A Critique of Lockian Epistemology Viewed in the Light of the Doctrine of St. Thomas

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A CRITIQUE OF LOCKIAN EPISTEMOLOGY

VIEWED IN THE LIGHT OF

THE DOCTRINE OF ST. THOMAS

by

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Loyola University, June, 1939
VITA

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INTRODUCTION

Our purpose in this thesis is not to place John Locke and St. Thomas Aquinas on the same high plane. For certainly the philosophy of Locke, which competent historians have termed "superficial", "inconsistent", and "devoid of force", is not worthy of the same merit as that of the Angel of the Schools, who has been aptly styled, "the norm for philosophers", by so many.

On the other hand, it must be admitted that Locke's philosophy has been very influential, especially in English and American philosophy, and particularly in the fields of epistemology and Psychology. A perfect understanding of modern English and American thought supposes a knowledge of Locke's philosophy. As Aristotle says: "He who considers things in their growth and origin will obtain the clearest view of them." It is worthy of study, therefore, to view these teachings of Locke, not in themselves, but alongside the doctrine of St. Thomas, which has stood the test of time, and is so consonant with revealed truths.

Our method of approach will be patterned after that of St. Thomas. It is his way, first, to set down the views of his adversaries, next to present his own views, and then to answer the opponents by comparison and criticism. Our thesis will consider both the Sensism and Attempted Realism of Locke, which necessitates a twofold partition of the work.
In each section we shall set forth Locke's doctrine, next Aquinas' views, and finally our critique presented in the light of Thomistic doctrine.

We have intended the chief characteristic of this work to be the fact that the criticisms are based principally on a parallelism of text. Thus in the third and sixth chapters many criticisms of Locke's Sensism and Attempted Realism have not been mentioned, since they have been brought forward by Saint Thomas' own words cited in preceding chapters.
AN EXPOSITION OF LOCKE'S SENSISM

By Sensism here we intend that system of philosophy which so analyzes the cognoscitive processes of man as to reduce all faculties to the level of the senses. Such a system puts man on the same plane as the animal as regards knowledge. In the present chapter we purpose to show that such was Locke's analysis of man's cognoscitive powers.

The first intimation of Locke's Sensism is found in his definition of "idea", one that is, to say the least, very vague and slipshod.

In his Introduction to the Essay he writes:

"Before I proceed on to what I have thought of on this subject, I must here, in the entrance, beg pardon of my reader for the frequent use of the word, "idea", which he will find in the following treatise, it being that term, which I think, serves best to stand for whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks. I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking, and I could not avoid frequently using it."

We could call attention, here, to the idealism implied in such a definition. But since in this chapter we are treating only of sensism we shall leave that for a later one. Our point is this. Locke, in this definition, does not distinguish between
the notion and the image. Since the image is always of the singular, and the notion of the universal, they are not precisely given the common name of idea. But yet this is what Locke does. Such a definition shows confusion of intellect and sense, which justifies us in saying that Locke at the very outset of his treatise on knowledge intimates the sensism which in the course of his essay becomes more and more explicit.

A modern scholastic critic of the same definition clearly corroborates our interpretation of the said definition:

"It would be just as appropriate to call an ox an angel as to call a "phantasm" and "idea". To call a concept or notion of the intellect, and a phantasm of the imagination, two things so totally different in their natures, by the same term --idea-- is an indication at the very threshold of his philosophy to confound intellect with sense, and to make man a mere glorified animal. So many outstanding philosophers of the ages -- Plato, Socrates, Aristotle, Descartes, Leibniz and even Kant -- were never guilty of this confusion."5

But let us proceed to Locke's analysis of our cognoscitive powers. It is in the second book of the essay that Locke proposes to himself the question:

"How comes the mind to be furnished with ideas? "To this I answer in one word from Experience."6

But what does Locke intend by experience? For him, as he clearly explains, experience is twofold: sensation and reflection. By sensation he means the perception of external phenomena, by reflection the perception of internal phenomena.
or the operations of the mind. Locke is very insistent that these two, sensation and reflection, are the only sources of knowledge which we possess.

"These two are the fountains of all knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring."7

Again:

"These two, I say, viz., external things as the objects of sensation, and the operations of our minds within, as the objects of Reflection are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings."8

Once More:

"I pretend not to teach but to inquire and therefore can not but confess here again that external and internal sensation are the only passages that I can find of knowledge to the understanding."9

The following is still more illustrative of the fact that Locke wished to limit all our knowledge to sensation and reflection.

"All those sublime thoughts, which tower above the clouds, and reach as high as heaven itself, take their rise and footing here; in all that great extent wherein the mind wanders, in those remote speculations it may seem to be elevated with, it stirs not one jot beyond those ideas which sense or reflection have offered for its contemplation."10

In fact at one point Locke challenges his opponents to name any other channel whereby he has knowledge outside of these two:
"Let any one examine his own thoughts, and thoroughly search into his understanding: and then let him tell me, whether all the original ideas he has there, are any other than of the objects of his senses, or the operations of his mind, considered as objects of reflection. And how great a mass of knowledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon taking a strict view, see that he has not any ideas in his mind but what one of these two have imprinted: though perhaps with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by the understanding."

We have been at pains to show that for Locke all the knowledge which we possess comes to us by means of these two channels. Our purpose in stressing this is because later we shall prove that all such knowledge attained in the Lockian fashion is sense knowledge. Since this is all of our knowledge, we shall have proved the Sensism of Locke.

But first let us continue with Locke's analysis of our cognoscitive powers.

Locke categorizes all our ideas in a twofold manner. Some he calls simple ideas, others complex. Simple ideas are those which are furnished to the understanding, by sensation and reflection, the understanding remaining entirely passive. He will enumerate four classes of simple ideas.

Some simple ideas come into the understanding by one sense alone. To this class belong the ideas of color, taste, light, sound, odor, solidity, roughness, hardness, etc. The ideas of this class are indeed very numerous, and Locke intends to set
down only a few of them.

"I think it will be needless to enumerate all the particular simple ideas belonging to each sense. Nor indeed is it possible, if we would, there being a great many more of them belonging to most of the senses than we have names for."  

To the second class belong those ideas which are conveyed into the mind by more than one sense. To this class belong the ideas of space, extension, figure, rest, and motion.

To the third class belong the ideas which are had from reflection only.

"The mind receiving the ideas mentioned in the foregoing chapters, from without, when it turns its view inward upon itself, and observes its own actions about these ideas it has, takes from thence other ideas, which are capable to the objects of its contemplation as any of those it has received from foreign things."  

Locke instances the ideas of thought and will as examples of this class, for these are the two principal acts of the mind.

"The two great and principal actions of the mind are these two: 'Perception or thinking, and volition, or willing.'  

To the fourth class of simple ideas belong those ideas which come into the understanding by all the ways of sensation and reflection. Thus we have the ideas of pleasure or delight, and its opposite, pain or uneasiness, power, existence, and unity.

"There be other simple ideas which convey themselves into the mind by all the ways of sensation and reflection, viz., Delight or Pleasure, and its opposite, Pain or Uneasiness, Power, Existence, Unity."
Complex ideas are those which the understanding "makes" by repeating, comparing, and combining simple ideas.

"When the understanding is at once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety; and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas."\(^{16}\)

However Locke will reduce these complex ideas to three classes. Some he will call modes, others substance, and others relations.

"Complex ideas, however compounded and compounded, though their number be infinite, and the variety endless wherewith they fill and entertain the thoughts of men, yet I think they may be all reduced under these three heads: 1. Modes; 2. Substances; 3. Relations."\(^{17}\)

By modes Locke understands those complex ideas which contain not in themselves the supposition of existing by themselves, but are considered as dependencies of substances. According as these combinations are made of the same simple idea or of different ideas we have simple or mixed modes. Thus for example "surface" is a simple mode resulting from the modification of the idea of duration, and memory a simple mode of thinking, etc. Sacrilege would be a mixed mode made up of the simple ideas of action, circumstance, and motive. Likewise beauty would be a mixed mode resulting from the simple ideas of color, figure, and order.

The second class of complex ideas are substances.
Historians of philosophy are not all in agreement as to what Locke meant by substance. However, most of the controversy concerns the reality of substance, a point which does not concern us here. What we wish to determine is this. Is the idea of substance merely a compound of simple ideas? The answer must be affirmative if we are to accept the following words:

"The ideas of substances are such combinations of simple ideas, as are taken to represent distinct particular things subsisting by themselves; in which the supposed or confused idea of substance, such as it is always the first and chief. Thus if to substance be joined the simple idea of a certain dull whitish color with certain degrees of weight, hardness, ductility, and fusibility, we have the idea of lead.... Now of substances also there are two sorts of ideas; one of single substance, as they exist separately, as of a man or a sheep; the other of several of those put together, as an army of men or a flock of sheep; which collective ideas of several substances thus put together are as much each of them one single idea, as that of a man, or a unit." 18

It is true that Locke elsewhere states: "the idea of substance we neither have nor can have by sensation or reflection." However, this is just another of those inexplicable contradictories found in Locke's Essay. Thus we can understand why Professor Morris, translator of Ueberweg's "History of Philosophy", from the German into the English, has this criticism to make:

"Locke's very desire for plainness and intelligibility has rendered his style, by universal admission, loose and inexact, not to mention colorless prolixity in him... and has consequently made his reasoning obscure and his conclusions uncertain." 19
Locke will distinguish three kinds of substances bodily, spiritual and divine. Moreover, he will maintain that our idea of spiritual substance is just as clear as that of bodily substance. For we have as clear an idea of thought as of extension, and of will as of force. The idea of divine substance is merely the complex idea of existence, power knowledge, etc. to which is added the idea of infinite. The idea of infinite is obtained by the addition of finite to finite.

The third class of complex ideas are relations. A relation, Locke tells us, arises in the mind,

"When the mind so considers one thing that it does as it were, bring it to, and set it by another, and carries its view from the one to the other." 21

For him relations are innumerable. However, he discusses only the principle relations such as those of cause and effect, identity, and diversity, and moral relations.

Let us recall what we purposed at the beginning of this chapter, namely, to point out the sensism in Locke's philosophy. Thus far we have merely summarized his ideogeny with scarcely any comment. Now we wish to show explicitly that all the ideas mentioned by Locke are merely sensuous.

We have already established the fact that all our ideas according to Locke, come to us by the channels of sensation and reflection. Are all of these ideas sensuous? That is the question we wish to answer now.
That the ideas of sensation are sensuous needs little proof. We must bear in mind that for Locke the intellect is entirely passive.

"These simple ideas when offered to the mind, the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter when they are imprinted than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas, which objects set before it do there produce." 22

If, therefore, the intellect in no way changes the sense impressions such impressions received in the intellect are no different than when they existed in the sense, even though we may then call them "Ideas".

Moreover, Locke explicitly calls these ideas obtained through sensations, "sensations".

"Thus the perception which actually accompanies and is annexed to any impression on the body made by an external object furnishes the mind with a distinct idea which we call 'sensation'; which is as it were the actual entrance of any idea into the understanding by the senses." 23

Are the ideas obtained by reflection sensuous? There seems to be no doubt about this. Let us recall his definition of reflection. In the second book of the Essay he tells us that it is "the perception of the operations of our minds within us, as it is employed about ideas got by sensation."

From such a definition we may legitimately reason thus: A faculty's nature is known by the nature of its operation. Furthermore, the nature of an operation is disclosed to us by its object. Therefore the nature of a faculty is manifested by
its object. We must bear in mind, however, that it is the formal object, and not the material object which discloses the nature of a faculty.

Let us apply this reasoning to our case. The faculty of reflection is employed about the operations of the mind which in turn are about the ideas got by sensation:

"In time the mind comes to reflect on its own operations about the ideas got by sensation and thereby stores itself with a new set of ideas, which I call ideas of reflection." 25

The ideas of sensation are sensuous as we have shown above. The operations of the mind about these ideas are operations of combining, comparing and so forth. Combining and comparing constitute the formal object of the operations of the mind. But certainly combining and comparing sensuous ideas are sensuous operations. The perception of these operations must also be a sensuous function. But reflection is nothing else than the perception of these operations. Therefore, reflection is a sensuous faculty. The ideas of reflection must also be sensuous, since Locke has explicitly warned us of the passivity of the understanding in the formation of simple ideas. Because of this passivity the mind can in no way immaterialize the ideas it receives.

Moreover, Locke explicitly calls reflection an internal sense.

"This source of ideas (reflection) every man
has within himself, and though it be not a sense as having nothing to do with external objects yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called 'internal sense.'

Thus far, it is evident that all simple ideas are sensuous ideas. But what about complex ideas? Are they too sensuous? They are, and it is evident if we keep in mind Locke's definition of them, and the fact that the intellect for him is entirely passive. Complex ideas are those which the understanding "makes" by repeating, comparing, and combining simple ideas.

"When the understanding is at once stored with these simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety: and so can make at pleasure new complex ideas."

The "making" of the understanding in the formation of complex ideas is by no means an action similar to the abstraction of the active intellect of the scholastics. It is merely a grouping together of simple ideas which are sensuous. Thus the complex ideas of Locke must be said to be of the same nature as the simple ideas, that is sensuous.

There is one passage in Locke's Essay which is sweeping indication of his sensism. It is found in the fourth book.

"Everyman's reasoning and knowledge is only about the ideas existing in his own mind, which are truly, every one of them particular existences. And our knowledge and reasoning about other things is only as they correspond with these particular ideas. So that the perception of the agreement or disagreement of our particular is the whole and utmost of all our knowledge. Universality is but accidental to it, and consists only in this, that
the particular ideas about which it is are such as more than one particular thing can correspond with it and be represented by."28

In this passage Locke clearly states that all our ideas represent particular existences. But sense faculties are sufficient to account for such a type of knowledge. Therefore, Locke, in his explanation of the cognoscitive processes of man, leaves no place for a spiritual faculty.
CHAPTER II

RELATED THOMISTIC DOCTRINE

Our purpose in this chapter is to present the doctrine of the angelic doctor, concerning human knowledge, not however in its entirety, but only as regards those points on which Locke has discoursed, or points closely related to them. Thus we shall be able to criticize Locke in our Third Chapter, in the light of the doctrine herein contained.

The following points we deem necessary and sufficient to explain, for our purpose:

1. Immateriality is the root of knowledge.
2. The nature of the intellect.
3. The difference between intellective knowledge and sensitive knowledge.
4. The dependence of the intellect on the sense.

1. IMMATERIALITY IS THE ROOT OF KNOWLEDGE

It is a very frequent assertion of St. Thomas that immateriality is the root of knowledge. In fact he rarely speaks of knowledge without in some way either explicitly or implicitly conveying this idea to his readers. It matters not whether he is considering knowledge from the part of the knower or the object known, for him it is still true to say that immateriality
is the root of knowledge. Let us now consider this principle, first as regards the knower and then as regards the object known.

In the "De Veritate" we are told that knowledge is not attributed to all things but only to immaterial beings.

"Cognitio non omnibus rebus attribuitur sed solum immaterialibus."29

Immateriality is here taken in the sense of eminence above potentiality in the reception of forms. Potentiality in receiving forms consists in this, that by the reception the form is determined, and a third entity arises composed from the potential and the form or the act. Thus when prime matter receives form we have a compound, namely the actuated or informed matter. Likewise when wax receives some accidental form it receives it in a potential manner. It is as a potency actuated by a form. Such a reception of form can be called a potential, subjective, imperfect, or material reception of form.

In knowledge the form of the thing known is not received in that way. It is received in a superior or more perfect manner. No third entity arises. The knower and the known do not combine to form a third. However the knower becomes the known, but remains itself and at the same time leaves the object in its "otherness". This is what M. Maritain styles "an apparent scandal to the principle of identity." And indeed the scandal can only be apparent. For we must distinguish between the order of
knowledge or intentional order, and the physical order. The knower becomes the known in the intentional order. The knower and the known remain themselves in the physical, or natural order. It is only in the intentional order that the Thomistic dictum "Intellectus in actu est intellectum in actu", is true. Because this union between subject and object is identity, Averroes reckons it greater than the union between matter and form, to which Saint Thomas would subscribe.

Since such a manner of receiving forms is opposed to the preceding way which was termed potential, subjective, imperfect, or material, we may describe this manner of reception as actual, objective, perfect, or immaterial. To receive a form thus, i.e. immaterially, supposes that that which receives be removed from potentiality or materiality. Hence Aquinas sums up his entire doctrine in the brief dictum:

"Immateriality is the root of knowledge."

If such is the case, it will be true also that the degree of knowledge is proportionate to the immateriality of a being. Hence logically the angelic doctor writes:

"Secundum gradum immaterialitatis est gradus cognitionis."

We find, therefore, descending cognoscitive powers in God, angels, man and animal, because of their descending degree of immateriality.

That such ideas are Thomistic may be easily seen from a
perusal of that article in the Summa in which St. Thomas wishes to demonstrate that there is knowledge in God. His conclusion is that the highest degree of knowledge must be predicated of God precisely because he is in the highest degree of immateriality:

"...intelligent beings are distinguished from non-intelligent beings because the latter possess only their own form; whereas the intelligent being naturally has also the form of some other thing; for the idea of the thing known is in the knower. Hence it is manifest that the nature of a non-intelligent being is more contracted and limited; whereas the nature of intelligent beings has a greater amplitude and extension; therefore the Philosopher says that the soul is in a sense everything. The contraction of the form comes from the matter. Hence, as we have said above, forms accordingly as they are the more immaterial, approach more nearly to a kind of infinity. Therefore, it is clear that the immateriality of a thing is the reason and rule of its cognoscibility: and the mode of immateriality is the mode of knowledge. Hence as the Philosopher says, plants do not know because they are wholly material. Sense knows in proportion as it receives images free from matter, and the intellect is still further cognoscitive, because it is more separated from matter, and unmixed. Since God is in the highest degree of immateriality, it follows that He occupies the highest place in knowledge."35

Immateriality, therefore, for St. Thomas, is the root of knowledge in the sense that it is the formal constitutive reason of knowledge. In other words, to say a power receives forms not as a potency actuated by them but as act receives act is the same to say that it knows.

Immateriality can be called the root of knowledge also on
the part of the object. For to be known, for St. Thomas, is to be received as act in act or form in form. The purely potential, being devoid of act, cannot be known in as much as it is potential. The material, and potential are here regarded as the same. Hence it is true that immateriality is the reason of knowledge, on the part of the object known.

That, this is the doctrine of St. Thomas is evident from his many articles on the question of knowledge. He rejects the doctrine of Empedocles precisely on this ground. Empedocles has maintained that the soul was composed of the four elements. Since like was known by like and all things were made up of the elements, it followed that the soul knew all things. Such a doctrine was false, according to St. Thomas because:

"...in the material principle of which they spoke, the various results do not exist save in potentiality. But a thing is not known according as it is in potentiality, but only according as it is in act .... wherefore neither is a power known except through its act." 36

When speaking of the cognoscibility of prime matter he will maintain that it can not be known by itself because everything which is known is known by its act or form and prime matter is considered as devoid of all form.

"Materia prima non potest sciri per seipsam, cum omne quod cognoscitur, cognoscatur per suam formam, materia autem prima consideratur subjecta omni forma." 37

Moreover, not even in God is there an idea of prime matter
distinct from form, not because of any imperfection in God, but because of the impossibility of the potential being understood in itself.

"Si proprie de idea loquamur, non potest poni quod materia prima per se habeat ideam in Deo distinctam ab idea formae vel compositi quia idea proprie dicta respicit rem secundum quod est producibilis in esse; materia autem non potest exire in esse sine forma."38

Again when speaking of God's comprehension of himself, he says that God knows himself in as much as He is knowable because the reason of His knowability is His actuality which is the reason of His cognoscitive power.

"For everything is knowable according to the mode of its own actuality. A thing is not known as potentiality but as actuality. The power of God's own knowledge is as great as His actual existence; because from the fact that He is Actuality separated from all matter and potentiality He is knowable in a corresponding degree."39

2. THE NATURE OF THE INTELLECT

Locke, as we have seen was insistent on the fact that the understanding is passive. St. Thomas will agree with him, but will remind us that there is also an active power in the intellect. It is from a study of these two phases of the intellect that we may grasp its nature according to St. Thomas' explanation.

The intellect is, first of all a passive power. St. Thomas will be careful to point out that to be passive may be taken in
three ways.

"Firstly, in its most strict sense, when from a thing is taken something which belongs to it by virtue either of its nature, or of its proper inclination; as when water loses coolness by heating, and as when a man becomes ill or sad. Secondly, less strictly, a thing is said to be passive, when something, whether suitable or unsuitable is taken away from it. And in this way not only he who is ill is said to be passive, but also he who is healed; not only he who is sad but also he who is joyful; or whatever way he be altered or moved. Thirdly, in a wide sense a thing is said to be passive, from the very fact that what is in potentiality to something receives that to which it was in potentiality, without being deprived of anything. And accordingly whatever passes from potentiality to act, may be said to be passive, even when it is perfected. And thus with us to understand is to be passive."40

But he will determine more minutely this passivity of the human intellect by comparing it with the divine and angelic intellect. The intellect has an operation extending to universal being. Now the divine intellect is related to universal being in as much as it is the act of all being. For all beings pre-exists in the Divine Essence, as in its first cause. Therefore, the divine intellect is not in potentiality but is pure act. But every created intellect is compared to intelligible things as a potentiality to act. Now we may distinguish between a potentiality which is always perfected by its act, and one that is not, but proceeds from potentiality to act. The first is the case with the angelic intellect, which is always in act as regards those things which it can naturally understand. The
The second is the case with the human intellect, which is in the beginning like a clean tablet on which nothing is written, to use Aristotle's example, and gradually actually understands. Such is the passivity of the human intellect according to Saint Thomas.

However, for St. Thomas as we have said, the intellect is not only a passive power. There is also what he terms an active intellect. In this he completely parts company with Locke.

The reason for positing an active intellect is because St. Thomas rejected the Platonic doctrine of the existence of subsisting forms and followed Aristotle who did not allow that forms of natural things exist apart from matter. Forms existing in matter are not actually intelligible, because immateriality is the root of knowledge. However, the intellect is passive and must be acted upon by its object. On the other hand, nothing is reduced from potentiality to act except by something in act. Hence there must be some active intellective power to make the object of the intellect actually intelligible. This power is the active intellect of the angelic doctor. There is no need for an active sense, since the sensible things are found in act outside the soul. Such an intellect was unnecessary for Plato, for whom the universals (direct) are in act outside the mind.
3. THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN
INTELLECTIVE KNOWLEDGE AND SENSITIVE KNOWLEDGE

Locke, as we have seen, confused the image and the notion, from which it followed that the sense and the intellect were not radically different. St. Thomas on the other hand, will utilize almost every occasion possible to point out a difference between sense and intellect. For him, they agree only in this that both are cognoscitive and not appetitive faculties.

They differ first of all as regards their object. The sense has for its object singular things, while the intellect apprehends universals abstracted from their material surroundings.

"Sensus non est cognoscitivus nisi singularium; cognoscit enim omnis sensitiva potentia per species individuales, cum recipiat species rerum in organis corporalibus. Intellectus autem est cognoscitivus universalium."\(^{47}\)

Moreover the senses are concerned only with the material, while the intellect can know the immaterial, not of course perfectly and in themselves but imperfectly and by means of material things.

"From material things we can rise to some kind of knowledge of immaterial things but not to the perfect knowledge thereof."\(^{48}\)

The sense cannot know its own act. But the act of the sense is perceived by the common sense. The intellect can know its own act. Therefore, they are different:

"The proper sense feels by reason of the change in the material organ caused by the external sensible. A material object, however, cannot
make a change in itself; but one material object is changed by another, and therefore the act of the proper sense is perceived by the common sense. The intellect on the contrary, does not perform the act of understanding by the material change of an organ; and so there is no comparison.\textsuperscript{49}

Moreover the sense may be damaged by a sensible object which is too powerful for the senses. A terrific explosion renders men deaf; an intensely bright light renders them blind. The intellect, on the contrary, is never corrupted nor damaged by the excellence of its object. Not even the idea of God is too strong for it. In fact he who knows greater things is better able to know the lesser things. For example, thanks to the knowledge of a principle of philosophy Aristotle was able to see a multitude of conclusions which the untrained philosopher would fail to see after many examples.

"Sensus corrumpitur ab excellenti sensitibi. Intellectus autem non corrumpitur ab excellence intellieibilis; quinimmo qui intelligit majora potest melius postmodum minora intelligere. Est igitur alia virtus sensitiva et intellectiva."\textsuperscript{50}

Moreover for St. Thomas intellect has for its subject the soul alone, whereas the senses are faculties of body and soul.\textsuperscript{51} They operate through corporeal organs. In this he differs from Plato who made the sensitive operation, an operation of the soul alone.\textsuperscript{52} Another difference, consequent to the preceding, is that the intellective powers actually remain in the soul after death, while the sensitive powers remain only virtually.\textsuperscript{53}
With such statements we readily see that the angelic doctor is at the opposite pole from Locke, regarding the relation between sense and intellect.

4. THE DEPENDENCE OF THE INTELLECT ON THE SENSE

Thus far we have seen that for St. Thomas, the intellect is different from the sense and superior to it. However the superiority of the human intellect over the senses is not such that there is no dependence of intellect on the senses.

In the "Summa" he devotes a whole article to this question asking whether or not intellectual knowledge is derived from sensible things. He takes a stand midway between Democritus and Plato, following the course of Aristotle. Democritus has held that knowledge is caused by a discharge of images. He did not distinguish between sense and intellect. Consequently, even intellectual knowledge was caused in this way. Plato, on the other hand, held that intellect is distinct from the senses. In fact so wide was the gap between intellect and sense for Plato that intellectual knowledge does not proceed from sensitive knowledge. The intellect for him knows by participation of separate intelligible forms. The senses are, at the most, occasions of intellectual knowledge.

St. Thomas on the one hand will agree with Democritus that the sensible things are the causes of intellectual knowledge. However they are not the total or perfect cause, otherwise
sense and intellect would be on the same plane. It is here that the angelic doctor leans towards Plato in making the sense and intellect different. He will not go as far as Plato however in making sensible things the mere occasions of intellectual knowledge but will call them the imperfect cause. The other cause of intellectual knowledge is the active intellect.

"Sensitive knowledge is not the entire cause of intellectual knowledge. And, therefore, it is not strange that intellectual knowledge should extend further than sensitive knowledge." 55

In the "De Veritate" he tells us that he finds this opinion more reasonable which places intellective knowledge to be caused partly by sensible things and partly from something separated from matter.

"Rationabilior videtur sententia Philosophi qui ponit scientiam mentis nostrae partim ab intrinseco esse, partim ab extrinseco; non solum a rebus a materia separatis, sed etiam ab ipsis sensibilibus." 56

The dependence of the intellect on the phantasms is greater than its dependence on exterior sensible things. For, it depends on exterior sensible things only to acquire knowledge, but it needs the concurrence of the phantasms to actually know that knowledge which it has already acquired. St. Thomas will support this doctrine with a posteriori and a priori proofs. If it were not the case, our actual intellective knowledge would not be impeded by a lesion of the corporeal organs. Experience testifies to this hindrance. Moreover we know from our own ex-
experience that when we want to understand something we form phantasms by way of examples in which we examine what we are desirous of understanding.

His a priori proof is to this effect: The proper object of the human intellect is the quiddity existing in corporeal matter. For the power of knowledge is proportioned to the thing known and the human intellect is a form united to a body. Such a nature exists only in an individual, and hence cannot be completely known except in the individual. But we apprehend the individual through the senses and the imagination. Hence for the intellect to understand actually its proper object it must turn to the phantasm in order to perceive the universal nature existing in the individual.

This of course would not be the case, he reminds us, if the natures of sensible things subsisted apart from the individual as the Platonists held.

Thus for St. Thomas the human intellect does depend on the senses. However, the dependence is an objective or extrinsic dependence, in the sense, that the intellect obtains its object from the senses. It is by no means a subjective or intrinsic dependence.

Thus far we have merely presented in an expository fashion the sensism of Locke and the intellectualism of St. Thomas. We now proceed to a criticism of this doctrine of Locke in the light of the Thomistic teachings.
CHAPTER III
A CRITIQUE OF LOCKE'S SENSISM

As we forewarned in our introduction to this thesis, many criticisms which we could make of Locke's Sensism, have already been brought forward and developed by St. Thomas in his rejection of similar errors and treatment of kindred subjects. In the preceding chapter a number of such texts have been cited from the works of the angelic doctor.

In this chapter, therefore, we shall indeed criticize Locke's Sensism in the light of Thomistic doctrine. However, we do not deem it necessary to develop all the reasons for the rejection of Locke's doctrine, but think it sufficient to point out these reasons. Otherwise we would be indulging in some unnecessary repetition.

The philosophy of St. Thomas is based on objective evidence. That is the reason for its merits. Now it should be clear to any open minded person that we, with our intellects, can perceive immaterial objects. Thus we can grasp or understand what virtue is, what wisdom is, and so forth. Logic demands that the faculty which perceives such object be itself immaterial. In an explanation of the intellectual process, therefore, we must save the intellect's immateriality.
On the other hand the objects of our experience are material. The Platonic doctrine which teaches the existence of immaterial, and consequently intelligible forms, is an unwarranted assumption.

A true doctrine of the intellective process must, therefore, explain how the intellect receives its knowledge from the material and sensible, leaving at the same time the immateriality of the intellect intact.

It is precisely on this point that the Lockian doctrine may be called false, and the teaching of St. Thomas true.

As we have seen, Locke does, indeed, maintain that our knowledge begins in the senses. Here he is in perfect accord with St. Thomas. But in the next step he falters. That which is in the sense passes to the intellect without any change.

"These simple ideas when offered to the mind, the understanding can no more refuse to have, nor alter when they are imprinted, than a mirror can refuse, alter, or obliterate the images or ideas, which objects set before it do there produce." 59

The idea, therefore, will differ from the image, only accidentally. How then can we uphold the immateriality of the intellect, without disregarding logic?

St. Thomas, as we have seen, will admit another power, which he calls the active intellect to extricate us from this dilemma. The active intellect will immaterialize the material in the phantasm. It will illuminate, so to speak, the immaterial and leave the material in darkness. This immaterial part,
or the essence of the material will then proceed to act upon the intellect. Thus the immateriality of the intellect is safeguarded.

Hence it is that Locke is wrong in insisting on the fact that the intellect is entirely passive.

It is clear, also, that we must not exaggerate the dependence of the intellect on the sense. For if the intellect is totally dependent on the sense for its operation, it must likewise be dependent on it, for its existence. In such a case it would no longer be immaterial.

As was explained, St. Thomas, while he must speak of some dependence of the intellect upon the sense is careful to point out that this dependence is only an objective or extrinsic one, by no means an intrinsic or subjective dependence. Locke, on the other hand, makes use of no such distinction, but leads his readers to believe that the intellect is totally dependent on the sense.

In Locke's essay there is no clean cut distinction between image and idea, nor sense and intellect, while in St. Thomas' writings their difference is unfolded from all angles. Hence from Locke's writings one would easily conclude that they were of the same nature, but from Aquinas' doctrine there would follow no such confusion.

Locke's reduction of the intellectual powers of man to the level of the senses is evident to any unbiased critic. Such a
verdict is the common opinion of historians. Thus Fr. Mahoney writes:

"The English mentality of Locke on the contrary, which is wedded to the concrete, individual, sensuous "ideas", made known by sense experience, and which are valid in so far as they can be tested by sense experience, tends to emphasize unduly sense knowledge, and minimize, if it does not deny outright, intellectual knowledge. Hence Locke repudiates the innate ideas of Descartes. Thus the idea of "substance", because it is directly and "per se" supersensible, Locke relegated to the realm of the "unknown". It is something merely supposed or imagined, because, forsooth, it is not an object "per se" of sense. "Species", "notion" and phantasm he included under the same category, that is he calls them by the same name - "ideas". Consequently he judges them to be of the same nature, and thus wipes out the clear-cut, traditional distinction, between intellectual (species, notion) and sensuous "ideas" (phantasm).....Those statements of Locke dispose of all intellectual knowledge in man, and make of him only an animal. Extremes beget extremes. Thus would Descartes make man an angel and Locke a glorified animal."60

Fraser, one of the editors of Locke's Essay, comments thus:

"Locke fails to distinguish between ideas as sense-phenomena, and ideas as concepts and meanings."61

That such a doctrine has very serious consequences is easily seen.

It destroys science. Science is of the universal. Sensism destroys all knowledge of the universal. When the scientist says: "Oxygen aids ignition" or "Fire burns" he is stating a truth which is true not only now but also in the future. For science professes to know what will happen in the future. However, sense-experience cannot transcend the past and the present.
No one can sensuously experience the future. Thus sensism is fatal to science.

Moreover if all our knowledge is of the sensitive order the intellect must be said to have the same nature as the sense. Hence we would have to say that it was essentially dependent on the material. But what is essentially dependent on the material, is material: Hence the human soul could not be called spiritual. Consequently it would be destroyed with the body and hence not immortal.

From a denial of the immortality of the soul, many perverse conclusions ensue. Morals would easily be lowered. For it is the rendering of account of their deeds in the next life which keeps many men on the right path.

Furthermore, if the soul were not spiritual there would be no liberty in man. For free will belongs only to one having power to know the universal, i.e. a spiritual nature. And, of course, the abolition of liberty brings with it a degradation of morals. Thus we see that a doctrine such as Locke proposed has far-reaching serious consequences.

Locke, himself saw that his explanation of the cognoscitive processes was sensistic. For, in one passage, he maintains that matter may be conceived as thinking.

"For I see no contradiction in it, that the first Eternal thinking Being, or Omnipotent Spirit, should if He pleased give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as He thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception and thought."62
He seems to believe that it would be derogatory to God to say that He could not make thinking matter. But we answer, that in this case we are not lessening God's power. For such a being cannot be, just as a square circle: A thinking substance can reflect totally upon itself, a material substance evidently cannot. Hence a material and thinking substance have contradictory attributes from which it is legitimate to conclude that their natures are contradictory since "operatio sequitur esse." Locke will add that since we do not know all the properties of matter, we should not maintain that it is impossible for it to think. But, of course it is not necessary to know all the properties of matter to say what is contradictory to it. We know that you cannot gather oranges from thorns, although we know not exhaustively the nature of that plant. In a similar manner, since we know contradictory attributes of thought and matter, we can truthfully say that thinking-matter is repugnant in terms.

Despite the fact that his premises logically led to a denial of the spirituality of the soul, Locke always upheld it, thus meriting the criticism of a modern historian:

"His Essay.......is teeming with contradictions and inconsistencies."
SECTION II ATTEMPTED REALISM OF LOCKE

CHAPTER IV

AN EXPOSITION OF LOCKE'S ATTEMPTED REALISM.

Our aim in this chapter is not to criticize, but to expose. Just as in the first chapter we brought forth passages from Locke's Essay in which his Sensism was explicitly and implicitly contained, in a like manner in this chapter we purpose to set forth other passages in which his futile attempts at realism are found.

The first indication of his Idealism* is found in his definition of "idea", in which also, strange to say, we noticed his sensism. After telling us about the occasion of his inquiry into human understanding, he continues:

"before I proceed on to what I have thought on this subject, I must here in the entrance beg pardon of my reader for the frequent use of the word, 'idea', which he will find in the following treatise it being that term, which I think, serves best to stand for whatever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks. I have used it to express whatever is meant by phantasm, notion, species, or whatever it is which the mind can be employed about in thinking: and I could not avoid frequently using it."65

Again:

"All our knowledge consists in the view the mind has of its own ideas, which is the utmost light and greatest certainty we with our faculties and in our way of knowledge are capable of."66

* i.e. According to our contention. Professedly he was a realist.
The same doctrine is contained in the definition of knowledge which he lays down for us:

"Knowledge then seems to me to be nothing but the perception of the connexion of and agreement or disagreement and repugnancy of, any of our ideas. In this alone it consists."67

The most explicit statement is perhaps the following:

"The mind hath no other immediate object but its own ideas which it alone does or can contemplate."68

If such is the case, one would logically say that we would never be able to know anything outside of our ideas. A modern scholastic picturesquely describes the predicament thus:

"What can be constructed from 'ideas' but an edifice of ideas, no matter how you manipulate them. Suppose there were no other material or commodity on earth for man to work upon but wood, then all his efforts could not make anything except out of wood. In like manner if as Locke says the only material of knowledge given to man, out of which he is to construct all his knowledge, are 'ideas' then out of the material of those ideas he cannot fashion anything except other ideas. All his judgments and reasoning will be confined, like a squirrel in a cage, within the realm of ideas. Hence the whole round of existing things outside the closed circle of ideas - matter, other human beings, soul, God, etc. - will be shut out from the range of his knowledge; he will be doomed forever to gaze, like a maniac at his own ideas."69

We would be wrong to think that Locke never recognized this difficulty. For he explicitly tells us:

"Our knowledge, therefore is real only in so far as there is conformity between our ideas and the reality of things. But what shall be here the criterion? How shall the mind when it perceives nothing but its own ideas, know that they agree with things themselves. This seems not to want difficulty."70
Locke will now proceed to solve the difficulty. He will begin to explain how we do come to a knowledge of reality. His reasons are multiple. We will set forth a few of them, in simply an expository manner reserving our criticism of them to the last chapter.

His first reason is based on the Will of God and the principle of causality. He will consider first simple ideas.

"The first are simple ideas, which since the mind, as has been shown can by no means make to itself, must necessarily be the product of things operating on the mind in a natural way, and producing therein those perceptions which by the wisdom and will of Our Maker they are ordained and adapted to. From whence it follows, that simple ideas are not fictions of our fancies, but the natural and regular productions of things without us really operating upon us and so carry with them all the conformity which is intended or which our state requires; for they represent to us things under those appearances which they are fitted to produce in us, whereby we are enabled to discern the states they are in, and so to take them for our necessities and apply them to our uses-------and this conformity between our simple ideas and the existence of things is sufficient for real knowledge."71

As regards complex ideas, all of them except the idea of substance cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge.

"All our complex ideas, except those of substance, being archetypes of the mind's own making, not intended to be the copies of any thing nor referred to the existence of any thing, as to their originals, cannot want any conformity necessary to real knowledge."72

Another argument which Locke uses to solve this difficulty can be termed the argument from the vividness of ideas of
sensation. The argument is contained in the following paragraph:

"There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds. This is intuitive knowledge. But whether there be anything more than barely that idea in our minds, whether, we can thence certainly infer the existence of anything without us, which corresponds to that idea, is that where of some men think there may be a question made; because men may have such ideas in their minds, when so such thing exists, and no such object affects their senses. But yet here, I think, we are provided with an evidence that puts us past doubting. For I ask anyone, whether he be not invincibly conscious to himself of a different perception (idea) when he looks at the sun by day, and thinks of it by night, when he actually tastes wormwood, or smells a rose, or only thinks of that savour or odor? We as plainly find the difference there is between any ideas received in our minds by our own memory and actually coming into our minds by our own senses, as we do by any two distinct ideas."73

A third argument which Locke advances for our knowledge of reality is based on the theory of Representative perception. In other words he will tell us that we know objects not directly in themselves but indirectly. He assumes that ideas are images or representations of extra mental objects. Thus he says:

"The mind knows not things immediately but only by the intervention of the ideas it has of them."74

Summing up we may say that Locke makes the idea the direct object of the understanding, in doing which he is simply accepting the postulate of Descartes, with whom he had parted company by his sensism. Despite such a promise Locke will attempt to show how we reach reality, and hence he is often correctly
termed a "critical realist." The arguments which we have selected were those based on the principle of causality and will of God, on the vividness of ideas of sensation, and on representative perception. After explaining the direct realism of Saint Thomas, we will criticize this doctrine of Locke.
CHAPTER V

RELATED THOMISTIC DOCTRINE

Saint Thomas' position as regards the object of the understanding is that of a direct realist. Instead of saying that the idea is "the object of the understanding when a man thinks", as Locke would affirm, he would call it the means by which we attain to reality itself. He will admit that we know the idea, but only secondarily, indirectly, and by means of reflection. The idea for the angelic doctor is never the direct object of the intellect.

The difference between these two notions sums up the fundamental difference between idealism and Thomistic realism. As Dr. Noel points out this doctrine is "the corner-stone of the critical reconstruction of philosophy."

St. Thomas in his writings has taken great pains to make clear his doctrine of realism. In the Summa he has given a whole articulo to the problem, asking whether the idea is that which we see or that by which we see. He first shows the false conclusions which would follow from a theory such as that of Locke. First of all science would be concerned with only ideas in the soul.

"Firstly because the things we understand are the objects of science; therefore, if what we understand is merely the intelligible species in the soul, it would follow that every science would not be concerned with objects outside the soul, but only with the intelligible species
within the soul."

The second false conclusion would be that whatever seems is true.

"For if the faculty knows its own impression only, it can judge of that only. Now a thing seems according to the impression made on the cognitive faculty. Consequently the cognitive faculty will always judge of its own impression as such; for instance, if taste perceived only its own impression, when anyone with a healthy taste perceives that honey is sweet, he would judge truly; and if any one with a corrupt taste perceives that honey is bitter this would be equally true; for each judge according to his taste. Thus every opinion would be equally true; in fact every sort of apprehension." 

The Angelic Doctor now passes to the constructive side and continues thus:

"There is a twofold action, one which remains in the agent, for instance, to see and to understand, and another which passes into an external object, for instance, to heat and to cut; and each of these actions proceeds in virtue of some form. And as the form from which proceeds as action tending to something external is the likeness of the object of the action, as heat in the heater is a likeness of the thing heated; so the form from which proceeds an action remaining in the agent is the likeness of the object. Hence that by which the sight sees is the likeness of the visible thing; and the likeness of the thing understood, that is, the intelligible species, is the form by which the intellect understands. But since the intellect reflects upon itself, by such reflection it understands both its own act of intelligence and the species by which it understands. Thus the intelligible species is that which is understood secondarily; but that which is primarily understood is the object, of which the species is the likeness."
Dr. Kremer will call this the essential thesis of direct realism:

"For the ancients and St. Thomas, it is indubitable that we know, not the representations of things but things themselves (vide e.g. Sum. theol. 1.q. 85, a.2.); and to know is to have this object for the normal end of intentional activity. The subjective intermediary which serves to make things known is not known by us in the first instance; its existence manifestly depending on that primary direct knowledge. This is, in my opinion, the essential thesis of "immediate" or "direct" realism." 79

In many other places St. Thomas also brings this same point to the fore. Thus in the Summa again he writes:

"The stone is that which is known, and not the idea of the stone, except indirectly by the act of reflection when the intellect turns back upon itself, otherwise our knowledge would be only of ideas, instead of things." 80

In the "De Veritate", he tells us that which is known by the intellectual vision are the things themselves and not their images or effigies:

"Ipsa cognita per intellectualem visionem sunt res ipsae et non rerum imagines." 81

In the same work he writes that the object of the intellect is the very essence of the thing, although one knows the essence through its similitude.

"Objectum intellectus est ipsa rei essentia, quamvis essentiam rei cognoscat per ejus similitudinem sicut per medium cognoscendi." 82

In his work "Summa Contra Gentiles" he writes so much in the same vein that there is no doubt left in the reader's mind
concerning his doctrine of realism. Thus he will point out that although he has told us that the idea is not that which is understood but the means of understanding nevertheless by a certain reflection the idea is understood.

"Licet autem dixerimus quod species intelligibiles in intellectu possibili recepta non sit quod intelligitur, sed quo intelligitur, non tamen removetur quin per reflectionem quamdam, intellectus seipsum intelligat et suum intelligere, et speciem qua intelligit."\(^{85}\)

The only way the intelligible can be said to be within the intellect is by the idea, by which the intellect understands:

"Intelligibile est intra intellectum quantum ad id quo intelligitur."\(^{84}\)

The idea by which the quiddity or essence of a thing is understood comprehends the thing in the sense of representing it:

"Omnis intelligibilis species per quam intelligitur quidditas vel essentia alicujus rei comprehendit in representando rem illam."\(^{85}\)

In one of his "Quaestiones Disputatae" he is led to tell us the same thing, in other words, when speaking of the divine relations. There are four elements to be considered in understanding, he will point out: the thing which is understood, the intelligible species by which the intellect is put in act, the act of understanding itself and the concept, all of which in man are distinct.

"Intelligens autem in intelligendo ad quattuor potest habere ordinem: scilicet, ad rem quae intelligitur, ad speciem intelligibilem quo
fit intellectus in actu, ad sumum intelligere, et ad conceptionem intellectus."86

His commentators will speak in language just as clear. John of St. Thomas will say that in the idea the thing is known as immediately grasped.

"Sed in ipsa immediate res cognita attingitur."87

Sylvester, in his classic commentary on the Summa Contra Gentiles, will tell us that in understanding the nature of a stone, the understanding terminates at the stone.

"Intellectio enim qua lapis intelligitur ad lapidem terminatur."88

It is quite evident therefore, that for St. Thomas, the idea is not that which is understood, but means by which we understand. As Dr. Noel puts it:

"The real is given us straight away in the activity of knowing."89

If some one would ask just what is that thing which is directly understood according to St. Thomas, we must answer that it is the quiddity of a material thing, which it abstracts from the phantasms.

"Objectum intellectus nostri secundum praesentem statum est quidditas rei materialis quam a phantasmatibus abstrahit."90

As regards the nature of this abstraction a sufficient explanation was given in our second chapter.
CHAPTER VI

A CRITIQUE OF LOCKE'S ATTEMPTED REALISM

In the preceding chapter we have seen from St. Thomas' logical reasoning, that if we would say that the object of the understanding is the idea, at least, two absurdities would follow. First, of all science would be only about objects within the soul, because the things we understand are the objects of science. Again, from this postulate, it would result that every opinion is equally true.

Such a postulate, we have seen, was a part of Lockian epistemology. Hence all that St. Thomas has said against it may be opposed to Locke's doctrine.

Locke, however, despite his Cartesian premise claimed to be a realist and adduced many reasons to bridge the gap between thought and reality.

We shall now attempt to criticize these different arguments which he brought forth, notwithstanding that, as St. Thomas has shown, the feat was an impossible one.

The first argument which Locke has given in this regard is based on the principle of Causality and the Will of God. Things produce in us those ideas which they are adapted to, according to the will of God. We can truthfully say that such an argument fails because of Locke's own account of the nature of cause. When he analyzes the nature of "cause" in the second book of the
"Essay" he concludes that it is a pure mental creation, having no objective value.

"So that whatever is considered by us to conduce or operate to the producing any particular, simple idea, or collection of simple ideas, whether substance or mode, which did not before exist, hath thereby in our minds the relation of a cause and is so denominated by us." 91

If then cause is something purely subjective, a mental relation, external objects can never be called causes and be said to really produce in us ideas.

Moreover Locke in the foregoing proof assumes the activity of matter, since he makes matter external to the mind the cause of our simple ideas. But when speaking specifically on active power he doubts whether or not matter has any active power at all.

"Power is twofold viz. as able to make, or able to receive, any change. The one may be called active and the other passive power. Whether matter may be not wholly destitute of active power, as its Author God, is truly above all passive power, and whether the intermediate state of created spirits be not that alone which is capable of both active and passive power, may be worth consideration." 92

If he wishes to be consistent, he cannot assume without any proof as he does in this argument that external matter has activity and is a cause in the true sense of the word.

The second argument which Locke uses to prove our intellectual contact with reality, was based on the vividness of ideas of sensation, when compared with the paleness of ideas of mere
imagination and memory.

The absence of consistency is quite conspicuous in Locke's Essay, and here again it must be noted. In this argument he assumes that we receive our ideas from external objects. For he begins:

"There can be nothing more certain than that the idea we receive from an external object is in our minds."95

But before, he had said that we know nothing but our own ideas. How then can he say that we also know that ideas are produced by external objects? Moreover in this argument he admits that he directly perceived objects outside of him, contrary to his avowed principle that all our knowledge, "consists in the view the mind has of its own ideas."

The third argument which Locke uses to demonstrate our knowledge of reality, was based on the fact that ideas are images or representations of extra mental objects. Since the ideas are known directly the objects which they represent are known indirectly, is the substance of Locke's reasoning.

But here again we may ask how can we know that our ideas are representative of external objects if all our knowledge consists in the direct perception of our ideas? In order to assert that there is a correspondence between two things we must first know both of them. But with Locke only one of them is known, i.e. the idea. To say that the idea is representative of an ex-
ternal object implies that we know that external object. If that is true for Locke then he abandons the principle which he had asserted, with so much infallibility, that the idea alone is the direct object of our knowledge.

This conclusion is confirmed by the judgement of two philosophers of his own English school. Thus Professor Archibald Alexander sums up his study of Locke:

"The truth is that Locke failed to make the transition from the individual to the world, or from the world to the individual...... All our knowledge is really subjective according to Locke, and human certainty is relative certainty." **94**

Professor Green gives the following estimate:

Only if existence were itself an idea would the consciousness of the agreement of the idea with it be a case of knowledge; but to make existence an idea is to make the whole question about the agreement of ideas, with existence as such, unmeaning.....There can be no assurance of agreement between an idea and that which is no object of consciousness at all ...The raising of the question, in fact, as Locke puts it, implies the impossibility of answering it. It cannot be raised with any significance, unless existence is external to, and other than, an idea." **95**

And thus we see that these three arguments of Locke can be refuted on the grounds of inconsistency. But we must bear in mind that Locke was doomed to inevitable failure because of his acceptance of Descartes idealistic postulate. One can never arrive at realism, by beginning with idealism. Gilson brings this out in his criticism of Descartes, which words can very aptly be applied to Locke and which M. Maritain calls "aurea
"He who begins as an idealist necessarily ends as one: it is impossible to be an idealist by halves. There is no need to doubt what history teaches by so many examples. . . . No one made a greater effort than Descartes did to throw a bridge between thought and things, basing himself on the principle of causality; he was indeed the first to make the effort since he had obliged himself to do so by placing the point of departure of knowledge in intuitive thought: it is therefore strictly accurate to say that every scholastic who things he is a realist because he accepts this setting of the problem is in reality a Cartesian. . . . One may begin with Descartes, but one will end along that road with Berkely or Kant. There is an internal necessity in the very essence of metaphysics, and the progress of philosophy precisely consists in an increasingly clear consciousness of its content. . . . No man will ever win from the "Cogito" the justification of the realism of Saint Thomas."
CONCLUSION

In the foregoing pages we have seen two errors in the epistemology of Locke ably refuted by the teachings of the angelic doctor. First of all we have noted how Locke reduced the intellect to the level of the senses, not indeed explicitly, but by means of his failure to distinguish between image and idea, and his over-exaggeration of the passivity of the intellect. Secondly he spoke of the idea as being the direct object of the understanding, and then with an attempt which was inevitably doomed to failure tried to show how we may grasp reality. Taking these two errors into consideration we may aptly style his doctrine an immanent materialism.

St. Thomas has pointed out the false consequences of such a doctrine. The first would reduce us to the level of beasts, destroy the immortality and liberty of the soul. The other would destroy science and make truth relative. Moreover it would make the apprehension of reality an impossibility. Hence St. Thomas saw the necessity of admitting a power in the human soul such as the active intellect. Hence it is also that he would never abandon the truth that we are in immediate contact with reality. The idea we know only by reflection.

Of all the verbal jewels added to the crown of St. Thomas perhaps the greatest was the testimony of Pope Innocent the VI: "His doctrine above all other doctrine, with the
one exception of the Holy Scripture, has such a propriety of words, such a method of explanation, such a truth of opinions, that no one who holds it will ever be found to have strayed from the path of truth; whereas anyone who has attacked it has always been suspected as to the truth. 98

The truth of this statement results from the fact that the doctrine of Aquinas is based on objective evidence. It is not the result of any gratuitously assumed, quasi principles. For that reason, it is most useful in refuting errors that have arisen after his time and will be helpful in disproving future erroneous doctrines.

Our thesis is an indication, we believe, of how Aquinas' doctrine serves to refute the errors of posterity.
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