Carthage: Her Civilization and Culture

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CARTHAGE: HER CIVILIZATION AND CULTURE

BY

THEODORE JAMES TRACY, S.J.

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INTRODUCTION

In his essay entitled "The War of Gods and Demons," after a plea for what he calls "psychological history" as opposed to purely economic and political history, G. K. Chesterton explains the war to extinction between Rome and Carthage as a contest, not merely of commercial interests, but of two deeply antagonistic cultures, world outlooks, religious atmospheres. He maintains that the Roman with his friendly, naturalistic gods, his ideal of "prisca virtus", his deep regard for the sanctity and inviolability of the home and family, was sustained in the face of death and defeat during the second, and most decisive, portion of the struggle, not by economic considerations, not by hope of world empire, but by a hatred of what he sensed in the Carthaginian culture,—a world outlook appalling to him in its basic despair, in its cruel commercialism, its utter disregard for objective moral standards, its inhuman cultus of blood-thirsty Eastern gods. Thus Mr. Chesterton introduces a new aspect, suggests a more basic motive for the death struggle of these two great powers.

The problem then arises: is this suggestion justified historically? What do we actually know of the civilization and culture, the spirit and moral atmosphere of Carthage as recorded by the ancients themselves? Do the historical sources justify Mr. Chesterton's interpretation, or is it enough to explain
the Punic wars simply as a contest for political and economic supremacy between two states having essentially the same moral outlook and values? Obviously, the first step toward a solution must be an examination of the ancient authors with a view to determining the nature of Carthaginian civilization and culture, especially at the time of the Punic wars. That is what we propose to undertake in this investigation.

Our attempt will be to discover not so much what Carthage did, but what she was. We shall not try, therefore, to trace the full history of the city, and historical details will be considered only in so far as they cast light on some significant trait of national character; rather we shall attempt to discover the reality behind those details. R.B. Smith states the problem thus:

If we try, as we cannot help trying, to picture to ourselves the daily life and personal characteristics of the people... and to ask, not what the Carthaginians did, for that we know, but what they were, we are confronted by the provoking blank in the national history...

It is with the hope of filling in somewhat that "provoking blank in the national history" of Carthage that we shall examine the ancient sources, extracting all that casts light on the people themselves, their civilization and culture, interpreting this data to determine their national character. And, since the investigation draws much of its importance from its connection with the larger problem of the Punic wars, our interest will be centered on the civilization and culture of Carthage especially during the period of those wars.
In regard to sources, the ancient Latin and Greek authors, particularly the historians, will be used almost exclusively as the basis of conclusions. It is true that the details they offer concerning the national character of Carthage are limited and fragmentary. Yet, in one sense, this limitation is an advantage, since it allows an exhaustive study of what data is provided. It will be objected, of course, that a study of Carthage through the accounts of her enemies, the Greeks and Romans, will necessarily be prejudiced and lacking in objective value. We can reply, first, that if Greek and Roman writers of different periods present a single consistent picture of the nation, and one that appears to be borne out by the actions of that nation, that is, by simple historical facts, then it is safe to say that their attitude must be justified by reality. Moreover, the Greek and Roman attitude itself is almost as important for our ultimate purpose as the reality it reflects, since it helps toward a basic explanation of their centuries of opposition to Carthaginian expansion. Finally, we must be satisfied with Greek and Roman sources for the very good reason that no others exist. It would be highly desirable to learn the national character of Carthage from Carthaginian historians, and to possess an account of the Punic Wars from the Carthaginian point of view. The fact is, however, that no such writings exist, and so we must make the best of what we have.

Much has been written on Carthage in modern times, both in the course of general histories of the ancient world, like those
of Mommson, Rostovtzeff, and Duruy, or in the form of special studies, like those of R. B. Smith and A. J. Church. The general histories, naturally, touch on the background of Carthage only in so far as it is necessary to an understanding of her political and economic history. Of the special studies, Smith is the most satisfactory; his style is interesting and his interpretations moderate. His effort to achieve literary excellence, however, is made at the cost of full citation and annotation of prime sources. Moreover, he is not concerned exclusively with the nature of Carthage herself, but treats her history at greater length. Church, too, is concerned mainly with political development and history; his account of Carthaginian civilization and culture is rather cursory and superficial, inferior to that of some of the general histories of the ancient world. Neither had as his prime aim the precise object of this investigation. All the existing accounts are most useful, of course, as guides to prime sources and aids to interpretation. We shall be concerned with them only incidentally, however, attempting rather to examine carefully the prime sources themselves and to draw, as far as possible, our own conclusions.

The data gathered from the ancient writers will be organized under the two main divisions of civilization and culture. The term "civilization" is here taken in its root meaning as signifying all that has to do with law and its enforcement, so that we can say with E. R. Hull, S. J.: "Civilization, therefore, I define as a state of social organization which binds together
a race or people into a unity under a definite social code ... In short, civilization is essentially the reign of social law."
Thus, under the head of "civilization" we shall group all material on the civil constitution and laws of Carthage and their enforcement.

Again, we follow Hull in distinguishing between "civilization" and "culture" as follows: 6

Civilization ... means essentially the reign of social law. Everything else which is found embodied in a given system of civilization must therefore for the sake of clearness be called by some other name; and that name, for want of a better, we may call "culture". Culture etymologically means the cultivation of something, and therefore the application of human faculties to some object.

Thus, the faculties applied in the material sphere give rise to material culture, - agriculture, commerce, resources, territorial dominion, etc. In the same way intellectual culture will include intellectual and aesthetic development, - art, literature, philosophy, and the amenities - while religion and national ideals will fall under moral culture. The division, no doubt, can be questioned; it is proposed, however, not as an absolute, but rather as a convenient framework for the organization of material. These two large aspects or approaches, the civil and cultural, while complementing and enlightening each other, will, we hope, join in focus upon the Carthaginians themselves, drawing out the salient features of their nature, enabling us to see with some accuracy "what they were", especially at the time of the Punic Wars.
Notes to Introduction

1 The Everlasting Man, New York, Dodd, Mead, and Co., 1930, 158.

2 Carthage and the Carthaginians, London, Longman's, Green, 1879, 29.


4 Carthage (Story of Nations Series), New York, Putnam, 1893.


6 Ibid., 15.
PART ONE

CIVILIZATION
CHAPTER I

THE CONSTITUTION AND LAWS OF CARTHAGE

I. General Type of Constitution

Our most complete and reliable authority on the constitution of Carthage is Aristotle, who sketches its broad outline in the Politics, characterizing it, with that of Sparta and Crete, as "justly famous." He classifies the government of Carthage as an aristocracy, "the government of more than one, yet only a few," so called "either because the best men rule or because they rule with a view to what is best for the state and for its members."

Yet it is not a pure aristocracy, governed by the "best in virtue absolutely," under which "the same person is a good man and a good citizen absolutely,"- but a secondary type of aristocracy, in which the rulers are "good men in relation to some arbitrary standard,... good relatively to their own form of government." "For even in the states that do not pay any public attention to virtue there are nevertheless some men that are held in high esteem and are thought worthy of respect. Where then the constitution takes in view wealth and virtue as well as the common people, as, for instance, at Carthage, this is of the nature of an aristocracy."

II. Chief Magistrates

According to Aristotle, the constitution of Carthage provided for chief magistrates whom he calls kings, corresponding to the kings at Sparta, probably in their twofold capacity as protectors.
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II. Chief Magistrates

According to Aristotle, the constitution of Carthage provided for chief magistrates whom he calls kings, corresponding to the kings at Sparta, probably in their twofold capacity as protectors
and rulers of the state. They held office, however, not by hereditary right as at Sparta, but by election on the double basis of wealth and merit. "If therefore election by wealth is oligarchical and election by merit aristocratic, this will be a third system exhibited in the organization of the constitution of Carthage, for there elections are made with an eye to these two qualifications, and especially elections to the most important offices, those of the kings and of the generals." Aristotle regards this as an advantage over the Spartan system, for in pointing out the resemblances of the two constitutions, he says: "It is another superior feature that the Carthaginian kings are not confined to the same family, and that one of no particular distinction."

This much we know about the kings from Aristotle; later writers fill in a few details. Nepos tells us their number and term of office: "As is true of the consuls at Rome, so at Carthage two kings were elected annually for a term of one year." Livy calls them by their more common and proper title "sufetes, qui summus Poenis est magistratus," and again, "sufetes (quod velut consulare imperium apud nos erat),"—a title which most modern historians and commentators trace to the Hebrew word shofetim, commonly rendered in Biblical English as judge, though the officials bearing this title at Carthage held executive as well as judicial authority.

What were the functions of the sufetes? Up to Aristotle's time they must have held, in conjunction with a group of Elders
who probably formed their cabinet or privy council, the supreme legislative and executive authority. "The reference of some matters and not of others to the popular assembly rests with the kings in consultation with the Elders in case they agree unanimously, but failing that these matters also lie with the people; and... the kings introduce business in the assembly...." 11

In later times, during the Punic wars, though the sufetes must have lost much of their power and authority through the limitations imposed on them by the excessive power of the order of Judges, 12 still they retained the prerogative of calling the senate or assembly together, 13 and probably of introducing business and acting as spokesmen for the body, as we find in Polybius' account of the Roman embassy to Carthage at the beginning of the Second Punic war: 14

The oldest member of the embassy, pointing to the bosom of his toga, told the senate that it held both peace and war for them. Therefore he would let fall from it and leave with them whichever of the two they bade him. The Carthaginian sufete bade him let fall whichever the Romans chose, and when the envoy said he would let fall war, many of the senators cried out at once, 'We accept it.'

Finally, the sufetes must have acted as judges in popular law suits, holding court daily in a busy quarter of the city, for Livy tells us that after the Second Punic war Aristo, the Tyrian agent of the exiled Hannibal, hung his written message to the senate of Carthage "celeberrimo loco, supra sedem quotidianam magistratuum prima vespera," and that it was discovered "postero die, cum sufetes ad jus dicendum consedissent." 15
III. The Council of Elders

According to Aristotle's account, there was a council of Elders (γερουσία) corresponding to the Elders at Sparta, though the exact nature of this group, its function, number, and mode of selection is not clear from the sources, and later commentators are hopelessly at odds upon the difficulty. Aristotle tells us that "the kings and the council of Elders correspond to the kings and Elders at Sparta," and we know that the council at Sparta, like that at Crete also, consisted of twenty eight members and acted as a single agency in conjunction with the kings. The Gerousia at Carthage may very well have been the same in number, forming, together with the kings, that council of which Livy speaks as negotiating for peace at the end of the Second Punic war:

Carthaginienses oratores ad pacem petendam mittunt triginta seniorum principes. Id erat sanctius apud illos concilium maximique ad ipsum senatum regendum vis.

It is quite clear from this and other sources that there existed along with the council of twenty eight another larger body, the senate, of which this group formed but a part, and from which it probably drew its members. In the passage just quoted Livy points out that this "consilium" comprised the "principes seniorum," while in another place he explains: "seniores, ita senatum vocabant." The council, then, were the "principes seniorum," the senate, "seniores." This distinction between the council and the larger senate is evident from Poly.
bius' account of the terms offered by the Romans before the Third Punic war, which included the surrender of three hundred hostages, the sons of senators (τῶν ἐκ τῆς σωφροσύνης) and of members of the council (ἐκ τῆς γερουσίας), while after the capture of New Carthage, according to the same author, Scipio set apart Mago and the Carthaginians who were with him, two of them being members of the council of Elders (γερουσία) and fifteen members of the senate (σύγκλητος).

The council of Elders must have been made up of the senators most distinguished for ability, family, and wealth, since these were the standards of excellence at Carthage, according to Aristotle. In his time, the legislative power of the council was apparently absolute when its members agreed with the two kings:

The reference of some matters and not of others to the popular assembly rests with the kings in consultation with the Elders in case they agree unanimously, but failing that, these matters also lie with the people.

There is question here, of course, as to whether Aristotle, in speaking of the Elders (γεροντες) means the council or the entire senate. It is likely that he speaks of the council; this would be more in accord with the practice at Sparta, and much more practical. The entire senate would be too unwieldy a group to act thus in harmony with the kings in the multiple affairs of government; its membership must have been fairly large, since Justinus relates that, at a period of more than fifty years before the writing of the Politics, "centum ex numero senatorum judices deliguntur."
The function of this council of Elders at the time of Aristo-
tole, then, was not merely to advise the kings, but actually to
share their power of government. Later, however, they must have
lost this prerogative with the decline in the monarchy and the
rise of oligarchical rule. While Livy speaks of them even in the
time of the Punic wars as "vis ad ipsum senatum regendum," they
probably exercised this influence more through personal author-
ity as "principes seniorum" than in virtue of any authority in-
vested in the council itself. The occasions upon which the coun-
cil of Thirty appears in Livy's account, the only times he
distinguishes between this group and the rest of the senate- is
when they are sent as a delegation to ask for peace, which indi-
cates that at least the conventional form of the council was re-
tained as a convenient committee for carrying out diplomatic and
civic formalities under the authority of the senate. This is
borne out by Polybius, who speaks of "the thirty of the Gerousia"
who were sent to reconcile Hanno and Hamilcar toward the end of
the Mercenary War.

IV. The Senate

Little is said of the senate at the early period; in fact it
is not mentioned by Aristotle. However, we know that it existed
in his time from the fact that a board of 104 Judges, whom he
does mention, was chosen from among its members, according to
Justinus. This fact indicates also that it must have been a
rather large body. The silence of Aristotle may be accounted for
by assuming that the senate was of little importance at his time, the power of state being in the hands of the kings and the Gerousia. The senate, like the council of Elders and the Judges drawn from it, would have been composed of representatives of families distinguished for wealth and influence.

In the time of the Punic wars, however, we know that the Senate was of great importance. There are several incidents in Polybius which show that the senators had the prerogative of deciding for war or peace. For example, when Regulus was threatening Carthage, it was the senate that determined not to submit, but to hold out against him to the end. Again, the senate decided to accept war from the Roman ambassadors who came to remonstrate about the aggression of Hannibal. Finally, when Scipio proposed terms at the end of the Second Punic war, at the instigation and under the influence of Hannibal, the senate voted to make the treaty on the above conditions and... at once dispatched envoys with orders to agree with them. V. The Hundred

How can we account for this change, the shift in power from the hands of the kings and Elders to the senatorial class? It was due, probably, to the influence of a new institution, introduced into the Carthaginian system at a comparatively late hour to restore the balance of power between the nobility and the senatorial order. For the family of Mago, through superior ability, wealth, and influence had come to dominate the state to
such an extent that they threatened to become absolute. Justinus, after telling of the death of Hamilcar in the Sicilian war (479 B.C.), says:

Deinde cum familia tanta imperatorum gravis liberae civitati esset, omniaque ipsi aegerent simul et judicarent, centum ex numero senatorum judices deliguntur, qui reversis a bello ducibus, rationem rerum gestarum exigerent, ut hoc metu ita in bello imperia cogitarent ut domi judicia legesque respicerent.

This new commission was instituted, then, as a check upon the power of the kings and generals, to exact an account of their administration and to punish them when necessary.

Aristotle, writing about fifty years after the death of Hamilcar, speaks of this "magistracy of 104" as one of the chief institutions of Carthage, "corresponding to the Ephors at Sparta," the Carthaginian institution is superior to that of Sparta, however, in this, that "the Ephors are drawn from any class, but the Carthaginians elect this magistracy by merit." He refers once more to the commission, this time as "the supreme magistracy of the Hundred," explaining that its members were elected by the Boards of Five, of which we will speak later. Thus it appears that even in the time of Aristotle, the Hundred (as the commission is generally referred to, although consisting of 104 actual members, as mentioned above) had become more than simply a board of judges to whom returning generals were accountable; they are already the "supreme magistracy", probably exercising a strong influence over the sufetes, generals, and senators through their supremacy as arbiters of official conduct at home and in the
field. We shall see later that this power eventually gave them the actual control of the city.

VI. The Boards of Five

Another feature of the political organization of Carthage, and one rather closely connected with the Judges in spirit and function, were the commissions of Five, or Pentarchies, described by Aristotle as an oligarchic element in the Carthaginian constitution:

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The appointment by co-optation of the Boards of Five which control many important matters, and the election by these boards of the supreme magistracy of the Hundred, and also their longer tenure of authority than that of any other officers (for they are in power after they have gone out of office and before they have actually entered upon it) are oligarchical features; their receiving no pay and not being chosen by lot and other similar regulations must be set down as aristocratic, and so must the fact that the members of the Boards are the judges in all law suits; instead of different suits being tried by different courts, as at Sparta.

This is all we know of the institution from ancient sources, and the account is none too clear. It is probable that as Carthage grew into an empire under the policy of expansion and foreign conquest which she undertook to offset the inroads of the Greeks about the fifth century B.C. 39 the business of government became too complex to be handled efficiently by the kings and council. The Boards of Five would have been instituted as permanent commissions in charge of "important matters"—military and naval affairs, commerce and revenues, colonial administration, and domestic discipline. The commissioners' tenure of office stretched over a long period of time, and this, with the custom of electing their own members by co-optation, was doubt-
less intended to insure stability and singleness of purpose in the vital departments of the state. Yet it is this very permanence that Aristotle criticizes as oligarchic, leaving the door open to abuse. The Boards of Five, having the privilege of electing the members of the "supreme magistracy of the Hundred", could place men of their own class and point of view in this powerful institution also. The fact that the commissioners received no pay, and that they were not chosen by lot, but probably on the basis of wealth and merit, Aristotle concedes to be an aristocratic feature, but points out later that such regulations in practice tend to oligarchy. Finally, he tells us that the members of these boards were judges in all law suits, a prerogative that could also easily be misused to strengthen the grip of oligarchy. It has been mentioned that the sufetes acted as judges in law suits; if this is to be reconciled with Aristotle's statement we must conclude that the sufetes were ex officio members of the Boards, perhaps the permanent chairmen, much as the vice-president is chairman of the Senate of the United States.

VII. The Assembly

Unusual as it may be in a commonwealth of Eastern or Semetic origin, there was a popular assembly at Carthage,—a δῆμος—with even greater power than the assembly at Sparta.

The reference of some matters and not of others to the popular assembly rests with the kings in consultation with the Elders in case they agree unanimously, but failing that, these matters also lie with the people; and when the kings introduce
business in the assembly, they do not merely let the people sit
and listen to the decisions that have been taken by their rulers,
but the people have the sovereign decision, and anybody who
wishes may speak against the proposals introduced, a right that
does not exist under the other constitutions.42

This passage proves that in Aristotle's time at least, the
kings could call the assembly and propose measures for consider-
ation. Under these circumstances the people had the right of
debate and their decision was final.

Among the later authors, Polybius relates an incident which
took place toward the end of the Second Punic war, and which
clearly shows that the assembly was still of importance at that
time. After the Carthaginians, by seizing the Roman supply ships,
had broken the treaty which was supposed to have ended the war,
Scipio sent ambassadors to demand an explanation. Polybius says:43

On arriving at Carthage they first of all addressed the
senate, and afterwards being brought before the popular assembly
spoke with great freedom about the situation.

After an account of their complaint, he continues:

There were few among the Carthaginians who approved of adher-
ing to the treaty. The majority both of their leading politi-
cians and of those who took part in the deliberation objected
to its harsh conditions, and with difficulty tolerated the bold
language of the ambassadors.... The popular assembly decided sim-
ply to dismiss the ambassadors without a reply....

Thus it is evident that even at this time, matters of the
greatest importance were put in the hands of the assembly for
deliberation and decision.

But the greatest proof of the power of the assembly is the
reform which Hannibal effected through it after the end of the
Second Punic war. Hannibal, being elected sufete, broke the
power of the Judges, who had dominated the Carthaginian state up to that time. A pretext was given him in the insubordination of a quaestor. Livy records the event thus: 44

Hannibal, thinking this conduct highly improper, sent a messenger to arrest the quaestor and haling him before the assembly (in contionem), assailed him and not less the order of Judges, in comparison with whose pride of place and power the laws were as nought, and the magistrates as well. When he saw that his speech was well received and that their haughty spirits menaced the liberty of the lowest classes also, he immediately proposed and enacted a law that judges should be elected for one year each, and that no one should be a judge for two consecutive terms. But whatever influence he gained in this way with the commons, to the same extent he roused the animosity of a large party among the nobles.

Thus the popular assembly was strong enough under the direction of Hannibal to overcome the ruling clique by passing a law directly contrary to their interests,—limiting their term of office. In order to appreciate the difficulty, the power involved, it must be remembered that the Judges had made themselves supreme, forming a narrow oligarchy and strengthening their position through years of domination.

It is not clear from the sources whether the assembly was composed of all common citizens without discrimination, or whether some qualification was necessary. It is likely that in a city where wealth was an important basis of distinction, some property qualification was required for participation in public affairs, even in the assembly. 45

VIII. Generals and Minor Officials

The last office mentioned by Aristotle is that of general. He refers to it only incidentally, saying that at Carthage "elect-
ions are made with an eye to these two qualifications (wealth and merit) and especially elections to the most important, those of the kings and of the generals. All we can gather from this is that the generalship was an office distinct from that of suffect, unlike the system at Rome, where the consuls were also generals; that the generals were elected; and that they had to be distinguished for wealth as well as merit.

Among the later writers, Nepos remarks that: On his return Hannibal was made king after he had been general for twenty-one years." It is evident from this that the generalship had no fixed term, but continued for the length of the war, or at least until the general was recalled for mismanagement, or simply defeat, as many of them were. The Carthaginian generals held this advantage over the Roman, in that they were not limited by a fixed term of office, and so could maintain a consistent and unchanging policy, profiting by experience. The Romans, in changing generals every two years, were deprived of these advantages.

As we have mentioned (supra V), the generals were responsible for their conduct, and in fact, for the outcome of their expeditions, to the Board of 100 Judges, and some paid for ill success with their lives. In the field they were supreme; it appears however that they were sometimes accompanied by members of the senate, who must have had some influence upon their conduct, probably attending them as advisers. There were fifteen senators
with Mago when Scipio defeated him and took New Carthage, according to Polybius. 48

There were at least two generals in charge of the armies of Carthage. Thus, while Hannibal led one army in Italy, another, under Hasdrubal, defended Carthage against Scipio. During the Mercenary War which followed the First Punic war Hamilcar and Hanno both held command. Polybius mentions three generals as holding command at the same time after the battle of Ecnomos in the First Punic war,- Hamilcar, Bostarus, and Hasdrubal, the son of Hanno. 49

There were minor officials at Carthage mentioned occasionally by historians, though little is known of their functions outside of what is indicated by their titles. We have mentioned the "quaestor" whom Hannibal summoned for insubordination, according to Livy. 50 The quaestors were, probably, on the analogy of the Roman system, treasury officers and paymasters. Nepos speaks of a "praefectus Morum" who reproved the great Hamilcar,- an official who must have fulfilled many of the functions of the Roman censor, with powers to supervise public and private conduct in all citizens, regardless of rank or position.

IX. Conclusion

Such was the general organization of the Carthaginian government,- kings, council of Elders, senate, the Hundred Judges, the assembly, the Pentarchies, the generals, minor officials- the bare external structure of the constitution, the letter of the
law, as far as we can determine from the ancient sources. It is this general form that Aristotle admires: 52

Carthage also appears to have a good constitution. (And further:) Many regulations at Carthage are good; and a proof of a well-regulated constitution is that the populace willingly remain faithful to the constitutional system, and that neither civil strife has arisen in any degree worth mentioning, not yet a tyran$.

It is this form which draws from Polybius the comment: 53

The constitution of Carthage seems to me to have been originally well contrived as regards its most distinctive features. For there were kings, and the house of Elders was an aristocratical force, and the people were supreme in matters proper to them, the entire frame of the state much resembling that of Rome and Sparta.
Notes to Chapter I

I. References to Greek Authors

1 Politics, II,8.9:
Peri mên oûn tîs Lakedaimonînîn politeias kai Krêtikês kai tîs Karâkhdonîn, aipêr dikaios eudokimôusì, ...

2 Ibid., III,5.2:
Kaleîn de elîbâmen ... tîn de tîn olâignîn mên pleîdôwnîn ò'êndos aristokratîn (h òia tî toûs aristouc ârchi soû h òia tî proû tî aristotîn-çî pókeiçai toûs koînônôsouc autûc) ...

3 Ibid., IV,5.10:
Tîn gár ek tîn aristouv apîlôs kai tîkat' ârêtîn politeias kai mi proû upotheiûn tîn aûgâvîn anôdrôn mûnîn dikaiôn prósagôreueîn aristokratîn, ân mûnî hár apîlôs o autôc anêh kai politeias âgathos èstiv, oî o ân tais allais aûgâvî prós tîn politeias eîsî tîn autôv.

4 Ibid., IV,5.11:
Kai gár en tais mi poloumênaic koînîn èpimîleiax òrêtîs èsîn ïmws tînes oî eudokimôunîtes kai dokouîtes ìnîa èpitiêxeic. Oîpou oûn h politeia blepei eîc tî ploutîn kai òrêtîn kai òûmon, oîn en Karâkhôa, autê aristokratîkê èstiv.

5 Ibid., II,8.2:
'Êchte de paraphèxia tî Lakywnikê politeiâ, ... toûs de basileic kai tîn gyrouân anâlogon toûs êkkei basileôn kai gyrouûi.

6 Ibid., II,8.5:
Elîper oûn toû mi aîreitai ploutîvônh òlgagyvôk w tî de cat' àrêtîn aristokratîkê, autê tîs ân eîh tàzîs trîzî kai hînper swntetâkai kai toûs Karâkhonîc tî peri tîn politeian- aîrîvntai gar eîc òûo tâstta blêpynîtes, kai màlîsta tâs megôtas, toûs te basileic kai toûs stratrgoucs.

7 Ibid., II,8.2:
Kai bêlîlon de toûs basileic mihte kátâ to autô ènîaî gêvoc, mède toûtô tî tûxôv ....

11 Ibid., II,8.3:
Toû mên gar toû mi prôsagêin toû de mi prôsagêin prôs toû ðîmou oî basileic kôrîoi metà tîn gýroun, aû ðîmowmînîsî pântes, eî de mi, kai toûtwn o ðîmoc. Ï o 'ân eîsffêrson oûtôi ...

14 III,33:
O de prôsctatoc autûn deîzoc toûs en toû suneôrîw toû nôlîpov, entadbâ kai tûn pûlîmou autôc âph kai tîn eîrînhn fêrîn- êkbalon oûn, òpôteron an keleuîson òpôleîvyn, o de basileic tûn Karâkhonîwv, òpôteron autôc faiîvetai, toût' êkbalîc êké-
λευσε. τον δ' ἰωμάλου φήσαντος τὸν πόλεμον ἐκβάλειν, ἀνεφώνησαν ἀμα καὶ πλείους τῶν ἐκ τοῦ συνεδρίου, δέχεσθαι φάσκοντες.

17 Politics, II, 8.2; vd. supra, note 5.

18 Ibid., II, 7.3

19 Plutarch, Lycurgus, V, 8.

23 XXXVI, 4:

...τεθέσαντα τούτων, καὶ τριάκοσίους δύο ὅσοι ἦσαν τοῦ πολεμοῦ ἐκτείνοντος, ἐν τριάκονθος ἡμέραις τοὺς νίκος τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου καὶ τῆς γερουσίας....

24 X, 18:

Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα Μάγνα καὶ τοὺς ἀμα τούτῳ Καρχηδόνιους ἑξώριζε· δύο μὲν γὰρ ἦσαν κατελήμνευοι τῶν ἐκ τῆς γερουσίας, πέντε δὲ καὶ δέκα τῶν ἐκ τῆς συγκλήτου.

25 Politics, II, 8.5:

οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀριστίνδην ἄλλα καὶ πλουτίνδην οἶονται (οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι) δεῖν αἰφείσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας...

29 I, 87:

Διὸ καὶ τριάκοντα μὲν τῆς γερουσίας προχειρισάμενοι, καὶ μετὰ τούτων... "Ἀνώνυμα,... ἕξαπεστελλον πρὸς τὸν Βάρκαν....

31 I, 31

32 III, 33; vd. supra, note 14.

33 XV, 19:

Καὶ τὸ μὲν συνεδρίου παρατίκα πρεσβευτὰς ἐξέπεμπε τοὺς ἀνθρωπολογομερένους ὑπὲρ τούτων.

36 Politics, II, 8.2:

"Εχει δὲ παραπλήσια τῇ Δακωνικῇ πολιτείᾳ τῶν δὲ τῶν ἐκατόν καὶ τεσσάρων ἄρχὴν τοῖς ἐφόροις (πλὴν ὁ οὖς χείρον, οἱ μὲν ἐκ
τῶν τυχόντων εἰς, ταύτην ὁ αἴρονται τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀριστερῶν...

37 Ibid., II,8.4; cf. below, note 38.
...τὴν τῶν ἐκατόν ταύτας (τὰς πενταρχίας) αἴρεισθαι τὴν
μεγίστην ἀρχήν...

38 Ibid.: 
Τὸ δὲ τὰς πενταρχίας κυρίας οὔσας πολλῶν καὶ μεγάλων ὑπ' 
αὐτῶν αἴρετας εἶναι, καὶ τὴν τῶν ἐκατόν ταύτας αἴρεισθαι τὴν
μεγίστην ἀρχήν, ἔτι δὲ ταύτας πλεονά ἀρχεῖν χρόνον τῶν ἄλλων
(καὶ γὰρ ἐξελεχνόντες ἀρχουσί καὶ κελεύσεις) ὀλιγαρχίαν τὸ δὲ 
ἀμέσως καὶ μὴ κηρυττὸς ἀριστοκρατικὸν θετέον, καὶ εἴ τι 
τοῖς ἄλλην ἔτερον, καὶ τὸ τὰς ὅλας ὑπὸ τῶν ἀρχείων δικαζέσθαι 
pάσας (καὶ μὴ ἄλλας ὑπ' ἄλλων καθάπερ δὲν λαξεδαίμονί). 

40 Ibid., II,8.6-7.

42 Ibid., II,8.3:
Τοῦ μὲν γὰρ τὸ μὲν προσάγειν τὸ δὲ μὴ προσάγειν πρὸς τὸν
δῆμον οἱ βασιλεῖς κυριοὶ μετὰ τῶν γερόντων ἀν ὀμογνωμονοῦσι 
pάντες, εἰ δὲ μὴ, καὶ τούτων ὁ δῆμος ὁ δὲ ἡ ἐλεφαρωσίν οὕτοι,
οὐ διακομόθαι μονὸν ἀποδίδασι τῷ δῆμῳ τὰ δόξαν τοῖς ἡρουσίν,
ἄλλα κυριοὶ κρίνειν εἰσί, καὶ τῷ βουλομένῳ τοῖς ἐλεφασμοῖς 
ἀντεπειν ἐξεστιν, ὅπερ ἐν ταῖς ἐτεραῖς πολιτείαις ὁπχ ἐστιν.

43 XV,1:
'Οι δὲ παραγενηθέντες εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα τὸ μὲν πρῶτον εἰς 
τὴν σύγχυσιν μετὰ δὲ ταύτα πάλιν ἐπὶ τοὺς πολλοὺς παραρθέντες,
ελεγον ὑπὲρ τῶν ἐνεστῶτων μετὰ παρρησίας....

(XV,2:) 

Τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ὅλγοι μὲν ἦσαν οἱ συναινοῦντες μὴ παρα-
βαλλεῖν τὰς ὁμολογίας, οἱ δὲ πλεῖοις καὶ τῶν πολιτευμένων καὶ 
tῶν δικαστῶν ὑπὲρ τῶν προσβετῶν παρρησίαν....

46 Politics, II,8.5; vd. supra, note 6.

48 X,18; vd. supra, note 24.

49 I,30.
52 Politics, II,8.1:
Politics is said of Carthaginian citizens... And many of these, because the citizens were not at this time divided into parties, made use of the terms in the constitution of Carthage, and were in many cases chiefs of government... Consequently the government was entirely in the hands of the citizen body, and the citizens were not disturbed by the tenures and the division of the state, but the government was always in the hands of the citizens of Carthage, and they were always in control of their government.

53 VI,51:
The state of Carthage was not at first divided into parties, but the citizens were divided into parties, and the government was divided into parties, and the citizens were in many cases chiefs of government... Consequently the government was entirely in the hands of the citizen body, and the citizens were not disturbed by the tenures and the division of the state, but the government was always in the hands of the citizens of Carthage, and they were always in control of their government.

II. References to Latin and English Authors

8 Vita Hannibalis, 7:
Huc ut (Hannibal) reedit, rex factus est, postquam praetor fuerat anno secundo et vicesimo - ut enim Romae consules, sic Karthagine quotannis annui bini reges creabantur.
It is possible that they were at first elected for life; cf. Duruy, History of Rome, Vol. I, p.545.

9 XXVIII,37.

10 XXX,7.

12 XXIII,46:
Iudicium ordo Carthagine ea tempestate dominabatur,...

13 XXX,7: Senatum itaque sufetes... vocaverunt.

15 XXXIV,61.

16 Cf. the conflicting accounts in Mommsen, Rollin, Duruy, Church, and the Encyclopedia Britannica ("Carthage") in regard to this and other features of the Carthaginian constitution.

20 XXX,16.
21 But cf. Mommsen, History of Rome, Vol. II, p.147: "It is doubtful whether by the side of this small council there existed a larger one; at any rate it was not of much importance."

22 XXXIV,61.

27 Historiarum Philippicarum Ex Trogae Pompeio, XIX,2.5.

28 Cf. XXX,16 and XLIX,7 (Epitome).

30 Loc. cit.; cf. section V, note 35.


35 Loc. cit.


41 As appears from Livy, XXXIV,61; cf. supra, section II, note 15.

44 XXXIII,46:
Enimvero indignum id ratus Hannibal viatorem ad prendendum quæestorem misit subductumque in contionem non ipsum magis quam ordinem iudicum, præ quorum superbìa atque opibus nec leges quicquam essent nec magistratus, accusavit. Et ut secundis auribus accipi orationem animadvertis et infimorum quoque libertati gravem esse superbiam eorum, legem ex templo promulgavit pertulitque, ut in singulos annos iudices legerentur, neu quis biennium continuum iudex esset. Ceterum quantam eo facto ad plebem inierat gratiam, tantum magnae partis principum offenderat animos.


47 Vita Hannibalis, 7; cf. supra, note 8.
50 XXXIII,46; cf. supra, section VII, note 44.

51 *Vita Hamilcaris*, 3:
Quo factum est ut a praefecto morum Hasdrubal cum eo (Hamil-care) vetaretur esse.
CHAPTER II
ADHERENCE TO THE LAW

I. The Problem

It is evident, then, from the testimony of Aristotle, whom Smith calls "the greatest political philosopher of antiquity," and of Polybius, whom Duruy terms "the wisest historian of antiquity," that the external structure of the Carthaginian government as originally planned, was excellent; what we want to determine next is: How did this constitution work out in practice? What was the spirit animating the corpus of laws? What do the ancients tell us of the actual operation of the Carthaginian government under the system proposed by the lawmakers? In other words, we have seen the Carthaginian system in the abstract; we must try now to discover how it was enforced in fact.

II. Defects Mentioned by Aristotle

It is important to notice that whereas Aristotle praises the general structure of the government of Carthage, he does not hesitate to criticize certain elements which he regards as defects, departures from the aristocratic form, and sources of danger to the state. "The features open to criticism as judged by the principle of an aristocracy or republic are some of them departures in the direction of democracy and others in the direction of oligarchy." The democratic feature criticized is the importance allowed to the popular assembly in making it supreme when the kings and
Elders fail to agree, giving it the right of debate and decision as explained above (Chapter I, section VII).

The oligarchical features are more numerous: (1) the Pentarchies, (2) venality or plutocracy, (3) official pluralism, and (4) the reduction of the populace by colonization.

(1) The Pentarchies, or Boards of Five, are dangerous because while controlling important matters, they elect their own members by co-optation, enjoying an unusually long term of office, and the privilege of selecting the members of the powerful Board of Judges.

(2) In regard to the venal or plutocratic tendency, Aristotle says:

But the Carthaginian system diverges from aristocracy in the direction of oligarchy most signally in respect of a certain idea that is shared by the mass of mankind; they think that the rulers should be chosen not only for their merit, but also for their wealth, as it is not possible for a poor man to govern well or to have leisure for his duties.... But it must be held that this divergence from aristocracy is an error on the part of the lawgiver; for one of the most important points to keep in view from the outset is that the best citizens may be able to have leisure, and may not have to engage in any unseemly occupation, not only when in office but also when living in private life. And if it is necessary to look to the question of means for the sake of leisure, it is a bad thing that the greatest offices of the state, the kingship and the generalship, should be for sale. For this law makes wealth more honored than worth, and renders the whole state avaricious; and whatever the holders of supreme power deem honorable, the opinion of the other citizens also is certain to follow them, and a state in which virtue is not held in the highest honor cannot be securely governed by an aristocracy. And it is probable that those who purchase office will learn by degrees to make a profit out of it when they hold office for money spent.

(3) The feature most characteristically oligarchical, however, is the union of a number of distinct offices and powers in one
person,—official pluralism: 6

And it might also be though a bad thing for the same person to hold several offices, which is considered a distinction at Carthage. One man one job is the best rule for efficiency, and the lawgiver ought to see that this may be secured and not appoint the same men to play the flute and make shoes.

(4) Finally, the rulers at Carthage were accustomed to rid themselves of troublesome surplus population among the lower classes by an expedient which Aristotle regards as dangerous: 7

But the constitution being oligarchical they best escape the dangers by being wealthy, as they constantly send out a portion of the common people to appointments in the cities (colonies); by this means they heal the social sore and make the constitution stable. However, this is the achievement of fortune, whereas freedom from civil strife ought to be secured by the lawgiver; but as it is, suppose some misfortune occurs and the multitude of subject class revolts, there is no remedy provided by the laws to restore tranquillity.

These five defects, then, were already evident in Aristotle's time. It is clear that they are not simply theoretical objections, based on an analysis of the constitution in the abstract. At least venality, pluralism, and the colonizing device are not regarded as merely possible dangers, but because they are seen to exist the constitution is criticized for not providing against them. Therefore the defects mentioned by Aristotle must have been actual dangerous tendencies in the operation of the Carthaginian government under the constitution.

III. During the First Punic War

A period of more than fifty years elapsed between Aristotle's death and the First Punic war, during which we have no record of the political development of Carthage. A few indications can be
gathered, however, from Polybius’ account. He speaks only once of the condition of the state, and that is to say only that: "The two states (Rome and Carthage) were also at this period still uncorrupted in principle, moderate in fortune, and equal in strength." All further evidence must be gathered by inference.

In relating the opening incident, the Roman occupation of Messene, Polybius says:

The Mamertines, partly by menace and partly by stratagem, dislodged the Carthaginian commander, who was already established in the citadel, and then invited Appius to enter, placing the city in his hands. The Carthaginians crucified their general, thinking him guilty of a lack both of judgment and of courage in abandoning the citadel.

Another commander, Hannibal (not the Great), later suffered the same fate: "Not long afterwards he was blockaded in one of the harbors of Sardinia by the Romans and after losing many of his ships was summarily arrested by the surviving Carthaginians and crucified."

This was, as is evident, the customary way of dealing with unsuccessful generals at Carthage. Since they were responsible to the Board of 100 Judges, the punishment, no doubt, was meted out by this group. They were traditionally cruel, though probably not so blindly severe as Valerius Maximus pictures them. After speaking of the rigor of Roman discipline, he says:

Leniter hoc, patres conscripti, si Carthaginiensium senatus in militiae negotiis procurandis violentiam intueri velimus; a quo duces bella pravo consilio gerentes, etiamsi prospera fortuna subsequita esset, cruci tamen suffigebantur; quod bene gesserant deorum immortalium adjutorio, quod male commiserant, ipsorum culpae imputantes.
In general, the practice shows the power of the order of judges, their interest in results above all else, and their cruelty.

It is likely, too, that they used this cruel power to gain their own ends within the state. There is an instance of this related by Justinus\(^2\) as taking place even in the time of Aristotle (circa 328 BC), while the government of Carthage was still relatively pure and uncorrupted. A certain Hamilear Rhodanus, "vir solertia facundiaque praeter caeteros insignis," was sent as a spy to the court of Alexander the Great. He fulfilled his mission with extraordinary success, yet, according to Justinus, "Carthaginienses post mortem regis (Alexander) reversum in patriam, quasi urbem regi venditasset, non ingrato tantum, verum etiam invido et crudeli animo, necaverunt." No doubt his success and abilities were a threat to the ambition of the wealthy class, embodied in the Board of Judges. It must have been through the exercise of their power in this manner that they eventually became the real directing power of the state, usurping the rights of the senate and controlling the magistrates through fear, as Livy relates.\(^3\)

There is another characteristic evident in the operation of the Carthaginian government during the first Punic war which was much more important in effecting the final result—their shortsighted commercial attitude. The Carthaginians were clearly led by the blindness of avarice into mistakes which not only cost them the war with Rome, but kindled the terrible mercenary re-
volt--the ἀπονόνον πόλεμον--which followed it. These mistakes were 1) the oppression of subject states, 2) the neglect of their fleet, and 3) the treatment of their mercenary army after the war.

The Romans gained their first real footing in Sicily not simply because they took Messene, but because their forces were joined and supported by the people of the island. Polybius says: "On their arrival in Sicily, most of the cities revolted from the Carthaginians and Syracusans and joined the Romans." 14

Again, when the Romans landed for the first time in Africa the native Numidians seized the opportunity to revolt and joined them against the Carthaginians: "In addition to the misfortunes I have mentioned, the Numidians attacking them at the same time as the Romans, inflicted not less but even more damage on the country than the latter." 15

Why should the states and peoples subject to Carthage be so ready to revolt, to join the invader against her, if not for the same reason that the Libyans rushed to support the mercenaries in the bloody insurrection that followed the war? Polybius tells us that the Carthaginians "had chiefly themselves to thank for all these grievous mischances," and explains as follows: 16

During the former war they had thought themselves reasonably justified in making their government of the Libyans very harsh. They had exacted from the peasantry, without exception, half of their crops, and had doubled the taxation of the townsmen without allowing exemption from any tax or even a partial abatement to the poor. They had applauded and honored not those governors who treated the people with gentleness and humanity, but those who procured for Carthage the largest amount of supplies and stores and used the country people most harshly....The conse-
quence was that the male population required no incitement to revolt,--a mere menace was sufficient--while the women, who had constantly witnessed the arrest of their husbands and fathers for non-payment of taxes, solemnly bound themselves by oath in each city to conceal none of their belongings, and stripping themselves of their jewels contributed them ungrudgingly to the war fund.

Thus, the revolts among subject nations may well be attributed to a harsh colonial policy, dictated by the avaricious desire of the Carthaginian government to throw the financial burden of the war on them rather than carrying it herself as Rome did.

Secondly, this same blind commercial outlook betrayed Carthage into the error that actually lost the war for her in the naval battle near the island of Aegusa, off Lilybaeum. The Romans had been driven from the sea twice already, their fleet shattered. "It was yielding to the blows of Fortune that they had retired from the sea on the first occasion; the second time it was owing to their defeat at Drepana, but now they made the third attempt, and through it, by gaining a victory and cutting off the supplies from the sea of the Carthaginian army at Eryx, they put an end to the whole war."\(^\text{17}\)

Why was Carthage defeated at sea in this decisive battle? (1) She failed to estimate correctly the spirit of her opponent and (2) she neglected her own fleet. Polybius explains thus: \(^\text{18}\)

Their ships, being loaded, were not in a serviceable condition for battle, while the crews were quite untrained, and had been put on board for the emergency and their marines were recent levies, whose first experience of the least hardship and danger this was. The fact is that, owing to their never having expected the Romans to dispute the sea with them, they had, in
contempt for them, neglected their own navy.

Those who governed Carthage judged the Roman spirit by their own materialist standards; it was only "sound business sense" to economize by cutting down on naval expenditures after the second Roman failure. Their economy cost them the war.

Finally, this same attitude brought on the mercenary revolt. After peace was made, the mercenary troops were shipped by their generals in contingents to Carthage for payment and quiet demobilization. The government of Carthage, however, allowed them to gather in the city, hoping that when all were assembled they might be persuaded to forego some of the wages due them, as Polybius points out: 19 "The Carthaginians partly because, owing to their recent outlay, they were not very well off for money, and partly because they were convinced that the mercenaries, would let them off part of their arrears of pay, once they got them all collected in Carthage, detained them there on their arrival in this hope, confining them to the city."

Among such a veteran soldiery, many of them half barbarian, all of them confident in their prowess after years of campaigning, few of them having any personal attachment to Carthage, the proposed reduction of wages for services already rendered could not but fan the spark of discontent into the roaring conflagration of revolt. The devastating war that followed could have been prevented had the Carthaginian government been willing to pay her soldiers the wages she had promised. It was not that
Carthage lacked the wealth, though she was hard pressed and would have had to make sacrifices. The wealth must have been there, since later, when threatened with revolt, the government agreed to pay even more than the soldiers originally demanded, and actually sent their general Gesco with money to discharge the arrears; but the affair had gone too far; Gesco and the money were seized and the mutiny became civil war. 20

These three great disasters,—the revolt of the subject states, the decisive naval defeat off Aegusa, and the outbreak of the "war without truce"—are all traceable to the myopic policy of an avaricious commercialism, a characteristic of the government of Carthage which indicates clearly that at this time she must have been dominated by the wealthy class,—an inevitable consequence of the oligarchic tendencies described by Aristotle.

Finally, it should be pointed out that along with its shortcomings the Carthaginian senate was also capable of genuine courage in the face of destruction. Defeated and almost in the hands of the Roman general Regulus, they sent ambassadors to ask for terms. Regulus dealt with them in a high handed manner, proposing conditions of extreme severity. In the words of Polybius: 21

"The attitude of the Carthaginian senate on hearing the Roman general's proposals was, although they had almost abandoned all hope of safety, yet one of such manly dignity that rather than submit to anything ignoble or unworthy of their past they were willing to suffer anything and to face every exertion and every
From Polybius' account of the First Punic war, then, we can conclude that the operation of the Carthaginian government was marked at times by cruelty, by oppression and neglect springing from the blindness of avarice, which cost Carthage not only the war, but the mercenary rebellion that followed. It must not be supposed that the Carthaginians were incapable of acting otherwise, as the incident of their opposition to Regulus clearly shows; nor were their counsels always rash and their plans impoprtunate, or they would never have been a match for Rome; further, they could produce a great leader like Hasdrubal, utterly selfless in devotion to his country, surpassing any Roman in his skill as a general; yet the fact is that Carthage did fail, and her failure may be attributed to the defects mentioned, since they undermined the structure of her government, kindling the hatred of her allies, arousing the hopes, and the contempt of Rome.

IV. During the Second Punic War

For the period of the Second Punic war, there is no need to determine the characteristic operation of the Carthaginian government by inference, since both Polybius and Livy have left enlightening generalizations on the matter. First of all, both agree that the government of Carthage underwent a change, that the old constitution no longer operated in its purity, that abuses had broken down the balance between the various depart-
ments of the original aristocracy. Polybius specifically mentions this change, its nature and causes. After praising the original constitution, he says:

But at the time when they entered on the Hannibalic war, the Carthaginian constitution had degenerated, and that of Rome was better. For as every body or state or action has its natural periods first of growth, then of prime, and finally of decay, and as every thing in them is at its best when they are in their prime, it was for this reason that the difference between the two states manifested itself at this time. For by as much as the power and prosperity of Carthage had been earlier than that of Rome, by so much had Carthage already begun to decline; while Rome was exactly at her prime, as far, at least, as her system of government was concerned. Consequently the multitude at Carthage had already acquired the chief voice in deliberations; while at Rome the senate still retained this; and hence, as in one case the masses deliberated and in the other the most eminent men, the Roman decisions on public affairs were superior, so that although they met with complete disaster, they were finally, by the wisdom of their counsels, victorious over the Carthaginians in war.

There is no doubt of the fact of the change; as to the nature, Polybius held that it was in the direction of democracy, that the old aristocracy had given way in the time of the Hannibal war to something like mob rule. Livy, on the other hand, does not mention the fact of the change specifically; rather it is implied in his summary of the situation immediately after the Second Punic war, when he describes the reforms instituted by Hannibal:

The order of Judges at that time was in control in Carthage, principally because the same men were judges for life. The property, reputation, and life of every citizen were in their hands. A man who offended one of the Judges made enemies of them all, nor was there any lack of persons to bring accusations before hostile Judges. Under their administration, marked by such violence,—for they did not use their excessive wealth in the spirit of a free state—Hannibal had been elected praetor.

The reforms instituted by Hannibal cast light on the condition
of the government during this period. These reforms were aimed at what Hannibal, unquestionably sincere in his desire for the good of his native city, evidently regarded as the greatest defects in her administration. The first reform was an attempt to restore the balance of power:

"When he saw... that their (the Judges') haughty spirits menaced the liberty of the lowest classes also, he immediately proposed and enacted a law, that Judges should be elected for one year each, and that no one should be a Judge for two consecutive terms."

These two passages clearly indicate Livy's opinion as to the oligarchic nature of the change. From both Livy and Polybius then this much at least is clear,- (1) that a change from the original constitution had taken place in the Carthaginian government, and (2) that the change was for the worse, though the sources apparently disagree concerning its nature.

It is possible, despite the apparent contradiction of the two accounts, that both may be right, the difference lying in the point of view. Livy says that the Judges held supreme power; Polybius claims that the people prevailed. We have seen that the dangerous tendencies noted by Aristotle were both democratic and oligarchic. It is probable that in a time of stress like the period of the Punic wars, these elements would grow, upsetting the balance of the original constitutional form, each striving for domination. Both Livy and Polybius agree on the fact of the change from the old form. They differ on the direction it took.
Polybius, speaking of the principles of political evolution in the sixth book, says: 

"Aristocracy by its very nature degen-
erates into oligarchy; and when the commons, inflamed by anger take vengeance on this government for its unjust rule, democracy comes into being." This may well have been the case at Carthage. The original aristocracy would have changed to oligarchy through the tendencies noted by Aristotle. Through the Pentarchies, official pluralism, venality, and power to crush opposition by the abuse of their cruel prerogative, the Judges would have gathered everything into their own hands.

On the other hand, because of the expense involved and the insecurity of war times, the official colonizing expeditions, the "safety valve" device mentioned by Aristotle for ridding the city of troublesome excess population—were probably discontinued, so that the lower classes, swelled by natural increase and joined by numbers of rural workers who flocked to the city for protection, must have offered an increasing threat to the oligarchy, eventually becoming its rival for power.

The struggle between these two would explain Livy's account of the tyrannical measures employed by the oligarchs against individuals. They would have been driven to such measures to maintain their position. This opposition also explains Polybius' remark about the increased importance of the multitude in the affairs of state, for the oligarchs, fearing a general uprising, would have been forced to allow the people to decide in matters
that concerned them intimately, as in the case of the renewal of the Second Punic war after the treaty with Scipio had been broken.

The final victory of the assembly under Hannibal, as Livy relates, would end the struggle by breaking the power of the Judges, and Polybius' principle would be fulfilled: "...and when the commons, enflamed by anger, take vengeance on this government for its unjust rule, democracy comes into being." Thus Livy and Polybius, apparently contradicting each other, would both be right.

In regard to a second great weakness in the operation of the government at this time, it will help to recall that Aristotle, noting dangerous tendencies in his own time, criticizes the law which made wealth as well as merit, a basis of preferment: "For this law makes wealth more honored than worth, and renders the whole state avaricious.... And it is probable that those who purchase office will learn by degrees to make a profit out of it when they hold office for money spent."

That Aristotle's sage prediction was borne out in fact in the subsequent history of Carthage is proved by the testimony of both Livy and Polybius. In tracing the causes of Rome's final victory in the Second Punic war, Polybius says:

"Again, the laws and customs relating to the acquisition of wealth are better in Rome than at Carthage. At Carthage nothing which results in profit is regarded as disgraceful; at Rome, nothing is considered more so than to accept bribes and seek gain from improper channels.... A proof of this is that at Carthage candidates for office practice open bribery, whereas at
Rome death is the penalty for it.

Livy's account of the second great reform of Hannibal is proof that at Carthage those who had "purchased office had learned by degrees to make a profit out of it":30

Moreover, by another act he served the public interest, but aroused personal enmities against himself. The public revenues were being partly wasted through carelessness, partly appropriated as their booty and spoils of office by some of the prominent men and magistrates, and money to pay the tribute to the Romans each successive year was lacking, and a heavy assessment seemed to threaten the citizens.

When Hannibal had investigated the revenues, how much was collected as taxes on land and as duty at the ports, for what purpose it was spent, how much the ordinary expenses of the state required, and how much embezzlement took form the treasury, he asserted in the assembly that the state would be rich enough, if it collected the revenues not otherwise used and omitted the assessment on individual citizens, to pay its debt to the Romans, and this assertion he was able to make good.

But now the men whom embezzlement from the treasury had maintained for many years, as if they were being robbed of their property instead of being made to give up the profits of their thefts, in passion and anger tried to bring upon Hannibal the wrath of the Romans.

The abuse was evidently of long standing if there were "men whom embezzlement from the treasury had maintained for many years." Some estimate of "how much embezzlement took from the treasury" may be gathered from the fact that in 191 B.C. the Carthaginians offered to pay up in a lump sum the remainder of the ten thousand talent indemnity imposed upon them by the Romans as one of the conditions of peace in 202 B.C. This means that by stopping the embezzlement of public funds through the Hannibalic reform the government was able to save ten thousand talents in about ten years, one-fifth of the time allowed them by the treaty.31
That the government of Carthage, then, had degenerated from the original well-balanced aristocratic form and that it was undermined by venality,—bribery and embezzlement—both Polybius and Livy agree. Polybius mentions several more weaknesses in the Carthaginian system, as further reasons for Rome's final victory. Among them is the utter dependence of Carthage on mercenary troops,—a practice consistent with the commercial character of the city. After speaking of the Carthaginian superiority at sea, Polybius continues:

But as regards military service on land the Romans are much more efficient. They indeed devote their whole energies to this matter, whereas the Carthaginians entirely neglect their infantry, though they do pay some slight attention to their cavalry. The reason of this is that the troops they employ are foreign and mercenary, whereas those of the Romans are natives of the soil and citizens. So that in this respect also we must pronounce the political system of Rome to be superior to that of Carthage, the Carthaginians continuing to depend for the maintenance of their freedom on the courage of a mercenary force, but the Romans on their own valor and on the aid of their allies.

Though the employment of mercenaries may not be a defect in government as such, still it indicates the materialistic character of the Carthaginian state, which sought to win its wars through wealth rather than through the moral vigor, the courage and patriotism, of its citizens. It is this lack of moral vigor, arising from the failure of the Carthaginians to foster public spirit and the manly virtues, that Polybius mentions as another of the causes of their final defeat. Finally, he attributes Rome's success in great part to her marked superiority in matters of religion:

"But the quality in which the Roman commonwealth is most distinctly superior is in my opinion the nature
of their religious convictions." However, the discussion of these last two important points, national ideals and religion—pertain rather to the moral culture of Carthage and will be considered later. 35

These passages, then, from the most reliable historians of the Second Punic war, give sufficient testimony to the fact that at this period the operation of the government at Carthage had fallen away from the provisions of the original constitution; that it was corrupted by wholesale bribery on the part of candidates, who reimbursed themselves from the public funds after their appointment to office; that it was characterized by the mercenary spirit and its corresponding weakness in moral fibre.

V. During the Third Punic War

As sources of our knowledge of the Third Punic war, Livy and Polybius are found to be of less value than the late Roman historian Appian, who, in the portion of his history of Rome dedicated to the Punic wars, has left us the only detailed account of the final struggle which ended with the destruction of Carthage. 36 Polybius' account is sketchy and fragmentary; Livy's has survived only through the epitome. Appian, though late (95?-165 A.D.), had the best sources at his disposal and is as dependable as any of the historians of his time. His account, however, affords only occasional glimpses of the working of the Carthaginian government during this period, and we shall have to rely upon inference, as in the case of the First Punic war,
rather than direct testimony.

According to this method, form the accounts of Appian, Livy, and Polybius, two main conclusions can be drawn concerning the government of Carthage at this period. The first is that the original constitutional form still existed, and second, that the operation of the government was rendered unstable by factional strife, particularly by the interference of the multitudes. Finally, in the last critical moments, a tyranny was established and under it the city was destroyed.

How do we know that the old constitutional form was maintained? The evidence is not complete; there is, for example, no mention in the sources of the sufetes or of the judges as such. Still, there is evidence to show that the senate, the Gerousia, and the assembly were still distinguished, and that the principle business of the state was still carried on through their agency up until the establishment of the tyranny.

It was the Carthaginian senate, for example, that decided to make terms after Rome had declared war. Polybius testifies to this: 37 "After a long secret discussion in the senate they appointed plenipotentiaries and sent them to Roma with instructions to do whatever they thought was in the interest of their country under the present circumstances." And the epitome of Livy fills in a significant detail: 38 "Delectique sunt ex primoribus triginta, quibuslibet conditionibus pacem impetraturi." From these two passages it is evident that the senate and the Gerousia were still functioning, the senate as a real agency of
government, the Gerousia (delecti triginta) at least as a diplomatic unit. This is further supported by the distinction incorporated in the Roman demand for "three hundred hostages, sons of senators or of members of the Gerousia."40

Then, even after the popular tumult that followed the announcement of Rome's determination to raze the city, the senate still retained and exercised the prerogatives of government.41

The same day the Carthaginian senate declared war and proclaimed freedom to the slaves. They also chose generals and selected Hasdrubal for the outside works, whom they had condemned to death, and who had already collected 30,000 men.... Within the walls they chose for general another Hasdrubal, the son of a daughter of Masinissa. They also sent to the consuls asking a truce of thirty days in order to send an embassy to Rome.

Despite the survival of the ancient constitutional form and the recognized authority of the senate, there could have been little internal tranquillity or stability of policy in Carthage at this time, for the city was racked with factional strife. During the fifty years of comparative peace preceding the Third Punic war, three groups formed in the city:42

Very soon (as frequently happens in periods of prosperity) factions arose. There was a Roman party, a democratic party, and a party which favored Masinissa. Each had leaders of eminent reputation and bravery. Hanno the Great was the leader of the Romanizing faction; Hannibal, surnamed the Sterling, was the chief of those who favored Masinissa; and Hamilcar, surnamed the Samnite, and Carthalo, of the democrats.

It was the rash action of the democratic faction which actually precipitated the Third Punic war. First they stirred up trouble with Rome's Numidian ally, Masinissa:43 "The latter party, watching their opportunity...persuaded Carthalo...to attack the subjects of Masinissa, who were encamped on disputed
territory." The incident made Rome determine to take up arms once more against Carthage. A second incident which took place a few years later brought on war with Masinissa, and gave Rome the excuse she needed to interfere. Again, factional disturbances in the city were at the basis of the trouble, and this time, too, the democratic group was responsible: 44

The democratic faction in Carthage drove out the leaders of the party favoring Masinissa, to the number of about forty, and also carried a vote of banishment and made the people swear that they should never be taken back, and that the question of taking them back should never be discussed. The banished men took refuge with Masinissa and urged him to declare war.

The Numidian king sent his sons to intercede; the sons were shut out of the city by Carthalo, the democratic leader; one of them was attacked on the return journey; and Masinissa opened the war by seizing a town allied to Carthage. Thus the action of the democratic group began the war which resulted in the destruction of the city.

There are evidences of popular violence all through the account of this period. The multitudes in the city must have been a force to reckon with; they apparently not only interfered in the government, but took it into their own hands when aroused. We have but to consider their treatment of the state officials after the announcement of Rome's determination to raze the city to realize how uncontrollable the people were, and consequently how great their influence through fear must have been upon those who conducted the government after that time: 45

Some fell upon those senators who had advised giving the hostages and tore them in pieces, considering them the ones who had
led them into the trap. Others treated in a similar way those who had favored giving up the arms. Some stoned the ambassadors for bringing the bad news, and others dragged them through the city.

As might be expected, this same spirit of violence broke out later in the assembly itself; it is surprising, however, and indicative of their character, to find it appearing at a time when the Carthaginians were elated by success and confident of victory, rather than reduced to desperation as on the occasion just mentioned:46

Being now armed, their designs grew unbounded, and they gained in confidence, courage, and resources from day to day. Hasdrubal, who commanded in the country and had twice got the better of Manilius, was also in high spirits. Aspiring to the command in the city, which was held by another Hasdrubal, a nephew of Galussa, he accused the latter of an intention to betray Carthage to Galussa. This accusation being brought forth in the assembly, and the accused being at a loss to answer the unexpected charge, they fell upon him and beat him to death with the benches.

It appears, then, from these passages that the government of Carthage at this time was characterized by factional strife and violent outbreaks among the populace. This does not mean, however, that throughout the period the multitudes held uninterrupted supremacy. The democratic faction had involved the city in war with Masinissa, as has been shown. But after the Carthaginian forces had been defeated and Rome intervened, the pro-Roman faction, probably the nobles and rich merchants who desired peace, must have gained the upper hand, for (1) the democratic leaders were condemned to death,47 and (2) great efforts were made to conciliate Rome, involving the surrender of three hundred hostages and all the city's vast store of armaments.48
However, after Rome's final demand for the destruction of the city, and the wild demonstration that followed, the pro-Roman faction fell, Hasdrubal was reinstated, and the people, infuriated against Rome, resolved to resist. The government at that time must have passed largely into their hands, though the traditional form was retained.

In the ninth book of the *Republic* Plato traces the natural development of governments through a series of stages,—aristocracy, timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. The theory appears to be borne out by the history of Carthage. Considering the time of the Third Punic war as the change to the democratic phase, during which the government of Carthage was influenced more than ever before by the multitudes, as has been shown, we find the theory fulfilled, the wheel turned full cycle, with the establishment of the tyranny of Hasdrubal shortly before the final siege and destruction. His rise to power can be traced through the passages already quoted from Appian. He led the Carthaginian forces in the democratic-instigated war against Massinissa, and after being defeated, was condemned to death; he escaped, gathered an army, and after Carthage declared war, was reinstated as general outside the city; after defeating the Romans twice, in a moment of popular favor he brought false charges against his namesake and colleague within the city, stirred up the people to kill him, and thus established his own supremacy. He openly assumed the role of tyrant after the capture of Megara by Scipio.
When daylight came, Hasdrubal, enraged at the attack on Megara, took the Roman prisoners whom he held, brought them upon the walls in full sight of their comrades, and tore out their eyes,.... He intended to make reconciliation between the Carthaginians and Romans impossible, and sought to fire them with the conviction that their only safety was in fighting; but the result was contrary to his intention. For the Carthaginians, conscience-stricken by these nefarious deeds, became timid instead of courageous, and hated Hasdrubal for depriving them even of all hope of pardon. Their Senate especially denounced him for committing these savage and outrageous cruelties in the midst of such great domestic calamities. But he actually arrested some of the complaining senators and put them to death. Making himself feared in every way, he came to be more like a tyrant than a general, for he considered himself secure only if he were an object of terror to them, and for this reason difficult to attack.

Hasdrubal had all the characteristics of the Platonic tyrant, and in their last days the Carthaginians, hemmed in on all sides by the Romans, were reduced to utter misery by his ruthless domination. Polybius describes the tyrant and his brief reign thus:

"Hasdrubal, the Carthaginian general, was an empty-headed braggart and very far from being a competent statesman or general."

This is followed by an account of Hasdrubal's stupid attempt to obtain the city's freedom by negotiating with Scipio, even after his horrible cruelty to the Roman prisoners, and when Carthage was already doomed. Polybius continues:

When we look at his utterance we admire the man and his high-souled words, but when we turn to his actual behavior, we are amazed by his ignobility and cowardice. For, to begin with, when the rest of the citizens were utterly perishing from famine, he gave drinking parties and offered his guests sumptuous second courses and by his own good cheer exposed the general distress. For the number of deaths was incredibly large and so was the number of daily desertions due to famine. And next by making mock of some and inflicting outrage and death on others he terrorized the populace and maintained his authority in his sorely striken country by means to which a tyrant in a prosperous city would scarcely resort.
Such was the state of the government of Carthage at her destruction, the old constitution suspended, all power gathered into the hand of the tyrant. Factional strife had led to popular interference and mob violence; the multitudes had raised up and encouraged their champion; with their help he had cleared away his rivals; and finally, taking over the government himself, became the oppressor of those who had brought him to power.

VI. Conclusion

Our purpose is to determine as best we can from the original sources the character of the Carthaginians, their civilization and culture at the time of the Punic wars. How has the discussion just concluded furthered this purpose? What light does the material presented cast upon the Carthaginian character? We have shown Carthage in her civil aspect, her basic system of government and the operation of that government during the Punic wars. What conclusions can we draw now in regard to the civil character of Carthage?

The first is that the ancients agree in praising the original constitution of Carthage as being well contrived, showing extraordinary political wisdom, as evidenced by the statements of Aristotle and Polybius. The best proof of its excellence is that this constitution was never overthrown, but remained, at least nominally, in force until the fall of the city.

Then, what of the operation of the Carthaginian government under this constitution? We have seen that even in the time of
Aristotle certain defects began to appear; that these are confirmed by the inferences drawn from Polybius' account of the First Punic war; that both Livy and Polybius bear witness to the growth of these defects, and of others, during the second war; and that Appian widens the breach between the law and its proper operation by giving evidence of factional strife and popular interference in government, ending in tyranny and a suspension of the law at the end of the Third Punic war. Thus, while the law itself was excellent, its effective operation was inhibited by defects and abuses springing from the national character. Carthage was like a man dominated and torn by unruly passions, knowing the right course of action, yet too weak morally to carry it out.

What were these defects and abuses? They may be roughly classified as: (1) Venality, springing from the commercial character of her civilization, making wealth the object of national desire, undermining the government by bribery and embezzlement, transforming the original well balanced constitution into oligarchy, dictating short-sighted and avaricious policies, such as the false economy on naval upkeep, and the attempt to deprive the army of its promised wages at the end of the First Punic war. (2) A certain heartlessness and cruelty accompanied the spirit of venality at Carthage, as manifested in the treatment of her generals, her subject states, her public servants. (3) Factionleness in internal affairs may also be related to the venal character of Carthaginian civilization, for with wealth exalted by
the constitution itself, virtue and honor lost their supremacy and the nation was deprived of the strongest moral bond. Jealousy and strife arose between classes and disturbed the operation of government, apparently growing in intensity until the final tyranny suppressed all freedom. Justinus bears evidence to this trait when he characterizes Carthage thus: 

"Condita est urbs haec LXXXII annis antequam Roma; cuius virtus sicut bello clara fuit, ita domi status variis discordiarum casibus agitatus est." (4) Finally, expediency, rather than principle, was the Carthaginian standard of policy in their external relations with other peoples. Illustrations are frequent,—the violation of the first treaty with Scipio toward the end of the first war, their treatment of allies during the second, and of their troops at its end, and the initial action against Massinissa leading up to the third. It was this lack of principle that gained Carthage her reputation for faithlessness, so that "Punica fides" became a synonym for treachery.

These were, in general, the defects which appeared in the operation of the government at Carthage; they were weaknesses that undermined her own civilization and kindled the hatred of Rome. But it would be foolish to suppose that Carthage did not have extraordinary talents as well; otherwise she could never have established herself as mistress of the seas, nor have resisted Rome as she did. The Romans themselves were not the last to recognize this; Appian tells of the wild rejoicings of the people of Rome at the fall of Carthage, for "they knew no other
war which had so terrified them at their own gates as the Punic
wars, which ever brought peril to them by reason of the persev­
erance, high spirit, and courage, as well as the bad faith, of
those enemies."^7 And Cicero, in a fragment from the De Repub­
lica, says:^8 "Nor could Carthage have prospered so greatly for
about six hundred years without good counsel and strict training
(Sine consiliis et disciplina)."

The strong qualities of the national character of Carthage,
so far as we have seen, are mainly:

(1) A remarkable cleverness, shrewdness, the kind of wisdom
that brings preeminence in commerce, but is distinguished from
wisdom in the fullest sense by a lack of comprehensiveness and
absolute standards. The limitations have been shown in several
instances,—the neglect of the fleet and the treatment of allies
and mercenaries, for example. The wisdom of Carthage was that of
a man of affairs, the wisdom of expediency, of clever devices
and practical measures; yet it was capable of producing the con­
stitution so admired by Aristotle; it succeeded in establishing
a commercial empire never before equalled; it kept the state
intact through centuries, in spite of turbulent elements within
and the assaults of powerful enemies from without.

(2) Courage was the second strong element in the Carthaginian
character, a courage which, from the ancient sources, seems born
of recklessness or desperation, rather than high resolve and
noble principle. It is the unpredictable courage that provoked
the raids on Masinissa, then, as rapidly as it had risen, gave
way to the point of surrendering arms and hostages, and as suddenly flaring up again when all seemed lost, shut the gates in the face of the conqueror, resisting with a frenzy and a power that left the Romans stunned and incredulous even after they had triumphed:

They were so excited over this victory that they could hardly believe it, and they asked each other over and over again whether it was really true that Carthage was destroyed. And so they conversed the whole night, telling how the arms of the Carthaginians had been taken away from them, and how at once, contrary to expectation, they supplied themselves with others; how they lost their ships and built a great fleet out of old material; how the mouth of their harbor was closed, yet they managed to open another in a few days.

Brilliant courage it was, but fickle, and ultimately ineffective against the solid, dogged determination of Rome.

Nations, like men, are rarely preeminently good or utterly depraved, and character must be judged on broad lines by considering the combination of good and bad which constitute it. To attempt to formulate in a sentence the character of a nation is difficult and dangerous at the least. Yet, from such testimony as we have seen, we may hazard the conclusion that the civil character of Carthage was shrewd and powerful, but defective in the higher qualities associated with the best civilization,—magnanimity, humaneness, unity of spirit and integrity of principle.
Notes to Chapter II

I. References to Greek Authors.

3 Politics, II, 8.3:
Τών δὲ πρὸς τὴν ὁπόθεσιν τῆς άριστοκρατίας καὶ τῆς πολιτείας τὰ μὲν εἰς ὁμονὸν ἔχοντει μᾶλλον τὰ δὲ εἰς ὀλίγαρχιαν.
Elsewhere (Ibid., III, 5.1-4) Aristotle defines democracy as government of the many in the interest of the poor, and oligarchy as government of the few in the interest of the rich; neither governs with regard to the common profit of the community.

4 Ibid., II, 8.4; v.d. supra, Chapter I, VI and note 38.

5 Ibid., II, 8.5:
Παρεκβαίνει δὲ τῆς άριστοκρατίας ἤ τάξις τῶν Καρχηδονίων μάλιστα προστιθήν ὀλιγαρχίαν κατὰ τινα διάνοιαν ἢ συνδοξεῖ τοῖς πολλοῖς. οὐ γὰρ μόνον ἀριστινόθν ἄλλα καὶ πλουτινόθν οὐχονται δεῖν αἱρεῖσθαι τοὺς ἄρχοντας, ἀδύνατον γὰρ τὸν ἀπορθόντα καλὸς ἄρχειν καὶ σχολαῖν... Δεὶ δὲ νομίζειν ἀμάρτημα νομοθέτου τήν παρἐκβασιν εἶναι τῆς άριστοκρατίας ταύτην· ἐξ ἀρχῆς γὰρ τοῦθ' ὀραν ἐστὶ τῶν ἀναγκαστῶν, ὡς οἱ βέλτιστοι δύνανται σχολασθεῖν καὶ μηδὲν ἄσχημοντειν, μὴ μόνον ἄρχοντες ἄλλα μηδ' ἐδιωτευοντες. Εἰ δὲ δεὶ βλέπειν καὶ πρὸς εὑπορίαν χάριν σχολῆς, φαύλον το τῆς μεγίστας ὄντας εἶναι τῶν ἄρχων, τῆν τε βασιλείαν καὶ τὴν στρατηγίαν. ἐντυντιοι γὰρ δὲ νόμος οὗτος ποιεῖ τὸν πλοῦτον μᾶλλον τῆς ἀρετῆς καὶ τὴν πόλιν ὁλην φιλοχρήματον· δὲ τὸ δ' ἄν ὑπολαβῇ τίμιον εἶναι τὸ κύριον, ἀνάγκη καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀλλων πολιτῶν δόξαν ἀκολούθειν τούτους· ὅποι δὲ μὴ μάλιστα ἄρετη τίμαται, ταύτην οὐχ οἶκον τ' εἶναι βιβαλὸς ἀριστοκρατικήν πολιτείαν. Ἐφοσον δ' εὐθυγραμμίζει γενεδίνειν τοὺς ψυχουμένους, οὔτε δὲν ἀποκαλεῖν αὐλείνως ἄρχοντος γὰρ εἰ πένης μὲν ὃν....

6 Ibid., II, 8.8:
Φαύλον δ' άν δόξειν εἶναι καὶ τὸ πλεῖος ἄρχον τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἄρχειν, ὅπερ εὐδοξὶ καὶ τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις. ἐν γὰρ ὡς ἐνος ἄργον ἁριστὸ ἀποτελεῖται, δεί δ' ὡς γίνεται τούθ' ὀραμ οἰκομενήν, καὶ μὴ προστάτευιν τὸν αὐτοῦ αὐλείν καὶ σκυτοτομεῖν.

7 Ibid., II, 8.9:
'Ολιγαρχικὴ δ' οὖσα τῆς πολιτείας ἀριστο ἐξεφεύρουσι τῷ πλουτεῖν, δεί τι τοῦ δήμου μέρος ἐκπεµποντες ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις. Τοὺς γὰρ ἰώγαν καὶ πολυβοι μόνιμον τὴν πολιτείαν, ἄλλα τοις ἐστὶ τούχῃ ἐργον, δεὶ δὲ ἀστασιάστους εἰναι διὰ τὸν νοµοθετὴν. νῦν δ' αν ἀτυχία γενῆται της καὶ τὸ πλήθος ἀποστή των ἄρχομένων, ούδὲν ἐστὶ φάρµακον διὰ τῶν νόµων τῆς ἠθικῆς.
8 Ι, 13:
Αὐτὰ τὰ πολλοὶ οὐδὲναμήν ἄκεραὶ μὲν ἢ τοὺς ἱδίως, μέτρια δὲ ταῖς τύχαις, πάροικα δὲ ταῖς δυνάμεσι.

9 Ι, 11:
oi δὲ Μαυρετίνοι τὸν μὲν τῶν Καρχηδόνων στρατηγὸν, ἢδη κατέχοντα τὴν ἄνναν ἐξεβαλον, τὰ μὲν καταπληκάμενον, τὰ δὲ παραλογισάμενοι τὸν δ’ Ἀπιοῦν ἐπεσπῶντο, καὶ τοῦτοί την πόλιν ἐνεχείριζον. Καρχηδόνοι δὲ τὸν μὲν στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν ἀνεσταύρωσαν, νομίσαντες αὐτὸν ἀβούλως, ἀμα δ’ ἀνάνδρως, προέβαι τὴν ἀκρόπολιν.

10 Ι, 24:
Χρόνοις δ’ οὐδὲ πολλοὶς κατόπιν ἐν τῇ Ἐσσυνίᾳ συγκελεσθεὶς ὡς Ρωμαίων ἐν τοῖς κτίσμα πολλάς ἀποβαλὼν τῶν νεῶν, παραιτήκας συλλήψεις ὡς τῶν διασωθέντων Καρχηδόνων ἀνεσταύρωσι.

14 Ι, 16:
ὡς τῶν Καρχηδόνων αὐτοὶ πόλεις ἀφιστάμεναι πόλεις προσεπηθέντο τοὺς Ἐρυθραῖος ἀπὸ τῶν Συρακοσίων.

15 Ι, 31:
Ἀμα γὰρ τοῖς προειρημένοις καὶ τοῖς τῶν Νομάδων ἔθνος συνεπιτεθέμενον αὐτοῖς οὐκ ἐλάττω, πλεῖον δὲ τῶν Ῥωμαίων εἰργάζετο καθὰ τὴν χώραν.

16 Ι, 72:
Οὐχ ἢ λέγεται ὁ αὐτοὶ σφῆξι τῶν τοιούτων καὶ τηλικοῦ παρὰ ἐγενόντα ἀγαθοὶ. κατὰ γὰρ τὸν προγεγονότα πόλεων ἐλεύθερον ἀφορμάς ἐγενήν ὑπολαμβάνοντες, πικρῶς ἐπεστάτησαν τῶν κατὰ τὴν ἄνω ἀνδρόποις, παραιτοῦμενοι τῶν ἐλιθρίων καὶ τῶν μεν πάντων τῶν καρπῶν τοὺς ἡμίσεις διπλάσιος δὲ ταῖς πόλεσὶ δοὺς φόρας ἣ πρὸ ἐπιτάττοντες, συγγενήν ὡς τοῖς ἄποροις ἡ συμπέριφοράν ὡς ἁντιλυθην ἐπ’ συνενε τῶν πράττων ἀποκράτων, θαυμάζοντες δὲ καὶ τιμῶντες τῶν στρατηγῶν ὧς τοὺς πρώτοις καὶ φιλανθρώπως τῇ πλήθει ἡμελούμενοι, ἀλλ’ ἀγέλου μόνον ἐκείθεν ἀποδόθησαν, ἀλλ’ ἔγινθαι καὶ τῶν τῆς χώρας ἀπογομένων περιγράφθησαι τοὺς φεσταρίμοις ἀνδράς καὶ γυναῖκας πρὸς τὰς εἰσφοράς, τόσο συνομοῦντας κατὰ πόλεις ἕφε καὶ κρύψαντων τῶν ἀπορομένων αὐταῖς, ἀφαιροῦμεν τὸν κόσμον εἰσεφερον ἀπορφαίνοντες εἰς τοὺς ὑψωματοὺς.
17 Ἰ, 59:
Τὸ μὲν γὰρ πρῶτον ἐξεχώρησαν τῆς θαλάττης εἰκαντες τοῖς ἐκ τῆς τούχης συμπτώματι, τὸ δὲ δεύτερον ἐλαττωθέντες τῇ περὶ τὰς ἀρεπάνας ναυμαχίας τότε δὲ τρίτην ἐποιοῦντο ταύτην τὴν ἐπιβολήν, ἦν ζητήσαντες καὶ τὰ περὶ τῶν Ἑρωκα στρατόπεδα τῶν Ἰρακνήνων ἀποκλειόμενες τῆς κατὰ θαλάτταν ἀχρήγας τέλος ἐπέθηκαν τοῖς ὀλίσ.

18 Ἰ, 61:
Αἱ μὲν γὰρ νῆς γέμουσα δυσχρήστως οἰκειοῦντο πρὸς τῶν κένων, τὰ δὲ πληρώματα τελέως ἦν ἀνάσκητα καὶ πρὸς καιρὸν ἐμβεβηλυμένα, τὰ δὲ ἐπιβατικὰ νεούσληνα καὶ πρωτόπετρα πάσης κακοπαθείας καὶ παντὸς δεινοῦ. διὰ γὰρ τὸ μήδεπο, ἀν ἐτὶ τοὺς Ὑρμαίους ἐλπίσα τῆς θαλάττης ἀντιποίησασθαι καταφθονοήσαντες ἕλιγουρον τῶν ναυτικῶν δυνάμεων.

19 Ἰ, 66:
Οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὰ μὲν οὐκ εὐποροῦμενοι χρημάτων διὰ τας ἐγκένημένας δαπάνας, τὰ δὲ καὶ πεπεισμένοι παρατίθησθαι τοὺς μισθοφόρους μέρος τι τῶν προσφελομένων ὑψών, ἐν καὶ συναθροίσαται καὶ δεξιόταν πάντας εἰς τὴν Καρχηδόνα, παρακατείχον εἰκεν τοὺς καταπλέοντας διὰ ταύτην τὴν ἐλπίδα καὶ συνείχον ἐν τῇ τόλει.

20 Ibid., Ἰ, 68-70.

21 Ἰ, 31:
Τὸ δὲ συνεδρίον τῶν Καρχηδόνιων διακούσαν τὰ προτεινόμενα παρὰ τοῦ στρατηγοῦ τῶν Ῥωμαίων, καὶ περὶ σχεδὸν ἀπεγνωκὸς τὰς τῆς σωτηρίας ἐλπίδας, ὅμως σωτερ ἀνδρῶν ἐστι καὶ γενναίως ὡστε πάν ὅποιος ἐλεφο καὶ παντὸς ἔργου καὶ καίρου πείθαν λαμβάνειν, ἐφ’ ὃ μηδὲν ἄγεννες μηδ’ ἀνάξιον τῶν πρὸ τοῦ πράξεων ὑπομείναι.

22 VI, 51:
Κατὰ γε μὴν τοὺς καίρους τούτους, καθ’ ὅuς εἰς τὸν Ἀννιβασιδ άνέβας ὁλέμοι, χείρον ὅν τὸ Καρχηδόνιον ἀμείνοι δὲ τὸ Ῥωμαῖων. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ παντὸς καὶ οὐκοτίκης καὶ πολίτειας καὶ πράξεως ἐστὶ τῆς αὑρίων κατὰ φύσιν, μετὰ δὲ ταύτην ἀχμή, κάπερ ἡ γῆ, πράττοτα ὁ αὐτῶν πάντα τὰ κατὰ τὴν ἁμήν, παρὰ τοῦτο καὶ τούτη διέφεραν ἄλλας τὰ πολιτεύματα. καθ’ ὅςον γὰρ η Καρχηδόνιον πρότερον ἐσχυν καὶ πρότερον εὐφύεις τῆς Ῥωμαίων, κατὰ τοσοῦτον ἴ μὴν Καρχηδόνιον ἢ τότε παρακλαμεν, ἢ δὲ Ῥώμη μαλάστα τῶν εἰχε τὴν ἁμήν κατὰ γε τὴν τῆς πολιτείας σύστασιν. διὸ καὶ τὴν πλείον ὅλον εν τοῖς διευθυνόμενοι παρὰ μὲν Καρχηδόνιοι ὡς αὐτον ἔχει εὐδοκιμήτος, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίους ἁμήν εἶχεν ἡ σύγκλητος. Ὑθεν παρ’ οἷς μὲν τῶν πολλῶν βουλευομένων, παρ’ οἷς δὲ τῶν ἀρίστων, κατ’ ὅσχυ
τὰ Ῥωμαίων διαβούλια περί τὰς κοινὰς πράξεις. ἡ καὶ πτασιαντες
tοῖς ὅλοις τῷ θουλευθθαί καλῶς τέλος ἐπεκράτησαν τοῖς πολέμωι
τῶν Ἀρχηγονίων.

25 Politics, II, 8.3; vd. supra, note 3.

26 VI, 4.9:
Καὶ μὴν ταύτης εἰς ὀλιγαρχίαν ἐκτρικείσης κατὰ φύσιν, τοῦ
δὲ πλήθους ὄργῃ μετελθόντος τὰς τῶν προεστώτων ἄθικας, γεννᾶται
δήμος.

27 Cf. Polybius, XV, 1.

28 Ibid., II, 8.5; vd. supra, note 5.

29 VI, 56:
Καὶ μὴν τὰ περὶ τοὺς χρηματισμοὺς ἐθῆ, καὶ νόμιμα βελτίων παρὰ
Ῥωμαίοις ἐστὶν ἡ παρὰ Ἀρχηγονίωι. παρ’ ὅις μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν
αἰσχρὸν τῶν ἀνικότων πρὸς κέρδος, παρ’ αὐτοῖς δὲ οὐδὲν ἀίσχρων τοῦ
διωροδοκεῖται καὶ τοῦ πλεονεκτεῖν ἀπὸ τῶν μὴ καθηκόντων. . . .
σμείων δὲ τούτοις παρὰ μὲν Ἀρχηγονίωι δώρα φανερῶς διδόντες
λαμβάνουσι τὰς ἀρχαῖς, παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις θάνατος ἐστὶ περὶ τοῦ
πρόστιμον.

32 VI, 52:
τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς πεζικὰς χρεὰς πολὺ δὴ τὶ Ῥωμαίοι πρὸς τὸ
βέλτιον ἀσκοῦσι Ἀρχηγονίωι, οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ὅλην περὶ τοῦτο
ποιοῦνται σπουδῆς, Ἀρχηγονίωι δὲ τῶν μὲν πεζικῶν εἰς τέλος
ὁλωροῆθι, τῶν δὲ ἑπικών βραχείας τινα ποιοῦνται πρόνοιαν.
αἰτιὸν δὲ τούτων ἐστὶν ὅτι ἐξενικάς καὶ μισθοφόρος ἡ ἡν
δυνάμεις, Ῥωμαίοι οἱ ἐγχωρίοις καὶ πολιτικαῖς. ἦ καὶ περὶ τοῦτο
τὸ μέρος ταύτην τὴν πολίτειαν ἀποδεκτέον ἐκείνης μᾶλλον. ἦ μὲν
γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τῶν μισθοφόρων εὐξυχίαις ἔχει τὰς ἔλπιδας ἀντὶ τῆς
ἐλευθερίας, ἦ δὲ Ῥωμαίων ἐν ταῖς σφετέραις ἀρεταῖς καὶ ταῖς τῶν
συμμάχων ἐπαρκείας.

33 Cf. VI, 52.

34 VI, 56:
Μεγάλητην δὲ μοι δοξεῖ διαφορὰν ἔχειν τὸ Ῥωμαίων πολιτευμα
πρὸς βέλτιον ἐν τῇ περὶ θεῶν διαλήψει.
37 XXXVI,3:  
...πολλούς καὶ ποικίλους ἐν τῷ συνεδρίῳ δὲ ἀπορρήτων ποησάμενοι λόγους κατέστησαν πρεσβεύτας αὐτοκράτορος, καὶ τούτους ἐξαπέστελλεν, ὦντες ἐντολὴν βλέποντας πρὸς τὰ παρόντα πράττειν τὸ δοξοῦν (συμφέρειν) τῇ πατρίδι.

40 Polybius, XXXVI,4; vd. supra, Chapter I, note 23.

41 Appian, Roman History, Book VIII, 93: 
'Ἡ δὲ βουλῇ πολεμεῖν μὲν ἐγφύσατο αὐτῆς ἡμέρας, καὶ τοὺς δούλους ἐκήρυξεν ἑλευθέρους εἶναι, στρατηγὸν δὲ εὐλογοῦ τῶν μὲν ἐξ ἀρχῆς Ἀσδρουβάλου, ὁ θάνατος ἐπικήρυκτος ἦν, ἔχοντα ὀσμαρ- impseν ἢν σύνοδον ἀνδρῶν καὶ...ἐντὸς δὲ τειχῶν ἤρθεν στρατηγὸς ἐκτερὸς Ἀσδρουβάλος, θυγατριδοὺς Μασσανάσσου. ἐπεμψαν δὲ καὶ ἐς τοὺς ὑπάτους, ἀποτυγχὴσεις αὐθεῖς ἡμερῶν τριάκοντα ἀνοχάς, ἵνα πρεσβεύσειν ἐς Ρώμην.

42 Ibid., VIII,68: 
Καὶ εὐθὺς, οἶον ἐν ταῖς εὐτυχίαις γίγνεται, οἱ μὲν ἔρρημαίκων, οἱ δὲ ἐδημοκράτικων, οἳ δὲ ἔρρησεν Μασσάνασσος. ἤγοντο δὲ ἐκάστων οἱ καὶ ὄξη καὶ ἀρετή προούχοντες, τῶν μὲν ἐρμαίκων ὡς μέγας Ἀννων, τῶν δὲ ἀρουμένων τὰ Μασσανάσσου Ἀννίβας δὲ Ἠλίχαρ, ὁ Σαυνίτης ἐπώνυμος ἦν, καὶ Καρθάλων.

43 Ibid.: 
οὶ φυλάκοις Ἰρωμαίοις...πελοῦσι τὸν Καρθάλωνα...ἐπιθέσαι τοῖς Μασσανάσσου σκηνομένοις ἐν ἀμφίλόγῳ γῇ.

44 Ibid., VIII,70: 
Καρχηδονίων δ' οἱ δημοκρατίζοντες τοὺς τὰ Μασσανάσσου φρονοῦντας ἐξέβαλον, ἐς τεσσαράκοντα μᾶλλον ὄντες, καὶ ψήφων ἐπῆνεγχαν φυγής, καὶ τὸν δῆμον ὥρκωσαν μῆτε καταδεξαθαί ποτε μήτε ἀνέξεθαί τῶν λεγόντων καταδέχεσθαι. οἱ δ' ἐξελαθόντες ἐπὶ τὸν Μασσανάσσην κατέφυγαν, καὶ ἐξηρτύνον ἐς πόλεμον.

45 Ibid., VIII,92: 
οὶ μὲν τῶν βουλευτῶν τοὺς περὶ τῶν ὀμηρῶν ἐσηνησαμένους ὡς ἐξάρχους τῆς ἐνέδρας ἤκιζοντο καὶ διέσωσαν, οἱ δὲ τοὺς συμβουλευόντας περὶ τῶν ὀπλῶν. οἱ δὲ τοὺς πρέσβεις κατέλευσαν ὡς κακῶν ἀγγελοὺς, οἱ δὲ καὶ περιέσυρον ἀνὰ τὴν πόλιν.

46 Ibid., VIII,111: 
ὅλως τε μικρὸν οὖθεν ἔτι ἐφρόνουν ὀπλισάμενοι, ἄλλα θυμῷ καὶ
The Carthaginians condemned Hasdrubal, who had conducted the campaign against Masinissa, and Carthalo, the captain of auxiliaries, and any others who were concerned in the matter, to death, putting the whole blame of the war on them.

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και πολύ κεχωρισμένος τῆς πραγματικῆς καὶ στρατηγικῆς δυνάμεως.

54 XXXVIII, 8:

"ὅσθ’ ὦτε μὲν εἰς τὰς ἀποφάσεις αὐτοῦ τις βλέψει, θαυμάζειν τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὸ μεγαλοψυχον τῶν λόγων, ὅτε δ’ εἰς τὸν χειρισμὸν τῶν πραγμάτων, τὴν ἀγεννίαν καταπλήττεσθαι καὶ τὴν ἀνανερικήν ὡς πρῶτον μὲν, τῶν ἀλλων πολιτῶν διαφυγειρομένων ὀλοσχερῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ λιμὸς, πότους αὐτοὺς συνήγε καὶ δευτέρας τραπέζας παρετήσετο πολυτελεῖς καὶ διὰ τῆς ἣδης εὐθείας παρεδειγμάτιζε τὴν ἐκείνων ἀτυχίαν. ἀπίστων μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὸ τῶν ἀποθεωκόντων πλῆθος, ἀπίστων δὲ τὸ τῶν αὐτομολογοῦντων καθ’ ἡμέραν διὰ τὸν λιμὸν ἐπείτα τούς μὲν διακλειδάζην, οἷς δ’ ἐνυβρίζων καὶ φονεύων κατεπλήττετο τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ τοῦτο τῷ τρόπῳ συνεῖχε τὴν ἐξουσίαν, ἦ μολίς ἄν χρήσατο τύμβον τῶν ἔν εὐδικαιοῦ πόλει, καὶ ἐν δεδυστυχήσεις πατρίδι.

55 Aristotle, Politics, II, 8. 5; vd. supra, note 5.

57 VIII, 134:

πόλεμον δὲ οὐδένα ἄλλον οὕτως ἐπὶ θύραις ἐπίφοβοιν αὐτοῖς ἡδεσαν, διὰ τὸ ἄνδρεαν καὶ φρόνημα καὶ τόλμαν εχθρῶν καὶ ἀπίστων ἐν σφίσιν ἐπιχλινδων γενόμενον.

59 Ibid.:

...μάλιστα ἐξίσουται περὶ τῆς νίκης ἐς ἀπιστῶν αὐτῆς, καὶ ἀιθίμες ἀνεπυνθανόντο ἀλληλών εἰ τῷ δότε Καρχηδών κατέσχατια, ἐλεγξῆνεν τὸ δὶ’ ὅλης νυκτὸς ὅπως μὲν αὐτῶν τὰ ὅπλα περιγρέθησαν καὶ ὅπως αὐτής καὶ στόλον ἐπίχαντο πάλιν ἐς ὅλης παλαιᾶς, τὸ τε στόμα τοῦ λιμένος ὡς ἀπεκλείθη, καὶ στόμα ὡς ἄρπαξαν ἐπιτροπολίγαις ἡμέρας.

II. References to Latin and English Authors

1 Carthage and the Carthaginians, p. 27.


11 De Dictis Factisque Memora bilibus, I, 7.


13 XXXIII, 46; vd. supra, Chapter I, section VII and note 44.
23 XXXIII,46:

24 Ibid.:
Et ut...animadvertit et infimorum quoque libertati gravem esse superbiam eorum, legem extemplo promulgavit pertulitque, ut in singulos annos iudices legerentur, ne quis biennium continuum iudex esset.

30 Ibid.:

Tum vero ii, quos paverat per aliquot annos publicus peculatus velut bonis ereptis, non furtorum manubiis extortis infensi et irati Romanos in Hannibalem, et ipsos causam odii quaerentes, instigabant.

31 The condition imposed by the treaty of 202 B.C. was: "Decem millia talentium argenti descripta pensionibus aequis in annos quinquaginta solverent"(Livy,XXX,37). In 191 they offered to pay at once the remaining installments: "Carthaginienses...polliciti...sese...stipendium, quod pluribus pensionibus in multos annos deberent, praeens omne ducturos"(Livy,XXXVI,4).

35 Cf. Chapter IV below.


38 XLIX,7.
Vd. supra, Chapter I, section III.


I, fragment 3:
Nec tantum Karthago habuisset opum sescentos fere annos sine consiliis et disciplina. (Monius, p. 526. 5.)
PART TWO

CULTURE
CHAPTER III
MATERIAL CULTURE
I. Introduction

Civilization, as we have described it in the opening chapter, concerns the "reign of social law,"—the government of Carthage, its form and operation; all the other elements which went to make Carthage what she was may be grouped under the general term "culture", divided into material, intellectual, and moral culture. In the state as it exists there is, of course, a mutual dependence between civilization and culture. A people must possess a certain minimum of material, intellectual, and moral culture before they can establish the "reign of social law," before they can form a civilization at all. But granted that the state be actually established, its subsequent history will be shaped by the mutual interplay of civil and cultural influences, one affecting the other. Thus cultural changes will show themselves in the government, and likewise the vicissitudes of government will react in the sphere of material, intellectual, and moral culture. Whatever we know of one, therefore, must cast light upon the other, helping us to trace the development and character of the social organism of which they are the elements.

In the first part we have attempted to reconstruct the picture of Carthaginian civilization,—the law and its operation—at the time of the Punic wars particularly. It remains to clothe
these dry bones with the flesh of culture by describing, as well as we can from the limited information of the ancient sources, the material, intellectual, and moral development of Carthage with special reference to this period. In the process it is to be hoped that light may be cast upon doubtful periods of civil development by the study of the cultural aspect, that inferences and conclusions in one sphere may be tested by knowledge which the other supplies, that the civil and cultural aspects may combine to form an integrated view of the nature of Carthage at the time of the Punic wars.

II. Description of the City

Carthage was the richest city of the ancient world. Yet, when we try to picture how she must have appeared in the days of her prosperity our sources leave much to be desired. They are far too meager to permit our tracing the external growth of the city and at best afford but a rough sketch in broad outlines. Yet in this sketch, rough though it is, we catch a glimpse of power and splendor which recalls that she was once queen of the Mediterranean and head of a vast commercial empire.

Perhaps our most familiar impression of the structure of Carthage, and only one purporting to represent the city as it appeared in the earliest period, is Virgil's imaginative conception in the first book of the Aeneid:

Aeneas marvels at the massive buildings, mere huts once; marvels at the gates, the din, and paved high roads. Eagerly the Tyrians press on, some to build walls, to rear the citadel, and
roll up stones by hand; some to choose the site for a dwelling and enclose it with a furrow. Here some are digging harbors, here others lay the deep foundations of their theatre and hew out of the cliff vast columns, lofty adornments for the stage...

Amid the city was a grove luxuriant in shade.... Here Sidonian Dido was founding to Juno a mighty temple, rich in gifts and the presence of the goddess. Brazen was its threshold, uprising on steps; bronze plates were its lintel beams, on doors of bronze creaked the hinges.... While beneath the mighty temple... he scans each object, while he marvels at the city's fortune, the handicraft of the several artists and the work of their toil, he sees in due order the battles of Ilium, the warfare now known by fame throughout the world.

Granted the poetic nature of Virgil's description, though we may not accept the details as historically accurate, still the general impression of massive structure and vast material resources is borne out by Strabo and Appian in their more prosaic accounts of the city at a later time. Strabo is brief, sketching only the predominant features of the city:

Carthage is situated on a kind of peninsula, which comprises a circuit of three hundred and sixty stadia, and this circuit has a wall; and sixty stadia of the length of this circuit occupy the neck itself, extending from sea to sea.... Near the middle of the city was the acropolis, which they called Byrsa; it was a fairly steep height and inhabited on all sides, and at the top it had a temple of Asclepius.... Below the acropolis lie the harbors, as also Cothon, a circular isle surrounded by a strait, which latter has ship houses all round on either side.

Appian's description of the city is very much longer, filling in some details of these general features mentioned by Strabo, though the two fail to agree in matters of direction and distance. The combined accounts, however, afford a picture of Carthage sufficient at least for our purpose, i.e. to indicate a highly developed material culture, manifested in the ingenuity of her harbors and fortifications, the power of her resources, and their efficient organization for military purposes, the
existence of well constructed temples and an agora, of multi-
storied dwellings, and monumental public works like the giant
stairway ascending the height of Byrsa. Appian's longest de-
scriptive passage is as follows:

The city lay in a recess of a great gulf and was in the form
of a peninsula. It was separated from the mainland by an is-
thmus about three miles in width. From this isthmus a narrow
and longish tongue of land, about 300 feet wide, extended to-
towards the west between a lake and the sea. (On the sea side)
where the city faced a precipice, it was protected by a single
wall. Towards the south and the mainland, and where the city
of Byrsa stood on the isthmus, there was a triple wall. The
height of each wall was forty five feet, not taking account of
the parapets and the towers, which were placed all round at in-
tervals of 200 feet, each having four stories, while their depth
was thirty feet. Each wall was divided into two stories. In the
lower space there were stables for 300 elephants, and along side
were receptacles for their food. Above were stables for 4000
horses and places for their fodder and grain. There were bar-
racks also for soldiers, 20,000 foot and 4000 horse. Such prepa-
ration for war was arranged and provided for in their walls
alone. The angle which ran around from this wall to the harbor
along the tongue of land mentioned above was the only weak and
low spot in the fortifications, having been neglected from the
beginning.

The harbors had communication with each other, and a common
entrance from the sea seventy feet wide, which could be closed
with iron chains. The first port was for merchant vessels, and
here were collected all kinds of ships tackle. Within the se-
cond port was an island, and great quays were set at intervals
round both the harbor and the island. These embankments were
full of shipyards which had capacity for 220 vessels. In addi-
tion to them were magazines for their tackle and furniture. Two
Ionic columns stood in front of each dock, giving the appear-
ance of a continuous portico to both the harbor and the island.
On the island was built the admiral's house, from which the
 trumpeter gave signals, the herald delivered orders, and the
admiral himself overlooked everything. The island lay near the
entrance to the harbor and rose to a considerable height, so
that the admiral could observe what was going on at sea, while
those who were approaching by water could not get any clear
view of what took place within. Not even incoming merchants
could see the docks at once, for a double wall enclosed them,
and there were gates by which merchant ships could pass from
the first port to the city without traversing the dockyards.
Such was the appearance of Carthage at that time.
Later in his account, Appian mentions the first harbor, open to merchant vessels, as "that part of Cothon which is in the form of a quadrangle," and the second, containing the military dockyards, as "the other part of Cothon which was in the form of a circle." This regularity of shape leaves little doubt that these harbors were dredged out by the Carthaginians themselves, a public work worthy of their Phoenician ancestors and lends historical support to at least one of Virgil's details, viz. "here some are digging harbors."

The harbor district lay in the northwest portion of the city. From Appian's account of Scipio's attack upon this district we learn that the forum was located near by: "The wall around Cothon being taken, Scipio seized the neighboring forum and...passed the night there under arms."

Either facing the forum, or close by, was the temple of Apollo, which must have been of extraordinary splendor if it corresponded to the statue housed within: "At daylight he brought in 4000 fresh troops. They entered the temple of Apollo, whose statue was there, covered with gold, in a shrine of beaten gold, weighing 1000 talents."

Not far from the forum and the temple of Apollo, and like them on the north, the sea side, of Carthage, arose the acropolis already mentioned by Strabo, the focal point of the city, the stronghold known as Byrsa, surmounted by the temple of Asclepius. The district surrounding the height was thickly populated, for: "There were three streets ascending from the forum
to this fortress, along which, on either side, were houses built closely together and six stories high."

The temple itself was "much the richest and most renowned of all in the citadel," and "in time of peace was reached by an ascent of sixty steps." The first statement implies that there were other temples in the citadel, less renowned than that of Asclepius. It is not certain to whom they were dedicated; perhaps to the goddess Tanit, whose worship superceded that of Asclepius on the height of Byrsa when Carthage was restored under the Romans.

It is likely that the senate chamber so often mentioned in connection with the government was located here as well. There were public baths too, which must have been situated near Byrsa in the heart of the city,—one for the privileged classes and another for the commons, as Valerius Maximus tells us in castigating the Carthaginian and Campanian senators for snobbery:

"Insolentiae vero inter Carthaginiensem et Campanum senatum quasi aemulatio fuit; ille enim separato a plebe balneo lavabatur; hic diverso foro utebatur."

In these scattered accounts, them, the bulk of Carthage looms up before the mind's eye, its main features just distinguishable, as though seen through a mist,—the massive battlements rising on three sides from the sea and tripling to face invaders from the mainland; the efficient land-locked harbors, cut with geometrical precision; the forum and the temple of Apollo, whence three roads lead through close packed dwellings
to ascend the mount of Byrsa; and finally the height itself, consecrated to government and the cult of Carthage's gods, and crowned with the collonades of temples.

There is little direct mention of esthetic detail in the ancient descriptions of Carthage. However, the public buildings of the wealthiest city of her times must have been splendidly adorned with the richest materials, materials which the surrounding country produced in such abundance that they became traditionally connected with its name. There was the famed Numidian marble, mentioned by Horace\textsuperscript{12} as "columnas ultima recisas Africa," and by Juvenal\textsuperscript{13} as "longis Numidarum fulta columnis",- the symbol of extravagant and elegant construction. We have seen how gold was lavished upon the shrine of Apollo in the temple near the forum; how much more common would silver have been in a city that had for centuries exploited the rich mines of Spain? Pliny remarks that the precious citron wood was found on Mt. Atlas, west of Carthage,\textsuperscript{14} and that ivory, so prized at Rome, was abundant enough in Africa to be used by the natives for door frames and even fence posts.\textsuperscript{15} All these precious materials must have added splendor to Carthaginian construction.

Vague and speculative as these conclusions may be, there is one detail of which we are certain in regard to the ornamentation of Carthage. We know that the city was adorned with the finest artistic productions of the Greek colonies in Sicily,- Silenus, Himera, Agrigentum, Gela. The only period we can definitely determine as marking a step forward in the artistic
development of Carthage is the last ten years of the fifth century, during which first Hannibal, then Hamilcar, sacked these Greek cities and sent their art treasures across the sea to adorn the city. After Hannibal had taken Silenus and Himera in the expedition of 410 B.C. he returned home in triumph, burdened with spoils, as Diodorus Siculus relates:°"When he sailed back to Carthage, laden with a vast quantity of booty, the entire population turned out to receive him with honor."

But the second expedition for that period, landing in Sicily about 406 B.C., acquired for Carthage her greatest treasures. Diodorus estimates the richness of the spoils taken from Agrigentum as follows:°°

Hamilcar, by systematically stripping both shrines and private dwellings, amassed spoils of such value as the city could be expected to possess, numbering as it did 20,000 inhabitants, having never yet been plundered from the time of its foundation being the richest of almost all the Greek cities of that period and one whose citizens spared no expense in indulging their fondness for the beautiful in every type of art and construction. Paintings executed with consummate skill were found in great numbers, and innumerable examples of every type of sculpture, products of the finest workmanship. He sent the most precious of these to Carthage, among them the famous "Bull of Phalaris."

And again he writes:

The Carthaginians, after taking the city, shipped votive offerings from the temples, statues, everything of great value, back to Carthage.

Finally, after the fall of Gela, Hamilcar followed the same procedure: °°"From the temples, that is, from as many as he did not think fit to destroy by fire, he stripped the carvings and whatever was of superior workmanship."
During this period, then, the finest productions of the Sicilian Greek artists were brought to Carthage and set up to adorn the city,—statues, paintings, carvings, decorative work of all kinds. The golden statue of Apollo mentioned above was probably acquired at this time; we know definitely that another, of giant proportions and cast in bronze, was seized when Gela fell and sent to Tyre: 20 "The people of Gela had a statue of Apollo outside the city, made of bronze and exceptionally large; seizing this the Carthaginians sent it to Tyre."

The Carthaginians seem to have kept many of these treasures intact through all the vicissitudes of their history, since Plutarch testifies that Scipio, entering Carthage after the final struggle, "found the city full of Greek statues and votive offerings, which had come from Sicily." 21 Thereupon, as Appian recounts, 22 Scipio "sent word to Sicily that whatever temple gifts they could identify as taken from them by the Carthaginians in former wars they could come and take away."

Thus, through the last centuries of their history at least, the Carthaginians could boast of artistic excellence in the adornment of their city, though as far as we can determine from the sources, it seems to have been borrowed, due to Greek, rather than Punic, genius.

III. Resources of the City

The resources of Carthage corresponded to the grandeur of her external structure. Appian's description already conveys some conception of the military resources contained in the
not a sword, nor a sufficient number of fighting men at home, having lost 50,000 a short time ago." Yet under the stress of siege, and with the courage of despair, the Carthaginians manufactured arms and ships at the rate indicated by Strabo, and held out against overwhelming odds for three years.

Where did they procure the materials? Some of it, as Strabo says above, had been stored away in readiness for just such an occasion. Zonaras suggests other sources: 26 "They melted down the statues for the sake of the bronze in them and took the woodwork of buildings, private and public alike; for the triremes and the engines." During the final siege Carthage was practically cut off from all outside supply, so that it was mainly upon the resources of just the city itself that she had to rely; it is evident, then, why her protracted resistance was a source of wonder and admiration to the ancients.

These details from the sources, finally, though sketchy and none too well connected, still afford a glimpse of the general lay-out, the magnitude and richness of construction, the powerful material resources of Carthage,—enough at least to indicate that this aspect of her culture was highly developed.

IV. The Environs

The countryside about Carthage must have been exceedingly fertile, well stocked, and well cultivated, from the glimpses we catch in a few of the ancient authorities. In fact, were it not, Carthage could neither have supported her population and
her armies, nor supplied grain to other parts of the ancient world through trade. Even a large portion of the territory enclosed within the walls of Carthage was under cultivation. This was the suburb known as Megara, which stretched out from the Byrsa on the side opposite the harbors to the wall that cut across the neck of the peninsula. Appian mentions it as the district of homes and gardens where Scipio gained his first foothold within the walls:27

That part of Carthage called Megara...was a very large suburb adjacent to the city wall.... Megara was planted with gardens and was full of fruit-bearing trees divided off by low walls and hedges of brambles and thorns, besides deep ditches full of water running in every direction.

This description, such as it is, is the only one we have of Megara; it is enough, however, to indicate that the Carthaginians were experts in cultivation and irrigation.

A picture of the countryside beyond the walls, much more detailed and impressive, has been preserved by Diodorus, who tells how Agathocles raised the spirits of his men with the sight of its opulence, promising that they should share it when Carthage fell:28

The intervening countryside through which they had to travel was cultivated as gardens and every type of plantation, the whole intersected by a well-developed system of irrigation through which it was plentifully watered. Landed estates bordered one another in succession, adorned with mansions of splendid architecture,—an indication of the wealth of the owners. The estates were fitted out with every possible facility for enjoyment, collected by the inhabitants as the fruit of a long peace. The plains were partly covered with the vine, partly with the olive, and planted with all the other trees that bear fruit. In another part herds of cattle and flocks of sheep were grazing, and in the neighboring fens great numbers of war horses. In brief all possible prosperity was manifest on those plains where the
most eminent citizens of Carthage owned property and used their wealth for the pleasure of indulging their elegant taste. Consequently the Sicilians were much impressed with the beauty and prosperity of the countryside.

It is not probable, of course, that the Carthaginian countryside presented so prosperous an appearance throughout the entire history of the city. Agathocles, as the text indicates, entered it after the period of prolonged peace from 337 to 310 B.C., during which the fortune of the merchant city would have risen to uncommon heights. Still, this condition of wealth and fruitfulness must have prevailed at the time of the First Punic war at least, since that too came at the end of a long term of peace. After the Mercenary war, however, which followed the first conflict with Rome, and after the depredations of Massinissa following the second, it is not likely that the same happy condition continued. The merchant princes of Carthage would have been willing to expose neither their lives nor their wealth on country estates situated at some distance from the city walls. Moreover, the loss of power and prestige, with the corresponding loss of personal income, suffered by the wealthy class through the rise of the democratic elements during the last period of Carthaginian history would have discouraged the continued maintenance of expensive establishments such as Diodorus describes. However, though the land may have changed ownership in later times, it need not be supposed that it thereby became less fruitful or less valuable to Carthage as her source of supply.

We have seen how the wealthy built themselves magnificent
mansions on their great landed estates; but what of the dwellings of the common folk, the rural workers and small farmers? For though the estates of the nobles were undoubtedly worked by slave labor, there were apparently many independent rural communities, groups of free farmers, in the vicinity of Carthage. Diodorus mentions that Agathocles, in subduing the territory about Carthage, "brought more than 200 towns in all under his dominion." These towns were probably not much more than clusters of the rude structures known as "mapalia" or "megalia" which Virgil speaks of as originally occupying the site of Carthage: "Miratur molem Aeneas, megalia quondam." Sallust describes them thus: "It is an interesting fact that even to the present day the dwellings of the rustic Numidians, which they call 'mapalia', are oblong and have roofs with curved sides, like the hulls of ships."

A group of these poor dwellings formed into a small village would offer the advantages of companionship and mutual protection to the families of rural workers who went out from them each day to the neighboring fields, and whose lot would thus be in sharp contrast to that of the gentlemen-farmers of Carthage with their luxurious estates,—a circumstance which helps to explain why foreign invaders found them willing allies against the Carthaginians.

In these few brief passages from the sources, then, we catch sight of the richness of the cultivated land in and about Carthage,—well stocked with fruit trees of all descriptions, the
vine, and the olive; fenced, hedged, and intersected by irrigation canals; the fields beyond the walls alive with grazing flocks and herds; the sumptuous mansions of the wealthy adorning luxurious estates and giving way to scattered hamlets of rustic huts as the distance from the city increased. It is enough to indicate that the cultivation of rural resources corresponded to the highly developed material culture within the city.

V. The People

Who were the people that composed this center of civilization and inhabited the country around it? Diodorus divides them roughly into four classes:

Africa at that time was divided among four peoples: the Phoenicians, who dwelt in Carthage; the Liby-Phoenicians who occupied many coastal towns and intermarried with the Carthaginians, being so named because of this relationship to them; the greater part of the common people, the original inhabitants, known as Libyans, who burned with a hearty hatred for the Carthaginians because of the harshness of their rule; and finally the Numidians, who occupied a large portion of Libya, extending to the edges of the desert.

From the fact that so sharp a distinction was possible between the racial groups dwelling in and about Carthage we may infer that the Carthaginians, unlike the Romans, for example, maintained a policy of exclusiveness in regard to the native subject population, treating them as inferiors to be exploited, rather than insuring their loyalty by incorporating them into the state or entering into compact with them as respectable allies. The hostile attitude of the Libyans supports this conclusion; we shall see more of it later in regard to the attitude of the Carthaginians.
ian subject nations to the mother city.

We might ask then: What did the Carthaginians look like? Their appearance is important for two reasons. First, and obviously, national characteristics are indicated by dress, and second, the representation of the average Carthaginian in the imagination of other peoples, like the Greeks and Romans, is significant in helping to explain their attitude toward Carthage. Imagination shapes attitudes and gives impulse to action. Though descriptions gathered from Latin and Greek sources may not be entirely accurate in regard to the first reason, they are nevertheless important in regard to the second.

To the stern Roman the dress of the Carthaginians must have suggested ostentation and luxuriousness, since they seem to have made ample use of the rich materials supplied through world trade to adorn their persons in lavish Eastern fashion. First, the rich purple dye of the murex, so prized by the ancient world, was developed by the Tyrians and became connected with their name, so that Horace could speak of "muricibus Tyriis iteratae velleralanae."33 Tyre would have been an easy source of the precious stuff for Carthage, but she had another even closer at hand in the island of Meninx and a portion of the African Coast, as Pliny points out:34 "In Asia the best purple is that of Tyre, in Africa that of Meninx and the parts of Gaetulia that border on the ocean." And Horace mentions "te bis Afro murice tinctae."35 With such ready sources of supply, then, the purple must have been a
common article of Carthaginian trade, and even more common in their own vesture. Thus Polybius presents Hasdrubal, the tyrant of Carthage in her last days - as coming forth to parry with Golasses, king of the Numidians, "in a complete suit of armour, over which was fastened a cloak of sea purple."36 And again, on a second meeting, he refers to the display contemptuously:37 "The Carthaginian again advanced slowly to meet him in great state, wearing his full armour and purple robe, leaving the tyrants of tragedy much to seek."

Appian describes a clown who appeared in the triumphal procession of the elder Scipio, evidently dressed to represent a Carthaginian, "wearing a purple cloak reaching to the feet and golden bracelets and necklace."38

Jewelry of this type was another item which must have formed a part of the Carthaginian costume, at least that of the wealthier classes. Gold, silver, and ivory, as we have seen, were common enough. Moreover, the Carthaginians would have been well supplied with glass beads and trinkets by their Phoenician kinsmen, who, according to Pliny,39 had discovered the process for making glass, for which, as Strabo mentions, Tyre furnished the sand and Sidon the workmanship:40 "Between Acre and Tyre is a sandy beach which produces the sand used in making glass. Now the sand, it is said, is not fused here, but is carried to Sidon and there melted and cast."

Not only glass beads, however, but genuine precious stones,
must have been plentiful in this center of world trade; one type of ruby, or carbuncle, for example, was called "Carthaginian" because of its abundance there, as Pliny says: 41 "Horum [carbunculorum] genera, Indici et Garamantici, quos et Charcedonios vocant, propter opulentiam Carthaginis Magnae."

That the men of Carthage were accustomed to deck themselves with jewelry may be gathered from the fact that at one time the government encouraged military service by offering the citizens a decoration of this sort as a public distinction, as Aristotle points out: 42 "Indeed, among some peoples there are even certain laws stimulating military valour; for instance at Carthage, we are told, warriors receive the decoration of armulet of the same number as the campaigns on which they have served."

The ordinary form of dress worn in time of peace was a loose tunic, without a belt or girdle, probably highly colored. Gellius remarks: 43 "Quintus Ennius also seems to have spoken not without scorn of the 'tunic-clad men' of the Carthaginians." And Plautus, in the Poenulus, capitalizes on this Roman scorn with references to the dress of Hanno, a rich old Carthaginian: 44

But what bird is that arriving here in the tunics? Was his cloak nabbed at the baths, I wonder? (975-6)

Hey, you without a belt, ... (1008)

Who's the chap with the long tunics like a tavern boy? (1298)

Though the details are scattered and meagre, still they are sufficient to conjure up the image of a bearded Semitic in a
long, loose robe of richly dyed material, glittering with gems, glass beads or trinkets, with the deeper glint of gold or silver at his throat and wrists and on his ivory sword hilt, scented, perhaps, with the perfumes of the East, his whole dress suggesting to the Roman ostentatious wealth and luxury, - such is the impression of the wealthy Carthaginian merchant or noble.

What of the dress of the lower classes? The historians, of course, are not much concerned with it, and leave us without a clue. It was probably as much like that of the merchants and nobles as their means would allow. One characteristic may be noted. The fondness for jewelry seems to have been universal. Plautus introduces Carthaginian slaves with rings in their ears:45 "Well, here they are with ring-arrayed ears." And it may be remembered that the Mercenary War was partially financed by the peasant women of nearby Libyan villages who "stripping themselves of their jewels contributed them ungrudgingly to the war fund."46 In general, it is probable that the dress of the North African peasant has not changed radically in the course of the centuries, so that he must have appeared in the days of Carthaginian glory much as he does today.

VI. The Armies of Carthage

Carthage, true to her commercial character, preferred to pay others to do most of her fighting, though she provided the generals and at least a nucleus of native Carthaginian soldiery. Up to the time of the Third Punic War she depended almost entirely
upon foreign troops for conquest and protection, recruiting them not only along the African coast, but from every country and island on the European side of the Mediterranean.

As early as 480 B.C. the Carthaginians sent a host against Gelon of Syracuse consisting, according to Herodotus, of "Phoenicians, Libyans, Iberians, Ligyes, Elisyci, Sardinians, and Cyrnians, led by Hamilcar, son of Hanno, the king of the Carthaginians." The Ligyes were Ligurians, the Cyrnians Corsicans, and the Elisyci an Iberian people.

In the next Sicilian expedition of 410, sent to relieve Egesta, according to Diodorus, "the Carthaginians dispatched to the Egestians 5000 Libyans and 800 Campanians," while Hannibal, their general, "throughout that summer and the following winter collected large mercenary forces from Spain, and enlisted a considerable number of citizens; then travelling through Libya, selected the best men from each village." The army thus collected numbered at the lowest estimate 100,000, as Diodorus recounts:

"The whole of Hannibal’s army, as Ephorus records, numbered 200,000 foot and 40,000 horse; but Timaeus claims there were no more than 100,000."

When the Carthaginians decided on a second expedition four years later an even more extensive enlistment was made; thus Diodorus says:

They [the generals] sent out certain eminent Carthaginians with vast sums of money to Spain and to the Balearic Islands, with orders to enlist as many mercenaries as possible, while they themselves went through Libya, enrolling Libyan and Phoe-
nician troops, including the best of their fellow citizens. They summoned Moors and Numidians from the kings and tribes allied to them, and even some from the territory around Cyrene. Then they hired Campanians, whom they transported from Italy to Africa.

It was this army that took Agrigentum and brought the treasures of Sicily to Carthage.

Later in their history, however, the Carthaginians did more of the fighting themselves. Thus in 383 B.C. they raised a body of troops from their own number. Carthaginians enrolled in former campaigns were for the most part officers; now they were called upon to serve in the ranks. "Prudently foreseeing a prolonged struggle, they enlisted as soldiers those citizens who were suitable."51 Yet these citizen troops were only a part of the army, since they hired great numbers in addition:52 "And gathering a great sum of money, they hired large forces of mercenaries."

In the war with Timoleon some forty years later, an estimated 10,000 native Carthaginians appeared in an army of 70,000, as Plutarch records:53

... the enemy were seen crossing, in the van their four-horse chariots formidably arrayed for battle, and behind these ten thousand men-at-arms with white shields. These the Corinthians conjectured to be Carthaginians from the splendor of their armor and the slowness and good order of their march.

Thus the citizen troops impressed the Greeks as being well armed and disciplined; they represented, moreover, the aristocracy of Carthage. Yet the action that followed ended in the sorest defeat the city had ever suffered:54
It is said that among 10,000 dead bodies, 3000 were those of Carthaginians, - a great affliction for the city. For no others were superior to these in birth or wealth or reputation, nor is it recorded that so many native Carthaginians ever perished in a single battle before, but they used Libyans for the most part and Iberians and Numidians for their battles, and thus sustained defeats at the cost of other nations.

About twenty years later, when Agathocles suddenly appeared before the walls of Carthage, the citizens were forced to turn out in numbers, since there was no time for a levy of mercenaries from Spain or the islands, or even the African coast. Diodorus speaks of the event:

The Carthaginian generals, seeing that there was no time for delay, refused to wait for troops from the surrounding country and from allied cities, but called out the citizens themselves, not less than 40,000, including a thousand horse and two thousand chariots. Hanno was in charge of the right wing, supported by the Sacred Cohort.

This Sacred Cohort probably represented the wealth and nobility of Carthage, and acquitted itself honorably, fighting on despite the loss of its leader and the flight of the Libyans. These latter, as has been mentioned, formed the bulk of the common people and probably of the army in this instance. Justinus puts the total strength of this army at 30,000, a more likely figure than the one above: "Obvius eis fuit cum XXX milibus Poenorum Hanno." This was as close to a purely citizen army as Carthage had ever mobilized. It was defeated, however, by Agathocles, and with severe losses.

By the time of the First Punic war the Carthaginians had apparently reverted to their practice of depending almost entirely upon mercenaries. Diodorus presents an imposing list of those
who took part in this war and in the mercenary rebellion that followed:57 "Those who had been enlisted to fight with the Carthaginians were Spaniards, Gauls, Balearians, Libyans, Phoenicians, Ligurians, and Greek slaves of various cities; and these rebelled." Polybius adds58 that "the largest portion consisted of Libyans" and that the entire force was "more than 20,000 in number."

There has been much discussion among scholars about Hannibal's army in the Second Punic war; it will be sufficient here, however, to cite the statement of Polybius on the army of Italy:

... his regiments were not only of different nationalities but of different races. For he had with him Africans, Spaniards, Ligurians, Celts, Phoenicians, Italians, and Greeks, peoples who neither in their laws, customs, or language, nor in any other respect had anything naturally in common.

As to the army in Africa, the Carthaginian array before the battle of Zama is typical:60

Hannibal placed in front of his whole force his elephants, of which he had over eighty, and behind them the mercenaries numbering about twelve thousand. They were composed of Ligurians, Celts, Balearic Islanders, and Moors. Behind these he placed the native Libyans and Carthaginians, and last of all the troops he had brought over from Italy. ... He secured his wings by cavalry, placing the Numidian allies on the left and the Carthaginian horse on the right.

Finally, in a passage which compares the relative strength of Rome and Carthage with particular reference to the Second Punic war, Polybius writes:61

As regards military service on land the Romans are much more efficient. They indeed devote their whole energies to this matter, whereas the Carthaginians entirely neglect their infantry, though they do pay some slight attention to their cavalry. The
reason of this is that the troops they employ are foreign and mercenary, whereas those of the Romans are natives of the soil and citizens.

After the Second Punic war Carthage's mercenary armies disappear. Conquest was forbidden her; any attempt to enlist troops would have brought sanctions from Rome. The Third Punic war was fought by the Carthaginians themselves, with help from the surrounding countryside. Their plight at the beginning of the war has been described by Appian, who mentions among other details: "Nor had they mercenaries, nor friends, nor allies, nor time to procure any." Their chief support at first must have been the army of 30,000 which the exiled Hasdrubal had collected, probably from his followers in the city and natives of the surrounding territory. The ranks of the army within the walls were swelled by freeing the slaves: "The same day the Carthaginian senate declared war and proclaimed freedom to the slaves. They also chose generals and selected Hasdrubal for the outside work, whom they had condemned to death, and who had already collected 30,000 men." This army included a considerable force of cavalry, for we know that when the chief cavalry officer, Phameas, deserted to Scipio, he brought a large number with him: "Some of the officers went over to the enemy with their forces, to the number of about 2,200 horse." Even during the final phase of the war, after the capture of Megara, Hasdrubal still had an army of 30,000 within the city, for Appian tells us that "the supplies brought by the ships Hasdrubal distributed to his 30,000 sol-
There was, moreover, in the country beyond, a large supporting force of Africans under Diogenes, whose duty was to keep the supply lines open and the natives loyal. Scipio routed this force at Nepheris and, as Appian says, "Galussa pursued them with his Numidian cavalry and elephants and made a great slaughter, as many as 70,000, including non-combatants, being killed, 10,000 captured, and about 4000 escaped." All this gives some concept of the armed force Carthage could raise from just her own citizens and the natives of the surrounding countryside.

In conclusion, then, it is evident that Carthage depended almost entirely upon mercenary armies throughout the greater part of her known history, though during the fourth century the Carthaginians themselves took an active part in bearing arms. The Third Punic war, however, was fought without the aid of mercenaries, proving that Carthage could raise a formidable army of her own, and manifesting her amazing native powers when driven to desperation. The contrast, then, between the Carthaginian and the Roman attitude at this time becomes clear. The Carthaginians depended mainly upon mercenary troops, supplementing them with citizen forces when necessary; the Romans depended on their main body of citizen-soldiers, supplementing it with foreign allies. The Romans preferred to do their own fighting; the Carthaginians paid others to do it for them.
VII. The Navies

The ancients are of one accord in regard to the naval strength of Carthage. They agree that in her prime she was complete mistress of the Western Mediterranean. Dionysius of Halicarnassus echoes them all when he speaks of "the Carthaginians, whose maritime strength was superior to that of all others." Polybius adds some reasons for this supremacy while comparing Rome and Carthage: "The Carthaginians naturally are superior at sea both in efficiency and equipment, because seamanship has long been their national craft, and they busy themselves with the sea more than any other people." The first may be attributed to their Phoenician background, the second to their character as a merchant city.

The Carthaginians were, moreover, proverbially jealous of their control of the sea and took drastic measures to preserve it, as Strabo remarks: "According to Eratosthenes, the expulsion of foreigners is a custom common to all barbarians ... and the Carthaginians likewise, he adds, used to drown in the sea any foreigners who sailed past their country to Sardo [Sardinia] or to the Pillars." There seems to have been an ancient boast, too, that no man could wash his hands in the sea without the consent of Carthage.

A few instances may be cited to indicate the magnitude of the naval forces by which Carthage maintained her hegemony. In the early period of her history, when Hannibal had gathered his
forces for the expedition of 410 B.C. against Sicily, Diodorus says:70 "He manned 60 ships of war and fitted out about 1500 transports, in which he conveyed his troops, siege machinery, weapons, and all other equipment." Fleets of the same proportions passed back and forth from Carthage to Sicily several times during the period of wars with Dionysius which followed, from 406 to 368 B.C., and the tyrant was finally defeated through the efficiency of the Carthaginian navy. Having reopened hostilities in 368 by taking Selinus, Entellus, and Eryx, Dionysius was besieging Lilybaeum when he heard that the docks at Carthage had burnt. Thinking, therefore, that he would not need his fleet, he sent much of it back to Syracuse, keeping 130 ships at Eryx. "But," says Diodorus,71 "the Carthaginians, contrary to all expectation, manned 200 ships and bore down upon the enemy lying at anchor in the harbor of Eryx." Dionysius lost over half his squadron, called a truce, and, dying shortly afterwards, left victory to the Carthaginians. About thirty years later Carthage sent another armada to Sicily against Timoleon, as Plutarch records:72 "Meanwhile the Carthaginians put in at Lilybaeum with an army of 70,000 men, 200 triremes, and 1000 transports carrying engines of war, four-horse chariots, grain in abundance, and other requisite equipment.

Through naval armaments of this magnitude Carthage maintained uninterrupted sway over the Mediterranean, so that at the beginning of the First Punic war Polybius could refer to them as "the
Carthaginians, who had held for generations undisputed command of the sea." It was in this war that her maritime supremacy was questioned for the first time, and that by the Romans who had never taken seriously to the sea before. Still, in the first engagement at Mylae (260 B.C.) a fleet of 130 Carthaginian ships was defeated and put to flight by not more than 100 clumsy Roman vessels, through the success of a device which the Romans used to pin the Carthaginian ships close to theirs, enabling their marines to carry the action. Made more wary by this defeat, the Carthaginians employed the next four years in strengthening their fleet for a decisive engagement. The Romans made good use of the time and did the same. In 256 B.C. the two fleets met at Ecnomos in one of the greatest naval battles of all times. Polybius carefully records the forces involved:

The Romans ... set to sea with a fleet of 330 decked ships of war ... the Carthaginians setting sail with 350 decked vessels ... The Roman forces embarked on the ships numbered about 140,000, each ship holding 300 rowers and 120 soldiers. The Carthaginians were chiefly or solely adapting their preparations to a maritime war, their numbers being, to reckon by the number of ships, actually above 150,000.

After describing the engagement, Polybius concludes:

The final result of the whole battle was in favor of the Romans. The latter lost twenty four sail sunk, and the Carthaginians more than thirty. Not a single Roman ship with its crew fell into the enemy's hands, but sixty four Carthaginian ships were so captured.

The victory was again determined by the Roman device mentioned above, rather than by superior seamanship; nevertheless, Carthage at her best had been defeated. She was kept on the defen-
sive until the third Roman fleet was destroyed by storm, when she was left once more supreme. But instead of strengthening their position, the Carthaginians "economized" by neglecting their fleet. Consequently the launching of a fourth fleet by the Romans caught them unprepared. Though the Carthaginians at once sent out their fleet to meet the new challenge, they were miserably defeated, for, as Polybius records, 76 "their ships, being loaded, were not in a serviceable condition for battle, while the crews were quite untrained, and had been put on board for the emergency, and their marines were recent levies whose first experience of the least hardship and danger this was." Consequently they "were soon routed, fifty ships being sunk and seventy captured with their crews." The result was that Rome thenceforward commanded the sea, and Carthage had to ask for terms. Her long maritime supremacy was broken. Her greatest strength had lain in this domination of the Mediterranean; she had lost it through a fatal attempt to economize.

That the Carthaginian supremacy on the sea was not subsequently restored may be inferred from two considerations. First, Hannibal chose to march his army across the Alps into Italy, instead of transporting them by sea from Spain. Second, Scipio had a small and newly constructed fleet, consisting originally, as Livy says, 77 of "thirty ships, twenty quinqueremes and ten quadriremes which, upon the insistence of Scipio himself, were so rapidly constructed that precisely forty five days after their
timbers had been cut in the forest they were launched, fully armed and fully equipped." This was increased after his sojourn in Sicily, so that putting out from Lilybaeum, "he sent his army across in transports numbering almost four hundred, escorted by forty ships of war." Yet this fleet, still comparatively small, made the crossing unmolested by the Carthaginians. "I take it on the authority of many Greek and Latin writers that the crossing was made successfully without threat or disturbance," says Livy.

After the fall of Tunis the Romans were almost taken unaware by a fleet from Carthage, and might have been annihilated had the Carthaginians not lost their spirit, as Livy remarks:

If the Carthaginians had hastened to the attack they might have overwhelmed all in confusion and fear at the first onslaught; but so oppressed were they by their defeats on land that they lost heart even at sea, where they had been most powerful, and so after passing the day in aimless maneuvers at sundown they put in with their fleet at the port which the Africans call Ruscinona.

The following day, after an attack on the Romans, they succeeded only in capturing six transports. "Sex ferme onerariae pupibus abstractae Carthaginem sunt." Thus, during the Second Punic war the Carthaginian fleet was certainly not the force to reckon with that it was in the First. Carthage could evidently no longer boast of being mistress of the Mediterranean, at least. And the treaty which ended the war ended all future pretensions to naval power for the Carthaginians with the demand that "they surrender their ships of war,
with the exception of ten triremes."82

VIII. The Empire - Sources of Wealth

In the course of her history Carthage had grown from a simple Phoenician colony to the powerful capital of a vast empire, as Appian points out:83

Later on, using this [the original site] as a base and getting the upper hand of their neighbors in war, and engaging in traffic by sea, like all Phoenicians, they built the outer city round Byrsa. Gradually acquiring strength they mastered Africa and a great part of the Mediterranean, carried war abroad into Sicily and Sardinia and the other islands of the sea, and also into Spain, while they sent out numerous colonies. They became a match for the Greeks in power, and next to the Persians in wealth.

This empire must have been established by the end of the fifth century, for Dionysius, contemplating hostilities against Carthage about 397 B.C., prepared huge armaments, as Diodorus relates,84 "because he realized that he was about to struggle with the most powerful people of Europe."

Fear of this ever-growing empire of Carthage and not mere lust for power was behind Rome's support of the Mamertines,85 the episode which began the First Punic war - according to Polybius:

They saw that the Carthaginians had not only reduced Libya to subjection, but a great part of Spain besides, and that they were also in possession of all the islands in the Sardinian and Tyrrenian Seas. They were therefore in great apprehension lest, if they also became masters of Sicily, they would be most troublesome and dangerous neighbors, hemming them in on all sides and threatening every part of Italy.

What were the motives behind this constant expansion? Three suggest themselves at once. (1) Carthage probably decided definitely on an imperial policy when the Greeks began to establish
colonies in the western Mediterranean, threatening her trade supremacy in that part of Europe. (2) She found colonizing a painless and profitable means of thinning out her population, as Aristotle remarks: 86 "They constantly send out a portion of the common people to appointments in the cities [colonies]; by this means they heal the social sore and make the constitution stable." And again: 87 "By following some such policy as this the Carthaginians have won the friendship of the common people; for they constantly send out some of the people to the surrounding territories and so make them well off." (3) It is evident, however, that the rulers of Carthage were anxious to counteract Greek expansion, and her people were willing to be transported to foreign soil, for a motive which was characteristic of the nation,—the hope of gain. Carthage was established as a Phoenician trading station; she grew into a nation of rich merchants; her empire was maintained as a source of wealth.

We have already mentioned some of the wealth supplied to Carthage by her African subjects,—grain, fruit, live stock, ivory, citron wood, precious stones, dyes. These riches, and more, Carthage could gather, first, through trade with her subjects. These she restrained from commerce with other nations that she might exploit them herself. At first, it is true, her policy was more liberal, as is shown by a treaty concluded with Rome at the end of the sixth century, which agrees, as Polybius interprets it, 88 that "to Carthage herself and all parts of Libya
on this side of the Fair Promontory, to Sardinia and the Carthaginian province of Sicily, the Romans may come for trading purposes, and the Carthaginian state engages to secure payment of their just debts." But from a later treaty with Rome, supposed to have been made about 306 B.C., it is evident how narrow her policy became. Polybius records the treaty:89

The Romans shall not maraud or trade or found a city on the farther side of the Fair Promontory, Mostia, and Tarseum. ... No Roman shall trade or found a city in Sardinia and Libya nor remain in a Sardinian or Libyan port longer than is required for taking in provisions or repairing his ship. If he be driven there by stress of weather, he shall depart within five days. In the Carthaginian province of Sicily and at Carthage he may do and sell anything that is permitted to a citizen.

It is significant that this agreement was made less than a half century before the outbreak of the First Punic war. The exclusive trade with their African subjects, however, did not satisfy the Carthaginians. For, in addition, they sailed along the western coast of Africa beyond the Pillars, carrying on a "dumb trade" with the natives, probably very primitive people, as Herodotus tells:90

There is a place, they say, where men dwell beyond the Pillars of Heracles; to this they come and unload their cargo; then having laid it orderly by the waterline they go aboard their ships and light a smoking fire. The people of the country see the smoke, and coming to the sea, they lay down gold to pay for the cargo and withdraw away from the wares. Then the Carthaginians disembark and examine the gold; if it seems to them a fair price for their cargo, they take it and go their ways; but if not, they go aboard again and wait and the people come back and add more gold till the shipmen are satisfied. Herein neither party (it is said) defrauds the other; the Carthaginians do not lay hands on the gold till it matches the value of their cargo, nor do the people touch the cargo till the shipmen have taken the gold.
In sharp contrast to this primitive kind of trade with the African aborigines in the West, the Carthaginians entered into complex commercial relations with the highly civilized Egyptians to the East. They must have supplied Egypt with the products of western Europe, and sometimes with grain. We know that they were on very friendly terms with the Egyptians at the time of the First Punic war, and that their credit was good enough to lead them to hope for a large loan from the Egyptian treasury, as Appian records: "Both Romans and Carthaginians were destitute of money ... the Carthaginians sent an embassy to Ptolemy, the son of Ptolemy, the son of Lagus, king of Egypt, seeking to borrow 2000 talents. He was on terms of friendship with both Romans and Carthaginians." The loan was refused, however, out of deference to Rome. But the attempt at least is an indication of the relations existing between Carthage and Egypt.

While individuals were enriched by this trade, moreover, the public treasury was filled by taxes levied upon African colonies and subject peoples. There are several indications that the revenues demanded by the mother city were excessive. As has been mentioned, the grinding taxation led the Libyans to support the Mercenary Revolt, according to Polybius:

They had exacted from the peasantry, without exception, half of their crops, and had doubled the taxation of the townsmen without allowing exemption from any tax or even a partial abatement to the poor. They had applauded and honored not those governors who treated the people with gentleness and humanity, but those who procured for Carthage the largest amount of supplies and stores and used the country people harshly,—Hanno, for example. The consequence was that the male population required no
incitement to revolt, ...

Again, the tax paid by one of the African cities is recorded by Livy:94 "They call this district Emporia; it is the coast of the Lesser Syrtis and a fertile spot; one of its cities is Leptis, and this paid to the Carthaginians a tribute of one talent per day." This is almost unbelievable when we realize that after the Second Punic war Carthage herself was only required to pay Rome an indemnity of 200 talents per annum for fifty years, which was considered a heavy penalty.

These two examples of land tax or tribute certainly indicate that Carthage demanded an excessive rate; the same is probably true also of the other known form of taxation, the tariff, mentioned by Livy in regard to the reforms of Hannibal:95 "When Hannibal had investigated the revenues, how much was collected as taxes on land and as duty at the ports, ..." Altogether, then, the Carthaginians reaped abundant profit from their African holdings, privately through trade, publicly through tribute and tariff revenues.

Spain was perhaps the oldest, and at least the richest, possession of Carthage in Europe. The Phoenicians had come there first in the earliest times, as Strabo remarks:96 "The Phoenicians ... occupied the best of Iberia and Libya before the age of Homer, and continued to be masters of those regions until the Romans broke up their empire." Strabo here evidently includes the Carthaginians under the term "Phoenicians". It is not clear
just when the Carthaginians as such came into the country; they may have taken over after Tyre was destroyed by Alexander. We do know definitely that Spain was invaded by a Carthaginian army under Hamilcar Barca after the First Punic war (238 B.C.), but this expedition served to consolidate and strengthen the power of Carthage, not to establish it there for the first time, as Appian indicates:97 "I think also that from an early time the Phoenicians frequented Spain for purposes of trade, and occupied certain places there." And further:98 "This favored land, abounding in all good things the Carthaginians began to exploit before the Romans. A part of it they already occupied and another part they plundered, until the Romans expelled them from the part they held ..."

The Phoenicians settled in what was known as Turdetania, on the western side of the Pillars above Gades, a region of extraordinary riches, as we shall see. Speaking of the Iberians, Strabo says:99 "Indeed the people became so utterly subject to the Phoenicians that the greater number of the cities in Turdetania and of the neighboring places are now inhabited by the Phoenicians." They also founded the city of Gades on the island of that name, the modern Cadiz, as Strabo, among others, records:100

... about the founding of Gades, the Gaditanians recall a certain oracle, which was actually given, they say, to the Tyrians, ordering them to send a colony to the Pillars of Hercules ... the men who arrived on the third expedition founded Gades, and placed the temple in the eastern part of the island but the city in the western.
It was probably these possessions, Gades and Turdetania, which the Carthaginians took over from Tyre, and which "they had already occupied" when Hamilcar arrived to "plunder another part" of Spain in 238 B.C., for it is here that Hamilcar landed from Carthage, using this territory as a base for further conquest, as Appian says:101 "At the end of the war ... Hamilcar was left in sole command of the army. He associated his son-in-law Hasdrubal with him, crossed the straits to Gades, and thence crossing into Spain, plundered the territory of the Spaniards without provocation."

Why should the Carthaginians be so interested in this portion of Spain beyond the Straits? First of all, the district had much to attract the attention of the merchant princes. Strabo describes it in glowing terms as it was at his time:102 "Turdetania itself is marvellously blessed by nature; and while it produces all things, and likewise great quantities of them, these blessings are doubled by the facilities for exportation." And after discussing the waterways which afford these facilities, he continues:103

There are exported from Turdetania large quantities of grain and wine, and also olive oil, not only in large quantities, but of the best quality. And further, wax, honey, and pitch are exported from there, and large quantities of kermes and ruddle [dye stuffs] which is not inferior to the Sinopean earth. And they build their ships there out of native timber; and they have salt quarries ... and not unimportant, either, is the fish-salting industry that is carried on ... Formerly much cloth came from Turdetania, but now wool, rather of the raven-black sort ... Surpassing too are the delicate fabrics which are woven by the people of Salacia. Turdetania also has a great abundance of cattle of all kinds, and of game.
The value of trade resources like these is evident; but the country possessed far greater riches of another kind. It was perhaps the most prolific source of wealth in the Carthaginian empire because, as Strabo says:

Although the aforesaid country had been endowed with so many good things, still one might welcome and admire, not least of all but even most of all, its natural richness in metals. ... Up to the present moment, in fact, neither gold, nor silver, nor yet copper, nor iron, has been found anywhere in the world, in a natural state, either in such quantities or of such good quality.

Gold there was in abundance, which, as Strabo explains, "is not only mined, but washed down ... and the so-called 'gold-washeries' are now more numerous than the gold mines. ... And in the gold dust, they say, nuggets weighing as much as half a pound are sometimes found." But Spain produced, above all else, silver, as Diodorus remarks: "For this land possesses, we may venture to say, the most abundant and most excellent known sources of silver, and to the workers of this silver it returns great revenues." While Strabo testifies: "The wealth of Iberia is further evidenced by the following facts; the Carthaginians who, along with Barcas, made a campaign against Iberia, found the people in Turdetania, as the historians tell us, using silver feeding troughs and wine jars."

If the Carthaginians had enjoyed the wealth of Turdetania before, even this was augmented by the expedition of 238 B.C., for Hasdrubal established their power on the south-eastern coast of Spain by founding the city of New Carthage, and opening up rich
veins of silver, newly discovered in the vicinity. The value of these mines may be estimated from what they yielded to the Roman treasury at a later time, as Strabo reports:

Polybius, in mentioning the silver mines of New Carthage, says that they are very large; that they are distant from the city about twenty stadia, and embrace an area four hundred stadia in circuit; and that 40,000 workmen stay there, who, (in his time) bring into the Roman exchequer a daily revenue of 25,000 drachmas.

Finally, what this constant supply of silver meant to Carthage throughout her history may be gathered from the remarks with which Diodorus closes his description of the Spanish mines:

Not one of the mines has a recent beginning, but all of them were opened by the covetousness of the Carthaginians at the time when Iberia was among their possessions. It was from these mines ... that they drew their continued growth, hiring the ablest mercenaries to be found and winning with their aid wars many and great. For it is in general true that in their wars the Carthaginians never rested their confidence in soldiers from among their own citizens or gathered from their allies, but that when they subjected the Romans and the Sicilians and the inhabitants of Libya to the greatest perils it was by money, thanks to the abundance of it which they derived from their mines, that they conquered them in every instance.

The city of New Carthage was, for the short period the Carthaginians occupied it after its foundation, their stronghold and the center of their activities in Spain. Scipio recognized this when he made it the first objective in his conquest of that country. Upon inquiring, according to Polybius,

... he learnt ... that it stood almost alone among Spanish cities in possessing harbors fit for a fleet and for naval forces, and that it was at the same time very favorably situated for the Carthaginians to make the direct sea crossing to Africa. Next he heard that the Carthaginians kept the bulk of their money and their war material in this city, as well as their hostages from the whole of Spain, and ... that the trained soldiers who garrisoned the citadel were only about a thousand in number, ... while
the remaining population was exceedingly large but composed of artisans, tradesmen, and sailors.

The wealth of this, the last and most famous of the colonies of Carthage, is seen in the spoils taken by Scipio after the fall of the city in 210 B.C., as Appian records:

In the captured city he obtained great stores of goods, useful in peace and war, many arms, darts, engines, dockyards containing thirty three war ships, corn and provisions of various kinds, ivory, gold, and silver, some in the form of plate, some coined and some uncoined, also Spanish hostages, and everything that had been captured from the Romans themselves.

The capture of New Carthage broke the Carthaginian power in Spain and lost for Carthage the richest province of her empire, stemmed the constant stream of silver which had flowed thence into her treasury, broke up the trade monopoly which she must have imposed, according to her custom, upon her own rich possessions, and drove her out of Europe forever.

In addition to part of Africa and Spain, the Carthaginians laid claim to most of the islands in the western Mediterranean. We have already seen some of their operations in Sicily, and the treaty quoted from Polybius showed that they regarded Sardinia as their own. This latter island would have been of use to Carthage, first, for its agricultural products, for, as Strabo says, "the greater part of Sardo is rugged ... though much of it has also soil that is blessed with all products, especially with grain." Then, the Sardinians were useful as soldiers, of whom Strabo says further: "Later on the Phoenicians of Carthage got the mastery over them, and along with them carried on
war against the Romans." They were, however, never really fully conquered, as Diodorus points out:114 "The Carthaginians, though their power extended far and they subdued the island, were not able to enslave its former possessors." And again:115 "Although the Carthaginians made war upon them many times with considerable armies, yet because of the rugged nature of the country and the difficulties of dealing with their dug-out dwellings, the people remained unenslaved." Carthage was forced to cede this island to the Romans after the First Punic war by a treaty which Polybius records:116 "The Carthaginians are to evacuate Sardinia and pay a further sum of twelve hundred talents." In the words of the same author in another place:117 "Thus was Sardinia lost to the Carthaginians, an island of great extent, most thickly populated and most fertile."

Corsica probably never belonged to Carthage; at least there is no mention of Carthaginian occupation in Strabo or Diodorus. But about 536 B.C. Carthage did ally herself with the Tyrrennians to drive out a colony of Phocaeans who settled there and interfered with Carthaginian trade, as Herodotus recalls:118 "But they [the Phocaeans] harried and plundered all their neighbors; wherefore the Tyrrennians and Carthaginians made common cause against them, and sailed to attack them with sixty ships." Thus, though Carthage did not own Corsica, she policed it, exercising indirect control in this way.

Next, to the West, was the Balearic group, which belonged to
Carthage and helped to maintain the empire by supplying the famous light armed troops known as Balearic slingers, who figured so prominently in the Carthaginian armies. In describing the two islands, Diodorus mentions that "in the hurling of large stones with slings the natives are the most skillful of all men," and that "in early times they served in the campaigns of the Carthaginians." Further, of the islands themselves, he says:

The smaller [Minorca] lies more to the east and maintains great droves and flocks of every kind of animal, especially mules, which stand very high and are exceptionally strong. Both islands have good land which produces fruits, and a multitude of inhabitants numbering more than 30,000.

Here again were agricultural products and man power for Carthage.

Further westward, within the Pillars, were the Pityusian Isles, described by Diodorus thus:

The island is only moderately fertile, possessing little land that is suitable for the vine; but it has olive trees which are engrafted upon the wild olive. And of all the products of the island, they say the softness of its wool stands first in excellence. The island is broken up at intervals by notable plains and highlands and has a city named Eresus, a colony of the Carthaginians. And it also possesses excellent harbors, huge walls, and a multitude of well constructed houses. The inhabitants consist of barbarians of every nationality, but Phoenicians preponderate.

This not only supplied produce and a market for trade, but afforded a convenient stopover between New Carthage and the mother city.

Finally, Carthage possessed the three key islands between Sicily and the African coast, a great advantage for her shipping,
as Diodorus points out: 122

Off the south of Sicily three islands lie out in the sea, and each of them possesses a city and harbors which can offer safety to ships which are in stress of weather. The first one is that called Melite...and it possesses many harbors which offer exceptional advantages, and its inhabitants are blessed in their possessions...This island is a colony planted by the Phoenicians, who, as they extended their trade to the western ocean, found in it a place of safe retreat, since it was well supplied with harbors, and lay out in the open sea.

This was the island of Malta, a valuable base in the Carthaginian empire, as it has been to the British. Just above it lies the island now called Gazo, the second in the chain from Carthage to Sicily. Diodorus describes it: 123 "After this island [Malta] there is a second which bears the name of Gaulas, lying out in the open sea and adorned with well-situated harbors, a Phoenician colony."

Last of all, there was the island of Cercina, now Kerkenna, lying along the African coast below the Carthaginian peninsula. "Next comes Cercina, facing Libya, which has a modest city and most serviceable harbors which have accommodations not only for merchant vessels, but even for ships of war." 124

Thus, a ship coming from the eastern Mediterranean would have to pass through this chain of Carthaginian possessions, a passage which, unless Carthage allowed it by treaty, involved evident danger from the nation who, as Strabo mentions on the authority of Eratosthenes, 125 "used to drown in the sea any foreigners who sailed past their country to Sardinia or to the Pillars."
Last of all, in regard to the island of Sicily, of which much has been said already, we must be content with the general appraisal of Diodorus, who calls it "the richest of the islands", and of Strabo, who asks: "As for the fertility of the country, why should I speak of it, since it is on the lips of all men, who declare that it is no whit inferior to Italy? And in the matter of grain, honey, saffron, and certain other products, one might call it even superior."

Because of its proximity, and because it threatened to harbor a rival Greek trade center, the Carthaginians were interested in Sicily at an early date; in fact their first recorded overseas expedition was sent there about 550 B.C. under the general Malchus, as Justinus recalls; he was defeated, however, when he attempted to carry the war into Sardinia: "Propter quod ducem suum Malchum, cuius auspiciis et Siciliae partem domuerant...exsulare jusserunt." The history of Carthage from that time to the Punic wars is the history of her struggle with the Sicilian Greeks under Gelon, Dionysius, Timoleon, and Agathocles. Through it all she managed to maintain at least a foothold in the western part, and at times almost succeeded in subjugating the island completely. It was her growing power in Sicily, finally, that threatened the Romans and brought on the First Punic war.

Sicily was one of the most valuable of the Carthaginian possessions. Her cities and colonies in the west enabled Car-
thage to command the sea; the produce of Sicily supplied her with support for her armies; the skill of Sicilian Greek workmen gave her articles of trade and a coinage to carry on that trade; finally, the subject peoples of Sicily paid her tribute, as is seen in the terms after the successful campaign of 405 B.C., quoted by Diodorus: 129

Peace was concluded on these terms: The Carthaginians were to hold subject, besides their ancient colonies, the Siconi, the Silenuntii, the peoples of Agrigentum and Himera. In addition, the citizens of Gela and Camarina could remain in their cities after tearing down the walls, but must pay tribute to the Carthaginians.

These advantages made Sicily well worth fighting for; when the island was lost, a wedge was driven into the heart of the Carthaginian empire.

The empire of Carthage, then, can be divided into three groups of territory: (1) The African coast of the Mediterranean from the subject city of Leptis on the east to the Pillars and beyond, including Carthage herself and the vicinity immediately under her dominion. (2) Spain, particularly Gades and New Carthage. (3) The islands of the Mediterranean from Malta to the Pillars. We have tried to indicate the advantages that Carthage reaped from these vast holdings in trade and tribute, in precious metals, from Spain and Africa, in man power for her armies, in agricultural produce for her support. It is not surprising that at the head of such an empire, Carthage should be the wealthiest city of antiquity.

But if the Carthaginians built up this empire entirely for
their own selfish interests, what held it together? A number of influences may be mentioned:

(1) Many of the dependencies of Carthage were her own colonies, the nucleus of the settlement being Carthaginians, or at least Liby-Phoenicians, sent out originally from Carthage in the colonizing expeditions mentioned by Aristotle to relieve Carthage of superfluous population and to enrich the colonists. They were attached to Carthage therefore by ties of blood, and probably maintained an ascendancy in the surrounding country by their connection with the powerful mother city.

(2) Carthaginian arms forced submission, as, for example, in Sicily, where a garrison was maintained in the Carthaginian settlements to suppress revolts, to enforce treaty stipulations, or to push the interests of Carthage. The garrison at Motya which resisted Dionysius' first revolt may be cited, or that already mentioned as forming part of the population of New Carthage.

(3) The fact that Carthage was complete mistress of the western Mediterranean and jealous of all foreign trade would enforce the loyalty of the merchant classes throughout the empire, since they could not hope to find secure markets or transportation without her approval.

(4) There was a common coinage to form another commercial bond between Carthage and her dependents. In fact a sort of bank note made of leather, corresponding to modern paper money, was issued
Finally, religion formed a common bond, the religion which the Carthaginians had taken from their Phoenician ancestors and which they passed on to their colonies in turn. There was a famous temple of the Phoenician Heracles at Gades, for example, erected by the Phoenicians long before Carthage took over. Diodorus speaks of it: "In the city they built many works appropriate to the nature of the region, and among them a costly temple of Heracles, and they instituted magnificent sacrifices which were conducted after the manner of the Phoenicians." And Polybius, describing New Carthage, mentions that on the largest of its hills "is built a temple of Aesculapius," while another eminence "is known as the hill of Saturn." Both references recall the cult of Aesculapius and of Moloch in the mother city.

What was the attitude of subject nations to the head of the empire? Those cities which she had founded and which shared her civilization and culture remained loyal, like Motya and New Carthage; among peoples whom Carthage had subjugated, however, there seems to have existed a chronic state of disaffection and rebellion.

The hatred of the Libyans manifested in the Mercenary Revolt after the first struggle with Rome has been mentioned. This attitude among the Africans was of long standing. Their hatred was old when in 396 B.C. Hamilco further exasperated them by
deserting the troops they supplied him in Sicily. Diodorus declares:133 "When, indeed, that disaster was made known throughout Libya, those who had assisted the Carthaginians in war, though they had long hated the burden of their domination, now because of the betrayal of the troops at Syracuse burned with a much greater hatred against them." About 379 B.C. this hatred among the Africans had broken out into a revolt which threatened to overwhelm Carthage while she was weak from plague. The Sardinians, seizing the opportunity, followed their example, as Diodorus records:134

It happened a little later that the plague fell upon Carthage which, increasing more and more, carried off many of the Carthaginians and they almost lost the empire. For the Libyans, being disaffected, revolted, while the Sardinians, considering this a good opportunity, conspired against Carthage and threw off her yoke.

As early as 310 B.C. Agathocles counted upon this rebellious disposition when he dared the invasion of Africa. Diodorus writes:135 "He hoped ... that their allies, groaning under Carthaginian demands for so long, would seize the opportunity to revolt." It is evident, then, that the hatred of Carthage burning among her subject neighbors was literally centuries old. This hatred is explained partially, as has been said, by the heavy tribute demanded from the Libyans, and by the manner in which they were betrayed while fighting for Carthage in Sicily. Diodorus adds a third reason:136

At the conclusion of the Libyan war, the Carthaginians avenge themselves upon the nation of the Micatani Numidians, including women and children, by crucifying all who fell into
their hands. Wherefore their descendants, remembering the cruelty worked upon their fathers, remained the most bitter enemies of Carthage.

In Sicily much the same hostile attitude prevailed among the subject states of Carthage. When Dionysius planned his first attempt to free Sicily from the Carthaginian rule, in 397 B.C., he found the citizens of Syracuse ready to join him, for, as Diodorus explains, "they desired the war no less than he, primarily because they hated the Carthaginians." The other Sicilians supported the revolt, "for although they dreaded the domination of Dionysius, still they willingly joined in the war against Carthage, incited by the cruelty of the Carthaginians. And for the same reason, when Dionysius openly took up arms, those who dwelt in the Greek cities under the dominion of Carthage manifested their hatred of the Phoenicians." Finally, all the subsequent history of the island until it came into Roman hands is a repetition of this attempt to be free of Carthaginian domination.

The Sicilians had many reasons for hating Carthage. The Carthaginian conquests had been attended with terrible barbarities; they massacred the people, stripped the cities, imposed tribute upon their children. More fundamental still, the Greeks cherished an inborn love of freedom and a contempt for the Carthaginian "barbarian". They could not live content under Carthaginian rule because, as A. J. Church remarks, "Carthaginian habits and ways of life seem to have been particularly offensive to the
taste of the Greeks." We shall understand their attitude more clearly when we understand the religion of the Carthaginians.
Notes to Chapter III

I. References to Greek Authors

2 XVII,1,19:
Καὶ Καρχήριδι δὲ ἐπὶ χερονήσου τινὸς ἠδρυταί, περιγραφοῦσας χύκλον τριακόσιων ἐξήκοντα σταδίων ἐχοντο τείχος, οὐ τοῦ ἐξηκον ταστάδιον μήρος αὐτὸς ὃ αὐχὴν ἔπεχει, καθήκον ἀπό θαλάττης ἐπὶ θάλατταν... κατὰ μέσην δὲ τὴν πολιν ἢ ἀκρόπολις ἢ ἐκάλουν βόρσαν, ἵππῳ ἰκανῶς ὀρθία, χύκλῳ περισσομενήν, κατὰ δὲ τὴν κυριφὴν ἔχουσα Ἀσκληπείου... ὑπόσκειται δὲ τῇ ἀκροπόλει οἱ τε λιμένες καὶ ὁ κάθων, νησίων περιφερές εὑρίσκι περιεχομένου, ἐχοντι νεωσοῖκους ἐκατέρθωσεν κύκλω.

3 VIII,95:
Ἡν δὲ ἡ πόλις ἐν μυκῶν κόλπου μεγίστου, χερονήσῳ τις μάλιστα προσεοικυία, αὐχὴν γάρ αὐτὴν ἀπὸ τῆς ἑπείρου διείργεν, εὔρος δὲν πέντε καὶ εἰκοσι σταδίων ἀπὸ δὲ τοῦ αὐχένος ταῖνια στενὴ καὶ ἐπιμήκης, ἡμιστάδιον μάλιστα τὸ πλάτος, ἐπὶ δυσμᾶς ἐχόρει, μεῖχη λίμνης τε καὶ τῆς θαλάσσης... ἀπὸ τείχει περικρήμαν ὁντα, τὰ δὲ ἀπὸ μεσομβρίαν ὡς ἑπείρου ἑνθα καὶ ἡ βόρσα ἢ ἑπὶ τοῦ αὐχένος, τριπλὸ τείχει, τούτων δὲ ἐκαστον ἢ ὕψος μὲν πηχῶν τριακόσιν χ' ὕπαλεν τε καὶ πύργων, οἱ ἐν διπλῆσθεν διαστήματος αὐτοῖς τετράμοροι περιέχειντο, βάθος δὲ ποδῶν τριακόσιν, διώροφον δὲ τὸν ἐκαστό τείχος τὸ ὕψος, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ κοίλω τε ὄντικα στεγανό κατά μὲν ἐστάθμευσαν ἐλεφάντες τριακόσιοι καὶ θησαυροι παρεσκευάσαντο αὐτοῖς τῶν τροφῶν, ἱπποστάσαι δ' ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν τὴν τετρακοσίλιος ἑποίκος, καὶ ταμιεύσαι χλιστο τε καὶ κρίθησις, ἀνάρατό τα καταχων πεζοῦς μὲν ἔς δισμυρίους, ἢπειροι δὲ ἐς τετρακοσίλιος τοθήσῃ παρασκευή πολέμου διετέσκατο σταθμεύσειν ἐν τοῖς τείχεσι μόνοις. γνωίτα δ' ἡ παρὰ τὴν γλώσσαν ἐκ τούτῳ τοῦ τείχους ἐπὶ τοὺς λιμένες περιεκαμπτεν, ἀσθενής ἡ μόνη καὶ ταπείνη, καὶ ἠμέλητο ἐς ἀρχής.

Ωδ' λιμένες ἐς ἀλλήλους διεισέκουσε, καὶ ἐπάγωσε ἐς πελάγους ἐς αὐτοὺς ἐς εὐρύς ποδών ἐβδομήκοντα, ὅν ἀλλοστην ἀπέχθειον σιδηραῖς. ο μὲν δὴ πρώτος ἐμπόροις ἀνεῖτο, καὶ πείχμα τὴν ἐν αὐτῷ πυκνὰ καὶ ποικίλα τοῦ δ' ἐντὸς ἐν μέσῳ νήσου ἢ καὶ κρηπίςις μεγάλαις ἢ τε νήσου καὶ ὁ λιμὴν διείληπτο. νεωρίων τοῦ ἐγέμνων αἱ κρηπίδες αἰδέ ἐς ναυὸς διαχοσίας καὶ εἴχοσι πεποιημένων, καὶ ταμιεύτων ἐπὶ τοῖς νεωρίωις ἐς τριπτετικὰ σχεδὴ. κίονες δ' ἐκάστου νεωσοῖκου προὔχον ἰωνικοὶ δύο, ἐς εἰχόνα στοῖς τὴν ὠψιν τοῖς τοῦ λιμένες καὶ τῆς νῆσου περιφερόντες. ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς νῆσου σκηνὴ ἐπεποίητο τῷ ναυάρχῳ, δεχονταῖς καὶ τὸν σαλπικτὸν σμαίνειν καὶ τὸν κήρυκα προδέλειεν, καὶ τὸν ναυάρχον ἐφοράν, ἐκεῖς δὲ ἡ νῆσος κατὰ τὸν ἐκπλωστὸν καὶ ἀνενεκοτότα τῷ κυνίδιος ἐγνατίς, ἵνα δ' τὸ ναυάρχος τὰ ἐκ πελάγους πάντα ἐφόρα, καὶ τοῖς ἐπιπλέουσι τῶν ἀφανῆς ὁ τῶν ἐνδον ὀψις ἡ ἀκρινής, οὐ μὴν οὔτε τοῖς ἐπιπλέον τοῖς ἐμπόροις εὐτικῆς ἦν τὰ νεώρια σύνοπτα τείχες.
τε γὰρ αὐτοῖς διπλούν περιέχειτο, καὶ πόλαι, ἀλλὰ τοὺς ἐμπόρους ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου λιμένος ἐς τὴν πόλιν ἐσέφερον ὡς διερχομένους τὰ καταρρία. οὕτω μὲν εἴχεν ἡ πόλις ἡ Ἀρκάδονίων ἡ τότε, ...

4 VIII, 127:

...τὸ μέρος τοῦ Κάθωνος τὸ τετράγωνον. ἕπειδὴ θάτερα τοῦ Κάθωνος ἐς τὸ περιφερές αὐτοῦ μέρος...

6 Ibid.:

ἀπεθέντος δὲ τοῦ περὶ τὸν Κάθωνα τείχους, τὴν ἀγορὰν ἑγγὺς οὗσαν ὁ Ἑλληνῖς κατέλαβεν.

7 Ibid.:

ἀρχομένης δὲ τῆς ἡμέρας ἑτέρους ἀχμῆτας ἑκάλει τετράχισχινοὺς, οἵ τε ἐσιάντες ἔρχον Ἀπόλλωνος, οὐ τὸ τὲ ἀγαλμα κατάχρυσον ἔν οἷς δὲ ἄρτῳ χρυσῆλατον ἀπὸ χιλίων ταλάντων σταθμὸν περιέχειτο...

8 Appian, VIII, 128:

τρίων δὲ ο תשלום ἀπὸ τῆς ἀγορᾶς ἀνδρῶν ἐς αὐτὴν, οἷς ἡπνᾶ πυκνά ἔως ἀριστεύοι πανταχόθεν ἦσαν...

9 Ibid., 130:

τὸ δὲ γὰρ ἐν τῷ ἔρχον ἐν ἀκροτοῦ ἐν ἀκροτῷ μᾶλλα τῶν ἀλλῶν ἑπιφάνεις καὶ πλούσιον... ἐς δὲ καὶ παρὰ τὴν εἰρήνην διὰ βαθρῶν ἐξήκοντα ἀνέβαινον.
16 XIII, 62: 
ἐπεὶ δ’ ἔτις Καρχηδόνα κατέπλευσε μετὰ πολλῶν λαφύρων, ἀπήντων ἀτύχων πάντες δεξιούμενοι καὶ τιμῶντες.

17 XIII, 90: 
‘Ἄμικας τὰ ἱερὰ καὶ τὰς οἴκιας συλήσας, καὶ φιλοτιμώς ἐρευνήσας, ὃσαν εἰκὸς ἔστιν ἐσχήκειν τόλμην οἰκουμενήν ὑπὸ ἀνθρώπων εἰκόσι μυριάδων, ἀπόρθησον δὲ ἀπὸ τῆς κτίσεως γεγονότης, πλουσιότατην δὲ σχεδὸν τῶν τότε Ἑλληνίδων πόλεως γεγονότης. καὶ ταῦτα τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ φιλοκαλησάντων εἰς παντοίαν κατασκευασμάτων πολυτέλειαν. καὶ γὰρ γραφαὶ παμπληθεῖς ἠκριβεῖσαν εἰς ἄκρον ἐκπεπονημέναι, καὶ παντικαίριον ἀνθριάντων φιλοτέχνως δεδημιουργημένων ὑπεραγών ἀριθμός. τὰ μὲν οὖν πολυτελέστατα τῶν ἐργῶν ἀπεστείλεν εἰς Καρχηδόνα (ἐν οἷς καὶ τὸν φαλάριδος συνέβη κομίσθηναι ταῦτον).

18 XIII, 96: 
οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ τὴν ἄλωσιν τῆς πόλεως τὰ μὲν ἀναθήματα καὶ τοὺς ἀνθριάντας καὶ τάλλα τὰ πολυτελέστατα μετήγχανον εἰς Καρχηδόνα.

19 XIII, 108: 
τῶν δ’ ἱερῶν οὐκ ἤδη καλῶς ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς ἐθέκει διεφθαρεί τὰς γλυφὰς καὶ τὰ περιττοτέρως εἰργασμένα περιέκοψεν.

20 Ibid.: 
ἐχοντων δὲ τῶν Γελών ἐκτὸς τῆς πόλεως Ἀπόλλωνος ἀνθριάντα χαλκοῦν σφόδρα μέγαν, συλήσαντες αὐτὸν ἀπεστείλεν εἰς τὴν Τύραν.

21 Moralia, 200b: 
εὐρόν δὲ τὴν πόλιν ἀνθριάντων Ἑλληνικῶν καὶ ἀναθημάτων ἀπὸ Σικυίας μεστὴν οὕσαν...

22 VIII, 133: 
ἐς δὲ Σικυίαν περιεπεμπεν, δὸς Καρχηδόνιοι σφῶν ἀναθηματο κοινὰ πολεμοῦντες ἔλαβον, ἐλθόντας ἐπιγιγνώσκειν καὶ κομίσθησαν.

23 XVII, 3, 15: 
γένοιτο δ’ ἂν εὐθῆς ἡ δύναμις αὐτῶν ἐκ τοῦ ὑστάτου πολέμου, ἔν, ὁ κατελύθησαν ὑπὸ σχισμίνοις τοῦ Διμισίανοῦ, καὶ η τοῦς ἀρδένην ἡφανίση. δὲ γὰρ ἡδαντο πολεμεῖν τοῦτον τῶν πόλεων, πόλεις μὲν εἰχόν τριακοσίας ἐν τῇ Διρδή, ἀνθρώπων δ’ ἐν τῇ πόλει μυριάδας ἐβδομήκοντα, πολιορκοῦμενοι δὲ καὶ ἀναγκασθέν-
τες τραπέζαι πρὸς ἐγγοσίν πανοπλίαν μὲν ἔδοσαν μυριάδας εἰκοσι καταπελτικὰ δὲ ὀργάνα τρισχίλια, ὡς οὐ πολεμηθησόμενοι, κρείδεντος δὲ πάλιν τοῦ ἀναπολεμεῖν, ἐξαιρέτως ὅπλοποιαν συνεστήσαντο, καὶ ἐκάστης ἡμέρας ἀνεφέροντο θυρεοῖ μὲν ἦκατὸν καὶ τεττάρακοντα πεπηγότες, μάχαιρα δὲ τριακόσια καὶ λόγχαι πεντακόσια, χίλια δὲ βέλη καταπελτικὰ, τρίγα δὲ τοὺς καταπέλτας αἱ θεράπαιναι παρεῖχον. ἔτι τοῖνυν ναῦς ἔχοντες ὀδύεια ὡς ἤτοι πεντεκόντα κατὰ τὰς ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ πολέμῳ συνθήκας, τότε καὶ περ ἡν συμπεφευγότες εἰς τὴν θάρασσαν εἰς διμήνως κατεσκέθασαν ναῦς ἦκατὸν εἰκοσι καταφράκτους, καὶ τοῦ στόματος τοῦ Κάθωνος φρουρομένου διάρυγναν ἀλλὰ στόμα, καὶ προῆλθεν αἰφνιδίως ὁ στόλος. ὅτε γὰρ ἦν ἀποκειμένη παλαιὰ καὶ τεχνητῶν πλῆθος προσεδρέσσον καὶ σιταρχοῦμενον δημοσίᾳ, τοιαύτῃ δ' ὅσα Καρχηδόν ὄμος ἐλαβε καὶ κατεσκάφη.

24 ΧΧΧΧΧΧ 6,6:
Δῆλον ἐγενέτο διότι μέγα τὸ βάσταγμα τῆς πόλεως ἤν πλείονα γὰρ εἰκοσὶ μυριάδων ὅπλα παρέδωκαν Ῥωμαίοις καὶ καταπέλτας δισχίλιους.

25 VIII, 82:
καὶ λόγον αὐτοῖς διδόντες ὡς ἦ μὲν πόλις ἐστὶν ἁνυπλος ξημοφ, οὐ γαθὴν, οὐ καταπέλτην, οὐ βέλος, οὐ ἐφος ἔχομα, οὐκ ἄνδρας οἰκείους ἱκανοὺς ἀπομάχεσθαι πέντε μυριάδων ἐναγχος διεθερμένων, ...

26 IX, 26:
tους μὲν ἄνθριάντας πρὸς τὴν τοῦ χαλκοῦ χρήσιν συγχωνεύσαντες, καὶ τὴν εὔλωσιν τῶν τε ἱδίων καὶ δημοσίων ἔργων πρὸς τὰς τριήρεις καὶ τὰς μηχανὰς μετενεγκαμοῦν, ...

27 VIII, 117:
χωρὲ ὁ ἐστὶν εὕμερες ἐν τῇ πόλει τὰ Μέγαρα, τῷ τείχει παρεξευμένοιν: ... τῶ γὰρ χωρὲν, τὰ Μέγαρα, ἐλαχανεύετο καὶ φυτῶν ἀραίων ἐγεμέν, αἰμασίες τε καὶ θριγκοίς βάτου καὶ ἄλλης ἀκάνθης καὶ ὁχετοῖς βαθέος ὑδατος ποιίλοις τε καὶ σκολιοῖς κατάπλευ την.

28 XIX, 8:
η δ' ἀνὰ μέσον χώρα, δι' ἥς ἦν ἀναγκαίον πορευθήναι, διειλημμένα καὶ παντοίᾳ φυτουργίᾳ, πολλαὶ ὑδατος διοχετευμένων, καὶ πάντα τόπον ἀρδευόντων, ἀγροίκα περὶ τοὺς συνεχεῖς ὑπήρχον οἰχοδομαῖς πολυτέλεοι καὶ κοιναίοις διαπονημέναις, καὶ τῶν τῶν κεκτιμένων αὐτάς διασφαιρίσθαι πλούσιον ἔγεμον δ' οὐ μὲν ἐπαιλεῖς πάντων τῶν πρὸς ἀπόλαυσι, ὥς ἀν τῶν ἐγχωρίων
...έν εἰρήνη πολυχρονίῳ τεθηραυρικότων γενημάτων ἀφθονίᾳ.

29. ΧΧ, 17:
τάς ἀπάσας δὲ πόλεις πλείους τῶν διακοσίων κεχειριμένος...

30. ΧΧ, 55:
τέταρτα γὰρ τὴν διβόθνη διείληφε γένη, φοινικεῖς μὲν, οἱ τὴν
Καρχηδόνα τότε κατοικουντες. Διβυρωνίκες δὲ, πολλὰς ἔχοντες
πόλεις ἐπιθαλαττίοις, καὶ κοινονοῦντες τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις ἐπι-
γαμίαις, οἵς ἀκοὶ τῆς συμπεπληγμένης συγγενείας συνέβη τοιχεῖν
τάξιν τῆς προσγεράς. ὦ δὲ πολὺς λαὸς τῶν ἐπιχωρίων ἀρχαι-
ότοτοι δὲν, Διβύς ἀνεμάξετο, μισῶν διαφερόντως τοὺς Ἀρχηγο-
νίους, διὰ τὸ βάρος τῆς ἐπίστασιας. οἱ δὲ τελευταῖοι Νομάδες
ύπηρχον, πολλὴν τῆς διβόθνης νεμόμενοι μέχρι τῆς ἐρήμου.

31. ΧΧΧΒ, 7:
ἐν πανοπλίᾳ, πορφυρίδα θαλαττίαν ἑπιπερπημένος.

32. ΧΧΧΒ, 8:
ο δὲ πάλιν ἐξεπορεύετο μετὰ μεγάλης ἀξίας ἐν τῇ πορφυρίδι
καὶ τῇ πανοπλίᾳ βάδθην, ἀδετε τοὺς ἐν ταῖς τροφῳδοίς τυράννους
πολύ τι προσοφείλειν.

33. ΧΧΧΒ, 66:
πορφύραν ποδήρη περικειμένος καὶ ψελία καὶ στρεπτᾶ ἀπὸ
χρυσοῦ...

40. ΧΧΙ, 2, 25:
μετατεθεὶ μὲν ἐν τῇ "Ψυχῇ καὶ θόρυβῳ θειότης αἰγιαλὸς ἐστιν ὁ
φέρων τὴν ἐναλίτῃν ἀμμὸν" ἐγκαθαι ἐκ τοῦ ποιητή ἡχείσαι,
κομισθεῖσαι εἰς Σιδώνα μὲν ἐν τῇ κυνέταν δέχεσθαι.

42. Politics, VII, 2, 6:
ἐν ἐνίοις γὰρ καὶ νόμοι τινὲς εἰσὶ παροξύνοντες πρὸς τὴν
ἀρετῇ ταύτῃ. καθάπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι φασὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρίκων
κόσμον λαμβάνειν δις αν στρατεύσωνται στρατεύσις.

46 Polybius, I 72:
άφαιρομενα τον κόσμον εισεφερον ἀποφασίστως εἰς τοὺς ὑπωνιασμοὺς.

47 VII, 165:
... ἐπήγει ὑπ' αὐτὸν τὸν χρόνον τοῦτον φοινίκων καὶ Διβίων καὶ Ἰβηρίων καὶ Δηλύων καὶ Ἐλισουκών καὶ Σαρδονίων καὶ Κυρ- νίων τρίτην μυριάδας καὶ στρατηγὸν αὐτῶν Ἀμίλχαν τὸν Ἀν- νώνος, Καρχηδονίων ἐόντα βασιλέα.

48 XIII, 44:
... Καρχηδόνια μὲν τοῖς 'Εγερταίοις ἀπέστειλαν Δίβας τε πεντακισχίλιους καὶ τῶν Καμπανῶν ὀκτακισχίλιους ... ο δὲ Ἀννί- βας τὸ τοῦ θέρους ἔκειν καὶ τὸν συνάπτοντα Χειμάνα, πολλοὺς μὲν ἐξ Ἰβηρίας ἐξενολογήσεν, οὐκ ὄλιγοὺς δὲ καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν κατ- ἐγραφέν. ἔπηκε δὲ καὶ τὴν Διβήν, ἐπιλεγόμενος ἐξ ἀπάσης πόλεως τοὺς κρατίστους.

49 XIII, 54:
εἶχε δὲ τοὺς ἐσμπαντας Ἀννίβας, ὡς μὲν Ἁφορος ἀνέγραψε, πεζῶν μυριάδας εἰκοσὶ, ἵππεις δὲ τετρακισχίλιους ο δὲ Τίμαιος ψήσι, οὗ πολλῷ πλείους τῶν δέκα μυριάδων.

50 XIII, 80:
ἐπεμέναν τινὰς τῶν ἐν ἀξίωματι παρὰ τοῖς Καρχηδονίας ὅντων μετὰ πολλῶν χρημάτων, τοὺς μὲν εἰς Ἰβηρίαν, τοὺς δὲ εἰς τᾶς Βαλλιαρίδας νῆσους, παρακελευσάμενοι ξενολογεῖν ὡς πλείστους. αὐτοὶ δὲ ἔπισαν τὴν Διβήν, καταγράφοντες στρατιώτας Δίβας καὶ φοινίκας, καὶ τῶν πολιτῶν τοὺς κρατίστους. Μετεπέμποντο δὲ καὶ παρὰ τῶν συμμαχοῦσιν αὐτοῖς θεῶν καὶ βασιλέως στρατιώτας Μαυρουσίους καὶ Νομάδας, καὶ τινὰς τῶν οἰκονύμων τὰ πρὸς τὴν Κυρῆνην κεκλημένα μέρη. ἐγὼ δὲ Ἰταλίας μισθωσάμενοι Καμπανοὺς, διαβιβάσαν εἰς Διβήν.

51 Id., XV, 15:
προσφέρομεν Δ ἐμφρόνως τὸ μέγεθος τοῦ πολέμου, τῶν τε πολι- τῶν τοὺς εὐθέτους κατέλεγον στρατιώτας.

52 Ibid.:
καὶ χρημάτων προχειρίσαμενοι πλήθος, ἐξενικὰς δυνάμεις μεγά- λας ἐμισθοῦντο.
53 Timoleon, XXVII:
...καὶ διαβαίνοντες αὐτῶν ἀφεθησαν οἱ πολέμοι, πρῶτος μὲν τοῖς τεθριπποῖς ἐκπληκτικῶς πρὸς ἀγώνα κατεσκευασμένοις, κατό-
πιν δὲ τούτων μυρίοις ὀπλίταις λεονάσησι, τοὐτοὺς ἐτεκμαίροντο ἀπὸ τῶν ἀριθμῶν εἰναι τῇ λαμπρότητι τῆς σκέυης καὶ τῇ βραδυτητι καὶ τάξει τῆς πορείας.

54 Ibid., XXVIII:
λέγονται γοῦν ἐν μυρίοις νεκροῖς τρισχίλιοι Καρχηδονίων γενέ-
σθαι, μέγα τῇ πόλει πένθος. οὔτε γὰρ γέγενεν οὔτε πλοῦτος οὔτε ὁ-
δὲ ἔτεροι βελτίονες ἦσαν ἐκείνων, οὔτε ἀποθανόντας ποτὲ μιᾶ-
μᾶχα πρότερον ἐς αὐτῶν Καρχηδονίων τοσοῦτος μυμνοῦνοιν,
ἀλλὰ Δέμποι τὰ πολλὰ καὶ Ἰβηρίοι καὶ Νομάσι χρόμενοι πρὸς τὰς
μάχας ἀλλοτρίαις βλάβαις ἀνεδέχοντο τὰς ἔπτας.

55 XX, 10:
οἱ γοῦν στρατευόμενοι τῶν Καρχηδονίων, ὁδώντες τὸν καιρὸν οὐδα-
μῶς ἀγαβολής ὀἰκεῖον, τοὺς μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς χώρας καὶ τῶν συμμαχι-
δῶν πόλεων στρατιώτας οὐκ ἄνεμειναν: αὐτοῖς δὲ τοὺς πολιτι-
κούς ἐξήγαγον εἰς ὑπαίθρον, οὕτως μὲν οὐκ ἐλάττους πεζοὺς ἐπ-
τραχισμένους, ἵππεις δὲ χιλίοις, ἀρματα δὲ δισθίλια.... καὶ
tὸν μὲν δεξίον κέρατος "Ἀνών εἰς τὴν ἡγεμονίαν, συναγωνιζο-
μένων αὐτῷ τῶν εἰς τὸν ἱερὸν λόχον συντεταγμένων.

57 XXV, fr. 1:
ὑπῆρχον γὰρ οἱ μετὰ Καρχηδονίων στρατευόμενοι "Ιβηρεῖς, Κελ-
tοι, Βαλιαρέωι, Δέμποις, Φοίνικες, Διγυστίνοι, καὶ μιξαλλήνες δοῦ-
λοι: οἱ καὶ ἐστασίασαν.

58 Ι, 67:
tὸ δὲ μέγιστον μέρος αὐτῶν ἦν Δέμποι... πλεῖος ὄντες τῶν δισ-
μυρίων.

59 XI, 19:
καὶ πέροι σοὶ οὗν ὁμοεθνεῖς, ἀλλ’ οὕδ’ ὁμοφύλοις χρησάμενοις
στρατοπέδοις. εἰς γὰρ Δίβας, "Ιβηρας, Διγυστίνους, Κελτοὺς,
Φοίνικας, Ἰταλός, Ἑλληνας, οῖς οὐ νόμος, οὐκ ἔθος, οὐ λόγος,
οὐχ ἔτερον οὐδὲν ἤν κοινὸν ἔκ φύσεως πρὸς ἄλληλους.

60 Id., XV, 11:
ὁ δ’ Ἀννίβας τὰ μὲν θηρὰ πρὸς πάσης τῆς δυνάμεως, ὄντα πλεῖο-
τῶν ὁγεύματον, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα τοὺς μισθοθρόφους ἐπέστησε, περὶ
μυρίων ὄντας καὶ δισθίλιως τῶν ἀριθμῶν. οὗτοι δ’ ἦσαν Διγυ-
στίνοι, Κελτοῖ, Βαλιαρεῖς, Μαυρουσίοι. τοῦτων δὲ κατόπιν παρεν-
έβαλε τοὺς ἑγχωρίους Λίβυας καὶ Καρχηδόνιους, ἐπὶ δὲ πάσι τοὺς ἐξ Ἰταλίας ἤκοντας μεθ' αὐτοῦ, πλείον ἦς στάδιον ἀποστῆσας τῶν προτεταγμένων. τα δὲ κέρατα διὰ τῶν ἱππέων ἤσφαλσατο, θείς ἐπὶ μὲν τὸ λαίδην τοὺς συμμάχους Νομάδας, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸ δεξίον τοὺς τῶν Καρχηδόνων ἱππεῖς.

61 VI,52:
... τὸ δὲ περὶ τὰς πεζικὰς χρείας πολὺ δὴ τι 'Ρωμαίοι πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον ἀσκοῦσιν Καρχηδόνιων. οἱ μὲν γὰρ τὴν ὅλην περὶ τοῦτο ποιοῦνται σπουδήν, Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ τῶν μὲν πεζικῶν εὶς τέλος ὀλιγοφροσύνης, τῶν δ' ἱππικῶν βραχεῖάν τινα ποιοῦνται πρόνοιαν. αὖτιον δὲ τούτων ἑστὶν ὅτι ἐξενικαῖς καὶ μισθοφοροῖς χρῶνται δυνάμεις, 'Ρωμαίοι δὲ ἐγχωρίοις καὶ πολιτικαῖς.

62 VIII,82:

63 Id., VIII,93; vd. supra Ch. II, note 41.

64 Id., VIII,108:
... τῶν δ' ἱλαρχῶν οἱ μὲν σὺν τοῖς αὐτῶι ἥτομοδισθαν, καὶ ἐγένοντο πάντες ἐς διακοσίους καὶ διαχιλίους ἱππεῖς.

65 VIII,120:
καὶ ταύτα δ', ὡσα φέροιεν αἱ νῆσες, Ἀσσοῦβας τρισμυρίοις ἀν- δράσι μόνοις διέγειμεν, οὗτ ἐς μάχην ἐπείληκετο, καὶ τοῦ ἀλλού πλῆθος κατεφρόνει.

66 VIII,126:
Ῥολόσσης δ' αὐτοὺς ἐπιτρέχων σὺν Νομάι πολλοῖς καὶ ἐλέφασι πολύν εἰργάζετο φόνον, ὡς ἀπολέσας μὲν ἐς ἑπταχισμυρίους σὺν τοῖς ἄχρείοις, ἀλὼν δ' ἐς μυρίους, διαφυγεῖν δ' ἀμφὶ τοὺς τε- τραχισμύλους.

67 Ι,35:
... Καρχηδόνιους, οἱ πλείστην ἔσχον ναυτικὴν δύναμιν...

68 VI,52:
... τὸ μὲν πρὸς τὰς κατὰ θαλάτταν, ὀπερ εἰκὸς, ἀμείων ἂσ- κοῦσι καὶ παρασκευάζονται. Καρχηδόνιοι διὰ τὸ καὶ πάτριο, αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχειν ἑκ παλαιοῦ τὴν ἐμπειρίαν ταύτην καὶ θαλαττοθρησκεῖν μά- λιστα πάντων ἀνθρώπων...
69 ΧVII, 1, 19: Φησί δ' Ερατοσθένης κοινῶν μὲν εἶναι τοῖς βαρβάροις πᾶσιν ἔθεος τὴν ἕξνηλασίαν... Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ καταποντοῦν, εἰ τις τῶν ἔξων εἰς σαρᾶδ παραπλέοιειν ἢ ἐπὶ στῆλας.

72 Τιμόλεων, ΧΧV: Ἐν τούτῳ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι καταπλέουσιν εἰς τὸ διλῦβαίον ἀγοντες ἐπὶ παράδας στρατού καὶ τριήρεις διακόσιας καὶ πλοῖα χίλια χαινέοντα μηχανᾶς καὶ τέθριππα καὶ σῖτον ἀφονον καὶ τὴν ἄλλην παρασκευὴν...

73 Ι, 20: ... Καρχηδόνιοις... τοῖς ἐκ προγόνων ἔχουσι τὴν κατὰ θάλαταν ἑγεμονίαν ἀδήριτον.

74 Ι, 25: ... Ρωμαῖοι μὲν ἀνήχθησαν τριάκοντα καὶ τριακοσίαις μακραῖς ναυσὶ καταφράκτοις... Καρχηδόνιοι δὲ πεντήκοντα καὶ τριακοσίαις ναυσὶ καταφράκτοις ἀναπέλευσαντες... καὶ τὸ μὲν σύνπαν ἢ στρατευμα τούτων τῆς ναυτικῆς δυνάμεως περὶ τέτταρας καὶ δέκα μυριάδας ὡς ἁγ γένιστας νεῶς λαμβανοῦσης ἔρετας μὲν τριακοσίους, ἐπιβάτας δ' ἐκατόν. οἱ δὲ Καρχηδόνιοι τὸ μὲν πλεῖον καὶ τὸ πᾶν ἡμιόσομο πρὸς τὸν κατὰ θάλαταν κίνδυνον· τὸ γε μὴν πλήθος αὐτῶν ἢν ὑπὲρ πεντεκαίδεκα μυριάδας κατὰ τὸν τῶν νεῶν λόγον.

75 Ι, 28: ... τὸ δὲ τέλος τῆς συμπάσης ναυμαχίας ἐγένετο κατὰ τοὺς 'Ρωμαίους. διεφέρῃ δὲ τούτων μὲν εἰχοσι καὶ τέτταρα σκάφη, τῶν δὲ Καρχηδόνιον ὑπὲρ τριάκοντα. ναις δὲ τῶν μὲν 'Ρωμαίων αὐτανδρεῖς οὐδεμία τοῖς πολεμίοις ἐγένεθ' ὑποχείριος, τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων ἐξήκοντα καὶ τέτταρες.

76 Ι, 61: αἱ μὲν γὰρ νήσεις γέμουσαι δυσχρήστως διέκειντο πρὸς τὸν κίνδυνον, τὰ δὲ πληρωματα τελέως ἡν ἀνάσκητα καὶ πρὸς καιρὸν ἐμβεβλημένα, τὰ δ’ ἐπιβατικά νεοσύλλογα καὶ πρωτόϕειρα πάσης κακοπάθειας καὶ παντός δεινοῦ...

78 Πολυβ., ΧV, 18: τὰ μακρὰ πλοῖα παραδοῦναι πάντα πλὴν δέκα τριήρων,...
83 ΒΙΤΑ, 2:
Χρόνος δ', ἐντεῦθεν ὁρμήμενοι καὶ τῶν περιοχῶν ἀμελεί ννυς ὡς χειρας ἐλθείν, ναυοὶ τε ὁρμήμενοι καὶ τὴν ἥλασαν ᾦτα Φολικεῖς ἐργαζόμενοι, τὴν πόλιν τὴν ἐξω τῇ Βύρσῃ περι- ἐμμαν. καὶ δυναστεύοντες ἡδυ Λιβύης ἐξάτον καὶ πόλης ἡθα- λάσης, ἐκδομοὺς τε πολέμους ἐστράτευον ἦς Σικελίαν καὶ Σαρόω καὶ νῆσους ἀλλα ὀσαι τῇ τῆς ἥλασης ἐστὶ, καὶ ἦς Ἰβηρίαν. πολλαχὶ δὲ καὶ ἀποικίας ἐξέπεμπον. ἢ τε ἀρχή αὐτοῖς ἐγένετο δυνάμει μὲν ἀξιόμαχος τῇ Ἡνληνίκῃ, περιουσίᾳ δὲ μετὰ τὴν Περσικῆν.

84 Υ, 41:
ὡς ἀν πρὸς τοὺς δυνατωτάτους τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἑλλάδαν μέλλων 
διαγωνίζεσθαι.

85 Ι, 10:
...θεωρούντες δὲ τοὺς Καρχηδόνιους οὐ μόνον τὰ κατὰ τὴν 
Λιβύην, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς Ῥωμαίας ὀπίκων πολλὰ μέρη πεποιημένους, 
ἐκ τοῦ τῶν νῆσων ἀπασών ἐγκρατεῖς ὑπάρχοντας τῶν κατὰ τὸ Σαρ- 
δόνιον καὶ Τυρρηνικὸν πέλαγος, ἤγγινων, εἰ Σικελίας ἦτι κυρι- 
εύσατεν, μὴ λίκαν βαρεῖς καὶ φοβεροὶ γείτονες αὐτοῖς ὑπάρχοιεν, 
μύκλω σφάς περιέχοντες καὶ πάσι τοῖς τῆς Ἑταλίας μέρεσιν 
ἐπικείμενοι.

86 Politics, II, 8, 9:
...δὲ τί τοῦ δῆμου μέρους ἐκπέμποντες ἐπὶ τὰς πόλεις. τούτῳ 
γὰρ ἤνταν καὶ ποιοῦσι μόνιμον τὴν πολιτείαν.

87 Ibid., VI, 3, 5:
τοιοῦτον δὲ τινα τρόπον Καρχηδόνιοι πολιτευόμενοι φίλον 
κέχθησαν τὸν δῆμον. δὲ γὰρ τίνας ἐκπέμποντες τοῦ ὁμοί 
πρὸς τὰς περιοχὰς ποιοῦσιν εὔπορους.

88 III, 23:
εἰς δὲ Καρχηδόνα καὶ πάσαν τὴν ἐπὶ τὰς τῶν Ἐλληνῶν ἄρωμο- 
ῆς Λιβύης καὶ Σαρδονία καὶ Σικελίαν, ἂς ἐπάρχοις Καρχη- 
δόνιοι, καὶ ἐμπορόν πλεῖν Ῥωμαίοις ἐξεστὶ, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον 
ὑπισχοῦντα ἐβεβαιώσειν οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι δημοσίως πίστει.

89 III, 24:
τοῦ Ἐλληνα ἄρωμος, Καστίλιας, Ταρσηῖος, μὴ λήγεσθαι ἐπε- 
κεινα Ῥωμαίοις μὴ δὲ ἐμπορεύεσθαι μηδὲ πόλιν κτίσειν ...ἐν 
Σαρδονία καὶ Λιβύη ηδοεῖς Ῥωμαίοις μὴ ἐμπορεύεσθω μηδὲ πόλιν 
κτίσετω ... καὶ μὴ ἔως τοῦ Εφοδία λαβεῖν η πλοῖον ἐπι- 
σκευάσας. ἦν δὲ χειμώνα κατενέχη, ἐν δὲ κατενέχη ημέρας ἀποτρέχετω.
ἐν Σικελία, ὡς Καρχηδόνιοι ἐπάρχουσι, καὶ ἐν Καρχηδόνι πάντα καὶ ποιεῖται καὶ πωλεῖται ὅσα καὶ τὸ πολιτή εξέστιν.

90 IV, 196:
λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τάδε Καρχηδόνιοι. εἶναι τῇς Λιβύης χώραν τε καὶ ἄνθρωπος ἐξ Ἡρακλεών στηλῶν κατοικημένους εἰς τοὺς ἐπεδών ἀπίστως καὶ ἔξελωσεν τὰ φορτία, θέντες ἄντα ἐπεζησον παρὰ τὴν κυματώγην, ἐσβάντες ἐς τὰ πλοῦτα τῷ κατανόντες τοῦ ἡμῶν ἐνιαύτης ἐπὶ τὴν ἠθαλοσάν καὶ ἐπειτα ἄντι τῶν φορτίων χρυσῶν ἑθελον καὶ ἔξαπετε ἐν πρὸς ὧν ἔργετον. τοὺς δὲ Καρχηδόνιον ἐκβάντας σκέφθησαν, καὶ ἑκάτερος ἐκ βίους ὁ χρυσὸς τῶν φορτίων, ἀνελομένου ἀπαλλάσσονται, καὶ ἑκὸν ἀξίον ἐξ ὧν ἑξάκτως ἐξ ὧν ἐπειτα, ἐξ αὐτῶν ὑπέστην πρὸς τὴν ἀπομακρύνεται. οἱ δὲ προσελθόντες ἄλλον πρὸς ὧν θηκαν χρυσὸν, ἐς οὗ ἅ ἐλθον. αὐτοὶ δὲ ὑπέστησαν, οὕτω γὰρ ἄντος τοῖς χρυσοῖς ἀπετέθη πρὸς ἃν σὴν ἀπομακρύνεται τῇ βίους τῶν φορτίων, οὕτω ἐκείνους τῶν φορτίων ἀπετέθη πρὸτερον ἡ αὐτοὶ τῷ χρυσῷ λάβωσιν.

92 v. 1:
ὅτι ἀποροντες 'Ρωμαίοι τε καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι χρημάτων, ... Καρχηδόνιοι δ' ἐς Πτολεμαίου ἐπεσεβιοντο, τὸν Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Δάνου, βασιλέα Αιγύπτου, δυσχίλια πάλαντα κιηρώμενοι. τῷ δ' ἦν ἐς τῇ 'Ρωμαίους καὶ Καρχηδόνιους φιλία, ...

93 I, 72; cf. Ch. II, nota 16.

96 III, 2, 14:
τοῦ δὲ Φολίνικας ... καὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας καὶ τῆς Λιβύης τὴν ἀρίστην οὕτω κατεσχον πρὸ τῆς Ηλλάδος τῆς ὧν ομήρου καὶ διετελεσαν χώροι τῶν τοιούτων ὄντες, μέχρις οὗ 'Ρωμαίοι κατέλυσαν αὐτῶν τὴν ἡγεμονίαν.

97 VI, 2:
δοκοῦσι δὲ μοι καὶ Φολίνικες, ἕς Ἰβηρίαν ἐκ πολλοῦ θαμίνα ἢ πρὸ ἐμπορία διαπλέοντες, οἴκησαί τίνα τῆς Ἰβηρίας, ...

98 VI, 3:
τὴν δὲ γῆν τῆδε εὕδαιμονα οὕτων καὶ μεγάλῳν ἁγάθων γέμουσαν Καρχηδόνιοι πρὸ 'Ρωμαίων ἡράκλει πολυτραγμονεῖν, καὶ μέρος αὐτῆς τὸ μὲν εἰχον ἡδη, τὸ δ' ἐπόρθουν, μέχρι 'Ρωμαίνσι σφάς εὐβαλόντες, ο μὲν εἰχον οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τῆς Ἰβηρίας, ...

99 III, 2, 13:
οὕτω γὰρ Φολίνικειν οὕτως ἐγένοντο σφόδρα ὑποχείριοι, ὡστε
τὰς πλείους τῶν ἐν τῇ Τουρδτανίᾳ πόλεων καὶ τῶν πλησίους τόπων ὑπὲρ ἔκεινων νῦν οἰκεῖσθαι.

100 III. 5, 5:  
περὶ δὲ τῆς κτίσεως τῶν Γαδείρων ... μεμνημέναι Γαδείτανοι  
χρησιμοῦ τινος, ὅν γενέσθαι φασὶ Τυρσίως κελεύοντα ἐπὶ τὰς Ἡρα-  
kλέους στήλας ἀποικίαν πέμψατε ... τῷ δὲ τρίτῳ στόλῳ τοὺς ἀφι-  
kλέοντος Γαδείρα κτίσατε καὶ ἵδρυσατε τὸ ἱερὸν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἔφοις  
τῆς νῆσου τὴν δὲ πόλιν ἐπὶ τοῖς ἐσπερίοις.

101 VI, 5:  
παυμένου δὲ τοῦ πολέμου, ... μόνος ὑπὸ ἐπὶ στρατῷ, καὶ τὸν  
κηδεστὴν Ἀσδρωβαῖν ἔχων οἱ συνόντα, διήλθεν ἐπὶ Γαδείρα, καὶ  
τὸν πορθμὸν ὕπερ Ἰβηρίαν περάσας ἐλεηκάτε τὰ Ἰβήρων οὐδὲν ἀδι-  
κοῦντων, ἀφορμὴν ...

102 III. 2, 4:  
αὐτῇ δὴ ἡ Τουρδτανία θαυμαστῶς ἐδυναθεῖ· παμφόρον δ’ οὐδῆς  
αὐτῆς, ὦσαύτως δὲ καὶ πολυφόρου, διπλασιάζεται τὰ ἐδυναθῆματα  
tαῦτα τῷ ἐκχομίσμῳ ...

103 Ibid. 6:  
ἐξάγεται δ’ ἐκ τῆς Τουρδτανίας σιτὸς τε καὶ οἶνος πολὺς καὶ  
ἐλαίον οὐ πολὺ μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ κάλλιστον· καὶ κηρὸς δὲ καὶ μέλι  
καὶ πίνακα ἐξάγεται καὶ κόκκος πολλή καὶ μέλιτος οὐ χεῖρων τῆς  
Σινώπης γῆς τὰ τε ναυπήγματα συνιστάσιν αὐτοῖς ἐξ ἐπιχώρων  
ὑλῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ὅρκυκτον παρ’ αὐτοῖς εἰσὶ ..., οὐκ ἄλλην δὲ οὐδὲ  
ἐκ τῶν ὅψων ταρτεία ... πολλῇ δὲ καὶ ἐσθῆς ἄρδερον ἵρχετο,  
γνὺ δὲ ἐρέα μᾶλλον τῶν κοραζῶν, ... ὑπέρβολῃ δὲ καὶ τῶν λεπτῶν  
δασμάτων, ἀπερ οἱ Σαλακιῆται κατασκευάζουσιν. ἀφθονος δὲ καὶ  
βοσκημάτων ἀφθονία παντολῶν καὶ κυνηγεσίων.

104 Ibid. 8:  
τοσοῦτος δὲ τῆς προειρήμενης χώρας ἀγαθοῖς κεχορηγημένης,  
οὐχ ἤκιστα, ἀλλὰ καὶ μάλιστα ἀπὸδεξαίται ἀν τις καὶ ἑαυτῷ ἔργα –  
τοι περὶ τὰς μετάλλευσις εὐφυεῖς ... οὔτε γὰρ χρυσὸς, οὔτ’ ἄργυρος,  
οὔτ’ ὃς ἀλκοος, οὔτ’ σίδηρος οὐδὲ κακὸς τῆς γῆς οὔτε τοσοῦτος οὐθ’  
οὕτως ἀγάθος ἐξήτασται γεννωμένος μέχρι νῦν.

105 Ibid.:  
ὁ δὲ χρυσὸς οὐ μεταλλεύεται μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ σύρεται ...  
καὶ πλεῖω τῶν χρυσωρυγείων ἐστὶ νῦν τὰ χρυσοπλάσια προσαγορευόμενα:  ... ἐν δὲ τοῖς ψήματι τοῦ χρυσίου φασὶν εὑρίσκεσθαι ποτε  
καὶ ἡμιλιτριαίας βύλους, ...
106 V,35:
αὕτη γὰρ ἡ χώρα σχεδὸν τι πλείστον καὶ κάλλιστον ἔχει μεταλλευόμενον ἄργυρον καὶ πολλὰς τοῖς έργαζόμενοις παρέχεται προσόδους.

107 III,2,14:
τοῦ δ' Ἰβηρικοῦ πλούτου καὶ ταῦτα μαρτύρια. Καρχηδόνιοι μετὰ τοῦ Βάρκα στρατεύσαντες κατελαβον, ὥς φασίν οἱ συγγραφεῖς, φάτναις ἄργυραῖς καὶ πῖθοις χρωμένους τοὺς ἐν τῇ Τουρόπτανίᾳ.

108 III,2,10:
Πολύβιος δὲ, τῶν περὶ Καρχηδόνα Νέαν ἄργυρεῖς μνησθεῖς, μέγιστα μὲν εἶναι φησί, διέχειν δὲ τῆς πόλεως ὅσον εἶχοσι σταδίους, περιειληφότα κύκλων τετρακοσίων σταδίων, ὅπου τέταρτα μυρίαδας ἄνθρωπίων μένειν τῶν ἐργαζόμενων, ἀναφέροντας τότε τῷ δήμῳ τῶν Ῥωμαίων καθ' ἐκάστην ἡμέραν δισμυρίας καὶ πεντακις-χιλίας δραχμάς.

109 V,38:
τῶν μεταλλουργείων οὐδὲν πρόσφατον ἔχει τῶν ἀρχηγίων πάντα, ὅταν τῆς Καρχηδόνος φιλαργυρίας ἀνεσθεῖ καὶ οἱ καίροι καὶ τῆς Ἰβηρίας ἐπεκράτουν, ἐκ τούτων γὰρ ἔσοχον τὴν ἐπὶ πλέον αὐξήσειν, μισθούμενοι τοὺς κρατιστοὺς στρατιώτας καὶ διὰ τούτων πολλοὺς καὶ μεγάλους πολέμους διαπολεμήσαντες. καθόλου γὰρ ἐκ Καρχηδόνοι διεπολεμόνοι οὕτω πολιτικοῖς στρατιώταις οὕτω τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν συμμάχων ἀνθρώποις σπάνες, ἀλλὰ καὶ Ῥωμαίους καὶ Σικελιωτάς καὶ τοὺς κατὰ τὴν ἱππίαν οἰκονόμας εἰς τοὺς μεγάλους ἄγιον κινδύνους καταπλουτομαχοῦντες ἀπαντάς διὰ τὴν ἐκ τῶν μεταλλών γινομένην εὐθύραν.

110 Χ,8:
ἀκοῦσιν δὲ πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι λιμένας ἔχει στόλῳ καὶ ναυτικαῖς συνάμεσι μόνη σχεδὸν τῶν κατὰ τὴν Ἰβηρίαν, ἕμα δὲ καὶ διότι πρὸς τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς ἱππίας πλοῦν καὶ πελάγιον δόραμα λίαν εὐφορίας κεῖται τοῖς Καρχηδόνοις, μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα διότι καὶ τῶν χρημάτων πλῆθος καὶ τὰς ἀποθεμαῖς τῶν στρατοπέδων ἀπάσιας ἐν ταύτῃ τῇ πόλει συνέβαινε τοῖς Καρχηδόνοις ὑπάρχειν, ἐτι deceived τοὺς ὀμήρους τοὺς ἐξ ὅλης τῆς Ἰβηρίας, ὃτι μάχαιροι μὲν ἄνδρες εἶχαν ἐκεῖ χιλίους οἱ τὴν ἀκραν θρούντες . . . τὸ δ' ἀλλο πλῆθος ὅτι πολὺ μὲν εἶνε διαμερίζόμενος ἐν αὐτῷ, πὰν δὲ δημιουργικὸ καὶ βάναυσον καὶ καλάττουργον . . .

111 VI,23:
τότε δ' εἰρηνικῶν ὅμοι καὶ πολεμικῶν ταμείων παραλαβῶν, οπλα τε πολλὰ ἐν αὐτῷ καὶ βέλη καὶ μηχανήματα καὶ νεωσολχοὺς καὶ νάυκα μαχράς τρεῖς καὶ τριάκοντα, καὶ σίτον καὶ ἀγοράν
ποικίλην, καὶ ἐλέφαντα καὶ χρυσὸν καὶ ἄργυρον, τὸν μὲν ἐν σκέφτεσθαι πεποιημένον, τὸν δὲ ἐπίθεμον, τὸν δὲ ἀδημάντον, ὀμηρά τε Ἱβῆρων καὶ ἀγχμάλωτα, καὶ ὅσα Ῥωμαίων αὐτῶν προεῖληπτο...

112 V,2,7:
ἐστὶ δὲ αὐτὴς τὸ πολὺ μέρος τραχῶ,..., πολὺ δὲ καὶ χώραν ἔχον εὐδαίμονα τοῖς πάσι, σίτῳ δὲ καὶ διαφέροντως.

113 Ἰβιδ.:
διστερον δὲ Φολγίκες ἐπεκράτησαν οἱ ἐκ Καρχηδόνος, καὶ μετὰ τούτων Ῥωμαίοις ἐπολέμουν.

114 V,15:
Καρχηδόνιοι τε γὰρ ἐπὶ πλέον ἰσχύσαντες καὶ τὴς νῆσος κρατησάντες οὐκ ἤδυνήθησαν τοὺς προκατασχόντας τὴν νῆσον καταδουλώσασθαι...

115 Ἰβιδ.:
τῶν δὲ Καρχηδονίων πολλάκις ἀξιολόγοις δυνάμεις στρατευσάντων ἐπ’ αὐτούς, διὰ τὰς δυσχωρίας καὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς καταγείλοις δυστραπέλειαι διέμειναν ἀδούλωτοι.

116 III,27:
ἐκχωρεῖν Καρχηδονίους Σαρδόνος καὶ προσεζενεγχεῖν ἄλλα χίλια καὶ διακόσια τάλαντα...

117 I,79:
ἡ μὲν οὖν Σαρδὼ τούτων τὸν τρόπον ἀπηλλοτριώθη Καρχηδονίων, νῆσος καὶ τῷ μεγέθει καὶ τῇ πολυάνθρωπῳ καὶ τοῖς γεννήμασι διαφέρουσα.

118 I,166:
καὶ ἤγον, γὰρ δὴ καὶ ἔφερον τοὺς περιοίκους ἀπαντας, στρατεύονται ἐν ἐπ’ αὐτούς κοινῷ λόγῳ χρησάμενοι Τυρσηνοὶ καὶ Καρχηδόνιοι, νησίζ ἐκάτεροι ἐξήκοντα.

119 V,17:
ἀπὸ τοῦ βάλλειν ταῖσις σφενδόναις λίθους μεγάλους κάλλιστα τῶν ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων,... κατὰ τὰς γεγενημένας πάλαι ποτὲ στρατευτές παρὰ Καρχηδονίους...
120 *Ibid.*:

η δ' ἐλάττων κέκλιται μὲν πρὸς τὴν ἑω, τρέφει δὲ κτήνη πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ, μάλιστα ὁ ἡμιόνοις, μεγάλους μὲν τοῖς ἀναστήμασιν, ὑπεραγοντᾶς δὲ ταῖς ρώμαις. ἀμφοτέρα δ' αἱ νήσοι χώραν ἔχουσιν ἀγαθὴν καρποφόρον καὶ πλῆθος τῶν κατοικοῦντων ὑπὲρ τοὺς τρισμύριους, ...

121 V, 16:

κατὰ δὲ τὴν ἄρετήν οὖσα μετρία τὴν μὲν ἀμπελόφυτον χώραν ὀλυγήν ἔχει, τὰς δ' ἐλαίας ἐμπεφυτευμένας ἐν τοῖς κοτύγως. τῶν δὲ φυομένων ἐν αὐτῇ καλλιστευθέντων φασὶ τὴν μαλακότητα τῶν ἐρων. διεισδημένη δὲ πεδίων ἄξιολογοῖς καὶ γεωλόφοις πόλιν ἔχει τὴν ὄνομαζομένην Ἐρεσον, ἀποικικὸν Καρχηδονίων. ἔχει δὲ καὶ λιμένας ἄξιολογοὺς καὶ τειχῶν κατασκευὰς ἐπιμελεῖς καὶ οἷον πλῆθος εὐκατασχευμένων. κατοικοῦσι δ' αὐτὴν βάρβαροι παντοδαποὶ, πλείοτοι δὲ Φοινίκες.

122 V, 12:

τῆς γὰρ Σικελίας ἐκ τοῦ κατά μεσημβρίαν μέρους νῆσοι τρεῖς πρόκεινται πελάγιαι, καὶ τούτων ἐκάστη πόλιν ἔχει καὶ λιμένας δυναμένους τοῖς χειμαζομένοις σκάφοις παρέχεσθαι τὴν ἀσφάλειαν. καὶ πρώτη μὲν ἐστὶν ἡ προσαγορευμένη Μελίτη, ... καὶ λιμένας μὲν ἔχει κολλούς καὶ οἰκοτροφίας ταῖς εὔχρησταις, τῶν δὲ κατοικοῦντας ταῖς ὁμίσθαις εὐδαιμονίας. ... ἐστι δ' ἡ νῆσος αὕτη Φοινίκων ἀποίκως, οἱ ταῖς ἐμπορίας οἰκοδομοῦντες μέχρι τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑκέανον καταφυγῆν εἶχον ταύτην, εὐλήμενον οὖσαν καὶ κειμένην πελαγίαν. ...

123 V, 12:

μετὰ δὲ ταύτην τὴν νῆσον ἔστιν ἑτέρα τὴν μὲν προσηγορίαν ἐχουσά Γαθλοὺς, πελαγία δὲ καὶ λιμέςιν εὐχαίροις κεκοσμημένη, Φοινίκων ἀποίκως.

124 *Ibid.*:

ἐξῆς δ' ἔστι Κέρκινα, πρὸς τὴν Λιβύην νενευκυῖα, πόλιν ἔχουσα σύμμετρον καὶ λιμένας εὐχρηστοτάτους, ὁμοῦ καὶ ταῖς ἐμπόροις ὅσιὰς ναυσὶν εὐθετοῦντας.

125 XVII, 1, 19:

... Καρχηδονίωθες δὲ καταποντοῦν, εὶ τις τῶν ἔξων εἰς Σαρδῶν παραπλεῦσειν ἡ ἐπὶ Μηλας.

126 V, 2:

... ἐπεὶ καὶ κρατίστη τῶν νῆσῶν ἔστι ...
124

127 VI, 2, 7:
τὴν δὲ τῆς χώρας ἀρετὴν θρυλουμένην ὑπὸ πάντων, οὐδὲν χείρω
τῆς Ἰταλίας ἀποφαινομένων, τί δὲ λέγειν; σίτῳ δὲ καὶ μέλιτι
καὶ κρόκῳ καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ καὶ ἀμέλεια χαὶ ἄμελεια τις φαίη.

129 XIII, 114:
τὴν εἰρήνην ἐπὶ τοῖς διὸς ἔθεντο. Καρχηδονίων εἶναι μὲν τῶν ἐξ
ἀρχῆς ἀπολυμένων ἄλλοις, καὶ Σικανοῦς, Σελήνους τε καὶ Αχρα-
γάντινους, ἔτι δὲ Ἰμεράτις πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Γελώνως καὶ Καμα-
ριναῖος οἰκείως μὲν ἐν ἀπεικόστοις ταῖς πόλεσι, φόρον δὲ τελεῖν
τοῖς Καρχηδονίοις.

131 v, 20:
... ἐν ὑπὸ τὰ άλλα κατεσκεύασαν οἰκείως τοῖς τόποις καὶ ναὸν
Ἡρακλεώς πολυτελῆ, καὶ θυσίας κατέδειξαν μεγαλοπρεπέις τοῖς
τῶν Φοινίκων ἔθεσι διοικομένας.

132 x, 10:
... ἐφ' οὖ καθίσσοται νεὼς 'Ἀσκληπιόν. ... ὁ δὲ τρίτος προσ-
ἀγορεύεται Κρόνου.

133 XIV, 77:
τῆς γὰρ συμφορᾶς διακρησθείσης κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην οἱ σύμμαχοι,
καὶ παλαι μὲν μισοῦντες τὸ βάρος τῆς τῶν Καρχηδὸνων ἡγεμονίας,
τότε δὲ διὰ τὴν τῶν στρατιωτῶν ἐν Συρακοσσίαις προδοσίαν πολὺ
μᾶλλον ἐξέκασαν τὸ κατ' αὐτῶν μίσος.

134 XV, 24:
μετὰ δὲ τάττα λοιμικῆς νόσου τοῖς κατοικοῦσι τὴν Καρχηδόνα
γενομένης, καὶ τῆς νόσου πολλῆς ἔπιτασσιν ἐχθρῶν, πολλοὶ τῶν
Καρχηδόνων διεφθάρμασαν, καὶ τὴν ἡγεμονίαν ἐκκενδύνευσαν ἀπέβαλεῖν
οἱ τε γὰρ Λιβύες καταφρονηθέντες αὐτῶν, ἀπέστησαν οἱ δὲ τὴν
Σαρδῶνα κατασκευάσας, γομάζοντες ἔχειν καιρὸν κατὰ τῶν Καρχηδο-
νῶν, ἀπέστησαν ἀπ' αὐτῶν, καὶ συμφρονήσοντες ἀπέθεντο τοῖς
Καρχηδόνιοις.

135 xx, 3:
ἡλίκει τοὺς δὲ κατὰ τὴν Λιβύην συμμάχους, βαρυμέμβρες τοὺς
προστάγμασι ἐκ πολλῶν χρόνων, λήψεθαι καιρὸν τῆς ἀποστάσεως.

136 XXVI, fr.:
ὅτι Καρχηδόνιοι καταλύσαντες τὸν Λιβυκὸν πόλεμον, τὸ τῶν
Μετατάνων Νομάδων ἔθνος σὺν γυναιξὶ καὶ τέχνοις τιμορησάμενοι,
πάντας τοὺς συλληφέρτας ἀνεσταύρωσαν, διόπερ οἱ τούτοις ἀπόφθονοι
II. References to Latin and English Authors

1 I,420 ff.:
Miratur molem Aeneas, magalia quondam,  
miratur portas strepitumque et strata viarum.  
Instant ardentes Tyrii, pars ducere muros,  
molirique arcem et manibus subvolvere saxa,  
pars optare locum tecto et concludere sulco.  
Hic portus alli effodiunt; hic alta theatris  
fundamenta locant alli, immanisque columnas  
rupibus excidunt, scaenis decora alta futuris.  
441:
Lucus in urbe fuit media, laetissimus umbra.  
446:
Hic templum Iunoni ingens Sidonia Dido  
condebat, donis opulentum et numine divae,  
aerea cui gradibus surgebant limina, nexaeque  
aere trabes, foribus cardo stripebat aenis.  
453:
Namque sub ingenti lustrat dum singula templo  
reginam opperiens, dum, quae fortuna sit urbi,  
artificumque manus inter se operumque laborem  
miratur, videt Iliacas ex ordine pugnas,  
bellaque iam fama totum volgata per orbem...

5 Cf. Smith, 434.

10 Cf. T. H. Bindley in the introduction to his edition of  
Tertullian's Apologeticus Adversus Gentes pro Christianis, Ox-  
ford, Clarendon Press, 1889, xi: "During the period of its  
independence Carthage had possessed on the summit of Byrsa a  
temple dedicated to Asclepius; but the Roman colony when re-  
building the town and acropolis preferred to replace the popular  
cult of this deity by that of the ancient ... goddess Tanit..."
Ceterum adhuc aedificia Numidarum agrestium, quae mapalia illi vocant, oblonga incurbis lateribus tecta quasi navium carinae sunt.

Epodes, XII, 21.

Hic Asiae; in Meninge, Africae, et Gaetulo littore oceani...

Odes, II, 16, 35.


Ibid., XXXVII, 25.

Q. quoque Ennius Carthaginiensium "tunicatam juventutem" non videtur sine probro dixisse.

Ll. 975-6:
Sed quae illaec avis est, quae huc cum tunicis advenit? Num-nam in balneis circumductust pallio?

Tu qui zonam non habes,...

Quia incedunt cum anulatis auribus.

XXII, 6.

XXVIII, 45:
Triginta navium carinae, viginti quinqueremes, decem quadri-remes, cum essent positae, ipse ita institit operi, ut die quadragesimo quinto, quam ex sylvis detracta materia erat, naves instructae armataeque in aquam deductae sint.
78 XXIX,26: Nam, praeter quadraginta longas naves, quadringentis ferme onerariis exercitum transvexit.

79 XXIX,27: Prosperam navigationem sine terrore ac tumultu fuisse, permultis Graecis Latinisque auctoribus credidi.

80 XXX,10: Carthaginienses, qui, si maturassent, omnia permixta turba trepidantium primo impetu oppressissent, percusli terræstribus cladibus, atque inde ne in mari quidem, ubi ipsi plus poterant, satis fidentes, die segni navigatione assumpto, sub occasum solis in portum (Rusucurona Afri vocant) classe appulere.

81 Ibid.


94 XXXIV,62: Emporia vocant eam regionem. Ora est minoris Syrtis et agri uberis; una civitas eius Leptis; ea singula in dies talenta vectigal Carthaginiensibus dedit.

95 XXXIII,47: Hannibal postquam, vectigalia quanta terrestria maritimaque essent,...

128 XVIII,7.

130 Cf. Smith, 36.

CHAPTER IV
MORAL AND INTELLECTUAL CULTURE

I. Introduction

When Bosworth Smith says that "the most important factor in the history of a people,—especially if it be a Semetic people—is its religion,"¹ he states a truth which Polybius implicitly accepted when, comparing Rome and Carthage, he wrote:² "But the quality in which the Roman commonwealth is most distinctly superior is, in my opinion, the nature of their religious convictions." Religion is at once the characteristic of a people, the gauge of their culture, and, often, the ultimate explanation of their differences with other people. Religion determines their outlook and eventually their action; it follows the rise and fall of government and of other elements of culture, being found at its purest and best when they have reached their peak; and the answer it gives to the fundamental questions of life will account for otherwise inexplicable enmities with other nations, since these questions form the ultimate basis of agreement or dissension among men. Knowing the religion of Carthage, then, we shall hold the key to her culture, her development, and her relations with the other nations of the ancient world.

Fortunately, the sources provide sufficient information to enable us to trace in broad outline the development of this important phase of Carthaginian culture, although the facts thin
out as we approach the time of the Punic Wars. It will be useful, however, to watch the development of moral culture through the early history of Carthage, inasmuch as this will manifest her moral background, determine her moral condition at the period of the wars with Rome.

II. The Gods of Carthage

The gods of Carthage were the gods of their Phoenician ancestors, and the Carthaginians through most of their history maintained close relations with Tyre in matters of religion. It is a bewildering task, however, to attempt to determine the exact hierarchy of the divinities in the original Phoenician system. The matter is further complicated by the fact that Greek and Roman writers, in speaking of the Carthaginian deities, apply to them the names of corresponding gods and goddesses in their own system rather than the proper Phoenician titles. Quintus Curtius Rufus, for example, refers to Moloch under the title of Saturn, while Plutarch calls him Cronos. We will be content, then, to mention the most important divinities worshipped at Carthage, giving to each that emphasis which the sources themselves seem to justify, without attempting to disentangle the complex system of which they were a part.

The chief deity worshipped at Carthage, or at least the one most closely associated with Carthaginian religion in the minds of the ancients, was Baal or Moloch, called by the Romans Saturn and by the Greeks Cronos. He was identified with the sun and with
fire, as his worship will indicate, and must have been regarded as a malignant power by the Carthaginians themselves, for he was propitiated by the cruel rites of which Justinus speaks in beginning his account of the Carthaginians: 6

Cum inter caetera mala etiam peste laborarent, cruenta sacrorum religione, et scelere pro remedio usi sunt; quippe homines ut victimas immolabant; et impuberes (quae aetas etiam hostium misericordiam provocat) aris admovebant, pacem deorum sanguine eorum exposcentes, pro quorum vita dii rogari maxime solent.

This element above all others impressed the Romans and Greeks and, to their minds, characterized Carthaginian religion, perhaps even Carthage herself, as is manifest in frequent references like that of Dionysius of Halicarnasus: 7 "It is said also that the ancients sacrificed human victims to Saturn, as was done at Carthage while that city stood." It deserves, therefore, a separate section of its own. Scholars agree that Baal-Moloch had a more noble aspect as god of the life-giving sun, yet whenever he appears in the history of Carthage it is to preside over some national excitement,—a grave crisis or wild exaltation—and to be propitiated with sacrifices of the kind mentioned above.

Baal-Moloch, the sun god, had his feminine counterpart in the goddess of the moon,—"the Phoenicians' goddess; Astarte the people of Sidon call her." 8 She was the "heavenly Aphrodite" to whom Herodotus refers, in the manner of the Greeks, when he speaks of the temple founded in her honor by the Phoenicians on Cythera: 9 "And the temple on Cythera was founded by Phoenicians
from the same land of Syria." She was Venus Caelestis, or simply Caelestis, to Latin writers like St. Augustine, who asks:10

"What had now become of Caelestis, whose empire was once so great in Carthage?" She, too, had a beneficent aspect, being goddess of the night and the giver of rain,—"virgo Caelestis, pluviarum pollicitatrix," as Tertullian calls her;11 yet it was rather under the aspect of the "heavenly Aphrodite", goddess of love, that she was worshipped, and her cult, at Carthage, as in other parts of the Phoenician empire, consecrated immorality. Identified with her in later times, at least as a subordinate goddess, was Dido or Elissa, the traditional foundress of Carthage, of whose worship Justinus writes:12 "Quam diu Carthago invicta fuit, pro dea culta est."

The Byrsa at Carthage, and the highest hill of New Carthage, were topped with temples dedicated to Aesculapius (Asclepius), as has been noted. From this it appears that he was recognized as the particular patron of Carthage and her colonies. He was not known to the Carthaginians, of course, as Asclepius, which was a Greek identification, but as Eshmun; he is said to have been the most famous of a family of deities called the Cabeiri, the sons of the Phoenician god Pataicus (identified with the Greek Hephaestus and Egyptian Ptah) who were "the makers of the world, the founders of civilization, and the inventors of ships and medicine." 13 They were represented as dwarfs. Pataicus, the father, was cultivated at old and New Carthage too; his
image was used as a figurehead for ships; Herodotus mentions among other details 14 that "the image of Hephaestus [at Memphis] is most like to the Phoenician Pataici, which the Phoenicians carry on the prows of their triremes ... it is in the likeness of a dwarf." Then speaking of the images of the Cabeiri, he says:15 "These also are like the images of Hephaestus, and are said to be his sons." That Pataicus was cultivated at New Carthage may be inferred from the fact that one of the city's hills was dedicated to him, along with one to Cronos (Moloch) and - characteristic note! - another to the discoverer of the nearby silver mines. Polybius remarks:16

The three other smaller eminences are to the north of the city, the most easterly being called the hill of Hephaestus, the next one the hill of Aletes, who is said to have received divine honors for his discovery of the silver mines, while the third is known as the hill of Cronos.

Melcarth, or Baal Tsur, the "Baal of Tyre", was rendered a special homage by the Carthaginians as the patron of the parent city, Tyre, and the protecting genius of the Phoenician colonies. He is the "Phoenician Heracles" to the Greeks, and his temple at Tyre has been briefly described by Herodotus:17 "I took ship to Tyre in Phoenice, where I heard that there was a very holy temple of Heracles. There I saw it, richly equipped with many other offerings, besides that in it were two pillars, one of refined gold, one of emerald, a great pillar that shone in the night time."

Later Herodotus visited another temple of the same god at
Thasos: "Then I went to Thasos, too, where I found a temple of Heracles, built by the Phoenicians."

Finally, at the other end of the Mediterranean, on the island of Gades, the Phoenicians, as Diodorus says, "built many works appropriate to the nature of the region, and among them a costly temple of Heracles, and they instituted magnificent sacrifices which were conducted after the manner of the Phoenicians."

Silius Italicus describes the custom and priestly ritual connected with this shrine:

Further, those who are permitted and privileged to have access to the inner shrine forbid the approach of women, and are careful to keep bristly seine away from the threshold. The dress worn before the altars is the same for all; linen covers their limbs, and their foreheads are adorned with a head band of Pelusian flax. It is their custom to offer incense with robes ungirt; and, following their fathers' rule, they adorn the garment of sacrifice with a broad stripe. Their feet are bare and their heads shaven, and their bed admits no partner; the fires on the hearth stones keep the altars alight perpetually. But no statues or familiar images of the gods filled the place with solemnity and sacred awe.

The absence of any image of the god, and purity of ritual seems characteristic of the cult of Melcarth. There is only one bit of evidence to the contrary; that is the reference of Pliny to "Hercules, to whom the Phoenicians each year sacrificed human victims." The cult of Melcarth also kept Carthage in close relationship with Tyre, for it was customary to send a tenth of the spoils taken annually to his temple in the parent city. The earliest direct reference to religious practice in the history of Carthage is the mention of this custom by Justinus when he speaks of Cartolo's meeting with his father, the
general Malchus (550 B.C.) on his return from Tyre, "whither he had been sent by the Carthaginians bearing the tithe of Heracles from the spoils taken by his father in Sicily."

The Sicilian expeditions of 410-397 BC brought Greek gods to Carthage. The adoption was occasioned by the utter disregard for these very gods, manifested by the Carthaginian generals in desecrating and plundering the Sicilian temples. The Greeks were astounded by the insensibility of the Carthaginians in pillaging unscrupulously those places which were, as a rule, respected even by an enemy. Diodorus comments on their action after the capture of Silenus thus: 23 "These barbarians surpass all others in their savagery; where others will spare those who flee to the sanctuaries, out of respect for the gods, the Carthaginians, unlike their enemies, plunder the very temples themselves."

Again, after the fall of Himera, Diodorus relates 24 that the Carthaginians "stripped the private homes of everything of value, while Hannibal despoiled the temples and burnt them." Other passages, too, have already been quoted from the same author in connection with the description of Carthage, telling of the exspoliation of the Sicilian temples and the transfer of their treasures to Africa in the expeditions of 410 and 406 BC. Finally, during the siege of Syracuse in 397, just before the beginning of the plague which brought the third expedition to disaster, Hamilco "seized the suburb of Achradina and plundered the shrines of Demeter and Persephone," as Diodorus recounts. 25
Shortly afterward he abandoned his troops and fled to Carthage in defeat; this desertion, as we have seen, aroused the Libyans to revolt, and Carthage herself was threatened with ruin. Dio­dorus relates the reaction that followed within the city:

The gods were now obviously hostile to the Carthaginians, so that at first they were terror stricken and begged the deity to cease being angry; but soon religious panic seized the entire city, as each person anticipated in imagination its subjugation. They passed a decree therefore, resolving to propitiate by every possible means the gods whom they had insulted, and although they had never worshipped Persephone or Demeter before, now they appointed the most prominent citizens as priests of their cult. Then, after setting up statues of the goddesses with great solemnity, they instituted sacrifices according to the customs of the Greeks. Selecting the most cultivated Greeks in their midst, they assigned them to the permanent service of the goddesses.

Thus, about 396 BC, the patron goddesses of Sicily came to be established at Carthage. The revolt that threatened the city soon subsided and this circumstance, probably attributed to the influence of the new deities, must have given an even greater impetus to their cult. Moreover, it has been suggested that the golden statue of Apollo, housed in its elaborate shrine near the Carthaginian forum, was brought from Sicily during these expeditions; whether Apollo was adopted as a foreign god and worshipped at Carthage, and Tyre, according to Greek ritual, or whether he was simply identified with one of the aspects of the sun god, Baal, is not certain. At any rate, there is no doubt that the Greek gods now received honors at Carthage that they had never been paid before.

Did their cult become so popular as to seriously rival that
of the traditional gods, - Baal-Moloch, Astarte, Melcarth? There is no positive evidence for such a change. Yet, from the negative aspect, we know that the strict worship of Melcarth and Moloch had to be renewed at the end of the century when the Carthaginians were threatened by Agathocles and turned to these gods for protection. It is evident, however, that their cult had certainly never been abandoned. Diodorus records the "reform" of Melcarth worship at Carthage when Agathocles defeated her army and threatened her existence about 309 BC:27

The Carthaginians, therefore, believed that this calamity had been inflicted upon them by the gods, and adopted every means of divine supplication. They thought that Heracles, the patron of their colonies, was particularly angry with them, and sent a great sum of money and a considerable number of very valuable votive offerings to Tyre. Since they were originally a Tyrian colony they had been accustomed in former times to send a tithe of their gains there to the god; later however, when they amassed great wealth, and their revenues increased tremendously, they sent very little, losing respect for the god. Moved to repentance by this calamity, therefore, they became mindful once more of all the gods of Tyre.

From the text it is evident then that the homage paid to Melcarth had fallen into neglect and had to be revived at this time. We shall see later that the same was true of the cult of Moloch. There is some basis, therefore, for suggesting that the Greek gods imported from Sicily became the popular objects of Carthaginian worship at least during the latter half of the fourth century.

With the invasion of Agathocles and the return to Moloch and Melcarth, however, Carthaginian religion settled back into its original mold, and no evidence of further change is noted. We
may conclude then, that the religion of Carthage for the half
century before, and all through the Punic Wars, was characteris-
tically Phoenician, centered about the Moloch-Melcarth-Astarte
triad. There is evidence to support this conclusion, though it
is scattered and unsatisfactory.

Melcarth continued to receive his customary homage from the
Carthaginians. Silius Italicus depicts Hannibal as worshipping
him at Gades: 28 "Thereafter he worshipped at the altars of the
god who bears the club, and loaded them with offerings lately
snatched by the conqueror from the fire and smole of the citadel
of Saguntum." And Polybius mentions the fact that one of the
Carthaginian ships used to convey the customary tribute to Mel-
carth at Tyre put in at the mouth of the Tiber about 264BC and
was hired to take Demetrius back to Syria: 29 "Finding a Carthag-
inian ship that had carried sacred offerings anchored at the
mouth of the Tiber, he hired it. Such ships were specially se-
lected at Carthage for the conveyance of the traditional offering
of first fruits to their gods that the Carthaginians send to
Tyre." Thus the relation to Tyre and the offerings to Melcarth
must have continued up to the destruction of the city.

Silius represents Hannibal as taking his famed oath against
the Romans at the altar of Dido, who, as we have said, was prob-
ably identified with Astarte (Tanit) and worshipped in one of the
temples on the Byrsa. Besides testifying to the continued vener-
ation of this goddess at the time of the Punic wars, this passage
is a typical Roman impression of Carthaginian religious rites in general:

In the center of Carthage stood a temple, sacred to the spirit of Elissa, the foundress, and regarded with hereditary awe by the people. Round it stood yew trees and pines with their melancholy shade, which hid it and kept away the light of heaven. ... Statues of mournful marble stood there,—Belus, the founder of the race, and all the line descended from Belus. ... There Dido herself was seated, at last united forever to Sychaeus; and at her feet lay the Trojan sword. A hundred altars stood here in order, sacred to the gods of heaven and the lord of Erebus. Here the priestess with streaming hair and Stygian garb calls up Acheron and the divinity of Henna's goddess. The earth rumbles in the gloom and breaks forth into awesome hissings; and fire blazes unkindled upon the altars. The dead also are called up by magic spells and flit through empty space; and the marble face of Elissa sweats. To this shrine Hannibal was brought by his father's command; and when he had entered, Hamilcar examined the boy's face and bearing. No terrors for him had the Massylian priestess, raving in her frenzy, or the horrid rites of the temple, the blood bespattered doors, and the flames that mounted at the sound of incantation.

Is the impression of cruel rites and gloomy mystery merely the product of prejudice and poetic imagination? This might be conceded if we did not know the appalling reality of Moloch worship, whose chief feature was human sacrifice, propitiation of the god by burning human victims in his honor; and the victims in which he especially delighted were well-born children.

III. Human Sacrifice

The Phoenician ancestors of Carthage had practiced this cruel rite and passed it on with the rest of their religious system to their colonies. The Carthaginians had made it so important a part of their ritual that at an early date it became notorious among other nations. About 490 B.C. Darius tried to use his
influence to stop the practice, as Justinus records: 31 "Envoys came to Carthage from 'arius, king of the Persians, bearing a communication which forbade the Carthaginians to immolate human victims." Apparently the step was ineffective, for Plutarch tells us 32 that about ten years later "Gelon, the despot of Syracuse, after vanquishing the Carthaginians off Himera, forced them when he made peace with them to include in the treaty an agreement to stop sacrificing their children to Cronos." Yet the rite seems to have been continued, at least in times of stress. During the siege of Agrigentum in the Sicilian expedition of 406 B.C., the plague carried off many of the Carthaginian troops, including Hannibal, the general. His successor, Hamilco, regarded this as a punishment because the Carthaginians had violated the tombs outside the city, and accordingly sought to placate the gods with sacrifice, as Diodorus relates: 33

When Hamilcar saw that the common soldiers were stricken with religious fear, he put an end, first of all, to the violation of the tombs. Then he sought to propitiate the gods according to Carthaginian custom, sacrificing a child to Cronos and drowning a number of victims in Poseidon's honor.

There was a partial neglect of the worship of Moloch in the years preceding the invasion of Agathocles, as Diodorus will show, but this very neglect brings out the full horror of the rites, for it consisted in a decline, not in the number, but in the quality of the victims. The nature of the "revival" of Moloch worship in 309 B.C. emphasises all the more the heartlessness and perversion of the worshippers. Diodorus describes the
They believed that Cronos was aroused against them too, because in former times they had sacrificed the sons of the aristocracy to that god, but later they bought children secretly, and after raising them, sent them as victims for sacrifice. But an investigation was held and some of the victims found to be supposititious. With these in mind, they beheld the enemy encamped at their gates and were filled with religious fear that the worship of their ancestral gods had been neglected. They hastened to rectify the carelessness by choosing out two hundred of the noblest children and offering them in public sacrifice. No less than three hundred others, yielding to reproach, offered themselves of their own accord. There were at Carthage brazen statues of Cronos fashioned with outstretched arms inclined at an angle so that the children placed in them rolled down and fell into the flaming hollow within.

Some details of this inhuman rite as practiced privately are added by Plutarch:

With full knowledge and understanding they themselves offered up their own children, and those who had no children would buy little ones from poor people and cut their throats as if they were so many lambs or young birds; meanwhile the mother stood by without a tear or a moan; but should she utter a single moan or let fall a single tear, she had to forfeit the money, and her child was sacrificed nevertheless; and the whole area before the statue was filled with a loud noise of flutes and drums so that the cries of wailing should not reach the ears of the people.

Tertullian laments the heartlessness of the practice thus:

Cum propriis filiis Saturnus non pepercit, extraneis utique non parendo perseverabat, quos quidem ipsi parentes sui afferebant et libentes respondebant et infantibus blandiebantur, ne lacrimantes immolarentur.

The ancients in these passages speak eloquently enough of the horrible reality of Moloch worship. That they fully appreciated its revolting nature is already evident from what has been said. Plutarch's comment is: "Would it not have been far better for the Carthaginians to have taken Critias or Diagoras to draw up their law code at the very beginning and so not to believe in
any divine power or god, rather than to offer such sacrifices as they used to offer to Cronos?"

The Carthaginians maintained this practice through the entire course of their history with the possible exception of a single period; it was neglected, as we have seen,—perhaps even discontinued for a time in the years before the invasion of Agathocles, the same time which saw the introduction of Greek gods and the decline of Melcarth worship. There is probably a causal relation between these factors,—the introduction of Greek gods and the decline of the Moloch-Melcarth cults. The Carthaginians were always, for better or worse, a religious people; they were Semetic, their names,—Hannibal, Hasdrubal—had religious significance, they gloried in images, temples, and shrines, they were strongly influenced by religious fear. If they neglected their own gods, it was only because they had turned to those of the Greeks. But then Agathocles appeared suddenly in Africa, defeated the Carthaginian troops, encamped close to the city. The Carthaginians must have felt that the Greek gods had failed them, or at least that something violent had to be done to pacify the old gods whom they had neglected. Melcarth was loaded with offerings, and the sacrifice to Moloch renewed with a vengeance. Shortly afterwards they gained a victory over Agathocles. Their exaltation took the same form as their despair. Diodorus relates that 38 "The Carthaginians after the victory were sacrificing the noblest of their captives at night as thanks offerings to the
gods, enveloping the victims with a great fire." Thus the prac­tice of human sacrifice was renewed at this time never to be abandoned until the destruction of the city. Quintus Curtius, speaking of the worship in general, says: 39 "Sacrum quoque, quod quidem diis minime cordi esse crediderim, multis seculis intermissum repetendi auctores quidam erant, ut ingenuus puer Saturno immolaretur, quod sacraligium verius, quam sacrum, Carthaginentes a conditoribus traditum usque ad excidium urbis suae fecisse dicuntur."

Though there is little direct evidence of human sacrifice among the Carthaginians at the time of the Punic Wars, statements like that of Curtius above leave no doubt that it still prevailed. Silius Italicus alone presents a specific instance as taking place at this time and, though the incident itself may be fictitious, the practice in general was probably as he describes it: 40

The nation which Dido founded when she landed in Libya were accustomed to appease the gods by human sacrifices and to offer up their young children, - horrible to tell- upon fiery altars. Each year the lot was cast and the tragedy was repeated, re­calling the sacrifices offered to Diana in the kingdom of Thoas. And now Hanno, the ancient enemy of Hannibal, demander the general's son, as the customary victim to suffer this doom according to the lot.

The practice of human sacrifice was, in fact, so integral a part of the Carthaginian religion, its necessity so deeply root­ed in the tradition of the people, that it actually survived the destruction of the city and after the founding of Roman Carthage,
was taken up again, persisting far into the Christian Era. Tertullian, in his day, could write: "Infantes penes Africam Saturno immolabantur palam usque ad proconsulatum Tiberii....Sed et nunc in occulto perseverat hoc sacrum facinus."

With the full horror of this dominant feature of Carthaginian religion in mind, it is not difficult to understand how Polybius could say without prejudice: "But the quality in which the Roman commonwealth is most distinctly superior is, in my opinion, the nature of their religious convictions."

IV. Spirit And National Virtue

Applying the universal standards of prudence, justice, temperance, and fortitude to the people of Carthage,—judging them not by single instances but by established traits and by general statements of the ancients,—what can be said of their moral character, of their national virtue?

First, in regard to prudence, it is evident that the Carthaginians could never have planned their government so efficiently, nor have raised themselves to the head of a vast commercial empire, maintaining sovereign sway over the western Mediterranean for centuries, without a great fund of native shrewdness and ingenuity. They were known for their subtlety and feared for their ability to outwit an opponent by stratagem. Cicero, moreover, remarks: "Nec tantum Carthago habuisse opum sexcentos fere annos sine consiliis et disciplina." Yet, prudent as they were in the very practical matters of government, commerce, and
empire, the Carthaginians were limited in their perception of higher spiritual values, as has been pointed out before; they were a religious people, it is true, yet their religion apparently never arose beyond the level of fear and propitiation. They were prudent as far as they saw, but their vision never pierced much beyond the material.

The sources have much to say against the Carthaginian sense of justice. No other people in the ancient world acquired such wide notoriety for faithlessness to agreements. "Punica fides" was a synonym for infidelity. It is certainly no more than fact that Carthage broke international law in plundering temples and tombs, that she oppressed her subject peoples with unjust taxation, that she betrayed her mercenaries and mistreated her generals. On this last point Diodorus is most specific, condemning it as a maker of tyrants: 44

The chief cause of this is the cruelty of the Carthaginians in dealing out punishment. They raise their most capable men to posts of high command in time of war, forcing them, as a rule, to bear the whole responsibility. But when peace returns they trump up charges against these very men, and haling them before unjust tribunals for fear of their power, overwhelm them with punishments. This is why some of their leaders, out of fear of judgment, desert their posts, while others turn to tyranny.

The Carthaginians must have maintained a certain minimum of justice in the ordinary conduct of state affairs, otherwise the government could not have functioned so long without violent revolt, as Cicero has pointed out. But certainly the evidence is all against the possibility of a high esteem, or a high degree of justice among them.
The rapidity with which the Carthaginians alternated in times of stress between deep despair and frenzied exaltation bespeaks a lack of restraint, of temperance, in their character. This change from one extreme to the other has been seen on the occasion of Agathocles' invasion, when, after defeat, their fear took a violent form, while after a subsequent victory the same violence was manifest in their rejoicing. The trait is well illustrated by the wild extravagances with which the Carthaginians reacted to the Roman ultimatum before the Third Punic War, vividly portrayed by Appian: 45

Then followed a scene of blind, raving madness, like the strange acts which the Maenads are said to perform when under the influence of Bacchus. Some fell upon those senators who had advised giving the hostages and tore them in pieces......Others treated in a similar way those who had favored giving up the arms. Some stoned the ambassadors for bringing the bad news, and others dragged them through the city. Still others, meeting certain Italians, who were caught among them in this sudden and unexpected mischance, maltreated them in various ways,.....The city was full of wailing and wrath, of fear and threatenings. People roamed the streets invoking whatever was most dear to them and took refuge in the temples as in asylums. They upbraided their gods for not even being able to defend themselves. Some went into the arsenals and wept when they found them empty. Others ran to the dockyards and bewailed the ships that had been surrendered to perfidious men......Most of all was their anger kindled by the mothers of the hostages who, like Furies in a tragedy, accosted those whom they met with shrieks, and reproached them with giving away their children against their protest, or mocked at them, saying that the gods were now taking vengeance on them for the lost children. The few who remained sane closed the gates, and brought stones upon the walls to be used in place of catapults.

There was, moreover, among the Carthaginians a marked tendency toward luxuriousness, evident in their clothing and decoration, the sumptuousness of their estates, and in the national
institution of public banquets, analogous to the sysitia of Sparta, as Aristotle remarks:46"Points in which the Carthaginian constitution resembles the Spartan are the common mess-tables of its Comradships corresponding to the Phiditia, etc...." Unlike the stern purpose of the Spartan messes, which were instituted to promote military spirit, the public dinners of the Carthaginians were organised by the "Comradships" evidently for social purposes, and later took on the aspect of unofficial political gatherings or caucuses, as can be inferred from Livy, who speaks of Hannibal's attempt to arouse the Carthaginians to war, after his exile:47"Et primo in circulis conviviisque celebrata sermonibus res est; deinde in senatu quidem...." What must the table service have been at these banquets in the capital when the drinking cups of Carthaginian officers in the field were precious enough to satisfy a mutinous army of mercenaries in the Sicilian expedition of 406 B.C.? Diodorus records49 that Hamilcar, the general, "persuaded the soldiers to be patient for a few days more and presented them with the drinking cups of the native Carthaginians as a pledge of his faith."

But the greatest intemperance of the Carthaginians, what may be called their predominant passion, was avarice, which has been illustrated several times already, attested by the sources from Aristotle to Polybius. It is enough to recall here the remark of Polybius:49"At Carthage nothing which results in profit is regarded as disgraceful."
Though it was apparently true that, as Polybius asserts, "the Carthaginians...depend for the maintenance of their freedom on the courage of a mercenary force," and "Italians in general naturally excel Phoenicians and Africans in bodily strength and personal courage," still the conclusion must be qualified by two considerations: (in regard to the fortitude of the Carthaginians) (1) At one period of their history they give evidence of a general increase in patriotism and courage. (2) At times of desperate crisis they were capable of an astonishing reckless daring.

The period during which public spirit may be said to have reached its height among the Carthaginians extends roughly from 383 B.C., when the citizens themselves were, for the first time enlisted as common soldiers in any considerable number, to about 308, when an entire citizen army turned out against Agathocles. The details have been given in discussing the armies of Carthage (vd. supra I E). There it has been noted that 10,000 native Carthaginians took part in the expedition of 339 against Timoleon, and that in the first clash with Agathocles in Africa, the Sacred Cohort made a brave stand in the face of defeat and the loss of their leader. There is, then, more solid evidence of courage and public spirit during this period than at any other up to the time of the Third Punic War. Moreover, Aristotle, a contemporary of this period, notes that "among some peoples there were even certain laws stimulating military valor; for
instance at Carthage, we are told, warriors receive the decora-
tion of armlets of the same number as the campaigns on which
they have served." This proves that the increase in valor was
not simply haphazard, but deliberately promoted by the govern-
ment; it is the only evidence we have of a positive attempt on
the part of the Carthaginians to foster any of the national
virtues.

It may be noted that Carthage at this period,- the greater
part of the fourth century- is remarkable in several respects.
This is the Carthage which Aristotle knew, whose constitution
won his esteem, whose promotion of valor he notes. The Carthag-
inians at this time manifest a nobler spirit, fight their own
battles, and even merit a word of praise from Diodorus for their
conduct after the battle of Cronium in 383 B.C.: 52"The Carthag-
inians bore their success like gentlemen, sending envoys to in-
vite Dionysius to come to terms." This period precisely saw the
imported gods of the Greeks rise in popular favor, and the old
practices of human sacrifice and Melcarth worship slip into de-
cline. Material prosperity, too, paralleled the rise in other
forms of culture; the city had been beautified with Sicilian art
at the end of the preceding century; during the long periods of
peace from 367 B.C. to 344, and again, after Timoleon, from 337
to the invasion of Agathocles in 308, commerce thrived and the
Carthaginian power in Sicilily expanded; the evident results of
this prosperity can be seen in the richness of the countryside
as Agathocles found it (vd. supra I C). All these considerations point to this as the peak period of Carthaginian civilization and culture.

The changes which took place after the invasion of Agathocles, - the return of the old religious practices, renewed dependence on mercenaries, the gradual break down of constitutional balance in the direction of oligarchy, etc.- have been discussed in their proper sections. What is important for our purpose is the realization that the decline had begun almost half a century before the first Punic War, so that it was not with Carthage at her purest and best that Rome fought, but with a corrupting civilization and culture. By the time of the Second Punic War the change was evident enough to draw from Polybius the remark: 53

At the time when they entered on the Hannibalic War, the Carthaginian constitution had degenerated, and that of Rome was better.....For by as much as the power and prosperity had been earlier than that of Rome, by so much had Carthage already begun to decline; while Rome was exactly at her prime, as far, at least, as her system of government was concerned.

If then, Carthage at her height only approximates the religion and the courageous spirit of Rome, the breach between the two in this respect must have been all the wider at the time of the Punic Wars.

Instances have already been given of the desperate kind of courage displayed by the Carthaginians in time of unusual stress, - that which inspired them, for example, to hold out so long against overwhelming odds in the Third Punic War. Yet this courage was not so much a fixed habit as a frenzied reaction, which,
for its very desperation, was all the more dangerous.

From these considerations, then, we may conclude that the Carthaginians were never, in the last extreme, cowards; yet during a single period only did their courage rise to anything like the stability of genuine fortitude.

Finally, Plutarch alone among the ancient authorities attempts a general characterization of the Carthaginians as a people. His comment on their spirit is the only passage we have which aims at telling, not what they did, but what they were. He describes them thus: 54

Quite different is the character of the Carthaginian people; it is bitter, sullen, subservient to their magistrates, harsh to their subjects, most abject when afraid, most savage when enraged, stubborn in adhering to its decisions, disagreeable and hard in its attitude toward playfulness and urbanity. Never would these people, if a Cleon had asked them to postpone the meeting of the assembly on the ground that he had made sacrifice and had guests to entertain, have adjourned the meeting amid laughter and the clapping of hands; nor would they, when a quail escaped from Alcebiades' cloak while he was speaking, have joined eagerly in hunting it down and then have given it back to him; no, they would have put them both to death for their insolence and their flippancy, seeing that they banished Hanno on the charge of aspiring to be tyrant, because he used a lion on his campaign to carry his luggage.

This characterization, though perhaps flavored by Greek bias, is in general accord with the impression left by Carthaginian religious practices. It is evident too that a people of little restraint or regard for virtue, of few ideals above the material, could hardly have enjoyed any great urbanity or freedom of spirit.

The moral culture of the Carthaginians may be summarized thus:

I) Their religion, during most of their history, was that of
their Phoenician ancestors, centering about the Moloch-Melcarth-Astarte triad and characterized by one authority thus: "The character of Phoenician religion and of the people who held it was at once impure and cruel."55

II) Their outstanding religious practice, at least in the minds of the Romans and Greeks, was the sacrifice of their children to Moloch, a rite which continued to the destruction of the city, and beyond.

III) In point of virtue, the Carthaginians appear neither just nor temperate, though they were certainly prudent in temporal matters and capable of reckless daring under stress. Their spirit, on Plutarch's authority, was sullen, cruel, unresponsive to amenity.

V. Intellectual Culture

Only the most meager traces of an intellectual culture survive, and these may be briefly recounted. The earliest recorded fact of intellectual significance is a decree of the Carthaginian senate quoted by Justinus,56 "facto senatus consulto, 'ne quis postea Carthaginiensis, aut litteris Graecis aut sermomi studeret; ne aut loqui cum hoste, aut scribere sine interprete posset.'" The measure was occasioned by the discovery that a certain Suniatus, "potentissimus ea tempestate Poenorum," had communicated with Dionysius in Greek, attempting to betray the general Hanno and the Sicilian expedition of 383 B.C. The effect of the decree must have been to cut Carthage off from the influence of
Greek intellectual culture. Whatever there was of literature at Carthage after that time would be thoroughly Punic.

That there was an interest in literature among the Carthaginians is proven by the fact that they possessed collections of books, which were distributed to the native African chieftains by order of the Roman senate when the city was destroyed. The nature, extent, and value of these collections are unknown. One work alone was deliberately preserved by the Romans, - Mago’s treatise on agriculture in twenty eight books. The esteem which this work won from the Romans is attested by Pliny, who mentions among other foreign authorities on agriculture "the Carthaginian Mago, whom our senata admired so much that when Carthage was taken and her libraries bestowed upon the African chieftains, they decreed that his twenty eight books alone should be translated into Latin, despite the fact that M. Cato had already expounded the principles of the same subject." Varro testifies to the popularity of the treatise, which had merited the supreme recognition of being translated into Greek; after listing the most eminent writers on agriculture, he affirms:

All these are surpassed in reputation by Mago of Carthage, who gathered into twenty eight books, written in the Punic tongue, the subjects they had dealt with separately. These Cassius Dionysius of Utica translated into Greek and published in twenty books, dedicated to the praetor Sextilius. And Columella adds the final word of praise, "paying greatest reverence to the Carthaginian Mago as the father of husbandry."
thaginian author.

Sallust made use of some Carthaginian historical works, preserved probably by the Africans to whom they had been given:

What men inhabited Africa originally, and who came later or how the races mingled, I shall tell as briefly as possible. Although my account varies from the prevailing tradition, I give it as it was translated to me from the Punic books said to have been written by king Hiempsal.

Finally, the only Carthaginian work extant is the travel account of Hanno, known as his Periplus, mentioned by Pliny with another of the same nature: "Also when the power of Carthage flourished Hanno sailed round from Cadiz to the extremity of Arabia, and published a memoir of his voyage, as did Hamilco when dispatched at the same date to explore the outer coasts of Europe."

Agriculture, history, travel,—it is the type of literature we would expect from a people occupied with practical matters. Whether the Carthaginians ever produced much of aesthetic or speculative value we cannot tell; their background and nature makes it seem unlikely.

Finally, there is evidence that philosophy was cultivated at Carthage, at least in the final period of her history. Clitomachus, who became head of the Academy in 129 B.C., was a native of Carthage, where he had instructed others in philosophy before coming to Athens to study under Carneades. We know of him chiefly from Diogenes Laertius, who leaves the following account:

Clitomachus was a Carthaginian, his real name being Hasdrubal, and he taught Philosophy at Carthage in his native tongue. He had
reached his fortieth year when he went to Athens and became a pupil of Carneades. And Carneades recognizing his industry, caused him to be educated and took part in training him. And to such lengths did his diligence go that he composed more than four hundred treatises. He succeeded Carneades in the headship of the school, and by his writings did much to elucidate his opinions. He was eminently well acquainted with the three sects, — the Academy, the Peripatetics, and the Stoics.

From the fact that he found pupils at Carthage it is evident that the Carthaginians could not have been entirely indifferent to philosophical pursuits, though, again, there is no way of determining the extent of their interest.

This brief data, then, comprises the bulk of our knowledge of Carthaginian intellectual life. It would be rash to conclude that this phase of their culture was therefore inconsiderable; we would be judging them as Samuel Johnson did the Athenians when he declared that they were barbarous because they had few books. Yet, on the other hand, if the Carthaginians had produced anything comparable to the intellectual monuments of Greece and Rome, it is not likely that such productions would have perished utterly. Masterpieces, especially of literature, have a way of surviving.
Notes to Chapter IV

I. References to Greek Authors

2 VI.56:
μεγίστην δὲ μοι δοκεῖ διαφοράν ἔχειν τό 'Ῥωμαίων πολιτεύμα
πρὸς βέλτιον ἐν τῇ περὶ θεῶν διαλήψει.

4 Moralia, 171 C:

7 I.38,2:
λέγουσι δὲ καὶ τὰς θυσίας ἐπιτελεῖν τῷ Κρόνῳ τοὺς παλαιοὺς,
ὡσπερ ἐν Καρχηδόνι τέως ἡ πόλις διέμεινε .... .

8 Achilles Tatius, I,1:
... τῇ τῶν Φοινίκων θεᾶ. Ἀστάρτην αὕτην οἱ Σιδώνιοι καλοῦσιν

9 I,105:
... τῆς θυσίας Ἀφροδίτης τὸ ἱρὸν. ... καὶ τὸ ἐν Κυθήροις
Φοινίκες εἰς οἱ ἱδρυσάμενοι εἰκ ταύτης τῆς Συρίης ἔδησεν.

14 III,37:
ἔστι γὰρ τοῦ Ἡφαίστου τοῦ αλαμα τοῖς Φοινικηλοῖς Παταίκοις
ἐμφερέσταταν, τοὺς οἱ Φοινίκες ἐν τῇ πρώρῃ τῶν τριήρεων περι
ἀγοῦσι. ... πυγμαίοι ἀνδρὸς μίμησις ἔστι.

15 Ibid.:
ἔστι δὲ καὶ ταύτα ὅμωνα τοῖς τοῦ Ἡφαίστου. τοῦτον δὲ φέας
παιδας λέγουσι εἶναι.

16 X,10:
καλεῖται δὲ τῶν τριῶν δὲ μὲν πρὸς ἀνατολᾶς νεών Ἡφαίστου,
tοῦτο δὲ τὸ συνεχῆς Ἀλήτου - δοκεῖ δὲ οὕτως ἐυρετής γενόμενος
tῶν ἀργυρεών μετάλλων ἱσοθέων τετευχέναι τίμων - δὲ τρίτος
προσαγορεῦεται Κρόνου.

17 II,44:
... ἐπλευσα καὶ ἐς Τύρον τῆς Φοινίκης, πυνθανόμενος αὐτὸθι
εἶναι ἤρων Ἡρακλέους ἄγιον, καὶ εἰδον πλούσιως κατευθευσμένον
ἀλλοιοτε τε πολλοὶ ἀναθήματι, καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ ἠσον στῆλαι δύο, ἦ
μὲν χρυσὸς ἀπεφθοῦ, ἢ δὲ σμαραγδοῦ λίθον λάμποντος τὰς νυκτας
μέγαθος.
18 Ibid.: ἀπικόμην δὲ καὶ ἐς Θάσον, ἐν τῇ εὐρόν Ἰρὸν Ἡρακλέος ὑπὸ Φοινίκην ἱδρυμένον, ...

19 v, 20; cf. Ch. III, note 131.

23 XIII, 57:
τοσότῳ ἀνάμφετερον οἱ βάρβαροι τῶν ἄλλων, ὅστε τῶν λοιπῶν, ἔνεκα τοῦ μὴν ἄσβεσθαι εἰς τὸ δαίμονιον, ὑδασκόντων τοὺς εἰς τὰ ἱερὰ καταφευγότας, Ἡρακλεῖδων τοῦν ἀπέσχοντο τῶν πολεμιῶν, ὅπως τοὺς τῶν θεῶν ναοὺς συλήσειν.

24 XIII, 62:
ἡ δ' ἐκ τῶν οἰκίων εὐθαμονία διέφορετο. ἡ δ', Ἀνάβας τὰ μὲν ἱερὰ συλήσας ... ἐνέπρησε.

25 XIV, 63:
... κατελάβετο δὲ καὶ τὸ τῆς Ἀχραδίνης προάστειον, καὶ τοὺς νεῶς τῆς τοῦ Δήμητρος καὶ Κόρης ἐσύλησεν.

26 XIV, 77:
oi δὲ Ἡρακλεῖδωνοι φανερῶς ὑπὸ τῶν θεῶν πολεμοῦμενοι, τὸ μὲν πρῶτον κατ' ὀλίγον ἐκτείνοντες ἐξεταράττοντο, καὶ τὸ δαίμονιον ἱκέτευον λήξαι τῆς ὁργῆς· μετὰ δὲ ταύτα πᾶσαν τὴν πόλιν δεισδαιμονία κατέσχε καὶ ταύτα, ἐκάστου τὸν τῆς πόλεως ἁνδραπόδισμον τῇ διανοίᾳ προδιαδόθησαν. διόπερ ἐνέπορευσάτο παντὶ τρόπῳ τῶν ἀσβεσθέντων θεοὺς ἐξελάσθαι. οὐ παρεῖληψέτες δ' ἐν τοῖς ἑρείας οὔτε Κόρην οὔτε Δήμητρα, τούτων ἑρείως τοὺς ἐπισημοτάτους τῶν πολιτῶν κατέστησαν, καὶ μετὰ πᾶσας σεμνότητας τὰς θεὰς ἱδρυσάμενοι, τάς θυσίας τοῖς τῶν Ἑλλήνων ἀθετήσαν εἴποιν, καὶ τῶν παρ' ἀυτοῖς ὄντων Ἑλλήνως τοὺς χαριεστάτους ἐπιλέξαντες, ἐπὶ τῆς τῶν θεῶν θεραπείαν ἐταξάν.

27 XX, 14:
dιόπερ οἱ Ἡρακλεῖδωνοι νομίζοντες ἐκ θεῶν αὐτοῖς γεγονεῖαι τὴν συμφορᾶν ἔτραπασαν πρὸς παντολαν ἱερείαν τοῦ δαίμονίου, καὶ νομίζοντές μάλιστα μηνίειν αὐτοῖς τὸν Ἡρακλέα τὸν παρὰ τοῖς ἁποίκοις, χρημᾶτων πλήθος καὶ τῶν πολυτελεστάτων ἀναθημάτων ἐπεμψάν εἰς τὴν Τύρον ὦρικ δέλιγα. ἀποκισθέντες γάρ ἐκ ταύτης, εἰσέλθεισαν ἐν τοῖς ἑμπροσθεν χρόνοις δεκάτην ἀποστέλλειν τῷ θεῷ πάντων τῶν εἰς πρόσοδον πιστοτώς· ὅστερον δὲ μεγάλους κτησιμοῦν πλοῦτους, καὶ προσόδους ἀξιολογώσας λαμβάνοντες, μικρὰ παντελῶς ἀπέστελλον, ὀλιγορθύντες τοῦ δαίμονίου. διὰ δὲ τὴν συμφορὰν ταύτην εἰς μεταμελείαν ἔλθόντες, πάντων τῶν ἐν τῇ Τύρῳ θεῶν ἐμημόνευον.
29 XXXI, 12:
οὗτος μὲν οὖν εὐρών ἐν τῷ στῶμα τῷ Τιβέριος ὄρμωσαν Καρ-
χηδόνιαν ναὸν ἀεραγωγὸν, τῇ τῆν ἑναυλώσαστο συμβαίνει δὲ τὰ
πλοῖα ταῦτα λαμβάνεσθαι κατ' ἐκλογὴν ἐκ τῆς Καρχηδόνος, ἐφ' οἷς
eἰς τὴν Τύρων ἐκπέμποντι οἱ Καρχηδόνιοι τὰς πατρίους ἀπαρχὰς
tοὺς θεοὺς.

32 Moralia, 175, A:
Γέλων ὁ τύραννος, ὅτε Καρχηδόνιοι πρὸς Ἱμέρα κατεπολέμησεν,
εἰρήνην ποιούμενος πρὸς αὐτοὺς ἤναγκασαν εὐγράφαν ταῖς ὁμολογί-
αῖς ὅτι καὶ τὰ τέκνα παῖδοντα τῷ Κρόνῳ καταθυντεῖ.

33 XIII, 86:
'Ἄμιλκας δὲ θεωρῶν τὰ πλῆθη δεσιδαιμονοῦντα, πρῶτον μὲν
ἐπαύσατο καθαρῶν τὰ μνήμετα. Μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα ἰεχεῖν τοὺς θεοὺς
κατὰ τὸ πάτριον ἔθος, τῷ μὲν Κρόνῳ παῖδα σφαγίας, τῷ δὲ Ποσε-
δόνι πλῆθος ἱερείων καταποντίζας.

34 XX, 14:
ὅτι μάλτο δὲ καὶ τὸν Κρόνον αὐτοῖς ἐναντιοῦσθαί, καθόσον ἐν
τοῖς ἐμπροσθεν χρόνοις θύωντες τούτῳ τῷ θεῷ τῶν οἴων τῶν κρατώ-
στὼν, ὑποτεθεν χνοῦμενοι λάθρα παῖδας, καὶ θρέψαντες, ἐπεμπο-
νεὶ τὴν θυσίαν. καὶ ἡμησίως γενομένης, εὐθρῆσθαι τῖνες τῶν
καθερουργήματι ὑποβολήματοι γεγονότες. τούτων δὲ λαβόντες
ἔννοιαν, καὶ τοὺς πολέμους πρὸς τοὺς τείχεσι δρώντες στρατο-
πεδεύοντας, ἐδεισδαιμονοῦν ὡς καταληκύνοτες τὰς πατρίους τῶν
θεῶν τιμὰς. διορθώσασθαι δὲ τὰς ἁγολοὺς σπεύδοντες, διακοσίους
μὲν τῶν ἐπιεικεστῶν παῖδων προκρίναντες ἔθους ὁμοσίᾳ. ἀλλοι
ἐν διαβολαῖς ὄντες, ἐκουσίως ἐκαυτοὺς ἔδοσαν, οὐκ ἐλάττως
όντες τριακοσίων. ἤ δὲ παρ' αὐτοῖς ἀνδρεῖς Κρόνου χαλκοὺς, ἐκ-
τητακὼς ὑπὲρ τὰς ὑπερίκεισι ἐγκεκριμένας ἐπὶ τὴν γῆν, ὥστε τὸν
ἐπιτεθέντα τῶν παιδῶν, ἀποκυλλέσθαι, καὶ πίπτειν εἰς τὰ χάρμα
πλῆρες πυρὸς.

35 Op. cit., 171, C:
ἀλλ' ἐξεστες καὶ γγυνώσκοντες αὐτοὶ τὰ αὐτῶν τέκνα καθιέρευ-
ον, οἷ δ' ἀτεχνοὶ παρὰ τῶν πενήντων χνοῦμενοι παῖδα κατέσφαξον
καθάπερ ἀρνάς ἡ νεοσθοῦς, παρελθηκε δ' ἡ μήτηρ ἀτεγκος καὶ
ἀστένακτος. εἶ δὲ στενάξειν ἡ δακρύσειν, ἐδεί τῆς τιμῆς στε-
ρεσθαι, τὸ δὲ παῖδιν οὐδὲν ἤτοι ἐθυτο. κρότου τε κατεπίπλατο
πάντα πρὸ τοῦ ἀγάλματος ἐπαυλοῦντων καὶ τυμπανιζόντων ἕνεκα τοῦ
μὴ γενέσθαι τῇ βοήν τῶν θρήνων ἐξάκουστον.

37 Ibid.:
Καρχηδόνιοι οὐκ ἔλυσινε μετιελίδει Κριτίαν λαβοῦν ἡ Ἀγάραπα νομο-
θέτην ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μῆτε τινὰ δαμόνων μῆτε θεῶν νομίζειν ἡ τοιαύτα
38 XX, 65:
καὶ τῶν ἱεροκαταρτίων τῶν αἰχμαλώτων θυσίας τούτης, καὶ πολλοὶ πυρὸς τοὺς ἱεροκαταρτίων ἄνδρας κατέχοντες, ...
48 XIII, 88:
τὰ δὲ μὲν στρατιώτας ἐπείσεν ὀλίγας ἐπισχεῖν ἡμέρας, ἐνέχυρα δοὺς τὰ παρὰ τῶν ἐκ Καρχηδόνος στρατευομένων ποτήρια.

49 VI, 56:
παρ’ οἷς μὲν γὰρ οὐδὲν αἰσχρὸν τῶν ἀνηκόντων πρὸς κέρδος, ...

50 VI, 52:
ἡ μὲν γὰρ ἐν ταῖς τῶν μισθοφόρων εὑρυχίαις ἔχει τὰς ἐλπίδας ἀεὶ τῆς ἐλευθερίας, ... διαφέρουσι μὲν οὖν καὶ οὕσει πάντες Ἰταλίωται Φοινίκων καὶ Λιβύων τῇ τῇ σωματικῇ ῥώμῃ καὶ ταῖς ψυχικαῖς τόλμαις. ...

51 Politics, VII, 11, 6:
ἐν ἐνίοτε χαρὶ καὶ νόμοι τινές εἰσι παροξύνοντες πρὸς τὴν ἀρετὴν ταύτην, καθάμαρ ἐν Καρχηδόνι φασὶ τὸν ἐκ τῶν κρικῶν κόσμου λαμβάνειν ὅσα ἀν στρατεύονται στρατεύει.

52 XV, 17:
ἀνθρωπίνως δὲ τὴν εὐμερίαν ἐνέχυκτες, ἀπέστειλον πρεσβευτὰς δόντες ἔξοισαν τῷ Διονύσῳ καταλύσασθαι τὸν πόλεμον.

53 VI, 51; cf. Ch. II, note 22.

54 Moralia, 799 D:
ἐπερον ἦδος τοῦ Καρχηδόνιν δήμου, πικρόν, σκυθρωπόν, ὑπῆρχον τοῖς ἄρχοντες, βαρὸς τοῖς ὑπηκόοις, ἀγγενέστατον ἐν φόβοις, ἀγριωτάτον ἐν ὁργαῖς, ἐπίμονον τοῖς γυνωθεῖσι, πρὸς παιδίαν καὶ χάριν ἀνήδοντον καὶ σκληρῶν· οὕκ ἀν ὡς αὐτοὺς, Κλέωνος ἀξιοδότος αὐτοὺς, ἐπεί τέθυκε καὶ ἔστω ἐστὶν μέλλει, τὴν ἐκκλησίαν ὑπεθέσατα, γελάσατες αν καὶ κροτήσατες ἀνέστησαν· οὐδέ Αλκμιδίδην ὅργανος ἐν τῷ λέγειν διαφυγόντος ἐκ τοῦ ἰματίου φιλοτήμως συνηθήσατες ἀπέδωκαν ἄν ἄλλα καὶ ἀπέκτειναν αὐν, ὡς ἄρρητος καὶ τρυφώντας· ὅπου καὶ ἶππων λέσυτον χρήματος φυσιοφρών παρὰ τὰς στρατεύεις αἰτιάσασθεν τυραννικά φρονεῖν ἐξήλασαν.

62 IV, 67:
Κλειτομάχος Καρχηδόνιος, οὗτος ἐκάλεσε τοῦ ἀστραβάτος καὶ τῇ ἑόρα τοῦ φυλῆς κατὰ τὴν πατρίδα ἐφιλοσόφη. ἐξόν οὐ εἰς Ἀθηναὶς ὁποτε παρακολούθηστ᾽ ἐντευχεῖ τῇ γεγονός ἠκουσε Κρεναδόν, καθεῖνον ἀποδεξάμενοι αὐτοῦ τὸ φιλόσοφον γράμματα τῇ ἐπιστολῆς μαθεῖν καὶ συνήσκει τὸν ἀνδρά, ὅ ὦ εἰς τοσοῦτον ἡλάσεν ἐπιμελείας, ὅστε ὑπὲρ τὰ τετρακόσια μιβλία συνεγράφη. καὶ ὁδεξαστό τὸν Κρεναδόν καὶ τοιοῦτο μᾶλιστα διὰ τῶν συγγραμμάτων ἐφώτισεν, ἀνὴρ ἐν ταῖς φιλοτημώμενοι διαπέρασε, ἐν τῇ Ἀκαδημαία καὶ περιπατητική καὶ στοιχί.
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4 De Rebus Gestis Alexandri Magni, IV,3,22.


6 XVIII,11.

10 In Psalms, XCVIII,14:
Regnum Coelestis quale erat Carthaginiae! Ubi nunc est regnum coelestis?

11 Apologeticus, XXIII; cf. Ch. III, note 10.

12 XVIII,6.

13 Sayce, 417; cf. also the note on Herodotus III,37 in the translation of A.D. Godley (Loeb), London, Heinemann, 1928, 4 vol.

20 Punica,III,20-31:
Tum quis fas et honos adyti penetralia nosse, femineos prohibent gressus ac limine curant. saetigeros arcore sues; nec discolor ulli ante aras cultus; velantur corpora lino, et Pelusiacum praefulget stamine vertex. distinctis mos tura dare atque e lege parentum sacrificam lato vestem distinguere clavo. pes nudus tonsaeque comae castumque cubile; irrestincta focis servat altaria flammae. sed nulla effigies simulacrave nota deorum maiestate locum et sacro implevere timore.

21 Naturalis Historia, XXXVI,4:
Hercules, ad quem Poeni omnibus annis humana sacrificaverunt victima...

22 XVIII,7:
... a Tyro, quo decimas Herculii ferre ex praeda Sicilienisi, quam pater eius ceperat,...
28 III,14-16:
Exin clavigeri veneratus numinis aras captivis onerat donis, quae nuper ab arce victor fumantis rapuit semusta Sagunti.

30 I,81-103:
Urbe fuit media sacrum genetricis Elissae manibus et patria Tyriis formidine cultum. quod taxi circum et piceae squalentibus umbris abdiderant caelique arcebant lumine, templum. stant marmore maesto effigies, Belusque parens omnisque nepotum a Belo series ipsa sedet tandem aeternum coniuncta Sycheo; ante pedes ensis Phrygius iacet; ordine centum stant aerae caelique deiis Erebique potenti. hic, crine effuso, atque Hennaeae numina divae atque Acheronta vocat Stygia cum veste sacerdos. immiguit tellus rumpitque horrenda per umbros sibila; inaccensi flagrant altaribus ignes. tum magico volitant cantu per inania manes exciti, vultusque in marmore sudat Elissae. Hannibal haec patrio iussu ad penetralia fertur; ingressique habitus atque ora explorat Hamilcar. non ille euhantis Massylae palluit iras, non diros templi ritus: aspersaque tabo limina et audito surgentes carmine flammas.

31 XIX,1:
... legati a Dario, Persarum rege, Carthaginem venerunt, afferentes edictum, quo Poeni humanas hostias immolare... prohibebantur...

36 Op. cit., IX.

39 IV,3,22.

40 IV,765-771:
Mos fuit in populis, quos condidit advena Dido, poscere caede deos veniam ac flagrantibus aris, infandum dictu! parvos imponere natos. urna reducEbat miserandos annua casus, sacra Thoanteae ritusque imitata Dianae. cui fato sortique deum de more petebat Hannibalis prolem discors antiquitus Hannon.
41 Loc. cit.: Modern archeological findings have dispelled all doubt of the reality of human sacrifice at Carthage as described by the ancients. For an illustrated account cf. B.K. De Prorok, "Ancient Carthage in the Light of Modern Excavation," National Geographic Magazine, XLV (April, 1924), 391-423.

43 De Re Publica, II, 48.

47 XXXIV, 61.

55 Sayce, 417.

56 XX, 5, 13.

57 Nat. Hist., XVIII, 5:
... cui quidem tantum honorem senatus noster habuit Carthagine capta, ut cum regulis Africae bibliothecas donaret, unius eius duo de triginta volumina censeret in Latinam linguam transferenda, cum iam M. Cato praecepta condidisset.

58 De Re Rustica, I, 10:
Hoc nobilitate Mago Carthaginiensis praeteriit, Poenica lingua qui res dispersas comprehendit libris XXIX, quos Cassius Dionysius Uticensis vertit libris XX ac Graeca lingua Sextilio praetori misit.

59 De Re Rustica, I, 1, 13:
... verum tamen ut Carthaginiensem Magonem rusticationis parentem maxime veneremur ...

60 Bellum Jugurthinum, XVII, 7:
Sed quo mortales initio Africam habuerint, quique postea accesserint, aut quo modo inter se permixti sint, quamquam ab ea fama quae plerisque optinet divorum est, tamen uti ex libris Punicis, qui regis Hiempsalis dicebantur, interpretatum nobis est ... quam paucissimis dicam.

61 Nat. Hist., II, 67:
Et Hanno, Carthaginia potentia florente, circumvectus a Gadibus ad finem Arabiae, navigationem eam prodidit scripto; sicut ad extera Europae noscenda missus eodem tempore Hamilco.
CONCLUSION

Out of the mass of details recorded by the ancients the dominant factor of Carthaginian civilization and culture appear clear and vivid. The study of the elements of civilization has revealed the Carthaginian law was well formulated but poorly enforced; the wisdom of the constitution of Carthage was vitiated by outstanding defects in the national character - venality, cruelty, expediency, factiousness. The strength of that character, on the other hand, lay mainly in the keen practical wisdom of the Carthaginians and their surprising capacity for reckless daring and fierce resistance in the face of a crisis. Their civil character, then, was shrewd and powerful, but defective in the higher qualities of magnanimity, humaneness, unity of spirit, and fidelity to principle.

The study of Carthaginian culture illustrates, explains, and enforces this general characterization. In keeping with her nature as a merchant state, the material element was the most highly developed in the culture of Carthage. The city itself was impressive in its buildings, strongly fortified, with cleverly constructed harbors and rich adornments, the work largely of foreign craftsmen and artists. The agricultural system of the surrounding countryside was a model for the ancient world, and resources within the city were abundant enough to last through many a long siege. The inhabitants were
sharply divided into four classes, with the wealthy merchants in their luxurious robes and jewelry occupying an exclusive position at the top. The large armies of Carthage were for the most part a motley aggregation of mercenaries, though in times of stress the citizens proved themselves capable of high courage. But the strongest arm of the empire city was her navy, which was magnificently equipped, but finally lost because of neglect and false economy. With this she controlled the entire Western Mediterranean, drawing from her colonies and subjects along its shores vast revenues through trade, taxation, and natural resources. Carthage established this empire through conquest and a shrewd system of colonization, held it by force of arms and economic sanctions, a common coinage and a common religion, kept it exclusive for her own gain. But this selfish purpose, pursued through overburdening taxation and cruel exploitation, won her the hatred of her subjects, provoked rebellion, and ultimately contributed to her complete destruction.

The Carthaginians aroused the animosity of others than her subject nations, moreover, by certain elements in her moral culture. The gods of Carthage were Eastern deities - Moloch, Astarte, Melcarth, Eshmun - though there is evidence that she adopted some of the Greek gods at one period of her history. Her native gods were worshipped with dark and secret rites, among them the repugnant practice of human sacrifice. Judged by the standard of the cardinal virtues, the Carthaginians
were prudent in a limited, practical way, but failed badly in justice; in fact, "Punica fides" became universally known as the antithesis of justice and honor. The Carthaginians were subject to wild extremes of fear and exaltation, luxurious, and above all, avaricious. They were never cowards in the face of danger, but only during one period - roughly from 380 to 310 B.C., and incidentally the same period that saw the introduction of Greek gods - did they rise to anything like a genuine spirit of patriotism and fortitude. This, perhaps the peak period of Carthaginian culture, had come to an end by the time of the Punic Wars, and Rome fought a nation that had slipped back into its inveterate vices, characterized by a public spirit which Plutarch describes as sullen and harsh, at one time abject in fear, at another savage in anger, stubborn, disagreeable and hard.

There is little to be said of intellectual culture at Carthage. Mention is made of large libraries, but only a few meager traces remain, - a travelogue, the title of a treatise on agriculture, a word about histories - which seem to indicate a practical literature. And yet, toward the end of her existence, there is evidence of an interest in philosophy at Carthage, for Clitomachus came from there after having taught for some years. It is not likely, however, from what we know of their other qualities, that the Carthaginians were much concerned with speculation, or that they ever produced a great literature, since little more than a title has survived the
the test of time.

This, then, is the civilization and culture of Carthage as portrayed by the writers of Greece and Rome. The picture is a single, consistent whole, and offers in general a solid historical basis for Chesterton's suggestion that the Punic Wars were a clash of opposing cultures. To demonstrate this in detail would require a careful comparison of Carthaginian civilization and culture with that of Rome at the time of the Punic Wars - a separate study in itself. The end of this investigation is attained if Chesterton's impression of Carthage is shown to be verified by the testimony of the ancients. We sincerely hope that it has.

L.D.S.
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*NOTE: The translations of Greek and Latin authors used in the text are taken from the Loeb Classical Library wherever possible; all others are original, e.g., those of Diodorus Siculus, books XIII to XXV.

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