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The Concept of Love By Plato in the Symposium Compared with the Concept of Love By John in the Holy Scriptures

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The Concept of Love by Plato in The Symposium compared with The Concept of Love by John in The Holy Scriptures.

by

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INTRODUCTION

Love indicates attachment. The kind of thing to which it attaches itself prescribes its effects. Because there may be a variety of objects of attachment, it is interesting to study the subject, for the student may thus see Love in its manifold operations. The study of our subject is also important for the reason that it may not only lead the student to direct his own Love aright, but use his influence to guide others along proper and profitable paths.

In this study, we are to examine the concepts of Love as presented by Plato in the Symposium, and by John, the Apostle of Jesus Christ, in The Holy Scriptures. We shall probably find a wide divergence between these two concepts. It will be our purpose not only to examine each concept, but to compare them; therefore we should have in mind at the outset some points on which the comparison can be made. We have selected three types of meter or means of measurement, as follows:

(1) The origin of Love as presented in each concept;
(2) The object of Love as presented in each concept;
(3) The objective of Love as presented in each concept.

These we shall try to bear in mind with the following
connotations:

In connection with the origin of Love, we shall be asking ourselves how the individual conceives Love and how it develops within him; and, incidentally, what constitutes its essence.

In connection with the object of Love, we shall be asking ourselves towards what object it is directed, and why, and how it increases or diminishes, and what such increase or diminution may do in the way of affecting the individual possessing Love.

In connection with the objective of Love, we shall be asking ourselves regarding its issue,—namely, when Love has conceived and developed, what results.

These, then, will be the main factors we shall have in mind in beginning our investigation. Whither we shall go in pursuit of the concepts we propose to investigate it is not possible for us to fully determine at this time, for one step will doubtless lead to another, and another to another, and so on. We feel certain, however, that our exploration will be profitable, not only to satisfy the intellect but to increase appreciation for this potent factor in human living and to enable us to direct it towards its proper end.

In seeking a solution to our problem, I hope we will not consider ourselves "harmonists" because we can strike the highest and lowest notes in the scale, but that we

\[1\] Phaderus 268 D & E.
shall seek to know all the notes and all the cords and their meaning in relation as well. And in this connection the writer hopes that each of us will become a dialectician, described by Socrates as "one who can divide and bring together so that he can see naturally the things that can be naturally collected into one and divided into many." Having done this, we shall become wise, for the wise man is he who can direct all things to their proper end.
Seeking a key

In an attempt to find the concept of Love contained in The Symposium, we may well repeat the words of Socrates, who, in replying to a query from Diotima, said:

"It wants some divination to make out what you mean, for I do not understand." 1

For in the matter of interpretation, we are confronted with the question of whether Plato intended to give us a language of literal statement or of allegorical representation of fact.

If we should look through the other writings of Plato for a key to the solution of this problem, it seems we would be disappointed, for many of his sayings are capable of various kinds of interpretation, as is evidenced by the fact that his commentators do not agree.

Since we are without a positive clue on this point, we shall attempt to present a thesis covering the teachings of Diotima in the form of a decad, then seek an explanation of our subject by approach through other statements in this dialogue, then seek a deeper understanding by an etymological study, then look into similar terms or concepts found in Plato's other dialogues, then see what Plato's commentators have to say, in the hope that finally we may arrive

1 Symposium 206 B.
at a correct concept of Platonic Love.

Summary of Points

The teachings of Diotima, as given by Socrates, seem to be capable of a summary in the form of a thesis as follows:

(1) It is necessary to make a distinction between Lover and Beloved, the Lover expressing himself by loving the Beloved. 1

(2) Love is neither god nor man, but a great spirit operating as an intermediary between the immortal and the mortal. 2

(3) Love as an intermediary possesses a tendency towards the Good and the Beautiful and the Fair (Wisdom is Fair). 3

(4) Love has the capacity to interpret and to transport the divine (immortal) to men and to carry men (mortal) to the divine. 4

(5) The Lover loves as a natural condition, and not as the result of Reason, using the term "Love" in its generic sense. 5

(6) While all men are Lovers, using that term in the generic sense, when we use the term discriminately, we must say that true Lovers love the Good to be their own forever. 6

(7) The Lover seeks to gain immortality by reproducing himself, and he is attracted to a Beloved because it can relieve him of his begetting power which has for him heavy pangs. 7

(8) The Lover begets intellectually upon the Beautiful as expressed in the form of Prudence (a diversification of the Good), which finds its multiplicity in sobriety and justice, and thus the true Lover begets concepts which are deathless. 8

4. Ibid 203 A. 5. Ibid 206 C & 207 C.
8. Ibid 203 D & E.
(9) The Lover may develop his appreciation of a worthwhile Beloved by loving a particular in which he finds beauty, by observing that true beauty exists actually in many particulars, by noting that true beauty may exist both actually and potentially in many particulars, even in observances and in laws of the state; and the Lover may finally comprehend true beauty as an ocean pervading all, so that not even a branch of knowledge exists in which he does not recognize it. 1

(10) Having come into sight of a vision of THE BEAUTIFUL, the Lover may continuously contemplate immortal, eternal, permanent TRUE ESSENCE of BEAUTY; and, doing so, he will find life worth while, beget virtue, and by reason of this continuous contemplation of TRUE BEAUTY himself become as nearly immortal as man may become. 2

Sayings of Other Speakers

We find that other speakers in The Symposium have made contributions to the dialogue, which may be summarized as follows:

Phaedrus tells us that Love is the most venerable and valuable of the gods, having sovereign power to provide all virtue and happiness for men whether living or dead. 3

He illustrates the venerability of the god Love by saying that he is of noble birth, having had no parentage, and having been born after Chaos (quoting Hesiod) 4 and having been born immediately after Chaos and at the same time as Earth (quoting Acusilaus). 5

He illustrates the valuability of the god Love by saying that he is the cause of man's highest blessings, guid-

ing man to the life of the greatest happiness, hindering him from ignoble deeds, inspiring him to the noblest service by what Homer calls "a fury inspired" and even serving to sacrificial death.

Pausanias tells us that Love is of more than one sort, and that the Love which deserves our praise and that Love alone is worthy of honor and eulogy.

Differentiating, he tells us of Heavenly Love and of Popular Love. He then says that every action is inspired by Love, and that the value of the action is to be determined by the manner of its doing; for when the doing is noble and right, the thing itself becomes noble,—when wrong, it is base,—therefore Love, like our actions, is worthy of praise only when impelling us to act in a noble manner.

Continuing his argument, he proceeds to say that Popular Love works at haphazard, and that this Love is seen in the meaner sort of men. The other Love is discriminating, orderly, consistent, and operates unselfishly both in the Lover and in the Beloved.

Eryximachus asserts that the previous speaker started well, but did not finish properly, so he will append a conclusion to his remarks. He adds that Love indeed is of two

7. Ibid 181 B.  8. Ibid 181 D & E.  
9. Ibid 185 C.
sorts, but that it is the attraction of all creatures to a
great variety of things which (attraction) works in every-
thing that is,—mighty, wonderful and universal in its sway.

Distinguishing the two sorts of Love, he illustrates by
love of a healthy body versus love of a sickly one, and sug-
gests that the good and healthy elements of the first body
center their interests on one kind of a beloved, while the
bad and sickly parts act contrariwise. The master-physi-
cian is he who can distinguish between the nobler and the
baser loves, and who can effect such alteration that the one
is replaced by the other. Even in social life, he adds,
well-ordered men will indulge in this noble, the Heavenly
Love, which springs from the Heavenly Muse. For this Love,
and this only, even in nature, becomes the bearer of ripe
fertility and health.

In summary, then, Love, conceived as a single whole,
exerts a wide, a strong, nay, a complete power; but that
which is consumated for a good purpose, temperately and just-
ly, both here on earth and in heaven above, yields the
mightiest power of all and provides us with a perfect bliss,
so that we are able to consort with one another and have
friendship with the gods who are above us.

Aristophanes, evidently holding a reputation for buffoon-
ery, presents a fantastic tale, portraying Love, of all

the gods, as the most friendly of them to men, succoring mankind and healing those ills whose cure must be the happiest of the human race. Concerning the nature of this god, he gives us this description:

Love appeared as the craving or yearning of mortals, ingrained in mankind, and the god provided a leadership which made possible a pious observance of the gods in order that man might escape harm and attain to bliss, thus bringing human beings to their very own and furnishing excellent hope for the future.

Agathon explains the virtues of the most blissful of the gods, Love, and then tells of his goodness and beauty.

Socrates now proceeds by his well-known method of inquiry to fathom the knowledge of the speakers, especially Agathon, and makes the following preliminary statements:

Love must be a possessor, for it cannot exist apart.

Love must have an object.

Love must desire something it lacks, and hence Love is directed towards certain things for which it has a want, hence since the Lover wants only the beautiful, Love must be directed towards Beauty. Now therefore Love cannot possess Beauty, for if such were the case, it could neither

10. Ibid 201 B.
require nor desire it, and since Good things are beautiful, the Lover desiring the beautiful must also lack the Good; - and, goodnaturedly, Agathon, seeing no way of contradicting Socrates, is willing to "let it be as your say" which means that Agathon's argument is set at naught.

These suggestive statements given at this point are not to be taken as representative of Socrates' complete doctrine of Love, but are made merely for the purpose of beginning the discussion on a more fundamental and satisfactory basis than would have been possible had the statements of the previous speakers been allowed to stand as such basis.

In this connection, the following excerpt from a commentator seems decidedly appropo:

"The purpose of this little interlude, as Socrates has said, is to make sure that his own eocomium which is to tell the truth shall begin at the right starting point; in other words, we are to be brought back to reality, of which we have been steadily been losing sight." 3

Such being the case, the problems raised here will be covered in subsequent discussion, so we shall not attempt to interpret the meaning of the speaker now, but wait until he himself again refers to these items.

The Problem of Interpretation

A matter suggested elsewhere comes up for consideration now. It is this:

Are we to interpret The Symposium as a complete presentation of one or more concepts, or as a series of ideas.
not necessarily consistent? This leads to the question:

Is Plato consistent

We may look at this question as it applies to the writings of Plato as a whole, and also as it applies to The Symposium. Since we are studying the Symposium only, or principally, it might be asked how the question of Plato's consistency or inconsistency generally might concern us in connection with the interpretation of this one dialogue. It seems to this writer that we may hope to find something of an answer to the second question in seeking to answer the first. Let us see what some outstanding students of Plato have had to say:

Lamb answers

"In this dialogue (Phaedrus) as in the Phaedo, we find the soul justly rewarded or punished for conduct in this life; but the soul is here described as made up of a charioteer and two horses, whereas in the Phaedo it is one and indivisible; but the description of the soul in the Phaedrus is confessedly and obviously figurative, and the simple, uniform nature of the soul is arrived at in the Phaedo by serious argument. It is therefore evident that Plato did not consider the soul a composite creature, but a single thing or being. The two horses, then, represent not distinct parts of the soul, but modes of the soul as it is affected by its contact with the body; the good horse typifying the influence of the emotions, the bad horse that of the appetites, and the charioteer the reason. It is important to bear in mind that the description of the soul in the Phaedrus is figurative, otherwise we are involved in hopeless confusion in any attempt to determine Plato's conception of the soul. Since the Phaedo and the Phaedrus were probably written about the same time, no real disagreement between them is to be assumed." 1

"Each of the dialogues (of Plato) is a self-contained whole. The order in which they may have been mentioned in this Introduction is that which agrees in the main with modern views of Plato's mental progress, though the succession in some instances is uncertain." 1

There are a number of thoughts expressed here which should interest us. To two only we desire to call attention:

(1) There is progress in Plato's thought, hence in his doctrine, which means that he is not necessarily consistent.

(2) There are at least two methods of interpreting Plato,—one literal, one metaphorical.

Zeller answers

"Platonic philosophy is on the one side the completion of the Socratic, but on the other an extension and an advance upon it. *** As Socrates in his philosophical enquiries concerned himself with the moral quite as much as with the intellectual life, so it is with Plato. *** Plato's views concerning the problem and principle of philosophy thus rest upon a Socratic basis. *** But that which had been with Socrates only a universal axiom became with Plato a system. *** It was Plato who first expanded the Socratic philosophy into a system, combined its ethics with the early natural philosophy, and founded both in dialectics, or the pure science of ideas. *** Thus the idealizing of the concepts involving a certain scientific dexterity, dialectical impulse and dialectical art, was now raised to the objective contemplation of the world and perfected into a system." 2

"Plato is the first of the great philosophers who not merely knew and made use of his predecessors, but consciously completed their principles by means of each other, and bound them all together in one higher principle." 3

"We see in the dialogues Socratic induction at

2. Zeller, Eduard, Plato and The Older Academy, Longmans, Green & Company, New York City, 1883, pages 144-145.
3. Ibid page 152.
first decidedly predominating over the constructive element, then both intermingling, and lastly inductive preparation receding before systematic deduction, corresponding to which there is also a gradual change from the form of conversation to that of continued exposition; but the fundamental character of the method is never effaced, and however deeply Plato may sometimes go into particulars, his ultimate design is only to exhibit with all possible clearness and directness the idea shining through the phenomenon, to point out its reflection of the infinite, to fill with its light not only the intellect but the whole man." 1

"This specialty in the philosophy of Plato explains the form which he selected for its communication." 2

Here again we have a number of thoughts expressed. Two only we desire to point out:

(1) Whatever method of explanation Plato uses, he has one purpose in mind.

(2) That purpose is consistent.

Reconciling these views with reference to The Symposium

Here, then, we have two opposite views so far as the general doctrinal scheme of Plato is concerned. We do have, however, agreement regarding the individual dialogue we are studying, for Lamb says that "each of the dialogues is a self-contained whole" which confirms at least to that extent the theory of Zeller that there is consistency in Plato's purpose. Applying this conclusion, then, to The Symposium, we may conclude that in presenting it, Plato had a definite, consistent purpose in mind.


2. Ibid Page 152.
Concerning the unity and purpose in The Symposium, and in the Phaedrus, another commentator says:

"Plato wrote no systematic treatise on philosophy, and no aesthetic." 1

"What, then, are we to think of The Symposium and the Phaedrus, which seem so obviously to be devoted to the praise of inspiration?" 2

"The vision of Beauty, according to Plato, makes us act and feel rightly towards those realities which thought alone apprehends." 3

Items to be remembered in analyzing the ideas in The Symposium

Going back to the original question, namely, whether we are to look for one idea in its various aspects or for several ideas in The Symposium, not necessarily consistent, we might remark as follows:

First: The dialogue under consideration is called "The Symposium" which, as the name indicates, is supposed to be a series of statements made by various speakers at a gathering on a single subject, covering various viewpoints or phases of that subject. Even if we allow that Plato had a consistent purpose in presenting this dialogue, we must think of each of the speakers as presenting his viewpoint, and attempting to elucidate the same.

Second: In a symposium, it is not necessary that all the speakers agree, for the very nature of the symposium requires a diversification of ideas; otherwise it would not

2. Ibid Page viii.
3. Ibid Page xvii.
be a symposium. Each of those invited would naturally speak to the subject from the standpoint of his own training, experience and observation, some perhaps seriously, some perhaps facetiously, and therefore it would hardly be expected that all the views expressed would be consistent. This would be especially true in any symposium with which Socrates had to do, considering, as we know it, his method of interrogation. Had the writer of this dialogue intended that all views expressed should coincide, it would have been more fitting for him to have presented a monograph. It seems to this writer that here we have a presentation of truth as the various speakers understood truth on the subject under discussion, leading up to the main speech of Socrates, and laying a sort of foundation for it. We shall try to point out how this is done later. Suffice it here to say that the speech of Socrates is intended to present the problem in its proper light and then to offer a correct solution; therefore what the other speeches, do principally, if not wholly, is to suggest different phases of the problem so that Socrates may discuss it in its many ramifications. In other words, the other speakers act as stooges so that Socrates may state correctly what they have presented erroneously or impartially.

1. Taylor, A. E., *Plato*, Constable & Co., London, 1914, page 29 says: "In form, the philosophical works of Plato are all dramatic. They are one and all discourses or conversations."* It is true that all the dramatic element has its purpose, but it is also true that the dramatic element becomes less and less and less prominent as we pass from the earlier works to the later."** In the dialogues of the last two groups, the
Third: Notwithstanding what we have said in propositions first and second above, it is just possible that the statement of every speaker offers some worth-while phase of truth as a contribution to the whole, if correctly interpreted, and that there is at least to this extent a measure of consistency in the dialogue after all. We must remember that Plato had several ways of presenting truth. Often he even employs the myth to convey what is not fully understandable from his or from our own point of view; and while in many cases he uses straightforward language which he intends to be interpreted literally, the meaning of which is apparent to every reader, he also engages in allegory and metaphor not so easily interpreted.

The functions of the various personages become less and less important. They tend more and more to serve as mere instruments for giving the chief speaker his cue."


"Plato maintains the fixity of the objects of knowledge in a great variety of studies, which enlarge the compass of Socrates' teaching till it embraces enough material for complete systems of logic and metaphysics. How far these systems were actually worked out in the discussions of the Academy we can only surmise from the dialogues themselves and a careful comparison of Aristotle, whose writings, however, have come down to us in a much less perfect state; but it seems probable that, to the end, Plato was too fertile in thought to rest content with one authoritative body of doctrine. *** There are flaws in his arguments; to state them clearly and fairly is to win the privilege of taking part in a discussion at the Academy."

In this interesting and remarkable statement, the writer admits the difficulties involved in presenting the arguments of Plato, and the reason is evident, viz: the understanding of them from the language in which they are expressed by Plato involves certain difficulties of interpretation, for we do not know in every case how he speaks.
As already admitted by our authorities, we can hardly conceive of a brilliant mind like Plato without purpose in presenting each dialogue. If he had such a purpose, it surely must be intelligible. In other words, even if we admit that the doctrine of Plato as a whole is inconsistent, we should be willing, as previously suggested, to concede that each dialogue as such is consistent, and intelligible, or at least that this is the case with The Symposium, which is one of the most finished of all the dialogues. Conceding this, and concluding that Love is the subject here under discussion, we may look for Plato's concept of Love in this work.

Later, when we attempt to interpret The Symposium, we shall take up more fully the various matters presented, and seek to find their meaning, so that the ideas can be woven into a complete whole, but here we desire to point out a principle of interpretation for this dialogue which we intend to follow: viz: In the statement of each speaker there must be a germ of truth which Socrates either corrects or confirms. It will therefore be necessary that we first find those germs of truth presented by the various speakers, and then determine whether Socrates corrects or confirms or contradicts them.

Interpreting The Symposium

Before proceeding with our own interpretation of The Symposium for our own purpose, it might be well for us to see what others have had to say about it.
"Love is the son of Plenty and Poverty, and partakes of the nature of both, and is full and starved by turns. Like his mother, he is poor and squalid, lying on mats at doors (referring to statement of Pausanias - 183 B). Like his father, he is bold and strong and full of arts and resources. Further, he is in a mean between ignorance and knowledge; in this he resembles the philosopher who is also in a mean between the wise and the ignorant. Such is the nature of Love who is not to be confused with the Beloved.

"But Love desires the beautiful and then arises the question: What does he desire of the beautiful? He desires of course the possession of the beautiful, but what is given by that? For the Beautiful, let us substitute the Good, and we have no difficulty in seeing the possession of the Good to be happiness; and we see Love to be the desire of happiness, although the meaning of the word has been too often confined to one kind of love, and love desires not only the Good, but the everlasting possession of the Good. Why, then, is there all this flutter and excitement about Love? Because all men and women at a certain age are desirous of bringing to the birth, and love is not of beauty only, but of birth in beauty; this is the principle of immortality in a mortal creature. When Beauty approaches, then the conceiving power is benign and diffuse; when foulness (approaches), she is averted and morose.

"But why, again, does this extend not only to men but also to animals? Because they, too, have an instinct of immortality. Even in the same individual there is a perpetual succession as well of the parts of the natural body as of the thoughts and desires of the mind; nay, even knowledge comes and goes. There is no sameness of existence, but the new mortality is always taking the place of the old. This is the reason why parents love their children, for the sake of immortality; and this is why men love the immortality of fame. For the creative soul creates not children, but conceptions of wisdom and virtue such as poets and other creators have invented. And the noblest creatures of all the created are those of legislators, in honor of whom temples have been raised. Who would not sooner have begotten these children of the mind than ordinary ones!

"He who would proceed in due course must first love one fair form, and then many, and learn the connection of them; and from beautiful bodies he should proceed to
beautiful minds and the beauty of laws and institutions until he perceives that of all beauty there is one kindred; and from institutions he should do on to the sciences, until at last the vision is revealed to him of a single science of universal beauty, and then he will behold the everlasting nature which is the Cause of all, and will be near the end. In contemplation of that Supreme Being of Love, he will be purified of earthly leaven and will behold Beauty not with the bodily eye, but with the eye of the mind, and will bring forth true creations of virtue and wisdom and be the friend of God and the heir of immortality."

Symonds comments

"In order to understand the Platonic and Florentine enthusiasm, the Love of The Symposium and the Love of the Vita Nuova, we must begin by studying the conditions under which they were severally elaborated.

"Platonic Love, in the true sense of that phrase, was the affection of a man for a man, and it grew out of antecedent customs which had obtained from very distant times in Hellas. Homer excludes this emotion from his picture of society in the heroic age. The tale of Patroclus and Achilles in the Iliad does not suggest the interpretations put on it by later generations, and the legend of Carrymede is related without a hint of personal desire. It is therefore assumed that what is called Greek Love was unknown at the time when Homeric poems were composed. This argument, however, is not conclusive; for Homer, in his theology, suppressed the darker and cruder elements of Greek religion, which certainly survived from ancient savagery, and which prevailed long after the supposed age of these poems."

"The orator Aeschines, in his critique of the Achilleian story, adopts this explanation,—unhappily for the science of comparative literature, we have lost theyclic poems; but there is reason to believe that these contained allusions to the passion in question; otherwise Aeschylus the conservative and Sophocles the temperate would hardly have written tragedies which brought Greek Love upon the Attic stage. If the Iliad had been his sole authority, Aeschylus could not have

made Achilles burst forth into the cry of 'unhusbanded grief' over the corpse of his dead comrade, which Lucian and Athenaeus have preserved for us.

"However this may be, masculine love, as the Greeks called it, appeared at an early age in Pelops. We find it localized in several points, and consecrated by diverse legends to the gods. Yet none of the later Greeks could give a distinct account of its origin or importation. ***

"The socializing of love was intended to promote a martial spirit in the population, securing a manly education for the young, and binding the male members of the nation together by bonds of mutual affection. In earlier times, at least, care was taken to secure the virtues of loyalty, self-respect and permanence in these relations. In short, masculine love constituted the chivalry of primitive Hellas, the stimulating and exalting enthusiasm of her sons. It did not exclude marriage, nor had it the effect of lowering the position of women in society.

"The military and chivalrous nature of Greek love is proved by the myths and more or less historical legends which idealized its virtues. *** The Greeks pronounced masculine love to be the crowning glory of free men, the source of gentle and heroic actions, the heirloom of Hellenic civilization, in which barbarians and slaves had and could have no part or lot.

"Greek love was in its origin and essence masculine, military, chivalrous. It was clearly neither an effeminate depravity nor a sensual vice. Still, it had grave drawbacks. Very close lurked a formidable social evil, just as adultery was intertwined with the chivalry of mediaeval Europe. In the Greek states, especially like Athens, where the love had not been moralized by prescribed laws, it tended to degenerate, and it was just here, at Athens, that it received the metaphysical idealization which justifies us in comparing it to the Italian form of Mediaeval chivalry. Sokrates, says Maximus Tyrius, pitying the state of young men, and wishing to raise their affections from the mire into which they were declining, opened a way for the salvation of their souls through the very love they then abused. Whether Sokrates was actually thus motivated cannot be confirmed or even asserted with certainty. At any rate, he handled masculine love with robust originality, and prepared the path for Plato's philosophical conception of passion as an inspiration leading men to the divine idea.
"Socrates, as interpreted in the Platonic dialogues entitled Phaedrus and The Symposium, sought to direct and elevate a moral force, an enthusiasm, an exaltation of the emotions which already existed as the highest form of feeling in the Greek race. In the earlier of these dialogues, he describes the love of man for youth as a madness or divine frenzy, not differing in quality from that which inspires prophets and poets. Under the metaphor of a charioteer, he indicates psychological distinctions of reason, generous impulse and carnal appetite. Composed of these three elements, the soul has shared in former lives the company of gods, and has gazed on Beauty, Wisdom, Goodness, the three eminent manifestations of the divine, in their pure essence. But sooner or later, during the course of her celestial wanderings, the soul is dragged to earth by the baseness of the carnal steed. She enters the form of flesh, and loses the pinions which enabled her to soar. Yet in her mundane life, she may be reminded of the heavenly place from which she fell and of the glorious vision of divinity she there enjoyed. No mortal senses could bear the sight of truth or goodness or beauty in their undimmed splendor. Yet earthly things in which truth and goodness and beauty are incarnate touch the soul to adoration, stimulate the growth of her wings, and set her on the upward path whereby she will revert to God. The lover has this opportunity when he beholds the person who awakens his passion; for the human body is of all things that in which beauty shines most clearly.

"When Plato proceeds to say that 'philosophy in combination with affection for young men' is the surest method of attaining to the higher spiritual life, he takes for granted that Reason, recognizing the divine essence of beauty, encouraging the generous impulses of the heart, curbing the carnal appetite, converts the mania of love into an instrument of edification.

"The doctrine of The Symposium is not different, except that it assumes a loftier tone and attempts a sublimer flight.

"In The Symposium, Love, child of Poverty and Contrivance, lacks all, yet has wit to gain all. When touched by Beauty, Love desires to procreate. If the body be the creative principle, Love begets children in the physical order. If the soul be the creative principle, Love turns to 'young men of fair and noble and well-nurtured spirit' and in them begets the immortal progeny of high thoughts and generous emotions."
"The same divine frenzy of Love as in the Phaedrus is the motive force which starts the soul upon her journey upwards the region of essential truth. Attracted by one youth in whom beauty is apparent, the Lover dedicates himself to him. Next he is led to perceive Beauty in all fair forms and recognizes it as a single quality. He then sees that intellectual beauty is superior to physical beauty, and so by degrees he attains the vision of a single science which is the science of beauty everywhere, or the worship of the divine under one of its three main attributes.

"Summarizing: Love is a divine gift. In the right use of this gift lies the secret of human excellence. Love man grovel in the filth of sensuality, or it may cause us to rise to the contemplation of eternal verities and to re-unite the soul to God." 1

Jowett again

"To most men, Reason and Passion appear to be antagonistic both in idea and in fact. The union of the greatest comprehension of knowledge and the burning intensity of love is a contradiction in nature. Yet this 'passion of the Reason' is the theme of The Symposium."2

The Interpretation of The Symposium for our Purpose

Proceeding now to our analysis of the speech of Socrates which he took from the lips of Diotima, we propose to examine his statements to see what we can find as to their meaning, and then what comparison there may be between his statements and those of the other speakers. We shall hardly expect to find all the statements of the other speakers confirmed or even contradicted, or even miterated, for we recall a statement by Socrates relative to what another had said:

"You are a darling, and truly golden, Phaedrus, if you think I mean that Lysias has failed in every respect and that I can compose a discourse containing nothing which he has said. That, I fancy, could not happen even to the worst speaker."  

It is quite evident that although Socrates felt that others, at least many others, were quite superficial in their remarks, he also realized that even the worst writer or speaker might have something of the truth. We may apply this to the speeches of the various speakers in The Symposium, looking at the matter from the standpoint of Socrates.

**Distinction between Lover and Beloved**

Under point one of our summary of points, we saw that it is necessary for us to differentiate between the Lover and the Beloved, the object of the Lover's love, if we are to understand correctly.

"The lovable, indeed, is the truly beautiful, tender, perfect, and heaven-blest; but the lover is of a different type, in accordance with the account I have given."  

This is in accord with a statement of Socrates found elsewhere:

"It is a gift from heaven to be able to recognize quickly a lover and a beloved."  

None of the other speakers in The Symposium make this distinction.

1. Phaedrus 235 E.
2. Page 5.
3. Symposium 204 C.
4. Lysis 204 C.
Love a great spirit

Under point two of our summary of points, we indicated the statement that Love is neither god nor man, but a great spirit operating as an intermediary between the divine and the mortal.

Phaedrus had previously stated that Love is a god, a great god. A summary of his speech, which he himself gives, is as follows:

"So there is my description of Love,—that he is the most venerable and valuable of the gods, and that he has sovereign power to provide all virtue and happiness for men whether living or departed." 3

Pausanias differentiates, saying that Love is not one, and he also refers to the godhead of Love, adding:

"This (popular) Love proceeds from the goddess who is far the younger of the two but the other Love springs from the Heavenly goddess." 4

Eryximachus agrees with Pausanias in holding that Love is a god or from the gods, for he says Love of one sort is the noble,—the Heavenly Love sprung from the Heavenly Muse, while Love of the other sort comes from the Queen of Various Song.

The jocular Aristophanes also refers to Love as a god, and says that he, of all the gods, is most friendly to men.

Agathon refers to Love as the most blissful of the gods, and possessing most Good and Beauty. It is Agathon that Socrates contradicts especially, tacitly of course, because Love lacks, hence cannot be god possessing Goodness and Beauty, for gods lack not.

In this connection, we might note that in Greek tradition, the gods are classified on various levels. Even in the Timaeus, Plato pictures some parts of the universe made by the lesser divinities. It was generally conceded, however, that divinities were always immortal and incorruptible, and if not real personalities, capable at such of acting in some way. Just how these speakers meant to represent Love as a god the writer of this paper does not know, but, at any rate, Socrates would not allow this; neither would he allow that Love is a mortal.

What then?

Socrates says that Love is a great spirit, for also all of that which is spirit is between god and man, between the immortal and the mortal.

From the reading of the English translation, we are apt to arrive at an incorrect conclusion, due possibly to our present-day use of the term "spirit." The Greek term here does not indicate a personality.

   "Daimones and Daimonion represent the mysterious agencies and influences by which the gods communicate with mortals."

The Greek term used here is "great daimon" meaning great
In the Phaedrus, Socrates says that the Lover is a more distraught one than the non-lover. He then proceeds to give a definition of Love, which is:

"Now everyone sees that love is a desire."
"The innate desire for pleasures" and
"An acquired opinion which strives for the best."

"These two sometimes agree within us and are sometimes at strife; and sometimes one and sometimes the other has the greater power. Now when opinion leads through reason toward the best and is more powerful, its power is called self-restraint, but when desire irrationally drags us towards pleasures and rules within us, its rule is called excess. Now excess has many forms, and whichever of these forms is most marked gives its own name to excess."

But how could impulse, influence, desire, serve as an intermediary between gods and men? Socrates words are:

"Possessing what power? " interpreting and transporting human things to the gods and divine things to men." Whoever has skill in these affairs is a spiritual man; to have it in other matters, as in common arts and crafts, is for the mechanical."

Hence it would seem conclusive that the desire of man, proceeding in one direction, conduces towards the spiritual, divine power or divinity, or heaven-sent, or marvelous, and sometimes "most clearly by the hands of the gods." See Liddell & Scott Lexicon of the Greek Language.

The idea of personality is not necessarily contained in this word "daimonion." The indication is rather that "daimonion" means an influence or impulse entirely distinct from personality, except as a personality exercises such influence or impulse.

1. Phaedrus 256 B.
2. Ibid 257 sq.
while if proceeding in the other direction, it conduces
towards the mechanical, but in either case, it is desire or
impulse proceeding as intermediary.

It might seem more intelligible if we defined the term
here involved as passion, providing we could disabuse that
term of that which suggests mere physical longing, and ele-
vate it so that it would have an intellectual or spiritual
connotation, if it can be interpreted to have such meaning;
or, we might define "spirit" as motive, but we will doubtless
do just as well to continue with the term "impulse" if we
understand it to mean passion as explained. Love, then, ac-
cording to Socrates, is neither a god nor a man, but an im-
pulse which man possesses inclining him as Lover towards
some object, material or immaterial, mortal or immortal,
which he calls his beloved.

Miranda comments

"The apprehensive faculties of the soul are em-
ployed about Truth and Falsehood, assenting to one,
dissenting to the other. The first is Love, the sec-
ond Hate. Love is distinguished by its objects; if
riches, termed covetousness; if honor, ambition; if
heavenly things, piety; if equals, friendship; these
we exclude and admit no other specification, but the
desire to possess what in itself or at least in our
own esteem is fair; and of a different nature from
the love of God to his creatures, who, comprehending
all, cannot desire or want the beauty or perfections
of another; and from that of friends, which must be
reciprocal. We, therefore, with Plato, define it as
The Desire of Beauty. Desire is an inclination to
real or apparent good. As there are diverse kinds of
good, so of desire. Love is a species of desire;
beauty is a species of good."
"Beauty in general is a harmony resulting from several things proportionately concurring to construct or constitute a third,- in respect of which temperament and mixture of various natures, agreeing in the composition of one, every creature is fair; and in this sense no simple thing is beautiful. The desire of Beauty is Love. *** Celestial Love is an intellectual desire of Ideal Beauty. Ideas are patterns of things in God, as in their fountain; in the angelic mind, essential,- in the soul by participation. *** Hence it follows that Love of Celestial Beauty in the soul is not celestial love perfectly, but the nearest image to it.

Thus in the soul there may be three loves, one in intellect, one humane, one sensual. The latter two are concerned with the same object, corporeal beauty. The first is concerned with celestial Beauty.

Here, again, we have a number of ideas. Two only seem pertinent to our present discussion, viz:

(1) Love may direct itself towards the corporeal or towards the celestial beauty.

(2) The desire for celestial beauty is true Love.

The interpretation then which we make of the statement of Socrates that Love is a daimon is that he means to say that Love is impulse, desire; and, as we shall see later, true Love is an impulse or a desire for the Essence of Beauty.

The tendency upward

Socrates tells us that Love possesses a tendency towards the Good, the Beautiful and the Fair, (as we have indicated in point three in our summary.)

He says that while Love is poor, always dwelling with want, at the same time he is a schemer for all that is beautiful and good; that he is a famous hunter, always weaving some stratagems, and not only born on the day of the

birth of Aphrodite (the Beautiful) but always attending and ministering to her, — meaning that Love ever follows the Beautiful. The inference here is that man has a desire or impulse towards the good.

Phaedrus gives us some interesting information on this point. He says that Love is a guiding principle, directing us to noble deeds and shaming us into fleeing from the ignoble, inspiring to devotion to duty, even to a sacrificial death.

Pausanias tells us that Heavenly Love, which is discriminating, orderly, consistent, and unselfish, inspires every action that is noble and right, and not only the action, but the manner of its doing.

To this representation Myrincclus assents.

Here we might have a word from a recognized scholar:

"The general groundwork of philosophy is the philosophic impulse; but as with Socrates, this never took the purely theoretic form of an intellectual impulse, but simultaneously with the personal acquisition of knowledge, aimed directly at the engendering of knowledge in others; so with Plato, it is essentially related to the practical realization of truth, and is therefore more exactly defined as generative impulse, or Eros.

"The philosophic impulse is then in the first place a striving for the possession of truth.

4. Ibid 181 D & E. 5. Ibid 183 D.
"Eros is a daimonion, midway between the immortal and the mortal, mediating between them. Accordingly, he is at once poor and rich, ugly and full of love for the beautiful, knowing nothing and ever striving after knowledge, uniting the most contradictory qualities, because in Love the finite and the infinite sides of our nature meet and find their unity; and Eros is born on Aphrodite's birthday, because it is the revelation of the beautiful that awakens Love, soliciting the higher in human nature to fructify the lower, finite, needy element, and unite it in the struggle towards the good." 1

Here, again, we have a number of thoughts, but we should not overlook two, which are:

(1) Love is characterized by a pull upwards.

(2) Love seeks to engender knowledge in others, in which proposition is the implication that those others, possessing knowledge, may see the Beautiful.

Another scholar wrote:

"Love then is the desire of reproduction in the Beautiful." 2

How shall we summarize what Socrates has told us in this section in a few words, so that we may know what said by his associates in the group has been confirmed, elaborated or explained, or allowed?

Is it not this, viz: That however it may have come to be there, within man will be found a desire, a longing for, an impulse towards the Good, the Beautiful, the Fair?


The transporting power of Love

We now come to the transporting power or carrying power of the impulse or desire, mentioned in point four of our summary.

Socrates tells us that Love possesses the power of interpreting and transporting human things to the gods and divine things to men. Perhaps a more intelligible translation would be this: the human to the gods and the gods to the human.

The previous speakers had already presented this thought as follows:

Phaedrus had told of how Achilles was highly admired by the gods and given a place of distinguished honor because Love had prompted his acts.

Eryximachus had said:

"Thus Love, conceived as a single whole, exerts a wide, strong, nay, in short a complete power; but that which is consumated for a good purpose, temperately and justly, both here and in the heaven above, yields the mightiest power of all and provides us with a perfect bliss; so that we are able to consort with one another and have friendship with the gods who are above us." 3

Socrates illustrates the tremendous force of Love by saying that the animals, prompted by Love, are ready to fight hard battles, even the weakest against the strongest, and to sacrifice their lives.

And how is it that Love has such a tremendous transporting power?

1. Page 5.  2. Symposium 202 E & 203 A.  
3. Ibid 188 D.  4. Ibid 207 B.
The suggestion is that in some inexplicable way it unites the immortal with the mortal, thus giving to the mortal an urge which has something of the immortal in it, enabling the mortal to persist even as though it were in a sense immortal. Is not this the suggestion contained in the phrases "human to gods" and "gods to human"?

Is Love innate

The question arises out of point five in our summary. The question is whether this Love, this desire, this impulse is innate in man; whether it is a natural condition; whether it is the result of Reason.

Reason and Love or desire are different potencies of the soul,—reason being directed towards Truth and Being, and Love being directed towards the Good. As to the connection between the two, Reason should direct Love if it would attain its proper end, but Love is not the result of Reason as cause producing effect.

As to whether Love is innate, Socrates answers, He, of course, is speaking of Love in the generic sense, and says that it is to be found at least to some extent in animals, where it cannot be the result of Reason. The inference is that Love is by nature bent on its Beloved, and that it proposes possession of its Beloved for the purpose of immortalizing itself.

When we think of Love being found in animals, we can only interpret that statement to refer to Love in the generic sense. In the animal, we can only think of Love as a desire to possess its beloved without reference to Reason, for the animal has no Reason. On the lowest level, however, Love is that impulse desiring an end without reference to Reason, and Love may exist even in man on this level. On its proper level in man, Love is that impulse in him which may be directed towards the Good, the Beautiful, the Fair; but it can only see and seek such an end,—such a Beloved,—when under the direction of Reason.

The nature of the creature will determine the character as well as the highest type of Beloved on which Love can center its aim.

The following statement is pertinent on this point:

"In considering the nature of anything, must we not consider first whether that in respect to which we wish to be learned ourselves and to make others learned is simple or multiform,—and then, if it is simple, enquire what power of acting it possesses, or of being acted upon, and by what, and if it has many forms, number them, and then see in the case of each form as we did in the case of the simple nature, what action is and what action is not proper to it, and how it is acted upon and by what?" 1

Referring again to Love in the generic sense, Socrates says:

"Generically, indeed, it is all that desire of good things and of being happy; yet, whereas those who resort to him in various ways are not described either as loving or as lovers,—all those who pursue him seriously in one of the several forms obtain, as loving and as lovers, the name of the whole." 2

1. Phaedrus 270 D. 2. Symposium 205 D.
The inference here seems to be that all living things have the impulse to seek, but that many seek diverse objects, and therefore they are lovers only in the most general sense of the term.

The true Lover seeks the Good to be his own forever, and hence it necessarily follows that Love is of immortality.

The true Lover, then, has Love in a specific sense.

The previous speakers had already hinted of the immortality of Love. Phaedrus had remarked that Love was interesting because invented before all other gods, hence was immortal in point of past and future, eternal as well as immortal, possibly. Pausanias had spoken of the Heavenly Love, belonging to the Heavenly goddess, therefore immortal, for the very term god implied immortality from his viewpoint. Love, being immortal, naturally the object of the affections should be and must be immortal for the satisfaction of the Lover.

The thought here doubtless is that Love lies within man, either,—to use an Aristotelian expression,—in actuality or in potency; if in actuality, then in operation; if as a potency, then awaiting an awakening. But how such an awakening?

In this connection, we should consider the following propositions:

(1) Every soul by the law of nature has beheld the realities;

(2) It is not easy for all souls to gain from earthly things a recollection of those realities;
(3) Few persons retain an adequate recollection of them;  

(4) Those who have such recollection yearn for the joys of that other time;  

(5) He who is not newly initiated, or who has been corrupted, does not revere Beauty but gives himself up to pleasure and pursues pleasure in violation of nature; but he who is newly initiated, seeing beauty in the particular, reveres Beauty.  

Here we have a reference to those who have no recollection, or only a dim recollection of Beauty, and who need initiation. This initiation is called awakening. Memory may be awakened through sight, one of the physical senses. Does Socrates suggest that memory of the Beautiful as expressed in harmony, may be awakened through discourse, which is another sensation?  

Returning to the Symposium:  

Pausanias spoke of the duality of Love, pointing out that Love may be Heavenly or Popular, referring of course to its modes.  

The good and serious physician, Eryximachus, agreeing with the former speaker relative to the duality of Love in its modes, gives us a definition and in so doing explains and illustrates the origin of Love. He says:  

"Love is not merely an impulse of human soul towards beautiful men, but the attraction of all creatures towards all things, which works in the bodies of all animals and all growths upon the earth, and practically in everything there is."

1. See Phaedrus 249 sq.  2. Ibid 250 D.  3. Ibid 264 D.  
4. Symposium 180 E.  5. Ibid 186 A.
Therefore, according to the physician-scientist, Love is an innate impulse. He illustrates its modes by saying that it may arise from a healthy body or from a sickly; that it is right to gratify the healthy impulse, base to gratify the dissolute. And these statements relative to the innateness of the impulse Socrates does not contradict; hence we may conclude that Socrates accepts them as correct.

We might not be going too far afield if we considered Love as an innate element in man and man's capacity for the exercise of Love. It is obvious that one cannot do that for which he has no capacity. We can understand this quite clearly when we think of the difference between generation and production. When God generates, He places within the thing generated the nature of the thing, and it can function according to its nature. Such is not the case where man constructs. But even that which God generates can only function within the area which its nature permits. Thus Saint Thomas says:

"We conclude, therefore, that things which are below man acquire a certain limited goodness; and so they have a few determinate operations and powers. But man can acquire universal and perfect goodness, because he can acquire beatitude." 2

Whether we interpret the impulse called Love to be innate as Love or as capacity to Love, Socrates says it is present, and that man loves as a natural condition. His metaphor of pregnancy confirms this interpretation, even although not clear.

1. Symposium 186 B.
2. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, Benzinger Bros., Chicago, I q 77 a 2. 3. Symposium 206 C
Method of pursuing the Good

This refers to point six in our summary.

We are now to deal with the specific use of the term Love wherein it is said that the true Lover loves the Good to be his forever. Here we may follow Socrates and try to discern the method of those who pursue the Good, and the behavior of those whose eagerness and straining we know as Love.

Plato does not follow through the downward trend of the Love of which he writes in this dialogue, but only its upward trend. We might ask, Why not? This would be a pertinent question.

Is it possible that the downward trend was so apparent to the observer of social life that discussion of it was not at all necessary?

May we find the reason in the fact that in all his words and in all his work of which we have record, Plato was seeking happiness for himself and for mankind through the pursuit of virtue, and therefore eliminated that which would not lead to happiness, at least in this dialogue?

Such was his purpose, without question. He refers to it here when he says that if we make the Good the Beloved of the Lover instead of the Beautiful, the terms being synonymous, we shall understand that Love is the desire of good things for the sake of happiness, and that this love (desire for

1. Page 5. 2. Symposium 205 C & 206 A.
happiness) prevails in all men. We also know that Plato taught that a knowledge of the Good comes through dialectics, which (dialectics) is the love of principles and search thereafter, so that what Plato really tried to do was to find happiness by the practice of virtue through knowledge of the Good, the Good being Truth or Reality or Being, and hence it is not difficult for us to see the reason for his emphasis here when he says that the true Lover loves the Good and desires it to be his forever.

Incentive to the cultivation of Love

We have already referred to the fact that Love is innate, in whatever sense we interpret that term, and to the additional fact that Love is either actual or potential. The impulse towards the Good arises out of a realization of a lack of the Good and out of a desire to supply that lack.

A few lines from an authority may help on this point:

"Love, according to the Symposium, springs from a defect and a need; therefore directs itself for the sake of the absolute good and godlike towards Beauty in eternal existence; *** Love therefore on the one side springs from the divinely related nature of man, - it is the yearning to become like the immortal; but on the other side, it is no more than a yearning, nor yet possession; thus far it presupposes a want and belongs to the finite, not to the perfect, divine essence. So Love is, generally speaking, the endeavor of the finite to expand itself into infinity, to fill itself with what is eternal and imperishable, to generate something enduring. The external condition of Love's existence is the presence of Beauty, for this alone, by its harmonious form, corresponding to the desire in ourselves, awakens desire for the infinite."

1. Symposium 205 D. 2. Ibid 206 A.
And yet again:

"When the remembrance of the archetypes which the soul beheld in the heavenly existence awakens in it at the sight of the earthly copies, it is possessed with a wonderful delight;—i.e., in the overpowering contrast of the Idea with the Phenomenon,—lies the ultimate ground of that wonder which Plato calls the beginning of philosophy,—i.e., of that bewilderment, that burning pain which consumes every noble spirit when first the presentiment of a higher than itself arises in it,—of that singularly peculiarity and maladroitness in worldly matters which to the superficial gaze is the most striking trait in the philosopher.

"The reason that this ideal enthusiasm assumes the form of Love is said in the Phaedrus (1) to be the special brightness which distinguishes the visible copies of the beautiful above those of all other ideas; therefore it is they which make the strongest impression on the mind. In the Symposium this phenomenon is more precisely accounted for by the striving after immortality of mortal nature, for having none of the divine unchangeableness, it feels the necessity of sustaining itself by continual self-propagation. This propagative impulse is Love.

"Briefly, then, Love loves the Good to be its own forever." "That is the very truth." 2

Reiterating, Love loves the Good to be its own forever. But why? Let us ask Socrates. Here is his answer:

"All men are pregnant both in body and in soul; on reaching a certain age, our nature yearns to beget. This it cannot do upon an ugly person, but only upon the beautiful. *** It is a divine affair, this engendering and bringing to birth, an immortal element in the creature that is mortal, and it cannot occur in the discordant. *** Thus Beauty presides over birth as Fate and Lady of Travail; and hence it is that when the pregnant approaches the beautiful, it becomes not only gracious, but also exhilarate, so that it flows over with begetting and bringing forth. *** Therefore when a person is big and teeming ripe, he feels himself in a sore flutter for the beautiful, because its possessor can relieve him of his heavy pangs." 3

How is this metaphor to be interpreted?

In only one way can Love, impulse of the soul, immortalize itself, and that is by generation; since in this way it can always leave behind it a new creature in place of the old. Every mortal thing is preserved in this way, not by keeping itself exactly the same forever, like the divine, but by replacing what decomposes or becomes antiquated with something fresh and new, in the semblance of the original. Through this device, a mortal thing partakes of immortality, and by no other means can it be done.

There is something of a physical immortality of this sort, but the greater and more enduring and more like the divine is the immortality of the soul, for pregnancy of soul may be characteristic of those who in their souls still more than in their bodies conceive those things which are proper for soul to conceive and bring forth. What are they? Prudence and virtue in general.

Prudence divides itself into sobriety and justice. So, when a man's soul is so far divine that it is made pregnant with these from his youth, and on attaining manhood immediately desires to bring forth and beget, he too goes about seeking the beautiful object whereupon he may do his begetting, since he will never beget upon the ugly.

If he chances on a soul that is fair and noble and well-endowed, he gladly cherishes the two combined in one; and

1. Symposium 207 D. 2. Ibid 203 B.
and straightway in addressing such a person he is resourceful in discoursing of virtue and of what should be the good man's character and what his pursuits; and so he takes in hand the other's education. For I hold that by contact with the fair and by consorting with him he bears and brings forth his long-felt conception because in presence or absence he remembers the fair. Equally too with him he charges the nurturing of what is begotten, so that men in this condition enjoy a far fuller community with each other than that which comes with children, and a far surer friendship, since the children of the union are fairer and more deathless.

"Homer and Hesiod and all the other good poets had such offspring which procured for them a glory immortally renewed in the memory of man.*** In their names has many a shrine been reared because of their fine children, whereas for the human sort never any man obtained this honor." 2

Of course, this impulse-denominated Love must have a distinct import to each individual, depending upon his capacity.

It is to be noted that in interpreting the words "Immortality of the soul" we must recall that Plato holds that the soul is immortal, and also eternal; that it lived in another world prior to its advent into a body, and that its advent into a body is a sort of imprisonment; hence when in this connection he speaks of the soul as desiring to beget upon the beautiful in order that it may become immor-

tal, or, to put it another way, when he says that Love yearns for the beautiful in order that it may possess it and beget upon it a reproduction of himself, Plato is using the term "immortality" in a new sense, for the soul already has immortality, according to his doctrine expressed elsewhere, and therefore need not beget to immortalize itself in the sense of that term as first used.

Here are some significant words:

"Some writings hardly admit of a more distinct interpretation than a musical composition; for every reader may form his own accompaniment of thought or feeling to the strain which he hears. The Symposium of Plato is a work of this character." 1

Therefore let all who have ears to hear hear what The Symposium saith unto them, particularly with reference to developing appreciation of the Beautiful, and with reference to developing capacity to "see" and "dwell" with the Beautiful. Socrates tells us that the Lover may develop his appreciation of a worth-while beloved by loving a particular in which he finds true beauty, by observing that true beauty as existing actually in many particulars, by noting that true beauty may exist actually and potentially in many particulars, even in observances and in laws of the state; and the Lover may finally comprehend beauty as an ocean pervading all, so that not even a branch of knowledge exists in which Beauty may not be recognized.

"He who would proceed rightly *** must from his youth begin to encounter beautiful bodies, beginning with a particular body, engendering beautiful converse therein; remarking how the beauty attached to this or that body is cognate to that which is attached to any other, regarding as one and the same the beauty belonging to all; and, having grasped this truth, he must make himself a lover of all beautiful bodies, slackening his stress upon the one in favor of the beauty which persists in all. His next step will be to see the beauty which is found in souls, and to recognize it as of higher value than beauty in bodies. Proceeding upward, he will observe the beautiful as appearing in observances and laws, and particularly the unity of beauty, even exemplified in the diversity of sciences and branches of knowledge, in each branch a particular phase of the beautiful, but in all knowledge the Unit of Beauty, culminated in philosophy, the love of wisdom based upon understanding of first principles, or reality." 1

But the end has not yet been reached. So far we have only had, as it were, diversified aspects of the Essence of Beauty. We are now to have Beauty presented in its full glory, as Socrates suggests that

"Having come into sight of the vision of the Beautiful, the Lover may continuously contemplate the true Essence of Beauty, and doing so, find life really worth while, for

"A man finds it truly worth while to live as he contemplates Essential Beauty, which, once beheld, will outshine all material things and cause the beholder to be willing to go without food or drink merely for the privilege of continuing to gaze upon it. But what would happen if Essential Beauty could be seen entire, pure, unalloyed? What if one could behold the divine Beauty in its unique form? Would we call it a pitiful life for one to lead, looking that way, observing that vision by the proper means, and having it ever with him? Do not consider that there only will it befall him, as he sees the beautiful through that which makes it visible, to breed not illusions but true examples of virtue, since his contact is not with illusion, but with Truth. So when he has begotten a

1. Symposium 210 A & B & C & D.
true virtue and has reared it up, he is destined to win the friendship of Heaven; he, above all men, is immortal." 1

Looking up, then, we have a continuous contemplation of the Essence of Beauty; and with regard to life on earth:

"If now the better elements of the mind, which lead to a well-ordered life and to philosophy, prevail, the individual will live a life of happiness and harmony here on earth, self-controlled and orderly, holding in subjection that which causes evil in the soul, and giving freedom to that which makes for virtue; and neither human wisdom nor divine inspiration can confer upon man any greater blessing than this." 2

ETYMOLOGICAL APPROACH

We have purposely left our etymological study until this time, because we wanted to try to get the sense in which terms appearing in The Symposium are used first, especially the term "Love" but now that we have made an approach otherwise, we desire to try to get the etymological significance of the terms under consideration and see what additional contribution to our subject may be had in that way.

In the etymological study of any term, we should remember that a speaker or writer may give a word a new connotation, merely using it because it keeps before the hearers or readers some item of meaning contained in its content as previously used, which the speaker or writer wishes to relate to the new connotation.

We should also remember that the meanings of words

change; e.g., witness the word translated "spirit" in this dialogue, from "daimon" which has been previously explained; or e.g., witness the English word "prevent" which formerly implied "stepping ahead of another one" but which now is used to mean "debar." To give the older meaning of the word "prevent" we must needs use the word "precede."

And yet, notwithstanding the difficulty of using language so as to convey the correct concept,

"everything is plainer when spoken than when unspoken." 2

We shall therefore proceed with our word-study.

Appended is a list of the various forms of the word translated "Love." It should be noted that Socrates uses the same word-form as do the other speakers, so that although he had a new content to give to "Love" he employed the old term. We must conclude that he attempted to sublimate the concept of Love, rather than to introduce a new concept through the employment of a new term or phrase.

1. See Page 25.
2. Phaedrus 238 C.
Greek words appear as follows

177 B The God of Love ἔρωτι
177 C A fitting hymn to Love ἔρωτα
177 D Praising Love ἔρωτος
177 E Love matters ἔρωτικα
178 A Love a great god ἔρως μεγας θεός
178 B Parents of Love ἔρωτος γονις
178 B And Love ἔρως (Hesiod)
178 B Earth and Love γῆν καὶ ἐρωτα (Anaxilas)
178 B Before other gods - Love ἐρωτα
178 C Love is allowed ὁ ἔρως
178 C Or a Lover ἐραστίς
178 D Acquired by Love ἔρως
178 D A man in Love άνδρα οστίς ἐρα
179 A A man in Love ἐρῶν ἄνδρ
179 A Love's influence ὁ ἔρως εὐθεὸν
179 B Love's peculiar power τοῦτο ἔρως τοῖς ἐρωσι
179 B Such as are in love οἱ ἐρωτείς
179 C Her Love ἐρωτα
179 D For Love's sake ἔρωτος
180 A On his Lover ἐραστὶν
180 A In Love ἐραν
180 B Valor coming of Love ἐρωτα
180 B Beloved fond of Lover ὁ ἐρωμένος τοῦ ἐραστὶν
180 B The Lover ἐραστίς
180 B Description of Love ἐρωτα
Eulogies of Love ἐρωτα
If Love ἐρως
Decide on a Love ἐρωτα
Love ἐρωτας
Love one ἐρως
Two loves ἐρωτεῖ
Two loves ἐρωτα
And loves ἐρως
The Love ἐρωσίν
Love women and boys ἐρωσί
When they love ἐρωςί
The child love ἐρως
Loving ἐραν
Popular Lovers πανδήμοις ἐραστας
With regard to Love ἐρωτα
To gratify Lovers ἐρασταίς
Aristocertous' Love ἐρως

versus

Harmodius Friendship φικία
One's Lover ἐρασταίς
To love openly ἐραν
The Lover ἐρωτεί
In a Lover ἐρωντεί
To the Lover ἐρωντεί
Loving ἐραν
Lover ἐρασταίς
note Affection φικίους
To crave

Love

Love hates

Love reigned

The delicacy of Love

Love a poet

These terms should be noted as of interest

Expressions used by Plato:

Concerning Love

Love a great god

Love ugly and bad

Consider not Love a god

Love a mortal

Loving or Lovers

Loving-matters

Love-matters

Re amorous condition in animals

Love by nature

In love with the immortal

The Lore of Love
Conclusions

In going through the Symposium, we note that the Greek word EROS in its various forms is used almost uniformly not only by the various speakers aside from Socrates, but by Socrates himself.

In English, there are at least three quite distinct senses of the word "Love." Speaking in English, if we would be accurate, we must distinguish them precisely.

There is:

(1) Love of complacency, the emotion aroused by the simple contemplation of what we admire and approve;

(2) Love of benevolence, which prompts us to confer kindnesses on the object of Love or to do him services;

(3) Love of concupiscence, desirous Love, the eager appetite of what is apprehended as our own good. It is only this "desirous love" which can be called EROS in Greek.

The meaning of EROS is Love, usually sex love.

ERÔS is a later form of EROS but it has exactly the same connotation.

The context of any word must give a clue to its meaning; hence the context of the word translated "Love" in The Symposium must give us its meaning, not merely the setting in the sentence, but the setting in the dialogue itself.

What did Socrates tell us or not tell us of Love?

What content did he intend to give this word?

2. See Liddell & Scott, Greek Lexicon.
Taking the English word "Love" as seen in its original Greek usage, and in its setting in The Symposium as indicated, we may conclude that Plato sought to center a powerful natural trait on the highest possible object, and, by doing so, elevate life to its highest level.

Some additional notes relative to the use of Greek terms which may throw light on our subject

In Ethica 1159a34, where Aristotle says that loving seems to be the characteristic virtue of friends, as will be noted by an examination of the text, a form of ἀγάπαμεν is used; whereas in Ethica 1171b39 ἐρωτόκοιτιμός is used for lovers, ἀγάπαμεν for beloved and ἄρωμα for love.

In Ethica 1155al, we have a more clear-cut use of terms. Aristotle here says that the young are amorous ἐρωτικός and then in 1156a3 he says that much of the friendship of love depends on emotion and aims at pleasure, and here he uses ἐρωτικός and ἄρωμα.

In Metaphysica, we have an interesting use of the term "Love" where Aristotle says that the Final Cause produces motion by being loved ἐρωτικός. Here it would seem that he is using the term "Love" metaphorically, and saying that just as a husband goes out and "spins" himself in toil because he loves his family and wants to earn money for their support, so the world "moves" because it "loves" its first unmoved mover; and from the point of view of Aristotle, this seems to be an excellent illustration.
Points for comparison

Having gone through The Symposium for items of information, and having tried to find additional light from Plato in his other dialogues having to do with the same subject as that of The Symposium, and having pled with commentators to lend us their assistance, what as to the points for comparison with the Concept of that other whom we are to study?

May we summarize as follows:

(1) As to the origin of Love:
   1. It is innate, actual or potential;
   2. Its essence is impulse, desire, craving, yearning;
   3. It may be developed by forces within or without.

(2) As to the object of Love:
   1. It is directed towards what the individual considers the beautiful or the good; but what the individual considers the good may not really be the good either for himself or for anyone else; therefore true Love follows what Reason determines as the Good;
   2. Love for the object may be increased through understanding, or through understanding plus vision. Vision proceeds through but also beyond the understanding, but not logically beyond it except through it;
   3. Diminution of Love for its proper object results in dimness (darkness), while consistent increase will bring the individual to the continuous contemplation of the Essence of Beauty, literally, to the continuous contemplation of the Perfection of Beauty.

(3) As to the objective of Love:
   1. To continuously contemplate the Essence (Perfection) of Beauty, which is so entrancing that material things in comparison appear as nought;
   2. To enjoy life, a life worth while;
   3. To beget virtue in its various forms.
PART TWO

The Origin of John's Concept of Love

It might not be out of place for us to ask ourselves, at the start, how John arrived at his concept of Love.

To provide a satisfactory answer, we shall have to look at his contact with Jesus. Of this, we will find a record in The Holy Scriptures. By studying these Scriptures, we learn:

(1) John was one of two sons of Zebedee, called by Jesus to follow Him. (James was the other son.) John must have come from a wealthy home, for we learn that Zebedee had hired servants, and that Mary, wife of Zebedee, and mother of John, ministered of their substance to Jesus.

(2) John was one of the members of the inner circle of Jesus, and as such went with Jesus to the closest spot in Gethsemane.

(3) John's name appears in every list of the apostles given in the Synoptic Gospels.

(4) John and one other disciple were entrusted with the task of preparing the passover meal for Jesus.

(5) John was designated as "the disciple whom Jesus loved" and sat next to Jesus at the last supper, leaned on Jesus' breast, and asked Jesus who it was who should betray Him.

That John was one of the most intimate of Jesus' followers cannot be denied or even doubted, and it is therefore not singular that he should be called "The Apostle of Love" and that he should write so extensively on the subject of Love. There can be no doubt that he acquired his concept of Love from Jesus.

We might add, incidentally, that the early Church recognized the place of intimacy John held with Jesus, to whom, by the way, Jesus also committed his mother just prior to His death on the cross, and also gave him a prominent place, for John became one of the three pillars of the Church, and was one of the two sent to Samaria to lead the converts into a higher state of spirituality.

The writings of John

We shall have to ask ourselves where we are to look for the concept of John with regard to Love before we are able to proceed intelligently.

It has been conceded generally by Christian scholars and by others who have had occasion to investigate the matter that the following books of the New Testament have been written by John, viz:

The Gospel of John
The First Epistle of John
The Second Epistle of John
The Third Epistle of John
The Revelation

All of these books appear in every one of the accepted
versions of The New Testament. There are no other books in
the canonical Scriptures which have been written by John,
whether we take the consensus of opinion from scholars or
from the claims of the books themselves.

There are no writings of John, either in part or in
whole, aside from those enumerated, in existence, so that all
we have from the pen of John is contained in The Holy Scrip-
tures, and in the books of The Holy Scriptures enumerated
above.

Were we writing on the life of John, or on the work of
John, it would doubtless be advisable for us to make a de-
tailed study of these writings, and provide evidence that
John produced them, but since it is not within our province
here to do more than to examine John's concept of Love, we
shall accept the authority of scholars for our purpose, and
use these books as the basis for our investigation.

Procedure

There are a number of ways in which we could proceed,
but it seems most logical that we should first examine the
"words" John used to express his concept, then try to find
what concept he gave those words by examining the setting in
which he placed them, then try to formulate something like a
consistent doctrine.

The Etymological aspect

John uses two Greek words which are translated "Love"
in The American Revised Version of The New Testament, and
consequently in the five books written by John previously listed, i.e., The Gospel of John, The First, The Second and The Third Epistles of John, and in The Revelation. These two Greek words are ἀγάπέω and φίλεω in their various forms.

In the Gospel of John, the English word "Love" appears fifty-four times. In examining the Greek text, I find that in forty-one cases, some form of ἀγάπεω appears, while in thirteen cases, some form of φίλεω appears.

In the First Epistle of John, the English word "Love" appears fifty times, and in every one of these cases, the Greek text uses some form of ἀγάπεω.

In the Second Epistle of John, the English word "Love" appears three times, and the Greek text has a form of ἀγάπεω in each case. In the Third Epistle of John, the English word "Love" appears four times. In three cases, the Greek is a form of ἀγάπεω while in the fourth case, where the text speaks of Diotrophes and says that he "loves to have the pre-eminence," the Greek word is a form of φιλοπρωτέων, literally meaning "having regard for the first or superior place."

In The Revelation, the English word "Love" appears seven times, and the Greek word is a form of ἀγάπεω in every case except two, where the form is one of φίλεω.

A list of these texts appears below:
The Gospel of John:

The First Epistle of John:

The Second Epistle of John:
verses 1, 5, 6.

The Third Epistle of John:
verses 1, 5, 6, and 9.

The Revelation:

Greek uses of these words

The Greek words \( \alpha \gamma \alpha \pi \alpha \varsigma \) and \( \alpha \gamma \alpha \pi \varepsilon \omicron \) are frequently used by classical authors. \( \alpha \gamma \alpha \pi \nu \) occurs first in the Septuagint.

In the Iliad, \( \mu \nu \omicron \omicron \omicron \alpha \gamma \alpha \pi \alpha \tau \omicron \omicron \omicron \) is used to indicate an "only son" and in the Odyssey a

1. Iliad Book VI, line 401. 2. Odyssey 2:365.
similar expression is used to indicate an only dearly beloved son.

Plato uses this term, or a derivative, \( \dot{\alpha} \gamma \alpha \tau \varepsilon \omega \) "to desire" in Lysis, and the same term is frequently used by him both of persons and of things.

Philo uses the term \( \dot{\alpha} \gamma \alpha \tau \zeta \) to indicate Love of God for man and of man for God. Just where he found that term we are not certain.

The Greek word \( \phi \lambda \varepsilon \omega \) and its derivatives is used frequently by the classical authors, and its general connotation is "esteem for" or "regard for" and its use in Scripture is perhaps not much different.

In the Analytical Greek Lexicon, the following definitions occur:

\( \dot{\alpha} \gamma \alpha \tau \varepsilon \omega \) to love, value, esteem, feel or manifest generous concern for, be faithful towards; to set store upon as in Revelation 12:11;

\( \dot{\alpha} \gamma \alpha \tau \zeta \) love, generosity, kindly concern, devotedness;

\( \dot{\alpha} \gamma \alpha \tau \varepsilon \tau \varepsilon \zeta \) beloved, dear, worthy of love;

\( \phi \varepsilon \iota \iota \iota \iota \) affection, fondness, love;

\( \phi \lambda \varepsilon \omega \) to manifest some act or token of kindness or affection; to love, regard with affection, have affection for; to like, to be fond of, to delight in a thing, to cherish inordinately, to set store by.

Professor Evans, well-known Biblical scholar, gives the following definition of "Love" in its Biblical connotations:

"The Greek word for Love, whether used of God or man, has various shades of and intensities of meaning. There may be summed up in some such definition as this:

"Love, whether used of God or man, is an earnest and anxious desire for and an active and beneficial interest in the well-being of the one loved.

"Different degrees and manifestations of this affection are recognized in the Scriptures, according to the circumstances and relations of life; e.g., the expression of love as between husband and wife, parent and child, brethren according to the flesh and according to grace, between friend and enemy, between God and man. It must not be overlooked, however, that the fundamental idea of love as expressed in the definition of it is never absent in any one of these relations of life, even though the manifestations thereof may differ according to the circumstances and relations." 1

The writer of this paper considers this a splendid and adequate general definition of the term "Love" translated from the Greek word \( \alpha \gamma \alpha \tau \eta \) as that word is used in the Scriptures generally, but what we are concerned about here, first of all and primarily, is an interpretation of the concept of Love as contained in the writings of John, so we shall have to turn to John's writings to find that concept.

2. See page 57 of this paper for definitions.
3. Note following uses of Greek words:

\( \Phi / \lambda \varepsilon \omega \) means "to love as a friend" with regard to affection, as opposed to \( \Lambda / \sigma \varepsilon \iota \), in many places in Greek literature; e.g., see Republic 334 C and Aristotle Rhetoric 2:4.
What we propose to do is to go through these writings, set down every expression John has given us regarding "Love" and divide those expressions as they relate themselves to

1. The origin of Love;
2. The object of Love; and
3. The objective of Love;

and then, if possible, formulate a doctrine or concept which we can use in comparing it with what Plato has given us on the same subject in The Symposium.

also refers to the love of the gods, to the love of a swineherd for his master, to the love of a man for his wife in the sense that he cherishes her, and it often means to treat kindly as a guest. See Liddell & Scott Lexicon.

were carefully distinguished by the Greeks, as were

For example, in Phaedrus 231 C we read "To regard with affection (\(\phiι\chiει\)) those for whom they have a passion (\(\epsilon\rho\omega\sigmaι\)); but

sometimes comes very near to the sense of passion, and it is almost impossible to distinguish a shade of meaning; e.g., Odyssey 18:325 and Tro 1051.
Statements in the writings of John

Note: For the convenience of the reader, each statement is lettered to indicate the Greek word used; i.e.,

\[\text{\textit{\textit{\textit{\textit{\epsilon}γ\alpha\ni\eta\nu}}}}\] or some form thereof, "A"

\[\text{\textit{\textit{\textit{\varphi\i\lambda\eta\omega}}}}\] or some form thereof, "Ph"

The Gospel of John

3:16 God so loved the world that He gave His Son. A
3:19 Men loved darkness rather than light. A
3:35 The Father loveth the Son. A
5:20 The Father loveth the Son. Ph
5:42 I know ** that ye have not the love of God in you. A
8:42 If God were your Father, ye would love Me. A
11:3 He whom thou lovest is sick. Ph
11:5 Jesus loved Martha. A
11:38 Behold, how He (Jesus) loved him! Ph
12:25 He that loveth his life shall lose it. Ph
12:43 They loved the glory of men more than of God. A
13:1 Jesus loved His own. A
15:1 Jesus loved His own unto the end (uttermost). A
13:23 One of His disciples, whom Jesus loved. A
13:34 A new commandment I give ** that ye love. A
13:34 Even as I have loved you. A
13:35 By this shall all men know, if ye love one another. A
14:15 If ye love me, ye will keep my commandments. A
14:21 He that hath and keepeth my commandments loveth me. A
14:21 He that loveth me. A
14:21 I will love him. A
14:21 He shall be loved of my Father. A
14:23 If a man love me, he will keep my word. A
14:23 If a man keep my word, my Father will love him. A
14:24 He that loveth me not keepeth not my words. A
14:28 If ye loved me, ye would have rejoiced. A
14:31 I love the Father. A
15:9 As the Father hath loved me. A
15:9 I have also loved you. A
15:9 Continue ye in my love. A
15:10 If ye keep my commandments, ye shall abide in my love. A
15:10 I have kept my Father's commandments,—abide in His love. A
15:12 This is my commandment that ye love one another. A
15:12 As I have loved you. A
15:13 Greater love hath no man than to lay down his life. A
15:17 These things I command you that ye love one another. A
15:19 If ye were of the world, the world would love its own. Ph
16:27 For the Father Himself loveth you. Ph
16:27 Because ye loved me, and believed that I came from the Father. Ph.
In the First Epistle of John:

There is only one Greek word in its various forms used, as previously indicated.

2:5 Whoso keepeth his (God's) Word, in him is love perfect.
2:10 He that loveth his brother, abideth in the light.
2:15 If any man love the world.
2:15 The love of the Father is not in him.
3:1 Behold, what manner of love the Father hath bestowed!
3:2 Beloved, now are we the sons of God.
3:10 He that loveth not his brother doeth not righteousness.
3:11 This is the message, ** that ye should love one another.
3:14 We* passed from death to life* because we love the brethren.
3:14 He that loveth not abideth in death.
3:16 How does the love of God abide in you?
3:17 Hereby we know love, because He laid down his life.
3:21 Beloved, ** we have boldness toward God.
3:23 This is His commandment that we love one another.
4:1 Beloved, believe not every spirit.
4:7 Beloved.
4:7 Let us love one another.
4:7 For love is of God.
4:7 Everyone that loveth is begotten of God.
4:8 He that loveth not, knoweth not God.
4:8 For God is love.
4:9 Herein was the love of God manifested.
4:10 Herein is love.
4:10 Not that we loved God.
4:10 But that He loved us and sent His Son.
4:11 Beloved.
4:11 If God so loved us.
4:11 We ought also to love one another.
4:12 God abideth in us and His love is perfected in us.
4:12 If we love one another.
4:16 We know and have believed the love which God hath.
4:16 God is love.
4:16 He that abideth in love abideth in God.
4:17 Herein is love made perfect in us.
4:18 There is no fear in love.
4:18 Perfect love casteth out fear.
4:18 He that feareth is not made perfect in love.
4:19 We love
4:20 Because He first loved us.
4:20 If any man say I love God and hateth his brother.
4:20 He that loveth not his brother whom he hath seen.
4:20 Cannot love God whom he hath not seen.
4:21 He who loveth God is commanded.
4:21 To love his brother also.
2:15 Love not the world.
5:1 Whoso loveth Him that begat.
5:1 Loveth him also who is begotten of Him.
5:2 We know we love the children of God.
5:2 When we love God and do His commandments.
5:3 This is the love of God that we keep His commandments.

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In the Second Epistle of John:

There is only one Greek word in its various forms used, as previously indicated.

verse 1 The lady elect and children whom I love in truth.
5 And now I beseech thee that we love one another.
6 And this is love, that we walk after His commandments.

************

In the Third Epistle of John:

verse 1 The elder unto Gaius, whom I love in truth. A
5 Beloved. A
6 Who bear witness of thy love before the church. A
9 Diotrophes, who loveth to have the pre-eminence. Ph

************

In The Revelation:
1:5 Unto Him that loved us. A
2:4 Thou didst leave thy first love. A
2:19 I know thy works and thy love. A
3:9 I will make them to know that I loved thee. A
3:19 As many as I love, I reprove and chasten. Ph
12:11 And they loved not their lives even unto death. A
22:15 Everyone that loveth and maketh a lie. Ph
Further investigation of *άγαπέω* and *φιλέω*
with special reference to their use in The Holy Scriptures

As we have seen, in the Epistles of John, the term *άγαπέω* is used uniformly, except where the statement refers to Diotrophes, who preferred the pre-eminence, but in the Gospel of John and in The Revelation, the case is different, and it seems we should either find that both Greek words have more or less the same significance, or that each has a distinct meaning,- otherwise we shall have difficulty in interpreting the passages. For example:

John 3:35 tells us that "The Father loveth the Son" and *άγαπέω* is used; John 5:20 tells us that "The Father loveth the Son" and *φιλέω* is used. Is there merely a repetition of the same thought here under different circumstances, or is there is difference in meaning?

Are these two Greek words synonymous? But even in synonyms there is a difference. Long, long ago, Prodicus, the Sophist, claimed that he could distinguish between meanings of synonyms.

Granted there is a difference between these two Greek terms, what difference is there?

We are not always able to distinguish between opposites; e.g., cold and heat. These are opposites when we speak in general terms, but they are relative terms when we speak specifically. To show this, how much heat is the exact opposite of 32 degrees Fahrenheit or of 2 degrees Centigrade?
The mathematician or the meteorologist or someone else will have to tell us for the non-scientific person cannot tell where the hot ends and the cold begins.

Coming back to αγαπέω and φιλεῖω and especially to the use of these terms in the Holy Scriptures:

One authority says:

"Of the two words for Love in the New Testament, φιλεῖω designates an emotional affection, which is not and cannot be commanded, while αγαπέω expresses a rational and benevolent affection which springs from deliberate choice. (See Thayer's New Testament Greek Lexicon, page 653) αγαπάω properly denotes a Love founded in admiration, veneration, esteem, like the Latin 'diligere' to be kindly disposed to one, to wish one well; but φιλεῖω denotes an inclination prompted by sense and emotion, Latin 'amare.' Hence men are said to αγαπάω God, not φιλεῖω. In this word αγαπάω when used of God, it is already implied that God loves, not for what He can get, but for what He can give. The rationality of His Love, moreover, involves a subordination of the emotional element to a higher law than itself, namely, that of holiness. Even God's self-love must have a reason and norm in the perfections of His own Being."

We cannot disregard the fine distinction made by such a great scholar as Professor Strong, but let us look at his statement briefly. He says that φιλεῖω denotes an emotional affection, and that αγαπέω denotes a rational and benevolent affection; something like Plato's potency of the soul, taste contrasted to desire; furthermore that men should αγαπάω not φιλεῖω God.

But note:

John 16:27 in Greek, translated "God the Father loves" reads: \( \alphaυτος ηλπις \epsilon \ πατρις \ Φιλει \ \ άμαγ \)

According to Professor Strong's fine distinction, God is here made to love emotionally. The whole statement, as it appears in The American Revised Version of The New Testament, reads:

"In that day ye shall ask in My name; and I say not unto you that I will pray the Father for you; for the Father Himself loveth you, because ye have loved Me, and have believed that I came forth from the Father."

It seems to the writer of this paper that there is a marked distinction between the two words, but that at the same time there are elements of each term in the other; in other words, that part of the content of each word is the same as part of the content of the other, and that therefore the words have been used interchangeably with something of the same meaning, although not exactly the same meaning.

To illustrate:

John 5:35 "The Father loveth the Son" \( \alphaυτος ηλπις \)
John 5:20 "The Father loveth the Son." \( \Phiιλει \)

The meaning is not the same, yet there is something of the meaning of each statement in the content of the other statement. This can be seen when we take into consideration the meaning of each of the terms.

2. See page 57 of this paper.
We might take the passage from The Revelation as further evidence. Note Revelation 3:19, translated in The American Revised Version of The New Testament as follows:

"As many as I love, I rebuke and chasten" which in Greek is:

**Characteristics of statements by John**

In reading and thinking over these statements by John, we cannot help but notice their directness and positiveness. For example:

1. The conditional type of statement, like the following:

   "If any man love me, he will keep my word."

   or again:

   "If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him." 2

2. The hortatory type of statement, like the following:

   "This is my commandment, that ye love one another."

   or again:

   "Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love one another." 4

3. The narrative type of statement, like the following:

   "God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish, but have everlasting life." 5

   or again:

   "For God is love." 6

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In each of these types of statement, and in other types which might be given, the statements are direct and positive, and, we might say, not subject to contradiction. To put it another way, each one of these statements is inflexible, irrevocable, unalterable, leaving the reader no choice but to accept or reject what is said, without addition or subtraction, without amendment or deletion.

Examining the several books as books to get the setting

Since we have several books written by John from which these statements are taken, and since each book was written for a specific purpose, we might be better able to attain our purpose if we first took each of the books separately to see what concepts of Love are offered, and then united them. In doing so, we would have the advantage of interpreting the statements in each book in the light of the purpose of the book as a whole, and thus get a better understanding of the setting of each concept.

Purpose in Presenting the Gospel of John

The Synoptic Gospels were written considerably earlier than the Gospel of John, and for a different purpose,—each for a distinct purpose.

Matthew was written by the converted tax-collector, who gives a vivid picture of Jesus the King of the Jews in the Gospel called by his name. Mark, first, minister to Paul and Barnabas on their first missionary journey, later amanuensis to Peter, and later author in his own right, gives us the
Gospel bearing his name written to the Romans, to show Jesus the servant. Luke, physician-scientist, companion of Paul after the middle of the second missionary journey, wrote his Gospel to picture the Divine Jesus, the Man, and in his Gospel undertook to draw up a narrative covering all things from the first and to present all events in the life of Jesus in the order of their occurrence.

John gives us the Fourth Gospel. He wrote to give us a picture of Jesus the Son of God, and his express purpose was "that ye may believe that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, and that believing, ye might have life in His name." 2

Purpose in Presenting the Epistles

Concerning the Epistles of John, and especially the First, we have this word from a noted Biblical scholar:

"Under stress of emotion, the writer's paternal love, sympathy and solitude break out in the affectionate appellation 'little children' or yet more endearingly 'my little children.' Elsewhere the prefatory 'beloved' shows how deeply he is stirred by the platitude of his theme and the sense of its supreme importance to his readers. He shows himself intimately acquainted with their religious environment, dangers, attainments, achievements, and needs." 3

Purpose in Presenting the Revelation

This book contains letters to the seven churches in Asia, as well as visions or signs of things to come. The letters

indicate the purpose of the writer in penning the book.

The following describes with unusual clarity the purpose of these letters:

"They spring from the heart of the writer and speak direct to the hearts of the readers. They were often called forth by some special crisis in the history of the persons addressed, so that they rise out of the actual situation in which the writer conceives the readers to be placed; they express the writer's keen and living sympathy with and participation in the fortunes of the whole class addressed. *** These letters express general principles of life and conduct, religion and ethics, applicable to a wider range of circumstances than those which called them forth, and they appeal as emphatically and intimately to all Christians in all time as they did to those addressed in the first instance." 1

Concerning The Revelation as a whole, another scholar says:

"What concerns the subject and contents of this book, I find for the most part in the name which it gives itself. *** What, then, are we to understand by 'The Apocalypse of Jesus Christ'? The book is the apocalypse of Jesus Christ. And this is the key to the whole book. It is a book of which Jesus Christ is the great subject and center, particularly in that period of his administrations and glory designated as the day of His uncovering, the day of His appearing. It is not a mere prediction of the divine judgments upon the wicked, and of the final triumph of the righteous, made known by Christ, but a book of the revelation of Christ, in His own Person, offices, and future administrations, when He shall be seen coming from Heaven, as He was once seen going into Heaven." 2

Still another scholar, referring to the purpose of John in presenting all of his writings, says:

"The object of the Fourth Gospel is not to tell us all that can be learned about the life of Jesus, but to awaken or strengthen our faith in Him. It assumes that we are already acquainted with His life, and the writer avowedly lays before us only a portion of a much larger mass of material which was at his disposal. The omission of the parables shows that he did not aim at giving an illustrative picture of what was most characteristic in Jesus.

"Now, if the book was written to promote faith, we cannot help asking,—Whose faith? If we look at the proposition that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of God, we might think that this work was intended for unbelievers, for this surely is fundamental in Christian belief; but as some knowledge of the evangelical history is presupposed, it is evident that the expected readers must be Christians.

"If the book was written with a theological interest, we must determine the kind of theological interest if we would not be misled. Theology suggests intellectual forms worked into a system, and supported by coherent argument; but this is not what we find in the Fourth Gospel. The faith which it wishes to create is spiritual, rather than intellectual. It is not systematic. It does not present its propositions in a regular order of mutual dependence and invite our acceptance of them by the logical cogency of its proofs. It does not even define its leading terms, but flings them out in a sublime vagueness, and allows them as in some heavenly trance to pass with dim majesty before the eye of the soul, so as to make their own impression according to the spiritual sensibility. Neither is the theology an expression of philosophic schools.

"There is one characteristic we should notice. The author writes out of the fulness of his own inward experience. His words indicate a profound sense of having received a veritable revelation, opening up vistas of heavenly glory that reached the very bosom of God." 1

One of the Church Fathers, the "golden-mouthed orator"

has also given us some valuable information on the subject of
the purpose of John in presenting his writings:

"For the Son of Thunder, the beloved of Christ, the
pillar of the churches, who holds the keys of Heaven,
who drank the cup of Christ, and was baptized with His
baptism, who lay upon His Master's bosom with much con-
fidence, - this man comes forward to us now.*** He will
appear before us as having put on Christ.*** Now he will
appear before us with unmasked head, and proclaim the
truth unmasked.*** Seeing then it is no longer the
fisherman, the son of Zebedee, let us hear him accord­
gingly. For he will say nothing to us as a man, but those
secret things which before they came to pass the angels
knew not; since they by the voice of John learn with us
the things we know."

Teachings in the Gospel of John:

Concerning God:

God so loved the world that He gave His own Son; God
loves the Son; God loves those who love Christ; God loves
those who keep Christ's word; God loves the disciples.

Concerning Christ:

Christ loved Martha; Christ loved Lazarus; Christ loved
His own; Christ loved one of His disciples; Christ loved His
disciples; Christ loved the Father.

Concerning man:

Light came into the world, but men loved darkness rather
than light because their works were evil. Men loved the
glory of men more than the praise of God. Men have not the

Love of God in themselves.

1. Chrysostom, Saint John, Homilies, Volume XIV, Nicene &
Literature Company, New York City, 1898.

In each of these references, the Greek word διανομή in some form is used, and if we take the definition of Professor Strong, confirmed by Thayer, and consider the term used to indicate rational action springing from deliberate choice, we shall have to conclude that:

(1) Men may love from a natural predisposition without having Love from God within themselves;

(2) The objects of such love springing from a natural disposition may be "the glory of men" and "darnlessness." These, then, are representative of what man may love naturally.

Note further concerning man:

John records the commandment of Christ to His disciples that they love one another, as follows:

"A new commandment I give unto you, that ye love one another." 3

"This is my commandment that ye love one another, even as I have loved you." 4

The very fact that we have this commandment indicates that there is a possibility that what is commanded is not being done; in other words, that while it is not being done, it is possible, hence that the thing commanded is not in act but in potency.

There is also the exhortation to

"Continue in My Love"

indicating the possibility of retrogression from, or diminution of Love, notwithstanding the fact that it was at one time possessed and exercised.

John says, in speaking of man, that there is a definite evidence of the exercise or operation of Love, viz:

"If ye love me, ye will keep my commandments." 1

"He that hath and keepeth my commandments, he it is that loveth me." 2

This is merely stating the same proposition in two different ways.

John says also, in speaking concerning man, and concerning the result of the exercise of Love, viz:

"He that loveth me (Christ) shall be loved of my Father, and I (Christ) will love him, and will manifest myself unto him." 3

"Jesus answered and said unto him, If any man love me, he will keep my word; and my Father will love him, and we will come and make our abode with him." 4

Loving Christ will make one beloved of the Father, Who will manifest Himself to the one loving Christ, and "we" (the Father and Christ) will make our abode with that one.

Teachings of John in the Epistles

Concerning the origin or First Cause of Love:

"Herein is Love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and sent His Son to be the propitiation for our sins." 5

Concerning Love in us:

"If any man love the world, the Love of the Father is not in him." 1

"But whoso hath this world's goods, and beholdeth his brother in need and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how doth the Love of God abide in him?" 2

Here we have two passages from the pen of John in which he refers to the Love of God in us, and in each case the Greek word \( \text{εὐ αὐτῶ} \), or rather prepositional phrase, is used. In the last passage, the English word "abide" is used as a translation of \( \text{μένει} \), which it seems to this writer might just as well or even better be translated "remain" to indicate that man might not continue to possess this Divine Love.

Concerning increase or diminution of Love:

"But whoso keepeth his (Christ's) word, in him verily hath the Love of God been perfected." 3

"No man hath seen God at any time; if we love one another, God abideth in us, and His Love is perfected in us." 4

"Herein is Love made perfect with us, that we may have boldness in the day of judgment; because as He is, even so are we in this world." 5

Here John speaks of the perfection of Love, indicating degrees, or the possibility of progress in the state of Love, or possibly of a progress of Love as a state within us.

1. 1 John 2:15. 2. 1 John 3:17. 3. 1 John 2:5.
4. 1 John 4:12. 5. 1 John 4:17.
Concerning the status of those not possessing (God's) Love:

"He that loveth not abideth in death." 1

Here, and in other passages which we shall not take time or space to cite, John indicates that there is a state in life in which the individual may live without being in possession of God's Love.

Concerning the status of those who do possess (God's) Love:

They are called "Beloved." 2 It should be noted that in each case mentioned, some specific characteristic of those possessing God's Love is mentioned which differentiates them from those who do not possess (His) Love.

"Behold, what manner of Love the Father hath bestowed upon us, that we should be called the children of God." 3 Note also: "And such we are."

"Beloved, now are we the children of God, and it is not yet made manifest what we shall be. We know that when He shall be manifested, we shall be like Him; for we shall see Him even as He is." 4

"Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is begotten of God; and whosoever loveth Him that begat loveth Him also that is begotten of Him." 5

Concerning the passage last quoted, it we give attention to the Greek words ΥΕΥΤΑΙ and ΥΕΥΚΑΗΤΑ translated "begotten" and "beget" we will probably get the fullsignification of this passage. The active form of

the Greek term here used means "to generate," and to generate means that the generator will impart, at least in some measure, his nature into that which is generated.

The other two passages indicate the present and prospective status of him who has been the recipient of the bestowed Love of God.

Teachings of John in The Revelation

There is just one point to which attention should be directed in the teachings of this book, so far as our present purpose is concerned. Other points, previously brought out in the other writings of John, have been specified elsewhere in this paper. The one point to which reference is made is this: There is a possibility of diminution and loss of Love.

"But I have this against thee, that thou didst leave thy first Love." 1

The Love referred to is God's bestowed Love. That Love was lost, or rather abandoned. These people, who once possessed it, possessed it no longer at the time John wrote.

General Summary of the teachings of John

John does not give us a complete system of teaching. We have already made the same remark concerning Plato. Whatever reason we may assign for Plato's failure on this point, we know that John was only one of a number of inspired writers, and that he merely made his contribution to the sum total of the body of Truth comprising The Holy Scriptures.

We have given the principal purposes of the several books we have had under consideration, and, as previously suggested, the concepts we have found and which we are about to summarize, should be considered with this fact in mind. Thus, the conclusions we shall present are only portions of the conclusions we would reach if we studied all the books which constitute The Sacred Canon. We mention this so the reader will not assume that the conclusions presented represent the complete system of teaching on this subject in The Holy Scriptures.

Concerning the Love of God in us

We have presented a number of passages on this point and made comment. Here we wish to add a confirmatory comment from a sermon by Reverend John Wesley, who says:

"A third Scriptural mark of those who are born of God, and the greatest of all, is Love,—even the Love of God shed abroad in their hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto them (Romans 5:5). Because they are sons, God hath sent forth the Spirit of His Son into their hearts, crying 'Abba, Father' (Galatians 4:6). By this Spirit, continually looking up to God as their reconciled and loving Father, they cry to Him for their daily bread, for all things needful, whether for their souls or for their bodies.***

"And in this sense also 'everyone who loveth Him that begat, loveth him that is begotten of Him' (1 John 5:1). His spirit rejoices in God His Savior. He loveth the Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity. He is so joined unto the Lord as to be one spirit. His soul hangeth upon Him, and chooseth Him as altogether lovely, the chiefest among ten thousand. He knoweth, he feeleth what that means 'My beloved is mine and I am his.' 'Thou art fairer than the children of men;

1. Page 74 of this paper.
full of grace are Thy lips, because God hath anointed Thee forever.'" 1

There are several items in connection with this statement worth noting. In the first place, we may believe that John Wesley enjoyed a mystical union with Christ which was most unusual, in the light of which he preached the sermon from which this quotation is a part. In the second place, he shows how a rich communion with Christ is possible on the basis of Love. In the third place, he points out that Love, not naturally within us, is brought into the heart of the individual and shed abroad there by the Holy Spirit, and he uses two texts of Scripture to prove his assertion, which we might consider briefly, viz:

"And not only so, but we also rejoice in our tribulations; knowing that tribulation worketh steadfastness; and steadfastness approvedness; and approvedness hope; and hope putteth not to shame; because the Love of God hath been shed abroad in our hearts (margin—poured out in our hearts) through the Holy Spirit which was given unto us." 2

"And because ye are sons, God sent forth the Spirit of His Son into our hearts, crying 'Abba, Father.'" 3

The passage first quoted is written concerning those who are justified by faith, and gives us cause for rejoicing the fact that Love has been shed abroad in our hearts. The passage last quoted shows a relation held by such person to God because of the possession of this poured-out Love.

Points for comparison

John has given us a complicated picture of Love, which we shall try to summarize in a few words for the purpose of making comparison with the concept of Plato.

(1) As to the origin of Love:

In his concept, there is what might be called a natural love, and there is also a Divine Love. By natural love, we mean one existing naturally in the soul; by Divine Love, we mean one that is implanted in the soul by an outside power,—that is, by God. John also tells us that there is the possibility of the perfection of Love,—that is, of Divine Love, which has been implanted within us. John does not give us a definition of the essence of Love, evidently leaving it to us to determine its essence (nature) by its operation.

(2) As to the object of Love:

Natural love may be directed towards anything material or immaterial, concrete or abstract, as for example, the world, the glory of men, a lie; on the other hand, it may be directed towards God. Divine Love will always be directed towards God first, and then towards God's creatures,—men. It is possible to "leave" Divine Love, as we have seen, and, of course, this means a loss of devotion to its objects.

(3) As to the objective of Love:

John Wesley has pointed out the possibilities which lie before the individual in the matter of communion with God,

1. See page 77 of this paper.
thus elucidating and illustrating the passages from John's writings we have quoted in this thesis.

Restating, we may say that the objective of Love in John's concept is

(1) Communion with a personal God,

(2) Fellowship with Him in His purposes and thus the observance of His commands,

(3) Ministry first unto those called "Beloved" (the brethren), and then to all God's creatures (men everywhere).

An exploratory detour

Before proceeding to our comparison of concepts of Love in Plato's Symposium and in John's writings in The Holy Scriptures, which we shall attempt to present in epitome, it would seem advisable for us to make further exploratory effort of a few phases of our subject on a somewhat wider scale than we have done heretofore. We present the results of our investigation in this separate section so that the injection of this material will not interfere too much with our formal presentation by causing too much divergence from the contents of the writings of the two persons, as stated. Here, then, we shall feel free to offer material somewhat remotely related to Platonic and Johannine teaching, for the very fact that we are on detour will suggest greater liberty.

Following the type of discourse in the Platonic dialogues somewhat, we shall resort to questions and answers.
God's Love

We might ask John for information concerning the nature of the God who is both Lover and Beloved, and put the question this way:

What is meant by the statement that "God is Love"?

John does not answer directly. He allows us to judge of the nature of the God Who is Love by the expressions of that Nature. This expression John explains. It may be summed up, at least comprehensively, by use of the verse which says:

"God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish but have everlasting life." 1

How God Loves

Granted that God is Love, and that He Loves, how does He Love?

Since it is impossible for us to understand the Nature of God except negatively, it is equally impossible for us to understand His Love, so the best we can say is that God's Love is a Love which flows out of His Nature and is becoming to it.

The principle involved is enunciated by the Prophet Isaiah when he says:

"For My thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are My ways your ways, saith the Lord; For as the heavens are higher than the earth, so are My ways higher than your ways, and My thoughts than your thoughts." 2

Mutuality of Love

Before we can consider this subject, we must decide upon the character of man's love. This will mean that we must look into the classes of men, and differentiate between them.

Let us notice, then, that God loves all men. John says:

"God so loved the world." 1

The world includes all men. But that very passage differentiates "all men" and divides them into two classes.

"Whosoever believeth on Him (God's Son)" shall not perish, but shall have everlasting life. 1

So we have among all men those who believe and those who do not believe on God's Son.

With reference to those believing, John tells us:

"If we walk in the light as He (God) is in the light, we have fellowship one with another, and the Blood of Jesus Christ His Son cleanses us from all sin." 2

Here, then, there is a fellowship made possible by a specified act, namely, believing on God's Son, to be followed by walking in the light. This walking in the light is a daily exercise or operation, - a continuous process. It indicates metaphorically those acts which are in full harmony with one's (the believer's) understanding of God's requirements as revealed in The Holy Scriptures, the doing of which assures the believer of fellowship with God. The Love wherewith God loves His believing children who walk in the light, brings, by their reciprocation, a mutuality of Love designated "fellowship"

which has its basis in cleansing; or, to restate, which mutuality of Love is made possible when the heart of the believer has been cleansed through the Atonement, expressed here as "the Blood of Jesus Christ."

One class of men, namely, those who have not believed, may love God with a natural impulse. Another class, those who have believed, will love with a Divine Love which they have received from God. The mutuality of Love results only in case of the exercise of the latter.

Here we may turn with profit to several passages from the pen of Saint Thomas Aquinas.

Discussing whether God loves all things, he says:

"God loves all existing things.*****

"Yet not as we love; because since our will is not the cause of the goodness of things, but is moved by it as by its object, our love, whereby we will good to anything, is not the cause of its goodness; but conversely its goodness, whether real or imaginary, calls forth our love, by which we will that it should preserve the good it has, and receive besides the good it has not, and to this end direct our actions; whereas the love of God infuses and creates goodness." 2

Dealing with the subject of charity, he writes:

"Accordingly, since there is a communication between man and God, inasmuch as He communicates His happiness to us, some kind of friendship must needs be based on this same communication, of which it is written (1 Cor. 1:9) 'God is faithful: by Whom you are called unto the fellowship of His Son.' The love which is based on this communication is charity; wherefore it is evident that charity is the friendship of man for God." 3

1. See Acts 15:9 ff
2. Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica I, Q20, A 2.
3 Ibid II. I, Q 23, A 1.
"But it is evident that the act of charity surpasses the nature of the power of the will, so that, therefore, unless some form be superadded to the natural power, inclining it to the act of love, this same act would be less perfect than the natural acts and the acts of other powers; nor would it be easy and pleasurable to perform. *** Therefore it is most necessary that, for us to perform the act of charity, there should be in us some habitual form superadded to the natural power, inclining that power to the act of charity." 1

"Therefore charity can be in us neither naturally, nor through acquisition by any natural powers, but by the infusion of the Holy Ghost, Who is the Love of the Father and the Son, and the participation of Whom in us is created charity." 2

Why does God Love

God does not love because there is any deficiency in Himself, which might be satisfied through attachment to the object of His love, but because He wills the best for every creature.

"God so loved the world that He gave His only-begotten Son that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish." 3

"Since to love anything is nothing else than to will good to that thing, it is manifest that God loves everything that exists." 4

Our Love for God

In the setting we have depicted, God is the Beloved, man the Lover. We are motivated to love God by His love for us.

This motivation may rest upon our appreciation of the

2. Ibid II, I, Q 24, A 2. 4. Ibid I, Q 20, A 2.
5. See page 82 of this paper.
goodness of God which leads to repentance, or it may rest on a realization of God's longsuffering and patience with us in our shortcomings which leads to repentance, or it may rest on a sort of intuitive perception or immediate cognition of God's Love for us revealed by God's Spirit to our hearts, resulting in our receiving Christ, as the result of which repentance is logical as a first step towards reciprocation of God's Love, receiving Christ the next and final step.

In any case, there is always within the human Lover a sense of lack, a recognition of deficiency, which may be supplied by the Beloved, who in this case is God. This deficiency, often called heart-hunger, is an agency playing an important part in inducing the Lover to seek the Beloved.

Saint Augustine said:

"Thou hast made us for Thyself, and our heart is restless until it rests in Thee." 4

Here is a choice bit worthy of our consideration:

"The God of Saint Thomas and of Dante is a God who loves; the god of Aristotle is a god who does not refuse to be loved; the love that moves the heavens and the stars in Aristotle is the love of the heavens and the stars for God, but the love that moves them in Saint Thomas and Dante is the Love of God for the world. Between these two motive causes there is all the difference between an efficient cause on the one hand and a final cause on the other." 5

Plato's Essence of Beauty

What is the nature of the Essence of Beauty which Plato would have us contemplate continuously?

What is the nature of the relation between the Essence of Beauty and of him who contemplates it?

This question is partially answered by Professor Gilson, from whose writings we have just quoted.

We might add that we have already seen that the Essence of Beauty is not a personality; hence it has no capacity for the exercise of Love, such as God, a Personality, has. The conclusion therefore must be that he who contemplates the Essence of Beauty looks upon Being, as Plato considers Being, immortal, incorruptible, eternal, but only Being in that sense.

To get a better understanding, we should contrast Plato's concept of Being with the concept of God given us by John. John's God is a Personality, with Intelligence, Will, and capacity to act. There is all the difference imaginable between Plato's Ideas, of which Beauty is one, and John's God, Who is the Eternal One, the Intelligent Creator of all things, Who wills only Good to His creation, and in whom the fullness of all things dwells.

Concerning the Essence of Beauty, and its nature, the following expresses an interesting opinion:

"The ideas of Plato are self-existing, independent realities, of which the sensible world-things are copies. How are the copies related to the originals?
They participate in them, but that participation cannot be by exchange of essences in any sense of that term. This can be clearly seen when one realizes that if the copies partook of the essence of the originals, the copies would no longer be truly copies; in other words, they would be composed, at least in part, of Being and therefore they would no longer be pure Becoming, for in Plato's schemitization, at least in this sense, Being and Becoming do not mix. Hence the only way the copies could be related to the originals would be by imitation, without reciprocation of any sort so far as essence is concerned. Therefore Plato would have us contemplate the Essence of Beauty, and seeing it, reproduce it by imitating it, but without abstrorting from it any of its Being. The nature of the Beauty, then, is that it is idealistic, and the imitation is in no sense a true participation of the attributes of the Being of the Idea of Beauty."

Summarizing, then, let us say that the Lover may gaze upon the Essence of Beauty, receive inspiration, and by that inspiration be carried away to new levels of thought and action, but this gazing upon the Essence of Beauty does not involve or include the kind of fellowship or communion which characterizes interacting love between two individuals, even between God and man or man and God.

Aristotle and his Ethica

Here the author refers to several items which are closely related to our subject. They will be found under the title of Friendship.

We think of the subject of Friendship because of John's remark in a section in which he is discussing Love, and referring to Friendship, in which he says:

2. Aristotle, Ethica, Book VIII.
"This is my commandment that ye love one another, as I have loved you. Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. Ye are my friends, if ye do whatsoever I command you."  

It would take us too far afield should we attempt to enter into a thorough study of this part of the Ethica, so we will simply take a few thoughts from the book for suggestions as a key to further thought regarding Plato's concept of Love as compared with that of John.

The following general divisions of the subject of Friendship are discussed by Aristotle:

(1) The value of Friendship
(2) Definition of Friendship

Friendship means a mutual recognition of goodwill and wishing well to each of the parties involved.  

(3) Kinds of Friendship

based on the desire of the lover

(A) Love for utility
(B) Love for pleasure
(C) Love between good persons with hope of participation each in the good of the other. Note: Perfect friendship is the friendship of men who are good.

(4) Equality in Friendship

(5) Friendship and Justice

1. John 15:13-14
2. Aristotle, Ethica, 1155a4-5.
In Plato, there can be no friendship between his Essence of Beauty and him who contemplates it, as previously explained, because the Essence of Beauty lacks the qualities of personality and is therefore incapable of responding.

In John, we do have friendship between God and the Lover, or the Beloved, whichever aspect is in view. This friendship is of great value, not only because it is intellectually satisfying, but because it finds issue in a higher type of living, - God being Good inherently and the Lover of God being good because of having been made good by reason of his having accepted God's Son, Who is made righteousness to all those who accept Him, as it is written, -

"By the obedience of One shall many be made righteous." 1

Aristotle says that perfect friendship is the friendship of those who are good, and thus John's picture of friendship (fellowship) between God and man represents the most perfect friendship of which we know. With reference to justice, the highest type of justice will characterize the thoughts and acts of him who loves God, not only insofar as the relations between God and that one are concerned, but also in all relations between that one and his fellow creatures.

1. Romans 5:19.
MAKING THE COMPARISON OF
CONCEPTS

There are some points of similarity and some points of
difference between the concepts of Plato and John.

First, let us take the points of similarity, and then,
the points of difference:

Plato tells us that Love is innate, actual and potential.
By potential, we mean that Love must be awakened by sight of
the beautiful. We are informed by him that it is difficult to
awaken Love in some persons because of their dulness.

John speaks of two kinds of Love,—one natural, the
other imparted by God through the Holy Spirit,—shed abroad
in our hearts,—to use the phraseology of the Apostle Paul
to convey the idea of the Apostle John.

Plato's idea of Essence of Love may be described by
the use of the term "craving" used by Aristophanes, since
the terminology is not contradicted by Socrates either
directly or by implication.

John does not describe the Essence of Love, but allows
us to judge of it by the nature of its operations. It might
be justly described in John's concept as a craving, for at
least in one of its operations, it craves the welfare of
man's fellow-beings.

Plato refers to the possibility of the development of
Love, and John does the same, so that they are in accord
in their concepts on this point.
Plato speaks of the Good, the Beautiful, as the object of Love. With him, Love rightly directed by Reason will persist until it leads to a vision in which there is continuous contact with the Essence of Beauty. The Essence of Beauty, however, does not indicate a personality.

John makes the object of Love a personal God, manifested in His Son, also a Personality, these two ONT, with Whom Love leads to intimate fellowship and communion.

Plato presents the objective of Love as entrancement in the vision of the Essence of Beauty, resulting in a life of virtue and of good deeds, in which the Lover, the Gazer upon the vision of the Essence of Beauty reproduces himself and begets ideas which are deathless and immortal, and, we may conclude, in this way serving humanity.

Plato has a noble concept, but comes short of the concept of John, because he lacks knowledge of a personal God, and therefore the vision of the Lover can have no true Being as its center. It is John who gives us the true Being as the center of attraction for the Lover, from man's viewpoint, and as the center of action, from God's viewpoint, with the result that God the Lover acts for the well-being of His creatures, and man, possessing Divine Love, not only enjoys fellowship with God as between person and person, but also acts for the well-being of his fellow-men;—God's act of Love is comprehended in the statement that He "loved the world and gave His Son that whosoever believeth in Him should
not perish but have everlasting life" and man's act of Love is comprehended, at least insofar as his fellow-creatures is concerned in the statement "hereby we know Love, because He (Christ) laid down His life for us; and we ought also to lay down our lives for the brethren."

2. 1 John 3:16.
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