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An Analysis of Some of the Implications of Carl Rogers' Hypotheses Concerning Human Nature

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AN ANALYSIS OF SOME OF THE IMPLICATIONS OF CARL ROGERS' HYPOTHESES CONCERNING HUMAN NATURE

By

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A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Education

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1961
George Roderick Youngs was born in Grand Haven, Michigan, January 6, 1911. He was graduated from Calvin College, Grand Rapids, Michigan, in June of 1932 with the degree of Bachelor of Arts. In 1935 he was graduated from Calvin Seminary with the degree of Bachelor of Theology. The author received the Master of Arts degree from Michigan State University in 1940 in the fields of psychology and sociology. He has done graduate work at George Williams College and the University of Chicago. He began work towards the doctoral degree at Loyola's evening school in 1951.

Mr. Youngs was ordained to the ministry in 1936 and has held pastorates in Lansing, Michigan, and in Chicago. He was a YMCA Secretary from 1942 to 1949 with program and counseling responsibilities. In 1949 he became Guidance Director at the Chicago Christian High School and since 1953 has been Principal of Timothy Christian High School in Cicero, Illinois. He has been a book reviewer for Religious Education and Elementary English magazines, held office in various professional organizations, and is the President of the Christian Educator’s Association. He has been interim pastor of a number of Chicagoland churches, and is also Director of Counseling in a local medical clinic.

His Master’s thesis was Marriage Counseling in the Lansing Community. He has also published "A Selected Bibliography on Marriage, the Family, and
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

The Development Of Guidance

Guidance as an activity is nearly as old as the human race itself. The Old Testament reflects a strongly patriarchal organization of society in which the father of the clan or tribe made basic decisions affecting the life of the entire group. The story of Abraham selecting a wife for his son illustrates this paternalistic and authoritarian guidance. The fact that Moses found it necessary to create a council of wise elders to assist the people in solving their problems is an indication that even in so early a period individuals were seeking aid from others than themselves.

Early Forms Of Guidance

The induction rites of many tribes of preliterate or semiliterate peoples even today contain elements of an early type of guidance program. Margaret Mead, in *Coming of Age in Samoa*, describes how the elders instructed the youth in patterns of acceptable tribal behavior as well as being the leaders in the sacred rites. The priests of Egypt, the shaman or medicine man of the American Indian, and the guardians of the Greek mysteries all performed similar guidance functions as well as their specifically religious duties.
Equally open to observation is the fact that for many generations troubled individuals turned to the local pastor or to some other person in the community deemed capable of providing assistance with the given problem. Specialized training for rendering this assistance scarcely existed. Counsel was sought either because of the position or the reputation of an individual in the community.

Since it is unlikely that the human race has ever been without problems that were very real both to the group and to the individuals concerned it is likely that guidance has been a continuing activity. Simple observation would also indicate the probability that there always have been those who either could not or would not solve their own problems. In some form or fashion society has found means to assist the troubled person. Guidance as an activity is therefore nothing new in the experience of men.

Contributions Of Research Into Mental Abnormality

Until the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the names of Charcot, Mesmer, Janet, and Freud came into prominence, there seems to have been little indication that guidance was any kind of a specialized function. People of education or native intelligence were simply assumed to be qualified to guide those less favored. In the early stages of specialized inquiry the focus was almost entirely on the pathological. Pastors, teachers, lawyers, and physicians were deemed perfectly capable of meeting the problems of those regarded as normal individuals. The pioneer efforts to establish the bases of mental and emotional deviations lent small impetus to any program of guidance for others than those regarded as abnormal. Even today
it is not uncommon to find reflections of the feeling that counseling by a
trained individual is only for those with problems regarded as beyond the
range of the normal. The early formulations of scientific guidance were,
therefore, largely concerned with the pathological.

Through this initial orientation came much of our current knowledge
concerning psychological processes. The concept of guidance as a desirable
and legitimate assistance to normal individuals has enjoyed a steady growth
since the turn of the twentieth century. This development since World War II
might even be considered a spectacular one. There are undoubtedly a number
of very important factors contributing to this rise in popularity of guid-
ance. For the purposes of this study, however, there are two that seem
especially significant.

Recent Trends In The Study Of Guidance

The first of these has been a growing interest in the nature of and
processes of the normal personality as a legitimate field of scientific
inquiry. The work of Gordon Allport and Gardner Murphy is illustrative of
the detailed research devoted to this area of investigation. While it is
true that the original inquiry of Alfred Binet into the field of intelligence
was the definition of the mentally deficient, it is equally certain that it
began or at least stimulated much research into the normal intelligence and
its functioning. As a result there is current a considerable body of know-
ledge in genetic and developmental psychology. Modern research has led to a
conception that there are probably intelligences combined to produce unique
individuals, rather than a single factor labeled intelligence. The
development of scientific psychology has led to a real knowledge of the ways in which individuals learn. This in turn has brought about many revisions of curricula in terms of these learning theories. In all of this development there has been a growing awareness of individual differences. The implications of a real recognition of individual differences for a program of guidance are quite clear and need not be elaborated here. As differences (and the recognition of them) multiply the need for guidance increases. This is especially so when the social and cultural matrix becomes more and more complex. At its most immediately functional level educational guidance is the recognition that learning is individual, and that probably to no two children in any school is the learning situation identical.

The second great factor in the spread of the guidance concept in the United States has been the extension of education at the secondary level to the great bulk of the population. One hundred years ago education beyond the grade school level was the prerogative only of the rich or of the fortunate. High school curricula as a result were almost entirely college preparatory. In the intervening years the circumstances have changed to the extent that now nearly all young people of appropriate age have some or all of a high school education. Not only is this so, but large numbers of these are planning careers other than academic. Modern technological advances have created a bewildering variety of job classifications from which the individual can choose. In view of these developments it is small wonder that guidance for the normal individual is more and more conceived as desirable and good. For the modern secondary school this has meant expansion of the curriculum to accommodate the greater range of capacity, talent, and interest found in the
student body. It has meant also the development of guidance programs
designed to assist youth in finding a proper location in the confusing com-
plex of vocational opportunity. Increasingly guidance at the secondary level
is coming to mean a program designed to assist the youthful personality in
becoming a truly mature individual.

Concepts Of Growth In Guidance

The parallel rise of educational and vocational opportunity in the
cultural matrix of the United States was probably the key factor in making
vocational guidance and placement the initial phase at the secondary level.
It is scarcely surprising that the earliest recorded efforts at organized
guidance were in this area. Trabue,¹ writing in the Encyclopedia of Educa-
tional Research, points out that guidance services in the secondary school
are strictly a modern development. He further indicates that these programs
are an extension of the original vocational and employment services as well
as the efforts of psychologists and educators to measure more accurately the
abilities and achievements of students. The latter soon revealed the wide
range of individual differences which were recognized as of importance in
discussing future plans with students.

Trabue then goes on to discuss the beginnings of the vocational guidance
program. He indicates that the origin was probably the work of Jesse B. Davis

¹Trabue, M. R., "Student Personnel Work - Counseling Services,"
of Grand Rapids, Michigan, in 1898. In 1907 guidance in the vocational sense became a regular part of the school program in Grand Rapids. By 1912 Davis became Vocational Guidance Director for the whole city school system. Other early leaders mentioned are Eli Weaver in 1906, Frank Parsons, and Meyer Bloomfield. A still later development was the founding of the National Vocational Guidance Association in 1913.

Although it may therefore be recognized that the early organization of guidance programs was largely in terms of vocational guidance, it ought also to be recognized how recent is the extension of guidance to other areas of concern. It is probably equally evident that today the concept of guidance is concerned with much wider meanings and functions. An examination of the table of contents of several current books in the field of guidance would reveal just how far the areas of concern have expanded from the original one of vocational guidance. Among the present emphases are found an interest in locating the various aptitudes of the student, the diagnosis of vocational interest patterns, the construction of personality trait constellations, an interest in counseling and guidance as psychotherapy by way of tension reduction, an assumption that guidance is really a part of the learning process, and an emphasis on guidance as an aid to the individual in personal and social adjustment. With respect to this kind of expansion Patterson writes:

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This newer approach, it is important to note, also makes use of the sources of occupational information but shifts the emphasis to a study of the individual in relation to occupational adjustments - his capacities, abilities, interests, and character traits in relation to occupational requirements. It is an attempt to individualize guidance service to meet specific life needs.

Guidance services in the schools have not confined their expansion to the addition of fields of interest to occupational counseling but have entered new areas with respect to all students whether the vocational problem exists or not. The effect of this has been to make all problems of adjustment the legitimate field of guidance in educational institutions. However, most ethical counselors understand that serious maladjustments, either physical or psychological, are to be referred to appropriate agencies other than the guidance service.

In the attempt to understand the whole student, aid came to guidance personnel from areas other than the field of counseling. A short time previous to World War I a center for research in applied psychology was set up by Walter Dill Scott and Walter V. Bingham. During the war itself a great impetus was given to clinical psychology by the work of Otis, Yerkes, and others in developing the army classification and group intelligence tests. Not to be forgotten either was the program of testing developed by L. L. Thurstone and the American Council on Education. The multiplicity of tests in all areas today is evidence of how far guidance and counseling have moved in the direction of a clinical approach to the problems of human personality. It is probable that the newer emphases in guidance and counseling would never have developed as they have without the body of knowledge and the techniques.
developed through the scientific efforts of many devoted research and clinical practitioners.

Another evidence of the great growth in the idea and practice of guidance is the large number of private, state, and national organizations that devote all or part time to the furtherance of guidance activities and psychological research. Even a mere catalogue of these agencies at the collegiate and secondary level would itself be a formidable task. Articles in professional and popular magazines, the periodicals devoted to guidance and psychological research, and the books appearing annually all likewise testify to the growth in importance of the guidance movement for American education today. The continued emphasis upon levels of training and certification as guidance specialists likewise attests to the growing importance of this area of educational endeavor.

Divergences In Guidance Concepts

Since the growth of guidance as a scientific procedure has largely been compressed into a period of about forty years, it could scarcely be expected that this expansion should have been completely harmonious or should have moved in a unified direction. Nor can one find today complete agreement as to the nature, techniques, processes, or the proper limitations of guidance. The discussion whether guidance is properly psychotherapy and that between the nondirectivists and others are illustrations of these current differences. Williamson in discussing the development of counseling speaks of three

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stages which are not historically discrete but which really describe differing approaches in philosophy and methodology. The first of these he calls counseling as vocational guidance. Here the vocational adjustment of the student or client is regarded as the pivotal point. This concept of guidance was forced into a wider viewpoint by the broadening knowledge of the factors involved in successful and socially effective personality adjustment. The second of these stages was the attempt to apply either the techniques of or techniques derived from the work of Freud and his disciples. This is in part previous to and in part parallel with the stage just previously mentioned. Its basic feature is the effort to assist the individual to gain better adjustment by self-insight and by self-acceptance. These two stages have been frequently in sharp disagreement and conflict. The third stage, according to Williamson, emerges as an attempt to understand the personality as interacting with other personalities in a social culture. This has not yet resulted in a clear concept and technique of counseling or guidance, although the work of Murphy, Lewin, Allport, and Sherif is defining a good basis in personality theory on which to begin.

This brief review of the genesis of modern guidance points up the fact that there is as yet no definitive body of accepted knowledge concerning human nature and the methods of dealing with it. Because of research it is true that the sum of accepted knowledge concerning observable phenomena of behavior is constantly growing. But there seems to be no such agreement with respect to the nature of human nature nor with methods of dealing with that nature. It may be somewhat of an oversimplification to point out that much of what is involved in present differences of opinion concerns the theory of
personality structure and the best methods of dealing with that personality. If a guidance worker adopts the Freudian construct of personality and the Freudian technology, he has identified himself as possessing a very particular viewpoint with respect to the structure of human nature and with respect to the methodology of adjustment. The same observation will hold true for all other viewpoints in the field today.

Importance Of The Rogerian Emphasis

The group of beliefs and clinical practices adopted by Carl R. Rogers and the non-directive or client-centered school of guidance and counseling, has, if it has done nothing else, served as a focus around which much of the modern discussion of counseling and guidance has centered. A review of all of the literature, for and against, non-directive counseling in the past decade would itself be a monumental task. Perhaps one reason for the storm has been the somewhat Messianic complex of the non-directive school in setting up a sharply cut dichotomy between themselves and all other therapists. The system of non-directive therapy has attained in a comparatively short time not only a considerable following, but has had an unusually large measure of space devoted to its concepts and to its methodology as well. The theories and practices of Rogers and his followers have been attacked from many directions. On the other hand the claims of non-directive therapy have been advanced with equally great fervor.

The advent of non-directive therapists into positions as guidance directors in the schools and the more recent extension of the theoretical structuring of personality by Rogers and others into the classroom situation
makes desirable an objective evaluation in so far as that is possible. Just as a school administration cannot long function without a philosophy to give it direction and vitality, just so guidance cannot truly function without a philosophy. Behind the definite program of guidance services in a given community there must be some philosophy of the nature of human nature, and some basic psychological principles upon which or with which the guidance techniques are to operate. If nondirective counseling is to be used within the schools then administrators should know its basic philosophy. They should understand likewise the implications for educational practice of such a system of thought. This observation would, of course, apply to any system or school of therapy operative in school counseling. It is particularly appropriate to one that makes specific claims regarding its extension into education.

Rogers And Personality Theory

Two other considerations make an evaluation of the basic philosophy of nondirectivism with respect to human nature desirable. The first of these is that until quite recently the practice of guidance has been largely confined to vocational and educational counseling and areas of psychotherapy. A number of factors involved in the full development of the individual have received comparatively scanty attention. Among these might be mentioned the relation of the social context to maturation, the effect of social conflict tensions, the relationship of religious or moral values to the personality structure of the individual, and the role of the basic drives as they affect the counseling situation. Of course the last named has been a concern of
those psychologists and psychiatrists holding a Freudian or Neo-Freudian approach to the structure of human personality. And despite their claims to uniqueness the nondirective therapists ought to be classed with this general group. Chapter II will elaborate upon this aspect of Rogerian theory.

As more and more students in the area of guidance are coming to view their discipline as the attempt to aid in the solution of the problems of the normal individual, it may be expected that more of the areas of personality just now mentioned will receive fuller exploration in research and counseling practice. It is therefore germane to ask whether a system of personality structure such as Rogers sets forth has the key to unlock the apparent complexity of human personality organization. It is evident that whereas in Counseling and Psychotherapy, 1942, Rogers believed that nondirectivism was ineffective in some areas of therapy, by 1951, when he published Client-Centered Therapy, he no longer so believed. It is important for educators to know if so penetrating a claim is valid. Obviously if here is the key to personality structure then the implications for educational processes and programs are very great.

This leads to the second consideration. Rogers and his co-workers consider their method of therapy of sufficient value to merit its extension to all kinds of counseling situations, to group activities, to the organization of the classroom, and to administrative procedures. In the book, Client-Centered Therapy, Rogers proposes certain hypotheses as a beginning theory of education from the nondirective point of view. Should it be demonstrated that Rogers and his group are philosophically, psychologically, and methodologically correct, then certainly many processes now called
counseling and guidance would have to undergo radical revision. Hence this increasing inclusion of all counseling areas under the wing of nondirective therapy and the corresponding exclusion of other therapeutic methods raises a question of sharp import for guidance practices in the schools. It is apropos to make inquiry whether nondirectivism is or is not the methodological and philosophical clue for educational and guidance procedures.

Purpose Of This Study

This study will attempt to make clear what concepts of human nature are expressed or implied in nondirective thought to date. The emphasis will be upon a critical analysis of Rogers' writings since he is still the mainspring of the school of thought that bears his name, though the contributions of others will not be ignored. In order that the field of inquiry may be properly limited evaluation will be confined to two basic questions. First, what are some of the logical implications of Rogers' hypotheses concerning human nature if these hypotheses are carried to their full extension? Second, are the methods of nondirective therapy as outlined by Rogers consistent with accepted facts, are they self-consistent, and are they consistent with the hypotheses advanced concerning human nature?

Method Of This Study

It would seem that a problem of sufficient gravity is proposed here and that the method of critical analysis is appropriate. It is surely not amenable to laboratory or statistical techniques. Although any one individual may not have all the requisite skill and knowledge to assess adequately the claims of a given system of thought, particularly when that system
touches upon widely diverse fields of specialization, it is not impertinent to comment upon the logic of the situation. For example, Rogers’ theory of self-directing drives within the individual in the direction of good is such a claim that may properly pass under the scrutiny of logic. One may reasonably ask whether it is congruent with other propositions advanced by Rogers, whether it is able to stand a logical extension of its implications for therapy and education, whether it agrees with accepted data concerning human nature, and whether other systems of therapy agree.

It would seem obvious that a critical study should set forth the basic concepts of the system of thought under analysis, should give comparable viewpoints if any, point out the divergences from other contemporary approaches within the field, uncover the origins of the theory if such are discernible, and the implications of the theory for practice. The strengths and weaknesses of the position under discussion should be evaluated as objectively as possible.

There have been a number of critiques of nondirective psychotherapy published in recent years, the greatest number of these being comparatively short articles in professional journals or short references in texts on guidance and therapy. Among the better known of such studies are those by Ellis, Berdie, Hahn and Kendall, Godin, Hathaway, Lowery, Nuttin, Robinson, Thorne, Williamson, and Wrenn. These and others will be discussed in detail in Chapter V but are mentioned here in order to point out that fundamental and basic questions are being raised in the literature with respect to a number of Rogers’ hypotheses. For instance, Williamson compares the humanism of Rogers with that of Rousseau, and Godin submits his criticism from the stand-
point of a Christian philosophy.

No work published, however, as far as the author is aware, has attempted as exhaustive an analysis of some of Rogers' assumptions and hypotheses as is proposed for this study. The method of this study, then, in distinction from others is an intensive application of logic to, and an analysis of the implications of a definitely narrowed section of Rogers' theoretical construct of human nature, namely, those dealing with the nature of human nature. This is an application of critical methods to certain hypotheses offered by Rogers as a tentative theoretical framework for his therapeutic practices. Four main steps will be involved in this procedure: (1) a systematic and precise statement of Rogers' hypotheses concerning human nature from his own writings and allied sources; (2) an examination of these hypotheses for logical consistency; (3) an analysis and evaluation of the logical implications of Rogers' assumptions; and (4) a bringing together of critiques that are germane to the question under discussion. The implied criteria therefore are the application of the principles of logic and the criticisms of accepted authorities in the field of therapy and guidance as they apply to the questions at issue.

Assumptions Of This Study

It is the purpose of this study to assess the assumptions of nondirective therapy concerning human nature as objectively as possible. It must be recognized, however, that any study proceeds in terms of the particular biases of the individual making the study. This is not to be regarded as a fault, if only the author states what these assumptions are, indeed it is an
unavoidable reality. In fact, there is neither criticism of nor promotion of a given concept without the operation of these assumptions.

Implicit throughout this study there will be the assumption that in the field of guidance and psychotherapy there will be no one methodology to fit all counseling situations. Coordinate with this is the assumption that no current theory of counseling dynamics is yet completely adequate to explain what does happen in counseling, since all known methods seem to have both successful and unsuccessful cases. Nor has it been demonstrated that one school of counseling has been outstandingly successful in comparison to others. It is also assumed that only a philosophy that takes into account the entire personality structure of human beings can erect a methodology that is both adequate and truly effective. Without entering therefore in much detail into the area of theology, which would take another thesis, this study assumes that only a Christian view of human nature can give a fundamentally adequate substructure for guidance practices. Anything less must be a defective philosophy of human nature since a great area of human activity and motivation will be removed from consideration. A true philosophy of human nature should take into account all areas of human concern.

With the procedures and assumptions outlined in this chapter in mind, it is pertinent to enquire concerning the origin and development of nondirective therapy, its main contentions, and its basic assumptions concerning the nature of human nature. When these have been ascertained this study will attempt to evaluate the basic assumptions of nondirective therapy and their implications. The succeeding chapters will follow this order of procedure.
CHAPTER II

THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF NONDIRECTIVE THERAPY

The Triple Origin Of Nondirective Therapy

Although nondirective counseling as a school of psychotherapy may be regarded as a distinctly American phenomenon, yet at least some of its tap-roots are distinctly European. The originator of the system, Carl Ransom Rogers, and his major followers are American scholars and were trained in American universities. It is, of course, no secret that many approaches to American culture and scholarship have been stimulated by European contacts and influence. And in some cases the relationship, while perhaps not derivative, has certainly been parallel. In discussing the origin and growth of nondirective counseling the attempt will be made to show that as a philosophy of human nature Rogers' main assumptions stem back to Rousseau and the other biological optimists of the Enlightenment. As a psychotherapy the nondirectivistic approach is a derivative of the psychoanalytic theories of Freud and his followers. While the deeply phenomenological framework of nondirectivism may not be derived from the European existentialists such as Jaspers, its concepts are certainly parallel to them. In addition the nondirective theorists have drawn from the truly American sources of Dewey and Kilpatrick. In delineating these origins it is not to be inferred that original constructs are lacking in nondirective theory. The only proposition advanced in the
immediate discussion is that in understanding something of the sources from which a theory has come the theory itself may be better understood.

Its Humanistic Basis

There is an old saying that the old is ever new, and Solomon went so far as to say that there is nothing new under the sun. It does not really make much difference that by the philosophic processes of reasoning Protagoras and the Sophists made man the measure of things, and that modern scientists like Rogers seek to establish the same thing experimentally. The end result is the same. During the time of the Enlightenment men sought to find that which could insure for humanity a continued growth and progress. Even though they lived under the impact of new discoveries in science and technology they could find no better hope than man himself. The new spirit of democracy was not based on divine laws nor on gifts of men divinely created. It came rather from the inherent rights of man as a child of nature. In this period of time is found Condorcet with his theory of the infinite perfectibility of man. Here too is Descartes putting man at the center of a geometrically perfect world with his famous *cogito ergo sum*. Rousseau, the champion of romantic naturalism, is of particular interest for our purposes in this study because of the way in which he used this concept of the centrality of man.

Rousseau, among other things, was concerned with education and with what rightfully ought to enter into the training of the child. In his *Emile* he sets forth his thesis that man is naturally good. It is the influence of society that corrupts and brings about maladjustment. If man, without
the hindrance of society, is allowed to be himself, he will both choose and do the good. This good is determined by the natural development of the organism. The history of education reveals how Froebel and Pestalozzi, among others, developed this idea until it became eventually the child-centered school. And so the sequence of thought begins to sound very much like the client-centered terminology of the Rogerian school.

It does not make much difference for the purposes of this study whether this valuational system in the individual is conceived to be a spiritual entity natural to him, or whether it is conceived to be naturalistic in the sense of arising out of the wishes and experiences of the person. The point is that either way the determining factor is considered to be only in man himself. In addition this determination by the self alone is naturally good and is directed toward satisfactory ends.

This concept of the innate capacity of the individual found its greatest expression in the United States in the teachings of John Dewey and his followers. In the progressive education movement is found probably the most vocal expression of man as himself the end of the learning processes. This movement began with Dewey's teaching of the enrichment of learning through the integration of interest and effort. In following the naturalism of Rousseau the doctrine of growth for growth's sake became the end of education. Although he began his career as a philosopher by following the idealism of Hegel, Dewey, soon after his return to America, began developing his instrumental and experimental approach to human nature and education. Since the general concepts of progressive education are well known, they need not be developed here. What is important is that it be recognized that
instrumentalism carried on in America the same naturalistic humanism found in Rousseau.

Williamson\(^1\) draws an interesting comparison between Rousseau and some of the concepts of nondirective therapy. He writes:

> Recently there evolved a third movement in part based upon a doctrine similar to (or growing out of) Rousseau's philosophy of human nature. It has served to focus attention on the great importance of the client's perception of himself and upon the central purpose of his growth...... Nevertheless this significant contribution is tempered by the nondirective emphasis upon some puzzling assumptions about the nature of human nature and particularly about the nature of human development. As with Rousseau, some nondirectivists seem to take the position that human nature would appear to be essentially "good" and society is essentially "wicked" in its "imposition" upon the natural growth of the individual.

Williamson then goes on to say that such a doctrine comes from a concept of a relationship between inner dynamic forces of the individual and the outer forces of society which places maximum emphasis upon the internal forces and minimum emphasis upon the external forces. He concludes that there has been an over-emphasis in the nondirective movement on the unhampered unfoldment of inner growth forces.

Undoubtedly more important in this linkage of ideas is that Rogers himself points out his obligation to the thought world of John Dewey and progressive education. In writing on the application of nondirective principles to education, Rogers\(^2\) points out that his ideas are similar to those

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of many others, past and present. He then says very specifically:

This is not to indicate that our indebtedness is limited to these recent expositions of radically new points of view in education. In one sense our experience is a rediscovery of effective principles which have been stated by Dewey, Kilpatrick, and many others, and a rediscovery of effective practices which have certainly been discovered over and over again by competent teachers.

Here Rogers clearly aligns himself with the patterns of naturalistic humanism set by Rousseau and Dewey. By admission the nondirective concepts belong in this group whether they are derived from the past or independently conceived.

Not to anticipate the burden of a later chapter where the biological optimism of Rogers will be discussed, but to note even more clearly that nondirectivism is of humanistic parentage, Rogers says that in nondirective counseling there is a very definite progression or movement in the valuing activities of the client. The client begins with value judgments that are largely introjected from the social environment and from the cultural environment. As therapy progresses the client becomes confused as he recognizes that he is attempting to live according to the standards of others, by what others think or may think of his actions, and not by the demands of his real self. Then Rogers goes on to say:

Gradually this confusion is replaced by a dawning realization that the evidence upon which he can base a value judgment is supplied by his own senses, his own experience. Short term and long term satisfactions can be recognized, not by what others say, but by examining one's own experience. . . .

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3 Ibid., 150-151.
Little by little the client finds it not only possible but satisfying to accept the locus of evaluation as residing within himself.

The meaning is quite explicit. Human nature, under the right conditions, can and will make value judgments that are both good and satisfying to his real ego needs as seen by himself.

Thus clearly nondirective concepts of human nature come within the continuing tradition of a naturalistic type of humanism. All psychologies have a philosophy of human nature upon which they are based, and so do all forms of therapy. The various authors may state their assumptions or leave them implicit in their writing. The founder of the nondirective school makes evident the hypotheses with which he operated in developing the theory of human nature that underlies nondirective therapy. They are the basic tenets of naturalistic humanism, particularly in the line that runs from Rousseau to John Dewey.

Its Psychoanalytical Basis

Probably no individual has so influenced the methodology of modern psychotherapy and its conceptual framework as has the great Viennese, Sigmund Freud. His development of the concept of the unconscious may be said to be the key that opened the door to the modern era. Though his observations were purely clinical, and not scientific in the technical sense, they were nevertheless a great stimulus. Many who do not accept his personality constructs still recognize their debt to this pioneering genius. In the field of psychotherapy today there are those who are "orthodox" Freudians, accepting both the master's method and theory. There are those who might be
called "heretical" Freudsians, or Neo-Freudsians, such as Jung, Adler, and Rank. And then there are those therapists whose methodology might be called derivative, and which is even perhaps much more psychoanalytic in nature than they themselves realize. In this latter group belong those who subscribe to the methods and theories of nondirective therapy.

It seems clear that some of the nondirective therapists have recognized that there is a measure of relationship between themselves and the proponents of psychoanalysis. Rogers himself has on more than one occasion expressed his indebtedness to Freudian concepts. Speaking of the origin of nondirective counseling Rogers \(^4\) says, "Its development would not have been possible without the appreciation of man's unconscious strivings and complex emotional nature which was Freud's contribution to our culture."

Others than Rogers have noted more precisely the contributions of Freud to the thinking of the nondirective group of therapists. Elaine Dorfman,\(^5\) who contributes the chapter on play therapy to *Client-Centered Therapy* indicates that important Freudian concepts retained by nondirective therapy have been those of the meaningfulness of apparently unmotivated behavior, of permissiveness, catharsis, and repression. She points also to the importance of the concept of play as the natural language of the child. This is not to say that nondirective therapy belongs to the orthodox or even the neo-orthodox group of psychoanalysis. But it is a recognition of the origin of a number of concepts vital to nondirective therapy.

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\(^4\) Ibid., \(^4\).

\(^5\) Ibid., 237.
As the Freudian theories became known and his methods were put into practice a number of variations and deviations came into being. Among these were Jung, Adler, Rank, and in more recent times, Horney. These broke with Freud at one point or another but all remained essentially psychoanalysts in that their concepts were ego-centered. Although Rogers does acknowledge an interconnection of his own concepts with those of psychoanalytical thought, he does not spell out what that relationship is. He does say that "Especially the roots of client-centered therapy are to be found in the therapy of Rank, and the Philadelphia group which has integrated his views into their own." 6 Reference is made here particularly to the work of Jessie Taft and Frederick Allen.

It has remained for Raskin 7 to indicate clearly the therapeutic origins of client-centered therapy in relation to psychoanalytic theory and specifically to the concepts of Rank. In this excellent summary Raskin points out that Rank differs from Freud on two important areas of therapy. The first of these was the Freudian emphasis upon the content of the interview. Rank, in distinction from Freud, considered the content to be relatively unimportant. The second was the emphasis of Rank upon the dynamics of the therapeutic process with the will of the patient as the central force in therapy. Among the contributions of Rank to nondirective theory are the concept that

6 Ibid., 4.
the client has creative powers of his own, the idea that the aim of therapy is the acceptance by the individual of himself as unique and self-reliant, the conviction that the patient rather than the therapist must become the central figure in the therapeutic process - indeed he is the therapist, and the theory that the goals of therapy are achieved by an understanding of present dynamics rather than past content. Raskin then points out that the chief contribution of Taft was her strong insistence upon the current situation of the client. In her thinking present time is the important thing. The lengthy case studies of Allen make clear how the Rankian therapy functioned. Rank and his followers, while holding many truly nondirective concepts - as had Freud before them, nevertheless were largely directive in clinical practice.

Its Phenomenological Orientation

Another major source of psychological theory in the development of client-centered therapy has been the phenomenological school of thought. This has been a development both in Europe and in America, and it is not at all clear whether nondirective thought derives from both or is more especially American. The important thing, however, is that client-centered therapy is consciously phenomenological and openly adopts the implications involved. Some of this may be already seen in Taft's emphasis upon the importance of the present situation of the client in counseling. It is common among writers of the nondirectivist orientation to speak of the internal frame of reference. Perhaps the clearest expressions of this point of view are to be found in the writings of others than Rogers, although he
too accepts this as one of the fundamental concepts of nondirective theory. Probably Combs and Snygg have stated these postulates more clearly in their writings.

Phenomenology is found as a concept both in the fields of philosophy and psychology. The word itself is quite neutral, and means only the science of phenomena. However in both the European and American branches of phenomenology the word phenomenon has taken on a special meaning. It does not mean the "dinge an sich" of Kant but means rather that which displays itself. This concept the German philosopher Husserl made into a psychological method of describing the conceivable or intuitable. In turn the Gestalt psychologists point to Husserl as laying the foundation for their emphasis on configurations and on the intuitable nature of meanings. This the nondirective theorists have taken to mean that the therapist can enter empathically into the field of the client and understand things as the client sees them. In Europe phenomenology was joined by Jaspers to existential philosophy and has had a large following of diverse nature; from the work of Rudolph Otto in religion to that of the pagan Jean Paul Sartre.

It is not difficult to see how the concept of things as displayed or revealed in action finds application in the nondirective postulate of the internal frame of reference. This has come to mean that not the event but the meaning of the event to the client is the important thing. The therapist therefore is concerned with the way things appear to his client and with
nothing else. Concerning this viewpoint Combs has this to say, "It is not the event but the meaning of the event which is important in the individual's behavior." (italics original) Speaking of the technique of recognition and acceptance of personal meanings of the client by the therapist, Combs goes on to say, "This latter technique seems to do two things for the client. In the first place, it centers his attention upon himself and upon the meanings of events for him. In the second place, it serves to facilitate the client's further differentiation by clarifying and often condensing concepts which he has expressed in hazy or jumbled fashion."

It is further clear that for some of the theorists in the nondirective group the concepts of the phenomenological approach have passed from scientific methodology into the area of philosophy. In their thinking the correlate of a phenomenological psychology is a behavioristic determinism. This is rather interesting in view of the fact that at least some proponents of nondirectivism seem to feel that the creation of the nondirective atmosphere is conducive to the exercise of free will. It is not the purpose here to attempt a solution of the apparent contradiction, it is rather to indicate that in the development of nondirective thought some differences appear. Two rather lengthy quotations will set forth this deterministic

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9 Ibid., 204.
orientation. The first of these is from Snygg and Combs: 10

As a science phenomenological psychology must accept determinism because prediction and control are only possible in a field where behavior is lawful and caused. As a method, it also recognizes that the behaver often feels that he has a choice of behavior even though none exists in reality, since he always chooses the one which is pertinent to his phenomenal field at the instant of action.

Less clear cut in terminology, although employing the same basic orientation is a statement from Rogers:

We may conclude this section by saying that one of the fundamental directions taken by the process of therapy is the free experiencing of the actual sensory and visceral reactions of the organism without too much of an attempt to relate these experiences to the self. This is usually accompanied by the conviction that this material does not belong to, and cannot be organized into, the self. The endpoint of this process is that the client discovers that he can be his experience, with all of its variety and surface contradiction; that he can formulate himself out of his experience, instead of trying to impose a formulation of self upon his experience, denying to awareness those elements which do not fit. (Italics original)

In this concept therefore is seen the conviction that the individual is what he is by heredity and by the immediacy of current experience. In the development of nondirective thought is to be found the utilization of phenomenological concepts both as scientific method and as basic philosophy.


Students of orientations other than the nondirective have noted the trend toward phenomenological concepts in the nondirective therapists. Heinz and Rowena Ansbacher\textsuperscript{12} point out that the phenomenological approach of Snygg and Combs is similar to that of Adler, Dilthey, Spranger, and Jaspers, although Snygg and Combs give no indication that they are aware of such similarity. Then the authors go on to say, "The fascinating aspect in Rogers is that at first he approached the patient or client without any theory at all, following him empathically without any attempt at explanation, not even on the basis of internal causes. Methodologically he thus represents the unprejudiced phenomenological approach in its purest form, applied to psychotherapy."

Nuttin\textsuperscript{13} looks on the development of the phenomenological concepts in nondirective therapy as a new development in that discipline. He writes:

\begin{quote}
The emphasis is therefore placed on the subjective way in which the patient experiences himself and others...........This is the origin of a new development in Rogers' school towards what is known as the "phenomenological" study of the personality. This kind of study means that instead of trying to find out as much as possible about the patient, the effort is rather to see and experience the world exactly as he experiences it himself. (Italics original)
\end{quote}

In a footnote to this observation Nuttin also refers to some of the European studies in phenomenology mentioned above. These observations are sufficient


\textsuperscript{13}Joseph Nuttin, Psychoanalysis and Personality: A Dynamic Theory of Normal Personality, New York, 1953, 93.
to indicate that one of the important roots of nondirective theory lies in the phenomenological approach.

Minor Sources Of Rogerian Concepts

Rogers cites three other sources from which the developing practice of nondirective therapy grew, namely: (1) the general development of empirical psychology in the United States with its emphasis on scientific method, (2) the Gestalt psychology and its emphasis upon the wholeness and interrelatedness of the clusters of phenomena which comprise the individual, and (3) the educational, social, and political philosophy which is at the heart of American culture as Rogers sees it. It would therefore appear that nondirective therapy has drawn many of its concepts from a variety of sources. It is in many respects a child of a certain cultural matrix.

Classification Of Nondirectivism

While labels are already a form of evaluation it seems valid to the author to indicate that the main streams of contribution to nondirective theory have been psychoanalytic and phenomenological in character. If any classification is to be made it would seem necessary to consider nondirectivism as a form of deviant Freudianism. If the claim of nondirective theory is accepted that the individual has innate forces of self-direction and growth for good, and that the only function of therapy is to release these capacities, then nondirectivism is clearly an "inner-release" therapy. As

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Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy*, 4-5.
such it belongs in the ranks of the psychoanalytic therapies. At least a
direct line of descent may be seen from Freud to Rank, Taft, Allen, and the
Philadelphia group of relationship therapists, and from thence to Rogers
and his followers.

There are important differences between the truly orthodox psychoanalysts and the nondirective group. Perhaps a brief indication of some of these
differences will point out at the same time the depth of Rogers' obligation
to them. The considered judgments of some experts in the field of therapy
may also help make clear that client-centered therapy is essentially a
psychoanalytic technique.

While analysts indeed recognize the importance of emotional factors
they have consistently subordinated these to an understanding of the content
of repressed materials. This is basically an intellectual approach. On the
contrary nondirective therapists stress the emotional components within the
client as blocking release. To them, as with Rank, content is not the
important thing. What is primary is the way that the client feels about
himself and his situation.

Rank, Taft, and Allen seemed to feel that a definite technique was
impossible for their type of therapy. The contribution of nondirective
therapy has been a definite methodology and supporting hypotheses, and both
are testable to a degree by statistical manipulation. Rogers and his group
were certainly the first to offer completely transcribed counseling cases in
which both content and vocal expression could be studied. It should be
noted, however, that the formulation of a clinically precise technique for
the release of the inherent capacities of the client is still an "inner-
release" therapy.

Freud considered the content of repressed materials as basic, and thus stressed the importance of the unconscious. It is an emphasis upon the past as determinative of the present. With Rogers however, it is the present and the conscious that is all-important. So Barry,15 in discussing the relation of personality theory to the technique of the counselor says, "The obvious advance from Freud was to adapt much of his theory and technique to a study of the conscious mind, and this is the procedure of the therapist. Our therapist here is an entirely naturalistic one;............Rank and Rogers are leaders in the field and have developed a client-centered technique."

Nondirective therapy differs from both Freud and Rank with respect to the acceptance of the feelings of the client. All of them, in common with all good therapists, insist that the client must feel accepted by the therapist. Freud was basically interested in the origin of emotion while Rank was primarily interested in the dynamics of feeling. Transference and dependence were accepted by them. Rogers, on the contrary, holds to the necessity of a completely nondirective acceptance. He insists that the only function of the counselor is to reflect accurately the feeling states of the client at the moment. In nondirective therapy the complete responsibility is thrown upon the client as the therapeutic agent.

Opinions Of Other Scholars

Gilbert Wrenn\textsuperscript{16} advances the opinion that the connection between Rogers and Freud is a direct one. His conclusion is that, "The direct line of development of the nondirective concept in counseling, as systematized and promoted by Carl R. Rogers, is traced back through Jessie Taft and Otto Rank to Sigmund Freud." Lowery\textsuperscript{17} in referring to a statement of Combs that the first function of counseling is that of bringing to awareness, says, "This is pure psychoanalysis no matter how denied - for a fundamental tenet of all psychotherapy is that only when the unconscious conflicts become conscious is there any possibility of controlling behavior or symptoms." In this same discussion he repeatedly points out that nondirective therapy is more like psychoanalysis than it is different. In summarizing his article he points out, "Although nondirective therapy is based on psychoanalytic principles, in so far as it succeeds at all, this origin is denied."

VanderVeldt and Odenwald\textsuperscript{18} make a classification of various schools of therapy. In their opinion nondirective therapy belongs to the area of orthodox Freudianism. Speaking in this regard they say, "This group may


\textsuperscript{17} Lawson G. Lowery, "Counseling and Therapy," \textit{American Journal of Orthopsychiatry}, XVI, October, 1946, 615-622.

probably also be called 'orthodox' inasmuch as it carries out Freud's inner-release program almost to the letter." Thus the opinions of a number of trained experts give some credence to the proposition advanced earlier in this chapter that basically nondirectivism is a variant form of psychoanalytic theory.

Raskin\(^{19}\) provides a good summary of the discussion which has been carried out above at some length. He points out that Freud in his later years used nondirective methods with increasing frequency while still remaining authoritarian. Rank, while displacing Freudian content with personality dynamics, nevertheless used directive methods to impress the dynamics on the client. Rogers, says this summary, has given Rank's client-centered therapy a method. This has been done by eliminating the directive features and emphasizing complete acceptance. Accompanying this has been an increasing emphasis on the internal frame of reference, on nondirective attitude rather than mere technique, and on appreciation of the importance of the self-concept.

Contributions Of Rogers And Others

It would be erroneous, however, to consider the development of nondirective therapy merely as a synthesis of previous theories and methodologies. The discussion in this chapter has included both likenesses of nondirectivism to other therapies and differences from them. It should be noted

in this connection also that many of the specific conceptions of nondirective theory arose out of the clinical observations of a practicing therapist. In addition there were the observations of those who followed his methods, as well as research entered into by himself and others. Murtin 20 in a footnote says that the great merit of Rogers lies in having developed a new technique and in opening up new lines of thought for the psychology of the personality, both empirically and experimentally, on the basis of principles drawn from actual therapeutic practice.

Nor have the conceptions of nondirective therapy been static. There are observable differences between the earlier and the later writings of Rogers. The trend toward phenomenalism has been mentioned above. Some ten years ago the terms "nondirective" and "client-centered" were not in use as labels, but it is common to find them today in the majority of serious writings in the field of therapy.

In a list of suggested readings at the end of Chapter I in Client-Centered Counseling, 21 Rogers himself indicates the sequence in the development of his thinking by referring to the titles of some of his publications. The growth of concepts found in Rogers' personal development roughly parallels the development of this chapter. He began his work as a clinical psychologist in the field of child guidance. In this his major interest was the diagnosis of problems as indicated by the publishing of his book,

20 Murtin, Psychoanalysis and Personality, 92.

21 Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, 13.
Clinical Treatment of the Problem Child, in 1939. In common with others, his interests in the dynamics of adjustment began to grow, and in 1940 Rogers delivered a paper which later with modifications became a chapter in Counseling and Psychotherapy. This publication became a milestone in the field of therapy and with its appearance began much of the controversy that marked the literature in the field for the next decade. Under the direction of Rogers some nondirective therapy was carried out both at Rochester in the Guidance Center and later at Ohio State University.

When Rogers became the Director of the Counseling Center at the University of Chicago the nondirective method received full scale acceptance in practice and research. The appearance in 1951 of Client-Centered Therapy as a summary of nondirective practice and research shows the great development of this system in the decade since the earlier work appeared. Much has been done by others as shown by the bibliography of some two hundred items in the volume. The major changes in methodology and theory are listed by Rogers himself as: (1) the extension of nondirective counseling from a comparatively limited range of applicable cases to any type that might be properly considered therapy material, (2) the shift from the emphasis on


24Carl R. Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, 9-16.
nondirective techniques to that of nondirectiveness as a counselor attitude and philosophy, (3) the extension of nondirective concepts to play therapy where verbalization is at a minimum, to group therapy, to classroom teaching, and to administrative procedures, (4) the publishing of a number of research studies by nondirectively oriented workers, (5) the training of a considerable number of nondirective counselors, and (6) the statement of a consistent theory of personality structure. The last is, of course, Rogers' own estimate.

The last major publication of Rogers appeared in 1954 under the title, *Psychotherapy and Personality Change.*25 This book is a description of the method and some of the results of research being undertaken to validate the theoretical considerations of nondirective therapy. Apparently the feeling is that the structure of personality theory is now established enough to permit rather extensive testing of the various hypotheses. This is a courageous undertaking and one rather unique in the history of therapy. It does not add much to the considerations germane to the purpose of this study. For this reason attention will be focused on the concepts outlined in *Client-Centered Therapy.*

Summary

In the discussion of the genesis and development of nondirective therapy four main sources have been noted. It has been seen to lie first in the

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line of those thinkers who have followed the basic assumptions of humanistic naturalism and biological optimism. Second, nondirectivism is most properly classified as a variant of Freudianism although differing in many ways. Third, it is noted that a definite trend toward phenomenalistic concepts is evident and toward a distinct concept of the self. Fourth, nondirective theory has drawn much from the clinical and research program of Rogers and his followers. Resting upon the substratum of previous and contemporary concepts, nondirective thinking has added theoretical constructions derived from its own therapeutic practice. Currently Rogers and his disciples are engaged in extensive research attempting to validate the theoretical structure.
CHAPTER III

THE MAIN CONTENTIONS OF NONDIRECTIVE THERAPY

To do justice to the volume of ideas which have sprung from Dr. Rogers' pen would probably require almost an equal volume of reply. So detailed a reply is almost a necessity because of the scope of the claims set forth by the proponents of nondirective therapy. Indeed to defend or to refute in detail would be a project beyond the purpose of this analysis. The content of this chapter will be centered around those topics that have relevance to a discussion of Rogers' assumptions concerning the nature of human nature. Two questions in particular present themselves at this point. First, what is the conception of human nature that is involved in the methodology of Rogers? Second, what are the contentions about personality that center in his structuring of the process of therapy?

The literature advancing the claims and hypotheses of nondirective therapy is quite extensive. Others besides Rogers have contributed to the development of its theoretical structure. Notable among these contributors have been Curran, Combs, and Snyder. But since the originator and the current leader in nondirective thought is still Rogers, the material of this chapter will be drawn largely from his writings. When appropriate to the discussion reference will be made to other writers.

It is interesting also to note that there has been a development in the theoretical constructions of the nondirective therapists. But the change is
not as important to the purpose of this study as the hypotheses now held.
For this reason, and this is in itself sufficiently valid, the major attention will be given to Rogers' publications subsequent to the appearance of *Counseling and Psychotherapy*. Rogers and his followers now seem to feel that the basic hypotheses of their system are well enough stated, and their major attention is being given to research intended to validate these hypotheses.
We may then take Rogers at his word and proceed to examine his assumptions in critical fashion.

The Methodology Of Counseling

In seeking to determine what are Rogers' conceptions of the nature of human nature it is rather natural to consider first of all the methodology of counseling. For here in action are the views of the counselor with respect to the counselee. In a most practical way the counseling situation reveals the basic attitudes of one human as against another. No matter what the counselor may posit with respect to his attitudes toward others, what he does in the actuality of the interview reveals what the attitudes really are. The counselor, for instance, may claim to be nondirective, but only a study of what he actually says and does in the face to face situation of counseling will show whether he is nondirective or not.

The Principle Of Warm Acceptance

In a recent article Rogers\(^1\) reaffirms the points of view crystalized

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\(^1\)Carl R. Rogers, "Implications of Recent Advances in Prediction and Control of Behavior," *Teachers College Record*, LVII, February, 1956, 316-322.
earlier in his writings and stresses the conception that the function of the
counselor is to provide a warm and acceptant atmosphere in which the client
may be free to examine himself. In what may now be viewed as the major
statement of nondirective thinking, Client-Centered Therapy, Rogers makes
little reference to the methods or techniques of counseling as usually
understood. This is not because method is considered unimportant, but
because of a basic shift in what is thought to make therapy effective. The
locus of effective change is now to be located even more within the per-
ceptive range of the client. Rogers states it this way:

As our experience has moved us forward, it has become increasingly evident that the probability
of therapeutic movement in a particular case depends primarily not upon the counselor's
personality, not upon his techniques, nor even upon his attitudes, but upon the way all these are
experienced by the client in the relationship. The centrality of the client's perception of the
interviews has forced itself upon our recognition.

This would seem to indicate two things with respect to the methods involved
in successful counseling. First of all, it means the creation and utiliz-
ation of techniques that will facilitate the perceptions of the client. This
is what the nondirective therapists mean by the principle of warm and com-
plete acceptance. The therapist is to accept in a positive fashion the
current feelings of the client about himself, whether these be negative,

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2Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, Boston, 1951.
3Ibid., 65.
ambivalent, or more creative. In the second place, this statement by Rogers implies the isolation of the client, by whatever techniques necessary, in a world of his own internal reference. This world the counselor seeks to understand and reflect empathically. This is done by the denial of all judgment, by the rejection of all save client advanced material, and by concentration upon the emotional climate of the client.

Dependence Of Method Upon Philosophy

Basic to the utilization of the techniques just mentioned is the conviction and philosophy of the counselor. This is the first requirement in the creation of the kind of an atmosphere in which nondirective therapy can work effectively. The mere use of nondirective techniques is bound to fail, says Rogers, unless the counselor has a genuine conviction of the capacity of the client to move in truly constructive fashion toward satisfactory goals. Clients, he says, can usually see through methods that are adopted but not inwardly genuine. The conception that counsel or attitude, technique, and philosophy are inseparable, and that the counselor's basic view of human nature is fundamental and determinative is expressed by Rogers in this way:

It has seemed to us that the client-centered therapist operates primarily upon one central and basic hypothesis which has undergone relatively little change with the years. This

\[\text{Ibid.}, \, 22-24, \, 30.\]

hypothesis is that the client has within himself the capacity, latent if not evident, to understand those aspects of his life and of himself that are causing him unhappiness or pain, and the capacity and tendency to reorganize himself and his relationship to life in the direction of self-actualization and maturity in such a way as to bring a greater degree of internal comfort. The function of the therapist is to create such a psychological atmosphere as will permit this capacity and strength to become effective rather than latent or potential. This acceptance is probably possible only for the therapist who has integrated into his own philosophy a deep conviction as to the right of the individual to self-direction and self-determination.

The meaning of this, it would seem, is quite clear. To be a successful nondirective therapist there must be the belief in the capacity of the individual to meet his problems and to find an adequate solution from within himself.

Others than Rogers have made the same point clear. Combs, in an address before the New York Academy of Science stated it this way:

Nondirective therapy is based upon the fundamental principle that the client not only can, but will, move toward better adjustment when an adequate situation is provided which frees him to do so. We must presume, therefore, that whatever this motivating force, it has its origin within the individual himself. Recognition of the individual and an absolute respect for his integrity is not just an idea in nondirective therapy. It is a working principle. (Italics original)

A conception pointed out so clearly ought not to be dealt with at great length at this point except for the fact that the client-centered therapists

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themselves stress the deep interrelationship between their methods and their philosophy of human nature. This is done even to the point of saying that you can not have the one without the other. The analysis of this basic assumption will be made in a subsequent chapter but perhaps two other citations will suffice to point out how deep is the concern of nondirective thought to establish the dependence of method upon its philosophic outlook.

Raskin\textsuperscript{7} writes, "......there are the nondirective or client-centered therapists who believe they can help most by providing an appreciative understanding of the way things appear to the client, depending, for movement in the therapeutic process, on the capacities for self-understanding and self-responsibility which exist within the client;..." In this same article Raskin speaks of the change in Rogers' approach as a development from eclecticism to a strictly nondirective therapy. He then adds this significant statement:

By now, Rogers' approach contained practically no element of counselor direction, the therapist's role being seen as one of providing a deep understanding and acceptance of the client's view of things as a way of promoting understanding of self and tendencies toward positive, self-initiated action.

Probably none of the nondirective writers state this relationship more clearly than do Butler and Seeman. After having discussed the contiguity

\begin{footnotes}
\footnote{\textsuperscript{7}Nathaniel J. Raskin, "An Objective Approach to the Study of Psychotherapy," reprinted from \textit{American Scientist}, XXXVII, Number 3, Summer Issue, 1949, 3.}
\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 4.}
\footnote{John M. Butler and Julius Seeman, "Client-Centered Therapy and the Field of Guidance," reprint from \textit{Education}, LXX, April, 1950, 1-2.}
\end{footnotes}
of various kinds of psychotherapy and counseling they go on to say:

Such therapy (client-centered - GRY) is based on certain premises about the nature of personality and the conditions under which personality reorganization takes place. It asserts that an individual who is aware of his own attitudes and motivations is likely to be an integrated person. Client-centered therapy further postulates that an individual has within himself the capacity and resources to develop this self-understanding, and that therapy should provide the conditions under which these resources may be released......It is one of the central tenets of a client-centered counselor that such a psychological climate can be established if, and only if, he consistently behaves in the counseling situation in ways which have been characterized as warm, permissive, and accepting........This means that the counselor must genuinely possess these attitudes. (Italics mine-Y)

It is apparent, then, that nondirective theorists insist that a particular philosophical approach to the nature of human nature is absolutely basic to successful use of nondirective therapy. Indeed the success of this therapy is conceived to hinge upon the genuine possession of this view of human nature far more than upon the methodology of the counseling situation. So Curran, for instance, claims that errors in technique can be negated if the counselor's basic attitudes are right. All of this does not mean that good technique in therapy is considered unimportant. The belief is rather that the therapist's fundamental convictions regarding human nature are determinative in successful nondirective therapy.

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Some of the hypotheses and inferences about human nature may be gathered directly from the citations above. There is first of all the concept that the individual has native within himself the capacity and conative power to reorganize his personality in constructive ways. In this process the therapist is purely a catalytic agency. The organism of the client is the effecting power. This approach further assumes that looking clearly at himself, as he is, with both good and bad characteristics, the client will himself move in directions that are tension reducing and homeostatic. With these assumptions in mind this discussion now turns to the question of how these capacities, according to nondirective theory, may be released within the client in the counseling situation.

It would seem that in the area of methodology two concepts are of major importance for the creation of the situation in which release and redirection may take place. The first of these is the principle of warm and permissive acceptance of the client as he is. In this there is thought to be the minimum of threat to the individual. The second concept is the isolation of the client within his own phenomenological and internal frame of reference. In this only the feelings of the client about himself and his current situation is considered of importance. The function of the counselor is to reflect accurately back to the client his own feelings. In so doing he is to avoid counselor diagnosis, interpretation, or advice.

What Is Acceptance?

The first principle of nondirective technique, then, is that of warm acceptance by the counselor of the client. While there have been changes in
client-centered theory this concept has remained a cardinal principle from the beginning. The very use of this phraseology indicates that to Rogers and his followers client-centered therapy is more of a system of attitudes than it is a technique as such. By warm acceptance is meant more than a willingness to accept the client as he now is. In effect it means the establishment of an emotional situation between counselor and counselee in which the latter can feel the genuine interest and concern of the counselor for the client's welfare. Three things will be considered in an effort to understand what this warm acceptance is: (1) the creation of a particular atmosphere, (2) the concept of full permissiveness, and (3) the technique of counselor empathy.

Creation Of Rapport

Since in nondirective theory the progress of therapy comes from the constructive forces within the client it is the function of the therapist to create a situation in which the client can really be himself and in which he can create from his own capacities a new organizational pattern. This situation is one in which the client feels that he is accepted just as he is without judgment or condemnation. He is free from any threat by the therapist to his present self-organization and therefore is able to freely contemplate its change. In a recent magazine article Rogers\footnote{Carl R. Rogers, "Implications of Recent Advances in Prediction and Control of Behavior," Teachers College Record, LVII, February, 1956, 318.} restates the classic nondirective concept this way:
We know the attitudes, which, if provided by a counselor or therapist, will be predictably followed by certain constructive personality and behavior changes in the client. If the therapist provides a relationship in which he is (a) genuine, internally consistent; (b) acceptant, prizing the client as a person of worth; (c) empathically understanding of the client's private world; then the client becomes (a) more realistic in his self-perceptions; (b) more confident and self-directing; (c) more positively valued by himself; (d) less likely to repress elements of his experience; (e) more mature, socialized, and adaptive in his behavior; (f) more like the healthy, integrated, well-functioning person in his personality structure. (Italics original)

Here is reiterated the assumption, based on a stated view of human nature, that given the creation by the therapist of a climate of warm acceptance, therapeutic changes for good will be effected by the client himself.

It is evident that acceptance is both an attitude and a technique, and the warning is issued not to use the technique without the attitude and philosophy. The creation of the special atmosphere in which therapy can flourish is, according to Rogers, primarily dependent upon the genuine and consistent conviction of the right and capacity of the client to self-reorganization. The therapist will convey by his overt actions and the more subtle gestures of tone of voice or facial expression what are his real feelings toward the client. It is important that the counselor be acceptant. It is even more important that the client feel accepted.

The Technique Of Permissiveness

The second factor in the creation of warm acceptance is that of full permissiveness. The counselee must feel that he is accepted as he is with all of his faults as well as his virtues. As Rogers states it in the
quotation above the therapist is to prize the client as a person of worth now. It would seem that a careful reading of Rogers would indicate that he feels this permissiveness should be complete - the therapist is to refrain from all judgment and evaluation. In *Client-Centered Therapy* it is stated this way:

It has seemed clear, from our clinical experiences as well as our research, that when the counselor perceives and accepts the client as he is, when he lays aside all evaluation and enters into the perceptual frame of reference of the client, he frees the client to explore his life and experience anew, frees him to perceive in that experience new meanings and new goals. To me it appears that only as the therapist is completely willing that any outcome, any direction may be chosen - only then does he realize the vital strength of the capacity and potentiality of the individual for constructive action. (Italics original)

He goes on to say that it is up to the client to choose goals - goals that may be social or antisocial, moral or immoral, neurotic or healthy, regressive or constructive, suicidal or life-seeking. Warm acceptance therefore depends upon the willingness of the therapist to accept completely the client as he is and as he chooses.

This does not mean the therapist is necessarily an amoral individual. The situation is, according to Rogers, that in the counseling process he refrains from expressing any evaluation of the client. Even more, he refrains from making such judgments to himself. All evaluation, all judgment, all change in evaluation is left up to the client. It is a fundamental

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willingness to allow the client to realize his own life in his own way. Only so can the atmosphere in which therapy will occur be created. Combs gets at the same idea in slightly different terminology by referring to the absence of threat in the counseling situation. The counselor must refrain from evaluation in any fashion lest the client feel impelled to defend his present personality organization and so therapeutic progress is impeded. Snyder and Curran show in full length case studies how this methodology is carried out. Snyder in particular refers to six cases of therapy, five of which were considered successful.

It is not the purpose at this point in the study to consider the validity of these claims. It is here indicated that the nondirective therapists set up certain conditions under which they say therapy occurs, and offer case studies to substantiate this hypothesis. The conditions of or methods of therapy reviewed so far are those of the creation of a particular atmosphere in the counseling situation and the adoption of full permissiveness with respect to the personality organization of the client.

\[14\] Snyder, William U., Casebook of Non-directive Counseling, Boston, 1947.
Establishment Of Empathy

A third technique in establishing the condition of warm acceptance is that of counselor empathy. Another way of saying this is that the therapists must adopt the frame of reference of the client. He attempts genuinely to enter into the internal field of feeling of the client. This, of course, stems back to the proposition with which we began, that the feelings of the client with respect to himself and his situation are determinative of progress in therapy. It is the world of the client that is important. If the original value judgment concerning the inherent worth of the individual be followed then certainly a technique for implementing this would be to enter as far as possible into the thought world of the client.

In *Counseling and Psychotherapy*, 17 notably chapters 6, 7, and 8, Rogers placed considerably more emphasis upon techniques such as clarification of feeling. In his later writings the emphasis has shifted to a much more phenomenological point of view with the emphasis being placed upon empathic entrance into the internal world of the client's feelings. The concern now is to see completely through the client's eyes, to look from his point of view, to adopt his frame of reference. Hence also the shift from the term "nondirective" to "client-centered."

Rogers himself puts it this way:

> In psychological terms, it is the counselor's aim to perceive as sensitively and accurately as possible all of the perceptual field as it is being experienced

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by the client, with the same figure and ground relationships, to the full degree that the client is willing to communicate that perceptual field; and having thus perceived this internal frame of reference of the other as completely as possible, to indicate to the client the extent to which he is seeing through the client's eyes.\textsuperscript{15}

Here several things are quite evident. In this conception of therapy it becomes the task of the counselor to lay aside in counseling anything from his own or any other perceptual field other than that of the client. There must be no reference either to an objective reality - an external frame of reference. All must be subordinated to the attempt to perceive the world as the client perceives it, to the effort to perceive the client as he himself does, and to the task of communicating this empathic understanding to the client.

As Combs\textsuperscript{19} points out, this is a herculean task. It requires experience, a broad cultural background, sensitivity to people, understanding, self-discipline, and maturity. In attempting to make clear what is meant by counselor empathy Rogers quotes extensively from an unpublished manuscript by Raskin.\textsuperscript{20} A part of this citation follows:

At this level, counselor participation becomes an active experiencing with the client of the feelings to which he gives expression, the counselor makes a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{15} Rogers, \textit{op. cit.}, 34. C.C.T.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Combs, \textit{op. cit.}, 11.
\item \textsuperscript{20} Rogers, \textit{op. cit.}, 29.
\end{itemize}
maximum effort to get under the skin of the person with whom he is communicating, he tries to get within and to live the attitudes expressed instead of observing them, to catch every nuance of their changing nature; in a word, to absorb himself completely in the attitudes of the other. And in struggling to do this, there is simply no room for any other type of counselor activity or attitude; if he is attempting to live the attitudes of the other, he cannot be diagnosing them, he cannot be thinking of making the process go faster. Because he is another, and not the client, the understanding is not spontaneous but must be acquired, and this through the most intense, continuous and active attention to the feelings of the other, to the exclusion of any other type of attention.

Where Rogers stated the proposition in terms of psychological theory, Raskin puts it in more functional and operational language. But the essential meaning is the same. To create the right kind of atmosphere for successful therapy the counselor must enter empathically into the world of thought and of the feelings of his client. He must further rigorously exclude all else.

The discussion of the methodology of nondirective counseling has so far noted that a particular conviction with respect to human nature is basic to success in therapy. The assumption is that the individual has within himself the capacity for reorganization of his personality given the right circumstances in which this may take place. The first principle of counseling therefore is that of warm acceptance. Included in this principle are the techniques of the creation of a particular atmosphere, the attitude of full and complete permissiveness, and the concept of counselor empathy. This immersion of the therapist in the feeling states of the client leads naturally to a consideration of the second principle in nondirective methodology. This may properly be called the principle of the isolation of the
client.

The Isolation Of The Client

It might be more correct philosophically to speak of this principle as the phenomenological approach, but for the time being this study is concerned with the use of certain concepts as operative techniques. This has been labeled the isolation of the client because as these various clinical techniques are rather rigidly employed they do result in the isolation of the client within the world of his own feelings. The use of this terminology does not imply a negative criticism. It is rather an attempt to understand what happens when the nondirective principles are given full scale employment. Fundamental to the employment of these techniques is to be understood once again the assumption of the capacities of the client for complete self-direction and reorganization of the personality. In fact the use of the techniques came first in clinical practice and the rationalization later. But for logical purposes it may be noted that the methodology is indeed directly dependent upon the philosophical constructs.

Its Basis In Emotional Content

It has been noted previously in Chapter II that nondirective therapy is concerned only with the present matrix of consciousness, the immediately evident perceptual field. The past is of no significance except as to how the client feels about it now. Of course, if in therapy the patient brings to awareness elements previously repressed, these are considered, but not in terms of content. The importance for nondirective therapy lies in the feeling of the client about them. This involves a second assumption, namely,
that emotional factors are etiological to personality disorders. It is evident in the writings of Rogers and others that what the client feels about himself is basic both to disorganization and reorganization.

In this discussion of the second principle of nondirective methodology stress will be placed upon the assumption of the primacy of emotional components in personality structure, and the three techniques that stem from this assumption. These techniques are: (1) the rejection in the counseling process of all save client-advanced materials, (2) the concentration in counseling upon the feeling states of the client, and (3) the reflection of feeling technique. It will naturally be obvious that the first two of these techniques here listed are as much assumptions as they are techniques. The discussion will be limited to their use as techniques of therapy in nondirective practice.

Consideration Of Client Material Only

The first proposition is that all material save that advanced by the client is to be barred from the therapeutic interview. This is considered necessary if the portals of progress in therapy are not to be blocked by irrelevant masses of data and suppositions. The relevant data are those actually in the perceptual field of the client at the time of therapy. Anything else is not only unneeded, it may even be fatal to the successful outcome.

It is probably germane to every genuine form of therapy to consider that the reaction of the client to himself and his situation is important. Indeed no successful therapy envisions anything but that the personality of
the client must undergo revision. The difference at this point between nondirective and other therapies is that nondirectivism would relate the therapeutic factors to the client alone. In keeping with this therefore is the rejection of any factor in the counseling situation not advanced by the client himself. So diagnosis, interpretation, evaluation, judgment, and any external social criteria of behavior must be eliminated in favor of concentration upon the meaning of experience as seen in the eyes of the client.

The function of the counselor therefore is that of sympathetically seeing, as much as is possible, the situation of the client, and communicating as much as possible of his understanding to the client. This is the way that Rogers frames it:

The therapist must lay aside his preoccupation with diagnosis and his diagnostic shrewdness, must discard his tendency to make professional evaluations, must cease his endeavors to formulate an accurate prognosis, must give up the temptation subtly to guide the individual, and must concentrate on one purpose only; that of providing deep understanding and acceptance of the attitudes consciously held at this moment by the client as he explores step by step into the dangerous areas he has been denying to consciousness.21

Rogers then goes on to say that he regards this as one of the distinctive features that set nondirective therapy apart from other therapies.

Stating the same thing from the standpoint of the client in another place, Rogers writes, "The fact that the therapist has put aside the self of

ordinary interaction and is in this situation primarily an instrument of understanding means that the client finds only himself in the interview. It is a situation which he can use to investigate himself, but he finds that all but himself is, in effect, absent from the experience." 22

Citations might be made from other nondirective writers to show they occupy the same point of view. Actually these would be of small value since they could add little to the clarity of Rogers' statements above. However, in order to indicate the tenor of these agreements with Rogers, the following brief citation from Combs is given: "By 'client-centered' the nondirective therapist means that he is concerned always with the way things appear to the client." 23 (Italics original)

It should therefore be quite apparent that in nondirective therapy there is a conscious effort as part of the technique of therapy to isolate the client in his own subjective world. That the conceptions of the client may or may not correspond with some objective reality is not the question in this kind of therapy. The point is that the therapist is to concentrate his attention actively on the attempt to understand the world of the client - whatever that world may be - without either commendation or criticism. A writer very sympathetic to Rogers sums it up in this fashion, "In warm acceptance the therapist avoids every interpretation and every construction


of the situation which is not the work of the client himself. 24

Concentration Upon Emotional Aspects Of Experience

The technique of entering into the world of experience of the client does not cease however just at that point. The process is carried to the point of the selection of and concentration upon the emotional components of the client's situation. It is not exactly the experience of the client that is at issue in therapy, it is more precisely how he himself feels about that experience. The nondirective therapist would certainly recognize that there are other factors in the client's situation beyond the purely emotional. There are social and environmental pressures, physiological needs, and intellectual and moral considerations. Such factors, however, are not considered in themselves. Nor are they deemed important for nondirective therapy even if they influence the client's behavior, which of course they do. The one primary concern is what, in the client's own perceptual world, creates emotional tension, confusion, and disorientation.

Therefore the focus in therapy is upon the way that the client feels about himself, about others, and about his world of experience. The assumption is that when the discomfort is removed the client can objectively assess himself and move toward a more comfortable reorganization of his personality. This is a further explication of the original assumption of the innate goodness of human nature and its capacity to meet and solve its own problems.

constructively. It is interesting that as clinical practice continued Rogers and his followers gradually shifted from emphasis upon techniques to an emphasis upon attitudes. If the sequence of ideas above is followed out, if the nondirective therapist genuinely acts in accord with his philosophy about human nature, then stress upon atmosphere, emotional feelings, and counselor attitudes is most natural.

This relationship has, naturally, not eluded the nondirective theorists themselves. In a statement Rogers thought significant enough to republish, and which is also quoted by Combs, Rogers says, "As time has gone by we have come to put increasing stress upon the 'client-centeredness' of the relationship, because it is more effective the more completely the counselor concentrates upon trying to understand the client as the client seems to himself." (Italics original) Combs adds to this a rather clear statement, "Personal meanings are crucial in the client's behavior for we behave not in terms of events but in terms of the meanings of these events for us. It is the personal meaning of facts which motivates behavior, not the facts themselves." In this kind of a construction feelings are seen simply as the way in which the client expresses the meaning of a situation for him. The way therefore to understand the world of the client is to understand his feelings, his emotions.

26 Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, 30.
The function of therapy, from this angle, and as nondirectivism postulates it, is to create the atmosphere in which feelings can be released and explored, and in which new self-feelings can be developed from within the organismic experience of the individual. Thus consciously the effort is made once again to confine the client within his own experience, and even more sharply within the emotional areas of that experience. The particular view of the self to which this experiential limitation is made will be discussed later. The concern at this point is to indicate that in method the nondirective therapists have chosen to isolate the client in a phenomenological and relative world. The further question whether this is not most highly directive will be reserved also for future reference.

Reaction Of Other Scholars

Let it be inferred that the author of this study is drawing conclusions with respect to the centrality of the emotional components of experience not warranted by the citations above, brief reference will be made to the way in which this trend seems to others in the field. Robinson suggests this summary: "Like other therapists, the nondirectivists feel that knowledge alone is not sufficient to bring about therapeutic change, but they place emphasis upon reacting to the feelings expressed by the client rather than to what he is describing. That is, the counselor reflects how the client feels about the situation rather than suggesting possible factors or solutions to

it." Thorne\(^\text{29}\) comes to the same conclusion in somewhat more lengthy fashion. He says that Rogers' methods are based on the postulate that emotional factors are etiologic to functional disorders in normal people and that the principal problem in psychotherapy concerns the handling of emotional factors which block healthy growth. The role of the counselor is to catalyze the expression of emotional conflicts and to encourage the client to assume maximum responsibility to work out his own problem solutions.

The Reflection Of Feeling Technique

So far, then, it has been indicated that the nondirective principle of the isolation of the client is seen in the techniques of the rejection of all save client advanced material and in the confining of the interview to considerations of the emotional reactions of the client. To these must be added a third technique which reveals equally clearly the same basic pre-occupation. This the nondirective therapists call the reflection of feeling. Probably this is more truly a technique than the others just mentioned, since they are as much suppositions and hypotheses as they are techniques. Here, however, is a real method for the concentration of both therapist and client upon the feeling states of the client.

In the earlier, formative days of nondirective therapy it was felt that a valid method in counseling was the recognition and clarification of client feeling. In Counseling and Psychotherapy and in a later article\(^\text{30}\) Rogers

\(^{29}\text{Frederick C. Thorne, Principles of Personality Counseling, Brandon, Vt., 1950, 228.}\)

\(^{30}\text{Rogers, "Significant Aspects of Client-Centered Therapy," Am. Psychol., 1956, 416.}\)
summarized the then current view as follows: "The therapist uses only those procedures and techniques in the interview which convey his deep understanding of the emotionalized attitudes expressed and acceptance of them. This understanding is best perhaps conveyed by a sensitive reflection and clarification of the client's attitudes. The counselor's acceptance involves neither approval nor disapproval." It began to be felt however that clarification involved a sort of subtle directiveness and attitudes toward it began to change.

Although Snyder's investigation had shown that progress in therapy followed counselor expressions of clarification of counselee feelings, Rogers gradually abandoned clarification as an accepted technique in favor of sheer reflection of counselee perceptions. The tendency toward reflection is seen in Rogers' article on the attitude and orientation of the counselor, and the trend is complete at the time of publishing *Client-Centered Therapy*. In this Rogers says concerning the technique of reflection, "This (clarification-Y) has been a useful concept, and it is partially descriptive of what occurs. It is, however, too intellectualistic, and if taken too literally, may focus the process in the counselor....In order to avoid this latter type of handling, we have tended to give up the description of the counselor's

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role as being that of clarifying the client's attitudes."

This reflection of feeling is more than a simple mirroring of the emotions of the client. It is not sheer passivity on the part of the counselor, even though the client feels the counselor to be his alter ego in the process of therapy. True the therapist is to be the catalyst in the reaction, but he is not inert. On the contrary the technique of reflection is the means whereby the counselor conveys to the client his understanding of and acceptance of the client. This conversation is to be done in a warm and acceptant manner so that a permissive and personal relationship between client and therapist may be established.

Selection Of Reflected Feeling

The therapist selects those feelings which are to be reflected. A given client response, for instance, may contain one feeling clue, it may be ambivalent, it may have several emotional components. And here again comes the fact that nondirective therapy places the individual within the world of his own feelings. For the clue or clues to which response should come from the counselor are those which concern the person himself and not his problem as such. In addition the reflection is most frequently given as a question or tentative statement referring the client back to his feelings for further exploration or acceptance. The consistent usage of phrases such as, "You feel......?", indicates the constant effort of the therapist to keep

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33 Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, 28-29.
the center of counseling in the client, and even more, within the feeling states of the client.

Rogers sums up the foregoing discussion in this way: "The most helpful techniques have seemed to be those that communicate something of the attitudes which the therapist deeply holds - his acceptance of the person as he is at this moment and his empathic understanding of the client's attitudes as seen from the client's point of view."\textsuperscript{34} That this is the trend in nondirective counseling is further established by Seeman's study.\textsuperscript{35} In this he points out that earlier nondirective therapists found it necessary to use some directive methods, but as experience grew there has come to be a sharp decrease in such use. In current practice he found that some eighty-five percent of counselor responses were reflective and acceptant in nature.

It should be clear, then, that the second principle in the methodology of nondirective therapy is that of the isolation of the client within the world of his own feelings - feelings toward himself, toward others, and toward his world. This isolation is accomplished by the rejection of all save client advanced data, by concentration upon the feeling of the client, and by the use of the reflection of feeling technique.


Summary Of Part One

Basic to the techniques of nondirective therapy are two assumptions concerning human nature. The first is that on the whole human nature contains a fundamental drive toward good adjustment, that there is a psychic homeostasis as well as a biologic one. It might be more properly said that the entire organism is homeostatic. Therefore the first principle of nondirective counseling is to establish the warm, acceptant climate in which the client can be truly himself, and in which he is free to reorient himself in his own way toward his own purposes.

The second assumption is that if the emotional difficulties of the client can be cleared then all others will clarify themselves. That is to say, emotional factors are primary both in personality organization and in disorganization. For this reason the second principle of nondirective therapy is the isolation of the client in the world of his own feelings. The attempt is to understand how the client himself feels, and to convey that understanding to him warmly and acceptantly.

In actual clinical practice these principles cannot be separated as they have been abstracted in this study for analysis. They operate concurrently as the implementation of the basic hypothesis concerning human nature, and are to be viewed really as a Gestalt configuration. Philosophy and practice belong together. The nondirective therapists are convinced that a requisite for successful nondirective therapy is the genuine possession of these convictions about the nature of human nature.

Probably the best summation of the first part of the chapter may be made in Rogers' own words:
It has seemed to us that the client-centered therapist operates primarily upon one central and basic hypothesis which has undergone relatively little change with the years. This hypothesis is that the client has within himself the capacity, latent if not evident, to understand those aspects of his life and of himself which are causing him unhappiness or pain, and the capacity and tendency to reorganize himself and his relationship to life in the direction of self-actualization and maturity in such a way as to bring a greater degree of internal comfort........It could be more truly stated that the conditions of therapy are met when the client experiences the respect and acceptance the therapist has for him, experiences an empathic understanding, experiences the locus of evaluation residing within himself, experiences no significant limitation of the expression of his attitudes.36

Rogers then goes on to point out the absence in nondirective therapy of factors regarded as essential by others. Among these are psychological diagnosis, the transference relationship, advice, guidance, reassurance, and interpretation. From the above citation it should appear evident that the analysis presented thus far is supported by the contentions of the nondirective therapists themselves.

The Process Of Therapy

Without doubt the clearest statement of the process and development of successful therapy is that made by Rogers and his associates. This sequence has been verified both by clinical procedure and by research studies. A review of nondirective literature reveals that all writers in this field are in agreement with Rogers on the steps involved in the process or development

of therapy. It is probable also that most major schools of therapy would agree on the basic facts as set forth by Rogers with respect to what does happen in successful therapy. It is very much a question how far other orientations would accept the nondirective terminology and the extent to which some concepts are pushed. However that is not the question at issue at the moment. The concern here is to set out what conceptions of human nature underlie Rogers' structuring of the process of therapy. For convenience in discussion the process may be divided into three parts: the self-acceptance of the client, the self-reorganization of the client, and the development of new behavioral patterns by the client.

In Chapter IV of *Client-Centered Therapy* Rogers delineates at some length a number of hypotheses and research studies aimed at their validation. These hypotheses are concerned with the process, the sequence of developments within the client, that occur during therapy. Rogers further notes that our knowledge concerning what actually happens is slight, and he carefully calls attention to the fact that these are hypotheses. To consider each of these in detail with the supporting research would be a project in itself. There is almost an endless opportunity for new research in the materials advanced in this one chapter - either to confirm or to reject the propositions given. However vital and fascinating this might be, it is not germane to the purpose of this study.

It is Rogers' claim that as therapy develops there may be found progressive changes in the client, such as increase in insightful statements, in positive attitudes toward himself, growth in acceptance of the self, the admission to awareness of previously denied experience a shift in the locus
of evaluation, a lessening of defensiveness, lessening of physiological tension, and changes in the personality structure. These and others are traced from the client's beginning in therapy to his conclusion of it, and in some cases follow up references are made. For analytical reasons the materials advanced by Rogers and his fellow-workers are grouped in what might be called three stages of therapy. This has been done in order that the basic hypotheses concerning the nature of human nature may be evident among the many details of research evidence.

Self-Acceptance Of Client

The first stage of therapy is the gradual coming of the client to accept himself as he is. It should be noted that for convenience of discussion the stages are abstracted and that in the reality of therapy they are often considerably intermixed. It is probable also that every brand of therapy would acknowledge that the client must come to a realistic appraisal of himself for therapy to proceed effectively. The question, therefore, is not this, but it is what the nondirective therapists mean by self-acceptance. This is naturally true for other therapists as well.

In writing of this from the viewpoint of the client nondirective therapists would propose that the client come to a full scale assessment of his virtues and vices, his strengths and weaknesses. From their standpoint it is even more important that he accept these findings as simply the way he is - without shame or moral recrimination. Rogers states it this way, "As he talks freely about himself, he becomes able to face the various aspects of himself without rationalization or denial - his likes and dislikes, his
hostile attitudes as well as his positive affections, his desires for
dependence as well as independence, his unrecognized conflicts and motivations, his wishful as well as his realistic goals....... As he finds that this unconventional self, this hidden self, is comfortably accepted by the counselor, the client is also able to accept this hitherto unrevealed self as his own.  

Development Of Positive Acceptance Of Self

The importance of this self-acceptance is underscored by a later statement by Rogers that mere acceptance is not enough, the individual must come to approve of and develop a positive affection for himself. In Rogers’ own words:

In various writings and researches that have been published regarding client-centered therapy there has been a stress upon the acceptance of self as one of the directions and outcomes of therapy. We have established the fact that in successful psychotherapy negative attitudes toward the self decrease and positive attitudes increase. We have measured the gradual increase in self-acceptance and have studied the correlated increase in acceptance of others. But as I examine these statements and compare them with our more recent cases, I feel that they fall short of the truth. The client not only accepts himself - a phrase which may carry the connotation of a grudging and reluctant acceptance of the inevitable - he actually comes to like himself....... Here it seems to me is an important and often overlooked truth about the therapeutic process....... As this occurs, the individual feels a positive liking for himself, a genuine appreciation of himself as a total functioning unit, which is one of the

37 Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy, 171-172.
important endpoints of therapy. (Italics original)

One of the objections voiced by nondirective therapy against other therapies was that frequently their respect for the individual was based upon what he could become and not upon what he was. It is quite clear that in the thought of Rogers that such respect is to be based upon what the client actually is at any stage of therapy - even in pre-therapy. And this viewpoint is carried further with the citations just made that in successful therapy the client comes to have such respect and acceptance of himself also. Comment upon the validity of such acceptance will be reserved for a later chapter. It is sufficient here to recognize that in successful nondirective therapy it is probably inevitable that the client should so view himself. When the client is placed in a genuinely acceptant approach, finds himself at all points accepted without criticism or judgment, finds a consistent reflection of his feelings, it is small wonder that he at last comes to self-acceptance and self-liking.

The Role Of Catharsis In Self Acceptance

It is recognized of course that antecedent to any acceptance of self the individual in therapy must have come to a reasonably objective assessment of himself which will include those denied elements of experience that were functional in bringing about the tension that called for therapeutic relief. In other words the client must have previously experienced an

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Rogers, "Some of the Directions and End Points of Therapy," 12, 13, 16.
emotional release which now enables him to more clearly look at himself as he is. But since catharsis is a recognized part of all therapies, and since it has no particular philosophical implications in nondirective therapy, this section began with the assumptions of the concept of self-acceptance. This does not imply that the experience of catharsis is unimportant in nondirective therapy. Indeed without this emotional release the next steps in therapy cannot occur.

The role of the counselor in this release situation is to provide that warm acceptance which sets the client free to expose his deepest feelings. Further than this he is to reflect the feelings of the client in such a way that deeper exploration will take place until such time as all pertinent material has been made clear. In an atmosphere free from any threat or judgment the client finds no blocking to full release and exploration even of areas previously considered most dangerous to his self-concept. Thus the client finds that he is free to hate, fear or love; he can be frightened, confused, or perplexed, because he is met at all times with a respect for what he is now, for the feelings he now has.

Reference has been made previously to the fact that nondirective therapy is an emotional release therapy. It is not necessary to belabor this point, nor to develop it at great length. Some therapies would consider the reduction of tension a desirable result of counseling. Probably all therapists would consider some reduction important. But the nondirectivists would consider catharsis to be a **sine qua non** of therapy. This is a correlative of the conception that emotional factors are etiologic in personality maladjustment. Concerning the release of feeling Rogers writes,
"Certainly one of the significant goals of any counseling experience is to bring into the open those thoughts and attitudes, those feelings and emotionally charged impulses, which center around the problems and conflicts of the individual. In effective counseling and psychotherapy one of the major purposes of the counselor is to help the client to express freely the emotionalized attitudes which are basic to his adjustment problems and conflicts. In this process the client finds emotional release from feelings heretofore repressed, increasing awareness of the basic elements in his own situation, and increased ability to recognize his own feelings openly and without fear."

As was pointed out earlier, one of the results of nondirective therapy is the isolation of the client in the world of his own feelings. This process occurs because of the consistent refusal of the counselor to consider and reflect anything but the client's feelings. In the citation above it is evident that Rogers considers these emotional components to be primary in therapy. And in his conclusion to the chapter quoted he goes on to say that this emotional clarification produces the basis for psychological insight and differentiation of perception. In the Rogerian conception, then, nothing occurs in therapy without the cathartic reaction. Of course, as is evident from the above, in successful therapy more must happen than emotional release. But unless release does eventuate nothing else develops.

In the process of therapy it has been noted that the first stage is that of the self acceptance of the client. In order to accept himself as he

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39 Rogers, Counseling and Psychotherapy, 131, 173.
is the client must first of all be released from the emotional tensions that characterize his present situation. When he is so set free the client is able, according to nondirective therapy, to come to a more clear understanding of his present personality dynamics and to new perceptions of himself. This clearer understanding of why he functions as he now does is also essential to his real self acceptance. Indeed Rogers calls it a crucial step.

Clarification Of Insight

In an accepting situation, such as that of nondirective therapy, the client can freely reveal his very deepest feelings, even those which he has previously rather rigorously denied to conscious awareness. When this occurs two other factors become present in successful therapy. The client perceives facts in new relationships. In many cases of therapy the need is not for new facts but rather that the client look at them in new ways. So the client who blames his parents or society for what he is may indeed face the fact of his maladjustment but he has not found the real locus of his trouble. In the freedom of therapy he can come to face the reality that the difficulty is in himself. In the second place the client comes to a gradual understanding of himself and his functioning dynamics. So long as the individual continues to deny facts of his own experience, so long will he develop defensive behavior and compensatory mechanisms.

According to Rogers, therefore, full self acceptance involves release from emotional tension about oneself, insight into the actual mechanisms of the personality's functioning, and an acceptance of that self as it is without criticism or denial of any part of it. Perhaps this can best be
First comes the experience of release - the pouring out of feelings, the loosening of repressions, the unburdening of guilt, the lessening of tension. There follows, if progress is to be made, the understanding of self, the acceptance of one's impulses, the perception of relationships, which we classify under the term insight.

Taken in other contexts, expressed in other terminology, the concepts of the process of therapy here set forth by Rogers might well find agreement among other therapists. But in the nondirective phraseology these concepts are based upon definite philosophical assumptions. Perhaps it would be more accurate to say that in nondirective therapy their successful usage depends upon the philosophy and attitude of the counselor with respect to the client. The client is to be viewed as worthwhile in himself now, he is essentially good, and capable of self-direction. And in the second assumption the client must be regarded consistently as the only locus of judgment and evaluation. The third assumption involved is that when the emotional components of a situation are dealt with the others will take care of themselves. A fourth assumption is that the internal frame of reference of the client is the only valid reference in therapy. No attempt is here made to evaluate these hypotheses, they are repeated in order that the preceding discussion of the first stage in the process of therapy may be made clear as to its basic reference.

Reorganization Of The Self Concept

Were therapy to cease at this point it would not yet be successful. Conceivably an individual under therapy might reach the stage of self acceptance and understanding but go no further. He might choose, because of the effort involved in self reorganization, the self pattern he now has. It is possible that some clients might feel more comfortable to retain a neurosis than to engage in creating a new personality. It is probable, however, that no one would regard this state of affairs as successful therapy, even though some tension reduction may have been brought about during counseling. It is one thing to accept without moral recrimination the self as it now is. It is quite another thing to reorganize the self in terms of more effective functioning and personal relationships. The second stage of the process of therapy is therefore precisely this reorganization of the self.

There are at least three parts to this process, if not more. It should again be recognized that these are not only concurrent with themselves, they may be developing along with areas of the first and third stages of therapy. And in addition there may be times of definite regression to a pre-therapy level of development in personality. The discussion will center about an increasing development of the internal frame of reference, the recognition of the individual's ability to choose and to act, and the creation of more realistic life and self goals.

Client Growth In Use Of Internal Frame Of Reference

One of the basic objectives of nondirective therapy is that the
individual come to a point where values and judgments are not introjected, where determinations of action are not gauged by external factors. Values, goals, choices - these are to be determined by factors within the organism, by how the individual feels about the situation at hand. This does not deny that there are external realities, or social pressures demanding conformity of behavior. It does assert that the client is to choose for conformity to social standards or for nonconformity in terms of his own personality organization. The individual and his desires, his wishes, his needs, not as seen by anyone else, but as he himself sees them, these are properly the only determinants of behavior. This assumption about human nature is the reason why nondirective therapy insists upon the consistent effort of the therapist to see things from the point of view of the client, and to reflect only the feelings of the client. That this internal frame of reference concept is important in nondirective therapy has been referred to previously in this study. The concern at this point is that in successful nondirective therapy there should be a growth in the client of this internal frame of reference. He should increasingly find the locus of evaluation within himself.

In summarizing the results of a study by Sheerer Rogers states:

There is a tendency for the 'acceptance of self', operationally defined, to increase during therapy. Acceptance of self, according to the definition used, means that the client tends:

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to perceive himself as a person of worth, worthy of respect rather than condemnation;
to perceive his standards as being based on his own experience, rather than upon the attitudes or desires of others;
to perceive his own feelings, motives, social and personal experiences, without distortion of the basic sensory data;
to be comfortable in acting in terms of these perceptions. 42

Rogers then goes on to cite other research of a nondirective character in which the client is said to come to see himself as the evaluator of experience as against the concept of being in a world in which values are inherent in the objects of perception. Rogers' own summary is stated as follows: 
"He tends to place the basis of standards within himself, recognizing that the 'goodness' or 'badness' of any experience or perceptual object is not something inherent in that object, but is a value placed upon it by himself." 43

In speaking of the technique of recognition and acceptance of the personal meanings for the client by the therapist, Combs probably states most clearly the factor of the internal frame of reference in the process of therapy. He states it this way:

Learning in an external frame of reference is a function of stimulus and response. In a phenomenological system change in behavior is a function of change in the individual's field of meaning........ Careful observation seems to indicate that these changes are a function of the differentiation of meanings in a figure-ground relationship........

42 Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy*, 138-139.
43 Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy*, 139.
To aid the client in making changes in personal meanings, the counselor promotes differentiation by his techniques. (Here Combs speaks of the creation of a free atmosphere and the recognition and acceptance of personal meanings. - Y.)

This latter technique seems to do two things for the client. In the first place it centers his attention upon himself and upon the meanings of events for him....

Thus Combs sets forth very clearly that the primary thing in the reorganization of the self is to center all the referents of behavior within the individual himself.

The foregoing is summarized by Nuttin in the following way:

The emphasis is therefore placed on the subjective way in which the patient experiences himself and others. This is why non-directive therapy tries to penetrate into the subjective world of each patient's experience and to express this world without using objective terms, without reference to a particular terminology. For such terms do not express the particular way in which the subject sees himself or the world.

This is the origin of a new development in Rogers' school towards what is known as the 'phenomenological' study of the personality. This kind of study means that instead of trying to find out as much as possible about the patient, the effort is rather to see and experience the world exactly as he experiences it himself. (Italics original.)

It would seem apparent that the central focus in the reorganization of the self, according to nondirective therapy, is to get the client to center his attention upon himself and his experience. It would seem further that

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45 Nuttin, Psychoanalysis and Personality, 93.
the basic assumption involved here is that man is the true measure of himself. And that not as measured by traits common to mankind, but by what each individual finds within himself.

Client Selection Of Goals In Life

It is not sufficient that the client create a new concept of himself as a person of worth and as the center of evaluation. On the foundation of this new viewpoint of himself the client next must select more realistic goals for his life. With a clearer realization of his actual self, a better understanding of his interpersonal relationships, and a more realistic appraisal of himself and his world, the client is able to select more fitting goals. He will be a more effective person because he will be working with his capacities rather than denying or working against them.

Probably no school of therapy would question the fact that one of the aims of therapy is that the individual shall arrive at realizable and realistic goals for his life. However, as in other aspects of nondirective theory, this is not the real question. The question is from where do these goals come, and on what basis are they to be selected. It is the contention of nondirective therapists that life goals can and should be subjectively derived, that is, from within the individual himself.

While this might be demonstrated from various areas of nondirective practice and theory, perhaps the most clear statements occur with respect to the system of values. Rogers writes in this connection:

It seems to be true that early in therapy the person is living largely by values he has introjected from others, from his personal cultural environment.........
As therapy progresses, the client comes to realize that he is trying to live by what others think, that he is not being his real self, and he is less and less satisfied with this situation. \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots The individual discovers that he has within himself the capacity for weighing the experiential evidence and deciding upon those things which make for the long-run enhancement of the self (which inevitably makes for the enhancement of other selves as well). \ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots In therapy, in the initial phases, there appears to be a tendency for the locus of evaluation to lie outside the client\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots Little by little the client finds that it is not only possible but satisfying and sound to accept the locus of evaluation as residing within himself.\textsuperscript{46}

In summarizing a study by Raskin on the locus of evaluation Rogers comes to the conclusion that the results justify the following statement: "This study permits the conclusion that there is a change in the valuing process during therapy, and that one characteristic of this change is that the individual moves away from a state where his thinking, feeling, and behavior are governed by the judgments and expectations of others, and toward a state in which he relies upon his own experience for his values and standards."\textsuperscript{47}

Validated By Biologically Accepted Experience Of Client

This internalization of judgment and setting of life goals may be carried one step further. It would be conceivable that an individual would come to accept as valid goals set by society or a peer group to which he belongs, and he might even accept these genuinely. But in Rogers' way of

\textsuperscript{46} Rogers, \textit{Client-Centered Therapy}, 149, 150, 151.

\textsuperscript{47} \textit{Ibid.}, 157.
thinking this would not yet be valid unless these goals were based on the biological and visceral accepted experience of the client. The biological optimism of nondirective thinking has been referred to previously, and here is another example of how it is carried through to the area of values. In fact, Rogers goes so far as to call it a continuing organismic process, and states that the sensual equipment is entirely adequate for evaluational procedures. This may be stated in Rogers' own words:

He (the client-Y) discovers that his own senses, his own physiological equipment, can provide the data for making value judgments and for continually revising them. He discovers that he does not need to know what are the correct values; through the data supplied by his own organism he can experience what is satisfying and enhancing. He can put his confidence in a valuing process, rather than in some rigid, introjected system of values.48 (Italics original)

Client Confidence In His Own Ability

The final step in the reorganization of the self comes when, having looked within himself and having set self-determined goals, the individual recognizes that he is free to choose and to act on the basis of that choice. This is the achieving of a kind of self-confidence that will enable him to develop new patterns of behavior freely based on his own experience. This confidence in his own ability is not realized all at once, and may undergo even severe regressions during therapy. But if therapy progresses successfully the client will become more and more self-reliant and independent of the therapist and of all others as well.

48 Rogers, op. cit., 523.
Rogers and his followers recognize the value of the development of some emotional relationship between the therapist and the client, but stop short of anything they feel might involve the typical transference of orthodox psychoanalysis. Probably all therapies have as a goal that the client should become independent, free to choose and to act. They differ in the way that the client is to get to the establishment of such independence. Some therapies depend upon a full but temporary dependence of the client upon the therapist, some urge a more mild supportive therapy, some have evolved a cooperative relationship between client and counselor. Nondirective therapy, however, stands alone in expecting the full achievement of independence to originate within the client. This reflects once more the basic conception of nondirective theory that the individual has native within himself the capacities of self-healing and self-direction.

As has been indicated above the new self-confidence of the client is not a sudden gift. It is arrived at through painful steps and slow stages of uncertainty as he admits all the evidence of experience into reality. Rogers has a very clear description of this stage of growth. Speaking of the client, Rogers says:

He feels, in spite of his uncertainty, a curious assurance in himself because he is more his real self, because he is acting on experiential data clearly perceived........He dares to launch out on his own, not with the feeling that all his problems are resolved or that he completely understands himself or has completely reorganized himself, but with the feeling (where therapy is most successful) that he has learned to look clearly at his own experiences
as they occur and to accept them and to guide
himself in view of them.49

In Rogers' thinking the client must come to the point where he can freely
choose to do nor not to do, to select from various choices those based on
his own experience which he feels appropriate to his needs and situation.
This recognition by the client of his own ability to make choices is an
essential step in the process of therapy because without it the individual
is not likely to develop new patterns of behavior that are his own. The
individual under pressure may change his behavior to conform with what is
expected or demanded. In nondirective thought this would not be a basic
growth in the personality nor a desirable development in the process of
therapy.

Development Of New Behavioral Patterns

When the individual has reached the point of being able to choose, to
select his own course of behavior, it would naturally be expected that new
behavioral patterns should result from the change in the organization of the
personality. Indeed it would be a reasonable expectation that behavioral
change in the direction of maturity is an indication of successful therapy.
This, of course, would be also true for all therapies. If no change or
growth is found in the life of the client or in his attitudes one might
validly assume that therapy was not successful.

Research Evidence In Support Of This Claim

It is precisely the claim of nondirective therapy that behavioral changes in the direction of increased maturity on the part of the client do follow successful therapy or are found developing concurrent with it. This claim is based on clinical evidence and insight but even more importantly, upon some research utilizing a variety of techniques to establish the evidence for behavioral change. These latter run from judgmental observations of the client's behavior to the use projective tests like the Rorshach.

In Counseling and Psychotherapy Rogers describes the clinical insights into behavior changes in this way:

As insight is developing, as the decisions are made which orient the client about new goals, these decisions tend to be implemented by actions which move the client in the direction of the new goals. Such actions are, indeed, a test of the genuineness of the insights which have been attained.

In actual counseling practice, such positive steps are almost invariably concomitants of insight. It is as though the client were saying, 'I am able to handle this by myself. I am working toward my new goal. I am enjoying becoming independent of your help.' This attitude is one of the real achievements of therapy.

Statements similar to this might be multiplied from the nondirective writers, but these would add little to the present discussion. Immediately following the second statement in the above citation Rogers quotes at length from two case studies in order to validate his argument. In one, the case of Barbara,

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50 Rogers, op. cit., 211, 216.
the question is whether the girl shall cut her hair in opposition to her
parent's wishes. When she finally decides to do so, Rogers points out that
the action is now based on her decisions with respect to herself. And he
argues that although the decision itself is minor, yet it shows how action
follows upon the new view of herself attained in therapy.

Nondirective therapy does not, however, rest its case upon clinical
observations however penetrating they may be. In the study by Snyder pre-
viously mentioned in this chapter, the author points out that in the later
stages of therapy there is an increase of material from the client dealing
with plans to be undertaken and behavior to be initiated by the client.
Hoffman, reporting also on materials advanced by the client found evidences
of increasing maturity as therapy progressed. This finding was corroborated
by judges reviewing the material independently.51 It should be noted that
these are reported references by the client in the clinical situation.52

Using the galvanic skin response and the variation in heart rate
Thetford53 found that clients after therapy were significantly improved over
their condition previous to therapy when exposed to a frustration situation.
This is to say that therapy enabled the individuals in the study to meet
problems of stress with less disturbance than before undergoing therapy.

51Snyder, op. cit., 222.
52Edward A. Hoffman, "A Study of Reported Behavior Changes in Counsel-
53William N. Thetford, "The measurement of physiological responses to
frustration before and after nondirective psychotherapy," The American
Psychologist, III, July, 1948, 278.
This type of research is an improvement over the foregoing in that it offers more objective evidence of behavioral change, even though that change be purely physiological in character. It would probably be even more meaningful if such research were applied to behavior choices that did not involve frustration. However the concern just at this point is that there is some evidence on objective grounds that behavior changes do take place as a result of nondirective therapy.

In *Client-Centered Therapy* Rogers quotes other studies to show that children improved greatly in reading after therapy and that a rather large group of veterans were rated as improved on their jobs during and after a course of therapeutic treatment. In the latter study it was noted that the degree of improvement seemed correlated to the amount of therapy. No better summary of the various researches can be given than that by Rogers himself:

"...The evidence at present suggests that the client's behavior changes in these ways: he considers, and reports putting into effect, behavior which is more mature, self-directing, and responsible than the behavior he has shown heretofore; his behavior becomes less defensive, more firmly based on an objective view of self and reality; his behavior shows a decreasing amount of psychological tension; he tends to make a more comfortable and more effective adjustment to school and to job; he meets new stress situations with an increased degree of inner calm."

It is evident then that nondirective therapists believe that the logical sequel of behavior change to therapeutic change in personality organization is being reached in nondirective therapy.

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54 Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy*, p. 186.
Chapter Summary

In this chapter there has been the attempt to set forth in as objective a fashion as possible the basic concepts of nondirective therapy with respect to the methodology and the process of such counseling. Both method and process were seen to have underlying philosophic conceptions with respect to the nature of human nature. It has been noted further that the methodology of nondirective counseling is in accord with its basic hypothesis that human nature has sufficient capacity to be its own therapist under the proper nondirective conditions. The demand of nondirective theory that its own philosophy of human nature must accompany successful use of nondirective methods has been stated. It has also been found useful to combine nondirective techniques under two main principles, namely, the principles of warm acceptance and the isolation of the client in his own world of internal reference. The process of therapy as viewed by the nondirective writers involves three stages or levels. There is first of all the coming of self-acceptance by the client, then the reorganization of the self, and finally the evidence of the new self as possessing more effective behavior patterns.

While some of the philosophic assumptions and hypotheses underlying the material of this chapter were noted, the discussion of these has been reserved for the following chapters of this study.
CHAPTER IV

THE BASIC ASSUMPTIONS CONCERNING HUMAN NATURE IN

ROGERS' THEORY

The very heart of any system of psychology or of psychotherapy is in the conception of the nature of human nature that is adopted. This is as true for the empirical behaviorist as for the Christian psychologist who believes in a soul. If a therapist believes that man is essentially a physio-chemical being governed by S-R bonds then his various techniques and goals of therapy will be thereby determined. Thus also, if following Rogers, the therapist believes that the patient is fully capable of providing his own conflict solutions, his methodology and end purposes will be congruent. Here it is assumed, of course, that the systems are logically developed and coherent. However it is basically true that the fundamental philosophic conceptions of human nature are determinative of the entire structure of a given system of therapy.

It is probably further true that few theorists have stated the case for a particular philosophy as have Rogers and his followers. In the great majority of writings in the field of therapy the reader is left to his own ingenuity in deducing the crucial concepts concerning human nature of the author in question. Rogers, on the contrary, has clearly stated some nineteen hypotheses which he believes to have either clinical or research evidence in support. These hypotheses are not presented as complete or as
yet a truly definitive theory of human nature. They do represent the organized statement of Rogers' conclusions on the basis of nondirective therapy to date.

In this chapter the effort will be made to state as clearly as possible the essence of Rogers' hypotheses in Rogers' own terms. There is naturally some limitation involved in this procedure since it must be presumed that the objective statements are a reasonably accurate reflection of Rogers' internal world of thought. This is not to assume the burden of a later discussion of the philosophic impasse involved in Rogers' theory of the internal frame of reference. It is true that one cannot fully enter into the world of experience of another individual. It is equally true that one must assume as valid the symbolic representations of that inner experience or all therapy and understanding is made impossible. For this reason the content of this chapter is stated as far as possible in Rogers' own terminology.

For purposes of convenience only the nineteen theoretical hypotheses as found in Chapter XI of Client-Centered Therapy will be discussed as answers to the following questions: What is the inter-relationship between the "self" and the organism? Does the individual possess innate growth forces that consistently promote constructive problem solutions? Is the internal frame of reference the only valid approach to therapy and self-insight? Is the emotional factor primary in both therapy and personality difficulty? On what is a valid valuational system based?

The last part of this chapter will review the five hypotheses that are specified as having a direct bearing upon the program and process of education. These are stated in Chapter IX of Client-Centered Therapy and will be
viewed as derivatives of the main considerations advanced in this chapter by Dr. Rogers. It will be seen that this is no reflection upon the importance of these theories concerning education. No doubt should exist that the applications of a theory may be as vital as the theory itself.

The Relationship Of The Self And The Organism

If one had to select, from various elements, the key to a theory of personality, it would probably be the concepts dealing with the organization of the personality. Recent years have seen a very considerable number of theoretical discussions of the structure of human personality, and it is scarcely to be wondered that the nondirective therapists have added their contributions also. Although there are a number of unique elements to be found in Rogers' formulations, he also recognizes his debt to the constructive efforts of other than nondirective colleagues. Rogers further makes clear that his present position is one almost completely opposite to that held at the beginning of his professional career. The difference is asserted to be a result of clinical experience and research in the nondirective orientation.

With the rise of functionalism in psychology and the erection of altars to empiricism in methodology the ancient idea of a self was largely led into discard and the process of introspection conceived to have little value. The followers of the Scholastics never abandoned it, and the concept of the self revived after Freud. Freud originally thought of the human personality as consisting of a somewhat superficial conscious self, the ego, and a much greater unconscious libido of primitive urges. These two poles were thought to be in rather constant conflict. In his later works Freud speaks of the
unconscious Id, the knowing or perceiving Ego, and the Super-Ego or conscience.

The concept of introspection also was revived by Freud and his followers as a valid method in therapy and in respect to ascertaining material relating to psychic functioning. It has remained for Carl Rogers, however, to raise the self-concept and the introspective method to a new and radical pinnacle in personality theory and in therapy. Other personalistic psychologists, such as Gordon Allport, have indicated that introspection is a valid tool along with others of a more objective character. The Freudian and the Neo-Freudian theorists use introspection to gain knowledge of unconscious mental content and past repressed experience as well as present conflict. But the nondirective group rejects all methods except introspection for the purpose of gaining insight into the immediately present emotional climate of the client. There is much speaking of the self and of the feeling states of the individual, but the constant emphasis is upon what he is now and how he feels about his experiences at this time. This preoccupation with the purely present has been noted in the chapter on the development of nondirective theory. It is mentioned here in order to point out that Rogers has moved far from the streams of theory that gave him birth.

The Nature Of The Self

What then is the self of which Rogers so frequently speaks? Rogers has a somewhat lengthy definition which is really a definition and explanation combined. It is as follows:
The self-structure is an organized configuration of perceptions of the self which are admissible to awareness. It is composed of such elements as the perceptions of one's characteristics and abilities; the percepts and concepts of the self in relation to others and the environment; the value qualities which are perceived as associated with experiences and objects; and the goals and ideals which are perceived as having positive or negative valence. It is, then, the organized picture, existing in awareness either as figure or as ground, of the self and the self-in-relationship, together with the positive or negative values which are associated with those qualities and relationships, as they are perceived as existing in the past, present, or future.¹

The concepts involved in the definition of the self by Rainy² are so similar that they need not bear repeating, since for all practical purposes they are identical. In the remainder of this discussion, therefore, attention will be confined to the formulations and definitions advanced by Rogers.

It will at once be obvious, whatever this definition by Rogers may mean, that the concept of the self advanced here has little if any resemblance to those advanced in past generations. The question is open indeed whether that which Rogers postulates may be properly called a self. Further examination of Rogers' hypotheses will make clear that he is speaking of a percept of a series or configuration of perceptions of experiences in a greater or lesser degree of awareness. Scholastic and other psychologists who speak of a self are referring to an identity that experiences rather than an organization of experiences that makes an identity.

¹Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, 501.
There is no doubt that Rogers speaks of a self, of an "I", and of a "me." The question is what he means by this terminology. The proposition advanced above is that he does not have in mind the more or less classical conceptions of the self. Perhaps the citation of the more formal hypothesis rather than Rogers' definition of the self will make this even more clear:

As a result of interaction with the environment, and particularly as a result of interaction with others, the structure of the self is formed - an organized, fluid, but consistent conceptual pattern of perceptions of characteristics and relationships of the "I" or the "me," together with values attached to these concepts.\(^3\) (In the original the entire quotation is in italics.)

It is rather clear that here Rogers speaks of a "Gestalt" or configuration of experiences and values that may be called an "I" or a "me." The ego is therefore really not something or someone that experiences but is rather the experience or percept itself. More correctly the ego is the sum of those perceptions and relationships admitted to awareness as figure and as ground. To this Rogers adds the caution that the self ought not be considered synonymous with the organism since self really refers to the awareness of being or of functioning.

The Origin Of The Self

As indicated above Rogers holds that the term "self" is to be restricted to the conscious elements of experience as compared to the total experience of the organism. The question therefore arises how the self develops from

\(^3\)Rogers, op. cit., 493.
the totality of experience. Recognizing that there are many unanswered questions Rogers does offer a theory of development for the self. Probably in view of his own definition this should be called the development of the self-structure rather than the self. It should be understood that in the following pages the term "self-structure" will be employed rather than Rogers' interchange of the terms.

From the inchoate mass of perceptions the child begins gradually to recognize a portion of the private world as himself as distinct from that world. In the process of interaction with environment the infant builds a body of concepts about that environment, about himself as experiencing, and about his relationships to the environment. In addition the child experiences a valuing process that recognizes some positive and some negative valences. He shows likes and dislikes even before he has any verbal symbolization for experiences. At this stage there is no clear cut line between the self-structure and the organism, nor is there such a division between the inner and the outer world. It would appear, according to Rogers, that the child cherishes self-enhancing experiences and reacts negatively to those containing threat.

The next stage is that of the recognition of varied evaluations of the child by others, and this positive or negative evaluation becomes a part of his perceptual field. It is at this point, believe the nondirective theorists, that direct sensory experiences become distorted in symbolization and denied to awareness. The infant, who up until now, has found himself an object of affection responds to this love with satisfaction. At the same time some sensations which are gratifying to him at the moment, such as
defecation or aggression, are met with negative reactions from the parents. To the growing self-structure which accepts all sensations of such sort as good the parental reaction poses a threat. If the new perceptions are admitted to awareness they are inconsistent with the previous concepts of being loved.

Since the individual tends to admit to awareness only those elements of experience consistent with his own self-structure, there are two results which tend to follow the shock of this negative experience. On the one hand there is a denial in consciousness of the experienced satisfactions, and on the other hand is a distortion in symbolization of the experience. Instead of accepting the displeasure of the parents at his behavior the nascent self-structure does incorporate the unwanted behavior as unwanted by himself. Actually he has found satisfaction in the behavior. This he cannot admit and retain acceptance by the parents. Therefore the value system of the parents is accepted as if it were his own, and he now judges the behavior as unsatisfactory. This is summed up by Rogers as follows:

In this way, it would seem, that parental attitudes are not only introjected, but what is more important, are experienced not as the attitude of another, but in distorted fashion, as if based on the evidence of one's own sensory and visceral equipment. In this way the values which the infant attaches to experience become divorced from his own organismic functioning, and experience is valued in terms of the attitudes held by his parents, or by others who are in intimate association with him. These values come to be accepted as being just as 'real' as the values which are connected with direct experience. 

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*Rogers, op. cit., 500-501.*
Quite clearly, then, Rogers ascribes to what would appear to be the normal process of learning the "don't" of socially accepted behavior the role of the initiator of potential maladjustment.

Since primary visceral and sensory reactions are denied or distorted when in conflict with socially introjected values a concept of the self-structure based in part upon these distortions has come into being. As Rogers indicates the basic sensory and visceral experiences are denied an expression into conscious levels, and any values built on them cannot be admitted. Rogers summarizes this part of the theory this way: "Out of these dual sources - the direct experiencing by the individual, and the distorted symbolization of sensory reactions resulting in the introjection of values and concepts as if experienced - there grows the structure of the self." The self-structure so acquired will seek to maintain itself. If other introjected evidence or organismic demands negative to the adopted structure are not too great it is likely that the individual will remain quite stable.

The Assumptions Of This Development

Following the citation above Rogers goes on to say that under the right conditions it might be possible to erect a self-structure in which distortion and denial did not exist. If parents and other adults were to act consistently in the acceptive atmosphere of nondirective philosophy the child

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5 Rogers, op. cit., 501.
would be able freely to accept all elements of his growing self-structure. As has been seen earlier in this study the goal of nondirective therapy is in no way different. It is to accept into awareness all parts of the sensory and other experience of the individual and to choose consciously one's behavior in terms of this awareness. It is no doubt unnecessary to point out that this theoretical construct raises many more questions than it answers. However it may be noted at this time that in the propositions of Rogers discussed so far in this chapter are two basic assumptions. The first is that a part of the perceptual field and ground may be differentiated as the self-structure. The second is that the basis of human behavior is distinctly biological.

It cannot be urged too strongly that these two assumptions are not to be viewed as discrete. They belong together. Even when Rogers speaks of a "self" he is speaking of the admission to awareness of visceral and sensory evidence. Too many times to quote he uses just exactly that terminology, but perhaps propositions XIV and XV will make this clear. They read as follows: "Psychological maladjustment exists when the organism denies to awareness significant sensory and visceral experiences, which consequently are not symbolized and organized into the gestalt of the self-structure...... Psychological adjustment exists when the concept of the self is such that all the sensory and visceral experiences of the organism are, or may be, assimilated on a symbolic level into a consistent relationship with the concept of self." In the draft of a chapter in Mowrer's Theory and Research

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6Rogers, op. cit., 510, 513.
in Psychotherapy, Rogers says that client centered therapy is a process whereby man becomes his organism, a getting back to basic sensory and visceral experience. "In therapy the person adds to ordinary experience the full and undistorted awareness of his experiencing - of his sensory and visceral reactions. He ceases, or at least decreases, the distortions of experience in awareness. He can be aware of what he is actually experiencing, not simply what he can permit himself to experience after a thorough screening through a conceptual filter. In this sense the person becomes for the first time the full potential of the human organism with the enriching element of awareness freely added to the basic aspect of sensory and visceral reaction...

What this seems to mean is that the individual comes to be - in awareness - what he is - in experience......"

It is clear, therefore, that in the first place Rogers' theory of personality is founded upon an internal, biological perception of experiences, and the organization in awareness of these perceptions into a self-structure. In this conception the organism and its experiences is the wider term. The self, or self-structure, being the organized configuration of perceptions of the self which are admissible to awareness, is the narrower term. Although Rogers does speak of spontaneous forces, innate capacities of integration and redirection, of volitional control, these are not to be thought of as distinct from or in control of physiological experience. The quotations above indicate that the personality is what it experiences, and the self is

really a set of perceptions relating to the awareness of the individual as experiencing.

Self Or Free Will

There have been those, who like Curran, have found some hope that in Rogers' use of concepts such as the "self" there might be some movement away from the purely biological determinism of much of modern personality theory. Curran especially seemed to feel that in nondirective therapy there might be found clinical and research evidence in support of such concepts as the freedom of the will. Nuttin goes so far as to say: "His ideas (Rogers-GRY) form an element in American psychology approaching to the traditional philosophic idea of human personality;......It may prove significant for the spiritual conception of man in psychotherapy that such ideas should have been reached from data supplied by actual psychological treatment." (Italics original.)

It is not to be denied that Rogers does speak of growth forces within the individual, and he does refer to a "self." However the preceding discussion in this and previous chapters should have made clear that Rogers does not mean the self in any traditional fashion as an autonomous force that cannot be reduced to external or physiological influences. His self, which is really a self structure, is a construct or configuration of perceptions about visceral and sensory experience. As quoted above Rogers

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insists that the person becomes in awareness what he is in experience, and he transfers directly into psychology the biological principle of homeostasis. Moreover in adopting the phenomenological approach to personality and therapy, Rogers and his followers have pursued a biological determinism. Indeed some of the nondirective theorists have gone so far as to claim that the determinism is an inevitable sequel to the phenomenology. So Snygg and Combs write: "As a science phenomenological psychology must accept determinism because prediction and control are only possible in a field where behavior is lawful and caused. As a method, it also recognizes that the behavior often feels that he has a choice of behavior even though none exists in reality, since he always chooses the one which is pertinent to his phenomenal field at the instant of action."²

The Biological Basis Of Human Nature

It must be asserted therefore that a very basic assumption of Rogers is the biological basis of human behavior. While Rogers nowhere so baldly states the case for determinism as do Snygg and Combs the effect is the same. In the peculiar terminology of Rogers the proposition is that the self is what the experience is, and the experience is sensory and visceral. As noted earlier the constant emphasis in nondirective thinking is upon how the person feels now - so it is the sensory experience of the now that controls action and behavior. The difficulty in reading Rogers at this point is that he

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constantly uses the classical terminology of the self as though it functioned in the traditional sense, but by definition he means something else. Finally it may be noted that in thirteen of the nineteen propositions of Chapter II in *Client-Centered Therapy* one or more of the following words are directly used: organism, sensory, or visceral. And in the explanatory text they appear much more frequently still. Since Rogers often juxtaposes self and organism his biological orientation of behavior is quite evident.

When this study asserts that for Rogers the basis of behavior is biological it is not meant that he is referring to any atomistic reaction to stimuli. He speaks of no simple S-R explanation of behavior. His third proposition is that the organism reacts as an organized whole to the phenomenal field. That is, a basic characteristic or organic life is its tendency toward total response, the organism is always a totally organized system which is goal-directed toward self-enhancement or homeostasis. However great or small the conceived complexity or organization may be, and no matter if awareness be added to sensory reaction, the fact of biological grounding remains. In proposition four Rogers recognizes this as true when he says,

"The organism has one basic tendency and striving - to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing organism. . . . . . . . . . . . . The directional trend we are endeavoring to describe is evident in the life of the individual organism from conception to maturity, at whatever level of organic complexity."

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10 Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy*, 487, 488.
Humanity Characterized By Innate Growth Forces For Good

While the foregoing is no doubt an unsatisfactorily brief summary of one aspect of nondirective thought, it does point up the fact that nondirectivism is basically a biologically oriented psychology. No one today would desire a return to the ancient view of body, soul, and mind as completely discrete entities. Rogers' views, however, raise the question of a monolithic structure or organismic functions garnished by some sort of awareness which is not at all defined. Nor does Rogers stop at this point. He asserts not only the biological basis of human nature and behavior, but also that it is optimally oriented toward the good in personal and social behavior. This is to say that the individual is natively in possession of innate growth forces that promote constructive problem solutions for himself and society. One of the ways in which Rogers differs from the stream of psychoanalysis is at this point. The struggle in orthodox analysis is to get rid of evil forces in the personality. The main thrust in nondirective therapy is upon the constructive forces of human nature. It may be a later judgment of time and evidence that Rogers has swung too far on the positive pendulum. But for now the simple fact is that he has staked his all on a biological optimism strongly reminiscent of the thought of Rousseau.

Tendency Toward Personality Adjustment

Rogers' first assertion in this regard is a rather innocuous one. In Proposition Twelve he says that most of the ways of behaving which are

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11 Rogers, _Client-Centered Therapy_, 507.
adopted by the organism are those which are consistent with the concept of self. There is little doubt that this is largely true. Basically almost everyone consciously chooses behavior that is self-enhancing, or at least is congruent with his conception of himself. Equally fundamentally the individual will reject or deny to consciousness needs or behavior conceived as a threat to or incongruous with his self-perception. Everyone has life goals, which may be more or less conscious, and shapes his behavior toward them. Rogers and the nondirectivists in general would lean only toward those goals which are presently conscious and therefore a part of the immediate self-concept. This insistence upon the attitudes now present to awareness seems to somewhat arbitrarily rule out the possibility that behavior may be unconsciously motivated toward unrecognized goals.

It is true that Rogers admits behavior caused by denied or unrecognized organic drives is sometimes present. But he asserts that such behavior is disowned by the person so behaving. Among such instances Rogers cites emergency behavior, snoring or other sleep activity, repressed sexual interests. In such occurrences, according to Rogers, there is organically determined behavior on the basis of experience denied accurate symbolization, and hence is carried through without having been brought into any consistent relationship with the concept of self. The proposition is stated formally in this way: "Behavior may, in some instances, be brought about by organic experiences and needs which have not been symbolized. Such behavior may be inconsistent with the structure of the self, but in such instances the
behavior is not 'owned' by the individual."^{12}

There may be, and indeed are, other explanations for such behavior. The non-directive viewpoint presented here by Rogers is obviously a conclusion drawn from the theoretical conception of the self discussed earlier. If the self be now limited to items of current consciousness, then autonomic behavior, well established habit patterns, and organic impulses at the unconscious level are ruled out as part of the self at the moment or as important for therapy. There doubtless are individuals who would respond to unacceptable behavior of their own by saying, "I wasn't myself." Rogers cites this reaction as evidence that the basic drives of human nature are innately in the direction of the good. It is gravely open to question, however, whether or not such reactions are pure rationalization. The individual cited by Rogers who had a need for sexual exploration contrary to the mores of his culture certainly could not help but know what he was doing. His unwillingness to accept responsibility for his actions, would, contrary to Rogers, indicate that the action is perfectly present to his consciousness. He rejects the behavior because it is socially or otherwise unacceptable, not because of a failure or inability to recognize it as a part of himself. He knows all too well that he is responsible. Be that as it may, the main thrust of Rogers is that the large body of behavior is chosen and organized toward the enhancement of the self idea and toward that which is good for the individual.

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^{12} Rogers, op. cit., 509.
Psychic And Biologic Homeostasis

As further evidence of the possession of innate growth forces toward good Rogers cites the biological process of homeostasis, and asserts that it would be strange were not a similar process to be found in the human psyche. One would indeed expect such a reaction in a monolithic system based on organismic reactions such as Rogers posits. He goes so far as to say in Proposition Four, "The organism has one basic tendency and striving - to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing organism." Rogers then goes on to cite others who likewise set this growth force as central. He could have probably cited many more than he did, for the idea is not at all new. While many authorities recognize a basic tendency in the organism toward self maintenance, it may be very much a question whether the transference from the biological to the psychic is as complete as Rogers wants to make it. At any rate his own position is clear, and may best be stated in his own terms:

We are talking here about the tendency of the organism to maintain itself - to assimilate food, to behave defensively in face of threat, to achieve the goal of self-maintenance even when the usual pathway to that goal is blocked. Its movement, is in the direction of an increasing self-government, self-regulation, and autonomy, and away from heteronomous control, or control by external forces. Finally, the self-actualization of the organism appears to be in the direction of socialization, broadly defined. It is our experience in therapy which has brought us to the point of giving this proposition a central place.

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13 Rogers, op. cit., 487.
14 Rogers, op. cit., 488, 489.
Combs probably states the proposition more bluntly than Rogers, but the point is the same. He sets forth this central thesis in this way: "We must presume, therefore, that whatever this motivating force, it has its origin within the organism itself. This is consistent with much of our modern thinking about the nature of the organism. In biology, the drive to maintain self-organization has long been recognized and is described as fundamental to all living things, in the principle of 'homeostasis'. In view of our present knowledge of the unitary character of the organism, it would be extremely queer if this function were not in psychological realms as well."  

From these citations it is evident that Rogers and his followers regard these growth forces as innate, biological, purposive, and social in direction. In other words, basic human nature is good. If left to itself, or redirected to itself, it will seek good ends in tension reduction, self-enhancement, and socialization. This assumption is indeed interesting. It may indeed be assumed that the individual will largely, if operating only on innate forces, seek ways and means that are self-maintaining and self-enhancing. Even the most ardent believer in residual evil forces in human nature will agree to this. But to argue as Rogers does, that the human organism, when set free from introjected standards, threat, or other blockage of innate forces, will naturally seek the good for himself and for society, is quite another argument indeed. It is not the purpose here to debate the issue of personality and morality, or the existence or not of objective standards of behavior. The

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intent is simply to point out that Rogers does assume that good society and
good standards come from good people, good in themselves. As far as he is
concerned human nature is basically good. If not, by reason of conflict
with introjected social and cultural standards, it will certainly become so
if allowed to be itself under the right conditions of absence of all threat
to the self concept.

If we follow Rogers' assumption that since human nature is unitary the
principles operative at the biological level will also obtain at the more
distinctively human level, then the basic question is whether human nature
is unitary as he sees it, in the biologic sense. There is no question but
that the emphasis of Rogers is consistently on the visceral, the organic,
the neurological experience. Therefore, as indicated above, he expects to
find in psychology also a thoroughgoing homeostatic law. In the strictly
literal sense homeostasis would mean the end of all progress since it would
mean absolute balance between desire and progress and its fulfillment.
Rogers uses the term to mean the drive of the individual to tension reduction,
self-maintenance, and self-enhancement. He also equates the term with
"actualization," a phrase borrowed from Goldstein. Both of these terms come
to mean the fullest realization in actuality of the intrinsic nature and
potentialities of the organism. It is clear that Rogers thinks that this
process is not only unitary but is also basically biological. He says:
"The outstanding fact which must be taken into theoretical account is that
the organism is at all times a total organizational system, in which alteration
of any part may produce change in any other." Rogers then advances Proposition Four, quoted previously, and its accompanying explanation:

>The organism has one basic tendency and striving -
to actualize, maintain, and enhance the experiencing
organism. (Italics original)

Rather than many needs and motives, it seems entirely possible that all organic and psychological needs may be described as partial aspects of this one fundamental need..... The words used are an attempt to describe the observed directional force in organic life - a force which has been regarded as basic by many scientists, but which has not been too well described in testable or operational terms.... The therapist becomes very much aware that the forward moving tendency of the human organism is the basis upon which he relies most deeply and fundamentally. It is evident not only in the general tendency of clients to move in the direction of growth when the factors in the situation are clear, but is most dramatically shown in very serious cases where the individual is on the brink of psychosis or suicide. Here the therapist is very keenly aware that the only force upon which he can basically rely is the organic tendency toward growth and enhancement.17

The foregoing should make it evident that for Rogers the human personality does contain innate growth forces upon which the ultimate dependency in therapy is placed, that these forces are innately good, and are basically biological. In this Rogers is in line with other students who are fundamentally holistic, of whom Angyal, Maslow, and Goldstein may be here mentioned, since Rogers himself does. But none have made this principle so weighty a factor in therapy as have Rogers and his followers. This has been recognized

16 Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, 487.

17 Rogers, op. cit., 487-490.
by the authors of the book, *Theoretical Foundations of Psychology*, when they write, "What such a positive concept can do for psychology is seen in the numerous writings of Rogers and his students, in which the concept of 'growth' (indistinguishable from self-actualization) assumes more and more a central and essential role." That this element in Rogers occupies a central place in his theory has been recognized by Nuttin also. While he is critical of the one track growth emphasis in Rogers, and decries its absorption into the growth of the biological organism, Nuttin points out that:

> The theory of personality developed on the basis of non-directive therapy seems to us as important as the method.

We have already pointed out one of its first essential elements: the emphasis on the sound, constructive forces of growth which exist in man. This change from the point of view which looks at man pathologically, and in the light of his destructive processes, to one which sees him from the angle of normality and in his constructive processes, seems to us a most important development in the theory of human development. (Italics original.)

These citations make clear that the second basic assumption of personality theory as developed by Rogers is that the individual possesses innate growth forces, that these forces are positive in nature and move innately in the direction of good for both the individual and society.

**Tendency Toward Realistic Social Goals**

It has been mentioned before that Rogers also lays emphasis upon his

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belief that the innate growth forces of the organism under the right conditions of freedom and absence of threat tend toward realistic and acceptable social goals. In Proposition Eighteen Rogers makes the point that a fuller acceptance of one's sensory and visceral experience into an integrated system makes one necessarily more understanding of and acceptant of others. This, he asserts, means that the person who accepts himself, will, because of that self-acceptance, have better inter-personal relations with others. If these phrases be divorced from their peculiar jargon they simply mean that the mature person gets along better with other people, and is more socialized than is the immature person. For this we need no statistical studies or long clinical reports. This is simply what everybody knows, that the well-integrated person is in general freely able to accept others. But since this proposition of Rogers is included as one of a series it can be properly evaluated only as a part of that series and in that context. Therefore also its import is quite other than the surface and obvious meaning. Set into the heart of Rogers' theoretical assumptions and propositions, the one here stated means that becoming socialized is an integral part of the results of non-directive therapy and theory. It means further that Rogers considers these results to occur when man is simply his natural self - freed from threat or introjected values he will simply become socialized. Rogers states it this way: "The implications of this aspect of our theory are such as to stretch the imagination. Here is a theoretical basis for sound inter-personal, intergroup, and international relationships. Stated in terms of social psychology, this proposition becomes the statement that the person (or persons or group) who accepts himself thoroughly, will necessarily
improve his relationship with those with whom he has personal contact, because of his greater understanding and acceptance of them."20

The key word, of course, is 'necessarily'. It is the clue to the fact that these socialized outcomes are viewed as a result not only of better acceptance of self but also of the total acceptance of the theory and therapy with respect to innate human nature. Rogers states the general idea of these social outcomes even more clearly in the chapter of Mowrer's book referred to previously. It begins thus:

One of the most revolutionary concepts to grow out of our clinical experience is the growing recognition that the innermost core of man's nature, the deepest layers of his personality, the base of his 'animal nature,' is positive in nature - is basically socialized, forward-moving, rational and realistic..... But when he is most fully man, when he is his complete organism, when awareness of experience, that peculiarly human attribute, is most fully operating, then he is to be trusted, then his behavior is constructive. It is not always conventional. It will not always be conforming. It will be individualized. But it will also be socialized.21

This is clear-cut, and there is no further need for argument to prove that Rogers' views of human nature are those of a thorough-going biological optimism. But Rogers is no Pollyanna either. He does indeed recognize that in human nature there are evil things, undesirable behaviors. From his viewpoint, however, these are intrusions, and not intrinsic. There are those

20 Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, 522.
21 Rogers, Some of the Directions and Endpoints of Therapy, 15, 30.
introjected and distorted values derived from society and its cultural norms which lead the individual to deny or to distort his own visceral and sensory experience. This denial and the consequent defensiveness lead to later maladjustment, or in the extreme to psychosis. This is rather strongly reminiscent of the catch-phrase of a few years ago, "Moral man - immoral society." However the point is that the evil in man is not residual. It is acquired in the conflict between the natural experiencing of the organism and its satisfaction with all experience and the cultural values of the society in which the organism lives. The real enemy is therefore the self-concept which denies symbolization to experience or distorts the symbolization in keeping with the mores of society. It is to be noted further that this self-concept is one which is not natural but is based on distorted or denied organic experience. Therefore in his views of the evils in human nature Rogers is in perfect harmony with his original assumption that human nature is innately good.

On the basis of the foregoing one might expect to find in non-directive therapy and theory an emphasis upon the individual and his needs as the determining focus in decision making and problem solution. Probably no system of therapy worthy of the name would insist on anything but that the client must eventually come to make his own decisions and stand on his own feet as an independent mature individual. But therapies and theories do vary as to how it is best for the individual to reach that stage, and how much of it can be accomplished by himself alone. There is variance too on how much the standard of decision is the organic need of the individual as contrasted to societal standards or objective criteria. It is not the
purpose of this study to debate which of these approaches may be better, more accurate factually, or more effective therapeutically. It is our task to determine what is the position of Rogers and what are his assumptions concerning human nature. This may be in effect summed up in the statement that only the client's internal frame of reference is valid for self-insight and for therapy.

It has been pointed out in Chapter III that the techniques of nondirective therapy tend to isolate the client in the subjective world of his own feelings. This is because ultimately it is eventually not even the organic or visceral experience that is determinative of behavior choices. The ultimate factor in nondirective theory is the way that the client feels about his experience. There are three assumptions at least which call for discussion. The first is that any material other than that advanced by the client himself is not only unnecessary for therapy, it may be positively harmful to progress in therapy. The second is that it is only the present consciousness of the client which is important for therapy. The third, which will be discussed separately, is that it is not even the present event which is significant, it is how the client feels about that event.

The Internal Frame Of Reference

In Proposition Seven Rogers lays down the general statement that the best vantage point for understanding behavior is from the internal frame of reference of the individual himself. It is important to do this, says Rogers, because it emphasizes to the client the deep faith which the therapist has in the client as person of worth in himself. By refusing to bring
outside materials into discussion, by reflecting empathically the client's own feelings, the therapist insistently calls to the attention of the client his own worth and inherent capacity to judge and act. There are no preconceived categories into which the client must fit, no judgments by which he stands or falls, save his own. Rogers quotes from one of his own articles to emphasize this viewpoint: "As time has gone by, we have come to put increasing stress upon the 'client-centeredness' of the relationship, because it is more effective the more completely the counselor concentrates upon trying to understand the client as the client seems to himself.... We have come to realize that if we can provide understanding of the way the client seems to himself at this moment, he can do the rest." (Italics original.)

A later formulation of this idea is found in Client-Centered Therapy, p. 36, where Rogers says, "We might say then, that for many therapists functioning from a client-centered orientation, the sincere aim of getting 'within' the attitudes of the client, of entering the client's internal frame of reference, is the most complete implementation which has thus far been formulated for the central hypothesis of respect for and reliance upon the capacity of the person."

Importance Of Present Reaction

Here Rogers quite clearly states that his method is the method for understanding the client, and he has left no doubt as to his belief in the...
innate capacities of human nature. The assumption is that only client-
advanced materials ought to enter into therapy because ultimately only the
client can truly understand himself. But in so far as the client is able to
communicate the therapist may empathically enter. Now Rogers does not stop
at this point. It is not only that the materials advanced by the client are
the only valid materials in therapy. There is the further consideration that
what is important is the way the client feels now, or what conceptions of
the self are present to him now. This is not to deny, nor does Rogers do so,
that past experiences are important in the development of the individual and
his current situation. It is on the contrary to assert that what is important
about them is how the individual feels about them at the present if they are
present in the phenomenal field. Rogers puts it this way: "In other
orientations there is also respect for the client or patient, but this is
respect usually for the person as unrevealed. It is a respect for something
underneath, not respect for the person as he seems to himself at that moment.
In client-centered therapy, however, the counselor attitude which we have
found most fruitful is a complete acceptance of the person as he seems to
himself at that moment." (Italics original.)\textsuperscript{23} In \textit{Client-Centered Therapy}
Rogers further states:

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It should also be mentioned that in this concept
of motivation all the effective elements exist in
the present. Behavior is not 'caused' by something
which occurred in the past. Present tensions and
present needs are the only ones which the organism
endeavors to reduce or satisfy. While it is true
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\textsuperscript{23}Rogers, "A Current Formulation of Client-Centered Therapy," 444.
that past experience has certainly served to modify the meaning which will be perceived in present experiences, yet there is no behavior except to meet a present need.\textsuperscript{24}

Others have noted this emphasis on the primacy of the immediate experience. Combs has noted that non-directive therapy stresses the immediate situation rather than the past.\textsuperscript{25} In the book, \textit{Theoretical Foundations of Psychology}, the authors state: "In many respects the nondirective psychotherapy of Carl Rogers, although it owes much to the thinking of Freud and Rank, seems to be in agreement with this Lewinian emphasis on problem solving in terms of the here and now. This does not mean that problems of motivation - both conscious and unconscious - are ignored in these approaches but merely that the orbit of investigation is limited to dynamic factors operative in the present."\textsuperscript{26}

To put this in somewhat more philosophical terms is to say that in nondirective thought man is the measure of things, he is the determining factor in choice, his needs and wishes are to govern his behavior. The phenomenological approach as adopted by Rogers rules out, at least for therapy, any question of the validity of social mores. In therapy the client must be accepted as he is in all of his attitudes and behaviors at this moment, no matter how anti-social or anti-moral according to external

\textsuperscript{24} Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, 492.


\textsuperscript{26} Helson, \textit{op. cit.}, 752, 753.
standards. But this approach does re-emphasize the basic philosophy of human nature which Rogers holds, namely that man has sufficient capacities to solve his own problems.

Primacy Of Emotional Factors In Relation To Reality

In perfect keeping with the primary stresses of nondirective thought concerning human nature mentioned earlier in this chapter is the emphasis that Rogers and his followers place upon the role of emotion in human life. It is not only that human nature is unitary, and its basic need for self-maintenance and self-enhancement is fundamentally biological, it is further true that in nondirective theory the basic reaction to experience is emotional. It is rational to expect that a system which is biologically grounded should also insist that the major motivating force in human conduct is likewise biological in nature. The propositions advanced by Rogers may be summed up as follows: the reaction of the individual is not reality as such but to reality as it is perceived at the moment, the significant fact is not the event but how the client feels about it, and the emotional climate of the client is etiologic in personality disorganization and reorganization.

In Proposition Two Rogers states that the organism reacts to the field as it is experienced and perceived. This perceptual field, he says, is for the individual "reality." One does not react to some absolute reality but to his own perception of reality. He then goes on to say that this

\[27\] Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy*, 484.
perception is for the individual reality. Now if this be understood rightly as a simple explanation of the neural and physiological process of perception, the mechanism of reaction biologically, no one would quarrel with it very much. For in purely neural terms there is no such thing as abstract thought apart from the nervous system that makes it possible in human nature in this life on this planet. So for instance the headache that comes from psycho-genic causes rather than some physical cause is very real to the person experiencing it. The twilight world of the psychotic may be filled with very real fears and terrors for him. These are reactions to a perceived reality, which reality may not correspond to any objective reality.

Rogers indeed goes on to say that for psychological purposes there need be no objective correspondence of the perceived to the actual reality. He says, "For purposes of understanding psychological phenomena, reality is, for the individual, his perceptions........ For psychological purposes, reality is basically the private world of individual perceptions, though for social purposes reality consists of those perceptions which have a high degree of commonality among various individuals. Thus this desk is 'real' because most people in our culture would have a perception of it which is very similar to my own."28 Of course as to just why there should be this similarity of perception in different individuals Rogers does not say. It may be very much open to question whether Rogers is oversimplifying human

28 Rogers, op. cit., 485.
nature by reducing it to the one basic need of self-maintenance and enhancement and to the one process of biological and neural operation. But there is no question that to him behavior is determined in terms of the perceptions at the moment of the stimulating situation. It would be possible to make a number of other citations to show how important Rogers considers this point, but they would be really just repetitions of the foregoing.

The Key Is Emotional Reaction To Experience

Human behavior, therefore is directed toward goals of self-enancement based on reality as perceived by the experiencing individual. Now, says Rogers, emotion accompanies such goal-directed behavior of the organism, or in some cases the self-concept as opposed to the organism. This is once more the kind of a proposition that left to itself, or read in a certain way, would create no great opposition. As it is stated, that emotion or feeling accompanies perception, probably every one would agree. Rogers says that in general the emotion facilitates behavior, the kind of emotion is related to the kind of behavior, and the intensity of the emotion is related to the kind of behavior, and the intensity of the emotion is related to the perceived significance of the behavior for the maintenance and enhancement of the organism.

It might be well to quote Proposition Six as Rogers states it: Emotion accompanies and in general facilitates such goal-directed behavior, the kind of emotion being related to the seeking versus the consummatory aspects of the behavior, and the intensity of the emotion being related to the perceived significance of the behavior for the maintenance and enhancement of
the organism." When this statement is read in context, however, when it is set in the framework of nondirective thought, it becomes clear that what is significant is not the event but the feeling that accompanies the event. It is no doubt true that for many experiences in life there is an accompanying emotional tone. For Rogers and his followers the important thing is not the experience but how the individual feels about that experience. One would have to reproduce almost all of *Client-Centered Therapy* to convey in any adequate manner the constant emphasis upon feeling, attitude, and emotion. So Rogers, for instance, in reflecting upon the abandoning of clarification of feeling as a technique remarks that it is too intellectualistic. Therefore reflection and acceptance of the client's attitude is now the chosen way of orthodoxy.

Rogers, in another place, has written: "This means a respect for the attitudes which the client now has and a continuing acceptance of the attitudes of the moment, whether they veer in the direction of despair, toward constructive courage, or toward a confused ambivalence." Here again is a statement of the importance of the attitudes of the individual with respect to himself. Elsewhere also Rogers points out that in successful therapy the attitudes of the client with respect to himself change. In giving a summary of the process of therapy Rogers says:

29 Rogers, *op. cit.*, 492, 493.

The client tends to enter therapy regarding himself critically, feeling more or less worthless, and judging himself quite largely in terms of standards set by others. Emotionally the balance of feelings about himself swings decidedly to the negative side. As therapy proceeds he often feels even more discouraged about himself and critical of himself. He finds that he frequently experiences very contradictory attitudes toward himself. As he develops more concern in regard to his current feelings and attitudes, he finds that he can look at them objectively and experience them neither as a basis for emotional self-condemnation nor self-approval. As these changes take place, he feels himself to be more spontaneous in his attitudes and behavior.

This section reveals quite clearly the prominence that is given to feeling, attitude, and emotion in nondirective therapy. Perhaps a very short summary by Combs is the clearest statement of all in this respect. It is: "Feelings after all are simply the client's way of expressing the meaning of a situation for him. Personal meanings are crucial in the client's behavior for we behave not in terms of events but in terms of the meaning of events for us. It is the personal meaning of facts which motivate behavior, not the facts themselves."

The meaning of all this with respect to the nature of human nature is therefore that emotion, feeling, attitude, are primary. Man is not essentially a thinking creature, he is a feeling creature. This is not to say that he does not reason, or think logically upon occasion, but it does insist

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31 Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy*, 141, 142.
that the most essential element in his nature is the emotional. Thorne links this tendency of nondirective thought to the general psychoanalytic approach, and says, "Accepting the psychoanalytic conception of the importance of affective factors in behavior, the relationship therapy of Rank and the nondirective therapy of Rogers tend to minimize cognitive and conative factors in behavior by regarding the client as the victim of his emotions." Other writers also, of course, have noted this emphasis upon the emotional factors in nondirective theory and practice, but few have put it as strongly as Mowrer who says that full-fledged nondirectivists are implacable in insisting that patients take full responsibility for the content and direction of therapy and in persistently focusing attention upon the client's feelings and perception.

Emotional Climate Basic To Personality Structure And Disorganization

It is altogether logical that Rogers, having stressed the primacy of the emotional components in human nature, goes on to make these etiologic in personality disorganization and reorganization. The basic nondirective views are contained in three propositions. The first of these is that the individual denies or distorts sensory and visceral experiences which are at variance with the feelings about the self. The second is that psychological


adjustment exists when the self-structure is sufficiently mature emotionally to accept all its sensory and visceral experiences. The third proposition is that when faced with experiences conceived as a threat to his conception of himself, the individual will develop defense behaviors in attempts at self-maintenance. As indicated above these propositions are of a piece with the basic thrust of Rogers that emotional factors are primary in the structure of the self. It is precisely this type of emphasis that links Rogers to the personality theories of Freud more deeply than he cares to admit, and makes his therapy an inner release therapy. The point that we are here concerned about is that the emphasis of Rogers upon the emotional climate of the client has the effect of turning the individual upon himself as the ultimate source of judgment and as the point of reference from which the client gauges his behavior. Now it is true that psychoanalysis seeks to liberate the individual from the destructive elements in his nature, and Rogerianism seeks to liberate the constructive forces in human nature. It may therefore be appropos at this point simply to raise the question whether these are not two sides of the same coin. For after all, when you seek to liberate someone from something, you thereby set him free for something. And conversely, when you seek to set free positive forces in someone, you likewise set him free from something that held him back.

The three propositions of Rogers just mentioned do describe, given his belief that all experience is in nature biological, something of the process of adjustment and maladjustment of an individual as viewed from within in terms of the feelings and attitudes toward himself. Indeed it may be pointed out that the techniques of nondirective therapy are expressly designed to
create that precise result. Snyder\(^{35}\) has pointed out that one of the results of nondirective therapy is this internalization of attitude on the part of the client. He has further shown that there is in successful nondirective therapy a tendency for these attitudes to change from negative toward positive attitudes and feelings of the client toward himself.

It would seem that logically the basic question is whether these emotionalized attitudes are an accompaniment of adjustment or maladjustment or whether they are etiologic to adjustment or its lack. No one would question that there are emotional problems in maladjustment, or that there are many cases of emotional disturbance, more or less severe. The issue is whether the emotional situation in functional disorders is primary or is symptomatic. The assumption of Rogers is that if the emotional problem be resolved other problems will be settled by the client himself, it is the one key that unlocks all the other facets of the personality. As Rogers himself states it, "More and more the therapeutic situation centers around the self and its relation to these denied or distorted experiences..... In general, however, the exploration of the perceptual field tends to go from others to self, from symptoms to self, from surface concerns to deeper concerns, from past to present, from experiences in awareness to experiences which have been denied to awareness."\(^{36}\) It should be clear then that the internalization

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\(^{36}\)Rogers, "A Current Formulation of Client-Centered Therapy," \(446\).
of attitude and feeling is the key in the arch of counseling that is crucial for development and progress in therapy. In the study by Snyder just referred to there is a further indication of this when he says that acceptance of self by the client seems most clearly to follow responses of clarification of feeling by the therapist. We may say then, for nondirective theory, that the feelings and attitudes of the client are basic both to his maladjustment and his personality reorganization.

Valuational Systems Are Relative To The Felt Needs Of The Individual

It is understood that Rogers is first of all speaking of a process of therapy but it must be further understood that therapy deals with personalities, living human beings. When therefore the emotional aspect of personality is made primary both in adjustment and maladjustment the only conclusion that can be drawn is that for Rogers this is the basic factor in human nature. Now this means a concentration on the individual and his needs, his necessary satisfaction of them in his own rather than societal terms. It is not at all surprising therefore when Rogers takes the next step with respect to human nature and declares that values and valuational systems are relative to the felt needs of the individual. For if the individual is ultimately to determine the direction of his life then he is likewise to determine what is and what is not of worth in his experience.

This is to say that the individual is to make choices of possible behaviors in terms of his own felt needs rather than in terms of objective standards or social conventions. As Rogers puts it, "He discovers that he does not need to know what are the correct values; through the data supplied
by his own organism, he can experience what is satisfying and enhancing. He can put his confidence in a valuing process, rather than in some rigid, introjected system of values.\(^{37}\) (Italics original.) According to Rogers, the basis of accepting values in a nondirectively oriented and adjusted person is that of the individual's acceptance of his own experience of the values in question. In one way it may therefore be true to say that in Rogers the pragmatism of James and the progressive experimentalism of Dewey have found their psychological counterpart. For on the one hand after the manner of James, it is to say that what works for me is good for me, and on the other hand it is to say that there are no fixed or permanent values in society - there is only the process of my determining what is good for me on the basis of my organically determined needs as of now.

Here is a diessel tigkeit of the highest order. Values are to be chosen not only on the basis of the immediately imperative need but in terms also of the organic and visceral experience of the individual. We have here both a biologism and a psychologism in that Rogers takes what is in actuality a living process and elevates it to the role of a law of life. Even those who hold to a most rigidly structured system of objective standards, for instance the Ten Commandments, do not doubt that in living the individual must accept them as his own values also. So St. James says that faith without works is dead. But in Rogers the standard and the experience are coalesced, the one does not exist without the other - the value is to be tested in the light of

\(^{37}\text{Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, 523.}\)
personal organic evidence. And if any discrepancy exists it is the experience that is to be chosen.

The valuational system which Rogers advocates is a biologism also. Note how he phrases the matter in Proposition Nineteen: "As the individual perceives and accepts into his self-structure more of his organic experiences, he finds that he is replacing his present value system - based so largely upon introjections which have been distortedly symbolized - with a continuing organismic valuing process." 38 Now again nearly everyone would probably agree that right choices carry with them a satisfying emotional experience. Rogers, however, would make the feeling, the satisfaction, the qualifying factor in making the choice. In amplifying the proposition just quoted he goes on to say, "He discovers that his own senses, his own physiological equipment, can provide the data for making value judgments and for continuously revising them......He senses, he feels that it is satisfying and enhancing....But then he discovers that he may let the evidence of his own experience indicate whether he has chosen satisfyingly.......In therapy it would seem that the reorganization which takes place is on the basis that those values are retained which are experienced as maintaining or enhancing the organism as distinguished from those which are said by others to be for the good of the organism." 39

38 Rogers, op. cit., 522. (Italics original.)

39 Rogers, op. cit., 523.
Notice further that Rogers postulates a process, a continual revision in terms of changing organic experience. This Rogers terms a more basic criterion for evaluation than what he calls the introjected 'oughts' and 'shoulds'. There are then no values which are inherent in the scheme of things, no standards of ethics to which the individual may be expected to conform - there is only the valuing of values with the locus of evaluation in the organic and sensual experience of the individual himself. This is of course to be coupled with the earlier assumption of Rogers that human nature is innately good, and if left to its natural self, will choose what is good for itself and society. It may be pointed out that Rogers hews close to the line. Having begun with a biological optimism he stays with it all the way, from human nature to psychological process to ethical standards. Not that Rogers' use of logic is without problems but it must be recognized that there is forward movement in his propositions.

Facing the possibility that someone would claim that such an ethics would promote anarchy and chaos, Rogers argues that to the contrary his system would promote a healthy society. "Thus, while the establishment of values by each individual may seem to suggest a complete anarchy of values, experience indicates that quite the opposite is true. Since all individuals have basically the same needs, including the need of acceptance by others, it appears that when each individual formulates his own values, in terms of his own direct experience, it is not anarchy which results, but a high degree of commonality and a genuinely socialized system of values. One of the ultimate ends, then, of an hypothesis of confidence in the individual, and in his capacity to resolve his own conflicts, is the emergence of value
systems which are unique and personal for each individual, and which are changed by the changing evidence of organic experience, yet which are at the same time deeply socialized, possessing a high degree of similarity in their essentials. These words are clear enough, and reflect once again the basic confidence of Rogers in his hypothesis of absolute trust in the innately good and constructive powers of human nature.

Nondirective Theory And Education

It has been noted before that Rogers has abandoned the earlier restrictions on the use of nondirective therapy. It is his current conviction that it is applicable in all cases where therapy is indicated except for mental defectives and certain juvenile delinquents. As a matter of fact, Rogers goes on to assert that nondirective methods and philosophy are considered apropos to most of life situations. Some of these, such as staff administration at the Counseling Center, are mentioned more or less in passing. There are four applications, however, deemed worthy each of a chapter in Client-Centered Therapy. These are play therapy with children, group-centered leadership and administration, group therapy, and educational procedures in the class room. Since the basic viewpoint in the first three, although not written by Rogers, is identical with Rogers, and since they do deal with phases of therapy, they will be in this study simply considered as a part of nondirective theory in general. But since Rogers makes so large claims for

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Rogers, op. cit., 524.
the extension of his concepts into an area other than therapy, the propositions concerning education will be examined as an application of nondirective theory.

Rogers takes his starting point from the fact that in therapy, as in education, there is learning involved. He then goes on to state that if acceptance, understanding, and respect are basic for therapy they might also be so for the educational process. A number of his staff, including Rogers, believing that this was so, began to put these basic concepts of therapy to work in the classroom. As a result of these and other experiments, notably those of Cantor, Kelley, Snygg and Combs, and Shedlin, as well as the progressive school of education generally, the propositions of Chapter Nine in Client-Centered Therapy were developed. Although Rogers recognizes that these others have advanced educational propositions similar to his own, yet he goes on to say that basing education on the concepts of therapy will result in a radically new education. He says, "Yet because the quality of learning which frequently resulted was so different from that taking place in the ordinary classroom, further experimentation seemed unquestionably demanded. A sobering aspect of the experience was the growing realization of the revolutionary character of what was being attempted. If education is most effectively conducted along lines suggested by client-centered therapy, then the achievement of this goal means turning present-day education upside down - a task of no mean magnitude."\(^{41}\) It might be remarked

\(^{41}\) Rogers, op. cit., 384, 385.
in passing that this is a claim of no mean magnitude either, and reflects something of a rather large naivete with respect to the history of education.

There comes next in this chapter a rather typical bit of Rogerianism. Just as previously Rogers has assumed that only those who follow his philosophy might be called client-centered so now he will say that only those who follow an approach similar to his will have democratic goals for education. He simply labels anything approaching the traditional forms of education as authoritarian and hierarchical. He says further that his form of education has relevance only for democratic goals. This will likely prove quite as irritating to educators as his absolute claims of client-centeredness have irritated the therapists.

It would be indeed difficult to take the criteria of democratic education as set forth by Rogers in Chapter Nine and find any educators anywhere, except perhaps in the most totalitarian of situations - such as Russia - who would very much disagree with these goals of education. On pages 387 and 388 Rogers lists eight of these goals for education as being relevant to the type of education he would introduce. At least six of these have been the marks of good education in all the ages of education that we know about. These may be briefly summarized as: the ability to take self-initiated action and responsibility for those actions, the capability of intelligent choice and self-direction, the ability to be critical in learning - able to evaluate the contributions of others, the acquiring of knowledge relevant to the solution of problems, the ability to adapt flexibly and intelligently to new problem situations, the ability to cooperate effectively with others. 42

42 Rogers, op. cit., 387, 388.
Now it is true that this list would not satisfy educators with a religious orientation - there are other goals that they would wish to add. But there would be scarcely any lack of agreement as to the value of these so stated by Rogers.

The two goals about which there might be some question are those which are stated in the more peculiarly client-centered terminology. They are as follows: the assistance of students in becoming those who have internalized an adaptive mode of approach to problems - utilizing all pertinent experience freely and creatively; the assistance of students in becoming those who work - not for the approval of others - but in terms of their own socialized purposes.43 These two goals reflect the typical approach of nondirectivism in their insistence upon the internal frame of reference of the individual and his right to select goals in terms of his own experience and desire. It is not that any real educator today might question the right or, if you will, the duty of the individual to select his own goals in life. The question at issue is whether the criteria of selection as propounded by Rogers, namely the organic needs and experiences of the individual, are the only adequate ones for consideration.

Therapy And Education

Having set forth these objectives Rogers then proceeds to state five hypotheses concerning human nature conceived to have relevance for educational principles and procedures to effectuate a client-centered program of

43 Rogers, op. cit., 368.
education. It will be noticed that these propositions differ in the main from those discussed earlier in this chapter only in phraseology, and Rogers himself notes that they are very parallel to the hypotheses of therapy. The five hypotheses are these:

1. We cannot teach another person directly; we can only facilitate his learning.
2. A person learns significantly only those things which he perceives as being involved in the maintenance of, or enhancement of, the structure of self.
3. Experience which, if assimilated, would involve a change in the organization of self tends to be resisted through denial or distortion of symbolization.
4. The structure and organization of self appears to become more rigid under threat; to relax its boundaries when completely free from threat. Experience which is perceived as inconsistent with the self can only be assimilated if the current organization of self is relaxed and expanded to include it.
5. The educational situation which most effectively promotes significant learning is one in which (1) threat to the self of the learner is reduced to a minimum, and (2) differentiated perception of the field of experience is facilitated.44

It does not require a greatly extended discussion to point out that Rogers carries into these educational hypotheses precisely the same basic views of human nature discussed previously. Very conceivably another study could be made on these hypotheses themselves and their implementation in the classroom, but as Rogers points out, not enough material is available to make these any more than very tentative hypotheses in practical education. The above formulations could be discussed in terms of current educational theory and practice, but this too would be beyond the proper scope of this study. What

44 Rogers, op. cit., 389-391.
is at issue here are the views of Rogers with respect to the nature of human nature as a basis for an educational program.

The Role Of The Teacher

While many, if not most, educators would have little difficulty with the goals of education set forth by Rogers, it is probable that a large number would have some problem with his setting forth the role of the teacher. It has to be borne in mind first of all that Rogers has developed a situation that is practically a therapy situation in group fashion. And, as he says himself, if the leader chooses to reflect the emotional content of the discussion, it will be a therapy session. It is noteworthy also that the teacher in Rogers' layout of the class program becomes the group leader, and if conditions become ideal in a nondirective fashion, he henceforth functions as one of the group. The term teacher is henceforth dropped. Of note also is the fact that Rogers says such a leader functions as a nondirective therapist with the exception that the teacher may be useful to the class exploration of purposes by indicating some of the possible resources which the members may use. The following rather extensive quotation will help make the philosophy of this approach to education clear:

We may say that the aim of the instructor is continually to assist in eliciting the contradictory and vaguely formulated individual purposes which gradually combine into a group purpose or purposes....

Initially the leader has much to do with setting the mood or climate of the group experience by his own basic philosophy of trust in the group, which is communicated in many subtle ways.

The leader helps to elicit and clarify the purposes of the members of the class, accepting all aims.
He relies upon the student desire to implement these purposes as the motivational force behind learning.

In responding to expressions from the group, he accepts both the intellectual content and the emotionalized attitudes, endeavoring to give each aspect the approximate emphasis which it has for the individual and the group.

As the acceptant classroom climate becomes established, the leader is able to change his role and become a participant, a member of the group, expressing his views as those of one individual only.

He remains alert to expressions indicative of deep feeling and when these are voiced, he endeavors to understand these from the speaker's point of view, and to communicate this type of understanding.

There might seem to be some sort of confusion here in that when group empathy is established the leader becomes just one of the group, yet when highly emotionalized material develops he is to function in the role of a therapist and reflect this feeling accurately. It may be viewed as logical if this whole process is really a form of group therapy organized around what is initially at least an academic problem or course of study. But to return to Rogers' listing of the leader's function.

Likewise when group interaction becomes charged with emotion, he tends to maintain a neutral and understanding role, in order to give acceptance to the varied feelings which exist.

He recognizes that the extent to which he can behave in these differing fashions is limited by the genuineness of his own attitudes. To pretend an acceptant understanding of a viewpoint when he does not feel this acceptance, will not further, and will probably hinder, the dynamic progress of the class.45

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45 Rogers, op. cit., 398, 401, 402.
Here are clearly set forth the basic concepts of human nature developed in this chapter as the viewpoint of Rogers. Here is the same basic trust in the capacities of the individual to recognize and solve his own problems, the emphasis upon the internal frame of reference and emotional components of experience, the conviction that goals will be personally and socially acceptable. It is therefore the hypothesis of Rogers that since both therapy and education involve a learning process what works for one will work for the other. This raises a number of interesting questions which Rogers does not attempt to answer here or in his latest book. For instance, according to Rogers, the client-centered teacher may act as a resource person, he may at the request of the group also give lectures, he may when he is accepted by the group also express his own opinion as an opinion. Just why should these activities be forbidden him as a therapist when precisely the same situations arise, and since the procedures and atmosphere required are the same for both therapy and the classroom?

Rogers' transference from therapy to education also raises a question concerning the human nature with which he is so diligently concerned. If the conditions for successful nondirective therapy are also basically the conditions for successful nondirective education are both students and clients to be considered maladjusted? Or is learning to be equated with therapy? Or may it be that the problems successfully met in nondirective therapy are comparatively symptomatic, surface problems of a type that can be best met by verbalization and the reduction of a tension similar to that experienced in seeking knowledge to solve a problem? If the latter is true then is Rogers'
therapy as significant and basic as he claims it to be? Or, if as is likely, nondirectivists do face real problems in therapy, do not these classroom sessions tend or gravitate toward the therapeutic rather than the educational? The all too brief excerpts given in *Client-Centered Therapy* from a class in counseling and one on the Great Books do show, however, how easily such a setting of nondirectivism and the principle of response to emotionalized contributions turns in the direction of nondirective therapy.

One notes also some generalizations on the basis of no evidence but which are perhaps demanded by the strength of the claims Rogers advances for his own system. Rogers insists that the common methods of lectures, tests, required readings, examinations, and so on, is evidence that the instructor cannot trust the student to do some learning - he must be motivated by these things to do so. Again he says that reading the evaluations of his non-directive type courses will cause one to give up the notion a given course will mean for all students a certain degree of coverage of given topics. One wonders what brand of super-naive teachers Rogers has been dealing with that they should have such a notion to begin with. Further on he says that another general trend in his type of courses is that most students tend to work harder, and at a deeper level, than in the conventional course. Now no one will doubt that a number of students in writing such evaluational papers setting forth their request for a given letter grade will make such claims. But this is no evidence that nondirective students do actually study more and deeper than others.

These and other questions indicate some of the problems raised by Rogers' transference of his personality constructs from therapy to education. Our
concern, however, is whether the same assumptions concerning human nature are evident in both sets of hypotheses advanced by Rogers. To that the answer is that they are so evident. Perhaps Rogers' own summary of the section on education will make this most clear. After an introductory section in which he repeats the charge that traditional education distrusts the student, he goes on to say:

The approach we have been discussing is based on an assumption diametrically opposed, that 'You can trust the student.' You can trust him to desire to learn in every way which will maintain or enhance self; you can trust him to make use of resources which will serve this end; you can trust him to evaluate himself in ways which will make for self-progress; you can trust him to grow, provided the atmosphere for growth is available to him.

If the instructor accepts this assumption, or is willing to adopt it as a very tentative hypothesis, then certain behaviors follow. He creates a classroom climate which respects the integrity of the student, which accepts all aims, opinions, and attitudes as being legitimate expressions of the student's internal frame of reference at that time. He accepts the feelings and emotionalized attitudes which surround any educational or group experience. He accepts himself as a member of a learning group, rather than an authority ..... He relies on the capacity of the individual to sort out truth from untruth, upon the basis of continuing experience.... He relies upon the capacity of the student to assess his progress in terms of the purposes which he has at this time. He has confidence in the fact that, in this atmosphere which he has helped to create, a type of learning takes place which is personally meaningful and which feeds the total self-development of the individual as well as improves his acquaintance with a given field of knowledge. 46

46 Rogers, op. cit., 427.
Thus it is clear that Rogers has restated his fundamental hypotheses respecting human nature in terms of learning rather than therapy. It is further evident from the foregoing citations that he equates much of educational process with group therapy and from the examples given by Rogers it appears that much of what goes on in nondirectively oriented classrooms is a kind of group therapy. We are inclined to agree with Rogers that this philosophy and procedure, carried out in extenso, would indeed revolutionize the practice of education at all levels.

Summary

It has been the purpose of this chapter to reduce the twenty-four hypotheses of Rogers concerning personality structure and education into a few basic assumptions with respect to the nature of human nature. There are also, doubtless, many other ways in which a study of nondirective theory might be made. Although Rogers has indicated that changes have occurred in the formulation of nondirective thought these changes have been largely in the direction of the extension of the basic hypotheses and their application to wider areas of endeavor. In fact, Rogers takes time out to indicate that in his thinking his fundamental assumptions are more deeply rooted than before. Currently Rogers and his group are engaged in research studies intended to validate the hypotheses set forth in this chapter.

The first and fundamental assumption of Rogers is that all human behavior is biologically based, and man is therefore a biological unity. All needs are ultimately organic and visceral. It is for this reason that while positing a "self," he defines that self as a grouping or differentiation of
perceptions within the field of perception and experience. The peculiarly human aspect of this differentiated field of experience he characterizes as awareness or consciousness. And, as noted in this chapter, whatever else this may be, it is far from the classical concept of the self as an experiencing and controlling entity. The individual is not created a self, he creates one out of his own experience.

The second, and equally fundamental, assumption of Rogers is that the individual possesses within himself innate growth forces which not only operate toward the maintenance and enhancement of the organism, but also move in the direction of social good. The position of Rogers is therefore that of a biological optimism. Man is innately good, and given a truly permissive atmosphere, will develop in positive directions. Where tensions arise it is because of the difference of the needs of the self as perceived, the self-image, and the requirements of society as either denied or given distorted symbolization.

These are the two most basic assumptions. From them come three others, as well as a specific application. Perhaps it is more proper to say that there are three corollary propositions or assumptions that relate fundamentally to the two major hypotheses. First of all there is the assumption that only the internal frame of reference of the client is valid for therapy and self-insight. If it be true that the innate growth forces in man are positive, and that he has the capacity to solve his own problems, then he has no need of reference outside of himself. There is no call to consider the opinions or abilities of others, he needs no standards set by society or God, he needs only his own available experience as it is within his own perceptual field.
or ground. The significant thing for therapy and for health is not the event but how the individual feels about it at the present moment. This leads to the second corollary, that the emotional climate of the individual is etiologic both for maladjustment and for personality reorganization. This is the reason for the consistent and persistent focus in nondirective therapy upon how the client feels. It is essential for good mental health that choices of action be based on the felt needs of the individual. Therefore the basic factor in the makeup of the self is not the rational, nor yet the volitional, it is rather the feelings and attitudes. This in turn leads to the third corollary in Rogers' set of hypotheses, namely that the valuational system is relative to the felt needs of the client. In evaluating behavior, or possible choices of behavior, the locus of evaluation resides within the individual. The choice of behavior is to be in terms of the homeostatic drives, the need for self-maintenance and self-enhancement. We are assured by Rogers that when the individual chooses what is best for him he will choose also what is best for society, if only he may choose in a fully permissive and acceptant atmosphere. This is to say that human nature is innately so that when it is most individual it is also most social.

In making application of this to the field of education the Rogerian hypothesis is that people will learn other things in the same way they learn in nondirective therapy. Motivation is effective only when it is internal motivation, significant learning is accomplished only in the absence of threat to the self-structure and in terms of the felt needs of the personality. Just as human nature may be trusted to make the right decisions therapeutically, students may be trusted to study and discuss the right things
educationally in a free and acceptant atmosphere. Students also will make the proper evaluation of their progress in terms of their understood needs of the present. Thus the usual formulation of a course of study is both unnecessary and improper.

Rogers' view of human nature therefore is that the individual has ample capacity to solve his own problems when he is set free to fully accept all his own sensory, organic, and visceral experience. He has within himself growth forces that move naturally in the direction of good for himself and for society.
CHAPTER V

THE EVALUATION OF NONDIRECTIVE ASSUMPTIONS REGARDING HUMAN NATURE

If one may judge by reports there seems to be little doubt that therapists of many varieties are meeting with some measure of what they consider to be success in their therapy. One can scarcely question that some clients have been aided by psychoanalysis, others by different forms of psychiatry, clinical psychology, social work, and nondirective therapy. It seems equally true that all forms of counseling or therapy have had their failures. The success or failure of therapy with a given therapist and a given client is therefore quite likely related to factors as yet not clearly determined. This is not to say that techniques and methodology are unimportant but that other factors influence the outcome of therapy to a very important measure. It is for this reason that we have chosen to consider Rogers' theories concerning the nature of human nature for critical study rather than a study of his methodology of counseling. The organization of society, government, church, and economic life depends basically upon the views of God and man that are held. The basic concepts with relation to human nature are also determinative with respect to the procedures and desired outcome of therapy or counseling. So, for instance, a fundamental belief that human nature can adequately solve its own problems under optimum conditions will lead therapy in one direction. A conviction that it requires more than man to meet the basic needs of life
will not be content with a pure humanism although both may entertain a profound respect for human nature. One critic of Rogers, in a review of *Client Centered Therapy*, says that nearly every page has something to irritate, stimulate, challenge, or provoke, and that therefore a review shorter than the book itself could scarcely do it justice.¹ To remain within reasonable bounds this critique will confine itself to the following questions: (1) Is Rogers' view of human nature as an optimistic biological humanism truly consistent?, (2) Is Rogers' concept of reality as subjective and phenomenological consonant with the facts of experience?, (3) Are there objective values, or is there only an evaluative organismic process?, (4) Is Rogers' program for education rational?

Rogers' Biological Humanism

It would seem clear that some scholars have found in the basic concepts of Rogers, ideas and language that speak to them in terms reminiscent of the classical or scholastic concept of the self. Curran, Nuttin, and Godin find in this terminology of Rogers a welcome departure from the deterministic approach of many psychologists. Others, like Thorne, find it a return to an outmoded and discarded view of human nature. Rogers himself, as has been noted in Chapters III and IV of this study, does speak of a "self", a "me", and of freedom of choice by the individual. On the other hand he speaks also of behavior being organically and viscerally determined, of homeostasis as a

basic law of life. It would therefore be pertinent to pursue further what Rogers does mean by the "self" of which he speaks so freely, and to ask whether or not Rogers is involved in a philosophic impasse between freedom on the one side and determinism on the other.

The Concept Of The Self

It is apparent that the self in nondirective theory becomes a psychic system, a segregation or hierarchy of experiences which is biologically grounded. The self-actualization of which Rogers speaks is a natural process. It is inherent in organic nature, and is distinguished from other biological drives by the factor of awareness, whatever this "awareness" may be, since Rogers never defines it. Indeed Rogers raises the question, although again he never answers it, whether this drive for actualization is not the fundamental drive, and all others are but variations or manifestations of it. If, however, it be remembered that the self of Rogers is actually a separation of certain percepts of the experiences of the individual, that these further are organic and visceral in nature, then probably Rogers does not need to answer his question further. If human life is basically biological then the fundamental purpose of the organism is self-preservation and self-enhancement.

This is precisely the point at issue, whether the self is merely a structure of percepts accompanied by awareness and essentially visceral in nature. The assumption here postulated by Rogers raises a number of questions. Is there a self which is an identity (albeit a growing one) and which undergoes and mediates experience, or is there only a grouping of some experiences of the individual into a self-structure or system within the totality of
experience? If Rogers' assumption concerning the visceral character of experience is correct, is this not really another form of determinism even though he does speak of volitional direction of behavior? Is emotion determinative of behavior or is it more truly an accompaniment of experience? Does the organic fact of homeostasis control mental and spiritual life, or is there a similar law in spiritual affairs?

Rogers' View Of The Self Is Functional

In Proposition VIII\(^2\) of his theoretical construct of personality Rogers says that a portion of the total perceptual field gradually becomes differentiated as the self. This should not be confused with the organism since it is restricted to the awareness of function or being. He then goes on to say that the conscious self is not necessarily coexistent with the physical organism, since the objects we control or the experience we control is regarded as a part of the self - other objects, experiences, even a part of the organism that is out of control is regarded as being less of or not of the self. Then in Proposition IX,\(^3\) Rogers adds, "As a result of interaction with the environment, and particularly as a result of evaluational interaction with others, the structure of the self is formed - an organized, fluid, but consistent conceptual pattern of perceptions of characteristics and relationships of the 'I' or the 'me', together with the values attached to

\(^2\)Rogers, *Client Centered Therapy*, p. 497.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 498.
these concepts."

On first reading of this material this seems to be quite good. Here we have a self and at that one not coterminous with the physical organism. There is the selection of materials that are dealt with consciously and volitionally. There is here an apparent advance over those systems that are purely mechanical or biological, and, as a matter of fact, Rogers would divorce himself from such theorists of human personality. It is interesting that Rogers realizes that this formulation of the self raises many questions, and he asks some of them. Of equal interest are the questions he does not ask and in this failure he indicates what the real slant of his formulation is. Among the questions proposed by Rogers are these: Is the self primarily a product of the process of symbolization? (Italics mine, GRY); Is it the fact that experiences may not only be directly experienced, but symbolized and manipulated in thought, that makes the self possible?; Is the self simply the symbolized portion of experience? When Rogers' formula is reread, when what he says elsewhere is added, and when these questions are studied it becomes apparent that for Rogers the self is a functional construct, a pattern of perceptions. It is noteworthy that Rogers does not ask what is this "I" or "me" that is the object of this perceptual pattern he calls the self. He does not even raise the question whether there may be a self that is given at birth (or before), which, although at first it may be largely potential, does nonetheless grow and become mature normally, and is in control to some measure of the activities and experiences of the total organism. As a matter of fact, Rogers objects to any idea of a substantial self. This he derides
as a fixed and static entity. Rogers denies any substantial self on the grounds that personality is process. It is clear therefore that Rogers is thinking of "self" as a function of the organism, a portion of the total perceptual field. And although he ascribes volition, integration, and redirection to what he calls this spontaneous force, it is clearly not what the classical or scholastic philosophers mean by the self. This difference, for instance may be seen in Herr's definition of personality as that dynamic organization of all the faculties and habit systems, which, under the direction of intellect and will, determine one's unique adjustment to his surroundings. He further says that a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. Another way of getting at this difference may be seen in the discussion on the nature of man as given by McGucken in a statement of the philosophy of Catholic education. He says that man is composed of body and soul, united in essential unity. Thus it is not the mind that thinks, it is the person, John Smith, that thinks. It is not the body that feels, it is again John Smith that feels. The soul of man is immaterial, spiritual, that is, intrinsically independent of matter, although necessarily united to the body to form a composite. This is sufficient to indicate that Rogers and the scholastics basically differ widely as to the nature of the self. Others


5 Vincent V. Herr, S.J., General Psychology, University Lithopinters, Ypsilanti, 1948, p. 203.

than those who hold to the scholastic concept are not willing either to reduce the self to a portion of the perceptual field. Stolz, for instance, says, "Soul or spirit is the warm, interior existence of man, that which separates him from even the highest animals. .... The soul is the citadel of man's being. It is not absolutely separate from mind. Nothing ponderable or material enters into the soul as such. It is invisible, non-material, and without weight or extension." This is apparently a quite different approach than saying that the self is a portion of the perceptual field.

If for the moment it be granted that in a purely functional sense the self is a group of percepts of the characteristics and relationships of the "I", this is not at all the same thing as a self that discriminates, surveys, chooses and eliminates the experiences to be admitted into awareness and the allowable concept of the self structure. For the latter is implying that there is something other than the experience. What or who is it that is capable of differentiating a set of experiences into an organized conceptual pattern? Nor can the experience decide that it is pleasing or self enhancing. Either there is an experience which is a gratifying response to a need or instinct or drive of the organism, (and this is a biological determinism), or there is a self which is other than the experience or even other than the organized pattern of concepts and percepts of experience. Rogers cannot have it both ways.

Freedom Or Determinism

This raises the question whether in Rogers' philosophic approach man is not indeed bound still within the determinism of a phenomenalistic system. Rogers says in Propositions XIV and XV that psychological maladjustment occurs when the organism denies to awareness significant sensory and visceral experiences, which consequently are not symbolized and organized into the gestalt of the self-structure; and, conversely, that psychological adjustment exists when the concept of the self is such that all the sensory and visceral experiences of the organism are, or may be, assimilated on a symbolic level into a consistent relationship with the concept of self. Rogers does not confine all experience to the sensational and organic or visceral, but he does apparently make these the key factors in adjustment or maladjustment. He does say that man has a capacity for volitional control, he can consciously alter his behavior in the light of new understanding about himself. If this were to mean that man has the freedom to intervene actively in his own life so that he can, if he will, actively oppose his natural goals (biological) one could well accept it in general. But this is not the freedom of which Rogers speaks. His freedom consists in being able to choose goals and experiences on the basis of self-enhancement and self-actualization along with freedom to reject the values of society if these do not coincide with the natural desires. In his sense, as quoted above, freedom becomes the tool of the natural process since self-actualization is a natural process inherent in

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8 Rogers, op. cit., 510-515.
man as a species. Now if man were perfect, and without natural flaw, if his only faults were those introjected by a faulty society, then it would be true that freedom would be as natural as anything else. While it is also true that Freud possibly went too far in ascribing evil impulses to the natural man, Rogers goes too far in assuming that man will naturally be free to do the good when set free from the threat of imposed categories determined by society to which he must conform.

While Rogers is not as blunt as some of his followers in acknowledging that his theories are deterministic, yet the conclusion is almost inevitable. It has been noted above that Rogers' concept of freedom is defective in so far that it is one sided and is not complete. The nature of Rogers' determinism is to be seen further in his choice of personality structure and in the terminology which he consistently uses. As has been noted in Chapters II, III, and IV of this study Rogers acknowledges his indebtedness to the field theory and gestalt psychology of Lewin, and as will be presently indicated, this does involve determinism. In addition, Rogers' consistent use of biological models and terminology leads him still further up this road. This is important because so often his phrases, taken by themselves, seem to say what a Christian or a personalistic psychologist would say.

Gestaltism And The Nature Of Man

It is not our purpose here to assess the philosophy of Lewin and others with respect to the nature of human nature. But in so far as Rogers has adopted the concept of field theory with respect to the structure of human nature it is germane to point out that Rogers and the gestaltists in general
have in so doing lost man in the process.

Rogers says that every individual exists in a continually changing world of experience of which he is the center, that the organism reacts to the field as it is experienced and perceived. The perceptual field is reality for the individual. The best vantage point for understanding behavior is from the internal frame of reference of the individual himself. Rogers then goes on to say that a portion of the total perceptual field gradually becomes differentiated as the self. These are Propositions I, II, VII, and VIII of Rogers' summary of his personality theory.

These assumptions state that what makes up the universe of the individual is only what is significant to him. Note first of all that we do not have here an individual who acts upon experience or sensation that comes to him, but one who follows the biological model of reaction to stimulation. Hence it is that Rogers is busy with the local scene, the relation of the individual to the forces of the field in the present moment of time. The total situation is determinative and must always be considered in order to grasp the meaning of particular behavior. Rogers consistently emphasizes the total reaction of the organism, and says, for instance, that difficulty in one part of the system will bring difficulty into all parts in some measure. Here then we have a concept that says that every event belongs to a larger whole of interacting forces which must be studied in relation to each other. In Rogers' thinking, since the self is a differentiation of the perceptual field, the

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9Rogers, op. cit., 482-498.
self becomes, or is, a process, or a field of fluid tension systems. This is on the one hand a concept of pure naturalism, for the system of nature is the ultimate reference of Rogers - his thesis being that man must be free to become his natural self. On the other hand this is a sheer abstractionism - for Rogers is not concerned with reality as such, as he clearly states, but with conceptual images and percepts as they occur to the individual. The world of psychology becomes not the real world or even the physical environment as such, it is the symbolic concept of the contemporary relations of the individual.

Now no one will doubt that in our human finiteness we must need approach reality in terms of our ability to perceive it. We must ever humbly recall that what we perceive is relative to the observer. But this is far different than saying that therefore the abstraction, the percept is the real thing. This is to lock the individual in the world of himself and his constructs and to make him be determined only by what he is. It is to deny a goal that is other than man now is, and is a determinism of the highest order. Human action cannot be explained merely by the pattern of significance and self-reference for man can and does initiate activity. So for instance, one may note a fellow human being, or an animal for that matter, in distress. This is a perception but it does not follow therefore that the individual will seek to alleviate the perceived distress. He may or may not, depending on other factors in the situation or in his own personality. But the point is that when he so undertakes to help this is not a reaction to a stimulus or to a significant percept of reality. It is, on the contrary, a voluntary expenditure of energy and an action freely chosen. Others subjected to the same
stimulus would pass by and offer no help. For significance and self-reference are relations and not things. They are qualities of an act of knowing. And there can really be no knowing without a knower. Hence Rogers, has, I believe, taken what is essentially a property or process and reified it.

In the second place we find that Rogers, following Lewin again, specifies the formation of a psychic system relating to the I or me which becomes differentiated from the total perceptual field. This is to say that there are forces within the individual and between the individual and his environment. But what these are, or what their origin Rogers does not say. He does raise the question whether or not these are related to fundamental biological needs of the organism. On the basis of this biological orientation he postulates the goals of equilibrium, differentiation and fluidity. The theory then postulates that self is a unit or psychical system distinguishable by the fact of awareness from other systems or the rest of the psychic organization. Rogers even goes so far as to say that this self-structure may seek to enhance itself even against the needs of the organism, and that behavior cannot be explained as atomistic or a simple S-R reaction.

That this represents an advance over the atomistic psychologists is granted, but so long as the self is still dependent upon response mechanisms and in so far as the self becomes in Rogers' theory a psychic system it is still a defective view of the self. Rogers still does not tell us what or who is undergoing equilibrium, what is really being differentiated, or what is stabilized. If it is the pattern of percepts then again we have lost the person, and there is no real idea who the "I" or "me" is. In logical analysis it makes little difference whether the chains be silk or steel, one is still
bound by them.

Rogers' Biological Terminology

It is instructive to note that essentially for Rogers the basic structure is a biological one. Reference has been made previously to the consistent use of terms like organic, visceral, organismic, homeostatic, differentiative, and integrative, when discussing the experience of the individual. It has been noted previously also that Rogers suggests that probably the fundamental drive in human nature is that of self-actualization and self-enhancement and that all others are derivative or correlative. He argues that it would be strange, since the organism acts as a totality, if the psychic life were in this respect dissimilar to the rest of life.

This is to say that the psychic system, or self-structure differs from the other systems not in nature but in function, and is subject to the same laws as the rest of the organism. At best therefore, man is only free to develop what is by nature within himself, and he is limited in this not only by what he is but also, in Rogers' conception, by what he is able to perceive and accept of himself. Although Rogers does say that man can consciously and wilfully alter his behavior in terms of new concepts about himself it should be noted that this does not avoid the problem of biological limitation - it is still a reactive behavior and not truly self-initiated. A short examination of three of these terms used by Rogers, although they are not original with him as he points out, will serve to focus our contention that Rogers' theory of human nature is essentially biological, and is therefore onesided, limited, and defective to that extent. We have noted above the determinism
involved in the concept of actualization, so we shall here speak of homeostasis, differentiation, and integration.

The Principle Of Homeostasis

In the field of physics the concept of homeostasis is that when a body or system of forces is in equilibrium it will remain so unless disturbed by some other body or tension. Thereupon it will react in such a way as to return to the previous state of balance. Homeostasis here is a passive reactional system. In biology the term has come to mean either the balance seeking activities of an organism such as the satisfaction of thirst, or the adoption of behaviors which have survival value. Following this later model Rogers has come to use the term in both of these senses. That is, the human being tends to choose those activities which reduce tension and those which enhance the self-structure as he sees it. The utilization of this concept as a psychological law draws the theory of Rogers still deeper into determinism of a biological model.

There are, of course, reaction behaviors in the human being. If one is pricked with a pin he will feel pain and move away from the stimulus. But one of the characteristics of living things, and this is even more true of the human being, is that frequently action involves far more energy than the stimulus calls for. A genuine psychological dynamic would require self-initiated change in the system, and even the presence of tensions as Rogers speaks of them would not sufficiently explain human activity. The reaction to tension under Rogers' law of homeostasis would be satisfied by tension reduction, and as a matter of fact, Rogers does make catharsis a sine qua non.
of therapy. The whole theory of homeostasis is based on the assumption that the activities of the organism under stimulation are adaptive reactions. But this does not fit in with some of the observed facts of human behavior at least. So, for instance, tissue needs as well as habit patterns create the sense of hunger, the involuntary muscles of the stomach contract and the human being becomes aware of hunger. Now, however, instead of eating whatever is most available, he may prepare an elaborate meal, thus postponing the satisfaction of hunger. Or he may go long distances by walking or driving to find a place to eat. In either case there is a great expenditure of energy beyond the demand of the need, and a response far greater and different in kind than adaptation to a tension of the organism.

One might mention also such non-survival reactions as shock in hemorrhage, symptom and anxiety neurosis in heart conditions, suicide, etc., as evidence that the human organism does not necessarily follow the law of homeostasis and naturally choose the self-enhancing or tension reducing reaction. Rogers' formulation precisely misses the point at issue, namely why the human being is not an automaton. We find then that Rogers' theory, when carried to its logical extension binds man to a physical and biological explanation of behavior. Not only is man basically determined by his physical nature and the physical world, or more correctly by his percepts of these, but Rogers' theoretical construction of homeostasis would lead in the direction of binding man to the law of action-reaction.

The Principles Of Differentiation And Integration

In a dynamic psychology it is not the process that is of basic concern
so much as it is the origin of the process. It seems that Rogers' theoretical construction can scarcely be a dynamic one, for it is the process with which we are constantly confronted. Thus it is that he speaks of the self as a differentiation of the perceptual field; of the fluid integration of the self and its activities; of an organismic valuing process rather than objective values. This is logically consistent with the adoption of homeostasis as the fundamental basis of the self-structure. Therefore also we need to look a little more closely at Rogers' terminology in order to understand that his freedom is not freedom and his willing is not really volitional control.

When Rogers says that from the mass of the perceptual field there emerges by differentiation a group or system of percepts which becomes the self-structure, he is saying that from one larger mass of experiences there arises a set which are recognizably different. Otherwise his use of the term has no meaning. In biology differentiation means that from a parent cell there arises a new cell different structurally than the parent, and integration means the formation of such new cells into a unit of specific function. That Rogers means such a parallel may be noted from Proposition VIII, quoted above, where he says clearly that a portion of the total perceptual field gradually becomes differentiated as the self. Further on in the same chapter he says:

The best definition of what constitutes integration appears to be this statement that all the sensory and visceral experiences are admissible to awareness through accurate symbolization, and organizable into one system which is internally consistent, and which is, or is related to, the structure of the self. Once this type of integration occurs, then the tendency toward growth can become fully operative, and the
individual moves in the directions normal to all organic life.\textsuperscript{10}

There is no way adequately to describe Rogers' theories concerning human nature except as a biological system, however much he may use the terminology of self and volition.

Implicit in the propositions of differentiation and integration is the assumption that personality in general and the self-structure in particular enters this world as an undifferentiated mass of perceptions. By some process of emergency, which Rogers does not at all define, there comes to be a definite pattern of perceptions about the "I" which Rogers calls the self-structure. There is no real evidence for such an assumption save the logical necessity of following the biological model. Since organic life does proceed from one cell to its final complex form, ergo so must the psychic life, since life is a unity. There is no evidence that the self is ever totally undifferentiated, nor is there any reason to believe that the various psychic systems are ever so. As a matter of fact the clinical material advanced by Rogers in support of his thesis is no support at all. That children at a certain level of maturity are able to verbalize their likes, dislikes, and wants certainly does not prove their incapacity to know these from the beginning of conscious life. Just so there is no evidence that the hearing of the person ever improves, or his color vision, or any perceptive possibility for that matter. That he may better learn to interpret what he sees or hears is a quite different story. No one will want to argue against maturation of basic

\textsuperscript{10}Rogers, op. cit., p. 513-514.
dispositions, but this is not the same thing as saying that from the undifferentiated mass of perceptions there emerges a portion of the perceptual field which becomes the self-structure. No one, not even Rogers, has demonstrated such an ontogenetic sequence as he here assumes.

In the nature of events physiologically integration involves the bringing together in at least a functioning unity elements of a diverse nature. It is questionable whether the natural process of actualization or even self-enhancement can provide the integration that ought to exist. Now it may well be that an individual who has cast aside all reference except to what he conceives to be his own good is integrated in that limited sense. But to limit integration to perception as Rogers does will not answer the realities of human behavior any more than his conceptions of homeostasis and differentiation. It misses the point that man does go contrary to his physiological needs of free choice for other ends and purposes. In addition, a purely natural kind of integration, which accepts the results of the interaction of the person and his world of percepts, can scarcely order and arrange these in purposive fashion other than the ends of survival and satisfaction of need. Goals other than these demand an organization of life other than that pictured by Rogers.

Thus in the end the freedom of Rogers is that of achieving a purely natural functioning, and there is no goal beyond that of man himself. It is one thing to accept man as he is, willingly and warmly, for the sake of basic understanding. It is quite another to accept this as the destiny of man. It is clear from Rogers' statement of his theory that he will go no further than what is in man as he is now. It is further evident from his definitions
and terminology that man is a creature bound to his own biology. Rogers' adoption of the gestalt framework, his emphasis upon the phenomenological approach, and his insistence upon a biological framework for psychology, all point out the fact that the person is lost in a world that is determined for him.

Therefore, although Rogers to some extent attempts to avoid the extreme and bald statement of a deterministic philosophy by reference to such concepts as awareness, life force, inevitable choice for good, socialization, and volitional control of behavior, the conclusion cannot be avoided. When these phrases are placed in the context of Rogers' theory and the overwhelming general consistency of his biological terminology we must conclude that Rogers has not avoided the pitfall of a deterministic system. We may even go a step further. It seems that Rogers' clinical experience has led him to sense something more in man than the fields of perceptualism and which can hardly be explained in biological terms. Thus it is that he speaks of life forces oriented toward good (even though he means by good the full natural development of organic man) and of inevitable socialization when the individual is integrated. But in our opinion, based on the somewhat lengthy study we have made of his statements, theory, and assumptions, Rogers no where gets to the heart of the essential nature of man. He has instead left us with an abstracted man in the world of percepts, a man bound in the limited world of his own subjective judgment, a man essentially determined by the field forces of his immediate environment, and a man whose future is wrapped up in his own biological development.
Thorne rather neatly sums this all up by saying: "All of these schools of psychology (here he refers to instinct psychology, behaviorism, topological psychology, Freudianism, nondirective psychology, and physiological psychology) are characterized by the common acceptance of the doctrine of psychic determinism; i.e., to regard man as a biological organism all of whose behavior is determined by natural laws and material principles." 11

As noted in the chapter on the basic assumptions of Rogerian theory, Snygg and Combs 12 have indicated that the phenomenological structure of nondirective therapy must be deterministic, and they deny outright the possibility of a free choice of behavior or response. They have stated in unequivocal language what we have shown to be implicit in Rogers' formulation. Rogers has noted that the work of Lecky assisted him in the development of his own theoretical formulations. It is interesting to observe what Walters 13 has written in connection with Lecky. She points out that while psychologists are attempting to include the whole organism in its own development, and while abandoning the older idea of determinism they have not brought the idea of freedom into their formulations. Then she says: "Lecky, for instance, while condemning the mechanistic determinism of the older school, says specifically that '......it must be understood that our intention in opposing


12 Snygg and Combs, Individual Behavior, p. 25.

this belief is to emphasize not the idea of freedom, but the idea of self-
activity. The conception of free will, even as a possibility, betrays a
preoccupation with anything save real individuals." Since Rogers accepts
Lecky's idea of self-consistency the remarks of Walters are appropriate.

14 Huttin in speaking of the self-realization principle in Rogers' theory
points out that it is not a force that follows a simple one-track direction
in man, as Rogers would have it, nor does it simply run parallel to the
growth of the biological organism. And Godin15 notes this same biological
preoccupation in Rogers and points out that this involves an irreconcilable
contradiction. He says: "The paradox and the impasse can be discerned in
this biological optimism and this intellectualism of perceived experience....
In truth no liberty at all is possible if it is not on the basis of obligation.
No human relationship at all, even a therapeutic one, is possible except on
the basis of a participation in common values. Liberty cannot be taken as an
end in itself save under pain of reducing itself to biological nature, to the
prevalent culture, or to pure thought, that is to say without destroying
itself.

Perhaps no one has ever analyzed the clinical conditions of liberty and
the attitudes necessary to restore it where neurosis has it fettered, better
than Rogers. Never, however, has anyone so clearly ended up with the impos-
sibility, and the internal contradiction, of a cure founded exclusively on

14 Huttin, Psychoanalysis and Personality, p. 100.

15 Andre Godin, "Psychotherapy: A New Humanism," Thought, XXVII, No. 106,
biological growth." (Italics original)

In our opinion, again based on the evidence from Rogers' own propositions discussed above, Rogers has come precisely to the point described by Godin. He has destroyed or lost the essential nature of man by reducing it to the determinism of biological growth, by reducing reality to the realm of pure perception internally organized and subjectively validated, and he has further limited the essential freedom of man by confining him to the present culture in the phenomenological framework of the here and now.

The Principle Of Constructive Growth Forces

Rogers has in one sense, at least, placed the outcome of therapy upon what he calls the constructive growth forces within the individual. He argues that it is this upon which the therapist must rely, and further that the therapist must have a deep faith that the individual can bring about his own integration when such growth forces are released. It is at this point, in our opinion, that Rogers arrives at the most profound insight philosophically in his theoretical construction of human nature. But it is also one in which is revealed the fundamental weakness of what is essentially a unilateral approach to human nature. It is our contention that Rogers, in emphasizing an area of human experience that needed emphasis, has mistakenly expanded this into the one fundamental principle of effective therapy and the organization of human behavior. We might point out, in passing, that this is not altogether illogical if one adopts the positions of Rogers in toto. If it be assumed that the one basic striving of the organism be toward self-actualization, that self-satisfaction results in natural good, then it may be assumed
also that the forces within the individual naturally are good and constructive as well. But we here raise two questions with respect to Rogers' assumptions. Are there not destructive as well as constructive forces in basic human nature? May it not be that the tension between these and other dynamics as well is the real dynamic of human self-growth rather than the natural unfolding or realization of innate growth forces?

Human Nature As Innately Good

It may be true, as some critics suggest, that Rogers in reaction to Freud turned to an opposite dynamic as an explanation of human behavior. It may be equally true, as proposed by Snyder, who was one of Rogers' students, that no one has placed so great faith in the client's capacity to heal himself as has Rogers. There is no doubt that the emphasis of Rogers upon the constructive and healing forces in human nature stands in a very refreshing contrast to the pathological emphasis of orthodox Freudianism. The latter, with its emphasis upon the destructive and coruscating forces residual within the Id, tends to look upon psychotherapy as a form of psycho-surgery. Freud and his school do not deny the presence of constructive forces, but the main thrust of their work lies in the elimination of the pathological forces. Rogers does not deny pathology, but he stresses the conception that these pathological forces are not innate but are introjected by society. His emphasis is that human nature is basically good and capable of self-direction when freed from threat, and its goals not only personally satisfying, but socially purposive as well.

Here is a line of thought that we have previously traced to Rousseau,
the innate goodness philosophies of Froebel and Pestalozzi, the process and child centered curricula of the school of Dewey. We have indicated before how Rogers acknowledges his debt to the thought of Dewey. It is clear therefore that dependence upon the healing powers of human nature is not exactly a new concept. Probably, however, no one has as yet been willing to make this the sole instrument of therapy, though Rousseau and Dewey were willing to do so in the field of education. Since Rogers has himself made this the core of his approach, and has denied the validity of other concepts concerning human nature, we may well consider whether this is an accurate view of human nature. We may indeed consider whether it is at all an accurate picture of nature in general, and whether here the necessities of Rogers' general theoretical position have not led him to logical absurdities.

Rogers And Traditional Therapy

Rogers' faith in the capacity of human nature to manifest its own innate constructive goals, his deep faith that the individual can restore himself with the therapist acting only as a catalyst, his insistence that human nature left to itself will seek good ends individually and socially, is a onesided emphasis. In our opinion it is possible only on the basis of an extreme naivete, the compulsions of an evolutionary logic, or an ignoring of all the facts of human nature in favor of those that meet his theory.

This is not the only instance of such naiveness in Rogers' thinking. His tendency to absolute dichotomies, as in the directive-nondirective controversy, his statement that teachers who are not nondirective therefore do not trust the student, his assumption that only his philosophy of human
nature is an adequate basis for democracy, are examples of this type of thinking. Others have noted this tendency of Rogers to erect "straw men" which he can easily knock down in defense of his own constructions. To mention but two, note the comments of Marzolf and Hahn and Kendall. To argue that because some do not place such absolute faith in the capacities of human nature, or do not make this the one dynamic of therapy, is therefore to deny these powers or tendencies toward good is fallacious logic. One may believe in constructive forces in human nature without necessarily believing that these are all that are present or native.

We may therefore agree with Rogers that there are constructive forces residual within human nature. We may go even further and recognize that for many therapists this fact had been lost in their preoccupation with the pathological. Rogers' emphasis upon the positive factors is helpful in so far as it reminds therapists that here is a vital force that can be utilized in the reconstruction of a disturbed personality. But that such innate growth forces are the one dynamic of successful therapy, or that all destructive forces are introjected, as Rogers claims, is gravely open to question.

16 Marzolf, Stanley S., Psychological Diagnosis and Counseling in the Schools, Holt, N.Y., 1956, p. 326.

Inner Destructive Forces

Rogers does not deny the presence of destructive forces in human personality. He does argue that they are not innate or essential, but have been introjected into man by society and religion. Perhaps his own words can better express this: 18

One of the most revolutionary concepts to grow out of our clinical experience is the growing recognition that the innermost core of man's nature, the deepest layers of his personality, the base of his "animal nature", is positive in nature - is basically socialized, forward moving, rational and realistic........

Religion, especially the Christian religion, has permeated our culture with the concept that man is basically sinful, and only by something approaching a miracle can his sinful nature be negated......

As I look back over my years of clinical experience and research, it seems to me that I have been very slow to recognize the falseness of this popular and professional concept.....

He (man-ORY) is realistically able to control himself, and he is incorrigibly socialized in his desires. There is no beast in man. There is only man in man, and this we have been able to release.

Not to be facetious, but surely all school administrators, police forces, armies, legislatures, and parents ought to welcome a system that would end all of our present difficulty by making the individual completely self-directive in positive directions. This would indeed be Utopia.

One could wish that it were possible to be so Alexandrian and so easily cut the Gordian knot. The fact is that all societies of record have been

18 Rogers, Some of the Endpoints and Directions of Therapy, pp. 16-29.
struggling with the fact of evil in human nature. The expenditures of time, energy, and money have been tremendous. The best thought of brilliant minds has been given to the problem of controlling and eradicating evil from human life. Now it would be possible that to a prophet should come a revelation concerning human nature that is new - and we should receive a clue that would solve the problem. Rogers does suggest that if his theories were applied to an infant from birth on the present problems of human life would disappear. He further suggests that his methods would indeed revolutionize education and government if put into practice in these fields. The only trouble is that his theory concerning the innate goodness of human nature is neither new nor untried. Space and time forbid tracing the various attempts to put this or similar theories into practice. One might examine the history of the Oneida colony in New York for example. Or has anyone demonstrated that the children educated under the philosophy of John Dewey have created less disciplinary problems or have been less sinful and better adjusted? The fact is that this is wishful thinking on Rogers' part, an assumption that is not proved clinically or experimentally. And one cannot rule out evil as existential by fiat or by deduction from previously accepted assumptions.

No one will question that there are evils that come to be a real part of the experience of humanity. Rogers does not deny this either, but his argument, it seems to me, runs into a curious cul de sac of logic. In his theory the ills of personality arise because the individual is not free to be himself, because he distorts symbolization by accepting the values of society instead of determining his own. Now if human nature is basically good, society, being composed of individuals, must be basically good also - and its
goals being human goals must likewise be good. It may be that current society is perpetuating evils developed by another generation - but that is only to push the problem back one level. For if the root of personality evils is in society then somewhere the human nature that composes society produced those evils - and there is no place for it to originate save in man himself.

On a clinical basis, if we for a moment adopt Rogers' structuring of human nature, it may be true that neurosis in a given individual is a result of the conflict between the organismic needs of the individual and the introjected demands of society. But it is an a priori assumption to state that therefore society is wrong and the individual right. Granted that under non-directive therapy the individual resolves the conflict in favor of himself, so tension is reduced, a harmonious pattern of percepts of the self is produced, and the individual is said to have undergone successful therapy. This is possible only where there are conceived to be no standards save the satisfaction of the needs of the individual organism, and where values are relative, in fact are themselves a process. The grave question unanswered by Rogers is indeed whether it may be that society is right and the individual wrong - as in the case of overt homosexuality, for instance. And it cannot be answered by the simple fiat that human nature is structurally good and will automatically do the right when set free in the Rogerian sense.

Rogers, we believe, has oversimplified the situation. No doubt Freud went too far in the negative direction. Perhaps even some adherents of Christianity have been too negative concerning human nature. For the fact is that there are both synthetic and destructive forces in human nature, good and evil. The truth lies not in Freud over against Rogers, nor yet in Rogers
contra Freud - each has seized upon a facet of human nature. And each has allowed the rigors of logic to develop assumptions into indefensible positions of logic and fact. With respect to Rogers at this point we must raise the question, is it really moral versus immoral society? In less ethical terms, is it really true that the individual freely left to his own program of self-actualization, following the law of homeostasis, will develop into what we have come to consider as a mature and socialized adult? Or is the sad truth that Rogers here has taken observable biological processes and has read into them psychological factors and ethical goals they do not possess. And if it is not enough that he has so reified natural processes, it seems to us that he has misread nature as well. By what process or scientific demonstration do we learn that nature itself is good? Nature knows little save a bitter struggle for existence, the law of the jungle. Then there are storms, earthquakes, floods, drought, pestilence, and all the hosts of natural evils against which man has had to fight even to live. The great benefits that man has had from the natural world have come as man has been able through distinctively human intelligence to bend nature to his wishes. Man's very position is contrary to purely natural processes; only selective breeding produces the animals we have, not natural development - left to nature the animal world would return to its own level, as would our flowers and vegetables. Even our health is possible only because in a real sense we have interfered with nature. A position such as that of Rogers is sheer naivete or wishful dreaming. Nature is not naturally good, nor is man naturally moving toward socialized and naturally good goals, for these do not exist except as man creates them. And when man creates them it is in obedience to
the Divine command and in terms of the Imago Dei.

So we cannot say that the evil in man is introjected by the devil of authority or society in its demands. It is not moral man and immoral society - the latter is only man as organized. The locus of conflict is in man himself.

Man As The Measure Of All Things

There is no doubt that Rogers stakes his theory and his therapy upon the innate goodness of human nature and its capacity to heal itself when set free to do so. In the preceding pages we have raised questions based on logic, clinical and empirical evidence. We have recognized that there are constructive forces in human nature that can be called on therapeutically, and that Rogers has made a real contribution in calling these to our attention. It is apparent, then, from our previous outline of Rogers' concepts that he is committed to assumptions postulating the natural goodness of man, the non-existence of absolute moral standards, and the acceptance of process rather than status as a goal, and measures value by life and man by man. This perspective challenges the Christian view of man at a number of points, some of which we have already discussed. We have indicated the conflict with respect to the nature of self and of freedom. But it should be noted that the concepts of Rogers with respect to human nature also challenge the Christian concept of authority and the location of the effective agent in psychotherapy. These last conflicts with the Christian viewpoint are bound up with Rogers' assumption that man is the ultimate measure of himself, that choices, judgments, and decisions are based upon the internal frame of reference. The choice of standards always rests with the client. The one
question that matters is, "Am I living in a way that is deeply satisfying to me and which truly expresses me?" When this question is affirmatively answered Rogers asserts that the individual is constructive and trustworthy, his need for companionship will socialize him, his need for giving and receiving affection will control undue aggression.

The Locus Of Effective Therapy

It would seem, at this point, that Rogers creates a logical contradiction, even if it be not an actual one in terms of clinical effectiveness. It seems to me that his clinical insight is closer to the reality of the therapeutic process than his theoretical construction and positive statements. If, as Rogers says above, man is so capable of solving his own problems, why or what use really is a therapist since the client is the effective locus of therapy? Yet it is curious that Rogers insists so strongly on the attitudes and philosophy of the counselor as a pre-condition of effective therapy even to the extent of claiming that one cannot have the therapy without the philosophy.

Why the need of a therapist if the locus of effective therapy is in the client entirely, if the ability to develop well is already in man? If all that the client needs is a sounding board while he talks out his problems, then surely anyone willing to listen will be effective or helpful. Yet Rogers devotes an entire section of Client Centered Therapy to the role, attitudes, and philosophy of the counselor as prerequisite to and accessory

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19 Rogers, Carl R., "Becoming a Person," Pastoral Psychology, April, 1956, p. 23.
to effective therapy.

May it not be that the nondirective therapist is far more active and directive in therapy than Rogers is willing to admit, and that this has a real effect on the outcome and effectiveness of therapy? If the counselor is consistent in client centered theory and therapy he must refuse to consider any elements of the situation save those brought out by the client, he must focus attention on the emotional rather than the intellectual components of the client's situation, he must direct attention to the feeling response of the client to the external factors rather than to the factors as such, he must refuse to do anything except to insist that the client can solve his own problems. Actually this is far more dogmatic and authoritarian than most therapists of other persuasions would dare to be since it confines therapy to an emotional release pattern. Be that as it may, Rogers' insistence on the one hand of the importance of the counselor's role, and on the other that the effective locus of therapy is in the client only, cannot be maintained.

Probably no qualified therapist today questions the fact that ultimately the client can and must make and implement his own decisions if therapy is to be considered effective. The dividing question is really as to the amount of responsibility for this desired outcome that rests with the therapist and with the client. In his theory Rogers stresses the capacity of the client for self-direction but in therapy he stresses the responsibility of the therapist where therapy is not successful. This represents a shift in the locus of the effective agent from that which is purely within the client to that which is at least partly the client-counselor relationship. For if when therapy fails it is the failure of the counselor then surely the counselor
must have something to do with its success when it is successful. It is in this sense that I consider his clinical practice more accurate than the theory - for Rogers' assumption of the adequacy of human nature leads him to demand also that the effective agent of therapy shall be the individual's drive toward integration or wholeness. Hence it is made evident that Rogers' conception of human nature views man and his natural life as an end in itself and as the standard by which it is to be judged.

It is intriguing that Rogers insists that his conceptions of human nature arise from his clinical practice. But so insist also Freud, Jung, Horney, Sullivan, and others and they are far from agreeing with Rogers as to the essential quality of human nature. Freud and Jung have, to say the least, been somewhat notorious for their pessimistic view of human nature while Horney and Sullivan emphasize the role of society in personality structure. In order for all of these varying viewpoints to be derived from clinical and therapeutic experience either each of these theorists hit upon one valid facet of human nature and became onesided in emphasis or else their basic assumptions determined the results of therapy as far as the structure of human nature was concerned, or the clients seen in therapy were too narrowly restricted and not truly representative of the variety of human nature. It is more correct, then, to say that Rogers' structuring of human nature is a logical development of his fundamental assumptions regarding human nature. While there is no doubt that Rogers does find positive and constructive elements in man, the fact that other qualified therapists find also destructive forces leaves neither one nor the other in itself as a complete basis for theory or clinical practice. The question must still be faced by Rogers
whether his theory of human nature is not a philosophic anarchy. It is a
gratuitous assumption that man will freely choose the good, viewed both
personally and socially, when in Rogers' terms, he is free to do so.

There is no doubt, again, that many clients have achieved tension reduc-
tion and a measure of integration under client-centered therapy. But the
question still remains very much open as to the social or ethical level at
which this integration is achieved. An integration satisfactory to a given
individual in terms of ego and biological needs may be not at all satisfactory
in terms of society generally and Christian ethics in particular. On Rogers'
own basis, must not the right of the individual to an a-social choice of
satisfaction be recognized and accepted?

The Nature Of Authority

Rogers' insistence that man, the individual, is the measure of all
things leads him also to deny any authority external to the person himself.
He does not deny the authority of the expert, in fact, he uses such authori-
ties as Rorschach or Stevenson to validate his clinical findings. Nor would
Rogers deny such intrinsic authority as might be found in the work of the
artist or the findings of science. Rogers has in mind an external, coercive
authority based on force or fear or both. It is in this connection that he
levels his charges against religion and specifically the Christian religion,
as has been noted on page 168 of this chapter. It is his contention that
Christianity is coercive, committed to view man as a sinner, drives man away
from his true self, and destroys his confidence in his only reliable check on
truth - his own organism. Rogers objects to any concept of man that implies
a need to subordinate himself to a power outside himself. This, he feels, is to coerce, to instil docility, and is maintained by power, status, or group pressures. Every therapist, I am sure, has met individuals subjected to coercion by parents, marital partner, family, social groups, or even religionists, and has noted the ill effects created by such pressures. But it is a quite unwarranted assumption to argue that because some use pressure wrongly therefore religion and all pressure are equally wrong.

No one will question that there are forms of religion, and perversions of true Christianity, which have been and are coercive - that ask man to give allegiance to a sub-Biblical view of God. But not even Rogers denies that man must give his allegiance to something or someone - be it God or be it man himself. The concept of freedom and authority that Rogers sets forth is not the freedom that comes when man has found his place in the Divine order of things, but is a self-autonomy, purely naturalistic and bound by human finitude. And in passing Dr. Rogers might learn that a basic argument against naturalism is not yet to deny the natural. The real function of religion from the human standpoint is to set men free to become what the Creator meant them to be. St. John, quoting Jesus, wrote, "If the Son make you free, you shall be free indeed," and St. Paul adds, "Stand fast in the freedom with which Christ has made you free." The Biblical view of freedom and authority

20 The Bible, John 8:36.
21 Ibid., Galatians 5:1.
is that unless man recognizes and also acknowledges that he is a creature, and unless he submits to the authority of God, his Creator, he will invariably and inevitably commit himself to some finite ideal which is itself enslaving. Hence the first of the Ten Commandments is the prohibition of having any other than the true God as the object of worship.

It is the insistence of Rogers that fixed and objective standards of morality foster a judgmental relation that makes therapy ineffective. He raises the question whether indeed a thorough Christian can function in therapy since non-condemnation is basic to success in therapy. He makes much of this attitude of the therapist, but this reviewer, at least, cannot see where any good therapist is condemnatory in his relations with the client. When, as in Rogers, this non-condemnatory attitude is coupled with a moral relativism there is of course little tendency to value one behavior pattern over another since there is no basis of comparison with objective standards or authority. When virtue has only pragmatic, or at best a social, value there is little temptation to be condemnatory. It may be granted, almost without argument, that there have been individuals who claiming to be counselors, have equated moral condemnation in counseling with religious and objective standards. This does not justify Rogers' assumption that such standards imply the necessary judgmental attitude of the counselor. Equally in error is his assumption that only moral relativism can provide a nonjudgmental attitude or atmosphere in counseling.

So then, we fail to be convinced by Rogers that man is intrinsically only good, that his natural tendency toward good is only perverted by a codifying and rejecting society, that man himself in his natural desires is
the measure of all things. He fails to offer either objective evidence or deductive logic that will bear scrutiny. As a matter of fact we may say that in his concern to develop a psychology that is scientific Rogers has descended into a scientism, and in the very effort to preserve man he has lost him. Zilboorg has described this kind of scientism very well: "This is another way of saying that the center of attention and interest becomes not truth, universal or particular, not knowledge of man or God, but rather a self-contained preoccupation with the adoration of the human mind - a psychological condition of utmost importance from the standpoint of modern psychology. In its most direct form it is narcissism, and in its consequences it does not even lead to self-knowledge. Still less would it lead to a synthesis, the demand for which becomes louder and louder as our contemplation of human problems deepens." Thus Zilboorg reenforces what we have been trying to say, namely, that the effort of Rogers to make man the measure of things is self-defeating, and in the end man himself is lost.

It is interesting to note that psychiatrists of other than psychoanalytic background, but who are also Catholic in belief and philosophy, have equal difficulty in accepting the philosophical bases of Rogers' theories of human nature. Vanderveldt and Odenwald have this to say (in condensed and summarized form):


In the first place, client-centered therapy, as set forth by Rogers, is based on the belief that man is basically good. Catholics, too, hold that some positive, constructive elements may be found in every man, but they also hold that, as a result of original sin, man is inclined toward evil, and that man, if left to himself, is only too prone to follow his evil tendencies because his intellect is darkened and his will is weakened.

Second, client-centered therapy, again as advanced by Rogers, is an anti-authoritarian system, i.e., it is based on the assumption that the source of valuing things lies exclusively in man himself. Man does not admit any authority outside himself, as he is the shaper of his own destiny. If we push this principle to its logical conclusions, it would follow that man is a law unto himself, both in moral and religious matters. In other words client-centered therapy refuses to admit an objective norm of morality and disposes of the authority of God. It should be emphasized that these principles and implications are inherent in the system itself.

It may be noted further that these are not the only doubts expressed by the authors just quoted with respect to Rogers’ views and therapy. They point out that it is utopian to believe that merely releasing inner forces is all that is needed to make man a morally healthy and responsible person since man has both constructive and evil forces residual in his own nature - therefore anyone who believes in the natural law as coming from God cannot accept that the patient has a right to choose evil. We have noted previously the serious questions raised by Nuttin and Godin from the viewpoint of Catholic philosophy.

One should note further that students of psychology who have an orthodox Protestant viewpoint offer an analysis of Rogers similar to that outlined
above. Rather typical of such summaries is the one by Granberg:

"From the foregoing it will be apparent that Rogers is committed to presuppositions postulating the natural goodness of man, the non-existence of absolute moral standards, and which accepts life as the measure of all values. From this perspective he challenges the Christian view of man at a number of critical points including the nature of the self, the ultimate locus of human conflict, the nature of authority, the nature of freedom, and the effective agent in psychotherapy... It will have been noted above that Rogers specifically excludes from his concept of the self any idea of a substantive self on the ground that personality is a process, it is dynamic. The idea of a substantial self he dismisses as 'static' and presumably deleterious to the growth of the personality itself and our understanding of it."

It would, therefore, appear that the hypotheses offered by Rogers as the theoretical basis of human nature underlying his clinical methodology present fundamentally unacceptable conclusions to those holding a Christian view of human nature. This does not deny the real values which Rogers has to offer, but it does mean that we can go so far with him but not all the way. Our estimate of the contribution which Rogers has made we reserve to a following chapter.

Rogers' Approach To Reality

In his references to the nature of reality Rogers quite clearly points

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out that a discussion of "Dinge an sich" is not for him. He will discuss reality only as a process in psychology, and is concerned only for that which appears real to the individual. This is of course not to say that Rogers has no ideas on the nature of objective reality, or that his theories concerning human nature have no bearing on this subject. It is our contention that Rogers cannot validly escape from the questions raised by his theories with respect to the nature of reality. We shall ask the question whether indeed the world of the individual is by itself a valid world; can the individual, even just logically, be really locked in the world of his own experience; is the present awareness the only valid field of therapy; are there indeed no valid external criteria; and is not the full extension of inwardness ultimately neurosis and psychosis? In our discussion of Rogers' theories concerning human nature we have of necessity made prior reference to some of these questions. We wish further to note that it is beyond our scope here to reply in detail to Rogers' ventures into the fields of phenomenology, existentialism, and idealism as philosophic systems. We wish to go no further than his applications of these to personality theory and the nature of human nature.

The Internal Frame Of Reference And Reality

In the thought of Rogers, whatever external reality may in itself be, it has no real significance for psychological process or for therapy. What is of importance is how the individual reacts to or feels about the perception which he experiences. Rogers puts it this way in Proposition II of his
Theoretical construction: 25 "The organism reacts to the field as it is experienced and perceived. This perceptual field is, for the individual, 'reality.'" He then goes on to say that one does not react to some absolute reality but to his perception of that reality, and it is this perception which for the individual is or becomes reality. He further posits the non-necessity of any judgment concerning true reality for either psychology or therapy. In his belief all that is necessary for therapy is the awareness of the perceptual field. His interpretation of reality for social purposes is that reality consists of those perceptions which have a high degree of commonality among various individuals. Thus a desk has reality because a majority of people have perceptions of it which are reasonably similar.

Rogers then goes on to state that the world of perception and experience is a private world - no measurement of stimulus or psychometric or physiological testing can adequately reveal the experience as experienced or perceived by the person.

In the conclusion to his chapter on theory Rogers makes the following statement: 26 "This theory is basically phenomenological in character, and relies heavily upon the concept of the self as an explanatory construct. It pictures the endpoint of personality development as being a basic congruence between the phenomenal field of experience and the conceptual structure of the self - a situation which, if achieved, would represent freedom from

25 Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, p. 484.
26 Rogers, Ibid., p. 532.
internal strain and anxiety, and freedom from potential strain; which would
represent the maximum in realistically oriented adaptation; which would mean
the establishment of an individualized value system having considerable
identity with the value system of any other equally well-adjusted member of
the human race." It is not necessary at this point to multiply quotations
from Rogers since we have noted in detail in Chapter IV how Rogers' theories
of personality really lock the individual in an abstracted world of his own
percepts. Note further that Rogers reemphasizes this internal frame of
reference approach in this final summary to his personality theory.

It is likely that no one will question the proposition that a necessity
for effective living is the subjective appropriation of the experiences that
come to the individual. But it is very much of a question whether the sub­
jective reaction to experience is the only reality for the individual.
Rogers' insistence that the primary, indeed the only, question is that of
the client's feeling about a given situation is a logical extension of the
concept of reality that he proposes. It may even be relatively true in some
minor relationship situations or in decisions affecting vocational choice.
It does not appear to be the answer for all problems and situations. There­
fore it would seem that this insistence of Rogers raises at least two
questions at this point. First, whether it is valid in therapy and theory
to consider only the emotional reaction of the client, to keep him confined
to the subjective world of his perceptions. Second, whether good mental
health does not actually call for a deep concern and activity of the person­
ality toward objects outside himself. These two questions are of course not
discrete but are so stated in order to make clear our objection to Rogers' approach to reality and personality.

Rogers' View Of Reality Is Too Simple

The first great error of Rogerian thought would seem to be that it makes man and his world too simple. When in the interests of a therapeutic technique Rogers would reduce all reality to the internal percepts of the individual as they exist in the immediacy of the present he aligns himself with the instrumentalist school of Dewey. And when he further simplifies the situation by denying the importance of any perceptions save those which reveal the emotional reaction of the client he ties himself down to a therapy which finds its all in emotional release. Hence we believe that those writers who profess to find in Rogers some hope that psychology is moving toward a return to the idea of a soul or self have been led astray by his terminology and have not considered sufficiently his basic philosophy. Very simply there is no reality for Rogers save that existing at a particular point of time within a given individual. This of course holds good for truth and goodness as well - therefore the insistence of Rogers that standards are created within the individual, he is the measure of all things. It is a denial that anything can exist independently of the perceptive process.

The limitations that Rogers imposes upon human nature grow out of his basic assumption of radical empiricism, the denial of the validity of anything not experienced by the client. Its difficulty is that in addition to eliminating much that is real and human it also eliminates the indispensable. This rigorous and parsimonious methodology flouts the intuitions of common sense
with respect to the existence of an external world. It is a way of attributing power to man to himself furnish the data that the cosmos no longer can, and the followers of such a philosophy have quixotic ideas of radical revolution. And Rogers has noted that to follow his ideas would revolutionize education, society, and government. It is probably the ultimate in human flattery.

The insistence of Rogers that when man is free on this individualistic basis he will inevitably become social and arrive at truth is again to say that truth is determined not by conformity to something externally given but by the consequences of one's reactions. One may dream of a world free of any compulsion and obedience to law, but this is simply to deny the reality of the truly external determinants of human behavior, the reality of the physical and personal objects that constitute the environment of the individual. Nor can one simply assign to this unreal world the role of the "devil" that causes the ills of the human mind and soul.

Reaction Of Others To Rogers' View

Other students of psychology have noted the tendency in Rogers outlined above and have reacted to it in various ways. It is our contention that Rogers having properly established clinically certain mechanisms of therapeutic process has mistakenly identified these as causative of natural phenomena. Zilboorg has this to say about the apparent simplicity of process which Rogers asserts: "The suggestion that human minds do not necessarily or always, perhaps never, function in accordance with the precepts laid down by the logicians is one with which the contemporary psychopathologist will
not find it difficult to agree, since he knows that affective factors more unconscious than conscious dominate our thinking more than it appears and more than we are willing to admit.\textsuperscript{27} This is to point out that the dynamics of human operation cannot be confined to the materials present in consciousness as the theories of Rogers would demand.

Wolberg\textsuperscript{28} points out that the one technique of Rogers has its limitations also. "Thus choice of or rejection of nondirective therapy will depend on whether or not the individual is deeply disturbed emotionally, has existing ego strength, and the nature of the problem for which he seeks help....Non-directive methods are most helpful in individuals of relatively sound personality structure who require aid in clarifying their ideas about a current life difficulty or situational impasse. They are definitely much less effective in serious emotional problems in which anxiety elements are present.\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots\ldots Permissiveness will not down anxiety, insight may be achieved but anxiety may still block action." Here Wolberg is saying, and we believe rightly, that no one system of therapy and no one technique is adequate to the complex nature of human nature - neither nature nor therapy is that simple.

Nuttin takes some pains to underscore some of the weaknesses that we have pointed out above. In a rather lengthy quotation he says:  

\textsuperscript{27}Zilboorg, \textit{op. cit.}, p. 290.  

\textsuperscript{28}Lewis R. Wolberg, \textit{The Techniques of Psychotherapy}, Grune and Stratton, 1954, New York, p. 44.  

\textsuperscript{29}Nuttin, \textit{op. cit.}, 94-104.
According to this method, the therapist's function does not consist in applying a special therapeutic process to the patient. The patient cures himself - that is to say, his own growth leads him to overcome his difficulties.

This means that the therapist must adopt a certain attitude and a certain method.

Rogers' attitude toward psychological diagnosis is a direct result of his idea of what therapeutic treatment aims at. As we have already seen, the aim is not so much the solution of problems as a change in the patient's mode of "experiencing." To obtain this result I have no need of "objective information" about anybody, nor do I need to treat him from the outside as an object, or try to size him up.

Rogers' words obviously contain an important truth; but he probably goes too far in his general condemnation of diagnosis and all its methods. For the truth is that psychological diagnosis, in the best sense of the term, is the fundamental way of access to the patient's subjective inner world, and this on the basis of objective data.

Rogers' idea of the total acceptance of man as he is seems to us in need of qualification. It is a defect even from a purely psychological point of view. And the ultimate reason for this is that Rogers does not sufficiently take into account the fundamental conflict that characterizes human personality dynamics.

The self-realization he talks about is not a force that follows a simple one-track direction in man; nor does it simply run parallel to the growth of the biological organism. The theory of acceptance in Rogers' sense loses sight of the specifically constructive element in the actualization of the personality, i.e., the conflict and tension at the heart of man's dynamic structure. (Italics original)

Here Nuttin makes explicit his objections to Rogers' elision of all except perceptual data, to his oversimplification of human nature, and states the requirements for good therapy in terms of objective data and standards. In another place he points out also the absolute necessity of man's active interest in things and activities other than himself as a ground for psychic health. While therefore he finds some good elements in Rogerian philosophy
Nuttin also delineates its basic failure as acceptable theory and therapy.

Perhaps no one has spoken more sharply to the philosophic weaknesses of Rogers' views of human nature than has Godin,\(^{30}\) when he writes, "Perhaps no one has ever analyzed the clinical conditions of liberty and the attitudes necessary to restore it where neurosis has it fettered, better than Rogers. Never, however, has anyone so clearly ended up with the impossibility, and the internal contradiction, of a cure founded exclusively on biological growth."

A little further on, and by way of summary, Godin says:

\[\text{The therapeutics of Rogers, in its overwhelming simplicity, has presented us with the role of liberty in the construction of our perceptions and in the attribution of significations. At the same time it has brought home to us the necessity of "warm acceptance" in order that liberty might be established or restored and developed. Man knows that the truest values which he tries to realize are those which bear a relation to the psychology of another - and this presents us with a full humanism. Liberty a deux, the one aiding the other to grow. But liberty for what?........}

The humanism to be found in these five volumes, (reviews of Bettelheim, Rogers, Horney, Curran, and Wise - GRY) then, we must say with regret, is a truncated humanism. It is truncated because no author studied has proposed either a coherent conception of mental health or a system of values which permits liberty to express fully in nature and culture its role at the heart of human relationships........

The art of living - the humanism - resulting from clinical psychology remains precarious and menaced. The psychotherapists have discovered liberty. But liberty is not a last end and cannot be willed for itself in human nature without contradiction. Liberty cannot grow and live unless it is based on values and on hope.

The criticisms voiced by Godin serve again to sharpen our conviction that Rogers has oversimplified the human problem and reduced human nature to the point where it has lost its real humanity. This conviction is apparently shared by a number of serious students other than those cited above, but space forbids our citing them all. It will no doubt have been noted that the foregoing statements are all from the viewpoint of Catholic scholastic scholars and therapists. But the basic objections to the philosophical theories of Rogers are by no manner of means confined to this one system of thought. And these objections are raised by individuals in the fields of therapy, education, philosophy, psychology, and religion. And rather remarkable too is the way in which these various scholars come to similar conclusions with respect to the propositions advanced by Rogers. In general these may be stated as a conviction that client-centered therapy is too narrow in its conception of human nature, is too restricted in its methodology, is actually highly directive in the strict attention to emotional factors, and poses a view of reality that is unacceptable.

So Wise\(^{31}\) points out that nondirective therapy is contra-indicated in many cases since it will result in an impasse therapeutically or in actual harm to the client. She insists that it is too arbitrary and inflexible, and that the superficiality of the technique may be dangerous for the deeply disturbed. With respect to the point of inflexibility because of the view of

human nature involved, Mowrer\textsuperscript{32} insists that full-fledged nondirectivists are implacable in that they insist that the patients take full responsibility for the content and direction of therapy, and that the nondirective therapist persistently focuses attention upon the client's feelings and perceptions. He then goes on to say that although reflection is often a highly useful device it is not alone sufficient for a radical and versatile psychotherapy.

To this we may add the comments of Bordin,\textsuperscript{33} "A multi-dimensional conception of therapeutic relationships is not universally accepted. As my earlier paper suggested, Rogerian theory seems to have assumed that there is a single characteristic of interpersonal relationships, namely non-directiveness or permissiveness, which can account for the therapeutic value of these relationships for all combinations of patient and therapist personality. As a matter of fact the directive-nondirective dimension of therapeutic relationships has never, to my knowledge, been subjected to the type of analysis which would permit a test of the tenability of the unidimensional assumption. Aside from this factual issue, it would appear that an assumption of uni-dimensionality of therapeutic relationships would seem to stem from a relatively simplified conception of personality structure and personality change." Strang\textsuperscript{34} has a somewhat similar view in which she points out that


\textsuperscript{34}Ruth Strang, \textit{Counseling Technics in College and Secondary School}, Harpers, N.Y., 1949, 113-120.
the exclusive use of one method for all cases is contrary to a fundamental
principle of clinical psychology, namely, that the approach should be adapted
to the individual, his needs, and the situation. She says that there is no
one method of interviewing that is appropriate to every case. Lowrey\textsuperscript{35} and
Thorne\textsuperscript{36} would also agree that the nondirective theory and practice are too
limited in their view of human nature and its problems. The latter has
listed seven major points at which he feels nondirective therapy and theory
are inadequate. Among these he lists the refusal to consider objective data
and reality with relation to the situation of the client. Hamrin and
Paulson\textsuperscript{37} find trouble also with the theories of Rogers in respect to human
nature and to the nature of reality when they suggest the following critique:
Client-centered therapy is only attitude and emotion centered, and therefore
eliminates from consideration much that is pertinent in the situation of the
client; it is actually very directive in its exclusive focus upon attitudes
and emotions, in the particular selection of attitudes and emotions to be
reflected by the therapist, and by the ignoring of test data and other data;
client-centered therapy is limited to cases initiated by the client and is
therefore of limited use in the schools; and finally the therapy is too

\textsuperscript{35} Lawson G. Lowrey, "Counseling and Therapy," \textit{American Journal of Ortho-
psychiatry}, XVI, October, 1946, 615-622.

\textsuperscript{36} Frederick C. Thorne, "A Critique of Nondirective Methods of Psycho-
therapy," \textit{Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology}, XXXIX, October, 1944,
459-470.

\textsuperscript{37} Shirley H. Hamrin and Blanche B. Paulson, \textit{Counseling Adolescents},
limited in its range of techniques to meet many personality needs. They also suggest that many of Rogers' claim to uniqueness are found in the work of others.

Citations like this could be multiplied, but would serve no real purpose. Apparently there are a number of scholars who feel that objective data and reality are of real importance in dealing with the client, that content cannot be divorced from process in psychology, and that Rogers' construct of human nature does not sufficiently account for the complexity of human nature.

No one, I am sure, will want to question the importance of the subjective reaction of the individual to experience. Nor would there be any denial that in many cases how the client feels about himself or about a situation is a basic question. Certainly no modern psychologist would minimize the role of emotion in personality development. But the fact is that Rogers moves from the subjectivism of an abstracted world of percepts to the consideration that in therapy it is the client's reaction to the percept that is basic.

Rogers And The Internal Frame Of Reference

The posing of a hypothetical situation, but one which is nonetheless met in clinical situations, may raise a number of the problems which a forthright internalism of experience creates. And, as in the previous section, space does not permit dealing with all the problems aroused by Rogers' theories. If one were to meet in a completely nondirective manner a very tense, hyperactive, anxiety ridden, hypertensive individual, it could conceivably be that the outcome of such therapy would be the recognition by the individual that this was his situation. And he could even come to accept himself as such.
Even more he could put forth genuine efforts to develop more socially acceptable behavior with a very rational plan for attainment of reasonable, self-satisfactory goals. But he would wind up about as much tense, hyper-active, anxious and hyper-tensive as before, if not more so, because of the frustration of finding no real answer to his problem. This is because the emotional situation is symptomatic and not causative in cases of hyperthyroidism. No amount of internal personality reorganization, no concentration on emotional components, is going to reduce an overlarge or overactive thyroid gland. Only surgery or medication can accomplish the desired end in this situation. It might be added that the percept or concept of surgery will not suffice either - only the concrete reality of the operating theater will do. It would be possible to list a considerable number of situations in which attitude, emotional response, perception or any other internal reaction cannot suffice to aid the client in any but a very superficial way.

Perhaps one other illustration, chosen from a different field, will be sufficient for our purposes at this point. If we consider the individual engaging in adultery or fornication in a Western Christian society we enter the area of both law and morals. This particular situation has been selected because the individual must consciously enter into it and actively bring about its accomplishment. When we are presented with the fait accompli we may consider the emotions and attitudes tangential thereto but we cannot stop at that point - for there is a physical and objective reality that cannot be avoided. One cannot, with Rogers, say that here only the attitude of the client with respect to the experience is important for therapy. We cannot say that the thing in itself is not as important as how the client
feels about it. He may indeed feel quite satisfied with himself, may have reduced physiological tension by his sex activity and thus be homeostatically balanced physically and psychically. Surely the law and the moral standards of Christian society would demand that this individual be either reoriented in his attitudes and emotions or confined where he cannot exercise them as they are. And again, no matter what his feelings about the particular sexual act or acts may be, the individual cannot escape the objective physical reality of the deed or its consequences of pregnancy, disease, or legal action. Nor can his feelings of satisfaction dismiss the objective fact that the law of God has been broken. Here also, then, is a situation in which focusing upon the emotional components masks the real situation. It would be misleading and false to say that only the way the client feels about the situation is important — and even worse his feelings may be altogether wrong to such an extent that their further exercise could be dangerous to him and to society.

So we face the question whether it is really so that only how the client feels is valid for therapy, whether it is indeed true that only the present awareness of feeling is the proper field of therapy, whether the internal frame of reference as the sole frame for therapy is not an impasse, and whether the full extension of inwardness is not neurosis and psychosis rather than sociality and mental health. That Rogers in his theory is taking issue with that form of science which would reduce to quantification all aspects of human nature and deny those not quantifiable is good. That all of the tests, measurements and physical examinations do not yet present us with the whole picture of the living man is true. But is it therefore true that only the emotional response and internal attitudes of the client are
valid for therapy as Rogers would have us believe?

Rogers' Subjectivism Is Onesided

To swing from one extreme to the other, from sheer objectivism to complete internalism, is simply to jump from Scylla to Charybdis. It is somewhat characteristic of Rogers' tendency noted previously to present false dichotomies. In our opinion Rogers has been misled by the fact that some success in therapy can be assigned to his therapeutics to assume that it is the method. But in so doing he has drawn a portrait of human nature that is as onesided as the one he seeks to avoid. A previous criticism indicated that Rogers' view of human nature is an oversimplification - it does not sufficiently take into account the multiple causation of behavior nor the complex nature of man himself. Rogers would essentially reduce motivation to the one force of self-actualization, yet human motivation is also complex and far from simple. The fact is that in any action, physical or mental, the entire person is involved although one or the other may predominate in a given situation. It is Rogers' assumption that emotion is etiologic. If you can straighten out the individual's feelings about himself, then all will be under control.

This is indeed an assumption and a large one at that. If for a moment we grant this assumption it would still seem that Rogers has drawn wrong and untenable conclusions therefrom. If it is only the emotional life of the client that needs to be redirected to insure the redirection of the rest of life then it still remains very much a question whether this reorientation must be as Rogers says in terms of the satisfaction of the needs of the self as such. In truth it may well be that the way to psychic health is precisely
turning away from self to serve others, developing interests other than in one's own self and its needs. In the exclusive focusing upon and mirroring the emotional life of the client the real problems may go quite unsolved. The nicely adjusted world of self-satisfaction may be quite rudely shattered on the rock of social and physical reality, and the last state of the individual may be worse than the first.

Rogers has taken the approach really of the subjectivist although he attempts to validate this by objective measures in clinical practice. That is, he has attempted, or his students, to use the Rorschach or TAT to confirm clinical impressions of therapeutic gain. These have never been really successfully quantified in themselves and a considerable measure of subjectivism remains with them. In addition Rogers and his followers have published studies seeking to quantify items taken from tape recordings of actual client-centered interviews. Another type of study has been to use Stevenson's "Q" technique to validate client gain in therapy. The tables and the data all look quite formidable and scientific. But are they really so?

If we accept Rogers' formulations at face value what really are these multiplied and accurate recordings worth? As noted previously Rogers says that it is how the client feels about a situation that is important. Combs echoes this by saying, "By 'client-centered' the nondirective therapist means that he is concerned always with the way things appear to the client."

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Actually all that the nondirective therapist can enter into is the verbal symbolization of the client's experience. By definition he can share neither the experience nor the feeling. The symbolizations have meaning only as they are regarded as being objectively true and accurate - in strict nondirective terminology and thought the therapist really can only state how he feels the client feels - he cannot say what the client feels - he cannot say what the client does feel unless he is willing to grant the objective validity of the client's symbolization of experience and emotion. Nor can there be any scientific measurement and validation of these records unless they be assumed to have such objective validity. Moreover if these protocols have objective validity what is wrong with other objective data forsworn by nondirective theory?

A full internalism is really a contradiction in terms and fact, and in truth is impossible. How can one really enter into the thought world of another on Rogers' terms? If reality is for the individual his perceptions of experience then the best we can ever achieve is our reaction to the verbal symbolization of the client. To really understand even at the level of empathy one eventually has to trust the validity of objective communication and accept the symbolization of the client as an accurate reflection of situation and feeling. Now this is a lot more than how the client feels about it or how the therapist feels about it. Rogers says that the commonality of response makes social relations possible. In other words that we agree that a specific response on the part of several individuals indicates that this is a chair or desk or whatever. But one is forced to ask what is this commonality since by his definition all experience is unique to the
experiencer? What can it be except it be an objective reality, concrete or abstract, capable of arousing similarity of response and capable of maintaining itself no matter how unique may be an individual response? Without this all of Rogers' quantifications are wind and so is his therapy; for without this objectivity there can be no communication.

The ultrasubjectivism of Rogers thus cannot stand and this is true even by virtue of its own logic. In speaking of psychological theory Gasson has this to say, "To begin with, the theory will have to be truly scientific. Let us take that to mean that it will deal with real things, not merely with 'free creations of the mind.'........That is, we take for granted that real things are and that they can be understood without involving contradiction." He then goes on to point out that if real things are not thus understandable they are simply nonsense.

The difficulty with Rogers at this point is that he would take what is a genuine factor in experience and raise it to the principle of reality - at which point it becomes the serious error of supposing that nothing is truly real except the experience, and he falls into the equally serious error of supposing that such subjective experiences or feelings can be quantified without becoming genuinely objectified and externally real.

Client-Centered Therapy As Immersed In The Present

A corollary of the internalism discussed above is the consistent attempt

of nondirective therapy to focus upon the feeling of the client here and now. This is natural if the focus of therapy is the feeling state of the client, and if values are considered as a valuing process rather than standards or norms. This concern with the immediate is not illogical if life is viewed as a process only, which Rogers seems to do. He states it this way:

It should also be mentioned that in this concept of motivation all the effective elements exist in the present. Behavior is not "caused" by something which occurred in the past. Present tensions and present needs are the only ones which the organism endeavors to reduce or satisfy. While it is true that past experience has certainly served to modify the meaning which will be perceived in present experiences, yet there is no behavior except to meet a present need.

It is probably true that here again Rogers is reacting against positions previously held in the field of therapy which may have stressed too strongly developmental or causal factors antecedent to the present situation of the client. Following Rank and Taft he emphasizes the relevance of the present, and along with Combs would restrict the content of therapy to the immediately present feelings of the client. The latter says that nondirective therapy stresses the immediate situation rather than the past because it is in the present that changes in the personality must take place.

Even if we grant, which we do not, that the contents of client communications are unimportant as compared to the emotional components, it is a moot

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40 Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, p. 492.

question whether the past or the future can so ruthlessly be ignored. As a matter of fact this is one more illustration of the tendency toward an oversimplification by Rogers. It is not a question of the present versus the past, of content versus emotion. The fact is that my present choice, my present feeling is not only an immediate actuality, it is also a blend of the past and a view of the future. To say, as Rogers does, that the past merely conditions the choice I now make is simply naive and to say further that all behavior is conditioned by present need is to deny the realities of human behavior. Or perhaps it is more proper to say that Rogers places behavior at the reactive and organic level. The fact is, however, that man can deny present need in terms of future satisfaction or in terms of outright rejection because of moral standards. And in addition it is too simple to say that present choice is conditioned by past experience. In many cases present behavior is determined and controlled by the meaning of the past. Thus the compulsive behavior present in many phobias for instance.

If we pursue the matter just a bit further we shall have to recognize that there could be no present choice except for the foundation of the past. It is for this reason that content is not irrelevant to present feeling. Without doubt the present fear or anxiety is meaningless unless one does understand the past and its relation to the now. The psychic situation of the client is not unlike the alcoholic - to dissipate the present fear by therapy may do nothing at all to remove the underlying cause that brought it about in the first place. To remove a sense of guilt because of a real sin in the past does nothing to remove the basic cause of the present behavior - the wrong must be dealt with before real psychic health can permanently ensue.
The individual is not so self-sufficient that he can divorce himself from his past nor refuse to consider the future consequence of his present choice or feeling state. As John Donne rightly said, no man is an island unto himself. The constructs of Rogers would make man so sufficient unto himself, and are for that reason seriously deficient.

Psychic Health Is Outgoing, Not Inward Bent

As we have noted, then, Rogerian therapy and theory would confine man to the world of his own emotions, and limit the validity of therapy to a consideration of present time. His view of reality is subjective and phenomenological. We believe that this presents too limited a view of human nature, is onesided in approach, and ignores aspects of human personality and data of experience. Others too have felt that this approach creates more difficulties than it solves and cannot adequately portray the complex realities of human nature. The concept of self-sufficiency, the idea of growth only as self-actualization is a snare and delusion, but is of a piece with Rogers' thought of man as the measure of all things.

We may then question whether it is good for man to be so turned in upon himself, whether growth is indeed merely the unfolding of potentialities present in the organism. Johnson\textsuperscript{42} in a rather lengthy section has this to say:

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The great illusion is the self-sufficiency of the finite creature we know as man. It is true that a person should do what he can to develop his potentialities, but it is an error for him to suppose that he can be independent. Without resources beyond his own he cannot live at all. In growing up one may become less dependent than the helplessness of infancy, and more independent in the responsible decisions of maturity. This is the partial truth in what the psychologist contends, but it becomes misleading if it passes for the whole truth in proclaiming my independence as one who can stand alone in splendid isolation.

The danger of self-sufficiency, as of any false claim, is the deception into which we are led. To believe that I am independent leads me to act as if I can be sufficient to myself, which comes to unhappy consequences. A truly religious person is ready to acknowledge the fact of his dependence, not to perpetuate the weakness of childhood, but to extend the area of growth.

It has been demonstrated time and time again that those who depend sufficiently upon God have not had to rely weakly upon human authorities. They have often shown a kind of boldness that astonishes the cautious politicians, who may be overawed by public opinion or deterred by a paralyzing fear of what people may think of them. To be free from these local intimidations of parents and petty officers who may oppress the growing person is the aim of the psychologist. To achieve freedom in the larger sense of unflinching responsibility to uphold the freedom of all—this will require sustaining relationships deeper than the divisive forces of separation.

In our opinion Johnson here rightly suggests that man is not the measure of things, nor can he look to himself as the ultimate authority for his judgments and valuations—as Rogers claims. And in addition, it is suggested that man does not just automatically become socialized because he has reached psychic freedom or adjustment in the Rogerian sense. Nor is Johnson alone in thinking that the way to freedom is paradoxically that of dependence upon the right sources to make man free.
We believe then, that Rogers' view of psychic health is as deficient as his view of human nature, that man cannot properly be turned in upon himself, nor safely concentrate on his emotional reactions to experience, nor refuse to consider anything but his present awareness as a valid criterion for action. It is our contention in company with other critics of views similar to Rogers, or of Rogers himself, that the road to psychic health and selfhood is found only partially in man himself, is found in a right relation of man to his God and to his fellowman, and is found in a right recognition of the dependence of man upon these relationships outside of himself. Granberg puts it this way, "If, as is maintained, redemptive love is the effective agent in therapy and is not simply instrumental; and if, as a matter of fact, you do not have an intrinsically good man whose natural tendency to grow in a constructive way has been perverted through the agency of a rejecting and coercive environment, but one whose essential nature must be changed before he can actualize his potential self, then far greater weight must be placed upon the place of agape in therapy. (Agape may be here defined as love in spite of, or forgiving love, which comes from God who demonstrated his love in sending his Son to die for sinners. GRY)........If, then, agape is the active therapeutic agent in neurosis as it is in sin, this would place a premium upon the therapist's having a source of agape to draw upon that does not fail at critical points in therapy. No therapist can be unfailingly kind, understanding, and forgiving. But God can. And if the therapist can make manifest the presence and love of God in the relationship, acceptance assumes

Granberg, op. cit., 30, 31.
a vertical and eternal significance, which, we believe, adds significantly to the potential of the therapeutic relationship to effect healing and transformation. This is not to imply that all Christian therapists are more effective than all non-Christian therapists. But it does raise the question why this is not so and whether or not it can become so."

Godin\textsuperscript{44} has some trenchant words with respect to Rogers and mental health. He says, "Finally, other lacunae—phenomenologically the most serious—relate to the uncertainty about the constitution of values and (what seems to be an inevitable consequence) about even the concept of psychic health itself. Here and there Rogers enunciates a sort of blind faith in a 'forward moving force of life', an 'enhancement of the organism', (p. 195), which reminds one of a causally biological development in which interpersonal relations can only cause obstacles: a biological optimism somewhat limited and ruinous to the theory of values......The paradox and the impasse can be discerned in this biological optimism and this intellectualism of perceived experience. Failing to define the nature of psychic health (and this, in our opinion, is possible only starting with a system of values, and therefore, with at least a basic morality), Rogers does not permit himself to qualify as neurotic an individual who, conscious of the constituent elements of his neurosis, would nevertheless opt for it." Going on from this point Godin refers to human nature and the art of living in ideal form and summarizes this by saying that true human nature is, "Neither liberty, nor nature, but a constant and

\textsuperscript{44} Godin, \textit{op. cit.}, 426, 427, 434.
substantial relationship. Neither a liberated superman, nor an enslaved child, but a son of God who sees himself in the role of a sinner and finds himself only by uniting himself with other men and with Christ. Such appear to be the true conditions of an art of living."

Godin is saying, we believe, that which we said earlier. The way to psychic health is not inward turned but outward bent. The constant focusing upon inward phenomena and endless reiteration of current emotional status is the road to neurosis rather than mental health.

It is without doubt true that many forms of objective psychology tend to ignore the data of introspection as not being genuinely quantifiable. Even if we grant the contention of Rogers that the proper field of psychotherapy is purely internal it becomes a matter of question whether Rogers' definition of this in terms of complete acceptance and homeostasis can be accepted as valid. At least Nuttin seems to feel that man cannot either simply accept himself as he is or ignore the fact that the real dynamic is tension rather than satisfaction. He has this to say: "It cannot be too often emphasized that the real aim of therapy is not to make the patient incapable of feeling guilty, but to refashion his disturbed functions and lead him to a truly human and therefore moral condition of mind toward the absolute, towards his neighbor, and towards himself." This is to say that psychic health relates to an absolute and to others as well as to self. The person himself is not his only real and valid measure. Nuttin then goes on

45 Nuttin, op. cit., 100.
to say that man rejects as well as chooses, he denies himself as well as
seeks satisfaction, he actively opposes his own tendencies. So he not only
negates but eliminates some givens of his nature.

At another place in his book Nuttin refers also to the fact that human
nature is not self-sufficient, as Rogers would have it be. He points out,
and we agree, that there is a drive for self-preservation or self-actualiza-
tion. He then says, \(^46\) "It seems to be a fundamental law of life that man
maintains his own existence better and develops more fully the less he con-
centrates on himself directly and the more he directs his attention to the
'object': the most efficient and efficacious way of developing through one's
actions is to be not immediately occupied with oneself, in order to be able
to give oneself completely psychologically to 'others'........... The basis of
this law of psychic life seems to be found in the very nature of life itself.
On the biological level, as we have shown, it is only by opening as wide as
possible to that which is other than itself, and by feeding on this source,
that life expands; in the same way, the individual who is psychologically
centered upon himself grows vacant and stony. This principle, which is valid
on both the biological and social levels, applies equally to the moral
development of the personality."

The words of the French psychotherapist say better than we could the
basic objection to the internalism of Rogers. His theory is not true to fact
either in the natural world or the psychological because it is too highly

\(^46\) Nuttin, op. cit., 222.
selective and ignores too much pertinent data. It is inimical to real mental health because it focuses upon too narrow a segment of experience. It is one-sided in that it ignores objective realities in nature and in morals - both the natural and the moral law. The immediacy of Rogers, his emphasis upon a transactionistic psychology, his attempt to be purely internal in reference leads us to another question, which we shall leave as a question: "Does not the full extension of inwardness lead in the end to neurosis and psychosis?" Is not one common feature of all neuroses and psychoses precisely this that the individual becomes so turned in upon himself that he loses contact with reality in varying degrees? Thorne and others have questioned the validity of this exclusively internal approach. Nuttin has best summarized it when he says: 47 "Many neurotics need to be taken out of themselves and delivered from their egocentric state of mind. It is often a bad thing for a patient during treatment to concentrate for months on end on his own psychic life. The objective attitude of the man who directs his psychic activity outwards towards 'the world', and does not concentrate always and everywhere upon himself is perhaps the first characteristic of psychic health."

Rogers Asserts An Organismic Evaluative Process

The last section of Rogers' theories concerning human nature that we plan to investigate is his theory of value. In keeping with the rest of his theory Rogers asserts an internally and organically derived system of values,

47 Nuttin, op. cit., lll.
or more properly in Rogerian terms a process of evaluation based on the organic experiences of the individual. Thus Rogers is logical to the bitter end, no matter how his logic may lead to an impasse and the inherent contradiction of pure internalism. He will make man the measure of all things in values also no matter how much of a vicious circle and begging the question this may involve.

The last of Rogers' nineteen hypotheses deals with the subject of values directly, and since it summarizes well what he says elsewhere in the book, and in subsequent writings as well, we shall depend upon this theoretical formulation. Rogers puts his theory this way, 48 "As the individual perceives and accepts into his self-structure more of his organic experiences, he finds that he is replacing his present value system - based so largely upon introjections which have been distortedly symbolized - with a continuing organismic valuing process." Need it be pointed out that this is genuine Rogers - as we have come to see him - and that being so it would take another dissertation to answer adequately the assumptions involved in this one statement. Since we have dealt with a number of these in other connections, namely the internalization of reality, the limitation of human nature, the biological foundation of human nature, and the role of society as the distoriter of experience, we shall limit ourselves to two considerations with respect to the problem of values as set by Rogers. Is it good logic to contrast and oppose a value system to a valuing process, and can evaluation be so limited to organic factors?

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48 Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, 522.
Evaluation As Organismic Or Experiential

It would seem in reading the formulation of Rogers above that he has replaced a value system, which implies judgment - and therefore comparison, with a process of physiological satisfaction. But try as he will, when it comes to explaining what he means, Rogers cannot escape making judgments - and his own conclusions are the kind of judgment he seeks to deny. They are rational abstractions, not physiological data. But let Rogers speak for himself: 49

Just as the infant places an assured value upon an experience, relying on the evidence of his own senses, as described in Proposition X, so too the client finds that it is his own organism which supplies the evidence upon which value judgments may be made. He discovers that his own senses, his own physiological equipment, can provide the data for making value judgments and for continuously revising them. No one needs to tell him that it is good to act in a freer and more spontaneous fashion, rather than in the rigid way to which he has been accustomed. He senses, he feels that it is satisfying and enhancing. (Note how Rogers has made the shift from judgment about or judging of experience to the sensation or satisfaction of the experience itself. This is a non sequitur - how do you suddenly get to avoid making judgments or when do you know that you are satisfied? Must not one make a judgment to make such a statement as the last one quoted from Rogers?)

He discovers that he does not need to know what are the correct values; through the data supplied by his own

49 Rogers, op. cit., 522-524.
organism, he can experience what is satisfying and enhancing. He can put his confidence in a valuing process, rather than in some rigid, introjected system of values......One of the ultimate ends, then, of an hypothesis of confidence in the individual, and in his capacity to solve his own conflicts, is the emergency of value systems which are unique and personal for each individual, and which are changed by the changing evidence of organic experience, yet which are at the same time deeply socialized, possessing a high degree of similarity in their essentials.

Rogers here makes the same assumptions as before that what is physiologically satisfactory to the individual is also ipso facto socially desirable and acceptable. But this is a reasoned judgment, it is not in any sense the sensory experience of Rogers - and on his own basis he could only speak for himself anyway. Now if Rogers wants to wipe out entirely the cognitive and abstract he will destroy himself and his theory, for it is based on abstraction. As Rogers says it is not the experience but how the client feels or perceives that experience - this is for the client reality. This is to say what is psychologically real in the percept of the experience or stimulus. This is an abstraction; it is not either the experience or the sensation or feeling. To really complete Rogers' sequence he must say that the individual makes a judgment about the experience; he values it either positively or negatively - but the judgment too is an abstraction. So when Rogers says that the individual does not need to know what the correct values are he must mean that he need not know what are the demands of the moral law or of society. Man can make his own in terms of his own experience. But he cannot escape creating or accepting standards by which to gauge his own experience - otherwise he can make no judgment at all - and these self-created standards
are abstractions from experience also.

It should be pointed out further that Rogers' attempt to flee the rigid standards of ethics involves him in an equal rigidity. To say that man can depend upon the fluidity of satisfaction based on the changes in experience, to say that he can depend on a valuing process rather than upon evaluation, is to rigidly confine the individual to himself and his own judgment. The one is as rigid as the other, and in fact more so, for it refuses to acknowledge that others, including God, may be wiser than we. For the inescapable fact is that no one can make any judgment at all save in terms of a standard against which the judgment is made.

The issue really resolves itself then into the question of the standard we accept as the norm of judgment or valuation. What is it that determines whether something is good or bad? In the section quoted above Rogers takes his stand that the norm must be that which is good for the individual as he is in himself with his various potentialities and this in terms of the particular experiences of the particular individual. Thus it is that he speaks of the "emergence of value systems which are unique and personal for each individual, and which are changed by the changing evidence of organic experience."

Now it may perhaps be true, or it is true in a sense, that knowledge or values derived from sense experience is relative to the experiences. But sense experience is not the only source of knowledge or experience despite Rogers' claim. No one has ever seen such a thing as justice, or goodness, or "nature", yet everyone, including Rogers, has no hesitation in making value judgments of experiences as right, just, good, or natural. Nor will it do to say that out of a multitude of experiences we gradually come to
separate those which are good or natural. There must be a basis for the separation in the first place. Experience may clarify what existed first rather vaguely in consciousness but it does not supply these standards by which it itself is judged. Rogers, then, we judge to be mistaken in his belief that the variation of value judgments means that they must necessarily be relative and subjective.

Experience, valuation, judgment cannot really delete the transcendental and objective reality. No one ever learns what justice or piety may be by observing pious or just actions or by doing them himself or being the object of them. On the contrary man would never know that a given act was good or right unless he had some idea of goodness or rightness that goes beyond the experience or the sensation and by which he may judge the situation in question. As a matter of fact, and this is where Rogers reasons in a circle, Rogers does go beyond the sensory level when he relies upon the percept or concept as the basic fact in psychology while still wanting to make the basis of valuing the organic satisfaction. Rogers is partially correct in stating that knowledge or judgment derived from sensation is relative and subjective. He is wrong in assuming that this is the only kind of knowledge or judgment. Reason and revelation can and do afford knowledge upon which judgment can be based in a way that cannot come from organic experience.

By fiat Rogers rules out the moral law of God and the canons of society as valid bases for valuation. This is an arbitrary judgment based on his assumption that only the organically experienced is valid for the individual. He will accept only the natural. But what precisely is natural to man? Only the organic? Only that which is similar in kind if not degree to the rest
of the animal world? By implication also, it would seem, Rogers rules out what we have come to call the natural law, since its principles are not derived from sense experience or satisfaction. Rogers would tell us that if we only follow nature, if we learn to live naturally, we shall learn to overcome conflict and tension in ourselves and to live peaceably with our neighbors. By natural he then apparently means seeking organic homeostasis, physiological satisfaction — psychological wholeness will be achieved when we achieve this.

Without question we are related in appetite and function to the rest of the living world. To deny or distort this is to literally commit suicide. But as conscious creatures with an awareness of self we are separated from the rest of nature — and our life cannot rest purely upon organic processes. Therefore to base judgment upon organic satisfaction, to limit our valuing to organismic data, is to limit life too much — and on this basis man as man is lost in the welter of organic life. The fact is that man is unnatural for all the rest of nature since he lives by reason and volition. Only the animal world can really live in peace with the present since it has no real memory of the past nor consciousness of the future. Man as man must ever be dissatisfied with the now and in search of a brighter future, else he is less than man. Therefore again we believe that Rogers' humanism is less than human. In seeking to glorify man by making his feelings the basis of all valuation, Rogers has lost what is truly human.

Valuation As Process And System

There can be little doubt that Rogers has chosen to regard values as
individual, organismic, subjective, and changing. He therefore values such
descriptions as process over against system, changing as against fixed, fluid
as contrasted to rigid. Naturally a valuing process which changes every
time the physiological system or need changes has little room for a fixed
set of values or standards. Valuation of course means subjectively the plac-
ing of worth or value upon an experience or sensation. Rogers assumes that
this is where it stops, and this forces us to ask what the status of values
is in reality. Is it mere subjective reaction to experience - "I like this,"
"This satisfies me," - or are values something plus the subjective reaction?

Individualistic subjectivism is the belief that value is wholly relative
to the private feelings of the individual. This Rogers sets forth when he
says that the individual can come to see that his own physiological processes
can provide the data on which to make value judgments. Now the fact that
Rogers asserts that such judgments will also be social because the needs of
men are similar will not release him from the dilemma of a world of beings
each going his own way to the satisfaction of his own desires. If value is
dependent upon private response then no value can claim any meaning beyond
"I like it" or "I desire it." There is no recourse beyond the individual,
and nothing more than the feeling of the moment is recognized as entering
into the value experience. It is difficult to see how Rogers on the basis
of his assumptions can find any real coherence in life, for coherence demands
some standard against which one may judge the feeling of the moment. The
fact that we find in ourselves changing values need not invalidate the concept
of standards or their objective reality. The change may only mean that one is
growing in understanding of the verities that exist whether he appropriates
them or not. Therefore Rogers is in error in assuming that no objective, external, standards exist or have reality for the individual.

Our protest at this point of Rogers' thinking lies not in his demand that experience is subjectively appropriated. Indeed we agree that no matter how objectively beautiful may be the music of Mozart it does me no good unless I can feel and sense this beauty. Religiously no matter how objectively efficacious the death of Christ may be in paying the penalty of sin I must in some measure appropriate Him as my Savior for it to be efficacious for me. Our objection to Rogers is that he stops at the point of subjective valuation and thus once more locks man within himself. He leaves man no gauge except himself, and an everchanging gauge at that. But Rogers does violence to his own position. The fact that he rules out objective norms means that he has set a standard by which he comes to this conclusion and this standard by no means can be conceived to be an organic sensation.

What is more coherent then - to assert that there are objective standards which go beyond subjective appropriation or experience, or to assert that really all value is relative to desire, and that nothing is really better than anything else? How can we even recognize such a thing as reason if there are no objective norms? We find Rogers' theory of values defective then in that he rigorously excludes even that which is available to human experience in reason and logic. Life is more than process. There is an ongoing, continuing reality that experiences and feels and judges. Judgment in fact is only possible when a norm exists by which to judge and to gauge feeling unless human life be reduced to pure instinctual reaction to stimulus.
It is the contention of Rogers that his views of human nature may as well be applied to education as to therapy since both involve learning. These contentions have been summarized previously⁵⁰ and need not be repeated at this time. Since Rogers himself equates the two on the basis of his views of human nature we may rightfully pose against his educational theory our objections to his theory of human nature. We have found in the previous section that Rogers does assume the same theoretical structure for therapy and education. We contend that therefore the issues raised previously in this chapter are germane to his theory of education.

To examine in extenso the goals which he sets forth and the five principles he enunciates in terms of current philosophies of education would require another dissertation. Our task has been to conduct a critical survey of his theories of human nature as these are basic to the applications Rogers would make in therapy, education, or government. It may perhaps be possible, without repeating the rest of this chapter, to examine two considerations that Rogers advances with respect to education. One is his conception of what education itself basically is, and the other is the role of threat in relation to education.

Rogers And The Nature Of Education

In education as in therapy Rogers goes all out for the capacity of the individual to direct himself. In so doing he takes very literally the meaning

⁵⁰Chapter IV, 129-139.
of the word "education"; that is to lead out or unfold that which is already within the person. This might be expected in terms of what we already know of Rogers' philosophy. Hence he equates education and learning. This equation is considered only from the standpoint of the learner and is in keeping with Rogers' theory of the internalization of experience. Rogers states it thus:

"There is something peculiarly compelling about the central hypothesis of the client-centered approach, and the individual who comes to rely upon this hypothesis in his therapeutic work finds almost inevitably that he is driven to experiment with it in other types of activity. If, in therapy, it is possible to rely upon the capacity of the client to deal constructively with his life situation and if the therapist's aim is best directed toward releasing that capacity, then why not apply this hypothesis and this method in teaching? If the creation of an atmosphere of acceptance, understanding, and respect is the most effective basis for facilitating the learning called therapy, then might it not be the basis for the learning which is called education?"

In these phrases may be noted again the typical Rogerian slant, for here he talks of process - adjusting to situations, releasing capacity, and equating education with learning. So in education Rogers would stress process rather than product, the growth of the pupils' personalities, the development of understandings, the progressive solutions of problems that occur in living from day to day. This is of a piece with Rogers' other emphases on feeling

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51 Rogers, Client-Centered Therapy, 384.
rather than content in therapy. It is then no accident that Rogers acknowledges his relationship to Dewey and as far as educational theory is concerned one might say they are one and the same.

The essential feature of education for Rogers is the unfolding of the innate capacities of human nature, the creation of an acceptant atmosphere that will release these capacities, and the willingness to allow education to move in whatever direction the student deems necessary to meet his problems. As Rogers acknowledges, the nondirective classroom on this basis may, and frequently does, become group nondirective therapy. This is especially true when the leader (who replaces the traditional concept of the teacher) chooses to reflect the feelings of the members of the group. In this sense then, learning is conceived as activity or process, not as content, and understanding becomes acquired dispositions for desirable reactions to life situations. This is placing the emphasis in education upon skills. Rogers merely assumes that human nature will choose good goals toward which these skills will be directed and will automatically discern the correct content or information needed to achieve these goals.

The drift of such a philosophy of human nature and of education is to inspire its advocates with dreams of educational, political, and social reform. The world that man has made he can as easily change, as if man were the measure of all things. And Rogers does say that if his ideas were to be adopted it would mean a revolution in education and politics. Indeed he puts it so strongly as to say that his is the only real democratic approach to education and social life. The ancient concern for truth is no concern of Rogers. The only reality for him is the internal reaction of the individual,
and he says that it is not necessary to know what "reality" is in any objective way.

What Rogers forgets is that experience and perception and learning are double terms. It is not just experiencing, it is also what is experienced - the activity cannot rightly be divorced from the content in situ, only in analysis. In like fashion there is no perceiving apart from that which is perceived or learning that can be separated from what is learned. The situation then is not as simple as Rogers would have it, and this tendency to oversimplification we have noted in Rogers before. It is not learning as both method and end purpose, it is not freedom as opposed to authority, nor problem solving as opposed to solutions, nor yet valuing as opposed to value systems. It is rather that there is method and there are solutions, there is thinking and the permanent results of previous thought, it is the life of the individual as free and as under authority, it is that the individual assesses experience but in terms of standards by which he can make judgments. A valid theory of education must take both sides of the problem into consideration and not eliminate one of them by ukase as Rogers does. This is the same error into which his theory of human nature falls. This is the gospel of Rousseau, resurrected and dressed in modern psychological language, but Rousseau just the same, and is presented as though it were the salvation of man, of education, and of society itself.

The Concept Of Threat As A Bar To Education

It is not sufficient for Rogers to discard traditional forms of education on the basis of his theories of the nature of human nature, he also
makes a direct assault upon the usual role of the teacher and of concept learning as threats to personality which effectively hinder learning if indeed they do not inhibit it altogether. In fact Rogers devotes three out of his five hypotheses concerning education to this concept of threat. They together imply, or rather directly state, that the essential factor in learning is the absence of threat or its being reduced to a minimum. It is further stated that another essential is the creation of complete acceptance in the classroom, and the examples given of nondirective classroom procedure show how this is to be done. In our opinion this is nondirective therapy and is not far from the analysis required of those who would be licensed psychoanalysts. In the example given of a class in adjustment counseling it is noteworthy the almost consistent pressure of the group to come to unanimity of approach - and that approach the nondirective. It is illustrative of the fact that students tend to return that which is expected of them, and is further illustrative of the fact that nondirectivism is highly directive in its selection of materials for consideration.

Now no one will doubt that education constitutes a kind of threat to the person as he now is at the time of learning. But Rogers has to show that this threat is more than that implied in hunger. The fact is that no organism grows at all save in the presence of some threat or tension. And one of the great gaps in Rogers' theories is the fact that some individuals grow under tension and threat while others falter under the same stimulus. If one replies that this is due to differences in native capacity then one has also eliminated the threat as the source of difficulty. There is no way to grow except by the exchange of present values for more adequate ones, except by
the replacement of inadequate data with more valid facts - and this always constitutes some measure of threat to the personality in its current structure.

The question therefore is not the presence or absence of threat, but whether the threat is so severe as to damage the growing personality. It is typically Rogerian that he simply categorizes all nondirective teachers as nondemocratic, authoritarian, and says that their methods indicate a fundamental distrust of the student. Nondirectivism now will become the great savior of student personality. But if nondirectivism in therapy or education fails to meet the need of the person as seen by that person is it not the great threat? Suppose now that we have a student who is not well adjusted, whose real need is to learn some helpful techniques of adjustment. Nondirective teaching would focus on his feelings and leave him more frustrated than ever.

That there have been and are some teachers of severe and forbidding mien, some of immense authoritarianism who rule by fear, is granted without argument by everyone. But that this is characteristic of non-nondirective teachers, as Rogers would imply, is sheer mockery and contrary to fact. The truth is that untold thousands of persons have been educated in traditional fashion and have remained normal well adjusted individuals. There simply is no indication that their personalities have been warped by the awful threat of non-nondirective education. And on the contrary there is no evidence that nondirective methods create better students as judged by objective tests or success in life. Indeed one shudders to think of facing a generation of students trained entirely to consider only their emotional response to all situations.
The question then remains, how account for the fact that some wilt and withdraw under apparent threat, while others (indeed the great majority) accept it as a challenge and rise to meet the situation, expand their personalities to include the new data, and continue to be growing persons? On the basis of Rogers' formulations there is no answer to this problem since he assumes that threat shrivels the personality and causes the individual to assume defensive behavior. Absence of threat, he asserts, enables the self to expand and assimilate new concepts and thus grow. Rogers, it seems, really begs the question because actually his theories demand not increased but released capacity - the capacity is there all along. Hence there should be no failure in the absence of threat. This is probably why he lays all failure at the door of the therapist or teacher - he cannot admit client failure. The fact is that Rogers nowhere draws a clear distinction between capacity to adapt and motivation. Rogers mistakenly assumes that adaptive capacity is fixed. It is rather conditional upon the motivational trends of the individual and the cultural matrix in which he lives.

Finally we may note that creating an unreal non-threat atmosphere in therapy or in education may only result in a temporary and localized relief without at all getting to the basic problem. The function of education is not only to provide methods for attacking life problems, much less Rogers' system of one method of emotional release, but of helping the student achieve the needed materials as well. Education is method and content and to stop half-way is to do half the job. We further find that Rogers' emphasis upon the person as himself completely able to fill the needs of his life is one-sided and narrow. It ignores the fact that education is both learning and
what is learned. By emphasizing process it puts unwarranted emphasis upon the capacity of the learner to reach personally and socially acceptable goals. As Williamson says, 52 "In education we should not repeat the mistake of over-emphasis upon inner growth forces." But the finest commentary on the whole naturalistic unfolding theory of Rogers is provided by Pope Pius XI in the papal encyclical, *Divini Illius Magistri*, of December 31, 1929, in which he says, 53

> Every form of pedagogic naturalism which in any way excludes or overlooks supernatural Christian formation in the teaching of youth is false. Every method of education founded, wholly or in part, on the denial or forgetfulness of original sin and of grace, and relying on the sole powers of human nature, is unsound. Any attributing to the child primacy of initiative, any independence of higher law, natural or divine, or any pretended self-government or unrestrained freedom on the part of the child diminishing or suppressing the teacher's authority and action is condemned.

**Summary**

In this chapter we have set forth our basic objections to the theoretical construct of human nature developed by Carl Rogers, and its specific application to the field of education. It has been pointed out that Rogers' viewpoint is essentially that of an optimistic biological humanism which nonetheless results in an inescapable determinism. It is a truncated, narrow

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humanism that does not do justice to the full scope of human nature, and locks man in the world of his own perceptions and emotions. His theories attribute too much to innate capacity in that experience does not bear out that man will naturally and unaided choose that which is good for him and for society. There is in man a will to evil as well as a will to good. In ignoring this Rogers does less than justice to the realities of human life and can offer at best a limited and partial answer to the problems of man. In addition, since the self in Rogers' theory becomes a differentiated set of percepts from out of the phenomenal field, he winds up with a self that is not a self in that he denies any substantial reality to it, and in fact, has no real answer to the question of the origin of the self. Man is his organic and visceral experience and the emphasis is laid upon how he feels about that experience. Hence man becomes the measure of all things and an end unto himself. This is a denial of goals beyond man, and more specifically a denial of the Christian religion as traditionally held.

We have noted further that Rogers' approach to reality is subjective and phenomenological. For his purposes reality does not exist outside of the reaction of the individual to experience in the present moment. He simply does not take up the question of any reality beyond the immediately psychological, and insists that for therapy this reality is all that counts. It is a grave question, and not to be simply assumed as Rogers does, whether all that is important is how one feels about an important experience. The experience per se may have vital consequences quite apart from how one feels about it. The full extension of internalism means the impossibility of real communication and therefore of therapy also. The internal frame of reference is
valid therefore only in a very limited way. Nor can experience and feeling be so sharply limited to the here and now. Behavior, experience, and feeling all have past reference as well as future consequence, and the reality of the moment is inextricably bound up with them. These cannot properly be separated and only the one aspect considered in therapy or education. This concentration upon self, and in particular the emotional response of the self, leads to ignoring and denial of any objective standards of morality and behavior. This does violence to the realities of common sense and science as well as the standards of revealed religion. And this internalism involves Rogers finally in an impasse in that the ultimate end of concentration on self is neurosis and psychosis rather than psychic health.

It has been noted also that Rogers pins his faith to an organic evaluative process. The continuing process of evaluation based on organic and visceral data supplied by the experience of the individual makes for a satisfying life. Man becomes both the judge and the criterion of judgment, he is at once the experience and the content of experience. But in fact Rogers is not concerned with content - he is intent upon experiencing, judging, feeling, process - as though it were in reality possible to divorce activity and content, learning and knowledge, judgment and the standard of judgment. This is transactionism - doing for doing's sake. Since evaluation is thus relative to the situation and need of the individual there are no permanent values, there is no need to know what are the correct values, man supplies his own as he goes along. Of course it is possible to integrate a personality sheerly in terms of self-satisfaction but to so do is to ignore the realities of human experience and the collective wisdom of the human race. The fact is
that man lives a better and more wholesome life when the direction and aim of life is other than himself, and he ignores the reality of the natural and moral law at the peril of losing himself. Here again in seeking to glorify man Rogers has only succeeded in losing what is truly human.

Rogers insists that since his hypotheses are fundamental to the structure of human nature they may therefore be applied to all the forms of human endeavor. He specifically claims that applied extensively they would radically revise current practices in business, government, social life and education. And indeed they would. With reference to education it is Rogers' claim that his views are the only ones that genuinely trust the student, answer directly to student need, and are truly democratic. We find this unwarranted, and it is only an assumption that all traditional methods are authoritarian, do violence to human personality and constitute a threat of such magnitude that learning is inhibited. We further find it difficult if not impossible to discover in what way Rogers' educational technique is distinguishable from nondirective therapy. As such, education becomes person centered, activity minded, and ignores or plays down the importance of content. It represents therefore not only a truncated humanism, defective and onesided, but also a revival of the outmoded and discarded theories of Rousseau.
CHAPTER VI

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Time and experience wield a sword of judgment that no contemporary critic of a movement can hope to possess. The place occupied by a St. Paul could never have been foreseen by those who saw him in the days of his life, nor would many have accurately predicted the influence of Thomas Aquinas upon succeeding generations of thought. Many a book and many a world leader have become items of interest only for the obscure delver into the by-ways of human culture. One can only hope therefore in assessing the work of a contemporary scholar to measure it against the demands of logic, the best consensus of contemporary thought, or the accepted standards of revealed religion. And even then one ought to speak humbly lest he may have misread the mind of another.

In our attempt to understand the thrust of Rogers' structuring of human nature we have taken as an assumption that one may depend upon the symbolization of another as an accurate formulation of meaning. On this basis we may properly subject his hypotheses to logical scrutiny even though we may not match him in erudition or experience. Nor is it improper to compare the propositions of Rogers with those of Christianity since he himself has suggested the contradiction between them. Throughout this study there has been an attempt to let Rogers speak for himself, to pinpoint the issues raised by his formulations, and to indicate the areas of difficulty into

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which his hypotheses lead. Where appropriate there has been no hesitation in affixing labels to Rogers' ideas even though often he represents some variant of a known school of thought. Thus, for instance, Lowry and others definitely fix non-directive therapy within the general framework of Freudianism as an emotional release therapy, even though Rogers would decry being so labeled or classified.

Difficulties In Assessing Rogers' Formulations

Some general problems in fairly and accurately appraising the thought world of another person have been mentioned above. But there are peculiar difficulties when one comes to assess the work of Rogers. One such problem arises from the attempt to make clinical insights conform to the rigors of scientific method. On occasion Rogers himself refers to the paucity of validational material and then proceeds to make his generalizations anyway. Since the question of the scientific validity of the purported evidence set forth by Rogers and his students is another field of inquiry altogether, we have chosen to consider his hypotheses as hypotheses relating to or forming a theoretical structuring of human nature, and to examine them from the standpoint of the philosophy so embodied.

That Rogers, more than any other contemporary psychologist we know of, has attempted through research to validate his hypotheses concerning human nature, we believe to be true. We know of no other series of studies such as that published by Rogers and Dymond. The question of the validity of such studies must be left to those competent to make such judgment. It may be said in passing that this attempt of Rogers also raises more questions than
it answers. So for instance, the book purports to be an objective test of a theory, yet the authors seem to take for granted that theirs is the only theory and to seek means of its validation. They leave quite untouched the question whether other methods than the non-directive might do as well or better in therapy. The point with which we are concerned, however, is that the shifting from theory to validation, from hypothesis to generalization to data is such that one wonders how much the hypotheses come from data or the data are controlled by the theory. Probably the easiest reading in Rogers is to be found in Chapter 11 of *Client-Centered Therapy* where he sets forth his nineteen hypotheses as his basic theory of human nature, and confines himself largely to statement of and explanation of these hypotheses.

Another difficulty in fairly assessing the theories of Rogers is that he is as much preacher and prophet as he is scientist or philosopher. The man is a believer, and he would have others believe also. For him it is very much the proposition that black is black and white is white - the greys do not exist. Or to paraphrase Kipling: nondirective is nondirective and directive is directive and never the twain shall meet. One is tempted to meet Rogers' dichotomies with others equally absolute. How does one answer for instance, Rogers' assertion that any approach to education save one similar to his is undemocratic and constituent of such threat to the learner that personality growth is inhibited? Such sweeping assertions almost demand either an equally categorical denial or involved research of great length. At any rate this kind of writing does impose difficulty upon anyone who wishes to make an appraisal of his theories. But it has one virtue, it is rarely dull.
Resume Of This Study

It is proposed that the evidence gathered from Rogers himself, and the conclusions drawn by other students, place Rogers in the tradition of psychoanalysis, even though he departs in many ways from the Viennese master. The basic thrust of Rogers' system is to bring into consciousness elements denied symbolization or given distorted symbolization and by means of catharsis to eliminate unhealthy emotional reactions to the constituent elements of one's nature. It is therefore essentially an emotional release therapy. One critic goes so far as to say that in so far as nondirectivism is successful it is because of the psychoanalytic elements present. It must be recognized however that Rogers adds a number of concepts which differ from orthodox Freudianism. Among these we may note his emphasis upon the present, upon feeling rather than content, and on complete nondirectivism as well as emphasis upon the constructive elements of human nature.

Rogers himself points out his indebtedness to the work of many scholars in different fields. He has drawn directly from the field theories of Lewin and the biological approach of Goldstein. He notes his obligation to John Dewey. We have traced some of Rogers' ideas back to the concepts of Rousseau and others who believe in the innate goodness of man. The current formulation of nondirective theory has many ancestors but we believe that Rogers has distilled these into the clearest and most forthright statement of biological humanism. And perhaps more clearly than most psychologists he has equated philosophy and therapy. It is particularly these statements of the philosophy that undergirds his therapy that we are concerned with in this study. What are his assumptions concerning the nature of human nature, and
what are the implications of these if drawn to their logical extension?

It is assumed that the methods chosen for therapy will reflect the underlying philosophy of human nature since the methods of dealing with human beings are directly related to the beliefs held about human nature. It is found that in nondirective therapy there are two basic principles, namely, the principle of warm acceptance, and the principle of the isolation of the client. Included under the principle of warm acceptance are the methods of the creation of an atmosphere free from threat to the client, of full permissiveness, and counselor empathy. The principle of client isolation includes such techniques as the rejection of all save client advanced data, the concentration upon emotional factors, and the reflection of feeling technique. Basic to these techniques, perhaps even to the point of itself being a technique, is the attitude of the counselor in holding to a firm belief that the client has the capacity and resources to solve his own problems.

One of the great contributions to psychotherapy has been Rogers' analysis of the process of therapy as evidenced from taped counseling conferences. As outlined by Rogers this process may be found in three stages, which may be sharply differentiated in analysis but not always as therapy proceeds, and in which regression may be found to earlier stages. The first stage is the acceptance of self by the client. Here we find such things as the clarification of insight, the catharsis reaction, and finally the acceptance of self based on organic and visceral evidence of one's own experience. The second stage is that of the reorganization of the self concept which involves an increasing development of the internal frame of reference, the recognition of the capacity of the self to choose and act, and the creation of more realistic
life goals. The third stage of therapy is the development of new behavioral patterns. These are based on the insight attained from the previous stages, and include particularly a new freedom to act on the basis of self chosen values, particularly with respect to activities and vocational choice.

The two basic assumptions of the theory of human nature that underly the methodology of client centered therapy are that all human behavior is biologically based and all needs are ultimately organic and visceral, and that the individual possesses within himself innate growth forces which not only move toward the maintenance and enhancement of the organism, but in the direction of social good as well. In defining the nature of the "self" Rogers limits that self to a grouping or differentiation of percepts within the field of perception and experience. The individual is not created a self, he creates one. The position of Rogers may be described then as that of a biological optimism.

From these basic postulates come three others. First there is the assumption that only the internal frame of reference of the client is valid for therapy and personal organization. The second is that the emotional climate of the client is etiologic both for good adjustment and for maladjustment. The third is that the valuational system is really a valuational process based on the felt needs of the individual. In making application of this to the field of education Rogers asserts that people will learn other things in the same way they learn in therapy. Rogers' view of human nature therefore is that man has ample capacity in himself to solve his own problems when he is set free to do so, when he is free to accept all his sensory, organic, and visceral experience. He has within himself growth forces that not only
enhance the organism but that also move naturally in the direction of good for society.

It seems clear in reviewing Rogers' hypotheses concerning the nature of human nature that the problems they raised centered around three areas: first, that Rogers' view of human nature was that of an optimistic, biological humanism; second, that Rogers' approach to reality is subjective and phenomenological; and third, that Rogers' trust is in an organismic valuing process rather than in objective values. There has been no attempt to relate these positions of Rogers to the accepted philosophical disciplines of epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics in the formal sense but rather to examine them from the standpoint of logic and congruence with reality.

With respect to Rogers' formulation of humanism it was noted that although Rogers speaks of a self this has little resemblance to what is usually meant. He denies any substantial reality to the self, any identity that controls experience, and refers to the self instead as a differentiation of percepts within the perceptual framework. Rogers' conception of freedom is that man should be free to be his biological self, behavior is organically determined. He thus arrives at a determinism that is the precise opposite of the freedom he seeks to achieve. For in setting man free from the introjected evil demands of society and objective values Rogers has imprisoned him within the framework of his own physical needs. In keeping with this organic framework Rogers makes emotion the key to therapy and effective living, and thereby turns from cognitive and volitional controls. The fact that there is a process of homeostasis psychologically as well as organically does not mean that this is the only law operative in life, for man does
actively deny his satisfactions for higher goals and sets forth activity far
in excess of that demanded by the stimulus. Rogers too easily dismisses data
indicating that evil and destructive forces are as residual in human nature
as are constructive forces. Hence he oversimplifies the situation and simply
assigns to society and religion the role of bringing evil into individual
experience. He quite gratuitously assumes that human nature when set free
from the demands of society will inevitably choose what is good personally
and socially. The end result of all of this is that man is made the measure
of all things - the real question is whether what I am doing is pleasing to
me. This is to deny the validity of the moral law and the law of God as well-
it makes man his own God.

It has been observed that Rogers' view of reality is subjective and
phenomenological. Only the world of the experience of the individual is
valid for him and for therapy - it is how the client feels about the experience
that is important, not the experience itself. It is true that how one per-
ceives reality or experience enters into determining the behavior that
results. But it is equally true that the objective reality, as in disease,
will also directly affect behavior no matter how one feels about it. Hence
one cannot depend only on the internal frame of reference nor upon how the
client feels about an experience at the moment of therapy. The present
awareness is not the only field for therapy because one cannot actually
divorce the present from the past nor yet from future consequences. If one
were to follow Rogers' thesis of the internal frame of reference fully, then
even therapy would be impossible since one cannot really enter into the
private world of another. The fact is that we must accept the objective
validity of communication - and therefore there is no real reason for reject-
ing other objective data about the client. Then too, to confine man to the
world of his own feelings is ultimately the path of neurosis and psychosis
rather than psychic health. True mental and spiritual health demands an out-
ward reference.

While it may be granted that valuation calls for a judgment on the part
of the individual this does not mean that nothing more is involved. Rogers
would have us believe that the basis for evaluation lies in the felt needs of
the person, the effort to actualize his potentials, and that therefore values
are relative to the situation and the felt need. He would substitute a
valuing process, based on organic and visceral data, for any system of object-
ive values. The satisfaction of organic need provides no standard for judg-
ment. Yet no judgment is really possible unless there be a standard by which
to gauge, and standards must perforce be objective to the immediate situation.
One cannot value an experience as good, or right, or just, without some con-
cept of goodness, or right, or justice. Nor can Rogers abolish by fiat the
standards evolved by the collective experience of the race, or the demands of
the moral and natural law.

It appears therefore that the humanism offered by Rogers is onesided and
to that extent defective. It is focused too sharply upon the organic and
biological, thus ignoring other data of experience. He presents no real view
of the self as the organizer, selector, and initiator of activity, and on
this basis his theory does not account for sufficient data in regard to human
life. His emphasis upon internalism presents a logical and philosophical
impasse. His freedom is in the end only an invitation to another slavery,
and in the attempt to make man the measure of all things Rogers only imprisons him within himself. We believe that the theoretical structure of human nature as set forth by Rogers cannot meet the approval of those systems of thought that are oriented toward orthodox Christianity.

The Positive Contributions Of Rogers To Psychotherapy

In an attempt to fairly and consistently follow the thought patterns of Rogers we have purposely left an appreciation of his very real contributions to psychotherapy to this point in our study. It is our conviction that Rogers has made four major contributions toward a better understanding of human functioning, and other contributions particularly in the area of therapeutic methodology. Although in some senses he has emphasized ideas previously advanced yet it has remained for Rogers to call some of these to the prominence they deserve.

The Fact Of Constructive Growth Forces

Much of the development of psychology arose from interest in and research into the pathological. Many of the early attempts at therapy were literally psychosurgery - aimed at removing or obliterating evil forces from the psyche. And much of current therapy has a similar aim. The great work of Freud emphasized the forces of residual evil in human nature. The neo-Freudians like Jung and Adler did little to change this basic theory although they found the dynamism of human action in sources other than the libido.

William James with his healthy-mindedness, John Dewey with his instrumentalism, anticipated in some measure the forthright belief of Rogers in the capacity of human nature to use its own powers for the constructive solution of
problems. The particular contribution of Rogers has been to demonstrate clinically that these powers can be utilized in therapy directly and effectively. And when awakened in therapy these powers can become a way of life when therapy is completed. It is Rogers' belief that these constructive forces are innate, forward moving, and social in tendency. He insists that the therapist must have a profound respect for and dependence upon these forces to be successful in therapy. Because of this deep regard for the capacity of the client to provide his own answers the particular methodology of nondirective therapy has evolved.

The force of this emphasis of Rogers must be seen over against the thrust of Freudian theory and its concentration upon the malignancies of human nature. It poises a welcome counter-balance to all those views of human nature that neglect the positive elements, whether these views be secular or religious. For there is without doubt a strain in religious thought that neglects the positive elements in humanity - and so to speak is concerned only about salvation in the purist sense of that term. Some elements of the Christian religion have forgotten that man is created in the image of God. And some students of human life have been negative with regard to the potentialities of human nature. This we may grant, and in contrast welcome the reminder of Rogers and his followers.

We believe that Rogers has presented clinical evidence that these forces of constructive drive do exist and that they can be effectively utilized in therapy. We would even add that any truly effective Christian therapy must bear this fact in mind so as not to neglect that which God himself has placed in human life. The difficulty is that Rogers has made this into so great a
principle of human nature that he assigns any evil or destructive forces to outside influences introjected into the personality. He thus has swung as far to the opposite as possible - this is understandable but scarcely logical. As far as we have evidence at all it seems likely that therapists of all schools of thought have approximately the same ratio of success in therapy. Research seems to indicate that the degree of expertness of the therapist is more a factor than the philosophic orientation he has. But even more, quite apart from the teachings of Christianity, which do explicitly locate evil in human nature itself, the evidence of human experience is contrary to Rogers' assumption that human nature is essentially good. The quite different reactions of individuals to the same frustration can scarcely be explained on the basis of introjected values, nor can the presence of temper tantrums in a very small child. Nor can we deny the testimony of intelligent men concerning the presence of impulses to wrong within themselves.

So then, recognizing that Rogers has mistakenly focused upon the positive while denying the negative factors in human nature, we ought not make the parallel error of failure to give him credit for the real contribution he has made to our understanding of the nature of human life. He has reminded us that a well rounded theory of human nature and a fully effective therapy must reckon with the constructive forces residual in man himself.

Rogers' Conception Of The Self

Apparently in assessing the results of clinical procedures and seeking to distil therefrom a theory of human nature Rogers discovered certain phenomena he found difficult of explanation in terms of current formulations
of personality theory. There was something in human nature that seemed to
give continuity to experience, to direct in some measure the activities of
the person. Rogers could find no better term for this than the classical
term "self." Curran and others found hope here of a return to the concept of
self; Pepinsky and Thorne found this a matter of criticism. As we have
pointed out Rogers uses the classic terminology of the self, and speaks of
freedom, self-determination, volition, and choice. Yet as we have examined
each of these in turn we have discovered that he has emptied these of all
classical meaning. He does not conceive of the self as an entity, as any
substantial reality, as in any sense given. It is only a differentiation in
the perceptual field distinguished by awareness. Rogers does attempt,
unsuccessfully we believe, to locate the self within the world of process and
perception. But his self ultimately becomes process and has no real being of
its own.

The failure of Rogers to find real freedom, to locate a real self, and
to differentiate self from experience ought not blind us to what he has done.
The fact that on the basis of empirical evidence and clinical experience
Rogers concludes that there is, or posits the need of, a soul or self to
explain adequately the phenomena of human nature is a step in the right
direction. That we cannot agree with his concept of the nature of that self
is another thing altogether. We are convinced not only that Rogers has mis-
read the data brought to him in therapy, but that he has also passed by other
relevant facts of human experience that would require a return to the concept
of a substantial self. We are grateful that Rogers has brought the idea of a
self to a place of responsibility in the structure of human nature.
Rogers And The Conditions Of Liberty

Rogers has rightly emphasized that man must be free to be himself. And Godin says that no one has better analyzed than Rogers the clinical conditions of liberty. The emphasis therefore in client-centered therapy upon the person is helpful in giving a counterbalance to overly authoritarian trends. The conditions that would stultify true growth must be removed before man can truly reach his human goals. There must be an atmosphere in which the person can feel free to explore himself. So far we can agree. But this leaves certain questions. What is the real human nature - is it the construct Rogers has given or something quite other? And what is it really to be free - is freedom merely the unfolding of what is innate in man, as Rogers would have it, or is man not really the true measure of himself?

We have pointed out in this study that Rogers, far from setting man free, has imprisoned him within a biological determinism and confined him in the subjective, internal world of his own organic and visceral experiences. We suspect too that Rogers has overemphasized the freedom giving aspects of his therapy as against the therapy of others, and in his usual dichotomous fashion has simply denied that other methods could bring freedom too. It is his way or else none. Mowrer insists that there is no evidence that any therapeutic method is more successful than any other, and that none of them do any more than time itself apparently does. Be that as it may, the fact is that Rogers has clearly set forth the need for liberty but has not established the conditions. Man needs not only to be free to be himself, he must in some measure be freed from himself. He cannot be his own goal and end without ultimate frustration.
The fact is that man has both good and evil elements, constructive and destructive tendencies. The evil is not simply introjected by the demands of an evil society. The data of experience simply will not allow such a construction as Rogers would give. We believe therefore that man must not only be free to, he must be free from himself. Moreover he cannot be really free until he attains to the normative goals of the ideals made real in the moral law. So we recognize the contribution that Rogers makes toward freedom but we insist that it does not go nearly far enough. It is a start, but just that - and if followed fully would lead in wrong directions - to man instead of to God.

Rogers And The Therapeutic Process

The world of therapy is in debt to Rogers for the many taped protocols which he has used to effectively outline the steps or stages of successful therapy. No one previously has so clearly, and by means of recorded data, set forth what good therapy has always believed. It has remained for Rogers and his followers to spell out the details with sufficient clarity so that the steps may be followed accurately in clinical work. It is our conviction that here is the real contribution of Rogers to therapy, here is the feature of his work that will endure when his theory is just interesting history. As long as the theory is based on a false view of human nature, and it is, time and the advance of knowledge will pass him by. But in so far as he has given us an accurate picture of the therapeutic process we are truly in his debt.

The technique of full recording of series of interviews which are available to the study of all makes possible a recognition of what does go on in
therapy. Rogers' attempt to confine this to client centered therapy is neither convincing nor successful. Similar recordings of cases of other therapists will reveal the same basic process or progress in therapy. One comparison will point the way to others. It is very difficult to see how Rogers' use of verbalization by the client differs very much from the free association of psychoanalysis in essence or in what is accomplished by it. It is equally difficult to see any fundamental difference in the use of catharsis, the end result of emotional release from tension by Rogers or the psychoanalysts. So one might go on. But the point is sufficiently clear that Rogers has described what goes on in good therapy regardless of brand. He has mistakenly assumed that these results are due to his form of therapy. Where client centered therapy has been successful it is only in the measure that any good therapy would be. Rogers has never demonstrated that his is the only therapy to achieve such results.

It is to be hoped that therapists of other orientations will follow the direction of full recording and publication as pioneered by Rogers. He has opened the door to a way by which therapy may come to develop and formulate real laws of method that correspond to the laws of human nature. His description, then, of the process of therapy remains a masterpiece, and his use of protocols a genuine advance in helping therapy to become as much science as art.

Rogers And Philosophy

For good or for ill Carl Rogers has had the courage forthrightly to declare the philosophy underlying his therapy. Not that he pretends to offer
a system of philosophy in the formal sense but that he does state what his conceptions of the nature of human nature are. One does not have to agree with Rogers' formulations to appreciate his understanding of the real relation of philosophy to a theoretical construction of human nature. He has taken his stand on a biological optimism, a subjective view of reality, and a valuational process based on the other two. He declares a profound faith in the capacity of human nature to heal itself and to direct itself to good ends, good for the individual and for society - and he is willing to stake the effectiveness of therapy upon this faith.

The thesis of this study has been to enunciate as clearly as possible the implications of these propositions, and to indicate where and on what grounds we disagree with them. But all students of human nature will appreciate the clear statement of Rogers' beliefs and applaud Rogers for making clear the background of his theories. No one will question that there is a fundamental relationship between philosophy and practice. Rogers claims to derive his theories from clinical practice. Whether this is entirely so is for the moment beside the point. But what is a matter of real importance is the claim of Rogers that to use his methodology successfully one must also adopt his philosophy of human nature. He is not willing to separate them. We grant him the right to make such an assumption but question its validity.

Conclusions

Our study of the philosophic implications of Rogers' hypotheses concerning human nature has led us to five main conclusions which we shall state and then discuss briefly in turn: first, that Rogers' therapy and his approach is
basically psychoanalytic; second, that nondirective therapy and thought is no panacea, it has limitations as well as usefulness; third, that it is not necessary to adopt Rogers' philosophy in order to distil what is useful from his system; fourth, we find his structuring of human nature to be defective and onesided and unacceptable to those holding Christian standards; fifth, his program for education is unsuitable in that it utilizes a faulty conception of human nature.

Rogers' Hypotheses Reveal A Basic Freudianism

As has been noted Rogers makes use of the basic Freudian concepts of repression, insight, and catharsis as key tools in therapy. He lays great stress upon bringing into present consciousness those elements of experience previously repressed or denied. Rogers makes catharsis a sine qua non of therapy and thus stakes his program upon an emotional release type of therapy. His method of client verbalization is scarcely different than free association, and his concept of evil being introjected into personality by society differs little from Freud's super-ego - both seek to free man to follow his own impulses and find the real locus of evil outside of man himself. We submit therefore that no matter how much Rogers may demur and claim distinctiveness, his ideas are not nearly so distinctive as he would make them out to be.

That Rogers differs from Freud we recognize, but so do Rank, Taft, Horney, and French. Rogers does emphasize feeling over against content, present over past, and makes the therapist largely catalytic in the therapeutic process, he denies the matter of transference but not very successfully. Rogers lays greater weight than Freud on the capacity of the client to heal
himself. But when all is said and done Rogers remains with an essentially psychoanalytic therapy and theory, one that is man oriented and basically hostile to Christianity. We have noted in the course of this study that scholars like Lowery, VanderVeldt, and Mowrer (to name only a few) have likewise noted this basic psychoanalytic approach to Rogers' theory and therapy. We reject only Rogers' claims to uniqueness for his ideas, and seek to value those concepts which have proved fruitful despite their origin. Thus because we reject Rogers' claim to be non-Freudian does not mean that we reject his ideas in toto.

Client Centered Therapy And Theory Is No Panacea

It seems to be the feeling of Rogers that if his ideas are universally adopted then a radical revolution would result in human nature, politics, economics, society, and education. He in fact says so. If his program were adopted we should have to discard current educational systems, ways of therapy, the organization of business and of government. Somehow Rogers has persuaded himself that his views alone of human nature are genuinely democratic. This is a rather large order, but rather typical of Rogers' tendency to absolutes, to dichotomies, and false alternatives.

As a matter of fact it is even difficult to conceive of client centered therapy as being the therapy and all others per se errant. It is very hard to imagine one method being able to meet all situations, yet Rogers will admit of none other. In this claim, as in those mentioned above, the non-directivists stand alone. No other system of therapy that we know of would restrict itself to one method or one technique. We believe that Rogers'
insistence on his method stems from his basic oversimplification of human nature and his reduction of motivation to just one - the striving of the organism to self-maintenance and enhancement.

That Rogers has emphasized constructive growth forces in human nature which some other systems had minimized or neglected is true - and we would give credit for such emphasis and reminder. But that therefore these constructive forces, these growth forces are all in all is gravely open to question and is contrary to the facts of human nature.

We conclude from our study of Rogers' hypotheses that client centered therapy has limitations in practice and in theory. It ignores concrete data of human experience and selects only what is useful to its theory. It reveals an ignorance of human history, because these ideas are not new. The hedonists of old Greece, the men of the French Revolution, the educational followers of Rousseau, and others, have tried to organize life in terms of the idea that man is innately good. History is littered with the wrecks of those who have tried this very idea.

Rogers has tried to account for the failure of his system in terms of therapist failure since he cannot admit that basic human nature can fail. But has he forgotten that the therapists are human too? As a matter of fact clients at the counseling center were screened for acceptability - were they less than human or were their problems such that the prospect of failure was larger than the prospect of success? It will not fit the facts to simply assume that when therapy fails it is the therapist who is at fault.

It would seem that the truth is that client centered therapy is successful under certain conditions - like any other therapy - no more and no less.
Its measure of success seems to lie in those elements it has in common with all good therapy and not in any special element it alone possesses. The varieties of human problems, the variety of human nature and its complexity would demand a flexibility of method and approach to suit the situation - not a forcing of all situations into the mold suitable for Rogers' method of therapy. We would accept those emphases in Rogers that are helpful in helping people, but we would not agree that his way is the only way.

Therapy And Philosophy

Rogers insists that to utilize his therapy effectively one must also be thoroughly indoctrinated with and be heartily in agreement with his basic philosophy of human nature. We are inclined to uphold Dr. Rogers at this point if it be indeed necessary to take his system in toto. It is difficult to see how one could have reservations about the capacity of human nature to solve its problems by itself and then simply trust that human nature to do so. The doubt comes in at the point of Rogers' assumption that we must take the whole thing or take nothing. He is far from proving that all the elements of his theory or practice are dependent upon his particular philosophy.

Thus, for instance, all successful therapy depends in some measure upon the fact that there are growth forces in human life. Even classic psychoanalysis depends upon this. All successful therapy relies in a measure upon what the client does for himself - and has as a goal that he shall achieve a greater independence of judgment than he now has. So the fact is that other systems arrive at similar concepts without holding to Rogers' construct of human nature. We may therefore rightly accept those findings, procedures,
and attitudes advocated by Rogers which appeal to all good therapy as we know it.

This we may do even while we reject his particular philosophic approach because truth is truth no matter where or how found. Rogers' claim for his philosophy we believe only to be true if one will adopt completely the client centered point of view and utilize only the client centered therapy. The question of the correctness of that philosophy in itself falls within our next conclusion.

Rogers' View Of Human Nature Is Defective

It has been our contention in this study that the humanism of Rogers is a defective humanism in that ultimately it makes man turn in upon himself. In support of this we noted that Rogers' approach is that of a biological model which reduces man at last to the status of his organic and visceral systems. His so-called freedom is really imprisonment within the world of his own desires. His real self becomes just a process and a function, having no reality of its own. Rogers denies the reality of innate impulses toward destruction and evil and so insists that man will, if set free in Rogers' terms, inevitably choose what is good. The basic question is whether what I am doing is satisfying to me. Hence by fiat Rogers denies the validity and reality of objective norms of behavior, and the possibility of objective and divine revelation.

We contend that this violates the accumulated experience of the race, the witness of individual experience, and the standards of the Christian religion. Rogers himself has indicated how far away he stands from
traditional religion. We conclude that any philosophy which ignores so large
an area of human experience as we have here noted is defective, onesided and
unacceptable to logic or religion. The end of such a philosophy of turning
man upon himself, of making man his own God, is a frightening frustration
that is the road to neurosis and psychosis rather than mental health.

Rogers And Education

The final conclusion was that a system of education based on so defective
a system of human nature is equally unacceptable - for human nature is the
basic stuff of education. If education is only the unfolding of that which is
in man then we may well substitute group client centered therapy and be done
with it.

Surely we may admire Rogers for a type of consistency. Given his
assumptions he follows them all the way into their practical extensions. It
has been our contention that the very assumptions are wrong, do not have ade-
quate factual support, are onesided in emphasis, and are contrary both to
natural and revealed laws with respect to human nature. Regretfully we part
company with what purports to be a new humanism because we find it to be only
a revival of long discarded theories, because it falls short of what is in
man both actually and potentially, and because it offers him no hope beyond
himself.
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Approval Sheet

The dissertation submitted by George Roderick Youngs has been read and approved by five members of the Department of Education.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Education.

January 31, 1961
Date

Henry R. Malecki, Ph.D.
Signature of Advisor