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The One and the Many

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THE ONE AND THE MANY

With Special Attention to the Doctrine of Participation
in the Philosophy of Proclus

by

W. E. Powers

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Loyola University, February, 1937.
VITA

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One need make no apology for writing a graduate thesis on the system of Proclus. He was one of the greatest of the Neo-Platonists as well as the last of the great Greek thinkers.

Proclus was not only a great commentator on the doctrine of Plato, but displayed great originality and also filled in many gaps in the philosophy of his most illustrious predecessor Plotinus. He is considered the greatest systematizer between Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas.

There is urgent need in our day for a revival of the discursive and dialectic method, for acute logical reasoning, and for a reinstatement of metaphysics to its proper place in the pantheon of modern philosophy. Whittaker very wisely says,

"If too much method is at last fatal to progress, too little means intellectual anarchy --- for the modern anarchy of endless specialism is an anarchy without liberty. It means that industrialism has led science captive. A renewed sense of wholeness is at the same time a renewed sense of freedom."

The modern craze for specialization, which never deals with more than the parts, has been a disappointment in
the field of philosophy. It will be refreshing to deal with Proclus from the sheer fact that he at least endeavors to present an all comprehensive and systematic explanation of the universe.

The plan of this dissertation will be to set forth with enough detail the method of the procedure of Plotinus and Proclus, (the method of each being substantially the same) by which they came to their interpretation of the cosmos. It will be necessary to do this first because the entire superstructure of the system of Proclus depends on it.

Next a general sketch of the system will be presented in sufficient detail to clarify his general schematization. This may seem but a repetition of what is already well known, and may be found in many books, but Proclus has made enough important innovations into the philosophy of Plotinus to warrant a statement of his system, and the new elements or distinctive features of his system will be emphasized.

The third and perhaps the most important part of the whole thesis, will be an attempt to trace the relation of the One and the Many with an especial effort to determine what Proclus means by his doctrine of participation. Participation is a much used term and still remains somewhat vague and illusive. It was not at all clear in the philosophy of Plato. If some contribution can be made toward a clearer understanding of this doctrine and determining of its meaning, the author will feel amply repaid for his efforts.

As a last section, a summary of the salient points
and an evaluation of the contribution of Proclus will be made.

The outline in general is:

I. Introduction

II. The Method

III. Sketch of His System

IV. The Doctrine of Participation

V. Summary and Evaluation

Of the works used and referred to in this thesis the most important of the primary sources are:

The Elements of Theology - translated by Dodds.

Three Short Treatises on Providence, Fate and Evil - translated by T. Taylor.

Fragments of Lost Writings of Proclus - translated by T. Taylor.

Proclus' Commentaries on the Alcibiades, the Timaeus, the Parmenides and the Republic.

An English Translation by Taylor. (This edition is out of print and can only be had at the Newberry Library, therefore the references in this thesis will be to the Latin translation edited by Cousin, Paris 1864.

The Enneads of Plotinus - translated by T. Taylor.

The secondary sources are:

The Comments of Dodds on The Elements of Theology.

The neo-Platonists by Whittaker.

The Philosophy of Plotinus by Inge.

These are the more important ones. Others will appear in the bibliography.
CHAPTER II

THE METHOD

The method of Proclus, as well as that of most of the Neo-Platonists, is psychological and therefore based in subjectivism. Since man is a microcosm, knowledge of man and the world are necessarily correlated. Therefore a study of man is the first step to an interpretation of the universe. For Proclus the One or God can be apprehended as the cause by the principle of mind itself. The Being of which the universe is a manifestation can only be understood by mind in its explicit activity.

In his process of introspection he found the soul to be not only unitary but also manifold; and so he divides its activities into intuitive thought, reason or understanding, opinion and sense perception. To judge belongs to the soul as a unity and the common power of judgment is discursive reason. Again by introspection he contrasts the soul or thinking subject with thought. He also thinks of the universe in the same manner, that is, the One which animates through a series of causes must also be transcendent and thought of as in contrast to the universe. By its outgoing powers the soul animates the entire body but by introspective processes it remains always beyond the limits of the body. The soul has power to think and finds itself to be all things. On this point Whittaker says,

"Since man is a microcosm, knowledge of man and of
"the world are necessarily correlated. As God or the One can only be apprehended as the cause by the principle itself of the mind, so the Being of which the universe is a manifestation can only be understood by mind in its explicit activity. To place the theory of thinking beside the theory of the object of thought is declared to be a Pythagorean point of view. This meant what we now call an idealistic position. The remark has special relevance because the historigal Timaeus was said to have been a Pythagorean."

It is thought by a great many writers that Plato sets out from a theory of knowledge which begins not by examining things but by asking what the mind can know. To learn the meaning of being and becoming, we must discover in what way each is known. The soul is not only unitary but it is also manifold, and there is a place for unity of thought, for reason or understanding, for opinion and for sense perception. For Proclus the power of judgment is discursive reason. At one extreme the human mind may grasp by intellectual intuition and at the other it may comprehend by sense experience. Since both of these philosophers are substantially the same in this psychological procedure, it will be much easier to state the process from the Enneads of Plotinus which deal with his psychology. The fact that he has an entire section on psychology and its relation to the cosmos, coupled with the above statements from Proclus, warrant the statement that the two are in this particular in substantial agreement. It will be much easier to give the psychological presentation of Plotinus inasmuch as he has much more clearly and specifically set it forth in his section on psychology, rather than cull here and there the statements of Proclus.
He starts by insisting on the paradoxical character of the soul's existence as contrasted with that of corporeal things. Body can be seen and touched and spread in space and time, while soul is invisible, intelligible, and by definition unextended. Soul cannot be described at all except by phrases which would be nonsensical if applied to body or its qualities, or to determinations of particular bodies. Body, once the soul is admitted and defined, can be described in terms of soul but not so vice versa. With this broad statement he proceeds to find within the soul all the metaphysical principles of the universe in some way represented. Among these principles are included that of unity, of pure intellect, of moving and vitalizing power, and in some sense matter itself. 5

The soul has not the characters of the thing possessing quality. It is not subject to quantitative increase or decrease. The unity in perception would be impossible if that which perceives consisted of parts spatially separated. The best that could be attained, if the perceiving subject consisted of spatially separated parts, would be a sort of transmitting of impressions from part to part. No such physical transmission or succession of impressions could be because of the very nature of material man which consists of parts each standing by itself, one part having no knowledge of what is suffered in another. The feeling of pain is a good example of this. We must assume a percipient which is everywhere identical with itself. Such a percipient must be another kind than body and that which thinks is still less body than that which
perceives. Therefore, the thinking or rational soul is of necessity of different order of being than body. The soul can and does apprehend things which have no magnitude and which do not require the use of bodily organs for their apprehension. Such are the abstract conceptions of the beautiful and the just. That which is magnitude could not, therefore, think that which is not magnitude. That which thinks must not be the body. The thinking subject cannot be body for the body has no function as an extended whole (and to be such is its nature as body,) since it cannot as a whole come in contact with an object that is incorporeal. According to Plotinus it is thus indivisible as he makes the statement "All in all and all and all in every part." This is also substantially the thought of Proclus. This is the soul's relation to body. Its unity is unlike that of the body which is one by spatial continuity, having different parts each in a different place; and is also unlike that of a quality of the body, such as color, which can be wholly in many discontinuous bodies. The identity of soul is formal and not numerical. Pushing the quest for unity still further, the Neo-Platonist holds that above perception is reason which has no physical organ at all. A sort of judgment is allowed to perception.

Both perception and memory are energies or activities not mere passive impressions received and stored up in the soul. In the perception of sight, for example, the thinking subject directs the vision to the object in order to perceive it more clearly. This outward direction would not be necessary
if passive impressions were only received. The soul has power to read, as it were, these impressions and interpret them. Impressions are one thing and the interpretations and judgments of them are another. Memory of things is produced by the soul. If memory were simply the mere multitude of perceptions then there would not be any fading of memory. It would not be necessary to consider or think in order to be reminded of anything if memory were only a store of impressions. Neither could things be forgotten and recalled again. The activity of perception, though itself mental, has direct physical conditions that memory has not. Memory itself is wholly of the soul though it may take its start from what may go on in the composite being. The soul directly preserves the memory of its own movements and not those of the body. The body furnishes no explanation of the storing-up of mental impressions which are not magnitudes. It is often a hindrance to memory by its addition of impressions, as memory is based and emerges most clearly in abstraction and pure reasoning. Something of the distant past, which is latent, can best be recalled when the impressions of the moment are removed. Memory, as well as the reason, belong to the separable part of man, the soul.

Again the soul can objectify its content and separate itself from thought. To this quest of consciousness and self-consciousness, Plotinus and Proclus have contributed greatly and cleared the matter to a considerable degree more than any of their Greek predecessors. They used the term (Ὑπακολούθησις ἑαυτῷ), accompaniment of one's self, or
the synthesis or unitary activity of the soul in reference to its contents. This is not, however, the highest unity according to these two philosophers. The highest mode of subjective life next to complete unification, in which even thought disappears, is intellectual self-knowledge. In this the knower is identical with the known. This is beyond feeling and feeling is a decided hindrance to it. One cannot object one's self and still remain a self. That would be to separate the inseparable. Then as he drives his quest further he finds at the center of the mind a unity which is beyond even self knowledge. This is one with the metaphysical cause of all things and is the proof of its reality in the metaphysical.

Upon this psychological unfolding of the microcosm which he finds in man, it is possible to proceed to a statement of his in metaphysics. This statement, however, reverses the order and starts with the One as ultimate unity.
CHAPTER III

A SKETCH OF THE SYSTEM

Inasmuch as the philosophy of Proclus is a system, any approach to an understanding of it must necessarily begin at the highest order of being or at the lowest. The approach of this thesis will be the former. Probably one of the best statements of his scale of being and becoming is that of Dodds.

The One

The highest order of being in the scale of Proclus is the One or the Pure Unity. This starting point is a logical one. Proclus stands among the many of the universe and makes a logical regress that there must be a One behind all multiplicity and that the multiplicity, which is apparent round about, in some way participates of unity. The only
transcendence that he ascribes to the One is that it is in no-
wise infected with plurality. 9

After the same manner he approaches the question of
cause and assumes that every cause must be superior to its
product. 10 In a logical regress he follows back and concludes
that there necessarily must be a first cause. 11 This first
cause he identifies with the Good and in turn states that all
unification is a Good therefore the Good is identical with the
One. 12 His scale of causation and identity of the One and the
Good are arranged by Dodds as follows:

1. The cause is superior to the effect. (7)
2. Unity and transcendence of the Good or
   Final Cause (8): it is distinct from the
goodness both of dependent and of self-
sufficient principles. (9-10)
3. Unity and transcendence of the Efficient
   Cause. (11)
4. Identity of the Good with the Efficient
   Cause. (12)
5. Identity of the Good with the One. (13)" 13

The principle of the cause being superior to the
effect is one of the underlying structures of all Neo-Platonism.
If this principle is accepted, the modern doctrine of evolution,
patterned on the Darwinian theory, would irrevocably be ruled
out. According to Neo-Platonism any emergence of the higher
from the lower must be attributed to the causative operation
which already exists. Neo-Platonism would freely admit that
such emergence is found in the phenomenal order, 14 but would
explain such emergence on the principle of the return of
power to its source. The source of this power is eternal and
unchangeably active in the real order of things.
More shall be said on this matter later. It is well, however, to mention here that probably Plotinus was the first to apply systematically the principle that the cause has always a higher and fuller reality than the effect. This doctrine is not exclusively a Neo-Platonic doctrine but is also implicit in Plato's doctrine of Being and Becoming. It has thus far been seen that the One is also the Primal Good and the Efficient Cause of all else. This, however, does not satisfy Proclus and he pushes his logical quest next into the realm of reality and endeavors to arrange it in grades. His method here is the same as used centuries later by St. Thomas. It is the doctrine of the Unmoved Mover. He uses the terms intrinsically or extrinsically moved. He draws the perfectly logical conclusion that the self-moved must have the primacy over all movers. It is the Unmoved Mover.

The next step in his consideration of reality is the power of reflecting upon one's self and he concludes that every original self-moving thing is capable of reversion upon itself. He also concludes that bodies cannot revert upon themselves and hence all things capable of reverting upon themselves must be incorporeal. He says,

"For it is not in the nature of any body to revert upon itself. That which reverts upon anything is conjoined with that upon which it reverts: Hence it is evident that every part of a body reverted upon itself must be conjoined with every other part - since self-reversion is precisely the case in which the reverted subject and that upon which

* Note: That is the method of St. Thomas in reference to the one item viz: "The Unmoved Mover."
"it has reverted become identical. But this is impossible for a body, and universally for any divisible substance: for the whole of a divisible substance cannot be conjoined with the whole of itself, because of the separation of its parts, which occupy different positions in space. It is not in the nature, then, of any body to revert upon itself so that the whole is reverted upon the whole. Thus if there is anything which is capable of reverting upon itself, it is incorporeal and without parts."

The gradation of reality, according to Proclus, as worked out by Dodds, is as follows:

(a) Vertical stratification of reality:
1. There is an Unmoved and a Self-moved. (14)
2. The Self-moved has reflexive consciousness (17), and is therefore incorporeal (15) and independent of Body (16)
3. There is nothing in the effect that is not primitively in the cause (18). Therefore Soul, being the source of self-movement in bodies, is primitively self-moved (20).
4. The primitive character of any grade is permanent and universal (19). Hence intelligence does not belong primitively to Soul. (20)
5. There are thus four grades, Body, Soul, Intelligence, and the One. (20)

(b) General structure of reality in each stratum:
1. As a One and Many. (21-2)
2. As a triad of Unparticipated, Participated, Participant. (23-4)

According to the above the One is the highest of all reality and has the power of reversion upon itself. The doctrine has moved from a metaphysical abstraction and is identified with the Summum Bonum and is the ground of individuality in that all things work according to natural appetite toward the largest good. Each individual must reach an individual good and fit into the pattern of the all-embracing Good.
He further, in proposition 18, attributes to this One the power of reflexive conscience. He also states that this function is in nowise the function of a body. It is in keeping with his doctrine of Unity because in the operation of reflexive conscience it is not a case of one part of the soul being subject and the other part object but it is the sum unit functioning as both subject and object and therefore his unity of the One is preserved. This, it will be found, is true of each stratum of the real. Each grade of reality, except the One alone, is an independent principle and enjoys unification though by participation.

On the matter of procession and reversion Proclus is at once confronted with the problem of preserving the unity of the One and at the same time accounting for the existence of a universe outside the One. This, according to Dodds, calls forth four points under each division; that is, under procession and under reversion. His scheme of stating the problem of Proclus is:

"(a) Procession

1. Law of Emanation (25).
2. Law of Undiminished Giving (26, 27).
4. Law of Immanence (30).

(b) Reversion

1. Reversion retraces the movement of Procession (31–4, 38).
2. Triad of Immanence, Procession, Reversion (35).
3. Reversion is recovery of value lost in Procession (36, 37).
4. Three grades of reversion (39).
He maintains that the laws of emanation do not diminish the resources of the cause. At the present we are interested only in the relation of the One to this process of procession and reversion. In a later chapter it will be examined more in detail since it is the heart and soul of the participation philosophy. The One is the Efficient Cause from whence the next highest order of reality proceeds. The movement does not start or occur within the One since any movement would destroy its unity, and if it be external to the One, it must be derived from the One either by another external movement (this would lead to an infinite regress) or without movement, which is the doctrine of Proclus.

His next item in the Elements of Theology is the discussion of the self-constituted. The self-constituted is identified with the One and the Good, not as something equal to them but as the same thing. The self-constituted cannot depend upon anything prior to it or any other cause which is superior to it for its existence or its activity. The self-constituted is capable of reversion upon itself and is without temporal origin. It is also imperishable and without parts, or simple. It is perpetual and transcends the things that are measured by time with respect to their existence. It is of an eternal substance.

At least Proclus in his discussion of the henads or gods, gives the name of God to the One or the Good. He uses the word gods in the plural and places the gods in the highest of orders or series but makes of the One or the Good a
sort of Godhead. When the question of participation is discussed in further detail, other reference to this matter will be made. This plurality of heads seems to be brought in by Proclus not only to maintain the One as such, but also to account for the ones which are found in reality. Further, he says that all which proceeds from any principle must remain in the producing cause and proceeds from it. This lays the groundwork for his doctrine of reversion. By connecting both cause and effect with this common link, he does not allow them to become entirely separated and thus they never are absolutely distinct things; else the effect might become an altogether new thing. In his own words he says,

"Every productive principle will imitate the One, the productive cause of the sum of things: for the non-primal is everywhere derived from the primal, so that a principle productive of certain things must derive from the principle which produces all things. Therefore, every productive principle produces its consequents while itself remaining steadfast."

Proclus' doctrine of reversion is summed up in this statement:

"Every effect that remains in its cause proceeds from it and reverts upon it."

He accounts for the union of things with things and reality with reality by this philosophy of procession and reversion. He deduces his doctrine of reversion from the fact that each thing has a natural appetition of its well being and of the Good and has an upward tension toward its begetter. In his attempt to account for the One and the Many in the highest realm of reality, Professor Taylor holds that Proclus was
teaching a doctrine of the attributes of God something like the
doctrine of Philo and the later scholastics, but this, as Dodds
points out, is very, very doubtful.²²

Intelligence

Here again the system of triads, which pervades his whole system, is brought forth; namely, the unparticipated and the participated and the partaker. He holds that there is a hierarchy of intelligences and in his own statement says:

"There is both unparticipated and participated intelligence; and the latter is participated either by supra-mundane or by intra-mundane souls.

"For the whole number of intelligences the unparticipated is sovereign, having primal existence (Propositions 23, 24). And of the participated intelligences some irradiate the supra-mundane and unparticipated soul, others the intra-mundane. For the intra-mundane class cannot proceed without mediation from the unparticipated Intelligence, since all procession is through like terms (Proposition 29), and a class which is independent of the world-order bears more likeness to the unparticipated than one which is locally distributed. Nor, again, is the supra-mundane class the only one: but there must be intra-mundane intelligences, first, because there are intra-mundane gods (Proposition 165); secondly, because the world-order itself is possessed of intelligence as well as of soul; third, because intra-mundane souls must participate supra-mundane intelligences through the mediation of intelligences which are intra-mundane (Proposition 109).²³

After a long and intricate dialectic process, Proclus concludes that the entire intellectual series is finite. He proves this on the basis of logical unity. Intelligences are finite in two aspects:

(a) In that their number is limited and therefore not infinite.
(b) Intelligences are below the One and therefore not infinite in the order of being.

The Primal Intelligence is divine and unparticipated. In his discussion of the order of Intelligence he says that every intelligence is a whole though not in the sense of one composite of parts while every unparticipated intelligence is a whole without qualification and has its parts implicit in its totality. On the other hand, each specific intelligence contains the whole as a whole in the parts. In this one aspect it is all things specifically and there remains a constant that runs through all intelligences. This constant is the cause, which in this case is the higher order of intelligence, and the cause remains in the effects and thus runs as a stream, as it were, or forms a constant which links the successive orders together. The higher and more universal the cause the farther does the constant reach in power but not in extension of production numerically. He ends by saying that every participated divine intelligence is participated by divine souls and that participation assimilates the participant to the participated principle and causes it to have the same nature and thus the soul is annexed to a divine intelligence. To quote his own words, which are very clear, he says,

"Every participated divine intelligence is participated by divine souls.

"For if participation assimilates the participant to the participated principle and causes it to have the same nature, it is plain that a soul which participates and is annexed to a divine intelligence is itself divine, participating through
"the mediation of the intelligence the divinity immanent therein. For that divinity is co-operative in linking the participant soul to the intelligence and thus binding the divine to the divine. (Proposition 56)."

Intelligence stands midway between the One and the next lower order of being. To the One by participation and to the lower order because it is the consequent to which intelligence is the cause. Proclus makes it, then, to be identical, after a manner, with both its priors and its consequents. The Superior Intelligence, or the Unparticipated Intelligence, knows all things unconditionally; while subsequent intelligence knows all in one special aspect. They are capable of self-reversion and know themselves, while the unparticipated knows itself only, but since it contains the whole within itself it knows all things. He makes the Primal Intelligence, as well as all other intelligences, to be eternal. They seem secondary to the One only in order of being and not in priority of time. Probably his system of procession and reversion compels him to make them eternal since he makes all proceed from the One and return to it. If the One is eternal and all lower orders proceed from it, and if, as Proclus maintains, the cause remains in the effect and reaches as deep as the effect may go, then all proceeds from the One and must be eternal. It is a logical deduction. Proclus is famous for his logical method and is so insistent upon it that the eternity of intelligence is logically necessary to his system.
Soul and Matter

"Soul", as Proclus says, "is the living world." It is not thought as opposed to thing; it is its own world, as Spirit is its own world. It is just within the confines of real existence (ousia); but it is more loosely integrated than the world of Spirit, and therefore the particular forms which compose it are not, when taken apart, what they seem to be. The world of the soul (the kosmos zotikos) is real but it cannot be pulled to pieces without admixture of error. That is, singulars cannot be taken out of the pattern of the whole because in so considering single things they would lack some of their relationships with the whole and therefore this lack of knowledge of such relationships would constitute error.

Proclus distinctly says that Matter is not evil but "a creation of God" (γίγνεται Θεόν) necessary to the existence of the world. This thought is not well developed in Plotinus and he did shrink from endowing his own "Matter" with active powers of resistance. Moreover, he never regarded reality (ousia) as the result of conflicting elements in the Absolute, nor would he have admitted that without tension there can be no life "Yonder". But he does say in one place "the All is made up of contraries". Proclus would deny that there are any active powers or powers at all given to Matter. Evil, therefore, could not be a resistance on the part of Matter because Matter is perfectly passive. In this he would disagree very decidedly with Plotinus.
Lower kinds of Matter are created immediately by the Absolute. Proclus says that the One acts directly upon Matter. His doctrine is that the higher the principle, the further down does its power extend.

Proclus makes necessity and will with God identical.

"Proclus is more emphatic in rejecting dualistic interpretation of the nature of Matter. Matter, he says, cannot struggle against the Good, since it cannot act in any way. It is not disordered movement; for movement implies force, and Matter has none. It is not the evil one, since it is an essential part of the composition of the world, and is derived from the One. It is not 'necessity' though it is necessary. What then is it? Take away order from everything that is orderly, and what remains is Matter. It is that which, if it had any active power, which it has not, would produce disintegration in that which is integrated, disconnection in that which is connected. It is in a word that which is no thing, though no absolutely nothing; it is a 'true lie'."

Necessity in the system of Proclus simply means that if Matter had not been created the impartation of the Good to creatures could not have been accomplished. Matter was necessary else all would have remained hidden in the ineffable One. It is necessary to generation.

According to the above Proclus attributes the origin of Matter directly to the One. When he says the world of Matter is derived from the One, it would seem that he bases it in the logic which reigns between cause and effect. Every cause transcends its resultant. It would seem that the actual is the perfect for him, and the potential is imperfect and that any particular thing passes into actuality through the agency of that in which its potentiality is already actual. Tracing
this back one must, of course, find pure actuality. This is found only in the One. Then logically the One produces all things through the principle of becoming actual. In Proposition 27 he says,

"Every producing cause is productive of secondary existences because of its completeness and superfluity of potency.

"For if it had produced not because of its completeness, but by reason of a defect of potency, it could not have maintained unmoved its own station: since that which through defect or weakness bestows existence upon another furnishes the substance of that other by a conversion and alteration of its own nature. But every producer remains as it is, and its consequent proceeds from it without change in its steadfastness. (Proposition 26). Full and complete, then, it brings to existence the secondary principles without movement and without loss, itself being what it is, neither transmuted into the secondaries nor suffering any diminution. For the product is not a parcelling-out of the producer: that is not a character even of physical generation or generative causes. Nor is it a transformation: the producer is not the matter of what proceeds from it, for it remains as it is, and its product is a fresh existence beside it. Thus the engenderer is established beyond alteration or diminution, multiplying itself in virtue of its generative potency and furnishing from itself secondary substances." 29

In support of the statement that his system is based more on logic than in the investigation of nature with regard to the origin of Matter, attention is drawn to Proposition 26, which reads as follows:

"Every productive cause produces the next and all subsequent principles while itself remaining steadfast." 30

He would, of course, hold that there may be many intermediate steps between the One and the world of Matter. One is at a
loss to understand how Matter can ever revert back to the One in any other manner but logically. Proclus holds that every effect remains in its cause and proceeds from it and reverts upon it. Matter is certainly an effect with the One as its ultimate cause. Although there are secondary causes in the procession, Matter must revert back at least to soul. Proclus, however, does not explain how this actually takes place and deals with it on a basis of pure logic only. He says that body has no participation in soul and it would seem that a definite break in the order of reversion would of necessity take place. His own words are:

"From this it is apparent why Matter, taking its origin from the One, is in itself devoid of Form; and why body, even though it participates Being, is in itself without participation in soul. For Matter, which is the basis of all things, proceeded from the cause of all things; and body, which is the basis of ensouled existence, is derived from a principle more universal than soul, in that after its fashion it participates Being."

In man's reversion back to the One he does not explain how he makes the transition from one level of reality or being to the other but seems to teach that in special cases man, while yet in the body, can have ecstatic experiences with the One. In the scheme of Plotinus, which is not so clear in Proclus, Matter is used in many ways. All but nonexistent Matter, which is at the bottom of the scale, is redeemed in giving itself as the recipient of form. In so doing it is an image of the great surrender whereby the World-soul receives illumination from Spirit and the ineffable self-surrender by
which Spirit itself awaits the visitation of the absolute Godhead. Matter, according to Proclus, is the resultant of the direct act of the One but yet it is never to be redeemed because it has no self-surrender power. It was necessary to create Matter in order that the will-activities of the Soul might become actualities. Matter, however, "is not in opposition to the Good because it has no power of its own."

Proclus further says that God created the world by His will, His goodness and His providence, a trinity in unity of motives. These correspond to the three attributes which he ascribes to Spirit-Being, Power, Activity. The soul descends into the phenomenal world because it desires to imitate the providence of the gods. He would hold that the higher does not need the lower; that is, God does not need the universe, but God would have remained hidden without the universe. Therefore, the universe is necessary in order that the Good might be revealed and in the process of procession and reversion the lower can imitate the higher and finally arrive at its proper source or end in reverting back to the higher. The soul, when it is separated from the body, has the Pneuma (shadow) as its vehicle. The vehicle, or Pneuma, has been received by the soul from the Celestial sphere. It is a sort of astral or gaseous body which the soul wears when it leaves its earthly body. He almost makes it to be a corporeal thing although its substance is of extreme tenuity. It is an invisible, intangible body, the first incorporation of the soul. Apart from this unifying principle nothing could exist.
All would be formless and indeterminate and therefore would have no being properly considered. The principle of unity in the soul is of higher order than that in natural things. A body has less unity because its parts are locally separate. Even the unity in the soul is not the highest unity because there are many individual souls. Particular souls, because of what they have in common, are derived from a general soul. This general soul is their cause but it is not identical with all of them. In turn, this general soul falls short of complete unity because it is the principle of life and motion in a world which is other than itself. The individual souls have intellect and this points to a higher unifying principle. This unifying principle is stable intellect that is, itself, able to think itself, and not the world, and this super-intellect contains, as identical with its own nature, the eternal ideas of all forms, both general and particular. These forms become explicit in the things of space and time, but even this intellect so highly unifying has still a certain duality because although the intelligence and the intelligible are the same in self-knowledge, that which this intelligence can do and does, distinguishes itself from the object of thought. Above this is Absolute Unity, the One which is simply identical with itself. This is other than All-being but is the cause of All-being. It is the highest good to which all things aspire. The greatest good for particular things is the greatest unification. Their aspiration for goodness and unity beyond that which they possess cannot be explained without positing the Absolute One and the
Absolute Good as their source and end. Proclus later identifies the One and the Good. In regard to this particular point, Proclus goes beyond Aristotle, who held that the One could think itself. To Proclus, the attribute of thinking itself belonged to mind only and not to the One.

Proclus, with Plotinus, allows a genuine reality to all grades of being and this extends even to Matter. He does not hold that virtue and knowledge here are simply images of archetypes yonder in the intelligible world but that everything which is here is there. Plotinus is very clear in his statement of this and Proclus follows very definitely the same doctrine; namely, that first, second and third orders in the intelligible principles are not spatial. In the intelligible order body may be said to be in the soul and soul in the One. By such expressions a relation of dependence rather than a being in a place in the sense of locality is to be understood.

Every multitude must participate in some manner in the One. If a multitude had no unity at all, it would consist either just of parts which are not beings or parts which are themselves multitudes, and so on to infinity. Every multitude, according to Proclus, is at the same time one and not one but derives its existence from the One in itself. Logically, that which is produced cannot be greater than the producer. Later, it will be seen that the One as cause penetrates all things even to the lowest order by remaining in the effect. He maintains that the higher in the causal order, the lower down is the reach of that cause. Thus the One being at the highest has
the farthest reach and remains even to the lowest forms. After identifying the Good with the One he goes on to show that the First Good is that for which all beings strive. It must, therefore, be before all beings. Nothing can be added to it else it would be lessened by such addition so it stands as the simple and First Good. If there is to be adequate and trustworthy knowledge, there must be an order of causation and this necessitates a first in this order. Causes could not go in a circle because that would make the same things to be prior and posterior, better and worse. There can be no infinite series because to make logical knowledge possible, or at least to have logical order, which to Proclus is absolutely essential to real knowledge, there must be a final term.35
CHAPTER IV
THE DOCTRINE OF PARTICIPATION

A General Sketch.

While words cannot be nailed tight to any meaning exclusive of all others, yet most philosophic writers have been very careful to give words a certain connotation and then use them according to that meaning. As the burden of this thesis is to rest upon the doctrine of participation, it might not be a complete loss to attempt to define the word participation and at least establish and clarify its meaning according to its use in the writings of Proclus. The word in the Greek is (μετέχω). This is the first person present indicative of the verb. The noun simply means a participating one. Taking the verb apart it is a combination of (μετα) and (έχω). (μετα) used in composition has the following meanings according to Liddell and Scott: 1. of community or participation; 2. of community of action in common with others. With the genitive it means to be in the midst of objects or in the midst of, among, or between. Sophocles used it in Ph. 1312. (μετα σώμα των Ειναι) to be with or among the living ones or to belong to that tribe or group. To share a common life with them. Also used in Aeschylus Ag. 1037. (Τοἰς ων μετα δούλων) means among the slaves of the cities which signifies a sharer of the life of the slaves.

Another meaning of the genitive is in common with, in connection with, along with, by aid of. These uses imply closer
union than the Greek word (δύναται). In the Iliad 13:700
(μεταποιήτωρ ἐκμάχημα) means by the aid of, in a combat,
or fighting among the ranks.

(μεταποιήτωρ) with the accusative it means: A. of motion,
right into the middle of, coming into or among, especially where
a number of persons are implied (as into a tribe)

Il. 15,54. B. In pursuit of or quest of, to pursue one
or go in search of. C. Mere sequence or succession. Next
after, behind. D. In order of time next after. E. In order
of worth or rank, or according to.

The word (μεταποιήτωρ) has many other meanings but since
they do not have any particular bearing on our subject the above
will be sufficient.

The other word in this combination is (ἐξωτέρως) which
means:

"Active Voice - Radic. signif., to have, hold.
I. to have in the hands, in Hom. very freq.
to receive in the hands:- hence in various usages.
I. to have, hold, possess: of outward goods,
property, etc., the most common usage, Hom.: later (ὁ ἐξωτέρως), a wealthy or powerful man,
Soph. Aj. 457, Valck, Phoen. 408; ὁ ἐξωτέρως,
the wealthy, Eur. Aic. 57.
Passive voice - to be possessed by, belong to."

Now putting both of these words together, the compound
as rendered according to the Lexicon of Liddell & Scott would be
as follows: First the verb form,

"(μεταποιήτωρ) to share in, partake of, enjoy a
share, take part in. Construct, usu. c. gen.
reí only. To be a member of a tribe, to share
same blood. In Plato, to partake in con-
stituent ideas."
Second, the noun form, "(μετα)χος) sharing in, partaking of, c. gen. Eur. Ion 697, Plat. Phaedr. 262 D. etc.; a partner, accomplice in. (ταο φόροι) with dative of persons, to share or enjoy a friendship; partakers in common, in acc. case."

One further source of information concerning the meaning of this term is the New Testament. The noun form of the very word is used in the plural in Hebrews 6:4, where it is rendered 'partakers' or 'participaters' of the Holy Ghost. In the Latin Vulgate the word is rendered 'participes' and this means, according to The Universal Latin Lexicon \(^{39}\), partakers of, having a share in, to be a companion, a fellow, or an associate. The verb form in Latin means to cause to share. This statement is important inasmuch as one of the main problems in both Platonism and Neo-Platonism is whether this act of participation is a cause or an effect. If the participation originates in the thing itself, then it would of necessity have to be co-eternal with the thing which it participates, if that thing be an eternal thing. If it is an effect, then the power of giving to the lesser reality a share of the greater must be vested in the greater. It will be seen that Proclus makes an endeavor to settle this point. In The Elements of Theology Proclus uses over and over again this very Metexo in the transitive sense. As a transitive verb it would mean that the lesser reality does the action of participating in the higher reality, but it would be too much to demand this meaning from his construction because his entire system seems to make the participation on
the part of the lesser reality a sort of effect rather than a cause. It is at least logically an effect. One can be genuinely certain that the meaning of the word is to have in common, to some degree, something which the higher reality is or possesses. A more detailed investigation of his system will establish this point.

The major problem in all Platonism, and especially in Proclus, is how the One can produce the many, or in other words, how one thing can participate in another. Proclus is great for triads. The unparticipated, the participated and the participating or participant, is the triad that he uses in this doctrine. One must be ever reminded that his system is a metaphysical system based on logical order. Space and time, in the sense of chronological order, do not enter into his explanations of the universe. First in order is always that which cannot be participated in, or the unparticipated. This is the One before all, always distinguished from the One in all. This in turn generates the things that are participated in. Next, and inferior to these are the things that participate. They are inferior to those that are participated like the middle one is to the first. On the reach of the One down through all beings and as the cause remaining in the effect, Whittaker says,

"The perfect in its kind, since in so far as it is perfect it imitates the cause of all, proceeds to the production of as many things as it can; as the Good causes the existence of everything. The more or the less perfect anything is, of the more or the fewer things is it the cause, as being nearer to or more remote from the cause of all. That which is furthest from the principle is unproductive and the cause of nothing."
"The productive cause of other things remains in itself while producing. That which produces is productive of the things that are second to it, by the perfection and superabundance of its power. For if it gave being to other things through defect and weakness, they would receive their existence through its alteration; but it remains as it is.

"Every productive cause brings into existence things like itself before things unlike. Equals it cannot produce, since it is necessarily better than its effects. The progression from the cause to its effects is accomplished by resemblance of the things that are second in order to those that are first. Being similar to that which produces it, the immediate product is in a manner at once the same with and other than its cause. It remains therefore and goes forth at the same time, and neither element of the process is apart from the other. Every product turns back and tries to reach its cause; for everything strives after the Good, which is the source of its being; and the mode of attaining the Good for each thing is through its own proximate cause. The return is accomplished by the resemblance the things that return bear to that which they return to; for the aim of the return is union, and it is always resemblance that unites. The progression and the return form a circular activity. There are lesser and greater circles according as the return is to things immediately above or to those that are higher. In the great circle to and from the principle of all, all things are involved."

That which is nearer to the One is less in quantity than the more distant but greater in potency. The more universal always precedes in this causal action and the more particular continues after it. In the order of generalities in the causal order being comes before living-being and living-being before man. Life is below the rational power but where there is no life there is still being. Matter is the extreme bound and it has subsistence only from the most universal cause,
namely, the One. The One is the subject of all things and therefore Matter proceeds from the cause of all. Even body, which is below the soul, participates of existence but not from the soul as it has its subsistence from the One which is more universal than soul. The more plurality or divisibility there remains in any genus, the farther it is from the One. Likewise it is the weakest. The finite is a sort of limited power. In the discussion of the infinite Proclus holds that that which is infinite is infinite neither to the things above it, nor to itself, but to the things that are inferior. It always retains a transcendence to the inferior. It has something that exists from the unfolding of its powers but is defined and held as a whole by itself and to that which is above it. That which is above always retains as cause an element imparticible or transcendent and retains by itself a certain detachment from each succeeding stage. Proclus introduces intermediate terms to bridge the gaps from one order to a lower. This is one distinct characteristic of his system.

It should be said that this section of our discussion is based principally on The Elements of Theology because this work is exclusively that of Proclus, and at the same time it is his most complete statement and systematic explanation of the universe. The references will be made to the propositions instead of page numberings.

In every order of being Proclus maintains his triad of the unparticipated, the participated and the participating one. When he speaks of order, consideration is not to be given to
numerical or chronological order, but logical order. It is an order of dependence and interdependence rather than of first, second or last. The One from which all things derive their existence is first logically, and by virtue of being first in logical unity it has the farthest reach or is first in reach of productivity and power. The cause remains farthest in the effect by being first in order of being and therefore more universal and effective. All things having being owe that being to the One ultimately. Again the One is the Undiminished Giver by virtue of being first, and not only possessing unity, but by being unity in se. In the material realm it might be debatable as to whether a cause can remain an undiminished giver but it would seem that Proclus can bear his case very well in the logical realm and in the realm of spiritual or simple essences. That is the realm in which he starts, continues, and concludes his philosophy. There are, however, two illustrations in human work-a-day things that bolster his position. First, in the realm of knowledge, the more one teaches or imparts to another does not decrease or diminish the original supply of knowledge of the teacher. If anything, teaching is a means of increase. But, of course, for Proclus the Primal Intellect is perfect in knowledge and not subject to increase. Second, in the realm of holiness of life, or goodness, the more good things or acts one might do does not diminish the intrinsic goodness of that individual, and so the logical position of Proclus is, at least to this degree, demonstrable in the realm of direct observation.

The very debatable question about conservation of
of energy; that is, whether the sum total of energy in the universe suffers any increase or decrease, would at least not militate against the position of our philosopher.

The great difficulty as one attacks the problem of participation, is that there are few terms in the human language which are adequate to describe the activities of simple essences and spiritual functions. There are found, however, many mental and moral activities, such as mentioned above, which give sufficient lead to require only deductions that are well within the bounds of reason to complete the transitions to the general participation scheme which undergirds the whole system of Proclus. When he says that every multitude participates unity, it is the question of the whole being in the part as well as the part being in the whole. In dealing with simple substances or terms such as unity, being, and cause, one cannot divide them. The whole scheme of these things lies outside the realm of extension or quantity, just as goodness and knowledge do. In his discussion of cause the whole possibility of knowledge rests in the fact of a final term. He maintains that it would make no difference how many intermediate causes there might be as this would in nowise weaken the Efficient and First Cause but rather holds that the First Cause is superior to all its product. There must be a First Cause else all the causal chain would run in a circuit and then cause and effect would both be prior and consequent at once. Proclus not only holds that the cause must be equal to the effect but very baldly states that it of necessity must be superior. Of course he means in efficiency
there can be only one First Cause and this First Cause is the One. Since unity must be the subsistence of all manifold, the manifold is necessarily posterior to the One, the Good being identified with the One as the principium. The First Cause of all transmits its causal relation into all the effects which follow and therefore imparts to them this element of good, which in turn, is the appetite within all the effects that causes them to strive to return again to the Good. A kind of indissoluble link or undergirding binds the universe together. It serves as a sort of desire and this desire is the reversive power which turns the attention of all things back to the Good.

In Proclus' scheme of participation he seems to have an abhorance for any wide gaps and in order to fill in these gaps between the several great and sharp divisions of reality, he propounds the doctrine of the Demiurge to fill the gap between the One and the Intelligence. In the system of Proclus the Demiurge simply means that the One has delegated to the henads the power of origination. That is, these henads have a certain power of producing or of generation, and thus there are many points of origination. The One is not the direct world-maker but it gives to these sub-divinities a sort of creative power and thus fills the gap. After the One he has a section on henads or gods. The whole number of these gods have the character of unity. They are likewise self-complete but all remain inferior to the One. They are all above life, being and intelligence. This doctrine of henads if probably a consequent development from Plotinus.
Proclus seeks the cause of plurality in things that are of a higher stage than the intelligible world; Plotinus was content to stop there. Whittaker helps us at this point. He says,

"Much has been written upon the question, what the henads of Proclus really mean—Now so far as the origin of the doctrine is concerned, it seems to be a perfectly consequent development from Plotinus. Proclus seeks the cause of plurality in things at a higher stage than the intelligible world, in which Plotinus had been content to find its beginning. Before being and mind are produced, the One acts as it were through many points of origin; from each of these start many minds; each of which again is the principle of further differences. As the primal unity is called (Theos), the derivative unities are in correspondence called (gods). Thus the doctrine is pure deductive metaphysics."47

Even at the risk of another long quotation it would seem necessary to quote the very important Proposition 116, in which Proclus offers proof for his doctrine of participation. The same question is involved in each step from one order of being to a lower one. If one step can be set forth, it will serve for an explanation of all the others.

"That with the other henads we reach the participable, we shall prove as follows: If after the First Principle there be another imparticipable henad, how will it differ from the One? If it be one in the same degree as the latter, why should we call it secondary and the One primal? And if in a different degree, then relatively to simple Unity it will be one and not-one. If that element of 'not-one' be nothing substantive, the henad will be pure unity (and identical with the One); but if it be a substantive character other than unity, then the unity in the henad will be participated by the non-unity. What is self-complete will then be this unity whereby it is linked to the One itself, so that once more the god, qua god, will be this component (prop. 114), while that which came into
existence as not-one exists as one by participation in the unity. Therefore every henad posterior to the One is participable; and every god is thus participable."48

The order of the divine henads is graduated. Some are more universal while others are more particular; the more particular being generated from the more universal but not by division, nor by alteration, nor even through the manifold relationships, but by the production of secondary progressions through superabundance of power.49 The gods transcend all division, all alteration and all relation and are only differentiated one from another in an order of power.50

These henads, or at least the primal henad, communicate their power to mind, and through mind it is presented to soul and then the soul actuates the body and even the body, in a sense, participates in the henad and to that extent participates divinity. In fact, the body receives life and motion from the soul.51 Those beings nearest to the divine henads participate directly and those more remote through various mediums. The more universal a thing is, the more direct its participation in the order of being above. This is but another way of expounding the doctrine of the Primal Cause reaching farthest into the effects. There are no limits of space and time set to the penetration of the powers of divinity.

It is through the providence of these gods that all things finally work for good since evil is but an absence of good and that which may seem an evil taken in relation to a part or parts becomes a good in the pattern of the whole. The divine
Henads are present to all things that participate but all things are not present to them in the sense of capacity to participate, that is, all things are not present to them in the same manner. Divinity is present to each series of being, in a manner to each causal order, and proportionately to each particular stage. All of these divine henads are finite in number but one is infinite to the other in power. It is infinity of potency and each minor order is comprehensible to what is below it.  

Another important item in the doctrine of participation is expressed in Proposition 77 on causality.  

"All that exists potentially is advanced to actuality by the agency of something which is actually what the other is potentially: the partially potential by that which is actual in the same partial respect and the wholly potential by the wholly actual."  

It is impossible for the potential to advance itself to actuality because all potentiality is imperfect and actualization is a kind of perfection. The cause would, therefore, be less perfect than the effect. Thus the power of actualizing emanates from the cause which is actuality and actuality continues through the series advancing the residue of potentiality in a given item of the series to actuality in the same series or in the series below, and so the perfection of actuality to any degree is derived from a former actuality above.  

Proclus uses the word potency in two different ways. One he calls perfect potency and this refers to active power or the creative power of the One and is in contrast to the passive potency, Matter. Proclus does not restrict this active potency to God alone but to all intellects.
All that comes to be arises out of the twofold potency. The agent must have the creative power or potency and the product must have the passive potency. Every agent has an active potency all down the line of being until we reach body. Body in itself is without quality and without potency. It cannot act by virtue of being body but only by virtue of a potency of action residing in it; that is, it acts by participation of potency. Incorporeal things participate passive affections along with the bodies to which they are joined and feel the effect of the divisible nature of the bodies, although in their own being the incorporeals are without parts. This is almost the same as the doctrine of immanence in which the whole is found in every part and the part in the whole, since in simple essences there is no separateness or divisibility.

The above seems to be only a restatement of the doctrine of the cause remaining in the effect. The link between the participated and the thing participating is expressed in the following words by Proclus.

"All that is participated without loss of separateness is present to the participant through an inseparable potency which it implants.

"For if it is itself something separate from the participant and not contained in it, something which subsists in itself, then they need a mean term to connect them, one which more nearly resembles the participated principle than the participant does, and yet actually resides in the latter. For if the former is separate, how can it be participated by that which contains neither it nor any emanation from it? Accordingly a potency or irradiation, proceeding from the participated to the participant, must link the two; and this medium of participation will be distinct from both."
This link being, as Proclus maintains, something distinct from both seems to be an attenuation of the participated substance which is not, in itself, completely actualized although in the participated it is. It is a logical connection with a sort of substantial undergirding. Proclus does not say exactly what it is, but calls it a kind of mean-term. Here, again, the language difficulty enters. The very use of the word attenuation in this thesis has a smack of material content to it and yet in this discussion of logical order quantitative terms are more of a hindrance than help even though they are thought of in a sort of figurative sense.

The above mentioned proposition was primarily directed to the elucidation of the problem of the relation of the soul to the body, which was raised in Proposition 80, and that is the hardest problem of the whole doctrine of participation.

How Matter emerges from the spiritual even in a creative act on the part of the One is very difficult to settle. Proclus interpolates a sort of tertium quid which serves as a connecting link. He probably gets the idea of this tertium quid between body and soul from the fact that man proceeds in perception back to a fantasm and from the fantasm to the idea in the soul. The fantasm has a mental element and is a kind of attenuation, to say the least, of the object itself, but containing a mental element, as well as the material, it does form somewhat of a link between the material objective universe and the simple essences or spiritual entity called the soul. In Proposition 24 the general scheme of the unparticipated, the participated and
the participating is concisely stated as follows:

"All that participates is inferior to the participated and this latter to the unparticipated.

"For the participant was incomplete before the participation, and by the participation has been made complete: it is therefore necessarily subordinate to the participated, inasmuch as it owes its completeness to the act of participation. As having formerly been incomplete it is inferior to the principle which completes it.

"Again, the participated, being the property of one particular and not of all, has a lower mode of substance assigned to it than that which belongs to all and not to one: for the latter is more nearly akin to the cause of all things, the former less nearly.

"The unparticipated, then precedes the participated, and these the participants. For, to express it shortly, the first is a unity prior to the many; the participated is within the many, and is one yet not-one; while all that participates is not-one yet one."

Dean Inge in commenting on Plotinus offers an illustration of how a soul participates in an idea. He raises the question, "Can many souls participate the same idea without division of the idea? Is the idea divided among the souls who participate in it?" Of course, this is impossible. But if not, then one must think in terms not of extension and quantity, but rise to the conception of the world of reality which is spiritual and has its own laws.

He further comments that reality must be understood in terms of values. The real attributes of reality are values, and values in turn are nothing unless they are values of reality. Truth, for example, is subjectively a complete understanding of the laws and conditions of actual existence. It is the true
interpretation of the world of sense, as notable by the soul when illuminated by the spirit. In its objective aspect truth is an ordered harmony of cosmic life interpreted in terms of final law and nowhere contradicted by experience. Perfect law and order are not found in the world of ordinary experience. These are only found when the soul turns to the spiritual world. The imperfections are in our faulty apprehension.

The difficulty, says Dean Inge, is that the judgments of values give us an essential graded world, while the judgments of existences are not so easily graded. Judgments of values do serve as an understanding for the system of Proclus. His order of existences or beings is based on their intrinsic value and by diligently keeping to that realm less difficulty will be experienced. The relation of Mind and Matter is more easily understood when based on their relative values. Matter then becomes a means of revelation or expression, and body only a means; or in other words, a recipient of forms which belong to a higher order and Matter to the lower. Each, therefore, is understood by its relative values. In this way the system of Proclus becomes highly intelligible.

Proclus commenting on the Alcibiades says,

"Goods that are indivisible are those which many may possess at once, and no one is worse off in respect of them because another has them. Divisible goods are those in which one man's gain is another man's loss." 60

This is another way of stating the doctrine of the Undiminished Giver and that the gradation of being is according to value. The thing that can be participated by many and yet remain
undiminished is of higher value than that which participates it.

In his attempt to elucidate the doctrine of causality he reiterates the doctrine that the more universal the cause the wider its implications are in the effects, or the farther reach it maintains in the effects. In Proposition 56 he says,

"All that is produced by secondary beings is in a still greater measure produced from those prior and more determinative principles from which the secondary were themselves derived."

In commenting on this proposition Dodds says,

"When the principle of transcendence is pressed too hard the world of experience tends to break loose from its ultimate causes. This and the following proposition are designed to obviate this danger by showing that the ultimate causes are actively present in the whole causal series. Every cause is responsible not only for the existence of its effects but also for the whole of the causative activity of those effects—a view which seems logically to issue in a rigid deterministic monism, and is difficult to reconcile with the doctrine of (prop. 40). For an illustration cf. in Tim. III. 222. 7 ff. This theorem was found very useful by some of the later scholastics as a means of reconciling the emanationism taught by Avicenna with the orthodox 'creationist' view; it is cited for this purpose by Dietrich of Freiberg, de intellectu et intelligibili, II. i, 134 Krebs. 'Quidquid fiat ab inferiori et secunda causa, illud idem fit a prima causa, sed eminentiori modo, scilicet per modum creationist'; cf. also Albert. Magn. X. 413 a Bocquet."

So long as the discussion is confined to indivisible essences and the causal chain, or in other words to metaphysical aspects of the universe, the gradation of values is rather easily understood. But again the big problem looms up—where, in this system, is the inanimate matter going to be placed? On the principle of the First Cause having the farthest reach, matter is
explained to be a direct creation of the One. It is not capable of participation in the Intelligible. There would be more Matter without form than there are souls or intelligibles below the One. In Proposition 62, this doctrine is explained by stating that every manifold that is nearer to the One has fewer members than those more remote, but is greater in power. It is quite apparent that bodily natures are more numerous than souls, that souls are more numerous than intelligences and that intelligences are more numerous than the divine henads. Since simple Matter has no form it is at the one end as the product of the causal One, and the simple One as First Cause stands at the other end of the causal chain. Whittaker says on this point:

"Proclus goes on to a characteristic doctrine of his own, according to which the higher cause - which is also the more general - continues its activity beyond that of the causes that follow it. Thus the causal efficacy of the One extends as far as to Matter, in the production of which the intermediate causes, from intelligible being downwards, have no share."

The inanimate in so far as it participates in form has part in intellect and also in the creative action of intellect. This is seen in Proposition 57. The Good is the cause of all that intellect is the cause of but not conversely. Privations of form are from the Good since all is thence. But intellect, being form, is not the ground of privation. Matter in itself has no form, and suffering privation of form it must be from the Good. Matter cannot act and therefore cannot in any way be a principle of evil. It is unable to struggle against the Good. This is an important question because here Proclus departs from
Plotinus. Inge says on this point, where he quotes from Proclus' Commentary in the Alcibiades,

"Proclus is more emphatic in rejecting the dualistic interpretation of the nature of Matter. Matter, he says, cannot struggle against the Good, since it cannot act in anyway. It is not disordered movement; for movement implies force, and Matter has none. It is not the evil principle, since it is an essential part of the composition of the world, and is derived from the One. It is not 'necessity' though it is necessary. What then is it? Take away order from everything that is orderly, and what remains is Matter. It is that which, if it had any active power, which it has not, would produce disintegration in that which is integrated, disconnection in that which is connected. It is in a word that which is no thing, though not absolutely nothing; it is a 'true lie'."

With God necessity and will always correspond. Matter was created in order that the will and activities of the soul and spirit might become actualities. With Plotinus Matter seems to have been an eternal creation. With Proclus it is very hard to tell. He maintains that it is not absolutely nothing and yet does not tell us exactly what it is.

In the discussion of Matter in Neo-Platonism the problem of evil necessarily arises. Evils are the result, according to Proclus, of conflict in the world of birth. The world is of such structure that it involves destruction, decay and death. But all this was necessary for the perfection of the whole. Infinite possibility was also a necessary condition for such perfection and therefore the existence of Matter. Matter of itself could not be evil because the philosophy of Proclus will not allow for two principles of exactly the same dignity and importance. Matter cannot be the cause of the fall of souls.
because it does not explain the various inclinations of different souls. There is no principle of evil. Evil is always identical to the pursuit of good. The cause of descent to rebirth pre-exists in the soul itself as a certain experience of alternation between the life of the intellect and the life of its own irrational part. There is also latent in every soul the desire to impart what good it possesses to lower orders and hence the reason for birth and re-birth. Matter can only be considered an evil in the sense that it is the ultimate stage of descent. In this sense it is only a lesser good. Such a world as ours should of necessity exist for the perfection of the whole, hence Proclus is an avowed Teleologist. Even latent dispositions to wrong need to be externalized in order that they might be punished and thus corrected. This makes even Matter serve a good purpose. Again by descending to a lower realm than the intellectual it runs the risk of loss and therefore to unite with the material body is in that measure an evil. Yet in view of the whole it is a good and is providential because some souls descend in order to raise others. Proclus' doctrine of Fate and Providence makes apparent evil in this world to be only the result of our faulty apprehensions. In his De Providentia et Fato he says,

"Many things escape Fate but nothing escapes Providence." Whittaker commenting on this line says,

"Fate is the destiny undergone by particular beings without insight into its true causes. With complete knowledge of reality, Fate itself would be seen as part of Providence."
All the parts according to this scheme are descended to the good of the whole and a certain amount of freedom is allowed to individual souls and for this reason some souls go lower than others. But it would be inconsistent with the order of the universe that any being, among men or demons, should be always evil. 71

The ultimate redemption of all is guaranteed in his philosophy of Progression and Reversion. Ueberweg helps on this matter of freedom. He says,

"The psychical emanates from the intellectual. Every soul is by nature eternal and only in its activity related to time. The soul of the world is composed of divisible, indivisible, and intermediate substances, its parts being arranged in harmonious proportions. There exist divine, demoniacal and human souls. Occupying a middle place between the sensuous and the divine, the soul possesses freedom of will. Its evils are all chargeable upon itself. It is in the power of the soul to turn back toward the divine. Whatever it knows it knows by means of the related and corresponding elements of itself; it knows the One through the supra-rational unity present in itself." 72

Proclus grants a certain choice to each particular soul, though he holds that each soul must by inherent destiny descend at least once to birth in a body. After this one birth all others depend on the choice of the soul. This implies a certain freedom but in the end all choice finally comes into subjection to Fate.

There is another complete innovation of Proclus' into Neo-Platonic thought; namely, that of the astral body, or the doctrine of the Vehicle. In his discussion of souls in The Elements of Theology Proclus says that every soul takes its
proper origin from an intelligence which is the next higher order of being and from this intelligence it has all the forms which intelligence possesses primitively. At least it has them potentially. 73

In Proposition 195 he places soul in a sort of intermediate position between bodies and intelligences, or between the intelligible world and the sense world. In this proposition he says,

"Every soul is all things, the things of sense after the manner of an exemplar and the intelligible things after the manner of an image." 74

From this he moves on to the statement that every participated soul makes use of a body which is perpetual and has a constitution without temporal origin and exempt from decay. 75 He will not state plainly that the material body is perpetual, but claims that the very being of soul is to en-soul a body. And since this is the nature of its being it must en-soul a body at all times and therefore there must be a vehicle or attenuated body which it en-souls in its birth and re-birth. This astral body is eternal in its essence but temporal in respect to the measurement of its activities. The vehicle of every particular soul descends by the addition of vestures increasingly material and in reversion it ascends, in company with the soul, through the divestment of all that is material and recovers its proper form after the same analogy of the soul which makes use of it. Although he claims that this vehicle is immaterial and indiscernible, yet he uses terms which are usually applied to extended bodies such as shape and size, greater and smaller, etc.
in discussing it in Proposition 210. In this proposition he goes so far as to say that its appearances at different times are diverse. He makes this concession in order to make the astral body or vehicle conform to the various bodies which the individual soul might en-soul through its births and re-births. It would seem that Proclus resorts to this in order to substantiate or to carry out his scheme of triads throughout his entire system. As has been said before, his entire metaphysical scheme is based on the nature of knowledge and in the analysis of man there is found at the lower end a quasi material element in perception with a very small amount of purely intellectual, and at the other end a purely intellectual intuition of reality with reason as the mean term. But as all these beings are inseparable as a triad, so must he find in the union of soul with body some mean term (the astral body which is tainted with the material and yet attenuated to reach the immaterial and thus connect body and soul), in order to keep his triadic unities intact.

As a final and more definite investigation of his participation doctrine, let us look into those propositions where the doctrine of participation is most prominent and most clearly expounded.

In Proposition 30 he says that all that is immediately produced by any principle must remain in the producing cause and proceed from it. In developing this statement Proclus says that all procession, and procession is in a manner equal to production, is accomplished through likeness. Each order of
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being produces its likeness first before unlikeness and in some sense the product remains in the producer, because if the term proceeded completely from the producer there would be no identity with that which remained. The common link of union with the cause is that it remains in the cause and proceeds in the effect. For if it remained altogether and only in the cause then there would be no production. It is both like and in some respect different from the cause. These two relations are inseparable. Dodds gives a good example.

"If a, b, c, are three terms in sequence, b both proceeds from a and remains in it while c proceeds from a and b but remains only in b: thus soul both remains in Intelligence and is produced from it, while Nature has wholly detached itself from Intelligence. (See In Tim. I. I2,19)"

Accordingly we have the triadic arrangement (a) μόνη (b) μόνη καὶ πρόδοσ (c) πρόδοσ.

Another element which Proclus introduces is what he calls continuity. There is no void in the physical universe so there is none in the spiritual. We must always keep in mind that spiritual beings are not separated by spatial but by qualitative intervals. This spiritual continuity which Proclus introduces in his philosophy of emanation and participation means that the qualitative interval between any term of the procession and its immediate consequent is the minimum difference compatible with distinctness; there are no gaps in the divine devolution. Whittaker says,

"That Leibniz owes his idea of continuum to Platonism."

Again in Proposition 130 Proclus says,
"In any divine order the highest terms more completely transcend those immediately subordinate to them than do these latter the subsequent terms; and the second order of terms are more closely linked with their immediate superiors than are their consequents with them."84

This is because the higher are nearer to unity or the One and enjoy more power or active potency. Each successive cause in the various orders of reality would, according to this scheme, be less able to remain distinct from its effect. In procession the order goes from better to worse, but in reversion it is from worse to better and all that is lost in procession is restored in reversion plus the retention of individuality which it got in procession. Therefore, even to en-soul Matter would be a good in so far as informing Matter would add to individual distinctness. This continuity which Proclus introduces in his scheme of emanation is carried out scrupulously in each order of reality. Beginning with the henads or gods, he has the same orderly scheme.

In Proposition 132 he states "All orders of gods are bound together by mean terms."85 Even gods experience procession through likeness. The gods possess the unbroken continuity, inasmuch as their substance is unitary. The One is their originative cause and they take their definition from it.86 In these divine orders the remission of power is introduced without loss of unity and the gods are more essentially unified than mere existence. In their order the likeness of the derivatives to the primary is greater than in the extentional orders. All classes of gods are, therefore, bound together by proportionate terms and even the first principles do not pass from immaterial
into the emanations wholly diverse from themselves. There are intermediate terms which have characters in common both with their causes and immediate effects. They preserve an ordered sequence in this generation of deities. Each order of god is participated by a more or less genus of existence according to the nearness of the god to the One and the Good which heads the hierarchy. Being is the first order below the gods and it participates the gods. Being is beyond Intelligence and life and is the most universal cause and is therefore the highest participant. It partakes more of unity than does Intelligence or life. All these heads are intellectual and the unparticipated Intelligence enjoys participation in them in the sense of likeness. Intelligence is true being and therefore, as has been said above, being is the next direct or we might say the first product of the heads. 87

Next in order after true being is Intelligence and again the unparticipated terms subsist prior to the participated. Intelligence is a form of being which exists in itself and is beyond participation. True being perfects Intelligence without loss of transcendence to itself. It gives to Intelligence the gift of being. Being an intelligible it imparts perfection to Intelligence.

On the question of souls the entire theory of Proclus is not acceptable in any metaphysics today because of the physics which were accepted in his time. He attributed souls to the planets and other heavenly bodies. He claimed there were intramundane intelligences because the world-order is possessed of
 intelligences as well as of souls and that these intra-mundane souls and intelligences participated the super-mundane intelligences.

This question of gradation of intelligences is very intricate and obscure. Even Dodds claims that a part of the text has been corrupted to the extent that it fails to make sense, but for our purpose the following may be said. There are at least three grades of intelligences. The unparticipated and super-mundane which has itself for its object of thought. It is something akin to Aristotle's self-contemplative god. The intra-mundane is the world-soul and world intelligible order which produces intelligences. The third is the world of souls which participates intelligences in the sense that they participate the forms in the world-order. The higher intelligences enjoy intuitive thought perpetually. The human consciousness does not enjoy intuitive thought except intermittently. The super-mundane souls seem to be a sort of make shift in the scheme of Proclus to take the place of what Plotinus called the higher part of the human soul.

When souls pass in birth and re-birth from one body to another Proclus claims that the vehicle or astral body participates the souls perpetually because these vehicles are also indestructible.

But the mortal bodies only participate souls intermittently. Intermittence of participation is the only real evil for Proclus. The Neo-Platonists clashed with the Christian doctrine of deliberate creation in time by maintaining an
emanative creation which is timeless and unwilled. For them the only creative power is contemplation or intuitive thought, which according to Dodds, at a certain level of being translates itself automatically into spatio-temporal terms. Each soul takes its approximate origin from an intelligence. This intelligence gives to the soul which arises from it, as a part of the soul's being, rational notions of all that it contains. The Intelligence contains these forms primitively but in the soul they are implanted by derivation, since the soul is the product of Intelligence. This possession by derivation gives to the soul the irradiations of the Intellectual forms. The soul has sort of a dual knowledge. It is in a manner all things. The things of sense after the manner of an examplar and the intelligible things after the manner of an image. 92

The hierarchy of souls is more or less the same as that of intelligences. There are divine souls that are sovereign over many souls and herein lies the providential direction where all the parts converge to the well being of the whole.

There is another very important reference to participation in Propositions 66 to 7493 and especially in Proposition 71 which gives a little further light on this particular thought. It is as follows:

"All those characters which in the originative causes have higher and more universal rank become in the resultant beings, through the irradiations which proceed from them, a kind of substratum for the gifts of the more specific principles; and while the irradiations of the superior principles thus serve as a basis, the characters which proceed from secondary principles are founded upon them: there is thus an order of precedence in
"participation, and successive rays strike downwards upon the same recipient, the more universal causes affecting it first, and the more specific supplementing these by the bestowal of their own gifts upon the participants." 94

When this proposition is compared with the scheme of Dodds, which is based in Propositions 14 to 20, 95 it is found that it is practically the same thing. There the One was the cause of everything from pure being to unformed matter and each successive order of being became a successive undergirding to the other orders. It is a sort of succession of irradiations. The last one the Ζήτη is caused only by the One and its essence is comprised of an element of unity alone. It is simple by virtue of lying at the other extreme of the order from the One and has no form whatever. Each successive order of being by the virtue of participation has some element of the one above it and in its reversion follows these successive elements or orders. There is both a like and an unlike in each intermediate order between the two extremes. The two extremes have one element of likeness. This does not mean, however, that the Ζήτη and the One are identical. It simply means that all the essence that the Ζήτη has is simplicity or unity but in the least possible quality or quantity. It is, of course, infinitely inferior to the One but has no other unity except a minimal unity. Each successive step in participation forms a basis for the bestowal of subordinate gifts.

Much has been said in the above pages on participation and yet one feels that he has not a strong grip upon the thought.
There seems to be something elusive that can't be tacked down. Proclus seems to leave us dissatisfied. The reason will be somewhat understood from the next chapter in which an evaluation of his doctrine will be attempted.
CHAPTER V

SUMMARY AND EVALUATION

Any evaluation of the doctrines of Proclus must accredit him with a definite attempt to interpret the universe on a spiritual basis. His philosophy was a real rebuke, if not a refutation of the Stoics and Epicureans whose doctrine developed after Plato and Aristotle. Although Proclus was headed in the right direction, he certainly was not warranted in going to the extreme which he did in his regress. He is more culpable than his illustrious predecessors; namely, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, because the Christian revelation had been brought to his notice. I maintain this on the basis that he surely knew of Porphyry and it was he who wrote a diatribe against Christianity. It is thought by some, and I share the opinion, that the systematic and studied silence of Proclus in regard to Christianity was a deliberate attempt to show his contempt for it. His thinned-out One, which at times is almost everything and at other times on the brink of nothing except unity, naked and bare, is in nowise philosophically comparable to the Creator-God of the Christian revelation. The above mentioned predecessors of Proclus are to be excused because they lived without a knowledge of the Christian revelation. Proclus unmistakably had such knowledge. His God or the One is but a logical entity. It was
unnecessary that he should go beyond Pure Being which is at the same time pure act in his regress. He makes unity to be the producing cause of being while even according to logic being should be first. Existence or being must necessarily be posited as a residence for unity which should only be an attribute. Proclus thought that he must arrive at Pure Unity or the One in order to fulfill his psychological scheme. Yet, had he looked more closely into his microcosm he would have found that the hierarchical steps in epistemology are not separated entities which indicate orders of being in the cosmos, but that all of these functions belong to one human being. Therefore, had he been true even to his own system, he would necessarily have come to the conclusion that the One or God should be a being of pure act to whom the exercise of intelligence, power, and providence could be attributed. It is for this reason that I say that his One was only a logical entity. One of the weaknesses of his philosophy was the fact that he endeavored to saddle on to the cosmos a logical system which did not fit in all points.

Now we must address ourselves to the question, does the act of participation originate in the lower or the higher order of being? Although he attributes the activity of participation to lower orders it is clear that this power to participate is received from the higher. He tenaciously maintains that there is nothing in the effect that is not in the cause. He holds the cause to be perfect and that anything that appears in the subsequent is an actualized potency which was made
actual by virtue of its having previously been actualized in a higher order. Using his same air-tight logic we are forced to the conclusion that all lower orders of being have received their various powers, and even that of participation, from the higher. Therefore, the power of participation is vested finally in the higher order. Any distinctly new element which the consequent possesses is a gift from the higher. Even the appetite to revert back is as it were a constant stream that flows out from higher to lower and circles back again.

His doctrine of reversion in cycles seems to be superfluous. Neither his psychological findings nor the observable facts in nature warrant such a conclusion. While it is true that the psychological urge in man never seems to be fully satisfied, that his capabilities for knowledge seem to be ever expanding, and that infinity might logically be deduced as his goal, yet this does not justify the reversion doctrine to the extreme extent that Proclus held it. His was a mistaken teleology. The observable facts in nature only warrant the conclusion that there is an intrinsic design and purpose in the universe and that all things are working naturally toward their proper end. This proper end is that they reach their full productivity and enjoyment, and also perpetuate their species or kind. To argue that each order of being must revert back to a higher order, etc., etc., may be done in the realm of pure logic but it does not fit in the realm of the observable universe.

Proclus, on the other hand, made a valuable
contribution to metaphysics and, of course, as has already been said, he blazed the trail more clearly than his predecessors for the spiritual interpretation of the universe. His contribution to the immateriality of the soul and to the existence of the intelligible world is beyond estimate. That he influenced many of the middle age philosophers and theologians is readily admitted by all. The extent of this influence is reserved for a later thesis on this same general subject but with much wider scope.

His doctrines of simple essences, the undiminished giver, cause and effect, evil as an absence of good, design and providence in the universe, as well as his doctrine of emanence, are in the main acceptable by Christian philosophers. His doctrine of transcendence is sadly lacking when compared with the Christian Scholastic philosophy and theology.

Finally, what is participation according to Proclus? It is the impartation by a higher order of being of something of its own likeness, without diminution to itself, to a lower order and at the same time a gift to this lower order of a new element. This new element in turn can be imparted to a still lower order. All that is imparted remains in a larger degree, or more perfectly, in the higher. The lower order, however, by virtue of this impartation from the higher, is said to participate in the higher to the degree that it has received from it by impartation.

In taking leave of Proclus I should like to say that his metaphysical voice is like a prophet crying in the
wilderness of present day hyper-specialization which deals only with parts. Proclus is calling us back and urging that we fit the parts into the whole. He was at least brave and consistent enough to attempt a philosophic system which would include all the facts which in his estimation were worthy of a place in the cosmic scheme. He did well, contributed much and at least laid a few stones in the foundation upon which it was St. Thomas' glory to build the temple of true philosophy.
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The thesis "The One and the Many: with special attention to the doctrine of Participation in the philosophy of Proclus," written by William E. Powers, has been accepted by the Graduate School of Loyola University with reference to form, and by the readers whose names appear below, with reference to content. It is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

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