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The Logic of Divine-Human Reconciliation: A Critical Analysis of Penal Substitution as An Explanatory Feature of Atonement

Blaine Swen
Loyola University Chicago

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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

THE LOGIC OF DIVINE-HUMAN RECONCILIATION:
A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF PENAL SUBSTITUTION AS
AN EXPLANATORY FEATURE OF ATONEMENT

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY

BY
BLAINE ANTHONY SWEN
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...if one earnestly and devoutly weighs the mysteries of the Incarnation, he will find so great a depth of wisdom that it exceeds human knowledge. In the Apostle's words: "The foolishness of God is wiser than men" (I Cor 1:25). Hence it happens that to him who devoutly considers it, more and more wondrous aspects of this mystery are made manifest.

Saint Thomas Aquinas
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<td>CDH</td>
<td>Anselm, <em>Cur Deus Homo</em>.</td>
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<td>CT</td>
<td>Aquinas, <em>Compendium Theologiae</em>.</td>
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<td>DMP</td>
<td>divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution</td>
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<td>F&amp;T</td>
<td>Kierkegaard, <em>Fear and Trembling</em>.</td>
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<td>M</td>
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<td>SCG</td>
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this research is to offer an analysis of the major conceptual and ethical problems facing penal substitution insofar as it is utilized as an explanatory feature of Christ's contribution to divine-human reconciliation. I present fourteen problems and argue that penal substitution can overcome these problems by embracing a "divine-manifest offering" approach to atonement. On this approach, God mercifully chooses to require satisfaction for sin through penal substitution in order to give God's Self the opportunity to meet this requirement by satisfaction through penal self-substitution. This divine self-substitution is intended by God to elicit a free human response of openness to a personal relationship of mutual love with God. Its effectiveness in drawing humans to such a relationship with God is a result of its ability to create obstacles to human persistence in alienation (e.g. demonstrating the danger of sin and the value of God's offer of personal reconciliation), to remove obstacles to human appropriation of divine forgiveness (e.g. a subjective perception of shame, doubt of divine justice, doubt of divine love towards humans), and to motivate humans toward divine-human personal reconciliation with a display of the depth of God's love for humans.
INTRODUCTION

Overview

The following is a dissertation in philosophy of religion which examines the logic of penal substitution as a key explanatory feature of the doctrine of the atonement.

Thesis

Several contemporary philosophers have renewed attacks upon penal substitution specifically (e.g. Eleonore Stump and Richard Swinburne) and theories of satisfaction generally (e.g. Philip L. Quinn and Richard Purtill).¹ Such attacks have prompted several others to offer defenses of the view (e.g. John E. Hare and Steven L. Porter). The purpose of this research is to offer an analysis of the major conceptual and ethical problems facing penal substitution insofar as it is utilized as an explanatory feature of Christ's contribution to divine-human reconciliation. I argue that penal substitution can overcome these problems by embracing a "divine-manifest offering" approach to atonement.² According to this view, God does not by God’s nature need satisfaction for sin. Neither does God need satisfaction in order to offer personal reconciliation to fallen humans. Instead, on a divine-manifest offering approach, God mercifully chooses to require satisfaction for sin through penal substitution in order to give God's Self the opportunity to meet this requirement by satisfaction through penal Self-substitution. This

¹ "Penal Substitution" and "Satisfaction" are defined below.

² "Divine-manifest offering" is a phrase employed by Paul K. Moser in The Elusive God. I will discuss this in more detail in chapter 3.
divine Self-substitution is intended by God to elicit a free human response of openness to a personal relationship of mutual love with God. Its effectiveness in drawing humans to such a relationship with God is a result of its ability to create obstacles to human persistence in alienation (e.g. demonstrating the danger of sin and the value of God's offer of personal reconciliation), to remove obstacles to human appropriation of divine forgiveness (e.g. a subjective perception of shame, doubt of divine justice, and doubt of divine love towards humans), and to motivate humans toward divine-human personal reconciliation with a display of the depth of God's love for humans.

**Relevant Definitions**

"Atonement"

Many humans report experiencing, to some degree, existential perceptions of guilt, shame, moral self-dissatisfaction, estrangement, loneliness, restlessness, and hopelessness. Many different courses of action are pursued in addressing these existential problems, including, for example, ignoring the problem or denying that the experienced shame has any corresponding basis in actual guilt; or the experienced estrangement corresponds to actual alienation from a real entity. Christian theory has historically interpreted these existential perceptions as indicative of human "sin." While the nature of sin is debated, it is generally agreed that sin includes human moral evil and that such evil is “sin” because it is offensive to or, in some sense, against, God. The "problem" with sin is that it has certain negative consequences which somehow separate humans relationally from God.

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3 We should note that human moral evil need not be conscious rebellion against God to be considered "sin." Such evil is still before, or against God, even if one does not believe that God exists.
The Christian doctrine of the atonement is concerned with the idea that Christ has overcome, or made it possible to overcome, the problem of sin. Christ, in dealing with the problem of sin addresses these consequences in order to contribute to a sinner's reconciliation, or "at-one-ment"\(^6\), with God. Thus, any fully developed theory of atonement will have to explain what it means to be separated relationally from God and how Christ contributes to the restoration of this relationship.

"Satisfaction"

Satisfaction theories appeal to a divine requirement (by divine necessity or choice) for satisfaction in order to explain Christ's role in atonement. "Satisfaction" refers to that which God accepts in place of a sinner's receipt of divine punishment (or, at least, the full divine punishment) for sin.\(^7\) To say that God "requires" satisfaction is just to say that God either cannot or will not forgo the punishment due to sinners without receiving satisfaction.

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\(^4\) I discuss the nature of sin and its negative consequences in detail in chapter 1.

\(^5\) Philip L. Quinn defines the doctrine of the atonement as “Christ’s incarnation, suffering, death and resurrection are supposed to have effected, or at least to have played an important part in effecting, the reconciliation of sinful humanity with God” (Philip L. Quinn, “Christian Atonement and Kantian Justification,” *Faith and Philosophy*. 3.4 (October, 1986), p. 440).

\(^6\) Robert S. Paul notes that the term "atonement" is "wholly and indigenously English," and as such, the word was purposefully designed to indicate an "at-one-ment" between persons that were at one point alienated from one another (Robert S. Paul, *The Atonement and the Sacraments*. (Nashville: Abingdon, 1960), p. 20). This fact is also noted in Paul R. Eddy and James Beilby, "The Atonement: An Introduction" in *The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views*, edited by James Beilby and Paul R. Eddy. (Illinois: IVP Academic, 2006), p. 9.

\(^7\) There is also a broad sense in which "satisfaction" can refer to both that which God accepts in place of a sinner's receipt of divine punishment or the punishment of the sinner itself. According to the broad sense, God can also be satisfied by the punishment of the sinner. In this sense, God's pursuing satisfaction would refer broadly to God's pursuing consequences for sin. Throughout the remainder of this study, I will be employing "satisfaction" in the narrow sense described above.
While elements of satisfaction theories can be found in earlier authors (e.g. Cyprian, Tertullian, Hilary, Ambrose) the first developed philosophical account appears in Anselm and is adapted and utilized by Aquinas. In both authors, the concept is associated with a type of exchange, and as such, is affiliated with the ideas of payment and debt. As a result it is common among satisfaction theories to claim that Christ pays to God the debt that sinners owe. Thus, a prominent historical take on satisfaction involves defining the relational gap between God and humans in terms of the debt that sin incurs; the reconciliation that must take place becomes a sort of legal reconciliation; and Christ's role in covering that debt is generally spoken of as a sort of legal transaction.

Satisfaction theories differ, however, according to each theory's answers to at least two questions. First, satisfaction theories vary according to their answer to the question, "Why does God require satisfaction?" That is, "Why is God either unable or unwilling to forgo the punishment that sinners deserve without receiving satisfaction?"

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10 Gustav Aulen notes, "The relation of man to God is treated by Anselm as essentially a legal relation, for his whole effort is to prove that the atoning work is in accordance with justice" (Aulen, p. 90).

11 Some theories suggest, for example, that God requires satisfaction in order to maintain His honor; some claim that in this He is preserving the moral order; and so on. For further examples, see John Stott, *The Cross of Christ* (Leicester, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 1986), pp. 110-123.)
Second, satisfaction theories vary according to their answer to the question, "What is the nature of Christ's payment to God?" While in each case it is agreed that Christ's payment is substituted (at least in part) for the punishment of sinners, there is some debate over the nature of the payment substituted. This debate results in varying theories of satisfaction.

"Penal Substitution"

Theories of penal substitution have been articulated in an attempt to answer that second question, "What is the nature of Christ's payment to God?" Broadly speaking, there are two ways to understand the nature of Christ's payment in making satisfaction to God. We will refer to them respectively as "non-penal substitution" and "penal substitution." Satisfaction theorists that hold to a view of non-penal substitution claim that while Christ's suffering and death do (at least partially) substitute for the penalty due to sinners, the suffering and death of Christ is not of itself "penal." Christ does not endure punishment by God. Instead Christ offers God reparation without Christ Himself undergoing any divine punishment. Some claim that Christ offers God the type of obedience that is due, or a life of virtue, or penance, etc. But all of these things are distinct from divine punishment. Those theorists who hold to a view of penal substitution claim that the payment that Christ offers is (at least in part) some sort of punishment by God which Christ endures on behalf of sinners.

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12 For example, penal substitution claims that Christ is paying a debt of punishment that sinners owe, while a non-penal theory claims that Christ is paying a debt of obedience, not punishment (some even claim that the Cross is not positively demanded by God, but rather an unavoidable result of Christ's paying the debt of obedience in a fallen world).

13 Non-penal theories could, and often do, still hold that Christ was punished by Pilate who sentenced Him, the Pharisees who accused Him, the Romans who nailed Him to the cross, and the people who called for His execution.
Not only are fleshed out theories of penal substitution found in the works of several contemporary theologians (e.g. John Stott, Leon Morris, and Wayne Grudem), penal substitution is often referenced as the popular account of the atonement held by contemporary Christian believers, particularly evangelicals. John T. Carroll and Joel B. Green claim that penal substitution is the dominant view in America.\(^\text{14}\) David Hilborn notes that,

...penal substitution has widely been regarded as the "controlling model" within mainline evangelicalism—the *sine qua non* of evangelical soteriology.\(^\text{15}\)

And Thomas R. Schreiner claims,

The theory of penal substitution is the heart and soul of an evangelical view of the atonement.\(^\text{16}\)

Eleonore Stump nods to this fact when she outlines what she claims is "a popular version" of the atonement.

*A popular version of the doctrine*: Human beings by their evil actions have offended God. This sin or offense against God generates a kind of debt, a debt so enormous that human beings by themselves can never repay it. God has the power, of course, to cancel this debt, but God is perfectly just, and it would be a violation of perfect justice to cancel a debt without extracting the payment owed. Therefore, God cannot simply forgive a

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\(^{14}\) John T. Carroll and Joel B. Green, *The Death of Jesus in Early Christianity* (Hendrickson Publishers: Massachusetts, 1995), p. 259. Green even expands this claim, saying, "For most Christians in North America and the United Kingdom, to speak of the atonement is almost invariably to speak of penal substitutionary atonement" (Joel B. Green, "Must We Imagine the Atonement in Penal Substitutionary Terms?" in *The Atonement Debate*, edited by Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker. (Michigan: Zondervan, 2008), p. 155).


person's sin; as a just judge he must sentence all people to everlasting torment as the just punishment for their sin. God is also infinitely merciful, however; and so he brings it about that he himself pays their debt in full, by assuming human nature as the incarnate Christ and in that nature enduring the penalty which would otherwise have been imposed on human beings. In consequence, the sins of ordinary human beings are forgiven; and, by God's mercy exercised through Christ's passion, human beings are saved from sin and hell and brought to heaven.17

A cursory glance at many Christian tracts seems to confirm that some take on penal substitution forms a popular account of the atonement. A tract published by Evangelism Explosion International and distributed by The Moody Church reads,

God is merciful and therefore doesn't want to punish us...But the same Bible which tells us that God loves us, also tells us that God is just and therefore must punish sin...God solved this problem for us in the Person of Jesus Christ...He died on the cross to pay the penalty for our sins and rose from the grave to purchase a place for us in Heaven.”18

Another, published by Living Waters Publications, reads,

God's Law demands justice, and the penalty for sinning against Him is death and Hell...God Himself made a way where His justice and His goodness could meet. We broke the Law, but He became a man to pay the fine. Jesus suffered and died on the cross to satisfy the Law. Then He rose from the dead, defeating death forever. Therefore God can forgive us and grant us the gift of everlasting life!19

These and several other tracts all promulgate penal substitution.20

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18 “Do You Know?” Evangelism Explosion International Inc, 2003. (P.O. Box 23820, Ft. Lauderdale, FL, 33307, info@eeinternational.org).


20 Here are three further examples. 1) "The judgments of God are sure, requiring the punishment of all who sin. God sent His beloved son, Jesus, who was without sin, to die in our place. God's judgment was satisfied only through the shedding of Jesus' blood." And again, "Jesus, God's sinless and perfect Son then came and told men how to live. He took our sins upon Himself and died on the cross, paying the price that was demanded. Jesus was a perfect man and therefore the only One who could pay the price" ("The Answer to Your Problems," published by the Church of God in Christ, Mennonite/Gospel Tract and Bible Society, P.O. Box 700, Moundridge, KA, 67107, gospeltract@cogicm.org). 2)"...you are guilty of breaking
Chapter Overview

This work has been divided up into an introduction and four chapters. In this introduction I present my thesis, list relevant definitions, identify my topic within the philosophical landscape, and detail fourteen problems facing penal substitution. I divide these problems into three categories: problems facing penal substitution insofar as it is a satisfaction theory; problems facing penal substitution as a theory of vicarious satisfaction, or satisfaction by substitution; problems facing penal substitution insofar as it advocates the importance of the penal suffering of the vicar.

Chapter one seeks to define “the problem of sin” in such a way that it may be possible to develop a theory of satisfaction that avoids the major problems outlined in (1). In so doing, I critically analyze four conceptions of the problem of sin including those developed by Friedrich Schleiermacher and Søren Kierkegaard. The second chapter critically analyzes the soteriologies of well-known satisfaction theorists, Anselm of Canterbury and Thomas Aquinas. In the third chapter I use the conclusions of chapters one and two to outline an approach to divine satisfaction through penal substitution according to which God pursues penal substitution as a means to elicit human appropriation of God's offer of personal reconciliation. Borrowing a phrase from Paul K. Moser, I call this the “divine-manifest offering” approach to penal substitution.21 I then

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compare this theory with the contemporary satisfaction theories of Richard Swinburne
and Eleonore Stump. In chapter four I argue that a divine-manifest offering approach to
penal substitution can avoid all of the fourteen problems outlined in this introduction.

Setting Within the Philosophical Landscape

This project falls primarily within philosophy of religion or religious philosophy.
While touching on various theological topics and doctrines, I will not be concerned with
exegetical problems that arise where the doctrine of the atonement is related to Scripture.
Neither will I be concerned with the historical development of the doctrine within the
Church. Instead this dissertation will be an exercise in the logic of the atonement and
moral philosophy. I will be primarily concerned with conceptual and moral problems
that arise insofar as the atonement is explained as an act of divine satisfaction by penal
substitution carried out by God (where "God" is a title for a being who is worthy of
worship. Such a being would be all-powerful and perfectly moral (i.e. just and all-
loving)). These problems are outlined below.

Fourteen Problems for Penal Substitution

Elizabeth Stump goes so far as to call the popular view of the atonement, which
promulgates penal substitution, an "unreflective account." At one point, she even
claimed that the popular account of the atonement

...is really hopeless, so full of philosophical and theological problems as to be irremediable.

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22 Stump calls this account "unreflective" (Stump, "Atonement according to Aquinas," p. 61). In a later
version of the essay, she calls the account "popular" and says that it "tends to be promulgated by
unreflective believers" (Stump, Aquinas, p. 427).

23 Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," p. 63. In a later version of the same essay, Stump pulls back
on this language somewhat. Instead she says, "It seems to me, then, that the version of the doctrine of
atonement in (P) is subject to serious philosophical and theological objections" (Stump, Aquinas, p. 429).
And she is not the only one. Keith Ward claims that,

One must therefore reject those crude accounts of Christian doctrine which...say that Christ has been justly punished in our place so that he has taken away our guilt and enabled God to forgive us. Almost everything is ethically wrong about these accounts.24

Here I outline the main problems facing penal substitution. I divide these problems into three headings. The first concerns problems that penal substitution must address insofar as it is a satisfaction theory. The second heading concerns problems for penal substitution as a theory of vicarious satisfaction, or satisfaction by substitution. The third heading relates to problems that penal substitution must face insofar as it advocates the importance of the penal suffering of the vicar. In total, I outline fourteen problems that confront penal substitution.

(1–6) Problems for Penal Substitution as Satisfaction

The following are problems that penal substitution must address insofar as it is a theory of satisfaction. Attacks on satisfaction tend to take one of three approaches. The first is to use an ontological argument which claims that divine freedom is lost if we hold that divine satisfaction is necessary. The second approach is to offer a moral argument against satisfaction. The third claims that satisfaction leads to conceptual inconsistency within Christian orthodoxy.

(1) The Ontological Argument against Satisfaction

This objection accuses satisfaction theories of dethroning the all-powerful God in that such theories subjugate God to an authority above God’s Self.25 According to this

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objection, an all-powerful God should have the freedom to demand satisfaction, enforce punishment, or forgive without either. Yet theories of satisfaction create an image of a God whose hands are tied; a God who wants to forgive but is prevented, by something to which God is subjected, from doing that which God longs to do. It suggests that a repentant sinner could stand before a God who desires a restored relationship with the sinner and yet God could say, “I’m sorry. I really want to forgive you, but My hands are tied. I cannot do so until satisfaction is made.”

(2 & 3) Moral Arguments against Satisfaction

Moral arguments against satisfaction typically take one of two forms. The first argument, "the problem of superfluous suffering," claims that divine satisfaction involves morally unjustifiable suffering. The second criticism involves the claim that a divine demand for satisfaction is at odds with a divine character of robust love.

(2) The Problem of Superfluous Suffering

Any theory of satisfaction faces the problem of superfluous suffering when it does not offer sufficient moral justification for the suffering endured by Christ. If suffering is prima facie bad, a demand for something that will result in unjustifiable suffering can be considered evil. In such a case, a satisfaction theorist is confronted with the possibility that her soteriology ascribes an evil demand to God.

25 See, for example, Stott, pp. 122-123.

26 Green and Baker criticize penal substitution theorist, Charles Hodge, saying "Within a penal substitution model, God's ability to love and relate to humans is circumscribed by something outside of God—that is, an abstract concept of justice instructs God as to how God must behave. It could be said that Hodge presents a God who wants to be in relationship with us but is forced to deal with a problem of legal bookkeeping that blocks that relationship" (Joel B. Green and Mark D. Baker, Recovering the Scandal of the Cross. (Illinois: InterVarsity, 2000), p. 147).

27 Throughout, I will vary my use of the third person pronouns “he” & “she.”
We can lay out this argument in the following way. Suppose it is possible to derive all of the benefits of an action, \( x \), from a different action, \( y \). Suppose further that \( x \) involves more suffering than \( y \). Where both of these conditions are present, then \( x \) involves superfluous suffering.\(^{28}\)

If we hold to the claim that suffering is prima facie bad then a burden of proof for the moral justification of a suffering-causing or suffering-allowing action, \( x \), lies with those who wish to perform \( x \).\(^ {29}\) If suffering is superfluous then, by definition, there is no benefit which could justify allowing that suffering. The proponent of such suffering would not be able to meet the burden of proof and that suffering could be considered bad. The action which inflicts or allows that suffering would be considered evil. Likewise, any demand for actions which inflict or allow superfluous suffering can be considered evil. Such a demand cannot be ascribed to a morally perfect God with consistency.\(^ {30}\)

Based on the above, we can claim the following. If a theory of satisfaction is to hold that Christ’s death is not a case of superfluous suffering, that theory must show that Christ's death involves some sort of benefit that could not be had in any other way or at

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\(^{28}\) I should note that I do not define suffering here merely as physical pain. If \( x \) fulfills a particular duty whereas \( y \) does not fulfill that duty, then performing \( y \) might be considered to involve a sort of suffering (let us call it a “moral suffering”) that \( x \) does not involve. Avoiding this suffering could be considered a benefit associated with \( x \). If this is the case, then there is at least some sense in which \( x \) could be considered necessary in comparison to \( y \). On the basis of this conditional someone might offer the following simple argument against the death penalty. We can derive all of the benefits of capital punishment (\( x \)) from life-long prison sentences (\( y \)). Capital punishment involves more suffering than life-long prison sentences (by taking life, occasionally killing innocents, etc.). Therefore, the suffering associated with capital punishment is superfluous. In order to defend the death penalty a proponent would have to argue that capital punishment involves some benefit that life in prison does not; or at least that capital punishment does not involve more suffering than life in prison.

\(^{29}\) Thanks to Heidi Malm for this way of articulating this claim.

\(^{30}\) We could also argue that love is incompatible with willed superfluous suffering. In this case, a soteriology which attributes an action to God that entails superfluous suffering would be in conflict with God’s all-loving nature.
least that it does not involve more suffering than any other means to that benefit. If
that theory cannot show this, then that theory is in jeopardy of holding that the suffering
of the Cross is bad without justification. Thus, the theory will be confronted with the
problem of superfluous suffering.

If I have read Richard Swinburne correctly, he uses the problem of superfluous
suffering against penal substitution when he objects to penal substitution by questioning
why God would choose to be satisfied through self-punishment (or the Son's placation of
the Father), when God could just "let us off."31 The problem of superfluous suffering
also appears to be in Vincent Brümmer when he responds to Calvin saying,

If the 'mere mercy of God' is sufficient, it is hard to see why the
'intervention of the merit of Christ' is necessary for the 'purchase of
salvation for us'.32

(3) Appeal to Robust Love

Another attack on the necessity of divine satisfaction appeals to God's character
as a being who is perfectly moral. One could argue that a being who is worthy of the title
"God" is a being who is worthy of worship. Worthiness of worship requires perfect
morality.33 A being who is perfectly moral is a being who is "robustly loving." That is to
say, such a being would be ever in pursuit of the benefit of others and is self-giving34 in

33 On "God" as "a title of a being who is worthy of worship" see Paul K. Moser, The Elusive God.
34 Michael J. Gorman distinguishes between "sacrificial love," "self-giving love," and "status-renouncing
love." "Sacrificial love" is "love as a costly act to benefit others." "Self-giving love" is "a fully self-
involving act to benefit others." And "status-renouncing love" is "a deliberate abandoning of status and
self-interest and a freely chosen act of concern for others" (Michael J. Gorman, Cruciformity: Paul's
Gorman is referring to a self-denial of status and rights (Gorman, p. 178). Gorman takes all of these to be
patterned in the Cross. Where I say "robust love" I include willingness to give sacrificial love and self-
such a way that it would be willing to relinquish any personal benefit inasmuch as the pursuit of that benefit conflicts with the benefit of the other. \(^{35}\) We might anticipate, then, that God, being a being who is worthy of worship (and thus perfectly moral) is a being who is robustly loving. \(^{36}\) A demand for satisfaction, some argue, conflicts with a character of robust love. \(^{37}\)

There is also a theological approach to this same objection. Those who take this approach argue that the picture of God as revealed in Christ’s parables (i.e. the prodigal son, the merciless creditor) and in Christ’s Own commands (He demands unlimited forgiveness) is at odds with the theory of satisfaction. \(^{38}\) Furthermore, someone taking

35 This is not to say that God, as a being of robust love, would ever neglect God's Own genuine self-interest because God may equate the attainment of human benefit with God's Own interest. Further, God's pursuing God's benefit may also be in the benefit of humans. Also, by "benefit" I am referring to things which are in one's overall self-interest. On this understanding of "benefit," things like short-term pleasures which lead to long-term harms are not benefits. Also, on this view, "benefit" is distinct from "that which a person desires." A person may or may not desire her own benefit.

36 Someone might claim that robust love, as I have defined it, goes beyond moral perfection to the supererogatory. If this is the case, then this argument can be modified such that "God" is a title of a being who is most worthy of worship. A being who loves supererogatorily is more worthy of worship than a being who merely loves without moral defect. We might anticipate, then, that God, being the most worthy of worship is a being who is robustly loving. \(^{36}\)

37 John Hare outlines a similar objection where he says "...forgiveness without requiring reparation would be the mark of a good person." And if so, it would be a defect in God to require penal substitution..." (John Hare, "Moral Faith and Atonement," Presented at the 1996 Annual Wheaton Philosophy Conference. http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/writings/moralato.htm.). Vincent Brümmer suggests that satisfaction can imply that "To put it crudely: God values his own honour more than he values me" (Brümmer, p. 446).
this approach could point to actions performed by Christ in which He appears to forgive without demanding satisfaction.

This objection is relevant here because it creates boundaries within which a satisfaction theorist must answer the ontological argument and the problem of superfluous suffering. For example, one might attempt to escape both of these problems by claiming that God chooses to seek satisfaction in the Cross because God values God’s reputation and that receiving satisfaction is the best way to preserve that reputation. Against this, one might present the appeal to robust love, arguing that such a being would not be worthy of worship and so not qualify for the title God. The more theological approach notes that Christ appeared to be robustly loving even to the point of enduring shame. Thus, if Christ's character is indicative of God's character we would not expect God to seek to preserve God’s reputation at so great a cost (even though it might be morally permissible for God to preserve God’s reputation in this way).

(4–6) Conceptual Arguments against Satisfaction

Even if one can escape all three attacks on the necessity of divine satisfaction, one must still face at least three conceptual problems that threaten theories of satisfaction with inconsistency. The first accuses satisfaction of incompatibility with the claim that God forgives sin. The second accuses satisfaction of incompatibility with the claim that some sinners are damned. The third accuses satisfaction of a sort of soteriological impotence. That is, it accuses it of failure to contribute to its intended purpose; the reconciliation between God and humans.

38 See, for example, Raymond Schwager, Must There Be Scapegoats? (New York: Crossroad Publishing, 2000), pp. 206-207.
(4) The Forgiveness Problem

Some claim that, by definition, one cannot both forgive and accept satisfaction. Thus, if God receives satisfaction through penal substitution, God cannot be said to give forgiveness. For example, Stump argues,

To forgive a debtor is to fail to exact all that is in justice due. But, according to (P), God does exact every bit of the debt owed him by human beings.39

Similarly, Vincent Brümmer claims,

Through bearing punishment or making satisfaction I can earn reinstatement into a relationship of rights and duties, and what I have earned you are obligated to give...punishment and satisfaction would make forgiveness unnecessary. If full satisfaction or appropriate punishment has been borne, there is nothing left to forgive.40

(5) The Damnation Problem

The conflict with damnation appeals to the theological claim that some sinners will likely still face damnation by God.41 This criticism notes that after receiving satisfaction, one no longer has any claim on the penalty previously owed. Thus, divine satisfaction is inconsistent with damnation. If God condemns sinners to damnation after receiving satisfaction, either God does so unjustly42 or God cannot be said to be fully satisfied in the Cross.43

39 Stump, Aquinas, p. 428.
40 Brümmer, p. 441.
41 This claim is controversial and is not held by all Christians. I address it here because it is a claim that is commonly held by those ascribing to some version of penal substitution.
42 For example, see Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," p. 63. See also, Quinn, "Aquinas on Atonement," p. 164 and Quinn, "Christian Atonement and Kantian Justification," p. 446.
(6) The Impotence Problem

A third conceptual attack on theories of satisfaction claims that satisfaction cannot accomplish what the atonement is said to accomplish. If the purpose of atonement is to facilitate reconciliation with God and humans, then satisfaction fails to do so because it is "too mechanical" to accomplish something so personal. That is to say, satisfaction may effectively free sinners from punishment by God, but it does not appear to restore God and sinners into a relationship of mutual love. A sinner could be relieved that he does not have to be punished while despising the One who freed the sinner from punishment.

(7 & 8) Problems for Penal Substitution as Vicarious Satisfaction

Insofar as penal substitution is a type of vicarious satisfaction it is vulnerable to at least two attacks. First, vicarious satisfaction can be criticized as impossible. Second, vicarious satisfaction can be criticized as immoral.

(7) Attack on the Possibility of Vicarious Satisfaction

Insofar as penal substitution is a theory of vicarious satisfaction it must face the challenge that vicarious satisfaction is impossible. The source of the problem lies in the claim that guilt and innocence are non-transferable.

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43 This criticism would not confront theories that claim that God is only partially satisfied by Christ's suffering and death. Neither would it confront theories that claim that Christ's suffering and death only provide divine satisfaction for a select group rather than for all people.

44 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 152.

45 See Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," p. 63. See also, Aulen, pp. 92, 147. See also, Green and Baker, p. 149.

Philip Quinn offers an excellent articulation of this objection. Following Kant, he claims that the notion of satisfaction through substitution is conceptually problematic because of the non-transferability of moral credit and debt. He claims that there is

...a salient disanalogy between pecuniary and moral debts. It seems that moral debts are not transferable in the way that pecuniary debts are.

Similarly we cannot be the recipients of someone else's moral credit.

If I owe it to God to love my neighbor, it does not seem that this debt is paid if another loves my neighbor a little extra but I do not love my neighbor at all.

But if

...neither moral merit nor moral demerit is transferable or transmissible...then the very possibility of vicarious atonement is precluded, as far as human reason can tell. Even if there were a surplus of goodness in the universe, it could never be reckoned to us as our own moral goodness because it would not be imputable to us.

The non-transferability of moral credit and debt is problematic, Quinn claims, for all cases of penal substitution, both in the examples above and in the atonement. What is more, it is problematic for any theory of vicarious satisfaction.


49 Ibid.

50 Ibid., p. 456.

51 Eleonore Stump similarly argues against vicarious satisfaction through penal substitution saying, "When a person commits a sin, a debt of guilt is registered in one column which must be balanced on the same line in the other column by the payment of a punishment which compensates for the guilt. This view raises a problem about how the books could ever balance if the debt is to be paid by someone other than the sinner, because the debt stems from guilt, and guilt is not a transferable commodity" (Stump, Aquinas, p. 436.)
(8) Attack on the Morality of Vicarious Satisfaction

Quinn raises this complaint when he claims that there is a

...problem of making sense of the notion of vicarious satisfaction in such a way as to render it morally palatable.52

He points out that a medieval thinker (like Aquinas who made use of the notion of satisfaction) lived in a time in which "the debt of punishment for even such serious crimes as killing was literally pecuniary."53 Thus,

It would be natural enough for a medieval thinker to extend this legal model to debts of punishment generally and to think of suffering as a kind of currency that can be used to pay them.54

As a result, we can understand how someone like Aquinas might think that one person could satisfy for another person's sins. Yet, because our notions of crime and punishment are "tutored by a very different legal picture" (one in which punishment for serious crimes is something like a prison term) we should anticipate that, to us, the idea of vicarious satisfaction for serious crimes will seem "alien and morally problematic."

While our intuitions in this regard should be recognized as fallible, he says that we should trust them "if they remain stable under reflection."55 Quinn claims that this objection

...strikes to the heart of any theory of Christ's atoning work that incorporates the element of vicarious satisfaction for the debt of punishment owed on account of serious sin.56

52 Quinn, "Aquinas on Atonement," p. 171.
53 Ibid., pp. 171-172.
54 Ibid., p. 172.
55 Ibid., pp. 172-173.
56 Ibid., p. 173.
(9–14) Problems for Penal Substitution as Penal

Penal Substitution is also confronted with criticisms that arise due to its claim that an innocent vicar, Christ, endures a penalty by God. Critics usually take one of three approaches when criticizing penal substitution on this claim. The first is to attack the possibility that Christ endures the punishment due to sinners. The second is to challenge the claim that Christ actually endures the punishment due to sinners. The third is to morally critique the notion of vicarious punishment.

(9 & 10) Attacks on the Possibility of Christ's Enduring Sinners' Punishment

Here I present two attacks on the notion that it is possible for Christ to endure sinners' punishment. Both claim that it is not possible for Christ to endure such punishment.

(9) An Innocent Person Cannot be Punished

In "On Punishment" A.M. Quinton presents a logical argument against the possibility of penal substitution. He argues that it is logically impossible to punish an innocent person. This is because punishment, by definition, can only correlate with guilt. An innocent person may receive suffering that he does not deserve, but he cannot, strictly speaking, "be punished."57

(10) One Person Cannot Endure the Punishment of Many

Even if one escapes Quinton's argument, one must address the fact that Christ is only one person. Penal substitution claims, however, that Christ suffered and died for all

It seems that it is not possible for one person to endure the punishment of many people when that punishment is something like death or a life sentence. Suppose three persons, A, B, and C, are convicted of certain crimes and all sentenced to life in prison. Suppose further that their friend, D, wishes to serve a life sentence on their behalves. It seems that, as D can only serve one life sentence, he can only be vicariously punished for one person. If D is punished for A, then B and C will have to serve their own sentences or hope that someone else will offer to serve it for them.

(11) Attack on the Claim that Christ Actually Endured Such Punishment

Some argue that even if one can show that it is possible for Christ to endure punishment on behalf of all sinners, it can be shown that Christ does not do this in fact. As evidence, they argue that the claim that Christ does so is at odds with the claim that Christ is resurrected. These objectors then point to the claim that the penalty that sinners deserve is everlasting damnation. Yet, Christ is said to be risen and exalted. Thus, it appears that Christ is not everlastingly damned and as a result, does not endure the punishment that sinners deserve. How can Christ pay an eternal punishment, when His punishment came to an end?59

(12–14) Moral Attacks on Vicarious Punishment

I present three moral attacks against penal substitution. The first attacks the concept of retributive punishment in penal substitution. The second criticizes the punishment of an innocent person. The third claims that such a model valorizes victimization as a virtue.

58 Or minimally for an "elect," which presumably is made up of more than one person.

(12) Retributive Punishment

This argument follows the structure of the appeal to God's character in problem (3), the appeal to robust love. It could be argued that even if one could show that some forms of satisfaction are compatible with robust love, satisfaction through retributive punishment is not so compatible. And, so the argument goes, theories of penal substitution rely upon a divine demand for retributive punishment. As a result, penal substitution is incompatible with a divine character or robust love. As with the appeal to robust love, a theological corollary of this argument claims that retributive punishment is incompatible with the revelation of God in Christ.60

(13) Punishing an Innocent

Some claim that even if one can show that vicarious satisfaction is possible and morally permissible, it is simply immoral to punish an innocent substitute in place of a guilty wrongdoer. To support this claim, an appeal is made to our moral intuitions. Our moral intuitions, as manifested in our current practice of punishment, reject such a notion as deplorable (even if they can be shown to be compatible with some forms of vicarious satisfaction). These intuitions manifest themselves in the claim that the suffering of the innocent Christ is simply "unjust" or "unfair."61 And so, Stump reminds us that according to penal substitution, God punishes "not the sinner, but a perfectly innocent person


instead." Then she asks, "And how is justice served by punishing a completely innocent person?" 

Peter Abelard simply calls it "cruel" and "wicked," saying,

Indeed, how cruel and wicked it seems that anyone should demand the blood of an innocent person as the price for anything, or that it should in any way please him that an innocent man should be slain—still less that God should consider the death of his Son so agreeable that by it he should be reconciled to the whole world! 

It is this objection that offers support to the feminist claims that the atonement involves divine "child abuse" and the characterization of God as "a sadist who willfully inflicts punishment... 

(14) The Valorization of Victimization

Finally, a feminist criticism of Christ's penal substitution claims that this model of atonement encourages the passive endurance of violence and so endorses victimization as a virtue. Green and Baker note,

Unfortunately, then, in calling people to imitate Christ the model [penal substitution] too easily has been misused to glorify suffering and encourage passive tolerance of abuse. 

62 Stump, Aquinas, p. 428.


65 Carroll and Green, p. 260.

66 Green and Baker, p. 149.
Also Carroll and Green claim,

Feminist theologians have been quick to observe that atonement theology construed along these lines legitimates and perpetuates abuse in human relationships, not least in the home. What is more, locating Jesus, characterized as the willing victim of unjust suffering, at the heart of Christian faith is tantamount to idealizing the values of the victim and inviting the abused to participate in their own victimization. 67

CHAPTER ONE

ON THE PROBLEM OF SIN

Introduction

We will better understand the atonement by further elucidating the problem that it is meant to overcome. We noted earlier that the Christian doctrine of the atonement is concerned with the idea that Christ has overcome, or made it possible to overcome, the problem of sin. We will better understand the atonement, therefore, if we can develop a clearer picture of the problem of sin. In this chapter I will pursue an understanding of the problem of sin. That is, I will seek to define the nature of sin and the problematic consequences of sin. I will be particularly concerned to pursue an understanding of the problem of sin which allows for the development of a staurocentric (or Cross-centered) theory of satisfaction that can avoid problems 1–6. For now, I will limit my consideration of sin to its relation to the individual; and the consequences of sin to the consequences experienced by the individual sinner.¹

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I critically analyze four conceptions of the problem of sin and evaluate whether each allows for the possibility of a staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can avoid problems 1–6. In the second section I present a reading and critical analysis of Schleiermacher’s view of the

¹ This is not to deny the reality of corporate sin. Neither do I intend to make light of the serious consequences that sin can have on other individuals who are not the sinner under consideration. My focus is narrowed here because the theory of penal substitution appears to be built upon a concern for the problem of sin as it relates to each individual.
problem of sin and its solution. I then ask whether this view can be used as a springboard from which to develop a staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can avoid the objections against satisfaction. In the third section I do the same with Kierkegaard’s view of sin and its solution.

I will argue that a theory of satisfaction which shows the necessity of the Cross while avoiding problems 1–6 must be developed using a personalist conception of the problem of sin. Schleiermacher's conception of the problem of sin does not allow for such a theory of satisfaction. A conception of the problem of sin inspired by a Kierkegaardian understanding does allow for the possibility of such a theory.

**Four Conceptions of the Problem of Sin**

In this section I critically analyze four conceptions of the problem of sin and broadly examine the potential role of the Cross of Christ in the solution to each conception of the problem of sin.\(^2\) I argue that two prominent historical conceptions of the problem of sin ((A) sin as a type of action followed by external consequences and (B) sin as a type of action followed by internal consequences) prevent the development of a staurocentric theory of satisfaction which can escape problems 1–6 outlined above.\(^3\) I will further argue that while a third prominent historical conception ((C) sin as a defective/broken/disordered human state)\(^4\) allows for a satisfaction theory that can overcome some of the problems by which the first two conceptions are confronted, such a theory is still threatened by some of the problems listed above. Specifically, a

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\(^2\) Another presentation of various conceptions of the problem of sin can be found in H.H. Farmer, *The World and God* (London: Collins, 1935), pp. 170-175.

\(^3\) As we will see, the problem of superfluous suffering becomes particularly potent when certain definitions of the problem of sin are presumed.

\(^4\) I will argue that an example of this can be found in the work of Friedrich Schleiermacher.
satisfaction theory utilizing this conception is vulnerable to problem (3), the appeal to
robust love and problem (6), the impotence problem. I will conclude that any
staurocentric satisfaction theory which hopes to hold up against problems 1–6 must
assume a personalist definition of the problem of sin such that sin is understood to be (D)
a willfully perpetuated state of alienation from the Person of God.\(^5\)

**First Conception: Acts of Sin Followed by External Consequences**

A common view of the problem of sin interprets sin as a category of actions that
are followed by external consequences. An external consequence involves one agent’s
response to another agent’s action, like God's punishing a sinner for a transgression of
divine law. One might view the problematic consequences associated with sin as external
consequences imposed by God. Much as a parent might punish a child for transgressing
a home law, so God will punish humans for transgressing a divine law.\(^6\) If this is the
case, then for God to offer salvation with regard to sin, God will need to rescue humans
from God’s Own external punishments.

A theory of satisfaction that requires the Cross as a means to rescue sinners from
God's external punishment will find itself confronted with several of problems. For
example, it will be confronted with problem (1), the ontological argument against
satisfaction. One could ask, "If the only negative consequence of sin is that God will
punish the sinner, why does God not simply withhold punishment, and so deliver humans
from the negative consequence of sin?" What, if anything, compels God to punish in

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\(^5\) I will argue that an example of such a view can be found in the authorship of Kierkegaard.

\(^6\) H.H. Farmer identifies such a conception in *The World and God* where he presents the conception of sin
as "something which man does against an eternal law, or laws, inherent in things." The consequences of
transgressing such law come in the form of divinely-sanctioned penalty (Farmer, p. 171).
response to sin? If nothing outside of God compels God to punish in response to sin, then a proponent of this view will have to address (2), the problem of superfluous suffering, to show that God’s delivering us from punishment by means of the Cross is more beneficial/effective than God’s delivering us by some less painful means. Further, the benefit to which a proponent appeals to escape problem (2) must not be subject to criticism under problem (3), the appeal to robust love.

To argue for a staurocentric theory of satisfaction which employs this conception of the problem of sin and can escape these problems, a proponent would have to argue for the necessity of a divine response to sin beyond God’s simply waiving the punishment. Broadly speaking, there are two ways in which one might do so. I will refer to the first method as a "deontological defense." I will refer to the second method as a "teleological defense."

According to the deontological defense, God must punish acts of sin. In order to avoid (1), the ontological argument, one would have to show that this response is not due to God’s submission to some power outside of God’s Self. Rather, this response is a necessary manifestation of a particular divine attribute. On account of this attribute God, by God’s Own nature, will not simply waive the punishment for sin.

There are at least two candidates for a divine attribute to which someone employing the deontological defense could appeal. First, someone might argue that God is a Promise-Keeper who binds God’s Own Self to do what God says. If God says that sin will be followed by punishment, then it must be so followed. Of course, the question then arises, “Why even threaten the external consequences in the first place?” If God is omniscient then God would know before making the threat that God will be forced to
make good on God’s threat if God makes it. But if God’s making good on God’s threat is the only negative consequence of sin, then when God chooses to remove the threat we are "saved" from all of the negative consequences of such actions. If this is the case, then in making the threat, God is committing God’s self to punishment simply for punishment’s sake. As a result, this defense would fall to (3), the appeal to robust love.

The second divine attribute to which one might appeal is divine justness. Perhaps divine punishment of sin is an unavoidable expression of God’s Justice. Yet it is not immediately clear why this would be the case. While it may be just for an offended party to demand punishment for sin, it seems to be consistent with justice for an offended party to forgive an offender without imposing any sort of punishment upon the offender. In fact, does not God sometimes command us to do this? If God can remain just while forgiving sinners without punishment, then this defense will fall to (2), the problem of superfluous suffering.7

Unless one can find another divine attribute to which one can appeal through the deontological defense, a proponent of a staurocentric theory of satisfaction which employs this view of the problem of sin will have to use a teleological defense. That is, one could appeal to a particular benefit that God is pursuing through the punishment of sinners or through satisfaction in the Cross; a benefit which could not be had by God’s waiving the punishment for sin. The benefits to which one might appeal can be divided into two general categories: benefits for God’s sake and benefits for our sake.

First, someone could claim that God must punish sin-acts for God’s Own sake.

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7 This critique of the appeal to God’s justice may here seem too brief and oversimplified. I will address this at greater length in chapter 2. See this diss., pp. 118-125, 132-137, 139-142.
A danger in pursuing this defense is that one will be constantly threatened by (3), the appeal to robust love. Robust love would be willing to relinquish any personal benefit inasmuch as such a pursuit conflicts with the benefit of the other.\textsuperscript{8}

Yet even if this defense can escape (3), it will find itself confronted with conceptual problems. For example, someone could claim that God must punish sin acts in order to preserve God’s honor.\textsuperscript{9} Let us suppose that God can preserve God’s honor in this way. If we can prove that there is no less painful way for God to preserve God’s honor than through the suffering and death of Christ, then we would be able to escape the problem of superfluous suffering. However, if the consequences of sin are merely external consequences, then once God has restored God’s honor through the suffering and death of Christ we will be confronted with (5), the damnation problem. That is, if God must punish sin acts to preserve God’s honor, and if God’s honor is preserved in the death of Jesus as a satisfaction for punishment of sin acts, then why are some humans still damned? What continuing concern should we have for sin? If the external consequences have been endured then the penalty has been paid. So, why not keep sinning without fear of damnation? If, after God’s honor has been preserved, sin still poses some sort of threat then we will need a fuller understanding of the problem of sin. Salvation from sin still must involve more than mere preservation from God’s (even necessary) external punishment.

\textsuperscript{8} Of course, these benefits could be connected such that God in pursuing a divine benefit also preserves our benefit.

\textsuperscript{9} The word “honor” may recall Anselm’s theory of atonement. Anselm’s theory will be addressed in more detail in chapter 2.
Second, someone could claim that God must punish sin-acts or pursue satisfaction in the Cross for our sake. For example, in the spirit of Hugo Grotius, someone could suggest that the punishment of sin is necessary for the preservation of public justice. We could then ask, “For whose sake must justice be seen?” If the answer is that public justice must be preserved for God’s sake, then we can appeal to the same critique just offered above. But perhaps God preserves public justice for our own good. For our own good we must see sin acts condemned. Yet why is this the case? So that we avoid sin acts? Why should we avoid them? Because God punishes them? This response is self-defeating. It claims that God must punish sin so that we can avoid God’s punishment for sin. But couldn’t the same avoidance of God’s punishment be had with less suffering if God simply chose to not meet out punishment? This is not enough to justify Christ's suffering and death and will fall to (2), the problem of superfluous suffering. It will have to be argued that it is good for us to avoid sin acts for some other reason. As a result we will, again, require a more robust understanding of the problem of sin. While sin-acts followed by external consequences may be part of the problem of sin, they cannot make up the problem of sin in its entirety.

Again, someone could suggest that God has set up external consequences for sin in order to create the opportunity for God to save us. Perhaps God’s point in doing something like this is to show us how much God loves us, or to teach us to respect God, or some other beneficial thing. But if this is the case, then the ultimate problem from which we need to be saved is not the external consequences of sinful acts. It will be

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something rather deeper, like our inability to see God’s love, or our lack of respect for
God. Again, we will need a fuller understanding of the problem of sin; one that goes
beyond this view of sin merely as a type of action subject to God’s punishment.11

**Second Conception: Acts of Sin Followed by Internal Consequences**

If my argument in the preceding section succeeds, then if we are to recognize a
need for salvation beyond a mere waving of God’s hand we must develop a picture of sin
and its consequences that goes beyond a type of action subject to external consequences.
Perhaps the consequences from which we need to be rescued are internal. HH Farmer
mentions such a conception when he notes that some have conceived of sin as a sort of
"self-abuse."

> [Sin] is an action, or way of life, which goes against the true norm of
man's own being.12

The consequences involved in this understanding of sin are that insofar as one sins, one
"turns aside from the path of his true development" or "injures his own being."13

It does seem that sin-acts have some very negative natural consequences for the
one who performs them. Just as over-indulging on sweets has negative physical
consequences, so acts of sin can negatively affect the sinner’s soul. Someone could argue
this point in the following way. Insofar as a person is a living body there are certain

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11 Though, actions subject to divine punishment may still make up part of the definition of sin. The point
here, is that this definition is not sufficient to define the problem of sin.

12 Farmer, p.172

13 Ibid. Dorothy L. Sayers also distinguishes between external and internal consequences, saying, "There is
a difference between saying: 'If you hold your finger in the fire you will get burned' and saying, 'if you
whistle at your work I shall beat you, because the noise gets on my nerves.' The God of the Christians is too
often looked upon as an old gentleman of irritable nerves who beats people for whistling. This is the result
of a confusion between arbitrary 'law' and the 'laws' which are statements of fact. Breach of the first is
'punished' by edict; but breach of the second, by judgment" (Dorothy L. Sayers, *The Mind of the Maker*
actions that are conducive to the flourishing of that body. In order to function at a peak level the body needs properly balanced meals, exercise, etc. There are also certain actions that prevent the body’s flourishing. Acts of gluttony and sloth are two examples. When a body participates in gluttony or sloth, it gives up a certain amount of freedom. Though over-eating or over-resting may be presently enjoyable, they impede a body’s ability to enjoy future goods.

Similarly a human soul can be harmed by certain actions performed by that human agent. Envying and lusting are two examples. If we allow our souls to participate in envy or lust we may soon find that we have lost hold of the reigns of our mind. Envy can quickly consume us, such that we can hardly think about anything else. And insofar as we are envious we sacrifice peace; we are dissatisfied and restless. In the same way we can give ourselves up to lust. To the degree to which we do this we may find that we cannot harness our minds to focus on other tasks or thoughts. Again we are restless and dissatisfied. When we participate in these things, we sacrifice our own flourishing and ultimately our happiness. Thus such actions are truly "deadly."\(^{14}\)

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\(^{14}\) It should be noted that a view of sin as a type of action subject to external consequences is compatible with the view of sin as a type of action subject to internal consequences. In fact, the external consequences of sin could be intended as a deterrent against the internal consequences. This can be explained using the following example. When I was a boy there was a rule in my house, set down and promulgated by my parents, which limited the amount of candy that I could consume when I came home from school. One day, I chose to break that rule, and after school, I consumed more than the allowed amount of candy. After my mother discovered the missing candy and tell-tale wrappers, I faced the two different types of negative consequences. First, my mother punished me by restricting me to my room for the afternoon. This was an external consequence. Then, while I suffered this external consequence in my bedroom, I also noticed another negative consequence—a stomach ache. This was an internal consequence of my action. Someone preserving a notion of sin as a type of action followed by external consequences might point out that in my mother’s case the external consequences are imposed in order to train me to avoid internal consequences. In this case, my mother punishes me because she recognizes that my pattern of behavior can lead to stomach aches, cavities, and poor health. One might argue that God, too, threatens us with external consequences in order to help us avoid certain internal consequences.
One can argue that a staurocentric theory of satisfaction is not necessary in order to escape this problem of sin. There are at least two ways in which one might do so. First, someone might argue that this view of sin allows for the possibility of sinning without serious consequence. While over-indulging on candy can hurt my body a little bit for the afternoon, my body will certainly recover assuming that I do not participate in regular candy binges. Why couldn’t I dabble in lust or envy just a little bit as long as I saw to it that I did not go too far? On this view, we might be able to escape the negative consequences of sin through a sort of disciplined sin-management. Thus, an attempt to overcome these consequences by means of the Cross would be confronted with (2), the problem of superfluous suffering.\textsuperscript{15}

Second, it can be argued that such internal consequences are really external consequences in disguise.\textsuperscript{16} The fact that a stomach-ache follows overeating is a causal connection ordained by God. Similarly, one could claim that the harmful consequences of envy and lust are consequences that God chose to associate with those actions.\textsuperscript{17} If this is the case, then such internal consequences will be subject to the same critique offered in the preceding section. In that case, we will still lack a picture of the problem of sin such that we require a salvation effort that exceeds a simple divine waiver.

\textsuperscript{15} Thanks to Paul K. Moser for this point.

\textsuperscript{16} Farmer indicates this when he points out that this conception of sin is a form of the first view of sin as lawlessness. The difference is that, "the law which is infringed is regarded as primarily written within the constitution of human nature" (Farmer, p. 172).

\textsuperscript{17} Leon Morris notes "Many today find no difficulty in the thought of an impersonal process of cause and effect operating quite apart from God. For Paul this would have been an intolerable thought. For him nothing operates apart from God. If men sin, and evil consequences follow, then that is because God has willed it so. God punishes men by those consequences" (Morris, p. 204). And again, "This is a moral universe and God has so made it that sin cannot but reap its reward" (Morris, pp. 182-183).
Here again we will require a more robust understanding of the problem of sin.

While sin-acts followed by internal consequences may be part of the problem of sin, they cannot make up the problem of sin in its entirety if we are to find a justification for the pursuit of divine satisfaction through the Cross. 18

**Third Conception: Sin as a Defective/Disordered/Broken Human State**

Another approach to the problem of sin claims that sin is not simply an issue of right/wrong or healthy/unhealthy actions followed by particular consequences. Instead, a sinner can be viewed as one who is in a particular state. Here, sin is not simply something that a sinner does or has done. Sin is also something that a person is "in" insofar as that person is in a state of sin. Or sin is something that is "in" a person insofar as sin can be conceived as a disposition, attitude, etc.

One such conception holds that sin is a sort of defective human state. That is to say that there is a certain human state that we might call moral perfection, or perfection

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18 In his overview of the problem of sin H.H. Farmer describes another conception that I have not included here. Farmer describes the view that sin "is an attempt to isolate and enclose the self and its ends, a refusal to merge the life in a larger whole" (Farmer, p.172). I have not included this conception in my analysis of the problem of sin because it appears to be fall into either of the first two conceptions of sin presented above. Farmer briefly describes several versions of the "sin-as-selfishness" view. It seems that each view defines the problem of sin as a type of action followed by an external consequence or an internal consequence. For example, Farmer describes one version of this view in the following way. "At the lowest extreme there is that thin and secular morality which identifies wrong-doing merely with anti-social conduct, and conceives that no one can be condemned for doing what he likes, provided only that he does not disregard unduly the requirements of community" (Farmer, p.173). In this case, sin (or "wrong-doing") is identified as a category of conduct which leads to an agent's condemnation by the community. This is to define the problem of sin as a category of actions that have external consequences. Farmer describes another version of the "sin-as-selfishness" view. "Then there is the view which on psychological grounds maintains that men's minds are made for fellowship, and cannot be healthy and happy unless they learn to lose themselves creatively in the larger life of mankind" (Farmer, p.173). This is to describe the consequences of selfishness in terms of the internal consequences that result from it. Insofar as we are "made for fellowship," one might say that a lack of healthiness and happiness are a contingent internal consequence of selfishness, since we might have been made otherwise. All of the other versions of the "sin-as-selfishness" view presented by Farmer can be similarly analyzed. One might argue that the conception offered by Farmer does not merely concern selfish actions but also the state of selfishness. If so, its analysis can be subsumed under the third category offered here.
of soul, and that any state that falls short of perfection is, to the degree to which it falls short, a state of sin. Sin is not defined primarily by sin-acts but by the defective state that manifests itself in sin-acts.

The question then follows, "What are the problematic consequences of such a state?" One could answer this question by appealing to external consequences. As long as someone is in the state of sin that person could experience divine punishment or be threatened with divine punishment. In response to this, we could refer to the analysis of the problem of sin as action followed by external consequences. The same analysis of external consequences there applies here as well. If the problematic consequences of a state of sin are only external, the need for satisfaction (especially a satisfaction which involves Christ’s suffering in the Cross) is not clear.

Another answer to this question claims that the state of sin is followed by internal consequences. Perhaps someone with a disordered soul experiences a certain pain or discomfort; a mental anguish, restlessness, sense of guilt, etc. As above, however, one could appeal to the claim that these causal connections are ordained by God. If there is no necessary connection between a disordered soul and the discomfort that it manifests, then it is unclear why God would require the Cross in order to deliver sinners from the consequences of the state of sin. This conception of the problem of sin is thus subject to the same analysis offered above with regard to the conception of sin as a type of action subject to divine external punishment.

There is yet another answer, however, to the type of consequences manifested by a defective/disordered/broken human state. One might argue that whether any sort of pain is experienced by the sinner, the defective/disordered/broken human state is its own
consequence. Living in a lower state, or lacking a higher state of being (when such a state is possible), is the negative consequence of being in such a state. Let us call this an analytic internal consequence of the state of sin. In such a case it is impossible to separate the state of sin from the consequence of sin, without removing the state of sin altogether.¹⁹

Still, someone might suggest that the suffering of the Cross isn’t necessary to overcome this problem of sin. Couldn’t God simply fix us as a mechanic might fix a broken machine? The answer to this question, it seems, depends on the extent to which God values human freedom. God could destroy the sinful state by making the higher (sinless) state the only possible mode of existence, but in such a case God would be removing human moral freedom. God would be removing the possibility of choosing anything but a sinless state. Of course, someone might respond, “Good! What’s the value in human freedom if it only opens the possibility to existence in a lower state?” Perhaps now we will need to justify the existence of human freedom. We might be able to do so by distinguishing between three states of existence. One in which we exist in a sinless state by our own consent, another in which we exist in a sinless state without our consent (not necessarily against our consent), and a third in which we exist in a sinful state. It seems that the first state is the highest and most noble state. Thus, in creating freedom, God creates the possibility of a higher human state than simply sinlessness.

¹⁹ It seems that God could allow us to be comfortable with our low state, but to do so appears to amount to a sort of abandonment (whether justified or not) on God’s part; a sort of letting us “wallow in the muck.” On this point see also, C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), pp. 32ff. And what is more, leaving us in a low state seems unable to free us from evil. For if we exist in this lowly state in a community of humans, there is sure to be wars, theft, envies and all sorts of misery. To avoid this, God could separate each of us from all other humans, but this alone would not transform us from our low state.
without consent (though God may simultaneously create the possibility of a lower state than sinlessness without consent; e.g. the sinful state).

Now, if our state of sin is a result of or comprised of, at least in part, a willfulness on our part then we may have found a conception of the problem of sin that requires a solution beyond a mere waiving of God’s hand. In order to overcome this willfulness, God could either force our transformation into a sinless state or invite it; even draw it. Through the first method, God destroys human freedom. Through the second, God works with the human will to achieve God’s ends. If we suppose that God values human freedom, God will pursue human transformation by the second means. This goal cannot be achieved simply by divine decree. The Cross of Christ may be an essential part of God's opening the sinner’s will to transformation into a state of sinlessness. If this is the case, we will have uncovered a route by which a staurocentric soteriology can escape (2), the problem of superfluous suffering.²⁰

Still, this view of the problem of sin can be attacked in at least two ways. First, someone might utilize (3), the appeal to robust love, and argue against the value of human freedom on this view. Perhaps the value of being able to consent to existing in a sinless state does not outweigh the harm allowed for by simultaneously opening up the possibility of existing in a sinful state (not to mention the pains involved in delivering us from such a state through the Cross of Christ). God’s creating the possibility of damnation could be considered a violation of God’s robustly loving character if the value of human freedom cannot be defended.

²⁰ I will also discuss this possibility in a following section in this chapter where I offer a critical analysis of Schliermacher's soteriology. See this diss., pp. 43-72.
Further, this conception of sin fails to include an obvious case of sin. That is, it seems that a sinner could be willing to exist in a higher state of being while hating the One who makes the transformation possible. Just as a patient might despise her physician, so the sinner might despise God while consenting to her transformation from a defective/disordered/broken state. She yields to God’s work in her life only because she finds it necessary. Perhaps all the while she wishes she could be free of the relationship and would be willing to do so if she could be “healed” without God. Yet, this despising of God is a clear case of sin. Thus, this conception of the problem of sin fails to fully capture our common intuition about the nature of sin. As a result a theory of satisfaction using this conception of the problem of sin will be vulnerable to problem (6), the impotence problem.

**Fourth Conception: Sin as a State of Alienation from the Person of God**

A fourth view of the problem of sin holds that sin amounts to a breach in relationship from the *Person* of God. Like the third conception, this holds that sin is a state. However, this state is not primarily defined as an internal defectiveness but as a dysfunction in personal relationship. Sin is an alienation from God; an isolation in a way analogous to the way in which we might be alienated or isolated from another human being. F.W. Dillistone puts it in the following way.

[T]here is a universal creature man whose essential being is determined by what we may call the ‘pull’ towards God and that his being can only find its satisfaction and fulfillment when all his instincts find a harmonious co-ordination in relation with God Himself and with His purpose for man’s good…[T]his ‘pull’ has been thwarted and resisted and even in a measure negated by all that is involved in what is comprehensively designated the *sin* of mankind.  

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21 Though a dysfunction in personal relationship with God could lead to a sort of internal defectiveness.
And again, H.H. Farmer describes this conception in the following way.

[ Sin amounts to ] ... a dislocation or rupture or alienation ... in the most fundamental of all personal relationships in which man stands, namely his relation as will to the Eternal as will. 23

One might then ask, as we did above, "What are the problematic consequences of such a state of alienation?" 24 Again, an appeal merely to external consequences will be subject to the same criticisms already offered. Perhaps, then, one could claim that the state of alienation from the Person of God is followed by internal consequences. One might suggest that such a state of alienation prevents the flourishing/healthiness/happiness of the person in that state. Unlike the second conception of sin (sin-acts followed by internal consequences), an appeal to the claim that this involves causal connections ordained by God will fail. It is not clear that someone could argue for the logical possibility of human flourishing apart from God. If God is a Person who does not merely possess the attributes of goodness, love, beauty, and so on, but is supposed to be a unique sort of Person who actually is Goodness, Love, and Beauty then human flourishing in isolation from the Person of God is impossible. One would be expected to flourish in the absence of Goodness, Love, Beauty, etc. Thus, this conception of sin as a state of alienation from the Person of God is not vulnerable to (2),


23 Farmer, p.174. Farmer notes that this understanding of sin, includes within it the other three conceptions of sin that he presents.

24 I refer to Kierkegaard to develop a personalist conception of alienation from God. I claim that alienation from God can be understood as a failure to trust God as the source and end of one's fulfillment (see this diss., pp. 82-95). I also utilize Aquinas to explain that alienation can be understood as an absence of mutual love between God and a human (see this diss., pp. 149-151).
the problem of superfluous suffering, in the same way that the conceptions of sin-as-action are.

This argument appeals to analytically connected internal consequences. However, even if this argument does not hold, this conception of sin could still be directly associated with an analytic internal consequence. If existing in a personal relationship with God is a higher state of being than existing apart from God, then to exist apart from God analytically results in the negative consequence of not existing in the higher state of personal relationship with God. Thus, God could not simply waive the consequences of sin without first abolishing the sin itself.  

Not only does this view hold up over the first two conceptions of sin, it seems to preserve the benefits of the third conception while avoiding the two main criticisms that confront it. Like the third conception, this view opens the door to a staurocentric soteriology that can escape (2), the problem of superfluous suffering. One could argue that the state of alienation from the Person of God is at least in part an issue of the human will. If God values freedom, God will seek to invite and even draw human beings into a personal relationship with God rather than simply override human freedom by force. The suffering and death of Jesus could be an essential part of this divine project.

Unlike the third conception, however, this understanding of sin is not vulnerable to (3), the appeal to robust love. This is because this view is not vulnerable to the same potential criticism of the value of human freedom. In the third conception there is such a thing as sinlessness without consent, which one might argue is as valuable as sinlessness with consent. It is not clear that the same holds with sin as a state of alienation from God.

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25 "First" here indicates logical priority, not temporal.
as Person. If freedom is an essential component of personal relationship, then on this conception of sin there will be no such thing as sinlessness without consent. We could not be in a personal relationship with God without freely engaging such a relationship. A relationship without freedom would de-personalize human beings and turn them into objects in relationship to God. So, God would not be able to override human freedom without simultaneously overriding the possibility of personal relationship with God (the very state which we’d presume God to be overriding human freedom to achieve). Thus, in order to bring the human being out of a sinful state on this view, God must work with human freedom to achieve God’s ends. Whereas in the third conception, by overriding human freedom God can destroy the possibility of sin but preserve sinlessness, in this conception, by overriding human freedom God destroys even the possibility of sinlessness.

Second, this conception of sin fully captures our common intuitions about the nature of sin. It would not be possible to hate God without somehow being isolated from God’s Person by one's hatred. Thus, this view can also avoid (6), the impotence problem. And, if someone were to claim that this view fails to capture our common intuitions about sin in that our common intuitions include sin-as-action or sin as a defective/disordered/broken state we need only note that this fourth description of sin and its consequences allows for each of the other three views within it.26 By being alienated

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26 Farmer makes the same claim with regard to this last view of sin and the three conceptions of sin he presents before it. “...in a way that is not unimportant to note, the three conceptions of sin first mentioned above are all included in the specifically religious category. Thus, sin, being against God, is felt as being against a law and an order which must somehow run throughout all creation...And, being against God, it is felt as being against the self; for God is apprehended as having created the self precisely that He might thus address it and claim its whole obedience...Finally, sin, being against an Eternal will which includes the whole of creation in its scope, is felt as being the most radical form of self-isolation...the more so as the divine demand is...mediated through, and draws its content from, man's social world and its requirements”
from God, one could be in and allow for a defective human state which will manifest itself in sinful actions. These sinful actions could be followed by both internal and external consequences (or the threat of external consequences). Thus, what has been presented here as four conceptions of the problem of sin could be viewed rather as four aspects of the problem of sin, the core aspect being the current conception under consideration: sin as alienation from the Person of God.

As a result, it appears that we must not neglect the role of alienation from the Person of God in a definition of sin. Such a personalist conception has an advantage over the first two conceptions of sin in that it does not preempt the possibility of escaping the problem of superfluous suffering. Further, unlike the third conception, a personalist conception of the problem of sin allows for a satisfaction theory that can more convincingly overcome (3), the appeal to robust love and (6), the impotence problem.

**Schleiermacher’s Conception of the Problem of Sin and Its Solution**

In what follows I will offer a reading and critical analysis of Schleiermacher’s conception of the problem of sin and its solution. I will then ask whether such a view can

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(Farmer, pp.174-175). This can address Darby Ray's concern that definitions of sin as alienation from God "focus so exclusively on divine-human relations that they establish human morality solely or even primarily in relation to a transcendent Other, with the result that the interhuman sphere is practically ignored" (Darby Ray, *Deceiving the Devil* (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1998), p. 33). An individual's failure in the interhuman sphere can be seen as a manifestation of that person's alienation from God. Likewise, the more a person comes to love God with all of her heart, the more she will love her neighbor as herself.

27 "[In] a faith which regards a living and personal God as the original creator and final goal of human existence…the essential problem of the atonement is the restoration of a torn fabric of personal relationships” (Dillistone, p. 16).

28 We will explore a personalist conception in more detail later in this chapter when we critically analyze Kierkegaard's understanding of sin and sin’s opposite, faith. See this diss., pp. 73-99.
offer hope for the development of a theory of satisfaction which can avoid problems 1-6.  

I will argue that according to Schleiermacher sin is a type of defective human state. When we yield to the independent impulses of the flesh, we exist (like beasts) in a lower state of being. This lower state is sin inasmuch as we are disposed to follow its impulses in the face of the impulses of the God-consciousness. This lower state of being is an analytic internal consequence of existing in a state of sin. We are implicated in the problem of sin in that we allow for and perpetuate this sinful state by the movements of our own will.

I will then offer a reading of Schleiermacher’s soteriology. I will argue that according to Schleiermacher, God seeks to transform the human being such that the God-consciousness rules over the impulses of the flesh. This is a goal that the sinner cannot achieve alone. Yet, the sinner’s will is still the gateway to this transformation. God seeks to initiate the process of transformation by inviting and drawing the human being to a place of openness through an attraction presented in the teaching and action of Christ. In the Cross, Christ displays God’s love in such a way that invites and attracts the sinner to a fellowship with God in which God can, with the sinner’s consent, begin the work of transformation in the sinner’s self-consciousness.

Finally, I will ask whether this reading can inspire a staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can escape problems of 1–6. I will argue that while such a theory could plausibly escape problem (2), the problem of superfluous suffering (a problem which

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29 While Schleiermacher himself is not a satisfaction theorist, I will be concerned with the possibility that his soteriology could inspire a viable satisfaction theory.
plagued the first two conceptions of sin above), it seems that such a satisfaction theory would still be confronted by (3), the appeal to robust love, and (6), the impotence problem.

The Problem of Sin

Sin as a Defective Human State

While Schleiermacher’s analysis of sin contains an understanding of sin as a certain category of action, it would be wrong to conclude that Schleiermacher holds exclusively to such an understanding of sin. While sin-as-action makes up part of Schleiermacher’s analysis, it is clear that Schleiermacher’s view of sin extends beyond this to the state of the human being. This is plain to see when we note that in The Christian Faith, the “Second Part of the System of Doctrine” Schlieermacher introduces a section titled “Sin as a State of Man.”

If I have read Schleiermacher correctly, then he holds that sin is characterized by a defective state of the soul. Schleiermacher claims that within human beings the flesh and the spirit are in conflict. When the flesh, or “the totality of the so-called lower powers of the soul,” is asserted as "an independent motive principle" over against the influence of the God-consciousness, sin is present. On the other hand, the person

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30 There are various places in Schleiermacher’s analysis of sin where one might be tempted to conclude that Schleiermacher holds to a sin-as-act conception of the nature of sin. For example, in The Christian Faith, he claims that “…as the swift movement of a sensuous excitation towards its object without ranging itself with the higher self-consciousness is unquestionably the act of the individual, every single sin of the individual must necessarily have its source in himself” (Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith (CF), 69.1). And again, “…what gives a moment the character of sin is the self-centered activity of the flesh…for all activities of the flesh are good when subservient to the spirit, and all are evil when severed from it” (CF, 74.1). And again, “…the distinctive feature of Christian piety lies in the fact that whatever alienation from God there is in the phases of our experience, we are conscious of it as an action originating in ourselves, which we call Sin…” (CF, 63).

31 CF, 66-74.
whose flesh is susceptible only to impulses from the God-consciousness is in a sinless (non-defective) state. Thus, he claims that sin is “an incapacity of the spirit.”

That is, sin is an arrestment of the “determinative power of the spirit, due to the independence of the sensuous functions.” Because of this sin is a “derangement of our nature” and a “hindrance of life.”

Robert Merrihew Adams describes this in the following way.

Sin in this view, as in much ancient and modern thought, is rooted in a conflict between lower and higher faculties or aspects of the self. It is constituted by a failure of the lower or sensuous consciousness to be properly subservient to the higher or religious consciousness.

Now that we’ve determined that Schleiermacherian sin involves a defective human state, let us attempt to more fully elucidate the nature of the defect.

32 CF, 66.2.

33 Ibid. (emphasis mine). One might note that “spirit” and “God-consciousness” are not identical in Schleiermacher and yet I am using them interchangeably here. I argue that while the two are distinct in parts of The Christian Faith, for the purposes of our discussion of Schleiermacher’s view of sin, the concepts can and should be used interchangeably. Additionally, “higher self-consciousness” can be read as “God-consciousness” or “spirit” in Schleiermacher’s discussion of sin. Schleiermacher describes spirit as “[a human’s] inner side, as a self-active being in whom God-consciousness is possible.” (CF, 59.1). Wyman takes this to mean that “Spirit would refer, then, to the higher self-consciousness (or the capacity for it)” (Walter E. Wyman Jr., “Sin and Redemption,” in The Cambridge Companion to Friedrich Schleiermacher, edited by Jacqueline Mariña (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press: 2005), pp. 129-150). Schleiermacher claims that without the God-consciousness there is no sin. While there may be an independent function of the flesh, the flesh cannot be in conflict with the spirit until the God-consciousness is awakened (CF, 67.1). And it is the God-consciousness that resists the independent motion of the flesh (CF, 67.2). Thus it seems, that to speak of the spirit in tension with the flesh is to say that the God-consciousness through the spirit, is in tension with the flesh. In this way, Schleiermacher and we, may speak of the tension between the flesh and the God-consciousness and mean the same thing as the tension between the flesh and the spirit. Since it is ultimately this tension that we are concerned to define, “God-consciousness” and “spirit” seem to be interchangeable insofar as they seem to relate to this tension in the same way. Similarly, “higher self-consciousness” seems to be akin to “spirit” and “God-consciousness” in as much as the tension between the “higher self-consciousness” and the “lower self-consciousness” seems to correlate with the tension between spirit and flesh.

34 CF, 66.2.

35 CF, 68 (emphasis mine).

36 CF, 83.1.

Schleiermacher holds that the God-consciousness is essential to sin. While there may be an independent function of the flesh, there is no sin unless the God-consciousness is in tension with it.\(^{38}\) Thus, to understand Schleiermacher’s view of sin, we must define the God-consciousness and determine how it can be in tension with the flesh.

If I have read Schleiermacher correctly then the activity of the God-consciousness which makes sin possible is the activity whereby we become aware of and encouraged to follow legitimate moral demands.\(^{39}\) This view finds support throughout *The Christian Faith*. Schleiermacher claims,

> ...the modes of action emanating from our God-consciousness are identical with those developed from the idea of the good.\(^{40}\)

That is,

> ...all modes of activity issuing from our God-consciousness and subject to its prompting confront us as moral demands.\(^{41}\)

This reading finds further support when we see that Schleiermacher describes sin as the state in which we desire what Christ condemns.\(^{42}\) Further he says,

> …sin is committed only where there exists a commanding divine will to which some active impulse is the opposition.\(^{43}\)

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38 CF, 67.1

39 By “legitimate” here, I refer to demands which come from a source with the authority to dictate morality. In this case, that is God. The question concerning the source of God’s moral authority is out of the scope of this paper. Here it is presumed that God does have such authority.

40 CF 83.1. One might note that Schleiermacher here attributes this view to the Evangelical (Protestant) Church and thus be tempted to suggest that he is here presenting a view held by some, but not necessarily himself. However, Schleiermacher joins himself to the Evangelical view by using the pronoun “we” when speaking of the Evangelical view (CF, 83.1); as well as “us Evangelical (Protestant) Christians” elsewhere (CF 3.1).

41 CF, 83.1.

42 CF, 66.2.
And again, he claims that defect, or living by the independent impulse of our sensuous self-consciousness, becomes sin when we are made to recognize the divine will.\textsuperscript{44} If the independent impulse of our sensuous self-consciousness is not sin until the God-consciousness is in tension with it, and the same impulse is said to become sin when we recognize the divine will, then we can read Schleiermacher as including the illumination of the divine will as an activity of the God-consciousness.

Thus, it seems that when this aspect of the God-consciousness (the God-consciousness as revealing divine demands) is present and the sensuous self-consciousness still motivates the self independently, that self is in sin. We can now begin to understand how the God-consciousness can be in tension with the sensuous self-consciousness. The God-consciousness reveals divine demands and encourages us to follow them, while our sensuous self-consciousness moves us to follow its own promptings (which may be contrary to the promptings of the God-consciousness).

We can clarify this point by appealing to a distinction between human beings and animals. C.W. Christian interprets Schleiermacher as saying

\begin{quote}
Without God-consciousness there can be no awareness of sin, only animal sensuality. The awakening of our sense of God arouses in us a sense of the higher life we do not possess.\textsuperscript{45}
\end{quote}

We might say that while a beast is moved by the flesh, it cannot be considered a sinner because it has no awareness of any moral demand to the contrary. The flesh dominates by default in that there is nothing for it to struggle against. The human on the other hand

\textsuperscript{43} CF, 81.1.

\textsuperscript{44} CF, 81.3.

is accountable to her moral illumination and is thus a “sinner” inasmuch as the flesh wins out over the God-consciousness. Thus, Schleiermacher can say that a person is in a state of sin inasmuch as she is disposed to follow her sensuous impulses over against the direction of her God-consciousness.

Three Potential Objections to This Reading and My Responses

There are at least three ways in which someone might object to my reading of the God-consciousness and its role in Schleiermacher’s conception of sin. First, someone might argue that this understanding of God-consciousness is misguided in that it appears to interpret sin as a transgression of divine law (a view which Schleiermacher appears to reject). Second, someone might argue that this reading is wrong to relegate moral insights and feelings to the God-consciousness. Third, someone might argue that I have misinterpreted sin as a moral concept instead of a religious concept. Here I outline these three criticisms and offer responses to each. In so doing, I aim to develop an even clearer picture of the role of the God-consciousness in Schleiermacher’s view of sin.

Someone could claim that I have attributed to Schleiermacher a view that he clearly rejects. That is, I have suggested that he defines sin as a transgression of divine law. An objector could point to CF 66.2 where Schleiermacher claims that his definition of sin (as “an arrestment of the determinative power of the spirit, due to an independence of the sensuous functions”) is less in harmony with an understanding of sin as a “violation of the divine law.”46 Again, one might read Schleiermacher as Richard Niebuhr does when he says,

While Schleiermacher does call sin a ‘turning away from God,’ the metaphor of rebellion or disobedience is not significantly present, and its

46 CF, 66.2. Though, Schleiermacher notes that such a harmony may be possible.
absence is undoubtedly coupled with the unimportance of the role that
divine law plays in his theology (CF 68.3) and with the omission, from his
view of the divine economy of creation and redemption, of any serious
consideration of Israel and its Scriptures.47

An objector would be correct to note that my understanding of God-consciousness
adheres to the idea that God reveals God’s will and encourages the following of God’s
will through the human spirit. God’s will as revealed in the human spirit is not merely
suggestive, but morally imperative. Therefore God’s will as revealed in the human spirit
can be understood to be a revelation of divine law. Insofar as a sinner is defined as one
who does not act with the God-consciousness as his motive principle, a sinner (according
to my reading) could also be defined as one who transgresses divine law.

However, we must make a distinction between what I will call, externally and
internally promulgated divine law. Externally promulgated divine law concerns divine
demands that are made known through some sort of announcement outside of the God-
consciousness. This would refer primarily to the Old Testament law or commands issued
through Christ’s teaching. Internally promulgated divine law concerns divine demands
issued through the God-consciousness.

My understanding of God-consciousness employs “divine law” in the internal
sense. It appears that when Schleiermacher refers to “divine law” in the passages above,
he is using “divine law” in the external sense. For example, to support his position,
Niebuhr cites CF 68.3. Presumably he is here alluding to the passage where
Schleiermacher says,

47 Richard R Niebuhr, Schleiermacher on Christ and Religion (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1964),
p. 200, footnote 34.
It is of course true that the consciousness of sin comes from the law, but as the law in the very multitude of its precepts is but an imperfect representation of the good, and even in the unity of an all-embracing maxim does not show how it can be obeyed, the knowledge of sin that arises out of it is ever in some respects incomplete and in some uncertain… 

When referring to the law in this passage, Schleiermacher cites Romans 7:7 where Paul says

What shall we say then? Is the Law sin? May it never be! On the contrary, I would not have come to know sin except through the Law; for I would not have known about coveting if the Law had not said, ‘You shall not covet’. 

Paul is here referring to the Mosaic Law and makes explicit reference to the command against coveting in Exodus 20:17. Thus, it appears that in citing Romans 7:7, Schleiermacher is indicating that by “law” he means the externally promulgated divine law of the Old Testament. This is not in conflict with my reading which claims that sin is a state in which the impulses of the flesh struggle against the God-consciousness through which we perceive and are encouraged to follow internally-promulgated divine law. 

Second, someone might argue that I am wrong to relegate moral insights and feelings to the God-consciousness. Moral insights and feelings, one might say, are not part of the God-consciousness but rather are activities specifically associated with the flesh, which is the sensible self-consciousness. Walter E. Wyman, Jr. notes that

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48 CF, 68.3.

49 Rom. 7:7 (New American Standard Bible).

50 According to my reading, however, the internally-promulgated divine law may call for adherence to the externally-promulgated divine law. The fact that my reading may have a place for an understanding of sin as a transgression of externally-promulgated divine law is not a problem when we recognize that Schleiermacher held that his view of sin could possibly be compatible with an understanding of sin as a “violation of divine law” (CF, 66.2).
[Schleiermacher] is explicit that flesh means ‘the totality of the so-called lower powers of the soul’ (CF 66.2); we may take it to mean, in Schleiermacher’s philosophical vocabulary, the sensible self-consciousness.  

And, according to Wyman’s reading, moral feelings are a part of the sensible self-consciousness.

It is the realm of feeling (or immediate self-consciousness) which arises from the self’s relation to the world (including ‘social’ and ‘moral’ feelings) that Schleiermacher designates the ‘lower’ or ‘sensible self-consciousness’.  

This claim is supported in The Christian Faith where Schleiermacher says, 

…by the word ‘sensible’ we understand the social and moral feelings no less than the self-regarding…  

Thus, it would seem that moral insights and feelings should be read as belonging to the sensible self-consciousness. If the sensible self-consciousness can be equated with the flesh, then moral insights and feelings cannot be understood to belong to the God-consciousness for Schleiermacher strongly distinguishes between the activities of the flesh and those of the God-consciousness.

Against this criticism, I will first argue that we should not, as Wyman does, equate Schleiermacher’s use of “flesh” with his use of “sensible self-consciousness.” I will argue that Schleiermacher’s use of “flesh” does not include moral insights and feelings. As we noted above, Wyman cites CF 66.2 when explaining Schleiermacher’s use of “flesh.” There Schleiermacher speaks of the tension between the flesh and the

51 Wyman, p. 134.
52 Ibid., p. 131.
53 CF, 5.1.
spirit and in so doing cites Galatians 5:17 where Paul also speaks of the tension between flesh and spirit saying,

For the flesh sets its desire against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; for these are in opposition to one another, so that you may not do the things that you please.  

For “flesh” Paul uses the word σαρξ. In every use, this word refers to the physical as opposed to the spiritual. It refers to the body generally and in this reference indicates “the seat of the affections and lusts.” It does not seem that Paul is intending to include moral feeling as a part of σαρξ, since he seems to be saying that we know what we should do and yet on account of the pull of σαρξ find ourselves unable to do it.

Schleiermacher also cites Romans 7:18-23. There, Paul also discusses σαρξ.

For I know that nothing good dwells in me, that is, in my flesh; for the willing is present in me, but the doing of the good is not. For the good that I want, I do not do, but I practice the very evil that I do not want…I see a different law in the members of my body, waging war against the law of my mind and making me a prisoner of the law of sin which is in my members.

This also clearly separates the “flesh” from the moral. Unless we think that Schleiermacher was unaware of this Pauline distinction when he cited these passages, we should hold that Schleiermacher does not consider the flesh to include moral feelings as is indicated by Wyman’s reading.

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54 Gal. 5:17 (NASB).


56 Rom. 7:18-19, 23 (NASB).

57 For further support see also CF, 59.1.
Still, one might note that while it may be true that moral feelings and insights are not part of the flesh, Schleiermacher relegates them to the sensible self-consciousness. This claim, however, does not clearly contradict my view that moral insights and feelings belong to the God-consciousness. There is some evidence to suggest that these two claims are not mutually exclusive in Schleiermacher. We should take note that in the quote above, Schleiermacher claims to be analyzing “sensible” in “the widest sense of the term.”\(^{58}\) This leaves open the possibility that there is a more narrow sense of “sensible” which excludes moral feelings and insights and allows them to be associated instead with the God-consciousness. It may be that in the second part of *The Christian Faith* Schleiermacher begins to utilize this more narrow sense.\(^{59}\) In any case, the evidence offered above (such as Schleiermacher’s claim that “all modes of activity issuing from our God-consciousness and subject to its prompting confront us as moral demands.”\(^{60}\)) indicates that moral insights and feelings are clearly an activity of the God-consciousness in Schleiermacher. Any interpretation of the sensible self-consciousness as distinguished from the God-consciousness must take this evidence into account.

Third, someone might argue that I have read sin in Schleiermacher as a moral issue, when it is essentially a religious issue. Walter E. Wyman cites Schleiermacher’s

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\(^{58}\) CF, 5.1.

\(^{59}\) Perhaps this explains why, in the Mackintosh/Stewart edition of *The Christian Faith*, there is a shift from the use of “sensible self-consciousness” to “sensuous self-consciousness.” D.M. Baillie, who translated the relevant passage in CF, 5.1 employed the term “sensible self-consciousness.” In the second part of *The Christian Faith*, translator, D.D. Macaulay employs the term “sensuous self-consciousness” (see, for example, CF, 66.1 and 66.2). Perhaps Macaulay intends to distinguish a more narrow sense of sensible self-consciousness. "Sensuous" certainly seems more "fleshly" and bodily in reference than the broader, "sensible."

\(^{60}\) CF, 83.1.
sermon “The Power of Prayer in Relation to Outward Circumstances” in order to make just such a point. There Schleiermacher says,

To be a religious man and to pray are really one and the same thing. To join the thought of God with every thought of any importance that occurs to us; in all our admiration of external nature, to regard it as the work of his wisdom; to take council with God about all our plans, that we may be able to carry them out in His name; and even in our most mirthful hours to remember His all-seeing eye: this is the prayer without ceasing to which we are called, and which is really the essence of true religion.61

Wyman suggests that through this quote we can better understand sinfulness as “God-forgetfulness” and thus a religious, rather than moral problem.62

This claim, however, is not incompatible with my reading inasmuch as “God-remembering” can be considered part of the revealed divine will. In this sense, the moral and the religious are united in the God-consciousness. Again, this view is in harmony with and supported by Schleiermacher’s claim that

...the modes of action emanating from our God-consciousness are identical with those developed from the idea of the good.63

The Problematic Consequences of Such a State

In Schleiermacher there appears to be three ways to interpret the nature of the negative consequences of sin. One view involves an understanding of those consequences as external; another sees the consequences as internal. I will argue that in Schleiermacher, the ultimate problem of sin involves a third understanding. Specifically,

61 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Selected Sermons of Schliermacher, translated by Mary F. Wilson, edited by W. Robertson Nicoll (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1890), p. 38. This is also cited by Wyman, p. 133.

62 Wyman takes the term “God-forgetfulness” from CF, 11.2. In an endnote, Wyman concedes that the given textual support for his claim may be weak on account of the early date of the sermon compared to Schleiermacher’s more mature work (Wyman, pp. 147-148, endnote 7).

63 CF, 83.1.
sin is followed by the analytic internal consequence of living in a lower state of being.

This reading allows Schleiermacher to escape the pitfalls (outlined earlier) of understanding the problem of sin merely in terms of external or contingently internal consequences.

There are places where Schleiermacher characterizes the evil that results from sin in such a way that the “evil” under consideration can be understood as external consequences that result on account of sin. For example, Schleiermacher at one point notes that we do not see a correspondence between sin and “evil” in the individual.

When someone lies, he is not always afflicted with disease; and honest people often get sick. Thus, he argues, we must see the connection between sin and evil on a corporate scale.\(^64\) And again,

\[\ldots\text{each individual does not wholly and exclusively suffer precisely the evil which is connected with his personal sin.}\(^65\]

This take appears to associate external consequences with sin. If this is the end of Schleiermacher’s analysis of the consequences of sin, he will be susceptible to all of the criticisms of such a view offered above.\(^66\)

There is, however, another consequence to sin that Schleiermacher discusses; one which sees internal consequences for sin. According to Schleiermacher, sin can lead to a

\(^{64}\) CF, 84.2

\(^{65}\) CF, 104.4

\(^{66}\) See this diss., pp. 27-32. Not only is this view subject to the above criticisms, also the corporate element emphasized by Schleiermacher allows for at least one additional criticism. If the self from which we are being rescued is “a self-enclosed life of feeling within a sensuous vital unity, to which all sympathetic feeling for others and for the whole was subordinated” (CF, 101.2), it would be strange that an awareness of the suffering of humanity in general would produce in us an essentially altruistic desire for a higher life (especially if we were experiencing no personal suffering). If the consequences of sin are supposed to spur the sinner towards repentance in some way, a more complete account of the consequences of sin is necessary; one which takes into account some element of personal suffering by the sinner.
certain experience of pain. When we sin, the lower consciousness feels pleasure, but the higher consciousness (which is aware of legitimate moral demands) feels pain.67

C.W. Christian describes this Schleiermacherian view of pain in the following way.

…what we call sin is the experience of God accompanied by a sense of alienation or guilt. Sin is the state in which we find ourselves when we think of God, and it “hurts.”68

Further Wyman claims,

By the experience of Unlust Schleiermacher apparently means a sense of incompleteness, mental discomfort, of things somehow out of joint, of the world lacking in religious meaning.69

This take appears to analyze the consequences of sin in terms of internal consequences.70

Of course, as we noted above, internal consequences for sin can often be seen as external consequences relative to God.71 Thus, it would seem that God could rescue us from these consequences of sin by breaking the connection between sin and the internal pain experienced by the sinner.

67 CF 66.1

68 Christian, p. 114.

69 Wyman, p. 133.

70 It is important to maintain a distinction between external and internal suffering when analyzing Schleiermacher’s view of the consequences of sin. External suffering can be understood as the suffering that results from living in a community of selfish beings. External suffering is the sort of thing that exists in the world without direct correlation to personal sin. Internal suffering, on the other hand, is the sort of thing that is experienced, for example, in the pangs of conscience. We could say that internal suffering is experienced when we become conscious of penal desert (CF, 84.2). Likewise, we could say that external sufferings are internalized when they are received as hindrances to life or as deserved penalties. Indeed, Schleiermacher must make such a distinction if we are to make sense of his claim that evil diminishes as actual sin diminishes, even though a person’s material condition may remain the same (CF, 84.2). Only in this way can Christ’s assuming us into fellowship with Himself dissolve the connection between sin and evil such that for the believer pain no longer means “simple misery” (CF, 101.2). Schleiermacher himself points out that the believer will continue to suffer (CF, 104.4). Thus, if evil truly diminishes as sin diminishes, then we must see a connection between sin and internal suffering in distinction from the connection between sin and external suffering.

71 See this diss., p. 34.
However, if I have read Schleiermacher correctly, then the internal consequence of pain experienced by the sinner is supposed to correlate with an awareness of the *analytic internal consequence*\textsuperscript{72} of existing in a lower state of being. Schleiermacher claims that legitimate moral demands assert themselves in our self-consciousness in such a way that we perceive any deviation from them as a “hindrance of life, and therefore as sin.”\textsuperscript{73} Elsewhere he claims that

...we have the consciousness of sin whenever the God-consciousness…determines our self-consciousness as pain.\textsuperscript{74}

Thus, the internal consequence of pain relates to our awareness of sin as a hindrance of life. If I understand Schleiermacher correctly, it is this hindrance of life which is the ultimate problem of sin, and that which Christ suffered to overcome. As we saw above, such an understanding of the problem of sin will allow Schleiermacher to escape the typical pitfalls of analyzing the problem of sin in terms of external or contingently internal consequences. That is, the hindrance of life cannot be removed without also removing the sinful state which *is* the hindrance of life.

**The Role of the Human Will**

If the ultimate problem of sin is that in sin we exist in a lower state of being, why doesn’t God simply raise us to the higher state of being, much in the way that a mechanic might raise a machine into a higher-functioning state? The answer, it seems, involves an appeal to the human will. If our defective state is a result of and/or comprised of, at least

\textsuperscript{72} See this diss., p. 37.
\textsuperscript{73} CF, 83.1.
\textsuperscript{74} CF, 66.
in part, a willfulness on the part of the human being, God may avoid simply forcing a change in us out of a concern to preserve human freedom.

Sin, according to Schleiermacher goes beyond a mere state of defect (the impotence of the God-consciousness against the flesh).\(^75\) Schleiermacher claims that the fact that the defect becomes sin is a result of human willfulness. Thus, he claims, that sin is “rooted” in human freedom\(^76\) though God created the elements that make up the defect (the natural impulse and the God-consciousness).

The relationship between our defective state and our will is represented in the difference between “original” and “actual” sin. The defective disposition that logically precedes our will (that is, the strength of the flesh against the spirit) is the original sin, in which our guilt is latent. This is the state of sin. Actual sins are our sinful actions. They are movements of the will which reveal the presence of a defective state\(^78\) and further perpetuate that state.\(^79\) We remain in a lower state because our will does not respond as it should to the insight and exhortation offered through the God-consciousness.\(^80\) Thus, wrong action relates to the problem of sin insofar as it reveals and perpetuates this low and sinful state.

\(^{75}\) CF, 83.3.

\(^{76}\) CF, 81.2. See also Adams, p. 568.

\(^{77}\) CF, 83.3.

\(^{78}\) CF, 69.3.

\(^{79}\) CF, 69.1.

\(^{80}\) CF, 68.
The Nature of the Solution to the Problem of Sin: Moral Perfection

In view of this problem we already have a general idea of what salvation would look like in Schleiermacher’s soteriology. A sinless state, as noted above, is a state in which the God-consciousness rules over the impulses of the flesh.\textsuperscript{81} The goal of salvation is to produce this state in the believer. Somehow our impulses and motive principle must be changed. The God-consciousness must increase in us, and the sensuous consciousness must decrease. Just such a transformation is what Schleiermacher claims the Redeemer intends. According to Schleiermacher, the fruit of Christ’s saving activity is the transformation of the internal composition of the person. The person’s impressions are differently received. The personal self-consciousness becomes altogether different.\textsuperscript{82} If I have interpreted Schleiermacher correctly above, the sinless state which would result could be accurately characterized as a state of moral perfection.

Parameters in Pursuit of a State of Moral Perfection

On my reading of Schleiermacher, the pursuit of this goal will be confined by at least three parameters. First, transformation cannot be achieved by the sinner’s strength alone. Second, the sinner’s will is the gateway through which God will pursue this goal of transformation. And finally, God will not force the human will in God’s pursuit of the goal of transformation.

Parameter 1: The Sinner Cannot Transform on Her Own Strength

It does not appear that we can accomplish such a transformation by our own efforts. Evidence from Schleiermacher’s “Second Speech” indicates that the God-

\textsuperscript{81} CF, 66.2.

\textsuperscript{82} CF, 100.2.
consciousness is something to be received rather than something to be achieved. In the “Second Speech” Schleiermacher describes the essence of religion as the "intuition of the universe." Schleiermacher then points out that the intuition of the universe, or "Infinite," proceeds from that which is intuited to the one who intuits. Further, the goal of religion is to be passively filled with the influences of the universe. Now, if I am correct in claiming that the goal of religion in *The Christian Faith* is to be filled with the God-consciousness, then we have reason to read “God-consciousness” in place of “the intuition of the universe.” In this case, God-consciousness is something to be received passively by human beings. It will take the form of influence received from God’s initiation. This move receives further support from the second edition of the “Second Speech” in which Schleiermacher shies away from using the term “universe” and instead claims that the object of religion is God and the world. This gives us an indication that it is acceptable to read “the universe” or “the Infinite,” as “God.”

This reading of the passivity of human transformation is consistent with Schleiermacher’s language in *The Christian Faith*. There he makes reference to the

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84 See Friedrich Schleiermacher, "Second Speech: The Nature of Religion," in *On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers*, 2nd ed., translated by John Oman. (New York: Harper and Row, 1958). (SS, 2nd ed.). The first edition of the "Second Speech" was published in 1799. The second edition was published in 1821. Concerning the differences between the two editions I hold that the changes in the second edition do not represent a new or modified theory of religion. Rather, the changes appear to respond to possible concerns that could have arisen after the publication of the first edition by making more explicit certain points that were already allowed for or implied by the first edition. So, by referring to "God" instead of the "universe" in the second edition, Schleiermacher seems to be steering away from the "materialistic pantheism" that can be easily read into the first edition but which he did not intend (SS, 2nd ed., p. 115).

85 SS, 1st ed., p. 104

86 SS, 1st ed., p. 102

divine impartation of the God-consciousness. Further, he says that God gives us consciousness of God's will. In fact, Schleiermacher indicates that since sin, properly speaking, cannot be present without the God-consciousness, God (the giver of the God-consciousness) is in a sense responsible for sin. Also, he claims that we cannot be expected to begin this transformation by ourselves.

Parameter 2: The Sinner’s Will is the Gateway to Transformation

While the transformation of self-consciousness is fundamentally passive in character, we can see that the human will can be a hindrance to this transformation. There is evidence of this in the “Second Speech.” In the “Second Speech” Schleiermacher links intuition with feeling. In fact, feeling is so attached to intuition that Schleiermacher includes it as part of the essence of religion. In the first edition of the “Second Speech” he even says that "intuition without feeling is nothing." He claims that the intuition of the universe produces a change in the "inner consciousness" of the intuiting subject. This change can come in the form of, for example, "heartfelt reverence," a feeling of kinship with humanity, and "the humblest desire to be reconciled

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88 CF, 81.1.
89 CF, 81.3.
90 CF, 81.1. Also, God is not the Author of sin in itself, but God can be considered to have authored sin with a view to redemption (CF, 81.3).
91 CF, 104.4. See also Christian, p.115.
93 SS, 1st ed., p. 102.
94 SS, 1st ed., p. 112.
to the deity.\textsuperscript{96} Now, we noted above that the reception of this “intuition of the universe” is initiated by God. If this is the case, then why doesn’t everyone experience religious feelings? Either God must show a kind of favoritism or persons must vary in their degree of receptivity. Schleiermacher appears to favor the second explanation.

While the connection between intuition and feeling is intimate, it is mediated by a certain attitude of openness or desire. Notice that Schleiermacher tells his religious despisers that something like religious intuition has likely entered their minds before, but before this intuition could achieve its effect upon their minds it was dispensed with or simply misunderstood.\textsuperscript{97} Thus, the genuine reception of intuition depends “entirely on the mood and attitude of the mind.”\textsuperscript{98}

Thus, inasmuch as intuition is hindered by a lack of openness and cannot beget feeling, what was potentially an intuition is not properly actualized as intuition. If, on the other hand, an attitude of openness is present in the intuiting subject, intuition will necessarily beget feeling and so will truly be actualized as intuition.\textsuperscript{99} As a result, the willing attitude of the intuiting subject acts as a sort of gateway to transformation. If we are to passively receive redemption, we must be willing for it to be imparted to us.

\textsuperscript{96} SS, 1\textsuperscript{st} ed., pp. 129-130.

\textsuperscript{97} SS, 1\textsuperscript{st} ed., p. 127.

\textsuperscript{98} SS, 2\textsuperscript{nd} ed., p. 106.

\textsuperscript{99} It appears, then, that if any one of these three components is missing (intuition/feeling/an attitude of openness) they all are missing, and where one is properly present, they all are present. Thus, Schleiermacher can refer to each as being the essence of religion. Furthermore, even in the first edition, Schleiermacher centralizes the role of feeling in his theory of religion (SS, 1\textsuperscript{st} ed., p. 130).
Parameter 3: God Respects Human Freedom

To enter through a gateway, one often has the option of breaking the lock and forcing his way inside. Likewise, God could simply override our unwillingness by divine fiat. If God wished, God could simply ignore our attitude and force upon us the change necessary for redemption. Of course, if God did this, God would seemingly have to retract the gift of freedom. Unless God is to retract the gift of freedom, God must somehow make us willing to receive the God-consciousness.

Schleiermacher claims that God does not redeem us by overriding our own choices. He points out that "the commanding will of God does not of itself secure obedience."\(^{100}\) And again, he claims that "submission to [Christ’s] lordship must always be voluntary."\(^{101}\) As, in the beginning, God created freedom in the human soul (a mystery "which we cannot expect to understand"), so Christ’s creation concerns freedom.\(^{102}\) Christ's activity of salvation is creative, "yet what it produces is altogether free."\(^{103}\) Thus, he claims that Christ saves us by means of "a creative production in us of the will to assume Him into ourselves."\(^{104}\) Christ seeks to evoke our "assent to the influence of His activity."\(^{105}\) Schleiermacher proceeds to say that,

\(^{100}\) CF, 81.1.
\(^{101}\) CF, 105.1.
\(^{102}\) CF, 100.2.
\(^{103}\) Ibid.
\(^{104}\) Ibid.
\(^{105}\) Ibid.
…the original activity of the Redeemer is best conceived as a pervasive influence which is received by its object in virtue of the free movement with which [the object] turns himself to its attraction… 106

In other words Christ creates willingness through Christ's attractiveness. In this way the power by which Christ opens the gate of our wills is like the attractive power of someone's "educative intellectual influence" to which we freely submit ourselves. 107

One Problem for this Reading and My Response

Someone might object to my reading in the following way. Above we noted that by "intuition of the universe" we can understand "God-consciousness." We also noted that if a potential intuition of the universe meets an unwilling attitude on the part of the intuiting subject it cannot manifest itself as intuition properly speaking. This is to say that the God-consciousness is not received if we are unwilling to receive it. We also noted, however that the presence of the God-consciousness is necessary in order for sin to exist. Is it not a contradiction to claim that the problem of sin is that we are not willing to receive that which must be present in order for sin to exist?

To preserve my reading against this criticism we will have to make a distinction within the God-consciousness. Some part of the God-consciousness will be present in us despite our attitude. Another part can be imparted to us only with the consent of our will. In The Christian Faith we have a candidate for the former in "conscience."

Schleiermacher defines conscience as

...the fact that all modes of activity issuing from our God-consciousness and subject to its prompting confront us as moral demands. 108

106 Ibid.
107 Ibid.
Recall that it is the awareness of moral demands that must be present for sin to exist.\textsuperscript{109} Thus, it is not surprising that Schleiermacher also claims that it is because of conscience that a given state becomes sin.\textsuperscript{110} Yet, Schleiermacher notes that "conscience is not identical with the fact of the God-consciousness in man."\textsuperscript{111} Now, since Schleiermacher also claims that it is only the presence of the God-consciousness that makes our state a sinful one,\textsuperscript{112} we must hold that conscience is part of (though, not the whole of) the God-consciousness. In fact, we see Schleiermacher doing just this when he distinguishes between the God-consciousness as understanding and the God-consciousness as will and implies that conscience falls into the former category.\textsuperscript{113} Thus, we can say that the God-consciousness as understanding is present in us (at least in some degree) despite the openness of our will, while our reception of the God-consciousness in its fullness can only be had if we are open to it.\textsuperscript{114}

\textsuperscript{108} CF, 83.1.

\textsuperscript{109} See this diss., pp. 47-49.

\textsuperscript{110} CF, 83.1.

\textsuperscript{111} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{112} CF, 67.1.

\textsuperscript{113} CF, 83.1.

\textsuperscript{114} This does not mean that the God-consciousness as understanding in its entirety must be present in us for sin to be present. Really we would only need one moral command to which we were unwilling to submit our sensuous self-consciousness. This allows for the possibility that the God-consciousness as understanding grows in us as we open ourselves to transformation. This also addresses the concern that Schleiermacher's account of sin entails that a person must have awareness of God in order to be a sinner. We can see here that an atheist or agnostic could become a sinner by allowing the impulses of the flesh to motivate despite impulses from conscience (or the God-consciousness as understanding) to the contrary.
The Role of the Cross in the Solution

We might now inquire, “How, in Schleiermacher, does the Cross of Christ function in God’s project of transforming our self-consciousness?” As noted above, Schleiermacher describes Christ’s activity as a sort of attraction. Christ attracts us to God’s project of transformation. In what follows I will attempt to articulate Schleiermacher’s view as to how Christ accomplishes this.

The longing for a better state of being is too general for us to claim that it is all that is needed to induce openness to the work of Christ. One can want something better but not know where to go to acquire it. This is where the suffering of Christ plays an important role in Schleiermacher’s soteriology. He claims that,

…in order to effect assumption into the fellowship of His blessedness, the longing of those who were conscious of their misery must first be drawn to Christ through the impression they had received of His blessedness.

And Christ’s blessedness is seen in its fullness in that “it was not overcome even by the full tide of suffering.” Again, he claims that in Christ’s suffering we can perceive Christ’s "imperturbable" blessedness. And again, Schleiermacher claims that if Christ, forseeing His death, perceived a means to avoid this death without shirking His duty, it was His responsibility to fulfill the duty of self-preservation. It behooved Christ to die, however, so that in doing so "He might proclaim the full dominion of the spirit over the

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115 See this diss., pp. 64-65.
116 CF, 101.4.
117 Ibid.
118 CF, 104.4.
A death such as the one Christ endured was more effective toward this end than an accidental death would have been. Yet, why should this vision of Christ draw us to Christ rather than provoke us to simple envy? We will envy, or merely admire, Christ if Christ represents a state of blessedness in which we can never partake. However, if Christ invites us to join in His blessedness, then we may open ourselves to Him that He might begin this project in us. If I have read Schleiermacher correctly, He argues that Christ makes just such an invitation through His teaching and His action in the Cross.

First, Christ calls us to "eternal life in the Kingdom of God." This is a very straightforward invitation to the sort of fellowship that we need in order to exist in a state of blessedness. But how do we know that such an invitation is legitimate? Anyone can make a promise of blessedness, but only God can execute that promise. Perhaps this is why Schleiermacher claims that the invitation to fellowship with Christ is most truly extended "by the proclamation of His peculiar dignity." That is, Christ also teaches us that He has a special relationship to the Father; one in which the Father reveals to Christ and is revealed through Christ.

As I read Schleiermacher, this invitation reaches its climax on the Cross. Schleiermacher claims that,
...in [Christ’s] suffering unto death, occasioned by His steadfastness, there is manifested to us an absolutely self-denying love; and in this there is represented to us with perfect vividness the way in which God was in Him to reconcile the world to Himself...\textsuperscript{124}

It will be helpful to note that Schleiermacher claims that Christ’s willing self-surrender is "identical with His persistence in redemptive activity."\textsuperscript{125} If we can understand this redemptive activity to begin with His attempt to attract us to Him, then we have reason to claim that Christ endures the Cross in order to reveal His blessedness to us and to draw us into a participation in that blessedness. Once this is realized, then we can see in Christ on the Cross "an absolutely self-denying love."\textsuperscript{126} If we remember that the Father is revealed in Christ then we see God in Christ showing forth God’s love for us; a love which is intended to invite us and attract us to fellowship with God. Once we have been opened to the work of Christ, God can begin the work of transforming our self-consciousness. That is, God can animate us such that "we ourselves are led to an ever more perfect fulfillment of the divine will."\textsuperscript{127}

**Final Evaluation of Schleiermacher’s Conception of Sin and Its Solution**

Let us now ask whether Schleiermacher’s understanding of the problem of sin and salvation can inspire a staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can plausibly avoid problems 1–6. While such a theory could plausibly escape problem (2), the problem of superfluous suffering (a problem which plagued the first two conceptions of sin above), it seems that such a satisfaction theory would still be confronted by at least two of

\textsuperscript{124} CF, 104.4.

\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{127} CF, 104.3.
problems: (3), the appeal to robust love and (6), the impotence problem. I will address each in turn.

Now, it seems that Schleiermacher has allowed for a theory that can escape (2), the problem of superfluous suffering. Since God has chosen to respect human freedom in God’s attempt to deliver humans from sin, God cannot merely deliver humans by divine decree. We have seen that God, given this Self-imposed limitation, must somehow seek to draw open the human will. It is arguably the case that Christ’s suffering is the most effective way of opening human wills to God’s project of transformation.128 Perhaps, God’s seeking satisfaction in Christ’s suffering is the most effective means to achieve this goal. As a result the satisfaction theorist could plausibly claim that Christ's suffering involves some sort a benefit that could not be had in any other way (the benefit of being the most effective means to non-forcefully open human wills to God’s project of transformation).129

Still, as we saw earlier in the analysis of the third conception of the problem of sin, this defense against the problem of superfluous suffering is on tenuous ground.

128 Though, it would be difficult to prove that it is certainly the most effective way, it is at least plausibly the most effective way, and as such would offer hope for escaping the problem of superfluous suffering.

129 Such a view even offers a plausible justification for the internal and external consequences that result from sin. The pains associated with this lowly state can be seen as divine penalties that exist to spur us toward deliverance. In fact, Schleiermacher defines divine punishment as, "…that which must of necessity be interposed wherever and in so far as the power of the God-consciousness is as yet inactive in the sinner, its object being to prevent his dominant sensuous tendencies from meanwhile attaining complete mastery through mere unchecked habit" (CF, 101.3). When we do not need to be deterred from choosing a lowly state, then, punishment is not necessary. One might ask, “Why must God associate any pain at all with our lowly state?” The goal is to keep us from becoming complacent in our lowly state. If we do not experience, at least dissatisfaction, how will we avoid complacency? God could allow us to be comfortable with our low state, but it would be a rather unloving thing to abandon us out of "kindness." And what is more, it could not free us from evil. For if we exist in this lowly state in a community of humans, there is sure to be wars, theft, envies and all sorts of misery (On this point, see also C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, pp. 32ff.).
Specifically, an objector might question the benefit of *non-forcefully* opening human wills as opposed to forceful transformation. First of all, in pursuing a non-forceful opening of the will, it is highly likely that not every will will respond to the attraction of Christ in the Cross. A forceful transformation by an omnipotent God, however, would certainly result in the transformation of every human being and thus complete human sinlessness.

This leaves a staurocentric satisfaction theory built on a Schleiermacherian conception of sin and salvation vulnerable to problem (3), the appeal to robust love. An objector could claim that ensuring the forced transformation of all humans is more loving than winning the non-forceful transformation of only some humans. Suppose that in allowing human freedom, God allows for the possibility of three states. The highest state is sinlessness with consent. Second, is sinlessness without consent. The third and lowest state is the state of sin. An objector could argue that it is more loving to guarantee that everyone exists in the second state (if possible) than to have some people existing in the first and some existing in the third. If a parent had two sick children, the loving parent would not respect human freedom when administering the medicine that would cure the child’s illness. Rather, each child would receive her medicine whether she wished it or not. This objector could argue that God, in respecting human freedom and thus allowing some humans to persist in a low state, is actually failing to manifest a character of robust love (as would the parent who respected his child’s wish not to receive medicine). Thus, even though a theory of satisfaction could plausibly escape problem (2), the problem of superfluous suffering, an objector could maintain that it fails to escape problem (3), the appeal to robust love.
Even if such a theory could escape this problem, it would still be confronted by problem (6), the impotence problem. That is, according to Schleiermacher’s view of sin, it appears that one could exist in a sinless state while still hating God. One could acknowledge that one is in a lowly state and cannot, on one’s own strength, attain to the higher state wherein the God-consciousness rules over the impulses of the flesh. Further, it is possible that one could see Christ’s blessedness and invitation through Christ’s suffering. One might then submit to God’s transformative influence through Christ much in the same way that one could submit to someone’s educative influence or a doctor’s healing influence. Yet, despite all of this, it seems that the sinner could still resent or even hate God, just as a student might despise her teacher or a patient might despise his doctor while recognizing the need for the teacher or doctor. If this is the case, then Schleiermacher has failed to capture the complete nature of sin. A theory of satisfaction based on this conception of sin would then be vulnerable to the impotence problem.\(^\text{130}\)

Schleiermacher’s conception of the problem of sin and its solution has clear advantages over the first two conceptions of sin. However, if we are to develop a staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can avoid all of problems 1–6, we must seek another conception of the problem of sin. In the next section, I argue that just such a conception can be found in the problem of sin as articulated by Kierkegaard.

\(^{130}\) One might argue that I have misread Schleiermacher and that part of the influence of the God-consciousness is to restore a love of God in the heart of the sinner. Anyone who thus despises God is still in a state of sin in which the impulses of the flesh have too much strength over the God-consciousness. This would be to argue that Schleiermacher can escape these problems by employing a personalist aspect to his conception of sin. That a personalist understanding of the problem of sin is necessary to escape all of problems 1-6 is the main thesis of this chapter.
Kierkegaard’s Conception of the Problem of Sin and Its Solution

In this section I will offer a reading and critical analysis of the problem of sin as it is presented in Kierkegaard's *The Sickness Unto Death*. I will also offer a reading and critical analysis of the solution to sin, faith, as it is presented in Kierkegaard's *Fear and Trembling*. I will then ask whether such a view of sin and its solution can offer hope for the development of a theory of satisfaction which can avoid problems 1–6.

I will argue that in *The Sickness Unto Death* sin is conceived of as a state of alienation from God. This state is realized when we freely refuse to rest dependently on God. That is, we pursue our terms for our own flourishing rather than God's terms. In doing so, we exist in a lower state of being which is an analytic internal consequence of existing in a state of sin. I will then offer an answer to the question, "What are God's terms for our flourishing?" by developing an understanding of faith as it is presented in *Fear and Trembling*. I will argue that faith can be understood as a state in which we place our trust in the Person of God not simply instrumentally, *for* our fulfillment, but intrinsically, *as* our fulfillment.

Finally, I will ask whether this reading can inspire a staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can escape problems 1–6. I will argue that this Kierkegaardian understanding of the problem of sin, as an example of the fourth conception analyzed above (a personalist conception), can justify the necessity of the Cross in a way that preserves the benefits of the third conception (as in Schleiermacher) while avoiding the problems to which such a conception is susceptible.
The Problem of Sin

Sin as a State of Alienation from God

Kierkegaard, using the pseudonym "Anti-Climacus," warns against falling into the mistaken assumption that sin is merely a problem of wrong actions. This is as superficial, he says, "as supposing that a train moves only when the locomotive puffs." Instead,

…this puff and the subsequent propulsion are not what should be considered but rather the steady impetus with which the locomotive proceeds and which produces that puffing. And so it is with sin. In the deepest sense, the state of sin is the sin; the particular sins are not the continuance of sin but the expression for the continuance of sin; in the specific new sin the impetus of sin merely becomes more perceptible to the eye.

As in Schleiermacher, while acts of sin are a problem, the full problem of sin must include an account of the state of the sinner. This state will likely manifest itself in various acts of sin, but the core problem will not be located in the acts.

Anti-Climacus claims that sin is more like a sickness. He begins to describe the human sickness which leads to death. He claims that “Christianly understood” no earthly

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131 In The Sickness unto Death (SUD) Kierkegaard is writing under the pseudonym, Anti-Climacus. He uses his own name as editor. For a brief comment on this pseudonym’s role in Kierkegaard’s authorship, see Sylvia Walsh, Living Christianly: Kierkegaard’s Dialectic of Christian Existence (Pennsylvania: The Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005), pp. 20-21. Also see, Murray Rae, Kierkegaard and Theology (London: T & T Clark, 2010), pp. 56-57. Also see, Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, Introduction to The Sickness Unto Death, edited and translated by Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (New Jersey: Princeton, 1980), pp. xix-xxiii. For my purpose here, it will not be necessary to determine the relationship between the beliefs espoused by Anti-Climacus and Kierkegaard’s actual beliefs. I am only concerned with explicating the conception of sin as it is presented in SUD and determining whether such a view can contribute to a satisfaction theory that avoids the problems outlined above.

132 SUD, XI 216.

133 Ibid.

134 “Certainly Anti-Climacus views sin as being fundamentally an inward ontological condition of humanity rather than consisting in particular external immoral acts. Particular sins are merely an expression of a more fundamental state of being in sin” (Walsh, p. 25).
suffering is the sickness unto death. That is, neither need, nor illness, nor grief is the sickness unto death. In fact, from a Christian worldview, not even death is the sickness unto death. That is because, from this perspective, our death in this life is only a minor event in an eternal life.\textsuperscript{135} When the human is considered as a soul, with an existence that extends beyond this body then the deadly sickness is what Anti-Climacus refers to as "despair"\textsuperscript{136} or "sin."\textsuperscript{137}

\textit{The Conditions under Which the State of Sin is Possible}

Anti-Climacus describes despair "in the strict sense" as taking one of two forms. One can either in despair not will to be oneself, or in despair will to be oneself.\textsuperscript{138} In one place Anti-Climacus claims that all despair proper\textsuperscript{139} can be traced back to this second form of despair: in despair to will to be oneself.\textsuperscript{140} He describes this second form of despair as

\ldots the expression for the complete dependence of the relation (of the self), the expression for the inability of the self to arrive at or to be in equilibrium and rest by itself, but only, in relating itself to itself, by relating itself to that which has established the entire relation.\textsuperscript{141}

If I have read Anti-Climacus correctly, then when he says that the second form of despair is “the expression for . . .,” he means to indicate that the fact that such a type of despair

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{135} SUD, XI 122.
  \item \textsuperscript{136} SUD, XI 127.
  \item \textsuperscript{137} SUD, XI 189.
  \item \textsuperscript{138} SUD, XI 127.
  \item \textsuperscript{139} For a brief comment on the distinction between the lower forms of despair and the intensification of despair which makes up sin, see Walsh, p. 22.
  \item \textsuperscript{140} SUD, XI 128.
  \item \textsuperscript{141} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
exists is only possible because of what follows (namely, because the relation is completely dependent, etc.). This reading gathers support from what immediately precedes the quote above.

If a human self had itself established itself [as opposed to being established by another], then there could be only one form: not to will to be oneself, to will to do away with oneself, but there could not be the form: in despair to will to be oneself.\(^{142}\)

Thus, we can read Anti-Climacus as saying that part of what makes this despair possible is the fact that the relation is completely dependent, that is, unable to find rest by itself. If this is the case, then we are justified in supposing that Anti-Climacus is offering us a metaphysical backdrop against which this type of despair is possible.

Anti-Climacus gives us two criteria for the possibility of despair: human dependence and human freedom. Since by "relation" Anti-Climacus means to indicate the human spirit or self,\(^{143}\) we can read him as saying that the human being is completely dependent. Upon what is the human being dependent? It is dependent upon that which established the self, that is, God.\(^{144}\) Thus the self will not find rest until it rests dependently upon God. It must do this "in relating itself to itself." This is to say that the human being must do so freely (since elsewhere Anti-Climacus has referred to the

\(^{142}\) Ibid.


\(^{144}\) SUD, XI 130.
relation’s relating itself to itself as “human freedom”). Thus, this fact of human freedom is the second factor that makes sin possible.

Finally, we should note that after setting this metaphysical backdrop as a defining feature of the second form of despair, Anti-Climacus says that

...this second form of despair (in despair to will to be oneself) is so far from designating merely a distinctive kind of despair that, on the contrary, all despair ultimately can be traced back to and be resolved in it.

As a result, we can conclude that Anti-Climacus is claiming that any sin is possible because humans are dependent upon God and have the freedom to choose to embrace or to defy this relationship of dependence.

The Manner in Which the State of Sin is Realized

Sin is realized when a person chooses not to embrace this relationship of dependence upon God. Anti-Climacus elaborates upon this point in another section in which he claims that all despair can be traced back to the first kind of despair: in despair not to will to be oneself. He describes this form of despair using two examples. In one case a person desires to be Caesar. But when the person cannot attain to this level of

145 Ibid. Or rather, we might say, the human being truly acts freely when it acts in dependence upon God.

146 Rae makes a similar point in the following way, “We exist in relation to God and are endowed with freedom to respond to God in love—or in defiance. Both things are true of each human subject; we are at once both finite, limited, material beings and yet endowed with freedom and called to life in communion with God” (Rae, p.92). However, Rae goes on to interpret the self’s “relating itself to itself” as self-consciousness. I have given evidence above to show that this aspect of the self should be read as human freedom.

147 SUD, XI 128.

148 Murray Rae appears to make a similar point in Kierkegaard and Theology where he says, "We exist in relation to God and are endowed with freedom to respond to God in love—or in defiance. Both things are true of each human subject; we are at once both finite, limited, material beings and yet endowed with freedom and called to life in communion with God" (Rae, p. 92).

149 SUD, XI 134.
power, wealth, and prestige the person despairs over himself.\textsuperscript{150} He cannot bear to be himself and now wants to be rid of himself. He despairs over himself because he cannot be the self that \textit{he} wants to be.\textsuperscript{151} In another case a girl despairs because her beloved has died. She despairs over having to be a self without her beloved, and despairingly wishes to be rid of this self. She despairs over herself because she cannot be the self that \textit{she} wants to be.\textsuperscript{152}

What is common to both despairing persons is that they both have set their own terms for their own flourishing. When they cannot achieve this, they are distraught and no longer wish to be. But Anti-Climacus points out, that even if they had reached their own goals, they would still be in despair. Even the person who despairingly wills to be himself is desiring to be something that he is not. Even if he becomes Caesar he has made it clear that “he wants to tear his self away from the power that established it.”\textsuperscript{153} Again, this person has set the terms for his own flourishing. And even if he attains to these terms, he is still in despair.

If I have read Anti-Climacus correctly, then when Anti-Climacus claims that the formula for all despair is willing to be rid of oneself\textsuperscript{154} we can read him as saying that all sin involves one’s own setting of the terms for one’s own flourishing. We can understand

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{150} Recall the distinction between despairing "over" and despairing "of." We despair \textit{over} that which binds us in despair. We despair \textit{of} that which releases us. We both despair over and of the self (SUD, XI 64, footnote, p. 60).
\item \textsuperscript{151} SUD, XI 133.
\item \textsuperscript{152} SUD, XI 133-134.
\item \textsuperscript{153} SUD, XI 134.
\item \textsuperscript{154} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
sin as a bid for independence. Because we are by nature dependent upon God for our flourishing, we will not be at rest until we abide in God. But we want to set our own terms, and since we have freedom we can choose to refuse God’s terms. Yet God’s terms are the only terms by which we will find rest. By setting our own terms, we attempt to become the master of ourselves—we attempt to become God. But since we are by nature dependent upon God and the terms that God sets, a person who sets his own terms is merely “a king without a country.”155 Sin is realized when we use our freedom to assert our terms for our flourishing over God’s terms for our flourishing.156 Khan and McKinnon make a similar point where they say,

...despair is essentially the self's reluctance to accept the fact that of itself it does not have the power to become a true self.157

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155 SUD, XI 180.

156 "Christianly conceived...[sin is] supposing that we can invest our own lives with meaning and purpose in defiance of the truly human life established and revealed in Jesus Christ" (Rae, p. 95). Rae is specifically referring here to the second form of despair "in despair to will to be oneself." Yet as I have argued, Anti-Climacus claims that this characteristic is common to both this form of despair and the form "in despair not to will to be oneself." Thus, I’ve applied Rae’s quote to the common nature of sin in SUD argued for above. (Though, one could argue that the one who despairs in weakness just wishes she could invest her life with meaning on her own instead of "supposing" that she can. In either case, there is an assertion of the despairing person's terms over God's terms.) Further, my reading of the conception of sin in SUD differs slightly from Rae’s where he claims, "Sin may be conceived, then, as a mis-relation between the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal, freedom and necessity. To over emphasize the infinite and the eternal is to suppose oneself to be a god; it is to be puffed up, to claim inordinate power and to imagine oneself superior to others. To over-emphasize the finite and the temporal...is to conceive of oneself...entirely in material terms" (Rae, p.93). I claim that the common essence of the mis-relation in any form is to suppose oneself a god not in the sense of considering oneself superior to others, but in the sense of setting the terms for one’s own flourishing as described above. Rae’s reading would leave Anti-Climacus vulnerable to the claim that one could still be in sin while avoiding both of the types of mis-relation described by Rae. I am instead emphasizing a point made by Walsh who says, "...the misrelation in the self to whatever degree and in whatever respect is recognized as being grounded in a prior misrelation to God" (Walsh, p.22).

157 Abraham H. Khan and Alastair McKinnon, "Kierkegaard's Two Forms of Conscious Despair," Studies in Religion 14.4 (1985), p. 453. Khan and McKinnon have rigorously analyzed the two forms of conscious despair for their similarities and differences. While they do note that the two concepts are distinct, they appear to agree that they are relevantly similar in the way that I have argued so far. They note, "Both [types of despair] involve a self which misses its true mark and thus never reaches its human plentitude. In Svaghed the self is either so busy relating itself to its own imaginary construct of the self, or so absorbed in
The question then arises, “How do we rest dependently on the power that established us?” That is, what exactly are God’s terms for human flourishing? We will address this question below in a section discussing the nature of the solution to the problem of sin.\(^{158}\)

**The Problematic Consequences of Such a State**

We’ve seen that an appeal to external consequences for sin will offer us no hope in developing a staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can escape problems 1–6. In Kierkegaard’s authorship there are clear references to internal consequences of sin, such as subjective anxiety.\(^{159}\) Yet, as we’ve seen, if this is the end of the problem of sin, we will still be unlikely to develop a successful satisfaction theory.

It seems, however, that Kierkegaard also has a place for analytic internal consequences in his authorship’s explication of the problem of sin. Anti-Climacus claims that insofar as we are a self we have the task of becoming ourselves. This, he says, can only be done in relationship to God.\(^{160}\) In this relationship to God, we gain ourselves only by giving ourselves.\(^{161}\) The result, then, of not giving ourselves is simply that we lose ourselves. We become sick unto death. If we were to become ourselves, however, we would find rest. For, “the self in being itself and in willing to be itself rests despiring over its own despair that it ignores its mark...In *Trods* the self misses its mark because...It refuses to rest itself in any power outside itself and instead wills to become itself independently of any external power or assistance...Each is still estranged from its true self” (Khan and McKinnon, p.448).

\(^{158}\) See this diss., pp. 82-90.

\(^{159}\) See Kierkegaard's *The Concept of Anxiety*. This point also referenced in Rae, p. 91.

\(^{160}\) SUD, XI 143.

\(^{161}\) SUD, XI 163.
transparency in God."\textsuperscript{162} According to Anti-Climacus, in choosing to relate properly to God we choose to have real life. Insofar as we do not do so, we choose death. As dependent creatures it is our nature to be dependent. We can never find rest in a bid for independence for it is a bid to become who we can never be. We can never succeed because when we try to become independent of the power that established us, we try to escape becoming who we are "in truth."\textsuperscript{163}

If what I have said above is correct, then it appears some consequences of the state of sin necessarily follow from being in that state. Sin is the rejection of a certain personal relationship with God. It will not be possible for God to allow us to simultaneously reject such a relationship and enjoy any analytically connected benefits of having such a relationship. If this is the case, then God cannot merely wave God’s hand at the consequences and allow sin to continue. We must be changed into the kind of people that relate appropriately to God.

The Role of the Human Will

As indicated above, the role of human freedom is part of what makes sin possible and is that through which sin is realized. As a result, we can understand Anti-Climacus’ claim that the state of sin is a "position."\textsuperscript{164} Sylvia Walsh states that this claim that sin is a position refers,

\textsuperscript{162} SUD, XI 194.

\textsuperscript{163} SUD, XI 134. Rae notes, “Climacus has also told us that sin is ‘to exist in untruth’ (\textit{Philosophical Fragments}, 15), to exist, that is, in alienation from the one who is himself the Truth” (Rae, p. 90).

\textsuperscript{164} SUD, XI 207.
...to the fact that sin is not a given condition or state in human beings...Rather, sin is a condition that is posited by humans themselves.”

Thus, we can see the centrality of the human will in this concept of sin.

The Nature of the Solution to the Problem of Sin: Faith

I have argued that to rest transparently in the power that established us we must freely embrace God’s terms for human flourishing. According to Kierkegaard the state in which this is accomplished is called, "faith." Anti-Climacus claims that the opposite of sin is faith.

...the formula...which describes a state in which there is no despair at all...is also the formula for faith: in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it.

We can gain insight on how to rest in the power that established us by elucidating a Kierkegaardian concept of faith. With this in mind, let us look at some of the characteristics of the "knight of faith" as presented by Kierkegaard through the pseudonym, Johannes de Silentio, in Fear and Trembling.

I will argue that the knight

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166 There is some question as to whether the role that freedom plays in this definition of sin implies that sin is inherently conscious. For discussion of this question see Walsh, pp. 24ff. See also Roberts, pp. 141-146, 153-156. Furthermore, Louis P. Pojman notes that even where Kierkegaard could be read as defining sin as an “ontological category” (e.g. in The Concept of Anxiety and the Postscript), which could be seen as a downplaying of the role of human freedom in sin, Kierkegaard still maintains that “we are infinitely responsible for our condition” (Louis P. Pojman, Kierkegaard's Philosophy of Religion (San Francisco: International Scholars Publications, 1999), p.55).

167 SUD, XI 161.

168 Someone could argue that “faith” in Fear and Trembling (F&T) differs from “faith” in the works attributed to Anti-Climacus. For our purposes here, it is enough to show how Anti-Climacus and Johannes de Silentio can be used together to develop a picture of the problem of sin and its solution that allows for a staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can escape problems 1-6.
of faith radically trusts the Person of God. The trust which characterizes faith is not simply a trust in God for the knight’s fulfillment. That is to say, the trust which is unique to the knight of faith is not simply trust that God will give the knight some other thing which will fulfill him. Rather, the knight of faith trusts God as his fulfillment. That is to say, the knight of faith intimately loves God for God’s Self and not for what God gives the knight of faith.

On "Fear and Trembling" as a Meditation on the Question of Trust

Fear and Trembling involves a lengthy meditation on Abraham's willingness to sacrifice Isaac (whom Abraham loved) at God's command. We can presume, therefore, that De Silentio would have been familiar with the Biblical account of Abraham. I argue that this account portrays Abraham as a person of faith inasmuch as Abraham trusts God.

It appears that if trust in God is not the very essence of what it means to have faith in the Biblical story of Abraham, then it is at least an essential (and likely dominant) part of that conception of faith. When we first meet Abraham in the Genesis account we hear God speaking to Abraham,

Now the LORD said to Abram,
Go forth from your country,
And from your relatives
And from your father's house,
To the land which I will show you;  

And God gives Abraham a promise.

And I will make you a great nation,
And I will bless you,

169 It seems that Rae would agree with this interpretation insofar as he claims that despair is “misplaced trust” (Rae, p. 94).

170 Gen. 12:1.
And make your name great;  
And so you shall be a blessing.\(^{171}\)

In response, we do not hear Abraham speak. We immediately see him act.

So Abram went forth as the LORD had spoken to him;...\(^{172}\)

We are not shown what happened before this. We are not told whether this is the beginning of Abraham's relationship with God, or whether we are being introduced to a relationship with a rich history. What we are given, is an image of trust. Perhaps Abraham doubted. These details are not given to us. It could be that they are kept from us because they are unknown. Or it could be that they are simply unimportant in the shadow of the truth that in the end, Abraham trusted God. In the end, Abraham left everything else that he had known before and set out toward he knew not where. He put his future, his benefit, himself in God's hands.

Soon the trust of Abraham was tested. Though he and his wife were well beyond child-bearing age, God promised them a son. And while it seemed impossible, God fulfilled his promise and Isaac was born. And Abraham loved Isaac.

God then came to Abraham saying,

Take now your son, your only son, whom you love, Isaac, and go to the land of Moriah, and offer him there as a burnt offering on one of the mountains of which I will tell you.\(^{173}\)

In response, we do not hear Abraham speak. Instead, we see him act.

So Abraham rose early in the morning and saddled his donkey, and took two of his young men with him and Isaac his son; and he split wood for

\(^{171}\) Gen. 12:2.  
^{172}\ Gen. 12:4.  
^{173}\ Gen. 22:2 (NASB).
the burnt offering, and arose and went to the place of which God had
told him.\textsuperscript{174}

We are presented with an image of trust. Perhaps Abraham doubted. We are not told.

We are only shown that when the morning came, Abraham trusted God.

The author of Hebrews recounts a long list of men and women of faith. The
author dedicates the central and longest portion of this list to the faith of Abraham.

By faith Abraham, when called to go to a place he would later receive as
his inheritance, obeyed and went, even though he did not know where he
was going...By faith Abraham, even though he was past age—and Sarah
herself was barren—was enabled to become a father because he
considered him faithful who had made the promise...By faith Abraham,
when God tested him, offered Isaac as a sacrifice. He who had received
the promises was about to sacrifice his one and only son, even though God
had said to him, 'It is through Isaac that your offspring will be reckoned.'
Abraham reasoned that God could raise the dead, and figuratively
speaking, he did receive Isaac back from death.\textsuperscript{175}

As God had promised, Abraham's name became great.\textsuperscript{176} And the author of Hebrews
greatly praises Abraham's name because of Abraham's faith. While, in the Genesis
account I suggested that Abraham's actions were characterized by an attitude of trust in
God, the author of Hebrews commends the same actions on account of Abraham's
attitude of faith. Thus, it appears that the Biblical account of faith holds that faith is, or is
essentially comprised of, trust in God.

It is not an unreasonable hypothesis to suppose that De Silentio also noticed this
connection and as a result understands the knight of faith to be a sort of knight of trust in
God. In the light of this we can read Fear and Trembling as a meditation on the question,
“Where should we place our trust?” Or to put it another way, “In what should we place our hope as our fulfillment and flourishing?” Johannes De Silentio seems to suggest that there are three possible objects of human trust: finitude, the ethical, and the Person of God. The knight of faith places his trust in the Person of God.

*On Trust and Infinite Resignation*

In the "Preliminary Expectoration" of *Fear and Trembling*, Johannes de Silentio insists that the movement of infinite resignation is the last stage before faith. This movement involves the relinquishing of everything that belongs to finitude. By resigning himself with regard to everything that belongs to finitude, the knight of infinite resignation surrenders all of his earthly wishes; everything that belongs to earthly happiness. This release may be painful, for one is surrendering things for which one truly wishes. However, even in the pain of this surrender, the knight of infinite resignation experiences peace, rest, and comfort.

The knight of infinite resignation has developed a sort of Stoic indifference to the circumstances of his life. He trusts neither health, nor wealth, nor fame for his fulfillment. He is resigned concerning all of the pleasures of finitude. As a result, he "has grasped the deep secret that even in loving another person one ought to be sufficient to oneself." In his resignation, he has become a man defined by a resolute act of will.

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177 F&T, p. 46.
178 F&T, p. 40.
179 F&T, p. 49.
180 F&T, p. 45.
181 F&T, p. 44.
rather than a man who is passively tossed about by the unpredictable happenings of circumstance. He is content with himself without regard to exterior circumstances. The knight of infinite resignation gives up his trust in exterior circumstance as that which will bring him fulfillment.

The knight of faith is like the knight of infinite resignation in that both must make a movement of infinite resignation, but the knight of faith makes one movement more.\textsuperscript{182}

\textit{On Trust and the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical}

How does the knight of faith differ from the knight of infinite resignation? According to De Silentio, the knight of faith is distinct in that he "teleologically suspends the ethical" in order to relate "absolutely to the Absolute." Even the ethical can be an idol which claims the place that belongs to God alone. According to Anti-Climacus, the person who does this only manages a sort of pharisaical righteousness, but is still failing to be dependent upon God.\textsuperscript{183}

Yet what is the "ethical" that must be suspended? Perhaps it is a sort of culture-specific morality. Someone arguing for this claim could point out that De Silentio does, in fact, equate the ethical with "social morality."\textsuperscript{184} Yet, by "social morality," De Silentio cannot be referring to a set of moral standards that is culture-specific. If so, he would contradict his own claim that the ethical is the universal, which means that it applies to everyone at all times.\textsuperscript{185}

\textsuperscript{182} F&T, pp. 37ff.

\textsuperscript{183} SUD, XI 193-194.

\textsuperscript{184} F&T, p. 55.

\textsuperscript{185} F&T, p. 54.
Instead, it appears that De Silentio is concerned with goodness itself (at least as it relates to how we should, without qualification, behave toward others). If this is what De Silentio means by the “ethical” then he is indeed making a very radical claim when he says that to be a knight of faith one must surrender one’s commitment to the ethical. One must not simply be willing to act against the accepted morality of his time. One must go further, and be willing to relinquish even the Good itself.

De Silentio employs a contrast between the knight of faith and the tragic hero in order to draw out this point. The tragic hero is the person that remains within the ethical, while the knight of faith teleologically suspends the ethical. The tragic hero is a knight of infinite resignation. He has made the infinite movement in relinquishing finitude. But in the contrast in Problemas I and II we see that the tragic hero finds his security in the ethical. The tragic hero puts his trust in the duty that he has relinquished all of his wishes to obey. The knight of faith, by contrast, must surrender both his wishes, and his duty as that which he trusts for his flourishing.

De Silentio may be suggesting that the tragic hero trusts God’s commands in such a way that he does not directly trust the God who gives the commands. While he does trust God’s goodness, it is the goodness that he trusts and not the God who is good. In Problema II, De Silentio makes this point in the following way.

The ethical is the universal, and as such it is also the divine. Thus it is proper to say that every duty is essentially duty to God, but if no more can be said than this, then it is also said that I actually have no duty to God.

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186 F&T, p. 59.
187 F&T, p. 78
188 Ibid.
The duty becomes duty by being traced back to God, but in the duty itself I do not enter into relation to God.189

That is, one can trust in goodness, which may be part of God’s very essence, without trusting God himself. The tragic hero may be in love with a sort of abstraction. God is the Good, but the tragic hero trusts the essence without trusting the Person. De Silentio speaks out against this, claiming that this sort of trust makes the Person, God, impotent. For the tragic hero, God’s power is only in the ethical.190 The tragic hero’s trust in God is impeded by God’s own essence, which stands between him and God. By contrast, the knight of faith as the single individual determines his trust in the ethical through his trust in the absolute.191 He trusts God’s commands only because he trusts the Person, God, who commands. The knight of faith is such a radical that he is willing even to suspend a commitment to God’s essence to trust in the Person of God.

On Trust and the Absolute Relation to the Absolute

The knight of faith, as a “single individual stands in an absolute relation to the absolute.”192 The knight of faith relates directly to God. If I have understood De Silentio correctly, his emphasis here is on personal relationship with God. The knight of faith uses “You” with reference to God, whereas others can only speak of God in the third person.193 De Silentio contrasts the knight of faith with the tragic hero who finds his

189 F&T, p. 68.
190 Ibid.
191 F&T, p. 70.
192 F&T, pp. 56, 120.
193 F&T, p. 78.
security in the ethical. While the ethical is the divine, the tragic hero does not, as the knight of faith does, enter into a private relationship with the divine.\(^{194}\)

As I have argued, this personal relationship is one wherein the knight of faith puts his trust in the Person of God.\(^{195}\) Yet a distinction is necessary. As I have read *Fear and Trembling*, the knight of faith does not merely put his trust in God for his fulfillment. He puts his trust in God as his fulfillment. Someone could put his trust in earthly wishes as his fulfillment while trusting God for his earthly wishes. In such a case, that person’s ultimate trust is in his earthly wishes and not in the Person of God.\(^{196}\) He is simply relying on God to give him what he really wants.\(^{197}\) The knight of faith trusts the Person of God as his fulfillment.\(^{198}\) Indeed, if I have read De Silentio correctly, then we can say that the absolute relation involves perfect love of God.\(^{199}\)

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\(^{194}\) F&T, p. 60.

\(^{195}\) It seems that I differ here from Khan and McKinnon who say, "...the self does not become properly structured until it humbly accepts the forgiveness of sins. Further, its constitutive force is not God but, more specifically, the healing power of God's forgiveness. It is only this forgiveness that makes it possible for the self to acquire its full human plentitude." (Khan and McKinnon, p.452). My reading agrees with the first sentence and even the third. But, the healing power of God's forgiveness is that it opens the door to relationship with the Person of God, Who is the constitutive force of the self.

\(^{196}\) Just as in Schleiermacher, the Christian ultimately trusts a state of perfect morality as his fulfillment and trusts God to bring the believer into that state.

\(^{197}\) This is not to say that the knight of faith should not also put his trust in God for his fulfillment. He might need to rely on God as the source of strength which enables him to put his trust in God as his fulfillment. It appears that the knight of infinite resignation must trust his own will for his fulfillment. It is by his will that he takes on a resolute attitude of resignation. He makes this movement of infinite resignation *all by himself* (F&T, p. 48) and he must continually use all of his strength to do so (F&T, p. 49). If his resolution is to continue, he must trust his own strength. This strength comes from no other source but himself. And as a result, he becomes sufficient to himself (F&T, p. 44). He places his trust in his own will (and not in God) for the salvation of his soul (F&T, p. 49). Yet if he is using all of his strength to do this, what strength is left to enter into faith? Perhaps, he must rely on God.

\(^{198}\) Though, in so doing, he may be given the strength to be perfectly ethical and given the pleasures of finitude through a sort of second immediacy.

\(^{199}\) F&T, pp. 37, 73.
One Problem for This Reading and My Response

At least one objection can be brought against this reading of *Fear and Trembling*. First, someone might attack my reading, protesting that if my reading is true, then I have put De Silentio in the unpalatable position of being a divine command theorist. By separating the person of God from the Good, I run the risk of allowing De Silentio’s God to give evil commands that must be obeyed.

I, however, have separated God’s person and God’s goodness only by abstraction. In my reading, De Silentio’s purpose is to emphasize the relational virtue that characterizes the knight of faith. While goodness is part of God’s essence, it is important that the knight of faith relate directly to the Person of God. This may mean that my reading puts De Silentio in the position of claiming that the knight of faith must relate to God as though he were a divine command theorist. Yet, it escapes the unpalatable result that the knight of faith may have to obey an evil command.

One could make the same point by stating that while God is Truth, one must relate to the Person of God such that one would believe a false proposition if God uttered it.

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200 Another objection could arise here. Someone could object to my reading of the ethical as making up part of the essence of God. This person could claim that the essence of a person is separable from a person only by an abstraction (if even that), but De Silentio separates God from the ethical in fact. De Silentio writes, “For I certainly would like to know how Abraham’s act can be related to the universal, whether any point of contact between what Abraham did and the universal can be found other than that Abraham transgressed it” (F&T, p. 59). If one can trust God, but transgress the ethical then God’s person and essence are not in harmony. This objection does put my reading in a tight spot. But it is a tight spot in which it appears that Kierkegaard has De Silentio standing as well. For De Silentio claims that the ethical is the divine (F&T, pp. 60, 68). And what is the divine but the essence of Divinity? Further, De Silentio binds the ethical with the notion of duty (F&T, pp. 68, 78) and he claims that duty is simply the expression of God’s will (F&T, p. 60). This puts De Silentio in the awkward position of claiming that Abraham’s trust in God led him to transgress God’s will. If someone can rescue De Silentio, then my reading is rescued as well. But if my reading falls from this attack, then it appears that it would fall in good company. Yet for the purpose of developing a view of sin that allows for a staurocentric theory of satisfaction which can escape problems 1-6, we are free to deviate from De Silentio here. We can maintain his views on the personalist nature of faith while holding that Goodness is part of God's essence.

201 F&T, p. 59.
While it may be impossible for God, being Truth, to utter a false proposition one could make the above claim with the purpose of emphasizing the importance of personal relationship with God. Such a claim could warn against the danger of trusting in truth while never relating to the Person who is Truth.  

We can explain this point in another way. De Silentio claims that in infinite resignation, one gains love of God. The act of resignation does not require faith, for what I gain in resignation is my eternal consciousness. This is a purely philosophical movement that I venture to make when it is demanded and can discipline myself to make, because every time some finitude will take power over me, I starve myself into submission until I make the movement, for my eternal consciousness is my love for God, and that for me is the highest of all.

However, the love of God gained here may not be the sort of love of God had by the knight of faith. According to De Silentio it is possible to love God without faith. 

...he who loves God without faith reflects upon himself; he who loves God in faith reflects upon God.

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202 This reading of faith in Fear and Trembling differs in an important way from another, more typical, reading represented by Louis P. Pojman. Pojman notes, “In Fear and Trembling the faith of the believer is against all the evidence. It is at odds with the universal requirement which proceeds from the moral law” (Pojman, p. 37). According to Pojman, “Kierkegaard’s point is that the God relationship is unique, qualitatively unlike any other relationship. It involves its own standards, which must be judged irrational—even immoral—by human standards” (Pojman, p. 155). Pojman then claims that this point is “fraught with problems” (Pojman, p. 157). He goes on to show how Abraham’s faith could be rationally justifiable and even not immoral (Pojman, pp. 157-160). On my reading, however, it is not a problem if a knight of faith has rationally justifiable evidence for trusting God as his fulfillment. On my reading, Kierkegaard’s point is simply that we should have a faith relationship with the Person of God. The knight of faith may have quite a bit of evidence including his own history of relationship with God and witnessing the fulfillment of others in a faith relationship with God. Further, it may never be possible for God to give an immoral command. Kierkegaard’s point is just that the knight of faith should relate to God’s person such that we would follow an immoral command if God gave one. This is because the knight of faith finds his fulfillment directly in God’s Person and not in God’s commands.

203 F&T, p. 48.

204 F&T, p. 37.
Perhaps the difference is that the person who loves God without faith, ultimately loves his own love of God and not God’s Self. He trusts his own love of God as his fulfillment rather than trusting God’s Person as his fulfillment. Perhaps De Silentio is warning against being in love with being in love without being in love with the Beloved.

Paramaters in Pursuit of a State of Faith

It seems that a Kierkegaardian solution to the problem of sin will, as in Schleiermacher, be confined to at least three parameters.

Parameter 1: Sin Cannot be Overcome on the Sinner's Strength Alone

De Silentio claims that the knight of infinite resignation must continually use all of his strength to resign everything. If this is the case, then what strength can he use to make the final movement of faith? How is such a movement to be made? Perhaps it cannot be made. Instead, it must be given. If the sinner cannot make the necessary movement himself, then the only hope for the movement will be from a source outside of himself. In that case, the most that the sinner can do is to be open to the transforming movement when it comes.

Parameter 2: The Sinner’s Will is the Gateway to Transformation

As we saw above, human freedom is a key element in the state of sin. While we may not be able, by a simple movement of the will, to enter immediately into a state of

\[^{205}\textit{F&T, p. 49.}\]

\[^{206}\textit{F&T, pp. 50, 66.}\]

\[^{207}\text{This reading is consistent with Walsh’s conclusion that according to Kierkegaard’s authorship “The admission of impotence is the only positive act that one can make toward one’s own salvation.” (Walsh, p. 40). Further, Louis P. Pojman argues that if Anti-Climacus' conclusions with regard to becoming authentic selves only by resting in the power that established us are true, then “it follows that if we are to be healed of our despair in our failed attempts to become authentic selves, we must have assistance from a higher power which constituted our being in the first place” (Pojman, p. 35). Also see Pojman, p. 55.}\]
faith, it is clear that the will is the gateway to faith inasmuch as a state of faith can be impeded by our unwillingness to enter into a state of faith. To escape the problem of sin, the sinner must choose to embrace, rather than reject, the relationship of dependence that she has with God, the power that established her.

Parameter 3: God Respects Human Freedom

God could initiate this change in us by force or in a manner which works with human freedom. If God were to make us sinless by force, then God would remove the possibility of sin for God would remove freedom. According to Anti-Climacus, however, our freedom to sin is our "superiority over the animal." The possibility of sin is an "infinite advantage." (Yet, the actuality of sin is "ruination"). Thus, God cannot remove freedom without making us into lesser beings. It certainly seems that we would become beings who are incapable of having a “personal relationship” with God in a deep sense. God’s relationship with us would become like our relationships with inanimate objects. But we correctly hesitate to call a relationship with a machine a personal relationship. Recall that according to Anti-Climacus we become truly ourselves only in relationship with God. If God saves us from sin by removing the possibility of our having a personal relationship with God, then (in a way) God saves us from sin by destroying us. If forcing change in us is an unacceptable option, then God must somehow elicit a free movement of human will towards change.

God could utilize fear toward this end. However, fear is an option that only seems to work as a behavior-modifier, but fails as a will-modifier. Suppose that God

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208 SUD, XI 129.

209 Ibid.
were to send an excruciating pain through a person’s body any time that person sinned.

God might succeed in frightening us into submission. We would very likely stop performing sin acts for fear of feeling pain. But this strategy would fail to reach the human heart. At our deepest part, we might still want our own way. Fear will not be enough to change us, only enough to control us.

Another option is for God to invite us into transformation. God must call us into a relationship with God. This does not mean that God cannot use any form of fear.210 God might frighten us by warning us of and exposing us to the necessary consequences of rejecting a relationship with God, but we must ultimately be willing to be transformed into the kind of people that will relate to God as a person and not simply to God’s commands as a good means for avoiding pain.

The Role of the Cross in a Solution

We might now ask, “What role might the Cross take in bringing us to a state of faith?” On this conception of sin and its solution God would, as in Schleiermacher, need to invite and draw us into a state wherein there is no sin. As opposed to Schleiermacher, God would not simply be inviting us to accept God’s help towards something God could give us or create in us apart from God’s Self. Rather, God would be inviting us to a personal relationship of trust with God’s Self. The Cross could be an essential part of this invitation and attraction.

210 In fact, God could use any number of indicators to encourage us to open our wills to our ultimate telos. “Despair, anxiety over the self, and guilt at our failures to realize our telos, are indicators which remind us of our origins and cause in us a holy homesickness, until we finally journey back to our Father’s home” (Pojman, p. 35). And again, “Guilt, then, drives him like a good school master to seek an education in a higher class, the school of grace where forgiveness may be forthcoming” (Pojman, p. 53).
While we do not have room for a thorough analysis of a Kierkegaardian soteriology, let us note that this role for the Cross could be consistent with Kierkegaard’s authorship. For example, the Cross could invite us to relationship with God inasmuch as it reveals our state of alienation from God and displays God’s desire for reconciliation. The fact that God has to go to such lengths as the Cross to reconcile us, could be a wake up call to how far we are from God. Thus begins an “inverse dialectic” wherein by becoming aware of our distance from God, we are enabled to draw near to God. Further, the fact that God is willing to go to such lengths could be a display of God’s love for us. And this could function as God’s invitation and attraction to personal relationship with God.

Kierkegaard claims,

…all by himself no man can ever come to think that God loves him. This must be proclaimed to men. This is the gospel, this is revelation. But precisely because no human being can by himself come to the idea that God loves him, in like manner no human being can come to know how great a sinner he is. Consequently the Augsburg Confession teaches that it must be revealed to a man how great a sinner he is. For without the divine yard-stick, no human being is the great sinner (this he is—only before God).

211 Kierkegaard clearly has a role for satisfaction and even penal substitution. "Thus when the punitive justice here in the world or in judgment in the next seeks the place where I, a sinner, stand with all my guilt, with my many sins—it does not find me. I no longer stand in that place; I have left it and someone else stands in my place, someone who puts himself completely in my place. I stand beside this other one, beside him, my Redeemer, who put himself completely in my place—for this accept my gratitude, Lord Jesus Christ!" (Without Authority, p. 123). Also cited in Rae, p. 103. Also see Walsh, p. 44 and Rae, pp.102-103.

212 See Walsh, pp. 47-48.

213 See Walsh, pp. 39-40. And, Without Authority, 131, 133 (as cited by Walsh).

Perhaps the Cross functions as an essential component in this revelation whereby God communicates these truths to us and invites us to reconciliation.

This potential role for the Cross is compatible with Murray Rae's interpretation of "how Kierkegaard conceives the atonement doctrinally." Rae claims that Kierkegaard focuses on the substitution of Christ. This substitution has a "threefold aspect." First, Christ sympathetically "puts himself in the place of the one who suffers" in order to offer comfort to the sufferer. "Second, Christ puts himself in the place of those who are tempted" so that he can stand with you in your own temptation. "Third, Christ stands in the place of sinners." Rae then cites *Without Authority* where Kierkegaard says,

> If he, if the Redeemer's suffering and death is the satisfaction for your sin and guilt—if it is the satisfaction, then he does indeed step into your place for you, or he, the one who makes satisfaction, steps into your place suffering in your place the punishment of sin so that you might be saved, suffering in your place death so that you might live.

While this third aspect of the substitution of Christ embraces penal substitution, Rae notes that,

> ...the emphasis here, and in Kierkegaard's further elucidation of the matter, is placed not at all upon the punitive aspect of the satisfaction but entirely upon the compassion of the Saviour who bears for us the cost of sin.

The point, then, according to Rae, is Christ's compassion for the sinner. This is compatible with my suggestion that the Cross could have an invitational role insofar as it displays God's love and the need for us to be reconciled to God. Even the first two

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215 Rae, p.102

216 Ibid.


218 Rae, p. 103
aspects of Rae's Kierkegaardian substitution theory can be seen as Christ's encouraging and exhorting the believer to be reconciled to the Person of God. This helps us to understand the claim that

> Kierkegaard is concerned above all with how one responds to the declaration of forgiveness and grace rather than with the mechanics of how atonement is accomplished.\(^{219}\)

**Final Evaluation of This Kierkegaardian Conception of Sin and Its Solution**

Let us now ask whether this understanding of the problem of sin and its solution can inspire a staurocentric theory of satisfaction that can avoid problems 1–6. I will argue that, as with Schleiermacher, such a theory could escape problem (2), the problem of superfluous suffering. Further, it seems that such a satisfaction theory would have an advantage in that it could also overcome (3), the appeal to robust love and (6), the impotence problem.

Since, as we have seen, God cannot remove human freedom without destroying what it is to be a “self,” God must work with human freedom to bring us into a state of faith. It is plausible that God’s finding satisfaction in the Cross is the most effective means towards accomplishing this end inasmuch as this draws humans into personal relationship with God.\(^{220}\) As a result the satisfaction theorist could claim that Christ's suffering involves some sort a benefit that could not be had in any other way (the benefit of being the most effective means toward drawing humans into personal relationship with God). If this is the case then such a satisfaction theory could escape (2), the problem of superfluous suffering.

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\(^{219}\) Rae, p. 101

\(^{220}\) This possibility will be explored with more detail in chapter 3. See this diss., pp. 154-182.
Further, such a satisfaction theory will not be confronted with (3), the appeal to robust love. God cannot force this transformation. If God overrides human freedom, then, as we have seen, God destroys the possibility of bringing humans into a state of faith. It appears that the only other possible way of eliminating sin, on this view, is to destroy the human self and so also eliminate faith. It does not seem that destroying the human self is more loving than allowing the possibility of a state of sin.

Finally, on this view, it is not possible to be in a state of faith and yet hate God. As we saw above, the relationship of faith is an absolute relation wherein the person of God is perceived as the end in which a human places her ultimate trust. In this absolute relation is "absolute love" of God.\textsuperscript{221} If a person hates God, but enters into a reluctant relationship with God because that person needs some end which only God can offer (e.g. out of hope for the attainment of some earthly wish, or as a source of strength from which to meet the demands of the ethical), then that person’s ultimate trust is in the end which she relies on God to help her to attain. But, if the Person of God is the ultimate object of one’s trust, there is no room for hate. One equates one’s flourishing with relationship with God.

\textsuperscript{221} F&T, p. 73.
CHAPTER TWO
SATISFACTION AND GOD'S EXTENSION OF FORGIVENESS

Introduction

In this chapter I examine the potential role of satisfaction in personal reconciliation by analyzing satisfaction's possible contribution to God's extension of forgiveness. This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I explain the role of forgiveness in personal reconciliation and show how satisfaction can relate to forgiveness. I claim that there are two necessary conditions for personal reconciliation. The first condition is that forgiveness must be extended by the offended party. Second, the offender must appropriate the extended forgiveness. A common way to understand satisfaction's contribution to personal reconciliation is in terms of its contribution towards God's extension of forgiveness. I argue that satisfaction is neither logically necessary for, nor the most effective means to, God's extension of forgiveness. One could claim, however, that God refuses to extend forgiveness until God has received satisfaction. For a satisfaction theory to make such a claim while avoiding problems 1–6, it will have to argue that God insists on satisfaction as a condition for God's extension of forgiveness because of its ability to achieve some benefit other than the mere eliciting of God's forgiveness.

1 One might ask whether God can extend forgiveness to an offender who has wronged persons other than God. I address this question in chapter 4. See this diss., pp. 245-247.
In the second and third sections I critically analyze two historical theories of satisfaction, paying specific attention to each view's claims concerning the benefits of satisfaction. In the second section I critically analyze Anselm's satisfaction theory. I will show that while Anselm can avoid (1), the ontological problem, Anselm fails to offer a benefit of satisfaction that enables his theory to simultaneously avoid both of the moral problems listed against satisfaction (e.g. (2) and (3)). In the third section, I critically analyze Aquinas's theory. I claim that Aquinas opens the door to a successful satisfaction theory by arguing that God's pursuing satisfaction contributes to the second condition for personal reconciliation; namely, human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. Thomas's theory succeeds over Anselm's in its ability to overcome (2), the problem of superfluous suffering, and (3), the appeal to robust love, simultaneously.²

**Personal Reconciliation, Forgiveness, and Satisfaction**

In chapter one I used a reading of Kierkegaard to argue that the core problem of sin is that sinners exist in a state of alienation from the Person of God wherein they fail to trust God as the source and end of their fulfillment.³ Therefore, the solution to the problem of sin will require *personal reconciliation* between God and a human being wherein the human turns from her lack of trust in God and embraces God as the source and end of her fulfillment. Since the problem with sin is that humans exist in an un-reconciled, or alienated, state, we must ask what conditions are necessary for a change from such a state into a state of personal reconciliation with God. I posit that for personal

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² I will use Thomas's theory to inspire an approach to penal substitution that can avoid problems 1–14. I develop this approach in chapter 3. I show how this approach can enable penal substitution to avoid problems 1–14 in chapter 4.

³ See this diss., pp. 74-90.
reconciliation to take place there are two necessary conditions. First, the offended party must extend forgiveness to the offender (the party culpable for the alienation). Second, the offender must appropriate the extended forgiveness. In order for satisfaction to contribute to personal reconciliation (and thus avoid (6), the impotence problem), it must contribute to one, or both, of these conditions. In this chapter I will analyze the approach which claims that satisfaction contributes to God's extension of forgiveness. To do this we must first define "extension of forgiveness" and its relationship to personal reconciliation.4

Personal Reconciliation and Forgiveness

Three Conceptions of Forgiveness

There are at least three ways in which we understand the term "forgiveness." I will refer to them respectively as "forgiveness-as-pardon," "forgiveness-as-letting go," and "forgiveness-as-restoration." I will define each and argue that forgiveness-as-restoration and forgiveness-as-letting go are necessary for personal reconciliation. Forgiveness-as-pardon is not necessary for personal reconciliation.

Forgiveness-as-Pardon

Let us begin with forgiveness-as-pardon. This type of forgiveness can be understood as an offended party's choice to release a claim to certain external consequences. In this way an offended party might forgive a financial debt or choose not to punish his offender. It is forgiveness-as-pardon to which we refer when we talk of the type of forgiveness that contributes to legal reconciliation.

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4 What it means for an offender to appropriate forgiveness is defined in this diss., pp. 155-158.
Forgiveness-as-pardon is not necessary for personal reconciliation. An offended party might become personally reconciled to an offender after the offender has received his due punishment. In such a case, personal reconciliation can be achieved even though forgiveness-as-pardon has not been given. Thus, forgiveness-as-pardon is not necessary for personal reconciliation.

Also, this type of forgiveness can be given regardless of the offender's current attitude or actions. In fact, this type of forgiveness could be given even if the offender did not want the forgiveness.

**Forgiveness-as-Letting Go**

A second type of forgiveness, forgiveness-as-letting go, is described by Eleanor Stump when she notes,

> Sometimes...we mean by 'forgiveness' the wronged person's putting away all resentment or wrath with respect to the wrongdoer.\(^5\)

In this type of forgiveness, the forgiver releases any anger or resentment that he feels toward the offender. This is the sort of forgiveness to which we refer when we say we are "letting it go." We are letting go of the resentment we feel towards our offender.

Forgiveness-as-letting go is necessary for personal reconciliation. If any harboring of resentment creates a sort of alienation between persons, then personal reconciliation cannot be had inasmuch as forgiveness-as-letting go is not also present.

An offended party might desire personal reconciliation with his offender while also

\(^5\) Eleanore, Stump, "Book Review: *Responsibility and Atonement* by Richard Swinburne," *Faith and Philosophy* 11 (1994), p. 325. It might be possible to read "wrath" in Stump's quote in such a way that it includes the first understanding of forgiveness. If that is her intent, then both the first and second understanding of forgiveness are present in her quote.
harboring resentment toward his offender. But in order to attain personal reconciliation he will have to overcome his resentment.

This type of forgiveness is similar to forgiveness-as-pardon in that it can be given without any change in (or expectation of) the offender. In fact, the offender does not even have to be aware of having been forgiven for these types of forgiveness to be complete.

Forgiveness-as-letting go can be done in conjunction with forgiveness-as-pardon but neither implies the other. One can give forgiveness-as-pardon while refusing forgiveness-as-letting go. For example, I could waive my claim to a debt owed to me but still despise my offender for having incurred the debt in the first place. Conversely, one can give forgiveness-as-letting go while refusing forgiveness-as-pardon. I could release my resentment toward my offender but still insist that the offender repay his debt or receive his punishment. In fact, I could even feel love towards my offender and still insist on punishment or repayment. For example, a parent, without resentment and in love could discipline her child because she values the instruction that such discipline will afford her child.

 Forgiveness-as-Restoration

There is yet a third conception of forgiveness. Sometimes by "forgiveness" we are referring to a type of forgiveness that cannot be given without regard to the offender's response. This type of forgiveness, "forgiveness-as-restoration," is given when an offended party enters into personal reconciliation with her offender. Stump briefly describes this type of forgiveness in the following way.
...sometimes...we mean by 'forgiveness' the restoration and healing of a broken relationship. When a husband asks his wife for forgiveness, he wants the marital relationship whole again.\textsuperscript{6}

Similarly Vincent Brümmer speaks of this type of forgiveness when he says,

...if you, by forgiving me, show your willingness to identify with me again, then our fellowship will not only be restored, but might also be deepened and strengthened.\textsuperscript{7}

Someone could object to the use of "restoration" in connection with this type of forgiveness. One could point out that someone could give this type of forgiveness even where there was no previous relationship to be restored. For example, a husband could abandon his wife not knowing at the time that she is pregnant. For years, the husband may not know that a daughter exists whom he has wronged. The daughter could then find her father and offer him forgiveness-as-restoration even though they are meeting for the first time. Yet here, we can identify forgiveness-as-restoration as restoring, as much as possible, the relationship to what it would have been had there been no wrongdoing. This applies as much to the man and the wife (who had a relationship prior to the wrongdoing) in the example as much as to the man and the daughter (who had no relationship prior to the wrongdoing).\textsuperscript{8}

As I mentioned, this type of forgiveness is distinct from the first two in that it cannot be given to an offender without regard to the offender's response. An offended party can offer forgiveness-as-restoration but this type of forgiveness will remain merely


\textsuperscript{8} Someone might then ask, "In what sense can we forgive a stranger who wrongs us?" It may be that forgiveness-as-pardon and forgiveness-as-letting go are the only types of forgiveness appropriate to strangers. If forgiveness-as-restoration applies at all to forgiveness of strangers, it applies in a weak sense. Restoring the relationship, as much as possible, to what it would have been had there been no wrongdoing will only mean going back to being co-existing human beings who do not harm one another.
an offered possibility until it is received, or *appropriated*, by the offender.⁹

Forgiveness-as-restoration cannot be given unless it is also received. An offended party cannot enter into personal reconciliation merely by an offer of forgiveness-as-restoration. For personal reconciliation to be complete, both the offender and the offended must be willing to be reconciled. This is why C.F.D. Moule says, "reconciliation is not complete until there is a *two-way* traffic."¹⁰

Forgiveness-as-restoration can be extended (offered and/or given) even if forgiveness-as-pardon is withheld.¹¹ For example, an offended party might offer forgiveness-as-restoration after punishment has been given or satisfaction received.¹²

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⁹ It is worth noting that there is a subtle difference between this understanding of forgiveness and a fourth way in which the term is sometimes used. Sometimes the term "forgiveness" is used to indicate the offer of forgiveness-as-restoration. To say, "I forgive you" can sometimes mean "I offer you personal reconciliation." C.F.D. Moule makes such a claim when he says, "...forgiveness is not a commodity, an impersonal something that can be bestowed without the recipient's response. Forgiveness is free, but it is essentially a free invitation" (C.F.D. Moule, "The Christian Understanding of Forgiveness," *Theology* 71 (1968), p. 441). Moule, however, has employed both the third and fourth understandings of forgiveness in this quote. It would be strange if, in his first use of "forgiveness" he meant "forgiveness-as-offer-of-forgiveness-as-restoration," since one could, in fact, give forgiveness in this way without a recipient's response. Here, Moule appears to employ forgiveness in the "forgiveness-as-restoration" sense. His second use of "forgiveness" clearly employs the fourth understanding, since he specifically refers to it as an "invitation." For our purposes, I will not use the term "forgiveness" to indicate this fourth sense but merely refer to an "offer of forgiveness-as-restoration" where I intend to use this concept.


¹¹ Garrard and McNaughton allow for this where they say, "To forgive is not necessarily to waive punishment...Holding that it is right to punish someone can be quite consistent with having an attitude of good will towards them" (Eve Garrard and David McNaughton, "In Defence of Unconditional Forgiveness," *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 103.1 (2003), p. 48). Richard Purtill also notes that "forgiveness is quite consistent with punishing exactly as much as deserved" (Purtill, "Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement," p. 43). Purtill is here referring to forgiveness-as-restoration for he says "genuine forgiveness is 'at-one-ment' and it requires action on both sides" (Purtill, "Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement," p. 42). Also, Steven L. Porter claims that in some cases one could even rightfully withhold forgiveness until the wrongdoer has not only repaid his debt but also endured appropriate punishment (Steven L. Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," *Faith and Philosophy* 21.2. (April, 2004), 234-235).
Also, forgiveness-as-restoration can be withheld even if forgiveness-as-pardon is
given. For example, an offended party could waive her claim to punishment or debt-
repayment while despising her offender and refusing to have any further interaction with
her.\textsuperscript{13}

Further, it seems that forgiveness-as-restoration can be withheld even if
forgiveness-as-letting go is given. As Stump points out,

\begin{quote}
We can forgive people who still aren't speaking to us; we can forgive our
parents long after they are dead; and we can be commanded to forgive our
enemies...\textsuperscript{14}
\end{quote}

Thus, there are times when one can forgive-as-letting go even where forgiveness-as-
restoration is not possible. It seems, however, that forgiveness-as-letting go is entailed by
forgiveness-as-restoration. As noted above, if any harboring of resentment creates a sort
of alienation between persons, then forgiveness-as-restoration cannot be had inasmuch as
forgiveness-as-letting go is not also present.\textsuperscript{15}

\textsuperscript{12} There could, however, be some debate as to whether forgiveness-as-restoration can be extended without
any form of legal reconciliation, or at least the promise of legal reconciliation.

\textsuperscript{13} C.F.D Moule also distinguishes between what I have called "forgiveness-as-pardon" and "forgiveness-as-
restoration." He says, "...it is a wholly inadequate...notion of forgiveness that sees it as the settling of a
credit and debit account, as though the offender paid and the injured party was then satisfied. That may be
what happens when an offence is dealt with on the level of legal proceedings, but it is certainly remote
from what happens on the level of personal relations when an estrangement is healed" (C.F.D. Moule, "The


\textsuperscript{15} Someone could point out that the type of forgiveness that applies to human-human relationships is often
"incomplete and involves the harboring of some residual feelings of resentment" (Thomas Carson, written
note to author). On my analysis, "incomplete forgiveness," or the type of forgiveness that harbors any
resentment, is either only forgiveness-as-pardon or an attempt to work towards forgiveness-as-letting go
and forgiveness-as-restoration.
Summary

Thus, God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration and human appropriation of such forgiveness are necessary conditions for personal reconciliation; together they are sufficient. God's giving forgiveness-as-letting go will be a necessary, though not sufficient, condition of God's extending forgiveness-as-restoration. And finally, God's giving forgiveness-as-pardon is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for either of the other forms of forgiveness.

Three Objections to this Analysis and My Responses

There are at least three ways that someone might object to this analysis of forgiveness. The first two objections involve the claim that my analysis of forgiveness is incomplete insofar as it neglects another type of forgiveness. The first is exemplified by Eve Garrard and David McNaughton who also identify three understandings of forgiveness. Two of their conceptions correspond to forgiveness-as-letting go and forgiveness-as-restoration respectively. They identify a third conception, however, which one might argue that I neglect. According to this third conception,

...forgiveness involves, in some sense, the removal or bracketing off of the wrong, or of the guilt created by the wrong—the wiping clean of the slate.  

I argue, however, that this conception of forgiveness is not separate from my three conceptions, but rather a common definition that applies to all three. Each type of forgiveness involves a "wiping clean of the slate" in a different way. When one gives forgiveness-as-pardon she "brackets off the wrong" from the debt or claim to punishment

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16 Garrard and McNaughton, p. 41.

17 Ibid.
that it has incurred. When one gives forgiveness-as-letting go she "brackets off the wrong" from the resulting hostility or resentment toward her offender. When one offers forgiveness-as-restoration, one is offering to "bracket off the wrong" inasmuch as it has caused a relational distance between the offended party and the offender.

Second, Anne C. Minas indentifies another form of forgiveness when she suggests that in one sense

...forgiveness may simply be retraction or modification of a previous adverse moral judgment about the act in question.\(^{18}\)

I argue, however, such a conception is mistakenly called "forgiveness." If I retract my adverse moral judgment, then I am declaring my original judgment to be false. Yet, one can only be forgiven in relation to wrongdoing. If my original judgment was false and I have mistakenly treated you as a wrongdoer, I cannot be said to forgive you when I later come to realize my mistake. As a matter of fact, I may need your forgiveness for my mistaken judgment. Even if my mistaken judgment results in a sort of resentment towards you, my release of resentment cannot be called forgiveness. A release of resentment cannot be called forgiveness if it does not correspond to any actual wrongdoing on the part of a perceived offender. For example, I might resent you for being better-looking than me or for being hired for a job that I wanted. If later I come to release my resentment, I cannot be said to have forgiven you. Rather, I dealt with my jealousy or my own anger problem. You need not be "forgiven" for being better-looking or more qualified. If, on the other hand, my original judgment was true, then in retracting

my original judgment I am committing myself to a false moral judgment.\textsuperscript{19} It is still unclear, in this case, how I can be said to forgive my offender since only offenders can be forgiven and I am refusing to believe that my offender is/was such.

Third, one might object to my distinction between forgiveness-as-pardon and forgiveness-as-restoration by pointing out that it is common for a punishment to be relational. That is, the offended party's refusal to enter into personal relationship is punishment. As a result, it will not be possible to give forgiveness-as-restoration without also giving forgiveness-as-pardon. My claim that one can give forgiveness-as-pardon while withholding forgiveness-as-restoration will, in such cases, be false. Also, my claim that forgiveness-as-restoration can be given even if forgiveness-as-pardon is not given will, in such cases, be false. This is particularly relevant in the divine-human situation since many claim that divine punishment is relational.\textsuperscript{20}

Even when the punishment due to an offender is the offended party's refusal to be personally reconciled, the distinction between forgiveness-as-pardon and forgiveness-as-restoration will hold. This is because there will be two different grounds upon which the offended party can refuse personal reconciliation. The offended party can refuse personal reconciliation on the grounds of punishment or the offended party can refuse personal reconciliation on the grounds of that person's free personal prerogative. In these cases one could give forgiveness-as-pardon by waiving one's claim to refusal of personal reconciliation on the ground of punishment, and yet exercise one's free personal

\textsuperscript{19} Thanks to Thomas Carson for this last point.

\textsuperscript{20} See, for example, Garry Williams, "Penal Substitution: A Response to Recent Criticisms" in \textit{The Atonement Debate}, edited by Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Michigan: Zondervan, 2008), pp. 177-178.
prerogative not to enter into personal reconciliation. Further, one might extend forgiveness-as-restoration only after satisfaction has been given or after the offender has endured one's refusal of personal reconciliation for a time.

Similarly, a wife might refuse personal reconciliation with her unfaithful husband for a period time, as a punishment for his unfaithfulness. When the period of time is over, the wife could still refuse personal reconciliation with her husband. The husband might protest, "Why are you still punishing me?" To which the wife could reply, "You are no longer being punished. I simply do not wish to be in a relationship with you."

Thus, the distinction between forgiveness-as-pardon and forgiveness-as-restoration still holds even where punishment is relational.

**God's Extension of Forgiveness-as-Restoration and Satisfaction**

Now that we have identified the conditions for personal reconciliation as an extension of forgiveness-as-restoration from God and the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration by humans, we can ask whether a theory of satisfaction can contribute to the attainment of either or both of these conditions in a way that avoids the problems for satisfaction. One common way to understand satisfaction's contribution to personal reconciliation is in terms of its contribution towards God's extension of forgiveness-as-

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21 If the offended party chooses not to exercise this prerogative not to enter into personal reconciliation, that person extends the gift of forgiveness-as-restoration. No offender has a right to forgiveness-as-restoration, even if punishment as a ground for refusal of personal reconciliation is removed. So C.F.D. Moule says, "Forgiveness...is, by definition, free...The offender may make material reparation for any material damage he may have caused; but, if he is to be forgiven by the person he has offended against, he must be humble enough to accept the forgiveness gratis and not try to pretend he can earn it" (C.F.D. Moule, "The Theology of Forgiveness," in Essays in New Testament Interpretation (London: Cambridge, 1982), p. 251).

22 Or after the promise of satisfaction has been made.

23 One might then ask "If the due punishment for sin is God's permanent refusal of relationship and yet God offers humans personal reconciliation, how can God be said to exact the full penalty for sin?" For my response see this diss., pp. 252-254.
restoration. There are three ways to argue for such a contribution. The first is to claim that satisfaction is logically necessary for an extension of forgiveness-as-restoration. The second is to claim that satisfaction is the most effective or efficient means towards an extension of forgiveness-as-restoration. The third is to claim that while God can offer forgiveness-as-restoration without satisfaction, God requires satisfaction as a prerequisite to God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration because of satisfaction's contribution to attaining some other benefit.

Any theory of satisfaction built using the first approach seems likely to fail. Just as forgiveness-as-pardon is not necessary for forgiveness-as-restoration, neither is satisfaction a necessary condition for an extension of forgiveness-as-restoration. One might argue that legal reconciliation of some sort (through forgiveness-as-pardon, satisfaction, or punishment) is a necessary condition for an extension of forgiveness-as-pardon.\(^{24}\) Yet even if this is the case, there are still two options aside from satisfaction that can be used to meet this condition. One of these options, forgiveness-as-pardon, involves less suffering than satisfaction. Thus, if an atonement theory advocates for satisfaction over forgiveness-as-pardon as the means to meet the condition of legal reconciliation, satisfaction will be vulnerable to the problem of superfluous suffering.

Let us now examine the second approach. Perhaps receiving satisfaction assists more effectively or efficiently than any other means to the attainment of one of the necessary conditions for an extension of forgiveness-as-restoration. For example, I have argued that forgiveness-as-letting go is a necessary condition for an offer of forgiveness-as-restoration. We can imagine a scenario in which receiving satisfaction could make it

\(^{24}\) Though, even this isn't clear. It seems possible to extend an offer of forgiveness-as-restoration to someone who has yet to be punished, offer satisfaction, or receive forgiveness-as-pardon.
easier for an offended party to give forgiveness-as-letting go to an offender. The offered satisfaction could soften the offended party's heart toward the offender making it easier to let go of the resentment one has toward the offender. Now, while this may be the case when we consider human offers of forgiveness-as-letting go, the same difficulty with regard to releasing resentment does not apply to God. Given that God is omnipotent, God could presumably remove God's resentment by the power of God's own will (if God felt any resentment in the first place).  Further, inasmuch as God is characterized by robust love, God does not need anything to appease God's anger or to help God release resentment. A pursuit of satisfaction (especially insofar as it includes the Cross) as a means to forgiveness-as-letting go would fall to the problem of superfluous suffering.

Forgiveness-as-letting go is not the only necessary condition for an extension of forgiveness, however. There are two additional necessary conditions for an extension of forgiveness-as-restoration. First, God must be willing to be personally reconciled to

25 Here we might feel the inadequacy of identifying this type of forgiveness with the phrase "letting go." It would be possible for God to give this type of forgiveness even if God had never "grabbed hold" of resentment such that God needed to "let it go." In fact, Anne C Minas takes advantage of this point to argue that God, as a perfect being, could not give forgiveness in this way (Minas, pp. 144-148.) Garrard and McNaughton offer a concise response to such a criticism saying, "...it is not the case that hostile feelings have to be present, and then overcome, in order for forgiveness to be possible...[O]ne in whom the quality of forgiveness is deeply embedded may never feel resentment or hatred in the first place. Effortless virtue is still virtue." (Garrard and McNaughton, p. 45). Minas might object, saying, "...forgiveness has to be a giving up of something" (Minas, p. 148). We could respond in two ways. First, we might argue that forgiveness does not necessarily involve a "giving up." Second, we could agree with Minas but argue that God could be said to "give up" something like a claim to resentment.

26 Jean Hampton argues that there are cases in which it is immoral to release one's resentment. (See Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (New York: Cambridge, 1988)). Paul Moser responds directly to Hampton's view noting that it has failed to distinguish hatred of "a position, attitude, or action" with hatred of a person. The former, he says is compatible with "love toward the person advancing that position, attitude, or action" (Paul Moser, The Elusive God, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 178). Garrard and McNaughton similarly argue against Hampton saying that her account "confuses love with moral approval" (Garrard and McNaughton, p. 51).
humans. Second, God must communicate God's willingness to be so reconciled. Perhaps receiving satisfaction assists more effectively or efficiently than any other means to the attainment of one of these two conditions.

An appeal to the former seems unlikely to help a theory of satisfaction. Since God can become willing to be personally reconciled with humans simply through the power of God's own will (and presumably God is perpetually so willing by virtue of God's all-loving character), holding satisfaction as a condition for such willingness would trap satisfaction between (1), the ontological problem, and (2), the problem of superfluous suffering.

Likewise an appeal to the communication condition seems dubious. Certainly there are a myriad of ways in which God could communicate God's willingness to be personally reconciled inasmuch as communication is understood to involve only announcement on the part of God. And we can think of several ways that God could announce a willingness to be personally reconciled with fallen humans which would involve much less suffering than satisfaction. For example, God could simply write each person a letter to announce God's willingness to be personally reconciled. Thus, inasmuch as communication involves only announcement, the communication condition will not offer satisfaction any help in avoiding the ontological and moral problems. If, however, the reception of such an announcement is part of what we mean by "communication," then we will be considering conditions for the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.27

27 Such conditions will be considered in more depth in chapter 3. See this diss., pp. 155-158.
Let us now consider the third approach. While satisfaction is not necessary for God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration it is logically possible for God to make satisfaction a condition of such an extension. That is, God could refuse to offer forgiveness-as-restoration until God had received legal reconciliation through satisfaction. For a satisfaction theory to claim this while avoiding both moral problems (2) and (3), that theory must show that there is some benefit achieved through satisfaction which cannot be achieved by any other means. I argue that Anselm and Aquinas both defend satisfaction using this third approach. I will show that where Anselm fails to offer a benefit of satisfaction that enables his theory to avoid these moral problems, Aquinas opens the door to a successful satisfaction theory by arguing that God's insisting on satisfaction as a condition of God's forgiveness-as-restoration contributes to the fulfillment of the second condition for personal reconciliation; namely, human appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration.

**Anselm's Theory of Satisfaction**

This section offers a critical analysis of Anselm's theory of satisfaction. First, I present some contemporary readings of Anselm's soteriology and suggest that these readings leave Anselm vulnerable to the ontological and moral problems outlined above. I then offer a reading of Anselm's theory of satisfaction beginning with an explication of the divine requirement of satisfaction. I show how Anselm's defense of the divine requirement of satisfaction has led some to hold the mistaken notion that Anselm's theory

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28 One might argue that it is also possible for God to make the promise of satisfaction a condition for God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration.
fails to overcome the ontological problem. I then show how Anselm escapes the ontological problem.

I continue to offer a reading of Anselm's theory of satisfaction, answering the question "By what is God satisfied?" I show that Anselm holds that Christ's death is a supererogatory act freely offered to God which replaces a deficit in God's honor/justice/fitness/orderly beauty; a deficit created by human disobedience of God. I then analyze Anselm's theory of satisfaction against the moral problems offered above. I argue that Anselm cannot appeal to divine justice, fitness, or beauty to avoid the problem of superfluous suffering. While he could appeal to God's honor to avoid this problem, such a move will force his theory of satisfaction to confront the appeal to robust love. It does not appear that an appeal to divine honor can sustain a theory of satisfaction in the face of this objection. To avoid these moral problems, Anselm will need to find another way to justify the suffering of the Cross.

**Some Contemporary Readings of Anselm’s Soteriology**

Jaroslav Pelikan claims that according to Anselm,

> [Christ’s] death on the cross made it, one may say, morally possible for God to forgive.\(^{29}\)

Similarly, Darby Kathleen Ray reads Anselm as saying that,

> [Jesus’] voluntary sacrifice of his innocent life is of infinite worth. With this sacrifice, Jesus satisfies God’s justice so that God is free to love and forgive human beings.\(^{30}\)

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\(^{30}\) Darby Kathleen Ray, *Deceiving the Devil*, (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1998), p.8. Gustav Aulen also claims that in Anselm, "It is an indispensable necessity that God shall receive the satisfaction which alone can save forgiveness from becoming laxity; and this need is met by Christ's death" (Gustav Aulen, *Christus Victor*, (London: SPCK, 1970), p. 90). Aulen further uses language similar to Ray when describing the "Latin type" of atonement theory (of which he considers Anselm's theory an instance). According to this
These readings illustrate a common contemporary reading of Anselm in response to the two questions that we noted satisfaction theories must address. Both readings answer the question of God's requiring satisfaction by appealing to the claim that God is bound in some way before Christ’s death, and is freed from this binding after Christ’s death. That is, God requires satisfaction so that God can forgive sinners. Without satisfaction it is not "morally possible" for God to forgive; God is not "free" to forgive. Such a reading leaves Anselm vulnerable to the ontological problem outlined above.

In response to the question "What was the nature of Christ's payment to God" we can see that both readings centralize the role of Christ’s death in Anselm’s soteriology. Why God finds satisfaction in the death of Christ is yet to be determined. However, it is clear that if Anselm really does hold to the importance of Christ's death for reconciliation between God and humans, he will be vulnerable to the two moral problems outlined above ((2) and (3)).

In what follows I will examine Anselm's theory of satisfaction against phrases like “the cross made it morally possible” and “Jesus satisfies God’s justice so that God is free” to determine whether such phrases are compatible with Anselm's actual views. Further, I will present a reading of Anselm's theory of satisfaction that affirms the central role that Pelikan and Ray assign to Christ’s death and explicates Anselm's position with regard to the role that Christ's death plays in divine satisfaction.

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31 See this diss., pp. 4-5.
Anselm on the Divine Requirement of Satisfaction

When explaining the importance of satisfaction, Anselm claims that Man cannot be restored to that end for which he was made unless he attains to the likeness of those angels in whom there is no sin. This state can only be attained if remission is received for all sins. And this remission is possible only if complete satisfaction has been made.\(^{32}\)

With regard to the end for which humanity was made Anselm says,

It ought not to be disputed that rational nature was made holy by God, in order to be happy in enjoying Him.\(^{33}\)

We can thus read Anselm as holding to the necessity of satisfaction for the personal reconciliation of God and humans. So, we can now ask, "How, on Anselm's view, does satisfaction contribute to the personal reconciliation of God and humans?"

Anselm claims that satisfaction must be made so that human sins can be remitted and humans can be returned to the enjoyment of God. John McIntyre takes this to mean that,

...the whole process of satisfaction...is regarded by St. Anselm as that which forms the ground of God's forgiveness and through which it takes place.\(^{34}\)

This raises the question, "Why is satisfaction necessary for the remission of (or forgiveness of) sins?" Anselm utilizes a handful of interrelated concepts in order to explain why God requires satisfaction for the remission of sins (there being only one alternative to satisfaction on his view, and that being punishment). At various places


Anselm argues for God's requirement of satisfaction through appeals to "God's honor," "justice," "fittingness," and "orderly beauty."\(^{35}\)

Anselm explains that to sin is to "not render to God his due." That which we owe to God is our complete subjection to God's will. To be subject to the will of God is to be upright in heart/will (that is, holy\(^{36}\)). Insofar as we fail to do this, we fail to give God the honor which is due to God.\(^{37}\) Therefore, through disobedience, we are said to "rob" God of the honor that we owe him as God's creatures. Anselm explains that God requires sinners to pay back the "honor" of which we have robbed God through disobedience.\(^{38}\) God maintains his honor by insisting upon satisfaction for sin freely given, or punishment. Any other alternative would mean God's not maintaining God's honor.\(^{39}\)

God's upholding God's honor is connected to the concept of justice when Anselm says that,

...God maintains nothing with more justice than the honor of His own dignity.\(^{40}\)

Such claims lead Paul Helm to state that for Anselm, it is a,

...necessary truth...that God's justice requires his honour to be satisfied.\(^{41}\)

\(^{35}\) One could also note that Anselm appeals to God's holiness (a concept that appears to be very much related to, if not identical with God's justice). See, CDH, II.xx.

\(^{36}\) CDH, II.i.

\(^{37}\) See also Meditation on Human Redemption where he explains that "to sin is to dishonor God" (MHR, p. 139).

\(^{38}\) In fact, Anselm sometimes insists on a superabundant satisfaction as when he says "...without doubt, unchanging truth and clear reason demand that the sinner give to God, in place of the honor stolen, something greater than that for which he ought to have refused to dishonor God" (MHR, pp. 139-140).

\(^{39}\) CDH, I.xi.

\(^{40}\) CDH, I.xiii.
In fact, the link between God's honor and justice is so strong in Anselm that it has led to some readings like the following from Gustav Aulen.

[Anselm] clearly taught an 'objective' Atonement, according to which God is the object of Christ's atoning work, and is reconciled through the satisfaction made to His justice.42

And again Aulen says,

The vindication of the justice of God and His judgment on sin necessarily involves a making-good, a compensation, which satisfies the demands of justice. Hence the payment of satisfaction is emphasized as a safeguard of moral earnestness...43

Aulen's reading appears to be confirmed where Anselm says,

...without the required satisfaction human nature could not be reconciled, lest Divine Justice leave a sin unreckoned within His kingdom.44

Anselm connects the concept of justice to the concept of fittingness when he claims that it is not fitting for God to do anything "unjustly or out of course" including allowing a sinner to go unpunished without repaying the debt owed to God.45 He involves the concept of beauty when he claims that if injustice is passed over without punishment, then injustice would have more liberty than justice. This, says Anselm, would be "unbecoming" to God.46 And again, by pursuing "the satisfaction for sin freely

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42 Aulen, p.2.

43 Ibid., p.89.

44 MHR, pp.139-140.

45 CDH, I.xii.

46 Ibid.
given, or if this be not given, the exaction of punishment" God is preserving the
"orderly beauty" of the universe. 47 If God were not to do this

...there would be, in the very universe which God ought to control, an
unseemliness springing from the violation of the beauty of arrangement,
and God would appear to be deficient in his management. 48

This would be both "unfitting" and "impossible." 49 Thus, as David Brown says,

...Anselm appeals not only to requirements of logical consistency but also
to what might now be more naturally termed aesthetic considerations:
what is fitting or appropriate (conveniens/decens). Here we need to think
ourselves back into a world in which God was identified not only with
Justice, Truth, and Goodness but also with Beauty. 50

On account of Anselm's appeal to these four concepts, critics of Anselm have claimed
that he is vulnerable to (1), the ontological problem outlined above. That is, Anselm is in
danger of subjecting God to a concept of honor, justice, fittingness, or beauty which
exists outside of God. Let us now see whether, given his position on the divine
requirement of satisfaction, Anselm can escape the ontological argument against
satisfaction.

Anselm and the Ontological Argument against Satisfaction

Recall that Ray and Pelikan interpret Anselm as saying that Christ’s death, in
some sense, allows God to forgive us. Ray claims that after Christ’s death God is "free to
love and forgive us." Pelikan notes that Christ’s death "made it morally possible…for

47 CDH, I.xv.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

[God] to forgive." Such claims have led to what I will argue is the mistaken notion that Anselm subordinates God to a justice or law which exists apart from God's Self.

In reference to Anselm’s soteriology John Stott says the following.

We must certainly remain dissatisfied whenever the atonement is presented as a necessary satisfaction either of God’s ‘law’ or of God’s ‘honour’ in so far as these are objectified as existing in some way apart from him.51

If I have read Stott correctly, then he is suggesting that Anselm's theory of atonement portrays God as a Being Who must yield to the demands of something outside of God's Self. Such a position would “demote” God’s place in the universe. Instead of having a God Who rules over all things, it would appear that there could be a time in which God's hands were tied by something outside of God's Self. Yet while Stott is right to point out that this view is distasteful, I argue that attributing this view to Anselm conflicts with Anselm’s own views in at least three ways. (1) It is in conflict with Anselm’s claim that God is “that, than which nothing greater can be conceived.”52 (2) It is in conflict with Anselm’s claim that God does not possess God's nature by participation in something apart from God's Self. (3) It is in conflict with Anselm’s explanation of God’s relationship to necessity.

First, as a premise in his ontological argument Anselm establishes the claim that God is "that, than which nothing greater can be conceived."53 If we portray God as a Being Who must yield to the demands of something which exists apart from God, then it

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52 Anselm, *Proslogium* (P) in *St. Anselm: Basic Writings*, translated by S.N. Deane, 47-80 (Chicago: Open Court, 1962), ch. iii.
53 Ibid.
seems that we can think of something that is greater than God. We could do this insofar as we could imagine that that which gives God demands is omnipotent, active, etc. That is, a God who is Goodness is greater than a God who answers to Goodness. Thus, it seems that Anselm’s argument in the Proslogium entails that God does not yield to a law or code of honor that is objectifiable apart from God. Such a view would likely give Anselm the same dissatisfaction that it gives Stott.

Second, in chapter xvi of the Monologium Anselm appears to reject Stott’s interpretation. There he explicitly argues against the idea that God is just because God participates in the quality of justice. If this were so, he claims, then God, or "the supremely good Substance," would be "just through another, and not through itself." Yet God is whatever God is through God's Self and not through another. Thus, we must conclude that God as God's Self is Justness. Anselm identifies God with certain attributes by which God will “necessarily” behave in a particular way. This is why he says,

...the supreme Nature...is, therefore, supreme Being, supreme Justness, supreme Wisdom, supreme Truth, supreme Goodness, supreme Greatness, supreme Beauty, supreme Immortality, supreme Incorruptibility, supreme Blessedness, supreme Eternity, supreme Power, supreme Unity...

Thus, we can concur with Hans Urs von Balthasar when he reads Anselm as saying that in God, freedom is identical with rightness.

54 Anselm Monologium (M), in St. Anselm: Basic Writings, translated by S.N. Deane, 81-190 (Chicago: Open Court, 1962), ch. xvi.

55 Ibid.

56 Ibid.

Finally, Anselm’s view of God’s relationship to necessity indicates that Stott has misread Anselm. According to Anselm, when we say that God acts necessarily what we should mean is that God’s desire "freely maintains itself in his own unchangeableness." No desire of God’s is constrained. That is to say that "the will of God does nothing by any necessity, but of his own power."\(^{58}\)

Anselm explains this position even further in chapter xviiia of the *Cur Deus Homo*. There he claims that "no necessity or impossibility exists before [God’s] choice or refusal."\(^{59}\) Once God has made a choice, the type of necessity that comes to exist is a necessity that restrains not God but everything else. That is, when God makes an immutable choice, by necessity nothing else can cause God to change it. For example,

...when we affirm that it is necessary for God to utter truth, and never to lie, we only mean that such is his unwavering disposition to maintain the truth that of necessity nothing can avail to make him deviate from the truth, or utter a lie.\(^{60}\)

Thus Anselm would say that the phrase, “It is necessary for God to maintain God's honor” can be read as “Of necessity, nothing can make God deviate from God's choice to maintain God's honor.”\(^{61}\)

This evidence indicates that we should not hold Anselm to the view that John Stott attributes to him.\(^{62}\) Anselm does not paint an image of God according to which God

\(^{58}\) CDH, II.xvii.

\(^{59}\) CDH, II.xviiia.

\(^{60}\) Ibid.

\(^{61}\) On account of this Paul Helm says that in Anselm, "The necessity by which God does what he does is, if the language of necessity is to be used at all, is, so to speak, 'internal necessity', the necessity which arises from God's own character and his own choice, a choice unconstrained by any factors external to him, and wholly in accordance with his character" (Helm, p. 133).
wants to forgive but must answer to something outside of God's Self first. Instead
God wants to forgive but God is prevented by God's own will. God refuses to forgive
without satisfaction because of God's own commitment to
honor/justice/fittingness/beauty. This recalls Anselm's words,

...the Father was not willing to rescue the human race, unless man were to
do even as great a thing as was signified in the death of Christ.63

Thus, when we claim (as Ray and Pelikan do) that Christ’s death “frees” God to
act in a certain manner, we must view the binding from which God is “freed” as a binding
which God freely established. In doing so, we will free Anselm's atonement theory from
the ontological argument against satisfaction.64

Anselm on the Object of Divine Satisfaction

Like Ray and Pelikan, Gustav Aulen claims that Anselm holds that God is
satisfied by Christ's death. Aulen says,

[Anselm's] whole emphasis is on the death as an isolated fact, and as in
itself constituting the satisfaction...65

One might argue against such a claim by pointing to where Anselm says,

For, as death came upon the human race by the disobedience of man, it
was fitting that by man’s obedience life should be restored.66

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62 This evidence also enables us to avoid a pitfall of Anselmian interpretation mentioned by Gustav Aulen.
63 It is certainly true that Anselm's teaching has often been misinterpreted, and that many, or most, of the
64 criticisms which have been levelled against it are valid only against a misrepresentation of it which
amounts to a caricature. Thus it has constantly been said, especially in popular expositions, that Anselm
taught that a direct change in God's attitude was effected by Christ's satisfaction; but this is not what
Anselm said." (Aulen, p.85).

63 CDH, I.ix (emphasis mine).

64 For more defenses of Anselm with relation to the ontological argument against satisfaction see Helm,

65 Aulen, p. 89.

66 CDH, I.iii (emphasis mine).
At first glance this passage seems to conflict with a reading that emphasizes the salvific centrality of Christ's death. This passage seems to indicate that Anselm's focus is, instead, on Christ’s obedience. Christ, being without sin, was presumably obedient to God his entire life. It is possible that Christ's death was merely a side-effect of his lifelong obedience to God and not the event which satisfies God.

This possibility seems to find confirmation when we notice that Anselm makes a distinction between what Christ does "at the demand of obedience" and what Christ endured "because he kept his obedience perfect." Anselm claims that the suffering inflicted upon Christ in the Passion falls within the latter category. This seems to indicate that Christ’s suffering was an outcome of His holy existence in our fallen world, rather than His pursuit of a divine death-command. We might be led by this to conclude that God is satisfied by the life of Christ, while Christ’s death is a side-effect of His living this life. If this is the case, then Ray and Pelikan are wrong to centralize the death of Christ in Anselm’s atonement theory.

However, to understand Anselm’s position correctly we must make a distinction between what God demands of Christ and what Christ does that satisfies God. Anselm makes it clear that God does not demand that Christ suffer death. He claims that,

> God did not…compel Christ to die; but he suffered death of his own will, not yielding up his life as an act of obedience, but on account of his obedience in maintaining holiness.  

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67 CDH, I.ix.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.
We might be tempted by this to think that Anselm is playing fast and loose with his words. Sure, God didn’t tell Christ to die, but there is no way He could have avoided death without being disobedient. And, of course, if He is disobedient, then He will deserve death. Thus it appears that there is no way at all that He could avoid death. From this it seems that there is no strong sense in which death is not demanded of Him. Yet when, in the *Cur Deus Homo*, Anselm’s interlocutor asks whether Christ could have remained holy if He had not died Anselm makes it clear that Christ was free from any obligation to die.\(^70\)

Anselm explains Christ’s freedom with regard to the Cross in at least two ways. First, he explains it in terms of human liberty. He notes that sometimes God gives a creature the choice to do one thing which is acceptable or another thing which is better. In a case like this,

...he [God] leaves the alternative with him [the creature], so that, though one is better than the other, yet neither is positively demanded.\(^71\)

Recalling the apostle Paul’s opinion in the first epistle to the Corinthians, Anselm elucidates this idea using the example of celibacy.

…though celibacy be better than marriage, yet neither is absolutely enjoined upon man; so that both he who chooses marriage and he who prefers celibacy, may be said to do as they ought.\(^72\)

Thus, while Christ’s choice with regard to the Cross was the better choice, He had the freedom to choose another acceptable, though not as good, option. The latter, it seems, He could have done without fear of punishment.  

\(^70\) CDH, II.xviiib  
\(^71\) Ibid.  
\(^72\) Ibid.
Second, Anselm explains Christ’s freedom in terms of divine liberty. By virtue of His divine nature, Christ was free “from all obligation, except to do as he chose.”\(^7^3\) From this evidence it is clear that God does not demand that Christ suffer death.

Yet, while God does not insist that Christ suffer death, Anselm argues that God cannot be satisfied unless Christ dies. Now, when we sin we steal from God the obedience which we owe Him.\(^7^4\) When presented with sin, God must respond with either "the exaction of punishment" or "the satisfaction for sin freely given."\(^7^5\) So, unless we are to be punished we must make satisfaction. According to Anselm, for God to be satisfied something must be given to Him that is not owed to him.\(^7^6\) Unfortunately, we owe even our repentance to God. Thus our contrition cannot satisfy God because when we give what we owe we cannot make reparation.\(^7^7\) As a result, there is nothing that we can give Him that we do not already owe Him.\(^7^8\) Only Christ is in a position to give such a gift. While Christ does owe His obedience to God, since He is sinless, He does not owe death.\(^7^9\) Thus, Christ "reconcile[s] sinners to God by his own death."\(^8^0\) And again,

\(^7^3\) CDH, II.xviiiib.
\(^7^4\) CDH, I.xi.
\(^7^5\) CDH, I.xv.
\(^7^6\) CDH, II.xi.
\(^7^7\) CDH, I.xx.
\(^7^8\) Ibid.
\(^7^9\) CDH, II.xi.
\(^8^0\) CDH, II.xv.
...there [is] no other salvation…but by his death.  

And again,

...the Father was not willing to rescue the human race, unless man were to do even as great a thing as was signified in the death of Christ.

Thus, we can see that while God does not positively demand that Christ die, God will not be satisfied unless Christ suffers death. In other words, God does not categorically demand satisfaction. But hypothetically, if God is to be satisfied Christ must die.

If this reading is correct, then Ray and Pelikan are justified in emphasizing the role of the Cross in Anselm’s atonement theory. Christ's death satisfies God on account of its being a supererogatory act freely offered to God which replaces the deficit in human obedience. In replacing this deficit Christ maintains God's honor/justice/fittingness/orderly beauty through satisfaction so that God will not have to maintain God's honor/justice/fittingness/orderly beauty through punishment. So, Anselm says,

To honor the Father, that man [Jesus] – who was not obliged to die, because not a sinner – freely gave something of His own when He permitted His life to be taken from Him for the sake of justice.

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81 CDH, I.x.
82 CDH, I.ix.
83 In fact, as we have seen, it is an essential part of satisfaction that Christ do something that God does not positively demand (CDH, II.xi).
84 This reading is also confirmed by Hans Urs von Balthasar. See Balthasar, pp. 258-259.
85 In CDH, I.xiv Anselm argues that Christ's life, being "more lovely than sins are odious," is of a value so great that in laying it down, this gift outweighs all of the sins of humans.
87 MHR, p. 140.
Two Potential Problems for this Reading

This reading seems to pose at least two problems for Anselm. First, one might ask, "How can we reconcile the passages which claim that Christ’s death was necessary for salvation with the passage in *Cur Deus Homo* Book I, chapter iii in which Anselm claims that man was restored by obedience?" If Anselm is to escape unscathed, we must claim that he employs two senses of the term "obedience." The first sense (used in CDH, I.iii) is broad enough to include things not "positively demanded" by God (namely, Christ’s death). We can see from Anselm’s treatment of celibacy and marriage that it is plausible that he would sometimes employ a broader sense of "obedience." As noted above, he claims that while celibacy is not positively demanded by God one who remains celibate can still be said to do what he "ought." Here he uses a broad sense of "ought" that includes things not positively demanded of God.

We should contrast this with a second sense of "obedience" in Anselm’s writing. This sense only refers to that which is positively demanded by God. It is likely that this is the sense that Anselm employs when he claims that Christ’s obedience was not enough to satisfy God because,

...this will not be giving a thing not demanded of him by God as his due.

The distinction between two senses of obedience can serve double duty. Not only does it smooth over this *prima vista* inconsistency within the *Cur Deus Homo*, it also

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88 CDH, II.xviiib.

89 Ibid.


91 CDH, II.xi.
resolves the seeming inconsistency between Ray and Pelikan’s readings and the passage in which Anselm claims that humanity is restored by obedience. When Anselm claims that humanity’s restoration comes through obedience we should read "obedience" in the first sense; understanding it to include Christ’s Passion. When Anselm claims that obedience is not enough to rescue us we should read "obedience" in the second sense; understanding it to exclude Christ’s Passion. Thus, Ray and Pelikan are further confirmed in their centralization of Christ’s death in Anselm’s soteriology.

The second problem arises with regard to the necessity of salvation. At the end of Book I of the *Cur Deus Homo*, Anselm argues that it is necessary for some people to be saved. Otherwise,

...it should seem that God had repented of his good intent, or was unable to accomplish his designs. ⁹²

If, as we have seen above, humans can only avoid punishment by offering satisfaction and satisfaction can only be offered through Christ’s death, then Christ’s death is necessary because salvation is necessary. One might then ask, “How can we reconcile the necessity of Christ’s death with the claim that God did not demand Christ’s death?”

In response, we should recall Anselm’s description of Christ’s divine freedom. Because Christ is also God, He has no obligations except those which He chooses. ⁹³ Thus, we should view the necessity of Christ’s death as the result of His free choice. Anselm likens the necessity of Christ’s death to a person who freely makes a vow. The person who makes the vow freely enters into an obligation, while being under no prior obligation to so enter. Similarly, Christ as God could foresee when He created humanity

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⁹² CDH, I.xxv.

⁹³ CDH, II.xviiib.
that humanity would fall. He also knew what would be needed to rescue humanity once it fell. Yet, Christ as God still chose to make humans. And,

...by freely creating man, God as it were bound himself to complete the good which he had begun.94

Therefore, while salvation (and by implication, Christ's death) is necessary, it is necessary only because Christ freely chose it, not because God demanded it.

**Anselm and the Moral Arguments against Satisfaction**

Anselm holds that the notion that God must respond to sin either by punishing the sinner or by receiving satisfaction is a necessary principle of God's maintaining God's honor. If this is true, and Anselm is right in saying that the only means to divine satisfaction is by Christ's death, then the benefit of Christ's death is that by it humans are allowed to avoid punishment while God maintains God's honor. With this, Anselm can avoid the problem of superfluous suffering.

However, Anselm will still have to face the appeal to robust love. In the face of such an appeal we must remember that

> The necessity for God to uphold his own honour is...a conceptual truth for Anselm, another aspect of what Anselm means by the nature of things. Other conceptions of God are possible, of course, but Anselm would reject these as not being in accord with the faith of the Church, and more pertinently as not being in accord with the idea of God as the most perfect being.95

Someone attacking Anselm by means of the appeal to robust love would claim that the idea of God as having a character of robust love is no less in accord with the idea of God as a perfect being. God, being robustly loving, would be willing to suffer injury to God's

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94 CDH, II.v.

95 Helm, p. 146.
honor in order to restore human beings to a right relationship with God's Self. What
is more, God, being robustly loving, would not insist on the great suffering endured by
Christ in order to maintain God's honor. Such a costly preservation of honor changes
honor into vanity, one could argue. And the idea of God being so vain is even in conflict
with the faith of the Church.  

Yet, it is likely that such an argument misunderstands Anselm's notion of honor.  
Recall the inextricable link that Anselm makes between God's honor and justice. It is
more likely in Anselm that God is concerned with an honorable commitment to justice
than with "how things look." We should then look to justice as that in which God finds
honor in Anselm. Now, if I have read Anselm correctly he would claim that the fact that
God must respond to sin either by punishing the sinner or by receiving satisfaction is a
necessary principle of God's maintaining justice. Again, if this is true, and Anselm is
right in saying that the only means to divine satisfaction is by Christ's death, then the
benefit of Christ's death is that by it humans are allowed to avoid punishment while God
maintains justice. With this, Anselm can avoid the problem of superfluous suffering.

Even if we accept the disjunction of divine satisfaction or punishment as a
necessary principle of Divine Justice we can question whether something as extreme as
Christ's death was necessary to effect such satisfaction. Gustav Aulen presents a
Nominalist criticism against the idea of God's requiring Christ's death in order to be
satisfied.

96 John Baillie similarly applies the appeal to robust love against Anselm's use of divine honor as the
justification for satisfaction. He says, "...casting its sinister shadow over everything else, there is Anselm's
view of God as being in His most ultimate nature, not a loving father, but a monarch and taskmaster, whose
first concern is for His own dignity and prestige, though these are not presented as bearing any necessary
relation to the proper good of His creatures" (John Baillie, The Place of Jesus Christ in Modern
The Nominalist criticism is that in the last resort all depends on the arbitrary act of God in accepting the satisfaction. The work of Christ has no value belonging to it, but only such value as God is pleased to recognize in it. It could not be called necessary that mankind should make the satisfaction which Anselm had laid down, for the sin committed by finite men could not involve infinite guilt. Nor, again, could the merit of Christ be infinite, since He only suffered in His human nature. Finally, no such infinite merit could be necessary, since God can assess any meritorious act precisely as He pleases.97

If this is the case, then we might suggest that each person could provide satisfaction for her own sin. We have seen above that Anselm holds that every person can perform supererogatory actions, like voluntary celibacy. If this is also a means to satisfaction, and so preservation of God's justice without punishment, then Anselm's theory of satisfaction is vulnerable to the problem of superfluous suffering. For, presumably this other means of satisfaction would involve less suffering than that endured by Christ in the Cross.

Even if Anselm can overcome the Nominalist objection, what reason do we have to believe that Divine Justice requires satisfaction for sin in the absence of punishment? We might presume that Divine Justice requires satisfaction because our sense of justice requires it. Yet, Anselm confesses that the human sense of justice clashes with the reality of Divine Justice.

...when thou dost bestow goods on the evil, and it is known that the supremely Good hath willed to do this, we wonder why the supremely Just has been able to will this.98

Again, Anselm asks how it is just for God to give everlasting life to those who merit eternal death. To this question he replies,

97 Aulen, p. 94.
98 P, ch.ix.
Truly, in the deepest and most secret parts of thy goodness is hidden
the fountain whence the stream of thy compassion flows.\textsuperscript{99}

If Divine Justice is so hidden and clashes with our own sense of justice, how can we
come to know what Divine Justice requires? Even Anselm confesses, we need God’s
revelation. We know that it is consistent with Justice for God to pity the wicked, he says,
because God does so pity them and it would be impious to say that God does something
unjust.\textsuperscript{100} It further seems that we are dependent upon revelation when Anselm says that,

...God can certainly do what human reason cannot grasp.\textsuperscript{101}

So, how do we know that Divine Justice requires satisfaction in the absence of
punishment? Anselm does not appeal to revelation to prove this. Instead, he claims that
we must not interpret Justice in such a way as to conflict with God’s dignity. That is, we
must filter our understanding of justice through the concept of what is “best” or most
"fitting."\textsuperscript{102} Now, we must ask ourselves, "Who is in a position to determine what is
most fitting?" Anselm’s own beliefs about the mystery and hidden depth of God’s justice
indicate that \textit{God} is the One who determines fitness and reveals it to us as God sees fit. A
similar argument would hold with regard to the "orderly beauty" maintained by justice. It
appears, then, that if we are to hold that Divine Justice requires satisfaction, we must find
this to be consistent with God’s revelation.

Yet some would argue that the revelation of Divine Justice shows that Divine
Justice can forgive without satisfaction or punishment. Raymund Schwager says,

\textsuperscript{99} P, ch.ix.
\textsuperscript{100} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{101} CDH, II.xviiia.
\textsuperscript{102} CDH, I.xii.
According to Schwager, the revelation that we receive through Christ’s teaching is in conflict with the theory of satisfaction. He makes specific reference to the parable of the prodigal son and the parable of the merciless creditor. From these parables, he says, we can conclude,

...that God forgives without demanding satisfaction and payment in return. He demands only that we forgive others as unconditionally as we are granted unconditional mercy.\(^{104}\)

Again, he points out that in Matthew 18:22, Jesus commands his disciples to forgive without limit. He then claims that if Christ demands limitless forgiveness of us, the Father whom Christ reveals "must be even more so willing" to forgive.\(^{105}\) Thus, Schwager argues that satisfaction is incompatible with the character of God as it is revealed in Christ’s teaching.

To this I add that it appears that satisfaction (as necessary for the preservation of divine justice/fitness/orderly beauty) is also incompatible with the character of God as revealed in Christ’s life. Even before his death, Christ freely offers forgiveness to those willing to receive it. Furthermore, Christ seems to live a life of such robust love, that in Christ, God appears to be fundamentally other-focused; willing to relinquish what rightfully belongs to God (even God's Own life) in the best-interest of the other. Also, if


\(^{104}\) Schwager, p. 206.

\(^{105}\) Ibid., p. 207. Schwager even goes so far as to attribute a heathen origin to the doctrine of satisfaction. He says that we learn from the Sermon on the Mount that “it is the tax collectors and the heathens who love and do good only to those from whom they expect the same” (Schwager, p. 207).
Christ is the image of the Father, then it seems that the Father does not seek to avoid shame brought upon Him by others. In fact, it is part of Christ’s glory that He allowed Himself to be publicly humiliated upon the Cross.106

It appears that the revelation of God in Christ’s teaching and life does not support (and is even in conflict with) a divine requirement for satisfaction as Anselm has defended it. Thus, Anselm cannot appeal to divine justice, fitness, or beauty to avoid the problem of superfluous suffering. While he could appeal to God's honor to avoid this problem, such a move will force his theory of satisfaction to confront the appeal to robust love. It does not appear that an appeal to honor can sustain a theory of satisfaction in the face of this objection. To avoid these moral problems, Anselm will need to find another way to justify the suffering of the Cross.

**Aquinas's Theory of Satisfaction**

In this section I argue that Thomas Aquinas offers the satisfaction theorist a framework by which she can hope to overcome (2) and (3), the moral arguments against satisfaction. I begin by showing that Aquinas must face these moral problems insofar as he maintains the centrality of Christ's Passion for divine satisfaction. I then show how, despite an apparent similarity with Anselm's theory, Thomas deviates from Anselm with regard to the divine requirement of satisfaction. Thomas claims that it is compatible with God's justice to waive the debt of punishment without satisfaction. However, the requirement of satisfaction still arises from a "more copious mercy" on the part of God.

I then attempt to determine in what way God's requiring satisfaction through Christ's Passion could be more merciful than waiving the debt of punishment without satisfaction. I show that Thomas holds to a robust view of the problem of sin that goes beyond the debt of punishment. For Thomas the problem of sin also lies in a corruption of the will whereby the sinner maintains an absence of love of God. This problem creates a relational "distance" between God and the sinner that must be overcome through mutual charity if the sinner is to be reunited to God in such a way as to experience beatitude. I claim that God's accepting satisfaction through Christ's Passion is more merciful insofar as this contributes to God's project of drawing sinners into a union of mutual love with God. If this is the case, then Aquinas offers the satisfaction theorist hope for overcoming the moral problems against satisfaction.

**Aquinas on the Centrality of Christ's Passion for Divine Satisfaction**

Like Anselm, Aquinas will have to confront the moral arguments against satisfaction on account of the role that he assigns to Christ's death in achieving satisfaction. In fact, these arguments may confront Aquinas even more insofar as he includes Christ's Passion (wherein we include the suffering Christ endured leading up to His death) in divine satisfaction. Aquinas says,

\[\text{Christ’s Passion…acts by way of satisfaction, inasmuch as we are liberated by it from the debt of punishment.}\]

And,

\[\text{Now it is a fitting way of satisfying for another to submit oneself to the penalty deserved by that other. And so Christ resolved to die, that by dying He might atone for us…}\]

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107 Aquinas, *Summa Theologica* (ST), translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1914) III, q. 48, a. 6, ad. 3.
We can see then, that insofar as Thomas advocates such a painful means of divine satisfaction, his theory of atonement will be forced to confront the moral arguments outlined above.\textsuperscript{109}

**Aquinas on the Divine Requirement of Satisfaction**

At first glance, Aquinas's explanation of the divine requirement of satisfaction looks very much like Anselm's. Like Anselm, Thomas explains that God does not categorically demand satisfaction; instead, satisfaction was hypothetically necessary to achieve the end proposed by God, namely humanity's deliverance from sin and unto salvation.\textsuperscript{110}

Also, while Aquinas does not linger over the language of "honor" as Anselm does, he heavily emphasizes the link between satisfaction and justice as well as the concept of fittingness.\textsuperscript{111} For example, there are several passages in the *Summa*...
Theologica that, at first glance, appear to endorse an Anselmian view of satisfaction.

Thomas claims that man was under

...the debt of punishment, to the payment of which man was held fast by God’s justice...  

Again, Thomas claims,

...it was fitting that through justice man should be delivered from the devil’s bondage by Christ making satisfaction on his behalf in the Passion.  

And again, he claims that man’s deliverance through Christ’s Passion was “in keeping” with God’s justice,

...because by His Passion Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the human race and so man was set free by Christ’s justice...  

And again,

Now it is a fitting way of satisfying for another to submit oneself to the penalty deserved by that other. And so Christ resolved to die, that by dying He might atone for us...  

These and other portions of Aquinas reveal an apparent similarity between Aquinas and Anselm in that Aquinas so links satisfaction and Divine Justice.  

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112 ST III, q. 48, a. 4.

113 ST III, q. 46, a. 3, ad. 3.

114 ST III, q. 46, a. 1, ad. 3.

115 ST III, q. 50, a. 1.

116 For more on Thomas's view of satisfaction and justice see Cessario, pp.53ff where Cessario discusses satisfaction's relationship to the virtue of justice according to Aquinas in *Scriptum super Sententias*, Book IV. Cessario notes that Aquinas experiences considerable intellectual and spiritual development between the completion of this work and the *Summa Theologica*. Yet, it is clear from the evidence above that, for Aquinas, a connection between satisfaction and justice still holds even in his later works.
Despite Thomas's apparent similarity with Anselm's view of satisfaction, it is clear that Thomas advocates a different understanding of the divine requirement of satisfaction. While Thomas does insist that the Cross was just, he does not insist, as Anselm does, that the notion that God must respond to sin either by punishing the sinner or by receiving satisfaction is a necessary principle of Divine Justice. Thomas asks

...whether there was any other possible way of human deliverance beside the Passion of Christ.\(^{117}\)

Thomas then writes on behalf of an imaginary interlocutor who says that Christ’s Passion was the only way for humanity to be delivered because

God’s justice required that Christ should satisfy by the Passion in order that man might be delivered from sin.\(^{118}\)

The interlocutor explains that if God were to otherwise deliver humankind, God would deny God's justice and so deny God's Self which is impossible.

Thomas opposes this claim saying,

Even this justice depends on the Divine will, requiring satisfaction for sin from the human race. But if He had willed to free man from sin without any satisfaction, He would not have acted against justice. For a judge, while preserving justice, cannot pardon fault without penalty, if he must visit fault committed against another...But God has no one higher than Himself...Consequently, if He forgive sin, which has the formality of fault in that it is committed against Himself, He wrongs no one: just as anyone else, overlooking a personal trespass, without satisfaction, acts mercifully and not unjustly.\(^{119}\)

If I have understood Thomas correctly, divine satisfaction is not the only alternative to punishment in a course of Divine Justice. It seems that God could have

\(^{117}\) ST III, q. 46, a. 2.

\(^{118}\) ST III, q. 46, a. 2, obj. 3.

\(^{119}\) ST III, q. 46, a. 2, ad. 3.
justly, “waved God's hand” at sin. That is, God could have released human beings from the debt of punishment without any satisfaction. If this is so, then God could have justly released us from the debt of punishment without the Cross. Yet, this seems contrary to the quote above which claims that God, in God's justice, “held fast” to our debt of punishment.\(^\text{120}\) How are we to make sense of this?

According to Thomas, we must say that when carrying out a just response to the problem of human sin, God has at least three options. It is just for God to demand satisfaction of us, it is just for God to accept satisfaction from another on our behalf, and it is just for God to pardon us without satisfaction. It is up to the Divine will to choose how to carry out justice.\(^\text{121}\) We might now ask, “Why might God choose any one of these ways over the other?”

If I have read Thomas correctly, then he answers this question by appealing to God’s mercy.

That man should be delivered by Christ’s Passion was in keeping with both His mercy and His justice. With His justice, because by his Passion Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the human race; and so man was set free by Christ’s justice: and with His mercy, for since man of himself could not satisfy for the sin of all human nature…God gave him His Son to satisfy for him…\textit{And this came of more copious mercy than if He had forgiven sins without satisfaction.}\(^\text{122}\)

According to my reading, Thomas asks of the three just options “Which of these three just options is the most merciful?” It seems that Thomas claims that God would be less merciful were God to choose to demand satisfaction from us over either of the other

\(^{120}\) ST III, q. 48, a. 4.

\(^{121}\) With this strategy, Thomas avoids the ontological argument against satisfaction.

\(^{122}\) ST III, q. 46, a. 1, ad. 3 (emphasis mine).
options. Were God to insist that we satisfy for sin, we would surely go undelivered because it is not possible for humans to satisfy for sin.\textsuperscript{123}

Thus, God’s mercy is left to decide between two just options: God can accept satisfaction from another or God can pardon us without satisfaction. At first glance, the choice seems obvious. Why would God choose to send God's Son to suffer and die upon a Roman criminal’s cross when God could justly waive our punishment and avoid that suffering altogether? Surely God’s mercy would be merciful toward Jesus as well and opt to avoid satisfaction altogether. Thomas employs an imaginary interlocutor to express this opinion. The interlocutor claims that it is not necessary for Christ to suffer for human deliverance, saying,

\ldots it does not seem necessary that He should suffer on the part of the Divine mercy, which, as it bestows gifts freely, so it appears to condone debts without satisfaction: nor, again, on the part of Divine justice, according to which man had deserved everlasting condemnation. Therefore it does not seem necessary that Christ should have suffered for men’s deliverance.\textsuperscript{124}

In his reply, as quoted above, Thomas appears to concede that God's waiving the debt of punishment without satisfaction would be merciful. However, God's delivering us through satisfaction is even more merciful.\textsuperscript{125} On this reading of Aquinas, then, where God could deliver humans from the debt of punishment by accepting satisfaction from another or pardoning humans without satisfaction, both alternatives are equally just. And

\textsuperscript{123} Thomas makes this point in ST III, q. 46, a. 1, ad. 3 where he cites q. 1, a. 2.

\textsuperscript{124} ST III, q. 46, a. 1, obj. 3.

\textsuperscript{125} ST III, q. 46, a. 1, ad. 3.
while both alternatives are also merciful, God's delivering us through Christ's satisfaction is more merciful.

Thus, Thomas does not ultimately appeal to God's justice to explain why God requires satisfaction in the absence of punishment. While accepting satisfaction from another is in keeping with God's justice, the ultimate motivation for satisfaction comes out of God's mercy. Somehow it is more merciful for God to require satisfaction for the debt of punishment than waive the debt of punishment without it. If we can determine how this is so, Thomas might be able to avoid the moral arguments against satisfaction.

Aquinas and the Moral Arguments against Satisfaction

Thomas can escape the moral arguments against satisfaction if he can offer a plausible explanation as to why God's receiving satisfaction through Christ's Passion "came of more copious mercy than if He had forgiven sins without satisfaction." If Thomas can show that there is some merciful benefit obtained by satisfaction that is not obtained by the alternatives to satisfaction, then he can escape (2), the problem of superfluous suffering. He can then escape both moral arguments against satisfaction if he can also show that that merciful benefit can stand in the face of (3), the appeal to robust love. Let us now ask to what sort of benefit Thomas might appeal.

Above, we defined satisfaction as that which God accepts in place of a sinner's receipt of divine punishment (or, at least, the full divine punishment) for sin. It is evident that Thomas maintains this minimal definition when he says,

…when sufficient satisfaction has been paid, then the debt of penalty is abolished.\textsuperscript{126}

And again,

\textsuperscript{126} ST III, q. 49, a. 3.
Thus, one benefit of satisfaction is that by it sinners are freed from the debt of punishment. This, however, is not sufficient for helping Aquinas escape the problem of superfluous suffering for, as we saw above, God could have removed the debt of punishment without satisfaction (and justly so).

We must then look for another explanation of the "copious mercy" that God pursues through satisfaction. Since satisfaction is meant to address the problem of sin, let us now examine the problem of sin according to Aquinas. In ST I.II. qq. 85-87, Thomas addresses three problems of sin: (A) Sin corrupts the good of human nature. (B) Sin leaves a stain on the soul. (C) By sin we incur a debt of punishment. To these we can add a fourth, because elsewhere Thomas claims that (D) by sin we fall under bondage to the devil. We have seen above that claiming that satisfaction helps to overcome (C) the debt of punishment will not help Thomas escape the problem of superfluous suffering. We might ask, however, whether satisfaction (more than the other just options) helps to overcome any of the other three problems. Let us begin with (D) the bondage to the devil.

127 ST III, q. 22, a. 3.

128 ST I.II, q. 85.

129 ST I.II, q. 86.

130 ST I.II, q. 87.

131 ST III, q. 48, a. 4. I add this here because it is another problem of sin listed by Aquinas that is not exactly equivalent to any of the problems of sin that he lists in ST I.II, qq. 85-87. The closest similarity would be between bondage to the devil and the debt of punishment. However, Thomas clearly distinguishes these as separate problems in ST III, q. 48, a. 4.
Thomas distinguishes between bondage to the devil and the debt of punishment as types of bondage to sin. He says,

Man was held captive on account of sin in two ways: first of all, by the bondage of sin…Since, then, the devil had overcome man by inducing him to sin, man was subject to the devil’s bondage. Secondly, as to the debt of punishment, to the payment of which man was held fast by God’s justice.  

Humans are freed from both types of bondage by Christ’s Passion.

Since, then, Christ’s Passion was a sufficient and a superabundant atonement for the sin and debt of the human race, it was as a price at the cost of which we were freed from both obligations.

It appears, then, that the Passion overcomes the bondage to the devil much in the same way that it overcomes the debt of punishment. Yet, an appeal to a role for satisfaction in dealing with bondage to the devil will not help Aquinas overcome the problem of superfluous suffering. For when discussing humankind’s deliverance from bondage to the devil Thomas says,

…justice required man’s redemption with regard to God, but not with regard to the devil.

And again,

Because, with regard to God, redemption was necessary for man’s deliverance, but not with regard to the devil, the price had to be paid not to the devil, but to God. And therefore Christ is said to have paid the price of our redemption—His own precious blood—not to the devil, but to God.

132 ST III, q. 48, a. 4.
133 Ibid.
134 ST III, q. 48, a. 4, ad. 2.
135 ST III, q. 48, a. 4, ad. 3.
Thus, humanity was delivered from the devil’s bondage by a price paid to God. This was a price that God required in God's justice. But, as we’ve seen, God can justly waive payment, so God could justly free humanity from its bondage to the devil without the payment found in Christ's Passion. Since an appeal to satisfaction's role in humankind's deliverance from (C) the debt of punishment or (D) the bondage to the devil won't help Thomas escape the problem of superfluous suffering, let us now examine problems (A), the corruption of the good of human nature and (B), the stain on the soul.

Concerning (A), Aquinas says that three things comprise the good of human nature.

First, there are the principles of which nature is constituted, and the properties that flow from them, such as powers of the soul, and so forth.¹³⁶ These, Thomas claims are neither diminished nor destroyed by sin. Humans still have these powers (reason, will, the irascible, the concupiscible)¹³⁷ despite the presence of sin. Second, the good of human nature is comprised of an inclination to virtue. This, he says, is diminished by sin insofar as "human acts produce an inclination to like acts."¹³⁸ Thus, insofar as we sin, we are more inclined to sin and less inclined toward sin's opposite, which is virtue.¹³⁹

Third, the good of human nature is comprised of original justice.¹⁴⁰ It was by original justice that

¹³⁶ ST I.II, q. 85, a. 1.
¹³⁷ ST I.II, q. 85, a. 3.
¹³⁸ ST I.II, q. 85, a. 1. Thomas also cites ST I.II, q. 50, a. 1.
¹³⁹ ST I.II, q. 85, a. 1.
...the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts of the soul, while reason itself was perfected by God and was subject to Him.\textsuperscript{141}

Thomas claims that original justice was destroyed in Adam.\textsuperscript{142} As a result,

...all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue.\textsuperscript{143}

We can see by this that original justice is strongly related to the inclination to virtue. By original justice, humans are perfectly inclined to virtue. This perfect inclination is destroyed in Adam. We are less and less inclined to virtue insofar as we commit acts of sin. This is because,

...through sin, the reason is obscured...the will is hardened to evil, good actions become more difficult, and concupiscence more impetuous.\textsuperscript{144}

At first glance, it seems that God could restore the good of human nature without any need for a painful satisfaction. Being omnipotent, couldn't God merely "re-wire" humans so that the powers of the soul are aligned as they were when humans had the gift of original justice? If I have read Thomas correctly, God could do this if He were not concerned to preserve human freedom.\textsuperscript{145} Since the will is one of the four powers of the soul that is corrupted by sin, Thomas would be reluctant to suggest that God would simply re-wire us altogether. If God did re-wire humans, then

\textsuperscript{140} ST I.II, q. 85, a. 1

\textsuperscript{141} ST I.II, q. 85, a. 3

\textsuperscript{142} ST I.II, q. 85, a.1; ST I.II, q. 85 a. 3

\textsuperscript{143} ST I.II, q. 85, a. 3

\textsuperscript{144} Ibid.

...man's good would be compulsory, and would be rendered unmeritorious and undeserving of praise.\textsuperscript{146}

Even if God were to intervene by ordering the human soul so that sinful actions could cease this would not be sufficient for overcoming the corruption of human nature.

This is because,

...man cannot return to one of two opposites unless he go away from the other; in order by the aid of grace to return to the state of righteousness, he must withdraw from sin whereby he had abandoned the path of rectitude. And since it is chiefly by his will that man is directed to his ultimate end and turned away from it, it is necessary that he not only withdraw from sin in his external actions, by ceasing to sin, but also withdraw by his will, in order to rise from sin by grace...[I]f he were willing to sin no more without repenting of his past sin, the sin itself that he committed would not be contrary to his will.\textsuperscript{147}

This "distance" between a sinner and the state of righteousness to which the sinner must return, results in, what Aquinas calls, (D) the stain on the soul. This problem is specifically a problem of the will.

When the stain is removed, the wound of sin is healed as regards the will.\textsuperscript{148}

Thomas explains how the stain on the soul comes about.

Now, when the soul cleaves to things by love, there is a kind of contact in the soul: and when man sins, he cleaves to certain things, against the light of reason and of the Divine law...[T]he loss of comeliness occasioned by this contact, is metaphorically called a stain on the soul.\textsuperscript{149}

For the stain of sin to be removed from a sinner

\textsuperscript{146} SCG IV, ch. 55.

\textsuperscript{147} SCG III, part II, ch. 158.

\textsuperscript{148} ST I.II, q. 87, a. 6, ad. 3.

\textsuperscript{149} ST I.II, q. 86, a. 1.
...it is necessary that his will should have a movement contrary to the previous movement.\(^{150}\)

It would appear that the contrary movement required is a movement towards God because Aquinas says that "the act of sin parts man from God."\(^{151}\) And again,

> The stain of sin is, indeed, blotted out by grace, by which the sinner’s heart is turned to God.\(^{152}\)

If I have read Thomas correctly the sinner's heart being turned to God is the sinner being united to God in charity\(^{153}\) so as to find "perfect beatitude" in the "enjoyment of divinity."\(^{154}\) The relevant movement "towards God" will involve a movement of love in the sinner. The stain of sin, then, is removed as humans are united to God in love.\(^{155}\)

We might now understand more plainly why God would be unwilling to override human freedom if God's ultimate goal is to be united to humans in love. Someone might

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\(^{150}\) ST I.II, q. 86, a. 2.

\(^{151}\) ST I.II, q. 86, a.2, ad. 3.

\(^{152}\) ST III, q. 22, a. 3.

\(^{153}\) ST III, q. 48, a. 4, ad. 1.

\(^{154}\) SCG IV, ch. 54.

\(^{155}\) While I do not have space to develop a complete view of Thomist love, a brief word here can show how, in Aquinas, love of God involves a union with God and the absence of love of God involves an alienation from God's Person. Thomas holds that "mutual indwelling is an effect of love" (ST I.II, q. 28, a. 2). Among other things, this indwelling takes place inasmuch as the lover unites the good of the beloved with his own good. "Consequently in so far as he reckons what affects his friend as affecting himself, the lover seems to be in the beloved, as though he were become one with him; but in so far as, on the other hand, he wills and acts for his friend's sake as for his own sake, looking on his friend as identified with himself, thus the beloved is in the lover" (ST I.II, q. 28, a. 2). On this, David M. Gallagher remarks, "Aquinas's doctrine concerning the love of friendship shows how one can take the good of another person as one's own good; thus, it opens up the possibility that one's perfection can be found outside oneself in another person, especially in God...One loves one's own good precisely in loving the good of the other person for that person's sake (IaIIae, q.28, aa.2-3). This happens especially in the case of loving God. If a person loves God with the love of friendship (caritas) then the good of God becomes his own good and his beatitude consists in possessing (by the visio beatifica) this good (IaIIae, q.180, a.1)" (David M. Gallagher, "The Will and Its Acts (Ia Iiae, qq.6-17)," in The Ethics of Aquinas, edited by Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2002), p. 85).
return to our suggestion of "re-wiring" sinners and suggest that God could simply
program us to love God. If this is possible, then the possibility that satisfaction could
contribute to the solution to the stain of sin and the restoration of the good of human
nature would not enable Thomas to escape the problem of superfluous suffering.

There is some question, though, as to whether such a re-wiring would cause love
to lose its value, or even whether a re-wired love can even be called love in the same way
at all. Consider Shakespeare's Titania. After Puck, in Oberon's service, spreads a love
potion on Titania's sleeping eyes, she wakes to fall in love with the next person she sees.
Her eyes open to see Bottom, whose head has been transformed into that of an ass.
Under the spell of the potion, she is immediately in love. She coos to Bottom,

    I pray thee, gentle mortal, sing again:
    Mine ear is much enamour'd of thy note;
    So is mine eye enthralled to thy shape;
    And thy fair virtue's force, perforce, doth move me,
    On the first view, to say, to swear, I love thee.\(^{156}\)

But we would not say that she truly loves Bottom. Since her freedom has been
bewitched by Puck's flower potion, she merely acts like she loves Bottom. Perhaps she
even believes that she does, but the comedic potential in this scene comes through the
dramatic irony. We, the audience, know that she is *deceived* under the influence of the
potion. If she could somehow come to her senses, she would realize that, in fact, she
does not love Bottom. And when, eventually, she does come to her senses, she will even
be embarrassed of the way she had behaved when she was under the influence of the
potion.

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Further, simply overlooking this relational distance will not be a solution to the stain of sin. While God could free us from the debt of punishment by ignoring the debt, it is no help for God to simply ignore the stain of sin. If God ignores the relational distance that separates humans and God, the distance is not overcome. If the problem here is that God loves us but we do not love God, God's ignoring the problem of the absence of human love toward God will do nothing toward overcoming this problem. If God cannot force the needed love and cannot overlook its absence, then it seems that there is only one remaining alternative for overcoming the stain of sin. God must draw us into love of God. 157

If divine satisfaction through Christ's Passion contributes to God's project of drawing humans into love of God (such that the stain of sin is removed and the good of human nature is restored—particularly as regards the will) then Thomas may have provided the satisfaction theorist with a way to escape the problem of superfluous suffering. If it can be shown that God's finding satisfaction in Christ's Passion more effectively removes the stain of sin than any less painful means to this end, Thomas will be free of this problem. 158

Also, this method of escaping the problem of superfluous suffering will not force Thomas into the unpalatable position of facing of the appeal to robust love. According to this Thomistic framework, God's pursuing satisfaction in this way is done because it is the most effective means of drawing sinners to God in love. We can articulate this


158 It should be noted that such an attempt will be unlikely to offer definitive proof that the Passion is not more painful than any other means to the removal of the stain of sin. It will be enough, however, to show how God's accepting satisfaction in this way is plausibly the most effective means to this end. I address this in more detail in this diss., pp. 212-213.
approach in the following way. While some theories of satisfaction claim that the efficacy of satisfaction is in its ability to free God to forgive, this Thomistic framework holds that the ultimate efficacy of satisfaction through the Passion is in its ability to draw sinners into the appropriation of God's forgiveness. While this will be described in more detail later, the relevant point for now is that this answer with regard to the goal of satisfaction reveals an other-focused approach to satisfaction on the part of God, and as such is perfectly compatible with robust love.
CHAPTER THREE
SATISFACTION AND HUMAN APPROPRIATION OF FORGIVENESS

Introduction

In this chapter I develop an approach to satisfaction through penal substitution, inspired by Aquinas. According to this approach God chooses to require satisfaction through penal substitution because it affords God the opportunity to fulfill this requirement through divine penal Self-substitution.¹ God creates and seizes upon this opportunity because of its effectiveness in eliciting human appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration.²

This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first section I outline the necessary conditions for human appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-restoration and argue that while satisfaction is not logically necessary to meet these conditions, it may be the most effective means to human fulfillment of these conditions. In the second section, I borrow a phrase from Paul K. Moser and present a "divine-manifest offering" approach to penal substitution. According to this approach, penal substitution can be a tool through which God makes demonstrations meant to enable humans to meet the conditions for appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-restoration. In the third section I compare this

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¹ "Require" here does not indicate a categorical demand on God's part. Rather, God refuses to waive the debt of punishment, making satisfaction the only alternative to divine punishment of fallen humans. Thus, in the absence of divine punishment of fallen humans, God "requires" satisfaction.

² "Effectiveness" here indicates causal influence as opposed to causal determination. I say more on this in this diss., chapter 4, p. 212, footnote 5.
divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution with the account of satisfaction developed by Richard Swinburne. In the fourth section I compare this divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution with the account of satisfaction developed by Eleonore Stump.

**Personal Reconciliation, Human Appropriation of Forgiveness, and Satisfaction**

This section is divided into two parts. In the first part, I outline three necessary conditions for human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. I present two doxastic conditions and one volitional condition. In the second part I argue that while satisfaction is not necessary for the fulfillment of any of the three conditions, it may be more effective than any other means at eliciting a person's fulfillment of the volitional condition.

**Personal Reconciliation and Human Appropriation of Forgiveness**

As I argued in chapter two, God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration is necessary, but not sufficient for personal reconciliation. In order for personal reconciliation to be complete, an offending human must also appropriate God's forgiveness-as-restoration. Here I outline three conditions for human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration and reply to an objection which accuses my account of neglecting a fourth necessary condition.

**Three Conditions for Human Appropriation of Forgiveness**

There are at least three necessary conditions that must be met for an offender to appropriate forgiveness-as-restoration, and so enter into personal reconciliation with the offended party. The first two conditions are doxastic conditions. First, the offender

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3 This is not intended to indicate a logical order.
must believe that she is in a state of alienation that requires forgiveness-as-restoration from the offended party. In order to meet the first doxastic condition for the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration, the offender must believe that she is alienated from the offended party. This belief, however, must be accompanied by another belief in the form of a judgment. That is, the offender must also see herself as the culpable agent who is responsible for the alienation.\(^4\) By believing that she is alienated and that she is responsible for the alienation, she will be able to perceive her role in personal reconciliation as an appropriator of forgiveness-as-reconciliation.

Second, the offender must believe that the offer of forgiveness-as-restoration is genuine. That is, she must trust the authenticity of the forgiver's offered forgiveness. This simply involves believing that the offended party's offer of forgiveness-as-restoration indicates a real willingness on the part of the offended party to enter into a state of personal reconciliation with the offender.

The third condition is a volitional condition. The offender must be willing to be personally reconciled to the offended. This involves a willingness to turn from the offensive behavior or state that caused (causes) the relational division and enter into a state of personal reconciliation. The offender must reject her state of alienation and embrace a state of personal reconciliation. As we determined in the first two chapters the

\(^4\) Richard Swinburne lists a similar condition as one of his two conditions of repentance. "Repentance involves, first, acknowledgement by the guilty one that he did the act and that it was a wrong act to do. Thereby the guilty one distances the act from his present ideals" (Richard Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," in *Philosophy and the Christian Faith*, edited by Thomas V. Morris (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 18). I disagree with Swinburne that one distances the act by acknowledging it as wrong. One might believe that the act was wrong but consider wrong acts to be a part of your "present ideals." That is why I add a third, volitional, condition below. It seems that Swinburne holds to some version of that condition as his second condition for repentance. "Repentance also involves a resolve to amend—you cannot repent of a past act if you intend to do a similar act at the next available opportunity" (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18).
relevant state of personal reconciliation which must be embraced can be described as
a state of mutual love between God and the human being wherein the human trusts God
as the source and end of her fulfillment.\(^5\)

**An Objection to this Analysis and My Response**

Someone might argue that my analysis of personal reconciliation is still
incomplete. Earlier I identified a communication condition as part of an offended party's
role in restoring a personal relationship with an offender.\(^6\) Namely, to extend
forgiveness-as-restoration the offended party must communicate her willingness to be
reconciled with the offender. Similarly, one might argue that a communication condition
must be met by the offender as well. Personal reconciliation cannot be had until an
offender has communicated her willingness to be reconciled to the offended party. We
can imagine a case in which an offended party has met all of the conditions for an
extension of forgiveness-as-restoration (she is willing to be personally reconciled to the
offender, she has released her resentment, and she has communicated her offer of
forgiveness-as-restoration), the offender has met the above three conditions for
appropriation, and still personal reconciliation is not complete because the offended party
is unaware of the offender's willingness to be reconciled. This, one could claim, is the
importance of apology, which Richard Swinburne defines as an offender's "public
expression to the wronged one" that the offender has disowned his wrongdoing.\(^7\) Thus,

\(^5\) See this diss., pp. 82-95, 149-151.

\(^6\) See this diss., p. 114.

\(^7\) Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18. Also see also Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme
someone might claim, this analysis of personal reconciliation is incomplete because my analysis of the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration does not appear to include a communication condition.

For our purposes, however, such a condition does not need to be distinguished from the above three conditions. Since God, as an omniscient being, is a reader of human hearts, genuine repentance (in the form of the second doxastic condition and the volitional conditional) can function as the successful attainment of any communication condition for the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. Thus, for divine-human personal reconciliation the above three conditions suffice as a description of the necessary conditions for human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. For human-human personal reconciliation an additional communication condition in the form of apology might be necessary.

**Human Appropriation of Forgiveness and Satisfaction**

Let us ask whether God's pursuing satisfaction can contribute to human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. There are three ways to argue that satisfaction contributes to human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. The first is to claim that satisfaction is logically necessary for appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. The second is to claim that satisfaction is the most effective or efficient means towards human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. The third is to claim that while humans can appropriate forgiveness-as-restoration without satisfaction, humans require satisfaction as a prerequisite to their appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration because of satisfaction's contribution to attaining some other benefit.
As we have seen, satisfaction is not logically necessary for personal reconciliation. While one might argue that legal reconciliation in some form is necessary for personal reconciliation, legal reconciliation need not take the form of satisfaction. An offender could appropriate forgiveness-as-restoration after receiving due punishment or after being given forgiveness-as-pardon. Thus, satisfaction is not logically necessary for the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.

Let us now examine the second approach. Perhaps God's receiving satisfaction is more effective or efficient than any other means toward the attainment of one of the necessary conditions for human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. Let's begin with the volitional condition. It seems that God cannot force the relevant movement of the human will without destroying the possibility of personal relationship; especially insofar as the relationship into which the human must enter is one that involves trust and love on the part of the human.8 Considering this, Paul K. Moser rejects the possibility that God makes reconciliation "humanly irresistible." He claims that,

Such a god would coerce human wills...in a way that robs humans of their moral agency and thus their personhood, at least in a definitive area of life. This would be to preclude genuinely personal interaction and thus genuinely loving interaction.9

This does not mean that God is powerless to pursue human appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration. There are non-coercive ways in which God can help humans to fulfill the volitional condition. For example, encouragement and discouragement are

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8 See this diss., pp. 41-42, 94-95, 150-151.

9 Paul K. Moser, The Elusive God (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), p. 175. Also James S. Stewart says, "...if the man does not wish to open, has no desire to be committed to discipleship, Christ will not break in. He stands and waits. This is the sacredness of personality. Even God will not violate it. This is the mystery of free will" (James S. Stewart, King For Ever (Nashville: Abingdon, 1975), p. 128).
consistent with a non-coercive attempt to elicit a particular movement of the will. So, God could encourage humans to enter into personal relationship with God and discourage humans from persisting in alienation. In this way, God could seek to draw humans into a relationship of mutual love while avoiding coercion.\textsuperscript{10} God's pursuing satisfaction (even through penal substitution) could be part of this project, and perhaps even the most effective means to this end.

With regard to the doxastic conditions for the appropriation of forgiveness, it seems that God may be able to coerce human attainment of these conditions without destroying personal relationship. However, the manner in which God makes available evidence that leads to the relevant beliefs can positively or negatively affect a human's fulfillment of the volitional condition. That is, there could be many different ways to enable a human to meet the doxastic conditions and one of those ways could be more successful than the others at eliciting the necessary movement of the will from the human being. For example, imagine that a man knows that a particular path in the woods is fraught with dangers; poisonous plants, wild animals, and brigands. The man might aim to discourage his son from traveling down this particular dangerous path. He could warn the son verbally by telling him that the path is dangerous and, because he is a trustworthy father, the son might develop the belief that the path is dangerous. Still, the son has the freedom to travel down the path. It is possible that the father could more effectively discourage his son from taking the path by showing the son the father's own scars from having traveled the same path when he was younger. This second choice could also produce the belief that the path was dangerous but have more success in discouraging the

\textsuperscript{10} I will discuss this possibility in more detail in this diss., pp. 161-182.
son's choosing to take the path. Also, the father might take care how he seeks to produce beliefs in his son depending upon the state of his son's heart. If the son hates the father, the father might risk the son's intentionally taking the path when the father tells the son that the path is dangerous. So, we can see that the manner in which a person seeks to produce belief in another person can affect the will of that other person.\footnote{For more on what Paul K. Moser calls "purposively available evidence" see Paul K. Moser, \textit{The Elusive God}.}

Similarly, satisfaction may be part of God's project of enabling humans to meet the relevant doxastic conditions in a manner that has the most success at helping humans to meet the volitional condition.

Finally, let us examine the third approach to satisfaction's contribution to human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. If personal reconciliation with God is the highest good for a human being it is unclear that there is \textit{any} benefit for which a human being could hold out before he is willing to attain his highest good. This is because anything for which the human would hold out is not \textit{beneficial} to the human being insofar as it is an obstacle to the attainment of the highest good. Thus, this approach is unlikely to provide a successful defense of satisfaction's contribution to human appropriation of forgiveness.

\textbf{A Divine-Manifest Offering Account of Penal Substitution}

This section is divided into three parts. In the first part I briefly describe Paul K. Moser's "divine-manifest offering approach"\footnote{Moser, \textit{The Elusive God}, p. 165.} to the atonement. According to this approach God, in the Cross, pursues human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. In the second part I argue that the divine-manifest offering approach is compatible with
penal substitution. There I argue that penal substitution can be a tool through which God presents evidence meant to help humans to meet the doxastic conditions for appropriation of forgiveness. This evidence can also be used by God to make various demonstrations intended for the effective encouragement of humans towards divine-human personal reconciliation and discouragement against human persistence in alienation.\(^\text{13}\) In the third section I further clarify the nature of this divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution.

**Paul K. Moser's Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Atonement**

What I have called "forgiveness-as-restoration," Moser calls "conciliatory forgiveness."\(^\text{14}\) According to Moser, this type of forgiveness

\[
\ldots\text{characteristically seeks perfect } \text{reconciliation} \text{ with a person under the demands of morally perfect love, despite that person's having violated those demands.} \quad \text{\cite{15}}
\]

As I have above, Moser also distinguishes between offering and receiving such forgiveness.\(^\text{16}\) Each of these is an "intentional action" rather than a "coerced happening."\(^\text{17}\) Because of this,

\[
\text{The reconciliation typically } \text{sought} \text{ by an offer of forgiveness isn't necessarily } \text{achieved} \text{ by the offer of forgiveness.} \quad \text{\cite{18}}
\]

\(^\text{13}\) "Effective encouragement" refers to causal influence rather than causal determination. See also this diss., p. 212, footnote 5.


\(^\text{15}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{16}\) Ibid., p. 176.

\(^\text{17}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{18}\) Ibid., p. 175.
Even so, an offer of conciliatory forgiveness "typically aims to lead a person to repentance." And repentance, which Moser identifies as "turning away from whatever violates perfect love," is a condition for receiving conciliatory forgiveness.

God's offer of conciliatory forgiveness, which seeks to lead humans to the reception of such forgiveness, is manifested in the Cross of Christ. Thus, Moser calls his theory a "divine-manifest offering approach" to the atonement. Moser is thus claiming that in the Cross, God is pursuing human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.

**Penal Substitution and Divine-Manifest Offering**

Paul K. Moser ultimately rejects penal substitution as an explanatory feature of the atonement. I will argue, however, that penal substitution is compatible with a divine-manifest offering approach to atonement such that God pursues satisfaction through penal self-substitution as a means to elicit human reception of conciliatory forgiveness. In other words, through Christ's satisfaction by penal substitution God is helping humans to meet the conditions for the appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration.

19 Ibid., p. 172.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid., pp. 173, 176.
22 Ibid., p. 166.
23 Ibid., p. 165.
Penal Substitution and the Doxastic Conditions for Appropriation of Forgiveness

God's pursuing satisfaction through penal substitution can contribute to the first doxastic condition for appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. God's pursuing atonement in any form is evidence that humans are in a state of alienation for which atonement is appropriate. This evidence as presented in God's pursuit of satisfaction through penal substitution is compatible with God's presenting other evidence for believing that humans are in a state of alienation for which they are culpable. For example, God might also give evidence for this belief through feelings of guilt and the teaching of Jesus.

God's pursuing satisfaction through penal substitution can also contribute to the second doxastic condition for appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. God's pursuing atonement in any form is evidence that God is willing to be reconciled to human beings. If God refuses to offer forgiveness-as-restoration unless satisfaction is made on behalf of humans, then in providing the required satisfaction God could be seen as giving evidence for God's willingness to be reconciled with humans. This evidence is also compatible with God's giving additional evidence for the belief that God extends forgiveness-as-restoration to human beings. For example, God might also offer such evidence through the teaching of Jesus and an existential feeling of peace.

Someone might object that God could enable us to meet the doxastic conditions without resorting to such extreme and painful measures. Yet, while the Cross is not logically necessary for producing the relevant beliefs, there are at least two reasons why it might contribute to the most effective means to human fulfillment of the doxastic conditions. First, humans have the ability to ignore available evidence. The Cross is
Attention-getting in a way that combats the human ability to ignore the claim that we are in an alienated state that requires forgiveness-as-restoration. Second, humans have the ability to doubt God's message that God desires reconciliation. The extreme lengths to which God will go to offer forgiveness-as-restoration is assuring in a way that combats human ability to doubt God's willingness to be personally reconciled with humans. This is compatible with the claim of James S. Stewart where he says,

> It was not enough to send Jesus preaching the Sermon on the Mount, challenging and appealing to people in tones they had never heard before to trust God's love for everything; even that could not do it...The death of Christ gives me the very heart of the eternal, because it is not words at all, not even sublime prophetic utterance: it is an act, God's act, against which I can batter all my doubts to pieces. We preach Christ crucified, God's truth revealed. ²⁵

Penal Substitution and the Volitional Condition for Appropriation of Forgiveness

The third condition for appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration is a volitional condition. To fulfill this condition, the offender must be willing to turn from her state of alienation and embrace personal reconciliation with God. It is possible for an offender to meet the doxastic conditions for appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration (acknowledge that she is alienated, trust the authenticity of God's offer of forgiveness-as-restoration) and still refuse personal reconciliation.

If freedom is an essential component of personal relationship, it will not be possible for an offender to be forced to meet this condition for the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration. The moment force is applied in this respect to the will the possibility of personal relationship vanishes. ²⁶ Yet God could preserve personal

²⁵ James S. Stewart, A Faith to Proclaim (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1953), p. 82.

²⁶ See this diss., pp. 41-42, 94-95, 150-151, 159.
relationship while pursuing non-coercive means towards human fulfillment of the volitional condition. God could seek to help an offender to meet this third condition (while preserving the possibility of personal relationship) through a sort of discouragement and encouragement. In penal substitution God could be discouraging the offender from moving away from personal reconciliation. That is, God is discouraging the offender from persisting in an alienated state. Further, God could be encouraging the offender to move toward personal reconciliation. God could be encouraging the offender to accept God's offer of forgiveness-as-restoration and enter into a relationship of mutual love with God wherein the offender trusts God as the source and end of her fulfillment.27

I argue that satisfaction through penal substitution could be a means by which God provides such encouragement and discouragement. I will present two ways that Christ's making satisfaction through penal substitution in the Cross can discourage human persistence in alienation and three ways that it can encourage human willingness to embrace personal reconciliation with God. Each of the ways presented is inspired by a reading of Thomas Aquinas.

*Penal Substitution as Discouragement against Alienation*

Through penal substitution, God could seek to discourage an alienated human being from persisting in her state of alienation. God could do this by creating obstacles

27 This approach is reminiscent of P.T. Forsyth where he says, "To the question what the worth was which God saw in the work of Christ...the answer can here but be useless brevity. First, the practical and adequate recognition of a broken law in a holy and universal life is an end in itself, and therefore a Divine satisfaction. Second, the effect of that vicarious and loving sacrifice on men must bring them to a repentance and reconciliation which was the one thing that God's gracious love required for restored communion and complete forgiveness...Thirdly, that effect on men is due to the satisfaction of God's moral nature in the constitution of man. God was in Christ reconciling the world by the sacrifice and satisfaction of Himmself" (P.T. Forsyth, *The Atonement in Modern Religious Thought* (New York: Thomas Whittaker, 1902), pp. 86-87).
to the human's continued resistance. There are at least two ways by which God can
give such discouragement through penal substitution. First, penal substitution could
serve as a demonstration of the danger of persistence in alienation. Second, penal
substitution could be a demonstration of the value of God's offer of forgiveness-as-
restoration. Each of these could serve as obstacles against human persistence in
alienation.28

*Penal Substitution as a Demonstration of Danger*

Thomas claims that in the Passion

> God's severity is thereby shown, for He would not remit sin without penalty...29

God's demonstration of severity through penal substitution could serve as a warning
which creates an obstacle against remaining in an alienated state. To see how this could
be so, let us distinguish between God's *active wrath* and God's *passive wrath*. God's
active wrath is that quality of God by which God pursues satisfaction or punishment for
sin. This is the sort of wrath to which Wayne Grudem refers when he claims that Christ's
suffering and death is

> ...a sacrifice that bears God's wrath to the end and in so doing changes
> God's wrath toward us into favor.30

We might also, with Raymond Schwager, characterize God as having passive
wrath in contrast to a holy anger which is carried out either upon us or upon Christ

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28 These obstacles would be surmountable to allow for human freedom.

29 *Summa Theologica* (ST) III, q. 47, a. 3, ad. 1.

(through active wrath). This passive wrath would be “the deliverance of humankind to themselves, their desires, their passions, and perverse thinking” through God’s respecting the freedom of "human activity right up to its ultimate and bitter consequences." God's passive wrath would manifest itself in the despair involved in God's allowing us to pursue our own deep desires apart from a mutual loving relationship of faith with the Person of God.

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31 We should note that Schwager argues that this interpretation of God's wrath is the only interpretation that we should hold. He rejects the idea of active wrath. Joel B. Green also characterizes God's wrath as passive (though he does not use this word) saying, "...sinful activity is the result of God's letting us go our own way, and this letting us go our own way constitutes God's wrath" (Joel B. Green, "Must We Imagine the Atonement in Penal Substitutionary Terms?" in The Atonement Debate, edited by Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Michigan: Zondervan, 2008), p. 163). Green contrasts this with, what I have called, God's active wrath. Green also denies that God pursues external punishment of sin through such active wrath (Green, pp. 160-163). See also Joel B. Green and Mark D. Baker. Recovering the Scandal of the Cross (Illinois: InterVarsity, 2000), pp. 54-55. C.H. Dodd also employs a concept of passive wrath when he claims that divine wrath is intended "not to describe the attitude of God to man, but to describe an inevitable process of cause and effect in a moral universe" (C.H. Dodd, The Epistle of Paul to the Romans (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1932), p. 23). Dodd is also cited in John R.W. Stott, The Cross of Christ. (Leicester, England: Inter-Varsity Press, 1986), p. 104. I should also note that by "passive wrath" I am referring to analytic internal consequences as developed in this diss., pp. 36-37 and pp. 40-41. I am not simply referring to contingently internal consequences like those identified by Garry Williams where he says, "with God the Creator, it is quite possible for a punishment to be intrinsic, to follow from an act, and yet still to be retributive in character" (Garry Williams, "Penal Substitution: A Response to Recent Criticisms," in The Atonement Debate, edited by Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Michigan: Zondervan, 2008), p. 175). I would characterize these consequences, ordered by God, as a type of active wrath. Similarly, I argued that contingently internal consequences can be characterized as a type of external consequence enforced by God (See this diss., p. 34).


33 Schwager. p. 216.

34 In the sense discussed in this diss., chapter 1, pp. 82-90.

35 Eileen Sweeney holds that Aquinas has a role for divine passive wrath. She claims that Aquinas's view "makes mortal sin, which consists in the rejection of God, its own punishment, a punishment consisting in forgoing forever the enjoyment of that perfect good in order to 'fix one's end in sin,' thus willing 'to sin everlasting'ly' (IaIae, q.87, a. 3, ad 1). It is a punishment less inflicted by God than a wish on the part of the sinner (mistaken though it is) that is granted by God" (Eileen Sweeney, "Vice and Sin (Ia Ilae, qq. 71-89)," in The Ethics of Aquinas, edited by Stephen J. Pope (Washington, D.C. Georgetown University Press, 2002), p. 156).
If God can justly waive God's active wrath by granting forgiveness-as-pardon, then God's active wrath is a threat to sinners only inasmuch as God chooses to exercise this wrath. If this were the end of the story we might anticipate that an omnibenevolent God would choose to do so, since in doing so God could remain just while also showing mercy. Yet, as we have seen, this is not the end of the story. There is still the danger of God's passive wrath. And this is a wrath which God cannot simply waive. A human's refusal to enter into personal relationship with God is its own negative consequence which God cannot forcibly remove without simultaneously removing human freedom (and as a result removing personal relationship). This is where the exercise of God's active wrath in seeking satisfaction through penal substitution becomes very useful; in it God displays a severity against alienation that serves as a warning to help sinners to avoid the dangers of God's non-waivable passive wrath. God makes a demonstration of the danger of sin through God's active wrath in order to discourage us from a path which leads to a consequence that we may not perceive: God's passive wrath.

Thus, in publicly exposing and judging sin through penal substitution in the Cross, God demonstrates that sin is a real problem with which we should be concerned. It is possible that if God were to exercise God's freedom to waive God's active wrath, we

36 Also, as we have seen, if this were the end of the story any atonement theory that claimed that God is somehow satisfied in the suffering and death of Christ would be unable to escape at least the problem of superfluous suffering.

37 Someone might ask how God's exercise of active wrath can be a warning if it is exhausted in the Cross. We can respond to this in two ways. One response is to claim that God exhausts God's active wrath and then warns that such wrath is indicative of a non-waivable passive wrath that awaits for those who remain closed to divine-human personal reconciliation. Another response is to claim that God's active wrath in the Cross manifests an offer of forgiveness-as-pardon which applies only to those who appropriate God's forgiveness-as-restoration. Those who do not appropriate God's forgiveness-as-restoration are not given forgiveness-as-pardon and still face God's active wrath. For more on this, see this diss., pp. 221-225.
would allow ourselves to be unconcerned with the danger of alienation and would become complacent in our alienated state.\textsuperscript{38} Instead, the severity of the Cross deters us from taking sin too lightly and the shocking nature of the Cross makes it more difficult to ignore the problem of sin.\textsuperscript{39} If we are to persist in our state of alienation we must ignore this warning, which is in itself an act of will.

\textit{Penal Substitution as a Demonstration of the Value of Divine Forgiveness}

This second form of discouragement against alienation is inspired by Aquinas where he says,

\begin{quote}
...by [Christ's Passion] man is all the more bound to refrain from sin, according to I Cor. vi. 20: You are bought with a great price: glorify and bear God in your body.\textsuperscript{40}
\end{quote}

By insisting that a price be paid as a condition of God's offer of forgiveness-as-restoration, God is demonstrating that God's offer of forgiveness-as-restoration has value. God insists on a high cost; as high as penal substitution in the Cross. And not just any penal substitution but, if Christ shares the Father's status and character as a being who is worthy of worship, and so is God, then the cost upon which God insists is divine penal Self-substitution.\textsuperscript{41} In this, God is demonstrating that God's offer of forgiveness-as-restoration has value.

\textsuperscript{38} Richard L. Purtill makes a similar point, suggesting that "simple pardon" could give humans "a false idea of the seriousness of sin, and not give them motive for repentance" (Richard Purtill, “Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement,” in \textit{Christian Philosophy}, edited by Thomas Flint (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1990), pp. 41-42).

\textsuperscript{39} This recalls Hans Urs Von Balthasar who says the following regarding God's "anger." "...in no way does it exclude his mercy; in fact, it should be regarded as a function of mercy..." (Hans Urs von Balthasar, \textit{Theo-Drama, Vol. 4: The Action}, translated by Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), p. 340).

\textsuperscript{40} ST III, q. 46, a. 3.

\textsuperscript{41} It is outside of the scope of this project to defend the divinity of Christ. I argue that if Christ is divine, God's action in penal self-substitution can be seen as a significant manifestation of love.
restoration has tremendous value. This consideration of the cost that was paid as a condition of God's offer could serve as a deterrent against persisting in alienation. This consideration could discourage the offender from ignoring the value of the offer of forgiveness-as-restoration and persisting in an alienated state.42

_Penal Substitution and Encouragement towards Personal Reconciliation_

Through penal substitution God could also _encourage_ an alienated human to embrace personal reconciliation. There are at least three ways by which God can give such encouragement through penal substitution. First, penal substitution can be a demonstration of God's objective dealing with guilt in order to overcome an offender's shame. Second, penal substitution can be a demonstration of divine justice which can encourage human victims of other humans' sin to be open to a relationship of mutual love with God. Finally, penal substitution can be a demonstration of God's love toward the alienated human being which encourages a loving response in the sinner.

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42 Similarly, Purtill claims "If God in his own nature had merely forgiven us without it costing anyone anything, we would not have the same motive for gratitude & repentance: we do not value what seems easy" (Purtill, “Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement,” p. 44). Purtill notes that Aquinas refers to this as "the major reason why God did not forgive us without satisfaction" (p. 49, footnote 6). Purtill, however, does not hold to penal substitution. Instead, he claims that Christ's suffering and death was "an act of supererogation" (p. 41) that gave God "a good reason to punish us less and reward us more than we deserve on our own merits. His suffering and death for our sake give us a claim on God's mercy and generosity" (p. 44). He considers this a ransom theory wherein "A ransom is a payment which gives a captor good reason to release a captive" (p. 45). On his account Christ's action gives God a good reason to free us from our self-captivity (p. 45). There are at least two difficulties with Purtill's theory. First, it is unclear on his account how Christ's suffering and death constitute a good reason for God to forgive humans. He claims that "All suffering undeserved by the sufferer and freely accepted out of love is an act of supererogation which gives God a good reason to punish members of Christ's body less than they deserve, and reward them far beyond their individual merits" (p. 47). However, it is not clear how Christ's suffering is an act of love on his view, instead of merely an instance of undeserved suffering. Second, Purtill seems to be involved in a contradiction where he claims that we can have "a claim on God's mercy and generosity" (p. 44) for earlier he claims that "God's forgiveness of us is purely supererogatory" (p. 42).
Penal Substitution as a Demonstration of God's Dealing with Human Guilt

Whereas God can use penal substitution to create obstacles to a sinner's moving away from God, God can also use it to remove obstacles to a sinner's approach to God. One obstacle that threatens to prevent an offender from embracing personal reconciliation with his forgiver is a sense of shame. In penal substitution God objectively addresses a sinner's guilt before God by dealing with the penal debt incurred through such guilt. In so doing, God demonstrates that guilt is not an obstacle to God's love and ability to offer forgiveness-as-restoration. As a result, the sinner who thinks, "I'm too guilty to be forgiven" meets rebuttal in the Cross.43

In offering an objective dealing with guilt, God helps the sinner to overcome a subjective sense of shame which could prevent the sinner from appropriating God's forgiveness-as-restoration. This is a departure from Stump who rejects a concept of atonement which makes God "seem like an accountant" who balances sin and punishment44, and contrasts this with her claim that the purpose of Christ's satisfaction is

43 In his review of Herrmann of Marburg's Communion with God, H.R. Mackintosh writes the following. "...in Jesus' presence we become aware that God is forgiving us. It is Jesus who has mediated to us the pardon of our sins, not however by His teaching but by being to sinners what He was...What the sinful saw in Jesus before the end was that this Man, who gave access to the Father, knowing that nothing else would avail, sacrificed Himself, and so took on Him their burden. While dispensing forgiveness, He at the same time did everything to establish the inviolable justice of God's moral order. The doctrine of vicarious atonement proves its value at just this point—it comforts the anxious and penitent believer. 'It helps to overcome the doubts which are always springing up as to the reality of the forgiveness which has been experienced' (p. 136). Christ did not merely proclaim the forgiveness of sins, nor did He merely render it a possibility. Rather He bestows it on us, as our mind, for the first time and ever anew, opens through Him to faith in the Father. 'His death, as He bore it and as He expounded it in words at the Last Supper, becomes to us the word of God that overcomes our feeling of guilt. The God who comes near to us in Christ reconciles us with Himself by that death' (p. 142)" (H.R. Mackintosh, "Books that have Influenced our Epoch: Herrmann's 'Communion with God'," The Expository Times 40 (1929), p. 314).

to transform the will of the sinner. On this divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution God utilizes the image of a divine accountant who balances sin and punishment so that God can transform the will of the sinner. If ever the sinner wonder, "Can God forgive me?" she needs only to look at the "divine ledger" which finds its balance in the Cross.

This is supported by Aquinas where he says,

...man, being aware of this offense, loses by sin that confidence in approaching God which is necessary to achieve beatitude. Therefore, the human race, which abounds in sins, needed to have some remedy against sin applied to it...But, if man is to be freed from awareness of past offense, he must know clearly that God has remitted his offense. But man cannot be clear on this with certainty unless God gives him certainty of it. Therefore, it was suitable and helpful to the human race for achieving beatitude that God should become man; as a result, man not only receives the remission of sins through God, but also the certitude of this remission through the man-God.

*Penal Substitution as a Demonstration of Divine Justice*

Thomas writes,

That man should be delivered by Christ's Passion was in keeping with both His mercy and His justice. With His justice, because by His Passion Christ made satisfaction for the sin of the human race; and so man was set free by Christ's justice... and again,

God's severity is thereby shown, for He would not remit sin without penalty...

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46 *Summa Contra Gentiles (SCG)* IV, ch 54 (8).

47 ST III, q. 46, a. 1, ad. 3.

48 ST III, q. 47, a. 3, ad. 1.
Above I argued that God's display of active wrath through penal substitution can create an obstacle to human persistence in alienation. In addition to this, God's demonstration of severity in response to sin can serve to remove an obstacle to human appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-restoration; namely, doubt that God is just. In this display, human victims of other humans' sin can see that God is not flippant about the sin that has affected them. While God could justly waive the debt of punishment, this would not be an act of justice that is visible to human victims of sin. Instead, God chooses to justly exercise active wrath through penal substitution. This is a visible display of divine justice that demonstrates God's seriousness about sin. So, in penal substitution God addresses human doubt that God is concerned with human victimization. 49 Thus this demonstration of divine justice is also a demonstration of divine love towards humans in a way which can encourage human victims of sin to be open to personal reconciliation with God. 50

*Penal Substitution as a Demonstration of Divine Love*

Thomas claims that on account of the deliverance of humans through Christ's Passion,

...man knows thereby how much God loves him, and is thereby stirred to love Him in return, and herein lies the perfection of human salvation... 51

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49 Penal substitution could also be seen as an expression of the value of human victims of sin. This calls to mind John Hare who borrows Jean Hampton's term and calls this "the expressive theory of punishment." On this view, "[punishment] is good because it expresses the right relative value of [the offender] and his victim" (Hare, "Moral Faith and Atonement").

50 I am also grateful to a sermon delivered by Russ Johnson at MissioDei Chicago titled "God is Just" (April 1, 2012) for insight with regard to this point (http://www.missiodeichicago.com/index.php/media/ul/podcasts)

51 ST III, q. 46, a. 3. See also SCG IV, ch 55.
In the Cross, not only does God demonstrate a willingness to be personally reconciled to humans, God could be seen as demonstrating abundant desire to be so reconciled. Since personal reconciliation is defined by a relationship of mutual love between God and humans, God's display of willingness to be personally reconciled could also be seen as a demonstration of love toward sinners. Penal substitution is a means by which God can display the depth of God's love toward each sinner. If Christ, as the substitute, is God (and as such shares the status and character of a being who is worthy of worship) then in the Cross we can see the depth of God's love for sinners, for we can see the extent to which God will go to win sinners back to God. While God could justly forgive sinners without external penalty, God allows God's Self to demand satisfaction through penal substitution because this affords God the opportunity, through self-substitution, to convincingly display the depth of God's desire for fallen humanity to be personally reconciled to God.

Thus, in the Cross, Christ and the Father conspire together to reveal God's love. Though God could simply waive God's active wrath, God chooses to make the pouring out of God's active wrath a condition of God's offering forgiveness-as-reconciliation.

52 Or perhaps God even creates in God's Self a need for satisfaction in the absence of punishment of fallen humans.

53 One might argue against this by claiming that unconditional forgiveness is a virtue. (For example, see Eve Garrard and David McNaughton, "In Defence of Unconditional Forgiveness," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103.1 (2003), pp. 39-60). The objector could say that by making God's offer of forgiveness-as-reconciliation conditional upon penal substitution the divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution creates a picture of God wherein God lacks moral perfection. Since God cannot lack moral perfection, this divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution must be false. It may be the case that where an unconditional offer of forgiveness-as-restoration and a conditional offer of forgiveness as restoration can both result in personal reconciliation, the choice to unconditionally extend forgiveness-as-restoration is sometimes the more virtuous choice. It is questionable, however, whether an unconditional offer of forgiveness-as-restoration is always morally superior to a conditional offer of forgiveness-as-restoration. In fact, where a conditional offer is more effective than an unconditional offer in eliciting
Thus God creates, through no other necessity than by God's choosing, an obstacle to God's offer of forgiveness-as-restoration. In overcoming this tremendous obstacle God's Self through penal Self-substitution, God shows sinners the lengths to which God will go to be personally reconciled to them. In doing this, God offers a shocking display of God's deep love for sinners and God's desire that they appropriate God's forgiveness-as-restoration. This display is so shocking that it can combat our ability to ignore or doubt it. In this way God works to remove obstacles to a human's movement toward God in love. Further, inasmuch as a loving display encourages a loving response, God could be seen as spurring the human towards personal reconciliation with God.

This is compatible with Moser where he says,

Jesus's obedient death on the cross, commanded of him by God, aims to manifest how far he and his Father will go, even to gruesome death, to offer divine forgiveness and fellowship to wayward humans.  


Further Explication of This Account

I will address four more points with regard to this divine-manifest offering account of penal substitution. First, this view can accommodate the concern that the human will is weak. Second, this view can address the moral problem of sin. Third, this view does not claim to be a complete account of God's work in the Cross. Fourth, on this view a human's fulfillment of the volitional condition is not dependent upon antecedent beliefs.

First, this view can accommodate the concern that the human will is too weak to fulfill the volitional condition on its own. If human appropriation of forgiveness-as-

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restoration depends upon a volitional condition, one might be tempted to think that human hope for actual appropriation is bleak on account of the weakness of the human will. We can address this concern with help from Eleonore Stump. Stump suggests that when a sinner reflects upon the Cross that person's mind and heart can be affected in such a way that the sinner experiences a second-order willing to avoid sin and draw near to God. God can accept this second-order willing as permission from the sinner to strengthen the sinner's will so that she can make any necessary first-order movements of the will. 55 Thus,

What God infuses as grace is a disposition to righteous first-order willing; but God can do so only if a person is willing to have him do so, only if a person wills to will what he ought to will. 56

We can call this second-order volitional attitude "openness." We can now say that on this divine-manifest offering account of penal substitution God pursues an openness on the part of the sinner to appropriating God's offered forgiveness-as-restoration. Once the sinner is open to appropriating God's forgiveness, God can help the sinner to meet the necessary volitional condition without destroying the possibility of personal relationship. What is more, God can help the sinner to acquire openness in the form of a second-order volition by providing encouragement and discouragement in the way described above. By reflecting on God's action through penal substitution, the sinner can find encouragement towards this openness and discouragement against resisting such openness. This does allow for the possibility that some people will remain closed to God's project of personal reconciliation. But, that is just what it means to have freedom.

Second, this view can address the moral problem of sin. According to this
divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution, God delivers the human from the
external consequences of sin (as presented in the first conception of sin in chapter one)\textsuperscript{57} through penal substitution as a means to deliver the human from the divine-human
relational problem of sin (as presented in the fourth conception of sin in chapter one).\textsuperscript{58}
At first glance, this appears to neglect the moral problem of sin.

I have argued, however, that divine-human personal reconciliation is
characterized by loving trust of God on the part of the human. Such a relationship entails
willingness on the part of the human to submit to the will of God. Insofar as a human is
unwilling to submit to the will of God, that person cannot be said to be in a state of loving
trust of God. Insofar as a human is willing to submit to the will of God, that human can
also be said to be willing to overcome the moral problem of sin. Thus, willingness to be
personally reconciled with God entails willingness to submit to God's will by which the
moral problem of sin can be overcome.

An objector might then appeal back to the first concern and attack this answer
based on the weakness of the human will. We can reply that an openness to lovingly trust
God entails an openness to submit to God's will. God can then take this openness as
permission to transform a person's first-order volitions, desires, emotions, and so on such
that the human is empowered to obey. In other words, the soteriology developed by a
divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution is compatible with a pneumatology
according to which humans are united with God in such a way that God pursues a project

\textsuperscript{57} See this diss., pp. 27-32.

\textsuperscript{58} See this diss., pp. 39-43.
of moral transformation in those who are open to a relationship of loving trust with God.\(^{59}\) Such a project could be identified as an essential part of God's project of sanctification.\(^{60}\)

Third, this account is not a complete account of God's work in the Cross. One might point out that if a willingness to submit to God's will is entailed by loving trust of God, then there may be other obstacles to the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration which a divine-manifest offering account of penal substitution does not appear to address. For example, willingness to submit to God's will would involve willingness to forgive one's enemies. One's reluctance to do so could be an obstacle to one's willingness to enter into a relationship of loving trust with God. This divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution does not seem to address this obstacle, thus someone might argue, this view cannot offer a complete account of the atonement.

\(^{59}\) H.R. Mackintosh claims that "Union to Christ is the fundamental idea in a theory of redemption." By this, Mackintosh also is concerned with union to God for "the fellowship thus established with Christ is in express terms set forth as being intrinsically, and purely in itself, fellowship with God. To have the Son is to have the Father also" (H.R. Mackintosh, *Some Aspects of Christian Belief* (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1924), p.108). Mackintosh describes this union as a "mystic union" wherein "the Christian's life is rooted in Christ and has in Him its encompassing vital element and medium...He Himself is present in His people as the living centre, the animating principle, of their inmost being (p.107). Through such a union, the human could be empowered to overcome the moral problem of sin. Yet, we must take care not to characterize the problem of sin merely as a moral problem lest this type of union be subject to the same criticism to which we subjected Schleiermacher and the third conception of sin. Mackintosh says that God indwells like the person's own soul. But, it is possible to hate one's self. Why wouldn't it also be possible to also hate God who dwells within you? Yet such a union could address the problem of sin at its core if it also is concerned to transform the human into one who lovingly trusts God.

\(^{60}\) John E. Hare notes, "We have a real possibility of living the kind of life God wants us to live, not merely because he can help us to live it, but because he offers to help us live it" (John E. Hare, "Atonement, Justification, and Sanctification," in *A Companion to Philosophy of Religion*, edited by Philip L. Quinn and Charles Taliaferro (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1997), p. 550). This divine power unto moral transformation could be presented to us through another divine offering which is manifest in connection with the Cross. We could see Jesus as obedient to the Father even in the extreme circumstances of the Cross. This obedience is divinely vindicated in the Resurrection. And Jesus, through His teaching, declares that a divine source which can empower us to such obedience is available and offered to us.
I am not concerned, however, to offer a complete account of Christ's work in the Cross. (Neither do I think that such a task is possible in one lifetime.) A divine-manifest offering account of penal substitution may avoid all of the problems listed in the introduction of this work, while being only a small part of what God is accomplishing in the Cross. One virtue of this account is its compatibility with other theories of atonement which might account for God's answer to other obstacles to human appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration. For example, in the Cross, Christ might be giving humans a demonstration of solidarity that can help a person to overcome her reluctance to submit to God's moral authority. The person who thinks, "God wouldn't expect me to forgive my enemies if God understood how reprehensible my enemies have been towards me," meets rebuttal through the solidarity offered through Christ in the Cross.

A solidarity account of Christ's work on the Cross is compatible with a divine-manifest offering account of penal substitution. In fact, in the Cross, Christ could also be giving us an example of a perfect human life, meriting grace from God for humans, ransoming humans from the devil, and many, many, other things while also making penal substitution. All of these things could work together as a sort of multi-lingual expression of God's love which aims to draw all humans into a personal relationship of loving trust with God.

This claim helps to harmonize Thomas's use of what have sometimes been seen as competing theories. Thomas can consistently maintain a satisfaction theory61 in conjunction with a redemption theory,62 a sacrifice theory,63 a merit theory,64

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61 ST III, q. 48, a. 6, ad. 3. ST III, q. 46, a. 1 ad. 3. ST III, q. 49 a. 3.
62 ST III, q. 48, a. 4.
exemplarism\textsuperscript{65}, victory over the devil,\textsuperscript{66} and so on. On the Cross, Christ could be said to actually, not just analogically, accomplish all of these things with the intent of eliciting appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-restoration from free human sinners. On this view, penal substitution\textsuperscript{67} could be only one small part of the story and we can thus say with Thomas,

\textit{...if one earnestly and devoutly weighs the mysteries of the Incarnation, he will find so great a depth of wisdom that it exceeds human knowledge...Hence it happens that to him who devoutly considers it, more and more wondrous aspects of this mystery are made manifest.}\textsuperscript{68}

Finally, a human's meeting the volitional condition for the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration is not dependent upon the development of certain antecedent beliefs on the part of the human. At first glance it seems that such antecedent beliefs might be necessary. Someone could argue that in order for a person's will to be moved by God's demonstration of love, that person must first assent to the claim, "God's work in the Cross is evidence of God's deep love for me." Or again, for a person's will to be moved by a demonstration of the danger of sin, that demonstration must first convince the human to assent to the claim, "My state of alienation has dangerous consequences for me. My fulfillment is not to be found in such a state."

\textsuperscript{63} ST III, q. 48, a. 3.
\textsuperscript{64} ST III, q. 48, a. 1. ST III, q. 46, a. 3.
\textsuperscript{65} Aquinas, \textit{Compendium Theologiae} (CT), ch. 227. ST III, q. 46, a. 3. ST III, q. 1, a. 2. SCG IV, ch 55.
\textsuperscript{66} ST III, q. 46, a. 3. ST III, q. 1, a. 2.
\textsuperscript{67} ST III, q. 47, a. 3, ad.1. SCG IV, ch. 55. ST III, q. 49, a.5. ST III, q. 50, a. 1. CT, ch 227 & 228.
\textsuperscript{68} SCG IV, ch. 54 (1). While this quote references the incarnation and not the Passion we might apply it to Christ's Passion insofar as Thomas holds that "...the chief cause of the divine incarnation appears to be the expiation of sin..." (SCG IV, ch. 55 (7)).
However, on this divine-manifest offering approach the demonstrations that God provides through penal substitution can be "purposive" in the sense that their primary purpose is to elicit a movement on the part of the human will. Such a movement in the form of openness can occur without antecedent beliefs of the sort just described. A person can be open to a possibility without the belief that such a possibility has been actualized. For example, a person could be open to marriage without believing that a suitable spouse exists. Similarly a person might be open to entering into a relationship of loving trust with God before they actually assent to the claim "God exists and desires personal reconciliation with me." Such openness might be accompanied by certain beliefs like "If God exists and desires personal reconciliation with me (as would seem to be the case if the Cross is a real manifestation of God's love), then I am willing to be in a relationship of loving trust with God." Such beliefs, however, are logically dependent upon the relevant human openness and not the other way around.

**Richard Swinburne's Theory of Satisfaction**

In this section I compare the divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution with the satisfaction theory of Richard Swinburne (which also finds inspiration from a Thomist understanding of atonement). After explicating Swinburne's theory of satisfaction, I argue that Swinburne's theory can be read such that satisfaction's ultimate benefit is its ability to elicit human appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration. This divine-manifest offering reading of Swinburne enables him to avoid some moral

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69 For more on what Paul K. Moser calls "purposively available evidence" Moser, *The Elusive God.*

70 Likewise, a person can be *closed* to a possibility without the belief that such a possibility has been actualized. One's closedness is a volitional stance that does not depend upon antecedent beliefs. In this way we could say that someone who has a closed volitional stance but does not opine as to whether God exists and desires personal reconciliation could still be said to "refuse" personal reconciliation with God.
criticisms typically launched against him. I then argue that the divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution is compatible with a divine-manifest offering view of Swinburnian satisfaction. This compatibility can help Swinburne to avoid problems with his reading of Thomas.

**Swinburne's Account of Satisfaction**

Richard Swinburne develops a theory of atonement which he believes "to be in essence very similar to the theory expounded by St. Thomas Aquinas."71 At first glance Swinburne's view seems to reject satisfaction as an explanatory feature of the atonement inasmuch as he claims that "sacrifice" articulates the appropriate model. A study of the nature of sacrifice in Swinburne, however, reveals that Swinburnian sacrifice meets our definition of satisfaction as "that which God accepts in place of a sinner's receipt of divine punishment (or, at least, the full divine punishment) for sin."72 In fact, he refers to Anselm's satisfaction theory as that which...

"...brought back into Christian thought what is in essence the sacrifice model..."73

Swinburne continues,

[Anselm] phrases it...in terms very close to my own terms. The term he uses most frequently for what is rendered by Christ to God is 'satisfaction'. Anselm makes the point that something beyond reparation is owed, and he uses 'satisfaction' to denote reparation plus penance.74

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72 See this diss., p. 3.


74 Ibid.
For now, therefore, I will approach Swinburne's view as a satisfaction theory and interpret him in this light.75

According to Swinburne, "God seeks our eternal well-being in friendship with himself"76, but there is an obstacle to this friendship in that we have failed in our duties to God (sinned) and so have acquired guilt.77 While guilt is a claim about the past it also "makes two further claims about the present."78 First, one who is guilty presently "owes something to...his victim." Second, one who is guilty "has acquired a negative status...which needs to be removed."79

There are two conditions for the removal of guilt. Atonement must be made by the wrongdoer and forgiveness must be given by the victim.80 Atonement consists in

75 Richard Cross critiques Swinburnian atonement as a theory of satisfaction (See Richard Cross, "Atonement without Satisfaction," Religious Studies 37 (2001), pp. 397-416). Steven L. Porter calls Swinburne's theory a "satisfaction-type" theory, saying, "While Swinburne's theory is not a penal view of atonement, Swinburne does present Christ's person and work as a means to satisfy the moral debt sinners owe to God." (Steven L. Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," Faith and Philosophy 21.2. (April, 2004) p. 229). Further, Swinburne appears to use "sacrifice" and "satisfaction" interchangeably as they relate to a Thomist account of atonement. See Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 156, footnotes 17 & 19. I would argue, contrary to Swinburne, that satisfaction is distinct from sacrifice. On my view (and I would attribute this to Aquinas also) satisfaction is that which God accepts in place of the debt of punishment. Satisfaction eliminates forgiveness-as-pardon. Instead of giving forgiveness-as-pardon, God can be said to accept satisfaction which eliminates the debt. Sacrifice, on the other hand, is an offering which encourages an extension of forgiveness-as-restoration. The same offering can be both satisfaction and sacrifice, but as they relate to forgiveness each has a different function. Swinburne appears to conflate these functions in his theory of atonement.


77 Ibid., pp. 26-27. Regarding guilt Swinburne says that it "belongs to a person only in respect of his failure to perform his obligations, or his doing what it is obligatory not to do, i.e. something wrong" (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 16). He distinguishes between objective guilt which is a result of objective wrong-doing, and subjective guilt which is a result of the intention to do wrong (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p.16. Also, Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, pp. 73-75).


79 Ibid.. Also, Swinburne. Responsibility and Atonement. p. 74.

80 Ibid., p. 18. Also, Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 81.
repentance, apology, reparation, and penance. These are all aimed at the removal of the consequences of the failed obligation (the harm caused by the act and the "purposive attitude of the wrongdoer"). While reconciliation can come about by repentance and apology alone, it is sometimes appropriate to demand reparation and penance. According to Swinburne, God demands reparation, which involves removing the "former harm" caused by sin, and penance, which is a "performative act" by which a sinner distances himself from sin. On Swinburne's view, the sacrifice of Christ's life and death on the Cross is a valuable gift of reconciliation by which Christ offers reparation and penance on behalf of sinners.

The final act of this guilt-removal is forgiveness. In forgiving, the victim accepts the wrongdoer's reparation, penance, and apology by agreeing not to hold the act against the wrongdoer; by forwarding the wrongdoer's purpose in disowning the act.

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82 Ibid. Also, Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18.
83 Ibid. p. 84.
84 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18. Also, Swinburne, *Responsibility and Atonement*, p. 82. Swinburne acknowledges that there are times when full compensation is not possible.
86 Ibid., p. 152.
87 Ibid., pp. 149, 153.
89 Ibid. Also, Swinburne, *Responsibility and Atonement*, p. 85. Repentance is not included here because repentance in Swinburne is an "expression to oneself" and so not an offering to another (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18).
Forgiveness can only come in response to at least an apology.\textsuperscript{90} Beyond apology, the victim can...
determine, within limits, just how much atonement is necessary before he is prepared to give the forgiveness which will eliminate guilt.\textsuperscript{91}

While a victim could "disown" a wrongdoer's act without receiving any atonement at all, such "disowning" would not be forgiveness properly speaking.\textsuperscript{92} In such a case, guilt would still remain.\textsuperscript{93} In addition, Swinburne claims, such a disowning would be wrong because it would trivialize human relationships by supposing "that good human relations can exist when we do not take each other seriously."\textsuperscript{94}

Swinburne notes that one might ask,

\begin{quote}
[W]hy would not God forgive us in return for repentance and apology without demanding reparation and penance?\textsuperscript{95}
\end{quote}

Swinburne cites Aquinas in answering that there would have been nothing wrong with God forgiving without a demand for reparation and penance.\textsuperscript{96} However, God does enforce such a demand because

\textsuperscript{90} In the case of subjective guilt repentance is also necessary. Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 20. Also, Swinburne, \textit{Responsibility and Atonement}, p. 87.

\textsuperscript{91} Swinburne, \textit{Responsibility and Atonement}, p. 86.


\textsuperscript{93} Swinburne, \textit{Responsibility and Atonement}, p. 85.


\textsuperscript{95} Swinburne, \textit{Responsibility and Atonement}, p. 148.

\textsuperscript{96} It is noteworthy that he cites ST III, q. 46, a. 2, ad. 3 where Aquinas claims that God could have forgiven without demanding "satisfaction" (Swinburne, \textit{Responsibility and Atonement}, p. 149. footnote 2). This is further evidence that we are correct in treating Swinburnian sacrifice as a theory of satisfaction.
...it is good that if we do wrong, we should take proper steps to cancel our actions...Our having the freedom subsequently to clear up...the mess we make...allows us to affirm our identities as agents continuing over time. If we are in no position to make proper atonement for what we have done, it is good that someone else (even the victim) put us in that position and thereby allow us to make proper atonement. 97

God's providing reparation and penance in the life and death of Jesus Christ is part of God's putting us in a position to make proper atonement. 98 While God's ability to set the amount of reparation and penance needed for forgiveness means that God could accept many different offerings as sufficient (even "one supererogatory act of an ordinary man") 99 Christ's life and death was particularly suitable for the task. 100 This is because

The best reparation is that in which the reparation restores the damage done rather than gives something else in compensation; and the best penance is that which more than makes it up to the victim in the respect in which he was harmed...101

Furthermore if reparation and penance are good, it is also good that the sacrifice providing them be "substantial" and not "trivial." 102

And it is good too that our creator should share our lot, and of his generosity make available to us his sacrificial life. 103

97 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 149.
98 Ibid., p. 150.
99 Ibid., p. 160.
100 Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 28.
101 Ibid.
102 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, pp. 160-161.
103 Ibid., p. 161.
The sinner has the opportunity "to use Christ's death to get forgiveness" by associating himself with it. 104 We may "join to it our feeble repentance and halting words of apology." 105 And so,

Any man who is humble and serious enough about his sin to recognize what is the proper reparation and penance for it may use the costly gift which another has made available for him to offer as his sacrifice. 106

**Swinburne and the Moral Problems against Satisfaction**

Like Anselm, Swinburne's account struggles to answer the moral problems against satisfaction. Several critics of Swinburne's atonement theory challenge him using some version of (2) the problem of superfluous suffering and (3) the appeal to robust love. For example, Steven L. Porter says,

...since the goods obtained by Christ offering reparation and penance on behalf of sinners could be accomplished without his suffering and death, it is implausible to think that a good God would require such an event for forgiveness. For a voluntary sacrifice of life is not a morally valuable act unless there is some good purpose that can only or best be achieved by means of it. 107

Porter thus claims that,

It appears essential for Swinburne's case that he spell out some great goods which could only or best be achieved by the death of Christ, or else there will be no sufficient reason for Christ going to the cross nor God requiring it for forgiveness. 108

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104 Ibid., p. 153.
105 Ibid., p. 161.
106 Ibid., p. 153.
108 Ibid., p. 233. Eleonore Stump says, "If as Swinburne claims, God is not morally obligated to demand penance but decides to require it anyway, how are we to understand a good God's deciding to require torture and destruction when (on Swinburne's own account) God could get what he wants without it?...Moreover...although we find the victim who insists on penance morally acceptable, we admire her if she is willing to forego it" (Eleonore Stump, "Book Review: Responsibility and Atonement, by Richard
Porter rightly leaves open the possibility that Swinburne can be rescued from this criticism if he can show that there is (at least plausibly) some benefit that is best achieved by the suffering and death of Christ. Porter continues,

Of course, there might be some other good purpose or purposes which the cross served which made it a valuable act, and thus, rendered it capable of being a part of the reparation and penance offered to God on behalf of sinners. But Swinburne does not suggest what these other possible goods may be.109

Let us see, however, whether there is a benefit to which Swinburne might appeal in order to escape these moral criticisms.

Swinburne cannot escape the moral criticisms by appealing to the ability of Christ's reparation and penance to elicit any type of God's forgiveness. Swinburne concedes that God could have accepted an act which involves far less suffering than the

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Cross as reparation for human wrongdoing. In fact, God didn't have to demand reparation and penance at all since forgiveness can come in response to repentance and apology. Thus, Swinburne must have another benefit other than God's forgiveness (in any form) to which he can appeal to justify the suffering involved in God's receiving reparation and penance through the Cross.

There are at least three other benefits to which Swinburne appeals to defend the substantial reparation and penance that comes by Christ's life and death. First, Swinburne appeals to something like "fittingness."

The best reparation is that in which the reparation restores the damage done rather than gives something else in compensation.

Thus, the reparation offered through Christ is "far more perfect" than any other acceptable reparation. This is because "what needs atonement to God" is humans having lived "second-rate lives." As a result, fitting reparation "would be made by a perfect human life, given away through being lived perfectly."

There are problems with this defense of the reparation offered in Christ's life and death. First, if a perfect human life is enough to meet the standards of a fitting reparation, it is unclear why Christ's death is not superfluous. Steven L. Porter says,

110 Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 160. "...God could have chosen to accept one supererogatory act of an ordinary man as adequate for the sins of the world. Or he could have chosen to accept some angel's act for this purpose."

111 Ibid., p. 86.

112 Ibid., p. 156.


115 Some argue that it is impossible to give reparation to God if reparation is the removal of the "former harm" caused by the wrongdoer's actions (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18). This is
One might think that if Christ had avoided the cross, then Christ would be seen as having dodged the inevitable result of the kind of life he led. But dodging bullets—even inevitable ones—seems a virtue, unless there is some good purpose to taking the bullet. Since Christ's life alone accomplishes the goods of substantive reparation and penance, Swinburne's view of the atonement provides no good reason for Christ to voluntarily go to the cross.\textsuperscript{116}

Further, even if Christ's death can be shown to be part of the "best" reparation, this defense will be vulnerable to (3) the appeal to self-sacrificial love. For why would God demand best reparation when God could avoid significant suffering by accepting a lesser reparation?

Swinburne presents a second benefit when he claims that the opportunity to make reparation and penance gives us

...the freedom subsequently to clear up...the mess we make...[which] allows us to affirm our identities as agents continuing over time.\textsuperscript{117}

This benefit does not help Swinburne avoid the problem of superfluous suffering. Surely we could "affirm our identities as agents over time" simply by apologizing for our past wrongs.

because there is some question as to whether any harm can come to God from human wrongdoing. Eleonore Stump suggests "...it isn't clear that human wrongdoing harms God, or that an omnipotent, omniscient deity could be harmed at all." (Stump, "Book Review: Responsibility and Atonement, by Richard Swinburne," p. 326). (Note: Stump couches this criticism as an attack on the need for penance, but it seems that she has failed to distinguish between penance as the removal of "...the purposive attitude of the guilty one toward the wronged one manifested in the causing of harm" and reparation as the removal of the former harm caused by the act (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18)). If this were the case, then any reparation would be unnecessary and so would involve superfluous suffering inasmuch as the reparation involved any suffering. It seems, however, that sin can be said to harm God at least insofar as it denies God something that God desires; namely, human sinlessness. If we agree to this, the idea of offering reparation to God is still coherent on these terms. For a more detailed account of how God may be harmed by human wrongdoing see McNaughton, p. 135. Also see Cross, p. 401. Both argue that criticisms like Stump's here, do not hold against Swinburne. Each argues for an intelligible way in which God can be said to be harmed by human wrongdoing such that reparation may be appropriate (though neither will defend Swinburne's application of reparation as an explanatory feature of Christ's work in the Cross).


\textsuperscript{117} Swinburne, \textit{Responsibility and Atonement}, p. 149.
Swinburne presents a third benefit that comes of a victim's receiving substantial reparation when he claims that

...the victim can insist on substantial reparation, and sometimes it is good that he should do so, that he should insist on the guilty one, for his own sake, making a serious atonement; for that allows him to take seriously the harm that he has done.

Here, Swinburne seems to offer an Aquinas-like defense, suggesting that God's accepting reparation through the Cross is to the benefit of the sinner in that it allows the sinner to take seriously the harm that has been done. Of course, God is the One providing the reparation, but Swinburne acknowledges this, pointing out that even a parent's providing a child with the reparation for a child's wrongdoing "allows the child to take his action and its consequences seriously."

What is the benefit of the child's taking his action and its consequences seriously? That is, what is the benefit of a human taking sin and its consequences seriously? While Swinburne does not explicitly answer this question, it seems that such an attitude of seriousness contributes to genuine repentance. Concerning repentance Swinburne says,

Repentance involves, first, acknowledgment by the guilty one that he did the act and that it was a wrong act to do. Thereby the guilty one distances the act from his present ideals. Repentance also involves a resolve to amend—you cannot repent of a past act if you intend to do a similar act at the next available opportunity.

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118 In *Responsibility and Atonement* (p. 86) Swinburne's text says "victim" instead of "guilty one," which must be a typo since it is not victims but wrongdoers who make atonement. Further, the corresponding quote in "The Christian Scheme of Salvation" reads "guilty one" as is quoted here.


120 Swinburne, *Responsibility and Atonement*, p. 149. For a detailed analysis of the analogy of the parent providing a child with reparation to God's providing our reparation through Christ's life and death, see McNaughton, pp. 131-137.

In providing reparation God could be making it known to the human that wrongdoing for which reparation is appropriate has been done.\textsuperscript{122} This helps the sinner to meet the first doxastic condition for appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration by developing an awareness of her sinful state. Further, this reparation could be meant to encourage a "resolve to amend." This helps the sinner to meet the volitional condition. It is possible that God's providing a reparation which includes the Cross of Christ is the most effective way of encouraging free human wills to repent (acknowledge wrongdoing and resolve to amend). If this is the case, then Swinburne may be able to defend himself against the problem of superfluous suffering and the appeal to self-sacrificial love. But note that he does so by showing how satisfaction ultimately contributes to human appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-restoration.

Swinburne also seems to indicate that the penance provided through the life and death of Christ has the benefit of encouraging repentance. One reason that Christ's life and death are a good penance is because

\ldots penance, to be good, must evince a concern that the particular harm was done which was done...Thereby it expresses the penitent's awareness of what he has done.\textsuperscript{123}

If expressing the penitent's awareness of wrongdoing is the only benefit of penance then it will fall to the problem of superfluous suffering. For God, being omniscient would be able to know without expression whether someone was aware of what she had done. But, Swinburne claims that penance is more than a mere expression.

\textsuperscript{122} The significance of the reparation provided could be an indication of the significance of the wrongdoing.

\textsuperscript{123} Swinburne, \textit{Responsibility and Atonement}, p. 157.
The giving of the extra gift does not have the function of making clear something which was true whether or not the agent made it clear; that he meant the apology. Rather it is a performative act whereby he disowns the wrong act (in a way which mere words do not do when the wrong is a serious one)...The penitent constitutes his apology as serious by making it costly.124

Swinburne uses "performative" here to describe actions which "create or abolish states of people or relations between them."125 So, what new state is brought about through penance? One might suggest that the giving of penance brings about personal reconciliation. However, on Swinburne's view, such reconciliation cannot be complete until the final act of forgiveness. Therefore, he must be referring to another state. He notes that in giving penance, the penitent's apology is constituted as serious. That is to say, the penitent, in giving penance, takes his wrongdoing and its consequences seriously. This attitude, as I argued above, is part of genuine repentance. Thus, penance seems to contribute to repentance. And once again, Swinburne's view implies that satisfaction contributes to the appropriation of forgiveness-as restoration. Thereby, Swinburne is again enabled to overcome the moral problems against satisfaction.

Someone might object to this reading of Swinburne, noting that on Swinburne's account repentance precedes reparation and penance. For Swinburne claims that

Any man who is humble and serious enough about his sin to recognize what is the proper reparation and penance for it may use the costly gift which another has made available for him to offer as his sacrifice.126


125 Ibid., p. 29, endnote 6. Swinburne derives this terminology from J.L. Austin's use of "performative utterances" to describe claims which do not merely "report already existing states of affairs but themselves bring about states of affairs."

Thus one might argue against my claim that reparation and penance contribute to human repentance according to Swinburne's theory of atonement.

It does seem to be the case that Swinburne holds that repentance precedes a human's offering of Christ's sacrifice as her own reparation and penance. However, it is consistent with Swinburne's account to claim that God's *provision* of Christ's sacrifice (now available for human use) precedes human repentance and can function in such a way as to encourage the sort of repentance that will offer Christ's sacrifice as one's own reparation and penance.\(^\text{127}\) This is consistent with Swinburne where he says,

God cannot literally atone for our sins, but he can help us to atone for our sins by making available to us an offering which we may offer as our reparation and penance, and by encouraging us to repent and apologize. He could give to us the opportunity to be serious enough about our sins to use his life and death as man to be our atoning offering.\(^\text{128}\)

If God's "making available" the offering can be seen as encouraging our repentance and apology, then Swinburne's account has hope for escaping the moral challenges posed by his critics. For Swinburne could claim that God's encouraging repentance in this way is the most effective way to draw out such a response from free human wills.\(^\text{129}\) Thus, it

\(^{127}\) This view is also consistent with Swinburne's view that God's demanding reparation and penance helps to avoid the trivialization of personal relationship (See Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 21. And, Swinburne, *Responsibility and Atonement*, pp. 86, 148-149.)

\(^{128}\) Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 27.

\(^{129}\) This take on Swinburne also allows him to respond to the following objection by Eleonore Stump. "Human sin produces a breach in the relationship between human beings and God, a breach which the atonement somehow heals. One way to see the problem here is to suppose that it lies with human beings and consists in finding a way of restoring to righteousness wills which are both free and (as Jeremiah says) "desperately wicked." On Swinburne's view, however, the problem lies with God, who requires reparation and costly penance, which is out of the reach of human beings and which the atonement then provides" (Stump, "Book Review: Responsibility and Atonement, by Richard Swinburne," p. 326). On my reading, Swinburne would be able to say that God requires reparation and costly penance as the most effective means of restoring free and wicked human wills.
appears that Swinburne can escape the moral criticisms of his account by adopting a divine-manifest offering approach to satisfaction.

**Swinburnian Satisfaction and the Divine-Manifest Offering View of Penal Substitution**

Someone who holds to a divine-manifest offering account of penal substitution need not reject a divine-manifest offering account of Swinburnian satisfaction. One can coherently claim that, in the Cross, Christ both makes satisfaction through penal substitution and makes available satisfaction in the Swinburnian sense.

Someone might object to this claim in the following way. First, someone might note that on the divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution God is said to be offering forgiveness-as-restoration in the Cross. According to Swinburnian satisfaction, however, God does not offer forgiveness-as-restoration until humans associate themselves with Christ's satisfaction. In the Cross, God only provides the means by which humans can elicit God's offer of forgiveness-as-restoration. Thus, one who ascribes to both views simultaneously is forced into a contradiction inasmuch as he must claim that God both offers and does not offer forgiveness-as-restoration in the Cross.

This objection can be overcome in the following way. On the divine-manifest offering view of Swinburnian satisfaction, God can be said extend a second-order offering in the Cross. That is, God offers to offer forgiveness-as-restoration if the offender associates herself with Christ's satisfaction. In this way, God can still be seen to manifest an offer of forgiveness-as-restoration in the Cross. It is coherent to hold that

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130 Though it should be noted that Swinburne rejects penal substitution on the basis of the moral objections and the impotence objection to satisfaction (Swinburne, *Responsibility and Atonement*, p. 151-152).
God manifests both a first-order and second-order offer in the Cross. On the divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution, God is understood to be declaring "I am willing to enter into personal reconciliation with you." On the divine-manifest offering view of Swinburnian satisfaction, God is understood to be declaring "If you associate yourself with the satisfaction that I have provided, then I am willing to enter into personal reconciliation with you." These two claims can be held simultaneously with consistency for they simply amount to $p \land (q \to p)$.

This compatibility can also help Swinburne insofar as he holds that his theory is a Thomist theory. As we noted above, Swinburne tends to conflate the concepts of satisfaction and sacrifice. As a result, Swinburne's view struggles to harmonize Aquinas's use of both concepts. It also leads Swinburne the bold claim that, "...Aquinas regards his theory as a sacrifice theory" which seems to ignore the fact that Aquinas also holds that his theory is a redemption theory, a satisfaction theory, and a merit theory among other things.

Aquinas clearly distinguishes between satisfaction and sacrifice where he says,

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132 Ibid., p. 156

133 ST III, q. 48, a. 4.

134 ST III, q. 48, a. 6, ad. 3. ST III, q. 46, a. 1 ad. 3. ST III, q. 49, a. 3.

135 ST III, q. 48, a. 1.

Christ's Passion...acts by way of satisfaction, inasmuch as we are
liberated by it from the debt of punishment...but in so far as we are
reconciled with God it acts by way of sacrifice...\textsuperscript{137}

From this we could develop a view according to which Christ's endures penal
substitution\textsuperscript{138} on the Cross, thus making the satisfaction which abolishes the debt of
punishment\textsuperscript{139} and achieves legal reconciliation (a divinely chosen condition for God's
extension of forgiveness-as-restoration). Also, on this view, Christ's work in the Cross is
a pleasing sacrifice to God which elicits God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration.\textsuperscript{140}

This view can avoid the ontological, moral, and conceptual problems above by adopting a
divine-manifest offering approach according to which both the satisfaction and sacrifice
achieved in the Cross work to elicit a sinner's appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-
restoration. Were Swinburne to explicitly adopt something like this view, he could avoid
the confusion between satisfaction and sacrifice that is in his account.\textsuperscript{141}

\textbf{Eleonore Stump's Theory of Satisfaction}

In this section, I critically analyze the satisfaction theory of Eleonore Stump
(which also is inspired by Thomas). After explicating her theory, I argue that Stump's

\textsuperscript{137} ST III, q. 48, a. 6, ad. 3.

\textsuperscript{138} ST III, q. 47, a. 3 ad. 1. ST III, q. 49, a. 5. ST III, q. 50, a. 1. SCG IV, ch. 55. CT, ch 227 & 228.

\textsuperscript{139} ST III, q. 49, a. 3.

\textsuperscript{140} Sacrifice might also be said to contribute to God's forgiveness-as-letting go inasmuch as it "appeases" God (ST III, q. 48, a. 3 & ST III, q. 49, a. 4). Of course, on the divine-manifest offering view God would allow God's Self to "hold on" so that we can see God "let go" and be drawn to an appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.

\textsuperscript{141} Philip L. Quinn also suggests that Swinburnian sacrifice and penal substitution may be compatible in a way that can "round out and strenghten that account" (Quinn, "Swinburne on Guilt, Atonement, and Christian Redemption," p. 297). However, while describing this parity Quinn abandons the penal element of Christ's suffering and describes it only as a "substitution" for the extraction of the debt of punishment from sinners. As a result, Quinn does not clearly add to Swinburne's view since Swinburnian sacrifice can also be described as a substitution in this way. See Quinn, Philip L. "Swinburne on Guilt, Atonement, and Christian Redemption," pp. 293-297.
account fails to consistently distinguish between what she calls "the problem of past sin" and "the problem of future sin." Further, her theory does not appear to be a theory of vicarious satisfaction as she claims. I will then argue that a divine-manifest offering account of satisfaction (and even penal substitution) can help Stump overcome these problems in a way to which she might be amenable. I also argue that the divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution can help Stump account for elements of Aquinas's theory which her theory struggles to harmonize.

Stump's Account of Satisfaction

In her book, *Aquinas*, Stump outlines her take on a Thomist theory of atonement. Stump explicitly argues that satisfaction contributes to personal reconciliation by eliciting human appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration. Thus, Stump already appears to advocate a divine-manifest offering approach to satisfaction.

Stump contrasts her theory with what she calls a problematic "popular account" of the atonement. On her reading of Aquinas, Christ's passion and death serve "two general functions" which "correspond to two different problems posed by moral evil." In the atonement, Christ makes satisfaction to solve "the problem of past sin" and merits grace to solve "the problem of future sin."\(^{142}\)

While satisfaction is meant to overcome the problem of past sins, this problem is seen differently on the Thomist and popular views. According to the popular view, the

\(^{142}\) The popular view according to Stump is outlined in detail in the introduction to this dissertation. (See this diss., pp. 6-7.) An earlier version of Stump's writing on this topic can be found in Eleonore Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas" in *Philosophy and the Christian Faith*, edited by Thomas V. Morris (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), pp. 61-91.

\(^{143}\) Stump, *Aquinas*, p. 430
problem is that such sins have resulted in God's alienation from humans, but on the
Thomist view the problem is human alienation from God. That is to say,

For [the popular account], the main obstacle to human salvation lies, in
effect, in God himself, whose justice constrains him to damn human
beings unless atonement is made. For Aquinas, the main obstacle lies in
sinful human nature, which damns human beings unless it is repaired or
restored by the atonement.\footnote{Ibid., p.432.}

On her reading of Aquinas, satisfaction removes the debt of punishment, but satisfaction
is not necessary for God's exercise of justice. God could justly forgive without
satisfaction but chooses it as the most "suitable way of healing our nature."\footnote{Ibid., p. 431.}

So the function of satisfaction for Aquinas is not to placate a wrathful God
or in some other way remove the constraints which compel God to damn
sinners. Instead, the function of satisfaction is to restore a sinner to a state
of harmony with God by repairing or restoring in the sinner what sin has
damaged.\footnote{Ibid., p. 432.}

She proceeds to describe how Christ's satisfaction attains this goal. In doing so, she
offers a "homely example of minor evil."\footnote{Ibid., p. 433.} She imagines a mother who has asked her
young son not to play near the flower beds to which she lovingly tends. Ignoring his
mother's instructions, the boy plays with his ball in the flower beds and destroys the
flowers therein. As a result, "some distance" is created between the boy and his mother.

His will and hers are not in harmony, and he does not love her as he
might.\footnote{Ibid.}
If the boy became truly sorry for what he had done, he would try to fix what he had destroyed. In doing this he would be making satisfaction, the "chief value" of which is not the restoration of the flowers but the restoration of "the harmonious and loving relationship" between the mother and son.\textsuperscript{149}

Of course, this is not yet an example of \textit{vicarious} satisfaction, so Stump continues,

Because, on Aquinas's view, the point of making satisfaction is to return the wrongdoer's will to conformity with the will of the person wronged, rather than to inflict retributive punishment on the wrongdoer or to placate the person wronged, it is possible for the satisfaction to be made by a substitute, provided that the wrongdoer allies himself with the substitute in willing to undo as far as possible the damage he has done.\textsuperscript{150}

In light of this, Stump re-imagines the mother approaching her son who has yet any interest in reconciliation. Disguised so that her son does not recognize her, she tries "to talk him into letting her make his restitution for him."\textsuperscript{151} In this way the mother seeks to turn "her son's will and love back to her, so that the harmony of their relationship is restored."\textsuperscript{152} And so,

...if she provides vicarious satisfaction for her son...she eases his return to her. She invites rather than forces his compliance. She counts as sufficient for reconciliation his willingness to undo his mischief and does not require his actually restoring the garden. And finally, in the person of the substitute...she sets before him a living model of what he should be if he were up for it, so that he does not need to initiate the desired state of mind in himself, but needs just to watch and copy someone else's.\textsuperscript{153}

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{149} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{150} Ibid., p. 435.
\item \textsuperscript{151} Ibid., p. 436.
\item \textsuperscript{152} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{153} Ibid., p. 437.
\end{itemize}
Stump then asks, "If the aim of making satisfaction is just a sinner's repentance, why bother with restoration?" She claims that God could have ignored satisfaction but it is useful in two ways. First, someone who is "truly sorry" will desire that the evil that was done be "undone." Second, "participation in making compensation for the wrong done," that is, "the willing of restoration, voluntarily undertaken in contrition, helps strengthen the will in its resolution of repentance." 155

Next, she asks "what the theological equivalent of restoring the flowers is." She answers that what is ruined is "human intellect and will." The thing marred is the sinner, himself. Thus,

...Christ restores what sin has marred in human nature because he gives God a particularly precious instance of human nature... 159

This satisfaction reconciles the sinner to God if "the sinner allies himself with the substitute by willing the restitution the substitute makes." 160 To ally oneself in such a way, one must have faith and charity. To have faith means that one believes "that Christ

154 Ibid., p. 438.
155 Ibid.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid., p. 439. In her earlier version she refers to this simply as "human character" (Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," p. 70).
158 Ibid.
159 Ibid.
160 Ibid.
has made satisfaction for his past sin." To have charity means to "have the love of God and goodness which makes him glad of the fact."\textsuperscript{161}

**Objections to Stump's Account**

There seem to be at least two problems with Stump's account of Thomist satisfaction. First, Stump's account does not consistently distinguish between "the problem of past sin" and "the problem of future sin."\textsuperscript{162} On her reading of Aquinas, the problem of past sin "lies in sinful human nature, which damns human beings unless it is repaired or restored by the atonement."\textsuperscript{163} Or again, the problem of past sin is that it has ruined "human intellect and will" by leading to "a proud, selfish, disobedient mind and heart."\textsuperscript{164} Yet she defines the problem of future sin as

...human proneness to evil, the disordered relationship among human reason, will and passions which, on Aquinas's view, is responsible for the tendency of human beings to sin.\textsuperscript{165}

It seems that there is no relevant difference between these two problems. This false distinction leads Stump to make the contradictory claim that satisfaction both overcomes and fails to overcome the same problem.\textsuperscript{166} For, after claiming that satisfaction overcomes the problem of past sin\textsuperscript{167} Stump claims that "making satisfaction for past sin

\textsuperscript{161} Ibid., p. 440.

\textsuperscript{162} Ibid., p. 430.

\textsuperscript{163} Ibid., p.432.

\textsuperscript{164} Ibid., p. 439.

\textsuperscript{165} Ibid., p. 442.

\textsuperscript{166} Of course, both satisfaction and meriting grace can contribute to overcoming the same problem together, but this is not Stump's claim.

\textsuperscript{167} Stump, *Aquinas*, pp. 430ff.
still leaves a person with the same proclivities to do evil in the future."168 This contradiction can be seen again when Stump claims,

...what will satisfy [God] is not repayment, but the goodness and love of his creature.169

If "making satisfaction for past sin still leaves a person with the same proclivities to do evil in the future,"170 then making satisfaction for past sin still leaves a person without the requisite "goodness and love" to satisfy God. Thus, Stump is forced to make the contradictory claim that making satisfaction is not enough to satisfy God.

As a result, Stump falls into a second problem. It is questionable whether Stump's theory of Christ's atonement is a satisfaction theory at all. Stump claims that according to Aquinas, "satisfaction...removes the debt of punishment for sin."171 Yet, she later claims,

For Aquinas, then, the aim of any satisfaction (including vicarious satisfaction) is not to make debts and payments balance but to restore a sinner to harmony with God.172

Thus it is unclear whether Christ's satisfaction functions in such a way as to remove the debt of punishment. If Christ's passion and death do not remove the debt of punishment, then Stump is wrong to explicate Christ's passion and death in terms of satisfaction. For, satisfaction is that which God accepts in place of a sinner's punishment. If God cannot be said to accept Christ's passion and death in place of a sinner's punishment, then Christ's

168 Ibid., p. 442.
169 Ibid., p. 437.
170 Ibid., p. 442.
171 Ibid., p. 431.
172 Ibid., p. 437. The conflict is more apparent in Stump's earlier version where instead she says, "For Aquinas, then, the aim of any satisfaction (including vicarious satisfaction) is not to cancel a debt incurred by sin but to restore a sinner to harmony with God" (Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," p. 69 (emphasis mine)).
passion and death are not satisfaction. As a result, Stump cannot be said to offer a theory of vicarious satisfaction as she claims.\textsuperscript{173} Indeed, if the transformed mind and heart of each person is what satisfies God, then it is not clear that Jesus can offer satisfaction on behalf of another at all. Perhaps, he can offer an example as to how each person can make her own satisfaction.\textsuperscript{174} Perhaps, Christ's passion and death can help each person to make, or persist in, her own satisfaction,\textsuperscript{175} but this is not vicarious satisfaction for on this view God accepts a sinner's own repentance as that which releases her from the debt of punishment. It is not Christ's passion and death (or even a combination of human repentance and Christ's passion and death) which does so.

**Stump's Account and the Divine-Manifest Offering View of Penal Substitution**

Stump can escape these problems with help from a divine-manifest offering approach to satisfaction (and even penal substitution). Now, Stump rejects the popular view's concern "to make debts and payments balance."\textsuperscript{176} She argues, that God is instead concerned with the sinner. What he wants is for that person to love what God loves and to be in harmony with God.\textsuperscript{177}

\addcontentsline{toc}{section}{Notes}

\begin{enumerate}
\item[173] Ibid.
\item[174] And it seems that Stump relies on this where she says, "On this view, a person making vicarious satisfaction is not providing compensatory payment so much as acting the part of a template representing the desired character or action, in accordance with which the sinner can align his own will and inclinations to achieve a state of mind which it is at least unlikely he would have achieved on his own" (Stump, \textit{Aquinas}, p. 437).
\item[175] This could be seen as the goal of "meriting grace" in Stump, \textit{Aquinas}, pp. 441ff. Also, note that Stump's two defenses of the usefulness of Christ's satisfaction involve help given to an already changed human will (Stump, \textit{Aquinas}, p.438).
\item[176] Stump, \textit{Aquinas}, p. 437.
\item[177] Ibid.
\end{enumerate}
While it is true that what God wants is for sinners to be in harmony with God, Stump creates a false dichotomy by claiming that God wants that *instead* of wanting "to make debts and payments balance." God's ultimate concern can be harmony with the sinner and balancing the accounts can be a means toward achieving that harmony. In fact, we could even say that God is only concerned with balancing the accounts insofar as it helps restore the sinner's will to harmony with God. If Stump were open to such a clarification, she could escape the problems presented above. First, she would be able to clearly distinguish between the problems of past and future sin. The problem of past sin could be the problem relating to the "accounts," while the problem of future sin could be the problem of human wills which are out of harmony with God. Perhaps God's pursuing satisfaction through penal substitution to handle the first problem is part of God's most effective means of addressing the second problem. Second, this theory would clearly be a theory of vicarious satisfaction for Stump would be able to show how Christ's atonement helps to "balance the accounts" and remove the debt of punishment. Stump, in fact, already seems open to a divine-manifest offering approach to satisfaction (even if she rejects penal substitution specifically) where she says,

> By affecting a person's heart and mind in the way that the Atonement is designed to do, God can bring about the act of will in which the sinner detests her sin and longs for God's goodness.\(^{179}\)

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\(^{178}\) Stump could distinguish between two uses of "satisfaction" in her account. According to one use, "satisfaction" is that which Christ does which removes the debt of punishment. According to the second use "satisfaction" refers to God's contentment or God's achieving God's ultimate goal. In this way Christ could make satisfaction (in the first sense) in the Cross and God could still be unsatisfied (in the second sense) until the human will is turned to God in charity.

\(^{179}\) Eleonore Stump, "Atonement and Justification," in *Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement*, edited by Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga Jr. (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1989), p. 205. Also she says, "Besides the role it has in making satisfaction to God for sin, liberating sinners from punishment, and the other benefits it is said to have, then the Atonement figures significantly in
A divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution can also help Stump insofar as she holds that her theory is a Thomist theory. First, Stump's account seems to struggle to accommodate any Thomistic reference God's severity or penal substitution. Yet, using a divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution she could harmonize this language with God's ultimate goal of "restor[ing] a sinner to harmony with God." She could argue that God mercifully pursues "the goodness and love of his creature" inasmuch as God seeks to elicit a sinner's openness of will by exercising the option to pursue severity through penal substitution.

Second, a divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution is compatible with Thomist exemplarism, where Stump's view seems to struggle to harmonize satisfaction and example. Stump claims that all of the roles of Christ's passion and death can be "subsumed under...making satisfaction and meriting grace." She cites Aquinas's *Compendium Theologiae*, chapter 227 when pointing out that these two functions correspond to the problems of past and future sin. Yet, the majority of justification because of its role in eliciting the assent to moral rebirth requisite for justification" (Stump, "Atonement and Justification," p. 201.) Also see Stump, "Atonement and Justification," pp. 200-201 and Stump, *Aquinas*, pp. 449-450.

180 ST III, q. 47, a. 3, ad. 1.

181 ST III, q. 47, a. 3, ad. 1. ST III, q. 49, a.5. ST III, q. 50, a. 1. SCG IV, ch. 55. CT, ch 227 & 228.


183 Ibid.

184 We must also take care to avoid the mistake of overemphasizing the role of God's severity in Aquinas, to the neglect of Aquinas's view of God's mercy. On my reading God's opting for severity is a manifestation of God's mercy because God's severity helps to draw sinners into a state of personal reconciliation with God.

Aquinas's chapter is spent discussing Christ's death as "an example of perfect virtue for us."\textsuperscript{187} It is unclear how Christ's death as an example can be categorized as part of Christ's making satisfaction or meriting grace.\textsuperscript{188} On a divine-manifest offering account, however, Christ's making satisfaction, giving humans an example of virtue, and meriting grace can all be means by which God presents demonstrations meant to elicit in the sinner an openness to receiving that grace by which a sinner can be brought into personal reconciliation with God.

\textsuperscript{186} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{187} CT, ch. 227.

\textsuperscript{188} Stump appears to subsume it under satisfaction where she says, "...a person making vicarious satisfaction is not providing compensatory payment so much as acting the part of a template representing the desired character or action, in accordance with which the sinner can align his own will and inclinations to achieve a state of mind which it is at least unlikely he would have achieved on his own" (Stump, \textit{Aquinas}, p. 437). But, this seems to say that Christ is not making satisfaction for sinners in the Cross so much as he is demonstrating how sinners can make satisfaction for themselves. This does not subsume exemplarism under vicarious satisfaction, but rather appears to replace vicarious satisfaction with exemplarism.
CHAPTER FOUR
A DIVINE-MANIFEST OFFERING APPROACH TO PENAL SUBSTITUTION
AND THE OBJECTIONS AGAINST PENAL SUBSTITUTION

Introduction

In this chapter I argue that a divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution (DMP) can enable a theory of penal substitution to overcome the fourteen problems outlined in the introduction to this project. I then argue that this view can be used to re-interpret Stump's "popular view" such that the popular view is logically and ethically defensible.

This chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section I argue that DMP can overcome the problems for penal substitution that arise inasmuch as it is a theory of satisfaction. In the second section I argue that DMP can overcome the problems for penal substitution that arise inasmuch as it is a theory of vicarious satisfaction. In the third section I argue that DMP can overcome the problems for penal substitution that arise inasmuch as it is a penal theory involving the punishment of an innocent vicar.

A Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Penal Substitution and the Problems for Penal Substitution as a Theory of Satisfaction

DMP can avoid all of the objections against satisfaction outlined in the introduction. Having structured this account according to its ability to navigate the ontological and moral objections against satisfaction, I will briefly summarize how this
view can escape these problems. I will then show how a theory of penal substitution can use DMP to escape the conceptual objections to satisfaction.

**A Response to (1) the Ontological Argument against Satisfaction**

On DMP God has the freedom to accept satisfaction, exact punishment on fallen humans, or give forgiveness-as-pardon without either satisfaction or punishment. Further, God can give forgiveness-as-letting-go and offer forgiveness-as-restoration simply by the free movement of God's Own will. There is no authority or power outside of God which requires debt repayment before God can freely do any of these things.

On this view, it is God God's Self who chooses to require debt repayment. God creates this requirement\(^1\) in order to give God's Self the opportunity to meet this requirement by satisfaction through penal Self-substitution. This affords God an effective opportunity to draw humans into a state of personal reconciliation with God. If God is to preserve the possibility of personal relationship, God cannot force a human being to be open to being personally reconciled (since human freedom is necessary for such a relationship). Neither can God overcome the relational distance that separates humans and God by simply ignoring that distance. As I have argued, if the problem here is that God loves humans but humans do not love God, God's ignoring the problem of the absence of human love toward God will do nothing toward overcoming this problem. If God cannot force the needed love and cannot bring about divine-human reconciliation by simply overlooking the absence of human love towards God, then it seems that there is only one remaining alternative for overcoming human alienation from God. God must

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\(^1\) It is even possible to say that God creates a need in God's Self for satisfaction through penal substitution in the absence of punishment of fallen humans.
draw us into love of God. 2 On DMP, God's requiring and providing satisfaction through penal substitution (in the absence of direct divine punishment of fallen humans) is an essential part of this divine project.

This is not a limit to God's omnipotence. As Paul K. Moser says,

Not even the true God, having supreme power and knowledge, can force genuine loving reconciliation.3

And again, C.S. Lewis says,

[God's] Omnipotence means power to do all that is intrinsically possible, not to do the intrinsically impossible. You may attribute miracles to him, but not nonsense. This is no limit to his power. If you choose to say 'God can give a creature free will and at the same time withhold free will from it,' you have not succeeded in saying anything about God: meaningless combinations of words do not suddenly acquire meaning simply because we prefix to them the two other words 'God can.'... It is no more possible for God than for the weakest of his creatures to carry out both of two mutually exclusive alternatives; not because his power meets an obstacle, but because nonsense remains nonsense even when we talk it about God.4

**Answering (2–3) the Moral Arguments against Satisfaction**

DMP can also offer theories of penal substitution escape from the moral arguments against satisfaction.

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4 C.S. Lewis, *The Problem of Pain* (New York: HarperCollins, 1996), p. 18. Or again, this point recalls Hans Urs von Balthasar who says, “Man's refusal was possible because of the trinitarian 'recklessness' of divine love, which, in its self-giving, observed no limits and had no regard for itself. In this, it showed both its power and its powerlessness and fundamental vulnerability (the two are inseparable). So we must say both things at once: within God's own self—for where else is the creature to be found?—and in the defenselessness of absolute love, God endures the refusal of this love; and, on the other hand, in the omnipotence of the same love, he cannot and will not suffer it" (Hans Urs von Balthasar, *Theo-Drama, Vol. 4: The Action*, translated by Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), p. 329).
A Response to (2) the Problem of Superfluous Suffering

For DMP to definitively avoid the problem of superfluous suffering, it would only need to be shown that through penal substitution God effectively encourages at least one more person toward personal reconciliation than the amount of people that would be so encouraged by any other means that excluded penal substitution. Now, it does not seem possible to empirically determine that God's receiving satisfaction through penal substitution in the Cross is an essential part of the most effective means of drawing humans into a state of personal reconciliation. Yet, the popularity of penal substitution as noted in the introduction of this work is evidence which suggests the plausibility of such a claim. Thus, while DMP does not give definitive escape from the problem of superfluous suffering, it at least gives plausible escape from this problem.

Someone might object to this defense, pointing out that while there are many who may respond to penal substitution, there are also many who find it logically incoherent and morally repugnant. As a result, if penal substitution is accepted as an explanatory feature of the atonement, it seems more likely that fewer people would respond to the divine offering in the Cross.

5 "Effective encouragement" is not causally determining in a way that overrides human freedom. It is rather, causally influencing in a way that is compatible with human freedom. The type of effective encouragement with which I am concerned is such that it achieves its goal when it elicits the desired free human response. In a similar way a coach can "effectively" motivate (causally influence) her players to make free choices relevant to their participation in a game; or a lover could "effectively" woo (causally influence) his beloved; or a politician could effectively persuade (causally influence) voters to make a particular free choice on the ballot. This does not mean that God is taking any particular risk when determining how to encourage/discourage humans (as the coach, lover, or politician does). God, in God's omniscience, could know the manner of encouragement/discouragement that will most effectively encourage human wills to appropriate God's forgiveness-as-restoration. With this foreknowledge God could pursue the means that will result in the most human appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-restoration. Again, this is not causally determining in a way that overrides human freedom, because God's foreknowing how a human will freely respond does not change the fact that the human's response was free. This fear could negatively affect human confidence in approaching God.
DMP, however, is compatible with subjective rejection of penal substitution. On DMP human assent to penal substitution is not necessary for the Cross to be effective as a divine-manifest offering that encourages humans to enter into personal reconciliation with God. Recall that DMP is compatible with other theories of atonement that have historically been considered rivals to penal substitution. On DMP someone who accepts, say, a sort of exemplarism and rejects penal substitution could still find the Cross salvific inasmuch as he is encouraged by God to enter into a relationship of divine-human reconciliation. On this view, God could objectively accomplish both perfect human example and penal substitution in the Cross. Exemplarism could function as a language through which God communicates God's extension of forgiveness-as-reconciliation to some, while God speaks through penal substitution to others. With this in mind, it seems plausible to say the following. Christ's work in the Cross of defeating the devil, meriting grace, offering a sacrifice, providing a perfect example of human life, and so on, could effectively encourage \( x \) amount of fallen humans to be open to divine-human reconciliation, while Christ's work in the Cross of accomplishing all of this in addition to satisfaction through penal substitution could effectively encourage at least \( (x + 1) \) fallen humans to be open to divine-human reconciliation.7

6 See this diss., pp. 180-181.

7 This can help us to make sense of how various atonement theories can have the same result (personal reconciliation with God) in human experience. As L.W. Grensted's claims "...the personal experience of Atonement is in its essence one and the same in every place and age, and for every race of man. The differences are differences of exposition rather than of life, and when we criticise the Ransom theory of the fourth century as crudely superstitious, the Penal theory of the sixteenth century as involving a conception of God's wrath impossible to us to-day, the Moral Theory of the nineteenth century as a mere emotional subjectivism, we have to remember that men holding these different theories have alike found in the Cross the key to the problem of life, have felt the bondage of sin and what it is to be free, and have known that this deliverance is not of themselves but of God" (L.W. Grensted, "The Atonement in Personal
A Response to (3) the Appeal to Robust Love

On DMP God demands penal substitution not exclusively for God's Own sake, but for the sake of the humans who would not otherwise appropriate forgiveness-as-restoration without the demonstration provided by it. Thus, DMP is consistent with a divine character of robust love.

Answering (4–6) the Conceptual Arguments against Satisfaction

We can now ask whether DMP allows escape from the problems of inconsistency presented against satisfaction in the introduction. I argue that a theory of penal substitution can use DMP to escape all three problems.

Responses to (4) the Forgiveness Problem

Eleonore Stump poses the challenge of the forgiveness problem in the following way.

Suppose that Daniel owes Sarah $1000 and cannot pay it, but Sarah's daughter Marion...does pay Sarah the whole $1000 on Daniel's behalf. Is there any sense in which Sarah can be said to forgive the debt?8

I argue that this problem only threatens penal substitution inasmuch as it holds exclusively to a specific understanding of forgiveness-as-pardon (that is, forgiveness related to legal reconciliation). I will argue that it is possible for penal substitution to escape this attack by distinguishing between two types of forgiveness related to legal reconciliation. Further, I will show that even if a theory of penal substitution cannot escape this attack as it relates to legal reconciliation, DMP can offer escape from this attack by appealing to concepts of forgiveness which relate to personal reconciliation.

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We have identified forgiveness-as-pardon as the type of forgiveness related to legal reconciliation.9 There are, however, two conceptions of forgiveness-as-pardon that we have yet to distinguish. On one conception, to give forgiveness-as-pardon is (to use a definition of forgiveness offered by Stump) to "fail to exact all that is in justice due."10 On another, to give forgiveness-as-pardon is "to fail to exact all that is in justice due from a specific debtor." We can understand the difference between these two senses of forgiveness-as-pardon by distinguishing between forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt and forgiveness-as-pardon of a person.11 One can release a debtor from her obligation to repay the debt (and so forgive the person) while accepting satisfaction from a third party (and so not forgiving the debt).

It seems that no account of penal substitution can escape the forgiveness problem if it defines forgiveness exclusively as forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt. Stump suggests a way in which one holding to this conception of forgiveness might attempt to escape this problem. Stump claims that such a proponent could note that in order to relate more closely to the satisfaction provided by God in Christ, we should not interpret the above example such that Marion pays the $1000 to Sarah, but instead such that Sarah pays the $1000 to Sarah. At least, we should consider the possibility that Sarah gives Marion $1000 to pay to Sarah on Daniel's behalf. In both cases, Sarah is ultimately "paying"

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9 See this diss., pp. 102-103.


11 John E. Hare also distinguishes between the notion of forgiving a debt and that of forgiving a person. See John E. Hare, "Moral Faith and Atonement", a paper he presented as the Keynote Speaker, at Wheaton Philosophy Conference, 1996, http://www.calvin.edu/academic/philosophy/writings/moralato.htm.). I analyze Hare's view in more detail below in this diss., p. 218, footnote 18.
herself. Thus, while in one sense Sarah does "exact every bit of the debt owed to her," in another sense she does not exact a dime of the debt and can be said to have forgiven the debt.\textsuperscript{12}

Against this, one might claim that even this modified metaphor is not apt. The penalty under consideration is not one that calls for financial remuneration, but one that requires a form of suffering.\textsuperscript{13} As a result, there is no sense in which the "debt," once paid, can be said to be unexacted. Thus, there is no sense in which it can be said to be forgiven-as-pardoned. Someone could be given money to give back without experiencing any actual loss himself. Yet one cannot be given suffering to suffer without experiencing the suffering himself. Thus, while in the case of pecuniary debt there is a sense in which we can say that the fee was not exacted, in the case of suffering there is no such sense.\textsuperscript{14} Even if God, God's Self, undergoes the required suffering, the suffering is still exacted. Even though it is not exacted from sinners, it is still exacted from someone

\textsuperscript{12} Stump does not ultimately combat this potential rejoinder as it relates to the forgiveness problem. Instead she pursues other problems that this rejoinder raises; particularly problems involved with punishing an innocent (Stump, Aquinas, p. 428).

\textsuperscript{13} One might claim that financial loss is a form of suffering, however this is not entirely true. The suffering involved with financial loss is a result of the loss (perhaps I grow anxious about the future, or I cannot afford a needed medicine, etc.), not the financial loss itself. In fact, financial loss need not involve suffering at all. A very wealthy person can afford to lose a dollar without experiencing any suffering. The person might even give away money and as a result feel pleasure.

\textsuperscript{14} David Lewis makes a similar distinction when he says, "As we mostly conceive of them, the condition of owing a debt and the condition of deserving to be punished are not alike. In the case of debt, what is required is that the creditor \textit{shall not} suffer a loss of the money he lent...whereas in the case of a 'debt of punishment,' what is required is that the debtor \textit{shall} suffer a loss... (David Lewis, "Do We Believe in Penal Substitution?" Philosophical Papers 26.3 (1997), p .204). While we have seen that in the case of financial debt there is a sense in which the debt can be both exacted and forgiven-as-pardoned, the relevant type of debt in the case of sinners is a debt of punishment. If God requires that the sinner (or a substitute) suffer a loss through punishment, there is no way to both exact and not exact that loss. In the case of sin, the debt sinners owe is a debt of punishment. Thus, at this point, the proponent of penal substitution is still confronted with the forgiveness problem.
and there is no sense in which it is not exacted from anyone. If a proponent of penal substitution claims that the full suffering is exacted, then the forgiveness problem holds with regard to this first conception of forgiveness-as-pardon.\(^\text{15}\)

DMP could still escape the forgiveness problem as it relates to legal reconciliation, however, by appealing to forgiveness-as-pardon of a person. In so doing we could claim that while God does not give forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt with regard to the debt of punishment, God does give forgiveness-as-pardon of a person inasmuch as sinners are released from the requirement to pay the debt of punishment themselves.

Thus, even though God cannot be said to forgive the debt, there is still a sense in which divine forgiveness is possible as it relates to legal reconciliation.\(^\text{16}\)

*The Forgiveness Problem and Personal Reconciliation*

Even if DMP cannot escape the forgiveness problem as it relates to legal reconciliation, it can still claim that divine forgiveness is possible as it relates to personal reconciliation between God and fallen humans. As I argued in chapter two, there are two more senses in which God can be said to forgive.\(^\text{17}\) God can also give forgiveness-as-

\(^{15}\) It is worth noting that this problem holds even if a satisfaction theorist claims that the debt that sinners owe is not one of punishment. On a non-penal theory of satisfaction, one could claim that punishment is what happens when sinners cannot pay their debt (or someone does not pay it for them). In this case, what we owe to God is a certain amount of obedience, or honor, or virtue, etc. It is something like this which Christ pays to God in full. Far from rescuing the satisfaction theorist, however, this move brings him right back to square one. Insofar as what is owed is paid to God in full, the challenge that there is no room for forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt will exist. Further, it is not clear in this case that God can be said to both receive payment and forgive it as in the case of pecuniary debt. For example, how can God give Christ obedience to return, without Christ Himself offering the obedience (and experiencing the suffering that is associated with it)?

\(^{16}\) Stump allows for this when she claims that someone who wants to argue that God does forgive this debt might note that God's forgiveness is apparent in the fact that it is not we who are required to pay. Since God (on account of God's justice) cannot overlook the debt, God is merciful in the only way possible. This forgiveness, one might claim, is even more evident when we recognize that it is God, *God's Self*, in Christ, who pays the debt (Stump, *Aquinas*, p. 428).
letting go and extend forgiveness-as-restoration. When someone who has been wronged gives forgiveness-as-letting go or extends forgiveness-as-restoration, the forgiver is pursuing reconciliation with the wrongdoer in a way that is distinct from any sort of legal reconciliation.

Forgiveness-as-letting go and forgiveness-as-restoration are not dependent upon forgiveness-as-pardon (in either sense). We can see the distinction by noting the possibility that Sarah could even give forgiveness-as-pardon with regard to Daniel's debt while still not giving forgiving-as-letting go or forgiveness-as-restoration to Daniel. Perhaps she forgives his financial debt in frustration, while personally vowing to have no further interaction with him. In this we can see that "failing to exact all that is in justice due" is something distinct from giving forgiveness-as-letting go or extending forgiveness-as-restoration.

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17 See this diss., pp. 103-108.

18 John E. Hare employs a similar approach by distinguishing between the notion of forgiving a debt and that of forgiving a person. (Hare, "Moral Faith and Atonement"). On my view forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt corresponds to forgiving a debt while forgiveness-as-pardon of a person, forgiveness-as-letting go, and forgiveness-as-restoration are three ways to forgive a person. Hare does not distinguish between these three types of forgiveness of persons. However, doing so is not necessary to escape the forgiveness problem since one can escape the problem using any of the three types. This distinction also finds application within the Thomistic framework developed in chapter 2. Insofar as the stain of sin is said to be overcome by a union of God and humans in mutual charity, it appears that the stain of sin is overcome by personal reconciliation between persons. The reuniting of two persons in mutual charity requires a forgiveness of persons distinct from the notion of forgiving a debt.

19 Giving forgiveness-as-letting go does not necessarily entail an offer of personal reconciliation, though it is necessary for personal reconciliation inasmuch as it is necessary for an extension of forgiveness-as-restoration. We could call the reconciliation directly corresponding to forgiveness-as-letting go, "emotional reconciliation," while the reconciliation directly corresponding to forgiveness-as-restoration is "personal reconciliation."

20 This extension of Stump's example requires us to add some background information for the relationship between Sarah and Daniel so that discussion of their personal relationship is clearer. Suppose that Sarah and Daniel are friends and that Daniel has promised to repay the loan on time. Suppose further that Daniel has failed to keep his promise and now the pecuniary debt owed to Sarah by Daniel includes an amount required as a punishment because Daniel did not repay the debt on time.
On account of this distinction, we can see that an offended party's refusal to
give forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt does not nullify the role of forgiveness as it relates
to personal reconciliation. Sarah could insist that Daniel repay the $1000, while giving
Daniel forgiveness-as-letting go and extending to Daniel forgiveness-as-restoration. She
could even make Daniel's debt repayment (by himself or another) a term for her
willingness to extend either of these latter forms of forgiveness. So, even if God cannot
be said to give forgiveness with regard to legal reconciliation, divine forgiveness is still
possible with regard to personal reconciliation. In fact, God could even demand that
the debt of punishment be paid (by fallen humans or a vicar) before God will give
forgiveness-as-letting go or extend forgiveness-as-restoration. It appears, then, that a
theory of penal substitution developed using DMP can escape the forgiveness problem.

21 Richard Swinburne appears to acknowledge this distinction when he notes that even after a wrongdoer
has done everything that he can to atone for his wrongs (offered repentance, apology, reparation, and
penance), the final act of atonement still belongs to the victim. The final act, Swinburne claims, is to
even claims that forgiveness is a work of supererogation. That is, a victim is under no obligation to
forgive. (Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 87. He notes, however, that Christians have a
responsibility to do so, having undertaken forgiveness as an obligation.) Thus, according to Swinburne,
even after a debt has been paid, the person to whom the debt had been due can give or withhold forgiveness
as he sees fit. Forgiveness does not become impossible by the repayment of a debt in full. Even Stump
would be forced to accept these distinctions with regard to forgiveness, for she notes that "Sometimes—
especially when we think about forgiveness from the point of view of the person wronged—we mean by
'forgiveness' the wronged person's putting away all resentment or wrath with respect to the wrongdoer....on
the other hand, sometimes—especially when we think about forgiveness from the point of view of the
person committing the wrong—we mean by 'forgiveness' the restoration and healing of a broken
relationship" (Eleonore Stump, "Book Review: Responsibility and Atonement, by Richard Swinburne,"

22 Though he does not hold to penal substitution, Richard Purtill also notes that "forgiveness is quite
consistent with punishing exactly as much as deserved" (Purtill, “Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and
Atonement,” in Christian Philosophy, edited by Thomas Flint (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1990), p.43). Purtill is here referring to forgiveness-as-restoration for he says "genuine forgiveness is 'at-
one-ment' and it requires action on both sides" (Purtill, “Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement,”
p. 42). Also, Steven L. Porter claims that in some cases one could even rightfully withhold forgiveness
until the wrongdoer has not only repaid his debt but also endured appropriate punishment (Steven L. Porter,
234-235). Garrard and McNaughton allow for this where they say, "To forgive is not necessarily to waive
An Objection to this Argument and my Response

One might object by saying that sometimes justice calls for a breach in relationship between the wrongdoer and the wronged. By offering personal reconciliation the victim does, in fact, "fail to exact all that is in justice due." Thus, one could say, Stump's definition of forgiveness does not merely apply to forgiveness-as-pardon. It also sometimes applies to forgiveness-as-restoration. The objector could claim that this holds true in the divine-human situation because divine punishment in response to sin is relational. That is, the due divine punishment is something like eternal separation from God. As a result, "failing to exact all that is in justice due" will not be distinct from the extension of forgiveness-as-restoration in the divine-human situation.

punishment...Holding that it is right to punish someone can be quite consistent with having an attitude of good will towards them" (Eve Garrard and David McNaughton, "In Defence of Unconditional Forgiveness," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103.1 (2003), p. 48).

23 It is worth noting that DMP also overcomes Moule's challenge for theories of atonement with respect to their explication of divine forgiveness. "So there is our dilemma. On the one hand there is this doctrine of free, unconditional forgiveness, matched by a penitence which is humble enough to acknowledge that it cannot earn or pay for forgiveness—seemingly a most un-quantitative process; but on the other hand is the need for an estimate of the character of sin, so realistic and objective and serious, that it has to resort to analogies of the quantitative type in order to safeguard quanti ponderis sit peccatum... And I suggest that it is the failure to bring these two considerations together into a single, realistic system that is partly responsible for the fact that different Christian theories of the atonement come into collision with one another" (C.F.D. Moule, "The Theology of Forgiveness," in Essays in New Testament Interpretation (London: Cambridge, 1982), p.253). On DMP the first need is met in God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration, the second is met by God's refusal to give forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt.

24 Some would argue that it even applies to forgiveness-as-letting go, saying that justice calls for negative feeling toward the wrongdoer. On this point see Jean Hampton in Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (New York: Cambridge, 1988).

25 See, for example, Garry Williams, "Penal Substitution: A Response to Recent Criticisms" in The Atonement Debate, edited by Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Michigan: Zondervan, 2008), pp. 177-178.
Even if the punishment due to humans is God's refusal to be personally reconciled, the distinction between forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt and forgiveness-as-restoration will hold. This is because there will be two different grounds upon which God can refuse personal reconciliation. God can refuse personal reconciliation on the ground of punishment or God can refuse personal reconciliation on the ground of God's free personal prerogative. Even if God eliminates the ground of punishment through satisfaction, God has the prerogative not to enter into personal reconciliation with humans. When God chooses not to exercise this prerogative, God extends the gift of forgiveness-as-restoration. Thus, the distinction between forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt and forgiveness-as-restoration still holds even where punishment is relational.

Responses to (5) the Damnation Problem

This objection notes that after receiving satisfaction, one no longer has any claim to the penalty previously owed. Full divine satisfaction is inconsistent with just human damnation. So, if God does damn some humans, either God damns them unjustly or Christ's penal substitution is not a full satisfaction.

26 I also discuss this in this diss., pp. 110-111.

27 However, it would be inconsistent with God's character of robust love to accept satisfaction for the debt of punishment if God intends to refuse personal reconciliation based on God's free personal prerogative anyhow. If God intended to refuse personal reconciliation to humans even if God received satisfaction, what benefit, consistent with robust love, could come of God's pursuing satisfaction?

28 No human has a right to such divine forgiveness. It must come as a gift, even if punishment as a ground of refusal of personal reconciliation is removed. So C.F.D. Moule says, "Forgiveness...is, by definition, free...The offender may make material reparation for any material damage he may have caused; but, if he is to be forgiven by the person he has offended against, he must be humble enough to accept the forgiveness gratis and not try to pretend he can earn it" (Moule, "The Theology of Forgiveness," p. 251).

29 One might then ask "If the punishment for sin is God's refusal of relationship and yet God offers humans personal reconciliation, how can God be said to exact the full penalty for sin?" For my response see this diss., pp. 252-254.
There are at least two ways that a theory of penal substitution using DMP can escape the problem of damnation. First, it can appeal to the distinction between legal reconciliation and personal reconciliation. Even if Christ's satisfaction fully covers the debt of punishment and results in a legal reconciliation, there is still the issue of personal reconciliation with God. As we noted above, a person whose debt of punishment has been paid might still not be personally reconciled to the one to whom that person was previously indebted. This personal reconciliation could fail to be actualized for one of two reasons. Either the person to whom the debt had been owed still refuses to extend forgiveness-as-restoration to the previous debtor, or the former debtor fails to appropriate the extended forgiveness-as-restoration. A satisfaction theorist can escape the problem of damnation by appealing to either of these. She can show how God can justly refuse to extend forgiveness-as-restoration to some even after their debt of punishment has been paid, or she can show how some fail to appropriate the offered forgiveness-as-restoration even after their debt of punishment has been paid. DMP takes the latter approach.

Against this, someone might offer the following analogy. Suppose that Daniel owes Sarah $1000 and Marion pays it. Now, Sarah might receive the $1000 and still refuse to extend forgiveness-as-restoration (be personally reconciled) to Daniel. Even so, 

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30 Someone might claim that since divine punishment amounts to God's refusal of personal reconciliation, God could not refuse humans personal reconciliation if the debt of punishment has been satisfied. However, even if God's refusal to extend forgiveness-as-restoration is exhausted qua punishment (on the level of legal reconciliation) in Christ's penal substitution, God would still have logical and moral freedom to refuse to extend forgiveness-as-restoration qua personal reconciliation. Humans have no right to reconciliation with God, even after the debt of punishment is removed. Similarly, a wife might refuse personal reconciliation with her unfaithful husband for a period time, as a punishment for his unfaithfulness. When the period of time is over, the wife could still refuse personal reconciliation with her husband. The husband might protest, "Why are you still punishing me?" To which the wife could reply, "You are no longer being punished. I simply do not wish to be in a relationship with you."
if Sarah receives the $1000 from Marion, she can no longer rightfully demand the $1000 from Daniel. She can refuse a personal relationship with him, but she cannot demand that he pay the debt that has already been paid. In the same way, God cannot demand that some sinners pay the debt of punishment that Christ is said to have already paid, even if they are closed to personal reconciliation with God. And it seems that God does make such a demand because at least some humans are still said to be damned.

To this, we may reply that there are two senses in which damnation can be used. There is a damnation corresponding to the debt of punishment and a damnation corresponding to divine-human alienation. While Christ's satisfaction could be said to free all sinners from damnation corresponding to debt of punishment, the damnation corresponding to divine-human alienation is the result of a lack of personal reconciliation with God. This damnation is simply separation from God through the absence of mutual charity. Thus this damnation is a logically necessary consequence of not being personally reconciled to God. As a result, even if Christ has paid the debt of punishment, if God refuses to be personally reconciled to a sinner or a sinner is closed to personal reconciliation with God, then that sinner will suffer damnation.

To clarify this idea, we can recall the distinction between God's active and passive wrath.31 God's active wrath is that quality of God that pursues satisfaction or punishment for sin. God's passive wrath would be "the deliverance of humankind to themselves, their desires, their passions, and perverse thinking"32 through God’s respecting the freedom of

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31 See this diss., pp. 167-168.

human activity. With this distinction in mind, a theory of penal substitution using DMP could claim that Christ's penal substitution provides a means of escape from God's active wrath. Those who still suffer damnation do so under God's passive wrath. This damnation is then, strictly speaking, not penal. Rather it is a consequence of not being personally reconciled to God. Thus while Christ's suffering and death may remove the debt of punishment, those who still suffer damnation do so either because God still does not extend forgiveness-as-restoration or because they do not appropriate the offered forgiveness-as-restoration. On DMP the damnation corresponding to God's passive wrath is experienced only by those who do not appropriate God's manifest offering of forgiveness-as-restoration.34

There is a second way that DMP offers escape from this problem. Someone using DMP could claim that Christ's satisfaction is a full satisfaction for sin, but it is only applied to those who are open to appropriating God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration. This is possible because satisfaction offered from a third party does not automatically dissolve an offended party's claim to punishment. The offended party must receive the offered satisfaction as sufficient payment on behalf of the wrongdoer. As a result, an offended party could set a condition upon her willingness to receive offered

33 Ibid., p. 216.

34 While a full account of the nature of Hell is beyond the purview of this project, my discussion of damnation could prompt someone to ask after the nature of damnation experienced under God's passive wrath. So I will say a few words about it here. If God is a unique person who is Goodness, Truth, Love, and so on, then to be separated from the person of God is to be separated from all of these things. Such a separation could be called "Hell" and would (if humans somehow continue to exist so separated from God) would certainly be unpleasant even without active punishment. Since, on DMP, Hell is experienced only by those who are not open to appropriating divine forgiveness-as-restoration, we can say with C.S. Lewis that, "...the doors of hell are locked on the inside" (C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, p. 130). DMP would also be compatible with the logical possibility that someone in Hell could become open to appropriating divine forgiveness-as-restoration and so be freed from her separation from God and personally reconciled to the one who is Goodness, Truth, Love, and so on.
satisfaction as sufficient payment on behalf of a wrongdoer. The condition could even include the wrongdoer's openness to personal reconciliation with the offended party.\textsuperscript{35} In such a case, those who are not open to appropriating divine forgiveness-as-restoration would still owe the debt of punishment.\textsuperscript{36}

A Response to (6) the Impotence Problem

The distinction between \textit{legal reconciliation} and \textit{personal reconciliation} can help us to understand how a theory of penal substitution using DMP escape the problem of impotence. The criticism raised by the problem of impotence is that satisfaction relates only to legal reconciliation but not to personal reconciliation. If, however, the satisfaction theorist can show that the way that God pursues legal reconciliation contributes to God's project of personal reconciliation, then the satisfaction theorist can clearly escape this problem.

As we noted above personal reconciliation involves two things. First, the offended party must extend forgiveness-as-reconciliation to the offender. Second, the offender must appropriate the offended party's forgiveness-as-restoration. On DMP, God chooses to allow legal reconciliation to be an obstacle to God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration. God does this because the demonstrations that God provides to humans by overcoming this obstacle through penal Self-substitution effectively elicit human

\textsuperscript{35} For more on this point, see this diss., pp. 234-237.

\textsuperscript{36} This latter approach could have an advantage when it comes to explaining justification by faith. It can claim that those who are open to divine-human personal reconciliation are legally reconciled (or justified), while those who are not so open are not legally reconciled. Someone who took the first approach would have to claim that all humans are legally reconciled while only some are personally reconciled with God. Thus, on the first approach justification will have to take on a non-legal meaning. Being "justified" would be something like having received God's promise that one will be transformed into one who is without sin in any sense. This is received by the believer through faith.
appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration. Thus, a theory of penal substitution using DMP can escape the impotence problem.

**A Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Penal Substitution and the Problems for Penal Substitution as Vicarious Satisfaction**

In this section I argue that a theory of penal substitution using DMP can avoid both the attack on the possibility of vicarious satisfaction as well as the attack on the morality of vicarious satisfaction.

**A Response to (7) the Attack on the Possibility of Vicarious Satisfaction**

As I noted above, the argument against the possibility of vicarious satisfaction relies upon the claim that moral credit and debt are non-transferable.\(^{37}\) In this section I will argue for the transferability of penal debt, thereby showing how a theory of penal substitution can escape this problem.\(^{38}\)

**On Guilt and Moral Debt**

Now, it seems that the claim that moral debt is non-transferable is predicated upon the relationship of moral debt (of which a debt of punishment is a type) to guilt. For example, Eleonore Stump claims that,

> When a person commits a sin, a debt of guilt is registered in one column which must be balanced on the same line in the other column by the

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\(^{37}\) See this diss., p. 17-18.

\(^{38}\) Though I will not deal with it here, another noteworthy response to this problem can be found in Hare, "Moral Faith and Atonement." Hare sketches a "partial-merger of identity" theory according to which Christians are incorporated into Christ in such a way that Christ can act as a representative on behalf of the entire group. He likens this to filial identity, in accordance with which a mother might offer reparation on behalf of her misbehaving child. Richard Purtill also suggests that an answer to this problem could involve "a theory of our incorporation into Christ which takes our unity with Christ as a genuine metaphysical fact" (Purtill, "Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement," p. 46). He, like Hare, utilizes the notion of filial identity (Purtill, "Justice, Mercy, Supererogation, and Atonement," p. 47). Also see, H.R. Mackintosh, *Some Aspects of Christian Belief* (New York: George H Doran Company, 1923), pp.117-118. Mackintosh addresses the present concern by appealing to a "mystic union" between Christ and Christians.
payment of a punishment which compensates for the guilt. This view raises a problem about how the books could ever balance if the debt is to be paid by someone other than the sinner, because the debt stems from guilt, and guilt is not a transferable commodity.\textsuperscript{39}

There does seem to be a sense in which individual guilt is non-transferable. Sometimes, to say that someone is "guilty" is to declare the fact that someone has performed a blameworthy action or has persisted in a blameworthy state. Guilt, in this sense, is an expression for the fact that one has behaved in a blameworthy manner. Such guilt cannot be transferred to another party. If I perform a blameworthy action, it can never be made the case that someone else performed that very same blameworthy action. My guilt, as an expression of the fact that I performed that particular blameworthy action, can never apply to anyone else. Another person might perform a similar action and thus become guilty themselves, but this guilt will be distinct from my own as it is related to that other person's action and not my own. Not only is it the case that this type of guilt can never be transferred; this type of guilt can never be removed. The fact that an agent committed a blameworthy action makes that agent identifiable as "one who committed blameworthy action \( x \)" as long as that agent's identity persists.\textsuperscript{40}

While moral debt (of which a debt of punishment is a type) is connected to this type of guilt (and may even be referred to as "guilt") it is still distinct from this type of guilt. Suppose a man commits a crime and incurs a debt of punishment wherein the man

\textsuperscript{39} Stump, \textit{Aquinas}, p. 436. In an earlier version of the article Stump writes "the debt is one of guilt" instead of "the debt stems from guilt" (Stump, "Atonement According to Aquinas," p. 68).

\textsuperscript{40} It seems that Kant identifies guilt in this sense where he says, "After his change of heart, however, the penalty cannot be considered appropriate to his new quality (of a man well-pleasing to God), for he is now leading a new life and is morally another person; and yet satisfaction must be rendered to Supreme Justice, in whose sight no one who is blameworthy can ever be guiltless" (Immanuel Kant, \textit{Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone}, translated by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper One, 1960) Book II, Section I, C., p. 67).
must pay a particular fine and endure a determined amount of time in prison. Having paid the fine and endured the prison term, the man can be said to have paid his debt of punishment such that he no longer owes such a debt. Still, the man remains "guilty" in the sense that he committed the crime for which he was punished. While the debt incurred by his guilt is gone, his guilt (as an expression for the fact that he once committed a crime) remains. Herein we can see a distinction between "guilt" and a debt of punishment.  

While guilt, as an expression of the fact of past wrongdoing, may be non-transferable, there is still some question as to whether a debt of punishment incurred through such wrongdoing is transferable.  

Note that in the case of pecuniary debt we can identify a relationship between having borrowed money and owing a debt. While the debt is incurred through the borrowing of money, the two are distinct. Further, while "being identifiable as the person who borrowed money \(x\) from creditor \(y\)" is a non-

\[\text{Charles Hodge makes a similar distinction in Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, Vol. II (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1989), pp. 532 & 540. Oliver D. Crisp acknowledges this distinction as well. He cites Berkhof in distinguishing between "liability to punishment" and "liability to guilt." He claims that the latter is "irremovable and non-transferable" (Oliver D. Crisp, "The Logic of Penal Substitution Revisited," in The Atonement Debate, edited by Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Michigan: Zondervan, 2008), p. 216). So, "the actual property of having committed this sin does not transfer" yet "Christ can suffer as a substitute for this liability to punishment" (p. 217). Crisp ultimately allows for the possibility of such a transfer and attacks it instead on moral grounds saying, "...it seems monumentally unjust to punish an innocent party in the place of a guilty one for a penal debt" (p. 219). I address the moral concerns that Crisp expresses regarding the guilty going free and the innocent being punished in this diss., pp. 239-247, 258-263.}

\[\text{Heinrich Vogel takes another approach. He claims that humans do not have the power to transfer guilt but "God can do it, simply because he is omnipotent, so that with Him the impossible is possible" (Heinrich Vogel, The Iron Ration of a Christian (London: Student Christian Movement Press, 1941), p. 140). This is also cited in Leon Morris, The Cross in the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965), p. 42, footnote 70. This understanding of omnipotence, while it may help one avoid problems like the current one, will ultimately lead to the problem of superfluous suffering. For why did God not simply, in God's omnipotence, coerce free wills and so be done with sin? If one responds saying something like "God did not do so that God might receive glory in the Cross", we could just respond, "Why did not God, in God's omnipotence, choose to be glorified without such glorifying actions?"} \]
transferable quality, the debt incurred through the borrowing is transferable.

Similarly, a sinner may, by his wrongdoing, take on the non-transferable quality of being guilty while also incurring a potentially transferable moral debt.

This distinction helps to answer Steven S. Aspenson where he says,

The guilt of the guilty...is tied to something, namely, the agent of the wrongdoing. And since the guilty can do nothing to disown that guilt (short of becoming someone else) and no one else can do anything to remove it from them, vicarious atonement has no mechanism to account for how Christ's efforts better the status of others before God rather than his own. 43

On DMP Christ's efforts do not necessarily remove human guilt as an expression that one has performed a particular blameworthy action or persisted in a blameworthy state.

Instead, it removes the debt of punishment and thus changes a human's status from "one who owes a debt of punishment to God" to "one who does not owe a debt of punishment to God."

This distinction also enables a theory using DMP to avoid problems that arise when one attempts to explain the transfer of moral credit and debt by appealing to a sort of "legal fiction." Purtill characterizes the legal fiction response in the following way.

God looks at us in our sinfulness, but pretends to see Christ in his perfect obedience. 44

He rightly criticizes this view, saying,

...so far as I can see this interpretation...fails because the idea of God 'pretending' or 'deeming' is unintelligible. The way God sees things is the way they are; the way God acts toward things is and must be based on the reality of these things. 45

On DMP God does not pretend with regard to human guilt. God sees a fallen human as one who is a wrongdoer in an alienated state. Yet, God also sees that same person as one whose debt of punishment has been paid. Further, as that person is transformed in relationship with God, God sees that person as one who was or is a wrongdoer in an alienated state who is becoming someone who exists in a personally reconciled state with God. This involves no divine pretending. Thus, DMP agrees with Hodge where he says,

> It is indeed true that God cannot but regard every person as he really is. His judgments are according to truth. But this is not inconsistent with his regarding Christ, although personally innocent, as having voluntarily assumed our place and undertaken to satisfy the demands of justice in our place; nor with his regarding the believer, although personally undeserving, as righteous, in the sense of being free from just exposure to condemnation, on the ground of the vicarious satisfaction of Christ.46

Let us now ask whether a debt of punishment is actually transferable.47

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45 Ibid.

46 Hodge, pp. 533-534.

47 Richard Swinburne's analysis of guilt also accounts for this distinction. He says that "the assertion that someone is guilty" makes a claim about the past: that the wrongdoer did something wrong. It also "makes two further claims about the present. The first is that the guilty one owes something to...his victim." The second is that "the guilty one has acquired a negative status, somewhat like being unclean..." (Richard Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," in Philosophy and the Christian Faith, edited by Thomas V. Morris (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 16). While "[a]n agent cannot alter the fact that he did the past act", the debt and the negative status are both removable (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," pp. 18-19). Though, he claims, neither is transferable. No one else can make apology for the guilty one (Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 149) which is necessary for the removal of the negative status (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 17). Further, no one can pay another's debts. "If I steal £10 from Jones and you give him an equivalent sum, he has not lost money; but it remains the case that I still owe £10 to Jones" (Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 149). He claims, however, that while these are not transferable someone else can help the guilty one to remove the debt and negative status (Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 149). I will argue that while guilt as an assertion about the past is neither removable nor transferable, a debt of punishment is both (at least in a way analogous to the way that we typically think of pecuniary debts as removable and transferable). The transferability of the negative status remains an open question on DMP. But, DMP's effectiveness does not depend on such transferability. Christ, in paying a guilty one's debt of punishment, could encourage the guilty one to be open to removing the negative status by "distancing" himself from his past (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 18); that is, by making "the present 'he' in his attitude as different as possible from the past 'he'... (Swinburne, "The Christian Scheme of Salvation," p. 17). Thus, again, we can see how DMP can avoid appealing to any sort of "legal fiction."
On Pecuniary Debt and Penal Debt

Some who argue that a moral debt is non-transferable, contrast moral debt with pecuniary debt, which is more clearly transferable. For example, Philip L. Quinn argues that there is

...a salient disanalogy between pecuniary and moral debts. It seems that moral debts are not transferable or transmissible in the way that pecuniary debts are. If one person owes another money, the debt can be transferred to and paid by a third party...But things are different for other kinds of debts. If one person murders another, we sometimes say that the murderer owes a debt to society which is to be paid by suffering punishment. But this is not a transferable debt that could be paid by the murderer's friends or relatives... 48

On Quinn's view, a debt of punishment related to sin is likewise non-transferable.

Like debts of punishment for crime in our legal system, debts of punishment for sin seem to me to be too tightly tied to those who commit the sins for it to be plausible to suppose that one person may remove another's debt of punishment by paying it in full. So I find the very idea of vicarious satisfaction for the debt of punishment of sin hard to swallow. 49

David Lewis offers some insight into why a debt of punishment could be non-transferable while a pecuniary debt is so. He distinguishes between a debt of punishment and a pecuniary debt in the following way.

As we mostly conceive of them, the condition of owing a debt and the condition of deserving to be punished are not alike. In the case of debt,


49 Philip L. Quinn, "Aquinas on Atonement," in Trinity, Incarnation, and Atonement, edited by Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga Jr. (University of Notre Dame Press: Notre Dame, 1989), p. 174. Quinn, however, softens this claim in a later article where he says, "When I compare the moral intuition that debts of punishment can never be transferred from the wrongdoer to an innocent party with the theological claim that Christ's life and death were sufficient to pay the debt of punishment for all human sin, I do not find myself stuck with the conclusion that the moral intuition is more likely to be true than the theological claim. So I, at least, am willing to reconsider the moral intuition and perhaps to revise or even to abandon it in the light of the theological claim" (Philip L. Quinn, "Swinburne on Guilt, Atonement, and Christian Redemption," In Reason and the Christian Religion, edited by Alan G. Padgett (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 293).
what is required is that the creditor *shall not* suffer a loss of the money he lent... whereas in the case of a 'debt of punishment', what is required is that the debtor *shall* suffer a loss...

This contrast appears to rely on two claims. First, it claims that pecuniary debts are compensatory while penal debts are not. Second, it claims that pecuniary debts are flexible with regard to the dissolution of the debt while penal debts are not equally flexible. That is, there is only one way that a debt of punishment can be paid. Specifically, the wrongdoer herself must suffer a loss. No one else can suffer the wrongdoer's loss on the wrongdoer's behalf for the debt of punishment involves *that particular wrongdoer* suffering a loss. The debt can only be paid by the wrongdoer or no one at all. This could be contrasted with a pecuniary debt which can be paid from several different sources. If Daniel owes Sarah $1000, Sarah can receive payment of the debt (and so *not* suffer a loss) from Daniel or Marion or anyone else who is willing to pay Sarah back on Daniel's behalf. Thus, one could argue, while it is possible for a third party to pay a pecuniary debt, it is not possible for a third party to pay a debt of punishment.

I will argue that penal and pecuniary debts are similarly compensatory and similarly flexible with regard to the dissolution of the debt. Let us first examine the nature of the compensatory function served by a pecuniary debt. Note that what is

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50 David Lewis, p.204.

51 Lewis also indicates that this could result in logically viable cases of vicarious satisfaction through penal substitution. He says, "What function would we have to ascribe to punishment in order to make it make sense to punish an innocent substitute?—A compensatory function" (David Lewis, p. 204). He explains that if a wrongdoer's punishment is viewed as a benefit to the victim then the source of the benefit would make no difference so long as the victim was "compensated" (David Lewis, 204-205). In this case, a debt of punishment would be much like a pecuniary debt. This similarity would make it possible for a penal debt to be transferable in the way that a pecuniary debt is.
required in the case of pecuniary debt is not simply that the creditor avoid a financial loss. In fact we can imagine a situation in which a creditor's lending results in an overall financial gain, even though the relevant debt remains outstanding. Suppose that Sarah meets Daniel at a coffee house to loan him $1000. After leaving the coffee house suppose that Sarah finds $2000 that goes unclaimed. Suppose further that Sarah would not have gone to the coffee house and found the $2000 had she not been meeting Daniel. Or suppose that Marion, pleased with Sarah's loan, decides to give Sarah $2000. In both cases Sarah avoids financial loss, and even experiences financial gain, after and as a result (in part) of giving a loan to Daniel. And yet, we would not say that Sarah has been compensated with regard to Daniel's pecuniary debt. This is because, strictly speaking, the pecuniary debt in this example is not one in which Sarah is owed $1000 from anyone, but a debt according to which Daniel must pay Sarah $1000. Sarah is under no obligation to count money received from any other source as payment of Daniel's debt.\footnote{I make this claim in contrast to L. Berkhof's claim that "If some beneficent person offers to pay the pecuniary debt of another, the payment must be accepted, and the debtor is \textit{ipso facto} freed from all obligation" (L. Berkhof, \textit{Systematic Theology} (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1941), p. 376). I claim, instead, that the only repayment that automatically dissolves the pecuniary claim of the creditor is repayment \textit{from the debtor}. Now, the creditor may have no say as to how the debtor acquires the money to repay the debt. As a result, anyone could give the debtor the money with which the debtor may repay the debt and automatically dissolve the pecuniary claim. However, contrary to Berkhof, the creditor is under no obligation to receive money from any source apart from the debtor as payment of the debt. In most cases of pecuniary debt a creditor would be willing to accept repayment from a third party, but this is because a creditor's usual concern is only the money and the third party is offering the money on the condition that it be received by the creditor as fulfillment of the debtor's debt.}

The nature of debt compensation, even within the context of pecuniary debt, is not a general claim to payment. Sarah has a particular financial claim over Daniel. When that claim is met, then Sarah may be said to have been "compensated" with regard to Daniel's debt. Now, it seems that any debt serves this sort of compensatory function inasmuch as the person to whom the debt is owed has a claim over the debtor; that is,
inasmuch as the debt is owed to someone. With regard to pecuniary debt the relevant claim involves financial payment. With regard to penal debt the relevant claim involves punishment. In each case, the person to whom the debt is owed has a claim over the debtor and can be said to have been "compensated" with regard to the debt when the claim has been met. Thus, in this way, penal and pecuniary debts appear to have a similarly compensatory nature.

Let us now examine the potential flexibility with regard to the dissolution of each type of debt. Now, it seems that debt, by nature, can only be owed to a person. One cannot owe a debt, for example, to a river or to the air. One might suggest that if a person were to pollute a river or the air one would incur a debt according to which one must clean up the river or air. But, inasmuch as this is the case, the debt owed is not to the river or to the air, but rather to the persons who depend upon and enjoy the use of it. Likewise a moral debt, inasmuch as it is a debt, can only be owed to a person. And so when a person has served a full prison term, we say that he has paid his debt "to society". That is, he has met the claim of the persons that make up his community.

Inasmuch as a debt is owed to a person, the person to whom the debt is owed has a claim over her debtor. Such a claim can be dissolved in three ways. First, if the debtor fulfills the claim by paying the debt, then claim dissolves. However, since the claim is held by a person, that person also has the option to dissolve her claim willfully. This leads us to the second and third means of claim dissolution. Second, the person to whom the debt is owed has the logical freedom to dissolve her claim willfully and unconditionally. This is to give forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt. And third, if one has the logical freedom to dissolve a claim willfully, then one also has the logical freedom to
set conditions for the willful dissolution of one's claim. Then, once those conditions are met, one releases one's claim. This third means of dissolving a claim is what we have identified as "satisfaction." Where the conditions are met by a third party, satisfaction is vicarious.

We can see how this is so in the case of a pecuniary debt. A creditor has a claim over her debtor. When the debtor has repaid the debt, the creditor's claim vanishes. The creditor also has the freedom to release her claim and so not require repayment from the debtor. Further, the creditor is free to accept a payment from a third party as a condition of her releasing her claim over her debtor. By accepting payment from a third party, she is accepting vicarious satisfaction with regard to the pecuniary debt. She is not obligated to receive such satisfaction, but has the logical freedom to do so.

It seems that the same logical possibilities hold inasmuch as a penal debt is owed to someone; that is, inasmuch as someone holds a penal claim over her offender. To show how this is so, let us look at an example from Shakespeare's *Merchant of Venice*. Shylock loans Antonio 3,000 ducats on the condition that it be repaid in three months. If the loan is not repaid, Antonio will owe a penalty to Shylock. Shylock says that...

...let the forfeit

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53 Steven L. Porter presents a similar argument. Porter explains that punishment, in his view, is an optional right to be enforced by the offended one. The victim is free to insist on the execution of punishment or to allow the offender to go unpunished. Because of this freedom there is some logical "flexibility" with regard to the execution of the punishment. And this flexibility could extend to allowing for "a voluntary penal substitute" (Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," pp. 236-237). See also Steven L. Porter, "Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution," in *Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide*, edited by William Lane Craig (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2002), p. 605.

54 She is even free to accept the promise of payment from someone else as a condition of her releasing her claim over the original debtor.
Antonio willingly agrees to the terms of the bond. And after three months have passed they stand before the court. The money which Antonio had anticipated using to repay the bond has been lost at sea. Shylock demands the price of the forfeit: one pound of Antonio's flesh. Bassanio, the friend on whose behalf Antonio borrowed the money, arrives and offers to repay the 3,000 ducat debt several times over. Bassanio even offers his own flesh in exchange for Antonio's.

Shylock has both a pecuniary and a penal claim over Antonio. Certainly it is possible for Shylock to accept vicarious satisfaction with regard to the pecuniary debt. It seems that Kant and Quinn would concede that it is logically possible for Shylock to accept the ducats offered by Bassanio on Antonio's behalf as satisfaction for Antonio's financial debt. Why would it not also be logically possible for Shylock to accept vicarious satisfaction of his penal claim through penal substitution? Antonio owes a penalty to Shylock as a result of not having repaid his debt by the promised time. That penalty involves the forfeit of Antonio's life. Bassanio offers to give his life in Antonio's place. That is, he offers to pay the penalty that is due to Antonio. It is unclear why it would be logically\textsuperscript{56} problematic for Shylock to accept a pound of Bassanio's flesh as a condition for Shylock's releasing his penal claim over Antonio.

\textsuperscript{55} Merchant of Venice, I.iii. 149-152.

\textsuperscript{56} The question as to the moral implications of such a substitution will be addressed in following sections. See this diss., pp. 239-247, 258-263.
Again, if we agree that it is neither logically problematic for Shylock to enforce his right to Antonio's punishment nor logically problematic for him to release his claim over Antonio, then how does it become logically problematic for Shylock to release his claim conditionally? That is, if it is not logically problematic for Shylock to either take Antonio's life or release his claim to Antonio's punishment, how does it become logically problematic for Shylock to either take Antonio's life or unconditionally release his claim to Antonio's punishment or accept 9,000 ducats to release his claim over Antonio, or accept Bassanio's freely offered life to release his claim over Antonio, or accept anything at all to release his penal claim over Antonio?57

Similarly, fallen humans owe a penal debt to God. Since God has the freedom to release God's claim on the divine external punishment of fallen humans, God also has the logical freedom to release God's claim on the divine external punishment of humans as a result of someone else having endured such punishment. Thus, penal substitution, at least insofar as it is an example of vicarious satisfaction, is logically possible.58

Two Objections to this Argument and My Responses

There are at least two objections that could be raised against this defense. First, someone might argue that a debt of punishment is distinct from moral debt. Moral debt, someone could claim, is an expression for the wrongdoer's responsibility for creating a ____________

57 Swinburne makes a similar point in the following way, "Can someone else be punished instead of the wrongdoer? There are many cases in history of heroic men offering to take the punishment (corporal, capital, or whatever) instead of another. What happens is that the wrongdoer by his wrong action loses certain rights...If some saint then offers the state a bargain—that the state return to the wrongdoer his right to life or whatever in return for the right to the saint's life, which the saint has the right to cede to the state, then if the state accepts that bargain, the saint loses his right to life and the wrongdoer regains his" (Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, p. 108).

58 We will later examine conceptual problems for penal substitution insofar as one innocent vicar is said to be "punished" on behalf of multiple people. See this diss., pp. 248-251.
relational distance between the wrongdoer and her victim. Overcoming such a debt requires something like repentance, and while a debt of punishment or reparation may be paid vicariously, no one can repent on another's behalf. Thus, even though a debt of punishment may be transferable, moral debt, and the payment of such a debt are non-transferable.

It does appear that vicarious satisfaction as it relates to moral debt defined in this way is impossible. Likewise, such a debt cannot be waived, for if a wrongdoer is unwilling to repent, the relational distance between her and her victim cannot be overcome; even if the victim is willing to extend forgiveness-as-restoration to the wrongdoer. DMP can escape this criticism by distinguishing between two types of moral debt: (1) moral debt as it relates to a debt of punishment and (2) moral debt as it relates to a debt of repentance/relational distance. According to DMP, God accepts vicarious satisfaction for (1) as a means to encourage and help the human to be open to overcoming (2).

Second, one might argue that I have not defended the transferability of penal debt, but instead have argued merely for a type of conditional cancelability of penal debt. That is, on the view I have defended, the same penal debt does not transfer from sinners to an innocent vicar. Rather, the sinners' debt is simply cancelled in response to someone else's endurance of punishment.

The same could be said, however, with regard to pecuniary debts. What we call a "transfer" of pecuniary debt can be understood as a creditor's cancellation of a debt in response to a third party's promise to take on a new debt of equal value. Thus, the creditor's claim over the original debtor dissolves as a result of the creation of a new
claim over the third party. If we call this conditional cancellation a "transfer" in the case of pecuniary debt, we must also call a "transfer" in the case of penal debt. And even if we do not call it a "transfer," conditional cancellation is what I have identified as satisfaction. And where the relevant condition is met by a third party, the satisfaction is vicarious. Thus, vicarious satisfaction will still be logically possible.

A Response to (8) the Attack on the Morality of Vicarious Satisfaction

It is true that our moral intuition does sometimes reject vicarious satisfaction. I will argue, however, that there are cases of vicarious satisfaction that are not so rejected. My argument relies on the claim that there are at least two reasons that we reject vicarious satisfaction for serious crimes in common practice. First, it seems that such a substitution would defeat at least part of the purpose of the punishment. A second reason that we reject substitution in such cases is simply that we do not have the moral authority to release the offended party from punishment. Thus, an instance of vicarious satisfaction in which the purposes of punishment are not defeated and the offended party has the moral authority to release the offender from punishment, may be an instance of vicarious satisfaction that is morally permissible.

The Rejection of Vicarious Satisfaction by Moral Intuition

Undoubtedly our moral intuitions reject vicarious satisfaction in some cases. For example we would not allow a rapist's mother to serve his prison term. We would demand that the wrongdoer serve his punishment himself.⁵⁹ Neither would we allow a murderer's innocent friend to replace the murderer on death row.⁶⁰ We would demand

that the murderer suffer the penal consequences of his own actions. And yet many Christians believe that something very like this happens on the Cross. An innocent Christ suffers penal consequences on behalf of rapists, murderers, liars, and thieves.

David Lewis sees this as evidence that the Christian who holds penal substitution has fallen into inconsistency. That is, in promoting penal substitution in the case of the atonement "they disagree with what they themselves think the rest of the time," and develop a sort of two-mindedness. Lewis concludes, "Their principles alter from one case to another, for no apparent reason."

I will argue, however, that there is a relevant difference between the examples used above (in which vicarious satisfaction is morally problematic) and the vicarious satisfaction in DMP. To determine the possible difference, let us first examine the reasons why we reject vicarious satisfaction in the examples used above. There are at least two reasons that we reject this substitution. First, it seems that such a substitution would defeat at least part of the purpose of the punishment. For example, we would never let the mother of a rapist serve the rapist's prison term, Steven L. Porter claims, because a major part of the prison term is to achieve "potential utilitarian ends" like

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60 David Lewis, p. 205.

61 Ibid., p. 206.

62 Ibid., p. 205. Lewis notes, however, that this two-mindedness is not limited to those who hold to penal substitution to explain the doctrine of the atonement. For while we all might reject penal substitution in the example of the rapist or murderer, there are some cases in which we allow it. He points out that in every day practice we unflinchingly allow penal substitution in the case of fines. This fact, he claims, is enough to show that we are all inconsistent with regard to our intuitions about penal substitution. Lewis claims that if we were really against penal substitution in the case of fines, but simply thought that giving up the idea of fines was impractical, then our dissatisfaction in retaining fines (since they allow for penal substitution) ought toshow. However, this dissatisfaction does not show (p. 209). As a result the penal substitution theorist has at least a "tu quoque" against anyone who complains of his "two-mindedness". This, Lewis claims, "...indicates that both sides agree that penal substitution sometimes makes sense after all, even if none can say how it makes sense" (p. 209).
deterrence, rehabilitation, and prevention.63 These ends cannot be achieved by a substitute.64 If we did allow such a substitution, then a murderer who happened to have a lot of very loyal and innocent friends, could freely go about committing as many crimes as he had friends willing to serve his sentence.

A second reason that we reject vicarious satisfaction in such cases is simply that we do not have the authority to release the offender from his debt of punishment. In the case of such serious crimes, when the offender deserves to be punished, allowing the offender to go free is tantamount to a crime in itself. But, why is this so? Particularly, why is this so if we consider mercy a virtue? I claim that in such cases we do not have the moral authority to give mercy. Even if the judge who is sentencing is willing to relinquish her own claim to the murderer's punishment, the victims still have a claim to punishment. And even if the direct victim(s) and the victim's family were willing to release their claims to punishment, the judge's hands could be tied by the fact that the crime threatens the security of the community and so was against the entire community.65 As a result, the judge must sentence the criminal. If the judge were to accept a penal substitute, she would be releasing the offender from punishment. If the judge does not have the moral authority to release the offender from punishment, then the judge does not have the moral authority to accept a substitute.

64 Ibid., p. 237.
65 Perhaps, if the entire community, victim, and victim's family were willing to release the offender's debt of punishment, we could then allow it.
The Resonance of the Vicarious Satisfaction in DMP with Moral Intuition

If I am correct in arguing that these are the reasons that we find vicarious satisfaction in the above examples morally problematic, then if we can show that DMP involves an instance of vicarious satisfaction in which (1) the purposes of punishment are not lost and (2) the punisher has the moral authority to release the offender from punishment, then we will have shown that DMP can offer escape from the present criticism.

Let us begin by asking whether any of the purposes of punishment are lost on DMP. We can find some help in this regard from Steven L. Porter. In his essay, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution", Porter defends the use of retributive punishment which he defines as

...the forcible withdrawal of certain rights and/or privileges from a wrongdoer in response to the intentional misuse of those rights and/or privileges by the wrongdoer.66

Porter proceeds to outline many of the benefits of such retributive punishment. He distinguishes between "potential utilitarian ends" and "intrinsic ends." In the former category he includes deterrence, rehabilitation, and prevention. The goods affiliated with the "intrinsic" category, he claims, are "secured in all cases of rightful, retributive punishment."67 In the case of God's punishment in response to sin, the "intrinsic ends" associated with such punishment include the facts that it

...takes human sin seriously, it treats sinners as responsible moral agents, and it vindicates or expresses the appropriate value of both the Godhead and the divine/human relationship. The result of this is that the sinner has


67 Ibid.
the opportunity to be morally educated and formed, and the provision of this opportunity is good even if sinners are unwilling to recognize the correct moral values which are expressed in the punishment.\(^\text{68}\)

Again, he elaborates on the goods affiliated with divine punishment in response to sin.

Moreover, sinners are provided the opportunity in the cross to recognize the gravity of their offense, to realize their responsibility before God, to grasp the great value of the Godhead and the divine/human relationship, and in all of this to become aware of the riches of God's mercy, grace, and love.\(^\text{69}\)

The distinction between the potential utilitarian ends of punishment and the intrinsic ends of punishment (with their potential results) is important, Porter claims, because it helps to make sense of those situations in which we find vicarious satisfaction (specifically, penal substitution) morally counter-intuitive. For example, we would never let the mother of a rapist serve the rapist's prison term. Presumably this is so, Porter claims, because a major part of the prison term is to achieve ends like deterrence and prevention (as we noted above). These ends cannot be achieved by a substitute. However, the intrinsic ends that Porter outlines, along with their results, can be achieved through the punishment of a substitute. And these are the ends that God is after in the divine/human situation.\(^\text{70}\)

To this we can add, with John Hare, that penal substitution is able to express the value not only of God but of human victims of human sin as well.\(^\text{71}\) DMP can add

\(^{68}\) Ibid., p. 235. See also, Porter, "Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution," pp. 603-605.

\(^{69}\) Ibid., p. 237.

\(^{70}\) Ibid.

\(^{71}\) Hare borrows Jean Hampton's term and calls this "the expressive theory of punishment." On this view, "[punishment] is good because it expresses the right relative value of [the offender] and his victim." (Hare, "Moral Faith and Atonement"). Porter cites Hare in noting this expressive value of punishment, but only does so in respect to the expressed value of God and not also human victims (Porter,"Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution," p. 604).
further to Porter's argument inasmuch as it argues that vicarious satisfaction through Christ's penal substitution is plausibly the most effective way to achieve God's goal of divine-human personal reconciliation. Specifically, it may be the most effective means to the elicitation of human appropriation of God's offer of forgiveness-as-reconciliation; which, on DMP, is the ultimate goal of divine punishment. On DMP, vicarious satisfaction through penal substitution is plausibly more effective in the realization of this goal than divine punishment of fallen humans directly. Porter appears to be amenable to such a point where he says,

...if God punished sinners to some degree, there would likely be further alienation between God and humans...But if Christ is able to bear the punishment well, then persons will have cause to be exceedingly grateful for this substitution rather than bitter towards God.72

What is more, this reconciliation can allow for a pneumatology according to which God transforms the fallen human such that the human avoids future sin. Thus, DMP could plausibly be the most effective means of securing Porter's "potential utilitarian ends" of punishment (deterrence, rehabilitation, and prevention).73

72 (Porter, "Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution."
p. 605-606). However, Porter later seems to downplay this point saying, "...whether the sinner subjectively appreciates the meaning of the cross or not, Christ's suffering the punishment due sinners objectively expresses the great moral truth of God's value relative to rebellious sinners" (Porter, "Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution," p. 606). The problem with downplaying this point is that the mere "objective expression" of God's value as a justification for the Cross will be vulnerable to the appeal to robust love (Why would God pursue the mere "objective expression" of God's value at so great a cost?) and the damnation problem (Why is there further punishment if God's purpose of expressing God's value objectively is achieved in the Cross?). The same objections apply to Porter's third good reason (listed first in his text) for Christ's vicarious punishment: that "the goods of substantive reparation and penance are more fully realized via the punishment of Christ" (Porter, "Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution," p. 605). Appealing to the opportunity for moral education and formation that the Cross affords will not rescue Porter either. First, this appeal is vulnerable to the problem of superfluous suffering (Could't God give humans this opportunity in a less painful way?) Second, this appeal on its own is vulnerable to the same shortcomings that we discussed with respect to the third conception of sin (see this diss., pp. 35-39). Specifically, it may be possible to be "morally educated and formed", that is to "recognize the gravity of offense," "realize responsibility before God," and so on, while hating (and so not being personally reconciled to) God.
Someone might object that this approach to divine punishment gives an undeterred sinner free reign to do as he pleases without facing penal consequences. That is, this view allows for something like a murderer who happens to have a lot of very loyal and innocent friends, to freely go about committing as many crimes as he had friends willing to serve his sentence. Because of the sacrifice of Christ, the sinner can enjoy a life of sin without concern about the consequences.

We have seen however, that on DMP, this is not the case. I argued above that an unrepentant and untransformed sinner will still be under divine wrath. This wrath may or may not be seen as penal (depending on which response to the damnation problem is chosen), but either way it will amount to separation from the person of God. Thus, an unrepentant sinner is not free to enjoy a life of sin without concern about the consequences.

Now let us ask whether, on DMP, God has the moral authority to release fallen humans from punishment. As I claimed above, it seems that inasmuch as a punishment is owed to someone, the person to whom the punishment is owed has the freedom to release his claim to it. Thus, inasmuch as fallen humans owe a debt of divine punishment for sin to God, God has the logical freedom to release God's claim on such punishment.

73 Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," p. 234. Porter also seems amenable to this point inasmuch as he notes that Christ's vicarious punishment allows for "the possibility of the further subjective good of what might be called moral education and moral formation" (Porter, "Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution," p. 604). DMP's emphasis, however, is not merely on the Cross's provision of such a possibility or opportunity (this opportunity could be given in other ways). DMP argues that Christ's vicarious satisfaction is part of the most effective means to that end.

74 See this diss., pp. 167-168, 221-225.

75 Answering this question will serve to answer the concern about God's offering forgiveness for evils done to others. Simon Wiesenthal expresses such a concern with forgiving someone for acts committed against others in Simon Wiesenthal, The Sunflower: On the Possibilities and Limits of Forgiveness (New York: Schocken Books, 1997). My answer here can be seen as a response to this concern where God is the forgiver.
Yet some might argue that it would be immoral for God to exercise such freedom because it unjustly impinges on other victims' claims to punishment. Those victims have a claim to punishment and in providing vicarious satisfaction without the consent of the victims, God is denying them the fulfillment of their legitimate claim (or the freedom to release it themselves).

However, the relevant punishment from which fallen humans are freed is divine punishment in response to sin inasmuch as it is before, or against, God. God is the only One who has a claim to such a punishment. If the divine punishment for sin is something like a spiritual death resulting from denial of fellowship with God, then it seems that God has complete logical and moral authority to release or enforce divine punishment. For, it is unclear how anyone else can have a legitimate claim to God's refusal of fellowship with another person. Thus, if God releases God's claim to this punishment, then the sinner is completely free with regard to that punishment.

Even if we hold that, despite their release from divine punishment, humans still have legitimate claims to punishment over one another, we can claim that God's forgiveness-as-pardon of a person is not unjust toward human victims. We can do so in two ways. First, God's releasing someone from divine punishment in response to sin inasmuch as it is before, or against, God is compatible with God's allowing and even enforcing punishment in response to human wrongdoing against other humans.

Similarly, we can imagine a human judge who has been wronged by a criminal. This judge may release her own claim to punishment of that criminal and even extend

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76 This objection could face an ontological problem insofar as it seems to hold to a moral standard apart from God. But, the objector could avoid this problem by modifying her claim to say that God's exercise of this freedom is not in keeping with God's character of robust love for victims.
forgiveness-as-restoration to that criminal. Still the judge's own forgiveness-as-pardon and forgiveness-as-restoration of the criminal is compatible with her enforcement of punishment on behalf of other victims. Likewise, God's forgiveness-as-pardon of a person and forgiveness-as-restoration is compatible with God's allowing and encouraging systems of human punishment. It is even compatible with something like purgatory which could involve other forms of divinely enforced punishment for wrongdoing against other persons.

Second, we can claim that God's forgiveness-as-pardon is not unjust toward human victims because even if they did have a claim to divine punishment of their offenders, God has the moral authority to command human victims to release their own claims to such punishment.77

Summary

Thus, it seems that DMP allows for a morally permissible account of vicarious satisfaction.78 This account seems morally permissible inasmuch as the divinely intended

77 Also exercising this authority could be in keeping with God's robust love. For example, a divine command to give forgiveness-as-letting go can be in the interest of the victim. When outrage is allowed to flourish, an outraged person can find himself oppressed by his own anger. He can become consumed by thoughts of evil done to him; constantly reminded of and reliving the situation. Forgiveness-as-letting go can be a means of liberating the victim by freeing him from his own outrage. This is not to condone the perpetrator's crime. To the contrary, to forgive in any sense involves the denunciation of the evil that is being responded to with forgiveness, because to forgive one must first acknowledge that evil has been done and the perpetrator is culpable for the relevant evil. Thus, Vincent Brümmer says, "...forgiveness should not be confused with condonation. If you were to condone my action, you would thereby deny that it is an action which caused you injury and thus also deny that there is anything to forgive" (Vincent Brümmer, "Atonment and Reconciliation," Religious Studies 28 (1992), p. 440).

78 L. Berkhof has listed four conditions that must be met for vicarious punishment to be "legal" (or free from injustice). "(1) that the guilty party himself is not in a position to bear the penalty through to the end, so that a righteous relation results; (2) that the transfer does not encroach upon the rights and privileges of innocent third parties, nor cause them to suffer hardships and privations; (3) that the person enduring the penalty is not himself already indebted to justice, and does not owe all his services to the government; and (4) that the guilty party retains the consciousness of his guilt and of the fact that the substitute is suffering for him" (Berkhof, p. 376). On the view I have defended (1) & (3) are not conditions for a moral transfer of punishment. If the victim has the moral authority to pardon (and so to conditionally pardon) and the
ends of divine punishment in response to sin are most effectively achieved through the punishment of the willing substitute, Christ. Further, God has the moral authority to demand or waive divine punishment. Thus, God has the moral authority to offer to accept satisfaction through an alternative; in this case, divine penal Self-substitution through the innocent vicar, Jesus Christ.

A Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Penal Substitution and the Problems for Penal Substitution as Penal

In this section I will address problems for penal substitution that arise insofar as an innocent vicar is said to endure a penalty.

Responses to (9–10) Attacks on the Possibility of Christ's Enduring Sinners' Punishment

A Response to (9) the Claim that an Innocent Person Cannot be Punished

As I noted in the introduction, A.M. Quinton presents a logical argument against the possibility of punishing an innocent person. Quinton argues that an innocent person can never be punished because punishment, by definition, can only correlate with guilt.
An innocent person may receive suffering that he does not deserve, but he cannot, strictly speaking, "be punished." ⁸³

Quinton is correct that by "punishment" we sometimes mean something like "deserved suffering inflicted in response to guilt." In this sense, an innocent vicar can never be punished because there can be no sense in which an innocent person can be said to deserve suffering. However, there is another, broader, sense in which we use the term "punishment." Sometimes, by "punishment," we simply mean "suffering inflicted as a response to guilt." This type of suffering can be inflicted on someone who does not deserve to suffer. ⁸⁴ For example, someone who was framed may claim to be enduring punishment (suffering inflicted as a response to someone else's guilt) that she does not deserve. We could also say that "the punishment outweighed the crime" when someone endures more suffering than they can be said to deserve. Or again, a coach might punish an entire team for the infraction of one player. While the team is running laps, one player could rightly complain to the offending player, "I am being punished for your guilt." ⁸⁵ If we are using "punishment" in this broader sense, it becomes clear that an innocent person can be punished. ⁸⁶

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⁸⁴ James Denney claims that Christ's sufferings "...were not penal in the sense of coming to Him through a bad conscience, or in the sense that God was angry with Him personally, as if He had really been a guilty man" (James Denney, *The Christian Doctrine of Reconciliation* (London: J. Clarke, 1959), p. 272). Rather, they "...were penal in the sense that in that dark hour He had to realize to the full the divine reaction against sin in the race in which He was incorporated..." (Denney, p. 273). This is also cited in Vincent Taylor, *Forgiveness and Reconciliation* (London: Macmillan and Co, 1960), p. 212.

⁸⁵ Steven L. Porter uses a similar analogy to demonstrate the transferability of punishment in some cases (Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," pp. 236-237).

⁸⁶ Steven L. Porter also addresses this objection in Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," p. 236. R.M. Hare addresses this objection in R.M. Hare, "Punishment and Retributive
A Response to (10) the Claim that One Person Cannot Endure the Punishment of Many

Even if we successfully show that an innocent person can be punished on behalf of a guilty person, any theory of penal substitution that claims that Christ's suffering removes the entire debt of divine punishment must offer an explanation for the claim that Christ suffered and died on behalf of many guilty persons. John Stott claims that a traditional understanding of the power of Christ's death is that

...in and through Christ crucified God substituted himself for us and bore our sins, dying in our place the death we deserved to die...

It seems that it is not possible for one person to endure the punishment of many people when that punishment is something like death or a life sentence. According to this criticism, while it may be possible for Christ to endure the same quality of punishment that sinners deserve, Christ as one person cannot endure the same quantity of punishment that multiple sinners deserve. How is it possible for one undeserved death to be substituted for many deserved deaths?

Unless we can show that Christ suffered as many deaths as there are sinners, then this argument will succeed in showing that Christ did not serve the same quantity of punishment that sinners deserve. This does not mean, however, that Christ's penal substitution is not a full satisfaction for the debt of punishment that sinners owe to God.

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87 This is distinct from what we could call "partial penal substitution" which holds that Christ only endured part of the penalty that sinners deserve and that sinners must still endure, or make satisfaction for, a portion of the penalty themselves.

Outside of the repayment of the debt by the offender, the offended party has the option of determining what will satisfy her. Thus, God is free to determine that the value to God of Christ's substitution is equivalent to the value to God of sinners enduring the suffering that they deserve. 89

For example, suppose that both Antonio and Bassanio owe a debt of punishment to Shylock. Each of them must give Shylock one pound of his own flesh. Suppose then that Portia steps forward and offers to willingly give one pound of her own flesh as satisfaction of the debt owed by Antonio and Bassanio. Shylock, as the offended party, has the option to accept such a satisfaction thereby dissolving his claim to the debt of punishment owed by Antonio and Bassanio. Even though Portia gives only one pound of flesh (whereas, between Antonio and Bassanio, Shylock is owed two) Shylock is free to accept this smaller quantity as full satisfaction. 90

Thus, while it may not be possible for one innocent person to suffer all of the punishment due to several guilty people, it is possible for one innocent person to suffer punishment on behalf of several guilty people inasmuch as the offended party has the freedom to accept the innocent's punishment as satisfaction for the debt of punishment due by the many.

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90 Of course, in the Shylock case there are moral concerns with regard to a potential vicarious satisfaction. I will address such concerns as they relate to the divine-human situation in the pages that follow.
Responses to (11) the Attack on the Claim that Christ Actually Endured Such Punishment

Some argue that Christ did not actually endure the divine punishment due to even one sinner. Christ's doing so, they claim, would be at odds with the claim that Christ is resurrected. This objection then points to the claim that the penalty that sinners deserve is everlasting damnation. Yet, Christ is said to be risen and exalted. Thus, it appears that Christ is not everlastingly damned and as a result, does not actually endure the punishment that a sinner deserves. Eleonore Stump claims,

...no matter what sort of agony Christ experienced in his crucifixion, it certainly was not (and was not equivalent to) everlasting punishment, if for no other reason than that Christ's suffering came to an end.

There are at least four ways that a theory of penal substitution using DMP can address this criticism. First, it can simply claim that the divine punishment due to sinners is not everlasting punishment. Thus, Christ could endure divine punishment which is equivalent to that which a sinner deserves and the punishment would come to an end.

Second, it could claim that the type of punishment that a sinner deserves is not necessarily everlasting punishment, but the spiritual death which is the punishment for sin is everlasting for typical humans. That is, perhaps Christ, in enduring the punishment...

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91 See this diss., p. 21. This objection loses strength if everlasting damnation is not held to be the due punishment for sin. And while such a claim is controversial I will still address this objection here since many theories of penal substitution (including the "popular view") hold that something like everlasting damnation is a consequence of sin.


for sin, died a particular kind of spiritual death from which Christ was able to rise; a
spiritual death from which other humans would not have been able to rise. Simply
because a different person will respond to a similar penalty in a different way, does not
mean that the penalty itself is any less similar. For example, suppose that a 7 year old has
somehow incurred a penalty of 10 lashes with a whip. The chances that the penalty will
result in the 7 year old's death are likely. Suppose then, that the child's father offers to
endure the lashes on behalf of his child. Though the lashes will still bring great
discomfort to the father, they will not affect him as fatally as they would his child. If the
offended party accepts the father's offer of satisfaction, then both the father and the child
could live. And in receiving the lashes, the father could be said to actually receive the
child's penalty. In this case, the penalty due to sinners is something like separation from
God. Now, if humans are ontologically dependent upon God, if God were to completely
withdraw from humans, then those humans would cease to exist. However, since Christ
was also God, one could argue that it would be possible for Christ to experience
separation from the Father without ceasing to exist. Thus, by being ontologically
independent, Christ could endure this painful penalty and survive, whereas other humans
could not. Thus, it could have been the case that Christ actually suffered the punishment
that fallen humans deserved.

Yet, even if the divine punishment due to sinners is held to be everlasting, there
are still two more responses available to a theory of penal substitution using DMP. The
third response is similar to the response I offered to the claim that one person cannot
endure the punishment of many. One could say that while Christ does not suffer the
same quantity of punishment, Christ suffers a limited amount of the same quality of
pursuit of the same quality of punishment that sinners deserve. This limited amount of the same quality of punishment endured by Christ could be accepted by God as full satisfaction for the debt of punishment owed by fallen humans to God. Thus, one could say that Christ actually endured the type of punishment that fallen humans deserve, though there was no need for Christ to endure the full quantity of such punishment.94

Fourth, DMP could claim that Christ endures only part of the punishment that humans deserve and it is of partial value to God relative to the value to God of the punishment that we deserve. The rest of the punishment could be waived by God,95 endured by humans,96 or covered by direct satisfaction from fallen humans (or addressed through some combination of these three).97 This response, however, would involve a deviation from the popular view which claims that Christ's penal substitution is a sufficient satisfaction for the debt of punishment related to human sin.98

94 Again, this response is reminiscent of Duns Scotus' acceptation theory of satisfaction. For further reference on this topic see this diss., p. 251, footnote 89.

95 This could allow for divine forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt with regard to the remaining debt of punishment, thus giving DMP another means of escape from the forgiveness problem.

96 However, if the deserved punishment is eternal, it is unclear that a portion of such punishment endured vicariously by Christ will result in less than eternal punishment as a remainder. At some point, it seems that God will have to count partial punishment as satisfaction for the part of the punishment that is unendured or waive any remaining punishment.

97 David Lewis takes note of a similar potential response to this problem (See Lewis, p. 206). "[Christians] may say...that what happened to Christ on the cross was something very much worse than crucifixion...Perhaps these evils, if not the crucifixion itself, were an equal substitute for the deserved damnation that the sinners escaped in return" (Lewis, p. 206). If I understand this response correctly, it claims that Christ's limited suffering was somehow of a quality more acute than the suffering deserved by sinners, such that the limited suffering He endured was equivalent to the infinite punishment deserved by sinners. However, it is not clear what sort of calculation can be done to show such a thing. Further, if there were a way to perform such a calculation, the current problem would still hold. For eventually, the infinite punishment that sinners owe would catch up to and surpass Christ's limited suffering.

98 There is a fifth, approach that a theory of penal substitution could utilize to escape this problem. It could take inspiration from Hans Urs von Balthasar and claim that "...[Christ's] experience of being abandoned on the Cross is timeless" (Balthasar, p. 336). With this in mind, one might argue that Christ's suffering somehow takes place outside of time and so is eternal. While this fifth response can help penal substitution
Responses to (12–14) the Moral Attacks on Vicarious Punishment

Here I will address the three moral attacks against vicarious punishment, arguing that DMP can answer all three.

A Response to (12) the Objection against Retributive Punishment

We should begin by distinguishing between rettributive punishment and revenge.

Retributive punishment simply refers to punishment that is exacted in response to an offender's deserving punishment. Revenge, on the other hand, is often thought of as a retaliation that is delivered with malicious pleasure. DMP claims that God pursues retributive punishment in the Cross, but not revenge in the sense just described.

99 For an interesting defense of retribution as an essential component of any moral punishment, see Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement, pp. 93-109.

100 Charles Hodge also distinguishes between "vindicatory" and "vindictive", saying, "It is a common mistake or misrepresentation to confound these two words, and to represent those who ascribe to God the attribute of vindicatory justice as regarding Him as a vindictive being, thirsting for revenge" (Hodge, p. 489).
Still, some argue that there is no role for retributive punishment in a moral theory of atonement. John Hare states that those who reject penal substitution on account of a moral rejection of retributive punishment claim that,

To return harm for harm done is...merely to increase the amount of suffering in the world, not to set anything right.\(^{101}\)

Now, it may be the case that the pursuit of retributive punishment \textit{for its own sake}\" merely increases suffering\" and is incompatible with robust love. Further, it is the case that DMP claims that God pursues retributive punishment through God's active wrath in the Cross.\(^{102}\) If this were the end of the story, then perhaps (if retributive punishment really is incompatible with robust love) penal substitution would fail on account of this objection. However, according to DMP, God does not pursue retributive punishment \textit{for its own sake}. Rather, God's pursuit of retributive punishment through active wrath is educative and demonstrative in such a way that it effectively elicits human appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-restoration (and thus moral transformation or rehabilitation through relationship with God).\(^{103}\) God can then be said to pursue retributive punishment through active wrath as a means to draw humans away from God's passive wrath. This goal of divine retributive punishment is entirely compatible with robust love.

This answer enables DMP to respond to Steve Chalke where he says,

Rather than a symbol of vengeance or retribution, the cross of Christ is the greatest symbol of love and a demonstration of just how far God the

\(^{101}\) Hare, "Moral Faith and Atonement."

\(^{102}\) For a take on penal substitution that does not claim that there is a retributive function of the Cross, see Boersma, Hans. "Eschatological Justice and the Cross: Violence and Penal Substitution," \textit{Theology Today} 60 (2003), pp. 186-199.

\(^{103}\) See this diss., pp. 163-179.
Father and Jesus his Son are prepared to go to prove that love and to bring redemption to their creation.\textsuperscript{104}

Chalke creates a false dichotomy. On DMP God's pursuit of retribution in the Cross is a manifestation of God's deep love for humans and it serves to demonstrate God's love in a way that is conducive to human appropriation of God's offer of personal reconciliation.\textsuperscript{105}

On DMP God's opting for severity\textsuperscript{106} is a manifestation of God's mercy\textsuperscript{107} because God's severity helps to draw sinners into a state of personal reconciliation with God. This in turn is a demonstration of God's love because it displays the lengths to which God will go to be personally reconciled with humans.\textsuperscript{108}

We can see a similar error in C.F.D. Moule who says,

\begin{quote}
...I want to argue that, on a fully personal level of procedure, and most of all in a Christian understanding of the way in which offence and estrangement are dealt with, there is \textit{no place at all} for retribution...Ultimately, the controlling factor cannot be anything so abstract and impersonal as justice or retribution: the controlling factor is the worth of human personality, and the creation or restoration of mature persons must be the paramount concern in whatever is done when an estrangement has occurred between persons - or between a human person and a God who is personal.\textsuperscript{109}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{104} Steve Chalke, "The Redemption of the Cross" in \textit{The Atonement Debate}, edited by Derek Tidball, David Hilborn, and Justin Thacker (Michigan: Zondervan, 2008), p. 44.

\textsuperscript{105} For more on this point, see this diss., pp. 174-176.

\textsuperscript{106} See Aquinas, \textit{Summa Theologica} (ST) III, q. 47, a. 3, ad. 1.

\textsuperscript{107} See ST III, q. 46, a. 1, ad. 3. Also see this diss., pp. 133-138.

\textsuperscript{108} Garry Williams gives an interesting answer to a theological variation of this argument which claims that "retributive punishment is ruled out by Jesus' own teaching on how we should relate to one another" (Williams, p. 173). Williams cites Romans 12:19, in answering that Paul "explains that individuals must not take revenge precisely because God \textit{is} going to do so" (Williams, p.174). Williams claims that this seeming inconsistency between God's Own actions and God's commands is not really inconsistent "since he is God and we are not" (Williams, p. 174).

\textsuperscript{109} C.F.D. Moule, "The Christian Understanding of Forgiveness," \textit{Theology} 71 (1968), p.437. Moule later argues, "...retributive justice must, on a Christian showing at least, be regarded rather as part of the educative or corrective process - part of the attempt to retrieve or to generate full personhood and to 'do
On DMP, God's pursuit of retribution through divine penal Self-substitution is an essential part of God's project of overcoming divine-human estrangement and making humans into mature persons. Divine retribution is not opposed to this end. Instead, it is conducive to it.

A Response to (13) the Objection against Punishing an Innocent

Someone could concede that we have shown that vicarious satisfaction is neither logically nor morally problematic, while complaining that the penal suffering of an innocent remains morally problematic. This objector could claim that it is always morally wrong to inflict punishment upon an innocent person. Thus, while accepting vicarious satisfaction is not morally problematic,\(^\text{110}\) the content of the satisfaction can be. In this vein the objector could say, "It might be morally allowable for an offended party to accept the torture of a baby as satisfaction (since he may set the terms of his own satisfaction) but it would never be morally allowable to actually torture a baby. Similarly, it might be morally allowable for an offended party to accept the punishment of an innocent, but it would never be morally allowable to actually punish the innocent."

Now, if we are going to hold to penal substitution in the case of the atonement, we must show that there are times when it is morally allowable to punish the innocent, or at least to allow an innocent person to receive punishment. Recall that we have defined justice' (if you like) to responsible freedom of choice. And the amount of suffering required will be measured (however instinctively and intuitively) by the person's need, not by his supposed deserts\(^*\) (Moule, "The Christian Understanding of Forgiveness," p. 438). On DMP retributive justice is instructive and corrective and it addresses a human's need by responding to that human's deserts. In this quote Moule appears to be amenable to such a role for retributive justice, but then this contradicts his earlier claim that "there is no place at all for retribution" (Moule, "The Christian Understanding of Forgiveness," p. 437).

\(^{110}\text{Accepting vicarious satisfaction is distinct from demanding it. An offended party has no claim to vicarious satisfaction and so cannot categorically demand it. She can accept it, however, in place of the penal claim which is hers to demand.}\)
Christ's punishment as "undeserved suffering in response to another's guilt." As a result, we might rephrase the question, "Is it ever morally permissible to allow an innocent person to be punished?" to, "Is it ever morally permissible to allow an innocent person to receive suffering that he does not deserve?" The answer to this last question seems to be, "yes." We, in fact, often allow this. A good example is in the case of a kidney transplant. The donor experiences undeserved suffering to benefit the recipient. Now to what benefit can we appeal to justify the suffering of the innocent Christ on the Cross? According to DMP, God, in the Cross, inflicts undeserved suffering upon God's Self in Jesus in order to overcome obstacles to sinners' appropriation of God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration. Someone might object that a kidney transplant is not morally permissible if the kidney is stolen from the donor, even if the donor will survive without the removed kidney. As a result, we would need to add the caveat that for the punishment of an innocent to be morally permissible it must be done with the full autonomous consent of the sufferer.

We can now see how the penal suffering of an innocent could be morally justified. It could be morally justified if it is done with the autonomous consent of the sufferer and if the benefit to be attained through the suffering is most effectively attained by no other, less painful means. Further, that we might avoid the appeal to robust love,

111 See this diss., p. 249.

112 Steven L. Porter says, "It would seem that the only possible way such a transfer of punishment could be just is if the substitute voluntarily and with sound mind accepts the penalty. But given that the substitute meets these conditions, I fail to see what is unjust about such a transfer" (Porter, "Swinburnian Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution," p. 236).

113 "Autonomous consent" will mean that the one who consents is not coerced and is mentally competent with regard to the decision being made.
the benefit to be achieved through the suffering of the innocent must be consistent with robust love. The penal suffering endured by Christ in the Cross is thus, on DMP, an instance of morally permissible punishment of an innocent. Christ autonomously consents to endure the penal suffering. And this is done because it is part of the most effective means to elicit human appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration; a benefit which is consistent with a divine character of robust love.

DMP is now in a position to reply to the concern that penal substitution is an instance of divine "child abuse." With Garry Williams, DMP can note,

There is an immediate problem here with the criticism; namely that when the Lord Jesus Christ died, he was a child in the sense that he was a son, but not in the sense that he was a minor. As an adult, Jesus had a mature will and could choose whether to cooperate with his Father. So we are in fact looking at a father and an adult son who will together for the father to inflict suffering on the son...114

DMP can also respond to the feminist concern that in penal substitution "God plays the role of a sadist who willfully inflicts punishment..."115 Let us rephrase our question from "Is it ever morally permissible to allow an innocent person to receive suffering that he does not deserve?" to "Is it ever morally permissible to inflict undeserved suffering upon an innocent person?" To answer this, we need only point to the doctor who cuts into the patient donating the kidney. In fact, she is inflicting suffering on an innocent (and even morally praiseworthy) patient. But, the doctor and the...

114 Williams, p. 185. Hans Boersma also claims, "Coercion on the part of the perpetrator and involuntary suffering on the part of the victim characterize abusive relationships. Neither coercion nor involuntary suffering can be attributed to Christ's atoning death on the cross. Any attempt to maintain abusive power structures by appealing to the cross is theologically incoherent and morally insidious" (Boersma, "Eschatological Justice and the Cross: Violence and Penal Substitution," p. 196).

donating patient are working together to save another. The doctor does not perform the operation from delight in the suffering. Indeed, she may even suffer herself if she is removing the kidney of her own daughter. Yet, she and her daughter work together to save the life of another. Likewise, God is not a sadist who pursues the suffering of the Cross for God's own delight. Rather, God inflicts redemptive suffering on God's Self in Christ for the purpose drawing humans into divine-human reconciliation. That is, according to DMP, Christ and the Father conspire together in the Cross to create obstacles to human persistence in alienation, remove obstacles to sinners' appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-restoration, and in all of this to elicit human openness to divine-human reconciliation.

A Response to (14) the Claim that Penal Substitution Valorizes Victimization

Hans Boersma explains how Christ's participation in penal substitution is not a valorization of victimization. He cites Richard Mouw who says that there is an "important distinction between redemptive and masochistic suffering." Christ's penal substitution is an example of redemptive suffering and as such is a morally praiseworthy example of robust love and not a valorization of victimization. He notes,

We can all imagine situations in which we would give up something of ourselves in the interest of others. As a parent, I gladly do certain things for my children, even if there is a personal cost attached. I like to think that I would even be willing to die, if that were necessary to save my children's lives. We all view self-sacrifice—the giving of oneself for the sake of others—as appropriate in certain circumstances...Though not all

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self-sacrifice is appropriate (and it is important not to lose sight of this fact), in certain circumstances it may be a perfectly right thing to do.\textsuperscript{118} Similarly, the kidney donor is active in accepting the suffering inflicted by the doctor. Here we have an instance of active acceptance of suffering that is worthy of moral praise rather than an accusation of unhealthy passivity or masochism.\textsuperscript{119}

This principle of robust love does not valorize suffering for the sake of suffering, rather it seeks the good of others even if suffering must be endured in order to procure that good.\textsuperscript{120} As a result, this principle is consistent with advocating for victims in a way that seeks to rid the world of the sort of victimization that feminists rightly want to avoid. For example, the same principle of robust love that motivates Christ's suffering in the Cross could also motivate a battered wife to move out of her home. The wife's withdrawal from her husband can be an act of love whereby she seeks to awaken her husband to his culpability in abuse\textsuperscript{121} and remove from him this opportunity to perpetuate his violence and deepen his culpability.\textsuperscript{122} In this accountability she calls him to repentance and

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\item Williams uses a different example. "Imagine...the father who directs teams of Medecins Sans Frontieres, sending his son into an area where he and the son know that the son will suffer greatly...There is no injustice here, because the purpose is good and both parties are willing" (Williams, p. 187).
\item Michael J. Gorman says, "When an abused wife endures violence at the hand of her husband as an 'act of love,' she is unwittingly allowing her husband to betray his own commitment to love and thus to live out the evil desires of the old age and old self. Accepting this violence is not an act of suffering love but—again, unwittingly—complicity with the powers of the old age...The God revealed on the cross does not
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
rehabilitation.\textsuperscript{123} In doing this the wife promotes healthy relationships and the absence of oppression and abuse.\textsuperscript{124} In doing this, she pursues her husband's own good.

This principle is also consistent with the active choice to endure suffering in order to publicly expose violent and oppressive power structures, as in many of the non-violent protests of the Civil Rights movement.\textsuperscript{125} Again, here suffering is not exalted as a virtue. Rather suffering is endured in the pursuit of the good of others. Of course, much more can be said on this topic, but for our purposes it is enough to say that on DMP, Christ willingly endures suffering out of love and in pursuit of the good of fallen humans. Christ's penal substitution is not a glorification of the patient endurance of suffering as a virtue for its own sake.

**Conclusion**

Using a divine-manifest offering approach, a theory of penal substitution can be developed which is both logically and morally coherent; able to avoid all fourteen problems presented above. This view can be used consistently to shed light on the deep truths that sin is a serious problem and that God intensely loves fallen humans and pursues personal reconciliation with them.

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\textsuperscript{123} See Ray, p. 35.

\textsuperscript{124} See Ray, p. 53.

\textsuperscript{125} On this point see Walter Wink, *The Powers That Be: Theology for a New Millennium* (New York: Doubleday, 1999).
APPENDIX A

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INTRODUCTION........................................................................................................p. 1

I. Overview...........................................................................................................p. 1

A. Thesis: Penal substitution, as an explanatory feature of Christ's contribution to divine-human reconciliation, faces fourteen objections. These objections can be overcome if penal substitution is viewed as a means by which God seeks to elicit human appropriation of divine forgiveness........................................p. 1

B. Relevant Definitions........................................................................................p. 2

1. "atonement"
2. "satisfaction"
3. "penal substitution"

C. Chapter Overview...........................................................................................p. 8

D. Setting within the Philosophical Landscape...................................................p. 9

II. Fourteen Problems for Penal Substitution.................................................p. 9

A. (1–6) Problems for Penal Substitution as Satisfaction..............................p. 10

1. (1) Ontological argument against satisfaction.
2. (2 & 3) Moral arguments against satisfaction.
   a. (2) The problem of superfluous suffering.
   b. (3) Appeal to robust love.
3. (4–6) Conceptual arguments against satisfaction.
   a. (4) The forgiveness problem.
   c. (6) The impotence problem.

B. (7 & 8) Problems for Penal Substitution as Vicarious Satisfaction........p. 17

1. (7) Attack on the possibility of vicarious satisfaction.
2. (8) Attack on the morality of vicarious satisfaction.

C. (9–14) Problems for Penal Substitution as Penal ............................................ p. 20

1. (9 & 10) Attacks on the possibility of Christ's enduring sinners' punishment.
   a. (9) An innocent person cannot be punished.
   b. (10) One person cannot endure the punishment of many.

2. (11) Attack on the claim that Christ actually endured such punishment.

3. (12–14) Moral attacks on vicarious punishment.
   a. (12) Retributive punishment.
   b. (13) Punishing an innocent.
   c. (14) Valorization of victimization.

CHAPTER ONE: THE PROBLEM OF SIN .......................................................... p. 25

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   B. Thesis: For any theory of satisfaction to avoid the six problems for satisfaction, it must be developed using a personalist conception of the problem of sin ................................................................. p. 26

II. Four Conceptions of the Problem of Sin ................................................................. p. 26

   A. Introduction ................................................................................................. p. 26

      1. Section overview.

      2. Thesis: Any staurocentric satisfaction theory which hopes to hold up against problems 1–6 must assume a personalist definition of the problem of sin such that sin is understood to be a willfully perpetuated state of alienation from the Person of God.

   B. First Conception: Sin as Action Followed by External Consequences .......... p. 27

      1. Explication of this view.
2. That such a view of sin is insufficient to justify the need for satisfaction through the Cross.

   a. Deontological justifications fail.

      i. Appeals to God as a promise-keeper are threatened by problem (3), the appeal to robust love.

      ii. Appeals to God's justice are threatened by problem (2), the problem of superfluous suffering.

   b. Teleological justifications fail.

      i. Appeals to God's benefit fail.

         α. They are threatened by problem (3), the appeal to robust love.

         β. They are threatened by problem (5), the problem of damnation.

      ii. Appeals to our benefit demonstrate the need to develop a fuller definition of the problem of sin.

C. Second Conception: Sin as Action Followed by Internal Consequences......p. 32

   1. Explication of this view.

   2. That such a view of sin is insufficient to justify the need for satisfaction through the Cross.

      a. A satisfaction theory based on this view is threatened by problem (2), the problem of superfluous suffering.

      b. A satisfaction theory based on this view is subject to the same critiques as a satisfaction theory based on the first conception of the problem of sin.

D. Third Conception: Sin as a Defective/Disordered/Broken Human State......p. 35

   1. Explication of this view.

   2. That such a view of sin is insufficient to justify the need for satisfaction through the Cross.
a. A satisfaction theory based on this view can escape problem (2), the problem of superfluous suffering.

b. A satisfaction theory based on this view is threatened by problem (3), the appeal to robust love.

c. A satisfaction theory based on this view is threatened by problem (6), the impotence problem.

E. Fourth Conception: Sin as a State of Alienation from the Person of God...p. 39

1. Explication of this view.

2. That a staurocentric theory of satisfaction which addresses the problem of sin as it is here defined preserves the benefits of previous conceptions while avoiding the problems.

   a. A satisfaction theory based on this view can escape problem (2), the problem of superfluous suffering.

   b. A satisfaction theory based on this view can escape problem (3), the appeal to robust love.

   c. A satisfaction theory based on this view can escape problem (6), the impotence problem.

III. Schleiermacher’s Conception of the Problem of Sin and Its Solution.................p. 43

A. Introduction..........................................................................................................p. 43

1. Section overview.

2. Thesis: While a staurocentric theory of satisfaction using Schleiermacher's conception of sin could plausibly escape problem (2), the problem of superfluous suffering, it seems that such a satisfaction theory would still be confronted by at least two of problems: (3), the appeal to robust love and (6), the impotence problem.

B. The Problem of Sin..............................................................................................p. 45

1. Sin as a defective human state.

   a. An explication of Schleiermacher's view.
i. Sin is not defined merely as a type of action.

ii. Sin is a defective state.

α. On God-consciousness.

β. On the way in which the God-consciousness can be in tension with the flesh.

b. Three potential objections to this reading and my responses.

i. First objection and response.

α. Objection: This reading, contrary to Schleirnacher, seems to suggest sin is a transgression of divine law.

β. Response: This reading, consistent with Schleirmacher, holds that sin is a transgression of internally promulgated divine law as opposed to externally promulgated divine law.

ii. Second objection and response.

α. Objection: This reading is wrong to relegate moral insights and feelings to the God-consciousness.

β. Response: Moral insights and feelings are not a part of the flesh and are relegated to the sensible self-consciousness in a broad sense that is compatible with their affiliation with the God-consciousness.

iii. Third objection and response.

α. Objection: This reading misinterprets sin as a moral concept rather than a religious concept.

β. Response: There is a sense in which the moral and the religious are united in the God-consciousness.

3. The problematic consequences of such a state.
a. External consequences for sin in Schleiermacher.

b. Internal consequences for sin in Schleiermacher.

c. Analytic internal consequences for sin in Schleiermacher.

4. The role of the human will.

   a. Defect becomes sin as a result of willfulness.

   b. Original vs. actual sin.

C. The Nature of the Solution to the Problem of Sin: Moral Perfection........p. 60

   1. The solution to sin is a state of moral perfection.

   2. The pursuit of this solution will be confined by three parameters.

      a. Parameter 1: The sinner cannot transform on her own strength.

      b. Parameter 2: The sinner’s will is the gateway to transformation.


   3. One problem for this reading and my response.

      a. Problem: This reading implies that the problem of sin is that we are not willing to receive the God-consciousness which must be present in order for sin to exist.

      b. Response: A part of the God-consciousness will be present in us despite our attitude; another part can be imparted to us only with the consent of our will.

D. The Role of the Cross in the Solution...........................................................p. 67

   1. Christ, in the Cross, attracts us to God’s project of transformation.

      a. By revealing Christ’s blessedness.

      b. By inviting us to join in Christ’s blessedness.

   2. Once we are opened to God, God can begin God’s project of transformation in us.
E. Final Evaluation of Schleiermacher’s Conception of Sin and Its Solution...
p. 69

1. A Schleiermachian satisfaction theory could escape Problem (2), the problem of superfluous suffering.

2. A Schleiermachian satisfaction theory is vulnerable to Problem (3), the appeal to robust love.

3. A Schleiermachian satisfaction theory is vulnerable to Problem (6), the impotence problem.

IV. Kierkegaard’s Conception of the Problem of Sin and Its Solution...
p. 73

A. Introduction

1. Section overview.

2. Thesis: A Kierkegaardian understanding of the problem of sin, can justify the necessity of the Cross in a way that preserves the benefits of the third conception while avoiding the problems to which such a conception is susceptible.

B. The Problem of Sin

1. Sin as a state of alienation from God.
   a. Sin is not defined merely as a type of action.
   b. The conditions under which the state of sin is possible.
      i. Human dependence.
      ii. Human freedom.
   c. The manner in which the state of sin is realized.

2. The problematic consequences of such a state.
   a. External and internal consequences.
   b. Analytic internal consequences.

3. The role of the human will.
C. The Nature of the Solution to the Problem of Sin: Faith..............................p. 82

1. The solution to sin is a state of faith.
   a. An explication of De Silentio's view.
      i. On Fear and Trembling as a meditation on the question of trust.
      ii. On trust and infinite resignation.
      iii. On trust and the teleological suspension of the ethical.
      iv. On trust and the absolute relation to the Absolute.
   b. One problem for this reading and my response.
      i. Problem: This reading puts De Silentio in the unpalatable position of being a divine-command theorist, allowing the possibility of evil divine commands.
      ii. Response: This reading separates God's goodness and God's person only by abstraction.

3. The pursuit of this solution will be confined by three parameters.
   a. Parameter 1: The sinner cannot transform on her own strength.
   b. Parameter 2: The sinner’s will is the gateway to transformation.

D. The Role of the Cross in the Solution..........................................................p. 95

1. Christ, in the Cross, invites and draws us to relationship with God.
   a. By revealing our state of alienation.
   b. By revealing God's Love.

2. This reading is compatible with Murray Rae's interpretation of Kierkegaard's theory of atonement.
E. Final Evaluation of Kierkegaard’s Conception of Sin and Salvation........p. 98

1. A Kierkegaardian satisfaction theory could escape problem (2), the problem of superfluous suffering.

2. A Kierkegaardian satisfaction theory could escape problem (3), the appeal to robust love.

3. A Kierkegaardian satisfaction theory could escape problem (6), the impotence problem.

CHAPTER TWO: SATISFACTION AND GOD’S EXTENSION OF FORGIVENESS.........................................................................................................p. 100

I. Introduction..............................................................................................................p. 100

A. Chapter Overview.................................................................................................p. 100

B. Thesis: By arguing that God’s demanding satisfaction contributes to human appropriation of divine forgiveness-as-restoration. Aquinas, unlike Anselm, develops a satisfaction theory that might escape the six problems for satisfaction...........................................................................................................p. 101

II. Personal Reconciliation, Forgiveness, and Satisfaction........................................p. 101

A. Personal Reconciliation and Forgiveness..............................................................p. 102

1. Three conceptions of forgiveness.

   a. Forgiveness-as-pardon.

      i. This is not necessary for personal reconciliation.

      ii. This can be given without regard to the offender's response.

   b. Forgiveness-as-letting go.

      i. This is necessary for personal reconciliation.

      ii. This can be given without regard to the offender's response.
ii. This neither requires nor is necessary for forgiveness-as-pardon.

c. Forgiveness-as-restoration.

i. This is the offended party's entrance into personal reconciliation.

ii. This cannot be given without regard to the offender's response, only offered.

iii. This neither requires nor is necessary for forgiveness-as-pardon.

iii. This is not necessary for forgiveness-as-letting go, but forgiveness-as-letting go is necessary for forgiveness-as-restoration.

d. Summary.

2. Three objections to this analysis and my responses.

a. First objection and response.

i. Objection: This analysis neglects forgiveness as a bracketing off of wrongdoing.

ii. Response: This is not a separate type of forgiveness, but a common element in all three types of forgiveness.

b. Second objection.

i. Objection: This analysis neglects forgiveness as a modification of a previous moral judgment.

ii. Response: Such a modification is not forgiveness since forgiveness must relate to wrongdoing and the modification declares that there was none.

c. Third objection.

i. Objection: This analysis neglects cases in which forgiveness-as-pardon and forgiveness-as-restoration are not distinct.
ii. Response: Where punishment is relational, there will be two different grounds upon which the offended party can refuse personal reconciliation.

B. God's Extension of Forgiveness-as-Restoration and Satisfaction..............p. 111

1. Satisfaction is not logically necessary for God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration.

2. Satisfaction is not the most efficient means to God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration.

3. Satisfaction may allow for a benefit not attained by any other means and so God may require it as a condition of God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration.

III. Anselm's Theory of Satisfaction.................................................................p. 115

A. Introduction......................................................................................................p. 115

1. Section overview.

2. Thesis: While Anselm's soteriology can escape (1), the ontological problem, it cannot escape the moral problems against satisfaction.

B. Some Contemporary Readings of Anselm's Soteriology.........................p. 116

1. That satisfaction frees God to forgive sinners.

2. That Christ's death is essential to divine satisfaction.

C. Anselm on the Divine Requirement of Satisfaction.................................p. 118

1. That God pursues satisfaction to maintain God's honor.

2. That God pursues satisfaction to maintain justice.

3. That God pursues satisfaction to maintain "fitness."

4. That God pursues satisfaction to maintain orderly beauty.

D. Anselm and the Ontological Argument against Satisfaction.....................p. 121

1. That some accuse Anselm of vulnerability to the ontological argument.
2. That this view is in conflict with Anselm.
   a. It is in conflict with Anselm’s claim that God is "that, than which nothing greater can be conceived."
   b. It is in conflict with Anselm’s claim that God does not possess God's nature by participation in something apart from God's Self.
   c. It is in conflict with Anselm’s explanation of God’s relationship to necessity.

E. Anselm on the Object of Divine Satisfaction..............................................p. 125

1. An explication of Anselm's view.
   a. That it seems that Anselm holds to the centrality of Christ's obedience and not Christ's death.
   b. That Anselm does hold to the salvific centrality of Christ's death.

2. Two potential problems for this reading and my responses.
   a. First problem.
      i. Problem: How do we reconcile Anselm's claims that man was restored by Christ's obedience and that Christ's death was necessary for salvation?
      ii. Response: Anselm employs "obedience" in two senses.
   b. Second problem.
      i. Problem: How can we reconcile the necessity of Christ’s death with the claim that God did not demand Christ’s death?
      ii. Response: Human salvation is necessary because Christ freely chose it, not because God demanded it.

F. Anselm and the Moral Arguments against Satisfaction...............................p. 132

1. That Anselm's claim that Christ's death Preserves God's honor can overcome problem (2), but not problem (3).
a. That this appeal overcomes (2) the problem of superfluous suffering.

b. That this appeal fails to overcome (3) the appeal to robust love.

2. That Anselm's claim that Christ's death preserves Divine Justice fails to overcome (2) the problem of superfluous suffering.

3. That Anselm's claim that Christ's death preserves "fitness" and "orderly beauty" fails to overcome (2) the problem of superfluous suffering.

IV. Aquinas's Theory of Satisfaction...........................................................................p. 137

A. Introduction............................................................................................................p. 137

1. Section overview.

2. Thesis: Aquinas's satisfaction theory can overcome the moral problems inasmuch as he claims that God's requiring satisfaction in the absence of punishment of fallen humans contributes to God's project of drawing sinners into a union of mutual love with God.

B. Aquinas on the Centrality of Christ's Passion for Divine Satisfaction.......p. 138

C. Aquinas on the Divine Requirement of Satisfaction.....................................p. 139

1. That Thomas's view is similar to Anselm's in that it links satisfaction with Divine Justice.

2. That Thomas's view differs from Anselm's.

   a. According to Thomas, God could justly forgive without punishment or satisfaction.

   b. According to Thomas, God chooses to pursue satisfaction through Christ's Passion because it is the most merciful alternative.

D. Aquinas and the Moral Arguments against Satisfaction.........................p. 144

1. That Thomas can escape (2) the problem of superfluous suffering if he can show that there is some merciful benefit obtained by satisfaction that is not obtained by the alternatives to satisfaction.
a. That an appeal to sinners' deliverance from the debt of punishment does not suffice.

b. That an appeal to sinners' deliverance from bondage to the devil does not suffice.

c. That an appeal to the restoration of the good of human nature and the removal of the stain on the soul could suffice.

i. Because if God were to force a solution, God would sacrifice human freedom upon which the solution depends.

ii. Because God cannot simply overlook the problem as with the debt of punishment.

iii. Because satisfaction may contribute to God's project of drawing humans into a relationship of mutual love.

2. That Thomas can escape (3) the appeal to robust love.

CHAPTER 3: SATISFACTION AND HUMAN APPROPRIATION OF FORGIVENESS

I. Introduction

A. Thesis: Penal Substitution can be a divine tool used to elicit human appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration. This "divine-manifest offering approach" can help the accounts of satisfaction developed by Richard Swinburne and Eleonore Stump.

B. Chapter Overview

II. Personal Reconciliation, Human Appropriation of Forgiveness, and Satisfaction

A. Personal Reconciliation and Human Appropriation of Forgiveness

1. Three conditions for appropriation of forgiveness.

a. Belief that one is in an alienated state for which one is culpable.

b. Belief that the offer of forgiveness is genuine.

c. Willingness to turn from alienation and embrace personal reconciliation.
2. An objection to this analysis and my response.

   a. Objection: Personal reconciliation cannot be had until an offender has also communicated her willingness to be reconciled to the offended party.

   b. Response: Since God, as an omniscient being, is a reader of human hearts, genuine repentance (in the form of the second doxastic condition and the volitional conditional) can function as the successful attainment of any communication condition for the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.

B. Human Appropriation of Forgiveness and Satisfaction................................p. 158

1. Satisfaction is not logically necessary for human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.

2. Satisfaction may be the most efficient means to human appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.

   a. On satisfaction as a means to the fulfillment of the volitional condition.

      i. God cannot coerce fulfillment of the volitional condition without destroying personal relationship.

      ii. Encouragement and discouragement are non-coercive attempts to elicit a movement of another's will.

      iii. Satisfaction may be part of God's encouraging an offender to embrace personal reconciliation and discouraging an offender from persisting in alienation.

   b. On satisfaction as a means to the fulfillment of the doxastic conditions.

      i. The manner in which evidence is made available for belief can affect the potential believer's movement of will.

      ii. Satisfaction may present evidence for the relevant beliefs in a manner which most successfully helps humans to meet the volitional condition.
3. Satisfaction is not necessary for some other human benefit aside from the appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.

III. A Divine-Manifest Offering Account of Penal Substitution.................................p. 161

A. Paul K. Moser's Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Atonement........p. 162

1. The type of forgiveness relevant for personal reconciliation is forgiveness-as-restoration, or conciliatory forgiveness.

2. An offer of conciliatory forgiveness typically aims to lead a person to the reception of such forgiveness.

3. God offers conciliatory forgiveness to humans in the Cross.

B. Penal Substitution and Divine-Manifest Offering.......................................p. 163

1. Penal substitution and the doxastic conditions for appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.

   a. On the first condition (awareness of sinful state).

      i. God's pursuit of atonement in any form is evidence that humans are in a state for which atonement is appropriate.

      ii. This is compatible with God's pursuing the first condition through other means as well.

         α. Through the teaching of Jesus.

         β. Through feelings of guilt.

   b. On the second condition (awareness of God's willingness to be reconciled).

      i. God's pursuit of atonement in any form is evidence that God is willing to be reconciled with humans.

      ii. This is compatible with God's pursuing the second condition through other means as well.

         α. Through the teaching of Jesus.

         β. Through an existential feeling of peace.
c. On the Cross as part of the most effective means to human fulfillment of these conditions.

   i. The Cross is attention-getting in a way that combats human ability to ignore evidence for the first condition.

   ii. The Cross is assuring in a way that combats human ability to doubt evidence for the second condition.

2. Penal substitution and the volitional condition for appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration.

   a. Discouragement against alienation.

      i. Penal substitution as a demonstration of danger.

      ii. Penal substitution as a demonstration of the value of divine forgiveness.

   b. Encouragement towards personal reconciliation.

      i. Penal substitution as a demonstration of God's dealing with human guilt.

      ii. Penal substitution as a demonstration of divine justice.

      iii. Penal substitution as a demonstration of divine love.

C. Further Explication of this Account...........................................................p. 176

   1. This view can address the concern that the human will is too weak to meet the volitional condition on its own.

   2. This view can address the moral problem of sin.

   3. This view does not claim to be a complete account of God's work in the Cross.

   4. This view does not claim that a human's fulfillment of the volitional condition is dependent upon antecedent beliefs.

IV. Richard Swinburne's Theory of Satisfaction.........................................................p. 182

   A. Swinburne's Account of Satisfaction............................................................p. 183
B. Swinburne and the Moral Problems against Satisfaction.................................p. 188

1. Swinburne is confronted with (2) and (3), the moral problems against satisfaction, by his critics.

2. Swinburne could escape these problems by appealing to a unique benefit of Christ's reparation and penance.
   a. Swinburne cannot escape these problems by appealing to the ability of Christ's reparation and penance to elicit God's forgiveness.
   b. Swinburne cannot escape these problems through his appeal to the "fittingness" of reparation.
   c. Swinburne cannot escape these problems by appealing to the opportunity for us to "affirm our identities as agents."
   d. Swinburne can escape these problems insofar as Christ's reparation and penance contribute to a wrongdoer's repentance.

3. An objection to this reading of Swinburne and my response.
   a. Objection: On Swinburne's account repentance precedes reparation and penance.
   b. Response: It is consistent with Swinburne's account to claim that God's provision of Christ's sacrifice (now available for human use) precedes human repentance and can function in such a way as to encourage the sort of repentance that will offer Christ's sacrifice as one's own reparation and penance.

C. Swinburnian Satisfaction and the Divine-Manifest Offering View of Penal Substitution..................................................p. 196

1. That these views are compatible.
   a. That a divine-manifest offering view of Swinburnian satisfaction is compatible with a divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution.
   b. An objection to this claim and my response.
i. Objection: Holding both views forces one to claim that God both offers and does not offer forgiveness-as-restoration in the Cross.

ii. Response: It is coherent to hold that God manifests both a first-order and second-order offer in the Cross.

2. That this compatibility can assist with Swinburne's Aquinas interpretation.

   a. That Swinburne's account struggles to distinguish between satisfaction and sacrifice in Aquinas.

   b. That Aquinas distinguishes between satisfaction and sacrifice.

   c. That a divine-manifest offering view of satisfaction can harmonize simultaneous roles for satisfaction and sacrifice.

V. Eleonore Stump's Theory of Satisfaction..........................................................p. 198

A. Stump's Account of Satisfaction.................................................................p. 199

B. Objections to Stump's Account......................................................................p. 203

   1. Stump's account does not consistently distinguish between the problem of past sin and the problem of future sin.

   2. Stump's account does not appear to be a theory of vicarious satisfaction as she claims.

C. Stump's Account and the Divine-Manifest Offering View of Penal Substitution.................................................................p. 205

   1. The divine-manifest offering view of penal substitution can help Stump to avoid the two problems presented.

   2. The divine-manifest offering view of penal Substitution can assist with Stump's Aquinas interpretation.

      a. With it Stump could account for Aquinas's references to penal substitution and God's severity.

      b. With it Stump could maintain a clearer role for Thomist exemplarism.
I. Introduction ..............................................................................................................p. 209

A. Thesis: A divine-manifest offering approach to penal substitution can overcome the fourteen objections against penal substitution .......................................................... p. 209

B. Chapter Overview ........................................................................................................... p. 209

II. A Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Penal Substitution (DMP) and the Problems for Penal Substitution as a Theory of Satisfaction ................................................................. p. 209

A. A Response to (1) the Ontological Argument against Satisfaction .......... p. 210

1. That there is no authority outside of God that restricts God's choice to give forgiveness-as-pardon, forgiveness-as-letting go, or offer forgiveness-as-restoration.

2. That God chooses to require satisfaction through penal substitution because of its effectiveness in drawing free humans into personal reconciliation.

3. That God's inability to force or overlook the necessary human movement is not a limit to God's omnipotence.

B. Responses to (2–3) the Moral Arguments against Satisfaction .................. p. 211

1. A response to (2) the problem of superfluous suffering.

a. DMP offers plausible, though not definitive, escape.

i. That it only needs to be shown that penal substitution effectively encourages one more person to be open to appropriation than would be encouraged without penal substitution.

ii. That the popularity of penal substitution indicates that this is plausible.

b. An objection to this argument and my response.
i. Objection: That someone might object saying that the seeming logical and moral problems of penal substitution could lead to fewer people responding to God's offering in the Cross.

ii. Response: That the compatibility of DMP with other theories of atonement allows for plausible escape from this objection.

2. A response to (3) the appeal to robust love.

   a. That God chooses to require penal substitution in the absence of direct divine punishment of fallen humans for the sake of humans who would not otherwise appropriate forgiveness-as-restoration.

   b. That this other-focused approach is consistent with robust love.

C. Responses to (4–6) the Conceptual Arguments against Satisfaction........p. 214

1. Responses to (4) the forgiveness problem.

   a. An overview of the responses given.

   b. The forgiveness problem and legal reconciliation.

      i. That there is a distinction between forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt and forgiveness-as-pardon of a person.

      ii. That penal substitution cannot escape the forgiveness problem as it relates to forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt.

      iii. That penal substitution can escape the forgiveness problem as it relates to forgiveness-as-pardon of a person.

   c. The forgiveness problem and personal reconciliation.

      i. That forgiveness-as-pardon is distinct from forgiveness-as-letting-go and forgiveness-as-restoration.

      ii. That DMP can escape the forgiveness problem as it relates to forgiveness-as-letting-go and forgiveness-as-restoration.

   d. An objection to this argument and my response.
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i. Objection: Forgiveness-as-pardon of a debt and forgiveness-as-restoration are not distinct in the divine-human situation because the due punishment is God's refusal of personal reconciliation.

ii. Response: The distinction holds because God can refuse personal reconciliation on the ground of punishment or on the ground of God's free personal prerogative.

2. Responses to (5) the damnation problem.

a. First response: Damnation is possible even after legal reconciliation has taken place.

i. That the damnation resulting from a lack of legal reconciliation (to which satisfaction directly pertains) is distinct from the damnation resulting from a lack of personal reconciliation.

ii. That the damnation corresponding to a lack of legal reconciliation corresponds to God's active wrath while the damnation corresponding to a lack of personal reconciliation with God corresponds to God's passive wrath.

b. Second response: Christ's Satisfaction is only applied to those who are open to appropriating God's extension of forgiveness-as-restoration.

3. A response to (6) the impotence problem.

a. That satisfaction can escape this problem if it can relate legal reconciliation to personal reconciliation.

b. That personal reconciliation involves two things.

i. An offer of forgiveness-as-restoration on the part of the offended party.

ii. Appropriation of forgiveness-as-restoration on the part of the offender.

c. That DMP claims that God's pursuing legal reconciliation through penal substitution elicits human appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration.
III. A Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Penal Substitution and the Problems for Penal Substitution as *Vicarious* Satisfaction

A. A Response to (7) the Attack on the Possibility of Vicarious Satisfaction

1. An overview of the response given.

2. On guilt and moral debt.
   
   a. That some derive the non-transferability of moral debt from the relationship of moral debt and guilt.
   
   b. That guilt, as an expression of an agent's performance of a blameworthy action, is non-transferable.
   
   c. That guilt and moral debt are distinct.
   
   d. That the non-transferability of guilt does not entail the non-transferability moral debt (including a debt of punishment).
   
   e. That this distinction enables DMP to avoid an appeal to "legal fiction.

3. On pecuniary debt and penal debt.
   
   a. That some claim that moral debt is not transferable in a way analogous to pecuniary debt.
      
      i. Because pecuniary debt and penal debt are not both compensatory.
      
      ii. Because pecuniary debt and penal debt are not similarly flexible with regard to dissolution of debt.
   
   b. That penal debt is transferable in a way analogous to pecuniary debt.
      
      i. Because pecuniary debt and penal debt are similarly compensatory.
      
      α. That what is required in the case of pecuniary debt is not simply that the creditor avoid a financial loss.
β. That what is required in the case of pecuniary debt is that the debtor meet the claim of the creditor.

γ. That what is required in the case of penal debt is that the debtor meet the claim of the creditor.

ii. Because pecuniary debt and penal debt are similarly flexible with regard to dissolution of debt.

α. That a debt can only be owed to a person.

β. That a person to whom any debt is owed has a claim over the debtor which can be dissolved by payment from the debtor, forgiveness-as-pardon, or satisfaction.

4. Two objections to this argument and my responses.

a. First objection and response.

i. Objection: There is a non-transferable type of moral debt apart from a debt of punishment.

ii. Response: DMP can escape this criticism by distinguishing moral debt as it relates to a debt of punishment and moral debt as it relates to a debt of repentance/relational distance.

b. Second objection and response.

i. Objection: This does not show the transferability of penal debt, but only a type of conditional cancellability of penal debt.

ii. Response: Conditional cancellation is called a "transfer" with respect to debts and analogously can be called a "transfer" with respect to penal debts.

B. A Response to (8) the Attack on the Morality of Vicarious Satisfaction....p. 239

1. An overview of the response given.

2. On the rejection of vicarious satisfaction by moral intuition.
a. That our moral intuitions reject vicarious satisfaction in some cases.

b. That our moral intuitions reject vicarious satisfaction in such cases for two reasons.

   i. Such a substitution defeats at least part of the purpose of the punishment.

   ii. Such a substitution is not within our moral authority.

3. On the resonance of the vicarious satisfaction in DMP with moral intuition.

   a. That the purposes of punishment are still achieved on DMP.

      i. The "intrinsic ends" of punishment are achieved.

      ii. The goal of divine-human personal reconciliation is plausibly most effectively achieved.

      iii. The "potential utilitarian ends" of punishment are plausibly most effectively achieved.

   b. That God has the moral authority to release fallen humans from divine punishment.

      i. Because God is the only one with a claim to the relevant divine punishment.

      ii. Because God's forgiveness-as-pardon does not unjustly impinge on human victims' claims to punishment.

         α. For God's forgiveness-as-pardon is compatible with punishment on behalf of human victims.

         β. For God has the moral authority to command humans to release their claim to punishment.

C. Summary..............................................................................................................................p. 247

IV. A Divine-Manifest Offering Approach to Penal Substitution and the Problems for Penal Substitution as Penal..............................................................................................................p. 248
A. Responses to (9–10) Attacks on the Possibility of Christ's Enduring Sinners' Punishment.........................................................................................................................p. 248

1. A response to (9) the claim that an innocent person cannot be punished.
   a. That we use "punishment" in a narrow and a broad sense.
   b. That Christ could not be punished in the narrow sense, but could be punished in the broad sense.

2. A response to (10) the claim that one person cannot endure the punishment of many.
   a. That it is unlikely that Christ served a quantity of punishment that matches the quantity of punishment owed by multiple sinners.
   b. That God is free to determine that the value to God of Christ's substitution is equivalent to the value to God of sinners enduring the punishment that they owe.

B. Responses to (11) the Attack on the Claim that Christ Actually Endured Such Punishment........................................................................................................p. 252

1. First response: The divine punishment due to sinners is not everlasting punishment.

2. Second response: The spiritual death which is the punishment for sin has everlasting results for typical humans but Christ can endure such a death without everlasting results.

3. Third response: Christ endures a limited amount of the same quality of punishment due to humans which is accepted by God as full satisfaction for the debt of punishment.

4. Fourth response: Christ endures a limited amount of the same quality of punishment due to humans which is accepted by God as partial satisfaction for the debt of punishment.

C. Responses to (12–14) the Moral Attacks on Vicarious Punishment............p. 255

1. A Response to (12) the objection against retributive punishment.
   a. That God's pursuit of retributive punishment is distinct from revenge.
b. That retributive punishment for its own sake may be incompatible with robust love.

c. That God does not pursue retributive punishment for its own sake but for its usefulness in eliciting openness to appropriation of God's forgiveness-as-restoration from humans.

2. A Response to (13) the objection against punishing an innocent.

a. That it is sometimes morally permissible to allow an innocent person to receive suffering that he does not deserve.

   i. When the suffering is endured for the benefit of another.

   ii. When the suffering is endured with the autonomous consent of the sufferer.

b. That this enables DMP to respond to the accusation that penal substitution involves "divine child abuse."

c. That this enables DMP to respond to the accusation that penal substitution involves divine sadism.

3. A response to (14) the claim that penal substitution valorizes victimization.

a. That Christ does not endure suffering for its own sake, but pursues the good of humans even if suffering must be endured to obtain it.

b. This principle is consistent with denouncing victimization.

c. This principle is consistent with other active choices to endure suffering to procure some other good or expose evil.

V. Conclusion..........................................................p. 263
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VITA

Blaine Swen was raised in Bakersfield, California. Before attending Loyola University Chicago, he attended Biola University where he earned a Bachelor of Arts in Philosophy, summa cum laude, in 2000. At Biola, he was a member of the Torrey Honors Institute, Biola University's great books program. He was also selected to membership in Epsilon Kappa Epsilon, Biola University's baccalaureate honors society. He then attended Loyola University Chicago on a merit scholarship where he earned a Master of Arts in Philosophy, with distinction, in 2011 and a Doctorate in Philosophy, with distinction, in 2012.