The Problem of Intuition in Saint Thomas Aquinas

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THE PROBLEM OF INTUITION

IN

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

BY

BERNICE J. NOVOGRODZKA

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FOREWORD

We hear so often at the present time about intuitionism and existentialism in philosophy in condemnation of Scholasticism, as though the latter were but a remnant of the ossified metaphysics of the Middle Ages, of no value to humanity of our time. This means that men do not know the true Scholasticism – the Scholasticism built on the teachings of St. Thomas.

The schoolmen themselves brought discredit on the classic Scholasticism in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries because they did not grasp the true meaning of the teachings of the Angelic doctor and, consequently, instead of trying to see and promote the scientific movement in the spirit of his doctrine, they not only stood aloof from it but actually opposed it as something contrary to his teachings. This was a crime of the first order not only against St. Thomas and his teachings, but also against Christ's Church and humanity in general, since thereby they alienated from Christ and His Church the best scientific and philosophic minds who, thereafter, viewed the Church, Scholasticism and its authors and representatives as the enemies of science and every human progress, and, consequently, labored with might and main for the alienation of the rest of humanity from those sources of truth – the Church, Scholasticism, Catholic teachings.

Today, the schoolmen should try to show men that true intuitionism and existentialism is found only in the philosophy of St. Thomas, who views man in his true nature, in the substantial union between his body and spirit and consequently, in the light of the principle that nothing passes into
his soul except from the outside world and through his senses in the light of the principle of contradiction, whereby the intellect apprehends being and rejects non-being. Thomistic intuitions have tremendous potencies for good in every field of human endeavor, in every walk of human life, from birth to death and, therefore, should be explored to the utmost.

Our own endeavors in this direction will be less than a tiniest drop in the immense ocean or, rather, nothing at all. Nevertheless, we have the good will and we hope and pray that it will be counted as an incentive to someone else to do more and better.
CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Man hungers and thirsts for truth. The history of philosophy plainly tells us so. From the time of Thales until now, there has been the philosopher's quest of wisdom. From the time of Adam until now there has been man's quest of truth and knowledge in all the fields of his endeavors.

Truth is the proper object of man's mind. Truth is the only door into the domain of goodness, love, beauty, righteousness, virtue, of everything that is truly great, noble, and sacred. For what is truth for the intellect is goodness, love, and everything else for the will since the same ens or being, in relation to the intellect, is truth, and in relation to the will is goodness. Man can and should come to the possession of truth and then live and become perfect by it and impart it to others for the glory of God and the good and perfection of mankind. Alas! More often than not, man misses the path leading to truth and consequently the road leading to goodness, love, unity, harmony and progress. Man, without truth in his mind, without goodness in his heart, without intellectual, moral and spiritual perfections in his very being, is a monster and creates monstrosities in his works - in those of the arts, of literature, of music, and of philosophy, as well as in the social, moral, economic, political and religious order of things.

The problem of intuition is that of epistemology or the theory of knowledge. How great and important this problem is, anyone can easily under-
stand if he bears in mind that on the theory of knowledge depend different systems of philosophy. Materialism, subjectivism, idealism, and all the rest of isms in the domain of this wisdom have arisen, in the first place, from wrong theories of cognition. If one philosopher lays down, as Cabanis (1757-1808), a principle that thought is a secretion of the brain then, his whole philosophic system will be purely materialistic. And if another philosopher, like Kant (1724-1804), postulates that all our knowledge is modified by the innate a priori forms, then his philosophy will be that of subjectivism. From this one can easily perceive the importance and the greatness of the problem of intuition in the field of philosophy. Whole systems of philosophy may be built on it, either for the good or the downfall of mankind. In fact, whole systems of philosophy have been built on intuition and have already exercised tremendous influence on mankind, either for good or for evil according as the intuition was rightly or wrongly understood in the theory of knowledge.

Among the Greek philosophers Plato (427-347) was the first one to study seriously the problem of knowledge. Hedged in between two contradictory systems, that of Parmenides (born about 540 B.C.), who upheld only being and rejected all becoming, and that of Heraclitus (born about 530 B.C.) for whom, on the contrary, there was only change in the world, Plato did much pioneering thinking for himself.

Plato did not reject entirely the teaching of Parmenides or that of Heraclitus. He beheld partial truths in both of them. If one follows Parmenides as he stands, then one is forced, Plato rightly believed, to admit that there is only the absolute in all things. But this is not true since the universe manifests movement and change everywhere. On the other
hand, if one fully agrees with Heraclitus, then he is obliged, Plato thought again, to admit that things in the world are only so many relations or relative phenomena. But neither is this true since a thing relative by its very nature implies a thing absolute from which it takes its rise. So there must be in the universe both things absolute and things relative. In other words, Parmenides and Heraclitus must be modified and combined to complete each other.

But then again, Plato was of the opinion that we can in no way find in this visible world the foundation for philosophic knowledge of truth. The knowledge in question must be universal and based on certitude. This means that our scientific knowledge must be absolute and, consequently, have for its object an absolute truth. However, Plato admits only a relative knowledge of things visible outside of us. He proves this relativity by the following example: If I put my hand half frozen in a bitter cold into lukewarm water, I will pronounce the water hot, but if coming from a hot bath I put my hand into the same kind of water, I will find it cold. Hence, the same lukewarm water is cold and hot according to physical, biological or psychological state of the person using it.¹

Accordingly, what is true and good and beautiful to one man may be untrue and evil and ugly to another, since the opinions of men are bound to be contradictory. But true knowledge cannot be contradictory, else the collapse of the whole order of truth is inevitable. Where, then, is the way out of this state of relativity, contradiction and absurdity? Plato

found the solution of the problem in the world of Forms or Ideas. To understand what Plato meant by a Form (it is better to use the word Form since the word Idea (Greek ιδέα) may be misleading since it is commonly used to signify an event in the mind, whereas Plato meant by his world of Ideas something outside the mind) let us consider the concept of whiteness. To be sure, whiteness is not the same thing as a white thing, such as snow, milk, sugar, and the like. Supposing we add all these things together, will the result thereof give us whiteness? No, for whiteness must transcend all white objects and be outside of them. Hence, white objects can never be whiteness itself. This is clear. The result cannot be greater than its cause. The sum total of white objects is the result of so many single and particular things of this kind.

What then is whiteness? For us, of course, it is an abstract idea existing in the mind or an abstraction of an abstraction, which means an essence minus its subject. For Plato, however, whiteness stood for an absolute reality outside of the mind and "somewhere" in the world of Ideas or realities beyond this visible world of ours. For Plato what we call ideas, abstract or concrete, universal or singular, would be only so many opinions in no way connected with the absolute realities. If all minds ceased to be, then there would be no ideas in our connotation for Plato, but his Ideas or Forms are independent of any mind and are eternal, immutable, perfect and existing apart from the phenomena which we behold in the world. Plato

2 Cf. Timaeus for the full exposition of Plato's physics and of knowledge regarding the physical world.
3 The Works of Plato, "Phaedrus" selec. and ed. by Irvin Edman.
describes his Form or Idea in the following manner:

"Now of the heaven which is above the heavens no earthly poet has ever sung or ever will sing in a worthy manner. But I must tell for I am bound to speak truly when speaking of the truth. The colorless and formless and intangible essence is visible to the mind, which is the only lord of the soul. Circling around this in the region above the heavens is the place of true knowledge." 4

The Form or Idea of beauty is described as "beauty only, absolute, separate, simple, and everlasting." 5 Similarly, Plato would no doubt describe for us any ideas, such as the idea of virtue, of justice, or again that of man, of animal, or anything else.

Nevertheless, the physical world in which we live and the world of Forms or Ideas in which the gods and the souls of the blessed live and contemplate, have something in common. It is the contact of the lower with the higher, of the phenomenon with the Idea by means of participation. The concrete good, such as a man, a horse, a cow, or a plant in the concrete world, partakes of the man-in-himself, of the horse-in-itself, of the animal-in-itself, of the plant-in-itself in the world of Ideas. 6 Plato also explains this participation by means of imitation ($\eta \iota \nu \rho o \iota s$), holding the Idea as the prototype (paradeigmata) and the phenomenon as an ectype ($\epsilon \iota \delta \iota \omega \mu \kappa$) or a copy thereof. 7

But how does Plato come to the scientific and philosophic cognition of things in the world of Forms or Ideas? It is not, as we already know, by way of the concrete order of things. Whence then can this knowledge come?

4 Phaedrus, op. cit., p. 247.
   Parmenides, p. 132D.
7 Ibid.,
Since Plato claims to possess the knowledge of the world of Forms or Ideas and since this knowledge cannot, according to him, come to us from the world of phenomena, the only way which we can have the knowledge of the universals, a parte rei, is by means of the innate ideas. Plato believed that the human soul existed long before the human body. In the Phaedrus he sets forth this doctrine under the form of an allegory. The souls before their imprisonment in the body lived an incorporeal and blessed life among the gods in the world of Ideas. The souls enjoyed in that region the vision of truth. Their favorite pastime consisted in riding in a chariot drawn by two steeds. One of the steeds was restive and ungovernable. The souls could not control it. Confusion was the result in their ranks. In the consequent tumult, the wings of many were injured and they fell into ever lower regions until they finally reached the earth, the region of material substances where they were united with the corporeal beings — human bodies. The meaning of the myth seems to be that the soul in its incorporeal state had committed some grievous offense for which it was punished by imprisonment in the body. By coming in contact with the body the soul forgot all its previous knowledge. Hence, Plato everywhere speaks of its union with the body not as an advantage but as an evil. He calls the body the grave in which the soul is shut in as in a corpse. He calls it a prison in which the soul is confined like a captive. He calls it a heavy chain which binds the soul and hinders its free expansion of energy and its activity. Hence the sooner the soul is released from the body, the better

8 The Works of Plato, op. cit.
it is for it. The body is its unnatural abode. In the Phaedrus Plato describes the soul as pre-existing before the terrestrial life of man and in the Timaeus as tied to the body with all the results consequent on this "unfortunate" union.\textsuperscript{9}

Plato is an extreme realist. For him the ideas in man's mind exist now as they did exist when he was in the heavenly regions. Ideas exist in the mind as they do in the world of Forms. The soul comes into this fleeting world with the indorm ideas derived from the stable world of Forms. The relation between the fleeting world and the forgotten data about the stable world in man's mind is this: The objects of sense cognition in this world become so many occasions for the mind of reawakening the dormant cognition in it of the Forms or Ideas somewhere beyond the heavenly spheres. Knowledge for Plato is nothing else than the revival of the dormant and the forgotten in the mind. It is not the analyzing of the subject and the predicate, nor comparing them, nor finally joining them with the copula, est, nor separating them by the non est. No, it is nothing of the kind. It is simply the mind's seeing things uno intuitu, at once and immediately, on the occasion of the sentient perception and cognition. This Platonic method of knowing things has been portrayed by the passage already quoted from the Phaedrus, "Now of the heaven which is above the heavens no earthly poet has ever sung or ever will sing in a worthy manner, etc.\textsuperscript{10}

The colorless and formless and intangible essences become visible to the mind as soon as its dormant cognition is reawakened by that of the

\textsuperscript{9} Phaedrus, 246 ff. 
\textsuperscript{10} The Works of Plato, op. cit.
sentient objects. The world of Forms or Ideas we reach not by sense knowledge but by means of intuitive contemplation. Again, all knowledge is recollection. Plato hardly ever speaks of the Idea in the singular but almost always of the Ideas or Forms in the plural. For Plato there are three worlds – the world of concrete phenomena, that of our concepts, and that of Ideas. The relation between the world and that of concepts lies in the fact that the former, that is, the world of concepts, is the faint reflection of the latter – that is, of the world of Ideas. To every concept in the mind there corresponds an Idea among the hypostatized Universals or Ideas belonging to the realm of true being and unchanging reality. Now, the world of phenomena is the world of sense perception, the realm of change, multiplicity, imperfection and, consequently, the world of partial not-being. This world of phenomena presents a striking contrast to the world of Forms or Ideas in the realm of hypostatized and viewless perfections above it. Nevertheless, there is something common between the two worlds – the world of phenomena partakes in the world of Ideas or Forms. By its very position the world of phenomena performs for us the function of recalling in our mind what our soul has forgotten about the world of Ideas. The world of phenomena reawakens the dormant wisdom. Such is Plato’s intuition. It introduces man into the world of Ideas or Forms so that he may be united with the highest Good. Further, the role of Plato’s intuition is to enable one to view the eternal and changeless hypostatized archetypes and to build on them science and philosophy. Again, the role of Plato’s

11 Republic, Bk V, 475 C-D.
intuition is to furnish the universal principles for science and wisdom.

After Plato comes Aristotle (384-322 B.C.) to study and investigate the problems of epistemology. First of all, Aristotle's conception of the soul entirely differs from that of Plato. He did not consider it as pre-existent somewhere beyond the skies and then coming to be imprisoned in the body in punishment for some transgression, but as a natural principle of specification, of being and of operation. So he defined it as the first entelechy of a physical body having life potentially. By this conception of the soul and, consequently, of the body and then of the whole of man, Aristotle relegated Plato's theory of knowledge to the domain of poetry and fairy tales. Man's body is not a prison for his soul but the material element with which the rational soul substantially unites to form with it one human compound, the person, and to be therein the principle of operation. However, in this human compound it is not the soul alone but the whole compound that acts and suffers the activity from the outside world. Man's soul as the first entelechy of his body has no pre-existent and innate ideas, but must receive all its ideas from the outside through the senses. Hence Aristotle does not, like Plato, begin with the Idea but with the data of experience, the empirical, the actual, and thence rises by means of abstraction to universal ideas, ultimate reasons of things. He does not proceed synthetically and progressively like Plato, but for the most part analytically and regressively. Wherefore Aristotle's method is not of the a priori or deductive kind, but it is mostly a posteriori or inductive.

12 De Anima, 11, c. 1.
For Aristotle there is first of all, analysis and then synthesis. Before one can know a whole he has to know its parts. This is the very trait of the human mind. It is the analytico-synthetic trait. Our intellective knowledge is first abstractive and then unitive. In this life we cannot do otherwise. This is our very nature. 13

"Hence his (Aristotle's) deliberate examination of facts, phenomena, circumstances, and possibilities as a means of rising to universal truths; hence his marked predilection for physical science, for nature is that which is nearest to us, and most actual in our experience; hence, too, his tendency to push scientific investigation in every direction for in his mind all facts have equal claims to consideration. This tendency led him to become the founder of sciences which were either unknown till his time or had previously received little attention, such as Logic, Natural History, Jus Naturae." 14

If analysis is the predominant feature in Aristotle's theory of cognition, is there in him any room left for intuition, that is, for immediate and simple views of things? Indeed there is. He teaches that the immanence of the essence or the noumenon is in the phenomenon. 15 But before the intellect can separate the essence or the noumenon from the phenomenon, the latter acts directly on the senses. Individual things are called by Aristotle "first substances," and universal notions or ideas, "second substances." 16 In the first substances lies the source of sentient intuitions and at the same time potential material for the second substances. In the first substances and sentient intuitions arising from them lies also the source of Aristotelian intellectual intuitions regarding

13 Analytica Posteriora, I, 13, B 1.
15 Metaphysics, XIII, 0, 1086, 2-7.
16 Categ., 5.
the first principles - those of Contradiction and of Excluded Third or
Middle. "Of the affirmation and the negation of the same thing the one is
false, the other true." 17 "Between the two terms of a contradiction there
is no mean; it is necessary either to affirm or deny every predicate of
every subject." 18 In the metaphysical or ontological form the principal of
contradiction (that is, as applied to being itself) is stated thus: "The
same thing cannot at the same time and in the same respect belong and not
belong to the same thing." 19 On the metaphysical or ontological form of
the principle of contradiction depends the validity of the logical form of
the same principle. Again of the principle in this form Aristotle asserts,
no proof is possible but only a subjective conviction that no one can deny
it in thought. And this is, of course, an intellectual intuition pure and
simple, but with its foundation in the concrete order of things and in the
sentient intuitions. The individual substance alone has substantial
existence (∃ ⊢ ∅), and the universal being is immanent in it in
potency. 20 Hence it is also there in the first (∃ ⊢ ∅) or substance
that immanently remain the first principles concerning which there finally
arises in the mind by abstraction from sentient intuitions the habit of
the first principles. Such is the Aristotelian form of intuition! Aristotle
thereby solved the great epistemological problem on the most fundamental
ground.

17 De Cat., c., 10.
18 Metaphysics, op. cit., IV, 7.
19 Ibid., 3.
20 Ibid., 1, 3 et al.
However, with the advent of Christianity it was not Aristotle's philosophy but the philosophy of Plato that was studied by Christian philosophers. The so-called Ante-Nicene Fathers, like Justin Martyr (100-160), Athenagoras (died about 180), Tatian and Theophilus (both belonging to the end of the second century), Irenaeus (140-202), Hippolitus (first half of the third century), Clement of Alexandria (died about 120 A.D.), Origen (185-254), and then the so-called Post Nicene Fathers, like Athanasius of Alexandria (died 373), Gregory of Nyssa (331-394), Basil (died 379), and Gregory Nazianzen (born 330), Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, Maximus Confessor (580-662) were all in one way or another Platonists. Aristotle was for them too materialistic, too earthly, but Plato sublime and divinelike. Hence they preferred his philosophy to that of Aristotle. Accordingly, they modelled their epistemology on that of Plato introducing into it the necessary modifications required by Christian religion. Thus, Justin Martyr says that whatever of truth is to be found in the works of the Greek philosophers and poets, and elsewhere must be ascribed to the workings of the divine Logos present among all men in the germ (logos spermaticos) while in Christ truth appeared in its complete fullness. (I. Apol. V, 4; XLVI; II. Apol. VIII, XIII, 5,6.)

But the greatest of all Platonists was Augustine (353-430), a philosopher and theologian in the Western Church. For him Plato was the Philosopher, just as Aristotle became the philosopher for St. Thomas Aquinas eight centuries later. Here are some examples of his Platonic intuitionism. The Platonic doctrine of Ideas can be consonant with Christianity, says Augustine, if we regard the Ideas as situated in the mind of God. 21

21 De Diversis Quaestionibus Octoginta Tribus, Q. 46, 2; Latin 40,30.
The Spiritual Creature which is the intellectual or rational soul is unformed unless it be turned toward the immutable Light of Divine Wisdom, the Word of God. Its wise and happy life as an angel or human soul lies in this conformation to the Supreme Wisdom. The effect of Divine Illumination is not only epistemological but is also ontological. By the influence of Divine Light man's soul is not only enabled to know truly but it is brought by this action of spiritual conformation to a more perfect existence. Again consider the Augustinian levels (hierarchies) of reality. The lowest kind of nature is that which is mutable in both space and time; this is the nature of bodies. The second kind of nature on a higher metaphysical plane is that which is not mutable in regard to place but which does change in time; this is the level on which the soul exists. The highest nature is immutable both in place and time; this is God. This is the Augustinian geography of being. The human soul residing on the middle plane may look down to the things on the lowest level by means of external senses and may consider these things rationally by means of the function called inferior reason. Or the soul may look up to the highest reality and consider it by means of the superior reason. Now on the highest level in the Wisdom of God there are the immutable, eternal reasons or causes. On the middle level abides, as mentioned above, ratio hominis, that is the rational soul of man. On the lowest level are found the rationes seminales, the seed-like principles of corporeal things which wait

22 De Genesi ad Litteram, I, 5, 10-11.
23 Ibid.,
24 De Genesi ad Litteram, I, 9, 17.
for a favorable opportunity to grow. 25 In all this St. Augustine is not only a Platonist but also a Plotinist—different levels and rationes superiores and rationes inferiores and rationes seminales unmistakably remind one of the emanations of Plotinus.

St. Anselm (1033-1109) styled "the last of the Fathers," "the Augustine of the eleventh century," was a precursor of Albert the Great and St. Thomas Aquinas. Intuition, as a technical term, was used for the first time by St. Anselm in his Monologium where, wishing to distinguish between our knowledge of God, especially in the next world, and our cognition of things created and finite, he quotes St. Paul: "We see now through a mirror in an obscure manner but then face to face" (St. Paul, I Cor. 13, 12), and explains, "Seeing God in an obscure manner is a speculation but seeing Him face to face is an intuition."

Albert the Great (1193-1280) dealt masterfully with the problem of universals and that of intuition. He indeed taught the universal exists in a threefold sense: (a) as Universale ante rem, in the mind of God, (b) as Universale in re, and (c) as Universale post rem. "Et tunc resultant tria formarum genera: unum quidem ante rem existens, quod est causa formativa; aliud autem est ipsum genus formarum, quae fluctuant in materia; tertium autem est genus formarum quod abstrahente intellectu separatur a rebus." 26 Hence he solved the problem of universals correctly. This means also that he must have had the right understanding of intuitions in the Aristotelian significance—the sense intuitions and those furnished by the "habit" of

25 De Trinitate, III, 8, 13-19.
26 De Natura Origine Animae Tractatus, I, 2.
the first principles. Had there been no St. Thomas Aquinas we would probably be writing today about *Intuitions in Albert the Great* instead of writing about those in St. Thomas. The Angelic Doctor took up his master's teachings and clarified them and made them firm and certain by the acumen of his own genius. Besides, Albert the Great was still under the influence of Platonism and Neo-Platonism and knew Aristotle only in Latin translations from the Arabic and just in a few instances from the Greek. It was St. Thomas who succeeded in procuring a new translation of Aristotle directly from the Greek and was able to see what the real Aristotle was.

In the transition period from Scholastic to modern philosophy (1450-1600) efforts were made by Gemüfstus Pletho, a Greek scholar, to revive Plato's philosophy. For this purpose he inspired Cosmo de Medici with the idea of founding a Platonic Academy at Florence. The famous Cardinal Bessarion (1403-1472) aided Pletho in the work of expounding Platonism. During the same period intuitionism was thriving in the pantheism of Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) and in the mysticism of Jacob Boehme.

The new period of modern philosophy begins with Descartes (1596-1650). In the midst of his universal methodic doubt he held but one certain truth; I think, therefore I exist. (Cogito, ergo sum.) First he doubts everything, the thinking faculty itself and then all at once he is certain about his existence. This illogical emergence from the sea of doubt into the domain of one's existence is accomplished by Descartes' intuition. One simply wonders how such a genius could venture to build his whole system of philosophy on the intuitions that stood on the ground of universal methodic

27 Discours, IVème partie.
doubt.

Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677), a pantheist, transformed the Cartesian dualism into a pantheism wherein the means wherewith one can attain the knowledge of God, and consequently one's happiness and blessedness, is intuition. At the close of the Ethics, Spinoza writes, "Blessedness consists of love toward God ... No one rejoices in blessedness because he restrains lusts, but on the contrary, the power of restraining lust comes from blessedness itself." And earlier in the Ethics he states,"Blessedness is nothing less than satisfaction of mind which arises from intuitive knowledge of God."²⁸

Leibnitz (1646-1716), the founder of the German philosophy of the eighteenth century, was an intuitionist. According to him all our ideas are innate.²⁹ Ideas exist potentially in the mind. Wherefore to the scholastic principle, "Nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu", Leibnitz adds, except the intellect itself, "nisi ipsa intellectus."³⁰ This is an innatism. Again he writes, "knowledge is adequate when everything which enters into a distinct conception is again distinctly known or when the analysis is carried to the very end. When a notion has been rightly formed, we are not able to think all the elementary notions which enter into it at once but when this is possible, or insofar as it is possible. I term our knowledge intuitive."³¹

Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) in combating David Hume's empiricism and pan-phenomenalism went to another extreme - to intuitionism a priori.

²⁸ Ethics, Conclusion.
²⁹ Nouveaux essais, Preface
³⁰ Nouveaux essais, II, i.
³¹ Nouveaux essais, II, i.
Kant's categories are nothing but so many intuitions of that kind. The substances or noumena of things are not known at all. The phenomena may be known not, however, as they are in themselves but as modified by the different a priori or innate forms in our mind. Kant's twelve categories are so many avenues and methods of immediate or intuitive knowing. 32 Kant's whole moral order also rests on intuition, on the intuition of the principle, I ought. 33

At length there comes Bergson (1859-1841) to propose a system of philosophy based entirely on intuition. What is Bergsonian intuition? Let him explain it to us himself. He writes:

"Now the image has at least this advantage, that it keeps us in the concrete. No image can replace the intuition of duration but many diverse images borrowed from very different orders of things may be the convergence of their action, direct consciousness to the precise point where there is an intuition to be seized. By choosing images as dissimilar as possible we shall prevent any one of them from usurping the place of the intuition it is intended to call up since it would then be driven away at once by its rivals. By providing that in spite of their differences of aspect, they all require from the mind the same kind of attention and in some sort the same degree of tension, we shall gradually accustom consciousness to a particular and clearly defined disposition, that precisely which it must adopt in order to appear to itself as it really is, without any veil. But then consciousness must at least consent to make the effort for it will have been shown nothing - it will simply have been placed in the attitude it must take up in order to make the desired effort and so to come by itself to the intuition." 34

Thus Bergson speaks about the intuition of duration. Evidently he allows other things like diverse images, their activity, the consciousness of the human ego "converge to the precise point where there is an intuition to be

33 The Critique of Practical Reason
"seized" and embodied in this ego. Again he writes, "By intuition is meant the kind of intellectual sympathy by which one places oneself within an object in order to coincide with what is unique in it and consequently inexpressible." 35

Speaking of the intuition of the movement as distinguished from that of duration, Bergson writes, "On our personality, on our liberty, on the place we occupy in the whole of nature, on our origin and, perhaps, also on our destiny, it throws a light, feeble and vacillating but one which nonetheless pierces the darkness of the night in which the intellect leaves us." 36

Note how Bergson ends the passage, "...but one which nonetheless pierces the darkness of the night in which the intellect leaves us." Is this intuition something different from the intellect? Does this intuitive cognition proceed from a special faculty? Is it from the instinct? However, Bergson seems to distinguish between intuition and instinct. "The Ammophila no doubt discerns very little of that force, just what concerns itself; but, at least, it discerns it from within quite otherwise than by a process of the knowledge, by an intuition (Lived rather than Represented)." 37

But a little further he writes, "By intuition I mean instinct that has become disinterested, self-conscious, capable of reflecting upon its object and of enlarging it indefinitely." Here he seems to identify instinct with reason since reason alone, as we know, can reflect and become disinterested. And what does Bergson mean by "the kind of intellectual intuition"? Is it an artist's intuition or that of a philosopher? Or could it be both, the

35 An Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 6.
36 Creative Evolution, p. 282.
37 Creative Evolution, p. 183.
artist's insofar as he understands his subject matter - the philosopher's insofar as he penetrates to the bottom of things? However, one may be sure that Bergson does not mean here, nor anywhere else, a penetration to the bottom of things in the Scholastic sense. He may mean here the artist's understanding of his subject, and yet he has a special kind of intuition for him. He describes it thus: "By placing himself back within the object by a kind of sympathy, in breaking down by an effort of intuition the barrier that space put between him and his model." 38

Again, Bergson writes: "Our eyes are closed to the primordial and fundamental act of perception - the act constituting pure perception whereby we place ourselves in the very heart of things." 39 Again, "Restore, on the contrary, the true character of perception; recognize in pure perception a system of nascent acts which plunge roots deep into the real and, at once, perception is seen to be radically distinct from recollecting; the reality is no more constructed or reconstructed but touched, penetrated, lived; and the problem at issue between realism and idealism, instead of giving rise to eternal metaphysical discussions is solved or rather dissolved by intuition." 40

In the first instance Bergson distinguishes between intuition and perception, "at once perception is seen radically distinct from recollecting" (one image evoking another by a kind of intuition) 41 and in the second he seems to identify "pure perception" with "intuition" - "We are actually placed outside ourselves, we touch the reality of the object in an immediate

38 Creative Evolution, p. 186
39 Matter and Memory, pp. 73-71
40 Matter and Memory, pp. 74-75
41 Matter and Memory, p. 84
intuition."

Again Bergson writes, "Thus intuition may bring the intellect to recognize that life does not quite go into the category of the many, nor yet into that of the one; that neither mechanical causality nor finality can give a sufficient interpretation of the whole process. Then, by a sympathetic communication which it establishes between us and the rest of the living by the expansion of our consciousness which it brings about, it introduces us into life's own domain which is reciprocal interpenetration, endlessly continued creation. But though it thereby transcends intelligence, it is from intelligence that has come the push that has made it rise to the point it has reached. Without intelligence it would have remained in the form of interest and turned outward by its movements of locomotion." 42

Remark what Bergson says at the close of the passage, "Without intelligence it (intuition) would have remained in the form of instinct, riveted to the special object of its practical interest and turned outward by its movements of locomotion." Hence it seems that Bergson identifies intelligence conception with intuition. From what has been said it follows that in Bergson's teachings about intuition there are confusions, incompatibilities, contradictions, insolvable difficulties. However, the general character of Bergson's intuition is that of becoming by means of a certain sympathy, one with the object outside the mind for the purpose of grasping and understanding it, as well as for the purpose of growing and developing with it and that is what he calls a creative evolution, elan vital, a vital impulse, progress, and freedom of life. But is it really so? Can such a union with

42 Creative Evolution, p. 187
creatures as Bergson proposes by his intuition be for the perfection of mankind? Does the human mind really work and tend that way? Can man satisfy his hunger and thirst for knowledge by means of the intuition in question? These and similar questions one can solve only in the light of St. Thomas' system of philosophy, with Thomistic intuitions as a sure and safe introduction thereto.
CHAPTER II

INTUITIVE KNOWLEDGE ACCORDING TO ST. THOMAS

The problem of intuitive knowledge cannot be solves unless the nature of man is properly known and evaluated. This was the main difficulty with Plato. He knew that scientific and philosophic cognition must be something universal. At the same time, he clearly perceived that the knowledge of things we obtain from the outside is something entirely particular and singular. He could not reconcile the singular with the universal. Therefore, to save the principle of the universality of scientific and philosophic knowledge, he was obliged to seek the universals a parte rei, in the world of Ideas or Forms abiding somewhere "beyond the clouds", although in reality abiding nowhere for there can be no such being as the hypostatized universal man, horse, cow, or anything else. Already Porphyry (232-304 A.D.) uneasy about Plato's doctrine, asked the question: "Do the Genera and Species exist as things in the world of reality or are they mere products of the mind (sive subsistant, sive in nudis intellectibus posita sint)? He was unable yet to solve the problem. Therefore he simply said, "I decline to give the answer (dicere recuso)." The Scholastics took up the discussion as it stood just in these terms: Are they (genera and species), or are they not, things. Those who replied in the affirmative received the name of realists; the others were known as anti-realists.

1 Migne, Patr. Latina, Vol. LXIX, Col. 82.
The controversy continued for over a century. St. Thomas rejecting platonic extreme realism, on the one hand, and the teachings of the nominalists, on the other, solved once for all the problem in favor of moderate realism, of the common sense.

"There are two ways of speaking of the universal: first, as considered under the aspect of universality; secondly, as considered in nature of which it is ascribed for it is one thing to consider the universal man and another to consider a man as man. If therefore we take the universal in the first way, no sensitive power, whether of apprehension or of appetite, can attain the universal because the universal is obtained by abstraction from individual matter on which every sensitive power is based." 2

St. Thomas rose to the domain of the universals from the concrete order of things. Therefore he says, "The same thing can be universal and particular. (Idem potest esse universale et particulare)." 3 Plato could not possibly see this since according to him the soul stood to the body in the relation of a causa movens, and nothing else; the body being merely the organ which it uses to exert an external activity (anima utens corpore). In this conception of man where the body did not enter as a constituent element into his being, there could be no question of substantial union between the spirit and the matter and consequently no question of obtaining the universals from the singulares by means of abstraction. Plato, therefore, was obliged to seek the universals elsewhere - in the world of Forms or Ideas. The fundamental question in Plato's theory of knowledge was that of anthropology. If Plato properly understood and evaluated man's nature, then the problem of epistemology would have been solved by him quite

3 QQ. De Potentia, Q. 6, Art. 1, ad 1.
otherwise.

St. Augustine, (a thorough Platonist), was saved from Plato's gross errors only by the light of faith and the power of divine grace, though his Rationes Seminales and Rationes Aeternae (seminal and eternal reasons) still retained some germs of psychologic errors.

Duns Scotus' fundamental proposition in psychology was this: Voluntas est superior intellectu, the will is superior to the intellect. The will is the moving agent and absolute master in the whole realm of the soul and everything must obey it. For this very reason Duns Scotus, although in his doctrine of the speculative functions he agreed mostly with St. Thomas, could not solve adequately and properly the problem of the theory of knowledge. The will is a blind faculty and consequently a very dangerous guide and master. Duns Scotus relying on the superiority of the will came to such perilous conclusions as these: The soul's nobility rests upon willing rather than knowing; freedom is the essence of the voluntary act; the immortality of the soul cannot be proven by metaphysical arguments nor can God's omnipotence be proven by the light of reason; the good is good because God commands. Moreover Duns Scotus took special delight in dwelling on the opposition existing between philosophy and theology of the Pagans and Arabs and he, himself, came dangerously near to the Averroistic principle that what is true in theology may be false in philosophy and vice versa. 4 Therefore in Duns Scotus, the voluntarist, one should not look for the solution of the great epistemological problem.

Neither can one find the solution of the same problem in Descartes.

This philosopher by seeing the essence of mind in thought and the essence of matter in extension considered body and spirit as constituting a dualism of perfectly heterogeneous entities separated in nature by an absolute and unfilled interval. Mind and matter, therefore, are antithetical. Hence the interaction between soul and body, as asserted by Descartes, was inconceivable. In this antithesis there is no room for the intuition and the abstraction and consequently no solution of the epistemological problem.

Neither Leibnitz could solve this problem by his monads and pre-established harmony since he too terribly misunderstood man's nature and psychology. Neither Kant, nor Fichte, nor Schelling, nor Hegel could solve the same problem on the ground of their false conceptions about man. For in neither Kant's subjectivism, nor in Fichte's subjective idealism, nor in Schelling's idealistic monism, nor in Hegel's absolute idealism was man what he really is in himself in relation to his fellow creatures, to God, and in that to the universe in general. Failing therefore to understand him, they failed to solve his problems, in the first place that of his cognition - the problem of light wherewith to see things properly. Schopenhauer, the pessimistic voluntarist, could not solve this problem for the same reason.

The late Bergson, a professed intuitionist, could not solve the problem because of his own erroneous conceptions about man's reason (intellect). He unduly depreciated and mistrusted man's reason. Moreover, he claimed that man is part and parcel of the total cosmic movement and that all reality is but a manifestation of the same élan vital, vital impulse, as he termed it.

5 Discourse on Method, VI, Meditation, p. 126.
Ever since Descartes proposed his doctrine of two substances which meant the antithesis between body and soul the philosophers who came after him stood in revolt against this dualism. We plainly see this revolt in the monism of Spinoza, in the materialism of the empiricists, and in the idealism of Berkeley. They all attempted to solve the problem of body and soul in man and that of the theory of knowledge, in other words, they tried to span the chasm between the soul and the body created by Descartes' mechanico-rationalistic system of cognition. Some "solved" it at the expense of the mind as was the case with all materialists; others at the expense of the body as was the case with Berkeley and all such similar idealists; still others solved it at the expense of human individuality as was the case with Spinoza. The revolt in question still goes on and the problem of human psychology and that of the light to see the truth becomes still more complicated. For the solution of the problem one must turn to St. Thomas.

Now how does St. Thomas consider man? For him man is what he really is, a "rational animal." True, this view of man he borrowed from Aristotle, but this only means that the great philosopher was correct in his definition of man. After all, St. Thomas himself was a most observant student of nature and reality, especially of man, studying and investigating him in his own personality not only by the light of reason but also by that of Divine Revelation; for which reason he gained a much deeper insight into human nature than Aristotle was ever able to do with his reliance on the light of reason alone. Both nature and grace tell him that man's actions are both material and spiritual or rational. Hence the source from which they
come must be material and spiritual or rational, for what is in the effect must needs be found in its cause.

But, then, what union does St. Thomas see between man's body and soul? It is like the one which Plato beheld when he claimed that the body is the tomb and mortal prison of the soul \((\omega / \mu \times \kappa / \lambda)\)? \(^6\) Or is it like the one which Descartes saw when he asserted that the mind is res cogitans and the body res extensa, the latter carrying on its own operations like a machine by virtue of the impulse received from the soul, which is located by him in the pinseal gland? \(^7\) Or is that union like the one which Leibnitz perceived when he taught that the soul is a monad self-active, self-sufficient, simply enveloped in an organic body? \(^8\) In short, is the union between the body and the soul a merely accidental and mechanical one? No! St. Thomas sees, even as Aristotle did before him, the substantial union between them. This is the central doctrine in the teachings of St. Thomas about man. Body and soul are united together as matter and form. Complete substantial nature belongs neither to the soul alone nor to the body alone but to the compound of both. This compound is what it is, namely, a rational creature, a substance, a being by virtue of the soul. It is by virtue of the soul that the body has whatever belongs to it. But just as the body requires the soul in order to be what it is and to move and to live, the soul requires the body for its natural being and operation. The rational soul is superior to matter. In its highest operations the mind is

\(^6\) Phaedo, 82 a3.
\(^\) Cratyl., 400 C.
\(^\) Phaedrus, 250 C.
\(^\) Gorg. 493 A.
\(^7\) Principia Philosophiae, I, 48-50.
\(^8\) Ibid.,
independent of the body and is capable of surviving the body. Nevertheless the soul needs the body in order to exercise its normal activity. It is the soul and the body substantially united that stand out as the human personality, a human being. After their separation the body is only a corpse and then turns into a decomposed matter and the surviving soul remains a being in an unnatural state until it is reunited with the body after the latter's resurrection.

In the soul is the substantial form and the body "the material element" of man's being. The soul is the active principle and the body the passive element. The rational soul is radically different from the body it animates. Nevertheless this rational soul has been created to be with the body and to form with it but one being, man. The result of this kind can be only the outcome of the substantial union between the soul and the body in question. That is why St. Thomas, unlike Plato or Descartes, who, considering the soul as a substance completely divorced from the body, located it either in the brain as the Greek sage did whence it might control the movements and operations of the whole organism or in the minute portion of the brain, called the pineal gland as the modern sage did, whence it might regulate the animal mechanism (for such is man's body in the Cartesian conception). St. Thomas, we say, unlike them views the soul as wholly present in the whole body and in all its parts: Animæ rationalis est tota corpore et tota in qualibet parte corporis. But how is the soul present in all the body and in all its parts? St. Thomas answers that it is

9 Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. 76, Art. 1.
10 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 76, Art. 8.
present in all of them not by the totality of its virtue, but by the total-
ity of its essence: Anima est tota in qualibet parte corporis secundum
totalitatem essentiae, sed non secundum totalitatem virtutis. 11 This is a
dearth blow to psycho-physical parallelism and monism. Those who advocate
psycho-physical parallelism maintain that our psychical life is only a
series of states without having any soul substance; that psychical acts and
physiological actions are not the same realities; that there cannot be any
efficient influence of the first on the second or vice versa. The best
exponent of this theory was Professor Wundt of Leipzig (1832-1920) who
denied the reality of substance. This is simply a psycho-physical pan-
phenomenalism.

Nevertheless it has its roots in Descartes' doctrine of two sub-
stances. For if the essence of mind is thought and the essence of matter is
extension, we cannot locate these "substances" in the Aristotelian category
of substance but must place them in the categories of accidents - in those
of quantity and action. Again if there is between those two "substances"
but a mechanical union, then the outcome must be the psycho-physical
parallelism. But St. Thomas lays the axe at the root of the tree. He
destroys all such theories by his doctrine of the substantial unity between
body and rational soul. He bases his teaching on fact and observation: It
is the very same man who understands and feels. Ipsum idem homo est qui
percepit se intelligere et sentire. 12 And those who advocate monism
recognize that there must be some subject in which phenomena are rooted and
which can account for the harmony and regularity they display. What is

11 De Anima., Quaestio Disputata, Art. 9.
12 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 75, Art. 1.
that subject? They do not name it but it may be well identified with the one subject of Spinoza according to whom all the objects of the universe are only different manifestations of a single substance that enjoys the two irreducible attributes of thought and extension. Against this monism there stands St. Thomas' dualism - the human compound of the rational soul and the corporeal element substantially united between themselves. 13 This substantial unit is a person since person according to the classical definition of it by Boethius is nothing else than an individual substance endowed with reason, rationalis naturae individua substantia. And it is the person which is the source of all activity, of all phenomena in man. It is the complete individual substance that acts, Actiones sunt suppositorum. 14

The schoolman Duns Scotus claimed that the body has its own special form, that of corporeity. Accordingly, the body is a body not by virtue of the soul as is the case in the doctrine of St. Thomas but by something different precisely by the form just mentioned, per formam corporeitatis. This cannot be. For this corporeity means that the body is already endowed with its own form and through the latter has already its own existence. Thereafter no other form can come in as the substantial form of the body. Thereafter every other form would be only its accidental form. This is Platonism and Neo-Platonism in Duns Scotus. St. Thomas teaches that the rational soul, being the substantial form of the body, informs the body in question and serves the functions of life in all degrees since it is natural for a higher form, like the soul, at once to contain and surpass the perfections and vital energies of the inferior forms or souls those of the

13 Summa Theologica, Q. 76, Art. 1
14 In Primo Libro Sent. D. 5, Q. 1, Art. 1.
sentient and vegetative orders. 15

In emphasizing the unity of human nature St. Thomas states that in the absence of such unity in man one could not account for the fact that the intensive exercise of one activity may interfere with that of others. (Una operatio cum fuerit intensa impedit alima.) This is certainly a daily experience. For when we are intensely preoccupied with our studies, we forget about being hungry at dinner time; on the contrary, we become averse to studies if we preoccupy ourselves too much with other things. In general, people greatly devoted to intellectual and spiritual pursuits care little about things material and those pursuing the paths of sentient life care little about things spiritual and intellectual. All this plainly proves the most intimate relation between the spiritual and material elements in us. "From the soul and the body there results in us," says St. Thomas, "the two-fold unity of nature and person." 16

There is a dualism in St. Thomas but it is not the dualism of Plato, of Duns Scotus, of Descartes. The dualism of St. Thomas results in the oneness of human nature and personality, whereas the other dualism inevitably results in the destruction of the unity in question. There is a monism in St. Thomas but it is not the monism of Plotinus nor that of Spinoza, nor that of the idealists, nor that of the materialists. The monism of St. Thomas is the oneness resulting from the substantial union between the soul and the body comprising therefore the spiritual and the material elements and neither proceeding from nor modifying the Divine Substance as Plotinus and Spinoza imagined, respectively, but existing in the created and

15 Summa Theologica, I, Q, 78, Art. 1; W. 77, A. 5-7
16 Summa Theologica, III, Q. 2, Art. 9, ad 3.
ontological order of things. With these notions in our mind let us approach the subject matter of intuition.

What does the eye perceive. The colored object. What does the ear hear? The Sound. What is the hand able to touch? The extended thing. What is the tongue able to taste? The savory matters. Every sense has its own proper object which it primarily and directly (primo et per se) perceives. This first and immediate perception of the sentient order, especially the perception of an object by the eye, is for St. Thomas an intuition. "A thing is known," says St. Thomas, "in three ways: first, by the presence of its essence in the knower as light can be seen in the eye; secondly, by the presence of its similitude in the power which knows it as stone is seen by the eye from its image being in the eye; thirdly, when the image of the object known is not drawn directly from the object itself but from something else in which it is made to appear as when we behold a man in a mirror." 17 Herein lies the key to the solution of the problem of intuition right from the beginning. Take the first way, "A thing is known by the presence of its essence in the knower as light can be seen in the eye." By reason of this principle I possess within me the sound when I hear the bell or music; the sweetness when I taste sugar; the fragrance when I smell a rose; the warmth when I put my hand into a basin of warm water. I possess all such qualities right within me, within my very being. To be sure, they are not known by me in the same way as the light is known when I see it in the eyes of my fellow creatures; nevertheless they are just as certainly known and experienced by me with my different senses as

17 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 56, Art. 3.
the light is through my eyes. All my senses are given me for conveying
impressions with certainty and without fail but, of course, each one in its
own way.

Again it is impossible for me to see and to know the light in my own
eye (unless, of course, I see it in the reflection of it in a mirror). How-
ever, I can see the light within me by means of my intellectual eye. For
instance, I can at once see the truth in my mind that a whole is greater
than any of its parts. But if this manner of knowing things is viewed in
relation to the outside world, then we must say that our mind cannot see the
presence of the essences of things except through the senses and by way of
abstraction. Only in heaven shall we see God face to face. 18 Only there
shall we see God immediately and everything else in Him. Only there our
entire being will be filled with His presence. This will be the most per-
fected way of knowing and loving God. Hence, continuing to explain the three-
fold manner of knowing things St. Thomas writes: "To the first named class
that knowledge of God is likened by which He is seen through His essence and
knowledge such as this cannot accrue to any creature from its natural
principles." 19

Again, "A thing is known, secondly, by the presence of its similitude
in the power which knows it as a stone is seen by the eye from its image
being in the eye." This manner of knowing things is that in which especial-
ly the eye gains knowledge of them. What then is this similitude? It is
nothing else than what St. Thomas calls the expressed species, species
expressa. 20
We know the eye receives the impressions from the outside world. The result of these impressions is the expressed species, species expressae, which in reality are so many similitudes or likenesses of the things in the concrete order of things. Bergson claims that to know a thing one must enter into it. We, too, say that one must penetrate things, go into the bottom of things, in order to gain knowledge of their natures, essences. But the mind alone can do this. The senses are passive organs. They receive things. Hence the eye cannot enter into a thing, identify itself with, grow and expand with it by a kind of sympathy, producing thus, as Bergson believes, a new creation. Yes, this is the process in the Bergsonian intuition. The Thomistic intuition is different. It is not we who enter into a thing but it is the thing that enters into us. In this initial intuition we remain as passive agents on whose senses and organs the things register or impress themselves. We simply look or gaze or marvel at what is happening. And this is what the Latin verb intueri, whence the word intuition has derived really means. 21 The lexicon tells us so. As soon as we open our eyes on God's world, this marvelous and mysterious phenomenon of intuition in its initial stage takes place in us. Hence it is not we who seek things but the things seek us by impressing themselves on our eyes or other organs. Accordingly, it is not we who identify ourselves with things but it is the things that identify themselves with us through the mysterious species impressa. It is only in this way that we ourselves become in a psychological and immaterial way things, the world, the universe! For there is no limit to the impressions we receive and can receive

from the outside world. It is for this reason that St. Thomas teaches
with Aristotle that the soul, in a certain way, becomes all things by
gaining knowledge of them. (Cognoscendo anima quodam modo fit omnia.)

This is realized by the expressed species. The impressions come and go
but the "expressions", that is, the images or the expressed species after
them remain in the soul. For this the organ must be really healthy and
normal. Some persons have apparently perfect eyes but in reality they do
not see. This is because the optic nerve does not function. The things
impress themselves on the surface of the eye but they do not register on
the retina, a sensitive surface at the back of the eyeball, because the
communication between it and the optic nerve does not function. The
outcome is that things leave in the eye no expressed species and the person
does not see anything, in other words, that person is blind even though he
has apparently good eyes. From this we see that the species expressa is
indispensable for the intuition proper to the eye. Once we have the ex-
pressed species then the intuition has been completed; in it and with it
and through it we possess the things themselves. Hence cognoscendo anima
fit quodam modo omnia. This is true, in the first place, of the sentient
intuitions and then of the intellective intuitions and of cognition in
general. For this reason St. Thomas writes: "As good has the nature of
what is desirable, so truth is related to knowledge. Now everything in-
sofar as it has being, so far is it knowable. Wherefore it is said in

De Anima III that the soul is in some manner all things through the senses

22 De Anima, 3, 37c.
and the intellect. And therefore as good is convertible with being, so is the true. But as good adds to being the notion of desirable, so the true adds relation to the intellect." 23

In this wondrous and mysterious psychological process of intuition whether sentient or intellective, two principles of St. Thomas have to be kept in mind if one is to understand anything at all about the problem in question. The first is, "Every cognition is realized in the image and likeness of the thing known in the knower." (Omnis cognitio fit secundum similitudinem cogniti in cognoscente.) 24 And the second, "The thing known is in the knower according to the mode of the knower." (Cognitum est in cognoscente secundum modum cognoscentis.) 25

From the first principles just stated we infer that the possession of a thing through intuition or other knowledge is not an appropriation of it in its physical qualities, as the ancient philosopher, Democritus, believed, alleging that all knowledge is realized by means of certain emanations or images coming from objects outside of us and entering into our body, organs, our entire being, in order to enable us to see and know the objects from which they emanated, but the possession of it in its psychological and immaterial properties by some sort of the resemblance of it achieved in us. From the second principle of St. Thomas, stated above, we conclude that the species expressa in the intuitive cognition is more than a mere resemblance, that it is an image or likeness or resemblance which is an imitation, a reproduction of the thing outside of us according to the

23 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 16, Art. 3.
24 Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. II, Chap. 77.
25 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 14, Art. 1, ad3.
nature of the knowing subject of ourselves. Hence the image, likeness, resemblance in question is not a material or physical image, likeness, resemblance like that of a photograph, for example, but an image, a likeness, a resemblance of another kind, that which we may call with the Scholastics a psychical, ideal, mental likeness, image, resemblance. This way the intellect ennobles things material because they assume in it a higher mode of existence than the one in which they exist in the order of reality. In themselves they exist materially; in the mind immaterially.

By the expressed species (species expressa) the intuition of the sentient order is, as already mentioned, complete. For then the sense organ and the faculty are in possession of the image and likeness of an object in the external world. The subject carries in himself the image and likeness thereof and views it as an immediate and direct presentation of what is in the outside world. But to come back to the manner of knowing things. St. Thomas says, "A thing is known, thirdly, when the image of the object known is not drawn directly from the object itself but from something else in which it is made to appear as when we behold a man in a mirror."

What do we see in something else as in a mirror? Many things. In the light of day we see everything that presents itself to our view; in the darkness of night we behold the moon and the stars. In a fish pond we see fishes in the water. Are these acts so many intuitions? Indeed! For they are direct and immediate perceptions of things in something else. However, when we say with St. Paul that "the invisible things of God are

26 Rom. 1, 20.
clearly seen being understood by the things that are made.\textsuperscript{26} we are no longer in the domain of intuitive knowledge but in that of discursive cognition, else we would be in the same position with the ontologists who imagine they see God intuitively. To see God's wisdom, goodness, the rest of His attributes, and Himself in His creatures demands much reflection, profound study, the notion of causality, the logic of induction. All this is not a simple intuition but a most complicated and difficult process of knowledge. Besides, if we knew God intuitively as the ontologists claim, there would be no atheists for everyone would see God and be happy in seeing Him. Unfortunately, there are many atheists in the world and none of us is happy as though we were already in the Beatific Vision of God. Hence St. Thomas referring to the third way of knowing things says again, "The third class comprises the knowledge whereby we know God while we are on earth by His likeness reflected in creatures. According to the Romans, I, 20, 'The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made.' Hence, too, we are said to see God in a mirror.\textsuperscript{27}

However there can be an intellective intuition in the third way whereby a thing is seen as in a mirror. That I can be sitting and standing at the same time involves, logically, a contradiction in terms and I know that this is something impossible, physically and ontologically. I see this truth at once with hardly any reflection on my part. This is an instance of an intellective intuition. Of this intuition, as well as of other kinds of intellective intuitions, we will speak later. Here we must chiefly speak of the senses, the sense cognition and perceptions.

\textsuperscript{27} \textit{Summa Theologica}, I, Q. 56, Art. 3.
We find ourselves in the midst of things material. We are living in the concrete order of things. This means that we are in one way or another in constant contact with the external world. Take the Aristotelian categories and view them one by one, substance, quantity, relation, quality, action, passion, place, time, and the rest. We are in the midst of these categories in the concrete order of things. They all affect us this way or that way. A tree is a substance with its own quantity, relation, quality, action, passion, and the like. When we see it we are invariably affected by it, differently in winter and differently in spring. A brute animal is a substance with its own attributes. It affects us in one way when we see it in a barn and in another way when we see it as meat on our table and eat it. Each of our fellow creatures is a substance with his or her own attributes. They all affect us as soon as we come in contact with them—sometimes pleasantly, sometimes otherwise. The channels through which the outside world exercises its influence on us are, as we know, our different senses, the eye, the ear, and the rest of them. What they convey belongs to the general domain of our intuitions. For it is not only the eye that makes us by means of its species expressa directly conscious of external objects, but the other senses do this also though, of course, in a different way. If I prick my finger with a needle, I at once experience pain. This is a direct knowledge of pain through the sense of touch. This is an intuition based on the sense of touch. Similarly, there are intuitions founded on the sense of taste, on that of smell, on that of hearing. That is why in the science known as epistemology all the senses are vindicated as the trustworthy fountains of our cognition. The whole world confronts us. We receive the world through our senses. From this one can
easily see how rich and varied our sense intuitions may be. Whatever is in the world may act upon us and impress us after its own fashion and leave in us "its expression" after our own fashion. "Cognitum est in cognoscente ad modum cognoscentis!" The mineral matter, the plant, the brute animal, the man may act on the sentient part of us and impress us accordingly. In fact such things and beings daily act upon us and enrich the store of our intuitions. Most of the time we are simply swayed by them instead of using them for the benefit of ourselves and of our fellow creatures. St. Thomas acted otherwise. By the power of abstraction he rose above them and appropriated them. Out of them he got universal ideas with which he built the wondrous system of his philosophy. Through them he went to the very source whence they came; that is, the external world. In this he discovered the foundation for his universal ideas in things themselves. Through them he also discovered their prototypes in God's mind - the universalia ante rem. The outcome of all this was his system of philosophy founded on moderate realism. Plato, Descartes, Leibnitz could not do this because they divorced the matter from the spirit, the body from the rational soul. Nor could the idealists like Berkeley do this for the simple fact that they reasoned away the matter. From them matter, as such, did not exist. Nor were the materialists capable of constructing any such system of philosophy because they reasoned away man's mind. For them the whole of man was but sense and matter.

The system of St. Thomas' philosophy is that of common sense and sound reason. This is because he properly understood and evaluated the sense intuitions in the light of the substantial union between man's body and soul. On this ground he could clearly see that what enters the sense
region cannot but go into the domain of the intellect and reason.

"Anima est tota in tota corpore et tota in singulis partibus corporis."
The soul is present in all the body and in all its parts. Again, "Ex anima et corpore constituitur in unoquoque nostrum duplex unitas naturae et personae." From the soul and the body there is in each one of us the twofold unity of nature and person. Therefore what affects the body must also affect the soul and vice versa. The soul cannot be affected without affecting the body. (Summa Theologica I, Q. 76, Art. 8.)

From the fact of the substantial unity of body and soul St. Thomas draws the conclusion that it is one and the same subject that understands and feels. "Idem ipse homo est qui se parcipit se intelligere et se sentire." 28 In other words, we predicate all our actions of one and the same subject which we call ego or self. Therefore it is I who think, reflect, study, who feel the fatigue thereof, suffer, live, eat, drink, and the like. Furthermore, on this substantial union between the rational soul and the body, on this ego or self, St. Thomas bases the fundamental principle for the whole range of human cognition, epistemology, theory of knowledge which principle he took from the great Aristotle and which reads as follows: "Man's intellect is (in the beginning) like a tablet on which there is nothing written. (Sicut tabula in qua nihil est scriptum.)" 29

But what is the proof of this? St. Thomas gives it in the very same article when he writes: "The falseness of this opinion (he means Plato's opinion) is clearly proved from the fact that if a sense is wanting the knowledge of what is apprehended through that sense is wanting also, for

28 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 75, Art. 1.
29 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 84, Art. 3.
instance, a man who is born blind can have no knowledge of colors. This would not be the case if the soul had innate images of all intelligible things." 30 Thence arose the scholastic adage that there is nothing in man's intellect unless it passes first through his senses. (Nihil est in intellectu nisi prius fuerit in sensibus). And since, as we know, there are external senses those of sight, of hearing, of touch, of taste, of smell, as mentioned previously, and the internal senses such as the common sense (sensus communis), phantasy, aestimative or cogitative faculty, memory, the principle here enunciated holds true of all those senses in general and of each one in particular. This means that all our senses are so many channels of sense cognition.

Therefore each of those senses, either external or internal, is a source of an intuitive knowledge for us. St. Thomas expresses this truth by saying that it is not in the nature of the sense faculty to know things by composition and division, in other words, to come to the knowledge of things by joining predicate to subject by the copula, est, or by denying predicates of subjects by the negative form of the same copula; that is, non est. Our intellect alone can do this and therefore it alone can possess reflective and discursive knowledge of things. While commenting on the doctrine of Aristotle, St. Thomas writes: "Cognitions of purely sentient nature are not drawn from principles and causes but they are begotten by the very fact that the sentient object stands out before this or that sense and impresses itself upon it." To proceed from causes to their effects or vice versa is not in the nature of the senses and sentient faculties - the

30 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 84, Art. 3.
intellect alone can do this. 31

However, the greatest source of sentient intuition seems to lie in the common sense (sensus communis) since it is an organic faculty whereby we at once perceive and distinguish both the sensations and the objects which produce them by acting on our external senses here and now. What a vast and rich source of intuitions it is! All the rest of the intuitions find their place in it and finally disappear from it into our subconsciousness to be part and parcel of our personality and to influence our whole life, now consciously, according to the circumstances of time, place, persons, and the rest. The next greatest source of sentient intuitions lies probably in the cogitative faculty whereby one at once and immediately sees and apprehends what is useful and good for him, on the one hand, or what is evil and harmful to him, on the other. The eye, ear, the touch, the taste, the smell - they all, each in its own way, contribute their intuitions to it for the good of man that he may live and prosper.

In a similar vein one could speak of the intuitions of every sense and faculty but what we have mentioned concerning the intuitions of the sensus communis and of the cogitative faculty suffices for us here to see the importance of sense intuitions in the life of the individual and in that of mankind.

For so many philosophers, from the dawn of human thought until our own days, sense intuitions were often occasions and fertile sources of mistakes, errors, with the resultant misfortunes and calamities for mankind since men are always powerfully influenced by systems of philosophy even despite

31 Metaphysics, 6, L. 1.
themselves, especially nowadays when human thoughts quickly travel around the world by means of newspapers, magazines, radio broadcasts, lectures, books and ever so many other channels influencing and swaying men and women, now this way, now that way in their very lives. This is especially true of mass movements. Once a mass movement is started by a false philosophy as Communism, for instance, by Karl Marx's philosophy, it becomes in the course of time a tremendous power for the overthrow of the "old order of things," nay, of the very principles on which the right kind of philosophy, life, and reforms should be built.

There were always two classes of philosophers for whom sense intuitions or visions were occasions and sources of mistakes and errors. The idealist type of sages of different shade and hue like Plato in the ancient world, Plotinus in the early Christian centuries, then Berkeley and others in modern times, unable to reconcile the sense intuitions with the higher order of human cognitions, rejected them as though something unworthy of human nature. The harm done thereby to humanity is evident. For philosophy which is not grounded on sense cognitions and intuitions cannot stand on its own principles; it has to be supported by Plato's world of Ideas or Forms, by Plotinus' emanations, by Berkeley's "dependence on mind." Such a philosophy is not proper to man, composed as he is of matter and spirit, the body, and the rational soul. Such a philosophy is one-sided philosophy and inevitably embodies flagrant errors and propagates still more flagrant ones. Let us take but one instance from the pseudo-Dionysius:

"Unto this Darkness which is beyond Light we pray that we may come and may attain unto vision through the loss of sight and knowledge and that in ceasing thus to see or to know, we may learn to know that which is beyond all perception and under-
standing (for this emptying of our faculties is true sight and knowledge), and that we may offer Him that transcends all things the praises of a transcendant hymnody which we shall do by denying or removing all things that are...

"It is not soul or mind or endowed with the faculty of imagination, conjecture, reason, or understanding... It is not number or order or greatness or littleness or equality or inequality... It is not immovable nor in motion or at rest and has no power and is not power or light and does not live and is not life; nor is it personal essence or eternity or time... nor is It one nor is it unity nor is It Godhead or Goodness; nor is It a Spirit as we understand the term since It is not Sonship or Fatherhood; nor is It any other thing such as we or any other being can have knowledge of; nor does It belong to the category of non-existence or to that of existence... It transcends all affirmation by being the perfect and unique Cause of all things and transcends all negation by the pre-eminence of Its simple and absolute nature—free from every limitation and beyond them all. 32

This is a description of the Absolute and of one's union with the Absolute and Transcendent Being. What does it mean? One may be certain that it is not the correct description of the Absolute nor of the rational creature's union with Him. "It is simply the Plotinian mysticism carried to its ultimate expression. In the words of Sir Thomas Browne it is 'Christian annihilation, extasis, liquifaction, transformation, the kiss of the Spouse, gustation of God, and ingress into the divine shadow.' The ecstatic philosophy of Plotinus introduced by the pseudo-Dionysius into Christianity became a perennial source of heterodox mysticism through the Middle Ages and down to the present day." 33

Our images and ideas must be regulated and corrected by the objective reality outside of us, else we will be inevitably carried away by them into the realm of phantasy and unreality. This is evidently the case of the idealist philosophers who discard sense intuitions and refuse to admit the

33 Hydrotaphia, Conclusion; p. 249.
reality of the senses and the concrete order of things. Preoccupied only with the ideal, they finally lose their balance. (Una operatio cum fuerit intensa, impedit aliam.)

On the other hand, the materialistic philosophers go to another extreme by rejecting the ideal order of things. For the ancient school of the Cyrenaic philosophy headed by Aristippus (born about the year 435 B.C.) the only criterion of knowledge we possess lies in the sensations or immediate affections, and so to use the technical term of modern philosophy, in the intuitions. Of these alone we are certain, whereas of the causes underlying them we can have no sure cognition. We know at once when a thing is white or sweet; we see its whiteness with our eyes; we taste its sweetness with our tongue but we can say nothing certain of what lies behind or beyond these sensations of ours. On this kind of intuitionism is based every materialism, empiricism, positivism, hedonism, relativism, ancient or modern. Professor Whitehead says: "All knowledge is derived from and verified by direct intuitive observation. I accept this axiom of empiricism as stated in this general form." 34 He (Professor Whitehead) finds that we have intuitions of probability, of inheritance, of memory, of new mental material, of the society of our personal experiences, of final causes, of God as intuition, or put in another way, of God as indicator of value." 35 Modern intuitionists do not rise above the realm of sense intuitions. Modern intuitionists explain by the intuition everything - God Himself and eternal truths! It means that God and eternal truths do not

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34 Adventures of Ideas, p. 177; (See Intuition by Wild, K. W., M.A.,) Cambridge at the University Press, 1938, p. 83.
35 Adventures of Ideas, p. 87, Process and Reality.
transcend the realm of sense intuitions, that God and eternal truths have no objective reality and they are only so many subjective indicators of values. Such is the philosophy divorced from the rational and ideal element in man; that is, from his rational soul.

St. Thomas avoided the fatal and disastrous mistakes of the idealists, as well as the still more fatal and disastrous mistakes and errors of materialists because he knew man's true nature and psychology. Therefore he did not reject the sense intuitions as the idealist always did as some unworthy accretion but accepted them as indispensably belonging to human nature and as immediate evidences of the external world outside of us and of the internal world within us. Nor did he remain in the sentient world, external and internal, as though it were the only reality. Mindful of the substantial unity between the soul and the body in man, he used the world belonging to the body, that is, the sentient world and sense intuitions, as so many means of reaching the world belonging to the soul, that is, the immaterial world, and of gaining intellective intuitions. In this way he built the domain of moderate realism against idealism, on the one hand, and materialism, on the other. On the certitude of sentient intuitions, St. Thomas has built a mighty system of philosophy as lasting as mankind itself and that, too, for the good and salvation of man.
CHAPTER III

SINGULARS AND SENSES

IN THE INTUITION

OF ST. THOMAS

William James in his preface to his two huge volumes on "The Principles of Psychology," writes: "All attempts to explain our phenomenally given thoughts as products of deeper-lying entities whether the latter be named 'soul, Transcendental Ego, Ideas,' or 'Elementary Units of Consciousness,' are metaphysical. This book, consequently, rejects both the associationist and the spiritualist theories and in its strictly positivistic point of view consists the only feature of it for which I feel tempted to claim originality." ¹

As we know, William James was the chief advocate and promoter of Pragmatism in America, a philosophy which claims that a test of truth lies in utility and practical consequences of a man's actions for his life, so that he (each man in particular), with his needs and demands and his cravings for the enjoyment of life to be satisfied, becomes in the words of that ancient sage, Protagoras, "the measure of all things." On pragmatism, positivism and sensism the whole of philosophy of William James is based.

However, in this he is not original at all as he "feels tempted to claim."

St. Thomas, treading in the footsteps of Aristotle and using the sense data as the foundation for MODERATE REALISM, may be called, in a certain sense, a pragmatist, an empirist, a positivist par excellence. Herein lies the true originality of St. Thomas. The originality to which William James lays claim is only a shadow in comparison to that of St. Thomas. William James' pragmatism, empiricism and positivism is lifeless, dead, because a useful good is considered in it as the highest criterion of truth; whereas St. Thomas' "pragmatism, empiricism and positivism" is pregnant with life and dynamism because it is the ground from which arises and on which firmly rests the highest and most powerful system of philosophy - that of Scholastic philosophy.

St. Thomas knows with Aristotle that the sense data, the senses, the sense faculties, and sense intuitions, are inevitably bound up with the useful good (bonum utile) for the preservation of the individual life and the procreation of the species. This is quite apparent when we examine the objects of our senses. What is the object of the eye, for instance? The colored object. Why must the eye see the colored object? Is it to enjoy the beauty of things seen? But the eye, a sentient organ, cannot see and appreciate the unity in variety, that is, the chief element of beauty! This can be done only by the eye of the higher order, that is, by our intellect. So the eye, this purely sentient organ, must have been given to the animal for the purpose of seeing what is necessary for the preservation of the sentient individual life and the multiplication of the species through mating and division of labor. Similarly, one can speak of the rest
of the senses. What is the object of the ear, to take another example? Sound. But why must the ear hear the sound? Is it to enjoy the music conveyed by the sound? But the sentient organ of the ear is unable to perceive and appreciate the harmony and melodies conveyed by the sound. The intellect alone can do so. Hence, the ear this purely sentient organ, is given the animal for some entirely different purpose, for that of enabling the animal to hear the sounds and noises connected with the preservation of its life and that of the species. Or take the estimative faculty, able at once to discern what is useful and good, on the one hand, or what is harmful and evil, on the other. What is it for? For the same purpose as the eye and the ear, that is, to preserve oneself and one's species, availing oneself in this of the perceptions of the eye and those of the ear, of those of the touch, and the rest of the sentient perceptions and cognitions. In all this St. Thomas is truly an empirist, a positivist, a pragmatist. With William James he can say that truth is not "transcendental" but ambulatory and that there is no truth outside of experience. And with Pragmatists in general St. Thomas can repeat Protagoras' principle that man is the measure of all things, for everything that is seen by his eye or perceived by his ear and the rest of his senses does not transcend him or his needs and demands, but is ordained for him and for the satisfaction of his needs and requirements. St. Thomas in this respect is not only in accord with William James but with any sensist or materialist, as for instance, Helvetius, Thomas Hobbes, and others. And yet there is a radical difference between St. Thomas' sensism, pragmatism, materialism, and the one which they advocated. Wherein lies the difference? In this, that they did not
rise above the sense intuitions, and entirely confined their system of philosophy within their limits, whereas St. Thomas rose above the sense intuitions and used them as the groundwork for his system of philosophy. How he did this we will show later. At present we must confine ourselves to the analysis of singular or individual things acting upon the senses in the intuitions of St. Thomas. What does he then mean by singular things and the senses?

_Singulare proprie sumitur pro individuo_ says St. Thomas with Aristotle. The singular stands for the individual. This individual may be a mineral matter, a plant, a brute animal, a man, or anything else in the world. Subsisting in the world of reality this mineral matter or this plant, or this brute animal, or this man, or anything else, holds its own position in time and space; performs its own functions, chemical or otherwise, that is, its vital functions of nutrition, growth, reproduction, as is the case with all living things, and exercises its influence on the outside world, chemically, functionally, vitally, or in any other way; for even a tiny pebble by the very fact that it occupies a certain definite space on the ground, however small that space may be, bears a certain relation to the earth and thereby exercises a certain influence on it; that of being in the midst of others for the completion of God's creation, wherein the highest and the lowest things find their suitable place and occupation. Man occupies the highest position and place among them. However, he is not independent of them. Through the material element of him, that is, his

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2 Phys. I, 1
body, he is related and bound up with them and cannot do without them. Hence, wherever he happens to be or live they inevitably act on his body and his bodily senses and organs and, through these, on his whole being.

When St. Thomas says that the singular stands for the individual he thereby means any individual substance in the world of reality outside of us, including, of course, our own fellow creatures. Further he thereby means that this world of reality acts in one way or another upon our senses, the eye, the ear, the touch, and the rest.

St. Thomas admits with Aristotle five external and four internal senses. Inquiring whether the five exterior senses are properly distinguished he quotes first of all what Aristotle said on this particular point, that there is no other besides the five senses,3 and then in the body of the article says, "The reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and per se. Now sense is a passive power and is naturally immuted by the exterior sensible. Wherefore the exterior cause of such immutation is what is per se perceived by the sense and according to the diversity of that exterior cause are the sensitive powers diversified." 4 And in the following article of the same question inquiring whether the interior senses are suitably distinguished, St. Thomas quotes Avicenna who assigned five interior senses or powers, namely, common sense, phantasy, imagination, the estimative and memorative powers.5 Nevertheless, St. Thomas says that

3 De Anima, III, L, 1.
4 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 78, Art. 4.
5 De Anima, IV, 1.
there is no need of the middle power between the estimative and imaginative. He writes, "Avicenna, however, assigns between the estimative and the imaginative a fifth power which combines and divides imaginary forms, as when the imaginary form of gold and the imaginary form of a mountain, we compose the one form of a golden mountain which we have never seen. This operation is not to be found in animals other than man in whom the imaginative power suffices thereto. To man also does Averroes attribute this action in his book, "De Sensu Et Sensibilibus (VIII)." So there is no need to assign more than four interior powers of the estimative and memorative powers." 6

All the senses, organs and sentient powers are evidently in the body, but the source from which they all arise is the same as that whence the body itself has its own life, that is, the rational soul or the substantial form of the human compound, man. The senses, the organs, the sentient faculties are so many accidents in this human compound and actualizations of the potentialities of the material element thereof, that is, the body. They all belong to the human ego and are instruments for the realization and manifestation of its life. The human ego lives and operates in the world of concrete reality and through the body extended in space and subject to time and through the bodily senses, organs, and faculties. St. Thomas expresses all this in the following words:

"We must assert that the intellect which is the principle of intellectual operation is the form of the human body. For that whereby primarily anything that acts is a form of the thing to which the act is to be attributed: for instance,

6 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 78, Art. 4.
that whereby a body is primarily healed is health and that whereby the soul primarily knows is knowledge; hence, health is a form of the body and knowledge is a form of the soul. The reason is because nothing acts except so far as it is in the act; wherefore, a thing acts by that whereby it is in act. Now it is clear that the first thing by which the body lives is the soul. And as life appears through various operations in different degrees of living things, that whereby we primarily perform each of all these vital actions is the soul. For the soul is the primary principle of our nourishment, sensation, and local movement; and likewise of our understanding. Therefore, this principle by which we primarily understand, whether it be called the intellect or the intellectual soul is the form of the body."

And to stress the idea that there really is the substantial union between man's rational soul and body, the former animating, the latter giving it its corporeity, its faculties, organs, senses and whatever else it possesses for the life and perfections of the human ego, St. Thomas continues: "But if anyone says that the intellectual soul is not the form of the body he must first explain how is it that this action of understanding is the action of this particular man for each one is conscious that it is himself who understands." 8

From the above doctrine concerning the substantial union between the rational soul and the body it necessarily follows that the body shares in the life and activity of the soul concerned and that the soul participates in the life and activity of the body in question. This must be well kept in mind when we are dealing with the intuitive knowledge of things in man. Let us analyze this knowledge in each of the senses.

In the intuitive knowledge of the eye we see wonders which no scientist, no philosopher can ever explain. Being such a small organ, it

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7 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 76, Art. 1.
8 Ibid.
takes in, however, everything that is presented to its view - mineral matter, plants, brute animals, men, villages, towns, cities, fields, forests, rivers, lakes, oceans, the sun, the moon, the stars, in short, the whole universe. The eye of the brute animal sees also such things, nevertheless it sees not in them what the human eye does. The brute animal eye sees in them only what its animal instinct impels it to behold therein, namely, only the preservation of the individual and of the species. The light wherewith they behold things reveals to them in them only food and what pertains to the preservation of their species. The human eye is different. In its intuitions it beholds the order and harmony among things in the universe, the beauty of the skies, revealed by the sun during the day and that of the starry heaven by night. It is because the human eye has a vital connection with man's spiritual eye which is his intellect, his reason: the human eye is animated and exists by man's rational soul, the substantial form of his body.

In the eye St. Thomas distinguishes two elements: the species impressa and the species expressa. 9 The proper object of the eye is the colored object. This is the formal object quod of the eye or that which the eye beholds first in its material object. But unless there be a light, that of the sun or that of a candle or that of electricity, the eye would not be able to see the colored subject matter; hence, the light is needed for that purpose. Accordingly, the light whereby the eye is enabled to see the formal object quod is called the formal object quo. When all these condi-

9 Contra Gentiles, II, 73.
Summa Theologica, I, Q. 85, A. 1.
tions are present, the seeing eye is impressed by the colored object confronting it. The result of this impression is the *species impressa* or the actual seeing of the object by the eye. This is the real sense intuition. The object confronting us is perceived at once and immediately, as though a seal had been taken and impressed on the wax, leaving its evident traces on the latter. In this way the whole universe and things in it may act upon the eye and leave in it their likenesses or images, not like the mechanical photographs but, as every Scholastic knows, certain vital and psychological likenesses and images that are taken up by the active intellect and stored away in the passive intellect wherein they become part and parcel of our very being, vitally affecting us in one way or another with the resultant influence on our life and conduct.

The question which arises in connection with the Thomistic *species impressa*, or image, likeness, similitude, intention, form (species, similitudo, intentio, forma) is this: That is really the object of our intuitive knowledge? Is it the cognitive image within us or the objective reality outside of us? If the cognitive image is the object of our cognition, then our knowledge of the things outside of us is not really immediate or presentative but representative or mediate, that is, we first see the image, the likeness, the similitude and then through it the object itself. In that case our cognition is no longer intuitive but reflective; one has to stop and think whether or not he is seeing only images or realities through them. But this is already the work of reason. The sentient faculties as such are unable to reflect and reason; they just see and comprehend things sentiently. To advocate representative or mediate,
cognition and perception is to open up a wide avenue into subjectivism and idealism. And that is what the subjectivists and idealists always did. St. Thomas advocates the presentative or immediate, cognition and perception. Hence for him it is the thing outside of us that is really the immediate object of our cognition and perception. He speaks of the union of what is perceived with the perceiving sense and of the identification of the sensation with the thing perceived. He writes, "Two things are required both for sensible and intellectual vision, viz., power of sight and union of the thing seen is in a certain way in seer." He similarly speaks in his Summa Contra Gentiles when he says that ex visu et visibili unum fit. And in the Summa Theologica he once more writes, "The sense is simply a passive potency which is disposed by nature to be changed by an external sensible object. This external something that produces the change is what is apprehended by the sense." St. Thomas is a perfect intuitionist in the domain of sense perceptions and cognitions and, consequently, is as great a realist as the greatest of the materialists, Moleschott, Buechner, Haeckel, Diderot, d'Alembert, Holbach, La Mettrie, Cabanis, and all the rest.

The eye is the noblest of senses. St. Thomas speaks of two kinds of changes in the senses, one that is natural and the other that is immaterial. The first he discovers wherever the form of that producing the

10 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 85, Art. 2.
11 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 12, Art. 2.
12 Summa Contra Gentiles, I, Chap. 51.
13 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 78, Art. 3.
change is received in its natural state by that which is changed, as for instance, heat is received by that which is heated. The second he finds whenever a form is received according to this immaterial being. He writes, "Now immutation is of two kinds, one natural, the other spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received according to its natural existence into the thing immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored." 14 An immaterial change is required for the activity of the senses because if a natural change alone were sufficient, then every body that suffered change would perceive something, a tree would see the sun or fruit hanging on its branches! So St. Thomas writes, "For the operation of the senses a spiritual immutation is required, whereby an intention of the sensible form is affected in the sensible organ. Otherwise, if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration." 15 The different senses arise from the fact that some of them experience purely immaterial changes whereas in others the changes are somewhat bound up with natural changes. To this effect St. Thomas says, "But in some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in the sight, while in others we find not only a spiritual but also a natural immutation, either on the part of the object only or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the object we find natural immutation by alteration, in odor to exhale an odor, a body must be in measure affected by heat. On the part of the organ natural immutation takes place in touch

14 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 78, Art. 3.
15 Ibid.
and taste for the hand that touches something hot becomes hot while the tongue is moistened by the humidity of the flavored morsel. But the organs of smelling and hearing are not affected in their respective operations by any natural immutation unless indirectly.  

In the sense of sight the alteration or change is purely immaterial. For this reason the human eye is the noblest of the human senses. For which reason St. Thomas says, "Now the sight which is without natural immutation either in its organ or in its object is the most spiritual, the most perfect, and the most universal of all senses."  

The next source of Thomistic sentient intuitive cognition is in the hearing. Here too must be species impressa and species expressa though they must be quite unlike the species impressa and the species expressa which are found in the eye since the organ of hearing is quite different from the organ of sight and the object of hearing, which is sound and quite different from the object of sight which is color or colored matter. What is the species impressa as regards the hearing? It is the sound caused, as St. Thomas says, by percussion and commotion of the air and striking the ear drum. Then the species expressa must be the actual hearing or perception of the sound.  

The bear seems to delight in music; the dog cannot stand the clap of thunder. Does a bear really appreciate music? Does a dog know the real danger in connection with a thunderstorm? No! The bear delights in music simply because it soothes his ear drum and the dog cannot stand the thunder

16 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 78, Art. 3.
17 Ibid.
clap because it terribly hurts his ear drum. Man's ear alone can perceive beauty in music and can hear the mighty forces of nature in a thunderstorm, revealing the might and power of nature's Author, those of God Himself. The rustling of leaves under the breath of gentle zephyrs, the howlings of the mighty winds, the roarings of the angry sea, the music of Beethoven, the symphonies of Tschaikovsky, the sermon of the preacher, a conversation with one's fellow creatures, a mother's words on the ear of a child — all these are so many direct impressions on the human ear and then so many direct expressions conveyed to the sensus communis and then to the mind, to the heart, and to the soul to sway us in one way or another! These marvels come from intuitions perceived first by the ear.

In degree of dignity the ear is next to the eye because of the immaterial change that takes place in its act of hearing though it requires, as St. Thomas says, "a natural immutation on the part of the object, sound caused by percussion and commotion of the air." 18

The next source of intuition lies in the smell. The sense of smell is given the animal for the sake of its individual good and that of its species. An animal smells food at a distance; so do we at times. Some animals smell their enemies at a distance and therefore make their escape in due time. For us there is the good odor of virtue and the awful odor of vice! The fragrance of a rose may convey to us the odor of sanctity in the Little Flower. The intuitions connected with the sense of smell may produce many other intuitions of another kind for our own spiritual good and

18 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 78, Art. 3.
that of our fellow creatures if we know how to profit by them.

In degree of nobility the sense of smell comes next to the hearing.
The physiologists describe the sense of smell as "the sense by which certain qualities of substances entering the nose are perceived." 19

St. Thomas speaks of two kinds of changes in the senses - natural and immaterial. He writes, "immutation is two kinds, one nature, the other spiritual. Natural immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received according to its natural existence into the thing immuted, as heat is received into the thing heated. Whereas spiritual immutation takes place by the form of the immuter being received according to a spiritual mode of existence, into the thing immuted, as the form of color is received into the pupil which does not thereby become colored. Now for the operation of the senses, a spiritual immutation is required whereby an intention of the sensible form is effected in the sensile organ." Otherwise if a natural immutation alone sufficed for the sense's action, all natural bodies would feel when they undergo alteration. "But is some senses we find spiritual immutation only, as in sight; while in others we find not only a spiritual immutation, either on the part of the object only or likewise on the part of the organ. On the part of the object we find natural immutation, as to place, in sound which is the object of hearing for sound is caused by percussion and communication of the air, and we find immutation by alteration in odor which is the object of smelling, for in

order to exhale an odor a body must be in a measure affected by heat."

Then classifying the senses according to their dignity and nobility, St. Thomas writes, "Now the sight which is without natural immutation either in its organ or in its object is the most spiritual, the most perfect and the most universal of all the senses. After this comes hearing and then comes the smell which requires a natural immutation on the part of the object, while local motion is more perfect than, and naturally prior to, the motion of alteration as the Philosopher proves (Phys. VIII, 7.)."

The next source of sentient intuitions is found in the sense of taste. Of the sense of taste St. Thomas writes, "The sense of taste according to a saying of the Philosopher is a kind of touch existing in the tongue only. It is not distinct from touch in general, but only from the species of touch distributed in the body. But if touch is one sense only on account of the common formality of its object, we must say that taste is distinguished from touch by reason of a different formality of immutation. For touch involves a natural and only a spiritual immutation in its organ by reason of the quality which is its proper object. But the organ of taste is not necessarily immuted by a natural immutation by reason of the quality which is its proper object so that the tongue itself becomes sweet or bitter, but by reason of a quality which is a preamble to and on which is based the flavor, which quality is moisture, the object of touch."

The animal is endowed with it for the sake of its own preservation for

20 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 78, Art. 3
21 Ibid.
it thereby knows what food to eat or what not to eat. For us this sense may mean other intuitions. In the very act of eating we may be inspired with love or hatred. With love if we remember the poor and leave something for them, with hatred if we keep everything for ourselves, unmindful of our less fortunate fellow creatures. Again in the act of enjoying food, we may pour forth our thanks to God for His bountiful gifts thus sanctifying ourselves even by these lowly necessary acts or we may enjoy the gifts quite unmindful of their Giver thereby bringing ourselves to the level of irrational beings and even placing ourselves below their level, since they do not possess the intellect to know such things; whereas we do possess it and should use it for the guidance of ourselves in all things.

The next source of intuition is in the sense of touch. Of the sense of touch St. Thomas writes, "The sense of touch is generally one, but is divided into several specific senses and for this reason it extends to various contrarieties, which senses, however, are not separate from one another in their organ but are spread through the whole body so that their distinction is not evident. But taste, which perceives the sweet and the bitter, accompanies touch in the tongue but not in the whole body, so it is easily distinguished from touch." 23 Elsewhere of the sense of touch he writes, "The sense of touch which is the foundation of the other senses is more perfect in man than in any other animal, and for this reason man must have the most equable temperament of all animals. Moreover man excels all other animals in the interior sensitive powers as is clear from what we

23 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 73, Art. 3, ad 3.
have said above (Q. 76, Art. 4). But by a kind of necessity, man falls short of the other animals in some of the exterior senses, thus of all animals he has the least sense of smell. For man of all animals needs the largest brain as compared to the body, both for his greater freedom of action in the interior powers required for the intellectual operation, as we have seen above (Q. 34, Art. 7), and in order that the low temperature of the brain may modify the heat of the heart, which has to be considerable in man for him to be able to stand up erect. So that the size of the brain, by reason of its humidity, is an impediment to the smell which requires dryness. In the same way we may suggest a reason why some animals have a keener sight and a more acute hearing than man, namely, on account of a hindrance to his senses arising necessarily from the perfect equality of his temperament. The same reason suffices to explain why some animals are more rapid in movement than man since this excellence of speed is inconsistent with the equality of the human temperament." 24

Particularly the sense of touch in the human hand does St. Thomas extol! With Aristotle he calls it "the tool of tools." He writes, "Horns and claws, which are the weapons of some animals, and toughness of hide and quantity of hair or feathers, which are the clothing of animals, are the signs of an abundance of earthly element, which does not agree with the equableness and softness of the human temperament. Therefore such things do not suit the nature of man. Instead of these he has reason and hands whereby he can make himself arms and clothes and other necessaries of life, of

infinite variety. Wherefore the hand is called by Aristotle the *organ of organs.*" 25

The sense of touch is a very great source of intuitions. Its *species impressae* and *species expressae* are effected by contact. The physiology book defines the sense of touch as "the sense by which pressure or traction on the skin or mucous membrane is perceived." 26 That is what St. Thomas also teaches. For him the senses are intermediaries between the knowing consciousness and the external world. He writes, "the reason of the number and distinction of the exterior senses must therefore be ascribed to that which belongs to the senses properly and *per se.*" Now, sense is a passive power and is naturally innated by the exterior sensible. "Wherefore the exterior causes are the sensitive powers diversified." 27 For him the sense of touch is, as we know, the basic sense 28 and consequently bound up with the very preservation of the individual's life. The touch coming into immediate contact with the texture of the outside world keeps the animal informed about it and enables it to ward off any pernicious and destructive influence. The infant in the mother's womb, before the infusion of the rational soul, feels mostly by the sense of touch. 29 This shows how vitally and intimately the sense of touch is connected with the individual preservation, as well as that of the species. One can be blind, and deaf,

26 *Textbook of Human Physiology,* op. cit.
27 *Summa Theologica,* I. Q. 78, Art. 3.
29 *Summa Theologica,* III, Q. 34, Art. 2, ad 3.
lose the sense of smell, and even taste, and still live...but if numbness comes over a body, that is a sign that death is near at hand.

St. Thomas accords the sense of touch a special importance in view of the rational element, life and activity in man. He believes that this sense in him conditions the endowments of his mind. He writes, "All the other senses are based on the sense of touch. But the organ of touch requires to be a medium between contraries, such as hot and cold, wet and dry, and the like of which the sense of touch has the perception; thus it is in potentiality with regard to contraries and is able to perceive them. Therefore the more the organ of touch is reduced to an equitable complexion, the more sensitive will be the touch. But the intellectual soul has the power of sense in all its completeness because what belongs to the inferior nature pre-exists more perfectly in the superior, as Dionysius says." Therefore the body to which intellectual soul is united should be a mixed body, above others reduced to the most equable complexion. For this reason among animals man has the best sense of touch. And among men, those who have the best sense of touch have the best intelligence. A sign of which is that we observe those who are refined in body are well endowed in mind, as stated in De Anima, II, 9. In animals the sense of touch is ordained solely to the preservation of the individual life and to that of the species. But in man the sense of touch is also a tremendous source of sense intuitions for the work of the mind. The first object of our

31 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 76, Art. 5.
intellect in this life is not any being or any truth but it is being and truth in material things from which the human mind goes forward to the knowledge of other things." 32 Again, "It is natural to man to attain to intellectual truths through sensible objects because all our knowledge originates from sense. Hence in Holy Writ spiritual truths are fittingly taught under the likeness of material things." 33

The sense of touch which is the foundation of the rest of the senses cannot but be a mighty source of intuitions from which the mind can lift out higher spiritual contents. In these sentient intuitions we can apprehend spiritual values and thence arise to the higher place of life. Particularly in music the sense of touch plays a tremendous role. The piano, the organ, the violin, would be useless instruments without the sense of human touch. Nor could other liberal arts, like sculpture, painting or architecture be realized without it. Our very speech could not function without this sense. Hence we must say that the intuitions afforded us by the sense of touch are many and most important for us in our every day life, as well as for our civilization and the uplift of our souls.

As for the internal senses, there is the common sense (sensus communis). It is a great source of intuitions because of the fact that it perceives at once and immediately what all the rest of the senses perceive singly. For instance, when one plays the piano, he sees this instrument, touches it, and hears the music. He perceives all this immediately and distinctly by the sensus communis that is in him. So there he has three

33 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 1, Art. 9.
different intuitions at once. And one can have therein as many intuitions as the rest of his senses can revive by confronting their proper or common objects respectively. The animal's common sense serves it just for the preservation of its individual life and that of its species. For us, however, the common sense is an inexhaustible mine of intuitions. The intellect with its own eye may see in them a world all of its own or a world belonging to God with all its beauty, goodness, righteousness, mercy. The sensus communis in itself is a marvel of nature's work and God's creation. Through its intuitions it can introduce us into the domain of other marvels in that same nature and His creation. The sensus communis radiates, as it were, intuitions; at first it perceives intuitions, then it unifies and distinguishes them and finally radiates them.

The next internal sense is the phantasy or imagination which is the faculty that preserves the sense intuitions or contents and forms and renews them. It is the treasury that contains the forms begotten by the external senses. It transmits to the appetitive faculty the representation of that which is not present and it makes dreaming possible. St. Thomas writes, "For the retention and preservation of these forms (he means sensible forms), the phantasy or imagination is appointed, which are the same, for phantasy or imagination is, as it were, a storehouse of forms received through the senses." 34 Phantasy or imagination in man can be a perennial source of intuitions. Out of it the intellect and reason can produce poetry, music and other liberal arts; out of it one can draw inspiration for great and

34 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 78, Art. 4.
noble deeds. One will be convinced of this truth if he studies great masterpieces in poetry, music, and other liberal arts.

What are the species impressae and the species expressae in phantasy or imagination? They are no longer like the species impressae and species expressae in the external senses and even, perhaps, like those of the sensus communis, the direct presentations of the world outside of us but the indirect representations of it. The sense contents are not only preserved here, as already mentioned, but they are also formed and renewed. So here a new element enters into the sense intuitions, namely, the subjective element founded on representation. Is it a subjectivism? No! This is simply a psychological element in the sense intuitions introduced from the outside by direct presentation of the external world.

The next source of internal intuitions lies in the cogitative faculty. In brute animals the corresponding faculty is called estimative whereby they know the harmfulness or the utility of a thing. St. Thomas calls it animal prudence or judgment. To this effect he writes, "Some things there are which act not from any previous judgment but, as it were, moved and made to act by others, just as the arrow is directed to the target by the archer. Others act from some kind of judgment, but not from free will, for sheep flies from the wolf by a kind of judgment whereby it esteems it to be hurtful to itself. Such a judgment is not a free one but implanted by nature."35 Again, "The estimative acts somewhat after the manner of reason."36 And

35 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 59, Art. 3.
36 Book of Sentences, III, D. 26, Q. 1, Art. 2.
again, "The young ravens are said to call upon God on account of the natural desire whereby all things, each in its own way, desire to attain the Divine Goodness. Thus too dumb animals are said to obey God on account of the natural instinct whereby they are moved by God." 37

St. Thomas writes:

"Now we must observe that as to sensible forms there is no difference between man and other animals, for they are similarly immuted by the extrinsic sensible. But there is a difference as to the above intentions for other animals perceive these intentions only by some natural instinct, while man perceives them by means of collation of ideas. Therefore, the power which in other animals is called the natural estimative, in man is called the cogitative, which by some sort of collation discovers these intentions. Wherefore it is called also the particular reason to which medical men assign a certain particular organ, namely, the middle part of the head for it compares individual intentions, just as the intellectual reason compares universal intentions." 38

That in the cogitative we are still in the domain of sense intuitions is evident from the fact that this particular reason apprehends things without much ado, almost instinctively, and therefore at once and immediately. The mother, for instance, at once apprehends the needs of her child and at once attends to them. So we all at once and immediately see what is of benefit to us in our daily life as well as what would be detrimental and act accordingly.

The next and the last source of sentient intuition is the memorative faculty. Its function is to recognize the past. Hence its contents are sense impressions and expressions from the past. St. Thomas writes:

37 Summa Theologica, 2–2, Q. 89, Art. 10, ad 3.
38 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 78, Art. 4.
"As to the memorative power, man has not only memory as other animals have in the sudden recollection of the past, but also reminiscence by syllogistically, as it were, seeking for a recollection of the past by the application of individual intentions." 39

By analyzing the senses and their intuitive contents we have laid the ground for the intellective intuitions in man. How St. Thomas will leave this ground and find himself in the midst of the lofty intellective intuitions will be our next problem to consider. We would like to take along with us William James and the rest of the Sensists, Materialists, Positivists and show them how St. Thomas "flies," but will they profit by his example? It seems they are more content to be in the domain of what is common between us and brute animals than in that of what is common between us and the angels, nay, God Himself. To be sure, brute animals have no real intuitions, even of the sentient order, since they are incapable of looking into or looking at things (which is the connotation of the word intuition and wherein a certain kind of participation in the higher faculty, that is, the intellect is implied) but are impelled and driven thereto, so to speak, by their instinct, and so St. Thomas says that the animals are more acted upon than acting themselves. (Magis aguntur quam agunt.) In man, because of the substantial union between his rational soul and material body, the latter, with all its senses, organs and sense faculties shares in the spirituality of the former. And so in virtue of this participated, so to speak, spirituality, man's sense impressions and expressions are intuitions, whereas those of brute animals are not. The materialist, sensists,

39 Summa Theologica, I, Q. 78, Art. 4.
positivists, empiricists by denying the immateriality and spirituality of the human soul destroy the real character of sense intuitions and thereby identify them with the sense impressions and expressions of the brute animal nature.

An upright stature was becoming to man for four reasons. First, because the senses are given to man, not only for the purpose of procuring necessaries of life for which they are bestowed on the animals, but also for the purpose of knowledge. Hence whereas the other animals take delight in the objects of the senses only as ordered to food and sex, man alone takes pleasure in the beauty of sensible objects for its own sake. Therefore, as the senses are situated chiefly in the face, other animals have the face turned to the ground, as it were, for the purpose of seeking food and procuring a livelihood; whereas man has his face erect in order that by the senses and chiefly by sight, which is more subtle and penetrates further into the differences of things, he may freely survey the sensible objects around him, both heavenly and earthly so as to gather intelligible truth from all things. Secondly, for the greater freedom of the acts of the interior powers - the brain wherein these acts are, in a way performed, not being low down but lifted up above other parts of the body. Thirdly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground he would need to use his hands as forefeet and thus their utility for other purposes would cease. Fourthly, because if man's stature were prone to the ground and he used his hands as forefeet, he would be obliged to take hold of his food with his mouth and thus he would have a protruding mouth with thick and hard lips and also a hard tongue so as to keep it from being hurt by exterior things,
as we see in other animals. Moreover, such an attitude would quite hinder speech which is reason's proper operation.

Nevertheless though of erect stature, man is far above plants. For man's superior part, his head, is turned towards the superior part of the world and his inferior part is turned towards the inferior world, and therefore he is perfectly disposed as to the general situation of the body. Plants have the superior part turned towards the lower world, since their roots correspond to the mouth and their inferior part towards the upper world. But brute animals have a middle disposition, for the superior part of the animal is that by which it takes food and the inferior part that by which it rids of the superior. Hence man's erect position itself makes him a commanding figure in the field of intuitions and enables him to gain them with ease.

40 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 91, Art. 3, ad 3.
CHAPTER IV

INTELLECTUAL INTUITION IN ST. THOMAS

The late G. K. Chesterton in his introduction to Dr. Fulton J. Sheen's book *God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy* writes:

"I remember a romance of rambling but rather interesting sort which came out in one of the strange and sensational series that used to be produced by the late W. T. Stead. It began with the incident of a modern sceptical heroine going into a confessional box and telling the priest that she did not believe in his religion. He asked her what she did believe in and she said reflectively, 'Well, I don't believe in the Bible, and I don't think I believe in the immortality of the soul, and I'm not sure that I believe in God, and so on.' And the unmoved cleric replied, 'I didn't ask you what you don't believe, but what you do believe.' 'Well,' said the lady, 'I believe that two and two make four.' 'Very well, then,' said the priest, 'live up to that.'"

Why was the lady in question so certain about the truth that two and two make four while she was doubting or completely rejecting those higher truths, by no means less but much more certain than the mathematical truth she took from the table of multiplication? The reason is that the truths contained in the Bible, God's existence, as well as the immortality of the soul belong to the domain of reflective truths at the possession of which

one can arrive only after a long course of profound reflective and discursive studies. The Bible, for instance, may be known by heart in the light of reason but one will not believe the truths and mysteries contained in it unless he is given the light of faith and divine aid from above. But the mathematical truth that two and two make four is evident per se so that hardly any reflection is needed to grasp it, it simply forces itself upon our mind as it did force itself on the mind of the unbelieving lady mentioned above. We cannot but accept the truth, else we are no longer in our sound mind, or we are simply relying on our sense intuitions when there is no proper adaptation between our senses and their objects, thus, if two parallel lines be prolonged, they seem to meet at a distance because of the lack of proper adjustment between them at that point and our eye or may be that organ is not in a normal and healthy condition; thus, to a person laid up with typhoid fever, even the sweetest things are most bitter. And in that case intuition, instead of being according to reason, are simply contrary to reason. Of such intuitions there are very many instances in Plato's philosophy, wherein he claims the universals in the world of Ideas or Forms; in Descartes' philosophy in which he intuitively sees that he thinks and that consequently he exists even while doubting the very power to think and to exist; in all subsequent materialistic and idealistic
philosophies wherein the modern sages after having erred about the real nature of man, the substantial union between his rational soul and body, could not but err in all their intuitions about him and everything else. Berkeley beholds only spirit in matter and Cabanis only a secretion of the brain in thought. All such philosophers are no longer able to see with certainty that two and two make four for in their cases the parallel lines meet and they say with Ibsen, "Who knows that two and two do not make five in the fixed stars?" 2 Being off the tangent, those philosophers are unable to come back to the first principles, the principle of identity, the principle of contradiction, and the principle of excluded middle in order to verify, rectify, or readjust, or even renounce altogether their intuitions, sentient or otherwise, in the light of irrefragable and eternally true principles on which all certitude and truth must stand, else there can be no falsehood, lie, while the wiseacres are striving to bestow on them the semblance of truth and certainty. For St. Thomas there is nothing in the intellect unless it goes first through the senses. Once this process has been realized, he bases the sense intuitions on the intellective intuitions on the intellective intuitions. What are these in the teachings of St. Thomas?

Once more we must note what is meant by intuition. Intuition is a cognition of an object outside of myself. Intuition is an accident. Hence it is inherent in me, in my ego. So there is the external object on the one side and there I am myself on the other, and the intuition is the bond

2 God and Intelligence in Modern Philosophy, op. cit.
of union between us, the outside world and my own ego. The external object stands out before us and we see it just as it is or impresses itself upon us, upon our senses, and then upon our intellect, as is truly the case with the intellective intuition. We see the object in question in consequence of the expressed species it leaves in us, through which we assimilate it (object), so to speak, and become one with it, of which assimilation and union we have already spoken in connection with sense intuitions. Hence intuition from the Latin verb, intueri, means to look at a thing attentively because it seizes, as it were, our cognitive faculty and we comprehend it by the same faculty so that we become lost in this mutual embrace, if one may speak so.

I see a friend and recognize him. And yet St. Thomas teaches that "the intellect knows sensible individual things only indirectly and by a kind of reflection." This seems to militate against the very notion of intuition since its chief trait is that of direct and immediate cognition. Hence even if I see my friend standing before me with my bodily eyes, directly and immediately, still I cannot see him directly and immediately with the eye of my mind. How are we to solve the difficulty? St. Thomas speaks of this problem in connection with the intellect's cognition of individual objects on two occasions in the *De Veritate* and in the *Summa Theologica*.

Once the intellect has come to know its own object which is the universal essence, it turns then to obtain the species which is the universal essence; it turns then to obtain some knowledge of its own act and after that it goes farther to obtain the

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3 *De Veritate*, II, Q. 6, Art. 2.
species which is the principle of its act, and then it looks at the phantasm from which it has abstracted the species and thus it obtains the knowledge of the individual. 4

Similarly he speaks of the process in the *Summa Theologica*, except that he does not mention the intellect's reflection on its own act. As we see, there is in both instances the reflective knowledge and not a direct and immediate cognition as the intuition should be. Are we, then, to say that we possess no intuitive knowledge of our friends, nor that of our brothers, sisters, parents? To say so would mean to deny easy and spontaneous intellectual intuitions of this kind in our daily lives and intercourse with our fellowmen and especially with our own folks. Wherefore, despite those apparent difficulties, we must maintain that we possess with certainty such intuitive cognitions on the ground of our previous contact, intercourse, experience, and living with all such persons. We have acquired a happy faculty or habit of knowing them in virtue of which we unmistakably recognize them at once in the midst of the individualizing notes and traits of their personalities. We know in general what is meant by goodness, truthfulness, honesty, justice, mercy and the like. We have gained these universal concepts from the concrete persons—our own folks, friends, acquaintances, whose goodness, honesty, righteousness we experienced before and now we intuitively recognize them by these qualities.

There is what is called the post-rational intuition, a result of the "habit of knowledge." Let us remember the twofold character of our mind—analytic and synthetic. We do not know things at once and immediately in

their entirety. First, we tear them apart, we analyze them, we examine them part by part, and then we join the parts together which is the work of synthesis in order to know them in their totality. So in acquiring sciences and knowledge we analyze, abstract, reason, and finally arrive at the conclusions which we store in our passive intellects, and which eventually become the "habit of knowledge" with us. We see scientific truths in them spontaneously, so to speak, at once and immediately. To the class of these postrational intuitions belong also the intellective intuitions we have of our friends, acquaintances, our own folks and the rest; our daily experience with these persons taught us to know them and to acquire "the habit" of knowing them. They may be called the post-experiential intuitions.

In all these instances, the spontaneous, the immediate knowledge of the individual is concomitant with the immediate knowledge of the universal. This solves the problem of the intellective intuition in question. And of such similar intuitions there are countless instances in every man, woman, and child, in every scientist, artist, and artisan, in every philosopher, metaphysician, and theologian. They all have them.

However, all such intuitions are possible and de facto exist because of the so-called fundamental intellective intuitions. What are we to understand thereby? It is the seeing by the intellect of its own proper object which is being. Just as the eye has its own proper object, the ear its own, and the rest of the senses, their own, so the intellect has its own proper and per se object and this is, as just mentioned, being.

But how does the intellect come to the perception of its own object in this fundamental intuition? Quite simply and naturally. It comes thereto
by means of abstraction from the sense data or the sentient perceptions and
intuitions. The eye brings in the colored objects, the ear the sounds, the
touch the extension, and the other senses something else, until their
contributions through the perceptions and functions of the internal senses
have accumulated in the imaginative faculty, from which the intellectus
agens abstracts the notion of being and the intellectus patiens understands
that whatever is, is and that whatever is not, is not and that there can be
no middle course between being and non-being. In this way a tremendous
leap is taken from the sense data into the domain of pure metaphysics, even
by the lowliest and most ignorant people for they all know what is to be
and what is not to be, or what is to live and what is not to live, that is,
to die. The animals perceive this too but with them it is not abstraction
of the intellectus agens and the understanding of the intellectus patiens,
but the instinct which forces them to seek self-preservation and to flee
from death. They are in no way able to rise above this animal instinct and
to die, let us say, a heroic death for the sake of one's own country and
say with Horace, Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori. (It is sweet to die
for one's own country.}

In De Magistro St. Thomas writes:

"We must recognize that there is this difference between the
intellect and bodily sight; to bodily sight all its objects
are equally immediate for knowing for the sense is not a
discursive power as to be obliged from one of its objects to
arrive at another; but to the intellect not all intelligible
things are equally immediate for knowing, but certain things
it sees immediately and certain other things it does not see
except by examining other principles. Thus then man gains
a knowledge of unknown through these two, namely, the intel-
lectualive light and the first concepts intuitively known which
are compared to the light of the active intellect, as tools
to a builder. With regard to both, God is the cause of man's knowledge in the most excellent way possible, because He endows the mind itself with the intellective light and impresses on it the knowledge of first principles, which are as certain germs of knowledge just as He impresses on other natural things, the germinal capacities of all the effects to be produced. But man being equal according to the order of nature to other men in the kind of intellective light, can in no way be the cause of knowledge in another man by increasing the light in him. But in view of the fact that knowledge is known, man is, in a way, the cause of another's knowing not by giving the knowledge of principles but by deducing into actuality that which is implicitly and in a certain way potentially contained in sense, as has been said in the preceding article. But because an angel has naturally a more perfect intellective light than man, he can be the cause of knowing in man in both ways, although in an inferior way than God is the cause and in a superior way than man is.  

In the above quoted passage St. Thomas states the fact that we possess sentient intuitions given to us by our senses, on the one hand, and intellective intuitions engendered in us by the first principle, on the other, and that between these two classes of intuitions there is the discursive knowledge obtained by analysis and synthesis, by induction and deduction, by a process from certain premises to corresponding conclusions. Further, St. Thomas states therein that God is the cause of our knowledge in the most excellent way because He gives us the intellective light and impresses on it knowledge. From these different statements of the Angelic Doctor, we see how he based all cognitions on the first principles. Our sense cognitions, discursive knowledge, lights received from above, from God or an angel, must be reduced to the first principles and judged in the light of those fundamental intuitions if we are to possess certain cognitions at all.

5 De Magistro, Art. 3.
and not simply unverified intuitions of the modern type to which one may well apply the name of Bacon's different idols - idols of the tribe, idols of the den, idols of the market place, idols of the theatre, and which lead us but to errors, absurdities, contradictions, in all our endeavors and spheres of life, material, spiritual, moral, scientific, philosophic, and every other.

St. Thomas speaks of the intuitions furnished by the first principles elsewhere. In the Summa Theologica he states that the first principles in order of cognition, as well as in that of ethics, are the unyielding principles of knowledge, as well as of desire and action. He writes:

"The intellect cannot but assert to principles naturally known; and the will cannot but seek good, insofar as it is good because it is naturally ordained to good as its object." 

The first principle in the domain of cognition is that of contradiction. The same thing cannot be and not be at the same time and in the same respect (Non contingit idem simul esse et non esse); and in the domain of things moral the first principle is this: Good is to be done and evil to be avoided (Bonum est prosequendum; malum vero est fugiendum.) Again the first principles are the most certain and secure grounds of our knowledge in the speculative order of things and of our actions in the practical order of life. Hence per se no error is possible on the ground of these principles. However, if there be an error about them, the error arises not directly from them but is contained in the conclusion badly drawn by a faulty reasoning. (Intellectus errat circa prima principia, in specula-

6 Summa Theologica, I. Q. 62, Art 8 and 2.
7 Summa Theologica, I-II, Q. 94, ad 2; II-II, Q. 1, ad 7.
tivis et in practicis ut sunt virtute in conclusionibus, per malam ratio-
cinationem, non autem secundum se). And the error about the first
principles, whether in the speculative or the practical order of things
is most serious and most shameful. (Error circa principia in
speculativis et in practicis, est gravissimus et turpissimus.) All
scientific certainty can be verified by referring to the first principle
of contradiction, of excluded middle term, of sufficient reason, and all
science is contained in them germinally and potentially for which reason
these universally known and immediately evident principles, though small
in extent, are very great in power.

It is in this light that St. Thomas speaks of the first principles
in De Veritate, Contra Gentiles, and Summa Theologica. His whole
system of philosophy is grounded on these principles. On the first
principles he bases all cognition in the speculative order of things and
all morality in the practical order.

We obtain knowledge of the first principles by an immediate act of

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8 Summa Theologica, II-II, Q. 154, Art. 12.
9 De Veritate, XV, 1; XVI, 1
Contra Gentiles, I, 61.
intuition. (Simplex et absoluta acceptio principii per se noti.) Hence fundamental intellective intuition is the groundwork for all true cognition, art, science, philosophy and theology in the speculative order of things and for all ethics and morality in the practical domain of human life.

There are two orders of truth, the speculative and the practical. In the speculative order where the notion of being is the first of all notions, the first indemonstrable principle is that of contradiction whereby we affirm that a being is or is not. Accordingly, in the practical order where the first notion is that of good (for every agent acts for an end and wills a good), the first principle is that which affirms that good must be sought and evil avoided. (Bonum est faciendum et malum vitandum.) Hence St. Thomas writes:

"The precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason what the first principles of demonstration are to the speculative reason because both are self-evident principles...a certain order to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For that which, before aught else, falls under apprehension is being, the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Wherefore the first indemonstrable principle is that the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time, which is based on the notion of being and not being, and on this principle all others are based... Now as being is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason which is directed to action since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently, the first principle in the practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz., that good is that which all things seek after. Hence this is the first precept of law, that good is to be done and evil to be avoided. All other precepts of the natural law are bases upon this so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided."

10 Summa Theologica, Q. 180, Art. 6, ad 2.
From the above doctrine it necessarily follows that just as there is the intuitive knowledge in connection with the habit of the first principles in the speculative order, there must also be the intuitive knowledge of the first principles in the order of practical reason, in that of ethics. This is done by the intuitive knowledge called synderesis or synteresis. This word comes from the Greek language meaning a close watching. In virtue of the synderesis, the mind does not employ the major and the minor, and consequently, does not draw a conclusion from the premises; it watches and sees at once and immediately what must be done as something good and avoided as something evil. This is an intellective knowledge, par excellence, of the practical reason. St. Thomas speaks of it as follows:

"Synderesis is not a power but a habit; though some held that it is a power higher than reason, while others said that it is reason itself, not as reason, but as a nature. In order to make this clear we must observe that, as we have said above, man's act of reasoning since it is a kind of movement, proceeds from the understanding of certain things, namely, those which are naturally known without any investigation on the part of reason, as from an immovable principle and ends also at the understanding, inasmuch as by means of those principles naturally known, we judge those things which we have discovered by reasoning. It is clear that as the speculative reason argues about speculative things, so the practical reason argues about practical things. Therefore, we must have bestowed on us by nature not only speculative principles but also practical principles. Now the first speculative principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power, but to a special habit which is called the understanding of principles as the Philosopher explains.12 Wherefore, the first practical principles bestowed on us by nature do not belong to a special power but to a special natural habit which we call synderesis. Whence, synderesis is said to incite to good and to murmur to evil inasmuch as through first principles we proceed to discover and judge of what we have discovered. It is, therefore, clear that synderesis is not a power but a natural habit." 13

12 Ethic., VI, 6.
But is this natural habit, synderesis, "inciting to good and murmuring at evil" which is contrary to the conscience commending us for our good deeds and reproaching us for the evil ones? True, they are not to be identified synderesis, which may be quite easily taken for suneidesis (joint knowledge), that is, conscience. In fact some writers, like St. Jerome and later St. Bonaventure, saw no difference between them. However, St. Thomas, Duns Scotus, and others distinguish them. For them synderesis is a habit, something permanent; suneidesis or conscience is an intermittent act. In virtue of synderesis, I, at once and immediately, almost spontaneously, know that parents must be honored. I must honor them, respect them, and help them in every way I can. However, if I fail to do so, my conscience will reproach me for this. And if I fail in my duty toward my parents continuously, my conscience will bother me also continuously, unless it be entirely deadened by my evil deeds. Still this constant reproach (or constant commendation if I am a dutiful daughter) will not cause my conscience to become a synderesis for me by the very fact that conscience commends or reproaches in virtue of synderesis. In other words, conscience has no light of its own; it is guided by synderesis. Hence St. Thomas writes:

"Properly speaking, conscience is not a power but an act. This is evident both from the very name and form those things which in the common way of speaking are attributed to conscience. For conscience, according to the very nature of the word, implies the relation of knowledge to something, for conscience may be resolved into cum alio scienza, i.e., knowledge applied to an individual case. But the application of knowledge to something is done by some act. Therefore, from this explanation of the name, it is clear that conscience is an act."
"The same is manifest from those things which are attributed to conscience. For conscience is said to witness, to bind, or incite, and also to accuse, torment, or rebuke. All these follow the application of knowledge or conscience to what we do; which application is made in three ways. One way, insofar as we recognize that we have done or not done something - Thy conscience knoweth that thou hast often spoken evil of others (Eccles., VII, 23), and according to this, conscience is said to witness. In another way, insofar as through the conscience we judge that something should be done or not done; and in this sense, conscience is said to incite or to bind. In the third way, insofar as by conscience we judge that something done is well or ill done and in this sense, conscience is said to excuse, accuse, or torment. Now it is clear that all these things follow the actual application of knowledge to what we do. Therefore, properly speaking, conscience denominates an act since habit is a principle of act, sometimes the name conscience is given to the first natural habit, namely, synderesis; thus Jerome calls synderesis, conscience. (Gloss. Ezch. i, 6); Basil, that natural power of judgment, and Damascene says that it is the law of our intellect. For it is customary for causes and effects to be called after one another."

Synderesis and conscience are the two great source of intuition in the moral order of things. A profound study and exploration of these sources cannot but be of the greatest benefit to individuals themselves and to society at large.

CONCLUSION

The ancient philosopher, Empedocles, claimed that like is known by like, "...earth by earth, water by water, fire by fire," and so on. This is the principle on which the moderns base their intuition, even though, perhaps, they are not aware of the fact that they are doing so. Take for example, the prince of modern intuitionists, Bergson. For him there are no intuitions in the Thomistic sense, be they of the sentient or those of the intellective order. For him there is no passive phase of intuition as there is for St. Thomas by the very fact that the things impress themselves upon our senses, or the first principles on our mind; there is only active intuition since he maintains that we become aware of the nature of reality through direct experience, only insofar as we enter into the reality in question, from a part of it, and interpret it through a kind of sympathy by becoming earth, water, fire, or anything else. This he calls true intuition and creative evolution wherein the chief element is the élan vital - the vital impulse. The underlying idea in this kind of intuition is truly that of Empedocles. The new element in it is that of becoming. The ground of all things is becoming since the creative vital process is at once the reality and moving principle of individual life and of the cosmos as a whole, whereof we ourselves are part and parcel in this total cosmic movement. For this reason, we are no longer free in the light of Bergson's philosophy, even though he undertook to vindicate the freedom of man in
opposition to other modern philosophic systems wherein not even the vestiges of his freedom have been left. We are in the process of becoming more and more one with the things about us, with the world, with the universe. Bergson's sympathetic intuitions and that of other modern intuitionists identify man with what he sees, hears, perceives, and so with the rest of his senses and his intellect itself. Therefore, the condition sine qua non of modern intuition is one's becoming identified with the world and then one's continuing to evolve with it. On this becoming and continuing is based, the modern theory of knowledge which may be stated thus: Becoming is known by becoming and continuing is known by continuity. Such is modern intuition and this is a degradation of man! In what sense? In this that he must identify himself with creatures lower than himself and by sympathetic intuition become like unto them, forfeiting thus his freedom, his moral dignity and making himself the slave of things material. This is an inversion and perversion of the order established by the Creator.

St. Thomas' intuition is radically different from that of the moderns. In his intuition man does not become one with things but things become one with him by means of the cognitive assimilation, first in his senses, then in his intellect. In this way things material, the cosmos, become ennobled by the quality of his mind and he himself becomes enriched by the impressions and ideas he acquires from the outside world since they become a part and parcel of him in the external world as in the case of modern intuition. St. Thomas conveys the idea of the order of human cognition in the following words: "Matter receives the form that thereby it may be continued in some species either in air or of fire or of something else; but the intel-
lect does not receive the form in the same way, otherwise the opinion of Empedocles (De Anima, 1, 5, Text 26) would be true to the effect that we know earth by earth and fire by fire. But, the intelligible form is in the intellect according to the very nature of a form for as such is it so known by the intellect. Hence such a way of receiving is not that of matter but of an immaterial substance.¹

For the modern intuitionists, the sense data are a source of degradation and enslavement, whether they want or not. They are led thereto by the inexorable law of logic for if one enters into the sense data and identifies himself with creatures by the bond of sympathy for them (whatever sympathy this may be), one is bound to become like unto them and thereby to lose himself in them. For St. Thomas the sense data are the source whence there arises the sentient intuition from which, by means of abstraction, he comes to the intellective intuitions. From the intellective intuitions he rises, by means of discursive knowledge, to the domain of such metaphysical truths as being, act, and potency, substance and accident, God's existence, His divine attributes, His providence in the world, the immortality of man's soul, life beyond the grave, sanction of the law whereby evil must be punished and good must be rewarded, and the like.

The sentient intuitions, rightly understood, inevitably lead to the intellective intuitions. First of all, they lead to the intuitive knowledge of the first principles. St. Thomas states that the intellect knows nothing but being which, in general, designates everything that exists or

¹ Summa Theologica, I, Q. 50, Art. 2, ad 2.
may exist, whether it be a substance, an accident, a material thing, or an immaterial one, again, there are contingent beings, as all creatures are, or the Necessary Being, that is, God. Hence the formal reason of our comprehending anything is that of its being. This also applies to the transcendental properties of being – unum, verum, bonum, aliquid, indivisum.

In Quaest. Disp. De Verit., Art. 1, St. Thomas writes:

"What the intellect first apprehends as something most evident and into which it reduces all its conceptions, is being. The true and being differ conceptually in this that what is in the concept of the true is not in the concept of being but not in such a way that what is in the notion of being is not in the notion of the true." 2

But how does our intellect comprehend being? Is it in its own essence as the angels do in theirs, or as God does in His? No, the proper object of the human intellect, the ratio entis (the very notion of being), is derived from sense but, of course, it is abstract and universal. The very substantial union between man's soul and body postulates such a course and there is for us no other way of possessing intellective knowledge of things in this life. Hence it follows that what we first apprehend from the data of sense perceptions, in other words, from the perceptive intuitions of our senses, is the notion of being and then that of non-being. This is done most easily and quite spontaneously from the very comprehension of terms or language conveying such notions. And so through the medium of our perceptive intuitions, we acquire the intellective intuitions of the first principles. From this one can easily see that these intuitions are mutually connected. The intellective intuitions are drawn by means of

abstraction from the sentient intuitions and the latter is verified and rectified by the former. For if we are to rely at all on our sense intuitions, we must bring them to unity by means of the principle of identity, contradiction and the rest; otherwise, we might take pure imagination, reverie, dreams, hallucinations, suggestions and auto-suggestions, madness, delirium, etc., for reality and truth. It is the intellect fundamentally through its intuitive cognition of the first principles that reduces the sense intuitions to unity, simplicity, and objective truth. In our intellectual intuitions there is already something angelic, something divine, insofar as we thereby share somewhat in the angelic and divine intuitions for this is the way in which the angels, and especially God Himself, know themselves and things outside of them at once and immediately in their very essences which is the most perfect way of cognition. Hence St. Thomas in referring to the habit of the first principles in man, that is, his intuitive knowledge of the first principles, writes:

"Although the human soul acquires knowledge by the process of reasoning, still there is in it a participation in that simple cognition which is found in the higher substances." 3

The bridge between the sentient intuitions and those of the intellect in man, there is the discursive knowledge. In judging of the validity of the sense perceptions and intuitions in the light of the first principles, reason must be used. On the first principles the whole reason of human cognition must stand, else man himself will fall as he does in the modern world in the midst of so many contradictory systems of philosophy. Since human knowledge

3 De Veritate, Q. 15, Art. 1.
is acquired only through the medium of senses and sentient perceptions, images and phantasies, whether it be at home, in school, in society, in the bosom of nature, or in the laboratory, one must constantly use reason in judging of everything in the light of the first principles. In all this one goes from the first source of truth, namely, the sentient intuitions to the last criterion of intellective intuitions furnished us by the habit of the first principles habitus primorum principiorum the germ cells of all knowledge and even of the preambles of faith since we must know that God exists, that He is all truth, unable to be deceived or to deceive others before we can even talk about the divine Revelation and consequently must verify and rectify and support our rational knowledge of God by the first principles - those of contradiction, identity, and sufficient reason. St. Thomas declares that there can be no contradiction between reason and faith. "Those things which are known by faith cannot be contrary to natural knowledge." In this way St. Thomas, unlike the moderns, does not abide in the sentient intuitions and does not remain in things material by a sort of sympathy thereby becoming like unto them, but by means of those intuitions he is enabled to reach the intellective intuitions connected with the first principles. Then in the light of these, by means of discursive knowledge and the aid of faith, he is able to build a marvelous system of philosophy and theology, which he makes autonomous because of their different formal objects - the light of reason in philosophy and that of faith in the sacred theology - but never separates them; one of them, that is, philosophy, leads to theology and the latter helps  

4 De Veritate, I, Chap. 7.
the former and furnishes a Christian philosopher with the intuitions which
God alone can give us. The *Summa Contra Gentiles* and the *Summa Theologica*
of St. Thomas are clear proofs thereof. Some of the schoolmen seem to insist
on the separation between philosophy and theology. They say that the field
of philosophy is the light of reason and that of the sacred theology the
light of Divine Revelation. This is very true. Nevertheless if they insist
on the separation between the two, it means that they do not understand the
spirit of St. Thomas nor his intuitions in the domain of reason and in that
of faith. They may be called "mechanists" in the domain of Scholasticism.
The Lord deliver us from such schoolmen for in time they are bound to bring
misfortunes upon us, just as the schoolmen called "ipsedixists", who, being
unable to meet the light and the spirit of the philosophy of St. Thomas, the
modern era of scientific discoveries, brought disgrace on Scholasticism and
the Catholic Church, which disgrace could not but result in untold harm not
only to the Catholic Church but to Christianity in general. William Turner in
his History of Philosophy writes:

"The representatives of Scholastic philosophy in the fifteenth
and sixteenth centuries seem for the most part to have completely
forgotten the principles of the classic Scholasticism of the
fifteenth and the thirteenth centuries, busying themselves with
subleties too refined to be grasped even by the learned, they
utterly neglected the study of the scientific movement sanctioned
by the usage in the schools of the Golden Age of Scholasticism,
raised the argument from authority to a position of unde impor-
tance... The decay of philosophical speculation in the schools
and universities of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, the
humanistic movement, the rapid progress of the natural sciences
and the influence of the first reformers contributed to bring
about the transition from Scholastic to modern philosophy." 5

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5 *History of Philosophy*, p. 423.
Our own times are no less, probably much more, critical than those of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Hence we too must abandon the ways and by-ways of "ipsedixism" and explore the spirit and intuitions of St. Thomas in his vast, tremendous, most profound, as though divinely inspired, works, particularly his *Summa Contra Gentiles* and *Summa Theologica*. Therein we shall find what the modern world precisely needs—realism arising from the sense intuitions, verified, rectified and supported by the intellective intuitions furnished us by the habit of the first principles in the speculative order of things by synderesis and conscience in the moral domain and finally by the sacred and tremendous intuitions given us by our holy Faith. It is only on the ground of such intuitions as these that we can be sure of ourselves and safe in the rest of our intuitions, those of the senses and the imagination. Furthermore, imbued with the spirit of St. Thomas' realism and guided by the principles of his manifold intuitions, we will be safe and sound in the midst of any human intuitions, be they those intuitions by which "genius reaches its fruitful creations—creations that seem to have been given gratuitously in a sudden illumination," or the post-rational intuitions, that is, the intuitions which are the fruit of analysis, abstraction and reasoning, in other words, the intuitions acquired by study, science, and investigation, or the supra-rational intuitions, that is, synthetic concepts of the spiritual reality in the higher order of things relating to God and our own souls, free from the tyrannical imagination and the partial and successive views of discursive reasoning or be they
finally the mystical intuitions or the vision of God in this earthly life. Then only will we be realists and progressivists in the true sense of the word.

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APPROVAL SHEET

The thesis submitted by Bernice J. Novogrodzka has been read and approved by three members of the Department of Philosophy.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts.

30 June 1949  
Date  

Signature of Adviser