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Prolegomena to Kant's Theory of the Derangement of the Cognitive Faculties

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LOYOLA UNIVERSITY CHICAGO

PROLEGOMENA TO KANT’S THEORY OF THE DERANGEMENT OF
THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES

A DISSERTATION SUBMITTED TO
THE FACULTY OF THE GRADUATE SCHOOL
IN CANDIDACY FOR THE DEGREE OF
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

PROGRAM IN PHILOSOPHY

BY

GISELE VELARDE LA ROSA

CHICAGO, IL
MAY 2013
Unconditional regard is a strange feature among human beings, almost only attributable to motherhood. However, I had the chance to have an excellent boss who became an unconditional friend, and who postponed his will and professional interests to help me grow as a scholar. I owe him my first acknowledgment and to him I dedicate this dissertation. To Vincent A. Santuc Laborde, French Jesuit, for his unreserved friendship, enormous love, outstanding intelligence, and for the pleasure of having worked under his presidency. Unfortunately, an unexpected heart attack took him away from life during the realization of this dissertation, not allowing us to share the expected happiness the completion of this project would have brought us.

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work he has already done and investing in valuable people who otherwise will never become the persons they can be.

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I thank also the professors who inspired me in Lima, Paris and Chicago, and to my university students in Peru, as well as to all the people who followed my work in my country. Their interests, needs and questions helped me to grow as an academic, an intellectual, and as a human being as well. I thank also the students I taught at Loyola University Chicago, since they showed me how different are the needs, goals and interests through cultures, and thus helped me diversify my teaching styles as well.
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Chicago, March 1st, 2013
To the memory of

Vincent A. Santuc Laborde

Unconditional friend and outstanding philosopher, whose life made a difference among human beings
When in September 2008, during the first semester of my doctoral studies, I read for the first time Kant's *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, I became deeply concerned about its place and function in Kant's *oeuvre*. It also caught my attention since I had, for a long time, been considering a research project focused on the limits of reason, a project that interested me not only for the sake of my own academic development, but also because of its relevance to the apparent incapacity of moral philosophy to rule practical life. Prior to my doctoral studies I had developed an interest in psychoanalysis and had performed some sociological and cultural research, with the aim of understanding better both the potential and limitations of human rationality. The development of philosophy during the 20th century contributed to my intellectual curiosity. Thus, encountering a book of Kant that talked about the derangement of the cognitive faculties deeply aroused my attention.

I began to research and surprisingly found that Kant had written on the topic since 1764 in his “Essay on the Maladies of the Head.” His *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*, written in 1798, developed the ideas presented in this essay in a more sustained philosophical manner. My interest was further developed when in 2009 I took a seminar on Kant’s *Critique of Pure Reason* and another on
Metapsychology and Philosophy. I began to ask myself fundamental questions: who is the subject? How do the Kantian transcendental and empirical consciousness relate to each other? What is the nature of the cognitive faculties? How can they be deranged? How do mind and world relate to one another? Thus, the project had arisen.

I have to say I was also challenged by the lack of secondary literature concerning the topic that traced the problem back to the beginning from a philosophical point of view. A review of the Kant literature in English, French, German and Spanish brought back negative results, and thus I decided to begin the enterprise, which eventually began to involve a much broader scope than initially conceived, since I had to deal first with Kant’s theory of cognition, and thus deeply enter into the *Critique of Pure Reason*, the primary basis on which this work is based. This required a great deal of time and reflection, and it became necessary to curtail my ambitious project; this is why I propose today a *Prolegomena to Kant’s Theory of the Derangement of the Cognitive Faculties* rather than a systematic account of that theory. After explaining the main elements of Kant’s theory of cognition, I propose what I consider must be included in a critical theory of derangement that takes into account Kant’s philosophical development. Such a task requires us to close certain gaps and to draw connections not always made explicit by Kant himself.

It is my thesis that it is possible to construct a theory of derangement in Kant that I present today in its initial stage; i.e., as a series of *prolegomena* that can indicate to us a path to follow. It is my hope that I and/or someone else will follow
this path and build the total theory. A complete theory of derangement should not 
only examine all of Kant’s works, but should focus especially on the roles played by 
the reflective judgment and the imagination in the conception of purposiveness that 
he develops in the *Critique of the Power of Judgment*. It will also require the 
inclusion of the transcendental illusions of reason, about which extensive research 
has been done. Among other topics, it is necessary to account for the fragile 
boundaries that separate the normal and abnormal functioning of the cognitive 
faculties. The concept of derangement presented in Chapter 5 is used in a general 
way, as a concept that includes under it all possible and real manifestations of 
cognitive deficiency and mental illness. When a particular cognitive deficiency or 
mental illness is established we refer to it with the specific term Kant uses to 
characterize it.

Since Kant situates the derangement of the cognitive faculties at the 
intersection of two disciplines—pragmatic anthropology and empirical 
psychology—our previous chapters deal with the relation between the mind and the 
external world. This means that the cognitive faculties to be treated here are 
sensibility, understanding and imagination, not only in their mutual relationship but 
also concerning their relationship to the objects of outer sense. A careful reader will 
perceive the point up to which the mind and the external world are interrelated, and 
need each other. Therefore, we will not deal with reason in this dissertation, for—
even if reason is the highest faculty—it is not a *constitutive* cognitive faculty, since it 
is the faculty of *regulative* principles, and, as such, its aim is to prompt the
understanding to strive to unify its cognitions and principles. Thus, reason never relates directly to any object of perception and by its own nature is necessarily pure. Thus, the unavoidable and natural illusions of reason are not part of this dissertation, despite their indirect relevance to Kant's theory of mental derangement. More precisely, the paralogisms of reason, the antinomies of reason, and the ideal of pure reason will not be treated in this dissertation. We do not deal either with any relations between reason and the understanding. Our interest in the four initial chapters has been to keep as close as possible to the senses, and to attain the relation to pure apperception as the original ground of experience.

It is worth mentioning that in our explanation of the deduction of the categories of the understanding we have focused mainly on the A-Deduction, due to the relevance the three-fold synthesis has to our topic. In the Preface to the first edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, Kant mentions that the deduction of the pure concepts of the understanding has two sides: an *objective deduction* that is concerned with the objects of experience and *a priori* concepts of the pure understanding, and a *subjective deduction* that has as its aim the pure understanding itself, and that concerns the possibility of thinking itself (cf. Axvi-xvii). Most commentators have focused more on the objective deduction which Kant himself considered essential to his aims (cf. Axvi). Some commentators consider the B-Deduction to be exclusively objective and/or more important. We agree, however, with those commentators who think that both deductions are to be considered together insofar as one complements the other; even if certain differences are
encountered in them and if the B-Deduction disregards certain topics of the A-Deduction that Kant’s later works show he still considered important. Accordingly, our explanation of the A-Deduction is complemented by certain passages of the B-Deduction that shed light on the topic we are dealing with and/or are necessary for a complete understanding of Kant’s ideas.

Likewise, this dissertation talks about Kant from, so to speak, a *Kantian point of view*, not from, say, a Humean, Wolffian, or Leibnizian point of view; neither do we interpret Kant from the point of view of any particular commentator. We have entered as deeply—and as unprejudiced—as possible into Kant’s own ideas, searching always to understand what he was trying to convey, to achieve insight into the core of each topic and the sense it has in the totality of his work. During this long process of almost three years dedicated to full-time research, I have been deeply nourished, not only from my long immaterial and atemporal relationship with Kant, as well as by the commentators consulted, but from the discussions, comments and revisions to my drafts performed by my dissertation director, Dr. Andrew Cutrofello. Nevertheless, any fault the reader may find herein is only mine and not his.

Finally, I have written this dissertation in the first person plural to include the reader and invite him/her to think together with me, i.e., as a way to be more communicative, since I think the critical aspect of philosophy has always to be maintained, not only to preserve its initial sense, but to avoid the danger of
destroying the human possibility to think, a vocation that by nature is free. History has already taught us many lessons in this regard.

Chicago, February 28th, 2013
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References to Kant’s works follow the standard proceeding for citing Kant. All citations, except those of the *Critique of Pure Reason*, follow the German Academy Edition: Kant, Immanuel.


All of Kant’s works mentioned in this list have been read in their totality for this dissertation, and are listed in chronological order.

References are indicated as follows: abbreviation of the title of the work as indicated in this list, followed by Ak., volume, and page. For the *Critique of Pure Reason* the references follow the standard practice, to the pagination of the original edition indicated by A for the 1781 edition, and B for the 1787 edition.

Quotations in German from Kant’s works in this dissertation are taken from the following edition: Kant, Immanuel. 1968. *Werke in zwölf Bänden. Theorie-Werkausgabe*. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag.

All citations in this dissertation are in English; those of Kant’s works follow The Cambridge Edition of the Complete Works of Immanuel Kant. Every English translation in this list appears after its corresponding German title.

Kant’s works in this dissertation are in italics and completely stated the first time; then only one, two or three words that clearly accounts for it will be mentioned; e.g. *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View* for the first time, and then only *Anthropology; Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science* for the first time and then only *Metaphysical Foundations*. Particular sections and chapters are mentioned in the text with capital letters, without quotations marks. For example, Transcendental Aesthetic, Transcendental Logic, etc.

**Abbreviations of Kant’s works:**

- **FSSF** *Die falsche Spitzfindigkeit der vier syllogistischen Figuren erwiesen von M Immanuel Kant* (1762)

**MH**

*Metaphysik Herder (1762-1764)*


**Neg. Gr.**

*Versuch den Begriff der negative Grössen in die Weltweisheit einzuführen (1763)*


**Kopfes**

*Versuch über die Krankheiten des Kopfes (1764)*


**Träume**

*Träume eines Geistersehers, erläutert durch Träume der Metaphysik (1766)*


**Raum**

*Von dem ersten Grunde des Unterschiedes der Gegenen im Raume. (1768)*


**Diss.**

*De mundi sensibilis atque intelligibilis formaet principiiis. (1770)*

[Inaugural Dissertation]

LB

*Logik Blomberg (1770s)*

ML1

*Metaphysik L1 (mid-1770s)*

LMH

*Kant's Briefwechsel (1749 – 1800)*

VL

*Wiener Logik (early 1780s)*

HL

*Logik Hechel (early 1780s)*

KrV

*Kritik der reinen Vernunft. (1781 and 1787)*

MM

*Metaphysik Mrongovius (1782-1783)*

Prol.

*Prolegomena zu einer jeden künftigen Metaphysik, die als Wissenschaft wird auftreten können. (1783)*
2002. Prolegomena to any future metaphysics that will be able to come forward as science. In *Theoretical philosophy after 1781. The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant*. xix

**MV**
Metaphysik Volckmann (1784-1785)

**MAN**
Metaphysiche Anfangsgründe der Naturwissenschaft (1786).

**WSD**
Was hieß: Sich im Denken orientieren? (1786)

**LMH1**
Kant's Briefwechsel (1749-1800)

**MK2**
Metaphysik K₂ (early 1790s)

**DWL**
Logik Dohna-Wundlacken (early 1790s)

**KU**
Kritik der Urteilskraft (1790).
ML2 Metaphysik L2 (1790-1791?)

MD Metaphysik Dohna (1792-1793)

MV Metaphysik Vigilantius (Metaphysik K3) (1794 – 1795)

Anthr. Anthropologie in pragmatischer Hinsicht (1798).

L Logik (1800)

JL Logik Jäsche (1800)

Refl. Reflexionen
CHAPTER I

SENSIBILITY AND SUBSTANCES AS MATERIAL OBJECTS


In its dealings with the external world the human ‘mind’ (Gemüt) relates to something different from itself.\(^1\) Kant calls ‘affection’ (Affection) the relationship the mind de facto has with things different from itself insofar as it is mere receptivity; i.e., the mind has the capacity to be affected by things that come from outside itself and that are not of its own generation. To the faculty that accounts for this ‘receptivity’ (Empfänglichkeit), or capacity of being affected by objects from outside us, Kant gives the name of ‘sensibility’ (Sinnlichkeit): “The capacity (receptivity) to acquire representations through the way in which we are affected by objects is called sensibility” (A19/B33). Sensibility then is a passive ‘faculty’ (Vermögen) that allows the reception of that which affects us, i.e., of the impressions of the senses or sensible impressions. Kant always links receptivity to the sensible faculty; e.g. “this receptivity, which we call sensibility” (A27/B43), “this receptivity of our cognitive

---

\(^1\) The concept ‘mind’ will be used in this dissertation in the same sense in which Kant usually uses it; i.e., as a generic concept that intends to convey our cognitive faculties but without specifying any of them in particular or in its particular function. However, it is worth mentioning that in the Lectures on Metaphysics Kant gives a definition of ‘mind’ in the context of Rational Psychology when talking about the soul: “Mind <psyche> means butterfly <papillom>” (MK2 Ak. XXVIII: 753). The analogy with the butterfly intends to convey that which is hidden preformed in the caterpillar, which is nothing more than its larval form.
capacity is called sensibility" (A44/B61), and sensibility is the receptivity of our mind to receive representations insofar as the mind is affected in some way (cf. A51/B75).

A first affection is the one that proceeds from the outer sense. Kant gives the name of ‘outer sense’ (äußerlich Sinn, äussere Sinn) to the mental property that relates to things outside the mind: "By means of outer sense (a property of our mind) we represent to ourselves objects as outside us" (A22/B37). Kant also says outer sense is where the human body is affected by physical things (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 153). Specifically, outer sense refers to the five outer senses, i.e., sight, hearing, touch, taste and smell (cf. MLz. Ak. XXVIII: 585; cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 154 ff.). Thus, objects of the outer sense are all things that affect us through these five senses. However, the mind can also be—and de facto is—affected by itself; more precisely, by its own representations, whatever their origin and content; e.g., feelings, desires, the effect of outer impressions on our self or whatever inner perceptions we may have. Thus, there must be another ‘sense’ (Sinn) that accounts for the affection that

\[\text{\footnotesize 2 Here Kant is using the expression ‘outside us’ its empirical sense that accounts for appearances as objects of the outer sense or of the external world that Kant also refers to as ‘empirically external objects.’ The expression, however, is also used at times in a transcendental sense to refer to ‘things in themselves’ that are the same external objects, but now not considered at an empirical level but at a transcendental one. The double usage the expression ‘outside us’ is made plain by Kant in the following passage:}
\]

\[\text{But since the expression outside us carries with it an unavoidable ambiguity, since it sometimes signifies something that, as a thing in itself, exists distinct from us and sometimes merely something that belongs to outer appearance, then in order to escape uncertainty and use this concept in the latter significance [as something that belongs to outer appearance] ... we will distinguish empirically external objects from those that might be called ‘external’ in the transcendental sense, by directly calling them ‘things that are to be encountered in space.’ (A373)}\]
proceeds from our inner self concerning our own inner state; to this sense Kant gives the name of ‘inner sense’ (inner Sinn): “[i]nner sense, by means of which the mind intuits itself, or its inner state” (A22/B37). Inner sense is only one (cf. ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 585), since it is the intuition of our self and its states.

Now, the affection through the senses can be produced in an undetermined way; this is why Kant uses the term ‘appearance’ (Erscheinung) to account for the sensorial impressions that affect the mind in an undetermined way: “The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called appearance (Der unbestimmte Gegenstand einer empirischen Anschauung heißt Erscheinung)” (A20/B34). It is part of the constitution of an appearance its empirical nature; the existence of appearances cannot be cognized a priori (cf. A178/B221). The concept ‘appearance’ (Erscheinung) is always referred to (the affection of) the senses; e.g., “as each affects our senses, i.e., as it appears” (B69) and “all appearances in general, i.e., all objects of the senses” (A34/B51). Appearance intends to convey the (external) object of the (outer) sense prior to its conception as an object of cognition, for appearance is basically the manifold of sensible impressions that is given to us in
certain relations. However, when the object is already determined it is called ‘phenomenon.’

The fact that appearances are given in empirical intuition means that they are representations of objects; i.e., that as intuition they belong to the subject, for all intuition is a representation (cf. A92/B125, cf. A32/B47). However, since the intuition is empirical, appearances are objects as well—even if (still) undetermined ones. Kant explains well what he intends to convey by appearance when he speaks about its two sides:

[A]ppearance, which always has two sides, one where the object is considered in itself (without regard to the way in which it is to be intuited, the constitution of which however must for that very reason always remain problematic), the other where the form of the intuition of this object is considered, which must not be sought in the object in itself but in the subject to which it appears, but which nevertheless really and necessarily pertains to the representation of this object. (A38/B55)

If Kant mentions here that the constitution of the object in itself must always remain problematic, it is because we can only cognize “objects” as they appear to us, i.e., as they are given to sensibility through intuition. Kant is clear about the fact that the object in itself cannot be cognized; i.e., we cannot cognize the things in themselves (cf. A30/B45) but only things as they appear to consciousness. This

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3 It is worth mentioning that Kant also suggests that appearances presuppose an act of mental synthesis. Thus, there is also a point of view in which appearances contain an aspect which is not merely given. This will be understood in Chapter 3 when we explain how the synthesis allows us to uphold a subjective constitution of experience.

4 The distinction appearance-phenomenon is treated in Chapter 3 when judgments of perception and judgments of experience are explained. We note here that Kant restricts the concept ‘appearance’ mainly for objects of the outer sense and not for the representations of inner sense, as this dissertation will make plain. E.g., “of the objects (of the appearances)” (A180/B222), and “objects as appearances” (A143/B182).
point is clearly stated in the following passage, where Kant also advances other topics that we explain below:

What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us (Was es für eine Bewandtnis mit den Gegenständen an sich und abgesondert von aller dieser Rezeptivität unserer Sinnlichkeit haben möge, bleibt uns gänzlich unbekannt). We are acquainted with nothing except our way of perceiving them, which is peculiar to us, and which therefore does not necessarily pertain to every being, though to be sure it pertains to every human being. We are concerned solely with this . . . Even if we could bring this intuition of ours to the highest degree of distinctness we would not thereby come any closer to the constitution of objects in themselves. For in any case we would still completely cognize only our own way of intuiting, i.e., our sensibility, and this always only under the conditions originally depending on the subject, space and time; what the objects may be in themselves would still never be known through the most enlightened cognition of their appearance, which alone is given to us. (A42-43/B59-60)

The fact that we cannot cognize things in themselves but only as they appear to us means that the cognition of objects requires that the intuited manifold conforms to the formal constitution of the subject; i.e., to the conditions the subject brings to cognition. It neither means that cognition is not truly possible, nor that there are no objects that exist in an external world outside the mind. Kant explicitly mentions “the external world of the senses” (A87/B120).\footnote{This clarification is relevant since Kant's Transcendental Idealism must be well understood. Kant explicitly talks about this when he says: Our transcendental idealism . . . allows that the objects of outer intuition are real too, just as they are intuited in space, along with all alterations in time, just as inner sense represents them. For since space is already a form of that intuition that we call outer, and without objects in it there would be no empirical representation at all, we can and must assume extended beings in space as real; and it is precisely the same with time. (A491-492/B520)
Thus, Kant thinks we can know there are things in themselves but we cannot know anything about their constitution. “For we have to do only with our representations; how things in themselves may be (without regard to representations through which they affect us) is entirely beyond our cognitive sphere” (A190/B235). As already anticipated, the thing in itself is the correlate of the objects of the outer sense: “but rather that objects in themselves are not known to us at all, and that what we call outer objects are nothing other than mere representations of our sensibility, whose form is space, but whose true correlate; i.e., the thing in itself, is not and cannot be cognized through them” (A30/B45). In Kant’s terminology, the concept ‘noumenon’ accounts for the ‘thing in itself’ from a transcendental point of view. He points this transcendental level by saying: “[t]he concept of a noumenon, i.e., of a thing that is not to be thought of as an object of the senses but rather as a thing in itself (solely through the understanding)” (A254/B310).6 Therefore, the term ‘appearance’ is a sort of mediating concept between ‘subject’ and ‘object’ and as such it is intended to convey features of both: the form of the subject and the content i.e., the object.

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6 The transcendental level will be made plain through our dissertation. We must avoid, however, the error of considering the transcendental level as a sort of superior level that grounds the world of senses or the external world in a Platonic sense. See: The Theory of the Forms in Book VI of Plato’s Republic. Plato.1992. Republic. Trans. G.M.A. Grube. 2nd ed. Indiana: Hackett Publishing Company. Kant openly rejects this possibility. However, it is worth noting that Kant still upheld the distinction between a sensible and an intelligible worlds in this Inaugural Dissertation of 1770. The transcendental level will be a constitutive level only concerning the object(s) of cognition, not the constitution of the object itself.
Now, the affection sensible impressions induce in us can be in an unconscious way; however, consciousness of this affection is called 'sensation' (Empfindung). “The effect of an object on the capacity for representation, insofar as we are affected by it, is sensation” (A19-20/B34). ‘Sensation' (Empfindung) is also defined as a representation through sense of which one is conscious (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 153). Sensation then is consciousness of the affection of an object.

Sensation is a difficult concept to grasp; commentators have different interpretations. Since sensation is immediately linked to the object of the outer sense, there tends to be some confusion among both and their boundaries. We think Dieter Henrich has the most accurate approach concerning this point. In Identity and Objectivity he makes plain objects must satisfy the requirement of constancy, and that their representations are those representations that repeatedly occur and are in principle repeatable under certain circumstances (cf. Henrich 1994, 130). He makes plain this goes from both sides, since we also attribute constancy to objects: “[w]e hold that objects are those particulars to which continuity in existence is fundamentally attributable” (Henrich 1994, 131). By contrast, sensations cannot satisfy these requisites (cf. Henrich 1994, 132). “It makes no sense to assume that the same sensory representations recur. Once gone, they can be replaced by others of the same kind” (Henrich 1994, 132). Henrich states that sensible presentations have to be distinguished from objects (cf. Henrich 1994, 132). Even if both appear together, sensations are just presentations that appear in diffuse spatial
juxtaposition, but are not structured in relations in space and time as objects are (cf.
Henrich 1994, 130-133). This point, i.e., that sensations are not structured in
spatio-temporal relations is fundamental, not only to distinguish them from the
objects they come with but also to understand their nature.

However, Henrich’s distinction accounts for the distinction between
sensations and objects but not for the effect sensations have on the self, since the
consciousness of being affected is an affection of the subject. This double aspect
concerning sensations is perceived in the third Critique, where Kant openly
recognizes the term ‘sensation’ creates confusion (KU Ak. V: 2050). Thus, in the
Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant distinguishes between an objective and a
subjective usage of the term ‘sensation.’ The passage says as follows:

If a determination of the feeling of pleasure or displeasure is called sensation,
then this expression means something entirely different than if I call the
representation of a thing (through sense, as a receptivity belonging to the
faculty of cognition) sensation. For in the latter case the representation is
related to the object, but in the first case it is related solely to the subject, and
does not serve for any cognition at all, not even that by which the subject
cognizes itself.

In the above explanation, however, we understand by the word
‘sensation’ an objective representation of the senses; and in order not always
to run the risk of being misinterpreted, we will call that which must always
remain merely subjective and absolutely cannot constitute a representation
of an object by the otherwise customary name of ‘feeling.’ (KU Ak. V: 206)

By ‘sensation’ in the sense in which Kant uses this term in the first Critique
we are to understand the objective usage of the concept; i.e., sensations as
immediately related to objects. This objective use then is what Henrich considers in
his explanation. It is worth mentioning that this type of sensation, which plays a
role in the conveyance of appearances, correlates to matter. “I call that in the appearance which corresponds to sensation its **matter**” (A20/B34), where “the matter of all appearance is only given to us *a posteriori*” (A20/B34). Through this association Kant makes clearer the usage of the term “sensation” in its objective meaning by making plain that matter in the appearance is the correlate of the sensation which affects us. This, united to the fact that the content is always *a posteriori*, allows us to understand in turn an **empirical** intuition. Kant says: “That intuition which is related to the object through sensation is called **empirical**” (A20/B34).

‘Intuition’ (*Anschauung*) is the **immediate** contact the mind has to something that is given through the affection of the senses, for intuition is an **immediate** representation of the object (cf. A19/B33, B41). An intuition is necessarily a singular representation of an object (cf. A32/B47) for it represents a single object, and cannot be, as such, universally communicable. What intuition brings to the mind is a manifold: “[e]very intuition contains a manifold in itself” (A99). Therefore, empirical intuition brings the manifold of sensible impressions to the mind. By ‘manifold’ (*Mannigfaltige*) Kant wants to convey the ‘multiplicity’ (*Menge*) of sensible impressions that affects the mind through the outer sense. This manifold is

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7 Further in this chapter we will deal with matter in the section on substances.
really the ‘content’ (*Inhalt*, *Gebalt*) of cognition that customarily we call object, and which ultimately refers to matter.⁸

Intuition for Kant is always sensible (cf. A35/B52) insofar as it is receptive of the impressions the senses give us, and because it contains the way in which we are affected by objects (cf. A51/B75). Kant denies to the human mind the possibility of an intellectual intuition, for this would imply the cognition of things in themselves via our understanding, without the mediating role played by sensibility. According to Kant, an intellectual intuition could only be given to an original being whose understanding would create the very objects it intuits, but not to finite rational subjects such as human beings. This is why he states that the intuition of human beings is derived, since it cannot be original and depends on the information the senses give us; thus, it is not self-activity (cf. B68). Kant says:

[I]t may well be that all finite thinking beings must necessarily agree with human beings in this regard (though we cannot decide this), yet even given such universal validity this kind of intuition would not cease to be sensibility,

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⁸ It is worth mentioning that the concept ‘matter’ has special connotations in Kant’s work. Kant uses the concept ‘matter’ as a synonym of ‘content’ mostly when ‘matter’ is presented as opposed to ‘form’ (cf. JL Ak. IX: 33; cf. MAN Ak. IV: 481). However, the concept ‘matter’—even when it is conceived as the mere material element of the object and has only the determinations proper to external relations in space (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 543)—is not the best synonym of ‘content.’ This is why Kant mainly uses the concept ‘manifold’ when he refers to ‘content.’ Through this dissertation it will become clear why Kant prefers the concept ‘manifold’ to account for the ‘content’ of cognition and in general. For the explanation of matter in general and its relations in space see the *Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Sciences*. Kant there explains matter related to motion, and in relation to the table of the categories. This work contains the explanation of matter as the movable in space (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 480), the filling of space by matter (MAN Ak. IV: 496) through a moving force (and not through its mere existence) (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 497), attractive and repulsive forces as the fundamental forces of matter (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 498 ff., MAN Ak. IV: 508 ff.), the impenetrability of matter (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 503), bodies, in the physical sense, as matter between determinate boundaries which therefore has a figure (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 525), the possibility of thinking an empty space prior to all matter (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 534 - 535), the law of inertia as the lifeless of all matter as such (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 544), among other topics.
for the very reason that it is derived (*intuitus derivativus*) (derivative intuition), not original (*intuitus originarius*) (original intuition), thus not intellectual intuition, which for the ground already adduced seems to pertain only to the original being, never to one that is dependent as regards both its existence and its intuition (which determines its existence in relation to given objects). (B72)

This said, Kant speaks at times of outer intuition and of inner intuition; by outer intuition he refers to the intuition of the objects of outer sense, while inner intuition refers to the intuition of the objects of inner sense: “of our kind of outer as well as inner intuition, which is called sensible because it is not original, i.e., one through which the existence of the object of intuition is itself given” (B72).

1.2. Space and Time as the Forms of Outer and Inner Sense

To establish a connection between the subject and the object, it is not sufficient to appeal to the receptivity of the mind; the mind itself has to bring something into cognition, so that the reception of the manifold is (spontaneously) organized: what the mind contributes is *the way* in which the reception of the manifold is organized. This *way* is what Kant calls ‘form’ (*Form*): “form, i.e., *the way in which we cognize the object*” (*JL* Ak. IX: 33). What we determine then is the form, but not the content, of cognition. That is to say, *the mind determines the way in which an object, i.e., an appearance, is going to be received (and understood)*. However, the content—the manifold of sensible impressions—cannot be determined by the mind; the content is *given* to us.

This is why Kant states that the form of appearance must already lie ready in the mind *a priori* (cf. A20/B34) for the form (of appearances) is brought into the
cognitive process by the mind itself; more precisely, and in this case, by the faculty of sensibility. Kant says “that which allows the manifold of appearance to be intuited as ordered in certain relations I call the form of appearance” (A20/B34). The form then is what makes possible that manifolds can be intuited organized in relations; this means then that that forms condition the possibility of objects of cognition. Forms then have to be necessarily a priori; Kant justifies the a priori nature of the forms when he says “since the receptivity of the subject to be affected by objects necessarily precedes all intuitions of these objects, it can be understood how the form of all appearance can be given in the mind prior to all actual perceptions, thus a priori” (A26/B42). Likewise:

[T]hat under which alone objects can be intuited, in fact does lie in the mind a priori as the ground of the form of objects. All appearances therefore necessarily agree with this formal condition of sensibility, because only through it can they appear, i.e., be empirically intuited and given (Mit dieser formalin Bedingung der Sinnlichkeit stimen also alle Erscheinungen notwendig überein, weil sie nur durch dieselbe erscheinen, d.i. empirisch angeschauet und gegeben warden können). (A93/B125)

It is plain then that the form of appearances is the same form that lies a priori in the mind. Both concern the formal constitution of the subject under which objects are given to us. Now, the question arises about the nature of this form. As mentioned above, the form is the way in which manifolds are received or intuited in certain ‘relations’ (Verhältnissen). The form then is what spontaneously structures manifolds in relations. Kant says: “the pure form of sensible intuitions in general is

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9 It is plain we are talking here of sensible form. See Chapter 2 for the explanation of how the understanding contributes the intelligible form of objects of experience.
to be encountered in the mind \textit{a priori}, wherein all of the manifold of appearances is intuited in certain relations” (A20/B34). Kant upholds the idea that the \textit{a priori} forms of sensibility are space and time, since all objects have necessarily to be structured in spatio-temporal relations; this can be made plain from the fact that all actual objects are necessarily in a determinate space and in a determinate time (cf. A23/B38, cf. A31/B46).

Indeed, ‘space’ (\textit{Raum}) and ‘time’ (\textit{Zeit}) are both \textit{forms} that \textit{condition} the reception of objects: “Both [time and space] taken together are, namely, the pure forms of all sensible intuition” (A39/B56). Space and time are then the pure forms of sensibility insofar as they are \textit{subjective conditions} under which the sensible manifold has to be intuited. This makes evident then that space and time do not exist outside the mind, but \textit{are conditions or forms the mind has that determine the way in which objects are going to be received by it}; i.e., that determine how the ‘multiplicity’ (\textit{Menge}) of sensible impressions is \textit{organized} in relations so it can be received in an unitary way to constitute objects of cognition. These statements make plain Kant is denying the \textit{absolute} reality of space and time; his formalism implies that space and time are real insofar as they are \textit{the condition for the reception of objects}; if we abstract from these subjective conditions nothing at all can be given to us for cognition.\footnote{A clarification concerning the usage of the terms ‘pure’ (\textit{rein}) and \textit{a priori} is required here. Kant uses the term ‘pure’ in contrast to what is ‘empirical’: what is pure is not empirical. Sometimes he uses also the term \textit{a priori} instead of ‘pure,’ i.e., as synonyms, and at times he uses \textit{pure a priori},’ i.e., both terms together one following the other. The difference between pure and \textit{a priori} is slight: if}
Now, a distinction between the formal constitution of space and time is required, since it is plain inner perceptions or representations that affect our inner self, and account for our inner state, cannot appear in a spatial form, for they have neither shape nor extension. Thus while space is the ground of all outer intuitions; time is the ground of all intuitions in general; i.e., of all outer and inner intuitions. Thus, space is the form of the outer sense since all objects of the outer sense must be necessarily received under the conditions of space, i.e., they must appear in relations in space. Kant points out:

Space is nothing other than merely the form of all appearances of outer sense, i.e., the subjective condition of sensibility, under which alone outer intuition is possible for us (Der Raum ist nichts anders, als nur die Form aller Erscheinungen äußerer Sinne, d.i. die subjektive Bedingung der Sinnlichkeit, unter der allein uns äußere Anschauung möglich ist). (A26/B42)

However, time is the form of all objects of the senses in general, i.e., of the object of the inner sense and of the objects of the outer sense, since it not only conditions our inner representations but also the representations of the outer sense, insofar as all intuition must necessarily be in us and, therefore, in time. Kant says:

Time is a necessary representation that grounds all intuitions (Die Zeit ist eine notwendige Vorstellung, die allen Anschauungen zum Grunde liegt). In

pure is opposed to empirical, a priori is prior to experience. Kant says: “a priori, i.e., prior to all perception of an object” (B41); also “prior to all actual perception” (A42/B60). Thus, a priori has more worth than pure, but both concepts are intended to avoid contingency, and convey that nothing empirical must be designated through them. This takes us to a fundamental distinction: the relation between a priori and transcendental. For Kant what is transcendental has necessarily to be a priori but not the reverse, i.e., all a priori is not necessarily transcendental (cf. A56/B80-81). A priori cognition is transcendental when it serves as a rule, i.e., when it acts like a principle in empirical cognition. For example, mathematics is a non-transcendental a priori cognition. In this sense, what pertains then to the possibility of mathematical cognition is transcendental, though mathematical cognition itself is not. Mathematical cognition is only a priori cognition.
regard to appearances in general one cannot remove time, though one can very well take the appearances away from time. Time is therefore given \textit{a priori}. In it alone is all actuality of appearances possible. The latter could all disappear, but time itself (as the universal condition of their possibility) cannot be removed. (A31/B46)

The distinction between space and time makes plain time has more transcendental significance than space, since time is the condition of the possibility of \textit{all} appearances, i.e., of inner and outer representations; this is why time is the \textit{universal} condition of their possibility, whereas space is restricted to outer appearances. The universality of time explains also why inner intuition is more fundamental, and even grounds, outer intuition.\footnote{For instance: "If we abstract from our way of internally intuiting ourselves \textit{and by means of this intuition also dealing with all outer intuitions} in the power of representation" (A34/B51). (Emphasis mine.)} Kant states these ideas in a fundamental passage:

Time is the \textit{a priori} formal condition of all appearances in general. Space, as the pure form of all outer intuitions, is limited as an \textit{a priori} condition merely to outer intuitions (\textit{Die Zeit ist die formale Bedingung \textit{a priori} aller Erscheinungen überhaupt. Der Raum, als die reine Form aller äußeren Anschauung ist als Bedingung \textit{a priori} bloß auf äußere Erscheinungen eingeschränkt}). But since, on the contrary, all representations, whether or not they have outer things as their object, nevertheless as determinations of the mind themselves belong to the inner state, while this inner state belongs under the formal condition of inner intuition, and thus of time, so time is an \textit{a priori} condition of all appearance in general, and indeed the immediate condition of the inner intuition (of our souls), and thereby also the mediate condition of outer appearances. If I can say \textit{a priori}: all outer appearances are in space and determined \textit{a priori} according to the relations of space, so from the principle of inner sense I can say entirely generally: all appearances in general, i.e., all objects of the senses, are in time, and necessarily stand in relations of time. (A34/B50-51)
The passage adds that all representations belong to our inner sense, because as such, i.e., as representations, they are determinations of the mind. However, we cannot go further than this if we want to inquire about the nature of our representations, for we cannot have more insight about them, but only grasp the meaning of the concept 'representation' (Vorstellung) through the comprehension of Kant's philosophy. In the Jäsche Logic Kant refers to the non-explicative nature of representations: “[b]ut representation is not yet cognition, rather, cognition always presupposes representation. And this latter [representation] cannot be explained at all. For we would always have to explain what representation is by means of yet another representation” (JL Ak. IX: 34).

Now, if all representations as such necessarily belong to the inner sense for they are determinations of the mind, it is plain then all representations in general are conditioned by time and stand also in relations of time, for time is the form of the inner state (cf. A33-34/B50-51). We can illustrate this by observing our own representations and we will find that one follows another in consciousness; i.e., their relation to one another is successive as time itself is. That all representations belong to inner sense is what justifies then the priority of time over space as the condition of all appearances. It also explains why Kant says time is the immediate condition of inner intuition but the mediate condition of outer intuition, since the relation of time to outer sense objects is derived from the relation of time to our inner sense representations.
Our inner state refers to the way in which our representations affect us, and if our inner state belongs under the condition of inner intuition it is because only through a sensible inner intuition—the intuition of ourselves as the object of inner sense—can we cognize our inner state, i.e., the affection representations have on us.

For what has been stated, it is plain then time is the form of the inner sense.

Time is nothing other than the form of inner sense (Die Zeit ist nichts anders, als die Form des innern Sinnes), i.e., of the intuition of our self and our inner state. For time cannot be a determination of outer appearances; it belongs neither to a shape or a position, etc., but on the contrary determines the relation of representations in our inner state. (A33/B49-50)

The Transcendental Aesthetic stresses the subjective formal constitution of space and time. As anticipated above, Kant is clear here that space and time are not something attached to the objects themselves: “[s]pace represents no property at all of any things in themselves nor any relation of them to each other, i.e., no determination of them that attaches to objects themselves” (A26/B42). Likewise: “[t]ime is not something that would subsist for itself or attach to things as an objective determination, and thus remain if one abstracted from all subjective conditions of the intuition of them” (A32/B49). Kant also makes plain that space and time are not empirical concepts:

Space is not an empirical concept that has been drawn from outer experiences (Der Raum ist kein empirischer Begriff, der von äußeren Erfahrungen abgezogen worden). For in order for certain sensations to be

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12 Likewise: “Time is certainly something real, namely the real form of inner intuition. It therefore has subjective reality in regard to inner experience, i.e., I really have the representation of time and of my determinations in it. It is therefore to be regarded really not as object but as the way of representing myself as object” (A37/B53-54).
related to something outside me (i.e., to something in another place in space from that in which I find myself), thus in order for me to represent them as outside <and next to> one another, thus not merely as different but as in different places, the representation of space must already be their ground. Thus the representation of space cannot be obtained from the relations of outer appearance through experience, but this outer experience is itself first possible only through this representation. (A23/B38)

Time is not an empirical concept that is somehow drawn from an experience. For simultaneity or succession would not themselves come into perception if the representation of time did not ground them a priori. Only under its presupposition can one represent that several things exist at one and the same time (simultaneously) or in different times (successively). (A30/B46) (Emphasis mine)

These statements supporting space and time as pure sensible forms, make clear that all cognition of objects of the outer sense requires both forms to be presupposed as their conditions of possibility. Without these subjective forms nothing at all will be given in an organized way through the outer sense, and less cognized as an object of cognition. From the outset then Kant makes evident his modern way of philosophizing, since he establishes that things can only be cognized insofar as they are conditioned by forms of the subject.13 This new—modern—way of thinking was precisely what he intended to convey through his famous ‘Copernican Revolution,’ when in the Preface to the B edition of the first Critique he proposed to adapt or “subordinate” the information of the external world to the anticipations of the mind following the modern scientific method, to evaluate if in this way the problems of traditional metaphysics could be solved and thus metaphysics could

13 These forms are not only space and time but also the categories. As anticipated in footnote 9, Chapter 2 deals with categories as intelligible forms.
still be considered a science or, better, as “the mother of sciences” as Aristotle upheld (cf. Bxvi). ¹⁴

However, as our last citation openly states, these sensible forms are presuppositions since we cannot justify their (ontological) validity in any way.

Years after the publication of the second edition of the first Critique, Kant makes clear this incapacity to go further concerning the “knowledge” of forms in a letter to Marcus Herz dated May 26th, 1789:

> [W]e are absolutely unable to explain further how it is that a sensible intuition (such as space and time), the form of our sensibility, or such functions of the understanding as those out of which logic develops are possible; nor can we explain why it is that one form agrees with another in forming a possible cognition. (LMH1 Ak. XI: 51)

Summarizing then, by form Kant intends to convey what the mind contributes to cognition; i.e., the conditions the mind brings into the cognitive process. Insofar as these conditions are subjective forms they have to be necessarily pure (rein), for they lie a priori in the mind and are not in the objects themselves; they neither attach to objects as their properties nor subsist by themselves apart from the subject. Forms are the relational structures in which appearances are to be organized when intuited by us. This means that the mind represents the manifold of sensible impressions not haphazardly but organized in spatio-temporal relations.

¹⁴ The main part of passage of the B Preface is as follows:

Up to now it has been assumed that all our cognition must conform to the objects; but all attempts to find out something about them a priori through concepts that would extend our cognition have, on this presupposition, come to nothing. Hence let us once try whether we do not get farther with the problems of metaphysics by assuming that the objects must conform to our cognition, which would agree better with the requested possibility of an a priori cognition of them, which is to establish something about objects before they are given to us. This would be just like the first thoughts of Copernicus. (Bxvi)
that are made possible by the \textit{forms} of space and time. It is in this sense then that Kant says space and time are the forms of sensibility; and, more precisely, that space and time are the conditions of the possibility of appearances (cf. A24/B39, cf. A31/B46). Kant says:

\begin{quote}
It is therefore indubitably certain, and not merely possible or even probable, that space and time, as the necessary conditions of all (outer and inner) experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuition, in relation to which therefore all objects are mere appearances and not things given for themselves in this way. (A48-49/B66) (Emphasis mine)
\end{quote}

1.3. The Pure Intuitions of Space and Time and their Relations

Now, besides considering space and time as sensible forms, Kant also states that space and time are ‘pure intuitions’ (\textit{reine Anschauungen}): “[b]ut space and time are represented \textit{a priori} not merely as forms of sensible intuition, but also as intuitions themselves (which contain a manifold) (Aber Raum und Zeit sind nicht bloß als Formen der sinnlichen Anschauung, sondern als Anschauungen selbst (die ein Mannigfaltiges enthalten))” (B160). “Space and time and all their parts are intuitions, thus individual representations along with the manifold that they contain in themselves” (B136n). Likewise: “[s]pace is not a discursive or, as is said, general concept of relations of things in general, but a pure intuition” (A24-25/B39) and “the representation of time is itself an intuition” (A33/B50). Kant also points out that intuitions contain relations (cf. A48-49/B66). The question then arises about how are we to distinguish space and time as \textit{forms} from space and time as \textit{pure intuitions}. The key concept here is that of \textit{manifold}, as our citations already
anticipate, since only intuitions—not forms—contain manifolds, which in this case
have to be necessarily a priori since space and time are pure intuitions.

That space and time are pure intuitions then means that each representation
of space and each representation of time is already a representation of one unique
space and a representation of one unique time since both—space and time as
intuitions—are in turn parts of a larger space and a larger time which are intuitions
as well. Kant says: “[I]f one speaks of many spaces, one understands by that only
parts of one and the same unique space” (A25/B39). The same is for time.

“Different times are only parts of one and the same time” (A32/B47). Thus, the
manifolds of space and of time are necessarily composed of spaces and times, since
each space and each time is already enclosed in another larger space and another
larger time. This means then that the intuition of an object implies immediately the
limitation of (a) space and of (a) time: this limitation implies then the establishment
of a determinate space and of a determinate time which are both parts of a larger
space and time themselves. It implies also that space and time can be divided
infinitely. This explains why Kant says that space and time are quanta continua.

Kant points out:

The property of magnitudes on account of which no part of them is the
smallest (no part is simple) is called their continuity. Space and time are
quanta continua (continuous magnitudes), because no part of them can be
given except as enclosed between two boundaries (points or instants), thus
only in such a way that this part is again a space or a time. Space therefore
consists only of spaces, time of times. Points and instants are only
boundaries, i.e., mere places of their limitation; but places always presuppose
those intuitions that limit or determine them. (A169/B211)
The idea underlying here is that the whole is prior to the parts; this is why points and moments can be conceived only as boundaries of space and time, respectively; which implies the establishment of *determinate* spaces and times. This idea complements Kant's conception of space and time as infinite given magnitudes, since its (possible) representations are beyond measure. Space is represented as an infinite given magnitude for it is represented as having an infinite set of representations within it, insofar as all the parts of space are simultaneous (cf. A25/B40). Time itself is also conceived as infinite: "[t]he infinitude of time signifies nothing more than that every determinate magnitude of time is only possible through limitations of a single time grounding it. The original representation time must therefore be given as unlimited" (A32/B47-48). Otherwise stated, space and time are infinite given magnitudes insofar as we represent space as a homogeneous manifold beyond all measure, and time as a sequence progressing to infinity. The only way we can determine a determinate spatio-temporal region is by establishing boundaries through points and moments.

Thus what Kant intends to convey is that each representation or intuition of space and of time is already a determination of space and a determination of time with their relational properties; otherwise stated, that all parts of space and all parts of time stand in relation to one another. In other words, the pure manifolds of space and of time consist of parts all of whose properties are relational. This means that *space and time are pure intuitions*. 
Therefore, while the forms of space and time refer to the conditions of possibility for objects of cognition, as pure intuitions space and time refer to the a priori representations of spaces and of times which means that a specific spatio-temporal region is determined through intuition and that its properties are relational, for they are necessarily in relation with other spaces and other times.

This distinction, however, did not come easy to Kant. In the Lectures on Metaphysics he deals with the distinction constantly; even the first Critique conflates space and time as intuitions and as forms frequently; they also appear as synonyms at times. In the first Critique we find, for instance: “[t]his pure form of sensibility itself is also called pure intuition” (A20/B34-35, cf. A21/B35, cf. A33/B49). In almost all the passages where form and pure intuition are presented as synonyms, pure intuition appears only as relations without manifoldness; e.g., “[t]he constant form of this receptivity, which we call sensibility, is a necessary condition of all the relations within which objects can be intuited as outside us, and, if one abstracts from these objects, it is a pure intuition” (A27/B43). Other times the distinction seems to be only that pure intuition is the immediate representation of the form:

Now how can an outer intuition inhabit the mind that precedes the objects themselves, and in which the concept of the latter [objects] can be determined a priori? Obviously not otherwise than insofar as it has its seat merely in the subject, as its formal constitution for being affected by objects and thereby acquiring immediate representation, i.e., intuition of them, thus only as the form of outer sense in general. (B41)

Likewise, sometimes Kant seems to conceive the a priori determinations of sensible contents to be pure manifolds. However, upholding this would be a
mistake. The *a priori* determinations of things given in space (and in time) are known by the mind *a priori* since we definitely possess an *a priori* cognition as the case of mathematics makes plain (cf. A87/B120); e.g., in geometry we exhibit *a priori* the qualities or shapes of objects. For instance, when we think of a triangle we think of it as having three angles.\(^{15}\) This ability the mind has to intuit *a priori* shapes and to invent figures is what allows Kant to establish the *a priori* determinations that all things given through the outer sense must have as possible objects of experience. It also justifies the application of mathematics to experience (cf. A160/B199). ‘Extension’ (*Ausdehnung*) and ‘shape’ (*Gestalt*) are the *a priori* determinations of space. However, the possibility to take these *a priori* determinations as the manifolds of pure intuitions could arise due to the wording Kant uses in certain texts. Kant’s wording in the following two passages gives us an example of how this confusion—that would lead to a mistake—is possible:

So if I separate from the representation of a body that which the understanding thinks about it, such as substance, force, divisibility, etc., as well as that which belongs to sensation, such as impenetrability, hardness, color, etc., something from this empirical intuition is still left for me, namely extension and form. These belong to the pure intuition, which occurs *a priori*, even without an actual object of the senses or sensation. (A20-21/B35)

[S]pace concerns only the pure form of intuition, thus it includes no sensation (nothing empirical) in itself, and all kinds and determinations of space can

\(^{15}\) Likewise, we know *a priori* that two times cannot be concurrent and that between two points there is only a straight line (cf. *MM* Ak. XXIX: 832): thus we can cognize properties of space and time *a priori*. The same: “I can know *a priori* the properties of things, just as well as the objects of pure intuition . . . for I can say something *a priori* about space without an object being there” (*MM* Ak. XXIX: 798).
and even must be able to be represented \textit{a priori} if concepts of shapes as well as relations are to arise. (A29/B44)\footnote{Concerning space as pure intuition Kant says: "it [space] is the formal aspect of outer appearances, and thus properties of space can be cognized \textit{a priori}. This condition under which appearances are possible is pure outer intuition" (\textit{MM} Ak. XXIX: 831). In the same tone Kant upholds that "[s]pace and time give us \textit{a priori} cognitions prior to all experience" (\textit{MM} Ak. XXIX: 832).}

It is worth mentioning here a comment on \textit{extension} since it refers to the filling of space. What we know \textit{a priori}—when we represent to ourselves any shape whatsoever—is that shapes fill space whenever a manifold of sensible impressions is empirically given to us. Extension means that the thing is immediately present in all points of the space in question (though not in all of space taken as an infinite whole). Kant uses the expressions “to occupy a space” or “to fill a space” to convey this idea (cf. \textit{MAN} Ak. IV: 497).\footnote{“Filling a space” is just a more specific determination of "occupying a space" (cf. \textit{MAN} Ak. IV: 497). The filling of space by matter is explained in the \textit{Metaphysical Foundations}. A major idea is that matter fills space not merely by existing but through moving forces, which are considered fundamentally two: an attractive force and a repulsive force. For this explanation see the chapter Metaphysical Foundations of Dynamics in the \textit{Metaphysical Foundations} (\textit{MAN} Ak. IV: 496 ff.).} \textit{A priori} we know that a manifold given in empirical intuition has to \textit{occupy space}. Everything given to us in empirical intuition \textit{de facto} fills (a) space; we \textit{perceive} that things fill space, but it is through pure intuition that we \textit{know} this determination, i.e., extension or the filling of space by matter is known \textit{a priori}. Thus, the manifold of space as pure intuition is \textit{not} composed of extension and shape, but both are \textit{a priori} determinations all objects of the outer sense must have, and we can know this \textit{a priori} in intuition.

Two clarifications are relevant concerning space and time at this point of our discussion. Our statements have made clear by now that forms are more
fundamental than pure intuitions insofar as they precede intuitions for they lie ready in the mind a priori. A second important point to consider about this distinction is that pure intuitions are not conditions in the sense of forms, for all pure intuition has to be related necessarily to a possible empirical intuition:

\[\text{Even if a pure intuition is possible a priori prior to the object, then even this can acquire its object, thus its objective validity, only through empirical intuition (wenn eine reine Anschauung noch vor dem Gegenstande a priori möglich ist, so kann doch auch diese selbst ihren Gegenstand, mithin die objektive Gültigkeit, nur durch die empirische Anschauung bekommen). (A239/B298)}\]

Thus, a pure intuition is necessarily related to a possible empirical intuition which, as already stated, gives us the manifold of sensible impressions. It is from this empirical intuition that pure intuition gets its objective validity. Even in mathematics, where the construction of the concept is simultaneous with the a priori presentation of the object, Kant makes plain that empirical intuition has always to be capable of accompanying a priori intuition for the latter to have objective validity or at least significance. Kant points out:

One need only take as an example the concepts of mathematics, and first, indeed, in their pure intuitions. Space has three dimensions, between two points there can be only one straight line, etc. Although all these principles, and the representation of the object with which this science occupies itself, are generated in the mind completely a priori, they would still not signify anything at all if we could not always exhibit their significance in appearances (empirical objects). (A239-240/B299)

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18 Other statements stress this point in a different way; e.g., “time is nothing other than the subjective condition under which all intuitions can take place in us” (A33/B49).

19 See Chapter 2 for the explanation of the simultaneity in the construction of concepts and objects in mathematics.
Kant's favorite way of illustrating this point is to argue that in order to represent a line it is necessary to draw it: “[t]hus the mere form of outer sensible intuition, space, is not yet cognition at all; it only gives the manifold of intuition a priori for a possible cognition. But in order to cognize something in space, e.g., a line, I must draw it” (B137). This passage stresses that the manifold of pure intuition correlates to a possible cognition. However, in order for cognition to be actual, empirical intuition is required.

Now, concerning the relations in which all parts of time and space stand to one another, the Transcendental Aesthetic mentions several times the expressions “relations in space” (cf. A27/B43) and “relations of time” (B47); e.g., “all relations of objects in space and time” (A42/B59, cf. A33-34/B50-51, cf. A24n/B38n). However, in that section of the first Critique Kant does not explain clearly what spatial relations are. It is in the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, written in between the two editions of the first Critique, that Kant deals with them. As already indicated, relations in space refer to the different ways in which an object of the outer sense or body can be in space, and how each determinate space relates to another enlarged space of which it is a part. More precisely, these treat such issues as how a body can be at rest or in motion in a space (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 481), how bodies can move without changing their place but changing their relation to external space (cf. MAN Ak. IV: 482), when the motion of the body is considered only in relation to the space and when the body is considered in active relation to other
bodies in the space of its motion (cf. *MAN* Ak. IV: 488), the different (possible) relations between line(s) and direction(s) (cf. *MAN* Ak. IV: 495), as well as the changes of relation with respect to the external space (cf. *MAN* Ak. IV: 557), etcetera.\(^{20}\)

Now, concerning the relations in time, we recall here that insofar as time is the form of inner sense it is the condition of possibility of appearances in general, and that only under its presupposition are the representations of ‘succession’ (*Sukzession*) and ‘simultaneity’ (*Zugleichsein*) as temporal relations possible. Insofar as time is the form of inner sense, Kant will attribute *persistence* to time.

Kant defines time itself—that represents time in general (cf. B225)—as *that which persists* where ‘persistence’ (*Beharrlichkeit*) is existence at all times and, thus, refers to something lasting (cf. A182/B225). Now, as time is (also) a pure intuition, this persistence cannot be cognized in itself but only represented *a priori*.\(^{21}\) Kant makes clear that time *itself* cannot be *perceived* by itself (cf. B225); indeed, neither time nor space can be perceived in themselves (cf. A166/B207) for we cannot perceive empty time and empty space: “a proof of empty space or of empty time can never be drawn from experience (*es kann aus der Erfahrung niemals ein Beweis vom leeren*)

\(^{20}\) The explanation of the relations in space is outside the topic of this dissertation. However, we have mentioned some of its relevant subtopics to have an idea about what Kant is talking about. For a detailed explanation of the relations in space see the *Metaphysical Foundations*. Likewise, in his early essay *Concerning the Ultimate Ground of the Differentiation of Directions in Space*, Kant explains the three-dimensional nature of space through the image of a subject placed inside three planes, and distinguishing the three directions in space: above-below, right-left, front-back.

\(^{21}\) “I call all representations pure … in which nothing is to be encountered that belongs to sensation” (A20/B34). Space and time are both necessary *a priori* representations (cf. A24/B38, A31/B46-47) insofar as all empirical *data* presupposes the representations of space and time as pure intuitions.
Raume oder einer leeren Zeit gezogen werden)” (A172/B214). However, as we can have a pure representation of them since they are pure intuitions; it is clear then we can think of empty time and empty space. As we can preview, thinking of empty time is the same as representing persistence a priori.22

Thus, due to the nature of time itself, it will only be through appearances that time can be perceived, for appearances are given to us in a simultaneous or in a successive way; i.e., in time-relations. By contrast, objects of the outer sense can appear to us insofar as they are necessarily in time (cf. B225 ff.). Thus, on the one hand, if time were not presupposed appearances could not be given to us (in temporal relations; i.e., successively or simultaneously). On the other hand, it is through appearances that we can perceive time; i.e., cognize time empirically.

Therefore, the form of inner sense, time itself, requires objects of the outer sense to be cognized as the substratum under which such objects can enter in relations of time. Kant says:

Now time cannot be perceived by itself. Consequently it is in the objects of perception, i.e., the appearances, that the substratum must be encountered that represents time in general and in which all change or simultaneity can be perceived in apprehension through the relation of the appearances to it. (B225)

Thus, time itself as the form of inner sense is the substratum insofar as it lasts and does not change (cf. A182/B225 ff.), and allows the possibility of things to enter into temporal relations. Time itself allows the representation of all relations in

22 Just to avoid confusion, empty time is time itself, i.e., time as the form of inner sense.
time as its own determinations insofar as it is the substratum that persists. “The time, therefore, in which all change of appearances is to be thought, lasts and does not change; since it is that in which succession and simultaneity can be represented only as determinations of it” (B225). ‘Succession’ (Sukzession) and ‘simultaneity’ (Zugleichsein) are then the determinations of time: more precisely, they are the only relations in time (cf. 182-183/B226). Succession accounts for the existence of appearances in time as a time-series, and simultaneity accounts for their existence in time as a time-domain\(^{23}\) which refers to the existence of a body or object as part of a whole, for only as parts of a whole in space can things be simultaneous in time (cf. B225). However, it is important to stress that these relations are the ways in which appearances are connected in time but not modi of time itself. Kant makes this clear when he says:

> For change does not affect time itself, but only the appearances in time (just as simultaneity is not a modus for time itself, in which no parts are simultaneous but rather all succeed one another). If one were to ascribe such a succession to time itself one would have to think yet another time in which this succession would be possible. (A183/B226)

Thus, time itself allows the possibility of appearances to enter into temporal relations, since it persists and has succession and simultaneity as its own determinations; however, we need appearances to actualize the relations and thus to cognize time empirically.

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\(^{23}\)This point is upheld in a footnote to B225 preceded by the letter d in the First Analogy in the section of the Analogies of Experience in the B edition of the first *Critique*. 
Two final comments concerning the manifold of time seem unavoidable. First, we have stated that the manifold of time is composed by times, insofar as all time is necessarily enclosed in a larger time. However, since the ‘I’ is the object of the inner sense (cf. A443/B471), wouldn't the manifold of time also be composed of the representations, feelings and affections of the self? This question is absolutely valid, mostly since Kant considers inner sense to be constituted by the sum of all our representations (cf. A177/B220). Kant would answer us in this way: such a manifold; i.e., that of time concerning the self in inner sense, can only be an empirical manifold; not an a priori one. This answer is satisfactory. Kant could remind us that: “[t]ime, as the formal condition of the manifold of inner sense, thus of the connection of all representations, contains an a priori manifold in pure intuition” (A138/B177). He could also remind us that the ‘I’ is really only the transcendental subject and that nothing can be predicated of ourselves conceived as souls beyond saying that the soul is the organ of the inner sense (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 161).24

This second point, however, is less convincing, mostly when we find statements that uphold the total certitude of the ‘I’. For instance, “[t]he first thing that is entirely certain is this: that I am; I feel myself, I know for certain that I am; but with just such certainty I do not know that other beings are outside me”(ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 206). Likewise, “[t]he reliability of inner sense is certain. I am, I feel that and intuit myself immediately. This proposition thus has a reliability of experience.

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24 See Chapter 4 for the explanation of the 'I' and its conception as transcendental subject, and the chapter on The Paralogisms of Pure Reason in the first Critique for Kant’s conception of the soul.
But that something is *outside me*, of that the senses can provide no reliability” (ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 206-207). Again, this could only convey an *empirical* manifold, but maintaining the *certitude* of our self and of our inner states inevitably poses a problem that Kant deals with only with difficulty. Even after having written the first *Critique* we find statements like this one: “[t]he first original experience is: I am” (ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 590).

In his pre-critical period Kant seemed to give more priority to the certitude provided by the inner sense than to that of the outer sense. However, as his thinking progressed, the certitude of the 'I' decreased until Kant finished upholding that the outer sense was required for the cognition of ourselves.25 We think it is possible that this progress came to be linked to the fact that the experience of ourselves in time presupposes the experience of objects of the outer sense. However, it is our impression that it was not until Kant wrote the chapter on The Paralogisms of Pure Reason in the first *Critique* that he took a final decision concerning the problem of the priority between outer and inner senses. In the Paralogisms Kant takes this discussion to its end by saying that everything in the soul is in *constant flux*; this statement fits well with the conception of the manifold of time composed by *times succeeding one another*. In a fundamental passage Kant says:

> [T]he appearance before outer sense has something standing and abiding in it, which supplies a substratum grounding the transitory determinations . . .

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25 See Chapter 4 for Kant's conception of the 'I' to have a better comprehension of this problem.
whereas time, which is the only form of our inner intuition, has in it nothing abiding, and hence gives cognition only of a change of determinations, but not of the determinable object. For in that which we call the soul, everything is in continual flux, and it has nothing abiding. (A381) (Emphases mine)²⁶

Second, the question about the manifold of time concerning of outer sense also arises in us. Kant could have eventually considered this question unnecessary due to time's nature as a subjective form and a pure intuition, which implies that only when the mind enters into contact with the external world do time and the objects of the outer sense relate to one another. Another possibility for not raising the question, however, is that Kant could have answered the same way as in the previous point; i.e., that since impenetrability and motion are empirical characteristics of matter, the manifold in question could only be an empirical manifold. Finally, we think there is another possibility for not posing the question, and it concerns our incapacity to account for how we relate to objects of the outer senses. Kant says openly there is no way to explain how outer intuition is possible in us, which makes evident there is a gap in cognition. The passage is as follows:

How is outer intuition—namely, that of space (the filling of it by shape and motion)—possible at all in a thinking subject? But it is not possible for any human being to find an answer to this question, and no one will ever fill this gap in our knowledge, but rather only indicate it, by ascribing outer appearances to a transcendental object that is the cause of this species of representations, with which cause, however, we have no acquaintance at all, nor will we ever get a concept of it. (A393).²⁷

²⁶ In another section of the first Critique we find statements in the same tone: “I can, to be sure, say: my representations succeed one another; but that only means that we are conscious of them as in a temporal sequence, i.e., according to the form of inner sense” (A37n/B54n).

²⁷ See Chapter 4 for the explanation of the transcendental object.
1.4. The Material Substratum: The Substance and its Accidents

Kant recognizes also a *material* substratum supporting the persistence of substances (cf. B225). This substratum is presented as the counterpart and complement of time—which can be considered a *subjective* substratum—in the external world, insofar as both substrata need each other, for while time itself allows the possibility of things to enter into temporal relations, there has to be something material; i.e., something substantial, so that the relation in time is really possible, and thus actual in existence.

We agree in general with Paul Guyer that the permanence of time requires something permanent among appearances or empirical objects to represent it (cf. Guyer 1987, 219). Guyer says: “[t]here must be permanence in what is actually perceived – empirical objects – because the permanence of time itself is imperceivable and needs to be represented by something which is both perceivable and permanent” (Guyer 1987, 219).28 Where we do not agree with Guyer is in his statement that the material substratum has to be *inferred* from the substratum of time itself (cf. Guyer 1987, 217), for Kant does not question the existence of an external world apart from the mind; he even at different points of his thought considers the *regularity* of the external world serves and/or guides the mental cognitive process. What could be said in this sense is that Kant *assumes* there is

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28 We also agree with Guyer that Kant’s argument here has nothing to do with the measurement of the duration of specific objects or events in time, as some uphold, but concerns only the permanent duration of time itself (cf. Guyer 1987, 218).
regularity in the empirical data of experience. It is our position that both substrata complement each other; in this sense it is not so much a question of “representation,” i.e., of the need of time to be represented so that it can be perceived, as Guyer considers, that is at stake here, but rather it is fundamentally a question of “making possible temporal relations” and “having something material that can enter into those relations.” Both substrata are persistent and complement each other.

It is precisely when explaining time that substances are introduced in the first Critique, by using the term ‘however’ to mark the contrast to time. Kant says:

However, the substratum of everything real, i.e., everything that belongs to the existence of things, is substance, of which everything that belongs to existence can be thought only as a determination. Consequently that which persists, in relation to which alone all temporal relations of appearances can be determined, is substance in the appearance, i.e., the real in the appearance, which as the substratum of all change always remains the same (Es ist aber das Substrat alles Realen, d.i. sur Existenz der Dinge Gehörigen, die Substanz, an welcher alles, was zum Dasein gehört, nur als Bestimmung kann gedacht werden. Folglich ist das Beharrliche, womit in Verhältnis alle Zeitverhältnisse der Erscheinungen allein bestimmt werden können, die Substanz in der Erscheinung, d.i. das Reale derselben, was als Substrat alles Wechsels immer dasselbe bleibt). (B225)

Here Kant makes clear that there is a material substratum; he calls it ‘substance’ (Substanz) and says it is “the real in the appearance” or “substance in the appearance.” This way of presenting substance is relevant since he wants to convey the idea that the substratum is in the appearance, that it persists in the appearance.

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29 Concerning the regularity in the external world, see in this dissertation the synthesis of reproduction, as well as the explanation of causality on purpose of the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience; both in Chapter 3.
In other words, that substance is what is \textit{real in} the appearance, but that it is not the appearance \textit{as such}. This subtle distinction is introduced to show that the \textit{ultimate material element} in the appearance always persists and never changes, and that it is precisely this material element in the appearance that affects us, and that corresponds to sensation.

The distinction goes further since, even if substance is \textit{in} the appearance, we do not perceive the substance \textit{as such}, but only the appearance. This is why the passage also makes clear that we cannot predicate existence of the substance; but only of its determinations, which are appearances. This does not mean that the material object is just a rational postulate, because for Kant it is something real; it means that it can neither be cognized nor perceived in itself; i.e., as mere substratum, but that it is \textit{in} the appearances that are its determinations, and that it ultimately affects us.\textsuperscript{30}

Substances then are the material elements that ground perceptual objects or appearances, and that persist whatever modification or change these objects undergo. Thus, as substrata, substances always persist and suffer no change. This is why Kant says “as the substratum of all change always remains the same.”

Kant’s point is then that in all that exists, in all appearances as objects of the outer sense, \textit{there is something that always persists}: “in all appearances there is

\textsuperscript{30} We could use a small ‘x’ to account for the substance in each appearance, since the upper case ‘X’ is the transcendental object for Kant, and thus accounts for all substances ultimately. By contrast, we can use a small ‘x’ to account for the material element in each object of the outer sense. We could then call this substance in the appearance the ‘x’ in the appearance. For the explanation of the transcendental object see the Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept in Chapter 4.
something that persists” (A184/B227). This “something that persists” is their material substratum: “in all appearances that which persists is the object itself, i.e., the substance (A183/B227). By the object itself or substance Kant wants to convey
the persistence of matter (cf. A185/B228) that ultimately lies in or subsists in all objects of the outer sense as their material ground.

Likewise, in between the two editions of the first Critique Kant reinforces certain points; e.g., “[t]he appearance of a substance is not the substance itself, and what is valid for it is not valid for the latter” (MM Ak. XXIX: 827). In the same sense he states that: “[s]ince the substances by definition <ex definitione> are privy to outer existence for themselves, one can remove all relation and the substances remain” (MM Ak. XXIX: 827), and “[i]n appearance, substance is what remains there while the determinations change” (MM Ak. XXIX: 826). This is stated similarly in the first Critique: “in all appearances there is something that persists, of which that which changes is nothing but the determinations of its existence” (A184/B227). In this work Kant also speaks of “the everlasting existence of the proper subject of the appearances” (A185/B228).

It is plain for what has been explained until here, that substance is not time itself, but the correlate of time itself in existence, or that which persists in what exists. This is why Kant says: “[s]ubstance is therefore also called the substrate.

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31 Kant will specify that substances are thought through the understanding (cf. MM Ak. XXIX: 828) in contradistinction with appearances that we already know are given to us in empirical intuition and are objects of perception. For the explanation of the categories see Chapter 2 that accounts on how substances are thought through the understanding.
<substratum> of appearances” (MM Ak. XXIX: 769). Both—time itself and substance—are then substrata and, as such, remain always the same through all change, and are not directly perceivable as such. Kant claims: “To time, therefore, which is itself unchangeable and lasting, there corresponds in appearance that which is unchangeable in existence, i.e., substance, and in it alone can the succession and simultaneity of appearances be determined in regard to time” (A144/B183).

The question arises about the reason Kant calls the material substrata substances since the concept ‘substance’ is basically a pure concept of the understanding. Why then does Kant use a fundamental concept of the understanding to refer to matter?32

In the chapter of the Metaphysical Foundations of Dynamics in the

*Metaphysical Foundations*, Kant gives us the answer:

The concept of a substance means the ultimate subject of existence, that is, that which does not itself belong in turn to the existence of another merely as a predicate. Now matter is the subject of everything that may be counted in space as belonging to the existence of things. For, aside from matter, no other subject would be thinkable except space itself, which, however, is a concept that contains nothing existent at all, but merely the necessary conditions for the external relations of possible objects of the outer senses. Thus matter, as the movable in space, is the substance therein. (*MAN* Ak. IV: 503)

That the concept ‘substance’ (*Substanz*) refers to the ultimate subject of existence; i.e., to that which can only be a subject and not a predicate, is a *leitmotiv* in Kant’s philosophy. Kant reminds us of this traditional idea since now he intends to convey that substances are the ultimate subjects of matter. He is then saying that there is something also in matter which is to be considered as a ground insofar as it

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32 See Chapter 2 for the explanation of the pure concepts of the understanding or categories.
cannot be predicated of anything else, but of which it is definitely possible to predicate something in turn. This explains the usage of the concept *substance* to refer also to the material elements that ground the empirical objects or appearances we perceive. The “ultimate subject of existence” is thus substance.

In the *Metaphysical Foundations* Kant upholds that substances as material elements are to be conceived as composite and not as simple. He states that matter is impenetrable and infinitely divisible, and that each part of matter is itself a substance because we can say of these parts that they are subjects as well, and not merely predicates of another matter. The only condition Kant attaches to these parts of matter, that are themselves matter and substances, is that they must be movable in themselves (cf. *MAN*. Ak. IV: 503 ff.)

Even if the *composite* nature of matter may fit well with the fact that it is a *manifold* or a *multiplicity* that is given in empirical intuition, *prima facie* it is difficult to account for substances as ultimate subjects. However, Kant solves this problem by stating that we cannot cognize the substance itself except through its accidents, and that accidents inhere in the substance.

As already mentioned, what belongs to the *existence* of things refers to the *determinations* of the substance. Thus, what we find in existence are all determinations of substances, not substances *as such*. These determinations are

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33 It is worth noting, however, that Kant dealt for a long time with this issue, as the *Lectures on Metaphysics* make plain. Shortly after the first edition of the first *Critique*, he stated also that substances were *simple* material elements (cf. MM Ak. XXIX: 828, MM Ak. XXIX: 827). The *Lectures on Metaphysics* reflect, however, that Kant was trying to conceive a conception of substances as material elements that could be distinguished from Leibniz’s monads and from material atoms as well.
then *the ways* in which the substance exists. In traditional fashion, Kant calls these determinations ‘accidents’ (*Accidenzen*): “The determinations of a substance that are nothing other than particular ways for it to exist are called **accidents**” (A186/B229). Likewise, “[a]ccidents are mere modes *<modi>* of the existence of substance and these cannot be apart from the substance” (*MM* Ak. XXIX: 769).

However, **accidents** must not be understood as something separated from the substance or just attached to it, for they *inhere* in it. This means that a substance has a relation of inherence with its properties or determinations which are expressed through predicates in judgments; that the accidents are the *ways* in which the substance *exists* or expresses itself in appearances. Kant says: “In regard to substance, however, they [accidents] are not really subordinated to it, but are rather the way substance itself exists” (A414/B441). The accidents of a substance all have to be coordinated among them: “accidents (insofar as they inhere in a single substance) are coordinated with one another, and do not constitute a series” (A414/B441). This means then that all the properties of a thing have to be coordinated among themselves and not only each one to the thing they belong to; otherwise stated, all the (possible) ways in which a substance exists have to be related to one another, for each substance is to be understood as a **unity** (cf. *MM* Ak. XXIX: 822). This is why Kant says this coordination cannot constitute a series, for an accident cannot posit another accident *in the same* substance. Accidents then are the properties of things *as belonging to things as such*. It is through their properties
that things are cognized. We can understand now why Kant states that: “we cognize nothing but accidents. For our understanding cognizes everything through predicates; we never cognize that which underlies the predicate” (*MM Ak.* XXIX: 771). Likewise, it is clear that substances cannot be accidents in turn, for then they would not be substances. Kant is clear on this point: “That which exists without being the determination of another is substance; that which exists only as determination is accident” (*MM Ak.* XXIX: 770). Thus, accidents refer to the way in which a substance is made knowable to us; i.e. to how the substance exists.

The concept of ‘inherence’ is introduced to make clear that a substance can only be cognized through its properties or predicates. In the following passage Kant explains what he intends to convey by inherence:

With the expression inherence one imagines the substance carrying the accidents, as if they were mere separate existences, but requiring a basis; however that is simply a sheer misuse of speech; they are simply manners in which things exist. – Insofar as a thing is determined positively, accidents *<accidentia>* inhere in it; insofar as it is negatively determined, they do not inhere in it. They do not exist for themselves and are not merely supported by the substance like a book in a bookcase. (*MM Ak.* XXIX: 769 -770)

The passage adds a new idea: even if accidents belong to the substance, this belonging or inherence is due to the positive determination in a thing. This idea also appears in the first *Critique* since Kant states that accidents refer to the ways in

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34 Likewise, in judgments the relation of substance–accident will be represented as that of ‘subject-predicate.’ This is why Kant explains at times the two topics in an interrelated way or through analogies. For instance: “[t]hat which cannot exist otherwise than as subject is substance, what cannot exist otherwise than as predicate is accident” (*MM Ak.* XXIX: 769). The verbal distinction, however, responds to a double level: while substance-accident accounts for the objective level of experience, subject-predicate accounts for the logical level.
which the substance is positively determined (cf. A187/B230). What are we to understand by this positive determination then?

1.5. The Reciprocal Causality of Substances: Interaction of Substances

The positive determination of a thing refers to what Kant calls “the causality of a substance” (cf. A648/B676, cf. B111, cf. A203/B248 ff.). This means that substances cause the way in which other substances exist; i.e., that substances posit the accidents of other substances. Kant says: “[c]ausality <causalitas> is the property of a substance insofar as it is considered as a cause of an accident <accidentis>” (ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 565).

Thus, causality is attributed to a substance insofar as it is considered as the cause of an accident in another substance. This explains why Kant understands the causality of a substance as ‘power’ (Kraft) (cf. A648/B676). Power accounts for the action of substances through which substances determine the ways of existence of other substances (cf. MM Ak. XXIX: 823). Since substances are movable in themselves, they cause determinations in other substances by their action. We can understand why then “[p]ower is merely the relation of the substance to the accident, no thing in itself” (MD Ak. XXVIII: 671).

Thus by acting, the substance posits accidents and shows it is power. “Action is the determination of the power of a substance as a cause of a certain accident <accidentis>” (ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 564-565). A passage written three or four years after the B edition of the first Critique summarizes well these ideas:
The concept of cause lies in the concept of power. The substance is considered as subject, and the latter as cause. Accident is therefore something real because it exists by inhering <i>inhaerendo</i> and not for itself. Causality is the determination of something else, by which it is posited according to general rules. The concept of the relation <i>respectus</i> or of the relation of the substance to the existence of accidents, insofar as it contains their grounds, is <i>power</i>. (ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 564)

This action is considered the empirical criterion of the substance (cf. A204/B249) for by it accidents are posited. “Action already signifies the relation of the subject of causality to the effect” (A205/B250). Action proves substantiability insofar as the subject of action itself cannot change. Otherwise, another subject would be required to determine change (cf. A205/B250). Kant says: “action, as a sufficient empirical criterion, proves substantiability without it being necessary for me first to seek out its persistence through compared perceptions . . . the primary subject of the causality of all arising and perishing cannot itself arise and perish (in the field of appearances)” (A205/B250-251). Thus, in experience action serves as a

35 By <i>general rules</i> Kant means laws of nature, the most general of which is the rule that all events are causally concatenated. Laws of nature, however, are determined by the understanding; what the external world exhibits is regularity and/or certain patterns to perception. Kant intends to show in certain parts of his thought that both processes can be equated or considered as following similar patterns to a certain extent. This is due precisely to the relationship mind – external world, where the former determines the latter, but the latter indicates the former. See for instance this interesting passage:

The law of nature that everything that happens has a cause, that since the causality of this cause, i.e., the <b>action</b>, precedes in time and in respect of an effect that has <b>arisen</b> cannot have been always but must have <b>happened</b>, and so must also have had its cause among appearances, through which it is determined, and consequently that all occurrences are empirically determined in a natural order – this law, through which alone appearances can first constitute one <b>nature</b> and furnish objects of one experience, is a law of the understanding, from which under no pretext can any departure be allowed or any appearance be exempted; because otherwise one would put this appearance outside of all possible experience, thereby distinguishing it from all objects of possible experience and making it into a mere thought-entity and a figment of the brain. (A542-543/B570-571)
sort of proof that the substantial persists through all change; these changes, like arising and perishing, can only be proper to appearances or accidents but not to the substance itself.

Now, the causality of the substance is to be understood as interaction.

‘Interaction’ (Wechselwirkung) is the mutual causality among substances; it is the relation each substance has with all other substances insofar as they constitute a whole. The ‘whole’ (Ganze) implies interaction: reciprocal connection is the condition of the whole (cf. MM Ak. XXIX: 852; ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 212).

Since his pre-critical period Kant conceives interaction as reciprocal causality: “this is interaction <commercium>, where the state of the one depends upon the state of the other, where one determines the other and is again determined by it” (ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 212). However, it is in the first Critique where the interaction or community of substances is fully conceived. There Kant says:

[T]he relation of substances in which the one contains determinations the ground of which is contained in the other is the relation of influence, and if the latter reciprocally contains the ground of the determinations of the former, it is the relation of community or interaction (und, wenn wechselseitig dieses den Grund der Bestimmungen in dem anderen enthält, das Verhältnis der Gemeinschaft oder Wechserlwirkung). (B257-258)

Thus each substance (since it can be a consequence only with regard to its determinations) must simultaneously contain the causality of certain determinations in the other and the effects of the causality of the other (Also muß jede Substanz (da sie nur in Ansehung ihrer Bestimmungen Folge sein kann) die Kausalität gewisser Bestimmungen in der andern, und zugleich die Wirkungen von der Kausalität der andern in sich enthalten). (A212/B259)36

36 Likewise:“Interaction <commercium> is reciprocal influence <influxus mutuus>, for how else is the interaction <commercium> of different substances possible than by one determining something in
Thus, ‘influence’ (Einfluß) is not interaction or community since interaction implies mutual influence. Kant makes this clear when he says “influence, i.e., how one substance can be the cause of something in another substance” (B111), but “community is the causality of a substance in the reciprocal determination of others” (B111). Interaction then is the causal action of one substance on another with the latter acting on the former as well. More precisely, it is the relation all substances have with one another in which they are causes and effects of all others.

To explain this let us imagine we have a whole composed of three substances—A, B, C—and that each has respectively, the properties e, f, g. Thus, A is e, and B is f, and C is g. These are three substances with their own determinations or properties. How the properties exist as accidents has already been explained. What Kant is saying now is that A is e because B is f and because C is g. Likewise, B is f because A is e, and because C is g. Finally, C is g because A is e and because B is f. That is to say, each of the substances causes the determinations the other substances have. This might seem to imply that it would be correct to say, for example, that the sun is round because the lake is blue and the bird is flying; that the lake is blue because the sun is round and because the bird is flying; and that the bird is flying because the sun is round and because the lake is blue. Obviously, however, this is not the case. The problem with the example is that it overlooks the vastly
larger class of simultaneous states to which the shape of the sun, the color of the lake, and the flight of the bird belong. One of the tasks of empirical science is to strive to provide a maximal understanding of reciprocal causality, but this can only be, for us, a regulative ideal. However, it is also necessary for us to posit reciprocal causality, because this is the only way we can explain *how* things exist *simultaneously in time*: “the simultaneity of substances in space cannot be cognized in experience otherwise than under the presupposition of an interaction among them” (B258).

The intention here is to understand the co-existence of things but not in the sense of a mere aggregate, i.e., as mere plurality of things in space (cf. A414/B441), but rather in the sense of the coexistence of things in time; i.e., it is a simultaneity in space and time. Kant says: “Things are **simultaneous** if in empirical intuition the perception of one can follow the perception of the other *reciprocally*” (B256-257). Likewise: “simultaneity is the existence of the manifold at the same time” (B257). Finally, “[t]hings are simultaneous insofar as they exist at one and the same time” (A211/B258). Going back to our example, this is how we can explain the fact that we can perceive *at the same time* that the sun is round, that the lake is blue, and that a bird is flying.

Kant is here evidently trying to justify the unity of perception, but also the unity of our experience of an objective world, for he claims that thoroughgoing interaction must hold among everything that comprises a single world. By ‘world’
he is thinking in the world-whole which is the only whole which is not part of another (cf. MM Ak. XXIX: 852). “The world is a whole of substances, which are in reciprocal connection” (ML Ak. XXVIII: 211). Kant claims:

An aggregate is still not a whole; here only many things <plura> that stand in no reciprocal connection are thought. The difference of the world from every other composite <composito> is: that the world is a substantial whole which is not a part of another <totum substantiale, quod non est pars alterius>. (ML Ak. XXVIII: 196)

Kant wants to deny the possibility of there being more than one world; this is why as his ideas progress he tends to use the concept of ‘whole’ as a synonym of ‘world’, and refers to ‘composite’, ‘aggregate’ or ‘multitude’ for apparent wholes where no interaction exists. Likewise, his conception of the mutual causality of substances constituting a whole makes it necessary for him to postulate the finitude of substances; otherwise, they could not constitute a whole (cf. MM Ak. XXIX: 852).

1.6. The Alteration of Substances and the Unity of Time

A second argument for the persistence of substance is introduced by Kant by maintaining that substances never change but only alter in their states. The concept ‘state’ (Zustand) is used as a synonym of a determination or property of the substance. As we have already seen, only the accidents of the substance change (cf. A183-184/B227).

‘Alteration’ (Veränderung) means the combination of contradictorily opposed determinations in the existence of one and the same thing (cf. B291). More precisely, “[a]lteration is a way of existing that succeeds another way of existing of
the very same object. Hence everything that is altered is **lasting**, and only its **state changes**" (A187/B230). Kant says: “only what persists (the substance) is altered, while that which is changeable (das Wandelbare) does not suffer any alteration but rather a **change**, since some determinations cease and others begin” (A187/B230-231).

Thus, the opposition of ‘alteration’ (Veränderung) to ‘change’ (Wechsel) corresponds to the opposition of the substance that persists (neither arises nor perishes) to the accidents that change (arise and perish), respectively (cf. A186/B229, B233, cf. A187-188/B230-231).³⁷ The key point here is, however, the concept of ‘opposed determinations.’ Kant says: “the concept of alteration presupposes one and the same subject as existing with two opposed determinations, and thus as persisting” (B232-233). We can say then that while the substance of water never changes, its **freezing** and **melting** are two opposed determinations, and when it passes from one to the other the substance has been altered. It is plain then that two opposed determinations cannot belong to the substance at the same time, but they have to be successive in time. Kant says that only in time; i.e., successively, can contradictorily opposed determinations in one thing be encountered.

The question then is how alteration occurs, and whether the succession in time has a major role here or is merely a secondary issue. Kant explains how alteration occurs in the Second Analogy of Experience:

³⁷ “Origin from nothing <ortus ex nihilo> is the origin of substance” (MM Ak. XXIX: 826).
The question therefore arises, how a thing passes from one state = a into another one = b. Between two instants there is always a time, and between two states in those instances there is always a difference that has a magnitude (for all parts of appearances are always in turn magnitudes). Thus every transition from one state into another happens in a time that is contained between two instants, of which the former determines the state from which the thing proceeds and the second the state at which it arrives. (A208/B253)

This passage by itself does not shed sufficient light on what Kant intends to convey. However, shortly after he adds this:

That is, now, the law of the continuity of all alteration, the ground of which is this: That neither time nor appearance in time consists of smallest parts, and that nevertheless in its alteration the state of the thing passes through all these parts, as elements, to its second state. No difference of the real in appearance is the smallest, just as no difference in the magnitude of times is, and thus the new state of reality grows out of the first, in which it did not exist, thorough all the infinite degrees of reality, the differences between which are all smaller than that between 0 and a. (A209/B254)

The text then says that there is continuity in all alteration; we know already that time is a continuous magnitude, and thus that we can divide every time into smaller times. Now, the passage just quoted states that the case is the same for substances; this is what Kant means by “no difference of the real in appearance is the smallest.” This means then that the substance itself also persists through the alteration. However, at the same time, Kant says that nevertheless in its alteration the substance passes through infinite degrees of reality; i.e., through infinite degrees of being in time, where none of them however persists; this is why he says that the difference is smaller than before the substance began its alteration and zero, for

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38 See MM Ak. XXIX: 863 - 864 for a similar answer to this question.
zero will imply the negation of a being in time. Thus, what Kant is intending to convey is that through its alteration the substance passes through infinite degrees of reality none of which persists, but that the quantum of the substance is maintained during all of the alteration.

A first observation then is that the quantum of the substance does not change through its alteration, for the substance itself always persists; this is explicitly stated by Kant when he says “[s]ince this [the substance in the appearance or the real in the appearance] ... cannot change in existence, its quantum in nature can also be neither increased nor diminished” (cf. B225). Thus Kant is trying to convey the idea that through alteration the quantum of the substance is always the same, even if through the passage of one state to another the substance is altered; e.g. during the freezing of water—the change from its liquid state to its solid state—the appearance passes through an infinite number of intermediate states.

The explanation of the alteration of the substance has a second aim, since it serves Kant to support additionally the persistence of time. Otherwise, the reality of the quantum of the substance could not have persisted through all of the time in which it changed from one state to another. Thus, through the alteration of substances we perceive the unity of time. Kant uses here a double argument since, on the one hand, the persistence of time explains how the reality of the quantum of the substance stays the same throughout its alteration, while, on the other hand, the
alteration of the substance reveals the unity of time; i.e., “the identity of the substratum in which alone all change has its thoroughgoing unity” (A186/B229).
CHAPTER II
CONCEPT FORMATION THROUGH THE UNDERSTANDING


2.1.1. The Understanding: The Faculty for Thinking Objects through Concepts

Our previous chapter explained how cognition requires the faculty of sensibility; more precisely, how space and time function as a priori conditions for the receptivity of sensible impressions. However, it is clear as well that cognition cannot arise from sensibility alone, since, as such, the sensible faculty is unable to produce a concept for the intuited manifold. Empirical cognition is always dependent on the senses, but even if the forms of space and time determine a priori all possible relations for the multiplicity of sensible impressions, no object of cognition, properly speaking, can be determined until the mind gives unity to these sensorial impressions that appear in certain relations. This unity is represented in a concept. Sensibility therefore has necessarily to act in a conjoint—and simultaneous—way with another faculty that produces the concept for the object, so that an object of cognition can be (totally) determined through its relation to consciousness.¹

¹ This chapter will introduce us to the relation to consciousness; Chapter 4 will explain it.
Thus, the concept correlates with the object, and the faculty whose role is to produce the concept is called by Kant ‘understanding’ (Verstand). Understanding is the faculty that thinks objects: “[t]he faculty for thinking of objects of sensible intuition . . . is the understanding” (A51/B75). Kant stresses that we think through concepts. “Thinking is cognition through concepts” (A69/B94). Thus, thinking is to be understood as the activity of the mind that produces concepts for objects or for the intuited manifold. Cognition then is the conjoint activity of sensibility and understanding, or of intuitions and concepts which are the two fundamental kinds of representations for Kant. Kant points out:

Our cognition arises from two fundamental sources in the mind, the first of which is the reception of representations (the receptivity of impressions), the second the faculty for cognizing an object by means of these representations (spontaneity of concepts); through the former an object is given to us, through the latter it is thought in relation to that representation (as a mere determination of the mind). Intuition and concepts therefore constitute the elements of all our cognition, so that neither concepts without intuition corresponding to them in some way nor intuition without concepts can yield a cognition. (A50-51/B74-75)

If Kant speaks here of ‘spontaneity’ (Spontaneität) it is precisely because the mind has the capacity to produce a concept for the manifold of intuition; the act of thinking is this spontaneous activity through which concepts originate in the understanding. More specifically, the receptivity of the mind is immediately accompanied by the activity of thinking; this means that when I think the manifold

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2 In the *Logic*: “Cognition through concepts is called thinking (cognitio discursiva)” (L Ak. IX: 91) and in the *Jäsche Logic* “Cognition through concepts is called thought (cognitio discursiva)” (JL Ak. IX: 91). It is worth noting here that Kant sometimes identifies ‘thinking’ and ‘understanding’; e.g., “understanding is a cognition through concepts, not intuitive but discursive” (A68/B93).
of intuition, it already appears in consciousness in a unified way; i.e., that the
relations in which the intuited manifold is given to us are united as being ordered
(in some way) in a concept and, at the same time, united to one consciousness.\(^3\) The
concept represents the unity of the manifold given in intuition, which implies that
intuitions must be brought under concepts. Kant is clear about the need of both
faculties for cognition, as well as the need of their conjoint action:

Neither of these properties [sensibility and understanding] is to be preferred
to the other. Without sensibility no object would be given to us, and without
understanding none would be thought (\textit{Keine dieser Eigenschaften ist der
andern vorzuziehen. Ohne Sinnlichkeit würde uns kein Gegenstand gegeben,
und ohne Verstand keiner gedacht werden}). Thoughts without content are
empty, intuitions without concepts are blind. It is just as necessary to make
the mind’s concepts sensible (i.e., to add an object to them in intuition) as it is
to make its intuitions understandable (i.e., to bring them under concepts).
Further these two faculties or capacities cannot exchange their functions.
The understanding is not capable of intuiting anything, and the senses are
not capable of thinking anything. Only from their unification can cognition
arise (\textit{Der Verstand vermag nichts anzuschauen, und die Sinne nichts zu
denken. Nur daraus, daß sie sich vereinigen, kann Erkenntnis entspringen}).
(A51-52/B75-76)

\subsection*{2.1.2. Forming Empirical Concepts through Reflection}

The question now is \textit{how} the mind produces the concept. How do concepts
arise? This question is then followed by another that requires us to explain what
kinds of concepts could be produced, since even to common understanding it is
plain that the concept ‘chair’ and the concept ‘God’ must be of a different kind. Let

\footnote{\textsuperscript{3} See Chapter 4 for the explanation on consciousness.}
us first focus on the origin of concepts. However, to understand this it is necessary first to define concepts.

Kant defines a concept as a universal representation or as a representation of what is common to several objects: “[a] concept is . . . a universal representation, or a representation of what is common to several objects, hence a representation insofar as it can be contained in various ones” (JL Ak. IX: 91n). He also defines a concept by saying that “a concept [is] a universal (repraesentatio per notas communes) or reflected (reflectirte) representation (repraesentatio discursiva)” (JL Ak. IX: 91). Concepts then imply a generalization of common marks and reflection. In addition, concepts have matter and form, the former being the object and the latter its universality. “With every concept we are to distinguish matter and form. The matter of concepts is the object; their form is universality” (JL Ak. IX: 91). The form of the concept is then its generality or universality; i.e., what accounts for the common marks of various manifolds that are subsumed under a determinate concept.

These definitions make clear that the main point here is the nature of concepts as universal representations, and the fact that this universality is their form. So, to account for the origin of concepts, we have then to understand how this universality is produced and why it is the form of concepts. This places us directly in Kant’s logic, since General Logic is what accounts for the form of concepts insofar

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4 The second question will be answered through this chapter.
as its task is to account for concepts (and judgments and syllogisms) abstracting from all of their content. Concerning the origin of concepts Kant says: “[t]his logical origin of concepts—the origin as to their mere form—consists in reflection, whereby a representation common to several objects (conceptus communis) arises” (JL Ak. IX: 94). Kant says:

The origin of concepts as to mere form rests on reflection and on abstraction from the difference among things that are signified by a certain representation. And thus arises here the question: Which acts of the understanding constitute a concept? or what is the same, Which are involved in the generation of a concept out of given representations? (JL Ak. IX: 93)

The logical origin of concepts then accounts only for the form of concepts or how concepts arise as universal representations. These citations introduce new points to consider: that reflection and abstraction are involved in this logical generation of concepts, and that these two mental activities work on given representations; i.e., on the given manifolds in intuition. Otherwise stated, since General Logic considers only the form of concepts (and not their matter), it considers the origin of concepts that account for several similar objects; this is what Kant means by “the difference among things that are signified by a certain representation” (it is understood that this certain representation is the concept).

Kant answers the question about the acts of the understanding that constitute a concept out of given representations as follows:

The logical actus of the understanding, through which concepts are generated as to their form are:
1) comparison (Comparation, d.i., die Vergleichung), of representations among one another in relation to the unity of consciousness;
2) reflection (Reflexion, d.i. die Überlegung), as to how various representations can be conceived in one consciousness; and finally
3) abstraction (Abstraction oder die Absonderung) of everything else in which the given representations differ. (JL Ak. IX: 94)

To make concepts out of given representations, one must then be able to compare, to reflect, and to abstract, for these three logical operations of the understanding are the essential and universal conditions for generation of every (empirical) concept whatsoever. For instance, I see a spruce, a willow, and a linden. By first comparing these objects with one another I note that they are different from one another in regard to the trunk, the branches, the leaves, etc.; but next I reflect on that which they have in common among themselves, trunk, branches and leaves themselves, and then I abstract from the quantity, the figure, etc., of these; thus I acquire a concept of a tree (cf. JL Ak. IX: 94-95). Thus, the universality or form of a concept is acquired through reflection; it refers to what is common to all given representations, once we have abstracted from all its particular features.

Therefore, three activities of the understanding are involved in the logical generation of concepts: ‘comparison’ (Vergleichung), ‘reflection’ (Überlegung) and ‘abstraction’ (Absonderung). Thus, I perceive several trees—i.e., several given representations—and notice that they are different from one another. I compare these several trees and I note they are different: this is the logical act of comparison. In comparison the sensorial impressions are related to one another and to consciousness as well. But then I reflect and, through this logical act of reflection, I realize that they all have trunk, leaves, branches, etc. This is the logical act of
reflection in which the similar features or common marks of the objects are recognized and conceived in one consciousness. Finally, the mind abstracts from all secondary characteristics of the trees, e.g., from their quantity, size, height, and color, and this is how the concept ‘tree’ appears in consciousness. Therefore, the understanding, by performing these three logical acts conjointly, gives rise to the concept ‘tree;’ this is how the understanding produces a concept for various similar given sensorial impressions.

Thus the concept—in this case the concept ‘tree’—is a universal (or general) representation, since it contains the necessary characteristics or common features of various objects of the senses that are given to us in empirical intuition. Thus, through the logical acts of comparing, reflecting and abstracting, the understanding is able to recognize the universal characteristics or determinations of similar objects. This is how the concept is logically generated and why universality is the form of concepts. This allows us to understand also why Kant states that “[t]he form of a concept, as that of a discursive representation, is always made” (JL Ak. IX: 93), since the concept as a universal representation is a product of the understanding’s three activities, where only the empirical manifold is given through sensible intuition. We can also say that if the concept is a universal representation it is because it accounts for what necessarily is in the object, i.e., we cannot imagine a tree that has no trunk, leaves or roots, etc.
It is important to stress the importance of reflection in this activity of thinking performed by the understanding, and by which intuitions are brought under concepts, since it is through reflection that universality appears. However, this opens the question about the relevance of abstraction. Abstraction is important insofar as it perfects the concept setting its limits: “[a]bstraction is only the negative condition under which universal representations can be generated, the positive condition is comparison and reflection. For no concept comes to be through abstraction; abstraction only perfects it [the concept] and encloses it in its determinate limits” (JL Ak. IX: 95). However, abstraction is important insofar as it is through this activity that the concept of ‘something’; i.e., the most abstract concept, arises.\(^5\) It is worth citing a fundamental passage where Kant explains how the most abstract concept is originated:

The expression abstraction is not always used correctly in logic. We must not speak of abstracting something but rather of abstracting from something. With a scarlet cloth, for example, if I think only of the red color, then I abstract from the cloth; if I abstract from this too and think the scarlet as a material stuff in general, then I abstract from still more determinations, and my concept has in this way become still more abstract. For the more the differences among things that are left out of a concept, or the more the determinations from which we abstract in that concept, the more abstract the concept is. Abstract concepts, therefore, should really be called abstracting concepts (*conceptus abstrahentes*), i.e., ones in which several abstractions occur. Thus the concept body is really not an abstract concept, for I cannot abstract from body itself, else I would not have the concept of it. But I must of course abstract from the size, the color, the hardness or fluidity, in short, from all the special determinations of particular bodies. The *most abstract* concept is the one that has nothing in common with any distinct

\(^5\) It is relevant know how the concept of ‘something’ arises, since it will be helpful to understand Kant’s conception of the transcendental object. See Chapter 4 for this explanation.
from itself. This is the concept of something, for that which is different from it is nothing, and it thus has nothing in common with something. (JL Ak. IX:95)

Finally, as stated above, concepts also have ‘matter’ (Materie): matter is the content of the concept, i.e., the object. In this case the tree(s) we see; more precisely, the matter accounts for the different but similar sensible manifolds we are given in empirical intuition.

This is then how all our ‘empirical concepts’ or ‘concepts of experience’ (Erfahrungsbe griffe) are produced. Kant says: “[a]n empirical concept arises from the senses through comparison of objects of experience and attains through the understanding merely the form of universality. The reality of these concepts rests on actual experience, from which, as to their content, they are drawn” (JL Ak. IX: 92). Concepts obtain their objective validity precisely by being derived from actual experience, insofar as the empirical manifolds falling under them are given to us in intuition. Thus, concepts that arise out of given representations have no need to justify their origin since the possibility of their empirical content is never at stake.

2.1.3. The Limitations of General Logic and the Role of Transcendental Logic

While General Logic accounts well for how given representations can become concepts in thought, Kant considers that it falls short to account for truth in cognition, insofar as it leaves aside the content and focuses only on the form of

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6 In the Logic: “The empirical concept springs from the senses through comparison of the objects of experience and receives, through the understanding, merely the form of generality. The reality of these concepts rests on actual experience, from which they have been extracted as to their content” (L Ak. IX: 92).
thinking (cf. A58/B83 ff.). Thus, Kant’s conception of a Transcendental Logic implies that besides the formal aspects of thinking, the content of cognition is considered as well. In this sense, a Transcendental Logic will have the role to account for the origin of cognition insofar as this origin cannot be ascribed to objects. More precisely, Kant proposes a logic that accounts for the manner in which the formal structure of the mind can relate a priori to objects of intuition. Otherwise stated, a Transcendental Logic must show how it is that subjective conditions can have objective validity, i.e., yield conditions for the possibility of cognition that relate a priori to objects (cf. A90/B122).

To attain this aim Kant will undertake an analysis of the faculty of understanding, to determine, first, whether pure concepts have their birth in it, and, second, whether such pure concepts can, or rather must, apply to intuition a priori. This is why Kant proposes to isolate the understanding in order to seek which part of our thought has its origin completely a priori. The Transcendental Analytic will be thus the part of the Transcendental Logic that will expound the pure concepts of

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7 Kant considers the nominal definition of truth; i.e., the agreement of cognition with its object, to be granted and presupposed. In the general criterion of truth we are considering all cognition without distinction among objects, but this implies abstracting from all content of cognition—the relation to the object—and truth concerns precisely this content. The logical criterion of truth, i.e., the agreement of cognition with the formal laws of the understanding and reason has a limitation; it can only be the conditio sine qua non—and thus the negative condition—of all truth. In this sense also the principle of contradiction is a conditio sine qua non and a negative criterion of all truth that belongs to logic insofar as it holds of cognitions in general. However, it has also a positive use since it is the universal and completely sufficient—supreme—principle of all analytic judgments (see A151/B190 ff.). Kant’s point is that a criterion of truth needs to consider (also) the content of cognition; this is why the criterion of truth of any cognition has to be found.
the understanding as the elements of the pure understanding, or as the elements of pure cognition of the understanding (cf. A63/B87). Kant says:

I understand by an analytic of concepts not their analysis . . . but rather the must less frequently attempted analysis of the faculty of understanding itself, in order to research the possibility of a priori concepts by seeking them only in the understanding as their birthplace and analyzing its pure use in general; for this is the proper business of a transcendental philosophy; the rest is the logical treatment of concepts in philosophy in general. We will therefore pursue the pure concepts into their first seeds and predispositions in the human understanding, where they lie ready, until with the opportunity of experience they are finally developed and exhibited in their clarity, by the very same understanding, liberated from the empirical conditions attaching to them. (A66/B91)

Thus, the task of transcendental philosophy is to seek these pure concepts of the understanding. They will guarantee strict universality8 in cognition without falling into the shortcomings of traditional metaphysics, one of which is to use concepts without first demonstrating their origin and their legitimate applicability to objects of possible experience. A critique of pure reason searches precisely to determine the legitimate sphere human understanding and reason.

Kant intends then to keep the universality and necessity proper to metaphysics through the possibility of encountering in our own human understanding a priori concepts, that have not arisen from experience at all and have nothing empirical in themselves, and that, nevertheless, govern a priori all empirical intuition. He points out:

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8 Strict universality is to be distinguished from relative universality, since the latter refers to the universality grounded in experience through an inductive reasoning; e.g., the first level of the Aristotelian scientific method and Francis Bacon's inductive-experimental method. By contrast, strict universality can never be grounded in experience.
In the expectation, therefore, that there can perhaps be concepts that may be related to objects \emph{a priori}, not as pure or sensible intuitions but rather merely as acts of pure thinking, that are thus concepts but of neither empirical nor aesthetic origin, we provisionally formulate the idea of a science of pure understanding and of the pure cognition of reason, by means of which we think objects completely \textit{a priori}. Such a science, which would determinate the origin, the domain, and the objective validity of such cognitions, would have to be called \textit{transcendental logic}, since it has to do merely with the laws of the understanding and reason, but solely insofar as they are related to objects \textit{a priori} and not, as in the case of general logic, to empirical as well as pure cognitions of reason without distinction. (A57/B82)\textsuperscript{9}

The Transcendental Analytic will be concerned with concepts that are pure and not empirical; concepts that belong to thinking and understanding and not to intuition and sensibility; and concepts that are elementary and so clearly distinguishable from those which are derived from or composed of them. It is a further requirement that the Analytic produce a table of these concepts that is complete in the sense that they entirely exhaust the entire field of pure understanding (cf. A64/B89).

Now, the idea of a Transcendental Logic or of a science of the pure understanding is fundamental to the whole Kantian project. In the first and second

\textsuperscript{9} In the same sense, Kant says:

\begin{quote}
General logic abstracts, as we have shown, from all content of cognition, i.e., from any relation of it to the object, and considers only the logical form in the relation of cognitions to one another, i.e., the form of thinking in general. But now since there are pure as well as empirical intuitions (as the transcendental aesthetic proved), a distinction between pure and empirical thinking of objects could also well be found. In this case there would be a logic in which one did not abstract from all content of cognition . . . It would therefore concern the origin of our cognitions of objects insofar as that cannot be ascribed to the objects; while general logic, on the contrary, has nothing to do with this origin of cognition, but rather considers representations . . . merely in respect of the laws according to which the understanding brings them into relation to one another when it thinks, and therefore it [general logic] deals only with the form of the understanding, which can be given to the representations wherever they may have originated. (A55-56/B79-80)
\end{quote}
Introductions to the *Critique of Pure Reason* Kant states that his aim is to establish a system of the principles of pure reason or principles of cognition absolutely *a priori* (cf. A11-12/B24-25). This project is undertaken following an *idea of the whole* as a regulative idea in the procedures of the understanding. Kant says:

Now this completeness of a science [of pure understanding] cannot reliably be assumed from a rough calculation of an aggregate put together by mere estimates; hence it is possible only by means of an *idea of the whole* of the *a priori* cognition of the understanding, and through the division of concepts that such an idea determines and that constitutes it, thus only through their **connection in a system**. (A64-65/B89)

Thus, having an *idea of the whole* beforehand benefits the inquiry insofar as it delineates the completeness of the science of pure understanding in a system. This systematic form is necessary for the completeness of a science; this is why Kant considers a system to presuppose the idea of the whole. This idea, however, is to be understood as merely **regulative** insofar as empirical investigation is still required; empirical investigation specifies the whole in several interrelated ways. It would be a mistake to take Kant as a thoroughgoing rationalist; Kant is neither a rationalist nor an empiricist. As our dissertation will show in different ways, he draws on both doctrines of thought but cannot be classified, strictly speaking, as adhering to either of them.  

*After these explanations, we can introduce ourselves into the discussion concerning the pure concepts of the understanding.*

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10 The contrast between *system* and *aggregate* is helpful to understand why Kant finds relevant an idea of the whole:

*Science.* A complex of cognition. Is divided into aggregate and system. An aggregate is a common cognition. A system is a science. A system rests on the unity of the idea, namely, how the manifold of a cognition is juxtaposed. It presupposes the idea of the whole, then, in
2.2. The Pure Concepts of the Understanding or Categories

2.2.1. Judgments are Functions of Unity among Representations

As already anticipated, besides ‘empirical concepts,’ or concepts of experience (Erfahrungsbegriffe), Kant upholds ‘pure concepts of the understanding’ (reinen Verstandesbegriffe) which are not abstracted from experience, but produced by the spontaneity (Spontaneität) of the mind, and are the conditions for the possibility of experience that relate a priori to objects (cf. A93/B126, B162, A88/B120). This implies that these pure concepts will function as rules for the empirical use of the understanding; i.e., for what is given in empirical intuition. It also implies that without these pure concepts no cognition of empirical objects is possible at all. Indeed, both implications are two sides of the same coin. Kant states this clearly when he says:

The a priori conditions of a possible experience in general are at the same time conditions of the possibility of the objects of experience (Die Bedingungen a priori einer möglichen Erfahrung überhaupt sind zugleich Bedingungen der Möglichkeit der Gegenstände der Erfahrung). Now I assert that the categories . . . are nothing other than the conditions of thinking in a possible experience (die Bedingungen des Denkens in einer möglichen Erfahrung), just as space and time contain the conditions of the intuition for the very same thing. (A111)

which the science is contained. With an aggregate one also intends to get to the whole by constantly adding parts. With an aggregate the parts precede the whole, then; with a system, the whole precedes the parts. This distinction is very important. All of metaphysics is nothing but an aggregate and a rhapsody, because we have never yet had the idea of the whole, [of] how far man can go beyond reason, and on what sort of means he builds what he says. Hence metaphysics is a constant rhapsody. (VL Ak. XXIV: 891)
The explanation of the so-called ‘pure concepts of the understanding’ (reinen Verstandesbegriffe) or ‘categories’ (Kategorien) is based on the logical functions of the understanding in judgments (von der logischen Funktion des Verstandes in Urteilen) since Kant considers that we have in these logical functions the clue for their discovery (A70/B95). An important passage, where Kant clarifies the relation between, concepts, intuitions and judgments, is useful to introduce us to the topic:

[A] concept is thus never immediately related to an object, but is always related to some other representation of it (whether that be an intuition or itself already a concept)\(^\text{11}\). Judgment is therefore the mediate cognition of an object, hence the representation of a representation of it. In every judgment there is a concept that holds of many, and that among this many also comprehends a given representation, which is then related immediately to the object. So in the judgment, e.g., ‘All bodies are divisible,’ the concept of the divisible is related to various other concepts; among these, however, it is here particularly related to the concept of body, and this in turn is related to certain appearances\(^\text{12}\) that come before us. These objects are therefore mediately represented by the concept of divisibility. All judgments are accordingly functions of unity among our representations (Alle Urteile sind demnach Funktionen der Einheit unter unsern Vortellungen), since instead of an immediate representation a higher one, which comprehends this and other representations under itself, is used for the cognition of the object, and many possible cognitions are thereby drawn together into one. We can, however, trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for judging. For according to what has been said above it is a faculty for thinking. (A68-69/B93-94)

This passage gives us important information. Concepts are never immediately related to an object because only intuitions are immediate

\(^{11}\) In the first edition of the first Critique the information inside the parenthesis appears differently and appears outside the parenthesis as well. It says: “which itself contains intuition only mediately or immediately.”

\(^{12}\) Kant’s copy of the first edition says ‘intuitions’ instead of ‘appearances’, which is more specific.
representations of objects. Thus, a concept relates to another concept or to an intuition. Judgments then are necessarily mediate representations of objects insofar as they are composed of concepts. However, Kant adds that in judgments not only concepts are at stake but also intuitions; that is what he means when he says that “in every judgment there is a concept that holds of many;” i.e., in a judgment a concept relates to other concepts but also to the intuitions (of objects) that correspond to those concepts. For example, ‘divisibility’ does not only relate to the concept ‘body’ but also to all concepts falling under it, such as the concepts of a corpse or a cake. Thus, when we apply a concept such as ‘divisibility’ to a general concept such as that of a body, we are indirectly attributing the predicate to all of the concepts included in the subject. This is one aspect of Kant’s view that a concept is a rule (cf. A106). Kant writes:

Thus the concept of body serves as the rule for our cognition of outer appearances by means of the unity of the manifold that it thought through it. .. Thus in the case of the perception of something outside of us the concept of body makes necessary the representation of extension, and with it that of impenetrability, of shape, etc. (A106)

And each of these other concepts includes their corresponding intuitions at the same time. This explains why Kant states that “all judgments are functions of unity among our representations;” where ‘function’ (Funktion) is to be understood as “the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common

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13 See Chapter 1 for Kant’s conception of intuition.

14 A concept can relate to another concept insofar as it can be subsumed under another concept; e.g. a concept can be a higher or a lower concept of another (concepts as genus or as species).
one” (A68/B93). Judgments are functions of unity because under them different concepts and their corresponding intuitions are united.

This explanation is relevant insofar as the categories will spring up from the logical functions of the understanding in judgments (cf. A70/B95 ff.). Kant is advancing this point when he states that “we can trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments;” which in turn allows us to conceive also the understanding in general as a faculty for judging.15 This conception of the understanding as a faculty of judging is reinforced when Kant states that “the understanding can make no other use of these concepts than that of judging by means of them” (A68/B93). Now, three questions arise here: What are judgments? What are the logical functions in judgments? And how do these logical functions allow the discovery of the categories? Let us begin by the first question.

2.2.2. Determining the Moments of Thinking in General through the Logical Functions of the Understanding in Judgments

To understand what a judgment is, it is important to clarify Kant’s distinction between ‘judgment’ (Urteil) and ‘power of judgment’ (Urteilskraft). The following citations account for this:

If one thinks two representations as they are combined together and together constitute one cognition, this is a judgment. In every judgment, then, there is a certain relation of different representations insofar as they belong to one cognition. E.g., I say that man is not immortal. In this cognition I think the concept of being mortal through the concept of man, and it thereby

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15 We can also specify here that the higher faculties of cognition for Kant are the understanding, the power of judgment and reason, which at times are broadly referred to as the understanding in general (cf. A131/B169).
happens that this cognition, which constitutes the unity of two different representations, becomes a judgment. (VL Ak. XXIV: 928)

If the understanding in general is explained as the faculty of rules, then the power of judgment is the faculty of subsuming under rules (Wenn der Verstand überhaupt als das Vermögen der Regeln erklärt wird, so ist Urteilskraft das Vermögen, unter Regeln zu subsumieren), i.e., of determining whether something stands under a given rule (casus datae legis) (in case of the given law) or not. (A132/B171)

Understanding is the faculty of rules. The power of judgment is the faculty for deciding whether a rule ought to be used at this place, hence it is the faculty for subsuming under a rule. I cannot give this faculty mere rules that are set over it. (VL Ak. XXIV: 883)

A judgment, then, is the relation of two (or more) representations, i.e., concepts, that are united in such a way as to produce a cognition. The power of judgment is the faculty we have to subsume a subject under a predicate. The concept that we predicate of the subject acts as a principle or rule. This is why a judgment can play the role of the major premise in a syllogism. The power of judgment is an activity we perform following certain rules or principles. In the Critique of the Power of Judgment Kant elaborates further on this point, making clear that the universal is the rule or principle under which the particular is to be subsumed: “[t]he power of judgment in general is the faculty for thinking of the particular as contained under the universal. If the universal (the rule, the principle, the law) is given, then the power of judgment, which subsumes the particular under it . . . is determining” (KU Ak. V: 179). We have to add here that the representations united in judgments via the power of judgment have also to be related to the unity of consciousness. “A judgment is generaliter the representation of the unity in a
relation of many cognitions. A judgment is the representation of the way that concepts belong to one consciousness universally[,] objectively” (VL Ak. XXIV: 928).16

Now, all the possible ways in which representations can be united together to give a cognition—i.e., all of the possible relations representations or concepts can have in a judgment—account for the form of judgments: “[t]he form of judgment is the relation” (BL Ak. XXIV: 274). As Béatrice Longuenesse points out: “[a]s beings endowed with understanding we relate our concepts to one another in judgments and inferences. These modes of ordering representations are what Kant calls the ‘forms’ of each capacity” (Longuenesse 2007, 136). By ‘form’ Kant is thinking here of ‘logical forms’ for it is clear that sensible forms are not at stake here. Through an analysis of the formal structure of judgments Kant will say judgments have four logical forms, for there are four principal moments of thinking under which we can subsume all the possible ways in which representations are united in judgments. More precisely, all judgments stand under four titles that account for their logical form. These logical forms are ‘quantity’ (Quantität), ‘quality’ (Qualität), ‘relation’ (Relation) and ‘modality’ (Modalität). Kant points out:

Logical forms of judgments: Quantity, quality, relation and modality
The distinctions among judgments in respect to their form may be traced back to the four principal moments of quantity, quality, relation and modality, in regard to which just as many different kinds of judgments are determined. (JL Ak. IX: 102)

16 See Chapter 4 for the relation between judgments and the unity of consciousness.
Each of these four logical forms can be expressed through one of its three possible moments in all judgments, and accounts for the way in which the specific form determines the judgment. For instance, if we say “John is smart” we are affirming a quality about John, i.e., its logical form concerning quality is determining the judgment as an affirmative judgment. But if we say “John is not smart” we are denying John the quality of being smart, i.e., its logical form concerning quality will be determining the judgment as a negative judgment. Finally, stating that “John is non-smart” asserts that the quality of being smart is not able to be predicated of John, i.e., that John does not belong to the class of objects to which this quality pertains; thus, its logical form concerning quality will determine the judgment as an infinite judgment. These three examples show that quality is always one of the logical forms a judgment has, but that it can appear only in one of its possibilities in each judgment, i.e., as affirmative, as negative, or as infinite. Otherwise stated, we cannot, without contradiction, predicate of John that he is smart, and at the same time that he is not smart or that smartness is not a quality that can be predicated of John. The only way in which we can put two or more of these three possibilities together is through a disjunctive judgment; e.g., “John is smart, or John is not smart or John is non-smart.” However, here the disjunctive judgment is composed of three subsidiary judgments, and it is clear that only one of these judgments can be true; i.e., that all the three judgments can be together insofar as one excludes the other two.
It is worth mentioning that the three moments of each of the logical forms cannot appear together due to the demand of logical perfection in cognition as well. *Logical perfection* is the perfection of cognition according to the laws of the understanding, that considers a cognition to be perfect if it is thorough (cf. *VL* Ak. XXIV: 806). It rests on the agreement of cognition with the object (cf. *VL* Ak. XXIV: 806). Kant says: “[l]ogical perfection is the *conditio sine qua non* and the basis of all thought” (*VL* Ak. XXIV: 808). Logical perfection is concerned with the understanding and is the cognition of objects through it (cf. *VL* Ak. XXIV: 809); Kant considers it is the skeleton of our cognitions (cf. *VL* Ak. XXIV: 811). Concerning the four logical forms, cognition must be *universal* concerning *quantity*; *distinct* concerning *quality*; *objectively true* as to *relation* and *necessary* in *modality* (cf. *VL* Ak. XXIV: 809-810). Perfection contains *manifoldness* and *unity*, but manifoldness has to have unity; otherwise, things would not be connected among themselves (cf. *VL* Ak. XXIV: 810).\(^\text{17}\)

Thus all judgments have four logical forms, but each of these forms can appear only in one of its moments; otherwise, the judgment would be contradictory or mere nonsense. Some examples can illustrate how the four forms appear in every judgment:

(1) If we say “All dogs are brown” we are stating a universal judgment (for totality is the quantity of the judgment); but we are also stating an affirmative judgment

\(^\text{17}\) See Chapter 3 for the explanation of how manifoldness attains unity.
concerning its quality (for an affirmation is being made about dogs), and it is also a
categorical judgment concerning its relation (since the judgment has a subject-
predicate form). Finally, the judgment is also assertoric concerning its modality
(since it purports to be contingently true).

(2) If we say, “Necessarily, 2 + 2 = 4” the judgment will still be universal concerning
quantity (since all 2 + 2 equal 4), it will still be categorical (since the judgment has a
subject – predicate form), and it will still be affirmative (for an affirmation is being
made about two plus two things), but it will now be an apodictic judgment
concerning modality (since the relation between the subject and the predicate is
affirmed to be necessary). As Kant points out, the modality of judgment does not
add anything to the object being judged but rather specifies our cognitive relation to
the object.

(3) By contrast, if we say “Susan did not do her homework”, the judgment will be a
singular judgment concerning quantity (since it is about one person, Susan), also a
negative judgment concerning quality (since no homework was done). It will still be
a categorical judgment concerning its relation (since the two concepts follow the
subject (Susan) – predicate form (homework united by the verb ‘to do’ as copula).
Finally, the judgment is assertoric concerning modality (since it expresses actuality).

Now, the question is how we know that each logical form has three moments.
The logical functions of the understanding in judgment will allow us to understand
this point. This will answer the second question. Kant points out:
If we abstract from all content of a judgment in general, and attend only to the mere form of the understanding in it, we find that the function of thinking in that can be brought under four titles, each of which contains under itself three moments (Wenn wir von allen Inhalte eines Urteils überhaupt abstrahieren, und nur auf die bloße Verstandesform darin Acht geben, so finden wir, daß die Funktion des Denkens in denselben unter vier Titel gebracht werden könne, deren jeder drei Momente unter sich enthält). (A70/B95)

What Kant is saying here is that if we abstract from the content of all possible judgments, we can find the logical function of the understanding in judgments. This means that instead of stating that “All men are mortal,” we think now in terms of “All X are Y.” Thus, by abstracting from the content of judgments we will be able to determine the bare form of judgment in general, and thus how judgable objects can be related to one another. These then are all the moments of thinking—i.e., the moments of thinking in general—that are conveyed through all our possible judgments and expressed in the Table of Judgments (cf. A71/B96). By abstracting all content from judgments we come to find all the mental activities we perform through judgments.

Thus through the logical functions of the understanding in judgments we find that a quality can be predicated of an object (affirmative judgment), can be also denied of an object (negative judgment), and besides may not belong to an object, i.e., that the object may be excluded from the class of things that have that quality (infinite judgment). Likewise, something can be predicated of all things of a certain sort (universal judgment), or merely of some things of that sort (particular judgment), or solely of one thing (singular judgment). In addition, something can be
predicated of another thing, and thus the two are related as subject and predicate (categorical judgment), or something can produce another thing and thus be related to it as cause to effect (hypothetical judgment), or a thing can be related to other(s) as part(s) of a whole, and thus the relation among them can be one of community (disjunctive judgment). Finally, through thinking; i.e., here through judging, we also find that we are able to determine whether our judgments are necessary, possible or actual. These are then what Kant calls the moments of thinking in general.

Thus, ‘logical functions’ are the acts of the understanding that account for all the possible ways in which something can be predicated of an object and related to other things as well. Kant says: “[a]ll relations of thinking in judgments are those a) of the predicate to the subject, b) of the ground to the consequence, and c) between the cognition that is to be divided and all of the members of the division” (A73/B98).

Logical functions are thus acts of thinking by which the understanding determines all the possibilities judgments have to express their logical forms in their respective moments; otherwise stated, they are mental activities by which the understanding determines all the possible relations a thing can have. It is worth mentioning that logical forms precede logical functions, as our explanation has tacitly suggested. This is because, although general logic reveals the clue to the discovery of the categories, the categories (the logical forms of thought) ground the possibility of judgment (the logical function of thought).
We can understand now why Kant says that we can “trace all actions of the understanding back to judgments, so that the understanding in general can be represented as a faculty for judging.” In the same sense, we understand that “[t]he functions of the understanding can therefore all be found together if one can exhaustively exhibit the functions of unity in judgments” (A69/B94). Thus, the moments of thinking in general account for all the mental activities that constitute or are expressed in judgments. The logical functions are the mental acts by which we determine the logical forms in all their moments. Now we can understand the Table of Judgments.

**The Table of Judgments (Tafel der Urteile):** (A70/B95)

1. **Quantity (Quantität der Urteile)**
   - Universal (all)
   - Particular (some)
   - Singular (this)

2. **Quality (Qualität der Urteile)**
   - Affirmative
   - Negative
   - Infinite

3. **Relation (Relation der Urteile)**
   - Categorical (subject-predicate)
   - Hypothetical (cause-effect)
   - Disjunctive (parts-whole)

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18 See Chapter 4 for the relation between judgments and consciousness. “That action of the understanding, however, through which the manifold of given representations (whether they be intuitions or concepts) is brought under an apperception in general, is the logical function of judgments” (B143).

19 What is in parenthesis in English language has been added by us to convey a better comprehension of Kant’s point.
consciousness is considering in judgments, for it is clear that not all objects in judgments are objects of possible experience. That is to say, the grammatical subject is not always an appearance or an object of the outer sense; concepts such as ‘God’, ‘goodness’, ‘unicorn’, etc., do not account for objects of possible experience since they cannot be given in empirical intuition. However, they are objects in judgments; i.e., they are used as grammatical subjects. Kant’s own example of a hypothetical judgment opens tacitly this question: “[i]f there is perfect justice, then obstinate evil will be punished” (A73/B98). Eventually, he will contrast illicit concepts of the understanding from necessary but non-empirical concepts of reason.

Therefore, insofar as the Table of Judgments conveys all the moments of thinking in general, it is a consequence of the previous exposition that thinking in

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20 Modality differs from the other logical forms insofar as it contributes nothing to the content of the judgment (constituted only by quantity, quality and relation), for it concerns only the value of the copula in relation to thinking in general; i.e., it is not focused in the cognition conveyed by the judgment itself but on the copula, the implication or the disjunction each moment conveys (cf. A74-75/B100). In this sense Kant states that “[p]roblematic judgments are those in which one regards the assertion or denial as merely possible (arbitrary). Assertoric judgments are those in which it is considered actual (true). Apodictic judgments are those in which it is seen as necessary” (A74/B100). However, modality is included in the moments of thinking in general as well, since it conveys how the understanding evaluates its own act of judging concerning its mental activities. Kant says: “[n]ow since everything here is gradually incorporated into the understanding, so that one first judges something problematically, then assumes it assertorically as true, and finally asserts it to be inseparable connected with the understanding, i.e., asserts it as necessary and apodictic, these three functions of modality can also be called so many moments of thinking in general” (A76/B101).
general includes some mental acts of unification of representations that do not rely on sensible intuitions in any way whatsoever. Through such acts no determinate cognition of objects takes place. Nevertheless, we can think (though not cognize) God, goodness and unicorns. When we make judgments about such objects our understanding is exercising some sort of function or act of unification, even though no manifold of empirical intuition is given to us. This shows something important, namely, that the domain of thinking in general is broader than that of cognition in general. Kant recognizes openly the broader character of thought:

> Once I have pure concepts of the understanding, I can also think up objects that are perhaps impossible, or that are perhaps possible in themselves but cannot be given in any experience since in the connection of their concepts something may be omitted that yet necessarily belongs to the condition of a possible experience (the concept of a spirit), or perhaps pure concepts of the understanding will be extended further than experience can grasp (the concept of God). (A96)

Now, it also happens the other way around; i.e., that appearances can be given in intuition without being determined by functions of the understanding (cf. A90/B122). Kant says: “objects can indeed appear to us without necessarily having to be related to functions of the understanding, and therefore without the understanding containing their a priori cognitions” (A89/B122). These statements suggest that there is a sort of “blurred zone” in the sense that empirical intuitions are not always subsumed under (pure) concepts, and that the understanding can perform actions of unification that can result in concepts without any intuition corresponding to them. The two cases are, however, entirely different. In the first
case, we are dealing with the possibility of undetermined appearances; in the second, with the mere logical (but not “real”) possibility of pure objects of thought (Gedankendingen).

It is worth mentioning that the fact that the grammatical subject is not always a possible object of experience has opened a discussion by certain commentators, who, like Henry Allison, consider it necessary to distinguish between Kant’s uses of the German words ‘Gegenstand’ and ‘Objekt.’ According to Allison, an object in the sense of a Gegenstand is a possible object of cognition, while an object in the sense of Objekt is a grammatical subject (Allison 1983, 134-136). Other commentators have noted that this terminological distinction does not appear to be supported by Kant’s texts. At least on some occasions, Kant uses indiscriminately the terms ‘Gegenstand’ and ‘Objekt’ when he refers to objects of possible cognition or to objects intended only as grammatical subjects of judgments. In particular, the German word ‘Objekt’ is used frequently in the first Critique to refer to objects of intuition. Thus, the terminological distinction Allison discerns appears to be questionable at best.

2.2.3. The Origin of the Categories through the Pure Synthesis of Space and Time

The question now is how through these logical functions we discover the ‘categories’ (Kategorien) or in what sense these logical functions provide a clue (Leitfaden) to the discovery of the categories (cf. A67/B92, A70/B95, A76/B102).
This will allow us to answer our third and last question. Shortly after Kant introduced the Table of Judgments he introduces the Table of the Categories. However, in between, he introduces the concept of ‘synthesis’ (*Synthesis*).\(^{21}\)

At first sight one might be tempted to think that in this context ‘synthesis’ (*Synthesis*) is a synonym of ‘function’ (*Funktion*), since Kant defines *synthesis* stating that “[b]y *synthesis* in the most general sense . . . I understand the action of putting different representations together and comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition” (A78/B103). Just before this citation Kant gives the first definition of synthesis in the *Critique of Pure Reason* when talking about the manifold of space and time:

> Only the spontaneity of our thought requires this manifold first be gone through, taken up, and combined in a certain way in order for a cognition to be made out of it. I call this action *synthesis* (*Allein die Spontaneität unseres Denkens erfordert es, daß dieses Mannigfaltige zuerst auf gewisse Weise durchgegangen, aufgenommen, und verbunden werde, um daraus eine Erkenntnis zu machen. Diese Handlung nenne ich Synthesis*). (A77/B102)\(^{22}\)

These definitions seem *prima facie* to juxtapose ‘synthesis’ (*Synthesis*) and ‘function’ (*Funktion*) to a certain extent. Nevertheless, what prevents us from making them synonyms is that *synthesis* fundamentally appears linked to the concept of a *manifold* (playing then a fundamental role in the constitution of

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\(^{21}\) The explanation in the first *Critique* begins in the Third Section: On the Clue for the Discovery of all Pure Concepts of the Understanding titled On the pure concepts of the understanding or categories (A76-77/B102).

\(^{22}\) We recall here that *function* is “the unity of the action of ordering different representations under a common one.”
experience as well). This makes the scope of the synthetic activity of the mind broader than that of the functions the understanding performs in its logical use. Likewise, the synthesis will relate not only to the understanding, but mainly to the imagination, as will be further explained. Abstraction will not be required as a condition to perform the synthesis either. The synthesis is presented by Kant as the mental act of spontaneity (Spontaneität) *par excellence*. The question then is why Kant begins to talk of synthesis just before presenting the Table of the Categories, and how are we supposed to understand the link between the categories and the manifold, since it has been stated that the concept of a manifold is intimately related to that of synthesis. The manifold in question has also to be specified since we already know a manifold can be given either *a priori* or empirically.

We begin by stating that the fact that we can discover the categories in judgments through the logical functions of the understanding in judgments (*von der logischen Funktion des Verstandes in Urteilen*) does not account for their origin as such. *The origin of the categories is a product of synthesis*. This explains why Kant interrupted his exposition to introduce the concept of synthesis. A fundamental distinction will allow us to explain the origin of the categories:

The synthesis of a manifold, however, (whether it be given empirically or *a priori*) first brings forth a cognition, which to be sure may initially still be raw and confused, and thus in need of analysis; yet the synthesis alone is that which properly collects the elements for cognitions and unifies them in a certain content; it is therefore the first thing to which we have to attend if we wish to judge about the first origin of our cognition. (A78/B103)

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23 See Chapter 3 for the subjective constitution of experience.
In this passage Kant contrasts *synthesis* with *analysis*. Synthesis is the act through which a manifold is composed by collecting its elements and unifying them to produce a (certain) content.\(^{24}\) We have to ask ourselves then what kind of synthesis produces the categories. Otherwise stated, what manifold are we talking about such that its unity—i.e., its composition as a *manifold*—generates categories? What *content* is at stake here?

We know already that the *content* refers to the *manifoldness* given in intuition. Since the senses provide the material—sensorial impressions—for the manifold of empirical intuition from which empirical concepts arise, the content Kant is considering here can only be an *a priori* content, for the categories are *pure concepts* of the understanding (cf. A95-96), and thus their manifold has to be an *a priori* manifold. Now, concepts whose content is composed of *pure* manifolds are necessarily produced by a synthesis: “[s]uch a synthesis is *pure* if the manifold is given not empirically but *a priori* (as is that in space and time). Prior to all analysis of our representations these must first be given, and no concepts can arise analytically as far as the *content is concerned*” (A78/B103).

As anticipated, the content Kant is talking about then is that of the manifolds of space and of time. Since space and time are *a priori* intuitions it is clear that their manifolds have to be given *a priori* as well. Kant reminds us of this when he states that “[t]ranscendental logic . . . has a manifold of sensibility that lies before it *a

\(^{24}\) See Chapter 3 for the clarifying work of analysis in contrast to the combination through synthesis.
priori, which the transcendental aesthetic has offered to it, in order to provide the pure concepts of the understanding with a matter, without which they would be without any content, thus completely empty" (A77/B102) (Emphasis mine). This citation makes clear that the manifolds of space and of time are then the matter of the pure concepts of the understanding or categories.

Thus, the synthesis runs through and collects the elements, i.e., the mind collects the different possible relational manifolds in space and the different possible relational manifolds in time that, as such, are dispersed, and unifies them in a manifold, i.e., in the manifold of space and in the manifold of time, respectively. Both are a priori manifolds. The elements of space and of time are then spontaneously organized and united in a manifold by the synthetic activity of the mind; this means that the manifolds of space and time have been composed.25 The activity of synthesizing is performed by the faculty of the imagination, even though the production of concepts is due to the understanding:

Synthesis in general is . . . the mere effect of the imagination, of a blind through indispensable function of the soul,26 without which we would have no cognition at all, but of which we are seldom even conscious. Yet to bring this synthesis to concepts is a function that pertains to the understanding, and by means of which it first provides cognition in the proper sense. (A78/B104)

It is important to stress the difference between composing the manifolds of space and of time and expressing their unity in pure concepts: composing the

25 See Chapter 3 for a detailed explanation of the synthetic activity of the mind.

26 Kant’s copy of the first edition of the first Critique states this clause instead with “of a function of the understanding.”
manifold is uniting the dispersed contents that are given a priori in intuition; this is an action of the imagination. This unity, i.e., the composed manifold, is not the unity of concepts, even if the latter unity conveys the former unity through concepts by the action of the understanding. Both actions are immediately connected and arise at the same time, but are different and, thus, performed by different faculties. That is to say, when the manifolds of space and of time are composed—i.e., unified—pure concepts of the understanding or categories arise to give form to these manifolds, for categories are forms. More precisely, they are forms of thought (cf. B150).

Now, these forms that arise from the pure synthesis are discursive forms. That is to say, the categories arise from the pure synthesis of space and of time to be able to convey discursively what is contained in both manifolds that, as such, can only be intuited. ‘Categories’ (Kategorien) arise to be able to think, and indeed cognize, the manifolds of space and of time; this is why they are forms of thought or intelligible forms. Otherwise stated, categories are the universal ways in which all possible relational manifolds in space and all possible relational manifolds in time are a priori organized in their completeness, through concepts that will function then as rules for empirical intuition. The following passage explains well the process:

Transcendental logic, however, teaches how to bring under concepts not the representation, but the pure synthesis of representations (Aber nicht die Vorstellungen, sondern die reine Synthesis der Vorstellungen auf Begriffe zu bringen, lehrt die transz. Logik). The first thing that must be given to us a priori for the cognition of all objects is the manifold of pure intuition; the synthesis of this manifold by means of the imagination is the second thing,
but it still does not yield cognition. The concepts that give this pure synthesis unity, and that consist solely in the representations of this necessary synthetic unity are the third thing necessary for cognition of an object that comes before us, and they depend on the understanding. (A78-79/B104)

It is worth noting that the passage conveys the process by which an object of the outer sense is cognized at the same time that it conveys how categories are formed. Therefore, it anticipates a question about the pure synthesis from which the categories originate, namely: are we to understand that the synthesis of spaces and of times is performed each time an object or appearance is empirically given to us in intuition, or is it a sort of original synthesis that is performed once and for all? There is no conclusive answer to this question in Kant’s texts; at least not if we consider the categories to be a product of the synthesis and not pre-given concepts. It is our position that the pure synthesis of spaces and times must be an original synthesis.27

Martin Heidegger upholds our same position concerning the origin of the categories. In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger claims that “the Table of Judgments is not also the ‘origin of the categories,’ but rather is merely the ‘guiding text for the discovery of all the concepts of the understanding’” (Heidegger 1997, 40).28 He also maintains that the categories are generated through the synthesis of the pure intuitions of space and time (Heidegger 1997, 30 ff.). As Heidegger points out:

27 We say an original synthesis because the original synthesis is the synthesis of the manifolds of consciousness. See Chapter 4 for this explanation.

28 The word ‘also’ seems to be unnecessary.
The authority of the categories must be determined through the elucidation of their essence. As pure representations of unities within finite representing, they [categories] are essentially dependent upon pure synthesis and hence upon pure intuition. (Heidegger 1997, 60-61)

However, as his exposition follows, Heidegger gives more importance to time than to space on the grounds that time “dwells” in the subject in a more original way than space (cf. Heidegger 1997, 35). More precisely, Heidegger's argument is that since the pure synthesis unifies \emph{a priori}, what it unifies has to be given to it \emph{a priori} (until here we agree), but since time is a more universal intuition than space, he considers ultimately the pure imagination has to be related to time essentially (cf. Heidegger 1997, 57). It is possible that Heidegger is considering here the relation of the categories to the transcendental schemata that are time-determinations. Now, it is true, as we will see, that the categories and the imagination have a closer relationship to time than space does. However, on this precise point, we think it is required to stay closer to Kant’s text than Heidegger does; also because the usage of the categories will be restricted to the \emph{empirical} use of the understanding; i.e., their application will be \emph{only} to objects of possible experience that, as we know already, are in space.

\footnote{Heidegger describes the nature of space and time as pure intuitions by saying: \emph{[A]s pure intuition, space gives in advance merely the totality of those relations according to which what is encountered in the external senses would be ordered. At the same time, however, we find givens of the 'inner sense' which indicate no spatial shape and no spatial references. Instead, they show themselves as a succession of states of our mind (representations, drives, moods). What we look at in advance in the experience of these appearances, although unobjective and unthematic, is pure succession.} (Heidegger 1997, 36)}
Space and time as pure intuitions are presented by Heidegger as original representations; i.e., as presentations which allow [something] intuitable to spring forth (cf. Heidegger 1997, 99). He says “[w]hat is discerned in pure intuition is a whole which is unified in itself, although it is not empty, and whose parts are always just limitations of itself. But this unified whole must allow itself to be discerned in advance regarding this togetherness of its manifoldness which is for the most part indistinct” (Heidegger 1997, 100).

Heidegger also quotes some of the same of Kant’s passages cited by us to justify his ideas. His main point is that the categories originate from the pure synthesis of space and time, since what this synthesis unifies or brings together is the essential unity of pure knowledge that brings together all the structural synthesizes as a whole (cf. Heidegger 1997, 42). He points out rightly that the pure synthesis unifies what in themselves already demonstrate synthetic structure (cf. Heidegger 1997, 43). Heidegger says:

With this essential dependency of our pure thinking upon the pure manifold, the finitude of our thinking ‘demands’ that this manifold fit with thinking itself, i.e., fit with it as a conceptual determining. In order for pure intuition to be determinable through pure concepts, however, its manifold must have been gathered from dispersion, i.e., it must be gone through and assembled. This reciprocal preparing-themselves-from-each-other takes place in that act which Kant generally calls synthesis. (Heidegger 1997, 44)

Heidegger also supports the idea that this synthesis is performed by the imagination (cf. Heidegger 1997, 44; 56 - 58). He states correctly that for the cognition of objects the unity of pure thinking and pure intuition is required, and
that this is performed through this synthesis (cf. Heidegger 1997, 46): “[i]n pure synthesis, pure intuition and pure thinking should be able to meet one another a priori” (Heidegger 1997, 49).

Heidegger’s position is not the only one dominant in the literature. In his essay On the Unity of Subjectivity, Henrich argues that the categories are pre-given concepts, and thus not products of pure synthesis. Henrich’s criticism of Heidegger’s conception, however, is mainly focused on denying that the transcendental imagination is the common root on which all other mental faculties are grounded.30 Heidegger openly holds that the transcendental power of the imagination is the common root of sensibility and understanding. He supports this statement by saying that the transcendental imagination is the faculty that is originally unifying (cf. Heidegger 1997, 96 ff.).31

Henrich considers that equating the common root with the transcendental imagination is a misguided way to understand Kant’s ideas (cf. Henrich 1994, 40). He points out rightly that it is the demand of reason to bring unity into the cognitions of the understanding, and that this is, for Kant, a merely regulative idea that serves as a focus imaginarius or imaginary focal point of human cognition (cf.

30 In the Introduction to the first Critique Kant mentions an unknown common root at the origin of our faculties and, more precisely, from which possibly originated sensibility and understanding. “[T]here are two stems of human cognition, which may perhaps arise from a common but to us unknown root, namely sensibility and understanding” (A15/B29) (Emphasis mine).

31 Heidegger recalls here that the concept ‘faculty’ (Vermögen) comes from the German verb vermögen that means to have the ability to do something (Heidegger 1997, 94n).
A644/B672) (cf. Henrich 1994, 26). We agree with Henrich besides in that this demand of reason to unify the cognitions of the understanding in as few principles as possible is not to be confused with the reduction of the mental faculties to a single grounding faculty (cf. Henrich 1994, 26). As Henrich points out, there is a pluralism of faculties in Kant whose “unity” arises through the achievement of harmony rather than through a common derivation (cf. Henrich 1994, 26-27).

Henrich’s argument against Heidegger’s Kant-interpretation is that the categories are grounded in apperception, and that apperception is the radical faculty from which everything follows. We agree with Henrich that pure apperception has priority in Kant over the imagination, even if the imagination is the most active of the faculties and mediates among them. Henrich claims:

In its content the structure formed by the faculties of the mind is determined through the structure of finite self-consciousness, that is, through apperception and its categories. To that extent apperception and not imagination is, in Kant’s words, the ‘radical faculty’ (*radix*) (A114). (Henrich 1994, 31)

The key point against Heidegger’s conception on the origin of the categories is stated by saying:

The concepts of faculty, power, spontaneity, and freedom are all predicables of relational categories. Their possible validity [the validity of the relational categories] thus depends on the principle of apperception, in which they first originate as merely logical forms through which it is possible to think

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32 See Chapter 5 for the analogy with the *focus imaginarius*.

33 See Chapter 4 for an explanation of the nature of apperception and its relation to transcendental imagination.

34 In A114 Kant calls transcendental apperception the radical faculty of all our cognition.
something. They can only bring about knowledge insofar as they [relational categories] are applicable to something pregiven (Henrich 1994, 35).\textsuperscript{35}

Since categories are conceived as necessary concepts implied in all thinking, Henrich recurs to Kant’s paralogisms to show that no object—or, in Heidegger’s preferred term, being—can be known through self-consciousness, for in self-consciousness only the condition for all thinking is thought (cf. Henrich 1994, 36). He then states that “[t]o know a being means to ‘determine’ something pregiven through those necessary concepts that are implied in all thinking” (Henrich 1994, 36). In other words, only by determining the given sensible impressions in intuition can we cognize an object, and this determination is performed by the pure concepts of the understanding that are contained in all thinking. He adds that these conditions; i.e., the categories, must also be pre-given to consciousness (cf. Henrich 1994, 36). The categories are not only pre-given concepts, but they guarantee the unity of self-consciousness through all the different thoughts that belong to it.

All reality that becomes accessible to self-consciousness has to be thought by means of the forms which guarantee its possible unity in all the different thoughts. It is inconceivable that self-consciousness could gain real cognition outside of that relation of itself—and the forms of possible unity—to pregiven thinkable data (appearances) (Henrich 1994, 29-30).\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{35} In this case, the “something pre-given” of the last sentence refers to the given through sensibility.

\textsuperscript{36} For a better comprehension of these statements see Chapter 4 in which self-consciousness is explained.
2.2.4. The Categories: the Determination of Intuition in General and their
Discovery through the Logical Functions in Judgments

Having explained the origin of the categories through the pure synthesis of space and of time, we can now clarify how the categories can be discovered in judgments through the logical functions of the understanding in judgments. The link between categories and judgments is stated in this fundamental passage:

I will merely precede this with the explanation of the categories. They are concepts of an object in general, by means of which its intuition [the intuition of the object in general] is regarded as determined with regard to one of the logical functions for judgments (Sie sind Begriffe von einem Gegenstande überhaupt, dadurch dessen Anschauung in Ansehung einer der logischen Funktionen zu Urteilen als bestimmt angesehen wird). Thus, the function of the categorical judgment was that of the relationship of the subject to the predicate, e.g., 'All bodies are divisible.' Yet in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding it would remain undetermined which of these two concepts will be given the function of the subject and which will be given that of the predicate. For one can also say: 'Something divisible is a body.' Through the category of substance, however, if I bring the concept of a body under it, it is determined that its empirical intuition in experience must always be considered as subject, never as mere predicate; and likewise with all the other categories. (B128-129)

The nature of the categories as pure concepts of the understanding that are disclosed in Transcendental Logic is conveyed in this passage by saying that categories determine the intuition of an object in general. This means that categories determine a priori the content of all possible objects of experience. It is clear that an object in general is given through an intuition in general. Thus, the correlate of pure concepts of the understanding is an object in general that is given through an
intuition in general. Since categories belong to the transcendental level of experience they cannot determine empirical intuition directly, but only intuition in general; they will need then a mediating representation to be applied to empirical intuition, as will be further explained in this chapter.

We know already that the logical functions of the understanding in judgments are the mental acts that account for all the moments of thinking in general. Thus, what Kant is saying in the passage just cited is that the categories determine a priori the way in which each empirical intuition—through the corresponding concept that represents the (empirical) intuition in a judgment—is related to another one as they are expressed in judgments. This explains also why the number of categories is the same—twelve—as the moments of thinking in general in the Table of Judgments. Stating this through an example, we can say that it corresponds to the logical function of the understanding in judgments the establishment of a cause-effect relationship, but it corresponds to the categories to determine which objects of intuition are going to be causes and which are going to be effects in the relationship. Evidently, the same is the case for all judgments. Kant claims:

In such a way there arise exactly as many pure concepts of the understanding, which apply to objects of intuition in general a priori, as there were logical functions of all possible judgments in the previous table [the Table of Judgments]: for the understanding is completely exhausted and its capacity entirely measured by these functions. Following Aristotle we will

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37 See Chapter 4 for a complementary explanation of the object in general.
call these concepts **categories**, for our aim is basically identical with his although very distant from it in execution. (A80/B106)

Therefore, all empirical intuitions that are brought under concepts in judgments are *a priori* determined by (one of) the categories. This means that the categories determine which concept can be used as a subject and which as a predicate, which concept accounts for a quality and which for a quantity, which for a cause and which for an effect, and which for a part and which for a whole.

Otherwise stated, determining intuition in general by means of the categories implies determining the way in which we *think* all objects of possible experience. For instance, the categories determine that we can predicate *being tall* of a person but not on the contrary; i.e., “Peter is tall” but not “Tall is Peter”; or in the case cause-effect relationship that we can say “if you push the chair, then it falls” but not “if the chair falls then you push it”, or “Dogs like bones” but not “Bones like dogs”, etc.

Therefore, the way concepts are related in judgments—concerning their content—is determined *a priori* by the categories. The categories determine intuition because they act upon the content that is given to us. Thus, we can now understand why Kant says that Transcendental Logic deals with pure concepts that relate to objects *a priori*. *As forms of thought* the categories determine all the moments of thinking in general, and they do so by determining intuition in general. Otherwise, we could not think what is given to us in empirical intuition, nor understand what is conveyed in judgments. This could never be achieved by
General Logic since it only analyzes logical forms without considering how these forms are related a priori to empirical contents.

By contrast, Transcendental Logic surveys all of the possible ways in which a manifold in empirical intuition can be unified. This explains what Kant means in the penultimate citation by "in regard to the merely logical use of the understanding it would remain undetermined which of these two concepts will be given the function of the subject and which will be given that of the predicate." That is to say, General Logic can never determine the content of the concepts it relates in judgments, and, thus, General Logic cannot determine which concept is to be considered a predicate and which is to be considered as a subject; e.g., it leaves undetermined which of two concepts—say 'body' and 'divisible'—has the function of the subject and of the predicate. Since General Logic abstracts from all content it can only analyze what is given to it, i.e., analyze given representations. Kant points out this limitation of General Logic by contrast to the action of Transcendental Logic:

The same understanding, therefore, and indeed by means of the very same actions through which it brings the logical form of a judgment into concepts by means of the analytical unity, also brings a transcendental content into its representations by means of the synthetic unity of the manifold in intuition in general, on account of which they are called pure concepts of the understanding that pertain to objects a priori; this can never be accomplished by general logic. (A79/B105)

It is clear then why Kant says we can discover the categories through the logical functions of the understanding in judgments, or why judgments provide a clue for discovering the categories; in judgments we can find how intuition has been
determined *a priori* and what concepts are subsumed under which categories. This is why Kant speaks of the discovery of the categories through the logical functions of the understanding in judgments. We can understand now the Table of the Categories.

**Table of Categories (Tafel der Kategorien)** (A80/B10)

1. **Of Quantity (Der Quantität)**
   - Unity
   - Plurality
   - Totality

2. **Of Quality (Der Qualität)**
   - Reality
   - Negation
   - Limitation

3. **Of Relation (Der Relation)**
   - Of inherence and Subsistence (*substantia et accidens*)
   - Of Causality and Dependence (cause and effect)
   - Of Community (reciprocity between agent and patient)

4. **Of Modality (Der Modalität)**
   - Possibility – Impossibility
   - Existence – Non-existence
   - Necessity – Contingency

Kant says "this is the listing of all original pure concepts of synthesis that the understanding contains in itself *a priori*, and on account of which it is only a pure understanding; for by these concepts alone can it understand something in the manifold of intuition, i.e., think an object for it. This division is systematically
generated from a common principle, namely the faculty for judging (which is the same as the faculty for thinking)” (A81/B106).³⁸

The categories then account for the understanding as a pure understanding. If categories allow us to understand something in the manifold of empirical intuition, it is because they \textit{a priori} determine intuition in general. This is why categories are considered \textit{rules}. As Longuenesse rightly points out: “the very acts of judging by which we subsume intuitions under concepts and subordinate lower concepts to higher concepts also provide rules for ordering manifolds in intuition and thus eventually for subsuming objects of sensible intuition under the categories” (Longuenesse 2007, 139).

Categories allow us to \textit{think} an object for the empirical manifold, insofar as they are forms of thought originated in the pure synthesis of the manifolds of space and time. Categories then express the unity of the synthesis of the manifolds of space and of time. The fact that categories \textit{a priori} determine all possible intuition that appears under concepts in all judgments makes them a \textit{priori conditions} for the possibility (of objects) of experience (cf. A111, A93/B126, A88-90/B120-122). Kant states that categories are the \textit{conditions of the possibility of experience in general}.

³⁸ The idea that the Table of the Categories has been systematically generated from a common principle that is the faculty of judging is at the core of transcendental philosophy. Kant says: Transcendental philosophy has the advantage but also the obligation to seek its concepts in accordance with a principle, since they [its concepts] spring pure and unmixed from the understanding, as absolute unity, and must therefore be connected among themselves in accordance with a concept or idea. Such a connection, however, provides a rule by means of which the place of each pure concept of the understanding and the completeness of all of them together can be determined \textit{a priori}, which would otherwise depend upon whim or chance. (A67/B92)
Thus, determining intuition in general in regard to one of the logical functions in judgments allows the categories to function as *a priori rules* in cognition.

It can be added finally that Kant takes the Table of Categories to contain all the elementary concepts of the understanding (cf. B109-110); he calls them also ancestral concepts (*Stammbegriffe*) of pure understanding (cf. A82/B107).^39^ Another relevant remark is that the *third* category in each title always arises from the combination of the first two in its class.^40^ However, this does not mean that the third category is a derivative one; it has the same value than the other two in its class, and is an ancestral concept of the understanding as well (cf. B111).

2.2.5. The Origin of the Categories Revisited: A Difficult Birth

Our exposition concerning the categories requires some final comments. A first topic concerns the question about the validity of pure concepts that arise from *pure* intuition, and whose function consists in their application to *empirical* intuition. At first sight the argument could seem to convey a certain circularity, mostly due to the necessary link that pure intuition has to maintain with empirical

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^39^ Kant holds that the family tree (*Stammbaum*) of the pure understanding can be composed if we establish the pure but derivative concepts of the categories, that he calls the predicables of pure understanding. However, this is only mentioned but the family tree is not composed since Kant’s aim in the first *Critique* is not the completeness of the system—which could not be passed over in a complete system of transcendental philosophy—but only the principles for a system. Nevertheless, some predicables are proposed: under the category of causality can be subordinated the predicables of force, action and passion; under the category of community those of presence and resistance; under the predicaments of modality those of generation, corruption, alteration. (cf. A82/B107-108).

^40^ In this sense *allness* (totality) is nothing other than plurality considered as a unity, *limitation* is nothing other than reality combined with negation, community is the *causality* of a substance in the reciprocal determination of others, finally *necessity* is nothing other than the existence that is given by possibility itself (cf. B111).
intuition to have objective reality, as explained in Chapter 1. However, the idea of a possible circularity can be disregarded since the pure synthesis of spaces and times is a way to unite intuitive and discursive forms that by themselves would be separated. The unity of both is necessary for knowledge to arise. Another possible aspect Kant could have had in mind here was the intention to avoid falling into the mistake of traditional metaphysics; in this sense, that pure concepts arise from synthesized pure intuitions allows the categories to have a link to what de facto is given.

Heidegger considers that it is precisely the dependence on pure intuition that allows the categories to rule empirical intuition: “[o]nly insofar as the pure understanding, as understanding, is servant of pure intuition can it remain master of empirical intuition” (Heidegger 1997, 53). He also considers pure intuition to link categories and empirical intuition. The composed manifolds of space and of time, with all their possible relations, are presented by Heidegger as ruling unities which thereby enable the categories to be conceived as rules: “[t]he pure concepts . . . are those which have such ruling unities as their unique content. They serve not only as rules, but also, as pure representing, they give first of all and in advance something rulable” (Heidegger 1997, 52). In the same sense he claims:

The unifying unity of pure understanding which grasps in advance, therefore, must itself already have been united previously with pure intuition as well. This a priori unified whole made up of pure intuition and pure understanding ‘forms’ the play-space for the letting-stand-against in which all beings can be encountered. (Heidegger 1997, 54)
A second comment concerns the fact that we discover the categories through the logical functions of the understanding in judgments, but at the same time these logical functions are possible due to the categories, since they are the ruling a priori concepts in all judgments (under which empirical intuitions are subsumed). Kant became aware of this situation; this is why in the second edition of the first Critique he refers to the discovery of the categories through judgments as the origin of the categories in the logical functions of the understanding, and calls this origin the metaphysical deduction (cf. B159). The principle of the metaphysical deduction is, as explained in our previous exposition, that categories originate in the understanding’s capacity to judge; this principle account for the completeness of the Table of the Categories. Kant says: “In the metaphysical deduction the origin of the a priori categories in general was established through their complete coincidence with the universal logical functions of thinking” (B159). The metaphysical deduction, widely referred to in the literature, explains why some commentators identify the logical functions in judgments with the categories.41

A third comment concerns the objective validity of the categories. It could be maintained that since they definitely rule the combination of representations in judgments, they are objectively valid as pure concepts. However, the objective validity of the categories is not to be demonstrated in the metaphysical deduction but in the transcendental deduction, whose aim is to justify the validity of applying

pure concepts—originated completely \textit{a priori} as rules—to what is given in empirical intuition (appearances). In Kant’s words, \“I therefore call the explanation of the way in which concepts can relate to objects \textit{a priori} their transcendental \textit{deduction}\” (A85/B117).\footnote{Kant distinguishes here this deduction from an \textit{empirical deduction} which is the one concerning empirical concepts, since it is described as that \“which shows how a concept is acquired through experience and reflection on it\” (A85/B117). See Chapter 1 for the formation of empirical concepts.} Thus, the concern is no longer about \textit{whether there are} pure concepts that can relate to possible objects of intuition \textit{a priori}, but rather about \textit{the entitlement} the categories have to do so. Kant explains the problem:

[A] difficulty is revealed here that we did not encounter in the field of sensibility, namely how \textbf{subjective conditions of thinking} should have \textbf{objective validity}, i.e., yield conditions of the possibility of all cognition of objects; for appearances can certainly be given in intuition without functions of the understanding. (A89-90/B122)

Thus, what Kant is conveying here is that \textit{we have to demonstrate} that pure concepts of the understanding are objectively valid; thus the transcendental deduction is a question about the \textit{right} or \textit{lawfulness} these pure concepts have to be conditions of possible experience; ultimately this turns out to be a question about \textit{how it is possible that} categories condition \textit{a priori} objects of possible experience (cf. B159). The objective validity of the categories is thus related to their \textit{proof} as \textit{a priori} conditions. The contrast with sensibility is introduced, for in sensibility there is no need to prove that space and time are \textit{a priori} conditions of the possibility of
objects, since appearances have necessarily to be given in space and time (cf. A89/B121-122).*

It is our position that Kant did not succeed completely in this demonstration. That is to say, even if the categories *de facto* rule the subsumption of intuitions in judgments, he did not really succeed in his *transcendental* deduction, partly because of his failure to provide an unambiguous account of the origin of the categories, and partly because there is no way to demonstrate their lawfulness further than the metaphysical deduction, at least we were absolutely sure categories are pre-given concepts. Through the first *Critique* it becomes evident that *the origin of the categories is an open question*. That is to say, the categories could have been originated through the pure synthesis of space and time—which we have explained here since it appears as the 'official version' in the first *Critique*—but they could also be *pre-given concepts* whose origin depends exclusively on pure apperception, as Henrich points out. The exposition of the deductions, notably the B-Deduction, makes clear that the categories express the synthetic unity of consciousness, and, in so doing, Kant seems at times to be taking them as pre-given concepts, even if the imagination still serves as a medium to link understanding and apperception.* It is worth mentioning that Heidegger himself admits the origin of the categories is

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*It is worth noting that *objective validity* must not be confused with the *objective reality*; what gives objective reality to space and time and to the categories is their relation to empirical intuition. That is to say, the objective reality is guaranteed by the *data* of the senses.

*For the relation of the categories to pure apperception, and the transcendental imagination, see Chapter 4.*
problematic: “[t]his origin of the categories has often been disputed and always will be” (Heidegger 1997, 39).

One of the sections in the B-Deduction that supports the conception of the categories as pre-given concepts is section 19 whose title is “The Logical Form of all Judgments Consists in the Objective Unity of Apperception of the Concepts Contained Therein” (B140). Even in earlier sections we find ambiguous statements; e.g.: “[n]ow pure synthesis, generally represented, yields the pure concept of the understanding. By this synthesis, however, I understand that which rests on a ground of synthetic unity a priori” (A78/B104) (Emphasis mine).

It is clear that Kant struggled with the transcendental deduction for a long time, and that it was a problem for him, even if the need and origin of the categories appeared since his pre-critical period, as the famous letter to Marcus Herz, dated February 21st, 1772, clearly shows:

[T]he pure concepts of the understanding must not be abstracted from sense perceptions, nor must they express the reception of representations through the senses; but though they must have their origin in the nature of the soul, they are neither caused by the object nor do they bring the object itself into being. In my dissertation . . . I silently passed over the further question of how a representation that refers to an object without being in any way affected by it can be possible. (LMH Ak. X: 130)

In the first Critique some passages express the same concern, and show Kant advancing a petitio principii; i.e., that pure concepts of the understanding are necessarily valid simply because we need them. The complete passage is as follows:

All appearances therefore necessarily agree with this formal condition of sensibility, because only through it can they appear, i.e., be empirically
intuited and given. The question now is whether a priori concepts do not also precede, as conditions under which alone something can be, if not intuited, nevertheless thought as object in general, for then all empirical cognition of objects is necessarily in accord with such concepts, since without their presupposition nothing is possible as object of experience. Now, however, all experience contains in addition to the intuition of the senses, through which something is given, a concept of an object that is given in intuition, or appears; hence concepts of objects in general lie at the ground of all experiential cognitions as a priori conditions; consequently the objective validity of the categories, as a priori concepts, rests on the fact that through them alone is experience possible (as far as the form of thinking is concerned). For they then are related necessarily and a priori to objects of experience, since only by means of them can any object of experience be thought at all.

The transcendental deduction of all a priori concepts therefore has a principle toward which the entire investigation must be directed, namely this: that they must be recognized as a priori conditions of the possibility of experiences (whether of the intuition that is encountered in them, or of the thinking). Concepts that supply the objective ground of the possibility of experience are necessary just for that reason (Die transz. Deduktion aller Begriffe a priori hat also ein Principium, worauf die ganze Nachforschung gerichtet werden muß, nämlich dieses: daß sie als Bedingungen a priori der Möglichkeit der Erfahrungen erkannt werden müssen (es sei der Anschauung, die in ihr angetroffen wird, oder des Denkens). Begriffe, die den objektiven Grund der Möglichkeit der Erfahrung abgeben, sind eben darum notwendig). (A93-94/B126) (Emphasis mine)

2.2.6. Applying Categories to Appearances through Schemata

At this point, it is clear that categories determine intuition in general. However, the question arises about how these pure concepts of the understanding are applied to empirical intuition. It has been already mentioned that a mediating representation is required. This mediating representation is called a schema and its function is precisely to mediate between categories and empirical intuition.

The section on the Schematism should contain one of the topics most developed in the first Critique due to its relevance. However, Kant only devotes a
few pages to it, and the discussion is obscure, since it is not clear at all how schemata will actually mediate between categories and empirical intuition. Kant himself accounts for the difficulty to account for schemata, recognizing them as “a hidden art in the depths of the human soul, whose true operations we can divine from nature and lay unveiled before our eyes only with difficulty” (A141/B180-181). Let us nevertheless try to elucidate the main points.

The schematism is the procedure (cf. A140/B179) by which categories will be able to be a priori related to objects of empirical intuition. However, to be able to apply the categories to appearances or to subsume an empirical intuition under an a priori concept, there has to be homogeneity between the two; i.e., “the concept must contain that which is represented in the object that is to be subsumed under it” (A137/B176). We already know that “pure concepts of the understanding . . . in comparison with empirical (indeed in general sensible) intuitions, are entirely unhomogeneous, and can never be encountered in any intuition” (A137/B176). Thus, there has to be a third thing, i.e., a mediating representation that will have homogeneity with the category and with the appearance at the same time. This mediating representation is the transcendental schema:

Now it is clear that there must be a third thing, which must stand in homogeneity with the category on the one hand and the appearance on the other, and makes possible the application of the former to the latter. This mediating representation must be pure (without anything empirical) and yet intellectual on the one hand and sensible on the other. Such a representation is the transcendental schema. (A138/B177)
The ‘transcendental schema’ (transzendental Schema) is then the mediating representation that allows the categories to be applied to empirical intuition; as such it has then necessarily an intellectual side and a sensible side. Kant says the schema is transcendental because it functions as an (a priori) rule to subsume appearances under pure concepts. Likewise, “[t]he schema is in itself always only a product of the imagination” (A140/B179); more precisely, it is a product of the transcendental imagination (cf. A142/B181). Kant says:

The schema of a pure concept of the understanding . . . is something that can never be brought to an image at all, but is rather only the pure synthesis, in accord with a rule of unity according to concepts in general, which the category expresses, and is a transcendental product of the imagination, which concerns the determination of the inner sense in general, in accordance with conditions of its form (time) in regard to all representations, insofar as these are to be connected together a priori in one concept in accord with the unity of apperception. (A142/B181)

Kant states that the schema only exists in thought (cf. A141/B180). This is explained by the relation the transcendental schema has to time; it has no spatial nature. Kant makes this clear by stating that “the schema is to be distinguished from an image” (A140/B179),45 and also by conceiving it as a time-determination: “an application of the category to appearances becomes possible by means of the transcendental time-determination which, as the schema of the concept of the understanding, mediates the subsumption of the latter [appearances] under the former [categories]” (A139/B178). Thus, the transcendental schema is a

45 See Chapter 3 for the explanation of an image.
transcendental time-determination; otherwise stated, the transcendental time-determination is the schema of the category.

This conception of the schema as a time-determination is fundamental since time is precisely what is shared by the categories and appearances insofar as all representations, as modifications of the mind, belong to inner sense, and then, as such, are all connected to time as the formal condition of inner sense. Ultimately, it is time that orders, connects and brings into relations all our representations (cf. A98-99). Categories then can be structured in time and this is precisely what Kant does when he describes each of the titles of the categories in terms of time:

The schemata are therefore nothing but a priori time-determinations in accordance with rules, and these concern, according to the order of the categories, the time-series, the content of time, the order of time, and finally the sum total of time in regard to all possible objects. (A145/B184-185)

Through a time-determination then the categories are connected with time as the form of sensibility. Concerning appearances, the connection with time is evident since appearances are in time, for all empirical intuition has a manifold that is given to us under the conditions of space and time as the forms of sensibility.

Thus all the categories have their corresponding schemata that allow them to be applied to appearances; e.g. the schema of the category of actuality is existence at a determinate time, while the schema of the category of necessity is existence at all times (cf. A145/B184). The schemata then are all a priori time-determinations in accordance with rules of their synthesis, i.e., with rules that account for the
synthesis of time-determinations. Each of the four types of categories is associated with a corresponding way of determining time: the time-series for the quantitative categories, the content of time for the qualitative categories, the order of time for the categories of relation, and the sum total of time for the categories of modality (cf. A145/B184-185). Schemata then “realize” the category in the sense of applying them to empirical reality; the key point for Kant is that the categories have to be sensibilized in order to be applied to objects of possible experience. This sensibilization occurs thorough the schemata which implies the structuring of the categories in terms of time.

Likewise, it must be noted that the realization of the categories through schemata is at the same time their restriction, since categories are limited to empirical intuition. In this sense Kant says: “[w]ithout schemata, therefore, the categories are only functions of the understanding for concepts, but do not represent any object. This significance comes to them from sensibility, which realizes the understanding at the same time as it restricts it” (A147/B187).

2.3. Mathematical Concepts: The Other A Priori Concepts

Pure concepts of the understanding are not technically speaking the only a priori concepts; mathematical concepts are a priori concepts as well.46 Mathematical cognition is rational cognition from the construction of concepts (cf. A147/B187).

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46 Even if the topic of mathematics is outside the scope of this dissertation, we consider it to be important to account for the third kind of concepts Kant introduces, in order to have a complete comprehension of the topic of concept formation.
A713/B741), and mathematical concepts are *a priori* concepts *constructed* arbitrarily: “to **construct** a concept means to exhibit *a priori* the intuition corresponding to it (*Einen Begriff... konstruieren, heißt: die ihm korrespondierende Anschauung *a priori* darstellen*)” (A713/B741). To construct then is to exhibit *a priori* in intuition the object corresponding to the concept; the point here is that in constructing the concept the object is already generated by the subject. This means that the mind has the faculty to determine an object *a priori* (e.g., a triangle) by intuited its properties in pure intuition. However, the intuited its properties is at the same time the determination of the concept itself, and the guarantee of its objective validity. This explains why mathematics conveys universality and apodictic certainty.

The arbitrary nature of mathematical concepts is due to the fact that they are *constructed*; they are neither abstracted from experience nor produced by the pure synthesis of the understanding. Thus, mathematical concepts are neither general concepts (empirical concepts) nor pure concepts of the understanding (categories) that determine (an object of) intuition in general. *A thing in general* is not the concern of mathematics.

Even if mathematical cognition is rational cognition, mathematical concepts—as all other concepts—are produced by the understanding, since reason

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47 We can exhibit an object corresponding to the concept either through mere imagination in pure intuition or on paper in empirical intuition, but in both cases completely *a priori*, without having to borrow the pattern for it from any experience (cf. A713/B 741).
does not produce any concept at all (cf. A408-409/B435). However, the fact that they are formed arbitrarily frees them from the need of a critique of pure reason, since their objects are perfectly defined: “for I must know what I wanted to think, since I deliberately made it up, and it was not given to me either through the nature of the understanding or through experience” (A729/B757). This shows too that only concepts that are arbitrarily thought can properly be defined. Definition (Erklärung) is to exhibit originally (urpsrünglich) the exhaustive concept of a thing within its boundaries (cf. A727/B755). In this way, all that belongs to the concept is included in the definition (of the object). Mathematical definition contains the complete exposition of the object. We go from the concept to the intuition that corresponds to it, and cognize a priori what pertains to its object.

The mind then has the faculty to determine geometrical and numerical objects by exhibiting their properties in intuition. As what can be exhibited a priori in intuition are spatio-temporal relations, what the mind constructs then are the qualities or shapes of objects or their quantitative relations. Mathematics allows the construction of concepts that account for different qualities or shapes in space, or temporal relations expressed in numbers. In geometry we exhibit a priori the

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48 Thus categories and empirical concepts cannot be defined properly speaking. In this sense, mathematical definitions can never err since the concept is first given through the definition; it contains just that which the definition would think through it. Kant, however, recognizes that even if nothing incorrect can occur in its content, sometimes, but rarely, there can be a defect in the form with regard to precision; e.g. the common explanation of the circle that it is a curved line every point of which is the same distance from a single one (the center-point), contains the error of unnecessarily introducing the determination curved. For it must be a particular theorem, which can be deduced from the definition and easily proved, that every line each point of which is equally distant from a single one is curved (no part of it is straight) (cf. A731–732/B759–760).
shapes or qualities of objects, and in algebra their quantity or the mere synthesis of
the homogeneous manifold through number (cf. A720/B748).

This explains why mathematics is neither interested in a thing in general nor
in existence as such, but in the spatio-temporal properties of the objects of
experience and solely insofar as these properties are combined with the concept of
such objects (cf. A719/B747). Thus, mathematics is focused on the properties of the
objects combined with the concept of the object. This, however, shows that there is
a synthesis in mathematics as well; the synthesis here consists in expanding our
knowledge of the spatio-temporal properties of geometrical and numerical forms.
Mathematics thus is composed of synthetic a priori propositions, i.e., by synthetic
propositions that are to be cognized a priori (cf. A718/B746 ff). Kant explains this
synthesis by saying that when I think the concept of a triangle (it is not that I see
what I think), I go beyond the concept to properties that do not lie in this concept
but still belong to it (cf. A718/B746). Thus, the synthesis in mathematics puts
together properties (of the object) that are not in the concept but belong to it. The
only way this synthesis is possible is by determining my object in accordance with
the conditions of pure intuition.
CHAPTER III

THE SYNTHESIS OF THE IMAGINATION AND

THE RECOGNITION OF THE OBJECT

3.1. Introducing the Synthesis in General and the Three-Fold Synthesis of the Imagination in the A-Deduction in Particular

All manifoldness—empirical and a priori—requires unity to be cognized, be it as an object of cognition, as a unified representation, or as a whole of any other sort. We have already explained that the manifold accounts for the content of intuition,¹ and that the ‘concept’ expresses the unity of the manifold and is produced by the understanding.² Now, the ‘synthesis’ (Synthesis) is the mental activity that allows the manifold to attain unity—be it as a manifold, in a concept, or in one consciousness. The need to synthesize the manifold of intuition is clear since our understanding cannot intuit (cf. B135), and our sensibility cannot pre-synthesize the manifold. As already explained, our intuition is merely sensible and our understanding only thinks (cf. B139). Therefore, there has to be an action that allows the passage from ‘manifoldness’ (Mannigfaltigkeit) to ‘unity’ (Einheit), and

¹ See Chapter 1. However, as already anticipated as well, the concept of a manifold is not reduced to the manifolds of space and of time. Kant uses the ‘manifold’ to account for a variety of types of contents involved in the cognitive process; eg., “the manifold of appearances” (A182/B225), “the manifold of our representations” (cf. A108), “the manifold of cognition” (cf. A109), and “the manifold of consciousness” (cf. A117n/B131).

² See Chapter 2 for the formation of concepts through the understanding.
this activity of the mind is the \textit{synthesis}. The synthesis then operates between two poles: manifoldness and unity.\textsuperscript{3} In this sense, there has to be also a faculty that acts upon the manifold with the aim of constituting determinable objects (of experience): this faculty is the imagination, according to Kant. “There is thus an active faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in us, which we call imagination” (A120).

From the onset we can understand then why Kant considers everything to be \textit{first} synthetic or produced by a synthesis, and only then subject to analysis; analysis always \textit{presupposes} synthesis (cf. B130). Through ‘analysis’ (\textit{Analyse}) we can only make a concept distinct (cf. BL Ak. XXIV: 263) but we cannot thereby fabricate a new concept: “no concept can arise \textit{per analysin}, rather, it is only distinctness that can thereby be given to it” (BL Ak. XXIV: 269).\textsuperscript{4} To produce a concept requires a

\textsuperscript{3} Less elaborated statements that indirectly indicate the need for synthesis are found in different sections of the Lectures on Logic: “[t]hrough combination, however, we fabricate something when we put much together that in experience is never connected” (BL Ak. XXIV: 262). Likewise, and as advanced in Chapter 2, “two things are always to be found, which in their harmonious union make up perfection in general, namely, manifoldness and unity” (JL Ak. IX: 39). “Mere manifoldness without unity cannot satisfy us” (JL Ak. IX: 39). In addition: “[m]anifoldness and unity constitute every perfection. Our power of cognition strives very much for manifoldness. But it has the need that it [manifoldness] must have unity. Otherwise it would not satisfy us, because cognition without unity, when one thing is not connected with the other, does not increase our cognitions” (VL Ak. XXIV: 810).

\textsuperscript{4} “A distinct concept is one, of whose marks I am conscious” (DWL Ak. XXIV: 694). The distinctness of a concept is intimately related to judgments:

[T]o cognize distinctly is to cognize everything \textit{by means of a clear mark}. But to cognize something by means of a clear mark is also just to judge. Thus we can also say that distinct concepts are ones that are cognized by means of a judgment. Now the 2 concepts that are compared with one another, and in such a way that one contains the marks and the other the clarity, constitute the material of the judgment. That concept, now, that is to be made distinct through comparison with its mark, is called \textit{the subject}. On the other hand, that concept that is added to the mark as a ground of distinctness is called the predicate. (BL Ak. XXIV: 273-274)
previous synthesis, so that through the imagination's activity the manifold can be
*recognized in a concept by the understanding*; the concept then is the product of this
synthetic activity. Thus, through analysis we cannot either attain unity or constitute
experience as such. Kant makes this clear by stating that “[a]ll experience is
synthesis” (*ML2* Ak. XXVIII: 551).

Therefore, the *subjective constitution of experience* refers to the action by
which the mind constitutes an appearance as a *determinable* object thorough the
synthesis of its manifold (in intuition). This means that the mind participates in the
constitution of the *object of experience, insofar as* the unity required for its cognition
will come from its own spontaneous activity. Kant points this out clearly:

> [A]mong all representations **combination** is the only one that is not given
through objects but can be executed only by the subject itself, since it is an
act of its self-activity. One can here easily see that this action must originally
be unitary and equally valid for all combination. (B130)

> [T]he **combination** of a manifold in general can never come to us through
the senses, and therefore cannot already be contained in the pure form of
sensible intuition; for it is an act of the spontaneity of the power of
representation. (B129-130)

Thus, ‘synthesis’ (*Synthesis*) in general is the act of the mind that works on
manifolds with the aim of attaining their unity in a whole, and to express this unity
in a concept. Kant uses almost interchangeably the concept of ‘synthesis’ (*Synthesis*)
and that of ‘combination’ (*Verbindung*), even if in the B-Deduction combination

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5 This is the topic we advanced in Chapter 1 footnote 3.

6 Likewise: “Combination does not lie in the objects . . . and cannot as it were be borrowed from them
through perception” (B134-135).
refers mostly to the synthesis performed by the understanding. Kant says: “all combination, whether we are conscious of it or not, whether it is a combination of the manifold of intuition or of several objects . . . is an action of the understanding, which we would designate with the general title synthesis” (B130). However, as the synthesis operates at different levels and with manifolds constituted by different elements, its action is not only restricted to the manifold given in intuition and to the unity attained in a concept by the understanding. Thus, the concept of synthesis is not only restricted to the combination of manifolds; at times Kant also uses it to convey the connection of manifolds with the aim of attaining a synthetic unity as the product or outcome of the act of synthesizing. Likewise, sometimes Kant talks of ‘successive synthesis’ (sukzessive Synthesis) or ‘successive addition’ to account for the addition of units to constitute a whole (from part to part); e.g., “the successive addition of one (homogeneous) unit to another” (A142/B182) or “successively added to each other by me . . . through this successive addition” (A103). Synthesis then also conveys the addition of units or of elements that compose a manifold, and to which Kant refers to as successive addition or by repeated positing.

Roughly speaking, we can say that synthesis is the act through which manifolds are composed and connected, that is, it is the layered act by which manifolds are combined with one another and, ultimately, brought to one consciousness. As the next chapter will make clear—even if the synthesis in general is performed by the imagination—the synthetic unity is ultimately related to
apperception (cf. A155/B194). However, we will use basically the concept of synthesis here since it is the concept that accounts for the synthesizing actions of the mind. It is also the term that Kant relies upon in the A-Deduction.

Now, by ‘imagination’ (Einbildung) Kant understands the faculty of intuition without the presence of the object (Anthr. Ak. VII: 167). The first Critique defines it in a very similar way: “Imagination is the faculty for representing an object even without its presence in intuition (Einbildungskraft ist das Vermögen, einen Gegenstand auch ohne dessen Gegenwart in der Anschauung vorzustellen)” (B151). The imagination is conceived an original faculty insofar as it cannot be derived from any other faculty or mental source, but itself contains the conditions of possibility of cognition. Kant says: “[t]here are . . . three original sources (capacities or faculties of the soul), which contain the conditions of the possibility of all experience, and cannot themselves be derived from any other faculty of the mind, namely sense, imagination and apperception” (A94).

Thus, the imagination is an original faculty that has the role of synthesizing the diverse manifolds and that is considered as a special kind of intuition—since it is neither pure intuition nor empirical intuition. In a certain way the imagination will be a mediating faculty between sensibility and understanding as the synthesis shows at times. Likewise, as with other faculties, the imagination also has both a

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7 Similar definitions are found in the Lectures on Metaphysics: “power of imagination [is] faculty of intuition without presence of the object (MD Ak. XXVIII: 672). “The faculty of intuition without presence of the object . . . is the power of imagination” (ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 585). “The power of imagination is the faculty of intuition, but also without presence of the object. It must be distinguished from the senses as much as from the concepts” (ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 585).
transcendental and an empirical use, the former being only concerned with form (cf. A94) and comprising it as one of the *a priori* foundations for the possibility of experience (cf. A97). The latter accounts for its reproductive activity (cf. A115), a topic to which we will return.

Having made these introductory remarks we can enter now to the explanation of the synthesis of the imagination following the three—*a priori* and empirical—levels of its activity as Kant describes it in the A-Deduction. The three-fold synthesis is divided as follows: “the synthesis of apprehension in the intuition” (cf. A98), “the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination” (cf. A100) and “the synthesis of recognition in the concept” (cf. A103). Kant introduces the three-fold synthesis by saying:

> If therefore I ascribe a synopsis to sense, because it contains a manifold in its intuition, a synthesis must always correspond to this, and receptivity can make cognitions possible only if combined with spontaneity. This is now the ground of a three-fold synthesis, which is necessarily found in all cognition: that namely, of the apprehension of the representations, as modifications of the mind in intuition; of the reproduction of them [representations] in the imagination; and of their recognition in the concept. (A97)

### 3.2. The Synthesis of Apprehension in the Intuition

The synthesis of apprehension is aimed directly at the intuition—at the empirical and pure intuitions. Kant’s main focus is on empirical intuition. He is now interested in distinguishing between ‘(bare) apprehension’ and ‘synthesis of
apprehension." The point of this synthesis is to bring the manifold of intuition into a representation, whose unity is to be further recognized discursively in a concept.

The distinction rests not only on the intention of the synthesis to attain the unity of the manifold in one representation, but also on the fact that this synthesis is aimed directly at unity of the intuition itself. Kant defines the synthesis of apprehension in the first Critique as follows:

Now in order for unity of intuition to come from this manifold (as, say, in the representation of space), it is necessary first to run through and then to take together this manifoldness, which action I call the synthesis of apprehension, since it is aimed directly at the intuition, which to be sure provides a manifold but can never effect this as such, and indeed as contained in one representation, without the occurrence of such a synthesis. (A99)

By the synthesis of apprehension I understand the composition of the manifold in an empirical intuition, through which perception, i.e., empirical consciousness of it (as appearance), becomes possible. (B160)

Thus, by synthesis of apprehension Kant means the mental activity of running through an empirical manifold and collecting its elements, i.e., of successively adding one element to another, so that the elements of the manifold can be put together, i.e., so that the manifold can be composed or received in one representation. Both definitions show the intention to unify what is dispersed and, thus, to present it in one representation. The "composition of the manifold" is not different from "its presentation as contained in one representation." The "running thorough the manifold" is the synthesis, i.e., the activity of adding one element to

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8 Bare apprehension is a mere juxtaposition of elements or manifolds. The contrast with synthesis of apprehension will become clear below. See section 3.4. The Recognition of a Manifold as an Object.
another, so that a determinable object can be constituted, where it is clear—from what has been explained thus far—that this determinable object is the appearance (as the second definition makes clear as well). Thus, the synthesis of apprehension conveys that the mind—the imagination—participates in the constitution of a determinable object insofar as it unifies the manifold that is given to us and received under the forms of sensibility.

However, the second intention Kant has in each definition is different, for while the A edition states that, while intuition provides the manifold, intuition itself cannot provide it in a unified way or as contained in one representation; this is why the empirical manifold in intuition has to be synthesized by the imagination. The imagination thus acts on the content of sensibility. By contrast, the B edition stresses that perception requires this synthesis as a condition; i.e., that no empirical consciousness is possible if the manifold has not previously been composed, since what we perceive are appearances and not dispersed elements of matter in space and time. It is in this sense then that we can understand that the synthesis of apprehension grounds perception. Kant claims: “every appearance contains a manifold . . . There is thus an active faculty of the synthesis of this manifold in us, which we call imagination, and whose action exercised immediately upon perceptions I call apprehension” (A120). In the footnote it is added that “imagination is a necessary ingredient of perception itself” (A120n). It is clear then
that the synthesis of apprehension is a condition for perception: "all possible perception depends on the synthesis of apprehension" (B164).

Now, it is also added that the synthesis of apprehension brings the manifold of sensible impressions into an image: "[f]or the imagination is to bring the manifold of intuition into an image (Bild); it must therefore antecedently take up the impressions into its activity, i.e., apprehend them" (A120). Thus, the ‘image’ (Bild) is also an outcome of this synthesis. However, this statement prima facie creates a problem, since the question arises about what the relation is between an ‘image’ (Bild) and an ‘appearance’ (Erscheinung), and if one precedes the other in some way.

A close look into the statements in which Kant refers to the image will allow us to clear up this problem.

My mind is always busy with forming the image of the manifold while it goes through [it]. E.g., when I see a city, the mind then forms an image of the object which it has before it while it runs through the manifold. Therefore if a human being comes into a room which is piled high with pictures and decorations, then he can make no image of it, because his mind cannot run through the manifold. (ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 235)

[T]he schema is to be distinguished from an image (so ist das Schema doch vom Bilde zu unterscheiden). Thus, if I place five points in a row, . . . . . , this is an image of the number five. On the contrary if I only think a number in general, which could be five or a hundred, this thinking is more the representation of a method for representing a multitude (e.g., a thousand) in an image in accordance with a certain concept than the image itself, which in this case [in a thousand] I could survey and compare with the concept only with difficulty. Now this representation of a general procedure of the imagination for providing a concept with its image is what I call the schema for this concept. (A140/B179-180)

We can only say this much, the image is a product of the empirical faculty of productive imagination, the schema of sensible concepts (such as figures in
space) is a product and as it were a monogram of pure a priori imagination, through which and in accordance with which the images first become possible, but which must be connected with the concept, to which they are in themselves never fully congruent, always only by means of the schema that they designate. (A141-142/B181)

The three citations allow us to understand the nature of an image. The first passage states that images are always formed while the synthesis of the manifold is performed; the synthesis of apprehension produces the image in some way. The second text makes clear that the image is a visual representation (of an object) and that the imagination provides concepts with images through schemata. Thus, schemata re-appear here as the mediating third representation; however, this time Kant is considering the empirical schema that provides empirical concepts with their corresponding images. Finally, the third passage says that image and schema are produced by the imagination—even if by different uses of the imagination—and that images are never fully congruent with their concepts, in spite of the action of the schemata that connects them.

Thus, while the image is a visual representation of an empirical object, the appearance is the (determinable) empirical object. Now, since both are produced by the synthesis of apprehension when the manifold in intuition is unified, we are to understand then that the image is the subjective way in which the appearance is

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9 See Chapter 2 for the transcendental schema, and its mediation between categories and intuitions.

10 The idea of the schema as monogram is only to be considered for sensible schemata that connect mathematical concepts with their corresponding images. The analogy of the monogram is understandable due to the simultaneous way in which mathematical objects and their corresponding concepts are formed. See Chapter 2 for the formation of mathematical concepts.
synthetically apprehended. That is to say, the composition of the manifold in empirical intuition brings in *the appearance* as a determinable object and, at the same time, *an image of* this determinable object. Both are brought in by the same synthesis and closely resemble each other. Nevertheless, they are different, for the appearance contains objective reality insofar as substances are their material elements, while the image, by its nature, is merely subjective. Thus, while the appearance is to become a determined object through the application of the categories, bare images can never be objects of cognition themselves.

Through the empirical schema the image is connected to the empirical concept that accounts for the empirical object; however, as images are necessarily particular they can never be fully congruent with their concepts, which are general. There are many possible ways in which an object can be imaged; multiple visual representations or mental pictures of an empirical object are capable of being formed. For instance, the concept of a dog—a concept that determines a certain type of empirical object—becomes applicable to *dogs* through its corresponding schema, namely, a general rule that applies to four-footed animals with such-and-such empirical features. In contrast to this general rule, the particular images that the mind produces are not restricted to one particular shape, for it is self-evident that many different shapes satisfy the requirement of the concept of a four-footed
animal with such-and-such features. A similar procedure takes place in the case of sensible schemata which provide mathematical concepts with their images. Kant says:

No image of a triangle would ever be adequate to the concept of it. For it would not attain the generality of the concept, which makes this valid for all triangles, right or acute, etc., but would always be limited to one part of this sphere. The schema of the triangle can never exist anywhere except in thought, and signifies a rule of the synthesis of the imagination with regard to pure shapes in space. Even less does an object of experience or an image of it ever reach the empirical concept, rather the latter is always related immediately to the schema of the imagination, as a rule for the determination of our intuition in accordance with a certain general concept. The concept of a dog signifies a rule in accordance with which my imagination can specify the shape of a four-footed animal in general, without being restricted to any single particular shape that experience offers me or any possible image that I can exhibit in concreto. (A141/B180) (Emphasis mine)

Thus, from this we can conclude that the image is only the subjective way in which the appearance is represented through the synthesis of apprehension, for it is only the visual representation or picture we have of the appearance. Both—image and appearance—are produced when the imagination unifies the manifold in intuition, but whereas the appearance is the determinable object that the mind receives in one representation, the image is just the visual representation of that object. In this sense we can say that an image is a particular representation of a particular object: multiple visual representations for an appearance can be made—and are made—by the imagination. The image then conveys that an

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11 See Chapter 2 for the explanation of how an empirical concept is produced and what role abstraction plays in this act, as well as the nature of the generality or universality of an empirical concept.
appearance (as object) can be visually represented or pictured from different perspectives.

Commentators usually do not focus on Kant’s account of the subjective image that arises through synthesis. Instead, they focus on the objective appearance. Indeed, they tend to blur the distinction between image and appearance. Rudolf Makkreel is an exception. He highlights the specificity and relevance of Kant’s account of the image in the A-Deduction by calling attention to the different temporal roles played by three imagistic products of synthesis. First, through the process of image formation (Abbildung) we acquire representations of the present, a process that corresponds to the synthesis of apprehension. Second, reproductive image formation yields representations of the past (Nachbildung). This is what Kant refers to as the synthesis of reproduction. Finally, an anticipatory image formation represents the future (Vorbildung). This corresponds to the synthesis of recognition in the concept (Makkreel 1994, 16). While we agree with the two first statements, we cannot agree with the third, since we do not find textual support in Kant for upholding it. As we mention here below in a footnote, anticipation is part of our capacity to form images, but this does not mean that it is related inherently to the synthesis of recognition in the concept.

12 For instance, in the case of Longuenesse we think this is due to her reading of the A-Deduction under the mathematical model (Longuenesse 2000, 35 ff.). It is worth mentioning that both, B. Longuenesse and R. Makkreel (who is mentioned immediately now), conceive both deductions are connected, and that they do not exclude each other.
Makkreel neither explains nor fully develops these three points concerning the A-Deduction. Nevertheless, he provides us with an interesting path for understanding the initial stages of image formation by explaining the different species of what Kant calls our *Bildungsvermögen* or ‘formative faculty’. Two points deserve our attention. First, in the pre-critical period Kant conceived imagination—*Einbildung*—not as he does during the critical period, namely, as a pure productive and reproductive faculty, but only referred to an ‘imaginative formation’ which was a more independent species than the others and consisted in the power to invent images. Second, focusing on the *Reflexionen zur Anthropologie*, Makkreel states that the *conscious* operation of the imaginative formation makes it a mode of invention that *connects* all representations by a free act of volition. Makkreel says it is here that we find the origin of the synthetic function of the imagination as Kant presents it in the first *Critique* (Makkreel 1994, 13 ff.).

As already indicated, the imagination grounds its empirical activity through its transcendental use by establishing an *a priori* foundation for it. Thus, the empirical synthesis of apprehension is grounded in the pure synthesis of apprehension in the intuition that is the synthesis of spaces and of times. This accounts for the imagination’s being considered a *productive* faculty (A123).13 That is, the imagination has also to run *a priori* through the manifolds of space and time.

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13 In the *Anthropology*: “[t]he power of imagination (*facultas imaginandi*) . . . is . . . productive, that is, a faculty of the original presentation of the object (*exhibitio originaria*), which thus precedes experience . . . Pure intuitions of space and time belong to the productive faculty” (*Anthr. Ak. VII*: 167).
to attain the unity of each manifold in one representation, i.e., to attain the
representation of space and the representation of time. This means then that all
possible representations of space are united in one representation, i.e., in the
representation of space; likewise with time. Kant says:

Now this synthesis of apprehension must also be exercised a priori, i.e., in
regard to representations that are not empirical. For without it we could have a priori neither the representations of space nor of time, since these can be generated only through the synthesis of the manifold that sensibility in its original receptivity provides. We therefore have a pure synthesis of apprehension. (A99-100)

The synthesis of spaces and times, as the essential form of all intuition, is that which at the same time makes possible the apprehension of the appearance, thus every outer experience, consequently also all cognition of its objects. (A165-166/B206)

[T]he synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold of appearance must always be in agreement with the latter [forms of outer and inner sensible intuition a priori in the representations of space and time], since it [the synthesis of the apprehension of the manifold of appearance] can only occur in accordance with this form. (B160)

3.3. The Synthesis of Reproduction in the Imagination

Now, the empirical synthesis of apprehension is inseparably connected with
“the synthesis of reproduction in the imagination” since formed images must be necessarily capable of being reproduced; otherwise, every representation would appear to us each time as a new one, and experience of enduring objects would be impossible (cf. A102). Kant joins both levels of the synthesis because he sees that this is the only way in which representations can be necessarily connected with one

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14 These statements concerning the pure synthesis of apprehension—i.e., the composition of the manifolds of space and time—complement the explanation of the pure synthesis of space and time in Chapter 2.
another; it is clear that this connection is required in order to constitute possible experience. If we were always to lose the preceding parts of a line, the previous representations of the house we are building, or of the perceptions we already had, no cognition would be possible at all. This is why Kant states that:

It is, however, clear that even this apprehension\(^{15}\) of the manifold alone would bring forth no image and no connection of the impressions were there not a subjective ground for calling back a perception, from which the mind has passed on to another, to the succeeding ones, and thus for exhibiting entire series of perceptions, i.e., a reproductive faculty of imagination, which is then also merely empirical. (A121)\(^{16}\)

Thus, the synthesis of apprehension is inseparably connected to the reproductive imagination: *image formation* is inseparable from the *reproducibility of images in thought*. This relationship is fundamental since it conveys that *what we reproduce are images and not appearances*. However, through the reproduction of these images it is possible to exhibit the entire series of perceptions—i.e., the exhibition of appearances—and this is where the synthesis of reproduction plays a role. Kant is conveying two empirical activities here: one is the *reproduction of images* and the other is the *synthesis of reproduction*. The former brings back to the present—i.e., reproduces—images that have already been synthesized in apprehension; the latter combines these past images with the *new* ones being produced.

\(^{15}\)Kant is talking here of the synthesis of apprehension and not of bare apprehension.

\(^{16}\)In the *Anthropology*, the reproductive imagination is presented as the faculty of the derivative presentation of the object (*exhibitio derivativa*) whose capacity consists in bringing back to the mind an empirical intuition it previously had (cf. *Anthr.* Ak. VII: 167).
If Kant speaks of reproduction as a subjective ground it is because both activities of the reproductive imagination are not only empirical but also only **in time**: there is a **mental transition** from past perceptions to actual ones. The synthesis of reproduction does not need the actual re-presentation of the object (appearance) once it has been intuited. This stresses the idea that what the mind calls back or reproduces are **images** and not appearances—even if both play a role in perception.

Kant wants to convey that being able to reproduce the image avoids the need to constitute the manifold in intuition of a determinable object or appearance **again**. Thus, even if images are subjective, they participate in the construction and continuity of cognition in some way, for the imagination is able to bring back to the present what it represented in the past. However, as already mentioned, the “exhibition of the entire series of perceptions” refers clearly to the entire series of objects (appearances) and not to the multiple, subjective, and diverse images of those objects. Kant had already envisaged these ideas in his pre-critical period, as the following passage points out:

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17 Kant claims that the capacity the imagination has to go from the past to the present allows it to **anticipate** images, and in this way to pass from the present to the future, as we have seen in connection with Makkreel. As Kant says we anticipate the future by producing images – as an architect produces an image of the house she intends to build. Thus, ‘anticipation’ (**Vorbildung**) is also possible even if we have no impression and thus no actual image. The twofold capacity of the imagination to go from the present to the past and from the present to the future constitutes the laws of the reproductive imagination (**cf.** MLt Ak. XXVIII: 236).

In another section of the *Lectures on Metaphysics* Kant calls attention to the anticipative power of the imagination: “[t]he faculty of imagination (**facultas imaginationis**) is reproductive (**reproductiva**) with respect to past time, anticipating (**praevidenti**) with respect to future, and productive (**productiva**) with respect to no time” (**MM** Ak. XXIX: 883). He says here that anticipation is grounded on the law of expectation of similar outcomes (**lex expectationis casuum similium**).
My mind draws forth the representation of the senses from previous times, and connects them with the representations of the present. I reproduce the representations of the past time through association, according to which one representation draws forth another, because it had been accompanying it. This is the faculty of reproductive imagination. (ML 1 Ak. XXVIII: 236)

This passage shows that the reproduction of images needs to be guided by a subjective rule that Kant calls 'association' (Assoziation), for this rule has necessarily to determine the way in which past representations are to be combined with present ones. If there were no criterion for bringing back what has already been imaged, then the synthesis of reproduction in imagination would only be an arbitrary play of the imagination and it would not serve at all in cognition. The first Critique makes a clear statement in this sense:

[Their reproduction [the reproduction of representations] must thus have a rule in accordance with which a representation enters into combination in the imagination with one representation rather than with any others. This subjective and empirical ground of reproduction in accordance with rules is called the association of representations. (A121)

Thus, reproduction is governed by the rule of association, so that certain representations can be brought back to the present—in instead of others—and synthesized with the new ones. Association establishes then which images are going to be reproduced in order to be combined with the new ones. However, this implies that association has in some way to be connected with the new images formed through the synthesis of apprehension. Otherwise, the synthesis of reproduction could not attain its aim. The mind has to be able to reproduce representations in a certain way to avoid generating unruly heaps and to present them in a lawfully
connected way, since otherwise no cognition would arise (cf. A121). As the penultimate quotation mentions, the criterion that association follows is that of accompaniment. This idea reappears in the first *Critique* when Kant states that:

> It is, to be sure, a merely empirical law in accordance with which representations that have often followed or accompanied one another are finally associated with each other and thereby placed in a connection in accordance with which, even without the presence of the object, one of these representations brings about a transition of the mind to the other in accordance with a constant rule. This law of reproduction, however, presupposes that the appearances *themselves* are actually subject to such a rule. (A100) (Emphasis mine)

Thus, the law of reproduction is the empirical law that reproduces past images in accordance with the law of association, which is in turn also an empirical law that follows the criterion of associating in accordance with the times a representation has been accompanied by another. This might seem vague and even unnecessary, but Kant introduces a fundamental point in the last sentence: in reproduction it is already *presupposed* that the objects of the external world—i.e., appearances—are actually subjected to the same *rules* of association. The last sentence establishes a break through the word 'however,' indicating a shift from (the rule of) association to the common properties objects in the external world *de facto* share, so that reproduction is ultimately grounded—through association—in something that conveys objective reality.

This way, what we associate in the mind is what we find already associated in the external world. This implies that there is some sort of *regularity* in the external world, and that it is this regularity or order that the mind follows when it brings
back past images and combines them with new ones. That “appearances themselves are actually subject to such a rule” means that this is how things stand in the external world; i.e., that appearances de facto share common properties. These ‘common properties’ are precisely what accounts for the objective ground Kant requires for association, so that it can rule the reproduction of images without remaining at the merely subjective level of images; i.e., keeping at the same time its connection with appearances. Otherwise, association would remain totally subjective and the reproduction of images would not collaborate to yield genuine cognition. The following passage allows a better comprehension of this idea:

If cinnabar were now red, now black, now light, now heavy, if a human being where now changed into this animal shape, now into that one, if on the longest day the land were covered now with fruits, now with ice and snow, then my empirical imagination would never even get the opportunity to think of heavy cinnabar on the occasion of the representation of the color red; or if a certain word were attributed now to this thing, now to that, or if one and the same thing were sometimes called this, sometimes that, without the governance of a certain rule to which the appearances are already subjected in themselves, then no empirical synthesis of reproduction could take place. (A100-101) (Emphasis mine)

Thus, if we can “think of heavy cinnabar on the occasion of the representation of the color red” it is because we have perceived something red, and the image of that thing red—say a piece of meat—brings to my mind the redness of cinnabar. That is to say, the common property both objects share de facto is what allows the imagination to associate images in the same way, and thus allows us to reproduce the images that have common properties with the new (imaged) objects they are combined with. The criterion of accompaniment in association is a way of saying
that the imagination associates according to the shared properties different objects in the external world *de facto* have. But the crucial point of Kant’s argument is that *de facto* regularities are guaranteed by *de jure* laws of possible experience. Thus, when thinking of red cinnabar I can also bring back the image of its heaviness and, thus, I can reproduce the heaviness of a stone in the mind, without the need to have any of these appearances actually present in perception again.

Now, Kant calls ‘affinity’ (*Verwandtschaft*) this objective ground that association has through the common properties in appearances (as objects): “I call this objective ground of all association of appearances their **affinity**” (A122). This is better specified when Kant makes explicit that this affinity belongs to objects themselves: “[t]he ground of the possibility of the association of the manifold, insofar as it lies in the object, is called the **affinity** of the manifold” (A113). Thus, by **affinity** Kant wants to convey the intrinsic similarity of appearances through the properties they share; by **affinity of the manifold** he means the common properties objects in the external world *de facto* share. The perception of this affinity of properties in appearances grounds the rule of association that in turn grounds reproduction, and allows thereby the synthesis of reproduction of the imagination to be performed. But that there is an objective affinity—one that holds *de jure* and not merely *de facto*—is due to the fact that experience consists in appearances determined by *a priori* laws of human understanding.
At this stage of his argument, however, Kant does not explain further what the empirical affinity consists in. Instead, he stresses indirectly its importance by making clear that the empirical rule of association cannot be put in doubt, even stating that it has to be assumed: “that empirical rule of association, which one must assume throughout if one says that everything in the series of occurrences stands under rules according to which nothing happens that is not preceded by something upon which it always follows” (A112-113). This citation also shows the relevance the reproduction of images has for cognition, insofar as it relates the rule of association to the causal rule. Thus, the causal rule requires the rule of association insofar as association establishes the relationship between images and appearances again. We say ‘again’ since, if left alone, the diverse images formed from each appearance would not collaborate in cognition in a law-governed way and would only be subjectively associated in our minds, giving rise to apparent patterns that have no objective validity. This would imply that all our past or previous representations were lost or had remained unconnected in the mind, or that they were arbitrarily connected with the new images we form in the present. As already explained, this second level of the synthesis requires past representations—images of appearances—to be kept and united to new ones.

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18 It is possible to think here that the common properties of things can be produced in some way by the mutual causality of substances. See Chapter 1 for the mutual causality of substances.

19 The topic of causality is explained below in this same chapter.
The distinction between the causal rule and the rule of association must not be blurred, since the merely subjective association of the manifold does not follow an objective sequence or succession as the causal relation does. In association, the connection among appearances as well as between images can take place arbitrarily. For example, according to the causal law that, *ceteris paribus*, if it rains the road will get wet, the representations “it rains” and “the road is wet” have to follow one another necessarily; i.e., first it rains then the road gets wet, and not the other way around. By contrast, association allows the connection to run in either temporal direction: either of the two—the rain or the wet road—can bring back or reproduce the other. The same holds true for our association of shared properties, though here there is no relevant contrast to be drawn between subjective and objective temporal sequences. When such sequences are involved, our perceptions are *actually* connected by the causal rule—insofar as what we perceive are appearances—but they are not *reproduced* by the causal rule.

Our discussion of the empirical synthesis of apprehension in intuition and of the reproduction in the imagination has clarified the fundamental role that perception plays in cognition. This is relevant since Kant conceives *experience* as *empirical cognition* (cf. B147), where empirical cognition is a cognition through perception, even if it is not grounded in perception, for we already know that every object has to be given under the forms of space and time in sensibility and governed by the categories of the understanding in order to be cognized.
Finally, Kant states that empirical affinity is grounded on a transcendentally affinity. However, the only statement concerning this point says: “[a]ll appearances . . . stand in a thoroughgoing connection according to necessary laws, and hence in a transcendental affinity, of which the empirical affinity is the mere consequence” (A113-114). This transcendental affinity is not explained until Kant investigates the regulative use of the ideas of reason. Nevertheless, it plays a crucial role in Kant’s account of association, for without it we could not explain how de facto regularities acquire their de jure character. The necessary laws to which Kant refers in the passage just cited originate in the understanding, one of which (perhaps the most important) is the causal law. Kant says: “the understanding is itself the source of the laws of nature, and thus of the formal unity of nature” (A127). This means that the laws of nature are not to be understood as merely particular or empirical, but as grounded in pure laws of the understanding that first make empirical laws possible (cf. A128). The formal unity of nature is established a priori through the principles of the understanding that come from the categories, which allow us to consider nature as a synthetic unity of all possible appearances in original apperception. From this we can infer then that by transcendental affinity Kant intends to convey the idea that since the unity of nature is formally determined a priori by the subjection of the sensible manifold to transcendental apperception (cf. A114), it can

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20 This topic, however, is outside the domain of this dissertation.

21 The principles of the pure understanding as rules of the objective use of the categories are not treated in this dissertation since they are outside its domain. See: Critique of Pure Reason. Book II: Analytic of Principles, Chapter II: System of all Principles of Pure Understanding.
be considered that the laws of the understanding will be connected *a priori* in some way with possible appearances. As Kant puts it: “[f]or this unity of nature should be a necessary, *i.e.*, *a priori* certain unity of the connection of appearances” (A125).

### 3.4. The Recognition of a Manifold as an Object

The question now arises as to how it is possible to recognize an object *as an object*. We have stated above that perception requires the synthesis of apprehension, insofar as what we perceive are appearances and not dispersed or isolated elements in space and time. The empirical synthesis of apprehension, we said, has the aim of composing the manifold as a unity; i.e., to bring it as one representation to the mind. In this sense, perception presupposes the synthesis of apprehension. Thus, the question is now: how is this manifold recognized *as an object*? Kant states this question by asking “how the manifold is combined in the object” (A190/B235). This question is also stated by asking how the manifold is combined in the appearance *itself* (cf. A191/B236).

The question arises for the synthesis of apprehension alone cannot guarantee the representation of the manifold *as necessary*—i.e., that the manifold we combine is combined *in the same way as* it is combined in the object itself—since,

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23 Kant’s usage of ‘appearance itself’ in this explanation must not be confusing. He introduces the ‘itself’ following the concept ‘appearance’ here to stress he is talking about appearances *as objects* and not focusing in their representational nature. See Chapter 1 for the two sides of appearances.
when apprehending, the imagination only *juxtaposes* the elements it collects but, in doing so, it cannot guarantee that the synthesized manifold is necessary. Thus, in bare apprehension (*Apprehension*), the imagination cannot recognize the manifold as an object. Kant says: “apprehension (*Apprehension*) is only a juxtaposition (*Zusammenstellung*) of the manifold of empirical intuition, but no representation of the necessity of the combined existence of the appearances that it juxtaposes in space and time is to be encountered in it” (A176/B219). This is why the example of the house is introduced,\(^ {24}\) since the apprehension of an object alone can occur in an arbitrary way; i.e., the empirical manifold could be synthesized without following a necessary order. That is to say, I can apprehend the house beginning from the roof to the ground level or vice versa (cf. A192/B237). Therefore, a necessary order cannot be determined through the successive apprehension of the elements in a manifold *alone*. Kant points out:

> The apprehension of the manifold of appearance is always successive (*Die Apprehension des Mannigfaltigen der Erscheinung ist jederzeit sukzessiv*). The representation of the parts succeed one another. Whether they also succeed in the object is a second point of reflection. (A189/B234)

Kant’s insistence on the *successive* nature of apprehension is relevant, for the fact that the imagination *always* apprehends *successively* the manifolds of appearances (cf. A182/B225, A201/B246) opens *prima facie* the alternative that the *connection* of manifolds can account for the recognition of an object as an object.

However, since the synthesis of the imagination determines inner sense concerning

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\(^ {24}\) The discussion concerning the distinction between the house and the ship driven downstream begins in A190/B235.
time (cf. B233), but time itself cannot be perceived, there is no guarantee that the connection of appearances in the imagination will be the same as the connection of objects outside the mind, for the imagination by itself has no criterion for determining which appearance—i.e., aspect of a thing or state of a substance—comes first and which comes second. Therefore, through this alternative I am only conscious that I am placing one appearance, or state of a substance, first and another second, but not that this is the order objects themselves follow in the external world. Kant says:

>[C]onnection is . . . the product of a synthetic faculty of the imagination, which determines inner sense with regard to temporal relations. This, however, can combine the two states in question in two different ways, so that either one or the other precedes in time; for time cannot be perceived in itself, nor can what precedes and what follows in objects be as it were empirically determined in relation to it. I am therefore only conscious that my imagination places one state before and the other after, not that the one state precedes the other in the object; or, in other words, through the mere perception the objective relation of the appearances that are succeeding one another remains undetermined (es bleibt durch die bloße Wahrnehmung das objektive Verhältnis der einanderfolgenden Erscheinungen unbestimmt). (B233-234) (Emphasis mine)

Thus, from the mere synthetic activity of the imagination in apprehension, there is no way to get out of the subjectivity of our own representations;\(^{25}\) there is no way to guarantee through bare apprehension that the connection in our mind corresponds to the connection of objects in the external world. It could be that both

\(^{25}\)“We have representations in us, of which we can also become conscious. But let this consciousness reach as far and be as exact and precise as one wants, still there always remain only representations, i.e., inner determinations of our mind in this or that temporal relation.” (Wir haben Vorstellungen in uns, deren wir uns auch bewußt werden können. Dieses Bewußtsein aber mag so weit erstreckt, und so genau oder pünktlich sein, als man wolle, so bleiben es doch nur immer Vorstellungen, d.i. inner Bestimmungen unseres Gemüts in diesem oder jenem Zeitverhältnisse). (A197/B242)
successions follow different patterns. This difference is clearly established by appealing to the nature of an objective time series: “I still have to show what sort of combination (Verbindung) in time pertains to the manifold in the appearances itself even though the representation of it in apprehension is always successive” (A190/B235). This is why the mind seeks a rule (Regel) through perception that guides its synthetic activity in apprehension. As expected, the condition this rule has to fulfill is to make one way of combining the manifold necessary, for this is what is required to recognize a manifold as an object; i.e., to guarantee the recognition of an object as an object. Kant states this condition clearly:

[A]ppearance, in contradistinction to the representations of apprehension, can thereby only be represented as the object that is distinct from them if it stands under a rule that distinguishes it from every other apprehension, and makes one way of combining the manifold necessary. That in the appearance which contains the condition of this necessary rule of apprehension is the object. (A191/B236) (Emphasis mine)

Thus, there has to be a rule that guides the synthesis in apprehension so that the synthesized manifold can be recognized as an object. The rule has to fulfill two conditions: it has to distinguish the combination of a manifold from all other combined manifolds, and has to make one way of combining the manifold necessary. The two conditions are really one for the necessary manifold already implies its distinction from other manifolds. The passage cited above indicates that the condition for the rule (that guides apprehension) is already contained in the appearance, and that this is the object. This explains why the initial question that gave rise to this section was stated in terms of recognition of the object as an object,
since there is something in the appearance itself that allows this recognition, as we will now explain.

To seek the rule in perception means to seek the rule in what happens, but the only way in which something that happens can be perceived is if a previous appearance precedes it that did not contain the appearance—or state of a substance—that we are perceiving now. “That something happens, i.e., that something or a state comes to be that previously was not, cannot be empirically perceived except where an appearance precedes that does not contain this state in itself” (A191/B236-237). This is because, as explained in Chapter 1, we cannot perceive empty time, so what we perceive is always a succession of occurrences. Kant points out: “a reality that would follow on an empty time, thus an arising not preceded by any state of things, can be apprehended just as little as empty time itself. Every apprehension of an occurrence is therefore a perception that follows another one” (A191-192/B237). This is precisely why Kant contrasts the example of the house with that of the ship driven downstream. In the former the successive apprehension of the manifold could be in any order, whereas in the latter the successive apprehension has to be guided by the sequence in the object, for we cannot perceive first the ship driven downstream and afterwards the ship driven upstream, but only in the contrary way. Kant says, “[m]y perception of its position downstream follows the perception of its position upstream, and it is impossible
that in the apprehension of this appearance the ship should first be perceived downstream and afterwards upstream” (A192/B237).

Thus, the successive synthesis of apprehension follows the succession of happenings in time (that we perceive). So apprehension and perception are both subjected to how things succeed one another in the external world, or to how the states of a substance change in time. The relation among appearances themselves—i.e., the occurrences or happenings we perceive—indicates to the imagination how to synthesize, for they show a *necessary order in the temporal sequence* which allows the connection to the object. A fundamental passage accounts for this:

In the synthesis of the appearances the manifold representations always follow one another. Now by this means no object at all is represented; since through this sequence, which is common to all apprehensions, nothing is distinguished from anything else. *But as soon as I perceive or anticipate that there is in this sequence a relation to the preceding state*,26 from which the representation follows in accordance with a rule,27 I represent something as an occurrence, or as something that happens; i.e., *I cognize an object* that I *must place in time* in a determinate position, which, after the preceding state, cannot be otherwise assigned to it. (A198/B243) (Emphasis mine)

Therefore, what allows the recognition of the object as an object is not simply that the imagination follows the rule that determines the succession of objects in the external world—i.e., the causal rule—while it successively synthesizes in apprehension, but that, in doing so, the imagination perceives that one state follows another necessarily so that the mind places—has to place—the objects of the

26 Note that the recognition of the object is intimately linked to the causal rule.

27 By “in accordance with rule” Kant means “necessarily” (cf. A194/B239).
sequence in determinate temporal positions. This allows the mind to recognize an object in the manifold, and to recognize it as different from other objects in the sequence as well. Hence, the perceived sequence of appearances indicates to the mind what specific causal relations hold in experience – i.e., what follows from what necessarily. This allows the mind to recognize an object in the manifold by determining its place in the temporal sequence.

Now, we mentioned above that “the condition for the rule is contained in the appearance.” But what exactly does “contained in the appearance” mean? The answer is that every appearance is the cause of the following appearance in time, because every appearance posits the following one: “if the state that precedes is posited, then this determinate occurrence inevitably and necessarily follows” (A198/B243-244). Kant answers this way: “there must . . . lie in that which in general precedes an occurrence the condition for a rule, in accordance with which this occurrence always and necessarily follows” (A193/B238-239). That “the condition for a rule must lie in what precedes an occurrence” and “that this occurrence must always follow necessarily,” means that the previous occurrence contains the condition of the later, and this can only be because it posits it. For example, the ship upstream is the cause of the ship downstream, because its first appearance or state has posited the second one. It is because one state or appearance posits the next one that the condition for the rule is contained in the
appearance itself, since each appearance is caused by a previous one from which it follows in time. Kant says:

This rule for determining something with respect to its temporal sequence, however, is that in what precedes, the condition is to be encountered under which the occurrence always (i.e., necessarily) follows (Diese Regel aber, etwas der Zeitfolge nach zu bestimmen, ist: daß in dem, was vorhergeht, die Bedingung anzutreffen sei, unter welcher die Begebenheit jederzeit (d.i. notwendiger Weise) folgt). (A200/B246)

This rule is always to be found in the perception of that which happens, and it makes the order of perceptions that follow one another (in the apprehension of this appearance) necessary (Diese Regel aber ist bei der Wahrnehmung von dem, was geschieht, jederzeit anzutreffen, und sie macht die Ordnung der einander folgenden Wahrnehmungen (in der Apprehension dieser Erscheinung) notwendig). (A193/B238)

Thus the rule the mind seeks—and finds—in the external world through perception is the causal rule, insofar as each appearance is necessarily an effect of a preceding one as well as being the cause of a following one, because earlier states posit later states necessarily. Kant says this is precisely the meaning that the concept of causality has: “that something could be so constituted that, if it is posited, something else must necessarily thereby be posited as well; for that is what the concept of cause says” (Prol. Ak. IV: 257). Through this explanation Kant conveys that the recognition of an object as an object is possible in the perception of the succession of appearances because there is a causal relation among appearances. Thus, the causal rule allows the mind to recognize a manifold as an object, insofar as the sequence of states that follow one another necessarily—and that the mind

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28 This statement is Kant’s conception of the so-called ‘law of causality.’
perceives—forces the mind to determine each state in time, i.e., makes the mind give each appearance a determinate position in the sequence.

The discovery of the causal rule then guarantees the perceiving subject that it is not enclosed in inner sense, and that its representations of objects are not just a play of its own imagination (cf. A194/B239). Ultimately, what the mind recognizes then are the different states of external substances through their alteration in time, and it does so by determining the position each appearance has in space and time. Thus it is the (causal) rule we find in appearances that determines the succession in apprehension, since the imagination synthesizes following the (successive) order of appearances in the external world. Kant’s point, however, is stronger, since what he intends to convey is that the successive synthesis of apprehension must follow the order of things in the external world; otherwise, no object would be recognized in the manifold that is being synthesized. A fundamental passage explains this:

In our case I must therefore derive the subjective sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of appearances, for otherwise the former would be entirely undetermined and no appearance would be distinguished from any other. The former alone [the subjective sequence of apprehension] proves nothing about the connection of the manifold in the object, because it is entirely arbitrary. This connection must therefore consist in the order of the manifold of appearance in accordance with which the apprehension of one thing (that which happens) follows that of the other (which precedes) in accordance with a rule. Only thereby can I be justified in saying of the appearance itself, and not merely of my apprehension, that a sequence is to be encountered in it, which is to say as much as that I cannot arrange the apprehension otherwise than in exactly this sequence. (A193/B238) (Emphasis mine)
As the passage makes plain, it is an imperative that the synthesis in apprehension follows the succession of objects in the external world; this is conveyed by the statement that “I must derive the subjective sequence of apprehension from the objective sequence of appearances.” This is the only way we can recognize an object as an object in the manifold that is being synthesized, for, by following the causal rule in appearances—where the preceding appearance posits the following one necessarily—the mind is able to distinguish one object from another in the manifolds it synthesizes by determining its place in the sequence, and thus recognizing a way of combination as necessary. Thus the causal rule frees the activity of the imagination from the mere temporal relations that representations have in inner sense. This is one of the most interesting explanations Kant gives of how the mind and the external world condition one another mutually.29

This is how the two required conditions are then fulfilled, for the rule encountered in the succession of appearances themselves guides the synthesis of apprehension to combine manifolds in the same way. This means that the combination in the manifold is necessary, and it allows us to distinguish one manifold from another precisely by making a combination necessary. The successive synthesis in apprehension follows then the succession of appearances themselves in time and this makes it possible for the mind to distinguish among manifolds and to recognize an object in the manifold it combines. It is the causal

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29 In Chapter 1 we explained how inner and outer sense condition each other as well, even if in the inner-outer relationship a tension exists which is not the case here.
rule then that grants of objective significance the synthesis of apprehension. In the same sense, Kant says:

If, therefore, we experience that something happens, then we always presuppose that something else precedes it, which it follows in accordance with a rule. For without this I would not say of the object that it follows, since the mere sequence in my apprehension, if it is not, by means of a rule, determined in relation to something preceding, does not justify any sequence in the object. Therefore I always make my subjective synthesis (of apprehension) objective with respect to a rule in accordance with which the appearances in their sequence, i.e., as they occur, are determined through the preceding state, and only under this presupposition alone is the experience of something that happens even possible. (A195/B240) (Emphasis mine)

A clarification needs to be made here, for this explanation seems to contradict our initial statement that perception (Warhnehmung) presupposes the synthesis of apprehension, for now it seems that this synthesis follows perception. Kant, however, is very precise in this presentation, for the apprehension of the manifold is one thing, and the perception of appearances is another. The distinction between the two is very subtle, since the three activities—i.e., the successive apprehension of the manifold in intuition, the perception of appearances, and their submission to the causal rule in apprehension (and perception)—are basically simultaneous. It is just that to perceive something there has to be some sort of manifold being synthesized in apprehension, for otherwise there would be nothing to perceive at all. In short, while I perceive the boat going downstream, my imagination is simultaneously synthesizing the manifold in apprehension in the same way. And due to the causal rule that guides perception and the synthesis of
apprehension, I am able to recognize the synthesized manifold as an object by
determining the place of the objects in the sequence in time.

Finally, the recognition of the object as an object has to be distinguished from
the determination of an object as an object of experience, for it is one thing to
recognize the manifold as an object and another to make the object an object of

cognition. We recall here that possible experience depends on the understanding,
since the understanding makes the representation of an object possible (cf.
A199/B244-445) through the categories. Kant says “this happens through its
conferring temporal order on the appearances and their existence by assigning to
each of these, as a consequence, a place in time determined a priori in regard to the
preceding appearances” (A199/B245). Thus it is not just necessary to determine
the position of an appearance in the temporal sequence, but to determine it a priori.
This implies we are no longer operating only at the perceptual level but, more
fundamentally, at the transcendental level.

Otherwise stated, we are no longer talking of the causal rule we seek and
find, but of the causal law that determines a priori the causal relation of
appearances. “The assignation of a place in time a priori to appearances” implies the
ruling action of the categories; more precisely, of the relational category of cause-
effect, where appearances are already conceived as phenomena or existing objects

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30 This distinction correlates to the distinction between ‘judgments of perception’ and ‘judgments of
experience’ that is explained in the next section of this chapter.
under natural laws. Thus the causal law\textsuperscript{31} determines an object insofar as it assigns it a priori a determinate place in the temporal sequence.

It is clear that assigning a place in time determined a priori—i.e., applying the categories to objects in general—is not the same thing as establishing the determinate position in time of a perceptual object. Since we are talking in both cases of objects of the outer sense, before as appearances and now as phenomena, let us explain how an ‘object of perception’ (Gegenstand der Warhnehmung) can become an ‘object of experience’ (Gegenstand der Erfahrung), since, strictly speaking, for Kant an object of perception is an appearance, while a phenomenon is an object of experience; i.e., an object of cognition properly speaking.

\textbf{3.5. The Controversial Distinction between Judgments of Perception and Judgments of Experience: A Possible Interpretation}

In Chapter 2 we explained how the logical functions of the understanding in judgments determined all the possible relations a thing can have with its predicates as well as with other things. It was stated that the different ways in which representations—more precisely, concepts—are related in judgments convey all the possible relations a thing can have, and that it was the role of the categories to determine which intuition is subsumed under each concept in judgments.

Transcendental Logic then clarified the absolutely necessary role of the categories in all judgments. However, in the \textit{Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics That Will...}

\textsuperscript{31} Even if Kant uses most of the time indistinctly the concepts ‘rule’ and ‘law’; in strict sense ‘law’ is a rule that is \textit{objective}. 
Be Able to Come Forward as Science, written in between the two editions of the first Critique, Kant surprisingly divides empirical judgments into what he calls a ‘judgment of perception’ (Wahrnehmungsurteil) and a ‘judgment of experience’ (Erfahrungsurteil), where the criterion for the distinction is precisely the absence of the categories in the former and their presence in the latter. Most commentators have been puzzled by this perplexing distinction.

Indeed, the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience inevitably raises the question about the need for the categories, since prima facie it seems that, if categories truly rule intuition, the distinction between the two types of judgments has no sense at all. On the contrary, if we accept this distinction, the question arises about the nature of the judgments of perception, and how are we to understand them in relation to the unity of apperception. Several commentators have criticized this distinction on the grounds that it does not cohere with Kant’s more considered account of the close tie between the categories and judgment in general. This is not, however, our position. We think the distinction between both types of judgments must not be disregarded as futile, even if it is problematic. The Prolegomena introduces the problem as follows:

Empirical judgments, insofar as they have objective validity, are judgments of experience; those, however, that are only subjectively valid I call mere judgments of perception (Empirische Urteile, sofern sie objektive Gültigkeit haben, sind Erfahrungsurteile; die aber, so nur subjektiv gültig sind, nenne ich bloße Wahrnehmungsurteile). The latter do not require pure concepts of the understanding, but only the logical connection of perceptions in a

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32 See Chapter 4 for the (objective and subjective) unity of apperception.
thinking subject. But the former always demand, beyond the representations of sensory intuition, in addition special concepts originally generated in the understanding, which are precisely what make the judgment of experience objectively valid. (Prol. Ak. IV: 298) 33

As surprising as the distinction itself, is also the demand that judgments of perception only contain a logical connection, for this implies that what we perceive are only representations connected to one another under the requirements of General Logic. This implies that the connection concerning content—i.e., what is given in empirical intuition—is not taken into consideration, and thus that the judgment has no universal or objective validity. 34 What are we to understand then by judgments of perception? Since these judgments are empirical, and the empirical synthesis in apprehension follows the causal rule that allows us to recognize a manifold as an object, a first approximation is to conceive judgments of perception as judgments that recognize the object as an object, and then to consider judgments of experience as those that determine an object as an object of experience. This explanation fits with the intention of the Prolegomena since Kant considers all empirical judgments to be first judgments of perception that are valid only for the subject, that are then transformed, through the application of the categories, into judgments of experience. As Kant says:

All of our judgments are at first mere judgments of perception; they hold only for us, i.e., for our subject, and only afterwards do we give them a new

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33 The Jäsche Logic presents the distinction between both judgments this way: “A judgment of perception is merely subjective, an objective judgment from perceptions is a judgment of experience” (JL Ak. IX: 113). However, besides a Note, Kant gives no further explanation.

34 Kant equates universal validity and objective validity (cf. Prol. Ak. IV: 298).
relation, namely to an object, and intend that the judgment should also be valid at all times for us and for everyone else; for if a judgment agrees with an object, then all judgments of the same object must also agree with one another, and hence the objective validity of a judgment of experience means nothing other than its necessary universal validity. (Prol. Ak. IV: 298)

Let us note first that the object Kant is talking about here is a genuine object. As Kant explains, we cognize an object only when we succeed in relating our representations to something distinct from our own representations. It is clear that this new relation refers then to the object as an object of experience or a phenomenon. Now, this new relation is established by adding the categories to the perceived appearances, and more precisely, to empirical intuition: “special concepts must yet be added, which have their origin completely a priori in the pure understanding, under which every perception can first be subsumed and then, by means of the same concepts, transformed into experience” (Prol. Ak. IV: 297). The addition of the categories then guarantees the cognition of a property that belongs necessarily to the object (cf. Prol. Ak. IV: 298), and this allows the judgment of that object to be considered as universally valid – i.e., to count as a judgment of experience. The cognition of properties that belong to the object necessarily is precisely the determination of the object which is only possible through the categories. Therefore, a determined object is an object of experience.

As the passage just quoted states, the determination of an object concerning its properties brings unity to the object: this is what Kant means when he says that “if a judgment agrees with an object, then all judgments of the same object must also
agree with one another." This unity of the object accounts for the object as a
phenomenon or as the object considered under natural laws, which, it is clear, cannot be accounted for when mere appearances are at stake. Therefore, the parallel between judgments of perception as judgments about appearances, and judgments of experience as judgments about phenomena makes sense. Kant intends to convey to us that just as appearances can become phenomena, so judgments of perception can become judgments of experience. Two questions arise then here: first, how are we to understand the process by which a judgment of perception becomes a judgment of experience, and, second, how are we to understand the fact that a perceptual judgment is not governed by the categories? An analysis of Kant's own examples is the most useful way to understand what he intends to convey:

[I]f I say: the air is elastic, then this judgment is to begin with only a judgment of perception; I relate two sensations in my senses only to one another. If I want it to be called a judgment of experience, I then require that this connection be subject to a condition that makes it universally valid (Will ich, es soll Erfahrungsurteil heißen, so verlange ich, daß diese Verknüpfung unter einer Bedingung stehe, welche sie allgemeingültig macht). I want therefore that I, at every time, and also everyone else, would necessarily have to connect the same perceptions under the same circumstances. (Prol. Ak. IV: 299)

What is interesting about this example is that the same formulation is used for both judgments. The judgment “the air is elastic” is first a judgment of perception and then a judgment of experience. This implies that in principle the way the judgment is formulated is not a fundamental point in the discussion. What the passage states as fundamental is that for a judgment of perception to “be called a
The judgment of experience" the connection has to be universally valid, and this depends on a condition that, as stated, is the application of the categories to the perceived elements. The question is then what connection Kant is talking about.

In the chapter concerning the Metaphysical Foundations of Dynamics in the Metaphysical Foundations, Kant defines elasticity as the expansive force of matter and explains that it is through this force that matter fills space. However, matter also has a compressing force that acts against the expansive force; the compressing force can drive matter from the space it fills into a decreased space. This way the enlargement of space by the expanding force can be resisted by the compressing force. This information is sufficient for our purposes here.

Going back to the passage cited above, when I inflate the tire of my bike I perceive that air is elastic at this present time and under a specific circumstance that is only mine; thus I say "air is elastic." The usage of an air pump in general makes me— you, Peter, etc.—perceive this elasticity, for the compressed air always tries to expand as soon as the compressing force diminishes. However, this judgment—"the air is elastic"—is only subjective insofar as it is only mine, and it does not matter how many times I inflate the tire of my bike and perceive the elasticity of the air, the judgment will still continue to be subjective since it is a judgment only valid for me. As Heidegger points out: "every time when . . . then,' is simply a uniting of various perceptions, i.e., a perceptual judgment. Here my perceptions (as also those of every

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35 The explanation begins in MAN. Ak. IV: 496.
other perceiving “I”) are always added to one another. This only determines how what is presently given to me appears to me” (Heidegger 1967, 138). As already anticipated, we have to focus then on the connection mentioned in the passage.

Since “the air is elastic” is a categorical judgment, for the predicate ‘elastic’ is attributed to the subject ‘air,’ we will expect the intuitions involved in the judgment to be subsumed under the relational categories of substance and accident – i.e., ‘air’ being subsumed under the category of substance and ‘elastic’ under the category of accident. However, Kant surprises us by stating that the subsumption of ‘air’ must be under the category of cause. This makes clear that the connection he is talking about is not that of the categorical judgment – i.e., that it is not the copula ‘is’ that is at stake in the passage from a judgment of perception to a judgment of experience.

In a fundamental passage Kant clarifies just this point:

A completely different judgment therefore occurs before experience can arise from perception. The given intuition must be subsumed under a concept, which determines the form of judging in general with respect to the intuition, connects the empirical consciousness of the latter in a consciousness in general, and thereby furnishes empirical judgments with universal validity; a concept of this kind is a pure a priori concept of the understanding, which does nothing but simply determine for an intuition the mode in general in which it can serve for judging. The concept of cause being such a concept, it therefore determines the intuition which is subsumed under it, e.g., that of air, with respect to judging in general – namely, so that the concept of air serves, with respect to expansion, in the relation of the antecedent to the consequent in a hypothetical judgment. (Prol. Ak. IV: 300)

Universality, then, or more precisely the universal or objective validity of an empirical judgment (about an appearance), is obtained when the judgment in question is connected with consciousness in general. Otherwise stated, universality is
obtained when our empirical consciousness is connected with one consciousness of pure apperception. *The connection of an empirical judgment with one consciousness or pure apperception is what allows a perceptual judgment to become objectively valid, and thus to acquire the status of a judgment of experience.* The category then not only determines the activity of judging in general but additionally connects the empirical consciousness with one consciousness of pure apperception. It is this connection that allows empirical judgments to acquire universal validity. Objective validity or universal validity implies then empirical intuition is connected to consciousness in general through the action of the category.

However, the key point in this explanation is that not all categories must be applied to perceptual judgments, but only that of causality. This is very important, since otherwise we would have to conclude that there is no category ruling perceptual judgments, what would make the relation of concepts in such judgments mere nonsense. On this interpretation of the *Prolegomena* Kant is not thinking of all categories but only of the causal relation of two judgments subsumed under the *category of causality*, since the point is to make an empirical perceptual judgment into a judgment of experience. More precisely, what Kant is conveying is that judgments of perception must be governed by the category of causality to become judgments of experience. As the passage says, the category at stake here is that of

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36 See Chapter 4 for the explanation of how categories connect empirical consciousness with one consciousness in general.

37 See Chapter 2 for the explanation as to how categories rule *all* judgments.
causality, and the intuition of ‘air’ has to be subsumed under that category. It adds that this is required “so that the concept of air serves, with respect to expansion, in the relation of the antecedent to the consequent in a hypothetical judgment.” In our reading, this statement gives us the path to understand Kant’s intention. Let us then go to the Logic to understand what Kant means by a hypothetical judgment. Kant claims:

The matter of hypothetical judgments consists of two judgments that are connected with each other as ground and consequent. The first of these judgments, containing the ground, is the antecedent proposition (antecedens, prius); the second, which is related as the consequent to it, the consequent proposition (consequens, posterius); and the presentation of this kind of connection of two judgments with each other in behalf of the unity of consciousness is called consequence, which makes up the form of hypothetical judgments. (L Ak. IX: 105)

The Logic adds an important idea that will allow us to understand fully Kant’s point:

The form of connection in hypothetical judgments is twofold: the positing (modus ponens) or the deposing (modus tollens) form.
1) If the ground (antecedens) is true, the consequent (consequens) determined by it is also true—modus ponens.
2) If the consequent (consequens) is false, the ground (antecedens) is also false—modus tollens. (L Ak. IX: 106)

The hypothetical judgment is then a judgment composed of two judgments under the form “if . . . then.” The first judgment (the one in the ‘if’ clause) is the ground and the second (the one in the ‘then’ clause) is the consequent; when the first judgment posits the second one, the “if . . . then” connection is called a modus ponens connection. These two judgments (united) constitute the matter of the hypothetical judgment, but its form is the connection between them – i.e., the
relation ‘if . . . then.’ Now, Kant calls ‘consequence’ (Konsequenz) the relation the form of the hypothetical judgment has to consciousness in general. In other words, ‘consequence’ (Konsequenz) is the formal relation of the judgment united to one consciousness.\(^{38}\)

The *Logic* then sheds light on the statements in the *Prolegomena* for we can understand now how a judgment of perception can become a judgment of experience. Subsuming the intuition of air under the category of causality—“so that the concept of air serves, with respect to expansion, in the relation of the antecedent to the consequent in a hypothetical judgment”—we have then the following hypothetical judgment: “if matter expands, then air is elastic.” This is a hypothetical judgment in *modus ponens* because the first or grounding judgment has posited the second one; i.e., that “air is elastic” necessary follows from the expansive force of matter.

Thus the perceptual judgment “air is elastic” has become a judgment of experience because the perception or perceptual judgment—including their concepts and the empirical intuitions subsumed under them—has entered into the necessary causal connections of perceptions determined a priori by its subsumption under the relational category of causality, i.e., the perceptual judgment has been subsumed under the causal law, and thus united to consciousness in general, since the

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\(^{38}\) Kant says that “[w]hat the copula is to categorical judgments, the consequence is to the hypothetical—their form” (*L* Ak. IX: 105). See Chapter 4 for the relevance the copula ‘is’ has concerning the unity of consciousness.
categories express the unity of consciousness. The “air is elastic” is no longer a judgment valid only for me; i.e., subjectively valid, but a judgment universally valid, since it has been united with one consciousness of original pure apperception.

The point is then that when the perceptual judgment is subsumed under the form “if . . . then” as the consequent of a previous judgment, it becomes a judgment of experience itself, for the connection “if . . . then” is related to one consciousness of pure apperception, from which the objective validity of the hypothetical judgments proceeds. That some judgments determined by the category of causality—more explicitly, the grounding judgments—are already judgments of experience that are presupposed in this process, is necessary for the growth of cognition. Kant points to the presupposition of judgments when he states that:

[T]he air is elastic, becomes universally valid and thereby for the first time a judgment of experience, because certain judgments occur beforehand, which subsume the intuition of the air under the concept of cause and effect, and thereby determine the perceptions not merely with respect to each other in my subject, but with respect to the form of judging in general (here the hypothetical). (Prol. Ak. IV: 301) (emphasis mine)

39 See Chapter 4 for the explanation of how the categories express the unity of consciousness.

40 Longuenesse seems to move in the same direction when she says: “[O]nly a metaphysics of nature can fully justify the move from a judgment of perception to a judgment of experience. And it can do this because its own universal principles rely on a priori demonstration of the objectivity of the categories” (Longuenesse 2000, 175). Moreover, in her essay Kant on causality: What was he trying to prove? Longuenesse says: “[w]hat allows the transition from the mere statement of a repeatedly observed occurrence (judgment of perception) to a hypothetical judgment for which we claim the “strict universality of a rule” (judgment of experience)? Kant’s response is that we presuppose the necessary truth through of another judgment, prior to both the judgment of perception and the judgment of experience. We presuppose the truth of a judgment that states that appearances, the objects of our perception and experience, are ‘in themselves determined’ with respect to the logical form of our hypothetical judgment. We presuppose, in other words, that appearances are in themselves, as empirical objects, connected by a chain of causal connections, or we presuppose the universal validity of the causal principle” (Longuenesse 2005, 240). Here Longuenesse is also arguing
Let us focus on another of Kant’s examples, where now the judgment of perception appears to have the form of a hypothetical judgment, but without necessity in the relation. The passage says as follows:

To have a more easily understood example, consider the following: If the sun shines on the stone, it [the stone] becomes warm (Wenn die Sonne den Stein bescheint, so wird er warm). This judgment is a mere judgment of perception and contains no necessity, however often I and others also have perceived this; the perceptions are only usually found so conjoined. But if I say: the sun warms the stone (die Sonne erwärmt den Stein), then beyond the perception is added the understanding’s concept of cause, which connects necessarily the concept of sunshine with that of heat, and the synthetic judgment becomes necessarily universally valid, hence objective, and changes from a perception into experience. (Prol. Ak. IV: 301n)

Even if the first judgment—i.e., “if the sun shines on the stone, it [the stone] becomes warm”—seems to be a hypothetical judgment, it is not, for the supposed grounding judgment does not necessarily posit the second one. It is just a judgment of perception. However, if we say “if sunshine heats, then the sun warms the stone,” here the first judgment posits the second one which follows from the first necessarily, and thus the relation purports to be objectively valid and the judgment is related to apperception in general. The judgment “sunshine heats” is then the grounding judgment, or the condition already present, in the judgment of experience “the sun warms the stone.” Through the subsumption of the intuition of the sun under the category of cause, the consequent or second judgment becomes part of a necessary sequence of causal relations that makes the heat of the sun to be

that this is how things are de facto arranged in the external world as well; i.e., she is appealing to the causal rule we mentioned in our previous section.
the cause of the stone becoming warm. This is how the connection between “the sun shines on the stone” and “the stone is warm” becomes an objective connection and thus this perceptual judgment becomes the judgment of experience “the sun warms the stone.”

This second example teaches us that the mere causal form, i.e., the ‘if . . . then’ connection, is not by itself sufficient for a judgment of perception to become a judgment of experience, for the consequent has to follow from the antecedent necessarily. *Non sequiturs*, such as, the judgment “If children are small, then leaves are green,” are clear examples, but as the non-experiential version of “When the sun shines, the stone grows warm” makes clear, there are perfectly reasonable hypothetical judgments of perception that also fall short of being judgments of experience.

This is what we consider Kant to be trying to convey through the *Prolegomena*’s distinction between *judgments of perception* and *judgments of experience*. We agree with Heidegger that Kant’s intention with this distinction between two types of empirical judgments is to point out that an object in the *strict sense* is neither what is only sensed (*Empfundene*) nor what is only perceived (*Wahrgenommene*), but that which a judgment of experience posits as an *object of knowledge*, i.e. something that has validity for any human subject whatsoever (cf. Heidegger 1967, 137). Heidegger rightly considers that a judgment of experience conveys a completely different representation of the given which is its apprehension
as nature (cf. Heidegger 1967, 139). It is in this sense also that we understand Kant’s statement that a judgment of perception has no reference to the object (cf. Prol. Ak: IV: 300).

Our interpretation coincides in many points with Longuenesse’s as well. She states that the passage from a perceptual judgment to a judgment of experience implies the subsumption of concepts under more general concepts, and these in turn under the category of causality (cf. Longuenesse 2000, 175). She states that: “[i]n the case of ‘Air is elastic’, the judgment of perception becomes a judgment of experience when the logically connected perceptions are subsumed under the concept ‘force of repulsion’, which is itself thought under the concept of cause” (Longuenesse 2000, 181). She also says that the passage from perceptual judgments to judgments of experience requires us to focus on the connection “if . . . then” and accordingly asks: “[t]he question then becomes, How does the merely logical combination of perceptions expressed by this connective lead to the subsumption of intuition under the corresponding category?” (Longuenesse 2000, 176n). She advances the need of hypothetical judgments for this transformation. However, it is in her essay Kant on causality: What was he trying to prove? that she really develops this topic. There she argues that is possible through the

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41 Force of repulsion—which is a fundamental property of matter—is also called expansive force, according to Kant’s Metaphysical Foundations. Longuenesse also refers to this work in her explanation.

42 “Categorical judgments such as ‘Air is elastic’ can thereby also acquire the status of judgments of experience. But they require the mediation of hypothetical judgments, the true guides of an experimental method whose main goal is the discovery of causal connections” (Longuenesse 2000, 177).
hypothesis judgments in *modus ponens* and she rightly expresses that “what a hypothetical judgment asserts is that the predication expressed by the consequent can be asserted *only under the condition* that the predication expressed in the antecedent be asserted” (Longuenesse 2005, 238). This is consistent with our own explanation.

Therefore, in our interpretation, the division of empirical judgments in the *Prolegomena* is not really about the lack of categories as ruling *a priori* concepts in perceptual judgments—even if Kant initially states so—but about the need to subsume empirical intuitions, and their corresponding concepts, under the category of *causality* to transform perceptual judgments into judgments of experience. Simply stated, for an ‘object of perception’ (*Gegenstand der Wahrnehmung*) to become an ‘object of experience’ (*Gegenstand der Erfahrung*) the category of ‘cause and effect’ (*der Kausalität und Dependenz*) has to be applied to the concatenation of appearances. In our reading, it is not that judgments of perception are not governed by the categories, for what is at stake in this explanation is *merely* the category of cause and effect that is a category that relates two judgments; *these two judgments themselves have necessarily to be governed by the categories*. Two passages from the first *Critique* convey relevant ideas in this explanation:

The concept, however, that carries a necessity of synthetic unity with it can only be a pure concept of understanding, which does not lie in the perception, and that is here the concept of the *relation of cause and effect* (*Der Begriff aber, der eine Notwendigkeit der synthetischen Einheit bei sich führt, kann nur rein reiner Verstandesbegriff sein, der nicht in der Wahrnehmung liegt, und das ist hier der Begriff des Verhältnisses der Ursache und Wirkung*), the former
of which determines the latter in time, as its consequence, and not as something that could merely precede in the imagination (or not even be perceived at all). Therefore it is only because we subject the sequence of the appearances and thus all alteration to the law of causality that experience itself, i.e., empirical cognition of them [appearances], is possible; consequently they themselves, as objects of experience, are possible only in accordance with this law. (B234) (Emphasis mine)

Thus the relation of appearances (as possible perceptions) in accordance with which the existence of that which succeeds (what happens) is determined in time necessarily and in accordance with a rule by something that precedes it, consequently the relation of cause to effect, is the condition of the objective validity of our empirical judgments with regard to the series of perceptions (mithin das Verhältnis der Ursache zur Wirkung die Bedingung der objektiven Gültigkeit unserer empirischen Urteile, in Ansehung der Reihe der Wahrnehmungen), thus of their empirical truth, and therefore of experience. Hence the principle of the causal relation in the sequence of appearances is valid for all objects of experience (under the conditions of succession), since it is itself the ground of the possibility of such an experience. (A202/B247)

Thus, in our interpretation there is no contradiction between this section of the Prolegomena and the main ideas of Kant’s critical philosophy. The distinction between two types of empirical judgments can only be understood in the context of a physical explanation; indeed the section in question in the Prolegomena belongs under the heading “How is Pure Natural Science Possible?” where Kant states, just before introducing the distinction between both types of judgments, the following idea:

A judgment of perception can never be considered as valid for experience without the law, that if an event is perceived then it is always referred to something preceding from which it follows according to a universal rule; or if I express myself in this way: Everything of which experience shows that it happens must have a cause. (Prol. Ak. IV: 296)

43 By 'law of causality' Kant understands the category of cause-effect as a ruling a priori concept.
It is worth mentioning that Kant himself seems to have had difficulty on this issue in the *Prolegomena* discussion, since he himself disregards the first examples that he gives to explain the topic, namely, “The room is warm,” “The sugar is sweet” and “The wormwood is repugnant” (cf. *Prol.* *Ak.* IV: 299). Immediately after having proposed these three examples he states in a footnote:

I gladly admit that these examples do not present judgments of perception *such as could ever become judgments of experience* if a concept of the understanding were also added, because they refer merely to feeling – which everyone acknowledges to be merely subjective and which must therefore never be attributed to the object – and therefore can never become objective. (*Prol.* *Ak.* IV: 299n) (Emphasis mine)

This shows not only that Kant considered his own initial examples to be inadequate to treat the problem, but also that he recognized that *not all judgments of perception can become judgments of experience*. We consider this division of perceptual judgments to be part of the confusion the text produces, for Kant mentions at times that subjective judgments concern *the state of the subject* at a specific time (cf. *Prol.* *Ak.* IV: 299), or that they are connected in *a consciousness of my state* (cf. *Prol.* *Ak.* IV: 300), as in the judgment “I *feel* the room is warm” or “The wormwood is repugnant *to me*.” Here Kant is clearly confusing the empirical consciousness that accounts for inner sense—and thus the inner perceptions about *my own* mental state or feelings—with perception as empirical consciousness related to the objects of the outer sense. The problem is that since perception is sometimes defined as empirical consciousness, while empirical consciousness is
also defined as inner sense,\textsuperscript{44} perception (concerning objects of the outer sense) appears here to be confused with inner sense. That is to say, the confusion arises because in these initial examples Kant mixes what belongs to inner sense with what belongs to the objects of outer sense. As the explanation progresses it is made clear that \textit{Kant did not intend to deal with inner sense}, whose perceptual judgments concern \textit{only the state of the subject}. Evidently, this type of perceptual judgments, i.e., judgments about our inner perceptions or about the subject’s feelings, can \textit{never} become judgments of experience strictly speaking. Longuenesse rightly points out that “[i]n the \textit{Prolegomena}, judgments of perception are judgments about \textit{spatiotemporal objects}, albeit valid ‘only for me’” (Longuenesse 2000, 169).\textsuperscript{45} This supports our interpretation that Kant’s intention was not to say that perceptual judgments are altogether deprived from categories, but only that they require supplementation by the category of causality to be considered as judgments of experience; it is clear that these are totally different ideas.

Summarizing then, our position is, first, that the text of the \textit{Prolegomena} contains a confusion concerning perceptual judgments, but that through Kant’s exposition it is possible to understand that the judgments of perception Kant is talking about are judgments concerning the objects of the outer sense. Second, as we have shown, it is possible that judgments of perception concerning objects of the outer sense become judgments of experience through the application of the category

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{44}See chapter 4 for empirical consciousness as inner sense.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{45}We recall here our example of the elasticity of the air \textit{I perceive when I} inflate the tire of my bike.}
of causality, and that this is what Kant intends to convey through the distinction between the two types of empirical judgments. Finally, there is no real conflict or contradiction with Kant’s critical thinking concerning the categories as *a priori* rules in all judgments. We agree in this sense with Guyer that if categories only conditioned judgments of experience, Kant would be contradicting his view defended in the first *Critique*, according to which categories are the conditions for all judgments (Guyer 1987, 91 ff.). In this sense Guyer raises a sharp and fundamental question: “How can judgments of perception express any form of self-consciousness, yet not use the categories?” (Guyer 1987, 100).

Finally, since the topic of causality has been at stake here, we finish this section with a comment on David Hume. The influence Hume had on Kant as well as the divergence in their views is well known; the literature about Kant is generous on this issue. Concerning causality, it is relevant to mention that Kant agrees with Hume that the influence of the senses is the starting point of all experience; i.e., sensible impressions or what is empirical must play a fundamental role in any explanation of our grasp of the empirical world. However, in contradistinction to Hume, Kant maintains that causal relations are necessary. Thus, Kant does not agree with Hume’s position that the causal relation is merely subjective and can only be grounded on habit. Even if both considered that the causal rule can be found in experience (*Erfahrung*), Hume grounded causality in *habit or custom*, implying

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46 See Chapter 4 for the explanation of self-consciousness and the full relevance of this question.
that no certainty, but only mere probability, was possible for empirical cognition.

This is why Kant took Hume’s empiricism to culminate in skepticism. A tacit reference to Hume summarizes Kant’s position, and his criticism of Hume’s conception of causality:

To be sure, it seems as if this contradicts everything that has always been said about the course of the use of our understanding, according to which it is only through the perception and comparison of sequences of many occurrences on preceding appearances that we are led to discover a rule, in accordance with which certain occurrences always follow certain appearances, and are thereby first prompted to form the concept of cause. On such a footing this concept would be merely empirical, and the rule that it supplies, that everything that happens has a cause, would be just as contingent as the experience itself: its universality and necessity would then be merely feigned, and would have no true universal validity, since they would not be grounded a priori but only on induction. (A195-196/B240-241)

Having attained this point in our discussion, an inevitable question arises: how am I conscious of my perceptions? How do I know that my perceptions are mine? Otherwise stated, how can I know that this empirical consciousness belongs to me? Kant answers that “only because I ascribe all perceptions to one consciousness (of original apperception) can I say of all perceptions that I am

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48 We can add here that, by contrast, René Descartes in his Third Meditation grounded the necessity of the causal relation on the degrees of perfection or of objective reality of an idea. That is to say, for something to cause another thing it must have equal or more objective reality or degrees of perfection. Descartes justified the necessity of the causal relation this way; however, he did not question it as such, perhaps because it served him to establish the existence of God as the first ontological truth, and to recover the external world that the hypothesis of the malin génie had jeopardized. See: Descartes, René. 1976. *Méditations métaphysiques*. Paris: J. Vrin.
conscious of them” (A122). Through this statement we introduce ourselves into the
transcendental level of the synthesis and to original consciousness as the ground.
CHAPTER IV

PURE APPERCEPTION AS TRANSCENDENTAL CONSCIOUSNESS

4.1. The Synthesis of Recognition in the Concept

To understand “the synthesis of recognition in the concept” (cf. A103 ff.) we have first to remember that concepts express the unity of the manifold – more precisely, that the manifold is recognized as an object through a concept.\(^1\) Kant recalls this frequently, even towards the end of the first *Critique* he says: “the understanding unites the manifold into an object through concepts” (A644/B672). In the synthesis of recognition in the concept Kant advances this fundamental idea that *the manifold is recognized in the concept*. However, he is concerned here neither with empirical nor spatio-temporal manifolds, nor with their corresponding concepts. The constitution of concepts by the understanding as the expression of the unity of the manifold in an object is not at stake here.

Kant defines “the unity that constitutes the concept of an object” by stating that “insofar as they [our cognitions] are to relate to an object, our cognitions must also necessarily agree with each other in relation to it [to an object]” (A104-105). This conveys the unity of all cognitions of *an* object. However, this is not Kant's main intention here, for he observes that the *manifold of cognition* has to correlate to *an*

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\(^1\) See Chapter 2 for the formation of concepts.
object. All cognitions have to be related to one another and at the same time related to an object that accounts for them in a unified way. Thus, the object Kant is considering now is the object that accounts for the (unified) manifold of cognition, and the concept that the synthesis of recognition is to produce is precisely the concept of this object, i.e., the concept of the object that accounts for the manifold of cognition (in a unified way).

The question then arises as to what kind of object this could be. Kant begins his explanation by inquiring about the meaning of the expression “an object of representations” (eines Gegenstandes der Vorstellungen) (cf. A104). The object in question is presented as the object that accounts for the manifold of (all) our representations concerning outer sense. However, it is plain there is no specific object that correlates to the manifold of (all) our representations—to the manifold of cognition—for it is clear that no intuition could correspond to such a manifold. Thus, Kant will talk about this object as “a something in general” and will give it the name “X” (cf. A104). Kant says:

What does one mean, then, if one speaks of an object corresponding to and therefore also distinct from the cognition? It is easy to see that this object must be thought of only as something in general = X, since outside of our cognition we have nothing that could set over against this cognition as corresponding to it (Was verstehst man denn, wenn man von einem der Erkenntnis korrespondierenden, mitin auch davon unter schiedenen Gegenstande redet? Est ist leicht einzusehen, daß dieser Gegenstand nur als

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2 We see here again how General Logic serves Kant’s Transcendental Logic: the most abstract concept, i.e., ‘something’ (explained in Chapter 2) serves Kant to account for the transcendental object as a ’something in general.’ In the Lectures on Metaphysics, Kant says: “Something means any object of thinking; this is the logical something. The concept of an object in general is the highest concept of all cognitions” (ML2 Ak. XXVIII: 544).
etwas überhaupt = X müsse gedacht werden, weil wir außer unserer Erkenntnis
doch nichts haben, welches wir dieser Erkenntnis als korrespondierend gegen
über setzen könnten). (A104)

Nevertheless, since it is also clear that objects exist in the external world, and
that upon them rests the objective validity of our cognitions, the reference to the
“object =X” has to convey a certain necessity in itself. Otherwise our cognitions
would be arbitrary or determined at pleasure (cf. A104).

Thus, on the one hand, there has to be an object that accounts for the
manifold of all our representations concerning objects of the outer sense, and, on
the other hand, this object cannot be an empirical object (cf. A109), since it is
precisely the “object” that contains all (possible) empirical objects—ultimately all
substances—and evidently there is no intuition of “this object.” Therefore, it can
only be a transcendental object (‘X’) (cf. A105). X then is the ‘transcendental object’
(transzendentale Gegenstand) that accounts for all our representations of objects of
the outer sense, and that has to be presupposed in cognition for upon it ultimately
rests all objective validity. Kant says: “The transcendental object . . . is . . . an
unknown ground of those appearances that supply us with our empirical concepts”
(A379-380). It is clear that the transcendental object is required since we cannot
cognize things in themselves, but only things as they appear through the
representations we have of them.

It is worth mentioning that the transcendental object is also called an object in
general for it refers to all possible empirical objects. Thus, the object in general is
the object that accounts for the manifold of all our representations (concerning objects of the outer sense) or the manifold of cognition. $X$ represents then an ‘object in general’ (*Gegenstand überhaupt*) (cf. A251), which is why it can also be called the object of sensible intuition (*der Gegenstand der sinnlichen Anschauung*) (cf. A250) or of intuition in general, since all objects are ultimately objects of intuition for Kant.

Therefore, $X$ is the *transcendental object* or the *object in general* or the *object of intuition in general*.³

³ These associations are made in the following passage of the first *Critique*.

All our representations are in fact related to some object through the understanding, and since appearances are nothing but representations, the understanding thus relates to them to a *something*, as the object of sensible intuition: but this something ‘is to that extent only the transcendental object (*aber dieses Etwas ist in so fern nur das transzendentale Objekt*)’. This signifies, however, a something $= X$, of which we know nothing at all nor can know anything in general (in accordance with the current constitution of our understanding), but is rather something that can serve only as a correlate of the unity of apperception for the unity of the manifold in sensible intuition, by means of which the understanding unifies that in the concept of an object. This transcendental object cannot even be separated from the sensible *data*, for then nothing would remain through which it would be thought (*Dieses transzendentale Objekt läßt sich gar nicht von den sinnlichen Datis absondern, weil alsdenn nichts übrig bleibt, wodurch es gedacht würde*). It is therefore no object of cognition itself, but only the representation of appearances under the concept of an object in general, which is determinable through the manifold of those appearances. (A250–251) *(In Kant’s copy of the A edition of the first *Critique* is says to “this something as object of an intuition in general”).

It is relevant to stress that the *transcendental object* is not the *noumenon*, in spite of certain sections where Kant tends to present them as synonyms. In Chapter 1, we mentioned that the *concept* of the *noumenon* is introduced by Kant to account for *things in themselves* conceived as objects of pure understanding, to indicate hypothetical objects of an *intellectual* intuition. Even if the transcendental object pertains equally to the transcendental level, it is clear that it cannot be equated with the *noumenon* for then the *transcendental object* would not stand for *things in themselves* but for *objects of intellectual intuition*. In short, while the transcendental object belongs to Transcendental Logic, the *noumenon*—more precisely, the *concept of a noumenon*—does not belong to it. The distinction is subtle but it must be kept in mind. Kant makes the distinction as follows:

The object to which I relate appearances in general is the transcendental object, i.e., the entirely undetermined thought of something in general. This cannot be called the *noumenon* (*Das Objekt, worauf ich die Erscheinung überhaupt beziehe, ist der transzendente Gegenstand, d.i. der gänzlich unbestimmte Gedanke von etwas überhaupt. Dieser kann nicht das Noumenon heißen*); for I do not know anything about what it [the transcendental object] is in itself, and have no concept of it except merely that of the object of a sensible intuition in general, which is therefore the same for all appearances. (A253)
Having made these clarifications, the question arises about the concept of this transcendental object: what is then the concept that accounts for this transcendental object? As \( X \) is only the object in general or the transcendental object, its concept can only convey the unity this object makes necessary, and this unity is the unity of the manifold of cognition—that is, the manifold of all our representations concerning objects of the outer sense, or of intuition in general. However, this unity can only be a formal unity since the object in question is a transcendental object. Therefore, it can only account for the unity of consciousness; more precisely, it is the unity of the object in general and of cognition in general in one consciousness. This unity is produced by the synthesis through which the manifold of all our representations is a priori united in one consciousness, and it is expressed through an a priori concept.

As Kant says:

It is clear, however, that since we have to do only with the manifold of our representations, and that \( X \) which corresponds to them, because it should be something distinct from all our representations, is nothing for us, the unity that the object makes necessary can be nothing other than the formal unity of the consciousness in the synthesis of the manifold of the representations.

(A105)

Thus, "the synthesis of recognition in the concept" consists in the a priori combination of all possible representations of determinable objects that constitute the manifold of cognition, and this at the same time is united in one consciousness, producing thereby the concept of the transcendental object as an expression of the unity of all possible cognition in one consciousness. This synthesis then is the activity by which the pure imagination unites all our representations of possible
determinable objects and at the same time combines them in one consciousness.

The formal nature of this unity is due to the fact that this unity expresses the relations established between the object in general, the manifold of cognition and one consciousness. This can be expressed in a simpler way by stating that the unity of consciousness is formal since through it no object of intuition is given. As Kant says: “this unity [the unity of consciousness] is only the unity of thinking, through which no object is given” (B421-422). Thus, through this synthesis the formal unity of consciousness is recognized in a concept that is the pure concept of the transcendental object. Kant claims:

The pure concept of this transcendental object (which in all of our cognitions is really always one and the same = X) is that which in all of our empirical concepts in general can provide relation to an object, i.e., objective reality. Now this concept [the pure concept of the transcendental object] cannot contain any determinate intuition at all, and therefore concerns nothing but that unity which must be encountered in a manifold of cognition insofar as it [the manifold of cognition] stands in relation to an object. This relation, however, is nothing other than the necessary unity of consciousness. (A109)

Thus, the necessary unity of consciousness is the formal unity of consciousness, and it is the unity that must be encountered in the manifold of cognition, insofar as this manifold correlates with an object in general or transcendental object, and this relation is at the same time a relation with consciousness. In the Reflexionen Kant stresses that the unity of consciousness must be understood in terms of relation: “[f]or unity properly concerns only the relation” (Refl. Ak. XVIII: 369). However, the question arises about how the diverse and specific manifolds of intuition are to be related to one another in cognition, and to
one consciousness as well. The answer to this question requires a preliminary explanation of the nature of consciousness itself.

4.2. Apperception is not Inner Sense

Consciousness (Bewußtsein) is also called ‘apperception’ (Apperzeption) by Kant, and it is represented by the concept ‘I’. “Consciousness of oneself (apperception) is the simple representation of the I” (Das Bewußtsein seiner selbst (Apperzeption) ist die einfache Vorstellung des Ich) (B68). The A-Deduction refers to apperception as “consciousness of oneself” (A107). Apperception then is not consciousness of something (different from us) but consciousness of ourselves; i.e., the representation ‘I’ merely means consciousness that I am. Kant says: “I am conscious of my self not as I appear to myself, nor as I am in myself, but only that I am. This representation is a thinking, not an intuiting” (B157).

As such, consciousness has necessarily to be one (cf. A103) and the same, for otherwise not even the logical unity required in every thought would be possible at all (cf. A398). This is why Kant refers to consciousness as “numerically identical” (cf. A107), i.e., as one and the same.

These two attributes are inherent to consciousness insofar as they constitute the nature of apperception for Kant. This is why he refers to both saying they are analytical propositions, i.e., that they are contained in the concept of consciousness and, thus, can be discovered through analysis. Concerning ‘oneness’ or unity (Einheit) Kant states: “[t]hat the I of apperception, consequently

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4 “Things that are entirely one and the same are called numerically the same <numero eadem>, for it is one and the same thing <unum idemque; G: ein und eben dasselbe Ding>” (MM Ak. XXIX: 839).
in every thought, is a **single thing** that cannot be resolved into a plurality of subjects, and hence a logically simple subject, lies already in the concept of thinking, and is consequently an analytic proposition” (B407-408). Likewise, concerning ‘sameness’ (*Gleichheit*): “[t]he proposition of the identity of myself in everything manifold of which I am conscious is equally one lying in the concepts themselves, and hence an analytic proposition” (B408).

Now, Kant postulates the thoroughgoing identity of the thinking subject, i.e., the total identity of consciousness, as a necessary condition for the **possibility of all representations** (cf. A116). He supports this statement by arguing that the only way in which all representations can represent something *in me* is by belonging to *one* consciousness (cf. A116). Otherwise stated, only this single consciousness can make representations into thoughts (cf. A350). All representations must then be capable of being connected with (one) consciousness (cf. A116). This is a **petitio principii**: Kant recognizes this fact, saying this is a principle that holds *a priori* (cf. A116). A synthesis will function as the proof of this principle.

From this we infer that the thoroughgoing identity of ourselves cannot then refer to empirical consciousness, since as such ‘empirical consciousness’ (*das empirische Bewußtsein*) is dispersed (cf. B133), always subjective and nothing abiding can come from it (cf. A107). It is worth mentioning, however, that empirical consciousness is not reduced to the perceptions of the objects of the outer sense, as

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5 Note that here Kant is talking of all representations *in general* and not of all representations concerning objects of the outer sense, as was the case when he explained the transcendental object.
anticipated already in the previous chapter. Empirical consciousness is also used by Kant as a synonym of inner sense insofar as inner sense accounts for what the subject itself undergoes (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 161) – that is, for our inner state and inner perceptions.

This distinction is fundamental since Kant clearly wants to distinguish ‘inner sense’ (äußerlich Sinn) from ‘apperception’ (Apperzeption), and the confusion between the two has been due to the fact that both concern the ‘I’. Kant states that while the ‘I’ in apperception accounts for the (grounding) subject, the ‘I’ in inner sense accounts for the ‘I’ as a (grounded) object: the ‘I’ is the object of the inner sense (cf. A362). “[T]he representation of my Self, as the thinking subject, is related merely to inner sense” (A371). This means that when I represent to myself the subject that I am, I am taking myself as an object and, thus, considering myself from the standpoint of my inner state, of what happens in me, of how I am affected in my inner self. This domain—i.e., the subject as the object of the inner sense—is outside the domain of cognition proper. The ‘I’ is not a possible object of experience for, even if these inner intuitions and self-perceptions are empirical, they cannot be given through sensibility in empirical outer intuition. In other words, what occurs in inner sense occurs only to me. Therefore, cognition of the object that accounts for our inner state is not possible, since the representation ‘I think’ is neither an

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6 “It is customary in the systems of psychology to treat inner sense as the same as the faculty of apperception (which we carefully distinguish)” (B153).

7 The ‘I’ of inner sense is sometimes referred as ‘soul’ (Seele). As explained in Chapter 1, the soul is the organ of inner sense, but nothing can be predicated of it.
intuition nor an object that can be given in any empirical intuition, and cognition

*necessarily requires the application of the categories to empirical intuition:*

[T]he categories do not afford us cognition of things by means of intuition except through their possible application to empirical intuition, i.e., they serve only for the possibility of empirical cognition . . . The categories consequently have no other use for the cognition of things except insofar as these [things] are taken as objects of possible experience. (B147-148)

Hence of the thinking I (the soul) . . . one can say not so much that it cognizes itself through the categories, but that it cognizes the categories, and through them all objects, in the absolute unity of apperception, and hence cognizes them [categories] through itself. Now it is indeed very illuminating that I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose in order to cognize an object at all (Nun ist zwar sehr einleuch tend: daß ich dasjenige, was ich voraussetzen muß, um überhaupt ein Objekt zu erkennen, nicht selbst als Objekt erkennen könne); and that the determining Self (the thinking) is different from the determinable Self (the thinking subject) as cognition is different from its object. (A402)

The second passage is also relevant for it openly states a tension present throughout Kant’s work. We can make this clear by considering Kant’s statement “that I cannot cognize as an object itself that which I must presuppose in order to cognize an object at all.” Kant means that I cannot cognize the ‘I’ that I am, in spite of the fact that this ‘I’ is presupposed in all of my cognition as its ultimate ground. The determining Self refers to the ‘I’ of apperception, while the determinable Self refers to the ‘I’ of inner sense. It is clear that both subjects are the same, but while the first functions as a grounding consciousness, the second is the subject insofar as it takes itself to be an object.

This tension is also present throughout Kant’s treatment of the question about the priority of the outer and the inner in the relation between outer sense and
inner sense. As mentioned in Chapter 1, while during his pre-critical period Kant
seemed to disregard the need of the outer sense to account for the certitude of the I,
in his critical period, and notably in the second edition of the first Critique, he makes
clear that inner sense presupposes outer sense to account for itself. As Kant says:

Even our inner experience . . . is possible only under the presupposition of
outer experience . . .
I am conscious of my existence as determined in time. All time-
determination presupposes something persistent in perception. This
persisting thing, however, cannot be something in me, since my own existence
in time can first be determined only through this persistent thing. Thus the
perception of this persistent thing is possible only through a thing outside me
and not through the mere representation of a thing outside me.
Consequently, the determination of my existence in time is possible only by
means of the existence of actual things that I perceive outside myself. (B275)
(Emphasis mine)

Therefore, the ‘I’ that I am—apperception—must not be confused with “I” as
the object of inner sense. As already mentioned, the ‘I’ as the object of inner sense
cannot be an object of cognition, since our inner intuitions cannot be subsumed
under the categories, but only the intuitions of the outer sense. Kant says: “[t]hus
through the analysis of the consciousness of myself in thinking in general not the
least is won in regard to the cognition of myself as object” (B409). Finally, the
mentioned identification between empirical consciousness and inner sense is clearly
stated in the following passage:

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8 Simply stated, this means that I am conscious of myself as the object of inner sense.

9 This is a tacit reference to substances as the persisting material elements. See Chapter 1.

10 Kant states this second passage precisely against the Cartesian cogito. Concerning Descartes, see
also the Preface to the second edition of the Critique of Pure Reason (Bxxxix).
The consciousness of oneself in accordance with the determinations of our state in internal perception is merely empirical, forever variable; it can provide no standing or abiding self in this stream of inner appearances,\(^{11}\) and is customarily called \textit{inner sense} or \textit{empirical apperception}. (A107)

\subsection*{4.3. The Synthesis of the Manifold of Consciousness: Transcendental Apperception as Self-Consciousness}

From what has been just stated, it is evident that empirical consciousness cannot condition the possibility of all representations. It has to be \textit{pure} apperception that is at stake here. We can make this clear by uniting the above postulated principle with Kant’s definition of pure apperception: “pure apperception, i.e., the thoroughgoing identity of oneself in all possible representations” (A116). In other words, \textit{pure} apperception is the condition of the possibility of all representations (and is also present in all representations). The question then arises as to how it is that pure apperception conditions the possibility of all representations. Otherwise stated, how do I know that all representations belong to me, i.e., to this one consciousness that I am? Likewise, how are we to understand the multiple and diverse representations of (empirical) consciousness in relation to this \textit{one} consciousness of pure apperception? The answer to both questions rests on the \textit{a priori} synthesis of the \textit{manifold of consciousness in one} consciousness (of ourselves). As Kant points out:

\begin{quote}
All empirical consciousness . . . has a necessary relation to a transcendental consciousness (preceding all particular experience), namely the consciousness of myself, as original apperception. It is therefore absolutely
\end{quote}

\(^{11}\) Here Kant refers tacitly to the constant flux in inner sense mentioned in Chapter 1.
necessary that in my cognition all consciousness belong to one consciousness (of myself). Now here is a synthetic unity of the manifold (of consciousness) that is cognized *a priori*. (A117n)

Through the *a priori* synthesis of the manifold of consciousness, performed by the *pure* imagination, all consciousness—i.e., all (possible) empirical and pure manifolds of consciousness—are *a priori* combined in one consciousness of pure apperception. On account of this synthesis pure apperception is conceived as a *transcendental* consciousness, since it is the *original necessary condition* that grounds all unity of manifolds of consciousness and in one consciousness of itself.

Kant states that “[e]very necessity has a transcendental condition as its ground” (A106), and he adds that “this original and transcendental condition is nothing other than the *transcendental apperception*” (*Diese ursprüngliche und transzendentale Bedingung ist . . . keine andere, als die transzendente Apperzeption*) (A106-107).

We see here then how the *unity of consciousness* is in one sense a by-product of this synthesis, but in another sense it is the ground of the very possibility of synthesis. The former is the case because through this synthesis all possible relations among the manifolds of consciousness are combined: this is also what Kant conveys when he refers to “a synthetic unity of the manifold of consciousness.” The expression ‘synthetic unity’ refers here to the outcome of the synthesis, as well as to the *a priori* connection of the manifolds in one consciousness. However, in another sense, the unity of consciousness is the very ground of this synthesis, for insofar as transcendental apperception, or the transcendental subject, is the ground of all
synthesis, it is not itself a by-product of the synthesis. As Kant says: “[a] transcendental ground must . . . be found for the unity of the consciousness” (A106).

We see again a double argument in Kant’s way of reasoning. This procedure seems to be a way to keep the relation between the mind and the external world conditioned from both sides, but also a way to avoid falling into a vicious circle.

Thus, through the \textit{a priori} synthesis of the manifold of consciousness, pure apperception becomes the transcendental condition—i.e., a \textit{transcendental} apperception—that grounds the \textit{unity}—or relation—of all possible manifolds of consciousness and in one consciousness, or in pure apperception. This happens when all the (possible) manifolds of consciousness are united to one another \textit{and} combined in \textit{one} consciousness.\footnote{In the B-Deduction the synthesis of the manifolds of consciousness in one consciousness begins just before B131. In the corresponding footnote Kant says that the consciousness of one representation, as far as the manifold is concerned, has to be distinguished from the consciousness of another. At issue is the nature of the \textit{synthesis of consciousness}. This \textit{a priori} synthesis of the manifold of consciousness in one (self)-consciousness is called by Kant in the B-Deduction \textit{the original combination} (cf. B132-133).}

This explanation answers the second question; that is, it accounts for how the multiple diverse manifolds of consciousness are united in one consciousness. This is further supported by the first synthetic \textit{a priori} principle that this synthesis brings about: “[t]he synthetic proposition that every different \textbf{empirical consciousness} must be combined into a single-consciousness is the absolutely first and synthetic principle of our thinking in general” (A117n). This principle accounts for the \textit{unity of consciousness} as a necessary outcome of the synthesis, which expresses all the
(possible) relations that the diverse manifolds of consciousness can have to one another. Likewise, it is relevant to note that following Kant’s explanation, we see how at the transcendental level of experience, the unity of consciousness precedes all data of sensible intuition (cf. A107).\textsuperscript{13} Again there is a double movement: initially we began with empirical intuition and attained transcendental consciousness; at first it seemed as if empirical intuition took us to the original consciousness, but at the transcendental level it seems that everything comes from the grounding consciousness.

It is worth mentioning that in the B-Deduction Kant points out that the synthesis of the manifolds of consciousness precedes the synthesis from which the categories arise: “[t]his unity, which precedes all concepts of combination \textit{a priori} is not the former category of unity … The category therefore already presupposes combination” (B131). This statement shows that, in the order of priorities, the synthesis of the manifolds of consciousness has to be conceived as more foundational than the pure synthesis of spaces and of times from which the categories originate as forms of thought. It is, however, not clear at all how these two acts of synthesis may occur simultaneously. It is assumed that all acts of synthesis are simultaneous, since the synthesis is only one, even if some commentators speak in the plural. Kant speaks of the synthesis in the singular and his explanations account for \textit{one} mental activity performed constantly and at several

\textsuperscript{13} In the \textit{Reflexionen} Kant says: “All representations must be represented \textit{in relation to} one consciousness \textit{and thus} as universally subjected to the unity of consciousness” (Refl. Ak. XVIII: 331) (Emphasis mine).
levels. We think, however, as already mentioned, that the a priori synthesis of the manifold of consciousness, and the pure synthesis of space and time, are not performed over and over, but rather represent a singly accomplished original synthesis. Were this not the case, Kant’s fundamental argument that the categories are ruling concepts would be weakened. When, as in this chapter, the categories are considered from the intellectual point of view, and not from the point of view of our pure intuitions of space and time (which belong to sensibility), it becomes evident that the synthesis of the manifold of consciousness has necessarily to precede the synthesis that gives birth to the categories. Kant says: “[a]pperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the categories, which for their part represent nothing other than the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, insofar as that manifold has unity in apperception” (A401).

Now, the a priori synthesis of the manifold of consciousness not only establishes transcendental apperception as the original ground, but it also makes evident that pure apperception is a self-consciousness, for it is through this synthesis that the subject becomes aware of its own self as the one that performs the synthesis, i.e., as the one that combines the diverse manifolds. Thus, through the synthesis consciousness becomes aware that it is (also) a 'self-consciousness' (Selbstbewusstsein). As Kant says:

[T]he mind could not possibly think of the identity of itself in the manifoldness of its representations, and indeed think this a priori, if it [the mind] did not have before its eyes the identity of its action. (A108) (Emphasis mine)
[T]his unity of consciousness would be impossible if in the cognition of the manifold the mind could not become conscious of the identity of the function by means of which this manifold is synthetically combined into one cognition. (A108) (Emphasis mine)

Thus, the a priori synthesis of the manifold of consciousness discloses the nature of consciousness as self-consciousness,\textsuperscript{14} and it is this awareness or self-consciousness that guarantees the subject that all its representations are its own, for it makes clear that these representations—the ones I am combining—belong to me, that they are my representations. As Kant points out: “the manifold representations that are given in a certain intuition would not all together be my representations if they did not all together belong to a self-consciousness” (B132). Thus self-consciousness allows us to answer the first question that was still pending—i.e., how pure apperception conditions the possibility of all representations—for the awareness that the mind has of its own activity of synthesizing enables it to recognize all its representations as its own. Thus, what was initially presented as a petitio principii, namely, the fact that “pure apperception conditions the possibility of all representations,” is proved at the level of self-consciousness.

The B-Deduction recalls this point when the analytical unity of consciousness—i.e., that one consciousness must always accompany all

\textsuperscript{14} It is worth mentioning that the awareness of the subject as the one that performs the synthesis is not restricted to the synthesis of consciousness. Indirectly, Kant represents consciousness as self-consciousness in other passages such as this one: “[i]f, in counting, I forget that the units that now hover before my senses were successively added to each other by me, then I would not cognize the generation of the multitude through this successive addition of one to the other, and consequently I would not cognize the number” (A103) (Emphasis mine).
representations—is grounded in the synthetic unity of consciousness—i.e., on the synthesis of the manifold of consciousness in one consciousness that establishes self-consciousness as the unconditioned ground. The passage says as follows:

Therefore it is only because I can combine a manifold of given representations in one consciousness that it is possible for me to represent the identity of the consciousness in these representations itself, i.e., the analytical unity of apperception is only possible under the presupposition of some synthetic one (Also nur dadurch, daß ich ein Mannigfaltiges gegebener Vorstellungen in einem Bewußtsein verbinden kann, ist es möglich, daß ich mir die Identität des Bewußtseins in diesen Vorstellungen selbst vorstelle, d.i. die analytische Einheit der Apperzeption ist nur unter der Voraussetzung irgend einer synthetischen möglich). The thought that these representations given in intuition all together belong to me means, accordingly, the same as that I unite them in a self-consciousness, or at least can unite them therein . . . only because I can comprehend their manifold in a consciousness do I call them all together my representations. (B133-134) (Emphasis mine)

The B-Deduction makes clear that the relation to the identity of the subject—i.e., to the thoroughgoing identity of apperception that recognizes itself as one self-consciousness by being conscious of the synthesis it performs—“does not come about by my accompanying each representation with consciousness, but rather by my adding one representation to the other and being conscious of their synthesis” (B133).

4.4. The ‘I’ is not the ‘I Think’, and the ‘I Think’ is not the Cartesian Cogito

As an expression of this awareness of itself, consciousness—more precisely, self-consciousness—will produce spontaneously the representation ‘I think’ (cf. B132). The ‘I think’ is then the expression of self-consciousness (cf. A398-399), and as such it must be capable of accompanying all representations insofar as all
representations are necessarily connected to self-consciousness (cf. A117, B132) as their ultimate and unconditioned ground. Kant claims: “it is that self-consciousness which, because it produces the representation I think, which must be able to accompany all others and which in all consciousness is one and the same, cannot be accompanied by any further representation” (B132). “Self-consciousness in general is therefore the representation of that which is the condition of all unity, and yet is itself unconditioned” (A401).

Insofar as the ‘I think’ is the proposition of self-consciousness it can only be an a priori judgment (cf. A343/B401), for it has to precede all possible experience. It is also contained in every judgment because it is the form of judgments insofar as it is the original judgment whose form all judgments necessarily reproduce; in it the “object” represented is that ‘I think’. Kant says: “the proposition I think . . . contains the form of every judgment of understanding whatever and accompanies all categories as their vehicle” (A348/B406).

The ‘I think’ is then the form of apperception (cf. A354); as form it is not only contained in every judgment but is also the vehicle of all concepts (cf. A341/B399), insofar as it is the condition under which anything can be thought. It is described as a “vehicle” because “it serves only to introduce all thinking as belonging to consciousness” (A341-342/B399-400). It is the form of consciousness that must be capable of accompanying all (my) representations, for otherwise I would not be able to think them. Through the ‘I think’ then representations are made into thoughts.
Therefore, all representation has to presuppose the ‘I think’ as a *transcendental a priori* proposition. Kant says:

> The *I think* must be able to accompany all my representations; for otherwise something would be represented in me that could not be thought at all, which is as much as to say that the representation would either be impossible or else at least would be nothing for me (Das: *Ich denke, muß alle meine Vorstellungen begleiten können; denn sonst würde etwas in mir vorgestellt werden, was gar nicht gedacht werden könnte, welches eben so viel heißt, als die Vorstellung würde entweder unmöglich, oder wenigstens für mich nichts sein*). (B131-132)

Longuenesse has a similar reading to ours insofar as she takes the ‘I think’ to represent the analytical unity of consciousness, and that can, but need not, accompany my representations (Longuenesse 2000, 65-67).

The ‘I think’ then is merely the *subjective formal condition* of all possible cognition and thinking in general; it precedes all experience because all experience depends on it. However, it is clear that the representation ‘I think’ of transcendental apperception is not an experience itself (cf. A354). In this sense the ‘I think’ is the analogue of time at the level of the understanding, for just as time is the universal formal condition of sensibility, so the ‘I think’ is the universal formal condition of the understanding from which all concepts and judgments originate. Thus, the ‘I think’ conditions and is presupposed in all thought. Thus, both—time and the ‘I think’—are to be presupposed in all possible experience.

However, the ‘I’ in the judgment ‘I think’ must be distinguished from the bare concept of a thinking subject. The concept of the ‘I’ is a *wholly empty representation* (cf. A346/B404), since it has no manifold or content in itself (cf. A381). As already
mentioned, the ‘I’ is merely consciousness of oneself. As such, it is neither an intuition, nor does it have any intuition bound to it (cf. A350). Through the concept of the ‘I’ Kant represents a transcendental subject of thoughts, where these thoughts are intended to be that subject’s predicates. Our thoughts then are represented as the predicates of a transcendental subject that is designated through the bare ‘I’.

“Now in all our thinking the I is the subject, in which thoughts inhere only as determinations, and this I cannot be used as the determination of another thing” (A349). 15 Thus, the ‘I’ as such cannot be cognized; we only cognize it through its determinations that are our thoughts. The ‘I’ is the subject in all thinking and its thoughts are its determinations or predicates. Thoughts are the determinations or predicates of the ‘I’; thoughts belong to the ‘I’ and it is through them that we can account for the subject transcendentally that is designated through the ‘I’. The following passages account for these main ideas:

[T]he simple and in content for itself wholly empty representation I, of which one cannot even say that it is a concept, but a mere consciousness that accompanies every concept. Through this I, or He, or It (the thing), which thinks, nothing further is represented than a transcendental subject of thought = x, which is recognized only through the thoughts that are its predicates, and about which, in abstraction, we can never have even the least concept. (A346/B404) 16

15 The usage of the concept ‘inherence’ here can cause confusion, since inherence implies reference to the category of substance (as mentioned in Chapter 1), and Kant denies that substantiality can be predicated of the ‘I,’ a topic he treats under the heading of the paralogisms of pure reason.

16 The reason Kant presents the ‘I’ here also in terms of a ‘He’ or an “It” is that since “what thinks” cannot be known, all possible thinking beings can only be represented by transferring a priori to them the same claim that self-consciousness asserts of itself. As Kant says: “we must necessarily ascribe to things a priori all the properties that constitute the conditions under which alone we think them. Now I cannot have the least representation of a thinking being through an external experience, but only through self-consciousness. Thus such objects are nothing further that the transference of
But it is obvious that the subject of inherence is designated only transcendently through the I that is appended to thoughts, without noting the least property of it, or cognizing or knowing anything at all about it. It signifies only a Something in general (a transcendental subject), the representation of which must of course be simple, just because one determines nothing at all about it; for certainly nothing can be represented as more simple than that which is represented through the concept of a mere Something. (A355)

These statements warrant a comparison with previously developed ideas. An analogy between the I and material substances is possible, insofar as both can only be cognized through their determinations: substances through appearances, the I’ through its thoughts. This analogy is relevant insofar as it allows us to perceive that the transcendental subject and the transcendental object are the two poles of cognition insofar as one guarantees the other to a certain extent. The I’ guarantees that there is a world to cognize—or that I relate to a world—while the (cognition of) the world presupposes the I’ insofar as whatever happens in the world happens, in some sense, to me.

Nevertheless, the temptation to consider the I’ as a substance or substratum must be seen as an illusion. Kant denies the possibility of attributing persistence to the I’ as he does to material substances. The I’ is not a substance (cf. A400), since the concept of substance always presupposes an outer intuition that can be subsumed under it (cf. B407-408). However, a stronger argument against the this consciousness of mine to other things, which can be represented as thinking beings only in this way” (A346-347/B405).
substantiality of the ‘I’ is the fact that inner sense does not present us with anything that persists in time, as already mentioned in Chapter 1. In this sense Kant says:

But now we have in inner intuition nothing at all that persists, for the I is only the consciousness of my thinking; thus if we stay merely with thinking, we also lack the necessary condition for applying the concept of substance, i.e., of a subject subsisting for itself, to itself as a thinking being. (B413)

In this sense, Kant criticizes the pretension of a Rational Psychology to be a science that attempts to ground on the ‘I’ all its supposed cognitions.

Finally, it is worth mentioning that the ‘I think’ of transcendental apperception is to be distinguished from the ‘I think’ of empirical apperception. It was Descartes who brought the empirical ‘I think’ to the fore. From what has been stated thus far, it should be evident that Kant’s conception of the ‘I think’ must not be understood in terms of the Cartesian cogito. Descartes established the ‘I think, I am’ (cogito ergo sum) as the first absolute epistemological truth, since our existence as thinking beings was the only thing that could not be put in jeopardy by the malin génie, and the hyperbolic and universal doubt. Kant considers the Cartesian ‘I

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17 “Now in every judgment I am always the determining subject of that relation that constitutes the judgment. However, that the I that I think can always be considered as subject, and as something that does not depend on thinking merely as a predicate, must be valid – this is an apodictic and even an identical proposition; but it does not signify that I as object am for myself a self-subsisting being or substance.” (B407)

18 See the section on the Paralogisms of Pure Reason in the first Critique for the explanation of these ideas. However, it is worth mentioning that in his pre-critical period Kant still conceived the ‘I’ as a substance (see Lectures on Metaphysics).

think’ to be merely an empirical proposition that must be distinguished from the transcendental one.

As already mentioned, for Kant our existence as thinking beings cannot be discovered and grounded apart from the manner in which we relate to the objects of the outer sense. It is precisely on this point that Kant bases his criticism of the Cartesian *cogito*, as is clearly stated in the following passage:

[That] I distinguish my own existence, that of a thinking being, from other things outside me (to which my body also belongs) – this is . . . an analytic proposition; for other things are those that I think of as distinguished from me. But I do not thereby know at all whether this consciousness of myself would even be possible without things outside me through which representations are given to me, and thus whether I could exist merely as a thinking being (without being a human being). (B409)

This shows that Kant does not accept the Cartesian division between ‘thinking beings’ and ‘extended beings.’ Even less would he accept the claim that perceptions of the latter must be grounded in an isolated mental activity. Descartes attributed to the mental activity of *intellectual intuiting* our knowledge of the persistence of the matter of material substances whose properties change over time.20 While Kant agrees with Descartes that there are persistent material substances in which changing attributes inhere, he cannot agree with Descartes that it is through an intellectual intuition that we can cognize them.

According to Kant the only way I can know *that I am* is by determining my existence in time with reference to persisting objects of outer sense, and not by any

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20 See Descartes’s Second Metaphysical Meditation.
intellectual intuition since our mode of intuition is strictly sensible. As Kant says:

“without any empirical representation, which provides the material for thinking, the act I think would not take place” (B422n). Therefore, the Cartesian *cogito ergo sum* is an empirical proposition, even if the ‘I’ in it must not be considered as empirical insofar as it belongs to thinking in general and represents the transcendental subject of experience. The empirical ‘I think’ is a proposition of the inner sense insofar as what it expresses is that *I perceive myself as a thinking being*. In contrast to Descartes, Kant argues:

> ‘I exist thinking,’ that proposition is empirical, and contains the determinability of my existence merely in regard to my representations in time. But since for this once again I first need something persisting, and, just insofar as I think myself, nothing of the sort is given to me in inner intuition, it is not possible at all through this simple self-consciousness to determine the way I exist, whether as substance or as accident. (B420)

4.5. The Unity of Consciousness: Relating the Empirical Manifolds to One Consciousness through the Categories

In discussing the transcendental object, we indicated that the unity of consciousness was the formal ground of the unity all possible determinable objects of cognition have to one another. Our subsequent discussion of the synthesis of the manifolds of consciousness allowed us to represent the unity of consciousness as the expression of all the possible relations that the diverse manifolds of consciousness can have to one another and in one consciousness. In both cases the unity of consciousness was presented as the ground of *relations among manifolds* and *in one consciousness*, even if the former explanation was presented at the level
of cognition in general, while the latter focused on the level of mere thinking in general.

Throughout our dissertation it has been made clear that cognition in general accounts for all possible cognition and consists in the relations between intuition in general, the object in general, and the categories. By contrast, thinking in general is mere thinking. Through thinking in general we do not even establish that anything is really possible for cognition. Thinking is just representing the object of a non-contradictory concept. For example, the concept of a round-square is a contradictory concept and, thus, we cannot represent any conceivable object that would fall under it. However, the concept of God and the concept of a unicorn, are non-contradictory, and, thus, logically conceivable objects are possible for them. However, mere logical possibility does not entail what Kant calls “real” possibility. This means that I can think the object of my concept, but by thinking it I do not show that the object is possible in the sense of conforming to the conditions of sensible intuition. For an object to be possible in this sense, the conceivable object has to be able to be giviable (though not necessarily given) in an intuition. In short, thinking that which is only logically possible remains cognitively idle or empty.

Having made this clarification, we now have to explain the connection between (self-)consciousness and empirical intuition, which express the highest transcendental ground and the basic sensorial data of experience, respectively. This will allow us to answer the pending question introduced in our discussion of the
synthesis of recognition in the concept, namely, how the diverse and specific
manifolds of intuition relate to one another in cognition and to one consciousness. In
cognition, both “extremes,” i.e., (self-)consciousness and empirical intuition, are
connected in the different ways in which manifolds can be combined one another and
in one consciousness. As Kant says: “All intuitions are nothing for us and do not in
the least concern us if they cannot be taken up into consciousness . . . and through
this alone is cognition possible” (A116). Likewise: “no cognitions can occur in us, no
connection and unity among them, without that unity of consciousness . . . and in
relation to which all representation of objects is alone possible” (A107).  

Since the unity of consciousness originated in the a priori synthesis of the
manifold of consciousness—thus from the faculty of thinking in general—there has
to be a faculty that combines the manifold of empirical intuition in one
consciousness. Pure apperception is the original ground, but is not, properly
speaking, a faculty. This faculty is the understanding (Verstand) since we know it is
the faculty for thinking; more precisely, it is the faculty or capacity for thinking
objects of possible experience. As such, it is the faculty through which all concepts
are produced. 22 This is why Kant also states that the two extremes to be related are
understanding and sensibility, instead of saying they are consciousness and
sensibility. “Both extremes, namely sensibility and understanding, must necessarily

21 Additionally: “[T]he unity of consciousness is that which alone constitutes the relation of
representations to an object . . . and consequently is that which makes them into cognitions” (B137).

22 See Chapter 2 for the formation of concepts and the role played therein by the understanding.
be connected by means of this transcendental function of the imagination” (cf. A124). Thus, it is the pure imagination that connects *a priori* the faculties of sensibility and of understanding, for through this activity of the imagination the manifold of intuition is combined with the *necessary condition* of the unity of apperception; and the *a priori* combination of the two faculties accounts for the transcendental function of the imagination (cf. A124).

Now we call the synthesis of the manifold in imagination transcendental if, without distinction of the intuitions, it concerns nothing but the connection of the manifold *a priori*, and the unity of this synthesis is called transcendental if it is represented as necessary *a priori* in relation to the original unity of apperception. (A118)

Now, Kant says: “[t]hrough the relation of the manifold to the unity of apperception . . . concepts that belong to the understanding can come about, but only by means of the imagination in relation to sensible intuition” (A124). 23 It is clear that these “concepts that belong to the understanding” are the pure concepts of the understanding or categories. Thus, what Kant is conveying here is that each

23 It is worth mentioning that this passage can be taken in another sense, namely, as saying that the categories *arise* from the combination of sensibility and understanding—for Kant presents this relation or connection in terms of a combination (synthesis) as well (cf. A124). This would explain why the function of the pure imagination is called here *transcendental*, and thus said to ground all cognition *a priori*. This second possibility is supported by another passage of the B-Deduction when Kant talks again about the transcendental synthesis of the imagination. The passage says as follows: [T]he imagination . . . can thus determine the form of sense *a priori* in accordance with the unity of apperception, the imagination is to this extent a faculty for determining the sensibility *a priori*, and its synthesis of intuitions, in accordance with the categories, must be the transcendental synthesis of the *imagination*, which is an effect of the understanding on sensibility and its first application. (B151-152)

This is, for instance, one of the passages where the categories are represented as *pre-given* rules. The origin of the categories in the imagination’s pure synthesis of space and time, explained in Chapter 2, allows Kant to posit an *a priori* connection between pure intuition and consciousness, i.e., between the forms of sensibility and pure apperception by means of the understanding. However, as mentioned already this origin is problematic since Kant also says the categories express the unity of consciousness, which *as such* is *a priori*.
time the imagination enters into contact with empirical intuition, the categories need to be applied—are *de facto* and *de jure* applied (through schemata)—to the empirical objects we synthesize. As the imagination is always synthesizing—even unconsciously (cf. B130)—every contact with a sensible datum implies the immediate application of categories when data are related to one another, since they are pure concepts of the understanding that determine intuition in general, and, thus, the categories *rule* the relation among empirical manifolds *a priori*. It is in this sense that the categories function as *a priori* rules for intuition. As Kant says:

> [A]ll appearances, insofar as objects are to be given to us through them, must stand under *a priori* rules of their synthetic unity, in accordance with which their relation in empirical intuition is alone possible, i.e., that in experience they must stand under conditions of the necessary unity of apperception. (A110)

It is evident that the “*a priori* rules of their synthetic unity” are the categories under which all determinable objects of empirical intuition—i.e., all appearances—must stand, because the categories *govern a priori* how these manifolds given in empirical intuition are to *relate* to one another. This means that appearances—insofar as they are to become *phenomena*—have to be governed according to the necessary unity of consciousness. “All sensible intuitions stand under the categories, as conditions under which alone their manifold [the manifold of sensible intuitions] can come together in one consciousness” (B143). Thus, the manifolds in empirical intuition cannot relate to one another *unless* they stand

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24 See Chapter 2 for the explanation of how the categories rule the manifolds of empirical intuition.
under the categories, for the understanding adds unity to intuitions through the categories: “the unity that is added to the intuition through the understanding by means of the category” (B144).

Thus, categories are the “tools” of the understanding, i.e., the rules the understanding has to unite or relate to the manifolds given in empirical intuition. This unity is the unity of consciousness. This explains why Kant considers the categories to be conditions of the possibility of experience (cf. B161). It is worth noting that the last block citation establishes a subtle distinction between the requirement that appearances stand under the categories, and the post facto condition in which phenomena stand under the categories insofar as they are conditioned by the unity of consciousness. However, what is more important in the passage is the association—established by the “i.e.”—between the categories and the necessary unity of consciousness, since in both cases objects of the outer sense must stand under them.

In the first Critique the association between ‘categories’ (Kategorien) and the ‘unity of consciousness’ (Einheit der Apperzeption) is frequent; this is because the categories express the unity of consciousness. Kant is clear about this point:

[F]or the peculiarity of our understanding, [is] that it is able to bring about the unity of apperception a priori only by means of the categories and only through precisely this kind and number of them (Von der Eigentümlichkeit unsers Verstandes aber, nur vermittelst der Kategorien und nur gerade durch diese Art und Zahl derselben Einheit der Apperzeption a priori zu Stande zu bringen). (B145)
The categories then are *the ways* in which the manifolds of empirical intuition can be connected to one another *in order to be in accordance with the unity of consciousness*. This means that through the categories the manifold of empirical intuition *is* connected with (self-)consciousness or original apperception. The categories, insofar as they are forms of thought (cf. B148) express the necessary, i.e., formal, unity of consciousness, but since they are conceived also as pure concepts of the understanding, they connect empirical intuition and (self-)consciousness, for they function as the rules under which the understanding subsumes empirical intuitions under concepts in judgments.\(^{25}\) It is worth mentioning here that the double characterization of the categories must not create confusion, for it is one thing to refer to the *nature* of the categories as *forms of thought*, and another to refer to their *function as rules of unity*.\(^{26}\) This is conveyed in the following passages:

But for their part they [categories] are in turn nothing other than *forms of thought*, which contain merely the logical capacity for unifying the manifold given in intuition in a consciousness *a priori*. (A248/B305-306)

[P]ure categories, through which I never think a determinate object, but rather only the unity of representations in order to determine their object. Without an intuition to ground it, the category alone cannot yield any concept of an object; for only through intuition is an object given, which is then thought in accordance with the category. (A399)\(^{27}\)

\(^{25}\) See Chapter 2 for the relation among categories, intuition, and judgments.

\(^{26}\) In Chapter 2 we could not yet make this distinction which presupposes the exposition of the unity of consciousness.

\(^{27}\) At this point we can now understand why Kant says: "Just for this reason, then, the categories do not represent any special object given to the understanding alone, but rather serve only to determine the transcendental object" (A251).
These statements imply that if we can think what is given in empirical intuition, it is because intuition in general is governed by the categories: “[w]e cannot think any object except through categories” (B165). This also supports our previous statements that the objects of perceptual judgments have to be determined by the categories. The understanding necessarily connects with the appearances by means of the categories (cf. A119). And, “the categories . . . are only rules for an understanding whose entire capacity consists in thinking” (B145). We stress here, however, the necessary connection of (empirical) intuition with pure consciousness through the categories of the understanding, since without this connection no cognition is possible at all. “[W]e cannot cognize any object that is thought except through intuitions that correspond to those objects” (B165). Cognition requires (empirical) intuition besides thinking. Kant states these two connections when he says: “I do not cognize any object merely by the fact that I think, but rather I can cognize any object only by determining a given intuition with regard to the unity of consciousness, in which all thinking consists” (B406). This complements the distinction recently made between cognition in general and thinking in general.\(^{28}\)

Let us stress the distinction between (merely) thinking and cognizing. As already mentioned, we can think of “something” that is logically conceivable, but

\(^{28}\) The following passage states well the relationship between understanding, consciousness and intuition as well:

Understanding is the faculty for bringing various representations under a rule. It rests on apperception. It is the faculty for determining the particular by the general. With the higher cognitive power the cognitive faculty is considered not in relation to intuition, but rather to the unity of consciousness. \((MM \text{ Ak. XXIX: 889})\)
this by itself does not guarantee that this “something” is or can be an object of
cognition; e.g., noumena, a spirit, God, etc. The fact we have forms of thought; i.e.,
categories, implies that some sort of unity can be formally determined; i.e., that the
understanding has the possibility of exercising some acts of unification by itself and
without relying on empirical intuitions. Nevertheless, cognition can only be attained
if categories are applied to empirical intuition and united in one consciousness. A
fundamental passage makes clear that thinking and cognizing must be clearly
distinguished from one another:

To think of an object and to cognize an object are thus not the same (Sich
einen Gegenstand denken, und einen Gegenstand erkennen, ist also nicht
einerlei). For two components belong to cognition: first, the concept, through
which an object is thought at all (the category), and second, the intuition,
through which it is given; for if an intuition corresponding to the concept
could not be given at all, then it would be a thought as far as its form is
concerned, but without any object, and by its means no cognition of anything
at all would be possible, since, as far as I would know, nothing would be
given nor could be given to which my thought could be applied. Now all
intuition that is possible for us is sensible (Aesthetic), thus for us thinking of
an object in general through a pure concept of the understanding can become
cognition only insofar as this concept is related to objects of the senses.
(B146)

We conclude, then, that the connection between empirical intuition and (self-
)consciousness is performed by the faculty of understanding, insofar as the
understanding is the faculty that allows us to think possible objects of experience
through pure concepts. Otherwise stated, the understanding allows us to think an
object in general through the categories (cf. B146). The understanding connects
empirical intuition and original apperception through categories that are forms of
thinking that express the unity of apperception, and function as determining concepts for intuition in general. However, as mere forms of thought the categories allows us to think whatever we can imagine, but can neither bring about cognition nor have any real significance; only through their application to empirical intuition through schemata do they acquire significance and give rise to genuine cognition. This is the process by which a determinable object—an appearance—becomes a determined object—a phenomenon. As Kant points out:

*The pure concepts of the understanding are . . . mere forms of thought, without objective reality – since we have available no intuition to which the synthetic unity of apperception, with they alone contain, could be applied and that could thus determine an object. Our sensible and empirical intuition alone can provide them with sense and significance.* (B148-149) (Emphasis mine)

We close this section with a key passage where Kant summarizes several of the main ideas explained here:

[T]he understanding, as spontaneity, can determine the manifold of given representations, in accord with the synthetic unity of apperception, and thus think *a priori* synthetic unity of apperception of the manifold of *sensible intuition*, as the condition under which all objects of our (human) intuition must necessarily stand, through which then the categories, as mere forms of thought, acquire objective reality, i.e., application to objects that can be given to us in intuition, but only as appearances; for of these alone are we capable of intuition *a priori*. (B150-151)

**4.6. The Unity of Consciousness in Judgments**

Through this explanation we can see that the categories, as pure concepts of the understanding, make possible the combination among manifolds of empirical intuition and in one consciousness insofar as they express the necessary unity produced by the synthesis of consciousness, i.e., the unity of consciousness, which is
ultimately grounded in one (self-)consciousness or original apperception.

Everything in Kant’s philosophy is, ultimately, grounded in this original apperception. We can now cite completely the passage cited above partially:

Apperception is itself the ground of the possibility of the categories, which for their part represent nothing other than the synthesis of the manifold of intuition, insofar as that manifold has unity in apperception. Self-consciousness in general is therefore the representation of that which is the condition of all unity, and yet is itself unconditioned. (A401)

The pending question recalled at the beginning of the previous section, i.e., the question of how the diverse and specific manifolds of intuition relate to one another in cognition and to one consciousness, has already been addressed at the transcendental level. Nevertheless, we still have to specify how this unity of apperception appears in judgments, i.e., how it appears through the relations of concepts in judgments when the categories are (already) applied to empirical intuition.29 A text of the Reflexionen, written in between the two editions of the first Critique, conveys relevant information:

[T]here are three logical functions under a certain title, hence also three categories: because two of them [categories] demonstrate the unity of consciousness in two oppositis, while the third in turn combines the consciousness of the two. Further kinds of unity of consciousness cannot be conceived. For if a is a consciousness that connects a manifold, and b is another [consciousness] which connects in the opposite way, then c is the connection of a and b. (Refl. Ak. XVIII: 370)

This passage indicates then that there are three possible ways in which consciousness can be united in judgments and that these ways correlate with the

29 See Chapter 2 for the relationship between categories and judgments.
three moments contained under each logical form in judgments. This explains why the moments in each of the four logical forms of judgments are always three: it is because we can relate things in one way or in the opposite way, but besides these two possibilities we can also relate them by somehow combining the two. Therefore, there are only three possible ways in which empirical manifolds can be related to one another and in one consciousness for each of the logical forms. Let us recall one of our previous examples: I can unite 'tall' to 'John' by affirming it, as in the judgment “John is tall” (affirmative judgment). This is one combination of the manifold. However, I can also unite them by denying that the predicate belongs to the subject, as in the judgment “John is not tall” (negative judgment): this is the opposite way of combining the manifold. Finally, I can say that what belongs to John is the property of being non-tall, which means that John is excluded from the class of objects that have the property in question (infinite judgment). This is the way of combination that arises from the connection of the two previous forms. Thus we have here an example of the three possible ways in which the unity of consciousness can be expressed in judgments concerning the logical form of quality.

The unity of consciousness can be objective or subjective; in either case, the content is considered when the concepts in judgments are related to each other and to one consciousness in general. Kant recalls the role of the categories and the logical functions in judgments to explain the objective unity of consciousness. He writes:
Through the category I represent to myself an object in general as determined with regard to the logical functions of judgments: of the subject (not predicate), of the consequence as ground, of the multiplicity in its representation. But why must I always represent every object as designated with regard not only to one, but rather to all the logical functions of judgment? Because only thereby is objective unity of consciousness possible, i.e., a universally valid connection of perceptions, hence experience as the only reality in cognition. (*Refl. Ak.* XVIII: 391)

This passage gives us new information. It says that every (possible) object must be determined in regard to each of the moments of thinking, i.e., in regard to each of the three moments under each of the four logical forms, because this is the only way in which the objective unity of consciousness is possible. This means that by objective unity of consciousness we are to understand all the possible determinations that objects can have in a concatenated way—and that are expressed in judgments. The objective unity of consciousness conveys then the unity of all possible objects of experience. This is why Kant refers to it as “a universally valid connection of perceptions,” since “[e]xperience is possible only through the representation of a necessary connection of perceptions” (B218). This implies that an *a priori* connection of all possible perception in one consciousness can only arise through the use of the categories. This is a way of guaranteeing the possibility of experience through the *a priori* unity of perceptions in one consciousness.

Now, the objective unity of consciousness implies that the relation of concepts in judgments is objectively valid. This means that the connection between (empirical) intuition and original apperception is established through the categories, and thus that the two representations combined in the judgment are not
only combined in the object (cf. B142) but also in one consciousness. The objective unity of consciousness is produced by subjecting the connection or relation of concepts in judgments to one consciousness through the categories. In the previous chapter this was explained in terms of the category of causality, but in the first Critique Kant will explain this objective unity of consciousness through the copula ‘is’ for the categorical judgment is the basic pattern of all judgments. As Kant says:

[A] judgment is nothing other than the way to bring given cognitions to the objective unity of apperception. That is the aim of the copula is in them: to distinguish the objective unity of given representations from the subjective. For this word [is] designates the relation of the representations to the original apperception and its necessary unity, even if the judgment itself is empirical, hence contingent, e.g., “Bodies are heavy.” By that, to be sure, I do not mean to say that these representations necessarily belong to one another in the empirical intuition, but rather that they belong to one another in virtue of the necessary unity of the apperception in the synthesis of intuitions. (B141-142)

The point Kant is conveying here is that what makes the connection of representations in judgments universally valid is the relation their empirical manifolds (subsumed under concepts) has to original apperception: the copula ‘is’ has the function of conveying this relationship in the judgment united to one consciousness. For example, the representations ‘body’ and ‘heavy’ in the judgment “Bodies are heavy” belong to one another insofar as the concepts imply that an empirical intuition has been subsumed under them. At the same time, the relation in the judgment, expressed through the copula ‘is,’ has been united to one consciousness. What judgments are these? Strictly speaking, Kant is thinking of all (possible) judgments of experience.
Now, Kant also conveys that the same relation—in this case ‘bodies’ and ‘heavy’—can in certain cases—namely, judgments of perception—have only subjective validity as well. Kant suggests that in that case the relation must not be expressed using the copula ‘is’; i.e., not as “Bodies are heavy”, but as “If I carry a body, I feel a pressure of weight” (cf. B142). We could also say something like “[t]his body weights a lot; I feel pressure when carrying it.” The point Kant wants to convey with this distinction is that there is also a subjective unity of consciousness, and that this kind of unity is determined by association: “the relation of these same representations [body and heavy] in which there would be only subjective validity, e.g., in accordance with laws of association” (B142).

Since association grounds reproduction, he also refers to the subjective unity of consciousness in terms of reproduction: “[i]f . . . I investigate more closely the relation of given cognitions in every judgment and distinguish that relation, as something belonging to the understanding, from the relation in accordance with laws of the reproductive imagination (which has only subjective validity) (B141). Likewise, “the reproductive imagination, whose synthesis is subject solely to empirical laws, namely those of association, and that therefore contributes nothing to the explanation of the possibility of cognition a priori, and on that account belongs not in transcendental philosophy but in psychology” (B152).

Thus the main point is the use of the categories insofar as they link the relation in judgments to one consciousness. However, as already stated, categories
govern all judgments; thus it could be argued that the boundaries between a subjective and an objective unity of consciousness are porous. It is evident that Kant is recalling here the distinction between judgments of perception and judgments of experience, where perceptual judgments are united to consciousness only subjectively, for the connection in the relation is only valid for me. Thus, the idea is to use the copula ‘is’ to state only judgments of experience.

Finally, the subjective unity of consciousness is easier to specify; all judgments of inner sense are evidently subjective united to consciousness since they are necessarily mine. Likewise, judgments of images are also subjectively valid; judgments based on association or on reproduction; i.e., on empirical laws, are all subjectively united to consciousness. This, however, does not mean that they are false; it means only that the connection among concepts in judgments is not united to one original consciousness. No doubt the controversy about the origin and deduction of the categories is somehow connected to this issue.
CHAPTER V

BOUNDARIES AND CONCEPTIONS FOR A THEORY OF MENTAL DERANGEMENT:

DEFICIENCY OF THE COGNITIVE FACULTIES AND MENTAL ILLNESS

5.1. Introduction to the Problem. The Unavoidable and Natural Illusions of Reason

In our previous chapters we have explained the fundamental ways in which our cognitive faculties function and relate to one another. In this explanation the boundaries of possible experience have been established, making clear that this domain must be governed by the categories of the understanding which can only apply to empirical intuition. We have also stated in the Preface that we are not dealing with the level of reason in this dissertation for ‘reason’ (Vernunft) is not, properly speaking, a constitutive cognitive faculty, since it does not relate directly to sensibility. However, reason, as the highest faculty, demands unity of the understanding, and this has consequences that are relevant to our interest, and that thus must be mentioned briefly. As Kant says:

In fact the manifold of rules and the unity of principles is a demand of reason, in order to bring the understanding into thoroughgoing connection with itself, just as the understanding brings the manifold of intuition under concepts and through them into connection (In der Tat ist Mannigfaltigkeit der Regeln und Einheit der Prinzipien eine Forderung der Vernunft, um den Verstand mit sich selbst in durchgängigen Zusammenhang zu bringen, so wie der Verstand das Mannigfaltige der Anschauung unter Begriffe und dadurch jene in Verknüpfung bringt). (A305-306/B362)
[R]eason relates itself only to the use of the understanding . . . in order to prescribe the direction toward a certain unity of which the understanding has no concept, proceeding to comprehend all the actions of the understanding in respect to every object into an absolute whole. (A326-327/B383)

Reason strives to attain the unity of the understanding by positing regulative a priori principles (cf. A11). These principles are conceived as transcendent principles insofar as they posit objects beyond the boundaries of possible experience (cf. A296/B352-353). The proper use of such posited objects is strictly immanent to experience. Nevertheless they function as if they were transcendent principles whose posited objects could be attained through pure inferences of reason (cf. A303/B360; A339/B397) in its search for unconditioned conditions of the conditions of possible experience. “[T]he proper principle of reason in general . . . is to find the unconditioned for conditioned cognitions of the understanding, with which its unity will be completed” (A307/B364).

Thus, it is through a priori inferences that reason strives to unify the cognitions of the understanding and so to bring the understanding into a thoroughgoing connection with itself. As such reason seeks to attain the absolute unity of a system. As Kant says: “reason, in inferring, seeks to bring the greatest manifold of cognition of the understanding to the smallest number of principles (universal conditions), and thereby to effect the highest unity of that manifold” (A305/B361). Since the major premises of syllogistic inferences of reason are relational judgments that relate a cognition to its condition, all syllogisms will be of
one of three types; categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive, depending on whether their major premise contains a categorical, hypothetical, or disjunctive judgment (cf. A304/B361). Since reason has a natural tendency to ground its major premises in higher-order syllogisms whose major premises are unconditioned conditions, it is naturally led to posit three unconditioned conditions. These unconditioned premises are correlated with three corresponding ideas: first, the idea of an absolute subject that is not itself a predicate belonging to an underlying subject; second, a cause that is not itself an effect of some other cause; and, third, an absolute whole that is not a part of any other thing. Kant represents these three ideas as *transcendental ideas of reason*, or the so-called pure concepts of reason (cf. A311/B368). They include the idea of the soul (*Seele*), the idea of freedom (connected to the cosmological idea of the world as a totality), and the idea of God (*Gott*). Kant specifies their function as follows:

> These transcendental concepts lack a suitable use *in concreto* and have no other utility than to point the understanding in the right direction so that it may be thoroughly consistent with itself when it extends itself to its uttermost extremes. (A323/B380)

Kant calls them ‘ideas’ because Plato conceived his ideas as ‘archetypes’ of things in themselves that do not have their origin in the senses (cf. A313/B370). In the following passage, Kant further explains his own conception of ideas:

**Ideas** . . . are still more remote from objective reality than **categories**; for not appearance can be found in which they may be represented *in concreto*. They contain a certain completeness that no possible empirical cognition ever achieves, and with them reason has a systematic unity only in the sense that
the empirically possible unity seeks to approach it without ever completely reaching it. (A567-568/B595-596)

Thus, it is clear the transcendental ideas of reason do not apply directly to experience in any way, and thus that they are merely *regulative* principles that guide the understanding toward a goal of unity as if each were an imaginary focal point or *focus imaginarius* towards which all cognition and principles of the understanding converge.¹ Kant writes:

I assert: the transcendental ideas are never of constitutive use . . . On the contrary . . . they have an excellent and indispensable necessary regulative use, namely that of directing the understanding to a certain goal respecting which the lines of direction of all its rules converge at one point, which, although it is only an idea (*focus imaginarius*) – i.e., a point from which the concepts of the understanding do not really proceed, since it lies entirely outside the bounds of possible experience – nonetheless still serves to obtain for these concepts the greatest unity alongside the greatest extension. Now of course it is from this that there arises the deception (*Nun entspringt uns zwar hieraus die Täuschung*), as if these lines of direction were shot out from an object lying outside the field of possible empirical cognition. (A644/B672)

Thus we see that the aim of reason to unify the understanding has as its necessary consequence unavoidable illusions and deceptions, since at the same time that reason projects its pure concepts – i.e., soul, God and world – to an imaginary focal point toward which all the principles and cognitions of the understanding must converge, it makes the understanding transgress its own boundaries. The resulting illusion that we can cognize the objects of the ideas is inevitable. It is this illusion that has given rise to the disciplines of rational psychology, theology and cosmology, which Kant regards as “pseudo-sciences.”

¹ The *focus imaginarius* as a focal point will be better understood further in this chapter.
It is worth mentioning that the very necessity with which reason directs the understanding to strive for unity guarantees its unlawful transgression of the bounds of possible experience; i.e., by establishing its rule over the understanding, reason does a sort of “violence” to it, guaranteeing that the understanding will use its concepts and principles to pretend to account for what lies outside the field of empirical cognition.

Thus, it is from the ideas of pure reason that unavoidable and natural illusions arise (cf. A298/B354, A339/B397). Such illusions can give rise to further misinterpretations and delusions (cf. A309/B366) and are thus relevant to the topic of this dissertation. The tendency to overstep the proper boundaries of its own faculties is natural to the human mind; this is why Kant thinks we cannot avoid certain illusions.

5.2. The Need of a Sensus Communis and the Tenuousness of the Boundaries between the Faculties of Cognition

5.2.1. Common Sense and Derangement in General

The exposition of the derangement of the cognitive faculties in Kant is fragmentary, disordered and basically descriptive. It is fragmentary, for he gives us here and there some unsystematic observations to reflect upon; it is disordered since these ideas are dispersed in different texts, though a relatively systematic treatment of the topic appears in his *Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View*; finally, they are merely descriptive because the *Anthropology* and the related “Essay
on the Maladies of the Head" primarily contain illustrative examples rather than real explanations. In what follow we are going to survey Kant's treatment of the topics and/or statements that could serve to construct a full-blown critical theory of the derangement of the cognitive faculties. We will focus, first, on the deficiencies of the cognitive faculties; second, on what accounts for mental illness; and third—or in between—on topics that fall between the other two.

It is in Kant’s “Essay on the Maladies of the Head” that we find Kant’s first discussion of mental illness, where a criterion concerning the frailties of the head is established by distinguishing between those frailties which do not suspend civil community and those in which official care provision is needed. Kant says:

I come now from the frailties of the head which are despised and scoffed at to those which one generally looks upon with pity, or from those which do not suspend civil community to those in which official care provision takes an interest and for whom it makes arrangements. (Kopfes Ak. II: 263)

To this criterion Kant adds a statement that is fundamental: the maladies of the head are not the same as the maladies of the heart; the former relate to the cognitive faculties whereas the latter pertain to the will. “I have designated the frailties of the power of cognition (Erkenntniskraft) maladies of the head, just us one

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2 It is worth noting that Kant does not always use the same German word to describe the same deficiency and/or mental illness. According to the translator and editor of the Anthropology, Robert B. Louden, Kant's usage of psychiatric terms also does not map well on to the modern psychiatric terminology, which itself has changed over time. According to Louden the translator's option of rendering the Latin terms that Kant uses to gloss the German is the best way of keeping close to Kant's meaning and of avoiding awkward translations into English. In this, Louden agrees with Mary J. Gregor (Anthr. Ak. VII: xxxviii), one of the two previous translators of Kant's Anthropology (Anthr. Ak. VII: 202n126).
calls the corruption of the will a *malady of the heart* (Kopfes Ak. II: 270). The *Anthropology* keeps the main distinction, but under the concepts of *mental deficiencies* and *mental illness* as defects of the cognitive faculty. “The defects of the cognitive faculty are either mental deficiencies or mental illnesses” (*Anthr. Ak.* VII: 202). In this work mental deficiencies are those that do not suspend civil community. Thus, the topic not only concerns the cognitive faculties but the criterion by which we distinguish what is merely a *cognitive deficiency* from a *mental illness*, namely, the capacity we have—or do not have—to live in community with others.

The association of mental derangement with our life in society explains why Kant discusses this topic in a work on *pragmatic anthropology*. Kant tells us at the outset that a pragmatic anthropology is concerned with the investigation of what the human being as a free-acting being makes of himself (cf. *Anthr. Ak.* VII: 119). More precisely, anthropology is *pragmatic* when “it contains knowledge of the human being as a *citizen of the world*” (*Anthr. Ak.* VII: 120). By this Kant implies that theoretical knowledge of the world is not sufficient for a pragmatic anthropology; for the latter refers to the dealings of the human being *in* the world, i.e., its *participation* in the world systematically formulated.4

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3 The distinction between maladies of the head and the heart is mentioned also twice at the beginning of the essay but it is not justified, and the maladies of the heart are not exposed (Kopfes Ak. II: 259-260).

4 By contrast to a *pragmatic* anthropology, a *physiological* anthropology is what nature makes of the human being (cf. *Anthr. Ak.* VII: 119).
Since our participation in the world is what is at stake in a pragmatic anthropology, the need of a common world is necessary—and even has to be presupposed—to be able to distinguish the cognitive faculties in their normal functioning from their deranged modes of functioning. In this sense, Kant points out two different but fundamental ideas: “[w]hen we are awake we have a world in common, but when we are asleep each has his own world” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 190), and “[t]he only universal characteristic of madness is the loss of common sense (sensus communis) and its replacement with logical private sense (sensus privatus)” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 219). The association of dreaming with the sensus privatus is important since Kant wants to convey that to share a common world we must share a common sense, and this is something that we only share when we are awake. Being awake and not sharing a world, or not having a common sense, will be synonymous with mental derangement. These ideas are complemented by the importance Kant accords to the activity of comparing what we think with the thoughts of others:

For it is a subjectively necessary touchstone of the correctness of our judgments generally, and consequently also of the soundness of our understanding, that we also restrain our understanding by the understanding of others, instead of isolating ourselves with our own understanding and judging publicly with our private representations. (Anthr. Ak. VII: 219)

Thus, a sound understanding—which, roughly speaking, refers to common sense in Kant—and the correctness of our judgments, together imply the possibility

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5 This statement is already mentioned in Dreams of a spirit-seer elucidated by dreams of metaphysics, where Kant credits erroneously Aristotle for its formulation. The editor of the book says it is a fragment of Heraclitus (Fragment LXXXIX). (Träume Ak. II: 342n30)
of communication with others – that is, the capacity to express our judgments publicly as well as listening to the judgments of others.⁶ We see then that, as in other cases, Kant supports a double argument: on the one hand, we need to share a world and to communicate with others to avoid derangement in general (and eventually some minor forms of mental illness). However, on the other hand, it is this common world that we share and to which we belong as human beings, that guarantees a normal functioning of our cognitive faculties. As the passage cited above indicates, the capacity to communicate with others is the standard or criterion by which we can measure the soundness of our understanding; as Kant says it is “a subjective but necessary touchstone.”

This idea makes clear from the outset that, at least to a certain point, the distinction between the deranged and the normal functioning of our cognitive faculties is not always rigidly delimited – i.e., that it is possible to become deranged to a greater or lesser degree. The relevance of contrasting our judgments with the judgments of others makes understandable why Kant sometimes presents as synonyms not only common sense and sound understanding but the faculty of judging as well. Thus in the third *Critique* he writes:

> By *sensus communis* . . . must be understood the idea of a communal sense, i.e., a faculty for judging that in its reflection takes account (*a priori*) of everyone else’s way of representing in thought, in order as it were to hold its judgment up to human reason as a whole and thereby avoid the illusion

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⁶ The idea of making public our ideas is central to the spirit of modernity; Kant himself states this in his famous essay, “What is Enlightenment?” In the same tenor, John Stuart Mill, in *On Liberty*, upheld the need to confront our ideas to the ideas of others in order to better our judgments and improve society.
which, from subjective private conditions that could easily be held to be objective, would have a detrimental influence on the judgment. Now this happens by one holding his judgment up not so much to the actual as to the merely possible judgments of others, and putting oneself in the position of everyone else, merely by abstracting from the limitations that contingently attach to our own judging. (KU Ak. V: 293-294)

This passage is interesting insofar as it presents the need to take into account everyone's position as a sort of “practice” that we must follow. In suggesting that this has to be done “a priori” Kant emphasizes that what is to be taken into account are “not so much the actual but the possible judgments of others.” Thus, here Kant is giving us a sort of regulative principle that has to guide a priori our faculty of judging. Kant then mentions that by this he intends to contrast a broad-minded person with a narrow-minded one (cf. UK Ak. V: 295).\footnote{It is worth mentioning that in the context of the third Critique, these statements are not mentioned with the intention of accounting for a malfunction or derangement of the cognitive faculties, but rather with the intention of establishing a way of thinking that gives a purposive use to the cognitive faculties. This is why Kant mentions the relation of judgment with reason as a whole in this passage. The point is then not only to contrast our judgments with those of others but to put oneself a priori in the position of others, because the idea is to reflect on our own judgments from a universal standpoint. This intention of the third Critique, however, does not invalidate the passage cited above, since the faculty of judging is being considered here in relation to a different aim. Likewise, the idea of comparing our judgments with the judgments of others was already mentioned in Dreams. As Kant says: “[a]ll of this perhaps reveals that, when it comes to our own judgments, we sense our dependency on the universal human understanding, this phenomenon being a means of conferring a kind of unity of reason on the totality of thinking beings” (Träume Ak. II: 334).

For a different conception of the relation between sensus communis and sensus privatus see: Saji, Motohide. 2009. On the division between reason and unreason in Kant. Human Studies 32, no. 2 (June): 201-223.}

However, Kant also stresses the idea that we can easily fall into some sort of derangement by stating that we must “avoid the illusion of taking as objective what are merely private conditions.” The illusion Kant is considering here are the
illusions of inner sense, for one of the main problems in derangement is precisely that inner sense is subject to illusions. Kant says:

It is said that inner sense is subject to illusions, which consist either in taking the appearances of inner sense for external appearances, that is, taking imaginings for sensations, or in regarding them as inspirations caused by another being that is not an object of external sense. (Anthr. Ak. VII: 161)

Kant is referring here to enthusiasm or spiritualism which he regards as forms of mental illness (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 161); below this is explained.

5.2.2. The Intersection of Empirical Psychology and Pragmatic Anthropology

This explanation touches on another topic, namely, that accounting for the nature of the inner states of the subject is a topic that belongs to empirical psychology. This is so because the judgments that account for my inner states are necessarily empirical. The question then arises about the relation that empirical psychology has to pragmatic anthropology, and how the two presumably distinct disciplines represent derangement of the mind. Until now the ‘I’ has always been presented in mental terms; Kant speaks of a mental subject and is basically interested in a pure mental subject; he does not focus as much on the nature of empirical consciousness as such. Jean-Paul Sartre is right then when he says Kant cared neither about the constitution nor the deduction of the empirical consciousness (cf. Sartre 2003, 94).

We have then passed from a (pure) mental subject that places a priori conditions on cognition, and that as empirical consciousness has inner states, to talk in this chapter of the human being of pragmatic anthropology. The question then is
how this *human being* comes to be, or how we are to understand the “passage” from
the mental subject to a human being that participates in a common world. Kant
deals constantly with these topics in the *Lectures on Metaphysics*; in his pre-critical
writings a dualism mind/body is prevalent. In his critical period, Kant replaces the
mind/body dualism with his more nuanced distinction between inner and outer
sense. For example, Kant says: “I, *as a human being*, am an object of *inner* and *outer*
sense” (*ML* 1 Ak. XXVIII: 224). In a later text he specifies this connection more
precisely:

> Pyschology is the cognition of the object of our inner sense. The object of all
inner intuition is the soul. As object of outer and inner sense I am a human
being. As object merely of inner sense I am a soul, and as an object merely of
outer sense I am a body. (*ML* 2 Ak. XXVIII: 583-584)  

Thus, by *human being* Kant means the ‘I’ that feels, has inner perceptions,
exists physically and lives in the world we share with one another. The
transcendental subject is not mentioned in his anthropological definition of human
subjectivity. Kant implies that the ‘I’ of apperception is not at stake in an inquiry
concerning the ‘I’ *as human being*. Since this ‘I’ has a body, exists in the world, and is
related to other *Is* in the same condition, it is the concern of a pragmatic
anthropology. However, as this ‘I’ has feelings and subjective inner states that come
directly linked to what affects his/her body, this ‘I’ is also the concern of empirical
psychology. In short, we can say that empirical psychology is concerned with the

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8 The topic of how the soul and the body are united; the community between soul and body, and the
location of the soul in the body, with its collateral topics is not a topic of this dissertation and thus
will neither be explained nor mentioned here.
inner states of the ‘I’ as an object of the inner sense\(^9\), while pragmatic anthropology is concerned with the living bodily ‘I’ in its dealings with others. This explains why both disciplines are concerned with mental derangement, though from somewhat different points of view. However, since both disciplines deal with empirical observations the boundary between them is sometimes difficult to discern. Three passages—written after Kant’s first edition of the first Critique—show this problem clearly:

A psychology of observations could be called anthropology . . . One can still distinguish anthropology from it, if one understands by this a cognition of human beings insofar as it is pragmatic. (MM Ak. XXIX: 757)

In empirical psychology we consider our I as soul and as human being. But we consider the body, on the one hand, as an organ of the soul which depends on the soul, but on the other hand as a lodging, since the soul also often depends on it. A short anthropology is thus presented in empirical psychology (MM Ak. XXIX: 877)

[E]mpirical psychology is not yet so complete that it could furnish a separate science, since work on it has begun only recently. Because one knew of no other science with which it could be paired, that is why it is joined to rational psychology <psychologia rationalis> as a stranger and guest, since it is still most closely related to this. (MM Ak. XXVIII: 876)

5.2.3. The Fragile Boundary between Sanity and Mental Derangement

Kant suggests not only that the boundary between empirical psychology and pragmatic anthropology is porous, but also that the boundary between a normal and a deranged mind is not rigid. A first point that deserves our attention is his reference to the fact that children initially talk in the third person—e.g., “Karl wants

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\(^9\) "Empirical psychology <psychologia empirica> is the cognition of the objects of inner sense insofar as it is obtained from experience" (ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 222).
to eat,” “Kant want to walk,” etc.—prior to developing a first-person consciousness of themselves. As Kant says, “[b]efore he [the child] merely felt himself; now he thinks himself” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 127). It is well known that people who suffer from mental illness sometimes speak in the third person as well. This suggests that in mental derangement a sort of involution is present, insofar as the person goes back to a stage when s/he did not have a robust sense of self-consciousness. This sense of self-consciousness is related to the capacity to “feel oneself” in inner sense. However, Kant suggests that apperception is a more developed capacity than that of inner sense, insofar as apperception implies an ability to think and not merely feel oneself. In certain cases of mental derangement the person will regress to his/her own private world where s/he lived in the earliest stages of life.

Another interesting fact about childhood that is also perceivable in mental illness is that initially the perceptions of a child cannot be united in a concept of an object (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 128). From our discussion concerning the synthetic activity of the mind, we can explain this by saying that the child is not yet able to perform the synthesis of apprehension that would allow him to recognize a manifold as an object and so form a concept of that object. Something like this could occur in cases of amentia, as we will see below.

Likewise, Kant warns us of two activities that have to be performed with caution, to avoid the danger of succumbing to mental derangement. The first is abstraction, which plays a fundamental role in forming empirical concepts and in
cognition in general. According to Kant, we must not make our inner sense into an abstract object of empirical investigation, since such an activity takes us away from our proper attention to objects of outer sense (cf. *Anthr*. Ak. VII: 131). There is a further danger that by analyzing our mental states we will interfere with the mind's natural tendency to synthesize its representations in one consciousness. The second activity is self-observation in general. Spying on oneself can produce mental derangement (cf. *Anthr*. Ak. VII: 132-133). As Kant says:

> To observe the various acts of representative power in myself, *when I summon them*, is indeed worth reflection; it is necessary and useful for logic and metaphysics. – But to wish to eavesdrop on oneself when they come into the mind *unbidden* and on their own (this happens through the play of the power of imagination when it is unintentionally meditating) constitutes a reversal of the natural order in the faculty of knowledge, because then the principles of thought do not lead the way (as they should), but rather follow behind. This eavesdropping on oneself is either already a disease of the mind (melancholy), or leads to one and to the madhouse. (*Anthr*. Ak. VII: 133-134)

In both warnings we see clearly the cognitive primacy that outer sense has for our mental health. In previous chapters we explained that the outer sense is what allows us to represent ourselves at all. Now Kant makes clear that outer sense is also necessary to maintain our sanity. Kant refers to this point indirectly when he says: “[i]nner sense sees the relations of its determinations only in time, hence in flux, where the stability of observation necessary for experience does not occur” (*Anthr*. Ak. VII: 134). Again, contact with the external world is considered fundamental to avoid a malfunctioning of the cognitive faculties. Retiring into oneself can promote insanity for it exposes us to the illusions of inner sense: “The
tendency to retire into oneself, together with the resulting illusions of inner sense, can only be set right when the human being is led back into the external world and by means of this to the order of things present to the outer senses” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 162).

5.3. The Deficiencies of the Cognitive Faculties

5.3.1. Misuse of the Power of Judgment as a Source of Mental Deficiencies

Mental deficiency is always the effect of the relationship between two faculties: one is the power of judgment and the other is the power of imagination. We have already explained that the power of judgments is the faculty of subsuming intuitions under a rule – i.e., it concerns our ability to determine whether or not something stands under a rule of the understanding. Here we are not dealing with the inferences of reason nor with the objective aspects of empirical cognition, but rather with empirical psychology and pragmatic anthropology. Many of the rules of our common world and/or daily life are taken for granted because they have been acquired in childhood and naturally arise just by living with others in a commonly recognized world. Some of these rules are cultural. For example, putting our shoes inside the refrigerator instead of in the closet or walking naked in the street would be signs of mental deficiency. If a person who has never cooked or even watched a cooking show on TV, were told to wash the rice before cooking it and then, taking this advice, washed it with Tide or Ajax, we would probably not attribute to him or her a mental deficiency, for ignorance does not involve a malfunctioning of the
cognitive faculties (cf. *Anthr*. Ak. VII: 205). The person in question would have followed the general rule that washing involves using soap, and his/her ignorance consists in not knowing that the washing of food falls under another rule.

However, another question has to do not with knowing—or not knowing—rules, but with how to apply known rules to concrete cases. More precisely, the question at stake in such cases is about how to determine whether something stands under a particular rule or not, since this is what subsumption under a rule involves (cf. A133/B172). The first *Critique* gives a clear account of what is at stake in judging in this sense:

> [I]t becomes clear that although the understanding is certainly capable of being instructed and equipped through rules, the power of judgment is a special talent that cannot be taught but only practiced *(Urteilskraft aber ein besonderes Talent sei, welches gar nicht belehrt, sondern nur geübt sein will)* . . . A physician therefore, a judge, or a statesman, can have many fine pathological, juridical, or political rules in his head, of which he can even be a thorough teacher, and yet can easily stumble in their application, either because he is lacking in natural power of judgment (though not in understanding), and to be sure understands the universal *in abstracto* but cannot distinguish whether a case *in concreto* belongs under it, or also because he has not received adequate training for this judgment through examples and actual business. (A133-134/B172-173)

As Kant explains here, it is one thing to learn a rule and another to know how to apply that rule; the latter is a skill that cannot be taught because there are an indefinite number of cases that will and will not fall under the rule. For example, Kant tells us, a judge may *know* very well that all premeditated acts of murder must be punished, but he or she may not be able to judge *that this is a case of murder*; for example, he or she may not be able to distinguish premeditated acts from
unpremeditated acts, no matter how the evidence is presented. In general, the judge can know perfectly well the rules of his discipline; he can know the criminal and civil codes. But if he cannot distinguish when they must be applied he has a kind of mental deficiency due to this lack of the power of judgment.

Thus, the distinction Kant makes between judgment and understanding is important. Our understanding can function perfectly well; we can even subsume empirical intuitions under the categories, for in this special case our grasp of concepts coincides with our grasp of their rules of applications (their schemata). Nevertheless, a mental deficiency is to be encountered in anyone who does not know how to apply empirical rules to particular cases. It is a deficiency for which no learning can compensate us because the power of judgment is a "natural power" or "special talent" that cannot be taught. This implies that one either does or does not possess the faculty of judgment; however, it can be developed to a certain extent through practice, examples, and experimentation. Examples are particularly noteworthy, since Kant considers their sole utility to consist in their capacity to sharpen the power of judgment (cf. A134/B173). The Anthropology recalls the same idea:

Natural understanding can be enriched through instruction with many concepts and furnished with rules. But the second intellectual faculty, namely that of discerning whether something is an instance of the rule or not

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10 Likewise: "examples are the leading-strings of the power of judgment, which he who lacks the natural talent for judgment can never do without" (A135/B174).
– the power of judgment (iudicium) – cannot be instructed, but only exercised (Anthr. Ak. VII: 199).11

From here Kant determines a specific mental deficiency: s/he who lacks the power of judgment is stupid (dumm) (A134n/B173n; cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 210).

Stupidity is the mental deficiency proper to s/he who is unable to apply rules to cases in concreto.

It is worth mentioning that not knowing how to judge is to be distinguished from judging erroneously. Error—in the theoretical rather than practical sense—is only to be found in judgments (cf. A293/B350), for judgments are the vehicles by which we specify the relation of objects to our understanding. In a cognition that agrees with the laws of the understanding there is no error (cf. A293-294/B350). Error is caused by an unnoticed influence of sensibility on understanding that makes the latter deviate from its proper action (cf. A294/B350). Because such influence is not systematic, error—or an erroneous judgment—does not count as an instance of mental deficiency. Kant adds that negative judgments have the specific role of preventing error (cf. A709/B737).

This distinction is important because of our tendency to attribute error to the senses. Kant makes clear that the senses do not err because they do not judge at all: “Thus it is correctly said that the senses do not err; yet not because they always

11 In a similar tenor, Kant says: “[a]n understanding that is in itself sound (without mental deficiency) can still be accompanied by deficiencies with regard to its exercise, deficiencies that necessitate either a postponement until the growth to proper maturity, or even the representation of one’s person through that of another in regard to matters of civil nature” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 208).
judge correctly, but because they do not judge at all” (A293/B350). In his apology for sensibility, Kant absolves the senses from three accusations: first, “[t]he senses do not confuse” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 144); second, “[t]he sense do not have command over the understanding” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 145); and third, “[t]he senses do not deceive” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 146), precisely because they do not judge at all. The Anthropology explains through examples how the influence of sensibility on the understanding produces error; for example we think and say that a tower is round because from the distance we do not see its corners, or because the distant sea seems higher than the water at the shore. This influence of sensibility on the understanding makes us take mere appearances for objects of experience, thereby making us fall into error (Anthr. Ak. VII: 146).

5.3.2. Can the Imagination be a Source of Mental Deficiency?

Besides the power of judgment, the imagination also plays a fundamental role in mental deficiency, and it is specifically the reproductive imagination that is at stake here. However, in contradistinction with the faculty of judging, the role of the imagination in mental deficiencies is more difficult to determine, since this is an activity of the mind that operates both involuntarily and constantly. Let us try to elucidate its main aspects.

We know already that images are particular representations of particular objects, and that they are produced at the same time as the appearances they
Each one of us has then multiple images for each object of our cognition. The imagination uses these images in different ways and constantly, and mental deficiencies may arise when the imagination has preponderance over the laws of the understanding or functions in a ruleless or unbridled manner. Kant considers that absent-mindedness is a mental deficiency proper to the reproductive imagination:

Absent-mindedness is one of the mental deficiencies attached, through the reproductive imagination, to a representation on which one has expended a great or continuous attention and from which one is not able to get away; that is, one is not able to set the course of the power of imagination free again. (Anthr. Ak. VII: 206)

The Anthropology defines the reproductive imagination as a faculty of the derivative presentation of an object (exhibitio derivativa), which brings back to the mind a previously acquired empirical intuition (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 167). This is another way to say that the reproductive imagination brings back to the mind images of objects. From these images the imagination has the capacity to invent new (imaged) objects. He who regards these images as (inner or outer) experiences is a visionary (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 167). This accounts for the inventive power of imagination, even if this does not mean that it is creative since it always requires a prior sense representation that has been given to us; it can never produce a sense representation that has never been given to our sensibility (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 168). This is why Kant says:

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12 See Chapter 3 for the explanation of the image formation.
So, no matter how great an artist, even a sorceress, the power of the imagination may be, it is still not creative, but must get the material for its images from the senses. But these images, according to the memories formed of them, are not so universally communicable as concepts of understanding. (Anthr. Ak. VII: 168-169)

Through association we can extend the domain of images with which the imagination plays, up until the point at which one person’s imagination can do violence to another’s. An example would be the excessive use of imagination in a work of art. Kant also has in mind abrupt changes of topic during a conversation, or beginning a new conversation with something unexpected or unfamiliar, like current events in another country. This explains why talking about the weather is so often a common conversational starting point, for it does not produce any violence to the imagination of others (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 176n). While memory brings back images voluntarily (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 182), fantasy accounts for the involuntary production of images by the power of the imagination (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 167). As Kant says: “[w]e play with the imagination frequently and gladly, but imagination (as fantasy) plays just as frequently with us, and sometimes very inconveniently” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 175).

We can make here a side reference to the disciplines of rational psychology, theology and cosmology insofar as they give rise to rational illusions, and so can be conducive to the production of further illusions; thus we can expect that fantasies, fables, fantastical histories, horror tales and movies, etc., may be directly linked to the metaphysical illusions through the power of the imagination. Besides, the
imagination can be excited or soothed, in the one case strengthening and in the other weakening its vital force; among Kant’s examples here we have intoxicating food and drink, certain mushrooms, wild rosemary, the chicha of the Peruvians, opium, wine and beer (cf. *Anthr.* Ak. VII: 170).

As in the case of sensibility, the imagination can also influence the understanding in the production or deployment of its concepts; this can be one of the sources of surreptitious concepts. Kant touches upon this vast domain and the obscure origin of such concepts when he writes:

> There are many concepts which are the product of covert and obscure inferences made in the course of experience; these concepts then proceed to propagate themselves by attaching themselves to other concepts, without there being any awareness of the experience itself on which they were originally based or of the inference which formed the concept on the basis of such experience. Such concepts may be called surreptitious concepts. (*Träume* Ak. II: 320n)

Considering that the understanding can exercise certain acts of unification that result in concepts without any empirical intuition being given to us, and that we can think up objects for concepts that are not givable in intuition, and that, finally, even the categories themselves are sometimes used beyond the bounds of empirical intuition, it is clear that there are many ways in which the power of the imagination can provide content for our concepts and collaborate in thinking up objects that cannot be given in intuition. For instance, the concept of a ‘spirit’ is fabricated by inferring the existence of an intelligible world whose “beings” live among us but have neither impenetrability nor extension, and thus cannot be given in empirical
intuition. Much simpler will be to explain the origin of fictitious concepts such as that of a unicorn or a siren, since they could be composed of the mixture of characteristic marks of given empirical concepts.

These statements make clear how the imagination can directly or indirectly contribute to mental deficiencies of which absent-mindedness is one case. They also make evident that some of the inventions and play of the imagination are not at all questionable, since from it great artistic, intellectual, scientific and technological productions arise as well. The question then is how can we establish a boundary between a normally functioning power of the imagination—with appropriate fantasies and fictions—from one that exposes the subject to the danger of mental derangement.

Kant introduces the expression 'waking dreamer' (Träumer im Wachen) to explain the tendency of some otherwise mentally healthy people to produce chimaeras and similar fictions while daydreaming; in most cases the individual is conscious that these chimaeras or fictions are products of its own imagination. As Kant says:

[H]e represents them [chimaeras] at the time as being in himself, whereas other objects, which he senses, he represents as outside himself. As a consequence, he counts the former as the products of his own activity, while he regards the latter as something which he receives from outside and by which he is affected. (Träume Ak. II: 343)

The criterion by which we distinguish an object of outer sense from what is a mere product of one's own imagination is the affection the object of the outer sense
has on our own body. As already explained, sensations refer to the consciousness of the affection of objects of the outer sense.\(^\text{13}\) Thus, the consciousness of this affection on our own body is what serves as a criterion for distinguishing what comes from an object of the outer sense and what is a product of our own imagination. As Kant points out:

> Hence, the images in question may very well occupy him greatly while he is awake, but, no matter how clear the images may be, they will not deceive him. For although, in this case, he also has a representation of himself and of his body in his brain, and although he relates his fantastical images to that representations, nonetheless, the real sensation of his body creates, by means of the outer senses, a contrast or distinction with respect to those chimaeras. As a result, he is able to regard his fantastical images as hatched out by himself and the real sensation as an impression of the senses. (Träume Ak. II: 343) (Emphasis mine)

### 5.4. Towards an Account of Mental Illness

While the sensations that the objects of the outer sense produce on our bodies can serve as the criterion for distinguishing the products of our imagination from what comes from outside us, people suffering from mental illness will not be able to identify sensations that allow them to distinguish between the inner from the outer. Kant suggests that mental illness cannot be conceived if there is not something wrong in our brains; at least this appears to be a guiding assumption of the Anthropology, as it is in his earlier *Dreams of a Spirit-Seer Elucidated by Dreams of Metaphysics*, in which he provides his only full explanation of a case of mental illness.

\(^{13}\) See Chapter 1 for the explanation on sensation.
Kant considers spirit-seers to be candidates for the asylum (cf. *Träume* Ak. II: 348). In *Dreams* he considers the case of Emmanuel Swedenborg, who believed he could commune with spirits. Kant speculates that the cause of Swedenborg’s delusion was a physiological tendency to transpose the figments of his imagination outside himself; i.e., Swedenborg’s brain *mislocated* his imaginings in a place *outside* his mind. As Kant says, sufferers of this type of mental derangement “transpose the illusion of their imagination and locate it outside themselves, and do so in relation to their body, of which also they are aware by means of the outer senses” (*Träume* Ak. II: 343-344). The question then is how this transposition occurs. How is it possible that a person can locate what is inside himself/herself as if it were an object of the outer sense?

To provide an answer to this question Kant draws on Isaac Newton’s account of the refraction of light-rays. In Book I, Part I, Axiom viii of his *Opticks*, Newton says, “[a]n object seen by Reflexion or Refraction, appears in that place from whence the Rays after their last Reflexion or Refraction diverge in falling on the Spectator’s Eye” (Newton 1952, 18). In Definition II, Newton states that the “Refrangibility of the Rays of Light, is their Disposition to be refracted or turned out of their Way in passing out of one transparent Body or Medium into another. And a greater or less Refrangibility of Rays, is their Disposition to be turned more or less out of their Way in like Incidences of the same Medium” (Newton 1952, 2).
Kant borrows these ideas to account for what happens in mental illness. Newton observed that when an object is seen through a prism or reflected in a mirror, the image of the object is refracted or reflected onto another position, i.e., the eye will see the object as located at another place from where it actually is. He explained this phenomenon by suggesting that the rays that emanated from the object intersect before entering the eye at a focal point. This intersection indicates the direction from which the sensation was transmitted to the eye. Kant draws on the same idea, suggesting that a normal person distinguishes an external object from the mere products of his or her imagination by locating the focus imaginarius of his imaginings inside the brain. The focus imaginarius is the point at which the lines—caused, in this case, by the imagination—intersect or converge when they are extended (cf. Träume Ak. II: 344). The focus imaginarius is then used by Kant as an analogy of Newton’s focal point to explain the intersection of the sensations and of the movement of the nerves in the brain. Kant uses Descartes’ conception of his ideas materiales; i.e., he speculates that there is a movement of the nerve-tissue (Nervengewebe) in the brain and that all the representations of our imagination are accompanied by its vibration.  

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14 Kant explains the Cartesian material ideas in his own words by saying they are bodily impressions. As Kant says: These conditions of the body, under which alone the thoughts can take place, are called material ideas <ideas materiales> or material correlates of the ideas... so must there also be impressions in the body that correspond with the thoughts and accompany the idea... there must be impressions in the brain of that which one has thought; there must be something bodily with thinking. (ML1 Ak. XXVIII: 259)
The Newtonian and Cartesian ideas taken together enable Kant to conceive that the *focus imaginarius* has to be different— in the ordinary or normal case—from the figments of the imagination and from the objects of perception—i.e., that the place where the *focus imaginarius* is normally located depends on the kind of object that is being considered: if the object is an object of sensation, the *focus imaginarius* is located *outside* the brain, whereas if the object is a chimera or a mere product of the imagination, the *focus imaginarius* is located *inside* the brain. In Kant's own words:

The concession I ask is this: that the chief difference between the motion of the nerves in the images of the imagination and the motion of the nerves in the sensation consists in the fact that the lines indicating the direction of the motion intersect in the former case inside the brain, whereas in the latter case they intersect outside it. In the case of the clear sensations of waking life, the *focus imaginarius*, at which the object is represented, is placed outside me, whereas in the case of the images of the imagination, which I may entertain at the same time as the clear sensations of my waking life, the *focus imaginarius* is located within me. For this reason, I cannot, as long as I am awake, fail to distinguish my imaginings, as the figments of my own imaginations, from the impression of the senses. (*Träume* Ak. II: 345)

From these ideas Kant will offer an explanation of mental illness which he refers to as ‘madness’ (*Wahnsinn*) and as ‘derangement’ (*Verrückung*), saying that what happens in the mentally ill is that s/he transposes the location of the *focus imaginarius* concerning the products of his or her own imagination from inside the brain to outside it, thereby treating the images as if they were real objects of the outer sense. As Kant says:

If this is admitted [the previous distinction that the normal person makes], I think I can offer a reasonable explanation of that type of mental disturbance
which is called madness (Wahnsinn), and which, if it is more serious, is called derangement (Verrückung). The distinctive feature of this malady consists in this: the victim of the confusion places mere object of his own imagination outside himself, taking them to be things which are actually present before him. (Träume Ak. II: 346)

Thus what explains this type of mentally illness is that the motions that are supposed to intersect inside the brain intersect outside the brain; the mentally ill person displaces the focus imaginarius from inside to outside the brain, and thus, locates the mere products of his imagination as if they were objects of the senses. “[T]he displacement of the nerve-tissue can cause the focus imaginarius to be displaced and located at the point from which the sensible impression produced by a corporeal body, which was actually present, would come” (Träume Ak. II: 347). Kant adds that this is a deception of the (outer) senses, and that the malady does not affect the understanding. Mere reasoning cannot help the deranged person in this case, because even if he can judge well, the impression of the senses precedes judgment and presents its evidence so vividly that there is no way the understanding can act against this illness (cf. Träume Ak. II: 347).

We think this early explanation of Swedenborg’s delusions could provide an explanation of how ‘dementia’ (Wahnsinn), as Kant understands it in the Anthropology, is produced.\textsuperscript{15} Thirty-two years later, when Kant attempted his systematic classification of mental illnesses he described dementia as follows:

\textsuperscript{15} We must not take, however, the German word ‘Wahnsinn,’ repeated in both explanations, as evidence. As already mentioned, Kant uses the same German words in different explanations, and sometimes different words for similar explanations.
Dementia is that disturbance of the mind in which everything that the insane person relates is to be sure in conformity with the formal laws of thought that make experience possible; but, owing to the falsely inventive power of imagination, self-made representations are regarded as perceptions (Anthr. Ak. VII: 215).

Besides dementia (Wahnsinn), other types of mental illnesses are amentia (Unsinnigkeit), insania (Wahnwitz) and vesania (Aberwitz) (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 214-215). “Amentia (Unsinnigkeit) is the inability to bring one’s own representations into even the coherence necessary for the possibility of experience” (Anthr. Ak. VII: 214). We think it is possible that Kant was considering here the case of a person who is unable to perform correctly the empirical synthesis of apprehension, but mostly the definition seems to point to cases in which the ‘I think’ is not capable of accompanying our representations, and, thus, the mentally ill subject would be someone who cannot make his/her representations into thoughts, which means that the representations would be nothing for him/her. Under these circumstances no possible experience could be even envisaged.

Kant also conceives of patients who suffer from ‘vesania’ (Aberwitz), or a deranged reason. A typical feature of such mental illness is that sufferers of it believe they can unveil the supersensible forces of nature and comprehend the mystery of the Trinity (cf. Anthr. Ak. VII: 215). As Kant says:

Vesania (Aberwitz) is the sickness of a deranged reason. The mental patient flies over the entire guidance of experience and chases after principles that can be completely exempted from its touchstone imagining that he conceives the inconceivable. (Anthr. Ak. VII: 215)
This type of mental illness seems to correspond to the derangement experienced by those people whose understanding has transgressed the boundaries of its proper exercise, and who guide themselves by pseudo-rational principles. In this case, they pretend to apply categories for supposed objects that are really not objects of a possible experience.

This malady seems to approach in some way to another, namely, Kant’s conception of ‘enthusiasm’ (*Schwärmerei*) that, as mentioned above, is an illusion of the inner sense that consists in taking imaginings for sensations. This illusion is conceived as mental illness (cf. *Anthr.* Ak. VII: 161) and its origin is linked to the illusions of reason insofar as the individual here thinks he has contact with a community of spirits, including the souls of the departed (cf. *Träume* Ak. II: 362-364). Once again, Kant bases his conception of enthusiasm on the case of Emmanuel Swedenborg, whom he considers to be the worst of all enthusiasts (cf. *Träume* Ak. II: 366). He says: “[t]o claim (with Swedenborg) that the real appearances of the world present to the senses are merely a symbol of an intelligible world hidden in reserve is enthusiasm” (*Anthr.* Ak. VII: 191-192).

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17 Emmanuel Swedenborg (1688-1772). Swedish scientist, religious teacher and mystic. Writer of the *Arcana Coelestia*, among other works. His religious conception is largely incorporated into the Church of the New Jerusalem.

We do not think it possible to account for an explanation of what Kant named *insania*. Therefore we just mention its definition in this footnote: "*Insania* (*Wahnwitz*) is a deranged power of judgment in which the mind is held in suspense by means of analogies that are confused with concepts of similar things, and thus the power of imagination, in a play resembling understanding.
Finally, a different type of mental illness is *melancholia* (*Grillenkranheit*), also called *hypochondria*. It is also a mental illness but of a different type since it is neither madness nor needs to take care of the person. Here the patient is well aware that something is not right with the course of his thoughts (*Anthr. Ak. VII: 202*). As Kant says:

[The illness of the hypochondriac consists in this: that certain internal physical sensations do not so much disclose a real disease present in the body, but rather are mere causes of anxiety about it . . . hypochondria, considered as melancholia, becomes the cause of imagining physical disease: the patient is aware that it is imaginary, but every now and then he cannot refrain from regarding it as something real. Or, conversely, from a real physical ailment (such as unease from flatulent food after having a meal), hypochondria will produce imaginings of all sorts of grave external mishaps and worries about one’s business, which disappear as soon as the digestion has been completed and flatulence has ceased. (*Anthr. Ak. VII: 212-213*)

In closing now our dissertation we recall here Kant's three maxims for wisdom: to think for oneself, to think into the place of the other (in communication with human beings) and to always think consistently with oneself (cf. *Anthr. Ak. VII: 200*). We add three further important suggestions for everyday life among the many that Kant gives us. First, the ideal of a good meal in good company. “The good living that still seems to harmonize best with true humanity is *a good meal in good company* (and if possible, also alternating company)” (*Anthr. Ak. VII: 278*). Second, scholars must not eat alone. “Eating alone (*solipsimus convictorii*) (the solitary person at the table) is unhealthy for a scholar who *philosophizes*; it is not restoration conjures up the connection of disparate things as universal under which the representations of the universal are contained” (*Anthr. Ak. VII: 215*).

Laughter is an affect resulting from the sudden transformation of a heightened expectation into nothing. This very transformation, which is certainly nothing enjoyable for the understanding, is nevertheless indirectly enjoyable and, for a moment, very lively. The cause must thus consist in the influence of the representation of the body and its reciprocal effect on the mind; certainly not insofar as the representation is objectively an object of gratification (for how can a disappointed expectation be gratifying?), but rather solely through the fact that as a mere play of representations it produces an equilibrium of the vital powers in the body. (KU Ak. V: 332-333)

We conclude that philosophers must eat good meals in company, and laugh as much as possible. No doubt this is a good method to prevent the illusions of sense and of reason to which we are all exposed. If Nietzsche said a philosopher must know how to dance, why not think that a philosopher must also know how to laugh?
REFERENCE LIST

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VITA

Gisèle Velarde La Rosa is a Peruvian philosopher and a public figure in Peru. Born in Lima, Peru, Gisèle Velarde studied philosophy at the top university in Peru, Pontifical Catholic University of Peru, where she obtained her B.A. in Humanities with Major in Philosophy in 1990, and her License in Philosophy in 1991. Her thesis, “Nonsense in Ludwig Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logicus-Philosophicus,*” received outstanding honors by unanimous decision of the jury. She did also postgraduate studies in International Relations in France, obtaining the Diplôme of the École des Hautes Études Internationales in 1993.

Gisèle Velarde has been a Professor of Philosophy at Pontifical Catholic University of Peru for ten years, where she was usually rated the top professor of the Philosophy Department. She primarily taught Modern Philosophy and Ethics, as well as courses in Contemporary Philosophy, Social and Political Philosophy, Ancient Philosophy, Critical Thinking, and Introduction to Philosophy. In 2004, she was appointed as a Professor in the Philosophy Department and the Director of Continuing Studies at Antonio Ruiz de Montoya University, founded in Peru that year with the expectation to become the best university in the country. Dr. Velarde was appointed to teach Kant Seminar (on Ethics), Theory of Knowledge, and Contemporary Problems in Ethics, Philosophy of Right, and Political Philosophy at the upper division and postgraduate level. She also taught courses on Jürgen
Habermas and Hannah Arendt. As Director of Continuing Studies, she performed innovative work that affected all levels of Peruvian society, and was recognized by the highest intellectual Peruvian circles. Likewise, she has been appointed three times to train the professors of the School of Arts and Sciences of the Peruvian Applied Sciences University in philosophy, and has been a visiting professor at Interbank Corporative University in Lima.

Aside from her academic work, various private and public institutions in Peru have appointed Gisèle Velarde since the beginning of her professional life, due to her versatile and creative profile, in order to create innovative ways to bridge the gaps in Peruvian education and create ethical alternatives for Peruvian society. She was invited to lecture on ethics to the Shining Path terrorists in jail at the Miguel Castro Castro Prison, was in charge of the consultancy of the ethical reconstruction of the Naval Academy of Peru, and was appointed by the Ferreyros Group to redefine the education materials for the upper third of students in public universities in Peru, among others.

Her first public conference in 1994 created two unprecedented situations in Peruvian society: the gathering of hundreds of people of multiple cultural, social, economic, and education levels who attended her lectures, and the consecutive presence of a philosopher in the public domain. By early 2000, she was already a recognized leader and public intellectual in Peru. All sectors and levels of Peruvian society have requested her philosophical and ethical work. Her conferences have been transmitted by cable TV, and since 1995, Dr. Velarde has been consistently
interviewed in all the major newspapers in Peru, as well as in television, cable TV, and radio.

She is the first philosopher in Peru who has been offered individual grants and awards to do philosophical, ethical, and educational projects, which she has shared with diverse intellectuals and professionals to work in teams. Her longest sponsors have been the Southern Peru Copper Corporation USA and the Peruvian Petroleum Company (Petroperu). Dr. Velarde has been asked to run for office in the Peruvian Congress on three occasions by different political parties; she has declined all the offers. However, she did agree to advise the Ethical Commission of the Peruvian Congress. She has also been appointed as a member of the consultant’s team of El Comercio Newspaper and Magazines (the most widely circulated newspaper in Peru) and she worked as a researcher at Apoyo and the Analysis Group for the Development (GRADE), funded by the Mellon Foundation, USAID, the Ford Foundation, and the United Nations for Development Programs.

In 2008, she won a full fellowship and scholarship for up to five years from Loyola University in Chicago to do a Ph.D. in Philosophy. The award was offered by the President of Loyola University, Fr. Michael J. Garanzini, S. J., and the Council of Regents, in collaboration with the Graduate School and the Philosophy Department. She finished her doctoral studies with a 3.8 GPA. While at Loyola, Dr. Velarde taught as an adjunct professor twice in Ethics and once in Philosophy of Religion at the undergraduate level. In 2010, she was invited to give a presentation in the Hannah
Arendt Circle – Annual Conference, at DePaul University. Gisèle Velarde is fluent in English, Spanish (native), and French, and reads Classical Greek and German.