The Existence and Nature of Predicamental Relations in the Philosophy of Francis Suarez

Michael Joseph Montague
Loyola University Chicago

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THE EXISTENCE AND NATURE OF PREDICAMENTAL RELATIONS
IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF FRANCIS SUAREZ

BY

MICHAEL J. MONTAGUE, S.J., A.B.

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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

In a discussion of any doctrine so radical in a metaphysics and so far-reaching in its ontological implications as that of predicamental relations, it is necessary at the outset to determine once and for all one's precise purpose and scope, method and attack, and the limits one places on the treatment of the subject.

A subject so vast could well become a mere superficial scaling of texts and shuffling of cliches torn from the pages of secondary sources and forced into some kind of extrinsic unity by reading into the opinions and conclusions of a philosopher the point one would like to find there and to establish. Such a work is foreign to everything that is philosophical and historical.

In this thesis we shall treat of relations, but not all relations. We shall try to focus on those relations which are known as "predicamental relations." But even this is too broad. We shall try to interpret and rethink the fundamental problems arising from predicamental relations precisely as these relations were conceived and understood by Francis Suarez, the theologian-philosopher, whom tradition has called the "Doctor Eximius."
But no doctrine in philosophy can be taken in complete isolation, cut off from its tie-up with everything else the philosopher understood, or from the historical development of that doctrine through the linkage of the writings of the philosophers through the ages. But the historical treatment in this thesis can, and will, be only incidental. We are not interested primarily in the concept of relation as it grew from the time it was first explicitly presented to the philosophic world by Plato to the time of Suarez. We are not primarily interested in showing in all its manifold details the internal influence of the Suarezian position on predicamental relations on the other metaphysical and theological tenets of Suarez. Our principal task will be to examine in detail Suarez's position on predicamental relations, their existence and their nature, the elements of a predicamental relation, and the various kinds of predicamental relations; then, we shall subject the initial bases of that doctrine to metaphysical analysis in order to determine the validity of Suarez's stand and the value of his arguments.

In the course of the exposition we shall have to treat in passing some of the opinions of Suarez's predecessors on this very question, but we shall do so only in so far as they in some way contributed, either positively or negatively, to Suarez's own stand, rather than for any merit or demerits they might possess in themselves.

With this as our aim and our scope we can briefly take note
of the procedure and method we shall employ in the following pages. Our key source will be the forty-seventh disputation of Suarez's *Disputationes Metaphysicae*. The greater part of the material considered in the purely expository chapters of the thesis will be taken directly from this source. The necessary background, principally historical, will be culled from leads in Suarez himself, traced through such books as Migne's *Patrologia Latina*, DeWulf, Ueberweg, and others that will be mentioned in the text or footnotes throughout the paper.

The thesis itself conveniently divides itself into two parts: the quest for Suarez's exact understanding of the existence and nature of predicamental relations. Here we will be primarily concerned with historical truth, establishing what Suarez actually held in regard to the fourth predicament. Secondly, we shall undertake a critique of Suarez's position in the light of metaphysical principles. These will be proved only in passing and in so much as they enter immediately into the question at issue. This chapter will view the ontological truth of Suarez's stand.

With this as a prelude, let us turn to our task, and watch Francis Suarez attempt to unravel the problem of predicamental relations.

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CHAPTER II

THE EXISTENCE OF REAL PREDICAMENTAL RELATIONS

If there is on thing that strikes us more soundly than anything else when we turn our philosophic eyes on the reality about us of which we are a part, it is its relational nature. Reality is not merely a reality of static absolutes. It is dynamic, and this radical dynamism shines forth in its every aspect. We are affecting things and things are affecting us. Everything is in some way similar to every other being and yet in some way different and distinct from everything else. It is a reality where every being is struggling to immortalize itself by reproducing itself continually, by stamping its own personality on all with which it comes in contact. It is a reality in which efficient and final causality are the main motif. Things are changing us, and we become dependent upon things in our knowledge, our volition, in our entire physical and psychic make-up.

It is a growing reality, an evolving process, which yet in some way is bound together by a thin thread of unity and synthesis. It is a reality where relations are obvious and absolutes need justification. Plato spent half his life and all his mind in trying to prove that there are absolutes beneath the phenomenal relative, only to turn in his last days to find that he
had destroyed even the possibility of explaining the dynamic relativism he had taken for granted. 1

But even though the relational aspect of reality is obvious, yet when a philosopher tries to dissect it metaphysically, he finds that it has difficulties all its own. Francis Suarez was not blind to any of these difficulties.

Before Suarez set out to discover the causes of the patent relativity of things, he stood back for a moment and took a backward glance over the thoughts of the men who had preceded him.

Aristotle brought the whole question of relations to a head when in the fourth chapter of his Categories he wrote:

Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action or affect. 2

Note the first words of this quotation: "Expressions which are in no way composite..." It would seem that Aristotle derives the categories from our speech and the various and diverse ways we can speak of things, rather than from an analysis of exist-


There are ten different ways of talking about things; but this is not to say that there are necessarily ten different modes of real being, at least, in the sense that each category cuts off and tags some particular being or principle of being in the real order.

Almost all the philosophers from Aristotle up to the time of Suarez himself freely admitted the ten categories or predicaments: ten ways of predicating. There was not, however, the same unanimity on the question whether there are ten real beings or kinds of being, each really distinct from every other being or principle, to correspond to the ten-fold division of the predicaments. It is true that our speech and our words are signs of things -- *signa suppositiva rerum* -- and that the modes of predication are proportionate to the modes of being, but many philosophers have interpreted this to mean that the being may either be in reality or in the mind. Thus the mere fact that there are ten categories or predicaments is not necessarily indication or proof that there are ten beings in reality, or that when a philosopher admits the categories, he, by that very fact, intends to commit himself to ten different really distinct kinds of being existing as such in reality.


5 This will be clear when we make our historical survey.
So when Suarez approaches the problem of the predicaments and of predicamental relations in particular, he cannot merely fall back on the evident fact that we do talk about things in this way. He must determine in some other way whether there is a reality, a relative reality, which corresponds to our words and ideas which are relative, in the form of a distinct principle of real being.

But at the outset, at least, this much can be said: if the ten predicaments do not of necessity demand ten real beings or kinds of being really distinct from one another, it is equally true that if there are only ten ways of speaking of real things, then anything that is real about these things, must fall within the ambit of these ten predicaments. 6 If things are really quantified, then that which renders them quantified must fall under the predicaments, omitting for the moment all consideration of the precise nature of that quantity. The same is true of relation. If things are really relative, that in virtue of which they are relative must be included in the predicaments, and under the predicament of relation.

But Suarez first limits what he means to include in this fourth predicament, and what he intends to exclude.

If the predicaments are ten ways of speaking of real beings, then the predicament of relation will include only real rela-

6 Scheu, 7.
tiona.

Cum ergo relationes rationis non sint entia realia, et consequenter nec vera entia, non possunt ad praedicamentum Ad aliquid, quod reale est, pertinere. 7

Suarez, who is always careful to take note of St. Thomas's stand on any point, says that some have thought that St. Thomas wanted the predicament of relation to contain under it both real and rational relations and to be predicated of them univocally. For St. Thomas writes in his Summa,

...considerandum est quod solum in his quae dicuntur ad aliquid inveniuntur aliqua secundum rationem tantum, et non secundum rem.

For if relation were predicated of them equivocally or analogically, there would be no reason why relations alone of all the predicaments contain not only real beings, but also rationate beings.

...nam si tantum esset sermo de denominatione seequivoca vel analoga, non tantum in his quae sunt ad aliquid, sed etiam in aliis generibus invenirentur aliqua secundum rationem tantum, ut caecitas in qualitate, et sic de aliis. 9

Cajetan, 10 Capreolus, 11 and Ferrara 12 seem to agree with

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7 Suarez, d. 47, s. 3, n. 3.
8 Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, M. E. Marietti, Taurini, 1937, I, q. 29, a. 1. Cf. also, I, q. 28, a. 2; I, q. 13, a. 7; Quodl., IX, a. 5; De Pot., q. 2, a. 5.
9 Suarez, d. 47, s. 3, n. 2.
11 Capreolus, In Summam Theologicam, d. 33, q. 1.
They claim that the nature and properties of relations as such can be applied equally to rational and real relations, for both can be said to be quorum totum esse est ad aliud se habere.

But Suarez denies that relations of reason are truly relations, and so they cannot be contained under the predicament of relation.

...sic ut ens rationis non est verum ens, sed fictum, sic relatio rationis non est vera relatio, sed ficta, vel quasi per intellectum. 13

The ultimate reason for this must be referred back to Suarez's concept of being, 14 which does not include real and rationate beings, but only real beings. 15 If being as such cannot be predicated strictly of both real and rationate beings, neither can the predicament of relation be predicated properly of rational relations, for the predicaments treat only of real being and are its ten divisions. 16

So Suarez's conclusion is that rational relations really do not fall under the predicament of relation, but are only conceived as if they were relations, through some kind of analogy or proportion with real relations.

...relationes autem rationis non constitui in reali praedicamento, sed per analogiam et proportionem ad veras relationes declarari... 17

13 Suarez, d. 47, s. 3, n. 3.
14 Ibid., d. 2.
15 Ibid., d. 54, intr., n. 1.
16 Ibid., d. 47, s. 3., n. 3.
17 Ibid., n. 5.
Suarez claims that this is in perfect agreement with the teaching of St. Thomas who never intended that the concept of relation should be applied univocally to real and rational relations.

...numquam enim (S. Thomas) dixit aut relationem rationis esse univoce relationem cum reali, aut esse ad aliquid non esse aliquid reale in relatione reali. 18

St. Thomas meant that the nature of a real relation was such that through some kind of similitude or proportion, relations of reason could be thought of as enjoying the formal notes of a relation, since there is some fundament in reality for such a mental consideration. St. Thomas, according to Suarez, only said that the formal notion of relation, sc., ad aliquid, does not tie itself down to any particular kind of relation, whether it be predicamental or transcendental, but merely implies a reference to another. 19 Thus it is easy for the mind to conceive of rational relations, not because they are truly relations or have a true esse ad, as in the case of real relation, but because they can be conceived after the manner of real relations.

So Suarez in the last paragraph of his discussion of real and rational relations neatly sums up his position on this point.

Ad rationem autem illius sententiae facile respondetur, negando propria rationem vere reperiri in relatione rationis, quia

18 Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 5.
19 Ibid., but cf. also, S.T., I, q. 29, a. 1.
in tali relatione nec est vera habitudo, nec verum esse ad aliquid, sed solum apprehenditur ac si esset ad aliquid. 20

In the terminology common among philosophers in their discussions of relations are to be found the terms: relations secundum dici and relations secundum esse. A relation secundum dici, which we shall translate an attributive relation, is a thing which is conceived or explained or spoken of after the manner of a relation, while in reality it really has no true relationship. A relation secundum esse, which we shall translate as a genuine relation, is a true and real order to something else.

...relatio autem secundum esse dicitur quae revera habet proprium esse cum habitudine ad aliud. 21

Because of these definitions, some have equated attributive relations with rational relations, since both would be something which is really not relative, but only conceived as relative.

But Suarez denies that attributive and rational relations are the same; for relations of reason are relations according to an existence proportioned to them, namely, a rational existence, while attributive relations do not enjoy any existence whatsoever.

...nam relatio rationis, eo modo quo est, censetur esse relatio secundum esse sibi proportionatum, ut patet de

20 Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 5.
21 Ibid., n. 6.
Nor are attributive relations limited merely to rational relations; they also can be applied to any real being whose existence is absolute, but which we explain and express in a relative manner.

For example, Suarez cites divine omnipotence as an attributive relation, not because of any rational relationship which we set up, but because we cannot conceive or talk about God's omnipotence, except with something else concomitant to it to which God is said to have some kind of relationship. Though this manner of speaking does imply a manner of conceiving the thing, yet that conceptual manner is not such that from it necessarily would result a rational relation. It is not a reflex concept or one had as a result of comparison. It is a direct concept of something absolute, which we, because of our imperfect mode of cognition, must conceive after the manner of those things which we know to be relative. Thus, in attributive relations we do not impose any kind of relation on the thing, either real or ra-

22 Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 8.
23 Ibid.
tional, but the relative nature of the thing conceived is entirely drawn from the knower himself, not from the thing known.

...in quo modo concipiendi non attribuitur ipsi objecto cognito habitudo ulla nec realis nec rationis, sed solum ex parte concipientis fit conceptus perquamdam imitationem et analogiam ad conceptus rerum respectivarum. 24

We often conceive of spiritual things after the manner of the corporeal things around us. We do not intend to place any corporeity in the spiritual objects, but we must conceive of them in this way since this is the only manner our mind can grapple with something which is strictly beyond their proper range. The same is true of attributive relations: we conceive of something relatively after an analogy with things which we know as relative.

Et sic interdum concipimus rem absolutam instar respectivae, et de illa ita loquimur ac si respectiva esset, et ideo dicitur esse relativa secundum dici tantum. 25

So it is clear that Suarez does not mean to include attributive relations under the predicament of relation, for nothing receives a peculiar nature merely from the fact that we conceive of it or speak of it in a certain way.

We have already seen that for a relation to fall under the predicament of relation it must be a real and genuine relation.

24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
The next question in our attempt to restrict our subject of predicamental relations is whether every real and genuine relation is also a predicamental relation. Suarez answers in the negative. He believes that there are some relations which are not restricted to any one particular predicament, but essentially pertain to various and almost all classes of being.

Praeter has vero esse alias habituidines veras etiam et reales, essentialiter pertinentes ad varis et fere ad omnia genera entium, quae propterea transcendentes dicuntur. 26

These are called transcendental relations; they transcend any one predicament and weave in and out of all of them. Predicamental relations, however, as we shall see, enjoy a certain kind of being which allows them to constitute a distinct class of being, a distinct predicament.

Suarez gives several examples of what he means by transcendental relations. Matter and form are really related to each other; each is defined through its reference to the other. The same can be said of accidental potencies which are essentially and intrinsically ordered to their proper acts and receive their specification from them. Such relations are transcendental; they are real and true relations.

...dentur relationes transcendentes, quae non sint tantum secundum dici, sed verae et reales habituidines secundum esse.... Et potest confirmari, nam in

26 Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 10.
Suarez proposes the objection that no real reference is included in the concept of anything absolute. But a transcendent reference would necessarily be included in that of an absolute. Therefore, it cannot be a true and genuine reference, but only according to our manner of speaking and thinking.

Dices: nullus realis respectus includitur in conceptu rei absolutae; sed hic respectus transcendentalis includitur in conceptu rei absolutae; ergo non est verus respectus secundum esse, sed tantum secundum modum loquendi et concipendi nostrum. 28

Scotus succumbed to this objection and ended by admitting that a transcendent relation is not of the intrinsic nature of any being, but rather has to be reduced to the real predicament of relation. 29

But Suarez would rather agree with Cajetan in saying that it is not contrary to the nature of any absolute to include within its essence a transcendent reference, proportionate to its nature. For example, aptitudinal inherence is of the very

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27 Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 11.
28 Ibid., n. 12.
29 Joannis Duns Scoti Opera Omnia, apud Ludovicum Vivès, Parisiis, 1904, Tomus XVII, In Librum Quartum Sententiarum, d. 12, q. 1.
nature of an accident and is not, as it were, a property consequent upon that nature.

...non esse contra rationem rei absolutae, ut in sua essentiali ratione includat respectum transcendentalem, suae naturae proportionatum. 30

Also, no created being is so absolute as to exclude an essential relation of dependence upon that being which is being of its very essence. For, perhaps, the actual dependence is distinct from the created being, yet the aptitudinal and necessary dependence is not distinct; it flows from the very essence of any contingent being.

...verisimile est, in entibus creatis nullo esse ita absolutum, quin in sua essentialia intime includat aliquem transcendentalem respectum, saltem quatenus est ens per participationem, per se essentialiter pendens ab ente per essentiam. 31

Such relations as these, of matter to form, form to matter, accident to substance, active potencies to their act, an act to its object, include within their very essence an intrinsic reference to another principle or another being. This relation cannot be confined to the predicament of relation, but is transcendent and transcendental.

Suarez takes his basic distinction between transcendental

30 Ibid., d. 47, s. 3, n. 12.
31 Ibid.
and predicamental relations from a notation of Cajetan. 32 Cajetan wants to distinguish the two types of relations by reason of their terms. He says that a predicamental relation views its term precisely in so far as it is a term, pure sub ratione termini. A transcendental relation looks to its term, not purely as term, but under some other determination: either as a subject, as an object, as an agent (efficiens), or as an end (finis).

   In hoc enim differt relatio pertinens ad praedicamentum relationis ab alius respectibus caeterorum generum, qui a quibusdam transcendentenses vocantur, quod respectus pertinens ad genus ad aliquid essentialiter est ad alium, non ut receptivum vel causam efficientem aut finalem aut formalem, sed praecise est ad alium tamquam terminum; unum enim relativorum nec est forma nec finis nec efficiens alterius, sed terminus. 33

This reasoning Suarez finds sound. Since relations are specified in some way by their terms, if two relations are different, they should differ in some way, at least, by reason of their terms.

...omnis respectus sumit speciem suam a termino, seu ab ea re ad quam tendit; et ideo, si quod est discrimen inter hos duos ordines respectuum, ex terminis desumendum videtur. 34

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32 Thomae de Vio Cajetani, In de Ente et Essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis Commentarium, cura et studio P. M. H. Laurent, Mariet-ti, Taurini, 1934, c. 7, q. 16.
33 Suarez, d. 47, s. 4, n. 9.
34 Ibid.
Nevertheless, there are two difficulties which Suarez takes up before he is willing to rest his position on this line of argument. First, motion, action, and passion all imply a transcendental relation to their term, and seem to view that term only in so far as it is term.

...motus, actio et passio dicunt transcendentalem respectum ad terminum, et tamen non respiciunt illum, nisi sub pura ratione termini. 35

The second difficulty which Suarez envisages is that every relation, taken abstractly and in general, only implies a reference to such a term which is a cause, an effect, an object, or in some other way partakes of the nature of a term. For example, paternity — granting for the sake of argument that it is a predicamental relation — views a term which is the effect produced.

...omnis respectus, si abstracte et in communi sumatur, solum dicit habitudinem ad aliud sub ratione termini, abstrahendo at aliis rationibus.... 36

The first of these two difficulties Suarez dismisses as a pseudo-difficulty.

Respondetur tamen ad priorem rationem laborare in aequivoco.... Hoc autem modo non potest dici motus, aut actio, vel passio esse purus respectus ad terminum; nam habitudo motus...non dicit habitudinem ad terminum, ut respicien-
A predicamental relation is said to view another purely as term, because it exercises no other function concerning that term than to direct the subject to it, nisi respiciendi tantum. This is clearly not the case in motion, action, or passion; they are not just orientations to a term. The order which motion enjoys to a term is as a means to that term, a via ad terminum. So motion not only looks toward that term, but in a sense constitutes it. Thus it cannot be said to view its term purely and merely as a term. The same is true of action and passion. All of these Suarez considers to be transcendental relations. Thus a transcendental relation does exercise some function regarding the term other than merely relating the subject to that term; these functions may be either those of causality, unity, representation, etc. Predicamental relations, on the other hand, merely look toward the term, nothing more. This is clear in the case of relations of similitude between two white objects.

The second difficulty also has its answer. To view something purely as a term is not to view that term abstractly or in general, as the second difficulty supposed.

Unde etiam patet responsio ad alteram rationem, in qua etiam laboratur in ae-

37 Ibid., d. 47, s. 4, n. 10.
Differenct specific predicamental relations view different specific terms. What is common to all predicamental relations, even in the concrete, is that they are content merely to view their term without exercising any other function; the function of a transcendental relation is, besides viewing and referring the subject to the term, to exercise causality of some kind on the term.

Another difference between the two types of relations is that a predicamental relation is of such a kind that it is never in itself intended by nature. It never of itself comes into being through some efficient action. It follows upon the foundation and term, once they are given. But transcendental relations, according to Suarez, are often of themselves intended by nature; the form essentially including such a transcendental reference often essentially comes into being through the action of some agent.

Respectus ergo praedicamentalis tali est, ut a natura non sit per se intentus, et ideo nunquam per se fit ex vi actionis aliquius agentis, sed consequitur posito fundamento et termino.... At vero respectus transcendentalis saeppe est per se maxime intentus a natura, et ideo forma essentialiter includens talem respectum saeppe fit formaliter ac per se primo per actionem proprietam... 39

38 Ibid., d. 47, s. 4, n. 11.
39 Ibid., n. 12.
Suarez quotes heat and the act of vision as two examples of things which contain transcendental relations and which directly are brought into being.

The reason behind this is the one we have just seen: a predicamental relation does not exist to fulfil some special and peculiar function, but merely to ordain something already existing to something else. On the other hand, transcendental relations do have a special office to fulfil, and so directly come into being as a result of some kind of action in order that they may fulfil their individual functions. This is possible, because they are always identified with some absolute which is intended by nature. So the relationship which is included in the full notion of that absolute also of itself comes into being and exists.

Respectus...transcendentalis convenit alicui formae vel entitati, aut modo entis, quatenus a natura per se est institutus et ordinatus ad aliquod peculiare munus, quod potest per se intendi per aliquam actionem... 40

Suarez mentions a fourth and last distinction between transcendental and predicamental relations. A predicamental relation is conceived as some kind of a form, slight and accidental, it is true, which does not give any new added entitative perfection to its subject, except to view something else; while a tran-

40 Ibid., d. 47, s. 4, n. 12.
scendental relation must be taken as an essential difference, rather than as a special accident, which exerts causality of some kind on some other being.

Tandem ex his intelligitur, respectum praedicamentalem concipiendum esse tamen formam quamdam minimam et acciden-talem, quae non dat subjecto aliquod esse, nisi respicere alius, neque ad aliquum alius in natura deservit. Respectus... transcendentalis non est...integra forma, cujus munus sit tantum referre, sed essentialis modus, seu differentia alicujus formae seu entitatis, quatenus ad causandum aliquo modo, vel operandum circa alia...41

Thus Suarez has limited his subject. He intends to discuss predicamental relations which are real and genuine. But before going on to Suarez's discussion of the existence and nature of these predicamental relations, let us take a brief glance at what some of Suarez's predecessors held concerning this predicament.

HISTORY OF THE QUESTION

Although the division of being into the ten categories was not formally introduced into philosophy until the time of Aristotle, because of the intimate connection of the categories with being and the fundamental problem of the one and the many, even the pre-Aristotelians were in some way conscious of some of the problems which the various classifications of reality presented.

41 Ibid., d. 47, s. 4, n. 15.
For our purpose, however, we can omit the Pre-Socratics from our historical survey. They were for the most part monists, and were intent on developing that aspect of their philosophy by seeking the material cause of things. But it is only when one admits a real pluralism that the problem of relations arises.

The first important philosopher deserving of special consideration is Plato. To understand the Platonic theory, we must understand that Plato began philosophy primarily as an ethician. He was interested in the Socratic problem of knowledge only as related to the establishment of stable moral and ethical ideas. The early dialogues bear this out. Intent on founding a firm absolute, objective basis for such moral virtues as piety, justice, and the like, Plato formulated his theory of ideas, subsistent forms or perfections, which were the norms and standards of everything else, thus allowing him to construct a solid metaphysics of morals. These ideas, existing apart in the topos eido

42 Jacques Maritain, An Introduction to Philosophy, Sheed and Ward, New York, 1947, 49
43 Although the chronological problem connected with the dialogues has been hotly contested, yet enough unanimity of opinion can be found for the three over-all divisions of the early, the middle, and the later dialogues. Among the dialogues of Plato's youth and early manhood up to his second Sicilian journey in 367 B.C., may be found the Euthyphro (on holiness), the Phaedo (on the soul), the Phaedrus (on the beautiful), the Laches (on courage), and the Meno.
44 Plato: Parmenides, transl. by H. N. Fowler, G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1926, 133 C-D.
Being for Plato meant self-identity, that which is always the same in itself. In the Platonic synthesis immutability was a property of being, so that there was no room for change or motion within being. Here Plato met a stone wall: the isolation and transcendence of the ideas, their remoteness from the sphere of what is commonly regarded as reality, was bound to become a serious problem.

Just as the absolute nature of the ideas militated against a solution or explanation of the problem of motion and change, it equally blocked the door to an understanding of the nature of relation. The basic Platonic error, as St. Thomas frequently points out, was to confuse and identify the mode of mental existence with the mode of real existence. Because the mind, due to its spontaneous abstractive process, conceives things in their absolute natures, prescinded from their individualizing characteristics and all concrete relationships with everything else, Plato thought that if the mind was to be a true reflection of reality, things had to exist in an absolute state independently of the mind. The result was that he hypostas-

45 Ibid.
47 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae et Quaestiones Duo­decim Quodlibetales, Vol. III, De Veritate, Marietti, Taurini, 1931, q. 21, a. 2.
tized his concepts in the real order and demanded a real world of absolutes. In fact, this world of abstract essences was the only real world in the strictest sense of real; the world of sense was real only to the extent that it participated in the reality of the absolutes. In such a reality where everything was complete and fully realized in all its potentialities in itself, there was no place for such a metaphysical monster as relation.

Nor could Plato grant there is a real relationship between the ideas and the things of sense without falling into an infinite series of sources of similarity. For if things participate in the ideas through similarity, this, according to Plato's own premisses, could only be because both the things and the ideas participate in a further idea, which cannot be similar to the previous idea or things unless all participated in a still more ultimate idea. Plato concludes in his Parmenides:

"Because," said Parmenides, "we have agreed that those ideas are not relative to our world, nor our world to them, but each only to themselves." 49
"Yes, we have agreed to that." 49

Therefore, relation for Plato is ultimately inexplicable, since he demands that the ultimate explanation of relation be found in the ideas. But the ideas are absolutes; therefore, relation can strictly have no place among the ideas, and so it has no

49 Plato: Parmenides, 134 D.
place in reality.

Plato realized the weakness of his theory on this point, and so tried to include such ideas as likeness, otherness, etc., in the *topos eidon*. 50 This was really to distort the basic notions of relation, for Plato was forced to treat these relative notions as absolute. Likeness was an absolute and as self-contained as his idea of being. If things in the world of sense were similar or like, for Plato it was because they participated in the absolute idea of likeness, not because of any relation between the two things themselves. But it is clear that two things could not become really relative through individual participation in an absolute.

But Plato, to be true to his metaphysical point of departure, could say no more than this. We have spent a good deal of time on Plato since, as we shall see in our critique, Suarez to a limited extent, fell into many of the same basic difficulties.

Aristotle, though he frequently speaks of \( \pi\rho\sigma\varsigma\chi\) and \( \pi\rho\sigma\varsigma\chi\omega\) in the course of his *Organon* and *Metaphysics*, is far from giving us a developed theory of relation. In the seventh chapter of his *Categories* he defines the relative:

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Those things are called relative, which, being either said to be of something else, or related to something else, are explained by reference to that other thing. 51

Note that Aristotle speaks of the relative rather than of relation as such. He always considers the concrete subject which is similar, unlike, etc. In the Metaphysics he describes what is relative as the least of all entities. 52 His reason for this is that it alone has no proper generation or destruction or movement. 53

Aristotle never speaks clearly of the exact nature of relation in itself; he does mention, however, that several of our terms are relative and some beings are relative. There does not seem to be a clear-cut distinction between this category and the others. In fact, the other categories seem in some way to imply relation in their essential make-up. 54 And "all predicates in the category of ποσά τα, involve some other category as well: larger involves πωρόν, earlier πορίστα, slave πάσχον, farthest πιστό, loudest ποιόν."

That Aristotle made relation a separate category, because, as Joseph thinks,

51 Aristotle: Categories, 6 a 37. For other important remarks on the relative, cf.: Cat. 1 b 26; Top. 103 b 22; An. Post., 83 a 21, 83 b 15; Soph. E1., 178 a 7; An. Post., 85 b 20; Top., 120 b 37, 152 a 39; Phys., 225 b 5; Meta., 1017 a 25, 1083 a 8; Ethic. Nich., 1095 a 24; Meta., 1088 a 23, 1071a 30.
53 Ibid., 1088 a 30.
54 Scheu, 21.
predicates of relation denote "less than others what a subject is" seems plausible in view of the Stagirite's claim that all the adjectival categories should present the individual subject in a specific light. 56

In his discussion of relatives in the Metaphysics, 57 Aristotle shows that relations are based on any of three foundations: 1) unity and number; 2) action and passion; and 3) measure. It is clear that not all of these relatives are equally real, but the precise extent of the reality of the various relations is left untouched.

We should take note of the very undeveloped state of relations as they exist in the logical and metaphysical treatises of Aristotle. There is no question of real or rational relations, 58 genuine or attributive, transcendental or predicamental.

The philosophers in the centuries after Aristotle for the most part were in agreement in maintaining the division of the ten categories, with relation among them. The Stoics 59 and the Neo-Platonists 60 worked out different systems to catalogue reality, but both outlines had little influence outside of

56 Scheu, 21.
57 Aristotle: Metaphysics, 1020 b 26-32.
58 Scheu, 33.
Boethius in his *De Trinitate Liber* is noteworthy for his development of the problem of relations. Because of the dogma of the three Persons in One God, the early mediaeval theologian-philosophers found the reality of at least some relations thrust upon them. They held that the real unity of God was in substance and the real plurality of Persons lay in relations.

It is clear that Boethius wanted quantity and quality to be real inherent accidents which definitely add to the perfection of the substance. It is equally clear that he did not consider the other seven accidents in this same sense:

Reliqua (i.e., praedicamenta) vero neque de Deo, neque de caeteris praedicantur: nam ubi, vel de Deo, vel de homine praedicari potest; de homine, ut in foro; de Deo, ut ubique; sed ita, ut non quasi ipsa sit res id quod praedicatur, de qua dicitur. Non enim ita homo dicitur in foro esse, quemadmodum esse albus vel longus, nec quasi circumfusus et determinatus proprietate aliqua, qua designari secundum se possit, sed tantum quod sit illud alius informatum rebus, per hanc prae­dicationem ostenditur.

Quod aliae quidem quasi rem monstrant, ali­ae vero circumstantias rei; quodque illa quidem ita praedicantur, ut esse aliquid rem ostendant; illa vero, ut non esse, sed potius extrinsecus aliquid quodam modo

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63 Ibid., 1252 B.
64 Ibid., 1252 D.
And he mentions the predicament of relation explicitly:

Non igitur dici potest praedicationem relativam quidquam rei quae dicitur secundum se, vel addere, vel minuere vel mutare. Quae tota in eo quod est esse consistit, seu in eo quod est in comparatione aliquo modo se habere. 66

So, although Boethius maintains the reality of relations, he does not want them to be considered as bringing about a real addition in the line of perfection to their subject. In speaking of relations, he writes,

Quare quae secundum relatio ejus, eo quod ipsa est, proprietatem non faciunt praedicationem, nihil alterare vel mutare queunt, nullamque omnium variare essentiam. 67

The influence of Boethius in the centuries after his death is hardly to be overestimated. He was the principal channel by which Aristotelian logic flowed through the Middle Ages. 68

His interpretations of the categories of Aristotle are constantly mentioned in the long struggle over the problem of universals; which is so intimately connected with the nature of the predicaments.

But Boethius was not a pure translator of Aristotle. He read into his Aristotle a good many Platonist, Stoic, Pythagorean

65 Ibid., 1253 C.
66 Ibid., 1254 A.
67 Ibid., 1254 B.
and Augustinian doctrines, which influences the thought of the following centuries quite as much as his Aristotelianism. 69

Another important contributor, in spite of his Platonic tendencies, to a further understanding of the categories and predicaments of Aristotle was Gilbert de la Porée. For, as De Wulf has written,

In addition to an exhaustive study of the logical writings and deductive method of Boethius, and of the new logical works commentated by Theodoric of Chartres though unknown to Abelard, Gilbert also conceived the idea of completing Aristotle's study of the categories. 70

In spite of the fact that the majority of the historians of mediaeval philosophy place Gilbert de la Porée in the camp of moderate realists, it is important to note that St. Thomas mentions the "Porretani," i.e., Gilbert and his followers, when he is discussing the position of Plato and the Platonists. 71

Gilbert seems to hold that relations are not intrinsic determinants of their subject, but rather are extrinsic to them and stand outside of them. The reason for this is that "each real object of conceptual thought is viewed as a distinct and separate form." 72 Each of these forms exists as such in the real order. But each of these conceptual forms is an absolute. Therefore

69 Ibid.
70 Ibid., 194.
71 Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 21, a. 4.
fore, Gilbert concludes that reality is a realm of absolutes and relations do not enjoy real being, *vera ratio essendi.* 73

Quae vero relativa praedicatio tota consistit... non in eo quod est esse (quoniam nulli confert aliquid esse), sed potius consistit in eo tantum quod est habere se ad alium, in comparatione alterius ad alterum. 74

But a comparison is a mental act and can exist only in an intellect. If relations consist in a comparison, then they, too, must exist as such only in the mind. They have their being only in knowledge, and neither add nor diminish the entitative reality of the relatives.

Quandoquidem extrinsecus accessu comparatio relatio praedicatur, igitur non potest dici praedicationem relatam, id est relationem praedicatam, vel addere secundum se quidquam rei de qua dicitur, vel minusere secundum se, vel mutare secundum se. 75

Kossel in his articles on relation concludes along the same lines:

Though we use the verb to be in predicating relation, Gilbert seems to indicate that it is here a pure copula with no existential significance; it simply indicates the movement of the mind in passing from one term to another. If being is in no way distinguished from those forms which correspond to abstract concepts, relation and all the categories involving relation must become properties of knowledge alone. 76

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73 Gilbert de la Porée, *In de Trinitate Commentarium,* Migne, *Patrologia Latina,* LXIV, 1284 B.
74 *Ibid.*, 1292 C.
75 *Ibid.*, 1292 C.
Philosophy continued much along the lines of Boethius and Gilbert de la Porée, with the best minds of those thundering centuries giving their all to the principal problem of the universals.

The majority of philosophers accepted what had become the traditional stand on the reality of relations. Almost all of them developed and distinguished the concept of relations in accordance with the exigencies of Trinitarian theology. Even St. Thomas first expounded his theory of relations in connection with dogma. There seems to be considerable disagreement as regards the precise doctrine which St. Thomas held on relations. This much, however, is clear. He demanded real relations, as opposed to those of second intention. The distinction between predicamental relation and foundation is still a matter of dispute. The triumvirate of Thomist commentators, Cajetan, John of St. Thomas, and Sylvester of Ferrara, are unanimous in asserting that St. Thomas held a real distinction between relation and foundation; but, as we shall see, Suarez believes that he has St. Thomas on his side when he holds out for a rational distinction.

Perhaps, for our purpose, the most important pre-Suarezian philosopher in our brief historical survey is Henry of Ghent,

77 Aquinas, de Pot., q. 7, a. 9.
the Doctor Solemnis. Although he has been considered by some
to be a disciple of St. Augustine, it would be more correct to
call him an eclectic peripatetic. 78 In many aspects of his
philosophic synthesis he is a forerunner of Suarez, and the
doctrines of Suarez on such points as the distinction between
essence and existence in creatures, prime matter's possession
of existence in its own right; the principle of individuation,
and most to our point, the stand on the existence and nature of
predicamental relations, all harken back to the positions ex-
pounded by Henry of Ghent. 79

Henry of Ghent holds that, at least, some relations are
real, because of the explanation of the plurality of persons
in the Trinity as constituted by these real relations. 80 But
not only are the divine relations real, but the intellect dis-
covers in nature things which are really related independently
of the mind.

Quaedam relatio habet esse in singulari-
bus ex natura ipsius rei extra, non ex
opere intellectus, sed quam intellectus
considerans rem, inventiv circa ipsam
rem. 81

But the nature of this relative reality is not entirely clear in

78 Maurice De Wulf, History of Medieval Philosophy, transl. by
Ernest C. Messinger, Longmans, Green, and Co., London, 1926,
79 Jean Paulus, Henri de Gand: Essai sur les Tendances de sa
80 Henry of Ghent: Disputationes Quodlibeticæ de omni genere
divinae sapientiae quam Theologiam vocamus refertissime,
Parisiiis, 1513, 2 vols., III, 4, 86 v.
81 Ibid., Quodl., III, 4, 33 v.
the mind of Henry. Because of a radical essentialism at the root of his philosophic intuition, he is hampered by an absolutism in outlook which makes him want to consider relations as absolute, though he knows this cannot be.

Quomodo autem fit in eis realitas, non omnino est perspicuum. Rem enim absolutam relationem dicere non possumus; quidditas enim relationis non est quod sit aliquid, sed solum quod sit ad aliquud. Res ergo quae relatio est non potest dici res quae est aliquid sive quid, sed solum res quae est ad aliquum, immo res quae est ipsum esse ad aliquum. Hoc autem quomodo ipsum esse ad aliquum potest dici res, hoc est quod hic obscurum est. 82

Since relations are essentially opposed to absolutes, and Henry conceived of every separate essence (identified with its existence) as an absolute, he concluded that relation could not be an essence really distinct from its foundation. It was only a resultant respect of that absolute foundation.

Et est relatio ista realis, quia fundatur in re, cujus quidditas est respectu alterius ex scipsa, non per aliquum additum ei. 83

For if it were really distinct from the foundation, Henry claims that it would necessarily be an absolute, and so could act as a basis for another relation, and so on without stopping.

Et ipsa relatio...non est res aliqua alia ab illa super quam fundatur, sed solum respectus ipsius quantitatis et subjecti

82 Ibid.
83 Ibid.
ejus... aliter enim super illam rem primo fundaretur ille respectus, et ipsa aut subjectum ejus, aut utrumque primo per illum respectum referretur ad alium, et tunc eadem ratione ille respectus adhuc esset res alia qua respectu illo referretur ad alium... et esset similiter ire in infinitum.

So Henry of Ghent wants relations to be real, but not distinct from their foundations; in fact, their whole reality is that of their foundations.

Nullam realitatem habet relatio, nisi a suo fundamento... ita quod quaecumque relationes super idem fundantur, eamdem habent realitatem.

As we shall see in the remainder of this thesis, this is substantially the doctrine that Suarez adopted on relations, their existence and nature. It has its roots in Platonism and the Platonic confusion of the real and ideal orders. That Suarez was conscious of his dependence upon Ghent on many scores is clear from the frequency of his quotations from Henry of Ghent and his explicit approval of many of the insights of the Doctor Solemnis.

POSITION OF SUAREZ

The first proof that Suarez himself offers in defense of the extra-mental reality of relations is really the same as that

84 Ibid., 85 r and 86 v.
85 Ibid., Quodl., IX, 3, 75 r.
86 Cf., F. X. Maquart, Elementa Philosophiae, Andreas Blot, Parisiis, 1938, III-2, 188, 89-90, 24. It is important to read these pages in the order in which they are given.
of Henry of Ghent. It is theological in essence, not philosophic.

Since the Catholic Faith teaches that there are three real relations in God, constituting and distinguishing the three Divine Persons, it is evident that the concept of relation as such cannot be merely a word, nor merely an extrinsic denomination proceeding from a merely mental comparison. It really must be something of the thing which is related; this must be true even in God Himself. So Suarez argues that even more so must relations be something in contingent and created beings.

Docet enim fides...esse in Deo tres relationes reales, constituentes et distinguentes divinas personas: ex quo fit evidens argumentum, conceptum relationis ut sic, non addendo quod creatas sit vel increata, non esse dictitium, et rem aliquid referri non esse denominationem extrinsecam provenientem ex sola comparatione mentis, sed esse aliquid rei, quandoquidem in Deo aliquid rei est. 87

The only reason why relations could not also be had in created beings would be due either to the degree of perfection of creatures or because of some implication of imperfection in the concept of relation as such. The first is absurd; for if relations are not repugnant to God Himself, how could real relations be beneath the perfection of any creature? In God, it is true, the relations are substantial, while in creatures they are accidental, but this does not in any way change the point

87 Suarez, d. 47, s. 1, n. 11.
at issue. Relation as such implies neither substantial nor accidental. If there are substantial relations, much more easily could there be accidental relations.

...quia relationi ut sic non magis repugnat quod sit accidentalis, quam quod sit substantialis, quia sicut accidens dicit esse in alio, ita substantia dicit esse in se; si ergo cum hac ratione conjungi potest esse ad aliud, multo magis cum illa; et alioqui creaturae ut sic non repugnat accidentis reales; ergo nec repugnabit illi talis relatio, quae, etsi sit accidentalis, aliquid rei sit. 88

Nor can real relations in creatures be rejected on the score of imperfection, since relation qua relation does not imply any imperfection. It is true that the fact that they are accidental relations, does imply some kind of imperfection; but such imperfection, implied in the notion of accident, is not foreign to the nature of any creature.

...relatio ut relatio non dicit imperfectionem; quod si aliquid imperfectonis ei adjungitur ex eo quod accidentalis sit, talis imperfectio non est extra latitudinem rei creatae. 89

Suarez admits that many find this theological argument for the reality of relations hard to digest. Since Divine relations are outside all the predicaments and would be reducible only to the genus of substance, the parity between these Divine relations and predicamental relations might be denied.

88 Ibid., d. 47, s. 1, n. 11.
89 Ibid.
The Divine relation of paternity, for example, which is substantial, can be said to be quasi-transcendental, i.e., intimately included in the adequate concept of the whole being or personal substance. Suarez, therefore, concludes that from this first argument one can argue, at most, only to real transcendental references which are intimately included in the make-up of certain beings.

From reason alone, Suarez advances the argument that many of our words, which are signs of things, signa suppositiva rerum, signify relations which exist in things themselves without any mental juggling on our part. These must be based on some extra-mental reality. But no absolute being could account for these relative concepts and words. Therefore, there must be some relational reality which can act as a real basis from which we form our concepts and words expressing those concepts. There must be real relations over and beyond the absolute essences in nature.

...probati hoc solet, praecipue ex locu-
Examples of such concepts and words which need a real relative basis for their validity spring immediately to mind: greater, less, equal, similar, near, far away, father, son, etc.

But not merely are individual beings relative in their concrete existence, but the total and complex order in the universe gives evident and convincing proof that relation, predicamental relation, is real. This is but a reiteration of St. Thomas's proof in the De Potentia. The universe is composed of absolutes, and yet there exists between these beings a certain order and relationship, which is not of the essence of any being, but is nonetheless real for all of that. This order is strictly accidental to these beings which are in themselves absolutes. Suarez gives an example from the heavenly bodies which resounds the strain of mediaeval physics.

Nam etsi elementa et coeli alio ordine constituerentur, res ipsae absolutae eadem sunt; est ergo ordo, quem nunc habent, aliquid accidentarium ipsius.

This extrinsic and accidental order between beings is evi-

92 Ibid., n. 12.
93 De Potentia, q. 7, a. 9.
94 Suarez, d. 47, s. 1, n. 14.
dent in every aspect of reality. We see it in the finality of beings, in their efficiency, in knowledge, in volition. Any similarity existing between beings is explicable only in terms of efficiency and finality, terms which imply further relationships. For, as St. Thomas reminds us, if two beings are similar it is either because one was the cause of the other, omne agens agit sibi simile, or because both of the beings proceeded from a common efficient cause to which they are related. 95

This patent ordering cannot merely be a product of the human intellect, for it arises from and in things themselves, and pertains to the objective perfection of the universe.

Et non est aliquid per rationem conficitum, nam per se constat in rebus ipsis esse, et ad magnum universi perfectionem spectare. 96

And so relations must pertain to a special predicament. They are not of the intrinsic make-up of any one absolute being, nor can they be reduced to any of the other predicaments. Substance, quantity, and quality belong to a being absolutely; the last six predicaments in some way follow upon relations, and so presuppose them. Therefore, there exist in nature real predicamental relations.

...et non est nisi relatio, quum necesse est per se ad proprium praedicamentum

95 De Veritate, q. 2, a. 14; q. 8, a. 8.
96 Suarez, d. 47, s. 1, n. 14.
Suarez briefly mentions two other proofs without developing them in any detail.

The various relationships found to exist among things can vary while the absolute form related remains the same. Therefore, over and above the beings which are absolute, there must also exist real relations irreducible to any absolute predicament.

...illas esse tales ut accidunt rebus creatis absolutis, possintque variari in aliquo subjecto sine amissione formae absolutae... 98

Also these relationships cannot be explained through any mere extrinsic denomination. Secundum est, has non esse denominationes mere extrinsecas... 99 Every extrinsic denomination is taken from something intrinsic. But with the denial of real relations, the only things that could be intrinsic would be an absolute of some kind. But no relative extrinsic denomination could be had merely from an absolute. If there is an extrinsic denomination in any particular instance, it is had only because of some real relation existing in one of the terms. If one

97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., n. 15.
99 Ibid.
denies that real relationship, he also has denied the basis for any true extrinsic denomination. 100

Thus Suarez has proved to his own satisfaction that there are real predicametal relations. The problems which remain all spring from a consideration of the nature of those relations.

100 Ibid.
CHAPTER III

THE NATURE OF REAL PREDICAMENTAL RELATIONS

DEFINITION

Thus far, our entire treatment has revolved around the question whether there are such things as real predicamental relations. Suarez now considers the essence or nature of those relations.

He defines a predicamental relation as:

Accidens cujus totum esse est ad aliud esse seu ad aliud se habere, seu aliud respicere. 1

He claims that this is identical with the second definition that Aristotle gives in the seventh chapter of his Categories. 2

Any strict definition must be had through genus and specific difference. 3 None of the predicaments can be defined strictly, 4 since they themselves are the ten supreme genera, and so do not fall under any higher genus nor are differentiated by any specific difference.

However, speaking loosely, we can say that the "genus" in Suarez's definition of predicamental relation is the term acci-

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1 Disp. Meta., d. 47, s. 5, n. 2.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid., d. 6, s. 9, n. 22.
4 Ibid., d. 39, s. 2, n. 29.
This excludes Divine relations which are not accidents, but substantial. It also excludes, as is obvious, all created substances, which can in no way be predicamental relations. It also excludes, as may not be so obvious, all rational relations, since these are not strictly speaking accidents, for accidents are subdivisions of real being.

Accidens ergo positum est in illa definitione loco generis. Per quod imprimis excluduntur divinae relationes, quae non sunt accidentia, sed substantiae. Excluduntur deinde omnes substantiae creatae, quae relationes praedicamentales esse non possunt ... Excluduntur praeterea relationes rationis, quae proprie et simpliciter non possunt dici accidentia, cum accidens simpliciter dictum sub ente reali contineatur.

In this, Suarez stands against Cajetan, who states that the general over-all definition of relation includes both real and rational relations. But, as we saw in the previous chapter, Suarez wants the formal notion of relation, esse ad, to apply only to real relations, and to rational relations only by some kind of analogy or proportion or comparison with real relations.

The second part of the definition, cujus totum esse est ad aliud esse seu ad aliud se habere, seu aliud respicere, is taken as its "specific difference," for this phrase specifies and cuts off predicamental relations from all the other accidents,

5 Ibid., d. 47, s. 5, n. 3.
6 Ibid.
7 Cajetan, In Summam Theologicam Commentarium, In I, q. 13, a. 7
8 Suarez, d. 47, s. 5, n. 3.
which have their existence only in a subject, not through a reference to something outside that subject.

Alterna pars illius definitionis, quae locum differentiae habet, separat praedicamentum hoc a reliquis praedicamentis accidentium... 9

It might seem that this definition would be applicable, not only to predicamental relations, but to transcendental relations as well. But this is not true. When Suarez says cujus totum esse est esse ad aliud, we must remember the fundamental distinction he made previously between predicamental and transcendental relations. A transcendental relation does more than imply a reference to some other being as its term; it enjoys other dynamic functions as well. But a predicamental relation is one whose entire essence is only to imply an ordination to something else, cujus TOTUM esse est esse ad aliud. 10

A second difficulty with Suarez's definition presents itself. This time it arises from a seemingly intrinsic contradiction in the terms of the definition itself. If a predicamental relation is an accident, then it is impossible for its entire essence to consist in a reference to another. That essence, in so far as it is the essence of an accident, must also include an ordination to its subject of inherence, inesse. 11

9 Ibid., d. 47, s. 5, n. 4.
10 Ibid., n. 5.
11 Ibid., n. 6.
...nam si relatio est accidens, ergo non potest totum esse illius consistere in habitudine ad aliud; necesse est enim ut aliquid ejus in subjecto sit, ut ea ratione accidens esse possit, cum accidentis esse sit inesse. 12

There are various answers to this objection, but Suarez rejects them, because they all seem to imply in one way or another a real distinction between the essence and the existence of a relation by demanding a real diversity between the esse ad and and the esse in. For example, some claim that when a predicamental relation is said to have its whole essence consist in an orientation to another, what is meant is that the essence proper to a relation is wholly an order to another, but not that essence under its accidental aspect. This latter aspect it has in common with the other accidents. This gave rise to the distinction between the esse ad and the esse in of the relation. According to this opinion, the esse ad as such, prescinds from all real existence, and so can be applied univocally to real and rational relations. 13

But Suarez is adamant in rejecting this line of reasoning, for, as he reasons, an accident does not just inhere in a subject without being any particular and proper nature. It is always a particularized form inhering in this particular subject.

12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
To write that the \textit{esse ad} does not commit itself to be what it is, namely, the particular accidental form of \textit{esse ad}, is to speak of an abstraction, in no way significant in a discussion of reality. Also, if the above argumentation were true, Suarez claims that no predicamental relation would ever attribute its proper, formal, and relative effect to its subject, since no accident can cause a formal effect unless it is actually inhering in the subject. A real relation and a real \textit{esse ad} cannot be a real relation and a real \textit{esse ad} unless it is simultaneously an \textit{esse in}.

\ldots \textit{de ratione accidentis, prout in re ipsa existit, non solum est quod insit secundum aliquam rationem genericam vel communem, sed etiam secundum prorsum, et prout est talis forma in rerum natura; imo impossibile est quod forma informet vel afficiat secundum communem rationem, et non secundum aliquam propriam, cum hac ratione a parte rei non distinguatur.}\footnote{Ibid., d. 47, s. 5, n. 6.}

\ldots \textit{alias relatio non tribueret subjecto proprium effectum formalem relativum, quia accidentes non dat effectum formalem, nisi inhaerendo et afficiendo; si ergo relatio non inest secundum propriam rationem, non confert proprium et specificum effectum formalem.}\footnote{Ibid.}

Lastly, Suarez objects that if the predicamental relation did not inhere, it would be nothing: it would not be a substance, and upon the supposition that it does not inhere in any
subject, it could not be an accident. Therefore, it would not be anything real. So Suarez concludes:

...concedendum est relationem secundum se totam esse accident; haec enim ratio...est quasi transcendentalis respectu novem praedicamentorum. Unde, cum dicitur totum esse relationis esse ad aliud, particular exclusiva ibi virtualiter contenta non excludit concomitantia, seu extrinsecas et transcendentalis rationes; quare, sicut non excludit rationem entis realis, ita nec rationem accidentis et inhaerentis. Solum ergo excludit esse absolutum, et indicat, esse relationis ut sic non sistere in subjecto, quod suo modo afficit seu denominat, sed illud ordinare ad terminum, et in hoc positam esse totam formalem rationem relationis. 16

A predicamental relation must according to its whole nature be an accident, which connotes a transcendental relation to its subject of inherence. The only thing, then, which a predicamental relation does exclude is an absolute nature; it does not stop merely in its ordination to its subject, but goes on further to refer that subject to another term. 17

But when Suarez says that the essence of a predicamental relation is ad aliud esse seu ad aliud se habere, does he mean that the essence of relation is actually to refer the subject to the term, or only to be apt to refer that subject so that it would be related to something else? It might seem that the mind can conceive of a relation as affecting its subject, and yet not referring that subject to anything outside of itself.

16 Ibid., d. 47, s. 5, n. 7.
17 Ibid.
Even the theologians admit that in Divine relations paternity can be conceived as constituting the first Person of the Blessed Trinity, prior to any relation or reference of any kind. 18

Suarez is clear that a thing is apt to be related to something else, not by reason of the relation itself, but by reason of the proximate foundation. The proper formal effect of a relation is actually to relate the subject. And, as he says,

...alias nec distingueretur, etiam secundum rationem formalem, a fundamento, nec requireret coexistentiam termini, nec vere diceretur totum esse ejus positum esse in respectu ad aliud. 19

In answering this objection Suarez reminds us that it is not one and the same thing to ask whether the formal effect of an accident is to constitute something to be such and such, and to ask whether it is of the essence of an accident actually to exercise its formal effect.

...aliud esse considerare an effectus formalis accidentis sit constituere actu tale, aliud vero an de essentia accidentis sit actu exercere suum effectum formalem; haec enim duo distincta sunt. 20

For example, it is true to say that the formal effect of an accidental form of whiteness is to constitute something actually white, and not only aptitudinally white, although, absolutely considered, it is not of the essence of whiteness actually to

18 Ibid., n. 9.
19 Ibid., n. 10.
20 Ibid., n. 11.
confer that formal effect on any subject. Although it is not of the essence of whiteness, simply speaking, actually to constitute something white, nevertheless, it is of the essence of whiteness as affecting and informing a subject, actually to constitute the being white. The same can be said of relations. 21

There are some accidents which of their very essence cannot exist in reality without affecting a subject; such are relations.

Relationes...non possunt esse in rerum natura, quin actu referant, eo quod non possint ab omni subjecto separatae conservari, quia in re non distinguuntur a suis proximis subjectis... 22

For unlike quantity and quality which can, with no intrinsic repugnance, exist (as in the Blessed Sacrament) without an actual subject of inherence, predicamental relations cannot exist nor be conceived separated from their proximate subjects. As we shall see, Suarez holds that the relations are really identified with those proximate subjects, their foundations. But if other accidents are conserved through Divine power without their proper subject of inherence, then any predicamental relation which has such an accident for its foundation, can also be conserved in this way.

Sicut autem verius est, relationem non esse rem distinctam a fundamento, ita etiam verius esse non posse ab illo

21 Ibid.
22 Ibid., n. 12.
separatam, vel per se conservari....
Unde eatenus etiam potest talis relationem conservari separata a tali subiecto, quatenus illa res, quae est fundamentum ejus, potest sine illo subiecto conservari.

As a last point, Suarez insists that it is impossible to conceive of relation with its formal and proper effect, without conceiving it as actually relating its subject to the term. It may be that the intellect has a confused and indistinct concept of relation and its foundation, and thus tries to think of it as not actually exercising its formal effect of relation.

...impossibile esse concepere relationem cum suo effectu formali plene ac proprie concepto, quin concipiatur ut actu referens... 24

After settling the questions of the existence and the definition of a predicamental relation, Suarez then takes up the elements that must enter into any relation.

ELEMENTS OF A RELATION

No relation of itself ever comes into being; it results or follows from the foundation once the term is given. Therefore, there is no strict efficient cause of a relation other than the cause of the foundation and term.

...cum per se non fiat, sed resultet,

23 Ibid., d. 47, s. 5, n. 12.
24 Ibid., n. 13.
vel formaliter consequatur positis
fundamento et termino, nullam habet
vel requirit efficientem causam, praeter eas quae fundamentum et terminum
efficient. 25

If one held the relation was really distinct from the foundation
then, perhaps, he could hold some kind of efficiency. But be-
Suarez denies this real distinction, he must claim only formal
resultancy, not efficient. 26

Since no predicamental relation is ever of itself intended
by any agent, it does not enjoy any strict final cause.

Cum enim haec relatio non sit per se
intenta in rebus, non habet propri
causam finalem, quamvis eo modo quo est,
dici possit esse propter suum formalem
effectum, vel propter terminum. 27

Efficient and final causality go hand in hand; if the efficient
cause is lacking, no final causality in the strict sense of the
word is had.

Since relation is itself some kind of a form, it does not
have any other proper and physical formal cause, but has its
own quiddity and formal metaphysical essence.

...cum ipsa relatio sit forma quaedam,
non habet aliam causam formalem pro-
priam et physicam, sed habet suam quid-
ditatem et rationem formalem metaphysi-
cam. 28

25 Ibid., d. 47, s. 6, n. 1.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
In so far as the term specifies a relation, one could say, perhaps, that the term participates in the nature of a formal cause. The precise nature of this participation we shall see in more detail in a moment.

The foundation and subject fulfill the function of the material cause of a relation.

Fundamentum vero et subjectum causam materialem compleere vixtur...

So all the causes and principles of a relation are to be found in its subject, foundation, and term.

**SUBJECT OF A RELATION**

That every predicamental relation does require a real subject is obvious to any one who considers the matter howsoever lightly. The reasons for this are clear enough. A predicamental relation is an accident. But every accident requires a subject. Therefore, every predicamental relation will require a subject.

...dicendum est omnem rationem predicamentalem requirere liquod subjectum reale. Haec est certa, nam relatio est accidens, ...omne aut accidens requirit aliquod subjectum ergo.

A second proof that Suarez tosses off in passing is that a relation is a form. But a form must always inform something; that

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29 Ibid.
30 Ibid., n. 2.
which it informs is called its subject. Therefore, every pre-
dicamental relation demands a subject.

\[ \ldots \text{relatio est quaedam forma; omnis autem forma aliquid informat; id autem quod informat, dicitur subjectum ejus, praesertim si ei inhaereat, et ab eo pendeat.} \ldots \]

Sometimes, it is true, philosophers speak abstractly of re-
lation, such as paternity, similitude, equality, etc. But in the concrete, it is really a father or something which is simi-
lar or equal to something else. In the concrete, a relation al-
ways needs a subject. In fact, what is really relative is the combination of the subject and the relation.

\[ \ldots \text{nam relativum in concreto non habet proprie subjectum, sed potius ipsum est quid constans ex subjecto et relatione, si formaliter sumatur ut relativum est, seu ut compositum quoddam ex relatione et subjecto ejus.} \]

Relations are never of themselves relative; they are that by which the subject is relative.

Granting that every relation must have a subject, the ques-
tion arises whether one single relation can have more than one subject or must it be content with one and only one. Henry of Ghent, as he writes in his Quodlibeta, thought that since a relation is between two terms, it could be said to be in both

31 Ibid.
32 Ibid.
33 Disp. Quodl., IX, q. 3.
terms as in subjects. Thus, there would be but one relationship between father and son, between son and father.

Suarez, however, sees this as impossible; for one and the same numerical accident could not be in really distinct subjects. 34 For a relation, as a simple form, is strictly one with a true and proper metaphysical unity; it could not simultaneously coexist in two different subjects. Otherwise, a relation would really be an aggregate of two mutual relations, called a single relation merely for convenience. But a mutual relationship, taken as one thing, is a product of reason, and does not pertain as such to the real order. So since a predicamental relation does not subsist by itself, it must inhere in something, and in only one subject.

...ergo necesse est ut in relationibus realibus et accidentalibus sit aliquid reale et accidentale, et ita redit argumentum factum, quod debet esse in uno aliquo subjecto. 35

Some relations can be said to be in more than one subject, if those subjects are themselves subordinated one to another.

Verumtamen hujusmodi relatio per se ac proprie solum afficit proximum subjectum, in quo suo modo inest; ad subjectum autem remotum solum comparatur medio proximo, in quantum hoc in illo inest et sustentatur. 36

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34 Suarez, d. 47, s. 6, n. 4.
35 Ibid.
36 Ibid., n. 5.
For example, the accidental relation of equality inheres immediately and proximately in the accident of quantity, and ultimately in the substance itself. Likeness has a quality for its proximate subject, the substance as its remote subject. But note that in these cases the two subjects are subordinated to each other, and the relation can be said to inhere in the remote subject only because it inheres immediately in the proximate subject.

Suarez makes an interesting appendage to this point:

...interdum relatio aeque vel in eodem modo denominat subjectum proximum et remotum, ut quantitas dicitur aequalis, et similiter substantia materialis; et albedo dicitur similis, et ipsum album, vel etiam subjectum, ut homo, vel paries. Aliquando relatio denominat subjectum proximum, et non remotum, ut intellectus dicitur referri relatione potentiae ad suum actum, anima vero non item, et sic de aliis. Aliquando, e converso, relatio denominat subjectum remotum, vel suppositum ipsum, et non proximum, ut filiation dicit suppositum filium, non vero humanitatem, quamvis probable sit proxime inesse humanitati; et paternitas paroxime dicitur esse in potentia, et tamen non denominat patrem, nisi ipsum suppositum. 37

Thus, some relations refer both the ultimate and the proximate subjects to a term, as in the case of equality and similarity. Other relations, however, orientate only their proximate subjects, as its in the case of intellection and volition, where the faculty is related to its operation as potency to act, while

37 Ibid., n. 6.
this cannot be said of its ultimate subject, the human soul. Still other relations refer their ultimate subjects to a term rather than their proximate subjects. Suarez's example of this is in the relations of filiation and paternity, where the relation ordains the entire supposit to the term, rather than the humanity of the father or the son, which he believes is the proximate subject of the relations.

The reason behind all this is ultimately the diversity in the nature of the various foundations. We shall see Suarez go into this matter more at length when we take up his treatment of the various types of relational foundations.

FOUNDATION OF A RELATION

The second element which Suarez gives as contributing to the entity of a predicamental relation is the foundation. Suarez nowhere offers a formal definition of the term foundation, but it is clear from his constant usage of the term that he accepts the traditional meaning of foundation as the reason why the subject is related to the term, id propter quod subjectum ad terminum refertur.

The first and most important thing to be said about the foundation of a predicamental relation is that a real foundation is required for every real relation.

Circa fundamentum autem relationis principio statudendum in communi est, omnem
There is hardly a philosopher who has ever denied this; its necessity is obvious.

Suarez gives as his first proof of the necessity of a real foundation one which is valid only granting Suarez's position on the distinction, rather the lack of it, between the foundation and the relation. Since a relation does not have any proper entity of its own — for according to Suarez it is not really distinct from its absolute foundation — it must partake of the entity of something else. But it cannot enjoy the entity of the term since the term is extrinsic and distinct, while the entity of a thing must be intrinsic to it. Thus, the real relation must take its entity from its foundation, which will always be required.

...relatio ex se non habet propriam entitatem...ergo necesse est ut habeat illam...ab aliquo alio; ...habet relatio realis suam entitatem a fundamento reali; ergo semper illud requirit. 39

An added reason is that since no predicamental relation as such ever of itself comes into being or is intended as the primary object of any agent, it must result from some other cause which is directly intended. This cause from which the relation results is the real foundation.

38 Ibid., d. 47, s. 7, n. 1.
39 Ibid.
...relatio talisti naturae, nec per se fiat, nec siper se intenta in natura; ergo conquitetur et quasi resut-tat in suo subjecto, posito termino; ergo requirit subjecto aliquam realem rationem vel causa ob quam in illo re-sultat talis remio, posito talii termino. 40

But must this foundation really distinct from the ultimate subject of the relation? Suarez first clarifies the issue by distinguishing between the proximate and the remote or ultimate subject of a relation. Of the former, the proximate subject of inherence, no other foundation is needed than that very subject, for the foundation and proximate subject are one and the same.

Et quidem de primo subjecto (proximo) certum est non quiter ut praeter il-lud sit aliud fundamentum relationis ex natura rei aliolo distinctum, alicui esset abeunnum in infinitum. 41

Thus the relation of equality which inheres immediately in the accident of quantity as in a subject needs no other basis or foundation than quantity itself.

But the difficulty arises in regard to the principal and ultimate subject. Is it necessary that in respect to the substance every real predicament relation require another accidental foundation really distinct from the substance? Many claim that such an intermediam accidental foundation is neces-

40 Ibid.
41 Ibid., n. 2.
sary, especially if the relation is not really distinct from the proximate subject. These philosophers demand that any accidental relation must be founded upon another accident, an absolute foundation from which it may receive its accidental entity. 42 If this were not true, then the relation, identified with its foundation, which would be a substance, would no longer be entitatively an accident, but a substance.

In spite of the fact that Aristotle and St. Thomas seem to hold that an intermediary accidental foundation is always required, Suarez is explicit in denying that an accident must always be the foundation for a predicamental relation.

Nihilominus dicendum est, necessarium non esse ut fundamentum proximum relationis sit aliquod accidens, vel res aliqua, aut modus realis, ex natura rei distinctus a primo subjecto relationis. 43

In some cases he thinks the substance itself is sufficient. For the foundation is nothing other than the real cause why something is related to something else. There can be no reason why the intrinsic nature of a being cannot be the cause and reason why two things are similar, or in some other way related.

Cur enim, sicut quantitas ex sua naturali conditione et natura habet sufficientem rationem ob quam ad illam consequantur quaedam relationes, et similiter qualitas, non potest etiam substantia simile quippium habere per seipsam? 44

42 Ibid., d. 47, s. 7, n. 2.
43 Ibid., n. 4.
44 Ibid.
Many examples could be given, some of which Suarez himself mentions, of instances where a thing is related because of its very substantial essence. Creation is on the part of the creature a predicamental relation; yet its foundation is the very nature of the creature itself. For even granting that dependence would be for some a really distinct mode, and that this mode would be the foundation of the relation of creature to God, nevertheless, this mode is not an accident, and so does not touch the point at issue. Suarez cites as added proof the relation of filiation:

Et confirmatur in relatione filiationis, quae non potest ita fundari in generatione activa vel passiva, ut illi proxime insit, nam transacta actuali generatione permanet relationis. Nec potest fundari in alio antecedente, quia nullum est quod sit causa ejus; fundatur ergo in ipsam substantiam. Ratio autem est, quia substantia ipsa creaturae, quatenus creabilis est, vel generabilis ab alia causa, est sufficiens ut in ea possit fundari relation, si a tali causa, creati vel genita sit.

The foundation of this relation can be nothing other than the substance of the son himself, for the foundation must endure as long as the relation is had. But anything else, e.g., the actual act of generation, comes and goes, while the relation of filiation still remains. The substance of the son in so far as it is either created or generated is a sufficient reason for

46 Ibid., n. 7.
the foundation of the relation of filiation; nothing else is needed.

But what about the objection Suarez himself brought against this position? If the relation is not distinct from the foundation, and the foundation is a substance, then the relation, too, would be a substance. Suarez writes,

...de divisione entis in substantiam et accidentes, proprium et physicum accidentes non posse esse in re omnino idem cum substantia; accidentes vero praedicamentale interdum posse sola ratione rationcinata distinguere. Sic ergo dicendum est, relationes, quae proxime in substantia fundantur, non esse accidentia physica, et quod entitatem suam, sed solum esse accidentia praedicamentalia, quod figuram et modum praedicationis, quia secundum rationem formalem suam sunt extra rationem substantiae, et ideo non est inconveniens quod tales relationes non distinguantur in re a substantia. 47

There is an important distinction present in these words which must be grasped to understand Suarez's position on the nature of an accident. When treating of accidents in general he defines what he means by a physical accident and what he means by a predicamental accident:

Potest enim accidens sumi, vel pro entitate accidentalis secundum se, et secundum suam tantum realitatem; vel pro quacumque ratione formali accidentis, quae in praedicamentis collocantur. Quod aliis etiam terminis dici solet, accidens posse

47 Ibid., d. 47, s. 7, n. 8.
considerari, vel prout aliquid, vel pro-
ut aliquid accidere dicitur; nam licet
omne, quod in se est accidens, aliquid
accidat, non tamen, e converso, omne
quod aliquid accidere dicitur, est verum
ac proprium accidens. Quomodo etiam
distingui solet accidens, in accidens
praedicabili et accidens praedicamenta-
tale, et accidens physicum, seu dicens
veram entitatem aut modum accidentalem. 48

So we gather that Suarez wants 1) a physical accident to be one
which has its own proper accidental unity and entity, while 2)
a predicamental accident is one which is predicated as modifying a being, but which strictly does not have its own accidental
tility. He gives the example of habitus or action, which are
predicated of a subject or agent as if they were really some-
thing new inhering in that subject, but which strictly speaking
do not entitatively inform that subject through a new acciden-
tal entity.

...propter ea genera accidentium, quae
solum extrinseve circumstant aut denomi-
nant; illa enim non sunt cum ea proprie-
tate inhaerentia, cum qua insunt caetera
accidentia, quae sunt verae formae in-
formantes... 49

Such a distinction allows Suarez, as we saw above, to say that
those relations which have the substance itself as its proximate
foundation, are not physical accidents as regards their entity,
but only predicamental accidents, according to the manner and
mode of predication.

48 Ibid., d. 37, s. 1, n. 5.
49 Ibid., d. 39, s. 3, n. 12.
Crucial in any discussion of the foundation of a predicamental relation is its distinction from the relation. Practically every theory possible on this point has been held by some philosopher or other through the centuries.

As is his wont, Suarez first review all the previous doctrines and opinions on this question before he states what he himself holds.

The majority of Thomists, led by Capreolus, Cajetan, and Ferrara, demand a real distinction between relations and their subjects and foundations. 50

Scotus distinguishes some relations which in no way are separable from their foundations from those which can be separated, as for example, the relations of similitude. These latter, Scotus admits, are really distinct from their foundations, while the others which are inseparable are not really distinct, since the Scotist criterion of a real distinction, sc. separability, is not present. 51

Durandus makes use of still another distinction in this question. He claims that there are some relations which are real orders or references consequent upon their foundations. There are, however, other relations which are merely relative denominations, e.g., to be equal or to be similar. These latter

50 Ibid., d. 47, s. 2, n. 2.
51 Ibid., n. 3.
are not really distinct from their foundations and add nothing over and above the concomitant coexistence of the two absolute terms. These denominations Durandus still wants to pertain to the predicament of relation and be sufficient to constitute a real relation. Durandus's argument for the real distinction in the former examples is the old one of separability. 52

Still others would prefer a modal distinction between relation and foundation; others argue for a formal distinction. 53 But Suarez rejects all of these positions and finally decides to place his philosophical chips with the Nominalists, Ockham, and Hervaeus by placing only a rational distinction between relation and foundation.

Inter has ergo sententias mihi maxime probatur quinta, quam Hervaeus et non-nulli alii Thomistae docuere, a quorum sensu fere nihil discrepant Nominales... 54

He does not want to admit even for a moment that this rational distinction makes the formal essence of relation nothing real or merely an extrinsic denomination taken from some absolute form. This would destroy the real predicament of relation which he desires to establish. Rather the relation is some intrinsic form of the thing related, but not to be either a thing or a mode really distinct from any absolute form. It is that

52 Ibid., n. 4.
53 Ibid., n. 7.
54 Ibid., n. 22.
same absolute form, which is its foundation, taken, not absolutely, but as viewing and looking toward something else conotated by the relative denomination.

...respondetur, esse relationis in re non esse aliud ab esse fundamenti, ratione tamen distinguui, quatenus illudmet esse concipiatur ut includens aliquo modo, seu connotans terminum quem respicit. 55

Thus, the relation of similitude would be nothing other than the form, e.g., of whiteness, precisely in so far as this form of whiteness connotes another white object as a term. 56

Suarez believes that such an explanation more than suffices to explain the various ways of speaking of things, and also to maintain a distinct predicament of relation.

Atque haec distinctio rationis sufficit, tum ad diversas loquendi formas, tum etiam ad praedicamentorum distinctionem... 57

The chief argument which his opponents offered in favour of something more than a merely rational distinction between foundation and relation was the argument from separability. If the term of a relation is destroyed, then relation of the subject to that term also perishes, even though no intrinsic change has occured as regards the subject and foundation taken in themselves. If this is true, then the relation must necessarily be really distinct from that subject and foundation. Suarez's

55 Ibid., d. 47, s. 2, n. 23.
56 Ibid., n. 22.
57 Ibid.
answer to that argument is as follows:

...negamus enim relationem separari unquam a fundamento secundum aliquid reale quod ei intrinsecum sit. Sed solum contingit, separari aut destitui terminum, quo ablato cessat etiam relativa denominatio, non quia aliquid rei vel realis modi auferatur, ab ipso relativo, sed quia denominatio relativa includit aliquid modo terminum, sine quo non manet actualiter sed fundamentaliter tantum, seu in proxima aptitudine. 58

Thus, the relation is the foundation as connoting the term. If one removes the term, the connotation is destroyed, while the foundation remains entitatively untouched.

If Suarez's adversaries pushed the point that if a white object, which was not similar to another, suddenly becomes similar, then that relation of similitude is either something (a new entitative perfection) or nothing, Suarez would fling back the reply:

...praeter illa duo membra est aliud tertium, nimirum aliquid rei esse de novo, non in re, quae prius erat alba, sed in termino, qui de novo factus est albus, quem terminum aliquo modo includit seu connotat illa res, quae est similitudo, sub ratione et conceptu similitudinis, non sub ratione albedinis. 59

Suarez is careful to explain that this connotation does not reduce predicamental relation to a mere extrinsic denomination. The relation is identified with an intrinsic form of the sub-

58 Ibid., d. 47, s. 2, n. 23.
59 Ibid.
ject, namely, the absolute foundation, which is relative in so far as it connotes something extrinsic in the extrinsic term.

...has denominationes respectivas, non esse mere extrinsecas...Unde consequenter concedimus, hujusmodi denominationem esse ab aliqua forma intrinseca, includendo tamen seu connotando aliquam aliam extrinse-cam in extrinseco termino. 60

Suarez finds many advantages in this position and many escapes from difficulties inextricably interwoven into the woof of the other positions.

We saw previously that he objected strenuously to the distinction between the esse ad and the esse in of a predicamental relation. We saw that some philosophers appealed to this real dichotomy in order to agree with some texts of Aristotle in which the matter seemed to claim that a being suffered no intrinsic change upon the advent of a new relation. Some philosophers explained these texts away by saying that no change took place by reason of the formal essence of relation as such, esse ad, but only in so far as that predicamental relation also enjoyed the accidental existence of esse in.

For Suarez, the esse ad and the esse in are not distinct, nor could they be. An esse ad which is not in itself either substantial or accidental cannot be anything real. No mode of being (esse ad) can prescind from being itself.

60 Ibid.
Falsum item est, verum esse ad, posse ita praescindı ab esse in, ut illud intrinsece non includat...modos entis non posse ita praescindı ab ente, quin illud in se claudant. 61

But once Suarez holds the real identification of relation and foundation, he can dispense with this distinction. For the esse of a relation is not anything other than the esse of the foundation. It is the esse of the foundation as connotative of a real term. 62

Also, Suarez finds it a simple matter to agree without further distinctions and qualifications with the texts of Aristotle, in which the Stagirite wrote:

Nor is there motion in respect of relation: for it may happen that when one correlative changes, the other, although this does not itself change, is no longer applicable, so that in these cases the motion is accidental. 63

Suarez believes that all positions other than his own would in the last analysis be forced to disagree with Aristotle. 64

Nor does he think that his rational distinction forces him to say that a predicamental relation is nothing. Though it is not really distinct from the foundation, it is rationally distinct, and this he thinks sufficient to save its reality.

61 Ibid., d. 47, s. 2, n. 24.
62 Ibid.
64 Suarez, d. 47, s. 2, n. 24.
Relation is real because it is identified with a real foundation; its total reality is that of its foundation.

This is essential for an understanding of Suarez's doctrine, for when the relative denomination is said to arise from the coexistence of many absolutes without any real addition to the subject, it is not to be understood that the denomination is equally and simultaneously taken from two absolute forms: one intrinsic, the other extrinsic. Rather, the denomination requires the coexistence of such forms, but the relation itself is taken in each instance from a proper and intrinsic form connoting another.

If the foundation is not real, then the relation consequent upon that foundation is not real, but only an extrinsic denomination or a rational relation. 67

But still another question arises concerning the foundation of a relation. Is the foundation really the same as what Suarez

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65 Ibid.
66 Ibid., n. 25.
67 Ibid.
calls the ratio fundandi? This latter term is untranslatable because of the various senses in which it is used. As we shall see, sometimes it is a cause, other times it means nothing more than a condition; in several passages it is found to be identified with the foundation, while in others it is really distinct. Because of these difficulties we shall keep the term in its original form.

It would seem, at first, that the foundation and ratio fundandi are the same; the foundation of a relation is nothing other than that by which the relation can modify its subject. But this fundament would then be the ratio fundandi, the reason for founding and receiving the relation. They would seem to be identical.

Est autem causa dubitandi, quia fundamentum relationis nihil aliud esse videtur quam id quo mediante relation convenit subjecto; sed hoc ipsum fundamentum est ratio fundandi seu recipiendo relationem; ergo haec non distinguuntur. 68

However, some authors would have it that the two would be distinct, and that the ratio fundandi would be some requisite either in the fundament or in the extrinsic term. Thus, as in the relation of paternity, the generative act is necessary, even though it is not the foundation. Suarez argues that it could not be the foundation which is always in the subject. The gener-

68 Ibid., d. 47, s. 7, n. 10.
ative act as a strict action is not in the agent, but in the patient, the son who is generated. In this instance, the generative act would be the ratio fundandi, even though it is not the foundation of the relation.

Ut ad relationem paternitatis necessaria est actio generandi, quae non est fundamentum, quia paternitas non habet ab illa entitatem suam, cum actio generandi sit in filio genito, paternitas vero sit in patre; est ergo ratio fundandi. 69

There seems to be a good deal of confusion on this point in many authors, but Suarez finds the truth of the matter quite obvious upon simple analysis. In every real relation there is required on the part of the subject, something which is apt and proportioned to found the reference to some other being. This is called the foundation of the relation.

In omni ergo relatione reali requiritur ex parte subjecti res aliqua, natura sua apta et accomodata ut fundare possit respectum ad aliud, ut ab illa proxime habeat relatio realitatem suam,... Hujusmodi ergo res proprie appellatur fundamentum relationis in quocunque relationum genere. 70

Now it happens that in some relations over and above this foundation some other condition is required to mediate between the foundation and term, in some way distinct from both of them, which will allow the relation to result.

69 Ibid., n. 11.
70 Ibid., n. 12.
This necessary condition is the generative act in the relation of paternity. If a person were created immediately and entirely by God as the sole efficient cause, no real relation of paternity would arise. And yet this generative act is not strictly the foundation, which Suarez describes as *illud in quo et a quo proxime habet entitatem suam*. 72

This necessary condition, for lack of a better name, is frequently called the *ratio fundandi* of the relation. Suarez admits that the choice of words is not too fortunate, 73 for ordinarily the term *ratio* is saved for something which exerts some kind of causal influence on the being in question. But this necessary condition is a pure condition, *removens prohibens*, and has no causal influence on the relation.

Suarez warns us that this is not to be taken as a general rule to be applied univocally to all relations. Many foundations contain within themselves the very *ratio fundandi* of the relation and are in need of no other necessary condition other than themselves and a real term.

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71 Ibid.
72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
Nam inter duo alba statim consurgit relation similitudinis, a quocunque facta sint, et ubicunque existant, aut quascunque alias conditiones habeant, et idem est de relatione scientiae ad scibile et similibus. Et ita hujusmodi ratio fundandi, etiamsi hac voce illam conditionem appellemus, non est necessaria in omnibus relationibus. 

Suarez in order to avoid multiplying terms needlessly prefers to take ratio fundandi as the formal aspect of the foundation, that natural property or nature of the foundation that makes it apt to found the relation. In this sense he concludes that there must be a ratio fundandi in every foundation.

The ratio and the foundation would not be really distinct, but only rationally so.

**TERM OF A RELATION**

The third and last elements of a relation is its term, the being which terminates the relation and to which the subject is referred. Every predicamental relation demands a real term.

_Dicendum...est, ad relationem praedicamentalem necessarium esse aliquem terminum realem... Cum enim essentia ejus sit ad alius se habere secundum suum esse essentiale, in hoc ipso includitur terminus; cumque relatio haec praedicamentalis et realis sit, terminum ejus realem esse necesse est._

Since the essence of a predicamental relation is _ad alius se_

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74 Ibid., n. 13.
75 Ibid., n. 14.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid., d. 47, s. 8, n. 1.
the term, the aliud, is in some way included in the relation. If the relation is real, then the term also must be real.

But need the term be not only real, but also actually existing independently of the mind? As Suarez showed above, such an actually existing term is not needed in the case of transcendental relations, which can be had either to pure possibles or even to rationate beings. What, then, is the peculiar nature of a predicamental relation that Suarez should demand that it enjoy an actually existing term? One reason for calling the matter in question is that just considering the relation and the term of the relation precisely under its terminating function, the relation does not seem to require any actual existence of the term. The relation takes its entity from its foundation. So if there is an actual foundation, this would seem to suffice; no actual term would be needed.

In spite of these difficulties Suarez demands a real term actually existing independently of the mind for every real predicamental relation. He admits, as we said previously, that a transcendental relation does not have this same exigency, and its term can either be a real being which can exist, but actually does not, or even a rationate being.

78 Ibid., d. 47, s. 5, n. 2.
79 Ibid., d. 47, s. 8, n. 2.
...relationes reales transcendentales, esse posse ad terminos non solum non existentes, verum etiam qui non sint entia realia secundum essentiam. 80

The difficulty in proving the necessity of an actual term is that practically all the arguments that are usually brought forward to prove this point should logically also apply to transcendentatal relations. To say, for example, that no real being includes in its notion a reference to a being which is not real, is not true in a real transcendentatal relation; or to claim that since a relation is always had between two terms, those terms must be real if the relation is to be real, and must be actual if the relation is to be actual, leaves us in the same difficulty regarding transcendentatal relations. 81

On our quest, however, for arguments which will hold and prove only for predicamental relations, we find this quotation from Suarez:

...relatio et terminus sunt simul tempore, et quod ablato correlativo seu termino aufertur relatio, et quod posito termino, si iam supponitur fundamentum, consurgit relatio; ...omnia vero illa supponunt realem existentiam termini, nam includunt coexistentiam extremorum, quae supponit utriusque existentiam. 82

Another sturdy proof is this: a predicamental relation

80 Ibid., d. 47, s. 8, n. 4.
81 Ibid., n. 5.
82 Ibid., n. 7.
consists essentially in a pure reference to the term, and exercises no other function. It is not of itself intended by nature or by any agent, but results over and above what the thing is in itself according to its complete absolute nature. From this explanation it is clear that such a total reference could not be had without the coexistence of the two terms, the foundation and the term of the relation. Without the term, the foundation would remain in every respect an absolute. It is only because of the simultaneity of term that the referential aspect of the foundation can be justified.

...si relatio praedicamentalis in re non est alius nisi ipsum fundamentum, ut accidentaliter dans denominationem relativam, ergo non potest in re ipsa dare illam, nisi coexistentia termino; nam omnis alia denominatio aut erit omnino absoluta et essentialis, et consequenter ad summum erit respectiva transcendentaliter, aut non erit denominatio ex solis ipsis rebus sumpta, sgd ex comparatione nostrae rationis. 83

These two arguments are valid even for those who place some kind of real distinction between relation and foundation, but in the Suarezian position they have even greater force. For if the predicamental relation is not really anything other than the foundation itself, viewed as relative or referred to a term, the foundation cannot really enjoy that denomination unless the term is actually existing. For every other denomination either

83 Ibid., d. 47, s. 8, n. 7.
would be absolute and essential, or would arise merely as a result of a mental comparison. Thus every predicamental relation does demand a real term which is actually existing. 84

The arguments that are frequently brought to bear than an actual term is not necessary, are really valid only against the actuality of the term of a transcendental relation. An actual term is needed in a predicamental relation precisely because it is a pure reference which arises upon the coexistence of the terms of that relationship. So though it is true that an actual termination does not add anything in the line of perfection to the already existing term, nevertheless, the relation does presuppose that term as its object towards which it tends.

\[ \ldots \text{terminum realem requiri ad relationem praedicamentalem ex natura et modo talis relationis, quae solum consistit in puro respectu orto ex coexistentia extremorum. Unde, licet verum sit ipsam actualem terminationem nihil ponere in termino, tamen necessario supponet entitatem in illo, accommodatam ut \textit{ux} positione ejus cum termino possit insurgere relatio, et ut ipsa relatio habeat quasi objectum in quod posrespicere.} \] 85

But to return to a point we by-passed earlier. Suarez has already implied that the term is somehow of the essence of a relation. Not all the authors are in agreement with him; in fact, some are almost violent in their denials. Their reason is that since the term is entirely outside of the relation and

84 \textit{Ibid.}, n. 7.
85 \textit{Ibid.}, n. 8.
really distinct from it, it could not possibly be of its essence. 

What is of the essence of a being must be intrinsic to it. Others claim just the opposite: the term is of the essence of a relation, since the entire essence is an ordination to that term.

The dispute arises only through a confusion in terminology. Everyone agrees that the term is not an intrinsic part, either as a genus or specific difference, of a relation. So the term cannot be of the essence of a relation in this sense.

But at the same time a relation is a tendency or reference to a definite term; this is its essence. So the term can in some way be said to be included in the essence of the relation, in the sense that the relation cannot be had without the term, nor strictly, even be conceived without in some way including the term within that concept.

Unde...dici potest includere aliquo modo terminum in sua essentia, quia non potest absolvi ab illo, neque secundum propriam rationem concipi, quin in tali conceptu terminus includatur. 87

To a certain extent this is true even of transcendental relations, for the forms or entities from whose essence they spring cannot be defined adequately without including the term

86 Ibid., d. 47, s. 8, n. 9.
87 Ibid., n. 10.
to which they are related. 88 But for Suarez the difference between the two is that a predicamental relation from its proper and peculiar essence requires an actually existing term; a transcendental relation does not result from its term, properly speaking, nor does it view that term precisely under the formal aspect of term, but always in some way as an object, effect, cause, etc. 89 Therefore, Suarez can write,

Atque ita est aliquo modo magis intrinsicæ et formalis habitudo ad terminum, praesertim existentem, in relatione predicamentali quam in respectu transcendentali. 90

Suarez insists that the necessity of this term is absolute.

Nihilominus tamen dicendum est non posse per ullam potentiam conservari relationem praedicamentalem ut sic sine suo actuali termino. 91

The reason is that a term is somehow involved in the very formal effect of a predicamental relation. Since a predicamental relation cannot actually exist without exercising its formal effect, and the formal effect includes a real and actual term, then the relation demands with absolute necessity that actual term. No formal effect can ever be had unless all its essential prerequisites are also given.

...non posse relationem conservari in rerum natura, quin actu exerceat suum

88 Ibid., n. 12.
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid.
91 Ibid., n. 13.
It is much easier to see how this term is necessary in the Suarezian position which identifies the relation with the foundation. Without the coexistence of the term, the relative denomination would not be had, but only the absolute foundation with its absolute denomination. So there is no question here of how God can conserve one entity without also conserving some other entity really distinct from the first. For God can and does conserve the foundation in existence without any other term. But He cannot conserve that foundation under its relative aspect and denomination without an actual term, for the very relative aspect of the foundation includes and involves the term.

This actual term of a relation must be really distinct from the foundation of the relation, and so from the relation itself, which is really identified with the foundation.

92 Ibid.
93 Ibid., n. 14.
necessarium esse ut fundamentum, et terminus formaliter sumptus, in re ipsa distinguantur. 94

Suarez thinks that the truth of this statement is evident.

Et quod requiratur aliqua distinctio in re inter correlativa realia est fere principium per se notum in metaphysica. 95

But if anyone demands proof for this statement, several spring immediately from the metaphysical scene.

In mutual real relations the two relations are really distinct from one another, otherwise, they would be but two aspects of one real relation. But each of these relations is identical with one of the terms, since a relation is not really distinct from its foundation. What is the foundation of one relation will be the term of the other, and vice versa. Therefore, if one relation is distinct from the other, and the other relation is identified with its own foundation, then, the first relation will be really distinct from the foundation of the other, but will have it as its term. Thus, it is clear the relation would be distinct from its term.

Nam correlativa censentur realiter opposita; non opponitur autem idem sibi ipsi; oportet ergo ut correlativa in re aliquo modo distinguantur. Unde necesse etiam est relationes reales oppositas, esse in re aliquo modo distinctas, tum propter oppositionem, tum etiam quia unaquaeque re-

94 Ibid., d. 47, s. 9, n. 3.
95 Ibid.
Also, not merely the two mutual relations should be really distinct, but also the subjects of those relations; for a real relation cannot be had between terms which are not distinct. For if there were really one, they would become two terms only because of the intellect separating and comparing them, and the consequent relations would be rational, not real. 97

Suarez says this real distinction between relation and term, between foundation and term, need not be adequate, as between two separate and separable things, but a modal or an inadequate distinction, as between a whole and its part, would be sufficient to maintain a real relation.

Breviter tamen censeo non esse necessarium aequalem in omnibus, sed juxta naturam fundamentorum et modum relationum pensandum id esse.... Saepe enim haec distinctio debet esse realis et suppositalis, ut in relatione patris et filii;... Ad aliquas vero relationes existimo sufficere distinctionem modalem; nam, sicut est vero efficientia aut emanatio inter rem et modum, ita etiam potest esse vera relatio. 98

The final question that arises regarding the term of a

96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., n. 4.
predicamental relation is whether the term is the being to which the subject is referred under its **absolute** nature, or in so far as that being is **relative**. The point is cardinal for a thorough understanding of our problem.

...est per se valde necessaria ad explicandam naturam relationis, quae tum ex fundamento, tum ex termino, suo modo pendet... 99

Suarez is speaking of the particular aspect of the term which is necessary to terminate a relation.

Est autem advertendum, hic nos non agere de formali denominatione termini, ut actu terminantis, sed de ratione seu forma, quae in ipsa re, quae est terminus, requiritur ut sit apta ad terminandum. 100

There are, in general, three schools of thought on this subject. The first group, with Cajetan as their leader, 101 maintain that in every relation the formal term ought to be relative.

Prima affirmat in omnibus relationibus, tam mutuis quam non mutuis, formalem terminum debere esse relativum. 102

The second school comes forward with Ferrara 103 to demand a distinction. In mutual relations the term is relative, while in relations which are not mutual, the term terminates

99 Ibid., d. 47, s. 16, n. 1.
100 Ibid., n. 2.
101 Cajetan, Commentarium in Summam Theologicam, I, q. 13, a. 7.
102 Suarez, d. 47, s. 16, n. 3.
103 Sylvester de Ferrara, Commentarium in Summam contra Gentiles, II, c. 11.
under its absolute aspect.

Secunda sententia distinctione utitur, nam de relationibus mutuis idem sentit quod praecedens sententia... De non mutuis autem affirmat terminari ad absolutum et non relativum... 104

The third opinion, advanced by such men as Scotus 105 and Capreolus,106 contends that all relations, mutual as well as non-mutual, terminate at an absolute.

Tertia sententia universaliter docet omnes relationes, tam mutuas quam non mutuas, terminari ad absolutum formaliter. 107

Suarez himself decides to join forces with the third group to hold that all relations terminate at an absolute. 108 He divides his proof into two sections: the first, for non-mutual relations, the second for mutual relations.

In non-mutual relations the real term cannot be another relation, corresponding to the first, but must be the absolute entity, or an absolute property of the term.

Dico ergo primo: in relativis non mutuis ratio quae est in uno extremo ad terminandam relationem alterius, non est aliqua relatio opposita relationi alterius, sed est ipsa terminus, vel proprietas aliqua absoluta talis termini. 109

104 Suarez, d. 47, s. 16, n. 4.
105 Scotus, Commentarium in Librum Sententiarum, I, d. 36, q. 1.
106 Capreolus, Commentarium in Summam Theologicam, I, a. 2, ad 3
107 Suarez, d. 47, s. 16, n. 5.
108 Ibid.
109 Ibid., n. 6.
The proof is obvious, for in non-mutual relations the real relation has a real and actual term which is not the basis or foundation for another relation. Therefore, the term cannot terminate under a real relative aspect, since it simply does not possess one; it must terminate in so far as it is an absolute.

...haec relatio habet terminum realem et realiter existentem; sed in illo termino nulla existit relatio realis correspondens opposita alteri relationi; ergo ille terminus non per relationem sed per aliquam rem absolutam constituitur aptius ad terminandum. 110

As regards mutual relations, Suarez offers several proofs, from which we shall briefly consider two. 111 In a pair of mutual relations each relation terminates at the foundation of the other in so far as it is an absolute, for even, imagining the impossible, if one of the two relations was withheld, if the foundation were still intact, the first relation could still fully terminate at that foundation.

...nam si per impossibile in altero extremo impediretur relatio, conservato toto fundamento ejus, nihilominus relatio alterius extremi posset ad illud terminari; ergo signum est illas duas relationes esse simul per concomitan-tiam, et non per formalem terminum unius ad aliam. 112

Suarez bases his second proof on an analysis of the philo-

110 Ibid.
111 Ibid., d. 47, s. 16, n. 15, 16, 17, 18, 19.
112 Ibid., d. 47, s. 16, n. 16.
Sophic axiom which every philosopher admits that given the foundation and term, a predicamental relation will result. These are the only requirements; no mention is made of any other relative or relation. Therefore, Suarez concludes that the term of a relation must be an absolute, not a corresponding relation.

Secundo argumentor, quia commune axioma est, posito fundamento et termino, resultare relationem praedicamentalem, et non alias; ergo terminus unius relationis non potest esse relatio opposita. Antecedens certum est omnium consensu, et constat ex supra dictis de natura hujus relationis. 113

Thus we have seen with Suarez something of the nature of the supreme genus of predicamental relation. But in the concrete, there are different kinds of predicamental relations. Although all of them are similar in so far as they are a pure reference to a term, yet all the various individual predicamental relations can be sub-divided into three species which fall under the general genus we have been considering.

KINDS OF PREDICAMENTAL RELATION

In determining the various types of relations Suarez once again takes his point of departure from Aristotle. In the fifth book of his Metaphysics, Aristotle distinguishes three kinds of relatives, specifically distinct, according to their three

113 Ibid., n. 17.
types of foundations.

Things are 'relative' (1) as double to half, and treble to a third, and in general that which contains something else many times to that which is contained many times in something else, and that which exceeds to that which is exceeded; (2) as that which can heat to that which can be heated, and that which can cut to that which can be cut, and in general the active to the passive; (3) as the measurable to the measure, and the knowable to knowledge, and the perceptible to perception. 114

It is obvious why both Aristotle and Suarez chose the foundations to be the distinguishing factor, for since the foundation -- and it must be remembered that for Suarez relation even owes its ontological unity to that foundation -- there could be no clearer sign or clue to the distinction of relations that the distinction of their formal foundations.

\[ \text{...nam cum una ex potissimis causis relationis sit fundamentum ejus, imo cum ab eo habet entitatem suam, nullum potest esse magis indicium distinctionis relationum, quam distinctio fundamentorum...} \] 115

In brief, Suarez's argument, though he does not put it precisely in this way, is this. Relation has its being from its foundation. But being and unity are convertible. Therefore, relation has its unity from its foundation. As the species of the foundations differ, so differ the species of relations.

114 Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1020 b 26-32.
115 Suarez, d. 47, s. 10, n. 13.
The remote subject of relation is not of equal value in determining this distinction, since it is further removed from the relation in question.

Nam fundamentum remotum vel potius subjectum non ita per se concurrit ad relationem, et ideo distinctio ejus non est ita sufficiens fundamentum ad distinguendias relationes. 116

At first consideration, it might have seemed better to distinguish relations according to their terms, since relations are ordination or references to those terms: the term then being the specifying factor in each case. Suarez admits that this would be true if one is speaking of some basis, even though remote, for the distinction of relations. But the fundamental and telling distinction had best be taken from something more immediately proximate.

Respondetur...id esse verum de distincione specifica et ultima; distinctionem vero genericam seu sub alteram, posse aliunde sumi. 117

Also, the Aristotelian basis of distinction does not completely overlook the diversity of terms, but in some way includes them, at least, implicitly. Since the relation is precisely a reference to another, which other, scil., the term, must be real and of such a nature as to terminate the relation, it is clear that the nature of the term will in its own right pro-

116 Ibid.
117 Ibid., n. 14.
portionately determine the relation, even if one makes the foundation itself the formal determinate.

Secundo respondetur, in illa distinctione non esse praetermissos terminos formales, sed vel expresse, vel saltem implicite significatos esse in illis tribus generibus. 118

The adequacy of the division Suarez says has never been called into question, 119 but we shall take up this in passing in the critique in the last chapter. Suarez quotes with approval Alexander of Hales's defense of the three-fold division on the ground that they are regulated by the "three universal modes of being": identity and diversity, act and potency, the perfect and the imperfect.

Aliam rationem hujus differentiae indicat eodem loco Alexander Alensis, dicens illam divisionem sumptam esse ex tribus modis universalibus entis, qui sunt idem ac diversum, quoad primum; potentia et actus, quoad secundum; et perfectum et imperfectum, quoad tertium... 120

The latter division of perfect and imperfect does present difficulties immediately, for it would seem to be reducible in some way to the second category of potency and act, since potency as a capacity for perfection, implies of its nature a state of imperfection, while by act we mean nothing other than perfection. Suarez also pressed a difficulty that arose in the mind

118 Ibid., d. 47, s. 10, n. 14.
119 Ibid., n. 15.
120 Ibid., n. 16.
of Alexander of Hales, the Doctor Irrefragabilis. The relation existing between sense faculty and its sensible object is not as the imperfect to the perfect, but only as that which is measurable to that which is the measure, the specifying term, which can either be more perfect, equally perfect, or less perfect than the sense knowledge. As a consequence of this difficulty Alexander of Hales stated without proving this three-fold division as the basis for the division of foundations.

Deinde, quamvis asserat illos tres modos sufficienter dividere fundamenta relationum, non tamen rationem sufficientiae reddit, neque ex vi illius explicationis declarat distinctionem eorum inter se. 121

In the last analysis, Suarez harkens back to Aristotle as his authority for the divisions of relational foundations and leaves the argument there. His distinction is based on authority, nothing more. Suarez argues that Aristotle must have arrived at such a division from some kind of inductive process by which he found that there was no relation that could not be reduced to one of these three heads:

Existimo ergo nullam alien rationem sufficientiae Aristotelem habuisse, praeter inductionem quamdam, qua intellexit nullam inveniri relationem, quae ad aliquod ex dictis capitibus revocari non possit... 122

Suarez's stand remains here; he goes no further, except to justify his stand with a consideration of the entire gamut of ob-

121 Ibid., d. 47, s. 10, n. 16.
122 Ibid.
jections and difficulties, as is his wont, which can be hurled at his "divisional" position.

As we saw above, Suarez places all relations which ultimately stem from unity or multiplicity into his first classification of relations, which he later subdivides into various sub-species. Relations of equality, similarity, and specific identity are grouped together as having their relational basis in unity: things are similar which have one quality; equal which have one quantity; specifically the same which have one specific substance or essence:

...nam in unitate...fundari aequalitate...fundari...similitudinem, et in universum identitatem eorum quorum una est substantia. Nam similia dicuntur, quae habent unam qualitatem; aequalia quae habent unam quantitatem; eadem vero, quae habent unam substantiam, quod potest intelligi vel proprie et in rigore de substantia, vel generatim de essentia... 123

Other relations are based or founded on number or multiplicity: those which are related in quantity, and yet do not enjoy a strict unity, such as multiple, excessive, double, triple, etc.:

In numero vero...fundari omnes relationes quae aliquo modo secundum quantitatem dicuntur, et ab unitate recedunt, ut sunt omnes proportiones inter numeros inaequales... 124

123 Ibid., d. 47, s. 10, n. 2.
124 Ibid.
Relations of dissimilarity, distinction, etc., Suarez also places under this first heading, for they too are in some way based on number, since distinction implies difference, difference implies multiplicity, while multiplicity implies unities:

Atque...ad idem fundamentum pertinent relationes omnes dissimilitudinis, distinctionis, et similes, quia in numero aliquo modo fundantur; hic enim non sumuntur in rigore unitas et numerus pro quantitate, sed generalius. 125

Whenever Aristotle speaks of relations of this type he always speaks of them in the plural, for they are always mutual relations. 126

In the second group Suarez, following Aristotle, places relations which are founded on an active or passive potency, or in actions flowing from them, e.g., the power of heating and the power of being heated; actually heating and actually hot:

In secundo genere ponit Aristoteles ea relativa quae fundantur in potentia agendi et patiendi, vel in actionibus earum... Et adhibet exempla, ut calefactivum et calefactibile, calefaciens et calefactum. 127

But Suarez makes two clarifications of Aristotle's position in the fifth book of his Metaphysics. First, when Aristotle places a real relation between a potency and a possible, he is not speaking of a possible effect taken objectively, as some

125 Ibid., n. 2.
126 Ibid.
127 Ibid., n. 3.
have thought; rather, he is speaking of a passive potency which can receive the action.

...cum Aristoteles ponit relationem realem inter potentiam et possibile, nunquam loqui de effectu possibili objective sumpto... Aristoteles autem aperte loquitur de potentia passiva seu subjecto catalfactibili... 128

Secondly, it is one thing to be the real term of a relation of an active potency, as actually acting or causing efficiently, and another to be the term of an active potency, abstracting from the action itself. The latter term is a passive potency; otherwise, it could not be a real term. The former is the effect itself as flowing from the agent.

...alium esse terminum realem relationis potentiae activae ut sic abstrahendo ab actione, a termino potentiae activae ut subest actioni, seu ut facientis... 129

This relation of an active potency as actually acting can be had according to differences in time: either in a present action, as a builder actually building, to his building; or in a past action, as in the relation of paternity; or even in a future action:

...hanc relationem, quae fundatur in potentia sub actione, variari juxta varias temporis differentias: alia enim fundatur in praesenti actione...alia in actione praeterita...et alia in actione futura, ut quod facturum est ad id quod faciendum... 130

128 Ibid., d. 47, s. 10, n. 3.
129 Ibid.
130 Ibid.
The third class or relatives consists in those which are based on some way on "measure," -- mensurabilis ad mensuram, as the relation knowledge has to the thing known, or the intellect to its intelligible object. A profound difference is to be noted between relations of this third type and those of the first two. The first two types of relations imply a mutual relationship; those of the third type are not mutual.

...in prioribus...utrumque relativum dicitur ad aliud, quia idipsum, a quo unumquodque est, aliud dicitur, et non quia aliud ad ipsum; at vero in tertio genere, licet unum relativorum dicatur ad aliud, quia vere est ad aliud, alterum vero, quod illi correspondet, non dicitur ad aliud quia vere sit ad aliud, sed quia aliud est ad ipsum. 131

Thus in the case of knowledge, knowledge is related to its known object, yet the object is said to be known, not because it has a real relation to the knowledge, but because the knowledge has a real relation to it.

Relative terms which imply number of potency, therefore, are all relative because their very essence includes in its nature a reference to something else, not because something else involves a reference to it; but that which is measurable or knowable or thinkable is called relative because something else involves a reference to it. 132

We have now seen in a general way something of Suarez's insight into the nature of predicamental relations. The task be-

131 Ibid., n. 4.
fore us is to stand back and to see this position in metaphysical perspective in order to evaluate Suarez's stand on this basic ontological question. This we shall do in the following chapter.
CHAPTER IV

A CRITIQUE OF SUAREZ'S DOCTRINE ON RELATIONS

We have thus seen through many pages Suarez's ideas on the nature of a predicamental relation. Our question now is to what extent he is correct in his analysis and in his conclusions. But any analysis or any set of conclusions presupposes certain philosophical doctrines which act as premises and as a point of departure for all the rest of a man's thought. It is ridiculous to begin and end merely with some doctrinal fragment, torn from the total complex of a philosopher's thought. If he has reasoned, and reasoned logically, to certain conclusions on a particular point, we cannot merely take those conclusions in isolation. We must trace them back over the paths of thought to their ontological and epistemological sources. It has been said of Kant that once one grants him his initial premises, one must also agree with him on the total remainder of his critical enterprise. ¹ To a certain extent this is true of every philosopher. Give Aristotle act and potency and he will explain the world. ² Grant St. Thomas creation and he will explain the universe. ³ This is obvious hyperbole, but I have put it with

deliberate provocativeness in order to emphasize the point I am trying to make. To understand and accept or reject Suarez's doctrine on relations, we must understand and equally accept or reject his first metaphysical beginnings.

But we shall not start from those beginnings; we shall not begin with the concept of being and watch its unravelling in one direction until it unfolds in an explanation of predicamental relation. Rather, we shall begin with relation and trace it back to its source in being.

As we stated in our introduction, our principal concern in this last chapter is with ontological truth: not what Aristotle said, not what St. Thomas or Suarez held merely because they held such positions; but what does reason itself say in thinking out reality.

If we begin with the problem of relation itself, it is essential that we see it precisely as a problem. A solution is no solution at all unless we clearly grasp the problem to which it is a solution.

The core of our present problem is this: we know with full certitude that the various beings which constitute reality are inter-related. They are really related to each other. Now what causes them to be related? In virtue of what can we say that two beings are really similar, that one being is really de-
ependent upon another, that a father is really related to his son and the son to his father? If they are really related, what makes them related? The answer is real relations.

Thus far there is no difficulty. The difficulty arises when we seek the intimate nature and explanation of those real relations. In explaining their nature, we must not explain them in such a way as to destroy either their reality or their relativity. In the two possible courses open to us, we find that one of the two elements would seem to be weakened. If we emphasize the reality of relations by plaving a real distinction between them and their foundations, then there is the danger of making them absolutes, entities with their own act of existence, super-added to the absolute quantified, qualified substance. A relation becomes another *aliquid*, rather than an *ad aliquid*, the least of the intrinsic predicaments as regards entity. Thus in affirming their reality, we seem to weaken, if not destroy, their relativity.

But if we take the second course open to us, and emphasize the utter and radical relativity of relations by claiming a rational distinction between relation and foundation, with relation being a mere fragile connotation, the least of the predicaments, we seem to destroy the reality of relations by making them merely rationate beings.

This is our antinomy; this our problem: to keep relations
real and relational. With the problem in hand, let us work toward a solution.

Predicamental relations are real; they have their reality of themselves. Independently of the mind things are really related among themselves. These relations are not of the essences of things, which are absolutes, but are really added to the absolutes as real accidents. Each relation, as an intrinsic accident, is a principle of being, an ens entis. In so far as that being is an accident, its existence will be that of accidental existence: inesse, -- for in every being there is a proper proportion between its essence and its act of existence.

...in aliis autem relationibus in creaturis existentibus, est aliquid esse relationis et substantiae quae referitur, et ideo dicuntur inesse, et secundum quod insunt compositionem faciunt ad subjectum... In so far as it is a finite being, it will not have its act of accidental existence from its very essence, but will be a being composed of two really distinct principles, essence and existence. Any finite being, whether substance or accident, is a composite of essence and existence. The essence of any creature, adequately conceived, does not include existence within its formal content. To know existence an analysis of essence

4 Aquinas, de Pot., q. 7, a. 9.
5 De Ver., q. 27, a. 1, ad 8.
6 In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1.
is not enough; one must proceed to a completely new act, the judgment, where the act of existence is formally known and affirmed.

Esse enim subsistens, non potest esse nisi unum... Oportet ergo, quod quae-libet alia res sit ens participative, ita quod aliud sit in eo substantia participans esse et aliud ipsum esse participatum. 7

This applies to any finite being. The essence of a relation is that by which it is what it is. But a relation in the order of essence totally consists in a reference to another: ad aliquid or esse ad.

Ea vero quae dicuntur ad aliquid significat secundum propriam rationem solum respectum ad alium. 8

Therefore, the essence of a relation can be expressed as esse ad. The existence of predicamental relation is that by which it is. But the existence of any accident is to be in a subject: esse in. 9 Predicamental relation is an accident. Therefore, the existence of a predicamental relation will be to inhere in a subject: esse in.

Et similiter licet ad aliquid non significetur ut inhaerens, tamen oportet ut sit inhaerens. 10

Thus, every real predicamental relation will be composed of these two elements: esse ad and esse in.

Dicendum quod ipsa relatio quae nihil est

7 Quodl., III, a. 20.
8 S. T., I, q. 28, a. 1.
9 In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 894; lect. 22, n. 1139.
10 De Pot., q. 8, a. 2.
There are some Thomists who, while maintaining a real distinction between finite essence and existence, still hold that the essence of a real predicamental relation contains two aspects of one reality which is the relation itself: the esse ad and the esse in. They claim that since relation, unlike the other accidents, does not of its nature commit itself to be either real or rational, the essence of a relation becomes real by including within itself the note of inherence, esse in.

For, as Cardinal Billot writes,

Sed cave ne concipias haec duo tamquam se habentia ad invicem eo modo quo potentia se habet ad actum, puta essentia ad esse, non secus ac si esse ad significaret essentiam relationis realis, et esse in ejus existentiam. Hoc enim verum non est, quia esse aliquid cui competit existere in subjecto, perfecto ingreditur essentiam relationis realis in quantum realis est.... Unde consulto dixi distinguendas esse duas notas id esse duos inadequatos aspectus unius simplicis atque incompositae

11 Ibid., q. 7, a. 9, ad 7.
12 Quodl., IX, 4.
Some Thomists who tenaciously hold the real distinction between finite essence and existence quote Card. Billot on this point with approval. It is because they conceive of relation as really distinct from the foundation, but as not adding any new entitative perfection to the subject. The clearest and most detailed exposition of this view has been presented in an historical study of "St. Thomas's Theory of the Causes of Relation," by Clifford G. Kossel, in The Modern Schoolman, St. Louis Univ., St. Louis, Nov., 1946, 19-36; Jan. 1947, 93-107; March 1948, 151-172. In the course of these articles Kossel writes:

First, granted the existence of the subject with the foundation of relation (in this case quantity), the subject acquires a new relation without intrinsic addition or change. Secondly, before there is an actual relation, the subject by its foundation has an indeterminate and virtual relativity. This is the root and esse of the relation; by the possession of this quantity, I am capable of being equal to all who have the same quantity. Thirdly, the actual relation arises when there is a term which determines this indeterminate relativity of the root. Finally, the real esse of relation, and hence its reality as an inherent accident, derives from the root and is entirely independent of the term in its being. (March 1948, 158)

According to this explanation there is but one physical form which is the source of quantity, the virtual relativity, and relation in act. (158) This is not explicitly, at least, the same as Suarez's doctrine. With Suarez, relation is only rationally distinct from the foundation; in the Billot-Kossel theory, relation is really distinct from the foundation, but is not a new physical form added over and above the foundation. Suarez's position logically leads to the conclusion that predicamental relation is only fundamentally in things, formally in the mind; for the second
I do not believe that this is correct. It is not necessary

school, predicamental relation is formally in reality, but
is nothing other than the simultaneous coexistence in being
and intelligibility of the two terms of the relation. This
unity of the two is real although it does not add anything
entitatively to either of the terms. This real unity can
be grasped and forged into a concept by an act of comparis­
on of the two real terms and uniting them within one spe­
cies.

In this explanation, however, it would seem that every
relation would be mutual, for if the relation itself is the
unity of the two, then, if one subject is related to the
other, then the other partaking equally in the unity of
simultaneity and existence would also be really related to
the first subject. It is doubtful, however, whether the
proponents of this theory would admit a real mutual predica­
mental relation between God and creature, for example, or
between an act of knowledge and its material object. (I do
not say formal object, since the relation would be tran­
scendental of faculty and nature of act to its formal ob­
ject, but intend merely anything that would fall under the
general formal object and would not specify the faculty or
nature of the act in question.)

Although this theory does not appeal explicitly to a
connotation of subject to term as an explanation of relation,
and so explicitly avoids the difficulties pressing against
Suarez's theory, nevertheless, it still must face the dif­
ficulty of explaining how this accident of relation does
not seem to inhere in any particular subject and yet par­
takes of the nature of accident; it would seem to differ
very little from the examples of the day which Plato appeals
to in his Parmenides (131 B 4-7) in attempting to explain
the participation of individuals in the forms. There does
not seem to be any reason for saying it is any more an ac­
cident of one being than it is an accident of another, un­
less one would appeal to the Suarezian connotation. And
while Billot-Kossel hold that it is in a subject only in so
far as the foundation is in the subject, since the actuali­
ty of relation does not add any new entitative perfection
to the subject over and above that of the foundation, it
would seem that the only accidental perfection really dis­
tinct from the subject would be the foundation. This, how­
ever, is admittedly an absolute. Hence, the distinction
between foundation and relation would seem to coincide with
the rational distinction posited by Suarez, and the rela­
tive entity would be destroyed by a real identity with an
absolute.
to include esse in within the essence of a predicamental relation to make it real. 14Relation of itself can be either real or rational depending on whether or not the foundation is real of rational. 15But though the concept of relation as such does not imply a real or rational reference, it is not necessary to go outside the essence of a predicamental relation to find the reality of any particular relation. Relation as such is an analogous concept to be applied analogously to real relations and rational relations, accidental and divine relations.16

15 Aquinas, S. T., I, q. 23, 1; de Pot., q. 7, a. 11.
16 Quodl., IX, 4. "Scientia quod in hoc differt "ad aliquid" ab aliis generibus; alia genera ex propria sui ratione habent quod aliquid; sicut quantitas ex hoc ipso quod est quantitas; et similiter est de aliis; sed "ad aliquid" ex propria sui generis ratione non habet quod est aliquid; unde invenuntur quae "ad aliquid"ae nihil sunt in rerum natura, sed in ratione tantum; et quamvis "ad aliquid" ex ratione sui generis non habeat quod ponat aliquum tamen etiam habet ex ipsa generis ratione quod nihil est; quia sic nulla relatio esset aliquid in rerum natura; unde "ad aliquid" non esset unum de decem generibus.

The analogy of the concept of relation as such can be drawn from the ideas presented in this paragraph. 1) Relation as such, unlike the other predicaments, can be either real or rational; some relate exist independently of the mind, other exist only in mind. 2) But to exist in the mind is not the same as to exist in reality, for a real being enjoys real existence, whereas being enjoys intentional existence. "Species intelligibilis est similitudo ipsius essentiae rei et quodammodo ipsa quidditas et nature rei secundum esse intelligibile, non secundum esse naturale prout est in rebus. Quodl., VIII, a. 4. Therefore, the concept of relation applied to real and rational relations is applied partly in the same sense, partly in a different sense. The adquid or esse ad is common to both types of relation, their respective acts of existence differ. Thus, relation is an analogous concept.
Predicamental relation is real from its essence and from that essence implies a proportion to the existence of an accident, inesse. 17 To claim that the actual existence is contained within the essence of a predicamental relation is to deny, in at least one instance, -- and therefore, why not in every instance? -- the real distinction between finite essence and existence.

This position would seem in the last analysis, as we have indicated in a previous note, to be reducible to that of Suarez. If the reference to a term (esse ad) is identified with the reference to the subject (esse in), then the complete and essential relativity of relation, cujus totum esse est ad aliud se habere, 18 would seem to be destroyed.

The essence, esse ad, of the predicamental relation is really distinct from the essence of the foundation. The foundation of any relation is always an absolute, 19 for no relation can be the basis or foundation of another relation.

Ad secundum dicendum, quod relationes ipsae non referuntur ad aliud per aliam relationem sed per se ipsas, quia essentialiter relationes sunt. 20

The reason for this is obvious. If the total essence of a relation is an ordination to another, then it does not require

17 Summa contra Gentiles, IV, c. 14, ad 9.
19 Ibid., 591 b 10.
20 De Pot., q. 7, a. 9, ad 2.
any other relation to make it relative. Of its nature it is referential; another relation added to this would be superfluous and would lead us into an infinite series:

Nec iterum una relatio refertur ad aliam per aliquam aliam relationem, cum enim dicimus quod paternitas opponitur filiationi oppositio non est relatio media inter paternitatem et filiationem. Quia utroque modo relatio multiplicaretur in infinitum. 21

So if the essence of every foundation is an absolute, while the essence of every predicamental relation is not in any sense absolute, but entirely relational, then it follows that the essence of the foundation and the essence of a relation cannot be really identified, but must be really distinct. 22

Nor can the act of existence of a predicamental relation be identified with the act of existence of the foundation. For in every being a proportion is set up between the two principles of being, essence and existence. 23 If two essences are radically different, their respective acts of existence will also be different. 24 Since the essence of a relation cannot be the same as the essence of its absolute foundation, neither can the existence of a relation be really identified with the act of existence of the foundation, though, as accidents, both

21 S. T., I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 4.
22 Régis Jolivet, Traité de Philosophie, Emmanuel Vitte, Paris, 1946, III, 298.
24 John of St. Thomas, I, 513 b 19-25.
will have an existence which is inesse.

To deny this real distinction of relation and foundation is to equate the two. One must consequently reduce the relation to an absolute, or make the foundation a relation. But since the foundation is the cause of a relation, it enjoys a priority of nature to the relation which is as an effect. 25 So one would be forced to take the former alternative and make relation an absolute. If a relation is in any respect or to any degree an absolute, in that respect and to that degree it ceases to be a relation.

And even if the foundation were reduced to the relation, this would not help things; for as we mentioned above, no relation can be founded upon a relation. If the foundation were a relation, it could not be the foundation of the relation. For, as Jolivet writes,

Il semble cependant que l'opinion affirmative, c'est-à-dire distinguant réellement la relation d'avec son fondement, soit la plus plausible, car elle revient simplement à constater cette évidences que si le fondement n'est pas uniquement absolu, c'est-à-dire une chose donnée en soi, mais aussi relatif, il ne peut l'être que par une autre réalité que celle qui le constitue en lui-même. 26

Suarez explicitly admits that the predicamental relation

26 Jolivet, III, 298.
is an absolute form, but an absolute form in so far as it con-
notes a term:

\[ \text{esse in re formam absolutam, non tamen} \]
\[ \text{absolute sumptam, sed ut respicientem ali-} \]
\[ \text{am, quam denominatio relativa includit seu} \]
\[ \text{connotat.} \]

Therefore, the whole reality of predicamental relation as such
would seem to consist precisely in this connotation of term.
Suarez himself nowhere in his treatment of predicamental rela-
tion analyzes in detail this notion of connotation. But we can
ask him several questions, suggested by Father Hugon, which
bring the point in full focus:

\[ \text{Quid sit connotatio termini, transcendentalis an praedicamentalis? Quid sit etiam} \]
\[ \text{esse accidentale quod fundamento additur,} \]
\[ \text{aliquid logicum an aliquid reale?} \]

Is this connotation of term a transcendental or a predicam-
mental reference to a term? If it is transcendental, arising
as a radical reference to a term, then the absolute foundation
can never lose such a reference. It is obvious from many exam-
pies which Suarez has granted, that the absolute foundation
can exist without any real reference. Therefore, the connota-
tion cannot be transcendental. But even granting that it were
transcendental, this transcendental connotation would not be a
predicamental relation, that is, a relation which would consti-
tute a distinct predication, a distinct classification of being.

27 Suarez, d. 47, s. 2, n. 22.
28 A. R. P. Eduardus Hugon, O. P., Cursus Philosophiae Thomis-
There would be no such thing as a predicamental relation. Suarez nowhere even hints that he would be content with this alternative. In fact, he is emphatic in claiming that over and above transcendental relations, there exist relations which constitute a distinct predicament. 29

But if this connotation of term is not a transcendental reference, it must be predicamental. If it is predicamental, then we ask further what is this new accidental reference which is added to the absolute foundation. Is this new additional connotation something real or is it merely rational? If the connotation is something real, then Suarez must admit that it is a real addition and is really distinct from the foundation to which it is added. If the connotation is real and was not present to the foundation before the existence of the actual term, then that connotation must make a real composition with the foundation.

It is clear that St. Thomas wanted a real composition of substance and relation:

...in aliis autem relationibus in creaturis existentibus, est aliud esse relationis et substantiae qua refertur, et ideo dicuntur inesse, et secundum quod insunt compositionem faciunt ad subjec-tum... 30

This could be had through the composition of substance and foun-

29 Suarez, d. 47, s. 4, n. 16.
30 In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1.
If this predicamental connotation is not real, but logical, then there are no such entities as real relations, but only rational relations which exist in an intellect considering those absolute foundations under a relative aspect. But Suarez maintains throughout his discussion that predicamental relations are real. Their reality can only be maintained if one grants a real distinction between them and their foundations.

Suarez seems to want the act of accidental existence, in-esse, to be the guarantee of the reality of relations. In the course of the discussion in which he identifies the esse ad and the esse in of a predicamental relation, he says that if a relation is to be real, then it must either exist in itself (ens per se) or in a subject (ens in alio). 31 It is true that the act of existence is that by which the relation actually exists in the real order. But the real relation enjoys that actual existence only because the essence with a real priority of nature implied a real aptitude for such an existential act. 32

31 Suarez, d. 47, s. 2, n. 24.
The reason why Suarez rejects the esse ad-esse in distinction is because he rejects the real distinction between creature essence and existence. For, as Maquart writes,

Item apparet quomodo, deficien-te termino, cessat relation: "denominatio relativa includit aliquo modo terminum, sine quo non manet actualiter, sed fundamentaliter tantum seu in proxima aptitudine." 33 Sed haec tenere non potest nisi quia, propter negationem distinctionis realis inter essentiam et esse, debet essentia realis relationis sumi relate ad esse quod est in subjecto: unde sequitur relationem "esse in re formam aliquam absolutam...respicientem aliam"... 34

For Suarez the essence and existence of any finite being are identified, distinct only in an intellect which separates the two elements:

Dicendum ergo est, eamdem rem esse essentiam et existentiam, concipi autem sub ratione essentiae, quatenus ratione ejus constituitur res sub tali genere et specie....
At vero haec eadem res concipitur sub ratione existentiae, quatenus est ratio essendi in rerum natura et extra causas. 35

Therefore, the essence of a predicamental relation as a real accident will also be identified with its act of existence. The whole essence of a relation as an order to something outside the subject will be really identified with the act of accidental existence which is an order to the subject of inherence. The foundation of a relation as an absolute accident is com-

33 Suarez, d. 47, s. 2, n. 23.
34 Maquart, III-2, 186.
35 Suarez, d. 31, s. 6, n. 23.
completely orientated to its substantive subject; for, as St. Thom-
as says,

\[ \text{Si consideremus propriam rationem cujus-} \]
\[ \text{libet generis, quodlibet aliorum generum,} \]
\[ \text{praeter ad aliquid, importat imperfectio-} \]
\[ \text{nem; quantitas enim habet propriam ration-} \]
\[ \text{em in comparatione ad subjectum; est} \]
\[ \text{enim quantitas mensura substantiae, qual-} \]
\[ \text{itas dispositio substantiae, et sic patet} \]
\[ \text{in omnibus aliis.} \]

Therefore, if Suarez identifies the order to a term which is the essence of a relation with the order to the subject which is the existence of an accidental relation, then it is not difficult to understand how he can hold that the entire relation, essence and existence are identified with the foundation which likewise implies a reference to its subject.

\[ \text{esse ad terminum : esse in subjecto.} \]

But the foundation totally : \text{esse in subjecto.}

Therefore, \text{esse ad terminum : the foundation.}

To push the question back still further, the ultimate basis for Suarez's denial of the real distinction between creature essence and existence is his concept of being.

\[ \text{Fundamentum distinctionis rationis inter} \]
\[ \text{essentiam et esse...est essentia prout} \]
\[ \text{praescindit ab actuali existentia, quae} \]
\[ \text{proinde nec essentia actualis, nec pos-} \]
\[ \text{sibilis.} \]

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36 \text{In I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 3.}
37 \text{Maquart, III-2, 89.}
Suarez in forming the concept of being forms a concept which represents all individual beings under a certain unity which they possess. It represents all the inferiors which verify being precisely in so far as they agree in being, in so far as they are similar:

Necesse est conceptum formalem entis habere aliquod aggregatum objectum; ...ergo oper­tet ut ille conceptus sit unus secundum ali­quam convenientiam et similitudinem entium inter se. 38

...omnia entia realia vere habent aliquam similitudinem et convenientiam in ratione essendi; ergo possunt concipi et representa­sentari sub ea praecisa ratione qua inter se conveniunt; ergo possunt sub ea ratio­ne unum conceptum objectivum constituere; ergo ille est conceptus objectivus entis. 39

Although the individual beings really differ in the real order, the Suarezian concept of being does not include the essential modes or differences of the inferiors.

Conceptus entis objectivus praecisus est ab omni ratione particulari. Dico secun­do: hic conceptus objectivus est secun­dum rationem praecisus ab omnibus particu­laribus, seu membris dividentibus ens, etiam si sint maxime simplices entitates. Haec conclusio videtur mihi necessaria ... quia, cum omnia entia determinata aliquo­modo dividentia ens sint inter se dis­tincta, et plura objective, non possunt intelligi convenire in unum objectivum conceptum, nisi saltem secundum rationem fiat praecisio et abstractio a propriis rationibus, in quibus distinguuntur. 40

Thus the concept of being in abstracting from the differen-
tiating modes of the inferiors, includes neither the modes of substance nor of accident.

Ex his infero primo, in hoc conceptu entis objectivo et sic praeciso, non includi actu modos intrinsecos substantiae, vel aliorum membrorum quae dividunt ens. 41

Since the concept of being does not include the essential modes of differences within its comprehension, neither does it include the inferiors themselves, for the differences as essential modes, are the entity of the inferiors. If the modes are contained within being only potentially, not actually, 42 then one can likewise conclude that the inferiors of being are contained within the concept of being only in potency. This allows Suarez to make the statement:

'Cum autem negatur esse de essentia creaturae actu existere sumenda est creatura ut abstrahit seu praescindit a creatura creata et creabili, cujus essentia objective concepta abstrahit ab actuali esse aut entitate, et hoc modo negatur esse de essentia ejus actu existere, quia non clauditur in conceptu ejus essentiali sic praeciso. 43

The radical reason for this de-existentializing method in treating the concept of being is that Suarez throughout his discussion of being remains entirely within the first operation of the mind, the simple apprehension. He does not go on to know real existence in the judgment, the real existence which dyna-

41 Ibid., n. 21.
42 Ibid.
43 Ibid., d. 31, s. 6, n. 24.
mizes the concept of being itself. 44

Precisely because of this essentialist approach to being, Suarez does not hold the real distinction between creature essence and existence. Because of his stand on finite essence and existence, he holds the real identification of relation and foundation, reducing both in the last analysis to an absolute.

A real distinction between a relation and its foundation, however, does not make relation in any way an absolute. In fact, as we have just seen, to take the opposite course and to identify the two, is to reduce relation to an absolute. But relation is distinct from any and every absolute. 46 It constitutes a distinct category of being, whose whole essence is a pure reference to a term. 48 Nor can predicamental relations ever be hypostatized so as to exist in themselves. 49 By their act of existence they inhere immediately in a subject, modify that subject, relate it to something else. 50 Nor, as Suarez pointed out, as relations can never exist in themselves separated from their proximate subject of inherence, can they ever be

45 Étienne Gilson, On Essence and Existence, lecture 12, from short-hand notes taken during an unpublished series of lectures given at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, Toronto, from March 8, 1946 to April 25, 1946.
46 Quodl., IX, 4.
47 In V Meta., lect. 9, n. 889-394.
48 S. T., I, q. 28, a. l.
49 Suarez, d. 47, s. 5, n. 12.
50 C. G., IV, c. 14.
the proper effect of any efficiency. 51 As every principle is of itself an absolute, 52 so every cause is of itself an absolute. 53 As every cause is of itself an absolute, so every proper effect is of itself an absolute. 54 But when the agent's causality terminates at an effect, if the proper conditions are had, a relation will result. 55 Although there are many difficulties arising out of this notion of resultancy, resultantia, 56 a thousand difficulties do not make a doubt. Resultancy is admitted by all the scholastics in the case of the origin of quantity and quality from a substance. 57

Thus, in brief, the Suarezian position on predicamental relation, focused on the rational distinction between relation and foundation, seems to destroy both the reality and the relativity of the relations. But in closing our brief study of Suarez's position on this question, we can add a word of qualified commendation. Throughout his distinction of relation, Suarez was manfully combating the radical Nominalism of his day by insisting on the extra-mental reality of relations. This fact he admitted and asserted with brilliant vigour. If his explanation of this fact seems in the last analysis incorrect

51 Suarez, d. 47, s. 6, n. 1.
52 S. T., I, q. 41, a. 5.
53 Ibid., I, q. 33, a. 1, ad 1.
54 Ibid., I, q. 43, a. 3.
55 John of St. Thomas, I, 595 a 20.
56 Ibid., 590-595.
57 Ibid., I, 461 a 30.
and even inconsistent with his initial premise of the reality of relations, let us not condemn him too harshly or too hastily.

Let us remember that even now, centuries later, scholastics, and even Thomists, are still quite divided in their interpretation of the intimate nature of this most elusive of beings.

But Suarez's final position fails to do justice to the evidence as we see it. His intentions were correct: to justify real relations; his explanation, however, seems to destroy the very thing he set out to justify. As we see the problem, the only way to explain real relations, to keep them real and to keep them relations; to keep them a distinct predicament, is to place a real distinction between the relation and its foundation.
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