The Basic Foundation and Ultimate Principle For a True Understanding of Negro-White Relationships in the United States

George E. Powers

Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses

Part of the Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_theses/323

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Theses and Dissertations at Loyola eCommons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Master's Theses by an authorized administrator of Loyola eCommons. For more information, please contact ecommons@luc.edu.

This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-Noncommercial-No Derivative Works 3.0 License.
Copyright © 1946 George E. Powers
THE BASIC FOUNDATION AND ULTIMATE PRINCIPLE FOR A TRUE
UNDERSTANDING OF NEGRO-WHITE RELATIONSHIPS
IN THE UNITED STATES

By
George E. Powers

A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of Master
of Arts in Loyola University
August
1946
Vita

George E. Powers was born in Indianapolis, Indiana, October 1, 1917.

He was graduated from George Washington High School, Indianapolis, Indiana, June, 1934. The Bachelor of Literature degree was conferred by Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio, June, 1940.

From 1943 to 1944 the writer was engaged in teaching Classics in St. Xavier High School, Cincinnati, Ohio. During the past two years he has studied in the School of Sacred Theology at Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I. THE OTHER ANSWERS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totalitarian philosophies: Communism or Classism, Fascism or Statism, Nazism or Racism -- White-supremists -- Academic totalitarians -- Irrationalists: materialistic scientists and psychologists -- &quot;Social Contract&quot; philosophers -- &quot;City of Man&quot; social philosophers -- Dr. Myrdal and An American Dilemma.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. PRELUDE TO THE SCHOLASTIC ANSWER</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primacy of philosophy -- Necessity of ontology for our study -- Meaning of ethics -- The Scholastic answer and St. Thomas Aquinas -- Postulate of God.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE SCHOLASTIC ANSWER: METAPHYSICAL</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The metaphysical concept of man -- Man and the nature of being -- The matter and form of man -- The meaning of man as a human person -- Intrinsic relation of dignity and person -- Man's faculties: intellect (its spirituality and mode of operation) and will (its existence and nature) -- Man's soul: its spirituality, subsistence, incorruptibility, and substantial union with the body -- Man's origin as a human person; creation of body and soul -- Man, the image of God -- Man's destiny: glory to God, beatitude to man -- Summary -- Application to race question.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE SCHOLASTIC ANSWER: ETHICAL</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ethical doctrine based on metaphysical foundation of man's essential dignity -- Human rights as safeguards of man's personality -- Relation of rights to obligations -- Justice -- Injustice: in general and applied to the race question -- Specifying human rights: life, liberty, pursuit of happiness -- Rights to existence, to own property, to work, to receive adequate wage, to worship, to develop oneself, to marry and have family, to be free as individual and as social being, to seek goods and privileges &quot;above the minimum&quot; -- Summary -- Application to race question.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>V. THE &quot;OTHER ANSWERS&quot; ANSWERED</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Analysis of &quot;other answers&quot; according to four headings: 1) the postulate of an absolute; 2) the meaning of man; 3) the relation of man to other men; 4) the value of these doctrines as answers to the race question -- Purpose of philosophy to give &quot;true understanding.&quot;</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

BIBLIOGRAPHY | 109 |
INTRODUCTION

From the United States Senate to Columbus Circle, the national question of the year has been "What are we going to do about the Negro-White problem?" The solutions suggested have been as varied as the types of people making them. But few of these solutions have ever gone to the roots of the problem; few have looked to "the science of ultimates" for help.

According to its definition philosophy is "the science of all things as known through their ultimate causes." It is the purpose of philosophy, therefore, to give final and ultimate answers. Today a presentation of philosophical principles as they affect the so-called race question is especially necessary because most American thinkers do not truly understand the relation of social problems — and especially the problem of race relations — to the science that searches the ultimate causes of all things. Everyone admits that the race question is a social problem; few are willing to admit that it is first of all a philosophical problem. The axiom, agere sequitur esse, indicates that the value of any action will be only as true and solid as the principles from which it flows. One's answer to the race question depends entirely upon one's philosophy or lack of it. The false answers to the question come from false philosophical principles or from a denial of true principles. If Americans neglect or abuse the true basis of their problem, they will never arrive at a true
understanding that will lead them to the reasonable and only satisfactory solution.

Our chief purpose is to present the principles of Scholastic philosophy as a basis for a true understanding of the problem of Negro-White relationships in the United States. This basis begins with the fact of God's existence and proceeds to a study of the nature and consequent dignity of the human person, who thus becomes the subject of certain inalienable rights.

In this thesis we are not dealing with theological proofs as found in Christian Revelation. We do not deny the importance of theology in a study of this kind. Philosophy, after all, is but the hand-maid of theology; it gives only the beginning for a perfect understanding of our problem. Theological truths are necessary for a perfect understanding because Christian Revelation perfects man's knowledge about the nature and operations of God and about man's own value as a human person. The truths concerning the Fatherhood of God; the New Law of Love given to men by Jesus Christ, the second Person of the Blessed Trinity; and the union in Christ of the members of His Mystical Body are sublime doctrines definitely related to the question of race relations and they should be studied and appreciated more than they are. However, it is necessary for us to limit ourselves; here we shall present only the beginning of an answer that can be perfected by the truths of theology.
Besides the positive presentation of the principles of Scholastic philosophy we have as a kind of corroborative corollary a negative approach by which we reply to the various "other answers" to the race question. We will begin with an outline of these answers; our replies to them will follow our positive presentation.
CHAPTER I
THE OTHER ANSWERS

When asked to give an opinion or to answer a question men frequently forget "the other fellow's viewpoint." It is natural for men to think that theirs is the only solution and that other answers are not worthy of consideration. Lest we seem to fall into this common human failing, we will begin our thesis with the "other answers"; we will show how other students have treated the so-called race question.

The first group of philosophers who have definite principles affecting race relations are those commonly known as totalitarian. The main tenet of these philosophers is that the chosen social group is absolutely autonomous, a kind of super-individual entity that is superior to other individuals and distinct from them. As Ross Hoffman states:

All that goes on in the life of society, all economic and cultural activity, all intellectual expression, all associational enterprise, is brought under the rule of the State... made subject to whatever
regulation the State may choose to impose."¹

From this primum principium they immediately deduce that all rights depend on the group because a man has value only as a member of the group. The main thesis of the totalitarian philosophers is always the same; the applications of their thesis differ according to the chosen social groups in which it is incorporated.

Communism or Classism is a form of totalitarianism that has set up the proletarian class as the absolutely independent unit in society. Communism is not merely a political philosophy but a creed and philosophy of life. Communism began with an economic purpose; its aim was to build a new economic order which would lead to a classless society; in order to accomplish this, revolution was necessary; private ownership had to be abolished, property conscripted, the economic aspects of human life subordinated to the rulers of the society, which is the organ of class domination. Although Karl Marx,¹


The word "totalitarian" should apply to all forms of philosophy or social living in which all the rights of individuals are considered as coming from one absolute source. Here it is a term which must be applied analogously to the completely group-absolute philosophy. A comparison of the cardinal principles of various totalitarian philosophies will manifest many points of difference; it is the spirit of totality which motivates them that is the same for all. Philosophically totalitarianism has its roots in the doctrines of Hobbes, Hegel, Fichte, and Marx. It is the antonym of liberalism, although it has historically -- and logically -- emerged from the basic principles of liberalism.
the father of Communism, made blind evolutionary matter an absolute, this theory has produced and given away to a more mystical absolute -- the proletarian class. The collectivity of the proletarians has become the integrating principle of all social life; it has become the measure of all values: moral, religious, ethical, economical; the goal and destiny of each individual. The relationships based on such accidental qualities as racial differences and physical characteristics have been completely immersed in the classless society dominated by a dictatorial proletariat. For the Communists there is no race problem; there is only a class problem.

The dictatorship of the State as it developed in Italy was consciously formed on the proletarian dictatorship. Italian Fascism replaced the class struggle with international conflict and hatred, using these as a means of bringing about the complete autonomy of the State. Dr. Luigi Sturzo claims that Benito Mussolini's notion of the complete subordination of man to the State had for Italy the twofold sense of the transcendence of the nation and of the resolution of every social activity into political power, so that not only was the primacy of politics proclaimed on the basis of the State, but the latter absorbed into itself every reason of social living in that every right came from the State to the individuals. 2

This conception of Fascism is in complete accord with Musso-
lini's definition: "Everything is in the State and nothing
human or spiritual exists, far less has value, outside the
State."\(^3\)

In order to indoctrinate the members of the Fascistic
State force was not enough; education was also necessary.
Therefore, Mussolini monopolized the schools, the sport
activities of the youth, the cinema, the radio, the press,
the labor alliances, the churches; all these he subordinated
to the State by organizing them into one party, his party,
the Fascists' party. Like Communism the Fascist State became
a philosophy of life that absorbed all values and finally took
upon itself a religious aspect that expressed a morality
based on devotion to the State. In 1935 Mussolini wrote:

The Fascist State, as a higher and
more powerful expression of person-
ality, is a force, but a spiritual
one. It sums up all the manifesta-
tions of the moral and intellectual
life of man. Its functions cannot
therefore be limited to those of en-
forcing order and keeping the peace,
as the liberal doctrine had it. It
is no mere mechanical device for de-
fining the sphere within which the
individual may duly exercise his
supposed rights. The Fascist State
is an inwardly accepted standard
and rule of conduct, a discipline of
the whole person; it permeates the
will no less than the intellect.\(^4\)

\(^3\) Loc. cit., note 22.
\(^4\) Benito Mussolini. Fascism: Doctrine and Institutions.
Fascism became the law-giver, the founder of institutions, the educator, and the promoter of spiritual life. "It aims," Mussolini stated, "at refashioning not only the forms of life but their content -- man, his character, and his faith. To achieve this purpose it enforces discipline and uses authority entering into the soul and ruling with undisputed sway."\(^5\)

Fascism, as a philosophy, differs from Communism in that it must depend upon political unity rather than economic unity. Yet this difference has only served to emphasize a common difficulty. Communism and Fascism have never succeeded on the sociological and psychological home front, because they have been forced to abandon individual interests for the sake of the class or State. Their essential problem has been "how to transform the mechanized dehumanized mass population of an industrialized State into a true community with a common ethos and a common faith."\(^6\) The philosophies of these two totalitarian groups have disregarded the differentiating marks of their individual members; they have both disregarded racial characteristics and have thereby suffered the "spiritual" loss of their people. The National Socialists were more logical, and philosophically more successful; they developed a more ideal form of totalitarian philosophy; they copied the corporative structure of the State from Italian

\(^5\) Ibid., 14

Fascism and then added the myth of the race as its crowning glory.

Racism is a race-centric totalitarianism; it makes racial origin the sole right to admission into the society of the chosen people; it holds racial purity as the *summum bonum* of human existence. Thus, in the racist society there is only one important problem: the preservation of the pure racial traits in the individual members. Racism has been generally adopted as the philosophy of private persons who have never been able to see it fully developed in an entire community or nation. In Germany, however, racism became identified with the political doctrines of the ruling Nazi party; later it developed as a "foolish philosophy" that overshadowed every aspect of German life.

In 1935, Dr. J. Goebbels, the Nazi minister of propaganda, wrote, "National Socialism has simplified thinking for the German nation and brought it back to its earlier and primitive form." The meaning of his words is evident to the most casual observer of Nazi philosophy in action. The theory of racial purity simplified for the Nazis not only their thinking but every phase of their national life. No one has described more accurately the principles of Nazi

philosophy than Alfred Rosenberg; his principal theory is that all goodness comes from Aryan purity as revealed in the German race. In his Der Mythus des XX. Jahrhunderts he states:

...what we today call science is the most outstanding creation of the German race. Law is that which Aryan men consider to be just. ...The God whom we worship would not exist at all if our soul and our blood did not exist. ...Today this inner voice demands that the Myth of the Blood and the Myth of the Soul, race and I, people and personality, blood and honor must alone, to the exclusion of all else, be uncompromisingly upheld and affirmed as long as we have life in us. ...Today we see a new faith revealed to life, the myth of the blood. It is the religion of the blood that will replace wonderfully well the old sacraments, which it has already succeeded largely in supplanting.

The race theory of Nazism, therefore, is simplified to a worship of the "pure blooded man." The moral values of Dr. Rosenberg's philosophy constitute an eternal principle that makes right whatever it touches, and it touches every phase of German culture. William Stapel brought forward this theory with equal force and clarity when he wrote, "Human society

8 The original meaning of "Aryan was "nobleman" or "member of the upper castes." In the Nazi vocabulary it was taken to mean "highest type of Caucasian."

9 Race: Nation: Person, 9, 10, 12, 143, 313
is naturally based on inequality. The champion of the New Power must be Germany....We are above all others, parallel to none. We are the Germans....If two Germans live in all Poland, they will be worth more than thirty million Poles, for they are Germans."\(^{10}\)

To accompany Rosenberg's "bible of Nazism" Adolph Hitler wrote his practical handbuch, Mein Kampf. Here the theories of race philosophy are put into an emotional, pleading language that has as its purpose the transfer of thought into action. Here Nazi philosophy is put on the common-folk level. Hitler begins with the premise that "the deepest and the ultimate cause for the ruin of the old Reich was found in the non-recognition of the race problem and its importance for the historical development of the people."\(^{11}\) From this theory Hitler gives the reason for his building a new nation of "pure blooded" Aryans whose motto must be "Race alone counts." Hitler's very words speak for themselves, "All that is not race in this world is trash. All world historical events, however, are only the expression of the races' instinct of self-preservation in its good or in its evil meaning."\(^{12}\) And again, "Everything in this world can be improved...as

\(^{12}\) Ibid., 406
long as the blood remains preserved in purity. Alone the loss of purity of the blood destroys the inner happiness forever; it eternally lowers man and never again can its consequences be removed from body and mind. The reason he gives for exalting racial purity above all else is that Providence has willed it so and Nature has proven it over and over. According to Hitler this exaltation of race is true to such an extent that the distance between the lowest forms that are still called human and our highest races is greater than that existing between the lowest type of human beings and the ape.

The education of the German people, especially the youth, must necessarily center attention on racial purity and Aryan superiority. Hitler writes:

The folkish State's entire work of education and training has some day to find its culmination in branding, through instinct and reason, the race sense and race feeling into the hearts and brains of the youth with whom it is entrusted. No boy or girl must leave school without having been led to the ultimate knowledge of the necessity and the nature of the purity of the blood.

The education of the boys must be directed primarily to their physical well-being, since it is the physical part that propagates other "pure blooded" members of the Aryan society; the

---

13 Ibid., 452
14 Loc. cit.
15 Race: Nation: Person, vii, (1)
16 Hitler, 636, 637
promotion of spiritual and intellectual values is a secondary
c consideration. Analogous with the education of the boys, the
folkish State must direct the education of the girls; the goal
of female education must always be the future mother. In
practice Nazism is consistent; its action comes straight from
the heart of its principles.

A more subtle form of racism than Nazism is the theory of
white supremacy. It began in Europe but became most widely
diffused in the United States, where many of its proponents
still cling to its main principles. In 1853, Joseph Arthur
de Gobineau wrote his Essai sur l'inegalite des races humaines,
a simple proof that the Negro was a member of an inferior race
and therefore necessarily fit for slavery. Houston Stewart
Chamberlain took hold of Gobineau's theory; later it traversed
the Atlantic and became the central theme of J. H. Van Evrie,
Madison Grant, Lothrop Stoddard, Major Shufeldt, Carlyle Mc-
Kinley, Gustavus M. Pinckney, Gene Talmadge, Senator Bilbo;
and the members of the Ku Klux Klan, the National Association
for the Preservation of the White Race, the White American So-
ciety, and the Commoner Party, all of which are in the United
States and supported by Americans.

According to white-supremists the Caucasian race repre-
sents the highest type of the human family, the Negro race the
lowest. Their solution of the race question is as simplified
as that of the National Socialists. In 1868, Dr. J. H. Van

17 Ibid., 621
Evrie published his *White Supremacy and Negro Subordination*, or "Negroes, a Subordinate Race, and (So-called) Slavery, Its Normal Condition." The theme of the author is introduced with the words of Dr. Cartwright, "...in regard to Negro slavery... it is no slavery, but a natural relation of the races...."¹⁸

A review of Dr. Van Evrie's sub-chapter headings will give a clear picture of the white-supremacy theory: "European Misconception of the Negro," "False Issue of a Single Human Race," "The Races Specifically Different from Each Other," "The Inferior Races are Incapable of Acquiring and Transmitting Knowledge," "The Black Complexion a Sign of Inferiority," The Folly and Impiety of Attempting to Equalize Those Whom God has made Unequal, etc."¹⁹ Nazi racists said that the distance between the lowest forms that are still called human and our highest races is greater than that existing between the lowest type of human beings and the ape. Dr. Van Evrie has written:

And the entire bodily structure of the negro, down to the minutest atom of elementary matter, differs just as widely, of course, as the color of the skin or other external qualities from those of the white man. It is equally palpable to the reason that the nature of the negro, his instincts, all the faculties of his mind, and all the functions of his body, are pervaded by the same or by relative differences from those of the Caucasian....

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, ix-xvi
Such, then, is the negro -- the lowest in the scale as the Caucasian is the most elevated in the human creation -- a creature not degraded -- for none of God's creatures are degraded -- but that is widely different and vastly subordinate to the elaborately organized and highly endowed white man. 20

It would be a mistake to suppose that Van Evrie was alone in his defense of white-wupremacy. The English essayist, David Hume, once wrote, "I am apt to suspect the negroes...to be naturally inferior to the Whites...Such a uniform and constant difference could not happen, in so many countries and ages, if nature had not made an original distinction betwixt these breeds of men." 21 Professor Smith of Tulane University: "Now, if nature and the tide of time have spent such centuries of centuries in chiseling out this chasm, how infinitely preposterous to suppose that man can close it up in a generation with the filmy webs of common culture and social equality and civil rights...." 22 Mr. James A. Froude: "The equality between black and white is a forced equality and not a real one, and Nature in the long run has her way, and readjusts in their proper relations what theorists and philanthropists have disturbed." 23 Carlyle McKinley: "The two races in America will

20 Ibid., 134-135, 141
23 James A. Froude, The English in the West Indies or The Bow of Ulysses. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1888, 247
remain apart, in obedience to a law that is so nearly if not wholly universal in its operation that we are compelled to regard it as a fundamental law of human nature, and, therefore, beyond hope of repeal or evasion. "24

The White-supremists' answer to the race question rests on the philosophical supposition that the white race is superior naturally to the colored races. For these racists the two central motives of action are: 1) The colored races must be kept in their subordinate position as servants of the white race; 2) The purity of the white race must be zealously preserved.

Besides the white-supremists in the United States there has grown up another system of philosophical thought with totalitarian inclinations. In opposition to the anti-totalitarian principles enunciated in the Declaration of Independence these philosophers would insist that actually the Declaration is an outmoded document no longer in agreement with modern thought. They would change one clause of the Declaration to read, "that all men are made equal under the State, that they are endowed by the State with certain State-given rights, that among these are Life, Liberty, and the Pursuit of Happiness." This major premise of totalitarian philosophy is still in the class-room stages in the United States. An example of this

school of thought is found in Harold Faulkner's history textbook:

"Viewed from the high point of twentieth century historical and ethnological research, the Declaration is not wholly convincing. Only in a limited sense, if at all, have men ever been created equal, nor are they endowed with any rights, except those they can obtain and hold, nor were governments, in spite of certain American precedents, originated to secure these 'inalienable rights.'" 25

Here is totalitarian philosophy at least in germ; the future of its program will depend on its acceptance or rejection outside the class room.

Other thinkers whose doctrines affect the problem of Negro-White relationships in the United States may be listed as the irrationalists and the social philosophers. The first group consists of the anti-spiritual scientists and the a-spiritual psychologists.

Some scientists today deny the reality of a spiritual order, and therefore of an intellectual order in man. Some of these are logical enough to keep out of the realm of philosophy altogether; others try to make the deduction that matter alone is capable of existing because nothing outside of matter

can be experienced by men. The findings of an absolutely materialistic science were systematized into the form of a theory propounded by Charles Darwin, the theory of evolution of organic species through natural selection. In the name of this same science a more modern materialist (and more avid anti-intellectualist and anti-spiritualist), John Dewey, put the final touches to the philosophy of irrationalism; he attacked every traditional belief by seeking a freedom against reason; he gave man only one life, that of servitude to physical nature. Thus, for the materialistic scientists race is only one way of classifying different animal types. Their answer to the race question is founded on men's identity in common animality.

26 To explain why natural scientists have readily taken to a materialistic philosophy is not a difficult task. In the past century enormous progress has been made in the investigation and interpretation of material nature, and the investigators and interpreters have been convinced that this must be all that exists. The biologists, for example, have labored over that part of man in which he is not essentially different from the other animals. Progress in medicine has been made by experiments with brute animals and then later applied to men. It is thus explainable why scientists have concluded that if the blood circulation and digestive processes of men are not essentially different from those of the other animals then man is not different from other animals in his nature. They become anti-spiritual, because they formulate the principle that the real is coextensive with the sensible.


28 Race: Nation: Person, 87
In line with this irrationalist philosophy has arisen a school of psychology that has taken the monistic philosophy of Hegel and Spinoza and developed a philosophy of "universal parallelism." G. T. Fechner, the father of experimental psychology proposed the theory of "psychophysical parallelism," which assumes a strict co-ordination of bodily and mental phenomena so that to each phenomenon of the "bodily" series there corresponds one of the "mental" series, both of which are due to a kind of "pre-established harmony." Fechner's theory was adopted by Friedrich Paulsen and later applied to animals, plants, and minerals, so that the whole world became "one vast animal animated by a single world-soul." The relations of men in this world-soul depend on their physical or psychical a-spiritual participation in that soul, which alone gives meaning to men's existence.

Various social philosophers have espoused a novel theory that has a direct bearing on the problem of race relations. This "Social Contract" theory began in Jean Jacques Rousseau's declaration of the sovereignty of the people or of

-------------------
29 Spinoza made the pantheistic (or monistic) idea of God or Nature the fundamental thesis of his system. Hegel went a step further by identifying reality with ideality. According to Dr. O'Toole, "This absolute Idea proceeds in eternal self-movement from itself to become Nature and then, reverting to itself, becomes self-conscious Spirit in Humanity....The individual mind, the 'subjective spirit', is a lower manifestation of the Absolute than the forms of the 'objective spirit' among which the State is the highest." Ibid., 297.
30 Ibid., 299.
31 Ibid., 232-242.
Society Absolutism, which has subsequently become the keystone of a social philosophy that places every solution of a social problem in the capitalization of Society or Humanity.

Rousseau explained his theory thus:

If the State or City is nothing but a moral person, the life of which consists in the union of its members, and if the most important of its cares is that of self-preservation, it needs a universal and compulsive force to move and dispose every part in the manner most expedient for the whole. As nature gives every man an absolute power over all his limbs, the social pact gives the body politic an absolute power over all its members; and it is this same power which, when directed by the general will, bears, as I said, the name of sovereignty.

Rousseau made the only truly living reality, existing in itself and for itself, Society, the "one substance" to which individuals are subordinated, and in which human personalities are submerged. For August Comte society became "the most vital of known beings"; for M. Fouillee, a great "physiological individual"; For E. Durkheim society was all, as he wrote "Man is a man only because he lives in society....It is

32 "By absolutism is meant any theory of supreme, unlimited, irresponsible power vested in the government of a State, such that all individual liberties are extinguished by the constitution of an omnipotent civil authority to whose will and sovereignty there is no limit." Ibid., 243

society that forms the human type." According to these social philosophies the racial characteristics of men are lost in Society in the same way as they are in the Communistic and Fascistic communities; here Society replaces Class and State as an absolute. Here the race question is answered by an understanding of men's common identity as members of Society.

A second group of social philosophers has been intensely interested in social problems and has presented their solutions in a manual, *The City of Man, A Declaration on World Democracy.* This group is especially concerned with the problem of race relations; they claim that the "Negro himself, with whom our failure was most inglorious, helps us by reminding us that our slow progress is a mere token of the justice we pledge -- until all races rise to equality in maturity." The purpose of the group, therefore, is to show how all races will rise to "equality in maturity," and why "the emergency of democracy must be the emergence of democracy." 

In order to make way for a true understanding of the equality of all races of men in the United States, a new foundation, then, must be

34 Race: Nation: Person, 226.
36 Ibid., 69
37 Ibid., 67
Democracy, therefore, must be redefined. "Democracy is nothing more and nothing less than humanism in theocracy and rational theocracy in universal humanism." \(^{39}\) Contrary to the Fascistic teaching that everything must be within the State, "Democracy teaches that everything must be within humanity, nothing against humanity, nothing outside humanity." \(^{40}\) The "Social Contract theory" has been revised to fit "modern" needs. These social philosophers want their humanitarian autocracy to oppose totalitarian autocracy without at the same time becoming totalitarian. Thus, everything must be measured according to the standard set by Democracy, "since democracy alone combines the fundamental characteristics of law, equality, and justice." \(^{41}\) "In broad terms the task here is to determine what religious and ethical traditions are of greater or lesser value for the preservation and growth of the democratic principle." \(^{42}\)

How all races will rise to "equality in maturity" is less evident than the fundamental principles which determine this

\(^{38}\) Ibid., 31  
\(^{39}\) Ibid., 33  
\(^{40}\) Ibid., 34  
\(^{41}\) Ibid., 28  
\(^{42}\) Ibid., 81
plan for equality. First, Americans must realize the *prima principia* of democracy: "Everything within humanity, nothing against humanity, nothing outside humanity." Secondly, they must adopt the universal religion of the Spirit, to which all men are witnesses:

This is -- in an interpretation suited to the modern mind -- the spirit which Christ called the Holy Ghost.43

This common creed already exists; toward its luminous center all higher minds already point, from whatever distant horizon they may set out. The yoke of the creed is as easy as it is inevitable....It teaches that a divine intention governs the universe -- be it called God or Deity or the Holy Ghost or the Absolute or Logos or even Evolution....It teaches that in the universe we know the human species is the spearhead of the divine intention.44

Thirdly, all people must participate in government to assure the rule of the strongest and wisest, who will be themselves the champions of humanity. Lastly, the State must always remain the hand-maid of humanity, the servant of the common good, because the unity of the people is the permanent source of power behind those who temporarily hold it.45

Why the emergence of Democracy must renew the face of the earth comes from the very meaning of Democracy and its "intrinsic opposition" to totalitarianism. "It is univer-

43 Ibid., 35
44 Ibid., 47
45 Ibid., 29
sality we oppose to totalitarianism, republican unity to au-
tarchic despotism, service in brotherhood to regimentation in
serfdom." The world has been thrown into the chasm of Tyr­
anny; a new world must arise as the City of Man, which will
be the source of man, his dignity, his rights. Here then we
have Human Absolutism replacing State and Class and Race Ab-
solutism, humanity redeemed by Humanity.

The third group of social philosophers is typified by Dr.
Gunnar Myrdal, professor in the University of Stockholm and
member of the Swedish Senate, who was invited by the Carnegie
Corporation of New York in 1937 to come to the United States
and make a comprehensive study of the Negro-White problem.
Dr. Myrdal accepted. In 1944 the complete expose of his
findings was published in a two volume work, An American Dil-
emma. Here we have the most generally accepted authoritative
study of the race question. But we are primarily interested
in Dr. Myrdal's survey in the light of its philosophical con-
tent, that is, in so far as it offers the ultimate answer to
the question.

In his introduction Dr. Myrdal gives the philosophical
basis for discussing his social data; thus, the first part of
the introduction bears the title, "The Negro Problem as a
Moral Issue." But before anyone can disagree with a sociol-
ogist's trespassing into the field of philosophy, Dr. Myrdal
hastens to state:

46 Ibid., 25
In approaching the Negro problem as primarily a moral issue of conflicting valuations, it is not implied, of course, that ours is the prerogative of pronouncing on a priori grounds which values are "right" and which are "wrong." In fact, such judgments are out of the realm of social science, and will not be attempted in this inquiry. Our investigation will naturally be an analysis of morals and not in morals. In so far as we make our own judgments of value, they will be based on explicitly stated value premises, selected from among those valuations actually observed as existing in the minds of the white and Negro Americans and tested as to their social and political relevance and significance. Our value judgments are thus derived and have not greater validity than the value premises postulated.

This is an important statement; it admits objectivity in recording subjective "valuations actually observed as existing in the minds of the white and Negro Americans." It gives Dr. Myrdal freedom to express boldly the problem as he sees it, without having to posit unsociologically any fundamental "first principles." Thus, when Dr. Myrdal speaks of a "moral issue," of "fundamental beliefs," ideals of essential dignity," etc., he does not mean to imply that he even knows that such things really and objectively exist as such, but that he is merely indicating what Americans, taken in globo, generally refer to as their "American heritage." Dr. Myrdal

is writing for all Americans; he wishes to combine all their various philosophies into a harmonious, universal creed, somewhat like the one presented by the City of Man humanists.

Dr. Myrdal explains what he means by "The Negro Problem as a Moral Issue";

Though our study includes economic, social, and political race relations, at bottom our problem is the moral dilemma of the American -- the conflict between his moral valuations on various levels of consciousness and generality. The "American Dilemma" referred to in the title of this book is the ever-raging conflict between, on the one hand, the valuations preserved on the general plane which we shall call the "American Creed," where the American thinks, talks, and acts under the influence of high national and Christian precepts, and, on the other hand, the valuations on specific planes of individual and group living, where personal and local interests; economic, social and sexual jealousies; considerations of community prestige and conformity; group prejudice against particular persons or types of people; and all sorts of miscellaneous wants, impulses, and habits dominate his outlook.48

He further states that the moral struggle goes on within people, and that their behaviour normally becomes a moral compromise when their valuations are in conflict. The struggle is between the American's devotion to the American Creed and his natural feelings: reason against emotion; spirit

48 Ibid., xliii.
against flesh. And the average American has, concerning this
problem of the races, compromised the Creed. This, then, is
the psychological aspect of the answer. What will be the more
basic, the ontological answer?

The ultimate norm of morality, as Dr. Myrdal sees it re­
lected in American thought, is adherence to the American
Creed, which, accordingly, must be ultimum atque summum. In
defining the Creed he says:

> These ideals of the essential dignity
of the individual human being, of the
fundamental equality of all men, and of
certain inalienable rights to freedom,
justice, and a fair opportunity repre­
sent to the American people the essen­
tial meaning of the nation's early
struggle for independence. In the
clarity and intellectual boldness of
the Enlightenment period these tenets
were written into the Declaration of
Independence, the Preamble of the Con­
itution, the Bill of Rights and into
the constitutions of the several states.
The ideals of the American Creed have
thus become the highest law of the
land. 49

The "ideological roots of the American Creed" are explained
as 1) European philosophy of Enlightenment, i.e. the French
eighteenth century humanitarianism and equalitarianism, rep­
resented by Rousseau, and the English seventeenth century
liberalism, represented by John Locke; 2) Christianity, es­
specially Protestant Christianity as seen in the lower class
sects; 3) English law with its democratic concepts of law and

49 Ibid., 4
order and its philosophical ideas of human equality and inalienable rights. Dr. Myrdal summarizes his discussion by saying that

for practical purposes the main norms of the American Creed as usually pronounced are centered in the belief in equality and in the rights of liberty...a humanistic liberalism developing out of the epoch of Enlightenment when America received its national consciousness and its political structure. The Revolution did not stop short of anything less than the heroic desire for the "emancipation of human nature." 50

The United States cannot claim this Creed as her own monopoly; rather must it be considered "the common democratic creed as it matured in our common Western civilization." 51

The answer to the question of Negro-White relationships will depend upon the American's ability to follow his belief in the American Creed, "which is firmly rooted in Americans' hearts." 52 Dr. Myrdal asserts that there is reason to believe that most Americans will succeed in overcoming this "moral dilemma," because "the trend of psychology, education, anthropology, and social science is toward environmentalism in the explanation of group differences, which means that the racial beliefs which defended caste are being torn away.... Authority and respectibility are no longer supporting the

50 Ibid., 8
51 Ibid., 25
52 Ibid., 1010
popular beliefs." Furthermore, it is significant today even the white man who defends discrimination frequently describes his motive as "prejudice" and says that it is "irrational." The popular beliefs rationalizing caste in America are no longer intellectually respectable. 
There is today a queer feeling of credo quia absurdum hovering over the whole complex of popular beliefs sustaining racial discrimination. This makes the prejudiced white man nearly as pathetic as his Negro victim. 54.

According to Dr. Myrdal it is the singular task of democracy "to determine what religious and ethical traditions are of greater or lesser value for the preservation and growth of the democratic principle." 55 Here humanity is redeemed by Democracy.

All the "other answers" to the race question have been outlined as objectively as possible. We will now present the Scholastic answer. In a later chapter we will judge the value of the "other answers" in the light of true philosophical principles.

53 Ibid., 1003.
54 Loc. cit.
55 Ibid., 81.
CHAPTER II
PRELUDE TO THE SCHOLASTIC ANSWER

In beginning the Scholastic answer to the question of Negro-White relationships we must insist on the primacy of philosophy in the sphere of human knowledge. Every human question must be first of all a philosophical question; the social question of race relations is no exception. All action directed to the solution of social problems proceeds from the philosophical principles that determine the purpose and mode of that action. These principles, then, are the sources from which comes progression in every human endeavor, whether it be purely speculative or practical.

Scholastic philosophy begins with ontology, the science of being, or "first philosophy," as Aristotle calls it. This science is "first" because it abstracts from the material and even from the quantitative aspect of being and penetrates to the "beingness" of all things. Although the immediate object of knowledge is the essence existing in the material, mutable thing of everyday contact, the mature mind clarifies the immediate object by accentuating its existential element and thereby arriving at the underlying reality that gives the thing its being. From this science of ontology comes order
in both speculative and practical knowledge. Jacques Maritain says that ontology reveals to man "the hierarchy of authentic values through all the extent of being. It gives a center to his ethics. It maintains justice in the universe of knowledge, making clear the natural limits, the harmony and subordination of various sciences...." Just as social action will depend on the philosophical principles that direct it, so philosophy will depend on its ontology; from this basic science will rise up the super-structure of philosophy; through it all knowledge is given the objectivity that makes it to be true.

Since our problem here is one dealing with the human actions of men, it is an ethical problem. Ethics or moral philosophy is that science concerned with the rightness of human actions as known from their ultimate causes and through the light of natural reason. Therefore, after establishing a firm foundation in ontology we must set up an ultimate principle in ethics, which will at once proceed from the objective reality of being and lead to a true as well as efficient sociology. The Scholastic answer begins with the ontological or metaphysical foundation -- the dignity of the human person -- then presents the moral or ethical principle -- the doctrine of human rights. Taken together the basic foundation and the ultimate principle form the complete Scholastic answer.

We offer the Scholastic answer, not because it has been mainly the answer of St. Thomas Aquinas, nor because any human or even divine authority has suggested this answer, but simply and practically because it is the only true and ultimate answer. Our dependence on the philosophy of St. Thomas in no way vitiates the reasonableness of our arguments. We follow him not because he is St. Thomas Aquinas but because he is a "herald of Truth." It would be the height of inconsistency for us to appeal to his authority as a basis for the acceptability of our arguments, for he above all distrusted human authority as worthy of argumentative use. He respected human authority but he was devoted to Truth. It is this devotion we wish to imitate and exemplify here -- in the Scholastic answer.

Finally, we must postulate in our presentation the necessary existence of a personal and provident God, who is the First Cause and the Final End of all that has being. These facts need philosophical proof and it can be found in the

2 Our answer is called Scholastic in reference to the spirit of medieval philosophy that was integrated into a systematic whole by St. Thomas Aquinas. Through the metonymous use of Scholasticism as the title of St. Thomas' philosophy he now stands as the Scholastic. The Scholastic answer, then, will be St. Thomas' answer, although there have been other Scholastics, in the less strict sense of the term, who have disagreed with St. Thomas' philosophical conclusions.

3 St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologica, I, 1, 8 ad 2. Domus Editorialis Marietti, editio XXII, 1939: "Nam licet locus ab auctoritate quae fundatur super ratione humana, sit infirmissimus...."
writings of St. Thomas. Here we must presuppose the validity and cogency of that proof. 4

4 Ibid., I, 2; 8; 12; 22; 44; 45; 46; 103; 104; 105.
CHAPTER III

THE SCHOLASTIC ANSWER: METAPHYSICAL

Since we are beginning a study that concerns the interrelations of men in society, we must have a complete and integral idea about men. To have this we must strip them of all material and quantitative values; we must study the essential meaning not of men, but of man.¹ Once we have understood man, then we will be able to study men. Jacques Maritain writes that this idea of man is "not entirely verifiable in sense-experience, though it possesses criteria and proofs of its

-------------------

¹ The metaphysical concept of man that we are considering here must not be identified with Plato's or Aristotle's doctrines. Etienne Gilson has fully expressed the Platonic and Aristotelian approaches: "In a doctrine like Plato's it is not at all this Socrates, however highly extolled he may be, that matters; it is Man. If Socrates has any importance at all it is only because he is an exceptionally happy, but at the same time quite accidental, participation in the being of an Idea. The idea of Man is eternal, immutable, necessary; Socrates, like all other individuals, is only a temporary and accidental being; he partakes of the unreality of his matter, in which the permanence of the idea is reflected and his merely momentary being flows away on the stream of becoming. . . . In the system of Aristotle the unreality and accidental character of the individual physical being as compared with the necessity of the pure acts and the eternity of species are no less evident. Aristotle's world is certainly a very different one from Plato's, since the Ideas, far from constituting the typical reality are now refused all proper subsistence. In Aristotle's philosophy the universal is far from nothing, but it never enjoys the privilege of subsistence, only particulars can properly be said to exist; and it is therefore only just to say that the reality of the individual is much more strongly marked in his doctrine than it is in Plato's. Nevertheless, in both, the universal is the important thing." The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1940, 190-191.
own, and it deals with the essential and intrinsic, though not visible or tangible characters, and with the intelligible density of that being which we call man."² The things we will want to know about him are: Who is he? What is He? Whence is he? Why is he? A reply to each of these questions will form the basic foundation for a true understanding of our problem.

To discover who man is, we must first know the full meaning of being and then of man's participation in being. Whatever we grasp mentally, we grasp as being; every concept that we use in order to arrive at knowledge of reality presupposes the concept of being. As to content, it is found in everything; it transcends all genera and species, which consequently represent certain particularizations of being. Yet in order to understand fully the idea of abstract being, we must analyze the concrete reality from which the idea of being arises. This concrete reality proclaims its being to our senses in the existence of individual things. All nature and all the processes of nature are designed for the production and sustenance of individual things, which thus become the material object of the natural sciences, as well as the subject of a scientific research which seeks to penetrate to the

principles of being. To get at the nature of being as visible in individual things philosophers have proffered many different doctrines. The Pythagoreans thought that numbers were the only true being. For Empedocles the natural elements of fire, air, earth, and water were the irreducibles. Plato turned to his universe of Ideas. Aristotle, rooted as he was in empiric reality, taught that the individual was true being, and that every individual thing subject to change was composed of two parts; matter and form. For him the matter is the basis for the reception of the form, through which the matter has existence. Father Meyer summarizes Aristotle's conclusion: "I call matter substance in the sense that it is possible; I call the form substance in the sense that it is real, and the individual thing I call substance in the sense that is composed of matter and form." In St. Thomas' writings we find the same declaration that the individual thing is true reality, and the term, substance, belongs primarily to the individual, which he defines as "in itself undivided, but

5 Ibid., 58-59
6 Ibid., 100-105.
7 Ibid., 137-139.
8 Meyer. op. cit., 98 (Metaphysics VIII, 1, 3; VII, 4, 17.)
9 Summa, 1, 29, 2 ad 4, 5.
distinct from others."\textsuperscript{10} Thus the individual is called first substance, in contrast to second substances which have existence only in some respect or because of a relation to the first substance.\textsuperscript{11} The first substance is independent of other beings for its subsistence; thus it may be called subject, suppositum, hypostasis, or merely subsistence.\textsuperscript{12}

To determine how individuals differ from one another we must distinguish their differences. Each being of which we have direct knowledge in the present life has certain evident traits which it shares with other individuals that closely resemble it; at the same time each being has other marks proper to itself alone. The common notes, called "specific characters" are manifested in all the members of a species; the proper notes or "individual differences," in the individuals alone. To find the ultimate reason for these individual differences St. Thomas recalled Aristotle's division of substance into matter and form.\textsuperscript{13} He knew that the form, the basis of the substantial essence, could not be the basis of individuality because the form in itself is universal and can be received

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 1, 29, 4: "...quod est in se indistinctum, ab aliis vero distinctum." English translations of the Summa are (unless otherwise noted) taken from Basic Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas, edited by Anton C. Pegis. Random House, New York, 1945.
\textsuperscript{11} St. Thomas Aquinas. \textit{In VII Metaphysica}, 1, 2.
\textsuperscript{12} Summa, 1, 29, 2.
\textsuperscript{13} By definition, form is that by which a being has existence; it is an active principle that confers on a thing a certain kind of being with specific properties. Matter, on the other hand, is the substratum from which, as from a co-principle, every being takes its origin; it is passive, indefinite, undetermined. The individual thing is a substance composed of matter and form.
in one or more substrata. If everything in the individual sub-
stance belonged to the universal essence, the multiplicity of
individuals within a species would be impossible; two Socrates
es would be one Socrates. The principle of individuation,
is, therefore, matter through which the form is contracted to
become this individual. (When St. Thomas speaks of matter
here, he means prime matter destined to receive one particular
quantity, that is, matter signed by quantity.) But if the
principle of individuation is matter, then St. Thomas seems to
contradict himself when he says that the individual's "self-
subsistence...is derived from the nature of its form, which
does not enter an already subsisting thing, but gives actual
existence to the matter, and so enables the individual to sub-
sist." An answer to this difficulty comes from Etienne Gil-
son, when he writes that "it is indeed matter that individual-
izes the form, but that, once individualized it is the form
which is individual." In other words, individuating matter
is individual only because it is integrated with the being of
the total substance, and since the being of the substance is

14 Summa, I, 11, 3.
15 St. Thomas Aquinas. Quodlibetales, VII, 3.
16 St. Thomas Aquinas. In Boetium de Trinitate, IV, 2. The
meaning of materia signata comes from Avicenna's use of the
phrase.
17 Summa, I, 29, 2 ad 5: "Sed quod per se subsistat, habet ex
proprietate suae formae, quae non adventit rei subsistenti,
sed dat esse actuale materiae, ut sic individuum subsistere
possit."
18 Gilson, op. cit., 80
that of its form, which is the source of substantiality, then
the individual owes more to the form than to matter.

All that has been said about being and individual can now
be applied to the subject of our discussion -- man. Man is
an individual, but not in the same sense that a tulip or a
kangaroo is an individual. He is something more; he is a per­
son, which is defined by St. Thomas (in accordance with Boe­
thius' famous definition) as "an individual substance endowed
with reason." After approving this definition of person, St.
Thomas immediately puts to use Aristotle's principles of matter
and form: Man is composed not of matter alone nor of form
alone, but of matter actualized by a form. Body (matter) and
soul (form) belong to the nature of man; this body and this
soul belong to the nature of this man. Lest his definition
of person seem to raise man to a level higher than his nature
warrants, St. Thomas notes that, although person in general
signifies the individual substance of a rational nature, per­
son in any nature signifies what is distinct in that nature;
thus in human nature it signifies body and soul, which do not
belong to person in general but to the meaning of a human
person. Now by comparing man with all other earthly beings,
we see that he alone fulfills the definition of a person, he
alone is endowed with reason. And since it is the form -- the

19 Summa, I, 29, 1 ad 1: "Persona est rationalis naturae in­
dividua substantia."
20 Ibid., I, 29, 2 ad 3.
21 Ibid., I, 29, 4.
soul -- that bestows being on matter -- the body --, we may rightly say that man is a person because of his soul; his rationality is the root principle of his personality. Since his rationality lies at the basis of the subsistence of his soul and, therefore, of himself, we may further say that the principle of his individuality and the principle of his personality come back in the end to the same thing. As Etienne Gilson puts it, "The actuality of the reasonable soul, in communicating itself to the body, determines the existence of an individual who is a person, so that the individual soul possesses personality as by definition." As it is the form that enables the individual to subsist, so is it the rational soul that enables man to exist as a human person. It is the soul of man that gives him dignity.

Tracing back the origin of the word, "person," St. Thomas agrees with Boethius that the word originally referred to the masks (πρόσωπον) worn by actors in comedies and tragedies; then he adds:

For as famous men were represented in comedies and tragedies, the name person was given to signify those who held high dignity. Hence, those who held high rank in the Church came to be called persons. Hence, some definite person as a hypothesis distinct by reason of dignity.

22 Again we must emphasize and maintain strictly the nonindividuality of the soul as soul, since two forms of this kind which would be numerically distinct as forms, would seem incapable of mutual existence.

And because subsistence in a rational nature is of high dignity, therefore every individual of a rational nature is called a person. 24

The intrinsic relation of "dignity" and "human person" clearly manifests itself. According to its definition, "dignity" means "the state, character, or quality of being worthy or honorable; elevation of character; intrinsic worth; nobleness; excellence." Dignity is a recognition of someone's worthiness, of inner qualities that demand to be honored. Human dignity is intrinsic to man; it comes from his nature -- his personal nature, as St. Thomas understood and defined it. This same dignity will be known through the operations characteristic of a rational being, that is, through thought and the exercise of free will.

The way has been prepared for the second question, "What is man?" The acts of intellectual cognition and will-power that are natural to man must find their proportionate cause in some concrete principle, real, and consequently subsisting in a determinate nature. When there are acts of thought and of will there are thinking and willing substances, call them

24 Summa, I, 29, 3 ad 2: "Quia enim in comoediis et tragoediis repraesentabantur aliqui homines famosi, impositum est hoc nomen, persona, ad significandum aliquos dignitatem habentes. Unde consueverunt dici personae in Ecclesiis, quae habent aliquid dignitatem. Propter quod quidam definiunt personam, dicentes quod 'persona est hypostasis proprietate distincta ad dignitatem pertinente.' Et quia magnae dignitatis est in rationali natura subsistere, ideo omne individuum rationalis naturae dicitur persona, ut dictum est."
whatever we wish. According to Thomist terminology they are intellect (intellectus) and will (voluntas), which are the esse from which the actio of man's rationality flows; consequently, the nature of the rational faculties will determine the nature of the rational operations. Yet it will be easier for us to study first the operations, in order to get at the full meaning of the faculties, themselves, which, according to St. Thomas, are the only two faculties of the soul,25 which is in truth the informing principle of the human person.

The important fact about the intellect is its spirituality, in defense of which St. Thomas offers three proofs; 1) it can know incorporeal things; 2) it has the power of reflection; 3) its proper object is the universal idea. We will summarize these three proofs.

First, the knowledge that men acquire through the external and internal senses always has to do with the singular and concrete, as experience itself shows. This fact is the result of the inherent dependence of the senses on physical organs for their proper functions; the sense of sight, for example, by means of its delicate organ, the eye, is adapted to receive and retain the external forms of individual colored objects. The intellect has an entirely different nature; it begins where the senses end their work. The fundamental process of the intellect is to abstract from the individuating

25 Summa, I, 16, 1.
notes, the quantity, and finally the matter itself, so that it
can get at the essence of a thing. Whereas the senses know
individual men, for example; the intellect knows the essence
of all men, the man-ness that makes them just what they are.
And it expresses this essence by means of a general definition
which can be verified in the case of each particular man.
"Man," it says, "is a rational animal." Besides this power
of deconcretization the intellect can know qualities that are
in themselves abstract and purely immaterial, such as justice,
love, truth, beauty, and dignity. It can even rise to an idea,
however inadequate, of God, who is Pure Spirituality. Now, as
St. Thomas argues, if the intellect were itself corporeal it
would not be able to know natures different from itself; to
know bodies it cannot itself be a body. If from experience we
see bodies that are incapable of knowledge, we can judge that
it is because they are merely bodies; and if we find corporeal
bodies that do think, then we say that their cognitive activity
is not a result of their corporeity but of something else that
must in itself be incorporeal.26 Now this incorporeal prin-
ciple we call "intellect," and this power of knowing bodies
through abstraction, its "proper operation."

26 St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 49: "Nihil
agit nisi secundum suam speciem, eo quod forma est principium
agendi in uno quoque. Si igitur intellectus sit corpus, actio
ejus ordinem corporum non excedet. Non igitur intelliget nisi
corpora. Hoc autem patet esse falsum; intelligimus enim multa
cuae non sunt corpora. "Intellectus igitur non est corpus."
The second power of the intellect is that of reflection, which is an action outside the realm of a purely material substance. Reflection, which is a turning or folding back upon oneself, is impossible for a material being, because the same part of a being having parts outside of parts cannot touch the very same part. The intellect, however, can accomplish this feat; it can reflect upon itself, not only part by part, but as a whole. St. Thomas writes:

No body's action reflects on the agent: for it is proved... that no body is moved by itself except in respect of a part, so that, namely, one of its parts be mover and the other moved. Now the intellect by its action reflects on itself, for it understands itself not only as a part, but as a whole. 27

In another place he says that "it is impossible for any power employing a bodily organ to reflect on its own act, since the instrument whereby it would know itself would fall midway between the power knowing and the instrument by which it knew in the first place." 28

Finally, the spirituality of the intellect is inferred

27 Loc. cit.; "Nullius corporis actio reflectitur super agentem; ostensum est enim...quod nullum corpus a seipso movetur nisi secundum partem, ita scilicet quod una pars ejus sit moverens, alia mota. Intellectus autem supra seipsum, non solum secundum partem, sed secundum totum."

28 St. Thomas Aquinas. In Librum III Sententiarum, Dist. 23, Q. I, a. 2: "Hoc autem non potest esse ita quod aliqua potentia utens organo corporali-reflectatur super proprium actum, quia oportet quod instrumentum quo cognosci se, caderet medium inter ipsam potentiam et instrumentum quo primo cognoscebat."
from the universality and necessity of the idea which it possesses. The species or ideas of things understood become actually intelligible only through the fact that they are abstracted from individual matter; and in so far as they are actually intelligible are they one with the intellect. Therefore, by very nature the universal must be immaterial, and the idea must be universal; as a result the intellect, which has the idea as its proper object, must be immaterial. 29

In describing the mode in which the intellect acts as a spiritual faculty St. Thomas introduces two new terms: possible intellect (intellectus possibilis) and active intellect (intellectus agens). The intellect is a passive potency, since it can possess universal forms and essences; it resembles a clean slate upon which the ideas are to be formed by the active intellect. 30 As an active potency the intellect through the spiritually effective force, the active intellect, illumines the sensible phantasms, and by abstracting from all individual and sensitive detail it releases the intelligible universal species which in turn informs the possible intellect and brings it into act. 31 The sensible phantasms offered by

29 Summa Contra Gentiles, II, 50: "Intellectus...non potest esse compositus ex materia et forma individuali; species enim rerum intellectarum flunt intelligibiles actu per hoc quod a materia individuali abstrahuntur; secundum autem quod sunt intelligibiles actu, fiunt unum cum intellectu; unde et intellectum oportet esse absque materia individuali."
30 Summa, I, 14, 2 ad 3.
the imagination are not efficient causes of knowledge, but rather the instrumental agents in the process of knowing. St. Thomas is not one to deny Aristotle's "Nil in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu; for him the human intellect is bound to its corporeal sensitive existence and by its nature tends to the forms of material things. Yet as a spiritual faculty the intellect rises far above the sensible world, because its adequate object which is the nature or essence of things, is the product of a spiritual operation proceeding only from a spiritual faculty.

The second faculty of the soul, called by St. Thomas the will or the intellectual appetite\(^32\), supplements the first faculty; together they form the essence of the soul, in which they are rooted as interdepending principles. Although these two faculties are specifically different, due to the difference between their proper objects, they have much in common, principally the fact that they are immaterial potencies without corporeal organs. The spirituality of the will follows directly from that of the intellect.

Now it is precisely because man is an intelligent creature that he enjoys the power of free-will. By means of his intellect he can set goals for himself, and propose suitable methods for their attainment; by it he can determine what shall be the last practical judgment respecting his preference of

\(^{32}\) Summa, I, 87, 4.
one means over another. It is this practical judgment, in fact, that gives the will reason to act at all, since the will waits for the presentation of an object sufficient to move the will to action. The cognitive faculty provides the evaluating judgment and offers counsel as to which object is to be preferred, while the appetitive faculty supplies the approval or disapproval. Thus, we can safely state that the root of freedom is in the reason as well as in the will; it is in the reason as in its cause and in the will as in its subject. And, as St. Thomas remarks, the will can turn freely to several different objects only because the reason has revealed the good in these objects.33

When a man looks about him in the world and sees myriads of other kinds of creatures fixedly determined to certain ways of action, he knows that as a free being he must be very special, one worthy of honor and full of dignity. He knows that he can perform a deed or not perform it, that he can do it in this way or in another, while these other creatures -- earth-bound by nature -- have not much powers. He will reasonably conclude that he and all other men possess a power that is exempt from the determining conditions of matter. This power

33 Ibid., I-II, 17, 1, ad 2: "Ad secundum dicendum, quod radix libertatis est voluntas sicut subjectum; sed sicut causa, est ratio; ex hoc enim voluntas libere potest ad diversa ferri, quia ratio potest habere diversas, conceptiones boni. Et ideo philosophi definiunt liberum arbitrium, quod est liberum de ratione judicium, quasi ratio sit causa libertatis."
of willing gives evidence of a will-faculty. According to the philosophical axiom, "action follows being," (actio sequitur esse) as a being is, so must it act. (In more familiar form, this is a variant statement of the principle of causality: "The effect cannot transcend its cause," or "Whatever becomes must have a proportionate cause.") Thus, we know that the immaterial effect of willing must proceed from the immaterial cause, the will.

If someone argues that the will is determined to a common object to which it inclines naturally, namely the good in general, we can agree with St. Thomas that this inclination is only another proof of the will's spirituality. St. Thomas distinguishes between the will considered as nature and as free; he states, "Since...the will is an immaterial power like the intellect, some one general thing corresponds to it naturally, which is the good; just as to the intellect there corresponds some one general thing, which is the true...."34

The power to will supplements the power to think; knowledge -- apprehension of Truth -- leads volition -- desire of Goodness -- to action. The will, like the intellect in man, is revealed as a spiritual faculty of man's spiritual soul.

Now that we have briefly outlined St. Thomas' exposition

34 Ibid., I-II, 10, 1, ad 3: "Cum igitur voluntas sit quaedam vis immaterialis, sicut et intellectus, respondet ei naturaliter aliquod unum commune, sicut etiam intellectui aliquod unum commune, scilicet verum."
of the two powers, of the soul we can investigate the nature of the soul as such. First, we know that the soul is a spiritual something; this fact has been proven in our review of the spirituality of the two powers of the soul. Just as the immaterial operations of knowing and willing proceed from the immaterial causes, intellect and will; so must an immaterial intellect and an immaterial will find sufficient cause for their existence as faculties of an immaterial soul. Defining soul as "the first principle of life," St. Thomas begins his "Treatise on Man" by proving that the soul is necessarily spiritual:

...no body can be the first principle of life. For it is clear that to be a principle of life, or to be a living thing, does not belong to a body as a body, since, if that were the case, every body would be a living thing, or a principle of life. Therefore a body is competent to be a living thing, or even a principle of life, as such a body. Now that it is actually such a body it owes to some principle which is called its act. Therefore, the soul, which is the first principle of life, is not a body, but the act of a body; just as heat, which is the principle of calefaction, is not a body but an act of a body. 35

35 Ibid., I, 75, 1: "...aliquod corpus non potest esse primum principium vitae. Manifestum est enim quod esse principium vitae, vel vivens non convenit corpori ex hoc quod est corpus; alioquin omne corpus esset vivens aut principium vitae. Convenit igitur alicui corpori quod sit vivens, vel etiam principium vitae, per hoc quod est tale corpus. Quod autem est actu tale habet hoc ab aliquo principio, quod dicitur actus ejus. Anima igitur quae est primum principium vitae, non est corpus, sed corporis actus; sicut calor, qui est principium calefactionis, non est corpus, sed quidam corporis actus."
The second question St. Thomas asks about the soul is whether it is subsistent, that is, does it have a nature all its own, or does it depend entirely upon the body for its being as such. His answer is:

Therefore the intellectual principle, which we call the mind of the intellect, has essentially an operation in which the body does not share. Now only that which subsists in itself can have an operation in itself. For nothing can operate but what is actual, and so a thing operates according as it is. 36

Gilson appeals to the doctrine of matter and form to prove that the soul has subsistence. He argues:

...although the man alone fully deserves the name of substance, he nevertheless owes all his substantiality to that of the soul. For the human soul is act, and is therefore a thing for itself and a substance; the body, on the contrary, although without it the soul cannot develop the fullness of its actuality, has neither actuality nor subsistence, save those received from its form, that is to say from the soul. 37

The soul of man does not need the body in the same way that the body needs the soul. Since the soul is the informing principle, the body without this principle remains non-existent; the soul, on the other hand, remains subsistent whether the

36 Ibid., I, 75, 2: "Ipsum igitur intellectuale principium, quod dicitur mens vel intellectus, habet operationem per se, cui non communicat corpus. Nihil autem potest per se operari, nisi quod per se subsistit. Non enim est operari nisi entis in actu. Unde eo modo aliquid operatur quo est."
body stays united to it or not. And this brings us to the last and perhaps the most important consideration concerning the soul -- its immortality.

What has been already said about the spirituality and substantiality of the soul offers much more than an introduction to the proofs of the soul's incorruptibility. St. Thomas presupposes that the soul is spiritual and subsistent, when he begins his arguments for its incorruptibility. He claims that a thing may be corrupted in one of two ways: in itself and accidentally. Taking for granted that the human soul has being in itself, it follows that it cannot be accidentally generated or corrupted, that is, by the generation or corruption of something else, since generation and corruption belong to a thing in the same way that being belongs to it. Things which do not subsist, such as accidents and mere material forms, acquire being or lose it through the generation or corruption of composites. Secondly, whatever is subsistent, such as the human soul, cannot be corrupted in itself, because being belongs to a form, such as the human soul, by virtue of itself and is therefore inseparable from it. Matter acquires actual being according as it acquires form; it loses being according as it loses form. But form cannot be separated from itself, and thus it is impossible for a subsistent form to cease to exist. 38 In a word, the dissolution of

38 Summa, I, 75,6.
man's body (matter), which owes its being to man's soul (form), can in no way affect the being of the soul itself, for being naturally (by virtue of itself) belongs to the soul, and cannot be separated from it.

A difficulty that immediately suggests itself, and one that has important consequences in our study of the nature of the human soul, is presented by St. Thomas thus: "Whether the separated soul can understand anything?"

To solve this difficulty we must consider that nothing acts except so far as it is actual, and therefore the mode of action in every agent follows from the mode of its being. Now the soul has one mode of being when in the body, and another when apart from it, though its nature remains the same. 39

St. Thomas continues by telling just how the mode of thinking in a soul joined with a body differs from that of a "separated soul." In the first existence the soul necessarily depends on corporeal phantasms, which are in corporeal organs; in the second existence it turns to pure intelligibles, as is proper to separate substances. Although knowledge through pure intelligibles is in itself a nobler method of understanding, still it is not natural to intellects joined to bodies, else

39 Ibid., I, 89,1: "Et ideo ad hanc difficultatem tollendam considerandum est quod cum nihil operetur nisi inquantum est actu, modus operandi uniuscumque rei sequitur modum essendi ipsius. Habet autem anima alium modum essendi, cum unitur corpori, et cum fuerit a corpore separata, manente tamen eadem animae natura."
men would have been created without corporeal sense organs and without the power of properly knowing sensible things from the things themselves. Therefore, it is for the soul's good that it is united to a body, and that it understands by turning to the phantasms; yet it is possible for it to exist apart from the body and also to understand in another way.

Now this again presents a problem. If the soul is independent of the body even in thought process, it would seem that it is so sufficient in itself that its union with the body is no more than accidental. Or we might be led to conclude that man is a third substance compounded of two other substances -- body and soul. Now St. Thomas insists that the union of body and soul is a substantial union: man is a complex substance which owes its substantiality to only one of its constitutive principles, that is, to the soul; man is neither body, which subsists only by the soul, nor soul, which would remain, according to his nature, destitute without the body; man is the substantial unity of soul, which substantializes the body, and of body, in which the soul subsists. 40

Thus when someone says "I know," he does not mean that his body knows, nor that his soul knows, nor that his soul knows by means of his body, but that a concrete being "I," taken in its unity, performs an act of knowing. The soul of man cannot develop its activity without the cooperation of sensorial

40 Ibid., I, 75, 4; 76, 5; 89, 1.
organs, and in order to obtain this cooperation it must actualize the body, which would not be without the soul; yet the soul is not itself save in a body. The nature of the soul is such, however, that even though the body corrupts, the soul continues in being, how different so-ever the mode may be.

To return to our starting point concerning the definition of "person," is to discover that "human person" is but a synonym for "man." Man, we have seen, is a substantial unity of matter and form, but because his form is a spiritual, substantial, incorruptible principle, it should be emphasized. The matter, on the other hand, is not to be despised; it does have a dignity of its own. The important point, however, is that the matter's worthiness is designed for the perfection of the form, and that man's dignity comes not from the matter but from the spirituality, substantiality, and incorruptibility of the form. It is this dignity that identifies man with his personality. From our discussion of individuating notes we must recall that although matter is the principle of individuation, once individuated it is the form that is individual, because "it is the subsistence of this individual form which, investing matter with its own proper existence, permits the individual to subsist."41 And since the form of man is his soul, we begin to see how really important this soul must be. Men are individuals, but more, they are human

41 Gilson, op. cit., 200-201.
persons; the natures of their souls make them such.

Having reviewed the nature of man, the human person, with his body-soul unity, we can now investigate his origin as a human person. First we must observe with the Angelic Doctor that by his nature man stands midway between corruptible and incorruptible creatures, since his soul is naturally incorruptible and his body is naturally corruptible. "Man," claims St. Thomas, "in a certain sense contains all things.... his reason, which makes him like to the angels (incorruptible); his sensitive powers, whereby he is like the animals; his natural powers, which liken him to the plants; and the body itself, wherein he is like to inanimate things." It thus seems that all matter aims at the ultimate form, the form of man: prime matter in potency to the forms of the elements, they in potency to the forms of the mixed bodies, they in potency to the vegetative soul, it in potency to the sensitive soul, and it in potency to the intellectual soul. And beyond this the soul is the connecting link with the purely spiritual intelligences.

42 Summa, I, 98,1: "Est ergo considerandum quod homo secundum suam naturam est constitutus quasi medium quoddam inter creaturas corruptibiles et incorruptibiles; nam anima ejus est naturaliter incorruptibilis, corpus vero naturaliter corruptibile."

43 Ibid., I, 96,2: "...in homine quodammodo sunt emnia....Est autem in homine quatuor considerare, scilicet rationem, secundum quam convenit cum angelis; vires sensitivas, secundum quas convenit cum animalibus; vires naturales secundum quas convenit cum plantis; et ipsum corpus, secundum quod convenit cum rebus inanimatis."
To understand fully the soul's dignity we must look to its ultimate source of being, that is, to its creation.

The creation of man suggests the fact that he is a contingent being, which in turn argues for the existence of one principle of being from which all contingent things, in whatever way existing, have their being; this principle must be "the uncaused cause," the first and the ultimate reason for being, the Creator from whom all creation proceeds. Thus we must understand God if we would truly know the meaning of creation. Since, according to St. Thomas, creation is the production of something from nothing (the "from" indicating a negation and expressing an order of things) there must be one absolutely Necessary and Pure Being, who can of Himself make something out of nothing, and who alone will be the origin of being.

Since all contingent beings are made according to their different natures, the nature of man's soul will determine its mode of creation. Because the rational soul is a spiritual, subsistent form, it cannot be made of pre-existing matter (whether corporeal, which would render it a corporeal being, or spiritual, which would involve the transmutation of one spiritual substance into another). Nor can it be made through the action of any created pure spirit, since it would presuppose something to its act and be capable of acting only

44 Ibid., I, 65,1.
by producing a change in matter, of which the soul is no part.45 Therefore, the rational soul must be created immediately by a uncreated Pure Spirit, and this is God. Because the soul is naturally the informing principle of man's body, it cannot be created by itself as though it were a complete species, but must be created in the body, which is the proper potentiality of which the soul is the proper act.46

The nature of the body will also affect its creation. Besides the fact that the materiality of the body demands that it come from pre-existing matter, whether it be the slime of the earth or the semen-ovum union, there must be an apt disposition in a body, which depends upon a soul for its substantiality. Since the proximate end of the human body is the rational soul, and its operations, in the same way that matter is for the form, God fashioned the body in the disposition that was best to serve the soul and its operation of thinking and willing. "If defect exists in the human body," says St. Thomas, "it is well to observe that such defect arises, as a necessary result of the matter, from the conditions required in the body in order to make it suitably proportioned to the

45 Ibid., I, 90, 2, ad 3.
46 Ibid., I, 90, 4 sed contra: "'actus proprius fit in potentia propria.' Cum ergo anima sit proprius actus corporis anima producet est in corpore." ad 1: "Sed quia naturaliter est forma corporis, non fuit seorsum creanda, sed debuit creari in corpore."
soul and its operations." As an example of the body's subservience to the good of the soul, he tells how man has an erect stature, so that his superior part, his head, is turned towards the heavens, and his inferior part is turned towards the earth; other animals have their heads turned down so that they can more easily seek food and procure a livelihood, while man is able to survey the heavenly and earthly things around him and so gather intelligible truth from them and have freedom in using his spiritual faculties.

We can truly say that man's rational nature is given even greater dignity by reason of the soul's being created as it is, and by reason of the body's being created for the soul. Now why is this true? From what does this greater dignity (if it may be called greater) come? St. Thomas gives the answer by asking another question: "Whether the image of God is in man?" He wants to know if something of the Creator manifests itself in the creature. To get at the full meaning of this problem we must distinguish the kinds of Creator-manifestations.

Since all things look to the Universal First Cause as the ultimate source of both their being and their operations, all

47 Ibid., I, 91,3: "Et si aliquis defectus in dispositione humani corporis esse videtur, considerandum est quod talis defectus sequitur ex necessitate materiae ad ea quae requiruntur in corpore, ut sit debita proportio ipsius ad animam et ad animae operationes."
48 Loc. cit., ad 3.
must necessarily resemble the Creator in some respect; for every effect in some way or other must represent its cause. Some effects represent only the causality of their cause, but not its form; their representation is referred to as a trace, for a trace indicates that something or someone has passed by, without disclosing the passer-by's identity. Other effects represent their cause by a likeness of form; this is called representation of image. Now all things resemble God in that they have being; some of them in that they have life; others in that they have rationality. Only reason-endowed creatures, such as man, approach near enough to the Being of their First Cause to merit the title, image of God, because only they bear a specific resemblance to God through their spiritual operations of knowing and willing.

The conclusions brought forward by man's likeness to his Creator suggest themselves: 1) the image of God is not found in irrational creatures, because they do not manifest a specific likeness to God; 2) pure spirits are more like to God than are men, because the intellects of pure spirits are more

49 The important requisite for a true image is that it must proceed from another like to it in species, or at least in specific sign. Ibid., I,35,1.
50 Lest man take too much dignity for himself, St. Thomas warns us that it is more correct to say that man is "to the image of God," than to call him simply "image of God," although if correctly understood we may call the human person an image of God. Ibid., I,93,1, ad 2.
51 Ibid., I,93,2.
perfect; 3) the image of God is found in every man because of his creation as a rational animal; 4) the image of God is found in the acts of the soul, because these acts are specifically like (no matter how imperfectly) those of God, and the more perfectly men use their faculties of intellect and will, the more perfectly will they liken themselves to Him, who is All-Perfect. Perhaps we understand now what St. Thomas meant when he wrote, "Person signifies what is most perfect in all nature," and what Gilson meant by the words, "We are persons because we are the work of a Person....To be a person is to participate in one of the highest excellences of the divine being."

52 Ibid., I, 93, 3.
53 Ibid., I, 93, 4.
54 Ibid., I, 93, 7.
55 Ibid., I, 29, 3: "...persona significat id quod est perfectissimum in tota natura."

Two corollary thoughts proceeding from the fact of man created-like-to-God suggest themselves; one in the form of a grace from God, the other in the form of an obligation upon man. The first thought is that of God's providence, which comes directly from the heart of creation. It would be incredible for God to present certain creatures with rational faculties specifically like His own, and then to neglect these creatures for the rest of their immortal existence. If it is reasonable to expect God to care for incorruptible creatures that bear merely traces of His specific nature, how much more will He protect and care for those who are intimately bound to Him by their very personalities. The second thought is that of man's subordinate attitude towards his Creator, and of his obligation of prayer to Him. Since prayer is an act of the reason, it is proper to a rational creature; since it is an act intended only for the reverence and honor of God through love of Him, it above all acts is the most perfect.
The final point that enters into our analysis of the dignity of the human person comes naturally from an understanding of the nature and origin of man. Now we wish to deal with his destiny. Why does man exist? Why does he exist as he is? And how does he achieve the purpose of his particular existence?

The first decision that even the most cursory student of Scholastic philosophy would make in regard to this philosophy is that it is theocentric. Almost no problem in metaphysics, psychology, or ethics can be raised without relating it to God; in a true philosophy He must always remain the beginning, the center, the end; for He alone is Being, the source of being, and the fund to which the participants of Being must return. All life is, in a sense, a circle from God, back to God. Now in discussing the why of man, who, as we have seen, stands midway between purely rational and purely irrational beings, we must keep in mind the divine attributes of God, who is not determined by His nature to depend upon anything outside Himself. We are not seeking a cause of the creative act of God whereby men came to be, for the creative act is God Himself; He has no cause, He Himself is cause. To seek a cause for God's own Will would imply an existence prior to Him or would demand a distinction of powers or attributes in God, who is Himself perfect One-ness. But to seek the end or purpose of God's acts is another question. If we denied that the Will
of God had an end for its acts, then we would be subjecting God to blind necessity or irrational contingency, either of which would certainly limit the perfection of God. What we can reasonably say, however, is that it would be contradictory for God in creating to have any other end than Himself; the only possible end of the divine Will is the Divine Being, and since this Being is identical with the Good, we may say that the only possible end for God is His own perfection. All these pre-notes are understood by St. Thomas when he quotes St. Augustine's phrase, "Because God is good, we exist."57

Generally speaking, an end is that towards which the movement of an agent tends; if there were no purpose in view, the agent would not act; when the purpose is attained he ceases acting. Again we may state that every agent by his action tends to some definite good thing; this statement is proven from the fact that all action and movement is directed in some way to being, either for the preservation or acquisition of being; now being is a good; thus all action and movement is directed to good, which may be defined as "the object of every appetite."58 Pressing this same argument to its ultimate limits we immediately see that the ultimate end of all created things must be the good that is ultimate and supreme. Now there is but one supreme and ultimate good, God. Thus we not

57 Summa, I, 19, 4, ad 3: "...quia Deus bonus est, sumus."
58 Contra Gentiles, III, 3.
only proceed from God — because He is good — but return to God — because He is good, ultimate and supreme.

If all created things seek their end in God, men as rational beings must even more strive for the possession of Him. They are human persons, made in the image of God by having likeness to His specific operations of knowing and willing. They have spiritual, subsistent, immortal souls. Thus they will reach their end in God in so far as they imitate the perfection of God. As He knows Himself and loves Himself, they will strive to know and love Him by striving to know Truth and to love Goodness, which in Him are identical and with Him identified.

In answering the question "How does man attain his ultimate end," the Scholastic philosophers put to good use their fineness of distinctions. They say that man has a double final end; the first is "giving glory to God," the second, "obtaining beatitude in God." But man's ultimate purpose is not divided. Glory and beatitude are naturally or a parte rei the same things. The reason for this identity is that formal glory given to God consists in acts of the intellect and will by which man unites himself to God; beatitude consists in man's possession of God through his intellect and will. Actually by the same acts man gives glory to God and obtains beatitude, which in the present life will be imperfect.

Glory, in general, is a kind of manifestation of perfection; according to St. Ambrose it is "clear knowledge with praise" (clara cum laude notitia). We know that it results from two acts, one of the intellect, and the other of the will; therefore, only a rational creature can glorify anything. In relation to God we note two kinds of possible glory: intrinsic whereby God perfectly knows Himself and praises Himself, extrinsic whereby rational creatures know and praise their God in as perfect a manner as they are capable of doing. From what we have already said about God, who is the source and object of all being, it becomes apparent that human persons will have certain obligations towards Him, who gave them personality; they will need to glorify God explicitly by their acts of knowledge and love of Him, and implicitly by turning their intellects only to truth and their wills only to what is good. In a word, men will have the obligation of always being reasonable, which is another way of describing a human person.

Beatitute, the other aspect of man's final end, can be defined as "the perfect good that satisfies the appetite completely." Since we know that man necessarily and always seeks a good end for all his actions and movements, ultimately he will have to seek the ultimate good end. Now if through

6D Summa, I-II, 2,8: "...bonum perfectum quod totaliter quietat appetitum."
the process of elimination we were to apply the various "ends" men might take as ultimate -- as St. Thomas has done in the second book of his Summa, or as St. Augustine does in his Confessions, and Francis Thompson in "The Hound of Heaven" -- we will discover that only He, who is the First Cause, the Pure Act, the All-Being, is Himself the Person, with whom these lesser persons seek to identify themselves by means of their person-powers given to them by God.

In summary, the metaphysical argument of the Scholastics puts the spot-light on the essence of man; it tells us that he is more than an individual, that he is a human person, a unity of body and soul, whose principal operations are those of knowing and willing; it tells us that the body and soul come from God, the body mediatelly, the soul immediately and made to the image of God Himself, and that the soul must return to its Creator for an immortal existence. This basic concept of man is not entirely verifiable in sense-experience, although it does have criteria and proofs -- staunchly unassailable ones -- which reveal to the honest student of man not merely a half-picture but a complete description of man as he is: a human person a creature of dignity. The Scholastic admits the existence of man's body and its necessity for the fulfillment of a truly human life; he also sees dignity in that same body, but a dignity of parts subordinated to the well-being of the whole, of delicate members caring for the
nourishment of the entire structure and for the propagation of other bodies like to it; yet he goes beyond the body's merely physical existence and there finds a reason for that existence. The Scholastic follows the reliable dictates of his reason when he says that the lesser must lead to the greater, the crasser to the nobler; he sees in man a higher life than that of vegetation and sensation, and he thinks that it -- the intellectual life -- must be the master, while the less noble must serve. He sees in this intellectual life, called "soul", an image that gives it greater value than the whole physical universe. And he says this is man.

We began our thesis by writing of a "basic foundation," and we have found it in the dignity of the human person. What this concept of man has to do with the relations of men in society becomes immediately evident. Either this is man or it is not man. There are no half-men, half-brutes -- although some men may seem to have cast off their rational natures for the irrationality of purely animal existence. The accidental physical characteristics of individual men in no way affect their essences as rational beings. To ask "How big is man?" or "What color is man?" is to show ignorance about the most fundamental concept of reality. To emphasize any purely physical characteristic of a man is to insult the essential dignity of that man and to dwarf one's own nature. Mr. Louis Achille writes:
In defining himself by the traits of his ethnic group a man travesties the true dignity of his own human personality; ignoring his essence, he chooses to exist in its accidents, and attempts to degrade -- if it were in his power -- his own person to the rank of nonhuman creature.

The man who emphasizes his body traits to the detriment of his soul's essence is like the idiotic ruler that amuses himself with his crown and his regal robe, and thinks nothing of his kingship.

Now it is our contention that so long as the true understanding of the nature, origin, and destiny of man -- as expressed in the metaphysics of Scholastic philosophy -- is neglected, so long as the material is placed over the spiritual, the soul made servant to the body, then mankind, no matter how intricate or highly specialized his civilization may be, will despair of itself and endanger its chances of ever attaining the peace and happiness which it madly craves and which it has the power to enjoy not only during the few moments on this earth but forever.

CHAPTER IV

THE SCHOLASTIC ANSWER: ETHICAL

In studying man's personality we find that his rational nature imposes upon him certain obligations towards God, himself, and other men, and confers upon him corresponding absolute rights which assure his fulfilling these obligations. It is this problem of obligations and rights that will determine to a greater or less extent the success of human relationships. This is the special problem for those men who have tried to degrade the soul-part of certain other men by despising some accidental characteristic, such as color of skin, which makes up the body-part of them. Those who degrade their fellow creature's personality are under definite obligations which they have forgotten. They who are the objects of this degradation have definite rights that must be protected, if not by themselves then by other members of human society.

The Scholastic doctrine of human rights is based on the metaphysical foundation of man's essential dignity as a human person. Man's dignity is the necessary "reason-for-being" of man's natural rights. (In the most ultimate sense only God, the First-Cause, can be the primary cause of human rights; in relation to Him, we say that the human person is the secondary
proximate foundation, but a true foundation nonetheless.\textsuperscript{1}

Because man has an intellect, which gives him the power to exercise control over them, he must use these powers for the development of his personality. Man knows only one dependence, that of his being with relation to the Creator, but this dependence, far from alienating him confirms him in his being, since it binds him to that which communicates to him intelligence and will.\textsuperscript{2} For this reason his person may be called absolute (\textit{ab-solutus}, detached from other things), and he may be said to be an end in himself. Within himself he has the faculties to develop himself; outside himself he has the obligation to direct these faculties to the proximate goal, his own person, and to the ultimate goal, God.

In order for man to attain the goals for which he naturally exists, he needs certain safeguards that will assure him of freedom in this attainment. These safeguards we call natural rights or "inviolable moral claims to personal goods...which a man acquires with his nature...designed as means for attaining his natural end."\textsuperscript{3} These rights are not derived from any positive authority, but proceed immediately from

\begin{thebibliography}{9}
\end{thebibliography}
man's rational nature and are directed immediately to the well-being of the human person possessing that nature; that is, they are natural to man and for man; they may be defined as "extensions of personality." 4

Since, therefore, man's natural rights are intimately concerned with the obligations imposed by the nature, origin and destiny of his very being, they are so necessary and so sacred for him that all men are morally restrained from interfering with them or ignoring them. In order to protect these rights all men are obliged to exercise a special moral virtue, called justice. This virtue is defined by St. Thomas as "the perpetual and constant will to give everyone his due." 5 With Aristotle, St. Thomas distinguishes three kinds of justice: a particular justice, divided into 1) commutative and 2) distributive; and 3) a general justice, called legal or social. As Father Meyer points out, this distinction "corresponds to the essential structure of the community which manifests a three-fold relationship: the relation of the members among themselves, the relation of the whole to the members, and the relation of the members to the whole." 6

The first relationship brings with it the moral obligation of one person's giving to another person his due, thus preserving an absolute equality between the thing owed (debitum) and the

5 Summa, II-II,58,1: "...perpetua et constans voluntas ius suum unique tribuens."
thing given (datum). The second imposes an obligation on the governors of a community to distribute among the members an equal proportion of burdens and rewards according to the needs and receptive capacities of the members. The last relationship presents the virtue of social justice, by which the members of a community are obliged to observe and promote laws for the common welfare.7

Just as there is a special moral virtue that protects men's natural rights, so is there a special vice opposed to that virtue. St. Thomas says, "...as the object of justice in external things is something equal, so the object of injustice is something unequal, that is, a person gets more or less than he deserves."8 It is unjust to deny a man his natural rights or to hinder without a reasonable cause his free use of them. We say "without a reasonable cause," because, although man's natural rights are absolute in existence, they are not absolute in extent; they are subject to limitations that will depend on the will of only the person in whom they inhere. For example, since a man has a right to live, not

7 Summa, II. 58.5,7,8: 61.1,2; 62.1. (According to St. Thomas restitution is demanded only for a violation of commutative justice, because there must be perfect equality between the thing owed and the thing given, i.e., the thing possessable and possessed by two distinct individuals. In distributive and social justice the man having the right is himself a part of the whole, and cannot owe anything to himself nor make restitution to himself.)
8 Ibid., II-II,59,2: "...sicut objectum justitiae est aliquid aequale in rebus exterioribus, ita etiam objectum injustitiae est aliquid inaequale, prout scilicet alicui attribuitur plus vel minus quam sibi competat."
even the State in order to preserve its own existence may di-
rectly and deliberately put an innocent man to death. The
natural right to life belongs in an absolute way to all men,
and in itself it is prior to any claim the State may have in
opposition to it. Man as a human person is autonomous in re-
lation to the State, which has meaning only in relation to
the welfare of its members. When, however, an individual
member gravely and willingly offends against the just law of
the State, he may be justly deprived of freedom to life or
even executed by the State. But the right to life is limited
only by the free-will action of the person possessing the
right. 9

Now it is a special kind of injustice to deny that this
or that man has any natural rights at all, because natural
rights are substantially equal in all men, although their ex-
tension will depend upon the various capacities and needs of
the persons concerned. The right to a higher education, for
example, will include more opportunities for self-improvement
in the cases of those who have greater capacities for learning.
But for all men the natural right will embrace a certain mini-
 mum of education that is necessary for preserving and develop-
ing men according to the reasonable needs of their personal-
ities. Because all men are equal in the nature, origin, and

9 This free-will action may be more or less deliberate on the
part of the actor; for example, when a member of a State at
war dons a uniform of his country, he thereby becomes a mili-
tary target.
destiny of their human persons, their rights, which are "extensions of personality," will be equal in kind, number, and sacredness. To deny that a particular man or group of men have natural rights is to deny that they are men. A blow aimed at a person's rights is a blow aimed at the essence of that person. Without rights men cannot fulfill the obligations imposed upon them as human persons; without rights they cannot be at all.

A second consequence of any form of injustice is that the natural rights of all men suffer when the rights of one man or one group of men are attacked. The reason for this is that "such an attack can be justified only by setting aside the ethical doctrine as to the objectivity and primacy of all and every form of human rights as rights which alone gives validity to any individual claim."10 An attempt to destroy, if it were possible, the essential equality existing between all men results in a complete destruction of all men's intrinsic worthiness and consequently all natural rights.

It is but a short step from general ethical principles to the particular question at hand. Since natural rights belong to all men because they are men, these rights must flow from the essential constituents of men's persons and not from their accidental characteristics of soul or body.

Human rights are human rights; they are not "Negro rights any more than they are white rights or red-haired persons rights." Negroes have natural rights because they are human persons; tall men have rights for the same reason; so do short men and fat men and men whose skin is red, yellow, or even white. And because all these men -- different as they are in physical appearance -- are equal as human persons, they possess equal natural rights that must be respected equally by all other men. When a Negro is unjustly denied the free use of his rights because he is a Negro, the attack aims at "something deeper than outer appearance and behavior: it insults the most personal and intimate traits of a man....his very life, his right to existence, the mere possibility of his being at all." 12 Father LaFarge says that "the only ground that can be found for denying equal opportunities to the Negro group as a group, is the hypothesis that the membership in such a population group implies an essential inferiority in each and every member of the same." 13 Since we know that Negroes are essentially equal and not inferior to other citizens of the United States they have equal rights with other citizens. Racial injustice in the United States violates these rights and offends the dignity of the human persons who possess these rights.

11 Ibid., 99.
12 Achille, op. cit., 111.
In order to analyze more clearly the ethical argument we will specify those human rights that all men must equally have to fulfill the reasonable demands of their personalities. Following the Jeffersonian division we will group these rights under the headings: life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. The most perfectly absolute natural right man has is that of possessing the means necessary for the attainment of his ultimate end; all other rights must remain subordinate to this one; all other rights, in a sense, will be the means man needs. We call these rights inalienable because they proceed from the intrinsic nature of an absolute being, although contingent in relation to God, and because they direct their possessor to an ultimate goal of self-perfection through the participation of his being in the Divine Being.

The first of man's inalienable rights (subordinate to the one perfectly absolute right) is that of existence, presupposing the creative act, and of obtaining the means that are necessary for the sustenance of his existence. So necessary, indeed, is the right to exist that a man in extreme need may take another man's property to satisfy his need. The right to life is prior to the right to possess property; the right of the first man supersedes that of the second. St. Thomas claims that a man in such need may take what is necessary, whether he does so covertly or in the open, because things that are superabundant for some men are by natural
right the necessary means of sustaining the poor.14 Consequently upon the first inalienable right are those to property, to work, and to receiving a wage adequate to care for oneself and family according to a standard befitting the dignity of human persons.

The right to property is part of the general right a man has to possess the goods of the earth for satisfying the reasonable need of his person. Ordinarily men need personal property in order to feed and clothe themselves, to raise and protect their family, and to safeguard their other rights, such as that to freedom and pursuit of happiness. By their physical make-up and their spiritual faculties of intellect and will they have the powers by which they can reasonably use external goods to satisfy their needs. Three further reasons for the right to property are suggested by St. Thomas: 1) things owned in common are usually neglected by the majority, who lack interest in the things not intimately connected with themselves; 2) ordinarily human affairs are well directed for the welfare of both individuals and the common good, if the care of the good is left to individual persons; 3) a more perfect community is preserved when each man rests

---

14 Summa, II-II, 66,7.
content with what he has as his own. 15

Man's right to work in order to receive a wage adequate to care for himself and his family in a manner befitting the dignity of himself and his family is necessary for the preservation and development of his person. Without this right his right to life would be meaningless, since this right is the means that assures him of his right to life and his right to attain his destiny. Without a certain amount of material possessions man's needs cannot be satisfied. Since God made the earth for all men, and since men usually must get their livelihood from the earth by labor, all men in general have equal rights over the material goods of the earth. But in specific cases men's rights differ, depending first on their needs and secondly on their capacities. A man with a family of ten, for example, will have a greater need for material goods, and therefore a greater right to them than the man with only a wife to support. It is chiefly the duty of the State to see that an "equal" (according to needs) distribution of goods be preserved among its members. After the needs of men are taken care of, then men's rights to the world's goods will depend on their natural capacities to receive them. The

15 St. Thomas further states (Ibid. II-II, 66, 2.) that the urge to strive for a lasting possession of external things corresponds directly to a man's natural urge to care for his family, as well as to his human characteristic of helping others. (Ibid., II-II, 32, 5 ad 3) Property should be private with respect to the power of acquisition and disposal but common as regards its use. Ibid., II-II, 118, 1; 66, 2, ad 2.
man with a stronger back or with more skilled hands or with a keener mind will have a greater right than his weaker or slower or duller brother. But if we consider the actual economic order as it exists in the United States, where a part of the people possess most of the wealth, we must insist that the laborers who perform reasonable amounts of useful work have rights - equal to those of the owners of the earth - to a decent livelihood not only for themselves but for their families as well. 16 Although it is just for men to make free contracts with their masters who "buy" their labor, still the masters must remember that man's labor is personal and necessary for him and must therefore be regarded as retaining the substance of a natural right, which is always permanent and inviolable. 17

Again we have seen that man's rights ultimately depend on his intrinsic worthiness as a human person with consequent obligations to fulfill the needs of his personality. As soon as we admit man's dignity, we are naturally led to the admission of certain fundamental rights, such as the right to life, to own property, and to work for a living wage. Since these rights are based on the foundation of man's essence,

they must be regarded as inherent possessions that cannot be taken away from him without disturbing the very order of nature.

The second specific right that all men have is the right to liberty, which may be personal or social.

The most basic aspect of man's right to personal liberty comes from the fact that he is directed and tends by the nature of his being to a supernatural end. He has the obligation and therefore the right to worship God and to strive for his eternal destiny in God. Upon this right depends the ultimate satisfaction and perfection of man's human personality. Religion, considered as a moral virtue, that gives God the honor He deserves, surpasses all other moral virtues because it alone is ordained directly and immediately to God as to its end. If we ask whether man is free to determine how he shall practice religion, we must reply that objectively he has freedom to practice only the true religion, but that subjectively he must follow the dictates of his conscience.

18 Summa, II-II, 81,5-6.
19 St Thomas was very strict towards those who, once knowing Truth, leave it. Ibid., II-II, 11, 3; 10, 8, 11, 12. On the other hand, he forcefully protects the freedom of conscience of non-believers. Ibid., I-II, 19,5. For Catholics who are commanded by ecclesiastical authority to perform acts that violate the moral law or are opposed to their own moral convictions, St. Thomas claims that they must die under the sentence of excommunication rather than disobey "the truth of life," which may never be sacrificed. Ibid., II-II, 104, 1, ad 1; 5.
The second aspect of personal liberty is that of the right to self-development, which includes the development of the whole man, his physical, intellectual, and moral traits. Since man has an inherent duty to develop his faculties of mind and will (first according to their needs and the needs of his whole person; secondly according to their capacities to receive development), he must enjoy the means necessary for that development; these means are secured only by a corresponding right.

A third personal right is that of marriage and family life. Not every man has the obligation towards which this right of marriage and family life looks. We may distinguish between a purely personal right which pertains to the person as an individual and a specific right which belongs to the whole species as benefitting the species as such. The former right has a corresponding unconditional obligation, but the specific right is not accompanied by this obligation, even though the right is exercised only by the individual.20

The right to marriage is based on man's natural inclination or need for an act which tends primarily to the perfection of the species and only secondarily to the perfection of the individual. Thus, not all men will enjoy the use of this right, because not all men have the obligation correlative to it. The right to family life "includes the right to

20 Ibid., II-II, 49, 2; 152, 2, ad 1; 5.
security and the preservation of a certain economic stability, the right to growth, the right to have children, and the right to provide for their physical and spiritual welfare."21 No one, not even the State, may deny a man the exercise of these rights to family life and to marriage unless there is a reasonable and grave reason directed to the common good that demands such interference.

The final type of personal right concerns the right of physical freedom. Since man needs to be physically free in order to satisfy his obligations towards himself and his family and in order to protect his rights and those of his family, he has a natural right to this freedom. This means that no man may have a direct dominion over him, nor an indirect dominion unless he wills it or unless the dominator acting for the State, holds him in punishment for crime or as a prisoner of war.22

Besides his personal rights to liberty man also possesses social rights, among which are his political, civic, and communal rights.

Man's social rights accrue to him by reason of his essentially social nature. The community is rooted in man's

21-Meyer, op. cit., 487.
22 Since the problem of slavery as defined and explained by St. Thomas (II-II, 10,10,ad 3; 57, 3, ad 2; 189,6 ad 2), is not entirely clear, the reader is urged to confer Winston N. Ashley's thesis, "The Theory of Natural Slavery according to Aristotle and St. Thomas." Ph. D., University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, Indiana, 1941.
nature, since "he is naturally ordained to live with other men." For the preservation of life, for the satisfaction of his material needs, and for the development of his physical and spiritual faculties, man depends to some extent on the support of his fellow-men; to assure this support he has rights in so far as he is a member of a society.

Man's political rights are due him by virtue of his membership in the national community, the State. The two common political rights consist in the right to vote and the right to hold office. These are not natural rights but positive rights based on man's social nature and proceeding from the free action of the State. These rights are conferred by law in the discretion of the State, which may widen or curtail them according to right reason and as the highest interests of the State demand. Father Gilligan explains the reason for this dependence of political rights on the State:

Just and beneficent governments have flourished in the past the subjects of which were not permitted to vote. Man can occasionally attain his end and reasonably develop his personality without possessing such a privilege. That truth may be more thoroughly understood if it is recalled that the State is not a contractual society which men are free to enter but a necessary institution. When a State or government is duly established and when it is functioning

23 Summa, I-II, 72, 4: "...quo homo ordinetur ad alios homines quibus convivere debet."
24 Ibid., I-II, 95, 1.
for the common welfare the subjects of the territory are bound to submit to it. They are not free to withdraw assent or obedience. 25

However, we admit that the subjects of any government always have the power to designate their form of government and to agitate for a change in form if it would actually promote their welfare; in this case the existing government must cooperate for the benefit of the citizens. In a democracy, such as the United States, the government must aim for people-participation in government and a free distribution of the franchise so that all the competent citizens may have a voice in the elections of officials. In regard to the right to vote the State must see that it is so regulated "that public order and peace will be preserved, that the natural rights of all will be protected and that all will have equal opportunity." 26 In like manner the State must make laws and regulations concerning the fitness of public officials so that the welfare of all citizens will be considered. The rights to vote and to hold office will be justly limited and defined by the State, but always for the common good and for the ultimate protection of the most fundamental rights of all.

Man's civic rights concern his relationship to his immediate community; they include the many protections such as the rights to making contracts, to trial by jury, to equal

26 Ibid., 177.
benefits of public service.

Man's communal rights concern his recreational, cultural, educational, and purely social needs. These particular civic and communal rights depend upon the State's obligation to practice distributive justice, which will mainly concern itself with seeing that substantial equality is always observed. Thus, if within the State certain individuals or groups, because of poverty or weakness, have special needs, the State is bound to fulfill these needs in so far as the common welfare will permit. The main reason for this special consideration of the poor and helpless members of society is that "the richer population have many ways of protecting themselves, and stand less in need of help from the State; those who are badly off have no resources of their own to fall back upon, and must chiefly rely upon the assistance of the State."27 An example of how distributive justice puts a demand on the State in this regard is the universal right in the United States for ordinary educational opportunities. All citizens must receive the same chance for an elementary and secondary education; for the State to deprive certain persons of this chance without sufficient reasons is to commit a grave injustice against those persons. And for the State to deal unfavorably towards those who need educational opportunities more than others is a greater act of injustice.

The State is obliged, however, to set up institutions of higher education only in so far as the capacities of its members demand such institutions.

Although in considering man as a social being we have noted how he must depend on the State or community for the satisfaction of his social needs, we must remember that the ultimate perfection of only one man surpasses the natural good of the entire State or community. Man is naturally social, but he is first of all a person; he has rights that in themselves supersede those of the State and must be protected and respected by the State.

Man's final specific right, the pursuit of happiness, concerns itself with goods and privileges "above the minimum." The peculiar needs, capacities, and abilities of individuals will determine their rights to such pursuits as to seek employment in a variety of businesses, to seek promotion, to seek higher wages or salaries, higher education, to possess an equal share of luxury goods as they become more common to all members of society; in a word, to progress as the majority do, and to receive the common rewards of such progress.28

With the development of civilization new rights ensue, so that "individuals who contribute to the progress of the common good may share in the benefits," with the freedom of opportunity due them.29 In the United States, where material

28 LaFarge, op. cit., 91 (quotations of Francis Gilligan at Twenty-First National Conference of Catholic Charities).
29 Loc. cit.
development and progress have become connotative of its spirit, special care must be taken by communities, states, and the nation at large to see that no individuals or groups are kept from enjoying the fruits of this spirit.

The racial situation in the United States furnishes an extensive field for the application of the principles outlined according to man's rights to life, to liberty, and to the pursuit of happiness. All men can lay claim to these three fundamental rights, unless they have deliberately sacrificed their claim. The accidental color of one's skin (which accident has given birth to the word, "race") or the accidental traits and characteristics arising from one's physical or social development have nothing to do with the principles or the application of the principles of justice and the doctrine of human rights. Human personality is the substance of man; the color of his skin is a very accidental mark of him. All man's rights flow from his substantial being; that is why they are called "human rights," and not American rights, or white rights, or red-haired-persons' rights.

We have said that human rights are substantially equal in all men. In application, however, we insist that when there is a conflict of rights -- not in rights in se, but in rights as possessed by this or that individual -- then emphasis must be placed on the rights of the weak, the poor, the unportected persons whose rights are more apt to be disregarded
and even violated. These persons need their rights in order to fulfill the obligations demanded by their human persons. Thus, in practice, in the United States the rights of the Negro population group will frequently supersede those of white men. If, for example, certain white men find personal happiness only when they are separated from Negroes, whom they have been taught to dislike, and if this discomfort actually conflicts with a Negro's right to work or to receive an education, or to preserve freedom of worship, then the Negro's right must be held as superior. Since in this country the white men control the organic resources, education, industry, commerce, and recreation, it must be the special duty of the governmental authorities to protect the rights of the Negro citizens. One of the States most necessary duties is to keep unprejudiced the minds of the youth in the country, so that they will never stamp as inferior any of their fellow Americans, who happen to be Negroes, but who are like themselves human persons.

Here, then, is the crux of the "other half" of the Scholastic answer to the race question in the United States. We call this the ethical argument; it carries conviction because it is firmly rooted in the metaphysical argument. The solution to the race problem must base itself on the admission and consequent application of these philosophical principles. It is outside the realm of philosophy to put these principles
into practical action; the philosopher directs, while the sociologists and social workers, the educators and religious teachers work. Of course the first step that the workers must take is the propagation of true principles; they must inform before they can reform; they must present Truth to intellects if they expect Good to come from wills. Any other answer, as we shall immediately see, fails in its initial error of neglecting or abusing the truths of the basic foundation -- man's essential dignity as a human person -- and of the ultimate principle -- the doctrine of human rights.
CHAPTER V
THE "OTHER ANSWERS" ANSWERED

The negative approach as a solution to a problem must always remain secondary. If the positive doctrine cannot be substantiated, an appeal to "answers to objectors" will never fully satisfy the reasonable inquirer. Although we have offered positive doctrine as proof of the Scholastic answer to the race question, we have a corroborative argument in our answers to the various solutions proposed by "the other side." Besides its service as the handmaid of positive doctrine this negative approach has an important and necessary role to play in revealing the errors of philosophers and social thinkers who carry great weight in the world today. The devastating effects of Nazism and Communism have been shown to all the world, but the dangerous half-truths and vestiges of untruth that take subtler forms are not sufficiently known. It is our purpose here to disclose not only the philosophical systems in their bold rejection of those truths upon which the welfare of man and society rests, but the false principles of less pretentious systems which are perhaps more dangerous because they wear masks of "sweet reasonableness" that easily deceive the unwary student.
To answer the various philosophers interested in the race question is a difficult task, because often it is next to impossible to get on a common ground of understanding. Therefore, we have found it necessary to analyze these "other answers" in the light of Scholastic principles and to show how these answers oppose the values naturally determined by human reason and thus destroy the basic foundation and the ultimate principle without which we will never arrive at a true understanding of Negro-White relationships in the United States.

The doctrines of the philosophers and social thinkers presented in the first chapter of this thesis will not be considered individually but will be analyzed under the four general divisions suggested as reasonable: 1) the postulate of an absolute; 2) the meaning of man; 3) the relation of man to other men; 4) the value of these doctrines as an answer to the race question.

1) The postulate of an absolute.

Every system of philosophy must have its to absolutum, because the very nature of philosophy is to seek ultimate causes, which in turn implies that there will be the ultimate cause, the absolute, beyond which nothing can be and towards which everything must tend. Scholastic philosophy admits one Absolute, the true Absolute: God, the Supreme Being of ontology, the Provident Creator of theodicy, the only true Absolute of all true philosophy. Since God is what He is, any
lower being set up as a rival of Him is a blasphemous caricature, and any human endeavor that neglects Him in a search for truth has already pronounced its own death sentence.

The totalitarian philosophies of Communism, Fascism, and Nazism have taken as their absolutes a particular collectivity. The definite form of the absolute differed according to the historical, political, and social-economic causes aggravating the birth of the new absolute. In Russia the absolute became the proletarian class; in Italy, the State; in Germany, the Aryan race.¹

Contrary to the dictates of human reason the totalitarian systems have claimed personality for their class, State, or race, which they portray as "a mysterious being outside and above the individuals of whom it is composed, a kind of divinity informing them, by means of collective coercion, with a potentiality foreign to their nature."² To represent a social group or "collective whole" alone as real and the individuals that compose the group as valueless apart from the

¹ It is a special study in itself to trace the historical evolution of totalitarianism as it has existed in Russia, Italy, and Germany. Complete references to this study are found in Religion and the Modern State, Christopher Dawson, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1936; The Metaphysical Relation Between Person and Liberty, Rudolf John Harvey, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1942; Selfishness and the Social Order, John J. Reardon, The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1943.

Dr. O'Toole states:

Absolutely speaking, the individual alone is real, whereas collections (classes, groups) are mental constructs, which, far from having any absolute extramental reality, do not even admit of realization outside the mind. Actually, a collection is not a single being, but a multitude of distinct individual realities whose sole unity is a logical or conceptual oneness ascribed to them by the mind. Collections are not real wholes but logical ones. This misplacement of emphasis that attaches importance to the unreal collection rather than to the real individuals mentally collected into a group, is an error....

It is this unreal collection that becomes the Summum Bonum of totalitarianism. Thus, Russia is class-centric; Italy, State-centric; Germany, race-centric; just as all true philosophy is theo-centric.

Although we cannot prove that the totalitarian absolutes totally emerged one from the other, we can note the philosophical de-purification they underwent: from the more universal to the more particular group of men, from the material principle of economic security and prosperity to political loyalty and civic dependence and then to physical well-being and pure-blood worship. In each stage God is replaced with a more material usurper. The last of the line deserves special mention because it is the race philosophy par excellence.

---

Racism is the lowest possible form of pseudo-absolutism. Besides being based on the false assumption that a collection of individuals equals a being with personality, it errs in presupposing that men of "pure-blood" equals a collection. Science has no answer to the question, "What is racial purity and purity of blood?" In fact, science cannot even define race in adequate terms. Yet, if we could admit that there can be a pure-blood race, still we would have to prove that mixture of pure-blood with non-pure-blood constitutes in itself a blemish or cause of moral or physical weakness. (The opposite of this statement can be shown by the fact that blood relationship has frequently been the cause of physical degeneration, while blood mixture has seemed to improve the racial stock.) But if it were proven that blood mixture is an evil, the problem of right and wrong would not be changed, since marriage and procreation are faculties attaching to the very nature of man and are thereby dependent on man's judgment in accordance with the objectively true order of things.

It is unfair to class all white-supremists in the United States as complete racists, since they do not set up a whole race philosophy, making their own race (used in the broad sense of the term) the absolute of life. We must state, however, that the theories of white-supremacy are irrational and if carried out logically and far enough will lead inevitably to a race-philosophy no less subversive than that of the
National Socialists in Germany. Any attempt to upset the ordo rerum is a threat to the supremacy of God, and the white-supremists are guilty of perverting this order when they subscribe to any doctrine or practice that admits or implies that certain members of the human race are inferior or tainted in their natures.

The irrationalists have no peculiar race philosophy of their own, but they are forced to revert to the conclusion: matter is the true absolute. For the irrationalists it is not the pure-blood of one group but the animality of all men that determines value. The materialistic scientists begin with the animal part of man and end with it. The zoological psychologists begin with the animal part of man and try to spiritualize it by immersing it in the "world soul," which can easily develop into a totalitarian philosophy of one sort or another.

The false social philosophers admit the necessity of a totalitarian philosophy, but they condemn the restricting elements of Communism, Fascism, and Racism; they want a place for all men in one all-absorbing unity through common and absolute equality. Since men must be equal in something, these social philosophers would have men equal in Humanity or Society. They have said, "Since God does not exist, we must invent Him." Thus, another pseudo-absolute is born.

Two special variations of the "old line" social
philosophers have arisen recently in the United States. Two groups, both very interested in the problem of Negro-White relationships, have offered their solutions as the only ones satisfying the ideals of mankind and at the same time fulfilling the particular needs of the problem in the United States.

The first group calls their program "The City of Man," which is closely aligned with the false social philosophers' pseudo-absolute, Society. Here God is dethroned to give place to the Universal Democracy, which is humanity-centric. Taken concretely, in the "City of Man" the foundation of law is a universal participation in government; the foundation of equality is that the state is the agent of collective human purposes; the foundation of justice in democracy as a community of persons. But ultimately "The City of Man" rests on the untrue assumption that God is given being by men and that men trace their origin to the unreal collectivity, Humanity.

The second group is headed by the sociologists, Dr. Gunnar Myrdal, who has collected a mass of valuable and interesting facts and has presented these facts in a scholarly form. Dr. Myrdal insists in his introduction that as a sociologist his purpose is not to philosophize, not to make value judgments, still in his first chapter he proceeds to prove that the race question in the United States is a moral problem which can be solved only by Americans resolving to submit
themselves completely to the "American Creed." Thus, he implies that creed is the objective norm of morality against which he measures all his findings; thus, his judgments, tending to a solution of the American Dilemma, are given value only in so far as they are related to the creed. Dr. Myrdal claims that he is not interested in whether the creed is right or wrong, since he has no personal value judgments of such things. But by defining the creed as he does he implies that there is nothing more ultimate or more absolute according to which the creed has objective value and upon which the creed depends for its being what it claims to be. Dr. Myrdal, therefore, has presented to the American people the "true absolute" -- the "American Creed."

It is easy to discover the reason for Dr. Myrdal's creation of a new pseudo-absolute. He did not begin at the beginning. Instead of going immediately to the true sources of the creed, where a true definition will be found in objective terms, he discovered sources of his own. Instead of defining the creed according to the concise words of the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution of the United States, and thus exploring the sources for the concepts expressed there, he says that it is the sum of the ideals which "represent to the American people the essential meaning of the nation's

4 It is interesting to note that Dr. Myrdal always capitalizes the words, "American Creed", which indicates a kind of personalization of the concept.
early struggle for independence."5 The tenets of the creed are outlined as a kind of emergence from the philosophy of the Enlightenment, the theology of sectarian Protestant Christianity, and the terminology of English law, all of which in themselves claim ancestry from a "common democratic creed as it matured in our common Western civilization."6

Dr. Myrdal misrepresents the American creed; first, according to its origin; secondly, according to its essence.

In writing of the origin of the creed Dr. Myrdal reveals his philosophical prejudices. Contrary to its name, the period of the Enlightenment by its avowed rejection of the supremacy of God and the primacy of the natural law as founded on the eternal law ushered in an age of darkness. It was the Enlightenment that displaced obedience to divine authority with the independence of man as a law unto himself; from this complete break with objective authority resulted an independent morality which brought with it a boundless license and eventual denial of the validity of human reason. If the American creed stems from this period of darkness, then it is worthless as a norm of morality, since it will be based on a philosophy that forbids any objective norm of morality. Protestant Christianity is as unworthy a parent; it was founded on a spirit of independence that fostered subjective claims

5 Myrdal, op. cit., 4.
6 Ibid., 25.
in preference to divine revelation. English law may be con-
sidered trustworthy in so far as it followed its traditional
dependence on the unchangeable natural and divine positive
law, but it too became errant when it gave way to individual-
istic adaptations and inconsistent exceptions that made law
the pawn of majority opinion, of brute force, or of mater-
ialistic expediency. It is fortunate for the United States
that Dr. Myrdal errs when he states that the American creed
has its foundation in these three sources.

The truth of the matter is that Dr. Myrdal has confused
the temporal background of a truth with the truth itself.
Even if the framers of the Declaration and Constitution were
for the most part influenced by Locke's *Two Treatises*, and
even by some phases of their Protestant faith and some tenets
rooted in English law, still the creed is not more or less
true for all that. For one searching out the truth behind
the American creed these factors serve only as scenery and
temporary back-drops of more basic and more universal truths. 7

7 It should be known, for example, that John Locke, to whom
historians trace Jefferson's statement of sovereignty, was re-
futing the *Patriarcha* of Sir Robert Filmer, who in turn wrote
his own work as a condemnation of St. Robert Bellarmine's *De
Laicis*. It can also be proven that Jefferson had in his
library not only the writings of John Locke, but also those of
Filmer and Algernon Sidney, who opposed Filmer even before
Locke did. Had Jefferson taken an interest in original sources
-- a fact we cannot doubt -- he would have been able to get
Bellarmine's work at the Princeton Library. Bellarmine was
the true secondary source of Jefferson's statement of sover-
eignty. Vd., John Clement Rager, *Political Philosophy of Bles-
sed Cardinal Bellarmine*. Catholic University of America Press,
The American Declaration and Constitution are only temporal expressions of eternal verities. The American creed is not true and credible because it is American; rather, because it is not American but universal and eternal and rooted in the true Absolute (a fact that Dr. Myrdal nowhere expresses or even implies), it is true and credible and naturally acceptable to mankind. Thus, in essence the creed is not an absolute, nor does it, as expressed in its official documents, claim to be so. It is Dr. Myrdal, who would endow it with that spurious essence and thus destroy its efficiency as an instrument for solving the problem of race relations.

2) The meaning of man.

When totalitarian philosophies dethrone God they must logically destroy the individual personalities of men, who become necessarily submerged parts of the social community. This depersonalization of man is the consequence of their personalizing the class, the state, or the race. By giving personality to a purely intra-mental concept they destroy the essences of those real beings who are said to be fused into this conceptual existence. The mode of fusion depends on the pseudo-absolute set up.

Since the guiding principle of Communism is the greater production and distribution of material goods for the physical well-being of a classless society, man's spiritual faculties

8 Reardon, op. cit., 140-141.
are neglected if not completely denied; his dignity becomes the reflected glory of the one class; his immortality, its immortality.

Statism makes man the tool of the State, a society in which no individual man can say "we," as he does of his family, but only "it." 9

In the racist's society men's endowments are conditioned by the physical characteristics produced by "pure-blood." All spiritual principles are degraded. Ignoring man's essence the racist chooses to exist in man's accidents.

He segregates himself within the narrow family of those who bear superficial likeness to him, and professes to be the offspring of an animal. Proud of his blood and other physical characteristics, which he shares with the rest of the animal kingdom, he spurns the incommensurate dignity with which the Almighty Creator gratuitously vested him. 10

The racist, if he is consistent, must base the dignity of man on a completely materialistic principle; he must lower man to a brute level, not only other men but himself included. There is no way by which human dignity can be limited to any single category of men without at the same time making all men irrational. Concerning the nature of man (the universal term for "all men") there can be no compromise; reason demands one response and no other.

There is no practical difference between the conclusions of the totalitarians and the principles of the irrationalists. To begin with totalitarian ethics is to end with irrational metaphysics; to begin with irrational metaphysics is to end with some form of totalitarian ethics.

The false social philosophers, including the "City of Man" group, widen the totalitarian horizon by directing man's existence to an all-embracing mass entity. For them everything must be within, nothing against, nothing outside humanity or society. They explicitly deny that every human being is an individual who is in command of his own life for his own supreme purpose and who can use things about him but can be used by nothing else in the universe. Here man is made the means to a communal end. "He exists," as Father Farrell states, "not for his own goal, but for the goal of that vague community called humanity; he is the necessary ally of some vague power; he has no liberty but to hold fast to that non-personal end that renders his life individually meaningless." This philosophy of man as an impersonal cog in a great machine is the logical result of a philosophy that has replaced the true Absolute with a "blasphemous caricature."

In Dr. Myrdal's writings the meaning of man is as confused as his description of the American creed. He implies

by neglecting to clarify the \textit{prima principia} that man's worth proceeds from his adherence to the ideals presented by the creed, which is given a kind of absolute essence. By referring to the "Enlightenment" of the "Creed" Dr. Myrdal implies the denial of man's spiritual soul with spiritual faculties which give man the power and dignity of a person.

3) The relation of man to other men.

The Scholastic doctrine of human rights is based on the proximate foundation man's essential dignity as a human person and on the remote foundation of the true Absolute, God. Since the various philosophies we have reviewed deny these two foundations it will be impossible for them to accept this further development. The truths of Scholastic position are built up like a great cathedral: everything has its place, at peace, and in harmony. Contrary to these truths the creators of pseudo-absolutes attempt to use sand for stones; always there is chaos and confusion.

In the totalitarian systems men receive their rights from the group to which they belong; they have no obligations towards a higher power; their obligations towards other men of their group are on the basis of their mutual relationship to the group and not to one another. Stealing from a neighbor, for example, is wrong because a neighbor is a member of the class or state or race, and it is the group that suffers the loss. In a society of this kind there is absolute equality
between the members. But it is the equality of slaves who are bound to the same master. Then, too, equality extends only to one group of men, not to all men. Caucasians, for example, may be judged by them to be totally superior to all other races. Thus the Aryan racists taught that "the races of mankind differ so greatly from one another, by virtue of their innate and inalterable character, that the lowest of them is farther removed from the highest than it is from the highest species of brutes." The totalitarian, and more especially the racist, commits a singularly embarrassing blunder. By confusing the generic concept of human dignity with the entity of his own particular race he degrades to the level of animal life, not only other men but also himself with his "pure" confreres; he annuls in his own mind the very dignity which he wishes to monopolize. They would leave all men with no dignity and consequently with no rights.

For the false social philosophers equality is not the result of men's personality-likenesses, but the unity of one man to another in humanity. Justice, therefore, does not proceed from the virtue of man who performs his obligations dictated by the necessities of his human nature, but comes from a democracy as a community of people who happen to be living together. The fundamental difference between this belief and

true doctrine is that human rights must flow from the very nature of man as a human person; they must be intrinsic to him. These other philosophies would draw man's freedom from its source in the universal and total democracy; thus they make the principle of man's freedom something outside and extrinsic to him; freedom exists, therefore, not for man as his own natural characteristic, but to the end that man may work to the end beyond himself which is within humanity. In this system humanity or society will determine rights and duties, which are necessarily temporary, mutable, violable grants of an extrinsic order. Based on such fragile principles man will soon become the vassal of an irrational despot.

If Dr. Myrdal wishes his readers to believe that Americans have rights and obligations towards one another solely because their American creed has granted them, then Americans have not the inalienable rights they claim. For a right to be inalienable it must come from an antecedent obligation that is determined by the need of the person who will claim the right; then too the right must ultimately proceed from the Absolute Being, who has ordered the needs of man to a purposeful end. Rights and obligations must be intrinsically a part of man; otherwise they are superimposed and contrary to his rational nature. Dr. Myrdal destroys the force and essence of human rights by refusing to found them as intrinsic parts of human nature, which is in turn made in the image of God.
Only firmly established concepts can assure harmonious relationships between men. Ethical principles must be set down explicitly and definitely. To call the race question a "moral question" and then to define morality as the conflict between "moral valuations on various levels of consciousness and generality," that is, "the valuations preserved on the general plane which we shall call the 'American Creed'...and, on the other hand, the valuations of specific planes of individual and group living,"\textsuperscript{14} is to confuse the issue rather than solve it. There must be a recall of basic postulates and a definition of objective terms; there must be a return to reason. Walter Lippmann says that philosophers must look to the traditional viewpoint of western civilization; he writes:

\begin{quote}
The institutions of the western world were formed by men who learned to regard themselves as inviolable persons because they were rational and free. They meant by rational that they were capable of comprehending the moral order of the universe and their place in this moral order. They meant when they regarded themselves as free, that within that order they had a personal moral responsibility to perform their duties and to exercise their corresponding rights. From this conception of the unity of mankind in a rational order the western world has derived its conception of law, and that the character of all particular laws is to be judged by whether they conform to or violate,
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{14} Myrdal, op. cit., xlIII.
4) The value of these doctrines as an answer to the race question.

For the totalitarian philosophies there is no "race problem"; in their own society, which is autonomous, men are identified and swallowed up by the class or state or race. In the Communistic community race means nothing; because of this fact the Communist propagandists deceive many members of the oppressed races by describing the equality afforded all who throw in their lots with the "classless society." In the Fascistic society race is usually identified with the members of the State; consequently racial characteristics are soon lost sight of, as long as all remain loyal to the absolute State. In actual fact, however, Fascistic states utilize national patriotism by marking hostile racial groups as disloyal to the State and therefore unworthy to be members; from here it is an easy step to the fully developed race philosophy of "pure-blood."

In the specific "race society" everything is measured by physical participation in the deified "pure-blood" group, whether it be called Aryan or Caucasian or any other racial type. The race problem is the only problem in such a society. Family life, education, recreation, national culture are

subordinated to safeguarding racial purity in individuals for the "pure-blood" society. The racist's solution is not for man but for certain men who have common animal characteristics. Because the racist's philosophy insults the nature of man, his dignity, and his rights, it must be driven from the earth as the worst kind of moral plague.

Since the materialists deny the spiritual faculties of man, they are forced to judge man as different types of animal specimens. For them race is a convenient means of classification. Although they would claim equality for men in their common animality, practically they choose higher types of soul-less men for their preferable bodily traits. Materialism has always been the forerunner of an irrational degeneration of men that easily gives birth to a kind of totalitarian racism. The materialists can never solve the race question by their monistic conception of life. The reality of spirit demands admission first.

The "City of Man" philosophers believe that they have found the solution for a true understanding between all groups of men. But, as we have proven, their solution is based on untrue "first principles." Their efforts may be admirable, but their purpose is predetermined to tragedy. By rejecting the established order of things they are led into chaos. They have yet to learn that truth is objective, that it is one and final.
Dr. Myrdal was correct when he said that the problem of Negro-White relationships in the United States was a moral issue. But he was wrong when he defined what he meant by "moral issue." Until social thinkers, such as Dr. Myrdal, decide to set down certain primary truths as credible they will never arrive at solutions of any social problem, least of all one so complicated and so intimately connected with the private prejudices and social habits of Americans as the so-called "race problem." Social thinkers must learn to be radical, in the original meaning of "radical" as "deeply rooted." The Scholastic answer is radical, because it has its roots in fundamental, immutable truths. It alone of all the answers here given satisfies the demands of human reason, because it alone defines the inalienable rights which all men possess as human persons.

The full Scholastic answer has been given by a simple presentation of its positive doctrine. A secondary, negative proof has been given by the presentation and refutation of all "other answers," which enter the realm of philosophy. It is not the purpose of philosophy to follow up its program of reason with practical techniques as applied to the daily lives of men in society. The adaptation of the "foundation" and the "principle" to the acting lives of Americans begins here where the "true understanding" ends.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


========, In Boetium de Trinitate.
========, In Librum III Sententiarum.
========, In VII Metaphysica.
========, Quodlibetales Quaestiones.
========, Summa Contra Gentiles.
========, Summa Theologica. Domus Editorialis Marietti, editio XXII, 1939.


Froude, James A. The English in the West Indies or The Bow of Ulysses. Charles Scribner's Sons, New York, 1888.


Lover, James F. Study of Papal Statements Against Racial Discrimination. (M.A. Dissertation, The Catholic University of America Library, # 5012)


Reardon, John J. Selfishness and the Social Order. The Catholic University of America Press, Washington, 1943.


