly correlative, so that one can not have the notion of "good" without a full understanding of what is "evil". Thus, Lao-tze concluded that we must talk neither about "good" nor about "evil". If unfortunately we were taught to know what is good and what is evil, then try to forget about it; and if the

11 Rousseau wrote about man in what he called the natural, and consequently perfect state: "It is evident at once that men in this state, having between them no kind of moral relation nor any known duties, could not be either good or bad and had neither virtues nor vices." ("Discours sur l'origine de l'inégalité parmi les hommes." See Oeuvres Complètes de J. J. Rousseau Mises Dans un Nouvel Ordre; par V. D. Musset-Pathay. Vol. 1, page 255, Paris, 1823. English translation by Ada Monaham, quoted from A History of the Problems of Philosophy. (See bibliography).
common people did not know about it yet, then let them ignore it as far as possible. With such an opinion in his mind, Lao-tze may well be called a nihilist in morals.

There is no better way to confirm our presentation of Lao-tze's teaching than to quote some of his own words as they are recorded in the "Tao Te Ch'ing": 12

When all in the world understand beauty to be beautiful, then ugliness exists. When all understand goodness to be good, then evil exists. 13

Hence, according to Lao-tze, to have an ethical science is rather harmful, and the world is becoming worse and worse just because ethical discussions are becoming more and more advanced. 14 Lao-tze declared his

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12 The authenticity of this book, Tao Te Ch'ing道徳经, is in doubt. It is now generally considered a later creation of some Taoists (the Taoists claim Lao-tze as the founder of their religion), because there was an unbelievable silence about this unique work of Lao-tze in all ancient Chinese documents, written immediately after the time of Lao-tze. Confucius, who was once a disciple of Lao-tze, did not mention this work at all, and neither did Mo-tze and Mencius. But the greatest of reasons to doubt its authenticity is the fact that in the book of Chuang-tze 草堂子, the greatest admirer of Lao-tze, no one could find a hint to indicate the existence of the Tao Te Ch'ing. Herbert A. Giles, professor of Chinese at Cambridge University, England, in the preface of his translation of Chuang-tze, asserted about the authenticity of Tao Te Ch'ing: "Chuang Tze himself never once alludes to such a book, although now, in this nineteenth century, there are some, happily few in number, who believe that we possess the work of Lao-tze's pen. It is perhaps happier still that this small number cannot be said to include within it the name of a single native scholar of eminence." (page XI, Chuang-Tzu, translation by H. A. Giles, London, 1926.)

13 Conf. Tao Te Ch'ing, chapter 2. This quotation is from the English translation by Ch'u Ta Ko. (See bibliography). All the following quotations of the Tao Te Ch'ing are also from this same translation.

14 The falsity of this argument of Lao-tze is even obvious to the atheistic Mr. Ts'ai Yuan-Bai (see above note 2 of this chapter.) He criticized Lao-tze's condemnation of moral discussions as ridiculous as a man's condemnation of the advancement of medical sciences because he thinks that it is the cause of more illness. (Conf. opus citata of Ts'ai, page 32).
nihilism as follows:

Do away with learning, and grief will not be known.
Do away with sagesness and eject wisdom, and the people will be more benefited a hundred times. Do away with benevolence and eject righteousness, and the people will return to filial duty and parental love. Do away with artifice and reject gains, and there will be no robbers and thieves. 15

Then, if you were to ask Lao-tze: "What is your plan, Sir?" Lao-tze would answer you in a few words:

Man follows the laws of earth; earth follows the laws of heaven; heaven follows the laws of Tao; and Tao follows the laws of its intrinsic nature. 16

What he meant exactly by the term "Tao" has always been a source of interminable discussions among the scholars. The trouble is that Lao-tze himself does not know what exactly the "Tao" is. He said:

There is a thing inherent and natural, which existed before heaven and earth. Motionless and fathomless, it stands alone and never changes; it pervades everywhere and never becomes exhausted. It may be regarded as the Mother of the Universe. I do not know its name. If I am forced to give it a name, I call it "Tao", and I name it as supreme. 17

15 From Tao Te Ch'ing, chapter 19.
16 From Tao Te Ch'ing, chapter 25. Here, the translation of Mr. Ch'yu is quite elaborated. We think that our readers will appreciate having a more literal translation in order to be able to guess the original meaning of Lao-tze's words by their -- i.e. our readers -- own intuition. "Man imitates the earth (meaning the world), earth imitates the heaven (astronomical universe), heaven imitates the Tao, and Tao imitates the nature." We do not know exactly what Lao-tze meant by the word "道", which literally means "to imitate"; and exactly what by "Tao" 道, which may be translated literally by "the virtue" or "the way" (for, even literally, it is an equivocal term in ancient Chinese); and finally, we do not know exactly what he meant by "太 元", of which the word "nature" seems to be the best literal translation.
17 From Tao Te Ch'ing, chapter 25. The last word in the original text is "大", that is, "big"; we think it is better to translate the last sentence of this quoted passage as: "and I name it as the Great."
Tao is a thing both invisible and intangible. Intangible and invisible, yet there are forms in it. Invisible and intangible, there yet is substance in it; subtle and obscure, yet there is essence in it. This essence being invariably true, there is faith in it. From of old till now, it has never lost its (nameless) name, through which the origin of all things has passed. How do I know what it is so with the origin of all things. 18

The incomprehensibility or rather indemonstrability of the "Tao" is solemnly proclaimed by Lao-tze at the very beginning of his Tao Te Ch'ing. He said: "The Tao that can be expressed is not the eternal Tao." 19

Most probably, Tao is considered by Lao-tze as an ultimate principle, not transcendental but rather immanent, of the Universe. It is something like the "One" of Plotinus and somewhat like the "Nature" of the modern atheists. 20

Lao-tze believed that man must have known this "Tao", or rather the laws of this "Tao", naturally and unconsciously, so whatever man does according to his natural instinct, is perfect, since it is according to the laws of Tao. "Good" and "evil" do not exist in nature or in the "Tao".

18 From Tao Te Ch'ing, chapter 21. The last sentence of the original text is very obscure. We may interpret it as this: "Lao-tze asked: How can I know what is supposed to be the origin of all things?" That is to say, Lao-tze believed that it is impossible for any human being to know the Tao clearly and completely. Parenthesis is from translation.
19 This is the opening sentence of the Tao Te Ch'ing.
20 Although Lao-tze spoke about "\( \text{\textquotedblleft nature\textquotedblright} \)" which is translated as "nature", we cannot be positive that it is therefore the "nature" according to modern atheists. For Lao-tze spoke about it with even more uncertainty than he did in explaining the Tao. Besides, he spoke about it, i.e., nature, only a couple of times. It seems that it is an even more original principle than the Tao; yet, it may be also considered as the same thing as Tao, only under a different aspect. We prefer the latter opinion because Lao-tze has many times explicitly stated that Tao is the ultimate principle of all things; hence, whatever "\( \text{\textquotedblleft nature\textquotedblright} \)" or nature represents, can not be really a more ultimate principle than Tao. We think "Tao" is similar to the "nature" of modern atheists, inasmuch as it is an immanent principle of the Universe.
They are rather artifically invented by those pseudo-wise men. When man forgets about the laws of the "Tao", then the knowledge of "good" and "evil" comes out, and together with it the knowledge of moral doctrines and, consequently, then comes the moral evil. "When the great Tao is lost," said Lao-tze, "there springs forth benevolence and righteousness. When wisdom and sagacity arise, there are great hypocrites." 21

He emphasized the correlation of "good" and "evil" so that he would assert that the "evil" is formally caused by the existence of the "good". Had man not known what is good they would not have done evil things. Hence, he wished for a total annihilation of what is known as good in order to annihilate what is evil. Thus, indeed, he had the courage to say: "Do away with benevolence and righteousness...etc." 22 which is a quite shocking statement to many people, Westerners and Chinese alike. Lao-tze even believed that the so-called wisdom of his time was but a pseudo-knowledge. He said:

He who knows does not speak; he who speaks does not know. He who is virtuous does not dispute; he who disputes is not virtuous. He who is learned is not wise; he who is wise is not learned. 23

This was his "coup de grace" for science and learning. Consequently his political theory is to make people simple and ignorant.

People are difficult to govern because they have much knowledge. Therefore, to govern the country by increasing the people's knowledge is to be the destroyer of the country; to govern the country by decreasing their knowledge is to be the blesser of the country. To be

21 From Tao Te Ch'ing, chapter 18.
22 From Tao Te Ch'ing, chapter 19. See above quoted on page 41 and note 15.
23 From Tao Te Ch'ing, chapter 81.
acquainted with those two ways is to know the standard; to keep the standard always in mind is to have sublime virtue. Sublime virtue is infinitely deep and wise. It does reverse to all things; and so it attains perfect peace.  

We wish immediately to call to the attention of our readers that here Lao-tze speaks about "perfect peace", "wisdom", "sublime virtue", which are not the terms preferred by one truly an amoralist; most of all, he even mentioned a "standard"; as the context shows, presumably a moral standard, i.e. a standard of political good and political evil.

Lao-tze's Utopia is described by himself as follows:

Supposing there is a small State with few people. Though there are various vassals I will not have them put in use. I will make the people regard death as a grave matter and not go far away. Though there are boats and carriages, they will not travel in them. Though they will have armour and weapons they will not show them. I will let them restore the use of knotted cords (instead of writing). They will be satisfied with their food; delighted in their dress; comfortable in their dwellings; happy with their customs. Though the neighboring states are within sight and their cocks' crowing and dogs' barking are within hearing, yet the people (of the small states) will not go there all their lives.

The practical conclusion of his teaching is, in a word, to be simple.

In order to be satisfied with simplicity, we must simplify our desires.

In order to simplify our desires we must simplify our knowledge. Lao-tze

24 From Tao Te Ch'ing, chapter 65. Italic is ours.
25 From Tao Te Ch'ing, chapter 80. Parentheses originally from Ch'u translation, therefore not ours.

We believe that the first sentence of this passage is to be translated as: "The states must be small" as Lao-tze spoke about states in general and not any one in particular. The original Chinese is "小國寡民". Also, the last sentence should be "The people will not go and come to visit each other during all their lives", since the original Chinese is: 民至老死不相往來.
understood fully the scholastic axiom: "Nihil est volitum nisi prae cognitum."
Therefore he teaches "ignorance" as the foundation of all virtues. This
is almost diametrically opposed to the Socratic (and also Confucian)
doctrine of identifying virtue with knowledge.

Lao-tze's idea of human life is very similar to the "abstine et
sustine" of the Cynics. From a certain point of view, his teaching is simi-
lar to the Evangelical doctrine of simplicity and poverty, although the
reasons given for the counsels are of entirely different character. Lao-tze
despises material goods merely because of material reasons — for the sake
of obtaining an easier satisfaction of our desires rather than to sacrifice
them (i.e. give up our desires); for the sake of appeasement rather than
that of mortification.

Nevertheless, we still do not think that Lao-tze was an amoralist,
strictly speaking, since he acknowledged the existence of what is good and
what is evil, notwithstanding the fact that he did not like to discuss their
"raison d'être", and did not wish to adopt the conventional term for them,
i.e., "good" and "evil". He explicitly and repeatedly speaks about virtue,
perfection, peace, order, and even sanctity, despite his rejection of
"righteousness and benevolence". He only wishes that people would be
simple enough to ignore elaborate moral discussions; and by ignoring what
is moral evil, Lao-tze says, people will not do what is morally evil, and
hence, they are good. In our modern philosophical terms, we will say that
Lao-tze would likely have said: "Let the people be ignorant about moral
doctrines, because in their ignorance, although they will be unable to be
formally good, they will, at the same time, be unable to be formally evil.
Yet, (according to Lao-tze) to be formally good is to know and to contemplate oneself as a "good man", and this is to be a hypocrite. Hence, ignorance will assure people to be both not evil and not hypocritical. Therefore, ignorance and simplicity form the only way to human perfection." The falsity of such an opinion is obvious; therefore, we do not have to comment on it.

* * *

3) CONFUCIUS

Confucius was neither a very devout Theist such as some of the Christian authors have presented him, nor strictly a sceptic or an agnostic concerning the existence of a personal God as many a modern skeptic has wished to prove. Some of his statements seem to be sceptic or agnostic; nevertheless, a great many of his teachings concerning "Shang-Ti" or Heaven rather conform to the traditional belief expressed by the ancient documents, as we have earlier explained, while presenting the teachings of the ancient Sage Kings. For instance, the prayer of King T'ang, which we quoted above, 26 is described by Confucius and recorded in his Analects. Moreover, as we have pointed out already, it was Confucius who compiled and edited the so-called Canonical Books. Had Confucius been a sceptic, probably the contents of these Canonical Books would be quite different from what is in the presently existing texts. Since Confucius was the editor of these ancient documents, and, since he always claimed that he teaches the same

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26 See above page 35 and note 6 of this chapter.
doctrine that was taught by these ancient documents, 27 we may rightfully conclude that these ancient canonical Books really represent the teaching of Confucius, perhaps even more faithfully than they would represent the original teachings of the Ancient Sage Kings. We believe that they represent the teachings of the Sage Kings only because we believe the authority of Confucius who compiled these ancient documents. Hence, we feel safe in asserting that the teaching of Confucius concerning the norm of morality is essentially the same as that of the ancient Sage Kings which we presented earlier.

However, direct disciples of Confucius were criticized by Mo-tze as being insincere in their belief in the power and intelligence of Heaven. Nevertheless, if such criticism were applied to the teachings of Mencius, it would be most likely untrue, for Mencius repeatedly asserted the authority and the directing hand of Heaven in human affairs. Mencius himself declined to dispute with the disciples of Mo-tze. In fact, he did not even answer the criticism of Mo-tze against Confucianism but simply attacked Mo-tze's teachings of "Universal Love" and "Simplicity of Funerals".

One thing is quite sure, that Confucius was very strictly conservative and also might be considered a formalist. He held to and encouraged the practice of all the ancient rites, ceremonies and formalities strictly "ad litteram", i.e. word by word, and even to the literal meaning of every

27 Confucius claimed that he was not the author of these Canonical Books but only the editor of them. He called himself "a transmitter and not a maker, believing and loving the ancient." (Quoted from J. Legge translation of the Analects of Confucius, Book VI, chap. 3.)
Yet he wished to establish many more new, small and almost insignificant regulations for all human activities; and in order to give good example he scrupulously observed all of them in detail. Thus, he would not eat a piece of meat which was not cut in a perfectly cubic or at least rectangular form. 28 This was criticized, not without reason, by Mo-tze as insignificant and hypocritical. 29

As far as the problem of morality is concerned, Confucius, and consequently his faithful followers, (that is, the Confucianists) failed to furnish any discussion on the existence and nature of an objective norm of morality. In judging moral affairs, he more or less recommended the moral sense, that is to say, the dictum of our own conscience, which is, according to him, naturally capable of distinguishing good from evil, and imperatively commanding us to do good, although practically speaking we are still free to do evil.

His Plato, 30 Mencius, explained this point more clearly by asserting that human nature is naturally good; that is to say, naturally inclined to do good unless forced by circumstances. So Mencius used to speak of the human conscience as "good conscience" and of human nature as "good nature." 31 Once, he discussed this matter with Kao-tze, who asserted that human nature is rather indifferent, by which Kao-tze meant that human nature is neither good nor bad, hence it is capable of being good and evil with equal facility, like the nature of water which flows indifferently towards east

28 Conf. Analects of Confucius, Book X, "Hiang Tang" Ch. 8. The entire Book X is virtually filled with such formal regulations.
29 Conf. text of Mo-tze, chapter 39, "Anti-Confucianism".
30 See above, page 28, and note 59 of our first chapter.
31 "Good conscience" in original Chinese " 心良知", and "Good nature" " 性善", often used by Mencius.
or west. Mencius replied:

Water indeed will flow indifferently to the East or to the West, but, will it flow indifferently upward or downward? The tendency of man's nature to good is like the tendency of water to flow downwards. There are none (human beings) but have this tendency to good, just as all water flows downwards. Now by striking water and causing it to leap up you may make it go over your forehead, and by damming and leading it, you may force it up a hill; but, are such movements according to the nature of water? It is the force applied which causes them. When men are made to do what is not good, their nature is dealt with in this way, (i.e. by force). 32

Hence, according to Mencius, men are rather forced to do evil things, and when they actually do evil things, their nature is distorted by force from outside. He attributed to evil political and social circumstances the crime of distorting human nature. However, since Mencius is posterior to Mo-tze and consequently had no direct influence on Mo-tze's teachings, we have no intention of discussing his doctrine other than inasmuch as it is needed to illustrate the thinking of Confucius, his Socrates.

In brief, Confucius did not have anything further to offer that is useful to the problem of morality properly speaking than what is already included in the teachings of the ancient Sage Kings.

Among many books written in many different languages dealing with the doctrine of Confucius, (either exclusively or incidentally) we prefer to cite this brief statement of Father Paul Geny, S.J., as the conclusion of our brief discussion on Confucius:

Confucius (n. 551 A.C.) morum pristinam rectitudinem, suo tempore collabentem, restaurare intendit; nullo autem fundamento metaphysico supposto. 33

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4) YANG-TZE

The only famous egotist in the whole history of Chinese civilization, Yang Chu 34 was very probably a contemporary of Mo-tze. His teachings were, as it was testified by Mencius, not less influential than those of Mo-tze and Confucius. To quote Mencius himself: "The words of Hang-Chu and Mo-ti fill the country. If you listen to the discourses of people throughout the land, you will find that they have adopted the views either of Yang or of Mo." 35 This is a frank acknowledgment, by a leading Confucianist of the time, of the overwhelmingly popular influence of Yang-tze's doctrine.

Yang-tze's ethical theory is, in Western terms, individualistic hedonism mixed with pessimism. Human life, according to him, has no meaning and no purpose. It is very short and filled with painful events so that the very little pleasure we can enjoy in our life must be so dear to us that we would not miss any of it. To miss any one of these pleasures is to be foolish. Hence there is absolutely no reason why we should sacrifice any of our pleasures, or anything we possess. Mencius has criticized him thus: "The principle of the philosopher Yang was 'each one for himself'. Though

33 Conf. Brevis Conspectus Historiae Philosophiae (page 25) by Rev. Paul Geny, S.J., professor of philosophy at the Pontifical University of Gregoriano, Rome, 1929. It is, however, regrettable that Father Geny did not know about the teachings of Mo-tze.

34 In Chinese, "楊" is the surname; "渠" Chu, is the given name proper to him. Yang-tze is of course equivalent to Dr. Yang.

35 Conf. Mencius, Book VI, part 1. (Legge translation used.)
he might have benefited the whole country by plucking out a single hair, he would not have done it." 36

However, when explicitly asked whether he would sacrifice a single hair in order to benefit the world, Yang-tze cleverly replied: "As a matter of fact, the world cannot be benefited by a single hair." The inquirer, Chung-tze (probably a disciple of Mo-tze), insisted again: "But suppose it would benefit the world, then would you do it?" Yang-tze declared (many centuries before our modern diplomatic science was born) that he declined to answer such a question. 37

However, when the inquirer, Chung-tze, had left him, Yang-tze commented on this matter for his own disciples:

In the ancient time, if you told the people that they might benefit the whole world by plucking out a single hair, they were not interested in it. And, if you should offer the wealth of the entire world to one person for his own benefit, he would not take it. If nobody bothers to pluck out a hair, and nobody bothers to benefit the whole world, then, the world would be in order. 38

36 Conf. Mencius, Book VII, part 1. Note here that James Legge has translated "Tze" as "Philosopher" (see our explanation on this matter on page 4 and note 8 of our first chapter). Also, he translated "天下" into "whole country" while most Western authors have translated the same word as "the whole world".

37 The conversation between Chung-tze and Yang-tze is recorded in the Book of Yang-Tze. There is only one chapter left to us. This chapter is the unique direct source of Yang-tze's teaching. Except for this, we know about Yang-tze only from his adversaries, chiefly from Mencius. Chung-tze was probably the same person called Chung Wua-lee or Chung-tze who is a disciple of Mo-tze and is mentioned often in the last eleven chapters of the original text of Mo-tze, because later in the text (of Yang-tze) this Chung-tze asserted to a disciple of Yang-tze that he (Chung-tze) had adopted the view of the Great King Yu and followed the doctrine of Mo-tze.

38 Conf. original text of Yang-tze, unique chapter. Since there is no English translation available, we had to translate it. Here, we furnish the original Chinese text for reference.
By these words, Yang-tze meant that the present trouble with the world is that everyone is too anxious to benefit the world and forgets about himself. If, instead, everyone would only mind his own business, and forget the big idea of benefiting the whole world, then, the world would be really benefited.

Yang-tze criticized the altruistic socialism of his time as merely hypocritical; and he frankly stated that the common good of society is ultimately based upon the individual interest of each member. Hence the real and ultimate norm in judging what is good and what is evil is our own individual interest. 39 Man's first and most natural instinct is the instinct of self-preservation and self-prosperity. These are, therefore, the first standards to be followed in guiding our own acts. 40

Based on such a strictly egoistic attitude, the norm of morality for Yang-tze is practically the same as that of the Epicureans; that is to say, the identification of pleasure with good.

* * *

By saying "In the ancient time," Yang-tze meant: "In the better time" i.e. when morals were higher; for all wise men of that time were more or less, to use Cicero's expression, "Laudator temporis praeteritii."

39 J. Bentham made a similar statement: "The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting, as it were, its members. The interest of the community then is what? -- The sum of the interests of the several members who composed it." Quoted from: An Introduction in the Principle of Morals and Legislations, Oxford, 1876, Chapter 1, section 4.

40 Dr. Hu-Shih (See our note 2 of this chapter) has given special praise to Yang-tze for his audacious invention of that "Self-preservation" instinct, and his courage in admitting frankly man's natural tendency to egoism. (Conf. An Outline of Chinese Philosophical History, Shanghai, 1928, 14th Edition, pages 179-180.)
B) THE NORM OF MORALITY ACCORDING TO MO-TZE

Our philosopher, Mo-tze, while believing that the traditional doctrine of the Ancient Sage Kings contains rudimentary truth, nevertheless realized its imperfection inasmuch as it is too generic and lacks logical reasoning explicitly set in the form of arguments. As the result of such an imperfection, Mo-tze believed that the traditional doctrine could not stand up against the sophistic, agnostic and individualistic views of his time. Hence our philosopher was eager to develop the traditional doctrine into a new and better system in order to restore its authority and thus help to solve the moral crisis of his time.

He was apparently very much disgusted with the indifferentism in moral affairs of Lao-tze, and furious against the almost agnostic attitude of the Confucianists about the existence of a God acting through intelligence and will. However, we must point out that Mo-tze did not make this accusation against Confucius himself, but only against the disciples of Confucius. As to Confucius himself, Mo-tze did criticize him as being a formalist and hypocrite. 41

It seems that Mo-tze ignored the teachings of Yang-tze, although the latter's doctrine had spread through the world so quickly that at the time of Mencius it had as many followers as Mo-tzeism and Confucianism. Nevertheless, obviously, Yang-tze was not the first egotist in China, although he was the founder of an egotistic philosophy. As may be seen indirectly through the books of Confucius and Mo-tze, the egotistic tendency had already become more and more the dominant sentiment of society at that time.

41 Conf. text of Mo-tze, Chapter 39. Also see above pages 46 and 47, notes 28 and 29 of our dissertation.
Mo-tze, indeed, was right in criticizing the scholars of his time as understanding only trifles but not things of importance, because whereas they all engaged in heated discussions about moral affairs, none of them ever discussed the origin and the standard of morality.

In fact, Mo-tze was really the first Chinese philosopher who ever properly discussed the essential character of the norm of morality. In ordinarily intelligible language he discussed the problem as follows:

Those gentlemen in the world who want to practice magnanimity and righteousness cannot but examine the origin of righteousness. Since we want to examine the origin of righteousness, then where does it originate?

Righteousness does not originate with the stupid and humble, but with the honorable and wise. How do we know it does not originate with the dull and humble but with the honorable and wise? For righteousness is the standard. How do we know righteousness is the standard? For with righteousness the world will be orderly, and without it the world will be disorderly. Therefore, righteousness is known to be the standard. As the dull and humble cannot make the standard, and only the wise and honorable can, therefore, I knew righteousness does not come from the stupid and humble but from the honorable and wise.

Now, who is honorable and wise? Heaven is honorable and wise. So, righteousness must originate with Heaven.

Then Mo-tze tried to prove that Heaven is more honorable and more wise than the Emperor who is the most honorable and supposed to be the most wise of all human beings. After this he continues:

This shows that Heaven is more honorable and more wise than the Emperor. But is there anyone more honorable and more wise than Heaven? So Heaven is really the most honorable and the most wise. Therefore, righteousness surely comes from Heaven.

42 Conf. text of Mo-tze, Chapter 27, Mei translation.
43 Ibid.
And hence Mo-tze concluded: "If the gentlemen of the world really desire to follow the way (i.e. the moral path) and benefit the people, they must not disobey the Will of Heaven, which is the origin of magnanimity and righteousness." 44

At the end of the same chapter Mo-tze explicitly pointed out that the Will of Heaven is the standard of morality:

Therefore, the Will of Heaven to Mo-tze is like the compasses to the wheelwright and the square to the carpenter. The wheelwright tests the circularity of every object in the world with his compasses, saying: 'That which satisfies my compass is circular. That which does not is not circular.' Therefore whether an object is circular or not is all known, because the standard of circularity is all established....Similarly, with the Will of Heaven Mo-tze will measure the jurisdiction and the government of the lords in the empire on the one hand and the doctrines and teachings of the multitudes in the empire on the other. If some conduct is observed to be in accordance with the Will of Heaven, it is called good conduct; if a teaching is observed to be in accordance with the Will of Heaven it is called good teaching; if it is in opposition to the Will of Heaven, it is called bad teaching; and if a government is observed to be in accordance with the Will of Heaven, it is called a good government; if it is in opposition to the Will of Heaven it is called a bad government. With this as the model and with this as the standard, whether the lords and the ministers are magnanimous or not can be measured as easily as to distinguish black and white. 45

The final sentence of his third chapter on the Will of Heaven is a solemn and decisive statement: "Therefore the Will of Heaven is truly the standard of righteousness."

44 Ibid.
We might well quote a fine discussion on this matter in the fourth chapter of the Book of Mo-tze, which is entitled "The Necessity of Standard". However, since the authenticity of that chapter is rather doubtful, we do not think that it is necessary to cite it here, especially when we have already cited sufficiently from one of the most indisputably authentic chapters of the Book.

From what we have quoted above, it is obvious that Mo-tze has positively and explicitly stated that the Will of Heaven is the standard of righteousness. Now, this is equivalent to saying that the Will of God is the norm of morality. The matter does not need proof but may need further explanation.

The Chinese term which is translated here as Heaven was commonly regarded at that time as representing the King of Heaven or the "Shang-Ti", i.e. the Emperor of Above, who is a personal God, Creator and Supreme Ruler of the Universe, Supreme Judge of all human activities. He sees and knows all the acts of every man so that no one can escape His observation. This is the traditional belief, according to the teachings of the Ancient Sage Kings.

However, after Lao-tze had used the term "T'ien" or "Heaven" in a rather material and impersonal sense, modern scholars doubted the intentions of all post-Lao-tze philosophers whenever they used this venerable term. As a matter of fact, Confucius used the same term sometimes in a merely material sense, in which the term indicates simply the sky or skies above our head.

46 See above, chapter I, page 14.
47 Even such an atheist as Dr. Hu-Shih has to admit this fact. Conf. his An Outline of Chinese Philosophical History, Shanghai, 1928 (pages 54-55).
But it is only natural that Confucius should at some time have used the term "T'ien" to indicate the material elements of the sky, since this is the original and literal sense of the term. It is only by a conventional concensus of the ancients that this term was used also to indicate the "King of Heaven", the "Shang-Ti", that is, "God" in English terminology. 48

W. H. Long has seen a very good reason why the later Chinese wisemen preferred to use the term "Heaven" instead of "Shang-Ti".

The use of 'T'ien', he noted, in place of Shang-Ti (the Lord) as the term designating Deity indicates a desire to avoid narrow anthropomorphic suggestions, while at the same time, affirming God to be self-consciousness, creative, intelligence and holy will. 49

S. Holth has made a praiseworthy observation on the religious belief of the common people at the time of Mo-tze:

One brief word must be added about the religious beliefs of that time. The original notion of Supreme Being, the Sovereign on High (Shang-Ti) or Heaven (T'ien) has apparently not degenerated, but the tendency towards animism was increasingly manifest among the religionists of the period. It seems to have been a common assumption that only the Sovereign on High possesses power to govern the world, to reward the righteous and to punish the wicked. In Him there was no change. He will exalt and bless the good, but the guilty will not escape His judgment. Nothing can happen contrary to His Will. 50

Whatever it might mean for Lao-tze and Confucius, the term "Heaven" as used by our philosopher, Mo-tze, was certainly a synonym for "Shang-Ti",

48 As we have noted before, this use of "Heaven" to indicate God is probably due to the respect to the term "Shang-Ti". See above page 34.
49 Quoted from his booklet, Mo-tze, China's Ancient Philosopher of Universal Love, pages 15-16. (Peiping, 1934).
50 Quoted from his booklet Micius, A brief outline of his life and ideas, Shanghai, 1935.
that is, a personal and intelligent God, Creator and Supreme Ruler of the Universe.

We may prove our statement as follows:

1) Heaven is, according to Mo-tze, a personal God, honorable, intelligent and capable of willing, who loves men universally and dearly, and wishes that men love each other universally. Mo-tze explicitly and repeatedly, without any kind of equivocation, has stated so: "Heaven is more honorable and wise than the Emperor. But, is there anyone more honorable and wise than Heaven? Heaven is really the most honorable and wise." 51 And Heaven is so intelligent that it discerns everything everywhere: "For Heaven certainly discerns it, even if it be in the woods, valleys, or solitary caves where are no men." 52

Heaven has volition. The fact that three chapters of his book were entitled "The Will of Heaven" speaks for itself. Heaven's love towards men as described by Mo-tze is the best assertion of its kind in all Chinese literature. "Heaven loves all men universally." 53 "Heaven loves all the people of the world." 54 And Mo-tze has tried to convince his listeners of the great love of Heaven; he pointed out many sound reasons why we must acknowledge that Heaven loves men dearly:

Heaven loves the whole world universally; everything is prepared for the good of men. ...Moreover, I know Heaven loves men dearly not without reason. Heaven ordered the sun, the moon and the stars to enlighten and guide them....Yet this does not exhaust my reasons whereby I know Heaven loves men dearly. It is said the murder

51 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, Chapter 27, Mei translation.
53 Ibidem, chapter 16.
54 Ibidem, chapter 28.
of an innocent individual will call down a calamity.
Who is the innocent? Man is. From whom is the visitation?
From Heaven. If Heaven does not love the people dearly,
why should Heaven send down a visitation upon the man
who murders the innocent? Thus I know Heaven loves man
dearly. This is still not all by which I know Heaven
loves men dearly. There are those who love the people and
benefit the people and obey the will of Heaven and obtain
reward from Heaven. 55

Heaven wishes that men love each other universally: "What is the will
of Heaven that is to be obeyed? It is to love all the people in the world
universally." 56

Heaven likes to have the world live, and dislikes to have
it die, likes to have it rich and dislikes to have it
poor; and likes to have it orderly and dislikes to have
it disorderly....He who obeys the will of Heaven loving
universally and benefiting others, will obtain rewards.
He who opposes the will of Heaven by being partial and
unfriendly and harming others, will incur punishment. 57

2) Heaven, according to Mo-tze, is the Creator of the Universe.

Heaven loves the whole world universally. Every thing
is prepared for the good of men. Even the top of a hair
is the work of Heaven....Heaven ordered the sun, the moon
and the stars to enlighten and guide them. Heaven ordained
the four season, Spring, Autumn, Winter and Summer to
regulate them. Heaven sent down snow, frost, rain and
dew to grow the five grains and flax and silk so that the
people could use and enjoy them. Heaven established the
hills and rivers, ravines and valleys, and arranged many
things to minister to man's good. 58

Our readers may remark that in the above quoted passage the term "create"
is not used. Hence it is doubtful whether or not Mo-tze really meant a
creation of the universe in the sense of scholastic philosophy. As we

55 Ibidem, chapter 27.
56 Ibid. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 28.
58 Ibidem, chapter 27. Italicics are our own.
consider this an interesting question, we wish to discuss it in some detail.

First of all we must remark that here we are not discussing what term was used by Mo-tze, for, in ancient China, there was no word that will exactly express the idea of Creation according to scholastic philosophy. The word "make" was used on all occasions. Sometimes the ancient Chinese used the word "generate" to indicate the creation of men. Thus they often said: "Heaven generated the people". It is but obvious that the word is not to be understood in a fleshly meaning. Since the technical word for creation was not to be found in Chinese literature until our modern age, we cannot accuse Mo-tze of not believing in a scholastically defined creation just because he did not use the technical term. The word "make" is most commonly used by all primitive peoples to indicate the creation of God. The mind of the user is to be determined by what he expressed throughout his discussion on the matter. Besides, although Mr. Mei Yi-Pao has translated Mo-tze's original word into "make", we nevertheless may find others who have translated it as "create". Thus, for instance, Dr. Wu Kou-Cheng often used the term "create" in his translation of Mo-tze's original text.

59 "Heaven generated the people" 一 "天生烝民" 一 is an expression often used in the canonical books. In the Analects of Confucius and the books of Mencius, we often see this expression "天生烝民也", i.e. "When Heaven generated the people..."

60 Dr. Wu (Ph.D. from Princeton University) has translated "T'ian" into God and the description of creation by Mo-tze as follows: "There are reasons why I know that God loves men dearly. He makes the sun, the moon and the stars to guide and to shine upon them. He creates the four seasons, spring..." (Conf. his Ancient Chinese Political Theories", Shanghai, 1928). We may, however, notice that Dr. Wu misplaced the word "create", for the seasons cannot be properly said to be created. This shows that even modern Chinese scholars still consider "create" as a term interchangeable with the ancient word "make". However, Dr. Wu has translated this following sentence of Mo-tze (from chapter 11) better than Dr. Mei: "In ancient times, when the people had just been created, and when neither government nor law was established..." (Conf. ibidem.)
to determine Mo-tze's original belief, we must inquire what would be his
idea of creation, or the making of the universe by God.

In fact, the conception of creation has never been developed by any
pagan wisdom as perfectly as according to Christian philosophers. One of
the greatest philosophers of the pre-Christian civilization, Aristotle, who
has conceived the Supreme cause of all beings as the "Actus purus", has not
yet quite reached the idea of creation properly speaking. 61 The general
belief of heathen religion and primitive peoples was that God created the
universe by giving a determined form to the pre-existing matter which they
called the Chaos. However, in China, except for a very few ancient scholars
who gained only secondary importance in our ancient culture, the general
opinion of our ancient wisdom rather seemed to be near to a Christian-like
conception of creation; that is, the idea that God has created everything
including the most elementary materials. In the five canonical books, the
Ancient Sage Kings have stated repeatedly that the Emperor of Above, "Shang-
Ti", has created everything. The term "everything" is used without qualifi-
cation; therefore, it is to be interpreted as including even the most
elementary materials.

Mo-tze went even further. He pointed out something more particular than
the general term of "everything". He said, as it is quoted above, "Even
the top of a hair is the work of Heaven". 62 Now, by the top of a hair,

61 The Most Rev. William Turner, who did not hesitate in calling Aristotle
"the greatest of heathen philosophers", (Conf. his article: Aristotle in
the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. I, p. 713) has this to say: "It seems
hazardous to say that he (Aristotle) taught the doctrine of Creation.
This much, however, may safely be said: He lays down principles which,
if carried to their logical conclusion, would lead to the doctrine that
the world was made out of nothing." (Ibid., p. 716.) We believe that
this could be said about Mo-tze as well.
62 In Chinese "若非之天, 見非天之為 " , Chapter 27, Mei translation.
Mo-tze meant the smallest and most elementary material; therefore, Mo-tze, if he did not exactly reach, at least he very nearly approached, the Christian idea of creation as it is expressed by this technical phrase: "Ex nihilo sui et subjecti". We shall prove our statement thus:

By saying "the top of a hair", Mo-tze meant the smallest and most elementary material; because:

a) In ancient China, the conception of hylemorphism is unknown. A hair is, for the Chinese, a simple i.e. uncomposed, elementary material, because it was not yet recognized as an organic body. The ancient Chinese did recognize that the human body is composed from many different materials, but they did not have the help of the microscope to see that even the hair is an organic compound. Hence, a hair is simply an elementary matter for the ancient Chinese; any composition for a hair, chemical, organic or hylemorphic, is unknown to them.

b) The expression of "a hair" was often used by ancient Chinese to designate the most common and most worthless thing. For instance, Mencius has criticized Yang-tze, the arch-egotist, that he would not even pluck out a single hair although this might benefit the whole world. Moreover, besides its original meaning, the word "hair" is used by the ancient Chinese to designate the smallest material unity known at that time. A hair in weight is the thousandth of a "liang" which is approximately an "ounce".

And again, a "hair" is used in the measurement of space; it is one

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64 In Chinese measure: 10 hairs "毛" make a Ch'ien "錢"; 10 ch'ien make a fen "分"; 10 fen make a liang "兩".
65 In Chinese measure (of length): 10 hairs "毛" make a lee "釐"; 10 lee make a fen "分"; 10 fen make a tsun "寸", which is approximately an English inch.
thousandth of an "inch". In addition, there are many well-known Chinese expressions in which we use the term "hair" to indicate "absolutely nothing." Therefore, for the ancient Chinese a hair is the synonym of what is the smallest and most elementary in all existing things.

c) Moreover, Mo-tze clearly emphasized that he wanted to say something even smaller and more elementary than the commonly accepted term, "a hair". Thus he said: "Even the top of a hair". That is to say: (if by any chance the hair should be still a composed matter, then I take the top of a hair) the extremity of that hair, not a part of its body, but just the point in its extremity. Hence, we are sure that Mo-tze meant to point out, as an example of the absolute inclusiveness of Heaven's creative power, "the top of a hair," which is, as he believed, the smallest and most simple being that a human mind could possibly imagine at his time.

Therefore, if Mo-tze had been an atomist, he would have said that even an "atom" is made by God. (In case that he might be a modern atomist, we should mention here the electron, proton, and neutron). And, if he believed in hylemorphism, he would have said that even the "materia prima" is made by God. Hence, we have reason to believe that Mo-tze rather favored something like the scholastic idea of creation, which is qualified by "ex nihilo sui et subjecti". At any rate, whether God created us from absolute nothingness, or, rather made us from some pre-existing materials, Mo-tze obviously still maintains that He is our father and our master, because, without going to the rather subtle discussion of absolute or relative nothingness, we may always say in either case that He made us; and therefore He is our master.

66 For instance: "毫不留心" means absolutely careless; "毫无用途" means absolutely no use; "毫无意义" means absolutely meaningless.
It is also quite obvious that this subtle distinction of absolute or relative nothingness is rather a very important issue in metaphysics, but, since here in this treatise our purpose is to discuss the moral philosophy of Mo-tze, the importance of such a distinction is rather secondary and almost negligible, as long as we are sure that Mo-tze did believe that God is our maker and ruler. For this is all that is required in his moral teaching.

3) Heaven, according to Mo-tze, is the Supreme Ruler of the Universe and especially of mankind. From the quotations cited above 67, we may see that Mo-tze has described Heaven as the Ruler of nature, the sun, the moon and the stars, the four seasons, snow, frost, rain and dew, rivers and mountains, etc. However, Mo-tze insisted again and again on Heaven's rule over human beings.

Each individual, no matter where he may be or what position he may have in the world, is actually under the rule of Heaven.

If a man commits a misdemeanor in the family, he still has other families in which to seek shelter....If a man commits a misdemeanor in the state, he still has other states in which to seek shelter....Now, all men live in the world and under Heaven. When a man sins against Heaven there is nowhere to seek shelter. For Heaven certainly discerns it, even if it be in the woods, valleys or solitary caves where there are no men. 68

This is to say that our Supreme Ruler, Heaven, knows everything that is done everywhere. This is more than being intelligent. Shall we say that, according to Mo-tze, Heaven is infinitely intelligent? Heaven's rule is so absolute that it includes even the Emperor, who is, as Mo-tze said: "the most honorable in the world". 69 Heaven makes the standard to be followed

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67 See above page 59.
68 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, Chapter 28, Mei translation. Italics are our own.
by the Emperors, and rewards them or punishes them according to their merits or sins.

The Emperor may not make the standard at will. There is Heaven to give him a standard. The gentlemen of the world all understand that the Emperor gives the standard to the world, but do not understand that Heaven gives the standard to the Emperor. The Sages explaining this said: "When the Emperor has done good, Heaven rewards him. When the Emperor has committed wrong, Heaven punishes him." 70

Mo-tze has even given to his statement an orthodox confirmation, that is to say, a confirmation from the venerable authority of the Ancient Sage Kings. After quoting a poem from the She-king (one of the five canonical books), Mo-tze concludes: "This is to proclaim that the King Wen used the will of Heaven as standard and was submissive to God's scheme." 71

Hence it is obvious that by the term "Heaven" Mo-tze really expresses and indicates what is most essential in the notion of "God" as this term is understood by modern theistic philosophers.

According to Andre Lalande, in his Vocabulaire Technique et Critique de la Philosophie, the exact philosophical notion of God may be summed up in these four definitions:

D I E U:

1) Considere comme un principe d'explication
A) Au point de vue ontologique: Principe Supreme de l'existence et de l'activite universelles.
B) Au point de vue logique: Principe Supreme de l'ordre dans le monde, de la raison dans l'homme et de la correspondance entre la pensee et les choses.

70 Ibidem, chapter 28. Italics are our own.
71 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 28. Also see above, page 36.
2) Considère comme un Étre actif:

C) Au point de vue matériel: Étre personnel supérieur à l'humanité, qui donne des ordres et fait des promesses, auquel on adresse prières et qui les exauce.

D) Au point de vue moral: Étre personnel tel qu'il soit, par son intelligences et sa volonte, le principe Supreme et la garantie de la moralité. 72

Now we can easily see that Mo-tze stated all the contents of those four definitions except the second part of the second definition, which is a very recent notion, since the problem of knowledge has risen into great prominence only with Descartes.

Therefore "The Will of Heaven" is, in other words, "The Will of God".

Now it remains to show that the Chinese term "I" 73 (pronounced like the "I" of Latin), which is generally translated as "righteousness", is practically, if not theoretically, an equivalent of the philosophical term "morality". We have said practically, that is, inasmuch as it is used here in this particular sentence, i.e., when we say, following Mo-tze, that the Will of God is the norm of righteousness.

However, philosophically speaking, these two terms are not exactly synonymous, because their comprehensions are not equivalent.

The Chinese term "I" at its very origin signifies "what is due to"; it corresponds pretty well to the notion of justice, as a general virtue.

72 Conf. opus cit. Since the text is a dictionary, one may easily find our quotation under the word "Dieu". Italics are our own. The purpose is to show that Mo-tze has expressed the ideas contained in these italicized words.

73 The Chinese term " " is also widely used to signify justice in the strict sense, and then it is considered as one of the four or five cardinal virtues according to the ancient Chinese wisemen. But here in our case it is obvious that the term must be translated as "righteousness".
especially as the term is used in the Bible. Justice meant, according to the writers of the Holy Scripture, whatever is due to the moral perfection of a man; hence, a just man is a morally perfect man. Many a Christian writer has, therefore, translated the Chinese term "I" by "justice". However, other authors, in order to avoid the equivocation with the meaning of "justice" in the strict sense, have preferred the word "righteousness" which stands for whatever is morally right, and, as is obvious, excludes whatever is morally wrong.

But, as a consequence of this obvious exclusion, the term "righteousness" is not the synonym of the relatively modern term "morality" because morality has an even wider meaning than righteousness. Morality, according to its philosophical definition, is a supreme genus which includes two supreme species (or three species, for those, i.e. Suarezians, who admit the existence of a species of indifference) which are: morally good or right and morally evil or wrong.

Such a well-developed and well-defined conception would not have a term to express it in ancient China; that is to say, the ancient Chinese had no such conception which would include righteousness and its opposite at the same time. Since morality includes what we may call "unrighteousness", it is obviously not a synonym of "righteousness".

Nevertheless, though this is true philosophically speaking, the vulgar language will (wrongly of course) make them synonyms. According to the popular way of speaking, only what is morally good is called "moral", and what is morally evil is rather called "immoral". Hence, according to this way of speaking, "righteousness" would be exactly the synonym of "morality";
and "unrighteousness" would be an equivalent of "immorality".

But we must not put the foundation of our statement on the vulgar use (or rather abuse) of the term which must be philosophically understood as we are actually dealing with philosophical questions. Thus we must point out that the vulgar notion of morality is not correct, because the contrary of "moral" is "amoral", and hence an "immoral act" is scientifically a "moral act". St. Thomas calls a moral act a "human act" (actus humanus) which can be morally good or evil, wrong or right; he calls all other activities of human beings which are not subject to the moral law simply an act of man (actus hominis). 74 Thus, the "actus hominis", which we may call "amoral act" (in opposition to "moral act" which St. Thomas called "actus humanus") is not a moral act; therefore it is neither morally good nor morally bad, simply because it is out of the realm of morality.

74 St. Thomas: "Actionum, quae ab homine aguntur, illae solae proprie dicuntur humanae, quae sunt proprie hominis, in quatum est homo. Differt autem homo ab irrationalibus creaturis in hoc, quod est suorum actuum dominus. Unde illae solae actiones proprie humanae vocuntur, quarum homo est dominus. Est autem homo dominus suorum actuum per rationem et voluntatem; unde et liberum arbitrium esse dicitur facultas voluntatis et rationis. Ille a ergo actiones proprie humanae dicuntur quae ex voluntate deleberata procedunt. Si quae autem aliae actiones hominii convenient, possunt dici quidem actiones hominis, sed non proprie humanae, quum non sint hominis, in quatum est homo." (S. Th. I 2, quest. 1, art 1.) (Italics ours). "Sic ergo moralis philosophiae, circa quam versatur presenti intentio, proprium est considerare operationes humanas, secundum quod sunt ordinatae ad invicem et ad finem. -- Dico autem operationes humanas, quae procedunt a voluntate hominis secundum ordinem rationis. Nam si quae operationes in homine inveniuntur, quae non subjacent voluntati et rationi, non dicuntur proprie humanae, sed naturales, sicut patet de operationibus animae vegetativae. Quae nullo modo cadunt sub consideratione moralis philosophiae. Sicut autem subjectum philosophiae naturalis est motus, vel res mobilis, ita subjectum moralis philosophiae est operation humana ordinata in finem, vel etiam homo prout est voluntarie agens propter finem." (In Ethicorum. Lib. I, Lectio I, No. 2-3).
Hence we may say that an amoral act is not a moral act, but an immoral act, as it is understood by the common people, definitely is a moral act. Of course, it is morally evil or wrong.

Therefore righteousness is only one species of morality. An unrighteous act is just as much a moral act as a righteous act. Unrighteousness (or immorality according to the popular notion) is but another species of morality.

Acknowledging fully the difference of the meaning of "righteousness" and "morality", we can, nevertheless, show that the two terms are practically equivalent in this particular case, that is, when we say "the norm of righteousness" or "the norm of morality". Because the norm of righteousness serves to distinguish what is morally right from what is morally wrong; and the "norm of morality" is just exactly another name for the very same being.

We wish to be permitted to quote Mo-tze at length in order to convince our readers that what Mo-tze meant by "standard of righteousness" is exactly the same being which is conceived by modern scholastic philosophers as "the objective norm of morality":

Therefore the will of Heaven to Mo-tze is like the compasses to the wheelright and the square to the carpenter. The wheelright tests the circularity of every object in the world with his compasses, saying: "That which satisfies my compasses is circular. That which does not is not circular". Therefore whether an object is circular or not is all known, because the standard of circularity is all established. The carpenter also tests the squareness of every object in the world with his square, saying: "That which satisfies my square is square; that which does not is not square." Therefore whether any object is square or not is all known. Why so? Because the standard of squareness is established.
Similarly, with the will of Heaven Mo-tze will measure the jurisdiction and government of the lords in the empire on the one hand, the doctrines and teachings of the multitudes in the empire on the other. If some conduct is observed to be in accordance with the will of Heaven, it is called good conduct; if it is in opposition to the will of Heaven it is called bad conduct. And if a government is observed to be in accordance with the will of Heaven it is called a good government; if it is in opposition to the will of Heaven it is called bad government. With this as the model and with this as the standard, whether the lords and the ministers are magnanimous or not can be measured as easily as to distinguish black and white. Therefore Mo-tze said: "If the rulers and the gentlemen of the world really desire to follow the Tao and benefit the people they have only to obey the will of Heaven, the origin of magnanimous and righteousness. Obedience to the will of Heaven is the standard of righteousness."

From this we also see that the norm of morality must necessarily be morally good itself, since evil does not exist as positive being, that is to say, a being which has its own "raison d'être", its own "esse".

Hence, we think, after this careful explanation, that we may state without temerity and without hesitation that according to Mo-tze's teaching, the norm of morality is the will of God.

Thus the problem of morality is proposed, discussed and answered by Mo-tze. However, the bare text does not always represent exactly the real mind of the author. It has always to be considered together with other critical reasons in order to decide the real mind of the author. Therefore many different opinions have often been expressed about one and the same original text. This has happened also to our philosopher, as we shall see in the following section of our essay.

75 From the original text of Mo-tze, chapter 27.
C) THEISM VERSUS UTILITARIANISM

For centuries, Chinese scholars have consistently believed that Mo-tze was a sincere theist and that he believed really in the existence of a personal God, Whose will is, as he stated again and again, the norm or the standard of morality. No criticism has ever been made against Mo-tze's sincerity on this point, although he was severely criticized by his adversaries, especially the Confucianists of all ages headed by Mencius, on almost all other points, of his teachings.

However, when the Chinese in modern times learned skepticism and all of its consequences, the curiosity and pride of finding something new and different in contrast to a long and common traditional belief tempted our modern scholars, of whom a great number have been converted to Positivism and Materialism under the influence of the neo-paganism of a modern Europe, and especially of a modern America. Hence they found, as they claimed, an atheistic Lao-tze, an agnostic Confucius, and a utilitarian Mo-tze. "God had no place in ancient Chinese philosophy, although He may have had a hideout in the hearts of the simple and ignorant common people." 76

This, of course, is quite a revolutionary statement about the history of Chinese philosophy. It is not only revolutionary with regard to the traditional belief of Chinese scholars, but, most of all, it is in diametrical contradiction to the opinion of the Western Christian Sinologists, who,

76 To name a few of these modern authors: Chen Yuan-Teh 陈元德; Ch'e Wen-Hu 李文蔚; Shang Nai-Hsi 章乃希; Ts'ai Shan-Ssu 泰尚恕. Conf. their respective works listed in the bibliography (section II, Chinese works). Also, they will be quoted later in our discussion.
from the time of Father Matteo Ricci, S.J., down to the most recent Christian
missioners, have always believed and even proved with sound arguments that
the ancient Chinese people were undoubtedly theists and even clearly
monotheists. 77 We shall cite a few statements of theirs, especially
referring to the teachings of Mo-tze. Henri Maspero, the noted French
Sinologist, has written the following words about Mo-tze in his well-known
work, La Chine antique:

Pour lui, (Mo-tze) la morale repose sur quelque chose
de plus profond: les hommes doivent: "prendre le Ciel
pour modele, faire ce qui lui plait et laisser de cote
ce qui lui deploait."....Le Ciel, pour Mo-tseu, c'est le
Seigneur d' En-Haut, Dieu personnel et tout puissant qui
sait tout, en sorte que vis a vis du Ciel, il n'6 a
pas de gorge ombreuse, de retraite, de desert, que sa
lumiere ne voir." 78

W. H. Long made a beautiful evaluation of Mo-tze's teachings:

Mo-tze is still a living thinker. The fundamental prin-
ciples which he taught, freed from the limitations of
their times, are as sound and as powerful for human good
today as they were in the ancient golden age of Chinese
philosophy. A purpose-governed cosmos, a God-appointed
moral law, spiritual personality as the essence of
Deity, moral freedom and personal responsibility, the
supremacy of the Divine Will in social and political
life, the law of universal love among men sanctioned by
man-loving Divine Spirit; the inwardness and social fruitage
of goodness, humanitarianism, the appeal to logic and
intelligence, the progressive mind, the distinction
between defensive and offensive war—these remain pro-
found doctrines challenging acceptance by the mind of
man today....Mo-tze's thought is essentially one with the

77 "Veteres Sinae in summitate rerum ponebant Deum unicum, omniperfectum,
personalem, a mondo distinctum, quem Shang-ti vocabant." Conf. Rev.
Paul Geny, S.J., professor of philosophy at the Gregorian University,
Rome: Brevis Conspectus Historiae Philosophiae, Romae, 1932. Also
conf. above text, page 33, and note 5 of this chapter.
78 Conf. opus cit., pg. 487 (Paris, 1927).
personalism and the theistic idealisms of the West which find in moral and creative Selfhood the clue to the most real as well as the most divine, the end of being, the goal of education, and the hope of society. 79

Even the most skeptical Western author who is doubtful about the sincerity of all Chinese ancient philosophers in their belief in the real existence of a personal God will accept Mo-tze as an obvious exception. Thus S. Holth cited Wieger as saying:

Mo-Ti is the only Chinese writer of whom it may be thought that he believed in God; the only apostle of love and champion of right which China has produced. 80

Thus the Western Sinologists have rather followed the traditional belief of Chinese scholars, which is but a natural and logical conclusion from the original text of the Book of Mo-tze.

Nevertheless, many scholars of modern China have created a question which deals with the personal conviction of Mo-tze because although Mo-tze, as a matter of fact, preached the Will of God as the norm of morality, it might well be that he himself was not convinced of the existence of a personal God. Kant, who encouraged the belief in the existence of God for a practical reason, is a good example for this case. Or, more recently, Giovanni Gentile, not agnostic like Kant, but positively an atheistic idealist and the founder of the Italian Liberal School, has been credited with the re-introduction of religious classes in the Italian schools. He asserted that the religious belief of faith in the existence of a Christian God was the only practical philosophy of the common people, while for philosophers,

80 Conf. Micius, A Brief Outline of His Life and Ideas, Shanghai, 1935, p. 3.
such as he, all religious teachings philosophically considered are but nonsense.

Confucius seemed to be, somewhat like Kant, agnostic about the existence of God, yet he was fanatically insistent upon conserving all the ancient sacrificial rites. This might perhaps be the real mind of Mo-tze, who is, according to those atheistic writers, too enlightened to be a sincere religious believer. Hence, they have formed this question: "Did Mo-tze really and sincerely believe in the existence of a personal God?"

This is an interesting and important question, because it deals not only with Mo-tze's personal belief, but also with a possibility of a change in the fundamental concept of values of the entire ancient Chinese philosophy.

Indeed, if Mo-tze, who criticized almost all the wise men of his time as insincere believers in God, did not he himself really believe in the existence of God, then how can one imagine that a really theistic idea existed in Chinese philosophy? As a consequence the entirety of ancient Chinese philosophy might easily be considered as sophistic, superstitious or utilitarian, and hence atheistic. What a change will then have taken place in the history of philosophy?

Such a thought may not lead one to doubt the sincerity of Mo-tze's belief. But, since the doubt has already arisen, we cannot neglect further investigations of the matter in order to assure ourselves of the truth.

Now it is a matter of fact that many objections have already been launched against the sincerity of Mo-tze's belief in the existence of a personal God. They are not without foundation, and some of them appear
quite convincing and are supposed to be trustworthy, since their authors possess considerable authority on this matter.

Here, however, our intention is to examine and criticize these objections carefully; however, not without respect to their authors. Above all, we should find the truth, for the truth is better than any human authority. Hence, if we shall find that the objections of these authors are not sufficient to convince us, we shall simply be maintaining the traditional belief, which is, in this case, still in the conditio possidentis. It may be that we can also procure some positive reason to confirm this traditional opinion.

Before we present and answer those objections, we would like to point out that almost no Western Sinologist is acquainted with the arguments of modern Chinese scholars and, as a consequence, none of them has as yet tried to answer them. We believe that our effort in examining and refuting those objections is the first of its kind in defending the theistic position of our philosopher, Mo-tze, and that if this effort is successful, we shall have contributed to the solution of an important problem in the history of Chinese philosophy.

The following are the objections as found in the words of modern Chinese scholars:

OBJECTION 1. Mo-tze did not prove the existence of God; therefore he did not sincerely believe in God; he only utilized the superstitious mind of the common people to propagate his political utilitarianism. 81

81 This argument is quite common among all Chinese modern authors. Conf. Ts'ei Shan-Sse 貞常受 An Outline of the Development of Chinese Civilization, Shanghai, 1932, Ch. II, p. 123. Also Chen Yuan-Teh 陳元德 History of Ancient Chinese Philosophy, Shanghai, 1937, p. 191.
ANSWER: At first sight it seems very strange that Mo-tze, who was a philosopher, should speak about God without ever attempting to prove the existence of God. However, if one understands well the ancient belief of the Chinese people, one is not greatly surprised by this, because the ancient Chinese always believed in the existence of a personal God. We could cite almost every authoritative work on this subject, Western as well as Chinese — even our modern materialistic authors — to prove our statement. 82 The very fact which this objection admits, namely, that Mo-tze was utilizing the belief of the common people, shows definitely that the common people did sincerely believe in the existence of a personal God. Therefore, Mo-tze did not need to prove the existence of God to his listeners. He could have merely described, as he did, God's knowledge, power, goodness, justice, etc., and insist, as a practical consequence, that man must act in conformity to the will of God.

Besides, as we can see in the text of the Book of Mo-tze, 83 he strenuously endeavored to prove the existence of spirits and ghosts; this was because people no longer believed in their real existence as certainly as in the existence of God. Yet, generally speaking, the Chinese people of that time still believed in the existence of spirits and ghosts. Hence, we can be sure that Mo-tze did not feel it necessary to prove the existence of God, because if he had felt the necessity of doing so he would have done it as solicitously as he proved the existence of spirits and ghosts. In addition, Mo-tze was very anxious to have a firm basis for his doctrine.

82 Conf. above text page 72, note 77 and pages 33 and 34, note 5.
83 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 31, "On the Existence of spirits and ghosts."
He was very careful in examining any doctrine; he established three ways of examining the source, the value, and the effect of any doctrine or any statement. 84

In exposing his doctrine of "anti-fatalism", his principal argument was his open challenge to fatalists that they must prove the existence of the thing they called "Fate". Yet, Mo-tze gave his arguments against the existence of "Fate" and thus concluded that "Fate" does not exist. He also wanted the fatalists to know that instead of "Fate" it was Heaven who rules over all men and will eventually reward good ones and punish the evil ones. 85
Therefore, if Mo-tze was conscious that the existence of God needed to be proved, he surely would have done it most anxiously, lest his opponent challenge him to prove the existence of Heaven, Whose will he considered as the standard of morality.

Moreover, Mo-tze is considered by all Western and Chinese authors, even the objectors themselves, as the most logical 86 and most radical in teachings among all ancient Chinese philosophers. Hence we may assert that he would certainly have proved the existence of God if he only had felt that this was in need of any proof.

84 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapters 35, 36 and 37.
85 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapters 35, 36, and 37, "Anti-Fatalism."
86 Conf. above text, page 23, note 44 of our first chapter. We may still add this statement of Wilhelm Richard, who wrote about the school of Mo-tze: "The whole spirit of this school is one of religious asceticism. Everything in their doctrine is logical, rational." (Conf. A Short History of Chinese Civilization, New York, 1929, p. 150. H. Williamson exalted Mo-tze's logic in these words: "Aristotle was born just about the time that Mo-tzu died, and he is usually considered to be the father of logic as a system. But possibly this honour may yet have to be accorded to Mo-tzu, or some other Chinese Sage not yet restored to us from the shade of antiquity." (Conf. his Mo-Ti, a Chinese Heretic, Tsi-Nan, China, 1927, page 16.)
Finally, our readers will understand our statement still better from the attitude of the opponents of Mo-tze. Almost every point of his teaching, especially that of "universal love", which is intrinsically connected with the existence of God, was vigorously attacked by his opponents from Mencius down to our modern age; but his teaching on the will of God without proving the existence of God was never criticized until very recent times.

In fact, none of the ancient Chinese philosophers ever systematically proved the existence of God. One might wonder at the fact, but it is perhaps more wonderful that the existence of God was never explicitly and deliberately denied in ancient China, and hence, that it needs no proof.

One might point out Lao-tze as an exception; but Lao-tze was rather a pantheist than an atheist, unless one would call Plotinus or Philo the Jew an atheist. On the other hand, some Protestant authors even have tried to show that the "Tao" of Lao-tze is rather a personal God and can be regarded as similar to the Logos of St. John the Evangelist. However, we would obviously not consent to this statement; we may acknowledge the resemblance of the "Tao" of Lao-tze to the Logos of Philo, but not to the Divine Word of St. John the Evangelist. 87

87 Conf. above text page 42. We have explained that the Tao of Lao-tze is somewhat like the "one" of Plotinus and somewhat like the "Nature" of the modern materialists. Therefore, it is impossible for us to admit any real similarity between the Tao and the Divine Word of St. John the Evangelist. As to the Logos of Philo, the Jew, since it is similar to the "One" of PÂ³Â³Â³Â³ Â³Â³Â³, it may be said also similar to the Tao. In one word, the Tao is an immanent principle of the universe while the Verbum of St. John is transcendent and distinct from the world.
At any rate, an explicit and definitive denial of the existence of God was unknown at the time of Mo-tze. The Tao Te Ch'ing of Lao-tze, whether authentic or not, was certainly unknown at that time, as we have demonstrated above. Hence we may say with certainty that an atheistic or even a pantheistic doctrine was unknown to the people of ancient China at the time of our philosopher, although it may have been embryonically growing in a small milieu of scholars.

Another objection to our statement might be based on the fact that Mo-tze criticized the scholars of his time, namely the Confucians, as insincere in their belief in God; therefore, the scholars, if not the people in general, of his time must have been agnostic, not to say atheistic. Hence, Mo-tze should have proved the existence of God.

We shall defend our statement by distinguishing two kinds of agnosticism and also two kinds of atheism. The first kind is theoretical or philosophical and the second kind is practical. Atheists of the former class deny the existence of a personal God by their theories, teachings and arguments, while those of the latter class have no arguments at all against the existence of a personal God, although they act as if a personal God does not exist. It is practical atheism or agnosticism that Mo-tze has severely condemned. In fact, the argument which Mo-tze uses against the scholars of his time is to show that they act contradictorily to their theory. They are accused by Mo-tze of being careful not to offend the head of family or state in which they were living, but not caring much whether they offend God or not, although theoretically they do agree with Mo-tze that everyone is living under the domination of God who is present everywhere and is watching
everyone of our actions.

If a man commits a misdemeanour in the family, he still has other families in which to seek shelter. Yet father reminds son, the elder brother reminds the younger brother, saying: 'Be obedient, be careful in conduct in the family. If one is not obedient and careful in conduct in the family how can he live in the family?' If a man commits a misdemeanour in the state, he still has other states in which to seek shelter. Yet the father reminds the son and the elder brother reminds the younger brother saying: 'Be obedient and be careful. One cannot live in a state and be disobedient and careless.' Now all men live in the world and under Heaven. When a man sins against Heaven there is nowhere to seek shelter. But people do not think of warning each other. Thus I know that they do not understand things of importance. And Mo-tze said: 'Be obedient. Be careful. Be sure to do what Heaven desires and avoid what Heaven abominates. 88

Therefore, Mo-tze recognized the fact that there were many practical though few theoretical agnostics and atheists in ancient China. This is a fact in our day; we are quite certain that there are only a very few theoretical atheists but the practical atheists or agnostics in our own time must be counted by millions. One of the most commonly used arguments against them (practical atheists) is still the same kind of argument that was used by Mo-tze; namely to show that their practical lives contradict what they admit theoretically; i.e. the existence of a personal God.

Acknowledging this distinction, one will not wonder why Mo-tze did not attempt to prove the existence of God while he criticized the insincerity of the scholars and people as well in their belief in God.

Yet Mo-tze was certainly far from being the only theist who preached the will of God without ever proving the existence of God. The typical

88 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 28, also chapter 26.
example would be Our Lord Jesus Christ Himself and His Apostles, especially 
st. Paul whose mission was precisely to teach the gentiles to whom the 
atheistic ideas of the early Greek philosophers seemingly were not unfamiliar, 
although as a matter of fact the people in general were rather polytheists 
at that time. We may remark two strange facts which are strange to us 
because they happened after ancient Greece had produced so many unquestion-
ably atheistic philosophers. The first is that the Greek people in general, 
up to the time of St. Paul, are polytheistic and very superstitious. 
The second fact is that Socrates, who talked so much about God or rather 
gods, had very little to offer in proving the existence of God or gods, 
except the statement that: "Whatsoever exists for a useful purpose must be the work of an intelligence." 89 On this matter, our philosopher did 
even better than Socrates when he stated that the standard of morality must 
be given by the most intelligent being whom he called Heaven. Yet Mo-tze 
did not have to confront Thales the materialist, Pythagoras the numerologist, 
Democritus the atomist, Heraclitus the evolutionist, and so on. China has 
fortunately had no such philosophers.

This shows us at least that the sole fact that Mo-tze did not prove 
the existence of God does not imply that therefore he was insincere in 
his believing in it, because proof is needed only when doubt exists. Hence 
where there is no doubt there is no need of proof, such as in the case of 
immediate "evidence". Generally speaking, the existence of God is not a 
priori and per se evident to human knowledge. However, it can become 
evident, a posteriori of course, to the extent that it will not be a matter

89 Conf. Memo. I. 4, 2.
of doubt for a certain number of people under certain circumstances for a
certain length of time. This seems to have been the case of the ancient
Chinese people, as it was for many other peoples during a certain period
of their history. It was because of this same reason that Our Lord did not
have to prove the existence of a personal God. And, thus, St. Paul did
not care to provide a really philosophical argument for the existence of
a personal and unique God 90 but he was rather anxious to demonstrate that
there is a moral law written in our hearts.

Moreover, such a popular belief in the existence of God is not a
merely superstitious idea unless we would completely deny the value of the
so-called argument from the unanimous consent of all peoples (consensus
omnium populorum) which is often used as a proof of the existence of God. 91

90 The text of Rom. 1, 20, is believed by some minor authors as an attempt
of St. Paul to prove the existence of God by natural reason. But major
authorities see only that the text furnishes an assertion from theological
authority that by natural reason alone man may know the existence of a
personal God. Thus the possibility of a natural theology is authorized
by the revelation. But St. Paul personally was not a natural theologian.
Furthermore, St. Paul seemed to insist on the invisible qualities or
proprieties of God: "Invisibilia enim ipsius..." seems to us more likely
to indicate the invisible qualities of God than the existence of God.
The immediately following context will confirm our opinion, for St. Paul
condemned those people as inexcusable because while by their reason they
may know that God is invisible, yet they "mutaverunt gloriam incorrupti-
bilis Dei in similitudinem imaginis corruptibilis hominis, et volucrum,
et quadrupedum, et serpentium." (Rom. 1, 23.) This is condemnation of
idolatry not of atheism. In other words, it deals with the spirituality
or invisibility of God rather than with His existence.

91 Here, it is not our task to defend the value of this argument from the
unanimous consent of peoples. However, personally we believe that this
argument has a profound philosophical value, because such a persuasion
common to so many people is obviously not a blind faith but rather the
result of clear reasoning based on solid facts. For instance Rev. J. S.
Hickey formed his argumentum ex Consensu Generis Humani as follows:
"Inter omnes homines existit ineradicabilis persuasio de alicujus numinis
supremi existentia; atqui haec persuasio non potest prodire nisi a natura
rationali, et proinde infallibiliter vera est; ergo..." (Confi. Summula
Especially is this true in China, for the ancient Chinese wise men certainly did not blindly believe in the existence of God. They considered God, their "Emperor of Above" (Shang-Ti), as Creator and Supreme Ruler of the Universe, whose existence was taken for granted by them, for otherwise there could be no explanation for the origin and the order (both physical and moral) in the Universe. These ideas contained at least virtually all the elements of the various standard arguments for the proof of the existence of God. Therefore, they have also a certain amount of philosophical value of their own.

In one word, we state that inasmuch as one cannot show that Mo-tze had to prove the existence of God, this objection remains invalid.

As to the second part of this objection, it is also of little value, since Mo-tze obviously could not be utilizing the superstitious belief of the common people while, at the same time, complaining that people lacked sincerity in their belief in the existence of God and spirits. Our philosopher, as we stated above, was solicitously attacking the practical agnosticism of his time; hence, one could scarcely say that he has utilized the superstitious devotions of the common people because only a practical superstition of this kind can be utilized for the purpose mentioned in the objection. The people at the time of Mo-tze, generally speaking, had solely a theoretical belief in the existence of God and spirits; as to the practical side of the matter, their belief did not bring up devotion nor zeal. Hence they acted as if there were no God to punish them. This is true not only

Philosophiae Scholasticae, Vol. III, Dublinit, 1941, page 63. In pages 64-67, the author proves his minor: "atqui..." Italics are our own.
in ancient China, but even in our present day there are a great many Christians who are actually enjoying their lives in sinful pleasures and profits as if God did not exist, although they do believe (not dubiously but rather certainly) that God does exist and will punish sinners. And most of such Christians are even still quite proud of their Christian faith. Such a cold belief in the existence of God without any real devotion and zeal cannot be utilized to back up a social movement, as the objector would wish us to believe in the case of Mo-tze. Given a people who were devoted and zealous in acquiring pleasure and profits, our philosopher should have preached the ways and means to pleasure and profit if his purpose had been to "utilize" the popular devotion or tendency. But, whoever should dare to speak of the ways and means of loving and obeying God to this kind of people, would only quickly lose his popularity (if he did have any) instead of gaining any support. They would not confront his doctrine by denying the existence of God, but they simply would not listen and would be annoyed by repeated attempts to speak to them. This was exactly what happened to our philosopher. Any one of our readers may try this on a practical unbeliever and let his own experience confirm our statement. Therefore, in concluding, we may say that since the people of that time did not deny the existence of God, Mo-tze did not have to prove God's existence, because there was no sufficient motive for doing so. But, on the other hand, since they were mostly practical unbelievers, our philosopher could not utilize their devotion and zeal towards God and the spirits to back up his social reform simply because there was no such devotion. Mo-tze, conscious of such a fact, complained of the lack of true believers. Therefore, we may say
that this objection failed completely in reaching its intended purpose, namely to convince us that Mo-tze was not a theist.

**OBJECTION II**

Mo-tze compared the "Will of Heaven" to the instruments of the carpenter; therefore, in his mind, the "Will of Heaven" is merely a tool to promote a good social order. In fact, Mo-tze said: "The Will of Heaven to me is like the compasses to the wheelwright and the square to the carpenter." 92

**OUR ANSWER**

Frankly speaking, we must say that this objection is rather sophistic. If one take it seriously, it shows only that his knowledge of formal logic is rather poor. A simple distinction will make it clear. We must know that Mo-tze compared the "Will of Heaven" to the compass and square of the carpenter not because they are instruments, but, because they are standards for measurements. In more philosophical terms, we may say that the comparison is based on the similarity of both objects in only one of their characteristics, namely their ability to be a standard for a certain kind of measurement. Hence the comparison is not to be extended arbitrarily to other characteristics of any of those two objects. And if one does so, it is but obvious that he is making a sophistic (i.e. illogical) inference, which is of course invalid. For example, when we say that while most of vertebrate animals are quadrupeds, birds, on the contrary, like men, have only two legs, of course we cannot conclude that therefore birds are intelligent or that men can fly without an airplane. Now, in the comparison of

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92 This objection is advanced by Chen Yuan-Teh 陳元德 once a lecturer at the University of Hu-Han 吳漢大學 Hupei, China. This objection is quoted from his (Chen's) History of Ancient Chinese Philosophy, Shanghai, China, 1937, page 212.
Mo-tze, the compass and square are considered as standards, not as instruments; in fact, strictly speaking, they are not instruments, they are solely standards. In quoting a few more lines of the original text, the sophistry of this objection becomes obvious.

Mo-tze said: The will of Heaven to me is like the compass to the wheelright and the square to the carpenter. The wheelright and the carpenter measure all the square and circular objects with their square and compass and accept those that fit as correct and reject those that do not fit as incorrect. The writings of the gentlemen of the world of the present day cannot exhaustively be enumerated. They endeavor to convince the feudal lords on the one hand, the scholars on the other. But from magnanimity and righteousness they are far off. How do we know? Because I have the most competent standard in the world to measure them with.

Throughout the entire book of 53 chapters, Mo-tze has repeatedly stated that the "Will of Heaven" is the standard (not instrument) of righteousness, especially in the three chapters on the "Will of Heaven" and in the fourth chapter which is entitled "On the Necessity of A Standard". Although this last mentioned chapter is not usually considered as among the most undoubtedly authentic ones, it is certainly the work of a follower of Mo-tze's disciples; hence, it is not to be considered as strictly spurious. And it does represent, as we stated above, the traditional opinion of Mo-tze on the doctrine of a moral standard.

93 Conf. text of Mo-tze, chapter 26, Mei translation. Italics our own.
94 See above, page 11 of our dissertation (first chapter). These chapters are not strictly spurious, because although they are later compositions, they do represent the original doctrine of Mo-tze, at least in substance. Hence, they are substantially faithful, and hence authentic, in the larger sense of the term. This is similar to the case of the Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagitae which is spurious in a sense yet a valuable ancient document accepted by all critics.
In teaching his doctrine on the standard of morality, Mo-tze said:

To accomplish anything whatsoever one must have a standard. The artisans have their compass, lines, or pendulum as standards in their words. But the gentlemen of the world do not realize the necessity of having a standard for their conduct; this shows that they are even less intelligent than the artisans. Now, what is the standard of human conduct? Or what could be its standard? Shall we say, let everyone imitate his own parents? Or his teacher? Or his king? But there are few good parents, good teachers and good kings. As a matter of fact, there are many bad ones. To take them as standards is to learn to be bad, and therefore they can not be the standard of morality. The only person surely and always good is Heaven. Therefore, Mo-tze wishes that everyone imitate Heaven, take Heaven as his standard of morality or righteousness.

It should be obvious even to those imperfectly acquainted with philosophical distinctions that the compass and square are not considered as mere instruments in making objects; rather they are standards in measuring the perfection of an object either already made or still in the making. Mo-tze exposed this comparison of his more explicitly in the second chapter on the Will of Heaven.

Therefore the Will of Heaven to Mo-tze is like the compass to the wheelright and the square to the carpenter. The wheelright tests the circularity of every object in the world with his compass, saying: 'That which satisfies my compass is circular. That which does not is not circular.' Therefore whether an object is circular or not is all known, because the standard of circularity is
all established....The carpenter also tests the squareness of every object in the world with his square....Similarly, with the Will of Heaven, Mo-tze will measure the jurisdiction and government of the lords in the empire on the one hand, and the doctrines and teachings of the multitude in the empire on the other. If some conduct is observed to be in accordance with the Will of Heaven, it is called good conduct....95

In concluding, therefore, we may say that Mo-tze did not intend to say that the Will of Heaven is an instrument to make a social order as the compass is an instrument intended to make a circular object; but the original text certainly and explicitly tells us that, for Mo-tze, the Will of Heaven is a standard or norm for judging the righteousness of all human activities just as the compass is a standard for judging the circularity of all objects.

If Mo-tze did intend to bring out the instrumentality of the objects as the liaison-concept in this comparison, then we may ask the author of this objection: "Why did our philosopher not choose any other tools used by the carpenter, such as the axe, hammer, saw, etc., which are more commonly known as instruments?"

OBJECTION III

We must examine how Mo-tze presented the "Will of Heaven" to us. He said: "I have the Will of Heaven..." 96 Again, on another occasion he said: "Therefore, Mo-tze has the Will of Heaven..." 97 Finally, he even said: "Therefore, Mo-tze established the Will of Heaven as the standard..." 98 Those words show us sufficiently that the Will of Heaven is something

95 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 27. Italics ours.
96 Conf. original Chinese text of Mo-tze, chapter 26.
97 Conf. ibidem, chapter 27.
98 Conf. ibidem, chapter 28.
that Mo-tze possesses, or that is established by him. Therefore it is
his own creation, or in other words, it is his mental child, his imaginative
invention so that he can say that he has it or that he established it.
This is to say that the Will of Heaven does not exist objectively, but it
is surely a subjective idea of Mo-tze's. Otherwise, why did Mo-tze not
say: "There is the Will of God to be followed as the standard of morality,"
which sentence would indicate clearly that the Will of God is something
objectively real and exists outside the mind of Mo-tze.

If Mo-tze were a sincere believer, i.e. a true theist, he could not
use such expressions as: "I have the Will of God" and "I establish the
will of God to be this or that..." Would not these expressions be most
insulting and humiliating to his Almighty God? Hence, we must say that the
Will of God is really the will of Mo-tze, who wishes to promote social
well being as this is obviously the ultimate aim of his teachings. 99

OUR ANSWER TO OBJECTION III

In examining this objection, we wish, above all, to note that the words
of Mo-tze quoted in the objection are not from the translation of Dr. Mei
Yi-pao. For Dr. Mei has translated these same words of Mo-tze in a much
less literal way. Instead of making Mo-tze say: "I have the Will of
Heaven," Dr. Mei has translated the original Chinese text as follows:
"Mo-tze said: 'The Will of Heaven to me is like..." Therefore, if we
had used this latter translation, we would have been somewhat unfair to

99 Mr. Chen Yuan Teh (see above note 92) is the author of this
objection. (Cf. opus cit. above in note 92) The three quotations of
Mo-tze are literally translated from the original Chinese text. Here,
we can not use the Mei translation, as we shall explain immediately
in answering this objection.
the objector, since it would greatly diminish the vigor of this objection, because the force of this objection is precisely built upon the literal meaning of the original text. Word by word, literally translated, Mo-tze did say: "I have the Will of Heaven." And, on the other occasion, the original Chinese text did say literally: "Therefore, Mo-tze has the Will of Heaven". Dr. Mei did not translate these words literally because he believed that they are not to be interpreted as the author of this objection did. However, we wish our readers to know that the author of the objection did not alter the original text; in fact, he could not, since he quoted Mo-tze in the original Chinese text; for this objection, as well as most of the following objections, is to be found in the works written in Chinese by modern authors of China. They quote the original text directly without opportunity to change an "iota" from it. On the other hand, Dr. Mei is not to be accused with unfaithfulness in translating; for, as we shall demonstrate now, the real mind of Mo-tze is not to be reached by a literal translation or literal interpretation.

Even according to this word by word literal translation, we may still remark that the words "I have" and "Mo-tze has" do not necessarily indicate a merely subjective meaning. For instance, the objector says: "I have an objection." He certainly does not intend to say that his objection does not exist objectively outside of his mind. In fact, except in the case of those who are strictly subjectivists or idealists, whenever one says that he has something, he presupposes a real distinction between himself and the object he possesses. Hence, the object possessed by a certain subject is, according to our common use of language, almost ipso facto
objectively distinguished from its possessor.

However, our objector went further. He pointed out that a sincere believer can not say that he has the Will of God, or that he establishes the Will of God to be this or that, as if he were superior even to God Himself. This would be absurd and most impious. Hence, in such a case, it is more logical to say that he is rather an unbeliever at heart. Mo-tze was probably such a person.

We would agree with our objector if Mo-tze did mean that he possessed or established the Will of Heaven in such a sense that it implies that he is superior to Heaven Himself. But, to the regret of our objector, this is most unlikely to be true. In order to show Mo-tze's real intention, we only have to read the original text a little further than the passage quoted by our objector, because the objection precisely consists in cutting Mo-tze's words from a complete sentence, which if read entirely will show that Mo-tze did not mean that he possesses the Will of Heaven as if it were one of his belongings. We may still use the literal translation, as would be preferred by our opponents, and thus we quote Mo-tze: "I have the Will of Heaven like the wheelright has his compass or the carpenter has his square..." The sentence is still not concluded but it is already sufficient to show that our objector misunderstood Mo-tze. As we have already quoted this complete passage of Mo-tze twice before, our readers will remember that, after having said so much, Mo-tze went on to explain that he uses the will of Heaven to measure the righteousness of human conduct just as the carpenter uses compass and square to measure the circularity and squareness of any object.
It is altogether different to say simply: "I have the Will of Heaven" and to say: "I have the Will of Heaven as the standard of morality, as the carpenter has compass and square as standards in measurements." If the former sentence were in itself a completed one, and definitely so expressed by its author, we might then think that its author was not a sincere believer. However, the latter sentence can just as well be a sincere and even devout profession of a theist, for, the theists do believe that the Divine Law is the norm of morality and if they do say that they have the Divine Law as the standard of morality, we understand well what they really mean.

So far we have clearly explained the meaning of the word "have", we still have to examine the word "establish" used by Mo-tze in this occasion. Indeed, as it is reported in the objection, our philosopher stated: "Therefore, Mo-tze established the Will of Heaven as the standard..." Hence, the objector concluded that the will of Heaven is merely a mental creation of Mo-tze.

We may first point out that the word "establish" has not the same meaning as the word "create" or "invent". This is even more obvious in the original Chinese text. The Chinese never use this term, (which is translated here by Dr. Mei as "establish") to indicate creation, formation or any kind of production, nor even any kind of manufacturing process. It means solely "to set up", that is to say, "to put something in a certain position in order that it may exercise a determined function." In a more material sense, this term is often used to indicate, for instance, "to set up a fence in order to divide land ownership". In a more abstract sense,
it is often used to indicate, for instance, "to set up a rule, or a standard to be followed". At any rate, the original notion of this term is very much different from that of creating or producing by manufacturing processes.

Thus, especially in philosophical discussions, whenever one says that he establishes (or he sets up) some thing as the standard of morality, it is but obvious that he means that he asserts, declares, or he adopts, accepts this or that as the standard of morality. It is, therefore, a statement, a declaration of a fact which is already existing rather than a creation or invention of a new fact. Hence, a theist philosopher, while discussing with his opponents, may rightly say that he sets up (or establishes) the will of God as the standard of morality against those who wish to accept or declare that the norm of morality is human interest. Therefore, properly speaking, these words of Mo-tze, even as they are cited in the objection, do not necessarily imply a subjectivist Mo-tze. We wish, however, to go even further so as to exclude positively the unfaithful and false interpretation presented in the objection. In other words, we will show that it is definitely false.

It is always a fundamental rule of interpreting, that when the text is somewhat obscure and ambiguous, the context must first be consulted in order to determine the original mind of the author. Such is now our case.

Now, the contexts, both preceding and following, of these three statements cited in the objection are favorable only to our interpretation, that is, that Mo-tze believed sincerely in the objective existence of the will of Heaven in a personal God.
We must remember that in the passage of the original text from which Mo-tze was quoted by our objector, our philosopher was demonstrating to his listeners that a moral standard must be unquestioningly recognized by all as absolutely good or righteous. In other words, Mo-tze wanted a universal and absolute standard. Thus, as we have already mentioned above, our philosopher, in explaining his doctrine on the necessity of a standard, has explicitly excluded all human beings and their respective authorities — parents, teachers, kings, and even the Emperor. Some of them are good but, as Mo-tze stated explicitly, most of them are bad; moreover, even the good ones are not always good. Therefore, their authorities, their teachings or their laws are not to be considered as the standard of morality, since the real standard must be absolutely good. Hence, Mo-tze reached the conclusion that only the authority of God can be the real norm of morality. Moreover, in his three chapters, undoubtedly among the most authentic, on "Identification with the Superior", Mo-tze condemned the subjective and individualistic theory which permits that every one take his individual opinion as the standard of morality, considering such a theory the cause of disorder in the world. Hence, the remedy for this evil is to unify the standard of morality in order to have a universal standard to be accepted by all human beings. Such a universal standard, our philosopher concluded, can be only the will of God. 100 Then, in explaining his teachings on the "Will of Heaven", Mo-tze said:

100 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapters 11, 12, and 13. All are entitled "Identification with the Superior".
Now a standard is never given by the subordinates to the superior; it is always to be given by the superior to the subordinates. Hence the common people may not make the standard at will, there are the scholars to give them the standard; the scholars may not make the standard at will, there are the ministers to give them the standard. The ministers may not make the standard at will, there is the emperor to give them the standard. The emperor may not make the standard at will. There is Heaven to give him the standard. The gentlemen of the world all understand that the emperor gives the standard to the world but do not understand that Heaven gives the standard to the emperor. The Sages explaining this said: "When the emperor has done good, Heaven rewards him. When the emperor has committed wrong, Heaven punishes him."

Thus by enumerating all human beings in different grades of authorities from the common people to the Venerable Emperor, Mo-tze certainly intended to say that absolutely no human being can make this standard at will; and ultimately he stated that Heaven alone can give and it does give this absolute and universal standard of morality.

Not only can no individual human being give the standard of morality, but not even can the agreement of a great many people or the tradition of a whole nation do such a thing as make a moral standard. Mo-tze stated clearly that a custom of a nation can not be considered as a standard, for it evidently can be wrong. In explaining his doctrine on the "Simplicity of Funerals", he debated with those who maintained that an elaborated and sumptuous funeral is from the ancient tradition of China, and that, therefore, it must be a right thing to do. Mo-tze said that this is only because tradition and custom do create habits and prejudice or a certain fixed way.

101 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 28, Mei translation. We must notice that only the last standard, this one given by Heaven, is, according to Mo-tze, the real standard, since it alone is ultimate and
of considering things; but this does not imply that it is therefore good.

In fact, our philosopher told his opponents that custom and tradition may even be obviously wrong.

South of Ch'u there was a cannibal tribe. Upon the death of the parents the flesh was scraped off and thrown away while the bones were buried. And by following this custom one became a filial son. West of the state of Ch'in there was the tribe of Yi-Ch'u. Upon their death the parents were buried on a bonfire and amidst the smoke, and this was said to be ascension to the golden clouds. In this way one became a filial son. The officials embodied it in the government regulations and the people regarded it as a commonplace. They practiced it continually and followed without discrimination. Is it then the good and right way? No, this is really because habit affords convenience and custom carries approval. 102

On another occasion, Mo-tze discussed the question of custom and tradition with Lord Wen of Lu Yang, and expressed similar opinions.

Lord Wen of Lu Yang said to Mo-tze: "There is a cannibal tribe on the south of Ch'u. When the first son is born they dissect and devour him. This is said to be propitious to his younger brothers. If he tastes delicious, he will be offered to the chief, and if the chief is pleased, the father will be rewarded. Is not this a wicked custom?" Mo-tze said: "So is the custom in China. How is killing the father and rewarding the son different from devouring the son and rewarding the father? If magnanimity and righteousness are not observed, wherefore shall we condemn the barbarians for eating their son?" 103

Thus, from the bad custom of the southern people, Mo-tze showed that even in the center of civilized China there were plenty of bad and immoral customs. 104 Therefore, most likely, Mo-tze would not accept the conven-

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102 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 25, "Simplicity in Funerals", Mei translation.
103 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, Mei translation, chapter 49.
104 Conf. ibidem, immediately following the quoted passage.
tional theory concerning the origin of moral laws. Those who adhere to this theory believe that, at the very beginning of human existence, there were no moral laws at all; men had merely learned by experience that it was better for their own good to establish some moral principles according to which one might judge what is wrong and what is right. Thus moral ideas originated. This opinion is generally called the conventional theory.

Our philosopher would appear most unwilling to accept such an idea, for he has clearly expressed himself that he does not believe in any human origin of the moral standard, either individually or collectively. Human will is explicitly excluded by Mo-tze as a possible source for moral principles; no man can make this moral standard at will; not even the whole hierarchy of human authority put together can produce this standard.

Finally, even the comparison itself reveals to us something not less significant. Because the compass and the square are absolute (mathematically absolute) standards for circularity and squareness and they are universally accepted by all men as such standards, but, of course, the carpenter did not create or make these standards at will, i.e. arbitrarily; nor could any one else do so; not even the highest human authority or the unanimous consent of all men in the world would be able to make an arbitrarily determined mathematical standard. We were told that in the early days of the existence of a modern state, the original state legislators were then so practical-minded that they passed a peculiar law which declared that in the State of Kansas the mathematical value of \( \pi \) would be exactly 3 instead of the traditional 3.1416. This was said to be a practical move to facilitate
mathematical calculations. Needless to say, such a law could not live long. People do find out that the human will is not almighty after all and that democracy can not be carried too far as to determine everything by the consent of majority.

Returning to our subject, we must admit that compass and square have their value in the nature of mathematical laws, which is entirely independent of the mind of the carpenter or of any other human being. Therefore, we may say that by this comparison, Mo-tze intended to state: "Just as the compass and the square are objectively absolute standards of geometrical figures, so the will of Heaven is an objectively absolute standard of morality for all mankind." In other words, if Mo-tze had known our modern philosophical terms, he would have said that the will of God is the standard of morality, and it is as absolute, as objective, and as universal as is the compass considered as the standard of circularity.

Just one more argument to confirm our opinion. We quote Mo-tze again:

Therefore Mo-tze established the will of Heaven to be the standard. Not only did Mo-tze establish the will of Heaven to be the standard, but it was also the theme of an ode in the Ta Ya, among the books of the ancient sage Kings: "God said to King Wen: I cherish your intelligent virtue. It was not proclaimed with much noise or gesture. It was not modified after the possessions of the empire. Instinctively and naturally submissive to God's scheme." This is to proclaim that King Wen used the will of Heaven as a standard and was submissive to God's scheme.

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105 We read this in the Chinese newspaper (The Sam-ming Morning paper, April 29, 1942, page 8) published in Chicago. It is mentioned among strange facts. We are unable to verify it with more authentic documents. But, it is of little importance whether it is true or not. Here, it serves as an example that conventional origin can not explain everything.

106 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 28. (Mei translation) The original text of Ta Ya is obscure.
This is a brilliant testimony to prove that Mo-tze was not trying to create or invent something new; neither was he establishing something never established before. He was just declaring a principle that much be recognized by all wise men, and it was in fact known to King Wen even hundreds of years ago. Hence, although Mo-tze did not state it explicitly, we may logically deduce that Mo-tze intended to point out that this standard of morality is unchangeable as time passes by centuries; in other words, it is permanent or even eternal; that is to say, universal not only in extension, but also in time. Therefore, for Mo-tze, the will of God is a moral standard common to all men of all time.

Summarizing our arguments, we may state, as a conclusion in answering this objection, that according to Mo-tze, the will of Heaven is objectively existing in a personal God, who is the Supreme Ruler of all men of all times; that is to say, an Almighty and Eternal God. According to what Mo-tze himself stated in the original texts, the will of Heaven as the standard of morality is universal, (in the sense we just explained above), objective, (i.e. independent of human will), absolute, (i.e. enforced among human beings even if it should be against their will) and unchangeable (i.e. not modifiable by human will). All these characteristics evidently exclude and reject the subjectivistic interpretation of the objector.

**ObjecTion IV**

Mo-tze was extremely anti-fatalistic. Now, if he really believed in the existence of a personal God who has power to determine our happiness or 107 King Wen was the father of King Wu, who was the first emperor and founder of the Chou dynasty (1122 B.C. to 255 B.C.) The exact dates of his birth and of his death are unknown.
unhappiness, the consequence would be just the same as that of fatalism. Therefore, Mo-tze could not sincerely believe in the objective existence of a personal God. 108

OUR ANSWER TO OBJECTION IV

We have only to note that this is a very singular opinion. We wish to reproduce it here because we wish our discussion to be most complete. We said that this is a singular opinion, for we found no supporter except its author. All other authors, Westerners and Chinese alike, have rather considered that the anti-fatalistic attitude of Mo-tze was a logical consequence of his doctrine of the will of Heaven. For instance, Dr. Hu Shih, who is an atheist and is well known in this country as an outstanding Chinese modern scholar with ample knowledge of American philosophy (for he is a graduate of Columbia University), has written the following statement:

The reason why Mo-tze refused to believe in fatalism is just because he firmly believed in the Will of Heaven, that is to say he firmly believed that God and the spirits can and will reward and punish the deeds of men according to their merits and demerits. Therefore, he can not tolerate the teachings of fatalism. 109

Indeed, fatalism destroys the real idea of reward and punishment. This is the same as to deny the dignity and authority of God as the Supreme Ruler of the Universe, and consequently His existence as God. Mo-tze vigorously condemned fatalism as destroying the moral order which is objectively based on the essential difference between good and evil, and subjectively based on the individual responsibility for one's own acts. The doctrine of fate automatically destroys these two basic ideas:

Now the fatalists say: "Whoever is rewarded by the superior is destined to be rewarded; it is not because of his virtue that he is rewarded....Whoever is punished by the superior is destined to be punished; it is not because of his vice that he is to be punished." The unnatural adherence to this doctrine is responsible for pernicious ideas and is the way of the wicked. 110

Furthermore, Mo-tze shows that fatalism offends God and hence those who believed in fatalism will be punished by God, as historical documents from the ancient canonical books demonstrated it to us.

The Great Declaration says: "Shieu became insolent and would not worship God and pushed away the ancestors and spirits without offering them sacrifices. And he said: Fortune is with my people. And he neglected and betrayed his duty. Heaven thereupon deserted him and withdrew its protection." This tells how King Wu shoed Shieu's belief in fate to be wrong. 111

In concluding his treatise against fatalism, our philosopher stated the idea of an intelligent governor as the true doctrine, in contradicting the wrong idea of the fatalists.

Hence, peace and danger, order and disorder, all depend on the government of the superior. How can it be said that everything is according to fate? 112

This statement of our philosopher is to be applied to the physical order of the universe, to the social order of the states and also to individual moral conduct; man's own intelligence and will is like a superior who governs the activities of the entire body. Mo-tze apparently noticed that where there is an order there must be an intelligent governor, for

110 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 35. ("Anti-fatalism")
111 Conf. ibidem. Shieu was one of the most wicked kings 禰王. The Great Declaration is the title of a chapter in one of the canonical books.
112 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 35.
order is produced only by intelligence.

Fatalism is the direct denial of intelligence, it is therefore condemned by all philosophers, since philosophy too is intrinsically a product of intelligence. What the author of this objection needs to know a little better is the diametrical opposition that exists between fate and intelligence. This diametrical opposition is even more obvious in moral philosophy than in metaphysics because if fatalism were to be accepted as true, then there could not be any subjects for moral philosophy, and thus moral philosophy would simply lose its "raison d'être" and therefore not exist.

In fact, if all movements in the universe were caused and directed by fate, which is by definition an unintelligent principle, then there should be no difference between actions of human beings and those of mineral elements; hence, obviously; human actions should merely be subjects of cosmology or physics. St. Thomas has noticed: "Moralitas necessario praesupponit libertatem, quia actus, qui non procedit a ratione deliberativa, non est proprie loquendo moralis." Moreover, because of the fact that fate is anextrinsic principle which moves human beings without any purpose, it would inevitably deny the value of both "finis operis" and "finis operantis", which are vital elements in moral philosophy. We all know that fatalism is diametrically opposed to finism. "Fate" is the special term that is invented by the fatalists with the sole purpose to deny the principle of finality; namely: "omne agens agit propter finem". Moral philosophy is based on the value of finism. "Moralis philosophiae proprium est considerare operationes humanas, secundum quod sunt ordinatae ad invicem et ad finem....Ita subjectum moralis philosophiae est operatio humana

113 Sum. Theo. I, 2, Qu. 18, art. 9.
The shortest descriptive definition of fatalism may be expressed in two words, i.e. NO PURPOSE; that is to say that there is no purpose whatsoever in any actions or movements in the universe. But the fatalists still have to answer the important question which asks why this action or that movement is so and so and not otherwise? They were forced to say that it is because fate has determined or directed it so and so and not otherwise. But, if we should persist in our inquiry and ask the fatalists why fate has determined or directed this particular action to beso and so and not otherwise, they would reply that fate has no reason for its decision, for it is not reasonable; it is not intelligent.

The inventors of fatalism as well as its followers of all ages indeed understood that finism is based on the existence and the value of intelligence in intelligent beings. Finism requires intelligence not only in moral philosophy but in cosmology as well.

Unde patet, quod non a casu, sed ex intentione pervenit ad finem. Ea autem quae non habent cognitionem, non tendunt in finem nisi directa ab aliquo cognoscente et intelligente, sicut sagitta a sagittante. Ergo est aliquid intelligens, a quo omnes res naturales ordinantur ad finem, et hoc dicimus Deum. 115

Acknowledging the diametrical opposition between finism and fatalism, one will easily see a similar opposition between the basic principles or elements of the two isms, namely fate and intelligence.

OBJECTION V

Mo-tze was a utilitarian. He stated that the standard for distinguish-
ing "good" and "evil" is utility. In fact, he said "If it [his doctrine of universal love] were not useful, then even I would disapprove of it. But, how can there be anything that is good but not useful?" This was an explicit confession of his real mind which was evidently utilitarian, since he identified the "good" with the "useful". Therefore, the "will of Heaven" was only a kind of smoke screen that served to adapt his utilitarian doctrine to the superstitiously-minded common people.

OUR ANSWER TO OBJECTION V

The last part of this objection was already refuted when we examined the first objection. In addition, as we will demonstrate later, our philosopher was precisely considering the utilitarians of his time when he stated the sentence that is now quoted in this objection. Therefore, he certainly did not need any kind of smoke screen to persuade them of utilitarian principles, since they were already utilitarians and moreover they were trying to convince Mo-tze of their utilitarian ideas.

As to the first part of this objection, which is considered by those authors as their most powerful argument in making Mo-tze a utilitarian, we shall examine more carefully the original text in order to find out the most exact interpretation of it. As is clear from the immediately preceding context, Mo-tze was not positively teaching the basic ideas or principles

116 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 16, "Universal Love".
117 This objection is to be found in The Ancient Chinese Ideas concerning Politics and Sociology by Ch'i Ven-Hu, Shanghai, 1930. Similar opinion is expressed by Liang Ch'i-Tsao, 梁啟超 Fun Yuan-Lan 楊沅蘭 . Similarly, S. Holth and W. Long called Mo-tze utilitarian for this reason, although they called him a sincere theist too. We will cite them later.
of his doctrine; but he was answering an objection, and it was an objection addressed to him by the utilitarians of his time. Therefore it is not surprising if he should speak on utility and almost adopt the views of these utilitarians just in order to prove to them that his doctrine of universal love is at the same time "good" and "useful".

In fact, the passage cited in this objection is quoted from the sixteenth chapter of the original text, which is the third chapter dealing with the doctrine of "universal love". In this particular chapter, our philosopher cited as many as six main objections against his doctrine of universal love and refuted them eloquently one after another. If we only wish to read just a few more lines which precede the cited text, we shall see clearly that Mo-tze was answering one of those objections given to him by the scholars of his time. Mo-tze reported to us:

Yet their objections to it are not exhausted. It is asked: 'It may be a good thing, but can it be of any use?'. Mo-tze replied: 'If it were not useful, then even I would disapprove of it. But how can there be anything that is good but not useful?'

We may immediately notice that the objection is strongly utilitarian. The objectors appear willingly to have agreed with Mo-tze that his doctrine of universal love is a good one; but, they asked: "Can it be of any use?", since according to them the practical criterion of all things is their usefulness.

Upon hearing such an objection, Mo-tze felt almost insulted. We may even imagine him jumping up on his feet and possibly banging his fist on the discussion table as he says, to quote: "If it were not useful", he said with indignation, "then, even I would disapprove of it." We have

118 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 16.
underlined the words "even I" not without reason. As a matter of fact, obviously Mo-tze has emphasized the word "even I"; that is to say: "even I, Mo-tze, who am not a utilitarian like you gentlemen, even I would disapprove of it, if it were not useful." This is to assert in a most absolute way that he is entirely convinced that his doctrine of universal love is not only, as the utilitarians have agreed with him, theoretically good, but also, undoubtedly, practically useful; i.e. possible of adoption by the people and therefore able to promote the common good for society.

It is literally obvious that the "even I" used by Mo-tze is intended to distinguish himself from the ideology of his questioners. Now, it is also quite obvious that the questioners here are utilitarians; therefore, Mo-tze indicates that he does not want to be considered as a utilitarian.

Moreover, Mo-tze went even further to refute their prejudice, because, contrary to their false idea, Mo-tze is convinced that whenever a moral doctrine is theoretically right, it must necessarily be useful, i.e., practically possible to put into use and thus promote the common good for men. Therefore, he counter-questioned them: "But, how can there be any good doctrine that is not practical? or not useful?" Although the original text does not say "good doctrine", but merely says "anything that is good", the contexts demonstrate sufficiently that it was the goodness of his doctrine that was in question. S. Holth, referring to this passage, translated the same discussion as follows:

119 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 16. The original Chinese words are: "美有善而亦可用哉?" We also have quoted the Mei translation above in the objection and also used it in our answering explanation until now. Here we merely want to express it more explicitly than the Mei translation which is rather too literal in this case.
"Sir, your theory is excellent, but it cannot be practical." His reply was: "If it is good, it must also be practicable." 120

Mme. Alexander David has translated this same passage in French as follows:

Il disent: "Il est possible que le principe soit bon, mais comment le mettre en pratique?" Notre Maître dit: "En supposant qu'il ne puisse pas être pratique, il paraît difficile, meanmoins, de continuer a le condamner. Mais comment peut-il être bon et impossible a être mis en pratique?" 121

These two lately quoted translations are obviously less literal, or more liberal, than that of Dr. Mei which we used in our discussions. However, they do help us here to understand the real and original meaning of the text concerned.

Therefore, with this counter question, Mo-tze wished to show that the objection against his doctrine of universal love is not based on reality but solely on a false prejudice of his questioners, namely that they believed that a moral doctrine could be theoretically good, honest and desirable, yet it might be at the same time practically inapplicable, useless or even harmful. So that it should be called practically wrong, i.e. no good.

Understanding the whole situation in which Mo-tze uttered this statement we may even say that, instead of its being a proof for the opinion of our opponents, it is really rather a quite solemn denial of their belief, namely that our philosopher was a utilitarian.

120 Conf. S. Holth in his Micius, a Brief Outline of His Life and Ideas. Also H. Williamson has a similar translation.
121 Conf. her work: Le Philosophe Meh-Ti et l'Idee de Solidarite, London, 1907. Italics our own. The reason for doing so is because we think the sentence is well translated.
Furthermore, even without the help of contexts, we may still demon-
strate that the conclusion of our opponents, namely that Mo-tze has identified
the "good" with the "useful", is not logically sound, although at first
sight one may easily think that our opponents have the situation well in
hand.

Indeed, Mo-tze's counter-questioning implies that whatever is good
be "ipso facto" also useful. This however does not necessarily mean to
assert the basic principle of utilitarianism, namely the identification of
"good" with "useful".

To say, as our philosopher said: "How can there be anything that is
good but not useful?" (here we use the literal translation of Dr. Mei
again, just so that our opponents will be the more convinced with our
arguments), is to say: "Everything that is good is therefore useful".
But, it is quite obvious according to the most fundamental rules of logic
that this does not necessarily mean the identification of "good" with "use-
ful" because it does not imply that whatsoever is useful is therefore also
good. In a universal and affirmative sentence the subject is simply
included in the predicate but is not necessarily equipollent with it. To
make those two concepts equipollents, one must state that all S are P and
vice versa. Now, in the original text it is obvious that Mo-tze did not
say "and vice versa." Nor did he say: "How can there be anything that is
useful but not good?", which would be by all means the speaking manner of
a utilitarian. Therefore, even literally speaking, one can not accuse Mo-
tze of identifying "good" and "useful".

To penetrate even deeper into the matter dealing with "good" and
"useful" we would like to inquire concerning the metaphysical conception of both of them. In fact, any concept may be abstracted from all particular qualifications, i.e. notes, and thus considered merely in its own "constitutivum metaphysicum", that is, the first and most essential notion. If we do consider the concept of "good" and that of "useful" in this manner, we will find that they do approach each other so much that they may be spoken of as practically indicating the same thing in reality. In other words, metaphysically speaking, they are equipollent concepts. 122

In fact, metaphysically speaking, what is "good"? It is nothing but being inasmuch as it is conceived to be desirable by some appetitive faculty. "Bonum est appetibile." 123 Neither the human will nor any other kinds of appetitive faculties will desire anything unless the cognitive faculty of the subject sees or feels the usefulness of the desired object. It is obvious that no appetitive faculty will be attracted by anything that is completely useless to itself or to the subject in general. In ordinary language, we may say that no one wants a useless thing. Therefore, "good" means "desirable" and "desirable" means, frankly speaking, "useful" to the subject desiring. A thing is desirable because it is good. Why then is it good and therefore desirable? Because it suits the natural needs,

122 N.B. We do not say that they are identical, but that they are equipollent concepts.

123 According to St. Thomas Aquinas "good" and "being" indicate the same thing, only the notion of "good" points out that the same is desirable. Thus he stated: "bonum dicit rationem appetibilis, quam non dicit ens." (Sum. Theo. I, Qu. 5, art. 1) Again he said: "Idem appetret ex hoc quod ipsum esse maxime habet rationem appetibilis; unde videmus quod unumquodque naturaliter appetit conservare suum esse, et refugit destructiva sui esse, et eis pro posse resistit. Sic ergo ipsum esse, inquantum est appetibile est bonum." (De Malo, Qu. I, art. 1. In respondeo...circa finem. Italics ours.)
and is adapted to the natures of the being that desires it or tends towards it; because it helps this being, agrees with it, by contributing towards the realization of its ends; *Bonum est id quod convenit naturae appetentis.* The good is that which suits the nature of the being that desires it. 124

Nevertheless, to assert this, one must conceive, as we noted above, the notion of "usefulness" in a most abstract way. It would be merely a notion of conformity or desirability of the perfections of the object to the subject of the appetitive faculty. We point this out carefully, because in the current use of the term, "useful" means solely and exclusively such a conformity or desirability in the physical order, so that the appetitive faculty is attracted only by the physical perfections of the object which is considered by the cognitive faculty to be physically helpful to reach a certain physical perfection (or pleasure) of the subject. It is now solely in this qualified sense that the utilitarians use the term "useful", or "utility."

Originally, however, it seems that the term "utility" was not necessarily restricted to physical goods. First of all, its essential notion does not imply this restriction; then even in the practical use of ancient times this term is not exclusively limited in the physical order. Thus, the ancient Church, in Her early dated Roman Missal prayers, asked the pious and devoted congregation to pray for the "utility" of themselves and for the whole household of Church members. "Ad utilitatem quoque

124 Coffey, Ontology, page 169. (Quoted from J. S. Hickey's *Summula Philosophiae Scholasticae*, Vol. I, page 338, note 1, Dublindi, 1942, Editio nona.) Father Hickey did not give any further reference to Coffey's work. There is no bibliography given in any of the three volumes.
nostram totiusque Ecclesiae Suæ Sanctæ." 125 Evidently, this utility that we are praying for in our daily Masses is by no means restricted solely to physical goods; it must also and even primarily include our spiritual welfare. Otherwise the Church, whose emphasis on spiritual welfare over that of the physical order is well-known to all, would likely have used some other terms which would properly represent our spiritual welfare before She would allow us to mention the term "utility". The fact that the term "utility" is allowed to be mentioned immediately after "Ad laudem et Gloriam Nominis Tuî", has revealed significantly that in the early days it was not solely intended for physical goods. Moreover, Christian moralists, even to this day, are accustomed to write a little paragraph "On the Utility of Moral Philosophy" at the beginning of their text books on this science. 126 Hence, utility or usefulness was originally used indifferently to express "goods" either physical or moral, spiritual or material.

Pope Pius IX, therefore, in denouncing the principle of utilitarianism did not use simply the term "utility", but rather he preferred to qualify that the utilitarians or pragmatists teach: "Omnis morum disciplina honestasque collocari debet in cumulandis et augendis quovis modo divitiis ac in voluptatibus explendis." 127

Therefore, utilitarianism is wrong because it confuses the two orders, namely moral and physical, which are "de jure" and "de facto" distinguished.

125 Quoted from the "Susciptiat." Originated about third century and still in daily use today.
126 Many text books of scholastic moral philosophy have such a paragraph. One instance is that of J. S. Hickey, O. Cist., in his Summula Philosophiae Scholasticae, Vol. III, page 244. (ed. 1941).
And what is even worse, utilitarianism literally dropped the moral order, which is "per se" superior, into the physical order of pleasure (divitiae et voluptates). Admitting that "useful" can be referred to the moral order, we shall nevertheless very carefully distinguish the morally "useful" from the physical, since they are two essentially different notions. Now, very cautiously in order to be most clear and exact, we wish to advance the following statements concerning when and how the notion of "useful" can be considered an equivalent to "good".

1) Whatever is useful in the moral order, is therefore good in the same order, and vice versa.

2) Whatever is useful in the physical order, is also therefore good in the same order, and vice versa.

3) Whatever is useful in the moral order, is also therefore good in the physical order, but not vice versa.

4) Whatever is useful in the physical order, is also therefore good in the moral order.

Of these four statements, the first two are obviously correct. The third one is correct too, because of the fact (we regret that it is outside the scope of our thesis to prove this) that both orders, moral and physical, originate from the same Supreme Being, the Prime Cause of all beings. By His decree, the physical order is so constituted that it is subordinated to the moral order perfectly and "per se" harmoniously. Thus, the moral order is a superior order which perfects, improves and beautifies the inferior order, namely the physical one. The superior order is by no means made to damage or to destroy the inferior one, as is believed by a few
modern thinkers. On the other hand, of course, the physical order, being inferior, has absolutely no right to overcome the moral order and, as the utilitarian principle makes it, to absorb completely whatever is moral.

However, we can not help but notice that de facto there is a kind of conflict between the two orders. This conflict is, nevertheless, merely apparent. It is due to the irregularity of human passions and the partial blindness of man's knowledge in perceiving the real good for himself, not as a solely material being but as a special and unique being composed of spiritual soul and material body, so that he alone is the subject of both moral and physical orders.

No one should be surprised at seeing this conflict. As a matter of fact, even in the physical order itself there are many conflicts which would have a character more serious than a merely apparent disagreement. Yet it is not to be found only among different numbers of subjects, such as when the interest of one man conflicts with that of the other, but even in the same individual. Mo-tze has noticed this long before us:

To cut a finger in order to save the hand is to take a minor damage in order to have a major profit. Thus, to take a minor damage is not to take a damage but it is to take a profit. 128

To put a finger, which is "per se"a physical damage, becomes a truly physical good and hence useful if it should be done in order to save the hand. A greater good caused by a certain act will justify the relatively small damage caused by the same act on the same subject, provided that the

128 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 44. Dr. Mei did not translate this chapter, and no other translations are available. We have, therefore, translated it. The original Chinese text is copied here for immediate reference: 断指以存掌中取大掌中取小之掌中取人之不取害之取利之
small damage is a necessary and hence inevitable effect of the very same act. That this is obvious in the physical order, even the materialists will agree with us. Now, based on the same reason, if we believe that the moral order is superior to the physical one, we must see no more conflicts between the moral order and the physical than there are in the physical order itself. Thus, simply speaking, moral goods, which are by nature superior to physical goods, must be preferred in any instances where a conflict between the two seems to be inevitable.

Returning now to the original subject of our discussion, we will see to which of those four sentences concerning the notion of "useful" our philosopher would adhere when he asked: "How can there be anything that is good but not useful?"

Now, if we wish to say that Mo-tze was talking about the very abstract metaphysical notion of the two terms "good" and "useful", we have no right to accuse him as a utilitarian, for the reason we have clearly explained above. Or, if we suppose that he was talking about "good" and "useful" in the same order, he was merely asserting the true statements expressed by our examples one and two. Neither of them is utilitarian in the sense of the term understood both by ourselves and by our opponents. The sole way to make Mo-tze a utilitarian is to prove that he stated the fourth form of our examples, namely: "Whatever is useful in the physical order is also therefore good in the moral order." The point is, however, to prove it positively and not merely to guess or suppose. We may predict their failure unless they can change the original text. The third statement, which is not utilitarian, is precisely our interpretation of Mo-tze's
real mind when he asked: "How can there be anything that is good but not useful?" As we have demonstrated before, the contexts show us definitely that our philosopher meant that a doctrine morally good must therefore ipso facto be practically good.

Finally, just to illustrate that a statement like this of Mo-tze does not imply utilitarianism, we may quote Cicero: "Est nihil utile quod idem non honestum", which is, under all aspects, much more utilitarian than what is said by Mo-tze; Cicero, however, immediately gave the reason for his statement: "Nec quia utile honestum est, sed quia honestum, utile." 129 Cutting his first sentence from the rest of this text, one would be able to make Cicero a perfect utilitarian. Yet, as a matter of fact, Cicero was one of the strongest opponents of the utilitarianism of his time. He clearly pointed out that utility is certainly not the norm of morality in these words: "Nemo est qui hanc affectionem animi non probet atque laudet, qua non modo utilitas nulla quaeritur, sed contra utilitatem etiam servatur fides." 130

We are fortunate enough to be able to cite a similar statement of Mo-tze to prove that he is no more utilitarian than Cicero would be:

Mo-tze said: Among all things there is nothing more worthy than righteousness. Suppose now I say to a man: 'I now give you a new hat and a pair of shoes; will you let me cut off your hands and feet?' He certainly will not accept this offer. Why? Because hat and shoes are not as worthy as hands and feet. Now suppose again I say: 'Give you the entire wealth of the world and let me kill you.' He will certainly refuse. Why? Because the entire world is not as worthy as his own life. Now there

130 Conf. Cicero De Finibus Bon. et Mal., I, 5, c. 22.
are people who gave their life because of one word. This is to state that righteousness is more worthy than their own lives. Hence, I say: "Among all things nothing is more worthy than righteousness." 131

This is a simple and clear statement which does not need further comment. It shows also that not only Mo-tze but even many people of that time did believe that there is something (which Cicero calls honestum and Mo-tze calls righteousness) which is superior and is therefore more precious than the entire grand total of all physical goods. Such belief is frank and genuine recognition of the real existence of a moral order superior to the physical one.

In closing our explanation, we wish to bring forward one more analogical reason in convincing our opponents. Leibnitz has said something very similar to what is the focus of our discussion. "True or real ideas are those whose execution we are assured is possible; the others are doubtful." 132 This, however, does not make Leibnitz a pragmatist. So why Mo-tze should be considered as a utilitarian for a similar statement?

OBJECTION VI

Mo-tze did not sincerely believe in the existence of spirits and ghosts even after a laborious attempt to make sure that others should believe in it. Therefore, a fortiori, he could not sincerely believe in God, Whose existence he never attempted to prove.

In fact, after he has done all he possibly could in order to convince the people of the real existence of spirits and ghosts, and thus urged them to keep the traditional ceremonies of sacrifices, Mo-tze has shown his

131 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 48, "On the value of Righteousness", Mei translation.
skeptic attitude on this matter by saying: "Even if there were no ghosts and spirits, a sacrifice would yet gather together a party and the participants could enjoy themselves and befriend the neighbors." This reveals his insincerity in believing in the real existence of spirits and ghosts. Yet, it also reveals that his real mind was utilitarian. He wished that the traditional ceremonies of sacrifices be conserved because they were socially useful; they gathered relatives and befriended neighbours that all participants might have a good time. It did not matter whether the spirits and ghosts really existed.

In addition to this, Mo-tze really did not believe in the ruling power of the spirits over human beings, although he has anxiously preached the same to the people. He stated frankly, when asked by one of his disciples, that the influence of ghosts and spirits on human welfare is only as little as one per cent of the total influence which man may receive from other elements of nature. This is to say that the influence of spirits and ghosts is practically nothing.

Mo-tze was sick; Teih-Pi came and inquired: "Sir, you have taught that the ghosts and spirits are intelligent and are in control of calamity and blessing. They will reward the good and punish the evil. Now you are a sage. How can you become sick? Can it be that your teaching was not entirely correct? That the ghosts and spirits are after all unintelligent?" Mo-tze replied: "Though I am sick how (does it follow that the ghosts and spirits) should be unintelligent? There are many ways by which man can contact diseases. Some are affected by climate; some by fatigue. If there were a hundred gates and only one of them is closed, how is it that the burglar should not be able to get in?"

133 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, ch. 31, "On the Existence of spirits and ghosts", Mei translation.

134 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, ch. 49. "Teih-Pi" probably is a disciple of Mo-tze. Parenthesis is Dr. Weil's.
Therefore, if that influence or control of ghosts and spirits which Mo-tze has emphasized so strongly in his public speeches, is, as he confessed privately, so little as merely "one per cent" of the total causes of calamity and blessing, we may say that practically, Mo-tze did not believe in the control of spirits and ghosts. Hence, they are practically non-existent. For an analogical reason, we may say that the mind of Mo-tze towards the existence of God is similar.

**OUR ANSWER TO OBJECTION VI**

To examine this objection we must, above all, distinguish and even separate the belief in the existence of God from that in the existence of spirits and ghosts. Because these two kinds of belief are not "per se" necessarily connected with each other. Therefore a doubt or even an explicit denial of the existence of spirits does not necessarily imply a similar mental position towards the existence of God. Hence, the a fortiori of the objection does not seem to be logical. Especially it is not adequately placed here, since, as we have demonstrated above, Mo-tze was not obliged to prove the existence of God.

In fact, there are people who do believe in God, yet deny the existence of purely spiritual beings, such as the Anabaptists and most of the liberal Protestants. St. Thomas Aquinas has reported many different reasons expressing the disbelief in the existence of created spiritual beings.

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135 This again is an objection authored by Chen Yuan Teh 陳元悌 誰 is the author of objection II and III. (op. cit., p. 194.) See above text page 75 and note 81. Also page 85, note 92. Also Fang Hsen Tsou 方桂楚 誰 insisted on the "one per cent" ratio. (Conf. his The Source of Motiism, Shanghai, 1935, p. 106.

Without body; apparently the authors of those opinions are all theists. 137 Furthermore, many modern scholastic authorities maintain that the existence of angels is not positively proved by reason alone. Reason can only show the possibility or the great probability of their existence. After the facts of revelation have positively testified to the existence of such created purely spiritual beings, then reason might give a persuasive argument to show such beings most probably must exist in order to complete the metaphysical hierarchy of beings. 138 St. Thomas himself demonstrated solely the great probability or great suitability of the existence of angels but he did not produce any reason for the absolute necessity of their existence 139 such as he did in proving the existence of God. In other words, the existence of God is an absolute necessity philosophically proved, whereas the existence of created spiritual beings is only a great probability, so that we see their existence suits our reason; but on the other hand, if and in case that they do not exist at all, we do not see any absurdity in it. This is, in our opinion, because God is absolutely free in creating all his creatures, that is to say, He may create the angels, but also, theoretically speaking, He could also not create them at all. Hence, for us theists, there is not an essential connection (philosophically speaking, for it would be different under theological aspects) between the belief in the existence of God and that of the spiritual beings, as it is expressed in the objection. A theist philosopher may doubt or even explicitly deny the existence of purely spiritual creatures.

137 Conf. De SpiritualibusCreaturis,art. V. As many as eleven objections were reported by St. Thomas.
139 See above note 137; also Contra Gentiles, 1, 2, c. 46, 91.
The simple fact that Mo-tze did attempt to prove the existence of spirits and ghosts, shows us that at least some people of his time did not believe in their existence. Yet, as we have demonstrated above, people at his time did believe in the existence of God so that Mo-tze does not see any necessity of proving His existence. Putting these two facts together, the logical consequence is that there were many people who, although believing in God, did not believe in the existence of spirits. Therefore, de facto it is possible to doubt the existence of spirits while at the same time sincerely believing in God. Hence, even though it might be positively proved that Mo-tze does not believe in the existence of spirits, it does not imply that he is not a theist philosopher. For this reason we said that the inference in the objection is not logically valid.

Mo-tze himself has always carefully distinguished God from spirits and ghosts. First, in the text of Mo-tze, the doctrine of the will of Heaven and that of the existence of spirits and ghosts are not only recorded in different chapters but even in different books, entirely separated from each other so that on the one hand the doctrine of the "will of Heaven" does not depend on the "existence of spirits and ghosts"; and on the other hand the existence of Heaven as a personal God does not imply the existence of spirits and ghosts. It is also to be remarked that, for Mo-tze, the will of Heaven alone is to be obeyed and to be considered as the standard of morality; not so the will of spirits and ghosts, although they are to be worshipped. Indeed, they can punish and reward men's conduct; but they must reward those who have obeyed the will of Heaven and

\[\text{For the distinction of "books" and "chapters" in the text of Mo-tze, confer above page 11. The extant text of Mo-tze is divided into fifteen books and sixty-one chapters (eight missing).} \]
punish those who have disobeyed It. They are ministers whom Heaven has established to "minister to man's good and bring them evil". 111

Although the spirits and ghosts, being spiritual like God, are much superior to human beings, they are nevertheless much inferior to God and, according to Mo-tze, there is an essential difference between them and God; our philosopher used a characteristic description of his own to designate three different degrees of intelligent beings, namely God, spirits and man. For example, in praising the virtue of the ancient sage kings, Mo-tze said about them: "In the highest sphere they revered Heaven, in the middle sphere they worshipped the spirits and in the lower sphere, they loved the people." 112

We have a statement of Mo-tze himself to confirm our opinion that the differences between these three kinds of intelligent beings are essential rather than merely of degree. Mo-tze stated that the perfections of spirits and ghosts are incomparably and even transcendentally superior to those of human beings. He said: "The ghosts and spirits are wiser than the sages by as much as the sharp-eared and keen-sighted surpass the deaf and the blind." 113 Now, it is obvious that the keen-sighted man surpasses ordinary-sighted man or near-sighted man only by degrees of perfection, but surpasses the blind by an essential difference. Thus, we may believe that Mo-tze intended to state an essential and even transcendental difference between the nature of the spirits and that of man. By an analogical reason, although our philosopher did not state so explicitly, he may well have recognized a

111 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 27.  
112 Conf. ibidem, chapters 26, 27, and 28. To be found in all three chapters.  
113 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 48, Mei translation.
similar distinction between God and the spirits, that is to say, there is an essential difference between the nature of God and that of the spirits.

Moreover, Mo-tze has conceived God as creator and supreme ruler of the universe, and upon His will he built the entire doctrine of his philosophy; since the existence of the spirits and ghosts plays no important part in his doctrine as an organized system, it could be taken away without affecting or changing any point of Mo-tze's teachings. Many a Chinese author in fact has already pointed out the superfluousness of this chapter on the existence of spirits and ghosts. Hence, the existence of God, or rather the belief in the existence of God, is not to be considered as insincere or doubtful in the mind of Mo-tze even though one might positively prove that he denied the existence of spirits.

But, we do not think that Mo-tze was even doubtful as to the real existence of spirits and ghosts, because he brought out many arguments based on the facts cited from authentic historical books (some of them were written or edited by Confucius) which, at that time, were considered by all scholars as well as common people as most trustworthy documents. The reason given by the objector is not sufficiently convincing so that one might discredit Mo-tze sincerely. It remains unconvincing unless the objector can prove that Mo-tze did not believe in the authenticity of those ancient documents from which he cited many facts concerning the existence of spirits.

Leon Wieger writing about Mo-tze's belief in the existence of spirits and ghosts has put these words into the mouth of our philosopher:
Comment peut-on douter de leur existence, de leur puissance, alors qu'ils se sont manifestes tant de fois, en plein jour, devant de nombreux spectateurs?

In the passage cited in the objection, Mo-tze was again answering a utilitarian objection to his doctrine of the existence of spirits and ghosts; we must not neglect the preceding context. Our philosopher was given an obviously utilitarian objection which said: "If ghosts and spirits did not exist, it would seem to be a waste of materials, of cakes and wine, that were used in the sacrifices." To this, Mo-tze immediately replied: "But such use is not just to throw them into the ditch or gully. For, the relatives from the clan and friends from the villages and districts can yet eat and drink them. So even if there were no ghosts and spirits, a sacrifice will yet gather together a party." What we see here is that Mo-tze once again wished to prove that whenever a thing is good (i.e. righteous) it must be also useful even in a material sense. The worship of spirits and ghosts is first of all a duty of human beings, because, although they are not our Creators, they are nevertheless, by the constitution of the Creator, our superiors and have power to bless or punish us. Hence, the sacrifices in their honor are only a natural duty of ours to pay reverence to our superiors and on the other hand it is also for our own good (or utility) because such sacrifices will bring us blessings and protection from the spirits and ghosts.

144 Conf. his Histoire des Cryances Religieuse et des Opinions Philosophiques en Chine, Paris, 1922, page 211.
145 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 31, Mei translation.
However, as we pointed out above, Mo-tze easily became over-anxious in heated discussions. This time is no exception. And, we may even say that this instance is the worst of all. For he even went so far as to suppose that he might adopt the principal belief of his opponents in order, as he believed, to show that even according to their principle the question discussed between them would still remain in favor of Mo-tze. In ordinary plain language we may describe Mo-tze's attitude as follows: "All right, gentlemen", our philosopher would have said, "if after so many arguments which I brought to you, you still refuse to believe in the real existence of spirits and ghosts and therefore do not believe in our duty of offering sacrifices to them and do not believe that they may bring us blessings and protection, then, you are fanatically materialists. But, I still may show you that even from a solely materialistic and utilitarian-point of view, you still have no reason to reject these traditional ceremonies of sacrifices. Because, it is at least for you, utilitarians, a good and useful party among relatives and friends, a valuable and practical way to befriend the neighbors. It is not a waste of cakes and wines as you said, for they are not thrown into the ditches, but are to be eaten and enjoyed by yourself and your friends. Therefore, no matter what is your belief, your objection based on the fact that the sacrifice is a waste of food is not valid."

Although this is our own interpretation, it is strictly based on the original text of Mo-tze. Whoever will read the entire original text of the chapter entitled "On the Existence of Spirits and Ghosts" will agree with us. Here, unfortunately, Mo-tze was overanxious to conclude this discussion in a hurry, so that he brought out the most destructive weapon against his
opponents by proving that even according to their own principle the point in question was still in favor of Mo-tze himself. Such an argument is in fact regarded by the common people, even in our present day, as a most powerful and decisive (comparable to the atomic bomb) counter-attack to silence one's opponents definitely and absolutely. Very probably Mo-tze had won a great applause from those who listened to this discussion. And evidently he also won the last word.

We have said that this statement of Mo-tze was unfortunate because even though it won him a decisive victory at that time, it nevertheless caused a serious criticism against him, namely against his sincerity in believing in the existence of spirits and ghosts. From a strictly philosophical point of view (that is, without considering the circumstances in which the statement is made), such a statement is rather a weakening of one's own opinion than a "coup de grace" for his opponents, as the common people believed.

From an historical point of view (that is, according to the critical rules adopted by writers of philosophical history), such a seemingly compromising statement as that of our philosopher's should not affect his previous positive arguments. An example in this matter is Socrates. No serious philosophical critics will doubt of his belief in the immortality of souls. Yet, one might well quote him as doubting in this matter from very authentic sources in Plato himself.\(^{146}\) In addition to our own judgment on this matter, we may cite a well-known American author in the field of the history of philosophy, His Excellency the most Reverend William Turner:

\(^{146}\) Conf. Apol., 40.
Although Plato represents Socrates as considering
dilemmatically "either death ends all things, or it
does not", there can be no doubt as to Socrates' belief in the immortality of the human soul. It may be that he thought the dialectical proof of the doctrine to be beyond the power of human mind, but the depth of his personal conviction cannot for a moment be questioned.\textsuperscript{147}

Let us also remember that Mo-tze has strongly criticized those who wished to offer sacrifice but did not sincerely believe in the existence of spirits:

Kung Men-tze said that there were no ghosts and spirits. Again, he said that the superior men must learn sacrifice and worship. Mo-tze said: "To hold there are no spirits and learn sacrificial ceremonials is comparable to making fishing nets while there are no fish." \textsuperscript{148}

Thus, Mo-tze mocked Kung Men-tze, a Confucianist, as being "just like a man who does not believe that there are such things called fishes, and yet he is seriously making his fishing net". That is to say that according to Mo-tze the opinion of Kung Men-tze is obviously absurd, because it is self-contradictory. Thus, we may be sure that Mo-tze's own mind must have been contrary to that of Kung Men-tze. Now, it is clear that Kung Men-tze was the typical example of the kind of person, whom the objector wanted to make Mo-tze look like. In other words, the author of this objection which we are examining wanted to prove that Mo-tze adopted the opinion of Kung Men-tze; i.e., to keep the traditional sacrifice solely because of a utilitarian reason not because the spirits really exist. This passage, which we just quoted above, is certainly no help to the opinion expressed in the objection.

As to the second passage cited in the objection, we must again note

\textsuperscript{147} Conf. History of Philosophy, page 82. Italics ours.
\textsuperscript{148} Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 48, Mei translation.
that Mo-tze was answering an objection to his teaching. This objection
offered to Mo-tze is quite familiar in every kind of theistic moral teaching;
for a typical example, one might read in the Gospel of St. John:

And as he was passing by, he saw a man blind from
birth. And his disciples asked him: "Rabbi, who
hath sinned, this man or his parents, that he should
be born blind?" Jesus answered: "Neither hath this
man sinned, nor his parents; but that the work of God
should be made manifest in him." 149

Concerning the fact of sickness and miseries, theist philosophers are
perpetually bothered by two kinds of queries. On one hand, the unbelievers
always point out the fact that the miseries are inflicted upon good men as
a proof that God does not exist. And on the other hand there are always
a great many persons who believe as did the disciples of Our Lord that all
sicknesses are punishments of God.

The inquisitive questioning of Teih-Pi, as cited in the objection,
presents a dilemma to Mo-tze, so it seems that Mo-tze either must acknow-
ledge that he himself is punished by the spirits or that the spirits are
not intelligent. Of course, we must remember that Mo-tze was only a heathen
philosopher, so that we cannot expect him to give such a sublime answer to
the question as did Our Lord. Nevertheless, he did give a philosophically
correct answer although he might have exaggerated while attempting to
explain that the punishment visited by spirits is only one of the many
causes of sickness. The objector has pointed that out that Mo-tze minimized
the influence of the spirits to as low as only one per cent of the total
influences man may receive. But, this is, in our opinion, not a logically
respectable inference because we do not see in the original text that

149 Conf. John, Chapter 9, v. 1, and sqq.
Mo-tze either directly or indirectly expressed such a mathematical proportion.

Indeed, Mo-tze did use an example in minimizing the influence or rather the punitive power of spirits as the cause of sickness. He said that if there were one hundred doors in our house and we closed only one of them, then we should not wonder why and where the burglar did get in. However, if one be accustomed to the style of ancient Chinese scholars, one must see that "one hundred" meant merely "a great many", "a good number", and did not necessarily indicate a precise mathematical value. Generally speaking, a tendency to numerical exaggeration is very common among ancient Chinese thinkers. And the term "one hundred" is the most commonly used, or rather abused, expression meaning "many" or "many more". It is obvious that sometimes when we say "many more", we mean merely "a few more". This is very probably what Mo-tze meant. For, as we may read in the original text, all Mo-tze meant to say was that there are many more causes for one's being sick than the punishment of spirits. Mo-tze even named a few of them, such as climate and fatigue. The comparison of the house with one hundred gates or doors is brought out solely to help in convincing his questioner. Therefore it is to be taken in its substantial sense and not in its literal meaning, because, in itself, it is not a statement explaining Mo-tze's doctrine. Therefore, what Mo-tze wished to say is: "There are many other causes of sickness besides the punishment of spirits, as in the case of a house with many doors, where if only one of them be closed we would not wonder how a burglar could get in."

Since the original text is already cited in the objection, we do not cite it again.
Furthermore, even if we are forced to take the mathematical number of one hundred, Mo-tze was not exactly wrong either, for modern medical science tells us that there are surely more than one hundred causes by which man suffers sickness from the forces of the elements of nature. Therefore there are more than one hundred different sicknesses which of course require different causes; yet even the same sickness may be produced by different causes in different persons under different conditions.

Moreover, this does not imply that Mo-tze considered the influence of the spirits therefore to be only "one per cent" of the total influences men may receive. Although punishment by spirits were only one of a hundred causes of sickness, it still would not mean that out of a hundred sick persons only one of them is punished by spirits, or that the chance of being punished is only one out of a hundred. We cannot see any logically legitimate inference in it. Punishment, even if one of a hundred causes of sickness, would have to be a principal or a most common cause, so that a great percentage of sickness were caused by it, in a manner similar to that in which sudden change of weather is the most common cause of the most common sickness, the common cold. Therefore, from the fact that Mo-tze said that the punishment of spirits is only one of the many reasons man is sick, one has no right to conclude that Mo-tze has reduced the power of spirits to practically nothing as the objector has attempted. Hence, the objection is invalid. It does not succeed in diminishing the sincerity of Mo-tze's belief in the existence of spirits and ghosts, and much less could it be of any use in questioning our philosopher's sincerity in believing in the existence of God.
OBJECTION VII

Mo-tze was a pragmatist, or altruistic utilitarian. He proved the value of all his teachings by their social consequences. The welfare of society is the real goal of his philosophy. The "will of Heaven" is merely another name for this goal. The conclusion of his teachings is invariably pragmatic. He repeated innumerable times: "Therefore, whoever wishes to see the world in order, peace and prosperity, or whoever wishes really to benefit the people, must necessarily accept his doctrine." 151 Even in teaching his supposedly fundamental doctrine of the "will of Heaven", Mo-tze used a clearly pragmatic starting point. He said: "What is the reason for disorder in the world? It is because the gentlemen of the world all understand trifles but not things of importance." 152 Then he went on to show that the important thing is to obey the "will of Heaven". If we should ask him why this is important, he would surely reply that, when we obey the "will of Heaven", then the world will be in order and in peace. This would show clearly that the "will of Heaven" is not the ultimate basis of his teachings; it is rather a means to his real goal which is "social welfare" not for one particular state only, but, in the mind of Mo-tze, for all nations and all peoples in the world. This attitude we call in modern terms "altruistic utilitarianism". Perhaps it is best to let Mo-tze say this for himself; after having stated that we must obey the "will of Heaven", Mo-tze continued:

Now what does Heaven desire and what does It abominate? Heaven desires righteousness and abominates unrighteousness.... But how do we know

151 Although this is not a direct quotation of Mo-tze, we do agree that Mo-tze has said so on many occasions.
152 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 28.
that Heaven desires righteousness and abominates unrighteousness? For with righteousness the world lives and without it the world dies. With it the world becomes rich and without it the world becomes poor; with it the world becomes orderly and without it the world becomes chaotic. And Heaven likes to have the world live and dislikes to have it die; likes to have it rich and dislikes to have it poor; and likes to have it orderly and dislikes to have it disorderly. Therefore, we know that Heaven desires righteousness and abominates unrighteousness. 153

Very similar discourses are to be found in the other two chapters on the "will of Heaven". In one word, it is obvious, according to Mo-tze, that the social wellbeing of the world is the "will of Heaven". Whatever we do to promote such welfare is to obey the "will of Heaven", and therefore is a virtuous act, which deserves reward and praise; and whatever we do to produce distress in society is to disobey the "will of Heaven", and, therefore, a vicious act which deserves punishment. This is the real mind of Mo-tze. And this shows that the "will of Heaven" is nothing but another name for the social wellbeing of the world. Hence, Mo-tze was a socialistic pragmatist, or an altruistic utilitarian.

The leading author of this objection was the late Liang Ch'i Tsao, 154 whose opinion is adopted by many modern scholars in China and is also followed and expressed in the English language by Dr. Mei, the translator of the original text of Mo-tze. Although Mei stated that the ethical principle of our philosopher rests ultimately upon the doctrine of Universal Love, he nevertheless pointed out explicitly, adopting the opinion of Liang Ch'i Tsao that Mo-tze was a utilitarian. Thus, Mei first criticized Mo-tze in these words: "For, in his opinion, anything that could enrich the poor 153 Quoted from original text of Mo-tze, Mei translation, chapter 26.
154 Liang Ch'i Tsao. 袁牧超 China's leading scholar in the beginning of this century. Cf. his A Critical Study on Mo-tze, Shanghai, 1921.
increase the few, remove danger and regulate disorder would be magnanimous and righteous." Later, Mei went on to say: "Mo-tze's answer to this argument we have already quoted was an evidence of his utilitarian principle of the greatest good for the greatest number." And, Dr. Mei briefly summed up this answer of Mo-tze's:

In short, he points out that the four or five successful states might be benefited thereby, but we have yet to take into consideration the destruction of the many unfortunate ones before we can give a just estimate of the merit of the institution of offensive war. His crude example was the merit of the physician that cured a few but killed a great many by giving every sick person the same drug. Moreover it is to be doubted whether victory in these wars is really a blessing and benefit. Mo-tze thinks that it is not. For cities and states are not taken without effort. Many people would be killed on both sides. The result is but an empty name and a tract of desolate land. Therefore, Mo-tze declares: "But, when we consider the victory as such, there is nothing useful about it." 157

With Dr. Mei, many Chinese authors have cited Mo-tze's criticism of offensive war as a revealing statement of his adherence to the principle of "the greatest utility for the greatest number". Therefore, Mo-tze was an altruistic utilitarian. 158

155 All three quotations of Dr. Mei are from his Mo-tze, a Neglected Rival of Confucius, London, 1934, (page 95.)
156 Ibidem, page 96.
OUR ANSWER TO OBJECTION VII

This objection, which is based not only on one particular statement of Mo-tze but on the fundamentals of his teaching, is perhaps the most convincing of all the arguments of our opponents. It is really a cumulation of all the other arguments. To answer this objection adequately we shall first explain the essential difference between a theistic moral philosophy and a utilitarian one.

This essential difference may be expressed briefly. The theistic moral philosophy is Theocentric, and the utilitarian doctrine is Anthropocentric. The former claims that God is the Supreme Being and therefore the center of moral philosophy; that is to say, that all moral principles come from this Center as from their ultimate source and origin, and all moral arguments converge to this Center as to their ultimate aim and end. But, utilitarians give this honorable place to human beings by denying the existence of God either practically or even theoretically. Thus, they make human beings the center of the physical universe, and consequently also the center of the moral universe, since, according to them, the moral order is not really distinguished from the physical one.

However, while the utilitarian denies simply the fundamental thesis of Theism, the theist does not deny the fundamental principle of utilitarianism.

Providence, he nevertheless kept one eye on practical social welfare. In technical terms he was a eudaemonistic utilitarian, holding that the wellbeing of humanity is the end of moral, social and political life. A pragmatic practicalism is also characteristic of his thought.” (Conf. his Mo-tze, China's Ancient Philosopher of Universal Love, Peiping, 1934, page 33.) Mme. A. David has a similar statement in her Le Philosophe Meh-ti et l'idée de Solidarité, London, 1907, page 154.
Also Rev. J. Edkins said that Mo-tze “based his doctrine of Universal Love upon political utility” (Conf. his article "Notice of the Character and Writings of Mow-tsu in the Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, May, 1897, page 164.)
simply, but only denies its absolute value. We theists do assert that man is, according to a very well qualified sense, the center of the material universe, because he is the only material yet intelligent being. It is by his intelligence that man surpasses all other material beings, and becomes the highest among all animals. Hence, in the material universe, that is in the physical order only, human interest or human utility is really the ultimate and supreme aim to be reached by all the actions in this order. Nevertheless, because we recognize the existence of a moral order which is based on the spirituality of human souls, we could not acknowledge that the physical order is the supreme order in itself. The existence of a moral order is immediately deduced from and guaranteed by the very existence of the human intellect which is spiritual, and the existence of human will which is free, and hence assumes moral responsibility. It is by the same obvious reasoning that the moral order is proved to be superior to the physical order just as the human being is proved to be superior to all other material beings. To deny successfully the superiority or the existence of a moral order is possible only by denying the existence of human intellect and free will, and, consequently, also denying the superiority of the human being over brute animals. If the human being has no spiritual faculties such as intellect and will, then he is by no means superior to brute animals and he will have no reason for regarding himself as the center of the universe. All he may take for granted is that perhaps de facto he is, or rather it seems to him that he is, the center of the universe, but there will be nothing de jure. In other words, he has no reason for so regarding himself. However, this situation de facto provides very little value for man if he does not believe in the spirituality of his own soul, since,
practically speaking, even the humblest of brute animals de facto might consider (not by intellect but by its instinctive feeling) itself, or its own species, as the center of the universe so that everything else would exist for its species, which would therefore be the supreme being.

Utilitarianism, therefore, cannot produce a reasonably convincing reason for its fundamental thesis unless it also acknowledges the spiritual value of human souls which will give him the right of being essentially superior to brute animals. However, as soon as one acknowledges the spirituality of the human soul, one must also necessarily acknowledge the existence of a spiritual order, which is, of course, superior to the physical order. Then, one is no longer utilitarian in the strict sense of the term.

Perhaps the utilitarians will reply that they do not care about the existence of spiritual beings, or about the essential superiority of human beings over all other animals; for them, the fact that man is the most perfect animal is sufficient to prove his superiority. It does not matter whether man has a spiritual soul; it is enough that he is in fact the most perfect and consequently the mightiest being in the universe.

We will say that this principle based solely on physical perfection and might is quite dangerous to human society. If man has the right to be the center of the universe because of his physical perfection and might, then why should we not also apply the same principle in dealing with the different races and nations of human beings? Hence, racism, nazism, imperialism, which all are based on the principle that might is right. History has demonstrated to us that this principle means the ruin of
Strictly speaking, we would say that there are only two kinds of theory about morality, namely theistic moralism and atheistic utilitarianism. To this latter belong both materialism and idealism.

We believe firmly that besides a sincerely theistic morality, there is no other moral system which is not fundamentally utilitarian. As we said above, moral philosophy is either Theocentric or Anthropocentric and, the latter, is necessarily utilitarian.

This can be clearly demonstrated by the following argument: The moral laws or moral principles must be made either by man or by some being superior to man, because it is absurd to think that some being inferior to man should make moral standards for us. Then, if it is a superior being who made this standard, he must be the Supreme being which is inferior to no other being; for otherwise he would be subjected to some other being superior to him and therefore must accept standards from the latter. Thus, following the process similar to that of St. Thomas by which he reached the prime and ultimate Mover (or Movens), we may conclude that there must necessarily be a Supreme superior who must give the ultimate standard of morality. This Supreme Superior is God, considered in the speculations of moral philosophy.

Mo-tze had this same idea in seeking for an ultimate and absolute standard of morality. First of all, he asserted that: "A standard is not

159 We are glad that we are writing this essay in a time when the evil of racism, nazism and imperialism is obviously accepted by all the people in the world, so that we do not have to prove it.

160 Even the theory of duty of Kant is ultimately utilitarian, because (1) it is agnostic in the existence of God; therefore, it is Anthropocentric (2) Kant repudiated the value of speculative reason and admitted solely the value of practical reason, which, if considered as the sole guidance on moral affairs, will lead us to pragmatism.
to be given by the subordinates to the superior, but by the superior to the subordinates." 161 Since this superiority is not based on mere political rank nor on physical power, our philosopher went further: "As the dull and the humble cannot make the standard, and only the wise and honorable can, therefore, I know righteousness does not come from the stupid and humble but from the honorable and wise." 162 Then he continued: "Now, who is honorable and who is wise? Heaven is honorable and Heaven is wise. So then righteousness must have originated with Heaven." 163 After this statement, Mo-tze brought out his arguments to demonstrate that Heaven is most honorable and most wise; and in concluding, he challenged his audience to point out some being more intelligent than and superior to Heaven; he asked: "But, is there yet any one more honorable and wise than Heaven? Heaven is really the most honorable and wise. Therefore righteousness surely comes from Heaven." 164 By using the terms "wise" and "honorable" 165 our philosopher brought out the notion of intelligence together with that of superiority, so that the Moral standard must be given by the most intelligent Supreme Being. This, according to all theistic moralists, is no one else but God.

Now, if one exclude the existence of God from moral philosophy, one must necessarily take the second hypothesis, namely that moral principles are merely man-made. But, if man did make moral principles for himself, he must necessarily have taken no other standard than that of his own utility

161 Quoted from Mei translation of the text of Mo-tze, chapter 26.
162 Mei translation of the text of Mo-tze, chapter 27.
163 Ibidem.
164 Ibidem.
165 The original Chinese word "智" (for wise) and "義" (for honorable.)
as he sees and understands it. It is impossible to conceive otherwise. Therefore, an atheistic moral philosophy must necessarily be Anthropocentric, that is to say, fundamentally utilitarian. Other systems such as Naturalism, Hedonism, Sentimentalism, Sympatism, Pragmatism, Kantianism and even Rationalism are, in our opinion, merely different denominations of either egoistic or altruistic utilitarian. We must find the ultimate standard of morality either in God or in man. Therefore, fundamentally speaking, in moral philosophy, we are either Theist or Utilitarian.

The only third position possible is that of fatalism, which is, as we pointed out before, anti-philosophical; it is therefore not to be considered as an opinion in moral philosophy. It is not only the denial of theism but also of utilitarianism; for fate, which is by definition blind (i.e. unintelligent) will act completely in disregard of human interest if it does exist. Theism does give a proper consideration to human interests; God, who is, as Mo-tze pointed out, a benevolent Father, necessarily aimed at the real interest of human beings when He brought them into existence and promulgated moral laws to them through their own nature. Hence, we may say with Mo-tze: "How can there be anything that is good but not useful?" since, according to our philosopher, "everything is prepared for the good of man; even the top of a hair is the work of Heaven." That is to say that God created everything, and, what is even more important to us, He created everything for the good of man. Therefore, theistic moral philosophy does not deny the "utility" of man, but solely and firmly denies that it can be considered as the ultimate norm of morality. And, if the term "utility"

166 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 27.
167 Mei translation of text of Mo-tze, chapter 27.
should be understood in its original meaning which includes both the moral and the physical welfare of human beings (as we demonstrated above in answering Objection V), it may eventually become a proximate (not ultimate) and practical (not theoretical) standard in judging social, economical and political doctrines, for it is precisely the *causa finalis* of these sciences.

After such a complete and radical explanation, one should not be so bold as to call whoever urgently discussed human interest (or utility), especially collectively taken, *ipso facto* a utilitarian. The essential characteristic of utilitarianism is to deny both theoretically and practically the existence of a moral order which is really distinct from and superior to the physical order. Therefore, as long as one does not deny the real existence of *moral goods* for man he is not a utilitarian in the real sense of the term. 168

Mo-tze not only did not deny the existence of moral goods but explicitly and repeatedly defended its real existence and its superiority over the material interests of human beings.

First of all, we must know that there was, in the time of Mo-tze, a general persuasion among the scholars as well as among the common people that above all material interests there is a moral principle which is to be followed at any cost of physical utility. The Confucianists even want so far as to have too little consideration of the physical utilities; this was justly criticized by Mo-tze as impractical, inasmuch as it leads to a great decrease in the production of material goods on the one hand and to increasing waste of the same goods on the other. 168

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168 See above, page 111 definition given by Pope Pius IX.
Now, we do not yet intend to discuss this point, but we do wish to emphasize that the ancient Chinese did have a very suitable notion of "righteousness" which is essentially different from the notion of interest or utility. Mo-tze did not, and could not alter the notions or identify them.

He did not, because, as a matter of fact, no one could quote him saying so, although several attempts have been made by modern utilitarians in interpreting him to show that he identified righteousness with utility. No one could quote him directly asserting this, and, as we have seen above, such attempted interpretations are not logically sound. On the contrary, we can quote our philosopher as saying that righteousness is more valuable than the entire wealth of the world and even more valuable than one's own life. Therefore, Mo-tze positively asserted that the principle of righteousness is superior to all physical utility.

He could not. Even though Mo-tze wished to alter the traditional meaning of the term "righteousness", he would have been unable to do so. Because no one could change the notion of such an important term and yet discuss with his many opponents on moral doctrines without their misunderstanding each other on this term and especially without being accused by his opponents of misconceiving or purposely altering the meaning of this term. Righteousness was one of most sacred terms for the ancient Chinese wise men. Its meaning is well known to all as representing moral good, virtues and other praise worthy non-material things. Although different wise men have given different definitions of this term, they all agree on one point, that is, that in the notion of righteousness there is nothing of material or physical goods.

169 See above, page 116 and note 131.
Among the opponents of Mo-tze, the Confucianists especially were most scrupulous in definitions of terms, and they most of all would not permit or tolerate any one who would try to materialize the sacred terms of magnanimity and righteousness. Confucianists considered "utility" as the opposite of righteousness, as something irreconcilable with the notion of virtue, so that many of them were actually ashamed to mention the term "utility" in their teachings. Mencius, whose criticism against Mo-tze was absolutely merciless, was also a great opponent of utilitarianism; he was so consistent and so determined in this point that his immediate disciples decided to begin the book of Mencius with a solemn condemnation of utilitarianism by their Master.

Mencius went to see King Hway of Leang. The king said: "Venerable Sir, since you have not counted it far to come here, a distance of a thousand li, may I presume that you are likewise provided with counsels to profit my kingdom?" Mencius replied: "Why does your Majesty use that word 'profit'? What I am likewise provided with are counsels to benevolence and righteousness and these are my only topics. If your Majesty say: What is to be done to profit my kingdom? The great officers will say: What is to be done to profit our families? And the inferior officers will say: What is to be done to profit our person? Superiors and inferiors will try to snatch this profit the one from the other, and the kingdom will be endangered. In the kingdom of ten thousand chariots, the murderer of his sovereign shall be the chief of a family of a thousand chariots. In a kingdom of a thousand chariots, the murderer of his prince shall be the chief of a family of a hundred chariots. To have a thousand in ten thousand and a hundred in a thousand, cannot to be said not to be a large allotment, but if righteousness is put last,

170 The book of Mencius is also written by his disciples, probably after his death. The case is quite similar to that of Mo-tze. See above, pages 11 and 12 of our first chapter.
and profit be put first, they will not be satisfied without snatching all. There never has been a man trained in righteousness, who made his sovereign an after consideration. Let your Majesty also say "benevolence and righteousness", and these shall be the only terms. Why must you use that word 'profit'? Indeed this is a very emphatic denouncement of utilitarianism; but when Mencius attacked the doctrine of Mo-tze, he could say nothing like this. This serves as a valuable criterion in confirming our opinion, namely that Mo-tze was after all not a utilitarian.

On the other hand, Mo-tze also had many utilitarians as his opponents and they discussed matters with him quite often. We may read their discussions in the original text of Mo-tze, especially in the sixteenth chapter. Mo-tze personally answered their objections, some of which were very cleverly proposed. They understood Mo-tze fairly well, and they also understood well the difference of opinion between themselves and Mo-tze. They were trying to convince Mo-tze of their principles just as eagerly as our philosopher was trying to convince them of his doctrine.

We just wonder how the utilitarians of those old days who discussed things personally with Mo-tze for a long period of time with frequent meetings and insistent arguments could not find Mo-tze a utilitarian at heart, while the utilitarians of our day claim that they find Mo-tze to be utilitarian. If we are permitted to use the famous statement of St. Augustine, "Credo ergo Evangelistae", 172 we would say that we rather believe the contemporaries of our philosopher who had a constant personal exchange of ideas (and terms)

172 Tract. I, in Joann. After examining the Arian heresy about the "Verbum", the Bishop of Hippo concluded with this famous proclamation. It is often mentioned and copied by theologians.
with him. Thus, from the attitude of the opponents of Mo-tze (both Confucianists and utilitarians), we could furnish a good reason to prove that our philosopher was after all not a utilitarian.

It is indeed a very common defect of modern utilitarians that they cannot see the fundamental difference between their principle and that of a theistic moral doctrine. They generally misunderstand the theists. They believe that the theists too are fundamentally utilitarians, but instead of proclaiming frankly the principle of utility, the theists -- according to these utilitarians -- preferred an indirect method using the religious superstition of the common people. Mo-tze certainly was not the only theist considered by them as a utilitarian like themselves. A typical example of this attitude can be quoted from the work of a leading utilitarian, John Stuart Mill, who wrote in his famous "Essay on Utilitarianism:"

I must again repeat that the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct is not the agent's own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of all others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. 173

Mill, who is so proud of his atheistic belief that he said of himself "I am thus one of the very few examples, in this country, of one who has not thrown off religious belief, but never had it", 174 is evidently trying to make Our Lord a utilitarian. Some utilitarians are so blinded that they cannot understand the fundamental difference between their principle of ethics

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173 Conf. opus cit., page 24.
and that of the theists. They are so fanatically sunken in materialism that they can not even imagine that some one else may believe in the existence of a personal God.

There is another group of utilitarians who have misunderstood the theist in a different way or a different direction. They believe that the theists are fanatically anti-utility or anti-pleasure inasmuch as theism is taken to be a condemnation of all kinds of happiness and material goods as "ipso facto" sinful and vicious, and exalt all kinds of abnegations or painful sacrifices as virtuous. This is, of course, not correct at all.

Mo-tze also has been often criticized as such a fanatic ascetic. Many a modern scholar, such as Dr. Hu-Shih, has noticed this point; but the earliest criticism came from Chuang-Tze only a few years after the death of our philosopher. In his book, Chuang-tze wrote:

Mih-Tzu and Ch'in Hua-li became enthusiastic followers of Tao, but they pushed the system too far, carrying their practice to excess. The former wrote an essay "Against Music" and another which he entitled "Economy".

There was to be no singing in life, no mourning after death....He would have men toil through life and hold death in contempt. But this teaching is altogether too unattractive. It would lead mankind in sorrow and lamentation. It would be next to impossible as a practical system and can not, I fear, be regarded as the Tao of the true Sage. It would be diametrically opposed to human passions, and as such would not be tolerated by the world. Mih-Tzu himself would be able to carry it out; but not the rest of the world, his chances of developing an ideal State become small indeed....And because he thus sacrificed himself to the commonwealth, ages of Mihists to come would also wear short serge jackets and straw sandals, and toil day and night without stopping, making self-mortification
their end and aim, and say to themselves: "If we

cannot do this, we do not follow the Tao of Yu,

and are unworthy to be called Mihists." 175

We do not feel it necessary to quote any other author in order to show

how Mo-tze could be and in fact was criticized as an extremist in asceticism.

This should be an inspiration, if not a persuasion, to those who wished to

make Mo-tze a utilitarian whereas Mo-tze himself did not bother much about the

pursuit of physical happiness, which is, according to the utilitarians, the

only thing desirable as an end, all other things being desirable only as means

to that end. 176

If Mo-tze was a utilitarian, he could not have been accused of excessive

asceticism; and if he was really an excessive ascetic, then he could hardly

be criticized as a utilitarian. The fact that he has been accused of both

extremes is a pretty good argument to demonstrate that in reality he is neither

one nor the other. "Vit" stat in medio"; so Mo-tze, as we think, is just

about in the middle between these two extremities.

Furthermore, utilitarianism inevitably ends in egoism in spite of all

its altruistic appearances. To prove this statement, we may call many a

famous utilitarian as our advocate.

Bentham, who was the preacher of the principle of "the greatest happiness

of the greatest number" has thus analysed his own altruism:

175 Quoted from Chuang-tzu 玺子, translated from the Chinese original text

by H. Giles, Professor of Chinese at Cambridge University, England,

chapter 33, page 440. Giles has spelled the name of our philosopher as

Mih-Tzu. Ch'in Hua-li 賴華禮 is a disciple of Mo-tze. Yu is King Yu,

one of the ancient sage kings.

176 J. S. Mill wrote: "The utilitarian doctrine is, that happiness is

desirable, and the only thing desirable as an end; all other things

being only desirable as means to that end." Quoted from Essay on

Utilitarianism, chapter IV.
The community is a fictitious body, composed of the individual persons who are considered as constituting, as it were, its members. The interest of the community then is what? — The sum of the interest of the several members who composed it. 177

This is enough to see that the "raison d'etre" of his altruism is fundamentally individualistic and even egoistic, while Christian altruism has an altogether different "raison d'etre".

Mill had an even franker statement in his famous Essay on Utilitarianism:

No reason can be given why the general happiness is desirable, except that each person, so far as he believes it to be attainable, desires his own happiness. 178

Hence, fundamentally speaking, the happiness of oneself is truly (for the utilitarians) the ultimate standard in judging the moral or ethical value of human conduct. Hobbes has declared more audaciously:

Whatever is the object of any man's appetite or desire, that is it which he for his part calleth good, and the object of his hate and eversion evil; and of his contempt, vile and inconsiderable. For these words of good, evil and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person that useth them; there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil to be taken from the nature of objects themselves. 179

This is going too far in indicating views alien to our philosopher Mo-tze. Whoever reads the text of Mo-tze will spontaneously agree with us. It is more reasonable to accuse Yang-tze, the egoist, with utilitarianism; but Yang-tze's teaching is, as we mentioned above, of course diametrically opposed to that of Mo-tze.

177 Quoted from An Introduction in the Principles of Morals and Legislation, by J. Bentham, Oxford, 1876, Chapter I, sec. 4, page 3.
178 Opus cit., chapter IV.
Summarizing what we have explained so far in answering this last objection, we may state that the fact that Mo-tze has always started and ended his discussion with an eager interest in securing a peaceful socio-political order does not imply that he was a utilitarian; even the fact that Mo-tze seemingly wished to prove the value of his doctrine by citing the social consequences it would produce does not imply that he was a utilitarian, unless one can prove that his principles of moral teaching corresponds with those of utilitarians, such as Mill, Bentham, or Hobbes.

It is obvious that a social doctrine is to be held good when its practice would bring social well-being. This is precisely the aim of all kinds of social theories. Hence, Mo-tze was completely right in using this as an argument to prove that his social theory does work and, therefore, is good, not only theoretically but also practically, since his opponents were solely interested in practical consequences. Any other theistic moralist would likely have done the same in a similar situation. Therefore, this does not imply that Mo-tze has taken social well-being as the ultimate standard of morality.

According to Mo-tze the will of God is the absolute standard of morality. In the realm of social and political orders the will of God is precisely that all men should cooperate in a friendly and even fraternal manner in promoting the greatest common good possible, provided that common good is to be understood as including both moral and physical interests. This is not the persuasion of Mo-tze alone but is that of all sincere theists, and this has caused the illusion of the utilitarians who believe that all theists are fundamentally utilitarian. We have already given our
explanation for it, because our God, as Mo-tze said, is a benevolent Father who can not but wish us good and thus looks after our own interest, of course, both spiritual and physical. If they still can not believe us, then they must have been blinded by their fanatic atheism that they can not even understand that someone may believe in the existence of God.

As we believe in the existence of a personal God, Creator and Supreme Ruler of the universe, infinitely good and infinitely perfect, we can not imagine anything else but that He loves us. He has created us because He loves us. He loves us, therefore, He wishes us good. We are in complete agreement with Mo-tze when our philosopher says that Heaven loves all men in the world universally; therefore, it must be His will that we should love each other mutually and universally in order to attain the greatest common good possible. We are philosophical theists and not superstitious devotees; therefore, we do not believe in any God who is a terrible slave master, perhaps with three eyes and six arms, etc. Our God is a God of love, "Deus Charitas est", and to love is, for God, to wish good for His beloved ones. God loves all men as a whole being, namely humanity, and also He loves every one of us as an individual; therefore, He wishes the common good for the mankind in general and also the individual good for each one.

180 St. Thomas wrote: "Deus alia vult in ordine ad bonitatem suam, non autem hoc modo, ut per ea aliquid bonitatis acquirat, sicut nos facimus circa alios bene operando, sed ita quod eis sua bonitate aliquid largiatur, et ideo liberalitas est quasi proprium ipsius, quia ex operatione sua non intendit aliquid sibi commodum provenire, sed vult bonitatem suam in alios diffundere, et ideo Augustinus dicit, quod ipse utitur nobis ad bonitatem suam et utilitatem nostram." (10 Sent., dist. 45, qu. 1, art. 2)
of us. This is the real reason why Mo-tze has stated that the Will of God is to promote the good for men. To reach this conclusion one must read the original text of our philosopher entirely as a whole and inseparable thesis, and not just cut one particular passage out of it, as our opponents have done, in order to show that Mo-tze was solely interested in social wellbeing. By doing so, they are greatly unfair to our philosopher, who has explicitly found the "raison d'être" of social wellbeing in the paternal love of God: "Heaven loves the whole world universally, everything is prepared for the good of men." As some scholastic philosophers have pointed out, the natural law (i.e. norm of morality) is to be found or discovered through the natural norm, which is, according to them, the human nature itself. In analyzing and observing this natural norm, we may find out the natural tendency to its own perfections, both physical and moral; so that we may say whatsoever is helpful to the fulfilment of such perfections is therefore in accordance with the natural law. This is by no means to be utilitarian.

Therefore, Mo-tze, as well as every philosophical theist, has a good reason to believe that the Will of God is that all men living in society should cooperate fraternally in order to promote the common good as well as the individual good of each person. These two kinds of goods which are seemingly of different character and sometimes even apparently contradictory to each other, are really reconciliable and are even harmoniously united under Divine Providence, since the Divine Will has intended both of them. This is why theists believe that the true individual good is to be found in the common good of society, and the true common good will provide, as a necessary

181 Original text, chapter 27, Mei translation.
consequence, the individual interest of each member of society.

The utilitarians, having rejected the real existence of God, will necessarily have no other reason to promote the common good except that each person desires his own individual happiness. Hobbes, Mill and Bentham, as we quoted them above, have frankly explained this fundamental point.

As long as one can not show that Mo-tze was fundamentally individualistic or egoistic, one can not state that he is fundamentally a utilitarian. A utilitarian who does not consider his own happiness as essential, would be a contradiction in terms, if the term "utility" is to be taken in its real sense. We are firmly convinced that the difference between an individualistic utilitarian and an altruistic utilitarian lies in the fact that the latter understands that individual happiness is only possible when the common good is first secured, while the former does not.

An ethical teaching that does not consider one's own happiness at all is absurd. St. Thomas has started his moral doctrine with the notion of beatitude, because it is, as Aquinas told us, the end of human actions. 182 Frankly speaking, what we are all looking for is precisely "happiness" of our own. 183 The purpose of ethics is precisely to teach us how to reach our real happiness but its first duty is to show us which and what kind of

182 St. Thomas stated that the aim of human will is "good": "Manifestum est, autem, quod omnes actiones, quae procedunt ab aliqua potentia causantur ad ea secundum rationem sui objecti; objectum autem voluntatis est finis et bonum: unde oportet, omnes actiones humanae propter finem sint." (Sum. Theol. I, II, qu. 1, art. 1.) A little later, the Angelic Doctor asserted emphatically: "Sed contra est, quod ultimus finis hominum est beatitudo, quam omnes appetunt, ut Augustinus dicit (lib. 19, De Civ. Dei, cap. i, et 13, De Trinit., cap 4.); (Sum. Theol., 1, IIae, qu. 2, art. 8.)

183 "Man, prompted by an irresistible tendency inherent in his nature, desires happiness, and rests only when he has achieved it, full, supreme, and endless." (John J. Ming, S.J., Data of Modern Ethics Examined, p. 43, 3rd Edition, Chicago, 1904.)
happiness is the real happiness for us. In the answer to this last question lies the essential difference between a theist and a utilitarian. Basically speaking we are all individualists, inasmuch as we all seek our own happiness, but not in the sense that we look solely for our own individual interest. The theists have a good reason to be not exclusively individualist; but the utilitarians do not have any such reason; therefore, their altruism is only a medium to reach their individualistic end.

Now, regarding the doctrine of Mo-tze, it is certain that no one can reduce his teachings to those of the exclusively individualistic utilitarian; not even modern utilitarian Chinese scholars have attempted to do so, for they all acknowledge that Mo-tze's altruism is sincerely unselfish. It is so strongly unselfish that many ancient Chinese wise men have criticized it as impossible to be put into practice or as something that is against human nature. However, we do not think so for Mo-tze has given a good reason why one must be altruistic, although we do think that he may have exaggerated a little in practising his altruism. This may be explained by pointing out that our philosopher was teaching and practising in reaction to the evergrowing egoistic tendency of that time.

The reasons why Mo-tze's altruism can not be reduced to the individual interest may be briefly listed as follows:

1) In fact, no one has ever asserted that Mo-tze was fundamentally an individualistic utilitarian. On the contrary, as we have just stated above, many of his opponents, both ancient and modern, have pointed out that Mo-tze

184 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 16. Conf. also above text, pages 105-106, translation of S. Holth and A. David.

185 Mencius criticized Mo-tze's altruism as against human nature. Conf. above text, page 28, note 60 of our first chapter.
was fanatically altruistic, to such a point that they think he was no longer reasonable, since he required that one must completely become a slave or a victim in working for the happiness of his fellow men.

2) We would like to recall to our readers' mind the fact that Mo-tze, together with his disciples, did in fact demonstrate his sincere spirit of abnegation and sacrifice for the benefit of his fellow men. We have briefly described this in our first chapter.

3) To quote only one more of many significant statements of Mo-tze himself:

To kill a man in order to preserve the world is not to kill a man in order to benefit the world. But, to sacrifice one's own life in order to preserve the world, is to sacrifice one's own life in order to benefit the world. 186

This shows clearly that self interest is not for Mo-tze the ultimate reason for working for the common good. Furthermore, the statement is obviously anti-utilitarian, because it shows clearly that the righteousness of an act does not depend upon its practical consequences. In the given example, the practical consequence which follows both acts of killing is exactly the same, that is to preserve the world, so that supposedly without it the world would be destroyed. But, Mo-tze has denounced the first act and approved the second. Although both acts would, practically, save the world, Mo-tze would not consider the first as a real benefit to the world for it violates a moral

186 Conf. original text of Mo-tze, chapter 44. Dr. Mei did not translate this chapter. No other translation is available; therefore, we are forced to translate it ourselves. We reproduce the Chinese text here for immediate reference. 故一人之行天下之利，非凡一人之利天下之也，殺己之身，救天下之。何故，而此章之可信，其為乙級。見第上册，頁10。
principle, namely to kill an innocent person. Mo-tze approved the second because he thinks of it as a voluntary heroic sacrifice; it does not violate any moral principle, and therefore, one might say that it really benefited the world. In addition, this also proves that Mo-tze would not agree to the axiom "finis sanctificat medium" taken in an unqualified sense, nor would our philosopher likely agree to the principle of the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Mo-tze maintained that even a "greatest good" such as to save the whole world can not justify the killing of a single person, supposedly innocent. This argument alone is sufficient to contradict our opponents who wish to make Mo-tze a supporter of the principle of utility.

Positively speaking, Mo-tze did not say that we must obey the will of Heaven because we may therefore reach our own happiness, although he might have said so to those utilitarians of his day just to persuade them to obey the will of Heaven. But, even though he had said so, it does not follow that he was therefore a utilitarian; almost all theistic moralists did state that man's true happiness may be reached only by obeying the laws of God. This is because man's nature is made by God in such a way that it must reach its perfection by following the Divine Law established for him and according to his nature. We call this law the "natural law".

But, for Mo-tze, this is not the primary reason we must obey the will of Heaven. Our philosopher has given three objective and a priori reasons as the basis of his doctrine on the will of Heaven, without any regard either for its social consequences, or for the individual happiness of the subject.

1) Above all, Mo-tze has taken a juridical concept as the starting
point of his teachings on the "will of Heaven". This juridical concept establishes men's absolute duty and obligation to obey the will of God, regardless of its consequences. He demonstrated this through the comparison with the family and the state. Just as all members of the family must "de jure" obey the head of the family, and all citizens of a state must "de jure" obey the head of the state, so all men living under Heaven must "de jure" obey the will of Heaven, since Heaven is the Supreme Ruler of the entire world. Our philosopher begins his teaching on the "will of Heaven" as follows:

Mo-tze said: The gentlemen of the world all understand only trifles but not things of importance. How do we know? We know this from one's conduct in the family. If one should offend the patriarch of the family, there are still the homes of the neighbours in which to seek shelter. Yet parents, brothers and friends all keep on reminding one to be obedient and careful. For how can one offend the patriarch and stay in the family? Not only is this true about conduct in the family, but also in the state. If one should offend the lord of the state there are still the neighbouring states whither he may flee. Yet parents, brothers and friends all keep on reminding one to be obedient and careful. For how can one offend the lord of the state and stay in it? From these there are yet shelters to flee to, yet there are such constant counsels. Should there not be more counsels in a case from which there is nowhere to flee? As the saying goes: "Sinning in broad daylight, whither can one flee?" Really there is nowhere to flee. For Heaven clearly discerns it, even if it be in the woods, valleys or solitary caves where there is no man. But, contrary to our expectation, regarding Heaven, the gentlemen of the world do not understand mutually to give counsels. This is how we know the gentlemen of the world understand only trifles and not things of importance.

Therefore, according to Mo-tze, our obedience due to the will of Heaven is a "de jure" matter and is consequently a question to be settled "a priori";

187 Mei translation, the first passage of chapter 26 which is the first chapter on the "will of Heaven". A similar passage is to be found in the chapter 28.
that is to say: The method of settling the question is one which prescinds
from the effect or advantage of the subject concerned. As it is here, the
rewards and punishments of Heaven which follow on the obedience or disobedience
of human beings do not constitute the real and "de jure" reason of Mo-tze's
teaching on the will of Heaven.

As to the brief introductory words in the beginning of the twenty-
eighth chapter of the text of Mo-tze, which is cited by our opponents in
their attempts to prove Mo-tze a utilitarian, we must remark that they are
to be found in only one of the three chapters on this same point of his
doctrine. The passage just quoted represents the opening words of our philo-
sopher in his teaching on the "will of Heaven". The third chapter on the
same subject (that is the twenty-eighth chapter) is quite similar to the first
one. Mo-tze also started his arguments with the same process in comparing
the jurisdiction of a father and that of a king with that of God. The intro-
ductive words cited by our opponents consisted merely of three short sentences.
They are obviously not to be considered as an argument. But, they are, as
we said, merely a short introduction to the proper subject. We do acknowledge
that these introductory words did bring up the importance of social well-
being, but that is only because the listeners of our philosopher were very
much interested in social wellbeing. Our opponents have yet to prove that
Mo-tze did consider social wellbeing as the norm of morality. The fact
that social wellbeing was mentioned first is no sound proof.

2) In the second chapter on the "will of Heaven", Mo-tze started his
teaching with a metaphysical concept of the origin and the standard of
righteousness. Such a standard, as we have sufficiently explained while
answering other objections, must be absolute, objective, universal and perpetual. Therefore we must adopt this standard or follow it regardless of our own interest. This is again a "de jure" matter, and the argument is therefore again an "a priori" one. The following is the opening of the twenty-sixth chapter.

Mo-tze said: Those gentlemen in the world who want to practice magnanimity and righteousness cannot but examine the origin of righteousness. Since we want to examine the origin of righteousness, then where does it originate?

Mo-tze said: Righteousness does not originate with the stupid and humble, but with the honorable and wise. How do we know it does not originate with the stupid and humble but with the honorable and wise? For righteousness is the standard... As the dull and humble cannot make the standard...

Now, the notion of a standard presupposes intelligence, for nothing can be a standard unless it is considered to be so by an intelligent being. Therefore, Mo-tze said: "I know that righteousness does not come from the stupid and humble but from the honorable and wise." This is similar to the notion of a moral standard in general (not necessarily the ultimate

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188 Conf. Mei translation of Mo-tze, chapter 27. We must make a quite important remark on the word "standard" which is used here by Dr. Mei in translating the original Chinese word "徳政". Lest our opponents accuse us of profiting from Dr. Mei's free translation, we must say that we acknowledge that the original words must be literally translated as "good government". However, even based on this literal translation, our argument still stands and its value is not affected at all, for, to govern is to make order, and as St. Thomas said, "sapientis est ordinare" (Cont. Gen., I I c. 1) and "Ordinatio non est absque ordinatore" (ibidem, L. III, c. 38), therefore, the idea of honorable (ordinator) and wise (sapiens).

189 We remark again, that even if the original text should be taken literally our inference stands. For a good government or a good order also presupposes intelligence, as we already said in the preceding note (188).

190 Conf. text of Mo-tze, chapter 27 (just quoted above).

190 Quoted from Sum. Theol., I, IIae, qu. 90, art. 4.
norm) as it is analyzed and described by St. Thomas Aquinas. The definition of law (including the natural law) by the Angelic Doctor is: "rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo, qui curam communutatis habet, promulgata." 191

Here, we see that St. Thomas pointed out especially two very important notions about law, namely, intelligence (rationis ordinatio) and authority (qui curam communutatis habet). For a like reason, Mo-tze has stated that the moral standard (or moral law) must originate from the wise (intelligence) and the honorable (i.e., authority). After that, our philosopher continued: "Who is honorable and who is wise? Heaven is honorable and Heaven is wise." 192 Then he tried to demonstrate that Heaven is really the most intelligent being and also has the most supreme authority. Although his argument for this matter was rather un-philosophical and even vulgar 193 we nevertheless can excuse him by noticing that his argument was fundamentally based on the commonly accepted fact that Heaven is the Creator and Supreme Ruler of the entire world. Moreover, after having demonstrated that Heaven is "de facto" more intelligent and more honorable than all men in the world including the venerable Emperor, Mo-tze even challenged his audience to prove or to point out any one more intelligent and more honorable (having higher authority) than Heaven. Since no one could do so, our philosopher

191 Quoted from Sum. Theol., I, IIae, qu. 90, art. 4.
192 Quoted from Mei translation of Mo-tze, chapter 27.
193 Conf. text of Mo-tze, chapter 27. It is too long to be quoted. Even though the argument is not philosophically sound, it does not diminish the value of Mo-tze's teaching on the doctrine of the "will of Heaven" because, at his time, people did believe (as we demonstrated above) that Heaven is the Supreme Ruler of the world. Considering this as accepted fact, Mo-tze's whole argument is sound, since the "major" is a principle taken from the metaphysical notion of "standard" or "order" and the "minor" is based on a commonly accepted fact.
concluded: "Heaven is really the most honorable and wise. Therefore, righteousness surely comes from Heaven". 194

One may easily see that this argument of Mo-tze in demonstrating the origin of righteousness is an "a priori" one; its value is metaphysical and not moral in the sense of being, based on the moral or social consequences of the theory. As we may see in the original text, Mo-tze used the argument right in the very beginning of the chapter before mentioning any social or political consequences of his doctrine. We said that the value of this argument of Mo-tze is metaphysical, because, according to him, it is proved directly from the essential notion of a moral standard, or moral order, that the norm of morality must come from intelligence and authority. Thus, the ultimate norm of morality (or the origin of morality) must necessarily come from the ultimately most intelligent and ultimately highest authority.

Now, continued our philosopher, since we all agree that God is the most intelligent and that He also has the highest authority, therefore, we must conclude that the ultimate norm (or the origin) of righteousness comes from Him. The force of this argument is obviously independent of the social consequences, which is not even mentioned here. We believe that it is absolutely impossible to consider this argument as representative of utilitarian or pragmatic reasoning.

3) A third "a priori" argument used by our philosopher to persuade his hearers of the "must" (i.e. an a priori necessity or obligation) of our obedience to the "will of Heaven" was the argument of love. It is not strictly a metaphysical but rather a moral argument. However, it is not to be considered an a posteriori argument, because it is not based on the moral

194 Mei translation, text of Mo-tze, chapter 27.
consequences of the premises. Mo-tze based this argument on a basic moral principle, a principle that is accepted by all human beings, and is considered an \textit{a priori} moral principle. The argument reads as follows:

Now Heaven loves the whole world universally. Everything is prepared for the good of men. Even the top of a hair is the work of Heaven. Substantial may be said of the benefits that are enjoyed by men. Yet there is no service in return. And they do not even know this to be unmagnanimous and unfortunate. This is why I say that the gentlemen understand only trifles and not things of importance.

Moreover, I know Heaven loves men dearly not without reason. Heaven ordered the sun, the moon and the stars to enlight and guide them. Heaven ordained the four seasons... This has taken place from the antiquity to the present. Suppose there is a man who is deeply fond of his son and has used his energy to the limit to work for his benefit. But when the son grows up he returns no love to the father. The gentlemen of the world will all call him unmagnanimous and miserable. Every thing is prepared for the good of men. The work of Heaven extends to even the smallest things that are enjoyed by men. Such benefit may indeed be said to be substantial, yet, there is no service in return. And they do not know this is to be unmagnanimous. This is why I say that the gentlemen of the world understand only trifles but not things of importance.

Thus, Mo-tze insisted on the moral obligation of our obedience to the "will of Heaven", because of Heaven's great love and great beneficence. Obedience to Heaven is considered by our philosopher as a "thing of importance", and in comparison with this very important obedience, obedience to a loving father becomes unimportant as a "trifle". This statement of Mo-tze does not imply that he belittled the importance of filial obedience, but only shows his emphasis on the great importance of a greater duty, namely to obey the "will of God."

195 Mei translation of Mo-tze, chapter 27. The first and the last parts of this quotation are almost identical. It is so in the original text. This passage was cited such as it is in order to show Mo-tze's insistence.
The duty of a son to obey and to please his loving father is an "a priori" obligation; that is to say that the enforcement of this duty is by no means based on the practical utility which may follow it as a result; but it is one of our most essential moral obligations which we must carry out not because of our own physical interest. This is precisely the essential difference between filial obedience and servile submission. The former is natural, moral "a priori", whereas the latter is decided upon considerations as to the practical consequences; it is therefore based on physical interest, or utility. It is obvious that Mo-tze did not preach a servile obedience to God, but he explicitly insisted on a filial one based on love, not on interest. Therefore, the basic reason for Mo-tze's doctrine on the "will of Heaven" is not the utilitarian principle.

By these three main arguments of an evidently "a priori" character, our philosopher has explained to us why we must obey the will of God. It is a "must" regardless of our personal interests. It is a must from a juridical point of view; it is a must from a metaphysical point of view; it is finally a must from a moral point of view: An obligation under a triple "a priori" reason.

Having thus established the "a priori" value of his doctrine of the "will of Heaven", our philosopher surely could and even had to consider the practical side of the matter. Especially did this become necessary when his listeners were, as we noted, very practical-minded. Therefore, Mo-tzewan was rather anxious to show them that his doctrine was also practical: First, it can be taught to the common people; secondly, any one who has a good will, after having understood it, will be able to put it into practice.
even though it requires a little sacrifice of his personal interest; thirdly, the little sacrifices involved will be considered but as trifles when one contemplates the great benefit that follows the practice of his doctrine, so that they are not to be considered as sacrifices. For a man who has made a little investment in order to collect a great profit, it is not to give away his money but to make profit. Finally, Mo-tze reasons, if his moral doctrine be not accepted, and practised, the world will be in disorder and consequently even our personal interests will perish. Therefore, even under this practical consideration alone, the doctrine of our philosopher is to be followed and practised.

As to the historical facts that Mo-tze cited in order to demonstrate that "de facto" Heaven rewards those who obey Its will and punishes those who do not, they are not cited or used as an argument to prove our duty of obeying Heaven. The contexts show clearly that Mo-tze's arguments were by no means based on these facts. In our opinion, Mo-tze rather cited these historical facts in order to confirm (not to prove) that the will of Heaven is precisely the principle of Universal Love which is another point of his teachings, although it is intimately connected with or rather derived from the doctrine of the will of Heaven.

Metaphysically speaking, there is an essential difference between those two points of Mo-tze's teachings, namely, the doctrine of the Will of Heaven and that of Universal Love. The former is the answer to the question "Whence comes the norm of morality"? And the latter is the answer to the question: "What is this norm of morality as we may know it and express its content in a sort of axiom?" The former solves the problem concerning the origin of
morality or righteousness. The latter solves the problem concerning the "constitutivum metaphysicumd or the most essential synopsis of this norm of morality. Mo-tze approached the first problem by establishing the necessary character of such an ultimate norm of morality. He stated that it must be absolutely good, universal, unchangeable, so that it must necessarily come from the Supreme Intelligence and Supreme authority, namely, from God. His solution of the second problem will be the topic of the next chapter of our dissertation.

Moreover, even in this second point of his teaching, namely, the doctrine of universal love, our philosopher did not use historical facts as a principal argument. The actual principal argument is, as we will see later, still an "a priori" one, based on the reason that Heaven must wish us to love each other, since It loves all of us. After having established the principal argument, Mo-tze could, of course, use some secondary ones or rather confirmations of an "a posteriori" character in order to persuade his listeners even more firmly since most of them were practical-minded. Thus, he cited those historical facts from the ancient canonical books (which are considered most trustworthy by all scholars of that time) just in order to demonstrate that the will of Heaven consists precisely in the principle of universal love, because, according to these ancient documents, Heaven did reward those who practiced universal love and did punish those who rejected this principle. Therefore, these historical facts cited by Mo-tze were confirmative factors rather than argumentative principles.

As we quoted him before (see page 156), Mo-tze explicitly used the term origin and started his teaching on the will of Heaven by, as he said, "examining the origin of righteousness."
Now we shall examine, in concluding this section, the opinion originated by Liang Ch'i Tsao, and adopted and expressed in English by Mei Yi-pao — an opinion cited in the last objection. According to them, Mo-tze adopted the principle of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number"; and they cited Mo-tze as saying: "For, any thing that could enrich the poor, increase the few, remove danger and regulate disorder would be magnanimous and righteous."197 Thus, they concluded that Mo-tze must have been a utilitarian.

Our readers may well remember how we explained why Mo-tze has said: "How can there be any thing that is good but not useful?" By the same reasons we may be convinced that in the passage cited by Mr. Mei Yi-pao, our philosopher did not state the principle of utilitarians. He asserted that any thing that could enrich the poor, remove danger and establish order is therefore magnanimous and righteous, because he firmly believed that whatsoever is morally good, is also ipso facto useful for men. As we explained quite extensively, Mo-tze, as a theist, was convinced that only by some principles or theories morally good might men reach their physical interests. Therefore, if a theory or a principle is morally not good, it just can not produce such good effect as to enrich the people, remove danger and establish social order. This is not because he adopted the utilitarian criterion, but it is because he already, by an a priori reason, had established a principle: that only a morally good doctrine can produce such an effect. Therefore, whenever one sees such effect is de facto produced, one may conclude that a morally good doctrine must have been adopted before. This is the sole reason why Mo-tze

197 Conf. Liang Ch'i Tsao's A Critical Study on Mo-tze, and Mei Yi-pao's Mo-tze, the Neglected Rival of Confucius. The quotation is from the latter work.
said that "whatsoever may enrich the people" etc. is therefore good. Besides, as we have explained, these social common goods are to be considered as the aim (causa finalis) of any social and political doctrines. Even in the general notion of law, St. Thomas pointed out the common good as its aim, \textit{ad bonum commune}.

Therefore, it may rightly serve as a positive or practical criterion for social and political theories. It is obvious that whatsoever reaches its proper aim is to be called good. For instance, a good watch is the one that keeps time most accurately, and not necessarily the one that has most diamonds on it. In addition, we firmly believe that only really good method or doctrine can reach the proper aim; thus, the proper aim may be served as a practical (not theoretical) criterion for distinguishing really good doctrine from what is only apparently good. "From the fruit of a tree you may know the tree, for a good tree can not bear bad fruit nor can a bad tree bear good fruit." This is not a utilitarian principle, for we do not consider the quality of fruit as the ultimate criterion, but we do take it as a practical criterion only because we firmly believe in this principle which we adopted as the real reason why we may judge a tree from its fruit; namely that a good tree cannot bear bad fruit nor a bad tree bear good fruit. Hence, a man who adopts this principle or a principle similar to this one, is not to be considered as necessarily utilitarian.

Dr. Mei Yi-pao has also tried to prove that Mo-tze adopted the principle of the greatest utility for the greatest number. However, the passage of the original text which Dr. Mei has translated and quoted in criticizing our

\begin{itemize}
\item[198] Conf. above, page 156 and note 189.
\item[199] This is obvious for Christians.
\end{itemize}
philosopher's real mind, is really not a positive expose of Mo-tze's teachings, but solely an argument of our philosopher given to the utilitarians of his time in order to show that even according to the viewpoint of its utility, the aggressive war is not to be preferred because it is obviously working against the utility even of the victor. Hence, even according to the principle of the utilitarians, it can not be considered some thing useful. "Therefore," Mo-tze declared, "when we consider the victory as such, there is nothing useful in it." 200

This, according to us, does not imply that our philosopher was therefore a utilitarian. It is the common practice of theists to show the utilitarians that the real good of mankind can not be reached through the principle of utilitarianism. In many instances, we may demonstrate to them that it is often a matter of fact that by directing one's activities solely according to the principle of utility one lands on the opposite side of what he originally intended, namely his own interest. This is especially clear in the case of aggressive war. Theists would gladly adopt such arguments as the one used by Mo-tze in order to show that aggressive war, or war in general, should be abolished. In fact, we are always glad to bring out statistics to show that aggressive war has never brought real profit to the aggressor even though he may completely conquer his victim, occupy a great and rich new land, etc. Obviously there is no reason to accuse any theist of adopting utilitarian principles whenever he prefers to use such an argument against aggressive war.

Moreover, Mo-tze did not use this argument as his principal reason in condemning offensive war. He started his doctrine of condemnation with a

200 Quoted in objection VII, see page 130 and note 151. Mei Yi-pao quoted Mo-tze as saying so. Conf. Mei's Mo-tze, a Neglected Rival of Confucius.
strict notion of commutative justice, so that we may say positively that his first argument against the aggressive war is because it is unjust. In fact, he compared aggressive war with the injustice committed in robbery and theft, but held that the former is even a much greater one. This is the essential

Since the original text is interesting and somewhat important in proving our opinion, but at the same time is unfortunately too long, we decided to put it in this note:

Suppose a man enter the orchard of another and steal the other's peaches and plums. Hearing of it, the public will condemn it; getting hold of him, the authorities will punish him. Why? Because he injures others to profit himself. As to seizing dogs, pigs, chickens, and young pigs from others, it is even more unrighteous than to steal peaches and plums from his orchard. Why? Because it causes others to suffer more, and it is more unhuman and criminal. When it comes to entering another's stable and appropriating the other's horses and oxen, it is more unhuman than to seize the dogs, pigs, chickens and young pigs of others. Why? Because others are caused to suffer more. When others are caused to suffer more, then the act is more unhuman and criminal. Finally, as to murdering the innocent, stripping him of his clothes, dispossessing him of his spear and sword, it is even more unrighteous than to enter the other's stable and appropriate his horses and oxen. Why? Because it causes others to suffer more; when others are caused to suffer more then the act is more unhuman and criminal.

These, all the gentlemen in the world know that they should condemn, calling them unrighteous. But when it comes to the great attack of states, they do not know that they should condemn it. On the contrary, they applaud it, calling it righteous. Can this be said to be knowing the difference between righteousness and unrighteousness?

The murder of one person is called unrighteous and incurs one death penalty. Following this argument, the murder of ten persons will be ten times as unrighteous and there should be ten death penalties; and the murder of a hundred persons will be a hundred times as unrighteous and there should be a hundred death penalties. All these gentlemen in the world know that they should condemn calling them unrighteous. But, when it comes to the great unrighteousness of attacking states, they do not know that they should condemn it. On the contrary they applaud it, calling it righteous. And they are really ignorant of its being unrighteous. Hence they have recorded their judgment to bequeath to their posterity. If they did know it to be unrighteous, then why would they record their false judgment to bequeath to posterity?

Now, if there were a man who, upon seeing a little weakness should
reason our philosopher was against aggressive war.

Thus, although many times Mo-tze seemed to adopt the principle and view of utilitarianism, he was by no means a true utilitarian, since his adoption was merely apparent, and could be distinguished by a more careful analysis of the meanings of his words through the study of the contexts.

Now, we may conclude this part of our essay by asserting firmly that it has been proved that Mo-tze was a theistic moralist, that is to say that the basis of his ethical doctrine is the real existence of a personal God, who is the guarantor of an absolute and objective norm of morality.

say it is black, but, upon seeing much, should say it is white; then we should think he could not tell the difference between black and white. If, upon tasting a little bitterness, one should say it is bitter, but upon tasting much, should say it is sweet; then, we should think he could not tell the difference between bitter and sweet. Now, when a little wrong is committed people know that they should condemn it, but when such a great wrong as attacking a state is committed people do not know that they should condemn it. On the contrary it is applauded, called righteous. Can this be said to be knowing the difference between the righteous and the unrighteous? Hence, we know the gentlemen in the world are confused about the difference between righteousness and unrighteousness.

(Quoted from original text of Mo-tze, Mei translation, chapter 17.)
D) Philosophy or Religion?

Whereas our philosopher is accused of being an unbeliever by a great many modern authors, it is strange but true that he is also accused by a few authors of being a religious preacher or even a founder of a religion; hence, according to the latter, he was not strictly a philosopher, for his doctrine was merely built upon the superstition of the common people of that time.

Dr. Hu-Shih was the pioneer of this opinion. He stated in his not yet completed An Outline of Chinese Philosophical History:

Mo-tze was an earnest religious world-saviour, a founder of religion....If Mohism had been placed in circumstances similar to those of medieval Europe, it certainly would have been able to develop a religious government, of which its 'Chu-Tzu's' would have taken the place of the Pope.202

As we mentioned above, Dr. Hu-Shih is a defender of Mo-tze's sincerity in believing in the real existence of God and the Spirits. He stated that Mo-tze, unlike the Confucianists of that time, really believed in the existence of God and spirits.203 This is quite a notable fact, since at that time, i.e., when he wrote this statement, he was definitely an atheist.204

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202 Conf. Hu-Shih's An Outline of Chinese Philosophical History, Vol. I. We said "not yet completed," because the second volume of the work is not yet published. The English translation is of S. Holth quoted from Micius, A Brief Outline of His Life and Ideas.


204 Dr. Hu-Shih obtained his Ph.D. from Columbia University, New York. He openly professed atheism in China and tried to prove that all proofs of the existence of God are invalid. A typical example can be found in his An Outline of the History of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. I, 14th edition, page 263, where he stated: "The religious preachers of the West usually use the principle of causality to prove the existence of God. They suppose that where there is a cause there must be an effect and vice versa. From effect A we may prove the existence of cause B; and considering B
However, Dr. Hu-Shih did not esteem very highly the philosophy of Mo-tze. His evaluation of the latter was:

The above-mentioned nine articles are precepts of Mo-tze's religion; they are not very important in Philosophy. . . . Mo-tze was a very deeply religious person; he wished, therefore, that "the will of God" be the "Universal moral standard," so that all men of the world will "identify their will to the Will of God." And, thus, from a philosopher Mo-tze became the founder of the religion of Mo. 205

Dr. Hu-Shih, being definitively an atheist at that time, ignored the existence of natural theology (or as the modern scholastics like to call it, theodicy) as a part of philosophy. Hence, whenever people speak about God as Creator and Supreme Ruler of the Universe, Dr. Hu-Shih believed that the matter was outside the realm of philosophy. According to him, philosophy must necessarily be atheistic.

It does not need a scholastic philosopher to point out the mistake of Dr. Hu-Shih and his fellow atheist scholars. We may cite one of the

as effect, we may prove the existence of cause C, etc. Thus, we must necessarily reach an ultimate cause; this ultimate cause is God, the creator of the Universe. But, we who do not believe in God, we may reply to them by the same principle of causality. The essential notion of the principle of causality is: "A cause must necessarily have an effect, and an effect must necessarily have a cause." Now, if you say that God is a cause, then, may I ask you what is the cause of God? If you say that God is the ultimate cause, this is equal to saying that God is an effect without any cause, which is contradicting the principle of causality. How can one still use the same principle to prove the existence of God? If you say that God also has his cause, then, may I ask what is the cause of the cause of God? . . . Therefore, it cannot be said that there is a Creator and Supreme Ruler of the Universe."

It would be going out of the realm of our dissertation to refute the argument of Dr. Hu-Shih. We only wish to say that, as it is obvious, his knowledge on the principle of causality, especially as it is understood by scholastic philosophy, is altogether wrong and even ridiculous.

Dr. Hu-Shih has said that Micius was the only early Chinese writer who sought to form a genuine religious system. He even calls him a founder of religion. This is undoubtedly an exaggeration....It seems strange Micius any more than Confucius and Lao-Tze should be a founder of religion....Micius, it must be admitted, was decidedly religious, but he can hardly claim to be considered as a founder of religion.206

Among Western authors, none of the authorities has ever depreciated the philosophical value of Mo-tze's doctrine. Nevertheless, there could be one or two writers who might follow Dr. Hu-Shih's mistake. To cite an example: W. B. Pettus wrote, in the preface of a booklet concerning Mo-tze:

In his life and in his teachings Mo-tze resembled Jesus more than did any other teacher or religious leader of Asia. He is the only Chinese who founded a religion or established a church. In his use of symbols he resembled the teacher of Freemasonry and he uses the square, the level, the compass and the plumb to teach morality.207

The statement is of negligible value; its opening assertion of the similarity of Mo-tze's teaching to that of our Lord, is merely a repetition of a widely expressed view. The second part is but a shadow of Dr. Hu-Shih's opinion. The last sentence very probably sets forth an original idea of the writer, but, unfortunately, it is not likely true. Our readers should have little difficulty in recognizing its falsity, since we already have given a good explanation of Mo-tze's mentioning those instruments, or rather standards. We cannot realize how this could have any resemblance to the mysticism of Freemasonry.

To decide whether the teachings of Mo-tze had any philosophical value, or whether he was merely a religious preacher among primitive people, who are,
as some think, more superstitious than civilized modern people, is a question involving a clear and precise definition of terms. Our opponents did not express clearly what they meant by the term "religious preacher" and what they meant by the term "philosopher". However, it does not take a scholastic to see that God, and things concerning God, are an essential part of philosophy. Thus, the definition of philosophy by Cicero was: "Philosophia est rerum divinarum et humanarum causarumque quibus hae res continentur, scientia." 208

We do not think that Mo-tze should be excluded from the realm of philosophy any more than the famous author of De Natura Deorum.

As a matter of fact, we may state without hesitation, that the intellectual milieu as a whole, even in our modern age, has never excluded God from the realm of philosophy. The reason is obvious to us; it is because God is by definition the ultimate universal cause of the universe, while philosophy is the science of knowing beings by their universal causes. Only those who deny the value of the principle of causality, such as William James, will ingeniously create an entirely new kind of definition for the term philosophy. James has stated: "Philosophy is an unusually persistent effort to think clearly." 209

But, even according to this definition of philosophy, followers of James, such as Dr. Hu-Shih, cannot banish the teaching of Mo-tze from the realm of philosophy, unless they prove that whenever people speak about God, they do not think clearly. But, this would imply that whenever people deny the existence of God, they do not think clearly either, because to deny the existence of God

208 Conf. Cicero De Officiis, Book II, chap. 2.
209 Quoted from Chen Yuan-Teh (陳元德), who in the preface of his History of Ancient Chinese Philosophy (written in Chinese), has purposely cited William James in the original English to emphasize its importance. (See bibliography.)
is to speak about God. It is obvious that the atheists must first understand clearly the reasons by which the theists affirm the existence of God; otherwise they simply have no reason for denying it.

Therefore, the mere fact that Mo-tze spoke about God and His will does not make his teachings lose their philosophical value. For us, it is clear that the essential difference between a philosophical doctrine and a religious one is that the former is based on natural reason as such, while the latter is produced by a co-operation of reason and Revelation.

Mo-tze was strictly a philosopher. This can be proved by the fact that he has never associated any supernatural elements with the basic principles of his teaching. Indeed, Mo-tze spoke often about the relations between man and his Creator, God; and this seemed to be a good reason to call him a religious preacher, since, by definition, religion is the relation between men and God. However, we must know that there are two kinds of religion, namely the supernatural and the natural; the latter is simply a part of philosophy, because it is deduced from natural reason. The natural reason of human beings, purely as such, is able to know and to prove the existence of God, and hence to deduce the due relations between man and his Creator.

The religion of the ancient Chinese was purely natural until the introduction of Buddhism from India. There were of course plenty of mythological legends and supernatural fairy tales, but none of them has ever so influenced ancient Chinese thought that the Chinese took it as the foundation of their religion. Mo-tze also has cited many of those supernatural tales, most

210 The fact is clear because prior to the introduction of Buddhism no Chinese has ever claimed having seen God or received revelations from the Same. In other words there was no supernaturalism in the religious belief in ancient China.
from the books edited by Confucius, in order to prove the existence of spirits, and specifically the existence of the human soul after the destruction of the body. This, however, does not affect the philosophical value of Mo-tze's teaching, because, as we demonstrated above, the doctrine of the existence of spirits thus confirmed is not an essential part of his teaching. It could be completely ignored without causing any change in the entire system of Mo-tze's doctrine.

It is obviously beside our purpose to discuss whether Mo-tze personally believed these reports on the re-appearance of deceased persons. Nevertheless, we may remark that even if he believed in them, he would not be considered merely superstitious, because the reports he cited do not involve absurdity, that is to say, those alleged facts are at least possible if one believes in the immortality of souls; we may say that it is possible that they come into contact with us with the permission of God. Besides, Mo-tze did not invent them, for they are recorded in the ancient historical documents, the canonical books. The Chinese are glad, and even a little proud, to point out that, unlike the ancient Greek mythologies, their ancient spiritual legends did not imply any idea of polytheism nor have any exaltation of immoral acts. The most common form of these legends was that the immoral and unjust acts committed by human beings were punished by the spirits or duly revenged by the very same spirit (that is the separated soul) of the victim. Mo-tze could have used those legends in promoting the moral consciousness of the common people; while doing so, he obviously would not have been teaching his philosophical doctrine, but merely citing the ancient books. After all, a philosopher is not expected to speak philosophically all the time. He might speak
as a theologian or an historian even for a great part of his life. Thus, St. Thomas was a true theologian and a true philosopher. As long as the philosophical teachings of Mo-tze can stand as a solid system without any help of supernatural knowledge, his doctrine must have a philosophical value.

Evidently, Mo-tze professed the existence of God without any supernatural help. Then he proved by merely natural reason that the norm of morality must necessarily have its origin from God, the most honorable and most intelligent Being. Hence, the will of God is the ultimate norm of morality. Now, his particular merit is that he succeeded in presenting what is the will of God in a concrete formula, with sound reasons, yet without introducing any supernatural factors throughout his entire argument. He did not say that if the norm of morality is the will of God, then let Him tell us what He wishes; but he rather said that if the norm of morality is the will of God, then, let us find out in what the will of God consists. We must find it out by natural reason, and not sit down and wait for a revelation. Mo-tze definitively demonstrated himself as a true philosopher by inquiring what is the will of God that could be expressed under the form of a general principle, and especially by inquiring into it through exclusively natural reasoning.

God, who is the Creator of all human beings, must love men all universally. He created every thing for the good of man. Thus, God is the Common Father of all human beings. Now, a father who loves his sons and daughters must necessarily wish that his sons and daughters love each other and work to their mutual benefit. This is the only reasonable way of understanding the matter. Hence, we may know that God, the Common Father, also

211 Conf. original text, Chapter 27.
wishes that all of his sons and daughters love each other and work for their mutual benefit. Furthermore, as the Supreme Ruler of mankind, God must also will the principle of universal love.

The rule of Heaven, said Mo-tze, over the world is not unlike the rule of the feudal Lords over the state. In ruling the state does the feudal lord desire his ministers and people to work for mutual disadvantage?\textsuperscript{212}

Mo-tze left the answer to his listeners. The matter is obvious. Therefore, according to Mo-tze, the fact that God is the Creator and Common Father of all men, and the fact that He is also the Supreme Ruler of all men must necessarily imply that He wishes that all men love each other mutually and universally.

Our philosopher discoursed quite extensively in order to demonstrate that God is a Loving Father for all humanity. As we cited above, he had many reasons to prove his statement.

Heaven loves the whole world universally. Every thing is prepared for the good of man. Even the tip of a hair is the work of Heaven.\textellipsis Moreover, I know Heaven loves men dearly not without reason. Heaven ordered the sun, the moon\textellipsis Yet this does not exhaust my reason whereby I know Heaven loves men dearly\textellipsis This is still not all by which I know Heaven loves men dearly.\textsuperscript{213}

When this fact, namely, that God loves men universally, is accepted, the implication is obvious. Thus, Mo-tze has demonstrated that the will of God consists in the principle of universal love.

We must note that all these reasons are of a purely natural character. There was not even a slight suspicion of the use of supernatural authorities.

\textsuperscript{212} Conf. original text, Chapter 27, Mei translation.
\textsuperscript{213} Conf. original text, Ibidem.
It is only a question of reading the original text; it does not need any further argument on our part.

The greatness of Mo-tze consists precisely in this, that he proved by metaphysical a priori reasons (i.e. from the very nature of the being concerned) that the absolutely ultimate norm of morality must necessarily be the will of God. And then, by a kind of a posteriori reasoning based on the facts of our immediate experience, he demonstrated that the will of God consists in the principle of universal love, which he declared by answering a self-posed question:

What is the will of Heaven that is to be obeyed? It is to love all the people in the world universally.\[214\]

This answer is definitely positive. It is the firm conclusion of a process of clear reasoning, which is merely natural and strictly within the realm of philosophy. Philosophy or Religion? We may leave the answer to our readers. But, before we conclude this chapter of our dissertation, we must not overlook one point that many of our readers are probably expecting us to bring out, that is, Mo-tze, with his doctrine of the will of Heaven, seems to be a voluntarist or a positivist.\[215\] According to the so-called voluntarists, the will of God is absolutely free to decide what is good and what is evil, so that prior to the decree of God's will there is nothing that may be called good and nothing that may be called evil. In other words, nothing is

\[\text{Conf. original text, Chapter 27, Mei translation.}\]
\[\text{214 Quite a few scholastic authors do not use the name voluntarism in this case. They rather insist on the intrinsic and essential distinction of moral species and thus make all those who maintain an extrinsic and positive distinction of the same their opponents. And this later opinion is called positivism in morals or "positivismus moralis." (Conf. J. S. Hickey, O. Cist., Summula Philosophiae Scholasticae, Vol. III, page 294, 7th Ed., New York, 1941.)}\]
intrinsically good or evil, but becomes good or evil only after the decree of God's will, which is an extrinsic principle or an efficient cause of species of morality. This was the opinion of Ocham, Gerson and other nominalists. In modern philosophy, Descartes was the greatest among the voluntarists.

The following statement of Descartes is very similar to the doctrine of the will of Heaven of our philosopher:

Thus it is that man, uniting his will to that of God, loves Him in so perfect a manner as to desire nothing more in this world but that the will of God be done.

The first thesis of voluntarism is: "To make our will and our understanding one with the will and understanding of God. — In this lies the whole of morality." Indeed, the above cited statement of Descartes and the first thesis of voluntarism applies very well to the teaching of our philosopher concerning morality. But, we may note that these also may be applied to the fundamental principle of Christian ascetism which can be summed up in one sentence: "Thy Will be done." Therefore, obviously, voluntarism properly speaking does not consist in these two statements quoted above.

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216 Suarez gave testimony to this statement: "Quidam dixerunt nullum esse actum voluntatis ita malum, quin possit esse non malus, quamvis libere et humano modo fiat, quia putant omnem malitiam pendere ex voluntate Dei, quae libera est in omnibus effectibus ad extra, quorum unus est prohibitio seu praeceptum. Ita Nominales fere setiunt, Ochamus, Gerson." (Conf. Suarez, De Bon. et Mal., dist. 7, s. 1, n. 2.)

217 Descartes was not only voluntarist in morals, but also in metaphysics as well: "Truth, according to Descartes, rests ultimately on the divine free-will; and had God so chosen, our necessary truths might have been the reverse of what they are." (Conf. J. S. Hickey, O. Cist., Summula Philosophiae Scholasticae, Vol. I, page 349, 9th Ed., New York, 1942.)


219 Quoted from A History of Problems of Philosophy, page 58.
The voluntarism of Ocham and Descartes consisted in their belief that 'per se' and 'a priori' there is nothing that is intrinsically wrong or right. It is entirely a matter of free choice made by the Divine will. Since we must admit that the Divine will is absolutely free, and therefore is not bound to choose a certain action as morally right or morally wrong, we must conclude that there is nothing that could be considered morally right or morally wrong prior to this determination of the Divine will. Therefore, if God had so wished, what is now considered moral wrong could become moral right and vice versa. In other words, morality depends entirely and absolutely on the free will of God.

Our preoccupation here is not to refute this Ocham-Cartesian voluntarism, since the procedure of such refutation is already well known to scholastic philosophers. We merely wish to state that voluntarism considered as such, our philosopher Mo-tze was not one of its defenders simply because Mo-tze never discussed this point and probably never thought about it. In fact, voluntarism, as it is described in the above paragraph, was simply unknown among the ancient Chinese wisemen. Therefore we find no one in ancient China (or even in medieval China) who has brought the point into discussion.

The teaching of Mo-tze concluded in the precept that we must obey the will of God and consider it as the standard of morality. This, however, can not be said of Cartesian voluntarism. The insistence on the absolute character of God's free will made by Ocham and Descartes was simply beyond the thoughts of our philosopher and if necessary admit that such a subtle and intricate question would not have occurred to him.

However, suppose Mo-tze was faced with this Cartesian doctrine. Would
accept or reject it? The following is only our opinion, since there can
be no certitude in answering this query. Considering that Mo-tze has said
that "no human being can make the standard at will (i.e. freely); even the
Emperor may not make the standard at will. There is Heaven to give him the
standard," and that, on the other hand, Mo-tze never said that Heaven may
not make the standard at will, it seems that one can suppose that our philo-
sopher has conceded the right of making a standard at will to Heaven. That
is to say, according to Mo-tze, God is free to make the norm of morality as
He is pleased.

Furthermore, according to Mo-tze, God makes the standard of morality;
He gives it to the emperor and to all other human beings, but He did not re-
ceive it from anywhere or anyone. Even more precisely, Mo-tze explicitly
stated that God's will itself is the standard of morality. This seems to
be a good reason why we may believe that Mo-tze would have been a supporter
of voluntarism if he had had the chance of learning something along this line
from either Ocham or Descartes.

Nevertheless, if, on the other hand, we consider the eagerness of our
philosopher to find out or to establish an absolute norm of morality, the
importance of intelligence with regard to the norm of morality and the
genuine interest (or rather love) or God in men which he described so well,

220 Conf. original text, Mei translation, ch. 28. Also page 93 of our disser-
tation.
221 Conf. original text, Mei translation. "Mo-tze established the will of
Heaven to be the standard." (ch. 28) "The will of Heaven is truly the
standard of righteousness." (Ibidem, last sentence of ch. 28.)
222 "Righteousness does not originate with the stupid and humble, but with
the honorable and wise." (Original text, Mei translation, ch. 27. Also
conf. page 150 and sqq.)
then we greatly doubt that Mo-tze could have believed that such an ultimate norm of morality would have no other reason than the arbitrary free will of God.

Particularly interesting to us is the fact that Mo-tze's main proposition is to find out the origin of righteousness. He begins his teaching on the will of Heaven thus:

Mo-tze said: "Those gentlemen in the world who want to practice magnanimity and righteousness cannot but examine the origin of righteousness. Since we want to examine the origin of righteousness, then where does it originate?

Mo-tze said: Righteousness does not originate with the stupid and humble, but with the honorable and wise....

Now who is honorable and who is wise? Heaven is honorable and wise. So then righteousness must originate with Heaven....

Then, after he proved that Heaven is most honorable and most wise, he concluded: "But is there yet any one more honorable and more wise than Heaven? Heaven is really the most honorable and wise. Therefore, righteousness surely comes from Heaven." This may convince us that Mo-tze would not be a voluntarist after all, because:

1) The reason for Heaven's being the origin or originator of righteousness is that Heaven is most honorable and most wise. Thus the ultimate authority is rather intelligence and consequently not free-will.

2) The origin, i.e. the ultimate source, of morality is rather Heaven's person Itself. The ultimate metaphysical reason for this is the absolute

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223 Conf. original text, Mei translation, ch. 27.  
224 Conf. ibidem.
nobility of Heaven's person and the absolute wisdom (or intelligence) of Heaven; and the free-will of Heaven is not even mentioned in Mo-tze's main argument.

3) Cartesian voluntarism, which states that originally and absolutely speaking there is no difference between good and evil, would find no supporter in ancient China except perhaps Lao-tze, whose teaching was not popular at all. 

Therefore, in concluding, we think that we have full reason to believe that Mo-tze would not have approved the doctrine of voluntarism.

225 Conf. pages 38-46 of our dissertation.
CHAPTER III

THE FIRST ETHICAL AXIOM: "UNIVERSAL LOVE"

A) THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE AXIOM

In the preceding chapter we have demonstrated that, according to Mo-tze, the absolute norm of morality is the will of God, and that the will of God may be expressed in a brief form, namely "That we must love all the people of the world universally."

Now, what is that Heaven desires and what is it that It abominates? Certainly Heaven desires to have men benefit and love one another and abominates to have them hate and harm one another. How do we know that Heaven desires to have men benefit and love one another and abominates to have them hate and harm one another? Because It loves and benefits men universally.¹

Mo-tze even went so far as to quote (from imagination of course) Heaven as speaking about the ancient sage kings:

Thereupon, the will of Heaven proclaimed: "All those whom I love these love also, and all those whom I benefit these benefit also. Their love to men is all-embracing and their benefit to men is most substantial."²

He repeatedly insisted on the term "universal":

What is the will of Heaven that is to be obeyed? It is to love all the people in the world universally.³

To obey the will of Heaven is to be universal, and to oppose the will of Heaven is to be partial (in love.)⁴

¹ Quoted from Mei translation, text of Mo-tze, ch. IV.
² Ibidem, ch. XXVI.
³ Ibidem, ch. XXVIII.
⁴ Ibidem, ch. XXVIII. Parenthesis original.
It is, as we believe, a firm conviction of Mo-tze that the will of Heaven is the principle of universal love; hence, "universal love" is the first axiom of morality, which in its turn is the standard dictating or measuring all human action and thinking. Thus, practically speaking, Mo-tze considered the following three terms as equipollent: 1) Norm of morality. 2) Will of Heaven. 3) Universal love.

However, as we have seen in his expose of the doctrine of the "will of Heaven," our philosopher liked to start his expositions with a seemingly pragmatic argument, although later in the explanation he would eventually show the significance of his a priori arguments, which are for him the real foundation of his doctrine. We have explained above that the reason for his doing so was to facilitate a proper approach in the mind of his audience who were for the most part exclusively interested in restoring social order and in stimulating peace and harmony. Thus we trust that our readers will not be surprised to find Mo-tze introducing his doctrine of universal love with a pragmatic argument. We prefer to quote him directly:

Suppose we try to locate the cause of disorder, we shall find it lies in the want of mutual love. What is called disorder is just the lack of filial piety on the part of the ministers and the sons towards the emperor and the father. Loving himself and not his father the son benefits himself to the disadvantage of his father. Loving himself and not his elder brother, the young brother benefits himself to the disadvantage of his elder brother. Loving himself and not his emperor the minister benefits himself to the disadvantage of his emperor. And these are what is called disorder. When the father shows no affection to his son, when the elder brother shows no affection to his younger brother, and when the emperor shows no affection to his ministers, on the other hand, it is also called disorder. When the father loves only himself and not the son, he benefits himself to the disadvantage of his son.... And the reason of all these is want of mutual love.
This is true even among thieves and robbers. Loving only his own family and not other families, the thief steals from other families to profit his own family. Loving only his own person and not others, the robber does violence to profit itself. And the reason for all these is want of mutual love. This again is true among the mutual disturbances among the houses of the ministers, and the mutual invasions among the states of feudal lords. Loving only his own house and not the others the minister.... These instances exhaust the confusion in the world. And, when we look into the causes we find they all arise from want of mutual love.

Suppose everybody in the world loves universally, loving others as one's self. Will there be any unfilial individual? When every one regards his father, elder brother and emperor as himself, whereto can be directed any unfilial feeling? Will there still be an unaffectionate individual? When one regards his younger brother, son and minister as himself, whereto can he direct any feeling of disaffection? Therefore, there will be not any unfilial feeling or disaffection. Will there then be any thieves and robbers? When everyone regards other families as his own family, who will steal? When every one regards other persons as his own person, who will rob? Therefore, there will not be any thieves or robbers.

Will there be mutual disturbance among the houses and invasion among the states of feudal lords? Therefore there will not be any mutual disturbance among houses nor any invasion among the states of feudal lords.

If every one in the world will love universally, states not attacking one another, houses not disturbing one another, thieves and robbers become extinct, emperor and ministers, fathers and sons all being affectionate and filial....If all this comes to pass the world will be orderly....So when there is mutual love in the world it will be orderly, and when there is mutual hate in the world, it will be disorderly. This is why Mo-tze insisted on persuading people to love others. 5

From this introductory argument of our philosopher, we may already grasp the general idea of his moral doctrine. He has already demonstrated that, speaking 'a priori,' the doctrine of universal love is the only reasonable

5 Quoted from Mei translation of Mo-tze's works, ch. 14.
interpretation of the will of Heaven; and now he has demonstrated by its logical consequences that the same doctrine is also the nucleus of moral order, which regulates the relations between individuals, families, societies and nations. Hence, for him, universal love is the first and most basic axiom of ethics.

All writers, Chinese and Western, ancient and modern, have unanimously agreed on this point. Yu Yuch, in his preface to Sun Yi-Jung's commentary on Mo-tze's works says:

According to my judgment, it seems Mo-tze was interested in the art of defence and fortification because he condemned offensive war; he condemned offensive war because he taught identification with the superior; and he taught identification with the superior because he championed universal love.6

The above quoted words were written prior to 1895 A. D. when Mo-tze's teachings were for the first time kindly and favorably studied by the Chinese scholars in public. There has never been a notable conflicting voice as to what is the basic principle of Mo-tze's teachings. Ever since Mencius, Mo-tze has been distinguished by the title of "Philosopher of Universal Love." Hence we do not have to prove our viewpoint, for it is already accepted by all as a fact. We wish now to compare this moral axiom of Mo-tze's with the axiom of the Western moralists.

Western moralists have agreed generally that the first moral axiom is what is usually expressed by this standard Latin sentence: "Bonum est faciendum, malum vero vitandum." However, this first dictate of our conscience (or, as the scholastics called it more specifically, synderesis) has never been put

6 Quoted in English from Mo-tze, the Neglected Rival of Confucius, by Mai Yi Pao, page 38.
into a formal axiom by any of China's ancient philosophers, although it is beyond doubt that they were all conscious of the existence of such an inner dictation from deep in our souls. As a matter of fact, Confucius, generally known as the greatest of all Chinese moralists, did not bequeath to us any moral axiom at all, except once when he was explicitly asked to condense all his teachings into one sentence; then he replied: "Whatever you do not wish to be done to you, then do not do this same to the others." 7

This incidentally is one of the syndereses commonly recognized by the scholastic philosophers. "Quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri ne feceris." 8

7 Conf. Analects of Confucius; Book 25, chapter 23. James Legge's translation reads as follows: "Tze Kung asked, saying: 'Is there one word which may serve as a rule of practice for all one's life?' The Master said: 'Is not reciprocity such a word? What you do not want done to yourself do not do to others.'" (page 301). Recently some Chinese scholars wished to demonstrate that the teachings of Confucius may be summed up in one precept: "To imitate Heaven" (法天). This opinion is not yet generally accepted and probably will never be: first, because it is still to be proved that Confucius really believed in a personal God who is the perfection of all virtues so that He must be considered as the perfect standard for us to follow in leading our moral life (this is incidentally the opinion of Mo-tze as it is recorded unequivocally in the fourth chapter of his works); secondly, as a matter of fact, Confucius did not explicitly express it in the form of an axiom.

8 Speaking of the difference between synderesis, moral science and conscience, Cornelius Damen, professor of Morals at the Pont. University of Propaganda Fide, wrote: "Synderesis est habitus naturaliter inditus, quo prima agentorum principia legis naturalis cognoscimus, e.g. bonum est faciendum, malum fugiendum; Deus est colendus; quod tibi non vis fieri, alteri ne feceris. Scientia moralis est habitus acquisitus, quo homo ope ratiocinationis conclusiones generales seu principia secundaria deducit a primis principiis, e.g. Deus est colendus; atqui blasphemia Deum inhonora: ergo blasphemia est fugienda. Conscientia vero est actus, quo homo principia synderesis et conclusiones generales scientiae applicat ad casus particulares. (Conf. Introduction in Theologia Moralis, Romae, 1939, 13th Edition, page 59.)
However, we would decline to agree that such an axiom could be recognized as a really basic principle of moral doctrine, because it is obviously negative in form; and, as we know, moral perfection is not attained or approached by not doing evil, but it must be pursued by positively doing good. But let us return to our remarks on Confucius.

Indeed, on several occasions, Confucius has given a few kinds of moral principles both in negative as well as in positive forms. Nevertheless he did not establish, and did not even attempt to establish, a moral system logically deduced from some sound principle of ethics. He was much too practical to care for the establishment of theoretical principles. His doctrine, as it is recorded in the so-called analects of Confucius, is rather a mere unconnected series of "do's" and "do not's", most of them without even a properly given reason for such a precept. Furthermore, a great number of them were merely external formalities deriving their social rather than moral value from tradition and from the ceremonial or ritual books.

Mo-tze, on the other hand, was quite anxious to build a systematic moral doctrine. First of all, he wished to find an ultimate, absolute and universal standard of morality, which effort has been the pride of our modern philosophers who considered it an indispensable basis of a scientific ethical doctrine. Thus, for example, Herbert Spencer wrote in the preface of his Data

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9 As we have noticed earlier in our dissertation, Father Paul Geny, S.J., professor of Philosophy at Gregorian University, Rome, has written about Confucius: "Confucius, morum pristinam rectitudinem, suo tempore collabentem, restaurare intendid; nullo autem fundamento metaphysico supposito." (Conf. his Brevis Conspectus Historiae Philosophiae, Rome, 1929, page 28.)

10 Rene Grousset wrote: "La philosophie de Confucius est une moral pratique, de caractere essentiellement positif et social. Elle se contente de formuler la theorie de la societe chinoise telle que celle-ci existait sous les Tchou." (Histoire de l'extreme Orient, Paris, 1929, Tome I, page 193.)
Written as far back as 1842, my first essay consisting of letters on the proper sphere of Government vaguely indicated what I conceived to be general principles of right and wrong in political conduct; and from that time onwards my ultimate purpose, lying behind all proximate purposes, has been that of finding of the principle of right and wrong in conduct at large, a scientific basis.  

This ultimate basis Mo-tze found in the will of God, Creator and Supreme Ruler of the universe; because, first, on the part of God himself, being the most intelligent and most honorable Being, He, and He alone, has the right of establishing the norm of right and wrong; secondly, on our part, as we are His creatures and subjects, our first duty is to obey His will regardless of our own interests; and, thirdly, Mo-tze even tried to prove that our own true

12 This is because to judge right or wrong (morally) is essentially an act of intellect; therefore, intellect must in some manner possess the norm or the standard of right and wrong. But, as a matter of fact, no human intellect is infallible in such judgments; therefore, no human intellect possesses the absolute norm of morality. However, we may note that human intellects are not equal, some being more capable and hence more accurate in judgments; thus, we may say, that the more perfect intellect is the one that judges more correctly, since judgment, especially moral judgment, is the essential act of the intellect. Therefore, we may say that the most perfect judgment is in the most perfect intelligence. Then, Mo-tze shows that beyond any doubt Heaven is the most intelligent Being and hence Heaven must possess the most perfect judgment; therefore, we may take this most perfect judgment as the most perfect standard of right and wrong. Thus, our philosopher stated that the norm of morality is given to us by Heaven through His will.

Of course, Mo-tze did not develop his argument to such an extent, but he did point out that the norm of morality must come from the most intelligent being because such a norm is a standard, and it requires intelligence to make a standard. This argument is not similar to the argument of "the greatest Being" of St. Anselm, for Mo-tze did not intend to prove the existence of God, but solely to prove that the ultimate and absolute norm of morality must be in the person of God. This is similar to the argument of St. Augustine in proving the existence of a Divine Law.
interests can be secured only by honestly obeying the will of God, since God, as a loving father, wishes us good and knows better than we do what is truly good for us. Therefore, Mo-tze stated that the will of God is the ultimate norm of morality. Supposing that the existence of such a personal God has been philosophically proved or commonly accepted by the people (such as here, in our case among the people of ancient China), then, our philosopher Mo-tze has furnished the most reasonable, and, hence, the most scientific basis of a general principle of right and wrong, that is, the norm of morality.

Having thus established the norm of morality, Mo-tze proceeded to his fundamental moral axiom. His main argument was deductive while the Western philosophers in searching for a first moral axiom used the inductive method or rather reductive method, i.e. by reducing all moral imperatives to the most common and most primitive one, which is, as they found: "Bonum est faciendum, malum vero vitandum." But Mo-tze used a different procedure. He developed his argument from the already established, objectively absolute norm of morality, which is for him the will of God, instead of proceeding from the subjective norm which is our own conscience. The latter way, which is used by the Western moralists, is to find the most simple and most original dictum of our own conscience. Mo-tze started from the objective side; he had proved that the will of God must be the objective norm of morality; therefore, he immediately asked what does God wish us to do. The proper answer to this question would be the practical expression of the objective norm of morality; and, in the opinion of Mo-tze, if and when this practical expression were properly understood and accepted by our intellect, then it would become the subjective norm of morality, that is, the norm that we possess within ourselves.
When this essential difference of aspects is well understood, we may again follow the argument of our philosopher. He noticed that the act "par excellence" of the will is to love. He saw that the first act of God towards us is the act of loving. God loves us and therefore He created us and created all other creatures for our benefit.

Now Heaven loves the whole world universally. Everything is prepared for the good of man. Even the tip of a hair is the work of Heaven. Substantial may be said of the benefits that are enjoyed by man....Moreover, I know Heaven loves men dearly not without reason. Heaven ordered the sun, the moon and the stars to enlighten and guide them. Heaven ordered the four seasons, Spring, Autumn, Winter and Summer to regulate them.... Suppose there is a man who is deeply fond of his son and has used his energy to the limit to work for his benefit. But when the son grows up he returns no love to the father. The gentlemen of the world will all call him unmagnanimous and miserable. Now Heaven loves the world universally; everything is prepared for the good of man. The work of Heaven extends to even the smallest things that are enjoyed by men. Such benefits may be said to be substantial, yet there is no service in return.13

Hence, according to Mo-tze, our first duty is to love God, render love for love, so that the love between God and ourselves may be mutual. But to love God truly one must obey His will. A spontaneous loving obedience is the basic act of loving a superior. At this point, the argument of our philosopher is quite close to the scholastic moral synderesis of "Deus est colen-dus" whose immediate implication is "Deus est obedientus." However, according to the ancient Chinese philosophers such a synderesis would be rather a religious precept than a true moral axiom. Morality, for the ancient Chinese, is the body of regulations among human beings. Thus the first moral axiom

13 Quoted from Mei translation of Mo-tze's text, ch. 27.
must be a dictum as to the relations among men. Hence, Mo-tze went farther to ask what God wants us to do to each other. If we admit that God loves all men universally, then it is but obvious that He wishes us to love each other. Therefore the principle of universal love is almost automatically deduced from the accepted premises. We find that a geometrical figure will help us to demonstrate the convincing force of this argument of Mo-tze.

Once establish the side lines of this triangular figure, the basic line is but a moral necessity.

St. John, the Evangelist, has assured us that whoever says that he loves God but does not love his brothers, is a liar. Mo-tze also conceived such an idea, and has given the natural reason for it; God loves all men universally; therefore, He wishes that men love each other mutually and universally. Hence the first axiom of morality is the principle of universal love.

The first axiom of ethics, being found via-objectiva, is necessarily of a character different from the moral axioms of western philosophers. It is not instinctive, nor subjectively self-evident, but it seems rather like an external precept to which we will willingly submit only after a clear and quite

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"If any man say, I love God, and hateth his brother, he is a liar. For he that loveth not his brother, whom he seeth, how can he love God, whom he seeth not?" (First Epistle of St. John, Chap. v, v. 20.) Cardinal Hayes edition.
elaborate reasoning. Thus, this first axiom of Mo-tze is not a real axiom in the strict sense of the word. We call it an axiom only inasmuch as it is an ultimate general principle of morality. We may compare it with the Christian commandment from Holy revelation: The second commandment is similar to the first one: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself." 15 It is indeed second for the Christian doctrine, but it would be a first precept for the Chinese moralists, since, as we have noticed above, they considered the realms of moral philosophy as merely embracing human relations. Our duty towards God is, for them, strictly religious, and religion is not considered as a part of ethical philosophy. Apparently Confucius has even considered religion as something less important than ethics. Once, when he was asked by a disciple how to worship God and the spirits, he answered almost indignantly: "Since you do not know yet how to serve your fellow men, then how could you wish to know how to serve God and the spirits." 16 This attitude of Confucius was severely criticized by Mo-tze, who believed that the ultimate reason for the

15 "This is the greatest and the first commandment. And the second is like to this: "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thyself."" (Matt. Chap. 22, v. 38-39.) Cardinal Hayes edition.
16 Conf. The Confucian Analects, Book XI, ch. 11. Some authors tried to interpret this answer of Confucius as demonstrating his great respect for religion and for our religious duties. They believed that the real meaning of this reply was: "If you did not learn yet the less important of your duties, then how can you learn the more important ones?" However, most authors see here an evidence of Confucius' skeptical attitude towards the real existence of God and the spirits, or at least his purposely expressed negligence of our religious duties. We believe that Confucius' first interest was human affairs, human relations, and, as a consequence, the relation between ourselves and our Creator (if he did believe in God) only came to the attention of Confucius in the second place. Rene Crousset, referring to this point, wrote: "De fait, Confucius, tout en honorant le T'ien concu comme principe de l'ordre universel, refusa toujours d'appofondir cette notion. 'Comment savoir quelque chose du Ciel quand il est si difficile de savoir ce qui se passe sur la terre!' repon-dit-il a ses interlocuteurs." (quoted from Histoire de l'extreme Orient, Paris, 1929, Tome 1, page 193.)
Our philosopher has always emphasized the importance of our duties towards Heaven and the spirits. Nevertheless, nowhere may we find that Mo-tze has objected to the then traditional idea of ancient Chinese scholars, namely that the realm of ethics is limited to the relations between men. Hence Mo-tze considered his doctrine of universal love not only as the distinctive character of his moral teachings but also the foundation or the first axiom of ethics.

17 Once Mo-tze was told by Kung Men-tze (公彊) that Confucius, being eminent by virtue of his knowledge of literature, history, rituals, music and sciences, would make a very good and very sage emperor to rule the world. To this Mo-tze replied: "A sage man must pay reverence to Heaven, respect to the spirits, and love his fellow men." From this it seems that Mo-tze believed that Confucius did not worship Heaven sufficiently. Again, in condemning the disciples of Confucius, Mo-tze declared: "There are four points from the Confucian doctrine which are sufficient to ruin the world. First, Confucianism teaches that Heaven is not intelligent...." (Conf. text of Mo-tze, ch. 48, Kung Meng (公彊)).

18 According to Mo-tze our relations to Heaven and the spirits are always prior to that to our fellow men. Mo-tze said: "Any word, any action that is beneficial to Heaven, the spirits and the people is to be carried out. Any word, any action that is harmful to Heaven, the spirits and the people is to be abandoned." (Conf. original text, ch. 47, Mei translation.) Describing the regime of the ancient sage kings as the ideal government, Mo-tze said in conclusion: "Such a regime was agreeable to heaven above, to the spirits in the middle sphere, and to the people below." (Ibidem, ch. 27, Mei translation.) Heaven was always mentioned as first and most important, followed by the spirits and then our fellow men.
B) TRADITIONAL CRITICISM AND MODERN OPINION

There was only one traditional criticism of Mo-tze's doctrine of universal love, the criticism of the Confucianists. It is, to our mind, an exceedingly severe condemnation rather than a philosophical criticism. Such an unkind condemnation, as we will show later, is probably based on a misunderstanding of the meaning of the term "universal." The principal exponent of such a severe criticism was no other than the Plato of Confucius, Mencius.

Mencius, as we have explained in the first chapter, did not meet Confucius in person, neither did he ever meet Mo-tze in person; but he was living amid the great dispute of the two philosophical schools, namely Confucianism and Mohism. And Mencius surely could take the whole credit for the definite victory of Confucianism over Mohism and later over the Egoism of Yang-tze. However, the dispute was not a simple matter for Mencius, for the doctrine of Mo-tze and that of Yang-tze were quite popular at the time. To quote Mencius himself:

The words of Yang Chu and that of Mo-ti fill the empire. If you listen to people's discourses throughout it, you will find that they have adopted the views of one or the other. 19

I am alarmed by these things and address myself to the defence of the doctrine of the former sages and to oppose Yang and Mo. I drive away their licentious expressions so that such perverse speakers may not be able to show themselves. 20

20 Ibidem, page 284. This also shows the eagerness of Mencius in attacking Mo-tze's doctrine for the defence of Confucian teachings.
However, as we noted in the previous chapter, Mo-tze also pictured himself as the faithful defender of the traditional doctrine of the ancient sages, and he also accused the Confucianists of misleading the people and distorting the traditional orthodox doctrine. Apparently Mencius did not know much about Mo-tze's teaching. His criticism or rather condemnation of our philosopher is limited to only two points of the teachings of Mo-tze; namely, the doctrine of universal love and that of simplicity in funerals. In both cases Mencius seemed to have misunderstood our philosopher. Mencius pictured Yang-tze as teaching extreme egoism and Mo-tze as teaching extreme altruism. And, of course, as a faithful follower of the ancient sage kings and particularly a faithful follower of the great Confucius, Mencius considered himself to be the champion of the true doctrine which lies in the middle between the two extremes. The Confucianists had a good understanding of the principle "virtus stat in medio." Thus Mencius condemned the two extremes as follows:

Now, Yang's principle is: "Each for himself" which does not acknowledge the claims of the sovereign. Mo's principle is: "To love all equally," which does not acknowledge the particular affection due to a father. To acknowledge neither the king nor the father is to be in the state of the beast. If their principles are not stopped and the principles of Confucius set forth, their perverse doctrines will delude the people and stop up [sic] the path of benevolence and righteousness.21

This is the solemn condemnation of Mencius directed against the doctrine of universal love of Mo-tze. We suggest that the reasoning of Mencius went on probably like this: "If we should love all the people in the world equally, then we must love our own father just as much as we love a stranger on the

21 Quoted from J. Legge translation of the Book of Mencius, Book III, part 2, chapter 9.
Now, to love our father just as much as we love a stranger is to neglect our father completely; that is, in other words, to deny the existence of the special relationship between ourselves and our own fathers; which relationship is one of the five basic moral relations established by the ancient sage kings and so much emphasized by our Master Confucius. Now, the essential difference between human beings and the beasts is that the human beings are moral beings; they are moral beings because they alone truly have these five moral relationships and understand the rules involved in these moral relationships. Hence, to annul or to destroy such relationships is to annul the essential difference between human beings and the beast. Therefore, Yang-tze, who annuls the relation between the king and the subjects, and Mo-tze, who annuls the relation between the father and the son, reduce the noble state of human beings to the state of beasts. Consequently their doctrines are to be rejected.

Such a prejudiced judgment has dominated the Chinese-thinking world for centuries. To be brief, we will just quote this statement of Wang Yang Ming:

22 These five moral relationships are: 1) The relation between king and subjects; 2) the relation between father and son; 3) the relation between elder brother and younger brother; 4) the relation between husband and wife; 5) the relation between friends. It seems that Confucius was the real author of these moral relationships although, as always, he prefers to say that the ancient sage kings were the originators of them. The original Chinese name for the five relationships is 五倫. They are 1) 君臣 2) 父子 3) 兄弟 4) 夫婦 5) 朋友.

23 Wang Yang Ming 王陽明 (1472-1528 A.D.) is a remarkable Chinese philosopher, noted for his analysis of human conscience and for his explanation of the two basic elements of the universe, the Ying and the Yang. 
one of the greatest medieval philosophers of China:

Mo's principle of indiscriminating love without recognizing any difference and class makes one look upon one's own home, father and brother as one looks upon strangers. Thus one is left without a proper starting point.

The weakness of this strong condemnation of Mencius and his followers is that it cannot be properly applied to the teachings of Mo-tze. Throughout his entire teachings, we can find no evidence that our philosopher would teach us to neglect our own fathers and to regard them as strangers on the street; but, quite the contrary, we find Mo-tze emphasizing so much his doctrine of universal love that he would lead us to believe that we must love any stranger on the street almost as much as we should love our own fathers and brothers. This, of course, does not mean that we must therefore neglect our fathers and brothers. To say: "we must love strangers as we love our own fathers and brothers" is obviously not the same as to say "we must neglect our father and brothers and treat them as if they were strangers." The first sentence emphasizes love, but the second one emphasizes negligence. One is to build up and the other is to destroy. Mencius and his followers such as Wang Yang Ming simply made a logically illegitimate jump from the first sentence to the second one, and thus they believed that they had good reason to accuse our philosopher of destroying the basic moral relationship between human beings.

We shall discuss the real meaning of the term universal according to Mo-tze in the following section of our dissertation. Here our sole intention is to show that the condemnation of Mencius is logically feeble and inaccurate.

This English translation is quoted from S. Holth's booklet: Mencius, a Brief Outline of His Life and Ideas, page 26.
in objectivity. Unfortunately, with the complete victory of Confucianism, this criticism or rather condemnation of Mencius remained for more than two thousand years the golden rule in rejecting the doctrine of "universal love" of our philosopher. And consequently the entire contents of Mo-tze's teachings has always been considered as heretical and dangerous to society. As we have noted in the first chapter, the works of Mo-tze were condemned many times by different Imperial authorities and the sale of his books was several times strictly prohibited.

For more than two complete millenia, the Confucian doctrine enjoyed supreme command over the minds of Chinese people. Millions and millions of Chinese who had no chance of knowing anything directly from the works of Mo-tze, but who had to study the books of Confucius and that of Mencius as an absolute necessity in accomplishing their education, have believed in good faith that Mo-tze was obviously a heretic who preached a queer doctrine which is not only false but also dangerous to such a point that its realization would mean to reduce the human being to the state of beasts. That was a part of my personal experience. When I was studying the book of Mencius under the guidance of my grade school teacher, who was then not yet a Catholic (he died a Catholic later, two years after his conversion) but surely a very strict Confucianist, I then sincerely believed that no one should be permitted to read the book of Mo-tze, since it contained such a perverse and dangerous doctrine.

Then, just about the time when I was seriously studying the books of Confucius and of Mencius to the point that I was able to recite by heart their entire contents without missing a single word, there was a great
revolution in Chinese literature following the political revolution which ended the nearly five thousand years of history of the Chinese Empire and gave birth to a new republic. In like manner, the revolution marked the end of the Confucian dynasty in thinking and in literature, and opened a vast and free field of studies and discussions. Since then, every one has been free to choose a proper literary form to express his thought without the necessity of imitating the styles of the traditional classic literature. The only judge of one's style is the general attitude of the public, which may accept the style as pleasant or may reject it as impractical. This is called the new Chinese literary movement.25 Such a movement has occurred in Italy, France, England, and in almost every nation in the world;26 therefore, it was not unlikely that it should also happen in China. The political revolution has given it the chance it needed. However, we regret to note that the Chinese literary revolution has proved itself to be much more successful than the political one.

As the result of this literary revolution, the study of Mo-tze's teaching is now widely open to the public. And it proved to be a new and very interesting field for those who were quite tired of the Confucian classics which they were only permitted to praise but not to criticize. The works and the doctrine of our philosopher has become one of the most common subjects of scholastic discussions. For quite a while, in school halls, in periodicals, almost every one wanted to say something about the doctrine of Mo-tze. The first statement commonly agreed upon was, of course, that the condemnation

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25 In historical terms the Chinese call this movement 新思想革命. The outstanding leaders of this movement were L'iang Chi-Ts'ao 梁啟超 and Hu-Sheh 胡適.

26 Just a few hundred years ago, in Europe, it was considered unorthodox and daring to publish a book in languages other than Latin. Some famous writers were punished for doing so.
of Mencius was obviously too severe and somewhat unjust. It was evidently a misrepresentation grossly exaggerated for whoever has had a chance to read the original works of Mo-tze himself. Hence, no modern Chinese scholar would take this traditional criticism of Mencius seriously. On the contrary, many modern Chinese scholars have tried to raise Mo-tze into a position almost equal to that of Confucius, at least inasmuch as the original teachings of the two are concerned. The doctrine of "universal love" our philosopher taught is then immediately considered as praiseworthy under the principle of democracy. The first of the five moral relationships of Confucius, that is the relation between the king and his subjects, is now considered as a reactionary principle, since the principle of democracy abolishes the dignity and rights of the king. A democratic government is by the people and for the people, and thus, the head of such a government is merely the public servant of the people. Therefore the Confucian attitude towards the king and the emperor is necessarily considered as an anti-republican idea, and hence reactionary. The relationship between father and son is no more so sacrosanct as Confucius wished it to be. Fathers are also human beings, so they are not infallible in domestic discussions and most of all they cannot claim, as Confucius permitted them to claim, the complete possession of their sons and daughters so that the latter would have no rights of their own and would have to follow the will of the parents and serve them at any cost. As to the elder brothers, they have lost completely their Confucian privileges under the new republican laws. Thus, the

27 Of course their past influence in the minds of Chinese people can never be equal, since Confucius has enjoyed the undisputed throne of Chinese literacy for more than two thousand years. All the literary works of these two thousand years possessed an obvious Confucian influence either in thinking or in literary style.
three top relationships of Confucian morals have been greatly diminished if they have not yet completely vanished. Only the last two relationships were left more or less unchanged, namely the relation between husband and wife, and that between friends. However, Confucius did not say much about these two relationships.

Almost simultaneously both Western and Chinese scholars noticed the similarity existing between Mo-tze's doctrine of "universal love" and the Christian principle of "love thy neighbor." However, neither any of the Western scholars nor any of the Chinese writers has ever attempted to determine and to demonstrate exactly to what extent the similarity between the two doctrines would go. They merely stated that there is an evident similarity between the two. This we shall investigate in the next section of our dissertation.

In one word, modern critics have found the doctrine of universal love is far from being such a menace to civilization as it was described by Mencius; it is, on the contrary, now considered the foundation of democracy and the basis of world peace and unity. The following statement is, as we think, a typical example of what the Western Christian writers think about the doctrine of universal love of Mo-tze:

The golden rule according to Micius [i.e. Mo-tze] is to regard others as we regard ourselves; and to regard

28 Writers who considered Mo-tze as a utilitarian have consequently noticed the difference between the two doctrines. However, as we have demonstrated above, their criterion is not objectively true, hence the difference pointed out is not true. Others who agreed with our opinion, namely that Mo-tze was a theist, did not mention any essential difference between the two doctrines.
the things of others as we regard our own. It is a maxim, as we see, very much like the Golden rule of the Bible.29

Thus far modern opinion is unanimous, among Westerners as well as among modern Chinese authors. However, a further step in discussion will necessitate a division of opinions among them, for those who believe in the sincerity of Mo-tze's faith (not as a supernatural virtue but only as a firm conviction by natural reason) in the real existence of a person God will connect the philosopher more closely with the principle of Christian morality; on the other hand, those who classify Mo-tze as merely a utilitarian will definitely dissociate him from the Christians.

We have already seen who is on which side during our long discussion in the preceding chapter. As a general rule, the Western Christian writers naturally tend to accept Mo-tze as being as close as possible to the Christian doctrine, whereas materialistic-minded modern Chinese authors will prefer to make of Mo-tze a mere social pragmatist or altruistic utilitarian. Nevertheless, we did notice immediately that there are quite a few exceptions. There are some prominent Chinese modern scholars who are openly atheists, yet who acknowledge Mo-tze's sincerity in believing in God, and so they place our philosopher side by side with the Christian moralist in establishing the basis of their respective doctrines of universal love because it is the only logical conclusion for the theists that God, being the Creator of all of us, must wish us to love each other. Thus, for instance, the late Professor Ts'ai Yuan-Pai, former Minister of Education of the republic of China, and Dr. Hu

29 Quoted from S. Holth in his Micius, a Brief Outline of His Life and Ideas, page 32.
Mai un mode avantageux de rapports reciproques et que, si nous nous aimions les uns les autres, nous y trouverions, mutuellement, un benefice direct.\textsuperscript{33}

Mei Yi Pao, the English translator of Mo-tze's works and so far the only Chinese who wrote a sizable treatise on Mo-tze in English (or any Western language), expressed a rather ambiguous opinion. He may be quoted to support both of the two quite different (not to say contradictory) judgments. In discussing Mo-tze's doctrine of universal love, he first stated:

Motse arrived at this all important conviction largely from reaction against the greed of the time and impatience at the inaffectiveness of the Confucian solution of graded love.\textsuperscript{34}

Besides, Mei Yi Pao has, as we have quoted him in the preceding chapter, definitely stated that Mo-tze was a utilitarian because he was concerned with the greatest happiness for the greatest number of persons. Nevertheless, in the same treatise, Mei asserted Mo-tze's sincerity in believing in God and consequently the similarity of his teaching to the Christian principle of universal love.

His [Mo-tze's] religion is a revival of the old orthodox cult of a personal God not only as the head of numerous other spiritual beings but also crowning the ethico-political hierarchy in the human world.\textsuperscript{35}

Mei continued:

Borrowing the Christian terminology, we might describe the effort as one realizing the brotherhood of men through the fatherhood or at least the masterhood of God. Thereby

\textsuperscript{33} Ibidem, p. 154.
\textsuperscript{34} Quoted from Mo-tse, The Neglected Rival of Confucius, page 88.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibidem, page 148.
Motse expected more wholehearted observance and a deeper sense of loyalty of his followers.36

Concerning this point, we heartily agree with this last statement of Mei Yi Pao and we shall undertake to prove that the statements of Madame A. David and others who wished to make Mo-tze merely a utilitarian are based only upon false pretence.

Indeed, Mo-tze has emphasized and even over-emphasized the mutual benefit that will result from the practice of his doctrine of universal love, but this does not imply that therefore he preached universal love for a utilitarian purpose. This is for two principal reasons:

1) Mo-tze has solemnly stated the 'a priori' reason for his doctrine of universal love, namely because it is the will of God that we must love each other, help each other and thus benefit each other. We have already proved in the preceding part of our dissertation how Mo-tze discovered this will of God without the help of revelation. Our triangular figure represented properly the logical implication of Mo-tze's argument. We have quoted abundantly from the original text of our philosopher in the preceding chapter to show his insistence upon our absolute duty to obey the will of God just as it is a duty for a citizen to obey the head of the state where he is living. And just because it is only natural that the father of a family wishes his sons and daughters to love each other, help each other and benefit each other, and also just as it is only natural that the head of a state wishes that all his subjects love each other, help each other and benefit each other, so God, who is, according to Mo-tze, our father and ruler of the universe, wishes all the

36 Ibidem, page 158.
men in the world to love each other, help each other and benefit each other.

The rule of Heaven over the world is not unlike the rule of the feudal lord over the state. In ruling the states does the feudal lord desire his ministers and people to work for mutual disadvantage? 

Thus, the ultimate and imperative reason why we must love each other is that we must obey the will of God. We are quite surprised to find Madame A. David saying that Mo-tze's argument "tendait a nous demontrer que la loi de L'Amour Universal n'était pas un devoir imperatif, mais un mode advanta-

geux..." We wonder whether the author of this statement can have read the entire text of Mo-tze thoroughly.

Furthermore, the entire fourth chapter of the original text will handily serve us as a supplementary argument. In this chapter which is entitled "On the Necessity of a Standard," Mo-tze demonstrated to us that, as human beings (i.e. moral beings), we are obliged to follow an absolute moral standard in directing our moral acts just as the artisans are obliged to follow their standards in their respective works. No actions can be accomplished without a standard. Mo-tze said explicitly that: "To accomplish anything whatsoever one must have standards. No one has yet accomplished anything without them." From this, Mo-tze went on to demonstrate that the absolute standard of our moral conduct is God himself.

Henri Maspero, the noted French Sinologist, agrees with us when he writes:

"Pour lui, Mo-tze la moral repose sur quelques chose plus profonde: Les hommes doivent prendre le Ciel pour

37 Quoted from Mei translation, ch. 27.
38 Conf. above, page 203 and note 31.
39 Quoted from Mei translation, ch. 4.
modele, faire ce qui lui plaît et laisser ce qui lui déplait....

In quoting Maspero's statement, we shall cite our philosopher directly:

In quoting Maspero's statement, we shall cite our philosopher directly:

Now, what is it that Heaven desires, and what is it that It abominates? Certainly Heaven desires to have men benefit and love one another and abominates to have them hate and harm one another. How do we know that Heaven desires to have men benefit and love one another and abominates to have them hate and harm one another? Because It loves and benefits all men universally.

Therefore, in spite of the strong emphasis on the social result of his doctrine of universal love, we have solid reason to believe that Mo-tze sincerely based his doctrine of universal love upon the fact that Heaven loves all of us and wishes us to love each other. Like our Heavenly Father who makes rain to fall on the farms of both good ones and evil ones, we must love all our fellow men.

However, we wish to emphasize that the similarity of Christian universal love and that of Mo-tze's teaching merely goes as far as pure natural philosophy goes. The common brotherhood of humanity is reached by natural reason because the common Fatherhood of the One and Unique Divine Creator is definitely within the realm of natural reason. That is to say, following scholastic philosophy, we do believe that our natural reason can reach a philosophical certitude in proving the real existence of God and consequently reach the principle of universal love or universal brotherhood. But, as all Christian doctrine is essentially supernatural, so Christian universal love is really Christian only in its theological or supernatural value, which is to be found in the magnificent dogma of The Mystical Body of Christ, that is, of course,

40 Quoted from La Chine Antique, Paris, 1927, page 478.
41 Quoted from Mei translation, ch. 26.
transcendentally beyond the realm of philosophy. Therefore, we state that
the similarity is merely and necessarily limited to the realm of natural
philosophy.

We have found that No Christian writers ever noticed this most essential
and most important distinction. This is somewhat surprising to us, since
there are at least two Protestant clergymen listed as authors in our biblio-
ography. No Catholic clergymen have ever written a treatise on Mo-tze's
teaching. Father J. Henry De Premare, S.J., published his Vestiges des
principaux dogmes chretiens tires des ancient livres chinois in 1878, a date
prior to the revival of the study of Mo-tze; hence we understand why not even
the name of Mo-tze was mentioned in this otherwise adequate research.
C) THE REAL MEANING OF UNIVERSAL LOVE ACCORDING TO MO-TZE

The keynote for a decisive judgment on the doctrine of universal love of Mo-tze is to find the exact meaning of the term "universal." We have seen that Mencius' condemnation is incorrect because he did not make enough effort to understand what Mo-tze meant by the term universal, and as a consequence Mencius condemned something which Mo-tze never preached.

It is obvious to anyone who has read the original text of Mo-tze that he never undermined the special affection due to one's own father. On the contrary, as we have noticed, he took up this all-important filial devotion as the basis upon which he established our duty to obey the will of Heaven, which duty in its turn becomes the basis of Mo-tze's entire moral system. The argument went as follows: Heaven is to us like a loving Father. Now it is but obvious that a son must love his father and obey him. Therefore, we must love and obey the will of Heaven. 42 Nowhere among the fifty-three chapters of the work of Mo-tze which we now possess may one find a single instance in which Mo-tze has taught us to consider our father as a stranger in the street. 43 Unless Mencius got his information about the teaching of Mo-tze from a disciple of Mo-tze who pushed his master's universalism to an extreme, which is quite possible, we might say that Mencius has maliciously and

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42 Conf. original text, ch. 27. See also above, pages 188 and 205-206.
43 This is unanimously agreed upon by modern authors both Chinese and Western. To cite one example, even Madame Alexander David noticed: "Nulle part nous le voyons, du reste, renier ou attaquer les sentiments d'affection familiale. Tout au contraire, a maintes reprises, nous l'entendons qualifier de "desordre" les cas ou la piete filiale, l'amour paternel et fraternel sont offenses." Confer her work Le Philosophe Meh-ti et l'Idee de Solidarite, London, 1907.
purposely misinterpreted the teachings of Mo-tze.

Neglecting criticisms both ancient and modern, for a moment, we will try to analyze the significance of the term "universal" from the original text of Mo-tze alone. After careful study, we state that:

1) Universal means all-including. The object of our universal love is the whole of humanity past, present and future because the whole human race, that is, every human being, was, is and will be as brothers and sisters of the same family having God as the common father. Hundreds of years ago, the ancient sage kings had worshipped this same God and obeyed His will by loving universally. In other words, this universality of our love is based on the universality of God's fatherhood, which is, according to Mo-tze, universal to such an extent that it includes every single human being without limits of time and space. Thus universality meant "all including."

2) Universal means constant, since the real motive of universal love is the fatherhood of God, which is an unchangeable fact and does not accept any increase or decrease in intensity. Hence we must love our fellow-men constantly during our whole life-time.

3) Universal also means equal, but this is to be understood correctly. Mo-tze himself has said more than once that we must love all men equally. It seems certain that the Confucianists have based their severe condemnation of the doctrine of universal love of Mo-tze entirely on their interpretation of this equality. Indeed, Mo-tze has stated on several occasions that we must love all men equally; however, the exact meaning of the word "equally" is to be established by the teachings of Mo-tze taken as a whole system of doctrine. The text most often used to condemn Mo-tze read as follows:
Wu Ma-tze said to Mo-tze: 'I differ from you, I cannot love universally....I love the people of Tsou better than the people of Ch'u, the people of Lu better than the people of Tsou, the people of my district better than the people of Lu, the members of my family better than the people of my district, my parents better than the other members of my family, and myself better than my parents. This because of their nearness to me. When I am beaten I feel pain. When they are beaten the pain does not extend to me. Why should I resist what does not give me pain and not resist what does give me pain? Therefore I would rather have them killed to benefit me than to have me killed to benefit them.' Mo-tze said: 'Is this view of yours to be kept secret or to be told to others?' Wu Ma-tze replied: 'Why should I keep my opinion to myself? Of course I should tell it to others.' Mo-tze said: 'Then if one person is pleased with your doctrine, there will be one person who will desire to kill you in order to benefit himself. If ten persons are pleased with you (your doctrine), there will be ten persons who will desire to kill you in order to benefit themselves. If (the people of) the whole world are pleased with you, the whole world will desire to kill you to benefit themselves. (On the other hand), if one person is not pleased with you, there will be one person who will desire to kill you as the propagator of a wicked doctrine. If ten persons are not pleased with you, there will be ten persons who will desire to kill you as the propagator of an evil doctrine. If (the people of) the whole world are not pleased with you, the whole world will desire to kill you as a propagator of the evil doctrine. (So then) those who are pleased with you desire to kill you and those who are not pleased with you also desire to kill you. This is to say what passes out from your mouth is what kills your body; Mo-tze continued: 'Then, where, after all, does the benefit of your doctrine lie?'

We can see that the objector, namely Wu Ma-tze, here is not arguing against the universal love according to its extension, that is, that love must extend to all men in the world, since Wu Ma-tze himself stated that he does love other people, but only less than those who are closer to him by a
certain natural relation. This attitude of Wu Ma-tze is but natural and quite correct. However, he went too far in stating that he would rather kill other people to benefit himself; this made him quite strictly an egotist. Hence, Mo-tze took this opportunity to demonstrate to him that the doctrine of egoism does not even work for one's personal advantage and, that it is ultimately a doctrine of self-destruction. Of course Wu Ma-tze was unable to answer Mo-tze further, and thus Mo-tze won the discussion. Nevertheless, it is still obvious that Mo-tze did not answer precisely the main proposition of the objection to his reported doctrine of universal love. And for this reason, Mo-tze was condemned by Mencius as teaching an absolutely equal love towards one's parents and towards strangers in the street. No one can approve such an absolute equality in love. We are quite sure that Mo-tze did not intend to teach such a doctrine. His failure to answer Wu Ma-tze's objection precisely and positively was due either to the fact that he really did not want to answer it, or he might have considered it much easier to dispose of this annoying objector with a reduction to the absurd of his own egoistic doctrine.

We may excuse Mo-tze for the second reason, because we have seen that this objector, namely Wu Ma-tze, has already asked many other questions, most of which did not show his sincerity in discussing philosophy but rather show his anxious desire to trap Mo-tze in a kind of dilemma which Wu Ma-tze hoped would silence Mo-tze and hence win him the great honor of triumphing over Mo-tze in a dialectical discussion. It seemed also that Mo-tze finally silenced Wu Ma-tze with this quoted method of reducing him to the absurd.

However, we could not excuse Mo-tze for not answering such a query
about his doctrine of universal love anywhere in his entire work. At least in the whole text of the now-existing fifty-three chapters we could not find any positive and precise statement of Mo-tze concerning such an important matter, namely to determine specifically one's due attitude toward his own parent and that toward a simple fellow-man. In other words, must we really love all men absolutely equally or must we rather love our own parents and relatives more than outsiders? Nowhere did Mo-tze give any sort of positive or direct answer to such a query. But, as we have noticed in our first chapter, it is a matter of fact that we do not possess the entire original work of Mo-tze; therefore it might be possible that Mo-tze had given such an answer in some missing chapters of his original text.

The best we can do now is to find whether Mo-tze was in favor of such an absolutely equal love from the rest of the text which we are fortunate to possess now.

First, we must not neglect the important fact that at the time of our philosopher the Confucian doctrine was the dominant factor in the ethical ideas of the people. This Confucian doctrine emphasized or even over-emphasized the duties of a son towards his father and that of a subject towards his king. The will of both the father and the king was to be obeyed at any cost and almost blindly. One had to give everything he had and do everything he could to please his father and his king. The following sentence was one of the famous expressions of Confucianism: "When a king wishes his minister to die, the minister must die and cannot do otherwise. When a father wishes his son to die, the son must die and cannot do otherwise."

45 Original Chinese text: "君欲臣死不得不死父欲子死不得不死"
The duties and affections between relatives are so much emphasized that nepotism in politics was then but a commonplace. Mo-tze wished to combat such harmful nepotism which is the result of the over-emphasized family relationship; therefore Mo-tze naturally kept silent on love among relatives. At any rate, there is no reason to emphasize what is already over-emphasized. Mo-tze wished to subordinate that over-emphasized love of one's own relatives and on the other hand to emphasize that completely neglected duty of loving our fellow-men just as such; so that by balancing more reasonably these two kinds of love one might obtain the key to peace and prosperity for the whole world. The miseries in society, nepotism and consequent inefficiency in the government, and war among the nations were all the results of exaggerated familialism and nationalism, which are nothing else but the effects of an ill-balanced love. Mo-tze called this ill-balanced love the particular love or the discriminated love.

But, what is the way of universal love and mutual aid? Mo-tze said: it is to regard the state of others as one's own, the houses of others as one's own, the persons of others as one's self. When feudal lords love one another there will be no more war; when heads of houses love one another there will be no mutual usurpation; when individuals love one another there will be no more mutual injuries. When rulers and ruled love each other they will be gracious and loyal; when father and son love each other they will be affectionate and filial; when elder and younger brothers love each other, they will be harmonious; when all the people in the world love each other, then the strong will not overpower the weak, the many will not oppress the few, the wealthy will not mock the poor, the honored will not disdain the humble, and the cunning will

46 There are three chapters of Mo-tze's work entitled "The exaltation of the virtuous" which are written against the nepotism in politics of that time.
not deceive the simple. And it is all due to mutual love that calamities, strifes, complaints and hatred are prevented from arising. Therefore, the benevolent exalt it. 47

We can see throughout his entire work that what Mo-tze meant by universal love is a more reasonably balanced natural love. The balance consisted in extending our love to our fellow-men. We must extend our personal love to other persons and consider them as "alter egos." We must extend the love of our family to love in a similar manner other people's families; we must extend our love of country to love other people's countries. This is what Mo-tze called universal or mutual love; and it is in this sense that Mo-tze advocated the equalization of love when he said that we must love all men equally.

Mo-tze certainly did not neglect the special relation between father and son, and that between king and subjects or between brothers and sisters. He specifically lamented the lack of the virtues due to such relations because of the uprising of the modern (i.e. at his time) tendency of egoism.

Again, the lack of grace on the part of the ruler, the lack of loyalty on the part of the ruled, the lack of affection on the part of the father, the lack of filial piety on the part of the son....These are further calamities in the empire. 48

Loyalty and filial piety are often openly recognized by Mo-tze as specific virtues, and the lack of them is called by him a calamity of the world. Hence, it is unfair to accuse Mo-tze of neglecting the special affections between father and son and other relatives.

Another fact to confirm our conviction is that Mo-tze has criticized the

47 Conf. original text, ch. 15, Mei's translation, pp. 82-83.
48 Conf. original text, ch. 16, Mei's translation, p. 87.
ultra-expensive funerals and the exaggerated three years' mourning for deceased parents which were practiced and preached by the Confucianists of his time. For our specific purpose here we will only consider the facts about mourning. Mo-tze described the Confucian rules for mourning as follows:

What are the rules to be observed by the mourners? He must weep without restraint and sound as if he is choking. Sack-cloth is worn on the breast and hat of flax on the head. His tears and snivel are not to be wiped away. The mourner is to live in a mourning hut, sleep on a coarse mat of straw, and lay his head on a lump of earth. Then he is obliged to abstain from food in order to look hungry, and to wear little in order to look cold. The face and eyes are to look sunk as if in fear, and the complexion is to appear dark. Ears and eyes are to become dull, and hand and feet as to become weak and unusable. And, also, if the mourner is an official, he has to be supported to rise, and lean on a cane to walk. And all this is to last three years.

Adopting such a doctrine and practicing such a principle, rulers cannot come to court early...the farmers cannot start out early and come in late to cultivate the land and plant trees; the artisans cannot build boats and vehicles and make vessels and utensils; and the women cannot rise early and retire late to weave and to spin. Upon the death of the emperor, there will be three years' mourning; upon the death of a parent there will be three years of mourning; upon the death of the wife or the eldest son, there will be three years of mourning....Besides, there will be one year for uncles, brothers and the other sons and five months for near relatives; and also several months for aunts, sisters, nephews and uncles on the mother's side....

So Mo-tze wished to shorten the time of mourning. He favored a three day period of mourning for parents and a one day period for other relatives. Here we are not discussing the ancient mourning rules; we merely wish to show

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49 Conf. original text, ch. 26, Mei's translation, pp. 125-126.
50 Conf. original text, ch. 48. According to some commentators this word "day" is to be read as "month" in the original text. This is probably because the Chinese "day" (日) is quite similar to the character for "Month" (月). A confusion in transcription or in printing is very likely possible.
that Mo-tze was combating the exaggerated particular love of that time, and
trying to equalize man's love by diminishing what is exaggerated and increas-
ing what has been neglected, namely the love for one's fellow-men as such.

On the other hand, it proves also that Mo-tze did not neglect the
special affections due to one's blood relations. Otherwise, he would either
abolish all mourning completely — that is, have one mourn for one's own
father no more than for any stranger in the street — or he would advocate
a three days' mourning for any stranger's death, which fact would prove that
he taught one to love any stranger in the street just as much as his own
father. The solid fact that Mo-tze advocated a three day period of mourning
for one's parent and, of course, none for the stranger, is enough to prove that
Mo-tze did not neglect the special affection between father and son.
And thus we may state safely that Mo-tze did not preach an absolutely equal
love for all human beings.

The by-word of modern democracy inaugurated by the French Revolution is
"liberty, fraternity and equality," which equality does not mean that all
men are absolutely equal under a democratic doctrine. It rather means that
the principles of democracy equalize social differences inasmuch as it is
reasonably possible. This would be very much like the equality of love ad-
vocated by our philosopher. Or even better, we might say that modern demo-
cracy considers all men equal as such; that is, inasmuch as they are co-
citizens of the same country, they are equal in the dignity and rights of a
citizen. Similarly, Mo-tze urged us to love all men equally inasmuch as they
are members of the human race. But it is a matter of fact that in a demo-
cratic society some citizens must possess a few special rights and even
dignities which are intimately connected with the public office they hold.

So, likewise, one who practices the doctrine of universal love may rightfully love and serve his relatives in a special way because by natural law they do deserve such a special affection. This, of course, does not destroy the value of the general principle of universal love. God loves all men equally, yet He will reward the just and punish the unjust. This is clearly emphasized by Mo-tze on many occasions. Thus, although we love all men equally, we cannot treat all men equally, because we have the duty which is dictated by the natural law to serve our parents and relatives and to show our affection towards them in a distinguished manner. Or we may put it this way, as expressed by one of the disciples of Mo-tze: "To me, it seems that we are to love all without difference of degree; but the manifestation of love must begin with our parents and relatives." 51

Once the meaning of the term "universal" is well qualified, we will proceed to determine the meaning of the term "love" according to Mo-tze. "Love" is surely one of the most widely used terms and yet its meaning is most confusing among the common people. People love to love and love to use the term "love," and most of them love to know what "love" is. Indeed, the definition of "love" has been most disputed from the first epoch of human culture until this very date. For us, the most satisfactory move concerning this matter was the distinction of "amor benevolentiae" and "amor passionis"

51 Conf. Mencius, Book III, part I, chapter 5. Note that this disciple of Mo-tze is actually discussing the matter with a disciple of Mencius at the home of Mencius (because Mencius refused to see him); therefore he used a less firm affirmation and begins with "To me, it seems..." Original Chinese: 爱无差等施由親始
(or "concupiscientiae") which is accomplished by scholastic philosophy, although it was initiated and even fairly well developed by a few earlier philosophers.

Now, having this clear distinction in our mind, we will have little difficulty in finding out the formal cause, i.e. the essential factor, of Mo-tze's universal love.

After a careful reading of the entire text of the now-existing works of Mo-tze, we may firmly believe that Mo-tze has completely ignored the "amor passionis" or rather purposely disdained to discuss it or even to mention it. Hence, the love advocated by Mo-tze is obviously benevolent love, or, as we said, the "amor benevolentiae." Mo-tze would agree willingly with the saying "amare est velle bene" to an unlimited extent. Cicero speaking of love has said:

Quid autem est amare, e quo nomen ductum amicitiae est, nisi velle bonis aliquem affici quam maximis, etiam si ad se ex iis nihil redate.52

In a slightly different tone and under a somewhat different aspect, the great Leibnitz stated: "Amare sive diligere est felicitate alterius delectare."53

52 Conf. Cicero's De Finibus, Lib. II, cap. 24, no. 78.
53 Conf. De Notione Juris et Justitiae from Leibnitz's Opera Philosophica, edited by Erdmann, Berlin, 1839, page 118. Leibnitz also developed a reason for universal love similar to the reason given by Mo-tze. About this William Turner wrote:

"The multitude of monads which make up the universe are organized into the kingdom of spirits, of which God is the Supreme Ruler, a city of God, governed by divine Providence, or, more correctly still, a family of which God is the father....From this realization springs the impulse to love others, that is, to seek the happiness of others as well as one's own. The road to happiness is therefore through an increase of theoretical insight into the universe, and through an increase in love which naturally follows an increase of knowledge. The moral man, while he thus
Throughout the entire original text, we may find Mo-tze using "love" and "benefit" correlative. Although there is no etymological connection between the two Chinese terms used by Mo-tze, the English and Latin terms in their connection show the same connection of ideas as is found in Chinese thought. The English verb "to benefit" which came from the Latin word "benefacere" is intimately connected with the "amor benevolentiae." It is obvious that "to benefit" is but the practical realization of a benevolent love. The attitude of Mo-tze concerning this matter may be clearly seen through this statement of his:

The Confucianists say that the wise-men do insist on loving people but they do not care to benefit them. This (according to Mo-tze) is an erroneous statement. What Mo-tze would say is that there is no love without benefit.

Therefore, for Mo-tze, to love implies to benefit, at least in intention. To exclude the idea of benefiting from the definition of love is to destroy the very conception of love. Hence, his doctrine of universal love should be called, in its complete description, the doctrine of universal love and mutual benefit. In fact, benevolent love is essentially to wish good which is not objectively real unless it is realized at least by intentionally doing so. Thus, "benevolent love" or "velle bene" at least implies "intentionaliter benefacere," "to benefit intentionally." Therefore, the concept of "benefit, turns promotes his own happiness by seeking the happiness of others, fulfils at the same time the Will of God." (Conf. W. Turner's article "Leibnitz" in the Catholic Encyclopedia, Vol. 9, p. 138.)

54 Conf. original text, ch. 14. Mei did not translate this chapter; the above translation is our own. Original Chinese: 聖人有愛而無利者之言，乃道之言，天下愛人利子墨子之言，是大駁。
i.e., doing good and not merely wishing good, is at least an integral part
of the definition of love.

Turning to the even more practical side of this matter, we may ask Mo-
tze how this universal love is to be carried out in our daily life. We wish
first to quote an unjust remark against Mo-tze by Frank Rawlinson, who is
reputed to be quite familiar with Chinese literature. Rawlinson wrote:

What would have happened, for instance, if Micius or the
Micians had applied their justly famed logical principles
to the question of finding out how an impartial love should
operate? This they do not seem to have done.\(^5\)

This remark, as we said, is unjust, because very probably Mr. Rawlinson
has misunderstood Mo-tze's doctrine of universal love as a teaching of
absolute equality in love which is maintained by the modern communists to
such an extent as to destroy the most natural human institution, namely the
family, by proclaiming that the children belong to the state and that their
father and mother are to them no more than any stranger on the street. Thus,
the condemnation of Mencius falls justly to those Communists: "To love all
equally which does not acknowledge the peculiar affection due to a father...
is to be in the state of beasts..."\(^5\)

If Mr. Rawlinson is expecting Mo-tze
to tell us how to practice such equal love, then Mo-tze surely did not do it.
But, if the doctrine of universal love of Mo-tze is to be interpreted, as it
has been correctly done, as a prototype of Christian universal love, then
Mo-tze certainly has said enough as to how to do it.

\(^{55}\) Conf. Micius, a Brief Outline of His Life and Ideas, by S. Holth (in the
Introduction by Frank Rawlinson).

II, p. 283.
Mo-tze was not merely satisfied to tell us: "Love thy neighbour as thyself," but he went further and more specifically to state that we must love other people's fathers as we wish to love our own father; we must love other people's nations as we love our own nation; we must love other people's property as we love our own property. This is more specific than to say

57 Mo-tze said: Partiality is to be replaced by universality. But how is it that partiality can be replaced by universality? Now, when every one regards states of others as he regards his own, who would attack the other's state? Others are regarded like self.... When every one regards the houses of others as he regards his own, who will disturb the others' houses? Others are regarded as self...." Conf. original text, ch. 16. Again: "Now that there is disapproval, how can we have the condition altered? Mo-tze said: It is to be altered by the way of universal love and mutual aid. But what is the way of universal love and mutual aid? Mo-tze said: It is to regard the state of others as one's own, the houses of others as one's own, the persons of others as one's self...." Conf. Ibidem, ch. 15. Again: "This is true even among the thieves and robbers. As he loves only his own family and not other families, the thief steals from other families to profit his own family. As he loves only his own person and not others, the robber does violence to others to profit himself...." Ibidem, ch. 14. Again in answering objections, Mo-tze replied: "Now let us inquire about the plans of the filial sons for their parents. I may ask, when they plan for their parents, whether they desire to have others love or hate them? Judging from the whole doctrine (of filial piety) it is certain that they desire to have others love their parents. Now what should I do first in order to attend this? Should I first love others' parents in order that they would love my parents in return, or should I first hate other's parents in order that they would love my parents in return? Of course I should first love others' parents in order that they would love my parents in return. Hence those who desire to be filial to their parents, if they have to choose (between whether they should love or hate other's parents) they had best first love and benefit others' parents. Would any one suspect that all the filial sons are stupid and incorrigible (in loving their own parents)? We may again inquire about it. It is said in the "Ta-ya" among the books of the ancient kings: "No idea is not given its due value; no virtue is not rewarded. When a peach is thrown to us, we would return with a prune." This is to say that whoever loves others will be loved and whoever hates others will be hated. It is then quite incomprehensible why people would object to universal love when they hear it." Ibidem, ch. 16. Parentheses are original in Mei translation.
"Love thy neighbour as thyself" because Mo-tze pointed out specific characters to be considered in directing our practice of love. In pointing out some person as father, the special character of fatherhood (not physically but morally considered) is brought out for consideration. This reminds us that we surely wish to respect our father and also wish other people to respect our father; therefore must we give to this person the respect due to a father, and so on and so forth. This is a very practical yet easy to understand rule in answering the question how to realize universal love. This also clearly shows that Mo-tze was not preaching a blindly equal love, or rather equal disregard, of all human beings. And modern materialistic Communism even goes so far as to equalize human beings with beasts by denying the spiritual value of human souls, so that one's own father does not mean more to him than a horse or a dog. This is truly a total destruction of morality; with its moral value destroyed, love is merely a passion to provide self-interest which we possess in common with the brute.

To practice universal love is to exercise a virtue, but, since a virtue permits degrees of perfection, so the virtue of universal love is not equal in each individual. And it is our duty to reach the perfection of this virtue as nearly as possible. Mo-tze stated clearly that the standard of such a perfection is the universal love of Heaven itself. Heaven is the standard of all virtues; this is demonstrated by Mo-tze in the fourth chapter which is entitled "On the Necessity of a Standard." Specifically about universal love he said:

The love of Heaven towards human beings is more universal than the love of a wise man towards his fellow-men. But the wise men love the common people more universally than
the common people would love the wise men. And also the wise men will benefit the common people more promptly than the common people would benefit the wise men.58

By the term "wise man," the ancient Chinese meant not merely a learned person, but rather a virtuous person. Thus, the exemplary cause of this most important and most fundamental virtue is Heaven, the standard of all perfections. Man's first moral duty is to imitate such a perfection as closely as possible. And the way to reach this purpose is also clearly indicated by Mo-tze; it is that one must use his most sincere and undisturbed reason to direct his act of loving. The more one is sincere and the more he is able to keep his reason undisturbed by the passions, then so much the more is he able to reach a higher degree of perfection in morality. The source of the so-called partial and discriminated love is human passion, namely the passion of selfishness, which always threatens to disturb the reason and even to dominate it completely. Hence, a clear thinking with careful consideration to apply the golden rule of universal love, namely "to love other persons as oneself," is the method of achieving this first and most important moral virtue.

Mo-tze cited the examples of the ancient sage kings and showed how they practiced universal love and that, therefore, it is humanly possible to practice it. After citing many examples of the ancient sage kings, Mo-tze declared:

Therefore, universal love is really the way of the ancient sage kings. It is what gives peace to the rulers and sustenance to the people. The gentleman would do well to understand and to practice universal love; then he would be gracious as a ruler, loyal as a minister, affectionate
as a father, filial as a son, courteous as an elder brother, and respectful as a younger brother. So if the gentleman desires to be a gracious ruler, a loyal minister, an affectionate father, a filial son, a courteous elder brother, and a respectful younger brother, universal love must be practised. It is the way of the sage kings and the great blessing of the people. 59

Mo-tze's emphasis on the importance of this fundamental principle of universal love is obvious in a great part of his works. He repeated and repeated the same statement or a similar one so that one may become tired at times while reading his works. However, this repetition which makes the text heavier than it should be probably was caused by the unskilfulness of his disciples who actually wrote these texts.

In spite of the difficulties in practising universal love (because it requires a great effort to overcome one's own passions and thus sacrifice a few personal advantages), Mo-tze still believed that it is not only possible for a few learned men to practice it, but it is also possible for the common people to practice it in a wholesome way. A whole nation, even the whole world, could be led to universal love, if the leaders would properly instruct their people and convince them of the value of this principle and assist them to practice it in their daily lives. If this be done, Mo-tze says: "I feel people will tend toward universal love and mutual aid like fire tending upwards and water downwards." 60

Because it is not against human nature and yet is attractive to human reason, the doctrine of universal love is easily accepted by all men of good will as a doctrine to procure peace and prosperity in the world. This

59 Conf. original text, ch. 16, the conclusion, Mei's translation, p. 97.
60 Conf. original text, ch. 16, Mei's translation, p. 97.
conviction of Mo-tze was cleverly illustrated by himself in answering another one of these sophistic objections of Wu Ma-tze:

Wu Ma-tze said to Mo-tze: 'Though you love universally the world cannot be said to be benefited; though I do not love universally the world cannot be said to be injured. Since neither of us has accomplished anything, what makes you then praise yourself and blame me? 'Mo-tze answered: 'Suppose a conflagration is on. One person is fetching water to extinguish it, and another is holding some fuel to reinforce it. Neither of them has yet accomplished anything, but which one do you value?' Wu Ma-tze answered that he approved the intention of the person who fetched water and disapproved the intention of the person who holds fuel. Mo-tze said: 'In the same manner do I approve of my intention and disapprove of yours.'

Therefore, the doctrine of universal love is by its very nature, that is to say prior to any realization of its practical advantage, obviously approved by human reason so that the human reason is more or less obliged to accept it as good. This is so obvious that even a malicious objector such as Wu Ma-tze could not deny it. Thus, those who wish to make Mo-tze utilitarian have an additional difficulty in attempting to convince us of their opinion.

Strange as it may seem, it is yet true that the Confucianists, such as Mencius, who condemned so severely the doctrine of universal love of Mo-tze, were teaching an almost identical doctrine. Confucius certainly never taught us to hate anyone. Although he did not teach positively "Love thy neighbor as thyself," he stated something very similar to it when he said: "What you do not wish to be done to you, then do not do it to others." Yet this was given as a moral axiom when Confucius was asked by one of his disciples to give such a rule for life.

61 Conf. original text, ch. 46, Mei's translation, p. 214.
62 Conf. Confucian Analects, Book 25, ch. 23. Also see above pages 186 and 187 and note 7 of this chapter.
The teaching of Confucius was always very practical and almost pragmatic inasmuch as it seemed that he did not care much about principles which concern our inner conviction, and consequently our inner action (actus humanus) which is the essential part of the moral act or human act. It seems in the instance cited above that Confucius did not care much whether we must love others or not, but for a practical reason he wanted us not to hurt anyone. Similarly, when he was asked about his opinion regarding the attitude towards our enemy, he said he was not for the opinion which urges us to render good for evil received because if we do render good for the evil, then with what may we justly render the good we received? Therefore, we must render good for good, but let us also not do evil to our enemy. In other words, Confucius disapproved the doing either of positive benefit or positive harm to our enemy; we must stay in a purely negative attitude of disinterest in this matter; that is, to forget rather than to forgive our enemy. This again shows that Confucius was not much concerned with our inner action. He did not care whether we should forgive our enemy and even go farther to love him, or whether we should still hate him while for a practical reason we do not want to do harm to him. The acts of mind and heart as often neglected by Confucius, but the external acts are most carefully regulated — such acts as how to walk, sit, eat and drink — and to such an exaggerated degree of formality that he was reported by his disciples as refusing to eat any piece of meat unless it was cut in cubes. It is little wonder that Mo-tze has criticized the Confucianists of his time for carefully learning all ceremonial.

63 Conf. Confucian Analects, Book 24, ch. 36.
acts of sacrifice while not believing in the existence of spirits.

Nevertheless, Confucius was reported by Chuang-tze, the naturalist philosopher, as teaching universal love.\(^{64}\) We may also notice that Chuang-tze seems to have believed that universal love is but natural to human nature. He stated: "He who be-friends some (and therefore not others) has departed from human nature."\(^{65}\) At any rate, it is beyond doubt that Confucius has anxiously urged all men under heaven (i.e. all men in the world) to live together peacefully in order and in harmony.

When Mencius took the floor among the disciples of Confucius, he decidedly insisted upon the importance of man's inner acts. He emphasized man's good will, the will to do good to others; he came so close to the doctrine of universal love that we often wondered how Mencius could condemn this doctrine of Mo-tze as heretical and dangerous. He was almost quoting Mo-tze when he said:

\begin{quote}
The man of magnanimity loves all men. The man of propriety shows respect to others....He who loves others is constantly loved by others.\(^{66}\)
\end{quote}

Again he said on another occasion:

\begin{quote}
Treat with the reverence due to age the elders in your own family, so that the elders in the families of others shall be similarly treated; treat with kindness due to youth the young ones in your own family, so that the young ones in the families of others will be similarly treated.\(^{67}\)
\end{quote}

This, under every aspect, is a facsimile of the doctrine of universal love. Mencius has summarized his teaching regarding this matter as follows:

\(^{64}\) Conf. Book of Chuang-tze, ch. 13.
\(^{65}\) Conf. op. cit., ch. 6. H. Giles translation.
\(^{66}\) Conf. Mencius, Book 4, part 2, ch. 28.
In regard to the inferior creatures, the superior man is kind to them, but not loving. In regard to people in general he is friendly but not affectionate. He is affectionate to his relatives, and friendly to the people in general. He is friendly to the people in general and kind to creatures.68

The following schema represents this opinion of his:

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<td>friendly</td>
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As was demonstrated above by our analytic discussion, Mo-tze had taught precisely the same thing and called his teaching the doctrine of universal love.

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CHAPTER IV

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES ON INDIVIDUAL ETHICS

A) THE INDIVIDUAL IS NOT NEGLECTED BY MO-TZE

Since individual ethics is also (and even more commonly) called basic ethics, we wish first of all to demonstrate against the opinion of a few authors, that Mo-tze did recognize the individual as a completely 'per se' existing moral entity, or moral subject, not just merely as a part of society.

In fact, quite a few writers, who misjudged Mo-tze as an altruistic utilitarian, have asserted that Mo-tze ignored individual ethics. Thus, for instance, Mei Yi Pao stated that for Mo-tze: "Evidently outside of society there can be no ethics."¹ The reason given here by Mei was that Mo-tze followed the principle of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number." We have demonstrated that Mo-tze did not follow such a utilitarian principle, because although he is most willing to provide by all means the greatest happiness for the greatest number, he nevertheless does not admit that such a principle is to be acknowledged as the ultimate norm of morality. Mo-tze certainly did not neglect the rights of individuals and those of minorities. In his description of an ideal peace and prosperity he clearly pointed out the rights of individuals and those of minorities.

¹ Conf. Mo-tse, the Neglected Rival of Confucius, p. 109.
When all the people of the world love each other, then the strong will not overpower the weak, the many will not oppress the few, the wealthy will not mock the poor, the honored will not disdain the humble, the cunning will not deceive the simple.  

Even against the benefit of the whole world, the right of an individual stands solid and unchallenged. Mo-tze is more than willing to sacrifice his own life for the benefit of the world, but he does not approve of someone else being forced to sacrifice his life for the benefit of the world. He said:

To kill one person in order to save the whole world is not to benefit the whole world at the expense of one person. But, to sacrifice one's own life in order to save the world, is to benefit the world at one's own expense.  

Therefore, according to Mo-tze, every individual has a right to life which is not to be taken away by force even should the whole world be saved by such an act. For such an act, that is to kill a person (supposedly innocent) is essentially unjust; therefore Mo-tze stated that even though the world was saved by such an act, it is still unjust, and hence it is not to be said that the act has benefited the whole world. On the other hand, a supreme sacrifice offered by one's own free will is justified by the great benefit which follows; hence: "To sacrifice one's own life in order to save the world, is to benefit the world by one's supreme sacrifice." That is how much Mo-tze maintained the rights of individuals. Therefore we do not think that Mo-tze has blindly followed the principle of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number" as it is understood by the modern materialistic utilitarians.

2 Conf. original text, ch. XV, Mei translation, p. 83.
3 Conf. original text, ch. 45. Since Mei did not translate this chapter, the above translation is our own. (Conf. above page 152 of our dissertation and note 186 of Chapter II.)
Another argument to prove that Mo-tze cared for an individual ethics is the fact that Mo-tze did insist upon the unlimited knowledge of Heaven who is the supreme judge of all human acts and who eventually will reward or punish us accordingly:

Heaven clearly discerns it (human conduct) even if it be in the woods, valleys or solitary caves where there is no man.¹

In such a case, since definitely there were no other men present with the subject in question whose conduct Heaven clearly discerned, it is to be understood that Mo-tze was not speaking about our social conduct. Therefore, evidently Mo-tze must have recognized the moral value of individual acts. However, what we call individual ethics includes all actions dealing with our fellow men as one individual to another individual. Mo-tze certainly could not neglect such an individual ethics, since it is but obvious that he tried to prove the existence of international and social justice by a comparison of their nature with the nature of the undisputed individual justice, or as the scholastics often called it, commutative justice.

Suppose a man enters the orchard of another and steals the other's peaches and plums. Hearing of it the public will condemn it; laying hold of him the authorities will punish him. Why? because he injures others to profit himself. As to seizing dogs, pigs, chickens, and young pigs from the others, it is even more unrighteous than to steal plums and peaches from his orchard. Why? Because it causes others to suffer more, and it is more unhuman and criminal... All the gentlemen of the world know that they should condemn these things, calling them unrighteous. But when it comes to the great attack of states, they do not know that they should condemn it. On the contrary, they applaud

¹ Conf. original text, ch. 26, Mei translation.
it, calling it righteous. Can this be said to be knowing the difference between righteousness and unrighteousness?  

Individual ethics thus serves as the basis of social and international ethics. We may even go so far as to state that "Politics with Mo-tze were thus merely Ethics on a larger scale," which sentence is usually accepted by critics as a proper judgment of Plato's political philosophy.

Moreover, Mo-tze has left us quite a few practical instructions concerning how to control our own passions in order to achieve perfection of inner actions. For instance:

Mo-tze said: the six peculiarities must be removed. When silent, one should be deliberating; when talking, one should instruct; when acting, one should achieve something. When one employs these three alternatively, he will be a sage. Pleasure, anger, joy, sorrow, love and hate are to be removed; and magnanimity and righteousness are to replace them. When hands, feet, mouth, nose, ears and eyes are employed for righteousness, then one will surely be a sage.

We must also notice that the second chapter of the works of Mo-tze is entitled "Self-Cultivation," in which Mo-tze has left us a series of practical counsels concerning the regulation of our individual virtues. We shall discuss this more specifically later.

We do acknowledge that Mo-tze's first concern was world peace through internationally and nationally well-organized governments. Nevertheless, we insist that he was also very anxiously interested in individual morals. In concluding, we cite the following from the third chapter of the original text:

Watching a dyer of silk at work, Mo-tze sighed, saying:

"What is dyed in blue becomes blue; what is dyed in yellow

5 Conf. original text, ch. XVII, Mei translation, pages 98-99.
6 Conf. original text, ch. XVII, Mei translation, page 224.
becomes yellow... This is true not only with silk dyeing; even a country changes its colour in response to its influences... Not only states but also individuals are subjected to influences.

Thus, as a matter of fact, Mo-tze did not neglect the individual and his specific importance in ethics.
B) THE EXISTENCE OF FREE WILL

The first and most important "condition sine qua non" of ethical science is undoubtedly the reality of free will. At the same time, it is also one of the most tedious tasks of moralists to prove the objectivity of our free will. Mo-tze was fully conscious of this point, and did his utmost to prove the value of our free will, although philosophically speaking his contribution to this particular point was of very little importance. However, we do have to acknowledge that Mo-tze was the only ancient Chinese philosopher who has ever realized the utmost importance of this matter and thus tried hard to prove the objectivity of our free will.

In the five canonical books, which are the most ancient records of our Chinese civilization, we do not find any vital material for discussion so far as the question of "free will" is concerned. For the freedom of the will to act as it pleases is to be understood as a fact taken for granted by the ancient Chinese. We notice that Tao Te Ching, i.e. the book of Lao-tze, is the oldest document where a skeptical attitude towards the reality of free will has been reported. However, as we pointed out above, the authenticity of this document is very much in question.

At the time of Mo-tze, the undisputed "conditio possidentis" of the doctrine of free will was greatly challenged. And if we are to believe Mo-tze's description of the situation "ad litteram," then we must say that the entire value of morality itself was then in danger of being annihilated. But, as we know, Mo-tze was a great orator, and it is most common that an orator will exaggerate the situation in which the subject of his speech is placed.
Western classics students are undoubtedly familiar with the superlatives of Cicero. Hence we believe they will understand why a tendency to push things to an extreme is often encountered in Mo-tze, Mencius and even the conservatively tempered Confucius. We have seen that Mencius has severely condemned Mo-tze because the latter (according to the former) reduced the dignity of human beings to the state of beasts by abolishing what is most important in morality. Now, Mo-tze has his turn in pushing his opponent into an extreme corner in order to condemn him. He has done so by accusing the Confucianists of having preached fatalism which destroys the value of free will.

Finally, they (the Confucianists) suppose there is a fate, and that poverty or wealth, old age or untimely death, order or chaos, security or danger, all are predetermined and cannot be altered. Applying this belief, those in authority of course will not attend to government and those below will not attend to work. This is sufficient to ruin the world.7

Continuing his fight against fatalism in a special chapter dedicated to this purpose, Mo-tze said:

To adopt the fatalists' doctrine is to overthrow righteousness in the world. To overthrow righteousness in the world is to establish fate, which is a temptation to the people. And to offer people temptation is to destroy the people.

This is because fatalism destroys the moral value of our action, which value made our action praiseworthy or punishable.

Now the fatalists say: Whoever is rewarded by a superior is destined to be rewarded. It is not because of his virtue that he is rewarded. Whoever is punished by a superior is destined to be punished. It is not because of his evil actions that he is punished.9

7 Conf. original text, ch. 48, Kung Meng. Mei translation.
And we may be morally certain that the necessary consequences of such a doctrine will be disorder and all kinds of moral evils:

Under these conditions, the people would not be filial to their parents at home and respectful to the elders in the village and in the district. They would not observe propriety in conduct, moderation in going out and coming in, or decency between men and women. And if they were made to look after the court they would steal, if they were made to defend a city they would raise an insurrection... The unnatural adherence to this doctrine (fatalism) is responsible for pernicious ideas and is the way of the wicked.\(^{10}\)

Thus Mo-tze devoted a great deal of his energy to combating fatalism. By demonstrating the absurdity of fatalism, Mo-tze consequently defended the traditional belief of human free will. Man is gifted with a reason by which he may know what is right and what is wrong, and he is also gifted with a free will which enables him to choose freely between doing good and evil; hence he is responsible for his action and merits reward if he does good, deserves punishment if he does evil. This is the traditional doctrine of the Chinese people, as well as the original belief of all peoples no matter how primitive or how progressive their material civilization may be in our day. It is a historical fact that fatalism or any other form of amoralism came after a certain period of time. The case here is similar to that of belief in the existence of God. The history of comparative religion has given evidence that all primitive people believed in the real existence of a God creator and worshipped Him, whereas atheism came much later, during the so-called progress of material civilization.

\(^{10}\) Ibidem, p. 186. The translation is rather too literal; however, we do not think that a translation of our own is necessary in this case, since the purpose of Mo-tze's speech is easily understood even in so strictly literal a translation.
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10 Ibidem, p. 186. The translation is rather too literal; however, we do not think that a translation of our own is necessary in this case, since the purpose of Mo-tze's speech is easily understood even in so strictly literal a translation.
In combating fatalism, Mo-tze was very anxious to show that the doctrine of fatalism is not scientifically proved, has no sufficient foundation, and is dangerous for the common good of the people; therefore it is to be rejected. But Mo-tze did not furnish any positive argument to prove the real existence of human free will. We can only try to construct what would be his positive argument after studying his refutation of fatalism. Also let us not forget that a positive argument to prove the real existence of human free will which will please and satisfy all philosophers, is still wanting in our age.

Mo-tze's refutation of fatalism is quite an elaborate effort in dialectical technique. First he describes it as follows:

The fatalists say: When fate decrees that a man shall be wealthy he will be wealthy; when it decrees poverty, he will be poor; when it decrees a large population, this will be large; and when it decrees a small population, this will be small; if order is decreed, there will be order; if chaos, there will be chaos. If fate decrees old age, there will be old age; if untimately death, there will be untimately death. Even if a man sets himself against his fate, what is the use?11

Then, Mo-tze tells us that such a doctrine has influenced both the rulers and the common people of his time, and that he therefore feels a careful discussion is urgently wanted to determine the trustworthiness of such a doctrine. Then he presents his three ways to test the value of any doctrine.

Mo-tze said: Some standard of judgment must be established. To expound a doctrine without regard to the standard is similar to determining the directions of sunrise and sunset on a revolving potter's wheel. By this means the distinction of right and wrong, benefit, and harm, cannot be known. Therefore there must be three tests. What are the three texts? Mo-tze said: its basis, its applicability and its verifiability. On what is it to be based? It is to be based on the deeds of the ancient sage kings. How is it to be

11 Conf. original text, ch. 35, Mei translation, p. 182.
verified? It is to be verified by the senses of hearing and sight to the common people. How is it to be applied? It is to be applied by adopting it in government and observing its benefits to the country and to the people. This is what is meant by the three tests of every doctrine.12

Here we must note that there are some slight differences among the three tests enumerated in three different chapters similarly entitled "Anti-Fatalism," namely chapters thirty-five, thirty-six, and thirty-seven. For instance, in chapter thirty-six, Mo-tze presents as his first test accordance with the will of Heaven and the spirits. And the senses of the common people are not named. Moreover, the texts following the enumeration of the three tests are somewhat confused. For instance, the senses of the common people is named as a test in chapter thirty-five, but its value only is discussed in chapter thirty-six where Mo-tze failed to name it as one of his tests.

We must therefore read these three chapters as if they were one, and try to make them supply each other's lack, and thus reconstruct the more likely original argument of Mo-tze.

After such an analytic and simultaneously (but not under the same respect synthetic research, we find that Mo-tze wished to condemn fatalism with these arguments:

1) Fatalism is not in accordance with the will of Heaven. This is proved by many quotations from the ancient canonical books in which are recorded the teachings of the ancient sage kings, who declare explicitly or, more often, implicitly that the fatalistic doctrine is not in accordance with the will of Heaven. The same books also furnish us with historical facts which prove that

12 Cf. ibidem, p. 183.
Heaven punishes severely those who believed in fatalism and rewards those who do not believe in fatalism. Therefore, since our first duty is to obey the will of Heaven, we then must reject the doctrine of the fatalists.

2) Fatalism is against the teachings and practice of the ancient sage kings. This is again proved by quoting the ancient documents. It is rather a convincing argument since the people of Mo-tze's time generally believed that the ancient sage kings were virtually infallible.

3) The real existence of Fate cannot be proved by any means. It cannot be proved physically by the senses of hearing and sight, for no one, from the beginning of time to our date, may testify that he ever saw or heard directly from such a thing as fate. It cannot be proved morally, because all moral arguments require the non-existence of fate, since it is most unwanted morally. It is even a moral necessity that fate must not exist. Therefore we may conclude that fatalism has no foundation in reality.

4) Fatalism is morally absurd, since its realization implies the total destruction of morality which is based on the fact that human will is free to operate as it wishes. Therefore, it must be a false doctrine.

5) Fatalism is the imaginary creation of tyrants, who wanted to enslave the people by making them believe in fate, blaming it for the miseries of their life. It is enjoyed by bandits and other evil doers in committing their unjust actions, for they may transfer the responsibility of their acts to fate. It is welcomed by lazy people, who will abandon their works and duties as they wish to trust themselves completely to the hands of fate.

Therefore, Mo-tze said: Fate is invented by wicked kings and utilized by desperados. It is the doctrine of the wicked ones.13

13 Conf. original text, ch. 37.
Thus, Mo-tze rejected and condemned fatalism or any other kind of determinism. He solidly maintained that human will is free, and that therefore man is responsible for his own actions. We may say that he proved the existence of free will by excluding the contradictory.

But, what if man cannot know what is right and what is wrong? In such case, free will alone will not imply moral responsibility. Therefore we must see what the attitude of Mo-tze is towards the moral value of the judgment of human intellect. This will be the subject of our next section.
C) THE VALUE OF INTELLECT

The topic of our present discussion, the value of intellect, is not the crucial problem of knowledge, although obviously there is a rather intimate connection between them. We are hereby merely asking whether the human intellect as such is capable of knowing what is morally right and what is morally wrong. Of course, to ask such a question we must pre-suppose that the objective value of human intellect has been accepted as a matter of fact. We do not want to go beyond the realm of moral philosophy and to invade the field of criteriology, which is a branch of metaphysics.

Quite a few modern scholars speak of a "moral sense" with which we distinguish what is morally right from what is morally wrong. We do not approve the use of the term "sense," because this may easily lead to a philosophically deplorable confusion. We maintain that the faculty in charge of moral judgment is intellect, which is not to be confused with any kind of sensitive faculties.

The ancient Chinese would not have approved the use of the term "sense" to designate the faculty of our moral judgment, because they firmly maintained that the essential difference between human beings and brutes lies in the fact that the former is capable of distinguishing what is morally right and what is morally wrong.

Just as in the case of "free will," the ability of our intellect to know morals is accepted as a matter of fact since the beginning of human civilization. It is historically certain that all peoples in their earliest and most primitive state have believed that human intellect, in its normal state, is capable of knowing what is morally right and what is morally wrong. The most
ancient written documents of any people will support either explicitly or at least implicitly this statement. One may find implicit support in the praise of heroes, the condemnation of villains, in all law codes, in religious records speaking about rewards and punishments by God. All of this necessarily implies that the people of that time have believed in the moral value of human intellect. The ancient Chinese people in particular were conscious of this fact, and insisted upon the importance of it, because they believed that precisely on this point stands the essential difference between humans and brutes. They did not take note of the abstractive power of human intellect by which the universal concept is formed. They did not see this as the essential superiority of the human being, only insisting upon the moral knowledge.

As a matter of fact, we must admit that moral skepticism came later during the progress of history. And whenever it came, it came as a surprisingly unusual doctrine. It is recorded in history rather because of its strange singularity than because of its value. We insist upon this fact because, first, the fact itself is a sort of positive argument for this important basis of morality; secondly, it may serve as a good reason to explain why the early philosophers did not care to prove the moral value of human intellect, for at their time moral skepticism was simply unknown.

Certainly at the time of Mo-tze, a moral skepticism, which challenges the capability of the human intellect in judging morals, was definitely unknown. The fatalists had challenged free will but obviously left the intellect unmolested.

Accepting as a matter of fact that our intellect can and does know what is right and what is wrong, there is still an important question: "How does
principles of morality which are evidently "musts" just as it understands that two and two must make four. Such principles are called moral axioms, or synderesis; they are morally 'per se' evident and hence do not need any dialectical proof or demonstration.

However, the moral problems facing us in our daily life are not all so simple as to be considered directly in the light of those moral axioms and thus to be judged by us almost instinctively. The practical facts are always much more complicated than the formula-like principles; this is because of the circumstances which are almost always present in any moral problem that faces us. In judging or rather solving a moral problem under many different circumstances, human intellect is infallible because it faces a quite complicated logical process. Therefore we must learn, we must study in order to improve our ability to solve moral problems.

This is probably the opinion of Mo-tze, because he believed that human intellect is capable of distinguishing clearly, immediately and without hesitation what is essentially wrong from what is essentially right. He compared this spontaneous and decisive judgment to the judgment of the eyes in distinguishing white and black, which was, for the Chinese of that time, a typical example of the most persuasive criterion of physical certitude.

In his argument against offensive war, he pointed out that theft, robbery and murder are unjust because by these actions one injures other persons in order to benefit himself. Now offensive war is nothing but theft, robbery and murder in large scale, yet some politicians are so perverse that

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14 We have quoted him directly on this matter. See above note 5.
they tried not only to justify it, but even to glorify it. So Mo-tze concluded:

Now, if there were a man who, upon seeing a little blackness, should say it is black, but upon seeing much, should say it is white; then we should think that he could not tell the difference between black and white. If upon tasting a little bitterness one should say it is bitter, but upon tasting much, should say it is sweet; then we should think he could not tell the difference between bitter and sweet. Now, when a little wrong is committed people know that they should condemn it, but when such a great wrong as attacking a state is committed people do not know that they should condemn it; on the contrary, it is applauded and called righteous. Can this be said to be knowing the difference between righteous and unrighteous?  

In this dialectical discussion, the immorality of theft, robbery and murder is directly deduced from the common principle that condemns any action by which one shall injure other persons in order to benefit himself. This principle, according to Mo-tze, is self-evident. All human beings are convinced that such an action is not right just as much as they are convinced that black is not white. St. Augustine has also noticed that theft is obviously wrong and so undoubtedly convinced by all that even the thief himself cannot tolerate anyone to steal his own possessions. Hence, here is one of the moral axioms which are obvious to all of us so that no argument is needed to convince us of its value. To injure others in order to benefit oneself is wrong. This is evident because our intellect sees it clearly and directly, excluding all possibility of doubts.

However, in a more complicated matter, human intellect may easily be lured from strictly logical reasoning and thus misplace its moral judgments, as in offense, i.e. aggressive, war, in which the war lord tries to persuade his people that the war they are going to start is a just one because of many
particular circumstances. We shall discuss later the arguments of Mo-tze against all those pseudo-justifications of aggressive war. Here we merely wish to demonstrate that Mo-tze was well aware of the fact that our natural or innate ability of distinguishing moral values is not alone sufficient because of the complications of circumstances. In other words, although this natural capacity to understand clearly fundamental principles of morality is "per se" sufficient to us in order to make up our moral judgments, it is nevertheless in many cases insufficient "per accidens." Therefore we must learn how to overcome the "per accidens." This is, according to Mo-tze, to be done by following his triple tests, which we have already listed in a preceding chapter. Hence, we can firmly state that Mo-tze does not approve extreme innatism, which we mentioned as the first theory.

Neither was he in accord with the second theory, extreme acquisitionism. In fact, Mo-tze clearly denounced conventionism in morals. Morals, for him, is something above human agreement. We have pointed out in the earlier part of this treatise Mo-tze's demonstration that such a common agreement may be made in disregard of moral principles, in which case it is not to be considered as good; if it is in accordance with moral principles then it is to be called good not because of the authority of such a conventional agreement but because of the natural authority of moral principles, which, in our present day, we call "natural laws." Mo-tze cited, as a typical example, the tradition of a certain cannibal tribe south of China. Cannibalism in certain determined circumstances was approved and even enforced by the civil laws of that tribe. But, he pointed out, it is only too obvious for us (that is,  

16 Chapter II, section 3.
the Chinese), to see that this is morally wrong. Therefore, custom, tradition, common agreements and even civil laws cannot justify anything that is "per se" morally wrong. Mo-tze used this argument against the super-expensive funerals of his time. If the description of Mo-tze was faithful, then we will all admit that there was unnecessary waste of useful material goods and unnecessarily exaggerated manifestations of sadness which were close to self-starvation and other means of endangering one's own health. To waste goods and to hurt one's own health unnecessarily is morally wrong; therefore even tradition of the ancients or agreement of the common people cannot justify the funeral customs of his time. 17 Thus, it is quite evident that Mo-tze does not belong to the group of supporters of extreme acquisitionism, which we mentioned as the second theory. Hence, even by way of exclusion we may reach the same conclusion; namely, that Mo-tze maintained the third theory we have mentioned above, a theory in which the value of human intellect in morals is stated as follows:

1) A priori and by its own nature, it a) understands well and definitely what is meant by morally right and what is meant by morally wrong; 18 and b) sees clearly and understands perfectly a few moral principles, which are

17 For more details conf. original text, ch. 25, "On Simplicity in Funerals," Mei translation, pages 123 and sqq.
18 Samuel Clarke, an English follower of Descartes, has expressed this point of view quite energetically and, what is more interesting, he also compared it with the distinction of white and black, although we are quite sure that he never read Mo-tze or any other Chinese philosopher's works. Mr. Clarke wrote in his A Discourse Concerning the Unchangeable Obligations of Natural Religion, London, 1706, p. 58: "Though it may perplex us to define them, yet right and wrong are nevertheless in themselves totally and essentially different, even altogether as much as white and black, light and darkness."
evident to it, i.e. persuasive by themselves and hence do not need proofs.

2) A posteriori and because of the complicated circumstances involved in many practical moral problems, it may form wrong judgments and reach wrong conclusions.

Since this defect is "a posteriori," we may correct it via a posteriori. And this is to be done by the three tests, which are, in other words, as we have seen above: to study the case or the problem carefully, following sound logical rules and solid dialectics using historical facts and experiences as materials to help our decision.

This is, as we believe, the moral value of human intellect according to Mo-tze.
C) HUMAN PASSIONS — PLEASURE — VIRTUE AND VICE

After having considered the role of will and intellect, we must not forget the important place in morals occupied by human passions. In fact, we may say that it was human passions which furnished the "raison d'être" of ethical studies. Without passions, we would probably all be saints, and ethical discussions would seem at least unnecessary if not exactly a waste of time.

Evidently Mo-tze admitted the existence of passions and advised us to control them:

Mo-tze said: the six peculiarities must be removed.... Pleasure, anger, joy, sorrow, love and hate are to be removed; and magnanimity and righteousness are to replace them. When hand, feet, mouth, nose, ears and eyes are employed for righteousness, then one will surely be a sage.19

Six passions are named here by Mo-tze, because these six are considered as standard passions at that time. The English translator has called them peculiarities, but their names very evidently indicate that they are what Western philosophers call human passions. The verb "remove" used here is obviously to be understood as "to control" since first of all it is impossible to remove the passions; secondly, Mo-tze, promoter of universal love, cannot logically demand us to remove our passion of love. We remember well that he merely asked to have us universalize our love and in a right way equalize it. Mo-tze noted that when the passions are well controlled, one might become a sage.

We have seen how Mo-tze wished us to control our passions of love and

19 Conf. original text, ch. 47, Mei translation, p. 224.
nate. Hate is to be restrained as much as possible, because it is diametri-
cally opposed to the will of Heaven, who "abominates to have them (men) hate
and harm one another."20 As for love, we have discussed it adequately in our
preceding chapter. The passion of love is to be guided by reason. Thus man
should not love as he pleases, but should love as he must. That is, in other
words, we must practice universal love which is based on reason and we must
reject partial love which is based on passion.

Pleasure here is named as one of the passions, but it is also the common
name for all passions, and in this sense it is almost a synonym for passion.
Mo-tze discussed pleasure under the latter signification. Hence we will follow
him in considering passion in general, because what we want to do here is to
determine the general principles used or rather followed by Mo-tze, and not
those particular counsels concerning how to control a given passion, such as
"Count to ten before you burst out in anger."

We must note that the term pleasure really means the satisfaction of
human passion; hence, if one be satisfied with his passion of anger, he does
have the pleasure of such a given satisfaction. Mo-tze admitted that passions
are natural demands of human beings, and that these natural demands must be
satisfied, but satisfied reasonably and not blindly, leading to excessive
pleasure. Mo-tze's philosophy of life is not a pessimistic one as one au-
thors wish us to believe. The aim of his doctrine is to promote peace, pros-
perity, happiness and also pleasure, but in a well determined sense.

According to Mo-tze, as we have seen above, Heaven created or made every

20 Conf. original text, ch. 4, Mei translation, p. 14.
thing in the universe (including the top of a hair) for the benefit of human beings. Therefore men are given by Heaven the right to enjoy all the creatures of Heaven. Like a loving father, Heaven is somewhat even anxious to see that men enjoy themselves with the benefits furnished by other creatures. Hence, there is nothing morally wrong if men shall have the pleasure of enjoying the benefit provided by Heaven's love. However, Mo-tze has given a rather strict rule over the limits of such enjoyment:

Mo-tze said: Before the art of building houses and palaces was known, primitive people lingered by the mounds and lived in caves. It was damp and injurious to health. Thereupon the sage kings built houses and palaces. The guiding principles of the buildings were these: The house shall be built high enough to avoid the dampness and moisture, the walls thick enough to keep out the wind and the cold; the roof strong enough to stand snow, frost, rain and dew; and the walls in the palaces high enough to observe the propriety of the sexes. These are sufficient, and any expenditures of money and energy that does not bring additional utility shall not be permitted.

Before clothing was known, the primitive people wore coats of furs and belts of straw. There were neither light and warmth in winter nor light and cool in summer. The sage kings thought this did not satisfy the needs of man. So, he taught the women to produce silk and flax and linen therewith to make clothing for the people. The guiding principles for clothing were these: In winter the underwear shall be made of spun-silk so as to be light and warm. In summer it shall be made of coarse flax so as to be light and cool. And this is sufficient. Therefore the sages made their clothes just to fit their stature and size, and not for the purpose of pleasing the senses or to dazzle the common people.

Before the art of cooking was known, primitive people ate only vegetables and lived in separation. Thereupon the sage king taught the men to attend to farming and to plant trees to supply the people with food. And the sole purpose of securing food is to increase energy, satisfy hunger, strengthen the body and appease the stomach. He (the sage king) was frugal in spending wealth and simple in habits of living, and so the people become rich and the
country orderly.

Before the primitive people knew how to make boats and carts, they could neither carry a heavy load nor travel a great distance. Thereupon the sage king made boats and carts to facilitate the people. The boats and carts were made durable and convenient so that they would carry much and travel far. Such an undertaking takes little wealth but produces many benefits...

From what we have quoted above, we may see clearly that Mo-tze did provide a rather sound and reasonable principle to be the rule of our enjoyment even in the necessities of living. Housing, clothing, food and transportation must be provided to satisfy the natural needs of men. But to seek what is beyond this modest satisfaction is to overstep the purpose of those creatures which we enjoy. This is to go beyond the demands of our nature. Therefore the pleasure resulting from such an action is considered by Mo-tze as illegal and immoral, that is, morally wrong. Hence, the general principle of Mo-tze is to enjoy material goods according to the purpose of the same, and only inasmuch as to satisfy our natural needs. To act according to this principle is to be virtuous. Vice is any act against such a principle.

Mo-tze did not teach self denying and rigid ascetism, although he probably practiced it with his disciples. His words to the public, such as we have quoted above, did not urge them to do mortification. On the contrary, he expressed positively that he wished them to be comfortable and enjoy those material means provided for us by a loving Heaven. He wanted the houses to have a basement to avoid dampness in living rooms; thick walls and safe roofs to make them weather proof. He wanted winter clothes not only to be warm, but
poor and denounce material goods; at least, it is not necessarily so, because he has explicitly stated that a superior man may well be also a wealthy man. "The way of the superior man makes the individual incorruptible in poverty and righteous when wealthy."²³

His effort to provide material satisfaction for all men is also quite obvious. He urged the rulers to benefit the people and to enrich them. However, Mo-tze did wish to set a limit to man's enjoyment. The limitation was that it must be reasonable. One must seek to satisfy natural demands only inasmuch as the purpose of such a natural demand is reached. More than this is, according to Mo-tze, more than reasonable, and is therefore vice. The general term used to indicate such a vice may be translated into English (rather literally) as "luxury."

Mo-tze understood very well that "luxuries" please the senses, flatter the passions, yet he firmly condemned them. His doctrine of "Anti-music" is really a doctrine of "Anti-luxury."

Mo-tze said: The reason Mo-tze condemns music is not that the sounds of the big bell, the sounding drum, the Ch'in (piano) and the se (Violin) and the yu and the sheng (flute) are not pleasant, that the carving and the ornaments are not delightful, that the fried and boiled meats of the grass-fed and the grain-fed animals not gratifying, or that the high towers, grand arbours, and quiet villas are not comfortable. Although the body knows they are comfortable, the mouth knows they are gratifying, the eyes know they are delightful, and the ears know they are pleasing, yet they are found not to be in accordance with the deeds of the sage kings of antiquity and not to contribute to the benefit of the people at present, and so, Mo-tze proclaimed: To have music is wrong.²⁴

²³ Conf. original text, ch. 2, Mei translation, p. 7.
²⁴ Conf. original text, ch. 32, Mei translation.
After this, Mo-tze proceeded to develop his arguments against such luxuries. However, the text hereafter gives only the arguments against music; the luxury of sight and that of taste is missing or purposely dropped since it is quite obvious that the same arguments which are used against the luxury of hearing (i.e. excessive pleasure in hearing) are to be adopted to condemn the others. This is perhaps why the chapter is entitled "Anti-music."

Summarizing Mo-tze's arguments, we may find that he had two principal reasons to condemn music or other luxuries.

1) Because, as a matter of fact, the ones who are enjoying such luxuries are the rulers and politicians. And moreover, in order to be able to enjoy such luxuries, they deliberately deprive many poor people of what is necessary for their living.

Now, the rulers take to music and deprive the people of their means of clothing and food to such an extent! Therefore Mo-tze said: To have music is wrong.25

2) Because, while man must work to honestly earn his living, he is nevertheless by nature capable of being very easily induced to laziness by excessively enjoying music (or other luxuries). Thus, there would be social and economic chaos.

Man is different from the birds, beasts and insects. The birds, beasts and insects have their feathers and fur for coats, have their hoods and claws for sandals and shoes, and have water and grass for drink and food. Therefore the male do not sow seeds or plant trees, neither do the female weave or spin, yet food and clothing are provided. Now man is different from these. Those who use their energy will live. Those who do not use their energy cannot live. When gentlemen do not attend to government diligently

25 Conf. original text, Mei translation, p. 177.
jurisdiction will be in chaos. When the common men do not attend to work, supplies will not be sufficient....

Therefore, Mo-tze did not condemn music simply as such, but disapproved of it under certain circumstances. In other words, it was excessive enjoyment of music against which Mo-tze protested. The same is to be said about all other sensual pleasures.

Man's sensitive faculties naturally tend to pleasure which is nothing but the satisfaction of their demands. However, it is a matter of fact, which we learn from experience, that excessive pleasure will eventually work against general prosperity and happiness. Therefore such excess must be morally wrong; for, Heaven has given man sensitive faculties with their innate tendencies precisely to facilitate him in providing his general good. Hence, the particular enjoyment of sensitive faculties is naturally subordinated to the pursuit of general good as such. Now, as is demonstrated by Mo-tze, such particular sensual enjoyment endangers the pursuit of general good; therefore it is to be condemned.

We noticed that Mo-tze has followed a technique which we may call a methodic finisism. Everything and also every action has its natural purpose. And Mo-tze even goes further, to observe that among many things and many different actions there is a certain subordination of purposes. This is not merely to say that there are principal and secondary purposes, but that there are some purposes whose very "raison d'etre" is dependent upon the realization of some higher purposes. This dependency is natural. Therefore, we may conclude that some actions are essentially dependent upon some other actions.

26 Ibidem.
In this quite extensive description, we may note:

1) That Mo-tze also insisted on removing immoral desires: "Nor entertain any idea of injuring somebody... There is nothing in his mind that goes beyond love...." Hence, not only action but the desire of action may qualify a person as virtuous or vicious. On another occasion, Mo-tze demonstrated that the intention of performing some action has its own moral value even though the action has not yet followed, and, of course the effect of such action is farther from being realized.

Suppose a conflagration is occurring. One person is fetching water to extinguish it, and another is holding some fuel to reinforce it. Neither of them has yet accomplished anything, but which one do you value? Wu Ma-tze answered that he approved the intention of the person who fetches water and disapproved the intention of the person who holds fuel. Mo-tze said: In the same manner, do I approve of my intention and disapprove of yours.28

Yet, what is internal seemed to be even more important for Mo-tze for he said:

Any virtue that does not spring from the heart will not remain and any (result of) action that is not aimed at by one's self will not stay. The superior man regards his body but as the vehicle for his character.29

Virtue is really something rising from the interior of man. The body is a vehicle for one's character, that is to say, a means of external expression of what is in the interior. Thus the seat of virtue or vice lies in the interior and not in what the body is actually doing.

2) Mo-tze believed that virtues may be improved or strengthened day by day, and they are to be perfected with time and experience.

28 Conf. original text, ch. 46, Mei translation, p. 214.
29 Conf. original text, ch. 2, Mei translation, p. 8.
Therefore, the superior men are daily more energetic in performing their duty, but weaker in their desires. This belief of Mo-tze is but the traditional belief of ancient Chinese, hence it is really not worthy of special note; but, as a supplement to our discussion, it is not entirely useless to bring it out.

Finally, we wish to note that although, as it has been demonstrated, Mo-tze was not an extreme ascetic, to whom all pleasure is criminal and the only good is privation and renouncement, nevertheless many relatively ancient documents have criticized him as teaching and practicing such a doctrine. Because of the importance they held in Chinese literature, we must give some of these documents serious consideration. For instance, in the book of Chuang-Tze, who lived only a few years after Mo-tze, we may find the following criticism:

Mih tzu (i.e. Mo-tze) and Ch' u hua Li (a disciple of Mo-tze) became enthusiastic followers of Tao, but they pushed the system too far, carrying their practice to excess. The former wrote an essay "Against Music" and another which he entitled "Economy." There was to be no singing in life, no mourning after death... He would have men toil through life and hold death in contempt. But this teaching is altogether too unattractive... It would land mankind in sorrow and lamentation. It would be next to impossible as a practical system, and cannot, I fear, be regarded as the Tao of the true sage. It would be diametrically opposed to human passions and as such would not be tolerated by the world. Mih tzu himself might be able to carry it out; but not the rest of the world. And when one separates himself from the rest of the world, his chances of developing an ideal state become small indeed. 30

Chuang-Tze then reported how Mo-tze described the hardship willingly undertaken by the great Emperor Yu; thus all his disciples are to follow such

30 Book of Chuang-Tze, ch. 33, H. Giles translation, pages 440 sqq.
an example:

And because he (Yu) thus sacrificed himself to the common-wealth, ages of Mihists to come would also wear short serge jackets and straw sandals, and toil day and night without stopping, making self-mortification their end and aim, and say to themselves "If we cannot do this, we do not follow the Tao of Yu and are unworthy to be called Mihists."

Another important and supposedly trustworthy document, the "She-Kee" by the famous historian Szu Ma Ch'en (145-186 B.S.) has described Mo-tze as follows:

Mo Tzu lived in a very small thatched hut built of rough, unworked timber. His utensils were of earthenware, his food of the coarsest kind. In the summer he wore garments of coarse, yellow cloth, and in the winter he wore a coat of deer-skin. When he was buried, he was laid in a coffin of thin boards.

According to our opinion, it is hardly possible to find anything in the original text of Mo-tze which would make us believe that Mo-tze did urge people to work and toil day and night without stopping or to make self-mortification their end and aim, or to live in a small hut of rough timber and wear deer-skin as winter clothing. On the contrary, we find him saying: "When the city walls are repaired with regular labor, the people may feel tired but there is no exhaustion." This is to caution the rulers that they must not let the people overwork themselves even in important matters such as repairing the city wall. As to living comfort, we have seen that Mo-tze wished houses to have a basement, thick walls, and a strong roof. He wishes that winter clothing be made of spun-silk so as to be light and warm. And

31 Ibidem.
32 This English translation is quoted from Micius, A Brief Outline of His Life and Ideas, by S. Holth, pages 11 and 12.
33 Conf. original text, ch. 6, Mei translation, p. 22.
he referred to primitive people's wearing of furs as a defect.

There must be a satisfactory explanation for the fact that these two later, but not less authentic, documents almost contradicted the original text of Mo-tze's teaching; but for the present we will settle it by contending that the original text of Mo-tze really represented Mo-tze's teaching, but that, however, a sect of his early disciples did go to extremes and preached and practiced self-mortification. And, in order to convince their contemporaries, they attributed both the teaching and the practice to their master Mo-tze personally. And it happened that this particular sect survived longer and became more influential than other sects among the disciples of Mo-tze.

Now, making a special note on the fundamental virtues, such as the cardinal virtues of the scholastics, we find that Mo-tze did not name any virtue as fundamental except perhaps charity, which he explained under the doctrine of universal love. There are many forms in naming cardinal virtues in ancient China; almost every philosopher has his own choice, but strangely they are all four in number, although there was no reason given to limit the number of fundamental virtues necessarily to four. The most common formula adopted by the Confucianists was: 1) Magnanimity, 2) Righteousness (or justice) 3) Good manners, and 4) Prudence. But Mo-tze, who considered his doctrine the antithesis of Confucian teachings, naturally would not follow this classification; thus he did not once mention these four cardinal virtues of Confucius. He did mention magnanimity and righteousness together, but never the four together. On the other hand, Mo-tze did not name another foursome to replace them. Hence if we shall insist upon knowing what Mo-tze would have named as the four fundamental virtues if he were asked to do so,
we should have to discover, from the now existing original texts, the four virtues Mo-tze has considered most important and most fundamental.

These we will attempt to name as: 1) Charity, 2) Justice, 3) Temperance, and 4) Fortitude, or Bravery. Charity is the practice of his doctrine of universal love, which is of course the most important issue in morals. Justice is so much emphasized by Mo-tze in his preaching against offensive war, against fatalism, and against nepotism in politics, that we may say that next to charity, justice is most fundamental for Mo-tze. Temperance is for Mo-tze the perfect control of human passion, particularly in sensitive pleasures. His teachings on economy in expenditure, simplicity in funerals, and his attitude on music are all based upon his persuasion of the importance of temperance. Finally Fortitude or Bravery is also a chief virtue emphasized by Mo-tze. We have seen that Chuang-Tze reported that Mo-tze taught contempt of death. Mo-tze indeed has believed that everyone should give his life without any hesitation for the principle he follows. In answering objections against his doctrine of universal love, Mo-tze acknowledged that this doctrine is difficult to practice; but he stated energetically that we must practice it no matter how difficult it might be, because we know this is the right way. Believing in fighting for justice, he encouraged defensive war; even a very small nation must resist the aggression of a large and strong

Conf. original text, ch. 47. "Suppose we say to a person...we shall give you the whole world on condition that you let us kill you. Would he agree to this? Of course he would not agree. Why? Just because the world is not so valuable as one's own person (i.e. life). Yet people have struggled against one another for a simple principle. This shows righteousness is even more valuable than one's person (i.e. life). Mei translation, p. 222.
An ethical doctrine without any discussion on moral sanctions is incomplete. It is not because we maintain that men must be encouraged to do good by rewards and must be prohibited from doing evil by punishments. We think the very notion of justice demands the real existence of moral sanctions. Of course, though we do not want the sanction to be an essential part of justice, it is nevertheless to be recognized as an integral part. In other words, for a very practical and concrete reason, that is under the present and real situation of moral subjects, without admitting the real existence of moral sanctions, the notion of justice itself would be simply incomplete. And, it is but obvious that an ethical doctrine with such an incomplete notion of justice is vitally paralyzed.

Mo-tze emphasized highly the importance and the necessity of moral sanctions by civil authority, but mostly he insisted upon the fact that Heaven and the spirits will supply what the civil authority cannot do on this matter. For Mo-tze, civil authority alone is not sufficient either to satisfy the demands of justice as to the retributions of past doings, or to prevent, by certain punishments, future misbehavior, or to encourage, by certain rewards, virtuous deeds. To recognize Heaven's knowledge and power concerning this matter is vital to morals; hence Mo-tze has selected disbelief of Heaven's intelligence as the first of four dangerous points among Confucian teachings:

Mo-tze said: In the teachings of the Confucianists there are four principles sufficient to ruin the empire. The
Confucianists hold that Heaven is unintelligent and the ghosts inanimate.39

Against this, Mo-tze emphasized the intelligence of Heaven and attributed to Him an unlimited knowledge of our deeds.

Heaven clearly discerns it (the human deed) even if it be in the woods, valleys, or solitary caves where there is no man.40

And "Heaven certainly rewards the good and punishes the evil."41 By saying "certainly" Mo-tze meant that the rewards and punishments from Heaven are inevitable, since Heaven knows everything that passes on earth, even in solitary caves. Yet it is most universal, i.e. includes every human being no matter how noble or how rich he may be because no man can exempt himself from the domination of Heaven. "Now all men live in the world and under Heaven. When a man sins against Heaven there is nowhere to seek shelter."42 Not even the Emperor is exempted from this all-including jurisdiction of Heaven. Mo-tze purposely cited ancient historical documents to show how Heaven rewarded the ancient sage kings and how He punished the wicked emperors.

How did Chieh, Shueu, Yeu and Lee incur their punishments? Mo-tze said: In the highest sphere they blasphemed against Heaven, in the middle sphere they blasphemed against the spirits, and in the sphere below they oppressed the people. Thereupon the will of Heaven proclaimed: 'From those whom I love these turn away and hate and those whom I want benefit they oppress. Their hate of men is without limit and their oppression of men is most severe.' And so they were not permitted to finish out their lives (meaning to die unnaturally), to survive a single

39 Conf. original text, ch. 48, Mei translation, p. 237.
40 Conf. original text, ch. 26.
41 Conf. original text, ch. 28.
42 Conf. original text, ch. 28.
generation (meaning their dynasty finished with their personal death). And people condemn them unto this day, calling them wicked kings. 43

In insisting upon Heaven's all-including knowledge and all-including justice, Mo-tze implicitly admitted that no matter how sage and how impartial the king (or other rulers) is, it is still to be said that the civil authorities are "per se" not sufficient to provide just retributions for human deeds. Besides this point is quite clear to all moralists, Chinese as well as Westerners. If a just retribution for all human deeds must exist, then it must come from a super-human source of intelligence and power. It must be made by a most perfect intellect, for it is necessary to this intellect to know all human actions both internal and external. It must be absolutely just, for such judgment must be guaranteed not only as infallible in essentials but also in the most minute details. It must be executed by most eminent authority, for such a just retribution must be carried out without resistance from the part of subjects and without handicap from the part of executive power. Mo-tze has found a perfect source for such an ideal moral sanction in the person of Heaven.

Heaven, according to Mo-tze, is "really the most honorable and most wise." 44 Although his proofs for this statement are not of much value as far

43 Conf. original text, ch. 26. Here what the translator meant to say by "In the highest sphere...in the middle sphere...and in the sphere below" is not explained. But in the original text it was simply these three words: "above, in the middle, and below," by which Mo-tze means that Heaven is above all in dignity, the spirits are between Heaven and human beings. This triple gradation also represents three degrees concerning their respective perfections of entity. Heaven most perfect, the spirits less perfect, and human beings perfect in a still lower degree.

44 Conf. original text, ch. 26.
as metaphysical reasons are concerned, he nevertheless has provided a few
good arguments to convince the people of his time that:

1) Heaven is most intelligent and knows everything that is done by
anyone on earth.

2) Heaven is most just, because He is the ultimate and absolute stand-
ard of right and wrong. What He judges as right or wrong, must automatically
and necessarily be so. Yet, Heaven is most impartial, because: "Heaven
loves men universally" and "Heaven does not discriminate among the poor
and rich, the honorable and humble." Even the Emperor, who is "the most
honorable in the world and the richest in the world" is simply subjected
to Him, for "When the emperor has done good, Heaven rewards him. When the
emperor has committed wrong, Heaven punishes him." These show sufficiently
that Heaven answers perfectly the description of an ideal source of intelli-
gen, justice and power that guarantees the realization of ideal moral
sanctions.

However, in comparison with the doctrine of Western moralists, particu-
larly among Christian philosophers, Mo-tze committed a surprisingly unusual
negligence by omitting completely any real retribution in man's future life
while he explicitly demonstrated the real existence of human souls even after
the death and corruption of the body. He called such separately existing

45 Conf. original text, ch. 16
46 Ibidem, ch. 16.
47 Conf. original text, ch. 26.
48 Conf. original text, ch. 28.
49 Conf. original text, ch. 31, "On Ghosts." Mo-tze explained: "The ghosts
and spirits of all times may be divided into spirits of heaven, spirits
of hills and rivers, and ghosts of men after their death." The whole
chapter reveals clearly that human souls really, although not physically,
existed after the separation with the body.
souls "the ghosts." They do really exist, although not physically; therefore one cannot see or otherwise sense their presence. Nevertheless they do see us and know what we are doing and watch over us everywhere. "Therefore, Mo-tze said: 'One may not act disrespectfully even in woods, valleys, or solitary caves where there is no man. Spirits and ghosts are watching everywhere." The intelligence of such a separated soul is much superior to that of the physically living man: "Mo-tze said: The ghosts and spirits are wiser than the sages by as much as the sharp-eared and keen-sighted surpass the deaf and blind." Yet, Mo-tze never discussed whether these separated souls remain responsible for acts and deeds accomplished while still living in the body, and hence whether they may or may not be subjected to the retributions of Almighty Heaven. This was a complete "laisser passer," as we believe, deliberately done by Mo-tze, because he was not sure what was best to say. He could avoid the issue quite easily because the people of his time were more or less influenced by the attitude of Confucius, who refused to discuss the "modus essendi" of ghosts and spirits although he admitted their existence. He even considered such a discussion a waste of time since, according to him, it is simply impossible for us to know more about them than that they do exist. And even about their existence Confucius was not much concerned. As a result, later Confucianists no longer believed in the real existence of ghosts and spirits, although they still observed the traditional ceremonies.

50 Conf. original text, ch. 39, "Anti-Confucianists." Mo-tze mocked the Confucianists of his time for their stupidity in searching for the ghosts of deceased ones by climbing on roofs, peeping in mouseholes, etc., as if the ghosts existed physically.

51 Conf. original text, ch. 31.

52 Conf. original text, ch. 46, Mei translation, p. 213.
Therefore it was possible that there was no one who had asked Mo-tze to explain whether these ghosts are still responsible for the deeds committed in union with the body and thus whether they should be rewarded and punished accordingly. In one word, moral sanction for Mo-tze is limited to merely our present life, except, perhaps, for a historical judgment.

Analyzing his descriptions of the various punishments and rewards received by the ancient wicked kings and sage kings respectively, we may enumerate Mo-tze's moral retributions as follows:

1) Bodily (or personally physical) retributions:
   reward: Long life, health, riches.
   punishment: Untimely and brutal death, pain, loss of riches.

2) Other (non-personal) physical retributions.
   rewards: Prosperity in posterity (sons and relatives).
   punishments: Miseries in posterity.

3) Mental retributions.
   rewards: Happiness, good fame, love from all.
   punishments: Worries, bad fame, hate from all.

4) Social retributions.
   rewards: harmony with fellow man, peace under his jurisdiction,
   which may mean respectively father of a family, mayor of a town,
   ruler of a state, or emperor of the nations.

53 "Kung Men-tze said that there were no ghosts and spirits; again he said that the superior man must learn sacrifice and worship. Mo-tze said: To hold that there are no spirits and learn sacrificial ceremonials is comparable to making fishing nets while there are no fish." Conf. original text, ch. 48, Mei translation, p. 236.
punishment: discord and chaos, in the same ways respectively.

5) Historical retribution.

reward: Praise from posterity.

punishment: Condemnation from posterity.

Evidently, except this last one, that is, historical retribution, none of these will deal with us directly after our death. And even historical judgment is of very little value; first, because it is obviously only for the notable ones who will have their names in history, whereas the mass of people is denied such reward or exempted from such punishment; secondly, because it is further possible that historical documents may be lost or altered by posterity. Hence it is somewhat uncertain and poorly limited to a mere handful of persons among the great mass of human beings. Thus it may be recognized only as a supplementary retribution for some special cases.

Christian philosophers are aware of the fact that in most cases a completely just moral retribution is often greatly wanted during one's life and including the circumstances of his death. It is even more common to see good ones suffer and wicked ones prosper in this world than to see the

54 Speaking of the sage kings, Mo-tze said: "Besides this, it is recorded also on bamboos and silk (our own note — there was no paper yet), cut in metals and stones, and engraved on the dishes and cups to be handed down to posterity. What is this for? It is to mark out those who loved the people and benefited them, obeyed the will of Heaven and obtained reward from Heaven." Then, continuing his speech, Mo-tze came to the ancient wicked kings: "Now who are those that hated the people and oppressed them, opposed the will of Heaven and incurred punishment from Heaven? They are the ancient wicked kings of the three dynasties: Chieh, Shueu, Yeu and Li....And they were called the enemies of Heaven. The most evil names in the world were written upon them....Besides this, it is also recorded on the bamboos and silks, cut on the metals and stones, and engraved on the plates and cups to be handed down to posterity." Conf. original text, ch. 27.
contrary. Therefore, they concluded, if there must be a completely just re-
tribution, as demanded by our reason, it must be necessarily done after our
death. Hence the existence of a future world is admitted. Heaven and Hell
are accepted as a matter of fact. Mo-tze did not go far enough to reach this
point. The Buddhist doctrine, which came from India, is credited with the
inauguration of the idea of the future world among Chinese thinkers. It is
now a very common belief of Chinese people that Heaven and Hell really exist.

At any rate, Mo-tze was satisfied with the theory of temporary rewards
and punishments, and so were the people in general of his time. How this was
possible is surely beyond our ability of guessing, especially when we know
with certainty that Mo-tze, as well as the people in general, did believe in
the real existence of human souls after separation from the body.

In concluding, we wish to say that Mo-tze has positively trusted to the
absolute justice of God in matters concerning moral retribution. But he also
insisted upon the necessity of civil law with its sanctional power maintained
by human rulers.

The ancient sage kings published laws and issued orders
to be standards of rewards and punishments, and to encourage
the virtuous and to obstruct the evil. And so the
people were filial to their parents at home, and respect-
ful to the elders in the village or district.

And the fatalists were absurdly wrong when they tried to deny the intrare-
cical value of such civil laws by saying:

55 Father Paul Geny, S.J., professor of Philosophy at the Pont. University
de Gregoriano, discussing the notion of moral sanctions among ancient
Chinese moralists, wrote: "Numquam est sermo de judiciis post mortem
subeundo, nec de poenis." Conf. Synopsis Historiae Philosophiae, Rome,
1929, p. 6. Also conf. Dictionnaire Apologetique de la Foi Catholique,
"CHINE."

56 Conf. original text, ch. 35, Mei translation, p. 185.
Whoever is rewarded by the superior is destined to be rewarded. It is not because of his virtues that he is rewarded. Whoever is punished by the superior is destined to be punished. It is not because of his vice that he is punished.57

As for the origin and the limit of the value of civil laws, we shall discuss these in a subsequent chapter on Mo-tze's politico-social principles.

57 Conf. original text, ch. 35, Mei translation, p. 185, note 56.
CHAPTER V
ETHICAL PRINCIPLES ON SOCIAL ECONOMY

A) THE RIGHT USE OF WEALTH

We wish to remind our readers that this thesis deals merely with the moral principles which one may find in the teachings of Mo-tze. As to his technical methods for "Benefiting or enriching the people" (such as how to sow seeds and plant trees in order to increase the harvest, or how to build a fortification to defend the town) are obviously out of our sphere. Hence, in this present chapter, one must not expect to see all problems of social economy solved or even mentioned; our sole purpose here is to expand a few moral rules that Mo-tze wanted to be observed in economical affairs.

Since wealth is the primary material object of economic science, we shall try, in the first place, to determine what role Mo-tze had given to it. But in order to determine this, it is most proper to know first Mo-tze's definition for wealth, or, in other words, what things Mo-tze would consider as wealth.

The notion of wealth is certainly one of the earliest and most original concepts of mankind. By his natural instincts, man knows what is good for his physical welfare and thus naturally tends to pursue it and to enjoy the possession of it. Thus, the very primitive idea of wealth was not much different from the material goods that are pursued by brute animals. However, with the multiplication of primitive men, and the rising of a more complicated social life as a necessary result, the notion of wealth became more developed in its
extension and eventually included whatsoever would provide directly or indirectly (by means of exchange) some sort of satisfaction of human desires. Thus, gold, pearls, jade, etc., became leading articles in the list of objects of wealth. However, even in the early days of civilization one finds some wisemen who have reminded the people that true wealth is not represented by expensive objects of luxury. Our philosopher has precisely done so:

Mo-tze said: The jade of Ho, the pearl of Duke Sui and the nine things — these are what the feudal lords value as excellent treasures. Can they enrich the country, multiply the people, put the government in order and place the state in safety? Of course they cannot. Excellent treasures are valued for their efficacy. Now, since the jade of Ho, the pearl of Duke Sui and the nine things cannot benefit men, then they are not the treasures of the world. On the other hand, if righteousness is employed in the government of state the population will be increased, the government will be in order and the state will be secured.... So righteousness is the treasure of the world. 1

Righteousness is to replace jade and pearls as the top values of wealth, because it really, although indirectly, provides benefit for human beings by securing peace and order, harmony and mutual aid to increase production, avoid waste and promote comfort and happiness. Thus, Mo-tze even went so far as to condemn all scientific experiments which apparently do not bring immediate benefit to mankind:

Kung Shu-tze constructed a bird from bamboo and when it was completed he flew it. It stayed up in the air for three days. Kung Shu-tze was proud of his supreme skill. Mo-tze said to him: Your accomplishment in constructing a bird does not compare with that of the carpenter in making a linch-pin. In a short while he could cut out the piece of wood of three inches. Yet it would carry a load of fifty Tan (a Tan is about 150 pounds). For, any achievement that is beneficial to man is said to be clumsy. 2

2 Conf. ibidem, Ch. 48.
If this incident is authentically recorded, then Mo-tze might have been responsible for setting impediments to the progress of science because of his short sightedness in empirical matters. However, his general attitude was obviously favorable to scientific researches that improve the living standard of human beings. He condemned the experiment of Kung Shu-tze because he could not see any practical use in it, and thus believed that it was merely a waste of time, an item of luxury.

We have demonstrated before that the right use of wealth is, for Mo-tze, to use it according to its natural purpose, and according to the natural need of the user. Thus, for instance, the purpose of clothing is to cover the body and protect it against the cold; hence, if one should use garments in order to show his richness, it would be a perversion. Likewise, the purpose of eating is to nourish the body and increase its strength, but, if one should eat excessively and merely for the enjoyment of taste, it would be a perversion. This is the fundamental moral principle in economy.

By their own nature, jade and pearls cannot satisfy any natural demands of man; therefore, for Mo-tze, they are simply not wealth at all. It is only because of human perversity in seeking luxuries that they were considered wealth. The virtuous man will not, of course, consent to such popular (or rather vulgar) ideas, and surely will not permit himself to pursue such objects. 3

At any rate, Mo-tze himself would not accept anything more than what was needed for his natural necessities of living, even though it was given to him

3 We find a modern naturalist who echoes this opinion of Mo-tze: "Si l'homme était sage, écrit Montaigne, il prendrait le vrai prix de chaque chose selon qu'elle serait le plus utile et propre à la vie." Quoted from Les Systèmes Philosophiques, by André Cresson, Paris, 1835.
in recognition of his great service in securing peace and order in a nation.

After Mo-tze has paid Kung Shang-kuo a visit, Kung Shang-kuo recommended him to the Lord of Yueh. The Lord of Yueh was greatly pleased, saying to Kung Shang-kuo: 'Sir, if you can induce Mo-tze to come to Yueh and instruct me, I shall offer him five hundred li square of land lying in the former state of Wu....' Mo-tze said to Kung Shang-kuo...If the Lord of Yueh will listen to my word and adopt my way, I shall come and ask only for food according to the capacity of my stomach and clothing according to the stature of my body. I shall be just one of the ministers. What is the use of any commission? 4

However, we should not think that Mo-tze has limited man's use of wealth strictly to the bare necessities of living. We find that he would also permit a little extra enjoyment of what he called luxuries provided that all the men in the world already have enough wealth for what is necessary to life.

He was quoted as follows:

Mo-tze asked Ch'ing Wa-ly (one of his disciples): 'Suppose during a famine some one shall offer you a strict alternative choice between the famous pearl of the Duke of Shieu and a sack of rice, so that if you shall choose the pearl then we will be deprived from having the rice, and vice versa. Which one of them, then, will you take? Ch'ing Wal-ly answered: 'Of course I shall take the sack of rice, for it will satisfy my need! Mo-tze said: 'Very well. Then why should men go after luxurious objects? They are useless but to promote luxurious desires. The true sage will not care about them. Therefore, I said, in eating we must first see that there is enough food to feed all men for a long time to come; only when this is secured, then we may pursue extra delicateness in rare tastes. In matters of clothing we must first see that there are enough clothes to keep warm all men for a long time to come; only when this is secured, then we may pursue extra beauty in fashions. In the matter of housing, we must first see that there are enough dwellings to house all men for a long time to come; only when this is secured, then we may pursue extra comfort on luxury items. The sound principle in these matters is that we must always first accomplish what is substantial;

4 Conf. original text, ch. 49, Mei translation, pp. 250-251.
then we are permitted to enjoy surplus benefit. This is indeed an excellent doctrine.\textsuperscript{5}

Even though the authenticity of this passage may be called in doubt, it is, nevertheless, to be considered as representing Mo-tze's ideas. For the doctrine expressed in this passage is really in perfect accordance with the teachings of Mo-tze as a whole. Mo-tze did emphasize benefitting and enriching the people. He preached universal love and mutual aid. He did wish everyone to have enough food, enough clothes and a comfortable house to live in. He condemned music, beautiful clothes and extravagant decorations in architecture, because of the fact that at his time the rulers were indulging themselves in unlimited luxuries while the poor people were deprived of the bare necessities of their livelihood.\textsuperscript{6}

Hence, if we could be made sure that all people of the world were provided with sufficient items for the necessities of life and that this were guaranteed for a long time to come, then it would be permissible even according to Mo-tze for men to indulge themselves in music or other kinds of luxuries, provided that they would not thereby neglect their duties or neglect their work. For this would again be the source of calamities, miseries and disorder.\textsuperscript{7}

Hence, the motto adopted by Mo-tze was "luxury after necessity";\textsuperscript{8}

\textsuperscript{5} This passage is quoted from 材 (Shieu Wei) by Lui Shaing (劉向) 77 B.C. to 6 B.S.), a great scholar of the Han Dynasty, who attributed it to the original works of Mo-tze. It is probable that Lui quoted this passage from one of the chapters of Mo-tze that we are not fortunate enough to possess now. From the style and the subject of the discussion this passage is probably a part of the original chapter twenty-two entitled "Economy in Expenditure," whose text is entirely missing to us.

\textsuperscript{6} Conf. original text, ch. 32, "Anti-music."

\textsuperscript{7} Ibidem, same chapter.

\textsuperscript{8} From the passage quoted above and qualified in note 5. "先質而後文" literally means "first substance and then beauty."
evidently this was not to be applied to the case of any given individual, so that whenever he or she had enough for necessity, he or she would then be permitted to indulge in luxuries. Mo-tze was obviously against this. Therefore, this motto is to be understood as holding good only when the necessities of all mankind are provided for and secured for a long time to come — then those who can afford them may be permitted to indulge in luxuries.

Wealth, for Mo-tze, is a gift of Heaven to human beings. Heaven has created it for the benefit of all men universally taken.

Heaven loves the whole world universally. Everything is prepared for the good of men. The work of Heaven extends even to the smallest things that are enjoyed by men.9

Therefore men must use them according to the will of Heaven. Now, Heaven desires that men love all their fellow men universally and benefit each other mutually. Hence, the wealthy ones must not be selfish in enjoying more than is needed and in wasting what they cannot use properly, but they must help the poor ones and distribute what they cannot use properly, but they must help the poor ones and distribute their surplus wealth to them.10 However this does not imply that therefore Mo-tze is in favor of Communism or Socialism. We shall discuss this in the subsequent chapter. According to the purpose of wealth as determined by the Creator, Heaven, we must, in using wealth, be governed by the following principles:

1) Everything that we enjoy (i.e. wealth) is created by Heaven for the benefit of all men taken universally.

9 Conf. original text, ch. 27, "Will of Heaven," II. 10 Speaking of the duties of a virtuous person Mo-tze said: "...When possessing much wealth, he shares it with the poor." Conf. original text, ch. 49, "Lu Question," Mei translation, p. 252.
2) Everything is created to satisfy our natural demands, not for luxurious purposes.

3) As a matter of fact, at the present time, i.e., the time of Mo-tze, there is not enough wealth to supply the necessities of life to all men; therefore, whoever indulges in luxuries will eventually deprive some of his fellow men of some necessities for their life. This is morally wrong.

Therefore, Mo-tze said:

The wise man should reverence Heaven and worship spirits, love the people and economize in expenditures. Combining these we get wisdom.

11 Conf. original text, ch. 47, "Kung Men."
B) PRIVATE OWNERSHIP

Although it is quite clear that Mo-tze wished all men to share the benefit of Heaven's creatures as universally as possible, we are, nevertheless, equally sure that Mo-tze was not in favor of Socialism or Communism in his teaching on economics.

First of all, a mere handful of secondary writers have tried to qualify Mo-tze as a Communist. Secondly, their reason for so doing is based merely on the superficial or literal meanings of some sentences in the text of Mo-tze, which they have interpreted in their own way in order to satisfy their own opinion. We acknowledge these passages or words of Mo-tze, already quoted above, do really inform us that, according to Mo-tze, all men have somewhat equal rights to enjoy the benefit of Heaven's creatures, since they are equally (i.e. without discrimination) loved by Heaven. Furthermore, we also acknowledge that Mo-tze did wish that the rich should distribute their surplus riches to the poor. But, we do not see that all this should therefore imply that Mo-tze was a Communist. We have good reason to demonstrate that Mo-tze's doctrine here is to be interpreted properly as corresponding to Christian democratic principles and not to any principle of Communism. Christian philosophy has proved that God loves all men universally and has created all material beings for their needs and advantages. Therefore, fundamentally speaking, all men do have equal rights to enjoy the benefits guaranteed by God. However, the doctrine of Christianity is known to the whole world as the

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12 Shang-Nai-Hsi, for instance, in his History of Chinese Thought, Shanghai, 1930. Among Westerners, we found that only Richard Wilhelm has called Mo-tze a Communist. See his A Short History of Chinese Civilization, New York, 1929. (English translation from the original German), p. 151.
archenemy of Communism and Socialism.

Evidently Mo-tze was not Christian at all, but his teaching is similar to the Christian in denouncing materialistic Communism because of its atheistical attitude and because of its denial of private ownership in favor of an absolute state ownership of all wealth.

1) Mo-tze has condemned the skepticism of the Confucianists by stating that such an impious attitude is enough to ruin the whole world. 13

2) Mo-tze has rated the inviolability of private ownership so high that he has used it as the basis of his argument against aggressive war. Aggressive war is unjust and criminal precisely because it is similar to the acts of theft and robbery which are violations of the private property. 14

Therefore, Mo-tze has considered the right of private ownership as so natural that its violation is obviously a criminal act. Private ownership is more sure, so it may be served as the model to illustrate what is called state ownership. And thus, it is obvious that the state ownership cannot turn out to be so absolute as to take over completely all private ownership. And besides, we also find that, according to Mo-tze, private ownership is so personal to the owner that even a rich man is not to be robbed or otherwise forced to do charity, but he is only advised by Mo-tze (with good reasons) that he ought to distribute his surplus riches to help the poor and the needy.

Of course, Mo-tze did not hold riches simply in contempt; a rich man is not therefore a bad man. Even a wise man may be rich and be a superior man

13 Conf. original text, ch. 48, "Kung Men."
14 Conf. original text, ch. 17. This has already been quoted above in our Chapter II; see note 201, p. 166.
(i.e. a virtuous man) while remaining wealthy. On the other hand, a poor man may be corrupted in morale just as well as a rich one may. The possession of wealth is not by itself a vice, provided that the way of possessing it is legitimate and righteous. We can find nothing in the entire text of the works of Mo-tze that can be used properly to form any argument against private ownership. Yet Mo-tze seemed by all means to disagree with the idea of state ownership.

Mo-tze's opinion on this matter is moderate and conservative. The state has, indeed, a certain degree of possessive right over the wealth of its citizen. For instance, the state has the right to enforce taxation; it has the right to draft its people for military services or for public labors in defending and promoting the common good. But, this is to be done with moderation and consideration of individual rights and possessions.

When the city walls are repaired with regular labour, the people may feel tired but there is no exhaustion. When taxes are collected according to the custom, the people may be deprived of some money, but there is no bitterness. The real woe of the people does not lie here, it lies in heavy taxes.

Reasonable taxation is not the woe of the people, but heavy taxation is. And this is precisely what most of the rulers in Mo-tze's time demanded. They were described by our philosopher as "heavily taxing the people, robbing them of their means of livelihood, in order to have elaborately embroidered and gorgeous garments."

Thus, should even the legitimate authority of state levy any unreasonable

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15 Mo-tze said: "The way of the superior man makes the individual incorrupted in poverty and righteous when wealthy." Conf. original text, ch. 2, Mei translation.
16 Conf. original text, ch. 6, "Indulgence in Excess," Mei translation, p. 22.
17 Conf. original text, ibidem, Mei, p. 24.
tax, it would rob the people of their possessions. Incidentally this was the
very reason why Mo-tze condemned music and other kinds of luxurious enjoyments
practised by the rulers.

A supplementary argument in favor of private ownership may be found in
his doctrine of anti-fatalism. Mo-tze condemned fatalism because it teaches
that whoever is decreed by fate to be wealthy will be wealthy, and whoever is
destined by fate to be poor will be poor, no matter how hard they have tried
to work against fate. 18 Such a doctrine, Mo-tze pointed out, will make people
lazy and cause them to abandon their work; believing in fatalism they will
ignore the natural motive of work which is based on the right of private owner-
ship.

The farmers set out at the daybreak and come back at the
dusk, diligently sowing seeds and planting trees to
produce much soil beans and millet, and dare not be
negligent. Why do they do this? They think diligence
will result in wealth and negligence in poverty; diligence
will produce plenty and negligence famine. Therefore
they dare not to be negligent. The women get up at dawn
and retire at night, diligently weaving and spinning to
produce much silk, flax linen and cloth, and dare not to
be negligent. Why do they do this? They think diligence
will produce wealth and negligence poverty. 19

If men and women are not persuaded that they might own the fruit of
their labor, they would have no ambition to work more industriously in order
to become rich. And, thus, the result would be almost the same as the reali-
zation of fatalism. We believe that the only reason Mo-tze did not write an
essay against Communism is that there was no Communism in China at his time.

18 Conf. original text, ch. 35, "Anti-fatalism," I.
In condemning fatalism, he certainly brought out his firm belief in the rights of private ownership.

Therefore Mo-tze was definitely not a Communist or a Socialist.
C) LABOR AND ITS VALUE IN PRODUCTION

"Man is different from the birds and animals," said Mo-tze. "For the birds and animals have their clothes and shoes furnished by nature; and they drink and eat what nature produces without labor. Therefore, they do not need to work. But, man must attend to farming in order to have food and he must makes his clothes and house with special efforts. Therefore, concluded Mo-tze, it is in the very nature of man that he must work and even work hard to make his living." 20

Thus, Mo-tze discovered a principle of human economy: "Those who work will live, and those who do not work will not live." 21 However, our philosopher did not think that this was a misfortune of man, for, he pointed out, with labor man did improve his living standards, whereas the birds and animals could not improve their standard of living, because they did not know what labor is. In primitive ages, men lived in the caves like animals; as this was not good for their health, the wise men used their ability at working and invented the house. Similarly, Mo-tze pointed out that clothes, the art of cooking, carts and boats for transportation were thus invented according to the needs of men. And finally, man had a much higher and much more comfortable way of life than the birds and animals. 22 Hence, after all, we must not be jealous of the easier life of birds and animals. Although we might not have an easier life than theirs, we do have a better one. Thus, the capability of working is really rather a gift of Heaven, a treasure of men and a distinctive

20 Conf. original text, ch. 32, "Anti-music." This is not a direct quotation.
21 Conf. ibidem.
22 Conf. original text, ch. 6, "Indulgence in Excess"; also chapters 20 and 21.
mark between men and animals.

Should labor then claim the entire fruit of production to its own credit exclusively? We must acknowledge that such a modern question did not arise in the time of Mo-tze; hence, we cannot find a formal and explicit answer to it, but we do find enough material in the text of Mo-tze which we may use as an authentic basis for suggesting what would have been Mo-tze's opinion if such a question had been addressed to him.

We wish to bring out this question because it is a very important issue in the economic theories of any moralist. Indeed, if labor may legitimately claim all fruit of production to itself exclusively then modern Marxism will be the bible of economics.

When our philosopher solemnly stated that those who labor will live and those who do not labor will not live, it seemed that he was entirely in favor of labor.23 However, what he called labor here is to be interpreted so that it does not contradict what Mo-tze said on other occasions and especially what he did himself during his lifetime. We notice immediately that Mo-tze was not a laborer himself; he was not a farmer nor a carpenter nor any other kind of laborer. Although he took on some kind of manual works once in a while in order to support himself, he was, nevertheless, well-known at his time as a scholar by profession, as a man of the intellectual class and not a laborer. He did not want to be considered as a laborer, and we find that Mo-tze was once criticized for not laboring; he did not deny the criticism, but

23 Conf. op. cit., ch. 32. Mei's translation goes like this: "Those who exert themselves will live and those who do not exert themselves will not live," p. 178. The original Chinese is "使用其力者生" which would be better translated as "those who use their strength..." Hence we may say: "those who labor..."
pointed out that labor alone is not sufficient to produce for man's benefit; labor is not the only source of production.

Among the rustic people living south of Lu there was a man by the name of Wu Lu. Making pottery in Winter and farming in Summer, he compared himself to Shun. Mo-tze heard of it and saw him. Wu Lu told Mo-tze: "Righteousness is just righteousness. Wherefore all the verbosity?" Mo-tze asked him: "Now, does what you call righteousness possess the power to serve other people and produce wealth to divide among the people?" Wu Lu said: "It does."

Then Mo-tze continued: "I have deliberated about this matter. I have thought of becoming a farmer and feeding the people in the world. If that could be successful I would become one. But, when a farmer's produce is divided among the world, each person cannot get even one Sheng of grain. Even if he can, evidently that cannot feed all the hungry people in the world. I have thought of becoming a weaver and clothing all the people in the world. If that could be successful, I would become one. But when a weaver's goods are divided among the world, each person cannot get even a foot of cloth. Even if he can, evidently that cannot keep all who are cold in the world. I have thought of putting on armour and carrying a weapon to come to the feudal lords' rescue. If that could be successful I would become a soldier. Now it is evident that a soldier cannot hold against a regular army. I concluded that none of these is as good as to familiarize myself with the Tao of the ancient sage kings, and discover their principles, and to understand the word of sages and to be clear about their expressions, and with these to persuade the rulers and then the common people and the pedestrians. When the rulers adopt my principles, their state will be orderly. When the common people and the pedestrians adopt my principles, their conduct will be regulated. Therefore I think though I do not plough and feed the hungry or weave and clothe the cold, I have greater merit than those who plough and feed, weave and clothe. Therefore I think my merit is greater than that of those who plough and weave though I do not do so."

Wu Lu kept on saying: "Righteousness is just righteousness. Wherefore all the verbosity?" Mo-tze continued: "Suppose the world does not know how to plough, who has more merit? the man who teaches people to plough, or who does not teach people to plough but simply ploughs himself?"

Wu Lu answered that he who teaches others to plough deserves more merit. Mo-tze said: "In case of attacking
an unrighteous state, who deserves more merit, the one
who beats the drum and urges the soldiers to fight on
or the one who does not beat the drum nor urges the soldiers
to fight on but he himself only fights on?" Wu Lu said
that he who beats the drum and urges the soldiers to fight
on deserves more merit. Then Mo-tze said: "Now, the
common people and the pedestrians in the world know very
little about righteousness at the present time; naturally
those who teach them righteousness deserve more merit,
too. Why do you not say so (in this case)? Would not
my righteousness be advanced if I can encourage them
in righteousness?" 24

From this extended passage we may see that:

1) Mo-tze asserted that righteousness (i.e. moral principles and
particularly the one who teaches them) does participate in the production of
wealth. "Righteousness possesses the power to serve other people and produce
wealth to divide among the people."

2) Mo-tze declared that he was not a laborer, but had more merit than
the laborers. "Therefore I think though I do not plough and feed the hungry
or weave and clothe the cold, I have greater merit than those who do plough
and feed, weave and clothe."

3) Mo-tze pointed out that in labor the directive power of intelligence
is more valuable than the manual part which carries its plans out. "He who
teaches others to plough deserves more merit." Thus, we can see clearly that
Mo-tze, instead of over emphasizing the importance of labor in production,
was really trying to diminish the claim of labor and somewhat to belittle it
especially before a person such as Wu Lu-tze who thought that only by labor-
ing may man earn an honest living.

When Mo-tze speaks of laboring or, more literally, "exercising one's strength," he is not to be understood as taking the most strict sense of the word. For him, one who teaches people to plough is also exercising his strength (indeed mental strength); and he who teaches people the way of righteousness is also laboring. We may remember that when he said "those who exert their strength will live and those who do not will not live," he then immediately went on to point out whom he meant in each case. "When the gentlemen do not attend the government diligently the jurisdiction will be in chaos; when the common people do not attend to work, supply will not be sufficient." Therefore the gentlemen who attend the government and take care of jurisdiction are really exercising their strength, too. Thus the rulers, ministers and other government officials are laboring too, if they do what they are supposed to do.

Therefore, Mo-tze considered the intellectual class (teachers in science and in morals) and the governing class as workers too; and even believed that they are more important than the manual workers. Hence they have the right to live and to enjoy the fruit of production, namely food and clothes. They even merited a great part as their share of the fruit of production, for, according to Mo-tze, they are to be given more material goods than others. Speaking of the rules (i.e. principles) for employing virtuous persons in the government, Mo-tze stated:

Therefore there should be laid down three rules...What are the three rules? They are: 1) when their rank (that of the virtuous) is not high, people would not show them respect; 2) when their emoluments are not liberal, people would not place confidence in them; 3) when their

orders are not final, people would not stand with awe before them. So the ancient sage kings placed them high in rank, gave them liberal emoluments, trusted them with important charges and decreed their orders to be final.

Considering the emoluments for the government workers of that time, we must say that they were quite good and much superior to those of any common laborers. But Mo-tze insisted on still more liberal emoluments; he even went so far as to say that such workers must be made rich, or be enriched. Now, if Mo-tze did not think that such persons have the right to enjoy the fruit of production more than the manual laborers, he would not recommend any emoluments for them. Hence, we do not believe that Mo-tze would give the entire credit of production to manual labor.

Aside from this, nature, or rather Heaven, plays a great part in production. Mo-tze has pointed out that the materials used by manual laborers have their own natural value, which the laborer cannot make or change. He said:

In all things, first there is what is from their own nature, then, workmanship can do something about it. Therefore, a carpenter cannot cut metal and a funder can not fund wood; this is because of the nature of the metal which cannot be chopped like wood, and it is the nature of the wood that cannot be funded like metals. 27

More obviously, Heaven occupies a greater importance in agricultural products. Up to our day, even with the great progress of science, weather

26 Conf. original text, ch. 9, "Exaltation of the Virtuous," Mei translation, p. 36.

27 This passage of Mo-tze is to be found in the Appendix of the text of Mo-tze "墨子佚文". It is not in the fifty-three chapters. It is originally found in a later document called "太平御览" which is a literal publication of the Imperial Academy, and is considered a trustworthy document. Since it says that it quoted Mo-tze directly, we may believe that the passage is probably from some chapters of Mo-tze's original text. (As we noted above in our Chapter I, originally the text of Mo-tze consisted of at least seventy-two chapters.)
has still the chief control over the harvest. Mo-tze surely did not neglect this all-important factor. In exposing his doctrine of "identification with the superior," he pointed out that our ultimate superior is Heaven. Hence, if we do not identify our purpose with the purpose of Heaven, that is to say, if we do not obey the will of Heaven, then Heaven will withdraw His blessings and will punish us with bad weather, warm and cold, wind and rain storms so that the crops will be destroyed and the domestic animals will perish. Therefore, we must respect and obey the will of Heaven in order to acquire His blessing which, according to Mo-tze, is evidently a great factor in the production of wealth.

Thus, the elements (or factors) responsible for the production of wealth are as follows:

1) The nature of material goods with its productive power.

2) The blessing of Heaven (weather and other circumstances necessary for production).

3) The social order, safeguard of production which is secured by heads of the government with the help of scholars and virtuous persons, i.e., the moralists.

4) Labor, i.e. the work of common people.

Hence, the distribution of the wealth produced must be accomplished according to merit or importance, and to the productive factors. Heaven heads the list, but since It does not need wealth, for It had created all of them for the benefit of men, It will claim only an honorable possession of them.

28 Conf. original text, ch. 12, "Identification with the Superior."
Therefore men must make sacrifices to honor Heaven:

Heaven claims all and accepts offerings from all. All states in the world, large or small, are cities of Heaven; and all the people, young or old, honorable or humble, are Its subjects; for they all graze oxen and sheep, feed dogs and pigs and prepare clean wine and cakes to sacrifice to Heaven. 29

It was a traditional custom of ancient China that, after each harvest of the year, the first duty of the Emperor, other rulers, heads of districts and heads of families was to prepare the best they could and to offer the sacrifice of thanksgiving to Heaven. This is not a new doctrine with Mo-tze; he merely repeated the ancient traditional teachings of early wise men. But, we wish to note that Mo-tze believed very sincerely in the power of Heaven as an all-important factor in production; while the Confucianists of his time became somewhat skeptical although they still maintained the necessity of sacrificial ceremonies. This attitude was severely criticized by Mo-tze as hypocrisy.

After the claim of Heaven, the rulers may claim the fruits of production according to their respective dignity and importance in securing peace and order which is a conditio sine qua non of production. The scholars earn their right to enjoy the fruits of production by their merits in teaching moral doctrine which is in its turn a conditio sine qua non of social order and peace. Thus, the laborers must contribute a better part of the total production to the rulers and scholars because, according to Mo-tze the latter have even greater merits than the former.

Therefore, in concluding this section, we may state that judging according to his doctrine about labor and its value in production, Mo-tze was

definitely not a Marxit. And, along with this discussion we have seen the synopsis of Mo-tze's doctrine on production and distribution of wealth; as to its consumption, we believe that we have discovered enough while discussing how, according to Mo-tze, man must pursue and enjoy material goods; and we believe that we have quite completely exposed what is right use of wealth and what is luxurious or immoral use of it.
We spent a great deal both in time and in effort to enable us to conclude our second chapter by demonstrating that Mo-tze was not a utilitarian because he had quite a different ultimate principle in morals from that of the utilitarians and socialists.

However, principles alone are not enough, for Mo-tze has been criticized as utilitarian or at least as un-humanitarian because of a few practical reasons.

Mencius again headed the list in condemning Mo-tze's doctrine on the simplicity of funerals. The expense of the funeral, noted Mencius, is not a waste of wealth, although it seems to be so from the viewpoint of utilitarianism. Our filial piety urges us to make a sumptuous funeral for our parents, in order to show that we do wish to do the best we can for them. This is a case where moral necessity wins over material utility.

Hsun-tze has given us this statement as his final judgment on Mo-tze's doctrine: "Blinded by utility he did not see the value of refinement." 30 Chung-tze said that, according to Mo-tze, "there was to be no singing in life, no mourning after death." 31

Not only the ancient Chinese scholars but also a few modern ones considered Mo-tze utilitarian for this same reason. But, for us, their arguments have little value because of the fact that either they misunderstood Mo-tze's doctrine or they purposely exaggerated in describing Mo-tze's practical rules.

in order to be able to condemn his doctrine as un-humanitarian. Mencius once in speaking to a disciple of Mo-tze (or rather a simple follower of Mo-tze) wished to demonstrate that the teaching of Mo-tze on simplicity in funerals is unhuman, because it is against human nature. He proceeded by telling the story of a man who did not care to bury his parent and in order to simplify the matter he threw the body of his parent in a ditch; when after a few days he happened to pass the ditch again, he found the body of his parent was covered with worms, flies and other insects, and some part of it had been eaten by animals. He felt so sorry, realizing that he had done something against his heart's natural desire that he ran back home and got some instruments to dig a grave and there he buried the body. Hence, Mencius concluded, to neglect the burial of our parent and relatives is naturally wrong, for that man naturally felt that it is wrong even without having been told so. Thus, without naming Mo-tze, Mencius wanted to show this follower of Mo-tze that the so-called doctrine of simplicity in funerals is against human nature. This would be correct if only we could find that Mo-tze has taught something similar to this. If we compare this criticism of Mencius with the original text of Mo-tze, we shall see that the criticism was completely without foundation. Mo-tze cited the following as his standard in this matter:

The ancient sage kings authorized the code of laws limiting funeral expenses, saying: Of shrouds there shall be three pieces to be enough to hold the rotten flesh. The coffin shall be three inches thick in order to be sufficient to hold the rotten bones. The pit shall be dug not deep enough to reach the water, but

32 Conf. Book of Mencius, Book III, part 1, ch. 5.
just so deep that the gases will not escape. When the
dead is buried the living shall not mourn too long.33

Even to the mind of modern Christian humanitarianism, the above quoted
prescriptions are quite acceptable as standards. It is simplicity and not
negligence in burial. We do not see that Mo-tze can be criticized as
"Blinded by utility" in this point. To these few modern writers who tried to
make Mo-tze an utilitarian by citing the criticism of Confucianists as authen-
tic authority, we may show that such criticism is incorrect, because it is
based on their own description of Mo-tze's teaching, which was grossly
exaggerated and deformed by them. We have quoted Mo-tze's own rules for
burial which proved to be quite humanitarian; besides, we can further quote
Mo-tze in condemning un-humanitarian burials:

South of Ch'u there was a cannibal tribe. Upon the
death of their parents, the flesh was scraped off and
thrown away while the bones were buried. And by following
this custom one became a filial son. West of the state
of Ch' in there was the tribe of Yi Ch'u. Upon their
death, the parents were burned on a bonfire and amidst
the smoke, and this was to be said ascension to the golden
clouds. In this way one became a filial son. The of-
officials embodied this in government regulations and the
people regarded it as commonplace. They practiced it
continually and followed it without discrimination
(i.e. exception). Is it then the good and the right way?
No, this is really because habit affords convenience and
custom carries approval.34

In acknowledging the exaggeration of the Confucianists in their descrip-
tion of Mo-tze's teachings, we also equally acknowledge the similar defect
on the part of Mo-tze in his description of Confucian doctrine and practice.

33 Conf. original text, ch. 21, "Economy in Expenditure II." A similar
statement also occurs in ch. 25, "Simplicity in Funerals."
34 Conf. original text, ch. 25, "Simplicity in Funerals."
We would gladly agree with Chung-tze who was an eye-witness to the great disputes between the two rival schools and hold that their attacks on each other were deplorable.

The Tao is obscured by our want of grasp. Speech is obscured by the gloss of this world. Hence the affirmatives and negatives of the Confucian and Mihist schools, each denying what the other affirmed and affirming what the other denied. But he who would reconcile affirmative with negative and negative with affirmative must do so by the light of nature.35

On another occasion, Chung-tze said: "These were perfect men, but had they been taught by Confucianists and Mihists, they would have hammered one another to pieces over scholastic quibbles."36

Another authoritative neutral observer, Han Fei-tze, who lived close enough to that time to be considered as a reliable witness, gave us rather a solid reason for favoring Mo-tze on this particular point, that is the rules on funerals. Thus, we find in Han Fei-tze:

According to the Mihist ideas of funerals, Winter clothes will do for shrouds in Winter and Summer clothes in Summer. The coffin shall be three inches thick. And morning shall last three months. This is often followed because of its simplicity. The Confucianists, on the other hand, would reduce the family to poverty to hold a funeral, and mourn for three years until his health was greatly injured and he had to walk with a cane. This is also adopted for filial sentiment. So then, Mo-tze would condemn Confucius for extravagance, while Confucius would condemn Mo-tze for perversity.37

Here, our intention is not to discuss the proper rules for burial and mourning; we merely wish to show that Mo-tze was, after all, not un-humanitarian on this matter. He was not "blinded by utility," thereby neglecting the

36 Ibidem.
37 Conf. Han Fei-tze, ch. I (韓非子)
natural sentiment of human beings. He positively taught humanitarianism in
his expose of the doctrine of universal love. He suggested the elementary
idea of all modern humanitarian works, such as orphanages, hospitals for the
poor and homes for the aged. He who practices the doctrine of universal
love will

take care of his friends as he does of himself, and
take care of his friends' parents as of his own. There-
fore, when he finds his friends hungry he would feed
them, and when he finds them cold he would clothe them,
and when they are dead he would bury them. Such is the
word and such is the deed of the advocate of universal
love.38

Particularly the rulers

should first attend to his people and then to himself.
Therefore, when he finds his people hungry he would feed,
when he find his people cold he would clothe them. In
their sickness he would minister to them and upon their
death he would bury them. Such is the word and such is
the deed of the universal ruler (i.e. the ruler who
practices the universal love).39

If the doctrine of universal love is adopted, then

the old and those who have neither wife nor children
will have the support and supply to spend their old age
with, and the young and weak and orphans will have the
care and admonition to grow up in. When universal love
is adopted as the standard, then such are the consequent
benefits.40

In one word, his teaching in the simplicity of funeral and moderation in
mourning cannot be considered as the opinion of a cold-blooded economist
whose concern for human welfare is purely materialistic and even mathematical.

38 Conf. original text, ch. 16, "Universal Love," III.
39 Ibidem, Mei translation, p. 91.
40 Ibidem.
Although his condemnation of music, clothing, fashion, carving and other decorative arts was, simply speaking, exaggerated so that he merited the criticism of "ignoring the value of fine arts," his doctrine on the whole is, nevertheless, essentially humanitarian. After all, what can be more humanitarian than a doctrine which teaches reverence to God, universal love to fellow-men, exaltation of the virtuous; and on the other hand, condemns infidelity, hatred, accumulation of wealth for personal luxuries, aggressive war and fatalism?
CHAPTER VI

POLITICAL IDEAS

A) THE ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT

Accustomed to the procedure of sociology, one might expect us to begin with a discussion on the family, which is the most simple, yet most fundamental of all societies. However, our philosopher has disappointed us by his silence on the matter. Indeed Mo-tze was not interested in discussing "how" and "what" concerning our life in the family and with our own blood relations. This is, we believe, because, first, Confucius had already expounded the due relations in family affairs, and, secondly, because Mo-tze could not find anything wrong in Confucian doctrine concerning this matter except perhaps that its band of love and respect was so exaggerated that it eventually became an impediment to the doctrine of universal love. Mo-tze, therefore, while he agreed in principle with Confucius on this point, felt, nevertheless, the necessity of emphasizing the fact that the love of our parents and relatives must not be made an excuse for violating the principle of universal love, which is the will of Heaven. We must extend the love for our parents and relatives to love of the parents and relatives of other persons. This is, we think, the only remark that Mo-tze has ever made on this very important organization, namely the "family." Thus, for the lack of material, we are excused in devoting our time and effort to politics alone.

If there was anything that is to be considered as the first concern in the minds of ancient Chinese scholars, it must be the "what" and "how" of
a good government in order to secure peace and prosperity. The relative lack of metaphysical, namely cosmological, discussions among the ancient Chinese thinkers is chiefly due to their anxiety and preoccupancy with this important problem. The Rev. M. Duyvendack has noticed this fact, for he wrote:

La philosophie Chinoise est, avant tout, une philosophie pratique. Certes, elle renferme des systèmes ontologiques, des speculations metaphysiques d'une importance considérable; c'est la cependant l'exception plutôt que la règle. L'esprit chinois s'intéresse avant tout à un problème de la vie pratique. Le bon gouvernement, voilà, le theme qui, d'abord, des les commencements obscurs de la litterature, occupe la pensee des scribes anonymes, puis, des l'autre des écoles philosophiques, est agite dans toutes les discussions.¹

Mo-tze was no exception to this criticism. He wished to discuss this important problem thoroughly so he has started with the origin of government:

Why not then examine the administration and theory of government of ancient times? In the beginning there was no ruler and everybody was independent. Since every one was independent, there would be one purpose when there was one man, ten purposes when there were ten men, a hundred purposes when there were a hundred men, a thousand purposes when there were a thousand men and so until the number of the different purposes became innumerable with it. And all of them approved their own ideas and disapproved those of others. And there was strife among the strong and struggle among the weak. ... Thereupon, Heaven wished to unify the standards in the world. The virtuous was selected and made emperor.²

Here, our philosopher did not give any name of ancient documents for the foundation of his knowledge on the origin of the government. It was obviously his own imagination that was author of this theory which is also adopted

by many modern sociologists. However, Mo-tze did deserve the credit of being the first Chinese ancient thinker who has pointed out explicitly that the "raison d'être" of a society is to unify the purpose of its members. Society is indeed best defined as "a moral union of two or more persons under the same purpose." We find that Mo-tze used the term "purpose" quite frequently. For him, everything has a purpose, and so has every action of man. He may be qualified as a "finist," who believes in the real existence of "purposes" and sees the necessity of an intelligence behind the purpose, so that the purpose is not to be determined by blind fate. Thus, the doctrine of Mo-tze, under this respect, may be called finism.

No one can authoritatively give us a narration as to how the first government was organized, for the event happened so early in pre-historic ages that no ancient document now existing can be considered as possessing an eyewitness account of the birth of this first government; hence it is left to the liberty of sociologists to give us their opinion on this matter. Many different theories have been invented, but basically they belong to two opposing categories of opinion. The first one believes that civil government is a necessity delivered from the very nature of human beings, for men are naturally social animals; while the second opinion maintains that civil

4 "Sciendum est autem, quod quia homo naturaliter est animal sociale, utpote qui indiget ad suam vitam multa quae sibi ipse solus praeparare non potest; consequens est, quod homo naturaliter sit pars alicujus multitidinis per quam praestet sibi auxilium ad bene vivendum." Conf. St. Thomas, Comm. in libros Ethicorum, Lib. I, Lect. 1, No. 4.
government was created merely by an arbitrary agreement of primitive men; it is really even against human nature, for man naturally pursues freedom as much as possible. 5

Now it is very likely that Mo-tze would adopt the first opinion and reject the second one, for he has pointed out the necessity of having civil government as something that came along inevitably with the multiplication of mankind. Besides, we can never believe that Mo-tze would have been persuaded that civil government is something against human nature, because he in following the steps of ancient sages, has ultimately attributed the origin of civil government to the will of Heaven.

In fact, the most ancient written document in Chinese civilization has recorded:

Oh! Heaven gives birth to the people with such desires, that without a ruler they must fall into all disorders; and Heaven again gives birth to the man of intelligence whose business is to regulate them. 6

Now Heaven, to protect the people on earth, appointed for them rulers and teachers that they might help God to secure the tranquility of the four quarters. 7

Mo-tze noticed that in the very beginning when there were only handfuls of human beings, it was then not necessary to have civil government, but as mankind multiplied, it became more and more obvious that a unification of purposes was needed in order to avoid disputes and struggles. "Thereupon,

5 Jean J. Rousseau and many other modern naturalists hold this opinion. Lao-tze was the only ancient Chinese thinker who sponsored such an idea.
7 The great declaration recorded likewise in Shu-Ching, part V, book 1, Legge translation, vol. III, part 2, p. 286. (We do not see why Legge first used "Heaven," but later used "God.")
Heaven wished to unify the standards in the world; the virtuous was selected and made emperor." Thus, according to Mo-tze, Heaven did not establish civil government at the very first "genesis" of mankind, but purposely waited until the time when it was needed. This has given a motive to a few Chinese modern scholars to believe that Mo-tze favoured, or rather anticipated, the so-called "social contract theory." We will simply say this, that if Mo-tze should be considered as favoring such an opinion, then the entire ancient Chinese wisdom including all ancient thinkers must be judged likewise, because none of them has ever taught that the civil government was established by Heaven at the very first existence of mankind. All agreed at least implicitly that civil government was established (by Heaven) later when the increase of people made it a necessity. Although no ancient Chinese wiseman ever did state explicitly that in the very beginning there was only one man and one woman created by God, it is nevertheless sure that the Chinese believed that there were very few men in the very beginning, and a civil government was not only not needed but was simply impossible to have. Moreover, Lao-tze was the only famous ancient Chinese whom we may find explicitly favoring the so-called social contract theory. He openly criticized and contradicted all the wisemen of his time, and he was contradicted by all. Hence, it is untrue that the ancient Chinese thinkers in general would adopt this theory.

The weakness of this theory is: if the civil government was based merely on a social contract, then it might be cancelled by the agreement of contracting parties on their liberal desires. This is most likely incompatible with

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8 For instance Liang Ch'i-Ch'ao. Conf. his Philosophy of Mo-tze (in Chinese), Shanghai, 1921.
the teachings of ancient Chinese philosophers. Mo-tze, and also Mencius, has explicitly stated that without any government, the world would be in disorder and chaos and men would live a life similar to that of brute animals.\(^9\) Hence, according to them (i.e. Mo-tze, Mencius and others), men would be degraded to the state of beasts, if there were no government at all. This is practically the same as saying that men need civil government by their human nature itself. Therefore, as we have seen above, the announcement of Chung Hui declared that the desire and the necessity of having a civil government is given to us by Heaven upon our birth. Mo-tze whose anxiety and zeal in conserving the ancient wisdom is well-known, must have been a believer of this declaration recorded on the first and most authoritative among the five canonical books. All these add up to fortify our opinion that Mo-tze was by no means in favour of the so-called social contract theory.

For atheistic scholars of our modern age, whenever God is mentioned, philosophy is automatically out and mythology or superstition is in. Therefore, to say that Heaven established the first government is to narrate a mythological legend. This, of course, we will not tolerate; for, philosophy by definition is the study of the ultimate and universal causes of everything. Hence, the atheist who denies the existence of the first Cause is not a philosopher. Philosophy definitely can reach and must reach Almighty God, and discover Him as the Creator and the Supreme Ruler of the universe. If he

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\(^9\) Conf. original text, ch. 11 and 12, "Identification with the Superior," and "Disorder in the Human World could be compared to that among the birds and beasts." Mencius said: "To not acknowledge the King (i.e. destroy the idea of government) is to be in the state of beasts." Conf. Mencius, Book 3, part 2, ch. 9.
is the Supreme Ruler, then it is metaphysically certain that civil government must have originated from Heaven, whom they considered as the Supreme Ruler of the Universe.

However, it is regrettable that they did not develop any argument more accurate and more philosophically adequate to support their opinion. This, as we think, may be explained by the same reason for which they are excused for not proving the existence of a personal God; namely that, as a matter of fact, there was no need of any proof, for, it was taken by all the people of that time as an indisputable reality. Thus, in ancient China, they all believed that the civil government originated from Heaven. But, what is more important here for us is to demonstrate that their belief was not based on superstition or mythology, such as that of other peoples in the Orient.

Take Japan for example. The Japanese people also believed that their civil government originated from Heaven or God; but their belief was based completely on superstition and mythology. They were taught to believe that their Emperor is a direct descendent of the Goddess of the Sun, who is the Supreme among all gods. Never in China, during its five thousand years of civilization, has there happened anything of this sort. According to ancient Chinese philosophers Heaven is purely spiritual and definitely has no body or flesh. Heaven does not have any descendent and He does not need any, for He is perpetual. The very same Heaven who was worshipped by the ancient sage kings hundreds of years ago is worshipped by Confucius and Mo-tze. Heaven does not marry and has no blood relations. In fact, there was absolutely no idea of the existence of any goddess among the ancient Chinese people. Not only the wisemen but even the common people have never had such an idea. The
first notion about any goddess was imported from India centuries after Mo-tze.

Another fact to illustrate our belief is that no ancient Chinese philosopher ever narrated the establishment of any earthly government by Heaven. No one ever said anything definitive about where and when Heaven established the first government or who He first elected as emperor or governor. Such a colorful detail would make it mythological; for, legends need details and myths require descriptions. But, the ancient Chinese thinkers did not want to tell myths concerning the origin of civil government because they reached the conclusion by clear thinking and reasoning. Hence, while they insisted that the fact itself is objectively true, they nevertheless declined to describe its details, which they admitted they did not know. In fact, no one can know it, because there just is no such early document to be considered as a trustworthy first hand story of the origin of government. What we may find in later documents is most likely the product of someone's imagination.

Philosophically speaking, if we must admit that civil government originated from Heaven or God, then there are two principal ways in which the first civil authority might have been established. 1) God appeared or revealed

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10 One might, of course, point out this fact as an objection; namely, that Confucius, Mencius and Mo-tze did call their emperor "the Son of Heaven." (天子). We think it is most unnecessary to answer it here in our treatise; for it is obvious to all writers, Western and Eastern (including Japanese), that such a title was merely conferred upon him "honoris causa." It is only ridiculous to understand it in a material sense. The significance of this title is to show that the emperor is the most honorable among all men in the world, but that he is nevertheless inferior to Heaven. He is elected by Heaven, and Heaven blesses him, loves him, and gives him the power to rule the world; therefore he is called not without reason "The Son of Heaven." In one word, the title is only analogical and not realistic.
Himself to the people, who were then numerous enough to require a civil government, and inform them that a civil authority was to be established to govern them in His name; then He might name the first governor or governors Himself, or also He might let the people choose whom they wanted. 11 2) It is equally possible and also reasonable that there was no revelation from the part of God. But God has given us such a nature that in due time (i.e. when there was a certain number of people) men would naturally be conscious of the necessity of having a civil government; thus spontaneously they formed the first government and chose their leaders. The essential differences between these theories of social contract lies in the fact that a contract is based on the arbitrary wishes of men while a natural of instinctive desire is based on the intrinsic necessity of human nature itself. Since it is a natural necessity, it cannot be altered by arbitrary wishes.

The ancient Chinese thinkers favored the second theory. We must remember what the announcement of Chung-Hui said: "Oh! Heaven gives birth to the people with such desires that without a ruler they must fall into all disorders; and Heaven again gives birth to the man of intelligence whose business is to regulate them." Thus, Heaven made this natural desire, and again Heaven provided prompt solution to it. Confucius has given us this definition:

11 Readers are to be reminded here that we said merely that such a fact is philosophically speaking possible, for it does not involve absurdity or anything contradictory. Of course we do not want to prove the reality of such a fact, for we do not wish to violate the boundary of philosophy. However, philosophy can and does demonstrate that God exists, and that the revelation is possible, if God does desire it.

12 The difference between men and other animals that live a social life, such as ants and bees, lies in the fact that men understand the reason why they must live a social life while the bees and the ants do not. But they are all naturally and instinctively social animals.
"What is ordered by Heaven is called nature," which is accepted unanimously by all Chinese philosophers. Hence, if it is natural to men that they must have a government, it is because Heaven has so ordered. Thus, we must say that civil authority originated from Heaven.

Following the ancient doctrine contained in the canonical books, Confucius adopted this theory, and taught it to his disciples. Then Mo-tze preached it more vividly and made Heaven more personal than in Confucian doctrine. Both Confucius and Mo-tze were fortunate in that no one ever asked them how Heaven established the first government. Mencius came later, but emphasized the personal direction of Heaven in the civil government even more than did Mo-tze. So he was finally asked this difficult question:

Heaven gave it to him (i.e. the King Shun). Did Heaven confer its appointment on him with specific injunction?" Mencius replied: "No, Heaven does not speak. It simply showed its will by his personal conduct and his conduct of affairs.

Although there is much to be desired in his answer, he has, nevertheless, expressed correctly what was in the mind of his predecessors; namely, that "Heaven does not speak, but we know He is the author of nature and what is intrinsically from nature is to be spoken of as originating from Heaven." In other words: "Civil government is a natural necessity to men; and its authority came ultimately from God."

15 In this particular point, Mo-tze can be considered as one of the predecessors of Mencius, for they agreed perfectly on this matter.
B) THE CIVIL LAWS

We may discuss the value of civil laws under three different aspects: its authority, its purpose and its prosecution. One may inquire what is the opinion of Mo-tze concerned with each and every one of these three points.

1) Authority. We have demonstrated above that, according to Mo-tze the authority of civil government comes from Heaven, so that naturally civil laws are authorized by Heaven. We must, however, be well aware that since the authority of civil government is directly from Heaven, and the authority of civil laws is directly from the authority of civil government, it is therefore logically obvious that the authority of civil laws is but indirectly from Heaven. We said that we must be aware of this point, because, as a matter of fact, many people do not see such an important distinction. The great difference between natural law and civil law consists in the fact that the authority of God directly proclaims the former, whereas for the latter it only acts indirectly. This all-important distinction explains why civil law is not infallible.

Mo-tze was well aware of this distinction. Whenever he discussed a "good government" he demonstrated very little concern about the legitimacy of the rulers' ascension to power, but his total attention was clearly on the correctness of the laws issued by the government. If these civil laws were morally correct, then the government was to be called "good"; otherwise it was to be called a "bad government." The standard in judging this matter, according to Mo-tze, was the "Will of Heaven," which is, of course, the absolute standard in judging all moral subjects.
If a government is observed to be in accordance with the will of Heaven, it is to be called a good government; if it is in opposition to the will of Heaven, it is called a bad government.\(^\text{16}\)

Obviously Mo-tze was not referring to the legitimacy of the governing power, but rather to the policy of the government in ruling the people, which policy is shown throughout the civil laws issued by the same. Moreover, the English translation here is somewhat questionable. The term \(^{17}\) as it is in the original text would be more exactly translated into "penal laws," which was then used frequently by ancient Chinese scholars to indicate all the civil laws issued by the government. At any rate, the contexts suggested plainly that we must understand the above quoted passage as saying: "If civil laws are in accordance with the will of Heaven, they are to be called "good," otherwise they are "bad."

We know that Mo-tze has established the will of Heaven as the norm of morality; but especially in this present instance concerning civil laws Mo-tze even had a more obvious reason to demonstrate that the will of Heaven must be the standard. For, according to Mo-tze, civil rulers are elected by Heaven in order to rule the people and thus to help them to secure peace and order. They are a sort of employee of Heaven who is the Supreme ruler of the universe. Hence, it must really be Heaven who is the principal ruler of the people. Therefore, whatsoever is issued or decreed by a subordinate ruler against the will of the principal ruler, is obviously not only a bad

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\(^{16}\) Conf. original text, ch. 27, "Will of Heaven II."

\(^{17}\) "政" is the original term which is translated by Mei Yei-po as "government." "政" which literally means to apply rules can be correctly translated into "government;" but "政" is better expressed by "penal rules," although we do acknowledge that the ancient Chinese did seem to have used the two terms alternatively to signify the policy of the government.
policy, but also will be eventually revoked and annulled by the superior power. In dealing with Heaven, we must say that any law that is against the will of Heaven, is not only a bad law, but it is no law at all, since it would automatically lose its enforcing authority. This is why we believe that any civil law or other kind of man-made rules that are against the natural law or any of the Divine laws positively issued, are "ipso facto" invalid in forcing one's conscience, and are therefore without authority.

Mo-tze also cited practical examples of existence of such evil laws. He described a certain savage tribe of the South as having the law concerning cremation of bodies officially contained in their government regulations. On another occasion, Mo-tze reported that there was a cannibal tribe, also in the extreme South, whose golden rule was to eat their first born son, believing that this would bring better fortune to the second son. Moreover, Mo-tze often criticized the heavy tax established by the rulers of his time, condemning them as robbers of their people. Because, for Mo-tze, the civil law has its enforcing authority only inasmuch as it is in accordance with the will of Heaven, which is, as we have demonstrated above (in the second chapter of our treatise) what the scholastics called natural law. For the authority of the ones who issued the civil laws is not their own authority but one received from Heaven precisely under the condition that they must use it according to the will of Heaven.

2) Purpose. The aim of civil law is evidently the same as that of the

18 Conf. original text, ch. 25, "Simplicity in Funerals III" "The officials embodied it in the government regulations..." Mei's translation, p. 133.
19 Conf. original text, ch. 49, "Lu's Question."
civil government, for civil law is precisely the means which the civil government uses to obtain its aim. Hence, the purpose of civil law is the common good.

"Common good" was always Mo-tze's favorite subject of discussion. He spoke about it so extensively and intensively that he was easily misunderstood and therefore considered a utilitarian. We call this a misunderstanding because we have already analyzed the essentials of Mo-tze's doctrine and found out that according to him the ultimate norm of morality is the will of Heaven and this norm is to be honored regardless of the practical effects on the common good. However, the "common good" is a kind of norm too; it is to be served as the standard in judging the value of civil laws precisely because the purpose of civil laws is the common good. The civil law is purposely made in order to provide and secure the common good; hence, if it does not serve for its own purpose, then, evidently it is to be regarded as "no good." Here, we may remind our readers of the finism tendency of Mo-tze's doctrine.

We have seen that, according to Mo-tze, everything has its own purpose.

20 For instance, Mo-tze stated that even though it benefit the whole world, it is not right to kill an innocent person. (Conf. ch. 45.) See detailed discussion in our Chapter II, p. 115, and note 130.

21 The finism of Mo-tze may be illustrated in the following incident. "Mo-tze asked a Confucianist why the Confucians pursued music. He replied that music is pursued for music's sake. Mo-tze said: You have not yet answered me. Suppose I asked why houses are built. If you answered that because they are to keep off the cold in the winter and the heat in the summer, and to separate men from women, then you would have told me the reason for building houses. Now, I am asking you why you pursued music; and you said music is pursued for music's sake. This is to say why houses are built — "Houses are built for houses' sake." (Conf. original text, ch. 48, "Kung Men."
Food, clothes, housing, all have their own proper purpose; so it is with all human actions. They must be performed in accordance with their own purpose. If they reach their purpose, they are good things and good acts (for instance, good food, good eating and drinking); otherwise they are bad. The civil laws must follow the same rule. If they do promote common good, they are to be called good, otherwise they are bad. This is not necessarily a utilitarian doctrine, for this is also the doctrine of scholastic philosophy, which is definitely in opposition to utilitarianism.

The key to the solution of this discussion is the fact that the natural and therefore correct purpose of any being is naturally adequate to be adopted as the standard in judging its value. This natural purpose or aim is called by Aristotle the "causa finalis." And, according to the scholastic philosophy, this "causa finalis" of civil law is precisely the common good. Obviously everybody will agree that if a civil law should prove to be against the common good, then it is simply no good. Therefore, no matter how extensively and how intensively Mo-tze emphasized the importance of adopting "common good" as the standard to judge the righteousness of civil laws, he was always within the realm of a properly ordained judgment, namely to judge the value of civil law with its own purpose as standard. For, this does not imply that the common good is to be considered the ultimate norm of morality. Yet, on the other hand, Mo-tze was not silent about the ultimate norm of morality; he demonstrated with a great effort and a great conviction that the ultimate norm of morality is the will of Heaven.

22 "...ordinatio rationis ad bonum commune, ab eo, qui curam habet communitatis, promulgata." Conf. St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, 1, 2, questio 90 ad primam.
3) Prosecution. To bring the civil law into effect if of course the responsibility of public officers. Often, a good legislation became inefective or even harmful to the people because of the fact that it was carried out by incapable government officers.

Mo-tze said: The penal code of Lu, among the books of the ancient sage kings said: 'Among the people of Miso punishments were applied without employing instruction and admonition. They made a code of five tortures and called it laws....

Yet the same king of five punishments, or tortures, were used by the ancient sage kings to put the world in peace and prosperity. Therefore, the most essential thing for the prosecution of civil laws is to have capable and competent public officers. This served to Mo-tze as the motif for his doctrine of exaltation of the virtuous, and employment of the capable.

Mo-tze said: Now all the rulers desire their provinces to be wealthy, their people to be numerous and their jurisdiction to secure order. But what they obtain is not wealth but poverty, not multitude but scarcity, not order but chaos — this is to lose what they desire and to obtain what they avert. Why is this? Mo-tze said: This is because the rulers failed to exalt the virtuous and to employ the capable in their government....

The Nepotism in politics must be abolished. It is not only unfair, but also unreasonable.

When the rulers cannot get a coat made, they will employ able tailors. When they cannot have an ox or sheep killed, they will employ able butchers. In these two instances they do know they should exalt the virtuous and employ the capable for business. But when it comes to the disorder of the country and danger of the state, they do not know

23 Conf. original text, ch. 12, "Identification with the Superior II".
24 Conf. original text, ch. 8, "Exaltation of the Virtuous." Opening words of the chapter, Mei's translation, p. 30.
they should exalt the virtuous and employ the capable for the government. Rather, they would employ their relatives, they would employ the rich who have no merit and would employ the good-looking ones.²⁵

The three essential characteristics of an ideal public officer are, according to Mo-tze, virtue, wisdom and ability. The head of the state, the king or the great duke, must see that all the public officers of his state are qualified in these three characteristics as highly as possible. This is what Mo-tze called the secret of success in government. However, the rulers of his time might find an excuse by complaining that there were so few men of virtue, wisdom and ability to be employed. Always resolved to have the last word in a dialectical discussion, Mo-tze never gave his opponents a chance to have an excuse for not doing what is right according to the conclusion of the discussion. Thus, Mo-tze wished to demonstrate that in the first place, it was not because there are not enough of virtuous, wise and capable men, but probably because they were not discovered; hence, the head of states must know how to discover them. Then, secondly, even though if it be true that there are not enough of such persons, then this is only because the head of the government did not try to encourage his people to be virtuous, wise and capable. When these characters are properly encouraged, there will be more than enough of such persons worthy of public offices.

Mo-tze said: This is because the rulers failed to exalt the virtuous and to employ the capable in their government. When the virtuous are numerous in the state, order will be stable; when the virtuous are scarce, order will be unstable. Therefore the task of the lords lies nowhere but in multiplying the virtuous.

²⁵ Conf. ibidem.
But what is the way to multiply the virtuous? Mo-tze said: Supposing it is desired to multiply good archers and good drivers in the country, it will be only natural to enrich them, honor them, respect them and commend them; then good archers and good drivers can be expected to abound in the country. How much more should this be done in the case of the virtuous and the excellent who are firm in morality, versed in rhetoric, and experienced in state craft...since these are the treasures of the nation and props of the state? They should be also enriched, honored, respected and commended in order that they may abound.26

This is because Mo-tze believed firmly that man naturally wishes to do good, to be virtuous, honest, and learn wisdom. The reason he became vicious, dishonest and crafty is that he was convinced that "de facto" this is the only way to become rich and to hold high rank in politics. Now this is certainly a great distortion of the truth. The true situation of this matter must be just the contrary. It seems only natural to right human reason that the virtuous, wise and capable must become rich and be honored with high rank in public affairs. Therefore why not correct this distortion and make it known to all that really "de facto" the virtuous, wise and capable will become rich and will be honored with high rank? If this is effectively done, then naturally everyone will pursue virtues and wisdom and no one will seek vices and hypocrises, since he is forced to see the fact that the evil man will never be a politician. Mo-tze surely had a good reason to say so, although he was obviously a little too optimistic, for he had much confidence in human nature, unfortunately ignoring the fact of original sin.27 Today,

26 Conf. original text, ch. 8, "Exaltation of the Virtuous I", Mei's translation, p. 31.
27 Here we do not want to put original sin into philosophy. Nevertheless, it is a solidly based fact which may help philosophy a great deal especially in studying social problems. It is not necessary to bring revelation into philosophy; a good observer of human nature through
after 2500 years, we still have to share the same regret with our ancient philosopher.

Mo-tze was not satisfied with merely presenting such an idea as a guiding principle, but even proposed practical methods:

However, if there is only the principle while the technique of its application is not known, then it would seem to be still incomplete. Therefore there should be laid down three rules. What are the three rules? They are: 1) when their rank (that of the virtuous) is not high, people will not show respect to them; 2) when their emoluments are not liberal, people will not place confidence in them; 3) when their orders are not final, people will not stand in awe before them. So, the ancient sage kings placed them high in rank, gave them liberal emoluments, trusted them with important charges and decreed their orders to be final. 28

With the prosecution of civil laws entrusted to the hands of the virtuous and the capable, it seemed to Mo-tze that the problem would be properly solved and only occasionally did he point out a few practical suggestions concerning how to prosecute the laws. We have already quoted him, on different occasions, criticizing heavy taxes, unreasonable drafting of labor, and most of all the way the contemporary rulers were conducting war, which Mo-tze considered the worst of all crimes and the greatest calamity of his time. Beside these negative admonitions, Mo-tze urged the public officers to give good personal example to the people, to enrich the people, or at least always provide them with enough for the necessities of life. Food is among the most important things for the government. Mo-tze realized that a hungry man makes history will easily discover the effects of original sin; and, even if he does not believe in original sin, the effects still remain as some sort of weakness of human nature which is quite obvious to all no matter what one might consider its cause.

28 Conf. original text, ch. 9, "Exaltation of the Virtuous II."
a poor listener and that famine generates criminals:

People are gentle and kind when the year is good, but selfish and vicious when many produce but few consume then there can be no bad year; on the contrary, when few produce but many consume then there can be no good year.

During better years, the public officers must see that the people are protected from famine in the less fortunate seasons. The motto is: "Hope for the best while preparing for the worst." No rulers can totally avoid natural calamities for a long time (they must be a kind of test imposed by Heaven), but the prepared one will diminish, if not completely avoid, the consequences.

Could even the ancient sage kings cause the five grains invariably to be reaped and be harvested and the floods and droughts never to occur? Yet none of them was frozen or starved, why was it? It was because they made full use of the seasons and were frugal in their own maintenance .... Therefore, famine and death cannot be prepared against, unless there are stored grains in the granaries....

The laws which reward the good and punish the wicked must be carried out effectively in order to convince the people of the objective value of law. Nevertheless, the essential motive of penalties is rather preventive than merely vindictive. The purpose of penal law is to promote good (i.e. common good) and not to torture and kill the people. Rulers must use it to protect the people rather than merely occupy themselves in punishing them according to the law. Thus, the same written law, which is the blessing of the world, the cause of order and peace, when prosecuted by sage rulers, may become an instrument of persecution and cause of disorder and misery.

Mo-tze said: The political leaders of the present day are quite different from those of the old days. The case is

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30 Conf. original text, ch. 5, "The Seven Anxieties."
parallel to that of the five punishments with the prince of Miao. In ancient times the sage kings made the code of the five punishments and put the empire in order. But when the Prince of Miao established the five punishments they unsettled his empire. Can it be that the punishments are at fault? Really the fault lies in their application....those who know how to apply punishments can govern the people with them. And those who do not know, make five tortures out of them....31

The prosecution of civil laws was, to Mo-tze, a really very important problem, because the practical realization of his doctrine depended largely upon it. And we know well that Mo-tze was practical minded.
C) "UTOPIA"

More or less, every philosopher has his own dream of human society, the one which is, according to him, the most perfect and most ideal form of state. Ever since Plato's Republic, innumerable thinkers and writers have described what a utopia should be, or, rather, what kind of utopia they were dreaming about. Some of them compiled their elaborately described best wishes into a special publication, whereas the great number of them were content to mention the matter somewhere in their writings.

Again, there are some of them who believe that the realization of their imagination is possible and even inevitable; where the majority show skepticism or kept a doubtful hope. Finally, most of them have imagined such a utopia as an earthly paradise only for a few chosen ones, which must then be in a remote place, free from contamination by this already corrupted world; we may nevertheless find some who are thinking about a utopia for all the people of the world.

Mo-tze did not write any special essay on his dream country; but he has described what a perfect world ought to be in the three chapters where he explains his doctrine of "Identification with the Superior." He sincerely believed that such a state is really possible if people are properly taught his doctrine. And, what is more important, he did not dream of a world out of this world; he wanted to transform this very world, which is corrupted, into a perfect utopia for every man.

The foundation of such an ideal state, according to Mo-tze, is rather simple. First, it must have unification of purposes: all men united and determined to make a peaceful and prosperous world. This is not only possible
but even as certain as that water will always run downward. It is possible if the people are properly taught the doctrine of universal love. However, such a unification is not to be decided by any plebiscite; it is acquired simply by teaching the people that they must trust in their immediate superior, obey him promptly and imitate his example. He must be a perfect man to them. And, since the immediate superior must, in his turn, trust, obey and imitate a higher superior, and the latter must act in the same manner toward a still higher superior, and thus one arrives finally at the Supreme Superior, it is only logical that by this way, the multitude of human beings will eventually be united into one world government. To quote Mo-tze directly:

Now the head of the village is the most high-minded and tender-hearted man of the village. He notified the people of the village saying: 'Upon hearing good or evil you shall report it to the head of the district. What the head of the district thinks to be right, all shall think to be right. What he thinks to be wrong, all shall think to be wrong. Put away from your speech that which is not good and learn his good speech. Remove from your conduct that which is not good and learn his good conduct. How then can there be disorder in the district? There was order in the district because the head could unify the standard of the district. The head of the district was the most high-minded and tender-hearted man in the district. Now, how was order brought to the feudal state? There was order in the feudal state because the feudal lord could unify the standard in the state. The lord of the state was the most high-minded and tender-hearted man in the state. He notified the people of the state saying: 'Upon hearing good or evil you shall report it to the emperor. What the emperor thinks to be right all shall think to be right; what the emperor thinks to be wrong all shall think to be wrong. Take away from your speech that which is not good and learn his good speech. Remove from your conduct which is not good and learn his good conduct. How then

33 "Like fire tending upward and water downward—it will be unpreventable in the world." Conf. ch. 16, "Universal Love III."
can there be disorder in the empire?... If, however, the people all identify themselves with the son of Heaven but not with Heaven Itself, then the jungle is still unremoved....34

But, the ascension of the hierarchy will not stop on earth; it must go still one step higher than the emperor and thus reach Heaven, who is the Supreme Ruler of the Universe.

If, however, the people all identify themselves with the son of Heaven, but not with Heaven Itself, then the jungle is still unremoved. Now, the frequent visitations of hurricanes and torrents are just the punishments from Heaven upon the people for their not identifying their standards with the will of Heaven....35

In other words, Mo-tze's idea of achieving unity and consequently peace is somewhat like the popular child-game "follow the leader." But, how can it be assured that the leader is always right? Although Mo-tze has secured the ultimate leadership by placing Heaven as the Supreme Superior, we may still inquire about the exemplary character of the rest of our superiors. How can it be assured that these human superiors do follow faithfully the virtues of Heaven? Even Mo-tze himself has dramatically admitted that not only a few but rather the majority of human superiors of his time were quite far from being exemplary.

What, then, should be taken as the proper standard in government? How will it do for everybody to imitate his parents? There are numerous parents in the world but few are magnanimous. For everybody to imitate his parents is to imitate the unmagnanimous. Imitating the unmagnanimous cannot be said to be following the proper standard. How will it do for everybody to follow his teacher? There are numerous teachers in the world but few are magnanimous. For everybody to imitate his

34 Conf. original text, ch. 11, "Identification with the Superior I."
35 Conf. ibidem, ch. 12, "Identification with the Superior II."
teacher is to imitate the unmagnanimous. Imitating the unmagnanimous cannot be said to be following the proper standard. How will it do for everybody to imitate his ruler? There are many rulers in the world but few are magnanimous. For everybody to imitate the ruler is to imitate the unmagnanimous. Imitating the unmagnanimous cannot be taken as following the right standard. So then neither the parents nor the teacher nor the ruler should be accepted as the standard in government.

What then should be taken as the standard in government? Nothing better than following Heaven. Heaven is all-inclusive and impartial in its activities, abundant and unceasing in its blessings, and lasting and unceasing in its guidance. And so, when the sage kings had accepted Heaven as their standard, they measured every action and enterprise by Heaven. What Heaven desired they would carry out; what Heaven abominated they refrained from.36

Shall we then accuse our philosopher of contradicting himself? Not necessarily, for we have a good explanation for his apparently contradictory statements. To begin with, we must remember his doctrine of the "Exaltation of the Virtuous." Only the virtuous may be made superior and leader. If this be established, then we may follow human leaders. Mo-tzé seemed to have imposed this vitally important responsibility on the first leader on the earth, that is, the emperor. Of course, this presupposes that the emperor himself must necessarily be a virtuous person; otherwise, the entire hope for a utopia is gone, or rather has no foundation to start with. Therefore, Mo-tzé sincerely hoped that the emperor would always imitate the ancient sage kings in employing virtuous and capable persons to assist him in ruling the world.

The ancient sage kings greatly emphasized the exaltation of the virtuous and the employment of the capable.

Without special considerations for relatives, for the rich and honoured or for the good-looking, they exalted and promoted the virtuous, enriched and honored them, and made them governors and leaders. The vicious they kept back and banished, depossed and degraded, and made laborers and servants. Thereupon people were all encouraged by rewards and threatened by punishments and strove with each other after virtue. Thus the virtuous multiply and the vicious diminish in number.

Thus, Mo-tze concludes his expose of the doctrine of the "Exaltation of the Virtuous" with this statement: "The exaltation of the virtuous is the proof of the Government." 

But this is rather the condition sine qua non" of the utopia of Mo-tze. The "status quo" of such an ideal world could be described at length and with much oratory; however, it may be described very briefly by saying that it is just the state of full realization of the doctrine of universal love, which realization implies a complete peace and harmony among all people. Nevertheless, a civil government is still needed; and it seemed even to be an essential part of Mo-tze's utopia.

The constitution of this government would be as follows: The emperor is the chief ruler of the whole world. He is elected by Heaven, although Mo-tze did not state how; neither did he demonstrate the ways and means by which we might assure ourselves of the fact that this or that individual person is elected by Heaven as the emperor. At any rate, the emperor has the incomparable authority, and also has the incomparable responsibility to choose the virtuous and capable in order to assist him in governimg the people.

But the world is so large that it is difficult to reach the far corners,

37 Conf. original text, ch. 9, "Exaltation of the Virtuous II," Mei's translation, p. 36.
38 Conf. ibidem, ch. 8, 9, 10. (All three chapters have this statement as a conclusion.)
and the people are so many and those who live at far distances differ so much
that it is a necessity that the emperor divide his empire into many nations
to facilitate the governing procedure. The head of each nation again must
choose virtuous persons to assist them in governing their nations. Thus, each
province, each district, each town and village must have its own government. 39
However, this hierarchy of government is so established that the inferior
governments must be completely subordinated to the superior ones. Mo-tze
called this subordination "Identification" inasmuch as the inferior govern-
ment must exercise a policy identical with that of its superior government,
so that the inferior government really has no policy of its own, but simply
carries out the policy indicated to it by its superior. Thus, although there
are in fact many subdivisions of government, it is nevertheless in reality
one and the same government for the entire world.

In spite of this method of divisions and subdivisions, it seemed that Mo-
tze still favored, at least in principle, a direct handling of local matters
by the emperor himself. The emperor must make his power extend as far as
possible and penetrate everywhere as thoroughly as possible.

During the reign of the ancient sage kings over the
empire, if there was a virtuous man more than a thousand
li away, he could reward him before the people in the
same district, and the village all came to know it.
And if there was a wicked man about a thousand li away,
he could punish him before the people of the same
district, and the village came to know it. Though it
may be supposed that the sage king was keen in hearing
and sight, how could he see all that is beyond a thousand
li at one look, and how could he hear all that is beyond
a thousand li at one hearing. In fact, the sage king

39 Conf. original text, ch. 13, "Identification with the Superior III."
could see without going there and hear without being near....There is the beauty of adopting the principle of identification with the superior.\(^{40}\)

This form of government, as it is advocated by Mo-tze, is obviously monarchism in the strict sense; materially speaking, it is even more or less similar to dictatorship. However, we do believe that the fundamental rights of individuals were to be respected and unviolated in this ideal government of Mo-tze. The reasons are:

First of all, Mo-tze did not make the emperor infallible. He is human too, and is subject to the punishment of Heaven. Heaven may depose him from the throne, as in the case of the wicked kings of the three dynasties which were ended with the deposition of their respective last emperors. These wicked emperors had even lost their own lives. Heaven punished them by permitting and even inspiring a revolution headed by the virtuous person who eventually was to take the throne, become the new emperor, and found a new dynasty. This is not a story invented by Mo-tze, but is recorded in the most trustworthy ancient documents; it is accepted by Confucius as historically true; and later Mencius cited it at length and gave the same comment as Mo-tze, namely that the wicked emperors are to be punished and to be executed as criminals. An armed revolution against a tyrant is, according to Mencius, a sacred crusade to save the people from oppression. Both Mencius and Mo-tze believed that whenever it is needed Heaven will inspire such a revolution in order to punish the tyrant and thus restore prosperity and freedom to the people. It seemed that Mo-tze (and Mencius) was not worried about when, how

\(^{40}\) Conf. original text, ch. 13, "Identification with the Superior III."
and by whom such a revolution should be realized, for he trusted completely to the Providence of Heaven, the Supreme Ruler of the world.

Furthermore, in this ideal government the interest of the common people was really the first concern. It was precisely in order to secure prosperity and peace for the common people that the emperor was made head of the government. Now remembering the finism of Mo-tze, we may conclude that if the emperor does not serve his purpose, he is not good and is to be rejected.

Mo-tze realized well that no human being is indefectible no matter how virtuous he may be; 41 and therefore, the emperor and the ministers are bound to make some mistakes; in such cases, the inferior should show them their mistakes in a polite and respectful way so that they may correct themselves. 42

Therefore Mo-tze did not advocate an unqualified identification with the superior so that one must blindly follow his leader. It is even a duty to advise one's immediate superior when he makes a mistake. 43 Thus, the essential evil of dictatorship is definitely absent in Mo-tze's utopia.

Moreover, the interest, prosperity and comfort of the common people was so solicited in Mo-tze's teaching that throughout his works one can never find anything that implies even remotely the enslavement of the people.

Madam A. David has rightly noticed:

Un examen plus attentif nous a bientot eclairé sur la véritable pensée de philosophie (of Mo-tze). Il n'a nullement entendu imposer aux masses populaires une servile sujection. Pour le bon ordre social il faut

41 He explicitly stated that no human being can be the standard of morality, but only Heaven can furnish the unfailable norm. Conf. original text, ch. 4, "On the Necessity of a Standard."
42 Conf. original text, ch. 11, "Identification with the Superior I."
43 Ibidem.
qu’elles approuvent les actes de leurs souverain, mais celui-ci doit agir de façon à s’attirer leur approbation spontanée.

L’empereur et le chef de village disent aussi: ‘Si nous commençons des fautes il faut nous en avertir.’

It is clear that the people are not slaves of the emperor.

On the contrary, it seemed that according to Mo-tze the emperor must work himself to the limit for the benefit of the people. The ancient sage kings, who are recognized not only by Mo-tze but by all ancient Chinese scholars as the models of good emperors, are described by Mo-tze as slaves themselves for the sake of the people.

Mo-tze argued in favour of his doctrine as follows: Of old, the great Yu (emperor) drained off the flood water, and... with his own hands he plied the bucket and dredger, in order to reduce confusion to uniformity until his calves and shins had no hair left upon them. The wind bathed him, the rain combed him... and because he thus sacrificed himself to the commonwealth...

Thus, it was rather the emperor who was to be the slave of the people and not vice versa.

Although, as a matter of fact, the imperial throne was, in ancient China a family treasure inherited from ancestors by sons or nephews, Mo-tze did not seem to favor such a system. According to his doctrine of the exaltation of the virtuous, it must have been in his mind that the most virtuous and most capable person was to be emperor. However, it might have been because of two practical reasons that he preferred to keep silent on the subject. First of all, he might have been careful not to offend the emperor of his time by teaching such a revolutionary doctrine. Secondly, he might also have realized that

45 Conf. Chuang-tze, Chapter 33 (See bibliography). H. Giles translation.
there is practically no way to decide with precision who is the most virtuous and most capable so that he may be made emperor. Therefore, Mo-tze preferred to tolerate the actual way of naming the emperor, that is, by family succession.

Aside from the emperor himself, the rest of the governing officers are not hereditary. They are of course named by the emperor, but the emperor is not free to name them according to his own pleasure. He must "exalt the virtuous and employ the capable." We have quoted Mo-tze as saying that even a relative of the emperor is not to be named to public office unless he is capable of performing that same office. Here, the principle of democracy comes in. Anyone who is virtuous and capable must be exalted and employed in government with high rank, liberal emoluments and great power. On the contrary, if one who is actually in high rank shall prove that he is not worthy of his office, he is to be deposed and even punished if necessary. Mo-tze did not give any consideration to the relatives of the emperor, even the most close. We do not find that he ever used the term "nobility" in the sense understood by the Western monarchists. Nobles for Mo-tze are those who are in high rank because of their virtue and ability. The relatives of the emperor are simply fellow citizens in Mo-tze's utopia. Thus, in spite of the fact that there is an emperor, the idea state of Mo-tze is nevertheless intrinsically democratic. His Excellency, the most Reverend Paul Yu-pin, first Archbishop of Nanking, China, has furnished us with this statement:

46 Even the most progressive democratic country of our days will still face this problem. Who can be sure that the president elected is the most virtuous and most capable man for the office?
Though China's government was monarchical in form, in spirit, but in reality it was democratic. The Chinese seem to be by nature democratic. Probably no people has been less affected by their rulers. The emperor sat on his throne, issued exhortations and collected taxes while the people went about their own business and governed themselves through their local country organization. The unit of strength in China has never been the nation or national loyalty, but the family and its loyalty. Chinese government has always been a government by men, not by law. When the men were good, all went well; when the men were evil, they were usually deposed.

Hence, Mo-tze's idea of utopia was not so much an attempt to change the form of the government, but rather a great wish to provide virtuous and capable governors; once this be assured, the ideal government will naturally be produced.
We are writing this thesis at a time when everyone in the world understands what war is. Mo-tze was not so unfortunate as we who live in this so-called atomic age, but he had surely enough knowledge about war since the time in which he lived is called by Chinese historians the period of warring states. As we have mentioned early in our writings, this peculiar status of the warring states was caused by the fact that the emperor had practically lost his control over local governments; thus the larger and stronger governments became more and more independent, and finally organized their own armies, and the heads of the larger states eventually became war lords fighting for more territories and more power to satisfy their own ambitions.

Our philosopher wished to stop these conflicts with his doctrine of universal love and also to restore the prestige of the emperor with his doctrine of identification with one's superior. Either one will satisfy his desire; for, if the emperor could regain real control over all state governments, then the world would be once more united in one government and thus there would be peace. And on the other hand, if the heads of the state governments respect each other's rights and keep on good terms and peaceful relations, the war is virtually eliminated even though the feudal states remain independent of the emperor. Mo-tze realized that the first method is practically hopeless; therefore he chose the second and thus issued his condemnation of aggressive war.

48 See our first chapter, page 20 and note 39.
We must immediately notice that he only condemned offensive or aggressive war; and he encouraged defensive war even to a point so exaggerated as to ask women and children to participate in the fighting and to give their lives. This is, of course, exaggerated and particularly unnecessary at his time, for the warring states were not enemy nations in the sense of modern times; the people were of the same race, they spoke the same language (although with difference accents). It was obviously a war between war lords and by no means between peoples. In other words, they were civil wars, as those of Pompey against Caesar, or the wars of the Barons in England.

Aggressive war then is what Mo-tze condemned so vigorously. He saw its worse consequences with his own eyes. He preached against it, and he would do anything in order to stop or prevent its happening. Once he walked ten days and ten nights in order to arrive in time to persuade a war lord who had everything ready for an aggression except the signal for attack that his ambition would eventually disappoint him, for it would bring him no profit but only damages. Mo-tze also solemnly declared that he and his three hundred disciples were all ready to die if necessary to defend innocent people against aggressive war. He referred to aggressive war as the most disastrous calamity of his time. It seemed as if his arguments and reasons for condemning this atrocious misbehavior could never be exhausted. Here are

49 Conf. original text, ch. 52, "Defense of the City Wall," where Mo-tze suggested that for every fifty yards, ten men, twenty women and ten children or aged ones must be placed for defense. Again, in ch. 61, women and children were put into first line defense and were given arms to fight in hand-to-hand combat.

50 Conf. original text, ch. 50, "Kung Shuh."

51 Conf. original text, ch. 50, "Kung Shuh."
a few important ones:

1) Aggression is essentially unjust. He compared it with common robbery and assault; the only difference is that aggressive war is more criminal, and more unjust, for it causes more damage, made more people suffer and took more lives. "When others are caused to suffer more, then the act is more inhuman and criminal."52 Whoever fails to see the evidence of this comparison must have something wrong with his mind, for he is like a man "who, upon seeing a little blackness should say it is black, but, upon seeing much should say it is white."53 Therefore, it is the lowest type of perversity to applaud aggressive war as a glorious and magnanimous act accomplished by heroic leaders.

2) Aggressive war is against the purpose of the government and the duty of rulers, for the purpose of government is, as demonstrated by Mo-tze, precisely to secure order and peace by unifying the people, and thus preventing struggles among individuals or groups. Now, aggressive war is nothing but to start these struggles on an even larger scale by killing more, destroying more and causing more miseries, more violation and more injustice. Therefore, by starting an aggressive war, a government is simply disqualified as a government and its leader is not only neglecting his duty but positively acting against his duty. This is to avert from the right path and to go in a diametrically opposed direction. It is either blindness or perversity.

3) Practically speaking, war is just as disastrous to the conquering state as it is to the conquered one. Mo-tze emphasized this point very convincingly, for he knew that in a time when the moral principle of justice

52 Conf. original text, ch. 17, "Condemnation of Offensive War I."
53 Ibidem.
does not mean much to those ambitious war lords, the only remedy would be
the practical disadvantage; that is, if he could succeed in convincing them
of his point. Mo-tze started his argument by pointing out the fact that,
first of all, the aggressor is not always the winner. He may end as the
loser, and thus lose what he possessed before, or even be captured and killed.
Secondly, even should the aggressor conquer some territories, then:

Mo-tze said: But when we consider the victory as such,
there is nothing useful about it. When we consider the
possessions obtained through it, it does not even make
up for the losses. Now, about the siege of a city of
three li, or a kuo (outer city wall) of seven li, if
there could be obtained without the use of weapons and
the taking of lives, it would be all right. But (as a
matter of fact) those killed must be counted by ten
thousand, those widowed or left solitary must be counted
by thousands, before a city of three li or a kuo of three
li could be captured. 55

Not only will the aggressive state lose many people so that the national
economy will be hurt for the lack of labor in production, but, also other
factors in production will be missed or abused by the war. Mo-tze noticed
that war is generally started in the early spring, because the strategists
regarded winter as too cold for the expedition of troops. Thus farmers are
called to war before they could sow seeds.

If it is in the spring, it would take people away from
sowing and planting; if it is in autumn, it would take
people away from reaping and harvesting. Should they be
taken away in either of these seasons, innumerable people
would die of hunger and cold. 56

54 Conf. original text, ch. 18, "Condemnation of Offensive War II." Mo-tze
even named a few of the states that perished because of waging offensive
wars, such as Lu in the East, Chen T'sai in the South and some others in
the North.
55 Ibidem.
56 Conf. original text, ch. 18, "Condemnation of Offensive War II."
Thus, the advance of seasons was abused, the utility of soil was abandoned, the fecundity of seeds was not utilized and, furthermore, the horses and oxen were drafted and were killed; and they could not be restored to the farmers immediately after the war, so that farmers were handicapped for a long time after the war, and were further deprived of many other farming instruments that are destroyed during war. Hence, agricultural production, which is almost a synonym for the national economy, is greatly damaged even in the state that won the war.

4) War diminishes the population. To understand well the value of this argument, one must know that in ancient China the increase of population was a thing desired by all rulers and was accepted by all as one of the essential elements of national property.

Mo-tze said: All the rulers in the world desire their states to be wealthy, their people to be many, and their governments and jurisdiction to be orderly.

Similarly, a numerous family meant only happiness and prosperity to its head, namely the father. Hence, the decrease of population, either by positive loss, of living persons, or by a lower birth rate, was considered at that time a calamity.

Mo-tze showed that war kills many directly in fighting and many more indirectly by the famine which usually follows the war; and that, besides, the birth rate is necessarily diminished.

Moreover, the rulers make war and attack some neighboring states. It may last a whole year or, at the shortest, several months. Thus man and woman cannot see each other

57 Conf. original text, ch. 10, "Exaltation of the Virtuous III."
for a long time. Is this not the way of diminishing the people? 58

5) Besides these positive arguments, Mo-tze answered quite a few objections against his doctrine of anti-offensive war, accepting no excuse whatsoever to justify aggression.

a) Those who endeavour to gloss over offensive wars would say: These states perished because they could not gather and employ their multitudes. I can gather and employ my multitudes and wage war with them; who then dares to be unsubmissive? 59

Mo-tze answered this objection by declaring that the ability of organizing people into a war machine for aggressive purposes is not something to be proud of, but rather something of which one may be ashamed. In addition Mo-tze pointed out that it is historically true that all those who loved to make war perished in defeat and in shame. 60

b) Now the objector also brought up historical facts: How could Mo-tze justify the wars started and won by the ancient sage kings:

The warring lords would gloss over (their conduct) with arguments to confute Mo-tze, saying: Do you condemn attack and assault as unrighteous and not beneficial? But anciently, Yu made war on the prince of Miao, T'ang on Chieh, and king Wu on Chow. Yet they are regarded as sages. What is your explanation for this? 61

Mo-tze answered that the sage kings did not wage an aggressive war. Their wars were sacred crusades inspired by God in order to save the people from the slavery and tortures imposed upon them by wicked kings. Their armies were spontaneously welcomed by all the people everywhere as liberators. Thus

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58 Conf. original text, ch. 20, "Economy in Expenditures I."
59 Conf. op. cit., ch. 18, "Condemnation of Offensive War II."
60 This causes us to remember "periunt omnes qui bella volunt."
61 Conf. original text, ch. 19, "Condemnation of Offensive War III."
the sage kings were authorized by Heaven to defend the rights and freedom of the people of the world, and to prosecute justice against the wicked kings by deposing them and executing them. This is not an aggressive war but one to carry out the will of Heaven.

c) To carry out the will of Heaven seemed immediately to be an excellent excuse for waging war. However, as always (i.e. according to what is recorded in the text of Mo-tze's work) Mo-tze had his retort.

Prince Wen of Lu Yang said: 'Why should you, sir, prevent me from attacking Cheng? The people of Cheng have murdered their fathers (i.e. their rulers) for three generations. Heaven has been visiting them with punishments. It has caused them to be unprosperous for three years. I am only helping Heaven to carry out the punishments.' Mo-tze said: 'The people of Cheng have murdered their fathers for three generations. Heaven has been visiting them with punishments. It has caused them to be unprosperous for three years. The punishment of Heaven is sufficient. Yet you are raising an army to attack Cheng, proclaiming "My attack on Cheng is in accordance with the will of Heaven."' Now, suppose there is a man whose son is strong but insolent. So the father punished him with a ferule. But the neighbour's father struck him with a heavy staff saying: 'It is in accordance with his father's will that I strike him.' Is not this perversity?

6) In addition to his arguing and preaching, Mo-tze also did something very practical in order to help force a practical conviction upon the minds of war lords. He encouraged defensive war. He urged an all out defense from the people of a small state when invaded. He wrote ten chapters on defensive techniques. In many instances, he even suggested a wholesome holocaust similar to what modern strategists call a scorched-earth policy. Most anxiously he urged the small states to make an alliance among themselves so

62 Conf. original text, ch. 49, "Lu's Question," Mei's translation, pp. 245-246.
that when one was attacked, all would come to war against the aggressor.
However, Mo-tze was not successful in this effort; no league of small states
was organized. Nevertheless, he did succeed in at least three instances in
stopping an aggressive war.

   a) The great king of Tsing was persuaded by Mo-tze that the war caused
damage even to the winner, and thus relinquished his ambitious plan.

   b) The prince Wen of Lu Yang was convinced by Mo-tze that to wage an
aggressive war is unjust and immoral; therefore he cancelled his prepared
attack on Cheng.

   c) Kung Shubai had everything ready to attack Sung; Mo-tze walked ten
days and ten nights to reach him. After all theoretical arguments had
failed to work, Mo-tze showed him something that surprised him. It was a
complete plan to defend Sung prepared by Mo-tze himself. This plan was so
effectively made that the aggressor finally was convinced that he could not
win, and thus dropped his idea.

We may notice that in these three instances, Mo-tze used three different
methods; namely: 1) The practical reason, i.e., no one wins the war; 2) the
theoretical reason, that aggression is unjust; 3) the practical fact; i.e.,
we will fight back and beat you. We may believe that these three are merely
illustrative cases chosen by his disciples to be recorded in the text. In

63 The incident is recorded in ch. 49, "Lu's question."
65 Conf. original text, ch. 50, "Kung Shu."
66 In concluding, we might say that if one should apply Mo-tze's idea in
the present world situation, then, Mo-tze would first of all advocate
a world government which will be not merely a league of nations but a
real unity of power that will effectively take the place of the emperor
in the utopia of Mo-tze, so that the people of the world become united
under one government with one purpose, and thus consider national and
local governments as one member of the whole body by practicing mutual aid and eliminating mutual hatred. If this should fail, then, Mo-tze would use the three methods alternatively or even all at once. And, we know that he would finally be forced to resort to the most practical point (for the principles are only recognized in papers nowadays); that is, to show the aggressors how the smaller and the weaker nations could and would fight back and eventually beat aggressors. Thus, Mo-tze would be greatly in favor of a solid alliance of all peace-loving nations in order to act unanimously against any aggressor. Shall we say that our philosopher anticipated the principles of the United Nations' Organization nearly twenty-five centuries ago?
EPILOGUE

A) A SYNSOPSIS OF OUR OWN CRITICISM OF MO-TZE'S DOCTRINE

As we have, during the course of our dissertation, expressed our criticism of the philosophy of Mo-tze, we will here merely summarize our opinions which are already manifested either explicitly or, at least, implicitly, somewhere in the preceding texts:

1) Mo-tze's doctrine is fundamentally theistic and therefore is not to be considered as utilitarian. The defect in this point is that our philosopher did not provide any scientific proof for the real existence of a personal God.

2) His theism is not a religion, but strictly a philosophical system. The will of Heaven, which is concerned with humanity's welfare, is to be determined by reason.¹

3) Mo-tze's method in discussing ethical rules, namely the so-called three tests, is quite similar to the method adopted by the scholastics, who asserted that the sources of ethical science are reason and experience, both external and internal, personal and alien, present and historical.

4) The norm of morality proposed by Mo-tze is definitely objective and absolute, as we have excluded all possibilities of interpreting it as a subjective or relative standard. Among the theists Mo-tze belongs to the group of voluntarists. Although he has demonstrated that the will of God is to be

¹ This last sentence is quoted from W. H. Long. Conf. op. cit., p. 28. Long even called Mo-tze the father of China's rationalists, a title with which we do not agree.
the absolute norm because God is the most intelligent being, his teaching nevertheless is to be considered as voluntarism.

5) His doctrine of universal love is similar to Christian humanitarianism in its "raison d'être" and also in its practice. However, the great difference between the two lies in the motive. Christian humanitarianism is essentially supernatural, although the natural motive is not excluded.

6) Against determinism Mo-tze defends the traditional belief of "free will", which is the basis of moral responsibility.

7) Moral sanctions are emphasized by Mo-tze. However, according to him, rewards are not so much for recompensation as for encouragement, punishments not so much for vindication as for prevention. A post-mortem existence of the human soul is admitted, but the state of such separated souls is not clearly described. No moral sanctions in this state are ever mentioned.

8) His philosophy of life is realistic finism. Only the actual realities are considered. The proper purpose is the guiding star of human acts. Against a good many authors, we do not think Mo-tze has taught frugality and strict ascetism. He merely limited enjoyment to moderation. His most emphasized point is that no man can enjoy luxuries while some of his neighbors (i.e. fellow men) are still suffering poverty and need help.

9) The moral order is superior to the physical. Man must rather suffer the loss of all physical goods and even his very life for the maintenance of moral principles. Besides, Mo-tze believed that if the moral order is established in society, physical prosperity will necessarily follow, whereas moral disorder directly generates physical chaos.

10) Man is a social being, but government is made for the common good
of the people and not vice versa. A government which does not serve its purpose (i.e. common good of the people) is to be removed, and the rulers to be punished.

11) Civil authority came from God; therefore, moral principles are prior and superior to civil laws. Civil laws are only good and effective when they are in accordance with the standard of morality, namely the will of God.

12) World unity is emphasized, although Mo-tze did realize that nations are necessitated because of the differences in people's customs and languages. A central government of the world which is capable of unifying, in theory and in fact, all the local governments is Mo-tze's solution to the world problem.

In these twelve points we believe that the moral doctrine of Mo-tze is quite adequately covered. Mo-tze's teachings, as we have demonstrated, were philosophical and not religious because they were based on reason. However, as a philosophical system, it leaves much to be desired. First of all, it lacks a systematic construction. Although many aspects of his doctrine were deduced from a few established principles, Mo-tze nevertheless did not construct a whole doctrine similar to an organic body which has its unity from the intimate connection of different elements, but from the fact that it has only one life for all composing elements.

Secondly, Mo-tze's doctrine did not cover the entire field of human activities. Many important problems of both fundamental and special ethics were entirely ignored, such as the value of conscience, its characteristics and incidentals, or the essentials of social justice and its practical applications.
Thirdly, his method of discussion was rather negative or destructive and offensive. Generally speaking, he was content to demonstrate that the opinion of his opponents was absurd; thus seldom did he care to provide positive reasons for his own opinion.

However, we may find some reasonable excuses for these defects. For 1) Mo-tze was not an ambitious scholar; he did not intend to immortalize his name by establishing a philosophical system which would be a scholastic masterpiece; he merely wished to preach a doctrine that would in practice save his country from the crisis of his time. This also accounts for the fact that his teachings can be understood as utilitarian. At any rate, we can hardly expect an ethical doctrine as systematic as the medieval scholastics at the time of our philosopher, that is 500 B.C. 2) By the same reason, Mo-tze felt no responsibility to cover the entire field of human activities in his teachings. He expounded only what is needed to be expounded, teaching and discussing according to the need of his time. 3) Since he only discussed on those points where discussion was needed, we naturally find Mo-tze in a position of willing to finish the discussion as sharply as possible.

This was most effectively done by demonstrating that the opinion of his opponents was absurd. Besides, as we noticed above, Mo-tze considered himself the faithful defender of the traditional orthodox doctrine of the ancient sage kings. He did not like to call his teachings his own opinion, even though it was really his own invention. He always attributed his doctrine to the ancient sage kings, and always succeeded in proving that either explicitly or at least implicitly the ancient sage kings had anticipated his
doctrine. Thus, considering himself merely as a defender and not as a builder, Mo-tze was satisfied to destroy the opinion of his opponents and to demonstrate that their doctrine was heretical. If the heretical doctrine be proved to be absurd, then the orthodox teaching will stand as it was. This is why Mo-tze did not care much to furnish positive proofs for his doctrine.

Finally, as an appendix (for our main purpose is to evaluate his moral doctrine), we may notice Mo-tze's contribution to formal logic. As we are ourselves Chinese, we prefer to quote a Westerner on this point:

Aristoteles was born just about the time that Mo-tze died, and he is usually considered to be the father of logic as a system. But possibly this honour may yet have to be accorded to Mo-tze, or some other Chinese sage not yet restored to us from the shades of antiquity.2

Another Western writer has concluded his brief presentation of the teachings of Mo-tze's as follows:

Mo-tze is still a living thinker. The fundamental principles which he taught, freed from the limitations of their times, are as sound and as powerful for human good today as they were in the ancient golden age of Chinese philosophy. A purpose-governed cosmos, a God-appointed moral law, spiritual personality as the essence of Deity, moral freedom and personal responsibility, the supremacy of Divine Will in social and political life, the law of universal love among men sanctioned by Divine Spirit, humanitarianism, the appeal to logic and intelligence, the progressive mind, the distinction between defensive and offensive war...these remain profound doctrines challenging acceptance by the mind of today.

Mo-tze's thought is essentially one with the personalism and the theistic idealism of the West which find in moral and creative Selfhood the clue to the most

2 Quoted from Moti, a Chinese Heretic, by H. Williamson, p. 16.
real as well as the most divine, the end of being, the
goal of education, and the hope of society. 3

It is not because we completely agree with these writers that we wish
to quote them. Our own opinion has been sufficiently expressed in this dis­
sertation. Readers may find easily that in many point the above quoted writer
departs from our statements. Still other points he takes merely as granted,
where we have demonstrated our statements with elaborated and conclusive
discussions.

We may say this much, that among the ancient Chinese philosophers Mo-tze
must be considered the greatest as far as the constitution of doctrine is
concerned, although, as a matter of fact, his influence was relatively negli­
gible prior to the Chinese Republic.

3 Quoted from Mo-tze, China's Ancient Philosopher of Universal Love, by.
B) THE INFLUENCE OF MO-TZE ON MODERN CHINESE THOUGHT

The doctrine of Mo-tze deluged the world at the time of Mencius, to whom the credit must be attributed of building the foundation of a Confucian empire in the Chinese thinking world that was to last more than twenty centuries. Mencius, as we said above, succeeded in wiping out Mo-tze's teaching completely. And it was not until the beginning of this century that Mo-tze was again discovered by the Chinese. The reaction, from the very first moment, was one of spontaneous welcome followed immediately by a great admiration concerning the adaptability of his doctrine to the modern age. Such an admiration was then shared by the Western world as well. However, it is its influence on modern Chinese thought that concerns us most.

The Chinese revolution in 1911 is justified by the principle which asserts that the government is for the common good of the people in general and not the comfort of the rulers, that if a government does not serve its purpose, it must be removed and replaced by a capable one. This is the fundamental teaching of Mo-tze's political ideas.

In spite of its almost instinctively manifested attitude of repulsion toward foreign ideas, the Chinese thinking world begins to accept the Christian doctrine of universal love more willingly, for it is discovered that such an idea had its own Chinese version even earlier than the Christian era.

Freedom of conscience is greatly challenged by the materialism imported

4 For instance, W. H. Long wrote: "Probably no more surprising discovery concerning the achievement of antiquity is to be found than that China, in the fifth century before Christ, produced a philosophic minded teaching that Heaven claims and loves all the people without discrimination." Conf. op. cit., p. 16, also the last two quoted passages.
into China from the United States of America (namely from Columbia University). Aside from the Christian doctrine which reached relatively few of the Chinese the condemnation of fatalism by Mo-tze must have served as a great preventive factor against the public damage caused by such materialism. Confucius has little credit in this matter, for he has shown little resistance to materialistic fatalism. At least he was not as fervent as Mo-tze in condemning it.

The famous "New Life Movement" which has been promoted by Generalissimo Chiang Kai Shek since 1930 is virtually a total adaptation of the philosophy of life preached by Mo-tze. The doctrine of universal love and mutual aid is propagated by the authorities of the government. The supreme principle in economics is to be that the right use of wealth is to use it according to proper purposes. The "New Life Movement" teaches the people to practice "economy in expenditure," "simplicity in funerals," and, as well, in marriage celebrations; the rules given for obtaining and enjoying such necessities as food, clothes, housing and transportation, are exactly a copy of Mo-tze's teachings; namely, when the main purposes are reached, enjoyment must be stopped, for what is extra is to be called luxury and is to be avoided. The New Life Movement campaigns against such excesses as sumptuous banquets, expensive fashion in clothing; it condemns drinking, smoking (particularly opium, but even cigarettes are desired to be forgotten), suggestive dances and music. Mo-tze should be very happy to see that his teachings are promoted seriously and anxiously by the government itself; for all his life he wished that his doctrine would be propagated by government officers because he believed this the only way to introduce it to the common people.
Finally, the most heroically determined resistance against the Japanese aggression which not only surprised but positively mystified the Western world for eight long years was surely somewhat inspired by Mo-tze's urgent appeal to resist offensive war at any cost. Believing that we are fighting on the side of justice we will defend the principle of justice with all our efforts and all our resources, because justice will always triumph, for God is just. We are glad that our modern China has followed Mo-tze's suggestions.
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