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The Development of the United Nations

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THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE UNITED NATIONS

By

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VITA

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### CRITICAL ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES
CHAPTER I

THE ATLANTIC CHARTER

AND

THE UNITED NATIONS DECLARATION

The year was 1941, one which would be recorded in the annals of American history with even more emphasis than the fateful year of 1917. Europe was almost totally submerged beneath the callous and ruthless German armies. Britain, her back to the wall, frantically preparing to defend herself against the imminent invasion from the continent, successfully negotiated lend-lease aid from the United States in March. France, Norway, and the low countries were ending their first year of Nazi occupation. In June, the German armies, flushed with success and hoping for a quick victory within the year, broke their non-aggression pact and began their invasion of Russia.

Here in the United States, during these earth-shattering, depressing, headline-making events, the majority of the populace continued their normal, routine lives, disturbed occasionally, on one hand, by thoughts of the foolishness of economic and material aid to those nations who had not, after twenty prosperous years, paid their debts from the last war, but more or less satisfied, on the other, with the more prosperous conditions about them. With the aid of subtle propaganda from the die hard isolationists, the defeatists, and the business as usual group, our thoughts were conditioned for continued peace. Noxious farewell parties, jokes and stories of camp life, and tunes such as "Goodbye Dear I'll Be Back In a Year", formed the total
contribution of many to defense from the world without. Embargoes, declarations of emergency, gasoline and fuel rationing, credit curbs and other restrictions were attacked as additional "New Deal" methods of gaining more and more control over our personal business. The President, in June wrote concerning those without fervor toward the program of defense and active aid:

Although they were a minority, they formed a very powerful group. They were powerful because they had large funds at their disposal for propaganda purposes. They were powerful because they had the support of some of the largest newspapers and newspaper chains in the country. They were powerful because they could command the services of a handful of United States Senators who knew that they had the power to filibuster and who were willing to use that power, if necessary, to gain their ends.1

It was evident that many Americans had not yet learned that our foreign policy and interests were an integral part of our domestic policy; that the communication, transportation, and military advances of the century had made an isolated life an impossibility; that the affairs of the world were affairs of ours.

Early in the year, recognizing its value should we enter the war, the Navy Department, with the approval of Great Britain, authorized the construction of a weather station and naval base in Placentia harbor, Argentia, Newfoundland. Sailing the great circle routes, our ships to Europe could obtain accurate information from this station on the state of the weather, and receive here, en route, additional protective convoy screening against the submarine menace in the treacherous North Atlantic waters.

It was to this place that the USS Augusta, with President Roosevelt aboard, made its way through the mine-laid, netted outer harbor on the morning of August 9th for a rendezvous with the HMS Prince of Wales, which would bring Winston Churchill, the Prime Minister of England. Among the President's aides and advisors were Sumner Welles, Averill Harriman, Admirals King and Stark, Generals Marshall and Arnold. In addition, a large group of technical advisors in all fields stood ready to furnish specialized information when needed.

About noon of the following day the HMS Prince of Wales, with its protective screen of light cruisers and destroyers, made its way slowly into the guarded harbor and dropped anchor near the President's flagship. With Winston Churchill were Sir Alexander Cadogan, Lord Beaverbrook, representatives of the British Army and Navy, and Harry Hopkins, President Roosevelt's special envoy who had stopped in England after a visit to Russia.

The meetings in the days that followed were concerned primarily with lend-lease problems and matters of military and naval importance. Both Churchill and Roosevelt had come to the meeting, however, with the plan of issuing a statement of peace aims, human and economic rights. When Mr. Churchill brought this subject up, Mr. Roosevelt suggested that, although their ideas were probably identical, he wanted to be certain that what he had in mind was amply covered in the statement. To this end, he requested that Mr. Welles confer with Sir Alexander Cadogan, review the problem in its entirety and prepare a draft of the statement.

3 Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, Harper and Brothers, New York, 1944, 175.
In its accepted form, this drafted statement, later to be known as the Atlantic Charter, was released to the press on August 4, 1941. The eight points it proffered were not new ideas in the philosophy of an orderly world. They had been repeated countless times during the course of history in other words and in other situations. At this time, however, the peoples of the world, having been deluded in their thinking by the league failure, were in need of a new hope, a new program of idealistic action toward which they could aspir. They found it in the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

It is significant to note that the Atlantic Charter was known as a set of peace aims as opposed to any particular group of aims dealing with the prosecution of the war. At the same time, however, by their very nature, they could be defined as the most effective of war aims. By strongly opposing the state of affairs on the continent under the Nazis, and by advancing the basis of a secure and lasting cooperative peace, the statement indeed, coming at that particular time, became a symbolic grail to be followed on the battlefields of the world. In this light, The New York Times praised it saying, "From the very start of the conflict it had been urged that an adequate statement of aims would be democracy's strongest weapon, that it could raise the tide of hope in the hearts of conquered peoples everywhere...". The concurring view of the President was made known by Sumner Welles in his book The Time for Decision:

The President had felt since the conclusion of the first World War that one of the chief factors in the ultimate breakdown of organized world society had been the lack of any over-all agreement between the Allied powers at the time of the Armistice in November, 1918. He was foresighted enough to recognize that the United

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The New York Times, editorial, August 17, 1941.
States could best prevent a recurrence of these conditions by insisting that Great Britain and the United States reach such an agreement without further delay. Subsequently, the effort could be made to obtain the support of all other nations fighting the Axis powers. The President rightly believed that the mere announcement of such an agreement would prove invaluable in giving encouragement and hope to the peoples now fighting for survival.5

The burden thus placed on the Charter was a difficult one, one that could be adequately borne only by the untiring faith and work of its adherents.

I. THEIR COUNTRIES SEEK NO AGGRANDIZMENT, TERRITORIAL OR OTHER.

Here, in the initial statement, two of the great powers of the world were making it clearly understood in the early stages of the war that, for them at least, the spoils of war were buried in the past. Britain, her great colonial empire built on conquest of one sort or another, was putting herself on record, that, as a victor, she would ask nothing in territorial, economic, or political recompense. The United States, not yet in the war, was strengthening her reputation of being a good neighbor with this reaffirmation of the tenth commandment, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's goods."

II. THEY DESIRE TO SEEK NO TERRITORIAL CHANGES THAT DO NOT ACCORD WITH THE FREELY EXPRESSED WISHES OF THE PEOPLES CONCERNED.

III. THEY RESPECT THE RIGHT OF ALL PEOPLES TO CHOOSE THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT UNDER WHICH THEY WILL LIVE; AND THEY WISH TO SEE SOVEREIGN RIGHTS AND SELF-GOVERNMENT RESTORED TO THOSE WHO HAVE BEEN FORCIBLY DEPRIVED OF THEM.

These two articles comprise the political rights of the Atlantic Charter.6 To the small, oppressed, and occupied countries of Europe the

5 Welles, 174.
Allies here held forth the prize of national sovereignty and popular governmental selection. These rights, which every man as an individual is entitled to expect and demand, had in the past been extended to only a minority of the world's population and even those fortunate ones had too often lost these rights by political action from within or aggression from without. Here then was a hope for the common man to have his national interests, his government, his customs, his language.

It became apparent, after the first flush of idealistic optimism which followed the issuing of the Atlantic Charter, that this matter of self-determination could not be achieved in a short space of time. Quincy Wright speaking of this matter, observes:

The commitments of the United Nations are not clear as to the method to be employed in each case. They were phrased with reference to objectives rather than procedures. It is assumed, however, that the objectives are ones toward which practical progress can be made through common effort of the United Nations.  

Many throughout the world seemed to expect that the mere statement of these ideals would accomplish the end. Veteran commentators carelessly allowed their enthusiasm to override their good judgment and spoke of self-determination as a fait accompli. While nationalistic groups the world over were hopefully, but sometimes blindly, interpreting self-determination to the best advantage in their particular situation, Sir William Beveridge very realistically stated:

Self-determination will not apply either to particular spots in the world whose importance is essentially strategic or to backward regions,

Ibid., 11
that is to say those in which, through lack of education, the inhabitants are not yet capable of self-determination.  

This interpretation, which proved later to be quite correct, meant that some peoples, because of their geographical position, would not obtain the privileges of their neighbors in other sectors, for in this age of struggle for power, when realism meets idealism there can be only one victor. Had this been more universally understood, the anxiety and the fears which accompanied the postwar settlements in Poland, Yugoslavia, Greece, and the Middle East, might have been somewhat allayed when humanitarian principles bowed to the necessities of power politics.

IV. THEY WILL ENDEAVOR, WITH DUE RESPECT FOR THEIR EXISTING OBLIGATIONS, TO FURTHER THE ENJOYMENT BY ALL STATES, GREAT OR SMALL, VICTOR OR VANQUISHED, OF ACCESS ON EQUAL TERMS, TO THE TRADE AND TO THE RAW MATERIALS OF THE WORLD WHICH ARE NEEDED FOR THEIR ECONOMIC PROSPERITY.

V. THEY DESIRE TO BRING ABOUT THE FULLEST COLLABORATION BETWEEN ALL NATIONS IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD WITH THE OBJECT OF SECURING, FOR ALL, IMPROVED LABOR STANDARDS, ECONOMIC ADVANCEMENT AND SOCIAL SECURITY.

VII. SUCH A PEACE SHOULD ENABLE ALL MEN TO TRAVERSE THE HIGH SEAS AND OCEAN WITHOUT HINDRANCE.

If the Atlantic Charter is to be considered a valid statement of general, basic, principles of an orderly, peaceful, world, and if we are to accept the importance of the economic causes of war, then these articles can well become the most important.

Last of these three, but definitely the most basic, is freedom of
the seas, without which it would be foolhardy to speak of economic coopera-
tion among nations. Reaffirmation of this principle of international law and
justice, though it has been successfully pursued for the past century, is
further evidence of the intent of the Allied powers not to use their might
to the detriment of the weaker nations.

The world reflects a long history of tariffs, export taxes,
preferential blocs, and favored nation treaties and clauses. A faith in the
future of our world plus a determined effort to build a universally prosperous
and secure economic life could bring an end to the evils listed above.
Since the gold standard had been dropped in the early thirties, economists
had been urging various types of substitutes designed to replace the gold
system of multilateral clearing and multilateral trade. The Atlantic Charter
seemed to give support to this theory, and in the words of Professor Halm,
Article IV of the Charter.

...quite obviously implies multilateral clear-
ing. In order to get the needed raw materials
the countries of the world must be able to buy
them and in order to be able to pay for them
the countries must be able to sell on the world
market. Thus nothing short of multilateral
trade can fulfill this point of the Atlantic
Charter.9

If Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill meant these objectives to be
carried out, they both certainly must have been thinking in terms of the
distant future, for both must have recognized the struggle they would have

9 George N. Halm, International Monetary Cooperation, The University of
to achieve them in their own countries. Protective tariffs in the United States, and empire preferences in Great Britain, although modified in the past decade, were still strongly ingrained, and it remained to be seen whether or not the people could be convinced to sacrifice these for the good of all nations. Many business interests in the world will fight to the bitter end to preserve the status quo of their selfish and discriminating economic existence which will in the end only serve to promote the causes of another world struggle for power.

It is against this conception [of economic barriers] that we are today fighting, and the Atlantic Charter is the expression of our conviction that the natural resources of the world are now adequate—if widely used—to provide a decent standard of life for all peoples, and that all are therefore entitled to their fair share in these resources.10

Articles IV and V became the basis for many meetings of the nations including The Food and Agriculture Conference, The Bretton Woods Conference, and The World Trade Conference. They became the subject of heated discussions by the inclusion of former enemy states in their benefits. This was pointedly shown at the International Labor Organisation meeting in Philadelphia in 1944 when the proposal of an American Federation of Labor representative to aid in the reconstruction of German labor unions to further their national rehabilitation met with complete hostility and was angrily voted down by a solid European bloc.11 Aside from a few instances of this sort, however, men of importance and foresight spoke of these articles of the

Atlantic Charter as being the cornerstone of the world peace to be achieved.

Complete victory will not be won until there is a full and increasing use of the world’s resources to lift living standards from one end of this planet to the other. The twentieth century is a time set apart for the winning of this total triumph.12

VI. AFTER THE FINAL DESTRUCTION OF NAZI TYRANNY, THEY HOPE TO SEE ESTABLISHED A PEACE WHICH WILL AFFORD TO ALL NATIONS THE MEANS OF DWELLING IN SAFETY WITHIN THEIR OWN BOUNDARIES, AND WHICH WILL AFFORD ASSURANCE THAT ALL THE MEN IN ALL THE LANDS MAY LIVE OUT THEIR LIVES IN FREEDOM FROM FEAR AND WANT.

VIII. THEY BELIEVE ALL OF THE NATIONS OF THE WORLD, FOR REALISTIC AS WELL AS SPIRITUAL REASONS, MUST COME TO THE ABANDONMENT OF THE USE OF FORCE. SINCE NO FUTURE PEACE CAN BE MAINTAINED IF LAND, SEA, OR AIR ARMAMENT CONTINUE TO BE EMPLOYED BY NATIONS WHICH THREATEN, OR MAY THREATEN AGGRESSION OUTSIDE OF THEIR FRONTIERS, THEY BELIEVE, PENDING THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A WIDER AND PERMANENT SYSTEM OF GENERAL SECURITY, THAT THE DISARMAMENT OF SUCH NATIONS IS ESSENTIAL. THEY WILL LIKewise AID AND ENCOURAGE OTHER PRACTICABLE MEASURES WHICH WILL LIGHTEN FOR PEACE-LOVING PEOPLES THE CRUSHING BURDEN OF ARMAMENT.

Here in the sixth and eighth points of the charter we find, first, a plea for a just peace, second, the first official mention of a new world organization, and last, the very touch subject of disarmament. In as much as the world organization will be of value only in proportion as the peace is just, and disarmament will depend on the strength and permanence of the world organization, the factors of the two articles are closely allied. That thoughts of a just peace existed at a time when the war was at a fever pitch, and that the major powers should promulgate them, certainly showed a change from the wartime utterances of the past. Bringing in two of his famous freedoms, want and fear, Mr. Roosevelt, with Mr. Churchill, backed up the just peace by appealing to all men whether from small nations or from large. The

12 Milo Perkins, "Winning the War after the War", The Peoples’ Peace, 248.
particulars of the just peace were not, of course, defined and criticism of
the Charter on this and other points was centered on its generalities. In
answer to these, Mr. Churchill, less than a month later, stated that the
Charter does not attempt to explain in each and every case how its broad
principles are to be applied and that each individual situation will have to
be dealt with after the end of the war.13

The subject of disarmament, although placed on a lofty pinnacle
for future use, pending the establishment of a permanent security system, was
boldly entered into the record for all to see. In the United States, from
that section of opinion which felt that war was nearly upon us, the resent-
ment of our participation in any disarmament program was strong, and even
though worded in a very futuristic fashion, this article drew bitter criti-
cism. Speaking of this during the latter part of the war, Sigrid Arne reacts
to disarmament in this fashion:

The lad with the badly burned finger wants to
know the fire is out--and on that score the
military chiefs are much like the Russians,
from Missouri, until they see the world organ-
ization actually successful in keeping the
peace.14

From another viewpoint, Sir William Beveridge writes that dis-
armament will be an impossibility unless we make a peace which leaves room
for the restoration of German self respect.15

13 Wright, II.
14 Arne, 9.
15 Beveridge, 68.
The proposal for a new security organization, much like other ideas in the Atlantic Charter, was not enlarged upon. This, perhaps, served an excellent purpose at the time, however, as it saved the American public an intense public debate between the internationalists and the isolationists at a time when national unity was vital. It remained for the Moscow Conference to give life to a plan for world organization.

In article six of the Charter, we find included specifically two of the four freedoms which President Roosevelt enunciated in his message to Congress in January of 1941, viz: the freedom from want, and the freedom from fear. As originally stated in the President’s message, freedom from want held a purely economic value, while freedom from fear visualized reduction of armaments and safety from aggression.16 Developments of the precepts can be found in every other article of the Charter, articles one, two, three, and eight, coming under freedom from fear, while articles four, five, six, seven, and eight can be considered within the general scope of freedom from want. In view of the world wide attention and acclamation given to the four freedoms at the time of their enunciation, it seems strange that they should have been used without being given a position of primary importance, and that also, while deeming it proper to include freedom from fear and want, the authors saw fit to exclude freedom of speech and freedom of worship. It may have been considered that because of their origin, any predominant position they might have been given would have lent itself to interpretations that the Charter was solely a platform of the United States. To some, the exclusion of the first and second freedoms, speech and religion, was an unforgivable error. Had they considered, however, the difficulties that would have been encountered in

16 Rosenman, Vol. IV, 672.
obtaining ratifications from those nations which recognized neither principle, they would have seen the expediency of the commission. A few days later, on August 21, in his report to Congress, Mr. Roosevelt pointed out that freedom of speech and religion were really an intrinsic part of the declaration.

It is also unnecessary for me to point out that that declaration of principles includes of necessity the world need for freedom of religion and freedom of information. No society of the world organized under the announced principles could survive without these freedoms which are a part of the whole freedom for which we strive. 17

Although many news writers, at the time of the announcement of the Atlantic Charter, likened it to the "Fourteen Point" program of Woodrow Wilson, their inception and their content were radically different. When Wilson contributed the "Fourteen Points", the United States had already been in the war for nearly a year; at the time of the release of the Atlantic Charter we were not at war and there were doubts in the minds of many as to whether we would become actively engaged in the conflict. Unimportant as this might seem, the history of United States foreign policy was here entering a new era, not only because the United States was going on record as intending to take her place in world affairs, but because she was approaching the problem not as an umpire or as a nation set apart, but as a member of the family of nations. Secondly, in their content the two programs have but little in common. While the "Fourteen Points" did strive to establish new levels of diplomacy, world conduct and order, they were primarily concerned with specific problems posed by World War I, and proposed detailed solutions for these various situations. The Atlantic Charter, on the other hand, was, solely and

17 Wright, 5.
completely, a statement of conditions for a lasting peace, covering the
political, social, and economic rights of nations and men, but going into
detail on none. The four points of similarity are: freedom of the seas;
removal of economic barriers; reduction of armaments; and a world organiza-
tion.

The announcement of the eight point program came as a great sur-
prise to many in the United States. Americans were not yet accustomed to
secret meetings such as this and even though several news accounts carried
stories of the President's absence from Washington, few suspected its impor-
tance. To the people of the middle west, where anti-British opinion ran the
strongest, such a meeting could mean only that the prophecies of the isolation
group were coming true, that the President was pro-British and a war-monger.
In Congress, Senator Walsh of Massachusetts condemned the meeting as he
asserted:

The worst of the matter is that the American people have been afforded no opportunity to pass
judgment; Congress and the constitutional con-
cepts of representative government have been brushed aside, and the President alone, and on
his own initiative, has undertaken to pledge our government, our nation and the lives of
130,000,000 persons and their descendants for generations to come.18

Those who were always willing to go along with Mr. Roosevelt's
actions, and those who realised that this move of the President was no less
out of order than President Monroe's Doctrine or President Jefferson's pur-
chase of the Louisiana territory, both announced without prior authorisation
of the Congress, were not disturbed by the means and were content to examine

the end result in terms of its value to humanity.\textsuperscript{19}

Economically, the Charter was sound. It emphasized the rights of nations to receive as nearly as possible a proportionately equal share of the world resources and trade, and to achieve for themselves a higher standard of living. Realistically, perhaps, it seemed to overlook the harsh monetary and commercial practices which the history of both nations reveals. It became, none the less, a goal to be achieved. In England, Anthony Eden stated:

> It is therefore most encouraging to note that in the United States the President himself and a number of leading statesmen have repeatedly expressed their determination to work for a world in which each country shall be given the opportunity to develop its own life and its own resources to the benefit of all. In this task, our American friends can be sure we are ready to meet and work with them all the time, all the way.\textsuperscript{20}

Here in the United States, most liberals hailed the program without reservation. The thoughts of many who failed to face the reality of the world situation soared. A middle of the roadder, Alvin Hansen, well known economist and State Department advisor, wrote:

> It is evident that the implementation of such a declaration in actual practice confronts deeply ingrained and established policies all over the world which make it impossible to carry it out to a 100 per cent ideal degree. It is a broad aim toward which the world is working, but as is true of many aims it cannot all at once be achieved.\textsuperscript{21}

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{20} Anthony Eden, "Necessary Fundamentals", The Peopless' Peace, op. cit., 63.
\textsuperscript{21} Alvin Hansen, America's Role in the World Economy, W.W. Norton & Co., New York, N.Y., 1945, 100.
The authors of the Atlantic Charter undoubtedly were thinking along these same lines when they began article IV, "....with due respect for existing obligations....". This interpretation is supported by Sumner Welles in his first hand account of the Charter meeting. Both Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill felt strongly that the imperial preferences should be abolished. However, even though his sympathies were for its abolition, Mr. Churchill was not empowered to make any commitments on the matter. At the time, "It was fully understood, however, that this reservation was inserted solely to take care of what it was hoped would be merely temporary impediments to the more far-reaching commitment originally envisaged in that article."22

The political aims of the Charter were well received. They spoke of "peoples" or "men", rather than of "nations" and "states", thereby achieving a universal appeal. Whether this was intentional or not is a matter of conjecture, for aside from article III respecting choice of a government, all others can, as well as not, be interpreted as protecting the group rather than the individual. To Poland, they held forth hope for a re-united nation, with secure borders and a government of its own choosing. To India, they offered hope for a new and better program of independence. To the Netherlands, it meant a program under which she could again become a trading nation and perhaps form a commonwealth of nations with her former colonies. To Greece, it signified the end of political pressure from without her borders. To men the world over, it meant a hope of living their lives free from war and its burdens.

22 Welles, 176.
Unfortunately, however, as we shall see in detail later, with the turning of the tide of war, self-determination became a more and more elusive term, giving way in almost every case to the power situation then at hand. Poland's self-determination became the determination of the USSR for a security ring. Greece became a political battle ground between the Communist party, supported by Russia and the Monarchy, supported by Britain. To those men who had hoped, worked, and prayed for a peaceful world, the nations seemed to be only preparing themselves for a new and greater struggle.

It is apparent that through the eight points runs a thread of uncertainty. Except for article I which considers only the particular countries of the authors and on which they were certain to receive support at home, Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill used verbs such as desire, respect, will endeavor, hope, should enable, and believe, in constructing the aims of the Charter. This shows the particularly dependent situation under which both men were working. "They were dependent on the voters back home not only for their jobs but for the right to pledge their nations to a continuing foreign policy which they hoped the voters would support long after both men had left office."23 In addition, and perhaps more important, both men knew that the USSR would have a great deal to say in the writing of any peace and it would have been definitely out of the question for them to have spoken for Russia in absentia.

The Charter was promulgated by the United States and Britain in the hope that it would become an instrument in binding the world together.24

23 Arne, 5.
24 Welles, 175.
This was partially fulfilled on January 1, 1942, when the "Declaration of the United Nations" was signed in Washington by twenty-six of the nations, including the "Big Four". It pledged their support of the principles of the Atlantic Charter, and committed them to aiding the Allies to the fullest extent of their resources, and pledged them not to make a separate peace.

But it was a tremendous leg up to the British and American leaders of the anti-Axis forces. The two foreign ministries had been working quietly and hurriedly to coax other nations either to keep close watch on Axis agents or to send them home. Their presence outside the Axis countries was a constant danger to the Allied movement of troops and supplies.

Indeed, if it did nothing else, it drew sides clearly and left sympathizers, neutrals, and those who would go with the tide, standing alone. The Declaration can truly be called the birth of the United Nations, for it was the group of signatories to the Declaration who formed the nucleus of the subsequent convention. This group expanded through the war to a total of forty-seven nations. A group of seventeen, including the Axis partners, failed to sign the Declaration. This was later to become a problem at the San Francisco Conference, when the methods of admitting new members were formulated.

As this is written, the Atlantic Charter stands as a monument of idealism, badly chipped since its unveiling by the realities of world politics. It now has a successor, the Charter of the United Nations, which contains some of its aims, and which, as an organization bound to action on these principles, can, if forcefully administered and properly supported, hold the line against world politics. However, not until men learn to live with one

25 Arne, 12.
another, to appreciate each other's problems, and to achieve a mutual understanding of earthly life, will these aims become precepts and the precepts, reality.
CHAPTER II

THE MOSCOW CONFERENCE

In the twenty-six months that intervened between the Atlantic Charter meeting and the Moscow Conference, the war had progressed from a continental affair to a world-wide conflagration, involving all of the militarily powerful nations of the world. Although it was the action of the Japanese on December 7, 1941, that had forced the United States into active war against the Axis, for some time American lend-lease goods had been moving across the Atlantic. At the time of our entrance, Russia was recovering from her darkest moment, the siege of Moscow, and was slowly rebuilding her strength to commence a general offensive.

In February, 1943, after the recapture of Stalingrad, the Soviets began their great drive westward. On the southern front, Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps had driven within sight of Cairo and Alexandria in the early part of 1942 and, for a time, it seemed that the eastern end of the Mediterranean would be lost. In November, 1942, at El Alamein, the offensive was stopped and the great German retreat from Africa began. It ended in May, 1943, in Tunis. In the Pacific, the Japanese had extended their offensive into Burma, India, and down the island chain into the Solomons and New Guinea. Their drive to the west was to have brought them together with the Germans; their drive to the south was, undoubtedly, aimed at Australia. They, too, though virtually unopposed in their original advances, began to feel the power of the Allied forces in early 1943.
The attitude of the American people took a sharp change after
the Pearl Harbor attack. It was characterized by general agreement, not only
in the all-out war effort that followed, with its intense mobilisation,
military expenditure, and extraordinary presidential powers, but also in our
charted foreign policy. In this period, the failure of the collective
security of the League was often cited, the blame being put on America's
refusal to assume her role in world affairs. Consequently, with hope in sight
for conquering the Axis partners, the Congress, in May, 1943, was presented
with the House Concurrent resolution 25. Representative Fulbright of
Arkansas, a young, liberal, first-termer, was chosen by the administration
to foster this bill which, henceforth, carried his name. Passed by the
House on September 21, 1943, this resolution expressed the Congress as being
in favor of a postwar international organisation for keeping the peace, the
United States to participate under constitutional provisions. It was a con-
current resolution, but when it was sent to the Senate, after House approval,
it was shelved, and Senate Resolution 192, known as the Connally Resolution,
was offered in its place. While essentially the same as that passed by the
House, the Senators insisted on pronouncing, a little more definitely, and,
perhaps with a little jealousy, their constitutional right in the making of
treaties, saying:

...any treaty made to effect the purposes of
this resolution, on behalf of the Government
of the United States with any other nation or
association of nations, shall be made only by
and with the advice and consent of the Senate
of the United States, provided two-thirds of
the Senators present concur.1

1 Toward the Peace, Dept. of State Pub. 2298, U.S. Govt. Printing Office,
Wash., D.C., 1945, 8.
Further, with reference to the proposed international organisation, the Senators voted that it should be "based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states...".2

Thus the Congress had constitutionally set the pace for the State Department and President in the conduct of foreign affairs, even though the initiative for these resolutions seemed to come from the executive branch.

From the opposition party, too, came a note of encouragement. The Republican party, the stronghold of the isolation elements, passed, early in September, their Mackinac Declaration, which put them on record as also favoring a general international organisation.3

While Britain and the United States had cooperated closely in the use of their military and naval forces since America's entrance, Russia was, to both nations, more or less a third party, an outsider, though an ally. To be sure, both nations had stinted themselves and suffered losses to supply Russia with war material, but neither knew the exact status of the Soviet strength, nor did the opportunity seem to come for a cementing of relations among the three partners. Perhaps the Russian distrust stemmed from the publicly pronounced pre-war hope that the Soviets and the Nazis would exterminate each other in a continental war. Britain had, in May, 1942, signed a treaty of alliance with Russia against Germany which included an agreement against making a separate peace, an agreement to agree on common action for a postwar world, and, a twenty year mutual assistance pact against Germany.4

2 Ibid.
Nonetheless, suspicion and distrust continued, with the Soviet press and its foreign stooges clamoring almost daily for a second front to be opened in Europe.

The need was definitely present for a meeting of the three great powers, to consider the problems of war and of peace. Some considered that the best method of achieving the needed unity was for the heads of the three nations to meet; others regarded this plan as merely a publicity stunt to increase their importance and indispensable character in world affairs. Without adequate groundwork being laid, a meeting could, however, be a very dangerous plan, and it was agreed that the groundwork should be done by the foreign ministers of the countries concerned. Through the summer and early fall of 1943, the minor officials worked out in detail the meeting place, the subjects to be discussed, and certain basic ideas which were to underlie the conference.

Moscow was the logical place for the conference to be held, as Cordell Hull, the American foreign minister, was the only one of the three who had not made a reciprocal visit to Russia. Because of his age and infirmity, the State Department worked hard to make Washington or London the meeting place, but Russia stood firm on her insistence on Moscow, and, in the end, Mr. Hull agreed to make the trip.

That there was to be a meeting of the ministers was not kept a secret, and, as a consequence, many suggestions on subjects to be discussed

were offered in the daily press. The "fellow travellers" took this opportunity to stage a "second front" drive, which was culminated by Earl Browder in an address at the Chicago Stadium on September 26.\textsuperscript{7} Pravda, on October 13, took this identical line of argument, saying:

"Military cooperation must precede economic and political decisions, because mutual operations directed toward quickening Hitler's defeat are a necessary premise for deciding all postwar questions.\textsuperscript{8}

Going further, Pravda, on the same day, declared that there could be no discussion of Russia's borders or of the postwar status of the Baltic states, and that any such discussion would be no more in line than a discussion of the postwar borders of the state of California.\textsuperscript{9} Russia, the perennial puzzle, was, in her foreign policy, following an almost incomprehensible pattern. While clamoring for a second front and more lend-lease, she showed her irritability by recalling the most popular and understanding of her ambassadors, Maxim Litvinov, from the United States, and simultaneously, perhaps as a threat or a scare, let the impression be given that the "National Committee of Free Germany" might be used to arrange a separate peace. These moves, which could not but be greeted with suspicion in the United States, were countered by supposedly friendly action with the public abolition of the Comintern, the recognition of the Greek Orthodox Church, and the relentless pursuit of the retreating Germans.\textsuperscript{10}

\textsuperscript{7} The New York Times, Oct. 5, 1943.
\textsuperscript{8} Ibid., Oct. 14, 1943.
\textsuperscript{9} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{10} Fay, 204.
The Anglo-American viewpoint seemed to sum up the situation, prior to the conference, by dividing the emphasis on the problem as follows: Russia, intent on general military operations, the military disposition of Germany, and our interest in her security belt; and, the Anglo-Americans interested in small nation sovereignty, the fourth front in the Pacific, and Russia's interest in the Mediterranean. 11

Thus matters stood at the opening of the conference, Russia putting her weight behind military matters, the United States and Britain determined to set a basis for a postwar world.

The details of the conference had been left to the hosts, the Russians. They chose a former Czarist mansion, called Spiridonovka House in Moscow for the meeting, which opened on October 19, 1943. Mr. Hull and Mr. Eden had come by plane and were greeted with full honors at the airport by Foreign Minister Molotov. Aside from the pictures and limited statements to the press upon their arrival, no information of importance was given to the press during the twelve day meeting. It was later released that the traditional Russian method of beginning the conferences near midnight and continuing until early morning had been modified out of deference to Mr. Hull's age, and the late afternoon was chosen as the meeting time for the principals. Conjecture as to the content of the meeting was voluminous, and earlier statements that the conference was to be chiefly military vanished when Messrs. Hull and Eden arrived with only one military advisor apiece. These military advisors, Lt. Gen. John R. Deane, United States, Maj. Gen. Sir Hastings Ismay, Great Britain, and Marshal Klimenti Voroshilov, Soviet

Union, attended the first full length meeting, which suggested that some military matters had to be ironed out before the diplomatic talks could commence. 12

On November 1, the pronouncements of the conference were released. In four parts, they were titled: Declaration on Austria; Declaration on Italy; Declaration of Four Nations on General Security; and, Declaration on German Atrocities. The first two were signed by Eden, Hull, and Molotov; the third by the three ministers, plus Foo Ping-sheung, the Chinese ambassador to Moscow; and, the fourth by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin. The inclusion of the Chinese in the Declaration on General Security was suggested by Mr. Hull and accepted by Mr. Molotov and Mr. Eden. 13 The fourth pronouncement, concerned with German atrocities and signed by the heads of the three states, had been agreed upon through diplomatic channels, and was released at this time to add strength and vigor to the other pronouncements. 14

DECLARATION OF FOUR NATIONS ON GENERAL SECURITY

This statement, the most important of the Moscow Conference, contained two of the most basic general agreements or any of the preliminary meetings. First, it laid down the principle of unconditional surrender, saying:

The governments...are united in their determination ...to continue hostilities against those Axis powers with which they are respectively at war until such powers have laid down their arms on a basis of unconditional surrender.... 15

Secondly, it pledged them to postwar international action, declaring that:

14 Toward the Peace, 5.
15 Ibid., 6.
...they recognize the necessity of establishing at the earliest practicable date a general international organization, based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, and open to membership by all such states, large and small, for the maintenance of international peace and security.16

It was the Soviet's first public acceptance of the Roosevelt-Churchill formula for unconditional surrender, which had been pronounced at Casablanca in January 1943, and put a quick end to the rumors that Russia might make a separate peace.17 Many critics considered the unconditional surrender stand too premature, that adherence to it would stiffen resistance and mean the loss of many more lives. However, their admonitions went unheeded and this demand remained to the last.

It is worth notice that within this section lies the means, through which China enabled to sign the pact even though Russia was not at war with Japan: "...against those Axis powers with whom they are respectively at war...". It was highly significant that China and the Soviet Union had signed a joint wartime document, and served warning on Japan that eventually she would be at war with Russia.

The caution with which the State Department was treating the Senate in these conferences was amply shown in article four, which dealt with the general international organization. The draft had been drawn by the American State Department in the spring and summer of 1943, and had been accepted by the other signatories with only slight changes.18 The Connally Resolution which was

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16 Ibid.
17 Casablanca, a military conference, was not attended by Stalin, although an invitation had been extended.
in the Senate committee rooms prior to the meeting of Moscow, was a word-for-word copy of section four, the only substitution being "the Senate" in place of "they" and a change of tense in the verbs. This collusion was obviously intended by the State Department to soothe those Senators who felt that such commitments should be first approved by the Senate. The upper house, however, did not finally pass on the resolution until four days after the release of the Moscow agreements.

The words "sovereign equality" and "peace-loving" were included in the Moscow agreements at the insistence of our Department of State, who felt them necessary to be sure of Senate approval of our participation in an international body. Their presence in such a definite provision brought many demands for a definition of terms. Hull met these in his report to the joint session of Congress, in which he said:

I should like to lay particular stress on this provision of the declaration. The principle of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, irrespective of size and strength, as partners in a future system of general security will be the foundation stone upon which the future international organization will, or should, be constructed.

Within this paragraph from Mr. Hull's speech lies the heart of the proposed world organization. Did he mean that the powers had agreed on limiting all their actions to respect the sovereignty of their smaller neighbors? Did Russia agree to the independence of the states along her western border? Did England agree to more freedom and self-determination within her empire?

19 Ibid.
Why did Mr. Hull add the indefinite "should be constructed" at the end of his sentence? The article itself stated that that is the way the new organisation is to be constructed and left no doubts. Did Mr. Hull consider that this provision would not be carried out? No answer to these and other questions was forthcoming, nor was a clear cut definition of sovereign equality.

Sovereignty and its closely allied term, self-determination, were left in an indefinite status probably to be interpreted only under duress, when a challenging situation threatened one or the other of the powers. *Time* came close to the truth when it said:

...there would probably be no public statement by London or Washington until the European war was over, if then. Perhaps Mr. Hull had been told in Moscow that he could not have complete agreement and the Atlantic Charter too.21

The continued use of the word "peace-loving" will remain a contradiction. The only logical definition that can be placed on this term is that the peace-loving states are composed of those belligerent powers joined together to effect the defeat of the Axis powers. This meant that those nations, Sweden, Switzerland, Finland, and others whose modern history reflect no aggression, were to be excluded as not loving peace. It meant that a line was clearly being drawn between victors, vanquished, and neutrals, with the exclusion of the neutrals from a peace-loving status, aimed at driving some of their governments from power and their nations into war on the side of the Allies. The term "squeeze play" was never more appropriate.

The remaining points of the general security agreement revolve...
around those already discussed. The principals, in articles one, two, three, and six agreed to agree on the continued prosecution of the war, the imposition and execution of surrender and disarmament, and the conduct of their military forces in the postwar occupation, this last being added to allay western fears of Russian occupation forces. Articles five and seven were closely related to article four, an interim consultation system for the United Nations being established in article five, and, in number seven, pledging the signers to agree on postwar regulation of armaments separate and apart from the proposed international organization.

DECLARATION REGARDING ITALY

On September third, six weeks before the Moscow Conference convened, Italy surrendered unconditionally. Although this did not open the territory to occupation, because of the German armies and the Italian Fascists still fighting, it put the Allies in the position of having to lay down the initial set of principles to be used in governing reconquered countries. Italy was further seeking the status of a co-belligerent. Russian troops had played a part in the invasion of Sicily and Italy, and it was to the British and Americans that Bagdolico went to surrender his government. They, however, probably fearful of setting a precedent, invited Russia at Moscow to join in laying down the Italian Declaration.

It was a simple statement, outlawing Fascism and its adherents, and calling for a democratic government, characterised by freedom of speech, of religious worship, and of political beliefs. Recognising the impossibility of

its immediate use, the Big Three gave the Combined Chiefs of Staff the authority
to determine the time when it could be put in operation.

That Russia should have been a party to the agreement was amazing
for the term democratic, as defined by the freedoms to be granted, gave the
Italian people a tremendously greater amount of liberty than the Soviet’s own
citizens. Perhaps Russia felt by acceding to our ideas on Italian reconstruc-
tion, we would reciprocate in kind in regard to the countries within her security
belt. The immediate cynical reaction that followed Russia’s signing of this
agreement was replaced by a wave of optimism on future Russian policy and hood-
winked even Professor Fay into questioning:

...is the war, with all its opportunities for
individual initiative and patriotic loyalty,
rapidly changing the Soviet Union into a more
liberal and democratic state?23

There were many such hopefuls, whose optimistic questions and
leading conjectures had a definite influence on public feeling toward Russia.
Their optimistic utterances were not, however, to go unanswered by Soviet policy
for very long.

DECLARATION ON AUSTRIA

Part of the general war strategy called for building the under-
ground resistance of Germany’s satellite nations. Austria, the first of these
countries to come under Nazi’s domination, was selected as the target for the
Allied pronouncement. In three paragraphs, the powers informed the world that
Austria would again be established as a free and independent nation, but that
her fate would be judged according to “her own contribution to her liberation”.

23 Ibid., 294.
A balder threat could not have been extended to Austria, nor could a darker outlook for the future have been given to Poland, Finland, and the Baltic states by their omission. This article, while of doubtful value as an instrument of propaganda, seemed to indicate a possible clash of ideas between the Soviets and the Anglo-American representatives, for is it logical that while selecting a nation outside of Russia's security ring, pronouncing for its future independence, no mention is made of Finland, Poland, Lithuania, Hungary, or Bulgaria? Did we not stand for their independence and freedom also? The omissions of this article raised many questions, the answers to which became clearer as the armies of Russia pushed westward, and her political influence showed the pattern of democracy foreign to the western world.

DECLARATION OF GERMAN ATROCITIES

The fourth statement issued by the conference was signed, not by the foreign ministers, but by Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin. Issued as a warning to the Germans to put an end to mass executions and slaughters, it contained a masterful threat:

Let those who have hitherto not imbrued their hands with innocent blood beware lest they join the ranks of the guilty, for most assuredly the three allied powers will pursue them to the uttermost ends of the earth, and will deliver them to their accusers in order that justice be done.

Going further, the statement distinguished between minor criminals, who were guilty of local crimes, and the major criminals, whose offenses they said "have no particular geographical localization and who will be punished by the joint decision of the governments of the Allies". This was the basis in fact for the later Nuernberg trials. Why this declaration was attached
to the Moscow pronouncements is a matter of conjecture, the best being that, in addition to the solidarity which the conference showed, they wished to strengthen the pronouncements and attempt to alter the German viewpoint from that of a warrior into that of a hunted criminal.

As a result of the conference, two advisory councils were established, the European Advisory Council, and the Advisory Council for Matters relating to Italy. The latter attained little importance. The European Advisory Council was established to advise the three governments on non-military matters, and drew a host of criticism from the governments in exile who were not represented on it. France, in particular, took offense and announced that she could not accept the decisions of a council upon which she was not represented.24 In the end, the advice of the council was disregarded, and its importance soon waned.

The reaction to the Moscow Declaration was given with typical wartime candor. Hull, speaking enthusiastically to Congress, threw all caution to the winds and, in an all-inclusive, all-trusting, non-historically minded statement said:

As the provisions of the four-nation declaration are carried into effect there will no longer be need for spheres of influence, for alliances, for balance of power or any other of the special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the nations strove to safeguard their security or promote their interest.25

24 Freda Kirchway, "Unfinished Business", The Nation, Nov. 27, 1943, 43.
25 Hull, 102.
Time, oftentimes caustic in its comments, optimistically wrote:

Out of Moscow came an agreement of such scope as few men had dared hope for...the fog through which the four great United Nations groped had lifted. Now—still far away but visible—could be seen the horizons of a new and brighter world.26

Pravda, with classic Russian enthusiasm, came forth with three great statements, totally ignoring, in their cheering comment, the most important of the conference measure, the international organization:

Long live the victory of the Anglo-Soviet-American fighting alliance over the bitterest enemy of humanity, the German Fascist enslavers.

Long live the glorious Anglo-American troops fighting against German Fascists on Italian territory.

Greetings to pilots of the Anglo-American Air Force who are dealing blows at the vital centers of Fascist Germany.27

One lone, quiet, critic came forth, the Catholic Church. The Bishops' statement, issued from the annual meeting of the Hierarchy in Washington, expressed fear of a compromise of principles at Moscow, stating that:

The responsibility for postwar social reconstruction will fall on the victors. Many serious men have misgivings that there may be tragic compromises and a fateful repudiation of sound principles...they know the forces at play in the world about us. The Declarations...represent a step in the right direction. They do not, however, dispel the fear that compromises on the ideals of the Atlantic Charter are in prospect. Some

26 Time, Nov. 8, 1943, 13.
things these documents imply by statement
and more significantly still by omission
leave an uneasiness in minds intent on peace
with justice to all.\textsuperscript{28}

The Federal Council of Churches of Christ, which had previously
given all-out approval of the conference, now accused the Catholic Church of
having access to inside information and demanded that Hull answer the so-called
charges that compromises had been made on the Atlantic Charter.\textsuperscript{29} In a round-
about fashion, on November 11, at a special press conference, Mr. Hull admitted
that before the conference could take place, he had to agree that: all questions
of distribution of territory involved in the war would be left for settlement
until the end of the war; that policing must be left in the hands of the armies
of occupation at the hour of victory; that all questions of fixing boundaries
will be settled by the victorious powers at the end of the fighting; and, that
matters of self-determination, plebiscites, etc., will not be taken up until the
victors had redrawn the map.\textsuperscript{30} The first, second, and fourth were clear victories for the Russian policy of expansion in as much as they allowed the Soviet
time to force its political character on the people of the countries she occupied
and failed to redefine the rights of the people in occupied territory under the
Atlantic Charter. The third clearly pointed to a power peace rather than a just
peace, and invalidated the Atlantic Charter to the point where it would have been
better had it not been written. Strongly protesting this appeasement of principle,
the \textit{Christian Century} demanded:

...that the three governments directly in-

\textsuperscript{28} The \textit{New World} (Chicago), Nov. 19, 1943.
\textsuperscript{29} \textit{Christian Century}, editorial, Nov. 17, 1943, p. 1328.
\textsuperscript{30} \textit{Chicago Daily Tribune}, Nov. 17, 1943; \textit{The Chicago Sun}, Nov. 17, 1943.
volved...owe it to the peoples of the world
to make an immediate, complete, and official
declaration concerning them...until that
statement is forthcoming we will live in
dread, as will millions of thoughtful Amer­
ican citizens, that Mr. Hull has come back
from Moscow bearing the shadow of a general
international organization but having lost
the substance of a lasting peace.31

There was silence from government quarters, and it was ignored by
Mr. Hull in his speech to the joint session of Congress, evidently in the hope
that the news of the day would subjugate the importance of this admission. That
the "silent treatment" did its work well was obvious, for, in the conferences
that followed, no attempt was made to correct these shattering compromises, nor
did the press seem to make any concerted effort to force the issue.

The Moscow Conference, preliminary as it was, brought forth a
document largely basic, but riddled with omissions and signs of compromise of
principle. In relation to the war, it showed a united front to the Axis; in
relation to peace, it forewarned of a difficult future.

To the thoughtful who recognized that only in the absence of
selfishness, greed, national interest, secret agreements, and concessions, could
a lasting peaceful world order be established, this effort of the nations to
organize took the shape of the familiar power politics. The majority, however,
influenced by a shallow press, continued their day dreaming about the brave new
world.

CHAPTER III

THE CAIRO CONFERENCE

On November 18, 1943, while the Moscow Conference was still in the news, The New York Times printed a story released by DMB\(^1\) from Bucharest, telling of a forthcoming conference at Mena House in Cairo, Egypt, between the leaders of the Allied nations.\(^2\) This story was vigorously denied by government quarters, but was followed, within two weeks, by a Reuter\(^3\) dispatch from Lisbon which gave essentially the same details.\(^4\) Thus the Cairo Conference, which was to have been kept a secret, became known as the worst kept secret of the war.\(^5\) American newsmen, who had been given the story in the last week of November, followed to the letter orders of strict secrecy to withhold the news until the evening of December 1. The British newsmen, who supposedly were under the same orders, had used their foreign news agency to break the story first, claiming that they themselves did not use the story within England but passed it on to subscribers of the Reuter service. The irate newspapermen filled their pages with accusations and demands, placing the blame on the bureaucratic bungling of Elmer Davis of the Office of War Information.

When the story and declarations of the conference officially

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1 The German news agency.
3 The British news agency.
5 Arne, 46.
broke on December 1, they came in the midst of a flurry of argument and hostile feeling between the British and American press. Perhaps if the earlier stories had been false or misleading, the situation might have been rectified, but they proved to have contained accurate information. The conference was held at Mena House, a hotel outside of Cairo, and it was attended by the leaders of three of the Allied nations.

The conferees, Franklin Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Chiang Kai-shek, met from November 22 through November 26, and issued what some newspapers ineptly called a Pacific Charter. The British and American delegations were the largest, the British having some eleven separate missions, made up of 201 members. The American party came close to this figure, while Chiang Kai-shek brought less than twenty to aid in his decisions.

In accordance with the large number of persons involved, the main discussions were military in nature. However, the declaration given out by the conference stressed three factors; the determination of the principals to press forward to unconditional surrender; to dispossess the Japanese of their empire; and, to underwrite China as the great power in the Orient.6

The first of these, the determination to continue the prosecution of the war to the utmost, spiked persistent rumors that the British, once the war in Europe had ended, would extend only a minimum of aid in the Pacific. Churchill had spoken previously of British determination to pursue the Pacific war, but it took the combined declaration to convince the pessimists of his

6 Toward the Peace, 14.
The dismemberment of the Japanese Empire had been talked of but never defined. The proclamation of Cairo definitely enumerated exactly what the post-war geography of Japan would include:

Japan shall be stripped of all the islands in the Pacific which she has seized or occupied since the beginning of the first World War in 1914, and that all the territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores shall be restored to the Republic of China. Japan will also be expelled from all other territories which she has taken by violence and greed.

This area amounted to 2,413,130 square miles with a population of 385,109,000 people. If the statement was carried out in full, it would reduce Japan to less than a second class power, with an area of about 148,000 square miles and a population of about 75,000,000 people. When combined with the application of the unconditional surrender terms to Japan, this statement left that nation no hope but to fight vigorously to the last ditch.

The last, and most important of the statements, was made by implication. The use of the term "three great Allies" recognized China as the fourth power, as did, of course, the very fact of the meeting. The restoration of Manchuria not only returned to China a vast territory, but indicated Russia's approval of the conference and of China's position as a power. The arbitrary

7 Arne, 47.
8 Toward the Peace, 14.
10 Arne, 46.
establishment of China as the dominant force in the Orient and as the world's fourth great nation, brought criticism on the basis that China was not a first rate power and should not be recognized as such. The reasoning behind this recognition was stated thus:

Mr. Roosevelt has consistently brushed aside as irrelevant the argument that China is not now a first class power. He has argued that: (1) the treatment of China as a first class power is essential to prevent the Pacific war from developing into a race between the white and the colored races; and, (2) China within a generation or two will be a first class power. This is forward looking statesmanship.12

Evaluation of the conference ran from mild praise, to criticism for failure to write a Pacific Charter, to questioning as to whether or not there was any need for the meeting at all. The New York Times called it a vote of confidence for New China and a sacred pledge for the Allies to support her in the attainment of her future.13 Life argued that, in terms of human aspirations, the meeting was a failure. It had failed to speak for the independence of millions of Orientals, aside from the Koreans, and it had not even promised the return of Hong Kong to China.14 The Chicago Daily Tribune practically ignored Cairo, saying:

The meeting at Cairo produced nothing except the assertion that we and the British intend to start doing in the Pacific what we should have started doing two years ago. The purpose of the present conferences is to build

up the participants as indispensable men whose personal assurances somehow have greater weight than the national assurances duly ratified.15

Cairo was principally a military conference, to work out the grand strategy of the Pacific war. From its outcome, it can be assumed that whatever plans were adopted proved to be correct. The political pronouncements, second to the military, had omissions, as did the pronouncements of the other conferences, but could the three powers have justly gone into more detail without the presence of Russia? Hardly so. The political pronouncements and intimations of the declaration went, in the light of the war situation, just about as far as they could go.

CHAPTER IV

THE TEHRAN CONFERENCE

Immediately after the Cairo meeting, Roosevelt, Churchill, and their parties moved on to Tehran, Iran, for a major conference with Marshal Stalin. The choice of Iran, formerly Persia, was obviously Russian, and brought the Western powers’ leaders half way across the world to within a few miles of the Soviet border. To the Occidental, this indicated a probable matter of convenience; to the Oriental, the symbolism involved seemed to indicate that the Western powers, especially the British, were coming as supplicants to the great leader of the East and meeting him in the very country where British and Russian interests had bitterly clashed in the past, and probably would in the future.1 Earlier in the year, begging pressure of the war, Stalin had turned down an invitation to meet in Casablanca, French Morocco. At that time, however, he communicated his desire to confer with the other leaders sometime later in the year. To facilitate this proposed meeting, the Moscow Conference was held, the results of which we have already seen. Then, on November 28, 1943, the three leaders of the great powers met.

Humors filled the air and press concerning the meeting, and, to the discontent of American newsmen, the British again broke the story first, as they had at Cairo. This time, under similar circumstances, exchange Telegraph

The story of the conference from Istanbul, Turkey, a full week before the date set for official pronouncements of the news. This did not mean, however, that the meeting was being kept secret, for those from whom the news should have been kept, the Axis partners, knew the details a full month in advance and had parachuted saboteurs into Iran to break up the conference if possible. However, their plan was discovered and the saboteurs arrested sometime before the arrival of the principals.

In contrast to the large staffs accompanying Roosevelt and Churchill, Stalin brought only Vyacheslav Molotov and Marshal Klimenti Voroshilov, his foreign minister and military chief respectively. The British delegation was housed in its own embassy, the Russians in theirs. Roosevelt and his close advisors stayed the first night in the American embassy, then, due to the length of the trip to the Russian compound where the meeting was held, and the dangers involved in daily travel through the narrow Iranian streets, they moved to one of the houses in the Russian compound, less than a hundred yards from where Stalin himself was staying. This arrangement was bound to lead to closer personal relationships but everyone present was still astonished when Stalin, the moment Roosevelt arrived at his Russian living quarters, came hustling across the grass alone, with hand extended to say hello. The feeling that developed between the two was continued throughout the conference, Roosevelt at times holding a sort of seminar concerning the structure of the government of the United States, the good

3 Arne, 52.
neighbor policy, and other allied subjects. Stalin seemed very impressed. In
regard to the former, Roosevelt’s teaching supposedly influenced the Marshal into
making certain changes in the structure of his own government where he felt an
improvement could be effected. Stalin’s interest in the good neighbor policy
was very pronounced, as he seemingly had known nothing of its workings up to this
time. Roosevelt formed his opinion of Russia’s desire to cooperate on the Mar-
shal’s reaction to this subject, which was that Russia had too much territory and
that she had no desire for expansion into Europe.\(^5\)

The President and Mr. Stalin seemed to agree with one another
like old friends, each showing a great amount of deference and respect for the
other. Mr. Churchill and Mr. Roosevelt also were amiable to each other, and
rightly so, for the ideas of each were well known to the other; however, Stalin
and Churchill seemed to clash a great number of times through the conference,
the Prime Minister’s tart wit and cynical attitude being returned doubly in kind
by the Marshal. Thus it more or less became the President’s role, at times, to
mediate personal enmities between the two men.\(^6\)

In the minds of each of the three, there seemed to be radically
different ideas. A meeting of the world’s leading communist, the son of a shoe-
maker, a revolutionary, and little known figure; the indomitable Tory, hardened
by years of argument in Commons, the leader of a fading empire; and, the country
squire, capitalist, and leader of the world’s top economic and militarily power-
ful nation, would hardly be expected to have complete agreement of mind.
Churchill had the saving of the British Empire on his mind. The war had not

\(^5\) Forrest Davis, "What Really Happened at Tehran", The Saturday Evening Post,
May 13, 1944, 13. This article was divided into two chapters, the first
appearing in the issue of May 13, 1944; the second, May 20, 1944.
\(^6\) Ibid., 12.
compromised that. Shortly before the conference, after the ill-fated Cripps' mission to India, he had in a speech to Commons, told the world that he had not become Prime Minister to preside over the liquidation of the British Empire. Russia had reverted in the past few years from her original revolutionary lines of decrying indemnities and annexations to historical Russian objectives in Europe. Assurance had been given in a secret Russo-British agreement, in 1916, that the Dardanelles question would be settled in Russia's favor at the end of the war. This was nullified when the revolution altered Russia's government. The settlement of the Baltic states questions after World War I was also against Russia's historical interests. Now, with Russia assuming her traditional role, having become a first rate power, these questions became the sore points of the future. Roosevelt's hope for world peace was based on the premise that Russia is a great power, and that her interests could be reconciled with those of the Western powers. He was staking everything on a reciprocal spirit of friendship among the three leaders and on an unquestioned need for a long period of peace by Russia. Obviously, this personal approach was faulty, both Roosevelt and Churchill being dependent on future elections and all three being subject to the uncertainty of human existence.

The conference was replete with expansive dinners and entertainment, one of the biggest and best being the sixty-ninth birthday party of Winston Churchill. On the liquid side it was reported that at this affair some fifty toasts were drunk to the health of the participants and the success of the Allies.

7 Welles, 330.
8 Davis, May 13, 1944, 32.
in war and peace. This revelry did not make too favorable an impression on the masses waiting for news of the parley.

At one of the opening sessions, Stalin showed a sentimental side to his nature when he visibly broke with emotion as Churchill presented to him the famed Stalingrad sword, a gift from the British people, hand forged to commemorate the gallantry of the defenders of Stalingrad.

The problem of a second front, supposedly settled at Moscow, was one of the foremost problems of the conference. It was not a question of whether or not there would be another front, but where it would be initiated. Winston Churchill's pet plan was for an invasion from the south, from the Aegean and the Black sea, and thence up the Danube valley. This plan did not in any way meet with Stalin's ideas, and he successfully talked Churchill out of the plan.

Seemingly, Soviet opposition was based on the wish to keep Allied troops as far away from Russia and the Balkans as possible, in line with the demand made before the Moscow Conference that troops in possession of territory at the cessation of hostilities should be the occupying troops. This possible fear of infection was borne out by the plan under which lend-lease goods going into Russia from the south were transferred to Russian couriers in Iran, the other Allied bearers not being welcome in the Soviet. It can be surmised, then, that the decision was taken at Tehran to start the second front drive from north-western Europe.

Second in military importance, but with a political twist, as have many of these questions, was the recognition of Tito Broz, rather than

9 Arne, 52.
10 Time, Dec. 20, 1943, 22.
Draja Mihailovitch, as the leader of Yugoslavia. It was closely linked to the question of the Danubian second front. Planning a division of influence in the Balkans, Stalin agreed to take his in Rumunia and Bulgaria, while Britain took Greece and Yugoslavia, countries along her Mediterranean lifeline. Stalin, following with an astute discussion of nationality differences in Yugoslavia, convinced Churchill that Tito the Croat would be better for England than Mihailovitch the Serb. Churchill acquiesced, after convincing his friend Roosevelt. The result of this, of course, was that Stalin, with Tito as puppet, became the ruler of Yugoslavia.12

Over and above the partition of influence in the Balkans, Churchill agreed to the partition of Poland, or more specifically, to the Curzon line, and a free hand for Russia in the Baltic states in return for a free hand for Britain in the Mediterranean. Roosevelt, supposedly not present when these actual discussions took place, took a stand neither for nor against.13 There seems to be no indication that any of the governments-in-exile was consulted concerning this division of territory and influence.

On questions of the future world order, the discussions were preliminary in nature. The structure and the mechanics of the new organization were talked over, as well as the extension of the mandate system, which Mr. Roosevelt called trusteeships. The elusive question of plebiscites as a method of determining the sovereignty of disputed lands was also discussed, but with some evasiveness. Little protocol was used, all questions being open for discussion. The greatest error of the conference was that in the whole procedure no

12 Ibid., 11.
record or minutes were kept, thus shutting out forever the possibility of a reliable account of the feelings, questions, answers, and arguments of the three men.14

The conference was short, lasting only four days. At the end of that time they issued two statements, the first called Declaration of the Three Powers, the second, Declaration of the Three Powers Regarding Iran.

The first, a statement of some three hundred and fifty words, had two thoughts, one concerning the war and one the peace, and could hardly have been more general. As for the war, they said:

...We have reached complete agreement as to the scope and timing of the operations to be undertaken from the east, west and south.... The common understanding which we have here reached guarantees that victory will be ours ....No power on earth can prevent our destroying the German armies by land, their U Boats by sea, and their war plants from the air.15

It was, of course, unreasonable to expect a statement any more definite on the operation of the war, but one had a right to expect at least an inkling of the decision on the future of the Axis territories. In this way Tehran differed from Cairo, where the declaration showed at least a plan for the future of the Japanese Empire. Perhaps the problems were too great, the solutions too difficult, for the leaders to come to any decision and still retain Allied unity.

With regard to the peace, the Big Three declared:

14 Davis, May 20, 1944, 22, 44.
15 Toward the Peace, 15.
...We are sure that our concord will win an enduring Peace. We recognize fully the supreme responsibility...to make a peace which will command the goodwill of the overwhelming mass of the peoples of the world and banish the scourge and terror of war for many generations....We shall seek the active participation of all nations, large and small, whose peoples in heart and mind are dedicated, as are our own peoples, to the elimination of tyranny and slavery, oppression and intolerance. We will welcome them, as they may choose to come, into a world family of Democratic Nations.16

Of outstanding import was the use of the term, Democratic Nations. How, under any definition, could Russia be called Democratic, or Stalin a Democratic leader? To use this term, one had to ignore the history of Communist Russia, and any justification of the use of the term in this instance would nullify its use in defining those nations whose system allowed its citizens freedom of thought, expression, and action. The Moscow Declaration based the proposed organization on the union of peace-loving states. The Tehran Declaration changed that to a world family of Democratic Nations. At the time of the writing of the two documents, little seemed to be thought of this interchange of terms of definition, the general feeling being summed up in the last two sentences of the declaration of Tehran:

We came here with hope and determination. We leave here, friends in fact, in spirit and in purpose.17

It would seem that the principals considered that all that was necessary to avoid the wrangling and argument usually attendant in establishing

16 Ibid., 15. The capitalization of "Democratic" in the text is confusing and unexplained.
17 Ibid., 15.
an international organization, was for the major power leaders to be in complete
accord on general principles. This, at least, was Mr. Roosevelt's hope in the
matter. Unless one could conceive that human nature and past performance were
to change radically, this whole theory of letting basic concepts and understand-
ings continue undefined seemed fateful and dangerous.

The future of the small nations was, in terms of wordage, left
essentially the same as existed after the Moscow Conference. At the earlier
meeting, the small nations were assured of credentials to the world organization
if they were peace-loving, and as the term implied, fought against the Axis
powers. Now, in different words, but with the same connotation, they were told
they should dedicate themselves to the abolition of tyranny and slavery, oppres-
sion and intolerance. This might as well have said, "We, the Big Three, are
without sin against humanity. Pattern yourself after us and your future will be
secure." The first indication of a possible power peace was contained in this
sentence of the declaration, "We will welcome them as they may choose to come,
into a world family of Democratic Nations". They should have said, "We are
setting up a world organization, we three, for we are the powers. You are wel-
come to come when you want, if you meet our conditions". Perhaps it was here
that the Big Three were developing their Security Council background and the veto
formula to hold the reins of the organization in their hands.

The second declaration of the conference, concerning Iran, pro-
claimed that the powers recognized her assistance in the war, in facilitating

19 Discussed fully on pages 29-30.
the shipment of lend-lease goods to Russia, and that out of gratitude the Big
Three would see that she would receive any economic assistance necessary from
them. Further the Big Three stated that Iran should remain independent, sovereign,
and territorially complete. On the surface, this would seem to indicate a grate-
ful gesture on the part of the powers for the hospitality shown them in Tehran,
and their debt of gratitude for her aid in the war. Later events proved this
approach false. Neither Britain nor Russia was interested in the independence
and sovereignty of Iran the moment either of their interests there were endan-
gered. This situation was the first protest to be brought before the Security
Council of the United Nations in January, 1946, and threatened a major break
when the Russians used their veto power to forestall action by the council.20
Analyzing this jockeying for influence between Britain and Russia, E. K. Lindley
pointed out that the real value of the Iranian agreement was the blocking of
Russia from demanding direct access to the Persian Gulf through Iran.21 If this
was the type of agreement that was made, is it any wonder that faith in the
future wilted faster than new documents to underwrite it could be written?

Immediately following the four day meeting, Roosevelt and
Churchill returned to Cairo, where they met with President Inonu of Turkey con-
cerning the entrance of that country into the war, and the future of the
Dardanelles. As a result of the conference, Turkey joined the Allies against the
Axis and opened the straits to allied shipping, which facilitated the passage of
lend-lease goods to Russia. Said Time:

Thus ended a shrewd and careful game of bal-
ance of power politics. For four years, Turkey

21 Lindley, 59.
had perched inviolate between the warring powers. The game ended because first Russia and then the United States and Britain wanted it to end; because Turkey realized the time had come to pay for post war security.22

The reaction in America, except to the harmonious-looking pictures of the Big Three, was weak. There was little in the document that news analysts could use. They could only surmise. American readers do not remain interested long in harangues on material that is strictly theoretical. Calling the Big Three smart politicians, none of whom was saintly, and whose records are against belief in a document of this sort, Life summed up the case, saying:

It is almost impossible to treat this declaration as a diplomatic document. Whatever diplomacy may have been carried on behind the scenes, it stands before the world as a moral document. All that the common man can say after reading the declaration is that it is either a fraud or a turning point in history.23

The Tehran Conference brought the leaders of the three great powers together, which in itself did not help the mental case of the Germans and Japanese. For a show of solidarity, it was unsurpassed. The impression was largely extended to the general public that the three leaders were charting, in a very democratic way, the road to the elimination of war and the building of the unselfish, helpful, and war-preventing United Nations. Without too much thought, it seemed the perfect panacea for our international ills. But, as we have seen, behind the curtain was the old familiar game of power politics, with the old familiar Balkans, Middle East, and Baltic states as the pawns. It would seem that the great men went to Tehran to bargain for influence, instead of, as the masses believed and wanted to believe, to build that brave world.

23 Life, editorial, Dec. 20, 1943, 32.
CHAPTER V

THE DUMBARTON OAKS CONFERENCE

The establishment of the new international organization, which had been referred to in the Atlantic Charter, mentioned vaguely at Tehran, and defined as a necessity in the Moscow Declarations, was first discussed concretely in the Dumbarton Oaks talks from August to September of 1944. By this time, the war in Europe was well on its way to being won, or so everyone thought. Surrender was expected at any time. On June 6, the Anglo-American forces had landed in Normandy, pushing boldly forward until, on the fourth day after the conference commenced, Paris was liberated. Practically all Russian territory had been recovered by early June, and the Soviets were fighting in Finland, Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, and the Baltic States. In Italy, the progress through the mountains was slow and costly. The first year saw the Allies move only 315 miles, less than one mile a day. On June 4, 1944, they succeeded in capturing Rome, and country a little more level lay ahead. The Pacific war, although not progressing as quickly as that in Europe, had reached the point where the strategy was concerned with the approaches to Japan itself. The Solomons, the Gilberts, the Carolines, and the Marianas had been retaken or neutralized, and, by the summer of 1944, tactics were being laid out for the invasion of the Philippines. From all fronts came news of fresh, encouraging accomplishments, and optimism for a quick peace ran high.
The first plan to be made public for the establishing of the new organization came from the United States. The President, in his June 15th press conference, revealed that the State Department had begun working on the details as far back as February 1942, and had tentatively finished them in May, 1943.

Through the Moscow Conference and the Tehran Conference, they were kept secret to enable the President to better size up the situation. The Roosevelt plan called for: first, a security council, which would be made up of the Big Four, plus three other elected nations, to handle the actual problems of keeping the peace; second, a world assembly, where nations could thrash out their problems; third, a reestablished world court; fourth, a general agreement among the Big Four outlawing aggression and war. No provision was made for an international police force, all troops, ships, and planes to come from the nations individually.

The President prefaced his enunciation of the plan with a carefully worded statement which said that the United States would join in a world order, but without a compromise of the integrity of the nation. This preface contained more than met the eye. The year 1944 was an election year, and the Republicans had, in their Mackinac Declaration, supported an international organization but qualified our participation by insisting that the United States retain her complete sovereignty.

Roosevelt had been attacked on two counts, one, that he had no definite international plan, two, that he was willing to include the sovereignty of the United States in bargaining for the international organization.\(^2\) In his press conference then, two weeks before the opening of the Republican convention, the

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1. *Time*, June 12, 1944, 12.
2. Ibid., 11.
President attempted to answer both these charges, by presenting a plan and by withholding American integrity from the organization. In doing this, he found himself on the fence, charged by the internationalists of having a minimal plan, and by the nationalists of using matters of great importance as political weapons. Mr. Roosevelt, however, had at least put his plan before the world, and gained with it recognition from Britain and China that they concurred in their ideas with its general principles.

The Russians published their ideas for the new order in the Leningrad Star, about a week before the conference began. Diverging from the United States plan, it called for absolute rule by the Big Four, as they were the ones who would, in the final analysis, keep or break the peace. The United States plan, which provided for a council of the four major and three minor powers, would not be, in practice, widely separated from the Russian plan. However, the Russians proposed that each of the powers be assigned an area, within which they would act independently, or, if they wished, in concert in the maintenance of peace. The United States had made no comparable suggestion, but it was incomprehensible to imagine the United States or Britain agreeing to such a proposal with the situation in middle Europe helping, as it was, the development of a series of Soviet satellites. The International Organization of Safety, which was the title the Soviets proposed, was to concentrate only on disputes, no other functions, and all other types of cooperative agencies were to be distinct organizations, supposedly established by treaty. The part of the small states

3 "Integrity" as used by the President had the same meaning as "sovereignty".
4 Time, Aug. 28, 1944, 15.
under the Russian plan would be the supplying of bases to be used in maintaining peace.5

The Dumbarton Oaks Conference was divided into two meetings, the first conducted by the British, Russians, and Americans; the second by the British, Chinese, and Americans. The technicality was that Russia was not at war with Japan and could not confer with China under the existing treaty of friendship between Japan and the Soviets. Aside from this, the real reason was probably the growing Russian coolness to the Chinese Nationalist government.6

Dumbarton Oaks, the site of the meeting, is a mansion located in the Georgetown suburb of Washington, D.C. Formerly owned by Robert Woods Bliss, it was given to Harvard University, in 1940, as a center for scholarly research. Here, on August 21, 1944, the delegates, Sir Alexander Cadogan, Andrei Gromyko, and Edward Stettinius, convened for their exploratory talks. It had been hoped that Russia would send Maxim Litvinoff as her representative, and the selection of Gromyko, a much younger and less approachable individual, was received with some apprehension.7 Sir Alexander Cadogan, the British Undersecretary for Foreign Affairs, was a diplomat of long standing, an imperialist of Churchill's type. Stettinius, the recently appointed American Undersecretary of State, had made a name for himself as lend-lease administrator, but, up to this time, had not proved himself in the field of diplomacy.

The conference was secret, the delegates were forbidden to grant interviews, and Secretary Hull informed news agencies that not until the confer-

5 *Newsweek*, Aug. 21, 1944, 38.
7 *Time*, Aug. 28, 1944, 15.
once had ended would a report be given. This set the reporters writing whatever stories were possible concerning the non-official activities of the conferees. The delegates were taken to see the President, the City of Washington, and, on a typical business men's weekend, were escorted to New York "to do" the town. The first part of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, between Britain, Russia, and America, lasted nearly six weeks. On September 28, the patient Chinese delegate, Dr. Wellington Koo, was allowed to enter into the discussions, his part being mainly one of approving what had already been agreed upon.

The general results of the meeting were released on October 7, as proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization. It is essential to remember in any discussion of these proposals, that they were in every sense preliminary and that the delegates were not of policy-making calibre. The use of the subjunctive, "should", in proposing each of the articles, was so very pronounced that no one could mistake the tentativeness of the declaration.

The proposals began by stating that an international organization, under the title of The United Nations, should be established for the purposes of maintaining peace through collective security, developing friendly relations among nations to foster peace, achieving cooperation in economic, social and political problems, and affording a center for the harmonizing and achievement of these goals. There existed little room for argument against these purposes, which, being announced near the end of the greatest war in world history, pointed the direction in which the nations would have to move if they were to avoid future hostilities equal to, or greater, in scope than the last.

8 Toward the Peace, 19. All future references made to the text of the proposals, will be taken from this source, 19-25.
In pursuit of the achievement of these purposes, a set of principles was extended, pledging the members to peaceful settlement of disputes, to the limitation of the use of force, to the extension of assistance when necessary, and to the fulfillment of all obligations assumed under the charter of the organization. Most basic of the principles was the first, which declared that the organization should be based on the sovereign equality of all peace-loving states.

Two years had passed since this phrase had first been used in the official pronouncement of the Moscow Declaration and, although the demand for a clear cut definition of its meaning had come from many quarters, no one had as yet taken the responsibility of defining its real meaning, significance, or import.9 Even before this second official use of the term, Pittman B. Potter declared that:

"[it]...must probably be regarded as both a niggardly gesture toward international principles and also a thinly concealed sop to national prejudice....Perhaps one might suggest to the statesmen that these venerable principles made far more trouble when played up rhetorically than they deserve in their essence and that the less said about them the better."10

It will be noted that the principles set forth for the guidance of the proposed organization are not identical to, nor do they reflect, for the most part, the principles set forth in the Atlantic Charter, the Declaration of The United Nations, and the declaration of the Tehran conference. What had happened to self-determination, religious freedom, freedom of the seas, equal access to raw materials, and the others? Were they now to be forgotten? It was

9 Discussed more fully on pages 26-28.
expected that the various pronouncements made during the war were to form the basis for the new organization, but aside from the most questioned of the previously announced principles, sovereign equality, statements regarding the use of force, rather than ones concerning basic patterns of conduct and human relations, were given as the principles. First the Catholic Bishops of America, then, the Federal Council of Churches of Christ, took a strong stand against this lack of basic principle. Said the Catholic Bishops:

We have no confidence in a peace which does not carry into effect without reservations or equivocations, the principles of the Atlantic Charter....It is not...a question of creating an international community but of organizing it. To do this we must repudiate absolutely the tragic fallacies of "power politics" with its balance of power, spheres of influence...and resort to war as a means of settling international difficulties.11

Four principal organs were proposed by the conference. They were as follows: a General Assembly; a Security Council; and International Court of Justice; and, a Secretariat. It also provided for the establishment of subsidiary agencies such as the Economic and Social Council and the Military Staff Committee.

The General Assembly was to be composed of delegations of all member nations, each to have one vote. Meeting annually, the discussions and decisions would concern general principles of cooperation and general welfare,

budgetary matters, admission of new members, election of the non-permanent delegates to the Security Council, and such other matters of general welfare, security, and the rights and privileges of membership as would be referred to it by the Security Council. The Assembly would have the right to initiate questions of general security, but could make no decisions, only recommendations, which in turn would be referred to the Security Council. If, however, the Security Council already had the matter under discussion, the General Assembly was forbidden to make recommendations. No statement was made as to whether or not, in such a case, the Assembly could discuss the matter without making recommendations. In practice, the Assembly, in which the smaller nations would have the majority, would be little more than a debating society.

The second, and by far the most important organ proposed for establishment, was the Security Council. This body, consisting of eleven members of the organization, was to contain the strength and potency of The United Nations. It was proposed that the Security Council be given prime responsibility for the maintenance of peace and, in this capacity, should function continuously. Further, it should have the power to investigate any dispute or situation which could endanger world peace, and, in pursuit of this, could have the power to establish such subsidiary agencies as would be necessary to ensure their control over matters affecting the peace. The eleven members should consist of the Big Four, plus France, in due course, as the permanent members, and six other states, each elected for a two year term. The question of voting power within the Council was regarded as too explosive for the stature of the delegates, and was left for the Crimean Conference, to be handled on a high political level.12

12 Stettinius, 26.
Recognizing the need for an effective administration of peace by a small, powerful group, the delegates thus proposed the Security Council as the real power within the new organization.

The third main body proposed at the meeting was an International Court of Justice, identical to, or patterned after, the Statute of the Permanent Court of Internations Justice. The newly proposed innovations were that the Court should be an integral part of the new organization, annexed by statute to The United Nations, and that all parties to the United Nations Charter should be parties *ipso facto* to the statute of the Court.

The fourth, and last major organ proposed was a Secretariat, or administrative agency, headed by a Secretary-General. This officer, elected by the General Assembly upon the recommendation of the Security Council, would be liaison man between the General Assembly and the Security Council, would have the power to bring security matters to the attention of the Council, and would issue an annual report of the work of the organization.

In addition to these main bodies, provision was made for the Security Council to establish a Military Staff committee which would advise the Council on military matters, and direct any possible military forces used under the direction of the Council. Another subsidiary organ should be the Economic and Social Council, an administrating and coordinating agency, under which all bodies working toward cooperation in the fields of economics, labor, education, agriculture, and health would carry on their activities.

The reaction to the proposed organization, as a whole, was one of approval with reservation. It was recognized as a change from the League system and whether this change was regarded as being for better or worse
depended on what was expected in the new order. To those who had been thinking in terms of world government the proposals did not extend to the new organization nearly enough power nor did it recognize the equality of states. It proposed to establish another government of governments rather than a government of peoples.

We believe that permanent world peace, justice and prosperity can be attained only under a world government which is responsible directly to the people of the world and which possesses military power superior to that of any individual nation.  

To those who were considering the moral aspects of the problem, the proposals seemed to represent a step in the right direction but were shackled with too many limitations, too little opportunity for the smaller nations and seemed to put force before law.

To those experts, who were familiar with the League document and history, the proposals foreshadowed an organization similar to the League, but with some difference in detail. It was felt that too much emphasis was placed on generalizations, too little on legal principles, judicial decisions, disarmament, and similar elements.

There can be no doubt but that the interest of the people was fostered by the proposals, for within five months after the conference, the State Department had distributed nearly two million copies of the proposals, were receiving in April of 1945, approximately twenty thousand letters of inquiry.

14 Graham, et al., 26, 27.
week, and had published about twenty pamphlets covering various phases of the
meeting. 16 Altogether, not less than ninety-seven pamphlets and articles were
written by various organizations on this subject by June, 1945, the majority
favoring the adoption of the agreements. 17

The proposals followed, in general, those lines which had been
set out in the American plan. In the question of the Security Council voting
plan, it was the conception of the British, Chinese, and American delegates that
no member of the Security Council could be a judge when the activities of his
country were under consideration. Gromyko disagreed with this, however, de-
manding that each of the big powers has the right to stop any action against it-
self. Soviet reasoning on this question centered, at that time, in the Baltic
states, where she felt, she had a legitimate right. If this situation was re-
ferred to the Security Council, Russia would have no voice in the matter, under
the American plan, and the demand to strike out this limitation was Russia's way
of saying that if you want international security, you must first provide nation-
al security for the major powers. 18 The Soviet attitude was not without defen-
ders in the United States, who likened the possible outcome to the Concert of
Europe, and felt that the Security Council might well do likewise in maintaining
peace by insuring the status quo. 19 The general argument favoring the latter
plan, set out that the Big Four control nearly sixty percent of the world's man-
power, resources, industrial potential, and military power, and that the small

17 Selected Reading on Dumberton Oaks, United Nations Information Office,
19 Vera Michelew Dean, The Four Cornerstones of Peace, Whittlesey House,
New York, 1946, 11.
nations would be far better off to be with the big powers within an organization where both have obligations and responsibilities, than they would be moving in circles of world trade and politics unguided or unchecked.\textsuperscript{20} These arguments, although they eventually won out, were not founded on the first principle of the organization, sovereign equality, nor did they have any basic truth, for under this plan any one of the major powers would have the prerogative to become an aggressor nation and stop action by the Security Council by its veto vote. This difference, basic and vital, was not decided upon and was referred to the policy-making leaders.

In reply to arguments that the General Assembly was without power, Joseph C. Grew pointed out that the General Assembly, through its various agencies, controls the dissatisfaction and discontent, both economic and political, which cause war. If, he maintained, we can make our agencies, commissions, etc., work, then it is the small and not the large nations which have control of the situation through their majority in the General Assembly.\textsuperscript{21}

The proposal on the International Court of Justice, was both commended and criticized on a very high plane. One major fault found was that the statute made no provision for non-justiciable disputes, those that could not be settled on a basis of law or treaty. Provision had been made for settlement between the principals by means of arbitration, negotiation, mediation, or conciliation, but no court, board, or other agency had been established to hear these disputes which in the main would be political.\textsuperscript{22}

\textsuperscript{22} Graham, \textit{et al.}, 28.
The Dumbarton Oaks proposals were received and accepted in the United States, not because they were full, complete insurance against future wars, but because, even with the omission of statements on mandates, on Security Council voting, on disarmament, and on non-justiciable disputes, they represented an available plan, one that the big powers could agree upon. Besides, no plan of similar capabilities was in sight, and the war was fast coming to an end. The proposals were not written in high-sounding rhetoric. There was little with which the after dinner speaker could stir his audience. Instead, they brought recognition of the fact that only through hard effort and cooperation could the machinery be made to work. The framework was indeed there, but one wondered as to whether or not the faith and trust which were even more necessary to insure its successful application, were likewise present.

23 Dean, 9.
CHAPTER VI

THE CRIMEAN CONFERENCE

In December, 1944, after the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, the thoughts of the people were centered on peace. Not only the occupation of Berlin, but the end of the war in Europe by Christmas was considered entirely possible. Then, on December 15, came the electrifying news that the Germans, under von Rundstedt, instead of surrendering as was expected of them, had begun a full scale offensive in the Ardennes region. For six weeks this new assault, known as the Battle of the Bulge, continued with heavy losses on both sides. By the end of January, the German gains had been negated, and the push toward central Germany began again. On the Eastern European front, the Russians were again pushing forward in Western Poland, after having been checkmated before Warsaw for a number of weeks, and by January 20, the Soviets were fighting on German soil before the city of Frankfort on the Oder. In the Italian mountains the winter rains had made progress impossible, and the battle lines remained static. In the Pacific, Japanese naval resistance had been shattered in late October, with the decisive battle of Leyte Gulf. MacArthur's forces had crushed effective resistance in the Philippines, and it was expected, once a closer base of operations was secured, that the invasion of the Japanese homeland would begin.

Parallel to the great military successes ran a growing feeling of apprehension concerning the political and diplomatic situation. It was becoming more apparent, while Britain and Russia both were pressing their aims and solu-
tions to the various problems, that the United States seemed to be content to
criticize the ideas of each but offer no definite plan of its own in return.
Among those writers who were concerned with the seriousness of the situation, one
major point of agreement stood out that the United States would have to alter the
practice under which decisions would be postponed until peace came. The solution
of the pressing problems of Poland, Greece, Bulgaria, and other countries could
not safely be delayed until the end of the war. Poland, in particular, was fast
becoming the sore spot of Europe. The United States and Britain had for some
time recognized the status of the London Polish Government in Exile, the general
feeling being that it would be re-established after liberation. Shortly before
Christmas of 1944, Churchill, in a Commons speech aimed at the London Poles,
revealed publicly, for the first time, that Poland had been partitioned at Tehran
that in return for the Curzon line in the East, she would receive German terri-
tory in the West. The outcry of the London Poles that followed went unheeded,
and three weeks later, when the Soviet forces captured Warsaw, they installed
there the Lublin Provisional Polish Government, dominated by Boleslaw Bierut,
alias Krasnodebski, a former active Communist party worker and OGPU agent. It
was obvious that little could be done to correct this situation without a meeting
of leaders with top diplomatic authority.

While the Polish question was becoming a disconcerting factor in
world affairs, another of the Tehran compromise countries, Greece, was in the
throes of internal strife. Premier Papandreou, with the aid of British troops,
was fighting what seemed to be a futile struggle against the armed forces of the

2 Time, Jan. 25, 1945, 40.
EAM, Greece’s left wing group. The Churchill solution to this problem, invasion through the Balkans, had been thwarted at Tehran. Now, to protect their interests for the future, it was necessary for the British to keep substantial numbers of troops within that country to prevent it from becoming another puppet state of the Soviets. This policy, which later precipitated a minor civil war, eventually brought about the restoration of the Greek monarchy.

America’s stand in these matters was given by the President in his annual message to Congress in January, 1945:

I should not be frank if I did not admit concern about many situations—the Greek and Polish for example....We have obligations, not necessarily legal, to the exiled governments, to the underground leaders and to our major Allies who came much nearer the shadows than we did.3

This admission of responsibility to the governments in exile, could be interpreted as backing fully the British plan for reinstatement of former governments. It was, considering the tone of the rest of the address, a disapproval of Stalin’s placement and recognition of the Bierut government in Poland, of the EAM activities in Greece, and the Tito dictatorship in Yugoslavia.

With regard to Yugoslavia, it was indicative of the state of Allied relations, that two months before the convening of the Crimean Conference, Dr. Subasic, the Prime Minister, who had been receiving strong British support, took a plan for the reorganization of the Yugoslav govern-

ment to Moscow, not to London for approval. This action not only strengthened the conviction that Russia was using all and any methods to enlarge her sphere of influence, but it put a new interpretation on the prerequisite agreements to the Moscow Conference. It meant that the policing of political thought, and that the postponement of plebiscites and popular elections aided the extension of Soviet ideas in such a way as to insure eventual domination.

Conditions like these, should they have been transmitted to Germany, perhaps even to Italy, would have almost eliminated the need for a peace conference. A meeting of the Big Three to alter this was long overdue, and many questioned whether, even now, these encroachments and defiances of principle and agreement could be corrected.

The Big Three had planned, at Tehran, to meet in the late summer of 1944, to consider the problems which would have arisen during the past year. This had to be postponed, first, because Stalin was engaged in directing the all-out offensive of the summer of 1944, and, second, because Roosevelt was involved in the election campaign of that fall and the inauguration of the following January. A minor dispute, too, was occasioned over the selection of a conference site. Roosevelt considered that he, having traveled to Iran for the last meeting, should at least be met half-way, suggesting Kartum in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan. Stalin stood firm, however, pointing out that Yalta in the Crimea would be close to Europe should the war's ending demand the presence of some of the military aides and advisors, and that also,

4 The prerequisite agreements to the Moscow Conference are given on p. 30.
its position close to the areas of dispute was advantageous. In the end, the President agreed to meet there on February 4, 1945.

Yalta, the Riviera of the Russias, had been famous for many years as the summer home of the Czars and their courts. During the war, the city had been almost leveled by the Germans, but the Palaces of Livadia and Alupka, where the United States and British delegations were housed, escaped damage. The majority of the meetings of the eight days' conference took place in Livadia, the American residence, because of the spaciousness of that structure. They were held around a table built especially for the purpose, and were, for the most part, informal and friendly. The American and British delegations were large, as at the last meeting, Stettinius, Hopkins, Harriman, Eden, and Cadogan comprising the top civilian representation for their countries. Stalin arrived with a party of twenty, led by Molotov and Gromyko.

As the Crimean meeting was secret, speculation on the site and the agenda filled the papers for many days prior to February 12, the day the declaration was released. Entitled Report of Crimea Conference, it was divided into nine sections which dealt with Germany, United Nations, liberated Europe, meetings of Foreign Secretaries, and general principles. More lengthy and specific than the Tehran Declaration, it attempted to recapture and revitalize some of the aspects of the Atlantic Charter which had been forgotten and violated in the past three years.

7 Toward the Peace, 33. All future references to the Yalta text in this chapter will be taken from Toward the Peace, 33-36.
Germany's defeat was by this time a certainty. No one doubted that. None the less, the Big Three emphasized the coming defeat of the Reich, the splendid cooperation between the Allied forces, and the heavy cost the German people would pay for continuing the hopeless struggle. This was nothing more than a reiteration of what had been said in the Tehran Declaration.

The plan for the occupation of Germany called for separate zones for each of the Allies, to be administered by the supreme military commanders of the respective forces, meeting as a commission in Berlin. The gate was left open for the French, if they wished, to occupy a fourth zone, the limits of which would be agreed upon by the European Advisory Commission. This plan, as later developed, provided an eastern zone for Russia, a north-western zone for the British, a south-western zone for the United States, a western zone for France, and joint control of the greater Berlin area. 8

Specifically, the agreement called for the disbanding and disarming of all German troops, the annihilation of the German General Staff, the destruction or removal of all military production, the punishment of war criminals, the extermination of the Nazi party and influences, and, finally, reparations in kind for war damages. The document did not specify the eventual organization of Germany. However, later developments indicated the Allies were not following the much publicized Morgenthau plan which would have reduced Germany to an agricultural nation, but tended rather to Sumner Welles' plan of general internal weakening of Germany, though without his proposed division into three

8 "Statement on Zones of Occupation in Germany", The Department of State Bulletin, June 10, 1945, 1052.
In regard to Welles' proposed division, the situation that developed in occupied Germany, caused by friction, barriers, and extension of particular political influences within each zone, unwittingly seemed to be bringing about a political division of the Reich much similar to that originally proposed by the former Undersecretary. It is not known whether or not the rigid political and economic lines later existent were decided upon at Yalta. The statement in this regard is rather vague, stating merely that, "Coordinated control has been provided for...." It is entirely possible, in view of the number of secret agreements made at this meeting, that an occupation of the type that exists was agreed upon by the authors of the declaration.

Though reparations in kind were mentioned in the section dealing with the occupation and control of Germany, the authors felt this subject of enough importance to include it in a separate division. In this, they stated that they considered the exacting of reparations as just, and to that end established a control commission to meet in Moscow for the purpose of ascertaining the extent and methods of payment. It was not mentioned, nor was it even rumored until some time later, that concessions had been made to Russia on this point. Known as the reparations formula, the secret agreement provided that Russia would obtain fifty percent, Britain and the United States twenty percent each, and the other nations would divide the remaining ten percent of the German payments. This agreement proved embarrassing to the Western Powers who had denied its existence, when the formula was brought up for action by the Soviets at the Potsdam Conference, in July and August, 1945.

9 Welles, 336-361.
The second topic of discussion in the release dealt with the United Nations. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals were here approved as a basis for the new organization. They established the date and place of the meeting as April 25, 1945, in San Francisco. In addition to the Big Three and China, the statement advised that France, too, would be consulted with regard to her becoming one of the sponsoring powers. China, not present at the conference, agreed to its precepts and later became one of the sponsoring powers of the San Francisco meeting. France, however, felt rebuffed by not having received an invitation to either the Dumbarton Oaks Conference or the Crimean Conference. DeGaulle's resentment of this was shown by his refusal of an invitation to meet with Roosevelt in the Mediterranean area after the Crimean Conference.11 France, therefore, did not become, on the invitations at least, one of the sponsoring powers. Four weeks after the opening of the conference at San Francisco, however, she was recognized as a major power, as a potential permanent member of the Security Council, and technically became one of the sponsors.12

One of the prominent difficulties of the Dumbarton Oaks discussions was the question of voting power in the Security Council. The omission of this from the published statement precipitated much discussion and uneasiness over the fate of the smaller nations. Consequently, those who had studied the Dumbarton Oaks agreements, were waiting anxiously for the decision of the Big Three in this matter. The Crimean Declaration, however, merely stated that, "...the present conference has been able to resolve this difficulty". They promised to make the agreement public after China and France had

12 J.A. DelVayo, "France At This Moment", Nation, May 26, 1945, 599.
been consulted. This was done on March 5. It called for one vote for each
member of the council, a majority vote on matters of a procedural nature, and
a majority vote, including the unanimous votes of the permanent members, on
all other matters. In certain cases, vis: those dealing with peaceful settle-
ment of disputes, or where regional action seems best, the party to a dispute
should refrain from voting. Without question this formula put the major
powers in possession of the reins of the organization. There was little at-
ttempt to cover or disguise this situation. It was defended openly with the
philosophy that a grand alliance of major powers was necessary to keep peace,
and to properly divide the responsibilities of the world order. It, in
turn, was attacked heavily on the grounds that it gave the powers a position
above the law which they were establishing for other nations. Further, it was
argued, the smaller nations under this plan would be forced into alliances
with the major power within whose sphere of influence they fell. Though
much non-official discussion took place on this voting question, no action to
modify it was taken at the San Francisco Conference, all discussion there
being concerned with the interpretation of the word "procedural", and which
matters would fall under its scope.

In treating of liberated Europe, the Big Three were handling the
most important problem of the conference. The manner in which the situ-
ation existing there was met could well determine the future, not only of
Europe, but of relations between the Big Three, and the United Nations as
well. The declaration contained an overall statement on liberated Europe,

13 Stettinius, 68, 69.
14 Beveridge, 153.
then two others on Poland and Yugoslavia.

The general statement stressed the need for order in Europe, the need for crushing Nazism in all those countries where it had been forced upon the people, and the need for establishing democratic governments, representative of all the people. It promised aid to those countries in the attaining of the objectives. No formula, however, was offered for the solution of the political problems in these chaotic countries. Again, it stressed those principles of the Atlantic Charter, so long confused, sovereign rights and self-government, but, with the exception of Poland and Yugoslavia, it overlooked a specific method of generation for these ideals in Bulgaria, Romania, Austria, Czechoslovakia, and other countries. This failure was quickly acted upon by the Soviets in Rumania, where, in the first week of March, Vishinsky arrived from Moscow and set up the government of Peter Groza, without consultation of the United States or Britain or with regard to the wishes of the people.15

Concerning Poland, the statement was more specific. There is no doubt but that the Western Powers were somewhat taken aback by the Soviet installation of the Lublin government, for the declaration set forth a specific committee, made up of Molotov, Harriman, and Clark Kerr, to preside over the reorganization of that government. The new authority was to be called the Polish Provisional Government for National Unity. The commission was authorized to confer in the "first instance" with members of the provisional government and with Polish democratic leaders within Poland and from abroad, with a view toward reorganizing the Lublin government. The London Poles flatly re-

15 Time, Mar. 19, 1945, 22.
jected the proposal saying:

The intention of the three powers to create a "Provisional Polish Government of National Unity", by enlarging the foreign appointed Lublin Committee with persons vaguely described as "democratic leaders from Poland itself and Poles abroad", can only legalize Soviet interference in Polish internal affairs.16

While the London Poles spoke out against the agreement, the Commission argued over its interpretation. The Soviets considered it to mean that the Lublin government would merely be enlarged with Poles from abroad and at home, while the United States and Britain interpreted it as meaning that the entire Polish government would be reorganized. Confusion over this and the "first instance" clause which the Soviets understood to mean that they were first to consult with the Lublin Poles and which the United States and Britain understood to mean that they were to consult as soon as possible with all elements, made it impossible for the commission to reach an agreement, the net result being that the Poles were not represented at the San Francisco Conference, and they received a Soviet-dominated government.17

Further, the agreement pledged the new government to the secret ballot, universal suffrage, and equal rights for all parties and candidates. These guarantees were, of course, never practiced.

It was also agreed, with regard to Poland, that any extension of territory to the west would have to wait until the peace conference. In late March, however, the Poles took over Danzig and the adjacent areas, soon after

17 Dean, 31.
they were reconquered by the Russians. Although this, too, was a distinct violation of what had been agreed upon, the Western Powers took no action. It would seem that the Soviets were agreeing at the conferences and doing what they pleased outside of them. The best example of the appeasing attitude of the Western Powers was shown in a speech of Winston Churchill to Commons, in which he vindicated the Russian action in Poland on the grounds of her natural quest for a security ring, at the same time that he was praising the security benefits of the United Nations.

In regard to Yugoslavia, the declaration recommended the immediate seating of the compromise government, which had been agreed upon between Tito and Dr. Subasic. Under this plan, the parliament would consist of members of the Assembly of National Liberation and the last Yugoslav Parliament, and would provide a regency for King Peter until a plebiscite could be held. This was the same government as that spoken of previously, and was largely Soviet dominated. Behind this pronouncement was probably the realization that only by the use of arms could the Soviet influence in Yugoslavia be lessened, and that the plebiscite which was promised, possibly might bring King Peter back to his throne.

It was also agreed at the Crimean Conference that the Foreign Ministers would meet regularly in the future to discuss matters of interest to the Big Three as they arose. Although it was suggested that these meetings take place about every three or four months, the pre-peace, peace and United

18 Ibid.
20 Page 67.
Nations Conferences reduced the number of special meetings that were held.

The statement was concluded by the Big Three in reaffirming their determination to keep a unity of purpose and action, in working toward a durable peace. It said:

Only with continuing and growing cooperation and understanding among our three countries and among all the peace-loving nations can the highest aspiration of humanity be realized—a secure and lasting peace which will, in the words of the Atlantic Charter, "afford assurance that all the men in all the lands may live out their lives in freedom from fear and want."

Thus the document was presented to the peoples of the world.

However, in addition to the secret agreement concerning the reparations formula, several other arrangements of this nature were made.

The first of these was an agreement made with Stalin by Roosevelt and Churchill under which Stalin consented to enter the Pacific war. In consideration for their participation, the Soviets were to receive: the southern half of Sakhalin Island and all islands adjacent to it; Port Arthur as a naval base; internationalization of the port of Darien; joint Soviet-Chinese operation of the Chinese-Eastern and South Manchurian railroads; the Kurile Islands, in toto; and, the preservation of the status quo of the Mongolian Peoples Republic. This agreement was regarded as top secret, so secret, in fact, that President Truman had no knowledge of it until just prior to the Potsdam Conference, and Secretary of State Byrnes did not learn of it until

after the Japanese surrender. 23

The second was the understanding that the Soviets would receive three votes in the United Nations Organization. At first, Stalin had asked for sixteen votes, one for each of the Soviet republics. Roosevelt considered this so preposterous that he dismissed the subject. Later on, Stalin again brought up the topic, this time modifying his request to three votes, one for the Soviet as a unit, one for the Ukrainian Soviet, and one for the Byelorussian Soviet. Roosevelt agreed to this on the condition that the United States would also get three votes. Churchill supported Roosevelt's counter-demand. 24 The Russian claim was based on the supposedly autonomous structure of the Ukrainian and Byelorussian republics, and the tremendous part they had played in the war. It seemed to have been a matter of internal patronage to the two republics, 25 for two votes in the assembly would have little value. There existed the possibility, though, of setting a precedent for the other Republics of the Soviet to receive a seat at some future date.

A third agreement concerned trusteeships. It was decided that before the United Nations conference the five governments with permanent security Council seats would consult with each other concerning machinery for trusteeships. Their discussions would only deal with League mandates, enemy territory, and possible voluntary trusteeships. Further, it was resolved that no discussions of any specific territories were to take place at the preliminary or the United Nations conference, as this would be handled by

23 Ibid., 189.
24 A.S. Henning.
25 Time, May 7, 1945, 28.
The San Francisco Conference followed this agreement, setting up trusteeship machinery only.

The fourth and last known agreement, held secret until March 8, 1946, dealt with the repatriation of United States citizens by the Soviets, and Soviet citizens by the United States. Under this agreement, the armies of one would care for and return without delay the citizens of the country of the other. The agreement was released, after a year of operation, with an interpretive statement which attempted to clarify just who was a Soviet citizen and to placate the charges of many national groups in this country that anti-Soviet citizens of Poland and the Baltic states were being sent to Russia, where they were imprisoned, persecuted, and executed. The new interpretation and instructions for the army made the repatriation voluntary for the person involved except in cases of deserters, collaborationists, and spies.

On his return trip, the President conferred with three leaders of the Middle East, King Farouk of Egypt, Emperor Haile Selassie of Ethiopia, and the powerful King Ibn Saud of Saudi Arabia. This meeting, at Great Bitter Lake in the Suez canal, came at a time when the Pan-Arab Federation, comprising Egypt, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Trans-Jordan, and Saudi Arabia, was forming. The United States' position was shown when the President arrived for the meeting on a United States' destroyer and departed on a British cruiser.

26 Stettinius, 128,9.
28 A.S. Henning.
29 Time, Mar. 5, 1945, 22.
One reason behind the visit was to persuade the rulers to declare war on the Axis by March 1, to ensure themselves an invitation to the San Francisco Conference. The basic motives for the meeting were probably the support of the British Empire in the Middle East by the United States, notice to France to cultivate a little more friendliness if she wished to retain her mandates, and a demonstration to the Soviets that America, too, had interests in this region.

Reaction to the Yalta Conference was at first very enthusiastic, and remained so, for the most part, until the release of the voting formula on March 5. The President, on his return, addressed a joint session of Congress on the Yalta agreements, but aside from discussing the material within the declaration, added nothing to what had already been said. Government spokesmen, as usual, gave unqualified support to the document. Acting Secretary of State Grew announced that:

The report...represents one of the greatest steps forward on the road to victory and to the establishment of an enduring peace that have yet been taken in this war. Among its many important provisions we may well find special gratification in its reaffirmation of our faith in the principles of the Atlantic Charter.

President Roosevelt in his report to Congress said:

The Conference in the Crimea was a turning point, I hope, in our history and, therefore, in the history of the world. There will soon be presented to the American people a great decision that will determine the fate

30 Time, Mar. 12, 1945, 25.
It was amazing how leaders could show so much unqualified faith in words, while the actions of the day invalidated the statements as they were being made. The *New York Times*, too, followed this line of thought and soundly admonished the London Polish Government in Exile for refusing the splendid opportunity offered them in the agreement.33 The French were more or less silent, awaiting information as to whether German boundaries and armistice terms had been discussed.34 In Congress, the President received majority support. The liberal Democrats were particularly loud in their praises, while two small groups, one led by Senator Wheeler and the other by Representative O'Konski, a Pole from Wisconsin, were the only opposing voices.35

This was the second and last meeting of the Big Three, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin, for shortly afterward, on April 12th, the President died. Soon after that, Prime Minister Atlee took over the reins of the British Empire, and the confusion and difficulties over secret agreements, interpretations, and oral promises began. Yalta, by far, had the record for arrangements of this sort. From this conference the nations of the world proceeded to San Francisco, to draw up the plan for the new world. They were planning to meet, discuss, write and pledge themselves to principles which were being violated daily. The smaller nations were coming, not to lend their ideas, but to voice their approval of decisions already reached. Yet the

majority, with the horror and brutality of war still upon them, blotted out the present and hoped somehow to make the United Nations work for the future.
CHAPTER VII

THE CONFERENCE ON FOOD AND AGRICULTURE

Before the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, even before the Moscow Conference, the leaders in the movement for international organization felt the necessity of finding a common denominator on the more basic subjects of food, agriculture, banking, international finance, and international labor problems. The impact of the war on the world's food production brought full realization that this subject would be vital in the building of a stable world order. To offer freedom of speech, freedom of religion, security leagues, and super disarmament plans to hungry people would have been, to be sure, a most erroneous approach. It was therefore decided that within the two freedoms of fear and want, which covered man's factual, bodily, day-to-day problems of existence, lay the factors which would determine the success or failure of their efforts.1

Plans for the assurance of sufficient quantities of food had been advanced in great numbers since the pessimistic Malthus had first written his theory of population. In recent years, the "ever-normal granary" theory of Secretary of Agriculture Wallace and the British program of buffer stocks were advanced. Both plans were national in design, however, and lacked, without great enlargement, the necessary elements for an international system.

1 Wright, 12.
In the United States, as in some other countries, per-capita production and consumption of food had made tremendous strides forward. If, however, the needs of the world population were to be considered, the production fell far below the basic subsistence level. It was with this in mind that President Roosevelt issued invitations to forty-five nations to meet in Hot Springs, Virginia, on May 18, 1943, for the purpose of discussing means of combating one of the basic causes of war, the search for food.

This meeting had no authority to consider terms of peace, but became known as the first peace conference of World War II, by virtue of the fact that it was considering one of the factors in the long range maintenance of peace. The delegates were neither diplomats nor military men, but farm and nutritional experts and government policy representatives from the Departments of Agriculture and Commerce. Their job was cut out for them by the statement of the President which opened the conference. He said:

The broad objectives for which we work have been stated in the Atlantic Charter....It is the purpose of this conference to consider how best to further these policies in so far as they concern the consumption, production, and distribution of food and other agricultural products in the postwar period.

From the start, relations with the press were as bad as they possibly could have been. When first announcing the coming meeting, the President, contrary to his established practice, said that he hoped the press

3 Ibid., 2.
would be excluded from the conference. The storm of protest that followed, in Congress and in editorials, forced Mr. Roosevelt to backtrack somewhat, but it was not until two weeks after it had opened that the reporters received any normal quantity of information concerning the meeting, which was heavily guarded by detachments of military police. Further attempts at secrecy and dictatorial tactics, such as the barring of all anti-New Deal papers from the Homestead Hotel, where the meeting was held and the delegates housed, were exposed and corrected by the efforts of the press. Early attempts to restrict the entrance and movement of congressmen who wished to see what was going on brought a storm of protests and demands from Capital Hill to the White House and the State Department, where the situation was soon rectified.

The haste with which the conference was instigated, and the failure to clearly define objectives, delayed its work for a number of days while the diverse purposes of the participating nations were brought to a common ground. The Soviets, along with the representatives of the European governments in exile, were firm in their demands that the conference should first consider the problems of relief and rehabilitation, and insisted that only after these were discussed, and action decided upon, could the postwar, long-range problems be taken up. This, of course, was not the purpose of the conference as the President had envisioned it, and it was only by promising

5 Arne, 25.
6 Ibid., May 20, 1943.
to have another meeting within the year to consider the immediate relief problems that the European bloc desisted in its efforts.  

For the remainder of the eighteen days of the meeting, the delegates divided into committees to consider production, distribution, and consumption of food in the postwar world. When they made their reports, the convention issued, not a charter or constitution, but a set of ten resolutions establishing the Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture. This commission, which was to sit in Washington, was directed to formulate a plan for a permanent food and agriculture organization, to fully develop its functions, and to establish its relationship to any future world organization.

Through the conference and in a press release near the close of the meeting, the delegates stressed time and again the need for international commodity arrangements to coordinate and adjust differences in the pricing and marketing policies of the various countries. Through such arrangements, it was held that the extreme fluctuations in world marketing could be avoided, with advantages being gained by the consumer, producer, and distributor. Two trends of thought developed in this regard. The British, with the majority backing of the Europeans, advanced their buffer stock plan which had been remodelled to operate on an international scale. Under this plan, prices would be set in advance, and an international financial body would absorb any excess production for use in years of scarcity. The delegates who opposed this were mostly from the Western Hemisphere, and were led by the United States' representatives. They offered in opposition a plan of increased production and

8 Ibid., May 25, 1943.
expanding markets, especially in underdeveloped areas. No decision was
taken on this matter of levelling world markets, but its discussion, when
considered with the public exclusion originally planned, caused suspicion of
the conference to be voiced everywhere. The New York Times, normally symp-
pathetic to the administration, termed it a socialistic plot and summed up its
evaluation of the meeting by saying:

Throughout the sessions of the conference, and
in the final official summary, there runs the
assumption that the problem of food and agri-
culture can be dealt with only by a sort of
authoritarian welfare state. The implication
is that abundance cannot be achieved except
by governmental action.

As no decision was taken on this matter, similarly, no deci-
sions of importance were taken on any other matters. The conference became,
in the end, a session devoted to gathering ideas and areas of agreement. In
the words of Herbert Feis, "The conference contented itself with being a
party of reconnaissance, not a party of action."

The Interim Commission which became operative on June 15, 1943,
in Washington, D.C., drew experts in the various fields, mostly from the
United States and the British Commonwealth. After a year of work, the com-
mission issued its first report which proposed a constitution for the Food
and Agriculture Organization. Later accepted, this constitution held the
purposes of the body to be:

9 Alvin Hansen, America's Role in the World Economy, W.W. Norton and Co.,
New York, 1945, 117-118.
12 Trolley and Stinebower, 3.
[the] raising of levels of nutrition and standards of living of the peoples under their respective jurisdiction...securing improvements in the efficiency of the production and distribution of all food and agricultural products...bettering of the condition of rural populations...and thus contributing toward an expanding world economy...13

The members were to report to the organization and to each other on the measures taken and the progress achieved in these fields. In the furtherance of these purposes, the organization was given the task of:

I. The collection, analysis, interpretation and dissemination of information related to nutrition, food, and agriculture.

II. The promotion of research, of conservation, of improved methods of handling products, of agricultural credit, of international commodity arrangements.

III. The furnishing of technical assistance as needed and the organization of missions to help nations fulfill recommendations of the Food and Agriculture Organization.14

Aside from these purposes and functions, the constitution dealt with the organization, administration, and financing of that body. With regard to the latter, it was agreed that the budget for the first fiscal year would be two and one half million dollars, twenty-five percent of which was to be contributed by the United States.15

The administration was to be placed in the hands of a Director General appointed by the "conference" or assembly of members. When the con-

14 Ibid.
15 Ibid., 50.
ference was not in session, this officer was to assume full authority for carrying out the policies and functions of the organization. His term of office and manner of appointment were to be decided upon at the first session of the conference.

The constitution instructed that the body should be placed under any general world organization which would be formed, and stated in a very general way the relationship which would exist between the two bodies.

Although the constitution was delivered to the various governments in August of 1944, by the end of 1945 only eighteen of the twenty nations necessary had ratified it. Here in the United States, it was continually shelved in Congress until it could be seen in respect to the general United Nations Organization.

In its presented form, there could be little argument against the Food and Agriculture Organization, for no one could attack attempts to feed the hungry, or build up the undernourished. The one argument that might have been held against the organization, that of commodity control, was present in the constitution in only a modified sense. The organization could promote international commodity arrangements, but it had no power to take any action toward their establishment. The general recommendations of the Interim Commission did consider these controls of future necessity, but suggested they be placed under the supervision of a separate international authority.\(^{16}\)

The truant attitude on the part of the participating governments in ratifying the constitution suggested that the long range purposes of

\(^{16}\) Interim Commission: First Report, 24.
the organization made its immediate application unnecessary and caused wonder as to why this particular conference was the first held. Perhaps it was called merely because it was felt that a food conference at this time would be a good thing, that it would give the nations a chance to see if they could agree on a relatively easy matter before attempting to solve the complex political and economic matters facing them. That much, the establishing of a pattern of cooperation, was accomplished. Its importance was magnified by the fact that they considered truly long-range humanitarian problems, which cut across the fields of agriculture, trade, politics, and international finance. The delegates showed the necessity and paved the way for the future conference of Bretton Woods, the Relief and Rehabilitation Conference, The International Trade Conference, and The International Labor Conference.

Further, at this meeting were established the principles of press reporting which were followed through the remainder of the international conferences. The newsmen successfully broke down attempts to keep them out completely or to limit their activities, and save for those meetings where their presence would be a deterrent to open discussion, obtained a precedent which would assure the public that no group of delegates could control the public reaction to their activities.

If we examine the Food and Agriculture conference in this light of setting precedents, and limit the importance of the decisions they postponed, we cannot help but say that it was as successful as the first link in the chain of international conferences could have been.

CHAPTER VIII

THE BRETTON WOODS CONFERENCE

The chaotic condition of international finance which developed during the inter-war period, and the complete abandonment of the gold standard mechanism in the thirties, brought forward many new schemes for restoration of the equilibrium in world trade. With the exception of the Young Plan, in support of which the Young Plan Conference was held in Paris in 1929, and which resulted in the establishment of the Bank for International Settlements, all the proposals were based on the theory that the gold standard system was unworkable in our modern economy.¹ The Bank for International Settlements which was attached to the gold standard system, and limited in its functions, was established in 1930, a time when the tremendous amount of foreign credits were on the verge of collapse. After a year and a half of operation, credit conditions in Europe forced the disuse of the bank, although it remained technically operative, holding gold and extending advice to some of the members.²

In 1933, after the United States, Britain, and France had gone off the gold standard, the London Economic Conference was called with a view in mind to stabilizing the par value of world currencies. Some economists

¹ Eleanor L. Dulles, "Bretton Woods Monetary Conference—Plans and Achievements", Foreign Policy Reports, Sept. 1, 1944, 139.
² Ibid., 140.
consider that the policy of the United States caused the failure of this meeting. While we had originally agreed, they say, to enter a stabilization agreement and had even suggested that we might enter a stabilization fund should the rates be satisfactory, our view of the necessity of the elasticity of the gold content of the dollar was contradictory and stood in the way of any possible accord. The President viewed the meeting differently, however, and claimed that it was too much concerned with a temporary expedient for patching up the gold system, and too little concerned with fundamental causes. Near the close of the meeting when the situation seemed to be stalemated, Mr. Roosevelt stated in a wireless to the conference:

I would regard it as a catastrophe amounting to a world tragedy if the great Conference of Nations, called to bring about a more real and permanent financial stability and a greater prosperity to the masses of all Nations, should, in advance of any serious effort to consider these broader problems, allow itself to be diverted by the proposal of a purely artificial and temporary experiment affecting the monetary exchange of a few Nations only....

....Let me be frank in saying that the United States seeks the kind of dollar which a generation hence will have the same purchasing and debt-paying power as the dollar value we hope to attain in the near future. That objective means more to the good of other Nations than the fixed ratio for a month or two in terms of the pound or the franc.

Thus a fundamental disagreement on the purpose of the meeting brought no tangible results.

From this time on, economists began in earnest to press various

3 Feis, 54-55.
4 Rosenman, Vol. II (1933), 265-5.
plans for stabilization controls and a stabilization fund. Lord Keynes, Dr. Harry White, Dr. Herbert Feis, and Professor Edgar Milhaud, took the leading roles in the development of these ideas.

During the thirties, Lord Keynes made several proposals along these lines on which no action was taken. On April 8, 1943, his best known plan, sections of which had a great influence on the final version of the Bretton Woods Agreements, was made public. Called "Proposals for an International Clearing Union", it became familiarly known as "The Keynes Plan". Written in comparatively simple language, it was based on seven premises, which also served as objectives. They were: (1) that an acceptable international currency is necessary; (2) that an orderly method of determining currency exchange values is vital; (3) that a supply of international currency, the quantity governed by world commercial conditions, is essential; (4) that a stabilizing mechanism is necessary to bring pressure on nations which are upsetting the equilibrium; (5) that a stock of reserve cash must be supplied to nations, according to their commercial importance, to provide an orderly exit from the war period; (6) that other institutions of a technical nature are necessary to plan and regulate the world's economic life; (7) that a means of reassurance is needed to make unnecessary various restrictions and methods of discrimination used by nations to bolster their national economies.

In pursuance of these objectives, the International Clearing Union was to be established by agreement among the nations on the basis of a

5 Halm, Appendix II, 224-253. All future references to the text of the Keynes Plan will be taken from this source.
unit called "bancor". The member nations would then accept their out-standing currency balances in terms of "bancor" on the books of the Union. In this way, the Union was to create its own resources. From this point forward, nations were to purchase or return credits or debits by the simple means of a transfer of "bancor" to the books of the other nation within the Clearing Union. This feature proposed to put a stop to the physical transfer of gold bullion.

The plan thus far was, in effect, nothing more than a clearing house, a convenience. To insure against the unlimited growth of credits and debits, the plan provided that the nations would be taxed an amount of one percent per annum on the balance, either credit or debit, which exceeded a quarter of its quota, and an additional one percent per annum on balances in excess of half its quota. The quotas would be established on the gold holdings, volume of trade, national income, etc. of the members. Provision was made for the altering of quotas if a change occurred in any of the determining factors. In those cases where a nation would become a constant creditor or debtor, the governing board would discuss with the member means of restoring the balances. For creditors, this would mean the expansion of domestic credits, reduction of tariffs, an increase in international lending, and appreciation of its currency. Debtors could devalue their currency, surrender their gold reserves, raise tariffs, and take any other necessary measures.6

The ideal situation under the Keynes' proposals would exist when no nation had either a credit or a deficit and a perfect equilibrium within

6 Halm, 83-86.
quotas was being maintained.

While the Keynes Plan was well received, it was regarded as too novel and ambitious to win support. It was criticized on the grounds that it offered the debtors too much, the creditors too little. To be sure, it was not in line with American banking theory to tax the creditor for money outstanding instead of providing interest. It was further criticized on the grounds that it placed too much responsibility on the creditor and too little on the debtor, that it spoke of credit expansion but avoided credit contraction. The Keynes Plan, too, was open to attack because in certain cases where international money is created beyond the creditor's control, it becomes an interference in the domestic policy of the creditor's country.

At the same time as the publication of the Keynes Plan, the "White Plan" or the "Preliminary Draft Outline of a Proposal for an International Stabilization Fund of the United and Associated Nations", was released. Both this and the Keynes Plan had been under discussion in governmental circles since early 1942, and were regarded as secret material. In this status, they were transmitted to the other members of the United Nations some months before publication. During May and June, 1943, a series of discussions on the plans was carried on in Washington, among representatives of thirty of the United Nations. The White Plan seemed acceptable and a

7 Dulles, 141.
8 Halm, 93-94.
9 Ibid., 95.
10 Ibid., 103.
revised draft, incorporating suggestions from the discussions, was issued under the same name on July 10, 1943. After the issuance of the Revised Draft of the White Plan, a series of bilateral discussions was begun between experts from the United States and other countries. These meetings continued until the publication, in April, 1944, of the "Joint Statement by Experts on the Establishment of an International Monetary Fund". This document, together with the revised White Plan, formed the basic material for the Bretton Woods discussions on the monetary fund.12

The Treasury Department, in November, 1943, published a draft of a proposal for an International Bank to supplement the fund. It was based on a deleted section of the original White Plan and had been given emphasis by the Keynes Plan which proposed "other institutions" to aid in its work.13 These plans were discussed by the experts along with the fund, but were not released in any official manner prior to the Bretton Woods meeting.

The White Plan, which was designed to meet the same needs as the Keynes Plan, differed from it in several respects.14 Rather than beginning operations without funds, as the Keynes Plan proposed, it set up a fund of gold and currency which would be established on the basis of adjustable quotas. The fund would then, by using the common denominator "Unitas", based on gold, buy and sell the currencies of the various countries in the interests

12 Dulles, 142.
13 Young, 4-5.
14 Halm, Appendix I, 205-223. All future references to the text of the White Plan will be taken from this source.
of the members. There would be restrictions on the amount of currency of any particular member that the bank could handle for resale. The disequilibrium resulting from such transactions would be subject to the scrutiny of the Board of Directors and appropriate curbs could be taken should the member fail to take the internal measures necessary to correct the situation. Should the demand for the currency of one member be so great that the fund's holdings would be exhausted, the fund would have the power to divide equally requests for that currency from the foreign balances of member countries. Surplus funds, as in the Keynes Plan, would be subject to a per annum tax. The original White Plan also contained measures for the gradual reduction of blocked balances. These, however, were omitted in the final plan.15

While both the Keynes and the White Plans were enthusiastically received by those who could understand the jargon of international finance, many felt that in both plans there was an inherent weakness which would cause them to fail because of their attempt to span both the transition and the normal postwar periods. They felt that neither plan differentiated clearly enough between long and short term loans. Further, they predicted that the tremendous demands of the postwar period on the normal creditor countries, principally the United States, would give those nations such surpluses as to make the fund irreparably lopsided and would weaken its future functioning.16

These critics, therefore, proposed that the functioning of any fund organization be held back until a semblance of normalcy appeared, and offered as a transition arrangement the "Key Currency" approach. Under this

15 Because of the great similarities between the White Plan and the Final Act, a more detailed discussion will be given later in this chapter.  
16 Halm, 159-168.
plan, the dollar and the pound sterling would be stabilized, by themselves, without reference to the other currencies of the world. When this was accomplished, the other nations, of lesser importance in world trade, would stabilize their currencies according to the pound sterling-dollar bloc. This approach was not completely at variance with the fund plans because the fund, to succeed, must depend on the close cooperation between the key countries of England and the United States.17

The objections to the "Key Currency" approach were based on the experience gained in this method before World War II, when Britain and the United States collaborated to secure dollar-pound sterling stability. The blocs that were created through this policy had not only an economic but a political effect and established some very discriminatory trading practices. It was also argued that by using this system the major powers would be imposing their will on the other member nations, rather than allowing all sovereign nations to come to an agreement on the type of economic world they wanted.18 No action was taken on the "Key Currency" approach.

It is apparent, then, that before the calling of the Bretton Woods meeting a great deal of planning and exploration had been done. Virtually all the members of the United Nations had expressed their views and had, in many instances, successfully amended sections of the proposals. Detailed planning was vital in approaching a topic as complex and basic as this. It seemed to have been done well. After the invitations had been extended for the conference to be held on July 1, 1944, at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire,

17 Hansen, 84-85.
18 Ibid., 85.
many of the delegates met first at Atlantic City, New Jersey, on June 15, to deal with some of the unanswered questions, to produce a more agreeable fund plan, and to write an acceptable pact for an international bank.

A more ideal spot for an international monetary conference could not have been chosen. The White Mountains of New Hampshire, which have long been known for their beauty and restfulness, provided a perfect retreat where the delegates could fully concentrate on the complex problems confronting them. The meeting officially opened on July 1, and continued for twenty-two days. The American delegation was led by Henry Morgenthau, Secretary of the Treasury, who was also elected permanent President of the conference, and chairman of the steering committee.19 Accompanying him were Fred M. Vinson, Dean Acheson, Marriner Eccles, Robert F. Wagner, and Charles W. Tobey of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency, Jesse P. Wolcott and Brent Spence of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, Harry W. White of the Treasury, and other representatives from the American Bankers Association and various University Economics departments. The United Kingdom was represented by Lord Keynes, Russia by M. S. Stepanov, the Commissar for Foreign Trade, France by Pierre Mendès-France, Commissioner of Finance, and China by Hsiang-Hsi K'ung, Minister of Finance.20

The conference, attended by delegations from forty-four nations, was divided into three commissions: (1) International Monetary Fund; (2) Bank for Reconstruction and Development; (3) Other Means of International Financial

20 Ibid., 11-19.
Cooperation. These, for the most part, worked privately, reporting to the conference as a whole on their progress only in the weekly or bi-weekly plenary meetings.

The press was well represented numerically, but the correspondents were mostly men who did not have the background to understand the economic concepts under discussion. Hence, the reporting of the meeting was sketchy and dealt with difficulties rather than achievements.21 Harry D. White held daily press conferences to attempt to put in plain language, for public consumption, what was being done. He was alone in his efforts, however, and was only partially successful.22

The conference was opened by the reading of a letter of greeting from President Roosevelt who expressed the hope that from this meeting would come a plan for an orderly, expanding world economy.23 Conference President Morgenthau then outlined the aims of the meeting, and requested that in their deliberations the delegates be guided by two economic axioms: (1) that prosperity has no fixed limits; and (2) that prosperity, like peace, is indivisible.24 The delegates then settled down to writing an agreement for a stabilization fund and an international bank.

Though the papers for the next three weeks carried rumors of many difficulties among the delegates, only one major problem seemed to gain official recognition; it concerned quotas. After the formula for determining the financial responsibility of each of the members had been established, the

21 Arne, 72.
22 Ibid., 73.
23 Final Act, 1-2.
24 Ibid., 4.
Russian delegates glatly refused to put their signatures on the dotted line, pleaded inability to pay, and stated they would only contribute a sum which was 300 million dollars short of their quota for the Bank. After holding up the conclusion of the meeting for a few days, it was decided to close the Bank discussions and terminate the meeting without the Soviet full contribution. Then, at the final formal dinner, Mr. Morgenthau was handed a cablegram which reversed the Russian delegates' stand and pledged her full payment. This action completed the requirements of all the members to both the Bank and the Fund.

The International Monetary Fund was given total resources of 8.8 billion dollars, a sum which was attacked in some quarters as being too high, in others as being too low. Of this amount, the Big Three would contribute 5.25 billion dollars, or 59.4 percent. This arrangement, although costly to the United States in particular, gave her 28 percent of the voting power in the organization. The quotas were reached by a combination of many internal national factors, chiefly national income and gold holdings.

The currencies of the members were given a par value in terms of gold or the United States dollar, which could vary a plus or minus ten percent but even then only with the consent of the Fund management. This use of gold, plus the fact that a substantial portion of the national quotas were to be paid in gold, was attacked by those who wished to see a complete abandonment of the use of that metal. However, in those circles where the plans were

25 Arne, 79.
26 Final Act, 60. All future references to the Fund provisions will be taken from this source, 28-67.
27 Halm, 87.
being made, this inclination was not present. It was unanimously considered that the gold standard system was obsolete, but it was felt that as a precious metal its usefulness could not be supplanted.\textsuperscript{28}

When the Fund would begin operations, the members would borrow currency from the accounts of the other members of the Fund to finance a deficit of exports to that particular member, and thereby save the otherwise dangerous drains on their own gold reserves. The debt thus incurred in the Fund would then act as a signal to the other members that that particular nation was in a position where, until her debts were repaid, she would have to export more than she would import. To stop any nation from carrying her debts too long, the Fund provided that no member could borrow more than one-quarter of its quota in any one year and its total borrowed currency could not exceed its quota except where collateral was pledged. Further, the Fund, should it feel that a member is misusing the facilities, could suspend the privileges of that nation. In short, the Fund is a banker for central banks, equipped with a specific capital fund, from which can be made short-term loans to tide nations over the ever-fluctuating export-import markets. It should be understood that the Fund will provide only for temporarily unbalanced situations, and that the major portion of international payments will not pass through the Fund.\textsuperscript{29}

The advantages that the Fund claimed were many. Foremost was the view that the cooperative use of the Fund was the only multilateral solution to the world's monetary problems.\textsuperscript{30} Again it was held that, aside from

\textsuperscript{28} Dulles, 143.
\textsuperscript{29} Halm, 64.
\textsuperscript{30} Halm, 204.
the right to draw on diversified sources, the Fund offered its members protection against competitive depreciation, and counsel and advice on financial policy. 31

The main argument against the Fund was that the United States was putting too much in, getting too little out. It was also pointed out that with all its resources the Fund still relied on the all-out cooperation of its members to live up to the rules of the game and, in this respect, was no advancement over the gold standard. 32 The American Bankers Association felt that the safeguards on the use of the Fund were too loose, that the "right" to a loan is contrary to approved banking practices, that the problem of post-war scarcity of the dollar would be inconsistent with the Fund rules, and that the tremendous sterling balances held by the Commonwealth nations put them, if they joined the Fund, in an even worse position, since it made no effort to liquidate these balances. It was further argued, in regard to the latter, that Britain's postwar problem was so great that any hope of establishing a truly multilateral clearing system while it remained unsolved was futile. 33

Because of these and other reasons, the American Bankers Association recommended that the Fund be eliminated while the Bank was kept and expanded. 34 The arguments pro and con were voluminous, the majority dealing with specific definitions and applications of economic terms.

The second agreement of the conference was the International

31 Dulles, 145.
32 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 19.
Bank for Reconstruction and Development. The first function of this body was to grant long term loans for reconstruction when private capital was unavailable or available only at rates of interest which were prohibitive. The second, and perhaps most important function, was to guarantee loans made by private sources. Through these practices, it was hoped that the long-range growth of international trade would be stimulated, that the urgent problems of the devastated countries would receive priority, and that the transition period from war to peace would be insured of a smooth passage.

To carry out these functions and accomplish these aims the bank assets were established at 9.1 billion dollars, the raising of which was divided among the members by the same type of quota as used in the Fund. Only twenty percent of this amount could be used in making direct loans, the remainder being a reserve fund on call, which would be used to guarantee loans. Thus a nation, at the outset, and until such time as a possible default would force the Bank to pay for a guaranteed loan, would only pay twenty percent of its subscription into the Bank. This payment would be eighteen percent in their national currency, and two percent in gold or American dollars.

There was little argument against the Bank, for its principles and detailed rules and regulations were quite in line with standard banking practices. To the borrower, it offered a standardization of interest and payment; to the lender, it offered a method of guaranteeing loans which a private institution might feel were too risky or too lengthy for the interest involved.

35 Final Act, 68-97. All future references to the text of the Bank Agreement will be taken from this source.
The relationship between the Bank and the Fund was close, both in concept and in operation. First, the Bank membership is only open to members of the Fund; second, the Fund depends on the Bank to draw off those loans which might otherwise be called short term and constitute a drain on the Fund resources; and, third, the Fund, by currency stabilization, enhances the value of the long term loans made by the Bank. Their interdependence was well established and vital, but proposals to accept one while rejecting the other often failed to take this into account.

These, then, were the accomplishments of the Bretton Woods Conference, the second of the meetings among the nations to establish a lasting peace. The purpose was the solution of the financial and monetary problems of the postwar and future peace period. It did not purport to cover the sphere of economic relations in its entirety, but concerned itself with a program designed to alleviate the troubles of international exchange. They were successful in that they offered a possible solution, and showed that cooperation was possible in economic problems. The possibilities for the success of the proposals were good as long as room remained for amendment. Even in this chapter, with the inadequate treatment of the proposals, it is possible to see a great variation of thought on the problem. However, this stopped only one nation, Russia, from ratifying the proposals by the deadline of January 1, 1946.

The conference did not attack the economic problems posed by the Atlantic Charter. The agreements would undoubtedly aid in their solution, but

36 Dulles, 146.
other conferences would have to be held, using the monetary policy as a partial basis, to adequately treat free access to raw materials, to trade, and the right to improved standards of living.
CHAPTER IX

THE MEXICO CITY CONFERENCE

On February 21, 1945, all the members of the Pan American Union, save one, met to discuss the proposed international organization and postwar peace problems. This was the first meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Western Hemisphere in over three years, the last being held in Rio de Janeiro under the consultative system of the Pan American Union, in January, 1942. The agenda of that last meeting was concerned with the security of the Americas and the breaking of diplomatic relations with the Axis. The conference met with success on both problems.¹ However, United States-Argentine relations at the meeting were poor, and shortly afterward, a deterioration began which virtually ended in an open rupture between the two nations. In 1944, when the Farrell-Peron government came to power, the United States refused to recognize it on the basis that it showed too much sympathy to the Axis powers and, in some cases, was guilty of open collaboration. Most of the Latin American Republics followed, somewhat reluctantly, the pattern set by the United States.²

Although the State Department had, from Washington's time, followed a policy of recognizing de facto governments, the action in this case

¹ Welles, 230-234.
² Dean, 40-41.
was taken in the hope that it would cause the fall of the Farrell government. The Under Secretary, Sumner Welles, who had long been associated with Latin American relations, violently disagreed with this method and resigned his post in protest. Later events proved his stand in the matter correct, for our attitude only strengthened the nationalist feeling in the Argentine.

To gain an airing of her case, Argentina, in October, 1944, invoked a meeting of the Pan American Union to discuss her situation. The United States, holding the power in the Union, vetoed this request and induced Mexico to call the Conference of Mexico City, to which Argentina was not invited. Invitations to the meeting were extended on January 10, 1945.

To the conference came 110 delegates from 20 countries, accompanied by nearly 200 advisors and assistants. The American delegation was led by Edward Stettinius, Secretary of State. His party of 79, the largest of the conference, included Senators Austin and Connally, Representatives Bloom, Johnson, and Rogers, and Nelson Rockefeller, the Assistant Secretary.

The meeting was officially titled, Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, and was held in Chapultepec Castle, near Mexico City. This site had a special significance to the delegates from the United States and Mexico, for here, nearly a hundred years ago, on September 13, 1847, the army of General Winfield Scott fought and defeated the Mexican Army in its last stand before Mexico City. The choice of this historic site was

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3 Welles, 236.
4 Life, editorial, March 19, 1945, 30
perhaps a coincidence, but the Argentine situation, definitely another instance of domestic interference, was bound to be discussed, and the memory of 1847 should have given the Latin nations at least a psychological advantage.

Aside from the Argentine question and the problems of war and peace, another purpose was rumored, that of lining up the Latin American countries as a bloc at the coming San Francisco Conference to offset the possible Russian demand for sixteen votes. Secretary Stettinius, it will be remembered, had just returned from the Yalta Conference where this question arose and, supposedly, on the day that the Yalta Declaration was released, February 12, the United States' Ambassadors to Chile, Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador, Uruguay, and Paraguay presented personal messages from President Roosevelt asking them to declare war on the Axis powers. On February 14, two days later, Ecuador, Peru, Chile, and Paraguay had declared war and signed the United Nations Declaration. On February 20, Venezuela, and, on February 24, Uruguay, followed suit. Thus, by the fourth day of the conference, every Latin American nation except Argentina had declared war on the Axis. This made the conference problems somewhat lighter for Mr. Stettinius, who now had but to straighten out the few existing conflicts of the Lumberton Oaks Agreements to insure a cooperative vote at San Francisco.

The conference, after the plenary opening session, divided into committees dealing with the war effort, world organization, inter-American affairs, and economic and social problems, and for the next twelve days wrote a total of sixty-one resolutions on the various subjects. 

7 *Time*, Feb. 12, 1945, 28.
8 *Mexico City, Final Act*, 35-108.
With regard to the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, the objections of
the Latin Americans were contained in a sixty page statement which had been
coordinated by the Venezuelan Foreign Minister. They felt that the mem-
bership requirements were too severe and that any nation disposed to obey the
purposes of the organization should be allowed membership. Further, they
wished to see a more clear cut definition of sovereign equality and a definite
non-interference statement regarding domestic affairs. It was suggested that
review authority over Security Council decisions be granted in order to
strengthen the powers of the General Assembly. They believed that the membership in the Security Council should be enlarged and that one seat be permanently granted to the Latin American Republics. It was also suggested that universality of membership, as a principle, was missing, that this should be included to constitute an ideal toward which the United Nations could work.

Most important, and a subject of concern, was the idea expressed that inter-
American controversies should be acted upon regionally while still remaining
in harmony with the United Nations organizations.

For the most part, these ideas were incorporated in Article XXX
for transmittal by the Attorney General of the Conference, Manuel Tello of
Mexico, to the sponsoring powers of, and to those other nations invited to the
San Francisco meeting. Other resolutions of an international character, such
as equality of women at international conferences, endorsement of the food and
agriculture program, the monetary program, etc., were set out individually

9 Dean, 48.
10 Dean, 48-49.
11 Mexico City, Final Act, Article XXX, 73-74.
Recognizing the still unfinished state of the war, the conference recommended a continued and increased effort by all the American nations to speed the end of hostilities. It was also resolved that the remaining centers of subversive activities be eliminated, and that any war criminals seeking to use the American Republics as havens be returned to any of the United Nations requesting their custody. In this connection, and in accord with other United Nations pronouncements, the delegates agreed to take the measures necessary to uncover any transfers of property or money by Axis nationals in the attempt to retain them for the benefit of their countries.

The economic considerations of the conference were important to the Latin Americans. Up to the time of the conference, the United States had spent, during the war, five billion dollars in their countries. Now, with the war nearing its end, new markets would have to be developed or a sever retrenching program instigated. To those governments whose foundations were insecure, it could mean revolution. It was a deadly serious problem.

The delegates agreed that to insure high standards of living a positive program of action had to be established. They, therefore, in Article LI of the Agreements, set out the "Economic Charter of the Americas". This ten point program recommended a greater development of natural resources, an expansion of trade and investment, the attainment of high levels of income, employment, and consumption in order that the people could be adequately fed,

12 Ibid., 75, 96, 97.
housed, clothed, and have access to education and health services. They agreed to take action against cartels and against excessive economic nationalism. They recommended the principle of the organizational and bargaining rights of labor, the promotion of private enterprise, the free movement of foreign investment capital, and other measures. The Economic Charter concluded by declaring:

The economic strength of the Americas, based on rising levels of living and on economic liberty, and attained through cooperation to provide a sense of security and freedom of opportunity, will constitute a beacon of hope to the world. The American Republics, basing their positive economic program on the desires of their peoples and on the time-tested methods of social and economic betterment, will lay the groundwork for strengthening the inter-American system to meet war and postwar conditions.

The most important action of the conference, and the resolution from which the meeting derives its common name, was Article VIII, "The Act of Chapultepec". The real title of the resolution was "Reciprocal Assistance and American Solidarity". Proposed by Colombia, the article restated certain fundamental principles of action which had been established in the inter-American conferences since 1890. Among these were:

The proscription of territorial conquest and the non-recognition of all acquisitions made by force;

The condemnation of intervention by a state in the internal affairs of another;

The mutual consultation procedure in case of war or threat of war between American countries;

15 Mexico City, Final Act, 93-94.
16 Mexico City, Final Act, 93-94.
The recognition that acts susceptible of disturbing the peace justifies consultation;

The adoption of conciliation and arbitration in the solution of differences of any nature or origin.17

Stating that the practice of these and other similar principles constituted an effective means of contributing to world security, the resolution then added its new, potent, mutual assistance agreement:

The security and solidarity of the continent are affected to the same extent by an act of aggression against any of the American States by a non-American State, as by an act of aggression of an American State against one or more American States.18

This regional security proposal, presumably not previously known of by the American delegation, was received with tremendous enthusiasm by all but the United States delegates. Two major problems immediately confronted them. The first, Senate approval, they did not wish to try, until that group had first passed the San Francisco agreements; the second, the possibility of a clash between this resolution and the Security Council arrangements, posed a difficult problem. Senator Austin, quick on his feet, stalled for time by pleading inability to read Spanish.19 During the breathing spell, the problem was discussed. Senate approval they could by-pass, for under the Presidential War Powers Act the agreement could be made effective for the duration. The clash with Security Council objectives was difficult to consider. If the regional plan stood, the whole general security scheme might be jeopardized by Russia's setting up her own security sphere in middle Europe, Britain some-

17 Ibid., 40-41.
18 Ibid., 42.
19 Time, Mar. 12, 1945, 25.
where else. Further, if the agreement stood, what would happen if the American nations took steps not approved by the Security Council? Conversely, what would happen if the Council took action against a Western Hemispheric nation and the regional system disagreed?20

A three-fold, satisfactory compromise was made. First, the agreement was to be valid for only the duration of the war, to avoid Senate approval. Second, a permanent treaty incorporating the same factors was to be made after the war. Third, the arrangements under the regional system treaty must be consistent with the aims and principles of the Security Council, when it was established.21 In this manner, the Latin American nations insured their hemispheric defense, the United States retained its sphere of influence, its own defense system, and proceeded to San Francisco with the knowledge that the nations of this hemisphere could cooperate in their ideas.

The Act of Chapultepec represented the first true American collective security system. It was a historical turnabout that the United States, who since the Monroe Doctrine was enunciated had advocated insulation of the Americas from Europe, should find herself in the position where she could not immediately accept an expansion of her favorite doctrine because she was under obligation to a wider, European security system.22

The origin of the Latin enthusiasm for the collective security agreement is believed to have arisen from the Argentine situation. The South American Republics were not too receptive to the American veto of Argentina's

20 Dean, 44, 47.
21 Mexico City, Final Act, 43-44.
request for a Pan American meeting and felt, too, that they should not in any way condone the interference of the United States, lest a precedent be established. On the other hand, they felt that Argentina was becoming much too strong and aggressive and had a fear that that country would cause trouble if not adequately stifled. Thus, from this line of argument, it was concluded that at least in some part the pact was directed at Argentina.23

After the compromise passage, a resolution in the form of a note was agreed upon which deplored Argentina's absence from the meeting and extended the principles of the Act of Chapultepec to her for her approval. The Article declared that:

....the Conference expresses its desire that the Argentine nation may put itself in a position to express its conformity with and adherence to the principles and declarations resulting from the Conference of Mexico....and hopes that the Argentine nation will cooperate with the other American nations, identifying itself with the common policy these nations are pursuing, and orienting its own policy so that it may achieve its incorporation into the United Nations....24

The conference could not have more clearly isolated Argentina and put the burden on her to take the next step. This she did on March 27, by declaring war on the Axis, and agreeing to the Act of Chapultepec. In return, the other American nations, plus England and France, recognized Farrell's government. Thus, although outward American solidarity had been achieved, the United States was defeated in her attempts to oust the Argentine government.

The conference and its results were well received. Criticism

23 Dean, 44.
24 Mexico City, Final Act, 107-108.
was sparse, and was mainly concerned with doubts as to the coordination of the regional and world security system. Secretary Stettinius was praised for his demonstration, before San Francisco, that equality of nations, when accompanied by mutual faith, patience, and good manners can and will work to bring about a more peaceful, cooperative world.

26 Life, editorial, Mar. 19, 1945, 30.
CHAPTER X

THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE

At noon on March 5, 1945, the diplomatic representatives of the United States presented to the governments of thirty-nine nations invitations to send representatives to a conference to be held for the purpose of preparing the charter of a general international organization for the maintenance of peace and security. The conference, under the sponsorship of the United States, the Kingdom of Great Britain, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and the Republic of China, was to meet on April 25, 1945, in San Francisco. The invitation suggested that the basis for the discussions should be the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, amended to include the voting procedure in the Security Council which had been decided upon at the Yalta Conference.¹

In the extension of the invitations, the State Department chose those nations who had, by March 5, signed The United Nations Declaration of January 1, 1942. Of those who had signed the declaration, France and Poland did not receive invitations. France was extended a separate request later, entreat ing her to become a sponsoring power. At first she declined, but later accepted after the conference had begun. Poland, under the Lublin government, was not invited until the meeting was nearly over, and after much discussion and ill feeling had been caused by Russia's attempt to have her seated. A

place was left vacant in the Charter for her signature as an original member. Syria and Lebanon, Class A mandates who signed the declaration after the original invitations were sent, also received bids. Argentina, the Byelorussian Soviet, and the Ukrainian Soviet were admitted by conference resolution. The total number of nations participating in the meeting amounted to fifty, excluding Poland.²

The choice of San Francisco seemed, at first, to be peculiar. As most of the delegates would enter the United States through east coast ports, the additional three days of travel seemed to place more strain than necessary upon them. However, the psychology soon became apparent. The special trains, from Washington, New York, and Montreal, were timed in such a fashion as to give the visitors the best possible view of the size of the United States and its tremendous agricultural and industrial resources. Then, too, San Francisco at that time was the busiest port in America. Shipments to the Pacific theatre were now doubling those to the European theatre and the spectacle of the busy harbor, with its troop transports and cargo carriers, added to the delegates' impression of America's strength.

The city of San Francisco was, furthermore, a good international convention site. The fifty hotels whose facilities were used provided adequate housing for the delegates, assistants, secretariat personnel, and radio and press representatives, who numbered nearly 4,200 persons. In addition, over 1,000 more visitors, only semi-officially connected with the conference, were housed and fed without difficulty.³ The Veterans' War Memorial Building

² Arne, 128.
served as the headquarters, while the Civic Opera House was used for the plenary sessions of the conference. Within the Veterans' Building, extensive facilities were set up for the press representatives, for the committee meetings, and for the secretariat. Special transportation facilities were established to take the delegates to and from conference meetings, social functions, and other activities. A United Nations Theater, restricted to the delegations, was also put in operation, showing newsreels, short subjects, feature, and documentary films. The visitors were encouraged to acquaint themselves with the city and surrounding countryside, and, for this purpose, the Division of Cultural Relations of the Department of State maintained an office in the Veterans' Building. Restaurant owners of the city made special effort to provide not only the national dishes of the various countries, but waiters who could converse freely in many of the languages of the delegates. Taxicabs with linguistic drivers were also available to the visitors. No effort was spared by the State Department or the people of San Francisco to give the city a cosmopolitan atmosphere and provide the best facilities available to those who came to talk of a permanent peace.

The United States delegation was a seven member team, headed by Secretary of State Stettinius. Accompanying him were Senators Vandenberg and Connally, Representatives Eaton and Bloom, ex-governor Stassen of Minnesota, and Dean Virginia Gildersleeve of Barnard College. The American delegation,

5 Ibid., 26.
6 Life, April 30, 1945, 35.
complete with assistants, advisors, liaison officers, technical experts, press and protocol officers, secretaries and consultants from national organizations totalled 291 people. Each of the governmental departments was represented by advisors, chosen by the Cabinet officers. The State Department, in addition, brought special advisors who were experts in the major world geographical divisions. Also included in the American mission were representatives of forty organizations affiliated with religious, peace, veteran, union, racial, farmer, education, and legal groups.

The reception given the various delegations upon their arrival and for the first few weeks should have made them feel important, for the people lined the streets and hotel lobbies for glimpses of the visitors. Special interest was shown in the Russians, to such an extent that one wondered just what the crowds expected to see. The Soviets did not disappoint them in their flare for the dramatic, however, for Molotov, leading the delegation, immediately requested a bulletproof car and was continually surrounded by a number of well-built members of the secret police. The latter, though they made every effort to appear inconspicuous, were the minor joke of the meeting. The story is told that upon arrival, without proper headgear, they purchased, en masse, new grey hats, which, disregarding the pleas of the shop salesmen, they insisted on wearing with the crowns perfectly undented or uncreased, just as they had come from the factory. The people of the city received, therefore, without difficulty, a peek at genuine Russian agents.

7 Stettinius, 254-266.
8 Ibid., 262-266.
9 Time, May 7, 1945, 27.
At 4:30 P.M. on April 25, temporary chairman Stettinius opened the conference and introduced President Truman, who welcomed the delegates by radio. His theme was that the meeting should stress a peace based on law, with a minimum of attention paid to power. "Force or power," he said, "should not be used, except in defense of law. Great powers must serve, not dominate, small nations." This idea was repeated by Britain's Eden, who asked for a code of international standards of conduct, and by China's Soong, who pleaded for justice in the peace. Molotov, speaking as the last of the sponsoring powers, proposed that the new body should stress authority rather than responsibility, and face reality with power rather than with sovereign equality. With these opening statements of the big powers, it is possible to trace the agenda of the conference. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, together with the Yalta voting formula, were the basis for the discussions. At Dumbarton Oaks, a power-dominated organization was agreed upon. At Yalta, this was confirmed and strengthened. What, then was there to talk about? Russia, through her envoy, Molotov, took a clear-cut supporting attitude for the retention, without change, of the basic proposition, leaving the conference the duty of clarifying details, establishing subsidiary organs, and making trusteeship agreements. The other major powers, by their pronouncements, indicated their desire to give the small and middle nations an opportunity to express their views on the basic proposals as a whole, with some hope, if their ideas were sound and constructive, of having them incorporated. Thus, at the out-

11 Dean, 57-58.
set, a radically different approach by the major powers indicated the possibility of down-to-earth, unshackled debate on principle as well as issue, and gave hope to some that the forgotten principles of the Atlantic Charter might be restated and revitalized to bring about a better new order.

The conference, never dull throughout its duration, had a disturbing beginning, when, in his opening speech, Molotov called for a rotating chairmanship among the sponsoring powers, and demanded the admittance to membership of the Ukrainian Soviet republic and the Byelorussian Soviet Republic. In regard to the former, it caught the entire conference by surprise, for at all international conferences it was taken for granted that the head of the host nation's delegation was automatically elected conference chairman. The confusion which resulted ended in a compromise. Molotov's proposal to rotate chairmen was granted, and the United States, in return, was given the leadership of the important steering committee.13

The request for the admittance of the two additional Russian states was made on the grounds that each had been given a free hand in its foreign relations and, also, that they, above all others, had borne the brunt of the German invasion and were entitled to have a voice in world affairs. Though the conference felt that dangerous precedents were being established, it none the less gave approval to Molotov's request.14

Shortly after the beginning of the conference, at the second steering committee meeting, another membership problem arose, that of the admission of Poland and Argentina. Molotov knew full well that the voting power

13 Arne, 126.
of the Latin American bloc, plus friends, would insure Argentina's admission. He therefore attempted to couple her membership with that of Poland, to trade one against the other. The United States and Britain stood firm, however, on keeping the two problems separate. Argentina, opposed by Russia on the grounds that she was pro-Nazi in foreign policy and a typical Fascist nation at home, won admission. The membership of Poland's pro-Soviet Beriut government, regarded as illegal by Britain and the United States under the Yalta agreements, was postponed, probably in the hope that it would force modifications in that government's composition.

This postponement of the Polish membership cast a shadow over the remainder of the conference, especially when Molotov announced that those Poles who had been selected as democratic leaders from the underground and who had gone to Moscow for a conference on admittance to the Lublin government were under arrest in Moscow, charged with a plot to make war on Russia. In an attempt to obtain the correct details on this, and to straighten out a very confused situation with regard to Security Council discussions, President Truman sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow to confer with Marshal Stalin. Upon his return, Mr. Hopkins announced that some members of the mission would be released and that a greater effort would be put forth to reconstitute the government of Poland. Within a few days, to everyone's surprise and to Hopkins' embarrassment, all sixteen were put on trial. Fifteen of the group pleaded guilty to acts of espionage and, at the conclusion of the trial, twelve were

15 Time, May 7, 1945, 28.
given jail sentences ranging up to ten years. Of capital significance at
the trial was the Soviet contention that the acts of the Polish leaders were a
front movement in a western coalition to eventually wage war on the Soviet.
It was generally believed that the whole purpose of the trials was to dis-
credit the Polish government in exile and the Polish underground and to en-
hance the possibilities of the Lublin government remaining in power. The pro-
tests of the Western Powers, however, finally brought about another pact,
identical to but clearer than the Yalta agreement. Under this, the reorgan-
ization began to take place with such success that, at the close of the San
Francisco Conference, it was indicated that London and Washington would recog-
nize the new government immediately after its installation. Considering the
two principles at stake in the issue, viz: the fourth article of the Atlantic
Charter concerning self-government, and the integrity of major power agree-
ments, the Western Powers seemed, on the surface, to have won their point.
There was no indication, however, that the Soviets recognized the matter as
anything except interference within her sphere, and seemed to take the atti-
tude that her accession to western demands was a matter of expediency and
nothing more.

Midway through the conference, the patience of the delegates was
sorely tried by the uprisings which took place in Syria and Lebanon. Toward
the end of May, the French had sent additional Senegalese reinforcements to
those countries. The Arab inhabitants, who considered this a forerunner of a

more dominating policy by the French, began a series of raids on the towns and villages. Within a few days, an open revolt had developed, which, it was rumored, was agitated by the British. Speculation at the conference grew over the question of whether or not the United Nations Security Council, if it were in operation, could have solved the problem. Still disputed was the right of the Security Council to discuss all matters on a pure majority vote. The small nations pointed out that this situation, under existing arrangements, could not even have been discussed if France so wished.

As the disorder grew worse, the United States was drawn into the situation at the behest of the members of the Arab League.20 Her role as mediator was small, however, for the problem was too complicated for a quick solution. The old problem of empire was involved with British, French, and, to a limited extent, Russian objectives clashing in the area. Added to this were religious, racial, and color conflicts. Nationalism, represented by the League of Arab States, further confounded matters. Lastly, but of extreme importance, was the question of the exploitation of the oil of the Middle East. Here, aside from France, Britain, and Russia, the United States, too, had economic interests.21

As four of the Big Five were in some measure involved, the entire problem of the veto power was forcefully brought to the fore by delegate Evatt of Australia. Though he was able to swing a large group of small nation votes to his side in attempting to make the veto applicable only in cases of

21 Chicago Daily News, editorial, June 1, 1945.
forceful settlement, the Big Five discouraged his action by stating that the small nations would have to trust the large, that if the major powers could not work out the problem between themselves there would be no possibility of peace. The movement by the small nations was then detoured into a minor committee where the big powers had a majority vote, thus stopping any possibility of a change in the existing agreement.

By the time the flurry over the use of the veto had died, so had the crisis that stimulated it. Britain, seeing that her interests in the Middle East might be greatly endangered by too much attention being focused on that area, demanded of France that she cease hostilities and discuss the matter on a diplomatic plane. This was done with much publicity on both sides. At the end of the conference, however, the Syrian-Lebanon question was still unsettled. The proposed conference of the five powers to settle the question was objected to by Britain on the ground that neither China nor Russia had legitimate interests there. The conference, because of this and other delays, never met, and the Levant question became one of the first problems on the agenda when the Security Council convened in London in January, 1946. There, too, the problem was not solved, but was carried over to the second meeting in New York, where it was temporarily shelved and later closed when charges were withdrawn by the principals.

While many minor differences occurred at the conference which occasioned anti-Soviet feeling, the dispute over the Trieste area, though not

22 Chicago Herald-American, June 1, 1945.
directly connected with the meeting, helped strengthen antagonism toward the Russians. Tito had, by then, been recognized as a mere puppet of the Kremlin. When he refused to remove his troops from the immediate vicinity of Trieste in the second week of May, as had been previously agreed upon, and instead declared that he, too, would occupy the territory until the peace conference had decided its fate, Field Marshal Alexander moved his troops in for a showdown. Tito then withdrew his army from the port and railway centers, but insisted on keeping some in the country in support of his contention.\(^25\) This move, in violation of the agreement which aimed to keep interested parties out of the territory until after the peace settlement, gave the delegates the uneasy impression that perhaps the major powers, and especially Russia, were merely seeking license to do as they wished. Occurring simultaneously with the Levant disorders, it cooled the ardor with which the major nations' pleas for Security Council power were received when they asked for faith and hope toward their intentions.\(^26\)

The role of France at the conference, though she had been recognized as a sponsoring nation in the fourth week of the meeting, continued to be that of an intermediate power, seemingly not knowing where she stood in the eyes of the other nations, and carrying over a sort of resentment about her earlier treatment at Yalta and Dumbarton Oaks. France had, prior to the conference, signed a mutual aid pact with Russia against the Axis nations and was looking toward Britain for an identical agreement. It was her view that

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25 *Newsweek*, May 28, 1945, 52.
should the Security Council not take action, or be slow about it, these pacts would operate in the meantime. The United States' delegation vigorously opposed the idea of such pacts, taking the view that they would destroy Security Council objectives. Further discussions at the time were dropped.

The French Foreign Minister, M. Bidault, brought a progressive idea to the conference in regard to France's colonies and mandates. If they wished, they would be given French citizenship, a fair amount of autonomy, and a parliament of their own. However, the French had not been too well informed of the Big Four position on trusteeships, and when she found it was merely an extension of the mandate system and that possibly France stood to lose her present mandates in any redistribution, she decided, after considering her lack of strength, to withhold her proposal until a later date and save a possible clash with England over it. From this point on, France merely attempted to go along with the Big Four without suggestions of her own.

The conference was expected to finish its work in a month. However, the sponsors had not foreseen the number of issues that extended the meeting to twice its proposed duration. In the drafting of the governing rules for each of the four major organs, the General Assembly, the Security Council, the International Court, and the Secretariat, areas of disagreement arose almost daily. Some of them were easily ironed out, others forced the conference to a stalemate.

28 J.A. Del Vayo, "France at This Moment", The Nations, May 26, 1945, 599-600.
The most prominent of these issues were those occurring over the Security Council, especially in regard to the veto. In general, it may be said that the problem was divided into three sections: first, voting to use armed force; second, voting with regard to peaceful settlement of disputes; third, voting with regard to the discussion or investigation of a particular problem. On the first, the conference as a whole did not dispute the right of the Big Five to have power over military measures, although they realized, and emphatically pointed out, the futile position the Security Council would be in should one of the major powers be involved. When, however, the use of troops of other nations was questioned, Canada and Australia took the lead in demanding a vote in any matter where their troops would be used, whether or not they were members of the Council. The small nations won on this point, Article 44 of the Charter providing for a nation’s participation, if she wished, in decisions concerned with the use of that nation’s contingents, but, as the small nations pointed out, it was a voluntary matter, which could be decided upon without their presence, and which in any case would be of minor importance, the committing decision of action having been already made.29

Over the second and third points, peaceful settlement, discussion and investigation, the major crisis of the conference arose. The small nations, led by Australia, had, after acceding to the veto right of the Big Five in matters of forceful settlement, presented twenty-two questions to the steering committee, which if answered would define many of the substantive and procedural matters.30 The meetings held to define these led to a major rift between the Big

Three. The Soviet delegation not willing, on any points, to change the Yalta formula, insisted that the right of veto included the power to stop discussion or investigation of problems, and if necessary, the selection of the Secretary-General. The United States, British and Chinese delegations, which already had disagreement within their ranks over the use of the veto on peaceful settlement, regarded this interpretation as nothing less than a calamity, for the Soviets let it be rumored that they would not compromise the point and that they would have to leave the conference if it was altered.31 Joined by the Yugoslavs, Czechoslovaks, and the two other Soviet republics, their stand clearly divided the conference. For over two weeks, no progress was made on this issue. Finally, after Hopkins' visit to the Kremlin, word was sent to the Soviet delegation to agree to the open discussion principle. Although this concession seemingly put an end to the differences, Australia's Evatt carried on a futile battle to have all situations enumerated by resolution to save difficulty later. Fear of another stalemate or possible disruption of the conference helped to weaken his pleas, however, and the section was approved without further action.32

As voted upon, the significant changes were two: the right of a nation not represented on the Security Council to participate in deliberations when its contingents were to be used; and, the right of the Council to discuss any matter which seemed to be a threat to the peace. The veto, with regard to peaceful settlement, stood as it had been written at Yalta, and no concrete definitions were passed which would clearly set out the jurisdiction of the

31 Dean, 70.
Council. The newspapers and radio commentators played up this issue so greatly that nearly everyone, even those who hardly knew of the conference, were asking, "What is this veto?" One of the results of this was that many who did not follow the meeting came to regard this one issue, which was headlined for days, as the crux of the conference, and developed an unfounded anti-Russian feeling. Government publications, on the other hand, tended to underplay the differences, Stettinius saying in his Report to the President:

In the exchange of views which occurred on this important point the United States delegation stressed the imperative necessity of providing for full discussion and consideration of any situation brought before the Security Council before any one permanent member could prevent further action by the Security Council with respect to the dispute. After full deliberation the delegation of the Soviet Union agreed to this viewpoint, and complete agreement was therefore reached among the great powers on this basic question.33

The second issue that delayed the conference arose over the means of amending the Charter. At Dumbarton Oaks it was provided that an amendment adopted by a two-thirds majority of the Assembly would come into force after a simple majority of the Assembly members' nations and the nations of all the permanent members of the Security Council had ratified it.34 Prior to the committee meetings at the San Francisco Conference, the United States' delegation, together with Russia, Great Britain, and China, agreed to an addition to the amending procedure under which a constitutional convention could be called. Amendments made by this convention would be subject to the

33 Stettinius, 73.
34 United Nations in the Making, 30.
same general voting and ratifying provisions as amendments made in ordinary Assembly meetings, except that a three-fourth majority would be necessary to convene it. When this was proposed to the conference committee, it became known that the change had been made in the attempt to pacify small nation criticism. The Brazilian and Canadian committee members immediately advanced resolutions to lower the quota vote necessary to call a convention from three-fourths to two-thirds, to remove the veto power over the calling of amending conventions, to set a date for a mandatory amending convention, and to raise the final majority needed after ratification from a pure majority to a two-thirds vote. Though not too apparent among the technicalities, there existed here two basic, conflicting ideas. One, supported by the Big Five, viewed the Charter as a very permanent structure, which should not in the slightest fashion be subject to an interpretation regarding it as temporary. It approached a sort of super constitutional attitude which appealed to the small nations as a freezing of the status quo within The United Nations. The small nations, on the other hand, felt that there would be a definite need to change the Charter, after the postwar situation had developed; hence they wanted an easy method of initiating amendments. To further insure this, they wished a definite date for a convention to be set, thinking, no doubt, that the Big Five might never, if it was not specified, consent to a meeting of that type. Further, they wished the final majority vote quota raised to make certain that any "steam-roller" tactics by the Big Five to put an amendment through could be more easily thwarted. Also probable, but not openly stated, was the

35 Stettinius, 167.
thought that if an amending convention could be called in a few years time, the veto question as a whole might be reviewed and limited.

On the matter of the amending convention, the Big Five at first tentatively approved its inclusion in the Charter. However, a week after this committee agreement had been made, the Soviets reversed their stand, indicating that they could not conceive of its enumeration in the Charter. The small nations, led by the Latin Americans, then coupled up the convention and amendment features with the right of withdrawal from the organization. Even faced with this determined effort on the part of the small nations, the Big Five refused to budge from their veto position. Because of this, the closing of the conference had to be postponed. Finally, in desperation, the small nations conceded their demand for removal of the veto. The demand for a withdrawal clause, though excluded from the Charter proper, was incorporated in an interpretive report. It provided that a nation could withdraw if: the organization was not maintaining peace with justice; it adopted unacceptable amendments; and amendments fail to come into effect because of the use of the veto power.

Through these concessions on both sides, though they delayed the conference, the Big Five retained the veto and kept the right of withdrawal from appearing in the Charter, while the small nations gained approval of the withdrawal right, the easing of the vote quotas necessary to instigate an amendment, the raising of the vote quota necessary to put it into effect, and

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38 Dean, 98.
a semi-definite provision, in the Charter for calling a general amending conference.

Many other problems delayed the closing of the conference. Among these were the discussion rights of the General Assembly, the rights of withdrawal and expulsion, the availability of international armed forces, the selection of the Secretary-General, and the major problem of trusteeships. The last, it will be remembered, was not discussed at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, but was reserved for a decision on general policy by the Big Three at Yalta. There it was agreed that no mention of specific territories would be made at the Charter meeting, but that principles and machinery alone would be established.39 Mr. Stassen took over this job at the conference, and received great praise for his work. However, the writing of the agreement was delayed by a dispute among the Big Five over the inclusion of a phrase offering ultimate independence to trusteeship areas. Russia and China demanded that such an inclusion be made, while the United States, Great Britain, and France took an opposing view. After much outside pressure had been exerted by groups attending the conference, and after the Philippine and other small nation delegations had made eloquent pleas,40 the proposal was incorporated as the second of the purposes of the trusteeship system.

On June 26, 1945, sixty-three days after the opening of the conference, the Charter was signed. By this time, public interest in the meeting had largely been dulled. The conference proceedings, during the last month, except when a serious dispute arose and a walkout was expected, many

39 Stettinius, 128
times failed to make the front page of the daily papers. True, there was other major news, such as the German surrender on May 7, the securing of Iwo Jima, and the costly suicide tactics at Okinawa. But even in the city of San Francisco, interest in the meeting had waned. Molotov had left after a few weeks, Eden and Attlee returned home after Churchill's resignation, and many other important and colorful characters had departed when Germany surrendered. The conference, floundering through the technicalities, lost for itself the spark of enthusiasm which could have made it a great show, and received, day after day, more critical, less optimistic criticisms of its decisions.

The purposes and principles of the Charter were an improvement over those enumerated in the Dumbarton Oaks plan. Human rights were more heavily stressed, as were the principles of justice and international law. More direct guarantees were added with reference to territorial integrity and domestic interference. The purposes of the organization were set out as the maintenance of peace and security according to principles of justice and international law, the development of friendly relations with regard to equal rights and self-determination, and the achievement of international cooperation with regard to human rights and fundamental freedoms. The United Nations was to act as the harmonizing center for these purposes.41 The principles by which these purposes were to be achieved bound the members to respect the sovereign equality of the other members, pledged them to refrain from force and resort to peaceful settlement of their disputes, obligated them to render

various types of assistance when requested, and bound the membership and the
organization to a policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of
nations except when enforcement action was being carried out.

Membership in The United Nations was open to all "peace-loving" states. The original members, however, were to be regarded as only those states who had participated in the conference, or who had signed the United Nations Declaration and who had ratified the Charter. Future prospective members would be accepted by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council. This was opposed by the small nations on the grounds of the veto power but was carried without too much difficulty. Later, in the first year of the organization's operations, this veto power was poorly used by both the Western and Soviet blocs to trade off the membership of one nation for another.\(^\text{42}\) The membership section also contained provision for the suspension or expulsion of any member. Power over these matters was given to the Security Council, which after a substantive vote could recommend action to the General Assembly.

The General Assembly, as established, gave each member one vote with a maximum of five placed on the number of delegates a member could have. The Assembly was directed to meet annually or at such other times as a majority of the members or the Secretary-General should desire. All voting on important questions was to be decided by a two-thirds majority, present and voting. The Assembly was extended the right to discuss any matter within the scope of the Charter and to make recommendations on security matters to the Council, except when that body already had the matter under advisement. All

\(^{42}\text{Chicago Daily News, Aug. 30, 1946.}\)
matters concerned with the specialized agencies, as well as budgetary problems were to be handled by the Assembly. To this organ, was extended the task of coordinating the work of all agencies and commissions established to foster international cooperation and peace.

The Security Council, an eleven member body, was established to deal solely with matters of keeping the peace. The five permanent members, the United States, Russia, Britain, France, and China, were given, through the use of the veto power, complete control over decisions except in those cases already discussed. The seven non-permanent members were to be elected by the General Assembly for a term of two years and were not eligible to immediately succeed themselves. The Council members, or a capable and fully accredited substitute, must remain at all times at the seat of the organization to facilitate action, however, there was no restraint placed on the Council members to move about and meet in various locations as might be necessary. In regard to matters threatening the peace, the Council was empowered to take any action necessary, from conciliation to armed force. All matters of action were subject to the veto by any one of the Big five. The Council was also given the military staff committee to coordinate international armed force and to formulate plans for the regulation of armaments.

The third major organ established by the Charter was the International Court of Justice. This had been provided for in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, but the statute to be used and the obligatory character of the Court were left undecided. At San Francisco, it was decided to base the new statute on the Old statute of the International Court of Justice. This re-
vised statute was appended to the United Nations Charter. The obligatory nature of the court's decisions became a matter of some discussion. A majority agreed that members of the United Nations, being ipso facto members, should be obligated to accept the Court's decision. Because some members felt that ratification under such circumstances would be made difficult, the matter was made optional. The new Court, composed of fifteen judges, was to sit at the Hague, its old home. Judges were to be selected by the Council and the Assembly from a list of nominees prepared by each of the member nations, no two judges being selected from the same national origin. Under the revised statute, the Court became an entirely new organ deriving its authority and financial support from the United Nations. No nation which was a party to the old Court was automatically a party to the new, except as that nation was a member of the United Nations.

The fourth organ established under the charter was the Secretariat, or administrative agency. The Secretary-General, who was to head the Secretariat, was given a responsible position as liaison man between the Council, Assembly, and the Court. In this capacity, he was to participate in all meetings of the Council, Assembly, Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship Council. Aside from coordinating affairs of and issuing an annual report on the work of the organization, he was empowered to bring before the Security Council any matter which he would consider a threat to the peace.

The fifth organ was the Economic and Social Council. This body, like the Secretariat, was to function mainly as an administrative organ, co-

43 Stettinius, 144.
ordinating the affairs of the Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Monetary Fund and Bank, the International Labor Organization, and such others as might be established. In addition, the Council was empowered to initiate commissions of its own to study various problems which would arise. The eighteen members of the Council were to be elected by the General Assembly, and the Council as a whole was subject to the Assembly. The members, upon whom there were no restrictions as to national origin, each had an equal vote in Council matters.

The sixth, and last, major organ to be established was the Trusteeship Council. This body, working under both the General Assembly and the Security Council, would have control over three types of territories: those now held under mandate; those detached from enemy states in World War II; and, territories voluntarily placed under trusteeship. The Council would, of itself, have no authority to place any area in a trustee status, such arrangements being made by individual or conference action. Its task, with the exception of strategic areas, would be the guidance of the administrators and the inspection of their territories to insure the political, social, economic, and educational advancement of their charges. All areas designated as strategic would be handled by the Security Council.

These six organs of the Charter, treated but briefly, formed the core of the new organization. Through this machinery, the delegates expected the peace would be maintained. That there was a definite improvement over the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals was shown by the inclusion of moral principles, in the extension of the powers of the General Assembly, and in banishing the veto
over discussion rights in the Security Council. However, the feeling that these improvements had not been carried far enough was universal. In the closing speeches of the delegation chiefs, three ideas stood out. They were, that the conference exceeded expectations in producing a better Charter than was considered possible, that it is a good piece of machinery but its success depends on how it is used, and that the solution of the difficulties of the conference has brought a closer understanding and friendship among the nations. President Truman, addressing the closing session, confirmed these ideas, stressed the need for recognition of the fact that it was not a perfect document, and that time and necessity would indicate the methods of improvement. Declaring that the Charter was a means, not an end, he continued:

If we had had this Charter a few years ago—and, above all, the will to use it—millions now dead would be alive. If we should falter in the future in our will to use it, millions now living will surely die... Let us not fail to grasp the supreme chance to establish a world wide rule of reason—to create an enduring peace under the guidance of God.

Newspaper after newspaper, article upon article, all stressed one theme: the will, the inclination, the wish, the desire, or the intent to use the machinery would be necessary to maintain the peace. Many wrote comparisons to the League Covenant and came up with the thought that the real difference was not in the machinery, but in the fact that the United States,

44 The New World, (Chicago), June 29, 1945.
45 "UNCIO, Final Plenary Session", The Department of State Bulletin, July 1, 1945, 6-10.
46 "UNCIO, Final Plenary Session, Address by President Truman", The Department of State Bulletin, July 1, 1945, 3, 6.
who had swung the tide in two wars, was going to participate actively in the new organization. Her weight would lay the cornerstone of peace.47

Few took the time and effort to examine the United Nations Charter against the principles of the Atlantic Charter, the source from which it had sprung. Secretary of State Stettinius, in his lengthy letter to the President summarizing the San Francisco conference, and tracing its history, failed to even mention the Atlantic Charter and its principles, though he threaded the development through the Moscow, Tehran, and Yalta conferences.48

Newspapers representing religious groups, although they gave favorable comment toward the charter, persistently pointed out that, except for definition of human rights under the Economic and Social Council, little had been done toward recovering the ideals of the Atlantic Charter.49

Judging the conference from its stated purpose, the writing of a charter based on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, we can only say that it was a success. It met with its difficulties and disputes and found an answer. That which it did not accomplish falls in the realm of principles and morals, ideas which many today term unrealistic. But the same people who disavowed the need for morality, were at the same time talking about the necessity of the "will" and the "inclination" to make the machinery work and live. was there a


difference? Would they both not stem from conscience and a realization of value? In building the charter of The United Nations, men demonstrated a realization of the unity of the earth, its nations, and peoples. They failed, however, to lay a basis for true understanding. Functions under the charter could only touch the surface of human rights and fundamental freedoms. No secure and lasting peace could come without a common understanding of basic moral values.
CHAPTER XI

THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE PEACE

The dominating force behind all international organization is the desire to make this world a better place in which to live. To accomplish this, the first necessity is freedom from war. Only in a prolonged period of peace, free from armament races, military and diplomatic intrigue, can industrial, agricultural, and educational development have the influence that is needed to erase from the earth the need to resort to bloodshed. The second necessity lies in the successful operation of those agencies designed to insure educational, agricultural, and industrial benefits to the "have-nots". These two thoughts, on preventing war and on keeping peace, are virtually identical, for if you prevent war you keep the peace, if you keep the peace you prevent war. Consequently, the problem becomes a single one, building the peace. To build the peace, we must remove, aside from hunger and inequality, those important causes so seldom admitted by man as an individual: nationalism, selfishness, and greed. Let us examine The United Nations in this regard.

The United Nations is an organization conceived and based on power. Whether this conception is right or wrong does not alter the situation. The power factor remains. It was built on power during a war, among allies, and was based on a coalition of strength against a common enemy. The binding force among the original promoters was complementary power and aid, ignoring completely ethnological and political factors. It will be argued that this
is untrue, that before the international organization was conceived the powers agreed to and signed the declaration of human rights and freedoms known as the Atlantic charter. But we have seen that not only were these precepts totally disregarded, but before the first meeting of the Big Three could take place conditions were imposed which violated the spirit and the letter of this charter.

At the Tehran and Yalta Conferences, as well as other big power meetings, the unconcerned attitude of the principals in partitioning nations and dividing influence demonstrated a type of power politic comparable to the worst in history. Yet from these same meetings came pronouncements brimming with faith and enthusiasm, containing, here and there, allusions to ideals mentioned or implied in the Atlantic charter and denying the existence of arrangements other than those publicly pronounced. How is it possible to have faith in agreements that have neither basic understanding nor honesty?

At Dumbarton Oaks, proposals were written by the representatives of the major powers which they took to San Francisco and offered for the approval of forty-five lessor nations. Certain minor changes were approved, but on every point which would lessen the hold of the major powers on the world organization, conciliation stopped, and the Big Five stood firm. No other conclusion can be drawn than that the Charter fails to recognize the equality of nations and establishes a hierarchy of states in the new world order. This is defended on the basis that only through power can the peace be saved, and recognizes the concept that The United Nations was conceived and built around a coalition against the Germans, Japanese, and Italians.

The failure of the theory is that it refuses to recognize the
existing competing forces in the world today. It is built for the world that prevailed prior to World War II. From the establishment of the Bolshevik regime in Russia, to the years immediately preceding World War II, not only the fears but the actions of the Western powers were directed toward holding back the advancement of the communist philosophy and influence toward the west. With the rise of Hitler and his alliance with Mussolini and Hirohito, a temporary reversal of policy became necessary. This was especially true after the signing of the Russo-German non-aggression pact. Through the war there were but few indications of a genuine understanding between the Allies. Now that hostilities have ceased, the prewar feelings and policies have returned, the United Nations notwithstanding.

The first ten months of the charter operations have defined the cleavage even more definitely. The continued and unwarranted use of the veto power in the Security Council by the Soviets has indicated the probable uselessness of that body in any real difficulty. The delay of the Soviets in ratifying and joining the world monetary fund and bank, and the food and agriculture program, has also been a demonstration of her unwillingness to cooperate in the building of a true peace. The action of the United States, especially in the matter of using loans from the Export-Import Bank to bring about desired changes in governments or situations, is equally deplorable.

At San Francisco, every effort was made to keep sacred the omnipotent theory of sovereignty and, to be sure, if it had not been so, it is doubtful that many nations would have ratified the charter. The United States, with its national selfishness, certainly would have been among the first to decry moves to limit her in any way. Under these conditions, then, it is
difficult to point out any place where an attempt was made to limit that powerful cause of war, nationalism.

At this time it is impossible to evaluate the contribution the specialized agencies will make toward keeping the peace. They are shackled somewhat in their work by the strict prohibition placed on any activities that resemble domestic interference and it is probable that through the next few years their activities will be largely lost within the tremendous struggle for world trade and markets.

The United Nations will keep the peace, at least for the present, if we define a United Nations peace as subduing the aggressor powers of World War II. However, should another aggressor arise from within the United Nations, and especially from within the circle of major powers, there is no basis for believing that the United Nations could take effective action. Finally, it is doubtful that any real measures will be taken toward building a peace based on justice, equality, and friendship, while nations have their nationalism and men have their selfishness and greed.
CRITICAL ESSAY ON AUTHORITIES

1-Source Material

of the Charter in pocket form for study purposes. Conference Inside Story, Department of State Publication 2351, is a reprint of a radio broadcast by Conference delegates, which had the purpose of bringing to light little known facts about the Conference. Main Street and Lumberton Oaks, Department of State Publication 2288, is another reprint of a radio broadcast. Given by State Department leaders, it was an attempt to publicize the proposals and voice the State Department's attitude. House Document 106, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1945, is a reprint of the President's message to Congress on his return from Yalta. Interim Commission: First Report, Food and Agriculture Organization, Wash., D.C., 1944, contains the directives of the Food and Agriculture Conference, and sets out the new tentative constitution. H.R. Trolley and L.D. Steinbower, Food for the Family of Nations, Department of State Publication 2296, contains a sympathetic treatment of the Food and Agriculture Organization. United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference, Final Act and Related Documents, Department of State Publication 2187, is a collection of virtually all the documents connected with the Bretton Woods Conference. John Parke Young, Conference at Bretton Woods Prepares Plans for International Finance, Department of State Publication 2216, treats the Bretton Woods Conference from an internationalist point of view. Final Act of the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace, Pan-American Union, 1945, contains conference information and the resolutions of the Mexico City Conference.

2-Secondary Material

Books: Sumner Welles, The Time for Decision, Harper and Brothers, New York,

Periodicals: *Time; Newsweek; Life; The Saturday Evening Post; Christian Century; United Nations News* (Woodrow Wilson Foundation, New York); Foreign Policy Reports; Vital Speeches; Current History; *The Nation; American Journal of International Law*.

Newspapers: *The New York Times; The New World* (Chicago); *Chicago Daily Tribune; The Chicago Sun; Chicago Herald-American; Chicago Daily News; New York Herald Tribune; Miami Daily News.*
The thesis submitted by Martin Joseph Lowery has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.