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The Relationship between Wilson and Carranza

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THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN WILSON AND CARRANZA

By

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Díaz, called maker of modern Mexico came from the mountain state of Oaxaca. He studied law under Juárez, became one of the most prominent citizens of his state and later fought with Juárez for the liberation of Mexico from the French Empire. Juárez became President of Mexico and in 1872 was the first of Mexico's presidents to die in office. Lerdo de Tejado, justice of the Supreme Court legally succeeded to the Presidency. Díaz plotted against him and on November 23, 1876, entered the capital in triumph.

Díaz was a strong ruler. His term is remembered, however, as the era when foreign economy penetrated Mexico. During his dictatorship, foreign capital came to Mexico, and as labor remained cheap Mexico's natural resources were exploited. Generous concessions were given foreigners and they left their influence on railroads, mines, oil fields, and farmland — developing Mexico, but making use of her at the same time. Concessions and the manner in which they were operated aroused people's hostility over all the land, but Díaz was able to keep them in subjection. Workingmen were killed if they attempted to strike, and Indians were sold into slavery.

2 Samuel Flagg Bemis, A Diplomatic History Of The United States, Henry Holt & Co., N.Y., 1942, 540.
Anyone who protested was either imprisoned or killed. Governors and political chiefs robbed the Indians of their land. Carlo De Fornaro in his work entitled Carranza and Mexico states that by 1892 the ownership of all large bodies of agricultural land had passed from the possession of more than a million small farmers into less than fifty rich families and corporations of the Diaz clique. The Indians lost their valuable land and independent economic life and went into peonage on the great haciendas, in the mines and factories where they could be more easily controlled by soldiers.3 Samuel Flagg Bemis in his book entitled A Diplomatic History Of The United States further concludes that during Diaz' reign there was no progress in education, public welfare, sanitation or social improvement.4 But on the other hand, H. I. Priestley in his book, The Mexican Nation, A History had this to say in summary:

Under Diaz Mexico became the safest country in the world, without exception. It was policed by some three thousand rurales, a small number of Municipal gendarmes, and an army of insignificant proportions in reserve. This peace was... spontaneous and natural, after the first years of the dictatorship.5

Madero advocated constitutional liberties. In his book entitled Presidential Succession Of 1910, he criticized the president and urged people

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3 Carlo De Fornaro, Carranza and Mexico, Mitchel Kennerley, N.Y., 1915, 45.
4 Bemis, 541.
to insist on the right to a fair ballot and the right to choose a candidate of their own. The democrats were arrested, and while they were in prison, an election was held and Diaz was again triumphant. Believing that he was safely installed again, Diaz released Madero. But Madero would not be suppressed, he issued his "Plan of San Luis Potosi" in which he advocated free suffrage, no re-election, restoration of land to the Indians, and freedom for political prisoners. His efforts were effective. On May 24, 1910, Diaz resigned. At the last, Diaz tried to put through reforms but he was too late. Civil war had begun May 6, 1911. The city of Juárez was the scene of the most decisive battle of the conflict, and, as Juárez was captured, Diaz sailed from Mexico forever. He is written about as a great and powerful ruler, but he forgot the people from whom his power came.6

On June 7, 1911, Madero triumphantly marched into Mexico City. His government is referred to as anti-capitalistic and anti-foreign. He was an idealist, believing that the people owned the land but having no practical method of carrying out his ideas. Soon opposition and discontentment arose from all quarters. The upper classes of the old régime were against any improvement of the lot of the common people. And the common people were disgruntled because they did not receive the land at once. Revolts occurred. Before 1913, four attempts had been made to overthrow the government. On February 18, 1913, Generals Blanquet and Huerta entered the National Palace, which they were supposed to defend, and arrested Madero. The men in power, 

6 Ibid., 297 et seq.
Felix Díaz (nephew of the former president, Porfirio Díaz), Blanquet, and Huerta called congress into extraordinary session and made Huerta Provisional President. This coup d'état was accomplished with the aid of the army which was accustomed to obeying Huerta, a general during Díaz' régime. On February 23, 1913, Madero and vice-President Suárez were shot.7

The American Ambassador to Mexico, Henry Lane Wilson, advocated the recognition of Huerta. Miss Inez Thomas in her thesis entitled Wilson and Huerta commented that the American Ambassador advocated "dollar Diplomacy." He had been appointed by former President Taft who practiced the same theory. The writer continues, "Henry Lane Wilson's brother, former Senator John Wilson, was intimate with Ballinger, who was a close friend of the Guggenheims. The Guggenheims had commercial interest in Mexico. The Ambassador was known to be a spokesman for the commercial interests in Mexico. He continually urged the recognition of the Huerta government....He felt that an orderly government would better protect United States interests and investments."8 But this would seem to assume that Huerta would bring order and tranquillity. However, the Ambassador's plans were completely disarranged when on March 4, 1913, the Taft administration retired and Woodrow Wilson became President of the United States. In his reports, the ambassador who was anxious to have Huerta recognized, seemed to overestimate Huerta's power and minimize the nature and extent of the revolt against him which was

rampant in many of the sections of Mexico. The American consuls in the war-
ing sections presented a different picture as shown in their reports to
Washington of the various sectional revolts. The leading state in revolt
against Huerta was Coahuila which was governed by Carranza who issued a
formal Proclamation of Independence on February 19, 1913:

Proclamation of the Independence
of the State of Coahuila

Venustiano Carranza, Constitutional
Governor of the free and sovereign state of
Coahuila de Zaragoza, to the inhabitants
thereof, greeting:
Know ye that the Congress of this State
has decreed as follows:
The XXII Constitutional Congress of the
free, independent and sovereign State of
Coahuila de Zaragoza decrees:
Number 1421.
Article 1. General Victoriano Huerta
is not recognized in his character of
Chief of the Executive Power of the Repub-
lic, which he alleges to have been con-
ferred upon him by the Senate; and none
of his acts and orders in that capacity
are recognized.
Article 2. Extraordinary powers are
granted to the Executive of the State
in all the branches of the Public Admin-
istration in order that he may suppress
any that he may see fit to suppress and
in order that he may proceed to arm
forces to aid in the support of Consti-
tutional order in the Republic...10

9 Papers Relating To The Foreign Relations Of The United States, Government
Printing Office, Washington, 1913, 756-512. Hereafter referred to as
For. Rels. To give the reader an example of what is to be found in this
citation, a few of the telegrams from the American consuls are quoted on
the three pages directly following. These are cited by footnotes 11 to 15
inclusive.

10 Ibid., 721.
A telegram from the American Consul General at Monterey to the Secretary of State of the United States reads as follows:

American Consulate General
Monterey, February 24, 1913

The situation in northern Mexico looks less encouraging. Active rebel armies in the States of Coahuila, Sonora, San Luis Potosi.  
Hanna

The Provisional Governor of Sonora sent the following telegram to President Wilson:

San Antonio, Texas,
February 28, 1913

The President: I take the liberty as a member of the National Congress of Mexico to enter protest against the recognition of the spurious government now attempting to be established by Huerta. President Madero never resigned and the alleged resignation presented to Congress was a forgery...  
R. V. Pesqueira

Ambassador Wilson, however, continued to work untiringly for the recognition of Huerta; as is evident from this telegram:

The American Ambassador to the Secretary of State

American Embassy
Mexico, March 12, 1913

...  
General Huerta is preeminently a soldier, a man of iron... who knows what he wants and how to get it, and is not, I believe overly particular as to his methods. He is a firm believer in the policy of General Porfirio Diaz and believes in the

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11 Ibid., 736.
12 Ibid., 749.
cultivation of the closest and most friendly relations with the United States. I believe him to be a sincere patriot.13

Two days later, our American Consul at Cuidad Porfirio Diaz, telegraphed the State Department as follows:

American Consulate,
Eagle Pass, March 14, 1913

Many believe Governor Carranza's goal is the Presidency. His success in securing volunteers is unquestionable; about 2,000 at Monolova.14

Luther T. Ellsworth

On March 30, 1913, Carranza declared himself provisional president of Mexico and on July 17th, Nelson O'Shaughnessy replaced Henry Lane Wilson as ambassador.15

Upon taking office, President Wilson was faced with the question of recognition of General Huerta who had become provisional president thirteen days earlier. Taft's administration had followed a policy of non-interference. Miss Thomas writes that since Madero was shot while in the custody of General Huerta, President Taft declined to take any immediate action which might prove embarrassing to the incoming president. At the same time, Taft believed Huerta would be recognized eventually.16 Wilson, in his March 11, 1913, statement outlined his friendly attitude towards Latin America. He declared his administration was for responsible governments in Latin America.

13 Ibid., 775.
14 Ibid., 777.
15 Ibid., 784-312.
16 Thomas, 26.
He said, "We hold that just government rests upon the consent of the governed..." This seemed to indicate that he was not going to recognize the heavy handed despotism of Huerta, and that he desired to help Mexico towards an era of democracy. In the same address, he implied that the United States would not seek territory in Latin America. He also spoke of his concern for the trade relations between the two continents: "The United States has nothing to seek in Central and South America except the lasting interests of the peoples of the two continents, the security of governments intended for the people and for no special group or interest, and the development of personal and trade relationships between the two continents which shall redound to the profits and advantages of both and interfere with the rights and liberties of neither." 

Wilson's first plan was to unite the people of the two continents for practical reasons. This Pan-American idea was not new. It goes back to John Quincy Adams. Henry Clay, James Monroe, and James G. Blaine had carried it on. The president, in his March 11, 1913, speech tried to lessen the Latin American suspicions which had been growing since the United States had annexed Texas. Theodore Roosevelt's "big stick" policy and the Panama revolution, as well as the "dollar diplomacy" of Knox and Taft had made Latin America injustice.

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American feeling ran high. The belief, which Woodrow Wilson also shared, that Ambassador Henry Lane Wilson and special American interest played a responsible role in the revolt against Madero especially antagonized some Mexicans. Priestley comments on the ambassador's attitude toward Madero thus:

Henry Lane Wilson was inimical to Madero throughout the Tragic Ten Days (the ten days before Madero was made prisoner by Huerta). The Embassy (American) was the center of anti-government activity. Huerta and Díaz visited him there on the night of February 18, and talked with him concerning their past for the division of the governmental powers they had seized. There the names of the prospective ministers were discussed and agreed upon. Wilson then submitted them to the foreign ministers, who were waiting in an adjoining room, and asked their comments, in case any of the appointments seemed inappropriate. The ministers merely took note of them, but made no comment. Huerta and Díaz shortly thereafter left, singly. The members of the Corps, on taking their farewells, expressed solicitude for the lives of the imprisoned executives. Mr. Wilson seemed not deeply moved. His associates noted that he had felt free to lend his influence to the destruction of a legitimate government and to listen to plans for the organization of the usurping faction, but when it came to proposals to save the lives of the prisoners, he had no plans, nor even suggestions to offer.


20 Priestley, 415.
recognized Huerta. John Lind, Governor of Minnesota, was sent to Mexico as a special agent of Woodrow Wilson. Wilson's intention was to give active assistance to Mexico to help it out of its difficulties. So instead of keeping to his "hands off" policy as expressed in his March 11, 1913 speech, and to the time honored policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of foreign nations he proposed the following terms through Lind:

1) The immediate cessation of fighting throughout Mexico...
2) Security for an early and free election...
3) Consent of General Huerta not to be a candidate in the forthcoming election...
4) The agreement of all parties to abide by the result of the election...

Huerta rejected the proposals. His Secretary of Foreign Affairs, F. Gamboa, sent formal notice of rejection;"Mexico can not for one moment take into consideration the four conditions which His Excellency Mr. Wilson has been pleased to propose through your honorable and worthy channel..."23 Because Huerta flatly rejected the conditions presented by Lind, the president decided to bring public pressure upon Huerta in his message of August 27, 1913, to Congress. Wilson wanted to tell the nation of his proposals and the principle of his policy toward Mexico. He spoke of the obligations of the United States government to protect American interests but he put forth first the "obligation to Mexico herself." American friendship should be such as to lead to willing sacrifices in Mexico's time of trouble. By sacrifices, he meant the curtailment of American interest in Mexico. The United States should be interested in the "peace, prosperity, and contentment of Mexico." This was to be accomplished by "an enlargement of the field of self-govern-

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ment and the realization of the hopes and rights of a nation with whose best aspirations, so long suppressed and disappointed, we deeply sympathize."

Huerta was not able to restore order so President Wilson believed it the duty of the United States government to volunteer to assist to bring about peace and "set up a universally acknowledged political authority" in Mexico. This was his reason for sending Lind to Mexico. This address also announced Wilson's future policy. It contained the spirit of Wilson's diplomacy throughout his term; "Meanwhile, what is it our duty to do? Clearly, everything that we do must be rooted in patience and done with calm and disinterested deliberation.... We can afford to exercise the self-restraint of a really great nation which realizes its own strength and scorns to misuse it. It was our duty to offer our active assistance. It is now our duty to show what true neutrality will do to enable the people of Mexico to set their affairs in order again and wait for a further opportunity to offer our friendly counsels...."24

After Huerta rejected the President's proposals, Wilson's stand became more aggressive. O'Shaughnessy sent a message to Wilson dated October 13, 1913, stating that Huerta dissolved the Congress, assumed the powers granted the congress in the Departments of Government, Finance, and War. And on October 23rd another message was received from O'Shaughnessy stating that many deputies had been arrested on the dissolution of the Chamber. American

24 Congressional Record, 63 Cong., 1 sess., 1913, Vol. 50, 3803, (H. Doc. 205). For comments on the president's speech see Robinson & West, 16-18.
relations with Mexico were now in a deadlock. On October 26, 1913, Huerta was elected President of Mexico. 25

The next step in Wilson's Latin American policy was announced at Mobile, Alabama, October 27th, 1913, one day after Huerta's election. The full meaning of his foreign policy now became absolutely clear. He pointed out the danger involved in the concessions obtained by foreign investors in Latin America. He predicted that eventually these concessions would be replaced by investments. The president saw the difference between his ideal and the actions of his country in the past. He stated that "the United States will never again seek one additional foot of territory by conquest." He advocated constitutional liberty, "Human rights, national integrity, and opportunity as against material interests -- that... is the issue." 26

Robinson adequately summarized Wilson's foreign policy by stating that it was firmly established before the expiration of 1913. Fair dealing involved a refusal to tolerate the "extension of the financial interest of the United States at the expense of peoples less advanced industrially, friendly co-operation embodied in a moral support of the forces of law and order and a reliance upon the universal principle of self-government.... At all times


26 James Brown Scott, ed., President Wilson's Foreign Policy, Oxford University Press, N.Y., 1918, 19-26. These pages give full text of the president's speech. For comments see Robinson & West, 21; also, Notter, 256-72.
emphases had been placed upon the spirit of the United States rather than upon their might as a nation." 27 Notter, in a like vein, said that the questions Wilson dealt with were not mere matters of diplomacy but were "shot through with the principles of life. Morality, not expedience" must be our guide. By the end of 1913, the president maintained an attitude of "watchful waiting." Constitutional government must be established in Mexico to obtain peace in America. 26 In his annual message to Congress, December 2, 1913, Wilson surveyed his foreign policy. He continued advocating peace. He declared that the United States was the champion of "constitutional government in America; we are more than friends, we are its champions; because in no other way can our neighbors, to whom we would wish in every way to make proof of our friendship, work out their own development in peace and liberty...." If Huerta prevented a real government from being inaugurated and "has made it doubtful whether even the most elementary and fundamental rights either of her own people or of the citizens of other countries resident within her territory can long be successfully safeguarded, and which threatens, if long continued, to imperil the interest of peace, order, and tolerable life in the lands immediately to the south of us.... By a little every day his power and prestige are crumbling and the collapse is not far away. We shall not, I believe, be obligated to alter our policy of watchful waiting. 29

27 Robinson & West, 23.
26 Notter, 272. See also Robinson & West, 23.
Wilson's next important step was to raise the arms embargo against Mexico. Lind recommended that Carranza be supported. This marked a change in policy from passive waiting to positive action. Previously, the president had been neutral toward the different factions except Huertistas, warring for the Mexican government. He advocated a fair election of some one other than Huerta. Despite the arms embargo of the United States Huerta received arms from foreign governments who recognized him, but, of course, the other factions could not. Neither could they receive arms from the United States which by lifting the embargo would seem to endorse the rebel leader, Carranza. However, Wilson believed that the basis for the revolution was the land question and that the constitutionalists were going to provide adequate compensation in this case. By allowing the forces of Carranza to receive American arms, it was hoped that the resulting civil war would resolve the issue in a more satisfactory manner than to have a foreign power interfere which would make the problem more difficult. Wilson uneasily lifted the arms embargo February 3, 1914:

A PROCLAMATION

Whereas, by a Proclamation of the President issued on March 14, 1912... it was declared that there existed in Mexico conditions of domestic violence which were promoted by the use of arms or munitions of war procured from the United States... it thereupon became unlawful to export arms or munitions

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30 Notter, 283.
of war to Mexico... Now, therefore, I, Woodrow Wilson,... hereby declare and proclaim that, as the conditions on which the Proclamation of March 14, 1912, was based have essentially changed, and as it is desirable to place the United States with reference to the exportation of arms or munitions of war to Mexico in the same position as other Powers, the said Proclamation is hereby revoked...31

Commenting on the President's Proclamation of February 3, 1914, an editorial in the American Journal of International Law stated if the president had recognized Huerta, Carranza would have been regarded as a rebel in arms against the legitimate government of Mexico. If no party was recognized, there existed no legal government. As matters stood the law of March 14, 1912, worked against the constitutionalists and in favor of Huerta who was able to obtain munitions from foreign nations since he was recognized by most of them. Consequently, Wilson withdrew the embargo on the importation of arms and thus placed the warring groups upon an equal basis.32

The United States was hoping that Mexico, if left free to settle her own affairs as soon as possible would be able to put them on a constitutional basis by her own force. But the constitutionalists made little use of their better equipment. They made no important military gains. Wilson's hopes for settlement in the immediate future were not realized.33

31 For. Rela., 1914, 448.


33 Robinson & West, 26.
On April 9, 1914, Admiral Mayo of the United States Navy sent the
following telegram to General Zaragoza:34

U.S.S. Dolphin
Tampico, April 9, 1914

This morning an officer... of the Mexican
military forces arrested and marched through
the street of Tampico a commissioned officer
of the United States Navy, the Paymaster of
the U.S.S. Dolphin, together with seven men
composing the crew of the ... Dolphin.

At the time of this arrest the officer and
men concerned were unarmed and engaged in
loading cases of gasoline which had been
purchased on shore..."35

Mayo

The men were released and Admiral Mayo was tendered an apology and an
expression of regret from Huerta. But Mayo demanded a formal apology, the
salute of twenty-one guns to be given the United States flag. Huerta refused.
President Wilson ordered the North American fleet to the east coast of Mexico
and on April 15th, the Pacific fleet to the west coast. The ports of Tampico
and Vera Cruz on the east coast and ports on the west coast were seized so as
to blockade Mexico.36 On April 20, 1914, Wilson went before Congress to give
an account of the Tampico affair. In this message the President stated that
this act was made to enforce respect for the United States. He said that the
Tampico affair was not an isolated incident. A series of incidents had
occurred which showed that Huerta had little regard for the dignity of the

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34 Commanding the Huertista forces resisting the Constitutionalists at
Tampico.

35 For. Rela., 1914, 448 et seq.

36 Robinson & West, 32.
United States government. War was not his aim but he asked approval of Congress to use the armed forces of the United States to obtain from Huerta and his adherents full recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States. "I, therefore, come to ask your approval that I should use the armed forces of the United States in such ways and to such an extent as may be necessary to obtain from General Huerta and his adherents the fullest recognition of the rights and dignity of the United States, even amidst the distressing condition... in Mexico." As has been indicated often, Wilson’s demands were made to the president of Mexico whom he did not recognize as existing.

On the 21st of April, the custom house at Vera Cruz was taken by American marines, and on the 22nd, the port of Vera Cruz was occupied. The blockade of the Mexican coast and seizure of the ports of Tampico and Vera Cruz cut off the munitions Huerta was receiving through Vera Cruz. Wilson expressed his feelings to his private secretary, Joseph P. Tumulty, by saying: "It is too bad, isn’t it, but we could not allow that cargo to land. The Mexicans intend using those guns upon our own boys. It is hard to take action of this kind. I have tried to keep out of this Mexican mess, but we are now on the brink of war and there is no alternative." Diplomatic relations were severed by Huerta. Even General Carranza protested this invasion of Mexican soil: "In the face of the real situation of Mexico ..."


and considering the acts committed at Vera Cruz to be highly offensive to the
dignity and independence of Mexico,... I interpret the sentiment of the great
majority of the Mexican people... and invite you... to order your forces to
evacuate all places that they hold in the port of Vera Cruz, and to present
to the Constitutionalist Government, which I as Constitutional Governor of the
State of Coahuila and First Chief of the Constitutionalist Army represent,
the demand on the part of the United States in regard to acts recently com-
mitted at the port of Tampico...."39 The situation was becoming dangerous.
Wilson had to use every ounce of patience to keep the situation steady. He
was the loneliest man in Washington.40

At this point, on April 25th, the government of Argentina, Brazil, and
Chile tendered their good offices to bring about some solution to the problem.
Wilson accepted immediately. Still his object was re-establishment of con-
stitutional government. He wanted the creation of "a single provisional
government acceptable to all parties... upon the bases of such reforms as will
satisfy the just claims of the people of Mexico to life, liberty and inde-
pendant self support."41 On May 13, 1914, the conference began. The first
meeting was held at Niagara Falls, Canada. The plan proposed by the American
representatives asked for the removal of Huerta, "that a provisional govern-
ment, representing constitutionalist sentiment should be appointed; that the

39 For. Rels., 1914, 477-484.
40 Tumulty, 154.
41 Notter, 297.
president should be pledged to carry into effect the agrarian and other reforms, etc....42

The mediation accomplished little in pacifying Mexico but it promoted Pan-American friendship. It also enabled Wilson to maintain the status quo in Vera Cruz until he could withdraw the American forces.43

As is well known much pressure was brought to bear upon Huerta that on July 15, 1914, he resigned and sailed for Spain. The able and honorable Francisco Carbajal, formerly Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Mexico and recently appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs was named Provisional President.44

The Wilson administration justified itself for not recognizing Huerta's government because of the fate of Madero, Huerta's failure to hold a real election, and the fact that he did not control, at any one time, the larger part of Mexico. To recognize Huerta would have meant recognition of a military leader, and this would have given a stimulus to other military leaders who wished to establish a military dictatorship.45

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42 For. Rel., 1914, 538. For further information regarding this conference, its proposals and amendments etc., see pages 488 et seq.

43 Rippy, 47.

44 For. Rel., 1914, 563.

CHAPTER II

AMERICAN RELATIONS WITH CARRANZA

Mexico was still in chaos. Huerta was gone but the various army chiefs fought for supremacy among themselves. This caused the revolution to be prolonged a few more years. Wilson was anxious to see a sound, permanent government set up by Carranza. Finally, the constitutionalists gained control of the north and entered Mexico City on August 22, 1914, seventeen months after Carranza began his struggle. He announced that he had taken charge of the executive power according to the Plan of Guadalupe. This plan dated March 26, 1913, declared the principles upon which the Carranza revolution was founded:

Whereas the legislative and judicial powers have recognized and protected General Huerta and his illegal and anti-patriotic proceedings contrary to constitutional laws and precepts; ... we, the undersigned, chiefs and officers commanding the constitutionalist forces, have agreed upon and shall sustain with arms the following:

1. General Victoriano Huerta is hereby repudiated as President of the Republic....

4. For the purpose of organizing the army which is to see that our aims are carried out, we name Venustiano Carranza, now governor of the State of Coahuila, as first Chief of the army which is to be called "Constitutionalist Army."

5. Upon the occupation of the City of Mexico by the Constitutionalist Army,
the executive power shall be vested in Venustiano Carranza, its first chief, or in the person who will substitute him in command.

6. The provisional trustee or the executive power of the Republic shall convene general elections as soon as peace may have been restored and will surrender power to the citizen who may have been elected.¹

This declaration was supposed to have been signed by sixty-four officers of the troops of the State of Coahuila. With these troops Carranza, then governor of that state, began his revolution against Huerta's government after the death of Francisco Madero.

Zapata and Villa were two revolutionists who combined their forces against Carranza after Huerta's downfall. Chaotic conditions became intensified. Events moved rapidly. Villa repudiated the government set up by Carranza. He said he was convinced that Carranza was incapable of re-establishing a democratic government. On September 30, 1914, Villa issued his manifesto which contained points against Carranza. In the next month, Carranza issued a Proclamation charging Villa with insincerity. A convention was held at Aguascalientes consisting of all the generals in the Mexican Army who opposed Carranza's government. On November 2, 1914, they elected a Provisional President, General Eulalio Gutiérrez, Governor of the State of Luis Potosí. Eight days later this convention declared Carranza a rebel. General Gutiérrez appointed Villa head of the convention army. General

¹ Thomas Edward Gibbon Mexico Under Carranza, Doubleday, Page & Co., N.Y., 1919, 47. See also For. Relts., 1914, 589.
Obregón, head of the constitutionalist army, declared war on Villa. Carranza temporarily established his government at Vera Cruz. On December 12, 1914, he issued his Declaration and Decree stating his position as executive and his intention to hold that place:

That the undersigned, in his capacity as constitutional governor of the state of Coahuila, had solemnly taken the oath to observe and cause the general constitution to be observed, and that complying with this duty and of the above oath, he was inevitably obliged to arise in arms to oppose the usurpation of Huerta and to restore constitutional order in the Republic of Mexico.

That, it being imperative, therefore, that the interruption of constitutional order should subsist during this new period of struggle, the Plan of Guadalupe should therefore, continue to be in force, as it has been the guidance and banner of it, until the enemy may have been overpowered completely in order that the constitution may be restored...2

Wilson tried to adjust the differences between Carranza and his enemies. Everything was done to reach some settlement between the factions and, at the same time, protect the personal and property rights of Americans. To support his return to a non-intervention policy, Wilson ordered that the American marines leave Vera Cruz by November 23, 1914.3 Notter states that his action was consistent with the essential part of Wilson's policy of building up

3 For. Rels., 1914, 590-626.
friendship with Latin American countries. During December, 1914, and January, 1915, dissension among the rebel leaders increased. The president continued to avoid armed intervention. Meanwhile, the press continually called for intervention.4

Wilson believed some action should be taken. In his June 2, 1915, statement he called upon the various factions to get together to settle their differences for Mexico's relief or the United States would lend its moral support "to some man or group of men, if such may be found, who can rally the suffering people of Mexico to their support in an effort to ignore, if they cannot unite the warring factions of the country, return to the constitution of the republic so long in abeyance, and set up a Government at Mexico City which the great powers of the world can recognize and deal with — a Government with whom the program of the revolution will be a business and not merely a platform."5 The conventionists were quarrelling among themselves, consequently they were not making any headway under Carranza's control. A Pan-American Conference which came into being to consider the matter, indicated that Carranza was the leader who should receive their support. The members believed Carranza had central authority among his forces while there seemed to be no central authority among the Villista forces. The loyalty and unity among Carranza adherents indicated that he had the more strength. Soon

4 Notter, 364 and 383.
5 Robinson & West, 269.
after the President's June 2, 1915 address, Carranza issued a Declaration to
the Mexican nation dated June 11, 1915, in which he said his government con-
trolled over seven-eighths of the national territory, that it had organized
public administration in twenty out of twenty-seven states of the Republic of
Mexico, and that more than thirteen million of the fifteen million people
were under his jurisdiction. Therefore, Carranza believed the time had come
when his government should be recognized by other nations especially the
United States. He also appealed to the warring factions to submit to his
government in order to obtain peace in Mexico. General Carranza's claim to
recognition was aided when his confidential agent at Washington on October 7,
1915, sent copies of his Declarations of December 12, 1914, and June 11, 1915
to Wilson. In this letter Carranza assured the United States that the lives
and property of foreigners would be respected. He also said that his govern-
ment would recognize indemnities for damages caused by the revolution. He
concludes that the laws of reform would be observed and the constitutional
government will respect everyone's life, property, and religion.6

In the meantime Carranza reoccupied Mexico City. After examining the
extent of Carranza's military control, it was decided by the members of the
conference that he possessed the essentials for recognition. On October 19,
1915, Wilson recognized Carranza as chief executive of the de facto govern-
ment of Mexico:

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The Secretary of State to the Confidential
Agent of the de facto Government of Mexico

Department of State
Washington, October 19, 1915

My dear Mr. Arredondo:

It is my pleasure to inform you that
the President of the United States takes
this opportunity of extending recognition
to the de facto Government of Mexico, of
which General Venustiano Carranza is the
Chief Executive.7

Robert Lansing

An article was printed in The Nation entitled "Brighter Days for Mexico" which
stated that regarding recognition of Carranza as against the other men in the
field warring for reform and reconstruction, Carranza was the result of a
process of elimination. His recognition came about following the united
efforts of the republics of Latin America, "Racially and by political
experience they are better qualified than we to understand forces and
personalities in Mexico..." Conferences with Latin American republics tended
to reduce their suspicions of the motives of the United States which were
brought about by big business interest.8 At this time, Carranza was still
not able to maintain order throughout the whole of Mexico. Villa continued
to harass the country and to make raids on the American border. Actually,
Carranza was not elected president until March 12, 1917.9 Wilson gave
Carranza his immediate support by proclaiming an embargo on the shipment of

7 For. Rels., 1915, 771.
arms to all anti-government parties in Mexico. But the fact that Carranza was not duly elected until much later leads one to believe that expediency played a large part in recognition, and it is clear that for a year and a half Wilson was recognizing a militarist type of government which he had previously condemned in the instance of Huerta.

At this time, Europe was in turmoil and holding the attention of the world. Wilson, in his annual message to congress, December 7, 1915, spoke of the community of interests among the American states: "The moral is, that the states of America are not hostile rivals but co-operating friends, and that their growing sense of community of interest, alike in matters political and in matters economic, is likely to give them a new significance as factors in international affairs and in the political history of the world." In this statement one can see that particular attention was called to the fact that the president looked beyond the present value of the growing unity of the Latin American countries in ideals and interests to its importance for the time of readjustment after the war for the future. After the war, the Latin American countries would cooperate commercially for pre-war economic adjustments. A united America would not only be an advantage against foreign encroachment here but it could be of service to Europe by giving economic aid, moral example, and leadership. In his January 6, 1916, statement, Wilson

10 Notter, 452.
11 MacCorkle, 93.
again spoke of his desire for friendliness and co-operation between all
American states. He stressed the chief features of this Pan-American
program; to guarantee to each other absolute political independence and
territorial integrity and to settle all disputes by arbitration.\footnote{13}

The recognition of Carranza’s \textit{de facto} government did not bring peace.
The events in Mexico were increasing the difficulties of this government to
maintain its non-intervention policy. Incidents along the border exasperated
our congressmen. Some demanded intervention. Then on March 8, 1916, General
Villa attacked the town of Columbus, New Mexico and killed seventeen
Americans. Now drastic measures had to be taken. The president sent forces
to Mexico to capture Villa:

\begin{quote}
\textbf{The Adjutant General}
\textbf{to General Funston}

\textbf{War Department}
\textbf{Washington, March 10, 1916}

President has directed that an armed force
be sent into Mexico with the sole object of
capturing Villa and preventing any further
raids by his band, and with scrupulous re-
gard to sovereignty of Mexico...\footnote{14}

\textbf{McCain}
\end{quote}

General Carranza had given his consent reluctantly for American troops to

\begin{flushleft}
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\footnote{13}{Robinson & West, 82.}

\footnote{14}{For. Rel., 1916, 483.}
pursue bandits in Mexico. General John J. Pershing did not receive any assistance from him to accomplish his purpose. Carranza denied him the use of railways for transportation of supplies, forbade the occupation of towns, and made no effort of his own to capture Villa. In April, Carranza also requested the withdrawal of American forces from Mexico. Pershing believed that he was actually encountering active opposition from the constitutionals:

General Funston to the Adjutant General

Fort Sam Houston
April 17, 1916

Following just received from Pershing:

Namiquipa
April 17, 1916

...My opinion is, general attitude Carranza has been one of obstruction. This also universal opinion Army officers this expedition. Carranza forces report all acts against Villa forces and death of Villa leaders. Activity Carranza force in territory through which we have operated probably intentionally obstructive ....

Funston

In order to reach some agreement, Lansing initiated a conference between General Hugh S. Scott of the American forces and the constitutionalist General Alvaro Obregón. At this conference it was revealed that Carranza

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15 For. Rel., 1916, 822.
wished to discuss completion of the withdrawal of American forces. He turned a deaf ear to any talk of cooperation or mutual agreement. The War Department retaliated by an embargo on shipments of arms and munitions to Mexico. The final decision given at the conference was that our troops would be withdrawn but gradually. Carranza refused to sign the agreement because no date for complete withdrawal was provided. The Mexican government promised to prevent further raids on the border. But May, 1916, brought new raids on Glen Springs and Banquillas, Texas.16

The conferences between Carranza's minister of War, Obregon and Generals Scott and Funston held during April and May did not bring relief to the situation. The breaking point occurred May 22, 1916. On this date, Carranza sent an ill-tempered note to the United States' Department of State. In its sharp and bitter terms it charged the American government with bad faith and demanded the immediate withdrawal of American forces from Mexico. He asked this government of its true intention toward Mexico:

... The Mexican Government considers it necessary to take advantage of this opportunity to request of the American Government a more categorical definition of its true intentions toward Mexico. The American Government for some time past has been making assurance of friendship to the Latin American people, and has taken advantage of every opportunity to convince them that it wishes to respect

16 For. Rels., 1916, 544.
their sovereignty absolutely.

Especially with respect to Mexico the American Government has declared on various occasions that it was not its intention to intervene in any manner in its interior affairs and that it desires to leave it to our country to work out alone its difficult and varied problems of political and social transformation....

The Mexican Government has, nevertheless, to confess that the acts of the American military authorities are in direct contradiction to the statements above referred to, and finds itself forced, therefore, to appeal to the President, the Department of State, the Senate and the American people, for a definition... of the true political intentions of the United States as regards Mexico....

The Mexican Government invites the Government of the United States to bring about a cessation of this situation of uncertainty between the two countries and to support its declarations and assurances of friendship with real and effective acts which shall convince the Mexican people of the sincerity of its proposals. These acts at the moment can not be other than the immediate withdrawal of the American troops which are to-day on Mexican territory....17

C. Aquilar

This brought on a deadlock in the relations between Mexico and the United States. Withdrawal of troops without success would be a blow to Wilson's prestige during a presidential election year. The troops stayed.

17 Foreign Relations, 1916, 552-563. C. Aquilar was Secretary of Foreign Relations of the de facto government of Mexico.
War seemed imminent. If Wilson had taken this opportunity to sever relations with Mexico for the redress of American wrongs, he would have had a united nation backing him. Even if the de facto government was not responsible for the raids, its attitude towards them was indifferent and almost suspicious. The Pershing expedition was the result of many wrongs which the de facto government had not even attempted to correct. With Carranza's help, it is believed that Villa could have been captured. But, in explanation of Carranza's actions, he was probably suspicious of the United States. This country had occupied Haiti in 1915 and Santo Domingo in 1916. Also, there were many stories in the American press calling for annexation of Mexico to the United States.

On June 20, 1916, Wilson sent his answer to Carranza. In it he stated his refusal to withdraw the American marines as long as they constituted the only check against intolerable grievances and bandit outrages:

... The Government of the United States has viewed with deep concern and increasing disappointment the progress of the revolution in Mexico. Continuous bloodshed and disorders have marked its progress. For three years the Mexican Republic has been torn with civil strife; the lives of Americans and other aliens have been sacrificed; vast properties developed by American capital and enterprise have been destroyed or rendered nonproductive; bandits have been permitted to roam

18 Gruening, 591.
at will through the territory contiguous to the United States and to seize, without punishment or without effective attempt at punishment, the property of Americans, while the lives of citizens of the United States who ventured to remain in Mexican territory or to return there to protect their interests, have been taken, and in some cases barbarously taken, and the murderers have neither been apprehended nor brought to justice....

In these attacks on American territory, Carrancista adherents, and even Carrancista soldiers took part in the looting, burning and killing. Not only were these murders characterized by ruthless brutality, but uncivilized acts of mutilation were perpetrated....Since these attacks, leaders of the bandits well known both to Mexican civil and military authorities as well as to American officers have been enjoying with impunity the liberty of the towns of northern Mexico. So far has the indifference of the de facto Government to these atrocities gone that some of these leaders, as I am advised, have received not only the protection of the Government, but encouragement and aid as well....

In the face of these depredations not only on American lives and property on Mexican soil but on American soldiers, citizens and homes on American territory, the perpetrators of which General Carranza was unable or possibly considered it inadvisable to apprehend and punish, the United States had no recourse other than to employ force to disperse the bands of Mexican outlaws who were with increasing boldness systematically raiding across the international boundary...
In conclusion, the Mexican Government invites the United States to support its "assurances of friendship with real and effective acts" which can be no other than the immediate withdrawal of the American troops. For the reasons I have herein fully set forth, this request of the de facto Government can not now be entertained. The United States has not sought the duty which has been forced upon it of pursuing bandits who under fundamental principles of municipal and international law, ought to be pursued and arrested and punished by Mexican authorities... If, on the contrary, the de facto Government is pleased to ignore this obligation and to believe that "in case of a refusal to retire these troops there is no further recourse than to defend its territory by an appeal to arms..." the execution of this threat will lead to the gravest consequence... While this Government would deeply regret such a result, it cannot recede from its settled determination to maintain its national rights and to perform its full duty in preventing further invasions of the territory of the United States and in removing the peril which Americans along the international boundary have borne so long with patience and forbearance... 19

The events which followed were even more ominous. On the evening of June 21st, hostilities broke out at Carrizal between Pershing's and Carranza forces. Some United States cavalry men were killed and others taken prisoner. In forceful terms Lansing demanded the release of the American prisoners.

There was more to follow. On June 26th, at Tampico, an American naval launch from the U.S.S. Marietta was fired on without warning by Constitutionalist forces. On July 4th, the de facto government suggested that the offer of mediation from the Latin American countries be accepted. On July 28th, the United States sent a note of acceptance. Wilson was relieved.

To date, Wilson's policy was considered unsuccessful for our relations with Mexico were still strained. The Columbus massacre remained unpunished, Americans on the border were still being killed. Mexicans were also killed in retaliation in Texas. After the Carrizal incident, Wilson spoke before the Associated Advertising clubs at Philadelphia, June 29, 1916, rebuking those who advocated conquest of Mexico:

I believe... that America... should be ready in every point of policy and of action to vindicate at whatever cost the principles of liberty, of justice, and of humanity to which we have been devoted from the first.... It is easy to think first of the material interest of America, but it is not easy to think first of what America, if she loves justice ought to do in the field of international affairs. I believe that at whatever cost America should be just to other peoples and treat other peoples as she demands that they should treat her.21

20 Ibid., 593-600.
In his June 30th, 1916, address before the Press Club at New York he was more emphatic. He stated here that it was an easy thing to strike against another nation but striking was no way to conserve the honour of the nation:

.....The easiest thing is to strike. The brutal thing is the impulsive thing....

Do you think the glory of America would be enhanced by a war of conquest in Mexico? Do you think that any act of violence by a powerful nation like this against a weak and destructive neighbor would reflect distinction upon the annals of the United States?

.....I have constantly to remind myself that I am not the servant of those who wish to enhance the value of their Mexican investments, that I am the servant of the rank and file of the people of the United States....

Then on July 4, 1916, the president said:

.....America did not come into existence to make one more great nation in the family of nations, to show its strength and to exercise its mastery. America opened her doors to everybody who wanted to be free and to have the same opportunity that everybody else had to make the most of his faculties and his opportunities and America will retain its greatness only so long as it retains and seeks to realize those ideals. No man ought to suffer injustice in America. No man ought in America to fail to see the dictates of humanity.

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Again on July 10, 1916, the president continued to emphasize his principle of justice and fairness:

What makes Mexico suspicious of us is that she does not believe as yet that we want to serve her. She believes that we want to possess her, and she has justification for the belief in the way in which some of our fellow citizens have tried to exploit her privileges and possessions. For my part, I will not serve the ambitions of these gentlemen, but I will try to serve all America, so far as intercourse with Mexico is concerned, by trying to serve Mexico herself.... Of course, we must make good our own sovereignty of Mexico.24

The mediation commission held its first meeting on September 6, 1916. They held numerous sessions but did not conclude their deliberations until 1917. But hampered by conflicting intentions, the conventions never resulted in an agreement which Carranza would accept. Meanwhile, intervention and war had been avoided and the serious crises had passed.25

The president in his 1916 campaign speeches discussed his foreign policy. On September 2, 1916, in accepting the nomination of the Democratic Party for a second term as President, he justified his actions in Mexico and emphasized the significance of Latin American relations for the future. Regarding Mexico, his ideal was to respect the sovereignty of the Mexican people and help them to do away with misrule and foreign control. Again, as before, he placed American economic power in a place of service to American ideals.

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25 Notter, 535.
The president defended the charge that the Pershing expedition violated his principles. He said that the marines and soldiers entered Mexico to vindicate the sovereignty of the United States, a duty which Mexico was unable to accomplish and we did so without obstruction to the sovereign authority of Mexico. Some condemned his policy of non-recognition of Huerta. In answer, he said that he would not extend the hand of welcome to anyone who obtained power by treachery and violence.\textsuperscript{26}

As the Pershing expedition came to an end a new problem was coming to a head. Withdrawal of American marines occurred a week before Germany declared unrestricted U-boat warfare. Carranza was elected President of Mexico, not by popular vote, but by the Mexican Congress sitting as an electoral college, March 12, 1917.\textsuperscript{27} De Jure recognition was extended to Mexico by the United States on August 31, 1917.\textsuperscript{28}

At this time, President Wilson's attentions were drawn elsewhere as he was concerned with the United States entering the great European conflict. As far as his Mexican policy was concerned, the matter was ended. Future difficulties involved protection of American rights under Mexico's Constitution of 1917 drawn up by Carranza and his adherents.\textsuperscript{29}

\textsuperscript{27} Notter, 618.
\textsuperscript{28} The Am. Journ. Internation'l Law, 1918, Vol. 12, 422.
\textsuperscript{29} Notter, 618.
CHAPTER III

THE MEXICAN CONSTITUTION OF 1917

Carranza was an improvement over Huerta but he left much to be desired as a chief magistrate. With Carranza as president of Mexico, some of the more anxious problems between the United States and Mexican relations from 1917 on were concerned with property rights which were included in the new Mexican Constitution of 1917. In this constitution many of the promises made by the Mexican government under Carranza were broken. He had stated that when he became established in the city of Mexico, he would call for the election of congressmen. He did not do so. In 1915, he called a constitutional convention to enact a new constitution disregarding the one promulgated in 1857 which he had pledged himself to uphold. The Constitution of 1857 had been adopted by a vote of all the representatives of the Mexican people but when he called for the election of delegates to the constitutional convention, some of the states of Mexico were still not under his control. These states were not notified, consequently, all the cities of Mexico were not represented.

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2 Gruening, 595-596.
3 Gibbon, 55-56.
The articles most commented upon were those concerned with labor, religion, and the nationalization of the country's subsoil products.

Priestley comments on the Constitution of 1917, as follows:

Whatever the benefits of the new constitution, these were not the features which gave it its great notoriety. The salient points of interest in it are its new application of the principle of eminent domain and its care, meticulously expressed, for the welfare of the laboring classes. With these also marches the determination to destroy the evils of authoritative control of the people by the church either through education or religion. It is dedicated to the rule of reason and of the proletariat... and it embodies the theory of social reorganization in the exhaustive way in which it attempts to protect the laboring class and forestall all its difficulties. It is in fact an attempt to institute a régime of state socialism.4

The author further comments that these provisions on labor under Article 123 of the constitution are theoretical, not practical. This is dangerous for they try to create conditions rather than control existing ones. Some of the provisions which would be ideal for a highly industrialized society would prove the direct opposite when applied to domestic laborers. There are, however, some admirable qualities in this article such as special favor given women and child labor, minimum wage provisions, an eight hour day, and accident compensation, etc.5 Arthur Constantine, a special correspondent in Mexico during this period comments on Article 123 as follows:

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4 Priestley, 436-437.
5 Ibid., 437.
The socialistic influences which have been active among the Mexican revolutionists since the days of Madero have resulted in the incorporation in the new constitution of such radical (or advanced) legislation as the eight hour day.... These are the salient features of the new Mexican Constitution now in force.... Now that the dominant faction has obtained what it has so often stated it was fighting for, the hour of the test of its patriotism arrives.... Those who have lived in Mexico during the comings and goings of revolutionary factions surmise that the test will try the soul of more than one patriot. 6

James Lord, Treasurer of the Pan-American Federation of Labor and member of the Labor Commission to visit Mexico in 1918 writes that at that time labor was in a bad state of affairs. Carranza's government was a state socialist government, they did not believe in labor unions, instead, advocated government control of industries to take charge of labor conditions, wages, and general welfare of the workers. He further claims that the Mexican worker never received enough wages to enable him to obtain a more substantial diet than frijoles and tortillas. This did not give him enough strength for the work he was expected to do, consequently, his efficiency was low. The author advocates better environment, food, and general conditions for the workers to be shown in their homes, hygiene and cleanliness. Finally, he concludes, the way to help Mexico is to help without trespassing, "to give them an opportunity to save themselves, and we will then see what they

As for Carranza, he was a disappointment to the Mexican workers who helped him into power. Their land of promise never materialized through him.

Francis Kelley in his book, Blood-Drenched Altars, writes with authority on the religious persecution in Mexico. This situation permeated throughout the constitution under many of its articles. Article 3 prohibits any religion from establishing or directing primary schools. The article itself reads as follows:

Instruction is free; that given in public institutions of learning shall be secular. Primary instruction, whether higher or lower, given in private institutions shall likewise be secular.

No religious corporation nor minister of any religious creed shall establish or direct schools of primary instruction.

Private primary schools may be established only subject to official supervision.

Primary instruction in public institutions shall be gratuitous.

Article 130 goes further; it ordered the confiscation of schools erected for teaching religion and provided that all primary school matters be placed under the direction of the federal government. No legal status was given to churches. It also forbade any Mexican to be a minister of any religious order.

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8 Ibid., 103.


creed, under penalty of loss of citizenship. It prohibited ministers from receiving a legacy for the benefit of a religious organization.\textsuperscript{11} Article 130 reads:

The Federal authorities shall have power to exercise in matters of religious worship and outward ecclesiastical forms such intervention as by law authorized. All other officials shall act as auxiliaries to the Federal authorities.

The law recognizes no juridical personality in the religious institutions known as churches.

Only a Mexican by birth may be a minister of any religious creed in Mexico.

No ministers of religious creeds shall, either in public or private meetings, or in acts of worship or religious propaganda, criticise the fundamental laws of the country, the authorities in particular or the Government in general; they shall have no vote, nor be eligible to office, nor shall they be entitled to assemble for political purposes...

Ministers of religious creeds are incapable legally of inheriting by will from ministers of the same religious creed or from any private individual to whom they are not related by blood within the fourth degree.\textsuperscript{12}

Article 5 further states that the law does not permit the establishment of monastic orders of whatever denomination or for whatever purpose contemplated. This article, Kelley comments, was incorporated to strike at religious organizations other than Catholic.\textsuperscript{13} The domination of the state over the church was complete under Article 37 in which churches are deprived

\textsuperscript{11} Kelley, 262-266.

\textsuperscript{12} Branch, 103-106.

\textsuperscript{13} Kelley, 262.
of protection because they cannot appeal to congress or to the courts to enforce property rights. If church authorities merely petitioned against confiscation, they lost their citizenship; since Article 37 provides that:

Citizenship shall be lost;

III By compromising themselves in any way before ministers of any religious creed or before any other person not to observe the present constitution, or the laws arising thereunder.16

In regard to the president of Mexico, in Article 82 he is forbidden to belong to any ecclesiastical state, "The President of the Republic shall have the following qualifications:...He shall not belong to the ecclesiastical state nor be a minister of any religious creed..."16 Finally, Article 24 states that "Everyone is free to embrace the religion of his choice and to practice all ceremonies, devotions, or observances of his respective creed, either in places of public worship or at home, provided they do not constitute an offence punishable by law". But to make sure that actually no one will be this free, Article 130 provides that as the law is now enforced, family prayer at home would constitute an illegal religious act.17

Francis Kelley places more of the blame for religious persecution on Obregón and Calles than upon Carranza. He said that Carranza was "between

14 Ibid., 262-263.
15 Branch, 31-32.
16 Ibid., 63-64.
17 Branch, 15 for Article 24, 103-106 for Article 130. Article 130 has been quoted on pages 42 and 43 of this chapter.
Obregon had deserted him and made an agreement with the radicals who wanted nothing less than complete destruction of the church. On the other hand, Carranza had made certain pledges to Wilson. On December 23, 1918, he went before the Mexican Congress to ask for a modification of Article 130 of the Constitution:

> Without flinching I have come before the Congress suggesting amendments to our Supreme Law. In doing this I have no motive other than a sincere desire to restore harmony between the word of the law and the universally accepted principles of common justice. In suggesting that you enact into law the bill I herewith submit, I cherish the hope the Congress will understand that my motive today is that which it has always been, namely, to give more weighty consideration to the welfare of the people as a whole than to the demands of any group no matter how honorable it may claim to be.

The bill I now enclose would amend Article 130 of the Constitution adopted at Queretaro, to insure respect for liberty of conscience that has been so highly esteemed in Mexico as an inalienable human right, removing provisions which abridge that liberty to a degree not consistent with correct morality and not in the public interest, which provisions moreover are not in harmony with the postulates of modern civilization, are a denial of true liberty and violate the statute itself under which the political organism of our country functions.... Those who adopted the constitution of 1857, had no hesitation in admitting that in Mexico there should be liberty of worship and liberty of conscience. If they did not embody it in the constitution it was through an excessive devotion to the complete separation of Church and State by which they denied their own jurisdiction
in any religious matter. The legislators of that day were so scrupulous in this matter that they refrained from even the mention of religion. This was due doubtless to the fact that the delegates to the 1857 Constitutional Convention had entered into an agreement not to introduce any provision that would place any restriction whatever on the liberty of conscience which itself is guaranteed by the constitution they adopted.... Not before the promulgation of the 1857 Constitution did civil administration in Mexico take on a purely secular character. Confusing the law of the church with the law of the state a mystical character was given to government, and it would have been altogether natural for the legislature to regulate matters of worship. Nevertheless legislatures scrupulously abstained from doing so.... The abridgment of the liberty of the human conscience as is done in the Queretaro Constitution has no antecedent in our national legislation, no precedent even analogous is to be found for this provision which I ask you to amend. I have searched our national record in vain, I have examined every effort made to curb the alleged abuses of religion, I have found nowhere anything that even had the faintest appearance of a mandate from the nation for any law that interferes with worship. Even in the Reform Laws, enacted at a time when laicism was firmly in the saddle, there is no clause which interferes with the details of worship.... I hold that, even if we take nothing else into consideration, the very fact that in our civil law there is no basis for any act that would prescribe or regulate the internal affairs of any religion without violating the principle of non-intervention which is traditional in Mexico, you cannot fail to see the justice of the recommendation I make that Article 130 be amended.18

18 Kelley, 241-244.
The Mexican Congress refused to act upon his December 23rd recommendation. Mexico City became a scene of intrigue and revolt for the next two years.

The section of the constitution which involved Mexico in international complications is concerned with the nationalization of the country's natural resources as expressed in Article 27. This article vested in the Mexican nation the ownership of all mineral and oil resources and asserts that direct domination by the nation over these subsoil products was occasioned for the good of society.19

Article 27:

The ownership of lands and waters comprised within the limits of the national territory is vested originally in the Nation, which has had, and has, the right to transmit title thereof to private persons, thereby constituting private property. . . .

The Nation shall have at all times the right to impose on private property such limitations as the public interest may demand as well as the right to regulate the development of national resources, which are susceptible of appropriation, in order to conserve them and equitably to distribute the public wealth. For this purpose necessary measures shall be taken to divide large landed estates; to develop small landed holdings; . . . Wherefore, all grants of lands made up to the present time under the decree of January 6, 1915, are confirmed.

Private property acquired for the said purposes shall be considered as taken for public utility.

In the Nation is vested direct ownership of all minerals or substances which in veins, layers, masses, or beds constitute

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19 Priestley, 437.
deposits whose nature is different from the components of the land, such as minerals from which metals and metalloids used for industrial purposes are extracted; beds of precious stones, rock salt and salt lakes formed directly by marine waters,... phosphates which may be used for fertilizers; solid mineral fuels; petroleum and all hydrocarbons - solid, liquid or gaseous...

Legal capacity to acquire ownership of lands and waters of the nation shall be governed by the following provisions:

I. Only Mexicans by birth or naturalization and Mexican companies have the right to acquire ownership in lands, waters and their appurtenances, or to obtain concessions to develop mines, waters, or mineral fuels in the Republic of Mexico...

II. The religious institutions known as churches, irrespective of creed, shall in no case have legal capacity to acquire, hold or administer real property or loans made on such real property;... Places of public worship are the property of the Nation,... Episcopal residences, rectories, seminaries, orphan asylums or collegiate establishments of religious institutions... any other buildings built or designed for the administration, propaganda, or teaching of the tenets of any religious creed shall forthwith vest, as of full right, directly in the Nation...

All contracts and concessions made by former governments from and after the year 1876 which shall have resulted in the monopoly of lands, waters and natural resources of the Nation by a single individual or corporation, are declared subject to revision, and the Executive is authorized to declare those null and void which seriously prejudice the public interest. 20

Disregarding Article 14 of the same constitution which forbade retroactive laws, Article 27 gave retroactive power which affected lands that

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20 Branch, 15-25.
were acquired before adoption of the new constitution on the theory that the nation never had the right to alienate subsoil products. It was contended by the present government in Mexico that Díaz violated Article 72 of the Constitution of 1857 when he legislated in favor of alienation of the subsoil products. Gibbons states that under the laws of 1857, solid mineral fuels; petroleum, and all hydrocarbons (solid, liquid, gaseous) belonged to the owners of the lands in which they existed. Constantine brings forth an important point regarding the nationalization of subsoil products:

> Of course, any nation may, if it thinks wise, legally - whether justly or not is another question - nationalize its land provided it compensates foreign owners under international agreements satisfactory to the owners and the nations to which they owe allegiance and from which they are entitled to protection. This however, does not seem to be contemplated in the Carranza document.

Petroleum conditions remained a problem all during Carranza's reign. Foreign interest wanted Article 27 amended to protect their rights. To put Article 27 into effect, Carranza issued decrees stating that all those who claim to be owners of petroleum lands must file statements of the lands they claim and pay rentals and royalties to the government in order to be

21 Priestley, 438.
22 Gibbons, 59.
23 "Mexico's Constitution," The Outlook, March 14, 1917, 463.
allowed to continue in their operation. Petroleum companies organized themselves and refused to comply with Carranza's decrees. In 1920, Carranza made concessions to oil men to the point of allowing them to resume drilling. This was done without prejudice to either side in the legal controversy. Before a conclusion was reached, Carranza was driven from power.

E. D. Trowbridge, formerly General Manager of the Mexican Light and Power Company in Mexico City commented that the Constitution was strongly anti-capitalistic. This aroused the hostility of the capitalistic class. Consequently, the chances for securing money necessary for reconstruction was diminished. The assembly that adopted the constitution was an extremely radical one. The reforms were so drastic, they defeated their own ends.

The reason for the non-fulfillment of the promises made by the Carranza government was the military situation which treated banditry and rebellion as an opportunity for self-enrichment; and also the chaotic conditions of the internal affairs. The constitution was too idealistic for practical use. Instead of trying to better conditions in affairs which menaced the life of the people; it undertook to revolutionize the government on a "socialistic theory while a corrupt military oligarchy and a none too honest set of civilian officers vitiated whatever was good in the new plan by the most cynical grafting." The condition was not new with Carranza, and will

25 Priestley, 60.
27 Priestley, 443.
not disappear suddenly under one government. It was believed that the first step in the development of the Mexican people toward self-government would come through a peaceful and stable method of transmitting the presidential office. But Carranza wished to retire only in place of a man who would continue his program. He made a fatal mistake when he quarreled with Obregón who at this time was the most prominent man in the party and stronger militarily than the president. Successors to Carranza waged their campaigns for a year and a half. This condition contributed to more unrest and disorder. In January, 1920, Obregón lead in the race, he was a popular idol and the only man ever to defeat Villa.\(^28\) Other men in the campaign were Ambassador Ignacio Bonillas, who returned to Mexico from the United States to quicken his candidacy; General Pablo González, who surrendered his military command in the south to begin his formal campaign; and Adolfo de la Huerta, governor of the state of Agua Prieta in Sonora. Carranza's government was planning to leave Mexico City for Vera Cruz. The remaining generals still loyal to Carranza advised him to resign not later than May 15th. Priestley in his account of the exodus shows that Carranza was not only making his escape with the government records but also the funds:

Twenty-one trains, collected and equipped at great effort, were to carry away 20,000 troops, carloads of records, and millions of treasure. The dispatches said 27,000,000 pesos were taken, but, after the disaster, Pastor Rouaix, ex-secretary of Agriculture, upon returning to Mexico on May 18 with the booty, said that it was worth 100,000,000 pesos.\(^29\)

\(^{28}\) Ibid., 442-444.

\(^{29}\) Ibid., 444-449.
Along with the troops went the employees of the State, the Cabinet, and the Supreme Court. Attacks were made upon the convoy from the outset. Trains were cut off, tracks torn up, and railroad employees killed or wounded. Finally, escape by rail was given up and Carranza set out for the Puebla Mountains. He was unsuccessful for on May 18th he met his death while asleep in a mountain shack at Tlaxcalantongo, in the State of Puebla. 30 Kelly, in his account of Carranza's death states that in the attack made upon Carranza's hut, he believes that someone of Carranza's own party must have been responsible for there were three others sleeping in the hut and only Carranza was killed.31

On May 25th, Adolfo de la Huerta was chosen substitute president by the reorganized Congress to serve to the end of Carranza's term, November 20, 1920. In 1921, Obregón became head of the Mexican Government. He was not recognized by the United States because of the offensive Article 27 of the Constitution of 1917. In 1923, Obregón agreed to validate subsoil and mineral rights obtained prior to 1917 and the United States resumed diplomatic relations.32

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30 Ibid., 450.
31 Kelley, 244.
CHAPTER IV

INTERPRETATIONS OF WILSON’S MEXICAN POLICY

Generally speaking, Wilson's foreign policy was fundamentally the belief in man himself and faith in democracy. Upon the soundness of the democratic principle he based all his other beliefs. He believed that all nations should regard every other nation as its equal. If disputes should develop between nations, the only proper way to settlement was by arbitration. This was examplied by his immediate acceptance of mediation from Latin America in disputes with Mexico. Ultimately, he believed that force should never be used by nations to settle disputes but should be used only to resist aggression. Wilson, however, had difficulty carrying out his policy. There was the constitution and laws of his own country, its treaties, and the obligations incurred by previous administrations, and rules of international law. Another element which conditioned the direction of foreign affairs was the pressure brought to bear by public opinion. Because of his faith in democracy, he wished to fulfill the desires of the people. Therefore, his speeches and messages were directed toward informing and moulding public opinion. Wilson was sincere about the principles he expounded. Robinson states that others have held to the same principles as did Wilson but few had the courage to apply them in foreign relations. His firm belief in democratic principles led him to submit his foreign policy to the test of public
opinion. He believed the public should be informed and they should be allowed to discuss the issue among themselves. This belief in democracy was responsible for his plan to leave the Mexican people to work out their own problems. He refused to allow the United States to assume responsibilities toward its own citizens insofar as it would carry the risk of interfering with the political life of other people. Other people of other nations were better off without the help of the United States if such aid meant mortgage of their future independence. He undyingly adhered to the supremacy of law. He insisted that constitutional methods be followed when administrations were changed in the Latin American countries. He could not condone with recognition Huerta's elevation to the presidency because it was, Wilson thought, obtained by such trickery.¹

There were three elements that were dominant in Wilson's foreign policy. First, he believed that nations as well as individuals should conform to the moral laws. Nations are obliged to be just, to curb exploitation among nations as individuals are obliged to do within nations. Secondly, he believed the people of various countries had the right to and were also capable, if permitted, of ruling themselves. Liberty was second only to justice. He always favored self-government. He showed the distinction between self-government and democracy. Democracy, he regarded as the final development of maturity in self-government, the full expression of self-government. The bases of both were the same, a developed sense of law,

¹ Robinson and West, 150-154.
a political consciousness, experience in obeying the law and the dictates of morality. The third great element of Wilson's foreign policy was his conception of the United States and its mission. Wilson believed that our real purpose as a nation was to set up a government by the people and to demonstrate by example the principle of right. Our duty was to be a model of democracy, to give examples of righteousness to the world, and work for the rights of men and their happiness. He also believed that promoting America's material prosperity was important to show ourselves sincere in carrying out our mission. The material interest in our foreign policy was to be subordinated to the higher interests of national dignity, honor, and duty. Here again, there were factors which made the mission difficult. One important one was the pressure put on governments to uphold American property rights, wherever they were justified, within this limit, that the government would not be committed to support special interest or to use force. Dollar diplomacy was repudiated. Wilson was convinced that the world was becoming inter-dependent. Isolationism was a milestone passed after the Spanish-American War. Peace would result if nations would realize their moral responsibilities, accept all nations as equals, do away with exploitation, and faithfully keep all treaty pledges.² All in all, Wilson considered himself at once a reformer of and a crusader for democratic ideals as far as the Latin Americans were concerned. He was, according to many opponents of his policy, still the schoolmaster trying to teach the little nations of the Americas how to behave.

2 Botter, 651-654.
Tumulty, Wilson's Secretary, in his writings about the president, said that in his inauguration address in March of 1913 he stated that legitimate property claims would be respected, but that those who believed that the chief business of this government is to promote their private or corporate interests were due for a disappointment. The president expressed more interest in the masses than in the special groups. Resisting the urgings of American industrial interests in Mexico was a great problem to the president. Those who wanted intervention were those with large land and industrial holdings there. To them, intervention in Mexico was a policy of enrichment. Wilson received bitter criticism as a result of this "watchful waiting" policy. He was disheartened by the fact that most of the criticism came from his own cabinet officers - they believed it too idealistic. The heart of his policy was expressed by him when he said, "I am more interested in the fortunes of oppressed men, women, and children than in any property rights whatever.... So long as the power of recognition rests with me the Government of the United States will refuse to extend the hand of welcome to any one who obtains power in a sister republic by treachery and violence...." Wilson vindicates his policy of "watchful waiting" when he said to Tumulty in June of 1916:

...were I considering the matter from the standpoint of my own political fortunes, and its influence upon the result of the next election, I should at once grasp this opportunity and

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3 Tumulty, 142-149.
invade Mexico for it would mean the triumph of my administration. But this has never been in my thoughts for a single moment. The thing that daunts me and holds me back is the aftermath of war, with all its tears and tragedies. ... I will not resort to war against Mexico until I have exhausted every means to keep out of this mess. Time, the great solvent, will, I am sure, vindicate this policy of humanity and forbearance.

Men forget what is back of this struggle in Mexico. It is the age-long struggle of a people to come into their own, and while we look upon the incidents in the foreground, let us not forget the tragic reality in the background which towers above this whole sad picture. ... Tumulty, some day the people of America will know why I hesitated to intervene in Mexico. I cannot tell them now for we are at peace with the great power whose poisonous propaganda is responsible for the present terrible condition of affairs in Mexico. German propagandists are there now, fomenting strife and trouble between our countries. Germany is anxious to have us at war with Mexico so that our minds and our energies will be taken off the great war across the sea. She wishes an uninterrupted opportunity to carry on her submarine warfare and believes that war with Mexico will keep our hands off her and thus give her liberty of action to do as she pleases on the high seas. It begins to look as if war with Germany is inevitable. If it should come - I pray God it may not - I do not wish America's energies and forces divided, for we will need every ounce of reserve we have to lick Germany. Tumulty, we must try patience a little longer and await the development.4

4 Ibid., 157-160.
Tumulty concludes that the Zimmerman note (January 19, 1917) proves that German intrigue was busy in Mexico. The president spoke again about this German infiltration in a Flag Day address, delivered at Washington on June 14, 1917:

They (Germany) sought by violence to destroy our industries and arrest our commerce. They tried to incite Mexico to take up arms against us and to draw Japan into a hostile alliance with them; and that, not by indirection, but by direct suggestion from the Foreign Office at Berlin.5

In view of developments in the early part of 1917 when the German intrigue into Mexico was discovered, it may be that the continuation of Wilson's humane and Christian policy was forced upon him since the United States would have been in a precarious position to deal with Germany if a war with Mexico had resulted.6

Houston vindicates Wilson's policy toward Mexico. He said that the president saved the United States from the "shameless disgrace of a war with the downtrodden, hapless, and helpless people of Mexico." In regard to the criticism the president received for taking Vera Cruz, he answers with a question: "What would the critics have said if the president had failed to sustain Admiral Mayo?"7

Wilson denounced Huerta because Wilson believed that he had assumed legislative power violating all constitutional law and thereby, destroyed

5 Ibid., 160.
6 Josephus Daniels, 187.
all possibility of fair and free elections. Wilson could not bring himself
to recognize such a president. The president's attitude since the death of
Madero was the subject of a great deal of discussion all culminating in many
differences of opinion. Some believed that the president set up an imprac-
tical standard for Mexico and others believed in the doctrine that internal
changes in a state do not affect its international position; they say that
he has confused the recognition of new states with the recognition of new
governments.8

One of the major issues which brought on a great deal of discussion
for and against Wilson's policy was the issue involving the sending of Amer-
ican troops into Mexico to pursue Villa. An editorial comment in the
American Journal of International Law vindicates Wilson's position. In this
instance, the "schoolmaster" in Wilson appears more prominently than the
idealist. The article states that there was no doubt that steps should have
been taken (as they were) to obtain reparation for the insult to our Ameri-
can sovereignty. It further explains that under ordinary circumstances the
problem would have been put before the Mexican Government with a request
that reparations be made and the bandits be apprehended and punished. Seem-
ingly, sending troops across the frontier into Mexico constituted a viola-
tion of Mexican sovereignty just as the invasion of American soil consti-
tuted a violation of American sovereignty. But, the article continues,

8 "Mexico", American Jour. Internat'1. Law, 1913, Vol. 7, 836. An editor-
ial comment.
the situation in Mexico was extraordinary, and even though Carranza's government obtained de facto recognition, Carranza still was not in control of all of Mexico. At any rate, due to the fact that Carranza had been recognized, he should have been called upon as the head of the de facto government to disavow the outrage. Upon his inability to accomplish this purpose, the United States could decide for itself to capture Villa and his satellite. Mexico and the United States have dealt with this border problem for many years. As far back as 1855, the then Secretary of State, Mr. Marcy in regard to the border problem arbitrarily stated that if Mexican Indians are permitted to cross the border and harass the country, they may be chased back over the border and punished. In like manner, the Mexicans could enter the United States to punish Indians under the jurisdiction of the United States who cross the Mexican border provided they abstain from punishing the persons and property of the United States citizens. Wilson was willing to maintain the same policy to which the State Department had been previously committed. Our Secretary of State Lansing communicated the following under Wilson's instruction:

The Secretary of State to Special Agent Silliman

Department of State
Washington, March 13, 1916

...The Government of the United States readily grants permission for military forces of the de facto Government of

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Mexico to cross the international boundary in pursuit of lawless bands of armed men who have entered Mexico from the United States, committed outrages on Mexican soil, and fled into the United States, on the understanding that the de facto Government of Mexico grants the reciprocal privilege that the military forces of the United States may pursue across the international boundary into Mexican territory lawless bands of armed men who have entered the United States from Mexico committed outrages on American soil, and fled into Mexico.10

Lansing

As it turned out, Carranza opposed our entry into Mexico and actually helped prevent the capture of Villa.11 The entry of our troops into Mexico was resented by the Mexicans, the very people whom Wilson thought he was helping. At Parral, it was believed that American troops were on the verge of capturing Villa but they were attacked by the inhabitants of Parral, so they withdrew in order to prevent bloodshed. Carranza denied the existence of the agreement that he made with the United States under which this country believed it had the right to send forces into Mexico. In fact no such agreement existed, as far as his new government was concerned. He said that we entered Mexico without his consent and ordered the American troops to withdraw. In accordance with the recommendations of the commission established to adjust this matter, Wilson withdrew the American troops and held the de facto government responsible for American interests in the affected territory of Mexico. Thus closed the period of interrupted official

10 Foreign Relations, 1916, 488.
11 See Chapter II of this paper, 28 et seq.
intercourse between the United States and Mexico which started with the refusal of Wilson to recognize Huerta. Many hold that it would have been wise for Wilson not to have been so idealistically concerned about Mexico, and therefore, to have recognized Huerta. These same believed that Huerta would have brought peace to Mexico and this would have saved years of bloodshed and the United States some expenditure of money. They also say that the failure to recognize Huerta and the demands made upon him amounted to intervention on the part of the United States. However, George A. Finch in his article "Mexico and the United States," stands behind the president and says there is no basis for the assumption that Wilson's action toward Mexico amounted to intervention. The American policy followed the best practices of American traditions. But it was obviously not Wilson's ideal policy of trust in the people.

CHAPTER V

VARIOUS OPINIONS BY AMERICAN STATESMEN AND SCHOLARS

American statesmen and scholars of the United States foreign relations have presented various general estimates of Wilson's policy toward Mexico. Among the views of the statesmen there is the statement of Senator Culberson printed in the Dallas Morning News, on May 3, 1914, which was the result of an interview with the senator on the Mexican situation. This information was incorporated in the Congressional Record on May 16, 1914. The senator advocated the people to support Wilson's Mexican policy because it "reflects the best sentiment of the American people." The president wants to avoid war. Aside from the sad results of a war, it would "dishonor us as a christian nation for engaging in a useless and preventable conflict with a comparatively helpless people." The president's plan of giving the people of Mexico an opportunity to settle their own problems, to refuse to intervene, and to decline recognition of Huerta was a wise plan to follow. Of the Tampico incident, the senator states that it was an act which could be settled short of war, but when suitable reparation was not made the president was "warranted in redressing by reprisals and seizure of ports." The principle complaint was, however, that Huerta should have been recognized. To many, it was believed that peace would have resulted. But Senator Culberson states that would have been extremely doubtful. He concludes, that we had a
president who went to the root of things and "declared the wholesome and
goodly doctrine that treachery and assassination would find no refuge here."

At Senator Howard's request, a letter which he received from Mr. George
Robinson Hackley, resident of Mexico City for many years, was incorporated
into the Record because the senator believed it would show the truth of the
Mexican situation to the American people. The letter was dated August 28,
1913, and incorporated into the Record June 22, 1914:

...I thank God that our president had the principle and moral courage to refuse, in
spite of the insistent clamor of big business interests, many being unscrupulous mercenaries, to help foist this false government upon an unwilling and resisting people -- did not help to prolong artificial conditions brought about by one of the most diabolical and revolting crimes in history, but is, on the contrary, lending his moral support to the cause of the people who are irresistibly struggling for liberty. There are thousands of intelligent Mexicans who respect and admire the attitude of nonrecognition and the high moral ground maintained...

I am certainly proud and delighted that Washington has refused to recognize or put its approval on the assassins who have usurped the Mexican Government, who, instead of representing the will of the people, represent a betrayal of the will of the people as expressed in the triumph of the Madero revolution and his election to the presidency...

The constitutionalists stand on a firmer and higher ground than Huerta, as they are fighting against usurpation and for

liberty and constitutional government, and should, in my opinion, receive from our country and Government every sympathy, encouragement, and assistance consistent with our honor. How can we honorably recognize, affiliate with, or assist on illegal, unconstitutional Government, established by "irregular force" and violence, causing the deaths in the very beginning, through on infamous fake battle when Mexico City was "shot up," of thousands of innocent people, including women and children, even babies? To me it is unthinkable."

Harper's Weekly printed an article, August 22, 1914, by Charles W. Eliot called "Wilson's Foreign Policies." This was included in the Record by Honorable J. Thomas Heflin, representative from Alabama. Mr. Eliot here stated that the principle achievement of the Democratic party was a sound international policy and conduct. Wilson was thoroughly committed to no forceful intervention. American investors went into Mexico of their own free will because they thought they could make more money there than at home. Revolution in Mexico would mean great loss to these industrious Americans, this could have been prevented by intervention. Wilson refused to intervene. Instead he brought the Americans, who would leave, out of Mexico. With this policy, America made a great contribution to international peace.

The Jacksonville (Ill.) Courier carried an article by former Congress-man James M. Graham of Springfield entitled, "Graham Defends Wilson's Mexican


Policy — Blames Capitalists For Disturbances In Talk At Franklin Catholic Picnic." It was incorporated into the Record September 7, 1916. Mr. Graham defends Wilson's policy. He said border and international problems that have made our relations with Mexico strained for so many years was the fault of American capitalists who wanted the United States to control Mexico so that their property in Mexico would increase in value. Americans owned more than forty per cent of land and this had decreased in value since Díaz's regime had collapsed. He praised the president's resistance against the power of these wealthy groups of capitalists. Then Mr. Graham reviews the Díaz regime when capitalists were allowed to enter the country with their views of exploitation. He says that these influences are so powerful they own a large part of the wealth of Mexico as well as a large part of wealth in the United States. Consequently, they control the press and thus can exert a power in forming public opinion. By this method they wish the authorities in the United States to conform to their views. They want our government to intervene in Mexico to protect their property there. The capitalist does not care about the rights of man. People of this type put a higher value on property rights than rights of man. Mr. Graham states that Senator La Follette expressed the view that American financiers have been responsible for American raids on the frontier to awaken the American public who in turn would force Wilson to intervene. In conclusion, Mr. Graham said, "I doubt if the people will ever fully realize the magnificent resistance which President Wilson has made to the efforts put forth by these powerful
The reference to La Follette in the previous paragraph introduces an article in Senator La Follette's magazine written by him entitled "Who Owns Mexico?" This article was incorporated into the Record at the request of Honorable Pat Harrison of Mississippi on August 11, 1916. Proceeding from where Mr. Graham left off, La Follette denounces the ambitions of big monied interests. Those who want war with Mexico are those that also own most of the United States. They are the captains of industry and finance. Their profits are so great they want to lower interest rates or else invest in foreign countries. They invest in the countries of Latin America where labor is cheap. But there is one drawback, the governments in most of them are weak, therefore, revolutions are frequent and property rights unstable. But they can make their foreign investments good by inlisting the backing of the United States. They wanted intervention and they tried to influence public opinion in that direction. Intervention meant war. Concluding, La Follette said, "In the ownership of Mexico we find that real menace to the peace between Mexico and the United States. American capitalists are desperately attempting to have the flag follow their investments."  

Honorable Claudius A. Stone of Illinois on September 5, 1916, spoke before the House of Representatives at which time he gave his opinion of Wilson's Mexican Policy. The representative begins, "President Wilson's

faith in democracy and the unselfishness of the United States in international dealings have been so strikingly expressed in his Mexican policy that it may be said to constitute the greatest contribution which the country has made in many years to the progressive thought of mankind." The president stayed with his Mexican policy throughout his administration for two reasons; first, his belief that all nations, weak or strong have the inviolable right to control their internal problems and secondly, his belief that Mexico will not become peaceful and law abiding until she has been left to settle her own problems without interference from elsewhere. Our relations with Mexico were closely connected with the rest of Latin America. Before Wilson's Administration, Latin America was suspicious of the United States. The Mexican policy to our neighbors presented a test of our sincerity and friendship. They believe they could expect no better treatment than the United States would extend to Mexico. Consequently, besides handling the Mexican situation Wilson was concerned with formulating a cooperative policy for Pan-America. It was created not only for trade relations but also for the development of an international brotherhood. Wilson's Mexican policy did accomplish this. Latin America became more trusting of the United States. Honorable Stone states that "in strengthening the bonds of good-will between the Republics of this hemisphere Mr. Wilson has rendered a patriotic service of highest order." When Wilson was faced with the problem of recognition of Huerta, some of his advisers only considered the selfish interests involved, they wanted to sacrifice Mexican liberties to establish order under any circumstance and thereby protect American property. But fortunately Wilson did
not weaken for it was later believed that Huerta was not powerful enough to control Mexico. Carranza was recognized by the Latin American countries and the United States because it seemed to them that his forces contained more organization, unity and harmony thus showing the brighter promise for Mexico's salvation. After recognition, Carranza's campaign against Villa was more successful. Villa forces disintegrated into small bands and he himself degenerated into only a bandit leader. He raided the border to bring about American intervention. Intervention did not result but the situation showed the United States that they could not depend on Carranza for help against Villa. As a result, Wilson ordered Pershing to capture Villa. Wilson informed the Mexicans that the American expedition into Mexico was solely for the purpose of punishing those responsible for the Columbus raid. Because of the Columbus raid and a little later the Carrizal affair, pressure was brought to bear upon the president to declare war. This would have been a war by a well-armed, great nation against a bankrupt people, tired with five years of civil strife. Wilson acted his theory of not exploiting the little nations of the world. The president was also concerned about affairs in Europe and a better development for Pan-American understanding. He refused to go to war with Mexico. Wilson's policy paved the way for settlement of disputes by a joint commission composed of three Americans and three Mexicans. Concluding, "Thus, the story of the Wilson-Mexican policy closes as it began, a story of peace — peace. War if necessary, but not for mere misunderstandings; not for lack of patience and certainly not for
exploitation."  

J. Hamilton Lewis, Senator from Illinois, in his remarks in the Senate, January 16, 1916, justified Wilson's recognition of Carranza. He said, Carranza was chosen for recognition because he showed more strength and a more advantageous position in Mexico than the other partisan leaders. It was not done merely at the "caprice" of the president, without information of justification upon the conditions. Then he concludes:

...Will not my eminent opponents be just to history and inform the United States of America fairly that it was only after consultation with the large and principal countries of South America -- Argentina, Brazil, and Chile -- neighbors of Mexico, bound by the same ties, held by the same sacred religion, animated by the same motives, and inspired by the same aspirations, knowing as they must have known better than all other sources what was best for their neighbors and their blood kin—that it was from these that there came the suggestion, as well as the proof, that Carranza was at the time the most promising solution of the then disturbing problem and that upon their request and manifestation of facts the recognition was accorded? Then it was that Carranza was recognized."  

Among the various general estimates of the American scholars of the United States foreign relations concerning Wilson's policy toward Carranza, there is the views of Latané and Wainhouse. In their diplomatic history,

they indicate that the "handling of the Mexican situation, though denounced at the time as weak and vacillating, was in full accord with his new Latin-American policy." They say that it was quite clearly a violation of our ancient policy to refuse recognition to Huerta, but they argue that Huerta could not claim the backing of the majority of the Mexican people. Huerta was "a self-constituted dictator." Therefore, Wilson was justified in not recognizing him. He was justified in recognizing Carranza because the latter had the backing of "three-fourths of the territory of Mexico." In the first instance there is question of the majority of people and in the second there is question of a majority of land. In neither instance is there any question of popular elections. Certainly, if the popular will of the people of the United States were to be followed, Wilson would have to have gone to war against Mexico, in view of the "loud and persistent demand in the United States for war against Mexico," after the recognition of Carranza. Wilson's idealism overlooked the fact that scarcely ever in the history of the Latin American republics had the will of the people been considered, and he was soon to learn that Carranza was not concerned about the will of the majority. In summary, Latané and Wainhouse point to the great moral effect of Wilson's policy of staying out of a war against Carranza. 8

President Wilson's refusal to become involved in war with Mexico convinced the world of his sincerity and gave him a hearing during the Great War such as no

political leader of any nation ever before commanded. His acceptance of the mediation of the A B C Powers and his subsequent consultation with the leading representatives of Latin America gave new life and meaning to Pan Americanism and tended to refute the charges of the Pan Hispanists.9

It is very doubtful, if we judge by subsequent events, whether Mexico appreciated this sentiment of respect for Wilson's sincerity.

That President Wilson had picked the wrong man in Carranza is clear from the account of our relations with Mexico as given by Professor Bemis.

We find such damaging statements as these:

The Government of Mexico fell among rival armed factions, temporarily to the Carranzistas who at all times denied the right of foreign powers to mediate in any settlement of Mexican affairs.

The elimination of Huerta did not bring peace to Mexico....

Confusion worse confounded, murder and pillage, swept Mexico. Anxious to hasten the establishment of order, President Wilson summoned a conference of diplomatic representatives of six Latin-American powers... to advise on which warring faction to recognize and support as the de facto government of Mexico.

The conference invited representatives of the Mexican groups to participate. Despite the fact that Carranza refused the invitation and consistently denied the right of outside parties to give advice to Mexico, the conferees announced their decision that the Carranzista party was 'the only party possessing the essentials of recognition....' The United States then promptly (October 19, 1915) recognized de facto Carranza's authority....

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9 Ibid., 660.
The de facto recognition of Carranza proved premature. 10

The instances of our troops activities along the borders under General Pershing and the utter inability of Mexican troops to prevent raids, along with Carranza's resentment over our troops and interference are then recounted. Then we find that the Mexican Congress, not the Mexican people, elected Carranza president.

Wilson now hastily recognized the new government de jure. When Henry P. Fletcher, the new Ambassador of the United States, entered the Chamber of Deputies, the members received him with hisses, in shameful contrast to the applause which greeted the German Ambassador, whose proposal to Mexico the British secret service and Washington government had just ventilated to the world: a war alliance, to include Japan, for the purpose of conquering back from the United States 'the lost territory' in the states of Texas, New Mexico and Arizona... It was a spectacular victory for Carranza.... 11

The watchful waiting policy if we are to judge by the statistics which Professor Bemis presents may have had some ideal behind it, but a casual observer would be bound to admit that it had no eye to the protection of Americans and their interest, since 397 American citizens were killed in Mexico and forty to fifty thousand forced to leave with American property losses between 170 million and 505 million pesos, according to different estimates. 12

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10 Bemis, A Diplomatic History of the United States, 550-551.

11 Ibid., 553.

Frederick Starr of the University of Chicago, who spent four years in Mexico during these troublesome times, wrote his opinions of the situation to the year 1914. He writes:

The latest step in the battle between the two presidents has been the lifting of the embargo upon arms.... It is amusing, however, and saddening, to find ourselves backing Villa and Carranza at the present. The avowed reason for hostility to Huerta is his bloody hands. His are clean, compared with Villa's.

What is the status at the present time? We have impaired a nation's sovereignty, — a serious matter; we have prolonged a bloody conflict, with hideous cruelties and frightful loss; we have entrenched a man in power, whose natural elimination was desireable and would soon have come about; we have produced ruin and disaster by a hysterical cry of exodus; we have made it impossible legally to collect damages by refusing to recognize a de facto government; we are encouraging and abetting flagrant abuse of individual rights and property.

All this we have done, and still are doing, with the best intentions in the world. 13

Professor Rippy points out that "Wilson took up the Mexican problem with the vision of a Pan American and even a world reformer." His policy "was clearly one of intervention, moral but far-reaching in its consequences." Rippy then describes how the Latin-American states accepted Wilson's leadership, but all of the European nations and Japan recognized Huerta. Wilson then brought pressure to bear upon the Europeans, who finally sent a

13 Frederick Starr, Mexico and the United States, The Bible House, Chicago, 1914, 407-408.
delegation to Huerta in December, 1913, to say that they would lend no support to him. Wilson thus blocked off all possibilities of aid or a loan to Huerta. It was all for the good of the Mexican people, Wilson said. Rippy does not give the obvious conclusion that this was all a policy of the end justifies the means. 14

Rippy appears to be anti-imperialist, and hence his attack is on the intervention of the United States in the affairs of any nation. He calls the recognition of Carranza a second intervention in Mexican affairs, and suggests the inconsistency of following the policy of non-intervention along diplomatic lines and intervention by military means. He cites the attacks of the Republican Senators Albert Fall and William E. Borah upon the watchful waiting policy and he follows with the opinions of the Representatives who made an issue of it. Carranza and Villa continued their attitude of hate toward the United States until, the writer states,

The whole country burst into flame and even Wilson himself either lost patience or feared to remain inactive. Release of the captured troops was demanded in none too diplomatic terms. For a moment Carranza refused to comply. The peace of the two countries was suspended by a thread. The entire militia of the United States was ordered to the border and available men for the Governor-Generalship of Mexico were discussed. But just before the breaking point was reached... Samuel Gompers sent a personal telegram to Carranza, imploring him in the name of humanity to release the American prisoners. A few hours later extras

announced to the American public that the soldiers in question had been set free. 15

Why it was that Wilson later recognized Carranza after this and after the events of the years following is still not clear, and Rippy admits that he cannot pass final judgment upon Wilson's policy. "So far as improvement in Mexican attitude toward the United States was concerned, little had been accomplished." 16

Professor Bailey in his Chapter XXXVI, "Wilson and the New Diplomacy, 1913-1917," uses practically the same sources as those already cited, but adds something to the interpretation of Wilson's Mexican policy. "In all diplomatic problems of major importance Wilson acted as his own Secretary of State." Latin America seemed the most urgent of the problems, and a week after his inauguration Wilson stated his policy in regard to the southern republics. "He struck out Dollar Diplomacy by announcing that the Administration was not interested in supporting any 'special group of interests'." The people applauded, but very soon the dollar had to be revived as far as the Caribbean was concerned. "President Wilson, like another distinguished idealist, Thomas Jefferson, found it difficult to square his theories with stern realities. This was particularly true of Central America and the Caribbean." Yet, a year later he won the applause of the British and the world for his honest stand in the matter of the Panama Tolls. 17

15 Ibid., 354-58.
16 Ibid., 363-364.
17 Bailey, 593-602.
Then Bailey discusses Wilson's Mexican policy. This he heads "Human Rights and Property Rights," and summarizes it as "a sharp clash between idealism and legalism." According to Bailey, Wilson stated: "I am going to teach the South American Republics to elect good men!" Wilson was not going to follow the lines of least resistance and recognize Huerta. The vast amount of criticism of this interference program is summarized by George Harvey, who demanded: "What legal or moral right has a President of the United States to say who shall or shall not be President of Mexico." Wilson "suspected that the British oil interests were backing the 'unspeakable Huerta'.... and therefore pursued a policy of nonrecognition and noninterference (which, under the circumstances, was really interference)."

Then under the heading of "Wrathful Waiting," Bailey gives an account of the savage criticism heaped upon Wilson at home and abroad. The waiting ended, and Wilson had no other course apparently but to embark on a war. According to Bailey it would seem that the mediation of the A B C powers, unthought of by Wilson, really saved the situation.18

Bailey does not add anything to the already given accounts of the recognition of Carranza. He summarizes the situation in 1917 after de jure recognition as follows:

...Wilson withdrew the troops in February, 1917. They left behind a snarling Carranza, a defiant and unrepentant Villa, and a

18 Ibid., 602-607.
revolution that had yet to run its course. Whatever may be said of Wilson's policy it is clear that he adhered consistently to the ideal of encouraging the Mexican masses to work out their own destiny.19

With the entrance of the United States in the first World War, the crises of the Mexican situation receded into the background and remained there for two years. Wilson's attentions shifted to the European situation. On June 8, 1918, he made his pronouncement to Congress of his famous Fourteen Points. The final German offensive in the west failed, July, 1918. This was immediately followed by a series of long-distance exchanges of peace views made by different governments. On October 6, 1918, Germany requested an armistice which was signed November 11, 1918, between the Allied and Associate Powers and Germany with the Fourteen Points as an agreed peace bases. Wilson's primary interest, at this time, was to incorporate the League of Nations in the peace treaties to be signed with the various countries. His determination took him to Paris as head of the American delegation. Bemis comments "He arrived in Europe as a true friend of mankind, closer to the principles of Christian charity and justice than any statesman in history." Wilson made the mistake of not including in the American Peace Commission representative from both parties in the Senate who would be responsible for ratifying the treaties. The Paris Peace Conference opened January 12, 1919. When Wilson returned from Paris he was criticized bitterly for not discussing the text of the League of Nations directly with the Senate

19 Ibid., 607.
to secure their opinions. But, in its stead, he discussed the document in public addresses and then informally with the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate together with the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House. He also began a speaking tour of the country to rally the public to his support. But on September 26, 1919, extremely overworked, he collapsed and was never able to recover his health. As Bemis states, "The cause had lost its most eloquent champion." Wilson never was able to resume governmental duties and for months the country was without an executive head. Meanwhile, the senate refused to ratify the League of Nations. On February 3, 1924, "Wilson died broken and bitterly disappointed." 20

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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Mary Marotta Leveccare has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

July 6, 1947

Signature of Adviser