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The Attitude of the Press Toward Andrew Johnson

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Ralph W. Tolson

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VITA.

Graduated from the high school at Moweaqua, Illinois, 1922. Received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from Illinois Wesleyan University, Bloomington, Illinois, 1927. Graduate student in Loyola University, Chicago, Illinois, during the year of 1931-1932.
This study of the reconstruction era of American history is based primarily upon editorials from the leading newspapers published during that period. Out of the multitude of facts which may be considered within the domain of reconstruction time, those have been selected which seem best fitted to explain the more outstanding political, constitutional and legislative developments. The editorials necessarily follow a natural chronological sequence as the national events developed from day to day. Therefore, events have been grouped into five chapters according to chronological order. An attempt has been made to give proper unity to the entire study and also to stress Negro Suffrage, Radical politics, and the leading issues which ultimately changed the course of American History.

It is admitted that sectionalism and political color found their way into the editorial pages, but in answer to this the reader is reminded by one writer that "the periodical press still remains the most important single source the historian has at his command for the reconstruction of the life of the past three centuries". James Ford Rhodes has a well known history of the reconstruction era, and his opinion regarding evidence is of value to us here. He writes, "take the newspaper for what it is, a hasty gatherer of facts, a hurried commentator on the same, and it may well constitute a part of historical

In this study, newspaper material constitutes the fundamental part of the historical evidence. However, this has been balanced by the use of two standard historical texts, those by Oberholtzer and Rhodes, and use has been made of general secondary works, reminiscences, biographies and a small amount of manuscript source material. A combination of these sources results in a view both of public opinion and individual ideas. The idea throughout has been to secure views from both sides, and in the absence of very much Southern material, it has been necessary to use a considerable amount of Northern Democratic opinion. The Northern papers have been selected from a group of cities in different states with the hope that a comprehensive view might be obtained.

In a work like this it is impossible to evaluate material properly without recognizing some of the leading personalities connected with the writing. Editorial writing reached its climax in America during this era under the guidance of such writers as E. L. Godkin, George William Curtis, Horace Greeley, Henry Raymond, and others included in our study. Mr. Oswald Villard of The Nation remarks, "we have a steady waning of individualism in the daily periodical, marked first by the disappearance of the great editor whose personality formerly

shown through its pages". There can be no doubt that these men exerted great influence during their time and for this reason their opinions are of value in reconstructing the story of national events from 1864 to 1868. Both Oberholtzer and Rhodes have used considerable periodical material from these writers in their standard volumes on reconstruction. Concerning them Frederic L. Paxson has stated, "Their differences in point of view are wide, but between them they cover most of the important facts".

American history developed rapidly after Civil War days into what F. L. Paxson calls "The New Nation". It has been the aim of this study to show some of the movements which lead to the change. Probably no other period shows the absurd lengths to which our two-party system may be carried, or the possible disaster for our nation in depending upon political organization such as now exists. Even the Constitutional basis of the executive, legislative and judicial departments was seriously endangered during Johnson's time. Andrew Johnson is presented here as one of the leaders, and no attempt has been made either to justify or condemn his part in national events. When his name was forgotten following the impeachment trial, all attention was turned to the Democratic Convention in New York City. America was now facing a new era.

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CHAPTER I

Our seventeenth President rose to power through the success of one assassin and the failure of another. Booth removed Lincoln, while his accomplice, Atzerodt, failed to eliminate Johnson, and the result was a Tennessee Democrat elected on a Union Party ticket, attempting to deal with a Republican Congress. If the immediate cause of his accession was assassination, then a more remote and significant one is the Baltimore Convention held on June 7, 1864, where the Republican Party made an effort to unite antagonistic sections to save an election.

Lincoln realized that a Union sentiment required a Union Party, and to complete this idea he sent General Daniel Sickles to investigate the war record of Andrew Johnson with the idea of placing him on the ticket if acceptable. Although it is obvious that a Tennessee candidate would probably have been an advantage, yet from the standpoint of politics there was another very real reason why Johnson was finally nominated. The fundamental motive at this point was the removal of William H. Seward from the cabinet to make way for Daniel S. Dickinson. The New York delegation brought about Johnson's nomination at Baltimore to save Seward. This defeated Sumner of

2. Ibid., p. 256.
Massachusetts whose intention it was to oust Seward, and may be looked upon as a definite basis of antagonism between Johnson and Sumner when the two clashed later.

Loyal Republican journals of 1864 emphasize the lack of wisdom in changing during a crisis, and a universal belief in the capacity of Abraham Lincoln. The Washington Chronicle said, "The Presidency came to him by a special Providence, and he has moved in the right path from the beginning"; and again, "He has shown the devotion of Washington and the energy of Jackson". General opinion in the North acclaimed him "as a man in the chair more universally acceptable by all odds, than we could hope to elect from without", and tended to believe that "God meant Lincoln for President or the nation is deceived".

Democratic opinion varied from this idea in maintaining that "it was not even necessary to hold a Convention, for Mr. Lincoln had long since re-nominated himself. Now that he has accepted, the farce of his nomination ends". Even though the stress of war days was sufficient to elicit some degree of united action, it was not powerful enough to remove sectionalism, and the Democrats saw little hope in placing their confi-
dence in a new administration because it included a Tennessee candidate.

It was a very natural and necessary thing that the Union should be emphasized in this campaign. Harpers Weekly said, "If Mr. Lincoln is re-elected, the Union, the authority of the government, and the national honor will be maintained unconditionally." It must not be assumed that Lincoln carried the ticket through in 1864 with overwhelming influence, and that Johnson merely rode to victory on the strength of the President's popularity.

A later historian has written, "There were many men in 1864 who believed that the war was a mistake, and that Lincoln was a failure." In the ultimate preservation of the Union, Johnson was the man who felt the effects of this dissatisfaction. Since the days when the Constitution was made, sectionalism had manifested itself perhaps stronger in New England than in any other part of the United States. The same political expediency which would secure New England support for a Tennessee Democrat as Vice-President would likewise make him unacceptable as a President.

Without moralizing regarding slavery, it is impossible to disregard this side of the question, since it was emphasized

particularly in New England by such speakers as Henry Ward Beecher, Edward Everett Hale, and the more radical Wendell Phillips. Some writers maintained it to be "no moral issue at all that impelled our government to take up arms. The only question was a civil one. War sprung alone from a civil necessity of maintaining constitutional authority? The South was equally conscious of a letter sent to the Governor of Kentucky in which Lincoln had stated: "I am naturally antislavery. If slavery is not wrong, nothing is wrong. I cannot remember when I did not so think and feel." Then if "the rebels went to war in order to win an unfettered and unlimited right of extending slavery" it is obvious that the Northern moralists could make a big issue out of this. In a republican form of government these issues reached their climax in the activities of the people's representatives. Meanwhile, the work of 1864 is more concerned with the two leaders of the nation than with Senators and Representatives.

Prior to the nomination, a journal in Lexington, Kentucky, made the remark that "Mr. Lincoln will be nominated without opposition, while Hannibal Hamlin is the most likely candidate for Vice-President. The least likely would be Andrew Johnson."

Even The Chicago Daily Tribune, later to be such an enemy of the Vice-President, admitted that "he (Johnson) has inherited traits of good character, an unusual strength of native talent, sound common sense, indomitable courage and honesty." Mr. Lincoln gave more reasons in a letter written March 26, 1863, why, "few men in Congress have exerted in the beginning of the war so decided an influence upon public opinion in the North as did Mr. Johnson. His conduct as military governor of Tennessee in no way diminished his popularity, and won him ardent admirers in every loyal State".

In 1861 Johnson had been recognized as a Democrat, and as a supporter of all the leading measures of the Democratic Party. In 1860 he had favored the nomination of Breckenridge and Lane and had given his support to that ultra-Democratic ticket. This was not a point to stress in 1864, but it was one to explain. A Washington paper answered it by saying, "Andrew Johnson supported Breckenridge for President in 1860 in the honest belief that he was speaking the wishes of his constituents." Perhaps this was a good political statement making the effort to emphasize Johnson's loyalty, but it was not enough to satisfy later opponents who claimed him to be a traitor to his party.

15. The Chicago Daily Tribune, July 9, 1864.
The first signs of reconstruction had already appeared upon the horizon when Charles Sumner advanced his idea that the rebel states had ceased to exist. Reverdy Johnson of Maryland struck a salient point when he remarked that "this makes Johnson an alien enemy". This idea did not become prevalent until after the election was over but it is significant to see its origin here in 1864 and later watch it develop into a severe struggle between President and Congress.

Southern opinion at times went so far as to maintain that the Vice-Presidential candidate was a traitor to his party and guilty of apostasy. The Lexington Observer and Reporter said, "Of all the men named, we should have preferred Johnson as Vice-Presidential nominee. Odious to the true Union men of his own party and state, enjoying neither confidence nor respect, he will prejudice even the nominee for President". The heat of war time tended to give Johnson, as a former military governor, additional political prestige despite this argument, and of course the absence of southern voting was likewise essential.

Reconstruction was sufficiently developed as a plan to have it brought into the campaign of 1864. The Chicago Times

18. Ibid., June 21, 1864.
believed "Mr. Lincoln's plan of reconstruction is fairly illustrated by the appointment of delegates to the Baltimore Convention from South Carolina. The next step will be to have the same people who elected them vote for Presidential electors for South Carolina. It is by this means that Mr. Lincoln proposes to re-elect himself". Of course such interpretations could be expected from a Democratic paper during an election, but the above statement is a sign of the times and is only one phase of irritation and opposition to Lincoln's ideas on reconstruction.

Hearkening back to the days of Jefferson, The New York Tribune hit upon the "majority-rule" idea and made "acquiescence in the decision of a majority the vital principle of Republics". Mr. Lincoln's idea of "one-tenth" was thus struck boldly in a way that could easily create unnecessary prejudice by adhering to maxims at the expense of human necessity during a crisis. One of the chief objections then in the North was based on the ground that it is violative of the principle laid down in organic law to follow the Lincoln plan; that above all, "Majorities shall rule". Next in the line of criticism came a hint of Congressional power in the process. The opposition to Johnson seemed quite eager to show that he

was breaking the fundamental constitutional principles of our government, and this argument soon became a political necessity in building up Congressional power. It was feared that the rebel states would be relieved of military rule too soon and returned to their old position in the Union. To avoid such a contingency it was declared that "neither the President nor Congress, singly, can do the work necessary to such restoration. There must be conjoint action between the President and Congress". The Atlantic Monthly advocated a plan for taking care of the South by sending "armies of freemen into that area to secure the necessary one-tenth vote". Then follows a long explanation concerning a total lack of the desire for vengeance on the part of the North except perhaps as was necessary in a few individual cases. Men of considerable influence in their day and who were writing, speaking, and helping to form public opinion, became possessed of the idea of a Northern Crusade. Edward Everett Hale thought the history of all times definitely proves that "Northern invasions, when successful, advance the civilization of the world". Puritanism gave vent to the Biblical plan and hoped the North would do in the South what Abraham

25. Ibid.
did in Canaan". After a time, Western papers followed in the same type of crusade against the South, and it is difficult to see anything but grim determination to demand an absolute change in social, political and economic life.

New England sermons may quite fairly be represented by the activities of Henry Ward Beecher. On November 14, 1864, Mr. Beecher advocated an idea which was to bear fruit later. He said, "Europe is made up of conquered provinces, whose people are contented and whose place in the world is still a powerful one". In the hands of Thaddeus Stevens this plan for reconstructing the southern states became so powerful as to hinder any kind or sympathetic attitude. But Mr. Beecher concluded that there was a cheerful future despite present submissions and that in ten years the South would have nothing to complain of and "would celebrate the destruction of slavery".

The campaign of 1864 accentuated the feeling of plebeian versus aristocrat and glorified an Illinois rail splitter with his colleague, a Tennessee tailor, over against an aristocratic South. Evidently the predominance of Southern men before the war was quite prominent in many minds of the North, and charts were printed in papers there to show how many offices this

26. Ibid.
28. Ibid.
section had held in the old days. "The chairman of almost every important committee of both House and Senate had formerly been a Southern slaveholder", and the most complete power is shown in such offices as Speaker of the House, Secretary of State and Supreme Court Justices. "But henceforth the Free States will guide the destinies of this Republic".

More light may be thrown on the attitude towards the South by realizing the underlying hatred of some Southern institutions. The Washington Chronicle maintained that, "it is too late in the day to repeat the stereotyped gasconade of invulnerable and invincible Southern chivalry". The Chicago Daily Tribune remarked that, "Where there is an aristocracy established by law it is necessary there should also be an inferior class". An example of the intermixture of slavery, sectionalism and hatred may be clearly shown in statements from The Chicago Daily Tribune. "If it were not for the corrupting influence of slavery, the people of the South as well as those of the North would all be swayed by a noble sentiment of union as one people". A few days later this same noble sentiment of union gave expression to a new feeling which revealed the idea

30. Ibid.
31. Ibid., April 1, 1864.
32. The Chicago Daily Tribune, January 1, 1864.
33. Ibid., February 8, 1864.
that the "South acts from feeling and the North from principle, hence the South is often eager and rash. When the Southerner is whipped he is accustomed to giving up; so he will now. Let the government make its calculations and act accordingly". Reconciliation is a wonderful thing, but it is difficult to see how a genuine Southerner could take open insult, lose his self-respect and still receive Northern plans of reconstruction freely and successfully.

According to the press, the mass of men in the North favored Lincoln. "We have a man at the helm in whom the masses repose great faith. The country has a certainty in Abraham Lincoln for he has been tried and proven to be pure gold". Harpers Weekly held up his personal character as the "rock upon which the opposition is wrecked," and believed the "profound confidence of the great mass of the people was still unbrokren. The accentuation of plebeian principles and the heat of civil war were both highly conducive to this attitude and one wonders what the opinion concerning Johnson was as public favor rose for Lincoln. One significant idea expressed before the election shows this quite well and is in itself a prophecy of events to come. "If Mr. Lincoln be re-elected, and by his decease Mr. Johnson should become President, there would be as

34. Ibid., February 11, 1864.
35. Ibid., February 27, 1864.
true and tried a Union man in the chair as if the President had lived". Political power was working too much at this time to really allow very many papers to print editorials against the President. War conditions explain part of this, and therefore it is fairly certain that the mass of people were ready to support the administration.

However this same mass of people inevitably came to the place where it was necessary to send representatives to Congress and at that point an opportunity for trouble arose. First of all, the primary system threw power into the hands of political leaders who could plan affairs far in advance of public opinion. Secondly, it was recognized and admitted that the primary system was the real cause for sending inferior men to represent the people. The New York Tribune said, "It is a solemn fact that we do not send so able men to Congress as we did some forty to sixty years ago; our detestable system of primary meetings and nominations are the main cause". While there need be no discussion here as to the relative merits and power of the legislative and executive branches of our government, it is at least essential that Congress shall not be looked upon as a panacea for national ills during times of stress when direct action is needed. But already

37. Ibid., October 8, 1864.
many were advocating that Presidential action be not too speedy, because Congress must be looked to if a substantial agreement was to be reached.

Negro suffrage makes its first appearance as a possible issue in the early part of January, 1864, and the opinion was voiced by the ardent sponsor of this campaign in later days, The Chicago Daily Tribune. "The black people are working into the ranks of recognized humanity and are without a doubt to take care of themselves as if their skins were white". Four million freedmen offered almost unlimited opportunities for political development so it is little wonder that national needs were held in abeyance while exploitation was carefully planned.

No time was wasted in starting criticism of the war administration after the first hope of peace arose. Some claimed the Northern people had formed erroneous judgments from the very beginning. For example, Lincoln had called for seventy-five thousand men to start a campaign against a territory one-half as large as the whole of Europe. In 1863 a day of thanksgiving was held in commemoration of the "final and

40. The Chicago Daily Tribune, January 5, 1864.
41. The Chicago Times, February 18, 1864.
permanent deliverance of East Tennessee, while exactly two months later General Longstreet was in possession of the same territory". Democratic journals looked upon the President as "A second Washington and a smutty joker", or a "blundering intermeddler in the affairs of the army". It was said of General Grant that he had three opponents during the campaign of Richmond; "The rebel army, New York press and a President-hunting administration". Rebel and Copperhead opinion thus rose quite high in the campaign of 1864 even in parts of the North.

Cabinet proceedings were certainly not entirely harmonious during 1864 if general indications from the press can be relied upon. Southern opinion declared Stanton and Halleck to be "an incubus upon the management of military matters", and looked upon them both as "notoriously unfitted" for their offices. But true to the "Old Jeffersonian doctrine, few men die and none resign while holding office". The New York Times thought it "very likely" that "some changes in the cabinet would conduce to the good of the country", but did not think

42. Ibid.
43. Ibid., February 25, 1864.
44. Ibid., May 2, 1864.
45. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, July 23, 1864.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
it was wise at all to begin with the War Department. Later in the year when further agitation created more discussion the same paper remarked that "neither the President nor the country would assent to Stanton leaving office". There was only one way for the country to express its opinion in an authoritative manner and that was by its representatives. Since the President is himself a representative of the people then the question arises as to what would happen if he disagreed with Congress in regard to cabinet officers. This question is more fully developed in 1865.

People were looking to Congress for "calmness, decision and precision in the legislation of the winter of 1864." Some thought that the new administration would even win Southern opinion and induce a return to "Constitutional Rule". It is quite significant to note the idea that if the election depended upon the conduct of the war there would be a large measure of doubt as to its outcome. Already the aftermath of Union Party activities became apparent as each side attempted to regain its status in time for Congressional elections.

The year 1864 marks a general beginning of movements whose power was not completed until a few years later. It is quite doubtful as to whether Lincoln's war administration would

51. Harpers Weekly, December 17, 1864.
52. The New York Times, November 18, 1864.
have made him very popular after public opinion had been cultivated to think differently. Criticism was growing stronger as 1865 approached. Although most people were apparently still in support of the administration, yet it is certain that there was an undercurrent of adverse opinion which was determined to be recognized when opportunity arose.
CHAPTER II

Lincoln's Civil War administration has been characterized as a "Presidential Dictatorship", although in using such power he is said to have shown "a better combination of temperament, conviction, and ability to grapple with a complication like that in which this country was involved than any man in the history of our nation". Whatever forces were working against him had as yet failed to shake the confidence of the people. Time has given present day views of this situation a better perspective and has opened the memoirs of men who were not in favor of Lincoln. After all, perhaps the press leads us to see the nationalist view or 'the people' too much as an aggregate. When the problem of reconstruction came up for final solution the man who inherited Lincoln's cabinet and who followed his plan found to his regret that 'the people meant very little in comparison with a rather small group of legislators.

George W. Julian of Indiana belonged to that group, and Mr. Julian at least gives us an indication of the trend of feeling which was to be characteristic of the Radicals." Of the more earnest and thorough-going Republicans in Congress probably not one in ten favored Lincoln, and "during the

month of June, 1864, the feeling became more and more bitter and intense against Mr. Lincoln, although its expression never found its way to the people". Mr. Julian therefore clearly states the fact that this group feeling was quite powerful long before Johnson's accession, and secondly, that it was not in the minds of the general public. George F. Milton adds that "Sumner, Chase, Butler, Wade, Tremont, and Davis sought desperately to prevent Lincoln's renomination", while the pocket veto of the Wade-Davis bill increased their wrath. The Chicago Daily Tribune believed that "he would have more influence over the administration during the next four years than he has had during the past". Whatever hatred had arisen, it was admitted by those who were not among his admirers and who believed "a stronger man could have been selected for President" that "his death now would be a calamity". This statement was made in March, 1865, and shows a lurking fear which tended to hold support for Lincoln until the crisis was over.

Andrew Johnson was inaugurated on the morning of April 15, and "was at once surrounded by radical and conservative politicians". Julian says there was a political caucus most of

5. The Chicago Daily Tribune, April 14, 1865.
the afternoon, "held for the purpose of considering the necessity of a new cabinet and a line of policy less conciliatory than that of Mr. Lincoln". "And while everybody was shocked at Lincoln's murder, the feeling was nearly universal that the accession of Johnson would prove a Godsend to the country". He concludes this radical outburst by declaring the reconstruction policies of Lincoln to be "as distasteful as possible to Radical Republicans".

The day following Mr. Johnson's inauguration, Gideon Welles was invited to Edwin M. Stanton's private office for a conference. Mr. Welles reports in his diary that he had not been there long when Charles Sumner, together with several Massachusetts politicians, came to the office. Mr. Stanton immediately took from his desk the copy of a plan for Southern reconstruction and read it before the group. Apparently, matters were taking definite form prior to Johnson's accession.

Southern people began to fear the new President, and expressed more faith in Lincoln as "a man of remarkable endowments". Johnson was feared because "he was understood to be less generous in his views", and this "rendered the whole

8. Ibid.
9. Ibid.
10. Ibid.
dreadful affair still more mysterious". The knowledge now at hand concerning the Radical plans would certainly tend to disprove Greeley's statement in _The New York Tribune_ that "we feel a growing confidence that his administration will prove efficient, successful, and popular". Nor is it likely that all the people held much confidence in the idea of "one emotion in every true American heart, and that is the most inflexible determination to support President Johnson".

Perhaps _The New York Times_ strikes the idea of American institutions best in asking people to remember that "it is impossible for any one man to be indispensable to the preservation of our Union", while in Mr. Johnson as a successor, the nation felt it had "a man of courage, sound judgment and patriotism" who had "stood the test of the most terrible trials".

Even Secretary McCulloch did not believe there was any distrust or radical upheaval in the cabinet until the year 1866.

The President's first message seemed to please all of them, and "none more heartily than Mr. Stanton". It is a little wonder that the mass of men in America did not realize the Radical force in opposition to the President, when the variation

12. _The Lexington Observer and Reporter_, April 19, 1865.
14. _Harpers Weekly_, April 29, 1865.
of opinion between Welles and McCullooh is so great, while both of them were active in the cabinet, and had first hand impressions of actual conditions is Washington.

Sorrow for the murdered President turned into more bitterness toward the South, and the results hardly agree with the sentiment expressed in his last inaugural of "malice toward none" and "charity for all". Opinion easily turned to the "real murderers whose action brought the Civil War", and this necessarily meant the Southern leaders as well as those who had supported them. This vindictive attitude, of course, demanded "that justice be meted out, and justice demands that treason shall be treated as a crime for which the leaders shall be punished". The President was described as one who was "characterized by his severity toward all enemies of the government" and to whom "a traitor was an infamous wretch to be detected and executed".

The amnesty proclamation of May 29, 1865, was the real beginning of reconstruction work under the new President. In the opinion of some, "it seemed in every respect deserving of approval". Harpers Weekly gives a good idea of its general reception in confessing that it "would be better pleased with 18.

20. The Chicago Daily Tribune, April 18, 1865.
22. Ibid., May 31, 1865.
the plan if it did not receive such unqualified commendation from those who have most savagely denounced President Johnson?

On May 12, a caucus of Republicans was held in Washington "to consider measures for saving the new administration from the conservative control which threatened it". Both Wade and Sumner insisted that the President was in favor of negro suffrage and based their assertions upon the results of many private conferences held with him. The Radical Julian introduced the usual appeal by declaring it to be "neither morally nor logically possible to escape negro suffrage". A man who called Lincoln's assassination a "God-send to the country" now spoke from the standpoint of a logician and moralist in dealing with political problems. Mr. Julian throws more light upon his views by adding in his "Recollections" that he now went back to Indiana to determine the attitude of his constituents. Northern newspapers of several cities were now practically ready to follow such a campaign for negro suffrage. The New York Times thought it "far better that Grant had surrendered to Lee than that the negro should not be allowed to vote".

The Nation believed by denying negro suffrage "in a country

25. Ibid.
26. Ibid.
where men who are denied enjoyment of political rights are denied everything belonging to manhood, we would make ourselves foolish every time we talked about Democratic principles. So the caucus had negro suffrage as its primary object, and clearly shows the determination of Radical leaders to force this issue upon the President.

Signs of opposition to the Radical plan of suffrage came when Andrew Johnson made an address on May 25, 1865, in which he said he was "in favor of leaving the question of suffrage of colored persons to a decision of the loyal white residents of the South". Sumner on the same night practically admitted what was planned, or at least prophesied what would happen, by remarking that "Liberty has been won, but the battle of equality is still pending". The Baltimore Sun was a champion of the President's attitude and maintained that he was only giving to the people of the States the rights guaranteed when our government was founded. During June, Northern journals claimed that the President "desires to see the negroes of the South invested with power of self-protection by the ballot". It is apparent that much of the situation now centered about

29. The Baltimore Sun, May 27, 1865, Baltimore, Maryland.
30. Ibid., June 5, 1865.
31. Ibid.
32. The Connecticut Herald, June 10, 1865.
suffrage, and even though the press as a whole upheld Johnson, yet his failure to assist in giving the ballot to the negro would immediately endanger his position in the public eye.

Virginia had an organized government under Governor Francis Peirpont, which had carried over from Lincoln's term. On May 9, Johnson recognized this government, and thereby tended to antagonize certain leaders. Oberholtzer feels that the "Negrophiles" already feared a change in the President by this time. Thaddeus Stevens wrote to Sumner immediately following the recognition of the Peirpont government asking if there might be a way "to arrest the insane course of the President in reorganization". First indications of a change in the press occurred on July 10, 1865, when The Chicago Daily Tribune claimed the Lincoln-Johnson policy would produce nothing but "shame and disaster". Lincoln's plan as followed by his successor was becoming unacceptable.

Editorial opinion in the South could have helped to create a good impression in the North if the editors would have realized how much was to depend on the attitude shown by the leaders of the South. Instead of this, however, we read indications in private letters of this period showing the real situation. A chaplain in the Union army who had served in

34. Ibid.
35. The Chicago Tribune, July, 10, 1865.
Virginia during the war wrote to Judge J. D. Davidson of Lexington, Virginia, in 1865, as follows: "I have had many friends invite me to Virginia, promising me the best meal of hominy and milk I could desire. But your papers and editors look discouraging". Another letter written June 1, 1865, describes conditions in Staunton, Virginia, and vicinity. "We are in the dark here and do not discover a way of coming to light. We have no newspapers from the North except those that occasionally, by chance, get through. I send you but one Richmond paper—it is all we can raise since our cars run only tri-weekly". It is evident that many people in the South must have been uninformed about affairs in their own area, to say little of the country as a whole; and most of the material that was circulated came from anti-Northern journals. The Lexington Observer and Reporter made some rash statements about this time. "Whenever the people of Kentucky desire to get rid of slavery, they will do so in their own way, but will take care not to meddle with the property of their neighbors. We will not willingly entrust the most delicate of our affairs to the 'appropriate legislation' of Congress".

36. Letter written by I. McIlwaine to Judge J.D. Davidson, Lexington, Virginia, June 1, 1865, in the McCormick Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois. Original letter.
37. Ibid., Mr. N. Frank to Judge Davidson, June 1, 1865.
38. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, March 25, 1865.
New England had a good opportunity, in the face of such remarks, to heap criticism upon the South, and The Connecticut Herald started the campaign. "Before Congress meets there will be a united North, demanding in a tone no Congress can disregard, the denial of all civil power to rebel states". Radicals were also busy, and took advantage of such opinion to write directly to Johnson. Thaddeus Stevens asked him to "hold his hand and await the action of Congress". A definite break was not yet made, and we find The Chicago Daily Tribune approving "some features of the President's plan". The main objection still held was regarding Presidential action as final "prior to its endorsement by Congress and the people". Harpers Weekly held the idea that "Johnson initiated action and Congress completes it,—a principle all loyal men of the Union will certainly heartily endorse". Furthermore, this journal maintained that "there was nothing in the acts or words of Johnson to justify the insinuation that he wishes to intrust political power to the late rebels", and that the only loyal thing to do was to "patiently wait".

39. The Connecticut Herald, August 1, 1865.
41. The Chicago Tribune, September 23, 1865.
42. Ibid.
43. Harpers Weekly, July 22, 1865.
44. Ibid., September 2, 1865.
45. Ibid., September 30, 1865.
A gradual restoration of the Southern states became more impossible because the problem became primarily a political one, and negro voting was the issue over which this was ultimately fought out. In March, 1865, a southern paper had said; "the political and social equality of the negro is the object aimed at by the Radicals of our last Congress". Then a few months later, Northern journals were conjecturing as to just how long it would require for negroes to be prepared for citizenship. It was thought "these four million loyal citizens could be educated speedily under competent officers, and then go out to put down brigandage and preserve social order". Over against this extreme radicalism it was urged upon the people to be patient and not "expect the South to be thorough-going abolitionists and advocates of negro suffrage", simply because they had been defeated in the war. It was beginning to be evident to many by this time that the suffrage question was diverting attention from more vital issues of human need, and The Baltimore Sun openly accused Wilson and Sumner of acting "for partisan expediency", and defied these leaders to prove they never had favored the use of federal power in determining matters relating to suffrage in their own state.

46. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, March 22, 1865.
47. The Chicago Tribune, April 26, 1865.
48. The Baltimore Sun, June 16, 1865.
49. Ibid., July 14, 1865.
The people seemed disposed to await the progress of the experimental government then going on in the South and leave the final decision until later. It was agreed upon by most editors "who in reality lead public opinion", that "not one among the distinguished opponents of President Johnson ever states that Abraham Lincoln's policy would have been different". Press opinion steadily worked on the idea that Congress must be consulted, and many editors traced governmental growth to show the absolute necessity for caution in the use of Presidential power. Therefore, when Congress convened on December 4, 1865, it is quite certain that some of the members had definite plans made contrary to the Lincoln-Johnson policy. Even though the people did seem disposed in the beginning to await the results of experimental government, the fact remains that their representatives theoretically expressed public opinion by demanding an entirely new plan.

While main issues were being brought up, the leader of our nation met regularly with a cabinet selected by his predecessor. Questions of reconstruction came up here, and any direct antagonism or opposition to Presidential policy in the cabinet would undoubtedly work for trouble. Gideon Welles, Secretary of the Navy, indicates in February, 1866, that a clique, in

51. Ibid., September 28, 1865.
opposition to the administration, with Henry Winter Davis as leader, had grown up in Washington. "Secretary Stanton is on terms with these men, and to some extent gives them countenance even in their war upon the President". It is well to keep in mind here that two factions were plainly in action in Lincoln's Cabinet before his death. Then when Johnson came to power, Hugh McCulloch, Secretary of the Treasury, says he requested the Cabinet members during the first session to stand by him in the crisis. "He appeared relieved when we assured him that while we felt it our duty to place our resignations in his hands, he should have the benefit of our services until he saw fit to dispense with them". This verbal agreement seems sufficient evidence to lead one to think that the members were willing to abide by Johnson's wishes, and to resign whenever he saw fit to demand it. If McCulloch's word is taken for it, "the first year's administration was cordially supported by every member of the Cabinet".

Clear judgment concerning the actual progress of reconstruction was clouded somewhat because of a lack of information, or an abundance of misinformation. As a result, the press spends considerable time in the use of flowing phrases which did not bear directly upon human need, and which did not

54. Ibid.
correspond to the action in Congress. Such very obvious phrases as, "It is one of the most critical periods of our history, and the people will all rejoice if the President and Congress should agree", make one wonder what the people were doing to make such a state of affairs come to pass. The Lincoln-Johnson plan was considered to be "sanctioned by every consideration of national justice and political expediency, and in spite of all fanatical or factious opposition in North or South it will certainly prevail". Radical justification went the limit, and in the interest and supreme welfare of our nation "looked to the recuperation of the negro as far more hopeful than changing the old slave-holding class from the curse of wrong and oppression they have been pursuing". Sectionalism, Puritanism and political expediency demanded something more than a mere return to the fold.

Evidence has already been brought forth to indicate that prearranged plans were ready for operation when Congress assembled on December 4, 1865. Some Cabinet members were doubtful supporters of the nation's chief and, unquestionably, several Congressional leaders were directly opposed to his plan. Despite all of this, there is evidence in several Northern papers that people were warned of the situation and later voted

55. Harpers Weekly, October 14, 1865.
57. The Chicago Daily Tribune, June 21, 1865.
directly against supporting Johnson. The Philadelphia Ledger judged it was an understanding among majority leaders of Congress to refuse admission to "rebel states", and The Baltimore Sun added that "the President's labor of love would go for nothing if this happens". At least a portion of the people in Northern States were in favor of amnesty, but realized already that preconceived plans would most likely prevent it.

Word from the South usually cast a cloud over hopes of amnesty, for there is little doubt that people there were quite indiscreet in handling affairs while hatred was at such a high level. In an original letter written to Judge J.D. Davidson of Lexington, Virginia, these words appear; "We are getting along as well as could be expected under militia rule---there are restrictions which are rather disagreeable, such as remaining indoors after dark, and doing nothing which looks like an insult to our flag". Later in 1865, another letter written to this same Judge Davidson describes the Congress. "Well, this Yankee Congress is not doing us any good. The Lord only knows what will come of it.--Great God! we can't stand negro equality in suffrage and our juries".

58. The Baltimore Sun, November 23, 1865.
59. Ibid.
60. Letter written to Judge J.D. Davidson, by N. Frank, Staunton, Virginia, June 1, 1865. In the McCormick Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois. Original letter.
61. Ibid., By F.J. Manay, December 8, 1865.
Most Radical papers used hasty action as a universal evil, and exploited such an idea to the limit to prevent public opinion from demanding that Johnson's plan be used. In order to prove the futility of depending upon Southern people, Southern Black Codes were published. "South Carolina passed stringent Black Codes, while Mississippi elected a Rebel Governor", said The Chicago Daily Tribune. "Louisiana is on the down grade, while Georgia and Alabama show plainly that they are not to be trusted". The idea of reinstating eleven states of this type, according to the Radicals, was nothing short of "political insanity".

Probably the most difficult problem was to actually present evidence of genuine Southern conditions, because it is fairly certain that such evidence passed through too much Congressional Committee work to remain thoroughly accurate. Even if it had passed through in the original form, nothing short of patience and amnesty would have allowed these Southern people a chance. Perhaps private letters give us a good a view as any. One letter, written December 5, 1865, by a resident of Shreveport, Louisiana, says, "I will give you a passing glance of this section of the country. In the first place, neither life, limb nor property is safe now, since the Yankees occupied this

63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
place. One can form an idea of a country swarming with idle, dissolute, improvident negroes and garrisoned with negro troops. Yankee cotton agents are having a good time; they seize upon a lot of private cotton and then offer to release it if the party will pay them a heavy bonus or divide.---This state of affairs prevails not only in this section of the country, but in many parts of Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Texas".

Evidence of Northern aggression or incompetence, and Southern disloyalty is about evenly balanced so far as communications are concerned.

Among the more conservative elements of the North there was a general reeling at the close of 1865 that Congress and President would ultimately solve the problem together. Harpers Weekly was firm in the opinion that the Southern experiment was quite successful enough to see no reason for doubting its continuation. The Washington Chronicle believed "Thaddeus Stevens will live to see the day when his gloomy predictions will pass away before a lasting peace. We cannot yield to his doctrine of Conquered Provinces".

Since the time when our Constitution was formed, there has been a controversy over fundamental rights vested in the several branches of the nation's government. "Already then, negro suffrage is reduced to a practical necessity and practical

wisdom". The reason given was, that since Johnson had prescribed conditions for the South, then Congress, under the Constitution, had the same right. This implied, evidently, that loyal negroes were necessary to create a loyal South, and thereby elect Congressmen who would support Congressional power. New England, through The Connecticut Herald saw some hope for the South in "the infusion of new blood from the North and the development of an enlightened South". Similar statements occurred quite often in several papers of the North. History has later shown what this Northern enlightenment proved to be, and letters of this same time clearly indicate conditions already in existence in 1865. The word exploitation is better suited as a descriptive term than enlightenment.

Congressional action began in December, 1865, and with its advent, the New York press believed any one looking for a break between President and Congress would be "utterly disappointed". These editorial opinions went further astray in maintaining that "unless we are greatly mistaken, the American people will give Johnson such support as has never been accorded to any Chief Magistrate since the days of Andrew Jackson". Indications of other developments were manifested when Congress proceeded without waiting for the usual Presidential

68. Ibid., November 30, 1865.
70. Ibid., December 28, 1865.
message. Radical papers excused this glaring omission by saying it was done, "in all probability in full understanding with the President". Gideon Welles thinks such understanding was not established, and furthermore, Johnson had sent Horace Maynard to prevent Steven's effort to have a Reconstruction Committee appointed. Both sides at least understood that trouble was approaching. Welles says Johnson told him the Reconstruction Committee would be "knocked in the head" by Maynard. He concludes his remarks on this subject by mentioning the fact that Congress also did not send the usual committee to inform Mr. Johnson of its organization. Welles thinks this was not unintentional, but had a definite "design in it".

At the close of 1865, direct attacks upon the President were still unpopular, and resented by the Northern press. This is shown by criticism of Charles Sumner's speeches against Johnson in December, 1865. Sumner, who prided himself upon his dignity and poise, was accused of being "in very bad taste, to asy the least", while scorning the President at this time. Oberholtzer says, "Whoever will follow the record of the fall and summer of 1865, cannot fail to form the opinion that the

71. The Connecticut Herald, December 4, 1865.
73. Ibid.
74. The Nation, December 28, 1865.
President, throughout that time, labored with industry, tact, and patriotism". Rhodes summarized the situation as follows: "The question was fairly before Congress and the country; with the main body of Republicans in the House and Senate as the jury, Johnson was the advocate of one side, while Sumner and Stevens were on the other".

Many editorials did not indicate that the whole question had resolved itself into a legal combat between President and Congress, as is indicated by The Washington Chronicle: "If the South wishes to be fully restored to the Union and to enjoy all the blessings which it affords, they have only to comply with Congress and the President and the general policy of our government". The actual Radical interpretation of this policy is stated by The Chicago Daily Tribune; "If there is to be any hanging back now against Constitutional Amendments, they will find negro suffrage at their doors by the unanimous voice of the North". The Connecticut Herald thought "the President will not take strong ground either way, but will leave the admission of Rebel States to the decision of Congress", Another newspaper said, "Neither the President nor the people's

77. The Washington Chronicle, December 24, 1865.
78. The Chicago Tribune, November 14, 1865.
79. The Connecticut Herald, December 5, 1865.
representatives in Congress, if we understand their relative positions, have any other purpose in view but to bring back the seceded states on terms of perfect equality with those who have continued loyal to the Union. These statements, while varying from one another somewhat, still show that people were led to think that the policy used would be agreed upon by legislative and executive departments together, and certainly gave no indication of a battle between the two, with Congress as a jury. It is necessary to follow these issues on into 1866 before an open break appears in the public press.

CHAPTER III

Intimate glimpses of political movements appear in the memoirs of two Cabinet members, Welles and McCulloch. On January 8, 1866, Mr. Welles reports, "The President and the Radical leaders are not in direct conflict, but I see not how it is to be avoided". McCulloch said, "he (Johnson) disagreed with Congress (as his predecessor would have done had he lived) in regard to what should be required of the Southern States, but he was not the aggressor, and although his course was in some respects indefensible, he little merited the obloquy which was heaped upon him". Day by day the relationship was becoming more strained, and Welles plainly indicates Stanton's turn to Radical policy, which gave a good connection for the Radicals in securing information, as well as blocking plans of President Johnson.

Henry J. Raymond, editor of The New York Times, was one friend of the President who started the year of 1866 with an open declaration of support by claiming, "nothing is left to be compromised. The fact is, the work of restoration is nearly complete". It seemed to him that opposition to President Johnson's plans would be justifiable only insofar as it was not in harmony with Mr. Lincoln's plan, since the Northern people

gave Lincoln their support. The newly organized Southern governments were a part of Lincoln's plan, so the only logical thing to do was to recognize them. Mr. Raymond was but one of a minority group in the House, destined to be crushed by the opposition under the leadership of Thaddeus Stevens.

Very little opportunity was left for a President to exert honest effort and express individual ideas when a leading Western paper declared "if the President quarrels with Congress, it will be for the purpose of following in the footsteps of his three apostate predecessors--Tyler, Fillmore, and Buchanan."

This opinion was carried to its conclusion in hoping for no trouble, and believing that no trouble would occur if the "acting President" would confine himself to his legitimate functions and not interfere in the business of Congress. Congressional supremacy is urged still further by New England editors who looked to Congress as a well-nigh perfect representation of the people. The Boston Transcript thought, "at no time since the adoption of the Constitution have the Senate and House so perfectly represented their constituencies. It belongs to Congress preeminently to settle the terms of reconstruction". The argument brought forth in behalf of such action included, first of all, a warning against hasty recon-

5. The Chicago Daily Tribune, January 3, 1866.
6. Ibid.
struction, and secondly, a reminder of Southern hatred, which, according to New England editors, was quelled only because the Confederacy was unable to fight any longer. Then, even though the Southern States were not represented, it was thought that the North would care for all local affairs, so nothing more was necessary from the standpoint of human need.

In 1861, Johnson declared in the U.S. Senate that no power existed anywhere to declare a state out of the Union. He held the same opinion in 1866, when Congress, under Sumner, Stevens, and their associates aimed to do that very thing. The group supporting Johnson called Congressional action a "Radical assault", which is in agreement with McCulloch's statements that Johnson was not the aggressor. The National Intelligencer said, "The people want reunion. The American masses, with their President, are looking to Peace". There is little evidence at this point to show Presidential inconsistency, although there is considerable to prove insurgent plotting against the administration. One thing may be stated for certain; Johnson was not a "drunken imbecile", as a Bishop stated a few years after his administration closed. This remark passed without rebuke, and was published without a comment in later years, which indicates the attitude of the American

8. Ibid., January 25, 1866.
10. Ibid., January 5, 1866.
people toward their seventeenth President.

Editorials of The Chicago Daily Tribune denounced the Southern reconstruction policy under Johnson as nothing more than the return of a caste system "which distinguished the laws and customs of the South". In the editorials of The Boston Transcript, which was said to be the organ of Charles Sumner in New England, Thaddeus Stevens was held up as a champion of the people, because, as that paper said, "in his fight he trusts to the people to sustain whatever is just and humane; and in that trust feels assured, as well he may, of a final victory".

To continue in Congress despite the absence of eleven states was no serious handicap in 1866, according to the Radicals. The Boston Transcript said, "the people are not under control of party demagogues or manners, but are voting and thinking for themselves. The majority in Congress are not ahead of the wishes of their constituents". All of this evasion of issues and political writing simply will not bear the test of experience or the testimony of history.

Andrew Johnson looked upon himself as the representative of all the American people. He had been consistent enough up to

13. The Boston Transcript, February 2, 1866.
14. Ibid., February 16, 1866.
this time to create the impression that he "represented a po-
15
tition both politically and Constitutionally strong". From
this time forward, criticism of his work began to take a more
open form. No better examples of disregard for Presidential
authority need be given than the attitude displayed by the
opening of Congress in December, 1865. That group of leaders
proceeded without waiting for a Presidential message, which
was contrary to all established precedent. Thaddeus Stevens
now went further on February 16, 1866, by adding, "we shall
not trouble President Johnson by sending him this amendment
(the Fourteenth), if it is passed by Congress, because it is
not necessary to submit it to him for his approval". Such a
statement was an open insult, and may be taken as one more in-
dication of Radical determination. The President had shown one
significant change thus far, and that was a desire to recog-
nize the Southern State governments after he had opened his
term of office with severe denunciations of the rebels. Rad-
icals interpreted this as traitorous activity rather than a
genuine desire to rebuild the South, or at least they claimed
to hold this view.

On February 6, 1866, the second Freedmen's Bureau Bill was
ready for the President's signature. This reorganized the for-
mer Bureau and continued its activity as a means of caring for

the South. February twentieth and twenty-first, 1866, were
days of editorial outbursts throughout the country in answer
to the veto of this Bill. One journal stated bluntly, "by this
formal act he has severed himself from the loyal party and
united with the enemy". His reason that it was not needed
opened the way for criticism, because the first act expired
May 1, 1866. This reason was called a "positively silly one",
and also led to the more radical supposition that the Presi-
dent proposed to use the veto power now to prevent successful
legislation until therepresentatives from the Southern States
were admitted. He now had made a stand that was definite
enough to place him in open hostility to a Radical Congress.
Sumner's supporting journal looked with "profound regret" upon
the veto, while The New York Times thought it was "not at var-
iance with either the majority or Congress or the country in
any essential point". The Bureau Bill provided for an oppor-
tunity of increased governmental activity and expenditure, and
furthermore, had originated "solely as a war measure". It rep-
resented a form a form of government which was burdensome, and
if the Presidential plan were carried through, there would
have been no justification for it. The National Intelligencer

17. The Chicago Daily Tribune, February 21, 1866.
18. Ibid.
19. Ibid.
20. The Boston Transcript, February 20, 1866.
22. The National Intelligencer, February 17, 1866.
hoped that, "even if the President signs it, his prudence and discretion may save us from some of its dangers". Therefore, we see some opinion strongly against the bill even before the veto, and after the veto, The New York Sun upheld Johnson by saying, "the veto is no sign at all that he has broken with his party".

While this was fresh in the minds of the people, Mr. Johnson made a speech which cast more gloom over his prospects of maintaining public opinion in support of his plan. In the address he uttered many remarks of a somewhat undignified nature, and ended by mentioning the names of a few opponents, thereby openly committing himself against them. Thaddeus Stevens, Charles Sumner, and Wendell Phillips were named as men who work against the fundamental principles of our government, and Johnson excited the boisterous merriment of the audience by calling John W. Forney "a dead duck" upon whom he "would not waste his ammunition". This was a dangerous pastime because Mr. Forney was secretary of the Senate, and editor of The Washington Chronicle. That journal then turned against Johnson and fought him to the end, whereas it was quite friendly up to this time. Another noticeable change against the President is shown in that powerful New York publication, The Nation. The

23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., February 20, 1866.
February twenty-second speech (1866) left the situation in such a state that most Radicals looked upon the executive power now as a threat capable of delaying, but not preventing Congressional action.

A regular campaign was inaugurated by Radical forces preparatory to forcing through a Freedmen's Bureau and a Civil Rights Bill. Among the Congressional supporters it was thought "all that loyal men need to do now is to fortify themselves against Johnson's attacks by passing such laws as shall leave him powerless or remove him altogether". After such remarks as Johnson made on February 22, it was vain to look for any further cooperation of President and Congress, and his staunch supporters stated that they were not surprised at a Radical campaign throughout the country because they "did not see how, as politicians, the Radicals could pursue any other course than the one they had adopted". And above all things, these Congressmen were politicians, so a deliberate attempt by the President "to make them and their party odious" was answered with an energetic campaign. It was also sarcastically proposed by ElL. Godkin that "a commission composed of conservative politicians be framed to enquire by what authority Congress

27. The Chicago Daily Tribune, February 23, 1866.
29. Ibid.
meddles in the government of this country at all". It was cer-

tainly a matter of regret that Congress and the President
should differ so decidedly at this important moment, but it
was very absurd now to expect, as Harpers Weekly did, that
"Congress should take the initiative in returning to coopera-
tion with the President". Mr. George William Curtis of Har-
pers Weekly thought this would be possible if Congressmen re-
ally studied the Constitution and saw the branches of govern-
ment in their proper aspects. He said, "The President is but
a coordinate branch of the government. He is not the superior
of Congress or the Supreme Court". Whatever attitudes might
have been taken, the fact remains that Radical forces scorned
the very idea that Johnson had followed Lincoln's plan, and
the press was filled with talk about this 'assault' for a week
or more. Each side regarded the other as guilty of the origin-
al 'assault'.

Using the first veto, together with the February twenty-
second speech as a basis, the opposition moved forward to exe-
cute the program of their 'Committee on Reconstruction' with
a new spirit of mastery. The intense feeling of antagonism be-
came more aroused as some editors thanked the President for

30. The Nation, March 8, 1866.
31. Harpers Weekly, March 10, 1866.
32. Ibid., March 17, 1866.
"the vigor and intelligence with which he called Congress to a sense of its duties, and for the pluck which has enabled him, more or less completely, to baffle the plans of the disunionists". Colonel Forney was told "it would be utterly idle for him or anybody else to prosecute war upon the President" because it will be impossible to force such hatreds upon the people. Most of the appeal to the people was necessarily based upon success in handling reorganized Southern States, together with the negro suffrage problem, so affairs hung in the balance until President or Congress could win a vote of confidence. It may be too harsh to say that Johnson was in a mood as bitter and defiant as that of the extremest Radical of the Congressional majority", or that "by sheer rashness and intemperance he forced the consolidation of the majority against him", but it seems unnecessary for a President to use his veto power as he did against the Freedmen's Bill, and it is nothing short of absurd and ridiculous to have a national executive engage in a useless tirade such as he gave in his February twenty-second speech.

Not all of the opposition went to an extreme because of these acts, however, and Mr. Godkin of The Nation is a good example. He urged the people to remember that, "no matter

33. Harpers Weekly, March 10, 1866.  
34. Ibid., February 26, 1866.  
36. Ibid.
what Mr. Johnson may say or do, he is our President, and his
shame is our shame, a fact which people in the excitement of
37 party contests are apt to forget". The Boston Transcript
lists The Washington Chronicle and Philadelphia Press as
friendly to Johnson at this time, and both were edited by Mr.
Forney. But editorials in these journals gradually became more
intense against Mr. Johnson, until the following summary was
made by The Washington Chronicle in the fall of 1866; "The
present deplorable condition in the South is the necessary re-
sult of the President's policy and of his political associa-
tions. He now belongs with the whole rebel population of the
38 South". The New York Tribune, which was recognized by anti-
39 Johnson papers as being friendly to him, spoke of Johnson's
inebriation as an excuse for his recent outbursts, and later
expressed regret that "the best excuse which could be offered
40 for it could no longer be pleaded in palliation". Executive
ability has declined to a low ebb when intoxication is used
to excuse a public address, and no matter what his former
record had been or how staunchly he now supported the people,
or whether he ever was intoxicated in his life, indications
from the press of that day show plainly that he created a
tremendous force of public opinion against his cause. This,

37. The Nation, March 15, 1866.
38. The Washington Chronicle, September 14, 1866.
in the end, defeated the very plan for which he seemed to be working, and judging from his tactless procedure, he was instrumental in aggravating his own downfall.

Senator Trumbull of Illinois had now seen his Freedmen's Bureau Bill defeated, but a second bill was brought forth by him, called the Civil Rights Bill, under which the negroes were declared to be citizens of the United States. By March 13, it had passed the House and was ready for the President's signature. *Harpers Weekly* hoped, by March 31, that "the bill might be approved by him and become a law." But while most people were uncertain as to what Johnson would do, and at a time when logical thought was needed, Thaddeus Stevens gave a speech in the House in which he disrespectfully harangued the Chief Executive. This led some to say "Thaddeus Stevens had no single quality of a statesman except fidelity to a principle", which necessarily meant his principle, and the further remark, "we insist that Mr. Johnson has reason to be hurt and indignant when he is represented as the friend and ally of red-handed rebels". Even if Stevens' remarks were erratic and unnecessarily bitter, it was no excuse for an unnecessary veto, if it is felt that the veto was uncalled for by circumstances.

41. *Harpers Weekly*, March 31, 1866.
43. *Harpers Weekly*, April 7, 1866.
While the bill was pending in Congress it was discussed by the Cabinet, where Seward, McCulloch, and Welles supported Johnson's plan of a veto. John Sherman's private letters claim that Johnson "deceived and misled his best friends". Sherman says, "I know he led many to believe he would agree to the Civil Rights Bill". Rhodes says that Governor Oliver P. Morton of Indiana hastened to Washington, D.C. and begged the President to sign the bill, urging that otherwise the rent between him and his party would be beyond mending". Governor Morton's prestige may be judged by some words of George W. Julian of the Radicals. Julian had little reason to heap flattery upon Morton for the two were life-long political enemies, and he adds, "I only make these statements in justice to the truth", for "it cannot be denied his services to the country in this crisis were great", and summarizes his importance as follows:— "Governor Morton was a phenomenal figure in American politics during the war period, and played a very remarkable part in the affairs of his Party". Apparently, Johnson misled some of the political leaders to the same extent that he did in giving an anti-rebel impression when he first ascended to office. And secondly, he made the veto appear as a defiance,

46. Ibid., p. 583.
47. Julian, p. 271.
48. Ibid., p. 270.
49. Ibid.
since there was certainly no reason why this bill would have wrecked his plan at all, and there were several reasons why the veto did do that. McCulloch upheld the veto in the Cabinet session, but some years later recorded that "the veto of the Civil Rights Bill turned not only the Republican Party, but the general public sentiment of Northern people against Johnson, and from that time onward there was open hostility between legislative and executive branches of the government". One advantage in using advisers is supposedly the better opportunity of having insight plus foresight. In this case, Mr. McCulloch's insight functioned almost twenty years too late to be of any particular use, if we may judge from the above statement taken from his reminiscences of this period.

Following the veto, some declared it was only what they expected, and added that "the arguments of the veto are loaned Mr. Johnson by some Democratic lawyers in Washington D.C." The Chicago Daily Tribune openly called for impeachment; "We believe on the simple merits of his action he deserver to be impeached by the House, tried before the Senate, and removed from office". President Johnson stated in his veto that he represented all of the people, while Congressmen had only a section or separate group of constituents. In reply to this,

50. McCulloch, p. 381.
51. The Boston Transcript, March 28, 1866
52. The Chicago Daily Tribune, March 31, 1866.
The Atlantic Monthly maintained that he was not elected to represent all of the people. "The President was not elected by the voice of the loyal people for the office he now holds. Our 53 Congressmen were elected for the exact position they hold". As to protecting the rights of eleven Southern states, it was seriously doubted whether "magnanimity which sacrifices the innocent in order to propitiate the guilty" is highly desirable. As we have seen, Mr. McCulloch admitted later that this veto turned general opinion in the North, and it may be added here that as a political move it was quite tactless, inasmuch as it opened the way for an almost complete Radical victory.

About the only thing in Johnson's favor is the fact that the Radicals had carefully planned against him, and the evidence is too strong to deny. Henry J. Raymond brought this out after the veto by asking the country not to forget that "the critical period through which we are passing is the result not of Presidential caprice, obstinacy or ambition, but of the disposition of the Radicals to force through legislation looking to negro supremacy in the South". Welles wrote earlier in March, 1866, "Stevens is determined to have an issue between the Executive and Congress, notwithstanding that the country deprecates such an issue. I incline to the opinion that, by

53. The Atlantic Monthly, April, 1866.
54. Ibid.
the working of his Directory machinery, he will be successful in raising that issue". These remarks only substantiate what has been said prior to this concerning a determination of one group to right the Chief Executive, and Stevens' bitter speech made before the veto may have been nothing more than a foul method of evoking that veto to aggravate public opinion.

So far as editorial opinion is concerned, the February twenty-second speech and the first veto of the Freedmen's Bureau Bill rather than the Civil Rights Bill marks the significant change against Andrew Johnson. For a year The Chicago Daily Tribune had criticized him, but with the addition of John W. Forney and E.L. Godkin to the opposition, journalistic creation of public opinion was decidedly anti-Johnson. Mr. Godkin openly denounced much that Johnson did, but when impeachment was imminent a year later, he reminded the American public of Johnson's past patriotism and pleaded for patience. "Andrew Johnson has in times past been tried and not found wanting in patriotism, in devotion to the Union, in faithfulness to his obligations". It is certainly not fair to claim, as George W. Julian did, that the veto of the Bureau Bill "stripped Johnson of all disguises". The evidence shows him to be obstinate, tactless, and erratic in speech, but it does not prove

58. The Nation, March 1, 1867.
that "everybody could now see the mistake of his nomination at Baltimore". Furthermore, there is little reason, so far as editorial opinion indicates, for supporting Woodrow Wilson's contention that "a less headstrong man might by conference have hit upon some plan by which his differences with the leaders in Congress would have been accommodated". Negro suffrage was demanded, and there is great doubt as to whether any other accommodation would have been considered. At any rate, it was no time to defy Northern opinion and strengthen Congress by resistance when Congressional elections were so near. Could Johnson have held his tongue and signed the two bills, his support in Congress would have undoubtedly been made stronger by the new elections. He gave up that opportunity and chose a way that was destined to bring him defeat.

Opinion was divided in such a way as to give credit to Congress while Johnson appeared as a rather stubborn individual. "The President is unquestionably pure of purpose and very determined, but the equal integrity, ability, devotion and firmness of Congress cannot be questioned". So long as such an opinion existed, and Johnson defied Congress, them people were likely to vote against him. The New York Herald added an

60. Ibid.
62. Harpers Weekly, April 14, 1866.
enlightening statement that the Congressional party in America was made up of "The God-fearing and Bible reading portion of the people". Now that an appeal had been made to Puritanical elements, the next thing was to hearken back to Lincoln's day and show some discrepancy between Johnson and Lincoln. In his last public speech Mr. Lincoln said, "the Executive claims no right to say when or whether members should be admitted to seats in Congress". This statement became quite prominent as a quotation in an effort to induce some degree of submission on Johnson's part to Congressional measures. The New York World concluded that the "earnestness" of Congressional members was best manifested by the open call for impeachment on the part of Radical papers. "The fact that the mask is thrown off evinces the intense malignity and 'earnestness' of Presidential enemies". Obviously, the entire problem now faced an final solution at the ballot box.

The Radicals used future elections as a threat and it was quite apparent that no compromise was possible. The Boston Transcript said, "Mr. Johnson can indulge in self-will and passion. The issue will finally be settled at the ballot box, and defeat is assured those who reconstruct states out of Rebel material". The chief aim now was not to conciliate, but

63. The New York Herald, July 2, 1866.
64. Harper's Weekly, April 21, 1866.
65. The New York World, April 5, 1866.
66. The Boston Transcript, June 5, 1866.
to "set upon a platform for public support". All hope of conciliation lay in submission on Johnson's part, and at this stage of the battle it is difficult to see just why he should have submitted. Almost anyone could see that "a little radicalism under the circumstances was perhaps natural and pardonable", but the insistence upon "making treason odious" meant treating the South as a conquered province, and this, in turn, was relinquishing all policy in favor of Mr. Stevens, together with his Radical supporters in the House and Senate.

Undoubtedly consistency is an admirable trait, but Mr. Stevens' consistency had by this time developed into a policy of "Radicalism, clear and undisguised; Partisanship, stern and unrelenting". There no longer was a middle ground of reason between Mr. Stevens and the President, but the Johnson supporters firmly believed "patriotism would array itself with the latter and partisanship with the former". Ordinarily a decision by the United States Supreme Court is supposed to throw some light upon the problems with which it deals, otherwise our governmental system does not function according to its constitutional basis. In this case, such decisions had little weight with the

67. Ibid.
68. Harpers Weekly, June 2, 1866.
69. Ibid.
70. The Baltimore Sun, May, 31, 1866.
71. Ibid.
Congressmen. An example was given when Justice Nelson of the Supreme Court rendered his decision in the Egan Case of 1866. Judging from the following words, this decision was quite definitely in favor of Johnson's plan: "Indeed, the moment the rebellion was suppressed, the ancient authority, possession and laws resumed their accustomed sway". Now with this decision, the opinion of Stevens, Sumner, and others that Southern States had forfeited all their rights fell completely to the ground.

These leaders in Congress looked upon the South as conquered territory, and the use of the negro as the main fruit of emancipation. According to Woodrow Wilson, "the negro became to them a creature who needed only liberty to make him a man". "They let their sentiment and their sense of power dictate their thought and purpose". In April, 1866, after Congress passed the Civil Rights Bill over the President's veto, they also sent the Fourteenth Amendment to the States, "as if less confident of their constitutional ground than of their parliamentary supremacy". First of all, any Southern State that rejected it was denied admission to the Union, and secondly subjected to a loss of representative power because of denial of suffrage to the negro. It is no wonder that Mr. Johnson

72. Ibid., June 4, 1866.
73. Wilson, Vol. V. p. 22.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid., p. 28.
expressed his opinion against such a move, but some of the opposition said, "there is nothing in it which is not strictly in consonance with Mr. Johnson's views, so we hope, for the sake of harmony, he will not oppose it"."We can see no purpose in opposition unless to reiterate his conviction that no amendments shall be passed until the unrepresented states are admitted". Any attempt to compromise or use conciliatory methods was condemned and the question was asked; "Is the President to be supported because he is the champion of conciliation and peace? Congress believes that his conciliation is the compromise of vital principles, and his peace is surrender of human rights". The final radical suggestion as a conclusion to all this was for "Congress by a joint resolution of both Houses to call upon the President to resign". Impeachment was the solution advocated by radical journals during June and July of 1866.

Pro-Johnson sentiment, however, was not lacking and The Baltimore Sun ran an article on "The Deceptive Constitutional Amendment". "This amendment (Fourteenth) aims at deluding the people, while avoiding the appearance of a conflict with

76. Harpers Weekly, June 23, 1866.
77. Ibid, July 7, 1866.
78. The Atlantic Monthly, April, 1866.
80. The Baltimore Sun, June 16, 1866.
Johnson. It is artfully framed to effect the purposes of the extreme Radicals in Congress and creates a gulf as wide as right and wrong between itself and Andrew Johnson's policy. In the opinion of The New York World, "the President's chief mistake at this crucial time was not so much in his opposition to the amendment as in "keeping the Cabinet of Mr. Lincoln". Evidence is quite plain that people recognized this lack of harmony in the Cabinet and that his friends urged a change. Henry J. Raymond stood by the President in proclaiming that "we sustain, thoroughly and heartily, the position of the President upon this subject". Above all, said The New York Times, "the people want the Union restored, and in our opinion will send members to the next Congress who will restore it".

Southern viewpoints naturally did not appease the appetite of eager politicians since they offered opposition to complete control of the South. One paper said, "we did not fight five years for the negro. Restore the Union and the negro will find his proper place under the protection of those most deeply interested in his welfare". The whole South had gone to work with zeal, and Kentucky papers urged a persistent campaign for financial power as the only means of reviving Southern life.

81. Ibid.
82. The New York World, June 16, 1866.
83. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, August 29, 1866.
The remarks made were undoubtedly quite tactless, and worked against amnesty on the part of Congress. However, some of the harshness of these statements was caused by the truth that was in them. For example, The Lexington Observer and Reporter suggested a hope that by a few years of persistent industry the "silver stolen by Butler, furniture burned by Sherman, and costly books captured by pious chaplains could be replaced".

One event which tended to give further stimulus to anti-Southern feeling was an outbreak in New Orleans. This received wide publicity throughout the nation, since the event centered around General Butler, who was located there, and offered an opportunity to demand something more of the South. First of all the Northern press declared that a white man fired the first shot, and that the mayor, an appointee of Johnson, sided with the mob. The Nation summarized the whole affair by calling Johnson's dispatch to the Louisiana Attorney-General as "disgraceful", and added that "any reconstruction that does not secure for Wendell Phillips the power of delivering one of his most radical lectures in any town or village of the South, with complete security, must be a mockery, a delusion, and a snare. General Grant had faced the South on the field of battle, and now in testifying as the reconstruction of this same area said: "The South is anxious to return under a

87. Ibid., September 5, 1866.
88. The Nation, August 2, 1866.
course which was not humiliating to them as citizens", Not many citizens of the South could have listened to Wendell Phillips' most radical lectures and upheld respect for themselves, to sat little of avoiding humiliation. It had been stated before this time that "Wendell Phillips is a man whose mission is to oppose everything; he first opposed slavery, then President Johnson, and among other things he occasionally opposes himself." The National Intelligencer said, "we are no advocates of vengeance. America can afford to forgive the South for this riot and forget Ben Butler".

Our Chief Executive felt that an appeal to the people might prevent Congress from securing a radical majority. To accomplish this purpose a tour was planned. The immediate occasion for it was an invitation from Chicago asking the President to deliver an address at the laying of the corner-stone for a monument to Stephen A. Douglas. During the preceding year, William Cullen Bryant declared, "Johnson was proving himself one of the most discreet, clear-sighted, upright, and sagacious statesmen of the age". This type of sentiment was not present in 1866 when the tour began, but Johnson at least had prospects of making an appeal. Henry Raymond said, "we believe

89. The Baltimore Sun, June 21, 1866.
90. The New York Herald, June 2, 1866.
91. The National Intelligencer, June 29, 1866.
both the President and the country will be benefited by the tour. We think it would be an excellent thing to follow this tour by another through the Southern States. One aspect of never-failing importance for Johnson’s day was the presence of opposition in the religious press of America. "The Boston Transcript said that, "the religious press of America now unanimously condemned Mr. Lincoln’s apostate successor."

One encouraging fact for the President was the support of friends who upheld him in his plan of reconstruction. Thomas Ewing of Ohio, a leader of the Ohio bar, had supported the President from the beginning of his administration. He and Lewis D. Campbell had fought for control of Republican State Conventions since 1865, against Ben Wade, Ashley, Giddings and others destined later to be quite radical in their views. Mr. Ewing issued a statement in The Baltimore Sun in support of Johnson on August 14, 1866, which came at a time when sound logical support was badly needed if the speaking tour was to mean anything. Ewing declared, "Congress itself is unconstitutional. Therefore the Civil Rights Bill, Freedmens Bureau Bill and Fourteenth Amendment are unconstitutional." This argument of Mr. Ewing was based upon the fact that Southern States were out of the Union while national legislation was

94. The Boston Transcript, August 20, 1866.
95. Milton, p. 221.
96. The Baltimore Sun, August 14, 1866.
enacted, and included the pertinent remark that, "exclusion is necessary only to retain power in the hands of the present majority".

Across the Atlantic, French newspaper opinion spoke favorably of Johnson. An editorial in La Liberte said: "This President Johnson has become a most devoted agent of reconciliation. He really was attempting to complete restoration despite severe opposition, and with his proclamation restoring civil authority in Texas, the Union was completed. The Baltimore Sun stated, "there is but one other step now necessary at the hands of the Executive, and that is to remove all restrictions from the proclamation of Amnesty." This would have been very well, providing the Executive could exert authority enough to accomplish such a purpose. The necessary move now was to influence public opinion sufficiently to secure a friendly Congress.

Public speaking had been costly to Johnson prior to this, and now he was in tremendous danger of saying many things to antagonize people, especially when influenced by feeling more than by logical thinking. Mr. Godkin thought "he is either under wretched advisers or is himself unmanageable. His speeches are vulgar, egotistical, and sometimes profane". The only

97. Ibid., August 14, 1866.
98. Ibid.; August 24, 1866.
99. Ibid., August 20, 1866.
100. The Nation, September 6, 1866.
mitigating circumstance in Mr. Godkin's criticism was an apology for using such harsh terms, but as he explained, "these harsh words were necessary after a careful reading of the speeches". *Harpers Weekly* defied any man to "read the speeches uttered by the President without wincing with mortification".

Chicago's welcome was not at all enthusiastic, according to *The Chicago Daily Tribune*, but "may be likened to a frost in midsummer, killing flowers and casting gloom over the face of Nature". *The New York Observer* upheld Johnson, but on September 20, regretted to say that "President Johnson's style has often been such as to sadden and even mortify national pride". This newspaper then continued to uphold him by criticizing the people for according him such a poor welcome. "His reception in some of the places is deserving of severest reprobation". Sumner's paper said the speeches were, "unsurpassed for shallowness", and that the "President chose to leave the Capital and become a stump orator or demagogue". In his speech at Cleveland he remarked, "I do not care about dignity".

His friend, Mr. Raymond could only say he "greatly regretted

101. Ibid.
105. Ibid.
107. Ibid.
such a remark".

Down in Kentucky the visit was hailed as "the most remarkable official tour in our history. The Radicals have shown an utter want of decency in their treatment of him during a time like this when Courage and Truth are more precious than dignity". The Baltimore Sun looked upon the President as "no polished orator, but an earnest man". Furthermore, according to this paper even though his speeches were at times rather impassioned, "he gave a conclusive answer to the unscrupulous enemies of restoration". A summary of the Baltimore speech includes some salient arguments of the President. The South fought because the North in its estimation, endangered the Constitution. They did not fight against the Constitution, but against a Union they thought broke the Constitution. After being compelled to lay down arms, "the South is now as firmly for the Constitution as always". The Baltimore Sun called this last remark the "corner-stone of his speech".

Whatever else may be said, it must be admitted that Andrew Johnson made a desperate effort to bring back the Southern States without having negro suffrage forced upon them. Nothing

109. Ibid.
110. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, September 15, 1866.
111. The Baltimore Sun, September 3, 1866.
112. Ibid.
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
proves this any more than persistent criticism by the radical exponent of negro suffrage, The Chicago Daily Tribune, which stated that, "for Mr. Johnson longer to persist in his attempts to restore the Rebels to power without such guarantees as the public sentiment demands, would be to defy and insult the American people in a manner requiring more turpitude than even Andrew Johnson has yet displayed". Apparently these guarantees that public sentiment demanded amounted to nothing more than negro suffrage, and this was definitely stated when The Baltimore Sun reminded people; "One single act remains to be done—the admission of representatives, but the separation party has entrenched itself behind the proposed amendment, negro suffrage."

Radical leaders were quite busy while the tour was being made. Ben Butler spoke in Cleveland and informed the audience there that "Mr. Johnson has filled thirty offices now without Senate concurrence. The Senate is already deprived of its right Thaddeus Stevens called the entire affair "A circus". The Nation probably gave Stevens too much credit by "deploring his oratory for the same reason he indulged in it— for the sake of the cause". Stevens had only one cause now, and that

115. The Chicago Daily Tribune, October 11, 1866.
116. The Baltimore Sun, September 24, 1866.
117. The Nation, October 4, 1866.
118. Ibid.
119. Ibid.
was Republican domination by a Republican Congress. The evidence lies in his speeches and attitude toward Johnson, together with the way in which legislation was engineered by his Reconstruction Committee.

New England opposition to the South was bitterly resented. The Lexington Observer and Reporter openly stated: "It may be taken for granted that so long as the New England oligarchy continues to control the public sentiment, Kentucky and the South will be excluded from a share in the Federal Government. Wendell Phillips declares there can be no lasting peace until South Carolina, Louisiana and Kentucky are born again in the image of Massachusetts. New England civilization stands ready to throttle us".

Some of the fruits of his February twenty-second speech came before Mr. Johnson as John W. Forney attempted to create opposition to him by using his Washington Chronicle for that purpose. Mr. Forney answered Thomas Ewing's appeal to the Constitution in favor of Johnson by quoting from a speech the latter made in Nashville, Tennessee, in 1864. "Whenever you find a man prating about the Constitution--- spot him; for he is a traitor". Many of these editorial discussions had been made with pro-Johnson papers, and The Baltimore Sun, which

120. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, November 21, 1866.
121. The Washington Chronicle, October 5, 1866.
printed Mr. Ewing's article, had given a fairly good answer to Forney's thrust in an earlier issue. "Isolated facts and incompleteness is a wanton thing when generalizations are made from them. We shall never prepare accounts to serve the corrupt purposes of a faction". However, the Northern people who read The Washington Chronicle saw there a complete denunciation of the President not based entirely upon isolated facts. "Whoever favors President Johnson, wishes to strip the loyal North of twenty-five members in Congress, and give twenty-five seats to the disloyal South". The President's journal in Washington tried to overcome this, and urged people to "remember that the plan of the President rests upon Constitutional government".

We are brought back at this time to a former reference made to Andrew Johnson's nomination for Vice-President. Charles Sumner gave a speech in Washington D.C., early in October, 1866 in which he called Johnson "a creature of an accident, and inferior in ability and character". Mr. Sumner referred to the immediate cause of Johnson's accession, which was an accident, but did not mention the political battle at Baltimore, June 7, 1864, in which his political designs against Seward resulted in Johnson's nomination.

Meanwhile as the elections approached, more radical state-

122. The Baltimore Sun, September 7, 1866.
123. The Washington Chronicle, October 4, 1866.
124. The National Intelligencer, September 13, 1866.
125. Ibid., October 4, 1866.
ments were made on both sides. The Chicago Times, a Democratic journal, suggested a hasty and decisive method. "An industrious and energetic application of the guillotine is all that is needed to remove the Republican party and save the country". This journal went further into the administration and gave some comparisons of prominent men. "If there is a worse man in the United States than Ben Butler, that man is Edwin M. Stanton. Only those capable of analyzing deliberate remorseless scoundrelism can understand the character of either of these wretches". More light was thrown upon the New Orleans riot by telling how General Baird sent a telegram to Stanton. Stanton placed it in his pocket and did not say a word concerning it until a week after the riot, and then, before informing the President as to its contents, sent it to the press. This type of journal was branded as 'Copperhead', and did not succeed in exerting enough influence to save many votes for Johnson's support in the autumn elections.

People in the seceded area had very little confidence in political aid and frankly admitted it. There plans turned to industrial and commercial welfare as the only means of regaining prestige. The Lexington Observer and Reporter thought, "if the South could make herself rich and prosperous she could

127. The Chicago Times, October 11, 1866.
128. Ibid., November 12, 1866.
129. Ibid.
secure every political right she desired". An editorial statement like this is quite prophetic and true to later developments, as we shall see from the following words of Frederic L. Paxson written in 1915, "The future of American politics after 1865 was largely determined by the methods by which the revenue had been increased. It was a prosperous Union that emerged from the Civil War and every region but the South was strong in its conscious wealth". In addition to the economic motive, the South saw how people of the North supported Congress, and therefore prepared for the worst. The Chicago Times said Congress quite obviously meant to carry measure to an extreme, and added, "the South may expect more degrading conditions than those heretofore offered".

Interpretations of the radical victory were immediately forthcoming as an aftermath of the elections to Congress. The Atlantic Monthly remarked, "the controversy has been disposed of by the people. The high reconstruction powers which Johnson so haughtily, ostentatiously and confidently claimed have been disallowed, denounced and utterly repudiated, while those of Congress have been confirmed". Mr. Raymond held out one ray of hope and did not desert Johnson when he wrote in The New York Times: "If the President will consent to retrace his

130. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, December 5, 1866.  
131. Paxson, p. 10.  
132. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, December 5, 1866.  
133. The Atlantic Monthly, December, 1866.
steps a little, it will not be difficult for him to present a plan which will command the respect and the sanction of the great majority of American people: A hope of this nature was too idealistic to be of any value under the circumstances, but it is encouraging to see a more careful analysis of events as given in The Baltimore Sun." The results plainly show that the Northern States declare in favor of more stringent measures of reconstruction than those of the President". The Baltimore Sun did not believe the majority of Northern people would require negro suffrage "because nearly all Northern States deny suffrage to their negroes". The last argument must have struck Northern leaders as quite true but decidedly impractical. At any rate, the elections were no direct indorsement of Ben Butler's impeachment program except insofar as they gave the Radicals enough votes to carry this out if desirable. There was really no contest now, for the force was too much on one side. "Surely no public man ever encountered such sudden and bitter retribution". Retribution was not completed, however, until impeachment was attempted, so 1866 closed with the President facing impeachment.

135. The Baltimore Sun, December 4, 1866.
136. Ibid.
137, Harpers Weekly, December 22, 1866.
CHAPTER IV

There is no assurance that Congress would have been satisfied to admit the Southern States with no other guarantee than the acceptance of the Fourteenth Amendment, and Oberholtzer says, "if ever there had been a time when Congress might have been contented with the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment as a condition upon which the Southern States might return to their Federal relationships, it had now passed". This was blamed upon Andrew Johnson in a speech made by James A. Garfield, who stated that "if the President had on any day since last July advised the people of the South to accept the Constitutional Amendment (Fourteenth) and come in as Tennessee did, it would have been done". Mr. Garfield's assurance of such return is further substantiated by George W. Julian's belief; "If the Fourteenth Amendment had been at first accepted, the work of reconstruction would have ended without conferring the ballot upon the negro. This will scarcely be denied by anyone, and has been frankly admitted by some of the most distinguished leaders of the party".

Southern people recognized this, as may be seen in the statement from The Lexington Observer and Reporter that "the great majority are bent on enfranchisement of blacks, together with the disfranchisement of rebel whites". Furthermore, this

4. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, January 2, 1867.
paper added that "Congress is supported by twenty dominant states, flushed with victory, and anxious to insult and proscribe ten or eleven enfeebled states". This humiliation was magnified through a suspicion that even if the amendments were accepted, there would be no relief or escape from vindictive measures. George S. Shanklin, Congressman from Lexington, Kentucky, said, "not one fourth of the Radicals are in favor of admitting Southern States even if they do ratify the Thirteenth Amendment". Sectionalism was entirely too noticeable in this suffrage drive to permit the use of much New England religious protection, or of very much patriotic appeal. There was considerable talk in papers throughout the land about the crime of rebel leaders and the terrible depravity of slavery, but the Chicago Daily Tribune was the only journal that had developed the idea to such an extent as to claim it would be easier to educate the four million negroes for citizenship than to attempt a return of the rebel whites.

Congress started out by presenting a bill to the President granting negro suffrage in the District of Columbia. Charles Sumner was the guiding hand of this measure, and he presented it to the Senate before that body was in session an hour. It was approved in less than a fortnight, and the House passed:

5. Ibid., January 9, 1867.
6. Ibid., January 2, 1867.
it with prompt decision on the following day, December 14, 1866. On January 4, 1867, Johnson read his veto message on the bill, in a Cabinet meeting, after which Edwin M. Stanton took from his portfolio a brief, and carefully expounded his approval of the bill. He could see no Constitutional objections to it, and therefore urged the President to sign it. Welles objected quite strenuously to Stanton's argument, and admits he "expected that Stanton would be defiant", but the latter "said not a word". General Grant was present at the Cabinet meeting, by invitation, and was very emphatic in his statements against the bill because "he thought it a very contemptible business for members of Congress whose states excluded negroes, to give them suffrage in this district". Attorney-General Stanberry thought the Supreme Court would probably declare against such a measure, but the immediate occasion demanded action, so Johnson expressed his opinion in a veto.

Immediately upon receipt of the veto, Congress listened to speeches for several hours, and then proceeded to pass the bill over Johnson's veto. According to Oberholtzer, "the negro had been made the peer of the white man at the ballot box in that domain of the United States under direct Congress-

9. Ibid., p. 5.
10. Ibid.
ional control". No time was taken for any reconsideration of the measure, and it was passed with such decisive force that no one could doubt the power of the legislative branch over any executive veto. Johnson's message vetoing the bill was a "clear, compact argument against a most unwise and unjust measure", said The National Intelligencer. The Chicago Daily Tribune could stand no interference whatever, and argued that "Mr. Johnson thinks Congress ought not to attempt to frustrate his attempts to carry on the government". Of course, this argument sufficed now, because the mass of people had repudiated Johnson at the polls, and had given evidence that they saw things in practically the same light.

Congress had one more branch of the United States to deal with before becoming absolutely supreme. This was the Supreme Court. That Tribunal created a considerable amount of turmoil by the decision handed down in the Milligan Case. This was published December 17, 1866, and newspapers were filled with it during the early part of January, 1867. The Supreme Court ruled that neither the President nor Congress had the power to declare martial law, and to authorize the trial of a citizen by military tribunals where the civil courts were open. Excitement ran high in Congress, and especially among those

12. The National Intelligencer, January 8, 1867.
in opposition to Johnson. On January 10, 1867, The Nation talked of impeaching the judges. Coercion seemingly had become a Congressional policy, and if any power stood in the way, impeachment was declared necessary. Rhodes says the chief reason for causing Congress to be thrown into the hands of Radicals was the almost unanimous rejection of the Fourteenth Amendment by Southern States. His statement only substantiates an already evident fact that negro suffrage was paramount. Whatever discussion may be raised over suffrage, those opposed to Johnson were equally convinced of a breach of faith, not only in executive, but now in judicial circles. The Chicago Daily Tribune remarked, "we cannot rely upon the Judicial Department of our government to cooperate in securing the fruits of a hard-earned victory over the rebels." "Copperhead" opinion expressed hope in recent decisions of the Supreme Court, because it was intimated that "the veto power, however wisely exercised, is no restriction upon corrupt, vicious or unconstitutional legislation". The excitement aroused over Supreme Court activities shows quite clearly what Congress would demand, and it likewise tends to show that Andrew Johnson, with all his mistakes, did not necessarily bring all his troubles upon himself.

15. The Nation, January 10, 1867.
16. Ibid.
18. The Chicago Times, January, 9, 1867.
Radical journals could usually bring forth abundant arguments in support of their case, and Mr. Lincoln was once more used as proof against the new autocrat, the United States Supreme Court. Lincoln said, "the candid citizen must confess that if the policy of our government upon vital questions affecting the whole people is to be irrevocably fixed by Supreme Court decisions, then the instant these questions are given to the Court, the people sign their government into the hands of that eminent tribunal". A remedy was suggested by following the precedent of earlier years, and The Chicago Daily Tribune used the following example; "The Supreme Court, many years ago, decided that the United States Bank was Constitutional, but the people, taking a different view, decided otherwise, and the charter was not renewed". Gideon Welles had reasons to see the possibility of a fundamental change in our government, and stated; "We are living in a revolutionary period, and the character of the government is undergoing a strain which may transform it into a different character".

While historians to not deal much with impeachment at this particular period, the people throughout America were reading it almost every day in some of the leading journals. The Boston Transcript busied itself with a discussion of how many

20. Ibid., January 18, 1867.
times Mr. Johnson had called Congress a disloyal body, and by heaping criticism upon Gideon Welles, who persisted in supporting the Executive. It was said that Welles had been dismissed from the Navy Department some years before as an incompetent assistant. Impeachment had developed to the point where some were wondering whether to suspend Johnson immediately after impeachment, and thereby deprive him of power, or to wait for the Senate trial to be completed. Intensity of public feeling was given as a good reason for waiting on the trial. Henry J. Raymond of *The New York Times* admitted, "if it is the determination of two or three members of the House to carry out a concocted scheme of impeachment, then the subject so far as the House is concerned may be considered settled in advance". Some hope was held out for Johnson because it was thought the issue would most likely never be pushed to the extremity.

Henry J. Raymond said, "The general sentiment of the country is already pretty distinctly pronounced against the whole project of impeachment," *The Boston Transcript*, while zealously advocating impeachment gives a good idea of the main obstacle. "The Constitution is very plain on the subject of impeachment, and yet the people seem not to understand".

E.L. Godkin discussed this problem in several issues of The Nation, and while condemning the President for his speeches and vetoes, admitted that impeachment was no remedy for the situation, He said, "His sophistry is of the half-simple kind, like smart young men who sharpen their wits by debating on the worst side". Nevertheless, impeachment appeared to him to be a much greater evil than Johnson's continuance in office, as is shown in the following remark:— "Mr. Johnson is a very narrow-minded person, who has concluded that he is the government, and the sole business of Congress is to vote money or care for details", yet his impeachment, we believe, "will be a great and lasting calamity unless far worse offenses are committed". The Nation concluded that besides arousing much hatred and spending money, the chief results of an impeachment would be "a vast increase in the consumption of whiskey and the use of profanity".

Thaddeus Stevens claimed the South had been in a state of anarchy now for two years, Therefore, circumstances demanded immediate action, and true to many indications in editorials prior to this, he demanded complete enfranchisement of the blacks in all parts of the South. The plan he prepared was

26. The Nation, January 10, 1867.
27. Ibid.
28. Ibid., January 17, 1867.
29. Ibid.
read in the House on January 3, 1867, and then went to the Re-
construction Committee, where it was made into a formal bill
on February 6. Some called it "hotch-potch legislation", and
others thought "it cannot be possible that the intelligent
masses of our countrymen will long submit to be mislead by
such transparent partisan artifices". The Lexington Observer
and Reporter said, "It is a highhanded act of tyranny; pure,
unadulterated military despotism". Mr. Rhodes maintained that
"Stevens carried his bill through an unwilling House; a strong
minority of his own party was opposed to it largely for the
reason that pure military rule was unpalatable". Opinion ex-
pressed by the Boston Transcript exalts Congressional leader-
ship in the following way: - "It is to the credit of the pres-
ent Congress that great questions are so well discussed, and
matters treated with such statesman like ability", and added
"the members of Congress represent the great dominant senti-
ment of loyal people in regard to the late rebellion". Judging
from James G. Blaine's account of the Congressional debates
the question was well discussed, but after potent remarks were

32. The National Intelligencer, January 25, 1867.
33. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, February 9, 1867.
35. The Boston Transcript, January 30, 1867.
36. Ibid., February 6, 1867.
made, the same men who made them were impotent in attempting to stop Stevens. Mr. Raymond, editor of The New York Times, opposed the bill in a vigorous speech and ended by saying, "because we cannot devise anything of a civil nature adequate to the emergency, it is urged that we must fly to the most violent measure the ingenuity of man can devise". General Garfield declared that the South had been given plenty of time to act, and they had acted by returning the Fourteenth Amendment with contempt. George Boutwell's remarks are interesting when compared with writings of later years. He said, "there are eight million people writhing under cruelties and injustices because of Executive favors toward rebellious states". John W. Burgess called the entire Reconstruction Act "the most brutal proposition ever introduced into the Congress of the United States by a responsible committee". Congress could see grave disorders in the South so long as political authority was uncertain there, but after this was granted, nothing was done to prevent a period of outrageous government, unsurpassed in the history of our country. Chicago's "Copperhead" journal paid a tribute to Stevens over this bill in the following way:

"Mr. Thaddeus Stevens, that pure and immaculate patriot, lofty and uncorruptible statesman, that cloven-footed representative

38. Ibid.
40. J.W. Burgess, Reconstruction and the Constitution.
of Hell's disorders, is about to open our eyes."

A Northern journal expressed indignation that the Chief Executive should have vetoed the Reconstruction Bill when "the distinguishing of it is the employment of military power in the interest of right and justice". Not only that, but "the President had the meanness and effrontery in his veto message to say the negroes do not want to vote, and that the bill itself is almost an excuse for secession". Blaine reports that James A. Garfield made the following utterance in Congress while debating the Reconstruction Bill: "I want this Congress to give its command to the President of the United States, and then perhaps, some impeachment hunters will have a chance to impeach him. They will if he does not obey". A survey of editorials includes the varying opinion quite well. E.L. Godkin joined Garfield in his impeachment remarks in the belief that "unpunished nullification of the Congressional Acts would be as evil as impeachment". Therefore, all that would save Johnson was complete submission to Congress, and a steady effort to execute the Military Act properly. The righteous indignation of Northern journals shows too well that such indignation is not the result of honest thinking among politicians, and their supporting newspapers. Mr. Stevens, who

41. The Chicago Times, January 22, 1867.
42. The Boston Transcript, March 4, 1867.
44. The Nation, March 7, 1867.
later demanded complete confiscation of Southern property, was now supported in his Military Bill. Johnson's veto was called "the plea of a dull advocate who has taken a side and not the 45 words of a statesman who regards only the Commonwealth".

The Executive's supporters, and also Southern papers expressed little hope of a successful future and Stevens' Reconstruction Bill was called "the greatest insult to common-sense and to the American people ever offered by a national legislature". In the South, affairs appeared to have settled down to a grim battle for mere existence. The Lexington Observer and Reporter thought "patient and unconsenting submission is the present duty of the South. The ordeal may be terrible, but compared to the life of the race or nation, it will be brief". Even among the Northern supporters, the only hope now was to "trust that the President will respect the action of Congress as a settlement of the Reconstruction question". Congress thoroughly squelched all consideration of the veto by passing the Reconstruction Act through both Houses on the same day the President returned it, March 2, 1867.

In his notorious "Swing-Around-The--Circle", Johnson made a remark later to be used against him. With regard to Federal

46. The Chicago Times, February 8, 1867.
47. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, March 13, 1867.
office-holders in many positions he said; "God being willing, I will kick them out. I will kick them out just as fast as I can". He had not done this, and McCulloch declares it is his chief fault during this crisis of his life that he had not removed some Federal men. McCulloch says, "for the first time in his life, he manifested indecision, and when he did act, he acted unwisely". Johnson was under pressure from some of his friends to make a complete change of Cabinet. Francis P. Blair plead for a complete change of personnel, and thought "no one could refuse to aid in the effort to lift the government above revolutionary factions to save the Constitution". Congress used the loosely spoken words of Johnson as one proof of a need to protect Federal office-holders. A law was passed which prevented him from doing what he should have done long before this time and his usual habit of speaking loosely only added to the downfall.

Editorial writing plainly indicates that there was nothing to do now but execute the requirements of Congressional Reconstruction. One man was more responsible for this, perhaps, than any other in the Cabinet, and that man was Edwin M. Stanton, Secretary of War. Time after time his opposition had been proved and clearly shown against the Executive Plan.

52. Milton, p.386.
53. Thesis, p.7 (notes, 45-46, Chapter I.)
He wrote the third Reconstruction Act which passed over Johnson's veto, July 19, 1867, and argued strenuously against Johnson's veto of the District of Columbia Suffrage Bill. Welles brands him as an opponent, and proves that he had started planning against Presidential Reconstruction before Lincoln's death. It is not necessary here to prove that he was guilty of malevolent deceit or gross faults of any nature. McCulloch says quite plainly that it was an agreement from the very beginning of Johnson's administration that each Cabinet member was to give his services "until the President saw fit to dispense with them". This was not only a gentlemen's agreement made at the first meeting with Mr. Johnson, but it was also the recognized precedent of Executive authority in our national government. If a President finds his Secretary of War "bold, resourceful and defiant," with regard to his fundamental plans, he certainly is under no obligation to submit his entire authority in order to save that individual a place in the Cabinet.

Congress placed an obstacle in the way of such change by passing a Tenure-of-Office-Act on March 2, 1867, which required the consent of the United States Senate in dismissing

55. Thesis, Chapter I
56. McCulloch, p. 376.
57. Bassett, p. 611.
a Cabinet officer. Arguments in behalf of this measure were nothing short of ludicrous. The Chicago Daily Tribune argued that there was never a time more auspicious than the present for such a bill as this. It lifts Federal men from dependency and assure them of work. Above all, it is no party measure". If these arguments were basically sound, then the Tenure-of-Office-Act was a sort of Civil Service Reform, but it appears that it did not produce quite that effect in giving security to Federal men. The Nation held that "the Tenure-of-Office bill is one of the most valuable of those caused by Mr. Johnson's folly. Its enactment with or without Mr. Johnson's signature is now assured, for which we rejoice", An inevitable struggle and it was now possible to openly insult the President, break the established precedent force him to retain Cabinet officers against his will, or even impeach him.

Since Reconstruction was working so powerfully through the halls of Congress, Thaddeus Stevens decided to advocate confiscation of property in the South. A proposal of this type indicates some of the fundamental patriotism and Constitutional authority upon which certain Radicals were working. Journals friendly to the Radicals would not uphold such a violent measure. In the opinion of The Nation, "had anybody proposed

59. The Nation, February 7, 1867.
such a bill to the Sultan of Turkey, he would have been expelled as a ruthless visionary. The mere discussion is an 60
affliction to the country". The Boston Transcript thought, "Thaddeus Stevens' grand scheme of spoliation by law was more 61
like Genghis Khan or Tamerlane". Mr. Stevens, in the face of
such remarks, made a renewed effort, and The Chicago Daily
Tribune offered a real, forceful argument in opposing him.
"The South is already poverty-stricken, with three-fourths of
the live stock killed, money and banks wiped out, fifty per
cent of the young men slain, credit abolished, and nothing but
disorder and chaos is left. No, Mr. Stevens, No! The Republican
Party's object is first Justice and then Peace".

People of the reconstruction era seemed to be impressed by
arguments brought forth from Washington, Jefferson, and other
early American leaders. Washington's farewell address was quoted in behalf of the South by The Lexington Observer and
Reporter. "One of the expedients of party government to acquire influence within a particular district is to misrepresent
the opinions and aims of other districts". Thomas Jefferson
also made some remarks in his first inaugural address which
seemed to agree with Southern viewpoints. "The minority
possess their equal rights, which equal laws must protect,

60. Ibid., March 21, 1867.
61. The Boston Transcript, May 29, 1867.
62. The Chicago Daily Tribune, November 2, 1867.
63. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, March 6, 1867.
and which to violate would be oppression". Southern people were resigned to the new rule and believed, "the only hope of the Republic lies in the speedy restoration of the conquered states and the return of a sufficient number of conservative Representatives and Senators to put a check on the reckless partisan ambitions of the men now holding the reins of power". The oppressive nature of Mr. Steven's work was recognized by the North as well as by the South, and even by some Radicals.

Gideon Welles writes on July 17, 1867, that Mr. Stevens merely sneered at those who held his hills were fundamentally unconstitutional. Welles accused him of regarding the Constitution as "no more obligatory than the resolutions of last year's Party Convention". "This is the spirit and feeling of the "Great Commoner", the Radical leader". George W. Julian expresses somewhat the same opinion, and it must be remembered here that Mr. Julian was a Radical, opposed to the nomination of Lincoln and Johnson, and heartily in favor of negro suffrage all through the conflict of reconstruction. He thought "statesmanship was sacrificed to party management", and that

64. Ibid., March 16, 1867.
65. The Chicago Times, March 18, 1867.
67. Ibid.
69. Ibid., chapter 12(entire chapter).
The Military Bill vetoed by Mr. Johnson, was "utterly indefensible on principle". "It was completely at war with the genius and spirit of democratic government. The entire bill was a confession of Congressional incompetence to deal with a problem which Congress alone had the right to solve". Mr. Julian contends, along with his fellow Radicals, that Congress alone had the right to solve this reconstruction problem, but he also admits that Congressional was merely the "abolishment of civil government entirely, and the installation of military power". Later on in his remarks, he shows that his chief concern was still suffrage, and probably the reason he said many of these things was because the blacks were not yet in control of the ballot, as the following statement indicates; "The Bill was a legislative solecism. It left the ballot in the hands of white rebels, and did not confer it upon the black loyalists".

Arguments over Constitutional Reconstruction occupy a goodly portion of the newspaper editorials throughout the summer of 1867. The mass of people had the opportunity to read many statements of sound thinking, with the usual amount of partisanship thrown in by various papers. Colonel Forney, of The Washington Chronicle, in an article headed "Thaddeus Stevens;
made the prophetic statement "that future generations will rise up and bless the man, who, opposing a treacherous President, passed over his vetoes those measures of reconstruction necessary to secure the results of war and freedom to the people". The Radical, George W. Julian, repudiated such an idea, and James Ford Rhodes, not a pro-Johnson writer at all, says, "Stevens obtained his majority for the reconstruction bills by sameasm, taunts, dragooning, and by cracking the party whip. Such methods are not necessarily a part of Constitutional procedure, but the Northern papers began a campaign to brand Johnson's opposition to them as contrary to the Constitution. The Chicago Daily Tribune summarized this opinion as follows:-"He assumes he is supporting the flag and the Constitution when he delays and defeats loyal men in the South in their right to vote. The issue was decided in 1866".

Presidential support was sufficient to balance part of this in the public mind, and at least part of the people saw some indications that Mr. Johnson was not destroying the entire Constitution. The National Intelligencer thought "the most ludicrous inconsistency observable in the efforts of the handful of Radical agitators is the enfranchisement of negroes and the disfranchisements of many whites, including foreigners."

74. The Washington Chronicle, April 18, 1867.
76. The Chicago Daily Tribune, September 19, 1867.
77. The National Intelligencer, May 1, 1867.
According to The Lexington Observer and Reporter, "this faction, having usurped the government, has demoralized the public sentiment and taught that above the Constitution is the will of the majority". It began to be apparent to many that if the Union was the chief aim and sole object of the war, then the prolonged delay in restoring the South was quite a contradiction in itself. The New York World stated, "Tennessee has been admitted, while other states are held under military authority. This is perfidy to the states, and a violation of the Constitution".

Northern sympathizers looked upon the Military Bill as an immense work to be carried out for the good of America. The Washington Chronicle decided that, "we must nationalize this agitation in support of the new Commission to carry out its work. We do this because of principles which are right". All speeches, appointments and general action of the President were watched for signs of opposition. In a speech of July 25, he said he would "never willingly execute the law", meaning the last Reconstruction Act. Rumors also spread abroad that General Sheridan was to be removed from his command in the South. His removal was interpreted as "pure spite, the spite of an obstinate man or a sort of stupid self-assertion of

78. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, April 6, 1867.
81. The Nation, July 25, 1867.
Constitutional powers belonging to the President, which, Mr. Johnson conceives, Congress has been encroaching upon". On July 4, the President made another address which, like most of those he made, did not fail to make some choice remarks for the opposition to use against him. He describes his way of arriving at conclusions in politics—namely, "First of all, be convinced that you are right". The Radicals met such a statement by quoting it against the President, and then expressing their intentions of "beginning reconstruction at the very first stages", and if the delay seems fraught with injury to the South," the responsibility for this must fall upon the President and his rebel cohorts, who have endeavoured to trick the nation out of its rights".

The impoverished South looked upon these proceedings with humiliation, but remained helpless to do much to relieve the situation. There are significant hints as to future developments in the United States in some of the Southern editorials that are refreshing in the midst of daily slander, criticism, or disgusting party politics. The opinions stated show a viewpoint and includes all of America and an attempt to see the nation as a growing power. In the opinion of The Lexington Observer and Reporter, "The plan of the Radicals could never

82. Ibid.
Ibid. (84)
have been accomplished but for the active assistance of our growing North West. Her leading citizens, former New Englanders, have control of the new states of the Northwest and led them in blind submission behind Massachusetts. The future destinies are not bound up with New England, for the West and South will be united on the great questions of policy looming before us. While the others fight over the negro, New England is gathering the rich spoils of high tariff into her coffers.

The most noticeable change in the editorial support of Johnson during the summer of 1867 is the attitude of opposition taken by Henry J. Raymond in The New York Times. For some time, this paper had counseled moderation on Johnson's part, and now that the Reconstruction Acts were United States law, it was thought to be "a matter of sacred duty that he should be receptive of the opinions of others, rather than over--tenacious of his own. The President will commit a very grave mistake if he interrupts this steady and acceptable operation of the law". The New York Times editorials make it quite plain that Johnson must carry out the entire Congressional program, and adds, "neither the President nor anybody else will have the power, even if he has the wish, to arrest the beneficent work the Reconstruction Bill was designed to accomplish".

85. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, August 14, 1867.
87. Ibid., July 3, 1867.
The Presidential plan was described as "crude and incomplete", and even in the execution of the Reconstruction Bill, more confidence was placed in General Grant than in Johnson. "To this quarter we look for the efficiency and peace which are most unwisely denied by President Johnson". "Mr. Johnson's career during the last few months has shown that he cannot appreciate moderation, and that forbearance does nothing but feed his arrogance".

Most of the month of August, 1867, is taken up with the removal of Edwin M. Stanton. Johnson argued that the Tenure-of-Office-Act "does not apply to Cabinet officers appointed by my predecessor". Stanton was accused of "clinging to office like a coward clings to life". The New York World held that circumstances furnished solid grounds for removal of Cabinet officers, and a mandamus would be effective in this case. It is quite evident that the Tenure-of-Office-Act was not passed to meet a general need, for "as a matter of fact Johnson has been far from free and indiscriminate in the removal of office-holders, even though their antagonism was carried to offensive lengths". McCulloch wrote to Samuel J. Tilden in October, 1866:

"The President desires to make as few changes as possible,

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88. Ibid., July 27, 1867.
89. Ibid., July 31, 1867.
90. Ibid., August 29, 1867.
91. The New York World, August 7, 1867.
92. Ibid.
93. Ibid., August 8, 1867.
and none on political grounds, unless it was clear that the interests of the service or the interests of the administration are to be certainly benefited by them. E.L. Godkin said, "the actions of Mr. Johnson towards the Secretary of War afford no grounds in themselves for vehement censure; but as an indication of his stubbornness they deserve emphatic condemnation."

The President had waited too long for this move, and his attempt to remove Stanton in 1867 only made the effort appear to be obstinacy rather than honest policy. No matter what the Constitutional grounds were, Johnson failed to use any tact or decisive action until such action was no longer possible. His friend, McCulloch, testifies to this when he says, "Johnson knew when the Tenure-of-Office Bill was before Congress that the object of its leading supporters was to tie his hands, and yet he refrained from using them when they were free. He manifested weakness and indecision, and when he did act, he acted unwisely."

The opposition lost no time in condemning Stanton's removal. From The Boston Transcript came the remark, "Johnson has accomplished one thing by his removal of Stanton; one more revelation of his wrong-headedness". The New York Post called Stanton "one of the most faithful, capable, upright public

96. The Nation, August 22, 1867.
98. The Boston Transcript, August 12, 1867.
servants this nation has ever had". The President opened the way for the very thing the Radicals wanted to use as condemnation. By removing Stanton, it appeared he was attempting to "modify the effect of the Reconstruction Acts in changing the War Department". When the Tenure-of-Office Act was up before Congress, editorials in the North defended it as a much needed reform measure, and carefully explained how it would benefit our government. The Chicago Daily Tribune offers some interesting explanations concerning the bill, now that it had become a law, and such remarks could no longer hinder its enactment. "The Tenure-of-Office Act was enacted expressly to meet the perverseness of Andrew Johnson, and probably four-fifths of those who voted for it believed they were taking measures to prevent the President from removing Mr. Stanton and filling his place with a rebel sympathizer".

So far as the North was concerned, he was displaying a stubborn insolence in even so much as questioning this measure, while in the South he appeared to be given to entirely too much delay. A Kentucky journal expressed satisfaction that "the President has at last summoned energy enough to maintain his

100. The Boston Transcript, August 24, 1867.
102. The Chicago Daily Tribune, August 3, 1867.
own authority. Stanton the bully, has been ignominiously ex-
103 pelled from the Cabinet". This Lexington Observer and Reporter upheld Mr. Johnson throughout and its criticism was severe with regard to Radicals, but the editor gives Edwin M. Stanton credit, even while rejoicing in his downfall. "Stanton displayed shrewd percept, knowledge and skill to paralyze the opposition. He has been overthrown by one his inferior in all save lawful authority". The President created one more available point against himself by suspending Mr. Stanton, rather than removing him. He was then accused of ordering Stanton's removal after the United States Senate had refused to suspend him, and this opened the way for his impeachment under the Tenure-of-Office Act. Public opinion in both North and South was rapidly gaining force against him. Welles shows a more intimate viewpoint, which the public, however, could not know or read for several years. In his diary he tells of a conversation held with the President on August 5, 1867. In speaking of Stanton, Johnson remarked: "It is impossible to get along with such a man in such a position, and I can stand it no longer--- to think that the man whom I have trusted was plotting and intriguing against me".

Some rather interesting political motives appear with regard

103. The Lexington Observer and Reporter, August 17, 1867.
104. Ibid.
to impeachment during the latter part of 1867. Preceding the October elections of 1867, The Chicago Daily Tribune constantly harangued Johnson and demanded impeachment. On August 21, it published this decisive statement: "The country has endured Andrew Johnson as long as endurance can be counted a virtue. There are reasons in law now, and let Congress put him out". Down to the first Tuesday in October, The Chicago Daily Tribune was almost rabid in its demands for impeachment, and then, by December 2, 1867, the sentiment had so far changed as to denounce immediate impeachment as "madness and folly sponsored only by men of dwarfed vision". One reason to prompt such a change was a turn toward conservatism as indicated in the fall elections. The Democrats and "Copperheads" also repudiated Johnson at this time, and made him so thoroughly subdued in power that little political harm could result by leaving him alone, while a great deal might happen if impeachment proceedings proved a failure.

Three Northern journals summarized the opinion in the following manner. According to The New York Times, "the general feeling is that Mr. Johnson's hands are tied already and the country will outlive his term of office. The removal may be essential to the success of a Presidential game, but vital

106. The Chicago Daily Tribune, August 21, 1867.
107. The Chicago Times, December 2, 1867.
interests of the nation cannot be sacrificed to promote a faction". The New York World said, "by its bold acts, Congress has virtually passed sentence upon the President, in advance of formal charges, and without evidence. They have taken from him the command of the army, removal of officers, and demand that he shall understand the Constitution in the way they choose to put it", while Harpers Weekly declared," we believe that public sentiment would justify impeachment, but it is for the judiciary committee to determine whether the case can be presented so as to make conviction a moral certainty".

A coming Presidential election caused one more change toward Johnson among Northern journals, The Chicago Times turned against him after the October elections of 1867, and criticised his speeches, motives and general administration. The Johnson administration allows demagogues to undermine the state, the financial burdens increase, industry languishes, and the Democracy regard Mr. Johnson as responsible to the people for this state of affairs. He has fallen between two stools, from which awkward situation we do not propose to rescue him. In his speeches, Mr. Johnson has done nothing but

111. Harpers Weekly, October 5, 1867.
strengthen the power of the Republicans by exciting popular contempt for himself". This caused rejoicing in The Chicago Daily Tribune columns, and according to that paper Johnson was "in the last ditch". "Andrew Johnson has reached the lowest depths to which any human being could descend in the estate of mankind: 'The Copperheads' refuse him"!

Republican papers in the North are in agreement as to the impeachment question at the end of 1867, and no matter what had been said before, or what actually happened later, editorial statements are quite definitely against it in December. Henry Raymond believed, "the country will rejoice at the summary dismissal of this wild scheme of personal malice, because we regard the President as beyond the reach of political redemption, anyhow". And other papers thought, "the impeachment has never been more than the whim of a few. It has never been sanctioned by the intelligent judgment of the country, and we do not believe it will be sanctioned by Congress". This statement of Harpers Weekly directly contradicts the opinion published in that same journal on October 2, 1867, when the editor said, "we believe that public sentiment would justify impeachment", and is one example of the change some journals

112. The Chicago Times, October 12, 1867.
113. The Chicago Daily Tribune, November 14, 1867.
114. Ibid.
117. Ibid., October 2, 1867.
had made by this time. The Chicago Daily Tribune felt relieved that impeachment charges fell in the first attempt before the House by a vote of 108 to 57 and added, "Thus that source of mischief falls, to be troublesome no more, for a few months will dismiss Mr. Johnson to the obscurity of Tennessee plantation life, whence he ought never to have emerged".

Since the October elections of 1867 showed a decided trend toward the Democratic party they therefore united Radicals and Conservatives in Congress in preparation for the Presidential election. This effect was disastrous to the welfare of Johnson if the Radicals aimed to impeach him, and Oberholtzer says, "the leaders in the House needed no goading to arouse their energies! Every detail of the plot to place the President in a position from which he could not extricate himself had been arranged. Stanton had played his part bluffly and arrogantly, while Grant had become an instrument to serve the party ends". The Nation thought "it was by no means improbable that the Democrats might elect their next President". And such a contingency as that immediately united the Republican ranks. The paramount sentiment now seemed to be centered on impeachment as a means of saving the party. The two-thirds majority in Congress was safe until March 4, 1869, and

118. The Chicago Daily Tribune, December 9, 1867.
120. The Nation, December 9, 1867.
"in the mean time it must be used so that a Republican President should be elected in 1868. There was no thought of turning back as a response to public sentiment".

122. Ibid., p. 94.
CHAPTER V

Reconstruction following the American Civil War included not only a restoration of the seceded states, but also a financial readjustment. Conditions demanded action, and with national affairs in a precarious state, Congress and President spent most of the time in battling with one another. A national debt of $2,846,000,000, or $74.28 per capita confronted the government, and the taxes supporting this debt were the heaviest that were levied in any civilized country in the world, amounting to $11.46 in gold for every inhabitant of the land. The historian Muzzey explains the difficulty in securing aid by means of the American Party system, and shows the absurd condition into which the United States political organization has fallen in past years. He says, "A vote cast against a Republican candidate for the humblest office in any village was a vote cast for treason. Under such conditions it was impossible to get any political issue like the tariff, the currency, or the patronage considered purely on its merits". On the other hand, if Congress had a sufficient majority in the Republican ranks to override vetoes, then even with a recalcitrant President, it still could have passed legislation regarding financial reconstruction and aided the entire nation. James Ford Rhodes says, "the essential fact was that Congress governed

2. Ibid., p. 24.
the country and was sustained by public sentiment at the North, so far as the policy of reconstruction was concerned, 3 Congress had nearly reduced the President to impotence. Evidently, then, the failure to reconstruct national finances could not be placed upon Johnson's shoulders with any degree of justice.

Editorials expressed a vigorous demand for something besides a constant battle between the Executive and Congress. Mr. Henry Raymond, of The New York Times said, "Congress must at once direct itself to those great vital questions bearing upon public interests—retrenchment, taxation, regulation of public burdens and establishment of sound financial principles.

The New York World accused Congress of legislating with Republican ascendancy in mind, and warned that "it remains for the people of the United States to say whether they can afford to have a country ruined to keep a moribund political party on its legs for four years longer". The National Intelligencer held no hope for Congressional action regarding financial matters, and thought "it is already evident and indeed understood that Congress does not seriously intend to touch the financial question during the present session", and continued by reminding people that "while the best interests of the

nation are thus wantonly and wickedly neglected, with suffering in the North and sorrow in the South, millions are wrung from oppressed taxpayers in order to support military despoticisms".

Opposition to Johnson was not diminished by the absolute failure of Congress to accomplish any financial legislation, and The Chicago Daily Tribune carried its program of opposition including abolition of privileged classes and freedom of burdened classes, which literally meant Republican supremacy in Southern politics. This newspaper accused Johnson of "obstnately, maliciously and cruelly" defeating the will of Congress and thereby prolonging the military rule over people in Southern States. Horace Greeley gave a typical political interpretation from the Republican standpoint in the following way: "Mr. Johnson's quarrel with Congress was premeditated, and was impelled by his early determination to break with and make war upon the Republican party. Mr. Johnson is exerting all his influence to obstruct and defeat Congressional Reconstruction". The Boston Transcript appealed to business interests of America to beware of such a man as Andrew Johnson, who had shown himself to be reckless and unfaithful in his political life, and argued that after the removal of the President

7. Ibid.
8. The Chicago Daily Tribune, January 20, 1868.
9. Ibid., January 1, 1868.
"the people will settle down to a season of financial and mercantile prosperity such as has not been known since Andrew Johnson determined to subdue Congress and constitute himself as the sole governing power in the Union".

Editorials in The New York World attributed the enormous expenses of governmental affairs to the Republican policy in Southern States, and claimed that "a multitude of crippling taxes could be removed if the lavish waste in holding the South in terror be eliminated". Mr. Henry Raymond's editorials reflect several changes toward Andrew Johnson during the Reconstruction period, and as election time approached in 1868, he defended the Republican policy, especially with regard to the Freedmen's Bureau. On September 8, 1868, an editorial in The New York Times gave the cost of the Freedmen's Bureau from January 1, 1865 to August 1, 1868. This total cost was $6,377,251. Mr. Raymond declared "this was a mere pittance to be spent for four million people, yet Democrats argue lavish extravagance"!

An interesting statement of the pro-Johnson opinion is given in The National Intelligencer, January 4, 1868. "If the plan of reconstruction proposed by Mr. Lincoln and adopted by Mr. Johnson had been accepted and carried out to its natural conclusion, the condition of the country would

be one of peace and prosperity. This policy, however, did not suit the aims of political agitators". Then the editor summarized the exact reasons why unnecessary expense was accumulating, by saying, "the military satrapies in the South, the Freedmen's Bureau and the whole army of office-holders and plunderers fatten at public expense. This political machinery costs our country one-hundred million dollars per year in order that the Radical program of Sumner, Stevens and their submissive satellites may be supported".

Horace Greeley declared that "the House and Senate are doing nobly, while the President threatens anarchy", and added, "we must reconstruct the South in spite of the President". On the same day Mr. Greeley's statement appeared in The New York Tribune, (January 4, 1868) The New York Times described the latest example of Congressional action. The chairman of the Judiciary Committee in the House, Mr. Wilson of Iowa, proposed a bill which required that two-thirds of the Supreme Court Justices should declare themselves in favor of a decision made by the Court before that decision should become binding. Mr. Raymond thought "the military dictatorship and the late invasion of the Supreme Court have proved to be a sorry fulfillment of the popular expectation, and the effect is most

15. Ibid.,
disastrous on the country". Furthermore, "the advocates of
the proposed law do not conceal the fact that the object of its
enactment is to prevent a judgment by the Court adverse to the
Reconstruction Acts", Although this bill never became a law,
it is a positive indication of the feeling then existing among
the departments of our national government, and shows to what
lengths Congress might go in order to maintain its authority.

It is a difficult task for Congressmen to answer certain
queries, and a good example of such is to be found in The National Intelligencer for January, 20, 1868. This paper concludes
that "after seven years of unprecedented sway, during which
time the Radical majorities in Congress have controlled and
shaped the whole legislation, the country finds itself on the
verge of bankruptcy". According to Mr. Greeley, "our trouble
is not that we have to reconstruct the South, but also to re-
construct the President". Yet Congress realized that public
opinion must support a final attempt to reconstruct the Presi-
dent which would necessarily mean impeachment, and E.L. Godkin
states quite clearly in The Nation why there was reason for
hesitating in such a move. "It cannot be said that impeachment
has grown in favor with the public. In fact, the attitude all

18. Ibid., January 23, 1868.
along has been one of resignation rather than eagerness".

At the beginning of February, 1868, all attention shifted from finances to the problem of impeachment. There was a noticeable production of undignified language in several leading papers when Johnson was discussed, and a vigorous effort was quite evidently made to foster impeachment proceedings. In the opinion of The Chicago Daily Tribune, "the United States owed its very existence to Stanton and Grant, while to Andrew Johnson it owed nothing but the lesson that our country survives even though a scoundrel be President". Such a conservative magazine as The Atlantic Monthly stated that "as far back as the elections of 1866, President Johnson proved himself to be a renegade". It is significant to note that the editor added in this same article that "time and events have, partially at least, showed that the President was not altogether wrong in looking for a change in popular sentiment". In this statement he referred to Andrew Johnson's appeal to the people, and his hope that public sentiment would ultimately save his policy. But the policy of Lincoln, Johnson or no other President was of any value then, and a statement from Harpers Weekly expresses this attitude."A President with a policy is an anomaly and

21. The Nation, March 5, 1868.
24. Ibid.
an absurdity in our system".

The New York Times granted that "the Republican party in Congress seems to be unanimously in favor of impeachment", but thought "it certainly would be a very extraordinary spectacle to see Congress pass a law creating an offense, prescribing a penalty, and then acting at once as prosecutor, judge and jury under this law". Nevertheless, Congress chose to impeach Andrew Johnson before the Tenure-of-Office Act was declared Constitutional by the Supreme Court, and on February 24, 1868, the House voted that Andrew Johnson, President of the United States, be impeached of high crimes and misdemeanors. The sentiment back of such a move is perhaps best shown by the editorials of Horace Greeley. He said, "We heartily endorse the action of the House. If the Republican party has, or ever had an enemy preeminently deadly and perfidious, his name is Andrew Johnson. He must be impeached for the good of the country, and the people will say, 'Amen'". On February 25, the following statement appeared in The Chicago Daily Tribune. "The American people impeach you, Andrew Johnson, as the disturber of national peace, the violator of national law, the stumbling block of national justice and the organizer of national ruin".

Opinion was sufficiently divided to make the outcome uncertain, and this added to the vigor with which many papers attempted to convert public sentiment. An attempt was made to exert pressure upon members of the Senate, and The New York World severely condemned the practice by saying, "at what former period in the history of this country could it have been possible for the party press to have made use of threats and denunciations for the purpose of compelling members of the Senate to act in obedience to a supposed popular demand. Johnson's removal will proclaim that the Executive office is held by any incumbent at the party pleasure of that faction which controls the legislature". Henry Raymond said, "the entire press, with one or two exceptions, have treated it only as a party matter, while Thaddeus Stevens, Ben Butler, Wendell Phillips, and others of the same stamp evidently believe that the Senate can be made to bend to party necessities".

James G. Blaine said, "In fact, there was but one charge of any gravity against the President--- that of violating the Tenure-of-Office Act. But on this charge there was a very grave difference of opinion among those equally competent to decide. Mr. Fessenden, one of the ablest lawyers that had sat in the Senate since Mr. Webster, believed on his oath and honor--- that

the President had a lawful and Constitutional right to remove 31
Mr. Stanton at this time and in the manner he did". Then, out-
side of professional opinion, there was supposed to be a popu-
lar demand for the President's conviction. Senator Fessenden
gave his official statement regarding such a demand." To the
suggestion that popular opinion demands the conviction of the
President, I reply that he is not now on trial before the
people, but before the Senate.-- The People have not taken an
oath to do impartial justice according to the Constitution 32
and the law. I have taken that oath". McCulloch believed that
"it was not an impartial trial", and when the oath was taken
"it is undeniable that a majority of the Senators were not 33
prepared to do impartial justice to the accused".

If we follow George W. Julian's opinion, then" the popular
feeling in favor of impeachment had now become formidable, and 34
the whole land seemed to be electrified". Julian remarked that
"the popular feeling against the President was now rapidly 35
nearing its climax, and becoming a sort of frenzy". Judging
from The Cincinnati Daily Commercial there is certainly no
evidence of such a frenzied feeling, as may be seen in the

32. Ibid., p. 381.
33. McCulloch, p. 397.
34. Julian, p. 313.
35. Ibid., p. 314.
following statement; "The impeachment trial causes very little excitement. The trial of Andrew Johnson is discovered to be very much like the trial of anybody else". This enlightening bit of information is added by the same editor—"There is reason to believe that about one-half of the Senators would vote to convict the President without evidence—simply upon the speeches of Butler or eloquence of Logan, but there are as many as ten Senators who will be governed by the testimony of the law". A few days later The Cincinnati Daily Commercial admitted that "it is a matter of serious doubt whether the impeachment of the President by the House was demanded by the highest considerations of public policy and the clearest intelligence of public duty".

After great pressure had been exerted and every effort made to convict Johnson, he stood acquitted on May 12, 1868. We may reasonably suppose that this acquittal was a relief in more ways than one. First of all, people were reminded that if the vote would be close and Benjamin Wade cast the deciding ballot, he would be made President by one vote, and that one, his own. Secondly, a great number of office-seekers had flocked to Washington expecting a sweeping change following Mr. Wade's accession to office, and Republicans were quite anxious as to the

36. The Cincinnati Daily Commercial, April 6, 1868.
37. Ibid., April 13, 1868.
38. The National Intelligencer, March 6, 1868.
effects this might have upon the next Presidential election. McCulloch says, "it is quite clear to the minds of many men that nothing would be gained, and great loss might be sustained by a change at that time and in such a manner". The New York Times said, "What makes Mr. Johnson's impeachment safe and tranquil is the fact that he has no party to sustain him, and therefore public opinion has become tolerably well settled in the matter. We believe that comparatively few hope for acquittal". The New York World remarked at the beginning of the trial that "one of the flagrant enormities which make impeachment a disgrace to the American people and a dangerous assault on the structure of their government is the fact that the Senate is an interested Tribunal", and Senator Wilson declared "if there were doubts to vex him in the process of reaching that conclusion, his country would have the benefit of those doubts, rather than the President". With political bias so evident, it is little wonder that as the trial proceeded, the conviction grew that the impeachment was "Politics".

Those Senators who dared to vote against the Radicals were subjected to severe criticism following the acquittal. In the opinion of The Boston Transcript, "treachery in the Presidential chair may perhaps be borne for a few months, but when it

41. The New York World, March 5, 1868.
becomes infectious and spreads to the Senate chamber, public indignation will be aroused to a degree such as has hardly been witnessed since the firing on Fort Sumter". Horace Greeley had already practically his verbal resources prior to the trial, and when the verdict was announced, he exclaimed," Well! Let Messrs. Chase, Fessenden and Company take care of their man Johnson, while we organize for and make certain the joyful advent of Grant and Victory ". E.L. Godkin thought the whole affair ought to be dramatized," for it certainly would furnish the material for what the play-bills call a side-splitting farce".

Following the impeachment trial Andrew Johnson's name rapidly became poor copy, because he was no longer in the political arena and public attention was now concentrated on the campaign of General Grant. Johnson's final message to Congress was practically disregarded and while he remained in a comparatively helpless condition, the United States Congress proceeded to bring the bitter negro suffrage campaign to its final culmination. This came in the enactment of the Fifteenth Amendment, granting suffrage without respect to color. Meanwhile the Democrats held their National Convention in New York City, where William Marcy Tweed, Fernando Wood, A. Oakey Hall and the

43. The Boston Transcript, May 13, 1868.
44. The New York Tribune, May 18, 1868.
45. The Nation, May 21, 1868.
Tammany leaders served as the reception committee. With these names appearing on the political horizon American history rapidly became what F. L. Paxson termed "The New Nation".
CRITICAL ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES

This essay includes manuscript source material, reminiscences, general secondary works, biographies and periodicals.

Manuscript Source Material

There are only a few letters available in the McCormick Historical Society, Chicago, Illinois, but these letters provide a very good source of information concerning private opinion in the South during this period. The letters included in this study were taken from the private correspondence of Judge D. Davidson, Lexington, Virginia.

Periodicals

The two most important weekly periodicals for a study of this era are Harpers Weekly (New York) and The Nation (New York). Under the editorial guidance of E.L. Godkin, The Nation became a periodical for cultured people. Ordinarily, at any rate, Mr. Godkin was able to see both sides of a question and his magazine is one of the most important and reliable sources used in this study. Mr. George William Curtis placed Harpers Weekly on a new plane of development, but his arguments are far more biased than those of The Nation, and taken as a whole they must be compared with standard historical writing to be of use in such a study as this. The Atlantic Monthly (Boston) offers a wide variety of opinion from business men, politicians, and ministers. The editorials were written by such
leaders as Henry Ward Beecher, Edward E. Hale and others. It is quite valuable as an indication of public opinion among leaders in the North.

**Newspapers**

Information taken from newspaper sources is necessarily susceptible to political prejudice and a great deal of sectional bias, therefore whenever possible, two papers have been selected from the same city or area to give a more balanced impression. The Chicago Times was a typical Northern Democratic paper whose editorials were unusually powerful, witty and outspoken. The Chicago Daily Tribune was constantly campaigning either for negro suffrage or against Andrew Johnson. It was probably one of the most powerful organs of public opinion in the entire country and the material it offers is almost unlimited. The Cincinnati Daily Commercial offers a good set of editorials apparently free from extreme radicalism and quite sensibly written. Opinion from Washington D.C. may be taken from The Washington Chronicle or The National Intelligencer. Colonel John W. Forney's Washington Chronicle reflects the effect of personal feeling between Mr. Forney and President Johnson and is a very good example of the way one of Mr. Johnson's blunders reacted against him through the press. At the beginning The Chronicle was quite friendly to Johnson and it never became extremely radical. The National Intelligencer presents some of the most forceful ideas found anywhere in the
press of America. It consistently supported him to the end and for the most part the editorials are free from political bias. New England sentiments are well shown in The Boston Transcript, which was said to have been under the control of Senator Charles Sumner. It is typically sectional, decidedly anti-Johnson, and a consistent upholder of Congressional plans and ideas. New York City naturally offers the widest range of material to be found in any one city of the country. The greatest of the New York papers was undoubtedly Mr. Henry Raymond's New York Times. Henry Raymond was one of the outstanding editors of his day, a member of Congress, and a man who maintained his ideas even against the drift of public opinion. The New York Times is one of the very best of all the papers studied. Horace Greeley, editor of The New York Tribune, was a unique figure in the political and editorial field of his day. He opposed Johnson during the entire contest, and his opposition is far too important to be disregarded in a study of the reconstruction period. Andrew Johnson received strong support from The New York World, and yet we must regard material from this paper as somewhat less reliable than that found in Mr. Raymond's paper. It is biased in favor of Johnson. Of all the papers for this era The Baltimore Sun is as consistent, brilliant and exceptional in every way as any to found in either North or South. It offers some unusually good arguments, and even though pro-Johnson throughout, it is characterized
by sane, well-balanced editorial writing. The Lexington Observer and Reporter (Lexington, Kentucky) went to such extremes from time to time that it was threatened with suppression. It was decidedly Southern in viewpoint, and very open in its denunciation of Congress. However, editorials are so interesting and well written that there can be no doubt as to the influence this paper exerted. The Connecticut Herald (New Haven, Connecticut) was a typical Yankee journal. To this paper, impeachment was always necessary, and there was little evidence of any viewpoint other than that of New England. Material is quite abundant in its editorial columns, and its value lies in the fact that it gives us a good sectional view.

Biographies

Robert W. Winston's biography of Andrew Johnson, Plebeian and Patriot, New York, 1928, is a good one-volume work to be used in a study of this kind. There are many ideas found in it not found in the ordinary works, and it is well written.

Reminiscences

Carl Schurz' Reminiscences, New York, 1907, Vol. III. is a rather biased story of events between 1863-1889. This book cannot be used too extensively because of Mr. Schurz' political affiliations and activities. George W. Julian, radical politician from Indiana, has written a small volume entitled
Personal Recollections, 1840-1872, Chicago, 1884, which is so highly colored as to be of small historical value except as an indication of this type of opinion. Our study here has shown a few of the inconsistent ideas in this book. Hugh McCulloch, Secretary of the Treasury, was associated with both Lincoln and Johnson. Along with Gideon Welles, he most assuredly provides the outstanding story of personal reminiscences for this time. His book, Men and Measures of Half a Century, New York, 1888, does not claim to be in chronological order, but includes many events just as they came to the author's mind. It must be remembered that the book was not published until 1888, but nevertheless, it is quite reliable. The three-volume Diary of Gideon Welles, New York, 1911, is the most exact, chronological account from the pen of one who was associated with Johnson from the beginning. It is interesting, favors Johnson, is quite accurate, and is the most complete of all this period.

General Secondary Works

James G. Blaine's, Twenty Years of Congress, Norwich Connecticut, 1886, is useful and very suggestive, but also often inaccurate and strongly partisan. The book by John W. Burgess, Reconstruction and the Constitution, New York, 1907, deals incisively with the political and legal aspects of the period. William A. Dunning's Reconstruction, Political and Economic, New York, 1907, gives a good analysis of the principle Consti-
tutional developments of the reconstruction in the South. Two standard historical texts have been used in preparing this study; James Ford Rhodes', *History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850*, New York, 1906, and Ellis Paxson Oberholtzer's, *A History of the United States since the Civil War*, New York, 1922. Rhodes is not an admirer of Andrew Johnson, and his book probably favors the Radicals slightly too much, while Oberholtzer is favorable to Johnson. The latter stresses periodical material, and his volumes include a more general view of social and economic problems than those of Rhodes. Volume V. of Woodrow Wilson's *History of the American People*, New York, 1901, is a brief but just and well-proportioned account of this period. For a one-volume work on the Lincoln of reconstruction, none is more complete than that written by Charles McCarthy entitled *The Lincoln Plan of Reconstruction*, New York, 1901. *The Age of Hate*, New York, 1930, by George Fort Milton, is one of the most exceptional pieces of writing available for this study. An unusual number of manuscript sources have been used, and the bibliography is extensive. A more standard type of work is that written by David S. Muzzey, *The American Adventure*, Volume II, New York, 1927. This is an ideal volume from which to secure economic and social developments in American history. Frederic L. Paxson's two books, *Recent History of the United States*, New York, 1921,
and The New Nation, New York, 1919, may be correlated with such a study as this in order to provide a sequence of events and maintain continuity. John Spencer Bassett's A Short History of the United States, New York, 1921, is the last volume used in our study, and is probably unsurpassed as a one-volume history of the United States.
The thesis, "The Attitude of the Press toward Andrew Johnson," written by Ralph W. Tolson, has been accepted by the Graduate School of Loyola University with reference to form, and by the readers whose names appear below with reference to content. It is, therefore, accepted as a partial fulfilment of the requirements of the degree conferred.

Samuel K. Wilson, S.J. 
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