The British Venezuela Incident and the Attitude of the American People Toward Cleveland's Policy in Venezuela

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THE BRITISH VENEZUELA INCIDENT AND THE ATTITUDE
OF THE AMERICAN PEOPLE TOWARD CLEVELAND'S
POLICY IN VENEZUELA

By

Jenny Pauline Gerakitis

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VITA

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In September of the same year she entered Rosary College, River Forest, Illinois, from which she received the degree of Bachelor of Arts with a major in history in May, 1944. From 1944 until 1947 she was engaged as a teacher of history in the Englewood and Parker High Schools, Chicago, Illinois.

She enrolled at Loyola University, in the department of History in August, 1947.
INTRODUCTION

In 1895 the question of the Venezuela boundary dispute "afforded opportunity for an emphatic reaffirmation of the Monroe Doctrine and for a notable victory of the principle of arbitration."\(^1\) The application of the Monroe Doctrine to act as a panacea for this controversy was to bring about a clearer and more exact definition and also with this a new perspective of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823.

It is easily realized and noted that in 1823 the Monroe Doctrine directed much attention in the process of its birth but the nation at that time little realized the importance that would be attached to that document with the passing of time and with the occurrence of various incidents that would seek shelter in some of the clauses of the Monroe Doctrine.

It is therefore with this perspective that I have tried to gather together some information relative to the general controversy between British-Guiana and Venezuela in 1895 to show that the controversy originated as far back as 1493 and to ascertain the position held by President Cleveland and his colleagues, the opinions of some of the critics of the time and the general attitude of the American people toward our stand in this issue.

It will be seen by the conclusion of this thesis that the British-Guiana Venezuela dispute was a complete victory for the spirit of arbitration. The decision of the special tribunal was indeed favorable to Great Britain but it was also a victory for the American people in the upholding of the principles of the Monroe Doctrine. Once again the principles of the Monroe Doctrine had been challenged and once again they held their ground. This incident as the others that had preceded it would serve only as lessons of example when the principles of the Monroe Doctrine were again challenged before the turn of a quarter of a century.
CHAPTER I

ORIGIN OF THE BRITISH-VENEZUELA CLAIMS

The British-Guiana Venezuela dispute over the extent of the boundaries of British-Guiana is regarded by many as an issue of the period of 1895 but historical research tells us that the controversy originated as early as 1493 in the document of Pope Alexander VI. Pope Alexander VI issued a papal bull on May 3, 1493, acknowledging the title of Spain to new lands discovered in the West towards the Indies in the Ocean Sea. This was not to the liking of Ferdinand of Spain who desired a document that would have far-reaching implications and on September 26, 1493, the Pope issued a second bull that stated that "a sovereign's title to new lands had to rest upon effective occupation in addition to mere discovery." This received papal confirmation in a bull issued by Pope Leo X on November 3, 1514.

About the same time the Papal Bull of May 4, 1493, set up a line of


Ibid.

Ibid., citing 79-83.

Ibid., citing 112-117.
demarcation between Spanish and Portuguese territory at one hundred leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands (Azores). On June 7, 1494 a second line of demarcation was established by the Treaty of Tordesillas that provided that this line of demarcation should extend from pole to pole three hundred and seventy leagues west of the Cape Verde Islands thus giving Portugal a title to Brazil.  

The original title of Spain to Guiana territory between the Orinoco and the Amazon is based upon discovery and occupation. In 1498 Columbus sighted the island of Trinidad and then Venezuela. Alonso de Ojeda, a lieutenant of Columbus in 1499 explored the northeast coast of South America. He sighted an Indian village made of pile dwellings in the Gulf of Maracaibo and because it reminded him of Venice he called the region Venezuela which means "little Venice."  

Spanish settlements were made on the coast of Venezuela in 1527 and within a period of four decades Caracas and in 1777 the Captaincy-General of Venezuela. It consisted of the provinces of Guiana, Cumana, Maracaibo

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8 Ibid.

9 Robertson, 82.
and the island of Margarita and Trinidad.⁠¹⁰ While the Spaniards were making their settlements the Dutch were preparing to seek claims in Guiana which the Spaniards had not effectively occupied as yet. According to the decree of 1493 and 1514 it was stated that a sovereign title to new lands was based upon effective occupation.⁠¹¹

In the early part of the sixteenth century charters were granted and settlements established by Spain in parts of South America. In 1530 a grant was made of Guiana by the Spanish monarch to Diego de Ordaz which included the coast from the Orinoco to the Amazon. Other Spanish expeditions are recorded also in the sixteenth century which ascended further into the Orinoco as is the one undertaken by Antonio de Berrio who started out in 1582 from Santa Fe, the capital of the New Kingdom of Granada to the Meta and Orinoco and made settlements on the island of Trinidad and Santo Thome and in 1591 in the territory of Guiana.⁠¹² Antonio de Berrio was appointed by the Spanish monarch as Governor and Captain-General of Guiana and the boundaries of territory over which Spain exercised her jurisdiction were designated as the Orinoco and the Amazon.⁠¹³ In 1595 Spain sent an expedition of colonists, missionaries and soldiers from the mother country.

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⁠¹⁰ Tansill, 622.
⁠¹¹ Ibid.
⁠¹² J. M. de Rojas, 2.
⁠¹³ Ibid.
In 1581 the Netherlands proclaimed a formal renunciation of Spanish sovereignty and war raged between Spain and the Netherlands until 1648. During this period the Dutch on a mercantile venture voyaged to Guiana in 1598 up the Orinoco to Santo Thome. However no Dutch settlement was made on the coast of Guiana prior to 1613 when the Spaniards destroyed a Dutch settlement upon the river Corentin. The Dutch West India Company was chartered in 1621 and began to contest Spain's American possessions and in a short time they were able to make settlements along the west bank of the Essequibo River.

The Dutch held on to their settlements in Guiana and on January 30, 1648, in the Treaty of Münster which terminated a war of more than seventy years between Spain and the Netherlands, the Spanish government recognized the title of the United Provinces of Holland to all the territories held in her possession at that time in South America. No effort was made on the part of either power in the treaty to try to fix the boundary of said territory although many cartographers tried to picture fixed boundaries which were not accepted.

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14 Ibid.

15 Tansill, 622, citing Report and Accompanying Papers of the Commission appointed by the President of the United States "to investigate and report upon the true divisional line between the republic of Venezuela and British Guiana." Washington, 1896-1897 9 vols., I, 61, 354-375.

Thus by the Treaty of Münster the war between Spain and the Netherlands came to an end and Spain acknowledged the independence of the Netherlands. Spain also acknowledged the Netherlands' possession of the places that she held and possessed at the end of the war which consisted of Surinam, Berbice, and Essequibo.\textsuperscript{17}

During the next period of one hundred and fifty years the Dutch continued to establish settlements along the Essequibo, Cuyuni, Massaruni much to the dislike of the Spanish. During this period there also arose a dispute between Spain and the Netherlands as to the rightful possession of territory west of the falls of Cuyuni and on the coast of Essequibo.\textsuperscript{18} The Spanish representatives of Guayana took it upon themselves to take action and charged that the Netherlands had invaded Spanish territory and thus they destroyed a Dutch trading post.\textsuperscript{19}

This general state of affairs continued until 1814 when the Dutch finally ceded to England western Guiana (Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice - later known as British Guiana). With this cession went also the indefinite boundary\textsuperscript{20} which would result in the revival of the question of the boundary limits of this area at a later date.

\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., 3.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., 5.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid.
The second party to the dispute was Venezuela which had in turn been declared a Captaincy-General in 1777 directing the provinces of Cumaná, Guiana, Maracaibo and the islands of Margarita and Trinidad. In 1810 a revolution took place in Venezuela which resulted in the final declaration of independence on July 5, 1811. This revolutionary movement was further assured by the assistance and leadership of Bolivar and in the final surrender of Puerto Cabello in November 1823 which brought the war to an end. From 1820-1830 Venezuela was part of the Great Colombian Republic after which Venezuela became a separate state and received the recognition of the United States on February 28, 1835, and of Spain on March 30, 1845.  

In consequence of this renunciation and cession His Majesty recognizes the Republic of Venezuela as a free sovereign and independent nation, composed of the provinces and territories mentioned in her Constitution and other posterior laws, to wit: Margarita, Guayana, Cumaná, Barcelona, Caracas, Carabobo, Barquisimeto, Barinas, Apure, Mérida, Trujillo, Coro and Maracaibo, and any other territories or islands which may belong to her.  

The question of boundary limits was thus bequeathed in turn to Great Britain and Venezuela respectively by the Netherlands in her cession to Great Britain in 1814 and by Spain to Venezuela in 1811. Thus the disputes and controversies which were formerly theirs were passed on and were to

\[21\text{Robertson, 219.}\]

\[22\text{J. M. de Rojas, 6, citing Venezuelan Constitution, Article II, vol. iii, 48-49.}\]
become a great issue especially in the second administration of President Cleveland and his Secretary of State, Richard Olney.
CHAPTER II
ROBERT SCHOMBURGK'S COMMISSION

There was indeed not a great lapse of time between the time that England and Venezuela exercised and assumed jurisdiction over their newly acquired territories and the time when both parties would be seeking as much of the land that could be obtained that each began extending her claims as far as possible without any authority to do so. England asserted claims as far as the region north of the Orinoco River and Venezuela north of the Essequibo River.

In 1835 the British Government commissioned a German-English surveyor and naturalist, Robert Hermann Schomburgk on an exploration trip into the interior of the Guiana area. On November 28, 1840, he was sent as "special commissioner to survey and delimit the boundary of the colony." On January 13, 1841, Venezuela was informed of the assignment made to Schomburgk and immediately steps were taken to get the Venezuelan Foreign Office to negotiate a treaty settling the Guiana boundary. When this idea was expressed it was refused on the basis that Schomburgk had probably started to carry out his assignment of the surveyance of the interior of Guiana.

24 Ibid., citing O'Leary to Smith, January 30, 1841, 190.
25 Ibid.
The purpose of Robert Hermann Schomburgk's expedition was to bring about some information of a survey nature in the disputed area. The Dutch had settled on the Essequibo River and the Spaniards on the Orinoco, but no definite line of demarcation had been drawn. When England was ceded the Dutch territory in West Guiana in 1814 no definite boundaries were established. When Venezuela declared her independence it was also essential to her to establish a definite boundary line. Venezuela claimed the territory north of the Essequibo River and England claimed the region north of the Orinoco River. Both powers wanted as much of the land as they could obtain and thus they extended their claims to the farthest limits. It was under this pressure that Robert Schomburgk worked. As he began a survey he realized the commercial and strategic value of the Orinoco and he set up posts at Point Barima and at the mouth of the Amacura River. He submitted to the British Government a report of his findings together with maps and it was this Schomburgk line which became the basis of British claims and it was also the line that was followed closely by the Tribunal of Arbitration on October 3, 1899.

It is claimed that in 1840-1842 Schomburgk had surveyed another line which would be desirable to Great Britain and this was known as Schomburgk's

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26 Ibid., citing Schomburgk to Gov. Light, June 22, 1841, British Parliamentary Papers, 97, 192-201.

Expanded Line. This map is said to have been kept secret and filed in the secret archives until it was published in 1886.  

Schomburgk asserts his authority of the Dutch claims in the eighteenth century primarily on Hartsinck's Dutch West India Company which considered the mouth of the Orinoco as the limits of their possessions.  

In an interview submitted to by Professor Emil Ludwig Scharff in the New York Times on January 2, 1896, the stress is made as to the unreliability of Schomburgk's map. The general opinion and information given by Professor Scharff is that the maps of Schomburgk were drawn up and circulated as an aid to the field of botany. He claims from information furnished to him through his father, Professor Theodore Scharff, late of the Imperial School of Metz that Schomburgk was not sent by any government but set out on a private, scientific expedition. Whenever he sighted British huts or camps he would make a notation of their location mainly for the benefit of scientists who would want to locate some of the flora described and the notation of location would aid them. It is claimed that when the Governor General of British Guiana learned of Schomburgk’s expedition he contacted him and accepted his information as an aid in the settling of the dispute.  

In 1841 the dispute between Venezuela and Great Britain began with the establishment of a sentry-box on which the British flag was raised in

28 J. M. de Rojas, 126.  
29 Ibid., 130, citing memoirs July 1, 1839 addressed to Gov. Light.  
Venezuela. Venezuela wanted this matter cleared up. On November 18, 1841, the Venezuelan minister believed this to be the work of Schomburgk commissioned by Great Britain to delimit boundaries and expressed the great dissatisfaction of the Venezuelans in regard to this act. It was the hope of the Venezuelan minister as well as the people of Venezuela that some compensation would be made to right this error. The British reply was made on December 11, 1841, on which Lord Aberdeen expressed the idea that the posts erected by Schomburgk "afforded the only tangible means by which Her Majesty's Government can be prepared to discuss the question of the boundaries with the Government of Venezuela." By January 31, 1842, Lord Aberdeen had sent a message to the governor of British Guiana instructing him to remove any posts that had been placed by Schomburgk. The British still held their claims. The difficulty was that Britain had claimed on the west of British Guiana a large area that was also claimed by Venezuela.

On January 31, 1844, a suggestion of boundary was made by Lord Aberdeen to Venezuela which proved unsatisfactory and was dismissed. For a short time there was a lapse in diplomatic negotiations until they were again resumed in 1851.

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32 Ibid., 7-8.
33 Ibid., 11.
34 Ibid., 10.
In 1851 the Venezuelan minister in London inquired of Lord Aberdeen about the Schomburgk survey and he received the assurance that the Schomburgk posts at the mouth of the Orinoco would be removed. The minister suggested to Lord Aberdeen that negotiations be carried out to definitely fix the boundary line between the two countries. The Venezuelan and British governments made extravagant claims. Britain agreed to give Venezuela complete control of the mouth of the Orinoco River, but Venezuela did not favor this proposal and negotiations were suspended. This was further complicated by the discovery of gold mines near the Yururai River in 1850. There was great fear lest Britain occupy this area despite the note reassuring the Venezuelans on November 18, 1850, "disavowed any intention of occupying or encroaching upon the disputed territory; hence in a like spirit of good faith and friendliness, the Venezuelan Government cannot object to make a similar declaration to Her Majesty's Government." The Venezuelan Foreign Office replied with a similar note.

On November 14, 1876, the Venezuelan Minister of Foreign Affairs sent a note to Lord Derby, the British Foreign Secretary in which he expressed the hope that the boundary would be settled. On November 14, 1876, the Venezuelan Government sent a note to Secretary Fish appealing to the United

36 Schomburgk, 126.

37 Ibid.

38 Tansill, 623, citing Belford H. Wilson to Señor Lecuna, November 18, 1850, British Parliamentary Papers, 97, 263-264.

39 Ibid.
States for aid "as the most powerful and the oldest of the Republics of the new continent; whose duty it was to lend its powerful moral support to Latin American States in their disputes with European Powers." A message was sent to the British Government with a statement of the claims they sought in Venezuela together with the emphasis that a settlement of the dispute was desired. The British Government however awaited the coming of the representative of the British Government before proceeding with any steps in the Venezuelan dispute. The visit of the representative of British Guiana was delayed and Lord Salisbury emphasized it would be more expedient to agree upon a frontier of accommodation which shall satisfy the respective interests of the two countries. "Her Majesty's Government was anxious to meet the Government of Venezuela in a spirit of conciliation and would be willing ... to waive a portion of what they consider their strict right, if Venezuela is really disposed to make corresponding concessions on her

40 Ibid., 625, citing Secretary Calcano to Secretary Fish, November 14, 1876, Senate Ex. Document, 220, 50 Congress, 1 session, 3-4. Also Cleveland. The Venezuelan Boundary Controversy, 22-23. President Cleveland wrote to Mr. Fish: "But whatever may be the result of the new steps of the Government it has desired that the American Government might at once take cognizance of them, convinced as it is, that it will give the subject its kind consideration and take an interest in having due justice done to Venezuela."

41 Ibid., citing Lord Salisbury to Rojas, May 19, 1879, British Parliamentary Papers, 97, 293-294. The Venezuelan representative in London waited for the arrival of the British Guiana representative which was delayed until May 19, 1879.
About this time gold was discovered in the disputed area and all efforts and peaceful negotiations were postponed. A suggestion was made to consider the mouth of the Moroco River as the frontier, but this was rejected by the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville and he suggested a line further to the north. Rojas considered this idea and agreed to a line one mile north of the mouth of the Moroco River. If this was refused by Britain, Rojas made the suggestion that the whole issue be offered up for arbitration. 43

The main objection to the line set up by Rojas was that there were many British inhabitants included in the territory suggested by Rojas and Granville suggested that a line be designated which would give Venezuela control over the mouth of the Orinoco River and reduced the territory claimed for England under the Schomburgk line. 44

President Cleveland said of Granville's proposal that it was "lacking almost every feature of concession." 45 The next move was taken by Rojas who turned to the United States for aid. A note was sent to Washington to Secretary Evarts on December 21, 1880, protesting the British interests at Barima Point. In reply Secretary Evarts wrote to Camacho:

42 Ibid., citing Lord Salisbury to Rojas, January 10, 1880, British Parliamentary Papers, 295.

43 Ibid., citing Rojas to Lord Granville, February 21, 1881, 298-299. Also see map relative to the Venezuelan Boundary Question on page 19.

44 Ibid., citing Granville to Rojas, September 15, 1887, 299-301.

... in view of the deep interests which the Government of the United States takes in all transactions tending to attempted encroachments of foreign powers upon the territory of any of the republics of this continent this Government could not look with indifference to the forcible acquisition of such territory by England .... This Government awaits therefore, with natural concern the more particular statement promised by the Government of Venezuela which it hopes will not be long delayed.46

The statement regarding Barima Point did not reach Washington until November, 1882, and at this time Frelinghuysen was Secretary of State and he advocated arbitration.

About this time ex-President Guzmán Blanco the representative of the Venezuelan Government to England and France came to confer with Frelinghuysen about settling the dispute. Frelinghuysen did all in his power to press the need of settling the dispute. In November, 1883, Dr. Rafael Seijas proposed that the British Government submit the question of the disputed territory to arbitration. Britain remained in great fear of arbitration lest the decision tend to favor Venezuela. Probably the greatest objection was that the nations were not in the habit of leaving it up to an arbitrator to decide such a vital issue as an important boundary line. 47

In 1884 Lord Granville refused arbitration but by 1895 he finally conceded to a general treaty of arbitration that would settle all disputes

46 Tansill, 627, citing Secretary Evarts to Camacho, January 31, 1881, 14. 47 Ibid., 630.
and arguments that might arise between countries. This was a hopeful outlook for ending the dispute, but it was disrupted when Lord Salisbury on July 27, 1885, repudiated any steps ventured into by Lord Granville and he stated that Great Britain could not enter such a course of action as that suggested by Venezuela of referring disputes to a court of arbitration. 48

48 Ibid., 631, citing Lord Salisbury to Guzmán Blanco, July 27, 1885, Senate Ex. Document, 226, 50 Congress, 1 session, 133-138. Granville announced to Blanco that the British Government was “unable to concur in the assent given by their predecessors in office to the general arbitration article proposed by Venezuela ... To engage to refer to arbitration all disputes and controversies whatsoever would be without precedent in the treaties made by Great Britain.”
THE VENEZUELAN BOUNDARY QUESTION

--- BOUNDARY CLAIMED BY ENGLAND

----- SCHOMBURGK'S LINE

SECOND LINE ON SCHOMBURGK'S MAP

LORD ABERDEEN'S LINE, 1884

SEÑOR FORTIQUE'S LINE, 1884

LORD GRANVILLE'S LINE, 1881

DR. ROJAS' LINE, 1881-1882

LORD ROSEBERRY'S LINE, 1886

BOUNDARY ACCORDING TO THE
AWARD OF THE TRIBUNAL OF
ARBITRATION, 1899

49

Ibid., 618.
CHAPTER III

CLEVELAND'S FIRST SIGN OF INTEREST IN VENEZUELA

Grover Cleveland became interested in the Venezuela boundary dispute in his first administration because it had caused some uneasiness in Washington. American observers were of the opinion that Britain was anxious that the dispute should not be settled and when the opportunity arose - that is, when Venezuela became preoccupied and involved in a neighborly squabble England could cleverly step in and secure the desired boundary. 50

In March, 1885, Señor Soteldo, the Venezuelan Minister sent a communication to Bayard. In a second communication he expressed the wish that his government desired to follow any plan that the Republic of the North might have in mind for Venezuela. 51 Bayard was obliged to answer that the United States could not take into consideration such a request unless it was submitted to by both parties. 52


51 Tansill, 633, citing Soteldo to Secretary Bayard, April 29, 1885, Senate Ex. Document, 226, 50 Congress, 1 session, 50-52.

52 Ibid., citing Secretary Bayard to Soteldo, July 21, 1885, 53-59.
Any possibility of progress in regard to the settling of this dispute was lost sight of until in 1886 negotiations were made with Roseberry. Roseberry suggested a line by which Great Britain would have control of the Guaima River, and the Orinoco would be free to commerce and navigation.\textsuperscript{53} Blanco suggested that arbitration included all the territory west of the Essequibo River.\textsuperscript{54} Great Britain however did not show any interest in accepting these demands but instead planted posts up the Orinoco and set up placards or signposts showing the limits of the British claims. This move taken by Great Britain made it clear that she was accepting Schomburgk's line as the boundary of British Guiana.\textsuperscript{55}

Great Britain had undoubtedly tired of proposing boundary lines that they favored but were unacceptable to the Venezuelans. Venezuela in return became greatly peeved because of the pressure placed on her by Britain to meet monetary claims. In addition the ire of Venezuela was greatly aroused after the \textbf{British Colonial Office List of 1885-1886} estimated that the British area made an estimated increase of 76,000 square miles in 1886 to 100,000 square miles.\textsuperscript{56}

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\textsuperscript{53} Ibid., citing Lord Iddesleigh to F. R. St. John, October 23, 1896, \textbf{British Parliamentary Papers}, 97, 372.

\textsuperscript{54} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid.

Venezuela began to fear the imperial ambition of Great Britain in South America and the attention of the United States was also aroused as we shall see later. The thing that was feared was the procedure of Venezuela to occupy any point in the dispute which might cause a diplomatic crisis.

In one instance Bayard in a message to Phelps said: "The doctrines we announced two generations ago ... have lost none of their force ... in the progress of time."57

In 1887 diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Great Britain were suspended. J. A. Olavarria tried to adjust matters when he dispatched a note in the nature of a request to be presented to the United States to act as arbitrator of this boundary dispute. The general contents of the note read as follows:

... urge or insist upon arbitration by Great Britain and also that the Venezuelan Government wished the United States to become the arbitrator. I (Bayard) told him that we should be very glad to lend our good offices in favor of arbitration, but that we could not suggest the United States as arbitrator; that such a suggestion must come from both parties; that at the joint request of both we would be unable to decline, but that we could not propose ourselves upon the recommendation of either. He said that he understood that and that Venezuela would make the suggestion that the United States should be arbitrator.58

57 Tansill, 636, citing Secretary Bayard to Phelps, December 30, 1886, Senate Ex. Document, 226, 50 Congress, 1 session, 67-68.
58 Ibid., 638, citing memorandum written by Bayard after a conversation with Olavarria, May 2, 1887, Bayard MS.
Many efforts were made at restoring negotiations between Venezuela and Great Britain but Venezuela refused to agree to anything until the disputed territory had been cleared of English officials. In addition Britain was seeking payment of an indemnity as compensation for the seizure of two of her vessels by the Venezuelans in 1883 and finally Venezuela paid. 59

The Venezuelan Government was greatly annoyed because it believed that Britain was laying claim to as much territory as she could with little consideration of her rights to it and Britain even went so far as to dispute the claims of the Venezuela railway grants which were definitely beyond dispute. 60 This attitude naturally aroused a general feeling against Britain's so-called policy of imperialism and thirst for conquest.

Thomas F. Bayard believed that England had no such plan in mind of extending her political sovereignty. Bayard as Tansill relates was not as easily swayed as Cleveland and Olney by the Venezuelans and because of this he put great trust in Great Britain for which he was later to receive severe criticism. 61

Diplomatic relations between Venezuela and Great Britain were in a critical condition and with the increasing demands of the British claims the two powers were on the verge of war in 1888. An effort was made to patch

59 Ibid., 639.
60 Ibid., citing Olavarria to Secretary Bayard, February 15, 1888, Senate Ex. Document, 226, 50 Congress, 1 session, 201-202.
61 Ibid., 645.
up the difficulty by a "return to the status quo of former years."62

Venezuela still remained aloof to any settlement of the dispute and this defiant attitude was probably adopted because of the assurance of the sympathetic support of the United States. The Venezuelan Minister aided things by presenting the case to the American authorities so as to give the impression that Venezuela was the victim of English expansion. Britain on the other hand did not present its case because at the time it was not regarded as an important issue.

The question of the Venezuela-British Guiana boundary did not assume the momentous that it would achieve in the second administration of Cleveland. The dispute was revived time and time again from the period of the Robert Schomburgk commission to the first and second administrations of Cleveland. Within a fairly short time this dispute would lead to the opening of new channels which would in turn lead to discussions of the applicability of the Monroe Doctrine.

Jefferson regarded the Monroe Doctrine as a sort of quid pro quo. 64

"Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe. Our second never to suffer Europe to meddle with

63 Ibid., citing Secretary Blaine to Henry White, December 30, 1889, Foreign Relations, 1890, 322.


cisatlantic affairs." As Olney said, "American non-intervention in Europe implied European non-intervention in America. As long as the principle is maintained there can be no fair charge of inconsistency."66

One can easily realize the position of the United States at this time for earlier leaders had set up a policy which in reality was only a presidential pronouncement namely, the Monroe Doctrine and this doctrine became very important in the history of our nation. Although it was not classified under international law it was consulted in many instances for important pronouncements that it contained. The principle motive for the Monroe Doctrine has been given as one of self-defense against European aggression, self-preservation and the acquisition of territory with view only of the safety of the country.67 Thus Monroe in his message said,

We owe it therefore to candor, and to amicable relations existing between the United States and those (Allied) powers to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety. ... We could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, the independent South American countries or controlling in any other manner their destiny by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States.68

65 Ibid., 261.
66 Ibid.
68 Ibid., 84.
CHAPTER IV

THOMAS F. BAYARD, DIPLOMATIC ATTACHÉ

Thomas F. Bayard, an American statesman and diplomat was born in Wilmington, Delaware, October 29, 1828. The Bayard family represented the State of Delaware for four successive generations in the United States Senate. Thomas F. Bayard practiced law until 1868; in 1885 he was chosen by President Cleveland as Secretary of State and in Cleveland's second administration he was appointed United States Ambassador to England.

The position of Thomas F. Bayard was different from the belligerent attitude of Cleveland and Olney. He did all in his power to keep friendly relations between the United States and Great Britain. When a request was sent to the United States to act as arbitrator Thomas F. Bayard replied by saying that in order for such a step to be taken a request must come from both parties concerned. 69 Bayard also tried to emphasize to Great Britain that the Monroe Doctrine was in full force. 70

In 1889 Thomas F. Bayard's term of office as Secretary of State drew to a close. He then went to Wilmington, Delaware, to resume his law practice.

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69 Tansill, 638, citing memorandum written by Bayard after a conversation with Olavarria, May 2, 1887, Bayard MS.

70 Ibid., 639, citing Olavarria to Secretary Bayard, September 22, 1887, Senate Ex. Document, 226, 50 Congress, 1 session, 194-195.
While he resumed his legal practice he did not divert his attention from foreign affairs. It was not therefore surprising despite different attitudes toward different policies that Cleveland made an offer to Bayard to become his Secretary of State in his second administration. It is stated by some authorities that Bayard refused this offer "because he dreaded the high expense and preferred to be our first Ambassador to Great Britain." 71

The offer was then made to Judge Walter Q. Gresham who at first refused. The general feeling in political circles however felt that Bayard would again assume the office of Secretary of State. 72 There is an account of a letter that Bayard wrote to William F. Vilas on February 8:

> From you, Mr. Cleveland and I have no secrets. ... It is not possible for me to refuse the best that I can give to such a man in such a cause, and this is what I told him, and so the matter was left, and now stands. He will need all the aid he can obtain, and it is a question of ascertaining and distributing forces. If he can find to his own satisfaction someone without my faults, and with more than my character to go into the State Department, I want him to do so, and you, my dear friend, will know that my "if" only means whether he has time to look the right man up, for I draw great comfort from the belief that our country does contain a ... kind of strength in its unknown citizens. You see I cannot tell you positively whether I will be in office again or not, nor will I stop to weigh minor ... considerations. I only want to do my duty. 73

71 Ibid., 653, citing Allan Nevins, Grover Cleveland, 511.
72 Ibid., citing Wade Hampton to Bayard, January 29, 1893, Bayard MS.
73 Ibid., 654, citing Bayard to William F. Vilas, February 8, 1893, Vilas MS.
This correspondence seems to imply that Bayard would have been only too glad to serve as Secretary of State providing that the Chief of State had desired him to do so. It is also apparent to most historians that the excuse given by Bayard as an office of "high expense" was irrelative if the Chief of State believed that his appointment to this office would be helpful to the nation.\textsuperscript{74} It seems however that Cleveland was greatly relieved when he received a letter of acceptance from Gresham.\textsuperscript{75}

Within a month's time Cleveland had found a place for Bayard in the appointment as Ambassador to England.\textsuperscript{76} Bayard expressed his gratitude to Cleveland for the confidence he showed in bestowing upon him such an honor as this position held.\textsuperscript{77} Bayard also received the congratulations of many political leaders.

When Bayard arrived in Southampton in June, 1893, he expressed the idea he was glad to set foot in England, a land of liberty similar to that of his mother country.\textsuperscript{78} He also felt a great sense of responsibility and he felt that it would be a means by which he would be able to bring together

\textsuperscript{74} Ibid., 654.
\textsuperscript{75} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., citing Cleveland to W. Q. Gresham, February 9, 1893, Cleveland MS. "Cleveland had raised the rank of diplomatic representation in England from that of Minister to Ambassador."
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 655, citing Bayard to President Cleveland, March 30, 1893, Cleveland MS.
the interests of the United States and England. 79 He saw and realized the
great value of his position and he hoped that if any misunderstanding arose
between the two great powers he should be able to remove them. Little did
he realize that before long he would be used as a go-between of the United
States and Great Britain in one of its major boundary controversies, namely
the British-Guiana Venezuela boundary dispute.

Bayard in this position was the target of much criticism as that of
Olney who was outraged that Bayard would not cooperate in supporting a
program of hostility towards England. 80

Bayard stated his position in 1893 when he expressed the view that he
did not believe that the European powers were interested in Latin America
with the purpose of carving it up into spheres of influence. 81 He also
showed a friendly feeling toward Great Britain and he sincerely hoped that
nothing should arise that would imperil this situation. 82 Thus with the
question of the Venezuela boundary dispute coming again into the limelight
it is little wonder that he expressed grave concern over the diplomatic
relations of the two powers.

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79 Ibid., 656, citing London Daily News, June 12, 1893 also London Times,
June 12, 1893.
80 Ibid., 660.
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid., 661.
Thomas F. Bayard wrote from London in 1893 that at the time Great Britain was very much preoccupied with other affairs in other parts of the globe. He also emphasized that England did not favor any disagreements with the United States. He went on to say that "the ... European nations are watching each other like pugilists in a ring." 83

Bayard's efforts to keep amicable relations between the two powers were further complicated in October, 1894, by a pamphlet published by William L. Scruggs, a former minister to Venezuela under Harrison. This pamphlet British Aggressions in Venezuela or The Monroe Doctrine on Trial, contained a brief outline of the Venezuelan controversy and it aimed to show that Britain was violating one of America's policies namely the Monroe Doctrine. 84 Copies of this pamphlet were sent to the editors of the leading newspapers and magazines in the United States and England, to members of Congress, to Governors and leading members of the General Assemblies of the States, to public libraries and to principal clubs. 85

The theme of this pamphlet was to emphasize the importance of America's resisting and disputing any claims England might make that would be

84 Tansill, 691, citing London Times, November 21, 1893.
85 Ibid., 664.
"... within the territory and jurisdiction of an independent American Republic ..." 86 If the United States did not resist England's interference in the New World she would in reality be falling back on her policy of 1823. If she abandoned the policies that were adopted by her predecessors she would also be sacrificing her national honor and prestige. 87

Scruggs' efforts to arouse American public opinion did not end here for he was equally determined to bring the Monroe Doctrine to the attention of the American People. With the aid of Colonel Leonidas F. Livingston of Georgia he was able to introduce a resolution which backed the President's suggestion to arbitrate the dispute. This resolution was unanimously approved by the House on February 13, 1895, and it was also adopted by the Senate. On February 20, Cleveland signed the resolution. 88 89

Much public opinion was aroused especially in America where a great effort was made to stress the importance of amicable relations of the English-speaking peoples. Quite the opposite in public opinion was stressed in other circles where the feeling was one of general suspicion of Great Britain. It was stated that since 1844 England had pushed her claims

86 Ibid., citing William L. Scruggs. The Colombian and Venezuelan Republics.
87 Ibid., citing William L. Scruggs. British Aggressions in Venezuela, or The Monroe Doctrine on Trial, 32.
89 Ibid., citing Congressional Record, 53 Congress, 3 session, vol. 3, 2642.
forward in Venezuela and also had refused arbitration. In addition, Great Britain had violated the Monroe Doctrine. The expressed views of many American leaders was to enforce the Monroe Doctrine so no other power would violate it. This was the general attitude of many Americans who were suspicious of Britain's land grabbing.

Secretary Gresham was very much opposed to the stand taken by Great Britain in the British-Guiana Venezuela boundary dispute. He stated that the position taken by Great Britain was unjust and he maintained if Great Britain persisted in this position that he would be forced "to call a halt." Gresham made this statement but he remained hopeful that amicable relations between the United States and Great Britain would be restored.

It was indeed fortunate for Bayard that Gresham also showed interest in keeping friendly relations between Great Britain and the United States. Little did Bayard realize that before too long there would come a complete change in the Department of State in the person of Richard Olney.

With the accession of Olney to the office of Secretary of State on June 8, 1895, the stage was being set for a new political play in which this belligerent Boston lawyer was to play the part of the bold knight that rescued defenceless Venezuela from the clutches of perfidious England. It was a stirring

91 Tansill, 695, citing Secretary Gresham to Bayard, March 31, 1895, Personal, Bayard MS.
92 Ibid.
melodrama that captured the fancy of most American audiences, and it was not until later that the public perceived that the Venezuelan maiden was a worthless wench.

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Ibid., 690.
CHAPTER V

THE ROLE OF GRESHAM AND OLNEY

Grover Cleveland's foreign policy during his administration was entirely different from the policies of Blaine, Seward and Hay. His policy had the tendency of being one strictly opposed to any vestiges of imperialism and for this the Hispanic-American nations breathed a sigh of relief. The government of Chile in 1893 expressed joy on the entry of Cleveland into power and sent him a message which declared that "his restoration was a pledge that the United States would preserve the tranquillity and well-being of all nations upon the American continent." Cleveland also wrote a letter to Bayard in which he told him of the great welcome given him in Washington by the representative of Central and South America in 1893.

Grover Cleveland developed an interest in the Venezuelan boundary dispute in both of his administrations. Grover Cleveland had definitely no reason to be favorable to England because of the Sackville-West incident which cost him the election of 1888. When Cleveland returned to the White

94 Nevins, Cleveland, 549.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid., citing Nation, March 9, 1893.
House in 1893 he was again confronted with the problem of Venezuela and soon after Cleveland had taken care of his presidential duties he turned to consider the problem of Venezuela which had dragged on too long. It was greatly feared by Cleveland and by others that this "looked like a case of land-grabbing at the expense of a weak nation." Cleveland became more vexed also when he learned that British troops made an effort to collect claims for damages by seizing the customs house at Corinto, Nicaragua.

Therefore in 1893 Cleveland was

suddenly faced with a choice not any greater than that which the Roman Senate had to make when the Mamertines invited it to occupy part of Sicily, and thus abandon the policy of isolation which had hitherto confined Roman expansion to the peninsula. As the Roman power according to Polybius long hesitated to commit itself to so fearful an intervention, so the American Government was now to hesitate for half a dozen years before embarking upon a definite course of expansion.

Cleveland made it known by his message to Congress in 1894 that he would take interest in the Venezuelan question. He said he would renew his efforts to bring about arbitration knowing that England had on other occasions agreed to the principle of arbitration. From the time of the

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98 MoElroy, 192.
99 Bailey, 481.
100 Ibid.
101 Nevins, Cleveland, 549.
102 Ibid., 631.
Civil War to the Spanish-American War there were many disputes with Great Britain such as the Alabama claims, the Bering Sea controversy, the Alaskan boundary dispute, all of which were settled by arbitration. 103

Cleveland urged our American Ambassador, Thomas F. Bayard to interview Lord Kimberly and to encourage a settlement of the dispute. Bayard interviewed Lord Kimberly, the British Foreign Secretary on January 23, 1895, and reported to him the strong feeling of the American Government to bring this dispute to a close. On February 20, he interviewed him again and in his report he emphasized that Lord Kimberly was very cool and said that Britain "refused to arbitrate anything east of the Schomburgk line or any area long settled by the British." 104 He also gave the impression that Great Britain would try to hold on to the territory at the mouth of the Orinoco River. 105

In April, Don M. Dickinson came to the White House and gave Cleveland some information about the map Kimberly had shown him regarding British-Guiana. According to this Britain was asserting claim to the Orinoco. 106

In April, 1894, diplomatic negotiations between Nicaragua and Great Britain were dispensed with. Several British subjects had been dismissed from Nicaragua and others were arrested for which Lord Kimberly demanded

103 Ibid., 629.
104 Ibid., 631.
105 Ibid.
106 Ibid.
& 75,000 in damages. British ships arrived into Corinto, Nicaragua seeking payment of the said demand and after this payment was refused four hundred English marines and sailors seized the custom-house. The Nicaraguan government protested to Cleveland for the drastic measures taken by the British but nothing could be done by the United States because it was the same procedure that they had taken in regard to Chile. The incident closed with the payment of the indemnity by Nicaragua.

Don Dickinson however did not keep silent in regard to this question, but he made a speech in which he denounced the British policy. He took his pressure off the British interests in Nicaragua and in the West Indies and he concentrated especially on the Venezuelan question.

In the present conditions, he said with reference to Bayard's Anglophile speeches, we may indulge in a reciprocity of polite phrasing and post-prandial exuberance, if our alert watchmen will meantime keep an eye upon our good friends across the Atlantic, especially when, having appropriated Africa, the islands and even the rocks of the sea, and wherever else force or intrigue may gain a footing, they begin to take an interest, not altogether born of curiosity or of a purely Christianizing spirit, in this hemisphere.

Because of his close association with the President this speech carried great

107 Ibid., 632.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid., 632, citing Appleton's Cyclopaedia, 1895.
weight and aroused much comment.

On May 9, Cleveland asked of Fairchild for suggestions as to whom to send as a representative to Caracas. He was greatly concerned over sending a capable representative and was perhaps greatly worried lest it would not appeal to anyone considering the salary was only $7500. 112

Cleveland was greatly irritated by Britain's refusal to arbitrate and he was soon led to believe that the great powers were willing to rob the weaker nations. 113 This attitude was encouraged by the policies pursued in the partitioning of Africa, England and Germany's struggle over Samoa, France's interest in Madagascar, English interests and difficulties in the Transvaal and Japan's interest in Korea. 114

As Dr. Bryant once said of Cleveland that he was temperate in all things, unless unduly irritated by those who would annoy him persistently and selfishly - then appropriate and emphatic remarks were made. Again and again he endured opposition or misrepresentation patiently for a long period, and then suddenly exploded with a force which astonished observers who had not noticed the tokens of rising international wrath. 115

It was perhaps this side of his character that urged him to suggest to his Secretary (Walter Q. Gresham) to draw up an intensive report on the

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111 Ibid., 632.
112 Ibid., 635, citing Fairchild Papers.
113 Ibid.
114 Ibid.
115 Ibid., 629, citing speech at City College Memorial Meeting, March 17, 1912.
Venezuelan question. Unfortunately Gresham took cold while engaged in this work and was taken seriously ill and died on May 28. The entire cabinet had great affection for Gresham who was more than a business partner, he was in the true sense a friend of a frank and simple nature. Cleveland above all expressed great sorrow for the loss of his official associate and for the loss of a dear friend.  

While Gresham was taken ill Richard Olney assumed the task of working on the Venezuelan problem and on June 10, he succeeded him as the Secretary of State. He continued to work on the preparation of a dispatch that was to be sent to Ambassador Bayard in London. Olney as well as Cleveland was of the conviction that this problem had dragged on definitely too long. On July 2, upon finishing a draft of his note he sent it to Gray Gables. On the day the note was received the White House was in a fluster over the arrival of a "plump loud-voiced little girl." Olney was anxious to hear of Cleveland's comments regarding his note. Cleveland

\[\text{\footnotesize 116} \text{ Ibid., 633, citing Gresham, Gresham, II, 795.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 117} \text{ Ibid., citing Gresham.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 118} \text{ Ibid., 633.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 119} \text{ Ibid., 634.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 120} \text{ Henry James, Richard Olney and His Public Service. Houghton, Mifflin Co., New York, 1923, 105.}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize 121} \text{ Ibid.}\]
approved highly of it. He said:

It's the best thing of the kind I ever read, wrote Cleveland, and it leads to a conclusion that one cannot escape if he tries - that is, if there is anything in the Monroe Doctrine at all. You show there is a great deal of that, and place it, I think on better and more defensible ground than any of your predecessors - or mine.122

Cleveland suggested that Olney take his note to Washington and read it to the members of the Cabinet namely, Carlisle, Lamont, Herbert and Harmon.123 Immediately upon this reading the note was dispatched. Thus this "twenty-inch gun" as Cleveland later refers to it was very belligerent in tone. The sharp language of this message regarding Venezuela was to bewilder the friends and critics of the President. The criticism against the Presidency that arose due to this message was severe as we shall see later in this paper and the effects it had on the economic phase were to be equally as great.

The "twenty-inch gun" of Secretary Richard Olney of July 20, 1895, was a conclusion of the report begun by Secretary Gresham. It is the general belief that had Gresham lived to carry on this work himself that such a note that was so belligerent in tone would never have been drawn up.124 Due to Gresham's illness Olney took charge of affairs and he worked upon the note that was dispatched to the British Government regarding the Venezuelan

122 Nevins, Cleveland, 634, citing Olney Papers, July 7, 1895.
123 Tansill, 701.
124 Ibid.
situation.

Perhaps before we investigate the contents of this note it would be better if we tried to relate some information regarding the character of Richard Olney. Richard Olney influenced Cleveland's second administration because of his strong personality. He was an aggressive leader who was moody and had many whims. One of these whims was that of a silent mute-when a certain mood came upon him he would remain silent and all the household remained silent with him whereas when he was in a talkative mood he could carry a conversation excellently. He exercised domestic tyranny over his sister whom he refused to come to his home upon her marriage to a suitor whom he had chosen. He had self-confidence, ability and he was a worker. He had such self-confidence in himself that he "regarded himself as a mad Ulysses who was the only one capable of directing the affairs of 1895 into their proper channels." Richard Olney wrote in his note that three thousand miles of ocean make any permanent political union between an European and an American state unnatural and inexpedient; that today the United States is practically sovereign on this continent, and its fiat is law upon the subjects to which it confines its interposition; and that while the United States had thus far been spared great

125 Ibid., citing Life of Richard Olney, 12-19.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid.
128 Ibid.
warlike establishments, with the powers of Europe permanently encamped on American soil, the ideal conditions we have thus far enjoyed cannot be expected to continue. 129

After an analysis of the Anglo-Venezuelan dispute Secretary Olney pointed out six main features of the dispute:

1. the "very large" area of territory in dispute;
2. the disparity of strength between the claimants;
3. the extreme age of the controversy;
4. Venezuela's persisted desire for arbitration;
5. Great Britain's refusal to go to arbitration except upon condition of the renunciation of a large part of the Venezuelan claim, and
6. the United States has made it clear to Great Britain and to the world that the controversy is one in which both its honour and its interests are involved, and the continuance of which it cannot regard with indifference. 130

The main theme of Olney's note was that England's interference in Venezuela was a strict violation of the Monroe Doctrine and if England continued this policy it would be considered as an unfriendly act towards America and would strain relations between the two nations. 131 Olney had directed his note at the right target and it found a vulnerable spot in the Monroe Doctrine. Although the Monroe Doctrine had not been adopted as an

129 Nevins, Cleveland, 635.
131 Bailey, 482.
international policy it was highly respected by the American people and it served as a good standby. Thus it was to this that Olney appealed to in his note of July 20, 1895, knowing that American public opinion would not permit the flouting of the Monroe Doctrine by any power not even Great Britain.

Cleveland also expressed his extreme satisfaction especially from the diplomatic point of view. He realized that the note was belligerent but it had achieved its purpose in that it had awakened the national spirit. He also stated that it was difficult for him to express his complete pleasure over this but he emphasized that the world owed something of a debt to Richard Olney.

Despite this belligerent note sent by Olney the attitude of Great Britain was still one of non-arbitration as we shall see very shortly in the information that is to follow. There were many inaccuracies in Olney's note which are noted elsewhere in this paper but the main idea of Olney as well as of Cleveland was to make Great Britain sit up and take notice. They came to the conclusion that the only way this point could be achieved was by a frank belligerent note that would make Britain sit up and take notice. It is little wonder then that it is referred to as the "twenty-inch gun" because the two men behind it believed they would get an

133 Bailey, 482.
immediate reply.

This note was made an issue in the New York Herald which gave the impression that the United States was on the verge of war and had given Great Britain a ninety day ultimatum. Even in the meeting of Congress in December the fear of war was felt among the members and a prayer was offered for peace.

While the Olney note was in the process of being dispatched there was a change in the ministry in England from Roseberry to Salisbury. Thomas F. Bayard was greatly pleased with this change and he wrote to President Cleveland rather enthusiastically that he believed that conditions would tend to be much more satisfactory than previously and negotiations between Great Britain and the United States would tend toward a settlement of the question in dispute. Bayard also emphasized that it was not necessary to impress our policy on Great Britain and that instead careful precaution should be taken with Venezuela for whom he had great distrust.

Cleveland was wholeheartedly supported by Olney in the determination that the problem must be settled. Lord Salisbury, an aristocrat and conservative was equally as capable in his position. He was an ardent fighter for British interests and he had as his assistant Joseph Chamberlain.

134 Ibid., 483.
135 Ibid.
136 Nevins, Cleveland, 635.
137 Ibid., 636.
Joseph Chamberlain had a great deal of parliamentary experience and was intent on "preserving and strengthening the empire."\textsuperscript{138} Of the four, Cleveland and Salisbury were cautious whereas Chamberlain and Olney were still devoted to the idea of Anglo-American friendship.\textsuperscript{139}

Olney awaited a reply from Salisbury but the reply was inexcusably delayed.\textsuperscript{140} Bayard wrote to Cleveland that he expressed to the British ministry the wish for a speedy reply, one that would come before the President's message to Congress in December. August, September and October rolled by with no reply from Downing Street. Olney made inquiries with no results.

In the \textit{North American Review} Henry Cabot Lodge had requested the recognition of the supremacy of the Monroe Doctrine if not peaceably, forcibly.\textsuperscript{141} Senator Chandler in the \textit{Concord Monitor} wrote an article in which he said that war was inevitable.\textsuperscript{142} Cleveland was disturbed at the way conditions were swaying and he was even more disturbed when he failed to receive a reply from Salisbury.\textsuperscript{143} This delay as was discovered later

\textsuperscript{138} Ibid.\textsuperscript{139} Ibid.\textsuperscript{140} Ibid. Also Tansill, 715. The reply was sent by steamer on November 26.\textsuperscript{141} Lodge, 657-658.\textsuperscript{142} Nevins, \textit{Cleveland}, 637.\textsuperscript{143} Allan Nevins (ed.). \textit{Letters of Grover Cleveland 1850-1908}. Houghton, Mifflin Co., New York, 1933, 417-420.
was not due to deliberation but was due to the pressing diplomatic problems in the Near East. Cleveland felt the Monroe Doctrine had been challenged and the United States must make this good by getting Britain to arbitrate.  

Salisbury was very much preoccupied with the affairs in the Near East and did not make it his duty to see when Congress was in session. His advisers permitted him to make an error in regard to this. Bayard on the other hand did not put much emphasis on the matter as a grave issue. In his visits to Salisbury he gave him the impression that Olney’s "twenty-inch gun" was not to be considered seriously. Henry White regarded Bayard as inefficient whereas Olney regarded him as a "misfit" and Lord Salisbury regarded him as an "amateur diplomat." Olney was of the opinion that Bayard should be removed from office and he suggested this step to Cleveland. President Cleveland favored this idea but thought it was too late to do any recalling and it would undoubtedly cause much disturbance and in the long run do more harm than good.  

On December 2, President Cleveland sent his message to Congress and on leaving instructions with Olney he set out on a duck-hunting trip. He

144 Nevins, Cleveland, 637.
145 Ibid.
146 Ibid., 638.
147 Ibid.
informed Olney that if any reply was received within the period of his return he should keep the contents secret. Cleveland said, "If I were here I should not be hurried in the matter even if the Congress should begin grinding again the resolution-of-the inquiry mill."148

CHAPTER VI

TWISTING THE LION'S TAIL

In the late eighties and early nineties there was a great feeling of Anglophobia in American political life. It took very little urging to further arouse America against England. This was to an extent accomplished by anti-British textbooks. The feeling toward England was so intense that she was labeled as a land-grabber who was in a sense trying to buy off the United States from giving protection. It was not very long before England and the United States would become friends but until this was accomplished the general theme of the United States was strictly anti-British. An example is one theme given by Thomas Marshall of a group of boys singing it one fourth of July:

Fee, fi, fo, fum
I smell the blood of an Englishman;
Dead or alive, I'll have some.
Fee, fi, fo, fum.

Another example of protest against Great Britain is that shown in the reaction of Senator Henry Cabot Lodge of Massachusetts, a Republican and an

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149 Bailey, 477.
150 Ibid.
151 Ibid.
152 Ibid., citing Recollections of Thomas Marshall, 125.
Anglophobe. He states:

If Great Britain is to be permitted to occupy the ports of Nicaragua and, still worse, take the territory of Venezuela, there is nothing to prevent her taking the whole of Venezuela or any other South American State. If Great Britain can do this with impunity, France and Germany will do it also.... The Supremacy of the Monroe Doctrine should be established and at once — peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must.153

This seemed to be the general trend of affairs in December of 1895. Thus far as we saw by the end of the preceding chapter no reply had been dispatched by Lord Salisbury to the American government in reply to the "twenty-inch gun" note. The general excuse given for its delay is that Salisbury had made an error in the meeting of Congress and it was due to this that they took more time to deliberate and to weigh carefully the reply that they would send to the United States. Other authorities are of the opinion that Joseph Chamberlain was instrumental in the delay of the reply. It is believed that Chamberlain held that if England were too willing to show interest in the principle of arbitration she would in turn bring upon herself new boundary claims made by her respective neighbors throughout her Empire.154

Despite all this the note was dispatched on November 26, and it was finally received on December 7, when Sir Julian Pauncefote brought Salisbury's reply to Olney. Salisbury's note consisted of two sections - one pertaining

153Lodge, 658.
154Nevins, Cleveland, 637.
to the Monroe Doctrine and the other to the Venezuelan dispute. Salisbury stated that the Monroe Doctrine was not regarded as international law. Salisbury in his note also tended to refute some of the statements of Olney. Olney stated in his note that Venezuela claimed as her boundary as far as the Essequibo River. Olney also stated

... there are circumstances under which a nation may justly interpose in a controversy to which two or more other nations are the direct and immediate parties.... The doctrine is ordinarily expressed in terms of the most general character and is perhaps incapable of more specific statement. It is declared in substance that a nation may avail itself of this right whenever what is done or proposed by any of the parties primarily concerned is a serious and direct menace to its own integrity, tranquillity or welfare. 155

Olney feared Great Britain's taking such steps that might result in the expansion of her boundaries and for this he fell back on the non-colonization principle of the Monroe Doctrine. Olney stated no European power would deprive any American State of the right of self-government; he also stated that the Monroe Doctrine was instigated by Great Britain, "who at once gave to it an open and unqualified adhesion which has never been withdrawn." 156 According to Professor Perkins that last statement of Olney's should have made "George Canning turn in his grave." 157 He further related that the

155 Tansill, 705.
157 Ibid.
emancipation of South America rested with the Monroe Doctrine.

... Europe as a whole is monarchical, and, ... is committed to the monarchical principle. America, on the other hand is devoted to the exactly opposite principle, to the idea that every people has an inalienable right of self-government.... If ... the forcible intrusion of European powers into American politics is to be deprecated, if, as it is to be deprecated, it should be resisted and prevented, such resistance and prevention must come from the United States.158

Olney by his very forward note caused the arousing of a suspicion in the American mind of British interests in Latin America which they in turn labeled as a spirit of imperialism.159

Salisbury's reply although delayed was to the point and matter of fact. He rejected any reference to the Monroe Doctrine because he did not believe the situation in any way violated the principles of 1823. Salisbury held that this dispute of frontier was far afield from the questions dealt with by President Monroe. In addition, he tried to emphasize that in 1895 the issue was quite the opposite from the issue of 1823. The question in 1895 was not one of the colonization of any part of America by a European Power or the imposition of a European system or form of government upon a Latin

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158 Tansill, 706.

159 Ibid., 707.
American country. The only question concerned was the settlement of a boundary line of a possession of Britain long before the existence of the Venezuelan Republic. Olney's note had an air of belligerence and defiance but Salisbury's note was equally to the point in that he took a definite stand that although he held highly of the Monroe Doctrine he refused to see its application in this case. England was in a sense hinting to the United States that the Venezuelan controversy in no way involved the interests of the United States and therefore it was none of her business. Salisbury also made reference to Olney's statement that "three thousand miles of ocean make any permanent political union between an European and an American state unnatural and inexpedient" and maintained that the union between Great Britain and her territories in the Western Hemisphere (Canada, Jamaica, Trinidad, British Honduras and British Guiana) are both natural and expedient.

Perhaps it was only fitting and proper that in reply to the "twenty-inch gun" note of Olney that Salisbury should draw up such a reply that was definitely to the point. Salisbury had experience in the field of political affairs and he was aided by such personages as Joseph Chamberlain, William Ewart Gladstone and Arthur Balfour. Salisbury was placed in a not

160 Ibid.
161 Ibid., 716. Also Mowat, Diplomatic Relations, 263.
162 Bailey, 435.
163 Mowat, Diplomatic Relations, 264.
too difficult position but it gradually emerged as a difficult situation. Salisbury stated his point as in the inapplicability of the doctrine, the history of the controversy and he believed that with these points brought forward that the United States would withdraw. This could not easily be accomplished because the Olney note was regarded in a sense as an ultimatum and if either nation withdrew now it would be a blow to the national honor and prestige. In addition Salisbury did not realize that the American public would be aroused to such a height of enthusiasm that it would take the Monroe Doctrine and adopt it to any circumstance that might arise.164 The American public thus became interested in a doctrine partly disregarded for a time and now realized that it was intended as a part of the national life and that as long as the Republic endured it could not become obsolete.165

The position of Cleveland and Olney at the time was indeed a difficult one for the belligerent tone used by Olney in his note to England was very harsh and took the attitude of treating "England as though she were a petty culprit caught in the act of thievery."166 This situation was not like the railway strikes where it was perhaps necessary to use a severe and harsh

164 Robert Glass Cleland. One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine. Times-Mirror Press, Los Angeles, California, 1923, 86.
166 Tansill, 709.
tone "to browbeat railway strikers." The question now remained as to how they could ease out without bestowing any harm to the national honor of their nation. One author applies to Olney's arguments the Oxford undergraduates account of the football game: "It would have been just as good a fight without the ball; the ball was only in the way." Still another author says that Olney realized too late that "he had uncoiled a genii, which he was unable to return to the bottle in which King Solomon had once sealed him up."169

167 Ibid.
169 Ibid.
CHAPTER VII

RECEPTION OF THE MESSAGE IN AMERICA

Great Britain refused all arguments and her answer to arbitration was still in the negative. She had Venezuela on the spot. She said to Venezuela:

You can get none of the debatable land by force, because you are not strong enough; you can get none by treaty, because I will not agree; and you can take your chance of getting a portion as I may designate.170

It was this trend of circumstances that directed President Cleveland on December 7, 1895, to deliver a special message to Congress. Again this note was drawn up by Richard Olney and it was looked over by Cleveland and Lamont. Cleveland went over the note but there is considerable doubt whether he did much to tone it down. The main message in the note was for the appropriation of $100,000 for a commission to investigate and determine the Venezuelan boundary. This special message to Congress received the full support of Congress. The message was read by Senator Cox. One author in the Chicago Daily Tribune says of this message, "It is the hand of Esau, but the voice of Jacob."171


171 Chicago Daily Tribune, December 18, 1895, 1.
Olney's note which was slightly revised by Cleveland read as follows:

When such report is made and accepted it will then be the duty of the government to communicate to Great Britain the boundary lines thus ascertained, and to give notice that any appropriation of territory or exercise of jurisdiction by Great Britain beyond that line, except with the consent of Venezuela will be regarded by this government as a wilful aggression upon rights and interests of the United States which this government cannot suffer to go undefended. In making these recommendations I do not act without a keen sense of responsibility nor without a vivid realization of all possible consequences... I am nevertheless firm in the faith in which I doubt not to have the hearty concurrence of all the American people - that of all the calamities to which a great nation can subject itself none are more to be deprecated or more to be shunned than those which follow from a supine submission to wrong and injustice and the consequent loss of national honor and self respect.172

Cleveland also makes reference in his message of this date to the British refusal to accept the Monroe Doctrine and its failure to meet the requirements of international law and its classification as a "novel principle" that did not receive the recognition of other countries previous to this date.173

In the Baltimore Maryland Herald the cry was that now England had encountered her match in the field of diplomacy.174 In the Chicago Daily

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172 James, 120-121.


174 Chicago Daily Tribune, December 18, 1895, 1.
The Tribune the cry was "Fight or Back Down!" The American press shared Cleveland's and Olney's attitude of distrust of Great Britain's interest in Venezuela. In 1894 the New York Sun warned the British that if the situation was not altered in Nicaragua that Britain would find herself involved with the United States. In the New York Tribune it stated that if measures were taken by England by bombardment or armed force to bully Nicaragua into paying a bill of damages which has been arbitrarily levied against her, the State Department ought to issue a new edition of the Monroe Doctrine with a marginal reading especially adapted to the case.

When Britain took an interest in Nicaragua the American ire was aroused. John B. McMaster firmly stated that the Monroe Doctrine did not give the United States any jurisdiction to interfere in any wars between Europe and the South American republics especially when the major concern of Britain in this case was to collect the payment of an indemnity.

175 Ibid.
176 Ibid.
177 Tansill, 689, citing New York Sun, April 20, 1895.
178 Ibid., citing New York Tribune, April 20, 1895.
179 Ibid., citing New York Herald, April 28, 1895.
Some of the general reactions of the leading men in the states were as follows: in 1899 ex-Governor Campbell of Ohio was of the opinion that England's venture was to persuade the United States to abandon the Monroe Doctrine and together with this idea he suggested that the United States maintain the same position she had held in 1866 in the case of Louis Napoleon in Mexico. Another leader, Captain Mahan expressed his view that England's interference in any American State would not be long tolerated by the American people and he is of the opinion that they would endeavor to prevent such a step from being ventured into.

The Atlanta Constitution on October 13, 1895, warned the United States that if she didn't awaken soon she would awaken too late and find Central and South America in the hands of Great Britain. The New Orleans Picayune urged that the Monroe Doctrine be adopted as our foreign policy. The New York Times warned the United States that she "could not with indifference see a European power, not even England, invade a weak South American State, and on no better title than the highwayman establishes to the traveler's purse, rob her of a sixth part of her territory." In this same issue citing the The Westminster Gazette it made reference to the controversy: "Venezuela, like Nicaragua after much fuss, will probably prove to be small beer. No

180 Ibid., 711.
181 Bailey, 486, citing The Atlanta Constitution, October 13, 1895.
182 Tansill, 711, citing New Orleans Picayune, October 13, 1895.
183 New York Times, October 22, 1895, 1.
doubt the less scrupulous of New York Papers will talk big about what they are going to do with the lion's tail, but Great Britain and the United States are not going to be set by the ears by a pack of Venezuelans. 184

Theodore Roosevelt was in favor of war. 185 Senator Henry Cabot Lodge maintained that the United States would not forsake the Monroe Doctrine or her rights in the Western Hemisphere and if necessary she would go to war to preserve her rights. 186

There was a great deal of criticism of Cleveland in regard to the stand he took in Venezuela. Some people were of the opinion that he was bluffing whereas others state that there is little possibility that Cleveland would have risked a war to gain his point. 187 John Bassett Moore did not believe that Cleveland's message was a bluff because he held that Cleveland would not want to pursue a similar policy to that of Louis XIV. 188 The note of Olney was agreed to by Cleveland because he realized the only way to arouse Britain to realize the important position of the United States was to send such a note. 189 Others were amazed when Cleveland took this step because they realized the odds were too great and in the case of war the British exceeded the United States in man power and in war equipment. The American

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184 Ibid.
185 Bailey, 486.
186 Alvarez, 410.
188 McElroy, 185.
189 Fish, Path of Empire, 87.
army numbered 25,000 men and 2,160 officers to the British 147,959 men and 7,496 officers.\textsuperscript{190} The United States had six battleships, seven first-class cruisers, three torpedo craft and a navy of 12,656 to Great Britain's forty-four battleships, forty-one first-class cruisers, one hundred and thirty-six torpedo craft and navy of 83,400.\textsuperscript{191}

The Philadelphia Press of October 23, 1895, said that this was not an electoral dodge but an expression of American sentiment.\textsuperscript{192} Some critics believed that it was also a party effort to gain the vote of the Irish-Americans and to set up a new campaign issue and to give "the lion's tail a twist on the eve of the presidential election."\textsuperscript{193} The truth of this statement is questioned. However, there is record made of an Irish alliance offering the services of 100,000 volunteers ready to aid America at a moment's notice.\textsuperscript{194}

Edwin L. Godkin, Carl Schurz, Charles W. Eliot condemned Cleveland for the position he took in regard to this dispute.\textsuperscript{195} Joseph Pulitzer tried to emphasize that this commotion over someone else's frontier was a complete

\textsuperscript{191} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{193} Bailey, 478.
\textsuperscript{194} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{195} Mowat, Diplomatic Relations, 268, citing New York World, December 21, 1895.
blunder. He cabled to the Prince of Wales to get his viewpoint of the situation and the reply he received was encouraging because in it the Prince of Wales expressed his hope that the two powers would resume their friendship. 197

The individual Britons were opposed to war such as William Ewart Gladstone, Cardinal Vaughn, Archbishop of Armagh. 198 In the London Times of January 1, 1896, James Bryce tried to bring home his point that not one man out of ten in the House of Commons even knew that there was such a thing as the Venezuelan question. 199 The British did not want a war with America and especially not at a time when she had many difficulties in other sections of the globe. There were many articles written about this time which tried to promote Anglo-American friendship and which stressed the point that these two nations should be on the best of terms because of their common interests.

Great Britain was indeed eager that the President would not be backed by Congress and she fervently hoped that the situation would drag along until at least Cleveland was out of office. 200 John Hay who was in London

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196 Ibid.
197 Ibid.
198 Tansill, 729.
200 Fish, Path of Empire, 84.
made it evident that even though there might be a change in the administra-
tion there was very little possibility that America would now retreat from
the position she had taken.  

It was unlikely that now the question of
the Monroe Doctrine was revived that the American people would allow it to
fall into the background.

Cleveland was severely accused of the method he employed and some
critics say he did this to receive patriotic applause. It is believed that
although Cleveland had thrust a bomb into British circles that he had
attached a safety valve to it which would produce the necessary results
desired namely the realization by England of America's full grown power.

America is then said to have been "looking England in the eye" and there
was definitely no bluff.

Joseph Chamberlain wanted to restore amicable relations between the two
great powers and he considered it would be absurd and a crime for the two
nations to go to war over such a question as Venezuela. His hope was that
in the very near future the "Stars and Stripes and the Union Jack would be
floating together in defense of a common cause."

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201  Ibid.
      British Foreign Policy 1783-1919. The Macmillan Co., Great Britain, 1927,
      III, 223.
203  Fish, Path of Empire, 87.
204  Carl Russell Fish. American Diplomacy. Henry Holt and Co., New York,
      1923, 393.
205  Cleland, 94.
Some clever cartoons are depicted in the London Punch of December 28, 1895, extending the "compliments of the season" to Great Britain following the speech of Cleveland. In a cartoon of the London Punch of May 23, 1896, Columbus is pictured as stating that had he foreseen that his discovery would have caused such a controversy he would not have discovered America. In still another issue of the London Punch a cartoon depicts the satisfaction of England on getting the better bargain of the deal.

England thus found herself in a difficult position especially in her economic relations because this controversy brought England on the verge of a quarrel with the nation that was her principal provider and to lose this for the sake of a piece of land was indeed absurd. Without a doubt England must have secretly rejoiced that Parliament was not in session at the time of the enunciation of Cleveland's message and that the Cabinet members undertook to view the crisis and to act accordingly.

The message of Cleveland also aroused much criticism in other parts of the globe. In France the reaction was one of great pleasure in seeing the position of Lord Salisbury being made difficult, however the French did not altogether approve Cleveland's tone because if it now applied to England it

206 London Punch, December 28, 1895, 302.
208 London Punch, November 21, 1896, 247.
210 Mowat, Diplomatic Relations, 266.
might in the near future cause a complete turnabout and apply in France's case in a similar boundary controversy. The French President is said to have stated to the German Ambassador in the *Die Grosse Politik*, "Who will put his trust in a country, of which the highest executive in an ugly mood or for election purposes will plunge the country into a devastating war?"

Bismarck denounced the policy of 1823 and in the *London Standard* of December 20, 1895, Germany referred to Cleveland's message of December 17 as an "epithet of jingoism." Thus in England the situation as it stood was regarded as a patriotic upheaval that originated with Cleveland's message and one that would slowly die out. The English were equally determined that they did not want a war and they believed that some means would be found by which the two nations would set themselves on the tracks of peace. A way out had to be found. In the meantime the anti-British press urged that if Britain did not come off her high horse there would be a war and this was to be avoided especially since neither power cared a "tittle about Venezuela." Their main

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interest was to maintain amicable relations between two powers which had major interests in common and to avoid a "fratricidal war." 216

CHAPTER VIII

RECEPTION OF THE MESSAGE IN AMERICA (continued)

With the enunciation of his special message to Congress on December 17, 1895, Cleveland was to realize whether or not he had the support of the American public. In the Senate and House of Representatives the message was received with great enthusiasm.

The general attitude of the members of the Senate and the House was one of acceptance of the Cleveland policy. Senator Stewart of Nevada favored war even if it resulted in defeat if for the only result that it would end the British bank rule of the United States. Senator Morgan of Alabama firmly denounced Britain's policy. When Representative Livingston of Georgia was asked what the position of the United States would be if Great Britain refused arbitration he only too readily replied to the effect that the United States would fight and she would definitely not permit Great Britain to acquire additional territory in the Western Hemisphere - they would rather go to war first.

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220 The New York Herald, December 5, 1895, 11.
In the New York World, Joseph Pulitzer denounced the message as a grave blunder and made reference that it had the "design of a coup' d' etat by Olney."\textsuperscript{221} Representative Morse felt that any war over such things as a Venezuelan boundary or seals of Alaska would be a step backward in the clock of progress and peace.\textsuperscript{222}

Senator Cullom of Illinois stated in one case:

> We do not claim that the world is ours, but we will insist on our right to be consulted upon affairs pertaining to the American continents. We do not, like Don Quixote, go prancing about the world looking for adventure or seeking for some imprisoned princess or struggling nation to set free, but we acknowledge kinship in a degree with all the Republics of America, whose independence like ours, has long since been acknowledged and recognized by the powers of Europe. The United States cannot sit indifferently by when the territorial integrity of any of these neighboring countries is questioned by a foreign nation.\textsuperscript{223}

Cullom also had stated that if the United States had protested England's occupation of Corinto, she would not have progressed so far. Now that she had gone this far he advised the use of force in getting her out.\textsuperscript{224}

Senator Lodge of Massachusetts praised highly the President's policy in Venezuela but he believed that the President should have included in his

\textsuperscript{222} Mowat, Pauncefote, 187.
\textsuperscript{223} Congressional Record, 54 Congress, 1 session, vol. 28, December 10, 1895, 111.
\textsuperscript{224} Blake, 265, citing New York World, May 3, 1895.
message the objection to "forcible" possession in the Americas. McCreary of Kentucky believed that Cleveland should be given full support on this issue despite party affiliations. Representative Curtis of Kansas in his support of the President states, "I was with Daniel Webster that my politics extends only to the water's edge ..."

Ex-Governor of Ohio Joseph B. Foraker believed that the Monroe Doctrine should be upheld and that the Central and South American States should be made to feel that in the United States they had a protector and a friend. John Bassett Moore was led to believe that America was looking for a fight and that the American people were getting "... irritable lest the world might think us not worth insulting."

In the New York Sun Charles A. Dana a "not infrequent beater of tom-tom of jingoism" took every chance to make the controversy a front page issue and his editorials supported the upholding of the Monroe Doctrine. E. L. Godkin of the Nation was of the opposite opinion and he stated that the tendency of the American people was to keep silent on the issues of the day especially those relative to foreign affairs so that there would be no

226 Ibid.
227 Ibid., December 18, 1895.
229 Tansill, 710.
230 Ibid., 720, citing J. B. Moore to Tansill, September 16, 1940.
231 Perkins, Monroe Doctrine 1867-1907, 183.
reason to suspect them of unpatriotic tendencies. 232

Senator Henry Cabot Lodge introduced a resolution based on the Monroe Doctrine and he inferred any attempt on the part of any European power to act contrary to this policy would be dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States and be regarded as an act of hostility. 233

Senator Cullom of Illinois, a Republican passed a milder resolution and stated that it was time the Monroe Doctrine was recognized as a proclamation of our national policy. 234 He also stated that this national policy should be "indelibly engraved upon the portals of the State Department," and "bear the definite approval of Congress and become a fixed and permanent ordinance." 235

Representative Livingston of Georgia proposed a resolution for a joint commission to examine the merits of the controversy between Great Britain and Venezuela. 236

The Republican floor leader, Representative Hitt introduced a bill to meet the request of the President's message and this was passed unanimously and reached the Senate on December 19. Here it was referred to a committee which reported on it the following day. The praises of the President and

232 Ibid., 184, citing Nation, LXI, December 12, 1895.
233 Congressional Record, 54 Congress, 1 session, vol. 28, December 3, 1895, 24.
234 Ibid.
235 Ibid.
236 Ibid.
236 Ibid.
of the principles of 1823 were sung and finally passed unanimously in the Senate.  

The New York World tried to get the opinions of the governors of the states in regard to the President's policy and they reported that twenty-six out of twenty-eight who replied unqualified in support of the Administration. Also the New York World declared the President's fear of danger from Britain in regard to Guiana "nothing less than a jingo bugaboo."  

Those in academic circles such as Professor Theodore S. Woolsey, the professor of international law at Yale University, Professor Von Holst of Chicago, President Hyde of Bowdoin and Professor Frank W. Taussig of Harvard considered Cleveland's language as needless and bellicose especially in its reference to the violation of the Monroe Doctrine. 

The financial system also felt a blow following the message of December 17, 1895. In many political circles especially those of the opposition party the general belief was that the message was made to strengthen the administration and an effort of Wall Street conspiracy. It was without a doubt that the note should cause a disturbance which was in the effect of

237 Ibid., December 12, 1895, 234-271.  
240 Ibid., 195-196.  
a temporary panic. In the New York Tribune at this time there was
reported an effect on the stock market and a decline in wheat and cotton.243
The New York Herald of December 22, 1896 in an article by G. W. Smalley
estimates the loss of $400,000,000 in two days.244

The President had indeed thrown business into a state of confusion and
many regarded this as a complete blunder on the part of Cleveland.245 The
business interests in Boston and New York were opposed to Cleveland's
policy.246 This bellicose enunciation of policy created a period of war
nerves and aroused much opposition against Cleveland from the pulpit as well
as from financial circles. For this reason prayers for peace were offered
up at the opening of the sessions of the Senate and the House of Repre-
sentatives.247

The business leaders such as Frederick D. Tappin, President of the
Gallatin National Bank and Charles S. Smith, ex-President of the New York
Chamber of Commerce regarded Cleveland's message as a grave blunder and the

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242 Ibid.
243 December 18, 1895.
244 Mowat, Pauncefort, 187.
245 Theodore S. Woolsey. "The President's Monroe Doctrine." The Forum,
New York, (February, 1896), XX, 707.
246 J. Fred Rippy. Latin America in World Politics. Alfred A. Knopf, New
York, 1928, 117.
247 Ibid. Also Congressional Record, 53 Congress, 3 session, vol. 27,
December 3, 1894, 13; December 4, 1894, 26; also 54 Congress, 1 session,
vol. 28, December 3, 1895, 26.
crime of the century. In the New York World the fall in securities was estimated at more than $350,000,000.

The financial situation at this time was made an object of advertisement in The New York Daily Tribune which said that it was perhaps likely that Cleveland would set right the financial situation but that the "ONLY CERTAIN CURE FOR COUGH OR COLD IS RICKER'S EXPECTORANT." The reaction of Latin America toward the United States policy in Venezuela was equally as important. The Mexican journals looked on Cleveland's message of December 17, 1895 with great favor. In the El Universal, the Mexico City Editor states, "Once more the strong people of excellence of the continent have come to the aid of the weak and championed it against aggression; the eagle of the North which has been falsely accused of voracity has held in awe the insatiable British Lion." The El Partido Liberal credited Cleveland's message as an electoral trick. The El Pregoneros of Caracas was very much enthused with the message and urged

Tansill, 777.

Ibid., 728.


Ibid.

Ibid., 284.
patriotic affairs to be held to honor the United States. As a result the Simon Bolivar Club put on a parade honoring the United States with speeches and placed floral decorations on the statue of George Washington.

The El Ferrocarril of Sonsonata in Salvador said of Cleveland's message, Monroe has opened to Cleveland the doors of the temple. In his turn Cleveland, if possible, has confined greater immortality upon Monroe. America has immortalized both Presidents, for she does justice to her benefactor. The Message of Cleveland... has been the compliment of American independence; or rather this state paper, which has made effective and practical a saving Doctrine that for many years was considered platonic and theoretical, has had the effect of a moral and political victory. Without cannon or bloodshed the exposition of the illustrious President has been as significant as a new battle of Ayacucho: it is a new seal of our continental emancipation! Spanish Americans actually do not know whether to accord more greatness and nobility to the champions of their independence or to Monroe and Cleveland - the champions of their international emancipation... In that achievement Monroe has been the brain and Cleveland, the arm.

The Latin-American countries prior to this time feared greatly the Colossus of the North but with the declaration of this message they became familiar with America's policy but still they took precautions lest the United States adopt the ideas of the European nations in regard to South America.


255 Ibid.

256 Ibid., 11-14, citing El Ferrocarril, March 18, 1896.
The problem has been stated, the attitudes of the various nations concerned enumerated and there remains only the solution. The period between December 17, 1895 and January 2, 1896 was a gloomy period for each nation had in a sense presented the other with an ultimatum.257 The day was saved by the report of Dr. Jameson’s raid in the Transvaal which had failed and immediately upon which the German Government sent a telegram of praise to President Kruger.257 Only a short time before when Rhodes had asked what possible way out there was in such a difficult situation where two nations had issued notes that had the tone of ultimatums, the reply given to him was, "One or the other," he said, "must crawl, but the news in to-night's paper shows the resolution of the difficulty."259 This was the news of the Jameson raid and it is on this basis that the Krueger telegram earned its reference as the "Deux ex machina."260 The purpose of the Kaiser's telegram is said to have been to make England realize that she should ally herself with Germany.261

Great Britain realized the predicament she was placed in and she agreed to arbitrate the dispute. Measures were taken by both parties to settle


258 Ibid.

259 Ibid.


the dispute. The United States and Great Britain realized that a step in any direction other than towards arbitration would serve only to create a diplomatic crisis. It was this feeling together with the after effects of the Kruger telegram that encouraged negotiations between London and Washington. The commission requested by Cleveland was drawn up to investigate conditions relative to the dispute. England offered her assistance in presenting her side of the controversy.

The commission was made up of such names as David J. Brewer, associate justice of the Supreme Court, Richard H. Alvey, chief justice of the court of appeals of the District of Columbia, Andrew D. White, Frederic R. Coudert, and Daniel Coit Gilman.262

Friendly relations were established between Great Britain and Venezuela and a treaty was signed on February 2, 1897. The dispute was submitted to an arbitration board which exempted any area held by either party for a period of fifty years.263 The arbitration board also made provision for an arbitral tribunal which would consist of five members. One of the members would be nominated by the judges of the Supreme Court of the United States, two of the members would be nominated by the English Supreme Court of Justice, one of the members nominated by Venezuela and the fifth member would be nominated by the four or in the case of disagreement by the

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262 Nevins, Cleveland, 645.
263 Dennis, 43.
King of Norway and Sweden. 264

The final decision of the dispute was reached on October 3, 1899 at Paris. The arbitral tribunal consisted of David J. Brewer, Melville Weston Fuller, Lord Russell of Killowen, Sir Richard Henn Collins and Frederic de Martens, councillor of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 265 According to the final decision the boundary was run along the Schomburgk line and Venezuela was given control of the mouth of the Orinoco. In this instance Venezuela fared much better than if the United States had not interfered.

While these negotiations were in progress Olney and Pauncefoote also signed a general arbitration treaty on January 11, 1897. This treaty was presented to the Senate but it was dragged along until it became an issue in the next administration. 266 The Senate managed to tack on amendments that would determine which questions would be subject to arbitration and which would be exempt. In addition it also stated that two-thirds vote of the Senate would be required. 267 The Senate finally rejected this treaty on May 5, 1897 by a vote of 43 to 26. 268

The rejection of the treaty is credited to the Senate's fear of

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264 Nevins, Cleveland, 645.
265 Mowat, Diplomatic Relations, 272.
266 Bailey, 491.
267 Ibid.
permitting such questions as might arise pertaining to foreign policy to be decided by an arbitral board.269 Some of the Senators who opposed the treaty were silverites who opposed Britain "as the bulwark of the gold standard.270

This trend of affairs was a terrific blow to the "lovers of peace"271 but it wasn't going to cause a rift in the amicable relations of the United States and Great Britain which had been restored upon the eve of a diplomatic crisis.

269 Ibid.
270 Ibid.
271 Ibid.
CONCLUSION

Another chapter in the history of the United States and Great Britain’s diplomatic relations was brought to a close by peaceable means. The important points that had been advanced by this episode were the arousing of the Monroe Doctrine to meet and help iron out a difficult situation and the principle of arbitration. Many authors are led to believe that had the Monroe Doctrine not existed there is a great probability that England would have pursued a regular "grab bag game" in South America. This stand that Cleveland and Olney took in regard to the Monroe Doctrine caused an emergence of America as a World Power and without a doubt made England sit up and take notice. This stand in regard to the Monroe Doctrine also made way for Anglo-American friendship.

Thus the Monroe Doctrine, the so-called shield for Hispanic American Republics was vindicated and the Venezuelan danger was removed. Without a doubt the purpose for which the United States had enunciated this policy toward Venezuela was realized because henceforth England would respect the policies of the United States. In addition other European powers would not venture to claim territory in the Western Hemisphere without first consulting the United States.


273 Bailey, 490.
Thus the prestige of the United States assumed greater importance and Great Britain had eased herself out of a difficult situation which would have been further complicated if the anti-British antagonism persisted.274

"The British lion slunk away with his much-twisted tail between his legs."275

The New World was called into existence to redress the balances of the Old and Monroe compared to the great god Terminus who presides over boundaries was vindicated276 and what was thought to be a message of war became a "harbinger of peace."277

The position of Latin America was one of praise for the attitude of the United States in her support of the Americas. Although Venezuela favored American aid there were signs of resentment shown in the attitude of some of the other Latin America and Central America States.

The most important result of the controversy was the return to amicable relations of Great Britain and the United States. Thus the spirit of Anglophobia was replaced by a spirit of Anglophilism and the "period of twisting the lion's tail was followed by one of patting the eagle's head."278

274 Andrew Cunningham McLaughlin. America and Britain. E. P. Dutton and Co., New York, 1919, 137.

275 Bailey, 491.


278 Bailey, 491, citing cartoon in London Punch, CX, May 23, 1896, 247.
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PARTICULAR WORKS


PERIODICALS

The thesis submitted by Jenny Pauline Gerakitis has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

Aug. 3, 1949

Date

Signature of Adviser