The Austrian Policy of Cardinal Consalvi, 1815-1823: An Experiment in Austro-Papal Co-Operation

Alan J. Reinerman
Loyola University Chicago

Follow this and additional works at: https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss

Part of the History Commons

Recommended Citation
https://ecommons.luc.edu/luc_diss/784
THE AUSTRIAN POLICY OF CARDINAL CONSALVI, 1815-1823:
AN EXPERIMENT IN AUSTRO-PAPAL CO-OPERATION

by

Alan J. Reinerman

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

June
1964
LIFE

Alan J. Reiner was born in Cincinnati, Ohio, on 22 March 1935.

He was graduated from St. Xavier High School, Cincinnati, Ohio, in June, 1953. He received the Bachelor of Science degree in June, 1957, and the Master of Arts degree in June, 1958, both in history and from Xavier University, Cincinnati, Ohio.

After completing his military service, the author began his studies for the Ph.D. degree at Loyola University in February, 1959. He spent 1961-1962 in Italy on a Fulbright grant from the U. S. government, doing research in the Vatican Archives on the subject of this dissertation.

The writer is at present teaching in the Department of History at Sacred Heart University, Bridgeport, Connecticut.
PREFACE

The writer would like to express his thanks to Dr. Margaret O'Dwyer for inspiring as well as directing the dissertation, and to Dr. Raymond Schmandt for his criticism. A special debt is owed to the Prefect of the Vatican Archives and his staff, without whose assistance this dissertation could not have been written.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chapter</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>I.</strong> INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>II.</strong> AN ERA OF GOOD FEELING, 1815-1817.</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Aftermath of the Austrian Occupation</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Theme of Austro-Papal Co-operation</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Reform and Opposition in the Papal States</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Co-operation against the Settai</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. The Project of an Imperial Visit to Rome</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>III.</strong> RELIGIOUS AND FINANCIAL DISPUTES, 1817-1820.</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Religious Controversy.</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Forniture Affaire.</td>
<td>163</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>IV.</strong> THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1820-1821</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. Revolution in Naples</td>
<td>179</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Preliminaries to Austrian Intervention</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Congress of Laybach</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Passage of the Austrian Army</td>
<td>206</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Revolt in Piedmont</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6. The Condemnation of the Carbonari</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. The Aftermath of the Revolutions of 1820-1821.</td>
<td>236</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>V.</strong> THE COLLAPSE OF AUSTRO-PAPAL CO-OPERATION, 1821-1823</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. The Inter-Congress Period, 1821-1822</td>
<td>250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. The Congress of Verona</td>
<td>265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. The Postal Controversy: 1822</td>
<td>286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. The Postal Controversy: 1823</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>VI.</strong> CONCLUSION</td>
<td>318</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>328</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Few statesmen stand so high in the annals of the modern Papacy as Ercole Cardinal Consalvi, Secretary of State of Pope Pius VII. The conspicuous ability which he displayed in dealing with such difficult diplomatic problems as the negotiation of the French Concordat of 1801, the restoration of the Papal territories at the Congress of Vienna, and the defense of Papal interests during the revolutionary upheaval of 1820-1821 entitles him to rank among the leading Papal diplomats of recent centuries. In internal affairs, he was the first Papal statesman to realize that it was necessary to liberalize the Papal government and bring it into greater harmony with modern conditions—the forerunner of Pius IX.

The importance of Consalvi's career has not been unrecognized by historians, but their attention has been largely confined to his first ministry (1800-1806), to the neglect of his second (1814-1823). That they have been attracted to the earlier phases of his career is understandable. In 1800-1815, the Papacy moved on an heroic plane: it was an age of crisis, of dramatic struggle against the rulers of half Europe, of courage and endurance amid persecution, exile, and imprisonment, of final victory against
overwhelming odds. Little wonder, then, that the spectacular events and obvious importance of Consalvi's first ministry during the turbulent Napoleonic period have overshadowed his second during the superficial calm of the Restoration era.

Yet Consalvi's second ministry, though less abundant in drama, has its own importance. In domestic affairs, it was marked by the nearest, indeed the only, approach to a liberalization and modernization of the Papal government before the days of Pius IX--the longest such attempt in the history of the Papal State. In the field of diplomacy, this period saw the Papacy involved in a half-hidden but still bitter struggle to preserve its spiritual authority against the Erastian rulers of Europe and its temporal independence against the encroachments of its presumed ally Austria, while at the same time it had to deal with the growing threat of the revolutionary movement.

In view of its importance this latter part of Consalvi's career is deserving of greater attention than it has hitherto received from historians. Some part at least of the neglect of this subject may be remedied by treating one of its most significant aspects: the Cardinal's Austrian policy.

The most important single thread in the diplomacy of Consalvi's second ministry was his conduct of Austro-Papal relations. It was inevitable that the Papal Secretary of State should have to give much of his time and thought to this relationship. The Hapsburg Empire was the dominant political and
military power in Italy, the leader of the conservative cause in Europe, and, during the eclipse of France, the greatest power in the Catholic world. Austrian and Papal interests were in contact—and often in conflict—along a wide front in both the secular and the religious fields. What should be the relationship between the Papacy, intent on preserving its temporal independence, and Austria, desirous of exercising hegemony in the Italian Peninsula? How and to what extent should the Papacy cooperate with Austria against their common foe, the revolutionary movement? How should the Papacy react to the attempts of the Imperial government to dominate the Church in its territories?

These and other questions arising from his dealings with Austria were among the most important problems that Consalvi had to solve in 1815-1823, but no comprehensive study of the Cardinal's Austrian diplomacy exists. Moreover, of the few works that do touch upon this subject, a large proportion are either out of date or distorted by the anti-Austrian and anti-clerical prejudices of the Risorgimento era. In particular, these works, when dealing with Austro-Papal relations under Consalvi, usually take the worst view possible of Austrian policies and intentions and tend to picture Empire and Papacy as being on consistently hostile terms.¹

¹See, e.g., Nicomede Bianchi, Storia documentata della diplomazia europea in Italia dall'anno 1814 al 1861 (8 vols.; Turin, 1865-1872), I, 221-223; Gellio Cassi, Il Cardinale Consalvi ed i primi anni della restaurazione pontificia, 1815-1819 (Milan, 1931); and Ernesto Vercesi, Pio VII (Turin, 1933), 254-263.
This traditional Italian interpretation, however, is not borne out by the documents in the Vatican Archives, which demonstrate that both Consalvi and the Austrian Foreign Minister, Prince Klemens von Metternich, sincerely desired a mutually advantageous cooperation between the Papacy and Austria and for a time, in 1815-1817, came close to achieving it. After 1817, however, conflicting religious and political interests gradually drove the two states apart, relations deteriorated rapidly after 1820, and the experiment in cooperation ended in failure. By the time Consalvi left office in 1823, Austro-Papal relations were unfriendly, almost hostile, but this hostility had developed late in Consalvi's ministry and was not a permanent feature of it.

Consalvi had had a long and distinguished career in the service of the Papacy before the Restoration era opened. Born

2Prince Klemens von Metternich (1773-1859), Austrian Foreign Minister 1809-1848, Imperial Chancellor, 1821-1848. Long the bane of liberal and nationalist historians because of his conservatism, Metternich has been defended by the Revisionist historians, led by Heinrich Ritter von Sribik, whose Metternich: Der Staatsmann und der Mensch (3 vols.; Munich, 1925-1954) is the standard biography.

3The basic source for Consalvi's career prior to 1815 is his own Memorie, ed. Mario Nasalli Rocca di Corneliano (Roma, 1950); this work will be referred to henceforth as Memorie. The most thorough study of Consalvi's diplomacy during this period is Ilario Rini, La diplomazia pontificia nel secolo XIX (5 vols.; Roma-Torino, 1901-1904), based on very thorough research in the Vatican Archives. For a useful short account, see Joseph Schmidlin, Histoire des papes de l'époque contemporaine, I: Pie VII, le Pape de la Restauration, trans. L. Marchal (Paris, 1938). Also useful is volume XX of the Fliche-Martin Histoire de l'église, Jean Leflon, La crise révolutionnaire, 1789-1846 (Paris, 1949). There is no good, modern biography of Consalvi.
at Rome of noble parents on 8 June 1757, he was destined to the Church from an early age. However, though he successfully completed his ecclesiastical studies, he never chose to be ordained a priest, but remained a deacon throughout his life. His ability attracted the attention of Pius VI, under whom he had risen to high office in the Papal government by the time of the French invasion of 1798. After a brief imprisonment by the French, he was released in time to attend the Conclave which met at Venice to choose a successor to Pius VI. Elected Secretary of the Conclave, Consalvi performed a major service to the Papacy when he promoted the compromise that broke a three-and-a-half month deadlock with the election of the Bishop of Imola, Gregorio Cardinal Chiaramonti, as Pius VII. This was the beginning of an association that ended only with the death of Pius in 1823, an association marked not only by the closest official co-operation, but by a rare degree of personal affection and mutual trust as well. The new pontiff soon demonstrated his confidence in Consalvi by raising him to the Cardinalate and appointing him Secretary of State in August, 1800. The Cardinal was promptly involved in negotiations with the French government that resulted in the famous Concordat of 1801, perhaps his most notable achievement.

After five years of defending the political and religious rights of the Papacy against Napoleon, Consalvi resigned under French pressure in 1806. His continued opposition to Napoleon
led in 1810 to his arrest and banishment to Beziers. In 1814 he was freed and returned to Italy, but was promptly sent by Pius VII as Papal representative to the Congress of Vienna. Here he was chiefly occupied with securing the restoration of the Papal territories seized by France and now occupied by Austria and Naples. It was while engaged in this difficult task that he first encountered Metternich, with whom he worked closely during the latter part of the Congress. While devising solutions for the many difficult problems involved in the restoration of the Papal territories, the two statesmen developed a mutual respect and esteem that was an important factor in later Austro-Papal relations. For several years afterwards, Consalvi, and possibly Metternich as well, remained convinced that most of the Papal problems with Austria could be readily solved if only they could meet again and hold friendly discussions, as they had done so successfully at Vienna.

In the end, the Cardinal's diplomatic ability --greatly aided, it must be confessed, by favorable circumstances--secured a resounding triumph: all of the Pope's Italian territories (except a small part of the Legation of Ferrara) were returned to him. Consalvi returned to Rome in triumph, to the applause of friend and foe alike. It was the summit of his career: never before had he known such general acclaim, nor would he ever again. Within a few short years his policies were to turn into bitter enemies many who now cheered him, in Rome and Vienna alike. The victor's laurels have ever withered rapidly in the hot Roman sun.
CHAPTER II

AN ERA OF GOOD FEELING, 1815-1817

1. The Aftermath of the Austrian Occupation

After his success at the Congress of Vienna, Consalvi believed that he would be able to turn away from diplomatic problems for a time and devote himself instead to internal reform. Less than a week after his return to Rome, however, he had to confess sadly to the Nuncio in Vienna, Msgr. Antonio Severoli:

I hoped after the immense labors undergone at Vienna to obtain the restoration of our Provinces, that there would be nothing else to occupy me after my return to Rome except the Plan for the new form of government to be given to them. Unfortunately, and to the infinite surprise and sorrow of His Holiness and myself, I find myself in the midst of infinite difficulties . . . .

This "multitude of cares" arose from the Austrian occupation of the Papal State (all save the area around Rome) and its aftermath.¹

¹Archivio Vaticano (hereafter cited as A.V.), Archives of the Nunciature in Vienna, file #125 (hereafter cited as ANV followed by file number), Consalvi to Severoli, 10 July 1815. The above document, like all others quoted in the dissertation, was translated by the author. Msgr. Antonio Severoli, nuncio in Vienna, 1801-1817; a Cardinal in 1816; at first a supporter of Consalvi, but broke with him in 1816 over the latter's reforms in the Papal States; then became a bitter enemy of Consalvi and a leader of the reactionary party (Zelanti) in the Curia that opposed the Secretary of State's policies.
The occupation itself had not noticeably contributed to better Austro-Papal relations. The occupying forces, their discipline sapped by years of war, were often guilty of brutal mistreatment of the people whom they were supposed to be defending. Papal protests brought only the true but unhelpful reply that indiscipline was by now epidemic in all armies and that the Austrian government obviously could not be held responsible for excesses committed by its troops, much though it regretted them.2

More serious, the long Austrian occupation had aroused widespread suspicion that Austria coveted the Papal territories, and even after the Treaty of Vienna had provided for their return, the conduct of the Austrian provisional government there continued to provoke the liveliest distrust. A prominent example was the issuance of a circular by the Austrian Intendant-General Dondi on 27 June 1815, ordering all public officials and employees in the occupied areas to swear an oath of loyalty to the Austrian provisional government. The Papacy protested vigorously that the oath was a violation of Papal sovereignty which could give rise among the "ill-intentioned" to doubts as to whether Austria really intended to return the territories or not. Austria replied, reasonably enough, that as the oath was only to a provisional government, it was itself only provisional, and would

2A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 1 July, 5 July 1815.
lapse when the government did.³

The question as to why Austria should exact an oath of loyalty to a regime which was to end in a few weeks remained unanswered. A possible answer soon suggested itself when it became apparent that Austria intended to prolong the occupation far beyond its determined end. An Austro-Papal Convention of 12 June 1815 had provided that the Austrian evacuation would begin within four weeks, that is on 10 July, and Metternich had promised Consalvi that it would take place by 15 July at the latest.⁴

Shortly after his arrival in Rome on 3 July, Consalvi was informed that Count Franz Saurau, in charge of the Austrian occupying forces, refused to turn over the occupied territories until a number of conditions had been met. In particular, the Papacy must agree to pay certain debts contracted by the former Kingdom of Italy (into which the Papal territories had been incorporated) and by the Austrian occupation forces. Furthermore, even if the Papal government complied with all these demands, the transfer of sovereignty made to it would still be only "virtual and pro forma"; the territories themselves would only be turned over gradually, over an extended period of time, and in the interim the administration would remain in Austrian hands.

³A.V., R(ubrica, i.e., file) 260, Pacca to Lebzeltern, 1 July 1815; Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 7 July 1815.

⁴A.V., R242, Consalvi-Pacca, 12 June 1815; Convention of 12 June 1815, in R242.
Consalvi protested vehemently to Metternich that the debts in question were no concern of the Papal government, and that the Convention of 12 June had definitely provided for the return in full sovereignty of the Papal territories within four weeks, with no mention of further delay for any cause. "I have never seen anything like this," complained Consalvi in exasperation. "The Holy Father is exasperated, with good reason, and public opinion . . . is most unfavorable to Austria. . . ." 5

Consalvi's vigorous protests, together with those which he instructed Severoli to make in Vienna, had the desired effect. The Imperial government ordered the transfer of the provinces, in both theory and fact, to the Papacy. The transfer of authority took place on 15-18 July 1815, and the evacuation of Austrian troops followed soon after. 6

In all probability, the responsibility for this attempted delay did not lie with Vienna. When Severoli protested to Count Hudelist (in charge of foreign affairs during the absence of Metternich from Vienna), the latter seemed genuinely astonished and annoyed, and assured Severoli that the Imperial government had not ordered Saurau to pursue this course of action. Probably Hudelist's protests were sincere; neither Francis I nor

5 Charles van Duerm, Correspondence du Cardinal Hercule Consalvi avec le Prince Clement de Metternich, 1815-1823 (Louvain, 1899), 81, Consalvi to Metternich, 10 July 1815.

6 A.V., ANV 125, Consalvi to Severoli, 27 July 1815.
Metternich was likely to have ordered a policy that was certain to annoy the Papacy without producing any visible benefits for Austria. Severoli was inclined to put the blame upon the failure of the Imperial government to maintain effective control and supervision over its subordinates, such as Saurau, who were thus allowed to devise their policies.  

Meanwhile, even before the transfer of the Papal territories had taken place, two new sources of dispute had appeared: the destruction of the fortress at Ancona by the Austrians, and the Austrian request for the arrest of suspected revolutionaries in the Papal State.

The latter problem was quickly dealt with by Consalvi. On 10 July 1815, the Austrian Provisional Government requested that, in the general amnesty which the Pope was soon to proclaim, an exception be made for certain suspected revolutionaries, or, at least, that the Papal government refrain in practice from applying the amnesty to these suspects. Consalvi rejected both alternatives as contrary to Article 103 of the Treaty of Vienna, which obliged the Pope to grant a general amnesty without any sort of limitation. Moreover, to grant either request would have

---

7 A.V., R247, Severoli to Consalvi, 26 July 1815. Count Franz Saurau, Military Governor of the Austrian-held territories in Italy, 1813-15; a firm Josephist, hostile to the Papacy in general. Count Josef von Hudelist (1759-1818), close friend and collaborator of Metternich, through whose influence he was appointed a Councillor in the Staatskanzlei in 1813.
a most pernicious effect upon public opinion; the second in particular would cause general distrust of the Papal government's good faith.  

Although Austria accepted this rejection without apparent protest, the same problem soon reappeared. Shortly after the transfer of Bologna to the Papal government, the Delegate of that city received from the commander of the Austrian troops in that area, General Steffanini, a request that some nine suspects be arrested and transported to Trieste. Whether these suspects were among those whom the Provisional Government had wished excepted from the amnesty is uncertain, but it seems very possible that this was another attempt, perhaps by the local commander on his own initiative, to secure the punishment of the suspects in question. If so, this attempt was equally unsuccessful.

Consalvi repeated that Pius could not violate Article 103 by granting the Austrian request; in addition to the moral factors involved, the effects on public opinion of such a violation would be most unfortunate. These arguments seem to have convinced the Austrian government, which made no further attempt to bring up this subject.

No Austrian action of 1815 aroused such Papal indignation as the destruction of the Papal fortress at Ancona. Early in

---

8 A.V., Bologna R165, Consalvi to Lebzeltern, 13 July 1815.
9 A.V., R260, Consalvi to Lebzeltern, 29 July 1815.
July, 1815, Consalvi was amazed to learn that "in spite of everything agreed upon in the first article of the Convention [of 12 June 1815], that the fortress of Ancona would be restored intact, now that the time for that restoration draws near, the fortress is being blown up" by the Austrian troops.\textsuperscript{10}

The Cardinal's strong protests produced no immediate action from Austria, though many expressions of regret, for both the Emperor and Metternich were absent from Vienna and no one there seemed to have the authority to halt the destruction.\textsuperscript{11}

Meanwhile, the destruction of the fortress continued, until finally the Emperor was informed of the situation. He promptly ordered the destruction to cease, and promised full compensation to the Papal government for its losses. The Emperor was highly annoyed by the destruction, which was the result of old orders which he had given during the war and had neglected to revoke, and which "were therefore carried out at a time when all was confusion, disorder, and the arbitrary will of subalterns in our Italy."\textsuperscript{12}

\textsuperscript{10}A.V., ANV 125, Consalvi to Severoli, 10 July 1815.
\textsuperscript{11}Ibid., Consalvi to Severoli, 27 July 1815; Severoli to Consalvi, 26 July 1815 (#1).
\textsuperscript{12}A.V., R247, Severoli to Consalvi, 12 August 1815. Also, R260, Delegate of Ancona to Consalvi, 13 August 1815. Van Duerm, 90-92, Note 2: Francis I to Metternich, 7 August 1815.
A "multitude of cares" indeed—and all or most of them had arisen not from the will of the Imperial government, but from the spontaneous or unintended actions of its subordinates. It is not surprising that in exasperation at the "infinite difficulties" surrounding him—none of them critical in itself but all taking the Cardinal's time and distracting him from his desperately-needed plans for internal reform—Consalvi should have cried out to Metternich that "I have wished a thousand times to be with Your Highness, and I have been tempted a thousand times to take the post-horses and hurry to talk with you," had he only been certain where Metternich was to be found; for surely he and the Prince, if they could only meet, could work out a satisfactory solution for any problems, as they had done at Vienna.13

Metternich's reply was friendly and conciliatory. He apologized for not replying earlier to Consalvi's complaints, but "facts are worth more than promises," and surely Consalvi must have been convinced by the satisfactory way in which these disputes had been settled that "if any measures have given the Court of Rome just cause for complaint, the motives that provoke them have always remained alien to the will of His Majesty."14

The Austrian spoke too soon, for not all problems growing out of the occupation had been settled. Two financial questions

13 Ibid., 87, Consalvi to Metternich, 12 August 1815.
14 Ibid., 90, Metternich to Consalvi, 28 August 1815.
remained, and neither was to be solved quickly, or in a way satisfactory to Consalvi.

As had been noted, the Emperor Francis I promised compensation to the Papacy for the damage done at Ancona. Unfortunately, this promise soon slipped the Emperor’s mind, for five months passed with no further action by the Austrian government, although both Consalvi and the Pope spoke to Lebzeltern several times on this subject. At the end of January Consalvi’s patience came to an end and he addressed a stiff note of protest to the Austrian ambassador, demanding that the Imperial government fulfill the Emperor’s promise as soon as possible.

Lebzeltern not only forwarded Consalvi’s protest, but also wrote to Metternich urging rapid satisfaction of the Papal demands, which he considered justified.

Consalvi’s protest, supported thus by Lebzeltern, produced prompt but not entirely satisfactory results. Upon the report

---

15 Count Louis Lebzeltern, Austrian ambassador at Rome from April 1814 to May 1816. A strong supporter of Austro-Papal co-operation as essential for European stability, he often opposed the policies of his government that seemed likely to weaken Austro-Papal good relations. He was on close and friendly terms with Consalvi; Bianchi’s claim (I, 221) that he worked against Consalvi’s policies is not borne out by the evidence. See Prince Emanuel de Robich (ed.), Un Collaborateur de Metternich: Memoires et papiers de Lebzeltern (Paris, 1949); hereafter cited Lebzeltern. Also, Hudal, Die Oesterreichische Vatikanbotschaft, 1805-1918 (Munich, 1952), I7-41.

16 A.V., R260, Consalvi’s Note to Lebzeltern, 26 January 1816; Consalvi to Lebzeltern, 30 January 1816; Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 3 February 1816.
of an Austrian investigating commission, the Emperor ordered the shipment of a large battery of artillery to replace that destroyed by his troops at Ancona. Unfortunately, even the best artillery could not effectively defend a half-ruined fortress, and Austria refused Consalvi's requests to provide the funds necessary to repair the destruction its troops had caused. The fortress therefore remained in a state of near-uselessness for some years, until the impoverished Papal government could at last afford to repair it.17

The Austrian refusal to compensate fully the Papal government for its losses at Ancona was particularly annoying because Vienna was just at that moment rigorously insisting upon the most scrupulous fulfillment by the Papal government of its financial obligations.

By an article "separe et secret" of the Convention of 12 June 1815, Consalvi had reluctantly agreed that the Papal government should pay Austria the sum of 1,700,000 Roman Scudi as compensation for the latter's expenditures in reconquering the Papal States for the Pope. Payment was to be in installments to be completed by 12 June 1816. 18 Though not explicitly stated, it seems likely that this payment was a quid pro quo for Austrian

17 Ibid., Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 10 March 1816; Apponyi to Consalvi, 8 August 1816.
18 Ibid., Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 23 September 1816, with copy of the secret article. Five Roman scudi were approximately equal to one pound sterling.
support for the restoration of Papal territories at the Congress of Vienna.

Almost immediately the Papal government began to experience the greatest difficulties in meeting the installments, and in December, 1815, it was obliged to request a delay. Austria agreed to show its "sincere respect" for the Holy Father by not insisting upon any further payments until June 1816, when, however, the entire balance must be paid in full.\(^{19}\)

This respite, though most welcome, was only temporary. The payment of the whole sum would eventually have to be made, and Consalvi was frankly doubtful whether this could be done without resort to ruinous expedients. He therefore begged the Austrian government to give concrete proof of its oft-expressed devotion to His Holiness by remitting the Papal debt in part if not in full, or at least extending the date due until 1817 when Papal finances would be on a sounder basis. Although in his letters to Lebzeltern Consalvi exhausted his ingenuity and rose to new heights of eloquence in discovering and expressing reasons for the remission or delay of payment, it was to no avail. Lebzeltern and Metternich expressed their sincere sympathy for the Papacy's difficult position, but they could do nothing, for the matter was outside the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. They could only refer the question to the

\(^{19}\text{Ibid.}, \text{Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 8 January 1816, Consalvi to Lebzeltern, 14 January 1816.}\)
Imperial Minister of Finance, who insisted that the money was absolutely necessary to supply the deficit created by Austrian military operations in Italy.20

Payment of the debt was therefore necessary, and by heroic efforts Consalvi was able to raise the sum by the appointed day. The Austrian government accepted with effusive thanks: it was "ravished with delight" at the "loyalty and precision with which the Papal government satisfied its obligations," which it felt would result in a still greater increase in Austro-Papal friendship.21

Consalvi's reaction was less enthusiastic.22 The Austrian government often appeared at its worst in financial matters: its general tendency was to insist upon the rigorous fulfillment of all Papal obligations while showing itself negligent about its own. However, the Cardinal does not seem to have blamed Metternich or the Emperor for this rigorous insistence, for it was too obviously the result of the determination of the Austrian Finance Minister to collect everything due his government, without regard for the interests of Austrian diplomacy—the policy which the disorganisation of the Austrian government

20Ibid., Consalvi to Lebzeltern, 14 January, 10 February, 4 June, 7 June 1816; Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 5 February, 28 March 1816.

21Ibid., Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 9 June 1816.

22Ibid., Consalvi to Severoli, 9 June 1816.
and its lack of effective central control encouraged. Nor did Consalvi allow either this financial disagreement or the other disputes arising from the Austrian occupation to dissuade him from giving a favorable response to the overtures which Metternich was even then making for a policy of close Austro-Papal co-operation.
2. The Theme of Austro-Papal Co-operation

Consalvi was correct in not ascribing responsibility to Metternich for the disputes of 1815-1816 for nothing was farther from the Austrian Foreign Minister's mind than unnecessary conflict with the Papacy.

If Metternich had had his way, the years after 1815 would have been a period of close Austro-Papal co-operation—of a "Union of Throne and Altar" on an international scale. The necessity of using religion as a bulwark against the spread of revolutionary principles was a commonplace of Restoration thought; the special value of Papal support for the "good cause" of conservatism was obvious. "A close and cordial union between the Holy See and H.I.M. . . , a perfect accord sacerdotium inter et imperium," was, Metternich felt, a necessity to defeat the "Spirit of the Age" that was attacking secular and religious authority alike.23 The temporal power alone could not entirely destroy this revolutionary spirit, for its roots were in a warped morality which only spiritual weapons could reach.24

23A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 22 February 1818. The following abbreviations of the titles of the Austrian Emperor occur in the documents: H.M.-His Majesty; H.I.M.-His Imperial Majesty; H.I.R.A.M.-His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty.

24A.V., R245, Francis I to Pius VII, 12 April 1821.
Fortunately, the true Catholic was impervious to its influence because he revered the authority of his King as he did that of his bishop and the Pope.  

Nor did Metternich need the advice of Gentz or Lebzeltern that the support of the Papacy was especially necessary in turbulent Italy, where Austria had recently acquired valuable territories. He was convinced that:

Their [Austria's and the Papacy's] intimate union is not merely desirable, but even absolutely necessary for maintaining the repose of Italy. Her tranquility will never be compromised if the Court of Rome is filled with the importance of employing all the spiritual means at its disposal for the common interest of the two governments.

Seconded by this moral force, the military power of Austria in Italy offers the surest guarantee of her internal tranquility, while that of the maintenance of peace with the outside world is found in its [Austria's] political system, which is essentially conservative. It is therefore in the interest of both courts to remain closely united.

With Metternich thus firmly convinced of the necessity of Papal co-operation, it is not surprising that he showered Consalvi


26 Wittichen, Friedrich Carl, and Ernest Salzer (eds.) Briefe von und an Friedrich von Gentz (Munich, 1913), III, Part I, 289, Gentz to Metternich, 11 April 1814. Friedrich von Gentz (1764-1832), friend and publicist of Metternich and Secretary of the Restoration congresses.

27 Lebzeltern, 308-311, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 23 April 1814.

with voluminous exhortations to Austro-Papal unity.29

How should Consalvi respond to these overtures? He could hardly be unaware that Austrian and Papal interests were not always so "identical" as Metternich claimed;30 points of conflict were numerous in both the religious and the political fields.

The development of Austro-Papal relations since 1780 did not encourage overmuch faith in the Hapsburg Empire. Thirty-five years of almost continuous religious conflict with the Josephist Court of Vienna had embittered the Papacy, and this strife had not yet ended in 1815.31 The Emperor Francis I, though devoutly religious, held firmly to Josephist principles, as did most of the Imperial bureaucracy. Metternich alone, disinterested in religious problems as such and reluctant to sacrifice political for religious advantages, dared to oppose the Josephist faction but his influence over Francis I in

29 See, e.g., A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 21 July 1816, 11 October 1817, 5 November 1817, 22 February 1818, R260, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 6 April 1816; Metternich to Consalvi, 23 April, 3 July 1816, 11 January 1817.

30 A.V., R260, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 1 July 1816; Metternich to Consalvi, 3 July 1816.

31 "Josephinism" was the name given to the system of the Emperor Joseph II (1780-1790), who wished to bring the Austrian Church under the control of the secular government. See below, Chapter III, for a further description of Josephinism and its effects on Austro-Papal relations.
religious matters was not great.\textsuperscript{32} Consalvi had encountered difficulties with the Emperor over the latter's Josephist policies during the Congress of Vienna,\textsuperscript{33} and hardly had the Pope been restored to Rome than Severoli was dispatching a stream of complaints concerning Imperial interference in the Austrian Church.\textsuperscript{34}

Nor in secular affairs had the Austrian behavior been precisely that expected of the "Premier Protecteur de l'Eglise."\textsuperscript{35} Pius VII and his Secretary of State could remember only too well that Austria, having driven the French from the Legations (the northeastern provinces of the Papal State, around Bologna) in 1799, had then sought to add them to her own territories; that she had attempted to dominate the Conclave of Venice to secure a Pope who would consent to this annexation; and that when despite her efforts Pius VII had been elected, she had shown her displeasure in no uncertain fashion. Even then, Austria had not abandoned her efforts to retain the Legations, but had continued to put the strongest pressure on Pius VII to compel him

\textsuperscript{32}For a discussion of Metternich's attempts to check the Josephists, see below, Chapter III.

\textsuperscript{33}Rinieri, IV, 340-348.

\textsuperscript{34}E.g., A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Pro-Secretary of State Pacca, 29 August, 10 September, 19 November 1814, 18 February, 30 April 1815.

\textsuperscript{35}Van Duerm, 64, Consalvi to Metternich, 21 February 1815. The following may be consulted for Austro-Papal relations during the first fifteen years of Pius VII's pontificate: Memorie, Chapters II, IV, and Appendix; Schmidlin, Chapters I and II, Rinieri; Lebzeltern, Chapters I, II, X.
to yield the desired territories by a formal treaty. Only the destruction of Austrian power by Napoleon at Marengo had finally brought this pressure to an end.

During the Napoleonic era Austrian policy towards the Papacy had been largely dictated by selfish considerations, with little regard for the welfare of the Church. In 1804-1806 she had encouraged the Papacy to resist Napoleon and had done her best to stir up strife between them; then, having become after her defeat the camp follower of the Emperor of the French, Austria had endeavored to persuade Pius to make peace with Napoleon by granting him the concessions which he desired. Throughout the long imprisonment of Pius VII, Austria had done little to aid him, but had only sought to persuade him to cease that heroic resistance which Francis I, Metternich, and all Europe so lavishly praised later. Only when the tide had definitely turned against Napoleon did Austria dare to speak out for the Pontiff.

In 1814 Austrian troops drove the French from the Papal State and restored Pius VII to his See—a deed of which Francis I was fond of reminding the Pope when he wanted concessions. The gratitude of Pius and Consalvi was considerably diminished when Austria demanded a sizable sum to cover the expenses of this liberation, and was still further tempered by the realisation that Austria had acted thus only for her own strategic
Moreover, Consalvi nourished well-founded suspicions that Austria had not yet lost interest in annexing the liberated territories, and he soon learned that she had not scrupled to buy the support of Murat by promising him a sizable area of the Papal State.

At the Congress of Vienna Austria did indeed display great interest in the Legations, and apparently considered retaining them as won by right of conquest. That she did not press for annexation at the Congress was not due to any special reverence for the Papacy. The real explanation can be found in Metternich's fear that the turbulent Romagnols would make undesirable subjects who might infect the other Austrian

36 A.V., R260, Consalvi to Lebzeltern, 10 February 1816; Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 28 March 1816.
37 A.V., R242, Consalvi to Pacca, 26 June 1814.
38 By a secret treaty of 11 January 1814: Rinieri, IV, 45-74. Joachim Murat, appointed King of Naples by Napoleon in 1808; went over to the Allies with the above treaty; in 1815 tried unsuccessfully to arouse a national movement against Austria in Italy; captured and shot.
39 Rinieri, IV, 309-310 does not believe that Austria had serious designs on the Legations, an idea which Consalvi came to share to some extent: A.V., R242, Consalvi to Pacca, 8 September 1814. But for convincing evidence to the contrary, see Lebzeltern, 322-341, and especially Angelo Filipuzzi (ed.), Pio IX e la politica austriaca in Italia dal 1815 al 1848, nella realazione de Riccardo Weiss di Starkenfels (Florence, 1958), 153-155, Metternich to Lebzeltern, June 1815.
territories with revolutionary ideas, \(^{40}\) and in the crucial fact that Austria "could not retain the Legations without making proportional concessions to Russia and Prussia, disadvantageous in that they would necessarily have involved lands and subjects infinitely more valuable. ... "\(^{41}\)

With this background in view, it is not surprising that distrust of Austria was endemic in the Papal States, or that rumours circulated widely that Francis I was only awaiting some favorable moment—perhaps a revolution or the death of Pius VII—to seize the Legations. \(^{42}\) These suspicions were nourished by the agitation of a faction in the Legations which wished Austrian annexation, preferring the efficient and secular Imperial rule to the Papal administration.

In fact, such suspicions seem to have been unjustified. \(^{44}\)

---

\(^{40}\) Prince Clement de Metternich, Memoires, documents, et ecrits divers, ed. Richard de Metternich (Paris, 1880-1884), III, Metternich to Francis I, 3 November 1817. Also, G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, Metternich et son temps (Paris, 1959), 171, Metternich to Neumann, 10 May 1832.

\(^{41}\) Filipuzzi, 153-156.

\(^{42}\) Cassi, 189-192. A.V., 247, Excerpt from Morning Chronicle, 27 April 1819. R260, Genotte to Consalvi, 11 July 1819. ANV 250, Mazio to Leardi, 16 September 1823.

\(^{43}\) A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Pacca, 5 August 1814; Severoli to Consalvi, 13 September 1815. R242, Consalvi to Pacca, 24 May 1815.

\(^{44}\) Bianchi, I, 221-223, and Cassi, 130, 189-193, accept these suspicions as correct, but give no evidence other than the rumours then prevalent in Italy to support their contention. As for the faction in the Legations that sought Austrian rule, Austria distrusted rather than encouraged it: Van Dueren, 175, Apponyi to Metternich, 18 March 1817.
There is no evidence that the Austrian government seriously considered annexation after the Congress of Vienna, nor that it was in any way involved in the agitation in the Legations. Apparently, Austria, having once decided in 1815 not to annex that area, definitely abandoned the project.

Consalvi never shared these suspicions. His apprehensions in regard to Austria were more limited, but more concrete. The real Austrian threat was not annexation, but the gradual extension of Austrian influence over the Papal State to such a degree that the latter would become a mere satellite or protectorate, losing thereby that temporal independence which was then felt to be essential to the spiritual freedom of the Papacy. Consalvi was well aware the "Austria seems to believe that she has the right . . . to take a sort of predominance" in the management of Italian affairs, and that her aim was "the acquisition of a direct influence on the governments of all the Italian states, indeed the political management of them."

Metternich would have preferred to achieve this aim through the creation of an Italian Confederation, somewhat

---

45 A.V., R242, Instructions for Spina, 1822. Metternich did in fact believe that Austria was entitled to such predominance: see G. Viezzoli, "Il principe di Carignano nei dispacci dei ministri austriaci a Torino," Rassegna Storica del Risorgimento, XXX (1943), 293, Metternich to Schwarzenberg, 6 July 1815.

46 A.V., R242, Quesiti che si propongono. . . , 1822, Also, R248, Consalvi to Macchi, 2 December 1822.
similar to that in Germany. 47 He had privately suggested such a Confederation at the Congress of Vienna, but Consalvi had rejected the plan. 48 In view of Italian resistance, Metternich began to work more cautiously. Abandoning for the moment his Confederation, he sought instead to extend Austrian influence in the individual states, especially by persuading them to sign treaties of alliance giving Austria considerable control over their policies. In this more limited aim he had considerable success: the petty states of Parma and Modena were Austrian satellites by their nature and location, while both Naples and Tuscany were persuaded to sign secret treaties of alliance. 49 Sardinia was placed under heavy pressure to do likewise, but with English and Russian diplomatic support was able to resist. 50

---


48 A.V., R242, Consalvi to Pacca, 8 September 1814, 1 November 1814, 1 February, 11 February 1815,; Pacca to Consalvi, 13 November 1814.


To a certain extent, then, Metternich's overtures to the Papacy for close co-operation were only a part of his overall Italian policy. However, the spiritual character of the Pope made his co-operation more valuable than that of the mere ruler of a minor state would have been, while at the same time it made difficult the application to him of such direct pressure as could be used with other Italian princes. Papal co-operation would have to be won by persuasion, not force--hence, the frequent Austrian messages of this period stressing the identity of Austrian and Papal interests and the need for close co-operation and unity between them. 51

Consalvi was aware of Metternich's ulterior aims, that Austria, "not being able to obtain a Federation. . . ., will try all the ways of obtaining at least a direct influence upon the governments of the other Italian states," 52 and "not being able to propose this project openly now . . . will seek to prepare for it by securing the adoption of principles and institutions of such a nature as to lead little by little to a system of

51 See especially A.V., R260, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 16 April 1816, 4 May 1816, 1 July 1816; Metternich to Consalvi, 3 July 1816; et passim in much of the R260 correspondence for 1816-1817. Also, R247, Severoli to Consalvi, 21 July 1816; Leardi to Consalvi, 5 November 1817, 22 February 1818, et passim in R247, 1816-1818.

52 A.V., R242, Quesiti che si propongono. . . ., September, 1822. See also Consalvi's similar comments in R242, Instructions for Spina, 1822.
federation under Austrian protection." He was therefore wary of too-close unity with Austria, which might enable that state to establish gradually a quasi-protectorate over the Papal State.

Yet, at the same time Consalvi could see sound reasons in favor of co-operation with Austria. The Napoleonic Wars had proven beyond all doubt that the Papal States were too weak militarily to defend themselves, and that neither the Papal principle of neutrality nor fear of its spiritual sanctions would suffice to protect them from attack by an unscrupulous and determined enemy. As in the past, the spiritual sword needed the temporal sword to support it, and for this role Austria, as the greatest Catholic state and the dominant power in Italy, was clearly indicated. In fact, though no new Napoleon arose to threaten the Papal States, Austrian aid was useful in the diplomatic sphere. For example, in 1816 a diplomatic break threatened by Russia because of what it deemed mistreatment of its representative at Rome was smoothed over by Austria's good offices, while in 1823 Austria upon Consalvi's request used its influence to persuade Naples to halt its

---

53 Ibid., Instructions for Spina, 1822.
54 Consalvi was so well aware of this that during the tense spring of 1815 when an attack by Murat was feared, he had reproached Metternich for not extending a guarantee of Austrian protection to include the Papal State—a recognition of Papal dependence upon Austrian protection that he may well have regretted later. Van Duerm, 64, Consalvi to Metternich, 26 February 1815.
pernicious practice of exiling suspected revolutionaries to the Papal States. 55

Austrian friendship could be equally valuable for the protection of the spiritual interests of the Church. No less than three times in 1815-1823 persecutions of Catholics in the Ottoman Empire which the Papacy was powerless to hinder were halted when Consalvi invoked the influence of Austria at Constantinople. 56 Austrian support also proved useful in the controversy between the Papacy and the Protestant German princes over the control of the Church in their states. 57 Nor was such Austrian support automatic: it could be quickly terminated, for Austria, intent upon its own interests, would

55 A.V., R260, Consalvi to Metternich, 2 June 1816; Metternich to Consalvi, 3 July 1816. ANV 250, Consalvi to Leardi, 26 April, 31 May 1823, ANV247, Leardi to Consalvi, 8 May, 15 May, 29 May 1823.

56 In Bosnia in 1816: ANV 242, Hudelist to Severoli, 25 May 1816. At Aleppo in 1818: ANV 242, Consalvi to Metternich, 4 July 1818; Metternich to Leardi, 22 December 1818: R247, Muxi to Consalvi, 24 April, 8 May 1819. At Constantinople in 1819: R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 20 October 1819, 3 June 1822.

57 See especially A.V., R247, Severoli to Consalvi, 12 April 1817; Leardi to Consalvi, 4 July 1818, 16 January, 16 October, 6 November 1819, 5 January 1820; et passim in R247 during those years. On the controversy between the Papacy and the Protestant German princes of the upper Rhine, see Schmidlin, 306-318.
withdraw should the Papacy prove unco-operative. 58

However, the chief motive impelling Consalvi towards cooperation with Austria was— as Metternich correctly divined 59—the threat from the Settarj on the one hand and the Zelanti on the other. 60 Each of these factions represented in its own way a menace to the stability, and indeed to the very existence,

Austrian support was in fact withdrawn temporarily in the controversy with the German princes when Austria failed in 1817-1818 to obtain desired religious concessions from the Papacy (see below, Chapter III). The Papacy was bluntly told that Austria could easily "extinguish this conflagration," but saw no reason to do so in view of the papal attitude: A.V., ANV 245, Leardi to Consalvi, 25 May 1818. 59

Maass, IV, 584, Metternich's Instructions for Prince Kaunitz, 31 May 1817. 60

The Settarj were the members of the "Sects", the Italian secret societies of the Restoration Era which sought to overthrow the existing Italian governments by force, drive out the Austrians, and set up a constitutional unified Italian state; the Carbonari were the best known of these societies; see below, section 4 of this chapter. The Zelanti or "Zealots" were a faction in the Papal Curia. They had no definite organization or program, but were held together by certain common characteristics: dislike of the predominant position of Consalvi in the Papal government, firm opposition to any attempt to modernize or reform the Papal regime, and a desire to increase the effective control of the Papacy over the Catholic Church as a whole by an uncompromising assault upon the secular rulers of Europe who had gained control of the Church within their territories. These aims brought them into conflict with Consalvi, and they sought constantly to hinder his policies and to drive him from office. See below, Chapter II, Section 3, and Chapter III, Section 1, for a discussion of these two groups, their aims and policies, and their relation to Consalvi and his policies.
of the Papal State: the Settarj, because they were constantly plotting to overthrow the Papal government which stood in the way of their liberal and nationalist ideals; the Zelanti, because their ultrareactionary principles would, if fully put into effect, arouse such discontent that revolution would be almost inevitable. The moderate Consalvi feared all fanatics equally, and wished at the same time to carry out reforms despite Zelanti opposition and to suppress the Settarj. Metternich, realizing the necessity of these policies for the stability not only of the Papal State but of all Italy as well, and realizing too that only Consalvi could carry them out, gave the Cardinal his wholehearted support in both endeavours. This natural community of interests was largely responsible for the good relations that existed between Metternich and Consalvi.

For "good" those relations generally were, at least in the years immediately following the Congress of Vienna when their mutual fear of the Zelanti and the Settarj was strongest.

---

61 Sauvigny, 178, Instructions for Apponyi, 16 September 1820. For Metternich's fears of the harm a Zelanti-dominated Papacy could do, see G. de Bertier de Sauvigny, France and the European Alliance, 1816-1821 (South Bend, Ind., 1958), 17-18, Metternich to Richelieu, 17 April 1817; hereafter cited as Sauvigny 1958. These opinions conflict with those of Bianchi, I, 221-223, and Cassi, 189-192, who attempt, without supporting evidence except dubious rumours, to picture Consalvi and Metternich as constantly hostile; the latter is described as plotting against Consalvi and opposing his plans for reform.
and when those aspects of Austrian policy that threatened Papal interests were less in evidence than they had been earlier or would become later. During the 1815-1817 period, therefore, and to a steadily lessening extent thereafter, Consalvi sincerely desired to co-operate with Austria and sought to do so in any way that would not weaken the temporal independence of the Papacy or its essential spiritual authority. 62

Consalvi could not, of course, be unaware of the threatening aspects of Austrian policy--its desire for hegemony in Italy, the menace of its Josephist policies--but in the years immediately after 1815 these elements were not strongly in evidence; they were then overshadowed for Consalvi by the more immediately serious problems of internal reform, Zelanti opposition, and Settarj subversion, in all of which Austrian support would be helpful and perhaps invaluable.

This situation could not long endure: the Austro-Papal alliance was unstable from the beginning. No amount of good will, or of fine rhetoric about the identity of Papal and Austrian interest, could permanently conceal the painful truth that those interests were in fact divergent, and at times

62

For apparently sincere expressions of this desire, see Consalvi's letters to Metternich in Van Duerm, 136, 151, 196, 205, 218. Both Labzelteln (Van Duerm, 127) and Metternich (Maass, IV, 584; Sauvigny, 173) believed in the Cardinal's sincerity.
diametrically opposite. In the last analysis, Austria did consider herself entitled to exercise hegemony in Italy, a hegemony which Consalvi could not recognise, while the Josephist spirit dominating the Austrian court was in direct contradiction to the Papal claims of spiritual authority.

Left to themselves, Consalvi and Metternich could have postponed or mitigated Austro-Papal conflict, especially in the religious field. Both favored a more conciliatory policy in religious matters than they were able to adopt. This was especially true of Metternich, who had no great zeal for Josephist principles and was unwilling to sacrifice the political advantages of Papal co-operation for the sake of increasing royal control over the Church. Consalvi too would have been willing to make somewhat greater concessions on non-essential matters and opposed the unrealistic ambitions of the Zelanti, but he could not compromise on the essentials of the Papal position. As the Cardinal told Metternich, no matter how strongly he might wish closer friendship with Austria, there were certain points on which he could not yield, and if Austria insisted on demanding more than he could give, she would destroy the basis of Austro-Papal unity—as in fact she eventually did.

For ultimately neither Metternich nor Consalvi was entirely

Van Duern, 136, Consalvi to Metternich, 11 June 1816.
the master of his own policy. Behind Metternich were the Josephist Court and Emperor; behind Consalvi were the Zelanti with their growing influence on Pius VII in religious matters. Under Josephist influence, Francis I demanded far greater concessions than Consalvi, much less the Zelanti, could make. As Consalvi warned Metternich, "I desire a close union with Austria and will do everything possible for this. But there are certain things which are impossible for us. . . . I beg Y. H. [Your Highness] for the love of God to oppose with all your influence things of this nature." 64 But Metternich's opposition could not prevent Francis I from demanding such things, while Consalvi, hampered by the Zelanti, could not adopt as flexible an attitude on non-essential points as he would have liked. 65 That Austro-Papal co-operation broke down as soon as it did was in large part the result of the influence of these two factions, Zelanti and Josephists, on the policies of their respective courts; 66 but the break-down itself was in the long run probably inevitable.

64 Ibid. Also, 206-210, Consalvi to Metternich, 1 October 1818, in which the Cardinal declares he has obtained for Austria everything except those things on which the Pope cannot yield.

65 For the way in which the conciliatory religious policies advocated by Metternich and Consalvi were thwarted by the Josephists and the Zelanti, especially the former, see below, Chapter III.

66 Ibid.
3. Reform and Opposition in the Papal State

Opposition to Consalvi at Rome had not been absent during his first ministry; it was an early consequence of jealousy of his influence over Pius VII, dislike of his reforming policies, and distrust of his flexible attitude towards Napoleon. However, it was not until his second ministry that he became involved in open conflict with a powerful opposition party within the Curia: the ultra-reactionary Zelanti. The conflict was an unequal one. The Zelanti, led by such influential Cardinals as Severoli and Bartolomeo Pacca, included the majority of the higher clergy and the College of Cardinals, while Consalvi's supporters--the "Diplomatici" or "Politician"--included only a few cardinals and a limited number of the lower clergy. Only the support of Pius VII kept Consalvi in power against such strong opposition, and as the Pope grew older the Zelanti gained an

---67---

On Consalvi's struggle with the Zelanti, see: Massimo Petrocchi, La restaurazione, il Cardinale Consalvi, e la Riforma del 1816 (Florence, 1941), hereafter cited as Petrocchi 1941; Schmidlin, 190, 197-198; Leflon, 317-320; A.V., R247, Extract from Morning Chronicle, 27 April 1819, presents an interesting contemporary view. Bartolomeo Cardinal Pacca (1756-1844), Pro-Secretary of State in 1808-1809; firmly opposed all compromise with Napoleon, who imprisoned him in 1809-1813; Pro-Secretary of State during Consalvi's absence in Vienna, 1814-1815; probably the most influential leader of the Zelanti in 1815-1823.
increasing influence over him. 68

Aside from personal factors, there were two main causes for conflict between Consalvi and the Zelanti. The first point at issue was the question of reform or reaction in the Papal government. Consalvi favored reforming and modernizing the antiquated and inefficient Pontifical regime, while the Zelanti were bitterly opposed to any innovation. The second question was the policy which the Papacy should adopt toward the secular power in religious affairs. This question involved a difference not of principle—both Consalvi and the Zelanti opposed the interference of secular government in religious matters and wished to prevent it—but of tactics. The Zelanti tended to favor an open assault on governmental control over the Church and to oppose any compromise with the secular power. Consalvi, with a more realistic appreciation of the international scene and the strengths and weaknesses of the Papal position than his adversaries, felt that any such policy would be most unwise. A frontal attack upon the principle and practice of governmental control over the Church would surely lead to conflict with most of the European powers, a conflict which would have the most unfortunate effects on religion in general and the Papacy in particular. Such a conflict was especially undesirable at that particular moment when the revolutionary threat was so strong,
as a long church-state conflict would only weaken both, to the joy of their common enemy. Consalvi was therefore reluctant to attack the secular power openly. He preferred to work indirectly, taking advantage of favorable opportunities to increase Papal control over the national churches. Unlike the Zelanti, he was willing to make concessions on non-essentials if it seemed advisable. In so far as Austria was concerned, the Zelanti were bitterly antagonistic to that Josephist power, while Consalvi, though distrustful of Austrian aims, was well aware of the political and religious advantages of remaining on good terms with her.

The Zelanti gained a major initial advantage over Consalvi when the latter spent the first year of the Restoration away from Rome, thus leaving a free field to his opponents to take control of the administration and carry out their reactionary policies. Both Monsignor Agostino Riverola, whom Pius VII sent ahead to restore Papal government in the territories of the "prima ricupera" (that is, those restored to the Papacy in 1814, principally Rome and the surrounding area, as opposed to the "seconday ricupera," the rest of the Papal possessions restored at the Congress of Vienna), and the heroic but intransigent Pacca, appointed Prosecretary of State upon the Pope's arrival in Rome, were Zelanti fervently opposed to any innovation in Church or State. The two lost no time destroying every trace of the French regime and replacing it with the
ancient pre-1789 Papal administration. The French administrative and financial innovations were abolished, and the modern efficient French law codes and courts were replaced by the antiquated and disorganized Papal legal system. The reaction extended even to the abolition of such salutary measures as vaccination, lighting of the streets, and emancipation of the Jews from the ghetto. The Inquisition (with the power of capital punishment though not of torture) was re-established, as were the feudal rights and jurisdiction of the nobility. The sale of secularized ecclesiastical properties was annulled and a commission set up to supervise their return; few of the well-to-do would not have suffered loss from these measures. Almost equally offensive to the educated classes was a system described by a moderate contemporary as "a law code compiled thirteen centuries ago, containing fourteen or more thousand laws, often mutually contradictory, and no longer compatible with the customs and outlook of the times which have utterly changed. . . ." A.V., R25, Pro-Memorial of Dr. Guarmani, sent to Consalvi by Cardinal Opizzoni, 18 October 1815. This Memorial contains a very interesting analysis, all the more impressive for its comparative moderation, of the manifold ills of the Papal regime.

The best account of the reaction under Paccia, as well as the reforms of Consalvi, is in the works of Massimo Petrocchi: La restaurazione romana, 1815-1823 (Florence, 1943), hereafter cited as Petrocchi 1943; and Petrocchi 1941. A good brief account is in Schmidlin, 179-201. Also on the reaction, Rinieri, IV, 203-297, rather apologetic in tone; and the excellent but very critical Adolfo Omodeo, "Cattolicismo e civiltà moderno nel secolo xix, III: Il Cardinale Consalvi al Congresso di Vienna," in La Critica, XXXVI (November, 1938), 426-440.

A system described by a moderate contemporary as "a law code compiled thirteen centuries ago, containing fourteen or more thousand laws, often mutually contradictory, and no longer compatible with the customs and outlook of the times which have utterly changed. . . ." A.V., R25, Pro-Memorial of Dr. Guarmani, sent to Consalvi by Cardinal Opizzoni, 18 October 1815. This Memorial contains a very interesting analysis, all the more impressive for its comparative moderation, of the manifold ills of the Papal regime.
was the removal of laymen from the Papal government. The laicization of the administration by the French had been highly popular with the educated classes, especially the numerous and often impecunious lawyers, and the return to ecclesiastical rule was bitterly criticized. 71

More defensible, though much criticized abroad, was the general removal from their benefices of the clergy who had taken the oath of loyalty to Napoleon; desirable on political and religious grounds, it was perhaps equally so as a matter of justice. It could scarcely be denied that the clergy who had suffered for their refusal to take the oath should be restored to their positions at the expense of the jurors, nor could men like Pacca, who had suffered persecution for their refusal to bow to Napoleon, be expected to have much sympathy for those who had been less heroic. Also understandable was the punishment of a very few lay collaborators, notably those who had led the assault on the Quirinale in 1809. Less justifiable was the public humiliation inflicted on certain prelates who had co-operated with the French. There was, however, no widespread persecution, no "white terror", despite the wildly exaggerated stories which circulated freely beyond

71 It is significant that ex-officials replaced by ecclesiastics were perhaps the most important single group in the secret societies. Petrocchi 1943, 38, 53.
the Alps, spread by enemies of the Papal government. 72

Consalvi was appalled by these proceedings. He was not a liberal in the strict sense of the term; 73 his reforms and his administration as a whole had more in common with the Enlightened Despotism of the eighteenth century then with the Liberalism of the nineteenth. However, if not a liberal, he was certainly an anti-reactionary, an intelligent and statesman-like conservative who realized that "the circumstances of the Age we live in are very different from those of the Past...It is necessary to come to terms with the spirit of the times." 74 He had long planned a thorough reform of the Papal regime, but during his first ministry Zelanti opposition and his own preoccupation with other problems had combined to thwart his plans.


73 The theme of Cassi's work, that Consalvi was indeed a true liberal, seems untenable; the general spirit pervading his reforms and his administration was that of an intelligent conservative. Upon being informed that a Swiss paper had praised his reforms as "liberal", Consalvi replied that such articles were attempts by the Liberals to associate the Papacy with their cause in the public eye. He stated his opposition to Liberalism as a doctrine and denied that his reforms were liberal in that sense. A.V., R257, Consalvi to Valenti, 10 February 1817.

74 A.V., R247, Consalvi to Severoli, 14 September 1816. Severoli had criticized Consalvi's reforms, and an increasingly bitter dispute sprang up between them that eventually led to an open break. Severoli later became an implacable foe of the Secretary of State and led the Zelanti in the Conclave of 1823.
In 1815, the disruption of the Papal government by the French occupation seemed to offer the opportunity for thorough reorganization for which he had hoped during his exile. Any attempt to restore the past would be futile, and would merely arouse popular discontent and alienate European opinion. It was necessary to move forward, to carry out reforms that would be in keeping with the "Spirit of the Age" if the best interests of the Papacy and its subjects were to be served. Consalvi had no intention of satisfying liberal demands for a written constitution, a parliament, or any other innovation that might weaken the authority of the Pope, which must be absolute in secular as in religious matters. Consalvi was willing to admit that the system of constitutional government, "ossia del Contratto Sociale," might be desirable in a government ruled by a purely secular prince; but in an ecclesiastical state it would be "most perilous," for any limitation of the authority of the Pope as a secular ruler might be thought to affect his

75 Memorie, 145-151, written by Consalvi during his imprisonment in 1811, describes his earlier attempts at reform, his bitterness at the reactionaries who had frustrated his projects, and his hope that in the event of a Papal restoration he would be able to profit by the disruption of the old system to create a new one.

75 A.V., R242, Consalvi to Pacca, 20 March 1815; Consalvi to Spina, 8 February 1821; Instructions for Spina, 1822, R165, Consalvi to Metternich, 23 August 1823 (copy).
necesary and divinely-given absolute power as Head of the Church. 77

What the Cardinal did propose was an amnesty for the past, plus large-scale administrative reform that would eliminate the sources of popular discontent against the Papal regime. A general reorganisation and streamlining of the administrative system to increase its efficiency and its ability to discharge its functions satisfactorily, financial reforms to reduce the burden of taxation, stimulate the economy, and place the state on a sound financial basis, a well-organized and humane legal system, the abolition of privilege, and the admission of laymen to the government in larger numbers—these were the reforms that Consalvi sought to put into effect.

Throughout his stay in Vienna Consalvi dispatched a constant stream of letters to Pacca urging moderation and reform and pointing out the evil effects of the prevailing reaction and repression. 78 In one of his last dispatches before departing for Rome, the Cardinal warned that:

77 A.V., R242, Consalvi to Spina, 8 February 1821.

78 See especially A.V., R242, Consalvi to Pacca, 30 June, 17 August, 3 December, 7 December, 14 December, 25 December 1814, 14 January, 12 June 1815; and Pacca's defense of the justice and necessity of his policies, Pacca to Consalvi, 8 June, 23 July, 5 August, 8 August, 17 August, 20 September, 3 November 1814. Much of this Consalvi-Pacca correspondence has been published in Rinieri, V; it is an excellent source for the conflict of opinion between Consalvi and the Zelanti in 1814-1815 when open strife between them had not yet broken out.
If it has been difficult, God knows, to recover what has been recovered, it will be yet more difficult to preserve it. You must believe what I am about to tell you. If we do not take the right path, if fatal errors are made, we will not keep the recovered territories six months. Heaven grant that the future does not confirm this prediction! But unfortunately so it will be if we make the wrong moves.

The only "right path" was to conciliate the people by a policy of moderation and reform, in particular by "adopting as soon as possible a new plan [of government] based on those views that wisdom, prudence, experience, the nature of the age, and circumstances imperiously counsel... When the current is of such great force that it cannot be resisted, better to seek to control and direct it than to let oneself be swept away by it."79

It was in this firm conviction that Consalvi set to work upon his return to Rome. His first step was an Edict of 5 July 1815, providing for the temporary maintenance of the French legal and administrative system; with some necessary modifications, in the Seconda Ricupera. 80 Soon afterwards, an Edict of

79 A.V., R242, Consalvi to Pacca, 12 June 1815.
80 The provisional government set up by this Edict was based on the plans which two Roman lawyers, Cristaldi and Barberi, had drawn up at the orders of Pius VII, and which they presented to Consalvi upon his return. However, though not developed by the Cardinal, it was revised by him prior to its publication. Its provisions, even if not entirely originated by Consalvi, show his influence and are in keeping with the spirit of his policy. See Anonymous, "La congiura di Macerata: la Restaurazione Pontificia del 1815 e le scontentezze settarie," La Civiltà Cattolica, 1916, I, 405. Also Petrocchi 1941, 52-53.
14 July guaranteed a complete amnesty and the possession of all purchased secularized ecclesiastical land. Meanwhile, though distracted by other problems, he had begun work on the preparation of a Plan of Reform, which proved to be a long and laborious task. The Plan might have appeared in early 1816 had it not been constantly hampered and delayed by the opposition of the Zelanti, who had taken advantage of the Cardinal's long absence to occupy most of the offices, spiritual and secular alike, in the State and to win considerable influence over Pius VII. Finally, in March, 1816, the Plan was completed, and Consalvi looked forward to its speedy publication.

However, when the Plan was submitted to Pius VII, although he stated his approval, the Pope hesitated to publish it, for the Zelanti were now making a supreme effort to persuade him to reject it. For two months the Pope hesitated and the issue hung in the balance, while Consalvi fought a constant, desperate battle with the Zelanti for the support of Pius VII. The long and bitter struggle took its toll of even Consalvi's indomitable spirit, and so weary and disheartened was he at times by the

---

81 Some Zelanti officials did their best to ignore this amnesty: A.V., R26, Consalvi to Leopardi, 6 September 1815; Pro-Memorial of Monaldo Leopardi, 1815.
82 See above, Section 1, for these problems.
83 Van Duerm, 127 Lebzeltern to Metternich, 30 April 1816, 21 May 1816. A.V., R247, Extract from Morning Chronicle, 27 April 1819. ANV 125, Consalvi to Severoli, 4 February 1816.
84 ANV 125, Consalvi to Severoli, 25 March 1816.
exhausting conflict, by his inability to secure the reforms he knew to be vitally necessary, and above all by the failure of his friend Pius to support him that he told Lebzeltern that he was seriously considering resigning his office. The Austrian ambassador, well aware of the gravity of Consalvi's position, tried to encourage the Cardinal, but nonetheless his report to Metternich painted the situation in dark colors:

The party opposed to him has daily gained ground, it spares no means of injuring him in the opinion of the public and the Pope... Strong in his conscience, sacrificing his existence to his sovereign and the general welfare, he errs perhaps by over-confidence in the righteousness of his intentions and leaves too much latitude to his adversaries. The Pope, constantly surrounded and worked upon by them, does not cease to respect him, but has less confidence in him. He is reticent towards him, he struggles between his attraction to a man who has rendered him such great services and the impressions that are given him daily.

His Plan of organization is already criticized, before being known. Even the most innocent moves of the Cardinal are misinterpreted, until an accolade which he gave to Lord Stuart was taken here as a bacio di frà-masone, for the Cardinal is judged such since he has been in Vienna and has announced ideas more liberal, or rather, less reactionary and ignorant than those that prevail in this city which has become the homeland of ignorance and egoism. He is reproached with wishing to do everything himself and allowing others to do nothing: a just reproach, but the answer is that if he abandoned the smallest matter to others, it would infallibly be thwarted and concluded in a sense contrary to his views.

The delay in introducing necessary reforms was causing mounting discontent and the spread of revolutionary sentiment:

During the few weeks that I have been gone, I have found that public sentiment has deteriorated remarkably in every way, and I consider this State in a sort of crisis, due chiefly to the bad administration... to ignorance, to presumption, and above all to
the intrigues of the Cardinals, who agitate against the Secretary of State quite openly [visiere levée] without control or opposition, authorized, so to speak, by the weakness of the Holy Father.

Lebzeltern gloomily concluded that he doubted Consalvi would be able to carry through his reform plan. 85

Though Consalvi's threat to resign may have been uttered mainly to impress Lebzeltern with the gravity of his position in order to win Austrian support in the struggle, the Ambassador's description was not exaggerated. The opposition had succeeded in checking his plans, and discontent was growing steadily as a result of the delay. Much alarmed by the deteriorating situation, Metternich reacted as Consalvi had hoped by giving the Cardinal his support against the Zelanti. 86

Metternich had long been interested in reform in the Papal State. Contrary to the tradition of nineteenth century Liberal historians, Metternich did believe in reform, but only to a certain extent and in a limited sense. No concessions that affected the rights of sovereignty or the prerogatives of the crown could be granted, for "kings, like bankers, when they live on their capital, must sooner or later arrive at bankruptcy." However, legislative and administrative reforms that

85 Van Duerm, 127, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 30 April, 1816.
86 A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 13 April 1816.
Lebzeltern was already doing his best to support and encourage Consalvi, almost certainly upon instructions from Metternich: Van Duerm, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 127: 30 April 1816, 131: 21 May 1816.
did not affect the rights of sovereignty were quite another matter: "they are simply government acts, tending to a progressive amelioration, a process just, simple, and wise."\(^{87}\) Change could not be avoided; the reform of government in keeping with "the progress of knowledge and the needs which recent events have created" was necessary.\(^{88}\) The essential point was that such reforms must be granted by the sovereign of his own free will, not wrung from him by revolutionary pressure.\(^{89}\)

Metternich did not fail to apply these principles to the Papal State. The widespread discontent and consequent growth of revolutionary activity in that State was not only distasteful to his conservative principles, but a direct menace to Austria, for revolutionary agitation there would certainly spread to Austria's Italian territories.\(^{90}\) Thorough repression of the Settarj was necessary, but it was equally necessary to remove the legitimate causes of discontent by timely reforms, thus depriving the revolutionaries of popular support. Metternich had already urged reforms upon Consalvi at the

\(^{87}\) Metternich, V, 392, Metternich to Neumann, 31 October 1832.

\(^{88}\) Sauvigny, 77, Caraman's dispatch of 23 February 1818.

\(^{89}\) Ibid., 77, Circular of 12 May 1821. For Metternich's attempts to secure such reforms "from above" in the Hapsburg Empire, see Srbik, I, 454-464.

\(^{90}\) A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 16 July 1814, 10 October 1815, R260, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 1 July 1816; Metternich to Consalvi, 3 July 1816.
Congress of Vienna; but as the chief point of the suggested reforms was some sort of constitution similar to the French Charter, the plan was rejected as incompatible with Papal authority.\textsuperscript{91} However, the Austrian minister did not lose sight of the situation in the Papal States, and Consalvi's reforms, being quite in line with his own ideas, met with his approval. It was natural therefore that when Lebzeltern informed him of Consalvi's difficult position, he was seriously alarmed and instructed Lebzeltern to give Consalvi full support to secure the adoption of these necessary reforms.

Meanwhile, though by mid-May the Plan had been in Pius' hands for six weeks, not all Consalvi's arguments and pleas could persuade him to publish it. It did not seem impossible that in the end the Zelanti might persuade the Pope to reject the Plan, or to so modify it as to destroy its value.\textsuperscript{92} Either outcome would have disastrous consequences for the Papal States, where the Plan was awaited with great impatience as the sole hope of saving the rapidly deteriorating situation.\textsuperscript{93} It would also, Lebzeltern believed, result in the fall of Consalvi, who had committed himself to carrying out reform and would certainly resign if he failed to do so.\textsuperscript{94}

\textsuperscript{91} R242, Consalvi to Pacca, 20 May 1815.
\textsuperscript{92} Van Duerm, 131, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 21 May 1816.
\textsuperscript{93} A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 24 February 1816.
\textsuperscript{94} Van Duerm, 131, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 21 May 1816.
Realizing that Consalvi's resignation was contrary to both Austrian and Papal interests, Lebzeltern did everything he could to aid the Cardinal. The crisis came in late May: Pius was about to make his decision, and neither Consalvi nor Lebzeltern could be sure that it would not be unfavorable. The Austrian ambassador found Consalvi in an extremely worried state:

Exhausted by the battles which he must fight at every moment, mortified at seeing himself so weakly, so ill supported by a sovereign to whom he has rendered such great services and whose character and principles have much changed and who has yielded himself up to the daily impulses he receives; seeing himself deprived of all means of execution by the maneuvers of the party... which took care to fill with its creatures all offices before the arrival of Consalvi from Vienna, he is in a truly critical moment.

Lebzeltern did his best to calm the "extreme agitation" of Consalvi and to encourage him to continue the struggle. Nor did he confine his assistance to mere encouragement:

As I am convinced of the extreme importance of keeping Consalvi in office [Lebzeltern explained to Metternich], for both the public good and for Austria; as I am also convinced that if Consalvi resigns and if the Pope decides to do everything after the fashion of '96, he will ensure the most evil consequences for this country, inhabited by malcontents of every type; I plan to have an interview with His Holiness on these subjects, and I flatter myself that the remonstrances which I plan to make with my usual frankness, will not be made without success.

The Pope was to make his decision within the next eight hours. If the decision was unfavorable and Consalvi resigned, "public opinion would range itself completely on his side, and the
confusion that would result from the restoration of the old
regime would form his greatest triumph."\(^{95}\)

Fortunately, Lebzeltern did not have an opportunity to
determine the accuracy of his prediction, for the Pope decided
in favor of publishing the Plan of Reform. The extent to which
Lebzeltern's "remonstrances" and Austrian support in general
contributed to this outcome is uncertain. In view of the Pope's
recognition of the Papal need for Austrian support and good
will,\(^{96}\) he would probably be inclined to listen with respect to
Lebzeltern's remonstrances, and the Austrian ambassador's support
was therefore almost certainly of significant value.

Opposition to Consalvi's reforms was not by any means ended
by the Pope's decision. The Zelanti continued to use every means
to block or delay the appearance of the Plan, which was finally
published only in mid-July. During this trying period Consalvi
lost the much-appreciated support of Lebzeltern, who (much
against his will) was recalled to Vienna preparatory to being
sent as ambassador to St. Petersburg.\(^{97}\)

\(^{95}\) Ibid.
\(^{96}\) Ibid., 127, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 30 April 1816.
\(^{97}\) Lebzeltern, 345-349. Consalvi and Lebzeltern remained on
close terms for some years afterwards, exchanging letters in very
friendly terms. The Zelanti, however, never forgave Lebzeltern
for supporting Consalvi's reforms, and when in 1826 Austria
proposed to send him back as ambassador, their opposition caused
the project to be dropped.
However, his successor, Count Apponyi, was instructed to support Consalvi "en tout et pour tout." The Secretary of State was also assured of continued Austrian support by Lebzeltern himself in a long letter written by the latter shortly before his departure from Vienna; this letter embodied the ideas of Metternich, who was unable to write himself because of an eye ailment.

After once again stressing the need for Austro-Papal unity, Lebzeltern assured Consalvi that the Emperor was extremely interested in the fate of the Reform Plan and of Consalvi himself, of whose possible dismissal he had heard alarming rumours. The Plan was eagerly awaited not only at Vienna but throughout Europe, because of "the news, perhaps exaggerated," of discontent in the Papal State, and because the Holy Father's Edict of 14 July 1815 had given rise to general hopes that he would follow a moderate and progressive policy as the only means of quieting this discontent. Vienna realized that an ecclesiastical state could not be governed in exactly the same way as others, but the enlightened principles now being adopted by the other members of the "Great Family" of nations must be imitated to the greatest extent practical, for a reactionary policy could only lead to "the most fatal consequences." It was known at Vienna that Pius VII and Consalvi supported reforms, but unfortunately they were opposed

by many at Rome who were utterly ignorant of the realities of the modern world "beyond the Aurelian Walls." Their intrigues were notorious and universally condemned. "No one can understand why the Pope tolerates them, or why He does not make energetic use of His authority to end them at one stroke." Only "His goodness and evangelical sweetness" could explain his strange reluctance to suppress their opposition and their intrigues.

Having expressed Austria's interest in reform and its opposition to the Zelanti, Lebzeltern went on to the chief point of his letter: Austrian support for Consalvi and opposition to his dismissal:

If I were to assure Y.E. [Your Eminence] that the Emperor expresses personally the most sincere esteem and confidence for you and that Prince Metternich professes towards you sentiments of genuine affection, I would not be saying enough to Y.E. The fact is that you have inspired high confidence and sincere respect in all cabinets. . . . They, like ourselves, would regard your dismissal as a veritable calamity, as an event that could lead to the most disastrous consequences for the Holy See. If only certain persons of my acquaintance, very highly placed too, who would like to take the Holy See back to the fourteenth century. . . . would take the trouble to become acquainted with the Catholic world beyond the circuit of the Aurelian Wall, they would tremble at the possible consequences of their system.

Lebzeltern concluded by apologizing for his frankness, which he

---

99 Worth noting is the remarkable way in which Cassi, 187, allows his anti-Austrian bias to distort the meaning of this passage. By careful selection and omission, he makes it appear as if Lebzeltern was criticizing the Pope for his excessive tolerance towards the Liberals (who are in fact barely mentioned in this letter) instead of the Zelanti. Schmidlin, 201, Note 31, unfortunately follows Cassi on this point, as he also does on some others.
said was motivated only by regard for the welfare of Consalvi and the Pope. 100

The purpose of this letter was apparently to encourage Consalvi and to assure him of Austrian support for reform, as a weapon to strengthen him in his struggle against the Zelanti. There is no evidence that Pius VII at any time considered dismissing his Secretary of State, though if the Plan had been rejected he might have resigned. However, this new pledge of Austrian support may have aided Consalvi to accelerate the publication of the Plan, which appeared soon afterwards as the Motu-proprrio of 6 July 1816. 101

Only the most important points of this lengthy and detailed plan need be recounted here. 102 The administration was thoroughly reorganized along Napoleonic lines of centralization and uniformity. In accord with enlightened contemporary opinion, separation of administrative from judicial powers was effected. In response to general demand, laymen were to be admitted to most secular offices. A limited concession was made to liberal demands for popular representation by providing that each delegate, legate,

---
100 A.V., R260, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 1 July 1816.
102 For a more detailed analysis of the Motu-proprrio, see Petrocchi 1941, 67-80, or Schmidlin, 184-189.
and governor was to be assisted by a council of two to four men from his province; their functions were purely consultative, but they must be summoned three times a week to give their opinion on important matters. The intricate network of privileges of the Old Regime was swept away, except for a few baronial privileges in the Prima Ricupera.

The complicated, inefficient, and disorganized judicial system was to be much simplified and reduced to coherent order, under the influence of the Code Napoleon. New civil, criminal, and commercial tribunals were to be provided; the old ecclesiastical tribunals survived, but their jurisdiction was strictly limited to ecclesiastical affairs. Torture and arbitrary punishment or imprisonment were forbidden. Commissions were to be named to draw up new civil, criminal, and commercial codes; in the interim, the present system would remain in effect.

The financial system was reorganized on simpler and more efficient lines, so that it would be possible to reduce taxation by a million scudi a year. Taxes, customs duties, and government monopolies were made uniform in all provinces, and an effort was made to redistribute the tax burden on a more equitable basis.

These reforms were, as the Preamble to the Motu-proprio made clear, only a basis on which further reforms must be constructed. Consalvi was aware how limited they were and would have preferred more extensive innovations, especially in regard to abolishing all noble privileges and replacing ecclesiastics
by laymen in the government; but in view of the opposition which even these limited measures aroused, there can be little doubt that Consalvi had indeed, as he claimed, accomplished all that was possible under the circumstances.

Modest though they were, the reforms stirred the Zelanti to fury and allied with them the nobility who resented the loss of their privileges. The Plan was denounced as "Jacobinism" and "Napoleonic," the latter with a certain amount of justice. The Zelanti, led by Consalvi's bitter enemy, Annibale Cardinal Della Genga, worked day and night to influence Pius VII to dismiss his Secretary of State, and a few fanatical reactionaries

103 A.V., R247, Consalvi to Severoli, 14 September 1816. R242, Consalvi to Pacca, 20 March 1815, 12 June 1815.
104 Van Duerm, 151-160, Consalvi to Metternich, 23 August 1816.
105 See especially A.V., R247, Severoli to Consalvi, 10 August, 17 August, 6 November 1816, 4 January, 12 February 1817. R25, Giustiniani to Consalvi, 17 August 1816. Severoli was typical of many former admirers (e.g., ANV 233, Severoli to Pacca, 17 June 1815) of Consalvi who now turned against him.
106 Ibid., Severoli to Consalvi, 6 November 1816, Consalvi to Severoli, 14 December 1816. R257, Consalvi to Valenti, 10 February 1817. The strong influence of Napoleonic precedents on Consalvi's reforms is undeniable, though Artaud de Montour, Storia di Papa Pio VII (Lucca, 1837), III, 182, exaggerates in saying that "except for the changed nomenclature", the new organization was "nothing other than the French system".
were even said to be plotting against the Pope himself.107

Consalvi remained undaunted by the furious criticism and abuse of the Zelanti—for whom he had only contempt—"dolts," "asses," "fools," (to quote a few of his more charitable descriptions) who could not see that the old regime had gone forever and thought they could turn the clock back to 1789!108

Consalvi was consoled for Zelanti condemnation by the generally favorable reaction to his Plan of moderate liberals and intelligent conservatives both at home and abroad.109 In particular, Metternich was pleased that the reforms he had long advocated had at last been enacted. Though the Papal government as reformed and reorganized by the Motu-proprrio was still not entirely satisfactory, it was a great improvement over the past:

If it is still far from being entirely in conformity with the circumstances and spirit of the times, it nonetheless approaches them sufficiently to be in harmony with that government which we have introduced in our provinces and to paralyze the efforts of those

107 Cassi, 157-159. Annibale Cardinal della Genga (1760-1829) was sent in May, 1814, to represent the Papacy at the conference drawing up the Peace of Paris. Through his own procrastination, he arrived too late to defend Papal interests, thus earning a harsh rebuke from Consalvi; the two prelates were thenceforth on hostile terms, and when Della Genga was elected as Pope Leo XII (1823-1829), he undid much of Consalvi’s work of reform.

108 A.V., R247, Consalvi to Severoli, 14 September, 14 December 1816, 20 January 1817.

109 Ibid., Consalvi to Severoli, 14 December 1816, R254, Papal Internunzio in Lucerne to Consalvi, 3 August 1816, R257, Valenti, charge d’affaires in Turin, to Consalvi, 7 August, 28 September 1816, 27 January 1817.
who have not moved with the age and who cherish the 
vain and dangerous hope of seeing re-established an 
order of things which twenty years of war and revolu- 
tion have morally and physically destroyed. It would 
be superfluous to linger over the inconveniences that 
would necessarily result from so impolitic a system;
it is undoubtedly to be feared by us, but how much 
more dangerous for the Roman government. . . 110

Though he recognized that there were definite limits to what 
the Secretary of State could accomplish under the circumstances 
and was pleased that he had managed to do as much as he had, 
Metternich continued to urge Consalvi to carry out further re- 
forms, especially greater laicization of the government. The 
Cardinal, he urged, must continue onward in his course and not 
allow fear of opposition to divert him from what was necessary.111

Consalvi needed no encouragement to continue his work of 
reform, which occupied him for the rest of his ministry. Numerous 
economic reforms were enacted with a view to stimulating the 
economy, but they had little effect because of the prolonged 
post-war depression. The police and army were reorganized and 
their efficiency increased, so that some progress was made 
against the endemic scourge of brigandage.112

---

110 Maass, IV, 584, Instructions for Kaunitz, 31 May 1817.
111 A.V., R247, Severoli to Consalvi, 13 November 1816: 
Leardi to Consalvi, 30 June 1821.
112 Consalvi's reforms are summarized conveniently in 
Petrocchi 1943, Chapter I. Anonymous, "Le industrie, il commercio, 
Le imposte sotto i Pontifici Pio VI e Pio VII, sino al 1815," 
A.V., R247, Severoli to Consalvi, 13 November 1816; Leardi to 
Consalvi, 30 June 1821, ANV 250, Consalvi to Leardi, 8 July 
1823.
In the more important areas of reform, however, he was able to make little headway against the constant Zelanti opposition. A code of civil procedure was enacted in 1817 and a code of commercial law in 1821, but the codes of civil and criminal law promised in the Motu-proprio were never published. They were drawn up and submitted for consideration to congregations appointed for the purpose, but apparently the opposition to them was too strong, as they never appeared. Nor did he succeed in introducing further political reforms; indeed, because of the ceaseless opposition which it encountered at all levels of the Papal government, many parts of the Motu-proprio of 1816 itself remained a dead letter.

---

113 Barberi, XIV, 444, Motu-proprio of 22 November 1817.
A.V., R247, Consalvi to Leardi, 12 December 1817, 9 June 1821; Leardi to Consalvi, 30 June 1821.


115 A.V., R247, Extract from the Morning Chronicle, 27 April 1819; Leardi to Consalvi, 30 June 1821. R25, Consalvi to the Delegate of Fermo, 5 July 1817, provides an interesting example of opposition on the local level: this Delegate had publicly proclaimed that he had never read the Motu-proprio, did not plan to do so, and hoped to die before putting its provisions into effect. R242, Instructions for Spina, 1822. Maass, IV, 584, Instructions for Kaunitz, 31 May 1817. Van Duern, 253, Note 1, Genotte to Metternich, 2 August 1820. Sauvigny, 178, Instructions for Apponyi, 1820. However, part of the difficulty of putting the reforms into effect was the result not of the ill-will of his subordinates, but of their sheer incompetence: see Petrocchi 1943, Chapter III.
The opposition of the Zelanti to Consalvi and his policies continued to the end of his ministry, nor did it slacken in intensity.\textsuperscript{116} His measures were constantly opposed and criticized, and he was "daily thwarted" in the routine operation of his government by Zelanti office-holders.\textsuperscript{117} They gained increasing influence over the aging Pius VII, especially in religious affairs where they represented Consalvi as being lukewarm in his devotion to religious interests—he was even accused of seeking to separate the spiritual from the temporal power and to give the Papal States to Austria at Pius' death.\textsuperscript{118}

Every occasion was seized upon by the Zelanti to attack him, often with little regard for consistency, as when (after having condemned Consalvi for years as too pro-Austrian) they criticized the Secretary of State for not taking a stronger stand in support of Austrian action against the Neapolitan Revolution.\textsuperscript{119} Through-

\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., Also, Van Duerm, 281 Apponyi to Metternich, 20 September 1820. Their plotting continued to the very end, while Pius VII was on his death-bed. Petrocchi 1943, 106, Consalvi to Cardinal Opizzoni, 13 August 1823.

\textsuperscript{117} Sauvigny, 168, Instructions for Apponyi, 1820.

\textsuperscript{118} A.V., R247, Extract from Morning Chronicle, 27 April 1819. Also, Maass, V, 173, Genotte to Metternich, 5 February 1820. Van Duerm, 253, Genotte to Metternich, 2 August 1820.

\textsuperscript{119} Van Duerm, 206, Consalvi to Metternich, 1 October 1818; 281, Apponyi to Metternich, 20 September 1820. Apponyi however realized that their sudden support was not due to any change of views, but merely to an incorrigible spirit of opposition to any policy of Consalvi's.
out his second ministry he was under a constant pressure that would have broken a less resilient and determined spirit. As it was, his energy and health were sapped by the long struggle.\textsuperscript{120} Perhaps the constant strain and fatigue, both mental and physical, which he had to endure were a factor in his comparatively early death.\textsuperscript{121} Certainly, much time and energy that he might otherwise have devoted to internal reform and diplomacy, probably with significant results, had instead to be expended on the ceaseless, futile struggle with the Zelanti. Any evaluation of Consalvi's achievements and ability must take this factor into account, and any evaluation of his Austrian policy must likewise take into account his wish for Austrian support in this struggle.

If the surrounding circumstances are ignored, the reforms which Consalvi carried out may not seem impressive. It is only when considered against the background of constant Zelanti opposition that they can be seen as the considerable achievement they in fact were. The important and impressive points about Consalvi's reforms are, that they were made in the Papal States, and that they were made at all. Consalvi himself was aware how limited they were and would have wished to go further, but in view of the strength of the Zelanti it would seem that he was justified in his claim that he had done all that was possible in

\textsuperscript{120} Ibid., 281, Apponyi to Metternich, 20 September 1820.

\textsuperscript{121} As early as 1816, Severoli, then an admirer of the Cardinal, had warned him that he was putting "troppo d'attivita ed intensione" into his efforts to secure reform and would ruin his health by over-work. R247, Severoli to Consalvi, 13 April 1816.
the circumstances.

Moreover, even these limited reforms were of some value in themselves: they did give the Papal State a more efficient and satisfactory government, one that satisfied at least the minimum demands of the politically educated classes.

The value of his reforms was proven by subsequent events: in 1820-1821, the Papal State, which in 1814-1816 had been the most turbulent and discontented area in Italy and would again become such after Consalvi's fall, remained remarkably quiet, despite the temptation of an active and temporarily successful revolution at its very door in Naples. This remarkable change in public spirit must be largely attributed to Consalvi's reforms and the comparatively good government which the Papal States enjoyed under his rule. It is significant that after the suspension of Consalvi's measures by the successors of Pius VII, the Papal territories once again became a hotbed of revolutionary activity and played a prominent role in the revolutions of 1830-1832. The contrast between the condition of the Papal States in 1814-1816 and 1830-1832 on the one hand, and 1820-1821 on the other, is the most impressive testimony to Consalvi's achievement.
4. Co-operation against the Settarj

Few factors encourage alliance so much as the possession of a mutual enemy. Consalvi and Metternich had the dubious fortune to possess two such foes: the Zelanti, already described, and the Settarj, the members of the "Sects" or revolutionary secret societies.122 Based perhaps on Masonry,123 inspired certainly

The chief source of information on the Settarj of the Papal State is A.V., R165, which contains Consalvi's directions for dealing with them, reports of Papal officials on their activities, strength, and aims, and much similar material. Of special interest are the reports of the Legates of Ravenna, Forli, and in particular Bologna, whose Legate, Cardinal Spina, was perhaps the most loyal and capable of Consalvi's subordinates; see, e.g., his perceptive account of the strength and aims of the various Sects and the dangers each presented to Papal rule, R165, Spina to Consalvi, 12 August 1820, Both Spina and Consalvi believed that the chief danger came in the long run not from the violently revolutionary Carbonari, but from the nationalist liberals who were working slowly but surely towards their goal of Italian unity---a judgment whose validity later events were to confirm. A vast literature has appeared on the secret societies, most of it more notable for liberal and nationalist enthusiasm and rhetoric than for objectivity and the critical sense. Among the more useful works are: A. Ottolini, La Carbonaria dalle origini ai primi tentativi insurrezionali (Modena, 1936); A. Pierantoni, I Carbonari dello Stato Pontificio (Rome, 1910); D. Spadoni, Sette, conspirazioni, cospiratori nello Stato Pontificio (Turin, 1904).

The masonic origins of the Settarj are asserted in Anonymous, Il settarismo," Civiltà Cattolica, 1915, II, 41-56, and denied by A. Luzio, La Massoneria e il Risorgimento italiano (Bologna, 1925). The present writer believes that the Settarj imitated the organization of the Masons and may well have originated in their lodges, but split away during the Napoleonic regime, the Masons supporting the latter, the Settarj opposing it.
by the ideals of the French Revolution, these societies first appeared during the Napoleonic domination as resistance movements directed against French rule. The fall of Napoleon did not bring their activities to an end, but merely redirected them against Austria and the restored Italian governments. The aims and ideals of the Settarj varied widely among the various groups making up the movement, but certain aims were generally held; the expulsion of all foreign rule and influence (especially that of Austria), some form of Italian unity, a written constitution and a parliament, reduction of the influence and wealth of the Church, and an end to special privilege. They drew their main support from the ex-officials and soldiers of the Napoleonic regime, some of the bourgeoisie, and a few nobles, with little backing among the other classes.124

These aims inevitably drew the Settarj into conflict with the existing Italian governments; there was conspiracy and agitation on the one hand, repression on the other. Austria was the natural leader in the effort to repress the sects. Against the Settarj within her own territories Austria could and did take effective measures, but Vienna was equally concerned with revolutionary activity in the rest of Italy. The Settarj in the various states seem to have co-operated to some extent, and were certainly

in close touch; hence, a successful revolution in any other Italian state would inevitably have serious repercussions in Lombardy-Venetia as well. Particularly worrisome to Austria was the situation in the northern Papal States, in 1814-1816 the most turbulent area in Italy; the waters of the Po would present no barrier to the spread of the revolutionary movement north into Lombardy. Suitable reforms could, by ending the sources of discontent, eliminate the basis for popular support of the movement. Until such reforms could have their effect, however, and even thereafter in so far as a few fanatics were concerned, efficient supervision and repression would continue to be necessary.

Aware that a peninsula-wide movement could best be fought by peninsula-wide measures, and with little faith in the ability of the Italian governments to suppress the revolutionary movement, Metternich would have liked to acquire for Austria the direction of all police activity against the Settarj throughout Italy. At the Congress of Vienna he had accordingly suggested to Consalvi the establishment of a General Commission of Police under Austrian direction. All information gathered by the various

125 Petrocchi 1943, 64-66.
126 A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 10 October 1815.
127 A.V., R242, Consalvi to Pacca, 8 September 1814, 1 February, 11 February 1815; Pacca to Consalvi, 13 November, 1814. This project was later revived by Metternich at the Congress of Verona in 1822; see below, Chapter V.
Italian states would be sent to this Commission for evaluation and correlation, and used as a basis for introducing greater co-ordination of the police activity of the various Italian states; the aim was a general and systematic attack on the Settarj throughout Italy. Consalvi was as eager as Metternich to suppress the Settarj and was willing to use all reasonable means to do so. However, he rejected the Commission, for its establishment would mean, in effect, giving Austria control over all police activity in the Peninsula, thus vastly increasing Austrian influence and weakening the independence of the lesser states. In short, it would be a major step towards that Austrian hegemony in Italy that the Cardinal so dreaded.\textsuperscript{128} In the face of Consalvi's opposition Metternich abandoned the Commission, but only until the revolutionary crisis of 1820-1822 seemed to present a more favorable opportunity.

Consalvi was by no means opposed to all co-operation with Austria against the Settarj. He fully realized that they posed a serious threat to the very existence of the Papal government. Acutely aware of the strength of the Sects in the Papal State, acutely aware too of the weakness of the Papal government in the event of a widespread revolt, he saw that some degree of co-operation with Austria was necessary. He was quite willing to

\textsuperscript{128} Ibid., Observations on the Project of a Police Commission, 1822; Instructions for Spina, October 1822; Consalvi to Macchi, 2 December 1822. For a more detailed description of Consalvi's motives for opposing the Commission, see below, Chapter V, Sections 1 and 2.
agree to co-operation on a more limited scale than the Commission, that would not threaten Papal independence, such as a reciprocal exchange of information and a voluntary co-ordination of Austrian and Papal police activities. Co-operation of this type, he believed, would have all the desirable effects of the Commission without its dangers. 129 This attitude was the natural outgrowth of his general policy of co-operating with Austria in every way that did not affect the temporal or spiritual independence of the Papacy.

Although there had previously been some limited exchange of information between Austria and the Papacy, it was not until 1816 that such exchange became standard procedure. It is uncertain who took the initiative, but the credit probably goes to Metternich, who wrote to Consalvi on this subject in April, 1816. After stressing as usual the identity of Austrian and Papal interests and the need for unity between them, he went on to praise the reorganization and reform of the Papal police which Consalvi was then carrying out as most essential in view of the forces working to overthrow both Austria and the Papacy. Since Austrian and Papal interests "cannot be divergent" on this point, Metternich declared that he was counting upon a mutual exchange of confidential information on this subject. 130

---

129 R242, Observations on the Project of a Police Commission, 1822; Instructions for Spina, 1822; Consalvi to Spina, 4 December 1822.
130 Van Duerm, 124, Metternich to Consalvi, 23 April 1816.
Consalvi was willing to agree to such an exchange, which would be mutually profitable, and in April, 1816, he sent Lebzeltern the most recent material uncovered by the Papal police: an intercepted letter from Forlì and an account of the latest Settarj plans there. However, still held back by distrust of Austria, he did not provide the Austrian ambassador with full details of these activities, in particular the names of those involved. Lebzeltern did not delay expressing his dissatisfaction. While thanking Consalvi for the information provided, he expressed great regret that the Cardinal, by withholding the most important part of the material without which the rest was of little value, had failed to show complete confidence in Austria. "What could be the cause of this reticence? I cannot admit the least divergence of views or interests on a point of this nature. In watching over police suspects we are working as much for you as for ourselves. We have more ways than you to become acquainted with these things. . . ." If fully informed by Consalvi, the Austrian government could follow up these leads and with its greater resources obtain a much more thorough knowledge of the subversive activities, which would benefit the Papal government as well as the Austrian. Lebzeltern concluded by again expressing his sorrow at Consalvi's unjustified distrust and his hope that in the future the Cardinal would see fit to transmit complete information. 131

131 A.V., R260, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 4 May 1816.
Evidently, Consalvi was impressed by Lebzeltern's complaint and was careful henceforth to transmit full information; at least, no more complaints were heard on this score. In June he wrote Metternich that he had been giving Lebzeltern much useful information on the activities of the "ill-intentioned." He described with alarm the activities and aims of the Settarj. In view of their rapid growth and the fact that they were clearly working on a peninsula-wide basis to overthrow all existing governments, it was necessary, he agreed, that Austria and the Papacy unite to thwart their plots. Soon afterwards Consalvi, perhaps to impress Metternich with his desire for co-operation, made a point of sending direct to him the most recent information on Settarj activity in Bologna, although it had already been transmitted to the Austrian police by the Bologna police.

These measures, indicating Consalvi's genuine desire to co-operate, did not fail to win Austrian approbation. At the beginning of July Lebzeltern conveyed to Consalvi the gratitude of Metternich (who could not write because of an eye ailment) for the confidence he had displayed in transmitting this information. Austria on its part would respond with equal confidence in this and all else, and would do everything possible to aid the Pope to maintain the tranquility of his territories. Austria was eager to see peace and order reign in the Papal State, not

132 Van Duerm, 136, Consalvi to Metternich, 11 June 1816.
133 Ibid., 143, Consalvi to Metternich, 22 June 1816.
only because of the filial devotion of Francis I for the Pope, but also in its own interest, for the Austrian territories in Italy could only be tranquil if the neighboring states were also tranquil.134

A few days later Metternich (having recovered from his illness) wrote that he attached an "infinite value" to the confidential information which Consalvi had been sending him; it would be promptly followed up by the Imperial government. In return, orders had been given to the Austrian authorities in Italy to pay particular attention to everything that could be of interest to the Papal government and to keep the latter informed of all such discoveries. Metternich expressed great satisfaction of Consalvi's display of confidence, not only because of its immediate advantages, but because it was a major step towards the establishment of that perfect accord between Austria and the Papacy which he so desired. He concluded by assuring Consalvi that the Papacy could count on Austrian aid and co-operation whenever necessary: "We are convinced that if our own tranquility is to be assured, that of our neighbors must be equally so."135

Metternich drove home the same point a week later in a letter to Apponyi which the latter was to read to Consalvi: the

134 AV, R260, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 1 July 1816.
135 Ibid., Metternich to Consalvi, 3 July 1816.
Austrian police would keep him informed of all discoveries concerning the Settarj, in gratitude for Consalvi's co-operation and in recognition that tranquillity in the Papal State was essential for the peace of Lombardy-Venetia.\footnote{135}

In addition to securing an exchange of information with the Papal government, Metternich also tried at times to influence its policy towards the Settarj to bring it into closer line with that of Austria. He has been accused of seeking to force Consalvi to adopt harsher measures towards the Sects,\footnote{137} but this accusation, though not entirely without foundation, pertains largely to the period after 1820. Before the Neapolitan Revolution of that year, he considered the Italian revolutionaries less dangerous than the German, and hence less harsh measures were necessary against them.\footnote{138} The policy which he advised Consalvi to follow towards Sects before 1820 was essentially one of watchful waiting: the Cardinal should maintain a close supervision over them with "the aim of... coming to a perfect knowledge" of their organization, plans, and personnel. This knowledge should be communicated to the Austrian government, which would decide when the time had come to act against the movement as a whole. Until that time,

\footnote{136}Ibid., Apponyi to Consalvi, 8 August 1816, with extract from dispatch of Metternich to Apponyi, 8 July 1816.
\footnote{137}E.G., by Cassi, 188.
\footnote{138}W. Maturi, "La politica estera napolitana dal 1815 al 1820," Rivista Storica Italiana, 1939, 260, Ludolf to Circello, August, 1819, Metternich, III, 255, 7 May 1819.
there must be no "prematurely rigorous action" which would only drive the Settarj into greater secrecy.¹³⁹

Thus, Metternich did not condemn Consalvi's treatment of the Settarj as too lenient or urge a more severe policy against them. On the contrary, when informed that the Secretary of State was planning to exile all suspected Settarj from Rome, he strongly advised against the plan as too rigorous.¹⁴⁰

Nor would Consalvi have needed pressure from Metternich to act with severity against the Settarj. Although his best hope for creating stability and order in the Papal State lay in his reforms, he knew they would not win over the more fanatical revolutionaries: "the way of thinking of these Settarj will not be changed by means of leniency, indulgence, and pardon; only the fear of punishment can affect them."¹⁴¹ He therefore consistently directed his subordinates to take firm action against them.¹⁴²

However, there was to be no persecution or injustice, no

¹³⁹ A.V., R260, Extract from Metternich's dispatch to Apponyi, 8 July 1816, in Apponyi to Consalvi, 8 August 1816.
¹⁴⁰ Ibid. Metternich had been misinformed on this point. In fact, Consalvi had planned to expel from Rome only three or four of the most prominent foreign agitators. There was no intention of a general expulsion. Van Duerm, 151-160, Consalvi to Metternich, 23 August 1816.
¹⁴¹ A.V., R165, Consalvi to the Legate of Forli, 13 March 1821.
¹⁴² Ibid., Consalvi to the Legate of Bologna, 3 July 1816; to the Delegate of Perugia, 31 July 1820; to the Legate of Forli, 16 July 1820, 8 July 1821; to the Legate of Ferrara, 5 July 1820; and numerous other dispatches to these and other subordinates throughout R165.
"witch-hunt". Action was to be taken only against those who were actually plotting against the government, not those who merely held liberal ideas, nor was anyone to be prosecuted upon mere suspicion, but only after "prova incontestabile" of his guilt had been furnished. Consalvi did not hesitate to administer crushing rebukes to subordinates whose zeal led them beyond the boundaries of strict legality and moderation.

Metternich seems to have been satisfied with Consalvi's treatment of the Settarj in 1815-1819. It was only after the 1820 revolutions had greatly increased his fears of the Italian revolutionaries that he began to complain of Papal laxity and inefficiency in pursuing the Settarj and to use diplomatic pressure to persuade Consalvi to take stronger measures against them. Even then, Metternich did not criticize Consalvi himself, whose sound policies he continued to praise, but the laxity and incompetence of his subordinates.

Close co-operation with Austria in the form of reciprocal

143 Ibid., Consalvi to Legate of Forli, 15 July 1820, 13 March 1821; to Delegate of Perugia, 31 July 1820; to Legate of Bologna, 28 June 1820; to Governor of Rome, 17 July 1820.

144 E.g., Ibid., Consalvi to the Legate of Ferrara, 5 July 1821; Consalvi to the Legate of Forli, 13 March 1821. S. Gualtero, Gli ultimi rivolgimenti italiani (5 vols.; Florence 1852), I, 285-287.

145 A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 10 March, 30 June, 10 July 1821.

146 Ibid., Leardi to Consalvi, 10 March 1821.
exchange of information continued for the rest of Consalvi's ministry until at least 1822. Routine information was exchanged between the Papal and the Austrian police, while more important items were sent to the Austrian ambassador in Rome, to the Governor of Lombardy-Venetia, or direct to Metternich. Apparently, Consalvi tried sincerely to co-operate with Austria on this point, as he claimed; there is no evidence that he attempted to hold back information. He was even willing to oblige Metternich by having the Papal police conduct special investigations of particular persons or groups whose activities had aroused Austrian suspicions.

Consalvi's efficient and reliable co-operation against the Settarj greatly increased Austrian confidence in him and his regime. After observing Consalvi's cooperation in this way for nearly a year, Apponyi felt justified in praising highly his "activity and solicitude," and in reporting to Metternich that

---

147 A.V., R242, Consalvi to Bernetti, September 1822; Bernetti to Consalvi, 14 September 1822; Consalvi to Spina, 16 November 1822.


149 Van Duerm, 151-160. A.V., Consalvi to Spina, 16 November 1822.

"I think I can be sure that everything discovered about the secret societies will be communicated to us with loyalty and frankness, and on this point we on our side cannot use too much confidence vis-à-vis the Court of Rome, and must unite all our efforts to arrive at our common end, the tranquility and solid happiness of Italy."\textsuperscript{151}

This steady flow of reliable information was of considerable value to Austria, and Metternich's desire to prevent any interruption of it was no doubt an important factor influencing him to remain on good terms with Consalvi even after serious religious and political disputes had begun to appear. Equally important, Consalvi's obvious efficiency and good faith in co-operating against the revolutionaries could not but increase Metternich's already high regard for the Cardinal and his confidence in him. Austro-Papal co-operation against the Settarj was, and long remained, even during the troubled period after 1817, a major force making for good Austro-Papal relations.

\textsuperscript{151} Van Duerm, 175, Apponyi to Metternich, 18 March 1817.
5. The Project of an Imperial Visit to Rome

While the foundations of an informal Austro-Papal alliance were being laid by co-operation against the Settarj and the Zelanti, plans were already under way for a much-anticipated event that was to set the seal upon Austro-Papal unity: the visit of Francis I and Metternich to Rome as guests of Pius VII.

The Emperor had first expressed his desire to visit the Pope soon after the conclusion of peace in 1814. At the Congress of Vienna he had told Consalvi that he hoped to visit Rome in 1815, but the unexpected prolongation of the Congress made this impossible. After some semblance of normal conditions had returned in the summer of 1815, Francis I once again began to speak with increasing frequency of his wish to visit the Pope, and at the beginning of October Severoli was assured that the visit would definitely take place.\(^{152}\)

This news delighted Severoli, as it did Consalvi and Pius VII, for it promised great benefits. The meeting of the two sovereigns and their consequent personal acquaintance would in itself be of great value in promoting mutual understanding and respect. At the same time, the visit would allow the two rulers

---

\(^{152}\) A.V., R242, Consalvi to Pacca, 17 September 1814. ANV 233, Severoli to Pacca, 20 July 1814; Severoli to Consalvi, 9 August, 12 August, 19 August, 16 September, 7 October 1815.
to discuss Austro-Papal problems in person. Consalvi knew that there was a powerful faction at the Austrian court hostile to the Papacy, which was seeking with considerable success to influence the Emperor against the Papacy and to stir up strife with the latter by distorting its policies and actions. If the influence of this faction could be removed, if Francis I could come to Rome and discuss matters with Pius VII in personal conversation rather than through hostile intermediaries, it seemed reasonable to hope that he would see the essential justice of the Papal position and would therefore adopt a more favorable attitude towards it. Finally, the visit would serve to demonstrate to all the world the harmony and good will that reigned between Pope and Emperor, thus discouraging the "visions of many ill-intentioned minds," that is, the Settarj who hoped for disunion among their enemies.\footnote{153}

The Josephist party in Vienna was equally aware of these advantages, however, and exerted all its influence to prevent the visit. In consequence, by December "all Vienna is full of rumours that Their Majesties will not go beyond Florence."\footnote{154} A few days later Severoli reported that "the trip to Rome is still uncertain. . . ." for the Josephist ministers were making a "supreme effort . . . to persuade the Monarch not to follow his

\footnote{153} A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 7 October 1815.

\footnote{154} Ibid., Severoli to Consalvi, 2 December 1815. At this time (November 1815—February 1816) Francis I was making a tour of inspection of his Italian territories.
original ideas." Exaggerated rumours of disorder and unrest in the Papal States were being spread with the obvious intent of discouraging the trip.\textsuperscript{155} At the end of December Severoli learned that all the ministers except Metternich and Hudelstlist had decided to make an open formal appeal to Francis I to return from Italy without visiting Rome: "the reason given is the needs of the State; that which is not given, is fear of the discussions between the Holy Father and H.I.M. I have spoken with the principali ministers and am convinced that they have done and are doing. . . everything to prevent the trip. . ."\textsuperscript{156}

Metternich strongly supported the trip, which would do much to promote the Austro-Papal co-operation he ardently desired, but he was encountering great opposition, as he explained to Lebzelter:

This project of the visit is strongly contested by those immediately surrounding H.M. . . . There are those who believe, despite all that one can tell them, that Our good Master will be forced to pass at least one or two nights bareheaded, barefoot, and without his shirt in the courtyard of the Quirinale, as was the Emperor Henry IV of unhappy memory. When I pointed out to our learned friend Urbner that times have changed and the circumstances are very different, he answered in a professorial tone that this was not certain. . . . This affair, which I consider of great importance, will only be definitely decided at Florence. . . which will be visited in February.

The only obstacle that Metternich would admit as genuine was the

\textsuperscript{155} Ibid., Severoli to Consalvi, 6 December 1815.
\textsuperscript{156} Ibid., Severoli to Consalvi, 27 December 1815.
possibility that Francis I might be compelled by the current administrative reorganization of Lombardy-Venetia to spend too much time there. In any case, he himself would definitely go to Rome even if his "August Master" did not.\textsuperscript{157}

Consalvi, who knew well the strength of the Josephist party in Vienna, was alarmed by Severoli's reports. On 1 January 1816 he wrote to Metternich stressing the great desire of Pius VII to meet Francis I and his own eagerness to talk with Metternich again.\textsuperscript{158} The Austrian reply of 7 January 1816 was not encouraging: the Emperor greatly desired to visit Rome, but would not be able to decide if he could do so until he had arrived in Florence. Consalvi responded by again expressing the Pope's eagerness to meet the Emperor and by stressing the unfortunate effects if the visit did not take place. The Papal government had already gone to great expense to prepare a suitable welcome for Francis I, despite its impoverished State, and it would be most unfortunate if all of this outlay went for nothing. More important, as public opinion expected the visit, its cancellation would be a great humiliation for the Pope and would no doubt encourage the mutual enemies of both Pope and Emperor, as well as starting rumours of a rift between them.\textsuperscript{159}

\textsuperscript{157} Lebzeltern, 343-344, Metternich to Lebzeltern, 6 January 1816. The author has been unable to identify the "Urbner" mentioned in the letter.

\textsuperscript{158} Van Duerm, 103, Consalvi to Metternich.

\textsuperscript{159} Ibid., 106, Consalvi to Metternich, 16 January 1816. The author was unable to find a copy of Metternich's reply of 7 January.
But the balance had already tipped against the Imperial visit, and the circumstances which Metternich had feared previously had materialized. On 16 February 1816 he regretfully wrote Consalvi that the administrative organization would compel the Emperor to prolong his stay in Lombardy-Venetia on the one hand, and on the other to hasten his return to Germany. He would not even have time to visit Florence, much less Rome.160

The explanation given by Metternich was essentially true. Although the Josepist party had brought great pressure to bear, this would not in itself have sufficed had it not been reinforced by this more solid motive which convinced even Metternich that the trip was impossible.161

Consalvi was greatly disappointed by the abandonment of the visit, which, as he had expected, at once gave rise to rumours of an Austro-Papal quarrel,162 but he still had two consolations: Francis I had expressed his determination to visit Rome at some time in the near future, and Metternich was still expected to come in 1816. This last was especially important for Consalvi, for whom a personal discussion with Metternich of Austro-Papal problems was one of the chief attractions of the visit.

Within a short time, however, doubt was thrown on

---

160 Ibid., 114, Metternich to Consalvi, 16 February 1816.

161 Metternich gave this as the true explanation in his confidential dispatch of 14 February 1816 to Lebzeltern: Lebzeltern, 345.

162 A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 25 March 1816.
Metternich's coming. His subordinates opposed the trip, complicated negotiations with Bavaria might require him to remain in Vienna, and, most important, he was afflicted with a serious eye disease. In the end it was the last which made it impossible for Metternich to come to Rome; the trip was definitely cancelled in June.\footnote{163}

Once again, Consalvi was disappointed but not discouraged. The Emperor still spoke of coming soon, while Metternich expressed his determination to come to Rome in the spring or summer of 1817.\footnote{164}

As 1817 began, the prospects for Austro-Papal unity and co-operation seemed bright. The problems growing out of the Austrian occupation had been solved in a reasonably satisfactory manner, mutually beneficial co-operation against the Settarj was in progress, and while Metternich was pleased by Consalvi's reforms, the Secretary of the State was duly grateful for his support in achieving them. The coming meeting at Rome of the Pope and the Emperor, and of Consalvi and Metternich, would no doubt settle any problems that still existed and would set the keystone in the arch of Austro-Papal unity for all the world to see.

\footnotetext{163}{A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 25 March, 2 April, 10 April 1816. Van Duerm, 119, Metternich to Consalvi, 12 March, 23 April 1816; 124, Metternich to Consalvi, 7 June 1816.}

\footnotetext{164}{ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 8 January, 5 February, 7 February 1817.}
But storm clouds were building up on the horizon. Within the next three years the foundations of Austro-Papal co-operation were to be perilously weakened, and when the long-anticipated visit of Francis I at last took place, it was not as the keystone of Austro-Papal unity, but as a mere outward show, an attempt to smooth over the gaping rents that had appeared and to present to the world a semblance of unity and good will that no longer corresponded to reality.
CHAPTER III

RELIGIOUS AND FINANCIAL DISPUTES, 1817-1820

1. The Religious Controversy

By 1817 Consalvi and Metternich had made considerable progress towards their aim of close Austro-Papal co-operation. Before 1817 had ended, however, that progress had been halted and indeed reversed by the revival of the religious controversy between Austria and the Papacy. The tensions arising from this controversy were to bring the two states perilously close to an open break, and though a settlement was at length worked out, a legacy of bitterness and distrust remained to blight Austro-Papal relations for the rest of Consalvi's ministry.

The religious controversies of the Cardinal's second ministry were only the latest outbreak of a long and bitter struggle between Austria and the Papacy, with control of the Church in the Hapsburg Empire as the issue.

In this struggle the Papacy was defending its traditional claim to a divinely-conferred supreme authority over the entire Catholic Church, in Austria as elsewhere. Since 1780, however, this Papal claim had been strongly and successfully challenged by the Austrian government. Upon his accession in that year,
the Emperor Joseph II (1780-1790) began the introduction of the religious policy which under the name of "Josephinism" was to be dominant in the Hapsburg states for seventy years. The ultimate aim of Josephinism was to create an Austrian state church in which all real authority was in the hands of the secular power; the Papal authority would be formally restricted to doctrinal matters, and even there would be largely nominal. The Church, reduced in effect to the level of a department of state, would be used by the government as seemed best to promote the power of the state and the general welfare.¹

This policy was quickly realized under Joseph and his successors. All direct links between the Papacy and the Austrian church were cut. The Church in the Hapsburg territories was put under the close control and supervision of an Ecclesiastical Court Commission appointed by the Emperor and inspired by Josephist principles. All Papal attempts to "interfere" in ecclesiastical affairs were firmly repulsed and any sign of independence or pro-Papal sentiment among the clergy rigorously repressed. The selection of the clergy, the administration of ecclesiastical property, and the organization and discipline of the Church were all put in the hands of the government, which regulated them down to the most petty details. Education was

¹ On the origin and development of Josephinism, see Maass, I-IV. Shorter accounts can be found in Josef Wodka, Kirche in Oesterreich (Vienna, 1959, Chapter X. Fritz Valjavec, Der Josephinismus: zur geistigen Entwicklung Oesterreichs im achzehnten und neunzehnten Jahrhundert (Vienna, 1945) studies the theoretical aspects of Josephinism.
closely controlled and great pains were taken to instill Josephist principles, especially in the seminaries.

The Papacy did not accept with passive resignation this challenge to its authority, and the reign of Joseph II was filled with religious controversy. But once again, as so often during the Enlightenment, the Papacy proved too weak to resist the secular power effectively. In the end, the Papacy had to accept Imperial control of the Austrian church, if not de jure, at least de facto.

Nor did Josephinism die with its originator, Leopold II (1790-1792) continued the Josephist tradition, while the reign of Francis I (1792-1836) was the apogee of the Austrian state-church. Francis, though devoutly religious, had been educated in Josephist principles and was determined to defend what he considered his sovereign rights over the Church. "Most jealous of his authority" in religious affairs, he "never has the slightest doubt about following and defending the Josephist system." Moreover, should his own determination ever waver, he was surrounded by Josephist advisers whose influence was constantly exerted to defend state control of the Church.

This, then, was the situation with which Consalvi had to deal. During his first ministry (1800-1806) he was several times embroiled with the Austrian court, most notably over Imperial attempts to deprive the Papal nuncio at Vienna of the last

---

A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 15 July 1815.
remnants of his ecclesiastical jurisdiction in the Empire and to reorganize various dioceses on Imperial authority alone. In the first of these disputes a combination of firmness and conciliation won the day for Consalvi, but he could not alter the fixed determination of Francis I to carry through the second.\(^3\)

The steady consolidation of Imperial authority over the Austrian church did not cease while Consalvi was out of office (1806-1814) and the Papacy was in conflict with Napoleon. By the opening of the Restoration era, the church in the Empire had been reduced to a "stato servile," completely dependent upon the state, virtually independent of the Papacy.\(^4\) The consequences for the church and the religious life of the people were most pernicious. The reports of the Vienna nuncio paint a gloomy picture of religious conditions in Austria. "The clergy present a truly horrible aspect," Consalvi was told. Uncontrolled by Papal authority and with the disciplinary power of their own bishops constantly hampered by state interference, educated in seminaries where more stress was laid on political reliability and anti-Papal sentiments than upon piety or religious zeal, demoralized by the prevailing atmosphere in which the whole emphasis was on the use of the Church for the good of the State and "all ecclesiastics are considered as agents and employes of the State," the clergy had suffered a disastrous decline in

\(^4\) A.V., ANV 246, Leardi to Consalvi, 29 August 1817.
numbers, quality, and prestige. They were "scarsissimo," quite insufficient to meet the religious needs of the people. Their level of morality, zeal, and learning was often deplorably low. Such clergy could not strengthen the religious devotion of the people or command their respect. Popular respect for the clergy, the Church, and religion in general declined, while, the nuncio warned, immorality, irreligion, and revolutionary principles were spreading rapidly. 5

In 1814 there had been some hope, inspired by Francis's benevolent attitude towards Pius VII after his release from captivity, that the Emperor might be prepared to depart from his Josephist policies, but such hopes were quickly dashed. Soon after Pius's return to Rome, Severoli wrote in disgust that "we here in Vienna are still as ever in the old system, and very far from expecting change; we will instead see consolidated in our midst the old abuses." Moreover, "there is no doubt that in Lombardy and in the newly-conquered territories they are thinking of reviving or establishing the laws of the Emperor Joseph II." 6

Here was the first warning of an Imperial policy which if pursued would make conflict with the Papacy inevitable: the

5 Such pessimistic descriptions of religious conditions in the Empire are very frequent in the correspondence of the Vienna nuncios during the Restoration. See, e.g., ANV 246, Leardi to Consalvi, 29 August 1817 (from which the above quotations are taken), 28 December 1817. ANV 233, Severoli to Pacca, 29 August, 19 November 1814.

6 A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Pacca, 29 August 1814.
extension of Josephinism to the newly-acquired territories. Most of the religious controversies of Consalvi's second ministry were to stem from this policy. To see Josephist principles still enthroned in the traditional Hapsburg territories was sufficiently unpleasant to the Papacy; to see those principles introduced into new areas, above all into Italy the very home of the Papacy, was not to be endured. In Italy the Pope had a special interest and exercised a special authority, for there he ruled not only as Head of the Universal Church, but also and in a more immediate sense as Primate of Italy. As the perceptive Lebzeltern warned Metternich, "All innovations made in religious affairs in Italy touch the Pope at his most sensitive spot. It is, so to speak, his exclusive domain, and he draws greater advantage perhaps from his title of Primate of Italy than from his others as Head of the Universal Church and Patriarch of the West." The Pope would tolerate many things in ultramontane lands that he would not accept in Italy "where he feels he rightfully exercises a more immediate jurisdiction." Lebzeltern therefore advised against the attempt to extend Josephinism into Italy, for it would certainly lead to conflict with the Papacy.

Lebzeltern's advice, though ignored by Vienna, was sound. The Imperial policy did collide with a firm Papal determination to resist further Imperial encroachments upon its own authority and the freedom of the Church, especially in Italy. This

Maass, IV, 512, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 4 April 1816.
collision was the immediate cause of the religious disputes that marked the Restoration era.

At the same time, however, the Papacy never forgot the evil consequences that Josephinism had already had in the traditional Hapsburg territories for both the authority of the Pope and the religious life of the people, and it never ceased to desire the overthrow of Josephinism in the Austrian Empire as a whole. This Papal desire was a constant undercurrent in its quarrels with Austria, an undercurrent which at times came to the surface. In the last analysis, there could be no permanent peace or lasting agreement between the Papacy and Austria while Josephinism ruled at Vienna, for the Papacy could never cease its efforts to regain its lost authority. Yet good relations between the two powers could be preserved and close co-operation in the political field attained, as the situation in 1815-1817 demonstrated, provided Austria respected the status quo. It was the failure of Austria to do so that precipitated the religious controversy with Rome.

There was little dissent in the Roman Curia as to the desirability of checking the expansion of Josephinism into Italy and of working to weaken it in Austria; but there was no such general agreement as to the best way in which to pursue these aims. Once again, as in regard to political reform, religious policy found Consalvi and the Zelanti on opposing sides.

To the Zelanti, the situation was simple. The Austrian
state-church was an affront to the divinely-conferred authority of the Pope and had had disastrous effects upon religious life in Austria; it must therefore be abolished as quickly as possible. There must be no further compromise with Vienna, which would only encourage Austrian pretensions. Instead, the time had come, with the post-war revival of religious fervour, to take the offensive against Josephinism. The attempt to extend the Austrian religious system must be utterly opposed; only if the Emperor first showed his good faith by the "prompt and sincere revocation. . . of all laws contrary. . . to the principles, maxims, and laws of the Catholic Church" could any concession be made on this point. 

Nor should Josephinism be tolerated in the rest of the Empire. Instead, it should be attacked directly, in particular by the publication of a Bull publicly condemning the Austrian ecclesiastical laws. 

Consalvi was in agreement with the basic aims of the Zelanti. He shared their devotion to the theory of Papal supreme authority and their wish to make this theory a reality. He too was horrified by the condition of the Austrian church, which he considered "a hundred thousand times worse than in France in the worst of times." As early as 1805, the Austrian ambassador in

8 A.V., R260, Obbligo de' Nominati, 1817.
9 Such a Bull was actually drawn up in 1819 by the Zelanti and received Papal approval; only the opposition of Consalvi prevented its publication. Maass, V, 173, Genotte to Metternich, 5 February 1820.
10 R242, Consalvi to Pacca, 8 September 1814.
Rome had warned his government that Consalvi wished to revive the Papal authority in its fullest extent; but he added that the Cardinal would proceed with caution, for he perceived the dangers of such a policy.\textsuperscript{11} This last phase offers the key to Consalvi's attitude, the crucial point on which he differed from the Zelanti. The Papacy, he saw, was still too weak, Austria too strong, for a direct assault on the state-church to have any hope of success. In all probability such an attack, far from intimidating the Emperor, would only provoke an open break, perhaps even the schism at which Austria occasionally hinted.\textsuperscript{12} It would also surely end Austro-Papel co-operation and deprive the Papacy of those important benefits which it could derive from Austrian good will.

Therefore, in dealing with Austria Consalvi preferred to adopt a policy of moderation which combined firmness on essential points with a conciliatory attitude on non-essentials. When the basic rights and authority of the Pope were involved, he could be adamant in refusing to yield. On less important points he adopted a flexible policy, defending Papal rights or seeking to extend Papal authority if it seemed possible without undue risk, but also willing to yield on specific points if it seemed for the general good of the Church, or if reciprocal concessions

\textsuperscript{11} Van Duerm, 35, Count Khevenhueler to Colloredo-Mannsfeld, 26 January 1805.

\textsuperscript{12} E.G., A.V., ANV243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817. R260, Quesito da esaminarsi, 1817.
could be obtained. "Sacrificing interests at times considerable but always unessential, he succeeded in saving that which was substantial and essential for the Church and the Curia." 13

Consalvi was encouraged in his policy of moderation by the appearance of one ray of flickering light amid the prevailing Austrian gloom: the adoption by Metternich of a conciliatory religious policy towards the Papacy. Metternich was unimpressed by either the theoretical arguments for Josephinism or its alleged practical advantages. He believed in principle that "to exalt the civil authority over that of the Church is no less an abuse than it would be to exalt the ecclesiastical authority over the civil." 14 In the practical field, he saw that Josephinism had weakened religion in Austria at a time when it was vitally necessary to resist the spread of revolutionary principles. Most important, the Foreign Minister opposed Josephinism as contrary to the political interests of the Empire: the Austro-Papal co-operation that he considered so valuable could hardly be maintained if the Papacy was to be constantly

13 Petrocoschi 1943, 43. This judgment delivered on the Cardinal's religious policy as a whole is equally relevant to his dealings with Austria. See also the similar opinion of Ranke: "Cardinal Consalvi und seine Staatsverwaltung unter dem Pontificat Pius VII," Historisch-biographische Studien. Sammtliche Werke, XL (Leipzig, 1877).

14 A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 22 February 1818.
antagonized by Josephist encroachments. 15

In 1814, therefore, Metternich began to advocate the adoption of a more moderate religious policy, with the aim of conciliating the Papacy by lessening government control of the Austrian church and halting the expansion of Josephinism. The Prince felt obliged to proceed with great caution. Josephist principles prevailed everywhere in the government; Metternich's later claim that in his opposition to Josephinism he had been "seul sur le terrain de la verite" in government circles was no great exaggeration. 16 Any attempt to modify religious policy was certain to arouse the strong and virtually unanimous opposition of the bureaucracy. More serious still, unless Metternich proceeded very cautiously, his opposition to Josephinism might cost him the support of the Emperor, who was still firmly attached to the principles in which he had been educated. He was therefore careful never to condemn Josephinism too bluntly or to advocate the complete abolition of the state-church system, for to do so would anger Francis I. He confined himself instead to seeking to halt the further expansion of Josephinism and to moderate its rigors in Austria. On the basis of this limited policy, if put into effect, Metternich could have reached a modus vivendi in religious affairs with Consalvi, whose immediate aims

15 For Metternich's opposition to Josephinism and his attempts to moderate Austrian religious policy, see Maass, IV, 98-120. Metternich, III, 5-7. Srbik, I, 523-524.
16 Metternich, III, 5-7, Note.
would have been met thereby.

Unfortunately, even the moderate aims of Metternich aroused strong opposition from the bureaucracy, and he could never secure the full Imperial support necessary to override it. His achievements in moderating Austrian religious policy therefore fell far short of what he wished and of what would have been necessary to satisfy the Papacy.

At the outset, however, the Prince was successful in moderating Austrian religious policy on several occasions, thereby arousing Consalvi's hopes that a general modification of Austrian religious policy was possible. The first such occasion came when in July, 1814, Pius VII appointed Bishop Joseph Maria Peruzzi of Chioggia to administer the vacant Patriarchate of Venice.\(^1\) Lebzeltern had previously agreed to this step, but now the Josephist President of the Ecclesiastical Court Commission, Prokop Count Lazanzky, stirred up Francis I against the appointment. Arguing that this step represented Papal encroachment on the Imperial right, inherited from the Venetian Republic, to nominate the Patriarch, he persuaded the Emperor to send a stiff protest to Severoli.\(^2\) Before Lazansky could provoke a quarrel with the Papacy, Severoli and Consalvi hastily saw Metternich. They pointed out that the temporary administration

\(^{1}\) A.V., R242, Pacca to Consalvi, 18 August 1814.

\(^{2}\) Maass, IV, 477, Lazansky to Metternich, 11 July 1814. A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Pacca, 4 September 1814, 18 January 1815.
of the Patriarchate by Peruzzi was necessary to check disorders among the Venetian clergy, that Lebzeltern had approved the Papal appointment before it was made, and that Imperial approval was not necessary in any case because the province had not yet been formally incorporated into the Austrian Empire. Metternich was won over by these arguments and was able to persuade Francis I to accept the appointment temporarily.19

Metternich was also successful in 1814 in dealing with the reorganization of the diocese of the Tyrol which Austria had recently regained. Lazansky wished to carry out this reorganization in accord with Josephist principles, without regard to Papal authority. Once again Metternich intervened. After rebuking the President for his excessive zeal, he assured the Papacy that the Imperial reorganization would be only temporary, and asked the Pope to grant his necessary approval for the final reorganization. Once again Metternich had successfully moderated Austrian policy and averted a quarrel with the Papacy.20

In 1815 Metternich had another opportunity to demonstrate his opposition to Josephist expansion. Lazansky wished to forbid the Lombard-Venetian bishops to have recourse to the Pope for marriage dispensations in the third and fourth degrees. This prohibition would have cut an important link between Rome and the

19 Maass, IV, 103-104, 489, Metternich to Francis I, 4 January 1815.
20 Ibid., IV, 102, 107. The Bull was finally issued in 1818: Bullari..., XV, 40-47, Nova diocesum distributio, 9 May 1818.
Lombard-Venetian church and aided in bringing that church under closer Josephist control. The Foreign Minister successfully opposed the plan, but he carefully avoided attacking the principles involved; instead, he merely argued that this step would antagonize the Papacy and was hence politically inexpedient. 21

Thus on these and several less important occasions the Prince was able to exercise a moderating influence on Imperial religious policy. Under the protective shelter of his moderating influence, the Austro-Papal co-operation of 1815-1817 could come into existence; lacking that protection, it would probably have been strangled at birth by the religious controversies which Josephist policies must otherwise have provoked. Furthermore, Metternich's conciliatory attitude encouraged Consalvi to continue to co-operate with Austria even when the Prince was not able to prevent the adoption of Josephist policies, for it aroused in the Cardinal the hope that Metternich might yet be able to work a general transformation of the state-church. This hope endured for several years after 1814, only gradually to be smothered under the accumulating evidence that Metternich could work no such miracle. Until 1818, Consalvi continued to express his confidence that the "spirit of conciliation which animates Prince Metternich" might yet reverse the trend of Austrian policy. 22

21 Maass, 496, Staatskanzlei to the Z. O. Hofkommission, 15 December 1815.
22 A.V., ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 14 June 1814.
Even at best, however, Metternich's campaign against Josephinism was only partially successful. He could not prevent the introduction of several measures that offended and alarmed the Papacy. Some of these measures—such as the prohibition of communication between the Vienna nuncio and the Austrian bishops, the rigid enforcement of the *regio placet* in Lombardy, and the introduction into Lombardy-Venetia of a new oath and ceremonial, very Josephist in tone, for use at the installation of bishops—were less alarming in themselves than as evidence of the general trend of Austrian policy. Three innovations, however, were such as must arouse the strongest Papal resistance: the prohibition to the Lombard-Venetian bishops of the Romreise or visit to Rome to receive Papal preconisation and approval; the Imperial claim to nominate bishops in the newly acquired territories without a formal concession from the Pope; and the introduction of the Austrian marriage laws into Lombardy-Venetia.

For centuries the nominees to Italian bishoprics, before they could assume their offices, had had the obligation to visit Rome, there to be personally examined ("preconisation"), instructed, and consecrated by the Pope. This duty was an outgrowth of the special relationships between the Italian bishops and the

---

23 ANV 233, Severoli to Pacca, 10 September 1814.
24 Maass, IV, 487, Bellegarde to the Lombard bishops, 22 November 1814.
25 A.V., ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 24 April 1817.
Pope in his capacity as Primate of Italy. In an age when most Italian bishops were nominated by secular rulers to whom they tended to be subservient, this custom had acquired a special value in that it preserved to the Papacy the influence that comes from personal contact and reminded the bishops of their special duties towards the Pope. Consalvi frankly admitted that "the Italian bishops are not in the least called to Rome to be examined or instructed, but solely to recall to them, to them and to the people, that the Holy Father is Primate of Italy "and that they therefore had special obligations towards him."26 The Popes were very tenacious of this right, as of all that pertained to their status as Primate, especially since the weakening of their authority outside Italy. As Consalvi explained, "since there only remains to the Holy See, of all its former power, hardly anything except the canonical institution of bishops throughout Christendom and this direct Primatial influence on the Italian bishops, it is necessary to preserve these two points, of which the first is reduced in most countries to little more than a simple formality."27 In view of this strong Papal determination to preserve the Romrèise, even Joseph II had not ventured to attack it, but had formally recognized this right in the Conventio amicabilis of 1784.28

26 Maass, IV, 591, Kaunitz to Metternich, 1 July 1817.
27 Ibid.
In February of 1916, Francis I was persuaded by the Ecclesiastical Court Commission to forbid the Lombard-Venetian bishops to make the Romreise. The official reasons were the great expense and inconvenience which this trip caused the bishops and the need for administrative uniformity between Lombardy-Venetia and the rest of the Empire (where the trip was not required). The real reason was Josephist fear that at Rome the bishops would come under Papal influence and would "return to their dioceses as Roman converts, hypocrites, or indifferentists, and hence as useless bishops--doing more harm than good to Church and State." The Papacy did not fail to perceive this motive: "the real reason must be the maxim of this Court... of weakening ever more... the contact of the bishops with the Supreme Head of the Church." Metternich, foreseeing strong Papal opposition, had argued forcefully but unsuccessfully against the prohibition as inexpedient and unjustified.

The second major Papal grievance also appeared in 1816: the Imperial claim to nominate bishops in the newly-acquired territories, especially the former Republics of Venice and Ragusa and the Archbishopric of Salzburg, without obtaining a special Papal concession of this privilege. The Emperor argued that he had inherited all the religious privileges, including the

29 Maass, IV, 505, Francis I to Metternich, 27 February 1816.
30 Ibid., 536, Lorenz to Francis I, 30 July 1816.
31 A.V., R260, Obbligo de' nominati, 1817.
32 Maass, IV, 506-507, Metternich to Francis I, 3 April 1816 (#137 and #138).
nomination-right, of the former rulers of those states as their legitimate successor. In May of 1816 he acted on this claim by nominating Bishop Francesco Milesi of Vigevano to the Patriarchate of Venice, followed by the nomination in July of Bishop Peruzzi of Chioggia to the Bishopric of Vicenza, and in August of the Prince-Bishop of Lavant, Leopold Count Firmian, as Archbishop of Salzburg.33

The third Imperial policy that aroused major Papal opposition was the introduction of the Austrian marriage laws into Lombardy-Venetia. Originally drawn up by Joseph II for his transalpine states, no other of his measures had so aroused the Papacy. In the opinion of the Papacy, this legislation reduced marriage from its divinely-ordained status as a sacrament of the Church to that of a mere civil contract under the authority of the State. Moreover, many of the specific provisions were contrary to canon law.34 The introduction of these laws into Italy, where the Papacy was most sensitive to religious innovations, was certain to antagonize Rome.35 All attempts to dissuade Francis I from this step failed, for he was convinced that his sovereign authority rightfully extended over matrimonial questions.36

33 A.V., R260, Consalvi to Apponyi, 2 August, 30 August 1816.
34 Ibid., Innovazioni della Corte Austriaca, 1819, summarizes the Papal objections to the marriage laws.
35 Maass, IV, 512, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 4 April 1816.
36 A.V., ANV 233, Severoli to Consalvi, 15 July 1815.
As Metternich had feared, these three measures aroused the greatest indignation in Rome, which flatly refused to accept them. Pius himself seems to have been most alarmed by the marriage laws, which he felt violated the most fundamental principles of the Church and feared would lead to a general moral decline. To secure the revocation or modification of these laws seems to have become his chief concern in the negotiations with Austria.

The Papacy did not long leave Austria in ignorance of its displeasure. In April of 1816 both the Pope and his Secretary of State spoke with Lebzeltern on this subject. The Ambassador reported that although they had refrained thus far from making an official protest, they were highly displeased by the recent religious innovations. Although the earlier innovations in Lombardy-Venetia had made "an unfortunate impression" upon the Pope, he would nonetheless have refrained from taking action against them, "from consideration for the Emperor", as long as "his sacred duties did not oblige him to do so." Unfortunately, two Austrian policies compelled his intervention: the marriage laws, whose principles "surpassed those which Napoleon had established," and the prohibition of the Romreise. To these "the Holy See could never consent," for they were "destructive of its authority and opposed, so far as the Marriage Patent was concerned, to the principles of Catholicism."

---

37 Lebzeltern, 352, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 11 June 1816.
Lebzeltern's attempt to justify the innovations as necessary for administrative uniformity was brushed aside by Consalvi: such a motive could never justify violation of the incontestable rights of the Holy See or of the principles of Catholicism. These measures, he warned the Ambassador, could destroy the "good harmony and real friendship presently uniting the two courts." 38

Lebzeltern seemed profoundly alarmed by these interviews. He wrote at once to warn Metternich that the "politically indispensable" co-operation of the Papacy was being seriously endangered by Austria's religious policy. "It is no doubt useful and advantageous to maintain our regulations; it would be dangerous to extend them." Such an extension would surely alienate the Papacy and lead to the loss of all the advantages which Austria derived from Papal co-operation. "There are some things [Lebzeltern warned in conclusion] on which the Pope can compromise, and then vigorous measures can compel him to do so; there are some inherent to his character, on which he cannot yield; finally, there are others which he can tolerate, but not approve. The measures indicated above can never obtain his consent. They will be a source of interminable disagreements without, I daresay, offering us a result sufficiently advantageous to counterbalance this." 39 The warning was to prove prophetic.

In this letter Lebzeltern was preaching to the converted, for Metternich was already alarmed by the threat to co-operation 38

Maass, IV, 512, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 4 April 1816.

Ibid.
with the Papacy. At that very moment he was attempting to
persuade the Emperor to moderate Austrian religious policy.

The occasion for this attempt was the Papal refusal to
accept the Imperial nominee to the Bishopric of Laybach. This
prelate, Monsignor Augustin Gruber, while acting as religious
adviser to the government at Milan had signed the Marriage Patent
introduced into Lombardy-Venetia. The Papacy therefore refused
to accept his nomination lest by doing so it seem to give in-
direct approval in the eyes of the Catholic world to the Imperial
marriage legislation. 40

Informed of this refusal, Metternich sought to persuade
Francis I of the desirability of adopting a more conciliatory
attitude towards the Papacy, not only in this particular case,
but as a general policy. He refuted the arguments of the
Josephists that the Papacy was seeking a quarrel and was en-
croaching on Imperial rights, pointing out that in fact the
Papacy had adopted a most conciliatory attitude and was doing
everything it could to avoid a religious dispute with Austria.
The Pope would grant any reasonable Austrian requests. Only the
introduction of inadmissible principles by Austria or tactless
Imperial diplomacy could drive the Papacy into opposition. Since
the Papacy was thus well-disposed to Austria, there was no sound
reason for raising principles which Rome could not accept and

40 Ibid., 510, Metternich to Francis I, 3 April 1816; 511
Staatskanzlei to the Z. O. Hofkommission, 3 April 1816.
which would only lead to a quarrel certain to have adverse political effects. Metternich therefore advocated the adoption of conciliatory policies which would eliminate all possible causes for conflict with the Papacy.\footnote{Ibid., 506-510, Metternich to Francis I, 3 April 1816. (# 137, 138, 139); 514, Metternich to Lazansky, 5 April 1816. Srik, I, 523-524.}

The Josephists counter-attacked vigorously, arguing that the recent innovations were entirely justified and claiming that if the Emperor stood firm the Papacy would soon yield. Francis I was persuaded by their reasoning to reject his Foreign Minister's suggestions and refuse any concession to the Papacy.\footnote{Maass, 515, Lazansky to Francis I, 11 April 1816; 519, Lazansky to Francis I, 12 April 1816; 521-522, Lorenz to Francis I, 22 April 1816.}

Contrary to Josephist expectations, the Imperial policy of firmness had not the slightest effect upon Pius or Consalvi, except to annoy them and to make it more difficult for Consalvi to resist Zelanti demands for a stronger policy towards Austria. The Cardinal was still determined to pursue his policy of moderation and there was no public Papal protest or criticism of Austria, but the Papacy gave no sign of accepting the religious innovations. On the contrary, in June the Pope again forcefully protested to Lebzeltern, especially on the marriage laws, "a point on which he feels strongly." The Pope "declaimed against the imprudent innovators" responsible for recent Austrian measures "who miscalculate the results of their plans." Only his
great respect for the piety of Francis I and his trust in the
good intentions of Metternich, Pius warned the ambassador, had
thus far restrained him from publicly condemning the marriage
patent.43

After this ominous conversation, Lebzeltern sent another
urgent warning to Metternich that a breakdown of relations with
the Papacy was possible if Austria persisted in her religious
policies. The Pope and Consalvi, he reported, were still firm
in their wish for co-operation and were willing to make reasonable
concessions, but they would not and indeed could not agree to
demands that attacked the basic rights and authority of the
Papacy and the principles of Catholicism. The Ambassador then
enumerated at length the benefits which Austria derived from
Papal good will and the grave disadvantages which would flow from
a break with the Papacy. He concluded by:

respectfully pointing out to His Majesty 1) that
the exercise of His sovereign rights is not at
all incompatible with recognizing those of the
Papacy; 2) that a perfect accord with the spiritual
power is completely in the interests of the Emperor,
and, I boldly affirm, in the rank of his first
interests.44

This warning, like so many others, had no effect upon the
Emperor.

Consalvi’s policy during 1816 was a delicate balance of
firmness and conciliation. The path he had to tread to reach a

---

43 Lebzeltern, 352, Lebzeltern to Metternich, 11 June 1816.
44 Ibid.
satisfactory settlement was narrow. On the one hand, an open break with Austria must be avoided if at all possible, hence no action likely to antagonize that power should be taken unless absolutely necessary. Consalvi must continue to display his essentially friendly attitude towards the Empire and his willingness to make reasonable concessions, thus encouraging Metternich to continue his efforts to moderate Imperial policy. At the same time, it was necessary to avoid the appearance of weakness, which would both encourage the Josephists and arouse the Zelanti. A further complicating factor was the necessity that the religious life of the people should be disturbed as little as possible by Papal resistance to Imperial demands; for example, prolonged Papal refusal to accept the Imperial nominees to Venetian bishoprics, resulting in lengthy vacancies in those sees, would have a detrimental effect upon religious conditions there. It was worth sacrificing non-essential Papal prerogatives if necessary to prevent such harm to the religious life of the people. 45

Throughout 1816 Consalvi was able to tread the narrow path between intransigence and appeasement with some success. He was able to work out settlements for various disputes which met the requirements of his position fairly well. In July a reasonably satisfactory compromise was worked out in the case of Bishop Gruber. The Papacy agreed to accept the Imperial nominee as

45

The Josephists were well aware of this weakness in the Papal position, and they argued that it would eventually force the Papacy to yield on the Austrian innovations if the Emperor persisted long enough, Maass, IV, 557, Wallis to Francis I, 30 January 1817.
Bishop of Laybach, but only on the secret condition that after assuming his office he would state his support for the orthodox Catholic doctrine on marriage in a pastoral letter.\textsuperscript{46} Also during the summer of 1816 the Papacy expressed its willingness to give formal approval to the Imperial project for a reorganization of the Venetian dioceses, but Consalvi took care to insert in the Papal reply a reaffirmation of Papal rights and a veiled criticism of Josephist policies that greatly annoyed the Josephists.\textsuperscript{47}

In August Consalvi took up the dispute over the Imperial claim to nominate to Venetian bishoprics, offering a compromise solution.\textsuperscript{48} The Imperial claim was firmly rejected, for "such privileges cannot be inherited or transmitted to a person of dynasty different from that to which it was granted." To sweeten this bitter pill, he added that the Pope was willing to grant the nomination-right to the Emperor, if the latter would request it as a special privilege. Consalvi had realized that on grounds of consistency it would have been very difficult to refuse to allow the Emperor to exercise in Venetia a privilege which was exercised by every other Italian prince and which Francis himself held in all of his other territories. If this

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{46} Maass, IV, 541, Metternich to Francis I, 4 August 1816. R247, Consalvi to Leardi, 27 April 1820.
\item \textsuperscript{47} A.V., R260, Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 1 July 1816.
\item \textsuperscript{48} The following account of the settlement proposed by Consalvi for the nomination-right is based on: A.V., R260, Consalvi to Apponyi, 2 August 1816.
\end{itemize}
power was not granted to the Emperor as a privilege, he would probably continue to exercise it as an inherent right of sovereignty, as the Josephists wished him to do in any case. All that the Papacy could do was to grant the nomination-right as a privilege and thus preserve at least the principle of Papal authority. At the same time, Consalvi insisted on the necessity of the Romreise before the Imperial nominees could be recognized by the Pope. Apparently the Cardinal hoped that by yielding on the nomination-right while insisting on the more important—and more defensible—Romreise he might persuade the Emperor to yield on the latter. This was to be the strategy he would follow during future negotiations, with ultimate success. Once again, firmness and conciliation met in the Secretary of State's policy. Consalvi's note to Apponyi in which he set forth this proposal closed with the suggestion that Papal and Austrian representatives be appointed to work out a Convention to settle Venetian affairs. The whole tone of this note is one of studied moderation and friendliness, but the underlying firmness of the Papal stand was unmistakable.

During the same month, Consalvi found another opportunity to demonstrate his friendly attitude towards Austria and Papal willingness to make concessions that did not affect its essential authority. The traditional though unofficial custom

---

49 Maass, IV, 557, Wallis to Francis I, 30 January 1817.

50 A.V., R260, Consalvi to Apponyi, 2 August 1816.
of the "promotion des couronnes" allowed each Catholic power to nominate one "crown cardinal" as a sort of unofficial representative to the Sacred College. On 3 July, Lebzeltern informed Consalvi that the Emperor wished the Pope to grant him the nomination of a second "crown cardinal." It was only just, he argued, that the Emperor as successor to the Venetian Republic should nominate its crown cardinal as well as his own. However, he was quick to add, Francis did not claim this as a right, but only asked it as a special favor for which he would be forever grateful.51

This request Consalvi was quite willing to grant, as it provided an opportunity to display the friendly attitude of the Papacy without involving any weakening of Papal authority. He therefore replied that the Pope, though denying that the Emperor had inherited any right from the Venetian Republic, would grant Francis a special mark of his regard. If the Emperor would secretly communicate to him the name of his candidate, Pius would confer the red hat upon him as his own choice. All must be done in strictest secrecy lest the other Catholic courts be profoundly irritated by this special favor; but even this, Consalvi stressed, the Pope was willing to risk in order to show his great regard for the Emperor, whose wishes he was always eager to please if at all possible.52

51 Ibid., Lebzeltern to Consalvi, 3 July 1816. Also Metternich to Consalvi, 4 July 1816.
52 Ibid., Consalvi to Metternich, 23 August 1816.
This concession had an excellent effect at Vienna.\textsuperscript{53} As Consalvi had no doubt intended, Metternich did not fail to cite it to Francis I as positive proof that the Papacy was willing to grant all reasonable Austrian requests provided the essence of the Papal position was not affected.\textsuperscript{54}

By the time this concession had been formally granted, Metternich had decided to resume his efforts to moderate the Emperor's religious policy. It was obvious by mid-summer that the Papacy could not be bullied into accepting the religious innovations, but a religious settlement was urgently needed. In late July therefore Metternich suggested to Francis I that a committee be set up to discuss the revision of Austrian religious legislation and the conclusion of a concordat with the Papacy.\textsuperscript{55}

The Josephists were up in arms at once, bitterly opposing any modification of the state-church system or any agreement with Rome.\textsuperscript{56} The Foreign Minister nonetheless persisted in his efforts,\textsuperscript{57} and for a time seemed close to success. Francis I gradually became convinced that negotiations for a settlement with the Holy See were unavoidable. He even began to consider the conclusion of a formal concordat with the Papacy. In October

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{53} Ibid., Metternich to Consalvi, 2 September 1816.
\item \textsuperscript{54} Maul, IV, 545, Metternich to Francis I, 26 August 1816.
\item \textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 534, Metternich to Francis I, 24 July 1816.
\item \textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 536, Lorenz to Francis I, 30 July 1816.
\item \textsuperscript{57} Ibid., 545, Metternich to Francis I, 26 August 1816.
\end{itemize}
of 1816 he set up a commission which was to prepare in secret all the material necessary to negotiate a concordat for Lombardy-Venetia, Istria, and Dalmatia. 58

Since this commission was composed entirely of Josephists, the outcome was predictable. When after three months their report was presented, it proved to be a forceful polemic against the very idea of a concordat. 59

The Emperor apparently accepted the reasoning of the commission and abandoned plans for a concordat. However, Metternich continued to press for some sort of agreement, the need for which was becoming increasingly pressing, as no stable organization of religious affairs in Lombardy-Venetia would be worked out in its absence. 60 At length he persuaded Francis I to authorize the opening of informal negotiations through the new ambassador to Rome, Prince Kaunitz, who was to leave for his post in June, 1817. 61 But Metternich's victory was very limited in scope. He accepted the Josephist Councillor Juestel as Kaunitz's religious adviser in the negotiations, and he had to submit his Instructions

58 Ibid., 557, Wallis to Francis I, 30 January 1817.
59 Ibid.
60 Ibid., 571, Metternich to Francis I, February 1817.
61 Prince Alois von Kaunitz-Rietberg, a grandson of Prince Anton von Kaunitz, the great minister of Maria Theresa, entered the diplomatic service at an early age and held several important posts before being sent to Rome in 1817. In 1819 he became mentally ill, suffering periods of profound depression, and was relieved from his post in 1820.
for the ambassador to Lazansky "for inspection and comment."

How limited Metternich's victory really was is clear from these Instructions to Kaunitz. Little trace can be found in them of the policies of conciliation and mutual concession that the Foreign Minister favored. The apparent purpose of the negotiations was not to work out a stable and mutually satisfactory settlement of Austro-Papal religious relations but solely to secure concessions. The most important of the desired concessions were: Imperial nomination to Venetian bishopries, abolition of the Romreise, Papal recognition of the Imperial nominee to the Archbishopric of Salzburg with the retention by that prelate of all of the special privileges of his predecessors, concession to the Lombard-Venetian bishops of the faculty of granting marriage dispensations in the third and fourth degrees, and formal Papal approval for the new diocesan organization in Lombardy-Venetia, the Tyrol, and Vorarlberg. Of these points, the greatest difficulty was anticipated, correctly, with the Romreise.

These concessions were to be obtained, not by reciprocal concessions, but by playing on the Papal fear of a break with Austria and by appealing to Papal gratitude for the restoration of the Papal States. An additional means was the possible visit

---

62 Ibid., IV, 124-125.
63 These instructions were in two parts; the first, in German, dealt with religious negotiations (Ibid., IV, 578); the second, in French, political questions (IV, 584).
of Metternich to Rome, which would take place only if the Papacy responded favorably to all the Imperial demands. In return for these major concessions, Kaunitz was authorized to offer only one minor concession, in the secular field at that: the possible withdrawal of the garrisons which the Treaty of Vienna allowed Austria to station in the Papal cities of Ferrara and Comacchio.

No religious concessions to the Papacy could be considered, and Kaunitz was to avoid if possible even discussing Austrian religious policies, especially the marriage laws. 64

Metternich was not blind to the unfavorable impression the Imperial attitude prescribed by the Instructions would make upon the Papacy. Negotiations conducted in a spirit of mutual conciliation such as he had advised could have appeased the religious controversy; but negotiations in which Austria demanded everything and offered nothing had little chance of success—indeed, they might only antagonize the Papacy still further. He warned Kaunitz that the religious negotiations could lead to further disputes that would threaten "our sincere desire to maintain with the Court of Rome the most intimate relations of confidence and friendship," but he hoped—over-optimistically, as he must have known—that Kaunitz's diplomatic ability would prevent this. Above all, he warned the ambassador, he "must never confuse [religious relations] with the political relations existing between the Emperor and the Pope as temporal sovereign of one of the first states of Italy. On this delicate nuance... hangs the

64 Ibid., 578, Instructions for Kaunitz; 583, Supplementary Instructions.
success of the negotiations.\textsuperscript{65} Metternich's over-riding concern with the political implications of the Austro-Papal religious disputes is here quite evident.

Consalvi learned with great satisfaction of the projected negotiations, which seemed to promise a settlement of the vexing religious disputes with Austria. Moreover, such a settlement, especially if in the form of a Concordat, would fit admirably into the overall pattern of Consalvi's religious diplomacy.

The chief aim of Consalvi's religious policy during his second ministry was to revive Papal authority over the semi-independent state-churches under royal control which had been set up in most countries. To attain this purpose he sought to negotiate a series of concordats with the European states by which the Papal authority, if not completely restored, was at least increased. Such concordats by 1817 had been or were being worked out with France, Bavaria, and Naples, and negotiations were in preparation for other states.\textsuperscript{66} A concordat or other agreement with Austria, the greatest Catholic power, would obviously be an essential part of Consalvi's policy, especially as it would give a good example that many other states would be inclined to follow.\textsuperscript{67}

Gradually the Secretary of State's satisfaction evaporated

\textsuperscript{65} Ibid., 584, Instructions for Kaunitz.
\textsuperscript{66} On Consalvi's concordat policies, see Schmidlin, chapters IV-VII.
\textsuperscript{67} A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 23 March 1818.
as disquieting reports began to arrive from Vienna. The news that Metternich himself would come to Rome only if the Papacy seemed disposed to accept the Austrian terms was ominous.

Further cause for alarm was the selection of Juestel as ecclesiastical adviser, for his Josephist principles were well known. Most serious of all was the rumour which the New Vienna nuncio, Paolo Cardinal Leardi, reported, that Austria planned to conduct the negotiations "not by way of principles to be discussed but by way of concessions to be demanded." Leardi added that, as usual, the "Austrian cabinet, which never wishes to retract an order once published," was unwilling to "recede from its adopted principles."

Leardi's suspicions were confirmed when Kaunitz, just before leaving for Rome, warned him that the Emperor had a very broad conception of his sovereign rights over the Church in his states, and would not enter into discussion on those alleged rights or on the principles of his religious policy. A conversation with Metternich brought no encouragement. The Prince admitted that the Papal claims, especially to the Romreise, were well founded, but he warned Leardi of the "danger of an absolute refusal" which

68 A.V., ANV 246, Leardi to Consalvi, 21 May 1817 (#1).
69 Ibid., Leardi to Consalvi, 21 May 1817 (#2). Paolo Cardinal Leardi (1761-1823) replaced Severoli in 1817 after the latter had quarrelled with Consalvi. A loyal supporter of Consalvi but inferior as a diplomat to his predecessor, he remained nuncio until his death in 1823.
70 Ibid., Leardi to Consalvi, 4 June 1817.
would alienate the Emperor and perhaps lead to the loss of
Austrian support in political and religious affairs. This would
be especially unfortunate at a moment when Francis I had at last
been persuaded to retreat so far from his Josephist principles
as to open negotiations and ask as Papal concessions what he had
formerly claimed as his rights. The Emperor's decision to
negotiate "even against the advise of his ministers" was in
itself, Metternich argued, "a great step forward." \textsuperscript{71}

Consalvi read these reports with mounting concern. From
Leardi's information it was unmistakably clear that Austria had
no intention of concluding a concordat, or even of working out
a mutually satisfactory settlement of immediate problems. There
had obviously been no basic change of policy in the Austrian
government, so that a successful conclusion of the negotiations
seemed unlikely. Friendship and co-operation between Austria and
the Papacy, he told Leardi just before Kaunitz's arrival, "would
be solidly established. ... only when there disappears from the
mind of H. M. that mistaken distrust towards the exercise of the
just and essential rights of the Holy See, as if they were
opposed to the rights of sovereignty." The Cardinal concluded
that if Austria insisted on confining the negotiations to the
concessions demanded from the Papacy, with no discussion of
principles or even of reciprocal concessions, there would be
little hope for a favourable outcome. Consalvi's "only hope" was
\textsuperscript{71}

\textit{Ibid.}, Leardi to Consalvi, 7 June 1817.
that "the spirit of conciliation which animates Prince Metternich" might yet lead to a favourable modification of the Austrian attitude. 72

The Cardinal's forebodings quickly proved justified. As early as their first conference on 16 June, it became clear to both Consalvi and Kaunitz that the negotiations were unlikely to produce a satisfactory result. 73 Consalvi was displeased to observe that Kaunitz was empowered only to request concessions, not to arrange a general settlement; but of this he had been forewarned. More disconcerting was the discovery that in return for the sizable concessions requested, Austria offered only one minor temporal advantage. He quickly informed Kaunitz that the Austrian proposals were unsatisfactory. Not Consalvi's anxiety to end the religious controversy, his eagerness to see Metternich in Rome, Kaunitz's veiled threat of the withdrawal of Austrian diplomatic support, nor even the ambassador's hints at a possible schism could induce him to accept such extensive concessions with no reciprocal compensation.

Furthermore, even had Consalvi been minded to yield, he could hardly have done so. Pius VII had been seriously ill for some weeks, and his death was generally feared. The nearness of

72 A.V., ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 14 June 1817.
73 This account of the first interview is based on: ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817, a very long and detailed account of the negotiations to that date; and Maass, IV, 586, Kaunitz to Metternich, 17 June 1817.
death intensified in Pius the scrupulosity, which often troubled him and which made him very susceptible to the influence of the Zelanti. The Pope refused to make any decisions on the negotiations with Austria except with the advice of a special congregation. This requirement was not unusual for Pius, but as the congregation was made up of Zelanti, with Pacca at their head, it could exert a hampering influence on Consalvi's conduct of the negotiations.

On the following day, 17 June, Kaunitz sent Consalvi a "Punctuation" in which—after much preliminary stress on the need for Austro-Papal unity to counteract the revolutionaries—he listed the five chief Imperial demands, as prescribed in his Instructions. Consalvi at once arranged for a meeting of the Congregation to consider these demands.

At the Zelanti-dominated congregation the Austrian requests encountered "une piene et entiere renitence," as least in so far as the Romreise and the grant of dispensation faculties were concerned. In view of this opposition, Consalvi assured Kaunitz that "there was nothing to be done in this respect with the Holy Father." All that the Cardinal could do was to hint that perhaps the Pope might be willing to grant frequent dispensations from


Copy with Kaunitz to Consalvi, 17 June 1817, R260.
the trip on an individual basis to nominees who had plausible excuses. This, Kaunitz felt, would at least diminish "the danger of contagion with ultramontane principles." 76

In his official reply of 23 June to Kaunitz's Punctuation, the Secretary of State, after first stressing his desire for "una inalterabile concordia" with Austria, declared that the Papacy wished in consequence to "eliminate all those unfortunate differences on which His sacred duties did not allow the Holy Father to remain silent." He therefore invited Austria to open formal negotiations for a religious agreement. Some at least of the Austrian demands, Consalvi implied, the Pope would certainly grant; but unfortunately his "sacred duties" prevented him from yielding on others. The special congregation would decide what concessions could be made. 77

Kaunitz transmitted Consalvi's note to Metternich, who was then in Florence. The Foreign Minister replied that "as long as the negotiation remains in this state... it is impossible for me to come to Rome." Only if there was a "moral certainty" that a satisfactory agreement would be reached could he make the visit, and only complete Papal acceptance of the Imperial demands could provide such certainty. For the sake of his own reputation both at Vienna and at Rome, Metternich would not become personally

76 Maass, IV, 589, Kaunitz to Metternich, 20 June 1817 (#2). Also, ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817.
77 A.V., R260, Consalvi to Kaunitz, 23 June 1817.
committed to negotiations that might have an unsatisfactory outcome. He wished to "tout concilier," but we was determined that if this was impossible, at least he would not have personally sanctioned an unsatisfactory arrangement. From Consalvi's reply it seemed the Papacy would reject important Austrian demands, thereby making an agreement impossible. He therefore rejected the proposal to open formal negotiations. Under these circumstances, he "could no nothing but regret" that religious problems which were not essentially his concern would interfere with Austro-Papal understanding "on other questions of the highest interest for Rome, for Vienna, and for all Europe." His only concern was "to defend the great political interests which link our states;" in religious questions he was "only a negotiator, only an intermediary," not an independent, and he would have preferred not to have been involved in such matters.

Before this reply reached Kaunitz, however, matters had taken a more hopeful turn. Consalvi had received Papal support for a compromise: the Papacy would agree to all the Austrian requests, provided "H. M. on his side does something for the Church by removing at least a few of those very serious abuses in ecclesiastical affairs which have been introduced into his states, and thus put the Holy Father in a position to justify... those concessions to which he is ready to consent only because of the advantages that would result therefrom to religion and the

Maass, IV, 590, Metternich to Kaunitz, 27 June 1817.
A special congregation would be set up to determine just what abuses should be remedied, but Consalvi felt that the most likely Papal requests would be that the Emperor "modify the marriage laws in Lombardy-Venetia to agree with the doctrines of the Church, and plan in concert with His Holiness the institutions of public instruction for the clergy." A few days later the Congregation raised the Papal terms to include, besides the two points mentioned by Consalvi, demands that free communication between the Papacy and the Lombard-Venetian bishops be allowed and that Bulls concerning dogma should not be subject to the regio placet.

In effect, the Papacy was demanding these concessions in return for renouncing the Romreise, for this had quickly become the crucial Austrian demand around which the rest of the negotiations revolved. The Austrian requests for the nomination-right in Venetia and the diocesan reorganizations would be granted by the Papacy without reciprocal concessions. The Salzburg question seems for some reason (perhaps a desire to simplify the negotiations by confining them entirely to Italy) to have disappeared from these negotiations. The request for

79 ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817.
80 Maass, IV, 591, Kaunitz to Metternich, 1 July 1817.
81 Ibid., 595, Kaunitz to Metternich, 4 July 1817. Also, ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817.
dispensation faculties the Pope definitely refused to grant, but this was the least important of the Austrian requests and its refusal would not disrupt the negotiations.

The Romreise therefore became the focal point of the negotiations. Kaunitz argued the Austrian case: the Romreise was a source of great expense and inconvenience for the bishops without producing any corresponding benefit; bishops of non-Italian territories did not make the trip yet were considered none the less Catholic for that; administrative uniformity between Lombardy-Venetia and the rest of the Hapsburg Empire demanded the elimination of the Romreise; and as the trip was only a matter of discipline, not dogma, there was no reason why the Pope could not yield on it—to refuse to do so could only stem from lack of good will towards Austria, which would no doubt have a detrimental effect upon Austro-Papal relations. 82

Consalvi retorted that Italy was a special case because there the Pope was also Primate and the Italian bishops therefore stood in a special relation to him with special obligations. He admitted that the Romreise was not directly a matter of dogma, and that the Pope could indeed yield it under certain conditions; however, such a renunciation would tend to "weaken de facto the dogma of inviolable unity . . . by diminishing ever more the bonds of communication and dependence of the bishops on their

82 A.V., ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1816. Maass, IV, 587, Kaunitz to Metternich, 20 June 1817; 591, Kaunitz to Metternich, 1 July 1817.
Head." Only if Francis I counteracted this weakening by allowing free communication between the bishops and the Pope could the Papacy consent to give up the Romreise. 83

Furthermore, Consalvi pointed out to Kaunitz the serious consequences of the "very grave scandal that a concession so extraordinary... without any corresponding concession would produce." The Papacy would universally be accused of partiality towards Austria, and its reputation would suffer accordingly. Great scandal would be given to the faithful, while "all the governments, both Catholic and non-Catholic, would be confirmed in their opinion that 'La cour de Rome est une cour poltronne'" and would be encouraged to encroach on Papal rights. Finally, all the other Italian princes would immediately demand the same concession, which the Pope could not logically refuse them. The only way to prevent these dire consequences was for Austria to grant the Papacy religious concessions sufficiently advantageous to religion and the Church as to enable the Pope to justify his concessions to Austria. 84

Moreover, Consalvi never failed to stress the indisputable right of the Papacy to require the Romreise, which he claimed had been exercised without challenge since the days of Gregory the

83 A.V., ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817.
84 Ibid.
Great, and to point out that Austria had formally recognized this claim in the Conventio amicabilis of 1784.85

Kaunitz was impressed despite himself by Consalvi's arguments. He was also alarmed by the Zelanti, who had "grown prodigiously" in numbers and influence, and who were encouraged in their intransigent attitude by the very favorable concordats which many powers, notably France, were making with the Papacy. They had persuaded the Pope to draw up a Bull condemning the marriage laws and the teaching in Austrian universities, which had even been printed; "it is only the Cardinal Secretary of State who has been able to prevent its publication." Therefore Kaunitz had become convinced that "the questions which have led to the present discussions definitely cannot remain open."86 If a settlement was not reached now with the conciliatory Consalvi, the situation would rapidly degenerate. Austria could expect no more favorable settlement than that now offered. For all his good will towards Austria, Consalvi could do nothing more: "Cardinal Consalvi is doing and will do the impossible to give Your Highness the possibility of coming to Rome, but I greatly fear he will obtain nothing from his colleagues. . . ."87

The ambassador therefore suggested to Metternich that it might be best to agree to some of the Papal demands, especially

85 Ibid. Maass, IV, 587, Kaunitz to Metternich, 20 June 1817; 591, Kaunitz to Metternich, 1 July 1817.
35 Maass, IV, 591, Kaunitz to Metternich, 1 July 1817 (#1).
87 Ibid., 594, Kaunitz to Metternich, 1 July 1817 (#2).
on the marriage laws, in order to reach a stable settlement. In this way the bishops would at least be freed from the danger of contamination by ultramontane principles since they would no longer go to Rome, and a great danger to the state-church system would thus be removed. 88 "It is exactly as I had foreseen," Kaunitz advised; "we will not get what we want except by taking with it what we do not want." 89

Despite Kaunitz's advice, Metternich replied to the Papal offer with a firm and total refusal to make any religious concessions. 90 In all probability he would have been willing himself to satisfy some at least of the Papal demands, but realized that such concessions would never secure the approval of Francis I and his Josephist advisers.

Metternich accompanied his refusal with a set of Réflexions, replying in detail to each of the Papal requests. The marriage laws could not be revoked in Lombardy-Venetia lest this upset administrative uniformity with the rest of the Empire. The instruction of the clergy was conducted in accord with Catholic principles and hence Papal intervention was unnecessary. There was no point to the Papal request for free communication with the Lombard-Venetian bishops, for they were already free to write to him whenever they wished. The placez regio was necessary even

---
88 Ibid., 594, Kaunitz to Metternich, 1 July 1817 (#3).
89 Ibid., 595, Kaunitz to Metternich, 4 July 1817.
90 Ibid., 596, Metternich to Kaunitz, 8 July 1817.
tor dogmatic Bulls to ensure that such documents did not contain anything likely to cause strife between Church and State. Thus, all of the Papal demands were unjustified. However, as the Pope had now admitted that it was not beyond the limits of his conscience to renounce the Romreise, there was no reason why he should not do so at once.\footnote{91}

These Reflections were read to Consalvi by Kaunitz. "Unfortunately," the Ambassador reported, "I cannot tell Y. H. that the explanations seemed to satisfy H. E. in the slightest..." The Cardinal found "une mauvaise raison" against each of Metternich's arguments. Consalvi refused to accept administrative uniformity as sufficient justification for the marriage laws; he declared that ideas contrary to Catholic doctrine had been openly taught and defended at Austrian schools for thirty years; he denied that the mere ability of the bishops to write private letters to the Pope while all official correspondence was closely controlled constituted genuine freedom of correspondence; and finally he could not agree that the state had any right to supervise dogmatic Bulls. To Metternich's argument that the Pope had shown that he could renounce the Romreise and hence should do so, Consalvi merely repeated his remarks on the necessity of reciprocal compensation to avoid the appearance of partiality.\footnote{92}

In the face of the firm Papal attitude Austria modified its  

\footnote{91} Ibid. A.V., ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817. 
\footnote{92} Maass, IV, 601, Kaunitz to Metternich, 13 July 1817.
demands, asking now that the Pope, as a special favor in return for Imperial aid in the restoration of the Papal State, should grant the renunciation of the Romreise only ad vitam imperatoris, but this too Consalvi rejected. 

Kaunitz then warned that "H.M. would never allow the bishops of the Lombard-Venetian Kingdom to come to Rome, and after a long vacancy in the episcopal sees, His Holiness would have to do without profit what he could now do and place H. M. under an obligation." Consalvi "did not hide from the ambassador the strength of this argument," but he pointed out that it would be "based on the principle of force" whose use would certainly lead to open Papal hostility and would discredit Austria in public opinion. Even should the Papacy finally be forced to yield, it would do so only in individual cases and would never surrender the general principle of the Romreise; thus Austria would make no permanent gain.

In the hope of altering the Papal stand, Kaunitz arranged a meeting between Juestel and Consalvi on 13 July. Juestel's enumeration of the services of Francis I to religion and the Papacy did not move the Cardinal, who only remarked dryly that no other state had legislation so overtly anti-Papal as Austria. The Councillor's arguments made no impression. Consalvi told Juestel frankly what neither he nor Kaunitz had ever openly

93 Except where other sources are cited, the following account of the negotiations is based on Consalvi's long dispatch to Leardi of 11 August 1817, in A.V., ANV 243. Since this dispatch contains few specific dates, a precise chronology for the negotiations cannot be derived from it.
admitted in their discussions, that he knew the true reason for abolishing the Romreise was to remove Papal influence on the bishops, and that Rome could never agree to this without adequate compensation.  

In effect, the negotiations ended with this meeting, and they ended in failure. The negotiations were not formally broken off because they had never been formally opened, but the facts were plain. It was clear that neither side would yield and that therefore an impasse had been reached. "I have the sorrow of having to announce to Y. H.," Kaunitz wrote to Metternich on 13 July, "that I no longer hope for anything from this negotiation. . . ." The Papacy would sanction the diocesan reorganization and would grant the nomination-right if the Emperor asked it as a special privilege; but on the other demands, the Romreise above all, the Papacy would not yield.  

The failure of the 1817 negotiations was not followed by an open break between Austria and the Papacy, for the evil consequences of a rupture were apparent and neither side had given up hope of persuading the other to modify its stand. Nonetheless, a perceptible chill was introduced into Austro-Papal relations. The atmosphere of cordiality and friendship that had marked 1816-1817 was gradually replaced by mutual distrust and a sense

94 Ibid. Maass, IV, 603, Juestel to Metternich, 15 July 1817.  
95 Maass, IV, 601, Kaunitz to Metternich, 13 July 1817. ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817.
of grievance. Both sides felt that they had been unfairly treated. On the Austrian side there was resentment and bitterness that "so little justice is paid [in Rome] to the magnanimous efforts that Our August Master had made in favour of the Church," which should surely have entitled him to special concessions. Consalvi was informed that "the Imperial Court has expressed itself most strongly against the refusal of the Holy Father, and H. I. M. was irritated in the extreme by it." Austrian displeasure was soon shown in more tangible fashion by the withdrawal of its support for the Papacy in Germany, by Austrian encouragement of Bavaria to reject its Concordat favorable to the Papacy, and by pressure on Tuscany to refuse concessions.

At the Papal court there was equal indignation that Austria, while asking such extensive concessions, had refused to offer anything of value in return, rejecting "all of the just and very moderate requests of His Holiness." Relations between Consalvi and Metternich remained apparently cordial. The Austrian minister gave no sign of displeasure with the Cardinal; no doubt it was clear to him from Kaunitz's

96 Maass, IV, 601.
97 A.V., ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817.
99 ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 11 August 1817.
dispatches that Consalvi had pursued a conciliatory policy during the negotiations and had done his best to work out a settlement. Metternich's high regard for the Secretary of State survived intact throughout the latter's life. 100

Consalvi's attitude towards Metternich, however, seems to have undergone some change in the wake of these negotiations. Consalvi's great hope in his religious dealings with Austria had been in Metternich's "conciliatory spirit." He had counted upon the Prince to secure the adoption by Austria of a conciliatory policy to match his own. In 1817 Metternich had singularly failed to do so. The Secretary of State did not lose his personal respect for the Prince or his confidence in his good intentions; 101 but his faith in Metternich's ability to put his good intentions into practice must inevitably suffer from the latter's failure to secure any significant modification of Austrian policy in 1817.

The only guide to Consalvi's attitude towards Metternich and Austria immediately after the failure of the negotiations is a very brief letter of 14 July to Metternich. 102 Consalvi expressed his deep regret at the failure of the negotiations and

---

100 See Sauvigny, 178, Instructions for Apponyi, 1820; Van Duerm, 381, Metternich to Consalvi, 3 September 1823, Metternich, IV, 91.

101 See, e.g., the high opinion of Metternich expressed in ANV 243, Consalvi to Leardi, 6 November 1817.

102 In Van Duerm, 190.
by implication reproached Metternich for not having adopted a sufficiently conciliatory attitude when the Cardinal had done everything possible on his part to reach a settlement. Diplomatic as ever, the Secretary of State refrained from direct criticism of Austria. Instead, he made his attitude quite clear by concluding his letter with an apparently irrelevant remark: "I cannot refrain from telling Your Highness that a special courier... just arrived, has brought the ratification of the Concordat by the King of France." The implied contrast between the generous French concessions in the Concordat and the niggardly and anti-Papal Austrian attitude in the negotiations was clear. A warning was also implied: the Papacy could find other friends than Austria. If the Emperor persisted in his attitude, the Papacy might turn to France for support, to revive, perhaps, the traditional Italian game of playing off Bourbon against Hapsburg. Consalvi was to move towards such a revival in 1821-1823.

The implications of this letter were not lost upon Metternich, who found therein a compelling argument for the adoption of a more moderate religious policy. In his report to Francis I on the failure of the negotiations (which he ascribed to the illness of Pius VII and the growing strength of the Zelanti encouraged by the French Concordat), the Foreign Minister outlined the course of action which he advised the Emperor to follow. It was "before all else necessary to provide for the vacant bishoprics of Lombardy-Venetia and to obtain the Pontifical
sanction for the new diocesan divisions. . . ; this done, a
more favorable moment could be awaited for the examination of the
other questions in dispute." Kaunitz should therefore be in-
structed to concentrate on these measures. As for the Romreise,
he suggested that the Lombard-Venetian bishops should be secretly
ordered to approach the Pope individually, each stressing "the
personal obstacles, such as age, infirmity, lack of financial
resources, which make it impossible for him to go to Rome in
person, and he must in consequence beg His Holiness to accept his
excuses." The Pope would no doubt grant these individual dis-
pensations, provided the principles of the Romreise was not
attacked. Thus the Romreise could be avoided without antagon-
izing the Papacy until a more favorable time came to resume dis-
cussions. In the interim, however, it was essential that "we
avoid new subjects for misunderstanding with the pontifical court.
This implies above all else suspending the publication of any new
ecclesiastical ordinance in the Lombard-Venetian Kingdom. . . ."
This policy was "the sole means of mitigating somewhat the un-
favorable impression that could be produced by the comparison
between the friendly relations of Spain and France with the
Roman court and those of Austria with that court. This rapproch-
ment [between Rome and the Bourbons] could produce grave damage
to our political interests."103

The Emperor agreed grudgingly to his minister's suggestions,
103

Van Duern, 191, Metternich to Francis I, 19 July 1817.
but only, he was careful to state, because "all the ecclesiastical ordinances of my other states have, I think, already been published in Italy." The Emperor's agreement was therefore no sign that he had been won over to Metternich's policy of moderation.\(^{104}\)

The following year saw improvement in neither Austro-Papal relations nor religious conditions in Austria. The Papal grant of the nomination-right in Venetia, intended by the Papacy as a conciliatory move, had the opposite effect: the Emperor was much irritated that the Bull of concession should insist on the necessity of the Romrême.\(^{105}\) Austrian resentment found expression in encouragement given the Bavarian government to repudiate its recent concordat, whose favorable provisions contrasted strongly with the Austrian policies. This threat to one of his most notable achievements greatly angered Consalvi, and he protested bitterly to Vienna. He did not, however, blame Metternich, but rather the Josephist advisers of the Emperor.\(^{106}\)

Nor was there the slightest evidence of a more moderate religious policy in the Empire. Instances multiplied of anti-Papal or heretical teaching, of anti-Papal books, and of constant government interference in religious affairs. At the close of 1817 Leardi submitted a discouraging report on religious conditions, which could serve to summarize the disappointment of

---

\(^{104}\) Ibid., Decision of Francis I

\(^{105}\) A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 28 December 1817.

\(^{106}\) A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 19 November, 28 December 1817, 5 February 1818.
The hope had been entertained that the Emperor... would be induced by the favourable dispositions of ministers convinced of the necessity of remedying the most serious disorders in religious affairs to move away from his pretended rights and to restore to the Church little by little its liberty and independence. There was also hope that, considering the very poor results of the requests sent by H. I. R. A. M. to the Holy Father, all the blame would fall upon his evil advisers, and they would be disgraced. Finally, there was a strong inclination to hope that the political interests of H. M. would lead him to forge strong bonds with the Holy See... The sequel, however, has not corresponded to these hopes.

The Emperor's attitude towards the Papacy was definitely hostile. Metternich could not even persuade him to send the Pope a formal letter of thanks for the nomination-right. The influence of the Josephists was supreme: "everything... shows the predominance over the mind of H. M. of his evil counsellors." Metternich still favored moderation, but he "laments that H. M. does not speak to him about religious affairs, and complains that no bishop of the Monarchy has the courage to tell H. M. the truth. All are afraid and all obey his orders." Those few ministers, Metternich at their head, who opposed Josephinism were discouraged and tended to lapse into despairing apathy: they "are aware of the evil, but say that there is no remedy, that it is necessary to temporize, and thus nothing is done." There was thus little effective resistance to the Josephists who "are seeking in every way to put into effect the principle of Joseph II that one can be Catholic (i.e., schismatic) without being Roman." Their latest move was to "insinuate" to the Emperor that
he should demand from the Papacy the right to nominate the
Archbishop of Salzburg, the retention by that prelate of all his
former privileges, and his appointment as Patriarch of Germany.
"And God only knows where these demands will end," Leardi con-
cluded in despair.107

Evidently the Josephists were successful in their
"insinuations," for in March, 1818, Kaunitz presented two demands
to Consalvi: that H. M. be allowed to nominate the Archbishop
of Salzburg and also the bishops of Gurck, Seggau, Lavant, Trent,
and Brixen, and to all the canonicates and prebendaries of those
sees; and that the Archbishop retain all of his extensive former
privileges, especially that of giving canonical institution to
his suffragan bishops of Gurck, Seggau, and Lavant.108 The
demand that the Archbishop be made Patriarch of Germany had
evidently been dropped, but the concessions demanded were in
themselves sufficiently destructive of Papal authority. The
privileges of the Archbishop were very extensive: if his full
claims were recognized, he would be in a "state of virtual in-
dependence from the Holy See."109 These special privileges were
a relic of the pre-Napoleonic era, when the Archbishop had been
an independent ecclesiastical prince of considerable importance.

107 Ibid., Leardi to Consalvi, 28 December 1817. Also, 19
November 1817, 6 February 1818.
108 Ibid., Consalvi to Leardi, 2 April, 17 June 1818.
109 Ibid., 17 June 1818.
The virtual independence of the German ecclesiastical princes had long been a source of worry to the Papacy, but Consalvi was yet more reluctant to see the Archbishop exercising his full powers and privileges if at the same time he was to be nominated by the Emperor and thus under Austrian influence. However, partly as a conciliatory move, partly because increasing disorder in the Archdiocese (which had been vacant since 1814) made a rapid settlement necessary, the Papacy was willing to offer a compromise of the Imperial requests. The Emperor was given his choice of two alternatives: the Imperial nomination of the Archbishop, who would then be deprived of all his special privileges; or the preservation of the status quo, leaving the Archbishop with all his privileges but elected by the metropolitan chapter of Salzburg.110

This choice did not satisfy Austria, which continued to press for its original demands in full.111 When the Papacy stood firm, the Austrian attitude, cool since the previous summer, became definitely hostile. The Papacy received unwelcome proof of this when Austria ceased to support the Papacy in its struggle with the Protestant princes of the Rhineland over control of the Church in their states.112 Questioned by Leardi, Councillor Hudeliat replied bluntly that Austria had withdrawn its support

110 Ibid., 2 April, 17 June 1818.
111 A.V., ANV 243, Consalvi, to Leardi, 17 June 1818. ANV 246, Leardi to Consalvi, 8 August, 1 September 1818.
112 On this struggle see Schmidlin, 306-318.
to show its displeasure at the Papal attitude on Salzburg and
the Romrese and at the recent concordats whose principles were
contrary to those held at Vienna. Hudelist did not conceal the
joy of his government at the difficulties which the French and
Bavarian Concordats were encountering. Summarising the Austrian
attitude, Leardi concluded that "everything considered, one would
say that this Imperial court would with pleasure see Rome
humiliated and almost on its knees imploring support and pro-
etection. ..." 113

The behaviour of Austria in regard to Salzburg marked
another stage in Consalvi's disillusionment with the Austrian
alliance. Hitherto, even during the most trying part of the
1817 negotiations, Consalvi had carefully preserved a tone of
moderation in his letters and dispatches. The Cardinal's letters
to Leardi on the Salzburg question mark the first major departure
from this moderation. Evidently his patience had worn thin, or
his faith in Austrian reasonableness had evaporated. The
Cardinal bitterly condemned the "unreasonable demands" of Austria,
which, unsatisfied by the "very generous" Papal concessions,
continued to make new demands upon the Papacy with the obvious
aim of securing control over the Church by "small insensible
degrees." 114 Consalvi was determined to oppose these unending

113 A.V., ANV 246, Leardi to Consalvi, 25 May 1818.
114 A.V., R247, Consalvi to Leardi, 2 April 1818.
demands, for yielding would only encourage still further demands, until in the end the Papal authority would vanish.\textsuperscript{115}

This blunt criticism is the more significant in that Consalvi knew that the Austrian government would at once learn of it, for his correspondence with the Vienna nuncio was regularly intercepted by the Austrian policy.\textsuperscript{116} Either the Cardinal was so annoyed that he no longer cared if Austria learned of his opinions, or—one suspects—he deliberately used this means of informing Vienna of Papal displeasure.

Determined to stand firm but hoping to avoid an open break, Consalvi appealed once again for the intervention of Metternich; and once again he was disappointed. The Foreign Minister admitted to Leardi that the "Holy See has much right on its side," but there was nothing he could do. In religious affairs the Emperor was entirely under the influence of the Josephists, who "constantly insinuate to the sovereign that he must uphold all the inherent rights of the Archbishopric."\textsuperscript{117}

This was the last time that Consalvi appealed to Metternich to use his influence to moderate Austrian religious policy. Nor after this incident can there be found in the Cardinal's correspondence any more of those expressions of confidence in Metternich and hope that he would be able to alter the religious

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., Consalvi to Leardi, 17 June 1818.
\textsuperscript{116} See Chapter V, below.
\textsuperscript{117} A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 4 July 1818.
policies of the Emperor, expressions which had been common in 1815-1817. It would seem that Consalvi's disillusionment with Metternich, which had begun during the 1817 negotiations, was completed during the summer of 1818. An important prop of Austro-Papal co-operation was weakened thereby.

Despite continued Austrian pressure, Consalvi refused to make further concessions in the Salzburg affair.\textsuperscript{118} As Austria did not lessen its demands, no settlement could be reached. Austrian irritation at this impasse showed itself in venomous criticism of Consalvi by high officials of the Imperial court.\textsuperscript{119} The Secretary of State was increasingly annoyed by this continual criticism, which attributed to him the blame for the deterioration of Austro-Papal relations. In October his pent-up resentment, not merely against this slander, but against the whole course of Austrian policy, burst forth in a bitter, eloquent letter of protest to Metternich:

I am convinced that everything which has been done at Rome for a long time in regard to the wishes of the Court of Vienna, except for a few things which for the soundest reasons His Holiness could not do, must have been to the satisfaction of that court . . . All that could be done has been done. . . . I am too frank and loyal to hide from Your Highness that the change of sentiment to the Roman government, and the unjust and bitter remarks against its conduct manifested for some time by

\textsuperscript{118} A.V., ANV 246, Leardi to Consalvi, 8 August, 1 September, 11 November 1818.
\textsuperscript{119} Ibid., Leardi to Consalvi, 18 August, 1 September 1818.
persons attached to the Imperial court, have made a deep impression on me. . . . To have to carry almost the whole world on my shoulders here; to be made an object of slander as a man who does not hold to principles; to be accused of laxity, because within the proper limits I try to adapt myself to modern ways; to arouse hatred as a supposed Austrian partisan; and after all this, instead of finding in those attached to Austria defenders and supporters, to discover in them unjust critics and . . . calumniators, I confess to Your Highness that I cannot endure it and that I am deeply hurt by it . . . . I will tell Your Highness frankly that were it not for the unbounded attachment which links me to His Holiness, I would already have retired from the ministry, and that if God should make me survive this Pope, which I do not desire, then, not owing to Pius VIII what I owe to Pius VII, I would have no further reason to prefer his service to my repose, and I would certainly retire from a position which yields me nothing but calumnious accusation and bitterness . . . . What could be more false than for me to be accused of refusing everything to Austria and never doing anything for her satisfaction? 120

This letter is of interest because it reveals the intense frustration and resentment which had been produced in Consalvi not merely by recent criticism, but by the frustrating and disappointing attitude of Austria since 1817. The emotions of resentment and grievance which mark this letter had been building up for well over a year; Austrian slander was only the last straw. Consalvi had sincerely wished Austro-Papal co-operation and had done everything possible to realize it, he had followed policies in the Papal States favourable to Austria, he had persuaded the Pope to grant Austria substantial concessions, he had restrained the anti-Austrian efforts of the Zelanti—and his

120 Van Duerm, 206, Consalvi to Metternich, 1 October 1818.
reward for this was slanderous criticism and an utter failure on the part of Austria to adopt an equally conciliatory policy. Little wonder that he felt injured and aggrieved.

Metternich—somewhat astonished at this outburst of emotion from the usually reserved and self-controlled Cardinal—replied with soothing words that were at the same time a covert apology and explanation of his failure to moderate Austrian religious policy:

I am happy to render full justice to all the nuances—because they are enlightened—that you have superimposed upon the attitude of the Holy See. I know all that Your Holiness has done and all that which you could not do—all that you wish and all that you do not wish. You have, Monseigneur, like all ministers, a limited authority; mine is the same. I can do much good; I try to do it; but I cannot do everything. . . .

After praising Consalvi's "enlightened and conciliatory spirit" and disavowing any criticism of him or of the Papacy, the Prince concluded with a piece of news designed to encourage the Cardinal. The long-anticipated visit of the Emperor to Rome, on which Vienna had blown now hot now cold for the last year, was definitely to take place at Easter of 1819. This would serve the desirable purpose of putting an end to the wide-spread rumours of an Austro-Papal break. "It is not sufficient," Metternich declared, "that governments be on an intimate footing, this is an age when it is useful that the people be not deceived as to the nature of the relations which exist. I apply this principle
especially to our relations with the Court of Rome...."121

Consalvi and Pius were most pleased by this news, which
offered the prospect of settling Austro-Papal disputes by dis-
cussions "at the summit." Such discussions were not part of the
Austrian plans, however. "H. M. desires," Metternich explained
to Kaunitz, "that the joy he will experience on finding himself
reunited with the Holy Father, which he is confident the latter
shares, be pure and unalloyed. He desires that his stay in the
Capital of the Christian World be marked only by reciprocal
testimonies of a confidence and agreement between the two
sovereigns so well established that the criminal hopes of the
enemies of public order will be confounded thereby."122 Dis-
cussion of Austro-Papal disputes was to be avoided, partly
because the Josephists feared Papal influence upon the Emperor
might lead to Austrian concessions, partly "to prevent either
of the sovereigns from having the displeasure of not obtaining
from the other...what he would like."123 A serious dispute
between Pope and Emperor in their personal conversations could
more than undo all the good that would otherwise be accomplished
by the Imperial visit.

Instead of discussions of Austro-Papal disputes between
Pius VII and Francis I, Austria proposed that Kaunitz and

121 Van Duerm, 212, Metternich to Consalvi, 17 October 1818.
122 Maass, IV, 617, Metternich to Kaunitz, 24 February 1819.
123 A.V., ANV 248, Leardli to Consalvi, 27 December 1818.
Consalvi resume negotiations on the two outstanding problems, Salzburg and the Romreise, with the aim of settling them before the arrival of Francis I in Rome. If a settlement could not be worked out then, these questions should be left open until after the Emperor's departure.\textsuperscript{124}

Consalvi agreed to these proposals, but his increasing distrust of Austria was evident in his comments to Leardi:

I fear that this [the project for negotiations] will create a new source of sorrow for the Holy See. . . . I cannot help foreseeing that there will be attached new demands and new pretensions; and since the way in which they will want to discuss ecclesiastical affairs will certainly not be ours, the principle professed in the Austrian states being too well known, the Holy Father has therefore every reason to fear that [these negotiations] . . . will be a new source of affliction for the Holy See.\textsuperscript{125}

On this occasion, however, Consalvi's apprehensions were not entirely justified. When the Imperial proposals were presented by the charge d'affaires, Chevalier William Gennotte (Kaunitz being ill), it was evident that Austria had been sufficiently impressed by the firm Papal stand to moderate its demands. Imperial opposition to the Romreise was continued, but in a modified form. The Emperor would agree to accept the principle of the Romreise, and would allow "the first bishop nominated in the Lombard-Venetian Kingdom after each accession to the Imperial throne, and likewise after each accession to the

\textsuperscript{124} Ibid., A.V., R\textsuperscript{2}47, Leardi to Consalvi, 2 February 1819. Maass, IV, 617, Metternich to Kaunitz, 24 February 1819.

\textsuperscript{125} A.V., ANV 244, Consalvi to Leardi, 20 February 1819.
Pontifical sovereignty, to make this trip. . . . In return, the Holy Father would engage himself and his successors to dispense the other bishops. . . . from this obligation."

As for Salzburg, Austria had decided to accept the compromise offered by the Papacy. Of the two alternatives presented, the Emperor chose the status quo—the Archbishop should retain all his privileges but should be elected by his chapter, not the Emperor. However, Francis I asked one modification of the status quo: he felt that he should have the privilege of nominating to all the canonicates, prebendaries, and other dignities of the metropolitan chapter as their patron, since he proposed to endow them on a very lavish scale.126

The explanation for this moderation of Austrian demands is not difficult to find: the Imperial government wished to settle these disputes with the Papacy and had at length realized that only if it moderated its terms could this be accomplished.127 If the Austrian government had indeed, held the opinion that "La cour de Rome est une cour poltronne" which could be bullied into submission, Consalvi's firm stand on the Romreise and Salzburg had evidently disabused it of the notion.

More moderate though the Austrian proposals were, they were still not acceptable in their entirety. The Austrian proposal

126 Maass, IV, 617, Metternich to Kaunitz, 24 February 1819. ANV 244, Consalvi to Muzi, 2 April 1819.
127 Maass, IV, 617, Metternich to Kaunitz, 24 February 1819. A.V., ANV 244, Consalvi to Muzi, 2 April 1819.
on the **Romreise**, though it conceded the principle of the trip, would to a large extent have eroded its substance, and the Papacy was as determined as ever to preserve this link between Rome and the Lombard-Venetian bishops. Not all the eloquence with which Gennotte repeated the standard arguments against the **Romreise** could move Consalvi to yield on this point. 128 The Cardinal in turn replied with all the arguments he had used so often since 1816: the ancient and incontestable right of the Holy See, the **Conventio amicabilis** of 1784, the special position of the Pope as Primate of Italy, "the certainty of having in the future to grant the same concessions to all the other Italian sovereigns," and the scandal that would be given both to the mass of the faithful and to their rulers. 129 After a week of futile discussion Gennotte had to report a total lack of success. 130 On 15 March Consalvi formally rejected the Austrian proposal. 131

More satisfactory to all concerned was the termination of the Salzburg question. The Papacy, pleased that Austria had chosen to maintain the status quo, agreed to give the Emperor the right of nominating to those dignities of the Salzburg chapter to which the Pope had traditionally nominated. However,

128 Maass, IV, 620, Gennotte to Metternich, 11 March 1819. ANV 244, Consalvi to Muzi, 2 April 1819.
129 Ibid., Also, Maass, IV, 623, Consalvi to Kaunitz, 15 March 1819.
130 Maass, IV, 627, Gennotte to Metternich, 16 March 1819.
131 Ibid., 623, Consalvi to Kaunitz, 15 March 1819.
the Archbishop and his suffragan would continue to nominate to
designations to which they had previously possessed the right
of nomination.\footnote{132}

The Emperor declared himself completely satisfied with the
Salzburg settlement and praised Consalvi for the "enlightened
efforts" by which he had contributed to settling this question.\footnote{133}

As for the Romreise, the Emperor, though displeased by the Papal
stand, declared that he would not make it an "objet de
recrimination," as he desired to improve relations with the
Papacy. Francis therefore accepted the principle of the Romreise,
but planned in the future to request frequent dispensations for
individual bishops.\footnote{134}

With these negotiations there ended at last the religious
controversy which had arisen from the Imperial attempt to
extend Josephinism into the newly-acquired territories. In
dealing with this attempt, Consalvi's policy of mixed conciliation
and firmness had been as successful as was possible under the
circumstances. Given the prevailing political and religious
ideas of the age, some degree of Imperial control over the church
in those territories was inevitable so long as they remained
under Austrian control. Consalvi had recognized this fact; the
\footnote{132} ANV 244, Consalvi to Muzi, 2 April 1819. Maass, IV, 620,
Gennotte to Metternich, 11 March 1819.
\footnote{133} Maass, IV, 628, Metternich to Gennotte, 20 March 1819.
Also, ANV 244.
\footnote{134} Ibid., also, Maass, IV, 629, Metternich to Francis I,
11 July 1819.
Zelanti apparently did not. Yet, continued Papal influence over the Church in Lombardy-Venetia had been assured by Consalvi's long fight for the Romreise, while Imperial control of a virtually independent Archbishopric of Salzburg had been avoided. Furthermore—a crucial point for Consalvi—these aims had been achieved without provoking an open break with Austria, which would have been the most likely result had the intransigent policies of the Zelanti prevailed. Consalvi therefore had reason to feel that his policies had been justified.

However, the more fundamental question of the status of the Church in Austria proper still remained, and here all the efforts of Consalvi and Pius had failed to secure any significant improvement. The long-awaited Imperial visit offered an opportunity to alter this state of affairs. Then the Pope would be able to explain directly to the Emperor the need to modify the state-church system. It seemed likely that Francis I, sincerely religious at heart, would be much influenced by this personal appeal, the more so as he would not then be surrounded by his Josephist advisers. Such hopes might be further encouraged by certain indications that the Emperor himself was becoming more favorably disposed towards the Papacy. The modification of Imperial demands during the 1819 negotiations, the acceptance of the principle of the Romreise, the Emperor's plan for reform in the Austrian religious orders, and finally his decision to

135 A.V., R260, Leardi to Consalvi, 5 February 1819.
come to Rome despite Josephist opposition, all seemed to indicate some modification of his attitude towards the Papacy.  

Francis I arrived in Rome on 3 April 1819 and spent some two weeks there as the guest of the Pope. In between public celebrations and guided tours of the city, Pope and Emperor found time to discuss the state of the Church in the Empire. Apparently, no record of their conversations has been preserved. Fortunately, it is not difficult to form a fairly accurate idea of the topics which they discussed by studying the reports and memorials which Pius ordered to be drawn up for his information in preparation for the Imperial visit. Especially useful for this purpose is a summary of the most objectionable Austrian measures whose revocation the Pope was to request from Francis I and which, it seems likely, he did in fact bring up during the discussions.

The seven points discussed in this summary (which are also the points most frequently mentioned in the other material in this file), most of which had long been the subject of Papal complaint, were:

Maass, IV, 142-143; V, Chapter I, holds that this change in the Emperor's attitude took place only after the visit to Rome, which was its cause. It seems more likely, however, that change had in fact begun some time before, for the reasons given above. Maass (V, 8-12) considers the Imperial reforms in the religious orders as significant evidence of the Emperor's changing attitude after his meeting with Pius; however, the Emperor had already planned the reforms before his visit to Rome (R260, 5 Feb. 1819).

A considerable quantity of this material is to be found in R260, fascio 1, 1819, including reports and opinions on such points as the marriage laws, teaching; and state of the clergy, and copies of the pertinent Austrian edicts and laws.

A.V., R260, Innovazioni della Corte Austriaca, delle quali il S.P. non puo dispensarsi dal chiederne la revoca, 1819.
1) First and foremost, the marriage laws, long the chief subject of Papal indignation.
2) The "system of instruction in the Universities and schools," which "includes a great number of theses which are taught and defended. . . . containing doctrines perverse or condemned."
3) The "Imperial prohibition of the introduction of certain briefs," especially Auctorem fidei issued against the Synod of Pisa by Pius VI.
4) The Imperial insistence that all Bulls and other Papal documents receive the placet regio before they might be admitted into the Empire.
5) The prohibition of appeals to the Pope by Austrian subjects in religious cases.
6) The new ceremonial for the installation of bishops, objectionable because it stressed the duties of the bishop to the state rather than those to the Papacy.
7) Imperial rules for the instruction and ordination of novices, objectionable because they involved the teaching of Josephist principles, and because it was the duty of the Church, not the State, to regulate these matters.

In all probability, these Imperial policies (and especially the first five) were the points discussed by Pius VII with the Emperor. The importance of these personal discussions must not

---

139 Maass, IV, 631, lists a large number of such theses.
140 A.V., R260, Innovazioni della corte austriaca. . . ., 1819.
be under-rated. In the words of Maass:

The Pope said virtually nothing that was new to the monarch; but it was of decisive importance that he said it, that he had broken through the magic circle of the rationalist court, and that what they had presented as primitive Christian doctrines, he had branded as uncatholic, and had thereby been able to plant the first doubts about the correctness of the Josephist state-church theory in the soul of the monarch. 141

The Emperor was undoubtedly greatly impressed by his discussions with Pius VII, and according to Metternich he "arrived at an understanding" with the Pope on religious questions. 142 The critical question was how long his favorable attitude towards the Papacy would survive after his return to Vienna, where he would once again be surrounded by those Josephist advisers to whose influence he had so long been susceptible.

For some time after his visit to Rome, the conduct of Francis I gave the Papacy grounds to hope that a definite improvement in the Imperial attitude had taken place. Shortly after his return to Vienna the Emperor broke with long Josephist tradition by agreeing to a Papal request to admit the Redemptorist order into his territories. 143 Of much greater significance in its implications was the Imperial decision in 1820 to admit the Jesuits who had been expelled from Russia and allow them to

---

141 Maass, IV, 143.
142 Metternich, III, 3-5, Note.
143 Maass, V, 7-8
work in the Empire. As devout champions of Papal authority and
inveterate foes of the state-church, the Jesuits had long been
anathema to the Josephists; the Imperial decision to re-admit
them into the Empire therefore indicated a major departure from
traditional Josephist concepts on the part of Francis I. 144

A more favorable Imperial attitude to Papal protests now
became evident. In March of 1820 Leardi felt compelled to
protest strongly to Metternich against the "scandal of the
theses upheld at the Catholic University of Vienna." 145 Dis-
regarding the advice of the Josephist Lazanzky that there was
nothing contrary to Catholic doctrine in these theses, the
Emperor decreed that in the future all theological theses must
be submitted to the local bishop for approval. 146

Later in the same year Leardi was warned by "trustworthy
Persons" that the Austrian government planned to introduce into
the Lombard-Venetian seminaries the objectionably anti-Papal
system of instruction found in the other provinces. The nuncio
protested to Metternich and Francis I, and the project was
quietly dropped. 147

144
Ibid., Chapter IV, A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 12
July, 14 August, 17 August, 23 August, 31 August, 10 September,
9 November, 20 November, 16 December 1820.
145
A.V., ANV 244, Leardi to Consalvi, 11 March 1820, with
copy of Leardi's note of protest to Metternich.
146
Maass, V, 4-7. A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 29 April
1820.
147
A.V., ANV 247, Leardi to Consalvi, 17 October 1820.
ANV 244, Consalvi to Leardi, 18 November 1820.
The extent and the limitations of the change in the Imperial attitude were illustrated when in January, 1820, a Papal Congregation placed on the Index the *Enchiridion juris ecclesiastici Austriaci* of Rechberger and the *Institutiones historiae ecclesiasticae* of Dannenmayer. These were the standard texts, the former on canon law, the latter on church history, used in Austrian schools. Both were permeated with Josephist principles, and the condemnation of these works was an implicit condemnation of those principles which were the foundation of the state-church system.

This wider implication of the condemnation was at once perceived by Gennotte, a zealous Josephist. He promptly protested to Consalvi that it constituted "a sort of manifesto against the Austrian laws" contrary to the "assurances which he [Consalvi] has often given me that he wanted a system of calm and moderation. . . ."

The Secretary of State replied that he had no responsibility for the condemnation, which had been carried out by the Congregation of the Index without consulting him. No doubt the Congregation had had "puissans motifs" for its action, and after all, he pointed out, only the texts had been condemned, not the Austrian legislation as a whole as the Zelanti would no doubt have preferred. In any case, his influence over Pius VII in religious affairs was declining while that of the Zelanti grew.

On the condemnation of these works, see Maass, V, Chapter III.
steadily, and he "could not answer for what they might wring from [the Pope] in a moment of weakness..." Consalvi refused to enter into further discussion of the condemnation, so Gennotte could only await further instructions from Metternich.149

It seemed that another round of religious controversy was about to begin. Certainly, a few years before, such a Papal condemnation would have aroused the Emperor to vigorous protest. If no such controversy developed in 1820, it was because of the change in Francis I's attitude. The Emperor did not make the condemnation a subject for protest, but merely ordered the preparation of revised texts to replace the older ones. However, since he did not specifically mention the two condemned works, they continued in use for some years.150

Consalvi was not overly impressed by what he called, rather contemptuously, "these minor improvements" in Austrian religious policy.151 After all, none of the major Papal grievances had been removed by them, nor had they affected the essence of the state-church system. The Cardinal's attitude mingled mild hope arising from the Emperor's recent moderation with the strong distrust that was a legacy of his dealings with Austria in 1817-1818. Francis I had been a stout defender of Josephinism too.149

Maass, V, 174, Gennotte to Metternich, 5 February 1820. 150

Ibid., 52-58. 151

A.V., ANV 244, Consalvi to Leardi, 20 December 1820.
long, it seemed, to abandon it now. Yet "these minor improvements," though of no great importance in themselves, might be a hopeful prognostic for the future. There seemed, moreover, good reason to hope that the outbreak of the Neapolitan Revolution of 1820 might show the Emperor the need for Papal moral support, even if obtained at the expense of Josephist principles. 152

A touchstone could be found for the validity of these hopes: the response to the Papal Memorials sent to the Emperor shortly after his departure from Rome. These Memorials criticised certain Austrian religious principles and policies, essentially those already discussed at Rome, and called upon Francis I to abandon them. 153 From the way in which the Emperor reacted to these Memorials, it would be possible to divine the true extent of his change of heart.

The impression which his meeting with Pius VII had made upon Francis I was so profound that he was at first eager to comply with the Papal requests. Even before leaving Italy, on July 4, 1819, he sent the Memorials to his Ecclesiastical Adviser Juestel, instructing him to report on the merits of the Papal ideas, regardless of whether or not they were in agreement with existing Austrian legislation. Juestel's report of August, 1819, was what the Emperor might have expected from so ardent a

152
Ibid. R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 31 May 1821.

153
Partial copy in Maass, IV, 631.
Josephist. He bluntly declared all the Papal complaints unjustified, and advised that the Memorials should be ignored. 154

This negative report failed to satisfy the Emperor, who was still under the influence of his meeting with the Pope. On 24 August 1819 he ordered a prelate of more moderate views, Bishop Jakob Frint, the Hof-und-Burgpfarrer, to comment on the Papal requests. Frint's report was delivered over a year later, on 1 September 1820. It was in general favorable to the Papacy, though markedly ambiguous on certain points, perhaps from fear of the Josephists. Frint agreed that heretical doctrines were being taught at Austrian universities and schools, admitted that the Pope could not properly perform his duties as Head of the Church without free communication with the bishops, and opposed the exclusion of an entire Bull simply because part of it was contrary to Austrian principles. However, he was unable or unwilling to attempt to delimit the respective spheres of authority of Church and State in regard to marriage, and contented himself with advising both to work in harmony. Nor was his position on the question of appeals to the Papacy very clear, though he did advise against unnecessary state interposition between Austrian clergy and the Pope. 155

Francis I was favorably impressed by Frint's report and

154 Ibid., 14-16.
155 Ibid., 16-17. Bishop Jakob Frint (1766-1834), appointed Hof-und-Burgpfarrer in 1810; encouraged the Catholic religious revival in Austria; especially interested in the improvement of Catholic schools and seminaries.
seemed ready to act upon it. Leardi reported enthusiastically that the Emperor, "filled with good will" towards the Papacy, was determined: "to correct everything contrary to the sound doctrine of religion and the Church." He had just "sent to the Chancery of the Interior the reply to be given to the Memorials. . . .

These good arrangements of H.I.M. are most remarkable because they involve abandoning doctrines held for no less than half a century in this Empire." 156

Consalvi, though encouraged by Leardi's report, did not echo the nuncio's optimism as to the possibility of great changes in Austrian religious policy. He had learned by sad experience the strength of the Josephists at Vienna and the extent of their influence over the Emperor. The most he would hope for was that perhaps the Emperor had at last realized that "the Secular Authority, threatened by the secret plotting of the Settarj and by irreligious principles. . . . has no more solid support than in the propagation and teaching of the true religion," and might accordingly make some alterations in its religious policy. 157

The Cardinal's scepticism was justified by the event, for the Emperor's original determination did not long survive in the hostile atmosphere of the Josephist court. The Josephists fought a delaying action to prevent the sending of the Imperial reply

---

156 A.V., ANV 247, Leardi to Consalvi, 21 September 1821.

157 A.V., ANV 244, Consalvi to Leardi, 20 December 1820.
while they gradually won Francis I away from his original resolve to satisfy the Papal complaints. Metternich may—as he later claimed—have continued to work for a better understanding with the Papacy, but if so, his efforts met with no success.

In March of 1822, after a year and a half of frustration and delay, Leardi reported sadly that, although Francis I was "risoluti di proibire ogni iota di dottrine perniciose, che s'inseguo nelle università," he had decided to take significant action in response to the other Papal grievances. Soon even this expectation began to seem overoptimistic. The Emperor was falling back again to an increasing extent under the influence of advisers "hostile to the good cause," who were seeking to persuade him to uphold in full the "pretended rights of the crown over the church." Leardi feared that they would be able to delay still further the Imperial reply and make changes in it unfavorable to the Papacy.

The final blow to the Papal Memorials was delivered in July, 1823, when the Emperor's official spiritual adviser,

---

158 Metternich, III, 3-5, Note.
159 Ibid., There is no contemporary evidence for Metternich's claim. He seems in fact to have taken little interest in the religious developments of 1820-1823. He apparently did not attempt to support the Papal Memorials, the nuncio's protests, or the Emperor's projected change in Imperial religious policy. Perhaps, as Maass suggests (V,5), having "burned his fingers" in opposing the Josephists in 1814-1817 to no avail, he was reluctant to do battle with them again.
160 A.V., ANV 247, Leardi to Consalvi, 6 March 1822.
161 Ibid., Leardi to Consalvi, 27 April 1822; also, 17 April 1822.
the Josephist Councillor (Staats- und Konferenzrat) Martin von Lorenz, submitted a formal report on the opinions given by Juestel and Frint. Lorenz was in complete agreement with Juestel that the Papal complaints were entirely unjustified and inadmissible. The Pope had only been persuaded to present these Memorial by the Zelanti, whose real aim was to place the Emperor and his predecessors under suspicion of heresy. He therefore advised against any attempt to satisfy the Papal grievances.¹⁶²

In the face of this strong Josephist opposition culminating in Lorenz's report, the Emperor abandoned his original aim of satisfying the Papacy and ceased to concern himself with the Memorials. No reply to the Papal Memorials was ever sent. On this negative note the Austro-Papal religious diplomacy of Consalvi's second ministry came to an end.

The effect of the religious disputes of this ministry upon Austro-Papal relations was seriously detrimental. The onset of the decline of Austro-Papal co-operation can be traced to the failure of the 1817 negotiations to produce a mutually satisfactory solution of religious problems. Mutual distrust and resentment, the inevitable result of the disagreements of 1817-1818, led to a rapid deterioration of the once friendly relations between the two powers. At the same time, Consalvi's confidence in Metternich (an essential factor for successful co-operation) gradually disappeared.

¹⁶² Maass, V, 213, Lorenz to Francis I, 3 July 1823.
The more conciliatory Austrian attitude of 1819-1820 checked for a time the deterioration of Austro-Papal relations. Had the Emperor held to his original resolve to satisfy Papal complaints, a revival of Consalvi's confidence in Austria and hence of Austro-Papal co-operation would probably have resulted. This did not take place, and as long as the basic Papal grievances remained, full Austro-Papal co-operation could not be attained. Nonetheless, the modification of Imperial policy, limited though it was, had some good effects. The most pressing disputes could now be settled, thus averting the danger of an open break and making possible the continuance of a certain measure of political co-operation, notably against the Settare. The religious truce that prevailed after 1819 offered the possibility, if not of the creation of full Austro-Papal co-operation which was impossible while Josephinism reigned at Vienna, at least of the revival of that degree of co-operation which had existed in 1815-1817. Had political factors not supervened, the gaping rents which religious controversy had torn in Austro-Papal unity might in time have been patched up. But within little more than a year after the Imperial visit to Rome, the Neapolitan Revolution broke out, and before its repercussions had ceased, the Austro-Papal alliance had received a mortal wound.

When Consalvi's second ministry ended with the death of Pius VII in August, 1823, Josephinism seemed hardly less dominant in the Hapsburg domains than it had been when the Cardinal returned from Vienna in 1815. Nonetheless, all was not as before.
With the hindsight of a century and half, it is possible to perceive that the flood tide of Josephinism was reached around 1815, and that by 1823 it had begun, very slowly, to recede. Certainly, this recession had not as yet attained spectacular proportions by 1823. Few contemporaries of Consalvi perceived it. Nonetheless, the moderation of the Imperial demands in 1819 and the acceptance of the Romreise; the admission of the Jesuits into Austria; the increased attention paid to Papal protests; and the serious, though ultimately unfruitful, attention given by Francis I to the Papal Memorials: all of these are indications, small but unmistakable, that the long, slow course of Austrian policy away from Josephinism had begun.

The policy of firmness and conciliation followed by Consalvi deserves some credit for this development. On the one hand, his firmness had checked Austrian encroachment and had shown Austria that the Papacy could not be bullied into surrender. The Papacy was not a mere satellite of Austria, obsequious to its will. If Austria wished to be on good terms with the Papacy, its pretensions would have to be abated. At the same time, the Cardinal's attitude of studied moderation and conciliation had averted quarrels and antagonism that would have retarded the Austrian movement away from Josephinism. The aggressive policy favored by the Zelanti would, almost certainly, have so antagonized Austria as to have prevented for an indefinite time that

Maass, IV, 142-143; Schmidlin, 344-345; Leflon, 340-341.
Power from seeking a rapprochement with the Papacy and moving away from Josephinism.

Thus Consalvi during his ministry carefully cherished that tender plant whose seeds were the ultramontane revival and royal fear of revolutionary principles, and whose fruition would be the destruction of Josephinism in Austria. He did not live to see the triumph of his work; the harvest was gathered by another's hand. But the credit for having cherished and protected its growth cannot be denied him.
2. The *Forniture* Affair: 1818-1821

Paralleling the religious controversies of 1817-1821 both in time and in effects was a financial dispute which, though less intrinsically serious, nonetheless played a similar role in undermining Austro-Papal friendship.

The subject of this dispute was the *forniture* or military supplies furnished by the Papal government to the Austrian army. During the Austrian occupation of Naples after the defeat of Murat, large bodies of Austrian troops frequently passed through the Papal States on their way to and from the Regno. The Austrian government, its military logistics system disorganized during the recent war, requested the Papal government to supply these troops with provisions. Consalvi was reluctant to add yet another financial burden to the Papal treasury, but his desire to remain on good terms with Austria and his fears that a shortage of provisions might lead to disorders among the Austrian troops led him to agree to Metternich's request in the Convention of 12 June 1815. The details of this agreement were later worked out between Consalvi and Lebzelter and embodied in a Convention of 24 August 1815. The Papal government agreed to meet the requisitions of the Austrian forces, while Austria pledged that the Papal government would be fully reimbursed for
During the remainder of the Austrian occupation of Naples, the Papal government provided the passing Imperial forces with all necessary supplies, at great financial inconvenience to itself. The reimbursement promised for this outlay was vitally necessary to the Papal treasury and hence was eagerly awaited. Unfortunately, the procrastination and evasion on the part of Austria which were to mark this whole affair soon made their appearance. Although Austria began to liquidate her debts from the Italian campaign in 1817, it was not until September 1818 that she finally dispatched an agent, Baron Johann von Koeller, to Rome to settle the Papal claims. Consalvi's annoyance at this delay, which added considerably to the financial difficulties of the Papacy, was as nothing to his indignation when Koeller announced, immediately upon his arrival, that his government had disallowed most of the Papal claim by reducing it from Scudi 135,615.87 to the "minute fraction" of Sc. 28,370.06².

Pressed by Consalvi to justify this "scandalous reduction," Koeller enumerated the Papal claims which Austria considered unjustified:

1) Sc. 37,796.50 1/8 of the fornitura had been provided not to Austrian troops, but to those of her Italian allies.

---

A.V., ANV 244, Consalvi to Leardi, 30 January 1819, which contains a very detailed account of the development of the affair. Also, Van Duerm, 81-85, Consalvi to Metternich, 10 July 1815. R242, Convention of 12 June 1815. R210, Convention of 24 August 1815.
Austria refused to assume responsibility for troops other than her own, hence this sum must be collected from the Italian states concerned. Consalvi vehemently disputed this contention. The Papal government had granted the right of transit only to Austria and had signed a Convention for the supply of troops only with her; the Italian troops had marched as part of the Austrian army and had been supplied by the Papal government only in that capacity. Therefore, he argued, Austria must accept the responsibility for supplies given to these forces.

3) Papal claims totaling Sc. 13,186.65 for the debts of Austrian officials and officers were disallowed as not being the concern of the Imperial government. Consalvi accepted this disallowance as justified.

3) Sc. 43,746.59 for clothing furnished Austrian troops was disallowed, on the ground that although this had been supplied after 12 July, it had been requisitioned before that date and hence did not come under the Convention. Consalvi rejected this reasoning, arguing that the Convention stated simply that the Papacy should be reimbursed for everything supplied after 12 July; the date of requisitioning was completely irrelevant.

4) A Papal claim for Sc. 16,237.59 7/8 for tobacco and brandy supplied was rejected on the ground that these items were not really military supplies, inasmuch as they no longer formed part of the standard ration issued to Austrian troops, and hence they did not come under the Convention. Consalvi replied that these items had been requisitioned by the appropriate Austrian
authorities, that the Papal government could not reasonably be expected to be aware of precisely what items formed part of the Austrian military ration, and that if the Austrian officers had made an unauthorized requisition the blame should fall upon them, not the Papal government. It would be most unjust to penalize the Papal government for doing everything possible to meet the needs of the Austrian army, especially as the denial of this particular requisition would no doubt have led to disorders among the troops.

5) The final deduction consisted of Sc. 10,434, of which 968,26 was for Papal errors in calculation, and the remainder for requisition forms (boni) illegibly or irregularly filled out. Consalvi agreed that the errors in calculation should be corrected, but felt that in justice Austria was bound to cover the irregular boni "because the Papal government in supplying the Austrian army did not do so for its own benefit in hope of gain, but in the character of a good neighbor and friend. . . . and if in so vast a transaction the Papal agents, ignorant of the language and of the rigorous rules of account of the Austrian army, had accepted and supplied irregular requisitions, the Papal treasury should not suffer thereby," for such errors stemmed only from the sincere desire of the Papal officials to satisfy every wish of the Austrian forces.

Consalvi therefore claimed payment in full for all the Papal claims (except the second above), "relying upon the well-known justice of His Imperial Majesty" who had assured the Pope
that the passage of his forces would not cause the Papacy the slightest loss.

With such skill and force did Consalvi argue his case that he scored a minor diplomatic triumph by winning Koeller over completely to his views. In his last conversation with Consalvi and in a later Note of 28 September 1818, the Austrian representative recognized the justice of the Papal claims. Although his instructions did not allow him to commit his government to paying these claims, he assured Consalvi that while liquidating Austrian accounts with her Italian allies, he would arrange for the collection from each state of its share of the Sc. 37,796.50 1/8 supplied to the allied troops and for the eventual delivery of this sum through the proper channels of the Austrian government to the Papacy. As for the other Papal claims, he would take upon himself the task of securing their payment by his government. 165

With this pledge Koeller departed, leaving Consalvi in apparent possession of the field. Disillusionment gradually set in as months passed with the Austrian government making no move towards paying the Papal claims. Finally, his patience exhausted and his confidence in Austrian good faith strained, Consalvi on 30 January 1819 instructed Leardi to inquire as to the intentions of the Austrian government and to press for a prompt

165 The above account of the negotiations with Koeller is based on Consalvi's detailed description in A.V., ANV 244, Consalvi to Leardi, 30 January 1819.
Since Leardi was then absent from Vienna, this task devolved upon his Uditore, Monsignor Muzi. The Uditore at first directed his inquiries to Baron Koeller, only to be told that this matter was now entirely out of Koeller's hands and in those of the Finance Minister, Count Stadion. Upon visiting Count Stadion, Muzi learned that the matter was being dealt with by one of the Count's subordinates, Councilor Joseph Von Filion, whom he would have to see.

Well aware of Consalvi's eagerness for information, Muzi at once visited Filion. To the Uditore's surprise, however, Filion refused his repeated requests for information, insisting that Muzi would have to direct himself to the Minister of Finance or the Foreign Minister. Deciding that it would be fruitless to see Stadion again, Muzi consulted Baron Johann von Stuermer, in charge of the foreign ministry while Metternich was absent from Vienna. The Baron professed himself unacquainted with the question and requested Muzi to send him an official note.

---

166 Ibid.
167 A.V., ANV 246, Leardi to Consalvi, 17 February 1819. Leardi was accompanying the Emperor on his trip to Rome. Muzi is best known for his mission to Chile in 1823; Schmidlin, 397.
168 ANV 246, Muzi to Consalvi, 10 March, 13 March, 20 March 1819. John Philip, Count von Stadion (1763-1824), Austrian Finance Minister and in charge of the administrative reorganization of the Empire.
requesting information, to which he would reply after more fully informing himself on the furniture affair.

This official note was duly sent, but Stuermer's reply was long delayed, and when it finally came added nothing to Consalvi's knowledge. The Baron merely announced that he had sent the note to Count Stadion, whose concern it was, "requesting him to make known as soon as possible the decision that will be made." 169

And there, so far as Vienna officialdom was concerned, the matter was to rest for many months.

Meanwhile, Consalvi was becoming increasingly irritated by Austria's procrastination and increasingly suspicious of her intentions. At best the Austrian government was showing little consideration for the interests of its presumed close friend the Papacy, which had been counting on the repayment of its claims to make ends meet; at worst, it seemed distinctly possible that Austria was resorting to a delaying action in a deliberate attempt to avoid paying her just debts. Certainly, Muzi's experience in being sent from one Austrian official to another, none of them willing to express any knowledge of or responsibility for the furniture affair, suggested the latter alternative. This suspicion was to grow steadily stronger as the affair dragged on. Consalvi therefore instructed Muzi to continue to press the

169
A.V., R247, Muzi to Consalvi, 8 May 1819, with undated reply of Stuermer and copy of Muzi's note to him of 22 March 1819.
Austrian government for definite information as to its intentions. At the same time, he took advantage of the Imperial visit to Rome to approach Metternich directly on the furniture question. The Prince seemed sympathetic and promised to look into the matter when he returned to Vienna, though it was not within his jurisdiction.

With this assurance Consalvi had to rest content during the summer of 1819, as Metternich did not return to Vienna until September. Nor did Muzzi succeed in stirring the Austrian bureaucracy to action or even in obtaining more definite information as to its actions.

Contrary to Consalvi's expectations, the return of Metternich to the capital failed to produce any improvement in the situation. Leardi met with Metternich several times but learned only that the matter was still under consideration by the Ministry of Finance. However, Metternich assured the nuncio that the furniture affair would be settled "soon" and in a satisfactory manner. Metternich's formal reply to Consalvi's inquiries merely repeated the same information.

Metternich may have sought to use his influence on behalf of

---

170 A.V., ANV 244, Consalvi to Muzzi, 24 April, 26 May 1819.
171 Ibid., Consalvi to Leardi, 2 October, 27 October 1819.
172 A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 15 September, 6 October, 16 October 1819.
173 Ibid., Leardi to Consalvi, 27 October 1819, with undated reply of Metternich to Consalvi.
the Papacy in the furnituré affair, as he had promised to do, but his authority was limited to his own Ministry of Foreign Affairs and his influence on other branches of the government was slight. In any case, his influence, if exerted, produced no visible results.

During the year that followed Metternich's return to Vienna, the furnituré affair made no progress toward a final settlement, but merely repeated what had gone before. Consalvi continued, with growing impatience and irritation, to exhort the Vienna nuncio to press for a settlement of the affair. Although Consalvi at times suspected Leardi of not acting with sufficient vigor, the nuncio did his best to carry out his orders; but all his efforts could not overcome the infinite talent of the Austrian bureaucracy for procrastination and evasion. For month after month Leardi went on a futile round from one Austrian minister to another, but from none could he obtain any definite information as to the status of the question; all seemed "content

Ibid., Consalvi to Leardi, 13 November, 4 December, 18 December 1819, 15 January, 19 February, 1 March, 19 April, 30 August, 4 October 1820.

See Consalvi's criticism of the nuncio on this account in R 247, Consalvi to Leardi, 4 December 1819. Leardi, though loyal to Consalvi, was not notable for energy or initiative, but in this case the Cardinal's criticism seems to have been unjustified; see Leardi's indignant defense in R 247, Leardi to Consalvi, 26 January 1820. Such outburst as this—like, indeed all strong expressions of emotion—were very rare in Consalvi's correspondence; it was no doubt an indication of the Cardinal's great annoyance and sense of frustration at the impasse which this affair had reached.
to let this disgraceful affair sleep eternally."176 Innumerable meetings with this or that minister, innumerable letters and notes to and from the Austrian government, innumerable promises that the matter would be settled "soon," hopes raised and hopes disappointed, and all with no tangible result: this was the course of the furniture affair in 1819-1820.

The outbreak of the Neapolitan Revolution in July, 1820, which made necessary a considerable increase in Papal defense spending, increased still further Consalvi's anxiety to secure rapid payment of the Papal claims "which circumstances have now made indispensable for us."177 He therefore decided to address Metternich directly. Writing on the same day that he learned of the Revolution, he begged Metternich to secure payment "au plus vite," for this event would put the Papacy in "extreme need."178 This letter having produced no effect, Consalvi renewed his appeal in August, declaring that only Metternich's intervention could bring about the settlement which was now more

---

176 Ibid., Leardi to Consalvi, 29 September 1820. Virtually every one of Leardi's dispatches in R247 for the November 1819-October 1820 period mentions some new visit by the nuncio to one Austrian minister or another in an attempt to obtain information but without success.

177 Ibid., Consalvi to Leardi, 30 August 1820. For the urgent Papal need for repayment created by the Revolution, see also: ANV. 247, Leardi to Consalvi, 24 July, 24 August, 29 September 1820. Van Duerm, 249-252, Consalvi to Metternich, 8 July, 12 August 1820.

178 Van Duerm, 249, Consalvi to Metternich, 8 July 1820.
than ever necessary.\textsuperscript{179} The Foreign Minister responded favorably, promising that as soon as he arrived at Troppau he would speak to the Emperor on this subject.\textsuperscript{180}

Consalvi realized that Metternich, preoccupied with the manifold problems arising from the Revolution, might easily forget what was for Austria a minor affair.\textsuperscript{181} Therefore while continuing to remind Metternich of his promise, he directed Leardi to go over the heads of the Austrian ministers by complaining directly to the Emperor. Francis assured the nuncio that he would look into the matter personally and see that it was settled as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{182} Thus prompted, the Emperor soon afterwards issued orders to Stadion to settle the question, but various unexplained difficulties in the Ministry of Finance once again brought delay.\textsuperscript{183} Two more months dragged by while the Emperor and Metternich were at Troppau. A letter in late November to the Foreign Minister having elicited no reply, Consalvi wrote to him again in mid-December in terms of near-

\begin{itemize}
  \item [\textsuperscript{179}] Ibid., Consalvi to Metternich, 12 August 1820.
  \item [\textsuperscript{180}] A.V., R210, Consalvi to Metternich, 22 September 1820. This letter was written to remind Metternich of his promise upon his arrival at Troppau; Metternich's letter containing this promise, like numerous others in the Consalvi-Metternich correspondence, apparently has not survived in the Vatican Archives.
  \item [\textsuperscript{181}] Ibid.
  \item [\textsuperscript{182}] A.V., ANV 247, Leardi to Consalvi, 24 August 1820.
  \item [\textsuperscript{183}] Ibid., Leardi to Consalvi, 29 September 1820; R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 28 September, 12 October 1820; Consalvi to Leardi, 4 October 1820.
\end{itemize}
desperation. The expenses of the Papal government were growing steadily as a result of the Neapolitan situation, and the need for payment of its claims was now "MOST EXTREME" (underlined three times!); if Metternich could not obtain action, Consalvi would have to send an official note of protest direct to the Emperor himself. 184

That drastic step proved to be unnecessary, for with the conclusion of the Congress of Troppau Francis I and Metternich found time to attend to the forniture affair. In late November the Emperor gave imperative orders that the matter be settled, and in mid-December the Ministry of Finance finally acted. On 16 December 1820, Leardi joyfully reported that Lebzeltern was on his way to Rome to settle the Papal claims. 185

Consalvi's satisfaction that this affair was at long last settled was short-lived, for the settlement proved little to his liking. He soon learned that the Austrian government, although it had by now spent over three tedious years going over the Papal claims, was still uncertain of its obligation to pay the greater part of them. When Lebzeltern arrived in Rome, he brought not the Sc. 106,181.01 to which the Papal government felt itself entitled, but a mere Sc. 36,000 for those claims which

184 A.V., R165, Consalvi to Metternich, 16 December 1820. Consalvi's earlier letter of 22 November is in Van Duerm, 308.

185 A.V., ANV 242, Metternich to Leardi, 22 November 1820. R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 4 December, 16 December 1820. The main purpose of Lebzeltern's mission to Rome was to request Papal assistance for the Austrian campaign against Naples. See below, Chapter IV, Section 2.
Austria had decided to accept. The remaining Papal claims would have to be submitted to a new and more detailed liquidation to be held at some unspecified future date.

Consalvi was utterly astounded and disgusted by this sudden disappointment of his hopes just as they had seemed on the verge of fulfilment at last. He protested "most vigorously" to Labzelttern, with whom he argued the Papal case for several days but without effecting any change in the Austrian stand. In Vienna Leardi too protested to Metternich, who was sympathetic but unencouraging. The Foreign Minister asserted that he had used every possible means to secure a settlement favorable to the Papacy, but unfortunately there were too many debatable points in the Papal claim for the Finance Ministry to accept it in full. Under the circumstances he could do nothing more for Consalvi.

Consalvi's indignation at this most unsatisfactory settlement, coming as it did after years of procrastination and evasion, knew no bounds. He had, he wrote Leardi, not been able to avoid feeling "the greatest disgust at hearing that, after having spent, as you justly observe, four years in the liquidation of this claim of ours, after so many supplications, after so many promises

---

186 A.V., ANV 247, Leardi to Consalvi, 16 December, 29 December 1820. R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 21 December 1820. ANV 242, Stuermer to Leardi, 26 December 1820, 3 January 1821. The exact sum claimed by the Papacy is given in ANV 244, Consalvi to Leardi, 2 October 1819.

187 A.V., ANV 245, Consalvi to Leardi, 3 January 1821.

188 A.V., ANV 247, Leardi to Consalvi, 29 December 1820.
given to us, all is to end by submitting our claim again to a new liquidation which, if one is to take the past as a guide, God knows if it will ever be finished, and that a payment so far out of proportion to the sum owed to the Pontifical Government is to be given. . . ." 189

Consalvi's doubts as to the completion of this further liquidation seem to have been well-founded, for no mention of further progress in this affair is to be found in the records of his administration. If the promised liquidation ever took place, the results would seem to have been negative, as no further mention of this point can be found in the surviving documents. 190

Though it thus disappeared from the surface of Austro-Papal relations after 1820, the effects of this "most disgusting affair" of the forniture were lasting, and most pernicious. These effects were to be seen not merely in the Papal refusal to supply the Austrian army that marched on Naples in 1821, 191 but in the

189 A.V., ANV 245, Consalvi to Leardi, 20 January 1821.

190 The writer has gone through all the pertinent files in the Vatican Archives, as well as the Archivio di Stato (Rome), to 1825, without finding any further reference to the conclusion of this liquidation or to any additional payment by Austria. The subject is never mentioned in Consalvi's correspondence with Leardi after January 1821. It is possible that all the material relating to this topic was gathered into one file which has since been lost or mislaid; but one would still expect to find at least some casual reference to it in the Consalvi-Leardi letters after 1821.

191 See below, Chapter IV, Sections 2 & 4.
general deterioration of relations between the two states. At best, Austria throughout this affair had shown little consideration for the needs and rights of its presumed partner in the Union of Throne and Altar; at worst, its conduct was susceptible of interpretation as a deliberate attempt to evade its just obligations to the Papal government. In either case, it was hardly calculated to increase Consalvi's confidence in Austria, already seriously weakened by the religious controversy. Metternich later attributed the Cardinal's growing distrust of Austria and his increasing reluctance to co-operate with her policies in Italy solely to his resentment at the forniture affair.\(^{192}\) This is certainly a great exaggeration. Consalvi's faith in Austria had already been undermined by the religious controversy, and his political principles would in any case have compelled him to oppose much of that Power's policy in Italy in 1821-1823.\(^{193}\) Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that the forniture affair did weaken still further Consalvi's already declining trust in Austria and thus widened the breach between Vienna and Rome. As drops of water can in time wear away the rock they fall on, so the many petty delays and evasions of the Austrian government, climaxed by the utterly unsatisfactory settlement which it offered, had gradually eroded Consalvi's faith in Austria. It would require only the renewed display of
Austria's desire for hegemony in the Italian Peninsula during the aftermath of the Neapolitan Revolution to sweep away what remained.
CHAPTER IV

THE REVOLUTIONS OF 1820-1821

1. Revolution in Naples

Early in July, 1820. Consalvi was distracted from his preoccupation with internal reform and religious affairs by the news that revolution had broken out in Naples. On 2 July, two Neapolitan army officers belonging to the secret society of the Carbonari led their men in a revolt which rapidly gained adherents in other units of the army. Thanks to the incompetence and panic of the senile King Ferdinand and his government, the rebels encountered no effective resistance and were soon the masters of the kingdom. The terrified king granted their demands: the radical Spanish Constitution of 1812 was proclaimed, a liberal ministry installed, and a national parliament elected. The Revolution was apparently a complete success.

Consalvi reacted with apprehension and dismay to the news of the Revolution. The Papacy could hardly welcome the establishment upon its southern frontier of a revolutionary

---

regime by a secret society notorious for its radical and anti-clerical views, a regime whose very existence was a stimulus to the Carlist of the Papal States. Papal distrust grew when revolts led by the Carbonari overthrew Papal authority in the small Papal enclaves in Neapolitan territory, Benevento and Pontecorvo, even though the Neapolitan government refused their requests for annexation. Nor was it long before anti-clerical legislation began to appear in Naples.

Under these circumstances, relations between Rome and the revolutionary government would never be cordial. The Papal attitude was always formally correct, and Consalvi was careful to avoid anything that might give unnecessary offense to Naples lest it serve as a pretext for attack. However, though accepting the new regime as the de facto government of Naples, the Papacy refused to grant it formal recognition until the other European powers had done so. 2

Except for Spain and Holland, the other European nations showed no disposition to recognize the new government. Indeed, it soon became evident that the great powers were implacably hostile to the Neapolitan regime and that Austria in particular was determined to suppress it. From this Austrian determination sprang most of Consalvi's problems in 1820-1821.

Unfortunately for the Papacy, its states lay between Naples and the Austrian territories; if Austria proposed to invade Naples, her army would first have to pass through the Papal States. Thus the Papacy would inevitably be involved, directly or indirectly, in any Austro-Neapolitan hostilities—a most serious situation, particularly in view of the Pope's dual character. The Pope was obliged by his religious character to maintain peace with all states unless attacked and to preserve his neutrality in wars involving other states. Common prudence dictated the same policy, for the militarily weak Papacy could not hope to defend its states against a determined attack. Unfortunately, the geographical position of the Papal States would make the preservation of this desirable neutrality difficult in an Austro-Neapolitan war. A serious complication was the attitude of Austria, which felt that as the champion of order and the conservative cause it deserved the whole-heartd support of the Papacy against Naples and would be most indignant if such support was not forthcoming. Hence, the Papal dilemma: to give Austria the full support she desired would be to violate Papal neutrality and risk provoking Neapolitan invasion; to refuse that support would mean alienating Austria and perhaps the other conservative powers as well. Consalvi's main concern during the fall and winter of 1820-1821 was to extricate the Papacy from this dilemma.

The Secretary of State was not long left in doubt as to the intentions of Austria towards the Neapolitan regime. Within a
few weeks after the revolution Leardi reported that Vienna, fearing the spread of revolution to the rest of Europe, was resolved to "ristabilire l'ordine turbato" in Naples, by force if necessary. The army in Lombardy-Venetia had already been ordered on a war footing. Soon thereafter, the Austrian government in a note of 10 August announced to the various Italian courts the mobilization of its forces and its determination to restore the legitimate order in Naples. The Italian states were called upon to support Austria by exhibiting a "strong and pronounced moral attitude" against the revolutionary regime.

Consalvi's first reaction to the news of the Austrian plans was extreme agitation. "We are lost [he told the Prussian ambassador]. . . . At the first news that Austrian troops have moved from Ferrara, the Neapolitans will occupy Rome." Yet he realized that to oppose Austria's plans would certainly antagonize that power. Any doubts he might have had on that point were removed in mid-August when Leardi reported that Austria was most irritated because the Papacy had not adopted a sufficiently condemnatory attitude towards Naples and was not supporting the Austrian position with sufficient vigor. Vienna was "firmly

---

3 A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 27 July 1820.
4 A.V., R165, Gennotte to Consalvi, 10 August 1820.
5 Van Duerm, 253, Note 1, Niebuhr to Gennotte, 2 August 1820.
determined to restore the old order at Naples, and desires that all the Italian governments declare themselves in favor of such an operation, or at least condemn what has happened." This the Papacy had not done, moving Metternich to exclaim angrily that "The fools prefer the Carbonari to the Austrians." The Foreign Minister was also displeased by rumours that Pius VII was planning to grant his subjects a constitution. 6

Metternich refused to see Leardi when the latter sought an interview to defend the Papacy against these charges. Consalvi therefore accompanied the official Papal reply to the Austrian note of 10 August (which merely expressed disapproval of the Neapolitan regime, passing over in silence the question of support for Austria against it) with a confidential letter to Metternich in which he explained the true Papal position. Consalvi "agrees perfectly with the sentiments of H.I.R.A.M.... on the forces of revolution in Naples, as well as the dangers that can result from them." He acknowledged that only in cooperation of all governments was safety to be found, but unfortunately the peculiar situation of the Papacy imposed certain limitations upon its co-operation. As the Cardinal explained to Metternich:

6
A.V., ANV 247, Leardi to Consalvi, 21 August 1820; also 16 August 1820.
means of defense, you will no doubt perceive the
invincible necessity that the Holy Father act with
care on certain measures for putting into effect
his union with H.I.R.A.M., if it is a question of
taking an inimical attitude towards the Neapolitan
government.

In his capacity as Head of the Church . . . ,
if the Holy Father cannot, even to save his political
existence, take action against non-Catholic nations
in order not to injure their relations with their
Catholic subjects, much less can He do so against an
entirely Catholic state, and still less to the most
certain detriment of a very recent concordat of such
great importance for religion [i.e., the Concordat
of 1818 which had made important concessions to the
Papacy]. The Holy See, which has always regarded the
sects as opposed to the spirit of that religion of
which it is the center . . , will never cease to fight
them, and all governments that seek to destroy them
will always find in the Holy See the most constant
and sincere support . . . But the religious relations
. . . which the Holy See must preserve with all govern-
ments. . . forbid it to take a hostile attitude to any
government. . . The Pope, even in matters where he
acts as a temporal sovereign, can never forget [these
religious considerations] nor prefer any temporal
advantage to them . . .

But this is still more evident . . . when one
considers the Holy Father as sovereign of a state
bordering on Naples . . . lacking any means of defense.
It is known with certainty that the Neapolitan govern-
ment, or rather the Carbonari, are only seeking a pre-
text to invade the Papal States. . . . The least appear-
ance of a hostile attitude on the part of the Holy
Father would suffice to attract immediately the entry
of the Neapolitans into His states. . . , carrying
there the flames of revolutions.

All that I have said above will demonstrate to
Y.H. how the most just and compelling motives force
the Holy Father to avoid . . certain measures in put-
ting into practice his union with H.I.R.A.M. if it
involves acting against the Neapolitan government.

Consalvi concluded by stressing again his desire to aid Austria
whenever possible, but at the same time expressing his hope that
Metternich would understand and sympathize with the difficulties
of the Papal position. Soon afterwards, Leardi was instructed to see Metternich and deny the absurd rumours that the Papacy preferred the Carbonari to Austria and that Pius VII was planning to grant a constitution.

At the same time, Consalvi took pains to demonstrate his friendliness to Austria by deeds as well as words. Early in August, Metternich had requested Consalvi to pass on to him all information on the activities of the Neapolitans collected by Papal officials. In order to show his good will Consalvi agreed to this request, though it was hardly in keeping with Papal neutrality; he therefore asked that it be kept strictly secret. The Cardinal continued this flow of useful information until the final overthrow of the Neapolitan regime. Another proof of his good will was given later in August, when he complied with an Austrian request to arrest an ex-officer of the Italian army suspected of Carbonari leanings.

Consalvi's assurances, supported by these tangible proofs of good will, succeeded in dispelling Metternich's former doubts about the Papal attitude. At their next meeting, the Prince

A.V., R165, Consalvi to Metternich, 23 August 1820.
8 A.V., ANV 244, Consalvi to Leardi, 9 September 1820.
9 Ibid., Consalvi to Metternich, 12 August 1820.
10 Examples, too numerous to list individually, may be found in Ibid., 252-356.
11 Ibid., 259, Consalvi to Metternich, 19 August 1820.
received Leardi in the most friendly manner possible, warmly praised Consalvi's "wise and prudent conduct," and "declared himself completely satisfied with the honest and loyal principles and maxims of the Pontifical government, which he unceasingly applauded." As a token of Austrian friendship, Metternich offered troops to defend the Pope against any attack, but only if the Holy Father voluntarily requested them. Leardi could detect no lingering trace of doubt or suspicion in his manner.  

The Secretary of State took another opportunity to display Papal friendship, not to say partiality, for Austria in late September. Two Neapolitan diplomats, the Duke di Gallo and Prince Cimitile, had stopped in Bologna on their return from unsuccessful missions to Austria. Their presence so near to Lombardy where they could easily spy on Austrian military preparations was most displeasing to Vienna. Metternich therefore secretly requested that neither they nor any other Neapolitans be allowed to remain long in Bologna, and that in the interim their correspondence should be intercepted by the Papal police.  

Consalvi promptly arranged for the interception of the Neapolitans' mail, with no apparent qualms, but he was reluctant to antagonize Naples by bluntly ordering the diplomats to leave Bologna. Instead, he instructed the Legate in that city,

12 A.V., ANV 247, Leardi to Consalvi, 29 September 1820.

13 Van Duerm, 279, Metternich to Consalvi, 15 September 1820. A.V., R242, Consalvi to Spina, 25 September 1820. R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 14 September, 18 September 1820.
Cardinal Spina, to interview the Neapolitans, point out the embarrassing position in which their prolonged stay was placing the Papacy, and request their co-operation in leaving as soon as possible. Thus approached, Gallo and Cimitile explained that they were only awaiting orders from Naples before leaving Bologna, and their intercepted correspondence confirmed this claim. 14 Their orders soon arrived, and by late October both diplomats had departed.

During the fall of 1820, then, Austria and the Papacy seemed to be drawing together under the threat posed to both by the outbreak of revolution in Naples. Consalvi's friendly attitude made a favorable impression upon Vienna; Metternich's letters to the Cardinal during this period are more friendly in tone than any since 1817. This was also the period, it will be remembered, at which Francis I seemed about to turn away from his Josephist policies and to co-operate with the Papacy in religious matters. In consequence, Austro-Papal relations during the fall and winter of 1820 were more cordial than they had been for three years and more. It seemed possible that the Austro-Papal alliance, strained by religious strife, might yet be restored to its pristine vigor.

14 A.V., R242, Consalvi to Spina, 25 September 1820; Spina to Consalvi, 30 September, 7 October 1820.
2. The Preliminaries to Austrian Intervention

Austrian preparations for intervention in Naples went forward rapidly in the fall of 1820. Military preparations were soon completed, but the diplomatic preliminaries were lengthy. Before Austria could act, she had first to obtain the support of the other powers and to arrange with the Papacy for the passage of Austrian troops.

The support of the Powers was sought at the Congress of Troppau in October-November 1820.\textsuperscript{15} England and France, though privately friendly to the Austrian intervention, refrained for political reasons from openly endorsing it. Russia and Prussia, however, proclaimed their solidarity with Austria in the well-known Troppau Protocol, which announced that: "States...which have undergone a change of regime due to revolution, the results of which menace other states, \textit{ipso facto} cease to be part of the Alliance, and remain excluded from it until their situation gives guarantees of legal order and stability..." If these states "cause by their proximity other countries to fear immediate danger," the Allied Powers would employ force

if necessary to "bring them back into the midst of the Alliance."\textsuperscript{16}

With the support of the Powers thus assured, the next move was to secure Papal consent for the passage of Austrian troops. Consalvi had long since foreseen such a demand, and while the Congress of Troppau was still in session he had outlined to the Paris nuncio Monsignor Vincenzo Macchi, the general policy which he planned to follow:

There are four main points to be considered: first, the passage of Austrian troops through the Papal States; second, the stationing of part of these troops in the Papal States; third, the supplies to be provided for these troops; fourth, the restoration to His Holiness of Benevento and Pontecorvo. To begin with the last, there can be no doubt that both these territories must be restored at once to His Holiness. . . . Should the Austrians propose to leave garrisons in those places to preserve order, the Papal government will take care of that itself.

As for supplying the army, the Papal government is definitely not in a position to assume any obligation, for it lacks the necessary resources . . . . [Also, to furnish supplies] would be to take an active part against the Kingdom of Naples, contrary to the attitude which the Papal government must by its nature take towards all states. . . . Finally, there is the difficulty which has been and still is being experienced in securing reimbursement from the Austrian government for its expenditures made for the maintenance of its troops in past years. . . .

The stationing of Austrian troops in the Papal State could only be asked by the Imperial Court for the preservation of its communications with the army in Naples, or for the preservation of order within

the Papal State. No other reason could be accepted by a government which must preserve perfect neutrality. But the first of these reasons does not require the presence of Austrian garrisons in the fortresses of the Papal State nor the stationing of Austrian forces at any point within the State. . . . The second motive does not exist, and is proved by the tranquility maintained here during the last four months. . . . The Papal government therefore does not intend to consent [to the stationing of Austrian troops].

Finally, the Holy Father does not intend to refuse passage to the Austrian army, but . . . given the peculiar position of His Holiness, his acquiescence must be hidden in some way. I can assure you that the other European governments believe that. . . . the Holy Father, because of his essential neutrality, must protest against the passage. But the Holy Father, because of the special friendship which binds him to H.M. . . . would like to spare him even the appearance of acting against a protest on his part, and wishes to find some way to avoid this while still concealing his consent to the passage of troops. When the Imperial Court makes its request for the passage, I will concert with the Austrian ambassador some way to allow it without compromising the neutrality of the Holy Father and without creating the impression that Austria is acting contrary to a protest of His Holiness.17

Two points worthy of comment stand out in the above explanation. First, it is clear that Consalvi had little interest in strict Papal neutrality per se. Partly from dislike of revolution, partly from a desire to retain Austrian good will, he was quite willing to allow the passage of the Austrian army, provided that Papal acquiescence could be concealed. His primary motive for insisting on the preservation of neutrality in public

17 A.V., Archives of the Nunciature at Paris (hereafter cited as ANP), file VIII, Consalvi to Macchi, 1 November 1820. A similar explanation was later sent to Leardil: R165, 15 November 1820. Monsignor Vincenzo Macchi, a supporter of Consalvi and a skillful diplomat, named nuncio in Paris in 1819; made a Cardinal in 1825.
was his fear of a Neapolitan invasion, which haunted him from beginning to end of the Neapolitan crisis.\textsuperscript{18} He was ceaselessly aware that the Papal army could never resist a strong Neapolitan attack, which would cause immense damage; in addition to the material damage to the Capital of the Church and the blow to Papal prestige, he feared that if Pius VII was forced to flee Rome again, the hardships of the journey in his present very poor health might easily kill him.\textsuperscript{19} This same disinterest in the principle of neutrality was to mark the Cardinal's conduct throughout the Neapolitan crisis--a good example of Consalvi's generally pragmatic approach to all questions that did not involve the essential rights of the Papacy or the doctrine of the Church.

The second notable point is that, while Consalvi still hoped to preserve friendly relations with Austria, a certain distrust of that Power had become evident on his part. The furniture affair had evidently destroyed the Cardinal's confidence in Austrian good faith in financial matters. More significant was his obvious determination to prevent the stationing of Austrian troops anywhere on Papal territory. Though not explicitly stated, it seems likely that one reason underlying this determination was Consalvi's fear of the increased Austrian

\textsuperscript{18} See, e.g., Van Duerm, 253, Note 1, 2 August 1820; Petrocchi 1943, 78, Consalvi to Opizzoni, 24 January 1821.

\textsuperscript{19} Petrocchi 1943, 78.
influence, not to say control, in the Papal States that would result from such an occupation. This control would restrict the temporal independence of the Papacy which seemed essential for that spiritual freedom which Consalvi was determined to preserve. Here, in the midst of apparently growing Austro-Papal good will, were the seeds of distrust—a threatening portent for the future.

Consalvi soon had occasion to apply the principles outlined in the above dispatch. In a confidential letter of 22 November, Metternich asked the Cardinal whether the Papacy would agree to the passage of Austrian troops and would provide them with supplies. He also hinted that an Austrian occupation of the strategic city of Ancona might be necessary to protect it from the Neapolitans. Finally, he requested Consalvi to tell him in confidence the views of the Pope as to the possibility of a Papal condemnation of the Carbonari.20

In his reply, the Secretary of State praised the decisions made by the Powers at Troppau (of which Apponyi had informed him in confidence) and declared that the Papacy would do everything possible to support them. Metternich’s requests were then answered in accordance with the Cardinal’s previously-determined principles. The Pope could not formally agree to the passage of Austrian troops, but “perhaps some accommodation can be worked

20 Van Duerm, 311, Metternich to Consalvi, 22 November 1820; 315, Consalvi to Metternich, 5 December 1820.
out" between Consalvi and Apponyi. The Papal government could not supply the Austrian forces, for the reasons earlier explained to the Paris nuncio. There was no need for Austria to "protect" Ancona, for it was safe from attack. Consalvi did not mention the condemnation of the Carbonari; the Papacy was long to remain wary of such a move. 21

The Troppau Powers hoped to secure more from the Papacy than mere permission for the passage of troops; they hoped to enlist its moral support for their intervention. Late in November they requested the Pope to support their invitation to the King of Naples to attend the coming Congress at Laybach. Such support might be useful in overcoming the resistance which the Neapolitan Parliament was expected to make to the King's attendance. Hoping that the Congress might lead to a peaceful settlement, Pius VII willingly sent King Ferdinand a personal letter urging him to attend in the interests of peace and order. 22

The Powers wished to secure the full support and formal approval of all the Italian states from the Austrian intervention; the approval of the Pope was especially desired because of his dual status as an important Italian prince and as Head of the Church. In late December of 1820, therefore, the Allies requested Pius VII to send a representative to join in the deliberations at Laybach. According to the invitation sent to the Pope,

21 Ibid., 315, Consalvi to Metternich, 5 December 1820.
22 A.V., ANV 244, Pius VII to Ferdinand I, 3 December 1820.
the purpose of the Congress was to work out a new Neapolitan sys-
tem of government which would "ensure tranquility and peace to
Naples and Europe." Since the new system of government would
certainly be a matter of concern to neighboring states, Consalvi
was willing to agree to the Allied request, though he knew well
that other aspects of the Neapolitan situation would be discussed
including the use of force against Naples. He insisted, however,
that the Powers must first send Pius VII a formal note of in-
vitation, to avoid giving Naples the impression that the Papacy
was spontaneously participating in what the Neapolitans con-
sidered a hostile gathering. This done, Consalvi appointed
Cardinal Spina, his most trusted lieutenant, to act as Papal
representative at Laybach.23

At the same time, the Allies adopted a Russian proposal to
appeal to the Pope to act as mediator in ending the Neapolitan
crisis. Austria was not pleased with this suggestion, which it
felt was an attempt to provide Ferdinand with an alternative to
Austrian intervention, but felt obliged to agree. Leibenztern was
entrusted with this mission to Rome; he was secretly instructed
by Metternich that while seeming to seek Papal mediation, he
should in fact try to turn the Papacy against it.24

23
A.V., R165, Consalvi to Metternich, 6 January 1821. R242,
Apponyi to Consalvi, 6 January 1821; Consalvi to Apponyi, 7
January 1821. Giuseppe Cardinal Spina (1756-1828) played an im-
portant part in negotiating the French Concordat of 1801; ap-
pointed Legate of Bologna in 1817; one of Consalvi’s ablest and
most devoted supporters.
24
Leibenztern, 396-400.
Metternich's instructions were superfluous. When Lebzeltern arrived in Rome, he found the Papal government already opposed to the idea of mediation. Consalvi explained his reasons for opposition in a confidential letter of 6 January to Metternich. The Pope would have wished to act as mediator, partly to show his appreciation of the honor paid him by the Allied invitation, partly because his religious character obliged him to further peace whenever possible. Unfortunately, certain practical difficulties made this impossible. Since the King of Naples was now in Laybach, the Papacy would have to mediate between the Allies and the King on one hand, and a rebellious Parliament on the other; the Pope would then have to recognize the Parliament as representing the people and as being capable of being the other party in the proposed mediation. Furthermore, the rebels were determined to have the 1812 Constitution, the Powers were determined they should not; it was difficult to see what compromise could be worked out between these two extremes. Hence, the mediation could hardly succeed. The only possible compromise would be the adoption of some less radical constitution, but the Pope could not suggest this lest it give rise to demands that he grant his own subjects a similar constitution.

For these reasons, the Pope could not agree to act as a mediator. He was eager to do everything possible to aid the Allies and avert the threat of war, but under existing circumstances the most he could do would be to write a letter to the
Neapolitan people pointing out "the dangers of war, the happiness of being assured of peace, the duties to legitimate authority imposed by religion, and similar things. . . . But what effect could this have on the Liberals?" This offer was apparently never taken up by the Allies.

During his visit to Rome, Lebzeltern also discussed a number of other points connected with the proposed Austrian intervention. The first point was the passage of Austrian troops through the Papal State. The Austrian government had planned a formal request for Papal permission, but Consalvi rejected this plan as likely to antagonize Naples. Instead, "give us," he asked Metternich, . "a Note in which we are told that after having exhausted all means of conciliation, finding yourselves obliged to fight, and considering that the enemy is near at hand, etc., you are regretfully compelled to enter our territory without a previous request, etc. This is plausible at least, and the Neapolitans will probably believe it."26

Lebzeltern had also been instructed to request that Austria be allowed to garrison Ancona. Consalvi flatly refused. To Metternich, he explained that no motive existed to justify such a breach of Papal neutrality. Ancona was well defended by Papal troops and in no danger of capture by the Neapolitans. Nor did Austria have any real need to occupy the city, either as a supply

25 A.V., R165, Consalvi to Metternich, 6 January 1821.
26 Ibid.
base or as a center upon which her army could fall back in the event of a retreat: supplies could be stored at many other points, and it was hardly likely that the superior Austrian forces could be driven all the way back to Ancona by the Neapolitan army. The occupation of Ancona would therefore be at most a convenience for Austria, and the Pope could not be expected to violate his neutrality merely for the sake of Austrian convenience. Such a violation, Consalvi warned, would surely lead to a Neapolitan invasion in reprisal, and he drew a lurid picture for Metternich's benefit of vengeful Neapolitans sacking Rome and destroying the artistic and cultural heritage of centuries while even St. Peter's and the Vatican went up in flames. Austria could not expect the Pope to expose his territories to such devastation without good cause. To Lebzeltern's suggestion that the Papacy yield Ancona after a feigned resistance, Consalvi replied that this stratagem would hardly deceive the Neapolitans, and that in any case it would present to the world the unedifying spectacle of apparent strife between the Papacy and Austria just when their firm unity should be known to all. 27

Consalvi was most determined to prevent Austrian occupation

27 Ibid. See also ANV 245, Consalvi to Leardi, 16 January 1821, which contains a good description of the negotiations over Ancona to that date.
of Ancona. He had previously ordered the commander of the Ancona garrison under no circumstances to allow any foreign troops to enter the place.\(^{28}\) Now, in addition to writing direct to Metternich, he also wrote secretly to Count Blacas, the French representative at Laybach, asking him to use his influence to prevent the proposed occupation.\(^{29}\) As the traditional rival of \(^{Austria}\) in Italy, France would no doubt be willing to support the Papacy on this point.

French intervention was not necessary. Upon receiving Consalvi's letter of 6 January, Metternich replied that the Emperor, to show his special respect for the Pope, had ordered that the Neapolitan campaign be planned without the use of Ancona as an Austrian base.\(^{30}\) For the time being, Consalvi's resistance to the occupation of that city seemed successful. However, Metternich had not given up hope of overcoming the "resistance opiniatre" of Consalvi; he was only awaiting a more favorable moment to renew his demands.\(^{31}\) The question of Ancona would once again rise to trouble Austro-Papal relations.

\(^{28}\) A.V., R242, Consalvi to Col. Silvagni, 23 December 1820.

\(^{29}\) A.V., R165, Consalvi to Blacas, 6 January 1821. Pierre Louis Comte de Blacas d'Aulps (1771-1839), close friend and adviser of Louis XVIII of France; French ambassador to the Papacy, 1816-1822; sympathetic to the Papacy.

\(^{30}\) A.V., R242, Metternich to Consalvi, 18 January 1821.

\(^{31}\) Van Duerm, 359, Metternich to Apponyi, 21 January 1821.
3. The Congress of Laybach

In response to the invitation of the Powers, Consalvi had agreed to send Cardinal Spina to represent the Papacy at the Congress of Laybach, which opened on 12 January 1821. The central theme of the Instructions which he had prepared for Spina's guidance at the Congress was the compelling necessity of preserving Papal neutrality. The official purpose of Spina's mission was to study the measures adopted towards the new government of Naples lest they should prove to contain anything likely to be detrimental to the welfare of the neighboring Papal State. "Only from this point of view is the Papal representative to participate in the measures to be taken in regard to the Kingdom of Naples;" he might give his personal opinion on other points, but he could not speak as the official Papal delegate. Above all, he must not involve the Papacy in any way, directly or indirectly, in any hostile measure towards Naples, but should take care to preserve the "most perfect neutrality" of the Papacy.

The preservation of Papal neutrality was also to be the

On the Congress of Laybach, see Schroeder, 104-128; Webster, 312-345; Brady, 77-93; Angelo Tamborra, "I Congressi della Santa Alleanza di Lubiana e di Verone e la politica della Santa Sede," Archivio storico italiano, 1960, 190-211.
governing factor should the Allies renew their request for Papal mediation; however, Spina was to make no commitments on such a request, but should instead refer it to Rome for careful consideration. If the subject of Papal condemnation of the Carbonari should be brought up, Spina was to explain that as yet the Papacy lacked sufficient information on the Society's religious principles to justify a condemnation. Finally, the Powers were reported to be planning to request the Italian governments to carry out various internal reforms to allay popular discontent. Because of the peculiar character of the Papacy, this was a very delicate question. No form of constitutional or parliamentary government could be considered by the Papacy; any other type of reform suggested by the Powers should be referred to Rome for judgment.33

Arriving in Laybach on 22 January, Spina learned from Metternich that the Powers had already agreed to put the principles of the Troppau Protocol into practice. Within ten days an Austrian army with the blessing of the Allies was to advance against Naples to suppress the constitutional regime and restore the King to his full authority. In effect, the representatives of the Italian states had been summoned to Laybach to give their approval to this plan. Spina at once reminded Metternich that "the Pope, both from his character and from the geographical position of his states cannot depart for a moment

33 A.V., R242, Instructions for Spina, 10 January 1821.
from his system of the most perfect neutrality, and that in case of any communication made to me, my reply can only be in full accord with this principle." The Prince assured Spina "many times that nothing more than this was or would be asked of us." 34

The Italian representatives, including Spina were first to participate in the Congress at the session of 26 January. Despite Metternich's assurances, Spina learned that at this meeting he, like the other Italian delegates, would be expected to express his government's approval for the Allied proposals. Naples was to be called upon by the Allies to abolish the revolutionary regime and restore full royal authority. An Austrian army would be dispatched to Naples to preserve order during the change of government, but if the demands of the Powers were rejected, then the army would impose them upon Naples by force. Spina saw Metternich before the session and warned him that he could not approve these measures with their implicit threat of war against Naples, for this would be a violation of Papal neutrality. 35

Metternich was not moved from his course by Spina's arguments. At the meeting on the 26th, he explained the Allied plan to the Italian representatives and requested their formal approval for it. Spina's comments were sought first. He reiterated that the neutrality of the Papacy must prevent it from giving its approval to any plan that involved the use of force

34 Ibid., Spina to Consalvi, 24 January 1821 (#3).
35 Ibid., Spina to Consalvi, 28 January 1821.
against Naples. Metternich denied that there was any reason why the Papacy could not approve the Allied plan, which was essentially peaceful and conciliatory, the use of force being threatened only in the hypothetical situation that Naples refused to accept it. Spina was unimpressed by this reasoning, which could not alter the fact that the threat of force was an essential part of the plan. The Papacy could not approve the plan without implicitly approving its parts, including the possible use of force against Naples.

The Russian representative, Capo di Istria, next rose to attack Spina from a different angle. He argued that the Pope, having sent a representative to discuss a new system of government for Naples, had by that very fact agreed that the existing Neapolitan government should be destroyed. Having approved this end, the Pope could not logically refuse to approve any means necessary to attain it, the use of force included. Spina retorted that the Pope had a legitimate right to participate in a congress that was to set up a new Neapolitan government, for changes in the Neapolitan system could have repercussions upon his own neighboring territories. Such participation, however, did not commit the Papacy to approve either that system of government or the means used to establish it. The Pope would gladly approve all peaceful means for settling the Neapolitan crisis; but the Allied proposals joined to conciliation a threat of force which the Pope's neutrality forbade him to approve.
The final attack on Spina came from the English observer, Lord Stewart, who remarked that although England, like the Papacy, had adopted a neutral position in public on the proposed intervention, she nonetheless realized that the revolution had been a disaster and accepted the Allied measures to be taken against it. The beleaguered Papal delegate now found an ally in Blacas, who pointed out to Stewart that the Papal government, which had the revolutionary regime at its very doorstep, could hardly adopt the same attitude towards it as England, which was a safe distance away. The French representative's intervention brought the discussion to an end.36

As Spina was not to be moved from his stand, it was agreed that he should prepare a statement explaining the Papal position for the Journal of the Congress. In this statement, composed with the aid of Blacas, Spina put on record the arguments he had used at the meeting of the 26th, but stressed especially that the Papal refusal to approve the Allied measures stemmed not from any opposition to those measures as such, but only from the necessity of preserving Papal neutrality.37

Consalvi fully approved the position taken by Spina and

---

This account of the session of 26 January is based on Spina's report to Consalvi, R242, 28 January 1821. It is essentially the same as that in Brady, 81-84, based on the same document. The earlier version in Bianchi, II, 43-44, is inaccurate. Jean, Conte de Capo d'Istria (1775-1831), Greek statesman in Russian service, 1807-1827; later a leading figure in the Greek Revolution. Charles Vane, Lord Stewart, British Ambassador in Vienna; half-brother of Lord Castlereagh.

---

Ibid., with Nota Verbale of 28 January 1821 enclosed.
praised the skill with which he had carried out his instructions. He directed the Papal delegate to persist in his refusal to associate the Papacy with any plan that involved even the possibility of military action. Spina's sole official function at the Congress, Consalvi stressed, must be to study and comment upon the new system of government for Naples. 38

This new system of government was presented to the Congress on 20 February. It contained only two significant innovations: separate administrations were to be set up for Naples and for Sicily, which were to be joined only by a common monarch; and a system of advisory councils appointed by the king and under his control was to be created to share in the work of government. 39

When asked for his comments upon this system, Spina replied that since he did not have full powers he could not formally approve the plan and would refer it to Rome. However, it was his own opinion that the Plan contained "no principle that might harm the rights and interests of the States of the Holy See," and that accordingly the Pope would "do full justice to the purity of His Majesty's intentions." 40

The other Italian states having given their approval, the plan was accepted on 25 February 1821. The Congress then closed

38 Ibid., Consalvi to Spina, 8 February 1821.
39 Ibid., Journal of the Congress, 20 February 1821;
Declaration of the King of Naples, in Spina to Consalvi, 22 February 1821.
40 Ibid., Spina's Note of 21 February 1821.
with the resolution that another Congress should be held at Florence in September 1822 to consider the development of the situation in Italy. 41

Ibid., Spina to Consalvi, 27 February 1821. The delegates of the Italian states now left Lainbach, but those of the great powers remained to observe the progress of the Austrian intervention.
On 6 February an Austrian army of 50,000 men crossed the Po and advanced southwards through the Papal States on their way to Naples. In keeping with Consalvi's advice to Metternich, Austria did not formally request permission for the passage of its forces, permission which the Papacy could not grant without openly violating its neutrality. To all appearances, the Austrian government simply presented the Papacy with a fait accompli. In all probability, however, this method of procedure had previously been agreed upon in discussions between Consalvi and the Austrian ambassador as the best way of avoiding an open violation of neutrality, as Consalvi had planned.

Consalvi had already, in late January, instructed his subordinates how to react to the entry of foreign troops. Since the Papacy was at war with no one, all foreign regular troops should be treated as friends and no opposition to their passage should be made. However, this friendly attitude should not extend to supplying them, except that local town officials might if necessary provide lodgings for passing troops. Nor, Consalvi

---

42 Ibid., Consalvi to Spina, 12 February 1821.
43 Van Duem, 311, Consalvi to Metternich, 5 December 1820.
R165, Consalvi to Metternich, 6 January 1821. ANP-VIII, Consalvi to Macchi, 1 November 1820.
stressed, were foreign troops under any circumstances to be admitted to any fortified place in the State. Even in unfortified places, the stay of foreign troops should be no longer than military considerations required. During this sojourn of foreign troops, Papal civil and military officials were to continue with their normal duties, nor was any foreign interference with the Papal administration to be tolerated. These principles applied only to regular troops; irregular forces, which would be undisciplined and would have to live off the country, were to be driven away. As these regulations applied to both Austrians and Neapolitans, the Papacy could not be accused of partiality, though of course Austria would profit far more from them than Naples.

After the entrance of the Austrian army, Consalvi again wrote to his subordinates, informing them of the Allied decisions at Laybach and ordering them to observe scrupulously his previous instructions. On 8 February he issued a Proclamation to inform the People of the State of the situation. This document explained the reasons for the Austrian troop movements, described the attitude of neutrality adopted by the Papacy, and called upon the people to treat the Austrians as friends.

---

44 A.V., R210, Consalvi to all Delegates and Legates, 27 January 1821.
45 A.V., R242, Consalvi to all Delegates and Legates, 7 February 1821.
46 Ibid., Notificazione of 8 February 1821.
At the beginning of the Neapolitan campaign, Consalvi insisted upon rigorous compliance with his instructions in order to avoid any open violation of neutrality or any friction with the passing Austrian forces. As the campaign progressed, however, it became increasingly evident that these aims could not be completely achieved. Difficulties soon arose on two points: the supplying of Austrian troops and Austrian attempts to occupy certain places in the Papal States.

Consalvi's rule against supplying Austrian troops soon broke down. The Austrian government before the campaign had given contracts to local agents (fornitori) to supply its troops. Unfortunately, these preparations had not been made on a sufficiently large scale, and to make matters worse, these fornitori were often unable to fulfill their contracts. Local Papal officials were thereby placed in a very difficult position, forced to choose between departing from their prescribed neutrality and seeing the Austrians resort of necessity to living off the countryside.

This problem arose as soon as the Austrians reached Bologna, the first Papal city on their march south. The Austrian commander requested the Vice-Legate, Monsignor Amat, to provide his troops with hospitals and baggage animals, for which his government had failed to make arrangements. Amat felt justified on humanitarian grounds in authorizing the care of the sick in local hospitals. Furnishing transportation was a more delicate
matter, but at length Amat decided to persuade a number of local citizens to provide the Austrians with the necessary vehicles and animals, promising future compensation. Another problem arose when the Austrian quartermaster asked the Vice-Legate to lend him 50,000 francs with which to pay the local fornitore in advance, for otherwise the latter would be unable to buy the necessary supplies. Amat refused this request but did agree to persuade, secretly, a local banker to honor an Austrian draft for 12,000 francs with which to tide the fornitore over the immediate crisis. Amat defended his conduct, which he feared was not in keeping with Consalvi's instructions, on the grounds that he had acted in the only possible way to prevent the disorder that could have resulted from the failure of the Austrian supply system. Moreover, he had been careful to act secretly and privately, so that Papal neutrality had not been formally or openly compromised. 47

Consalvi agreed that circumstances had justified Amat's conduct, but advised him to avoid such measures unless absolutely necessary. 48 When a similar problem came up at Perugia, the Cardinal suggested that the local officials there imitate Amat's example by obtaining transportation unofficially for the Austrians. 49

47 A.V., R210, Amat to Consalvi, 10 February 1821.
48 Ibid., Consalvi to Amat, 17 February 1821.
49 Ibid., Consalvi to the Delegate of Perugia, 14 February 1821.
The events at Bologna were repeated with variations in other cities as the Austrian army moved southwards. At the outset, Consalvi continued to insist on the strict observance of neutrality by local officials, and subordinates who stepped too far beyond his instructions received stinging rebukes. Under the pressure of events, however, he was gradually driven to approve an ever-increasing degree of assistance to Austrian forces by his subordinates, to the detriment of strict neutrality. Consalvi himself worked out with Apponyi a general arrangement for the treatment of the Austrian sick, who were to be received into Papal hospitals or, if these proved insufficient, into new hospitals that should be set up and supplied by the fornitori. This policy, however, could be defended on humanitarian grounds against the charge of violating Papal neutrality.

A few days later, on 17 February, Consalvi intervening in another problem, instructed the Delegates to use their influence unofficially with local merchants and farmers who were taking advantage of the increased demand caused by the presence of Austrian troops to raise their prices to exorbitant heights. Such price raising made it difficult for the fornitori to keep the Austrians adequately supplied, and the resulting shortages

---

50 Ibid., Delegate of Viterbo to Consalvi, 17 February 1821; Consalvi to Delegate of Viterbo, 19 February 1821.
51 Ibid., Consalvi to Aven and the Delegates of Urbino, Ancona, Perugia, and Viterbo, 14 February 1821.
could lead to disorders among the troops. Consalvi therefore sought to keep prices at a reasonable level, but without formal action by the government.52

The further the Austrians advanced from their base of operations in Lombardy-Venetia, the less efficient their supply system became, until by late February it seemed on the verge of breaking down altogether. Consalvi suspected that this was the work of the Settarj, who hoped to sabotage the Austrian expedition.53 In all probability, however, the chief reasons were the inadequate preparations and the lack of co-ordination in the Austrian army, added to the innate difficulties of supplying a large number of men in a relatively unproductive country with inadequate means of transportation.

Whatever the cause, the breakdown of the supply system could have serious consequences for the Papal States. To prevent that calamity, Consalvi was compelled to authorize increasingly greater departures from strict neutrality.54 When in late February the Austrian supply system failed at Perugia and no one could be found to provision the troops, Consalvi allowed the local authorities to take over the burden of supply.55 At the

52 Ibid., Consalvi to all Delegates, 17 February 1821.
53 A.V., R242, Consalvi to Spina, 4 March 1821.
54 That this policy was not necessarily motivated by partiality for Austria is indicated by the adoption of a similar policy towards the few Neapolitans who crossed the frontier. Brady, 131-139.
55 A.V., R210, Consalvi to the Delegate of Perugia, 24 February 1821.
same time, as the fornitori were still having difficulty in securing supplies because of inflated prices, he authorized the Delegates to compel owners if necessary to sell at reasonable prices or to lend their goods against the later return of an identical quantity and quality.56

The situation was at its worst along the southern frontier near Rieti, a poor area which had already been drained by a Neapolitan occupation. Here, all other remedies failing, Consalvi was compelled to authorize the Delegate to resort to forced requisition if necessary to secure supplies from the inhabitants. The Secretary of State also felt compelled to involve the central government directly by sending supplies from Rome to Rieti to relieve the shortage there.57 A week later, crises similar to that in Rieti having appeared rapidly throughout the Papal States, Consalvi extended the power to make forced requisitions to all Delegates.58 By this time, early March, the Cardinal had reluctantly accepted the unpleasant necessity that, given the disintegration of the Austrian supply system, the city governments of the State would have to act as agents for supplying the Austrian forces. His chief concern now was to

56 Ibid., Consalvi to all Delegates and Legates, 24 February 1821.
57 Ibid., Consalvi to the Delegate of Rieti, 28 February 1821 (#1 & 2).
58 Ibid., Consalvi to all Delegates and Legates, 7 March 1821.
ensure that they, as well as all citizens who had dealt directly with the Austrians, should secure receipts for their goods from the proper Austrian authorities so that they could later be reimbursed.59

Thus, by March Consalvi had been compelled by force of circumstances to allow the Papal government to become involved openly in the supplying of Austrian troops. No doubt this involvement violated the principle of Papal neutrality, but Consalvi considered that violation well justified as necessary to prevent serious injury to the Papal State and its people.

Fortunately, the situation rapidly improved with the total rout of the Neapolitan army at Rieti on 7 March and the subsequent rapid Austrian occupation of Naples. The bulk of the Austrian army soon moved from the Papal State into Naples, and the supply problem disappeared.

The second cause of friction with the Austrian forces arose from their attempts to occupy various Papal cities against the will of the Papacy. The cities mainly concerned were Ancona and Bologna.

It will be recalled that the Austrian government had wished to occupy the strategic port of Ancona as a base of operations against Naples but had temporarily abandoned this design in the face of Papal opposition. Hardly had the Austrian

59 Ibid., Consalvi to all Delegates and Legates, 10 March 1821.
march southwards begun than it became apparent that Austria still cherished hopes of garrisoning the city. On 12 February Consalvi learned that the fornitore at Ancona had been instructed by the Austrians to provide supplies for 2000 troops who were to arrive at Ancona shortly and remain there "until further orders." The Cardinal at once suspected that Austria planned to occupy the city without warning and thus present the Papacy with a fait accompli. He protested strongly to Apponyi whose protestations of Austrian innocence failed to convince him. The Cardinal therefore instructed the Delegate of Ancona that when the Austrian had reached Sinigaglia fifteen miles to the north, he was to inform them that the Papacy was aware of the order to remain "until further orders" and had no intention of allowing them to occupy the town. If the Austrians continued to advance, when they were within three miles the city gates were to be barred and the Austrian commander again forbidden to enter the city. Should the Austrians nonetheless insist on entering, they should be allowed to do so only after breaking through the gates. It would then be obvious to all that the Papacy had attempted to preserve its neutrality and was only yielding to Austrian violence. However, Consalvi thought it unlikely that the Austrians would actually proceed to such

60 A.V., R242, Consalvi to Spina, 12 February 1821. R165, Consalvi to the Delegate of Ancona, 12 February 1821. Petrocchi 1943, 82, Consalvi to Opizzoni, 14 February 1821.
extremes because of the bad effect upon public opinion of "presenting to the world the spectacle [of Austrian troops] firing upon the Pope." 61

Consalvi also instructed Spina to protest to Metternich at Laybach. The Foreign Minister, however, denied that his government planned to occupy Ancona except in the case that Neapolitan troops had already done so. If the city was still in Papal hands the Austrian army was to by-pass it and continue south. 62

Despite Metternich's denials, events soon indicated that the Cardinal's suspicions were well founded. As the Austrians moved towards Ancona, the Delegate duly warned them as Consalvi had ordered. Nonetheless, on February 15 the commander of the approaching army, General Vermoden, dispatched an officer to Ancona to prepare the way for the occupation of the city. The officer explained that the occupation of Ancona was an integral part of the general Austrian war plan, and denied that any orders to the contrary had been received from Vienna. The Delegate repeated his government's determination to oppose an occupation, which could only be carried out if the Austrians first took the place by storm. General Vermoden was apparently

61 Petrocchi 1943, 82.
62 A.V., f242, Consalvi to Spina, 12 February 1821; Spina to Consalvi, 17 February 1821.
impressed by the Papal stand: upon receiving his officer's report, he announced that from respect for Papal neutrality he would refrain from occupying the city. The Austrians then moved away southward without attempting to occupy the city.63

Consalvi was less successful in opposing Austrian plans to occupy Bologna. In mid-January he was warned by the Papal consul at Milan, Count Pietro Alborghetti, that Austria planned to occupy certain places in the Legations, especially Bologna. The purpose was two-fold: to protect Austrian lines of communication and to "watch over the conduct of those lands," where Austria feared a Settaref uprising. Consalvi at once ordered Spina to protest to Metternich against this violation of Papal neutrality. Spina was to point out that neither Austrian pretext was justified: Austrian communications were in no danger in the Papal State, a friendly power, while the Papal government was quite capable of maintaining order in the Legations, where tranquility now prevailed.64

In response to Spina's questioning, Metternich declared that his government had no intention of leaving garrisons anywhere in the Papal States. The Prince professed himself fully satisfied with the tranquility prevailing in the Legations and 64

63 A.V., R165, Delegate of Ancona to Consalvi, 15 February 1821 (#1 & 2). Bianchi, II, 73-75, incorrectly describes this incident as taking place in August, 1820, six months earlier, at a time when no Austrian troops had as yet entered the Papal State.
64 A.V., #242, Consalvi to Spina, 15 January 1821.
the firm attitude taken by the Papal government towards the Settarj there. 65

Consalvi himself approached Apponyi and compelled him to admit that the Austrian military had indeed considered leaving a garrison in Bologna, but the Ambassador insisted that no plans had been made to put this project into effect. 66

Despite the assurances of Metternich and Apponyi, Consalvi's suspicions were not allayed. On the day after his conversation with Apponyi, 7 February, he described to the Archbishop of Bologna the Austrian "proposizione indecente" of leaving a garrison of 3000 in the city. He repeated Metternich's and Apponyi's comforting replies, but added:

But I think that this is only a feigned retreat, and I am of the opinion that my determination to remain neutral from the outset, and our constant refusal to various requests for things contrary to neutrality, have caused the adoption of a plan of saying nothing to us and presenting us with faits accomplis. 67

On the following day Consalvi wrote to Spina of his fear that the Austrian government planned to occupy Bologna and then place the blame upon the initiative of the military, but without withdrawing its troops. The Papal representative was to bring

---

65 Ibid., Spina to Consalvi, 26, 30 January 1821.
66 Ibid., Apponyi to Consalvi, 5 February 1821.
67 Ibid., Consalvi to Spina, 8 February 1821.
this possibility to Metternich's attention. 68

Under Spina's persistent questioning, Metternich finally admitted that the Austrian army as it passed through Bologna was to leave troops there to guard its communications. However the Prince insisted that these troops would not form a permanent garrison, but would be withdrawn as soon as the main Austrian army reached Naples. He also denied that the force was in any way intended as a "misura di polizia" against the Settarj and expressed his satisfaction at the tranquility maintained by the Papal government in its territories. 69

Spina's protests having had no effect, he enlisted the help of Blacas, who as French representative could be expected to look with disfavor on any extension of Austrian control in Italy. Blacas saw Metternich, but received from him only the same assurances that the occupation was necessary and would end when Naples was occupied. Blacas next suggested that Spina seek a formal written pledge from Metternich that the troops would be withdrawn, but Spina feared that this would show too apparent a distrust of the Austrian's good faith. Blacas then arranged with Capo d'Istria that the subject be brought up at the next general session of the Congress, but for some unknown reason this general discussion did not take place. 70 Consalvi was thus

68 Ibid., Consalvi to Spina, 8 February 1821.
69 Ibid., Consalvi to Spina, 12, 15 February 1821.
70 Ibid., Spina to Consalvi, 17 February 1821.
left with no guarantee but Metternich's word that the Austrian force would be withdrawn.

By the time Consalvi learned of these developments at Laybach the Austrian occupation of Bologna had already taken place. On 3 February the passage of Austrian troops through the city began; on 13 February the Austrian commander requested the municipal officials to provide quarters for 2000 troops; and on 14 February, despite the protests of the Vice-Legate Amat, a force of 2000 was stationed in the city. Amat could do no more than insist that the occupying force be regarded not as a "garrison," which would imply a permanent stationing of troops, but only as "passing troops making a prolonged sojourn." He also insisted that the troops' expenses must be borne by Austria, not the city. 71

Consalvi approved of Amat's conduct. The Cardinal had apparently resigned himself to the occupation which he could not prevent; he contented himself with insisting that Austria must pay for the expenses of the occupation. 72 Approached by Spina on this point, Metternich promised that the Papacy would be reimbursed for all expenses. 73 Consalvi made no further protest.

---

71 A.V., R210, Oppizzoni to Consalvi, 12, 13, 21 February 1821; Amat to Consalvi, 14 February 1821.
72 Ibid., Consalvi to Amat, 21 February 1821; R242, Opizzoni to Consalvi, 21 February 1821.
73 A.V., R242, Spina to Consalvi, 22 February 1821.
about the occupation while the campaign lasted. It remained to be seen if Metternich would keep his word to withdraw the Austrian troops after the capture of Naples.

Though the Austrians were able to occupy Bologna, their attempts to occupy other cities failed. At Perugia the Austrian commander attempted to station a garrison, thinly disguised as "military police," in the citadel. The Delegate, remembering Consalvi's strict prohibition on the entry of foreign troops into any fortress, refused the request, and the Austrians marched off with no further incident.74 At Spoleto the Austrian commander openly demanded the right to garrison the citadel, but here too departed after meeting with a firm refusal.75 Somewhat similar in nature was the attempt of the Austrian government to secure passage for its troops through Rome itself. This request too was refused by Consalvi as incompatible with the special position of Rome as capital of the Catholic Church.76

The Austrian attempts to occupy Papal cities against the known will of the Papacy were probably the crucial factor in the renewed deterioration of Austro-Papal relations that began in early 1821. Certainly the deliberate and frequently-repeated

---

74 A.V., R210, Delegate of Perugia to Consalvi, 22 February 1821.
75 Ibid., Delegate of Spoleto to Consalvi, 10 March 1821.
76 A.V., R242, Consalvi to Spina, 21 February 1821.
attempts of Austria to deceive the Papacy as to its intentions and its blatant disregard for Papal sovereign rights had a very bad effect upon Consalvi. Once again we find in his correspondence a strong note of distrust towards Austria. This lack of confidence was to grow in months to come.

---

See, e.g., p. 218 above.
5. Revolt in Piedmont

With the Austrian victory at Rieti, the fate of the Neapolitan Revolution was sealed. But even before the Austrian forces entered Naples on 24 March came the news of another revolution, in Piedmont at the opposite end of the peninsula. The Allied representatives still at Lajbach hastily authorized Austria to suppress this new revolutionary conflagration before it could spread.

With one of its armies engaged in occupying Naples while another was dispatched against Piedmont, Austria felt an increasing need to hold some strong point in central Italy to safeguard its over-extended lines of communication and supply. Ancona, the strongest fortress and best port on the Adriatic between Naples and the Po, was the logical choice. Hence, on 24 March Apponyi once again renewed his government's request to occupy that city. After explaining the situation, he argued that as the Neapolitan War was virtually at an end, the Papacy need no longer preserve its neutrality so scrupulously as before and could permit the Austrian occupation. His government would cover all expenses of the occupation and would undertake not to interfere with the normal Papal administration. 78 Three days

A.V., R165, Apponyi to Consalvi, 24 March 1821.
later the Prussian and Russian ambassadors also wrote in support of the Austrian request. 79

Consalvi was reluctantly compelled to admit the force of the Austrian argument, and he had no wish to put the Papacy in the position of openly opposing the wishes of the three powers. Yet, his aversion to an Austrian occupation was as strong as ever; evidently it was distrust of Austria rather than concern for Papal neutrality that inspired it now. These conflicting factors mingled in his reply to Apponyi. Consalvi declared that the Papacy was always ready to meet the wishes of the Allies, and especially of Austria, whenever possible, and admitted that with the end of the Neapolitan Revolution it would now be possible to admit Austrian troops without violating Papal neutrality. However, such an occupation would still inevitably cause great inconvenience to the inhabitants of Ancona and might also be unfavorably interpreted abroad. Moreover, the Piedmontese situation had greatly improved in recent days and the victory of the "good Cause" seemed near. In view of these factors, Consalvi hopefully inquired whether the Allies would still feel the need to occupy Ancona, and expressed his government's hope that they would not. Should they continue to insist, however, the Pope would agree to the occupation. 80

79 Ibid., Niebuhr to Consalvi, Italinsky to Consalvi, 27 March 1821.
80 A.V., R247, Consalvi to Leardi, 31 March 1821.
The Cardinal apparently feared that this plea would have no effect, for on the following day he ordered the Delegate of Ancona to prepare solutions for the various problems that would be raised by the entry of Austrian troops.  

Austria was most unfavorably impressed by Consalvi's attitude, which could no longer be explained as concern for Papal neutrality and fear of Neapolitan reprisals. His reluctance to admit the Austrian forces was obvious, and this "strange inflexibility" towards the "true friends of religion and the good cause" was severely criticized at Vienna. Austria nonetheless took prompt advantage of the conditional Papal consent, and Apponyi was directed to work out with Consalvi the conditions and preparations for the entrance of Austrian troops into Ancona.

The result of discussions between Consalvi, Apponyi, and the Austrian General Staff was the Cardinal's note of 7 May 1821 setting forth the proposed terms for the occupation. Consalvi began this note by pointing out again that with the royalist restoration in Piedmont there seemed little reason for an Austrian occupation; but nonetheless the Pope, to show his devotion to the "good cause," would permit it. The most important

81 A.V., R165, Consalvi to the Delegate of Ancona, 31 March 1821.
82 A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 17, 26 April 1821.
83 R165, Consalvi to Delegate of Ancona, 31 March 1821.
of the conditions laid down for the occupation were: the garrison was to be limited to 2000 men, of whom no more than fifty would be admitted to the inner citadel; the expenses of the occupation should be borne by Austria, which would make arrangements for supplying the troops prior to their arrival; there should be no interference with the ordinary civil and military administration of the laws of the city; and the force should be withdrawn as soon as the emergency created by the Piedmontese Revolution had ended, or in the event that Austria became involved in a war in which the presence of the Austrian garrison would compromise Papal neutrality. 84

In order to counteract any bad impression that this admission of Austrian troops might create abroad, Consalvi dispatched a note of explanation on the following day to all foreign representatives in Rome and to Lord Castlereagh in London. This note described the Allied requests to occupy Ancona, the Papal resistance, and the conditions on which the Papacy had finally agreed--conditions designed to safeguard the essential independence of the Papacy. 85

The conditions laid down by Consalvi were accepted by the Austrian government, and arrangements were rapidly made for the arrival of the garrison in June. 86 Just when all seemed ready, 84

Ibid., Consalvi to Apponyi, 7 May 1821.
85
Ibid., Consalvi's Note of 8 May 1821. England had no representative in Rome at that time.
86
A.V., ANV 245, Apponyi to Consalvi, 21 May 1821.
a sudden reversal of the Austrian attitude took place. On 27 May, Apponyi notified Consalvi that the Emperor, in view of the suppression of the Piedmontese and Neapolitan Revolutions and the tranquility reigning throughout Italy, had decided that the occupation of Ancona would be unnecessary and had accordingly suspended plans for it. However, should circumstances ever arise in the future to make the occupation a necessity again, Austria expected the Pope to agree to the occupation under the conditions previously worked out.

Consalvi was pleased by this news, but the Austrian assumption of a right to garrison the city in any future emergency was not to his liking. As this stipulation had no time limit, it would in theory give Austria a permanent right to occupy Ancona. Preferring not to offend Austria by open opposition on this point, he adopted an indirect way of setting a time limit. In his reply to Apponyi, he agreed that the Papacy would indeed allow an Austrian occupation of Ancona, under the same conditions as those recently established, but only "if, as a consequence of recent events, the forces of the Seets should ever again manage to threaten the tranquility of Italy... so that in the revival of the same circumstances the Allies should regard Ancona as indispensable." Thus, Austria could only occupy Ancona in an emergency that was a direct result of the

87 A.V., R165, Apponyi to Consalvi, 27 May 1821. ANP-VIII, Consalvi to Macchi, 9 June 1821.

88 Ibid., R165, Consalvi to Apponyi, 4 June 1821.
1820-1821 revolutions. This limitation, accepted by Austria, accomplished its aim: as no further emergency arose in consequence of the 1820-1821 revolutions, Austria was not able to occupy Ancona. 89

89 Schmidlin (261, Note 80) errs on this point.
6. The Condemnation of the Carbonari

It was in late 1820, while engaged in preparing the way at Troppau for Austrian military action against Naples, that Metternich first tentatively suggested to Consalvi the desirability of a formal Papal condemnation of the Carbonari. To Metternich, such a condemnation seemed a logical compliment to the Austrian intervention: it was one more weapon in the arsenal of legitimacy, to be used when it seemed expedient. The Carbonari "must be attacked by all weapons at once," spiritual as well as temporal.90 The Austrian armies soon to attack Naples, representing the secular arm of Society, would supply the material force necessary to crush the Carbonari; but this alone was not sufficient. The Pope, wielder of the spiritual power of Society, must also unloose his weapons to destroy the moral position of the Carbonari.91

Metternich broached this subject to Consalvi with some caution, framing his requests in general terms and not as yet mentioning a formal Bull, though that was clearly his aim. No doubt, he foresaw that his request, involving as it did the rather obvious intent to use spiritual weapons for an essentially

90 Van Duerm, 311, Metternich to Consalvi, 22 November 1820.
91 Ibid., 326, Metternich to Consalvi, 13 December 1820.
political end, would encounter some difficulties at Rome. Such proved to be the case. Needless to say, neither Consalvi nor Pius VII had the slightest sympathy with the Carbonari and would hardly have been displeased by the extirpation of the Sect. The difficulty was that the Carbonari could not be condemned simply because they were politically obnoxious; it would have to be demonstrated that they held to errors in matters of doctrine, and as yet the Papacy lacked sufficient knowledge of the Sect to judge its religious principles. Moreover, condemnation of the Carbonari might antagonize the revolutionary government in Naples and lead to reprisals. For these reasons, the Papacy was reticent on the possibility of a condemnation at that time. Consalvi replied to Metternich's letters only by declaring in general terms that the Pope would of course "try to concur, on his part, in everything that is possible to him in his character and his relations with the views manifested" in Metternich's letters. This evasive reply failed to satisfy the Prince, who continued to beseech the Papacy to bring its spiritual weapons to the aid of the Allies in order to crush the Carbonari completely.

Suspecting from these appeals that Metternich would renew his insistence at Laybach, Consalvi gave Spina precise instruc-

---

92 Ibid., 315, Consalvi to Metternich, 5 December 1820.
93 Ibid., 326, Metternich to Consalvi, 13 December 1820. R242, Metternich to Consalvi, 18 January 1821.
tions on this point. The Papal representative was to explain to Metternich that the Carbonari, like any other organization, could only be condemned for doctrinal reasons, if they erred in matters of faith, and thus far the investigation of the Sect had not produced sufficient evidence to make this possible. The Papacy had gone as far as it could in the Edict of 15 August 1814, which had prohibited the "continuation, revival, or establishment" of freemasonry or similar secret organizations. If this general prohibition was not sufficient for Metternich's purposes, then there was nothing more that the Papacy could do at the present time.94

Soon after Spina arrived at Laybach, Metternich did in fact bring the subject up, arguing vehemently that such a condemnation was necessary for the defense of Church and State alike. Spina replied in accordance with Consalvi's instructions. The Prince then argued that Freemasonry had been condemned because its secrecy made it suspect; therefore, the Carbonari, as an equally secret organization, should also be condemned for the same reason. Spina pointed out that this argument rested upon a false premise: the condemnation of the masons had been based on sound evidence of their doctrinal errors, not upon their secrecy alone. Neither this nor any other of Spina's arguments made any impression upon Metternich; the Prince

94 A.V., R242, Instructions for Spina, 10 January 1821. Copy of the Edict of 15 August 1814 in R242, January 1821.
remained unconvinced and continued to insist upon the necessity of a condemnation.95

Discouraged perhaps by Papal resistance, Austria allowed this question to lie dormant until April, 1821, when it was raised again by a personal letter from Francis I to Pius VII. That the Emperor himself saw fit to write directly to the Pope indicates the importance which Austria attached to this question. Evidently Austria had grown weary of the delay and opposition encountered at Rome, and hoped to overcome all opposition by appealing straight to the Head of the Church.

In his letter the Emperor explained that he was writing directly to the Pope because of the great importance of his subject, "which interests equally the welfare of Religion and that of Society." His armies had crushed the Neapolitan Revolution, but:

The success which we have just scored against crime cannot be complete, rather it will be uncertain and insecure, as long as the impious sects are not suppressed... which threaten to cover Italy and the world with desolation and ruins... The temporal power alone cannot bring to an end so salutary a work. The source of the evil is in the field of morality and religion; it is that which Your Holiness rules, and it is from you that I ask aid and assistance.

By condemning these "impious sects" the Pope would "contribute no less powerfully... to the cause of justice and order"

95 Ibid., Spina to Consalvi, 26 January 1821.
than the united efforts of the Powers have thus far... contributed to it." The Imperial letter closed with the hope that "Your Holiness will wish to complete, in a moment of such general crisis, the triumph of principles by which alone can Society be saved from its own errors" by complying with the Austrian request to condemn the Carbonari. 96

Considerable diplomatic pressure was exerted upon the Papacy by this direct Imperial request. Discussions on the proposed condemnation were now begun at Rome by the Austrian ambassador. No details of these conversations seem to have survived, but evidently the Austrian point of view gradually prevailed. This weakening of the Papal position was no doubt aided by two factors: study of the writings of the Carbonari revealed increasing concrete evidence of doctrinal errors on their part, while the collapse of the Neapolitan regime removed the danger of reprisals from that quarter. At the end of May, Metternich learned with satisfaction that "the discussions which have taken place to induce the Holy Father to speak as Head of the Church against the Settarj. . . have ended with mutual satisfaction. . . . Father will make His apostolic voice heard

96 Van Duerm, 376, Francis I to Pius VII, 12 April 1821. This letter—and indeed the whole incident of the condemnation—is an instructive example of the Austrian theory of the Union of Throne and Altar at work, both using their respective weapons in unison for the benefit of society as a whole, as well as of a certain hesitancy on the part of the Papacy to give its full support to putting that theory into practice.
to the faithful."\textsuperscript{97} 

The preparation of this much-desired Bull (or, more properly, Pontifical Constitution) occupied some time, but it finally appeared on 13 September 1821. It decreed the formal condemnation of the Carbonari, described as "a multitude of wicked men... united against God and Christ, with the principal objective of attacking and destroying the Church... deceiving the faithful, and leading them astray from the doctrine of the Church by means of a vain and misleading philosophy." The reasons given for the condemnations were:

The books... statutes, and other authentic documents of the Carbonari... as well as the testimony of those who after belonging to the society have left it... demonstrate clearly that the Carbonari aim at giving everyone the license to create at will his own religion according to his own opinions, thereby introducing religious indifference, than which nothing more pernicious can be imagined; that they parody sacred rituals by their sacrilegious ceremonies... and that they plot to ruin the Apostolic See against which... they have a special hatred.\textsuperscript{98}

Consalvi took care to send copies of the Bull to Metternich immediately after its appearance. The Prince was highly pleased

\textsuperscript{97} A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 31 May 1821.

\textsuperscript{98} Bullari Romani Continuatio... XV, 446-448, Damnatio societatis secretæ nuncupatae Carbonariorum, 13 September 1821.
by the Bull, which he felt would be a potent weapon in the struggle against the revolutionaries. He took care to have the condemnation well publicized in the press and elsewhere, and in November an Imperial Patent against the Carbonari was issued in support of the Bull.\textsuperscript{99} It seems improbable, however, that the Bull ever had the great moral effect that Metternich had anticipated. Liberals were unlikely to pay much heed to Papal anathemas, while those sufficiently religious to be impressed thereby were not likely to become *settari* in any case.\textsuperscript{100} Here obviously was a major flaw in Metternich's plan to use the Church as a weapon against the Revolution.

Contemporaries were not unaware of the role that Austria had played in the condemnation of the Carbonari. Some Liberals, at least, felt that the Papacy had been too responsive to Austrian wishes and criticized the condemnation as "a political manifesto and not a religious act."\textsuperscript{101} There was some justification for this view. Although certainly the condemnation was justified by the society's principles, there can be little doubt that the immediate motive was political and that the

\textsuperscript{99} A.V., ANV245, Consalvi to Muxi, 15 September 1821, R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 27 September, 26 November 1821.


\textsuperscript{101} De Pradt, II, 209.
chief impetus was provided by the pressure exerted by the Austrian government.
7. The Aftermath of the Revolutions of 1820-1821.

The Neapolitan Revolution was crushed in March of 1821, but two problems deriving from it continued to plague the Papacy for some time thereafter: the collection of Austrian debts and the presence of Austrian troops in Bologna.

During the passage of its troops through the Papal State, Austria had given frequent assurances that it would reimburse the Papacy for all expenses caused thereby. Soon after the end of the campaign, Consalvi therefore directed the Delegates to learn from their communes the expenses incurred and to send their claims to Rome, where he would work out a settlement with Austria.

The initial Austrian response to the presentation of these claims was unsatisfactory. The Austrian authorities declared many of the claims invalid, while the remainder were first reduced in amount and then turned over to Signor Polidori, the chief fornitore, for payment. From lack of funds, Polidori was able only to make small payments on account, deferring payment of the balance to some unspecified but probably distant date in

---

102 A.V., R242, Spina to Consalvi, 22 February, 28 February 1821.
103 A.V., R210, Consalvi to all Delegates and Legates, 7 April 1821.
the future.

The indignant communes complained to Consalvi, whose vigorous protests to Apponyi produced a reversal of Austrian policy. In early May Vienna agreed that it would itself settle all claims at their full value during the month of June. This promise was unduly optimistic, for to Consalvi's exasperation the Imperial Treasury, with what seemed to be its customary procrastination where debts to the Papacy were concerned, failed to make the expected payments in June, and the summer and early fall passed with no further progress on this point. Not until November did payment at last begin. By mid-December the Austrian government had settled its accounts by the payment of Sc. 152, 572, 13½ to the various Papal communes.104

These financial negotiations were paralleled by equally protracted discussions on the Austrian forces in Bologna. It will be recalled that Metternich had promised that the occupation of Bologna would be ended when the Austrian army took Naples.

The Vatican Archives contain little on these negotiations and must be supplemented by the additional material in the Archivio di Stato, Rome (A.S.R.). The above account is based on: A.V., R197, Consalvi to all Delegates and Legates, 30 May 1821. R210, Consalvi to Apponyi, 23 July 1821; Consalvi to Leardi, 4 August 1821; Consalvi to the Delegate of Macerata, 7 November 1821; ANV 245, Consalvi to Leardi, 16 January 1822. A.S.R., Archivio di Buon Governo, Serie I, Busta 5, Passaggio dell'armata . . ., December 1821; Serie XI, Busta 221, Prospetta generale di liquidazione. . ., December 1821. The last contains a list of the creditor communes, with the type of goods and services supplied. The author has been unable to find any additional information on Foliodori.
Naples was occupied on 24 March, but nonetheless several months passed and the Austrians showed no sign of evacuating the city. Consalvi's earlier suspicions that the Austrian force was intended as a permanent garrison returned in full force, and were increased when Spina reported that rumours to that effect were current among the Austrian officers. More tangible evidence was provided by the demand of the Austrian commander that Spina undertake an extensive renovation of the barracks to render them suitable for occupation during the coming winter—the implication was obvious.

For some time Consalvi delayed taking action, perhaps because he hoped that Austria might yet withdraw her forces voluntarily. By September it had become apparent that this hope was vain. On 5 September therefore, Consalvi presented Apponyi with a formal demand for the withdrawal of the Austrian force, in accordance with Metternich's promises.

Two months passed before the Austrian reply came—a firm though regretful refusal. The Austrian government would like to grant the Papal request, but unfortunately this was impossible. The continued presence of an Austrian "garrison"—this term was now used for the first time, an ominous sign—in Bologna was

---

105 A.V., R242, Spina to Consalvi, 21 April 1821; R210 Spina to Consalvi, 28 April 1821.
106 A.V., R197, Spina to Consalvi, 9 June 1821.
107 A.V., R210, Consalvi to Apponyi, 5 September 1821.
essential to secure communications with the army occupying Naples. Moreover, the garrison was no doubt useful to overawe the Settarj and maintain order in the Legations. To show his regard for the Papacy, Francis I would reimburse it for any expenses caused by the occupation; but the occupation itself must continue.

Consalvi was unimpressed by this display of Imperial "regard." He prepared another note, in which he criticized the Austrian reply at great length. He denied that the force in Bologna could be considered a "garrison," which implied a long-term occupation, for no agreement for such an occupation had been made and Austria in consequence had no right to garrison the city. Moreover, Metternich had specifically promised that the troops would be withdrawn at the fall of Naples. The Cardinal pointed out that an Austrian garrison was not needed to protect communications, which were threatened by no one, or to maintain order in the Legations, where tranquility reigned. He also stressed the inconvenience caused to the Papal government and the people of Bologna by the occupation. The only point on which he fully agreed with the Austrian note was that the expenses of the occupation must be borne by Austria. 109

108 Ibid., Apponyi to Consalvi, 9 November 1821.
109 A.V., R260, Consalvi to Apponyi, dated 17 December 1821 but never sent.
This note was written in mid-December, but for some reason was never sent. Possibly Consalvi delayed because he had been privately informed that a spontaneous reversal of Austrian policy might soon take place. In any case, he made no further protest, and in February Austrian policy was indeed reversed. On 16 February Metternich informed Apponyi that the Emperor had decided to show his special respect for the Papacy by ordering the immediate evacuation of Bologna, despite the military drawbacks of such a step. However, should there by any serious disturbance in the Legations during the Austrian occupation of Naples, Vienna reserved the right to reoccupy Bologna to protect its communications. In this reply Consalvi accepted this reservation and expressed his satisfaction at the friendly solution that eliminated a potential source of irritation. The incident was thus closed in a satisfactory manner.

Consalvi was entitled to feel some satisfaction with the results of his policies during the revolutionary period. Under extremely difficult circumstances he had dealt skilfully with both Austria and Naples and had secured his essential aims: the preservation of the independence and neutrality of the Papacy, and the prevention of serious damage and hardship for the Papal State and its people. Although Papal neutrality had perhaps

110 Ibid., Metternich to Apponyi, 16 February 1822.
111 A.V., ANV 245, Consalvi to Apponyi, 1 March 1822.
been bent, it had never publicly broken. Consalvi had in fact performed numerous unneutral acts (for example, intercepting the correspondence of the Neapolitan diplomats at Bologna), but these remained secret. Obviously, Consalvi's primary concern in this regard was not the abstract principle of Papal neutrality as such, but its preservation in the eyes of the world: the former he had not hesitated to violate if expedient, the latter he had defended tenaciously and successfully. Here is a good illustration of the Cardinal's essentially pragmatic approach to most questions that did not involve the essence of Papal authority or Catholic doctrine. If it seemed expedient to defend the principle of neutrality—in order, say to prevent a Neapolitan invasion—he would do so; and likewise he could at times use Papal neutrality as an excuse to oppose Austrian policies—such as the occupation of Ancona or, earlier, the Italian Confederation—which he in fact opposed from distrust of Austrian intentions. However, should it seem expedient to disregard the principle of neutrality, he could and did do so without a qualm. Consalvi had resisted, then, with considerable though not complete success, those Austrian demands which would have compromised Papal neutrality or limited Papal independence. Unlike the other Italian states which were content to follow along in the wake of Austria, the Papal government under Consalvi's direction had adopted and followed both at Laybach and elsewhere an independent policy based on its own proper interests. At the same time, by his
skilful diplomacy and his insistence on neutrality he had averted the danger of Neapolitan incursions. The material loss inflicted on the Papal State by the Neapolitan War had been slight compared to what it might have been had a major Neapolitan invasion taken place.

But Consalvi's policies had one unfortunate consequence: their successes had been purchased at the cost of a further deterioration in Austro-Papal relations. At the outset of the Neapolitan Revolution, it had seemed that the very opposite would be the case—that the Papacy and Austria would draw together against their mutual enemy the Revolution. During the brief Indian Summer of Austro-Papal co-operation in late 1820, Consalvi had demonstrated his good will towards Austria whenever possible, while the Austrian attitude towards the Papacy became very friendly as Vienna realized the value of Papal moral support and the need for Papal co-operation in the crusade against Naples. Metternich's letters to Consalvi of late 1820 were more cordial than any he had written for over three years. Once more were heard those enticing phrases "Austro-Papal co-operation," "Union of Throne and Altar," "identity of Austrian and Papal interests," and others, once so common, which had seemingly disappeared forever during the years of religious controversy.

Yet this revival was only temporary, doomed by the inherent conflict between Consalvi's policies and those of Austria. That Power had expected, not unnaturally, that the
Papacy, realizing the danger posed to Church and State alike by the Neapolitan Revolution, would co-operate whole-heartedly. Certainly Consalvi feared the danger presented by the Revolution, hoped to see it suppressed, and was willing to co-operate with Austria to that end, within the limits of his overall policy based on Papal interests. But those limits proved too narrow to satisfy Vienna. Consalvi, it must be repeated, was determined to preserve the independence and neutrality of the Papacy and to avoid any pretext for Neapolitan invasion. These aims inevitably conflicted with the Austrian plans for crushing the Revolution. On many points the Cardinal felt obliged to oppose Austria—the supply of Austrian troops, the occupation of Papal cities, the proceedings at Laybach—and though he tried to be tactful and conciliatory, Austria was surprised and irritated by his un-expected opposition.

As 1821 wore on, Austro-Papal relations became increasingly strained, and once again bitter criticism of the Papacy and of Consalvi began to be heard at Vienna. "I would be betraying my duty [Leardi reluctantly admitted to Consalvi in April] if I concealed from you that . . . on those occasions on which Y.E. has vigorously sustained the system of strict neutrality, there have not been lacking complaints by those attached to this government about your strange obstinacy towards the true friends of religion and the good cause." Consalvi's obvious reluctance to allow Austria to occupy Ancona had caused these complaints to
be redoubled. This apparent distrust of Austria, a "proven friend," was unfavorably contrasted with the former willingness of the Papacy to allow Napoleon, "a known and dangerous foe," to garrison that city in 1805. The Cardinal's reluctance was considered inexplicable, unless it stemmed from distrust and ill-will, for "now the Holy See has little reason to maintain a strict neutrality between the Good and the Evil, since, Naples having submitted, it is no longer exposed to imminent danger." 112

Criticism of the Papacy in general and Consalvi in particular continued to grow, and Leardi could do little to check it. Metternich and Francis I were soon to return from Ljubljana, and the nuncio had reason to fear they too would join in the chorus of criticism. Accordingly, on 26 April he begged Consalvi to "give me special instructions for the case that during the discussions [with Metternich and the Emperor] they should speak to me of some cause for discontent that a government, though animated by the best intentions, may in very difficult circumstances give to another." The nuncio explained apologetically that as he was not familiar with the details of Consalvi's policy it was difficult for him to defend it effectively. 113

This request provoked a sharp reply from the Secretary of

112 A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 17 April 1821.
113 Ibid., Leardi to Consalvi, 26 April 1821.
State. He was "amazed that you could so much as conceive the idea that H.I.R.A.M. or H.H. Prince Metternich could have any cause for discontent with the Pontifical government after the shining proofs of special regard that the Pontifical government has given to that of H.I.R.A.M." To show the absurdity of such ideas, he embarked upon a lengthy defense of his policies, describing in detail the great co-operation of the Papacy with Austria during the entire Neapolitan crisis, especially during the passage of Austrian troops through the Papal States. He enumerated at length the expense and inconvenience which this willing co-operation had caused the Papal government and its subjects; surely these sacrifices should prove Papal good will towards Austria. In co-operating with Austria and fulfilling its wishes, Consalvi had gone as far as he could possibly go without openly violating Papal neutrality, which Austria could not justly expect him to sacrifice for her sake alone. The greatest proof of his good will was the recent agreement allowing Austria to occupy Ancona. The Papacy might well have refused to allow this occupation, as there was no military necessity for it, nor was it necessary for the preservation of order. Nonetheless, the Holy See, solely from good will towards Austria, had agreed to the occupation, though in so doing it had seriously imperilled its precious neutrality and impartiality before the whole world. Keeping in mind all these "shining proofs" of Papal good will, Consalvi concluded, he could not see how Austria could possibly find any just cause for discontent.
with the Papal government. Leardi should therefore have little
difficulty in defending it against unjust criticism.\textsuperscript{114}

If Leardi used the defense outlined by Consalvi, it was to
little effect, for criticism of the Papacy continued.\textsuperscript{115} The
The Papal consent to the occupation of Ancona and the condemna-
tion of the Carbonari produced some improvement, and the attitude
of Metternich upon his return was less critical than Leardi had
feared. Nonetheless, the Prince had not forgotten Consalvi's
opposition and feared that it might continue.

In his first conversation with the nuncio, Metternich
praised the Pope, but did not entirely conceal his annoyance at
the "divergence of opinion" between Austria and the Papacy" in
regard to the utility and political aims of the neutrality
maintained by His Holiness during the hostilities." Any such
divergence of opinion was a threat to the common cause; only in
co-operation and unity could safety be found. In these critical
times, "governments must become close friends and establish
among themselves the most perfect trust." In particular, the
Italian states must show greater confidence in Austria: surely
"the Italian governments must by now have been convinced by
experience that... Austria has no other aim then to preserve
public order, whose disturbance menaces the security of all

\textsuperscript{114} \textit{Ibid.}, Consalvi to Leardi, 19 May 1821.

\textsuperscript{115} \textit{Ibid.}, Leardi to Consalvi, 24, 31 May 1821.
The appeal to the Cardinal to abandon his distrust of Austria and co-operate wholeheartedly with her again.

The appeal failed. It failed, in essence, because Consalvi's suspicions were not in fact without foundation. True, Metternich's defense of Austrian policy was sound—but only in

---

116 Ibid., Leardi to Consalvi, 31 May 1821.
a certain sense. The Prince was not lying when he asserted that Austria's essential aim was only to maintain order and the status quo in Italy and that she cherished no expansionist ambitions there. However, the Austrian government, Metternich in the lead, had become convinced that its primary aim of maintaining tranquility could only be attained by greatly increasing Austrian influence over the various Italian governments and by exercising a "right of supervision" over them, which included the right to intervene in their policies both internal and external. From the point of view of the Papal statesman, these policies presented almost as great a danger as any territorial ambition could have, for they threatened that temporal freedom of action which was considered necessary for the Papacy's spiritual independence. Consalvi therefore did not and could not respond to Metternich's appeal. He could not trust Austria so long as these considerations governed her Italian policy, for they posed a threat to what he was determined to defend. While Austria persisted in her present policy, Consalvi was reluctantly compelled to oppose her.

The end result of the Neapolitan Revolution, then, was not to draw the Papacy and Austria closer together, as might have been expected, but to drive them farther apart. To the distrust and enmity aroused by religious controversy was now added that

On Austria's wish to exercise a right of supervision over the Italian states, see Schroeder, 125-128, based on extensive research in the Austrian archives.
that resulting from political conflict. Austria persisted in its Italian policy; Consalvi persisted in opposing it. The result was growing distrust, mutual suspicion, and renewed conflict. The religious controversy of 1817-1820 had begun the decline of Austro-Papal co-operation; the political disputes of 1821-1823 were to consummate it.
CHAPTER V

THE COLLAPSE OF AUSTRO-PAPAL CO-OPERATION: 1821-1823

1. The Inter-Congress Period, 1821-1822

Superficially, the eighteen months between the Congress of Laybach and that of Verona were a period of calm in Austro-Papal relations. The even tenor of their relations was apparently disturbed only by a minor incident in January of 1822 when an Austrian officer was kidnapped by brigands in the southern Papal States and the Austrian commander in Naples threatened to enter Papal territory to suppress the brigands himself. Through prompt action by the Papal forces, the captive Austrian was returned and the brigands punished. The Austrian commander was rebuked by Metternich for his threat to occupy Papal territory and the affair blew over. The only significant result was, in fact, a measure for increased Austro-Papal co-operation, in the form of an agreement for joint action against the brigands along the Neapolitan border.¹ Papal antagonism that had appeared during the revolutions had not

¹ A.V., ANV 245, Consalvi to Leardi, 16, 19, 21, 22, 26, 30 January, 9 February 1822. R260, Metternich to Apponyi, 15 February 1822. ANV 247, Leardi to Consalvi, 11, 14 February, 14 March 1822. R247, Consalvi to Leardi, 6 March 1822.
diminished, but rather had grown, for its essential cause continued to exist: Austria had not abandoned her plans for increasing her control over the Italian Peninsula, nor was Consalvi any less determined to oppose those plans.

Consalvi's growing distrust of Vienna was fed by several Austrian policies during the inter-congress period. Most immediately annoying, perhaps, was Austrian pressure for more severe repression of the Settari. Prior to the Neapolitan Revolution, Metternich had appeared satisfied with Papal measures against the Sects, but the events of 1820-1821 had wrought a great change in his attitude on this point. He came to believe that the Settari were far more dangerous than he had thought previously, and that in consequence harsher repression of them was necessary.²

Despite the alarm aroused by the revolution in Naples, Consalvi had not been frightened into extreme measures against the Settari. He directed that their agitation should be firmly repressed, and those whose serious guilt could be proved were to be punished accordingly. However, he ordered the strict observance of legality in the arrest and trial of suspects, who were to be punished only if their guilt could be proven beyond all doubt. Arrest or imprisonment on mere suspicion was for-
bidden. Subordinates who acted with excessive rigor were rebuked and ordered to proceed with moderation. During the crisis of 1820-1821 a number of Settarj were arrested, but no executions or other severe punishments were carried out; exile or police supervision were the only penalties inflicted, and even the exiles were soon allowed to return. 3

This mild policy met with no favor at Vienna. In March, 1821, Leardi reported that "the Imperial government is not entirely pleased with the conduct of the Court of Rome on this point. . . . which does not display that rigor and activity that such situations call for. . . ." Austria complained that the Papal government did not always act on the information given it by the Austrian police, and that when it did, it frequently displayed too much "indulgence." This lenient Papal conduct was contrasted unfavorably with the properly severe measures recently taken against the Seets in Lombardy-Venetia and Modena. 4

Consalvi did yield to mounting Austrian criticism to the extent of arresting and exiling a few Settarj whom Austria de-


4  A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 10 March 1821; also, 10 July 1821.
nounced, but in general he held to his policy of moderation and legality. 5 No doubt it was partly because of his dissatisfaction with Consalvi's continued moderation that Metternich revived a former plan for combatting the Seets, one that posed a far greater threat to Papal independence: the establishment of a Political Commission or General Commission of Police under Austrian direction. This Commission would co-ordinate and direct the police activity of all the Italian states against the Settarj: the Peninsula-wide revolutionary organization would be confronted and overcome by a Peninsula-wide police, efficiently directed by Austria. To Metternich, the idea may have seemed unobjectionable; Consalvi saw it in a different light. The Papacy--and any other Italian government not content to be a mere Austrian satellite--had a compelling motive for opposition: such a Commission would in effect give Austria control over all police activity in Italy, greatly increasing her influence over the Italian states and presenting her with limitless opportunities to interfere in their internal affairs. 6 The proposal of such a Commission could only increase Consalvi's distrust of Austrian aims and ambitions.

The Cardinal first learned of Metternich's plan from the


6 A.V., R242, Observations on the Project of a Political Commission... 1822; Instructions for Spina, 1822; Consalvi to Spina, 28 November 1822.
latter's confidant, Count Ruffo, who visited Rome in April, 1822. The Count, at Metternich's instructions, informed Consalvi of the project and sought his reaction. The Cardinal, taken by surprise, was unwilling to commit himself and merely replied in general terms that the Papacy would always co-operate against the Settajar whenever possible. Metternich may have interpreted these remarks as indicating Papal approval. In fact, Consalvi was implacably hostile to the Commission, though he planned to veil his opposition as much as possible in the hope that the plan might fall through without his intervention. But he foresaw the likelihood that Metternich would propose his Commission at the approaching Congress, and was prepared to oppose Austrian designs there openly if necessary.\footnote{Ibid., Also, R242, Consalvi to Leardi, 1 May 1822. Furlani, XXXIX, 484-485, is incorrect in assuming that the chief subject of Ruffo's mission was the reform of the Papal government; there is no evidence the latter was even discussed. See R242, Consalvi to Spina, 28 November, 4 December 1822.} A second source of continued Austro-Papal tension was the apparent determination of Austria to impose certain reforms upon the Papal and other Italian governments. Metternich had long supported Consalvi's plans to reform the Papal government, as has been discussed in Chapter II, but after the Neapolitan Revolution, he decided that the slow pace of Papal reform, hampered by the Zelanti, was insufficient. He saw "without surprise but not without sorrow that because of these obstacles many
parts [of Consalvi's reform program] have remained unexecuted or paralyzed." If the Papal government would not carry out necessary reforms on its own initiative, then the Powers would have to compel it to act. 8

Austria was not alone in this opinion. At Laybach Russia had been concerned lest the Neapolitan Revolution spread to the Papal territories. In January, 1821, the Russian ambassador at Rome, Prince Andre Italinsky, was instructed to impress upon Consalvi the necessity of prompt reforms to forestall revolution, and to suggest that the subject be brought up at the Congress of Laybach. 9

Italinsky's overtures were unwelcome to Consalvi, who had no intention of allowing foreign interference in Papal internal affairs and believed that his Motu-proprio of 1816 contained all the essentials of a sound government if only he could put it into effect. Moreover, as Italinsky did not specify the type of reform desired, the Cardinal feared it might be in the direction of constitutional government, which was incompatible with the absolute authority of the Pope. He therefore rejected the Russian proposals, and the subject was not brought up at Laybach.

8 A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 30 June 1821.
9 A.V., R242, Consalvi to Spina, 14, 17 February 1821; Nesselrode to Italinsky, 22 January, 3 February 1821. Prince Andre Italinsky, Russian ambassador in Rome, 1815-1827.
during Spina's sojourn there. 10

The Tsar's interest in promoting Papal reform seems to have dwindled after this rebuff, for henceforth Russia took only a very secondary role in this question. It was now Austria that took the lead in pressing the Papal and other Italian governments to carry out reforms.

The question of reform was taken up by Austria, Prussia, and Russia at Laybach after the departure of the Italian delegates. The result of their deliberations was the issuance on 12 May 1821 of Circulars by the three Eastern Powers to their representatives at the various Italian courts. The Austrian Circular, the strongest of the three, argued that:

Austria can be considered a partly Italian power. Austria has lent to the other States of the Peninsula material assistance which had led to the re-establishment of peace. Austria offers to those states the material means of which they will still for some time have need to ensure the preservation of this beneficent peace. . . . Therefore, Austria is in a certain sense authorized to insist on the adoption of measures that the states themselves must take so that this inconvenient and expensive aid will not be continually necessary. . . .

Austria did not specify what these measures should be; the individual states should choose those measures of reform best calculated to satisfy the legitimate grievances of their subjects and thus eliminate all cause for discontent. At the Congress of

10 Ibid., Spina to Consalvi, 26 February 1821; Consalvi to Spina, 4 March 1821, with undated letter from Consalvi to Italinsky.
Florence the Italian states would have to explain to the Powers the measures which they had adopted and demonstrate that the latter were sufficient to ensure tranquility if the Austrian forces were withdrawn. If their measures were found inadequate at the Congress, then the Powers would themselves have to prescribe suitable reforms and insist upon their implementation.\textsuperscript{11}

It is difficult to say which more alarmed Consalvi in these circulars: the immediate threat of interference with his own reform plan or the explicit assumption by Austria of a general right of interference in the Italian states, but neither was to his liking. His first reaction was to send Leardi a detailed description of all recent reforms, legal, administrative, and financial, enacted in the Papal States, as well as those that were planned, with instructions to communicate it to Metternich. This description, the Cardinal felt, should convince the Prince that Austrian interference in the reform of the Papal State was unnecessary as well as objectionable, for "the paternal solicitude of the Holy Father does not cease to occupy itself in giving to his people the most useful institutions which serve to establish their well-being on solid foundations, and that it is wrong to accuse the Papal government of not profiting from the present moment of calm to promote those useful institutions that ever increase the love of the people for their legitimate

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., Circular of 12 May 1821. Also printed in Alberti, IV, 458-459.
Consalvi evidently did not try to hide his dislike for the Circular in his private conversations, for news of criticism on his part soon reached Vienna. At the end of June Metternich decided to let the Cardinal know of his displeasure at the latter's attitude and at the same time to try to reassure him as to Austria's policies. Speaking with Leardi (who had just conveyed Consalvi's congratulations on the Prince's elevation to Chancellor), Metternich praised the Secretary of State's "rare gifts," but "he did not fail to let me know [the nuncio reported] that he had experienced some displeasure in noting that Y.E. had not always judged the conduct of the Austrian cabinet with the full confidence it deserves." Consalvi's reaction to the Circular was the latest example of this misjudgment. The Chancellor explained that the sole motive behind the Circular had been the fear that if the Italian courts did not make necessary reforms, the resulting popular discontent would end in revolution; Austria had thus been acting with the best interests of all the Italian governments in mind. "The Italian governments cannot fairly judge in any other way the intentions of H.M., for H.M. has already given the most striking proofs that his actions are not motivated by any personal ambitions, but only by the good of all the sovereigns of the Peninsula." In view of this

12 A.V., R247, Consalvi to Leardi, 9 June 1821.
purity of Austrian intentions, Metternich could not conceal "the sorrow he feels that Y.E. has, in reading the Circular, as also in the progress of the negotiations for the occupation of Ancona, shown an irritation that betrays a certain distrust, as if the House of Austria wished to encroach upon the sovereign rights of the Italian princes."

Metternich went on to praise Consalvi's great efforts for reform, all the more commendable in that "the obstacles to be overcome are much greater and more complicated than anywhere else." Nonetheless, it was undeniable that despite his heroic efforts the Cardinal had been unable to put more than a fraction of his reforms into full effect. Circumstances demanded the rapid introduction of more extensive reforms. Consalvi should not allow the apparent tranquility of the Papal States to deceive him, for revolutionary forces were at work under the surface. "The present military occupation keeps the discontented in check; but this will not last forever. . . ." Consalvi and other Italian statesmen must therefore take advantage of the present temporary respite to satisfy all popular cause for complaint, or the withdrawal of the Austrian forces would be followed by peninsula-wide revolution. At the coming Council of Florence the Papal and other Italian governments must be able to convince the Powers that they had satisfied their subjects, or Austria could not evacuate its armies. Metternich charged Leardi to report his words faithfully to Consalvi, remarking that
"you will agree that I can hardly be called a Jacobin; so if I speak to you of necessary institutions and reforms, I can only be motivated by the wish to see the repose of all legitimate governments assured."\(^{13}\)

Apparently Metternich never specified in detail the reforms he desired the Italian states to adopt. The general model he proposed can be seen in the new government set up for Naples, which provided for a system of councils whose advice the king must hear but need not follow, for some participation by the propertied classes in local government, and for greater administrative efficiency. For the special case of the Papal State, he particularly desired a greater number of laymen in the government.\(^{14}\)

The Cardinal's distrust of Austrian policy was not diminished by Metternich's explanations. Realizing this, the Chancellor delivered another equally lengthy apologia for Imperial policy in June 1822, using the same arguments as before with an equal lack of success.\(^{15}\)

Despite Metternich's denials, the fact remained that the Austrian attempt to compel the Italian states to introduce

\(^{13}\) Ibid., Leardi to Consalvi, 30 June 1821.

\(^{14}\) Ibid. Also, R242, Instructions for Spina, 1822; Untitled document beginning "Essendosi stabilito. . . .", 1822; Fogli letti nella prima Conge. tenuta. . . ., 1822. Schroeder, 124-126.

\(^{15}\) A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 6 June 1822.
reforms did represent interference in their internal affairs, and might well be the thin end of the wedge for much more extensive interference later. Such interference Consalvi could never willingly accept. Furthermore, though considered by itself this attempt might be as innocent in motivation as Metternich claimed, when taken in the context of Austria's overall Italian policy it assumed a more sinister aspect: it then appeared as one of the three facets of an offensive movement designed to establish Austrian hegemony in Italy. The first facet was the Austrian attempt to assume control over police activity in Italy by the establishment of a General Commission; interference in the internal affairs of the Italian states in the name of reform appeared as the second; and the third facet, the keystone in the arch, was the revival of Metternich's old project for an Italian Confederation.

It will be recalled that the project of an Italian Confederation had first been suggested by Metternich at the Congress of Vienna but had been abandoned in the face of strong Italian opposition. He had, however, been able to persuade Naples and Tuscany to sign treaties somewhat restricting their independence and forbidding them to contract any obligations that might weaken the proposed Italian Confederation--treaties that were clearly intended to serve as a possible basis for the Confederation.16

16 See above, Chapter II, Section 2.
There is some doubt as to what Metternich meant by an "Italian Confederation." The phrase was applied to have two different concepts, and Metternich never stated clearly which of the two he sought: first, a true Confederation, similar to that in Germany; second, a system of bilateral alliances, similar to that of 1815 with Naples, by which Austria would acquire considerable control over the policies of the individual Italian states. The most plausible explanation for this confusion is that Metternich himself was not certain as to which concept to pursue. Probably he would have preferred the true Confederation which offered greater control over the Italian states, but in view of the strong opposition to that scheme considered the alliance system to be more practical. In any case, if the alliance system could be worked out it could serve as the foundation on which a true confederation could be built.  

Whichever of these two versions Metternich had in mind in 1822, the Italian Confederation was certain to meet with strong opposition from the Papal government:

Whatever might be the advantage that might result to the Italian governments from a Confederation [Consalvi explained to Spina] their chief interests are always opposed to it. . . . The excessive disproportion between the colossal forces of Austria and those. . . even of all the Italian states together would give her a preponderance so decisive that Austria alone would decide the destinies of Italy, and the independence of the Italian rulers  

On the different concepts of the Confederation, see Bettanini, 3-50; Srbik, I, 551; Furlani XXXIX, 488-491.
would be in the greatest danger. But if every Italian government should recoil from this system, how much more should the Pontifical government oppose it? [The Pope, as Head of the Church as well as a temporal ruler, must preserve complete impartiality towards all nations; therefore he cannot] join for temporal objectives with other rulers, for their interests, though now common with those of the Pontifical government, could at times be in opposition to the relations which the Pope must preserve with other powers. . . .

[The Papacy] therefore will have to reject any proposal for an Italian Confederation, whether this Confederation covers all the relations of the Italian states or whether it is limited only to some of them. Should any of the Italian sovereigns, whether for family connections or for any other reason, agree to form with the Emperor of Austria a political alliance and to regulate in accordance with the will of his own state [the Papacy must also disapprove such an Alliance. . . .] 18

Thus, Consalvi was opposed to either form of Metternich's Italian Confederation. Indeed, he feared the Political Commission and the Austrian insistence on reform in large part because those measures could serve as stepping stones to a Confederation. 19

Beneath the superficial calm of the inter-Congress period, then, tension had in fact been building up between the Papacy and Austria over the latter's program for attaining hegemony in Italy. Thus far, prior to the Congress of 1822, this tension had been latent. It seemed probable, however, that at the ap-

---

18 A.V., R242, Instructions for Spina, 1822.
19 Ibid., Instructions for Spina; Quesiti che si propongono, 1822; Consalvi to Macchi, 2 December 1822 (#2).
proaching Congress Metternich would attempt to impose part or all of his program upon the Italian states; and if he did so, a direct collision between Papal and Austrian policies could not be avoided.
2. The Congress of Verona

Originally scheduled for Florence, the Congress of 1822 was shifted to Verona where the more efficient Austrian police could maintain better order. As the discussion of Italian affairs was to be an important part of the Congress, every Italian state was to be represented. Metternich hoped that Consalvi would act as Papal plenipotentiary, "at least for eight days, until general principles have been agreed upon;" thereafter some lesser diplomat, preferably Leardi, could handle the remaining negotiations. Evidently, Metternich wished to discuss the sore points in Austro-Papal relations in the hope of quieting Consalvi's distrust and persuading him to co-operate with Austria's plans. Difficulties between Austria and the Papacy had been smoothed out before by personal discussions, at the Congress of Vienna; perhaps the same could be done at Verona.

The Chancellor realized, however, that very possibly the "press of business" would make it impossible for Consalvi to

---

20 A.V., R247, Leardi to Consalvi, 4 July 1822. Leardi's explanation, apparently overlooked by Furlani, renders unnecessary the latter's argument that the Congress was moved to Verona for the sake of Austrian postal espionage; the latter may have been a factor, but there is no evidence to support it. Furlani, XXXIX, 465-471.

21 Ibid., Leardi to Consalvi, 8 June 1822.
attend the Congress. In that event, the probably Papal representative would be Cardinal Spina, a choice little to Metternich's liking, for at Laybach Spina had not hesitated to oppose Austrian plans and might be expected to do so again at Verona. Metternich would therefore have preferred some other delegate, such as the more docile Leardi, but his frequent hints at this preference produced no response from Consalvi.

Metternich therefore appears to have made an attempt to prevent Spina's appointment shortly before the Congress was to begin. In August, 1822, Spina was accused by the Duke of Modena (who frequently served as a "stalking horse" for Metternich) of having displayed sympathies with the Settann while Legate of Bologna. Spina, realizing the probable origin of this accusation, at once sent an eloquent and skillful refutation of these charges direct to Metternich. Confronted by the detailed proof of Spina's innocence presented in his letter, the Chancellor grudgingly admitted that the accusation was unjustified. Nothing more was heard of these charges.

This accusation, whether inspired by Metternich or not, failed to affect Consalvi's determination to appoint Spina. In

---

22 Ibid.
23 Ibid., Leardi to Consalvi, 8 June, 16 July, 9 September, 24 October 1822.
25 Furlani, XXXIX, 474-483, discusses this incident at length, arguing that Metternich was behind it; this seems very probable, though not completely proven.
September, Metternich formally invited Consalvi to attend the Congress. The Secretary of State refused, courteously but firmly, stressing the "press of business" and the "precarious state of health of His Holiness, which makes it impossible for the Secretary of State... to leave his side." He had chosen Spina as his representative, for he had "complete confidence in his ability and loyalty." As for the Duke of Modena's charges, "that very circumstance in a way obliges His Holiness not to choose anyone else, since if he should pass over Cardinal Spina... he would thus cause it to be believed that he lacks complete confidence in him after the letter of H.R.H. the Duke."

In deference no doubt to Metternich's frequently expressed wish, Leardi was to accompany Spina, but only in an advisory capacity.26

The Powers had agreed that the Congress should be divided into two periods: the first, a discussion of general European questions, was to begin on 1 September; the second to begin three weeks later, would deal with Italian affairs. The Italian delegates were to attend only the second period. However, the suicide of Lord Castlereagh, the British Foreign Minister, in August delayed the opening of the Congress until 29 September, and prolonged disputes on the Spanish question further retarded the discussion of Italian problems. Spina therefore did not

26 A.V. R242, Consalvi to Leardi, 17 September 1822. Leardi played only a very secondary role at the Congress.
leave Rome for Verona until 21 October. 27

Consalvi put this delay to good use by thoroughly discussing with an advisory congregation and with Spina the problems that seemed likely to come up at the Congress. As might be expected, the discussions with the Congregation centered around the threat posed by Austrian policy. It was agreed that Austria would probably not dare to propose openly an Italian Confederation, but would try to prepare the way for it by seeking a Political Commission and by attempting to interfere in the internal affairs of the Italian governments in the name of reform. Both these policies were to be opposed as unnecessary, useless, and dangerous to Papal independence. 28 With Spina, Consalvi discussed a wide range of topics that might be brought up, particular attention being given to Austrian policies. 29

The conclusions reached in these various discussions were embodied in Spina’s Instructions of 19 October, written by Consalvi. After first describing the Congress of Laybach and the Circular issued at its conclusion, the Secretary of State went

27 Ibid., Spina to Consalvi, 31 October 1822.

28 Documents bearing on these discussions can be found in R242, Congresso di Verona, 1822. See especially: Quesito che si propongono. . . ; Osservazioni sul Progetto della Commissione; Fogli litti nella prima Conge. tenuta. . . ; and the document beginning “Essendosi stabilito. . . .”

29 No record of these discussions has been preserved, but there exists a list of the topics discussed: R242, Le materie delle quali si è parlato con l’Eminentissimo Spino, 1822. Significantly, “Confederazione Italiana” is the first item on the list.
on to analyze Austrian policy and the threat it posed to the Papacy:

Austria, being that power which possesses in Italy a territory more extensive than any other ruler, and having contributed its troops to restore the disturbed order in Naples and Piedmont, seems to believe that she has the right to compel all the other Italian governments to adopt measures (she considers) appropriate... and to assume a sort of supremacy in the management of those interests common to all the states of the Peninsula... Prussia and Russia [agree]... that Austria has a special interest in Italian affairs... and should play the dominant role in them...

These circumstances, which are certainly favorable to the assumption by Austria of a preponderant influence over all the Italian governments, cause some to believe that the Austrian government... aims at preparing the way for the establishment of an Italian Confederation similar to the German Confederation, making herself Head and Protector... [But English and French opposition has made Austria hesitate to suggest this project openly]. However, the Austrian government, not being able to propose this project openly just now, will probably seek to prepare for it by securing the adoption of principles and institutions of such a nature as to lead little by little to a federal system under Austrian protection.

Obviously, Spina "will have to reject any proposal for an Italian Confederation" in view of the restriction of Papal independence which it would inevitably produce. Less obvious was the answer to

the very delicate but essential question, namely whether the Pontifical Plenipotentiary should refuse to agree to any measure, institution, or general principle regarding the interests of all the Italian states. [Such common measures might be useful against the Seattari].... However, whatever general institution be adopted, whatever common measure be de-
...it would always be another step, more or less considerable, towards a system of federation, and Austria will always wish to have the dominant role in such measures...

Consalvi therefore concluded that the Papacy would have to oppose Austrian projects for such common measures or institutions. The project that was most likely to be proposed was the General Commission of Police. Spina must oppose this Commission, but without stating, if possible, the essential reason for his opposition, namely, that it would increase Austrian influence and lead to a Confederation; instead, he should argue "that the Pontifical government is taking adequate steps to hold the Settarj in check, and that reciprocal communication between governments of their discoveries about the Settarj would offer advantages equal to those that could be derived from a Commission."

The Instructions next covered the third phase of the Austrian offensive, the attempt to interfere in the internal affairs of the Italian states in the name of reform and to impose upon them a common system of government modeled upon that drawn up for Naples at Laybach. Spina was to oppose any such innovations on the grounds that they were unnecessary, for the reforms which Consalvi had drawn up and which were already being put into effect would satisfy all the needs of good government and would eliminate all just cause for discontent. A detailed description of these reforms and the progress made thus far in
putting them into effect was enclosed. The various features of the Neapolitan system were then considered in detail and shown to be either superfluous or undesirable. The most undesirable feature was the Consulta, the consultative council whose advice the ruler was required to hear, though not necessarily to take; this body could become "the first step towards the formation of a constitutional government"—a prediction whose accuracy was to be demonstrated by the later experiment of Pius IX in 1848. Consalvi concluded by defending certain much-criticized aspects of the Papal administration: the financial system, whose burdens were, he demonstrated, lighter than those of the other Italian states, and the judicial system, whose remaining defects were to be remedied by further reforms.30

These Instructions symbolize the breakdown of the Austro-Papal alliance: their very essence is a profound distrust of Austria and all her works. Consalvi's disillusionment with Austria was complete; her policies were a threat to the independence of the Papacy, and he was determined to oppose and defeat them. The Cardinal made no further attempts to conciliate Austria or to patch up the reweled web of Austro-Papal co-operation—the time for that, he realized, was past. For the remainder of his ministry, distrust of Austria and hostility to her ambitions would be the keynotes of Consalvi's diplomacy.

30 A.V., R242, Instructions for Spina, October, 1822.
Armed with these instructions, Spina set out for Verona, arriving there on 29 October. He found that the discussion of general European affairs was still going on, so that for three weeks he had little to do but observe the diplomatic world and make courtesy calls upon the various rulers and ministers present. Soon after his arrival, he was received in audience by Francis I. The Emperor displayed great concern over the activity of the Settarj in the Papal State and the need for reforms there. Spina, making use of the information supplied him by Consalvi, described recent Papal reforms and measures against the Settarj, which seemed to satisfy Francis I.

By the third week in November, however, the general European questions were well on their way to solution. Metternich was now free to turn his attention to Italian affairs, and in consequence Spina’s inactivity soon came to an abrupt end.

On 20 November, the Sardinian Foreign Minister, Count de la Tour, visited Spina to tell him of a "discourse" which Metternich had delivered to him the previous day. The Austrian had admitted that

at first he had thought of establishing a Commission

Ibid., Spina to Consalvi, 31 October, 1, 2, 9, 14, 18 November 1822.

Ibid., Report of the Imperial Audience, 7 November 1822. Francis’s alarm at Settarj activity in the Legations was unfeigned, and was expressed even more strongly to the Tuscan envoy. See: Archivio di Stato, Florence (hereafter cited ASF), Ordine 2392, Serie 1931, Corsini to Fossombroni, 2, 3, November 1822.
for Italy like that at Mainz for Germany, but had then abandoned the idea because of the difficulty of bringing it about. However, the idea had then come to him of forming instead a Political Commission made up of commissioners from all the Italian governments, whose duty would be to follow the movements of suspects in order to discover all the strands of their webs and their relations abroad, especially with France which is their center. The commissioners would be in touch with their respective governments and would reciprocally exchange the information thus obtained [from their governments].

After this description of Metternich's "discourse," La Tour asked Spina to consider it carefully so that they might later exchange ideas on the subject. Spina agreed, commenting that "at first sight it seems to me impractical, and, moreover, simply the old inquisitorial commission under a new name."33

Consalvi agreed that Metternich's new project was much the same as the old and had the same purpose; it must be inflexibly opposed by the Papal representative for the same reasons. The Austrian drive for hegemony in Italy had begun. The first step was "to take control of all the police of Italy" through the proposed Commission; if this move succeeded, Austria would have gone "a long distance towards a Confederation, whose results must be most fatal for the small states." Consalvi therefore directed Spina to try to line up the other Italian representatives in a united front to defeat Metternich's plans; but even if this

33 Ibid., Spina to Consalvi, 20 November 1822.
could not be achieved and the Papacy had to stand alone, Spina
must still refuse to accept the Commission, despite the Austrian
enmity that such a course must produce.34

Consalvi realized that the opposition of the small Italian
states might well prove insufficient to prevent Austria from
establishing the Commission. However, "if France should oppose
herself to such an institution... then the protests of the
Papal plenipotentiary would acquire much greater force and one
could hope that the Commission under discussion would not be set
up." He therefore wrote at once to Macchi in Paris. After
explaining the situation and pointing out its great dangers, he
instructed the nuncio "to discuss this subject [with the French
ministers].... in order to persuade the French government to
oppose the establishment of this Commission without showing that
the Pontifical government has had recourse to it, so that he may
be compromised as little as possible." As the traditional rival
of Austria in Italy, France might be willing to oppose Metternich's plans.35

Spina had not meanwhile been idle. Long before Consalvi’s
reply came, the Papal representative was attempting to align the
other Italian states, especially Tuscany and Sardinia, in a
united opposition to the Commission and to enlist French support.

34 Ibid., Consalvi to Spina, 28 November 1822; also, 30
November 1822.

35 Ibid., Consalvi to Macchi, 2 December 1822.
His first move had been to inform the Tuscan representative, Prince Corsini, of the Austrian plans. Corsini agreed that the Commission was a device for giving Austria control over the police of all the Italian states, "to the destruction of their independence." He promptly set to work with Spina to "devise suitable and prudent ways of defeating such a measure." They agreed upon various pretexts for refusal, such as that the Commission was unnecessary since a voluntary reciprocal exchange of information among the states could achieve the same results, so that they need not express their distrust of Austria too bluntly. They also agreed to invoke the aid of France in secrecy and to consult the other Italian governments.36

The efforts of Spina and Corsini to obtain the support of the other Italian states had little success. Although La Tour had first given the alarm about the Commission, Corsini at their next meeting found him inclined to acquiesce in Metternich's plans and unwilling to oppose the Commission actively.37 Probably the difficult negotiations with Metternich for the evacuation of Austrian troops from Piedmont in which La Tour was then engaged

36 A.S.F., Corsini to Fossombroni, 24 November 1822; also, 23 November 1822.
37 Ibid., Corsini to Fossombroni, 26 November 1822, 2 December 1822; Fossombroni to Corsini, 30 November, 6 December 1822.
explains his reluctance to go against Austria's wishes. Of the other Italian states, Naples seemed favorable to the Commission, while Parma and Modena would certainly accept it. This left only the tiny state of Lucca in opposition.\footnote{38}

With the Italian states thus divided among themselves, Metternich pressed forward with his project during early December. "The affair of the Commission, far from being abandoned, is on the contrary making progress," Spina reported in alarm. To make matters worse, Metternich now spoke of locating the Commission not in Piacenza as formerly planned, but in the Papal city of Ferrara.\footnote{39}

Consalvi was not daunted by the knowledge that the Papacy stood almost alone against the Commission. He continued to instruct Spina that even if all the other Italian states should agree to the Austrian proposal, the Papal representative must still refuse his consent, no matter what diplomatic pressure Austria might bring to bear. He realized that "the odium of refusal will fall entirely upon me," and that not only the Papal government but himself personally would incur thereby the enmity of Austria; "but as I know that I would betray my duty if I acted differently, I am ready for any consequence that may befall

\footnote{38} Ibid., Corsini to Fossombroni, 2, 6, 8 December 1822. A.V., R242, Spina to Consalvi, 2, 5 December 1822; Consalvi to Macchi, 2 December 1822.

\footnote{39} A.V., R242, Spina to Consalvi, 2 December 1822.
However, the position of the Papacy was not so serious, nor that of Austria so strong, as Consalvi feared. Metternich was well aware of the opposition of the Papal and Tuscan governments; should both of these states, which between them controlled all of central Italy, persist in their refusal to join the Commission, the latter would be so handicapped as to be of little value. Heavy pressure by Austria, supported or at least tolerated by the other Powers, upon these small states might compel them to submit; but this Metternich could not bring about. Spina had already warned the French representatives, the Foreign Minister Viscount Mathieu de Montmorency and his assistant Count Pierre De La Ferronays, that Austria was maneuvering towards a Commission. Spina had little difficulty in convincing them that such a move was disadvantageous to French interests, and they were accordingly prepared to intervene on behalf of the Italian states against the Austrian project. Moreover, La Ferronays discussed the proposed Commission with the Tsar and was apparently able to convince him of its undesirability. Faced with the opposition of France and the central Italian states and deprived of the support of his most essential ally Alexander I, Metternich's hopes of forcing the Commission upon the recalcitrant

Ibid., Consalvi to Spina, 4 December 1822; also, 7 December 1822.
The question of the Commission came to a head at the session of 8 December, which was primarily concerned with the evacuation of Austrian troops from Naples and Piedmont. After the latter subject had been treated, Metternich announced that:

The special affairs of Austria, Piedmont, and Naples being settled, it remains for us to warn the other governments of the Peninsula, because, although those governments may see their internal situation in rosy colors... [Metternich] has very different reports, and could not doubt that ferment and discontent were everywhere, especially in the Papal States.

He therefore felt it was necessary to "warn them of their true situation."

At this point La Ferronays interrupted Metternich to ask "if he really wished to limit himself only to warnings," as he had heard differently. Metternich insisted that this was indeed his sole aim, but the French representative was not deceived: he at once retorted bluntly that "it was by now notorious among the plenipotentiaries that Y.R. had expressed other ideas, and in particular that he had spoken... of a certain Commission." Trapped, Metternich tried to equivocate, but when La Ferronays, obviously well informed, continued to

press him, he finally admitted having broached the idea. He still continued to protest his innocence of any ulterior motives, offering the ingenious defense that "he had only acted thus with the aim of creating fear, convinced that without this preliminary the Italian governments would have given little attention to his warnings. Now, filled with apprehension, they will be more compliant" to suggestions of reform from the Powers.

It is unlikely that this disingenuous explanation convinced anyone, but since Metternich had now publicly disavowed his plan, La Ferronays allowed the subject to drop.

"I believe that the affair of the Commission will end here," predicted Spina, and his prophecy proved accurate. Deprived of the support of his Russian ally and with France openly hostile, Metternich could not compel the Papal and Tuscan governments to submit. The Commission was therefore abandoned.

Papal diplomacy had scored a notable success.

The Commission had been defeated and an Italian Confederation had not so much as been mentioned, but one threat still remained: Austrian interference in the internal affairs of the Papacy in the name of reform. Metternich had long been critical of the Papal regime, but at the Congress his criticism became increasingly virulent and public as Papal opposition to his

---

A.V., R242, Spina to Consalvi, 9 December 1822. Also, 17 December 1822. A.S.F., Corsini to Fossembroni, 10 December 1822.
plans became obvious. His remark at the session of 6 December that "ferment and discontent" were especially bad in the Papal State was only the latest evidence of his attitude. He had previously spoken vehemently in this strain not only to the Italian representatives but also to Montmorency, in an apparent attempt to prejudice the latter against the Papal government. 43

Spina therefore suspected that the plenary session of 11 December when the question of reform in the Italian states would be taken up, would be the occasion for "some censure of or attack upon the conduct of the government of His Holiness." 44 He decided to approach Metternich the evening before the session to "show him my distaste for the unfavorable opinion he has of us" and prove how unjust this opinion was. Spina "told the Prince frankly that I intended to erase this opinion and all the false reports that have caused it." His frank and vigorous defense of the Papal government may have had some effect upon Metternich; at least, the Prince admitted that his information might be erroneous and asked for a confidential note describing the true state of affairs. 45

Whether because of Spina's defense or--more likely--as part of a general weakening of the Austrian drive for hegemony in

43 A.V., R242, Consalvi to Macchi, 2 December 1822; Consalvi to Spina, 6 December 1822.
44 Ibid., Spina to Consalvi, 9 December 1822.
45 Ibid., Spina to Consalvi, 12 December 1822.
Italy in the face of strong opposition, no special attack was made on the Papal government the next day. Metternich merely read a Declaration by Austria, Prussia, and Russia which did no more than repeat the ideas of the Laybach Circular. The Italian sovereigns were reminded that they must act to end discontent, "whether by reinforcing and consolidating their power on the basis of justice and order, or by introducing into their administrative systems such improvements as are necessary to satisfy the true needs of their States." 46

The Italian states were to reply to this Declaration and to the Laybach Circular at the session of 13 December by describing the reforms which they had undertaken and demonstrating that they were sufficient to end popular discontent. Metternich had intended this session as the grand climax of the Congress, so far as the Italian states were concerned. Those states would be called upon to defend their internal policies, and in the likely event that they would be unable to do so successfully, he had planned to put forward--using the Duke of Modena as his "stalking horse"--a program of administrative reforms and a common pattern of government to be imposed upon them. The opposition of the Italian states, backed by France, had made it evident to him that his position was not strong enough to put this plan into effect. Therefore, all the declara-

46 Copy of Declaration of 11 December 1822 in Ibid.; also printed in Bianchi, II, 133-135.
tions of the Italian governments as to their reforms were ac-
cepted by Metternich without comment or criticism, although most
were evasive or unsatisfactory. 47

Spina was the first called upon to read his government's
declaration. In this statement, he explained that the Powers
wished the Italian governments to carry out reforms, but
fortunately:

The Plenipotentiaries of His Holiness have the
great satisfaction of observing that their govern-
ment has foreseen the desire of the Powers, in such
a way that, to conform to their wish, this govern-
ment has only to follow without deviation the course
it adopted some years ago.

Spina then enumerated briefly the reforms which the Papacy
had carried out, beginning with the Motu proprio of 1816. These
reforms had established "perfect tranquility" in the Papal
States and hence no alteration of the basic reform plan was
necessary. 48

This Declaration constituted, in effect, a polite rejection
of the Allied demand for governmental changes, on the ground
that the policy long followed by the Papacy rendered them un-
necessary. "In substance," Corsini perceived, Spina "declared
47

Schroeder, 124-128, 226-227. Furlani, XL, 37-40. A.V.,
R242, Spina to Consalvi, 14, 17, 28 December 1822. A.S.F.,
Corsini to Possombroni, 15 December 1822.

48

A.V., R242, Congress of Verona, Proces-verbal of 13
December 1822.
that all that [the Papal government] has done has been well done, and that they intended to continue to persist in the same system," whether it pleased Austria or not. 49

Although no doubt Metternich perceived as clearly as Corsini the defiant tone of the Papal Declaration, he made no comment upon it or upon the policy of the Papal government. The other states then made their declarations, the Powers accepted them without demur, and the session came to an end. The third facet of the Austrian plan for establishing its hegemony in Italy had failed as the other two had done before it.

With the end of this session, Spina's mission to Verona was concluded. In general, Consalvi had good reason to be pleased with the outcome of the Congress. 50 Austria's plans for the expansion of her influence in Italy, which had seemed so formidable a menace to Papal independence, had been checked all along the line. The Italian Confederation had not even been mentioned by Metternich, though its spectre had haunted the Italian delegates throughout the Congress, for the Chancellor had realized that it could not be set up in the teeth of Italian and French opposition.

The Political Commission had been a more genuine and immediate danger. It was a less obvious device for extending

49 A.S.P., Corsini to Fossombroni, 15 December 1822.
50 Consalvi's satisfaction is evident from the tenor of his letter complimenting Spina on the latter's skillful conduct; A.V., R242, Consalvi to Spina, 21 December 1822.
Austrian influence and a plausible case could be made for it as a weapon against the Settari, hence it might be expected to arouse less opposition. Metternich had therefore passed the project vigorously, hoping it might if successful serve as the first step towards a Confederation. The firm resistance of the Papacy and Tuscany, backed by France, had disposed of this plan once and for all.

Finally, the Austrian attempt to exercise a "right of supervision" over the Italian states by interfering in their internal affairs in the name of reform had come to nothing, as Metternich's position was not sufficiently strong to enable him to impose such reforms upon the recalcitrant states. Spina's Declaration of 13 December was in effect an announcement that the Papacy intended to pursue its own course in internal affairs and would tolerate no Austrian interference therein.

Thus none of the dangers which Consalvi had feared had materialized. In part, this happy outcome was the result of fortuitous developments—to Metternich's preoccupation with the Spanish question that prevented him from devoting sufficient attention to Italian affairs, and to his inability to obtain sufficient support from the other Powers to overcome Italian resistance. Yet the stubborn resistance of the Papacy and Tuscany had been an essential factor without which Metternich's plans would have succeeded. Spina was justified in remarking that "if one can congratulate a Minister because nothing of that
which a certain Power planned to do at the Congress was accomplished, that negative merit can well be applied to the ministers of our Italian governments."\(^51\) Certainly, Austria had achieved none of its aims for strengthening its power in Italy, and, though Spina was too modest to say so, it was undoubtedly he of all the Italian representatives who deserved the major credit for this result. He had taken the lead in opposing Austrian designs and had persevered in his efforts until success was attained, despite the apathy or hostility of all the other Italian delegates but Corsini. Consalvi appreciated Spina's achievement at its full value and praised him warmly for the "zeal, skill, and loyalty" with which he had performed his mission, "especially in the delicate matter of the Commission."\(^52\)

At the Congress of Verona, then, Papal diplomacy had been highly successful; but it was to be the last diplomatic victory of Consalvi's career. Already, even before the end of the Congress, another problem, previously unforeseen, had arisen that would compel Consalvi to remain in opposition to Austria, as he had been at Verona; but the diplomatic struggle that followed--the last of Consalvi's life--had no such happy outcome.

\(^{51}\) A.V., R242, Spina to Consalvi, 17 December 1822.

\(^{52}\) A.V., R242, Consalvi to Spina, 21 December 1822.
The central issue in Austro-Papal relations during the last months of Consalvi's ministry was the attempt of Austria to bring under its control all the correspondence of the Italian Peninsula. This attempt, though a continuation of a long-standing Austrian policy, was also an integral part of the general Austrian drive, inspired by the 1820 revolutions, to tighten its control over Italy. 53

Though control over Italian correspondence might have financial and administrative advantages for Austria, it was desired primarily from political motives. During the Restoration period espionage was a regular and important function of the Austrian postal service; all mail that passed through the Austrian post offices was customarily opened and examined for

53 This account of Austria's general postal policy is based primarily upon the standard work of the pioneer in the field, Josef Karl Mayr, Metternichs Geheimer Briefdienst: Postlagen und Postkurse (Wien, 1935) which is based on documentation from the Vienna Archives. Little else has been done on this neglected subject, which is of greater significance than may at first be apparent. Silvio Furlani planned a study of Austrian postal policy in Italy, but has apparently abandoned the project after producing two articles: "La convenzione postale austro-pontificia del 1815," Archivio della Deputazione Romana di Storia Patria, 1946, 23-58; and "La questione postale italiana della Congresso di Verona," Nuova Rivista Storica, 1948, 36-49. Considerable work remains to be done on this subject, especially on its Italian aspects.
information that might be of use. The data thus obtained was often of considerable value to Austrian diplomats as a guide to conditions in foreign states, and of even greater value to the Austrian secret police in keeping track of the activities and inter-relations of the various revolutionary organizations.

Obviously, the value of this postal espionage would be much enhanced if neighboring states could be persuaded to turn over to Austria for forwarding all correspondence passing through their boundaries, correspondence which normally they would have sent by other routes. As a step toward this goal, Austria opened new and better postal routes through its territories along which mail could move more rapidly and cheaply than by older routes through other states. An example of this policy was the opening of a new route from Italy to Hueningen on the Rhine; because of its more efficient organization, a letter sent from Bologna to Paris on this route would arrive a day earlier than on the older routes through Piedmont. However, despite the advantages of these routes, few states were willing to send all their correspondence along them, for the espionage of the Austrian postal system was too well known. Austria was therefore compelled to resort to diplomatic pressure, to subterfuge, and to offering special financial inducements in order to persuade or compel other states to enter its postal orbit.

Nowhere were the efforts of Austria to attain postal
hegemony stronger—or, for a time, more successful—than in Italy. There, the weakness of the small states made it difficult for them to resist Austrian pressure for long, and their lack of financial resources made them susceptible to Austrian financial inducements. Nonetheless, the first Austrian efforts in the Peninsula bore little fruit.

The first Austrian target in Italy was the Papal State, for control of its correspondence would be especially valuable: because of its geographical location, virtually all correspondence between northern and southern Italy, as well as a good part of that between northern Europe and the Mediterranean, naturally passed through Papal territory.

In 1815 Metternich sent to Rome his most skillful postal diplomat, Baron Charles de Lilien, to negotiate a convention regulating Austro-Papal postal relations with the Superintendent of Papal Posts, Cavaliere Lorenzo Altieri. The chief purpose of Lilien's mission was not the mere regulation of routine postal matters, but to gain control of all Papal correspondence for Austria. Altieri, an unimaginative bureaucrat, was concerned only with technical postal questions and had little conception of the wider political implications of the negotiations.

54 For a detailed description of the 1815 postal negotiations, see Furlani, "La convenzione postale... del 1815." 1815 and 1831 he concluded more than twenty postal conventions with various states. Lorenzo Altieri (1778-1817) was Superintendent of Papal Posts from 1814 to 1816, the year of his death.
Lilien therefore had little difficulty in securing the insertion into the preliminary draft of several articles that would achieve his political objective. Most important was Article 6, which provided that "the Pontifical Post Office will consign directly to the Imperial Office all correspondence... destined for..." and here all the nations of Europe, from Russia to England, were listed.55

Altieri made no objection to this clause, which would have made Austria the master of all Papal correspondence. At this point, however, Consalvi's attention was attracted to these negotiations. The Secretary of State saw the dangerous implications of Article 6 at first glance.56 Though Austrian control of its correspondence must be distasteful to any Italian state, it posed a much more serious danger to the Papal government than for any other. The reason was that, whereas most states sent their important diplomatic correspondence by special diplomatic couriers, the impoverished Papal government could not afford this expensive means of communication and was therefore compelled to communicate with its representatives abroad by regular mail. Papal correspondence with the Vienna nuncio was already subject to Austrian scrutiny; should the

55 A.V., R117, Preliminary draft of the postal convention, August 1815.
56 Consalvi's reasons for opposing this article are explained in A.V. R117, Osservazioni sul progetto del Sig. Baron Lilien, 1815.
Papacy agree to turn over all its mail to Austria, then all its diplomatic correspondence would be as restricted and hampered as that with Vienna already was. The damage that such a situation would do to the conduct of Papal diplomacy is readily apparent. The Papal government, therefore, had greater reason than any other in Italy to oppose Austria's plans to obtain control of all Italian correspondence, for those plans posed a threat not only to the privacy of its citizens, but to the successful conduct of its own diplomacy as well. Consalvi accordingly rejected Lilien's proposed convention at once, substituting a project of his own eliminating the objectionable articles.

Once his subterfuge had been detected by Consalvi, Lilien made no further attempt to secure control of Papal correspondence. No attempt was made by Austria to apply diplomatic pressure upon the Papacy, probably because any such pressure would have interfered with the policy of Austro-Papal co-opera-

57 Unless, that is, some other state offered the use of its diplomatic couriers or some trustworthy private traveller was willing to carry the Papal correspondence. Code would be and was used, of course, but the skill of the Austrian cryptographers made this an insecure refuge. This situation explains why, for example, much of Consalvi's correspondence with the Vienna nuncio or with Spina at Verona and Laybach (both in Austrian territory) was so guarded in tone. Only on the infrequent occasions when he could send his letters by some other state's couriers or by private traveller did Consalvi feel able to speak freely. The historian finds it difficult to discover Consalvi's real attitude to Austria from his correspondence, for the latter was written in the knowledge that it would soon become known to Vienna.
tion then sought by Metternich. The postal convention which was eventually signed on 7 October 1815 dealt only with routine administrative matters and had no political overtones. The Papacy was left free to send its correspondence by whatever route it preferred. 58

For six years after this rebuff Austrian postal diplomacy in Italy was relatively quiescent. Once again, as in other fields, it was the revolutions of 1820-21 that stirred up renewed activity on Austria's part. The information on the activities of the Settarj that could be obtained by control over all the correspondence of the Peninsula now came to seem vitally important to the Austrian government. The opinion of the Austrian charge in Turin, Baron Daiser, that the revolutions could have been prevented had Austria been in control of all Franco-Italian correspondence, may have been an exaggeration, but it was typical of the Austrian attitude. 59

In 1822, therefore, Metternich set to work with redoubled energy to impose Austrian control upon the correspondence of all the Italian states. The basic Austrian strategy was a revival of an older plan: to form a sort of postal blockade across central Italy through which no mail could pass without falling into Austrian hands. Metternich would create this blockade by

58 Copy of this Convention in R117; also, printed in Furlani, "La convenzione postale...", 51-53.

59 Mayr, 44.
by negotiating conventions with Tuscany, Modena, and Parma, by which those states would agree to turn over to Austria all correspondence originating in or passing through their territories. These three states when joined with Lombardy-Venetia formed a continuous band of territory stretching across the Peninsula from the Adriatic to the Tyrrhenian Sea and all landborne correspondence between northern and southern Italy must pass through them. The Papal State and Piedmont, the states most likely to oppose Austrian designs, would then be isolated from each other. If they would not voluntarily agree to turn their correspondence to Austria, then it would perforce be turned over by the central Italian states through which it must pass. "We cut Italy in half and become its masters," commented Metternich. 50

The crucial link in this plan was Tuscany, for Parma and Modena were completely subservient to Austrian wishes. Secret negotiations were initiated at Florence in early 1822, and Tuscan hesitation was overcome by a mixture of diplomatic pressure and very advantageous financial concessions. The result was the Austro-Tuscan Convention of 4 September 1822, by which Tuscany agreed to "pass on to the Imperial Austrian posts all letters originating in or in transit through the Grand Duchy,

---50
Ibid., '61
destined for... in short, the whole world, except only letters to and from the South of France, which alone are to be consigned to the Sardinian office."  

With the conclusion of this Convention, Metternich had taken the first and most crucial step towards postal hegemony in Italy. A postal barrier had been created across central Italy which could not easily be circumvented and through which no mail could pass without falling into the Austrian hands. This agreement placed Austria in a strong, indeed almost impregnable, position, from which it would be very difficult for the Papacy to dislodge her.

The Convention was kept secret for some months. It is uncertain precisely when Consalvi first learned of it, but apparently he had some idea of its contents by late October. In that month he spoke about it to Blacas, requesting the aid of France to avert Austrian control over the correspondence of all Italy. In response, the French government assured him it would oppose any such Austrian design.  

Equally encouraging was the attitude of Piedmont: De la Tour promised that "he will display the greatest firmness in the postal question at the Congress of Verona, and will do everything there in complete harmony with... Spina."  

61 A.V., R242, Consalvi to Spina, 4 December 1822.
62 A.V., R261, Blacas to Consalvi, 28 October 1822; R248, Macchi to Consalvi, 29 October 1822.
63 A.V. R248, Macchi to Consalvi, 29 October 1822.
At the very minute these assurances were given, however, both Piedmont and France were negotiating postal agreements to give all their correspondence to Austria. Immediately upon hearing of the Austro-Tuscan negotiations, Piedmont had dispatched the Postal Director of Genoa, Cavaliere Cerruti, to Florence to negotiate a favorable convention. In the end, Cerruti was completely outmaneuvered, and the Tuscan-Piemontese Convention of 9 November 1822 which he signed was a disaster for Piedmont. By this agreement Piedmont was obliged to turn over to Tuscany (and hence to Austria) all mail from or to the Papal State and Naples, while Tuscany was not bound to turn over to Piedmont any correspondence save that for southern France. The inept Cerruti was promptly disavowed by his government, which refused to ratify his convention as too unfavorable to Piedmontese interests. Not only would this Convention contribute to Austrian postal hegemony, it would also deprive Piedmont of an important source of revenue, for the correspondence of Italy for western Europe would no longer pass through the Piedmontese postal system. Time was to show that the second of these drawbacks far outweighed the first in the eyes of Turin, and that Piedmont’s main objective was to secure its own financial interests, not to defend the freedom of Italian correspondence. In late 1822, however, Piedmont seemed eager to co-operate with

---

Copy of this convention in R117, 1822.
the Papacy to defeat Austria.

The contents of the Austro-Tuscan Convention were fully divulged to the Italian governments in late November, and at once Spina, La Tour, and the representative of Lucca, Marchese Manzi, met to discuss it. All agreed that the convention must not be allowed to go into effect, but it was difficult to see how this desirable aim was to be attained. The only way in which these three states could bring pressure directly would be for them to deny Austria and Tuscany the use of certain routes which they controlled: the Alpine passes through Piedmont, the Bologna Road from Venetia through the Legations to Florence, and the route through Lucca to Tuscany. Unfortunately, Austria and Tuscany had alternate, though longer, routes to these, so that closing the latter would not compel those powers to give in. On this gloomy note the conference broke up. "Our situation... is certainly most unpleasant," Spina concluded.

Meanwhile, Consalvi too had learned the full content of the Austro-Tuscan Convention, which was even worse than he had feared. He at once realized that the Papacy alone had little chance of defeating Austria under existing circumstances. The only hope lay in securing the co-operation of other powers. His first step was to seek an understanding with Piedmont. A recent dispatch from Turin had implied that if the Papacy would formally protest against the Tuscan-Piedmontese Convention of

---

65 A.V., R117, Spina to Consalvi, 27 November 1822.
9 November, Piedmont would use this protest as a pretext for refusing to ratify the agreement. Consalvi accordingly directed Spina to give De la Tour such a protest. At the same time, the Cardinal made plans to bring the Austro-Tuscan Convention to the attention of France and England, who could hardly look with favor upon the concentration of their correspondence in Austrian hands. 66

Spina promptly sent De la Tour a formal protest, as Consalvi had directed. The Piedmontese replied with two notes, one public, one confidential. The first declared formally that Piedmont, from consideration for the rights of the Pope, would refrain from ratifying the Convention with Tuscany. In the confidential letter, De la Tour agreed completely on the dangers presented by the Austro-Tuscan Convention and the need for Piedmont to unite with the Papacy to oppose it, suggesting as one means of opposition the establishment of a packetboat service between Genoa and Civitavecchia to circumvent Austrian control of the land routes. 67

Consalvi was pleased by De la Tour's reply and considered the packetboat suggestion interesting, but he feared that France might object if its correspondence was delayed by use of this

66 A.V., R242, Consalvi to Spina, 4 December 1822.
67 Ibid., Spina to De la Tour, 9 December 1822; De la Tour to Spina, 15 December 1822 (#1 & 2).
novel route in bad weather. 68

Meanwhile, Consalvi's efforts to rouse France and England were having a mixed success. The Cardinal had been astounded to learn in late November that despite Blacas's promise of support, France had signed a Convention turning over all its Italian correspondence to Austria. 69 Macchi reported that the French postal bureaucrats had signed the agreement without realizing its political implications. The French Foreign Minister Montmorency had been "most surprised and indignant to learn of it," and had assured Macchi that the French government would refuse the ratification of the Convention. 70

Montmorency's surprise was probably genuine. Like most statesmen, he tended to ignore postal matters as mere technical questions of no political significance. However, he was highly suspicious of Austrian designs in Italy and favorably disposed towards the Papacy; when the political implications of the Convention were made clear to him, he promised to do all in his power to help defeat Austria's aims. 71 At Verona he made a determined effort to persuade Tuscany to abandon its convention with Austria, and to his efforts were joined those of Lord

---

68 A.V. RL17, Consalvi to Macchi, 26 December 1822.
69 Ibid., Consalvi to Macchi, 29 November 1822.
70 Ibid., Consalvi to Papal charge Tosti in Turin, 30 December 1822.
71 Ibid., Tosti to Consalvi, 26 February 1823.
Burgherish, the English ambassador in Florence, who had also been enlightened as to the danger; but their combined efforts met with no success. To all pleas and protests, the Tuscan government replied that its Austrian convention was far more advantageous than its former agreements with Sardinia had been; that in signing the Convention it had been motivated entirely by these financial advantages and was unaware of any wider political considerations; and that it accordingly saw no reason to abandon its Convention. 72

Since Tuscany, secure in the knowledge of Austrian support, thus resisted the combined pressure of France, England, and the Italian states, nothing was accomplished at the Congress of Verona to halt Austria's drive for control of all Italian correspondence—and as 1822 passed into 1823, it became increasingly apparent that that drive would not be stopped.

72 A.S.F., Corsini to Fossombroni, 7 December 1822.
Even before the final dissolution of the Congress the opposition to Austria had suffered a serious setback: in late December Montmorency fell from power and was replaced by Viscount Francois Chateaubriand. Since Chateaubriand was less concerned with Papal interests and less disposed to quarrel with Austria over Italy than his predecessor, Montmorency's fall was a serious matter for the Papacy, as Consalvi realized. From this time onward, French opposition to Austria's plans steadily weakened, in fact if not in principle.

Nonetheless, at their first meeting Chateaubriand assured Macchi that the Austro-French Convention would not be ratified. Not only was that agreement contrary to French interests, but England too had strongly protested the deviation of its correspondence from the former route. Fortunately a convenient pretext for rejection could be found in the refusal of Sardinia to ratify its convention with Tuscany, a ratification which the Austro-French Convention had stipulated as a necessary preliminary. These assurances were very encouraging, but when Macchi suggested a concrete plan for action in the form of the

---

73 A.V., R165, Consalvi to Spina, 13 January 1823 (copy); R117, Testi to Consalvi, 25 February 1823. Francois Viscount Chateaubriand, noted French writer and diplomat, Foreign Minister 1822-1824.
paquetboat scheme, Chateaubriand promptly vetoed it on the
ground that it might delay the transit of French correspon-
dence.  This was to be the pattern of French policy during 1823:
voluble assurances, but no tangible support.

Nor was the course of events in Piedmont entirely reassuring. Turin continued to protest its firm opposition to Austrian plans, but Consalvi was disturbed to learn that Sardinia was simultaneously engaged in negotiating a new postal convention with Austria. On 28 January, the Piedmontese charge in Rome, Count Barberoux, informed Consalvi that his government was contemplating an agreement by which it would turn over to Austria all correspondence to and from the eastern but not the western Papal States. Although such an agreement would not in itself be a serious threat, Consalvi considered it an alarming sign that Piedmont was wavering in its opposition to Austria. In his reply to Barberoux he exhorted Piedmont to remain firm, warning of the Austrian strategy:

Having failed with the Papal government, Austria now makes this proposition to Sardinia, in order to force the hand of the Papal government and

74 R117, Macchi to Consalvi, 9, 28, January 1823.
75 Ibid., Consalvi to Tosti, 27 February 1823; Macchi to Consalvi, 17 March, 22 April, 20 May, 2 August 1823.
75 Ibid., Tosti to Consalvi, 13 January 1823.
divide the Italian states. This is the sole aim of the Austro-Sardinian negotiations... Austrian plans to divide and conquer by approaching Sardinia alone. If Sardinia agrees, the Papal State will be isolated and forced to see... its correspondence brought into Austrian hands. 77

Despite the Cardinal's warning, the Sardinian government continued the negotiations. Two weeks later, Consalvi learned that Turin was giving favorable consideration to a new Austrian proposal "to consign to the Sardinian posts all the correspondence received at Milan for France, England, and beyond. ..." However, all Italian correspondence would still pass through the Austrian office at Milan before being given to Sardinia.

"This scheme," Consalvi commented bitterly, "will assure the pecuniary interests of the Sardinian posts, but allows the concentration of correspondence in Austrian hands to continue to the fullest extent, permits the preservation in toto of the Austro-Tuscan Convention, and... deprives France of its best excuse for not ratifying its convention... If Sardinia yields to Austria, all is lost." 78

While France and Sardinia were thus wavering, Consalvi had been maintaining a firm resistance to Austria's plans. The

77 Ibid., Consalvi to Barberoux, 29 January 1823, with copy of Barberoux to Consalvi, 28 January 1823.
78 Ibid., Consalvi to Tosti, 10 February 1823. In fact, this scheme had been first proposed by Sardinia, not Austria: see Maschi to Consalvi, 4 March 1823.
first official notice the Papal government had had of the Austro-Tuscan Convention was a brief letter from the Tuscan Postal Superintendent, Cavaliere Lustrini, to his Papal equivalent, Marquis Massimo (who had replaced Altier in 1817), informing him of the Convention's provisions. As these provisions would necessitate various changes in Tuscan-Papal postal relations, Lustrini requested a meeting with Massimo to discuss these points. Apparently Lustrini was following the usual Imperial tactic of trying to make its postal innovations appear as mere routine administrative measures. Massimo was not deceived; he replied that as this matter "combines not only economic and administrative affairs, but also political and ministerial," it was beyond his competence to treat and must be taken up with the Secretary of State. 79

Two weeks after this rebuff, Apponyi (who served in Rome as Tuscan ambassador as well as Austrian) took up the postal question on the desired ministerial level, requesting Consalvi to authorize Massimo to treat with Lustrini. 80 In his reply Consalvi refused Apponyi's request and set forth for the first time the arguments against the Austro-Tuscan Convention which he was to use regularly henceforth in his official communications. First, he argued, the Convention violated the principle

79 Ibid., Massimo to Lustrini, 28 November 1822; also Lustrini to Massimo, 26 November 1822; Massimo to Consalvi, 28 November 1822.
80 Ibid., Apponyi to Consalvi, 10 December 1822.
of freedom of correspondence, the right of the sender to choose
the route along which his mail should go; second, Austria and
Tuscany had no right to negotiate a treaty disposing of Papal
correspondence without consulting the Pope and satisfying his
just interests and sovereign rights; third, the Papal government
could not agree to the deviation of its correspondence for
"France, England, etc.," from its natural course without those
nations' consent; and finally, the new route was longer and went
through more difficult terrain, hence it would delay the transit
of correspondence. For these reasons, Consalvi declared, the
Papacy must formally protest against this Convention and refuse
to co-operate with it in any way, for example by adapting Papal-
Tuscan postal regulations to conform with its provisions. More-
ever, since Tuscany and Austria refused to allow Papal corres-
pondence to pass freely, the Pope must exercise his sovereign
right of refusing to allow their couriers to use the post road
through Bologna. The Papal government would be willing to dis-
cuss a new postal convention, but only if the interests of all
the Italian states were respected. 81

The immediate reaction to this letter was mildly encourag-
ing: Tuscany announced that it would not put its Convention with
Austria into effect on 1 January 1823, as planned, but would
postpone it until 1 March. However, this postponement betokened
no fundamental change in policy. A letter of 20 January from

81 Ibid., Consalvi to Apponyi, 19 December 1822.
Metternich to Apponyi which the latter read to Consalvi rejected all the Papal arguments. The most telling point was a demonstration that although the new Austrian postal road (through Hueningen) was indeed longer than the old Piedmontese route, it was better organized and in better condition and therefore mail sent along it would travel faster and arrive with equal or greater rapidity. 82 This contention—which was in time proved correct 83—seriously weakened the best of Consalvi's official arguments, and was therefore repeated in greater detail in Apponyi's official reply to the Cardinal's letter of 19 December. 84 Consalvi could only retort that it remained to be seen whether the new route could equal the old in rapidity, but "this much at least is certainly true, that the longer road, despite all improvements, remains the longer." Hence, the Papal government would persist in its protests. 85

In the following weeks, various unofficial communications were exchanged between Consalvi and Apponyi, but none offered anything new or in any way eased the tension between Austria and the Papacy. On March 20, Apponyi, following Metternich's instructions, made another lengthy attack on the Papal position.

82 Ibid., Consalvi to Macchi, 8 February 1823, describes Metternich's letter, of which no copy could be found in the Vatican Archives.
83 Ibid., Macchi to Consalvi, 2 August 1823.
84 A.V., ANV 250, Apponyi to Consalvi, 9 February 1823.
85 Ibid., Consalvi to Apponyi, 14 February 1823.
He began by denying that the Austro-Tuscan Convention "had any political end at all" (a good example of the guilty fleeing where none pursueth, since Consalvi had carefully refrained from even hinting at this charge), but was designed solely for administrative and financial improvement of the postal system in Italy. He also denied that the Convention violated the Pope's sovereign rights, for Austria and Tuscany had the sovereign right of regulating the transit of mail within their borders as they judged best. In conclusion, Apponyi again praised the advantages of the new Austrian route, which was both shorter (he claimed) and better.\(^86\) These same arguments were repeated in five additional notes which Apponyi gave Consalvi during 27-29 March.\(^87\) The Cardinal replied that he had never accused the Convention of being politically motivated; that his information on the length of the new route differed from Apponyi's, and that in any case it was an unnecessary deviation from the natural route; and that Austria and Tuscany did indeed have the right to regulate postal affairs within their borders, but not to injure the rights and interests of other states in so doing.\(^88\)

So passed the winter and early spring of 1823 for Consalvi, in ceaseless activity to stem the Austrian advance: protests to Austria, protests to Tuscany, exhortations to Sardinia to hold

\(^86\) Ibid., Apponyi to Consalvi, 20 March 1823.
\(^87\) Copies in Ibid., Consalvi to Leardi, 12 April 1823.
\(^88\) Ibid., Consalvi to Apponyi, 29 March 1823.
firm and to France to oppose Austria's designs, plans for new postal routes to circumvent Austria's, plans for packetboat service, plans for a congress of all Italian states on postal affairs--but all in vain. As Consalvi already suspected, the struggle was hopeless. Neither Austria nor Tuscany could be forced to abandon their strong position by any pressure that Consalvi alone could bring, and of his presumed allies, Piedmont sought in effect only its own financial interest, while France feared to challenge Austria openly. In the last analysis the Papacy stood alone--and in a single contest with Austria and Tuscany, Consalvi knew well that the Papacy had no hope of victory.

The crucial step in the isolation of the Papacy came with the signing in March of a new Austro-Sardinian postal convention by which Piedmont acquiesced in Austrian postal hegemony. Tosti, the Papal charge in Turin, had long foreseen this development:

"The primary interest of this government," he had warned Consalvi in February, "is its pecuniary advantage; on various pretexts it will negotiate, as it is now doing, and will sign any treaty with Austria that safeguards its finances."^89

Tosti's prediction was proven accurate at the end of March, when De la Tour admitted that Sardinia had signed a convention with Austria. The Piedmontese insisted that the agreement contained "not a word... that could harm the rights... of the

---
^89 A.V., R117, Tosti to Consalvi, 19 February 1823.
Holy Father, "90 but the facts belied his words. By this convention Piedmont agreed to turn over all correspondence for states on the left bank of the Po to Austria, while that for the right bank (including the Papal States) would be consigned to Parma. Thus, in theory, the concentration of all correspondence in Austrian hands would be avoided. In return, Austria would consign to Sardinia the correspondence for much of western Europe, but only after it had first passed through Austrian offices and had thus been subject to inspection. 91 Thus the last gap in the Austrian postal barrier across Italy had been filled, and every route by which the Papal State might send mail to the North was cut off.

Consalvi, brushing aside De la Tour's attempted justifications, was bitterly critical of what he considered Piedmontese betrayal:

Piedmont, by which the Pontifical Government was first encouraged to oppose the Austro-Tuscan Convention, instead of holding firm in the defense of the old system as the Pontifical Government has done, has sought to assure its own selfish interests by securing the greatest possible consignment of correspondence, without opposing the concentration of all letters in Austrian hands. . . . It is true that Austria, feigning to retreat from the principle

---

90 Ibid., Tosti to Consalvi, 31 March 1823.
91 Copy of this convention in R117, 1823. Sardinia also agreed to put its convention of 9 November with Tuscany into effect.
of concentration too clearly manifested in its Tuscan Convention, has set up two centers for correspondence... but this does not really prevent the concentration of all correspondence in Austrian hands, for Parma can be considered as actually an Austrian territory... .

But Consalvi's indignant protests had no effect and the Convention was duly ratified.

The Cardinal's last hope was to arouse France to active opposition to the Austrian plans, but once again he was disappointed. When Macchi, following Consalvi's instructions, sought the support of Chateaubriand against Austria, the latter agreed as to the "necessity that France protest and thwart them."

However (Macchi continued) he confessed to me with complete frankness that in these times of war with Spain he could not clash with Austria and enter upon acrimonious disputes. For the present, he wished to limit himself to using language that will not displease Austria, and to give advice, not protests.

No help, then, could be expected from France. The isolation of the Papacy was complete. All that was left for the Pontifical government to do now, Macchi felt, was to negotiate with Austria in the faint hope of "making her a bit more reasonable."

---

92 A.V., ANV 250, Consalvi to Leardi, 13 April 1823.
93 A.V., R117, Tosti to Consalvi, 4, 11 June, 2 July 1823.
94 Ibid., Macchi to Consalvi, 22 April 1823.
Consalvi had already come to the same distasteful conclusion. On 29 March he had suggested negotiations for a postal convention, but Metternich, after a lengthy criticism of the Papacy's allegedly unreasonable suspicions, had refused to negotiate until the Papacy revoked certain measures it had recently taken, notably the denial of the Bologna road to Austrian couriers.95

Consalvi rejected this demand, which would have compelled the Papacy to abandon the use of what few weapons it had against Austria, and once again defended the principle of free correspondence in terms sharply critical of Austrian postal policies.96

May and early June passed while the Papacy and Austria exchanged acrimonious notes on the preliminary conditions for negotiations. Despite all Austrian pressure, Consalvi refused to retreat from his stand, or to co-operate in any way with the Austrian postal conventions.97 As the conventions could not be put fully into effect unless the Papacy adapted its postal regulations to conform to those of Austria and Tuscany, their execution was considerably hampered by the Papal refusal of

95 A.V., ANV 250, Consalvi to Apponyi, 29 March 1823, in Consalvi to Leardi, 2 April 1823; Metternich to Apponyi, 17 April 1823, in Consalvi to Leardi, 21 May 1823.
96 A.V., R117, Consalvi to Apponyi, 9 May 1823.
97 Ibid., Apponyi to Consalvi, 19 June 1823. Also, ANV 250, Consalvi to Leardi, 28 June 1823.
co-operation, and postal affairs in central Italy were in confusion. Austria and Tuscany needed some sort of postal settlement that would end this confusion, which meant obtaining at least the passive adherence of the Papacy. To obtain this adherence some minor concessions on Austria's part seemed justified. On 19 June Apponyi informed Consalvi that his government had decided to drop its preliminary conditions and open negotiations for a new convention "correspondant aux intérêts reciprocques." Once again, Baron Lilien would serve as Austrian plenipotentiary. Consalvi accepted the Austrian overture and appointed Massimo as his plenipotentiary.

Lilien arrived in Rome at the end of July and began negotiations with Massimo, but after a few meetings in which nothing was accomplished he requested discussions with Consalvi, "to establish fundamental principles on which the subsidiary provisions of the convention can be based." Consalvi agreed, and henceforth the negotiations on major issues were conducted between Consalvi and Lilien.

These negotiations took place against a tragic background: on 6 July, Pius VII had suffered a serious accident from which

98 Ibid., Apponyi to Consalvi, 19 June 1823. Also, ANV 250, Consalvi to Leardi, 28 June 1823.
99 A.V., R17, Consalvi to Apponyi, 7 July 1823.
100 A.V., ANV 250, Consalvi to Leardi, 13 August 1823. The following account of the 1823 postal negotiations is based largely upon this dispatch, together with those to Macchi, 4, 9, 14 August 1823, in R117.
in his poor state of health he could not recover. During July his condition tended to deteriorate, and by early August hope for his recovery was slight. During these weeks when Pius VII was edging closer to death, Consalvi's chief concern was with the health of his sovereign and friend; he could spare only a fraction of his time for the postal negotiations. Moreover, these circumstances in effect imposed a time limit upon Consalvi's conduct of the negotiations, for the death of Pius VII would mean the end of the Cardinal's ministry. If the Secretary of State was to complete the postal negotiations himself, he must fight not only Austria, but time as well.

Discussions between Consalvi and Lilien went on in halting fashion during the early weeks of August, whenever the Cardinal could find time to spare from all the pressing problems caused by the Pope's condition. At first, "Lilien was unable to reply to [Consalvi's] sound arguments. . . , and seemed disposed to become more reasonable," but "suddenly he presented a project . . . completely identical to the Austro-Tuscan Convention." Such a project was of course inadmissible and Consalvi at once rejected it, remarking caustically that if this was all Lilien had to say, "it was useless for him to have come to Rome from Vienna."101

After this rebuff Lilien abandoned his proposed convention, but not his attempts to persuade Consalvi to co-operate with

101 A.V., R117, Consalvi to Macchi, 4 August 1823.
Austria's aims. The chief point at issue during the discussions that followed was the Austrian's insistence that the Papal government "oblige itself to give to Austria all the correspondence originating in or passing through the Papal State, not only for Austria, but also for [all of Europe north of the Alps]." In support of this demand, Lilien argued that the nations concerned were indifferent to what route their correspondence took, that mail would travel more rapidly over the Austrian route, and that the latter was more economical for the Papacy. Furthermore, continued Papal resistance "would be useless, for Tuscany would have to turn these letters over to Austria in any case."

Consalvi was hard pressed to answer these arguments:

How difficult and delicate [he lamented to Macchi] is the Papal position on this point! If only we could give the political reason for not wishing the concentration of correspondence, we would have an unanswerable argument; but as we are unable to adduce this reason, all the odium of refusal falls upon the Pontifical Government which, against its own financial interest and with the certainty of not being able in any case to attain its objective..., finds itself in the necessity of giving a most embittering refusal without being able to support it with the arguments so solid that they admit of no reply.

But "despite all this, we have held firm to the principle of... not obligating ourselves to give Austria the correspondence."\(^{103}\)

\(^{102}\) A.V., ANV 250, Consalvi to Leardi, 13 August 1823.

\(^{103}\) A.V., R117, Consalvi to Macchi, 4 August 1823.
Consalvi's position became yet more difficult during the second week of negotiations when Lilien, in addition to repeating his previous arguments, offered tempting financial inducements to overcome Papal reluctance. He first offered free transport for all correspondence for the Papal States from France along the Austrian road from Hueningen to Bologna, and when this had no effect, added the free transportation of all foreign correspondence for the Papal State through Austrian territories. Thus, the cost of sending a letter between, for example, Rome and Paris, would be reduced by well over one third. If, Lilien warned, the Papacy should still refuse "despite these great advantages, Austria must conclude it had some ulterior motive and is displaying a definite hostility to Austria. . . ."\textsuperscript{104}

Consalvi "could not but realize all the strength of this argument, and all the offensiveness of a refusal which (not being able to give the true motive on which it is founded) must appear utterly irrational." Nonetheless, he persisted in his refusal. The Cardinal was now pursuing a favorite tactic: seeking to preserve a principle even when compelled to yield on its practical exercise, in the hope that one day more favorable conditions might allow the Papacy to put that principle into effect again. He saw clearly enough that under existing circumstances the postal situation was hopeless: the Papacy alone could not possibly overthrow Austrian control over the Italian postal

---

\textsuperscript{104} Ibid., Consalvi to Macchi, 9 August 1823.
system and preserve the freedom of its own correspondence. However, if the Papacy could avoid binding itself to turn over all correspondence to Austria, if it could preserve the principle of free correspondence, then in time circumstances might turn against Austria and the Papacy might recover its postal independence. Such a charge could come about when the Spanish war ended and France was free to take a stand against Austria. The Papacy must preserve its freedom of action until that time came.

Consalvi therefore rejected Lilien's proposals, despite his tempting offers and his threats of Imperial displeasure. It was difficult to find arguments to justify this stand publicly: in this "difficilissima" situation Consalvi "could find no better argument than that based on the natural character of the Papal government," that is, its necessary neutrality and impartiality. The Papacy, he claimed, would be displaying partiality for Austria if it agreed to give here all its correspondence, and other states (for example, Piedmont) would have just cause for complaint. Lilien brushed this admittedly weak argument aside, and, irritated by the tenacity with which Consalvi clung to it, broke off the talks, warning that "the Austrian ambassador would intervene in this affair, and the Papal government would have to explain its refusal to Austria." 105

---

Ibid., Consalvi to Macchi, 9 August 1823.
Apponyi then entered the negotiations in support of Lilien, but despite their combined pressure Consalvi held firm. After another week of talks the Austrians at last gave up and agreed to the Convention of 19 August by which the Papacy's freedom of action, in principle if not in practice, was formally recognized. On the crucial point, the consignment of Papal correspondence, the Convention reads:

The Papal Post Office will send in closed and sealed packets the correspondence which it may decide to turn over to the General Post Office of S.M. the Emperor of Austria, both that originating in its own borders and that coming from ... Naples and beyond, and destined for [all of Europe and the Near East except the Italian States].

With this Convention the postal controversy came to an end. Though not unimportant in itself, the greatest significance of that dispute lies in the revealing light it casts upon the disintegration of the Austro-Papal alliance. The halcyon days of

---

106 Ibid. Also, Consalvi to Macchi, 14 August 1823. No account of the negotiations after 14 August is in the Vatican Archives, but one may assume from the outcome that Consalvi continued his resistance and the Austrians finally admitted defeat.

107 This was a point on which there had been considerable discussion. Customarily, mail was given to foreign post offices in sealed packets. As this would hamper, though not prevent, Austrian inspection of the letters, Lilien wished the mail to be transmitted loose. Consalvi, equally aware of these facts, insisted on closed and sealed packets and eventually won his point.

108 Copy in R117, 1823. The numerous other provisions dealt with technical postal matters only.
Austro-Papal co-operation were long since vanished. For five years Austro-Papal relations had deteriorated under the impact of religious and political disputes until by 1823 those states were in open opposition. The contrast between the postal negotiations of 1823 and those of 1815 is most instructive in this connection. In 1815, the negotiations had been conducted on a friendly basis throughout: the Papal rejection of the Austrian proposals had been accepted by Vienna with good grace, and the issue had disappeared beneath the smooth flow of Austro-Papal co-operation. How different was 1823 when the tone of the whole negotiation was one of hostility and distrust, when Austria and the Papacy fought to the bitter end for its objectives, each using whatever weapon it could find. Clearly, by 1823 Austro-Papal co-operation was little more than a memory.

What judgment should be passed upon Consalvi's handling of the postal controversy? The grudging praise given by enemies is more impressive than the eager admiration of friends. Let then the final words on the postal dispute and its outcome be uttered by one who had no love for Consalvi: his bitter enemy, the Zelante Cardinal della Somaglia who succeeded him as Secretary of State:

From [the Convention of 19 August], it can be seen that the Pontifical Government, despite all obstacles, held firm to the principle of freedom of correspondence, and has not obligated itself to give Austria the correspondence either for England or for France, or any other foreign correspondence, but has only made arrangements for the cost of that correspondence which it may
decide to give to Austria, under which arrangement it remains free to give any correspondence to whomever it considers most suitable.

Moreover, . . . the Government of H.H. has not obligated itself to give its correspondence loose to Austria, so that it remains free to transmit closed packages . . . .

It is true that the Austro-Tuscan Convention, by which Tuscany has obligated herself to give Austria all foreign correspondence, prevents in practice this consigning [of Papal correspondence to other states than Austria]; but if France and Sardinia should ever make Austria and Tuscany recede from their convention, the Pontifical Government will always be in a position to make a special convention with France or Sardinia, and will always be free to consign that correspondence which, according to the Convention, it may decide to give them. 109

On the testimony of his foe, then, Consalvi had once again skillfully guided the Papacy through another "difficilissima" situation and, acting under the most unfavorable circumstances, had managed to save for the Papacy all that could still be saved.

It was his last service to the Papacy. On 20 August, the day after the Convention was signed, Pius VII died and Consalvi once again resigned his office, this time forever. Sick, worn out by years of overwork and bitter conflict, within six months he had followed to the grave his friend and ruler whom he had served so well.

---

109 Ibid., Cardinal della Somaglia to Macchi and Tosti, 30 November 1823. Giulio Maria Cardinal della Somaglia (1744-1830); Cardinal Deacon (1820); ultra-reactionary and a bitter enemy of Consalvi, his appointment as Secretary of State (1823-1828) symbolized the reaction against Consalvi's policies under Leo XII (1823-1829).
CHAPTER VI

CONCLUSION

Consalvi's second ministry, which had opened with such fair promises of Austro-Papal co-operation and good will in 1815, ended in 1823 in an atmosphere of mutual distrust and hostility. The development of Austro-Papal relations in 1815-1823 explains how and why this radical transformation took place.

Any alliance will be effective only so long as it continues to satisfy the essential interests of the states concerned. This principle also applies to the informal alliance that Metternich and Consalvi sought. In the years from 1815 to 1817, Austro-Papal co-operation seemed likely to serve the interests of both states. Austria hoped to obtain thereby the support of the Papacy's moral and religious authority in the struggle to uphold the existing order and defeat the revolutionaries. The Papacy, on its part, sought the material backing of Austria against any possible future aggression and, more important, against the immediate threat of internal subversion. Moreover, Papal co-operation with Austria might persuade that Power to moderate its Josephist religious policies. Finally, Consalvi had his own motive: Austrian support could be of great value to him in his
bitter struggle with the Zelanti for reform. For a time these expectations seemed justified, both states benefited from co-operation, and the alliance prospered.

However, this smiling surface of co-operation could not permanently conceal certain fundamental divergences of interest. The claims of the Josephist Imperial government to control the Church in Austria were essentially incompatible with the Papal claims to supreme authority in the Catholic Church as a whole. The lurking Austrian ambition for hegemony in Italy posed a threat to the political independence of the Papacy which the latter was certain to oppose. In 1815-1817 these divergences were latent, over-shadowed by the points on which Austrian and Papal interests were in agreement. As long as these conflicting interests remained submerged, Austro-Papal co-operation survived; when they once again came into prominence, then unless one side or the other retreated, co-operation was doomed.

The first stage in the decline of the informal Austro-Papal alliance came with the revival in 1817 of open religious controversy between the two states over the extension of Josephinism, especially in Italy. Metternich foresaw that the Papacy must resist this expansion, but his attempts to win over Francis I to a conciliatory policy ended in failure. The religious negotiations of 1817, which might have saved Austro-Papal co-operation, for a time at least, had Austria pursued them in a conciliatory spirit, failed because Vienna demanded
everything and offered nothing in return. Despite his wish for
good relations with Austria, Consalvi could not negotiate on
such a basis. To the cardinal, Austro-Papal co-operation implied
a relationship between equal partners, each respecting the
other's rights and interests and each willing to settle disputes
on a mutually-satisfactory basis through a process of give-and-
take. The religious negotiations of 1817-1818 made it apparent
that this was not the concept that prevailed at Vienna. Con-
salvi's disillusionment with Austro-Papal co-operation began at
this point. Mutual distrust and recrimination soon came to
characterize relations between Rome and Vienna.

The rapid deterioration of Austro-Papal relations which
began with the religious controversy and was fed by the
furniture affair was temporarily checked in 1819-1820, when
Francis I seemed to be planning some mitigation of his Josephist
policies. The outbreak of the Neapolitan Revolution of 1820, a
threat to Austria and the Papacy alike, also served to bring
those states closer together. Austria wished the moral support
of the Papacy and its co-operation in the passage of troops
towards Naples, while the Papacy found Austrian military strength
a reassuring bulwark against the spread of the Revolution.
Thus, a basis for renewed co-operation existed. Austro-Papal
relations during the autumn of 1820 were better than they had
been for three years.

This revival of good relations was only temporary. It soon
became apparent that Austria and the Papacy were once again at cross-purposes. Austria expected full Papal co-operation against the Neapolitan revolutionaries. Consalvi was willing to co-operate, but only within the limits of his firm determination to preserve the independence and neutrality of the Papacy and to prevent a Neapolitan invasion. This determination compelled the Cardinal to oppose Austria's wishes on several occasions. Moreover, various incidents, such as the Austrian attempts to occupy various Papal cities, reawakened his old suspicions of Austrian ambitions in Italy. Austria, on her side, was disappointed and angered by this opposition and distrust, and became increasingly critical of the Papal government. Before 1821 had ended, all the improvement in Austro-Papal relations that had taken place in 1819-1820 had vanished.

The revival of Austrian ambitions in Italy, which Consalvi first suspected during the Neapolitan campaign, dealt the death blow to Austro-Papal co-operation. The 1820-1821 revolutions had convinced Vienna that greater Austrian control in the Peninsula was necessary to prevent further outbreaks there. The ways in which Austria sought to increase its control were varied: an Italian Confederation, a Political Commission, the exercise of a right of supervision over the Italian states in the name of reform, control of the Italian postal system—but all inevitably met with Consalvi's opposition, for all would serve to restrict the necessary political independence of the Papacy.
Austrian and Papal interests were now obviously in collision, and the last two years of Consalvi's ministry were marked by conflict with Austria, none the less bitter for being partly concealed. Austria's plans to increase its control in Italy came to a head at the Congress of Verona; the Papacy took the lead in opposing those plans there, and eventually brought about their defeat. This struggle sounded the death-knell of the Austro-Papal alliance. Henceforth, little more than the bare pretense of friendly relations was maintained.

Two other factors must be mentioned that probably made the Cardinal less reluctant to oppose Austria. First, it was clear by 1823 that Francis I was not going to undertake any sweeping revision of his religious policy and that Josephinism would continue to rule at Vienna. Since co-operation with Austria would plainly not produce any favorable modification of its religious policy, such began to seem less desirable. Second, by 1822 the Revolution that Consalvi had so dreaded had swept through Italy--but there had been no uprising in the Papal State. Even during the height of the Neapolitan Revolution on the Papacy's very doorstep, there had been little disturbance and the Papal government had little difficulty in preserving order. The Secretary of State may well have felt that his reforms had appeased popular discontent and that Austrian support against the Revolution was not so necessary as it had previously seemed. Thus, the factors that had once made the alliance seem attractive
to Consalvi were diminishing in appeal, just at the moment when the fundamental divergences in the political and religious interests of the Papacy and Austria were once again becoming evident.

Only in its schemes for postal hegemony in Italy was Austria successful during Consalvi's ministry. The Papacy once again took the lead in the struggle for free correspondence; but, deserted by the other Italian states and unsupported by France, it was forced to recognize the Austrian victory in practice, though by a desperate resistance Consalvi was able to save the principle of free correspondence for future use.

The postal controversy is significant, not only in itself, but for the revealing light it sheds upon the breakdown of Austro-Papal co-operation. By the time that controversy was settled, the Austro-Papal alliance had clearly ceased to exist, a victim of the diverging interests of the two states. The eventual collapse of Austro-Papal co-operation was for all practical purposes inevitable, given the basic preconceptions dominating Austrian policy. True, the alliance could have been saved had Austria adopted a more conciliatory religious policy and been willing to respect the full temporal independence of the Papacy; but there was little chance that these modifications of policy would be adopted under existing circumstances. Josephinism was still too strong in the Imperial government for even Metternich to be able to defeat it—too strong, indeed, for even
the Emperor to be able to reverse religious policy unless he were a stronger man than Francis I. Only after the intellectual climate in Austria had undergone a radical transformation could the hold of the Josephists on the Austrian government and church be broken. It was equally unlikely that Austria would cease its efforts to tighten its control in Italy, for since 1815 that Peninsula had been regarded as a legitimate Austrian preserve, and the revolutions of 1820-1821 had seemed to show that such increased control was vitally necessary if another outbreak of the dreaded revolutionary fever was to be prevented.

While these policies prevailed at Vienna, there was nothing Consalvi could do to save Austro-Papal co-operation except by sacrificing essential Papal interests, which he would never do. The Papacy could no longer continue to co-operate with Austria, for to do so would mean acquiescence in Austrian religious and political ambitions that threatened both its spiritual and its temporal power.

In view of the ultimate failure of Austro-Papal co-operation, the question may well be asked whether Consalvi was justified in attempting the experiment in the first place. The answer would seem to be definitely in the affirmative. The experiment was well worth trying, for, if successful, it promised great benefits to the Papacy: protection against foreign attack and internal revolt, support for reform and for Papal interests abroad, perhaps a moderation of Austrian religious policy in the
interest of good relations. In 1815, there seemed good reason to hope that the experiment would be a success. Metternich's opposition to Josephinism aroused hope of religious improvements, while Austria for some time after the Congress of Vienna gave no hint that it wished to increase its political control over the Papal State. Taking these promising circumstances into consideration, it would surely have been an error for Consalvi to have refused at least to try the experiment of co-operation with Austria.

Furthermore, even though the informal alliance with Austria eventually collapsed, it did bring some benefit to the Papacy. The firm support that Consalvi received from Austria for his reforms was undoubtedly an important factor in securing their enactment. Austrian diplomatic support was at times very useful to the Papacy in dealing with non-Catholic states such as Turkey. Co-operation against the Settarj, though Austria was probably the chief beneficiary, was also of service to the Papal government.

In return for these gains, Consalvi gave up very little by co-operation with Austria. His transmission of information on Settarj activities to Austria cost the Papacy nothing, and was in any case in the general interest of the "good cause." In his religious negotiations with Austria he surrendered little, if anything, that the Papacy would not have been compelled to relinquish by force of circumstances in any case, such as the
nomination-right in Venetia; on questions where the essential authority of the Papacy was concerned, he never yielded or compromised. Consalvi's aid was of value to Austria during the Neapolitan campaign; but the suppression of that revolution was also in the Papal interest, and the Cardinal's skilful handling of the situation prevented any serious harm from befalling the Papal State in the wake of the Austrian intervention. All things considered, Consalvi in his dealings with Austria yielded very little that could have been saved, and received useful assistance in return. Even leaving aside the great possibilities of Austro-Papal co-operation which never materialized, Consalvi's decision to co-operate seems justified on a practical basis of value received for value given.

One further question may be asked in criticism of Consalvi's policy: was he motivated too much by considerations of secular policy, to the detriment of religious interests? Although it is difficult to determine the precise motivations of one so secretive as Consalvi, in so far as his dealings with Austria at least are concerned, this question must be answered in the negative. In the religious negotiations of 1817-1819, he certainly did not sacrifice the religious interests of the Papacy, but defended them tenaciously, even though in so doing he angered Austria and thereby weakened his political position. How easily could Consalvi have kept Austrian good will, so politically valuable, by extensive religious concessions—but
Moreover, the extent to which even Consalvi's secular policy was motivated by religious considerations must not be overlooked. In political affairs, his basic aim was to preserve the temporal independence of the Papacy, not, however, as an end in itself, but as an essential means to the preservation of the Papacy's spiritual freedom of action. If Austria had succeeded in reducing the Papal State to the level of a satellite, could the Papacy have preserved its full spiritual independence? Perhaps; but the history of the Avignon Papacy does not provide an encouraging parallel. Certainly the Papal reputation for impartiality would have suffered.

In any case, whether the temporal independence of the Papacy was still essential or not, Consalvi, like virtually everyone else in 1815, certainly believed that it was. In fighting for the Papacy's political independence, he was fighting for its spiritual freedom as well. No one who has studied the record of the Cardinal's Austrian diplomacy can deny the consummate skill with which he defended both. The reputation which Consalvi has long justly enjoyed for the achievements of his first ministry must now be further enhanced by the study of his second.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

A. UNPUBLISHED DOCUMENTARY SOURCES

The principal documentary source for this dissertation is the Vatican Archives (Archivio Segreto Vaticano). Of the many collections of documents in the Vatican, the largest, and by far the most important for the diplomatic historian, is that of the Secretariats of State (Segretariato di Stato).

The Segretariato di Stato collection is arranged in three divisions on a chronological basis: the Fondo Vecchio, comprising materials prior to ca. 1790/1800; Epoca Napoleonica, material of the Napoleonic era, now being reorganized; and the Fondo Moderno, materials since 1814, from which the documents cited in this dissertation are taken. The Fondo Moderno is divided into nine divisions called Titoli (Titles), each Titolo containing the documents pertaining to one of the Secretary of State's major fields of activity. The Titoli are in turn subdivided into smaller collections called rubriche (headings), each rubriche dealing with one limited aspect of the general subject of the Titolo of which it forms a part, as follows:
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Titolo</th>
<th>Rubriche</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Affari ecclesiastici</td>
<td>1 to 24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. Amministrazione pubblica</td>
<td>25 to 70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. Materie giudiziarie</td>
<td>80 to 99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. Finanze</td>
<td>110 to 130</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. Sicurezza interna</td>
<td>149 to 166</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. Forza pubblica e marina</td>
<td>190 to 210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. Materie offiziose</td>
<td>220 to 229</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. Confinazione</td>
<td>230 to 232</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. Affari esteri</td>
<td>241 to 301</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The rubriche that proved most useful and are cited in the text, are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rubrica</th>
<th>Titolo</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>149.</td>
<td>Provvidenze Generali</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>155.</td>
<td>Rapporti Politici</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>165.</td>
<td>UNIONI E SOCIETA SOSPETTE, DILITTI POLITICI, LEGAZIONI E DELEGAZIONI.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>166.</td>
<td>Delitte contro la Sicurezza Pubblica</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>199.</td>
<td>Fortezze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>210.</td>
<td>Passaggio di Truppe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>241.</td>
<td>Circolari ai Nuntii e nomine de' medesimi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>242.</td>
<td>Questioni di alta diplomazia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>243.</td>
<td>Concordati.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>244.</td>
<td>Lettere de Sua Santità</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>245.</td>
<td>Lettere di Sovrani</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>247.</td>
<td>Nuntii in Vienna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>248.</td>
<td>Nuntii in Parigi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>249.</td>
<td>Nuntii in Madrid</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>252.</td>
<td>Nuntii in Napoli</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>253.</td>
<td>Nuntii in Firenze</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>254.</td>
<td>Nuntii in Lucerna</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>257.</td>
<td>Incaricati di Affari in Torino</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>258.</td>
<td>Console Pontificia in Milano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>259.</td>
<td>Commissione Pontificia in Milano</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260.</td>
<td>Austria ambasciatore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>251.</td>
<td>Francia ambasciatore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262.</td>
<td>Spagna ambasciatore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>267.</td>
<td>Sardegna ministero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>268.</td>
<td>Russia ministero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>269.</td>
<td>Prussia ministero</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272.</td>
<td>Toscana incaricato</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each rubrica consists of a varying number of volumes or
bundles (buste) of documents, arranged in chronological order.
In general, those documents that date from before 1820 have been
bound into volumes, while those after that date are still packed
loosely in boxes or bundles. The latter are often disorganized
and hence more difficult to use than those that have been bound.
The documents from the Restoration era are usually in a good
state of preservation; only rarely has their legibility suffered
from the effects of age or careless treatment. The chief
obstacle for the historian using these documents for the first
time is the eighteenth century Italian script in which they are
written. This style of writing differs considerably from that
of the present day, and the historian may at first have some
difficulty in understanding it. With sufficient practice in
reading the script, however, this obstacle can readily be
overcome.

Of the other Vatican collections, the Archivii Rientrati,
comprising the archives of the various Papal nunciatures abroad,
are important for the study of the Austro-Papal relations; the
Archives of the Nunciatures of Vienna and of Paris are especially
valuable. Although much of the material in these Archivii
Rientrati is duplicated in the rubriche of the Segretario di
State collection, some is not: for example, the Archives of the
Nunciature of Vienna contain numerous dispatches between
Conzalvi and the Vienna nuncio that are not duplicated in
rubrica 277, as one would have expected.

Material useful for this dissertation was also found in the Archivi di Stato (State Archives) in Florence and Rome. In the Florentine Archive the following material proved of value:

- **Ordine 2392, Serie 1931**: Congress of Verona and Congress of Laybach.
- **Ordine 2393, Serie 1932**: Revolutions of Naples, Spain, and Portugal.
- **Ordine 2407, Serie 1932**: Minister of the Austrian Court.
- **Ordine 2435, Serie 1973**: Tuscan Legation in Rome.
- **Ordine 2452, Serie 1990**: Tuscan Legation in Vienna, 1820-1821.
- **Ordine 2453, Serie 1991**: Tuscan Legation in Vienna, 1822

The State Archive in Rome yielded the following material dealing with Austro-Papal relations:

- Archivio della S. Congregazione del Buon Governo:
  - **Serie I, Affari Generali**: Buste (Files) 5, 33, 88.
  - **Serie XI, Conti e tasso diverse**: Buste 219-221.

Nothing of value for this study was obtained at the other State Archives consulted, at Naples, Parma, and Lucca. It may be noted, in passing, that the Archives in Naples and Parma suffered severely during the last war, and that at Parma in particular considerable material for the Restoration Era was destroyed.
B. PRINTED SOURCES


Brezzi, Paolo. La diplomazia pontificia. Milano, 1942.

Carte segrete della polizia austriaca in Italia estratte dall'Archivio di Venezia e pubblicate per commissione di D. Manin, 1814-1848. 3 vols. Capolago, 1851.


Duerm, Charles van, ed. Correspondance du Cardinal Hercule Consalvi avec le Prince Clement de Metternich 1815-1823. Louvain, 1899.


-----... Dépêches inédites du Chevalier de Gentz aux hospodars de Valachie pour servir à l'histoire de la politique europeenne (1813 à 1828). Published by Graf Anton Frokesch von Osten. 3 vols. Paris, 1876-1877.


Sala, Mons. G.A. Piano de Riforma umiliato a Pio VII. Roma 1888.
II. SECONDARY SOURCES

A. BOOKS


Solid work with special reference to Italy; relatively little on the Papacy.


Bandini, G. *Giornale e scritti politici clandestini della Carboneria Romagnola (1819-1821)*. Rome, 1908.


Sound and objective, but very little on the Restoration papacy.


Analyzes Metternich's character, policies, aims, etc. by presenting wide range of excerpts from his writings; well done; favorable to Metternich.


Candeloro, Giorgio. Storia dell'Italia moderna. 3 vols. Milano, 1956--.


Farini, Luigi Carlo. The Roman State from 1815 to 1850. Translated from the Italian by the Honorable W. E. Gladstone. 4 vols. London, 1851.

------. Storia d'Italia dell'anno 1714 ai nostri giorni. Torino, 1854.


Gualterio, S. Gli ultimi rivolgenti italiani. 2d ed. 6 vols. in 5. Firenze, 1852.


Lemmi, Francesco. La restaurazione austriaca a Milano nel 1814. Bologna, 1902.

Luzio, A. La massoneria e il risorgimento italiano. 2 vols. Bologna, 1925.


Mosearini, Maria. La restaurazione pontificia nelle province di "prima recupera" (maggio 1814 - marzo 1815). Roma, 1933.


Otto1ni, A. La carboneria dalle origine ai primi tentativi insurrezionali (1797-1817). Modena, 1936.


Petrocchi, Massimo. La restaurazione, il Cardinale Consalvi, e la Riforma del 1816. Firenze. 1941

-----. La restaurazione romana, 1815-1823. Firenze, 1943.


Quasquarelli, A. La crisi del potere temporale del Papato nel Risorgimento. Bari, 1940.

Quinzi, Guido. La lotta sociale nel risorgimento: classi e governi della restaurazione all'unita, 1815-1851. Torino, 1951.


Silvagni, David. La corte e la società romana nei secoli XVIII e XIX. 3 vols. Roma, 1883.


B. ARTICLES

"L'agricoltura e la campagna romana sino a tutto il Pontificato di Pio VII," Civiltà Cattolica, 1906, IV, 655-672.


Cameron, R. E. "Papal Finances and the Temporal Power (1815-1871)," Church History, XXVI (1957), 132-142.


"Di alcuni relazione tra il Principe de Metternich ed il Cardinale Consalvi (1815-1823)," Civiltà Cattolica, 1899, VII, 583-588.


Furlani, Silvio. "La convenzione postale Austro-Pontificia del


"Le industrie, il commercio, le imposte sotto i Pontificii Pio VI e Pio VII, sino al 1815," Civiltà Cattolica, 1906, IV, 434-449.


Tamborra, Angelo. "I Congressi della Santa Alleanza di Lubiana e di Verona e la politica della Santa Sede (1821-1822)," Archivio Storico Italiano, CXVIII (1960), 192-211.


Zanno, Alfredo. "L'occupazione napoletana ed austriaca e i primordi della restaurazione in Benevento (1814-1816)," Samnium, XXIX (1956), 189-206; XXX (1957), 1-26, 121-147.
Approval Sheet

The dissertation submitted by Alan J. Reinerman has been read and approved by five members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

May 10, 1965

Date

[Signature of Adviser]