The Response of American Journals of Opinion To the Rise and Consolidation of National Socialism in Germany

Thomas Martin Keefe
Loyola University Chicago

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THE RESPONSE OF AMERICAN JOURNALS OF OPINION
TO THE RISE AND CONSOLIDATION OF
NATIONAL SOCIALISM IN GERMANY

by

Thomas M. Keefe

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Thomas Martin Keefe was born on December 25, 1933 in Chicago, Illinois. He attended Chicago Catholic grammar schools, St. Cyril and St. Philip Neri, from 1940 to 1948 and De La Salle High School from 1948 to 1952. As a college undergraduate he matriculated at Wilson Junior College and Chicago Teachers' College from 1952 to 1953, and St. Mary's College in Winona, Minnesota from 1953 to 1956. He graduated from St. Mary's with the Bachelor of Arts degree in June 1956. He was awarded a Master of Arts degree in International Relations from Denver University in December 1957.

After one semester of graduate work at Loyola University in 1958, he became a Teaching Fellow in the History Department from September 1959 to June 1962, and he was a part-time lecturer during 1962-1963. During the school year 1963-1964 he taught history as an assistant professor at St. Mary's College in Winona, Minnesota. He served as a lecturer of history in Loyola's School of Business Administration in 1964-1965, and since September 1965 he has been Instructor of history at St. Joseph's College, Philadelphia.
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INTRODUCTION

This dissertation is a study of the response of the American periodical press to a decade of German history—a decade which helped to shape the future of the world. Specifically, it is concerned with the events of the period from September 1930 to September 1939. In no way does the author conceive of his project as a new interpretation of German history during the National Socialist era; there has been no attempt to discover new facts relating to this period. Rather, the dissertation attempts to see the events of these years through the eyes of the writers who were shaping opinion in the United States toward German National Socialism. It intends to indicate what the journalists found interesting and worthy of comment and to analyze their views.

Thus while one intention of this work is to indicate what the American periodical press had to say and how it was said, a second consideration is whether or not the news coverage and interpretation by the journals were reliable, responsible and intelligent. It is hoped that this work will reveal enough information so that the many American journals considered here may be judged as to how well they performed the function they claimed to be fulfilling: giving the American reading public an accurate and
authoritative account of the events in Nazi Germany and a credible assessment of Adolf Hitler and National Socialism.

In examining the periodicals, a number of worthwhile lessons can be learned from the American response to some of the significant problems which arose between the two world wars. One question asked is whether the many periodicals and journalists were able to come to grips with the true significance of the National Socialist ideology or the character of Adolf Hitler. The same question was posed by Dr. Brigitte Granzow in her new book *A Mirror of Nazism* (London: Victor Gollancz, 1964) which considered the response of British newspapers and journals from 1929 to 1933 to Hitlerism and its growth.

Since the period under consideration was one in which great political, social and economic experiments were being undertaken by most of the important nations of the western world, the various assessments by the journals must be considered in this light. For example, the United States was following such a course under the direction of President Franklin D. Roosevelt after March 1933. That this one man played such a key role in directing America's recovery legislation could have been reflected in the journals that attempted to understand the so-called leadership principle of the National Socialist doctrine.

While in some American circles in the 1930's the Rooseveltian New Deal was considered revolutionary, hindsight shows now that it was nothing more than a moderate left-wing enterprise. This brings to the forefront the question of whether the
American journalists really had a clear conception of what extremism in government entailed, or whether they fully comprehended the concept of modern totalitarianism. There was no faction in the United States at this time which could compare with the National Socialists. The extremist and hate groups that blossomed in the nineteen-thirties lacked the organization and leadership to pose too great a threat to American institutions or to win a sizeable number of American converts. Nonetheless, the noise being made by the extreme right- and left-wing American movements must have been heard by the journalists who were shaping opinion on Germany and could well have influenced their writing in one way or another.

The racial theories of Nazism were a spectacular aspect of Adolf Hitler's program. Of course, anti-Semitism was not a new problem, but one wonders if the American periodicals and journalists were prepared intellectually to grasp the significance of Hitler's plans. Whether the journalists ever took seriously the racial policies of the National Socialist leader and his friends is another consideration worthy of investigation. One might also ask if a real sense of urgency with respect to the Jewish question was felt by the journals at any time during the period from 1930 to 1939.

Another factor which might well have figured in the journals' interpretation of the first years of the Hitler era was the Versailles Peace Treaty and the revisionist interpretation of the causes of World War I. Because many of the periodicals, especi-
ally those which could be classified as liberal-inclined, looked upon the 1919 settlement as an unjust and ill-suited arrangement, the views of these magazines on the emergence of National Socialism—a movement which used the anti-Versailles Treaty argument as one of its chief propaganda slogans—should be probed. Inquiries should also be made into how the journals treated the early activities of the Fuehrer and his officials. Whether the American journalists looked upon the National Socialists as ordinary politicians who, although dissatisfied with the status quo, would exercise their rule according to the standards of the twentieth century in their efforts to restore Germany's lost prestige, is another question to be answered.

Work in European history using the American journal and newspaper approach is not of recent origin. Several studies of press response have already appeared with respect to Nazi Germany. Two masters' theses at Loyola University in Chicago have touched on limited aspects of this problem: Robert L. Bireley, S.J., "The Reaction of Five American Catholic Periodicals to the Rise of Nazism: 1923-1937," 1963; and Samuel A. Marotta, S.J., "The Reaction of America, The Commonweal, and The Catholic World to Italian Fascism," 1959. The only known attempt thus far at a more intensive study is the unpublished Yale University dissertation written in 1954 by Frederick K. Wentz: "The Reaction of the Religious Press in America to the Emergence of Nazism." Sections of this author's work, based on his dissertation, can be found in two published articles in the quarterly Church History: "American

Several monographs dealing with press and periodical reaction to National Socialism have recently been published. In 1959 Alfred Grosser edited Hitler, la Presse et la Naisance d'une Dictature (Paris: Armand Colin), in which he documents the treatment of Hitler's rise to power in the major newspapers of the western world, 1932-33. A more recent work is Brigitte Granzow's A Mirror of Nazism (London: Victor Gollancz, 1964). Dr. Granzow has analyzed the response of the more serious British press, which she limits to The Times, the Observer, the Manchester Guardian, the Daily Telegraph and the Economist, with an occasional use of the New Statesman, to the rise to political power of Adolf Hitler from 1929 through most of 1933 and to the nature of Nazism. Andrew Sharf's The British Press and Jews Under Nazi Rule (London: Oxford University Press, 1964) is an important topical work which covers the period from 1933 to 1945. Dr. Sharf uses approximately 150 British newspapers and magazines in making his assessments of the British press reaction to the National Socialists' anti-Semitic program.

The present dissertation is distinct in its handling of the American journal response, notwithstanding the various unpublished manuscripts and published articles and monographs covering the same period of German history. It differs from the two Loyola University masters' theses in two ways: in the scope of years cov-
red in German history and in the number of journals selected for the study. Wentz's Yale dissertation considered only the years 1933 to 1937, and his research was limited to American religious journals and newspapers. In contrast this dissertation covers the years 1930 to 1939, and utilizes American secular publications, more Catholic periodicals, and fewer Protestant ones, than Wentz's study. Almost no similarity exists between the present dissertation and the published monographs. Both Grosser and Granzow researched primarily non-American journals and newspapers and limit their investigations to the advance of incipient National Socialism. As the title of Sharf's book indicates, he is concerned with one facet of the British press response to the Hitler program.

More than three dozen quality American journals have been investigated for this dissertation's approximately nine-year study of German history, September 1930 to September 1939. The decision has been made to use only the leading journals of opinion so that the problem might be followed in depth and with some consistency. The journals of opinion selected, with few exceptions among the monthlies and quarterlies, responded to the problems of the nine-year growth of National Socialist tyranny with a number of long editorials, a variety of signed articles and, in many instances, a news section devoted to short comments. With the application of these criteria, it was decided to reject the more popular magazines such as Time, Newsweek, Life, Collier's and The Saturday Evening Post, whose coverage and assessment of foreign affairs were found to be superficial and limited in depth. In these last-
named magazines the emphasis was on factual content and polished articles by men of literary talent which appealed to the less politically alert American reading public. No effort was made to consider newspaper articles. The day-to-day handling of the events does not allow the newspapers to linger long on any one particular subject, so that depth studies were relatively infrequent.

In the selection of the journals of opinion, an attempt was made to include representatives from the commonly recognized groups within the spectrum of American life. Representing the liberal school, The Nation and The New Republic, both weeklies, were the two prime examples of the secular journals which were examined. A moderately liberal approach to world politics was taken by The Survey Graphic; the same could be said for Current History until 1937 when, after The New York Times sold its interest in this monthly, it became a sensational type of journal for the next few years. The articles which concerned German affairs appearing in The American Scholar were usually left of center. Until it ended publication in 1932, The Outlook and Independent presented

1 The political orientation of most of the journals used in this study can be determined by investigating Edwin Emery and Henry Ladd Smith, The Press and America (New York: Prentice-Hall, 1954); Theodore Peterson, Magazines in the Twentieth Century (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1956); James P. Wood, Magazines in the United States (2d ed.; New York: The Roland Press, 1956); and Martin E. Marty, John G. Deedy, Jr., David Wolf Silverman and Robert Lekachman, The Religious Press in America (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1963). For those periodicals not cited or precisely categorized in any of these monographs, the author has had to make his own judgment based on a thorough reading of editorials and signed articles touching on a number of important issues of the day.
a liberal interpretation of the news. The year 1932 also saw the
demise of another moderately liberal monthly, The World's Work,
which was absorbed by the conservative Review of Reviews.

The moderately conservative viewpoint of the American
secular magazines was probably best expressed in the editorial
section of The Living Age and in the pages of The Literary Digest.
Both journals contained significant features. The Living Age's
pages were filled by articles taken from various European news
sources, while the Digest summarized world press opinion of the
important events. More to the right in their editorial opinion
and feature articles were The Review of Reviews and The American
Mercury. Extremely reactionary material was published by The Am-
erican Review.

A number of quality journals featured articles by authors
with varying sets of values and political beliefs; except for an
occasional editorial, it was difficult to determine the political
Magazine, The Forum and The North American Review. Hence they may
be considered as neutral.

Attention was also paid to the religious periodicals,
since many of them were keenly interested in world affairs. They
became even more alert to events in Germany once the Hitler re-
gime tried to bring the churches under state control. The most
frequent Catholic response occurred in the Jesuit weekly America
and the weekly Commonweal, controlled and edited by Catholic lay-
men. More often than not, America's reactions were conservative
in tone, while *The Commonweal* tended to be somewhat more liberal. The weekly *Ave Maria* and the monthly *Catholic World* and *Sign* were other Catholic magazines, all three controlled by religious orders, which offered their readers a significant number of articles and editorial comment devoted to German affairs. Their orientation was generally conservative. A minimum of material on world events was furnished by *The American Ecclesiastical Review* and the Knights of Columbus monthly *Columbia*.

For the Protestant side of the story, the highly respected non-denominational *Christian Century* must be placed at the head of the list. Numerous editorials and articles devoted considerable attention to the various developments in Nazi Germany. The *Christian Register*, a weekly of the Unitarian and Universalist churches, contained a few editorials and signed articles with a generally liberal orientation like the *Century* pertaining to events in Germany. Another weekly with a liberal slant to its editorial comments was *The Presbyterian Advance*. During 1934 this periodical changed its name to *The Presbyterian Tribune*, but unfortunately not every issue from this year to 1939 was available for research. A number of worthwhile articles were contributed to the Protestant quarterly *Religion In Life*. On the other hand, the subscribers to *The Lutheran Church Quarterly* were able to read only a few selections concerning the situation in Nazi Germany.

Some of those journals taken under consideration aimed at a more highly educated readership than others. Among these, the quarterly *Foreign Affairs* supplied a number of worthwhile long and
incisive articles on the Third Reich. Less attentive to international events but containing some response to the Hitler regime were The Yale Review, Thought, a Catholic journal, and the Protestant quarterly Christendom. Occasional valuable commentary was also discovered in such scholarly reviews as the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, The American Political Science Review and The Catholic Historical Review.

A chronological approach seemed most natural for the first three chapters in this dissertation. These cover the span of time during which the National Socialists made the transition from a political faction into the totalitarian government of Germany with the enactment of the Enabling Law on March 23, 1933. Their program possessed the flexibility, the vagueness and the dubious qualities of a mere opposition group. Thereafter, when the National Socialists assumed political responsibility, they were forced to devise concrete policies designed for specific day-to-day situations, in all aspects of German life. Hence a topical treatment of the material, i.e., the journalists response offered the best method for organization, and allowed for analysis in depth and with continuity.

The varying publication dates of the weekly, monthly and quarterly journals present some difficulty since they responded at closer or greater distance from the concrete events. The events themselves rather than the date of publication have supplied the criterion for determining the order of treatment in the dissertation.
CHAPTER I

THE NATIONAL SOCIALISTS SCORE THEIR FIRST SUCCESS

The Reichstag election of September 14, 1930, turned out to be a profitable one for the extremes—both Fascist and Communist. The National Socialists increased their total vote from just over 800,000 votes in the 1928 national election to over 6,400,000. More impressive was the number of seats won in the Reichstag: 107 as compared to only twelve in the previous campaign. A less spectacular increase was shown by the Communist Party, which acquired approximately 4,600,000 votes and 77 Reichstag seats—1,230,000 ballots and 23 deputies more than in the May, 1928 election. Readers of the American journals of opinion had not been fully prepared for such results.¹ Few journals on

¹It should be pointed out that a somewhat more than cursory inspection of the journals under consideration during the nineteen-twenties revealed little in the way of depth study with regard to the National Socialist movement. In times of German political and economic crisis, the Nazis would appear along with other radical and revolutionary groups, but it did not seem that the periodical press went out of its way to detail any of their activities or to outline their program. The major event in the nineteen-twenties in which the Hitlerites participated, the Munich Putsch, was given extremely limited coverage in 1923, as was the post-revolution trial of Adolf Hitler, General Erich von Ludendorff and their associates.

Once the troubles of the early twenties had apparently been alleviated, the operations of the anti-republican forces faded from the pages of the journals, except for an infrequent reference. It was not until 1930, when a variety of problems descended on republican Germany, that the American periodicals began to note
election eve had sensed the degree of animosity that the German people felt against the moderate government led by the Centrist, Heinrich Brüning. In the immediate post-election period the journals were quick to suggest reasons for the election results and to analyze the prospects for Germany's political future.

The first response appeared in the various weeklies. The liberal New Republic gave the most space to events in Germany. Time and again, it would present the most accurate assessment of German internal affairs during the period covered by this dissertation. Its September 24 editorial noted that the parliamentary government had the dual job of affecting legislation in a Reichstag which now had about 244 left- and right-wing extremists and a revival of the extremist activity. However, there was little specific notice of the growing strength of the National Socialist Party until just about two months before the September 14, 1930 national election. More significant was the fact that the journals failed to perceive just how potent a force the Nazis were becoming as a result of their high-pressure campaign tactics and their appeals to the disenchanted voters of Germany.

For a knowledge and understanding of the political climate in which the National Socialist Party was founded and was nurtured, background material is essential. There are a number of worthy volumes in English on the Weimar era. Harlan P. Hansen and Robert G. L. Waite have recently translated into English the two volumes of Erich Eyck's A History of the Weimar Republic (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962 and 1963). This is the most thorough study of the republican era. Still useful and always interesting is the work by the Social Democrat, Arthur Rosenberg, History of the German Republic (London: Methuen and Co., 1936). A short but profound monograph is Arnold Brecht's Prelude to Silence (New York: Oxford University Press, 1944). Samuel William Halperin is frequently given credit for presenting the best material for essential background knowledge in his Germany Tried Democracy (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Co., 1946). The Weimar Republic: Overture to the Third Reich (London: Faber, Faber and Faber, 1946) is a short, readable history by Godfrey Scheele. Economic and administrative problems are given particular emphasis.
keeping the World War I allies, especially the French, happy, while it struggled to fulfill the financial demands of the Young Plan. Carefully viewing the political situation, The New Republic seemed to think that there was little likelihood that even a Socialist-led coalition government would be able to carry on for any length of time. No government could be more than a temporary stop-gap with such pressure being applied from all sides. The German people were determined to upset the Versailles agreement, and they now had sought out a politician, Adolf Hitler, who was willing to oppose reparations fulfillment. But once Hitler came to power, there would be passive resistance and "perhaps even a resort to arms." One reassuring sign for this editorial writer was that the actual number of Hitler's backers was unknown, although the number of Germans voting for the National Socialist Party had already been published. It was believed by this weekly that many German votes for the National Socialists were cast to frighten more concessions from the British and French at the international level. The New Republic hoped that some kind of moderate coalition, organized by President Paul von Hindenburg and blessed with the "goodwill of the world," might be able to salvage some aspects of German democracy.²

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²The New Republic, LXIV (September 24, 1930), 139-140. This liberal organ had consistently supported the Weimar Republic and sympathized with it because of the restrictions imposed by the Versailles peace.

Where no specific author is named, in either the text or the footnote, the reference is to an unsigned editorial or short editorial comment; even when this editorial bears a title in the journal, this will not be indicated in the notes, in the interest of economy of space.
The radical victory in Germany was just as threatening as far as the September 24 Nation was concerned. Neither the Fascists, whose voting strength appeared to be within the middle class, nor the Communists, held enough seats in the Reichstag to claim a majority, although they were the second- and third-ranking parties according to the number of deputies. For the present, they could only increase their disturbances and continue to curtail normal parliamentary procedures. But the fact of the matter was that parliamentary government in Germany was approaching its demise. The Nation held out little hope for the advocates of moderation. No moderate ministry, said the editorial, would be able to stand for long against the attacks of the extremists. Besides, the German people wanted a dictatorship. This remark was apparently intended to remind the readers that the republican structure of the government was already tottering. The principle of ministerial responsibility had been violated on July 16, 1930, when Article 48 of the constitution had been invoked. After the Reichstag had rejected Chancellor Heinrich Bruening's financial measures, Hindenburg had permitted the Chancellor to take emergency powers in order to effect his fiscal program.

Adolf Hitler's activities since the abortive 1923 putsch were briefly surveyed by The Outlook and Independent for September 24, 1930. His recent success at the polls was reportedly due

3The Nation, CXXXI (September 24, 1930), 309. The Nation is the oldest and probably the most influential of American liberal journals. Its contributors included the most noted promoters of American liberalism.
his great gift of oratory and his appeal to women and the German youth. The main points of his program called for Anschluss, repudiation of the peace treaties and the disfranchisement of Jews. In this brief article the editors committed themselves to nothing except that the National Socialist gains caused some concern abroad. The September 27 Literary Digest noted the same concern for this "specter of Fascism" in foreign capitals; it, like The Nation, doubted whether anyone could now form a government of moderate parliamentarians.

Despair was the cause of the Hitler party's success, according to the weekly Christian Century in the September 24 issue. The desperate German population was turning to a dictatorship as a panacea for its country's economic ills, an action which, in the long run, could only bring instability to central Europe. A Presbyterian Advance editorial for September 25 attempted to analyze the new party alignment in the Reichstag and concluded that possibly a coalition led by the Socialists could make a workable government. This arrangement depended upon whether the center parties would agree to serve with the Social Democrats and vice-versa. The Socialists had refused to go along with Chancellor

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4 The Outlook and Independent, CLVI (September 24, 1930), 156. The editorials of this journal were moderately liberal.

5 The Literary Digest, CVI (September 27, 1930), 9. In its editorial policy this journal was generally considered to be conservative; however, a significant part of the Digest was the inclusion in its pages of a survey of world newspaper opinion.

6 The Christian Century, XLVII (September 24, 1930), 1139. This non-denominational Protestant weekly had a liberal policy.
Eucken's financial measures, and there was no indication that the stalemate would be broken. No Social Democrat sat in the Premier's cabinet. Nevertheless, the Advance was convinced that the German people would not remain radical and that "the situation probably will work out better than now appears probable." The magazine's optimism was not shared by another religious weekly. That the election results were "probably a faithful picture of the point of view of the electorate" was the verdict of the Catholic journal Commonweal. It believed that the political future of Germany was in the hands of the Catholic Center Party which was now faced with turning to the right or left for help in forming a new government or being confronted with indefinite chaos. Unfortunately for the administration the people who might have helped with the problem believed that "grinning and bearing it is the best recipe," while the masses hastened to the banner of Germany's most "picturesque demagogue."

From the time of the Nazi September election accomplishments, Adolf Hitler and his followers remained an almost constant news item in the journals under consideration. The majority of the articles continued to view the situation as serious, but the initial apprehension concerning the new reactionary surge in Germany began to wane. Professor Sidney B. Fay, in his October 1930

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7. The Presbyterian Advance, XLII (September 25, 1930), 4. The Advance had a liberal slant with regard to its editorials, but its feature articles varied in opinion, depending upon the author.

8. The Commonweal, XII (October 1, 1930), 536. The Commonweal is a liberal Catholic weekly run by Catholic laymen.
Current History column, focused his discussion of the National Socialists upon their noisemaking and physical encounters with the members of the opposition parties, a condition, important to the ultimate success of National Socialism, which few other periodical journalists took time to note. Rather than write of violence, other magazines preferred to speculate. A number of this kind of article and editorial began to appear in early October 1930.

An editorial in The Nation of October 1, 1930 reevaluated the German situation and ended up with a more optimistic viewpoint than was thought possible a week before. The short editorial quoted Adolf Hitler as saying that he was against a physical revolution and was content to work in the area of ideas. At this moment, The Nation was apparently ready to accept the National Socialist Party leader at his word. It might well be, the journal conjectured, that the Fascist chief was prepared to work for a dictatorship through parliamentary procedure, fighting it out against the Bruening ministry which had not yet resigned. A general assumption pervaded the American journals and many German political circles as well that Chancellor Bruening and his associates would submit their resignations soon. However, eighteen months were to pass before these politicians vacated their offices. Contrary to the position held by The Commonweal that the Catholic Center’s decisions would determine future events, The Nation wrote that the viability of the Weimar system now seemed to depend upon

9Sidney B. Fay, "The Teutonic Countries," Current History, XXXIII (October, 1930), 136. This was a regular feature by Fay, a Professor of History at Harvard University and at Radcliffe College.
what action the Socialists would take.  

In a signed article in the same issue of *The Nation*, Reverend Reinhold Niebuhr argued that the Socialists held the key to the Republic; however, it was up to some of the other "so-called republican" parties, among which he included the Democratic Party, the People's Party and the Catholic Center Party, to cease their opposition to Socialist ideas so that the government could form a united front against the extreme right-wing's attack. Reverend Niebuhr correctly pointed out that most of the German republican parties had been gradually growing more conservative and were willing to live with National Socialism rather than to submit to the demands of the class-conscious Socialists. On the other hand, the followers of Hitler were observed to be making a more determined effort to win over the workers by offering a mixture of class-conscious Socialism and fire-brand nationalism. In their political maneuverings, the National Socialists had been able to acquire a substantial following by making vague promises and appealing to the emotions. The last campaign emphasized anti-Semitism, but the anti-parliamentary government, anti-Versailles treaty and anti-Young Plan issues were not forgotten. No one seemed to know what the Nazi alternatives were with regard to the latter issues, except that the Hitlerites constantly made "vague allusions to a dictatorship." A party which was able to build a formidable organization in a short time on such a nebulous platform indicated to Niebuhr that Germany was sick politically and that the nation's

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10 *The Nation*, CXXXI (October 1, 1930), 336.
future was in doubt.11

A brief news article in the Catholic weekly America for October 4 was cognizant of the complications that the election results could cause, but for the moment, it thought, not with complete accuracy, that everything was peaceful in Germany. America claimed to be receiving reports showing that even the Nazis were exercising some self-control. The extent of their electoral success apparently had sobered them, and there was little talk now of a revolutionary coup. In fact, America found that the party leader, Adolf Hitler, was speaking more softly and more conservatively.12 America had no comment on the demagogic speech made by Hitler in mid-September at the trial of Nazi-oriented army officers, in which he promised bloody retribution against all those Germans who had participated in the 1918 peace settlement. An editorial in the same issue erroneously interpreted the September election results as the possible first step in a Communist takeover of the government. For its source of information, the journal used a recent interview which The New York Times had had with Father Edmund A. Walsh, S.J., who had just returned from Europe. According to the parts of the interview printed in America, Father

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11 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The German Crisis," ibid., 358 and 360. Niebuhr was perhaps the leading Protestant spokesman in the United States. Most of his fame was to be acquired while he was teaching at the Union Theological Seminary.

12 America, XLIII (October 4, 1930), 604. The Jesuit-managed America is generally conservative in its editorial approach, although on occasion, depending upon the subject, both editorials and feature articles could be placed in the liberal camp.
Walsh had recognized the anti-democratic tendencies of both the German extreme right and left. The editorial commentary, on the other hand, ignored Hitler and the National Socialists because they were supposedly without a program worthy of adoption, and then it predicted that the Bolsheviks would soon be masters of Berlin if Chancellor Bruening was not able to form a coalition government capable of bringing aid to the German workers. After having said all this, the editorial ended on the note of confidence that the "good sense and the good faith of the majority of the German people" would keep Germany within the ranks of a democratic republic. 13

Another religious journal, The Presbyterian Advance, agreed with America in thinking that the Hitlerites presented no immediate threat to the Republic, although it did not share with the Catholic magazine the same fear of the left. The Advance also accepted Hitler at his word and ignored contrary evidence. The journal had heard that Hitler had recently spoken about his future plans which emphasized his desire to restore Germany to her rightful position in the world, not by war, but by moral force, which of course could not be accomplished without the National Socialists winning a majority of seats in the Reichstag. The Presbyterian weekly wondered whether the Nazis had not already attained their maximum strength in September 1930. 14

Most of the American monthly periodicals did not have an

13 Ibid., 607.
14 The Presbyterian Advance, XLII (October 9, 1930), 4-5.
opportunity to make a detailed appraisal of the September vote until their November issues. Sidney B. Fay in his regular column for the Current History magazine found a few "positive" aims among all the "anti" slogans in the National Socialist literature. He listed such things as the revival of nationalism, the return of the German overseas colonies, and the restoration of equality in international affairs. But anti-Semitism still appeared to be the Nazis' most pronounced viewpoint. Adolf Hitler might be downgraded by his opponents, but Professor Fay detected that he sincerely believed in himself and his program and through extraordinary organization had begun to mold a hard core of followers representing the new generation. His personal magnetism and seductive promises had brought him to the threshold of a Mussolini-like dictatorship.\footnote{Sidney B. Fay, "The Teutonic Countries," \textit{Current History}, XXXIII (November, 1930), 293-295.} As time went on, other journalists besides Fay compared the German party leader to the Italian dictator, although they long regarded Hitler as inferior to Mussolini. The November \textit{Living Age} wrote that Adolf Hitler could eventually become a "potent" if he showed "character and capacity"; however, if he did not, he would pass into oblivion.\footnote{The \textit{Living Age}, CCCXXXIX (November, 1930), 222. In its editorial policy the \textit{Living Age} was usually moderately conservative. The major portion of this American monthly consisted of translated or English articles of major political significance from the journals and magazines of Europe. In the next two years, several other journalists would point out the similarities between Adolf Hitler and the Italian Fascist leader. These articles included the following: George N. Shuster, "Il Duce's Handkerchief," \textit{The Commonweal}, XIII (December}
In spite of all the absurdities of Hitler's program, Frank H. Simonds, writing in the November Review of Reviews, was reasonably certain that his appeal for a dictatorship was being carefully considered by the German electorate. The German people were looking for some way out of the intolerable situation existing within the parliamentary government. The enigmatic Adolf Hitler was given a closer look by another Review of Reviews correspondent. No longer could anyone laugh at Hitler and his ideas, said Katherine M. Palmer. He had done much studying after his putsch failure in 1923, and his rise in the last few months had been along strictly legal lines. His only recent physical encounters had been with Communists as he sought to create an image as an ardent foe of Bolshevism. Miss Palmer unfortunately seems to have equated Communism with Marxism, for she made no mention of the Nazi struggles with the Social Democrats. Reporter Palmer went on to attribute Hitler's large, enthusiastic following to his emotional oratory.

3, 1930), 131; S. McClatchie, "Germany Awakes," The Forum, LXXV (April, 1931), 223-224; Roger Shaw, "Germany Votes for President," The Review of Reviews, LXXV (March, 1932), 44-45; The Christian Century, XLIX (August 10, 1932), 971; Sidney B. Fay, "Germany Elects a New Reichstag," Current History, XXXVI (September, 1932), 659; Frank H. Simonds, "Germany's Role in the Crisis," The Review of Reviews and World's Work, LXXXVI (October, 1932), 35-36; The New Republic, LXXIV (February 15, 1933), 3-4; and The Nation, CXXXVI (March 1, 1933), 219.

17 Frank H. Simonds, "New Germany Serves Notice: Why It Happened," The Review of Reviews, LXXXII (November, 1930), 66. Foreign correspondent Simonds was one of the most prolific writers on European affairs during the interwar period.
Hitler's method has been entirely personal. He believes in the power of the spoken word, and relies little on his books, pamphlets, and news-organs to win converts. Tirelessly he goes from beer-garden to beer-garden to address political meetings. Those who have attended these say that there is nothing outstanding about his appearance; nor is his voice inspiring. He is thin, almost to the point of emaciation, is nervous and appears to be overworked. He has fine features, dark wavy hair, a small bristling mustache, and a delicate complexion. When he speaks his eyes blaze with fanatic zeal. He utterly despises women, giving them little chance for power in the party, yet they adore him.

But Miss Palmer was convinced that many more Germans would have to be converted to his way of thinking before he triumphed. Once this was accomplished, the next step would be the winning over of the other states of western Europe to his plans for the glorious "third Reich." The odds were stacked against Adolf Hitler, according to Miss Palmer's calculations.18

The same general view of the German Fascist leader was also found in the October 11 and 18 Literary Digest and The Outlook and Independent for October 8. The Digest reported that Hitler was considered the most "fantastic figure" in post-war Europe.19 He was a man who believed in summary action, and with him anything was possible as he worked his way up the political ladder. Much of his political success was attributed "largely to women" who liked to refer to him as "Handsome Adolf." He was said to despise his female admirers,20 but no doubt he appreciated

18 Katherine M. Palmer, "Personalities: Handsome Adolf Hitler," ibid., 128-130. Miss Palmer had gotten her impressions while on a recent trip to Europe.
19 The Literary Digest, CIXVII (October 11, 1930), 15.
20 Ibid., (October 18, 1930), 34-36.
their votes. A more serious attitude was taken by The Outlook and Independent. This "strange leader" and his disciples were "no longer a joke." As long as economic hard times continued, they would remain a threat in Germany. While an immediate Fascist revolution seemed unlikely, action in the near future was quite possible. The Outlook was willing to wait and see whether Hitler would work for power through the Weimar political system as he had recently outlined. Another article in the same journal concerned itself with both the character of the National Socialist leader and the future of his movement. The author, Harry Lorin Binsse, was not impressed with the physical appearance of the little man with the "Charlie Chaplin moustache," but he agreed with Katherine M. Palmer in her analysis of Hitler's great gift of oratory as his most potent weapon. He, too, seemed to think that Hitler's political strength rested on the German youth, women and old army officers, all of whom had been carried away by his romantic promises. They were also the main sources of contributions for the National Socialist Party treasury, although a number of other people had been mentioned as his financial backers. Included in this odd assortment by Binsse were Henry Ford, Leon Daudet, the Bolsheviks, the Rhenish industrialists, Mussolini and President Poincaré of France. All of these rumors amused Binsse, and he argued that it was absurd to think that the great majority of the German people would ever support "such patent foolishness.

21 The Outlook and Independent, CLVI (October 8, 1930), 216.
as Hitlerism."\textsuperscript{22} Once the economic depression was alleviated, German Fascism would be doomed. For Binsse, the real question in Germany was the menace from the left--Communism. Hitler might contribute to the solution of this problem "by forcing the issue."\textsuperscript{23} The fact that Binsse was a Catholic may explain his fear of the unfounded Communist scare in Germany. However, The Christian Century for October 22 was also worried; it looked for a possible Communist revolution during the coming winter, followed by a Fascist reaction and a civil war between the two groups.\textsuperscript{24} What the government and the Reichswehr would be doing during the struggle was not stated. In full agreement with those who had faith in the German people was the Unitarian weekly, The Christian Register, which, on October 16, called them "too steady and stolid" to fall for the National Socialist line. Nevertheless, the political situation remained serious, and the German people were going to have to undergo a considerable strain, but how long the crisis might last, the Register would dare not say.\textsuperscript{25}

\textsuperscript{22}The same kind of assessment could be found in a more scholarly journal. Professor James K. Pollock, Jr., a member of the Political Science Department at the University of Michigan, made clear his views in "The German Reichstag Elections of 1930," The American Political Science Review, XXIV (November, 1930), 993-995. Pollock hoped that the increase in popularity of the Nazis was only a "passing fancy." While he considered the German people ripe for demagoguery, it was difficult for him to see how anyone could be captivated by the Nazi propaganda. It was the "sheerest drivel."

\textsuperscript{23}Harry Lorin Binsse, "Adolf Hitler, German Hypnotist," The Outlook and Independent, CLVI (October 15, 1930), 256-257, 277. Binsse was on the editorial staff of The Living Age.

\textsuperscript{24}The Christian Century, XLVII (October 22, 1930), 1269-1270.

\textsuperscript{25}The Christian Register, CIX (October 16, 1930), 821.
If the Register and other sources maintained their confidence in the intelligence of the German electorate, there was still another important source of strength in Germany, according to The Nation's editorial on October 8. That Hitler and the German Fascists were not yet ready to upset the power structure in Europe or to smash the republican government was this journal's opinion. A revolutionary coup by the Nazis, or any other group, for that matter, would be thwarted by the "stout-hearted and patriotic old warrior" President Paul von Hindenburg and by the threat of British, and French, punitive action if the Young Plan was repudiated. 26 This was the same periodical which responded so despondently to the results of the German election two weeks before. Having apparently lost faith in the German moderates, it gave evidence that it was forsaking its liberal principles and was placing the fate of Germany in the hands of a man who had the reputation for being a militant autocrat.

Any hope that the Bruening government could either contend with or overcome the opposition of the extremists died at the opening session of the Reichstag on October 13, 1930. Nazi hoodlumism ran rampant through the streets of Berlin, and attacks in the Jewish sections of the city were particularly prominent. 27

The Register is the liberal-oriented weekly of the Unitarian and Universalist churches.

26 The Nation, CXXXI (October 8, 1930), 265.

27 The Nation, CXXXI (October 22, 1930), 431 and The Presbyterian Advance, XLII (October 23, 1930), 5.
The policing power of the government had obviously broken down. Inside the Reichstag building, the 107 National Socialist representatives solemnly filed in, dressed in their Party uniforms. That this novel sight caused much laughter in the assembly hall was some indication of the condition in which German democracy found itself. But as far as The New Republic was concerned, the Hitler party was by no means a laughing matter. The ingredients for a successful coup were still present, and the future of the nation was uncertain. 28

Chancellor Bruening and his government were momentarily saved from political embarrassment when the Socialists refused to support a "no confidence" motion offered by the reactionaries, and the Reichstag was adjourned until December 3. Somehow, Bruening had to maintain this alliance of the republican parties or else call for new elections in the winter months, when the economic problem would be at a seasonal peak. Both The New Republic and The Outlook and Independent agreed that the Communists and the Nazis would probably be the election victors. 29 More optimistic, because of a somewhat naive idea of native German characteristics, were The Nation, The Literary Digest and The Presbyterian Advance, all of which predicted less spectacular radical successes. 30

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28 The New Republic, LXIV (October 22, 1930), 241.
29 The Christian Century, XLVII (October 29, 1930), 1303; The New Republic, LXIV (October 29, 1930), 279; and The Outlook and Independent, CLVI (October 29, 1930), 328.
30 The Nation, CXXXI (October 29, 1930), 459; The Literary Digest, CVII (November 1, 1930), 16; and The Presbyterian Advance, XLIII (October 30, 1930), 5.
During the period of the Reichstag's recess, The Commonweal published a comprehensive series of articles on the German political situation by George N. Shuster. At this time, educator Shuster was on tour in Germany, and he reported on the basis of his first-hand impressions. In discussing the problems of terrorism, he was not sure that the Nazis were the group to be worried about. This Catholic layman wrote on November 19, 1930, that "socially speaking," the National Socialists "seem comparatively harmless," but not so the Communists, who should be the major concern of Germany. That Hitler was fully aware of the Bolshevik threat and had instructed his followers to combat with the Communists in the streets of Berlin was in Shuster's estimation, "a blessing." No matter what Shuster thought of the Nazis personally, he was more of an anti-Communist than a pro-National Socialist; there was no effort on his part to whitewash the right-wing reactionaries. He could see little good coming from following the Nazi's "nationalism of despair." What seems to have influenced him at this time was the late September 1930 statement by the Catholic diocesan officials of Mainz declaring that no practical Catholic could belong to the National Socialist movement. "Hitlerism proceeds to ethical and religious conclusions of the gravest import," wrote Shuster. It could be compared, he felt, to other contemporary movements such as French ultra-nationalism or Ku Klux Klanism in the United States. 31

31 George N. Shuster, "Germany At Low Tide," The Commonweal, XIII (November 19, 1930), 70-71. At this time Shuster was managing editor of this journal and a teacher of English at Brooklyn
Shuster's second report on Germany appeared in the following week's issue of The Commonweal. That Chancellor Bruening, a man for whom the author showed great admiration, was able to find a supporting coalition after the fateful September election did not really alleviate the threat of a radical take-over was another one of his opinions. Too many Germans were well aware of the inadequacies of the Weimar democratic system, and "one must always reckon with the German need for a vision of some more resplendent reality." 32 On December 3, 1930, Shuster reported that Germany was "really on the verge of becoming desperate" and that it was no secret the Fascists seized power in Italy in the same political atmosphere. 33 Although it might have appeared that the longer his stay in Germany the more alert Professor Shuster was becoming to the German political realities, his last report of 1930 indicated that he had not completely lost hope with respect to Germany's immediate future. He wrote that despite all the pessimism, conditions were not yet as bad as the Germans themselves believed.

The present hard times have naturally not engendered optimism. Indeed, the Berlin of the hour is doubtless gazing through too dark a glass. One feels, however, that

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33 Shuster, "Il Duce's Handkerchief," ibid., (December 3, 1930), 131.
this excessive inclination to adopt the mood of Lent is in several respects an advantage in periods of transition like that in which we live.34

Shuster was not alone in his reserved optimism. On the eve of the December reopening of the Reichstag, Oswald Garrison Villard, another frequent visitor to Germany, estimated in the December 3 Nation that the Bruening government had gained in strength during the weeks of adjournment. However, the real time of crisis was still in the future. The winter months ahead would be the most difficult time for the government, according to Villard. While it was generally rumored that a dictatorship would be ruling in Germany by the spring, there was no guarantee, in Villard's mind, that it would be established by the Nazis. Because of the recent attacks on Catholics and Socialists, the Hitlerites were hurting their cause, and Villard predicted that they would probably have to be satisfied with sharing some posts in a Bruening ministry, or with watching the Chancellor set up his own dictatorship.35

Two days before the Reichstag met on December 1, the drastic financial reform laws, which had caused a Reichstag crisis for almost six months, were put into effect by President Hindenburg's signature, thereby preventing the anticipated rejection by the parliament and the calling of new elections. When the Reich-


35 Oswald Garrison Villard, "Germany Nears the Crisis," The Nation, CXXXI (December 3, 1930), 603-604. At this time, Villard was editor of The Nation, a position he held until his retirement in 1932.
stag opened, the emergency action won approval because the Social Democrats once again decided to vote with the moderate republican parties and prevent another torrid election campaign. There was real fear of another major extremist victory. Reports out of Germany showed that both the National Socialists and Communists, especially the former, were picking up strength in local elections.

On December 10, 1930, The Christian Century advised its readers to watch closely the German political scene because the nation was on the "verge of desperate action." A similar warning was given by The Commonweal a few weeks later.

Meanwhile, The New Republic for December 31 could report that the German economist, Dr. Otto Nathan, had confidently announced in a New York address that the German Republic was in "no immediate danger from internal forces." An English traveller, Sir Philip Dawson, writing in the January 1931 Current History, was also sure that there would be no revolution in Germany and that subsequent governments would rule according to constitutional means and maintain a continuity in policies.

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36 The Nation, CXXXI (December 17, 1930), 664.
37 The Christian Century, XLVII (December 10, 1930), 1518.
38 The Commonweal, XIII (January 7, 1931), 255.
40 Sir Philip Dawson, "Germany's Economic Plight," Current History, XXXIII (January, 1931), 570. Dawson was a member of the British parliament.
and somewhat naive voice was heard from *The Review of Reviews* in its January, 1931 issue. The worst was over in Germany, said Frank H. Simonds, for "the Hitler movement had in some degree spent its force." "Its more dangerous expressions" had been checked by a union of the republican parties. The counterattack was underway.41 What was noteworthy about Simonds' impressions of the German scene was that he was writing them from Berlin. Because he had just arrived in the German capital, his estimation of conditions had to be superficial. His information proved to be misleading, since the National Socialists were again taking the offensive and this was duly reported by other journals and their overseas representatives.

As the new year got under way the Nazis began a campaign against pacifism with an attack upon the film *All Quiet on the Western Front*. It was regrettable, wrote Oswald Garrison Villard, that the Bruening Cabinet decided to keep the moving picture from being distributed in Germany. This decision not only added to the prestige of the radicals who attacked the film, but also "antagonized every liberal and every liberal element in Germany."

In many democratic circles in Germany, Villard found that there was talk that "the fate of this Republic will always be linked with the banning of a single film."42 Considering the same prob-
lem in the January 21, 1931 Commonweal, George N. Shuster believed the Nazi Party objective to be the resurrection of compulsory military service in order to give many of the National Socialists work. Another new point of emphasis for the Hitlerites, according to Shuster, who was still in Germany, was the touchy eastern question and the Polish Corridor. Any means were sought to embarrass the government. And still the reports in the February Living Age were that the Nazi Party was growing stronger by combined appeals to reaction and violence during January 1931.

William Martin, another European observer, wrote in the February Atlantic Monthly that Germany's forces of resistance were growing much weaker and that the only hope for the Weimar Republic was a balance of power among the various parties with President Hindenburg using his prestige to keep them together. A National Socialist victory would bring a general strike, while a Communist coup would bring out the German army. A strong German government was needed, stated Martin, but there was nowhere to turn. If the Bruening government collapsed, "no one would know how to replace it." The Literary Digest's report on February 14 said that many German and foreign observers considered a

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44 The Living Age, CCCXXXIX (February, 1931), 556.

45 William Martin, "Europe. A Continent in Travail," The Atlantic Monthly, CXLVII (February, 1931), 242-244. Martin was the editor of the Journal de Genève.
Bolshevik Germany just around the corner. The nation was surely undergoing its worst crisis since the war had ended. This response came as a result of events in the German parliament.

The Reichstag reconvened on February 3, 1931. Both the Communist and Nazi representatives resumed their verbal attacks on the Bruening ministry. The climax came on February 7, when no-confidence resolutions introduced by the two extremist parties were defeated. Rebuffed as well was a National Socialist request for immediate dissolution of the Reichstag. Once more the Social Democrats came to the aid of the Centrist Chancellor. In spite of the defeat, the German Fascists continued to harass the republican advocates. Finally, on February 10, the Nazis, together with some of Alfred Hugenberg's Nationalists who had been playing a key role in the political disturbances of the last year, walked out of the Reichstag. Why these right-wing members took this step was a point of interest to some American journals, particularly those with a liberal orientation. The February 25 New Republic was somewhat mystified by the Fascists' maneuver of leaving the German political sounding board, no matter how much the frustration. It may well be, advised this journal, that the Hitlerites were preparing to undertake their often threatened revolution. Under the circumstances a return to the parliament would cost a great deal in prestige. No matter what the plans of the right-wing extremists were, The New Republic felt that the situa-

46 The Literary Digest, CVIII (February 14, 1931), 12.
tion had to be carefully watched.

We do not believe the German people are yet ready to support a revolutionary fascist movement which invites European war. If one were imposed upon them, it would probably bring a Communist reaction. The power of the more moderate parties to prevent one or the other of these extreme alternatives rests, first, on their ability to extract from the Allies and the United States a revision of reparations and other injustices of the war settlement, and second, on a revival of trade and industry.47

While The New Republic exercised caution with regard to the political future of Germany, a decisive victory for Chancellor Bruening was heralded by The Nation for February 25. Poor leadership had guided the National Socialists into obstructionist tactics in the Reichstag, and these had supposedly played into the hands of the skilled pro-government parliamentarians. The Nazi withdrawal was a "play to the galleries," a fatal gesture which failed to stimulate the mass reaction desired. Nevertheless, the prevailing economic conditions still meant to The Nation that demagogues like the Fascists could cause further trouble.48 A similar appraisal of the Nazis' action was given in The Outlook and Independent. As far as this periodical was concerned, the National Socialists' theatrical exit from the parliament was the final piece of evidence needed to show that the Nazis were "incapable of doing anything in the Reichstag of any great consequence."49 Reports, which had been received from Germany by The

47 The New Republic, LXVI (February 25, 1931), 28.
48 The Nation, CXXXII (February 25, 1931), 203.
49 The Outlook and Independent, OLVII (February 25, 1931), 286.
The Literary Digest, indicated that German newspaper opinion was split over the question of whether the radical withdrawal strengthened the government or condemned the parliament to futility.\textsuperscript{50} As a matter of record, the legislative body continued to operate without the boisterous elements. But it was premature to speak about the demise of National Socialism or to say that the Nazis were finished as a political force, as time would prove.

The uncertainty which gripped Germany during the early months of 1931 was reflected in the variety of reports that appeared in the spring numbers of the American journals. The New Republic of March 4, 1931 featured an article by Mildred S. Wertheimer, a staff member of the Foreign Policy Association. Miss Wertheimer reviewed Hitler's career and pointed out some of the planks of his largely negative program. In 1930 he had successfully appealed to the younger generation and many voters who did not normally exercise their right of suffrage to make a vote of protest against the status quo. Many of the votes cast for Hitler, she contended, were not for his program but were meant as a warning to the government.

It was a warning to the moderate parties in the Reich that if the parliamentary system is to survive, it must prove its worth by actual accomplishment, and also a warning that a great people cannot be continually oppressed without creating the danger of a wave of extreme nationalism which may eventually sweep a civilization into revolution or war.

The Bruehning government had to act, and act it did over the win-

\textsuperscript{50} The Literary Digest, CVIII (February 28, 1931), 15.
ter months with sweeping financial reforms in spite of widespread opposition. In any event, this kind of positive action had to continue, wrote Wertheimer, or the parliamentary system would ultimately collapse. The chances for continued accomplishments by the democratic coalition were already waning at the time of the Wertheimer article. A short report in the March 18 Nation told of the gradual disintegration of the spirit of cooperation within the ranks of the pro-republican Reichstag delegates. With the departure of the radical reactionaries from the parliament, The Nation observed the violent antagonisms of the government factions, plus the differences in political principles, rising to the surface. That this had been the reason for Hitler's plan of action was suspected by The Nation.

The Commonweal's response to these political occurrences in Germany consisted primarily of George N. Shuster's strange suggestion that what Germany needed was a few dozen Hitlers, "so that the novelty of one will wear off." In his estimation, a few more years of democracy would bring to the German political scene men of the same caliber as the National Socialist leader. The other major Catholic weekly, America, viewed the German scene from an altogether different angle and offered its own remedy for the political chaos. It was happy to report that some German bishops

52 The Nation, CXXXII (March 18, 1931), 286.
53 George N. Shuster, "Munich: Anno Domini 1931," The Commonweal, XIII (March 11, 1931), 513. In the same paragraph, Shuster wrote that Hitler's ideas had about the same value as those of the average United States senator.
had struck a blow for the Republic by openly criticizing the excessive nationalism of the National Socialists. The editorial in the March 21 issue suggested that "Catholic moderation and Catholic charity" were the "best guarantee for the security and prosperity of any State." It seems doubtful if this reported stand taken by the German hierarchy did much to stem the tide of Nazism after some other reports of the spring of 1931 were taken under consideration. Besides, the Jesuit staff of America was consistently placing unwarranted confidence in the German episcopate that had yet to formulate an official policy with respect to the Nazi program.

There would be little opposition to a Hitler government if the economic trouble continued for any length of time in the estimation of S. McClatchie, an American who resided in Germany. His article in the April 1931 Forum saw Hitler acquiring substantial financial support from the German capitalist class, which indicated to McClatchie that his radical declarations were for propaganda purposes. McClatchie believed what many other German

54 America, XLIV (March 21, 1931), 566.

55 The problems confronting the German hierarchy in the year 1931 have recently been treated by Guenter Lewy in The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), pp. 10-15. On page 12 of his monograph, Lewy noted that only one member of the Catholic hierarchy at this time, Konrad von Preysing, Bishop of Eichstätt, "stands out as the one bishop with insight into the totalitarian aspirations of the Nazi regime. Most of the other members of the episcopate were excellent theologians or administrators but possessed only limited understanding of political matters. Their average age was slightly above sixty; their outlook on politics had been shaped by life in imperial Germany before World War I. Many were still convinced monarchists;
and foreign observers presumed that, once in control of the nation's affairs, Hitler would revert to the role of a traditional conservative. After he had been able to put into effect "some of his pet measures," especially restrictions upon the Jews, McClatchie believed that he would urge his country on to "the achievement of bigger and better things." 56

By March 26, 1931, the Reichstag's current business was completed, and the assembly adjourned until mid-October; however, President Hindenburg, at the request of the Bruening Cabinet, decided to extend the emergency powers under Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, which would leave the governing of the country in the hands of the executive until the autumn parliament sessions. Designed to aid in alleviating economic problems, this action proved to be another step in precipitating the demise of the Weimar government. The all-too-free use of these special constitutional powers, especially when there did not appear to be an urgent need for them, corrupted the fundamental concepts of parliamentary government and gradually destroyed whatever faith the German people had in the Weimar system. Some journals felt that there should be some response to this extension of constitutional dictatorial powers. President Hindenburg's action could

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56 S. McClatchie, "Germany Awake!" The Forum, LXXXV (April 1931), 218-224. McClatchie was an engineer and inventor who lived in Germany since the World War.
be understood but not condoned by the April 8 Nation. It was
clearly an attempt to save the moderate government, but the liber-
al-oriented weekly also thought it placed in jeopardy German dem-
ocratic institutions. The equally liberal New Republic, more
aroused than its counterpart, called the situation in Germany
precarious when even a majority government had to resort to a
dictatorship to preserve itself. Showing considerable insight,
it noted another possibility: the renewal of autocratic rule
might influence some more desperate elements of society to "de-
cide to substitute another set of dictators if it came to believe
they could produce better results." A generally conservative American journal, The Literary
Digest, on the other hand, argued that a dictatorship to save
German democracy, however paradoxical, had to be. Besides, it
could report that most German citizens and politicians seemed to
acquiesce in the government's move. Physical violence on the
streets had gotten out of hand, and the reports from Germany in-
dicated that only right- and left-wing radicals objected to the
government's decision. A different view of the situation was
taken by the April 8 Commonweal, which reacted less strongly to
Germany's constitutional dictatorship. Its readers were advised
that the abandonment of the republican ideas was only a temporary

57 The Nation, CXXXII (April 8, 1931), 368-369.
58 The New Republic, LXVI (April 8, 1931), 190.
59 The Literary Digest, CIX (April 11, 1931), 12.
measure. While no prediction was made concerning how long the German executive should retain these powers, it was implied that the behavior of the Communists and Fascists would be the determining factor. Typical of Catholic opinion found in the journals, The Commonweal still regarded the Bolsheviks as the more dangerous threat to the security of the German state, despite the fact that some German bishops had already expressed reservations about National Socialism.

Thwarted time and again by the Hindenburg-Bruening tandem, many of the National Socialists began to grow restless. The enthusiasm generated by the September 1930 election results was starting to wane. In fact, on April 2, 1931, a faction of the Nazi Party led by Walter Stennes broke out in revolt against the Party high command. Stennes was a leader in the Nazi S. A. stormtroopers (Sturm Abteilungen) assigned to Berlin and a proponent of revolution to achieve Nazi goals. His reaction to Hitler's orders restraining the street activities of the S. A. in February 1931 was to seek out an arrangement with a former Nazi, Otto Strasser, leader of the factional Black Front group. What turned out to be a minor struggle within the German Fascist movement received notice in a couple of American journals. The Nation of April 15 called attention to the threatening schism be-

60 The Commonweal, XIII (April 8, 1931), 617-618.
tween the Munich and Berlin branches of the National Socialist organization. However, even if Hitler fell from power as a result of this friction, the Fascist threat of revolution would remain. The incident was heralded by America on April 18 as the end of Hitler's reactionary revolution phase. The Nazi leader was quoted as being critical of those in the organization—the Stennes faction—who were calling for immediate action. America made no attempt to present Adolf Hitler in a better light, although the implication of its remarks was that he had added both prestige and power to his own person as well as to what he considered to be National Socialist orthodoxy, which may well have been the case. On the other hand, both the May Living Age and correspondent John Elliott writing in the May 20 Nation agreed that Hitlerism was on the wane. Elliott added that he believed that, in the long run, the Hitler menace had served the German government by making it stronger in its international dealings.

In July 1931, two months after the optimistic reports about the frustrations and the factionalism of the National Socialists, discussions concerning the Hitler menace reappeared in the American journals. Chancellor Bruening had been forced in part

62 The Nation, CXXXII (April 15, 1931), 396.
63 America, XLV (April 18, 1931), 26.
64 The Living Age, CCCXL (May, 1931), 225.
65 John Elliott, "Germany's Bid for Independence," The Nation, CXXXII (May 20, 1931), 568. Elliott was on the Berlin staff of the New York Herald Tribune.
By the Nazi clamoring to seek dramatic political successes in the international arena, one being an attempt for a German-Austrian customs union made public on March 23, 1931. An Austro-German political union or Anschluss had been expressly forbidden by Article 80 of the Versailles Peace Treaty "except with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations"; however, Bruening and his associates had hoped that, if they kept the arrangement exclusively economic, opponents to union would find it less objectionable. The Chancellor's hopes were dashed almost immediately when France, Italy and Czechoslovakia protested against the plan, claiming that the maneuver was really a first step toward political Anschluss. Meanwhile, the plan was referred to the World Court where it was finally rejected in September 1931.66 Taking account of Bruening's customs union scheme in the July Review of Reviews, Frank H. Simonds announced that Germany would be lost to Fascism unless the Bruening ministry stopped trying to fulfill the radicals' international demands and faced political realities.67 Simonds was the man who had regarded the Nazis as an expiring force in his last Review of Reviews' article in the January number. Several other journals warned that revolution in-
spired by one group of extremists or another was imminent in Germany unless the economic ills were cured.68

Throughout the summer of 1931 a number of international discussions took place concerning the world financial crisis. One major matter for consideration was the moratorium on all reparation and war-debt payments suggested by President Herbert Hoover in June 1931. More important for Germany was the problem of the rapid withdrawal of foreign capital from the country. Although an agreement was reached in August 1931, which maintained the flow of short-term loans into Germany, new economies had to be imposed upon the nation. This meant more trouble for Chancellor Brüning, even though the Reichstag was still in recess. During all the weeks of international negotiations, the extremists did not let up in their pressure in domestic politics. An attempt was made on August 9 to force the Socialist government of the state of Prussia out of office by referendum. The Nationalist-Nazi bid was turned aside, and The Nation for August 19 seemed to go out of its way to praise the good political sense of the Prussian people. They should now earn the confidence of world public opinion, remarked this liberal journal, for the motion was defeated overwhelmingly. The vote was not taken according to party, and it was hard to determine the actual strength of the

68 The Living Age, CCCXL (July, 1931), 425-426 and (August, 1931), 524; Max Jordan, "Zero Hour in Germany," The Commonweal, XIV (July 8, 1931), 257; The Literary Digest, CX (July 11, 1931), 15; and The New Republic, LXVII (July 22, 1931), 243.
reactionaries, but The Nation claimed to possess information from Berlin which indicated that the results entailed a sharp setback for the National Socialists. There was mere praise forthcoming for the way the Social Democratic Party was coming to the aid of the Bruening ministry, which was out of sympathy with the working classes. The New Republic for August 19 believed that the Weimar Constitution was saved for the time being, but only on account of the support given to the Bruening dictatorship by the Socialists. They had abandoned their principles of change and revolution to help conserve the existing social and economic order. The decision made in Prussia indicated to the September Living Age that no rightist revolution would ever be successful without the support of the working classes. Nevertheless, this did not rule out the Nazis’ joining a coalition government in the near future. In fact, the “immediate prospect” for The Living Age was a Bruening-Hitler coalition ministry. This was the first forecast of such a Centrist-National Socialist arrangement to appear in the journals. Other notices would soon follow referring to the possibility of a new coalition government with right-wing extremists included, and within a few weeks the public would be given the facts.

The setback for the Hitlerites in Prussia in August 1931,

69 The Nation, CXXXIII (August 19, 1931), 172.
70 The New Republic, LXVIII (August 19, 1931), 4.
71 The Living Age, CCCXLI (September, 1931), 6.
if it could be described as a setback, was to be only temporary. The National Socialists continued to work hard in local elections, they hoped to gain national power by utilizing the democratic processes of the Weimar Republic—a system which they ultimately planned to destroy. The local elections in the city of Hamburg, scheduled for September 26, happened to be the occasion where the German political spotlight shone next. The National Socialists engaged in a vigorous campaign. Accused of having "delusions of grandeur" by The Nation for September 16, Adolf Hitler was said to be attempting to sell himself as the last hope of millions of Germans. While once again his speeches failed to define new policies or suggest new remedies for Germany's problems, he seemed to be doing well enough to fill this journal with "great apprehension."72

On the other hand, there was a definite touch of optimism in two contemporary American Catholic periodicals. The Catholic monthly Sign for October 1931 spoke enthusiastically about what had been said at the Catholic General Assembly, meeting at Nuremberg during the first week of September. The members of the congress, both clerics and laymen, endorsed the moderate government of the Catholic Heinrich Bruening and praised his tactics of moving the Catholic Center Party forward while the left- and right-wing extremists were neutralizing each other. In the words of the delegates, said The Sign, Christian principles would be the

72 The Nation, CXXXIII (September 16, 1931), 269.
basis of all future actions undertaken by the German government. A man who was in a more direct position to know something about German affairs since he was reporting from Germany, Father Joseph F. Thorning, discussed the spread of German radicalism in the September 26 America, but two weeks later he concluded that the Brüning government was gaining strength in spite of alluring appeals being made to "the German youth" by the Communists and National Socialists.

In contrast to the views of the Catholic periodicals, the Protestant Christian Century of October 14 found only "unrelieved fatalistic gloom, without a ray of hope" in Germany as the radicals prepared for the final day of reckoning for the Weimar government. Like Father Thorning, the author of this article, Sherwood Eddy, had himself been gathering information in Europe.

The Hamburg elections for the local House of Burgeses gave the National Socialists and Communists a much greater number of votes than ever before. Since the September 1930 Reichstag election, the Nazis had picked up almost 60,000 supporters and

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73 The Sign, XI (October, 1931), 131. The Catholic monthly Sign was moderately conservative when dealing with political problems.

74 Joseph F. Thorning, S.J., "The Crisis in Germany," America, XLV (September 26, 1931), 584-585, and "Germany--Victory or Defeat?" XLVI (October 10, 1931), 8-9. Father Thorning was acting as the special European correspondent of America.

75 Sherwood Eddy, "The Crisis of Europe," The Christian Century, XLVIII (October 14, 1931), 1279. Eddy was identified by this journal as an international Christian statesman. He was the secretary for Asia for the YMCA until 1931 and held yearly seminars in Europe for American educators until 1938.
the Communists approximately 30,000 additional voters. Forty-three of the total of 160 seats in the Hamburg municipal senate were captured by the Hitlerites, while the Communists won thirty-five seats. The October 21 Nation now doubted if the Bruening government would survive another concerted attack by the opposition extremist forces, which were being greatly helped by defections from the moderate parties of the center.76 A contributor to the October 14 Nation differed with a part of the journal's editorial opinion, when he pointed out with the Hamburg election figures as evidence, that the gains made by the radical revolutionary parties were chiefly at the expense of the Socialists. The author, Harry W. Laidler, believed that the Socialist Party was paying for its support of the conservative-moderate German government.77

Some of the journal response at the time of the Hamburg municipal election also alluded to other German occurrences which were equally significant. By early October Chancellor Bruening and President Hindenburg, upon hearing the frequent rumors that the Social Democratic Party was beginning to feel uncomfortable supporting Bruening's executive government, had decided to call in Adolf Hitler for discussions. It was hoped that the Nazi leader could be persuaded to support the government program, at

76 The Nation, CXXXIII (October 21, 1931), 417.

77 Harry W. Laidler, "German Socialism in the Balance," ibid., (October 14, 1931), 384. The author was the director of the League for Industrial Democracy and had recently returned from Germany.
least temporarily, but the talks produced no results. The Nation for October 21 thought that the Hindenburg-Hitler conference had given the Nazi morale a big lift, while The Christian Century for the same week interpreted the government's action as a sign of desperation.

Following his interview with Hindenburg on October 10, 1931, Hitler left immediately for Bad Harzburg, where a meeting of all the reactionary forces had been called. Uniting in what was then called the National Front, now usually the Harzburg Front, were the National Socialists, the German National Party and the Stahlhelm veterans' organization. Also in attendance were leaders of German big business and landowning groups. At the meeting a call was made for the defeat of the Bruening administration and the destruction of the Weimar Republic. To replace the 1919 Constitution, these reactionaries submitted as an alternative a political dictatorship which could combat effectively the Communist threat.

78 The Nation, CXXXIII (October 21, 1931), 417.

79 The Christian Century, XLVIII (October 14, 1931), 1269-1270.

80 Earl R. Beck, Verdict on Schacht (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1955), 19, called the creation of the right-wing alliance at Bad Harzburg "one of the most significant steps in Hitler's rise to power." Hitler became the leading figure in the German reactionary ranks as a result of the October conference, according to Walter H. Kaufmann, Monarchism in the Weimar Republic (New York: Bookman Associates, 1955), 200. "The greatest impression made by the Harzburg rally on the general public was that the National Socialists had now apparently united completely with what was usually called the more 'honorable' members of the opposition," wrote Erich Eyck in his second volume on the Weimar era: A History of the Weimar Republic, trans. Harlan
The vast majority of American journals failed to grasp the importance of this gathering at Bad Harzburg. Those magazines that did comment had little valuable analysis to offer to their readers. Alluding to the Harzburg Front, The October 21 Outlook and Independent guessed that Hitler was getting ready to force a dissolution of the Reichstag to bring new elections, so that the right-wing radicals could implement their scheme to gain control of the government. No matter what happened in the next few months, The Outlook and Independent foresaw troubled days ahead for the German people. A few weeks later, Michael Farbman, writing in the December 16, 1931 New Republic, pointed out very astutely that it was German industrialists who supplied Hitler with the cash for his campaign. Some of Hitler's followers were reported to be ready and eager to break with the representatives of capitalism and court the support of the German workers, but Farbman doubted that they would succeed. From all appearances, the Nazi leadership and the representatives of big business...


81 The British journalists also failed to grasp the meaning of the Harzburg assembly. Brigitte Granzow, A Mirror of Nazism (London: Victor Gollancz, 1964), 160-162, discovered but a few comments about the German reactionary meeting. "The British press was not very impressed by it."

82 The Outlook and Independent, CLIX (October 21, 1931), 232-233.
stood on the same principles of social reaction. A visitor from Germany, Gerhard Friters, explained in the January 1932 Current History that the capitalists had chosen the lesser of two evils by giving their support to the Nazis rather than the left-wing Socialist groups. It was obvious that for many Germans the ultimate aims of Fascism had less radical implications, in spite of the National Socialistic Party's continued appeal to the workers of Germany. It was an accepted fact that the real strength of the Nazi movement rested with the embittered middle classes, said Friters.

A noticeable rise in Hitler's prestige was observed by the January 1932 Living Age: "Whereas Hoover's statements send the stock market down, Hitler's make the market go up." From all general appearances, German business interests seemed to The Living Age to be working to make Adolf Hitler respectable and to calm the fears that he was intent upon forcing a social revolution. Neither did non-German business interests seem to be terribly worried about the Nazi threat to Germany, reported the December 16, 1931 Nation. In his recent utterances to the foreign

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83 Michael Farbman, "Deadlock in Berlin," The New Republic, LXIX (December 16, 1931), 125-126. Farbman was editor of the yearbook Europa.

84 Gerhard Friters, "Who Are the German Fascists?" Current History, XXXV (January, 1932), 532-536. The author was a student of German political parties, doing work under the Faculty of Political Science at Columbia University.

85 The Living Age, CCCXLI (January, 1932), 379.
press, Hitler was saying that the National Socialist Party would be in power soon, possibly in a matter of weeks, and that his government would gladly pay Germany's commercial debts, but not reparations' payments. "Ominous" is what The Nation called "the calm with which his frank plays to the gallery have been received by foreign industrialists and financiers." It was easy to see that, if Adolf Hitler received considerable support from German big business, he would be well along the road to becoming the head of state. On the other hand, an alliance with capitalism would mean that the Socialism of the Nazi movement would have to be discarded in order to maintain this arrangement. Hitler seemed to be definitely leaning toward a working agreement with big business by the end of 1931.

The Reichstag sessions resumed on October 13, two days after the Bad Harzburg gathering. The meetings were more boisterous than ever, but once the demonstrations by the extremists were finished, the Chancellor remained in control. Nevertheless, in the view of the October 21 Nation, which had turned very pessimistic about the future of Germany, there was "nothing left but the shell of a republic."

The spirit of the republic is dead and gone. Its form only survives, and history shows that if it is profoundly easy to get away from democracy it is still more profoundly difficult to retrace one's steps. For always the dictator is certain that the emergency calls for more emergency decrees, and that he alone is capable of understand-

86 The Nation, CXXXIII (December 16, 1931), 654.
ing the necessity for cutting loose from all constitutional and democratic guaranties and restraints.\textsuperscript{87}

Meanwhile, a motion co-sponsored by the Nationalists and the Nazis which called for a vote of no confidence in the Bruening administration was won by the government on October 16. The choice was Bruening or civil war between the Fascists and Communists, wrote \textit{The Nation} for October 28. But the decision to sustain the government was not the end of the political troubles; \textit{The Nation} looked for the worst winter since 1919 in the months ahead. Nothing good could come from the second theatrical display of the National Socialists, this time joined by their Nationalist allies, in walking out of the Reichstag.\textsuperscript{88}

In this period Heinrich Bruening was able to stay in power and prevent complete chaos because he could rely on Article 48 of the Weimar Constitution, which allowed for a constitutional dictatorship in time of national emergency. With the Reichstag deadlocked in the fall of 1931, reliance on Article 48 appeared to be the only way to attain the vital measures necessary to keep the Republic afloat. As long as Bruening had the confidence of President Hindenburg, he could issue decrees designed to meet Germany's economic and social needs. However, by assuming what amounted to the legislative function—the Reichstag elected in September 1930 was to sit only six times for a total of about twelve

\textsuperscript{87}Ibid., (October 21, 1931), 420.

\textsuperscript{88}Ibid., (October 28, 1931), 446-447.
weeks in its approximately twenty months of existence—Bruening was setting a course which could be emulated by future chancellors who had no devotion to republican ideals.

The political scene in Germany was surprisingly calm as 1931 approached its last weeks, in the estimation of the journals under consideration. Roger Shaw, an editor of The Review of Reviews, discussed the views of Professor William R. Shephard, who told Shaw his story after his recent return from Germany. Shaw was in agreement with Shephard's theory that despite the many crises, the German people would rise to the occasion when tyranny threatened. Only two journals, the November 25 Christian Century and The Literary Digest for November 28, mentioned another strong showing by National Socialism in the local provincial elections in Hesse in mid-November, despite Chancellor Bruening's personal campaign pleas for moderation. However, both periodicals indicated concern about this continual growth of Nazism's popularity. Their fears were confirmed when Current History printed a report of investigations undertaken by Richard A. Lester concerning German student life. Lester estimated that thirty to forty

89 Roger Shaw, "An Expert Looks at Germany," The Review of Reviews, LXXXIV (November, 1931), 49. Shaw and members of his family controlled the editorial policies of this very conservative journal.

Shephard, the Columbia University historian, apparently saw what he wanted to see. He seemed disinterested in the political struggle and instead discussed the pacific characteristics of the German people who spent their energy on body culture.

90 The Christian Century, XLVIII (November 25, 1931), 1477 and The Literary Digest, CXI (November 28, 1931), 13.
percent of the students were National Socialists; however, the overwhelming majority remained "quite religious" notwithstanding some points of the Nazi Party platform. 91

As the year 1931 came to a close, Adolf Hitler as a man and The National Socialists as a movement became more respectable in the view of a few American press observers. Critical accounts also continued to appear, so that it was increasingly difficult to get a clear picture of National Socialism. Without predicting whether or not Hitler would ever gain control of the German government, the December 16 Outlook and Independent thought that his diatribes and vague solutions for Germany's problems indicated that he lacked "the level-headedness necessary for effective leadership of a great nation like Germany." He reminded this periodical of Senator Tom Heflin of Alabama with his "swagger and brag-gadocio." 92 In contrast with this description was the evaluation made by the December 16 Christian Century, which gave Hitler credit for being an astute politician. His was a bold approach to Germany's ills, wrote this weekly, for he avoided making concrete proposals. He planned to settle on a definite program only after his organization had gained a Reichstag majority. The Century mentioned another story which was more rumor than fact. The gos-

91 Richard Lester, "The Germany of Today: Life Among the Students," Current History, XXXV (December, 1931), 385-386. Lester was an Instructor in Economics and Social Institutions at Princeton and attended the University of Bonn during 1930-1931. 92 The Outlook and Independent, CLIX (December 16, 1931), 488.
had Hitler going to Rome to negotiate with Vatican officials in order to force the hitherto aloof Catholic Center Party into a political alliance and thereby precipitate the right-wing extremists' accession to power. 93

The pronounced failure of the Bruening ministry, even with the aid of the emergency decrees, to work out the economic problems was causing many more Germans to turn away from the moderate cause and fall into line with the radicals, observed John Elliott in The Nation of December 16. He predicted that the next general election would give the Nazis the largest popular vote. Possibilities of party alliances were also discussed by Elliott, one being the National Socialists and the right-wing Centrists, and to counter this the joining of forces of the Social Democrats and the Communists--an almost fantastic suggestion. 94 Another European correspondent like Elliott, Father Joseph F. Thorning, had a somewhat different view of the German politicians' maneuvers. Father Thorning advised that Social Democracy was beginning to crumble under the Hitlerites' assault. Already eliminated were the moderate parties to the right of center. The attraction for the Fascists had become almost irresistible, even though their nationalism rested on the narrowest base of anti-Semitism; moreover, they were no less materialistic than the Marxists, whom

93 The Christian Century, XLVIII (December 16, 1931), 488.
94 John Elliott, "Germany in the World Crisis," The Nation, CXXXIII (December 16, 1931), 662-664.
they attacked. The National Socialist terrorism and violence reminded Father Thorning of the tactics used by the Soviet secret police.95 Thorning's America report for December 26, "Hitler: The Man and His Movement," gave no hint that any German Catholics were ready to form an alliance with the Nazis; however, that the Catholic Church was doing its bit to prevent a Hitler triumph, contrary to other reports and rumors, was the theme of Father Thorning's article in the January 9, 1932 America: "The German Bishops and Hitlerism." The author was disturbed by the reports of a possible National Socialist-Center Party entente. There seemed to be little likelihood that the Catholic Center Party could ever coalesce with the Nazis in a future government unless the latter made some drastic and fundamental adjustments in principles. It was plain to see, continued Father Thorning, that the German Fascist program had only to be stated to show its inconsistency "with decent ethics, Divine revelation, and the world character of Catholic culture." Above all, Thorning asserted that the German bishops could be seen making clear to their flocks the Church's position with regard to Nazi propaganda and policies.96


In The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964), 14, Guenter Lewy makes this assessment of the German Catholic Church's relations with National Socialism at this time: "The National Socialists were quick to perceive that the Catholic episcopate was far from united on the question of how best to handle the Nazi problem. Exploiting the bishops' fear of the left-wing parties, they continued to stress in their
A view which differed from Thorning's appeared in a delayed editorial in The Living Age of February 1932. This monthly believed that Bruening would almost certainly turn to the right extremists for support in the next episode of the German political drama. The Chancellor was already leaning toward the right, for his emergency decrees outdid even some of Hitler's demands. A number of foreign sources were reported to feel that Hitler was losing some popularity and that in negotiations for cabinet positions Bruening would have the upper hand.97

No matter what political parties might be maneuvering behind the scenes, Frank H. Simonds, contributing to the January 1932 Review of Reviews, was positive that the first five months of the new year 1932 would be a period of decision. He ventured to predict that Nazism would find itself legally in power by the spring of the year unless the economic trend changed, if only a little. There was still a slim chance that Germany would pull through, but Simonds saw the odds packed against it. "Watch Germany," advised the author, "for the key to the European crisis is there."98

in their agitation that only the assumption of full political power by National Socialism could protect Christianity from its mortal enemy, Marxism. The Nazi propagandists also noted that even those bishops' declarations most critical of National Socialism had paid their respect to the nationalistic aspirations of the Nazi Party and they proceeded to put these utterances to good use.

97 The Living Age, CCCXLI (February, 1932), 473-474.
98 Frank H. Simonds, "Watch Germany!" The Review of Reviews, LXXXV (January, 1932), 36, 37.
A National Socialist government in Germany had been a possibility since September 1930, but Chancellor Bruening and his associates had been able to delay the final reckoning through maneuvers that reportedly included agreement with the right-wing radicals. The last such confrontation between Bruening and the leaders of the right-wing forces, both Adolf Hitler and Alfred Hugenberg, took place during the first two weeks of January 1932. The discussion evolved around the possibility of avoiding an emotion-filled presidential election in April 1932, when President Hindenburg's seven year term of office expired. Bruening hoped to alleviate a number of problems by getting a parliamentary extension of the President's term for a year or two until calm could be restored in domestic politics. The Prime Minister's plan was in the nature of a constitutional amendment, and this necessitated the approval of two-thirds of the Reichstag. By January 12 Hugenberg had refused to permit his party members to vote for the extension, and Adolf Hitler had engaged in propaganda maneuvers in which he had offered President Hindenburg his support in return for Bruening's dismissal and the dissolution of the Reichstag. Hindenburg himself put an end to the negotiations by declaring his decision to run for reelection on February 16. The government set March 13 as election day. Adolf Hitler announced his candidacy on February 22, 1932, before he was actually a German citizen.

The approaching election naturally directed the attention of the American journalists toward Germany with renewed interest.
Michael Farbman, contributing an article entitled "The Twilight of German Capitalism" to the February 3 New Republic, declared that the collapse of the Weimar government would mean the end of the capitalistic system. Survival was being offered in what the National Socialists liked to allude to as state capitalism. "The middle classes must either sink to the level of the masses or help that party to power which promises them salvation." An editorial in the March 1932 issue of The Living Age announced that a revolutionary state of mind definitely existed in Germany but that the revolution itself would have to wait until the government collapsed. Until then, the Nazis and Communists would have to bide their time. This monthly was optimistic about the future, since it thought that the republican forces were getting ready to form a united front against the radicals. Another reason for hope was that "Hitler's personal appeal had declined at the turn of the year," or so imagined The Living Age.

In the mind of Reverend Reinhold Niebuhr, this type of thinking was premature. He expressed an opinion in The Christian Century for March 2 that in spite of the strength of the two extreme political wings, neither dared to start a revolution because it feared that the result would then be a union of the republican parties and the thwarting of a revolutionary victory. Here, he

100 The Living Age, CCCXLII (March, 1932), 7.
thought, was a peculiar trait of the general structure of western urban society. All forces seemed to realize that there was much more to lose by a revolution of any kind and that no one class was powerful enough to triumph over the others. That revolution had thus far been prevented under the circumstances was more significant to Niebuhr than the possibility of revolution. 101

In March and April 1932, talk of revolution was put aside while the politicians prepared for the national presidential election and the subsequent run-off. President Hindenburg's leading rival for office was Adolf Hitler, with the Communist chief, Ernst Thaelmann, a distant third. As the campaign progressed, some interesting comments appeared in the American periodicals. The National Socialist leader and his organization were given a respectable presentation by one of the conservative Shaw family in their journal, The Review of Reviews, one month before the voting day. Hitler was depicted by Roger Shaw as the "honest, if outspoken" opponent of Hindenburg. Following this rather incomplete assessment of the Nazi chief, Shaw discussed the National Socialist program, omitting such matters as anti-Semitism and coming to the conclusion that it advocated "an intelligent use of force" under a strong leader, such as in Fascist Italy. 102

As far as the March 2, 1932 New Republic was concerned,

102 Roger Shaw, "Germany Votes for President," The Review of Reviews, LXXXV (March, 1932), 44-45.
there was no candidate acceptable to those Germans who wished to preserve the Weimar Republic. Especially frustrated were the Social Democrats who had sacrificed principles to maintain the Brüning ministry in power. What to do was the great Socialist dilemma, said The New Republic. The German Socialists realized now that a vote for Hindenburg did not necessarily mean that Hitler would be kept out of the government. As for Hindenburg's attitude, German author Karl Tschuppik expressed it this way in the October 1931 Foreign Affairs: "He took his stand 'faithfully and loyally' on the basis of the Brüning Government. But everyone in Germany knows that, if a change of cabinet should bring the parties of the Right into power he would support just as 'faithfully and loyally' a Hugenberg-Schacht government." Adolf Hitler was stepping out of character, reported the March 2 Christian Century, for he was presently seeking office in a Republic, which he was set on destroying, by the regular constitutional means of election. "Hitler as the leader of a fascist revolution was an ominous figure. Hitler as a constitutional candidate for office is no figure at all." It might be that Hitler had abandoned his anti-republican position now that he had become a German citizen, wrote Professor Sidney B. Fay in the April issue of Current History. "He has long been shifting from his original extremist

103 The New Republic, LXX (March 2, 1932), 275-276.
104 Karl Tschuppik, "Hindenburg," Foreign Affairs, X (October, 1931), 69. Tschuppik was the editor of the Tagebuch of Berlin.
105 The Christian Century, XLIX (March 2, 1932), 275-276.
doctrines to a more moderate attitude," was Fay's pre-election view of the National Socialist chief. 106

The final tally of the March 13 vote gave President Hindenburg a little more than 18,650,000 ballots (49.6% of the total). Hitler received approximately 11,339,000 or 30.1% of the total vote, while the Communist Thaelmann picked up 4,983,000 supporters and 13.2% of all the ballots. Nevertheless, another election had to be held because no candidate received a majority of the vote. Hindenburg's victory in this election, whether by a majority or a plurality, was anticipated by most observers in the American journals. The Literary Digest for March 26 rejoiced that the old soldier had been successful, so that Germany could be kept on the road of moderation in domestic and international affairs. It expected him to increase his vote margin over the "dapper Fascist leader" in the April run-off election. 107 Hitler remained very much of a threat, but Communism had been defeated, was the April 1932 Outlook and Independent's analysis between the first and second election campaigns. 108 A clear-cut Hindenburg majority would have been better news, in the eyes of The Christian Century for March 23, but the election did point to the fact that the German middle class and skilled workers were sensible enough to avoid


107 The Literary Digest, CXII (March 26, 1932), 15.

108 The Outlook and Independent, CLX (April, 1932), 205-206.
the revolutionary extremes when it really counted. However, the situation would bear watching, for the extremists indicated that they could gather in great numerical strength. 109

Making presumably another effort to exonerate Catholics in Germany from the charges of cooperating with the Nazis, Father Joseph F. Thorning pointed out in the April 23 America the situation in which Catholic Germany had actually voted for the President, while the Protestant north and east had generally fallen in line behind Hitler. The latter, thought Thorning, had now reached an impasse from which it would be hard to escape. The Nazi chief had promised too much to his followers, and now only another putsch would bring him any kind of success. 110 It is difficult to see how Father Thorning could write off the National Socialists and their leader when this man had just received eleven and one-third million votes for the post of chief executive.

Hitler personally and the National Socialist Party attracted more attention than ever in the issues of journals which discussed events between the two presidential elections. Numerous and often conflicting interpretations, views and predictions made it difficult for the American reading public to arrive at a clear idea of the German scene. Analyzing the strengths and weaknesses of National Socialism in the April 1932 issue of Foreign Affairs, the American correspondent of a German newspaper, Paul Scheffer, 109

put more stress on the deficiencies. It was his opinion that the movement was "torn within by conflicting currents" and had no definite policies. As a "common basis" the Nazis relied chiefly on propaganda. For this reason, many Germans were saying that Hitler was "afraid to assume power." Nor did Scheffer think that the future was especially bright for Hitlerism.

...[T]here is no way of knowing whether the party can ever take on full status as a party. We do not know whether its leaders feel certain that it can. We are not even sure whether Hitler in his secret heart is free from doubts, whether, out of the inner aspirations, the chemically pure ideals, which his following shares with him—out of so much still fluid metal—he can forge a weapon of steel adapted to practical politics. We do not know whether at bottom he is a "strong man." Also befuddled by German affairs was William Harlan Hale, a contributor to The Nation for March 16. Hale found it difficult to break through the massive amounts of propaganda emanating from Germany. One could not really tell, he wrote, whether the National Socialists were on the threshold of victory and a Nazi dictatorship or on the brink of defeat. But it was true that the so-called Hitler cult had grown to serious proportions, especially within the ranks of young Germany. Students, in particular, found that their education condemned them to unemployment. These youths, said Hale, had tired of the continual economic and international failures of the republican government. In their despair, they

111 Paul Scheffer, "Hitler: Phenomenon and Portent," Foreign Affairs, X (April, 1932), 390. Scheffer was the Washington correspondent of the Berliner Tageblatt.

112 Ibid., 382.
had reached out for a messiah image. National Socialism's dynamic technique of political action offered them the chance to let loose some of their frustrated energy in marching, singing and shooting.

Hale gave Adolf Hitler personally a low rating, classifying him as a typical fanatic. The German demagogue had speaking and leadership ability, but he was "utterly lacking in any sort of intelligence." The collection of doctrinaires and neurotics who surrounded him were, except for the German Communists, the malcontents of Germany. The real radicals of the National Socialist Party were few, and these, in the main, were idealists, each having worked out his own system for prosperity. The German people had the choice to make between these extremists and the forces for conservative reconstruction and internationalism. "The immediate future of Europe seems to rest on this decision."

A long-time resident of Europe, the American Nicholas Fairweather, presented a study in depth of Hitler and his organization in two consecutive issues of The Atlantic Monthly in the spring of 1932. The earlier article first surveyed the "Bible" of the National Socialist movement, Mein Kampf (Fairweather was one of the first responsible journalists in an American periodical to draw attention to Hitler's plan of action as it was written in his book), and briefly and accurately summarized the major

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113 William Harlan Hale, "Ten Years of Hitler: One Hundred of Goethe," The Nation, CXXXIV (March 16, 1932), 380-387. Hale was the former editor of Harkness Hoot and a frequent visitor to the European continent.
points of the Nazi leader's political philosophy. In effect, it was not really Hitler's program that had startled Germany and Europe, said Fairweather, but the way that he had set about to exploit it. A man with an egocentric mentality, he was able to identify himself with his ideas. Like almost all the other American commentators, Fairweather recognized Hitler's speaking ability as one of the real bases of his personal success. Hitler insisted upon having personal contact with his audience, and they were quickly overwhelmed by his emotional oratory. The Nazi leader's program, which was allowed but one interpretation, that of Adolf Hitler's, was being pursued with an absolute singleness of purpose, with an appeal to force if necessary. In Fairweather's estimation, Hitler wanted simply victory and the "expansion of the tribe." 114

The second article of the series told of Hitler's economic plan for state-controlled capitalism, which would exclude all Jewish interests. Economic boundaries would coincide with political boundaries. His explanation of racial purity brought marriage and childbirth under the state's surveillance. For Hitler it was paramount that the Germany of the future be racially pure.

Author Fairweather thought that Hitler was uncertain of his own future. It appeared to the author in this April 1932

114 Nicholas Fairweather, "Hitler and Hitlerism. I. A Man of Destiny," The Atlantic Monthly, CXLIX (March, 1932), 380-387. The Atlantic Monthly said that this American living in Europe had become so interested in "the phenomenon of Hitler's meteoric rise from obscurity" that he made a study of the man, his ideas and his methods.
article that Hitler would be willing to serve in a coalition govern-
ment, rather than try it alone.

In that event, what ally would be least objectionable and most serviceable for him? The Social Democratic Party must be ruled out, for its policies are fundamentally opposed to Hitler's and no common ground could be found for a working agreement. But the Centre—the Roman Catholic party in Germany—is a businesslike organization; it will work with anyone for a limited objective so long as there is a prospect of carrying on orderly government and preventing a revolution. Why, then, should Hitler not seek the Centre, and the Centre not strike up a bargain with him? After all, if Hitler cannot be kept from power, the Centrists may think it better to share responsibility with him and exercise some check upon his wildest tendencies, just as Germany preferred to have the English remain on the Rhine with the French. The Church's ban on the Nazis may perhaps not prove irrevocable.

However, Fairweather was not willing to bet that Hitler would be content with only part of the state's power, once he had a taste of office-holding—a shrewd observation. It was clear, nevertheless, that Fairweather's comments about the Catholic Centrist alliance with National Socialism would get some argument from Catholic sources, particularly America's reporter Father Joseph F. Thorne who had been doing his best to portray the German Catholics as the backbones of the Republic and the epitome of moderation.

In an article which appeared in the May 1932 Current History, journalist Ludwig Lore wrote that he did not think that Hitler's personality had anything to do with his success. It was his ability as an organizer and an agitator which counted most. How-

115Nicholas Fairweather, "Hitler and Hitlerism. II. Germany under the Nazis," ibid., (April, 1932), 509-516.
ever, Lore agreed with many other observers that the National Socialist leader did personify for the German masses their ideas and ambitions, which made the Nazi movement a serious threat. Emotional slogans hid the many contradictions of the organization's platform. Should the Nazis achieve partial or complete control of the government, Lore predicted that the movement would split apart. The social goals of the worker members would immediately conflict with those of the Party's financial backers: industrialists, bankers, aristocrats and Junkers. At any rate, despite the existence of a basic dichotomy in Nazi policy, Lore seemed to expect the National Socialists to play a key role in future German politics.

The meaning of the German Fascist movement still remained a mystery to him, William C. White implied in the April 1932 issue of Scribner's Magazine. Here was the saviour, Adolf Hitler, who alone knew the vague way to the "Promised Land." Yet, with all the inconsistencies in policy and the lack of a precise program for the future, the National Socialist Party continued to grow in stature. If success was forthcoming, one could be assured, wrote White, that the Hitlerites in power would be basically different from when they were merely in opposition. White mistakenly asserted that the Nazis would respond just like the traditional parties. There would occur a moderation of principles.

116 Ludwig Lore, "Hitler's Bid for German Power," Current History, XXXVI (May, 1932), 166-170. Lore was a German-American journalist residing in New York City.
which, in the long run, would cost the Nazi leaders many of their adherents and perhaps their control over the German government. The unfaithful, meanwhile, would gravitate toward the Communist Party. Here was the real danger to Hitler and Germany, declared White,\textsuperscript{117} who underestimated the strength of National Socialist discipline. A second article by S. McClatchie in the same issue of \textit{Scribner's Magazine} labeled the Nazis a "red" party like the Social democrats and Communists. All three were "pledged to suppress capitalism and to establish industrial democracy."\textsuperscript{118} This muddled interpretation, following White's unsatisfactory assessment, could not have failed to keep the readers of this monthly journal completely in the dark about German politics.

It was noteworthy at this juncture that two Communists were called upon by American journals to air their views concerning the German political problems. Their articles, in general, were more incisive and penetrating than many by the American commentators. The liberal weekly \textit{The Nation} on April 20, 1932, published a translated article by Karl Radek arguing that the beleaguered middle class, struggling to keep itself from being proletarianized, had found a leader in Adolf Hitler. This class would have been better off if it had allowed itself to sink in the social scale instead of listening to the "quack" Hitler and his

\textsuperscript{117}William C. White, "Hail Hitler," \textit{Scribner's Magazine}, XCI (April, 1932), 229-231. White was an expert on Russian affairs, having lived and studied in Russia for several years.

\textsuperscript{118}S. McClatchie, "Germany Between Despair and Resurrection," \textit{ibid.}, 233-234.
theory of a German saviour. The Nazi leader had never had a single clear thought or a concrete intelligent program. About the only thing to come from his movement had been the promotion of military life and the arts of war with an increase of saber-rattling.119

Another revolutionary, the famous Russian Bolshevik Leon Trotsky, contributed an article entitled "I See War with Germany" to the April 1932 Forum, which dealt primarily but not exclusively with the international policies of the National Socialist Party. It was Trotsky's belief that if Adolf Hitler was ever to gain control of the German government, which he could never do by means of an elected parliamentary majority, he would need foreign allies while handling the internal chaos brought on by the opposition of the Socialists and Communists. Trotsky foresaw a period of German-Polish cooperation, with Soviet Russia as the ultimate target for aggression. Trotsky urgently advised the Soviet government to be prepared to mobilize immediately upon receiving notice of the establishment of a National Socialist government in Germany.120 While their forecasts of military action and warfare were premature, Radek and Trotsky were almost alone among

119 Karl Radek, "Hitler," The Nation, CXXXIV (April 20, 1932), 464. This article by the Russian journalist and revolutionary originally appeared in Germany in the Weltbühne of Berlin.

120 Leon Trotsky, "I See War with Germany," The Forum, LXXXVII (April, 1932), 224-227. Trotsky (1879-1940), who was asked frequently in this period to contribute to American journals, was residing in Turkey.
the journalists at this time in drawing attention to the potential military menace of a Nazi-controlled Germany.

Whatever threat Hitler and the National Socialists might have posed was temporarily forgotten when the results of the April 10 presidential run-off election were published. Although President Hindenburg handily defeated Hitler for the second time within a month, Hitler's showing, nonetheless, remained impressive. Since the March election the Nazi leader had picked up over two million votes and emerged with approximately 13,400,000 against 19,360,000 ballots cast for Hindenburg, an increase of only 700,000 over his earlier total. From all appearances, however, moderation had prevailed, and democratic elements in Germany felt a sense of relief. This, nonetheless, was not the feeling expressed by The New Republic, The Nation or The Literary Digest. The New Republic for April 20 displayed concern about the nineteen percent increase in Hitler's vote since the March election. It was possible, thought this liberal organ, that when local elections were held on April 24 and Hindenburg's name would count for little, Hitler and his party would obtain their "most important victory" so far. 121 The worst was not yet over, predicted The Nation, for only an improvement of the economic situation could save Germany from dictatorship of the right or left. The Prussian state elections were going to be the key to the Fascists' future. While it appeared quite likely that the extremist groups would gain

121 The New Republic, LXX (April 20, 1932), 255.
enough strength to unseat the Social Democrat—Catholic coalition there and replace it with a rightist coalition, The Nation spoke of hopeful signs.

It is, of course, by no means certain that the Socialist—Catholic combination will be upset. The republican leaders have demonstrated that they are shrewder in politics than the extremists and they may very well again carry the day for moderation and the present republic. 122

The worst was still to come in Germany, echoed The Literary Digest on April 23. Citing French newspaper sources, The Digest pointed to the large increase of votes for Adolf Hitler in the run-off election and noted his immediate appeal to Nazi Party members for hard campaigning in the Prussian elections. 123

The presidential election was examined from a different angle by The Commonweal, which observed that apparently Hitler's entire campaign program had been severely curtailed by the government's using Hitlerite methods. "The argument that devils must be fought with their own fire had definitely prevailed in Berlin. So much, at least, Herr Hitler has accomplished." Such conduct should have exploded the myth that Germany was still being run under the Weimar Constitution. On the other hand, Bruening's decision to fight fire with fire might be considered a welcome sign because it showed that the Chancellor no longer thought it feasible to try to bring some of the more moderate Nazis over to his way of thinking. 124

122 The Nation, CXXXIV (April 20, 1932), 45.
123 The Literary Digest, CXIII (April 23, 1932), 15.
124 The Commonweal, XV (April 20, 1932), 674.
Catholic author and educator George N. Shuster was not able to speak with certainty about the future of Germany in an article in the May issue of The Forum. He thought that anything could still happen.125 The surprise in the entire election for Roger Shaw of the May 1932 Review of Reviews was the failure of a large Communist vote to materialize. Adolf Hitler had once more increased his popularity, but it was Shaw's opinion that he had reached his peak. The votes for his opponents were almost two-thirds of the total, which, for Shaw, was a sizeable repudiation. A further observation seconded the views of those who looked upon German Catholics as a moderating element in the Weimar Republic. "It was a strange paradox that Hitler, who is a Catholic Lower Austrian, ran strongest in the Protestant North, while Hindenburg, the Protestant Junker, made his strongest showing in the Catholic South."126 Contributing to the April 20 Commonweal, Max Jordan considered both the great gain of votes by Hitler and the Hindenburg victory, since the General's present chancellor had, on several occasions, given evidence that he desired not only a postponement of reparation payments but the final termination, as the final defeat for the German "fulfilment" policy. As matters stood, President Hindenburg seemed to be the only one who had the authority and popularity to keep the Germans within the bounds of


126 Roger Shaw, "The Reich Says 'Hindenburg,'" The Review of Reviews, LXXXV (May, 1932), 35.
reason, but Jordan considered it doubtful that he could revive the
Weimar government and restore German faith in the possibility of
a peaceful revision of the Versailles Treaty and a satisfactory
solution to Germany's economic problems. The Germans were now a
"desperate" lot, and the election trend pointed to disaster in
the near future. "But there is still time for the correction of
past mistakes, on all sides."

There would not be long to wait until the National Socialists' vote strength would be tested. The elections to the Prussian Landtag were set for April 24, 1932. The preparations for
these elections were in progress when the recently reelected Hindenburg took steps which gave indication that the government was
no longer willing to tolerate the activities of the German Fascists. Evidence had continued to mount that the Nazi storm troop
groups were planning to rise in revolt. After considering the
petitions of German state officials to restrain the Nazi paramilitary organizations, the Minister of the Interior, General Wilhelme Groener, together with Chancellor Bruening, requested the
President to sign a decree outlawing the army of storm troops.
Hindenburg signed the decree on April 13. Most American journals
commented favorably. The government maneuver won warm applause
from the April 21 Presbyterian Advance, which saw little good
coming from this private army during the upcoming elections. The

127 Max Jordan, "Germany Elects a President," The Common-
weal, XV (April 20, 1932), 682-683. Jordan, a long-time Washing-
ton correspondent, was reporting for the National Catholic Welf-
far Conference.
President was praised but so were the German people. They "have shown a steadiness under the most trying circumstances which entitles them to intelligent consideration at the hands of other nations." The Nation for April 27 also approved of the measure but expressed less hope in the "steady" Germans than did the Advance. For most observers of the German political scene, it was a surprise to see the disbanding proceeding peacefully. To account for this, The Nation surmised that Adolf Hitler was fully aware that he could survive underground if need be. He also knew that the Nazis had a good chance to take over the Prussian government after April 24, and this would permit the incorporation of his outlawed legions into the police arm of the state. Since this was a distinct possibility, The Nation hoped that the disbanding measure did not come too late. The dissolution decree received a different response from The New Republic.

If Adolf Hitler had been given the privilege of choosing the moment for the inevitable governmental attack on his military machine, he could hardly have asked for a more opportune time. The recent emergency decree ordering the dissolution of his troops comes when the Geneva and Lausanne Conferences, plus the Prussian state election, are keeping all Germany in a state of suspense, which works to Hitler's advantage.

Hitler was currently accusing Chancellor Bruening of being intimidated by the French government in the banning of his military organizations. This propaganda campaign issue should win him some more votes in the upcoming election, thought The New Republic.

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128 The Presbyterian Advance, XLV (April 21, 1932), 5.
129 The Nation, CXXXIV (April 27, 1932), 480.
130 The New Republic, LXX (April 27, 1932), 283.
In contrast to this assessment, the more conservative editor of *The Living Age* believed that the Hitler menace had been exaggerated by the republican forces in order to cut down the Communist and Nationalist Party vote. "In other words, the danger to Hindenburg's presidential candidacy did not come from Hitler's fanatical followers but from middle and lower-class elements that might have thrown away their votes on one of the other two candidates." This resulted in Hitler's prestige growing much greater than his numerical following. Although "there is no doubt whatever that Hitler could seize political power by force," his chances for a successful coup were gradually diminishing.

However the threat of Communist revolution was increasing, thought *The Living Age*. The Bruening government was already interfering with banks and businesses, a step in the direction of Socialism as far as this journal was concerned.\(^{131}\) The writer seemed to lose sight of the fact that the Communist candidate, Ernst Thaelmann, lost a million votes between the presidential elections of March and April, which hardly confirmed his own prognostications. But then in its very next issue *The Living Age* called attention to what seemed to be a split within the German Communist ranks. Most Bolsheviks were still intent upon carrying on their feud with the Social Democrats, while a small faction regarded Adolf Hitler as the chief menace to the German workers. Only the National Socialists profited from the feud, "and both

\(^{131}\) *The Living Age*, CCCXLII (May, 1932), 194.
the presidential and the Prussian elections show that the swing to Fascism continues."\textsuperscript{132}

National Socialism recorded another tremendous success in the Prussian state election for April 24, 1932. The Nazis became the leading party in the Prussian \textit{Landtag}, holding 162 of 419 seats. Since the Center Party won 67 seats, which would have permitted a working majority for a Nazi-Centrist coalition, the May 4 \textit{New Republic} revived the discussion concerning Catholic cooperation with the Hitlerites. Referring to recent editions of Centrist and Nazi newspapers, \textit{The New Republic} saw both parties getting ready to meet each other half way: "As a matter of fact, an alliance between these parties is not as unnatural as it may seem. Both are diametrically opposed to the social philosophy of the labor parties, and the Centrists have, on a number of occasions, demonstrated their readiness to cooperate with the National Socialists." By no means, however, did \textit{The New Republic} intend its analysis to be anti-Catholic. Earlier in the same editorial this journal had praised the Center Party and Prussian Catholics for holding their ground against the National Socialist threat in the Prussian elections. According to \textit{The New Republic},

\begin{quote}
...it proves that the Catholic Church still dominates the German workers of that faith, and that the Fascists have been as unsuccessful in their endeavors to win them as were the Socialists and Communists in the past.
\end{quote}

One more factor mentioned in this editorial was the almost complete disintegration of the smaller parties\textsuperscript{133}—one of the chief

\begin{footnotesize}
\textsuperscript{132}Ibid., (June, 1932), 286.
\textsuperscript{133}\textit{The New Republic}, LXX (May 4, 1932), 314-315.
\end{footnotesize}
reasons why the National Socialists were eventually successful.

Now that the Prussian state election had clarified the German political picture, two choices confronted Chancellor Brüning, as a Nation editorial saw it. He and the members of his Catholic party must either work with the National Socialists in a coalition government for Prussia or support a minority dictatorship; the former represented the "safest course." Thus the two leading American liberal journals agreed completely on this point. It was possible, The Nation suggested, that Hitler and his friends might well be sobered by this attainment of power. Either because it had lost all hope for democratic Germany or because Nazi propaganda had taken effect, The Nation claimed that Hitler had already tempered some of his views as his movement picked up electoral strength. "Indeed, only six weeks ago he revised his reparations policy so that today it is hardly to be distinguished from Brüning's." To have said the same thing about Chancellor Brüning would probably have been more accurate.

That National Socialism's leading spokesman, Adolf Hitler, could be kept under control, no matter what ballots showed, was the position taken by John Palmer Gavit in the June 1 Survey magazine. Germany would take care of Hitler as the United States had "absorbed Bryan and the Bull Moose," if only the French agreed to make certain international adjustments. "Forget Hitler and fix attention upon whatever may be going to happen this month at Lau-

134 The Nation, CXXXIV (May 4, 1932), 501.
sanne in Switzerland," was Gavit's advice. On the other hand, the May 7 Literary Digest, gathering information from all its new sources, found that the vast majority of correspondents judged the National Socialist Party to be nearing its goal for power in Germany after the election success in Prussia. Like the New Republic, the Digest also had information that Centrists "might join hands" with the Nazis to form the new Prussian state government. The May 5 Presbyterian Advance could see only disaster coming from a Hitler rule in Germany; and, unfortunately, the Fascist leader's day seemed near at hand. The reelection of Hindenburg for the presidency over Adolf Hitler had led many to believe that the National Socialist leader was finished politically, however, the Prussian elections proved beyond a doubt, for the Christian Century, that once the element of sentiment attached to Hindenburg was removed from an election, the Nazi Party would win the test in stride. The Century too considered it reasonable that the next government in Prussia would be a Catholic and Fascist combination, with the Nazis holding the important posts. In this event, it might be interpreted as a challenge to the French government, and chances were that this was just the beginning of a new


136 The Literary Digest, CXIII (May 7, 1932), 12-13.

137 The Presbyterian Advance, XLV (May 5, 1932), 5.
set of international problems. The Christian Century's German correspondent, Siegfried Scharfe, did not believe that there was any solution to the German political dilemma for the time being.

As the summer months approached and German political life seemed at an impasse, several journalists made an assessment of the National Socialist movement in the light of its constant popular growth. A very penetrating interpretation appeared in the May 18 issue of The Commonweal. Nazism, like Fascism, was an extreme measure, dedicated to the elimination of extreme conditions, wrote Johannes Mattern, a political scientist. The movement arose in an atmosphere of chaos mixed with a "will to live" feeling of the German people. Mattern pointed out the all-embracing nature of the National Socialist program, which included projects aimed to attract liberals, conservatives and nationalists. Demands of a more radical nature, made as early as 1920, had, in part, reportedly been modified so as not to offend capitalistic supporters; yet, Mattern observed that Hitler had not revealed these modifications for fear of alienating the more liberal of his followers.

Professor Mattern ascertained that this heterogeneous movement had surprised most of the German political parties by the strictness of the organization's discipline and the method it used to win adherents and acquire funds to swell the Party's treasury.

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138 The Christian Century, XLIX (May 4, 1932), 563-564.

139 Siegfried Scharfe, "Germany's Status Still Uncertain," ibid., (June 8, 1932), 746. Scharfe was the German correspondent of The Christian Century.
The Germans' love for organization, colorful uniforms, music, marching and the like had been fully exploited by the Nazi leaders. Newspapers, magazines, theaters and other businesses had all helped the organization in one way or another. But in spite of all this activity, the National Socialists remained outside of the government, and, in the presidential election of 1932 and the subsequent run-off, the votes for Hindenburg, in fact, meant in Mattern's judgment votes for the moderate solution of Germany's ills. Still, if the Bruening-Hindenburg duo failed to achieve some successes in subsequent international conferences, chances were that Hitler would replace Chancellor Bruening. The National Socialist victory depended upon whether Adolf Hitler and his followers were able to restrain themselves and wait for the opportunity to succeed to power legally. Mattern closed his article with a prediction:

Will the National-Socialist party, once it gets into power, be able to fulfill what it has promised? Leon Trotsky, who should be able to judge, is reported as having said that Hitler in power would do precisely what Bruening is doing now. Trotsky might well have added, what he unquestionably visualizes: When that comes to pass, millions of Hitler's faithful adherents will be crushed beyond hope, while the rest may well be expected to turn in desperation to Communism as Germany's last chance of curing her social malaise in accordance with the Russian prescription.140

In another serious discussion Frank H. Simonds, writing in The Review of Reviews for June 1932, warned his American readers

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140 Johannes Mattern, "The National-Socialist Movement," The Commonweal, XVI (May 18, 1932), 63-65. Mattern was a professor of political science at Johns Hopkins University.
that American officials and press commentators were not taking the Nazi threat seriously enough. Contrary to a widely held belief, Simonds insisted everything would still not be well in Germany, if Hitler and his "mob" came into power. In such an eventuality, all constructive work in Europe would come to a standstill; international cooperation would end; and a new economic crash would occur in Germany. Furthermore, Hitler's promises and goals in foreign affairs would bring Europe to the brink of another war. What could be even worse was that without a fixed program for the domestic ills of Germany and without cohesion in the ranks of his followers, Adolf Hitler was bound to fail, bringing on a Communist regime. Overwhelmed by pessimism, Simonds thought it certain that Germany would experiment with Hitler: "The pace of the progress of this reactionary party has reached the point where all hope of arresting it must be abandoned."

Another realistic and pessimistic appraisal of the German scene was that of William C. White in the July 1932 issue of The Atlantic Monthly. White was especially disturbed by the political action of the young German generation, some of whom had climbed upon the Communist bandwagon, while the majority had turned to National Socialism for comfort. This "lost generation" had no faith in Germany's future under present conditions. For it, the only possible alternatives were international conflict or civil war. White was uncertain about the outcome of what he thought to

141 Frank H. Simonds, "If Hitler Comes to Power," The Review of Reviews, LXXXV (June, 1932), 35-37.
be the Communist–Nazi struggle for power. "No matter what happens, the members of the lost generation are confident that it is only a question of time before victory will be theirs," wrote White. 142

In the view of the American journals of opinion, Germany in the spring of 1932 had an uncertain future. There was no denying the steady progress of Adolf Hitler and National Socialism since the September 1930 election, although the correspondents had mixed emotions about this rise. Most closely identified with the Nazi ideology was one man—the leader, Hitler. Other important figures in the German Fascist movement's hierarchy remained shadowy individuals who seemed to be temporarily relegated to secondary roles by the journalists; there was little indication just how formidable the National Socialist Party executive committee had become. Some attempt to establish the identity of those in the movement had been made by the American periodicals. Members of the middle class, a considerable portion of the younger generation and the malcontents of German society were credited with making up the majority of the Nazi Party faithful. The Hitler program was geared to attract a number of diverse groups, but as yet it was difficult to pinpoint these converts, who remained nameless, except as ballots in the National Socialists' rising vote strength. While no list of prominent German intellectuals had been cited by the magazines for pro-Nazi leanings, references to Hitler's support from big business and men of wealth had been

given some minor consideration, but certainly such a situation was worthy of a more thorough and specific analysis.

Hitler himself proved to be a difficult character for almost all the observers to assess. That he was a spellbinding orator was certain, but most of his other qualities and characteristics seemed to escape the American journalists. In too many instances, Hitler was compared to American politicians, some of whom, like William Jennings Bryan, had been considered radicals in their day. That Hitler was put into this category indicates that few reporters had bothered to study the Nazi leader's program. Mein Kampf was seldom mentioned, and a discussion of Hitler's policies usually centered on some of his more spectacular and unorthodox proposals; even these were often given superficial treatment. Although there were frequent shallow comparisons of Hitler to Benito Mussolini, an understanding that the German leader was a promoter of totalitarianism seemed to be lacking. It was all too apparent that American observers were unable to pass judgment upon Hitler and his followers except within the context of the American democratic system. On the other hand, most correspondents from Europe and Americans who had resided in Europe for many years reported the growth of National Socialism more realistically.

Too much faith was put in the democratic process by the journals, especially since democracy in Germany had such a slender basis and had lost much of its appeal because of the failure to deal successfully with the various crises of the post-war
The sagacity of the German electorate was consistently overpraised, even while the records showed that the National Socialists were increasing their ballot strength. Seldom was the German electorate's depth of despair accurately perceived, nor was the fact that Chancellor Bruening had established a constitutional dictatorship, which helped to undermine the belief in democracy, shrewdly assessed.

Over-confidence in the ability of Heinrich Bruening and the Center Party to maintain Germany along a moderate path was repeatedly exemplified by articles in the American journals of Catholic persuasion. A number of other commentators continued to look upon General Hindenburg as the one man in the Weimar Republic who could successfully guide the government through the period of stress, whatever his political leanings might have been. The behind-the-scenes political maneuverings in Germany seemed to have escaped the American observers. In general, however, those reporters who had been making their reports from the scene of the action or who had been recent visitors to Germany seemed to have more insight into the confused political struggle than those who relied on second-hand accounts to make their appraisal.

The threat of a Communist revolution in Germany, in reality not a distinct possibility by the spring of 1932, disturbed such conservative periodicals as The Review of Reviews and The Living Age, as well as Catholic journals. This distraction tended to blur the picture of National Socialism presented in the pages of these magazines. On the other hand, in following the German
political scene in the prominent liberal journals, especially The Nation and The New Republic, one reads a more thoughtful and accurate evaluation of the major problems; however, these two liberal weeklies, along with many other observers, tended to vacillate in their views according to the successes and failures of the National Socialists. But when one reads The Nation editorial of May 4, 1932, expressing the opinion that Hitler's program would be moderated by responsibility if he ever came to power, one can only wonder at the limited understanding of the nature of National Socialism on the part of the American journalists.
CHAPTER II

THE PAPEN AND SCHLEICHER INTERLUDE

By May 1932 it was becoming clear from many of the American journals' reports that the Bruening government would soon have to decide upon what decisive measures to take with regard to the growing threat of National Socialism. Time seemed to be running out for the floundering Weimar Republic. Although the Bruening administration was able to defeat a no-confidence motion offered by the Nazis and other opposition parties in the Reichstag on May 12 by a vote of 287 to 257, the very next day General Wilhelm Groener, both Minister of War and Minister of Interior, resigned the former post under pressure. Not only had he been under fire from the National Socialists for the way in which he had dealt with the Nazi storm troopers, but behind the scenes one of Groener's subordinates, General Kurt von Schleicher, whose ambition it was to take command of the Reichswehr, was intriguing against his chief, as well as against Heinrich Bruening. Schleicher, on very close terms with the President, convinced Hindenburg that Bruening and Groener had made a serious political blunder when they dissolved the National Socialists' private bands. In spite of the fact that Chancellor Bruening had worked so diligently for Hindenburg's reelection, the President was persuade to make a change
in the administration. That Bruening no longer had the confidence of the President was revealed to the Chancellor on May 29, 1932. On the following day, Hindenburg announced the resignation of Bruening's ministry.

For most close observers of the German political scene, the resignation of the Bruening Cabinet was a surprise. On numerous occasions in the past months there had been rumors that the administration was about to topple or be replaced by reactionar­ies or radicals. Outwardly, however, Heinrich Bruening looked as if he were firmly entrenched in office in May 1932. Although major domestic and international problems remained unsolved, Bruening had, so far, proved capable of beating down the National Socialist and other opposition parties' attempts to unseat him. This situation accounts for the dazed condition in which world opinion, along with the American journals of opinion, responded to the event of May 30, 1932.

The Nation, in an editorial entitled "Europe in Extremis," interpreted Bruening's resignation as a signal for greater political and social unrest in Germany. No good could come from the removal of a man for whom The Nation now indicated great respect.

For twenty-six months, through one of the worst periods in Germany's history, he had surmounted every difficulty despite the fact that he had had to work with an extreme­ly slender majority in the Reichstag, and one that was none too friendly to his policies. Even the rising tide of Hitlerism had not caused him to depart from his calm and certain ways.

It was ironic, in the words of the editorial, that this turning away from moderation by the German President occurred at the very
moment in which France appeared to be willing to modify some of her economic demands. The Nation had heard that Chancellor Bruening's dismissal was the result of behind-the-scenes intrigue of the Junkers and the military faction led by General Kurt von Schleicher. This American weekly could not verify these rumors, but if they were true, and they were, it proved to this journal that Germany had "learned little since 1914, for it was such intrigue carried on by Baron Holstein and others which contributed so largely to the diplomatic debacle that forced the World War upon Europe." It was safe to predict, The Nation felt, that a new administration led by a general, or by a dictator, or a combination with Hitler as a member of the cabinet, was in the offing. "In any event, the situation in Germany can only get worse, and with it that of Europe."

Although The New Republic still liked to blame the Versailles peace settlement for all the troubles in central Europe, this time it specifically named "the mounting power of the Hitlerites and the fact that von Hindenburg is himself, after all, a Junker and a militarist" as the two causes for the ouster of Chancellor Bruening. In The New Republic's opinion Hindenburg had taken the "first steps" toward a "Fascist dictatorship." It was fair to assume that the National Socialists and Adolf Hitler were in the driver's seat and would either participate in or control the next government. Even if this was not the case, the calling

1 The Nation, CXXXIV (June 8, 1932), 639.
of new elections, almost "inevitable" in the immediate future, was sure to bring the Nazis "another tremendous increase in their strength." Hitler in power with a vote of confidence would be very dangerous; however, *The New Republic* looked for him to seek a peaceful solution with France by holding out an offer of collective action against Soviet Russia. Speculation such as this gave *The New Republic* an opportunity to defend the Soviet Union, for which it had special affection. Here it is enough to note that this magazine's evaluation of the Bruening resignation was directly to the point: "The whole situation is full of dynamite."2

If it did one deed, the curt dismissal of Heinrich Bruening indicated that President Hindenburg was no longer fit to serve, in the eyes of both the most prominent Catholic weeklies, *America* and *The Commonweal*. However, the Jesuit periodical seemed to have mixed feelings, allowing sentiment to enter into its discussions of the German problems. On one hand, it editorialized that Hindenburg would be "likely to regret" his decision, and as far as the future was concerned, the prospects were not good. The news of the appointment of the ultra-conservative political dilettante, Franz von Pappen, to head the new government had reached the offices of *America*. It seemed willing enough to accept this move, as long as the government of Junkers and aristocrats served as the "transition" cabinet it was rumored to be. What concerned *America* was that a long stay by Pappen and his co-

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2 *The New Republic*, LXXI (June 8, 1932), 83.
horts could spell disaster for Germany in international affairs. On the other hand, it declared that "pessimism is not in order." One basis for this statement consisted of the erroneous calculation that Bruening would remain a potent force in his country's affairs. Another was "the fundamental good sense of the German people" to make the right decision in times of crisis. A third reason was the "axiom" which said that "a radical in power usually becomes a conservative." The radical alluded to was Adolf Hitler, who was "now near the top." America did not express an opinion about precisely what role it expected the Nazi leader to play after Papen's "transition" government; since it grouped him with "the militarists" and "the landlords," Adolf Hitler in a coalition of conservatives seemed plausible.3

A more alarmed Commonweal considered the fall of Chancellor Bruening to be a "ghastly and frightening...catastrophe." He was viewed as the only man capable of formulating policies to keep to Communists out of power in Germany and of compromising with the Nationalists of the Hitler-type. To make matters worse, the selection of Papen as the new government leader had not only split the unity of the Center Party, of which Papen was a member (America had not referred to this fact), but it had given the reins of government over to a man who did not "know what the year 1932 is all about." Interestingly enough, The Commonweal found Papen personally appealing, "a gentleman of moderate endowments and unselfish

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3America, XLVII (June 11, 1932), 225.
ambitions," yet it had doubts about his political philosophy. After Papen, and his stay would be very brief, predicted The Commonweal, new elections would have to be called, and Adolf Hitler would be the next figure propelled into power. He, it assumed, would also lose out quickly. Only God knew what would come after him, but it seemed certain that Western Civilization was on the brink of collapse. Unlike America, The Commonweal seemed to appreciate the fact that Germany's ills could not be corrected by the methods of either Papen or of Hitler. What both Catholic journals probably feared was an ultimate Bolshevik victory if no other combination was successful in restoring order and prosperity in Germany. That neither weekly was aware of all the complexities of the situation was made evident by their interpretation of the event and their description of some of the leading characters in the political drama.

The appointment of a military and reactionary government under Chancellor von Papen indicated to the June 8 Christian Century that Hindenburg who, in the opinion of this Protestant weekly, remained in control of the situation, was finally convinced that a moderate-led dictatorship with republican forms was no longer capable of balancing the political situation. The editor thought that Germany faced only two alternatives: civil war and revolution under the National Socialists or government by a group of older, experienced ultra-conservatives, serving as "a temporary

4The Commonweal, XVI (June 15, 1932), 17.
stop-gap." It still remained to be seen, however, if the German workers would react with physical force against the new administration. A second Protestant weekly, The Presbyterian Advance, viewed the appointment of the new cabinet as a kind of political truce. It was indeed a better situation than that other alternative, the National Socialists in complete control. The Advance was one of the first periodicals to recognize that General Kurt von Schleicher was the power behind Papen and that these two, together with Hindenburg, appeared to have reached an accord with Adolf Hitler. They were reported "seeing eye to eye." What was all very clear was that Germany would be much harder to deal with in international negotiations.

Both The Literary Digest and The Nation agreed that the makeup of the new government was reminiscent of pre-republican Germany. A return to monarchical rule appeared imminent, according to the Digest's sources of information. The Digest also expressed its fear that Franz von Papen was unconsciously preparing the way for Hitler. In fact, reports received from Berlin indicated that the Nazi crowds were already acting like the masters of state affairs. The Nation for June 15 saw the Junker administration falling after the next election, with Adolf Hitler, not a

5 The Christian Century, XLIX (June 8, 1932), 723.
6 The Presbyterian Advance, XLV (June 9, 1932), 5.
7 The Literary Digest, CXIII (June 18, 1932), 11.
8 Ibid., (June 11, 1932), 12.
Taking, taking command. But, in the meantime, chances for European economic cooperation would collapse. The fate of the Lausanne Conference, called for June 16, 1932, to seek a solution for the world economic crisis as well as to reach a final settlement for the reparations problem, seemed uppermost in the mind of The Nation. It assumed that Germany's domestic tension would be eased as soon as the world's great states adopted a program of economic reconstruction. The Christian Century for June 29 wondered whether the conference might be too late.

Certainly it is too late to undo what has happened in Germany in the last six weeks. Von Hindenburg has made his choice. He has placed the reich in the hands of the junkers. By that act he has perhaps taken the fate of Germany out of any relationship where the other nations can largely affect it.

The selection of Papen to head the government could only mean a future filled with civil strife, as far as the Century was concerned.

When Franz von Papen assumed the chancellorship on May 31, 1932, he found himself assailed from all sides. No support for the government was forthcoming except from Junker landowners and some of the traditional conservatives. The key role was played by the Reichswehr, which was represented in the administration by General Schleicher, the new minister for defense. Schleicher, the man who was primarily responsible for the dismissal of Bruening, looked upon himself as the chief source of power in the near-

9 The Nation, CXXXIV (June 15, 1932), 662.
10 The Christian Century, XLIX (June 29, 1932), 826.
ly defunct Weimar Republic. Papen's need for the army's backing was all the more evident when his own Center Party associates ran him out of the organization for his contributing to the overthrow of another Centrist, the more popular Bruening.

Previously General Schleicher had made contact with the Nazi leadership, alerting it to his plans to unseat Bruening and preparing the way for a truce between the new government and the National Socialists. Hitler gave his final consent to the Schleicher compromise plan on May 30. In return for Nazi toleration of the Papen Cabinet, the storm troopers were to be permitted to reorganize, and the Reichstag was to be dissolved and new elections held in July. The dissolution occurred on June 4, and the ban on Nazi military units was lifted on June 16. Meanwhile, Papen and Schleicher had until the July 31 election day to build up public support for their rule and to cultivate their friendship with the Hitlerites.

Schleicher's intrigue did not escape the attention of American journalists. The Junkers and militarists had matters well under control, said John Elliott of The New York Herald-Tribune, writing in The Nation on June 29. This, in his belief, represented a more dangerous combination than a Hitler government. General Kurt von Schleicher apparently had plans to extend the so-called transitional regime and either bring in the Nazis after the summer elections or form his own military dictatorship, depending on the outcome of the July election. It was Elliott's opinion that Bruening had made his fatal mistake in not forcing the
National Socialists into a more moderate position by giving them some cabinet responsibility. As doubtful as this assessment might be, Elliott himself was more concerned with the future than with reminiscing about the past. "It behooves German republicans to watch the developments of the next months with the closest attention, for never has the Weimar democracy been in such danger as it is now."\(^1\)

The present dangerous predicament happened, said The Nation of June 22, because the principles of the 1918 Revolution had not been fulfilled by the Socialist leaders. Militarism and monarchism should have been dealt with more decisively. Now it appeared that the workers, exhausted by their economic problems, were not going to be strong enough to protect the Weimar Republic as they had at the time of the Kapp Putsch. "Unless all signs fail," The Nation foresaw a Nazi government by August.\(^2\)

There was no question about it, General Schleicher was now the man of the hour in Germany, reported The Literary Digest on July 2. News from Germany indicated that he was the man capable of containing the National Socialists.\(^3\) On the other hand, The New Republic warned that the Nazis were carrying on as if they were already in power. Anti-Semitic violence had increased, and the Papen government had been given orders by Hitler to fire.

\(^1\)John Elliott, "How Bruening Was Overthrown," The Nation, CXXXIV (June 29, 1932), 720-722.

\(^2\)The Nation, CXXXIV (June 22, 1932), 695.

\(^3\)The Literary Digest, CXIV (July 2, 1932), 11.
Socialists, moderates and Jews in government offices or face reprisals after the July 31 election. The Nazis had become almost "hysterical" in demanding the ouster of the Prussian Socialist administration of Carl Severing, according to the July 27 Nation.

General Schleicher and Chancellor Papen's plan of appeasing the National Socialists confused more than one commentator and produced some rash judgments. The Papen-Junker government was really a Hitlerite government in disguise, George Gerhard proclaimed in The North American Review for August 1932. Heavy contributions had come to the Nazi Party treasury from these aristocrats; it was a fact that the provinces most under the jurisdiction of the landed gentry had enthusiastically climbed aboard the Hitler bandwagon. However, with reference to Hitler, Gerhard did not appear disturbed that he might soon join the government. Most of his platform, including even his bold anti-Semitism, was only political propaganda which would be soon forgotten once in a responsible position. Taking no interest in the growing rumored Papen-Hitler collusion, journalist Ludwig Lore was more worried about the irreparable damage a man such as Papen would cause, even though this regime might be short-lived. Chancellor Papen was prepared to lead Germany into war by playing the same crafty dip-

14The New Republic, LXXI (July 13, 1932), 218.
15The Nation, CXXXV (July 27, 1932), 66.
diomatic game as he did during the World War.  

The Living Age felt certain that Papen would soon drop from power because he "counts for little among the younger generation of Nazis and Communists." As for Schleicher, he and Constantin von Neurath, the Foreign Minister, would probably stay around in some kind of dictatorship containing a few National Socialists. As a concession to the right radicals, Hitler's forces and other para-military groups would probably be allowed to unite with the Reichswehr. The Living Age incorrectly predicted that the Social Democrats would gain in popularity because "they have a strong organization and will no longer be held accountable for the conduct of government and intensification of the crisis."  

The Catholic journal, The Sign, was disturbed by reports from a "reliable informant" that the new leaders of Germany represented an anti-Catholic plot. The Junker-Hitler combination was out to end the influence of the Center Party and the Catholic Church in Germany, even if this meant a gain for Communism, the perennial bugaboo of the Catholic writers. The Sign added that "few realize that it is the Catholic populations of Germany that are making the most strenuous fight against Hitlerism; and the Hitlerites are not ignorant of the personality of their enemy."  

17 Ludwig Lore, "Von Papen at Lausanne," The New Republic, LXXI (July 20, 1932), 258. In December 1915 the United States government demanded the recall of Papen, a military attaché to the German embassy in Washington during the World War, for espionage.  

18 The Living Age, CCCXLII (August, 1932), 475.  

19 The Sign, XII (August, 1932), 5.
The Catholic monthly failed to mention that Chancellor Papen was a Catholic.

Some journalists were obviously confused by the events in Germany. The New Republic, for example, gave credence to a rumor that factions of the Center Party were working closely with the National Socialists in some German states. 20 Siegfried Scharfe, writing for The Christian Century, could do little more than describe the present political situation as "one of the queerest which Germany has met since the revolution of 1918." 21

To the behind-the-scenes political intrigue in Germany was added the street violence being carried out by the various bands of the political parties. The climax of these engagements occurred in the city of Altona on July 17, 1932, when bloody riots broke out between Nazi and Communist sympathizers. Since the city was under the jurisdiction of the Social Democratic government of Prussia, Chancellor Papen thought he had found an excuse to expel the legal Prussian government. Therefore on July 20 Papen informed the Prussian administration that, since law and order was not being maintained in their state, President Hindenburg had authorized emergency powers naming the Reich Chancellor Federal Commissioner for Prussia and removing both the Prussian premier and the minister of interior. Although the Social Democrats tried to resist, they were forced to abandon their offices by the action of

20 The New Republic, LXXI (August 3, 1932), 302.
the Reichswehr. By this illegal action Papen and Schleicher acquired the largest and most important German state, which they immediately began to turn into a conservative bastion by ousting moderate and leftist civil servants. 22

The German political scene had been "simplified" by Papen's illegal act, in the view of The New Republic, which, with its leftist orientation, lamented the illegal suppression of the Socialist government of Prussia more deeply than did the other journals. The New Republic quite correctly assessed this action as a direct step toward an absolute dictatorship. It also noted that a number of leading American newspapers had adjusted themselves "to the idea of a Nationalist Germany with a monarchy in the offing." There were ulterior motives behind all this, suspected this liberal weekly.

The New Republic did not share the enthusiasm of these editors for Dr. Brüning, nor did it rejoice at the "triumph of democracy" supposed to be signalized by the Hindenburg victory. It is not now deceived by the pretensions to law and order and political sanity of the " monocle" Cabinet. Will it be said in the future that public opinion in the United States stands behind that power in Germany and Austria which promises to return the billions of dollars invested by American capitalists—no matter whether the power is that of democracy or dictatorship? 23

The Nation saw more problems developing than The New Republic. There was real danger of a civil war, depending upon what

22 A detailed study of this episode in Prussian history can be found in Earl R. Beck's The Death of the Prussian Republic: A Study of Reich-Prussian Relations, 1932-1934 (Tallahassee: Florida State University Press, 1959).

23 The New Republic, LXXI (August 3, 1932), 301-302.
role Adolf Hitler and his associates had played in the coup d'état in Prussia. If a deal had been worked out, it might just be that Adolf Hitler and the militarists would be ruling Germany by the autumn of the year. With the striking down of the Socialist government in Prussia went the very roots of democratic government in Germany, reported The Literary Digest. No relief could be expected in the immediate future, warned an editorial in the August 3 Commonweal. All progress had been ended by the Papen-Hindenburg tandem, and it was impossible to think that the broken pieces of the republican government, especially in Prussia, could be successfully restored by a subsequent government. "In view of conditions," The Commonweal found the Papen "experiment" to be "quite ridiculous."

This stop-gap Cabinet went into office expounding a version of nationalism less bizarre than Herr Hitler's "old soldier" patriotism, but willing none the less to pat every stalwart "Brown-shirt" on the back. In company with the great majority of Germans, Colonel Von Papen and his associates wanted to cleanse the body politic of Communism. But like so many ultra-conservatives in other lands, they fancy that hygiene is an affair of one combing and brushing. Assuming that such men as Severing, whose services to the republic as a leader of Social Democratic labor are of inestimable value, can be brushed aside like mosquitoes with the help of a few soldiers, this government is playing with windmills like a manner worthy of Don Quixote.

The London correspondent of The New Republic, Henry N. Brailsford, pronounced a eulogy for the German Republic on the eve

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24 The Nation, CXXXV (August 3, 1932), 98.
25 The Literary Digest, CXIV (July 30, 1932), 9.
26 The Commonweal, XVI (August 3, 1932), 338-339.
of the July 31 national election. In his estimation, the Reichstag could not function any longer as a parliamentary body. In fact, it had been two years since it had really done anything constructive. To a degree the difficulties in contemporary Germany stemmed from the fact that Socialism had failed miserably. The party of the 1918 revolution, the Social Democrats, had been content to work through the ballot and had never actually been able to acquire real economic and military power from the Junkers, industrialists and militarists. These forces were now in political control and would set about to reorganize a strong capitalistic state. Brailsford already saw the other capitalist nations giving more support to the Junker Papen's government than was ever given to the Socialist or moderate ministries. 27

Election returns on July 31 revealed the growth of extremism in Germany in the preceding two years. The Communist Party picked up almost 700,000 more votes and added ten new members to the Reichstag for a total of eighty-nine seats. The biggest gain by far, however, was seen in the Nazi landslide. Hitler's Party increased its total vote by over one hundred percent and added 123 Reichstag seats to the 107 which it already possessed. The Center Party added to its strength, picking up more than 500,000 votes and seven seats since the 1930 national election, while the Social Democrats suffered a loss of ten seats and about 600,000 supporters. The smaller liberal parties were almost wiped out.

Even the two conservative parties upon which Papen could depend for support, the People's Party and the Nationalists, had little success at the polls. Together they could give Papen only forty-four votes out of a Reichstag total of 608. Yet the National Socialists had not been able to obtain a majority of the Reichstag seats. Moreover, there was little difference between the number of votes for the Nazis in July and for Hitler in the April presidential run-off, a possible indication that the Nazis' peak of popularity had been reached.

Only one journal, Current History, devoted a full article to an analysis of the latest German election; eight others left it to their editors to express their opinions in briefer compass. Both The Nation\(^{28}\) and The New Republic\(^{29}\) thought that Hitler might be in for some trouble in spite of the Nazi Party success at the polls. A period of great decision-making confronted the leaders of National Socialism, since they had not gotten the majority needed to take control of the government leadership by legal means. Normal parliamentary procedure would have Hitler at least in a cabinet if his Party was willing to compromise with others, such as Nationalists and Centrists. Any reluctance on the part of the Nazis to accommodate would probably mean the continuance of the Papen regime with the aid of presidential decrees. Of the two liberal journals, The Nation's view of Hitler's future was the

\(^{28}\)The Nation, OXXXV (August 10, 1932), 115.

\(^{29}\)The New Republic, LXXI (August 10, 1932), 330.
bleakest.

By remaining outside the government, playing only a passive part in the affairs of Germany during the next few months, Hitler's influence would be largely negative. True, the large bloc of fascist votes in the Reichstag could be used as a club to hold over the present regime, but there are not enough fascist votes to put into effect any part of the Hitler program. And the fascist party is a party of action. It has grown fat on Hitler's extravagant promises. If its leader now fails to produce concrete results, fails to take energetic action leading to early improvement in the German economic situation, the party may very quickly turn upon this false messiah. On the other hand, if Hitler elects to enter a Nationalist-Catholic coalition, he will presumably be permitted to join only on terms laid down by former Chancellor Bruning, leader of the Catholic Center, without whose votes no coalition government can be erected. There is little doubt that Bruning would accept nothing in the Hitler program except that which is economically and politically sound. In brief, the greater part of that program would be unceremoniously rejected. But this again would mean that the action which has been promised the fascist voters would not be forthcoming. Hitler's impressive victory in the Reichstag elections virtually commits him to action; but, short of adopting violent measures, there is no way in which he can effectively act. Will the impoverished middle classes continue to follow his unproductive leadership much longer?

The New Republic believed that Hitler's more radical followers would demand a putsch. However, The Nation pointed out that General Schleicher was still lurking in the background ready to lead the Reichswehr into political control if necessary. Whatever the decision of the National Socialist leadership, The New Republic regretted that German reactionaries might be more willing to unite for common goals than the workers' parties of the Republic, which were busy denouncing each other.

In spite of the increase in Reichstag seats by both the Nazis and Communists, The Commonweal recognized that the election
was inconclusive. This Catholic journal put great emphasis on the fact that Heinrich Bruening's Center Party had increased its representatives. Although admitting that it might be wishful thinking, this journal expressed the hope that the ex-chancellor would be a determining factor in keeping the government moderate if the Reichstag continued to function. 30 The second prominent Catholic weekly, America, responded much differently to the election than did most other journals. In the first place, it seemed to have more respect for the ability of Chancellor Papen than he actually deserved. Referring to him as a man of "political sagacity" and one who "seemed to have gained influence and power by his latest decisive actions" just before the election, 31 America found Papen and his associates "satisfied" after the results were known. "They found themselves in a stronger position than before and were confident that they would receive a vote of confidence from the new Reichstag to continue their policy of uniting Germany through a government not allied to any political group." 32 The Jesuit periodical had apparently been fooled by the German ministry's propaganda, since few people imagined more than a handful of supporters could be found in the Reichstag for Papen's administration.

After what it described as the bitterest election campaign in the short history of the Weimar Republic, the August 11 Presby-

30 The Commonweal, XVI (August 10, 1932), 358-359.
31 America, XLVII (August 6, 1932), 413.
32 Ibid., (August 13, 1932), 437.
terian Advance saw the Papen regime surviving temporarily, although it did not explain how it reached this conclusion. The Advance still considered the German future to be a question mark because, as it pointed out, the anti-republican parties had outpolled the advocates of the Weimar Constitution.33 Another Protestant church organ, The Christian Century, took a more discerning look at the German affair. What really amazed this journal were the actions of the German Fascists, or rather the inaction of the Hitlerites. For months they had talked of a violent coup if the election results gave them less than a majority, but, as matters turned out, Hitler and his associates ruled out a march on Berlin. This was a wise decision, said The Christian Century, but it was not the technique of Fascism. Apparently the Italians were made of "sterner stuff." "German fascism, for all its brown shirts and nationalism, seems to lack the courage of its convictions."34 Nearly the same idea was expressed by Professor Sidney B. Fay in Current History. His article was the best summary of the events surrounding the election. He ruled out "any serious likelihood" of the establishment of Nazism. "Hitler does not have in him the stuff of which a Stalin or a Mussolini is made, nor are the conditions in Germany like those in Russia or Italy."35

What prompted statements like this was that Adolf Hitler

33 The Presbyterian Advance, XLV (August 11, 1932), 5.
34 The Christian Century, XLIX (August 10, 1932), 971.
had first of all decided against a National Socialist insurrection. Within the ranks of the Nazi Party, however, there remained some rambunctious elements still calling for a putsch. The discontented groups got no satisfaction out of the negotiations carried on between Hitler and the leaders of the government, Schleicher and Papen. The Nation for August 17 felt that neither Chancellor Papen nor General Schleicher appeared to want to take steps which might offend Hitler, yet the Nazi leader seemed unable to control his followers, who thirsted for action and power. "It appears almost certain that the political gangsters will drag Germany into civil war with their bloody tactics." There was really no way to tell whether a satisfactory agreement worked out with Adolf Hitler would appease his most radical followers.36 Even while the meetings between the Nazi leader and the government spokesmen were in progress, the campaign of terror continued. A new emergency decree against political terrorists providing for the death penalty for political crimes and the establishment of special courts had to be issued on August 9. The Literary Digest of August 20 reported that the usually "breezy" Papenhaid grown very apprehensive about the anti-government demonstrations.37

Nevertheless, The Christian Century for August 17 judged that the more responsible National Socialists and the other leaders of the rightist forces were seeking to get along with each

36 The Nation, CXXXV (August 17, 1932), 133.
37 The Literary Digest, CXIV (August 20, 1932), 996.
other. The Century assumed that as long as the forces of the right cooperated, the internal machinery of the state would survive, but there seemed to be little chance that any headway could be made with international problems.\textsuperscript{38} The Presbyterian Advance for the same week, on the other hand, saw the German state on the verge of collapse. Reaction was in the driver's seat and, whether fortunately or unfortunately, it did not know where it was going. Furthermore, said the Advance, the rest of the world was so occupied with its own economic problems that it did not really care what happened to Germany\textsuperscript{39}—an opinion that it reversed completely only a week later!\textsuperscript{40} In this latter issue, the Advance optimistically pointed out that the so-called republican parties had remained steadfast in their principles and had lost little of their voting strength to the extremists in recent election contests. A contrary view was expressed in the August 20 America. Reports had been received which told of many important German politicians who were ready to tolerate Adolf Hitler in the government, if there could be certain guarantees and safeguards imposed which would prevent a National Socialist dictatorship. "The general impression was that the time had come for Hitler to take over the Chancellorship and face the problem of demonstrating his ideal of statesmanship."\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{38}\textit{The Christian Century, XLIV} (August 17, 1932), 996.
\textsuperscript{39}\textit{The Presbyterian Advance, XLV} (August 18, 1932), 4.
\textsuperscript{40}\textit{Ibid.}, (August 25, 1932), 4.
\textsuperscript{41}\textit{America}, XLVII (August 20, 1932), 461.
Speculation was put to rest on August 13, 1932, when the government clique announced a continuation of the non-party type of administration then in existence. As a party leader, Hitler in the premiership was now out of the question. Besides, during the negotiations he had demanded more power in the ministry than either Hindenburg, Schleicher or Papen was willing to allow him. When he was offered the Vice-Chancellorship, Adolf Hitler refused. "Hitler's audacity had failed to impress Hindenburg," announced The Nation on August 24. It seemed to this liberal journal that Hitler had been pushed by the Nazi activists against his better judgment to make the dictatorship bid. "Forced on by the more fanatical of his followers, Hitler was in no position to compromise." Although talk of a Nazi putsch was being revived, The Nation doubted that the Fascists would test the strength of Schleicher's army units.42

A coup was definitely out of the question, wrote The New Republic, after Hitler's failure to join the Papen government. An armed revolt could have succeeded only while Brüning was in power. There was some reason to believe that Hitler was reluctant to turn down the Papen-Schleicher offer, and it appeared likely that he would renew negotiations with General Schleicher after a National Socialist leadership conference. This would be done despite the opposition of some of his disciples. Junker-Hitlerite cooperation seemed to be the only solution for the German politi-

42 The Nation, CXXXV (August 24, 1932), 135.
Since the present government can in no other way procure a majority in the Reichstag, the dissolution of that body would be the only alternative. In that case the present government could continue to rule for a few months with emergency decrees, but it would find hard sledding against the combined opposition of practically all important parties and groups. The Social Democrats could not support, and the Communists would certainly refuse to support a government that chose the celebration of the Weimar Constitution anniversary to announce its intention of altering the fundamental law of the country to fit political conditions of a century ago by restoring the Herrenhaus, raising the voting age and decreasing and disorganizing the country’s social services. The alternative of calling a National Constitutional Assembly, which has been suggested as a way out of the present inner-political deadlock, is hardly practical, for it too would produce such an overwhelming majority against the present regime that nothing would be gained thereby.

However, The New Republic called attention to one more possibility: a coalition of National Socialists and Centrists, about which rumors still circulated. 43

Journalist Ludwig Lore, writing in the October Current History, heard the same reports, and he seemed to think that an understanding was almost certain. The National Socialists wanted immediate results, while the Catholics were supposed to be afraid of Protestant Junker domination. For the moment, the man of the hour in Lore’s estimation was General Schleicher. It was this "conservative of old Germany" who, from the shadows, made and unmade governments. 44 That Hitler would have to get his approval, and not Hindenburg’s, for political power was another judgment

made by Lore in the August 24 New Republic. A New Republic editorial predicted that Adolf Hitler would never obtain "real power" but it failed to take into account the changing moods of National Socialism's right-wing opponents. While this magazine believed that Hitler's inclusion in a coalition was a definite possibility, a complete usurpation of power by the Nazis would never be permitted by the industrialists, Junkers, or General Schleicher and the Reichswehr. It was precisely these elements which the National Socialist leader outmaneuvered within the next year.

Adolf Hitler had been "humiliated" in the words of America; he had been rebuffed by the President, and it now seemed that he was on the verge of losing control of his organization. The recuperative powers of the Nazi Party were underestimated by the Jesuit weekly, but it had been able to pick out one consequence of Hitler's talks with the Papen government. "It was certain that Hitler and von Schleicher had parted and would henceforth be political enemies." The Commonweal, which usually gave a good deal of attention to current events, had little new to say. On August 24 it carried an article on Germany by its European correspondent, Max Jordan, who presented what can only be termed a simplistic solution for all of the country's ills by arguing that the core of Germany's troubles was overcrowding. There was not enough land

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46 The New Republic, LXXII (August 24, 1932), 59-60.

47 America, XLVII (August 27, 1932), 485.
for Germany's increasing population. Solve this problem, declared Jordan, and the German situation would be considerably eased.\textsuperscript{48} Echoes of the National Socialist \textit{Lebensraum} argument could be heard here!

August of 1932 found the American journals in a state of obvious uncertainty. Hitler's great success at the polls brought him publicity but not power, and he had turned down a chance to join the Papen Cabinet. There seemed to be many doubts that the traditional conservatives would ever permit him peacefully to take the lead in government affairs. Talk of a \textit{putsch} persisted on the part of the more fanatical Nazis but not the leader. The major questions that interested the journalists were whether Hitler retained firm control over his movement's organization and what did he personally want on the German political scene. Although the political future of Germany was still dark, the American periodicals seemed to think that the threat of a Hitler-rule was diminishing. Maybe the National Socialists would enter a coalition government before long, but this could not be any worse than the Papen-Schleicher constitutional dictatorship.

There were, of course, the persistent rumors of deals and plots. These could be found in the American journals at almost any time, including the autumn months of 1932.\textsuperscript{49} That the Hitler-

\textsuperscript{48} Max Jordan, "Back to the Land in Germany," \textit{The Commonweal}, XVI (August 24, 1932), 404.

\textsuperscript{49} \textit{The New Republic}, LXXII (September 7, 1932), 83; \textit{America} XLVII (September 3, 1932), 509; and \textit{The Living Age}, CCIIXLIII (September, 1932), 7-8.
ites, Centrists and Hugenberg Nationalists had finally gotten together was the latest word from *The New Republic* on September 7. Only Papen's and Schleicher's determination to maintain their regime prevented the takeover by this newly formed coalition, but continued stubbornness by the present ministry could bring on the long-awaited civil war. Similar stories were heard by *America* about discussions between the Center and the "Rightist parties," including the National Socialists. The monthly report of *The Living Age* mentioned that both Hitler and Schleicher had been carrying on discussions with French industrialists with the goal of working up some kind of agreement over Poland; the journal determined that Schleicher was the less trustworthy of the two: the "unscrupulous" General and Chancellor Papen had already backed down in their so-called deal to permit Hitler control over the Prussian state government.

According to Professor Sidney B. Fay in the September *Current History*, there need not be so much worry about Adolf Hitler, for he was a mere demagogue, he had "become more moderate in his program," and President Hindenburg could be depended upon to persuade the Nazis to respect "authority and order, efficiency and a strong sense of duty." Fay thought that he saw "a more conservative evolution," not a "reactionary or radical revolution" in the German future.50

One critical voice was heard denouncing this type of report-

50 Sidney B. Fay, "Germany Elects a New Reichstag," *Current History*, XXXVI (September, 1932), 660.
tong. Berlin newspaperman S. Miles Bouton expressed extreme displeasure with the way American observers were handling the German news. Few seemed to grasp the true significance of the National Socialist movement and the reason for its growth. "Every gain by the Hitlerites was followed by comforting assurances that now the last reservoir of their votes had been exhausted." The American public was being misinformed, because either the readers themselves or the editors wanted it that way. Above all, Bouton believed that it should be made clear that Hitler's followers were not all the worst elements of the body politic or "the ragtag and bobtail of the country." Within the ranks of his organization were Nobel Prize winners, noted scientists, jurists, writers, industrialists, noblemen and laborers. 51 Bouton mentioned no names, nor did he go into any detail; however, his remarks were pertinent since the majority of the journalists and editors in the summer of 1932 seemed confused by the issues in Germany and perplexed by the personalities who were making the headlines. Bouton's remarks called attention to the fact that the Hitler movement was clearly becoming acceptable in the eyes of respectable Germans.

An article appearing in the October 26 issue of The Christian Century touched on the same problem. The Century's German correspondent, Siegfried Scharfe, told of the disappearance of the middle parties which had been the vehicles of political expression

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51 S. Miles Bouton, "False News From Germany," The American Mercury, XXVII (September, 1932), 34. Bouton was an Associated Press correspondent.
for the educated Germans, who had turned to one of the Marxist parties, the Fascists and the Nationalists, or the Catholic Centrists. For the time being, despair had overwhelmed intelligence. This could account for people such as the unnamed Nobel Prize winners mentioned by reporter Bouton. Scharfe hoped that many of the votes for Hitler were made with the clear understanding that his was not a satisfactory solution for Germany's problems. Other ballots, he thought, were cast with the intention of bringing the Hitler crisis to a head, so that Germany could settle down and face the future without the Fascist annoyance.52

Another session of the Reichstag was scheduled for August 30; now the leading party would be the National Socialists with their 230 delegates. Before the first meeting was held, however, an event occurred which stirred emotions and caused heated debates. This was the celebrated Potempa case. On August 9, 1932, five members of the Nazi Party murdered a Communist in the Upper Silesian village of Potempa, and two weeks later they were sentenced to death by the special emergency political court in Bethuen. Adolf Hitler spoke out strongly in defense of his convicted comrades, bitterly accusing the government of legal assassination. At first Chancellor von Papen replied with strong words, announcing that he intended to maintain the domestic security of the state, no matter who the lawbreakers might be. Then, fearing the conse-

52 Siegfried Scharfe, "German Middle Parties Vanish," The Christian Century, XLIX (October 26, 1932), 1310.
quences of new Nazi outbursts, Papen backed down and on September 2 commuted the murderers' sentences to life imprisonment. In the meantime, the Chancellor had announced a bold economic reconstruction program, which he hoped would win public support for his ministry.

In the light of the sequence of events during August, several journals tried to guess what would happen once the Reichstag convened on August 30. The two leading liberal weeklies, The New Republic and The Nation, suggested that the Nazi leadership would subsequently seek out accommodation with the Papen government,\(^{53}\) when, in reality, these radical politicians had decided to oppose the right-wing administration. That Papen was the master of the political situation and was on the verge of becoming dictator at the expense of Hitler and the National Socialists was the somewhat contrary view given by both The Literary Digest and America.\(^{54}\) The latter journal went so far as to suggest that "a bloody civil war" was an immediate "prospect."

There was no revolt, and the Reichstag met as expected on August 30. Hermann Goering was elected speaker, and immediately the Reichstag adjourned until September 12. During the recess Chancellor Papen took the opportunity to put into action his economic plans by emergency decree on September 4, 1932. Before the Reichstag resumed, America had time to respond to the first ses-

\(^{53}\)The New Republic, LXXII (September 7, 1932), 83.

\(^{54}\)The Literary Digest, CXXIV (September 10, 1932), 11, and America, XLVII (September 3, 1932), 509.
sion. It had forecast "a bloody civil war" in its September 3 issue, and now a week later it noted the "perfect decorum" of the legislature, which occasioned a note of hope in America's report. 

But it was not the time for optimism. When the Reichstag reconvened on September 12, Goering decided to press for a confidence vote in the government, even though Papen possessed a decree of dissolution. A Communist Party motion of no-confidence in the Chancellor's ministry was given immediate consideration against Papen's protests. While the vote was in progress, the Chancellor placed the decree of dissolution before Speaker Goering and walked out. The final vote of 512 to 42 was overwhelmingly against the government, but this only meant a return to rule by cabinet and decree, with Papen retaining the commanding position. Calculating that the National Socialists had begun to decline in popularity, the Chancellor dissolved the Reichstag and called for new elections on November 6. Papen hoped to influence the industrialists and financiers who had been making campaign contributions to the Hitler party and to exploit the dissatisfaction of Nazi Gregor Strasser and his right-wing faction which believed in cooperation with the conservative forces.

Predictions concerning the outcome of the German political crisis had proved to be erroneous, stated The Christian Century in its September 21 number. Neither Nazis nor Communists but the Junkers had formed the long-awaited authoritarian dictatorship.

55 America, XLVII (September 10, 1932), 533.
This audacious group of aristocrats had stolen the thunder from the Hitlerites, but this reactionary regime would last only so long as the army and police power were behind it, for it was "without any vestige of popular support other than that of the president." Nevertheless, The Christian Century thought it almost certain that a dictatorship would be long entrenched in Germany, even after Papen and Hitler had passed from the scene, because "it is hard for anything but some other form of dictatorship to overthrow it." At least it was clear to the Century that Germany's short adventure with democracy was finished. The Literary Digest agreed that Germany lay in the hands of a dictator, backed by Hindenburg and the German army. On the other hand, America, while admitting that "Chancellor von Papen emerged stronger and freer than ever" from the latest crisis, thought that the scheduled November elections justified some optimism.

The liberal journals could only express bewilderment at the rapid pace of events in Germany. The September 21 New Republic thought it saw signs that the Socialists and Communists were beginning to seek ways to cooperate in face of the right-wing front of the Nazis and Junkers. "In the final analysis, there is as little basic difference between these two parties of the right as between our own Republicans and Democrats," except that

56 The Christian Century, XLIX (September 21, 1932), 1123.
57 The Literary Digest, CXIV (September 24, 1932), 14-15.
58 America, XLVII (September 24, 1932), 580.
the Nationalist Junkers held the power that the National Socialists sought. Harping back to its ancient theory, The New Republic reiterated its suspicion of Nazi-Center efforts at a "working agreement," as indicative of the realignment of parties that lay in the immediate future. The Nation recognized that the new elections would not solve any problems, since they would not make the Reichstag any more workable than before. This liberal organ too saw the similarity of the right-wing groups, but this fact only confounded the puzzle of why the Nazis were contributing to the fall of Papen's government.

Writing in the autumn issue of Religion in Life, Professor Harvie Branscomb formed the mistaken opinion that the old guard Junker forces were in permanent control of the government. The Hitler group had picked up strength, especially in the German working class, but not enough to claim a majority of the German people. The growth of violence on the part of the political parties, led by the Nazis, had forced President Hindenburg to seek out individuals who would restore domestic tranquillity, even if it meant the return to power of people who were important in pre-republican Germany. The Papen government was expected by Branscomb to eliminate Hitler as an active force by taking up two of his policies, the rebuilding of the army and the destruction of the Communist threat in Germany, or by inciting the Fascist leader

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59 The New Republic, LXXII (September 21, 1932), 141.
60 The Nation, CXXV (September 28, 1932), 267.
to take the path of violent revolution. But Branscomb thought that this was about all of a positive nature that the world should expect from this Junker government. 61

Everett R. Clinchly, in the September 21 Christian Century, bared some of the worst features of the Nazi policies. Among other matters, Hitler's nationalism was of the excessive kind but, according to Clinchly, the National Socialist leader had the opportunity to become a statesman and a pioneer if he would champion a "nationalism that is not nationalistic." The author next called upon Adolf Hitler to accept Germany's military inferiority and to work for the good of humanity and a new world order. 62

The Living Age changed its mind in its October issue. Admitting that it had underestimated the strength of Papen and the ability of Schleicher, it predicted, accurately as events showed, that the Junker ministry would last as long as General Schleicher was able to "change with the times." 63 However, Frank H. Simonds in The Review of Reviews and World's Work for October, thought that chances of a civil war were increasing. The German Republic

61Harvie Branscomb, "Germany's Great Defeat," Religion In Life, I (Autumn, 1932), 605-608. Branscomb was a professor of New Testament at Duke University and was on the advisory council of this quarterly journal.

62Everett R. Clinchly, "I Saw Hitler, Too," The Christian Century, XLIX (September 21, 1932), 1131-1133. Clinchly was the secretary of the National Conference on Goodwill Between Christians and Jews. He saw Hitler with a streak of the Rooseveltian campaigner in him, as well as with some trace of New York Mayor Walker's facility with public sympathy.

63The Living Age, CCCXLIIL (October, 1932), 102-103.
was finished, in Simonds' opinion, but as yet there was nothing to replace it. The Catholic Center Party had been trying to salvage something of the Republic by negotiating with the National Socialists for a coalition government. Simonds thought that the idea of a constitutional government still appealed to Hitler who, however, knew that he would lose his more radical followers to the Communists if he joined a coalition. The Nazis were a dynamic movement, and Hitler realized that there must be action sooner or later or the organization would disintegrate. Chances of success were growing slimmer as the Junkers and the army were united against him, and word was out that the Socialists were working more closely with the Communists against the Nazi challenge. Hitler was going to have to make up his mind soon or lose his opportunity to sit in any government.

In a word Hitler has come to the crisis which Mussolini met when he marched on Rome; and nearly two thousand years earlier Caesar solved by crossing the Rubicon on a similar adventure toward the Eternal City. But Hitler is hanging back. He cannot make up his mind to fish or cut bait, to throw himself upon the bayonets in front or succumb to the hardly less deadly peril of a constitutional control in partnership with the Catholics.64

Some contrary views were expressed by Denis Gwynn in a long, detailed article in the November issue of The Sign. He placed confidence in the fact that Chancellor Papen and the still powerful ex-premier, Heinrich Bruening, were faithful Catholics. These two statesmen were sure to be able to stem the tide of the

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64 Frank H. Simonds, "Germany's Role in the Crisis," The Review of Reviews and World's Work, LXXVI (October, 1932), 35-36.
"gasbag" Hitler. The fact that Chancellor Papen had resorted to dictatorial methods did not seem to bother Gwynn at all. Neither did the fact that Papen had been put into the chancellorship by those forces which opposed Bruening and not as the official Centrist candidate. Bruening and Papen were Catholics in religion but held many different political principles. Both, however, were exponents of the papal social encyclicals, continued Gwynn from London, and, if given the chance, they would work for the restoration of Germany's greatness. Papen, asserted Gwynn, had already shown himself to be a strong leader, able to restore stable conditions. Of course the Chancellor had recently put into effect economic reforms which were detrimental to the German working class and hardly in line with the encyclicals, and few observers would agree that calm had been restored by his regime. Gwynn maintained that he had won over many of the army veterans' organizations and had seemingly injured Hitler's popularity and prestige by stealing the issue concerning rearmament. Any thought of Hitler's increasing his power now was extremely unlikely.

Since rumors persisted of a Center-Nazi coalition, Gwynn thought it necessary to discuss the possibility. Gwynn contended that it would take a great change of attitude on the part of the Nazis before this could occur. He said this even though, he admitted, the two parties had recently held discussions. That National Socialism had already been condemned by several German bishops was the basis of Gwynn's argument. The author noted that the papacy had not made a public statement about the Hitlerites.
but it was reasonable to suspect that they were not yet considered a permanent menace by the Church officials.  

Max Jordan, another Catholic reporter, also admitted the Centrist-Nazi discussions in the November 16 Commonweal. His article told of the more influential German conservatives abandoning the National Socialist movement and turning to Papen, who promised stability based on the old order of things. 

The British author, Hilaire Belloc, in a glaring misrepresentation of the facts in the October 1 America, attributed the "new reign of violence" in Germany to the anti-Catholic campaign.

There seemed to be no agreement whatsoever concerning the value of the Junker dictatorship or the future role of the National Socialists. That the Papen-Schleicher regime was stealing the issues from the Nazis seemed apparent in the reports received by The Literary Digest in early October. The Junker ministry was setting the stage for the rearmament of Germany and at the same time alienating the other powers of western Europe.

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65 Denis Gwynn, "The Real Situation in Germany," The Sign, XII (November, 1932), 206-208. The Irish author Gwynn had been on the staff of several British journals, and a contributor to many others. During the nineteen-thirties, he was a director of the publishing firm of Burns, Oates and Washbourne. An almost regular contributor to The Sign, he became the chief spokesman of foreign affairs for this journal from this issue onwards.


67 Hilaire Belloc, "The Religious Factor of Germany's Chaos," America, XLVII (October 1, 1932), 612. Belloc (1870-1953) was the noted British Catholic poet, essayist and biographer.

68 The Literary Digest, CXIV (October 1, 1932), 14.
weal called the Papen government's move to rearm "a concession to nationalism justified by an endeavor to defeat Hitler." That Germany was worse off as a result of this present government than she would have been under National Socialism, was the opinion of Emil Ludwig in the October 26 Nation. The author based his thesis on the assumption that the more "modern" and "socialistic" elements of the Nazis would have won control of the Party machinery, once it took over the state. Instead the leaders of the Papen government represented the most ardent and ruthless of reactionaries, those who had no desire to help the masses. The Living Age for November agreed that the government in Germany had cut itself off from the people. Even the National Socialists had split away from the Junkers, and it was anticipated by this journal that the German Fascists would help the workers' parties in a general strike. The Hitler movement had definitely moved to the left and could expect no more financial support from the industrialists.

Sidney B. Fay saw the same trend developing:

The Hitlerites are likely to have less campaign funds in the coming election than hitherto. The industrialists, who in the past contributed freely to Hitler's movement as an excellent weapon to curb the power of the trade unions and Socialists, need him no longer. The von Papen Government, in its general program for the reanimation of business, has given the industrialists more than Hitler could, even if he were in power.

69 The Commonweal, XVI (October 5, 1932), 519.
70 Emil Ludwig, "The Flight of the German Spirit," The Nation, CXXXV (October 26, 1932), 391-392. Ludwig was a popular historian and biographer.
71 The Living Age, CCCXLIII (November, 1932), 192.
There were other reasons for the coming decline of Nazism, asserted Professor Fay, who had discovered "extraordinary strength" in the National Socialist movement, namely the enthusiasm in the ranks. No organization could maintain itself as long as its leader's promise of fulfillment was "always just beyond the horizon." Fay reported that most outsiders felt that National Socialism "has reached its culmination."\(^72\)

Professor Karl Geiser, who had recently spent several months in Germany, disagreed with Fay. The ideas of National Socialism, he wrote in *The Nation* on November 16, 1932—from all indications, the article was submitted before the balloting in the November 6 German election—went much deeper than just a phenomenon in Germany. Nazism was a "functional disorder of the heart of Europe." This disease was on the verge of becoming "organic" unless something was done about worldwide financial and economic problems. Only the continued excesses of the Nazi Party, Geiser believed, had weakened its cause. It still remained, however, a strong popular movement which reflected the misery of all the German people. Despite these discerning insights, Professor Geiser's assessment lacked depth, for he declared that the only group comparable to National Socialism in American history was the

movement centered around William Jennings Bryan. 73

November 6, 1932 was Reichstag election day again in Germany and, as in the past, there were a few surprising results. The voting was done in adverse conditions in Berlin, where a general transport strike had been in progress for three days. National Socialists and Communists alike supported the workers' demands, but this maneuver proved an asset for only the Bolsheviks. Since the July national election, the Nazis had lost some of their appeal. Their vote total dropped from almost 13,746,000 to 11,737,000, and they lost thirty-four of the 230 seats won in the summer election. The Communists, on the other hand, added eleven more Reichstag places, giving them a total of 100, while their ballot strength was enlarged to 5,980,000, a gain of just about 700,000 votes. As far as the National Socialists were concerned, Papen's undermining tactics gave some appearance of working. This was the first time in a national election in over two years that the Nazis had suffered a decline in their electoral strength. Nevertheless, the political groups which supported Papen's administration added only about twenty places in the new legislature, and this was not enough to help his Cabinet get its program through the Reichstag.

The journals could not miss the facts of the election, which they called to their readers' attention, but the signifi-

73 Karl Frederick Geiser, "Hitler's Hold on Germany," The Nation, XXXV (November 16, 1932), 474-475. Geiser was a professor of political science at Oberlin College.
cance of the National Socialist reversals provoked varying com-
ment. One group, including The Literary Digest, The Christian Cen-
tury and The Presbyterian Advance, forecast the continuing decline,
if not the imminent demise, of National Socialism. Other empha-
ized the continuing crisis for constitutional democracy stem-
ming from the impossibility of forming a workable majority out
of the new party structure, a situation which would force closer
right-wing cooperation, but The New Republic and The Nation felt
relief that now a Nazi-Center alliance seemed to be out of the
question. Concerning Chancellor Papen's role, The Presbyterian
Advance thought he seemed satisfied with the election outcome,
Frank H. Simonds in The Review of Reviews and World's Work saw his
faced now with a greater menace from the Communists after his par-
tial success with the Nazis, and The Living Age correctly predic-
ted that Schleicher would soon receive the chancellorship.

The January 1933 Current History carried an article that revealed
to the American reader the thinking of upper-class Ger-
mans: Richard von Kuselmann's "The German Drift to Revolution."
The author, German Foreign Secretary from 1917 to 1918 and since

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74 The Literary Digest, CXIV (November 19, 1932), 13; The
Christian Century, XLIX (November 16, 1932), 1397; and The Presby-
terian Advance, CXLVI (November 17, 1932), 5.

75 Frank H. Simonds, "In Germany, England and France," The
Review of Reviews and World's Work, LXXXVI (December, 1932), 30.

76 The Nation, CXXXV (November 16, 1932), 468, and The Liv-
ing Age, CCCXLIII (December, 1932), 285.

77 The New Republic, LXXIII (November 16, 1932), 6, and
The Nation, CXXXV (November 16, 1932), 468.
then a frequent lecturer in the United States, asserted that his
greatest fear was a Communist government in Germany. This article
was written soon after the November 6 election. While declaring
himself a democrat, von Kuehlmann wrote that only the present dic-
tatorship could preserve what was left of the Weimar Republic.

Germany's most valuable assets today are the pres-
tige of President von Hindenburg and the Reichswehr. Both
have been deeply committed to the Papen-Schleicher exper-
iment, so much so that some observers doubt whether they
could disentangle themselves should the principles behind
that Cabinet finally fail. Probably the von Papen govern-
ment, or one similar to it, will be backed to the utmost
by both the President and the army. Much will depend on
the degree of material success. If the tide of returning
prosperity is running fast enough, violent change may be
avoided. The revolutionary forces, led by Moscow, know
that if prosperity and normal business return before revo-
lution is successful, all hopes for an overturn must be
put aside for many years. Knowing this, they will strain
every nerve to make hay while the sun shines. It is the
battle of Europe, nay, of the whole world, which is now
being fought on German soil. The von Papen cabinet stood
for all that tradition had made venerable, and that is
why many Germans gave it their support, fearful lest it
prove to be the last dam against the rising floods of
combined radicalism.

What Kuehlmann meant by combined radicalism was Nazism and Communism. With all the violent disorders between these two extremist
groups, Baron von Kuehlmann perceived that their adherents were
seeking out channels of cooperation in their attack upon the Papen
government. This was not surprising, in the estimation of the au-
 thor, for many of the National Socialists were "very sympathetic
to Communist ideals." Now that Hitler had failed to make good his
promise to take control of the government, it could be that the
Nazis were beginning to break up into factions, declared Kuehl-
mann, with some of them already aligning themselves with the left-
wing extremists. While his evaluation of the government forces was that of a typical upper-class German, his assessment of the Hitlerites—they were "even more radical than the followers of Moscow"—was very accurate.  

Meanwhile in Germany Papen's regime was rapidly approaching its end. Ambitious General Schleicher, in particular, was displeased with the way that Chancellor Papen had been dealing with the National Socialists and at the same time striving to replace him, Schleicher, in the affections of the aging President. Schleicher also seemed to feel that the Chancellor had gone too far in alienating Hitler and his associates, who in the future would be badly needed to cooperate in some kind of national front government that the General dreamed of organizing. Pointing to the growth of the Communist vote as a danger sign, Schleicher demanded that von Papen resign so that the General's experiment might be implemented. Still a member of Hindenburg's inner council of advisors, Papen received permission to explore the possibility of a conservative-reactionary ministry including National Socialists, Nationalists, Centrists and members of the ultra-conservative People's Party. Affirmative answers were received from the Nationalists and the People's Party, but neither the Centrists nor the Nazis wanted anything to do with Papen. It only took the Chancellor a few days to determine that he could not form a party cabinet, and he announced on November 17, 1932, that he would con-

continue to serve only so long as it took President Hindenburg to organize a new ministry. The President was urged by his Chancellor to seek out Adolf Hitler to be the next premier—advice that Papen hoped would bring him back into office, since he knew it would be almost an impossibility for the Nazi leader to form a government with a parliamentary majority.

Hitler conferred with Hindenburg and General Schleicher on November 19 and again on November 21 but with no concrete results. Although Schleicher counseled moderation, Hitler demanded the chancellorship with full powers and nothing less; this the President refused. For the next two weeks uncertainty prevailed within government circles. Forced finally to abandon his friend, Papen, Hindenburg asked General Schleicher to form the next cabinet. So thus it was on December 3, 1932, that the man who had operated behind the scenes emerged openly on the political stage.

During all these events there was some, but not much, American journal response, probably because it was so difficult to comprehend what was going on behind the conference room doors. The Nation of November 30 came out definitely for no compromise with Hitler, whom it described as a man "committed to wholesale bloodletting." The New Republic sensed that Hitler would not join in a coalition at this time; it guessed correctly that he would refuse to compromise his principles by joining a coalition government. This liberal organ also felt that the next constitu-

79 The Nation, CXXXV (November 30, 1932), 515-516.
tional dictator would probably be General Schleicher, who was known to have held a powerful position in the background during the Papen episode. Both General Schleicher and President Hindenburg, this journal contended, were attempting to play off Nazism against Communism with the hope that both ideologies would collapse and leave the way clear for a strong Prussian-type state led by the Junkers and industrialists. 80 The New Republic's supposition about Schleicher's next role in German politics was accurate, but the same could not be said with respect to his policies. That Adolf Hitler was actually asked to take over the government proved to the November 30 Christian Century that he was now considered harmless. Without knowledge of the activity of General Schleicher, the Century concluded that Papen would return. 81 For The Nation of December 7, the most significant event of all was Hitler's refusal to take political office on Hindenburg's terms. The "confused and weak demagogue" had been deflated, trumpeted The Nation, and no longer need his threats and boasts frighten anyone. His power over his disciples had now been acutely compromised. "He has told his army of their impending victory so often that this need alarm no one." Germany would have some form of dictatorship over the winter months, but this was preferable to having Hitler in office. 82

80 The New Republic, LXXIII (November 30, 1932), 55.
81 The Christian Century, XLIX (November 30, 1932), 1460.
82 The Nation, CXXXV (December 7, 1932), 543.
The less than two months of military dictatorship under General Kurt von Schleicher brought little reaction from the American journals. Few observers seemed to realize what was happening in the inner councils in Germany. Every area of German domestic politics was neglected, including the actions of the National Socialists. One possible reason for the lack of response might be the approaching holiday season, during which the American journals usually reduced the number of their pages and the foreign reports. It might well be that most of them considered the new constitutional dictatorship only a temporary government which would soon be replaced after the first of the year; on the other hand, if the Schleicher ministry lasted, then there would be plenty of time to comment on it after the Christmas lull.

The Reichstag met from December 6 to 9; after a series of physical clashes between the Nazis and the Communists, it was adjourned until January 31, 1933. While some National Socialists criticized General Schleicher for bringing the Reichswehr into the political controversy, there was no vote of no-confidence taken, and the new cabinet enjoyed a reprieve to work out its program. Schleicher proceeded to attempt to win over as much support as possible, from the working classes as well as the Nazis. He restored wage cuts for the laborers and allowed a restoration of many civil rights. An amnesty bill for political prisoners was also signed. Not a doctrinaire conservative, the General was willing to make concessions to get public support. In the process, he alienated some of his former associates who disliked his
economic policy of currying favor with the masses and not protecting the agricultural products of the Junkers' estates from foreign competition.

In their commentary on Schleicher's chancellorship, none of the American journals demonstrated any real knowledge of the circumstances and intrigue that had brought him into office nor of the inner workings of German political life. The New Republic called attention to the fact that the German working-class parties were watching and waiting, as were the National Socialists. It expressed the obvious truth that the Chancellor needed the Nazis' support if he hoped to build a mass base for his regime, while The Literary Digest said with equal truth that Schleicher really needed no one's help to stay in power, especially since the army and the Prussian state police stood behind him. Writing in Current History, Sidney B. Fay noted that the new regime "is significant for its greater centralization of authority in the hands of the Chancellor." In general, the consensus of opinion was that Schleicher had a reasonable chance of surviving. Ludwig Lore's analysis in Current History for December revealed by its title the trend of his thought: "Will the Hohenzollerns Return?"  

83 The New Republic, LXXIII (December 14, 1932), 10-11; The Literary Digest, CXLIV (December 17, 1932), 9; and Sidney B. Fay, "Germany's Cabinet Crisis," Current History, XXXVII (January, 1933), 480.  

84 Ludwig Lore, "Will the Hohenzollerns Return?" Current History, XXXVII (December, 1932), 293-294. On the monarchist tradition during the Weimar period, see Walter H. Kaufmann's Monarchism in the Weimar Republic (New York: Bookman Associates, 1953). Although the monarchist groups were an important aspect of German political life until 1933, they were not too powerful after 1923, according to Kaufmann.
At this time the Catholic journal, The Ave Maria, discussed at length the religious manifestation of Nazism as seen in the faction called the "German Christians," a group about which a great deal more would be heard after Adolf Hitler came to power. The "German Christians" were to bring about a number of serious crises within the ranks of German Protestantism. Their impact on Catholicism was a secondary consideration. However, The Ave Maria perceived the sect to be a particular threat to the Catholic Church, since it sought to achieve the incorporation of the church by the state. The "German Christians'" failure or success would depend upon the way they handled the Catholic Center Party, which was always ready to battle for its religious rights. Later events showed that this journal apparently had a keen sense of what Nazism in power would mean for religion. On the other hand, it gave the Centrists too much credit, as events too would soon prove.

Some of the journals in early 1933 were moderately confident that Adolf Hitler and the National Socialists had lost their opportunity in the autumn of 1932 to take command of the government. Hitler failed because of his own personality defects, related The Living Age of February 1933, which was published before word was received from Germany that the National Socialist leader had accepted the chancellorship. If he had not been emotionally unstable he could have seized power in the summer. The truth was

85 The Ave Maria, XXXVII (New Series)(January 14, 1933), 54. This was a conservative Catholic weekly.
that the entire Nazi leadership was beset with personal emotional problems. The Living Age believed that only the Strasser Brothers were qualified as leaders, and these two had broken with the Nazi Party. Otto Strasser had separated from Hitler in 1930 and established the splinter Black Front organization. His brother, Gregor, remained one of Hitler's advisors until December 1932, when his suggestion for moderation and cooperation with the other conservative and reactionary organizations was rejected. General Schleicher had long hoped that Gregor Strasser would be the man to lead the National Socialists into a national front coalition government headed by the Reichswehr leader.

If Hitler had compromised with respect to joining a conservative coalition, he would have been a statesman and not a German, declared Gerhard Hirschfield in America. On account of this stubbornness concerning principle, Hitlerism was apparently subsiding, in the judgment of the author. One week later, on January 21, America noted that Hitler had presumably been driven to a defensive attitude as a result of the reported split with Gregor Strasser. Quite obviously America misread the signs, since the defection of Strasser created no unrest in the ranks of the Nazi Party faithful at the time. Nevertheless, this Catholic Jesuit weekly felt that Hitler was now fearful that another elec-

86 The Living Age, CCCXLIII (February, 1933), 474.

87 Gerhard Hirschfield, "The Spirit of Modern Germany," America, XLVIII (January 14, 1933), 357. Hirschfield was identified as a writer on political and economic topics.
tion would bring heavy losses to his movement. His treasury was also being strained, and it was beginning to look as if he would seek a post in the Schleicher ministry, rather than take the chance of losing his supporters in the business world. Another rumor heard was that Papen and Hitler had met in conference, which they did on January 4. The importance of this meeting was not grasped.\(^88\) Unknown to America or to any other observer in the journals of this country, this was the beginning of the end for Kurt von Schleicher's regime. A week later America found Hitler a little more confident, which he was, after a local election victory in the state of Lippe. Now there would be no compromise with General Schleicher, wrote America.\(^89\) The January 28 Literary Digest also found the "drooping spirits" of the National Socialists revived.\(^90\)

Contrary views could likewise be found in American periodicals, right up to the very eve of Adolf Hitler's chancellorship. Professor Calvin B. Hoover in Current History was sure that the Reichswehr and its leader, General Schleicher, would be able to keep peace and order. Thoughts of a coup by either the Communists or Fascists were thoughts of the past, said this article, dated February 1933.\(^91\) In the same issue of this monthly, Sidney

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\(^88\) America, XLVIII (January 21, 1933), 370.
\(^89\) Ibid., (January 29, 1933), 394.
\(^90\) The Literary Digest, CXV (January 28, 1933), 13.
\(^91\) Calvin B. Hoover, "The Strength of German Capitalism," Current History, XXXVII (February, 1933), 544. Hoover was a professor of economics at Duke University.
B. Fay discovered "something like optimism" returning to German political life under the rule of Schleicher. General von Schleicher is rather firmly entrenched for the time being," wrote George Gerhard in the February 1933 issue of The North American Review. America of February 4 felt that Schleicher's hold over the nation was slipping, but it believed that he was quite willing "to bring matters to a head." On the other hand, "a sufficient fear had been instilled into the Nazi leader to make him willing to delay a test of strength with the Chancellor." 

By the time these words were being read, Adolf Hitler had already become the Chancellor of the German government. Schleicher's position had become untenable, and he had handed in his resignation on January 28. His plan for a national front-type of government had made little progress. He tried to play for time; however, President Hindenburg refused to provide him with an order of dissolution for the Reichstag, which was scheduled to re-open on January 31. Franz von Papen and his associates, in the meantime, had been preparing for the next ministry with the knowledge of Hindenburg. At the time of his departure, Schleicher suggested Hitler as his successor. Papen, then the President, along with other conservatives, agreed on the Nazi leader, but he

92 Sidney B. Fay, "Von Schleicher as German Chancellor," ibid., 616.

93 George Gerhard, "The German Interlude," The North American Review, CCCXXV (February, 1933), 112.

94 America, XLVIII (February 4, 1933), 418.
was to serve in a government which would be dominated by traditional conservatives. Hindenburg extended the invitation, and Hitler accepted on January 30, 1933.

The appointment caught the American journals by surprise. January 1933 found Adolf Hitler apparently declining in prestige and voter appeal and, in the view of some journals such as *The Living Age* and *The Nation*, on the verge of seeing his organization splinter because of a failure to fulfill long-promised goals. For a number of observers--*America*, Calvin B. Hoover, George Gerhard and Sidney B. Fay--he did not seem to present a danger to the government of the likes of a Reichawehr general.

The election setback in November 1932 looked like a turning point in Hitler's career. Some journals hinted that he had neither the courage nor the ability of a Mussolini to bring his Fascist ideals to fruition. Still others, throughout the period from May 1932 to January 1933 covered here, considered him harmless enough to join a coalition government without causing eventual political upheaval, since the National Socialist Party had not been able to obtain a Reichstag majority. Hitler just was not so frightening anymore.

According to articles in *America*, *The Nation*, *The New Republic*, plus comments by Sidney B. Fay in *Current History* and Harvie Branscomb in *Religion In Life*, first Papen and then Schleicher were said to be outmaneuvering Hitler in the game of politics, even though neither man was popular with most of the journalists. *The Commonweal*'s view of Papen was a major exception. The Catho-
lic magazines, in particular, counted heavily on Catholic states-
men and the Center Party to keep the National Socialists under
control, while some of the more liberal journals still mentioned
rumors of Center-Nazi collusion.

Almost all the American journals considered here had
failed to understand what was happening behind the scenes in Ger-
manv. The weekly *New Republic* was the one main exception. S.
Miles Bouton had to speak out against irresponsible reporting.
The American periodicals were often surprised by the German gov-
ernment changes, starting with the sudden ouster of the Bruehing
ministry. While on the surface both the Papen and Schleicher con-
stitutional dictatorships looked as if they could endure for a
time with Hindenburg's and the army's support, these were but
brief episodes in the intra-conservative struggle within the gov-
ernment to find political stability. The intrigue and strategem
finally led to the appointment of Adolf Hitler.
CHAPTER III

HITLER IN POWER--THE FIRST PHASE: FROM THE CHANCELLORSHIP TO THE ENABLING ACT

The prospects of Adolf Hitler as German Chancellor had been discussed for so many months that it seemed rather surprising to see him at last at the head of a government on the afternoon of January 30, 1933. As has already been shown, articles in American journals were telling of National Socialism's disintegration and of the strong government under the firm rule of General Schleicher, even while the new premier was enjoying the first fruits of his office. Ever since the November 1932 election, news from and about Germany seemed to be scarce in American periodicals. However, once the news of Hitler's government appointment reached the United States, the journals under consideration gave the Hitler triumph more editorial and news space than they had since the days of his Party's first electoral success back in 1930.

For one, The Nation of February 8 doubted that Hitler actually achieved the long-talked-of German Fascist victory with his sudden appointment as Chancellor, for there seemed to be too many "checks" on his control. Besides Hitler, only two Nazis, Hermann Goering and Wilhelm Frick, sat in what amounted to a reactionary coalition government. The other members of this new ministry
were Franz von Papen; General Werner von Blomberg; two holdovers from the Schleicher government, Baron Constantin von Neurath and Count Lutz Schwerin von Krosigk; and two leaders of the ultra-conservative Nationalist Party, Alfred Hugenberg and Franz Seldte. Actually there was no strong anti-Nazi in the Hitler government, but The Nation at the time thought that Franz von Papen was the man to watch. In its closing paragraph, in which it predicted that the duration of the new German government might well depend upon whether the Center Party gave its support, The Nation cast doubts about Hitler's skill to overcome domestic political troubles.

If the new government is tolerated by the Center Party it may survive for months, perhaps much longer. If the Centrists turn against it, it may fall at once, for no government depending on a parliamentary majority can be formed without their support. Of course, Hitler and Von Papen may choose to dispense with the Reichstag altogether, precisely as Von Schleicher intended to do, but it is more than probable that Hindenburg would not consent to such a frank violation of the constitution. Even if the new government should remain in office, with or without Catholic support, Hitler seems destined to lose much of his following unless he can prevail upon his colleagues to carry out some of his blood-and-thunder promises. That they will do so is entirely out of the question. A majority of them would be only too happy to see the National Socialist movement destroyed, or at least working in harness with the other forces of reaction, but on their terms, not Hitler's.1

While the Nation thought that Hitler would cause little trouble as a member of the government, The New Republic, another liberal journal, viewed the situation quite differently. It expressed the opinion that the reactionaries had reached the end of

1The Nation, OXXXVI (February 8, 1933), 137-138.
143

the line with the appointment of Hitler. The man for whom President Hindenburg had had nothing but disdain two months before was definitely in a commanding role in German politics. Unlike the Nation, The New Republic saw the National Socialist leader as the real head of the government. Hitler got just what he asked for—the premiership and some seats in the ministry for his associates; no compromise had been forced upon the new Chancellor. In general, the Cabinet membership shared the views of the Chancellor. Since the new government contained so many aristocrats, The New Republic mistakenly referred to it as the most typical Junker government since the 1918 revolution. How long it would remain so was another question. Three key posts were held by Nazis, and in spite of statements to the contrary, it was expected by The New Republic that these men would soon take the lead in trying to impose unconstitutional measures. Dr. Joseph Goebbels' Nazi newspaper, the Angriff, was predicting a Fascist Germany within the year. Thus, except for the one statement that "every one of the new Ministers is nationalistic to the core, belongs to the military caste, is monarchistic and reactionary," The New Republic's view was an accurate description of what was actually happening in Germany. ²

In its reports from the European press and overseas correspondents, The Literary Digest found that there was no consensus of opinion about the new German leader. Some viewed him as a

²The New Republic, LXXIII (February 8, 1933), 336-337.
possible "clown or faker," while others saw him reestablishing law and order and perhaps even the monarchy. It was his oratory which seemed most impressive. This conservative weekly relied entirely on information from others, most of which seemed to be superficial at best.

Nothing about Adolf Hitler inspired confidence for The Presbyterian Advance. His past record was marred by disgraceful deportment; he had gained German citizenship only within the last year, obviously an opportunistic move. That the German people had permitted such a man to reach an "official position" puzzled and dismayed this religious organ. Predictions about his regime varied, but there was a possibility, one frequently mentioned at this time, that he might moderate his views and lead Germany through the crisis period. The Advance was ever hopeful, but not very optimistic, that Hitler would take this road.

President Hindenburg's decision to call upon Adolf Hitler for government service surprised even the "keenest observers," declared America of February 11, 1933, the first Catholic journal to respond to the event. The National Socialist leader seemed to be getting off to a good start, nevertheless, by announcing a "reasonable and moderate program" based on Christian standards. He also asked God's blessing, which probably appealed to the Jesuit

3 The Literary Digest, CXV (February 11, 1933), 12
4 The Presbyterian Advance, XLVI (February 9, 1933), 4.
5 America, XLVIII (February 11, 1933), 442.
Meanwhile in Germany preparations began for a new Reichstag election on March 5, 1933. Seeking to form a majority government, Hitler had just negotiated with Monsignor Ludwig Kaas, head of the Center Party, which held seventy Reichstag seats. Kaas seemed willing to come to terms, but Alfred Hugenberg, Cabinet spokesman for the Nationalists, objected. Hitler too changed his mind rather than accept the compromises Kaas demanded as the price of cooperation. Hitler preferred to carry on another election campaign, this time with the resources of the state at his disposal. Hugenberg acquiesced in a new election when Hitler assured him that the make-up of the government would not be altered, whatever the results.

As far as the February 15 New Republic was concerned, there was little doubt that the National Socialists would strengthen themselves in the forthcoming election, since their leader could now bring to bear a considerable amount of the state's power on the behalf of the Fascist ideology. No longer did this weekly refer to the present German government as one dominated by Junker and militarist ideals. Instead it bared some of the initial actions of the Nazi tyranny—the Socialist and Communist press was being suppressed, and new emergency laws had given the government control of all vehicles of propaganda and surveillance over poli-
political meetings. Again this leading liberal organ warned that no attention should be paid to the fact that Hitler controlled only a minority of the seats in the government. Mussolini had started this way, and already, it seemed to The New Republic, Chancellor Hitler had outmaneuvered his Nationalist associate, Alfred Hugenberg. The new Reichstag elections "will not only make the power of the Nazis secure but will leave the German Nationalist People's Party in a hopeless minority position." The Italian press had shown a noticeable interest in the Hitler regime, and The New Republic speculated about the possibility that the two Fascist leaders would organize a new bloc to reestablish the European power balance.6

Not everyone agreed with The New Republic's pessimistic editorial viewpoint. In the same February 15, 1933 issue, Hans V. Kaltenborn argued that Adolf Hitler had assumed the chancellorship with "crippling handicaps." His colleagues in the Cabinet, who were already being pushed to the background as Kaltenborn wrote, would supposedly never permit him to initiate his program. The National Socialist leader had moved into the chancellor's office with waning prestige, contended Kaltenborn. No matter how the March national election came out, Kaltenborn was sure that Hitler had lost his opportunity to establish his so-called "Third Reich." "He is sworn to obey the Constitution and is likely to do so."7

6 The New Republic, LXXIV (February 15, 1933), 3-4.
7 Hans V. Kaltenborn, "Hail Hitler!" ibid., 11. Kaltenborn was the news editor for the Columbia Broadcasting System.
Kaltenborn accepted at face value Hitler's statements to him in his private interview some months earlier.

A Nation editorial of February 15 again reflected the inability of this liberal journal to grasp the full meaning of the ascendence of the Nazis. Hitler was depicted as being under the power of the industrialists and Junkers, who were plotting to "capture and tame" him; "and this the reactionary groups seem to have accomplished." The Nation felt concern that the Nazi chief had abandoned the working class as well as apparently his Party's Socialist principles. Now, it seemed safe to say that only a mouthpiece of the wealthy reactionaries would talk in terms of a compulsory labor service. Missing from the latest National Socialist propaganda were the "grandiose promises" to restore prosperity to the middle and lower classes at the expense of big business. How the German workers would react to this turn of events remained in doubt, but it appeared to The Nation that the Hitler government had everything under control. The biggest potential threat to the present right-wing extremist rule remained the Communist and Social Democratic Parties, but the editorial described both of them as being disorganized and demoralized. A shorter editorial note reported the vicious election campaign being waged by the Nazis; Germany was said to be under a "mob law" which had the government's support. 8

A short editorial in the February 15 Christian Century es-

8 The Nation, CXXXVI (February 15, 1933), 163, 164.
sentially agreed with The Nation's position that the German government was still a reactionary coalition, not yet dominated by the three Nazi members of the Cabinet. Right-wing cooperation was very evident to this Protestant weekly, for the rightist organisations were "throwing all their resources into the effort to give his [Hitler's] government an impregnable constitutional position." Their intention was to help the government entrench so it could meet the anticipated Communist thrust. One point of particular interest for The Christian Century was the new government's decree of protection for religion.

To have Hitler, with his anti-Semitism, and von Papen and Hugenberg, with their love for the Hohenzollerns, celebrate their accession to power by decreeing special protection for religion is to have religion more certainly identified as a camp-follower of the reactionary forces.

Regardless of any initial period of prosperity for the churches, the Christians of Germany, according to The Christian Century, would suffer severe losses for several generations, should the Nazis succeed in establishing a lasting regime. 9

The Commonweal also waited until February 15 to express its first thoughts on Hitler's chancellorship and the forthcoming election. The surprising choice of Hitler to head the government was merely the fourth of a series of stages, beginning with the Bruning ministry in 1930, carrying Germany farther to the political right. While German financial interests had pushed Adolf Hitler to the front of the political stage, The Commonweal's editors

9The Christian Century, L (February 15, 1933), 212, 213.
believed that the Nazi leader remained a man of the people, a shrewd observation contrary to that expressed by other periodicals such as *The Nation* and *The Christian Century*. *The Commonweal* insisted that the National Socialist Party

...was and still is essentially a "worker's party"—a movement joined by hundreds of thousands of poor folk unwilling to adopt a Marxist creed and yet convinced they must do something to escape from poverty and misery. But in all probability Adolf Hitler is too simple and fearless a man to betray the working population. If he finds that what he believes ought to be done cannot be accomplished, he will resign. And the people who made room for him will find the last stages of these things worse than the first.

By this last stage *The Commonweal* meant Communism. Rumors that a Fascist state would be imposed were brushed aside by this same Catholic journal a week later, in disregard of information that "even in Catholic circles voices are heard, suggesting that the Center party ought to prepare for the kind of action expedient in case parliamentary rule came to a sudden halt." *The magazine* argued that there was no parallel between the rise of Mussolini and that of Hitler. The two countries were not alike, and Hitler could not be compared with the Italian chief.

A major editorial in *The Commonweal* of February 22, 1933, could still find "no startling developments" coming out of the German political situation. "If the existing government can exert sufficient pressure, it should be able to drive the radical left underground; and the ultimate result might even be the disappearance of Communist candidates from the electoral lists." Such a possibility seemed to meet with *The Commonweal*’s approval, but it expressed some misgiving that the National Socialists could fail
to satisfy the workers. "It may therefore eventually enlarge rather than heal the wound caused in German life by the scission between labor and bourgeoisie." However, this journal refused to become too pessimistic. The future did not look "rosy," but the editorial recalled the past greatness of the German nation and hoped that things would work out well for the future. Nevertheless, it was regrettable, said The Commonweal, that the Center Party would have so little influence on the course of German political life. A Centrist-Nazi fusion, which had been so "ably sponsored" by Catholic leaders, had probably been made impossible by the German bishops' condemnation of National Socialism. The Commonweal left its readers with a false impression of the attitude of the German Catholic hierarchy's attitude and a serious underestimation of the Church's ability to adjust itself to whatever situation might prevail. It could well be that The Commonweal believed that Centrists could harness the energies of the Nazis and guide them in the correct direction.

Reports had been gathered by the February 18 America, which told of attacks on the opposition Communists and Socialists; the suppression of anti-Nazi newspapers; and the complete subjugation of the Prussian state government. The last was the work of Hermann Goering, the Minister of Interior for Prussia, who had gone about his business without any attention being paid his so-called superior, the National Commissioner for Prussia.

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10 The Commonweal, XVII (February 15, 1933), 423, and (February 22, 1933), 451, 454.
Franz von Papen. Such action could be viewed as a key to the future. Furthermore, the February 25 America added that there would be no getting rid of Adolf Hitler even if the March 5 election went against him—a far different assessment of the German political scene than The Commonweal's. While campaigning, Hitler had announced his intention of carrying out his program for four years, whatever the election decision, reported America. To guarantee his victory, the Chancellor had curtailed the movement of moderate and left-wing political organizations. There seemed to be no way to stop the National Socialists, said an America which was growing more and more disturbed by the German news. Even President Hindenburg had retired into the background.\(^{11}\)

In "Who Stands Behind Hitler," a signed article by Ludwig Lore in the February 22 issue of The Nation, the author reminded his readers that the Reichstag had been eclipsed since the days of the Bruening ministry and actually no longer had an essential role in the conduct of the government. Assessing the present German regime, Lore did not think it necessary as yet to separate the Nationalists from the Nazis.

Both parties are composed of extreme nationalists, monarchists, and militarists who dream of the return of their country's pre-war greatness and believe in the possibility of its regeneration through a youth trained to military service and obedience to the state, and an army and navy that will restore to the Fatherland the territory and colonies it once possessed.

This would permit the two parties with their similar aims "to co-

\(^{11}\) America, XLVIII (February 18, 1933), 466, and (February 25, 1933), 490.
operate for a time," although Lore called attention to the disparities between them. Hitler's followers were crude nationalists, weighed down with the frustrated feelings of underdogs; they lacked the Nationalists' "cultural background,...bred-in-the-bone self-assurance, and...disdain for the lower classes." Nazi anti-Semitism took a much more violent physical form than the Nationalists', and this was a fundamental part of the Nazi Party program. In economics, they demanded a return to the "Spartan life of Germany's forefathers," with the hope of becoming self-sufficient, a proposal foreign to Hugenberg's party. Furthermore, Lore foresaw the totalitarian aspects of the National Socialists who, he predicted, would eventually stamp out all opposition and would abolish constitutional rights and liberties. The individual citizen was going to become a helpless tool of despotism. Needless to say, almost everything that Lore pessimistically predicted in February 1933 came true within a few months.

The German situation was not quite so bleak for The Living Age, a moderate conservative monthly. First of all, it felt that Hitler's emergence as Chancellor was a "fluke." He had been able to outmaneuver General Schleicher at a time when the Nazi leader was losing some of his popularity. Schleicher's policy, according to this editorial, was "to allow the Nazis to wear themselves out with internal dissensions," and The Living Age believed that this could still happen. Even a victory on March 5 would

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12 Ludwig Lore, "Who Stands Behind Hitler?" The Nation, CXXXVI (February 22, 1933), 196-197.
not satisfy Hitler's most radical followers. They were demanding extreme economic measures which would never be accepted by the wealthy financiers behind the National Socialist Party. The Living Age looked for a possible rapprochement between these elements of the Nazis and the Communists if Hitler followed the advice of big business.\textsuperscript{13} Two other journalists shared this view, Denis Gwynn in The Sign\textsuperscript{14} and a German newspaper publisher, Heinrich Simon, who contributed to Current History.\textsuperscript{15} Gwynn felt that Hitler's world was collapsing around him due to intra-party conflict which was undermining the power and prestige of the Nazi leader. Simon maintained that Hitler's movement would decline, especially within middle-class circles, as soon as Germany's economic life improved. All that the Germans needed, wrote Simon, was a sense of security to rid themselves of the messianic Hitlerites. These three articles all shared the common error of overemphasizing the discordant elements in the National Socialist Party, of treating it as a traditional rather than a radically new political group, and of underestimating Hitler's skill.

The only extreme right-wing journalistic response to the German situation of early 1933 is to be found in The Review of Reviews, whose editor Roger Shaw wrote an article with the title

\begin{enumerate}
\item The Living Age, CXCXLIV (March, 1933), 7-8.
\item Denis Gwynn, "Catholic Action and Disarmament," The Sign, XII (March, 1933), 496.
\item Heinrich Simon, "German Class Lines Crumble," Current History, XXXVII (March, 1933), 653.
\end{enumerate}
"De Valera and Hitler: Europe’s Men of the Month." When dealing with the Nazi leader, Shaw was generally sympathetic and apologetic. He pointed out that Hitler was in power by strictly constitutional means. His was a victory for the middle class at the expense of the "trade-union elements" which, Shaw insisted, erroneously, had dominated German politics since 1918. So far Hitler, whom the author compared to Oliver Cromwell, was not a dictator, but Shaw admitted the possibility that he would call his armed disciples into action if things went badly on election day. Hence, wrote Shaw, many liberals would vote for the Nazi leader just to keep the Weimar Constitution in operation, and thereafter the republican forces would be able to oppose him in the Reichstag.

According to Shaw, anti-Semitism was to be the key to the National Socialists’ success. It would unite all classes of Germans "in a common hatred of the Jews...so that the pauper Nazis hate the wealthy Jewish bankers, and the plutocratic Nazis hate the Penniless Jewish communists." However, there was not to be an actual persecution of the Jews, for Hitler had no intention of disturbing his regime. Basically an extremely conservative man, Hitler was only radical in his methods. As a constitutional chancellor, Hitler would be "nothing whatsoever to worry about."16 An extreme right-winger himself, Shaw would naturally be inclined

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16 Roger Shaw, "De Valera and Hitler: Europe’s Men of the Month," The Review of Reviews and World’s Work, LXXXVII (March, 1933), 37.
to favor the rule of a man with whom he shared common principles. Nevertheless, considering the fact that Nazi thugs were already wandering through German streets physically promoting the National Socialist cause, this column by a responsible journalist was highly misleading.

While some reports managed to remain optimistic with respect to the prospects of the Hitler government and still others, confused and bewildering, *The New Republic* continued to pound the theme that Adolf Hitler was gradually becoming an all-powerful dictator, even while the Reichstag elections were still weeks away. The National Socialist "Trinity" in the ministry was actually ruling the country, according to this liberal journal on March 1, 1933. Already Vice-Chancellor Papen's Centrist newspaper, *Germania*, had had issues suppressed after it happened to disagree with Nazi policies, and leading government officials affiliated with other parties had been replaced by National Socialists. Renowned educators of Jewish origin had been purged from institutions of learning. Even the Hugenberg Nationalists were complaining. It was plain to see that if the evidence gathered were true, and it was, *The New Republic* had been right all along regarding the menace of National Socialism. If, as some had predicted, the Nazis were going to be controlled by the conservatives in the Cabinet, the job was being badly bungled. *The Nation* of March 1, which, heretofore, had underestimated the resourcefulness of the

17 *The New Republic*, LXXIV (March 1, 1933), 57.
Nazis, now agreed with *The New Republic* that Chancellor Hitler was "proceeding as if he considered himself sole dictator—as if he were Mussolini in Italy—and by the same methods." The Hitlerites' disregard for civil rights was likewise a concern of *The Nation.*

The more prominent religious-oriented weeklies, *The Christian Century, America* and *The Commonweal,* questioned Nazi campaign tactics as they related to the Christian Faith, Christian institutions and political organizations. At this juncture, the *Century* was particularly concerned with the way German Protestants seemed to be aligning themselves with the new government. What would happen to the Protestant churches in Germany after the disappearance of Hitlerism was the question that *The Christian Century* desired these religious-minded people to ask themselves. This situation was particularly significant, since the *Century,* a Protestant journal, foresaw Catholicism becoming the bulwark against Nationalism as a result of the Nazis' anti-Catholic activities. *America* also evinced concern over the Fascists' attacks on the Center Party and other Catholic interests. Because of this "reign of terrorism" *America* was getting more involved with the German political scene and becoming more critical of the methods of National Socialism. *The Commonweal,* on the other hand, attributed anti-Catholic agitation to Hermann Goering, who

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18 *The Nation,* OXXXVI (March 1, 1933), 219.
19 *The Christian Century,* L (March 1, 1933), 275.
20 *America,* XLVIII (March 4, 1933), 514.
had since been admonished by Adolf Hitler—a man turning toward a more moderate policy, according to this journal. "It seems altogether likely that he will discontinue violent oratory for the good old German middle-class habit of going ahead very slowly and cautiously." Quite obviously, little attention in detail was being paid to overseas reports in The Commonweal's appraisal of events in Germany, particularly since the journal referred to the Nazi street violence activities as "something like an old-fashioned Kentucky feud." The Commonweal was also willing to bet that the National Socialists would turn out to be just like the Social Democrats in the post-1918 period.21

One Catholic journalist, writing for a monthly, had already begun to change his mind about Hitler, now that the Nazi demagogue had taken a firm hold upon the German executive. In an article for the April 1933 Sign, Denis Gwynn saw the Hitler Cabinet remaining in power no matter what the electorate decided on election day; and incidentally, the author forecast a Nazi majority. After March 5 Gwynn looked for a Cabinet power struggle with Hitler eventually outwitting his opponents. Nevertheless, it would not be a very strong Hitler, in Gwynn's estimation, unless the Chancellor sought an alliance with another political faction, namely the Center Party. The author was under the mistaken impression that the one common policy of the Nazis and Centrists, opposition to the Communist Party, would eventually serve as the

21 The Commonweal, XVII (March 8, 1933), 507.
basis of a rapprochement, with both Frans von Papen and Heinrich Bruening steering the Center in this direction. Since the National Socialist storm troopers had been attacking Centrist political meetings and suppressing the Catholic press, Gwynn admitted that his picture of the new coalition was optimistic. Yet these incidents, he said, "should not be taken seriously." Hitler wanted to keep his legions loyal to him while the election campaign was in progress; he was intelligent enough to realize that the National Socialists could not govern without the help of the other major parties. This was not the same Adolf Hitler who was being overwhelmed by revolt in the racist political party that Gwynn described in the previous month's issue of The Sign. Nor was it the real National Socialist chieftain.

The climax of the entire election campaign, and perhaps of the first phase of Hitler's chancellorship, came on February 27 when the Reichstag building was struck by fire of an incendiary origin. Varied historical interpretations concerning the setting of the fire make it difficult to say for certain who actually started the blaze; however, that the Communists were to be

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22 Denis Gwynn, "The New Regime In Germany," The Sign, XII (April, 1933), 553-555.

23 In the latest literature on the Reichstag fire of February 27, 1933, Alan J. P. Taylor, "Who Burnt the Reichstag?" History Today, X (August, 1960), 515-522 and Frits Tobias, The Reichstag Fire, trans. Arnold J. Pomerans (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1964), conclude that the fire was not the result of a Nazi or Communist plot, as is frequently pointed out in texts and monographs concerning modern German history, but the sole work of the Dutchman Marinus van der Lubbe.
the primary scapegoat became evident when a known Communist, Mar-
inus van der Lubbe, was arrested and accused of arson. On the
day following the fire, Chancellor Hitler issued the emergency
decree "For the Protection of the People and the State," signed
by President Hindenburg, which suspended civil rights guaranteed
under the Weimar Constitution. Also the federal government was
given the right to take over all powers in any German state, and
the death penalty was imposed for various crimes against the state.
What this did was to give encouragement plus state approval to
the barbarous actions of the Nazi storm troopers against the meet-
ings and official organs of the Communists, Social Democrats and
other political opponents.

Events happened so quickly in Germany during the last
days of February that only a few American journals had an oppor-
tunity to respond in detail. Only three periodicals had anything
concrete to say concerning the action taken by the Reich govern-
ment following the Reichstag fire: The New Republic, The Literary
Digest and America all pointed out how the National Socialists
were using this incident to their advantage and how threatening
for the future was the suppression of civil rights. Only the
Literary Digest voiced what soon became the common assumption that
Hermann Goering himself and the National Socialist Party were re-
ponsible for the blaze.

24 The New Republic, LXXIV (March 8, 1933), 86; The Literary
Digest, CXXV (March 11, 1933), 15; and America, XLVII (March
11, 1933), 538.
In spite of what was happening in Germany in late February and early March, Ludwig Lore, in a contribution to The New Republic of March 15, 1933, which was submitted before the Reichstag elections, opined that organized labor and its political representatives would be the Nazi leaders' major hurdle. As long as Hitler continued to show favor to the industrialists and large landowners, worker members of his movement were bound to turn from him and re-enforce the ranks of his Communist and Socialist opposition. If this political reality continued to be ignored, Lore predicted that the workingmen's parties would remain a long-time threat to Hitler's rule. Reports of the results of the March 5 voting seemed to support Lore's theory, for the Socialists and Communists picked up more than thirty percent of the vote in an unpleasant atmosphere.

Terror tactics used by the Nazis during the election campaign were but partially successful, since Hitler's Party did not receive the desired majority vote. The Nazis' 17,277,200 ballots, or 43.9 percent of the total vote represented 288 out of a total of 647 Reichstag seats, which, together with the Nationalists' 3,136,800 votes (8.0 percent of the total) and 52 seats, gave the National Socialist-Nationalist coalition 51.9 percent of the popular vote and a constitutional majority with 340 seats in the German parliament. The Socialist Party received 7,181,600 votes and

25 Ludwig Lore, "Can Hitler Survive?" The New Republic, LXXIV (March 15, 1933), 120-123.
120 seats—a loss of only one since the December 1932 election, but the Communists suffered a loss of nineteen Reichstag places to 81, and their vote total fell from 5,980,200 to 4,848,100. The Centrists gained 196,000 supporters, giving them a total of 4,424,900, and their Reichstag delegation increased by four to 74.

In one degree or another the American journals looked upon the results of the March 5 election as a Nazi victory, but most of them seemed to feel that Hitler would soon encounter political opposition. The March 15 New Republic, for instance, pointed to the large Communist and Socialist vote as proof that the labor parties were much more firmly entrenched than they had been in Italy when Mussolini so easily came to power. The Nazis would have to make a considerable effort to subdue them, and The New Republic fully expected the Hitlerites to make that effort in the ensuing months. Already announcements had been made that would point to this. Non-Nazi bureaucrats and officials were being replaced in governmental, educational and cultural institutions, indicating an eventual attack on the labor unions also. The Jews too were in danger, said The New Republic in its usual pessimistic tone. 26

Even though Hitler had won the battle against German democracy using constitutional methods, The Nation, still underestimating his ability, forecast serious future difficulties. Adolf Hitler was "incompetent" and "totally ignorant of economic and

26 The New Republic, LXXIV (March 15, 1933), 119.
financial questions." So many promises had been made that it was
doubtful that he could ever fulfill them. If he does not repair
the economic situation, the masses which had backed him because
of his promises "to lead them out of the wilderness" would turn
elsewhere—if they were still able to do so. This was the key to
Germany's future, thought The Nation's editors, for if Hitler in
the next few months succeeded in cowing the people so that a sta-
ble National Socialist administration could be established, he
might rule for years. This March editorial indicated for the
first time that the journal was slowly coming around to the view
that the National Socialists had a chance to enjoy a long rule.
Brutal repression awaited the Social Democrats and the Communists
who were "weakened and frightened," in the words of The Nation.
As for the Jews, the magazine had been fooled by official Nazi
announcements denying plans for overt persecution, yet, The Na-
tion suspected, they would live as "marked persons" and without
the right to leave the country.

Altogether the spectacle of Germany is one to make the
gods weep. It is, of course, at bottom due to the folly
and the wickedness of the Treaty of Versailles. But this
does not alter the fact that Germany has now become one
of the danger spots of Europe, a source of unrest and in-
ternational anxiety, and perhaps another threat of war.27

Hitler was "thunderously approved" in the March 5 Reich
election, according to the conservative Literary Digest, but the
large vote total for the other major parties was an encouraging
sign that Germany was still politically alive. Noticed also was

27 The Nation, CXXXVI (March 15, 1933), 277.
another sign of hope, the slim margin in the new legislature enjoyed by the National Socialists and Nationalists combined. A comparable show of optimism could be found in The Christian Century for March 15, which doubted that Hitler could ever firmly establish his so-called Third Reich. An orator and demagogue he might be, but he seemed to lack the qualities of leadership. Many of his best men had left his side "convinced that he was not worth their support," asserted the Century, without, however, naming any. Old Germany was definitely dead, The Christian Century recognized, but it would be up to others besides the National Socialists to organize the new one, as soon as Germany "found itself." The new Reich would pass beyond National Socialism; Hitler and his friends would have nothing to do with the real German revolution of the future.  

False hope was not found in America on March 18, 1933. It appeared resigned to the fact that the election truly represented the sentiments of the German people, who "overwhelmingly" favored the National Socialists. "The greatest surprise" for this journal, which seemed to be jarred by the fact, was the large number of votes polled in Catholic Bavaria by the Nazis—six million more votes than the Catholic Bavarian People's Party. Because so many Germans went to the polls, almost ninety percent of the electorate, America concluded that the German people "were

28. The Literary Digest, CXV (March 18, 1933), 11.
grasping desperately for some form of stable government with a possibility of a functioning Reichstag, and the end of the confusion and bitterness of further elections."30

The Commonweal, on the other hand, expressed more confusion than astonishment, a quality that often characterized this journal in early 1933. For a few months, thought The Commonweal, life would be easy for the victorious National Socialists, but after that Hitler and his associates would have to produce more than noise and public speeches. Failure to realize that National Socialism could be more than just a fleeting trend in German politics probably accounted for this journal's superficial comment. The Commonweal could see nothing constructive being done in Germany, or, for that matter, it perceived nothing very destructive either. The Junkers and industrialists in the government were struggling to conserve the state's financial structure, while Adolf Hitler seemed content with emulating Mussolini's Fascist gestures. The future for Germany was a "huge puzzle," concluded The Commonweal, which declared that it could discover no opposition to the government in power. The Communists had gone into hiding, and the Social Democrats were undergoing a fierce attack.

A week later The Commonweal reported that events had shown the Catholic Center Party being outmaneuvered, with many of its leading members being forced out of office. Nonetheless, The Commonweal ventured the opinion that the rest would do the Centrists

30 America, XLVII (March 18, 1933), 562.
some good and perhaps revitalize them, after which the Center Party would be ready to contribute constructive work for the state, once the passions of nationalistic fervor had died down. As the month of March 1933 closed, The Commonweal continued to treat the National Socialists as little more than an ephemerical nuisance.

In Germany the main currents following the election consisted of the introduction of the program of Gleichschaltung or the coordination of the Reich begun under Hitler's sponsorship. Non-Nazi state officials lost their positions, steps were taken to tighten the federal government's control over the Länder, and even private organizations felt pressure to reshape their structure along the lines of the "leadership principle." Leading Communist and Social Democratic officials were arrested and imprisoned, although the two movements were not yet outlawed. The once sacred German trade unions underwent constant harrassment and suffered from Nazi confiscatory raids. Hitler's program enjoyed amazing success from its very inception.

National Socialism was consolidating its position with great speed, The Nation in mid-March warned its readers. In his pronouncements Hitler himself was speaking more softly, but his disciples under his directions were moving ahead at a rapid pace. Indiscriminate attacks were taking place against the Jews, and political opponents were reported being kidnapped and murdered.  

31 The Commonweal, XVII (March 22, 1933), 563 and (March 29, 1933), 594.
German newspapers were being shut down. Censorship prevented the world from learning all the details of the persecution and the police-state tactics, said *The Nation*, but enough was known to Great Britain and France together for joint discussions concerning the "German peril." If still unsure about Hitler and his system, *The Nation* was beginning to realize that the National Socialists were not going to submit to those forces that this journal once thought could control them. This same theme received more thorough treatment a week later when *The Nation* published a signed article by the Berlin correspondent, John Elliott, who pointed out that Hitler had his own "mandate of his people." Consequently he had neither the need nor the intention of bowing to the whims of the aristocrats, nationalists and monarchists. Hitler, Elliott wrote, was a product of German democracy, and therefore he had no desire to restore the old order. The new monarchy in Germany was destined to have Hitler as a dictator rather than a Hohenzollern king at the helm. *The Nation* ran an editorial along with Elliott's article, stating its belief that the whole course of recent German developments pointed to dictatorship of the worst type.  

*The Nation* had definitely come around to the thinking of its liberal contemporary, *The New Republic*, with respect to the resolution of Hitler to command German affairs, but it still did not be-

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32 *The Nation*, CXXXVI (March 22, 1933), 302; John Elliott, (March 29, 1933), 337-339 and 332-333. Another of the many articles which, like Elliott's, discusses the possibility of the return of the Hohenzollern dynasty is the short editorial comment in *The Literary Digest*, CXV (April 1, 1933), 1-2.
lieve Hitler would last.

Real concern for the fate of Germany under National Socialism was shown by several religious journals in this spring of 1933. Two articles, appearing in The Christian Century and The American Ecclesiastical Review, were studies in depth and unlike many of the other essentially factual articles of that time.  

With the mention of the first serious study of the essence of National Socialism, an opportunity is presented to cite a number of the most valuable works available in the area. The very latest monograph by George L. Mosse, The Crisis of German Ideology (New York: Grosset and Dunlap, 1954), explores the currents of thought through nineteenth- and twentieth-century German history, discussing the role they played during a century of German life. An excellent monograph by Fritz Stern, The Politics of Cultural Despair (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1961) examines the German root sources of National Socialism in the years before Hitler's ascendancy to political power. Taking a similar approach, Peter Viereck attempts to tie the German Romantics historically and logically into National Socialism in Metapolitics From the Romantics to Hitler (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1941). For a more than adequate examination of the phenomenon of the total state, as well as the problem of anti-Semitism, there is the pessimistic account by Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (2nd ed. enlarged; New York: Meridian Books, 1958). Probably the best survey of modern German history can be found in Koppel S. Pinson's Modern Germany: Its History and Civilization (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1954). Especially useful is Chapter Twenty-One, which is concerned with Adolf Hitler and National Socialism. One of the most enterprising volumes is The Third Reich (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953) edited by Maurice Bammont, John H. E. Fried and Edmond Vermeil. This large work investigates the many aspects of the phenomenon of National Socialism. A number of international scholars have contributed essays in their own particular area of study to this volume. Franz Neumann's Behemoth, the Structure and Practice of National Socialism (New York: Oxford University Press, 1942) presents a most valuable description and interpretation of Nazi Germany. Cited for its interesting insights and massive knowledge, this monograph is especially useful for its understanding of Nazi economics. Sidney B. Fay has translated Friedrich Meinecke's The German Catastrophe (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1950). This German historian investigates the social and historical forces that led to the rise of Adolf Hitler and the ruin of his homeland. Hermann Mau and Helmut Krausnick, German History, 1933-45: An
Writing in the March 29, 1933 *Christian Century* in an article called "Hitler and Religion," Reverend Elmer G. Homrighausen theorized that National Socialism was a cult of the absolute mystical state, with its strength firmly rooted in the mass of German people. It was striving to create a national revival, one in which all Germans would participate. Nazism was close to being a religious movement, Homrighausen found, yet it had not attempted to take the place of religion. Nevertheless, he also portrayed Hitler as believing in the Platonic idea of the state and thinking of himself as the messiah chosen by God to lead Germany back to her days of glory. What paths this National Socialist search for lost prestige would take interested Reverend Homrighausen, who rejected

the opinions that the Nazis were an immediate threat to world peace.

There is imperialism of the most passionate kind, and yet, in spite of the sword-clanging we hear so much about from the distorting press, there is a sincere desire to avoid international armed combat. What sound like war scares from Germany are nothing more than the rising spirit of the German reich demanding a respectable place among the nations and a right to express the nation's inherent spirit...

To make the kind of Germany he desired, Hitler would have to work closely with the churches, Reverend Homrighausen prephesied; however, so far he found that the Christian churches had ignored his bid for a close working agreement. Of the two Christian sects Homrighausen deemed the weak and poorly organized German Protestant church as the best bet to fall under Hitler's control. The Catholic Church presented a more formidable problem for the Nazi Chancellor, according to this Protestant clergyman. Before a thorough reconstruction of the state could begin, he correctly predicted that the government would have to seek accord with Rome or face the same kind of opposition which confronted Otto von Bismarck in the nineteenth century. Hitler would do well "to go to Canossa voluntarily," advised Homrighausen, yet he found it difficult to believe that the papacy could compromise with a movement which claimed spiritual supremacy. Catholics in Germany had faced this dilemma for several years and, in spite of what Homrighausen misconstrued as an official ban placed upon National Socialism by the Catholic Church, one found many of its members turning to the Nazi Party. Here, the author suggested,
would be a prime mason for the Vatican to reconsider its attitude toward National Socialism. While Homrighausen's article was inaccurate in some details—he contended that Hitler was a practicing Catholic, and he seemed to put faith in Hitler's appeal to organized religion for support at the very beginning of his rule—he showed considerable insight in his assessment of the churches' predicament.

Some of Homrighausen's views were echoed by another author. Professor John B. Mason, contributing an article to the April 1933 American Ecclesiastical Review entitled "The Catholic Church and Hitlerism," viewed the Catholic Church as the chief obstacle to the growth of National Socialism. In what was primarily an historical survey of the Catholic Church's policies toward and pronouncements against National Socialism, Mason considered several documents on the diocesan level such as the Mainz edict of September 1930 and German Catholic newspaper opinions and then

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34 Elmer G. Homrighausen, "Hitler and German Religion," The Christian Century, L (March 29, 1933), 418-420. The author was a minister of a reformed church in Indianapolis.

The most thorough and significant recent study of the Protestant church in Nazi Germany in English is Arthur O. Cochrane, The Church's Confession Under Hitler (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1962), which describes the German Protestant struggle with the National Socialist state and the heretical "German Christian" faction in the years 1933-1934. A less thorough volume, but one covering the entire Nazi period, is Franklin H. Littell, The German Phoenix (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1960). A brief essay by Birger Forell, entitled "National-Socialism and the Protestant Churches," is to be found in The Third Reich (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1953). Homrighausen's view that the Protestant church was not prepared to meet the Nazi menace in 1933 finds general support in the three studies cited above.
erroneously concluded that "the German cardinals, archbishops and bishops in the course of the last two years have unanimously condemned a part" of the Nazi program. On the other hand, Mason suggested that "the Holy See may consider it too early to make an official and public pronouncement." In addition, Mason indicated that he was optimistic about the future role of the Center Party in German politics, because it had been able to hold its own against the Nazis at the voting polls.\(^\text{35}\)

The Catholic World for April 1933 also did not respond as if it expected Catholicism to reach an early accord with National Socialism. In an all-too-brief article which was the first response of this Catholic monthly to Adolf Hitler and National Socialism since a short editorial mention in December 1930, it did little more than display anger over the excesses of the Hitler government with respect to the Jews, Catholics and other minority groups, especially since Hitler "is, or was, a Catholic."\(^\text{36}\)

\(^\text{35}\) John B. Mason, "The Catholic Church and Hitlerism," The American Ecclesiastical Review, LXXXVIII (April, 1933), 385-401. Author Mason was a professor of history and government at Colorado Women's College; he was particularly interested in the German problem and later wrote a book on the church struggle: Hitler's First Foes: A Study in Religion and Politics (Minneapolis: Burgess Publishing Company, 1936).

The latest and most thorough discussion of the position of the German Catholic Church in 1933 can be found in Guenter Lewy's The Catholic Church and Nazi Germany (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1964). Lewy clearly indicates that the Catholic Church in Germany did not stand united against the Hitler government but, in fact, tried to cooperate with the new government. The same German Catholic Church policy is described in the article, "German Catholicism in 1933" by Ernst-Wolfgang Böckenförde and translated by Raymond Schmandt in Cross Currents, XI (Summer, 1961), 283-304.

\(^\text{36}\) The Catholic World, CXXXVII (April, 1933), 109-110.
similar angry reaction to the recent Nazi activities appeared in the March 25 *America*.37

As Hitler moved toward absolute power, reports streamed from Germany telling of the acceleration of the reign of terror. All the journals responding agreed in condemning the atrocities, although some more vehemently than others, and a considerable divergence of opinion manifested itself as to what should be done about them. Both the April 1 *Literary Digest*38 and *The Commonweal* for April 5 misconstrued the latest sequence of events as the re-opening of another epoch of Prussianism. The Catholic weekly wrote:

The anti-Jewish movement in Germany is far more than a tempest of prejudice stirred up in the lower depths of mob emotion by a demagogue. It is part and parcel of a strongly developed racial nationalism, with its own passionate, even fanatical philosophy of Teutonism, the spearhead of which is nothing other than the same dangerous, almost insane Prussianism which was glorified before 1914, and which the world too naively thought to have been overthrown, and discarded by the German people themselves, but which now is violently seeking to reestablish its predominance. To such a religion of racial pride and brutal power, the purging of the people obsessed by its spirit from what is considered to be the alien and corrupting taint of the Jewish element, seems a clear and certain duty.

Taking what amounted to its first really strong stand against Nazism, *The Commonweal* maintained that only the overthrow of Hitler and his followers would bring justice to the Jews and other minority groups, including the German Catholics. For the moment, the

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37 *America*, XLVIII (March 25, 1933), 586.
38 *The Literary Digest*, CXV (April 1, 1933), 3.
opposition to the regime was impotent, but it was hoped that the more sane elements of the National Socialist Party, and The Commonweal believed there were some, together with the German democrats, would bring an end to the terror once the "contagious delirium of the revolution subsides." Above all, declared this journal, those democratic groups left in Germany should be given full moral support by world public opinion. 39

Two other religious journals, one Protestant and the other Catholic, did not share The Commonweal's sense of urgency. Caution should be exercised with regard to the reports coming out of Germany, advised the April 5 Christian Century, which was willing to give the National Socialists the benefit of the doubt. Stories of what was supposedly happening would remain only unfounded rumor unless a neutral fact-finding board was sent to investigate. In the Century's opinion, emotions should be curbed until the truth was found out. 40 The April 1 America agreed that the severe censorship of news from Germany made it almost impossible to get a clear picture of what was occurring. 41

More positive action with regard to the German Fascists' crimes was favored by the two leading liberal weeklies. While the April 5 Nation advocated continued world pressure against the Nazi excesses, 42 The New Republic for the same week called for a

39 The Commonweal, XVII (April 5, 1933), 620.
40 The Christian Century, L (April 5, 1933), 443.
41 America, XLVIII (April 1, 1933), 610.
42 The Nation, CXXXVI (April 5, 1933), 360.
prompt internationally inspired investigation. No number of foreign protests would ever mitigate the Nazi anti-Semitic campaign, but if these were to continue, The New Republic urged that sympathy should be given to other elements of the German political community—besides the Jews—which had disappeared behind the gates of the Nazi concentration camps. On no account did this periodical wish the United States government to get entangled with other protesting nations over the German problem or contribute to the upkeep of Hitler and his collaborators. The New Republic took the stand that the victorious powers of western Europe were responsible for Hitler, so it was their collective job to work something out with him or organize against his tyranny.  

Although the Hitlerites were acting as if they had confidence in the future of their movement, several commentaries appearing in the journals expressed some doubt. In the April 1933 Survey Graphic, John Palmer Gavit had yet to see anything coherent demonstrated by the Hitler coalition. The Communists had been subdued, but there still remained the labor unions and the Social Democrat Party, as well as the strong Center Party, to contend with. Anything could happen in the future, said Gavit, even civil war. The Living Age for April also thought that the Hitler Cabinet was on shaky ground. "The immediate question in Germany is

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whether the alliance between the landowners and the industrialists will give way before Hitler's mass movement crumbles." So little did this conservative monthly think of the Nazis' hold over the country that it predicted the next power struggle would take place between the Junkers of eastern Germany and the businessmen of the Rhineland area. This distorted view of German affairs, as seen through second-hand reports, can be contrasted with the opinions of a correspondent in Germany. This anonymous author, who initialed his articles "Y. K. W.," predicted in The New Republic complete success for Adolf Hitler. All opposition would be suppressed, and enough of the working classes would line up behind Hitler to give him something approaching "popular support." When President Hindenburg died, the Nazi Chancellor would probably succeed him. For the present, Fascism seemed to be the end of the political process in Germany. However, the author advised that, since Germany was a highly industrialized state, no one could say just how many years of prosperity Hitler would have to construct the type of state he wanted.

The Reichstag gave the Chancellor his opportunity to mold his kind of Reich by approving on March 23 the Enabling Act—the "Law for Removing the Distress of People and Reich." This piece of legislation transferred the legislative functions of the Reich-

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45 The Living Age, CCCXLIV (April, 1933), 97.

46 Y. K. W., "Eye-Witness in Berlin," The New Republic, LXXIV (April 5, 1933), 207. The author was an American who had lived in Germany for many years. He was unable to sign his name for fear of reprisals.
stag to the Reich Cabinet and allowed for any deviations from the constitution deemed necessary by the Cabinet. In essence, the Reichstag had committed political suicide, but the National Socialists and other forces had contributed to its demise. Moreover, the law suspending civil rights passed at the time of the Reichstag fire remained in effect.

Because the Enabling Law would be a basic change in the Weimar Constitution, a two-thirds majority of the Reichstag was needed to pass it. The government had arrested the Communist representatives and some of the Social Democrats, but this still left the National Socialists short of the necessary vote. To overcome the now-suspicious Nationalists, Adolf Hitler promised that he would not try to alter the powers of President Hindenburg, the Nationalists' idol. Hitler's negotiations with the Centrist Party reached a climax when he addressed a letter to the Center leader, Monsignor Ludwig Kaas, in which the Chancellor promised to continue the existence of the German states, not to change the Weimar Constitution, and to protect the confessional schools and respect the concordats signed between German states and the Vatican. The Hitler promises were accepted at face value, and the Enabling Law passed the Reichstag 441 to 94. Only the Social Democrats cast "no" ballots. So it was on March 23, 1933 that Adolf Hitler became the legal dictator of Germany.

Little outspoken comment on the passage of the Enabling Law appeared in the American journals. The New Republic wrote that "the dictatorship and the terror in Germany are now com-
plete." This journal's major concern seemed to be what was going to happen to the German people in the future. The April 8 Literary Digest's response was very similar. In what was primarily a factual article, Sidney B. Fay in Current History accurately summarized the events surrounding the passage of the Enabling Act. These three articles, none of which attempted to analyze, were the extent of the American journal response to this significant German constitutional change.

What the National Socialists achieved in the eight weeks of German history covered in this chapter was noteworthy. The chancellorship, a majority in the national election with the assistance of right-wing allies, control over the state's bureaucracy and police, and a constitutional dictatorship attained through the Enabling Law, were the accomplishments of Adolf Hitler and the National Socialist Party. While American journals responded to Hitler's appointment and the events immediately preceding it, they seemed less interested in the March election and even more so in the German Reichstag's decision to dissolve itself and permit an unencumbered rule for the Nazi chancellor. Only three periodicals, The New Republic, The Literary Digest and Current History commented directly on the Enabling Law after its

47 The New Republic, LXXIV (March 29, 1933), 170.
48 The Literary Digest, CXV (April 1, 1933), 1-2.
Some journals did so later, several months afterwards in some cases, but by that time whatever impact the action might have had had worn off. Perhaps it could be argued that the journals looked upon the Enabling Act as merely legalizing a political reality of almost three years' standing. The name "dictatorship" had been applied by some to Brunenings term as Chancellor and even more frequently to the regimes of Papen and Schleicher. It was also true that Hitler had been busy consolidating his regime in dictatorial fashion for at least three weeks before the Reichstag vote on March 23, 1933.

Many of the liberal- and religious-oriented journals responded immediately to the first of the Hitlerites' anti-Semitic measures, but they were puzzled about the ultimate norm for them. The interest created by this Nazi vendetta seemed to serve as a smokescreen to cover a good many of the details in German political affairs, at least for the American journals of opinion.

By the time of the enactment of the Enabling Law, the American periodicals had just about concluded that Adolf Hitler was going to be around for a while in the news headlines. But where Hitler would go after March 23 was still a question mark. He was experiencing complications with some of his Nationalist associates over his methods for keeping order and managing government, but an open rupture had not yet come. Domestic reconstruction was desperately needed, but the Nazi Party propaganda had promised dramatic results in foreign affairs. Germany and the world waited in April 1933 for the Berlin government to start making
decisions.
CHAPTER IV

THE JEWISH QUESTION

Following the passage of the Enabling Law on March 23, 1933, German affairs were given close scrutiny by American journals as editors and writers realized now that Adolf Hitler and the new German government meant important news. The topic with the most emotional impact during the first year of the Hitler regime was the continual harsh treatment of the German Jews by the government and by the Nazi para-military units.\(^1\) Anti-Semitism represented one of the basic principles of the National Socialist Party, a fact long recognized by the majority of American periodicals; with the prospects of at least four years of a Hitler dictatorship, the fate of German Jewry was certainly a most critical problem for the journals to consider carefully.

Almost without exception the major journals of opinion had something to say about the apparently unabated German anti-Semitic campaign. The first response, already noted in the previous chapter, appeared in the March 1933 issues of the journals; more comprehensive study began in April. Official and private denials to the contrary, extreme economic measures had been imposed upon Jews throughout Germany, according to The Literary Digest of April 8. The brief note reported the growth of foreign protest and boycotting movements in western Europe and the United States, which had brought threats from the German government of retaliatory measures.2

The New Republic for April 12 perceived that the Nazi government was "obviously frightened by the worldwide uproar over its boycott of the Jews," because it had declared in early April 1933 that it would treat Jews justly "if foreigners only behave themselves." Just the same, this journal predicted that the assaults upon the Jews would continue, since the elimination of German Jewry was an integral part of the Nazi program. The New Republic was correct in its assumption that anti-Semitism was "by far the easiest" of the National Socialists' pledges "to carry out."3

The anonymous Y. K. W. wrote in The New Republic that the Nazi chieftains had to promote the attacks to keep their wavering followers from wavering.[2]The Literary Digest, CXV (April 8, 1933), 9.
3The New Republic, LXXIV (April 12, 1933), 226.
ing mass support in line. The popularity of the National Socialists had been definitely slipping at the time Adolf Hitler took charge of the government in January 1933, in this author's view. Anti-Semitism was an immediate outlet for the energies of Hitler's younger disciples, observed Ludwig Lore in another New Republic article. The call for the expulsion of the Jews was supposed to be the solution of the state's economic ills. The fact of the whole matter, said Lore, was that anti-Semitism was "nationalism's best ally."

They are blood brothers; they belong together. A race which, without land and without concentrated material power, maintains its identity with such dogged persistence through the centuries is the living antithesis of nationalist ideology, that concept of the nation which is promised exclusively on political domination. Nationalism and anti-Semitism today outline the political picture of official Germany.

"The Nazis stand convicted of barbarism without parallel since the Middle Ages," proclaimed a more emphatic Nation editorial on April 12. Of course, because of the state censorship not all the facts were known, but the case could be judged by the words and actions of the Hitlerites. Attacks on Jews, liberals, Socialists, Communists and others would spell the ruin of the Nazi dictatorship, although The Nation did not say how this would come about. It did, however, think that only the mobilized protest of world opinion could save Germany from going to still low-

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er depths. 6

Both The Presbyterian Advance and The Christian Century denounced German anti-Semitism. 7 While the former believed that the Jews would suffer severe handicaps for many months to come, the Century felt that the future of the Jews depended upon an alleged power struggle going on inside the German government.

In an unusual article, considering the source, an American Jew, Robert E. Asher, contributed "A Jew Protests Against Protesters" to the April 12 Christian Century. Asher found nothing strange about the National Socialists' movements. It was realistic to eliminate one's opposition after a revolution or a significant political change. "History proves too well the necessity for this type of political realism, whether morally right or wrong." Now, history had shown how useless it was to persecute the Jew, said Asher, but a more tragic element of Hitler's policy was the assault upon the Socialists and Communists and everything they worked for in the way of labor legislation and privileges. In one of the few manifestations of the true humanitarian spirit appearing in the journals, Asher wrote that the Marxist groups deserved as much sympathy from the American people as the Jews, but as yet they were not getting it. 8 Only some of the more lib-

6 The Nation, CXXXVI (April 12, 1933), 388.
7 The Presbyterian Advance, XLVII (April 13, 1933), 5, and The Christian Century, L (April 12, 1933), 483-484.
8 Robert E. Asher, "A Jew Protests Against Protesters," The Christian Century, L (April 12, 1933), 492-494. Asher had done postgraduate study in Germany and was working for the betterment of unemployed groups in the United States.
eral American journals would eventually respond to Asher's request.

On the other hand, Louis C. Cornish, in an editorial in the *Christian Register* of April 13, 1933, assessed world opinion as "amazed to find that the Hitlerites mean exactly what they have been saying." Cornish could not believe that this return to what he called "medievalism" would last. Tolerance was bound to win out in Germany, but the author did not say when.9

Representatives of some of the Catholic periodicals in early April showed less concern about Nazi anti-Semitism. *America* interpreted the early reports of Jewish mistreatment as exaggerations "invented by passion." Unlike most of the other American magazines, *America* believed the Hitler government entertained no planned campaign against German Jewry. Hitler and his Cabinet had been said to have already condemned the activity of the guilty culprits, "irregular groups," and order was now being restored.10 America's view on the Jewish question was amplified by one of its staff members, Father Florence D. Sullivan, whose article for the April 8 issue touched on a variety of aspects of the German problem. While Sullivan attempted to show some sympathy for the Jews, his article was permeated with mistrust.

All will deplore the violence, hatred, and injustice that admittedly accompanied the change of government. It

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9 Louis C. Cornish, "Editorial: Germany Under Hitler," *The Christian Register*, CXII (April 13, 1933), 235. The Register's editorials at this time were generally written by Unitarian and Universalist churchmen, but Cornish was not identified.

10 *America*, XLIX (April 8, 1933), 22-23.
is particularly distressing that Hitler and his followers have so often blamed the woes of the nation on the Jewish race and vented almost diabolical hatred against many of its members. Much of this now seems to have sporadic and not intended by the man in power. There are too many contradictory stories for one to come to a conclusion. The evidence would seem to point to frightful exaggerations, perhaps part of Communist propaganda which is known to wax far on the miseries of others. The responsible officials have pledged themselves to prevent unjust treatment of the Jews; and testimony from reliable Jewish sources is added to the reports of our own Ambassador through the Secretary of State that order has been restored and no future outbreaks need be feared. Organized protests, especially when they excite governments to a hostile attitude towards Germany, will be resented by loyal Germans and only give pretext for unleashing destructive passions and cruel reprisals.

In all fairness the facts and circumstances should be fully known before a judgment is passed. Moreover, the distinction must be borne in mind that persecution against Communists who are Jews is not an attack on Jewry. Evidence is not wanting to prove that many Jews have long forgotten the religious tenets and holy practices of Zion and have become leaders in spreading an ungodly philosophy and in fomenting disorder and revolution. These should not have the sympathy of either Christian or Jew.11

Perhaps in an attempt to offset some of the remarks made by Father Sullivan, another Jesuit from America, John La Farge, found value in the protests against the Nazis' activities. However, he was hopeful that the same attitude might soon be taken with respect to the deeds of the Soviet government.12

Christian elements in Germany, it was hoped by The Commonweal for April 12, would come to the front and modify the brutal

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11 Florence D. Sullivan, S.J., "Whither Hitler?" ibid., 7. Father Sullivan was an associate editor of America. This was the only signed article on German affairs by Sullivan during the period 1930-1939.

12 John La Farge, S.J., "Jewish Protests and Russian Experiments," ibid., 11-13. Father La Farge was another associate editor of America.
tactics of the Hitler regime. Above all, the Jews as a race should not be condemned, because there were good and evil in every nation. So too, a final judgment on the German nation must consider this fact. "Irrespective of all other things--political, business or cultural considerations--Christians outside of Germany must not judge rashly either the Jews or the Germans." While The Commonweal now appeared more ready than America to criticize the Nazi government, it seemed to be contemplating a wait-and-see attitude not entirely dissimilar from America's.

The Catholic weekly Ave Maria also took a position somewhat similar to America's. It quoted an article from the London Catholic Times which saw German Jewry getting just what it deserved. The Jews, said this English report, were responsible for much of the world's "irreligion and immodesty" and were also leaders in Communism's attack on a civilization "which Herr Hitler, for all his faults, has sworn to uphold." Jewish Freemasonry also played a major role in the persecution of Catholics the world over. The Ave Maria found "truth" in the London reprint's undisguised attack on Jewry. 

Professor Sidney B. Fay in the Current History for May 1933 was also unwilling to place on Hitler the blame for the excitement after his political victory. Much of the abuse against the Jews stemmed from unauthorized Nazi bands, that were later...

13 The Commonweal, XVII (April 12, 1933), 647-648.
14 The Ave Maria, XXXVII (New Series) (April 29, 1933), 535.
brought under control and given strict orders to restrain themselves. As in the French and Russian Revolutions foreign interference only made matters worse for the Jews and others, contended Fay. Another monthly columnist, John Palmer Gavit, writing in the May Survey Graphic, called the contemporary German scene a "drunk-and-disorderly exhibit of medieval atavism." A contrary view was expounded by the arch-conservative editor of The American Review, Seward Collins, in his appraisal of the German situation. Writing off the Nazi excesses with regard to the Jews as "absurd atrocity stories," Collins expressed delight that capitalism had been saved in Germany by the Fascist revolution. Now Communism as a threat to the capitalist system was finished "forever," Collins prophesied.

Exactly the opposite viewpoint appeared in the May Nation in an article by the literary critic and author, Ludwig Lewisohn. In his opinion the "gigantic atrocity" of the Nazi regime was the plan to eliminate the Jews from German life. Some Jews were Communists, he admitted, but the vast majority had no connec-

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15 Sidney B. Fay, "Germany's Anti-Jewish Campaign," Current History, XXXVIII (May, 1933), 142-145.


tion whatever with Marxist activity. The irony of the predicament which the German Jews faced was that they had been thoroughly acculturated over the years.

All previous major persecutions of the Jews, from the Middle Ages on through the pogrom waves in Czarist Russia after the Russo-Japanese War, were persecutions, that is, of a self-conscious group who were able singly and as a group to resist and survive persecution by means of the moral power of their historic and religious consciousness. This German persecution is the first major persecution in which the persecuted have sold out spiritually to their oppressors at the latter's invitation and command. They have eviscerated themselves; they have for generations extruded from their consciousness all Jewish content and from their political and moral lives all Jewish bindings. They are in fact today as Germanized as it is possible for them to be and have nothing within them wherewith to bear their Jewish fate. Can anyone conceive of a more cruel confusion or of a more hideous dilemma?18

Two months later a similar argument was used by Mary Heaton Vorse, then travelling in Europe, who wrote an article entitled "Getting the Jews Out of Germany" for the July 19 New Republic. Her article hinted that the physical extermination of the German Jews in the future was possible. She thus thought it pathetic, under the circumstances, to see some Jews trying at any cost to "become acceptable" to the regime.19

On April 19, 1933, The Nation recorded that reports about a persecution in Germany, all consistent, continued to mount.20

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18 Ludwig Lewisohn, "Germany's Lowest Depth," The Nation, CXXXV (May 3, 1933), 493-494. Lewisohn was an author and literary critic.

19 Mary Heaton Vorse, "Getting the Jews Out of Germany," The New Republic, LXXV (July 19, 1933), 256-258. Miss Vorse was a novelist and short story writer.

20 The Nation, CXXXVI (April 19, 1933), 429.
while The New Republic believed that the Jewish discriminatory attacks had subsided for the time being, although "everything possible is being done to destroy the economic life of all Jews except bankers who were needed for the moment."21 Four months later the August 5 Literary Digest also called attention to the persecution. Only poor and lower middle-class Jews had been struck down.22 Ludwig Lore in the April 19 Nation noted the Jewish "economic annihilation."23

Meanwhile, a Christian Century editorial of May 3 expressed itself as very pleased to report that the Christians of the world and even many in Germany had come to the defense of the persecuted Jews.24 Yet this journal's own Geneva correspondent, William A. Visser't Hooft, could detect "little violent persecution," in fact "much less than in most other revolutions." Contrary to the position taken by his magazine, Visser't Hooft advised his readers to be patient. "The official attitude of the new government seems to be progressing from the blind anti-Semitism of the irresponsible period of party politics to the somewhat less crude policy of distinguishing between anti-national and pro-national Jews."25 Three weeks later another writer in

21The New Republic, LXXXIV (April 19, 1933), 264.
22The Literary Digest, CXVI (August 5, 1933), 12.
23Ludwig Lore, "The Nazi Revolution at Work," The Nation, CXXXVI (April 19, 1933), 440-441.
24The Christian Century, L (May 3, 1933), 582.
25William A. Visser't Hooft, "Christ or Caesar in Germany?" ibid., 589. The author was the Geneva correspondent of this
The Christian Century contradicted this journal's editorial opinions. Samuel McCrea Cavert "regretfully" noted in his article entitled "Hitler and the German Churches" that the German churches had not made any public protest against the injustice done to the Jews. But in the next breath he defended the Christian sects when he described the situation in contemporary Germany as "much like that of wartime." He believed that there were "inevitable limits to what any group can do" during a period of revolution.26

As long as the National Socialists continued their intimidation of the Jews, public proclamations from overseas and outside of Germany denouncing the Nazis' activities would continue, but it seemed doubtful that they would influence the regime. In the long run the Jews could be confronted with more severe handicaps. Concerning this application of pressure, the American journals were often ready to offer suggestions. The Literary Digest announced on May 27 that a campaign was underway under the sponsorship of American Jews for a worldwide boycott of German goods. The Digest considered this to be the best course "short of war,"27 although The New Republic of May 31 advised an appeal to the League of Nations as a concomitant to economic reprisals. The New Republic hoped that such a maneuver, combined with the economic results of the boycott, would influence the saner elements of

26 Samuel McCrea Cavert, "Hitler and the German Churches," ibid., (May 24, 1933), 683-684. Cavert was the general secretary of the Federal Council of Churches of Christian America.

27 The Literary Digest, CXXV (May 27, 1933), 16.
the Nazi movement, and it believed that there were some, to seek ways "of getting out of the mess." However, the journal appeared doubtful that these rather feeble attempts would accomplish anything.

The Jewish problem remained a major consideration in the June number of the American monthly journals. Reviewing the sequence of events in the National Socialists' anti-Jewish program, Current History's Sidney B. Fay concluded that the action taken so far was "unparalleled in modern times." But he hinted that a more moderate policy under the direction of Adolf Hitler might prevail in the months ahead. Another Current History report, written by Roger B. Nelson, who was in Germany at the time, stated that "no effort was spared" to tack down public officials who might have traces of Jewish blood in their family backgrounds. This action, of course, was a portent of the future. Curiously enough, Edward S. Martin, the editor of Harper's Magazine, could find no reason for the Nazi persecution of the Jews in any of Hitler's formal documents. Evidently the Harper's editor was unfamiliar with Mein Kampf. Martin thought there was some truth in the belief that the Nazi leader had been influenced by the Prussian Junkers with respect to the Jewish problem. With reference

28 The New Republic, LXXV (May 31, 1933), 55-56.
30 Roger B. Nelson, "Hitler Propaganda Machine," ibid., 293. Journalist Nelson had been doing research in Germany, including personal interviews with political leaders.
to the Junkers, he also included this ridiculous statement in his column: "It is the opinion of the British-Israel authorities that they are the descendants of the Assyrians and that their propensity to beat up the Jews is just an outbreak of an immemorial habit of their mind which has run through thousands of years." 31

Writing from Germany for The Forum, the American S. McClatchie said that it was Adolf Hitler who had at last shown the German people "what they really wanted." Hitler had galvanized them into action in a search for what he termed German traditions. The Jew, of course, according to McClatchie, was not of this tradition, and therein lay one of the reasons for anti-Semitism. McClatchie made a point of stating his opposition to Hitler's methods and to intolerance of any kind. So it was, he said, that the world must be tolerant of the Nazi leader. There was a "special reason" for this tolerance. All opposed to Communism owed Hitler thanks, wrote this rather politically naive observer. The National Socialists had won the race with Communism for the control of central Europe. This occurrence, truly, had a more "vast and far-reaching significance" than the "racial squabble." 32

An American student in Austria, Kenneth McLeith, revealed

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32 S. McClatchie, "Why Germany Hates the Jews," The Forum, LXXXIX (June, 1933), 374-378. A second article in the same issue, this one by a former associate editor of The Forum, Howard H. Bailey, "Europe's Sorest Spot," 322-326, contributed nothing significant to the discussion.
information concerning Nazi anti-Semitic activities outside of Germany in the June 14 Nation. Jewish students at the University of Vienna were under constant pressure and physical assault from Nazi sympathizers within the school.\textsuperscript{33} While this was not a very profound article in itself, McLeith's mention of National Socialist influence in Austria was an ominous indication that Hitler's ideas were gaining adherents in his homeland. It should also be remembered that the German Chancellor had long campaigned for Anschluss before stepping into his present position in January 1933.

A short New Republic article on June 7, 1933, heralded the first victory for the Jews over Nazi Germany. The protection of minorities in Silesia had been part of a German-Polish treaty in 1922, and after pressure by the League of Nations, the Nazi government agreed to suspend anti-Semitic laws in the area. "Silesia will now become a Jewish sanctuary inside Germany and will be a powerful influence making for more reasonable treatment of the Jews elsewhere in the Reich," declared the suddenly optimistic New Republic. It also felt that the international Jewish boycott on German goods and services was definitely affecting the German economy. Reports from Berlin in the possession of this periodical revealed that the Nazi leaders were trying to seek out a formula regarding the Jews "without losing too much face."\textsuperscript{34}

\textsuperscript{33}Kenneth McLeith, "The Nazi Terror in the University," The Nation, CXXXVI (June 14, 1933), 669. This was a pseudonym of an American student at the University of Vienna.

\textsuperscript{34}The New Republic, LXXV (June 7, 1933), 84.
Both *The Presbyterian Advance* and *The Christian Century* praised
the League of Nations for investigating Nazi discriminatory tac-
tics in Silesia. The latter weekly saw the Hitler acceptance of
the League verdict as giving the world organization a great boost
in prestige, and encouraging those who believed that the German
Chancellor might moderate his racial policies.35

In reality, nothing of the sort was happening in Germany.
Leaders of the Nazi movement continued to find ways to harass the
German Jewish population during the summer months of 1933. On
July 12 *The Nation* made an accurate guess that sterilization was
soon to be legalized in Nazi Germany. The official announcement
would be published two weeks later, and the law was to take ef-
fect on January 1, 1934. It was *The Nation's* prediction that the
"diseased and socially undesirable individuals" who would be ster-
ilized would include Jews. Jewish workers were also to be exclu-
ded from the planned government labor organization, disclosing
that the Hitlerites intended to oppress all classes of Jews, not
just those who possessed wealth or were members of a profession,
as had been the contention of many apologists. An editorial in
the same journal two weeks later continued to prophesy the doom
of the Jews.36 *The August 2 New Republic* reported the same situ-
ation to its readers.37

35 *The Presbyterian Advance, XLVII* (June 8, 1933), 5, and
*The Christian Century, L* (June 14, 1933), 773–774.

36 *The Nation, CXXVII* (July 12, 1933), 34 and (July 26,
1933), 87.

The eminent Englishman, Hilaire Belloc, writing in America for July 22, advised his Catholic readers to recognize that the National Socialists' treatment of German Jewry was immoral, even though Belloc seemed to doubt the authenticity of published reports of "atrocities." On the other hand, it was Reinhold Niebuhr's opinion that the German Jews were undergoing even greater suffering than the foreign press imagined. One paragraph from his August 9, 1933 Christian Century article entitled "Germany Must Be Told!" read:

Besides the admitted facts of government policy there are many other aspects of the German ferocity against the Jews about which the average German citizen knows nothing. The Germans constantly remind the visitor that the streets are quiet, and invite him to observe the peacefulness of the cities for himself. But they know little of what goes on in nazi barracks, concentration camps and nazi hide-outs.

Hitlerism was an assault on modern civilization and the twentieth century, according to Dorothy Thompson and Benjamin Stolberg in the September 1933 issue of Scribner's Magazine. Yet, it was their contention that the Nazi revolution would have received less worldwide attention in this time of severe economic stress if Hitler had not turned upon the Jews. Ludwig Lewisohn thought that Nazism went farther than just an attack on material

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39 Reinhold Niebuhr, "Germany Must Be Told!" The Christian Century, L (August 9, 1933), 1014.

40 Dorothy Thompson and Benjamin Stolberg, "Hitler and the American Jews," Scribner's Magazine, XCV (September, 1933), 136. Miss Thompson, then the wife of the noted author Sinclair Lewis, was a reporter of international events, as was the German-born Stolberg.
civilization. The German people had gotten themselves involved with paganism.

German nationalism to-day is a revolt against Christianity in its broadest as well as in its deepest sense; it is a pagan revolt against the whole of Christian civilization; it dreams, spinning like a dervish, of Nordic armies over-running the earth, of berserker rage in battle, of the ecstasy of death and blood. To think of the Nazis merely as hoodlums and fools stung into action by hunger and demagogues is gravely to underestimate both the force and the menace of the movement...

This "demon of pagan revolt" had to assail "an immediate and accessible object." That is how the Jew fitted into the picture, believed Lewisohn.41 While this Harper's Magazine article was not the first to treat the revival of German paganism, it was the only one at the time to link paganism with anti-Semitism.

One short notice in the September 20 New Republic called for the vigorous support of the economic boycott of German goods on behalf of the German Jewish cause.42 A minor part of Dr. Alice L. Hamilton's report on Germany in the September Survey Graphic also touched on the Jewish question. She believed that merely a superficial inspection of German society would show Hitler and his anti-Semitic crusade with the almost unanimous support from the German nation.43

42 The New Republic, LXXVI (September 20, 1933), 139.
43 Alice L. Hamilton, "Below the Surface," The Survey Graphic, XXII (September, 1933), 450-453. Dr. Hamilton was on the staff of the Harvard Medical School.
An interesting thesis was introduced by Francis J. Oppenheimer in the October North American Review: "What really annoys a Nazi in a Prussian Jew is not his Semitic denationalism, but the Jew's overnationalized Germanism." Oppenheimer then erroneously asserted that many Jews had been behind Hitler's program, except for the anti-Semitic planks. He put himself on record with the statement that "it's altogether questionable whether the Chancellor would be the force he is today had he lacked their support." 44

One major article of the period was by Reverend Stanley High in the November 11, 1933 issue of The Literary Digest. In High's estimation anti-Semitism was the only point in the National Socialist program that had so far been carried out as originally planned. The source of this hatred was definitely Adolf Hitler. For him anti-Semitism was a religion, and no Jew should escape his wrath. High accurately foresaw what was in store for German Jews; he predicted that "unless there is an unlooked-for change in Nazi purposes, they will all be eliminated." 45

Anti-Semitism had also struck at intellectual circles, according to a German student in the pages of the November 8 Nation. Jewish students and professors had been expelled from schools, scientific institutions sacked, and books by Jewish au-


45 Stanley High, "The German Program of Anti-Semitism," The Literary Digest, CXVI (November 11, 1933), 13, 26-27. High was a clergyman of the Methodist Episcopal Church.
...thers destroyed. "The intellectual life of Germany had been set back at least one-hundred and fifty years." The "epidemic" of ultra-nationalism had swept over Germany. This was the only way to explain the violence of the Hitler regime, said Philip W. Wilson in the December 1933 Review of Reviews and World's Work. Lewis Einstein, writing in The North American Review of December 1933, wondered whether this state of affairs, based on an unhealthy nationalism, indicated that the existing society was dissolving. Furthermore, he did not think that contemporary civilization could continue in a world half-free and half-slave, as it existed in the totalitarian states. It was ironic, wrote Waldo Frank in The New Republic for December 13, 1933, that the Jew "is persecuted by barbarous and desperate men because of ideals that he no longer lives."

Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein stated in The Nation on December 27 that the Nazi government had displayed its "worst duplicity" on the Jewish question. Hitler had washed his hands of any

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46 Peter Lieberknecht, "A German Student Speaks," The Nation, CXXXVII (November 8, 1933), 534. The author was a German student living in France.

47 Philip W. Wilson, "The World Watches Germany," The Review of Reviews and World's Work, LXXXVIII (December, 1933), 22. Wilson was a journalist and former member of the British Parliament, who was living in New York.


49 Waldo Frank, "Should the Jews Survive?" The New Republic, LXXXVII (December 13, 1933), 122-123. The author was a novelist.
guilt for the anti-Semitic campaign. But it was clear to most observers that the Nazi leadership was morally responsible for the actions of its disciples.\(^5^0\) The Catholic weekly America for January 6, 1934, found that the standards adopted by the Hitler government in the "sustained and systematic attacks" upon the Jews had reached a new low by the end of 1933.\(^5^1\) This response was certainly a change in attitude from America's earlier response in April 1933. On the other hand, while Professor Carl J. Friedrich recognized that anti-Semitic feeling existed in Germany, he considered the tales of Jewish persecution to be "nonsense" in his Christian Register article for November 23, 1933. Friedrich looked forward hopefully to the time "when the great German traditions would eventually permeate the 'new' Germany."\(^5^2\)

The year 1934 began in Germany with more precise anti-Semitic measures. One edict prohibited the employment of Jews for editorial and illustrative work in newspaper and publishing businesses after January 1, 1934. Another, also scheduled to become effective on January 1, placed new restrictions on Jewish

50 Philip S. Bernstein, "Can Hitler Be Trusted?" The Nation, CXXXVII (December 27, 1933), 728-730. The author was Rabbi of Temple B'rith Kodesh in Rochester, New York, and had visited Germany in the previous summer.

51 America, L (January 6, 1934), 315.

students in medical and law schools: the Jew was given the choice of renouncing his citizenship for the right of studying in German schools, an action which would exclude him from practicing his profession in Germany, or he could maintain his citizenship and be refused the license to practice. "The Jewish student in Germany can now choose the process by which he is to commit economic suicide" was the response of the January 3, 1934 *New Republic*, the only journal which felt the need to comment. During the first six months of 1934 the plight of the German Jews became involved with other problems, such as economic policy, which will be examined later. Overt persecution of Jewry in Germany, however, appeared to have receded into the background, and the American journals reflected this tendency.

Anti-Semitism remained a minor topic of consideration for the American journals until the summer months of 1935, although an occasional major article paused to reexamine the Jewish question in Germany. In part of a comprehensive review article, reasons why the German people were able to live with Hitler were cited by S. Miles Bouton in the October 1934 *American Mercury*. One outstanding reason was that National Socialism's program of anti-Semitism "appealed to a greater part of the German people." It was an historical fact, wrote the newsman, that "no other country on earth has such a long record of persecution of the Jews as has Germany, going back to the first Crusade." 54

A summation of the Jewish problem was given by Paul Kiniery in the December 1934 Catholic World. Entitled "The Jewish Minority Problem in Germany," this article emphasized the fact that less than one percent of the German population was Jewish.

Kiniery displayed astonishment that the theory that German Jewry had been the cause of all of Germany's woes in the last generation was espoused by the Nazi government. "Seldom in world history has anything more ridiculous been taken seriously. Seldom have sordid motives been covered with such a thin veneer of respectability." Subsequently Professor Kiniery offered for the Jewish dilemma in Germany a simple solution, too simple since it seemed to be based on the premise that Adolf Hitler and his associates were reasonable men.

In view of the contributions made by the Jews during the War, in lives and money, it seems unreasonable to bar them so definitely from civil and governmental positions. It would be far more reasonable to admit at least the number to which they would be entitled on the basis of their population. If certain Jews circulated ideas subversive of German welfare, these Jews could be dealt with by the constituted authorities. There is no need for justification for a general condemnation of all Jews.55

Writing in the March 27, 1935 Nation, the British journalist William Zukerman accurately foresaw the resumption of the Nazi anti-Semitic campaign. The undisputed success of the German cause in the Saar plebiscite vote of January 1935 had given the Nazis the idea that there were actually few Germans who opposed

55 Paul Kiniery, "The Jewish Minority Problem in Germany," The Catholic World, CXL (December, 1934), 424-427. The author was a professor of history at Loyola University in Chicago.
their strong-handed tactics. "The trend in Germany before January 13 was clearly toward moderation, and German Jews took hope from it." After the vote the Nazi inner circle decided to revive the plan for expelling the Jews from German life which had lapsed for several months, since there no longer seemed to be a real domestic need for temperance. The pathetic hope of relief in German Jewish quarters, revived for such a short time, was ended for good, wrote Zuckerman. "It will be observed that the blasting of Jewish hopes coincided with the shattering of the broader hope for the gradual liberalization of Germany which Europe entertained for a while."56

Beginning in the last half of July 1935 and continuing into the autumn of the year, German racism again made headlines. The first vicious anti-Jewish riots in over a year were reported by the July 27 Literary Digest. This anti-Semitic "purge," said the Digest, "has been described as a 'purification.'" More information concerning the particulars of the persecution was included in the next week's issue.57

The physical attacks instigated by the National Socialists plus the restrictions imposed upon the small Jewish businessmen indicated to The Nation for July 31 that a split had occurred.

56 William Zukerman, "Anti-Semitism Revives in Germany," The Nation, Volume 27, Number 1178 (March 27, 1935), 356-357. Zukerman was a well-known London journalist who had given special attention to international Jewish problems.

57 The Literary Digest, Volume 20, Number 10, August 3, 1935, 12.
within the Nazi ranks between those "moderates" led by General Hermann Goering who wanted the Jews eliminated from the professions and the arts and the more radical followers of Dr. Joseph Goebbels, who sought to drive the Jews out of Germany altogether or into a ghetto. While The Nation hoped that this rumored break in the Nazi front would "hasten the day of reckoning," it correctly ascertained that the excesses would continue as long as the Nazis remained in power. The New Republic of the same week was uncertain whether this renewed anti-Semitic activity on the part of the Nazi Party radicals denoted a split over Party policy or an attempt to divert public attention from economic problems.

Neither liberal weekly, it is strange to note, suggested that perhaps the attacks proved beyond all doubt that anti-Semitism was an intrinsic part of the National Socialist ideology, a fact pointed out by The Christian Century in its response on August 7. Even if some of the attacks on the German Jews had been unauthorized, declared the Century, the Hitler government was fully responsible because of its outspoken principle of radical intolerance. Reports that the regime's officials intended to call a halt to the latest anti-Jewish activities would change neither the National Socialists' beliefs nor world opinion. "It has become entirely clear that the Nazi program is inconsistent with the existence of any free institutions, any diversity of blood or cul-

58 The Nation, CXLII (July 31, 1935), 1004.
ture, and any church that is not a passive instrument of state-
craft."60

Both Sidney B. Fay in the September Current History and
the Catholic Commonweal for August 2, 1935 reported the rumors
of Nazi Party strife and general discontent, which were supposed
to be contributing factors to the latest anti-Semitic violence.61
The same argument was succinctly put by the German correspondent
to The Christian Century, A. S. Eker, in the September 18 issue.

Nowadays, the struggle is on a deeper issue. Superficially, it appears to be just the enforcement of the racial theories so long preached. In reality, it is something more fundamental. The Jew in Germany is being made
the scapegoat for the general discontent which has arisen out of the disillusion due to the realization that nazidom has no new heaven to offer, and that it will be a far worse earth which will result from the policies now being
put into effect.62

The annual congress of the National Socialist Party met
at Nuremberg in September 1935. It was here that the 1935 anti-
Semitic campaign reached a climax, when on September 15 the Reich-
stag, meeting in a special session, approved new Nazi legislation
which turned out to be merely the first of the infamous Nuremberg
Laws. The German Jews were now deprived of their citizenship
rights by this initial legislation. Nor from this time could Jew

62 A. S. Eker, "Correspondence from Germany: Germany Nears Another Purge," The Christian Century, LII (September 18, 1935), 1183-1184. Eker was this journal's German correspondent.
marry a so-called Aryan or employ female Aryan house servants under thirty-five years of age. Other legislation would follow. Surprisingly enough, there was practically no recognition shown by the American journals that the Nazi campaign against the Jews had reached a new stage of development. Perhaps the periodicals accepted the new German laws as something inevitable.

What reference there was to the Nuremberg Laws in The Nation of September 25 was almost entirely factual, while a short article in the next week's issue contained only some references to the Jewish reaction to the legislation. The Literary Digest for September 21 summarized the events that took place at the Nuremberg conference without trying to interpret them; The Presbyterian Tribune, The Commonweal and oddly enough, The New Republic, only cited the anti-Semitic legislation. A factual account was given by Professor Sidney B. Fay in the November 1935 Current History, with one interesting observation: Fay believed that the Nazis had set a pattern with regard to the Jewish question which

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63 Andrew Sharf, The British Press and Jews Under Nazi Rule (New York: Oxford University Press, 1964), points out that the British press, in general, also failed to recognize the significance of the Nuremberg legislation. There was likewise "a marked and rather curious division of opinion on Nuremberg, which did not by any means follow customary divisions of political, group, or social interests."

64 The Nation, CXLIII (September 25, 1935), 337-338, and (October 2, 1935), 366.

65 The Literary Digest, CXX (September 21, 1935), 13; The Presbyterian Tribune, LI (November 14, 1935), 6; The Commonweal, XII (September 27, 1935), 511-512; and The New Republic, LXXIV (September 29, 1935), 169.
they hoped the rest of the world would eventually follow. 66

The tide had turned again, for the Nazi dictatorship had proven that it could overcome its internal problems, responded the September 25 Christian Century. After taking all that had occurred at Nuremberg under observation, the Protestant journal concluded "that the future holds in store only an increasingly rigorous application of the Nazi principles of dictatorship, minority rule, rampant nationalism, drum-thumping militarism, ruthless anti-Semitism, and utter totalitarianism." 67

Following the Nuremberg legislation, there was an uneven response in the journals of an accelerated German government drive against the former Jewish citizens. The Nation revealed on October 2 that the German Jews were completely at the mercy of the Nazi government and police. Dire threats had been made if the world Jewish economic boycott continued. "The new Ghetto is almost complete—the next step will probably be a Jewish costume, to match the Jewish flag which the Nazis gracefully permit to fly." 68 The November 30 Literary Digest called attention to the rumor of new economic measures aimed at the Jews reportedly to be more extreme than anything yet promulgated. A source from The New York Times, reprinted by the Digest, ascertained that the new laws would "leave the Jews only a slim basis for a bare existence


68 The Nation, CXLIX (October 2, 1935), 366.
as second-class citizens without political rights and with inferior legal rights."\(^{69}\)

That laws would not be anti-Semitic but pro-German and part of a campaign against Bolshevism was Hitler's reply to criticism leveled at the proposed legislation, according to The Nation of December 11. The Jewish Communist agents must be crushed, declared Hitler, and he intended to fight terror with terror. "Surely there are very few persons left, outside of the most reactionary circles in England and the United States, so gullible as to swallow this monstrous misrepresentation," said the Nation.\(^{70}\)

Following up this argument on January 8, 1936, The Nation hoped that the December 30, 1935 denunciation of the Hitler regime by James G. McDonald, the recently resigned League of Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, would help destroy the growing tendency to accommodate the Nazi leaders in foreign affairs. Despite reports from travellers in Germany that the land was "a model of peace," McDonald was certain that the situation for Jews and others was growing worse, with arrests and the like taking place under the cover of night. "His recital of conditions in Germany will convince every humane person of the need for some concerted move on the part of civilized nations," commented The Nation's editor.\(^{71}\)

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69 The Literary Digest, CXX (November 30, 1935), 12.
70 The Nation, CXLI (December 11, 1935), 662.
71 Ibid., CXLII (January 8, 1936), 29.
Fay in the February 1936 *Current History* all noted McDonald's remarks but without adding anything significant to the discussion. What may well have been one of the casual observers in Germany, cited in *The Nation* article above, happened to tell his story in a late-1935 issue of one of the journals under consideration, the Protestant quarterly *Religion in Life*. Professor Frank Gavin seemed to have had a pleasant visit in Nazi Germany during 1935; he returned to say that it was "the most exciting spot on earth."

One sees few signs of objectionable people, of offensive conduct. I should say that friendliness, genuine and unforced, is more markedly in evidence to-day than ever before, and I saw no sign whatever of a single instance of the kind of truculence in bearing or attitude which was certainly not uncommon some years ago.

Gavin noted various changes in the new Germany. "It is not feverish or hectic at all, but it is certainly far more vitally alert than I remember having observed on other visits." For the peace of the world, people must try to understand "the phenomena of Nazi Germany," declared Gavin. "The vitality and vigor, the renewed hope and faith, the adventurous courage it shows, and the adherence to its ideals of many distinguished people...demand a fair and honest consideration of the Nazi scheme and its functioning in practice."

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72 America, LIV (January 11, 1936), 319-320; The Literary Digest, CXXI (January 11, 1936), 18; and Sidney B. Fay, "The Flight of the German Jews," *Current History*, XLIII (February, 1936), 536-537.

Other observers viewed the German scene more realistically and more accurately over the winter of 1935-1936. In the January 15, 1936 *New Republic*, Dr. Kurt Rosenfeld presented the historical background of the German Jews in an article entitled "What Germany Does to the Jews," and commented upon the contemporary situation. Since 1933 the position of the German Jew had deteriorated until the present, where he lived "in a veritable ghetto." Almost all means of livelihood had been cut off by government administrative and legislative measures. Hitler had warned, in the meantime, that, if this procedure failed to produce satisfactory results, he might turn the "Jewish question" over to his radical Nazi Party disciples. "It is not difficult to surmise what this will mean," said Rosenfeld. 74

Writing in the February 5 *Nation*, William Zukerman conjectured that the German Jews were being herded into a ghetto in order to make it easier to persecute them. Contrary to the belief of many foreign observers who expected gradual improvement for the Jews during the year, the anti-Semitic campaign had increased in intensity. It was "probably the last and greatest of all," and it had been legalized through the Nuremberg legislation. For their allies in this final assault the Nazis had the German middle-class and petty bourgeoisie, which Zukerman considered to be

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74 Kurt Rosenfeld, "What Germany Does to the Jews," *The New Republic*, LXXV (January 15, 1936), 275-277. Rosenfeld, a German lawyer and a member of the Social Democratic Party, had been the Minister of Justice in the Prussian provisional government of November 1918.
"an impotent and ineffectual class doomed to extinction."75

Responding to this latest surge of Nazi racial oppression, Oswald Garrison Villard opined in the March 4 Nation that "the cowardice of the Hitler policy is beyond words." In reality, the anti-Semitic persecution was a confession of the superior ability of the Jews. The Fuehrer would have the world believe that the Germans were in danger until this small minority was driven out of the country. Such a campaign was easily accomplished against a foe which could not defend itself.

To me this is so dreadful a happening that if all the rest of the Hitler regime commended itself to sane and liberal men, I should never for a moment forgive it. The poisoning of the lives of the Jewish children is not the gravest count in the indictment. Even worse is the poisoning of the souls of the rest of the German youth by the inculcation of hatred, prejudice, and sadistic cruelty.76

With few publicized Nazi anti-Semitic activities upon which to respond from the spring of 1936 to that of 1938, the journals, particularly the liberal secular ones, intermittently printed feature articles on German Jewry's predicament; however, the Jewish problem was also occasionally discussed within other major topics.

The condition in which the German Jews found themselves was discussed by Benjamin Stolberg in the June 17, 1936 Nation,77

75William Zukerman, "Where the German Ghetto Leads," The Nation, CXLII (February 5, 1936), 154-155.
while The Presbyterian Tribune of August 20 featured an editorial entitled "The Nazis Indicted," in which it expressed pleasure that world opinion was growing more concerned with German anti-Semitism. One final article in 1936 by Herbert J. Seligmann in the December 30 New Republic did little more than review the three years of Jewish life under the Hitler dictatorship.

A feature article on Adolf Hitler in the May 1937 Review of Reviews by Roger Shaw touched on anti-Semitism. Shaw, who had often treated the National Socialist regime sympathetically, again showed this inclination, although this time he listed as Hitler's greatest blunder the alienation of the Jews who had long been Germany's friends in international circles.

On October 9, 1937, The Nation revealed that Jews were being released from German prison camps, "not because the anti-Semitic fever is abating in government circles of the sick Reich" but to make room for new Jewish victims. Local National Socialist officials were reportedly handling the Jewish question, which meant a return to the vicious pogroms of the early days of the Hitler dictatorship. The Nation's editorial staff reported that it had evidence which showed "that the German people take little

78 The Presbyterian Tribune, LI (August 20, 1936), 5.
79 Herbert Seligmann, "Anti-Semitism in Europe," The New Republic, LXXXIX (December 30, 1936), 265-268. The author was a student of race relations.
interest in the persecution of Jews."  

Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein viewed German domestic affairs a little differently in his *Nation* article in the October 23 issue. He believed that the German people were still decent and humane or they would have followed the Nazi program to the letter and destroyed every German Jew. The Jew still survived because Germans continued to patronize his shops and use his professional services. Since 1933 anti-Semitism had not been of the violent nature due in part to the spontaneous world reaction. "Strange as it may seem, the Nazi government which has a genius for alienating others, is pathetically eager for friendship and is therefore restraining its extremists from violence." A more subtle policy was being followed at the moment, one which made the Jewish cause in Germany a hopeless one. Jewish firm and business names had been retained, but all except a few essential figures had been forced out of their jobs into the ghetto or driven out of the country. "Thus," concluded Bernstein, "the Nazi assault upon the German Jews moves on from segregation to pauperization, to emigration, to annihilation." For the persecuted there were but two alternatives—emigration or death. The Jew had to leave Nazi Germany, concluded Curt L. Heymann in the March 1938 *Current History*, after he reviewed the five-year history of Nazi anti-Semitic activity.

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81 *The Nation*, CXLV (October 9, 1937), 363.

82 Philip S. Bernstein, "The Fate of German Jews," *ibid.*, (October 23, 1937), 423-425. Rabbi Bernstein had just visited Germany for the first time since 1933.
There was no other choice, declared Haymann, but he neglected to say how the Jews were supposed to get away. 83

The summer of 1938 brought more journal response to the German Jewish problem than had been published since 1933; most of it sympathized with the Jews, although the impression seemed to be that their position was hopeless. The June 25 Nation believed that the reported resumption of savage attacks on Jews was due to the Nazi government's failures to bully Czechoslovakia into submission over the Sudetenland question. Because of the need for a scapegoat, "the world is treated to a spectacle of cowardly brutality refined to the point of insanity." 84 It was the June 29 Christian Century's judgment that the latest Nazi surge against the Jews had "already surpassed all previous records of similar inhumanity in recent times, and apparently the crest of this flood of savagery has not yet arrived." While both government troops and undisciplined mobs carried out the attacks, the whole venture seemed to have been sanctioned by the government. Jews were now being arrested for the most trivial matters as the dictatorship determined to purify the state. 85

Prospects that anything could be done about the Nazi misdeeds seemed improbable to the July 1 Commonweal, for "observers

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83 Curt L. Haymann, "German Laws Against the Jews," Current History, XLVIII (March, 1938), 38-43. Haymann was a member of the editorial staff of The New York Times.

84 The Nation, CXLVI (June 25, 1938), 712.

85 The Christian Century, LV (June 29, 1938), 805-806.
noted that many of the decent elements in the Berlin populace watched the anti-Jewish marauders in silent disapproval, but were apparently helpless."86 The Ave Maria for August 6 sympathized with the Jews' predicament in Germany; however, it was not happy that world Jewry had not opposed Stalin and the Russian Communists, whose "system achieves the same results."87

A first-hand report on the German persecution appeared in the August 20, 1938 Nation, written by the former ambassador to Germany, William E. Dodd. In one passage Dodd remarked: "Altogether the catalogue is a striking example of the extremes to which mass hysteria and blood-hungry official propaganda can drive a people."88 Writing in the August 31 Christian Century, the Negro historian Lewis K. McMillan explained German anti-Semitism with arguments that echoed National Socialist assertions. The German Jews, McMillan stated, were different from their fellow countrymen. Jews were not closely attached to German tradition and history or to the everyday social life of Germany. Nor was the German Jew a member of the German Christian community. Since historically the Germans were "more or less prejudiced against Jews," the emergence of the National Socialists as a poli-

86 The Commonweal, XXVIII (July 1, 1938), 253-256.
87 The Ave Maria, XLVIII (New Series) (August 6, 1938), 183.
88 William E. Dodd, "Germany Shocked Me," The Nation, CXLVII (August 20, 1938), 176-178. Dodd was the American ambassador to Germany from 1933 to 1937.
tical force merely helped to activate anti-Semitic tendencies. 89

Articles concerning the Jewish persecution in Austria, which had recently been united with Germany, appeared in The Ave Maria, The Nation and The Commonweal, 90 and the fate of the Jews in the newly acquired province of Sudetenland was related by the October 19 New Republic. 91

A more vicious attack upon the German Jews began in November 1938 immediately after a German official in Paris had been murdered by a Jewish refugee. The Nazi anti-Semitic campaign increased in intensity during the remainder of the year and into 1939. Responding in the editorial "War Against the Jews," the November 19 Nation commented that "never were mass cowardice, mass brutality, and mass destructiveness so gruesomely displayed. Despite the Nazi threat that the attacks would become more savage if protests were forthcoming from abroad, The Nation found itself forced to denounce this "degenerate brutality." Yet the viciousness of the Nazis' crimes was difficult to ascertain when this journal simply described new fines and laws which kept Jews out of all public entertainment houses. The November 26 Nation reit-


90 The Ave Maria, XLVII (New Series) (April 2, 1938), 439; The Nation, CXLVI (June 18, 1938), 685; and Michael Williams, "Views and Reviews," The Commonweal, XXVIII (July 15, 1938), 323. Williams had recently stepped down from this journal's editorship, a position which he had held since the periodical's inception in 1924.

91 The New Republic, XCVI (October 19, 1938), 292.
erated its stand, and former editor Oswald Garrison Villard ac-
cused the Nazis of planning the "deliberate murder" of 600,000
people. 92

An equally strong editorial stand against the German dic-
tatorship was taken by the contemporary New Republic, which stated
that there was "ample evidence" in the Nazi organs to indicate
"that the coup was planned long ago and waited only a convenient
opportunity." This journal's plan to alleviate the sufferings of
German Jewry, which "can never find peace or happiness, or even
a chance to survive, except by leaving Germany," entailed the
modification of United States immigration restrictions—a situa-
tion which it doubted could be achieved. 93

An unusually forceful stand was taken by The Christian
Century which declared that "Hitler and his government have soun-
ded depths of infamy which had not previously been plumbed in mo-
dern times." The German church should at once stand up and make
its position clear, dissociating itself from the program of paga-
nized racial nationalism. The American government should be
pressed to speak out against the National Socialists' tactics.
It should be clear to all that the point had been reached where
the German treatment of a group within Germany's own borders
could no longer be ignored by other governments. But the Century

92 The Nation, CXLVII (November 19, 1938), 524; (November
26, 1938), 550, 552-553; and Oswald Garrison Villard, "Issues and
Men," 567.

93 The New Republic, XCVII (November 23, 1938), 60, and
(November 30, 1938), 87-88.
refused to abandon its traditional policy against the use of force and called for pacific measures to check this madness. Still, it thought the situation urgent enough to warrant this statement: "Suppose that, instead of merely subjecting the Jews to economic and social disadvantages, nazi Germany should decide to massacre them." One week later, on November 30, the editors of this Protestant weekly conceded that other nations would have to interfere in German affairs for the sake of humanity, if the Nazi persecution continued. This task would be complicated because "in the nazi regime the modern world confronts a phenomenon for dealing with which it has not experience or precedent."94 The November 24 Christian Register expected the Nazis to direct themselves "against the rest of the world" after this final assault against the Jews.95

Even though the Nazi dictatorship was not Christian, The Ave Maria for November 26 still expected it to be civilized. The Hitlerites' resumption of their attack on Germany's Jewish citizens indicated their unconcern for world opinion. In its response, The Ave Maria almost made it sound as if the German leaders were only just now showing their disdain for world opinion. Roy Temple House, in the same issue, gave the appearance that he, too, misunderstood the policies of the Nazi dictatorship. He believed that the more intelligent German leaders were "too wily"

94 The Christian Century, LV (November 23, 1938), 1422-1423, and (November 30, 1938), 1456.
95 The Christian Register, CXVII (November 25, 1938), 689.
to persecute with brutal directness. 96

Many have already put Germany beyond the pale of civilized nations, declared America, but the truth was that basically the German people had not changed, only now they were being dominated by a madman. Certainly this planned attack on German Jewry was "one of history's blackest pages," but this Jesuit weekly could still perceive one ray of light: a government which based its policies on such measures had begun to dig its own grave. "We believe that the downfall of the Nazi Government will be dated from that fateful second week in November," since the Nazis had stirred up passions which could very well destroy them. In conclusion, the editors called for the Germans themselves and Germany's neighbors to settle the Jewish problem and pleaded for American non-involvement. This same point was taken up by the Jesuit father, Paul L. Blakely, in the December 3, 1938 America. Blakely criticized the American press for an apparent plan to involve the United States in another world war. The attacks on the German Jews were no worse than the atrocities committed against Catholics in Mexico and Spain. This new campaign for "humanity" had all the makings of another period like the years 1914 to 1917 in the author's opinion. With a touch of cynicism, he added that all that was needed would be the repeal of the Johnson Act's...
neutrality clauses so that certain European powers could carry on a war successfully.97

Writing in the December 2 Commonweal, Michael Williams called the Nazis "the high priests of an organized false religion which strikes at the very roots of the religion of liberty and love." In was just this type of movement which the combined power of Judaism and Christianity overthrew about two thousand years before. Only two weeks before in the November 18 Commonweal, Williams expressed an opinion that Fascism and Nazism could be endured as long as they tolerated the Catholic Church.98

Because many of the world's important statesmen uttered no condemnation of the German dictatorship's program, Father Gregory Feige in a Commonweal article entitled "Shall the Jew Perish?" feared that many individuals would begin to link "national progress and success with anti-Semitic policies." The problem was a basic moral one, and some had forgotten that God had created all men to His own image and likeness.99 Father Feige seemed to imply that others shared the Nazi gangs' guilt. The December 1938 Catholic World added that the recent anti-Semitic campaign

97America, LX (November 26, 1938), 170, 181-182, and Paul L. Blakely, S.J., "Nazi Atrocities and the German War Fever," (December 3, 1938), 202-203. The author was associate editor of America.

98Michael Williams, "Views and Reviews," The Commonweal, XXIX (December 2, 1938), 153, and (November 18, 1938), 99-100. The Commonweal editorial comments concerning the anti-Jewish actions, XXIX (November 25, 1938), 113, added nothing of any value.

99Gregory Feige, "Shall the Jew Perish?" ibid., (December 9, 1938), 177-178. Father Feige was the American representative of the newly established organization called the Opus Sancti Pauli, an international institution to combat anti-Semitism and to work for the conversion of the Jews.
could "bring nothing but shame to the greatness of the German people," for it was "a riot of unreason and the repudiation of a thousand years of culture."100

Late in 1938 new Nazi laws against the Jews restricted their ownership of property and of stocks and bonds and forbade them to sell and buy gold. The December 14 Christian Century interpreted this as the beginning of a new ghetto system. "By the time it comes, the Jews who remain alive in Germany may be glad to have it."101 Blackmail was another policy that the National Socialists were considering. According to The New Republic of December 21, the Nazis were proposing to exchange the German Jews for concessions in foreign trade. "For example, a wealthy German Jew may be allowed to escape from the fatherland with three or four poor Jews in his custody, if he can find friends abroad to buy enough German exports to meet the cost of the emigration. The persecution of Jews was, of course, not a new situation, stated John Palmer Gavit in the January 1939 Survey Graphic, "but never before was there so widespread a reaction of horror." Indicating that he had little faith in the world's moral fabric, Gavit wrote that the world's dictatorships were setting a pattern for retaliation upon themselves when the positions were reversed.103

100 The Catholic World, CXLVIII (December, 1938), 257-259.
101 The Christian Century, LV (December 14, 1938), 1535.
102 The New Republic, XCVII (December 21, 1938), 189.
"To ask the Nazis to cease their anti-Semitism is to ask them to stop believing their creed," wrote Richard L. G. Deverall in The Catholic World of January 1939. It would be just like asking Christians to stop loving one another. Specifically the Nazi dictatorship was but a means to an end which was "German blood." The cause of the regime's conflict with Christianity as well as Judaism was this basic belief in racism. Any thought of compromise was out of the question, wrote Deverall.104

The Commonweal's George N. Shuster found it necessary on December 30, 1938 to come to the defense of the German Jews after they had been attacked by the famous radio priest, Father Charles E. Coughlin, for allegedly aligning themselves with the Communists. The Jews had been misrepresented, for most of them had not even been Social Democrats in 1918, let alone Communists, and "Bolshevism tainted them...far less notably than it did other German groups." Shuster stated that, while some Jews turned to the radical left after 1928, especially when Hitler began his climb to power, many others favored the imposition of a reactionary dictatorship and the solutions of the ultra-conservative parties, that is, of all except the National Socialists. Chancellor Franz von Papen had much overt Jewish support, probably much more than was given to him by his fellow Catholics. The Catholic Center Party also received some backing from the Jews at the polls. The

104 Richard L. G. Deverall, "Racism," The Catholic World, OXLVIII (January, 1939), 398-404. Deverall was the editor of The Christian Front and a teacher of sociology at the Augustinian Seminary at Villanova, Pennsylvania.
German Jews had made mistakes, political and otherwise, admitted Shuster, but turning en masse to Communism was not one of them.105

During the greater part of 1939 little response to the German Jews' predicament appeared in American journals. The few major articles which were published, such as the ones by Marvin Lowenthal in the February 1939 Survey Graphic and Father John La Farge in the Catholic quarterly Thought for March 1939, were absorbing but added little which was new to the discussion.106 The interests of the vast majority of the vehicles of American opinion turned elsewhere after the more dramatic attacks on the German Jews ceased.

As might be expected, in its initial stages National Socialist anti-Semitism attracted much attention and usually strong condemnation from the journalists, but no one suggested any really constructive or feasible means for alleviating the sufferings of German Jewry. Even though the National Socialists had loudly broadcast their hatred, the fact that they would actually carry out their threats startled most journalists and editors. Catholic journals, particularly America and The Ave Maria, appeared to be less sympathetic than many others to the Jews' plight and rea-

105 George N. Shuster, "The Jew and Two Persecutions," The Commonweal, XXIX (December 30, 1938), 263.

to accept the Nazi justifications of association between the Jews and the Communists. Religious prejudices obviously blinded the Catholic journals to the true significance of the anti-Semitic movement, and rendered their commentary superficial if not actually erroneous.

Starting in 1934, the Jewish problem noticeably moved to the background in the journals, except for its more spectacular manifestations. While a few long articles, mostly by contributors to liberal journals, continued to deplore German anti-Semitism, editorial response almost disappeared. However, by their silence the journals seemed to imply that the worst was over for German Jewry. Even the Nuremberg Laws of 1935 were passed over by all the journals without penetrating commentary. With a significant amount of anti-Jewish legislation already passed, there was really little need for the Nazis to persecute openly the Jews by extra-legal means or by physical assaults; however, the journals did not explore this line of thought. In fact, only a few liberal observers continued to discuss the German anti-Semitic activities and legislation within the broader framework of humanity.

The vicious renewal of the anti-Jewish purge in 1938 received a greater amount of attention from the American journals than any other specific event of this kind since the early days of the regime. While the Nazi regime was recognized for what it was, some observers persisted in arguing that the Nazi leaders would eventually listen to reason on this issue. Now and then an article accurately predicted the ultimate fate of Jews under the
Nazi heel, but the journalists did not dwell long on this subject. During 1939 the journalists' interest in foreign affairs completely overshadowed Nazi anti-Semitism.

The case of the German Jew was adequately presented in the American journals only when he was under overt assault, an unfortunate situation in the light of what would happen to Jewry in the near future.
CHAPTER V

THE NATIONAL SOCIALISTS AND THE
ROMAN CATHOLIC CHURCH

Even while the first attacks upon the German Jews in the
spring of 1933 were being discussed, the American journals of
opinion began to turn to the question of how the Roman Catholic
Church would fare under the Hitler regime. As time progressed,
this church-state problem became one of the most written-about
topics in the periodicals. The American Catholic journals took
the lead in the discussion, although the Protestant and secular
magazines made a number of important contributions.

America, the Jesuit weekly, revealed on April 8, 1933,
that the German bishops had on March 28 revoked the ban against
Catholic participation in the National Socialist Party. Adolf
Hitler, it seems, had promised to respect the rights, duties and
doctrines of the Catholic Church in Germany. At this point, Amer-
ica almost became an apologist for the regime, a change in policy
obviously connected with the German hierarchy's action. Follow-
ing the new orientation, the same issue of America carried a major
article by Father Florence D. Sullivan, reviewing the rise of
Adolf Hitler and his first two months in power. In spite of the
"many unkind rumors" about Hitler, there was little question a-
bout his Catholic orthodoxy, according to Father Sullivan. He
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was a champion against Communism, and now even the Catholic Center Party had joined him in this struggle. The Jesuit priest recognized the fact that revolution always brought violence, and the fascist revolution in Germany was no exception. It could now be reported however that the government was getting domestic affairs well under control after a few weeks of run-away, "pent-up emotions." In his public utterances Hitler revealed "that he is too sanny to believe that government can be built up or maintained by violence or disregard of the rights of others, or of the principles of justice and fair play." Besides, Father Sullivan thought the German people had too great a love of liberty to allow themselves to be driven into slavery. For a successful fulfillment of his program, Adolf Hitler must work with a united nation, the America article continued. Disorder would not be permissible, but he should not attempt to proscribe any race or religion. The German Catholics remembered well Bismarck's attack, and they would be ready at a moment's notice to withdraw their support from the government. The signs, however, appeared to Sullivan to be "favorable for a complete restoration of a great nation with all the noble ideals and lofty aspirations" which had put Germany "in the vanguard of modern progress."¹

In contrast to the interest shown by America, The Common-wealth, for many weeks, remained relatively silent about German affairs with the exception of the Jewish problem. Another Catholic

¹America, XLIX (April 8, 1933), 23, and Florence D. Sullivan, S.J., "Whither Hitler?" 6-7.
weekly, The Ave Maria, did see fit to comment in its April 29 issue, and like America it seemed ready now to accept Hitler as the new, permanent leader of Germany. His statements with regard to Christianity as the basis of moral life together with what looked like Hitler's desire to settle affairs with the Church in Rome appealed to The Ave Maria's editors.2

This wish for compromise, part of Hitler's plan to render harmless the German churches, got under way in the first half of April 1933, when Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen was sent to discuss concordat proposals with Vatican officials. Several journals voiced their opinion of the events preceding the concordat signing in July 1933. Among the secular journals, The New Republic for April 19 took note that Hitler could promise Catholic officials "cooperation in a great crusade against Communism." Yet it also wrote:

For those who believe that such an alliance would be a disastrous mistake for the Catholic Church, there is comfort in the realization that the Vatican has seen more than one dictator rise and fall again, and usually conducts its international relations on a basis of the strictest Realpolitik.3

"The hour of complete subjugation has come" for German Catholicism, wrote the more pessimistic Ludwig Lore in the April 19 Nation. Although he believed the "next logical step" to be "Fascist dominance of the Catholic church," some trouble could be antici-

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2 The Ave Maria, XXXVII (New Series) (April 29, 1933), 535.
3 The New Republic, LXXIV (April 19, 1933), 264.
pated from the rank-and-file clergy. 4

The April 19 Christian Century reminded its readers that both Hitler and Papen were Catholics, and although they had "nothing quite so definite" to offer the Catholic Church officials as Mussolini had, "it may be enough." Hitler would "be firmly in saddle" if an agreement could be reached, for it would undoubtedly mean the elimination of the important middle faction in German politics—the Catholic Center Party. This was an accurate picture of what would eventually happen, but in its next issue this Protestant organ seemed delighted to announce that "Vatican diplomacy was too wise to be caught by any promises or persuasions" of the Nazi representatives. The Pope, it was reported, gave them "pleasing trinkets for their wives" but no assurance that the Center Party would come to the side of National Socialism. The Christian Century's position continued to be that Hitler had "little to give and much to gain" from an agreement with the papacy, but first he would have to prove the stability of his government before the Holy See would reconsider the offer. 5 Similar statements could also be found in The Nation for April 26. 6 Nonetheless, both journals had been deceived, for steady progress toward the concordat continued to be made. General editorial


5 The Christian Century, L (April 19, 1933), 515, and (April 26, 1933), 547.

6 The Nation, CXXXVI (April 26, 1933), 458.
Comments by America during the last part of April hinted at cooperation between the Catholic Church and Nazism, which was possible, it felt, despite the embryonic totalitarian nature of the German state, and which could save the Christian churches from persecution. It even hinted at the possibility of ex-premier Bruning joining the Hitler Cabinet in order to cement a working agreement between the Nazis and the Centrists.  

Editor Michael Williams of The Commonweal finally spoke out about the church-state problem in Germany on May 19 in an article entitled "Hitlerism and Religion." Since Chancellor Hitler had just about consolidated his hold on the government and was getting ready to settle down for a long term of office, the German Catholics—and especially their bishops—faced "a cruel dilemma." Evidence of the great state of uncertainty was seen in the hierarchy's resolution to lift the ban on the National Socialist Party. Williams declared that traditional religion was being confronted with a "racial nationalism exalted to religious fervor." German youth, Catholics included, had been drawn to this movement, creating a "potentially dangerous" situation for the churches.  

Editor Williams unfortunately did not reveal how the

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7 America, XLIX (April 22, 1933), 70-71, and (April 26, 1933), 95.

8 Michael Williams, "Hitlerism and Religion," The Commonweal, XVIII (May 19, 1933), 69. The greater portion of Williams' article reviews and discusses John Mason, "The Catholic Church and Hitlerism," The American Ecclesiastical Review, LXXXVIII (April, 1933), 385-401, and Elmer G. Homrighausen, "Hitler and German Religion," The Christian Century, L (March 29, 1933), 418-420, both cited in the preceding chapter of this dissertation, plus an
lifting of the Church ban on Nazism would do anything to strengthen Catholicism's role in German affairs.

On the other hand, Denis Gwynn, The Sign's correspondent for European news, perceived that German Catholics, in general, had given their support to the Nazi experiment. The Catholic politicians seemed to be making a comeback as a result and could have a restraining influence on the young hotbloods of the National Socialist Party. All this cooperation was being undertaken, said Gwynn, despite the fact that the Center Party had been discredited earlier in the year, more so "than most people outside Germany had expected."9 Opposed to Gwynn's view were the editorial comments made by The Christian Century on April 26. This major editorial reiterated its confidence in the Catholic Church to stand firm, especially since many of the clergy had not been able to "adjust themselves to the new regime." However, because of the exigencies of the domestic situation, this Protestant weekly expected Hitler to leave the door open until some kind of settlement with the Catholics was worked out.10

A very significant piece of news from Germany as far as the June 3 America was concerned, and this was the only American journal to respond immediately, evolved around the May meeting of

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9 Denis Gwynn, "America and the New European Situation," The Sign, XII (June, 1933), 682-683.
10 The Christian Century, L (April 26, 1933), 550-551.
the German Catholic bishops in their annual assembly at Fulda. Commenting upon a pastoral letter which emanated from this conference, *America* called it "a magnificent enunciation of religious freedom," although the journal did note that the bishops expressed a willingness to support the national aims of the Nazi regime. The Jesuit journal seemed so eager to believe that everything would now go well for Catholicism in Germany that it refused to accept the American newspaper stories that told of the dissolution of a congress of the German Catholic Journeymen by the Nazi officials in Munich. Showing absolute distrust in the American foreign correspondents, it declared that "it will be well, in the absence of better information, to withhold judgment." What the source of this better information might be, it did not say.

Late June occurrences in Germany drew brief mention in several of the weekly journals. The opinion that a rigorous struggle was under way between the government and both major churches, but that as yet Hitler had been "stopped at the door of the sanctuary," appeared in *The Literary Digest*. Especially noteworthy were the attacks upon Catholics and Catholic institu-


12 *The Literary Digest*, CXVI (July 1, 1933), 16.
tions. Their wait-and-see policy apparently at an end, the editors of *The Commonweal* in the July 7 issue assailed directly the National Socialist program.

It is now quite apparent that the ruthless attempt to uproot and to gradually exterminate all participation or influence of the Jews in Germany—even of the considerable body of Christian Jews—is only one item in the program of realizing the totalitarians' state, under which Christianity, either Protestant or Catholic, will be degraded into mere instruments of the triumphant policy of Teutonic race supremacy.14

Writing from Germany to the July 26 *Christian Century*, Reverend Elmer G. Homrighausen pointed out that the tide of Nazism was sweeping into Catholic ranks, where priests were now speaking out on behalf of the regime—a reversal of the situation noted by *The Christian Century* for April 26. This trend worried Homrighausen, whose religious prejudices came to the forefront. A concordat with the German state was apparently being considered by the Vatican, giving Catholicism, he feared, an advantage in a nation which had been "the bulwark of Protestantism."15 The editors of *The Presbyterian Advance*, however, still believed that German Catholics could be counted upon to stand firm against Nazi intimidation, and they suggested that Hitler might well fail in this venture because of joint opposition from both branches of

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14 *The Commonweal*, XVIII (July 7, 1933), 255.

Christianity, each with a large number of adherents. The *Advance* felt this way because even Mussolini, who had given the National Socialists many of their ideas, had not been very successful with only one church, the Catholic, to contend with.¹⁶

On the other hand, Sidney B. Fay in the August *Current History* discerned the Catholics of Germany being literally clubbed into submission.¹⁷ Neither did Professor John B. Mason see German Catholicism surrendering meekly to the German government in his article entitled "The Catholic Church in Hitler Germany" in *The American Ecclesiastical Review* for October 1933. Catholic priests and leaders found themselves in jail under "protective arrest" or physically assaulted "because they spoke their minds too freely." Nevertheless, the position of the Catholic Church was strong, contended Mason, who looked to the Kulturkampf as an example. He conjectured that there did not have to be another struggle, however, for the German hierarchy was presently willing to cooperate with the regime if the Catholic Church was granted her "minimum and inalienable rights."¹⁸

Through the work of the reactionary Catholic Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen, the German government's representations to the Vatican seeking an accord with the Catholic Church were

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¹⁶ *The Presbyterian Advance*, XLVII (July 13, 1933), 5.


¹⁸ John B. Mason, "The Catholic Church in Hitler Germany," *The American Ecclesiastical Review*, LXXXIX (October, 1933), 381-
finally fruitful in the summer of 1933. Early agreement was reached on July 8, with the Concordat finalized on July 20. Some observers had predicted this action for a number of weeks, but other journalists believed that the German Catholics' traditional spirit of no compromise would prevail to the end. This latter group had failed to comprehend that a settlement with Catholicism had become a most necessary item in Chancellor Hitler's program.

The sequence of events leading to the signing of the Concordat was: March 28, German bishops lift the ban on National Socialism; early April 1933, Franz von Papen and Monsignor Ludwig Kaas visit Rome, where the decision is reached to draw up a draft concordat; July 2, the draft is completed; July 2 or 3, Kaas orders the Center Party dissolved; July 8, the Concordat is initialed, and on July 9 news of the signing is released to the press; and July 22, the text of the Concordat is published.

Nor was the depth of the German Catholic leaders' demoralization perceived.

Of the religious journals considered, the Catholic ones were hardest pressed to explain the situation; only The Commonweal seemed eager to take up the task. The announcement of the Nazi-Vatican agreement received a less-than-enthusiastic reception by The Commonweal, which in a major editorial on July 21 cautioned that an appraisal of the document had to wait until it was officially released. Yet by way of background, The Commonweal called attention to the conference of the German Catholic hierarchy at Fulda on June 11, at which the bishops had made clear the Church's stand on National Socialism and what the Nazi state could expect in the way of cooperation with Catholicism. The bishops would respect the new spirit of German nationalism, hoping that it would tend toward "orderly patriotism," but they could not forget the universality of the Catholic Church. The Church was for all nations and races, and this concept ran counter to the racial theories of the government leaders. The prelates found these racial beliefs unacceptable to the Christian conscience, adding that "equality of convictions" was as important as "equality of blood" in achieving a national unity. While maintaining the Church's traditional respect for legitimate authority, the churchmen issued a warning against the "authoritarian principle" prevailing in government circles. The authority of the state "shall not restrict human freedom beyond what is required for the sake of the community's welfare," and, by all means, it should be
How the government intended to interpret the Concordat remained a puzzle for *The Commonweal*. If it acted according to Christian principles, there would be no struggle. This journal still believed that Hitler and some other Nazis had dealt in sincerity with the Church, but that there were other National Socialist Party radicals who planned to bring the Church under "utter subjugation." Without the support of the dissolved Center Party, which had disbanded on July 5 as part of the price for the Concordat, Catholics in Germany would face unfortunate conditions should the radical approach to state-church affairs be adopted. The bishops were outwardly confident that the Nazi leadership would be faithful to its agreement. *The Commonweal*, however, did not share this sentiment.20

Later issues of *The Commonweal* frequently discussed the Concordat. In answer to widespread criticism of the agreement, the August 11 *Commonweal* presented an historical picture of such treaties, emphasizing the fact that concordats with the separate German states had long been customary and "not a new thing created in a kind of vacuum." Above all, the Church did not intend to give "moral recognition" to the Nazi government. Lacking such a tradition of agreements, the Protestant leaders were forced to surrender to Hitler.

Additional editorial comment appeared in *Commonweal's*...
August 11 and September 1 issues. The former spoke optimistically about Hitler's personal desire for agreement with traditional Christianity; the latter was devoted to a close analysis of certain aspects of the July Concordat. Again it was stated that the Church found many National Socialist beliefs abhorrent. Nevertheless, said The Commonweal, the Nazi dictatorship was the legal government which had been voted into office by a "majority" of the German electorate. For Church recognition, the Hitler government had promised, and it was "a solemn obligation," to respect the rights of the Catholic religion. In this changing world the Church was being forced to deal with fundamentals at the cost of sacrifices. The most fundamental matter that the Church of Rome was concerned with in this era was "the purely spiritual mission of the Church of Christ." Unless the Church could continue to offer the Mass, impart the sacraments, continue her religious instruction and carry on her education facilities, all else would be lost. The editorial smacked of forced rationalization.

George N. Shuster of The Commonweal staff analyzed the effect of the Concordat on Catholic political and religious life in Germany in a signed article, "Germany Under the Concordat," in the same issue. First of all, the German-Papal agreement gave sanction by the Church "to the annihilation of the Center Party."

21 Ibid., (August 11, 1933), 359.
22 Ibid., (September 1, 1933), 419.
The work of many generations had been crushed, but the Vatican seemed to have reasoned, supposedly after gathering evidence from Germany, that the Center Party was weakening and that its survival was doubtful. Shuster agreed: "Though the election statistics of the year 1932 show a remarkably constant vote, there is no doubt that Catholics were rallying to other standards while their places were being taken by liberals who had no other party to support." More significant, according to Shuster, was the "marked personal opposition of Pope Pius to the spread of Bolshevism." Hitler's anti-Communism apparently appealed to the Pontiff.

The Concordat also defined the rights and liberties accorded to the Church. Here, said Shuster, while the German Catholics were pledged not to interfere with the Fascist regime, freedom in the area of religious education was increased, and the right to organize for religious purposes was acknowledged. What groups would be allowed to exist had not been clearly defined in the agreement, but early indications were that the government would be generously liberal. By no means did the Church "sell out" in order to preserve property and privileges, contended Shuster. Rather than retire to the catacombs she chose to stay above ground to preach the gospel to the Nazi-indoctrinated masses. "Time alone can prove whether the decision was right or wrong." Reason, however, appeared to be on the side of Rome, concluded Shuster.23

23George W. Shuster, "Germany Under the Concordat," ibid.
Other Catholic periodicals reacted promptly to the Concordat with brief superficial editorial comment (The Ave Maria and, strangely, America) or with more penetrating articles as in the case of The Catholic World and The Sign.24 The Catholic World's article, by a German observer writing under the pseudonym of Albert Brandt, saw the Concordat as another step in the Fascist scheme to organize a state religion. In spite of this show of friendship, Brandt advanced the idea that the Nazis disliked Catholicism almost as much as Judaism. Of late, only Hitler among the leaders had toned down his anti-Catholic attacks. In an accompanying editorial the same journal pointed to the historical dislike of the Vatican for political parties like the now-suppressed Center Party.

In the September Sign the British correspondent, Denis Gwynn, viewed the German Church agreement as comparable to the Mussolini-Vatican settlement of 1929. Even though it arranged for the demise of the German Catholic Center Party, which had been dissolved in July 1933, Catholic organizations would be permitted free scope in a supposedly totalitarian state. Whether or not this arrangement would work in practice remained to be seen.

420-422.

24 The Ave Maria, XXXVIII (New Series) (July 22, 1933), 119-120; America, XLIX (July 29, 1933), 383; Albert Brandt, "Hitlerism Versus Catholicism," The Catholic World, CXXXVII (September, 1933), 641-651; Brandt, according to this journal, was the pseudonym of a well-educated German pacifist who had contributed articles to many American journals; The Catholic World, (August, 1933), 619; Denis Gwynn, "Europe's New Perspective," The Sign, XIII (September, 1933), 74-75.
however, Gwynn himself was very optimistic. In the weeks preceding the Concordat's signing, repeated assaults had occurred on Catholic organizations, laymen, and even on priests. Nazi principles were in basic conflict with Church teachings, and it was very likely that new difficulties would develop. But all-important to remember was that Chancellor Hitler himself desired peace with the Church. He had "committed himself to a policy of cooperation with the Church." With intra-party problems still brewing, Hitler was hoping to rely on Bruening and his followers for support, announced Gwynn, who could not have had any evidence upon which to base this conjecture. Furthermore, he maintained that before the signing of the Concordat many observers had felt that the Catholic Church would be the next National Socialist target.

But the new Concordat with the Holy See at least gives hope that there will be no open conflict during the next months of transition. And the fact that Hitler has enlisted the cooperation of the Centre Party and is determined to protect them from victimization gives much more promise of stability to the new regime than existed hitherto.

At the same time another Catholic spokesman, Father Joseph F. Thorning, eulogized the Center Party in the September 2 America. He regretted its demise but saw no reason why Hitler would not keep his word about the religious sphere of interest as outlined in the Concordat. 25

The response of the Catholic journals was in most instant-

ces favorable to the action taken by the Holy See; none expressed any real uncertainty that the teaching of Catholic doctrine and the practicing of the Catholic religion would continue unhindered even though the Center Party had disappeared. There prevailed the general impression that the papacy was fortunate in getting the agreement. All this optimism was based on the assumption that Adolf Hitler made the settlement in good faith, in spite of pressure being applied to him by the "anti-Christian" Nazis. Actually, it was only a matter of a few months before the journals' bright picture of future church-state relations was completely disfigured.  

Less enthusiasm for the accord was shown by non-Catholic journals, some of which actually believed that the Vatican had "sold-out" to a totalitarian dictatorship. Probably their disappointment stemmed in part from the hope they had formerly expressed, as noted above, of joint Protestant-Catholic opposition forcing a halt in the Nazi anti-religious efforts, and now they felt themselves abandoned by their potential ally. The Hitler government had been successful in eliminating all Catholic opposition now that the Centrist Party was dissolved and priests

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26 During this period when the Concordat was being praised by most Catholic journalists, a short new item in America, XLIX (August 5, 1933), 430, noted, without elaborating, "further evidence of anti-Christian trends in Hitler's Reich with the July 22, 1933 announcement that a sterilization law had been decreed for Germany. Editorial comment would not appear until several months later when it was becoming evident that the Concordat had not solved all the existing problems between German Catholics and the Nazi state.
forced out of politics, said the July 19 Christian Century; thus the Concordat contributed to the evolution of the totalitarian state.

The Catholic Church agreed to stay clear of politics, but what was meant by "politics"? The Presbyterian Advance asked.

Whatever the government's interpretation, the Advance suspected that the German Catholics would not let themselves be severely handicapped.

It was a great moral victory for Chancellor Hitler and his government, remarked foreign sources cited in The Literary Digest. The conservative Living Age for September 1933 thought that the Vatican had surrendered to a "Government that discriminates against Catholics in particular and religion in general," but it added that at least the Catholics fared better than the Protestant church.

Roger Shaw described the agreement as a mutual understanding; all concerned seemed to be satisfied, according to this conservative journalist. The Concordat would not work, predicted Albrecht Paul Maerker-Branden in the same journal, The Review of Reviews and World's Work. The Catholic Church recognized neither national boundaries nor racial differences and this fact would spell the eventual doom of the compromise with

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27 The Christian Century, L (July 19, 1933), 924.
28 The Presbyterian Advance, XLVII (July 20, 1933), 4.
29 The Literary Digest, CXVI (July 22, 1933), 11.
30 The Living Age, CCCXLV (September, 1933), 6-7.
31 Roger Shaw, "Has Hitler Scored?" The Review of Reviews and World's Work, LXXXVIII (September, 1933), 57.
the National Socialists.\textsuperscript{32} The liberal \textit{New Republic}, recalling the history of the German Catholic Church, thought that German Catholicism was still a force to be reckoned with. This journal stated that "the famous shrewdness and political sagacity of German Catholicism will find new channels" to contend with National Socialism.\textsuperscript{33}

In one of many articles for \textit{The Literary Digest} during 1933, Reverend Stanley High mentioned on October 14 that already trouble could be brewing between the Nazi government and the Catholic Church. Nazi interference with Catholic activities had increased, and rumors had it that the Vatican was ready to renounce the July Concordat.\textsuperscript{34} This was the first mention anywhere of such rumors. It would be several months before the Catholic journals began to comment on the possibility of further difficulties between the National Socialists and Catholicism. Catholic reports in the autumn continued to be generally optimistic about the future.

On October 3, 1933, a group of prominent conservative German Catholics headed by Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen founded a new organization called the \textit{Arbeitsgemeinschaft Katholischer Deutscher}, which sought to promote closer ties between Catholics and

\textsuperscript{32}Albrecht Paul Maerker-Branden, "Germany, Hitler, and Austria," \textit{ibid.}, 40. The author was a German-born journalist who had turned conservative after an early career as a radical.

\textsuperscript{33}\textit{The New Republic}, LXXV (August 2, 1933), 300.

\textsuperscript{34}Stanley High, "Hitler's One-Purpose Government," \textit{The Literary Digest}, CXVI (October 14, 1933), 12, 34.
the Hitler regime. The November 11 Ave Maria was the only journal giving immediate attention to this development. It felt, under the circumstances, that the safest course for Catholicism had been taken, but it also pointed out that Catholics could not forget the duties of their faith when cooperating with the National Socialists. Two weeks later The Ave Maria reminded its readers that "since the Pope had made concordats with two Fascist States, he probably considers Fascism an altogether legitimate form of government." To give weight to its argument, the November 25 Ave Maria quoted Father Owen Dudley, the English novelist, who interpreted Fascism as a movement aiming "to re-establish a political and social order based upon the traditions that have formed out European civilization." Fascism was the "only political and social system powerful enough to conquer Communism." A form of government which went to extremes was bad, admitted the journal, "but there seems to be every indication that Fascism, in the hands of reasonable men, would give the Church fuller exercise of her rights, because of its opposition to Communism and Freemasonry."35 Neither The Ave Maria nor Father Dudley recorded that Pope Pius XI had made it clear in his encyclical of June 29, 1931, Non abbiamo bisogno, that no good Catholic could be Fascist.

Just a week before this Ave Maria column appeared, Father Wilfrid Parsons in the November 18 America had classified Hitler

35 The Ave Maria, XXXVIII (New Series) (November 11, 1933), 632, and (November 25, 1933), 695-696.
Germany as a totalitarian state, which would seem to rule out any of that reasonableness looked for by The Ave Maria. The Catholic World in December 1933 took a more cautious approach. Reports of Catholic-Nazi difficulties with the persecution of priests might not have been true, but all signs indicated that the details had not been hammered out between the two groups represented in the Concordat of July 1933.

As for the Protestant journals, the November 29 Christian Century related that the German Catholic newspaper Germania, once the official voice of the Catholic Center Party and partly owned by Franz von Papen, had in a recent editorial called for a Christian alliance to protect the common faith of all religions from the "threat of the government." Apparently the July agreement with the government was not working smoothly in the eyes of the Catholic church officials, the Century speculated. In spite of recent election triumphs, the Nazis had "overshot their mark," with regard to their arbitrary treatment of the churches. The November 30 Presbyterian Advance seemed delighted to recount that German Catholics had been seeking ways to unite with their Protestant brethren in the church-state struggle.

36 Wilfrid Parsons, S.J., "Totalitarianism," America, L (November 18, 1933), 150. Father Parsons was editor-in-chief of America from 1925 to 1936.

37 The Catholic World, CXXXVIII (December, 1933), 358.

38 The Christian Century, L (November 29, 1933), 1491-1492.

39 The Presbyterian Advance, XLVIII (November 30, 1933), 5.
The weekly Nation for November 29 also praised Protestant and Catholic cooperation against "anti-religious new heathenism"; it likewise expressed concern for those brave men who had openly defied the dictatorship. Although not extraordinary, The Nation's interest in the fate of the religious was unusual. "It is counter-revolution," declared the enthusiastic Reverend Stanley High in his December 2 Literary Digest article, "The German Clergy's Defy to Hitlerism." "Only the Church, Protestant and Catholic, provided an opposition that refused to flatten." The Nazis were finding out the hard way that the Christian conscience could not be strong-armed. While the pressure upon the German government from religious leaders of the rest of the world had been tremendous, the Protestant clergyman thought it too early to discern Hitler's reaction. Certainly to control religion was an essential part of the Fuehrer's plan for the totalitarian state.

While the Protestant journalists in general, as well as the secular periodical The Nation, were heartened by signs of religious cooperation in Germany, an editorial in the Catholic weekly America for December 9 placed a good deal of the blame for the rampant German paganism on Protestant over-enthusiasm; however, three weeks later America's short editorial column praised the orthodox Protestants for their "gallant fight for Christian indepen-

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40 The Nation, CXXXVII (November 29, 1933), 607.
41 Stanley High, "The German Clergy's Defy to Hitlerism," The Literary Digest, CXVI (December 2, 1933), 12.
In a survey of the German religious problems, Sidney B. Fay told his readers in the January 1934 Current History that Michael Cardinal Faulhaber of Munich had become the leading voice of German Catholicism, demanding in a December 3 sermon the carrying out of the Concordat guarantees and criticizing the beliefs advanced by the neo-pagan Nazis. The whole business of the churches and the state had become such a serious affair that Fay believed Chancellor Hitler had sought to dissociate himself and government authorities from the conflict. The January 1934 Catholic World expressed some apprehension about the future of German Christianity after hearing of Faulhaber's speech.

That American Catholic journals were beginning to grow uncomfortable about the Hitler government did become evident in late 1933 and early 1934. At the very moment when most Catholics were congratulating themselves for the way German Catholicism had managed to win the Concordat, a new Nazi decree on July 25 was published making sterilization of defectives the law of the land, effective at the beginning of 1934. America had mildly criticized the Nazi measure on August 5; however, its October 21 issue directed a much sterner warning to the German government in an edi-

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42 America, L (December 9, 1933), 220, and (December 30, 1933), 312.


44 The Catholic World, CXXXVIII (January, 1934), 493.
torial on the subject of medical ethics in general. Whether it be euthanasia or sterilization did not make a difference morally. But the fact that the National Socialists were tempering with the laws of nature was "Hitler barbarism."

One shudders at the possible effects of the Hitler plan in operation. By hampering medical research and making it pointless, the plan fosters the spread of disease. By weakening the integrity of the physician, it destroys public confidence in the medical profession. By assuming an authority over life and death which belongs to God alone, it directly attacks His sovereignty. Under this barbaric policy, instead of staffing our hospitals for the incurable with able and humane physicians we shall staff them not with public executioners, acting under the rightful power of the State, but with murderers.45

No matter how bad the situation, America nevertheless seemed to retain confidence in the future concerning German affairs. On December 2 one of its editorials advised a Nazi official in Bavaria, who was reportedly unhappy with the Catholic bishops' response to the recent National Socialist legislation, to take "the easiest road to Canossa." Another America editorial on January 6, 1934, admitted that there was little that was "cheerful" to discuss, but it refused to concede that the Nazis might hold the upper hand in the church-state struggle. Signs of tension between the Catholic Church and the Hitler government were very apparent, as seen in the Catholic bishops' protest against the government's "immoral" medical legislation. Chancellor Hitler had yet to learn that it was folly to attack "considerable bodies in the State purely on the ground of their religious or

45America, L (October 21, 1933), 50-52.
racial affiliation," editorialized the Jesuit weekly. The German nation must look to its Catholic citizens "for redemption." America thought that "at the proper time the Bishops will announce their program," but it still wondered how long "religious-minded" Germans could tolerate the "extravagances of Hitlerism." One other article in the February 10, 1934 America, written by its editor, Wilfrid Parsons, discussed sterilization in general and mentioned the German legislation only briefly.46

The only Commonweal recognition of the National Socialist medical legislation was a general article by a Catholic physician, James J. Walsh, appearing on February 2, 1934. Walsh seemed equally disturbed by the evils of modern science and by the German government. Although it did not mention the sterilization law by name, an article by Commonweal staff member George N. Shuster showed more than mild concern over the situation in Germany. He wrote on January 6, 1934, that few realized just how difficult it was for the representatives of religion to carry on in Nazi Germany. With particular reference to the Catholic Church, he believed that even German Catholics were unaware of the government pressures on so-called "political priests." A censored press made it appear that only a few clergymen had been removed to concentration camps for criticizing the new order. Actually, Shuster said, the religious struggle was "a great, fateful and bitterly

46 Ibid., (December 2, 1933), 195-196; (January 6, 1934), 315; and Wilfrid Parsons, S.J., "Sterilization Is Criminal Fol- ly!" (February 10, 1934), 445-447.
contested action." What made the entire affair more secret was the fact that the German bishops did not want to appeal for foreign support in order "to avoid the stigma of what is now called 'treason.'" Religious journalism and education had already been struck severe blows by the state. Catholics with Jewish blood had lost their places in society and could find relief in neither Hebrew nor Catholic circles. Shuster called for an alliance of Catholicism, Protestantism and Judaism against the "brutal, inchoate, fantastic but primitive" creed of National Socialism. These must stand united, "cost what it may." 

Two other Catholic journals commented briefly and superficially about the sterilization legislation. The January 1934 *Sign* declared for the first time that it had considered the Nazi-Catholic conflict inevitable. "The Church is the guardian of morality as well as of doctrine. And anything that strikes at the Catholic idea of the natural and Christian dignity of man the Church will not only resent but emphatically condemn." The following month's *Catholic World* felt happy to report that "the Church authorities protested so effectively in Germany that they won three important concessions from the Government." Catholic hospitals and doctors were to be exempt from the law, and Catholics sentenced to sterilization were to be permitted to "enter

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48 *The Sign*, XIII (January, 1934), 325.
some institution" rather than submit to the operation. 49

No Protestant periodical dwelled upon the German medical laws, but three secular journals offered a few comments. Both The New Republic and The Nation for January 3, 1934 50 now realized that Hitler was not joking when he proposed sterilization legislation. They viewed this law as another weapon over the heads of the Nazis' victims, although basically they approved of such operations. A few weeks later The New Republic cited a German report which told of the use of the sterilization laws against political prisoners. This journal wondered whether the German Jews would be next to fall under the law. 51 The most complete reporting of the German sterilization legislation was performed by Sidney B. Fay in the October 1933 Current History. Professor Fay made no moral judgment concerning the law, nor did he discuss possible repercussions. 52

Editor James E. Clarke of The Presbyterian Advance, on one hand, in an article entitled "The Church Issue in Germany," bemoaned the fate of German Protestantism and praised the "sacredness" of the Catholic clergy for securing a treaty with the Nazi state; at the same time he wrote an editorial sympathizing with

49 The Catholic World, CXXXVIII (January, 1934), 493.
German Catholicism because it was under severe attack from the government. This situation would seem to indicate that the German Catholics were far less shrewd than at first perceived by Clarke. The Christian Century of February 21, 1934, told of Catholic priests "being subjected to astonishing physical indignities," a matter not yet stressed in most Catholic periodicals except in the January 6 Commonweal article by George N. Shuster.

On January 24, 1934, Adolf Hitler named Alfred Rosenberg, the theoretician of the Nazi Party and one of the leading advocates of the neo-pagan cult, to the post of supervisor of the spiritual and ideological training of the National Socialist organization, including the Hitler youth. His tome, Mythus des 20. Jahrhunderts (The Myth of the Twentieth Century), espousing racial superiority and purity, was placed on the Index of Forbidden Books by Catholic Church officials on February 9, 1934. At the same time as Rosenberg's appointment, pressure was being applied to bring the Catholic youth groups into the Nazi organization. Commenting on these developments, the March 1934 Catholic World declared that only with great difficulty could anyone preserve his religious faith in an organization supervised by Alfred Rosenberg. Furthermore, it rejected the recent efforts by Franz von Papen and his conservative Catholic youth associates to take the

53 James E. Clarke, "The Church Issue in Germany," The Presbyterian Advance, XLVIII (February 6, 1934), 7, 4.

54 The Christian Century, LI (February 21, 1934), 244.
Catholic Church out of all non-spiritual activities. The March 17 Ave Maria bristled with indignation. Attempts would be made, no doubt, to introduce Germanic cult ideas into the Catholic Church, but

if Hitler thinks the German Catholics will tolerate any such action without organized resistance, he doesn't know by this time that it doesn't pay, in the long run, to oppose the Catholic Church. The past is a good indication of what may be expected in the future.

Unfortunately The Ave Maria's expectations were not to be fulfilled in the nineteen-thirties, for the main ingredients of the struggle were very much different from those in the past.

On March 24, 1934, America called attention to the recent speeches of the Nazi leader of the Hitler youth movement, Baldur von Schirach. His demands for the seizure of Catholic educational and young people's organizations were in direct violation of the July 1933 Concordat. If the government insisted, this activity could light the fuse of a new Kulturkampf, said America. Again with reference to the struggle for the minds of the German youth, a major America editorial entitled "The School Fight in Germany" said on March 24: "It is daily becoming clearer that the temper of the Nazi Government is definitely anti-Christian and anti-religious." Germany was seeking the level of Soviet Russia, but before it sank there, America (which in 1932 naively trusted the good sense of the German people to keep Hitler out of the government) believed that the German people would reassert their

55 The Catholic World, CXXXVIII (March, 1934), 747.
56 The Ave Maria, XXXIX (New Series)(March 17, 1934), 344.
authority. If they failed, Nazism would be a "permanent menace to civilization." 57

In the April Current History, Sidney B. Fay noted the "sharp friction" developing between the Nazis and the Catholics and called attention to the fact that Michael Cardinal Faulhaber of Munich had been urging German Protestants and Catholics to unite against the pagans. 58 "The tide of Nazi resentment" appeared to be rising against Catholic priests everywhere, in the opinion of the March 7 Christian Century, and on April 11 this journal cited the fact that Pope Pius XI had spoken out on Easter in praise of the young Catholics' perseverance in the face of pagan propaganda. There was no question, as far as the Century was concerned, that the pontiff was alluding to the German situation. 59

The Catholic phase of the religious struggle continued to hold the spotlight throughout the spring of 1934, more than any other issue concerning Nazi Germany, and was given full coverage by the religious-oriented journals, plus some attention by the others. On April 14 America voiced its objections to the suppression of German Catholic newspapers, but it also found that nothing had been done so far by the National Socialists to deter the bishops from their constant attack upon German paganism. Was

57 America, XL (March 24, 1934), 602, 582-583.


59 The Christian Century, LI (March 7, 1934), 309, and (April 11, 1934), 483.
Hitler at fault for fostering this pagan trend, wondered America, or was the blame to be placed on certain radical elements of his Party? Was it not possible for Chancellor Hitler to control these people? America admitted that it was difficult to find the answers. Many German supporters of the Nazi leader were certain that he was anti-pagan and would soon put a stop to the "ravings of his wild men." While it had given hints that it mistrusted the intentions of Adolf Hitler and that it was on the verge of issuing a condemnation of the man for his role in the past year's events in Germany, America here showed that it was not yet ready to admit that Hitler personally controlled German affairs.

Perhaps America was influenced in its cautious treatment of the German Fuehrer by the fact that negotiations over further application of the Concordat had resumed between the German government and Vatican officials on April 9, 1934. In any event, America was silent editorially with respect to Germany as long as the fruitless talks continued. This, however, was not the case for other journals, both Catholic and non-Catholic, during April and May.

A second Vatican-German concordat, this one more exact with regard to church-state relations, was in the offing, responded the April 18 Christian Century. This Protestant organ also desired to see a brighter future for Germany, and the Catholic Church seemed to be the key. The Nazi government did not intend

60 America, LI (April 14, 1934), 5.
to get itself involved with another Kulturkampf, and besides that, the Century pointed out, "Hitler is a Catholic, as Bismarck was not." Moreover, the papal diplomats knew well how to compromise with secular rulers. If matters were worked out with the Catholics, a compromise between Hitler's government and the German Protestant sects would very likely follow. 61

The April 21 Literary Digest implied that the direct intervention by the Vatican in the German religious dispute was necessitated by the weakness of the Catholic forces in Germany. That Chancellor Hitler, apparently willing to settle the differences with the Catholic Church officials, was reportedly investigating the anti-Catholic actions of his followers was the purely speculative news received by this journal. 62

On the one hand, the Catholic Church was praised by the liberal Nation of April 25 for her stand against the Hitler government, but, on the other hand, the Church was criticized for abandoning her political vehicles--the Center Party and the Bavarian People's Party--when she placed her trust in the National Socialists' promises of the 1933 Concordat. Of course the Church had many material interests at stake, but for her mistake German Catholicism was paying dearly. The Nation, however, hesitated to place any reliance on Catholicism in negotiations with the Nazis. The Catholic Church was not fundamentally opposed to National

61 The Christian Century, LI (April 18, 1934), 516-517.
62 The Literary Digest, CXVII (April 21, 1934), 16.
Socialism.

The Catholic church is not opposed to fascism. It made its peace with Mussolini and actively participated in the fascist domination of Austria. As fascism developed from a small sect to a mass movement, the church discovered much of which it approved and by which it might profit. Fascism may divide church and state and may deprive the former of some of its prerogatives, but it fosters religion and its concrete expression, the church, as the most effective means of bringing the masses to humble obedience to authority. Mussolini, the Anarchist-Socialist of an earlier day, introduced the cross into the classroom and religious instruction into the curriculum of every public school in the land. In the same way Hitler ordered that the schools of the country be permeated with religion—his religion to be sure—to lay the spiritual foundation for the acceptance of National Socialism's ideals.

The Catholic church in Germany is putting up a courageous fight with heathen perversions. Backed by Rome, it is today the strongest force that can be brought into action against the National Socialist regime. And yet it may take its stand in line with German fascism if and when the Hitler regime accedes to its demands.63

There was no "bargaining" between the Church and the Nazis, asserted The Sign in May 1934, contradicting press reports that the Church had sacrificed principle as well as abandoned German Catholics to their fate. "It looks as if some of our American editors," who remained nameless, "were more concerned with sensationalism than veracity," contended this Catholic monthly. "The Catholic Church has not retreated one inch before the insanity of Hitler and his lieutenants," was a statement which seemed to ignore the July 1933 treaty. As far as The Sign was concerned, a bitter struggle, with the entire Catholic population up in arms, was going on in Germany, with all the faithful ready to suffer

63 The Nation, CXXXVIII (April 21, 1934), 16.
martyrdom if need be.64

A good example of one extreme of American Catholic periodical response to the affairs in Germany could be seen in The Catholic World for May 1934. An editorial, probably written by Father James Gillis, was unconcerned with Nazism in its political form and "the attitude of the German leaders to their internal affairs" as long as they stayed out of the realm of theology. Once they began to meddle with the Christian religion, it was the responsibility of every Christian to react. "But now the die is cast. The ultimate is clear, the gauntlet is down, the conflict is on. It is Christianity against heathenism...." In another comment the editor rekindled the hope that the German leaders may yet return to a reasonable policy. "I venture to think that Adolph Hitler would give his right eye to stop the prairie fire started by his own attacks on the Jews. He cannot be such a fool as his absurd mustache, his gestures, his grimaces and his wild utterances would seem to make him."65 It is difficult to see how the editor could have ignored the totalitarian ideology and all its manifestations as espoused by the Nazi leaders, especially since it was through political action that the National Socialists were able to strike successfully at the Church organizations.

While exploring the problem of German paganism--"a kind of bastard Christianity"--in the Summer 1934 American Scholar,

64 The Sign, XIII (May, 1934), 579.
65 The Catholic World, CXXXIX (May, 1934), 131-132.
Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr found that some German Catholics were willing to go much further in their opposition to Nazism than *The Catholic World* editor. It was to the credit of German Catholicism, Niebuhr believed, that the "average Catholic priest" had been more consistently aware of the scope of activities and the total evils of Nazism than his Protestant brethren. He had been less vocal, to be sure, but in the end the Catholic opposition might well prove to be more effective. Niebuhr fully recognized that because the Catholic opposition had been political as well as religious, more Catholic priests than Protestant clergymen were inmates of the government's concentration camps.

As the summer of 1934 approached, despairing reports concerning the Catholic aspect of the German church struggle continued to appear, although the Nazi pressure on the Church had abated temporarily. The least optimistic review of the German Catholic position was written by a leading Catholic layman, George N. Shuster, for *The Commonweal*. Having pointed out earlier in the May 11 issue the essential similarity between Nazism and Communism, on June 29 Shuster appealed to American Catholics to awake to the seriousness of the German religious situation. "Those who still believe that the letter of a papal concordat will prevail against barbarism are living in a fool's paradise." Contrary to the often heard rumor, there would not occur another "Canossa" in Germany, explained Shuster. It would be disastrously fatalistic.

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for Catholics to sit back without concern in anticipation of an inevitable papal victory. In the modern world victory was only possible "when the last man on the fringe of the battlefield is wholly conscious of his duty and his responsibility." Injurious to German Catholics was the Jewish boycott of German goods, because it affected chiefly the industrial area where Catholics comprised the majority of the population. The "inevitable consequence" was that anti-Semitic nationalism and Hitlerism were bound to increase in these Catholic regions. Perhaps, mused Shuster, the old-fashioned idea of prayer and sacrifice on the part of the world's Catholics might be the only thing left to help the Church in Germany.67

Shuster's realistic appraisal seemed to be echoed by other Catholic observers. For instance, America on June 16 wrote that a crisis was building and that hopes for a new Church-state compromise had almost vanished. The bishops were meeting again at Fulda, and a bold statement was expected from the gathering.68 Writing in The Squire for July 1934, Denis Gwynn announced that what appeared to him to have been several months of "comparative truce in the relations between the new German State and the Church," had been broken by Dr. Joseph Goebbels on May 11 with a blistering speech against Cardinal Faulhaber, Archbishop of Munich.


68 America, LI (June 16, 1934), 239.
Although the author found the Nazis doing everything possible to make life uncomfortable for German Catholics, ecclesiastical officials, he insisted, were striving earnestly to heal the breach. He actually believed that their efforts might succeed "in an atmosphere of good-will." "The Church has nothing to gain, and much to lose, by an protracted quarrel with the Nazi Government," observed Gwynn. 69

On the eve of the June 30, 1934 Roehm Purge, relations between the Hitler government and the Catholic Church seemed to be deteriorating, in the estimation of American observers; however, in Germany Catholic negotiators (three members of the German hierarchy: Archbishop Konrad Grober of Freiburg and Bishops Wilhelm Berning of Osnabruck and Nicholaus Bares of Hildesheim) on the further implementation of the 1933 Concordat seemed willing to make what amounted to great concessions with respect to the disbanding of Catholic lay organizations. The killing of such Catholic leaders as the Berlin Catholic Action director, Dr. Erich Klausener, and Adalbert Probst, a spokesman for the Catholic youth organizations, in the June 30 purge, as well as the objections made by Adolf Cardinal Bertram of Breslau to the many concessions offered the Nazi government by the Catholic delegates, postponed indefinitely the final signing. Negotiations finally collapsed in January 1935.

Notwithstanding the murders of leading German Catholics in late June, the Protestant weeklies, The Christian Century for July 18 and the July 12 Presbyterian Advance, both subscribed to the theory that the Nazi-Catholic problems would soon be settled. However, The Christian Century believed the latest trend to be one of compromise, since it reported that Cardinal Faulhaber had made it known that the Catholic Church was willing to treat the Nazi government more favorably if "its new orientation will agree that the totalitarian state has no control over church affairs." On the other hand, The Presbyterian Advance, considering the pending Catholic-German government agreement on Catholic lay institutions, erred in calling it a victory for Catholicism. While voicing its admiration for the Catholic leaders, it criticized the German Protestants for failing to emulate their Catholic brethren's courage and persistence.

One such example of courage was the letter drawn up in early June 1934 by the German bishops at their annual assembly at Fulda. Although this document approved of the concessions being offered the German government in the negotiations, it was candid in its protest against the spread of paganism and against Nazi interference with Catholic Church organization activities. A single Catholic journal, The Sign, treated as significant this message which was ultimately forbidden publication inside Germany. The letter drafted by the bishops was called "forthright and im-

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70 The Christian Century, LI (July 18, 1934), 939-940, and The Presbyterian Advance, XLIX (July 12, 1934), 5.
pressive" by the August Sign.

This courageous condemnation of the Hitler-Goebbels-Rosenberg program..., coming at such a critical period, serves to prove to the entire world that the Roman Catholic Church will not suffer the pagan Nazi ideas to be spread among the people but will withstand them to the last ditch.71

The direction that the negotiations took over what would happen to the Catholic organizations received no penetrating comments from The Sign or any other magazine. As a matter of fact, for some time little discussion with respect to the German Catholic problems could be found in either the Catholic or non-Catholic journals. The National Socialists' pressure upon the Church was relaxed for several months, since the Saar plebiscite was scheduled for January 1935, and Catholics were very numerous in that territory.72

The most incisive article on Catholic Church problems in Germany in the five months preceding the Saar vote was by G. E. W. Johnson in the November 1934 North American Review. He opined that the Catholic Church alone remained outside the German totalitarian state, mainly because of her own authoritarian structure. The evangelical church had fallen before the Nazi steamroller because the Nazis had been able to infiltrate and undermine the

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71 The Sign, XIV (August, 1934), 3. The Fulda pastoral is mentioned briefly with only mild enthusiasm by America, LI (June 16, 1934), 239, and The Catholic World, CXXXIX (August, 1934), 618.

72 The details of the pre- and post-plebiscite journal response will be covered in a subsequent chapter on foreign affairs, although there appear frequent references to the German Catholic Church.
Protestant church's democratic structure. Several prominent leaders of the National Socialist Party were Catholics, including Hitler and Goebbels, and some inroads had been made by the movement among the Catholic faithful. The Catholic hierarchy had made an impressive stand against the National Socialists, and so far, the bishops had escaped persecution. The Hitlerites had instead taken the offensive against subordinate clergy in order to prevent the creation of prominent martyrs of the Bismarck Kulturkampf variety. Arrests had reached their peak in the early months of 1934 and had since abated to prevent bad impressions among the Catholic population in the Saarland. Johnson felt that both parties of the 1933 Concordat still wished to prevent a "head-on collision." The Nazis hoped to be able to work on the German Catholic masses through propaganda. Johnson believed, however, that the pressures would quicken once the Saar question was decided. A similar drive against the Protestant rebels accelerated as soon as Hindenburg passed away in August 1934.73

Only one Catholic journal printed an analytical article concerning Catholic-Nazi relations at the close of 1934. Anonymously written, the article appeared in the December 7 Commonweal and depicted the Catholic Church as coming out second best to the Hitler regime. German Catholicism was "in an exceedingly serious plight." Clearly evident was the fact that the government was "absolutely anti-Christian" and "absolutely anti-Catholic."

Agreements signed with Hitler were of no value. The 1933 Concordat was "invariably interpreted to the disadvantage of the Church," All questions were considered "political," thereby excluding the Church from any influence upon public opinion. The National Socialist control over the education of Germany's youth would pay dividends later, if permitted to endure for long. Young Germany would "forget what a truly Christian milieu is like." Unlike Marxism, declared the author, Nazism appeared as a force hostile to Christian principles, "adroitly camouflaged" as something called "positive Christianity." On September 8 The Ave Maria, in a short editorial, had declared that there was "little difference between this teaching and that of Soviet Russia," indicating that it, too, was making a more serious appraisal of the German religious problem than in the past.

Extensive commentaries on the position of the Catholic Church in Germany did not reappear in quantity until the early spring of 1935, following the Saar plebiscite, although The Commonweal of January 4, 1935 noted that "a silent but dogged war" between Nazism and Christianity continued. Much of the discussion by the Catholic periodicals appears to be of dubious value. Writing in two successive issues of The Commonweal, journalist

74 Anonymous, "Catholics in Germany," The Commonweal, XXI (December 7, 1934), 163-165. This journal called the author a distinguished German Catholic publicist, author and leader.
75 The Ave Maria, XL (New Series) (September 8, 1934), 311.
76 The Commonweal, XXI (January 4, 1935), 274.
George Seldes found, first of all, that Adolf Hitler's opponents had been taken by surprise when he turned out to be a much more impatient man than his Italian counterpart, Benito Mussolini. The German Fascist government took less than two years to achieve the totalitarian state which, only in rudimentary form, took the Italians almost ten. "Hitler orders the Fascist state to begin functioning at once. No one, priest or politician, must stand in the middle of the road. There is no time to waste." For this political situation the Center Party was "indirectly" to blame. Seldes stated that the German Catholic political party's refusal to commit itself "to one year's 'toleration' of Hitler in the Reichstag" back in February 1933, forced Hitler "to make the March election a mandate for dictatorship." This account was a clear distortion of the facts.

Other departures from reality occurred in Seldes' second article on March 1. While stronger than she had been in several decades, the Catholic Church, in Seldes' opinion, still found herself running behind "the march of the dictators" and "the super-nationalism of the twentieth century." So far, however, he argued that the Church had been able to safeguard satisfactorily the rights of Catholics. The Vatican still managed to stand out as a beacon of moral force and peace. With an air of confidence Seldes stated: "Today the Church is more alert than ever in its history to the political and moral currents in which modern society is caught."77 Most assuredly Seldes could be questioned on

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77 George Seldes, "The Vatican and Nationalism." ibid.
whether the compromise was working in Nazi Germany and whether
the Catholic response to the government plan of action was at
the moment adequate. Seldes must have been aware that negotia-
tions for greater clarification of the points in the 1933 Con-
cordat dealing with Catholic lay institutions had finally broken
down at the end of January 1935. The Fuehrer had announced that
he would follow through with the agreement negotiated with the
German bishops in June 1934, in which the prelates had granted
unnecessary concessions.

Little that had not been said before by others was writ-
ten by Professor Patrick W. Browne in an article entitled "Ano-
ther Kulturkampf" for the March 2 Ave Maria. He misinformed his
readers by citing the German Catholic clergy as a "solid phalanx"
against the Nazi regime. Germany under National Socialism, in
his opinion, was a "more lurid picture" than the terrors of the
French Revolution and what existed in Soviet Russia. Browne
borrowed a recent argument from America on this last point. The
Jesuit journal's February 23 editorial, while discussing the
problems of Catholic education in Germany, rated the religious
struggle in the Reich to be "less keen" than the one confronting

(Febuary 22, 1935), 471, and (March 1, 1935), 506. This Ameri-
can journalist and sociologist had written numerous books about
the American press and international affairs.

Patrick W. Browne, "Another Kulturkampf," The Ave Ma-
ria, XLI (New Series) (March 2, 1935), 271-272. Browne was a pro-
fessor of European history at Catholic University until his
death in 1937.
the Church in either Mexico or Soviet Russia. The Catholic World editorial for April 1935 contributed little but the pronouncement that Adolf Hitler was probably a "lunatic" if he thought the Church would collapse before his dictatorship.

There was no apparent easing of Nazi pressures. More and more clergymen were being arrested, and harassment of the various Catholic institutions was increasing, but "the situation will doubtless get much worse before it grows better," in the words of a May 10 Commonweal editorial. On May 18 America's editors likewise considered the situation in Germany very grave. The Hitler regime was leaving "nothing untried that may outrage the feelings of the religious inhabitants of that country." Some of the attacks and denunciations had proceeded from extremists outside of official circles, yet these were tolerated by the government. Nevertheless, the evidence seemed to show that the regime itself, led by many of its highest officeholders, had taken charge of the anti-religious program for more than a year. America, as usual, had confidence that German Catholics would triumph over this oppressive and insane rule, as their fathers had over Bismarck. But an American visitor in Germany, Edith Fernbach, told the readers of America that it did not seem likely that

79 America, LII (February 23, 1935), 461.
80 The Catholic World, CXLI (April, 1935), 3.
82 America, LIII (May 18, 1935), 122-123.
German Catholics alone could overcome the National Socialists. More penetrating articles appeared occasionally. The editors of The Commonweal reminded Catholics on May 24 that in essence National Socialism was a religious movement. "It is the offspring of the bottomless secularization and apostatizing of modern man, who is no longer capable of reverencing—despite his errors—his purity of Christianity, and must now try to subordinate even this to issues involving power and gain." Writing in the June 1935 Current History, Professor Charles Sarolea showed how, for the philosophy of National Socialism, the church had to be a national institution. According to the Nazis, a so-called universal church was "an unreal monstrosity." The doctrine of the separation of temporal and spiritual powers was "a heresy and a crime against the Germans!"

In order, therefore, that the new German religion may discharge its vital national function, Rosenberg demands the uncompromising elimination of the Old Testament, the repudiation of the abortive attempt to transform and degrade the Germans spiritually into Jews, the elimination of all the dogmatic foundations of historic Christianity, whether they are Roman Catholic or Lutheran or Calvinistic. He demands the suppression of the Cross, and instead of the dreary and degrading dogmas and malignant symbols of the present churches he wants the new German Church to substitute the Nordic myths and sagas.

83 Edith Fernbach, "Catholic Life in Nazi Germany," ibid., (May 25, 1935), 153-154. Miss Fernbach was an eyewitness of what was taking place in Germany.

84 The Editors, "Reply," The Commonweal, XXII (May 24, 1935), 94. This was a reply to the Reichbishop Ludwig Mueller, whose article on the church and state in Germany, "Church and State in Germany," appeared on pages 93 and 94 of this issue of The Commonweal.
and fairy tales which alone, since the beginning of time, have expressed German aspirations and ideals and represented German moral values.85

Three contemporary Catholic journals also expressed concern over the inroads being made by neo-paganism.86 An America editorial considered the damage inflicted upon the minds of the German youth almost "irreparable." Although America did not say so explicitly, it appeared to be waiting for Hitler to announce his personal support of Christianity and to condemn his pagan associates.

In the late spring and summer of 1935 the government again accelerated its attack on the religious front, and the disturbances with the Catholic Church appeared to be the most pronounced. Almost every American weekly and some monthlies noted the efforts of the Nazi regime to destroy the reputation of German Catholicism. Much of the government activity involved petty annoyances, but most of the periodicals considered the situation serious. That Catholic clergymen were brought to trial for violating the Reich currency laws and for alleged moral offenses was touched on briefly by The Commonweal, America and The Sign.87

85 Charles Sarolea, "The German Anti-Chríst," Current History, XLII (June, 1935), 243-244. The author of this article was a Belgian who was for many years professor of French literature at the University of Edinburgh.

86 The Sign, XIV (June, 1935), 644; The Catholic World, XLII (June, 1935), 361; and America, LII (July 6, 1935), 290, and (July 13, 1935), 314-315.

87 The Commonweal, XXII (June 21, 1935), 199; America, LIII (August 17, 1935), 435; and The Sign, XV (August, 1935), 5.
Also noting the attack on the Catholic clergy and Catholic institutions were *The Nation*, *The New Republic*, *The Literary Digest*, *The Christian Century* and Sidney B. Fay in *Current History*.\footnote{The Nation, CXLI (July 31, 1935), 114; The New Republic LXXXIII (July 31, 1935), 317; The Literary Digest, CXX (July 27, 1935), 10; The Christian Century, LII (July 31, 1935), 980; and Sidney B. Fay, "Germany's Religious Conflict," Current History, XLII (September, 1935), 649.} All expressed sympathy for the German Catholics.

Naturally, more was heard from the Catholic journals when the Nazis continued their policies. The August 1935 *Catholic World*, as usual, was not sure what could be done; it seemed willing to wait for the German bishops' annual Fulda conference in August before making a pronouncement.\footnote{The Catholic World, CXLI (August, 1935), 618.} *The Sign* for August exhibited poor judgment by expressing the hope that the National Socialists would ultimately return to a policy of moderation.

We trust that sanity may be restored to those whose nationalism has become a mania. But should further conflict result, our prayer is that German Catholics may stand loyal to their Faith, as they have done on other occasions, regardless of the cost. Opportunities for heroic confession of the Faith and even for martyrdom are not limited to any country or to any age of the Church.\footnote{The Sign, XV (August, 1935), 5.}

The pessimistic words of possible martyrdom expressed by *The Sign* were in direct contrast to the views found in two other Catholic journals. The August 24 *Ave Maria* responded angrily to action taken by the Nazis against Catholic youth groups.

This is, without doubt, a declaration of war against the Faith. One would suppose that an average man would rea-
lize from a glance at the past how futile it is to fight the Church. It seems, however, that every generation must learn by experience; and a costly experience it generally is.\footnote{91}{The Ave Maria, XLII (New Series)(August 24, 1935), 249.}

The America editorial of August 3 made some rather bold assumptions which, in the main, were nothing but dreams.

Can we hope that the Catholics of Germany who today know the persecution which their ancestors bore under Bismarck will at some time be able to share their victory as well? The present moment seems dark; may it be only the deeper darkness before the dawn. At their meeting at Fulda this month, the Bishops of Germany will no doubt issue the command to the army. Upon that command, and the obedience given it, depend, under God, the future of the Church and her children in Germany.

America took an even stronger position on August 24, when it declared that "if the Nazi Government forces the issue, it probably will not live to go to Canossa."\footnote{92}{America, LIII (August 3, 1935), 385-386, and (August 24, 1935), 459.} On occasion America showed itself totally ignorant of the Church's real position in the German Reich.

The climax of the annual meeting of the German Catholic hierarchy at the historic monastery at Fulda in August 1935 was the issuance of a pastoral letter to be read in all Catholic churches on September 1, 1935. The bishops also drew up a list of grievances which was delivered to the Fuehrer. The pastoral letter, which could not be put into pamphlet form or mentioned in German newspapers by the regime's orders, was partially aimed at the German neo-pagans. It likewise called for the protection of
Catholic schools and organizations. The Nazi charge of political Catholicism, recently made against the clergy, was labeled a subterfuge to permit attacks upon the Catholic religious.

The Commonweal of September 13, 1935 believed the document to be a denunciation of the National Socialist activities during the last two years, although the bishops' letter was drafted in conciliatory terms. "One might have relished a strong indictment of terrorism and a courageous word about the non-Aryan cult"; however, The Commonweal fully realized that the Church was in no position to be anything but cautious. It could see no "signs of a political and civic movement compatible with the Christian conscience" arising in the near future to assist the Church in her battle. No enthusiasm was shown by this Catholic weekly for some recent statements by Dr. Hjalmar Schacht criticizing the Nazi excesses. "It is far from clear that his fanatical, reactionary conservatism would be, from the Catholic point of view, more than the lesser of two grave and disturbing evils."

One week later Michael Williams, The Commonweal editor, observed that the German-Vatican relations "were about as critical as could be without an actual denunciation of the violated Concordat." 93

Neither Commonweal account was especially pleased with the way affairs were going in Germany, but, as could be expected

from what they had been writing at this time, both America and 
The Ave Maria responded differently. The Fulda declaration was 
an act of "faith and courage," said the September 14 America with 
its usual air of optimism. German Catholicism stood united a-
against the persecution.

That the Catholics in Germany will stand firm in the 
Faith, we have no doubt whatever. Persecution has united 
them with their Bishops and with Peter, and there is no 
disloyalty, or even dissension, among them. Nations rise 
and fall, but the Church survives to continue her mission 
among men. One need not be a prophet to foresee that 
when the Nazi faction is remembered only as a band that 
misruled Germany, the Catholic Church will still hold 
her German children, bound to her by the chains of Peter. 94

The September 21 Ave Maria described the letter as "a splendid 
example of power in reserve." Considered noteworthy was the fact 
that the hierarchy expressed greater anxiety for their country 
than they did for their Church. "For the Fatherland more than 
the Church will suffer from the drum-major antics of the preten-
tious Hitler. The Church has outlived other power-mad, strutting 
tyrants and will outlive Hitler." 95

One Protestant journal immediately responded to the Cath-
olic bishops' declaration. Germany was progressing toward her 
greatest religious crisis, in The Christian Century's opinion. 
The Catholic Church leaders had formally reiterated their refusal 
to subject their institution to state dictatorship. In the bi-
shops' counterattack the Century believed that they had gone as 

94 America, LIII (September 14, 1935), 531.
95 The Ave Maria, XLII (New Series)(September 21, 1935), 
374-375.
It was threatening to place all Germany under an interdict. "German national feeling has never forgotten the result of one interdict; even the treaty of Versailles has not left as deep wounds as the courtyard of Canossa." 

In effect, the Nazi answer to the churchmen came during the National Socialist Party Congress at Nuremberg, September 9–16, 1935, a meeting which also saw the birth of the initial anti-Semitic Nuremberg Laws. Addressing the wildly-cheering, partisan throng, Adolf Hitler listed the so-called political Catholics as one of his enemies at home and denied that his regime was fostering neo-paganism.

It soon became evident from the news and articles found in the periodicals in the subsequent weeks that there was little relaxation of tensions. Although in some particulars it was misleading, a significant article on the problems of the German Catholic Church, "The Catholic War on Hitler" by Emil Lengyel, an author of numerous books on international affairs, appeared in the November 26, 1935 Nation. German government officials had publicly proclaimed often that they wished to avoid the problems that Bismarck became involved with, but actually, said Lengyel, "the Kulturkampf is on, and the Vatican has reversed its previous policy toward Hitler rule." The arrests of nuns and priests for so-called illegal currency transactions had helped to mold the German Catholic masses into the most radical opponents of the

96 The Christian Century, LII (September 11, 1935), 1131.
Hitler dictatorship, and, at the present, the only organized faction to oppose the Nazis. Lengyel went as far as to say that the "majority" of the Catholics "would gladly make common cause with the Socialists and dissident Protestants--some of them even with the Communists--if these potential allies were not too weak to move." German Catholics, led by Cardinals Faulhaber of Munich and Bertram of Breslau, "have reached the conclusion that it is their religious and patriotic duty to resist the Hitler regime, which they regard as that of the anti-Christ." Government pressure and persecution were "less open than that of the Jews, but... almost as virulent." Lengyel found it hard to believe that the attacks could go on without the Fuehrer's approval. Whoever doubted the accuracy of Lengyel's story, said the editors of The Nation, who seldom found anything good to say about the Catholic Church, could look at the latest news telling of the "suicide" of the former head of the Dominicans in Germany, Thomas Stuhlweissenburg, and the reported "sickness" of another Dominican bishop, Peter Legge.

If a German Catholic priest ends his life rather than endure longer the torments of a German prison, it is news. Any one may suspect, the Catholic belief in the impropriety of suicide being what it is, that Dr. Stuhlweissenburg's death was actively hastened by his jailers. 97

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Emil Lengyel, "The Catholic War on Hitler," The Nation, CXLI (November 6, 1935), 532-534, and 523. Other editorial comment equally as critical of the Nazi treatment of the Catholic Church was published in: The Literary Digest, CXX (November 9, 1935), 12; The Commonweal, XXII (October 4, 1935), 540; The Ave Maria, XLII (New Series)(November 23, 1935), 663; America, LIV (November 30, 1935), 191; The Catholic World, CXLII (January, 1936), 393-395; and The Sign, XV (January, 1936), 324. The Nazis
Writing in the December 6 Commonweal, Father Victor Green saw the curse of paganism undermining the bulwark of Christianity, the Catholic Church, "with diabolical thoroughness, and determination." She was "being tied and dragged to the slaughter." Hitler himself was behind the program, Father Green claimed, although many were ready to accuse only his associates. A German who called himself Adolf Schübelgruber fully agreed with Father Green in his article for The Catholic World for December 1935. He indicated that Chancellor Hitler was the master of the German political scene.

Many people have evolved the idea of a Hitler who is a weak man entirely at the mercy of evil counselors. This is nonsense, Hitler with all his weaknesses and faults inspires absolute loyalty. He is a master in the art of employing other people's capacities and defects. There is no vice and no crime which he could not use while himself remaining apparently aloof from the frailties which he tolerates in his servants and in the mob.

Actually, continued the author, he had never officially proclaimed war on the Catholic Church. He gave the appearance that he desired to save Christianity and "to help Catholics to be better Christians than they were under the aegis of 'corrupt Centrum politicians.'" The Hitler totalitarian government was attempting to place the Catholic Church in Germany in the same position as

behavior was also censored by Sidney B. Fay, "German Church Conflict," Current History, XLIII (December, 1935), 317, and by an associate editor of America, John A. Toomey, S.J., "Nazi Madhouse," America, LIV (October 19, 1935), 36.

98 Victor Green, "Some Impressions of Germany," The Commonweal, XXIII (December 6, 1935), 145-147. Green, a Catholic Priest, had recently visited Germany.
the Russian Orthodox Church. 99

Youth organizations became a constant source of friction between the Catholic Church and the government. News that Cardinal Faulhaber had spoken out on this subject, denouncing the government for failing to live up to the 1933 Concordat, appeared in The Christian Century on February 19, 1936. The journal editorially chided Catholics for believing that any kind of agreement could ever be reached with a totalitarian state. 100 An account by The Literary Digest of February 22 revealed that a number of Catholic priests and laymen, all prominent in Catholic youth work had been arrested, some being charged with collusion with the Communists. 101 Commenting on the current difficulties, Sidney B. Fay in the March Current History suggested that a German youth group, less radical and demanding than the Hitler organization, might restore peace between the Catholic Church and the government. Whatever the outcome, the upper hand was held by the dictatorship; and it would be the Nazis who worked out the final arrangement to which the churchmen would have to eventually accede.

America, which earlier had criticized reports emanating from Germany for supposedly exaggerating the details of the Na-

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99 Adolf Schückelgruber, "The Church in Germany," The Catholic World, CXLII (December, 1935), 292-293. The author was a Catholic who had to disguise his name.

100 The Christian Century, LIII (February 19, 1936), 283.

101 The Literary Digest, OXLI (February 22, 1936), 13.

tional Socialist atrocities against Jews and Socialists, announced on February 22, 1936, that the stories being sent from Germany concerning Catholic sufferings probably "err by understatement." It further added that "the complete abolition of Catholic youth organizations, in violation of the Concordat, was reported to be the goal of Hitler's Government." A list of the various crimes against the Catholic Church, her clergy and her organizations was given by the March 1936 Catholic World. Yet it found the Hitler dictatorship difficult to understand: while the German Catholics were being "bitterly harassed," the Nazi government sent congratulatory messages to Pius XI on the anniversary of his coronation. On February 15 the editors of The Ave Maria contributed the news that at least eight Catholic publications had recently been suppressed. Expatriate Prince Hubertus Loewenstein told Father John A. Toomey in an America interview on March 21 that the Church was "in greater peril today in Germany than it ever was in German history."106

The February 26, 1936 Nation speculated about the effects of the anti-Catholic program on German life and foresaw some interesting developments. "There may even be substantiation for the theory that the Catholics and the Communists have joined

103 America, LIV (February 22, 1936), 463, 482.
104 The Catholic World, CXLII (March, 1936), 746.
105 The Ave Maria, XLIII (New Series) (February 15, 1936), 217.
hands in a struggle with the powers of darkness against which every degree and kind of enlightenment, religious or non-religious, are necessarily united." But these forces would not and could not win, "unless their strength, and the strength of any allies they have been able to enlist is greater than we have been led to believe." No disturbances would be allowed to get out of hand, for this would place in jeopardy the Nazi military preparations. The stakes were very high. Every person must be dedicated to militarism, said the Nazi philosophy, no matter what the religious leaders think about it. Presently, the whole German countryside is the domain of the Gestapo secret police, and any criticism of the government will be answered by wholesale arrests.107

In a May 8, 1936 Commonweal article entitled "Crucifixion on the Swastika," an observer of religious affairs in Nazi Germany, who called himself Heinrich Waellermann, recorded the Nazi boasts that the Catholic Church in Germany would be exterminated within two years. Although the totalitarian state was still in its incipient stage, already great inroads had been made by the National Socialist ideology among the German Catholic population. "German Catholics remind one of defenseless sheep huddled in silent helplessness, beaten on all sides by a perfect storm of propaganda," said Waellermann. Today in Nazi Germany the Catholic had to be a hero and not merely a "good" Catholic, for the "good"
Catholics of ten years ago...are today on the other side.\textsuperscript{108} The April \textit{Sign} seemed to find it ludicrous that Adolf Hitler had been referring to himself in speeches as the "Defender of the Faith" against the Communist threat to the East. Everything that he attributed to the Russian Bolsheviks was being practiced by the Nazis against organized religion.\textsuperscript{109}

More arrests and trials of the Catholic clergymen in Germany, particularly those of 276 Franciscans for "moral offenses," again brought some journal response in June 1936 and after. The June 12 \textit{Commonweal} opined that this situation should "arouse even sleepy Americans to a realization of the force of the attack now being leveled against the Catholic Church in Germany." Having destroyed almost everything else, the Nazis were now after the good name of the simple Catholic clergy.\textsuperscript{110} While \textit{The Ave Maria} agreed with the views of \textit{The Commonweal}, \textit{America} was critical of foreign correspondents for spreading the false rumors being instigated by the German government about the Catholic clergy.\textsuperscript{111} Writing in the September \textit{Catholic World}, Miss A. Norton Raybould restated a position once held by other Catholic commentators but

\textsuperscript{108} Heinrich Waellermann, "Crucifixion on the Swastika," \textit{The Commonweal}, XXIV (May 8, 1936), 35-37. Waellermann, an observer of German affairs, was the pseudonym of a Catholic eyewitness to the events which he described.

\textsuperscript{109} \textit{The Sign}, XV (April, 1936), 515.

\textsuperscript{110} \textit{The Commonweal}, XXIV (June 12, 1936), 171.

\textsuperscript{111} \textit{The Ave Maria}, XLIII (New Series) (June 20, 1936), 791, and \textit{America}, LV (June 20, 1936), 242, 262.
now apparently abandoned by most in the light of what was going on in the Third Reich, that the "Church will find the means to heal these moral and political ills" and turn back the menace of religious persecution. 112

The Franciscan episode was "new evidence of the ruthless disregard of justice which characterized the totalitarian state," declared The Nation on June 10. The underhanded attack upon the Catholic Church would be partially successful, this journal predicted, since the Catholics, now with no free Catholic press or Center Party to help bolster and defend their position, had nothing with which to defend themselves except their courage. This situation was the result of the 1933 Concordat. 113 On the other hand, The Christian Century for July 8 believed that the National Socialist government was "riding for a fall" if it continued its attack on the universal practices of the Catholic Church. The present Nazi assault aimed at the monastic institutions and the practice of celibacy among the Catholic clergy. "It makes no difference what non-Catholic critics may think of these institutions --both of which, in our judgment, are objectionable from many points of view--any government that makes a frontal attack on them is going to get hurt." 114

112 A. Norton Raybould, "Whither Europe?" The Catholic World, CXLIII (September, 1936), 734. Miss Raybould, a well-known Catholic authoress and traveller, was living in Austria.
113 The Nation, CXLII (June 10, 1936), 726-727.
114 The Christian Century, LIII (July 8, 1936), 957.
Along with the government attack on Christianity, which subsided appreciably during the summer of 1936 because of the Olympic games, the continual activity of the pagan cult in National Socialist circles occupied the columns of some religious journals, both Catholic and Protestant, in the summer months. One of the observers, Ralph Thurston, writing in the July 10 Commonweal, noted the increase of cooperation between German Catholics and Protestants to fight the pagan evil.

The German Catholic bishops gathered for their annual conference at Fulda during August 1936. Besides the yearly pastoral letter, a special note was sent to the Fuehrer. On this occasion, the memorandum was compromising in tone, suggesting that the hierarchy was worried that Catholicism's status in Germany was being weakened by the Nazis' assault. While appealing to Hitler to live up to the 1933 Concordat and to end the government's attacks on Catholic institutions, the bishops argued that Catholicism could be National Socialism's natural ally in the struggle with world Communism. The Hierarchy's criticism was also directed at the Nazis for making overt efforts to link Catholicism with Communism.

The response of The Ave Maria for September 26, 1936.

115 Ralph Thurston, "Hitler's Heathens," The Commonweal, XXIV (July 10, 1936), 279-280; Thurston was the pseudonym of a foreign correspondent; Paul I. Morentz, "A Nationalization Religion Versus Christian Morality," The Lutheran Church Quarterly, IX (July, 1936), 309-310; and James G. McDonald, "Modern Spiritual Dictatorship," The Christian Register, CXV (June 11, 1936), 400; McDonald had recently resigned as the High Commissioner for Refugees from Germany.
denoted that it still seemed to be hoping that the Hitlerites would ultimately listen to reason. "If Hitler gives heed to the warning of the Bishops he will be able to keep Communism out of Germany as Mussolini has done in Italy." However, on October 10 the editors finally despaired that the German leaders would come to their senses; the same issue of this Catholic weekly included an article by Florence Gilmore eulogizing the Catholics who had died as a result of Nazi persecutions.\footnote{The Ave Maria, XLIV (New Series) (September 26, 1936), 408; (October 10, 1936), 471; and Florence Gilmore, "Contemporary Martyrs in Germany," 457–460. Miss Gilmore had been a long-time contributor to Catholic periodicals.}

Although America of August 1 considered the anti-Catholicism of the Hitler government to be a "permanent policy," six weeks later it expressed the hope that Hitler would "see the light." If his attitude toward Communism was sincere, he would follow the bishops' advice, editorialized the Catholic organ. Nonetheless, another editorial, entitled "In Germany," on December 5 contended that "the Church has earnestly striven to avoid a break with the Government but it would appear that patience is fast ceasing to be a virtue."\footnote{America, LV (August 1, 1936), 386; (September 12, 1936), 541; and LVI (December 5, 1936), 204.} America had recognized that the German bishops' appeal to the Fuehrer had been in vain.

In spite of the condition of Catholicism in Germany, the October 9 Commonweal could still state that although in principle Fascism and Nazism were condemned by the Church, "the Church has
been able to tolerate Fascism and Nazism, simply because as yet neither of these two systems have attempted to enforce the final conclusions of their philosophies." Just what point National Socialism had reached in its varied undertakings, many of which had been aimed at the ultimate destruction of the Catholic Church, The Commonweal editorial did not say. At variance with the editor's views was a Commonweal article by William Western, who thought that the Nazis had already gone quite far enough in enforcing their ideas by diabolical methods. It was very clear to the intelligent observer that the Nazi pagans were out to substitute for Christianity another creed "which is more convenient to the nature of Germans and makes them more fit to devote themselves entirely and without restriction to the political task as figured out by the Nazis."118

The November 1936 Catholic World added little to the discussion besides the comment that the German hierarchy was "profoundly concerned" about religious affairs, while the monthly Sign decided that, under the circumstances, the German Catholics had little choice but to fight the regime.119

In a cynical article, "The Catholic Stake in Europe's Crisis," which appeared in the October 21 Christian Century, a

118 The Commonweal, XXIV (October 9, 1936), 542, and William Western, "The Present Front in Germany," (October 23, 1936), 601-613. Western was the pen-name of a priest familiar with the German scene.

119 The Catholic World, CXLIV (November, 1936), 239, and The Sign, XVI (November, 1936), 197.
journalist who called himself Ignaz O’Brien did not think that the problems between Catholics and National Socialists would last. A good likelihood existed that the two groups would find ways to cooperate. Adolf Hitler was a Catholic and thought "along Catholic lines." Both the German and the Vatican foreign policies had as a basic aim the eradication of the Communist threat in the Soviet Union.

Seeing that national socialism has also completely routed within its borders communism, socialism, free masonry and all other movements likely to divert loyalty from the all-embracing state, the way is paved for closer understanding between the Vatican and Germany, since the Vatican has no sympathy with anything that savors of "Marxism," and can appreciate the importance of the spirit of supreme loyalty. When the moment is ripe for a real concordat between the two powers, all persecution of the Catholics in Germany will probably be immediately called off by the "Leader."120

Most other American journalists, including the editors of The Christian Century, would probably disagree with O’Brien's contentions, for the possibility of a Nazi-Catholic entente appeared to have long disappeared under the existing circumstances in Germany. But within a few months the writings of some American Catholic journalists would lend support to O’Brien’s views.

While the Nazis grappled with their various domestic questions and tried to decide what to do about such foreign issues as the Spanish Civil War, an interesting debate developed

120 Ignaz O’Brien, "The Catholic Stake in Europe's Crisis," The Christian Century, LIII (October 21, 1936), 1386-1388. O’Brien was the pseudonym used by a journalist of international repute, according to this Protestant weekly.
in the pages of the American Catholic journals. It should also be pointed out that during the first half of 1937 the Nazi government again eased up in its anti-Catholic activities, and therefore, the Catholic journals had few opportunities to reiterate their usual charges. Because of the war in Spain, a question arose of whether or not a Fascist regime—such as the one organized by General Francisco Franco—could be supported by Catholics if the enemy was Communism. During 1937 this discussion often turned to the subject of the German form of Fascism and provoked a variety of responses by Catholic journalists.

Taking the lead in examining the perplexing question was the former editor of America, Father Wilfrid Parsons. In the January 1937 issue of the Knights of Columbus monthly Columbia, Parsons at first concentrated on international affairs, discussing the possibility of organizing an alliance against the growing Nazi threat. He considered Great Britain the key to the future of Europe, since the British statesmen had a choice to make: either stand behind France and her ally the Soviet Union against the Fascist powers, or stay out of continental affairs and let the Fascist states eliminate Communist Russia. Influencing the English decision, according to Parsons, would be the fact that Russian agents had been active in the British Empire, "while Italian and German Fascism is keeping to itself." Much depended on which of the two totalitarian ideologies the London government decided to support, but if it was Father Parsons' choice it would have to be Fascism, for it represented merely a reaction to the evils of
Bolshevism.

There is no Fascism unless Communism comes first. Fascism is only the reaction of the middle class to the menace of Communism. It is not an end sought in itself, as Communism is. If there were no Communism, there would never be any cry for Fascism; for Fascism is nothing more than the instinctive demand of the middle class, threatened in its security, for a strong central authority to curb its enemy. Take away the enemy and you will never have that demand.

A few weeks later, Father Parsons amplified his remarks in The Commonweal. In an article entitled "Fascist-Communist Dilemma," he warned American Catholics that Communism was quickly identified with democracy in many naive circles, and a week later he compared and assessed the totalitarian ideologies.

While Fascism is a social-economic-political system of State organization, Communism is that, and also a philosophy of life. It has its definite dogmas on God, on the nature of man and his destiny, and on moral obligations that are the diametrical opposite of Christianity, and the preaching of these dogmas is inseparable from its economic grounds, in the name of democracy; Communism must be rejected not only on these but also on religious grounds, in the name of God. There can be no question as to which is the greater evil.121

In "Catholicism and Communism," the editors of The Commonweal entered the discussion by defending Catholicism against various "left-wing" groups and The Christian Century management, whose "reckless charges play the game of those more active left-wing groups." Commonweal's editors outlined the long history of the Catholic condemnation of Communism on religious grounds. But

by no means, they asserted, did this attack on one totalitarian ideology imply the support of another, namely Fascism. While The Commonweal seemed to realize the evils of the right-wing extremists' movement, it substantially supported the views of Father Parsons. Another defense of the Catholic Church's policy with regard to the modern totalitarian ideologies was made by the February 12 Commonweal. The editorial, "The Policy of Catholicism," intended to answer charges publicized in a recent address by the noted American Protestant leader Reverend Reinhold Niebuhr that Catholicism was linked to modern feudalism or Fascism, just as it had been to the feudal system of the middle ages. Of course the policies and methods of the Church had been influenced by medieval feudalism, but the Church had existed before this institution, and when it disappeared, the Church remained "unchanged, essentially, and essentially unchangeable," was The Commonweal's reply.122

Not every Commonweal commentary smacked of forced rationalization. An outspoken criticism of Nazism was voiced by the English priest Edward Quinn in the February 5 Commonweal. "Nazi Germany, which claims to be the defender of Christendom, is only second to Russia in following out the Machiavellian principle, and appeals to it even more explicitly." Since the spiritual weapons of Christianity had "failed" to contain and conquer Bolshevism, they had been cast aside by the Nazis. The principles of

122 The Commonweal, XXV (January 1, 1937), 257-258, and (February 12, 1937), 426.
National Socialism were now "regarded as supremely spiritual," wrote Father Quinn. 123

In April and May 1937, the managing editor and the editor of the two leading Catholic weeklies, The Commonweal and America, carried on a dialogue on the evils of Communism and Fascism, with the starting point being the Spanish Civil War. 124 It is interesting to note that Pope Pius XI had already issued the encyclical Mit brennender Sorge on March 14, 1937, criticizing the Hitler regime, but neither party in the debate lingered on this document. Mr. George N. Shuster, the managing editor of The Commonweal, spoke out strongly against Fascism in all its national forms and warned churchmen not to identify themselves with Fascist regimes. Shuster recognized that, while Fascism might oppose Communism, it had in its growing process eliminated the most elemental moral principles and all signs of Christian ethics. In Germany, for instance, Fascism was rapidly becoming a "national Bolshevism." 125

123 Edward Quinn, "The Primacy of Politics," ibid., (February 5, 1937), 408. Quinn was a priest from the diocese of Leeds, England.


Editor Francis X. Talbot, S.J., cited in *America* the historical fact that the Catholic Church did not associate herself with any one form of government, and, in spite of the evidence that some clergymen had indicated their preference for the Fascist form, there was no danger of the Vatican aligning itself with this view. Concluding his side of the dialogue, Father Talbot made a rather thought-provoking statement, considering the difficulties the Catholic Church was experiencing under the German Fascist dictatorship, as well as the recent papal encyclical.

But here is the point: a collaboration with Fascism is possible for the Catholic Church; a collaboration with Communism is absolutely impossible for the Catholic Church. Mr. Shuster can be a Fascist and a fervent Catholic; he cannot be a Communist and a Catholic.126

Don Luigi Sturzo, a former political leader of the Italian Catholics before the Fascist episode, compared the ideologies of Communism and Fascism for the readers of the April 16 Commonweal. One difference between the two was that in Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy social classes "still coexist, with the principle of private property," while in the Soviet Union private property had been abolished and the proprietary classes scattered. In the area of religion, the Communists were materialists and atheists, but Nazism desired "a religion for its own purposes," and the Fascists sought a compromise with Catholicism. Sturzo denied that either ideology was "the remedy for the other"; neither were

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126 Francis X. Talbot, S.J., "Further Reflections on the Spanish Situation," *America*, LVII (May 1, 1937), 76-77. Father Talbot served as *America*'s editor from 1936 to 1944 after succeeding Father Parsons.
they antithetical. "The real fact is that Fascism paves the way for Communism or for something of the kind, and that Communism paves the way for Fascism or for another regime of the same type? In the course of his article, Sturzo perceived an important area of similarity in the totalitarian movements.

What does more than anything to put Germany, Italy and Russia on the same plane, so that they disturb the whole world, is their common and relentless war against western democracies, against the system of traditional rights, against respect of human personality, things rooted in our Christian civilization. These regimes sooner or later are bound by their very nature to result in war.127

In an article entitled "The German Situation," the Englishman Christopher Hollis discussed the German problem in The Ave Maria for April 24, 1937, and gave an excellent example of how a Catholic could reconcile himself to National Socialism while always hoping for the best. The majority of Germans, he believed, saw in a dictatorship the only way to gain equality in European circles. They were willing to surrender their liberty to achieve this end, but, in the last four years, more had probably been lost than they ever considered possible. Economically, however, the regime had improved conditions to a point where they were better than any time during the Weimar period, in spite of many rumors to the contrary. Hollis was convinced that the lib-

127Luigi Sturzo, "Communism: Fascism," The Commonweal, XXV (April 16, 1937), 686-688. Sturzo (1871-1959) was a Sicilian priest who founded and headed the Catholic Popular of Italy (Partito Popolare), which was destroyed by the Fascists. He authored numerous books on contemporary political problems and was especially interested in the role of the state in the modern world.
eral regime of the post-war era could not have survived for long. "If Germany had not gone Nazi it would have gone Communist, and all central Europe with it. And therefore in that negative sense the coming of the Nazi regime was certainly a good thing."

Some of the National Socialist teachings, Hollis admitted, were objectionable, and papal protests had been curtly brushed aside. Too, there had occurred the overt persecution of German Catholics and clergy. No one could be sure that the regime would turn even more anti-Christian, but one fact was clear: Hitler was no fool and in time he should realize that to combat Communism successfully he had to have the Catholic Church on his side. The German tradition was Christian, and "therefore the likelihood is that the German rulers will find that the attempt to maintain a policy that is both based on tradition and also anti-Christian involves them in contradiction and weakens the regime." For this reason their hostility to Christianity would probably be curbed. Hollis concluded by saying: "The situation is then one not without anxiety, but by no means without hope."128

Hollis was not alone in his expressions of hope. Writing in the March 1937 Sign, Denis Gwynn recognized the fact that the National Socialist dictatorship continued to limit the activities of the Catholic Church, besides promoting the German pagan sect; however, he felt that "there is still time for diplomacy and

128Christopher Hollis, "The German Situation," The Ave Maria, XLV (New Series)(April 24, 1937), 513-515. A member of the editorial board of The Tablet of London, Hollis had been doing economic research at Notre Dame University.
statesmanship to produce a settlement without revolutions." Gwynn took a position which was open to criticism: the Catholic Church could still play a constructive role in German affairs if some kind of modus vivendi could be reached with the regime. Ironically, an editorial in the very same issue of The Sign admitted that agreement with Hitler "seems to be almost hopeless. Concordats were scraps of paper." The February 6 Ave Maria also seemed to look forward to a compromise settlement in Germany.

While Catholic journalists debated the possibilities of Catholicism accommodating with National Socialism, a few reports from Germany telling of anti-Catholic persecution and German Catholic protests continued to make their appearance. Despite the hopes of the more optimistic Catholic writers, no change in Nazi policy to strangle gradually the Catholic Church was visible. At this point, in the spring of 1937, the Catholic-Nazi problem was clarified by an official pronouncement from the Holy See.

The papal encyclical referred to as Mit brennender Sorge was dated Passion Sunday, March 14, 1937; it was read in the churches of all the Catholic dioceses in Germany on the following Palm Sunday, before the Nazi police were aware of the letter's

129 Denis Gwynn, "Germany and Peace," The Sign, XVI (March, 1937), 494-495, 452.
130 The Ave Maria, XLV (New Series)(February 6, 1937), 183
131 The Catholic World, CXLV (April, 1937), 550; The Literary Digest, CXXXII (February 27, 1937), 10; and The Ave Maria, XLV (New Series)(March 13, 1937), 343-344.
existence. In the document the pontiff protested the Hitler government's failure to abide by the 1933 Concordat which, Pius said, was drawn up in the first place with "many and gave misgivings," and he denounced the German pagan trend.

"Almost from the beginning those misgivings were justified," replied America on April 3, but it should be remembered that at the time of the treaty's signing this journal had very little to say about it. America noted that the Holy Father had been patient, but the Nazi persecution of the Church had become too grave to maintain silence. Of course Pius XI wanted peace, "but he plainly warns these madmen in Berlin that 'the Church is prepared to defend its rights and liberties.'" The Jesuit weekly expressed doubt, however, that the pope's message would halt the Nazis' anti-Catholic activities.132 The Commonweal allowed the encyclical to pass without significant commentary.133

Both the May Catholic World and The Ave Maria for April 10 naturally supported the papal position, but neither journal evinced optimism for future German church-state relations.134 More penetrating comments were found in the May 1937 issue of Columbia. Father Wilfrid Parsons reasoned that the Holy See actually had no choice in 1933; it was either the Concordat and its

132America, LVI (April 3, 1937), 612–613.
133The Commonweal, XXV (April 2, 1937), 636, was only a brief news dispatch calling attention to the publication of the papal encyclical.
equivocal terms or a National Socialist war against German Catholicism. Regrettably, it turned out to be both.

She naturally took the peace, praying for the best. After all, she is no worse off than if she never had a Concordat; and she enjoys before the peoples of the world the unsailable moral advantages of being the wronged party, whose only fault was to trust the present German rulers. She will outlast them.135

Pope Pius XI's pronouncements looked like the beginning of a Nazi-Catholic fight to the finish to the March 31 Christian Century. Another Kulturkampf seemed imminent, a phrase mentioned very frequently over the last three years, and the Protestant organ seemed just as confident of Catholicism's ultimate success as some of the Catholic journals. "If it is that, it may confidently be predicted that in the long run the church will win, though it may require years to verify that prophecy."136

After briefly reviewing the action by the Vatican officials, The Literary Digest for April 3 concluded that since the pope had not renounced the Concordat of 1933, Hitler probably would soon.137 The Nation and The New Republic agreed that it was about time for the papal officials to take action.138 Considering the present situation in the Iberian peninsula, it was "inexplicable" that the Catholic Church would join hands with the

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136 The Christian Century, LIV (March 31, 1937), 404.
137 The Literary Digest, CXXIII (April 3, 1937), 13.
German and Italian Fascists to overthrow the legal government of Spain, declared The New Republic. "Fascism, in any country, means enslavement for the mass of the population among whom the Church finds its strength. The Vatican's policy of allying itself with the fascists is certain to endanger the Church's own existence."

As a result of the pope's March declaration, the Nazi government intensified its anti-Catholic activities against the clergy and educational facilities. Editorials and articles called these events to the attention of the American people during the late spring and summer of 1937, but without any new, astute observations. Both religious and secular journals seemed to be waiting for the Church's next move. A few perceptive articles also appeared in this period. Having already touched on the problem of Nazi persecution of the Catholic Church in the July 2, 1937 Commonweal, Professor Waldemar Gurian presented a thorough study in the January 1938 Foreign Affairs. That the Nazi-Catholic

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139The Ave Maria, XLV (New Series) (May 22, 1937), 664; (June 19, 1937), 792-793; and XLVI (New Series) (July 17, 1937), 89; The Sign, XVI (June, 1937), 645; (July, 1937), 707; and Denis Gwynn, "The Anti-Fascist Front," 759; The Catholic World, CXLV (July, 1937), 389-392, 492; and George H. Shuster, "The Man Who Might Have Saved Europe," 426; America, LVII (May 15, 1937), 122; and John A. Toomey, S. J., "The Hitler Scheme to Kidnap Catholic Children," (May 22, 1937), 152; The Commonweal, XXVI (May 14, 1937), 59, 75; and (June 4, 1937), 143-144; The Christian Century LIV (May 12, 1937), 603; (May 26, 1937), 672-674; (June 9, 1937), 732; and A. S. Eker, "Correspondence from Germany: Church Struggle Grows Tenser," (June 16, 1937), 783; The Nation, CXLIV (May 29, 1937), 606-607; (June 5, 1937), 634; and (June 12, 1937), 663; The New Republic, XCI (June 30, 1937), 206; The Literary Digest, CXXXII (June 19, 1937), 12; and John Palmer Daivit, "Through Neighbors' Doorways: Leaks Around the Bulkheads," The Survey Graphic, XXVI (July, 1937), 393.
struggle would persist without resulting in an open break in German-Vatican relations was Gurian's assumption. After summarizing the chain of events since the 1933 Concordat, Gurian, who had some unkind words for patronizing German Catholics and reticent bishops, concluded that the Nazis would continue to eat away at the Church body, using, ironically enough, the 1933 agreement "as a means of fettering and oppressing the Church." As for the future, Gurian said:

The National Socialists are conducting their war on the Church not so much by means of a frontal attack as by the process of elimination. Such methods demand a new attitude on the part of the faithful. That is why one must conclude that the future of the Catholic Church in Germany depends above all upon the unknown believers who defend themselves against the totalitarian claims and obscurantist tactics of the National Socialist state. On the success of their attitude depends the question whether there will ever again be a humane culture in Germany, one in which the rights of free individuals are fully recognized.140

In an article for the July 17 America entitled "Hitler Should Learn a Lesson from History," historian Raymond Corrigan, S.J., compared the Hitlerites' assaults on the Church's position with the Prussian government's response to the mixed marriage problem in the nineteenth century, which was a false and misleading analogy. Father Corrigan hoped that the Nazi government ac-

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140 Waldemar Gurian, "Nazi Persecutions of Catholics," The Commonweal, XXVI (July 2, 1937), 261, and "Hitler's Undeclared War on the Catholic Church," Foreign Affairs, XIV (January, 1938), 260-271. Gurian, a refugee from Nazi Germany, was an historian who was particularly interested in the religious struggle in Germany; he wrote Hitler and the Christians (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1936), and was a member of the department of politics at Notre Dame University.
tion would soon bring the Church a new vitality similar to that of one hundred years before.141

An editorial in the July 2 Commonweal, "The Church in Germany," which contained a critique of several articles and books dealing with the religious struggle in Germany, made a half-hearted attempt to be realistic about religious conditions in the Nazi state. It recognized that the National Socialist aim was to eliminate completely the Christian idea from German life. As the Nazi government ruthlessly proceeded step by step to fulfill its plan, the Church seemed to be suffering a loss of prestige as well as membership for her failure to take an unequivocal stand against Fascism. Especially harmful seemed to be the Vatican's policy of indecision in denouncing the German government for its handling of the 1933 Concordat instead of severing relations with the dictatorship. But The Commonweal deemed this criticism unjustified, and it defended the papacy's position by quoting from Michael de la Bedoyere in The Dublin Review.

Those who would have her concentrate either on a quasi-political attack on Communism and Agnostic Liberalism when not bringing about a new reign of economic and social justice forget that she is powerless to effect anything except in so far as these secondary and tertiary matters automatically result from conviction in her religious dogma and practice of her moral teaching. To concentrate on them at a time when her essential function is widely challenged may be good short-term policy, but it is neither honest nor likely to pay in the long run. One may be sure that the Vatican realizes that if the

141 Raymond Corrigan, S.J., "Hitler Should Learn a Lesson from History," America, LVII (July 17, 1937), 343. Corrigan was a professor of history at St. Louis University.
Church has much to say about social reform and international morality, and a great part to play in the fight against Communism and Agnostic Liberalism, her immediate and primary task must be to defend and to win back ground on her dogmatic and moral side, for it is from this side alone that the rest of the things she would like to do find their spring and their coercive forces.142

More on the German religious question in the same issue of The Commonweal was added by Michael Williams in "Blood and Tears." He acknowledged that some American Catholics continued to support the Hitler regime in spite of the latest anti-religious episodes, maintaining that the German bishops and the Vatican had been deceived by anti-Hitler propaganda. Their position continued to be "that Herr Adolf Hitler was plainly a divine messenger entrusted by Providence with the glorious task of preserving civilization and Christianity from the subversive undermining of the Communists and the Jews." The facts, however, could not support this ridiculous point of view, but, unfortunately, the great majority of American Catholics had failed to recognize them as such, and, to the amazement of the author, were "indifferent" to what their fellow Catholics, as well as the Protestants and Jews, were suffering in Germany.143

In the autumn of 1937 and over the winter months of 1937–


143 Michael Williams, "Blood and Tears," The Commonweal, XXVI (July 2, 1937), 257-258.
1938, the Nazis continued to apply pressure on the German Catholic Church organizations. Many of the reports found in the journals were very similar to those found in earlier issues.\textsuperscript{144} One by-product of the continuing anti-Catholic activity by the National Socialist officials was that Catholic spokesmen began to take a more realistic attitude toward all forms of totalitarianism. That both Fascism and Communism were evil was the theme of articles by Professor Paul Kiniery in the August 1937 \textit{Catholic World} and Father Wilfrid Parsons in the March 1938 \textit{Columbia}.\textsuperscript{145} Every Christian should be aware "that a great line of demarcation lies not between Fascism and Communism, but between democracy and the totalitarian state," exclaimed Prince Hubertus Loewenstein in the March 18, 1938 \textit{Commonweal}.\textsuperscript{146}

\textsuperscript{144} "American Visitor," "Hitler and Goebbells Are Having Their Day," \textit{America}, LVII (September 4, 1937), 509; This visitor had relations in Germany and did not want his name disclosed; (October 23, 1937), 60; Hilaire Belloc, "Catholicism or Nazi State-Worship," LVIII (October 30, 1937), 76-77; Gabor De Bessenyey, "Herr Rosenberg Fashions the Third Reich," (November 20, 1937), 149; the author had been an army officer in the Austro-Hungarian army and later served as a newspaper correspondent, college professor and lecturer; \textit{The Ave Maria}, XLVI (New Series) (October 23, 1937), 536; Marielli Benziger, "The Case of German Catholics," (October 30, 1937), 545; a professional genealogist and dietician, Miss Benziger had contributed many articles to Catholic journals over the years, including several on Germany; and (November 27, 1937), 694; \textit{The Sign}, XVII (November, 1937), 198; and Waldemar Gurian, "Nazi Against the Church," \textit{The Commonweal}, XXVII (November 19, 1937), 91-93.


\textsuperscript{146} Hubertus Loewenstein, "Goose-Step Freedom," \textit{The Commonweal}, XXVII (March 18, 1938), 567. Prince Loewenstein was an exiled German Catholic liberal and the author of books on international affairs.
While Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr congratulated those few Catholic liberals who continued to speak out against the totalitarian ideology, he remained particularly critical of Catholicism and its stand on Fascism in the December 8, 1937 Christian Century. In Nazi Germany the Catholic Church had "cast its lot" with Fascism, according to Niebuhr. "In Germany the church is reduced to the pathetic role of begging the Nazis to let it co-operate in their anti-communist campaign, since the pope hates communism as much as Hitler does."147 An interesting observation was made by the March 1938 Living Age. It correctly ascertained that the Fuehrer was toying with the Catholic Church, alternating between expressions of esteem and periods of persecution. "There has been persecution or tolerance, depending on the state of public opinion and expediency at the moment.... Hitler was born a Catholic and knows the Catholic mind."148

The Catholic liberal George M. Shuster painted a black picture of the Catholic situation in Nazi Germany in the February 4 Commonweal article entitled "Twilight in the Third Reich," which seemed to substantiate the charges made by Reverend Niebuhr and The Living Age. "A whole nation walks through the dark toward a collective and political goal of which it is able to form no picture of any kind." It was impossible to predict or define any-

148 The Living Age, CCCLIV (March, 1938), 3.
thing in Germany under the circumstances, but in the growing darkness "men derive a strange resolve to bravery," and under this condition Shuster believed that the Christian churches in Germany had to be judged. In his opinion, German Catholicism was drifting into the same feeling of separateness that engulfed the Jews. Externally the Catholic Church remained intact, but little by little her functions were being destroyed. "Present-time Germany witnesses a piecemeal destruction at the end of which the national Church may be proclaimed." German Catholics had tried to deceive themselves, and so far they had been entirely successful. There was "a curious lameness" attached to Catholic resistance, with the feeling being that better days were bound to come in the future. So far this tactic had failed and now, wrote Shuster, "the real struggle is beginning," and German Catholicism did not appear prepared psychologically to confront it.

It is impossible to convey an impression of the sorrow and discouragement that prevail among widely diverse groups of Catholics, or of the fearful silence that is gradually descending upon the most intrepid spirits. Despite all the antipathy to the Nazis, and despite the widespread bitter hatred of all they are and imply, there really seems to be no longer a way out.149

When, on March 12, 1938, Anschluss became a reality, thousands of Austrian Catholics became members of the Third Reich. This situation could have easily created a new religious crisis. Thus, the activities of the Austrian Catholics and the Church hierarchy immediately attracted the attention of some American

149 George N. Shuster, "Twilight in the Third Reich," The Commonweal, XXVII (February 4, 1938), 397-399.
journalists. In the March 19 Christian Century Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein contended that the German annexation of Austria would greatly aggravate the lingering church problems for Adolf Hitler. Despite evidence to the contrary, he insisted that the Austrian clergy and their Catholic parishioners had resisted the National Socialist ideology and would continue to do so even though Anschluss had been accomplished. Discounting the early friendly gestures of the Austrian hierarchy, a problem which resulted in further controversy, Bernstein was hopeful that the Austrian religious would not follow the example of many of their German clerical brethren in 1933. He maintained that the Christian leaders of Germany had failed in their duty.

By their blindness and lack of comprehension they made the Nazi dictatorship possible. They showed little concern when Hitler robbed the German people of their freedom and imprisoned or murdered pacifists, Social Democrats, and Communists. Pastor Niemöller's sermon pronouncing God's blessing on Hitler's electoral mandates after the burning of the Reichstag was an interesting revelation of the mentality of the clergy. A small number, among them Cardinal Faulhaber, have denounced discrimination against Christians of Jewish descent, but scarcely a voice has been lifted against persecution of the Jews as Jews. Only when Hitler began to attack the church did the clergy rise to resist.

Too late did the German clergy realize that Hitler supported and fomented the anti-Christian crusade, said Bernstein. Nevertheless, writing with what appeared to be the last ray of hope, the rabbi admitted that the Christian churches remained the lone center of opposition to the totalitarian regime. It was not expected that they would be victorious if the regime endured for any length of time, but they "can keep alive a spirit of rebel-
ion which under other conditions may help to liberate Germany.  

Almost as if it were answering Rabbi Bernstein's accusations, The Ave Maria in an April 2 column recognized that the Nazi purge of Austrian Jews was well under way. Yet the editors thought that their condition might have been improved if they had worked more closely with Roman Catholicism and forgot some of their liberal notions.

Catholicism throughout the world is the same as it is in Vienna. Yet Jews and Jewish supported agencies have notoriously backed those forces which are openly at war with the very same religious reality that has proved such a good neighbor in Vienna. Striving repeatedly to undermine its social principles and morality, Jews have looked upon the Church as an organization that must be removed from the earth. The Vienna incident should be an evidence of their folly. They cannot afford to continue this folly if they would continue to prosper. Jewish Communists in our own country are conspicuously burning their candles at both ends.

Upon his arrival in Vienna, Adolf Hitler was given a very friendly greeting by the archbishop of Vienna, Theodor Cardinal Innitzer. Moreover the Austrian Catholic hierarchy issued a statement on March 18 praising the accomplishments of National Socialism and calling for Catholics in Austria to support the Anschluss plebiscite. The opportunist actions of the Austrian episcopate received some consideration from American journals, notably the Catholic-controlled ones. The Catholic World for April 1938 told of Innitzer's efforts to appease the Nazis, but

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150 Philip S. Bernstein, "Hitler Dooms the Church," The Nation, CXLVI (March 19, 1938), 329-331.

151 The Ave Maria, XLVII (New Series) (April 2, 1938), 439.
it did so without editorial comment. This was probably all The Catholic World wanted to say for the time being, until more of the Austrian Catholic story could be learned.

What the Church officials at the Vatican thought about the stand being taken by the Austrian bishops became known on April 1 when a Vatican radio broadcast openly criticized the Austrian hierarchy. Innitzer was quickly summoned to Rome, where he signed a statement made public on April 7, 1938, which said that no Austrian Catholic was bound by the bishops' call for the support of the April 10 plebiscite and that the statement published on March 18 was not to be interpreted as a blanket approval of National Socialism.

Just a few days before the plebiscite vote, The Nation reported that the Catholic Church leadership was splitting into factions over the ideas of National Socialism. It described the activities of Cardinal Innitzer and his fellow Austrian bishops along with the reactions of the Holy See. The Nation assumed that the papal officials had criticized the Austrian hierarchy for being duped by the Nazis in the light of "the sad experiences of others." At last the Holy See seemed to be awakening to the political realities of the day, and the editors of The Nation were hopeful that "a suspicion is beginning to dawn on the Vatican that in choosing to beat Marxism with fascism it has clambered astride a bucking bronco and is in a fair way to be kicked by

152 The Catholic World, CXLVII (April, 1938), 104.
both horses. 153

Word reached The Christian Century on May 4 from its Vatic-
can correspondent, R. H. Markham, that the Vatican had been using
Vienna for its headquarters in the fight against the Hitler gov-
ernment in Germany. All was now lost because of Hitler's suc-
cessful appeal to nationalism. To crown the Nazi success, Mark-
ham pointed to Innitzer's written approval of the dictatorship.
"A cardinal had gone to Canossa."

Innitzer could not withstand the wishes of a whole
people. He dared not make his church the enemy of Ger-
many and raise Italian Rome above German Berlin. Long
has the Catholic Church hindered German unity and Innit-
zer at the supreme hour when all Germans were coming toge-
ther dared not try to dam the strength. It would have
swept the church away. It might have continued the Refor-
mation and pushed political Catholicism entirely beyond
the Alps. 154

Markham, however, failed to mention the April 7 statement made in
Rome by the Austrian prelate.

More criticism aimed at the archbishop of Vienna was
found in the May 4 Christian Century. Once again later declara-
tions made by Cardinal Innitzer appeared to be ignored. Reverend
Martin Schroeder, a Lutheran minister, stated that "for all prac-
tical nazi purposes the church is in the bag" in Austria. In more
than one instance in recent German history the Catholic hierarchy
had stood behind German nationalism rather than heed the advice

153 The Nation, CXLVI (April 9, 1938), 398.
154 R. H. Markham, "Correspondence from Austria: Vienna
Catholics Vote for Hitler," The Christian Century, LV (May 4,
1938), 571.
of the Vatican. Another important consideration, contended Schroeder, was the fact "that Hitler is a Catholic." Do not be surprised, he wrote, if the Austrian cardinal becomes an important cog in the Nazi machine. "Through this manifesto blessing the annexation, Cardinal Innitzer has made a strong bid to head a national German episcopate, and Hitler is known not to forget anyone who ever was his friend in need."\(^{155}\)

Much of Schroeder's assessment was, from all appearances, influenced by his emotions. Nevertheless, the Catholic author, George N. Shuster, writing in the April 15, 1938 Commonweal, conceded that nationalism or "national Catholicism" had played a major role in the success of the Anschluss. Many Catholics in both Germany and Austria had veered either to the extreme right or left in the post-war period.\(^{156}\)

Innitzer's visit to Rome, where he was reprimanded for his actions at the time of the Nazi seizure of Austria, was mentioned by the May 1938 Catholic World. Without adding any comment, it printed a section of the Cardinal's April declaration concerning Nazism.\(^{157}\) America had more to say than usual about Innitzer's behavior. While it refused to condemn him outright, an America editorial of April 16 entitled "Unhappy Austria" im-

\(^{155}\)Martin Schroeder, "How Will Hitler Reward the Cardinal?" ibid., 555-557. Schroeder was minister of St. Mark's Evangelical Lutheran Church in Bloomfield, Nebraska.

\(^{156}\)George N. Shuster, "Terror in Vienna," The Commonweal, XXVII (April 15, 1938), 679-680.

\(^{157}\)The Catholic World, CXLVII (May, 1938), 237-238.
plied that Innitzer had made a bad error in judgment, for "it is clear to all the world outside Germany that no reliance is to be placed on any promise that Hitler may make." In another short editorial comment, it reported that the primate had gotten an "emphatic reprimand" from the Vatican officials. Clearly the Catholic Church leaders no longer placed trust in the Nazis. While it approved of this attitude, America advised "that the Church is preparing herself for inevitable conflicts that may arise."

A later article in The Ave Maria for September 17, 1938, by the Filipino, Manuel C. Colayco, tried to exonerate Cardinal Innitzer. He objected to the criticism that had been aimed at the prelate, "most of it lying and unkind." His opinion was that Innitzer, "in using the Nazi greeting" as he had on several occasions, "was merely externalizing the good faith in which he accepted Hitler's assurances." Anyway, wrote Colayco, there was no use for the Austrian Catholics to try to oppose National Socialism. It was "as foolhardy as standing on the road in order to stem the tide." If Innitzer had slighted the Hitlerites by keeping silent instead of recognizing publicly the Fuehrer's promise to protect the Church, a whole series of reprisals would have taken place. In all probability the Cardinal "remembers that a kind word turneth away wrath and that mutual trust can yet estab-

158 America, LIX (April 16, 1938), 38, 26.
lish peace."  

By the time of this article, it should have been quite clear to Colayco that nothing that Innitzer had done or could do would change Hitler's decision to make the Church subservient to the Nazi state.

Actually little had changed over the past several years with regard to relations between the Nazi regime and the Catholic Church in Germany; however, by the spring of 1938 many of the Catholic periodicals were speaking out more candidly about German affairs. In the editorial "The Terrible Taint of Fascism" the May 14, 1938 America concluded that Catholics could not morally cooperate with a Fascist regime, a radical change from Father Talbot's argument in its pages during April and May 1937. This unsigned editorial declared that Fascism was a totalitarian ideology "which does not recognize human and spiritual values outside the state, and except conferred or allowed by the state." Nor could Catholics accept the theories of Social Fascism which used force to order social and economic groups.  

On the other hand, the weekly Ave Maria gave the impression on May 14 that the Fuehrer and his followers could still be reasoned with when it came to the religious question. Often used

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159 Manuel C. Colayco, "Cardinal Innitzer's 'Heil Hitler,'" The Ave Maria, XLVIII (New Series) (September 17, 1938), 354-355. The author was a Filipino lawyer, teacher and leader in the Catholic Action Movement.

before by journalists, this old argument would never be confirmed.

"One would think that men who pride themselves on their ability to organize would see that they are attempting the impossible."

If they continued in their program, a time of crisis would only find disunity in the German state. 161

The Atlantic Monthly of September 1938 featured an article by Prince Hubertus Loewenstein, the German liberal refugee, which was highly critical of Vatican relations with Nazi Germany since the signing of the 1933 Concordat. There was "an increasing distrust of the temporal policy of the Church" for her failure to break completely with the National Socialist ideology.

The Holy See had forced the German Catholics to sacrifice their political vehicles to Nazi totalitarianism, while the German hierarchy lifted the ban imposed on National Socialism until the Church's rights were infringed. Many devout German Catholics now wondered whether the Church would cooperate again with the state if her rights were restored. In Loewenstein's opinion Hitler had won his little game with the Church. 162

Michael Williams, although an admirer of Loewenstein and his democratic principles, criticized the Atlantic article in the September 30 Commonweal. Williams considered it "a singularly shallow article dealing with the Catholic Church in its relations with world movements and world affairs, the effect of which is

161 The Ave Maria, XLVII (New Series) (May 14, 1938), 632.

162 Hubertus Loewenstein, "Catholicism at the Crossroads," The Atlantic Monthly, CLXII (September, 1938), 326-327.
likely to be mischievous and thoroughly misleading...." Some of the criticism might have been justified, but Williams did not satisfactorily deal with the issue of church relations with the totalitarian state.\textsuperscript{163}

Writing in the September 2 \textit{Commonweal}, a Chicago priest, James A. Magner, observed that the Church had not condemned Fascism by name because it was not predicated on atheism. "Moreover the term Fascism itself is only in the process of definition and covers too broad a field, at least in popular concept, to be singled out for final analysis." Father Magner noted, however, that the Church had condemned certain ideas closely identified with the Fascist movement, but so had she attacked all attempts "to crush out religious freedom and the rights of man." While the Catholic Church had been consistent in her policies, Magner argued, this was not the case for those who had been the Church's most vociferous critics. As an example of this, the author turned to the problem most often used by the Catholic press to answer the attacks upon Catholicism: those who were maligning the Church were usually found on the side of the supporters of the "Communist cause" in Spain.\textsuperscript{164}

An example of religious intransigence was seen in the latest pastoral letter from the German Catholic hierarchy after its

\textsuperscript{163} Michael Williams, "Views and Reviews," \textit{The Commonweal}, XXVIII (September 30, 1938), 584.

\textsuperscript{164} James A. Magner, "The Church and Fascism," \textit{ibid.}, (September 2, 1938), 464. Father Magner was a priest of the archdiocese of Chicago.
annual Fulda meeting in August 1938, just as the Sudeten question was approaching its climax. The document summed up all the Church's complaints against the regime's policies ("war") toward Catholicism. It was perhaps the "most outspoken statement that has yet been made on the bitter struggle between the Catholic Church and National Socialism," in the view of the October 1938 Catholic World. The German bishops announced that the limits of patience and toleration had been reached. "Caesar has had all he can lawfully expect." America called the situation grave, but it foresaw the ultimate triumph of the Church over the "power-crazed madman." This editorial, "A Battle Against Christendom," believed that the German bishops would somehow bring an end to the "mad persecution." Having "withstood the gates of hell" for hundreds of years, the Church was well fortified to withstand this tyrant.

The overly optimistic Michael Williams declared that the Fulda message revealed the full nature of German domestic turmoil. Since it occurred at a time when the Nazis were mobilizing for war, it could have serious international repercussions plus bring down upon the German Catholics the full wrath of the dictatorship. Williams called to all Catholics to awake to the danger of this positive war upon Christianity.

The notion held by too many people, including too many easy-going Catholics, that the movement against Christi-
anity in Germany represented nothing more serious—however deplorable—than the eccentric opinions of a few individuals, chance holders of public power, and that the storm would blow over, cannot be seriously held in the face of the declaration now made by the German bishops.

Several weeks later, on October 21, Williams again appealed to American Catholics to stop minimizing the danger in Nazi Germany. In view of the latest Fulda pronouncements, Nazism had to be considered undeniably an ally, not a foe, of world Communism. Nevertheless, in the November 18, 1938 Commonweal, Williams made some puzzling comments in an article which concerned the conflict between Communism and Fascism and the involvement of Catholicism in such world trouble spots as Spain. He showed a willingness to defend the Vatican policy of maintaining relations with Italy and Germany and of pressing for a Franco victory in the Spanish conflict. Having apparently overlooked what had been happening in Germany, Williams declared that these Fascist forces would accord the minimum rights to the Catholic Church, "but the Soviet government would not grant the indispensable minimum requirements of the Church." The Catholic Church only tolerated Fascism in all its forms because Fascism tolerated the Church. That the Fascists opposed Communism was of real significance to the Holy See. "If Fascism and National Socialism go to the full length of the logical application of their own principles the Church will oppose them as now it opposed godless communism."167

167 Michael Williams, "Views and Reviews," The Commonweal, XXVIII (September 9, 1938), 500; "Views and Reviews," (October 21, 1938), 673; and "Views and Reviews," XXIX (November 18, 1938), 99-100.
The Protestant weekly Christian Century admitted that the Catholic pastoral letter of Fulda was "probably the most resounding denunciation of nazi policy that had yet been made public." It responded unfavorably, however, to some of the "arrogant claims" made by the Catholic churchmen, and it thought that the bishops might have "broadened the scope of their demands," saying something about other rights besides religious. 168

The journals' attention was drawn to more than just the bishops' decrees in the German religious dispute. An anonymous article entitled "The Nazi Persecutions Break No Bones, Shed No Blood" in the October 14, 1938 America described the conditions of German religious life. There seemed to be no outward signs of a persecution, and everywhere one got the feeling there was great prosperity, for the churches were always filled. Most of the persecution of the clergy was done outside the public's eye. No clergyman could take the risk of becoming popular, since the government would order him into seclusion. 169

Considering much the same problem Father Edward Quinn, in the November 25, 1938 Commonweal, opined that the feeling still prevailed in Germany and elsewhere that the radical elements of the National Socialist Party would disappear and the regime would take up some constructive work. "One theory prevalent among Cath-

168 The Christian Century, LV (October 19, 1938), 1251.

olic is that Hitler will be impressed by the former glory of the Roman and German Christian Empire and will revive something of the prestige of the Medieval Church." Quinn was convinced that all one had to do was to listen to one of the Nazi leaders to know that the National Socialists planned to follow through with their program for years. Given the time to train the youth, it was highly probable that the movement would maintain itself like other revolutionary systems in recent history. As successes mounted, the program of Nazism would find easy reasons for its justification. Compromising with National Socialism would be of little value.

Concessions may get rid of the injustices created by the treaties but they will create even more fundamental injustices, the deprivation of the right to live for non-Aryan Germans and the destruction of the Church's right to condemn immoral political actions, and they will not get rid of the philosophy out of which the problem has arisen.

Resistance was the alternative to compromise, but this did not seem like it would solve the problem either. "It creates martyrs and strengthens the attachment of those who live to their particular religion." Father Quinn also doubted whether anybody was willing to take the chance of standing up to the Germans after the Czechoslovakian tragedy. This subject led to his suggestion that spiritual resistance might well be the only successful solution in the end. Only the "Spirit of God" could overcome and destroy the secular spirit which seemed to be in command of the world situation. 170

The noted author, lecturer and educator, Monsignor John A. Ryan, delivered an address to the Catholic International Peace Congress meeting at The Hague in late August 1938, in which he condemned German Nazism as "the most definite and most formidable threat to international order and security." What disturbed Ryan most of all was the Hitlerites' denunciation of the Christian virtues, but he also recognized the dangers of the Nazi theories of racial purity and racial superiority. In an article found in the February 1939 Forum, historian Saul K. Padover predicted ten more years of life for German Christianity including Catholicism. German paganism would be firmly established once the younger generation reached maturity.

The October 22, 1938 Nation recorded that the Nazi attack on the Austrian Catholic Church had begun with an assault upon Cardinal Innitzer's residence. This liberal journal would "waste no sympathy" on the prelate himself, but it did commiserate with Austrian Catholics in general: "We hope that before it is too late they--and Catholics everywhere--will force their church to repudiate its Innitzers who, like Prime Minister Chamberlain, believe that there is peace and safety in conciliating a paranoiac."

171 John A. Ryan, "Political Causes of International Disorder," ibid., XXVIII (October 21, 1938), 668. The major portion of this article was taken from the speech delivered by the noted scholar and sociologist, Monsignor Ryan, at the Catholic International Peace Congress at The Hague, August 19-22, 1938.

172 Saul K. Padover, "The Catholic Church: Nazi Scapegoat Number Two," The Forum, CI (February, 1939), 51-55. Padover was a research scholar and historian.

173 The Nation, CXLVII (October 22, 1938), 395.
The appeasement policy of the Austrian hierarchy had failed, admitted the October 29 *America*, which, for once, agreed with *The Nation*. "Every indication seems to point definitely to the attempted eradication of every vestige of Christianity, as diametrically opposed to the Nazi philosophy," but however persistent the Nazi attack might be, the always hopeful Jesuit weekly believed that the Church would prevail in the end.174 There had been hope that the Nazi Commissioner for Austria, Joseph Buerchel, a Catholic, would be able to work with the Austrian Catholic leaders; however, the November 1938 *Catholic World* found that his solution for the situation was to accelerate the official attacks upon the Catholic Church hierarchy.175

The flow of articles, the great majority of which related the same old story of persecution, continued in late 1938 and into 1939. Many of these editorials and articles called for Catholic action against the Nazi dictatorship, but without specifying how Hitler would be overthrown.176

174 *America*, LX (October 29, 1938), 74-75.

175 *The Catholic World*, CXLVIII (November, 1938), 235.

176 A. I. S., "National Socialism a Religion," *The Catholic World*, CXLVIII (November, 1938), 167-171; (March, 1939), 642; CXLIX (April, 1939), 1-9; and Marieli Benziger, "Nuns in the Third Reich," (May, 1939), 142-148. Stephanie Herz, "There Is No Persecution, Mr. Hitler?" *The Commonweal*, XXIX (February 17, 1939), 457; Miss Herz was acting secretary of the Committee for Catholic Refugees from Germany. *The Ave Maria*, XLIX (New Series) (February 11, 1939), 185, and (February 18, 1939), 217. Anonymous, "Rosenberg Reveals Mind of Nazis Toward Catholicism," *America*, LX (March 25, 1939), 586-587; America described this author as "a man who has studied the Nazis in Naziland". J. Elliott Ross, "Catholics and Anti-Semitism," *The American Ecclesiastical Review*
Although it would take another ten months to become a fact, the Jesuit Father John La Farge warned that Nazism and Communism would find no real problem in coming to a political accord. As of November 5, 1938, "signs thereof have already appeared." The most evident portent was that the Hitlerites did not oppose Bolshevism on religious grounds. Yet Nazism "persecutes, exiles, imprisons, calumniates those very laymen, priests and prelates who are or have been active in combating Communism as an anti-religious plague and a denial of Christianity." 177

"'Love yourself and hate your enemies' is the Nietzschean dogma which animates the new pagan nationalism," wrote Father Wilfrid Parsons in the March 1939 Thought. Not too many months before, Father Parsons was involved in the controversy concerning the evil of the totalitarian ideologies. Now that Nazism had fully revealed itself to Parsons' satisfaction, he apparently decided to take another look at the problem. In this article entitled "Nationalism, Racism, and the Church," National Socialism was found to be more dangerous a threat to traditional values than Communism. It was a religion of materialism and the most notorious of the selfish nationalisms in Father Parsons' opinion. While "Nazi-Fascism" thought in terms only of the particular good of a...

narrow group, "even Communism makes a profession of subordinating everything to the common good." 178

A reprint article in *The Living Age* for March 1939 by the Frenchman, Gunther Buxbaum, reviewed the policy the Catholic Church had tried to follow with respect to the Nazi government. "The Church's problem was to come to a working understanding with National Socialism, while at the same time rejecting its heretical implications." The Church tried everything possible, but Buxbaum believed that she had failed. Refusing to make a forecast about future events, Buxbaum closed his article, "The Cross and the Swastika," with the hopeful thought that perhaps the Church's "attitude in the future will be more uncompromising." 179

Rather than upset the "sensitive social organization" in Germany, the Nazis have not attempted to destroy all religion, which they had the power to do, wrote George N. Shuster in the May 19, 1939 *Commonweal*. The churches, on the other hand, could offer no more than moral resistance and only hope that this did not stimulate the regime to resort to more violent tactics. Shuster believed that "the duel may go on until the number of priests and faithful has shrunk to a mere handful." Nazism was indeed a great menace to European civilization, "the most formidable" of

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179 Gunther Buxbaum, "The Cross and the Swastika," *The Living Age*, CCXLVI (March, 1939), 56-60. This revealing article had been taken from the *Mercure de France*, a Paris political and literary bi-monthly.
its kind "since the days of the Mohammedan invasion." There seemed to be no doubt in the mind of the author that Communism, although "evil enough," was not "a really substantial menace." It was Shuster's honest opinion that National Socialism would probably terrorize Europe for years to come. He concluded his article by questioning those who continued to ignore the political realities with respect to Hitlerism. "Accordingly one can only say that those who are inclined to relegate the German system to a position of inferiority to Russian Sovietism as an agent of trouble in human society are ignoring the essential aspects of the world in which they live." 180

Possibly responding to the view of Shuster and other Catholics, The Christian Century of May 24, 1939 remarked that it looked as if the Catholic Church was finally "waking up to the dangerous position in which it has placed itself by its past friendliness with fascism." This Protestant weekly wondered whether it was too late. 181 This very definitely was the view of the German exile, F. Wilhelm Sollman, who reviewed the problems of the German churches in the March 29 Christian Century. The Catholic Church with its "totalitarian world view" was in "complete agreement" with the Nazi social and economic principles, and she favored "a state system under strong authoritarian leadership." There remained only a few liberal churchmen who stood their

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181 The Christian Century, LVI (May 24, 1939), 659.
ground against the government encroachments. 182

During the summer months of 1939, there was a marked decrease in the number of articles and editorials attempting to come to grips with German religious problems, since international politics had become the all-important single issue of the day. A few short editorials in Catholic journals renewed their attacks upon the Nazi dictatorship which by now was an old story. 183

As we survey the periodical response to the Catholic religious struggle in Germany from the spring of 1933 to 1939, we discover that after the ban against Catholic membership in the National Socialist Party had been lifted in the spring of 1933, American Catholic journalists, particularly those representing America and The Ave Maria, seemed willing to tolerate the Hitler regime. There seemed to be a possibility that Catholic politicians would join the Hitler government and control the radical Nazis, although The Commonweal and the liberal secular journals doubted the efficacy of trying to cooperate with Nazism. All the Catholic journals either defended the signing of the July 1933 Concordat or avoided discussing it, while the non-Catholic jour-

182 P. Wilhelm Sollman, "Have German Churches Broken with Hitler?" ibid., (March 29, 1939), 416-417. Until he fled from Germany in 1933, Sollman had been the editor of the Rheinische Zeitung for more than twenty years.

183 The Ave Maria, XLIX (New Series) (June 17, 1939), 759-760, and L (New Series) (July 29, 1939), 153; America, LXI (July 15, 1939), 325; and The Commonweal, XXX (July 28, 1939), 327.
nals believed that the Church officials had made a highly questionable move.

Over the winter of 1933-1934, reports of renewed Nazi anti-Catholic activity were at first treated cautiously by the American Catholic journals, but such matters as the German sterilization law, plus numerous violations of the Concordat in the spring of 1934, appeared to sober them. Although the Catholic journalists decided that the Hitler regime was "anti-Christian," they persisted, with the general exception of The Commonweal staff, in defending the church-state treaty, with the hope that the Nazis would eventually listen to reason. America took the lead in predicting that the German Catholics led capably by their bishops would overcome present obstacles. Meanwhile, Protestant journals in the United States anticipated renewed Catholic-Protestant cooperation against the National Socialist enemy.

Following the lead of the German bishops, who issued a condemnation of the Nazi tyranny from Fulda in June 1934, American Catholic journals became outspoken critics of the dictatorship. Yet the criticism hardly varied in tone over the years, although the Nazi regime's pressure did not remain constant. Very often in the next four years, the Catholic journals and, in a few cases, non-Catholic ones, developed the habit of looking backward and judging the contemporary German situation by the standards of another period. They expressed the idea that another Kulturkampf had begun, and many journalists pointed out that the Nineteenth-century struggle had ended in the Church's favor.
Since the situation remained virtually unchanged for the next five years, non-Catholic journals eventually lost interest, but Catholic journals continued to censor the regime, with some still dreaming that Hitler would eventually make peace with the Church. Pope Pius XI's encyclical *Mit brennender Sorge* scarcely changed the journals' attitudes.

The reporting of the Catholic journals was obviously greatly affected by the outbreak and the progress of the Spanish Civil War. Superficially the struggle in Spain appeared to be between two totalitarian ideologies, with Catholic Church interests at stake. Many Catholic writers found it very difficult to avoid the complex Spanish problem, and discussions quickly led to a comparison of the evil of Fascism, in all its national manifestations, with that of Communism. Despite the fact that the German Catholic Church had been all but paralyzed by the Nazi totalitarian structure, some Catholic spokesmen expressed a willingness to find accord with Fascism whatever its shortcomings. Even during 1938 and 1939, a time when Nazi Germany made known to the world its foreign ambitions, Catholic journals showed little inclination to reappraise the attitudes of Catholic prelates and their congregations when dealing with the Nazis. The poor judgment of a Catholic leader like Cardinal Innitzer was passed over quickly. However, Catholic periodicals, notably *America*, changed substantially their views on the Fascist and Nazi ideologies.

By the summer of 1939, with war clouds rapidly gathering, the Catholic Church struggle became a minor item of interest in
the Catholic journals, something which it had been in the non-
Catholic journals for several years. The feeling of hope, which
had so long played a role in the American Catholic response, was
no longer exhibited; more pronounced was the attitude of frustra-
tion, for at no time did Hitler's Kulturkampf meet the formidable
obstacles so often predicted by these journals.
CHAPTER VI

NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE PROTESTANT CHURCH

A second part of the Nazis’ campaign against organized religion concerned their subjugation of the Protestant sects. This episode interested the Protestant journals primarily, but Catholic and secular periodicals also responded on various occasions.

From the very beginning of the Nazi era, German Protestantism faced greater difficulties in its fight for survival than the Catholic Church, because the basic issue of the struggle centered more distinctly around matters of faith. As early as June 1932, one group of Protestants with a National Socialist orientation founded the "Faith Movement of German Christians," which took for its own many of the planks of the Nazi Party program including the points on anti-Semitism and "positive Christianity." These "German Christians" could be regarded as liberal Protestants who desired to form a nationalistic sect free of Jewish influences.

A second threat to the Protestant churches was the Aryan pagan cult as presented in the writings of Alfred Rosenberg and other neo-pagans associated with the National Socialist leadership. Even though the spokesmen for the "German Christians" op-
posed the Nordic cult in principle, it was extremely difficult at first for American journalists to distinguish between these two factions. In fact, there appeared to be only a fine line of distinction between the more extreme "German Christians" and Rosenberg's followers, who can truly be called pagans. Only a few months after the establishment of the Hitler government, radical "German Christians" were heard calling for the elimination of many aspects of traditional Christianity, and thus the distinction became blurred in the Third Reich as well as in the American journals.¹

The confusion was evident as early as April 19, 1933, when the usually accurate Christian Century spoke of the "German Christians" as pagans. The situation remained unclear a week later, when the editors analyzed the status of German Protestantism from an historical point of view. Seen against the historical pattern, a concerted Nazi effort to undermine the Protestant church, the Century speculated, would not encounter serious opposition.

Given the power which Hitler now has, and sufficient time in which to exercise it, the Christianity of German Protestantism can be grafted on to the Teutonic root with much less effort than was required to annihilate traditional

¹Arthur Frey, Gross and the Swastika: The Ordeal of the German Church (London: The Macmillan Company, 1938), and Arthur S. Duncan-Jones, The Struggle for Religious Freedom in Germany (London: Victor Gollancz, 1938), are two monographs which examine in some detail the German pagan organizations and the Protestant Christian factions with pagan tendencies. For a brief study comparing the pagan cult with the "German Christians" see Curt L. Heymann, "The German God," Current History, XLVI (April, 1937), 63-68.
religion in Soviet Russia. In no Protestant land would such a task be so easy as in Germany, where Protestantism has been from the days of Martin Luther a thing apart from the secular life. The social responsibility of religion has never been even theoretically acknowledged by German Protestants as it has been in Western Europe and the United States. Both Calvinism and Anglicanism, despite the blinding effect of their close association with the capitalistic system, have held theoretically to a degree of responsibility for the character of the social order, and both have been haunted with a vague sense of guilt for the sins of the secular state. The modern development of the social gospel has had more to build upon in Anglican and Puritan Protestantism than in Lutheran Protestantism. The latter early took flight from the economic and political sphere and developed under the forms of quietism and mysticism, in disregard of the kind of state and social order which secular forces left of themselves were producing.

In so many words, The Christian Century had little hope for the future of traditional German Protestantism, regardless of the insidious neo-pagan movement about which the Century's editors still seemed to know little.

In its next issue, on May 3, 1933, The Christian Century published an article "Christ or Caesar in Germany?" by its Geneva correspondent, William A. Visser't Hooft, who thought that the German situation gave all Christian churches a chance to stand together in a spirit of unity against the National Socialists. The great issue at stake in Germany was the spiritual freedom of the churches. The Nazi Third Reich wanted to be totalitarian. This condition would put the church in the position of becoming an arm of the state, carrying out its wishes. The majority of the Protestant bishops rejected the idea of being tied completely to the state; however, the "German Christians," those who wished to hasten the process of state consolidation, were growing pro-
emphatically that this turn to German paganism was restricted to a minority of German Protestants. 4

A clearer picture than the Digest's of German Protestantism's dilemma was written by Samuel McCrea Cavert, an official of the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, in an article for The Christian Century on May 24. Unlike the labor unions and the universities, he wrote, the churches had so far been able to maintain some semblance of independence in Germany under the Nazi regime. One could, nevertheless, expect a continuation of the crisis, and Cavert hoped that German Protestantism would resist government pressure. However, the more radical "German Christians," advocates of a government-controlled church, probably commanded a majority in church elections. Consequently, the church leaders, whom Cavert mistakenly believed almost to a man opposed to the radical wing, must act prudently. Their dilemma arose from the fact that "earnest Christians" supported the "German Christians" because they felt Hitlerism to be Germany's only hope. 5 Almost every German adult, whatever his religion, had to face this moral crisis.

In an editorial entitled "Has Hitler Cowed the Churches?" The Christian Century of June 14, 1933, maintained that the ecclesiastical unity desired by the Hitler government would be beneficial to the church. "National church union represents a natural

4 The Literary Digest, CXV (April 22, 1933), 16.

development of the church, parallel to the unifying political policy of the Hitler government and helpful to it, but not necessarily subservient to it." In a very unusual mood, the Century seemed to apologize for the Protestant failure to criticize loudly the German regime's racist policies.

If German Christians do not rise as one man to protest, we should modestly remember the occasions when the apparent demands of patriotism have dulled our own moral perceptions. German Christians are also patriots. Most of them doubtless hope that in the present regime lies the hope of their country, though they may not like everything that it does. The German churches are going along with Hitler, but it does not appear that he is leading them by the nose. In calling upon them to unite in the formation of a national church, he marshalls them the way that they were going.6

A less apologetic critic of the German Protestant clergy contributing to The Christian Century was Reverend Reinhold Niebuhr; however, he still maintained that the Protestant church had given the Hitler government its strongest organized opposition to date. On one hand, Niebuhr considered the stand on church freedom taken by the traditional churchmen against the so-called "German Christians" to be an admirable one, but he too regretted that they had not seen fit to make statements concerning the terror methods and anti-Semitic campaign of the government. The struggle for independence, the influence of nationalism upon the church, and the traditional Lutheran view that politics belonged to "the world" and was "incapable of Christianization" had done much to keep the spiritual leaders preoccupied, said Niebuhr.

6The Christian Century, L (June 14, 1933), 776-777.
True, they had stood up against the attempt to have baptized Jews dismissed from the church body, "but in their very protest against anti-Semitism in the church they have by implication allowed it in the state." Perhaps, suggested this Protestant minister, no more could be expected, for it was estimated that seventy-five percent of the church membership was "avowedly nazi." These were individuals who feared the Marxian revolutionaries and who greeted the Hitler chancellorship "as a gift of God." They had been reinforced in their attitude by the fact that Chancellor Hitler had publicly endorsed Christianity and had returned religious instructions to the schools very early in his rule. Extravagant demagogic promises and the intensity of political feeling had blinded most Germans to the glaring contradictions of the government's policies. On July 5 Niebuhr commented again; he observed that many in Germany described the Protestant opposition as reactionary, while the "German Christians" supposedly consisted of young progressives "honestly anxious to establish the church again in the life of labor." 7

By early July 1933 the constitution for a new united Reich Protestant Church had been drawn up. The document was approved by the Nazi-dominated Reichstag on July 14, but by that time the fight between the traditionalists and the "German Christians" centered around the selection of the first Reichbishop

7Reinhold Niebuhr, "Religion and the New Germany," ibid., (June 28, 1933), 843-845, and "Notes From a Berlin Diary," (July 5, 1933), 872.
for the new organization. Adolf Hitler's personal candidate was Dr. Ludwig Mueller, while the Protestant traditionalists preferred Dr. Friedrich von Bodelschwing, an elderly church leader. Bodelschwing had been elected Reichbishop by a committee of leading churchmen on May 26; however, Mueller and his backers protested that government approval was needed to make the election valid, and that the new constitution had to be sanctioned before the church leader could be named. On June 24 in support of the Mueller faction the government indicated its disapproval of the Bodelschwing election by appointing a "German Christian," Dr. August Jaeger, as state commissar for the Evangelical Church of Prussia. Jaeger immediately began to replace elected church officials with "German Christians," and in protest Bodelschwing resigned his position on June 24. Dr. Mueller and his associates now took command of the church machinery of government, and for all practical purposes the way was now clear for Hitler's candidate to be elected Reichbishop. On July 14 the Reichstag approved the new church constitution, and set July 23 as the date for the election of delegates to the German Evangelical Church Synod. The ministers of this body would then elect the new Reichbishop.

On July 13, 1933, The Presbyterian Advance guessed that Hitler might find his Protestant church program "too difficult for accomplishment." It noted that German orthodox Protestant clergymen were attempting to sustain their followers in the struggle, and the Advance called upon "Protestants of all lands" to give support to this fight "for freedom of conscience." Finan-
cial aid was said to be on the way from Protestants in other European countries, and the hope remained that German Protestantism and Catholicism could present a common front. In the meantime, in a public letter President Hindenburg had implored Chancellor Hitler to let the Protestant body maintain "the church's inner liberty." This would have to mean the right to criticize the state when warranted, observed the July 20 Presbyterian Advance, or else it would not matter if the church was maintained or not. 8

The Literary Digest of July 15 wrote that in spite of the appeals of Hindenburg for an end to the religious feuding, the Chancellor was going to force Ludwig Mueller upon the Protestant church. The move was made, The Literary Digest conjectured, because of Nazi claims that the church had failed to halt the advance of Marxism. Hitler and Mueller apparently held the upper hand, but whether or not the government's campaign would end in success was another matter. The Digest had seen others fail in the same type of policy, and, besides, there remained yet another force to be heard from—the Catholic Church, which, according to this weekly, still opposed National Socialism. 9 It is interesting to notice how often during these weeks the American secular and Protestant journals looked to Catholicism for help during the Protestant time of tribulation in Germany. Catholic journals, on

8 The Presbyterian Advance, XLVII (July 13, 1933), 5, and (July 20, 1933), 4.

9 The Literary Digest, CXVI (July 15, 1933), 15.
the other hand, seemed only mildly concerned with the Protestant problem. Occasionally periodicals like *America* and *The Commonweal* would express editorial sympathy for the Protestant clergy's troubles with the German government.  

A *Christian Century* editorial, "The Ordeal of German Protestantism," predicted on July 12 that Hitler would soon overwhelm the Protestant churchmen: "A church which has conceived its liberty as a possession rather than as a function, as a privilege rather than as a responsibility, as a treasure to be kept rather than as a strategy to be employed, goes into the conflict handicapped from the start." From Germany Reverend Elmer G. Homrighausen told much the same story to the readers of the July 26 *Christian Century*. Only a few clergymen such as the eminent theologian Karl Barth had dared to challenge the state's doctrine of totalitarianism, as exemplified in the latest tactics used against the Protestant Church, but his stand produced little emulation.  

Current History's columnist Sidney B. Fay also saw the struggle finished, with the Protestants yielding to Adolf Hitler.  

While Chancellor Hitler was coming to terms with the

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10 *America*, XLIX (June 3, 1933), 215, and *The Commonweal*, XVIII (July 7, 1933), 255-256. When not responding editorially to the German Protestant troubles from 1933 to 1939, Catholic journals would usually keep their readers abreast of events by including a factual report in one of their news columns.  

11 *The Christian Century*, L (July 12, 1933), 901-903, and Elmer G. Homrighausen, "Barth Resists Hitler," (July 26, 1933), 954-955.  

Vatican in the summer of 1933, Protestant journals reported continued headway by the Nazi officials against the German Protestant church traditionalists. The Christian Century for July 19, 1933 announced that the Protestant press had been put under censorship and that church youth organizations had been brought under Nazi rule. While the church leaders had been speaking out against the government more than had been publicized, apparently nothing could halt the National Socialist domination of the church's administration.13

Both sides, the Nazi-dominated "German Christians" and the orthodox Protestants, were girding for the German Evangelical Church Synod election on July 23. American Protestant spokesmen were naturally sincerely interested in the contest which would ultimately decide who would serve as Reichbishop. In preparation for this election, The Christian Century on August 30 published a clear exposition of the "German Christians'" position by Reverend Elmer G. Homrighausen, a recent visitor to Germany. Young German adherents of the "German Christian" point of view had told him personally that the National Socialist movement had "basic Christian elements in it." They expressed closely the Nazi propaganda line that Germany was being born again after having stood on the brink of Communism. "Anyone who will deny the presence of God in this movement," they argued, "will never admit God's presence in any event. Hitlerism is not anti-religious, it is a divine emer-

13The Christian Century, L (July 19, 1933), 924, and (July 26, 1933), 947.
gence meant to liberate. Hitler is no arbitrary demigod, he is the chosen Fuehrer--Crusading Leader." The "German Christian" would further argue that Adolf Hitler had been a boon for the church, and it should show its appreciation by pacifying the liberal elements of the confession, by giving spiritual sanction to the administration's work and by correctly indoctrinating its youthful members. On the other side of the ledger, Homrighausen called attention to the German theologian Karl Barth's famous pamphlet *Theological Existence Today*, which developed the thesis that a church was no longer a church once it had succumbed to state dictation. Barth believed that the traditional German Protestants would be better off going underground rather than making a compromise with the "German Christian" group.¹⁴

The degree to which some had become enamored of Hitler was indicated by Paul Hutchinson, another Christian Century reporter in Europe. In an article entitled "Germany Welcomes the Messiah," he described how the Nazi leader was being accorded "almost messianic rank." He had heard Hitler described as the "incarnation of the Holy Ghost."¹⁵ The Swiss Protestant bishop John Louis Nuelsen reviewed the position of the state and church in Germany in the autumn number of the Protestant quarterly *Religion In Life*. He sketched the background of National Socialism and observed

¹⁴Elmer G. Homrighausen, "The Ethical Dilemma of German Christians," *ibid.*, (August 30, 1933), 1086.

¹⁵Paul Hutchinson, "Germany Welcomes the Messiah," *ibid.*, (August 16, 1933), 1031-1032. Hutchinson was managing editor of the Century.
that the movement had "infatuated the very best minds of the na-
tion." He heard the claims of the Nazis that they were the best
friends of religion. Under the National Socialists traditional
religion had been given a boost, but quickly the church had be-
come nothing but a department of the totalitarian state. The
religion of the state was not traditional Christianity, but "hu-
manism of an exclusive national, racial, Nordic type." He clar-
ified a confusing point by taking note that the "German Chris-
tians" had repudiated this kind of religion, but they also denied
that the state supported the pagan cult. Nuelsen thought that
these radical Protestants, the "German Christians," deceived them-
selves, since the totalitarian state requires a religion of na-
tionalism to add to its power and glory. In subsequent genera-
tions the Nazi education system should solidify the regime's the-
ory of the state, reflected Bishop Nuelsen.

What chances will there be for the claims of Jesus Christ
to be the only and absolute Master and Lord? The German
Christians are very optimistic. They see the face of the
Third Reich illuminated by the light shining forth from
the triumphant Christ. Will the next generation see the
eternal light of the Son of God? Or will they merely
see the fleeting flicker of national self glorification? 16

When the German Evangelical Church Synod election occurred
on July 23, the victory went decisively to Mueller and his "Ger-
man Christian" supporters. Mueller's own election, scheduled
for September 27, 1933, was now merely a matter of procedure.

16 John Louis Nuelsen, "Religion in the Third Reich," Re-
ligion in Life, II (Autumn, 1933), 542-552. The author was the
senior bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Zurich, Switzerland.
Unanimously the American journals deplored the results. The August 12 Literary Digest believed that the totalitarian state had now been "achieved." "With a concordat with the Vatican signed in respect to Catholics, himself as overlord of the Protestants and all else under his sway, Hitler has succeeded in yoking all Germany to his star."\textsuperscript{17} The New Republic pointed to the opposition organized by the traditionalists in spite of severe handicaps as a sign of hope for the future.\textsuperscript{18} The signing of the Concordat meant to America's editors that Hitler "would yield" in his feud with the Protestant clergymen.\textsuperscript{19} Conversely, while defending the signing of the July 1933 Concordat, The Commonweal mentioned that the Protestants had been forced to surrender: "They could not look back upon a long tradition of agreements and Concordats in the same way as could Catholics." Yet the editors conjectured that the Concordat signalled a defeat for the promoters of paganism.\textsuperscript{20}

While it had expected the results, a Christian Century editorial accused the Protestant laity of letting its church down in this time of trial. "The church organization is therefore made over, from bottom to top, in accordance with Hitler's ambition to bring every element of German life under his control."

\begin{itemize}
\item[17] The Literary Digest, CXVI (August 12, 1933), 16.
\item[18] The New Republic, CLXXV (August 2, 1933), 300.
\item[19] America, XLIX (July 29, 1933), 383-384.
\item[20] The Commonweal, XVIII (August 11, 1933), 359.
\end{itemize}
Unlike many of the Catholic journals' attitude toward the Concordat, there was no apologetic attitude on the part of this Protestant weekly for its German brethren's shortcomings. No doubt the Century desired to be sympathetic, but it could not deny the fact that all was not well in church circles and with the churchmen's thinking. No more help from the Protestant church against Nazism could be anticipated, wrote Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr in the August 2 Christian Century. To him it was all too apparent that the churchmen opposing the "German Christians" were so preoccupied with their fight for church autonomy and against the aryanizing predilections that they had not had the time to protest the government's outrageous anti-Semitic conduct the way Catholics had. But German Catholics had freedom through the Concordat, "which the Protestant church sadly lacks."21

It was but a short time later that a few of the after-effects were felt in Germany and observed by two Protestant journals in the United States. A Presbyterian Advance editorial on September 21 criticized the recent action of the "German Christians" in barring all non-Aryans from church offices in the new Protestant organization. There would not have been room for Jesus Christ himself in the new administration of spiritual affairs.22 Some members of the general synod of the church had

21 The Christian Century, L (August 2, 1933), 971-972, and Reinhold Niebuhr, "Germany Must Be Told," (August 9, 1933), 1014.
22 The Presbyterian Advance, XLVIII (September 21, 1933), 5.
reportedly withdrawn in protest and would probably be imprisoned. Praise and honor should be given to these men, wrote The Christian Century on September 21, 1933. Apparently there was enough virility left in the church to force Hitler into a showdown.23 As a matter of fact, at the very moment in Germany a group of dissenting clergy was preparing to organize an opposition faction protesting the tenets of the "German Christians."

The story of German Protestantism from the fall of 1933 to the spring of 1934 contained only a few bright moments. A strong feeling of pessimism prevailed among most of the observers analyzing the scene. For instance, Reverend Stanley High, in one of several articles at this time for The Literary Digest, observed that although the Christian churches had been the only organizations to stand up to the National Socialist "steamroller," presently the dissenting Protestant pastors appeared to have come out second best in their contest with the Nazi state.24

While thoroughly assessing theologian Karl Barth's recent challenge to National Socialism, Reverend Elmer G. Homrighausen, in the October 26 Presbyterian Advance, drew attention to the fact that Barth did not attack Hitler personally or the Nazi Party's political policies. Barth had not even mentioned the Jewish problem, which, Homrighausen believed, he should have.

23 The Christian Century, L (September 20, 1933), 1164.
24 Stanley High, "Hitler's One-Purpose Government," The Literary Digest, CXVI (October 14, 1933), 12, 24.
Only the government's treatment of the Protestant church antagonized Barth. The German theologian claimed that the Nazi-oriented "German Christians" were undermining the very essence of the Christian gospel and violating the nature of the church. What appeared to grieve Barth more than anything else was the fact that the church was not ready to engage in the present struggle. "The trouble is that the church no longer knows why she is a church!" 25

Writing in the same Protestant organ on November 2, 1933, Henry Smith Leiper also thought that the work of the "German Christian" faction had violated the spirit of Christ. However, he expressed his willingness to maintain contact with the new German Protestant church organization in hope that the revolutionary spirit would be modified and that the beleagured German orthodox church leaders would not be isolated. 26 How far the radical "German Christians" had actually gone was shown in a report received by the Advance three weeks later. Leaders of the Nazi-backed group, particularly Dr. Reinhold Krause of the Berlin "German Christians," wished to discard the crucifix, eliminate the Old Testament, edit the New Testament and prohibit

25 Elmer G. Homrighausen, "Barth's Protest Against Hitler's Church Policy," The Presbyterian Advance, XLVIII (October 26, 1933), 6-7

26 Henry Smith Leiper, "The German Church Problem," ibid., (November 2, 1933), 2. Dr. Leiper was the secretary of the department of relations with churches abroad for the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America.
visits to the Holy Land. This kind of activity, which actually came close to the views held by the pagan sect, might help increase the number of orthodox members of the church ready to stand up for their convictions, thought the Presbyterian weekly.27

One Protestant clergyman viewed current events as only the inevitable result of the church's reactionary political attitudes. In his unique, penetrating Christian Century article of November 22, 1933, the Lutheran minister Martin Schroeder asserted that the German Protestant church had not "been taken for a ride" by the National Socialists. "Hitler had done nothing out of turn, nothing contrary to the tradition, theology, spirit, or even the expectation of a great portion of his people. He has made shifts in form, it is true, but the heart of the church he has not touched." A majority of the churchmen, continued Reverend Schroeder, was in sympathy with the Nazi goals. The pastors had been "bidding for the brown shirt." "Let them keep it on," advised the author, "and we may do the same with ours." Above all, "sympathy or resentment" for the church in Germany would be "wasted effort."28 Such an agonized examination of conscience as Schroeder's found few echoes in the more superficial Protestant journalistic comments.

Meanwhile, late November reports suggested that Hitler had suffered setbacks in his battle with the Protestant oppo-

27The Presbyterian Advance, XLVIII (November 23, 1933), 5.
tion. A perceptible stiffening of the conservative opposition within the Protestant church was noted by *The Christian Century* on November 29 and by the November 30 *Presbyterian Advance*.29

Although these Protestant journals did not identify the evidence for their newest appraisal, they were referring to the action taken by the dissenting clergy's new organization: the Pastors' Emergency League. This organization was born on September 21, 1933, when Pastor Martin Niemoeller sent a letter to all German pastors asking them to unite against the government's interference and to oppose the racist policies of the "German Christians." By January 15, 1934, the League had enlisted 7,036 members. Their protests quickly brought rather startling results under the circumstances. One of the most vigorous "German Christian" clergymen, Dr. Reinhold Krause, the Berlin leader of the Nazi-oriented sect, was silenced for heresy by Reichbishop Ludwig Mueller on November 15, 1933. The Emergency League clergy were also seeking the removal of Krause's superior, Bishop Joachim Hossenfelder of Brandenburg, who had long been a leader in the "German Christian" movement and had joined the National Socialist Party as far back as 1929. Although Mueller delayed his decision on Hossenfelder's fate, "moved by this pressure" from the orthodox clergy "and perhaps by his own sense of what is right," the Reichbishop rescinded the church's anti-Semitic rules, said the *Century*.

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The feeling of restrained optimism which the "revolt" of the German orthodox Protestant clergy generated for The Christian Century on November 29 began to fade slightly in early December. Even while the orthodox leaders, Pastors Gerhard Jacobi and Martin Niemoeller, the latter an early supporter of the National Socialist revolution, grew more defiant, the Nazi-oriented "German Christian" gave a vote of confidence to Reichbishop Mueller and pledged themselves to continue their alliance with the regime and to maintain the church on what they conceived to be "the gospels in their unadulterated form." On December 13, 1933, The Christian Century called the dissenters "marked men," who, if they failed in their mission to preserve religious liberty, would lose their position in the Protestant church, and perhaps even suffer physical violence. At the moment, the government was keeping hands off, apparently waiting for further developments. In the long run, the outcome of the contest "will probably be determinative of Hitler's success or failure." Without a doubt, the Century believed, "its effects will influence every other area of German culture which the state now dominates. If these Christian Germans are beaten by the 'German Christians,' Hitler's power will be absolute."30

As a result of the activities of the Pastor's Emergency League, more confidence in the future of German Protestantism was

30 The Christian Century, L (December 6, 1933), 1523, and (December 13, 1933), 1566-1567.
expressed by the December 7 Presbyterian Advance, the first journal to refer by name to the dissenting clergy's new organization. The December 13 Nation hailed the League for inflicting the "first internal political defeat" upon the National Socialist government; however, this weekly contended that the Protestant group was aligned with the right-wing elements of the Hugenberg Nationalists, which had been eagerly searching for ways to weaken the dictatorship. Several Catholic journals watched anxiously the Nazi-Protestant battle, since fundamentals of Christianity were being threatened. Only America expressed optimism regarding the ultimate verdict. The Pastors' Emergency League had given courage and strength to other Christian groups, according to Professor Sidney B. Fay in the January 1934 Current History. The Union of Free Evangelical Churches, the organization representing Methodists, Baptists and Congregationalists, for example, had demanded assurance from the government that no attempt would be made to coordinate it with the Lutheran-Calvinist church.

On November 29 Mueller reorganized his spiritual ministry and excluded all members of the Faith Movement of German Chris-

31 The Presbyterian Advance, XLVIII (December 7, 1933), 4-5.
32 The Nation, CXXXVII (December 13, 1933), 664.
33 America, L (November 25, 1933), 191; (December 9, 1933), 220; (December 16, 1933), 263; and (December 30, 1933), 312; The Catholic World, CXXXVIII (January, 1934), 493; and George N. Shuster, "Toward Rome?" The Commonweal, XIX (December 29, 1933), 231-233.
34 Sidney B. Fay, "German Churchmen Defy the Nazis," Current History, XXXIX (January, 1934), 482-483.
tians. Seeing in this action renewed hope for German Protestantism, the December 20 Christian Century spoke as if the "German Christian" threat had been repulsed indefinitely. The movement would survive within the Protestant body but not as "a church within a church, dominating the whole, forcing its candidates into office and rewriting the creed and the laws of the church in conformity with its nazi ideals and for the promotion of the Hitler program."  

What the Century did not realize was that Adolf Hitler could not permit the action taken by Reichbishop Mueller to become definitive and still maintain the image of a totalitarian state. If this approach to religious unity under National Socialist dominance proved a failure, the Nazis would quickly find another, as they eventually did.

That the German leader would admit his error and choose to take the side of the Emergency League dissenters was a fallacy, yet this was the assessment of Charles S. MacFarland in the January 1934 Review of Reviews and World's Work. Showing a thorough lack of understanding of the goals and policies of the Nazis, MacFarland naively contended that the moderates of the Pastors' Emergency League had been successful in lessening the influence of the Nazi-oriented "German Christians" in the Protestant church organization because they finally got a hearing with the Chancellor. When MacFarland had spoken to Hitler in a recent interview, he had found him honest and sincere but with no comprehension of

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35 The Christian Century, L (December 20, 1933), 1595.
the essential spirit and motives of the Christian church. Hitler had expressed to MacFarland his willingness to meet with the leaders of the League in order to hear their side of the story. The author identified the recent events as the results of such a conference. 36

During the first week of the new year, 1934, the Protestant church struggle was renewed. On January 4, 1934, Reichbishop Mueller issued a decree which forbade all Protestant churchmen to discuss the religious controversy. Immediately the members of the Pastors' Emergency League protested publicly. Mid-January 1934 issues of The Christian Century, The Nation, The New Republic, and the February Catholic World, all described what they believed to be the makings of a gigantic struggle which seemed to have pagan overtones. 37 The January 25, 1934 Presbyterian Advance judged correctly that the cards were stacked in favor of the National Socialists but that "when conscience is aroused something is sure to happen." 38

George J. Walmar, writing in the February North American Review, foresaw the government practicing a series of tactical re-

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37 The Christian Century, LI (January 17, 1934), 76; The Nation, CXXXVIII (January 17, 1934), 58; The New Republic, LXXVII (January 24, 1934), 293; and The Catholic World, CXXXVIII (February, 1934), 620.

38 The Presbyterian Advance, XLVIII (January 25, 1934), 4.
treats and advances in order to weaken the church opposition. He also tried to describe the "German Christians" and to detail their goals.

Just as the Nazis insist that the German nation must sunder all ties of intimacy with other countries, so the German Christians declare that the Christian Church in the Reich must be Germanized and purged of all false notions of the universality of human brotherhood. They represent a school of thought which, with that truly Teutonic thoroughness for which Germans have long been famous, is prepared to carry the theory and practice of anti-Semitism to a logical extreme from which most anti-Semites have hitherto shrunken. Anti-Semites of former days, while declaiming against the Jews, usually remained orthodox Christians in the theological sense, acknowledging the Bible as the word of God. But the German Christians at least possess the virtue of being far more rigorously consistent in their reasoning, if such a term can be properly applied to the mysterious complex of hatreds and passions which fills the space where their minds ought to be. 39

Several other articles and editorials in the February issues of religious journals discussed aspects of the church-state clash. "Christian Totalitarianism," a major editorial in the February 7 Christian Century called attention to the most significant deficiency in the argument of the dissenting Protestant clergy,

The pathos of the German situation is that, though the six thousand pastors are making the most heroic stand which any body of Christians have been compelled to make since the days of the early martyrs, the cause which they champion is not the fully Christian ideal. It may, as we suggest, develop into the fully Christian ideal before the issue is decided, but it has not yet reached that stage. The explicit cause for which the German pastors are making their brave stand is a defense of the cloistered freedom of the Christian Church to manage its own

39 George J. Walmar, "Hitler and the German Church," The North American Review, CCXXXVII (February, 1934), 139-140. The author was using a pseudonym.
affairs as to membership, offices, ritual, creed and scriptures in accordance with its own ideals. But except in the domain of the church the pastors have not challenged totalitarian pretensions of the Nazi state.\textsuperscript{40}

Not every Protestant spokesman agreed with \textit{The Christian Century}'s argument. The well-known German theologian Paul Tillich reminded the readers of the Protestant quarterly, \textit{Religion In Life}, in the Spring 1934 issue, that the conflict within the German Protestant church was strictly non-political and would remain so. Sympathizers with the National Socialist Party could be found in both the orthodox and the "German Christian" factions. Some liberals and radicals backed Reichbishop Mueller, while the Emergency League was the camp of many old-time conservatives. To call the latter group the party of political resistance within the church would be to cloud the issue. The Catholic Church struggle, even though it might be hidden for the moment, was of more significance, according to Tillich, because the Catholics possessed a tradition of criticism in the political and social realms which the Lutherans had never developed. Paganism, a part of the world-wide trend toward secularism, was the real enemy in Germany. Tillich hoped that the German struggle would serve as an example and "open the eyes of other nations." Then, if the German church were to be sacrificed, it "would not be in vain." However, Tillich believed that the churches would be "partially successful" in their battle with paganism.\textsuperscript{41}

\textsuperscript{40}\textit{The Christian Century}, LI (February 7, 1934), 174-175.

\textsuperscript{41}Paul Tillich, "The Religious Situation in Germany Today," \textit{Religion In Life}, III (Spring, 1934), 163-173. Tillich had
Throughout the first three months of 1934 Reichbishop Mueller performed his duties in a dictatorial manner, and many ministers were subjected to disciplinary measures, suspensions and dismissals, including Martin Niemoeller who was forcibly retired effective March 1, 1934. The Reichbishop appeared to have the situation well in hand. The Protestant church was being forced to go underground, in the opinion of the March 7 Christian Century, although it admitted accurate news from Germany was scarce. The Century felt that an underground church opposition would give the Hitler government considerably more to worry about in the future. 42

From what the Century said, The Sign of March 1934 was too optimistic when it stated that the dissenting Protestant clergymen, with assistance from the German Catholics, would be successful in their revolt. 43 Sympathy for the Protestant pastors under harassment from the pagan elements in the new German society was expressed by the Catholic weekly Commonweal on March 23, 1934. Yet, in the same column it reminded its readers that many of these orthodox Lutherans had formerly opposed ex-Chancellor Bruening just because he was a Catholic and a Centrist. The lesson to be learned here, announced the journal, was that in these just been dismissed as professor of philosophy at the University of Frankfurt after publishing The Socialist Decision, which was critical of the Nazi regime. Professor Tillich was one of the world's most influential theologians.

42 The Christian Century, LI (March 7, 1934), 309.
43 The Sign, XIII (March, 1934), 451.
days of trouble and peril, Christians of whatever denomination must cooperate.\(^{44}\)

A short article in the May 12 *Literary Digest* was also concerned with political allegiances; it discussed the courageous activity of Pastor Martin Niemoeller but also noted that the Protestant leader was "a staunch supporter of the Nazi regime" and its political program—a situation which was no longer true. Presumably Niemoeller "balks only at the substitution of the German pagan gods for the Christian faith and at racial discrimination."\(^{45}\)

During the first half of 1934, the Nazi campaign to promote the renaissance of paganism within the Third Reich received increasing attention both within Germany and outside. In January 1934, Alfred Rosenberg received an appointment as spiritual director of all the organizations of the Nazi Party, perhaps to strengthen his hand in his efforts to weld Protestantism into a single, malleable structure. Then in May 1934, the German Faith Movement, the largest pagan sect, was formally organized under the direction of Jacob Hauer with its membership rolls including a number of government dignitaries. Such open support by the government of the pagan program disturbed greatly the editors of *The Presbyterian Advance, America* and *The Sign*.\(^{46}\) While *The Pres-

\(^{44}\) *The Commonweal*, XIX (March 23, 1934), 563.

\(^{45}\) *The Literary Digest*, CXVII (May 12, 1934), 18.

\(^{46}\) *America*, L (March 24, 1934), 582-583; *The Sign*, XIII (March, 1934), 451; and *The Presbyterian Advance*, XLVIII (February 15, 1934), 5, and XLIX (May 31, 1934), 5.
Presbyterian Advance conjectured that Christianity could deal successfully with the pagans, America expressed little optimism. The Sign, meanwhile, continued to confuse the "German Christians" with the neo-pagans. On the other hand a secular weekly, The Literary Digest for February 24, correctly pointed out that the pagan movement differed from the "German Christians" who now occupied a middle position between the "dwindling" supporters of the orthodox Protestant position and Teutonic paganism.47

Sidney B. Fay briefly surveyed the pagan organization for Current History, making the interesting comment: "There is considerable sound historical and archaeological scholarship behind some of their contentions, but they have indulged in exaggeration and greatly minimized the benefits of Christianity in the history of Germany."

Discussing the entire church problem for The American Scholar, Reinhold Niebuhr established for his readers the basic differences existing between the "German Christians" and the German Faith Movement. Niebuhr pictured the "German Christians" as those who wished to mix "the paganism of a religion of race and blood...with a religion which seeks the universal and absolute above all particulars." According to this Protestant clergyman, the pagans of the German Faith Movement "want to reject Christianity altogether because its tendency toward universalism raises too many doubts about their religion of race and

47 The Literary Digest, CXVII (February 24, 1934), 22.
48 Sidney B. Fay, "German Neo-Pagans," Current History, XL (July, 1934), 489.
During the next several years American journals frequently printed articles and editorials commenting on Teutonic paganism without tying it directly to the Protestant church struggle; however, these responses, which, in general, condemned the heathen tendency, threw little new light on the subject. More important, for the moment, was the factional contest within the Protestant church structure, which seemed to be nearing another critical stage.

Editorials in The Presbyterian Advance on May 24 and May 31 called attention to increased government police activity in support of Reichbishop Mueller against the dissenting Protestant clergymen. Nonetheless, Sidney B. Fay reported in the July Current History that the traditional Protestants had grown strong.

49 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Churches in Germany," The American Scholar, III (Summer, 1934), 344-351.


51 The Presbyterian Advance, XLIX (May 24, 1934), 5, and (May 31, 1934), 5.
er as the summer months began, while the "German Christians" had been forced into a more defensive position. Pastors and their congregations in south and southwestern Germany had virtually declared their independence of the official leadership and would probably organize a self-supporting denomination, said Professor Fay. Parishes in northern and eastern Germany, on the other hand, remained firmly in the hands of Reichbishop Mueller's supporters.\footnote{52}

Just how this independent movement was supposed to function within the German totalitarian structure was not discussed. However, Fay was drawing attention to a very important tendency which reached its pinnacle of success on May 29-31, 1934. On these days, the First Confessional Synod of the German Evangelical Church was held in Barmen, Germany. In attendance were members of Lutheran, Reformed, and United Churches, and of various free synods. The Barmen Declaration, the result of the three days of conferences, condemned the doctrines of the "German Christians," especially those pagan beliefs which they seemed to share with the German Faith Movement, restated certain basic Christian beliefs and refused to cooperate with Reichbishop Mueller's church administration.\footnote{53}

\footnote{52}{Sidney B. Fay, "The German Protestants," \textit{Current History}, XL (July, 1934), 486-488.}

\footnote{53}{The only extensive study in English of the gathering at Barmen is by Arthur C. Cochrane, \textit{The Church's Confession Under Hitler} (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1952). This monograph includes many valuable documents concerning the early struggle between the German Protestant churches and the National Socialist government, as well as the Barmen Declaration.}
Because this new united church at Barmen asserted for itself the role of the true evangelical church of Germany, it would naturally expect to be challenged by Mueller's administration. What seemed to delay the expected showdown was the Roehm Purge of June 1934 and its aftermath, to which the Nazi leaders devoted much of their time. As a result of this bloody domestic episode, The Christian Century was cheered by the possibility that Reich-bishop Mueller might soon be replaced, since his position was described as "practically untenable." In terms of church affairs and religious life, Mueller and the "German Christian" sect "have stood for the same extreme application of unadulterated nazi doctrine as Roehm and the brown shirts were accused of standing for in the political and economic realm." For The New Republic it now seemed possible that Hitler would bid for peace with the churches.

Mueller, however, remained at his post, as strongly entrenched as ever. In August 1934, he successfully moved to merge all the state churches into the united national Protestant church under his direction. The new laws demanded an oath of allegiance to Hitler and to the decrees of the national church. Already protests were being heard from the members of the Barmen group, and The Christian Century for August 22 predicted that further agitation would develop. Yet this Protestant weekly could report that

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54 The Christian Century, LI (July 18, 1934), 939-940.
55 The New Republic, LXXIX (July 18, 1934), 252.
many of the clergy showed a willingness to take the oath of allegiance as individuals but not as pastors. 56 Sidney B. Fay noted in the October 1934 Current History that Mueller had been given complete control over all public pronouncements of the German Protestant churchmen, and in the following month's issue he recorded what appeared to be open revolt by the Protestant clergy of southern Germany. 57

The October 3 Nation interpreted the Protestant church trouble as a serious breach in Hitler's totalitarian state structure. To both the churches and their leaders "belongs the credit of having been the first to venture an open and organized opposition to Nazi tyranny." Three weeks later The Nation maintained that the continuing Protestant-inspired demonstrations could have "far-reaching repercussions," -- a view shared by a contemporary issue of America. 58 Even the "German Christian" faction, a one-time ally of Mueller, had reacted unfavorably to the Reichbishop's exercise of power, according to both The Literary Digest and The New Republic. 59 The Digest possessed reports that Hitler was greatly disturbed over the entire affair, whereas the November 7


58 The Nation, CXXXIX (October 3, 1934), 365-367, and (October 24, 1934), 463; and America, LII (October 27, 1934), 70.

59 The Literary Digest, CXVIII (October 27, 1934), 20, and The New Republic, LXXX (November 7, 1934), 351.
New Republic wrote that the Fuehrer had yet to declare where he stood in the controversy. However, the November Living Age looked forward to "the bitterest period of religious persecution in centuries." A new dimension was apparently added to the religious disturbances when The Literary Digest wrote on October 6 that Mueller and Hitler were contemplating the establishment of a united church with the German Catholics, a thought also mentioned by America without comment.

Another Catholic journal, The Commonweal, showed considerable interest in the Nazi-Protestant contest. It praised the actions of the Protestant nonconformists and denounced the Nazi regime for trying to make "Christianity into the cringing image of an ideological slave doing service to a nationalism gone mad." But because Lutheranism had always been closely dependent upon the state, this Catholic weekly reasoned, there was little hope that the revolt would succeed. Professor Kurt F. Reinhardt added that "the outcome may be decisive and fateful for the future of the reformed churches," a view which supported the earlier comments in The Commonweal by Karl Thieme.

60 The Living Age, CCCXLVII (November, 1934), 193.

61 The Literary Digest, CXVIII (October 6, 1934), 18, and America, LII (October 13, 1934), 22.

62 The Commonweal, XX (September 28, 1934), 497; Kurt F. Reinhardt, "The Lutheran Struggle," (October 12, 1934), 55; and Karl Thieme, "The End of Heresy," (June 8, 1934), 145-147, and (June 15, 1934), 176-177. Reinhardt was a professor in the department of Germanic languages at Stanford University, while Thieme was a German Lutheran who had recently converted to Catholicism.
The Christian Century summed up the Protestant religious situation on October 31, 1934, with the comment that "an irrevocable schism" loomed unless the government backed down. The Second Confessional Synod of the Evangelical Church in Germany had convened on October 24 and 25 at Dahlem, where the principles worked out at Barmen were laid down. The meeting at Dahlem called upon the Protestants of Germany to reject the instructions of Reichbishop Mueller, and it requested that its own leadership group, the Council of Brethren, assume the executive functions of the Protestant church government. The Christian Century observed

So long as the nazi program is one of state domination over the church—"one nation, one people, one church"—the schism will continue. The new synod's proclamation throws the blame directly upon the personnel of the existing church government for their arrogant methods and their employment of police and political force to overthrow the constitution of the evangelical church; but the blame rests back, as the dissentients clearly see, upon the government which appointed and instructed these agents and furnished the police and political force.

Declarations of loyalty to Adolf Hitler as the head of the German state did not hide the fact "that the resistance is directed essentially against the intention of the state and its head to control the church."63

Indications that the Protestant insurgents were meeting with success quickly appeared: Dr. August Jaeger, Reich administrator for the Prussian Evangelical Church, resigned on October 28 with the statement that his task was completed. Although Reichbishop Mueller remained in office, despite continuous attacks

63 The Christian Century, LI (October 31, 1934), 1366.
by his opponents, his power had all but vanished, and he would retire at the end of 1935. On October 30 Hitler met with representatives of the Council of Brethren, Lutheran bishops August Marahrens of Hanover, Theophil Wurm of Stuttgart and Hans Meiser of Munich, assuring them that he was willing to let the church work out its own future. But this meeting did not solve all the Protestant problems, for on November 9 at Dahlem a faction within the Council of Brethren led by Bishop Meiser lobbied for a new synod which would embrace more Protestants. A step in this direction was the setting up of a Provisional Board of Administration with Bishop August Marahrens as its head. Pastor Martin Niemoeller and a few others resigned from the Council of Brethren, protesting that this new "Third Front" would be inclined to compromise with the dictatorship. Protestant unity had proved to be very elusive.

In the light of these events, the November 14 Christian Century expressed the opinion that the Protestant clergy had inflicted on Hitler "his first major defeat." "The revolting pastors have punctured the pretension of Der Fuhrer to infallibility, and a once-infallible demigod is well started on the road toward becoming just an ordinary mortal." But would the pastors follow up their victory? "The prospects that they will do so are not bright." Other Protestant journalists shared The Christian Century's pessimistic view.

64 Ibid., (November 14, 1934), 1445.
65 Henry H. Meyer, "Religious Education in the New Germa-
The Nation for November 14 heralded "the rout" of Mueller and his associates, but it accurately foresaw that the Fuehrer's authority would remain undiminished. "From the outset the insurgents have made it quite clear that theirs was a fight for ecclesiastic, not for political liberty." Moral criticism of National Socialist policies lay outside the scope of the Protestant tradition, declared this liberal, secular weekly on December 12. However, it acknowledged that a few of the Protestant clergymen had fastened themselves tenaciously and courageously to the minute "spiritual territory which the church staked out for itself." These men put to shame "groups with larger pretensions."66

At first glance, America on November 10, 1934 hailed the victory of the Protestant dissenters, but a week later its Jesuit editors correctly interpreted the Nazi concessions as a tactical move on the government's part to soothe temporarily the opposition.67 The January 4, 1935 Commonweal called the outlook "dark" for German Protestantism, while the January 23 Christian Century expressed considerable pessimism regarding religious

66 The Nation, CXXXIX (November 14, 1934), 549, and (December 12, 1934), 660.

67 America, LII (November 10, 1934), 118, and (November 17, 1934), 118.
affairs after the popular support Hitlerism received in the Saar plebiscite. 68

Even though the Nazi government resumed the harassment of the Protestant clergy and organizations, two reports in depth on German church affairs early in 1935 tended to be optimistic. In retrospect, Elmer G. Homrighausen, writing the article entitled "The Nub of the German Crisis" for the February 6, 1935 Christian Century, felt that the Nazi government had definitely muffed its chance to bring the entire Protestant church under state control. Weak in membership at the time of the Nazi ascendancy to power, Protestantism reacted slowly to the national enthusiasm for the Hitler movement.

There are many things to keep in mind in judging the church struggle in Germany. There is the mystic idea of the state, conceived not as a social contract, but as an organism which protects and promotes culture. This is native to the German mind. Coupled with this is the notion of a people's or community church, so unlike the voluntaristic denominationalism of America. Ministers are social servants, paid by the state. Religious education is given in public schools. Sects have always been considered socially divisive, and "permitted" only after exhaustive examinations. German religion is not critically individualistic. Like the German mind it is mystical, but never anarchistic. Thus state and church have been complementary sides of the total life.

The Fuehrer's great mistake was his poor selection of men to take charge of religion in Germany. 69

The tendencies of moderation and circumspection had be-


come involved in the church conflict for the sake of "internal
unity," wrote journalist Douglas L. Reed in Foreign Affairs for
April 1935. He believed that the peace could be preserved,
"since the tumult is clearly subsiding," and that a much stronger
Protestant body might emerge.

The Church had gained, and not lost. The struggle has
rallied lethargic churchgoers, quickened their interest
in their faith, made them feel that it is something to be
fought for, not kept on the bookshelf. Half-empty churches
now are filled. Ultimately the conflict that was forced
on Christianity in Germany in 1933 by the blurring of the
borderline between the claim of the Party-State to absolute
temporal authority and the claim of the Church to freedom
of conscience may lead to the Church's renewal and reju-
venation.70

In spite of these optimistic judgments, the National So-
cialists showed no inclination to admit defeat in this area of
the religious question. Nor were Pastor Martin Niemoeller and
his followers, most of whom had broken with the Council of Breth-
ren, willing to rest in a moderate stance on what they considered
to be principle. On successive Sundays in March, the 10th and
the 17th, a manifesto drawn up by the Niemoeller faction was read
to a number of German congregations. This document again con-
demned the government's religious tactics and reiterated the pro-
test against neo-paganism. As a result of this action, Niemoel-
ler and over five hundred other clergymen were placed under house
arrest. Four journals in spring issues, The Presbyterian Tribune,
The Christian Century, The Literary Digest and The Sign, denounced

70Douglas L. Reed, "The German Church Conflict," Foreign
Affairs, XIII (April, 1935), 483-498. Reed was the Berlin Corres-
pondent of the London Times.
the Nazis' retaliatory measures, while the Digest, The Sign and The Catholic World criticized the government's support of paganism.\footnote{The Presbyterian Tribune, L (May 2, 1935), 4; The Christian Century, LII (July 31, 1935), 980; The Literary Digest, CXIX (March 23, 1935), 18; The Sign, XIV (April, 1935), 517; and The Catholic World, CXLI (April, 1935), 3.} Led by Catholic editors, the censuring of the pagan program continued through the summer of 1935.\footnote{The Sign, XIV (June, 1935), 644; The Catholic World, CXLI (June, 1935), 361; America, LIII (July 6, 1935), 290; and (July 13, 1935), 314-315; and Charles Sarolea, "The German Anti-Christ," Current History, XLII (June, 1935), 240-244.} Sidney B. Fay's Current History column for May 1935 included a summary of the contemporary Protestant troubles and called attention to the fact that the government had permitted publication of the part of the manifesto which was aimed at the "Nordic paganism." Fay interpreted this action to mean the continuing of uncertainty in the National Socialists' religious policies, particularly on what to do about the pagan sect.\footnote{Sidney B. Fay, "German Religious Conflict," Current History, XLII (June, 1935), 203.}

Persisting government maltreatment had the effect of reuniting the Protestant pastors who had separated at Dahlem in November 1934. The theme of harmony emerged at the Third Confessional Synod, meeting at Augsburg from June 4 to 6, and Niemoeller and his friends rejoined the Council of Brethren. But the concord appeared to come too late. On June 26 a new law practically placed the church under Nazi police control by providing that all future legal cases involving the Protestant church would
be heard by a special bureau in the department of the interior and not by the German law courts. Three weeks later, on July 16, Hitler, forgetting his "promise" not to interfere in church affairs, appointed the Nazi Dr. Hans Kerkl as the Reich Minister for Church Affairs with absolute powers and with instructions to bring "peace" to German Protestantism. Almost immediately Dr. Kerkl showed his apparent willingness to compromise with the churchmen who opposed the government's meddling; he appointed a committee of Protestant spokesmen to administer church affairs headed by the highly-respected Lutheran Superintendent Wilhelm Zöllner. This committee's first public statement, nonetheless, reaffirmed many of the "German Christians'" racist and political declarations originally condemned at the Barmen convocation in May 1934.

The journal response to Kerkl's appointment and to the events which followed was basically hostile. Kerkl was in full command of the situation, The Christian Century told its readers on October 9, 1935, after closely watching his activities. He was willing to make some concessions but only on his terms, which would leave church affairs under government jurisdiction. The Protestant church, this journal spelled out, was definitely handicapped in its struggle by the fact that it depended upon the government for funds. "Its struggle for independence from state control may be heroic but it is hopeless." The only remedy that The Christian Century visualized was cutting loose from state support. In the November 13, 1935 editorial entitled "As Free as a
State Church Can Be," the editors of the Century concluded that the efforts being made by Kerrl and the committee led by Wilhelm Zöllner to restore the resemblance of unity to German Protestantism were not an ideal arrangement, but they were the best which could be expected.

If, as it begins to appear, the official smile of the Leader has been withdrawn from Rosenberg's neo-paganism, and if liberty of worship and teaching has been restored to all elements in the church, and if the experience of the past three years has taught the politically minded officials of the government that there are some things that even their totalitarian omnipotence cannot do with faith and conscience—then it may be that Germany is even now on the way to having a united church that is as free as any state church can reasonably expect to be.

Reports in the Century during the next six weeks gave no indication that Kerrl had brought peace to the Protestant church. By December 11, 1935, the Century's editors announced that Nazi Kerrl had generated as much opposition as the discredited Reichbishop Mueller. Kerrl had declared for an authoritarian church structure which, in effect, forbade the church associations and synods any voice in the church government. "The former leaders of the resistance have expressed their determination not to yield. The final clash seems imminent and inevitable." Within days Niemoeller and other pastors who had defied Kerrl's orders were being deprived of their salaries, and some were on the verge of being charged with treason. In its January 8, 1936 issue, The Christian Century stated that "nothing of much further significance can happen in the campaign for the enslavement of the German church, for almost everything has already been done that can
It had become totally impossible for a Protestant minister to speak out from the pulpit without fear of arrest and imprisonment. Although Dr. Kerrl now spoke in a commanding voice to the church, the Century was happy to note that he did not yet speak for it. In The Christian Register for November 7, 1935, Dale DeWitt suggested one new reason why Hitler's Protestant plan was not working: Protestant pastors did not wish to join the Fuehrer in destroying German Catholicism.

Historian Koppel S. Pinson offered a long-range analysis rather than a commentary on the contemporary problem in a perspective article entitled: "Pietism--A Source of German Nationalism" in the Winter 1936 issue of the Protestant quarterly Christendom. Pinson viewed the basic problem in Nazi Germany as a struggle "between two world views and two theologies, the theology of traditional religion and the theology of nationalism." Historically wrote Pinson, religion and nationalism have long been crucial factors in German political and cultural life, besides being closely related. "In Germany, where religion continued to dominate public life for a longer period than elsewhere in Western Europe, those elements which went into the making of modern

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74 The Christian Century, LII (October 9, 1935), 1267-1268; (November 13, 1935), 1447; (November 20, 1935), 1477; (December 11, 1935), 1579-1580; (December 18, 1935), 1612; and LIII (January 8, 1936), 37-38. An America news note, LIII (October 5, 1935), 624, reported that the German Protestants feared that Hitler had decided to undermine the Protestant church by means of diplomacy.

nationalism and the nationalist spirit were first developed and engendered in the field of religion." Today, however, they stand toe to toe in a titanic conflict for the minds of the Germans. 76

Frank Gavin investigated the Protestant problems from another angle for the readers of the Winter 1935 issue of Religion In Life; he considered the troubles to be centered around an intra-Protestant contest with the Lutherans standing by Reichbishop Mueller and the Reformed pastors lining up with the Barmen group.

The instinct animating hostility to the church program of the government is largely under the impetus of Reformed ideas: any dominance of the Church by the State is violently inconsistent with a theology in which the ideal of social organization is theocratic. Historic Lutheranism, on the other hand, regards the church as essentially invisible and attaches no necessary divine sanction to the forms, institutions and organized life of the visible church. From the time of Friedrich Wilhelm III, who constructed the Evangelische Kirche, with its quasi-reformed theology and the Lutheran liturgy, the constitutional and organizational side of this church has been largely molded and controlled by the State. Genuine autonomy and independence from the State was really never passionately desired by the true Lutherans. Within it those of the more Reformed wing were always restive under this relationship. 77

The Literary Digest was the only non-religious journal in late 1935 or early 1936 to devote short editorial space to the Protestant dilemma. This conservative weekly objected to the harassment of the Protestant clergy, but it suggested that the minis-


77Frank Gavin, "Germany Revisited," Religion In Life, IV (Winter, 1935), 110.
ters offered "the most challenging defiance" to Hitler since he came to power. 78 Brief commentary on the Protestant-Nazi struggle could also be found in America, The Catholic World, The Sign and The Ave Maria; these Catholic periodicals either denounced Dr. Kerrl's arbitrary decisions, praised the resistance being offered by the pastors, or once again assailed the Teutonic pagan principles. 79

For the next several months the American journals exhibited little interest in the German Protestant problem, even though the Council of Brethren, at a Berlin meeting on January 3, 1936, issued a condemnation of the Zöllner committee and reasserted that the Council was the lawful group to reorganize the Protestant church. Similar declarations were made at the Fourth Confessional Synod, meeting at Bay-Oeynhausen on February 17, 1936, at which time was created the strongest united front against the Nazi government to yet appear.

The government's response to this insubordination was quick and arbitrary. More Protestant pastors were arrested and imprisoned, one of them for praying in public for the German Jews. Visibly depressed by the actions of the National Socialists, the February 19 Christian Century stated: "When a church is no longer

78 The Literary Digest, CXX (October 5, 1935), 14; (November 9, 1935), 12; (November 16, 1935), 18; and (December 14, 1935), 13.

79 America, LIII (October 5, 1935), 624; The Catholic World, CXLII (January, 1936), 490; The Sign, XV (January, 1936), 324-325; and The Ave Maria, XLIII (New Series)(February 15, 1936), 217.
free to pray, it no longer has any religious significance."\(^{80}\)

The Protestant struggle for religious freedom dragged on until the summer of 1936 when the dissenting clergy again opened up a barrage directed at Kerrl and the Zollner committee. The official address of July 16 again proclaimed the Barmen program the sole authority for all German Protestant bodies, notwithstanding the Zollner committee which was packed with orthodox Lutherans.

The German Reformed Church's challenge met with the wide approval of the American journals. "In respectful but quite un-mincing terms" the Protestant pastors published what appeared to be "the most outspoken condemnations of nazism," according to The Christian Century. Additional comments were found in Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr's Century article entitled "German Church Girds for Battle." The Protestant pastors had finally decided, Niebuhr declared, that cooperation with the state was impossible because anti-Christian elements predominated in the ruling circles. There would not be another false peace, since the dissentients had declared sections of the National Socialist program "completely incompatible with the Christian religion." Thus a new chapter opened in the never-ending struggle between religion and National Socialism, asserted Niebuhr. "There will be new crises and there may be additional defeats but there are bound to be

\(^{80}\) The Christian Century, LIII (February 19, 1936), 283.
triumphs also, for the church has a new vitality."\(^81\)

Commenting in a September 17, 1936 editorial, *The Presbyterian Tribune* announced that it was "thrilled" by the stand taken by Niemoeller and his associates. Such a dramatic display signified that "the gospel of Christ still is the power of God and ultimately the rulers of the earth must acknowledge it."\(^82\)

It was not what the pastors said but the spirit animating them which impressed the September 4 *Commonweal*. "These pastors are fully aware that the majority does not stand with them, and that force with all it implies rests in other hands." Nonetheless, they were willing to suffer martyrdom.\(^83\) On the other hand, "Chancellor Hitler's reaction was nervously awaited," reported *The Literary Digest* on August 8.\(^84\)

No immediate Nazi reaction came. With the international Olympic games focusing world attention on Berlin during July and August 1936, the German government temporarily curtailed the activities of its police and simply ignored the adherents of the Barmen declaration. However, the respite did not appear to aid the dissenters, for the November 11, 1936 *Christian Century* quoted Pastor Niemoeller as saying that the religious fight was finished "and the church was lost." Cowardice killed the church,

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\(^{82}\) *The Presbyterian Tribune*, LI (September 17, 1936), 4-5.

\(^{83}\) *The Commonweal*, XXIV (September 4, 1936), 436.

\(^{84}\) *The Literary Digest*, CXXII (August 8, 1936), 26-27.
continued Niemoeller, for no longer did anyone dare to speak out against the Nazi administration. "Perhaps he speaks too bitterly of those who were a little less bold than he. But his estimate of the struggle must be taken seriously," replied the Protestant organ.  

In a November 19 Christian Register editorial, "The Fight in Germany," Norman Hapgood described Niemoeller's statement as entirely accurate.  

A few weeks later, on December 23, The Christian Century called attention to the fact that some of the German Lutheran leaders had expressed doubt that a compromise with the Nazis, like that promoted by the Zöllner committee, could ever be fruitful. Lutheran good-will had not been able to halt the advance of the pagan German Faith Movement.  

Finally, on February 12, 1937, the Zöllner committee resigned, obviously despairing that a compromise could ever be reached. The German Protestant body now found itself under the complete charge of Dr. Kerrl and his Nazi officials. However, these men appeared anxious to justify the Protestant dissenters, for they offered to allow for a new church election of governing officials, supposedly without government interference. The Chris-

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85 The Christian Century, LIII (November 11, 1936), 1483.

86 Norman Hapgood, "Editorial: The Fight in Germany," The Christian Register, CXVI (November 19, 1936), 694. Hapgood, at this time the editor of this Unitarian weekly, had been closely associated with the "muckraking" era in American history when he edited Collier's.

87 The Christian Century, LIII (December 23, 1936), 1708-1709.
tian Century, the only journal which remained interested in the
various aspects of the Protestant predicament, was justifiably
pessimistic. Labeling the new election a "trojan horse," its edi-
tors predicted that the voting would be rigged so that the "Ger-
man Christian" element would gain a sizeable majority. Too, it
was quite possible that many would boycott the election in the
face of "insuperable handicaps." The Century cautioned: "The in-
creasing paganism of government officials and the influence of
this paganism upon youth makes the outlook for Christianity in
Germany dark indeed, no matter what the outcome of the coming
church election may be."

The German correspondent for the Century, A. S. Eker,
suggested that the Protestant-Nazi struggle had returned to its
1933 stage just before the installation of Reichbishop Mueller
by Chancellor Hitler. In 1937, however, most of the church op-
posed government control, after having sampled almost four years
of experimentation under the dictatorship.

The first flush of general enthusiasm for nazi ideas has
passed. The use of the secret police, of prison and
concentration camp, to enforce "positive Christianity"
during the intervening three-and-a-half years has removed
many illusions and bared the struggle in all its nakedness
to the whole of Protestantism and most of all to the faith-
ful in this country itself.88

During 1937 Kerrl was reinforced in his battle against
the discontented Protestant pastors by other prominent Nazi offi-

88 Ibid., LIV (March 3, 1937), 271-272, and A. S. Eker,
"Correspondence from Germany: Church Hostility Perplexes Nazis,"
(April 14, 1937), 502.
cials who aimed to silence the church discord. Wilhelm Frick, Minister of the Interior and a prominent member of the pagan movement, took charge of all the finances of the Protestant churches and forbade the publication of the pastors' names placed on the suspension list. The Gestapo under Heinrich Himmler began to arrest and imprison Protestant ministers reluctant to abandon the principles established at the Barmen convocation. Added to the physical force were the violent harangues by the Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, who doomed "theological nonsense."

The usual American journals responded with most of the emphasis centered around the July 1, 1937 arrest of Pastor Martin Niemoeller. Writing in the July 14 Christian Century, E. Sinclair Hertell believed Niemoeller's recent arrest to be a probable indication "that Hitler has decided to hazard one final supreme effort to make the swastika triumphant over the cross."

But, Hertell pointed out, the pastor's arrest was the result of opposition to the neo-pagan aspects of Nazism, not to the movement's political theory, which Niemoeller reportedly never totally rejected. On the other hand, in the Century's July 21 issue, the editors asserted that the arrests of Protestant clergy had brought into the open "the ultimate issue inside Germany." "A state in which the inhabitants cannot so much as address authority without being in danger of prison is a servile state. Its people are not free men, but slaves." A few weeks later in the article "The German Church Says No!" Harold E. Fey remarked that the arrests had not stopped Protestant ministers from making
public denunciations. As a matter of fact, Fey believed he saw German Protestantism widening its platform upon which to defend its rights against the state's infringement. 89

The July 10 Nation called attention to the Nazi government's efforts to intimidate the Protestants and made this appraisal: "In the past the anti-religious campaign has tended to quiet down during the tourist season; the fact that it is being intensified just now may signify an even more vigorous opposition than is indicated in the censored press reports." The same theme was presented in the August 14 issue, with the additional comment that the Nazis seemed unable to formulate a satisfactory way to eliminate independent-minded Protestant ministers. 90 In a feature article on Pastor Niemoeller in the September 1937 Current History, Emil Lengyel called him the greatest German religious figure since the Reformation: a man whom "History will not forget."

Although it was not Niemoeller's aim to start a revolt against Hitler, his movement has come to assume great political importance. The only effective opposition to the dictatorship is now the churches. In the early days of their fight it was customary for Protestant dissidents to emphasize their wholehearted loyalty to the Fuehrer. It is highly significant that this is no longer being done.

89 E. Sinclair Hertell, "Niemoeller," ibid., (July 14, 1937), 896-897; Hertell was the religious news department editor of Newsweek, (July 21, 1937), 915; and Harold E. Fey, "The German Church Says No!" (September 1, 1937), 1068-1069; Fey was the secretary of the Fellowship of Reconciliation for the United States and later editor of The Christian Century.

90 The Nation, CXLV (July 10, 1937), 30, and (August 14, 1937), 162-163.
The Government's attitude has so embittered the religious opposition that today it is difficult to say where religious resistance ends and political opposition begins. As leader of a great movement, Niemoeller has taken up arms against a seemingly invincible dictatorship.91

The November 6, 1937 Digest, commenting on the outlawing of the Barmen group by the German courts, expressed the opinion that the religious battle remained far from finished. "Although Adolf Hitler has claimed continuous triumph in his fight against church rebels, the paradox of the whole fight has been the packed pews in both Protestant and Catholic churches throughout the country."92 Concerning the same general subject, The Christian Century's correspondent in Germany, A. S. Eker, reported rumors that the more radical neo-pagan Nazis together with Hitler desired more drastic steps against the churches, but they feared the repercussions.93

A new source of friction in the German religious controversy attracted the attention of the December 8 Christian Century in an editorial entitled "The German Army Enters the Church War." It pointed out to its readers that a group of Reichswehr chaplains had protested directly to Hitler against the pagan orienta-


92 The Digest, I (November 6, 1937), 35. On July 17, 1937, The Review of Reviews purchased The Literary Digest, and the new combination was called The Digest until November 13, 1937, when it resumed the name The Literary Digest.

93 A. S. Eker, "Correspondence from Germany: Germans Greet Lord Halifax," The Christian Century, LIV (December 15, 1937), 1569-1570.
tion of the government's religious program. Whatever the consequences of the chaplains' complaints, this Protestant weekly thought it significant that no other groups had been "so frank in their statement of the facts in regard to the Nazi war upon religion, or so trenchant in their criticism of it, or so realistic in their delineation of its effects upon the morale of the nation." 

America's editors on December 18 prayed that something would come from the petition. At the least, the journals found this expression of opposition within the army an ominous portent.

Ignoring the chaplains' protest, a detailed report on the German religious question by the December 29 Christian Century revealed that official journals of the National Socialist Party were proclaiming the German pagan cult the official "state religion" at the same time that the government was announcing its intention to disestablish the existing church. A January 1938 report from A. S. Eker, on the other hand, remarked that the regime still found itself unable to make "any progress" against the churches, whereas in other spheres, notably the cultural, Germany resembled "an arid desert."

The secret trial of Hitler's nemesis, Pastor Martin Nie-

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94 The Christian Century, LIV (December 8, 1937), 1518.
95 America, LVIII (December 18, 1937), 252.
96 The Christian Century, LIV (December 29, 1937), 1613-1614, and A. S. Eker, "Correspondence from Germany: Nazis First to Conquer Church," LV (February 23, 1938), 249.
moeller, occasioned some response from The Christian Century on February 23, 1938. It could well be, it editorialized naively, that the government felt apprehensive about publicizing the case in Germany where few people actually knew the full circumstances of the litigation. The reaction of world opinion to the trial gladdened the hearts of The Christian Century editorial board. A few weeks later, after the Protestant dissenter had been fined and released, he was rearrested for resuming his anti-government preaching. He and the other opposition ministers would continue to resist the regime's encroachments "unless the government makes a radical change in its policies," announced the March 16 Christian Century. The National Socialist government had created a martyr in Reverend Niemoeller and thus exposed its own weaknesses, in the opinion of the February 1938 Catholic World, the only Catholic journal to respond editorially.

Meanwhile, in a decisive stroke against the Protestant revolters, Hans Kerrl, Reich minister for Church Affairs, had appointed as president of the Protestant church the lawyer Dr. Friedrich Werner, a National Socialist and a "German Christian" sympathizer, who was assisted by Lutheran and "German Christian" clergy. In mid-March 1938, soon after Hitler's Austrian coup, an order was issued commanding the clergy to take a personal oath to the Fuehrer. By now announcements such as this aroused little

97 The Christian Century, LV (February 23, 1938), 232, and (March 16, 1938), 324.
98 The Catholic World, CXLVI (February, 1938), 747.
journalistic response. As usual The Christian Century spoke for the Protestant position. For the Century the new oath was not surprising; its comment recalled a fact that the Century had emphasized previously on a number of occasions:

The fact is...that the Protestant church in Germany has never been independent, and so long as it continues to depend almost entirely upon state support for its maintenance, it can hardly lay proper claim even to the strictly circumscribed freedom which is allowed social institutions generally in the nazi state.99

Why this historical point received so little emphasis from most journalists is not certain. Very possibly the emotional involvement with the many problems created by the Nazi dictatorship had some bearing on the situation.

Three later articles in Protestant journals reflected upon the German Protestants' trials. Their main theme centered around the Nazi persecution of the Protestant pastors.100

By the middle of 1937, the American journals, including those affiliated with the Protestant churches, began to restrict themselves, with only a few exceptions in The Christian Century, to an occasional brief, factual note recording the day-to-day re-

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99 The Christian Century, LV (May 4, 1938), 547. Cf. also note 73.

100 Edward Platzhoff-Lejeune, "Religion in Germany Today," The Christian Register, CXXVII (May 5, 1938), 296-297; The Register identified this author as a Swiss citizen; Ewart Edmund Turner, "Remember Martin Niemoller!" The Christian Century, LVI (January 11, 1939), 56; the author was an executive of the American Committee for Christian German Refugees and formerly a Berlin correspondent for the Century; and Charles R. Joy, "Voices From German Prisons," (May 3, 1939), 569-570; Joy was the administrative vice-president of the American Unitarian Association.
ligious struggle. However, they did publish a number of articles during 1937, 1938 and 1939 that attempted an analytical evaluation of the condition of German Protestantism, and the historical, theological and philosophical factors that had contributed to its present posture. The American reading public had an opportunity to scrutinize thoughtful critiques contributed by more serious writers than the harried editorial writers and reporters whose opinions had been aired before. Also, the journals finally began to devote close attention to the neo-pagan element in National Socialism and its relationship to Protestantism.

Both Curt L. Heymann, who included considerable historical background regarding the "German Christians" and the German Faith Movement for the April 1937 Current History, and Professor Cornelius Kruse in Religion in Life for the summer of 1937 offered thorough analyses. They both concluded that Christianity was irreconcilable with the teachings of National Socialism. Its Weltanschauung, based on the concept of blood and race, soil and honor, and the glorification of the nation-state, already established it as a religion in itself. In the words of Heymann:

It is the goal of Nazism to create one people, one Reich, one leader and one faith—the third confession for the Third Reich. God, according to the totalitarian principle, must be approached universally through the Volksseele, the folkic soul, which is the soul of the

believing Nazi. Hitler, hailed by his millions of followers as a new Messiah, is regarded by many as an instrument of God, similar to the Kaiser's idea of a modern knight in shining armor. According to leaders of the Germanic Pagan Faith Movement in their efforts to reject Christianity, or rather to de-Christianize present-day Germany, "God has revealed himself to us through the Fuehrer."

Kruse's article was essentially an attempt to instruct Christian leaders on how to combat Fascism. His final piece of advice said: "Should Fascism, nevertheless, establish itself also in our midst, the best strategy of the Church would be to emulate the heroic courage of the German churches today."

Educator Nathaniel Micklem, in an article entitled "Theological Issues in the German Church Conflict," for the Spring 1938 issue of Christendom, argued that the German churches were not unalterably opposed to the "politics" of the Nazi Party: "We should not belittle the really remarkable achievements of National Socialism, not only in organizing the national life in the interests of the whole community but also in awakening an almost religious fervor of service and sacrifice; but there can be no doubt that in fact positive Christianity is increasingly a mode of paganism." The problem, basically the same one pointed out by Heymann and Kruse, was that Nazi politics was intimately tied to the National Socialist Weltanschauung, which embraced man's world attitude toward life, although Hitler himself "makes a sharp distinction between religion and Weltanschauung." Dr. Rosenberg was the "crowned" leader for the Weltanschauung, and he stood "definitely outside the Christian church." It was this "philos-
"phy" of the Fascist movement which Christianity could not accept, although the so-called "German Christians" had been eager to seek out a compromise. Presently, the struggle between paganism and Christianity found Rosenberg holding all the important cards: government support, control of education, and a monopoly over the newspapers and radio broadcasting. "Apart from the spoken voice the church is almost silenced."102

The more optimistic Ambrose W. Vernon, an American Protestant clergyman, reviewed three years of church turmoil, highlighting the "German Christians" and the followers of the pagan doctrines, in the 1937 winter number of the quarterly Religion In Life. He opined that of all the institutions in Nazi Germany the church alone preserved some semblance of independence, even though freedom of movement had been greatly hampered. The "German Christians" had "steadily" lost ground after 1933 because, according to Vernon, they supported the government's anti-Semitic campaign; they failed to win over to their cause the leading ministers and theological professors; and the concept of the leadership principle, "cardinal in National Socialism," was totally rejected by German Protestants, thereby revealing "the spirit of democracy, implicit in Protestantism." Nonetheless, the "German Christians" would continue to have an important voice in Protes-

102 Nathaniel Micklem, "Theological Issues in the German Church Conflict," Christendom, III (Spring, 1938), 250-259. Micklem was interested in the religious struggle in Germany and within a year of this article would publish: National Socialism and the Roman Catholic Church (London: Oxford University Press, 1939). He was the principal of Mansfield College, Oxford.
tant church affairs because of the ominous presence of the pagan-oriented German Faith Movement.

It is this powerful movement which hangs like a sword of Damocles over the Christian Church. To many of the moderates in the camp of the Confessionalists it seems wiser to accept the program of the German Christians, with its assurance of government favor, than by an attitude of intransigence to dare the National Socialists to an open endorsement of these anti-Christian tendencies. Rosenberg and Hitler hesitate to snap the ties which still bind their followers to the Christian sentiment and tradition of Germany and Europe. So long as this hesitation keeps the Damocles sword from falling, it is possible for the Church to hold its favorable position in the empire and to avoid a bitter struggle for its very existence.

Is it not better to throw an uncaged tiger a bone?103

The American Lutheran theologian, Professor John Aberly, in his Lutheran Church Quarterly article for October 1938, recognized that the German churches seemed to welcome the Nazi revolution in 1933, and they had been regretting this decision ever since. But Aberly shared Vernon's opinion that the German churches remained relatively strong. To the credit of the religious leaders was the fact that many of them had continued to stand their ground against the state's "betrayal of the Christian faith," especially with regard to the treatment of the Jews, while other groups and institutions had succumbed with hardly a protest. Aberly advised:

The Christian world, if not the whole world, should take an intelligent interest in what is going on in these religious movements in Germany. It has been said that, in

103Ambrose W. Vernon, "The Religious Conflict in Germany," Religion In Life, VI (Winter, 1937), 112-124. Vernon was a congregational clergyman, educator and author.
their ultimate issues, all our problems, social, economic, national, and international, are religious issues.104

Christianity was still very much a living force in Nazi Germany, contended another very hopeful journalist, the British newsman, Fritz A. Voight, who discussed the German religious problem and religious conditions in the Soviet Union for the February 1939 Survey Graphic in an article entitled "The Menace to Free Worship." The Hitler government had not been "openly anti-Christian," wrote Voight, although it had practiced a more subtle form of persecution which was a "greater" threat to the Christian tradition than Russian Communism.

Unlike the Russian state, it does not halt at the church door, it does not look upon the altar and the Cross as useful, rather than useless or harmful, it has not contemptuous toleration, but it is determined, while preserving outward forms, to make the Christian faith serve the secular purpose of the state. The German state does not even halt at the foot of the altar or of the Cross, but would place the swastika over the altar and side by side with the Cross, or even over it. The essence of the German religious conflict is thereby symbolized. According to the German state, the swastika is supreme and demands complete allegiance, spiritual and corporal.

Against tremendous odds, Voight saw the German churches as the last bastion of freedom in Germany. He would not predict how the churches would fare, but he believed that the religious bodies "exercise a greater power today than they did under the tolerant Republic."105


105 Fritz A. Voight, "The Menace to Free Worship," The Survey Graphic, XXVIII (February, 1939), 83. Voight was a correspondent for The Manchester Guardian.
Another confident writer who used the *nom de plume* of Marie Munk wrote in the Autumn 1939 issue of *Religion In Life* that while the anti-Christian trend in Germany was growing, a remarkable religious revival was occurring simultaneously. Church services were overcrowded, and clergymen were becoming more "valiant" and "more anxious to spread the gospel and to help their parishioners." Marie Munk did not judge the dramatic gestures of defiance a lost cause, although it was clear to the author that the German youth—the future leaders of the German nation—had embraced the principles of Nazism.

The Christian Church in Germany goes through a time of crucial testing. It has withstood many persecutions in the past. There are many hopeful signs that like Phoenix from the ashes, the German Church will rise one day stronger and more powerful.106

A similar story was told by Reverend Charles S. MacFarland in the article "Hitler or Christ: The Fate of Christianity in Germany" for *The American Mercury* of September 1939. There seemed to be a lesson to learn from the German religious situation—a lesson which MacFarland appears to have fully comprehended, for the Protestant minister noted that many of the clergy who had sought a policy of "appeasement" with National Socialism had "often suffered the most grievously" at the hands of the Nazi government. In this assessment of the Nazi-church conflict, MacFarland left little doubt that he now viewed matters realistic—

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106. Marie Munk, "Nazi Ideology and the Christian Church," *Religion In Life*, VIII (Autumn, 1939), 483–495. The author, a former member of the German bar, was teaching at Hood College.
ally: "The outcome of that struggle is of incalculable importance to all mankind." 107

In a perceptive article criticizing the German churches, "Have German Churches Broken with Hitler?" for the March 29, 1939 Christian Century, F. Wilhalm Sollman distinguished between opposition to the present regime's religious policy and to the ruling system itself. Church policy appeared to be determined primarily by "the state's position in regard to church finances." Clearly, it was a case of blackmail! The religious leaders dared not go too far in their attacks on the dictatorship, since the government had yet to restrict the grants-in-aid, the tax exemptions or the special legal privileges enjoyed by the churches. It should be noted that Sollman was one of a very few journalists to emphasize this obvious facet of the structure of the German church. Whether or not his assessment conformed to reality, it represented an indisputable realistic approach to the subject.

Another factor, fear of a Communist government succeeding the Nazi regime, if it fell, also influenced the German churchmen. Moreover, Sollman suggested that the Lutheran concept of the state prevailed in German religious quarters: the state was "an expression of God's love for a sinful world." Although the author realized that "the issues behind the struggle between

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107 Charles S. MacFarland, "Hitler or Christ: The Fate of Christianity in Germany," The American Mercury, XLVIII (September, 1939), 1-10. MacFarland's views had changed noticeably since his January 1934 Review of Reviews and World's Work article in which he called attention to Hitler's reasonableness in treating with German Protestant dissenters.
church and state in Germany are highly complex," he cautioned his American readers not to equate liberalism with opposition to the government in the ecclesiastical field. "For the time being church and state are at loggerheads. But neither has yet repudiated the old partnership." 108

Professor Harry F. Ward published an article in The Christian Century for November 16, 1938 entitled "The Morals of Reaction," just after the Munich Conference and evidently in response to it. Dealing with moral values rather than with the organized religions, Ward, in his appraisal, could have been referring to both Catholics and Protestants. By this particular approach to the problem, it could well be that Ward was trying to show the consequences of Nazi policies in terms that his readers might understand better than theological or libertarian concepts and arguments. Ward lamented the destruction of the world's basic moral values by the Fascist states and the forces of reaction in other countries which had aided the advance of this totalitarian ideology. The Fascists did not recognize ordinary standards; yet, "the tragedy of our time and its dark menace for the future is not so much the broken pledges of those who pursued a planned policy of deception as it is the dishonored covenants of the people of good faith and good will." Ward denounced the appeasers of 1938 for failing to create new institutions in order to preserve old values.

Those Christians who support the policies and program of reaction, either because they are afraid of social change or because they seek to avoid present suffering, are like Saul of Tarsus, consenting to the death of the forces of the future. Let us hope that, like him, they may realize in time that a religion which brings them to, or supports them in, this position is inadequate.109

Likewise censuring the moral code of the world's great powers, John Coleman Bennett, in a section of the article entitled "Christians and the International Crisis" for the Spring 1939 issue of Christendom, looked to the religious leaders of Germany to help restore the world to sanity but not in the immediate future. Nevertheless, he reflected: "A revitalized church, a repentant church can become a channel through which God can work in the world in ways beyond all predicting."110

In summary, the American Protestant journalists, who contributed the vast majority of the articles and editorial response on the German Protestant religious question, expressed far less optimism about the future of their German co-religionists than Catholic writers about theirs. From the very start of Hitler's term as Chancellor, it was recognized that the "German Christian" faction and the neo-pagan movement seriously menaced the orthodox churchmen. Only after the Protestant-Nazi struggle had been all

109 Harry F. Ward, "The Morals of Reaction," ibid., LV (November 16, 1938), 1395-1396. Ward was professor of social ethics at Union Theological Seminary and chairman of the American Civil Liberties Union.

110 John Coleman Bennett, "Christians and the International Crisis," Christendom, IV (Spring, 1939), 174-182. Bennett was professor of social ethics at the Union Theological Seminary.
but decided by government measures in 1937 did a few American Protestant spokesmen speak in terms of an ultimate victory for German Protestantism. In general, most commentators on the Protestant conflict, and in the main these were associated with some Protestant church or organization, acknowledged that their German brethren had made numerous errors in judgment.

The threat of paganism within the Protestant church and within German life perplexed American Protestant journalists, plus a number of Catholic editors, throughout the period from 1933 to 1939. At first, some of the journals, including The Christian Century, confused the followers of the Nordic cult with the "German Christians," thereby invalidating their assessments. But this confusion gradually disappeared, and correct thinking prevailed in the end.

The non-religious journals quickly expressed sympathy for the German dissenters, but seldom did they seem to see the struggle in anything but political terms. Basic doctrinal problems received little mention. On the other hand, The Christian Century and other Protestant observers immediately realized that fundamental Christian beliefs were at stake and that the issues in the German religious question were complicated by the makeup of the warring factions. It was clearly impossible to categorize the orthodox Protestants and the "German Christians" as liberals and conservatives. As the church struggle moved from stage to stage, the Protestant journalists continued to speak candidly about the participants, noting that the Protestants led by Pastor Martin
Niemoeller seemed little concerned with the progress of the Nazi totalitarian state except where church rights were involved—a traditional German Protestant position.

With the passage of time, the Protestant journals rightly recognized the fact that the Barmen confessional group was little more than a minor nuisance to the Hitler government. American Protestant writers acknowledged the bravery of Niemoeller and his associates, but seldom did they allow their optimism to get out of hand. Some Protestant journalists actually considered the control of the Protestant church by "German Christians" and government officials preferable to seeing pagan groups like the German Faith Movement gain ascendancy in German religious life.

The American Catholic journalists' response to the Protestant dilemma was extremely limited. It could well be that because of religious prejudices, Catholic journals failed to consider in depth the struggle of the Protestant pastors. Only an occasional editorial or factual note seemed to perceive that a relationship existed between the Protestant and Catholic troubles in Nazi Germany. The Catholic journals, unlike the Protestant ones, generally ignored the possibilities of confessional cooperation.
CHAPTER VII

GERMAN DOMESTIC POLITICS FROM THE ENABLING LAW
TO THE ROEHM PURGE

During the period from late March 1933 to early July 1934, Adolf Hitler and his Nazi followers speedily constructed a totalitarian establishment. Within their own ranks the most serious question was how far to go in the direction of social and economic revolution as the concomitant of their political innovations. The American journals of opinion thus had two factors to observe: the construction program of the National Socialists as they replaced the Weimar Republic, and their own intra-party controversies.

State Consolidation

Very early, the all-powerful Hitler government took several significant steps to fashion the total state. German state federalism came to an end on March 31, 1933, when the states of the Reich were stripped of their power. All political parties except the National Socialist Party were suppressed by early July 1933, and a law of July 14 prohibited any others. During the spring months of 1933 the special Nazi police forces also went into action arresting and jailing all dissenters and anti-Nazis.

Much of the initial journal response to the domestic Ger-
German politics at this time appeared in the form of general articles reviewing the entire scope of German events. Most of these reviews were accurate as far as they went, but they were something less than perceptive. For example, without referring to a single specific domestic issue, Frank H. Simonds in the May 1933 Review of Reviews and World's Work hinted at an early collapse of the Nazi regime because of unspecified domestic problems.¹

On the other hand, the noted Protestant theologian, Reinhold Niebuhr, observed that Hitler and his partisans had been able in short order to weld together a strong force which should control the destiny of Germany for years. In his April 5 Christian Century article, which bore the misleading title "Why German Socialism Crashed," Niebuhr outlined with little analysis the technique used by the Nazis to achieve their often enunciated goals.

The fascists first of all developed the energy which increased their parliamentary vote from nothing to 30 percent in a few years. This still left them short of a parliamentary majority than were the socialists in earlier years. But they began to manipulate the organs of the state, particularly the presidency, until they came to power without parliament. Thereupon, they used all the power of the state, including the organs of propaganda, the suppression of the opposition press, incarceration of their foes, etc., so that they were able, with their allies, to establish a clear parliamentary majority. Since it was not overwhelming enough to insure complete stability, they kicked the ladder of democracy from under them after they had partly used and partly abused it to achieve power. In using the tremendous power of the presidency to gain their ends, it is interesting to note that they

availed themselves of an instrument which the socialists had set up to protect themselves against fascism. Only a year ago the socialists and Catholics combined to elect Hindenburg as president in order that he might protect Germany from fascism. Hindenburg defeated Hitler in a campaign engineered by Bruening and the socialists only to become the door through which the fascist hordes were admitted into the counsels of the state. The appeal of Bruening to Hindenburg two weeks ago, to protect those who had elected him from the vengeance of the groups who had opposed him and were now using his presidential decrees to oppress their foes, marks an interesting and rather pathetic chapter in the history of German politics.2

Another article which dealt in generalizations, "The Folly of Hitler," was written by Oswald Garrison Villard for the April 12 Nation. This former editor of The Nation pictured Hitler as a charlatan. The German Chancellor knew no history and lacked knowledge of the "true aspirations of men." His advisors had been drawn from the discredited ultra-conservative groups which had led the German nation along the road to ruin in 1914. With a program which consisted of a hodge-podge of opposing and contradictory doctrines, Hitler was preparing to lead Germany back to greatness and world leadership. It included Communist and Socialist planks, while it called for the elimination of all true Marxists. To attain complete orthodoxy, he had unleashed his storm troopers. As far as Hitler was concerned, reconstruction would come about by wishing, thinking and declaring it often enough that the entire populace would eventually be caught up with the tide of optimism, wrote the unbelieving Villard.3


Neither Devere Allen writing in the April 20 Christian Register nor Denis Gwynn in the May 1933 Sign attempted to assess specific events in the Third Reich. Allen advised that the Nazis might give superficial concessions in any area at any time but would never actually let up in their war upon all aspects of the liberal democratic community. The future of Adolf Hitler and his government was in the hands of the German people, Allen believed, but for them the "hour of effective action of any kind" would soon be past. He concluded with this accurate prediction: "As a matter of fact soon the entire German people will be reading what Hitler wants them to read, speaking what he bids them to speak, and holding counter-ideas, if at all, strictly incommunicado." Gwynn, to the contrary, hesitated to speak so decisively. While Adolf Hitler had "apparently triumphed all along the line," Gwynn suggested that a better judgment of the situation could be made after the early enthusiasm had died down.

Hope was already gone, according to Ludwig Lore, a spokesman of the liberal Nation. Free Germany had been destroyed, and creative Germany lay under siege after eight weeks of the Fascists' rule, Lore wrote in the April 19 issue. German fought German in a struggle for survival, since brute force had supplan-

became a contributory editor to this journal upon his retirement as editor in 1932.

"Devere Allen, "Back of Hitler---and Beyond," The Christian Register, CXII (April 20, 1933), 247-248; Allen was the editor of World Tomorrow; and Denis Gwynn, "Hitler's Uneasy Partnership," The Sign, XII (May, 1933), 535."
ted more liberal and humanitarian ideas.\textsuperscript{5} In a less pessimistic vein, \textit{The Christian Century} of April 12 editorialized that Hitler did not appear to be the master of the situation as yet, and it offered a factual base for its opinion. Allegedly disturbed by the activities of energetic National Socialists, representatives of big business and Junker members of the Cabinet had reportedly stepped in and advised Hitler to bring calm to the country. The great fear of these elements was supposed to be foreign economic reprisals. \textit{The Christian Century} believed that Adolf Hitler would let himself be guided by the voice of big business—a logical enough conclusion from the known facts of prior collaboration between German businessmen and Nazi politicians.\textsuperscript{6}

The April 19 \textit{New Republic} was the first journal to acknowledge the March 31 law which destroyed the "sacred" state independence.\textsuperscript{7} In general, this law, which centralized German government and wiped out the last trace of the historic states, thus completing a process that had begun at the Congress of Rastaat in 1799, was overlooked by the vast majority of the journals under consideration. The April 26 \textit{Nation} and \textit{America} for May 6 merely mentioned the end of federalism,\textsuperscript{8} while the conservative monthly

\textsuperscript{5}Ludwig Lore, "The Nazi Revolution at Work," \textit{The Nation}, CXXXVI (April 19, 1933), 441-442.

\textsuperscript{6}\textit{The Christian Century}, L (April 12, 1933), 483-484.

\textsuperscript{7}\textit{The New Republic}, LXXIV (April 19, 1933), 264.

\textsuperscript{8}\textit{The Nation}, CXXXVI (April 26, 1933), 458, and \textit{America}, XLIX (May 6, 1933), 119.
Living Age editorial for June cited the law which transferred Germany from a federal into a centralized state as one of the "best things the Nazis have done." It would increase "the operating efficiency" of the political machinery.9 Obviously the judgment of the journal on this point was conditioned by the leading trends in American political thought during the nineteen-thirties. One would logically have anticipated a more critical comment from conservative circles. In his June 1933 column for Current History, Sidney B. Fay summarized, without comments, the details of the Nazis' consolidation program since the Enabling Act.10

Prior to the final destruction of the non-Nazi political organizations, an occasional reference to inter-party infighting appeared in the American journals; however, a sharp picture of what was actually happening never appeared, and conflicting reports made it extremely difficult for the American reading public to make an intelligent judgment, regardless of the journal they read.

Writing in The Sign for May 1933, Denis Gwynn intimated that Hitler's position was threatened by the disillusioned Alfred Hugenberg and his Nationalist followers, who were finding the coalition government unsatisfactory, plus the more radical elements of his own organization led by Hermann Goering and Joseph Goeb-

9The Living Age, CCXLIV (June, 1933), 284.
bels. The April 26 Nation reported the same rumors and held out hope that the Hitler regime might topple quickly. This liberal journal perceived that two of the more radical Nazis, Goering and Goebbels, had been doing most of the talking and acting of late, while Hitler and his more conservative associates had been strangely silent. Some Berlin observers were convinced that the dissension was more serious than that which had earlier resulted in the departure of the Strasser brothers from the ranks of the movement's faithful. If the extremists won control of the Fascist body, The Nation expected either a resumption of the now abated terror tactics or a Nazi Party rupture which might open the way for the opposition to return to power.

While the liberal Nation would soon have to reevaluate its observations, the conservative monthly Living Age showed that it was momentarily in closer touch with the realities of the situation, although it might not have all the facts straight. Others besides the German Jews had fallen under the iron heel of the National Socialist Chancellor, said the editorial section of the May 1933 issue. The Hugenberg Nationalists were being eased out of the picture, and already Foreign Minister Neurath had tried to resign "in despair." Both the Prussian Junkers and the financial and industrial leaders were "being swept away" by the Nazi regime.

11 Denis Gwynn, "Hitler's Uneasy Partnership," The Sign, XII (May, 1933), 535.

12 The Nation, CXXXVI (April 26, 1933), 190.
However, the terror would not go on, thought this editorial, and perhaps Hitler would regain the confidence he had won at the time of his triumph and lost shortly afterwards when the anti-Semitic campaign was initiated.¹³

From what The Literary Digest had to relate on May 6, tranquillity did not prevail in German domestic life. In fact, it appeared that the German dictatorship was getting temperamental about its terror campaign. The so-called “Brown Terror” could not be mentioned in the Third Reich under penalty of arrest, according to the Digest.¹⁴ On May 10 The Nation admitted that the Hitlerites held the upper hand in German affairs; it saw the government adding new strength with the merging of the Steel Helmet veterans’ groups with the Nazi armed battalions. An important feature of this union was that the Nationalist Party Minister of Labor and commander of the Steel Helmet, Franz Seldte, had converted to National Socialism and brought his forces over with him. The Nationalist leader Alfred Hugenberg was not expected to sit still while his organization disintegrated,¹⁵ but unknown to The Nation it was actually too late for Hugenberg to do anything about it. In the light of what happened a few months later—the quiet departure of Hugenberg from the Hitler Cabinet—The Nation’s idea that the Nationalist leader would seriously challenge Hitler

¹³The Living Age, CCCXLIV (May, 1933), 190.
¹⁴The Literary Digest, CXV (May 6, 1933), 10.
¹⁵The Nation, CXXXVI (May 10, 1933), 514.
was wishful thinking, to say the least.

During the first half of May 1933, three editors and a political scientist agreed that Adolf Hitler appeared to be growing stronger. The May 13 Literary Digest wrote that the world was no longer joking about the dictator and that some observers now felt that not even the German Reichswehr could unseat the Nazi Chancellor. He was presently so powerful, said The Christian Century of May 10, that he could "ignore his allies, and grant amnesty to most of his possible enemies." An America news note felt that the Nazis "had reaped the spoils of their recent coup d'etat and were in complete control of the German situation."

This Catholic journal also saw the National Socialist system being applied with "speed and efficiency." Already a "legend of a glorious national revolution" was being created, said Oscar Jazzi in the May 17 Nation, and Hitler would be depicted as the great national hero.

A more conservative appraisal of the German scene was given by George Gerhard in the June 1933 North American Review. He miscalculated that Hitler and Hugenberg would jointly exercise a moderating influence over the more enthusiastic Nazis in the months to come. Also misleading its readers was the May 26

16 The Literary Digest, CXV (May 13, 1933), 10; The Christian Century, L (May 10, 1933), 615-616; America, XLIX (May 6, 1933), 119, and (May 13, 1933), 143; and Oscar Jazzi, "The Hitler Myth--a Forecast," The Nation, CXXXVI (May 17, 1933), 553. Jazzi was a professor of political science at Oberlin College.

17 George Gerhard, "German Realities," The North American Review, CCXXXV (June, 1933), 517-522.
Commonweal, which announced that Hitler was in a position where he must continue to manipulate the masses, and more important, he needed to "conciliate, utilize and compromise with the politically helpless but nonetheless indispensable groups at the top." ¹⁸

In a rather clear-cut and certainly unique statement, another Catholic journal, America, spoke out on June 3, asking for a more considerate attitude toward the Fascist regimes because of their stand against Communism.

The success of Mussolini in Italy and the strength of Hitler in Germany are making fascism for many the torch of liberation. What is uppermost in the minds of the majority of the people is to repeal the tidal wave of anarchy and economic revolution, which is the announced program of International Communism. While many will regret the abandonment of democracy for dictatorship, it is well to recognize that these modern dictators have taken the wheel to save storm-tossed nations, and have succeeded wonderfully in preserving the traditions of national life.¹⁹

It is not clear what traditions America alluded to, but since the journal had already noted on several occasions the destructive tendencies of the National Socialists, this commentary could well be considered a preparatory step in obtaining American Catholic acceptance for the upcoming Concordat.

In a contrary statement, the totalitarian state of Hitlerite Germany was compared to Bolshevik Russia by The Literary Digest of June 17, ²⁰ and Ludwig Lewisohn, writing in the June 21 Nation, confidently expected the National Socialists to join

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¹⁸ The Commonweal, XVIII (May 26, 1933), 87.
¹⁹ America, XLIX (June 3, 1933), 197.
²⁰ The Literary Digest, CXX (May 27, 1933), 10.
forces with the Bolsheviks in a campaign to take Europe back to "the dark ages." 21

During a period from the middle of June to early July 1933, several articles repeated the stories of inter- and intra-party strife. In the June 1933 Sign Denis Gwynn doubted the ability of Hitler and his colleagues to withstand the pressure from other important German politicians; however, in the following month he predicted a Nazi-Catholic alliance to replace the Hitlers' faltering compact with the Nationalists. 22 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of the quarterly Foreign Affairs, rightly indicated in a July article that the National Socialists needed the help of no faction to maintain control of the government, and he added: "The mentality of the Nazi leaders is mainly an intensification of the instincts and feeling of the Nazi masses." Nevertheless, Armstrong foresaw a future division of the National Socialist leadership with figures like Goering and Goebbels challenging Hitler for supreme command. 23

"The Opposition in Germany," a major article by Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr appearing in the June 21, 1933 New Republic, expressed some agreement with what Armstrong had written. Niebuhr,


22 Denis Gwynn, "America and the New European Situation," The Sign, XII (June, 1933), 682, and "Hitler and the Polish Corridor," (July, 1933), 719-720.

23 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, "Hitler's Reich: The First Phase," Foreign Affairs, XI (July, 1933), 589-604. Armstrong was the editor of this quarterly.
too, was convinced that Hitler had everything under control as far as the former major parties were concerned. What was noticeable, however, was that thousands of Socialists and Communists had come over to the government party in recent weeks, and many of these had become active in the Nazi storm troop battalions. This transformation meant that the most radical forces of the Hitler movement were being greatly strengthened in preparation for the internal struggle with the more conservative business elements. Those of the German Fascists who were at heart Socialists were not ready to concede an end to revolution. With numbers now behind them, the S. A. units were causing the Nazi officials enough concern that even the man once thought of as a radical, and still so considered by others besides Niebuhr, Minister Goering, pleaded with them to go slowly and not discredit the Hitler government. That political struggles in the Germany of the future would be intra-Nazi Party, with the radicals eventually gaining control, was Reverend Niebuhr's estimate. 24 Although the American Protestant leader selected the wrong group to win the showdown that would eventually come in the summer of 1934, his assessment was particularly shrewd, especially since the editors of The New Republic still considered the Nazis' position threatened by Catholics and Hugenberg Nationalists. 25

24 Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Opposition in Germany," The New Republic, LXXV (June 28, 1933), 169-171.

25 The New Republic, LXXV (June 21, 1933), 137.
By July 5 it had become evident to The New Republic's editorial writers that talk of anti-Nazi opposition was nonsense. They now predicted that Alfred Hugenberg would soon be forced into political oblivion. "His resignation will relegate him to futility in Germany's political and industrial affairs under the dictatorship, and not even his string of more than one hundred newspapers will be able to prevent it."\(^{26}\) That Hugenberg was finished was also the view held by The Literary Digest of July 1,\(^ {27}\) and the July 5 Christian Century admitted that German Fascism was made of "sterner stuff" than was first realized, as the Nazis advanced on the existing parties one by one.\(^ {28}\)

Under pressure, Germany's political parties disappeared by early July 1933. The Communist Party was outlawed on May 26, and the Social Democratic Party suffered the same fate on June 22, 1933. "Voluntarily" the Center Party, the mainstay of most of the governments of the Weimar Republic, dissolved itself on July 5. The smaller parties passed out of existence almost without a trace, including the Nationalist Party, the National Socialists' coalition "partner," Alfred Hugenberg, the Nationalist leader, resigned from the Hitler Cabinet on June 29. On July 14, 1933, the government promulgated a law which decreed under penalty of imprisonment that "the National Socialist German Workers'  

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\(^{26}\) Ibid., (July 5, 1933), 192-193.  
\(^{27}\) The Literary Digest, CXVI (July 1, 1933), 12.  
\(^{28}\) The Christian Century, L (July 5, 1933), 867-868.
Party constitutes the only political party in Germany."

The American journals of opinion, for some unexplained reason, neglected the details of the political parties’ elimination, which was unmistakably a major Nazi maneuver to destroy the last vestiges of German democracy. Minor remarks on the demise of the Center and the Nationalist Parties found above, plus a signed article and a portion of a major editorial on the suppression of the Social Democrats were the extent of the coverage at this time. According to the famous revolutionary Leon Trotsky, writing in the July 5 New Republic, the suppression of the Social Democratic Party on June 22 was a long-expected move. "The masses wanted to fight," but certain leaders of the movement deceived themselves into thinking that by supporting some of the National Socialist measures their organization could be preserved.

One cannot, unfortunately, deny the superiority of the Fascist over the proletarian leadership. But it is only out of an unbecoming modesty that the beaten chiefs keep silent about their own part in the victory of Hitler. There is the game of checkers and there is also the game of losers-win. The game that was played in Germany had this singular feature, that Hitler played checkers and his opponents played to lose. As for political genius, Hitler has no need for it. The strategy of his enemy compensated largely for anything his own strategy lacked.29

"The labor movement, for the time being, is powerless; liberalism always weak and ineffectual in Germany is dead," declared a Nation.

29 Leon Trotsky, "The German Catastrophe," trans. Max Schachtman, The New Republic, LXXV (July 5, 1933), 200-203. Besides his criticism of the pathetic maneuvers of the leaders of the Social Democratic Party, Trotsky made a strong denouncement of the Communist Party’s policies leading up to and immediately after the ascendancy to power of Adolf Hitler.
editorial entitled "Nazi Unification" on July 12. 30

Possibly in response to the six-month anniversary of the National Socialist government, several editors and writers in August and September tried seriously to evaluate events since January 31, 1933. The Literary Digest of August 26 recorded that various European newspapers and periodicals were continuing to treat Chancellor Hitler as some kind of comedian, "a sort of actor-manager, staging his big show with scraps of discarded ideas and unconsidered trifles." 31 Some explanation on this point was offered by the British journalist Harrison Brown who had just spent four years in Germany. In this August 2 Nation summary article entitled "Six Months of Hitlerism," Brown called the ferocity of the "new hates" in Hitler Germany unbelievable. The news about the "Brown Terror" to the outside world was delayed "because the editors of responsible papers abroad could not believe that even their picked reporters were not misinformed or carried away by their own emotions." Much of the Nazi "dirty work" was being done by "young men from relatively sheltered middle-class homes," which was all too astonishing at first glance. The terror would continue, predicted Brown. The new leaders, most of whom were "drug addicts and murderers, thieves, forgers, and moral decadents," had to perpetuate the reign of terror because it served as a substitute for constructive measures, and it just happened

30 The Nation, XXXVII (July 12, 1933), 33-34.

31 The Literary Digest, CXVI (August 26, 1933), 13.
to fit their barbaric natures. Already thirty thousand men had been put in concentration camps, where a number of them had been "shot in flight." Without a doubt, the Nazi terror was the "worst" in European history; and the whole truth would never be revealed.

"To know what is happening in Germany today you must go to friends of old who know and trust you," wrote Dr. Alice L. Hamilton, who had recently visited Germany, in the September 1933 Survey Graphic. Dr. Hamilton found that many Germans had been overwhelmed by Nazi propaganda and spoke only the Nazi Party line. Others had been bullied into submission and were living in constant fear. Few were willing to speak critically of affairs since January.

A more valuable contribution by Dr. Hamilton was her article for the October Atlantic Monthly. She declared that whatever Adolf Hitler had done so far should not be any surprise. It was all in his book Mein Kampf, step by step, and Miss Hamilton then proceeded to make the most thorough investigation of this book that had yet been found in the American journals. Hitler, she said, had expounded his plan to become the master of the street battles and his system of propaganda whereby the big lie would be repeated so often that it would be believed by the masses. The doctrine of Germany's betrayal in the war and the need for a dictatorship to restore Germany's rights and military power

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32 Harrison Brown, "Six Months of Hitlerism," The Nation, CXXXVII (August 2, 1933), 121-124. Mr. Brown was a British correspondent on the European continent.
were there too, as was the demand for unity of everything in German life. According to the author, events had proven that "he knew, and knows little" about economics. However, his plan for education was clear: physical training with the stress on the soldierly virtues." His foreign policy called for "living room" for the more advanced Aryan race at the expense of the weaker races in the East. Russia "is destined to provide for Germany the space she requires," but France remained Germany's chief enemy. To destroy French hegemony in Europe demanded allies, and for Germany these would have to be Great Britain and Italy.33

One of the most terrifying word pictures of Germany in the autumn of 1933 was given by Richard Neuberger in the October 4 Nation in the article "The New Germany." In his estimation, a tourist in Germany, with only the slightest knowledge of the language, could not leave the country without a feeling that an explosion was near. Germany was a "fortress bristling with hate and martial fervor." On the other hand, the belief in liberty was finished. Using the excuse of saving Germany from Communism, Hitler had crushed the rights and liberties of all his opponents and enemies.

Thus we see the "new Germany" as a land in which a racial and religious minority has been sacrificed on the altar of political expediency and intolerance in which democracy and civil rights have been abolished, from which culture and independent thoughts have been expelled, which is pre-

33 Alice L. Hamilton, "Below the Surface," The Survey Graphic, XXII (September, 1933), 450-453, and "Hitler Speaks," The Atlantic Monthly, CLII (October, 1933), 399-408.
paring its children to be cannon fodder on the battlefields of a future war.34

In contrast to the view of Germany given by Brown, Hamilton and Neuberger was the evaluation in the September Review of Reviews and World's Work by the conservative journalist Roger Shaw. He surmised Hitler to be no snob, for he was opposed to Socialists and Communists on one hand, and to monarchists, Junkers and Reichswehr generals on the other. "He and his followers are typically of the middle-class—strict, Spartan, conscientious—similar to the unswerving Puritans and to the French Jacobins of 1793." They were Victorian in morals, and the Chancellor was described as a "municipal 'clean-up man.'" The Jews had borne the brunt of the Fascist terror campaign because of their lead in the "modernistic movement." Hitler claimed, furthermore, that his dictatorship was protecting the general welfare of the workers from the Jewish capitalists.

Mussolini had given Hitler his methods for the revolution, Shaw reminded his readers. Unlike the Italian revolution, however, the Nazi revolution cost jobs instead of lives. It "ranks as the most orderly in history." For this peaceful coup, he gave credit to the Nazi leader who was "decidedly not a killer, despite some very flamboyant speechmaking." As far as foreign policy was concerned, Adolf Hitler was not a "true imperialist," for he de-

34 Richard Neuberger, "The New Germany," The Nation, CXXXVII (October 4, 1933), 377-379. Neuberger, who later distinguished himself as a journalist and as a politician in Oregon, had spent the summer in Germany as a student.
manded only what was German. Under him, Germany was swiftly regaining her stature as a great power and building up its national morale. "The little man with the Charlie Chaplin mustache is attempting a Reformation and a Renaissance rolled into one." Great energy was being put into a solution for the unemployment crisis. "Untrammeled freedom" in religious activities for the Catholic Church had been worked out. "Hitler is alleged to have done much that is bad," wrote Shaw. "Upon investigation it appears, however, that there is another and happier side to the question."

Hitler has recently announced that his favorite historical figure is Oliver Cromwell. Cromwell was a military dictator, puritanical, and a believer in direct action. He was a despiser of parliaments. In all these particulars this twentieth-century admirer has, to date, followed in his footsteps. It is no great leap from Iron Sides to Brown Shirts.35

Writing in an editorial in The Christian Register on October 12, 1933, Herbert C. Parsons expressed reservations about certain types of reporting which could have applied to Shaw's article.

American observers in Germany in recent months have not failed to observe certain physical benefits resulting from autocratic rule. Cleanliness in the streets, orderliness in policing, advance in housing plans, speak of a strong governmental direction. These are akin to the betterments which have come to be the familiar gains under dictatorial government, the cost of which in denial of self-reliance and individual freedom, as a spiritual value, is deeply obscured. Social reformers see the ends toward which they labor through educational and legislative paths, none too swiftly trod, accomplished almost instantaneously under aristocratic command. They are impressed by the regimentation of youth and the display, in brown-shirted ranks,

35 Roger Shaw, "Has Hitler Scored?" The Review of Reviews and World's Work, LXXXVIII (September, 1933), 41-42, 57.
marching with shouting enthusiasm under Nazi banners. And they, or some of them, return wondering if the childhood of America might not indeed by recruited in a somewhat similar manner to support our efforts toward recovery from the ills and ails of depression.36

In one of his several articles written from Germany, Paul Hutchinson of The Christian Century staff seemed convinced on September 6 that the Hitler regime could not last. That the leaders had nothing to offer but bellowing oratory was his rather shallow assessment. Too many of the campaign promises had been abandoned. Yet Hutchinson believed that Hitler was politician enough to know when the tide flowed against him. He would offer the nation a return of the Hohenzollern monarchy, Hutchinson predicted.

After six more weeks in Nazi Germany, correspondent Hutchinson became more penetrating in his analysis. "Hitler deserves to be taken with the utmost seriousness," advised Hutchinson in the October 18 Christian Century, since the German dictator had found substitutes for the existing order of things which were accepted by a majority of the population. In place of parliamentary democracy he offered the "principle of leadership" with the political creed of nationalism. His new social order combined nationalism and Socialism, to attract as many malcontents as possible. Continuing his incisive analysis of the many facets of Hitlerism, Hutchinson next asserted that Hitler had

36 Herbert C. Parsons, "Editorial: The German 'Christians','" The Christian Register, CXII (October 12, 1933), 666. Parsons was a state official in Massachusetts.
brought religious life "down out of the vague clouds of mysticism and absorption in the possible bliss of a sweet bye and bye."
The church was to be recognized as a social agency with the expressed duty of building up the "community morale for the attaining of the ends set by the state." More Germans had openly opposed the government's religious program than any other, but the author also admitted that the reform-minded "German Christians" made up a vast majority of the church-going Protestant people.\(^\text{37}\)

A Catholic correspondent, Denis Gwynn, in the September Sign, remained skeptical that the Nazis could maintain their control over the state. "The most uncertain factor" was Chancellor Hitler. He had not shown any capacity for the constructive measures which were absolutely necessary for the well-being of the German people. If he proved to be but a demagogue, there were formidable men standing in the wings ready to displace him. Gwynn acknowledged that it was difficult to ascertain exactly what was happening behind the scenes of the administration because of the strict censorship,\(^\text{38}\) which may account for his poor assessment.

Two Protestant writers, on the other hand, tried to be more realistic in evaluating the events in Nazi Germany. Professor William Lofthouse, in an article in the Protestant quarterly

\(^{37}\)Paul Hutchinson, "Will Hitler Restore the Hohenzollerns?" The Christian Century, I (September 6, 1933), 1104-1105, and "The Portent of Hitler," (October 18, 1933), 1299-1301.

\(^{38}\)Denis Gwynn, "Europe's New Perspective," The Sign, XII (September, 1933), 73-74.
Religion In Life for the autumn of 1933, while mildly critical of the Nazi totalitarian ideology, cautioned that Germany and the German people must be treated justly as they rose from the depths of despair. The excesses of the totalitarian regime were of course dangerous, but this British professor depicted Hitler as "Communism's relentless foe." What the Nazi Chancellor was asking for Germany was no more than any other state would ask in the same condition. 39

James E. Clarke, the editor of The Presbyterian Advance, disputed the "high rating" that some unnamed publicists had been giving the German Chancellor lately. In a September 14 editorial Clarke wrote that "for the prosperity of Germany and the peace of the world it is to be hoped that Hitler is a man of unquestioned ability and of high and unquestioned devotion to the genuine welfare of the German people." But, according to Clarke, Hitler's recent speeches indicated that he was placing difficulties in his own path. His desire for race purity could never be attained. Germany's destiny would have to be worked out on a mixed blood basis like every other great nation. 40

Some first-hand impressions of contemporary Germany were presented to the readers of The Literary Digest by the Protestant


40 The Presbyterian Advance, XLVIII (September 14, 1933), 4.
clergyman Reverend Stanley High. This was an unusual procedure on the part of this weekly, for it seldom printed signed articles. In "Hitler and the New Germany," the first of a series of four articles, High argued that Hitler had accomplished almost nothing constructive since taking office in January. Most of the major problems still existed, but "barring the possibility of international action, Adolf Hitler has come to stay." The Fuhrer, High maintained, had been accepted by "every articulate German." Germany was presumably undergoing a religious ecstasy, where active support for the ruling authority involved a spiritual experience. High felt that religious adoration had been directed to Hitler without his invitation, and he had accepted it and capitalized upon it. "For religion in Germany has a peculiar political importance. Among no other western people is the conviction of a Divine mission so strong as among the Germans." The Nazi leadership had intelligently translated these notions into popular language for the masses. They, particularly the German youth, had received this "revitalized Teutonism" with great enthusiasm. Hitler had ended their feeling of despair and had given them jobs. It was these young people that the National Socialist were depending upon to extend their regime, for they could be "most easily molded."\(^{41}\)

One week later, in the October 14 Literary Digest, Reverend High's second article discussed the totalitarian movement in

\(^{41}\)Stanley High, "Hitler and the New Germany," The Literary Digest, CXVI (October 7, 1933), 5, 42-43.
Hitler's Reich. "For each sphere of the nation's interests and activities there is to be but one organization; in each compartment of the nation's mind, one thought; in each corner of the nation's heart, but one aspiration." The Chancellor's most successful undertaking had been in the area of political consolidation and state centralization. At this point, High appeared almost to praise the Fuehrer's political acumen. State localism was completely erased, forcing people to think nationally. Nazi officials were also playing down the traditional dominant role of Prussia and Berlin in the state. The National Socialists had divided the major bureaus of their organization between Munich and Berlin, while Hitler and his government officials made it a point of policy to conduct visitations throughout the Reich. Having in mind the successful political unification under the Nazis, High made this statement: "If Adolf Hitler's regime was to end to-morrow, his place in history would be secure for this, if for no other reason."\(^4^2\)

In the next article of the series, Reverend High took a close look at Hitler's position in the Third Reich. The first section of this October 21 article contains what seems to be High's most significant piece of analysis in the entire Literary Digest series. Before taking over the government, Hitler and the Nazis were bitterly opposed, but now, High observed, everyone seemed to be jumping on their bandwagon. How many of these were

\(^4^2\)High, "Hitler's One-Purpose Government," ibid., (October 14, 1933), 12, 24.
convinced Fascists would be difficult to ascertain; many Germans were "undoubtedly as much anti-Nazi as ever." Except, however, for a few outspoken opponents who quickly found themselves interned in concentration camps, "one would search far to find a more docile company of antis." Hitler's pledge to destroy the post-war political system had been disturbingly efficient, giving weight to the opinion of some that the Weimar era was artificial. "The Germany of Adolf Hitler is the real Germany," was the cry of the government's supporters.

As for the National Socialist Party organization, Hitler held the upper hand, despite rumors about "fire-eater" Goering's rivalry with his leader. Hermann Goering was a showman, but he knew who was boss. Thus High indicated that he had made a thorough study of the alleged power struggle within the ranks of the National Socialist leadership. "If Hitler chose," Goering "could be consigned tomorrow to an outer darkness that would be complete and final." The difference between Hitler and his associates was not quantitative, but qualitative. "It is all the difference between prophet and the disciple. And no one understands that better than the disciples." Hitler was devoted to his friends and had rewarded their loyalty amply; however, "if the issue arose, he could make it just as clear how ample his punishments would be for those who proved unfaithful." The purge of 1934 proved the validity of High's observation on this point! The weakest link in the author's study was his profile of the Nazi leader, whom he depicted as a warm and friendly man who was defi-
The Nazis' October 14, 1933 venture in foreign affairs—the withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Geneva Disarmament Conference was followed by a November Reichstag election and plebiscite, which resulted in overwhelming approval for Hitler's foreign policies. Nazi officials decided the opportunity was right to elevate the National Socialist Party together with its various subsidiary organizations to an official status as departments of the German state. In the words of The New Republic for December 13, 1933, which alone commented on this occurrence, "the party and state in Nazi Germany have become identical."

Censorship and Propaganda

The new German press law was first published on October 4, 1933, to take effect at the beginning of 1934. It empowered the government to exclude from publication anything which tended to weaken the "will for union of the German people and German culture." Using this part of the law, the Nazis gradually strangled the German free press, both religious and secular. As for

43 High, "The Man Who Leads Germany," ibid., (October 21, 1933), 5, 42. In "Danger Still in Austria," The Nation, CXXXVII (September 20, 1933), 322, John Gunther presented a view of Chancellor Hitler which contrasted drastically with High's kindly and religious man. "Hitler has served to housebreak Mussolini and make even Litvinov semi-respectable."

44 This problem will be treated in the chapters on German foreign affairs.

45 The New Republic, LXXVII (December 13, 1933), 115.

46 The most authoritative study of the Nazification of the
radio broadcasting, the National Socialists had a monopoly from the very inception of the Hitler ministry because the German government owned and operated all stations. Moving pictures remained in the hands of private firms, but they were soon following ever so closely the directives of the propaganda ministry headed by Dr. Joseph Goebbels.

The American liberal journals took the lead in showing concern about the freedom of writing and publishing and the exchange of ideas as they existed in Nazi Germany. Specific reference to the regime's attitude to the press appeared on November 8, 1933, in The New Republic. That Hitler had "complete control" over the German press was an exaggeration, declared this weekly, for many newspapers with independent convictions were still trying to maintain themselves. At the moment, the government appeared to be more interested in the distribution of foreign newspapers and periodicals, which it could not bully into submission. A somewhat contrary view was written for the November 15 New Republic by Richard Neuberger, who described the regime as very nervous about all criticism. "Fear of indignation abroad, coupled with fear of strife and rebellion at home, has prompted the Nazi government to control all publications with a mailed fist." He also thought that "the Nazis control one of the most highly organized movements in modern times to direct sentiment and opinion in

By April 1934, Sidney B. Fay of the monthly *Current History* could report that arrests, suppression and censorship had forced more than six hundred German newspapers out of business in little over a year. The quality of the newspapers had suffered, he continued, because of the ouster of Jewish newsman. The April 4 *Nation* told of the demise of Berlin's more than two-hundred-year-old newspaper *Vossische Zeitung*, and it also condemned the "dead hand of censorship." What was happening in Germany as a result of this censorship was disclosed by the usually perceptive foreign correspondent S. Miles Bouton in the May 1934 *American Mercury*, a conservative monthly. It was his opinion that most Germans remained ignorant of what was happening in their own country and in the outside world. They remained hypnotized by the regime's "dizzy pace" and believed whatever the controlled press and radio told them. On the other hand, *The Nation* for April 4 argued that few Germans wanted to read the "dull and "stupid" stuff appearing in the official press, which was having difficulty maintaining its circulation.


49 *The Nation*, CXXXVIII (April 4, 1934), 371.


51 *The Nation*, CXXXVIII (April 4, 1934), 371.
While censorship was being strictly applied in Nazi Germany, government officials were reportedly seeking ways to spread abroad the gospel of National Socialism. Three American journals in the late fall of 1933 discussed Nazism's penetration of North America. *The Nation* of November 1 called attention to the fact that "half crazy representatives" of the National Socialist movement were organizing quasi-Nazi groups in America at the same time that the Machiavellian German leader was broadcasting assurances that he wished only peace with all peoples. In the article "Hitlerism Comes to America" for the November 1933 *Harper's Magazine*, John J. Smertenko disclosed that the National Socialist units in America were being directly supervised by the main Party headquarters in Munich and that they were carrying out their campaign "systematically and methodically." Albert Brandt made similar remarks in *The Catholic World* for January 1934 but added the fact that the Nazis were also carrying out their activities in western Europe and South America.


53 *The Nation*, CXXXVII (November 1, 1933), 499.

54 John J. Smertenko, "Hitlerism Comes to America," *Harper's Magazine*, CLXVII (November, 1933), 666-667. Smertenko was the former editor of *Opinion*.

Women and Youth

German womanhood under the Hitler dictatorship was the subject of one major article during the fourteen months covered in this chapter. Dr. Alice L. Hamilton described the subordinate role of German women in the new Third Reich for the readers of the January 1934 Survey Graphic. She called the Nazi attitude toward women a "reversion to the past." 56

The fate of the German youth in the Nazi state, alluded to in a number of summary articles, was the primary concern of two journals during the summer of 1933. 57 In The New Republic for June 14, Mary Heaton Vorse wrote that the National Socialists were bent on indoctrinating the German youth from the primary schools to the universities. All experimental schools had been closed, liberal instructors dismissed, and "questionable" books banned. 58 News had been received by the July 12 Nation that all the youth groups were to be brought under Fascist administration, and the members would be instructed to spy on their parents and relatives in order to maintain political orthodoxy in the state. 59

56 Alice L. Hamilton, "Women's Place in Germany," The Survey Graphic, XXXII (January, 1934), 28.

57 For background material regarding one important activity of the young people, the German youth movements in the twentieth-century, see the recent work by Walter Z. Laqueur, Young Germany: A History of the German Youth Movement (New York: Basic Books Publishing Company, 1962).

58 Mary Heaton Vorse, "Germany: The Twilight of Reason," The New Republic, LXXV (June 14, 1933), 119.

59 The Nation, CXXXVII (July 12, 1933), 33-34.
Several months later, Oswald Garrison Villard discussed the role of German youth for the March 7, 1934 Nation. Villard noted that the backbone of Hitler's brigades remained the young people of Germany, just as they were before Hitler became Chancellor. Since January 1933, an overnight transformation from a despairing lot to a virile, happy and enthusiastic marching mass had greatly influenced many foreign observers of the Nazi state. But Hitler's program for a return to greatness had demolished the ideas which the German nation cherished most. Not only culture, but the rule of law, had been destroyed.

Its young men and women have been poisoned—poisoned with hate for certain classes in the community, taught to believe that they must smash and imprison and outlaw every individual whose views go counter to their own. They are bred in intolerance, nurtured in vindictiveness, breast-fed with hate. They are even being taught, many of them, that what Germany needs is the setting up of a pagan religion, the renewed worship of gods who typify at best only the crude idealism of men who lived in the days when everybody carried a weapon and was clad in the skin of a wild beast. If the teachings of Adolf Hitler are sound, however, the Christian religion ought truly to be scrapped, not only because Jesus was himself a Jew, but because all that he taught of brotherly love, tolerance, kindliness, good-will and forgiveness of sins is entirely banned.

The Nazi chief was leading the youth down a path of ruin, but the young people were incapable of analyzing the present situation, being blinded by nationalistic fervor and wild expletions. It was a sorry state of affairs, said Villard. Daniel B. Pulsford added in the April 1934 Sign that the German youth were being inculcated with the ideals of the bloody warrior as part of their

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60 Oswald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Men: Hitler and the Youth of Germany," Ibid., OXXXVIII (March 7, 1934), 265.
education for the good of the Fatherland.  

**Education**

The German school system and intellectual life felt the heavy hand of Nazi interference almost immediately, since the schools and universities were under the supervision of local governments which became Nazi-infested during 1933. However, it was not until April 30, 1934, with the appointment of Bernhard Rust as Reich Minister of Science, Education and Popular Culture, that the entire school system was coordinated under a single hardcore National Socialist.  

Several months before the naming of Rust, the November 8 New Republic considered the educational system "reduced to little more than propaganda for war."  

Almost the same observation was made by Dr. Alice L. Hamilton, herself a one-time graduate student in Germany, in Harper's Magazine for January 1934. She wrote that Germany was now "deliberately abdicating her place of leadership in the intellectual world." Intellectual activity could not be tolerated in a totalitarian state where dissent was considered treason. The attacks upon the Jews, she stated, could be partly explained by their influence.

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61 Daniel B. Pulsford, "Cross or Swastika?" *The Sign*, XIII (April, 1934), 555.


63 *The New Republic*, LXXVI (November 8, 1933), 351-352.
in the German intellectual world. It was at the younger generation that the anti-intellectual campaign was primarily aimed. 64

By February 14, 1934, The New Republic's Verne Andrews could report that the Nazis had everything under control in the education area, 65 a view which was supported by Shephard Stone's article in Current History for April 1934. The great German universities had been forced into conformity by Nazi dictation. Stone seemed unhappy to relate that the majority of professors had "flexible backbones" and were voluntarily making the pillars of intellectualism the fortresses of Nazi chauvinism. They preferred to retain their academic chairs, however repugnant the restrictions, rather than be forced into exile or poverty. 66

A lone dissenting voice, that of William E. D. Allen in the ultra-conservative American Review for January 1934, was heard singing the praise of Fascist policies and their effect upon western culture. He assessed the Fascist movement as one "directed towards the revival of European culture." Moreover, it represented a revolutionary group led by war-veterans which "should establish the truth that further wars can hardly be a primary objective of the supporters of Fascist movements." Allen

66 Shephard Stone, "Twilight of the German University," Current History, XL (April, 1934), 39. Stone had spent several years studying in Europe.
had obviously not read the works of Mussolini or Hitler. He con-
tended that Fascism concentrated on the consolidation and devel-
opment of the internal resources which "should further exclude
the necessity of war. " "Building around the old and sure founda-
tions of European racial culture," Fascism would assure peace to
Europe and order to the world. 67

Nazi Justice and German Resistance

The brutal police-state tactics utilized by the Nazis in
creating Hitler's Third Reich were periodically noted by the Am-
erican journals. 68 Also treated somewhat superficially, since
little was actually known about them, were the so-called under-
ground opposition groups. 69

67William E. D. Allen, "The Fascist Idea in Britain," The
American Review, II (January, 1934), 340-341. Allen was interes-
ted in the history of Russian nationalities, writing works about
the Georgians and Ukrainians.

68For a detailed description of concentration camp poli-
cies and conditions see Eugen Kogon, The Theory and Practice of
Hell, trans. Heinz Norden (New York: Farrar, Straus and Gudahy,
1950).

69There are several valuable monographs available con-
cerning anti-Nazi activity in Germany. Allen Dulles has written
a sympathetic view of the resistance groups in Germany's Under-
ground (New York: The Macallan Company, 1947). More insight in-
to the motivations of the underground factions may be found in
Hans Rothfels' The German Opposition to Hitler, trans. Lawrence
Wilson (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1948). German historian
Gerhard Ritter's The German Resistance: Carl Goerdeler's Struggle
Against Tyranny, trans. Robert T. Clark (New York: Frederick A.
Fraeger, 1959), takes into consideration many of the author's
personal experiences with members of the resistance. Both Mother
Mary Alice Gallin, German Resistance to Hitler: Ethical and Reli-
gious Factors (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1961), and
James Donohoe, Hitler's Conservative Opponents in Bavaria 1930-
Reports to the May 6, 1933 *Literary Digest* from the Manchester Guardian told of the establishment of extraordinary political courts with arbitrary powers. These dealt out prison sentences for the slightest offenses against the state. What was happening, the British paper contended, was being done systematically and with the knowledge of Hitler and his intimate advisors, not by bands of undisciplined storm troopers. Sidney B. Fay told the readers of the June 1933 *Current History* that news had been received that several large concentration camps for political prisoners were under construction. More would be heard about the concentration camps in greater detail. On July 5 *The Nation* called attention to the reported overcrowding of German prison camps as the political arrests became more numerous with the families of suspected persons now being seized, while in an earlier issue of the same journal, Emil Lengyel stated that "the true torch-bearers of civilization in Germany are in exile, in prison, or without work, and are labeled 'public enemies.'"

One optimistic sign for the July 12 *Nation* was the report that underground groups were being organized. German workers

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1945 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1961), present excellently documented analyses on the resistance groups.

70 *The Literary Digest*, CXV (May 6, 1933), 10.

71 Sidney B. Fay, "Nazis Consolidate Their Power," *Current History*, XXXVIII (June, 1933), 358-359.

72 *The Nation*, CXXXVII (July 5, 1933), 2, and Emil Lengyel, "German Culture in Exile," CXXXVI (May 31, 1933), 607.

73 *The Nation*, CXXXVII (July 12, 1933), 33-34.
appeared to play the key role in the early resistance movement. According to the August 2 New Republic, a Communist-led underground movement had already begun to operate, and on September 13 it could report that "the new rulers of Germany have no enemies—and yet they are still arresting them." "Daily one reads of Communists beheaded, of Socialists sent to concentration camps, of boys sentenced to eighteen months of prison for distributing illegal newspapers." This journal also had some information that small subversive cells were proliferating throughout the industrial areas.\textsuperscript{74} Nazi officials referred to these cells as "this pest" and demanded "Draconian counter-measures." Still these groups were increasing all the time, declared the October 1933 Living Age.\textsuperscript{75} The National Socialists could be in power for a number of years, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr thought, but in an October American Scholar article, he predicted a long and hard government struggle against the worker-led opposition groups.\textsuperscript{76}

On the other hand, some journals expressed reservations about the strength and potential of the opposition forces. For one, Ludwig Lore, writing in the September 1933 issue of Current History, foresaw a hard job ahead for the workers to rebuild a new organization after the recent failures of their associations

\textsuperscript{74}The New Republic, LXXV (August 2, 1933), 299-300, and LXXVI (September 13, 1933), 113.

\textsuperscript{75}The Living Age, CCCXLV (October, 1933), 98.

\textsuperscript{76}Reinhold Niebuhr, "The Germans: Unhappy Philosophers in Politics," The American Scholar, II (October, 1933), 417.
to stem the tide of the Nazi totalitarians. Yet Lore called to
the attention of the readers of The New Republic for September 27
the reports that forces on the right were organizing illegal op-
position, especially since the resignation of Alfred Hugenberg
from the Hitler Cabinet on June 29. From Geneva Robert Dell,
a correspondent for The Nation, declared in an October 18 article
that his Berlin informants saw "no chance at all of an overthrow
of the Hitler regime by the Germans themselves." Underground ac-
tivity stories had been exaggerated by the Nazis themselves to
give them an excuse for future severe policies. The Reichswehr
might have done something earlier, but it was "now too late." Professor Seelye Bixler in the October 12 Christian Register re-
ported that resistance was "still offered in some quarters" but
"few dare to allow their opposition to become overt." The first major article devoted to German resistance for-
ces did not appear in an American journal until late in 1933.
Publishing the essay "Underground Germany" in the December 6,

77 Ludwig Lore, "The German Socialist Debacle," Current
History, XXXVIII (September, 1933), 700, and "The Last Stand of
the Junkers," The New Republic, LXXVI (September 27, 1933), 174-
176.

78 Robert Dell, "The German Nightmare," The Nation, CXXXVII
(October 18, 1933), 454. Dell was the Geneva correspondent of
the Manchester Guardian and a frequent contributor to American
journals.

79 Julius Seelye Bixler, "The World Today: German Univer-
sities," The Christian Register, CXXI (October 12, 1933), 665. Dr. Bixler was professor of religion and biblical literature at
Smith College from 1924 to 1933 and professor of theology at Har-
vard University from 1933 to 1942.
1933 Nation, journalist Roger B. Nelson showed that he had more confidence in the German workers' resistance movement than the facts, as they are known today, warranted.

Whatever light there is today in darkest Germany is to be found underground. All that was good in German culture, all that was inspiring in German traditions, and all that was worth while in the German labor and revolutionary movements will be preserved by the new heroes of the Germany of tomorrow now being reared underground.

The membership was "almost suicidal in its heroism" and almost exclusively from the laboring class. Nelson admitted that the movement was small and somewhat confused, but it was growing rapidly and achieving a clarity of purpose. Although the author made no predictions, unity would not be accomplished easily, since he mentioned that the three main forces of resistance were reportedly represented by the official Communist Party, the Social Democratic Party and its youth organizations, and those workers opposed to the Marxist philosophy.

Rather than the dubious underground work by the laboring classes, it was the opposition from "the more devout Protestants and Catholics" plus that of "aristocratic circles" which The Living Age of January 1934 thought was hurting the regime more. However, in the next two issues, the editors began to give more credit to the workers, maintaining in their April editorial that the greatest threat to Hitler was the "possibility of united working-class opposition." Needing only unity, the workers had the

80 Roger B. Nelson, "Underground Germany," The Nation, CXXXVII (December 6, 1933), 647-649.
potential to erupt as they did during the Kapp Putsch of 1923, an indication that the full extent of National Socialist dominance had not been grasped by The Living Age.

A revitalized Social Democracy was presently working underground to unify the working classes and all anti-Nazi groups, claimed Ludwig Lore in the April 1934 American Mercury. Details about the society were scarce, as they were for all such resistance groups, but what appeared certain, according to Lore, was that the group was more concerned with building up an organization than with promoting agitation here and now. Because of this policy a split had occurred in the ranks of the young members who were "demanding decisive reorientation toward illegal revolutionary activity." These would be the leaders of the movement's future, thought Lore. They had not lost the spirit of revolution as the older workers had, and they were willing to fight for what they believed in, however desperate that cause might seem to be. Lore developed the same argument in another article, "German Socialism Underground," for the August 15, 1934 New Republic. Not the existence of active resistance cells, but a "fear complex" grasping all of Germany was recorded by Verne Andrews in the March 21 New Republic.

81 The Living Age, CCCXLV (January, 1934), 380; CCCXLVI (March, 1934), 4–5; and (April, 1934), 98, 154–157.


83 Verne Andrews, "Off to a Concentration Camp," The New Republic, LXXVIII (March 21, 1934), 156.
Journalist Louis Fischer did not fully agree with those who saw a resurgent workers' opposition. Writing in The Nation on April 4, 1934, he said that "millions of workingmen have accepted fascism out of the conviction that the Marxist sermons on class war were wrong." Supposedly the aggressive foreign policy and the dynamic militarism of the Hitlerites were two of the main attractions for the workers. Fischer did not discuss the problems of unemployment.

Characteristically, Leon Trotsky predicted the ultimate success of the German workers, but only after a long and careful reorganization. In an article entitled "How Long Can Hitler Stay?" in the usually conservative American Mercury for January 1934, Trotsky maintained that the old Communist and Social Democratic Party organizations should be forgotten. They had both failed miserably before January 1933 and afterward. "No self-deception! A defeat covered up by illusions means ruin. Salvation lies in clarity. Only a merciless criticism of all failures and errors can prepare the great revenge." The German proletariat must make this effort, said Trotsky, since the Fascist regime

84 Louis Fischer, "Fascism and Bolshevism," The Nation, CXXXVIII (April 4, 1934), 381-382. Fischer was a noted journalist and an author of many works on international affairs. Nazism would survive, according to Frederick L. Schumann, professor of political science at the University of Chicago, in a more scholarly article, "The Political Theory of German Fascism," The American Political Science Review, XXXVIII (April, 1934), 232, as long as it continued to bring solace to those classes which it claimed to have saved from Bolshevism. A new revolutionary situation could be created, however, if economic disintegration continued or if a series of diplomatic defeats occurred.
"cannot fall of itself."

It must be overthrown. The changing of the political regime in present-day Germany cannot be realized without an insurrection. True, for such an insurrection there is at present no direct and immediate prospect; but no matter what devious path developments should take, they must inevitably break through to insurrection.85

Refugees

In the midst of all the National Socialists' repressive measures, it was not uncommon to find stories concerning German refugees. John Haynes Holmes, writing in the March 21, 1934 Christian Century, argued that the Hitler tyranny was "the most terrifying experience since the world war." The number of refugees fleeing the country spoke for itself. "Citizens do not run away from their native land except under conditions of terror and despair."86 Additional authoritative background information on the refugee problem was furnished by Joseph P. Chamberlain in the April 1934 Survey Graphic.87

National Socialist Dissension and the Blood Purge

During the first half of 1934, the American journals re-

86 John Haynes Holmes, "How Do I Know About Hitler?" The Christian Century, LI (March 21, 1934), 391-392. Reverend Holmes was a minister in New York City and was the editor of Unity.
87 Joseph P. Chamberlain, "The High Commission for German Refugees," The Survey Graphic, XXIII (April, 1934), 177-180. The author was the American member of the High Commission for German Refugees.
ported a number of stories indicating that there was increased in-
ternal dissension within the government circle and the ranks of
the Nazi Party. These rumors, together with the information that
the workers were growing restless, caused a number of journals to
speculate about what was going on behind the scenes in Germany.
For instance, The Living Age of February 1934 noted an apparent
reshuffling within the Nazi government's hierarchy. It looked as
if Hermann Goering was being eased out of power with his replace-
ment being Wilhelm Frick, another old Nazi Party stalwart. 88 The
March 7 New Republic examined similar rumors. Goering, it was
conjectured, had become "a thorn in the side" of Hitler and his
other lieutenants; he was now most influential in Germany's for-
eign policy-making and had been steadily gaining national promi-
nence. The New Republic thought it clear that "relations among
the leaders of the Nazi regime are far from harmonious." It
called attention to a recent move by Chancellor Hitler to obtain
a public pledge of loyalty from his government bureaucrats and
Party chiefs. 89 The Presbyterian Advance misinterpreted the oath-
taking as a step taken by Hitler to crown himself emperor, rather
than as an attempt to halt political unrest. 90

In The Review of Reviews and World's Work for March 1934,
Roger Shaw discussed the role the army would play in the politi-

88 The Living Age, CCCXLV (February, 1934), 474.
89 The New Republic, LXXVIII (March 7, 1934), 86.
90 The Presbyterian Advance, XLIX (March 8, 1934), 86.
local battle that was apparently shaping up. The Reichswehr, the
one major factor in German life outside of Hitler's control, ac-
tually held Germany "in the hollow of its hand." It had no great
admiration for the Nazi leader, and it genuinely felt contempt
for the para-military units of the National Socialist Party, con-
sidering them "hopeless amateurs and bombastic boy scouts."
"That the storm troopers outnumber the Reichswehr by nearly six
to one, does not disturb the seasoned professionals." So far,
the army had remained silent, but Shaw warned that "behind the
silence is a mailed fist, which is capable of dealing knockout
blows." On May 23 The New Republic revealed that Hermann Goer-
ing, once thought by some American observers to be on the road to
oblivion, had been resurrected to help the regime acquire the
solid backing of the regular army in case of an internal revolt
by "elements in the Storm Troops." May speeches by Joseph Goebbels reminded the suspicious
Christian Century of the days when the outcast Nazis were shout-
ing threats at the republican coalitions. Cries to renew attacks
upon the Jews, condemnations of the German Catholics, calls for
individual Germans to act as spies in their neighborhoods, and
the establishment of more extra-legal courts to deal with dissen-
ters, indicated to the Century that something was worrying the

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91 Roger Shaw, "Germany—France—Austria!" The Review of
Reviews and World's Work, LXXXIX (March, 1934), 36.
Nazi Chancellor and his friends.93 A contrary view was given by Philip W. Wilson in the May 19 Literary Digest. From some source that remained unnamed, he saw "signs that Hitler is arriving at years of discretion."94

Although the journals did not know it, the time of decision in Germany was near at hand. The first week of June 1934 found Ernst Roehm meeting with Hitler in what has been described as a last-ditch effort to reach an understanding on some basic principles. Exactly what transpired is not certain, but a few days after the meeting Roehm's S. A. troopers were given a one-month leave and Roehm himself went on sick leave. Then suddenly another voice was heard attacking the Hitler regime for its excesses and calling for a final end of the revolutionary changes that Germany had undergone since Hitler's coming to power a year and a half earlier. This was the theme of the speech made by Vice-Chancellor Franz von Papen at the University of Marburg on June 17. At the time it was widely believed that Papen was supported by the dying President Hindenburg who, in turn, had within his grasp control over the Reichswehr.

Two journals, the June 9 America and the July Living Age,95 hinted that revolt was near at hand in Germany after hear-

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94 Philip W. Wilson, "Is Mankind Talking Itself Into--or Out of--War?" The Literary Digest, CXVII (May 19, 1934), 41.
ing about the Hitler-Roehm discussions. Both periodicals surmised that a major point of contention evolved around the control of the army.

Papen's speech drew slightly more notice from the American journals. The Vice-Chancellor's address "astounded" the July 4 Nation, one of the four journals which had time to react to this event before more serious developments occurred. Discontent seemed to be more widespread than at first believed. Papen had gone "extraordinarily far in his attack," criticizing not only personalities and the radical wing of the Nazi Party but also "the theory of Hitlerism itself." Rumors concerning the restlessness of Roehm's storm corps had also reached the desks of The Nation. Thinking that Adolf Hitler was caught up in the middle between two feuding factions, its editors ventured a poor guess that Hitler would now assume "the role of moderator." More realistic and more accurate was the close of this editorial.

The battle will not be a brief one nor gently fought, if it really comes to open conflict. The people may actually be called upon to take sides with one or the other of the two great national heroes, Hitler and Hindenburg, although they have so little to gain in the choice of masters thus presented to them. At any rate it will be a genuine test of Hitler's capacity as a statesman and fighter. It is one thing to be a silver-tongued orator and the world's greatest showman, and another to deal with a far-reaching revolt in your own ranks.96

The New Republic for July 4 thought much less of Papen's speech. It was the message of a man who had failed in his as-

96 The Nation, CXXXIX (July 4, 1934), 5.
signed task of containing the radicalism of the National Socialists in the government. He had become a useful tool and errand boy for Hitler in his relations with big business, Junkerdom and the Catholic Church. That Papen, representing the business interests, should berate the Nazis for turning to "National Bolshevism" was a mere disguise. "Nothing is more ridiculous and more dangerous than to say of the Brown Shirts and the Nazi leadership that they are 'brown outside and red within.'" What the industrialists feared most of all was a continuation of the ineffectual Nazi experiments which "contradict every known law of industrial development and every precept of commercial practice." 97

The Marburg address was given only a small news item mention by the June 30 America. Apparently still deceiving itself about Hitler's personality, America reported that the Nazi chieftain had "frankly endorsed" Papen's points of criticism. His only objection seemed to be that Papen had voiced his views publicly. 98 Aspects of Papen's speech received careful consideration in Cabinet discussions, according to the July 5 Presbyterian Advance. From all indications the moderates seemed to be in command, and their strength was "likely to increase." Rampant radicalism was on the way out, said the Advance, without realizing how it would be eliminated. 99

97 The New Republic, LXXIX (July 4, 1934), 196-197.
98 America, LI (June 30, 1934), 287.
99 The Presbyterian Advance, XLIX (July 5, 1934), 196-197.
The climax and the end of the National Socialist intra-Party disputes occurred on June 30, 1934, in an event accurately referred to as the "Blood Purge." This dramatic move by Hitler was directed primarily against the more radical social revolutionary wing of the National Socialist Party led by Ernst Roehm, which was also aiming at the incorporation of the S. A. troopers into the Reichswehr as a means of gaining control of the regular army. In a lightning-like maneuver carried out by the S.S. (Schutz Staffeln) blackshirted corps whose leader was Heinrich Himmler, Roehm and other S. A. leaders were murdered and the power of the brownshirts destroyed. Besides the S. A. leadership, the assassins struck down several who had ties with neither the S. A. nor the Nazi Party: Hitler's old enemies and potential leaders of dissenting political factions, many of whom were conservative and Catholic. The list of dead included General Kurt von Schleicher and his wife; General Kurt von Bredow; the former Nazi leader Gregor Strasser; two of Papen's assistants who had drawn up the Marburg speech, Herbert von Bose and Edgar Jung; the Berlin leader of Catholic Action Erich Klausener; and some of Hitler's old adversaries in Bavaria. Hitler later admitted to having had seventy-seven persons executed; estimates have gone as

100 The latest study of the June 30 blood purge is by Elisabeth Wiskemann, "The Night of the Long Knives," History Today, XIV (June, 1964), 371-380, which clearly shows that Ernst Roehm and his subordinates had not planned a coup, although they may have said rash things."
high as one thousand dead. 101

On July 13, 1934, Chancellor Hitler appeared before the Nazi-packed Reichstag to give his account of the events two weeks before. He spoke mysteriously and vaguely of secret plots and the moral degeneration of the victims, particularly that of his former associates. He made it quite clear in his address that he was the law of the land—the man who determined life and death in Nazi Germany. It was an impassioned speech by a man who seemed to be very confident of his power.

Most of the significant American weekly journals and many of the monthlies responded to the June 10 killings, and almost all were shocked. In general, the religious-oriented journals seemed eager to pass moral judgment upon the events of June 30. 102 America's responses of July 14 and 21 were the best examples of such reporting. 103 European civilization was definitely being menaced by the German "mad dogs," said the July 14 America editorial en-
titled "Germany Shocks the World."

It is not as if these deaths came as a result of a revolt against the safety and security of the German state. If revolt there was, it was not against Germany, but merely against a regime. The real gravity of the situation becomes apparent only when we realize that. The state has a right to punish its enemies, after fair trial and real evidence. In Germany it was the Nazi party that wielded death. It was a mere accident that those who were killed were practically all the local leaders of that party. If the chiefs of any other political party had stood in the way their heads would have dropped instead, just as they have in Mexico, Russia, or any other pagan totalitarian state.

This "desperate clique" would continue to resort to anything to stay in power. One issue later, America's opinion had changed little. It believed that the German people had been thoroughly "cowed by men mad with power." They had not forgotten Christian morality and principles, but the Nazi government had wiped out all liberty, including that of expression.

The reasons for the decisive action taken by Hitler was a point of some discussion and divergent opinion among the journals. The theory that Roehm and his assistants had been plotting to overthrow Adolf Hitler and planning to bring about a "second revolution," was held by The Literary Digest, correspondent John Elliott writing in the Digest, The Commonweal, and an Englishman called "Dornatis," whose article appeared in The Atlantic Monthly. The July 11, 1934 New Republic accepted the story of an...
alleged plot against the state, but by the following week's issue it discounted these charges because proof was lacking.\textsuperscript{105} While The Nation for July 11 believed the outbreak of violence within the ranks "inevitable" because of the great diversity of opinions on basic principles, it too failed to find any evidence to substantiate the plot theory.\textsuperscript{106} The Christian Century, Roger Shaw writing in The Review of Reviews and World's Work, Sidney B. Fay in his Current History column, The Living Age, and The Catholic World all felt that a revolt had been brewing when the government decided to strike.\textsuperscript{107} The Jesuit weekly America refused to commit itself to any position,\textsuperscript{108} but Oswald Garrison Villard and the editors of The Presbyterian Advance and The Ave Maria accused Hitler and his companions of murder.\textsuperscript{109}

That the German people had been stunned by the sequence of events was the report of The Nation, The Christian Century,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{105}The New Republic, LXXIX (July 11, 1934), 222, and (July 18, 1934), 251-252.
\item \textsuperscript{106}The Nation, CXXXIX (July 11, 1934), 32, and (July 18, 1934), 61-62.
\item \textsuperscript{107}The Christian Century, LI (July 11, 1934), 919-920; Roger Shaw, "July in Germany," The Review of Reviews and World's Work, XC (August, 1934), 29; Sidney B. Fay, "Nazi Against Nazi," Current History, XL (August, 1934), 620; The Living Age, CCGXLVI (August, 1934), 471; and The Catholic World, CXXXIX (August, 1934), 618-619.
\item \textsuperscript{108}America, LI (July 14, 1934), 315.
\item \textsuperscript{109}Oswald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Men: The Strange German Character," The Nation, CXXXIX (July 18, 1934), 63; The Presbyterian Advance, XLIX (July 12, 1934), 4; and The Ave Maria, XL (New Series)(July 28, 1934), 119.
\end{itemize}
and *The Commonweal*, none of which elaborated upon this topic; however, the editors of the weekly *Literary Digest* and *The Ave Maria* contended that the country was seething below the surface and that exasperated Germans could take action to bring down the dictatorship. The Nation's Oswald Garrison Villard predicted that the German people would continue to rationalize away the "barbarism" of the Hitler regime. On the other hand, the Protestant clergyman Edward T. Ramsdall, writing in *The Christian Century*, believed that some Germans—Hitler's more fanatical followers—would approve of the terror methods, but the majority of the population would be silent—an eloquent silence of hatred. Clearly Ramsdall had more esteem for the German people than Villard, but it might well be that Ramsdall's silent Germans, in the long run, were just as much to blame for subsequent crimes perpetrated by the Nazis as the rationalizers denounced by Villard.

Having had several weeks to reflect, the editors of *America* on August 25 could only offer their readers the often expressed hope that the German people themselves would open their eyes slowly to the evils of the Nazi administration, if given the slight-

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110 *The Nation*, CXXXIX (July 11, 1934), 32; *The Christian Century*, LI (July 18, 1934), 919-920, and (July 18, 1934), 939; *The Commonweal*, XX (July 20, 1934), 296; *The Literary Digest*, CXVIII (July 7, 1934), 13; and *The Ave Maria*, XL (New Series) (July 28, 1934), 119.


112 Edward T. Ramsdall, "Hitler—Adored and Hated," *The Christian Century*, LI (July 25, 1934), 971–973. Ramsdall was minister of the federated church in Capac, Michigan; he was in Berlin from January to June 1934.
These latest excesses in Germany recall the dictum of the pagan poet that whom the gods would destroy, they first make mad. At present, according to trustworthy correspondents, it is difficult for the mass of the people in Germany, deprived as they are of a free press, both religious and secular, to understand just what is going on in Berlin. In consequence, they are still unable to present any organized or effective protest against the creation of an omnipotent Nazi State. Although censorship of the cables, and to a certain extent of the mails, deprives us of knowledge necessary if a reliable judgment is to be formed, there is reason to believe that Hitler's power is not what it was three months ago. It is our belief that given the opportunity to understand the ultimate purpose of the groups which are playing the despot in Germany, the people will quickly bring this reign of terror to an end. But many a gloomy day may dawn in Germany before that opportunity comes.113

A somewhat contrary view of German affairs was given in the August 29 Christian Century. In an early August report from his post in Geneva, Switzerland, the usually perceptive Elmer G. Homrighausen told of the "uncertainty and anxiety" in Germany. The Germans feel this tension, but they were helpless to do anything about it. The German individual continued to avoid politics; "he prefers to plod on in his daily round, submerging himself in his rich old culture and music." The country was waiting to see what Hitler would do next. His rule appeared to be "more firm than ever"; however, "many feel that all is not well in the inner councils of the state." Hitler had done nothing so far to

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113 America, LI (August 25, 1934), 458. The same attitude was shown by Oswald Garrison Villard in "Issues and Men: Hitler's 'Me and Gott,'" The Nation, CXXXIX (August 1, 1934), 119. He could not believe that "in the long run" the German people would stand for Hitler's activities—even though he had been highly critical of the German people just two weeks before.
solve the really grave state problems, but again many felt "as if chaos and perhaps communism would come" if he should disappear from the scene. The government had the German young people still well in hand, but some of the older youth had already grown weary of the Nazi propaganda line which lacked concrete results. Taking account of the overall situation in early August, Reverend Homrighausen could not help being pessimistic.

The religious and intelligent German is caught in a terrible dilemma. He dare not criticize; nor do criticism and radical action belong to his nature. And he cannot organize his protest. He knows not what the future may bring. He does not want war.114

The effect the June 30 purge had upon the power of Hitler and the direction the dictatorship would ultimately take were also points of concern for the journals. Contrasting views prevailed, even between the two most renowned American liberal weeklies, The Nation and The New Republic. In its initial response to the Roehm Purge the July 11 Nation declared that the incident would do the greatest damage so far to Hitler's cause: "At one blow, it shows him to be a knight of the revolver and not divinely inspired to lead by the nobility of his example and his teachings." The regime had clearly cast its ballot for the conservative right, but it remained in a position with a doubtful future; the economic problems had not been solved, and Hitler showed little promise that he had the ability to do so. "It gives his big business masters and the Junkers the weapon they need to turn

upon him." The army and General Blomberg still stood behind the dictator, but The Nation felt that the Chancellor would be more like their tool, with his position growing more precarious by the day. One week later, a second Nation editorial supported most of the original response, although this time it was admitted that "Hitler's position seems relatively secure at the moment." Some reflections on the future were also added.

With the S. A. reduced to a shadow of its former self, no group save the military leaders themselves will be in a position to challenge the authority of the government. But by casting his lot with the right, Hitler has irreversibly narrowed the basis of his support. This action may enable him to escape some of the inner contradictions of his regime, but it cannot allay the growing discontent of which the alleged conspiracy was a symptom. The reorganization of the Storm Troops can serve only to drive thousands of disillusioned Nazis into the ranks of the despised Marxists. Although the ranks of the Communists and Socialists have been enormously reduced by Nazi terror, recent reports from Germany indicate a marked growth in their underground activities, a development which is likely to be accentuated if the Nazis adopt a reactionary policy.

The New Republic for July 11 took a much more cautious approach than The Nation, saying that "no one can estimate what a new constellation of political forces may bring." Nevertheless, one question had been answered. The purge had shown the Chancellor that he could rely on the bulk of the police, Nazi corps and army for support. The odds that either the monarchist or the disorganized workers' groups would attempt to challenge the regime in the face of such power were now very poor. One week later, The New Republic declared that Hitler "to a dangerous extent" had

115 The Nation, CXXXIX (July 11, 1934), 32, and (July 18, 1934, 61-62.
become "the tool of the reactionaries." It believed that by cut-
ting himself off from his storm troopers he had become the vir-
tual "prisoner of the Reichswehr and their reactionary allies."
"Hitler's overthrow will not come as soon as many persons hope
and expect; but it is likely to come more rapidly than any but
extreme optimists believed a year ago." The ultimate result of
the purge was that economic problems would remain unsolved be-
cause the radical economic reorganization could never be taken
against the industrialists. Any change in Germany's economic
situation could "only be superficial and temporary."

The New Republic continued to doubt whether Hitler was
his own master after hearing his speech before the Reichstag.
"In the main, it demonstrated his sincerity as completely as it
gave evidence of his gullibility, the dark and devious course of
his thought, the lack of sound intelligence and reasoning power."
General Hermann Goering and the industrialists apparently con-
trolled the situation, and these forces, together with Hitler,
had decided that the leftists of the National Socialist Party had
to go. It was a Hitler-led rebellion against his Party's own
principles. All aspects of Socialism and every aid for the work-
ers were now lost permanently. "The new fascism toward which
Germany is moving will combine the evils of private initiative in
industry and fascist totalitarianism without the mitigating fea-
tures of either."116

116 The New Republic, LXXIX (July 11, 1934), 222; (July 18,
1934), 251-252; and (July 25, 1934), 278-279.
Some similar remarks were found in the response of The Nation of July 25. In order to come to grips with the economic problems, a firm alliance with the industrialists was decided upon by the National Socialists. Unlike The New Republic, The Nation considered Hitler the senior partner of this pact, not under the thumb of any interests. The Nation's editors reaffirmed that the regime had abandoned its promises for the workers and the lower middle class; and they looked for the rigorous application of policies directly detrimental to these groups. Yet, The Nation felt that this move could very well prove to be a great boon for the working class, if it took advantage of it. "The feeling that it is grappling with an invincible foe is gone; it knows from experience that it can stand firm against the industrialists." "The reorganization of Germany's working class is about to begin," exclaimed the much too enthusiastic Nation, forgetting it was dealing with a totalitarian police state.\(^{117}\)

The Catholic weekly America could not make up its mind about Hitler's position after June 30. In a July 14 editorial entitled "Germany Shocks the World," the Jesuit editors surmised that Hitler had profited by the purge, but America's response after hearing Hitler's Reichstag speech was that he seemed to be on the "defensive."\(^{118}\) Writing in the August 1934 Current History, Professor Sidney B. Fay prophesied that Hitler could very

\(^{117}\) The Nation, CXXXIX (July 25, 1934), 89-90.

\(^{118}\) America, LX (July 14, 1934), 315, and (July 28, 1934), 382.
well improve his position if he decided to follow through on a trend of "moderation." Fay considered the rise of Rudolf Hess and his recent appointment as Minister Without Portfolio to be a major sign that moderation of overall policy would probably soon take place. 119

Several editors and writers, including those representing The Christian Century, The Ave Maria, The Living Age and The Atlantic Monthly, inaccurately perceived a much less potent or ominous Fuehrer after the events of June 30. 120 Shattered were both the German people's belief in Hitler's infallibility and in the "sanctity of the fellowship of his followers." Hitler as Germany's spokesman was just about finished, and General Goering was now reportedly managing the Chancellor's affairs. It was clear to the Century that many Germans would welcome an old-fashioned military dictatorship and the restoration of order. "We look for the fall of Hitler," announced the editors of The Ave Maria on July 28, while The Living Age echoed the sentiments of The Christian Century that a military dictatorship would very likely replace the Nazi dictatorship. In a confusing response,
the British journalist "Dornatis" predicted that Adolf Hitler would no longer be able to convince a single German "of the wisdom and righteousness of his methods." He also speculated that President Hindenburg, Franz von Papen and Hermann Goering, along with the conservative forces and the Jews, were making progress toward restoring the Hohenzollern monarchy.

Spokesmen of two leading conservative journals, The Literary Digest and The Review of Reviews and World's Work concluded that Hitler was about to embark upon a middle-of-the-road policy of moderation, but they did not say whether the Chancellor would be stronger or weaker as a result. One of these authors, Roger Shaw of The Review of Reviews and World's Work, inserted the questionable opinion that the National Socialist leader, "in many respects," was a "facade" in office, behind which worked the man with the "big brain," Joseph Goebbels, the "organizer of victory and manipulator extraordinary of public sentiment."

Neither The Presbyterian Advance nor Denis Gwynn of The Sign would hazard a guess concerning Hitler's future role in German affairs. Both, however, made thought-provoking comments. Germany may yet be spared a civil war, said the Advance, "but

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122 The Presbyterian Advance, XLIX (July 12, 1934), 4, and Denis Gwynn, "Europe Re-Arms," The Sign, XIV (September, 1934), 73-74.
even that might be better than some things which can happen under the present dictatorship—apparently the dictatorship of ambition, unrestrained by moral standards." An astute assessment was formulated by Gwynn in his September 1934 column.

The first shock caused by Hitler's lightning stroke against his former colleagues, on June 30, has already passed off. His personal statement to the Reichstag leaves foreign observers quite unconvinced as to the facts which he alleges. But in all countries there is now a clear conviction that the new regime in Germany cannot be judged by ordinary standards, and that things are likely to happen again in Germany which could not happen elsewhere. Criticism of current events in Germany by the application of ordinary standards has, in consequence, largely ceased. But it should be remembered that criticism of events in Italy by ordinary standards has also largely ceased.

Three journals, The Nation, The Christian Century and The New Republic, felt that one of the consequences of the Blood Purge of June 30 would be a loss of prestige and respect for Nazi Germany in international circles. On August 1, for example, The New Republic concluded that the Nazi bloodbath had "opened eyes that were willfully blind before," all over the world; it pointed to this event as perhaps, a turning point within the circles of National Socialist apologists, many of whom "have now turned in horror from the cold-blooded vengefulness of this system."

In an article for the July 18 Nation, Oswald Garrison Villard described how "The Strange German Character" would react

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123 The Nation, CXXXIX (July 11, 1934), 32; The Christian Century, LII (July 25, 1934), 963; and The New Republic, LXXIX (August 1, 1934), 303.
to unfavorable foreign response to the purge.

The odd German character will manifest itself anew by more of the unending bitter complaints that we have had ever since 1914, that the world does not understand Germany, that it is unjust to it, that it is so credulous as always to believe the worst of Germany. There will continue to be the same bewildered protests that the Germans are not accepted by the rest of the world at their own rating as the greatest and most cultured race in all the world, who, as Hitler has said, are a people divinely appointed to lead the human race to greater heights than have ever been achieved before. 124

Bruce Bliven of The New Republic staff generally concurred with Villard's opinion. A war of revenge headed the agenda of foreign policy aims of all patriotic Germans, thus, according to Bliven, it made no difference who happened to control the German Government.125

As one surveys the response of the American journals of opinion to the German domestic affairs from April 1933 to July 1934, one notes in summary that certain tendencies developed before the Roehm Purge. While some journals throughout the period, particularly those with a conservative slant, and the few Catholic journals which exhibited interest in non-religious domestic events, thought that some good might come from the German dictatorship if it was given some time to become properly oriented, the majority of liberal and neutral observers felt that the re-

124Oswald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Men: The Strange German Character," The Nation, OXXXIX (July 18, 1934), 63.

125Bruce Bliven, "The Next War," The New Republic, LXXIX (July 18, 1934), 253. Bliven was one of the editors of this weekly.
gime would ultimately bring disaster to the German nation.

In the spring of 1933, soon after the passage of the Enabling Law, some major liberal secular and Protestant journals believed Hitler's position to be shaky; however, speculation that the Chancellor could be managed by forces outside the Nazi Party disappeared during the summer of 1933, as the German party system came to an end. Beginning in the summer of 1933, the liberal journals, in particular, mentioned bits of news about dissenting opinions being voiced and anti-Nazi opposition in the form of underground movements. Most periodicals and journalists obviously hoped something would develop to unseat Chancellor Hitler, but these hopes were based on nothing but rumors of rather feeble German attempts at opposition without specifying the details.

The idea that the majority of the German people supported their government, despite any immediate shortcomings, appeared more frequently in the journals as the summer months progressed. The liberal weeklies, The Nation and The New Republic, offered their readers the best coverage of the German domestic scene, while conservative, liberal and neutral journals published numerous first-hand accounts of German conditions during the late summer and autumn of 1933 and the months which followed. There were many differences in interpretation, but a significant consensus was that Hitler held tight control over the German state, and, in spite of difficulties, his regime would be long-lasting. Most of these observers in Germany seemed to be able to make more realistic assessments of the situation than the editors and columnists
who relied on indirect sources of information.

Perhaps as a rationalization some of the more conservative editors were reminding their readers that matters could be worse in Germany; however, Hitler had one factor in his favor—his anti-Communism, a cause which impressed the Catholic and some conservative journals. A certain number of conservative American journals and journalists could be expected to quietly support Hitler as long as he maintained his anti-Communist stand.

In discussing the moves being taken by the National Socialists in the domestic area during the fourteen months covered in this chapter, the American journalists, with the exception of some conservative spokesmen, seemed to realize that a totalitarian establishment was in the making, but they often failed to understand the full meaning of "totalitarian." Techniques used by the Nazis to consolidate the Reich received superficial response and were inadequately detailed.

Intra-party Nazi disputes in 1933 drew numerous comments, some astute, others less so. Nevertheless, the journalists can be credited with anticipating the 1934 break in the Nazi ranks. So spectacular and concrete an event as the Roehm purge naturally attracted a great deal of comment, much of it uncertain. The consensus was that Hitler's power slipped because of the purge and that he would turn toward a more moderate policy, in line with that of the industrialists and Junkers, now that his more radical supporters had been liquidated. While some journalists predicted that Hitler would be overthrown or be replaced, the attitude of
most American periodicals seems to have been one of wait-and-see.
CHAPTER VIII

DOMESTIC ISSUES FROM THE ROEHM PURGE TO THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR

During the five years which separated the Roehm episode from the outbreak of the Second World War, the purely domestic problems of Nazi Germany, except for religion, attracted a diminishing amount of attention in American journals of opinion. The time for "surprises" in domestic affairs had passed, and the domestic legislation which was passed from 1934 to 1939 seemed to lack the drama found in the religious struggle, anti-Semitism and foreign affairs. By 1938 international relations tended to overshadow all other issues.

This chapter examines the American journals' response to such domestic developments as caught their interest from mid-1934 until September 1, 1939. Summary articles analyzing a wide spectrum of events appeared more frequently than explorations in depth of specific issues. This creates problems of duplication and overlapping when one attempts to organize the material into manageable topics; nevertheless, the material can be grouped under six headings: 1) domestic politics; 2) social factors; 3) the resistance movement; 4) Nazi discipline; 5) education and culture; and 6) Nazi propaganda and Nazism in other lands.
The rapidly fading President Hindenburg finally died on August 2, 1934. Within a few hours on the same day, the Cabinet vested in Hitler the combined powers of President and Chancellor. Officially designated Fuehrer and Reich Chancellor, Hitler now had under his control all the powers of the chief of state and, of primary importance, he thus became the supreme commander of the German armed forces. To secure the total allegiance of the military leaders, Hitler ordered them to take an oath to himself personally. Having thus once again disregarded the constitution, which called for the election of a new president upon the death of the old, Hitler turned to one of his favorite devices, the plebiscite. This would be held on August 19, 1934, to determine whether the German people approved of Hitler's accession to the powers of the presidency. Four days before the plebiscite, Hindenburg's so-called "Political Testament" was published, revealing that the late President gave his support to Hitler's movement.\textsuperscript{1} A couple of days later the former President's son, Oscar von Hindenburg, seconded his father's views in a radio broadcast urging that the Nazi leader be given unanimous support.

On the eve of the plebiscite, The New Republic said that "on the whole Hitler's position at this moment seems firmer than

\textsuperscript{1}In the latest monograph on Hindenburg, Hindenburg and the Weimar Republic (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964), Andreas Dorrpalen accepts the pro-Hitler views attributed to the last Weimar President in his "Political Testament."
before June 30," yet it speculated that the number of opposing votes would increase by five times over the previous election. Nevertheless, The New Republic hazarded the guess that continuing economic problems in Germany rendered the prospects very "discouraging" for a long Nazi rule. A week later, on August 22, it repeated this assessment: "From the emphasis with which the German government has set its machinery into motion for the plebiscite of August 19 the conclusion is inevitable that her rulers are by no means so sure of their position as they would have the world believe." As evidence, the New Republic cited reports of few instances of Nazi terror, and of anti-government pamphlets circulating rather freely. The August 10 Literary Digest also observed that Hitler had been less blustering and threatening since the death of President Hindenburg and had even been willing to grant political amnesties "for minor offenders." 2

"His conquest of the Reichswehr and the return to his camp of the nation's industrialists are Hitler's present assets and explain, in large measure, the boldness of his assumption of presidential power," replied The Nation on August 15. Moreover, The Nation commented shrewdly on the importance of the oath demanded from the armed forces. "He who knows the meaning of German discipline will appreciate the significance of the individual

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2 The New Republic, LXX (August 15, 1934), 5-7, and (August 22, 1934), 30.

3 The Literary Digest, CXVIII (August 18, 1934), 12.
pledge which holds every last man in the Reichswehr, the navy, the state police, and the SS detachments to the Chancellor's personal service." While this liberal weekly hoped that the number of dissenters voting in the plebiscite would double, "it would be futile to expect more than that." On another point The Nation differed from the two journals previously cited: it foresaw more, not less violence as a concomitant feature of the election.4

Looking across the border at Germany from Vienna, correspondent John Gunther saw Hitler making his position almost impregnable. Winning command over the Reichswehr was his greatest achievement thus far. "If the Reichswehr doesn't mutiny in about the next ten minutes it never will, German officers being what they are," was Gunther's accurate appraisal in the August 22 Nation. "Now nothing can shake him except formal revolution, I believe," concluded the author.5 On the other hand, John Palmer Gavit wrote in The Survey Graphic that no one, not even Hitler, knew what would happen next. With the death of President Hindenburg and Hitler's usurpation of all official powers, "the last shred of respectability" in Germany had disappeared. It was certain, nevertheless, said this columnist, that the National Socialist leader knew that "he must make good."6

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4The Nation, CXXXIX (August 15, 1934), 172.
5John Gunther, "After the Dollfuss Murder," ibid., (August 22, 1934), 204. Gunther was the Vienna correspondent of The Chicago Daily News.
As usual, a much calmer view was expressed by the conservative Review of Reviews and World's Work. Editor Albert Shaw described Hitler's decision to reserve the presidential powers for himself as the only logical thing. "To have elected another president at this time as the Chancellor's nominal superior would have been a farce, or else an occasion of discord and partisanship." Shaw further recognized that the government was now exerting every effort in the plebiscite to demonstrate to the world the solidarity of the National Socialists' hold on Germany.

Speaking for Protestant opinion, the August 15 Christian Century longingly hoped that Hitler's accession to absolute power "may sober and restrain him with such limits as are possible to a situation so ominous, an absolute dictatorship over a nation of sixty millions in the heart of Europe." For the Catholic side, The Commonweal of August 17 argued quite incorrectly that the oath of personal allegiance that Hitler got from the armed forces formed part of a deal, with the Fuehrer earning the worst end of the bargain. "Very probably this alliance follows the traditional scheme of things. The Reichswehr, anxious to keep out of politics, backs Hitler but is slowly and surely curbing his freedom of movement." National Socialism would wane gradually, and Hitler eventually would retire in favor of a restoration of the

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7 Albert Shaw, "The Progress of the World: Europe Prepares for War?" The Review of Reviews and World's Work, XC (September, 1934), 51-52. Dr. Shaw was the editor of this conservative journal, which was controlled by his family.

8 The Christian Century, LI (August 15, 1934), 1035.
monarchy. Then "Germany will settle down to be a disciplined, hard-working state of which Professor Spengler can be proud." However, if these plans were somehow upset, "Heaven alone knows what will happen then." 9

Not at all surprised by Hitler's decision to succeed President Hindenburg as chief executive, the August 9 Presbyterian Advance conjectured that the Fascist leader would soon turn over the chancellorship to General Goering, a theory that it specifically rejected a week later. It also had more to say about the plebiscite, referring to it as a "mockery" because Hitler was merely using the people as a "rubber stamp" to approve of what has already been done. 10

In Germany on August 19, over thirty-eight million people, nearly ninety percent of the total vote, approved of the Chancellor's usurpation of the presidential powers. Yet, in the face of serious obstacles more than four million voted "no," and another 873,787 turned in invalid ballots. Typical of the journals' reaction was the sentiment of The Literary Digest, which called the plebiscite vote "the first real setback in the Nazi bid for 'totality' after their rise to power eighteen months ago." The same journal cited a United Press report which denied rumors of any organized opposition, 11 but the exact nature and cause of

9 The Commonweal, XX (August 17, 1934), 377.
10 The Presbyterian Advance, XLIX (August 9, 1934), 5, and (August 16, 1934), 5.
11 The Literary Digest, CXVIII (August 25, 1934), 225.
the protest vote called forth a wide variety of guesses. The Nation saw "the first effects of Hitler's desperate coup at the end of June." The New Republic, which foresaw increasing "opposition...from election to election--assuming that Hitler will ever again invite such a demonstration of popular disapproval," traced the negative votes to Socialists, Communists, and even Catholics, as did the Literary Digest. Internal unrest and economic difficulties were Sidney B. Fay's very general interpretation for the heavy "no" vote. "A mounting Catholic opposition" was revealed by the voting results, according to The Commonweal, but The Presbyterian Advance merely expressed "surprise" without hazarding a guess about what the vote indicated. The plebiscite was utterly worthless, for it actually proved nothing, as far as The Christian Century was concerned, while the size of the negative vote indicated to America that Germany was "on the road to freedom."

The disciples of Adolf Hitler seemed ready and eager to proclaim the great victory of their champion. They did not have

12 The Nation, CXXXIX (August 29, 1934), 225.
14 The Literary Digest, CXVIII (August 25, 1934), 15.
16 The Commonweal, XX (August 31, 1934), 417.
17 The Presbyterian Advance, XLIX (August 30, 1934), 5.
18 The Christian Century, LI (August 29, 1934), 1083.
19 America, LI (September 1, 1934), 481-482.
long to wait, for the annual meeting of the National Socialist Party congress was to assemble in a festive atmosphere in September 1934. A triumphant Hitler addressed his followers on September 5, announcing the arrival of the millennium and rejecting the idea of further revolutionary innovations. Hitler spoke with the confidence of a man who was master of the Reich, observed the September 22 Literary Digest. The New Republic commented that the assembly at Nuremberg "exceeded all previous demonstrations of Nazi debasement." There seemed no doubt that the stability of the German state and the personal popularity of the Fuehrer were "firmly established," wrote the September 22 America, which had drastically altered its views of September 1. A contrary view was expressed by Oliver Martin in a Christian Register editorial: Nazism was "doomed to destruction by its own contradictions."

During the fall of 1934, several American journalists attempted to analyze various aspects of the German domestic scene. Reasons why the German people were able to live with and under National Socialism were cited by S. Miles Bouton in the article "Why Germany Endures Hitler," for the October 1934 American Mercury. Bouton seemed convinced that the German people lacked "intestinal stamina." "The German will not fight when the situation

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20 The Literary Digest, CXVIII (September 22, 1934), 15.  
21 The New Republic, LXXX (September 26, 1934), 171.  
22 America, LI (September 22, 1934), 574-575.  
23 Oliver Martin, "Editorial: Hitler Versus the Absolute," The Christian Register, CXIII (September 20, 1934), 560.
becomes hopeless." Also the German had for centuries glorified authority; they had been taught to obey and "to believe what Authority tells them." In spite of these factors, Bouton speculated that the dictatorship would rapidly disintegrate, if it were not for one more consideration: fear, even among the Fuehrer's enemies, of what might follow in the even of National Socialism's collapse. "Communism? Civil War? Chaos?" 24

In an article dealing with the Nazi police state for the November 22, 1934 Christian Register, Charles Joy recorded some of his impressions of the dictatorship. Joy summarized his thoughts in the concluding paragraph: Adolf Hitler "has cast away the spiritual heritage of his people," even though bringing Germany "for a brief moment out of black despair." 25 On the other hand, Professor William Orton, in a November 1934 Atlantic Monthly essay, observed, however, that Hitler had restored self-respect to the German people, giving them hope for the future and a feeling now of confidence. "It is a tremendous achievement." 26

Brinckerhoff Jackson, whose article was published in the ultra-conservative American Review for September 1934, likened Hitler's regime to his own concept of democracy: "the tyranny of popular

24 S. Miles Bouton, "Why Germany Endures Hitler," The American Mercury, XXXIII (September 20, 1934), 560.
26 William Orton, "The New Wine In Germany," The Atlantic Monthly, CLIV (November, 1934), 608. The author was a professor of economics at Smith College; he had just returned from a summer in Europe.
ignorance, of popular heroes, and a general lowering of the cultural level to suit the capacities of the Common Man."\(^{27}\)

In America for August 25, 1934, Gerhard Hirschfield posited an interesting theory concerning the future German power structure in the article "Germany After Hindenburg." He suggested that "if Hitler takes up all the headlines and front pages, it may be well to remember for the better understanding of future developments that further in the background there loom factors, silent but powerful: the Junkers." By the word "Junkers" Hirschfield meant both the aristocratic landowners and the leaders of industry.\(^{28}\)

Another questionable judgment was made by G. E. W. Johnson in his regular monthly North American Review column for January 1935. He was not quite sure what Hitler had in mind when he had not chosen a successor to President Hindenburg. At any time he could surprise the world and bring back the Hohenzollern family. "It is significant," wrote Johnson, "that the measures taken by Hitler upon the death of President von Hindenburg are precisely those that would pave the way for a restoration."\(^{29}\)

\(^{27}\)Brinckerhoff Jackson, "Prussianism or Hitlerism," The American Review, III (September, 1934), 464-465. This recent graduate of Harvard University had spent the better part of the previous two years in Europe.


this date, few other journalists still believed, as Johnson did, that the Nazi dictatorship was concerned with the problems of the royal family, although this idea had earlier been quite common among the American writers.

During December 1934 and January 1935, three American weeklies, America, The Nation and The New Republic, discussed the reports of feuds between the Reichswehr generals and the leaders of the Nazis' S.S. corps. The dispute resulted from the S.S. buildup by the government after the Reichswehr leaders had been promised complete control over the German armed forces following the Roehm Purge episode in mid-1934. There also appeared to be some agitation over the activities of the Nazi-oriented members of the Reichswehr. While America foresaw a compromise settlement, The Nation judged that the government held the upper hand in the contest, and The New Republic appeared to favor the military leaders.

Rumors concerning army unrest reappeared during the summer of 1935, at a time when the German economy was reported to be


in serious difficulties and new repressive measures were being used against the German Jews and the Christian churches. The September 1935 *Living Age* cited reports calling attention to the new Nazi radicalism, but one source from the British *New Statesman and Nation* surmised that the National Socialist activist elements were "attempting to stem the growing prestige of the Reichswehr by giving the people bloody circuses."\(^31\) Roger Shaw, who had often made inaccurate predictions concerning Nazi Germany, cautioned the readers of the September *Review of Reviews* to watch the German War Minister, General Werner von Blomberg. Blomberg happened to be an innocuous character and one of Hitler's most loyal pawns. However Shaw contended that the general controlled the German armed forces, "the real and ultimate power in Germany," and thus he must be dangerous.\(^32\)

The German army had been "raised to an unparalleled eminence," reported the military historian Alfred Vagts in the September 1935 *Harper's Magazine*. In his examination of the history of the German army since 1918, Vagts theorized that the Reichswehr's strength "lies in its aloofness from factional struggles." "The National Socialist Party has ceased to be a formidable rival of the Army." The Nazis, according to Professor Vagts' thinking, would be tolerated as long as they "restrict themselves to the tasks assigned them." The author thought it possible that the

\(^{31}\) *The Living Age*, CCCXLIX (September, 1935), 3-4.

"ultimate objectives" of the army had not yet been determined. "For the moment it is concerned with its own aggrandizement, with developing the fighting machine, and consolidating its social, economic, and political power." However, Vagts did not rule out the possibility "that the Reichswehr may yet be the executor of Hitler's Testament, Mein Kampf."\(^{33}\)

Editor George Soule of *The New Republic* explored the same topic on November 13, 1935. Soule declared that "there is a belief in the probability of the fall of Hitler during the coming winter," since it appeared to this American journalist that the Reichswehr had finally had enough of the Fuehrer. "He is now a liability." Rearmament could not proceed without foreign credits, and Hitler's policies had alienated all the potential foreign creditors. Given the right political climate with sufficient popular unrest, the army generals would take charge of the revolt and help organize a new government. Soule envisioned a new administration that would be "democratic, parliamentary, with sane elements of temporary dictatorship, required on account of the economic crisis." Even though the Reichswehr constituted a danger because it desired colonies plus the economic hegemony of central Europe, the new government would make a point of seeking cooperation with the other powers of the continent.\(^{34}\)


\(^{34}\)George Soule, "Europe--Four Expectations," *The New Re-
A comprehensive and penetrating article by Dale DeWitt in the November 7 Christian Register possibly responded in part to articles like those written by Shaw, Vagts and Soule. Concerning the German domestic scene, DeWitt said: "It is only when one begins to look more critically into things, and especially the human aspects, that the surface deception is realized." The unity of Nazi Germany, which evolved around the person of Adolf Hitler, although widely proclaimed, was not a political reality.

In so far as the unity of Germany represents dictatorship, national independence, and a great army, it is a voluntary unity. But when the unity involves the identification of the state and all institutions with the National Socialist Party such unity achieved is quite evidently under a reluctance that creates tension, division, and would probably involve revolt were not the main reasons for unity so compelling. Every informed person with whom I talked in some was emphasized the tension that was created by the taking over or abolition of institutions which have been historically a part of German life. But it is mostly Hitler's lieutenants who have to carry out this program, and it is they rather than Hitler who get the force of the blame.

DeWitt listed the obvious factors of disunity as the radicalism in the underground movement, the church struggle, and the intra-

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Fascist struggle between extremists and moderates. Another much discussed feud was that between the dictatorship and the German army. Some observers saw the Reichswehr as the dominant power in Germany, merely biding its time before ousting Hitler and his compatriots. "Although the army is very powerful and could undoubtedly rule politically, it was not greatly interested in doing so. It is not interested in politics except as its own development is concerned." As long as Hitler continued to maintain his political prestige, the regime was safe, because, said DeWitt, "Hitler's belief in a powerful army makes him a satisfactory instrument for their purpose." Only if the National Socialist program completely collapsed would the dictatorship be threatened, and then the army generals would take the lead in establishing the new government.35

In an article for the November 1935 American Mercury, Eugene Lyons touched on the topic of German unity just as DeWitt had done. After taking a careful look at the Hitler government, Lyons decided that "Nazi Germany presents a curious political phenomenon in that its unity is essentially emotional: a passionate, romanticized, know-nothing nationalism that holds the most diverse and mutually hostile elements in hypnotic suspense." Like incipient Italian Fascism, Nazism lacked the unity of a social purpose. "If Hitler and his regime survive long enough the emotional unity may be made to coincide more closely with a social

unity." It would take several more purges, "perhaps less spectacular in character," thought Lyons, before the Fuehrer could be assured of enough time.36

The well-known foreign correspondent William Henry Chamberlain touched on several aspects of the German state and its activities when he sought to compare Soviet and Nazi totalitarianism in The Atlantic Monthly for September 1935. As far as political techniques, both regimes were ruled by individuals who were absolute and whose decisions were accepted as "infallible." Propaganda served as a vital element in "cementing" the two dictatorships as did the "technique of repression," although Chamberlain judged that the Bolsheviks had been more brutal in dealing with their enemies. He also suggested that "there is more psychological kinship under the skin between the two systems than a devout Russian Communist or an equally devout German Nazi would like to admit or recognize."37

Early in 1935, the last vestiges of local autonomy in Germany disappeared. Dispensing altogether with the Reichstag, Hitler issued executive decrees reorganizing the country into twenty administrative units, each with a governor appointed by and responsible to the Chancellor alone. City governments were also

36 Eugene Lyons, "Europe's Number-Two Men," The American Mercury, XXXVI (November, 1935), 306. Lyons was a journalist and an author of several books on world affairs.

turned completely over to Berlin's jurisdiction. Three American journals showed perfunctory interest: The New Republic, Current History and America, with the last-named journal pointing out that the latest action was the culmination of a process of political centralization begun in 1933. 38

On December 1, 1936, the Nazi government outlawed all youth organizations except the Hitler Youth. Although a significant measure, no American journal responded; however, some magazine reports several months earlier had indicated that preparations were already being made to incorporate all German young people under the National Socialist banner. A plan outlining a youth program of physical and cultural training for all boys and girls between the ages of ten and eighteen years had been announced for the spring of 1936. The January 11, 1936 Literary Digest and Sidney B. Fay in the March Current History had called attention to the new program, but only The Christian Century for January 15 had speculated. 39 It considered the proposed organization an "establishment of a complete regimentation of youth with a view to molding the entire rising generation into complete conformity to the Nazi pattern." More than military arms, this move would ultimately help in entrenching the National Socialist ide-
logy. "It is the surest way of building a powerful government—and of killing everything in a nation that makes it deserve to live."

Mention of the Hitler Youth group appeared infrequently in the months which followed, with the only interesting commentary appearing in the December 1, 1937 Christian Century article "Let Mortal Tongues Awake!" by Reverend Martin Schroeder. This Lutheran minister was especially conscious of the fine spirit the German youth apparently possessed and the vigor with which they attacked their work, although he had little praise for the Nazi organization.

While it discussed domestic politics only secondarily, John Gunther's character sketch of Adolf Hitler for Harper's Magazine of January 1936, pointed out that the Nazi totalitarian structure evolved around the leadership principle—"Hitler's one contribution to political theory." "Real rivals" to the Fuehrer "do not exist." It was equally as evident to Gunther that the Nazi state found its chief source of strength in the person of Hitler in spite of his various personality flaws. "Hitler's political sense is highly developed and acute. His calculations are shrewd and penetrating to the smallest detail."

40 Martin Schroeder, "Let Mortal Tongues Awake!" The Christian Century, LIV (December 1, 1937), 1482. More material concerning the young people of Germany will be found in the section on education in the Third Reich in this chapter.

On two occasions during April 1936, long articles attempting to pass judgment on domestic conditions appeared. Ethan Colton presented the view in his article "Why Hitler Lasts" for the monthly Forum, that Hitler had grown in stature and public esteem over the last three years. Public grumbling concerning domestic conditions was heard often, but it did not involve the Fuehrer. The German masses remained firmly behind the Nazi chief because "he came out of their very kind." Concerning the life expectancy of the dictatorship, Colton ventured a fairly accurate prediction of what to expect in the future.

The outlook, then, is for a regime that can be taken for granted to operate along the present general lines indefinitely. Realistic people will deal with it accordingly. No boycott will end its life or even shorten it. The more pressure exerted by a ring of outside enemies, the more secure is Hitler. He won his people by giving them leadership against hostile foreign policies aimed at Germany after the War was over. They will sustain him at least so long as these persist. Paradoxically, then, mediation and friendliness promise to turn more Germans away from reliance on Hitler than hostility will do. 42

On the other hand, the German novelist, Lion Feuchtwanger

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42 Ethan Colton, "Why Hitler Lasts," The Forum, XCV (April 1936), 233-237. Colton was a long-time observer of European affairs. Emil Ludwig made a similar appraisal in "The Coming War," Current History, XLV (March, 1937), 40-46. He asserted that the Germany of 1937 represented exactly the type of state that most Germans had yearned for between 1919 and 1933. "The great mass of Germans never wanted peace with France; they never wanted a League of Nations in Europe." Moreover, they were militarists: "They wanted the sword, and the majority of scholars served this Moloch as those of Bismarck's time had, teaching youth to idolize the red stripe of rank on the General's uniform." Furthermore, the Germans still felt that they had a definite role to fill in world history. Essentially the same analysis could be found in Ludwig's "The Cause of the Coming War," The Forum, XCVII (April, 1937), 202-207.
writing in the April 22, 1936 *Nation*, looked forward to the time that Nazi Germany would be laughed out of existence. All the stupendous lies of the German Fascist propaganda machine and the policies of Adolf Hitler would, in the last analysis, arouse much more laughter than indignation. Until that time comes, foreign observers must regard a Germany which had returned "to the savagery of the primeval forest, to the time when men banded together in hordes which fell upon each other because each horde considered itself the best."\(^{43}\)

A conservative assessment was made by Roger Shaw, who chose Adolf Hitler as his "Man of the Month" for the May 1937 *Review of Reviews*. After four years of Nazi control in Germany, Shaw discerned that Hitler had built up a tremendous popular following. "Many sensible Germans" who once denounced National Socialism now align themselves with the regime. Taking everything under consideration, Shaw judged that Hitler had done both "bad and good" for his nation.

Anti-Jew laws, sterilization, abolition of States' rights, militarization, censorship, no strikes and no unions, the unemployed reduced from 6 million to 1½ million. Social conditions have been improved unquestionably, education has been revised, remarkable roads are under construction. Private capitalism has been converted into a rigidly controlled state-capitalism. The rich, who brought Hitler into being, are losing enthusiasm; the poor, who formerly opposed him, are being won over en masse. Peasants and peasant landholdings have been hitched together by hereditary laws, with mortgage-foreclosures cancelled. Factory

\(^{43}\)Lion Feuchtwanger, "Germany--a Winter's Tale," *The Nation*, CXLI (April 22, 1936), 505-506. Feuchtwanger was a German novelist.
workers have been getting free vacation-trip boatrides. Germany was irreligious but legally church-ridden. The Nazis are seeing to that too.

Hitler's greatest blunder, wrote Shaw, was the alienation of the Jews who had long been Germany's friends in international circles. 44

Almost a year later, another detailed but more profound analysis appeared in the February 1938 Harper's Magazine, in an article entitled "The Riddle of Hitler," by Stephen H. Roberts. This essay commemorated the fifth anniversary of Hitler's ascendance to power; it was devoted to Hitler personally and attributed most of the Nazis' accomplishments to the Fuehrer alone. Especially complex in personality, Hitler was called a dreamer and a visionary. Roberts accepted the doubtful thesis that the brutal side of the National Socialist movement had not yet penetrated Hitler's world of imagination, in which he supposedly dwelled. This romantic German leader, according to Roberts, was honest and sincere and always completely absorbed in the policy of the moment. "He believes so utterly, so appallingly in what he is saying." Strange as it may sound, the Fuehrer was uncomfortable unless he was making a public address. "There he does not have to think, for he has said it all thousands of times and will keep on saying it until he dies." This man who in 1933 fitted in exactly with the psychology of the German nation had subsequently emerged

as a myth. No one could unseat him for fear of alienating the German masses. A new government, if there was to be one, "would probably have to keep him as nominal leader." It was a fact, said Roberts, that "the Hitler myth is the dominating" feature of contemporary German life.  

Hitler's fifth anniversary also elicited a short editorial comment from The Christian Century for February 9, 1938. It conceded that Hitler had not been taken seriously enough by a good many people back in 1933. "Predictions were wide of the mark. Things have happened which were not expected, and could not reasonably have been expected, to happen. Even those closest to the events have been surprised." Hitler's policies have been intelligent, in terms of what he sought, while his achievements have been enormous. "As to the intelligence of his choice of ends, the next five years may tell."  

A less sanguine appraisal of Hitler's popular strength had appeared in The New Republic a few months before the Century article just cited. Guenter Reimann, who contributed several discussions of the German scene to The New Republic at this time, analyzed and found wanting the morale of the German people, both citizens and soldiers. The "new Germany," he felt, was far from ardent nation of patriots, one hundred percent behind their gov-


46The Christian Century, LV (February 9, 1938), 164-165.
Fascism has not remedied those conditions, which drove the German middle class and peasantry, many workers and especially the youth, in desperation, to the support of Hitler. They are still desperate. They are still discontented. Their morale is low, despite the elaborate shows the Nazis stage.

Continuing his interesting and largely erroneous speculations, Reimann pointed out "that the army chiefs are dissatisfied with the spirit manifested by the German people, the morale of the new recruits." Many were in the army because they had no other alternative. Then again there existed other elements that did not care what they were "fighting for or against," and these included "mercenaries, unscrupulous adventurers, slum proletarians" and "sons of ruined middle-class families." The Reichswehr leaders despaired because of the lack of the old reliable middle-class nationalists in uniform. A "fighting spirit" was missing. Yet the army itself, Reimann felt, loomed as a formidable war machine capable of standing the strain of a serious war.47

In the article "The German Mind" for the February 1938 Atlantic Monthly, Emil Ludwig explored what he believed to be some of Nazi Germany's domestic problems. Ludwig refused to believe that the oath taken by the military leaders to Hitler immediately after Hindenburg's death meant much in the light of what had happened in 1918 when only a handful of army officers attempted to protect the monarchy. He also came to the conclusion that

47 Guenter Reimann, "Morale and the Nazis," The New Republic, XCIII (November 17, 1937), 34-35. Reimann was a German economist living in New York City.
individuals in the National Socialist movement could not be trusted to support the Fuehrer indefinitely. Then there existed the dormant element of revolution, which, Ludwig judged, lay close to the surface and would probably erupt in the event of war. Then, speculated Ludwig, "the great side of German character will come again to the top."  

Social Factors

Periodically, between July 1934 and September 1939, American journalists attempted to inspect the German social climate, hoping perhaps to determine the actual strength of Nazism among the Reich's population and the effects that National Socialism might have had on social mores. After a short excursion into Nazi Germany, Dorothy Thompson informed the readers of Harper's Magazine for December 1934 about her conversations with numerous Germans. Although Miss Thompson met a few people angered by the activities of the Nazi regime, most of the common folk seemed satisfied with the Hitler government and willing to sacrifice some of their personal pleasure in order to help the state recover.

William Orton, in March 1935, tried to interpret the Ger-

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49 Dorothy Thompson, "Good-By to Germany," Harper's Magazine, CLXV (December, 1934), 43-51. Miss Thompson had been asked to leave Germany by the Hitler government because of some of her critical articles about the Nazi leader before he assumed the duties of chancellor.
man scene for the American public with an essay "Understanding the Nazis." He theorized that "the tangible forms evolved by the German genius for order have never fully satisfied the German spirituality." The great conflict "of irrational forces against ideas," which had been going on for years, had finally reached a "spectacular crisis" under the Nazis. Orton maintained that "every German" had not condoned the vicious actions of the regime but many "were desperate men in desperate circumstances grasping at a desperate remedy"—National Socialism. Obviously sympathizing with the German predicament, Orton called on the historian to recognize one more thing:"

He will recognize that previous forms of German unity, with their inner stress and tensions, failed to create a Germany that could live at peace with herself and the world; and he will hope that out of this new beginning may grow a form under which Germany may be more at ease with her spiritual self, and therefore with her neighbors. Admittedly, that hope is faint. All other hope is fainter.50

The role of the German middle class in the new Germany received more attention from the American journals than any other social topic.51 Writing the essay "Germany: Battlefield of the


51Only one earlier article touched specifically on the problems of the German middle class under Nazism: Ludwig Lore, "The Little Man's Fate in Germany," Current History, XXXIX (November, 1933), 143-150. Lore opined that the problems of the German bourgeoisie had hardly been investigated, let alone remedied, when Chancellor Hitler announced the end of the revolution during the summer of 1933. The Nazi leaders could be accused of bad faith, "but their defense of the middle class was essentially honest." The questions of the world depression and military considerations had to come first. For the so-called "little man" the promises of a year ago were gone, and "nothing remains but this
Middle Classes," for Foreign Affairs of January 1935, sociologist Sigmund Neumann maintained that the Nazis had been "victorious" in 1933 because of their ability to add together German youth and middle class support. It was Neumann's theory that Hitler and his associates had turned to legal methods after the putsch failure of 1933 because they recognized that German society "had undergone Verbuergerlichung (the process of becoming bourgeois-minded)." In the meantime, National Socialism was becoming more and more bourgeois-minded.

The divided nature of National Socialism now that it is victorious, which renders so difficult an accurate interpretation of its future, rests in no small measure upon the mixture of social types which compose it, rooted as they are in different generations and in different experiences. This fact also gives a peculiar trait to its foreign policy, itself a mixture of warlike and heroic attitudes and a striving for burgher security.

At stake in Germany, thought Neumann, was "the historical test of the burgher order."52

Other observers voiced different opinions regarding the Nazis and the middle class. Dorothy Thompson, in an extensive article in the quarterly Foreign Affairs for July 1935, which reviewed the history and the progress of the Nazi totalitarian state focussed some attention on important social factors. Working through its propaganda organs, wrote Miss Thompson, the govern-

show of force" embodied in the Nazi totalitarian state.  

52 Sigmund Neumann, "Germany: Battlefield of the Middle Classes," Foreign Affairs, XIII (January, 1935), 271-283. Neumann was a member of the sociology department at Wesleyan University, Middletown, Connecticut.
ment had effectively created "the appearance of the classless state" by fashioning a "national myth." It "has ameliorated the pains of poverty... by removing from poverty the stigma of inferiority, by giving to it a sense of purpose, and by holding out the hope of a glorious future."

It remains to be seen whether a system of economy good for waging war is, in the long run, good for anything else, or whether heroic endurance can exist for its own sake. The present system will not, because it cannot, rehabilitate the middle class and the small entrepreneur. So far the result of National Socialism has been to carry forward the levelling process between the middle class and the workers by blotting out the only difference which really remained—a psychological one.53

A similar analysis by the Marxist economist Lewis Corey appeared in The Nation of August 21, 1935. Although Corey conceded that the middle class had united with the Nazis "to avert a civil war that might aid the revolutionary struggle," this social group would not profit by this alliance. "Fascism deprives the middle class of all independence; it must, like the workers, submit silently to the new authoritarianism of the totalitarian state, for freedom of action becomes a monopoly of the state and its big-capitalist masters." The problems of the middle class were "aggravated by fascism."

It neither solves the crisis of capitalism nor prevents the inner class changes which increasingly convert the middle class into propertyless masses of salaried depen-

53 Dorothy Thompson, "National Socialism: Theory and Practice," ibid., (July, 1935), 565-573. Several years later the leveling process was also described by Frank C. Hanighen in "Brown Bolshevism," The Atlantic Monthly, OLXIII (April, 1939), 478-485. Hanighen was an American journalist and foreign correspondent.
dents. Nothing is changed except for the worse. Fascism is not a new social order; imprisoned within the forces of declining capitalism, fascism is the old capitalist order become putrid, organizing economic disintegration, mass misery, and reaction into a system.54

In his article for the September 1935 *Atlantic Monthly*, William Henry Chamberlain rated the middle class, "especially the poorer middle class," among Hitler's most enthusiastic supporters.55 Two years later, Guenter Reimann reported to the readers of *The New Republic* for November 17, 1937, that the German middle class had grown disillusioned with the Nazi recovery program, which had done almost nothing to improve the conditions of this desperate class. "Morale is low," warned Reimann.56 Similar statements appeared in the spring of 1939 in the article "The End of Economic Man in Europe" by Peter F. Drucker. Yet, while the masses were wavering in their respect for National Socialism, Drucker surmised that faith in the Fuehrer remained almost con-

54. Lewis Corey, "The Crisis of the Middle Class: II. The Middle Class Under Fascism," *The Nation*, CXLI (August 21, 1935), 207-210. The Nation was periodically reprinting chapters from Corey's book *The Crisis of the Middle Class* (New York: Covici Friede, 1935). Under the name Louis C. Fraina, the Italian-born Corey had led a long career in the United States as a Marxist revolutionary and had been a leading member of the American Communist Party from 1920 to 1922. After Corey broke with the Comintern, he remained sympathetic to the Communist cause until the German-Russian pact of 1939. The story of Corey's interesting career can be found in Theodore Draper, *The Roots of American Communism* (New York: The Viking Press, 1957).


People continued to rationalize that the Nazi leader stood apart from his movement and that if he only knew what his subordinates were doing, all wrongs would be corrected. In such desperation the thinking was: "Hitler must be right because otherwise nothing is." It was this "constant need for self-persuasion" which Drucker believed lay behind the tension in Nazi Germany. "This tension is almost unbearable, and yet it has to be borne," since there was no "real alternative" to Nazism in the minds of Germans. 57

While probing "The Philosophical Antecedents of German National Socialism" for the Catholic journal Thought of June 1939, American philosopher Vernon J. Bourke discussed the domination over German society of Nazi principles. In examining the ideas behind the Nazi Weltanschauung, he remarked that the "State philosophy has resulted in a rather amorphous body of doctrine, remarkable not so much for its completeness in dealing with philosophical problems as for its quick and wide-spread penetration into the minds of the German people." Under the "watchful guidance" of Nazi officials, the National Socialist view of the world and human life had engulfed all German citizens. "No single man can discover or make the German Weltanschauung. This point of view is imposed upon each and every German by his physiological membership in the German race." Bourke added that in spite of Hitler's reliance

57 Peter F. Drucker, "The End of Economic Man in Europe," Harper's Magazine, CLXXVIII (May, 1939), 561-570. Economist Drucker had been editor of the Frankfurter General Anzeiger; he was also the author of a most valuable study, The End of Economic Man: A Study of the New Totalitarianism (New York: The John Day Company, 1939), sections of which frequently reappeared in his articles.
upon physical coercion, the "average German" was still quite willing to cheer the Fuehrer "as the symbol of a new-found national strength."\(^5^8\)

It was the opinion of the great German author Thomas Mann in the February 1939 Survey Graphic that the middle-class intellectuals of his homeland bore the brunt of the blame for the present totalitarian establishment: "The unhappy course of German history, which has issued in the cultural catastrophe of National Socialism, is in truth very much bound up with that unpolitical past of the bourgeoisie mind, and with its anti-democratic habit of looking down the nose from its intellectual and cultural height at the sphere of political and social action." As a result of this attitude, Germany had lost both civic and moral freedom. Mann wondered how the guilty individual "can ever again hold up his head before the world," but he allowed for the fact that six years of a police-state might have sobered the German bourgeoisie and brought them to an understanding of the meaning "of the words freedom, justice, human dignity, duty and conscience."

Mann's son Klaus investigated the same topic for the August 1939 Survey Graphic. Klaus Mann agreed with his father that the German middle class were "responsible for the moral and mental degradation of their own nation." The "deepest cause" of the tragedy was the "'unpolitical' outlook" of the intellectuals.

\(^5^8\) Vernon J. Bourke, "The Philosophical Antecedents of German National Socialism," Thought, XIV (June, 1939), 225-242. Bourke is a professor of philosophy at St. Louis University.
which threatens to become the tragedy of European civilization."

Most Germans were now "disgusted and profoundly ashamed" after having been tricked by Nazi propaganda. Since these people were the representatives of the Germany of great spiritual and cultural traditions, Klaus Mann asked the civilized world not to let its anti-Nazi feeling become anti-German.

I am convinced that the German people will emerge from their present tragic and humiliating experience with a new outlook. A people that has never really understood what freedom means, will appreciate the value of liberty, since it had to live without it completely for so many years.59

Focusing on other groups than the middle class, a German journalist refugee, Frans Hollering, in The Nation for February 5, 1936, condemned the liberals (and their press), Socialists and military men for having allowed Hitler to grow into a Frankenstein's monster. Had these groups been able to cooperate, they might have prevented such consequences.60

Another class, the peasants, came in for an examination by Professor Carl J. Friedrich. Writing in the scholarly Yale Review in 1937, in an article entitled "The Peasant as Evil Genius of Dictatorship," Friedrich touched on the topic of German peas-

59 Thomas Mann, "Culture and Politics," The Survey Graphic, XVIII (February, 1939), 149-150. Mann (1875-1955) was the famous German novelist and essayist and a winner of a Nobel prize; and Klaus Mann, "The Two Germany's," (August, 1939), 478-481. Klaus Mann, the son of Thomas Mann, was also an important German literary figure; he was residing in the United States.

60 Frans Hollering, "I Was an Editor in Germany," The Nation, CXLII (February 5, 1936), 151. Hollering had been an important liberal editor in Germany before the Hitler era.
the Nazis had "set up the peasant as the incarnation of national integrity." He would serve the regime as "the symbol of the real people." With this in mind, it was natural enough to expect the Hitler government to patronize the agrarians, and as Friedrich noted, the favors continued even though the German peasantry had displayed an aversion for the Nazi religious tenets and the political trend toward centralization. The author noted that Hitler, like other leaders of western Europe, was trying "to save the peasantry from being extinguished by modern trends," yet he theorized that the Fuehrer could not continue this policy for long since he was an exponent of "a centralized industrial system." The German peasants, Friedrich exclaimed, would eventually suffer a "bitter disillusionment." 61

Occasionally, while analyzing trends in German society, the journals examined concrete social problems. Contrary to what one might expect because of the moral aspects of such questions, only one religious periodical commented on such issues. The liberal journals too generally ignored the subject. On December 22, 1934, the editors of The Ave Maria voiced concern over "an increase in vice conditions in Germany since the advent of the Nazi regime." They were especially appalled by the openness of "sex perversion." 62 In an unusually sensationalist-type article,

62 The Ave Maria, XL (New Series) (December 22, 1934), 792.
"Illegitimacy in Germany," the Current History of July 1937, through its reporter, Walter Brockman, told about the problems of German girls when fulfilling their obligation of compulsory labor in rural areas. The German government, Brockman charged, had done nothing to correct the situation, since it desired more cannon-fodder. The same thesis was explored by S. L. Solon and Albert Brandt in the essay "Sex Under the Swastika" for the August 1939 American Mercury. The authors remarked that the world "has not yet realized how deeply the ethics and conventions of sex relations have been affected by the new Germany's fanatical eagerness for more and still more children."64

Judith Gruenfeld, a German exile, discussed some of the problems of German women for The Nation of March 13, 1937. The author noted that the National Socialist program to force women out of employment and back to the home had failed, since figures showed that there were 1,200,000 more women employed in 1937 than in January 1933. The Nazi campaign had been effective only in that it squeezed women "out of the better-paid positions into the sweated trades," a type of labor "extremely dangerous to the health of women" and degrading to the family. Yet Miss Gruenfeld had heard reports that "prominent Nazi women" had expressed con-

63 Walter Brockman, "Illegitimacy in Germany," Current History, XLVI (July, 1937), 66-70. Brockman was an American correspondent in Germany.

64 S. L. Solon and Albert Brandt, "Sex Under the Swastika," The American Mercury, XLVII (August, 1939), 425-432. Solon was an associate editor of The Modern Quarterly.
cern about working conditions for women laborers. 65

The Resistance Movement

During the period from July 1934 to September 1939, the topic of domestic opposition to the Nazi regime attracted considerable attention in the American journals. As previously noted, anti-Nazi opposition on a specific issue appeared in religious circles. More general ideological dissent existed, within the National Socialist Party and outside it, but the totalitarian nature of the state turned the proponents of other theories or methods into subversives or traitors, operating secretly or obscurely. The American journals found a reading public eager for news of such opposition and curious about its composition. In so far as possible, the journals responded.

For all practical purposes, opposition to Hitler's policies from within the Nazi ranks ended with the Roehm Purge. While the mass of German people, particularly members of the middle class, displayed little overt resistance to the regime, there was some evidence to indicate that the enthusiasm for the Nazi revolution, so pronounced in the beginning, had been gradually dashed. Although the earlier reports of underground groups from April 1933 to June 1934, discussed in the previous chapter, emphasized almost exclusively worker organizations, articles studied in this section

65 Judith Gruenfeld, "Women Workers in Nazi Germany," The Nation, CXLIV (March 13, 1937), 295-296. The author was a contributor to the International Labor Review and other economic journals; she had been a member of the German Trade Union research staff until 1933.
would refer to groups which represented a wider variety of factions. The role of the army in particular generated considerable discussion, at least during the later years under examination.

On September 5, 1934, Evelyn Lawrence, writing in The Nation, related her experiences with clandestine opposition cells in Germany. Members of every social class appeared to be represented, and Miss Lawrence related the opposition forces to the deteriorating economic situation. In the January 1935 American Mercury Walter Schoenstedt wrote a glowing account of the reported increase of anti-Hitler literature being printed by the various underground organizations.

Three descriptions of the German underground forces appeared in The Nation during the late autumn of 1935 and the winter months of 1936, when rumors were circulating that the Hitler regime was beset with troubles. Naturally enough, the long-time German Socialist Kurt Rosenfeld depicted a bright future for the resistance movement on October 30, 1935. He concentrated entirely on the labor movement. After a slow beginning, the anti-Nazi groups were gaining in strength and exerting some influence upon German workers. What was lacking so far was a united front; however, cooperation was increasing between Communists and Social

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66 Evelyn Lawrence, "The Hitler Terror Mounts," ibid., XXXIX (September 5, 1934), 261-262. Miss Lawrence had just returned from Germany and Austria, where she reportedly had many underground contacts.

67 Walter Schoenstedt, "Illegal Periodicals in Germany," The American Mercury, XXXIV (January, 1935), 40-43. The author had fled from Nazi Germany in 1934.
Democrats, and in western Germany even Catholics and liberals were said to have joined forces with the Marxists. As the deplorable economic conditions grew worse, wrote Rosenfeld, the anti-Nazi would find the opportunity to unite against the common enemy. These forces, Rosenfeld fully expected, would "take control of Germany into their own hands."

The second *Nation* article, written by Josephine Herbst about two months later, presented the same basic picture of the subversive cells, except that she felt that their efforts were hardly enough to bring an end to the dictatorship. Miss Herbst correctly calculated that a war would be needed to finally break the Nazi regime. Similarly Louis Fischer held out no hope for the success of the anti-Nazi forces. In his *Nation* article for February 12, 1936, entitled "What I Saw in Germany," he called the "hostility" to Nazism "ubiquitous and impotent." 68

On the other hand, American Socialist spokesman Norman Thomas, writing in the April 1936 *Foreign Affairs*, evaluated the German underground activities somewhat differently, yet he avoided the question of what these might accomplish, except in the area of recruitment for a potential "revolutionary elite."

68 Kurt Rosenfeld, "The German Underground Movement," *The Nation*, CXLI (October 30, 1935), 507-509; Josephine Herbst, "The German Underground War: I. Anti-Nazi Feeling Rises," CXLII (January 8, 1936), 42-43; Miss Herbst had written a number of novels, and she was also interested in international affairs; and Louis Fischer, "What I Saw in Germany," (February 12, 1936), 178.
In view of all the facts, the really surprising thing is that the underground struggle against Hitler among the workers is so intensive. Once a group has been so completely deprived of power, time is needed for it to recover its morale. Yet today unknown thousands of Germans—socialists, trade unionists, communists—daily face concentration camps, torture and beating, death by the ax, to carry on their propaganda.69

It is interesting to notice that the two spokesmen for Socialism, Rosenfeld and Thomas, remained more hopeful about the underground operations, in contrast to the non-Socialist writers.

Later in 1936 American journalists seemed to arrive at the judgment that the Germans, including those in the underground movement, were a fairly impotent group after all. In the September 1936 issue of *Current History*, Gordon Rand pointed to one "strange outfit," the League of Decent Germans, which remained a big mystery to everybody including, as it appeared from the article, the author. Its only visible activity was the printing and disseminating of anti-government literature. "It has no officers, no offices, no membership cards, no dues. And there is no fixed system by which those who direct it keep their followers informed. Rand insinuated that this organization was nation-wide in scope and that its program "appeals to all classes of Germans," but he also surmised that it lacked potency.70

69Norman Thomas, "Labor Under the Nazis," *Foreign Affairs*, XIV (April, 1936), 424-436. Thomas is the famous American Socialist leader and many times a candidate for the office of President of the United States.

70Gordon Rand, "Opposition in Germany," *Current History*, XLIV (September, 1936), 54-56. Rand was a German-American newspaperman who was using a pseudonym.
More than a year later, another attempt was made to identify the subversive organizations in the February 1938 Current History. In the article "Underground Europe," Max Nomad, who had personally investigated the resistance groups, found that whatever group action existed in Nazi Germany was thoroughly disorganized due to the presence of numerous shades of left- and right-wing opinion.

The mutual relations between the various underground organizations are more strained in Germany than they are in Italy. The Communist proposal of a united front has met with little response. Most of the revolutionary groups seem to believe that a victory over Hitler, with the help of the Communists, would soon be followed by their own extermination. The Socialists, in particular, seem to place their hopes largely upon their connections with certain dissatisfied strata among the middle classes and even among the officers of the Reichswehr. The establishment of a more or less "civilized" form of military dictatorship, as distinguished from a party dictatorship of the Nazis, has for a long time appeared to many as the only way out of the present situation.71

Writing in the February 1938 Atlantic Monthly, Emil Ludwig commended the workers, clergy "and other religious-minded men of both creeds" for the stand against Nazi tyranny, but he recognized that "these real heroes of the Germany of today are not strong enough for revolution now." Yet Ludwig felt that these individuals "are the precursors of those who, when the war comes, will represent the other Germany in much greater strength than in 1914."72

71Max Nomad, "Underground Europe," ibid., XLVIII (February 1938), 35-38. Nomad was in Europe on a Guggenheim Fellowship studying the subject of this article.

72Emil Ludwig, "The German Mind," The Atlantic Monthly, LXI (February, 1938), 263.
Far-reaching developments, which would have a direct effect upon the future of German resistance to the Hitler government, occurred in the Third Reich on February 4, 1938, when Hitler abruptly replaced the Minister of War, General Werner von Blomberg, and the Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr, General Werner von Fritsch. Neither general had stood enthusiastically behind the recently revealed war plans of the Fuehrer, but the official reasons given for their dismissal were false charges of scandals in their personal life. Hitler took for himself the office of Commander-in-Chief of the Reichswehr and abolished the War Ministry; he named the pliable Wilhelm Keitel as his chief of staff and the equally adaptable General Walter von Brauchitsch as commander of the army. Furthermore, in the foreign office the place of Constantin von Neurath, the old-line conservative who had objected to the orientation of Hitler's foreign policy, was assigned to Joachim von Ribbentrop, another Hitler favorite who had achieved great success in his foreign representations. To the American journalists, the significance of this shake-up in the army high command touched an important source of anti-Nazi sentiment within Germany. Back in 1932 and 1933 the journals had discussed this possibility, and the subject had since reappeared occasionally.

particularly during 1935.\textsuperscript{74} The weekly \textit{Nation} made its initial response to the National Socialist reshuffling in the editorial for February 12 entitled "Purge in the Reich." It viewed events in the framework of a resistance movement and foreign policy.

Today there is no important branch of the government which is not under the absolute and undisputed control and authority of the Führer. The menace of a possible monarchist revolt by the old army generals is gone forever and with it that other ghost—a military dictatorship as a transition from National Socialism to a more democratic regime—has been laid to rest.

As a result of these vital administrative changes \textit{The Nation} correctly looked forward to a new era of "militant aggressiveness" and German expansion in Europe. After a week of reflection, \textit{The Nation}'s editors were not quite so certain that the reshuffling in the government would ultimately help the National Socialists. The fact that Hitler was concentrating power in his own hands, instead of broadening the bureaucratic base, would do nothing to relieve the strains on the already unhealthy totalitarian regime.\textsuperscript{75}

\textit{The New Republic}'s editorial of February 16, "Behind the Nazi Purge," dismissed as insignificant Hitler's change of military commands, and it contradicted \textit{The Nation}'s assertion that Hitler's hold over the German government had been tightened.

\textsuperscript{74} See this chapter's section on domestic politics for American journal commentary on the role of the army in Nazi Germany.

\textsuperscript{75} \textit{The Nation}, CXLVI (February 12, 1938), 174, and (February 19, 1938), 197-198.
It is scarcely likely that these changes have materially altered the army tradition of the opinions of its officers, or that the military caste will now be subservient to the Nazi philosophy. They may be a little more cautious about expressing their independence, but the rift certainly has not ceased to exist. It may even be that Hitler himself is not too anxious to give all power to his party, but rather is using his old technique of keeping himself on top by balancing opposed forces.

Behind "his new facade of control," Hitler could either launch into more foreign adventures or continue to work along the same diplomatic lines with the concentration on peaceful penetration. "In either case his position is fundamentally insecure, and Nazi Germany is weaker in fact than she appears to the superficial observer." 76

Writing in the February 23 New Republic, newsman Leonard Carlton presented his view of the Hitler-army conflict. He traced the army purge to the fact that the Reichswehr leaders had consistently asserted a more realistic assessment of Nazi Germany's military strength, in opposition to the National Socialist Party leadership. Yet he did not evaluate their opposition very highly.

It may be said with full confidence that no responsible army officer was thinking of the seizure of power by the armed forces. There was no monarchist plot, no scheme to take over the reins of government. Hitler cannot stand the continued pressure of the militarists for a policy more in accord with the Reich's real position. Hitler easily outmaneuvered the Reichswehr in this struggle, because the generals lacked the self-confidence that the Fuehrer possessed and often boasted of in his truculent speeches. 77

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76 The New Republic, XCIV (February 16, 1938), 33.
The editors of Current History shared Carlton's assessment of the reason for the army shake-up, namely because the officers opposed Hitler's proposed belligerent adventures in foreign policy. The editors also discerned some "remarkable" parallels to recent events in Soviet Russia, resulting in the execution of prominent military men by Premier Joseph Stalin. The Current History column speculated that the German and Russian military men were planning a simultaneous coup; however, while there had long been discussions between German and Russian officials and military personnel, it was an error on the part of Current History to assume that there was anything like a grand design for revolution drawn up by dissenting Nazis and Bolsheviks. Current History added that it expected another round of purges before the German government ventured a new move in international affairs.78

The February 16 Christian Century, the only religious journal to respond editorially to the purge, examined it only in relationship to Hitler's power. "If anyone had a hope that the Hitler dictatorship might be overthrown by an army revolt, as many a dictatorship has been, that possibility is by one long step more remote than before."79

At a time when Germany appeared to be pushing the world to the brink of another great war, a variety of opinions concerning opposition to the Nazi totalitarian structure appeared in the

78 Current History, XLVIII (March, 1938), 15.
79 The Christian Century, LV (February 16, 1938), 196.
1939 issues of American periodicals. An unnamed source in The Survey Graphic for March 1939 insisted that two significant events, the official removal of Hjalmar Schacht from his last government office, President of the Reichsbank, and the ouster of General Werner von Fritsch and several of his officers, had given the small underground movement a new lease on life. This anonymous author seemed confident that the future of the various clandestine groups of dissenters would be filled with innumerable successes. The author hazarded the prediction the the "future of Germany, the future of Europe, the future of our world," all depended upon how the German underground performed. 80

A note of hope also appeared in Heinz Liepmann's article "Underground Germany" for the April 1939 American Mercury. He called attention to the resurgence in recent months of "communist Social Democratic, religious, and liberal" resistance organizations notwithstanding the National Socialist spy network. These groups amounted to the most serious underground threat since 1933 according to Liepmann. Only "small, romantic groups of intellectuals," the only mention of opposition from intellectual circles, had furnished opposition to the regime for the last several years. Presently, the new anti-Nazi force has three "great" points to its program, said the author.

80 "Y," "Underground Germany," The Survey Graphic, XXVIII (March, 1939), 219. The author of this article was a European who was said, by this journal, to be in close touch with the developments of the German underground.
First, the education and training of its own members. Second, the distribution of true and reliable news to the German people who would otherwise know only what the Nazis tell them about national and international affairs. And third, preparation for the day on which they must be ready to take over the government. The day, the believe, cannot come without revolution.

According to the May 17 New Republic editorial entitled "Germans Against Hitler," the major indication of increased disension was that the German jails and concentration camps remained filled to capacity and that opposition literature had reportedly tripled in quantity in the last year. The opposition endeavored to disseminate the idea that Hitler and National Socialism would mean war in the future. This issue of the journal reached the newsstands just as the Polish Corridor issue began to ripen in Germany. "The greatest wish of the opposition is peace, even though they know their influence is growing but slowly compared to the immense forces they must defeat to free their country." 82 The Nation for July 1 likewise believed it recognized increased restlessness throughout the German empire. 83

A somewhat contrary view of the German anti-Nazi resistance appeared in the same issue of The Nation. "Religious people who attempted to come to terms with the regime are now compelled to acknowledge the hopelessness of their efforts," were

81 Heinz Liepmann, "Underground Germany," The American Mercury, XLVI (April, 1939), 442-446. The author was a newspaperman and novelist who had lived in America since 1937 after escaping from a Nazi concentration camp.
82 The New Republic, XCIX (May 17, 1939), 34.
83 The Nation, CXLIX (July 1, 1939), 2.
the words written by Albert Viton. Some secret resistance existed, admitted Viton, and it would be an error "to dismiss it lightly." But the author expressed little optimism since the "weapons are obviously unevenly divided." 84

The resistance elements were mainly Communists, wrote Edwin Muller in the August 1939 Current History, as he apparently tried to discredit the work of all the dissenting factions. The sole piece of "evidence" presented by Muller, whose credentials were highly questionable, was the thought that the Germans seemed to be getting their "inspiration" from beyond the Russian border. 85

**Nazi Discipline**

The readers of American journals had only a few opportunities in the approximately five-year period covered in this chapter to review the situation concerning the Nazi concentration camps and other disciplinary measures. The August 8, 1934 issue of The New Republic contained a rather frank discussion of the Nazi penal system. Instances of undisguised brutality by Nazi concentration camp officials were cited by an anonymous author. This activity had nothing to do with what some people called

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84 Albert Viton, "Niemoller or I," *ibid.*, 14. An expert in eastern European problems, Viton had just returned to the United States after an extended visit in Palestine.

85 Edwin Muller, "Waging War with Words," *Current History*, L (August, 1939), 26-27. Muller was a "professional adventurer and sportsman."
"certain deficiencies in the character of the German people."
The author of this article was "strongly" convinced that "the at-
rocities committed are the work of a few criminal types who are
strongly backed by their superiors." 86

On September 4, 1935, Emil Lengyel denounced the Nazi
government for destroying the traditional penal law system, as of
September 1, an action which assured the condemnation of defend-
ants "whatever the evidence." The new revolutionary law "codi-
ifies Nazi lynch justice, divorces jurisprudence from impartial-
ity, and makes the National Socialist Weltanschauung the guiding
star of criminal trials." 87

German women received no special treatment in this total-
itarian system, if they refused to conform. Two articles in the
summer of 1936 acknowledged the presence of women inmates in Nazi
concentration camps and described some of their experiences. The
first of the two anonymously written articles seemed to be of a
more sensational variety with no effort made to analyze the cau-
ses for the establishment of such camps. In general, this Current
History "story" described a rather lenient type of camp life, sim-
ilar to any women's prison, for Jew and Gentile women alike. The
second study, appearing in The New Republic for August 19, de-
tailed some of the more horrifying and degrading experiences and

86 Anonymous, "Prisoner of the Nazis," The New Republic, LXXIX (August 8, 1934), 337-339. The author was forced by neces-
sity to remain anonymous.

told of women being tortured for the purpose of obtaining information with regard to anti-Nazi activity. From the evidence gathered since 1945, this report seemed to be an accurate description of the Nazi penal system. 88

Using the pseudonym Johann Schmidt, an anonymous German disclosed his six months of degrading trials for the readers of the September 12, 1936 Nation. 89 Commenting on the various stories concerning Nazi concentration camp discipline, The New Republic for February 24, 1937 said: "So much has been heard, for example, of the brutal Nazi regime in Germany, that things now pass almost unnoticed that would have brought a worldwide uproar thirty years ago." 90 Others, writing during the winter of 1936-1937, seemed to concur with this pronouncement. Writing in the January 30, 1937 Nation, Oswald Garrison Villard reached this conclusion with regard to the Hitlerites' behavior: "Whatever else may be

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88 Anonymous, "Protected by Hitler," Current History, XLIV (June, 1936), 83-90; The German woman who authored this article remained unidentified "for obvious reasons," said this monthly; and Anonymous, "The Nazis Are Kind to Women," The New Republic, LXXXVIII (August 19, 1936), 39-41. The unidentified author of this article was once a political prisoner in Nazi Germany. Two years earlier a Nation editorial, "Nazi Women Speak Out," CXXXIX (September 12, 1934), 286, said this concerning German women: "The opposition of Germany's leading women to the repressions of the Nazi regime may turn out to be quite as important as the other evidence of internal disillusion and rebellion that have recently been revealed.

89 Johann Schmidt, "Sojourn in Hell," The Nation, CXLIII (September 12, 1936), 300-302. Schmidt was the pseudonym of a German businessman who spent six months in the concentration camp described in this article.

90 The New Republic, XC (February 24, 1937), 62.
said about the European dictatorships, they are compelling us to
test anew our standard of values in ethics as well as our politi-
cal beliefs."\(^91\) The Hitler dictatorship which "was once be-
lieved must become more sane and sober with passing time has only 
become more ruthless," wrote John Haynes Holmes in the November 
12, 1936 \textit{Christian Register}.\(^92\)

In general agreement with these evaluations was a certain 
"Dr. X," who disclosed in the September 1939 \textit{Atlantic Monthly} 
that few Germans were able to escape the watchful eyes of the 
Nazi secret police. Most of the author's article "Concentration 
Camp" summarized his experiences under Nazi camp discipline which, 
from the doctor's point of view, did not seem to be especially 
brutal. It was interesting to note that "Dr. X" had been official-
lly 'released' after six months to make room for new arrivals.\(^93\)

In \textit{Foreign Affairs} an author identified only as "Balticus" 
compared the Russian and German totalitarian police forces. With 
reference to the Nazi Gestapo, he surmised that its pressure "is 
only beginning to be fully felt"; however, even now the secret 
police stood as the "chief pillar of stability and security."
The author reserved his main criticism for the Nazi "terror"

\(^91\)Oswald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Men: Germany and 

\(^92\)John Haynes Holmes, "Christian Refugees from Germany,"
\textit{The Christian Register}, CXVI (November 12, 1936), 681.

\(^93\)"Dr. X," "Concentration Camp," \textit{The Atlantic Monthly},
CLXIV (September, 1939), 378-384. The author had been a leading 
Jewish medical authority in Germany.
Young men, unfortunately, seem best suited to carry out terror by flogging. And so among the most serious approaches to be brought against National Socialism and the Gestapo is that they introduce still undeveloped minds to some of the worst forms of physical brutality.... Cruelties in Soviet concentration camps are haphazard, more thoughtless than vicious. But the German people is deliberately intimidated by the rubber truncheon, the steel rod, the rifle butt. Mortification vies in efficacy with the threat of death and with death itself.

Education and Culture

What National Socialism had been able to achieve in the area of education and culture was occasionally considered by several authors. An article by Henry Albert Phillips in the July 20, 1935 Literary Digest discussed aspects of German university education, making only a few penetrating comments. Under the Nazis German higher education was no longer a closed aristocratic corporation, since a "social leveling" had occurred. Among other decrees, the government had forced the universities to accept students of little financial means. Yet Phillips recognized that the Nazis had recast the universities into a "crucible" for Fascist leadership. "Students who fail—not in their studies, which is secondary—but who fail to keep up their political enthusiasms will be demoted, and those revealing a hostile attitude toward community or State must be dismissed. Thus Germany is made safe for National Socialism."  


95 Henry Albert Phillips, "Foreign Comment: German Univer-
Historian Charles A. Beard best summarized the National Socialist school system three years after Hitler became German leader, in an April 1936 *Foreign Affairs* article entitled "Education Under the Nazis." Very pertinent were Beard's concluding remarks:

Besides bringing up a generation predisposed to war and prepared to serve the military State when it is ready to strike, Nazi education shuts Germany off from intellectual intercourse with other nations. With independence of research and thought destroyed in German universities, students who once flocked there by the hundreds turn elsewhere. Except for branches specifically physical and mathematical, German science sinks toward the level of partisan charlatanry. German learned publications which once circulated throughout the world have dropped in quality and lost the respect that they formerly commanded. Nor do German students, apart from the exiles, expect to find a friendly reception in other countries or to derive advantages from study abroad. Turned in upon themselves, nourishing deep resentments, and lashed to fury by a militant system of education, the German people are conditioned for that day when Hitler, his technicians, and the army, are ready and are reasonably sure of the prospects of success in a sudden and devastating attack, East or West. To cherish any other conception of Hitler's State or of the aims of German education is to cherish a delusion.96

Generally agreeing with Beard were the opinions in most articles and editorials on the subject of education published during the next two years.97 In particular, for *The Survey Graz-

96 Charles A. Beard, "Education Under the Nazis," *Foreign Affairs*, XIV (April, 1936), 437-452. Beard (1874-1948) was the famous American historian.

97 *The Literary Digest*, CXXII (July 4, 1936), 12; Frank C. Hanighen, "German War Machine," *The Review of Reviews*, XCV (August, 1936), 50-53; *The Nation*, CXLIII (October 10, 1936), 407; Arthur E. Holt, "Western Society at the Crossroads," *Christendom*, I (Summer, 1936), 624-632; the author was a professor of social
nic of August 1937, Franz Boas wrote about the efficiency of thought control in all branches of German education, as well as in the entire German school system. Only in antiquarian research was German scholarly life flourishing. Here the National Socialist ideology looked with favor upon the studies of German superstitions, German folk tales and German folk songs.  

By September 22, 1938, American Quaker M. Whitcomb Hess seemed convinced that Germany was almost completely Nazified. "A strictly national education" had been imposed with a vengeance, and culturally the days of German greatness were over. The Fuehrer had promised a "unity of spirit," but what had been created was more like a "unity of gangland," which was out to destroy civilization. Finally, during the course of an article for the Thought of September 1939, Father Edward Quinn predicted that "another five years will probably bring about irreparable devastation in the minds of German youth and will certainly create a new mass, wholly saturated with the new ideas."

One optimistic voice, that of the German Stefan Heym, was ethics in the Chicago Theological Seminary; and Gabor De Bessen-vey, "German Youth Is Lost Under State Tutelage," America, LVIII (January 8, 1938), 320-321.

98 Franz Boas, "Science in Nazi Germany," The Survey Graphic, XXVI (August, 1937), 416-417. Boas was a noted anthropologist.

99 M. Whitcomb Hess, "Is Germany a Sanctuary of Civilization?" The Christian Register, CXVII (September 22, 1938), 539. Hess was the author of many works concerning the Society of Friends.

100 Edward Quinn, "The Birth of an Age," Thought, XIV (September, 1939), 425-427.
heard, but Heym's article appeared back in the June 27, 1936 issue of The Nation. Heym manifested hope that the majority of the German students had finally come to its senses regarding Adolf Hitler and National Socialism. Long deceived by Nazi propaganda, the students, Heym believed, "were bound to be disappointed by the political trickery, the military humiliation, and the stupid discipline which are all integral parts of German National Socialism." Even the reactionary students had been disturbed because the fraternities had been dissolved and their property confiscated.101

Journalist Dorothy Thompson reviewed the cultural life of Germany under the Hitlerites in the April 1936 Foreign Affairs. Her conclusions resembled those of Charles Beard, who had appraised Nazi education in the same issue of the quarterly journal. "It is the business of culture to aid in impressing on the public mind the aims of the National Socialist movement."102 Mrs. Lillian T. Mowrer agreed with Miss Thompson's statements in an April 15, 1936 Nation article. The Nazis used the theater for propaganda purposes; "everyone who had contributed to the brilliance of the former regime was banned."103

101 Stefan Heym, "Youth in Hitler's Reich," The Nation, CXLII (June 27, 1936), 838-839. Heym, a German literary man, was once active in Germany's youth movements.

102 Dorothy Thompson, "Culture Under the Nazis," Foreign Affairs, XIV (April, 1936), 407-423.

103 Lillian T. Mowrer, "Hitler's Totalitarian Theater," The Nation, CXLII (April 15, 1936), 477. The author, wife of Edgar Ansel Mowrer, well-known correspondent who had long been stationed in Germany, spent eight years as a drama critic in Germany before Hitler came to power.
In November 1936, Joseph Goebbels, the Minister of Propaganda, placed a limitation on all cultural affairs except those representing the National Socialist viewpoint. Both the December 12 Nation and The Commonweal for November 20 called this "tightening up" by the Nazis an attempt to force a united front at home against the steadily mounting world pressure, while in the December 26 Nation, Klaus Mann "doubted whether anything of Germany's cultural life will remain after Goebbels' latest decrees have been carried into effect."104

The German writer Lion Feuchtwanger reported to the readers of The Nation for July 24, 1937, that almost every great contemporary German literary figure had been driven from the country, including author Feuchtwanger, yet their reputations and their works still remained under constant attack by government propaganda sources.105 According to Bruce Bliven in the article "Thank You, Hitler" for the November 10, 1937 New Republic, the Nazi drive to rid the state of unorthodox and racially unfit intellectuals had greatly profited the United States, since many of these famous figures now resided in this country. "The average scholar has an 'investment value' of $200,000. Viewed in these terms alone, Germany's contribution to us goes a long way toward

104 The Nation, CXLIII (December 12, 1936), 690; The Commonweal, XXV (November 20, 1936), 87; and Klaus Mann, "Discipline for German Writers," The Nation, CXLIII (December 26, 1936), 764.

105 Lion Feuchtwanger, "How Germany Persecutes Writers," The Nation, CXLV (July 24, 1937), 103.
paying her defaulted post-war debt.\textsuperscript{106}

Investigating the new books being published in Nazi Germany, M. Whitcomb Hess found for \textit{The Christian Century} of August 4, 1937, that the great majority stressed "with monotonous regularity" the "superiority of the old German ways and glorification of war as a desirable communal experience."\textsuperscript{107} Ralph Thurston recorded in the March 20, 1937 \textit{Nation} that even children's books were being rewritten so that they would correspond with Nazi propaganda.\textsuperscript{108}

American journal interest in the condition of the German press was minimal. Articles appearing in \textit{Scribner's Magazine}, \textit{America} and \textit{The North American Review} presented no new insights.\textsuperscript{109}

\textbf{Nazi Propaganda and Nazism in Other Lands}

Nazi propaganda and the international activities of the National Socialist organization received slightly more attention from the periodicals. A lengthy essay devoted to the international activities of the National Socialist movement appeared in \textit{The

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{106}Bruce Bliven, "Thank You, Hitler," \textit{The New Republic}, XCIII (November 10, 1937), 12.
  \item \textsuperscript{108}Ralph Thurston, "Hitler Mobilizes 'Mother Goose,'" \textit{The Nation}, CXLIV (March 20, 1937), 318.
\end{itemize}
New Republic's August 21, 1935 issue. According to the outline of Joachim Joesten, a Swedish newspaperman, the German Fascists were not satisfied with mere peaceful penetration through propaganda. "Pro-German sentiment is organized into active political parties which often wield tremendous influence." Subsidies were sent directly from Germany. Joesten hazarded the guess that these foreign front groups would be a valuable asset for the Nazis in the event of war. "The Brown International will prove, some day, to be a much more efficient reality at the disposal of Berlin than the Red could ever become for the sake of Moscow." Nazi Germany's successes in Austria and Czecho-slovakia would soon prove Joesten to be an accurate prognosticator.

The well-known foreign correspondent William Henry Chamberlain touched on some aspects of Nazi international activity when he sought to compare Soviet and Nazi totalitarianism in The Atlantic Monthly for September 1935. Ideologically one major difference, purportedly, was that Communism was international, while National Socialism was exclusively national. But Chamberlain thought otherwise.

Yet it is a paradox of contemporary world politics that National Socialism is a more explosive, more revolutionary, more disturbing influence in international affairs to-day than is Bolshevism. This is because the emotional appeal of National Socialism is far more compelling to Germans outside of Germany—in Austria and Czecho-

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vakia and Memel, for instance—than is the appeal of Bolshevism to workers outside of Russia.111

During the next several years a number of American journalists and editors echoed the sentiments of Chamberlain.112 One dissenting voice was heard in the December 1937 Current History. Louis F. Gittler detected several weak points in the German propaganda machine—an organization which had been called the greatest peace-time operation of its kind. "This is unreservedly true for the sheer 'organization' of its vast network, but as to quality, direction and genuine effectiveness in all its activities, it has yet to prove indisputable greatness."113

The progress of Nazi factions in foreign countries received some notice. A Nation editorial for August 28, 1937 and The Living Age for September 1938, discussed Nazi maneuvers in Great Britain. A long article in the April 1937 Foreign Affairs by Harold Callender surveyed Fascist activity in Belgium, while Joachin Joesten showed concern for Nazi penetration in Scandinavia in the July 1937 issue of the same journal. That the Nazis had also stepped up their activity in Latin America was the subject


112 The Christian Century, LIV (September 15, 1937), 1123; The Living Age, CCCLIII (November, 1937), 194; and Henry C. Wolfe, "Hitler's Fifth Column," The New Republic, XCV (June 29, 1938), 206-207. Wolfe as an author and lecturer on international affairs.

113 Louis F. Gittler, "Nazi Propaganda at Work," Current History, XLVII (December, 1937), 35. This former research assistant at the University of Chicago had been studying in Europe.
of historian Carleton Beals' article in the July 1938 Harper's Magazine. 114

The accomplishments of German-American Nazis received minor notice limited to two feature articles in the American journals of opinion included in this study. Neither of the essays seemed to treat the American Nazis too seriously, although a hard core of enthusiasts was noticed. 115 One would have to turn to the newspapers and news magazines for information and comment on the German-American Bund and comparable activities.

In summarizing the response of the American journals to domestic German events after the Roehm Purge, it became increasingly clear in the periodicals that by the end of 1935 domestic affairs in Nazi Germany had taken a backseat to foreign affairs and the religious controversies. Two major domestic issues did constantly attract attention, the religious issue and anti-Semitism (both treated in separate chapters), but in regard to compar-


115 Alson J. Smith, "I Went to a Nazi Rally," The Christian Century, LVI (March 8, 1939), 321-322, and Maxwell S. Burt, "Why Hate the Jews?" The Forum, CI (June, 1939), 291-295. Occasionally the short news and short editorial sections of most of the weekly journals and some of the monthlies during 1937 to 1939 would mention briefly the activities of the German-American Bund.
able issues the journal response was superficial and uneven. While the secular journals exhibited only limited interest in the different phases of domestic life, the concern of religious periodicals was almost negligible except perhaps for The Christian Century. Even the long summary articles, with the exception of Vernon J. Bourke's, William Orton's and those appearing in Foreign Affairs, failed to probe deeply the inner workings of the Nazi totalitarian establishment. Many of the authors were German exiles whose accounts were colored by their personal experiences and pre-Hitler activities.

During the months immediately following the events of June 30, 1934, spokesmen representing every category of the American periodicals expressed opinions that Hitler's control over Germany's destiny appeared insecure. Although this idea gradually dissolved in the light of actual events, the journals continued to emphasise various sources of unrest and opposition. Until 1938 the German military leaders received occasional credit for keeping themselves independent of the Nazi regime and ready to take action if the National Socialist government faltered in its quest to restore Germany to a position of greatness. Attention was frequently called to the limited activities of the German underground groups; however, in general, American journalists appeared to display too much enthusiasm for these overrated and irregular organizations. Besides, journal reports suggested that the German masses gave their allegiance to the Nazi government.

Some authors, obviously not able to comprehend the Nation-
al Socialist leadership principle, seemed to find it hard to believe that Hitler managed to remain in power, but all hope for a successful domestic uprising had vanished by 1939. The Fuehrer's personal reorganization of the Reichswehr high command dampened the spirits of all but a few optimists.

Steadily, the journalists came to the realization that the totalitarian methods of control and censorship were highly effective in all domestic areas and that the Nazi ideas were capable of being exported to and nurtured in far distant places.
CHAPTER IX

THE NATIONAL SOCIALISTS AND GERMANY'S ECONOMIC PROBLEMS

Taking power in January 1933 in the midst of the world depression, the Nazis inherited a number of economic problems which had contributed greatly to the downfall of several preceding ministries. Unemployment had passed the six million mark in 1932 and was still rising. Domestic buying power was naturally drastically curtailed. Foreign financial aid was desperately needed. After 1930 foreign loans which had primed the German economy and aided German industry were withdrawn. Export trade declined rapidly.

Although the National Socialists had long appealed to the workers and the middle class in their campaign literature, they had obtained financial backing and political support from German big business, which was opposed to the labor unions and the Marxist parties. Consequently by 1933 there existed no well-defined Nazi economic policy, and Party membership included spokesmen for various economic theories. Gottfried Feder, author of the early National Socialist economic "theories" which alluded vaguely to Socialism, received only a minor post in the ministry of economics when the National Socialists came to power. Even though repudiating Socialism, the Nazi government was not about to embrace "free enterprise" in the American sense; the principle remained fairly tight government control of the economy, but with private ownership respected. It was also generally understood that Germany would attempt to become self-sufficient in basic areas. From the beginning of the Hitler dictatorship, it seemed likely that whatever economic path the Nazi government chose, a number of its supporters would be alienated.

An important economic policy, which played a key role in state consolidation (Gleichschaltung), was the May 2, 1933 dissolution of the German trade unions, an event which received only a minimum of coverage in the American periodicals. Simultaneously came the announcement of the new German Labor Front under the direction of the Nazi Dr. Robert Ley. This organization was scheduled to begin operation later in the year. Although the first government declarations spoke of the protection of the workers'
rights by the regime, as the plan developed a few weeks later, the German proletariat lost its right to strike and to collective bargaining.

These actions drew the immediate response of only the two popular American liberal weeklies—The Nation and The New Republic—which always showed interest when the rights of the working man were involved. By his seizure of the labor unions and their funds, wrote the May 17 Nation, Hitler had left the German workers "in subjugation" to the whims of the Hitlerites and their big business allies. This condition occurred in spite of the unions' willingness to cooperate with the regime. The Nation predicted correctly that the workers would be united into a state corporation with the advantage going to the employers in labor disputes. The attack on the unions was essentially a thrust at the Social Democrat Party since the latter commanded the largest workers' organization. Leading Social Democrats were taken into custody for the crimes allegedly committed by the labor unions. Social Democracy and its subsidiary units were paying the penalty for believing they could exist under the Fascist regime, in the opinion of The Nation.  

Similar comments appeared in the May 17 New Republic, which tried to put the suppression of the unions into perspective by observing that this further demonstrated the intention of the dictatorship "to subordinate every public and
personal consideration to national greatness and nationalist aggression. 3

With the exception of the move against the unions, the Nazis seemed uncertain in the economic area, and probably as a result the American journals' coverage of German economic problems was superficial and inconsistent. Specific issues were in general avoided, as the periodicals during most of 1933 appeared to be waiting for the Hitler government to take more positive action in the field of economics. A typical example of this type of reporting could be seen in the article by the anonymous Y.K.W. in The New Republic for May 10, 1933. He conjectured that economic recovery was the major problem for the Hitler Cabinet, but he noted that an overhaul of the economic system had not been undertaken by the new government. In fact, specific measures introduced so far helped the small farmer and small merchant at the expense of government economy. The author observed that the whole revolution seemed to be slowing down; however, it was still a fact that the German masses were almost completely behind the Nazi government or "benevolently neutral." That "the genius" of the leader would pull Germany through the economic crisis was the general consensus. 4

The Nation, in a short editorial on May 10, could only

3 The New Republic, LXXV (May 17, 1933), 4-5.

comment that the National Socialists had not been able to improve economic conditions, which, in fact, appeared to be worsening because of the foreign boycott inspired by the Nazi anti-Semitic activity.\(^5\) Writing in the June Harper's Magazine, Frank H. Simonds likewise observed that the German people waited patiently for the National Socialists' "promised domestic miracle,"\(^6\) while a more realistic Living Age for June recognized that because the Nazis espoused contradictory economic policies little would be done to improve the depression conditions.\(^7\) Then, on June 14, a Nation editorial evinced no surprise that Hitler emphasized "his peaceful intentions" in recent public utterances, since evidence pointed to the fact that Nazi Germany was going to be hard-pressed to continue payment of its debts, a view supported by the new president of the Reichsbank, Hjalmar Schacht.\(^8\) Suzanne La Follette suggested in Scribner's Magazine for July 1933 that to win support from the German masses a Nazi attack on capitalism could be expected momentarily,\(^9\) but events would soon prove her wrong.

When Adolf Hitler, in an address on July 6, 1933, publicly

\(^5\) The Nation, OXXXVI (May 10, 1933), 154.
\(^7\) The Living Age, COXLIV (June, 1933), 284.
\(^8\) The Nation, OXXXVI (June 14, 1933), 658.
\(^9\) Suzanne La Follette, "Gotterdammerung," Scribner's Magazine, CXIV (July, 1933), 14-15. Miss La Follette was from the famous Wisconsin political family and was active in political and social affairs.
pronounced the Nazi revolution to be at an end, he made it emphatically clear that the upheaval was political rather than economic. There would be no fostering of radical economic experiments, but instead an orderly attempt led by German businessmen to restore German economic prosperity. By committing his government’s economic policies to the care of the traditional conservative business interests, Hitler took the chance of offending a great number of his supporters, who were anti-capitalist.

This situation was immediately recognized by American journalists. The July 12 Nation perceived the internal clash between opposing political and economic Nazi factions. On the other hand, The New Republic’s editors on July 12 seemed unsure of what Hitler had in mind when he announced the end of the revolution. His recent speech directed at a possible counter-revolutionary rising and his break with Alfred Hugenberg were evidently related to a long-time struggle between the industrialists and the Junkers, each of whom had diametrically opposed economic policies—with the exception that both were opposed to organized labor and the Marxist parties. The German Chancellor would not be dictated to, nor did he seem ready to make a choice between the two conservative factions. As on so many other issues, he had decided to straddle this one too, in the view of The New Republic. Two weeks later in the July 26 issue the editors acknowledged that “Hitler, torn by conflicting loyalties, decided in

10 The Nation, CXXXVII (July 12, 1933), 33-34.
favor of the industrial overlords who had made his rise to power possible, at the price of open rebellion in his own ranks." That the embryo revolt among the Nazis had been quelled "with such comparative ease," was a portent for the future, declared this New Republic short editorial. 11

The August Living Age refused to concede that the Nazis who were more radically inclined in economics had been completely pacified, and in the following month this conservative journal's editors noted that German economic recovery had not been rapid enough as far as most Germans were concerned. The future peace of Europe seemed to depend on how Hitler ultimately handled the economic problems. 12

In the most lengthy article on economics under the National Socialists during the summer of 1933, "German Capitalism and the Nazis," in the August Current History, Calvin B. Hoover suspected that Hitler's capitalist backers, now in no position to control the Chancellor, were soon to be confronted with more than they bargained for. He was "inclined to believe" that the Hitler government was preparing an "economic and social order on a new model."

Whether or not the new mechanism will operate successfully or indeed whether the construction of the new mechanism will ever be completed, depends upon whether or not the

11 The New Republic, LXXV (July 12, 1933), 219, and (July 26, 1933), 272-273.

12 The Living Age, CCCXLIV (August, 1933), 474-475, and CCCXLV (September, 1933), 5-6.
fanaticism of the leaders and the masses of the party will tolerate the internal and external peace that is so sorely needed if this economic and social experiment is even to have a chance of being put to a thorough test.13

Two late-summer articles sent to The Christian Century from Germany by correspondent Paul Hutchinson alluded to the Nazi government's economic troubles. In both articles he foresaw Hitler's youthful followers—"they are idealists, and most of them are socialists"—causing the downfall of the Nazi dictatorship if economic promises were not fulfilled quickly.14

Other sources of unrest were reported by several journals. The August 23 New Republic correctly surmised that Hitler's middle-class followers unhappily accepted the government's alliance with big business, but they were helpless to do anything about it.15 The November 1933 Living Age was more optimistic. Having armed the "white-collar workers" to help them maintain the status quo, the Nazi leaders now found these forces discontented with the progress of the economic reconstruction.16 The October 11 Nation, too, appeared to rely considerably upon reports of what could well have been exaggerated unrest caused by economic factors. Had not the depressed middle-class seen that Hitler was "working hand in glove with the great industrial and financial in-

13 Calvin B. Hoover, "German Capitalism and the Nazis," Current History, XXXVIII (August, 1933), 534-540.
14 Paul Hutchinson, "Germany Welcomes the Messiah," The Christian Century, L (August 16, 1933), 1031-1032, and "Will Hitler Restore the Hohensollerns?" (September 6, 1933), 1104-1105.
15 The New Republic, LXXVI (September 13, 1933), 113.
16 The Living Age, CCCXLV (November, 1933), 189-191.
terests"? asked this journal. What could be done about the situation The Nation did not disclose, but "until Hitler and his ideas are driven out, what hope can there be for the German people?" 17

Many of Hitler's most ardent supporters had been shaken by the Fuehrer's announcement of the end of all except political innovations in July 1933, and that there would be no embarking upon untested economic experiments. The March 17, 1933 appointment of Hjalmar Schacht (the significance of which escaped the attention of the journals), as president of the Reichsbank, one of the key posts in the German economic system, further indicated Hitler's conservative fiscal orientation, for Schacht was a friend of German big business and a traditional, conservative economist.

Grumbling was soon heard within the ranks of the Nazi para-military units, and this became louder when Hitler and the leader of the S. A. Ernst Roehm, found themselves at odds on the future function of the storm troopers in relation to the German army. By the late fall of 1933, few American journals had taken time to thoroughly analyze Hitler's more conservative economic principles and the resultant threat to the cohesiveness of the Nazi Party. Nevertheless, talk of intra-Party discord grew more pronounced in the American periodicals during the winter months of 1933-1934.

In a brief editorial entitled "The Nazis Continue Their

17 The Nation, CXXXVII (October 11, 1933), 397.
Retreat from Socialism," The Christian Century of November 1, 1933 called its readers' attention to the trend of Hitler's economic strategy. Adolf Hitler had greatly complicated the recovery program, observed Lewis Einstein in the December 1933 North American Review. "The test of the Nazi movement, as Hitler himself avows, lies notoriously in its ability to bring about the prosperity of the Reich and of this there is yet no real sign." Einstein estimated that if the German recovery program proved to be slower in the economic sphere than in other areas, not even the Nazi storm troopers could keep the people from revolting.

The German economy was briefly discussed in two Foreign Affairs articles in the April 1934 issue, one by the German Heinrich Mann and the other by Leon Trotsky, both of whom spoke of the impotence of the National Socialist government in this area. Mann summed up the situation with this statement:

Controlled economy has proved to be too difficult a task for the Hitler dictatorship. It has gone back on its program of economic socialization, and its Four Year Plan remains only a promise. Despite subterfuges, there can no longer be doubt that nothing has been done for the middle classes. The only beneficiaries of the present gamble with the destinies of Germany, besides the members of the National Socialist Party, are the big industrialists, who gain by the strangling of the labor unions and who scent fresh profits in armaments. American democracy has established a greater degree of controlled economy than the boasted totalitätstaat, which actually has reverted to a laissez-faire economy of eighty years ago.

18 The Christian Century, L (November 1, 1933), 1357.
20 Heinrich Mann, "Dictatorship of the Mind," Foreign Affairs, XII (April, 1934), 418-425; Mann was a German novelist; and Leon Trotsky, "Nationalism and Economic Life," 395-402.
Noting the Fascists' policy of attempting to isolate their states from the world economy, Trotsky defined Fascism's "historic mission": "to reduce to an absurdity the theory and practice of the economic impasse."

December 12, 1933 was the date when the various trade union organizations, under National Socialist supervision since May 1933, were officially abolished, and the National Socialist Labor Front began operation. At least as far as the December 13 New Republic was concerned, it took no imagination to visualize how the Nazis, now so closely tied with capitalism and big business, would fix wages and working conditions. 21 Professor Carl J. Friedrich, writing in the November 23, 1933 Christian Register called the repression of the unions one step in the "leveling of the masses" as defined by the concept of the "Total State." 22

Still another change in the National Socialists' labor policy was enunciated on January 20, 1934: the so-called Charter of Labor, to take effect on May 1, 1934. After that day the Nazi Labor Front would consist of all persons connected with industrial work, whether employer or employee. There would be no more shop councils, nor would strikes, lockouts or work stoppages be permitted. And the settlement of all labor disputes was to be in the hands of the employers. The announcement of this new German

21 The New Republic, LXXVII (December 13, 1933), 115.
labor code did not surprise anyone, said The Nation on January 31, 1934, but the harshness of the terms did. The totalitarian state had demolished many years of hard work by the trade unions in one sweeping blow. The new arrangement "saddles upon the German worker all the hardships which his Russian colleague has been enduring, without giving him or even promising him any of the benefits of socialism." Writing in the same issue of the journal, Ludwig Lore thought that the Nazi leaders had spent many hours considering the future of the unions. Only after the November national election and plebiscite was the final decision made; and then the regime "relieved itself of all moral responsibility toward the working class." 23 Hitler had shown more daring in abolishing the trade unions than Mussolini had in eleven years of his dictatorship, reported the January 31, 1934 New Republic. 24

The Literary Digest for January 27 cited comments which called Hitler's seizure of the unions his "greatest revolutionary feat." However, at a closer look it was actually a reactionary maneuver rather than a revolutionary one. Everything gained by labor since 1918 had been wiped out. 25 This latest endeavor could very well be the last by Hitler, wrote the January 25 Presbyterian Advance, which now looked for an aroused working class

25 The Literary Digest, CXVII (January 27, 1934), 16.
to mount an attack upon the government as it had successfully done in the past. But history was not to be repeated.

No matter what Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, the often-called Nazi "financial wizard," did, the German economy failed to improve, said the April 11, 1934 Nation. A reduction in foreign debt was his latest project; however, it was expected that he would meet with foreign disapproval. Few, The Nation wrote, considered serious his threats to establish autarchy (economic self-sufficiency) or to boycott foreign merchandise. The regime could little tolerate a lowering of the standard of living at this time. The May 4 Commonweal reflected that "Herr Schacht is going about with a hat maneuvering for credits which no outsider in his right mind would dream of extending."

A slightly different story of German economic conditions was related by the moderately conservative editors of The Living Age in March and April 1934. An increase in employment was noted, but to accomplish this the working week and wages had to be reduced. Moreover, "the flight of 60,000 Jews and political refugees and the law forbidding the employment of married women

26 The Presbyterian Advance, XLVIII (January 25, 1934), 4.

27 The American journal response to the workers' anti-Nazi activities is found in the two preceding chapters of this dissertation.

28 The Nation, CXXXVIII (April 11, 1934), 401.

29 The Commonweal, XX (May 4, 1934), 3.

30 The Living Age, CCCXLVI (March, 1934), 4-5, and (April, 1934), 98.
whose husbands are working have probably removed about 250,000 job holders." Nevertheless, the large corporations gave evidence of improving their financial positions.

Economic considerations, no doubt, contributed to the slackening of the Hitler government's anti-Semitism, in the thinking of both the April 11 Christian Century and America for April 7. They suggested that the international Jewish-led boycott of German goods was beginning to sober the minds of the Fascist leaders.

The Nation of May 23 pointed out that "while the working people are again having to tighten their belts, they take a certain satisfaction in seeing that the plight of the more prosperous classes is relatively worse than their own." No longer was the German government's major worry the workers, reported the same week's New Republic. The greatest threat to the security of the state was from the "deluded and disappointed middle class and the proletarian elements in the storm troopers," who had not seen any real economic progress.

During the month of June 1934, reports alluding to Nazi Germany's economic troubles appeared once more. The June 13 New Republic expected "a new flood of terrorism" as a result of the

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31 The Christian Century, LI (April 11, 1934), 484, and America, L (April 7, 1934), 651.
32 The Nation, CXXXVIII (May 23, 1934), 579.
33 The New Republic, LXXIX (May 23, 1934), 30.
tensions caused by the economic problems. While George Gerhard wrote in the July 1934 North American Review that Nazi Germany had failed in a drive for self-sufficiency, a goal which would, in fact, long remain a Nazi economic dream, the monthly Living Age for July more accurately pointed out that trade was gradually increasing and business activity was "on the upgrade."

The June 30 Literary Digest commented that the Nazi officials were acting "somewhat hysterically" with respect to the economic difficulties. Like the Digest, Gerhard Hirschfield, writing in the June 30 America, forecast that Schacht was on the verge of imposing a moratorium upon foreign debts and severely reducing the foreign exchange available for the purchase of foreign goods. (Schacht actually did this on July 1.) Hirschfield added this judgment:

The Nazis are rapidly drifting away from the foundations which built the Reich of 1871. They are ignoring the tomes of German history written between then and 1918. Their Third Reich is built with soundproof walls and big hedges around it so no one may peek in from the outside, and no sound may enter. The political dogma of racial superiority must work out as a theory of isolation. It is an economic fallacy in a predominantly manufacturing country.

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34 Ibid., (June 13, 1934), 112.
36 The Living Age, CCCLVI (July, 1934), 380.
37 The Literary Digest, CXVII (June 30, 1934), 15.
38 Gerhard Hirschfield, "Behind the German Default," America, LI (June 30, 1934), 273-275.
But *The Nation* warned that: "The Nazi regime has reserves that will permit it to continue for many months without a collapse of its national economy." Nevertheless, a few weeks later in *The Literary Digest*, Harry Lee Franklin pointed to Nazi Germany's "economic plight," which he attributed to the lack of foreign trade.  

With the appointment of Dr. Hjalmar Schacht to succeed Kurt Schmitt as the Minister of Economics in the Hitler government on August 2, 1934, the Nazi leadership indicated its concern with the rate of domestic economic recovery. Too, only a month before Schacht's selection, Hitler had had to eliminate many of his left-wing followers in the Roehm Purge in part because of their demands for economic radicalism.

Even with the promotion of Schacht, the August 15 New Republic believed the German economic outlook to be "discouraging." Upon taking up his role in the Hitler administration, Dr. Schacht had reportedly warned that he would either have to extend restrictions of foreign imports or yield to those who desired an inflationary trend. Schacht subsequently announced that "he will give a six months' trial to the Hitler program of reducing imports of raw materials from other countries, depending on German science and chemistry to provide substitutes." "In the final analysis

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39 *The Nation*, CXXXVIII (June 27, 1934), 718-719.

40 Harry Lee Franklin, "Germany's Tobaggoning Trade Balance," *The Literary Digest*, CXVIII (July 21, 1934), 38. Franklin was formerly United States consul in Berlin.
Hitler's tenure of office" would depend upon the success or failure of the new minister, declared this journal. In harmony with the general views of The New Republic was the September 1934 Living Age. It speculated that the Nazi government was playing "its last card" with the appointment of Dr. Schacht.

Just about the time Schacht took charge of the German economy, two feature articles commenting on the overall economic situation were published. In the September 1934 Current History article "The Real Crisis in Germany," Robert Crosier Long warned that the "economic crisis had only begun." Therefore, the Nazi government dealt with the major economic issues "without any guiding principles." The economic troubles were numerous, according to Long's detailed outline, and these included a serious crop failure, rising costs, industrial confusion caused by Nazi bureaucrats, and a serious currency problem which threatened to lead to the depreciation of the German mark and could cause "a national panic." "It is conceivable," advised Long, "that Hitlerism, in spite of its past and probable future successes in suppressing disaffection with rifle bullets, may be brought to an end by unsolved problems of currency, credit, wages, prices and food."

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42 The Living Age, CCCXLVII (September, 1934), 1.

43 Robert Crosier Long, "The Real Crisis in Germany," Current History, XL (September, 1934), 657. Long was the financial correspondent in Berlin for The New York Times as well as a correspondent of the London Economist.
A second article "How Real Is the German Recovery?" by George M. Katona in the October 1934 *Foreign Affairs* featured numerous German graphs and charts to substantiate his theory that the National Socialists, despite their many shortcomings, had remarkably improved German economic conditions between February 1933 and July 1934. Unemployment had decreased, industrial production improved and foreign trade rallied. Yet, Katona suggested after careful scrutiny that the Nazi figures revealed "that the actual extent of German recovery was considerably smaller" than indicated by the published data. "Further, the recovery was achieved at the cost of enormous sacrifices, and these sacrifices seriously depleted Germany's strength."\(^{44}\)

Dr. Schacht was soon in the news headlines. In a front-page interview in the Sunday, August 26, 1934 *New York Times*, the new "economic dictator" of the Reich announced that Germany had no money to pay for the coupons on the Dawes or Young Plan bonds or for the other foreign debts. Schacht intimated that American imports would be curtailed if the United States did not buy more German goods. Earlier, on July 1, Schacht, then still only the president of the Reichsbank, declared a complete transfer moratorium for the foreign debt—a condition which would quickly become permanent. Nazi Germany, exercising currency control, refused to repay its creditors in foreign money, which was to be

\(^{44}\) George M. Katona, "How Real Is the German Recovery?" *Foreign Affairs*, XIII (October, 1934), 26-44. Katona was an Hungarian economist.
used instead to buy raw materials needed for the industries contributing to the military buildup. The New Republic of September 5 appeared to be startled by Schacht's tactics. "What we still fail to understand is this attitude on the part of the Reich's outstanding financier at a moment when America's foremost bankers are considering the flotation of a tremendous loan to put the Reich back on its feet." "Is it the madness of a nation hell-bent on its own destruction?" asked The New Republic. 45

Oswald Garrison Villard asked no such questions in the September 19 Nation: he expressed the opinion that the untrustworthy Schacht's actions should influence more people "to utilize any peaceful weapon" to bring down the Hitler government. Villard further commented:

I have never believed in Schacht, even when he properly pleaded that Germany be freed from the economic fetters of the Treaty of Versailles. It is my belief that if a Communist government were to arrive in Berlin and were to ask him to continue to head the Reichsbank, he would serve it as loyally as he is serving Hitler, and as he formerly served the republic....46

In the article "German Repudiation Policy" for the October 1934 Current History, Allan Nevins likewise spoke critically of Schacht. This "once fairly moderate and sensible" man had become the "notorious political weathercock" for the Nazi dictatorship and a violent nationalist. Schacht now stood as the "mouthpiece for the dishonest Nazi group which regards all debts as

45The New Republic, LXXX (September 5, 1934), 86.
'tribute' and means to slough them off." The National Socialists had grown indifferent to world opinion, believed Nevins.47

Schacht made an effort to placate American public opinion by publishing a short article in Foreign Affairs defending his policies and citing Germany's willingness to discipline herself. The debt problem had long obstructed German economic recovery, but Schacht reassured his readers that Germany would eventually repay her debts, and he hoped that the United States would see fit to trade more with Germany. Schacht also revealed aspects of his so-called "New Plan," first promulgated on September 24, 1934, which had as its basis the principle of barter. Because of the severe shortage of foreign exchange, Schacht proposed that Germany's purchases abroad be paid for by German products without consideration of prices. Germany's consuming power also received major emphasis, for Schacht wrote that the consumer, not the producer, was "the ruling factor in economic life."48 The German minister's trade program aroused little discussion in the American journals in the months which followed, even though the concept of barter agreements had long been out of fashion in economic circles.

Two authors in the November 1934 North American Review

47 Allan Nevins, "German Repudiation Policy," Current History, XLI (October, 1934), 70-72. Nevins, the noted American historian, was a monthly contributor to this journal.

48 Hjalmar Schacht, "German Trade and German Debts," Foreign Affairs, XIII (October, 1934), 1-5.
inspected Germany's economy, but omitted direct references to the "New Plan." George Gerhard wrote that because of world hostility to National Socialism, Hitler and Schacht could have no other economic program than that of self-sufficiency or autarchy; yet the "Nazis have made headway in the past without the world." Anything could be expected from the National Socialists in the future, advised the author. "Even if every precedent is a warning to Hitler to go slowly, his tremendous hold on the imagination of his people may prove powerful enough to shatter every one of them--even to regain the good will of the world."

Bernard Lande Cohen attempted to answer critics who, emphasizing the Marxian class-struggle, linked Italian and German Fascism with capitalism.

The doctrine that Fascism is a result of capitalism is not only wrong as a theory, but leads to practical conclusions which are both wrong and dangerous. If capitalism is really the cause of Fascism it follows that the world could only be saved by destroying the capitalist class. However, there is reason to believe that the opposite would be the result, that an uprising which sought the ruin of any important element of the population would be the surest prelude to a Fascist government.

In addition, Cohen remarked: "To cope effectively with the Fascist menace, it is necessary to abandon the emphasis upon class and to concentrate rather upon those individuals who are really behind the movement."

In the area of economics, Cohen felt that Fascism had

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little to offer but "pompous phraseology," particularly with regard to its economic panacea—the corporative state. "In principle, the corporative state is an attempt to recast the guild system of the Middle Ages."

The December 19 New Republic noted Schacht's dismissal of undersecretary to the Minister of Economics, "the father of the confused Nazi economics," Gottfried Feder, which it interpreted as clear proof that now "no socialistic nonsense will be tolerated" in the Third Reich. 50

Discussing the activities of Hjalmar Schacht, the editors of The Nation for January 2, 1935 conjectured that the economic czar had made too many enemies in the government and among the great industrialists to stay long in his job. The continuation of economic failures would force the Fuehrer to make a scapegoat out of Schacht in spite of personal feelings to the contrary. Speculating about the future, The Nation said:

Hitler's Germany is facing difficult days. A begging campaign that brought cabinet ministers to the streets with collection boxes has failed to alleviate the sufferings of the middle and lower classes. But so far the Third Reich stands firm. Despite confusion in the government and conflicts of interest among capitalist groups, the industrial and peasant masses stand together. Opposition to the National Socialist regime is only in the first stages of organization. Nevertheless, inner disintegration continues, and the opposition of the masses grows in strength. The millennium which Hitler predicted for his regime will end before many years have passed, and people will realize that it only seemed like a thousand years. 51

50 The New Republic, LXXI (December 19, 1934), 150.
51 The Nation, XL (January 2, 1935), 5.
Quite a different view could be found in an article by Henry Albert Phillips for the January 5, 1935 *Literary Digest*. Phillips contended that the "organized working class" accorded almost "unanimous support" to the Hitler government. Nazi Germany was supposed to be a "new workers' world," where most of the emphasis was on the "social status and welfare of the worker." Adolf Hitler had performed "one of the great coups of opportunity." The German workers, Phillips alleged, had been won over to the Nazis' cause by the call for state unity and the appeal to nationalism.52

One of the most accurate assessments of the German economic situation in early 1935 appeared in a short editorial in the January 9 *New Republic*. This journal suspected "that the Reich will continue to muddle along." The economic collapse, so long predicted, was not going to occur. True, wages had tumbled to below a subsistence level in some areas, but the government had been able to avoid extreme suffering. "It has been able to satisfy the primitive needs of the population."53

Sidney B. Fay's February 1935 *Current History* report, "Germany's Economic Outlook," was also favorable. Upon surveying the various facets of German economic life, Fay concluded that by the end of 1934 the situation "was better than most of her cri-

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tics predicted, and even better than many Germans expected."
"Strict regimentation" appeared to be the key to the government's success.54

Contrary opinions concerning the German economy appeared frequently in the American journals of opinion. During the late winter and early spring months of 1935, several reports, mainly of the editorial variety, continued to picture dire economic conditions in Nazi Germany. Regardless of the optimistic claims of the Hitler government, wage problems and the loss of export trade continued to plague Nazi officials, in the opinion of the February 20 Christian Century. What Germany needed were some economic miracles on the part of Dr. Schacht. Three weeks later in the editorial entitled "The End of National Socialism," the Century's editors expressed the judgment that "a complete change of policy inside of Germany" had nearly been accomplished. Racist theories were soon expected to be abandoned like the once prominent Socialist ideas of the Nazi Party. Dr. Schacht reportedly stood behind the move to halt the repression of the German Jews, in the hope that the world boycott of Germany in international trade would be terminated. For this Protestant periodical, the Nazi revolution had reverted to "an essentially Prussian dictatorship": "What Germany actually is today is such an old-fashioned dictatorship, with the professional army caste maintaining a state whose foreign and economic policies are controlled by big finance." In

concluding, the Christian Century declared: "Few 'revolutions' have so quickly been emptied of their revolutionary content and delivered into the control of the very elements which they were created to destroy." 55

Commenting on a new Nazi decree which allowed Schacht to ask for forced loans, The New Republic for March 6, 1935 considered this action almost desperate. Schacht admitted, said the editors, that he was finding it "almost impossible" to overcome the nation's financial problems. There would have to be at least a ten-year austerity program "to safeguard the existence of the next generation." 56

Paul Crosser's article "The Mystery of Nazi Economics" appeared in the same issue of The New Republic. This report supported the views expressed by the editors. Crosser pointed to Nazi Germany's rapid decline in gold reserves, unfavorable trade balance and increase in indebtedness, none of which he expected could be remedied in the immediate future. While a revival of heavy industry had occurred, the rate of recovery depended on the importation of raw materials. German technology was at work seeking out substitutes for raw materials, but this plan of action could only continue through large investments of capital. "The raw-material supply remains the most vital problem of the whole German economy. Were Germany actually to make herself self-suf-


56 The New Republic, LXXXII (March 6, 1935), 87.
ficient, she would have to cut her production capacity squarely in half."

Problems in agriculture had not been solved, since peasant indebtedness had swollen, and production increases had hardly varied. The real income of all German wage earners had been reduced, because prices for commodities had risen. An estimated 16,600,000 people were required to seek government relief during the winter of 1933-34. Furthermore, the Nazis had juggled the unemployment figures, and approximately 5,000,000 German workers were now out of work. Besides, those 2,000,000 who had been employed since the National Socialists took office received no more salary than the usual relief doles. The "only gainers" in the past two years in Nazi Germany, concluded Crosser, were the armament manufacturers. "The Strengthening of Germany's military forces is the actual basis of the Nazi economic policy."57

Willson Woodside's essay in Current History essentially concurred with Crosser's evaluation: "the Nazis are struggling within an ever tightening ring of economic difficulties."

Schacht's "New Plan," Woodside noted, could not remedy Germany's major economic problems, for the Nazis had only been able to make successful contacts with Latin American countries. "In any case such deals would only be a drop in the bucket. They cannot get around the main truth that Germany's big expert business lies in

57Paul Crosser, "The Mystery of Nazi Economics," ibid., 96-98. Crosser was formerly an economic expert in the German government.
Europe, is made up of steel, machinery and chemicals and therefore depends on the maintenance of a tranquil European atmosphere favorable to new construction." Nonetheless, after considering a number of factors Woodside concluded that Germany's economic future was not at all bleak.

Still the productive equipment of the country is splendid, and the great technical ingenuity and organizing ability of the people and the surging vitality of the youth must in the long run put Germany on her feet again and perhaps once more make her predominant in Central Europe.58

Little comment on economics appeared in the summer 1935 issues of the American journals. More important news from Nazi Germany was arriving, namely the Fascists' clash with the Christian churches and the renewed assault upon the Jews, plus certain international events involving the Reich. That the anti-Christian and anti-Semitic campaigns for 1935 might be tied up with economic conditions received notice in Sidney B. Fay's column for the September Current History and in the August 2 Commonweal.59

The August 7 Nation, in pointing out the manifestations of the so-called economic crisis, noted unrest among workers, small businessmen and housewives. "There are unmistakable signs of disintegration in the National Socialist regime. With the exception of the enormous Nazi bureaucracy there is hardly a group or class

58 William Woodside, "Germany's Shattered Economy," Current History, XLII (April, 1935), 19-24. The author was a member of the engineering department at the University of Toronto; he had spent the past three years teaching and studying in Germany.

in the nation that is satisfied with the present state of affairs." The "window dressing" of the short-lived "moderate" stage of the Nazi dictatorship had been ended by extremists, wrote the August 14 New Republic.

What seemed like a new crisis of serious proportions was developing in Hitler's Reich as a result of the activities of the more radically oriented National Socialists. The more conservative and moderate Nazi enthusiasts led by their spokesman, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, had issued a warning to the Fuehrer that the consequences of the Christian and Jewish persecutions might just turn out to be catastrophic for the economy. Schacht, in fact, had declared in his well-publicized Konigsberg speech of August 18, 1935, that he would hold the Nazi hot-bloods responsible if the financial and economic reconstruction plans collapsed. The Literary Digest found that the first reaction to the Schacht warning in Germany was the increase of violence by the extremists on both right and left. The Nation pointed out that no amount of violence on either side could, however, give Germany what she really needed: raw materials and credits.

Almost nothing more was heard concerning this late summer episode, and, in fact, the topic of economics in Nazi Germany re-

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60 The Nation, CXLII (August 7, 1935), 146.
63 The Nation, CXLII (August 28, 1935), 226.
ceived little notice for the next few months. One major exception was the article "Nazi Economics at Work" by Paul Einsig in the October 1935 Current History. Einsig felt that the Nazis' unorthodox and unscrupulous policies had contributed to an economic recovery trend in Germany. "Much as we may dislike admitting it, economic conditions under the Hitler regime have continued to improve." Public work schemes, rearmament and more artificial means such as the government's forcing employers to hire workers whether they are needed or not have been largely responsible for the recovery. The latter stimulant had surprised many observers by spurring business. A similar report of German economic growth could be found in George M. Katona's short article in the January 1936 Foreign Affairs, but Katona exhibited more caution.

Compulsory loans, national sacrifices, and similar expedients of a dictatorial state may prolong the life of the present economic system; but they will not foster the national recovery which alone would eliminate the necessity of public expenditure.

Whatever decision the German Government may take, Germany is on the verge of a new era. Its essence was clearly stated by a sentence in a recent German article: "The time has come when it is no longer the State that must help business, but it is business that must help the State."65

Writing in the September 25, 1935 New Republic, Paul Crosier called attention to the fact that forced loans had substantially aided the government's financing of the armament program.

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65 George M. Katona, "The 'Miracle' of German Recovery," Foreign Affairs, XIV (January, 1936), 348-350.
But a day of reckoning is coming. Sooner or later, the German people will discover that they have been deprived of many of their financial resources and that this money has been spent for armaments that can never return either interest or profits to them, even in case of war.66

Due to mainly economic shortcomings "Hitler's grip on Germany may be approaching its end," wrote The New Republic on December 11, 1935, even though the Fuhrer had recently "proclaimed the material and financial self-sufficiency of Germany." Citing Schacht as a critic of the Nazi extremist policies, The New Republic hazarded the guess that opposition was mounting within German economic circles. "What nationalist Germany vitally needs today is world credit and a more favorable world opinion while she completes her rearmament program." If the presence of Hitler hindered fulfillment, "the ruling interests that made it possible for him to come to power may see to his removal."67

If one accepted the prophecy that Hitler's government would stand or fall depending upon how it dealt with the economic problems, Sidney B. Fay in the January 1936 Current History believed the German outlook to be optimistic even though "German foreign credit is at a low ebb." Schacht's drastic measures to reduce exports had apparently not greatly interfered with Germany's rearmament program nor seriously crippled other industries. Besides, self-sufficiency had almost been achieved in certain

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areas like foodstuffs. 68

Several shorter articles disagreed with Fay's assessment. The German masses, among them "good party men," were stirring with resentment because of shortages of "necessary foodstuffs," while the dictatorship continued to demand more sacrifices in order to supply the Reichswehr's arms requirements, wrote A. S. Eker, the German correspondent to The Christian Century, in the January 29, 1936 issue. 69 Food shortages were so serious that food cards were issued on January 1, 1936, reported the January 11 Literary Digest. 70 The February Living Age related that some of the National Socialist faithful were trying to oust the economic dictator, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht, "the real 'man behind Hitler,'" whose policies had brought a steady price rise. 71 Never occupying a great deal of space in the American journals of opinion, the analysis of German economic problems now slipped again into the background for over three months.

By the late spring of 1936, Dr. Schacht was repeatedly warning the Nazi leaders that unless the remilitarization program was slowed down, the German nation would be confronted with an economic calamity. Not being a National Socialist Party member,

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69 A. S. Eker, "Correspondence from Germany: Discontent Grows Within Germany," The Christian Century, LIII (January 29, 1936), 197-198.

70 The Literary Digest, CXXI (January 11, 1936), 15.

71 The Living Age, CCCXLIX (February, 1936), 473.
Sohaoht was also having difficulties in forcing Nazi officials to follow his directives especially with regard to exchange control. Hopeful of influencing Hitler and the more responsible National Socialists to recognize economic realities, Schacht recommended that the Fuehrer appoint Hermann Goering as comptroller of raw materials and foreign exchange.

The early response of the American journals completely misinterpreted the behind-the-scenes maneuvering in the Hitler administration. The May 6 Nation wrote that Schacht had been superseded by Goering, who probably had the position forced on him "as a means of offsetting the growing discontent with Schacht's deflationary program."72 The May 9 Literary Digest erroneously thought that the rift within the National Socialist Party over Schacht's policies had become so serious that Hitler had been forced to relieve him of his duties as economic dictators. General Goering, whom the Digest referred to as a conservative Nazi thinking along the same lines economically as Schacht, indicated his intention to follow the program of his predecessor.73

The "noun in national socialism" had, at last, the opportunity to be emphasized, wrote The Christian Century in the May 13 editorial entitled "Goering Becomes Economic Dictator of the Reich." The ouster of Schacht, which was still actually many months away, meant to this Protestant weekly a turn to the more

72 The Nation, CXLII (May 6, 1936), 565.
73 The Literary Digest, CXXI (May 9, 1936), 14.
left-wing Nazi economic strategy. Goering's position in the new order was by no means certain asserted this journal, unless he was supposed to serve as a transition stage. The reported dismissal of Schacht was a "sudden jolt," wrote the June Living Age, and it marked a triumph for those who wanted an inflationary boom. In subsequent weeks little effort was made by the journals to explain away their mistaken assessment of Goering's appointment. Nor did they seem to recognize that their views concerning Schacht's position were erroneous.

Once again during the summer of 1936, the summer for the Olympic games in Berlin, American journals abstained from comprehensive studies of German economics. Only the editors of the monthly Living Age offered their readers some interesting judgments. They seemed cheered by the news from Germany that the Nazis faced persisting economic trials. In June the Living Age believed that the lack of raw materials was causing delays in the rearming of the Nazi war machine. Some progress was being made in the development of synthetic products, but "in the event of war a few successful air-raids could put Germany's source of substitute materials out of business and cripple the nation more in a week than the submarine campaign crippled England in a year."

According to the September Living Age, a very emotional economic question was the continued presence of many giant Junker estates.

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74 The Christian Century, LIII (May 13, 1936), 14.
75 The Living Age, CCCL (June, 1936), 285.
Stirred by the protests of the masses, the German government was making plans to break them up, but few observers in the Third Reich expected any real success against such vested interests.76

On September 7, 1936, Hitler announced at Nuremberg the start of a Four Year Plan with Goering at the helm of the organization. The new program, whose main object was to prepare the war mobilization of all the resources of the German economy, had been thoroughly discussed for several weeks in the Nazi inner councils, but without the advice of Hjalmar Schacht. From this point on, all of Germany's resources were to be mobilized to attain greater self-sufficiency. The 1936 plan meant the end of caution or moderation in economic policies, and it turned out to be the beginning of the end of Schacht as a key figure in the Nazi state. Although no worthwhile comment appeared in the American periodicals at the time the Four Year Plan was announced, journalists would occasionally note the progress of the program during the next three years.

While Oswald Garrison Villard warned in the October 3, 1936 Nation that foreign observers should not underestimate the hold which the German Fuehrer had over his people, several editorials in subsequent weeks predicted the end of the dictatorship because of economic shortcomings including the early failure to meet the agricultural quotas of the Four Year Plan. One can determine from the title of the December 30 New Republic editor-

76 Ibid., and CCCLI (September, 1936), 5.
rial: "Nazi Morale Begins to Crack," that in some journalistic circles hope ran high for the immediate economic collapse of Germany.77

Other remarks concerning Germany's dark economic future were written by Willson Woodside in the article "Germany's Hidden Crisis" for the February 1937 Harper's Magazine. Woodside suggested that the western European statesmen, utilizing every available diplomatic trick, could keep Nazi Germany isolated for the next year, while economic decay quietly weakened the state's foundation. The author considered economics to be the dictatorship's weakest link, for he doubted that autarchy could ever be realized, particularly in food production. "The democracies—and this is too often forgotten—have the power of money on their side in this game of peace or war."78 It was plain to see that German economic issues were being judged more and more according to political criteria.

Writing in The Atlantic Monthly for February 1937, Henry C. Wolfe wondered how long the Nazis could go on defying "inexorable economic laws" in their drive to rearm the country at the expense of domestic needs. War had become the "national industry

77Oswald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Men," The Nation, CXLIII (October 3, 1936), 395; The Nation, CXLIII (December 19, 1936), 719; The New Republic, LXXXIX (December 30, 1936), 257-258; and The Living Age, CCCL (January, 1937), 378.

of Hitler's Germany. Alexander Vidakovic told the readers of The Nation that Germany was rapidly running out of ways to make ends meet. Unless the Nazis curtailed their rearmament program, Vidakovic foresaw a period of widespread inflation. Germany continued to get food and raw materials from foreign sources, but funds were almost depleted. The author described the German situation as "economic Bedlam," yet he could not fail to admire "the financial wizardry of Schacht." In conclusion, Vidakovic suggested "two possible solutions" for the German economic impasse.

One is that Germany receive back its colonies or be given easy access to raw materials. This, of course, could be contemplated only under a stipulation that the raw materials were not acquired simply as a means to further armament. The other would require a complete reversal of the present armaments policy and a return of finance, industry, and labor, through a series of painful adjustments, to normal productive activities. Such a reversal of policy would be tantamount to abandoning the tenets of the Nazi philosophy. If neither of these methods is tried, the result must be collapse or explosion.

Vidakovic's mention of colonies was not accidental. On January 30, 1937, in a major address, Hitler, disregarding his own views expressed in Mein Kampf, called for the return of the pre-war German colonies. Hitler was eloquently seconded by Hjalmar Schacht in an article entitled "Germany's Colonial Demands" for Foreign Affairs of January 1937. Schacht appealed to America


80 Alexander Vidakovic, "Germany's Economic Impasse: How Hitler Pays His Arms Bill," The Nation, CXIV (January 30, 1937), 125-126, and "Germany's Economic Impasse: Raw Materials and Food," (February 6, 1937), 153-154. The author was the London correspondent of Politka, leading journal of Belgrade, Yugoslavia.
not to remain indifferent to Germany's needs, and the greatest need was raw materials. Because of the decline in international commercial relations, colonies would be the solution. "It is simply and solely a problem of economic existence. Precisely for that reason the future of European peace depends upon it."  

Germany's demand for colonies, raw materials and credits was actually not going to help the Reich extract itself from the economic muddle brought on by mobilizing the entire nation on a war basis through the Four Year Plan, in the estimation of The Literary Digest. Foreign credits would be very difficult to obtain because of Germany's rather arbitrary treatment of former creditors. Furthermore, this weekly also observed that Germany's importation of raw materials in 1936 only matched the total of 1929; moreover, Germany's pre-war colonial history clearly indicated that almost nothing had been gained by imperialistic ventures. The best advice that "foreign critics" could offer Nazi Germany was that it should try to balance its imports in order to give the population both "consumption and production goods."  

Other important American weekly treated Hitler's call for colonies extremely superficially, thereby giving the appearance that they did not consider serious the Fuehrer's demands.

Willson Woodside responded to the colony issue but not until the April 1938 issue of Harper's Magazine. By the time of


82 The Literary Digest, CXXXII (February 27, 1937), 36-37.
this article, the subject was practically forgotten in the light of other international events involving Nazi Germany. Reviewing the history of Germany's earlier colonial failures, Woodside ridiculed the Nazis' recent propaganda effort. He seemed to have astutely analyzed the reasons behind Hitler's campaign for overseas territories.

Whether Hitler sincerely wants colonies has little to do with the matter. The cry is too useful for excusing food shortages, for justifying the sacrifices demanded for the substitute stuff of the Four Year Plan, for raking the British conscience, and ranting about Germany's struggle for "equality." It might be said that if a colonial question didn't exist Hitler would be driven to invent one.83

In the summer of 1937, Professor Otto Jellinek, an active participant in Germany's economic experiments, wrote enthusiastically in *The Atlantic Monthly* about the endeavors of the Four Year Plan. German science received great praise for its efforts in the search for substitutes, and Jellinek also commended the German people for their willingness to sacrifice.

Beyond a doubt the experiences that Germany accumulates while carrying out her Four-Year Plan will be of advantage when the problem of careful utilization of raw materials assumes importance in other lands as well. The moral buoyancy behind the Four-Year Plan is easy to understand if one considers that the German people are continuing in their great scientific and technical tradition, finding opportunity to demonstrate their love of peace by acting in the spirit of Frederick the Great, who once said that he who wrests increased fruits from the earth does more for his native land than he who conquers a new province.84

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On the other hand, Ludwig Lore, writing in a summer issue of The Nation, declared that a "cloak of darkness" had been spread over German economic conditions. Nevertheless, he speculated that the Nazi "war economy" would eventually lead to the Third Reich's demise.85

An author identified only by the letter "V" informed the readers of the July 1937 Foreign Affairs about "The Destruction of Capitalism in Germany." From all apparent observations, he ascertained that conventional capitalism no longer existed in Nazi Germany. Total control had taken care of that situation. Private property had ceased "to be more than a mere legal form" which had "almost lost its content." German industrialists, workers, peasants and tradesmen all suffered under similar limitations. The author erroneously considered Germany under a "socialist planned economy," and he hinted that there were many parallels between the Soviet Russian and Nazi German economic theories. He further argued that the "Weimar democracy" had seriously weakened capitalism in that it brought a number of major industries under government control; however, he also pointed out that "the German conception of capitalism was always essentially different from the Anglo-Saxon, because it was developed under an entirely different conception of state and government."86

85 Ludwig Lore, "Will Europe Go to War," Part II. The Nation, CXLV (July 31, 1937), 127-129.

86 "V," "The Destruction of Capitalism in Germany," Foreign Affairs, XV (July, 1937), 595-607. Almost the same argument, point by point, could be found in Frank C. Hanighen,
In Germany during 1937, Dr. Schacht found it increasingly
difficult to work with General Goering on economic problems.
Sharing control over Germany's economic recovery was not to
Schacht's liking, especially since Goering had gradually gained
Hitler's complete confidence. Dr. Schacht took pride in the fact
that he had gradually increased Germany's export trade, only to
see this policy upset by the Four Year Plan. Finally, in August
of 1937, Schacht demanded that the Fuehrer make a choice between
Schacht's or Goering's fiscal plans, and when Hitler hesitated,
Schacht left his ministerial post on September 5 with his resign-
ation finally being accepted on November 26. However, Schacht
remained head of the Reichsbank until January 20, 1939.

John C. DeWilde, whose article "Dr. Schacht and Germany's
Future" appeared in The Nation for October 16, 1937, called atten-
tion to the rumors that Schacht had resigned his ministerial po-
sition, but "prophecies of his departure have been as numerous
and erroneous as predictions of imminent economic and financial
collapse in Germany." Nonetheless, the Four Year Plan had been
achieving greater success than the outside world originally be-
lieved. DeWilde speculated that if Schacht remained in the gov-
ernment, the reason could be the regime's desire to maintain a
"good front." 87

"Brown Bolshevism," The Atlantic Monthly, CLXIII (April, 1939),
478-485.

87 John C. DeWilde, "Dr. Schacht and Germany's Future,"
The Nation, CXLV (October 16, 1937), 402. The author was a re-
search associate of the Foreign Policy Association.
Lester Velie, writing in the October 16 *Digest*, surmised that Schacht's fall from power marked the beginning of the end for Nazi Germany. Until then the impending crisis had been forestalled by Schacht's maneuverings, but presently it seemed to Velie that Germany's financial situation was "reminiscent of that dark moment in November, 1923." The *Nation* verified Schacht's resignation, a foregone conclusion for many months. What the official resignation signified was that the Hitler dictatorship had definitely replaced the notion of international cooperation to remedy the ills of the economy with the theory of autarchy, "with all that such a policy means in the way of rigid state control of business, fever-pitch nationalism, and the craving for territorial expansion." However, the conservative editors of *The Living Age* for December 1937 took special note of the still flourishing system of capitalism in Nazi Germany.

For Guenter Reimann, writing in the November 24, 1937 *New Republic*, the resignation of Schacht "does not mean any decisive change in economic policy. Nor does it mean a victory of the Nazi Party leaders over the army staff and the banks and trusts, whose representative Schacht has been." Furthermore, it was Reimann's judgment that "to understand clearly the significance of Schacht's resignation, it is necessary to understand the

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88 *Lester Velie, "Debt Doctor," The Digest, I* (October 16, 1937), 20-21. Velie was the associate editor of the *Journal of Commerce*.

89 *The Nation, CXLIV* (November 6, 1937), 490.

90 *The Living Age, CCCLIII* (December, 1937), 285.
role of the army and the big finance capitalists, and their relation to the NSDAP in the Third Reich." In this 1937 article, Reimann still considered the army to be a powerful, semi-independent force, outside the scope of Nazi politics: "Although the German army cannot stand 'above parties' in the one-party state, and is part of the fascist state, there is a clear division of labor between the army and the armed forces of the Nazis." Besides, the Reichswehr leaders held a top policy-decision position in the government as long as the rearmament program had priority; they could, and did, interfere in the economic and fiscal area. The army high command had thrown its support behind Hjalmar Schacht because he showed promise of attaining the credits needed for the arms buildup. His lack of success had been a great blow to the army's hopes to outrun other powers in the arms race. In sum, the German situation in 1937 looked like this to Reimann:

The gigantic rearmament program has led dangerously close to an exhaustion of economic and financial resources. The shortage of raw materials which must be imported and of foodstuffs seriously handicaps war preparations. The economic strain affects the spirit of the people and threatens depletion of reserves even before the war starts.

Now the military leaders were ready to accept state control of industry, "but only in so far as such an economic policy serves the interests of the army." While the many German economic problems would not be solved in the near future, there was a likelihood that the new economic experiments might well lead to a war of desperation. "Even the army is driven toward an adventurous foreign policy as the only way out."
More than two months later, Reimann made some additional comments concerning Germany's economic development. In this February 9, 1938 *New Republic* article, Reimann observed: "Germany's industrial machine is decaying." Just like the period during the last war, all funds in Germany were being used to buoy up the war industries. What was being ignored were those industries which usually supplied the world market. Likewise the skills and techniques that the German workers had taken years to perfect in developing complicated machines, instruments and advanced technical equipment were being sacrificed to the military buildup. The laborers themselves were unhappy about working conditions and the loss of their unions, and it was evident to Reimann that they could not be trusted in wartime. "Outside Germany, Hitler may appear to be a guarantee of 'social peace.' But paradoxically, many German capitalists would welcome an opportunity to invest their money in countries where there were still strikes organized by legal trade unions."  

*Harper's Magazine* in March 1938 treated the particular problem of Germany's economic condition in relationship to the world economy. Elmer Davis discussed the efforts being made to improve international trade conditions. Concessions by individual states would naturally hurt some domestic industries, but the creation of an international economy would cost far less than

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warfare. Any arrangement, however, could only be temporary unless the Fascist states showed a willingness to cooperate. Fifteen years before, Davis believed, cooperation would have been possible. But now Fascism and Nazism had "become religions, ends in themselves" and most difficult to deal with on a *quid pro quo* basis.

With ordinary governments, more or less responsive to the needs of their constituents, you can come to terms. But no Fascist state can limit its action by international agreement, except temporarily as a matter of tactics; its paramount needs to which it has forced the individual to submit cannot be subordinated in turn to foreign interests.92

Whatever journals commented on German economic policies after mid-1938 almost always did so in terms of their relations to Germany's potential for war, which by now seemed close at hand.93 Thus Willson Woodside, the editors of *The Nation*, Peter F. Drucker, Graham D. Hutton, Adolf Sturmthal, Judith Gruenfeld

92Elmer Davis, "We Lose the Next War," Harper's Magazine, XVII (March, 1938), 347-348. Davis was a noted journalist, author and radio commentator.

93Willson Woodside, "What Would Germany Fight With?" Harper's Magazine, CXXXVII (September, 1938), 426-432; The Nation, CXLVII (December 24, 1938), 681, and CXLVIII (January 28, 1934), 108; Peter F. Drucker, "How Nazi Economics Works," The New Republic, XCIX (March 29, 1939), 211-213; Graham D. Hutton, "German Economics Tension: Causes and Results," *Foreign Affairs*, XVII (April, 1939), 525-537; Hutton was the author of several books on international affairs and the assistant editor of the London Economist; Adolf Sturmthal, "The End of Hitler's Many Miracles," The Nation, CXLVIII (April 22, 1939), 460-462; Sturmthal was for many years head of the research and publication department of the Labor and Socialist International; Judith Gruenfeld, "Why Hitler Must Bluff: Exhausted Nazi Labor," The Nation, CXLIX (July 8, 1939), 36-38; and Louis F. Gittler, "Why Hitler Must Bluff: No Food for War," The Nation, CXLIX (July 8, 1939), 38-41.
and Louis F. Gittler all estimated that Germany did not possess the various resources needed to fight a large-scale war and simultaneously to feed her people. Just before the Munich crisis broke in 1938, Woodside, writing for Harper's Magazine, alone suspected that the Nazi leaders may well have worked out alternatives for getting needed supplies in case of war. There might be secret supplies stored away or secret caches of gold and foreign exchange to be used in trade with neutral states. The Nazis might also have planned "lightening moves" at the outset of the war in order to seize the source of needed materials from neighboring countries.

Woodside astutely warned that "Germany might be ready to go to war even if it did not look like it was economically prepared to do so," while Graham D. Hutton advised the readers of Foreign Affairs in the spring of 1939 that "financial considerations...never stopped a country from going to war." The Nation's editors during the winter of 1938-1939 wondered whether the National Socialists would dare take the chance of another foreign adventure until economic ills were somehow relieved—and this relief was nowhere in sight. For the moment, they did not consider the possibility of the Nazis' directing attention from domestic problems by new surprises in international relations. Alluding to the annexation of both Austria and Czechoslovakia, Adolf Sturmtal declared without real proof in his Nation article that "experience" had proved to the Germans that "the Nazi policy of conquest only makes the country economically poorer." On the other
hand, economist Peter F. Drucker made this shrewd prediction.

An export drive, even if it is fully successful, can never solve the real difficulty: the enforced reduction of domestic consumption which would only be accelerated by an increase in exports. Hitler's "export at all costs" is merely a temporary expedient; his real aim must be the totalitarian penetration of raw-material-supplying countries. For there is only one lasting solution to the import problem under "Wehrwirtschaft": the formation of a self-sufficient economic area organized on totalitarian, political, social and economic lines. The Third Reich has to conquer or perish.

The effects on German morale of the war-oriented economy and of the reported food shortages likewise stimulated some response.94 A general view indicated that most Germans seemed unhappy under the present economic policies. Two writers, Willson Woodside and Louis F. Gittler perceived a similarity between wartime and contemporary Germany.

The German laboring man continued to experience numerous hardships.95 Writing in the January 25, 1939 New Republic, Guenther Reimann suggested that the Nazi-sponsored Labor Front had "failed in its promise to create an ideal 'work community' of social peace and happy collaboration of all classes." Neither worker nor industrialist had discovered contentment.


95 Cf. the articles by Reimann in The New Republic, Feiler and Gruenfeld cited in the previous note.
The real picture of industrial relations does not conform to that portrayed by Nazi propagandists. There is still strife between capital and labor. The troubles of management have not been abolished by the abolition of trade unions. Scarcity of raw materials, the use of expensive and inferior substitutes and increased taxation have added greatly to the costs of production. A corresponding rise of prices is forbidden. Most industrialists seek to maintain profits at the expense of labor, to reduce production costs by wage cuts and the speed up.

Arthur Feiler reviewed the history of the German laboring man and labor unions during the twentieth century in the February 1939 Survey Graphic. In comparing the Nazi Labor Front with the older workers' associations, he found that the former came out second best. Feiler's statement: "The workers are little better than slaves in the drive for rearmament," best summarizes his criticism of the Nazi organization. He also expressed sympathy for the workers themselves—"browbeaten into despairing submission, shorn of hope by the destruction of freedom." Writing for The Nation in the summer of 1939, Judith Gruenfeld shared the same opinions as Feiler. She noted "labor's increasing disability and exhaustion."

The attitudes of German business men were also examined.\footnote{Guenter Reimann, "Doing Business in Germany," Harper's Magazine, CLXXVIII (March, 1939), 373-381, and Peter F. Drucker, "How Nazi Economics Works," The New Republic, XCVII (March 29, 1939), 211-213.} Guenter Reimann concluded in his March 1939 Harper's Magazine article "Doing Business in Germany" that free enterprise was just about dead in the Third Reich.

Under this new order the whole form of business, its accent, its risks, have been changed. To-day the main
thing is not so much to buy cheaply, gauge the right production, and sell well. The most important thing is to win and retain the favor of the local Party chieftains and the State bureaucrats who control your line of business, to secure State orders, State permits for raw materials or foreign currency, and State authorization of a selling price which will allow you to make a profit. Businessmen who have been able to adapt themselves to this far-reaching change have survived. Others who could not do so, or not in time, have gone under. Only those engaged in the armaments traffic or enjoying very special Party protection have prospered.

While the small businessmen, once Hitler's most devoted disciples, were having the hardest time adjusting to the Nazi regulations, "the big industrialists, and the big agrarians as well, are none too pleased with affairs, in spite of their seemingly miraculous financial recovery and their strengthened monopolies." All available capital had been pressed into service for the success of the Four Year Plan. As a result, "the industrialists wonder how long the State will be able to go on financing the armaments boom, and what will happen to them if it collapses." But the business interests have no choice but to obey the directives of the state. In a New Republic article for the spring of 1939, Peter F. Drucker perceived the "managed-consumption" economy of the National Socialists running into grave difficulties with the German upper and middle classes showing definite signs of growing tired of making sacrifices.

The blame for the economic difficulties was placed squarely on the shoulders of the German people by Drucker in a Harper's Magazine article for May 1939. The Germans had made Adolf Hitler a demi-god and had deceived themselves into thinking
that he could bring about economic recovery. Most Germans now readily recognized that the Nazi leader was not able to produce the economic security so desperately needed and desired. Instead of the anticipated economic miracles, National Socialism had imposed not only more hardships but a vicious state discipline.97

After painting a bleak picture of the German economy for the April 1939 *Foreign Affairs*, Graham D. Hutton concluded with this shrewd judgment:

But when all this evidence is reviewed, we still cannot prophesy immediate economic disaster for the Nazi party-state. To begin with, most of us who live in the happy-go-lucky countries would count it an economic disaster to have to live as the German people have now had to live for five years. Secondly, we have learned that men and women will quietly put up with the continuance of conditions against which cattle would probably kick.98

On January 20, 1939, Dr. Schacht was dismissed as the president of the Reichsbank, his last official post in the Nazi government, but since Schacht's influence had all but vanished, his departure was given little more than cursory notice by only three American journals. *The Nation* was "hardly" surprised and pictured Schacht as a useful tool, although only a month earlier this liberal weekly had alluded to Schacht's "comeback" in German economic affairs.99 *The New Republic* interpreted this dismissal


98 Graham D. Hutton, "German Economic Tension: Causes and Results," *Foreign Affairs*, XVII (April, 1939), 525-537.

as the final step in the appropriation of Germany's economic institutions by the "more radical" Nazis, a view which had been expressed many times in the past. No longer would the cautious business sense of the industrialists stand in the way of Germany's buildup for war, declared this liberal weekly, which seldom had words of praise for German businessmen. The New Republic appeared to be insinuating that Schacht might well have served a useful purpose as a modifying force within the Nazi hierarchy. According to Franz Rainer in the next week's issue of this same journal, Schacht had been "the only one of Hitler's civilian officials and advisors who dared tell him the truth—to warn him of the destructive consequences of his political actions."

Schacht's successor, Walter Funk, might succeed better than his predecessor, since he was a member of the Nazi Party; yet, Funk believed in the same economic principles as Schacht, wrote Rainer, and for this reason no fundamental change would occur in German economic policies. Thus the readers of The New Republic had two contradictory views on the significance of Schacht's dismissal and presumably could take their choice!

For The Commonweal Dr. Schacht's ouster was an ominous sign, since this economic expert was the last important link Germany had with foreign banking interests. "Dictatorships tend to

100 The New Republic, XVIII (February 1, 1939), 353, and Franz Rainer, "Hitler Takes a New Pilot," XVIII (February 8, 1939), 12-13. Franz Rainer was the pseudonym of a German exile, who was formerly a leading financial editor in Germany and a friend of both Schacht and Funk.
use politics and force in place of money." 101 Ironically the monthly Living Age reprinted in its February 1939 issue an article written by Schacht himself for a British weekly. In this relatively short essay Schacht enumerated his various successes in the German economy. 102

A survey of the response of the American journals of opinion to the problem of the German economy, makes it altogether clear that this specialized topic received minor and occasional consideration. The periodicals' reaction to specific policies and events was at a minimum, and there was little effort made by any journal to keep its readers informed about the numerous Nazi economic laws and decrees. Seldom did the remarks in the editorials rise above the pedestrian. However, being well aware of the persisting world depression conditions, American journalists conveyed the impression as early as 1934 that economics was the key to the success or the failure of the National Socialist state.

Why or how Nazi Germany kept moving forward toward economic recovery in 1934 and 1935 appeared to mystify most observers, who frequently predicted imminent economic collapse. Erroneous prognostications of this kind continued throughout the period of 1934 to 1939, and were probably due to the lack of suffi-

101 The Commonweal, XXIX (February 3, 1939), 393.

102 Hjalmar Schacht, "I'm No Sorcerer," The Living Age, CCCLV (February, 1939), 524–526. This article was taken from the Sunday Chronicle, a London independent weekly.
cient data on actual German conditions, plus some wishful thinking. Even after Nazi Germany proceeded to score diplomatic victories which brought it close to European hegemony, observers of German economic forces doubted the Reich's economic capacity to conduct a major war. Obviously the resourcefulness of the totalitarian state was underestimated in the economic area.

The most consistent response to the German economic situation appeared in the liberal weeklies, *The Nation* and *The New Republic*; however, the editors of both journals were often guilty of jumping to false and hasty conclusions concerning the reported dire conditions in Nazi Germany. At times their political orientation seemed to influence their judgments, mostly negative, on Nazi economics. Too, a total picture of the economic situation was seldom presented. More penetrating general articles, some more accurate and astute than others, but most, in general, painting a bleak picture of German economic life, appeared in the liberal weeklies and the neutral monthlies. Many of the assessments were made by German exiles, which could account for the distorted view of Germany's economy. On the other hand, some of the most astute analyses were made by Peter F. Drucker, a German economist.

Conservative journals like *The Literary Digest* and *The Living Age* seemed more reserved in their condemnations of Nazi economic tendencies, just as long as a capitalistic facade was retained. Yet, it should be noted that by the middle of 1938, conservative appraisers of the German economic program no longer had vehicles, with the exception of the moderately conservative
Living Age and the extremely conservative American Mercury, the latter rarely interested in economic topics, in which to express their views. The Review of Reviews and The American Review had ceased publication in 1937, and The Literary Digest stopped publishing during 1938 after appearing irregularly for several months.

The various journals exhibited great interest in the activities of Hjalmar Schacht. As long as Schacht remained in the German economic picture, he received extensive coverage and appeared to be the only man responsible for Germany's economic plans. While no American periodical openly sympathized with Schacht's "unorthodox" policies, he still seemed to serve as a symbol for the journalists. For some of the more conservative observers, the German economic czar represented all that was traditional in the capitalistic economic system. For the liberal spokesmen, however, Schacht represented reaction and a man who was willing to ally himself with right-wing fanatics intent upon destroying their nation and upon bringing the world to war.
CHAPTER X

NAZI FOREIGN POLICY TO THE REMILITARIZATION
OF THE RHINELAND

According to National Socialist propaganda literature in 1933, Nazi foreign policy aspired to the rectification of the injustices of the Versailles Treaty, particularly the military clauses and the "war guilt" clause. Mein Kampf and the Twenty-Five Points offered more specific goals in this area, although the journalists' ignorance of these early statements of National Socialist ideology, or at least their failure to refer to them in their writings, led them to consider only the more ephemeral party literature— which of course was threatening enough. At best, it was beyond doubt that established patterns of international relations would be directly challenged and probably upset by the National Socialist government. To the foreign responses to the

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new Germany and to the possible role Nazi policy and attitudes might play, the American journals therefore showed themselves especially alert and sensitive.

Much early journal response, particularly from April to June 1933, discussed Germany's position in the international arena with an eye upon the domestic scene. The fact that Germany was militarily very weak did not deter certain journalists and periodicals from depicting Nazi Germany this early as a threat to the European peace. On two occasions, in long feature articles in the May 1933 Review of Reviews and World's Work and Harper's Magazine for June,² the pessimistic Frank H. Simonds maintained that Adolf Hitler made a European war a distinct possibility, regardless of his achievements in domestic policies. The same concern was expressed by Howard H. Railey in the June Forum. Railey was positive that Hitler's policies would eventually bring on war.³

The early actions of the Nazi government within Germany had sent "a shiver of apprehension throughout the western world," stated the May 10 Christian Century. As far as international opinion was concerned, Hitler had taken Germany back to where it stood in 1917.⁴ "The savagery with which the German rulers are


³Howard H. Railey, "Europe's Sorest Spot," The Forum, LXXXIX (June, 1933), 326.

⁴The Christian Century, L (May 10, 1933), 615-616.
crushing all opposition within the Reich" had convinced Europe that Nazi Germany was "a permanent menace to world peace," opined The New Republic on May 24. By reviving the memories of past military glories, Hitler had created a "Frankenstein's monster," and this liberal weekly feared that the German youth would lead the nation into war in spite of anything the Chancellor could do. Completely underestimating the strength of the German Fuehrer, it believed that a brilliant and strong man was needed to control events, but Hitler was "weak and unscrupulous" and had "been made by events."

Finally, the very fact that everyone believes, and says, that war is coming makes it more likely that war will come. There is something of a general compulsion-neurosis, which causes feverish preparation for war which in turn makes the compulsion ever deeper; and so on.5

Not every observer in the American journals feared war in the event Hitler remained as German Chancellor for any length of time. Reverend Reinhold Niebuhr ruled out any chance of war or even a war-scare in The Christian Century for April 5. A war would mean the end of the Fascist regime in Germany, for this would be the opportunity the Communists and Socialists were waiting for. The fissure in the body politic was too deep to unite even by warfare. "That is why the Fascists will content themselves with making faces at the outside world and will hope that their gestures will not be taken too seriously." However, to take the Nazis lightly would be dangerous, warned Niebuhr.6

5The New Republic, LXXV (May 24, 1933), 29, 31-32.
6Reinhold Niebuhr, "Why German Socialism Crashed," The
An interesting and thought-provoking, but highly questionable assessment of the German scene was written by George Gerhard in The North American Review for June 1933. He began by stating that the National Socialists had carried on "the most reckless display of brutality and partisan fervor of modern times." Yet in reality, for Gerhard at least, Adolf Hitler himself was not a radical at heart, but a politician who wished to avoid the international problems confronting German statesmen since the World War. Thus the Nazis had occupied their time with attacks on their political and racial enemies. Logically, if most of the members of the Nazi Party leadership were extreme nationalists and revolutionaries, Gerhard contended:

They would have taken over the Polish Corridor; they would have introduced compulsory military service, and declared the Austro-German union an established fact; they would have united all Germans, including those living in the "minority-territories"; they would have abrogated the peace treaties of Versailles and St. Germain; they would have occupied the colonies; they would have abolished unearned and effortless income, overthrown interest servitude, confiscated all War profits and shared in the profits of all large department stores, enforced the death penalty of all criminals, usurers and profiteers, and finally, granted freedom of worship for all creeds and denominations.

What Gerhard forgot was the time required for the Hitlerites to become involved with these issues. Nevertheless, he confidently predicted without reservation that the National Socialists would seek international cooperation so that Europe's reconstruction work could soon resume. This last idea harmonized with the opin-

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Christian Century, L (April 5, 1933), 451-453.

7George Gerhard, "German Realities," The North American Review, CCXXXV (June, 1933), 517-522.
ion of Sir Evelyn Wrench, whose article from the conservative British press was reprinted in the June 1933 Living Age.8

Because of Nazi Germany's diplomatic isolation and military impotency, Chancellor Hitler had to tread softly in international affairs until the powers could be convinced of his "peaceful intentions." With this in mind, he addressed the Reichstag on May 17, 1933, with a speech proclaiming his desire for world peace and disarmament. However, at the same time, Hitler demanded equality of treatment in armaments—in essence he was telling the other powers to disarm or be confronted with German rearmament—under threat of Germany's withdrawal from the League of Nations and the Geneva Disarmament Conference. Even though there had been considerable discussion in the journals about the German threat to world peace, only an insignificant response to this speech appeared in the American periodicals.

The Nation declared the Hitler speech mere propaganda. "If the Nazi leaders are pulling in their horns a little, it is because, like all bullies, they are essentially cowards and are cringing beneath the indignation of the world and the economic consequences." It was disconcerting, however, for this journal to find many foreign observers greeting the speech with much praise for its moderation.9 Several weeks later, The Nation's

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8 Sir Evelyn Wrench, "The Hope of Hitlerism," The Living Age, CCCXLIV (June, 1933), 314. This article was from The Spectator, a London conservative weekly.

9 The Nation, CXXXVI (May 31, 1933), 602.
Oswald Garrison Villard added that the damage Hitler had done to his cause and his prestige before May 17 was almost irreparable. Villard tried to minimize the effect of the speech on foreign observers.  

On the other hand, the conservative weekly *Literary Digest* for May 27 told its readers that even the most liberal press had reacted favorably toward Hitler's address. The question now seemed to be could the German Chancellor be trusted? Writing in the September *Sign*, Denis Gwynn was much impressed by Hitler's message of peace, which he curiously enough believed had been taken from notes once prepared by Chancellor Brüning. Nowhere did there seem to be any concern about Hitler's contingent threat in his May 17 address.

In the months following Hitler's Reichstag speech, there occurred no apparent easing of tensions in Europe, even though American journalists differed in what they considered to be Germany's future in world affairs. Correspondent John Gunther, in *The Nation*, found that in areas around Germany National Socialism had created "anger, distrust, disgust, and fear." These sentiments represented more than just a reaction against the Nazis' anti-Semitic and political atrocities. The great fear was of

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11 *The Literary Digest*, CXV (May 27, 1933), 10-11.

12 Denis Gwynn, "Europe's New Perspective," *The Sign*, XII (September, 1933), 74.
another war perpetrated by the revived German nationalism. As a result Hitler had not been able to secure the friendship of other European states, not even Italy.13

Ludwig Lewisohn expressed his belief in the August issue of Harper's Magazine that there could now be no thought of revising the Versailles peace, since no one, after what had happened to German Jewry, would dare place additional non-German people under the "Nazi heel." He warned that any apparent moderation expressed by Germany would be a "game."14 In the contemporary issue of The North American Review, Dr. Robert Briffault described the other western European powers as willing to tolerate Nazi Germany because of its anti-Communist stand. There was little danger from the dictatorship, contended Briffault, because Adolf Hitler remained under the guidance of the Junkers, who had no interest in expansion for expansion's sake.15

Some of the most astute comments on German foreign policy during 1933 came from Leon Trotsky. In an essay entitled "What Hitler Wants" in Harper's Magazine for September 1933, Trotsky disclosed that he was not at all impressed by Hitler's speeches.

13John Gunther, "Revolt Against Hitler," The Nation, CXXXVI (June 7, 1933), 636.
15Robert Briffault, "War Bogies in Europe," The North American Review, CCXXXVI (August, 1933), 118-122. Dr. Briffault was on a lecture series in Vienna. He was one of England's leading sociologists and the author of several works on social evolution.
on peace. The German Chancellor had not talked about foreign conquests because German military power had not yet been reestablished. By means of diplomacy, Hitler was charting his course for imperialism. Once the disarmament proposals were shelved, Hitler planned to obtain British support for German rearmament with the Russian Bolshevik threat as the chief selling point at Downing Street. Within ten years—less if domestic problems were not alleviated—Chancellor Hitler would have the war that he was plotting, Trotsky insisted.

Leon Trotsky was encountered again in the December Yale Review in an article written before Germany's decision to leave the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference on October 14, 1933. Much of this article retraced the failures of the Weimar government and the ascent of the German Fascists, but, in concluding, the Russian revolutionary warned that Hitler and his capitalist supporters were preparing for war—this was the "true historic mission of the Fascist dictatorship." The Nazi leadership's talk of peace meant nothing. Fascism cannot be reformed; "it can only be overthrown." Alluding to the Nazis' domestic policies, Trotsky wrote that already the Hitler program was "being fulfilled with iron logic before the eyes of the world." It was only a matter of time before the National Socialists would strike in the international area. Yet Trotsky observed that the inevitable might still be forestalled "by the inner forces of Germany."16

16 Leon Trotsky, "What Hitler Wants," Harper's Magazine,
Across the German border in Austria, Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss faced increased agitation from the Austrian Nazis during the summer of 1933. The German National Socialists had long demanded Anschluss, and their Austrian brethren now began a campaign for this purpose with the German government’s unofficial support. Austria’s predicament drew numerous journal responses. In a long article in the July Foreign Affairs, Hamilton Fish Armstrong forcefully called attention to the Anschluss issue as a major Nazi goal. Benjamin Z. Goldberg in the August Current History concurred in Armstrong’s view, adding that because of a failure in economic affairs, Nazi Germany stood “urgently in need of some success abroad.” The Christian Century echoed these views.

Nazi agitation in Austria had reached serious proportions, and “exhibitions of fury followed one another with incredible brutality,” reported Devere Allen in the September North American Review. Great Britain and France were ready to halt a German

CLXVII (September, 1933), 385-393, and “Hitler’s National Socialism,” The Yale Review, XXIII (December, 1933), 351-361.

17 The Anschluss question has recently received close inspection by two scholars. A better-than-average analysis of the unification problem appears in Jurgen Geyl, Austria, Germany and the Anschluss, 1931-38 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). Gordon Brook-Shepherd’s The Anschluss (Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1963) is a day-by-day account of the period from mid-January to mid-March 1938.

18 Hamilton Fish Armstrong, “Hitler’s Reich: The First Phase,” Foreign Affairs, XI (July, 1933), 599-602; Benjamin Z. Goldberg, “Austria Resists Nazi Imperialism,” Current History, XXXVIII (August, 1933), 542; Goldberg was a writer on international affairs; and Paul Hutchinson, “Will Hitler Restore the Hohenzollerns?” The Christian Century, L (September 6, 1933), 1104-1105.
seizure of Austria, stated a major editorial in the August 23 Nation, because of the need to restrain the first step of the Nazi plans of aggression throughout Europe. However, The Commonweal of August 18 scoffed at the provocative acts of "Hitler's Bad Boy Scouts" and said that they should not be taken too seriously. Not even the Catholic Commonweal referred to a traditional aspect of the Austrian-German union project, namely that it would upset the religious balance in Germany in favor of the Catholic Church. Writing in The Commonweal several weeks later, Austrian Franz Calice believed that the reason for the limited successes of the National Socialists lay in their lack of political allies—a factor which had contributed to the rise of the Nazis in Germany. Albrecht Paul Maerker-Branden suggested to the readers of the September Review of Reviews and World's Work that Austria could become the next battleground of Europe. 19

Austria was desperately needed to fill out the German core of the Hitler empire, declared John Gunther in the September 20 Nation. He called attention to the sentimental ties between Hitler and his native land, and he pointed out that annexation of Austria would make good at least one of the Nazis' boasts and hence prove the might of the new Germany in international affairs.

19 Devere Allen, "The World's Stake in Austria," The North American Review, CXXXVI (September, 1933), 231; The Nation, CXXXVII (August 23, 1933), 202; The Commonweal, XVIII (August 18, 1933), 376; Franz Calice, "Austria and the Nazis," The Commonweal, XVIII (September 22, 1933), 481; Count Calice was a writer and a native of Austria; and Albrecht Paul Maerker-Branden, "Germany, Hitler and Austria," The Review of Reviews and World's Work, LXXXVIII (August, 1933), 40.
"Hitlerism means Pan-Germanism or nothing," observed Gunther from his post in central Europe. Austria's resistance pained and astonished most of the Germans, who looked upon that country more and more as a "rebellious province."\(^{20}\)

In one of his many articles on Germany for *The Literary Digest*, Reverend Stanley High discussed Hitler's foreign policy in the November 4 issue. Since the Nazis gained ascendancy in Germany, optimism about the future had disappeared in western Europe. Hitler's foreign policy had certain goals which, if not abandoned, would only be achieved by war. Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland were immediate spots, as soon as the Nazis were able to strengthen the army. Until that happened:

The shadow of things to come stretches darkly across the continent. Governments are uncertain what to do. In their uncertainty they will probably do nothing. But they look into the next five-year period with anxiety and foreboding. There are still die-hard optimists with faith enough left to believe that Europe may be spared the catastrophe which appears, now, to be in the making. But even the optimistic concede that there is scant basis, in fact, for their optimism. The new order, such as it was, has failed and is being abandoned. The old order is being restored in its place. And men and nations which, apparently, are powerless or too short-sighted to prevent that development look, now, with a fear born of a knowledge of history, upon the consequences that may follow in its train.\(^{21}\)

As usual High's prediction proved to be highly accurate, yet he built his case on the assumption that German rearmament was inevitable and that the Versailles Treaty's restraints on German for-

\(^{20}\) John Gunther, "Danger Still in Austria," *The Nation*, CXXXVII (September 20, 1933), 40.

\(^{21}\) Stanley High, "Hitler and the Peace of Europe," *The Literary Digest*, CXVI (November 4, 1933), 5, 28-29.
eign ventures no longer existed; both of these assumptions seem rather premature and unduly pessimistic for November 1933. It is possible that the defeatist mood generated by such speculation actually contributed to the creation of the very atmosphere which it took for granted.

Denis Gwynn in the November 1933 Sign noticed that fear of Nazi Germany had not vanished among neighboring countries, as he had believed it would after Hitler's peace message in May.22 Another ominous signal received the attention of the September 13 Nation. At the official autumn meeting of the National Socialist Party at Nuremberg, the Nazi chieftains defended their anti-Semitic policy and announced their intention to force it upon the rest of the world. This declaration, cited only by The Nation, together with provocative Nazi activities along Germany's borders, had put Europe on edge again, declared this weekly.23 The October 18 New Republic issued a timely warning that Germany was about to press "her claims to equality in armament" at Geneva. "If France will not disarm, the only road to equality is German arming."24

The tranquillity of Europe was disturbed again when the National Socialist government made its first major move in inter-


23The Nation, CXXXVII (September 13, 1933), 281.

24The New Republic, LXXVI (October 18, 1933), 266.
national affairs in October 1933. Adolf Hitler had given his views concerning disarmament in his Reichstag address of May 17, 1933. He had made peaceful gestures, but, on the other hand, the Nazi leader had also made it clear that Germany would not remain long a second-rate power if the other European states together with the League of Nations did not rectify the wrongs imposed by the Versailles Treaty, particularly as far as disarmament was concerned. Ever suspicious of Germany, France grew even more intransigent with Hitler and the National Socialists in power; and by mid-October 1933, when it became all too apparent that the French were stalling with regard to the disarmament issue, Adolf Hitler made what was to be only his first of a number of surprise moves in international affairs. On October 14 the German Fuehrer announced his intention to take Germany out of the League of Nations and the Geneva Disarmament Conference. He maintained that the Germans had tried to cooperate over the years with the other nations, but to no avail. Moreover, the Nazi Chancellor said that he had taken the action in order to fulfill the desires of the German people. To prove his point, he called a national plebiscite for November 12 so that the government's action could be judged by the German people. Also he dissolved the Reichstag with the intention of presenting the German electorate with a single slate of National Socialist candidates on the same November voting day. Next he made a shrewd move to deter Great Britain and France from applying military sanctions because of the withdrawal action and to indicate to them that he was ready to
live in peace. He publicly condemned the use of force in international disputes and reassured the world that Germany still hoped for an eventual solution for the arms problem. Chancellor Hitler likewise offered to sign non-aggression pacts with any interested party.

With the only slate of candidates on the ballot for the November 12 election day, the National Socialists had little trouble acquiring all but a small percentage of the votes for the Reichstag. Only eight percent of the voters dissented. Ninety-five percent of the ballots cast expressed approval of Germany's leaving the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference at Geneva.

Almost all the American weeklies and many of the monthlies responded to Adolf Hitler's October 14 maneuver and to the election and plebiscite planned for November 12, but only a few weeklies and one monthly made an effort to evaluate the voting, while even a lesser number attempted to explore the implications of the balloting in the weeks which immediately followed. "Europe waits," the October 25 Nation said, with a show of concern, after the Nazi government's decision to withdraw from the League of Nations and the Geneva Disarmament Conference. It was waiting for the next move by the German Chancellor, "an insane and dangerous egotist," but it was already evident that the German voters would give an affirmative answer to his foreign policy. Quite clearly for The Nation, there now seemed not a doubt that the Disarmament Conference had been wrecked and that in some European
areas near the German border defensive military measures were being taken.

Several weeks later, in *The Nation's* November 29 issue, this journal's former editor, Oswald Garrison Villard, commented upon Hitler's success at the polls. "Only a German like Hitler, who had never been abroad, and, with his associates, has no knowledge or understanding of other peoples and their psychology" could trumpet his election victory when all the world knew how the vote was obtained. Villard ranked this "childish performance" with the stupidity of the Zimmermann affair of 1917. It was this "immaturity of mind" which impeded negotiations with the Germans in international affairs. The Hitler regime also appeared to have the "great mass of Germans" behind it, despite continuing economic problems. Absurd statements by Hitler and his cohorts seem to have endeared them even more to the hearts of the German nation.

These things go over because the Germans, always victims of an inferiority complex and always stirred because the rest of the world will not accept them at their own valuation as the greatest of all nations, are ready to believe anyone who plays up to their national prejudices and tells them what they wish to hear about their terrible maltreatment. If Hitlerism were not such a menace to the whole world, one would almost wish that the Germans might never awake out of their present dream.25

The editors of *The New Republic* on October 25 were less perturbed by Hitler's action, and they pointed to the failure of

the other powers to disarm according to the Treaty of Versailles. "To oppose Hitler on this issue disarmament is to solidify the German people behind the Nazis." A short November 15 editorial comment concerned the November 12 plebiscite and election, which the *New Republic* described as a "farce." "What could be more absurd than for a dictator who has always despised democracy and has gone to extreme lengths in order to kill it to conduct a plebiscite in order to show that the people support him?" Contrary to some editorial opinion, Professor Frederick L. Schuman's article in the November 22, 1933 issue of *The New Republic* expressed the opinion that the election of November 12 would scarcely affect Germany's international standing. The results would be manifest in domestic affairs. Undoubtedly the last of the Nationalists and Junkers in high government offices, including Franz von Papen, would soon be replaced by Nazi Party regulars. The remaining vestiges of the old republican party system and the Weimar Republic would be liquidated. No single force remained in Germany to halt such a process, for articulate opposition to the dictatorship had disappeared, wrote Schuman. Most Germans stood enthusiastically behind the National Socialists, and "they act toward the world in a spirit of proud desperation shot through with dementia." Not only was German cultural life being destroyed, but this Germany "of fierce hatreds and primal hungers" menaced world peace and order.

Scrutinizing the returns for the November 12 election and plebiscite, *The New Republic* attributed the results to the Nazis'
terror methods; the balloting represented no true picture of the German electorate's feeling toward the regime. Habitual non-voters were threatened with severe penalties to get them to the polls. "Even the concentration camps in which their political enemies are confined are reported to have given overwhelming majorities to the government." The remarkable development of the entire campaign, The New Republic believed, was that over three million people had had the fortitude to vote against the National Socialist dictates. In spite of this opposition, this journal felt that the Hitler regime would exploit its victory in the field of international politics. 26

In an article in the November 11 Literary Digest, "Fifteen Years After the Armistice," Frank H. Simonds wrote one of the most incisive articles on the action taken by Hitler on October 14. The author believed that the arrival of Adolf Hitler on the European scene had ended all hopes for the establishment of a lasting peace through the League of Nations. Rival nationalism would prevent an adjustment of land and minority problems just as it had brought an end to disarmament talks. As for the future, Simonds saw continual clashing between Nazi Germany and its neighbors, but no full-scale war in the immediate future; the Germans, he pointed out, were unready for war. Demonstrating his deep

26 The New Republic, LXXVI (October 25, 1933), 293-294; LXXVII (November 15, 1933), 2; (November 22, 1933), 30; and Frederick L. Schuman, "The Third Reich Votes," (November 22, 1933), 38-40.
understanding of European instincts, Simonds prognosticated that the other European powers, caught in a dilemma, would probably for the time being sit back and passively watch Germany rebuild her military might rather than risk a preventive war. But sooner or later war would come, warned Simonds, and it would be another general war. There could be no peace with Hitler's Germany unless it were a Nazi-type peace, one "which would be as fatal to other peoples as those of Versailles were to her."

Two weeks later the editors of The Literary Digest responded to the November 12 voting in Germany. They pointed out that even though the election was one-sided, the voting was the heaviest in Germany's history. The fact that the concentration camp inmates had endorsed the regime might bring Hitler around to granting a political amnesty, according to Berlin dispatches arriving in the Digest's offices. Clearly misunderstanding the situation in Germany, this American conservative weekly thought such a move might very well placate foreign opinion and favorably affect domestic sentiment. 27

A Christian Century editorial for October 25, 1933, found that Hitler's League and Disarmament Conference announcements had "surprised and shocked the world," but these were "logical, natural and inevitable." Hitler's promise not to make war for his territorial demands should at least be considered sincere, for

27 Frank H. Simonds, "Fifteen Years After the Armistice," The Literary Digest, CXVI (November 11, 1933), 5-6, 39, and (November 25, 1933), 11.
actually France and its allies could do nothing but face the "indisputable fact": Germany had escaped from the Versailles system. A short news article in the November 4 America also seemed to accept at face value the Fuhrer's explanations and promises; national honor seemed to be the primary reason for Hitler's conduct.

Arrogant and reckless, Hitler had delivered a staggering blow to international cooperation in the opinion of the editors of The Commonweal, who were overly confident that other interested powers would be willing to accept the Nazis' challenge. Yet hasty action by the allies would not settle anything and could be fatal. More pessimistic than The Commonweal's message was the report by Denis Gwynn in the December 1933 Sign. Give Germany two years, he warned, and she would be ready for military action. He related the rumor, now known to be accurate, of secret German military preparations in Russia, and "unless some new means of averting war can be found," Gwynn prophesied, the Nazis would soon be reclaiming lost territories by force of arms.

The religious journals seemed almost unwilling to come to grips with the new problems created by Hitler's sudden diplo-

28 The Christian Century, L (October 25, 1933), 1328-1329.
29 America, L (November 4, 1933), 94.
30 The Commonweal, XVIII (October 27, 1933), 599.
31 Denis Gwynn, "A New Approach to Disarmament," The Sign, XIII (December, 1933), 270.
matic moves. In general, the tone of these journals' response was steeped in fatalism. This attitude was also apparent later when neither the November 25 America nor the Christian Century for November 22 expressed surprise at the November 12 vote in Germany, although the latter seemed to be mystified regarding the reported concentration camp balloting. 32

The secular monthly journals all expressed alarm and uncertainty, except The Review of Reviews and World's Work, but without penetrating analysis. The liberal columnist of The Survey Graphic, John Palmer Gavit, commented in the November 1933 issue that "anything" could now happen; no one wanted to forecast the consequences of Hitler's mid-October moves, but it was quite plain that "the German people march in ecstasy into isolation." 33 Allan Nevins in the December Current History professed himself unable to explain Hitler's foreign policy. He could only say that the Nazi leader probably had a dual character: a combination of "defiant and provocative acts" with "a conciliatory reasonableness." Shephard Stone, in the same journal, pointed out that the German government was not ready to fight a war here and now, but that "the 'testament' of the Leader is not reassuring." In the following month, Current History carried a brief comment by Sidney B. Fay that, "even if one makes allowance for the fact

32 America, L (November 25, 1933), 191, and The Christian Century, L (November 22, 1933), 1460-1461.

that many people undoubtedly voted in his favor because they did not dare do otherwise," the vote was "a remarkable endorsement of Hitler by an overwhelming majority of the German people." 34

Contributing to the January 1934 Foreign Affairs quarterly, Allen W. Dulles considered that in the light of what had just happened in Germany, "it will be necessary to probe the underlying causes of unrest in continental Europe." A technical settlement of the disarmament question was not enough.

The time may not yet have come when the concerned are ready to face this issue; they may never be ready to face it until it is too late. If the issue is not met before Germany has rearmed, Europe will be taking the road which may lead to a major conflict unless Germany's neighbors decide in the meanwhile to adopt the heroic remedy, if in fact it be a remedy, of preventive military actions. 35

Roger Shaw, the ardent conservative editor of The Review of Reviews and World's Work treated rather casually both the November 12 plebiscite and the character of Nazi Chancellor, "Handsome Adolf," in his monthly report for January 1934. While he thought those who opposed the government "courageous," he voiced no disapproval of the Nazis' election tactics. 36

34 Allan Nevins, "Germany Quits the League," Current History, XXXIX (December, 1933), 324; Shephard Stone, "The Rearming of Germany," 295-301; and Sidney B. Fay, "The Vote for Hitler," (January, 1934), 483.

35 Allen W. Dulles, "Germany and the Crisis in Disarmament," Foreign Affairs, XII (January, 1934), 260. Dulles was an American diplomat.

Shortly after Hitler's sudden and defiant act of October 14, 1933, American editors and writers began to conjecture about what the future would bring to European foreign affairs. Much of the speculation, which continued over a span of six months, focused on the possibility of an aggressive war, even though the Hitler government had yet to make public its projected military buildup without which such a conflict could not be undertaken. 37

37 A chronological arrangement of some of the more significant of these articles and editorials is: A *Commonweal* editorial, XIX (November 17, 1933), 61-62, seemed very apprehensive. Robert Machray, an author and observer of affairs in eastern Europe, presented his ominous views in "The Nazi Threat to Eastern Europe," *Current History*, XXXIX (December, 1933), 302-308. In "Germany Rearms," *The Forum*, XCI (January, 1934), 13-19, Albert Brandt gave an exaggerated tale of German rearmament. War would begin as soon as France began to weaken, and this seemed inevitable to Frank H. Simonds in "Consequences: The Sequel of the League's Collapse," *The Atlantic Monthly*, CLIII (January, 1934), 1-10. For Denis Gwynn, the Nazis' continued glorification of war would force the other powers to take action; this was in *The Sign*, XIII (February, 1934), 393-395. Professor Frederick L. Schuman discussed German militarism and the foreign policy goals of Nazi Germany in "Germany Prepares Fear," *The New Republic*, LXXVII (February 7, 1934), 353-355, and "Nazi Dreams of World Power," *Current History*, XXXIX (February, 1934), 535-541. America mistakenly thought that war between Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy over central Europe was close at hand in an editorial, L (February 17, 1934), 463. German barbarism and foreign policy were the subject of Robert Briffault's "Madness in Middle Europe and World Peace," *Scribner's Magazine*, XCV (March, 1934), 175-182. Johannes Steel, the pseudonym of a German Social Democrat who was for several years an economic observer attached to the German Department of Commerce, devoted particular attention to Hitler's Germany in two articles of his series "Europe Moves Toward War," in *The Nation*: "Germany's Dreams of Expansion," CXXVIII (March 21, 1934), 324-326, and "The Mechanics of Nationalism," (April 11, 1934), 411-412. German rearmament was the subject of articles by Ludwig Lore, "How Germany Arms," *Harper's Magazine*, CLVIII (April, 1934), 505-517, and Helmuth C. Engelbrecht, associate editor of *World Tomorrow*, and Frank C. Hanighen, the co-authors of * Merchants of Death* (New York: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1934), "Is Germany Re-arming?" *America*, LI (April 21, 1934), 32-33, and also an editorial in *The Literary Digest*, CXVII
Although many of the articles seemed to think in terms of an immediate conflagration, no author would guess when the war would start. That so many responsible journals and journalists talked of war when Germany was utterly incapable of such an undertaking because of the restrictions of the Versailles settlement indicates that the journalists were naive, out of touch with reality, or mesmerized by Hitler's bold conduct. Only two writers during these six months pointed out that peace for the time being was absolutely essential for the Nazis' future domestic and military plans. One of these was Augustus Bauer in the May 9, 1934 New Republic, and the other was Howard H. Railey in his Forum article for February 1934 entitled "Fear Over Europe." Railey correctly surmised that "Hitler is the safety valve of Central Europe," since "at this critical juncture peace is indispensable to the vast and significant consolidation" which the Fuehrer had outlined.

A problem of prime interest for the American journals was the National Socialist agitation in Austria. Many of the

(April 28, 1934), 15. The daughter of historians Charles and Mary Beard, who had lived in Germany for the previous six years, tried to explain the character of the leaders of Nazi Germany in "Who's Who in Nazidom," The Nation, CXXXVIII (May 2, 1934), 501-504. Economics was behind the latest war threat, according to The New Republic's London correspondent Henry N. Brailsford in "Twenty Years After: War," LXXIX (June 20, 1934), 144-145.


discussions about war in the autumn of 1933, the winter of 1933-34 and the spring of 1934 pertained to this question. In his *Current History* column for November 1933, Professor Sidney B. Fay took note of the divisive elements in Austria and the difficulties confronting the Vienna government from radical groups on both the right and left. The crisis mounted even though Chancellor Engelbert Dollfuss had set in motion what he believed would remedy Austrian ills—the corporate and authoritarian state.\(^\text{40}\)

Looking at the issue from the German angle, journalist Emil Lengyel maintained in *The Literary Digest* for December 16, 1933 that Adolf Hitler desperately wanted to be the "messiah" of Austria; however, this stronghold of Roman Catholicism had observed the difficulties that German Catholics had faced even after the July 1933 Concordat with the Vatican. Austrians were also cognizant of how the National Socialists dealt with the sovereignty of the lesser German states earlier in the year. Nor did the many Austrian extreme right-wingers, who had no connection with the Nazis, desire to give up their leadership of the reactionary forces to foreigners from Berlin in the event of Anschluss. Although the German Chancellor found the present situation discouraging, Lengyel asserted, Hitler had to keep pressure on Austria for union, for how could he impress the rest of the world if his own homeland ignored him?\(^\text{41}\)

\(^{40}\)Sidney B. Fay, "Fascism in Austria," *Current History*, XXXIX (November, 1933), 230-231.

\(^{41}\)Emil Lengyel, "Austria's Fight Against Hitlerism," *The Literary Digest*, CXVI (December 16, 1933), 17.
Almost the same assessment was made by John Gunther in the January 1934 *Foreign Affairs* and in a later article in the *Nation*, in which he observed that the campaign of terror by the Austrian Nazis was wearing down the Dollfuss government. The deteriorating conditions in Austria were scrutinized in the next few months by several journals and writers including Frank H. Simonds in *The Atlantic Monthly* of April 1934, Denis Gwynn in *The Sign* for the same month, the editorial comments of the March 3 *Literary Digest* and the March 7 *Nation*, one of the series of articles by Johannes Steel in *The Nation* of March 21, the editorial column of the May *Living Age* and a delayed report, written before the July assassination of Chancellor Dollfuss, by Marcel W. Fodor in *The American Mercury* for August 1934.

While American journals speculated about war, peace and Anschluss, Germany's ten-year non-aggression pact with Poland on January 26, 1934, hardly created a stir in the periodicals. Out-

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side of the usual factual reporting, there were only three significant comments: in The Nation, The New Republic and America.

True, the pact was merely a temporary measure which settled none of the basic differences between Germany and Poland, but, in reality, it was a severe blow to the French system of European alliances that had been developed since the World War to contain Germany and should have aroused more journal response. Only Robert Dell's contribution to The Nation pointed out this aspect of the treaty:

One would have expected French opinion to be more excited than it was ever before, but it is outwardly calm. This is not, however, the calmness of conscious strength. The French are more terrified by Germany than ever, but their fear has paralyzed them. Ever since Hitler came into power France has drifted like a rudderless ship. Her rulers, afraid to move in any direction or to take any initiative, have had no policy of their own and have been content to follow the lead of Ramsay MacDonald or Mussolini.

The editorial in The New Republic dismissed the treaty as meaningless, "just another Kellogg Pact" agreement "badly needed" by the Nazi government for the single purpose of prestige. It contributed to the first anniversary celebration of the Hitler Chancellorship. America editorialized that the "real significance" of the pact could not be stated "with any degree of precision"; however, it was probably "another stage in Hitler's plans for the creation of a Pan-Germanic power."

Even Current History articles like those by Frederic A. Ogg, professor of political science at the University of Wisconsin, "Polish-German Relations," XXXIX (March, 1934), 623-624, and Sidney B. Fay, "The Pact with Poland," XL (April, 1934), 103, added nothing significant to the discussion.

Robert Dell, "Will Germany Conquer France?" The Nation,
Not until five months later did the German government engage in another overt diplomatic move. Then on June 14 Adolf Hitler flew to Venice for his first meeting with Benito Mussolini in an effort to iron out differences of opinion. The confrontation failed to produce anything concrete, although at the time there was no way of knowing this. Actually the meeting looked portentous since it brought together the two Fascist dictators of Europe, each of whom had different ideas about the future destiny of Austria.

Concerning the Venice meeting, one found again that the American magazines were, with a few exceptions, disinterested. A short editorial in the June 20 New Republic, written just before the two dictators sat down at the conference table, forecast trouble for Austria. Something seemed to be in the air, since the Austrian Nazis had stepped up their activity recently.

"There can be no compromise." Both Hitler and Mussolini knew that the way to the Balkans was through Vienna, and neither could afford concessions on this point. Nothing had happened at Venice which would relax tensions in central Europe, wrote The Nation, just after the meeting ended. Hitler had probably promised not to push for Anschluss, but the next Austrian elections would probably bring the advocates of German National Socialism to power.

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CXXXVIII (April 18, 1934), 440; The New Republic, LXXVII (February 7, 1934), 347-348; and America, L (February 17, 1934), 463.

46The New Republic, LXXIX (June 20, 1934), 139; The Nation, CXXXVIII (June 27, 1934), 716; and Denis Gwynn, "Re-Armament and Insecurity in Europe," The Sign, XIV (August, 1934), 20-21.
anyway. Denis Gwynn in the monthly *Sign* for August 1934 acknowledged that the spectacular meeting built prestige for both dictators. In fact, the author characterized it as one of the most important events since the World War, but he could not say exactly why.

Foreign affairs were temporarily pushed to the background while the American journals of opinion assessed the events surrounding the June 30, 1934 Roehm Purge. However, the tranquility of Europe was shattered forcefully on July 25, 1934, when an Austrian Nazi band attempted to overthrow the government of Engelbert Dollfuss in Vienna. About the only Nazi success was the murder of Dollfuss, for the Austrian government officials quickly regained control of the situation and arrested the assassins. In a show of friendship, Mussolini unhesitatingly called up four Italian army divisions and moved them toward the Austrian border. Although Hitler had long promoted the activities of his Austrian disciples in his desire for Anschluss, he immediately denounced the coup when its failure became evident.

The August 8 *Nation* considered the Nazi action in Austria a catastrophe for Hitler's foreign policy. "At the end of June it seemed a mere matter of mathematics to estimate the date on which a Christian Socialist-National Socialist cabinet would take the Austrian government out of Dollfuss's hands." The situation was now "completely altered," since the "possibility of a coalition with the Nazis is definitely out of the picture." The hopes of Hitler's Austrian followers were doomed from the very begin-
ning, argued The Nation's editors, since direct German aid for the Austrian National Socialists could very well result in war for Germany "with every other European nation." This judgment was seconded by Vienna-based John Gunther in the August 22 Nation: "The Hitlerite dreams of a Nazi Mitteleuropa are blasted into remote fatuity." 47

Sensing confusion in Hitler's Reich, The New Republic discerned signs that "Hitler did not control his own forces" and that intra-Party divisions existed in spite of the recent Roehm Purge. Why else would Hitler act so energetically to avoid implication in the Dollfuss murder? "Apparently he did so before he knew whether or not the putsch would succeed," wrote this weekly inaccurately. For the second time in a month, continued the editors, Hitler and the National Socialist Party faithful had lost prestige and self-confidence. This journal felt that one fact had been proved: Hitler's Germany was not materially ready to go to the brink of war. Nevertheless, it also acknowledged the strong possibility that the German Nazis might yet manage to get control of the Austrian government peacefully, "after the present fires die down." One week later, The New Republic was not quite sure where Germany stood in the international arena because of its apparent isolation.

Germany's foreign policies are more than ever undecided. Will Hitler return to the League of Nations and

47 The Nation, CXXXIX (August 8, 1934), 332, and John Gunther, "After the Dollfuss Murder," (August 22, 1934), 204.
sign the "East Locarno" treaty? Will he give Austria the pledge she demands? Unless he relents on these important issues, Germany will continue to stand apart, an outcast among nations with all the misfortunes that this position entails. Last Monday the Chancellor called to heaven to preserve his nation's peace. But peace and National Socialism are incompatible. A National Socialist government must be nationalistic and imperialistic or it ceases to exist. Power is its vital essence, power maintained by conquest abroad and oppression and exploitation of the economically weak at home. 48

In the opinion of Sidney B. Fay in the September Current History, Dollfuss fell victim to the Nazis because of his more vigorous policy regarding the Austrian Hitlerites, following the Roehm Purge. Until then he had treated them firmly but not roughly. Dollfuss's change of tactics cost the Austrian leader his life. 49 Writing in the October American Mercury, Marcel W. Fodor emphasized that the Nazis had been overconfident in Austria. Yet he foresaw a renewal of pressure once the Austrian National Socialists regrouped. 50 John Palmer Gavit reiterated this opinion in The Survey Graphic, on the basis of his estimate of Hitler's need for an immediate success in some area. 51

If Alfred Rosenberg had anything to say about future plans, Nazi Germany would continue to aid the Austrian Nazis,


50 Marcel W. Fodor, "The Dilemma of Austria," The American Mercury, XXXIII (October, 1934), 224.

declared Roger Shaw in The Review of Reviews and World's Work for November. Rosenberg "would not favor the military conquest of Austria by Germany, but would prefer to see the Austrian Nazis gain control of their own country, thereby voluntarily uniting its destinies to those of Nazi Germany." Throughout his character sketch of Rosenberg, Shaw tried to portray the Nazi leader as a man of peaceful intentions. This is one of the few articles dealing with the Nazis in which an American journal concentrated on a top-ranking Nazi besides Hitler himself.

Although thousands of his followers had been disappointed, The Presbyterian Advance expressed gratification that Adolf Hitler had declined to entangle himself in Austrian affairs. Why he ended his aid to the Austrian Nazis remained an unanswered question, but this Protestant journal drew the reasonable assumption that Hitler, influenced by the warnings of other European powers, felt the time not yet right for successful Anschluss.

Catholic periodicals treated the Austrian putsch superficially; they published no analytical articles, only editorials of varying length. America associated the putsch with German domestic issues. The Commonweal viewed it as inconclusive and surmised that "permanent peace is as remote as ever." Only a

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53 The Presbyterian Advance, XLIX (August 8, 1934), 5.

54 America, LI (August 11, 1934), 411; The Commonweal, XX (August 19, 1934), 355-356; and Denis Gwynn, "The Tragedy of Dollfuss," The Sign, XIV (October, 1934), 147.
"New Deal in the matters of the Versailles Treaties," it editorialized, could save humanity from "the chaos of anarchy, and the jungle of barbarism." Denis Gwynn in the October Sign, was the putch as proof of Hitler's "reckless impulses and his capacity for sudden and ruthless action."

During the months following the events in Austria, Chancellor Hitler made a determined effort to reshape his image in international circles. Peace was the Fuehrer's topic, and he spoke often in the later summer and fall of 1934. In one of his first propaganda messages, Hitler told the world in an August 1, 1934 London Daily Mail interview that as far as he was concerned war could benefit nobody. Although he maintained that Germany had to continue arming for her defense, these forces would be not used for aggressive purposes. According to the German leader, even the union with the Austrians would have to be delayed until the European climate of opinion improved.

This Nazi peace campaign was given rather irregular coverage by the American journals. As expected, The New Republic discounted point by point Hitler's declarations to the Daily Mail. There was no doubt of the German Nazis' implication in the outbursts in Austria, The New Republic assured its readers, but the Fuehrer had not been well-informed about the coup. Germany's arms program had surpassed the amount needed for mere defensive purposes. Hitler "has made similar declarations of peaceful intent in the past, but in the meantime he continued to follow policies that augment the tension in Europe." The Nazi chief per-
Bonally might prefer peace, "but he insists upon things that in the long run can be gained only through war." 55

In the article "Hitler as a Pacifist" for the August 22 Christian Century, Reverend Edward T. Ramsdell considered this plea for peace no more convincing than any other made by Hitler. Agreeing with The New Republic, Ramsdell felt that actions spoke louder than words and that the Nazi domestic program was oriented on the assumption of a future war. "Avowed pacifism has been forced to silence." However, Ramsdell believed that Hitler was not thinking of war at the moment. "So utterly does this immediate need dominate his mind that he is actually thinking of himself today as an apostle of peace." War would find Germany isolated, and Hitler recognized this fact. Nevertheless, if he wanted to seek a genuine peace, wrote Ramsdell, changes are in order in Germany's domestic policies to convince the western world of the genuineness of pacifist declarations. Three weeks later, The Christian Century's editors, responding to another Hitler talk on peace, declared that they, like "the rest of the world," remained skeptical. 56

55 The New Republic, LXXX (August 15, 1934), 2. Discussing the peace question in the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, CLXXV (September, 1934), 35, Professor Frederick L. Schuman advised in his article "The Third Reich's Road to War" that whatever the number of peace talks by the Nazi leaders, their aims and policies remained unchanged. Admittedly, it was difficult to determine just what the Nazis were after in foreign affairs: "Every pacific gesture...can be matched by gestures of truculence and aggrandizement."

56 Edward T. Ramsdell, "Hitler as Pacifist," The Christian Century, LI (August 22, 1934), 1065-1067, and (September 12, 1934), 1132. The Literary Digest, CXVIII (August 11, 1934), 3, 12, merely reported Hitler's views without passing judgment.
Frank H. Simonds in the October *Atlantic Monthly* article "The Turn of the Tide in Europe," ventured some highly misleading judgments concerning Adolf Hitler and the peace issue. He felt that the Nazi leader had been put on the defensive at home by economic and financial problems. Hence, unable to afford war, there had to be for Germany some kind of truce in international relations. "As a threat to European peace he has shot his bolt." Hitler would not survive the coming winter, after which, through the intervention of western Europe, a Hohenzollern restoration would occur.57 A few months later, Simonds' prognosis had yet to become reality, but G. E. W. Johnson was telling the readers of the January 1935 *North American Review* that he foresaw the leading states of Europe uniting to control the German dictator. "Hitler is the one man in Europe capable of unleashing another world war," said Johnson.58

Conversely, also in January 1935, the American public heard another plea from Nazi Germany that "all problems could be solved by sound common sense and by the earnest will of the governments concerned." This opinion emanated from no less a person than the German Minister for Foreign Affairs Constantin von Neurath in an essay on "Germany's Foreign Policy," in *The Forum for..."
The National Socialist peace campaign was directly associated with an important event for the Hitler regime: the Saar plebiscite scheduled for January 13, 1935. The plebiscite, prescribed by the settlement of Versailles, was to determine whether the Saar became French, reverted to Germany, or continued under its existing status: supervision by the League of Nations. Before 1933, it was a foregone conclusion that the Saarlanders would vote to rejoin Germany. After the rise of Hitler, the problem became more complex. Discussion of the plebiscite began in the American journals many months before the actual voting.

As early as April 1934 the Saar was the major subject of an article entitled "The Future of the Saar" in the quarterly Foreign Affairs by the former German diplomat, Richard von Kuehlmann. It was no surprise to find that Kuehlmann expected the Saar's population to vote overwhelmingly to return to Germany. He hoped, however, that the French and German governments would settle all differences before the plebiscite in order to lessen the possibilities of a clash and an increase of bitterness at voting time. Once an understanding was achieved, Kuehlmann perceived an era of Franco-German economic cooperation. Nevertheless, his argument was not very convincing, because he failed to consider seriously enough the goals and policies of the National

59Constantin von Neurath, "Germany's Foreign Policy," The Forum, XCIII (January, 1935), 3-4. Neurath was Hitler's Minister for Foreign Affairs from January 1933 to February 1938.
Socialist government. 60

The editors of The New Republic alone associated the Nazis' peace campaign in the summer of 1934 with the Saar question. They advanced the theory that the forthcoming plebiscite would "discourage whatever adventures in foreign affairs" Hitler "might otherwise have contemplated."61

That the question of the Saar's future would be closely tied with the Nazi government's Catholic Church policy and with the political attitudes of the Saarland Catholics was pointed out by a number of journalists from the summer months of 1934 to just a few weeks before the January 1935 voting.62 Of particular note was The Literary Digest dispatch on December 8, 1934, and


61 The New Republic, LXX (August 29, 1934), 58.

62 Sidney B. Fay, "The Nazis and the Catholics," Current History, XL (July, 1934), 488-489, and "The Fate of the Saar," XLI (January, 1935), 406; The Presbyterian Advance, XLIX (June 28, 1934), 5, and L (September 6, 1934), 5; Gerhard Hirshfield, "Plebiscite Puzzle in the Saar," The North American Review, CCXXXVIII (August, 1934), 175-176; Roger Shaw, "European Tinder Box," The Review of Reviews and World's Work, XC (September, 1934), 63; The Commonweal, XX (September 7, 1934), 437-438; The Nation, CXXXXIX (September 19, 1934), 310; Albert Brandt, "Hitlerism and the Saar Catholics," The Catholic World, CXL (December, 1934), 452-459; Marcel W. Fodor, "The Saar Plebiscite," The American Mercury, XXXIII (December, 1934), 466-472; Edgar Packard Dean, "The Saar--and Human Nature," Harper's Magazine, CLXX (January, 1935), 236; Dean was professor of history at Princeton University; The Literary Digest, CXVIII (December 8, 1934), 4; Hubertus Loewenstein, "The Saar Valley," The Commonweal, XXI (December 14, 1934), 196-197; Prince Loewenstein was residing in the Saarland at this time; and Phillipe Soupault, "The Saar on the Auction Block," The New Republic, LXXI (December 26, 1934), 182-183; the author was a well-known French poet, novelist and publicist.
the views of Phillipe Soupault in the December 26 New Republic which hinted that the Catholic Church officials were ready to trade their neutrality in the Saar for concessions in the German religious struggle. Writing in the December Catholic World, Albert Brandt wrote that "Berlin and the Vatican are still attempting to find some common ground for resurrecting the concordat in a more satisfactory form." (As a matter of fact, the German hierarchy did announce in favor of the Saar incorporation into the Reich one week before the balloting.) No other Catholic journal discussed this point, although the September 7 Commonweal had ruminated on the fate of the predominately Catholic population if the Church actively campaigned against the German cause. This Catholic journal feared that "resistance means preparation for something really akin to martyrdom." On the other hand, America, the other leading Catholic weekly remained editorially silent on the Saar issue until after the balloting.

A key role in keeping the Saar independent from Nazi Germany would be played by Saar workers in the estimation of Gerhard Hirschfield, Roger Shaw, the editors of The Nation and Albert Brandt. The conservative Shaw and the German exile Brandt, in addition, saw the Communists adding their forces to fight incorporation into Hitler's Reich.

63 Cf. the articles by The Literary Digest, Soupault, Brandt and The Commonweal cited in the previous note.

64 Gerhard Hirschfield, "Plebiscite Puzzle in the Saar," The North American Review, CCXXXVIII (August, 1934), 175-176; Roger Shaw, "European Tinder Box," The Review of Reviews and
Several journalists stressed nationalism as a major emotional feature in the Saarland contest. The fact that the Saarlanders were Germans would certainly work in the favor of reunion with Germany. In one of his rare accurate statements, Roger Shaw best summed up the situation: "If the Nazi movement in Germany is founded upon a virulent anti-semitism, it is also based on a sense of Teutonic racial solidarity which is exceedingly hard to beat."66

The Nazi propaganda machine was hard at work seeking a large, favorable vote in the Saarland, and many American observers took note of this powerful factor.67 Adolf Hitler himself

65 In addition to the articles cited in the previous footnote by Hirschfield, Shaw and Brandt, cf. also Ferdinand M. Isserman, "Dare the Saar Vote for Freedom?" The Christian Century, LI (November 14, 1934), 1455; Isserman was rabbi of Temple Israel in St. Louis, Missouri; Edgar Packard Dean, "The Saar—and Human Nature," Harper's Magazine, CLXX (January, 1935), 233-236; and Sidney B. Fay, "The Fate of the Saar," Current History, XLI (January, 1935), 406.

66 Roger Shaw, "European Tinder Box," The Review of Reviews and World's Work, XC (September, 1934), 63.

67 Sidney B. Fay, "The Nazis and the Catholics," Current History, XL (July, 1934), 488-489, and "The Fate of the Saar," XLI (January, 1935), 406; Gerhard Hirschfield, "Plebiscite Puzzle in the Saar," The North American Review, CCXXXVIII (August, 1934), 175-176; The New Republic, LXXX (August 29, 1934), 58; Roger Shaw, "European Tinder Box," The Review of Reviews and World's Work, XC (September, 1934), 63; The Literary Digest, CXVIII (September 1, 1934), 4; The Presbyterian Advance, L (September 6, 1934), 5; Ferdinand M. Isserman, "Dare the Saar Vote for Freedom?" The Christian Century, LI (November 14, 1934), 1455; Albert Brandt, "Hitlerism and the Saar Catholics," The Catholic World, CXL (December 1934), 452-459; Marcel W. Fodor, "The Saar Plebiscite," The Amer-
appeared to be playing a leading role in the campaign by making
beneficial political and religious pledges to the Saarlanders.
Less subtle means, the threat of physical force by the Nazis re-
ceived an equal amount of attention from the periodicals. At
least during the late summer and the autumn of 1934, the journa-
lists pictured the Hitlerites as desperate for an overwhelming
victory in the Saar territory. According to foreign correspondent
Robert Dell, the Saar vote would determine "The Future of Hitler." The
Fuehrer could not afford another setback like that in Austria
earlier in the summer; "Hitler is certainly prepared to resort to
violence, if necessary, rather than lose the Saar." The Nation's
editors perceived the Nazi preparations for armed action in the
Saarland and opined that the Reich officials "felt that even a
large minority against return to Germany would be a serious blow
to Nazi prestige, since it would lead to inevitable comparisons
between the results of the plebiscites in the Third Reich and the
result in a German country where the vote is free."69

American Mercury, XXXIII (December, 1934), 466-472; and Edgar Packard
Dean, "The Saar--and Human Nature," Harper's Magazine, CLXX (Janu-
ary, 1935), 233-236.

68 In addition to the articles cited in the previous foot-
note by Fay (Current History of January 1935), Shaw, Isserman,
Brandt, Fodor and Packard, cf. also Robert Dell, "The Future of
Hitler," The Nation, CXXXIX (September 19, 1934), 321; The Nation,
CXXXIX (September 19, 1934), 310, and (November 14, 1934), 553;
Frank H. Simonds, "The Tur
g of the Tide in Europe," The Atlantic
Monthly, CLIV (October, 1934), 489; and The Living Age, CCCXLVII
(October, 1934), 101.

69 Cf. the articles by Dell and The Nation cited in the
previous note.
In the light of recently completed Franco-German negotiations in December 1934, which resulted in the sale by the French government of its state property in the Saarland to Germany and the agreement by France not to interfere with Nazi propaganda in the Saar, French publicist Phillipe Soupault, in *The New Republic* of December 26, warned that this agreement "perhaps changes...the general political pattern of Europe." Only a few American journalists and editors made an effort to explore this virtual French abandonment of the Saar to Nazi Germany. Paul Hutchinson in the January 2, 1935 *Christian Century* alluded to the agreement, when he related that there was no reason to doubt that Hitler had everything well in hand in the Saar. Great Britain and France had apparently accepted at face value the Fuehrer's claim "that the Saar was the only problem which was disturbing Germany's foreign relations."

That the tide had turned in favor of the Nazis in the Saarland was most definitely recognized by *The Nation*, which called a German plebiscite victory "a foregone conclusion" in its January 9 issue. Its opinion was reached because of the calm now prevailing in Germany, plus a number of other factors. Its summary, published on the eve of the election, reveals a thorough and accurate assessment of all aspects of the situation:

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Six weeks ago the entire world looked with apprehension on the approach of January 13, the date of the Saar plebiscite. It was rumored that Hitler would attempt a putsch irrespective of the final vote, a step which must have led to a clash with the French army. Today, on the eve of the poll, there is little anxiety and even a certain amount of indifference as to the outcome. This alleviation of tension is the result of two developments, either of which seemed impossible a short while ago. First came the agreement signed at Rome on December 3, which provided for the mines in the event of a German victory. This was made possible by France's unexpected generosity in assenting to partial payment in kind over a period of years. In return the Reich promised to extend the benefits of its social-insurance laws to all inhabitants of the Saar and to grant full immunity against reprisals, regardless of race or political belief, for the next twelve months.

Of even greater importance was the decision reached two days later by the League Council to send an international force—not to include French or German soldiers—to police the territory until after the vote should be completed.... While the British, Italian, Dutch, and Swedish soldiers were received with ill-concealed hostility by the pro-Nazi German Front, the feeling is scarcely comparable to that which would have been aroused if French troops had been sent in....

What remained important about the plebiscite vote would be the size of the anti-German protest. "A large poll against Germany, even though it is not more than 30 per cent of the total, will be a moral defeat for Hitler and should have some influence on German public opinion."72

Written on the eve of the plebiscite vote, a report from Saarbrucken, submitted to the January 23 Nation by the British journalist Jack Fischer, recorded the Nazi boast that ninety-three percent of the Saarlanders would vote for union with the Reich and the opposition claim that at least thirty-five percent would dissent and vote for the status quo. Fischer believed the

72 The Nation, CXL (January 9, 1935), 33-34.
latter claim to be excessive. "The very fact that 800,000 people are eager to trade such plain economic and political advantages for the doubtful glories of Nazi Germany is one of the most discouraging symptoms in Europe today."73 Fischer's pessimism was well-founded. On January 13, 1935, approximately ninety-one percent of the 528,005 votes favored return to Germany, while only 46,512 Saarlanders voted for the status quo and 2,124 for annexation to France.

The American journal response to the plebiscite results was mixed: the editors of The Nation, The New Republic, The Sign and spokesmen for The Sign and The Christian Register called the vote a great Hitler victory, but the editors of three religious journals, America, The Commonweal and The Christian Century, expressed some doubts that the election had increased Hitler's strength. Among the former, The Nation, feeling "severe shock" upon hearing the returns, believed that "fear, intimidation, and subterranean pressure" probably played a role in Hitler's victory as did the desire for many Saarlanders to jump on the National Socialist bandwagon. Nevertheless, the fact remains that in an election which was as free as it could possibly have been made, with able neutral supervision and with material advantage favoring a status quo vote, the inhabitants of the Saar indicated a desire to pass under Nazi rule by a majority almost identical with that which Hitler obtained in the German plebiscite last summer.

73 Jack Fischer, "Election in the Saar," ibid., (January 23, 1935), 96-98. This British journalist was engaged in economic research at Oxford University.
The more restrained editors of The New Republic limited themselves to the innocuous observation that Hitler "has been able to make delivery on his promises." While the editors of The Sign had "grave anxiety" concerning the future, they hoped that the decisive vote would sober Hitler and his associates and thereby permit the reincorporation of the Saar into the Reich with a minimum of trouble. The Sign's European correspondent, Denis Gwynn, noted "the immediate and evident change of attitude in Germany once the Saar question had been settled." Hitler's announcement soon after the Saar vote was known that Germany intended to abandon all further territorial claims, bewildered observers who were familiar with the Nazi ideology, according to Gwynn. He suspected that these claims would be revived sooner or later, but "they are no longer a source of constant and immediate anxiety to Germany's neighbors." Raymond B. Bragg's editorial in The Christian Register exclaimed that the more than ninety percent of the total vote "contributed much to the enhancement and stabilization" of the dictatorship.  

On the other side of the argument, it is of some significance that the three journals that interpreted the plebiscite as bringing no serious increase in power to Hitler were the fore-

most religious journals of opinion. Generally ignoring the significance of the election for National Socialism, America viewed events in terms of the successful administration of the plebiscite campaign by the League of Nations. "The success in the Saar will go far to inspire confidence in two prime methods of pacific settlement: mediation and conciliation." One week later, on February 2, 1935, the Jesuit editors reported "considerable alarm" in Europe, since many observers now thought that the Nazis might demand the application of a plebiscite in other areas populated by Germans. The Commonweal felt the need to defend the Holy See for not directly interfering in the election, for it "would have meant openly challenging the right of Hitler to exist." Moreover, the vote indicated to this weekly that "Europe as a whole does not view the German Jewish problem as a matter of life or death."

Finally, what could be the key to The Commonweal's rather reserved response to the plebiscite vote was this statement: "One may add that the vote certainly does testify to the waning of Marxism throughout Europe and to the increasing strength of nationalism."

The Saar plebiscite was barely alluded to in The Christian Century's editorial response "Germany After the Plebiscite." Even though the Fuehrer's "ruthless and belligerent policy" had won one success after another in the foreign field, the Nazi regime could not yet claim internal stability, in the Century's judgment.

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Despite the Saar plebiscite.

For about a month after the Saar settlement, the journalists speculated in the articles about Hitler's next move. Oswald Garrison Villard in *The Nation* saw a revival of the Austrian question in the near future, and beyond that a continuous aggressive German foreign policy based on the security of the Nazi hold on Germany and the apparent absence of opposition abroad. The same journal's editorial board pointed out that the Saarland plebiscite really represented Hitler's only significant foreign success to date, and counterbalancing this was the fact that the Nazis "have alienated the countries which were formerly friendly to the Reich's desire for treaty revision." Anti-foreign propaganda had been able to keep the German people stirred up emotionally for most of the last two years, but this situation could not continue indefinitely. "Already we find Hitler depending less on propaganda and more on the army as the basis of his rule." *The Nation* interpreted this situation "as the first sign of approaching decay" within Nazi Germany.76

An article entitled "Swastika" by Barbara Spofford Morgan in *The Atlantic Monthly* for February 1935, challenged the view of a faltering German dictatorship. In essence her article reported the Nazi crusade still marching forward "hitched to a dynamo."?7

76Oswald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Men: Hitler After the Saar," *The Nation*, CXL (February 13, 1935), 175, and (February 6, 1935), 145.

77Barbara Spofford Morgan, "Swastika," *The Atlantic Monthly*, CXL (February, 1935), 143-150. Mrs. Morgan took a doctor's degree at the University of Berlin, while her husband carried out
The great majority of the journalists shared her opinion.

Yet Germany seemed pacific enough in February 1935. The peace theme continued to be a primary concern for world statesmen and for the Nazis too, at least on the surface. Only the disarmament lurked in the background. Germany's demand for equality in armaments, which pre-dated the Hitler regime, was under consideration by the French and British governments in February 1935, and this discussion attracted some attention.

What Hitler meant by equality in arms at that time no one really knew, wrote J. Emilyn Williams in the February 27 Christian Century; however, Williams speculated, his repeated declarations of willingness to sign non-aggression pacts could be interpreted as "a step toward international understanding." On the other hand, The Nation had grown despondent regarding the future peace of the world. The Anglo-French agreement on a joint policy toward German rearmament, which was tentatively reached at this time, came years too late. "If the offer to abrogate the military clauses of Part V of the Versailles pact had been made three years ago, Hitler would in all probability not be in power today; it if had been made eighteen months ago, Germany would not have withdrawn from the League." This Anglo-French maneuver could aid the transfer of reparation payments of the Dawes Plan. A political scientist at New York University, Arnold J. Zurcher, "The Hitler Referenda," The American Political Science Review, XXIX (February, 1935), 91-99, perceived little sign of weakness in Nazi Germany.

78 J. Emilyn Williams, "Correspondence from Germany: Germany Insists on Arms Equality," The Christian Century, LII (February 27, 1935), 284. Williams was a German correspondent for this weekly.
in the bringing back of Germany into the League of Nations, but, on the other hand, "the bitterness which has been aroused in the interval may reduce this organization to scraps of paper." 79

The February 22 Commonweal also grasped at the straws of Germany rejoining the League, 80 while the editors of The Literary Digest seemed to sense that the prospects for European peace had improved since Great Britain and France had made known their policy on German rearmament. 81 The New Republic advised its readers that it thought it saw a dilemma confronting Hitler about what road Nazi foreign policy should take next. 82

With his usual suddenness, Hitler arbitrarily settled the question of German rearmament on March 16, 1935, when he officially denounced the clauses of the Versailles Treaty providing for German disarmament. Essentially this amounted to a declaration of his intention to rebuild Germany's military might as rapidly as possible. His move was made before any real progress could be achieved in the Anglo-French plan of February, but it is indeed unlikely that the Fuehrer would have accepted the western powers' terms. To justify his March 16 proclamation, Hitler called attention to imaginary threatening gestures by Germany's western neighbors.

79 The Nation, CXL (February 13, 1935), 170.
80 The Commonweal, XVII (February 22, 1935), 469.
81 The Literary Digest, CXIX (February 23, 1935), 16.
82 The New Republic, LXXXII (February 20, 1935), 31.
In the light of this gesture by Hitler, The New Republic's opinion of Germany, expressed in the March 27 editorial "Europe's Tragedy: Act II," and in a signed article three weeks later, remained unchanged. A strong possibility of war had existed since the day that the Nazi leader stepped into office. Recent events, exclaimed the editors, would only hopelessly confuse the problems of disarmament. No European power would ever consider limiting its armaments and men-in-arms now. Rather than return to the League, The New Republic felt that Hitler would "use the respite to gain a more favorable position, both in diplomatic and military ways." Obviously not yet ready for a full-scale war, the National Socialists would now try by diplomacy to divide their opponents. The maintenance of the status quo by a threat of overwhelming force remained the sole hope of keeping the peace for the former World War allies, but even this action would inevitably end in calamity. "When force confronts force and will confronts will too long, conflict is sure to break out." The dilemma began with the Versailles Peace Treaty and continued with subsequent failures to fulfill the various clauses. "The world of capitalistic nationalism that made the War and the peace has, as if in a Greek tragedy, raised up the fury that will destroy it."

The New Republic's London correspondent Henry N. Brailsford appeared to be far less gloomy about the future of Europe. "In a mood of liberal optimism," he perceived the possible set-

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tling of political grievances, but, at the same time, he noted that "the anarchy that reveals itself...is in the last analysis economic." Political solutions "would do little to ease" this aspect of the problem, which could only be handled by world cooperation at the economic level. "But who dares predict that we can on a world scale solve the problem of a planned society that baffles each of us at home?"

Less discouraged than the editors of The New Republic, The Nation editorial entitled "Hitler Liquidates Versailles" credited Hitler with throwing down a challenge to the World War allies, destroying their "world of illusion" and compelling them to reassess their foreign policies now that they were confronted with a rearmed German nation. It was up to "the little and weak men who now guide the destinies of France, England, and Belgium, together with Mussolini," to decide the fate of Europe. Regrettably, predicted The Nation, these men would reject the most intelligent solution: a large reduction of armaments. In an additional comment elsewhere in this same issue of March 27, the journal's editors touched on a different aspect of this situation: while placing in doubt the ultimate success of a European system of collective security and increasing the chances of an arms race, Hitler's action made possible the renewal of cooperation between the western powers and the Soviet Union, which, in the end, could effectively guarantee world peace.84

84The Nation, CXL (March 27, 1935), 348, 345.
Several weeks later, Oswald Garrison Villard in The Nation wrote disparagingly about the Fuehrer's adventures in foreign affairs. "When Hitler mixes into international affairs he is pretty certain to blunder and blunder badly." This time he had played into the hands of the Bolsheviks by making possible an Anglo-French accord with Soviet Russia. Hitler was "forging a chain against himself all along the line" and would ultimately lead his nation to destruction. Similar sentiments were expressed by journalists William Orton, Willson Woodside and the editors of The Living Age, namely, that Nazi Germany could never live at peace with its neighbors.

The long-deflated ego of Germany was given a gigantic lift by Hitler's March 16 pronouncement, disclosed a Literary Digest article. "Comparatively united within, she is again fired with the Pan-Germanic impulse and in no mood to brook an agreement." Nazi Germany did nothing but follow the example of the western powers in repudiating the military clauses of the Versailles Treaty, in John Palmer Gavit's opinion. This Survey Graphic columnist claimed that "everybody in his right mind knew that in the

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87 W. M. H., "News and Comment: At the Observation Post," The Literary Digest, CXIX (March 30, 1935), 14. Only the initials of the author were given.
war-settlements, at Versailles and elsewhere, there were planted the seeds of any number of future wars."  

Frank H. Simonds' article "From Crisis to Conversation" for the May 1935 Harper's Magazine, asserted that the European opponents of Hitler had decided or were forced to abandon "the technique of Geneva" or working through the League of Nations. To contain Hitler, Europe had "returned to its own tradition, substituting the old practice of coalition for the new theory of collective action."  

Current History for May 1935 included two comments. Sidney B. Fay pointed out that "no act of Hitler appeared to have been more popular" than his decision to rearm Germany. With reference to international rather than domestic issues, Allan Nevins observed that "Nazi Germany had become a menace to all mankind," yet he felt that it was still not too late for the allies to make the effort to win Germany over to a policy of peace with her neighbors.  

The five major religious journals also commented on Germany's rearmament, and their expressed views did not differ significantly from those of the non-denominational periodicals. The Protestant journals, The Presbyterian Tribune and The Christian  

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Century, seemed inclined to rationalize a justification for Hitler's action in the injustice of the Versailles Treaty. The Presbyterian Tribune said as much, while the Century stressed the fact that Hitler was only trying to gain for Germany what other countries also hoped to achieve through similar military means. The Century's editors felt that an element of bluff underlay Hitler's action, in the sense that, since the German Chancellor probably did not desire war, he did realize the value of appearing more aggressive and better armed than was actually the case. 91

Catholic spokesmen were not quite as accommodating as the Protestant journals when dealing with Hitler's diplomatic activities. The Commonweal, America and The Sign all felt that war had come much closer through this acceleration of the arms race. The Commonweal's editors resorted to the old cliché about "might can do what right is unable to accomplish" in Hitler's eyes, which was, however, the closest any of these journals came to a moralistic pronouncement. Yet, however grim the situation and however near "Europe's ruin," war remained only a strong possibility, not an inevitability, in the eyes of these Catholic editors. Along with its editorial, The Commonweal also printed an article over Hubertus Loewenstein's signature which contributed nothing significant to the discussion, since it looked back toward mistakes in the past in attempting to explain the present situation.

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Not only had Adolf Hitler made good in his efforts to re-establish Germany's military might, but he also easily brushed aside the verbal censures of the League of Nations and the western European powers. He scored still another diplomatic coup when Great Britain, one of the protesting powers, decided to continue alone the disarmament talks with Germany. The negotiations personally undertaken by the British Foreign Secretary Sir John Simon, produced an innocuous naval treaty later in the year.

News of Simon's conversations with Adolf Hitler was considered by the liberal journals in April 1935. Both The Nation and The New Republic correctly interpreted Hitler's motive as a desire to divide the powers of the West so that Germany would gain a free hand for expansion eastward. Both journals saw renewed trouble for the West, unless the democracies could finally present a united front against the German threat. The New Republic doubted that even the league could restrain the Third Reich by way of economic sanctions; "war is inevitable sooner or later," it prophesied gloomily. Indicating some of its prejudices, this liberal journal declared: "If war comes again in Europe, it will be the crowning demonstration of the ruin of capitalism, a ruin finally precipitated by the absurd and logical extreme of capi-

In "What Will Europe Do?" for the April 26 Commonweal, George N. Shuster declared that for two years German diplomats had been trying to convince other nations that the Reich's expansion was an economic necessity, but results had been meager. "It may well be that if Germany had been a stronger and more intelligently governed country this policy would have succeeded." It now looked like the sole way for German economic success was through war, and in the long run, Germany would be the loser, predicted Shuster.

In mid-April 1935 a minor event, having both local and international implications, drew some interesting response in two American periodicals. A local election held in the heavily populated German city of Danzig, a free city under League control since 1919, found the Nazis receiving less than a two-thirds majority of the vote, notwithstanding the Hitlerites' drive for the usual ninety percent of the vote.

Grasping at any straw, The Nation interpreted the election results to be a major defeat in Germany's drive for hegemony in Europe: the myth of Nazi invincibility had been shattered.

Inflating the election way out of proportion, this journal declared: "Within Germany it should at least counteract the effect

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94 George N. Shuster, "What Will Europe Do?" The Commonweal, XXI (April 26, 1935), 725-726.
of the Saar victory, and revive hope in the hearts of the opposition for an ultimate return to sanity. The April 19 Commonweal was also full of optimism. Led by the Catholic clergy, the anti-Nazi factions of Danzig had supposedly united to show the world "the real Germany." The Commonweal boldly predicted that some day "history may point to April 7 as the day on which a heavy stormcloud began to lift from Europe." Yet the Danzig episode failed to impress other journals as it did these two.

Without reference to any specific event, the editors of The New Republic, The Christian Century and The Nation early in May expressed dire predictions for the future of Europe.

The western world's confusion and uncertainty about German aims were vividly reflected in several major signed essays during May and June 1935, offering the American public contradictory interpretations and aspirations.

Correspondent Edward Price Bell published in The Literary Digest the notes of an interview he had had with the German Fuhrer, who played again on the theme of Germany's peaceful intentions. The terror of the report was that Hitler should be taken

95 The Nation, CXL (April 17, 1935), 430.
96 The Commonweal, XXI (April 19, 1935), 693.
98 Edward Price Bell, "Foreign Comment: 'Nobody in Germany Wants War'—Hitler," The Literary Digest, CXIX (May 11, 1935), 11 32-34. Bell had been a leading American journalist for more than fifty years.
taken at his word. On the other hand, Hubertus Loewenstein announced rather inanely in The Commonweal for May 17 that Adolf Hitler did not speak for and represent Germany. National Socialism was something alien and non-German. Only those people like Loewenstein who, living outside of the Reich, truly represented Germany. 99 All of this discussion by the German exile provided small comfort to The Commonweal's readers who understood that their government had to deal with Hitler, myth or reality, rather than with Loewenstein.

Writing in the June Current History, Frank H. Simonds asserted that this man of violent and sudden action, Adolf Hitler, could not be trusted anyway. He was neither a statesman nor a practical politician; no amount of experience in international affairs could give him enough insight into basic realities. Hitler would never learn, for instance, that every show of force would "multiply the odds" against Germany. Simonds likened him to Emperor Napoleon I, who was willing "to challenge a Europe that his own unbalanced ambition had consolidated into an irresistible coalition." 100 Such an interpretation could suffice for the long view, but it offered small comfort for the immediate present. A few months later, John Gunther explored aspects of Hitler's complex personality in a character study for the January


100 Frank H. Simonds, "What Next in Europe?" Current History, XLII (June, 1935), 228-229.
1936 Harper's Magazine. This correspondent offered his American readers a more realistic appraisal of the dictator than the one by Simonds. On one hand, Gunther stated that Hitler had "no poise" and found it "difficult to make quick decisions," but, on the other hand, he perceived the Fuehrer as a "shrewd and penetrating" politician, which would help him reach his goals. Concerning the future Hitler course of action, Gunther said: "His tactics may change; his strategy may change; his aim, never. His aim is to create a strong national Germany, with himself atop it."101

The will of the European powers to contest with Hitler had vanished, according to a German journalist, Wilhelm Stefan, writing in the July 1935 Review of Reviews. He added, cynically it is suspected, that war would come "only when the attitude of Hitler's present liberal opponents has made them lose office and when Hitler's own power has grown to such a point that the war has finally become completely senseless."102 This sweeping criticism of liberalism and this shifting of responsibility for Hitler's actions to the western statesmen reflected the right-wing orientation of The Review of Reviews. So unique an argument could not be found in any other journals of this period.

Another Hitler peace speech before the Reichstag on May


102 Wilhelm Stefan, "No War for Europe?" The Review of Reviews, XCII (July, 1935), 58, 74. The author was a German journalist living in exile in Czechoslovakia.
21, 1935 failed to impress greatly The Nation, although this liberal weekly still gave the impression that time would bring the Fuehrer to his senses. The sincerity of his intentions had to be weighed with what he had not made explicit and those points which he was willing to compromise. He would not bargain over German populations, nor was he ready to sign an eastern Locarno pact. An attack on Russia in the near future appeared to be his way of breaking "the evertightening ring that surrounds him." This was indeed a desperate measure and gave rise to the hope that the Nazis might finally feel compelled to accept The Nation's favorite panacea, collective security, as a last resort.\(^{103}\) Reports on German affairs gathered by The Literary Digest were also optimistic that new diplomatic exchanges concerning armaments could get started again, "in a business-like manner." Germany, these sources asserted, "had neither the intention, nor the desire, to withhold her cooperation in any effort toward political stabilization of Europe."\(^{104}\)

On June 18, 1935, the Nazi diplomatic effort to drive a wedge between the British and French governments was successfully culminated with the signing of the Anglo-German naval agreement in which Germany promised not to extend her navy beyond thirty-five percent of Great Britain's. Again the two liberal weeklies led the way in trying promptly to analyze the event. The Nation's

\(^{103}\) The Nation, CXL (June 5, 1935), 645.
\(^{104}\) The Literary Digest, CXIX (June 8, 1935), 8.
indignant editorial "England Drops Europe" judged that the British government had capitulated "completely." Very clearly, Great Britain had decided to play an independent role in European affairs rather than join a united front against the Nazi challenge. If the British government was placing its faith in the bilateral agreement to end the arms race, it was endangering the whole theory of collective security and the League of Nations. "In bilateral negotiations a balance of power may be struck between two countries which is completely out of line with the best interests of the world as a whole." The New Republic announced a "startling alteration in the European balance of power and notified its readers that the Anglo-German treaty fulfilled another chapter in Hitler's Mein Kampf, one of the few references to this programmatic volume in the journals.

In a comprehensive article on National Socialism in the summer issue of Foreign Affairs, Dorothy Thompson saw the Anglo-German agreement as the foundation for an anti-Communist front, which Hitler and Rosenberg had long dreamed of organizing. The new pact, wrote Miss Thompson was intimately associated with the Nazis' theories of race superiority. An episode of international implications which provoked a great deal of American press response was the Olympic games,

105 The Nation, CXLII (July 3, 1935), 5.
scheduled for Berlin in the summer of 1936. The Olympics brought comparative domestic calm to Nazi Germany as the Hitler government made a concerted effort to influence favorably world opinion through the visitors flocking to Berlin. With little other international news to discuss in mid-1935, the American Olympic committee's meeting regarding United States participation in the competition received considerable editorial response. The consensus of editorial opinion, which had no effect on the eventual decision of the American Olympic committee, was to keep the United States athletes at home, since the German government showed no intention of lifting its ban of racial discrimination, plus the fact the Nazis would certainly use the games as another propaganda springboard.108

While Adolf Hitler seemed temporarily satisfied with the progress he was making in international affairs, the same could not be said about the other infamous Fascist dictator, Benito Mussolini. Italy's invasion of Ethiopia officially got under way on October 3, 1935. Since a firm bond of friendship had not yet been established between the two dictators, Nazi Germany's interests were not at once vitally affected. But there was some immediate interest shown, notably in the liberal weeklies, concerning

what bearing this conflict might have on future European affairs and the Third Reich.

It was the opinion of the October 16 *Nation* editorial that the Italo-Ethiopian war could well have definite repercussions in Nazi Germany. An Italian failure might mean the end of both Fascist dictatorships, and because of this danger, the German leader "may well decide to give Mussolini all help within his power." A German-Italian rapprochement, impossible as long as the duel over Austria was maintained, could now serve as the base of the Hitler-desired revisionist bloc in European diplomatic relations. 109

On the other hand, a few weeks later, the December 4 *New Republic* editorial "Hitler's Move" observed that the German dictator was holding back aid from Fascist Italy and conducting himself very cautiously with regard to Austria. "He is using his nuisance value to try to bargain with France and England." His major aim remained a strike in an easterly direction, and he desired either active support from the French and British against Soviet Russia, or at least their benevolent neutrality. Another of Hitler's immediate goals was the acquisition of foreign credits, which if not forthcoming could endanger his regime. "Hitler might even go to the length of rejoining the League if sufficient concessions were made." Beyond a doubt, wrote *The New Republic*, success would clear the way for a loan, which would permit him to continue the arms-manufacturing program with-

out interruption and somewhat alleviate internal distress as well. It would immensely strengthen his position at home and free his energies for progress in penetration of neighboring countries. It would be a long step on the road laid out from the beginning.

Future negotiations would be long and tedious, since Hitler would find France difficult to conciliate. No faction in Paris but the French Fascists would be willing to allow the Germans a free rein in the East. 110

According to Denis Gwynn in the December Sign, the Italo-Ethiopian war would find Germany making large economic gains at the expense of the Italians, who were attempting to defy the League of Nations' sanctions. The real loser in the whole episode looked like the Austrians, suggested Gwynn very correctly, for they now faced the renewal of Nazi agitation without the protection of Mussolini. 111

During the early months of 1936, Nazi foreign activity remained unspectacular. During this pause the American journals briefly commented on a variety of topics touching on foreign affairs. The threat of future aggression by Nazi Germany appeared to worry several journalists. Marcel W. Fodor warned the readers of the February 5 Nation: "Before an astonished world has time to recover from the shock, one country after the other, it seems probable, will fall before this cleverly launched attack." 112

111 Denis Gwynn, "If Italy Fails?" The Sign, XV (December, 1935), 266.
Frank C. Hanighen, writing in the March 1936 *Current History*, and the editors of *The Living Age* and *The Literary Digest* speculated on the Nazis' aggressive foreign policy aims. 113

Louis Fischer's estimation, in the article "Germany Prepares for War" in the March 11 *Nation*, was that Nazi Germany, not yet ready for war, would depend on diplomacy to win friends and undermine the policies of potential enemies. At the cost of great sacrifice by the German people, the new German war machine could be ready by the end of 1936, but knowledgeable observers pointed to the year 1939 as a more certain date. In the meantime German diplomacy had to fill the breach, with much depending on Mussolini's relations with the League. 114

The Russian-born historian, Leonid I. Strakhovsky, correctly appraised Germany's role in international affairs in early 1936, although the article did not appear until the June 1936 issue of *The Catholic World*. Strakhovsky discounted the possibility of war in the near future. The Hitler of 1936 was not the same man of 1923 who had written *Mein Kampf*, since it had become quite obvious that he would not have to resort to warfare to win back the German lands lost in 1919. Strakhovsky pointed out that Germany had already been able to destroy much of the Versailles

113 Frank C. Hanighen, "Troubled Days in Czechoslovakia," *Current History*, XLIII (March, 1936), 578-583; *The Living Age*, CCCXLIX (January, 1936), 382; and *The Literary Digest*, CXXI (February 22, 1936), 13.

114 Louis Fischer, "Germany Prepares for War," *The Nation*, CXLII (March 11, 1936), 311-313.
settlement without recourse to armed force.

She stand today, strong and united, courted by most na-
tions because she is feared, and she has no need to resort
to war when she knows that she can obtain, in the near fu-
ture, most of the things she now desires. In the present
state of affairs in Europe, much to the disgust of those
who are opposed to the principles and practices of the Na-
zi regime, Germany stands as a factor contributing rather
to the maintenance of peace than as a disturbing element
leading to war.115

Strakhovsky's assessment, which contradicted most of the contem-
porary literature, seemed to rest on a firmer foundation of his-
torical perspective and realism, yet the author failed to notice
how much of the Versailles settlement remained intact.

As if in confirmation of Strakhovsky's judgment and to
point to his limitations at the same time, Germany's next move,
the remilitarization of the Rhineland on March 7, 1936, sent a
wave of terror through western capitals which quickly subsided
without serious incident. In his Reichstag speech announcing the
German action, Hitler, while condemning the French government for
making an alliance with the Russian Bolsheviks and thereby "in-
validating" the Locarno agreements, held out an olive branch to
the western European countries. On the other hand, Hitler, in
threatening terms, discussed the dangers presented by Communist
Russia in the East.

The German remilitarization was an open breach of the Ver-
sailles Treaty and a casus foederis under the terms of the Locar-

115Leonid I. Strakhovsky, "Peace in Europe," The Catholic
World, CXLIII (June, 1936), 271-272. Strakhovsky was a member of
the history department of Georgetown University.
no Pact. Since the German army was not yet prepared for a full-scale war, the military commanders voted against the reoccupation, yet it seemed to the Fuehrer that the time was ripe for this historic step. The great powers of Europe and the League of Nations were preoccupied with the Italo-Ethiopian war. Then there was the pending Franco-Soviet alliance which, if Hitler delayed in his Rhineland scheme, might ultimately thwart his ambitions. Germany's domestic situation also demanded something to bolster the people's morale.

The international crisis precipitated by Hitler's aggressive step received close attention from the American journals and provoked a variety of responses: most of the periodicals did not even express surprise at Hitler's decision.

The editors of The New Republic said that they had expected this German move. The Rhineland remilitarization had been the next logical step for the Fuehrer to take in his unmaking of the post-war settlement. Yet it had not solved any problem, and besides there were the Hitler threats aimed at the Soviet Union.

The dreadful fact about Europe today is that peace is almost impossible no matter what the existing governments may want to do. They are the victims of their own past, during which they have built up hostile attitudes and policies that simply cannot be obliterated quickly, even given the will.

One week later, in the editorial entitled "The Chance of Peace in Europe," The New Republic editors again pointed out that the Nazi leader would quite willingly go to war if driven to it.

He believes in the use of force, and has taken pains to militarize not only the German body but the German mind.
No doubt he does not want war in the abstract, and certainly he does not want it until the chance of victory is good; he would rather attain his ends by frightening his enemies than by fighting. But if he finds that he cannot win without fighting, he will be ready to make good his bluff.

Here extreme caution was called for when dealing with the National Socialists. As a constructive measure that lacked all details and all reality, the editors suggested the setting up of a fixed zone in Europe, heavily armed, beyond which German aggression would be met by armed force. However, one drawback to this plan was that it would probably "solidify Hitler's internal support."

Another course, the one preferred by the editors, could be the economic isolation of the Third Reich. This choice could either encourage a domestic revolution or force Hitler to take a desperate chance, but at least the time gained meant a further weakening of the Nazis' economic situation. "Delay, coupled with resolute refusal to deal with Hitler, is Europe's only chance for peace," concluded this editorial. 116

The Nation associated Hitler's action with the League debates on sanctions against Fascist Italy for its African aggression. Making a premature judgment, The Nation's editors assumed that the two Fascist dictators had decided to work together to destroy the League of Nations and to play off the other powers against one another. Again this weekly advised that the ready solution for the situation would be collective security. "Firm-

ness toward Mussolini would seem the surest way of preventing Hitler from launching his widely heralded drive toward the Soviet Ukraine." With his rearmament only partially completed, Hitler would not dare launch his eastern campaign. In spite of the logic of its position, The Nation looked for the European statesmen to fall back on the antiquated and dangerous methods of diplomatic maneuvering, "even though these measures are bound to lead to war." But people should not be disheartened, wrote The Nation, since there appeared to be "an overwhelming popular sentiment against war," which could prove to be irrepressible. The editors continued to voice support for collective security in the next two weeks and objected to the Locarno powers' failure to take prior consideration of a solution for territorial problems in eastern Europe.

Correspondent John Gunther told the readers of The Nation that a rebuke by the League would be a mere "academic gesture" under the circumstances. "The overwhelming impression of those best informed is that Hitler's wary and ruthless boldness has once again presented Europe with a fait accompli impossible to resist." Most European statesmen sensed that it was time to devise a new system of European security, but the "cards are in the fist of the potential aggressor." Oswald Garrison Villard seconded Gunther's remarks. Hitler has shown himself to be a shrewd diplomat; his skillful pattern of operation had paralyzed European public opinion. "The most alarming thing about it all is that the statesmen of England and France and Belgium and the other
countries are so without vision, so unable to move constructively to deal with this man who menaces the peace of all the world. Villard had nothing to say about any responsibility by the United states for this present world situation; in fact, no journal did.

Writing in the May 1936 Review of Reviews, conservative Roger Shaw advanced the theory that the Rhineland remilitarization did not menace France because Germany looked East at the Russian Ukraine and the "Jewish Republic of Russia"—as they tactfully put it." "Peace with France and England has been a keynote policy of the nazis." The military reoccupation along the Rhine frontier was undertaken to forestall a French invasion if the Germans moved across Poland into Russia or "had upset the impossible dictatorship which rules over Austria." It was Shaw's naive appraisal that the Nazis were only after "the right of self-defense." As so often before, The Review of Reviews sought desperately to justify the latest German venture in foreign affairs. Also the fact that Hitler had once more publicly announced his desire to destroy Russian Communism, no doubt, influenced Shaw's thinking.

Much less positive was the report "Defiance on the Rhine" by Allan Nevins for the April Current History. He called the...
Rhineland move a decisive turning point, a "thunderclap" which may presage a storm or which alternatively may bring a rapid clearing of the air and a brighter outlook."\(^{119}\) Neither the editors of The Living Age nor the Literary Digest offered their readers more than some general comments on the Rhineland event, which was considered a momentous occasion.\(^{120}\)

In "Goose-Stepping Toward Chaos," The Commonweal expressed confidence that the world statesmen would work out a peaceful arrangement, but it wondered about the future of Europe as long as Hitler was at the helm of a great state. The Commonweal had just made the discovery that other European states had fallen under the spell of self-interest. The world faced a difficult time ahead unless the European leaders "withdrew from the edge of the abyss and recognize and live up to the honor which is based on the laws of God," said the editors. "No more man-made treaties will save our civilization."\(^{121}\) America gave its readers only factual reports on the Rhineland incident.\(^{122}\)

An editorial and two articles in The Sign completed the Catholic response to the Rhineland move. The editors concluded, not without surprise, that Hitler's repudiation of the Locarno

\(^{119}\)Allan Nevins, "Defiance on the Rhine," Current History XLIV (April, 1936), 407.

\(^{120}\)The Living Age, CCCL (April, 1936), 99, and The Literary Digest, CXXI (March 14, 1936), 12.

\(^{121}\)The Commonweal, XXIII (March 20, 1936), 561-562.

\(^{122}\)America, LIV (March 21, 1936), 578-579, and (March 28, 1936), 602-603.
pact and the Versailles Treaty indicated that the German leader was without "fundamental honesty," as he broke treaty after treaty. Columnist Denis Gwynn in the same periodical saw no immediate danger arising out of the German Rhineland action. Neither France nor Germany wanted war at the moment, although the author quickly noted that if France showed continuing signs of weakness, one could be sure that Nazi Germany would make an attempt to seize the lost provinces of Alsace and Lorraine. As for the Fuehrer's latest deed, Gwynn found British public opinion to be "overwhelmingly on his side," but it remained to be seen what the British reaction would be if new negotiations proved fruitless.

One month later, Gwynn amended his earlier remarks: "Every week increases Germany's strength and adds to the nervous anxiety of her neighbors." He continued by making this judgment:

> Every week makes Germany more powerful as her re-armament proceeds night and day. In two years, or even less, she will be in a position to defy any combination that opposes her. And her rulers make no secret of their intention to amalgamate all the German populations in adjacent countries under a united Reich. Will the countries which fear that future be content to wait while Germany re-arms with the object of carrying out the program which menaces them directly? Or will they strike, on one pretext or another, before it is too late to defend themselves except in a suicidal war of defense?123

The March 18 editorial of The Christian Century, "Germany Invades the Rhineland," took a very realistic position with respect to the Rhineland venture of the Nazis. This latest Hitler

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strike was executed with "dramatic suddenness" in order to make "it mean as much as possible both for the stimulation of German morale and for striking alarm to neighboring nations." The Germany of 1919, weak and broken, no longer existed. The Nazi Germany of Adolf Hitler was much too strong for the Versailles and Locarno provisions, which had "become completely impractical and irrelevant to the conditions of 1936." Before it was too late, wrote the Century, the other powers were going to have to recognize that Germany, even under her present regime, was an equal, and in a true democratic spirit the Century expressed its approval of Hitler's tactics up to mid-1936:

Hitler may be wrong about nearly everything else—about his treatment of the Jews and the churches, about the absurd racial nationalism that he has fostered, about the whole program of violence and repression and dictatorship—but he is right about this: that a permanent peace among the nations of Europe cannot be built upon the theory that one of them occupies a lower status and endows a smaller degree of independence than any of the others.124

Another Protestant weekly, The Presbyterian Tribune, echoed the sentiments of the Century by calling the Rhineland re-militarization just an inevitable effect of the peace imposed upon Germany in 1919. While the Tribune admitted that the Germans would probably have been just as vengeful if they had been victorious, "the fact still remains that such a peace was a tragic mistake. Had there been a forgiving peace, a Christian peace, the world would not now be drifting over the rapids."125

124 The Christian Century, LIII (March 18, 1936), 422-424.

125 The Presbyterian Tribune, LI (March 19, 1936), 4.
On March 29, 1936, another plebiscite of affirmation was held in Nazi Germany to give approval to the Rhineland action, together with the election of another rubber-stamp Reichstag. Almost ninety-nine percent of 45,453,691 voters went to the polls, and only 540,211 voiced their disapproval of the government.

Most of the important weeklies responded to this election but not one of them expressed surprise at the outcome. For The Nation "the campaign marked the high point in the Nazis' mastery of mob psychology"; however, the number of negative or mutilated ballots indicated that some courageous opposition still existed. The New Republic accused Hitler and his associates of having muddled minds because they saw "no real distinction between a compulsory demonstration of unanimous support and a voluntary one." The Literary Digest called Hitler's majority a "thundering reply" to the Locarno powers, and it also believed that credit for the highly favorable vote was due to the impassioned campaign which the Fuehrer carried directly to the masses.

The Christian Century described the election as an exercise in discipline: "All this 'election' amounts to is that Hitler casts forty-four million votes for himself and throws out all others." The Ave Maria claimed that the votes had been tam-

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126 The Nation, CXLII (April 8, 1936), 433.
127 The New Republic, LXXXVI (April 8, 1936), 234.
128 The Literary Digest, CXXI (April 4, 1936), 12.
129 The Christian Century, LIII (April 8, 1936), 523-524.
pered with, for German Catholics could hardly give the government a vote of confidence under the present circumstances.  130 America ascertained, without indicating what proof it had for its assertion, that "millions of the votes counted for Hitler were in reality cast against him."  131 But The Commonweal correctly perceived that there was no longer any value "in studying such manifestoes" of the Hitler dictatorship, since "it is the phenomenon of dictatorship itself that becomes increasingly important."  132

By way of summary, war or the threat of war in Europe was a problem which received much secular periodical attention in mid-1933; yet few commentators seemed to realize that Germany was militarily unprepared. At this time, only Leon Trotsky, writing from Europe to various American journals, showed real perception in accurately predicting Hitler's plan of action in foreign affairs.

With the exception of The New Republic, the American journals, as well as most European statesmen, were surprised by Hitler's move in withdrawing Germany from the League and the Disarmament Conference. But American periodicals, except for some comments from The Nation, failed to handle in great depth the major challenge by the German totalitarian leader. American rea-

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130 The Ave Maria, XLIII (New Series) (May 9, 1936), 601.
131 America, LV (April 11, 1936), 23.
132 The Commonweal, XXIII (April 10, 1936), 647.
ders found no penetrating analysis of this giant step in the direction of revising the Versailles Treaty, and of restoring the German nation's hegemony over continental Europe.

Soon after the first shock at the news that Germany had withdrawn from the League of Nations and the Disarmament Conference, the journals evinced considerable concern for Germany's future role in world affairs, but too much attention was again directed to the threat of war and to speculations about Germany's war potential. This attitude was unrealistic and showed the superficiality of the journals. On the other hand, the most important tactic made by the Nazis in foreign affairs during 1934—the German-Polish pact—was given brief treatment.

The periodicals displayed some interest with regard to the Austrian Nazis' activities, particularly when Chancellor Dollfuss was murdered. The journals treated the Austrian episode as a giant setback for Hitler and believed Nazi Germany isolated diplomatically. In the light of the Dollfuss murder and domestic events, most importantly the Roehm Purge, Hitler's campaign for peace in the summer of 1934 received little support from American journalists, many of whom gave the impression that Hitler was losing his grip on German affairs.

Some journals did exhibit enough foresight during 1934 to begin speculating about what would happen to the Saar region in January 1935. In general, the observers found too many uncertain factors to make definitive predictions, and only The Nation on the very eve of the election revealed the real situation. Assess-
ments by the Catholic journalists, who should have been intensely interested in the fate of the predominately Catholic Saarland were notable by their absence. In its one comment *The Commonweal* tried to rationalize the Catholic Church's lack of a vigorous policy.

The Saar election results were inspected cautiously, and there were hints that Hitler might now calm down after this latest success. Only *The Nation* appeared worried over the similarity of the voting patterns in the Saar and Germany proper. The editors of *The Christian Century* responded as if the Saar vote counted for little in the light of German domestic problems.

Nazi rearmament surprised few American journalists, or so it appeared from the responses. Implied throughout the analyses was a feeling of sympathy for Germany—even Nazi Germany—because of the war-time allies' failure to adhere faithfully to the Versailles disarmament provisions. Only *The Nation* continued to count on a victory for the theory of collective security, a position this journal would maintain for several years.

During all of 1935, Nazi Germany made few overt maneuvers in the foreign arena, and only *The New Republic* and *The Nation* speculated with any regularity on possible Nazi moves. One minor incident, a local election in Danzig which gave the National Socialists less than their usual overwhelming majority, resulted in *The Nation* and *The Commonweal* making overenthusiastic evaluations. It appeared that Fascist Italy's undertaking in Africa might have an effect upon Hitler's future activities, but the
journals were restrained in their predictions, since Hitler gave the appearance of biding his time.

When the Rhineland remilitarization occurred, once more the journals seemed prepared to accept calmly Hitler's surprise and defiant move. The intransigent western powers rather than Adolf Hitler bore the brunt of the criticism, and the logic of the Fuehrer's argument was accepted, even if what the Nazis stood for was opposed. Suggestions for dealing with Hitler lacked imagination and realism, although some journalists believed the time had come for a complete reassessment of the European treaty arrangement.

Throughout the three years covered in this chapter, the American observers found it impossible to isolate Germany's diplomatic undertakings. Very often the journalists tried to show a connection between German foreign and domestic affairs.
CHAPTER XI

NAZI FOREIGN POLICY, 1936-1939

Between April 1936 and September 1939, the Nazi Fuehrer plotted the course leading to the complete fulfillment of his foreign policy goals. Because of the growing seriousness of the European situation, the American journals of opinion devoted much attention to German foreign affairs almost to the exclusion of domestic German matters. The question the journalists tried to answer was, "what next"?

Immediately after the Rhineland episode, while the Nazi government paused to enjoy the victory of the March fait accompli and to prepare for the summer Olympic games in Berlin, journalists speculated upon Europe's future in the light of a revitalized and apparently aggressive Germany.

In the article "Is It Zero Hour?" for the April 10, 1936 Commonweal, George N. Shuster made the obvious observation that Europe once again resembled two armed camps, and the chances of war would increase commensurate to the growth of armaments. For the time being, Shuster foresaw a stalemate, with no power desiring war. Besides, the internal condition of Nazi Germany would seem to control future events. While the League powers appeared ready to work together to halt the German advances, Shuster was
far from confident that the peace could be maintained indefinitely. "Looking ahead, one can see only the likelihood of pressure—ceaseless, remorseless pressure grinding down those in the lower castes and exposing those in military command to temptations of recklessness and monomania."¹

Newsman Marcel W. Fodor indicated keen interest in the possibilities of the Austrian Anschluss, the "next logical step," he wrote in "The Austrian Volcano," in The Nation for May 27, 1936. Mussolini, it appeared to Fodor, was emerging from the Ethiopian campaign without diminishing his strength. He would not sit idly by while the German army marched into Austria, although the correspondent surmised that the two Fascist dictators "would go to war only as a last resort." The German leader clearly recognized the dangers, and both his diplomatic corps and the Reichswehr generals opposed such adventures, "but they also prophesied that disaster would result from Germany's adoption of conscription last year and from the recognition of the Rhineland a month ago." Two months later Fodor published in Foreign Affairs a detailed account of past and present National Socialist influence in Austria.²

By the beginning of the summer, The Nation's editors reached the conclusion that the pessimistic observers of world

¹George N. Shuster, "Is It Zero Hour?" The Commonweal, XXIII (April 10, 1936), 649-650.

affairs were correct in their assessment that the opportunity to bring a halt to Hitler's plan of conquest was "practically nonexistent today." Only the application of rigorous new penalties upon Fascist Italy by the League of Nations would be impressive enough to show Hitler the hazards of aggression. "Any other course means certain war for Europe," and it was becoming plainer every day that Austria would be the issue. Only Mussolini stood in Hitler's way. It had been determined by the Nazis that France would not challenge Germany unless she received British support which, the Berlin officials surmised, would not be forthcoming. The fact that the Nazis were probably mistaken "only magnified the danger," declared The Nation, which obviously had confidence that Britain and France would soon take a firm stand. The historian and foreign observer, Denis W. Brogan, writing in the July 1936 Harper's Magazine, cautioned the world that it appeared as if both Mussolini and Hitler, leaders of so-called "have-not" countries, were beginning to believe in the ultimate success of their forceful policies when challenging the leading capitalistic states for imperialistic dominancy. "For peace of the world I hope that both leaders are consummate hypocrites—but I doubt it." Equally despondent was Christopher Hollis, a conservative

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3 The Nation, CXLII (May 27, 1936), 665-666.

4 Denis W. Brogan, "Capitalism and War," Harper's Magazine, CLXXIII (July, 1936), 140-146. This British historian and political scientist was the author of a number of books on international subjects.
English Catholic correspondent, in the July 4 \textit{Ave Maria}. But it was not particularly the activities of the Hitlerites which worried him. Communism represented the greatest contemporary evil in his opinion. A concrete sign of European decay was the French-Soviet mutual assistance pact of May 1935, since it showed how badly all principles had been abandoned. "Stalin is clearly ten times more an enemy," he wrote, expressing a line of thought that had occurred previously in Catholic periodicals. "If we have to choose between the domination of our historic civilization by the one or the other, we may as well have Hitler without war as Stalin. And it would be far better to have Mussolini than either of them."\(^5\)

Some journalists shifted their view to the city of Danzig. The editors of \textit{The New Republic}, having despaired of any effective action from the League of Nations, saw a Nazi seizure of the city imminent.\(^6\) \textit{The Nation} called attention to the degree of the Nazi effort there.\(^7\) Newsman W. Walter Crotch, authoring the article "Eyes on Danzig" for the September 1936 \textit{Current History}, surmised that the Fuehrer believed a German fait accompli would be accepted peacefully wherever and whenever he decided to stage it. "Conquest in Danzig, of all available dramatic ges-


\(^6\)\textit{The New Republic}, LXXXVII (July 8, 1936), 256, and (July 15, 1936), 279.

\(^7\)\textit{The Nation}, CXLIII (July 11, 1936), 30.
tures, appears to be the easiest and the one fraught with least dangers." Although the city itself was no longer essential to Poland as a seaport, its easy acquisition by Germany would signal the end of European peace: "There will be no bounds to her appetite and no limit to the possibilities of her aggression." 8

The July 25 Literary Digest called attention to the Nazis remilitarizing of the island of Helgoland, contrary to the Versailles Treaty. 9 The September 1936 Living Age reported a concerted Nazi propaganda campaign against Czechoslovakia on behalf of the Sudetenland Germans. That Poland and Hungary had joined the Germans in protesting the minority populations' conditions was a very ominous sign. 10

Meanwhile in Berlin on July 11, 1936, in the midst of the Olympic festivities, Germany concluded with Austria an agreement designed to lull suspicious minds for the time being. The German Fuehrer promised to respect the sovereignty of Austria and to abstain from interference in Austrian internal affairs, while the Vienna government agreed to follow a policy that befitted a German state. Unknown to the press and foreign observers, the treaty included secret clauses which would contribute to the demise of the Austrian government: Austrian National Socialists were to

8 W. Walter Crotch, "Eyes on Danzig," Current History, XLIV (September, 1936), 79-82. Crotch was the editor-in-chief of the International Press Bureau.

9 The Literary Digest, CXXII (July 25, 1936), 11.

10 The Living Age, CCCLI (September, 1936), 6.
be granted a political amnesty and some places of responsibility in the Austrian administration.

American journals virtually ignored the treaty. America mentioned it without comment, while The Commonweal guessed incorrectly that the National Socialists were preparing the way for a customs union like the one proposed in 1931.\textsuperscript{11} It was The New Republic's opinion that Hitler "renounces violent conquest but opens the door to peaceful penetration and a possible—even probable—unity of international action. With this \textit{fait accompli}, he strengthens himself to bargain with England and France."\textsuperscript{12}

Except for this treaty the journals had little Nazi activity to assess in late summer of 1936. Frank C. Hanighen contributed a general article "Armies Over Europe" to the September 5 Nation, touching on the subject of German rearmament and offering the opinion that: "There will soon be marching men all over the face of Europe." A short editorial note in the same journal spoke of the beginning of a "not wholly unsuccessful German effort to offset anti-Nazi sentiment by launching a vigorous drive to 'save Europe from Communism.'" The Nation felt that the French conservatives, in opposition to the present French Popular Front government, which the Communists supported, listened more closely to Hitler's anti-Communist propaganda than anyone else in Eur-

\textsuperscript{11}\textit{America}, LV (July 18, 1936), 352, and \textit{The Commonweal}, XXIV (July 24, 1936), 315.

\textsuperscript{12}\textit{The New Republic}, LXXXVII (July 22, 1936), 310.
The annual Nuremberg meeting of the National Socialist Party in September 1936 stimulated more discussion of German militarism. Along with this subject, Hitler, in his major address, contrary to his opinions in Mein Kampf, demanded colonies for Germany; moreover, he condemned Communism and threatened war with the Soviet Union. "Hitler Looks East," a September 23 New Republic editorial, observed that a frightened world, suffering from war nerves, had been given "a painful shock" by the Fuehrer's latest oratory, "but far less painful than if any other responsible ruler--except, perhaps, Mussolini--had uttered them." The Nazi leader had made so many bellicose speeches "that the diplomats of other lands have perforce become somewhat insulated against their effect." The editors assumed that Germany's economic difficulties had forced the Fuehrer to speak boldly.14

The Literary Digest interpreted Hitler's speech to be "an ultimatum to Europe."15 In his October column in The Review of Reviews, Albert Shaw expressed interest in Hitler's "bold" declaration of German goals. Nowhere did the conservative journalist Shaw see the danger of war, even though the Nazis had torn the Versailles Treaty to shreds and were now seeking more territorial changes. The fact was that Germany had learned how to achieve

13 Frank C. Hanighen, "Armies Over Europe," The Nation, CXLIII (September 5, 1936), 268, and 257.
14 The New Republic, LXXXVIII (September 23, 1936), 171-172.
15 The Literary Digest, CXXII (September 19, 1936), 14-15.
diplomatic successes "without the terrible danger and risk of actual conflict." These accomplishments were primarily due to the personality of Hitler, who "has shown leadership that has surprised a world that had not believed in his capacity for statesmanship." 16

The Christian Century called Hitler's colonial demand "economic nonsense." A. S. Eker, the Century's German correspondent, opined that Hitler's projected attack on the Soviet Union was either an attempt to nullify the recent Franco-Soviet treaty or an indication that the Nazi leadership had really nothing new to offer its followers. Both the army and the foreign office, Eker claimed to have learned, had cautioned against the attack upon the Russian Communists, and it was their pressure which supposedly prevented Hitler from severing relations with the Soviet Union as a "grand climax" to the Nuremberg rally. 17 While Eker seemed to enjoy inside information which was fairly accurate, The Commonweal appeared befuddled by Hitler's warlike speech: "Unprecedented tragedy is interwoven with unparalleled bluffing." 18

On July 18, 1936, the Spanish Civil War began, an embroilment destined to affect the foreign relations of most European states for the next three years. Nazi Germany would be one of

17 The Christian Century, LIII (September 23, 1936), 1234, and A. S. Eker, "Correspondence from Germany: Germans Ponder Hitler Speeches," (October 14, 1936), 1371.
18 The Commonweal, XXIV (September 25, 1936), 495.
these powers, since on July 26 Hitler decided to send secret military aid to General Francisco Franco's Nationalist forces and to recruit "volunteers" for service in Spain. While Germany continued to try to mask her Iberian policy, the large amount of German equipment and the great numbers of German personnel proved impossible to conceal completely from observers' eyes. Intermittently the American journalists tried to analyze the effect of the Spanish conflict on German policy and the strategy behind Germany's foreign aid to General Franco's forces.

One of the first articles to concern itself in part with the impact of the Spanish struggle upon Nazi Germany was George N. Shuster's contribution to the October 2, 1936 Commonweal. He viewed the war as fitting neatly into Hitler's grand scheme: "Hitler's ancient role of anti-Bolshevik was now a big part in the world drama." The Nazi chief now looked forward to receiving western support against the Soviet Union, or at least to the annulment of the Franco-Soviet treaty. Perhaps the fact that this journal reflected the general Catholic fear of communism explains why it was one of the few to respond to this issue at this time and in this way. However, The Living Age for October 1936 tended in this same direction; it suggested that Hitler would avoid entangling Germany in the Spanish Civil War while concentrating efforts on his European crusade against Communist Russia. But other information received by this monthly called attention to a

19 George N. Shuster, "European Quandaries," ibid., (October 2, 1936), 520.
German military concentration along the Rhine River and not in the East.  

Almost three months later, when Nazi arms shipments to the Spanish Nationalist armies had become regular, the editors of The New Republic observed that Germany faced a dilemma in Spain, where the Franco armies needed continuous large-scale aid from the Fascist states to conclude successfully the civil war.  

Correspondent Walter Duranty suggested in The Nation for January 2, 1937, that Hitler would have to abandon his projects in Spain, if he planned to fulfill his dreams of a German empire in central Europe.  

But in the very same issue of the journal, the editors believed that Spain occupied most of the Fuehrer's attention. In their estimation the point had almost been reached where Hitler would have to intervene openly in the Iberian peninsula or halt the indirect aid to Franco. The threat of isolation, since Great Britain and Italy stood ready on January 2 to sign a "gentlemen's agreement" to maintain the status quo in the Mediterranean, and the chance of a major defeat made a war started by Hitler an unlikely possibility in 1937.  

In partial agreement with The Nation, The Commonweal sus-

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20 The Living Age, CCCLI (October, 1936), 97-98.  
21 The New Republic, LXXXIX (December 30, 1936), 257-258.  
22 Walter Duranty, "Hitler's House of Cards," The Nation, CXLIV (January 2, 1937), 9-11. Duranty was a noted journalist of European affairs who was well-known for his reporting of Soviet Russian affairs.  
23 The Nation, CXLIV (January 2, 1937), 4-5.
pected that Germany was on the verge of being isolated again, particularly regarding the Spanish intervention. Yet it did not dare suggest that a solution was in sight for Europe's problems. The question of German isolation also received attention from The New Republic. Reading too much into the recently signed Anglo-Italian agreement governing the Mediterranean, The New Republic for January 6 announced that "the whole European situation had been altered." As yet Hitler had not formulated a new policy, but whatever his decisions, this weekly thought that most German officials realized that the Italians "would probably get the lion's share of the reward" in any final settlement in Spain.

An altogether different assessment was made by Denis Gwynn in the article "The Spanish Conflict Spreads" for the February 1937 Sign. "It is almost inconceivable that Germany in present circumstances should either relax in her assistance to General Franco or even fail to intervene on a much bolder scale." A rebel victory would help keep France preoccupied, while Germany fulfilled her ambitions in the East. On the other hand, in Gwynn's opinion a victory for the left-wing loyalists would create a definite menace in the West, extending the encirclement of Germany. Two months later Gwynn radically readjusted his earlier opinions. Apparently Hitler was ready to allow the Italians to take full

24 The Commonweal, XXV (January 8, 1937), 287, and (January 15, 1937), 315.

responsibility for helping General Franco's cause, and the Fuehrer would turn his attention elsewhere. Before the year was over, Gwynn expected an explosion along Germany's eastern borders. 26

In the April Current History, George E. R. Gedye urged the British and French to call the Nazi bluff, and the best place at the moment, he suggested, would be in Spain. 27 The May Review of Reviews questioned the efficiency of the German weapons being used in the Spanish Civil War both by the Franco forces and the German "volunteers." In spite of the reports which had acclaimed the superiority of German weapons, new German equipment had "fallen down" on the Spanish battlefield. The conservative monthly assessed "that the very haste of German rearmament has proved its undoing." 28

The May 31, 1937 bombardment of the Spanish republican city of Almeria administered by German warships by way of reprisal for an air attack by the Spanish Loyalists upon the German warship Deutschland, caused little stir in American journalistic circles, and only The Nation made noteworthy editorial response. While the June 12 editorial "The Drift to War" expressed relief that the bombing had passed without plunging Europe into war, it


28 The Review of Reviews, XCV (May, 1937), 18.
saw greater significance in the fact that Adolf Hitler had shown all the peoples of the world "that he can order the bombardment of a foreign city in defiance of the League, of the Pact of Paris, and of all principles of humanity without rebuke from the democratic powers." The Nation wondered how long this condition could continue: "Encouraged by the passivity of the democratic states, Hitler or Mussolini is certain on some occasion to misjudge the extent to which the powers will retreat." 29

Other observers in the fall of 1936 and the spring of 1937 turned to different aspects of Germany's foreign affairs. Frenchman Ernst Henri in The Living Age, referring to a Nazi master plan on foreign affairs, speculated that Hitler aimed in the immediate future to conquer and divide Russia and then turn his armies on the West. 30 The city of Danzig continued to be the number-one European danger zone according to Henry C. Wolfe in the October 17 issue of The Nation. 31

Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr analyzed Nazi foreign policy for the readers of the November 1936 Current History. Germany ultimately intended to displace France as the leading power in western Europe although without challenging France directly. "The Nazi pur-

29 The Nation, CXLIV (June 12, 1937), 665.
30 Ernst Henri, "Hitler Over Russia," The Living Age, CCCLI (November, 1936), 203. This French author had written several books on contemporary European affairs.
31 Henry C. Wolfe, "Danzig Under the Terror," The Nation, CXLIII (October 17, 1936), 447.
pose," explained Dr. Niebuhr, "is to expand at the expense of the smaller nations of Europe and in the hope of avoiding conflict with the larger ones." He called the Nazis' expansion policy entirely predictable, because each new gain in military strength had to be tested in the international arena. Each test was "to demonstrate and to establish their power and prestige in Central Europe." A showdown with Czechoslovakia over the German minorities in this state lay in the immediate future, Niebuhr predicted.32

In late October 1936, a highly significant meeting occurred in Germany between Mussolini and Hitler, resulting in the beginning of the official alliance between the two dictatorships, the alliance that came to be called the Axis. The surprisingly limited response by journals may have been due to a lack of information. Only The Christian Century and The Nation reacted immediately; neither expressed alarm.33 The Century tried to view this German-Italian alliance from the vantage point of historical perspective. It reminded its readers of the old Triple Alliance, and pointed out that many of the conditions which caused this pre-World War I system to collapse in 1914 remained unchanged. "The two nations are not natural allies," for politically they are rivals in central and southeastern Europe. They could be counted


33 The Christian Century, LIII (November 4, 1936), 1446, and The Nation, CXLIII (November 21, 1936), 593.
upon to cooperate against Bolshevism, but these two dictatorships would not dare initiate a war which would lead to conflict over the division of spoils. As long as Hitler and Mussolini continued to meet no foreign opposition, there would be no war for Europe, wrote The Nation. Its editorial "False Hopes for Europe" prognosticated: "But this is merely another way of saying that when the war comes it will be at the time and under the conditions most favorable to the fascist cause."

The journals' failure to recognize the formation of a new coalition of Fascist powers was again evident in November 1936, when Germany and Japan signed the anti-Comintern pact. The December 9 New Republic, the one journal at the time to respond in an editorial entitled "Fascist Alliance," described the pact as "something strange in international agreements," since it was aimed not at a nation but at an organization: the Communist International. If Germany and Japan really wanted to destroy Communism, an invasion of the Soviet Union was ultimately necessary, in this journal's judgment. Three weeks later, The New Republic made some important additions to its original comments. It seemed to think that many "level heads" in both Germany and Japan had discovered that the foreign policy move of "bold challenge" identified with the anti-Comintern treaty had been overdone. The new anti-Communist alliance had failed to impress either France or Great Britain, and The New Republic assumed that Italy's failure immediately to join the coalition doomed it to
ultimate failure.\textsuperscript{34}  

In the January 2, 1937 \textit{Nation}, newsman Walter Duranty concurred with The \textit{New Republic}'s assessment. In his mind the Hitler-built totalitarian state resembled "a house of cards." Hitler erred seriously, Duranty wrote, in enlisting Japanese help for his campaign against world Communism, since this tactic annoyed the British and had strengthened the French and Russian will to resist. Initially the Fuehrer planned to pressure Czechoslovakia into surrendering her German population and then to force Austria, Hungary and Rumania into the Nazi sphere of influence. Three months ago he would have been successful, maintained Duranty, but now his opponents seem prepared to support the Czechs against German aggression.\textsuperscript{35} Duranty did not indicate the source of his information about the new will to resist on the part of Germany's neighbors.

Throughout a considerable portion of 1937, the journalists and editors devoted much space to several major European problems involving Germany, besides the above mentioned Spanish Civil War. The theme of the danger of war reoccurred constantly in the journals. For example, in February \textit{The Catholic World} discussed the German threat to world peace and insisted that the German people desired peace. "If they can be persuaded that no one else wants

\textsuperscript{34}The \textit{New Republic}, LXXXIX (December 9, 1936), 159, and (December 30, 1936), 257-258.

\textsuperscript{35}Walter Duranty, "Hitler's House of Cards," \textit{The Nation}, CXLIX (January 2, 1937), 9-11.
war, war will not come, at least in Europe." While war might not result, The Living Age for January 1937 seemed almost positive that the Nazis would soon create tensions in Austria or Danzig for the purposes of diverting citizen attention from domestic conditions. On the other hand, Henry C. Wolfe, one of the most prolific authors of the period, argued in the January Current History that the Memel territory and its German citizens were becoming increasingly important in the Nazi scheme for hegemony in the Baltic area. Wolfe reiterated his thesis in the February Atlantic Monthly that Nazi Germany looked to eastern Europe for its future land empire.

On the occasion of his fourth anniversary in power, Hitler addressed the Nazi-packed Reichstag on January 30, 1937. The Fuehrer proclaimed no surprise moves in foreign relations and spoke less belligerently than usual; he announced that he had no intention of making any more sudden strikes in international affairs, and, in his only defiant gesture, he renounced the war-guilt clause of the now defunct Versailles Treaty. As hinted in this address, 1937 saw the Nazis concentrate upon internal affairs and the buildup of the armed forces.

The whole tone of Hitler's message surprised The Nation for February 6, 1937, which a week before had warned its readers

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36 The Catholic World, CXLIV (February, 1937), 516.
37 The Living Age, CCCLI (January, 1937), 378.
to expect the worst. Nevertheless, it would not concede that Hitler's character had suddenly changed: "It remains to be seen how long Hitler can without war divert the people's attention from their empty larders." From his station in Europe, Robert Dell wrote to The Nation that, contrary to the superficial views of many observers, Hitler's speech had been recognized by many in Europe as "one of the most sinister that he has yet made." It was all too clear that he would have nothing to do with a general European settlement by the tone of his remarks against an international arms agreement and the League of Nations. In Hitler's mind, "Germany must be the sole judge of its own requirements in the matter of armaments and everything else," said Dell. 39

Brief response to the speech also appeared in The Literary Digest, the Christian Century, and The Survey Graphic. The Digest accepted the speech as "conciliatory," while The Christian Century and John Palmer Gavit for The Survey Graphic expressed misgivings. 40

The spring and summer of 1937 were devoid of spectacular events in German foreign affairs, and many of the American journalists gave the impression of groping for material, since many of the old themes were repeated. In one instance Emil Ludwig ad-

39 The Nation, CXLIV (January 30, 1937), 114; (February 6, 1937), 141-142; and Robert Dell, "Paying Ransom to Hitler," (February 27, 1937), 234.

40 The Literary Digest, CXXIII (February 6, 1937), 14; The Christian Century, LIV (February 10, 1937), 172; and John Palmer Gavit, "Through Neighbors' Doorways," The Survey Graphic, XXIV (March, 1937), 152.
vised in essays for the March Current History and the April Forum that the very nature of the National Socialist dictatorship made war inevitable.  

41 The March 13 Nation warned the leaders of Europe to be alert in central and southeastern Europe, while the April Living Age pointed to Czechoslovakia as "the first victim" of Nazi aggression. However, two months later The Living Age's editors noted an "unmistakable lull in the rumors of war,"--the first time since Adolf Hitler took power in 1933. It surmised that the Reichswehr officers and Dr. Hjalmar Schacht had convinced the Fuehrer that a war at this time would be too costly.

43 Elmer Davis, writing the article "Czechoslovakia: Bridge or Barricade?" for the June 1937 Harper's Magazine, considered the numerous complexities of European diplomacy and concluded that a peace settlement appeared doubtful without some costly concessions to the National Socialists. Czechoslovakia loomed as the biggest obstacle to Germany's plan for southeasterly expansion. How long it would remain so was a major question, since it appeared to Davis that there were too many people in Great Britain and France who would desert the Czechs if the Germans promised to spend their expansionist energies in the East. Some observers even believed that the Czechs were hopeful that an im-

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42 The Nation, CXLIV (March 12, 1937), 282-283.

43 The Living Age, CCCLII (April, 1937), 99, and (June, 1937), 284.
Improvement in the international trade situation would encourage the Nazis to live in peace. Davis had the impression that, at the moment, Nazi Germany did not feel that war would be profitable but could lead to a "final disaster" for all Europe. "With the present line-up it would be most surely disastrous to Germany, and the Nazi leaders would hardly destroy themselves just to have the fun of destroying their neighbors too. This implies of course that Hitler and Goering and the rest of them are rational men—which not all Europe believes." Davis also called attention to the upsurge of pro-Nazi activity within the German population of Czechoslovakia.

Echoing the sentiments of American non-interventionists, a special editorial in the May Current History, which definitely turned more conservative under its new ownership, suggested that Americans mind their own business with respect to Nazi Germany, regardless of their personal feelings. Generally the Nazis had kept their hands out of American affairs, except for the small unimportant radical quasi-Nazi groups. "Nothing will be achieved by splenetic anti-German outbursts." To be sure, the Nazi leaders would not heed any advice. Current History called for concrete measures to help those in need in Germany, perhaps the founding of an American refuge for the persecuted.

44 Elmer Davis, "Czechoslovakia: Bridge or Barricade?" Harper's Magazine, CLXXV (June, 1937), 84-86.
45 Current History, XLVI (May, 1937), 30.
The German shelling of the Spanish city of Almeria seemed to arouse among American journalistic circles more speculation concerning the possibilities of a general war and its implications. Changing its opinion once again, the July *Living Age* warned that Hitler was looking around "for a new master stroke" for the summer months.⁴⁶ Reporter Geoffrey Fraser described the German dilemma for the readers of the June 25 *Commonweal*. Germany was not fully prepared for a major war, and if the German generals decided not to risk a sudden stroke this year, by 1938 the anti-Fascist states would be rearmed, and "none but madmen would dare challenge them."⁴⁷

In "The Odds Against Germany" for the July *Harper's Magazine*, Willson Woodside also mistakenly subscribed to the theory that time was running out for successful Nazi aggression: "The odds against a successful German stroke in either eastern or western Europe are lengthening month by month." The final settlement with France as outlined in *Mein Kampf*, a volume now receiving considerable attention in the American periodicals, or a push to the East would be met by a solid phalanx of allies. Even if Fascist Italy sided with the Germans, and Woodside was not certain about this, the Fascist alliance would be at a distinct disadvantage. Rather than see Germany annihilated, Minister Schacht and

⁴⁶ *The Living Age*, CCCLII (July, 1937), 377.
⁴⁷ Geoffrey Fraser, "The Tangle of Central Europe," *The Commonweal*, XXVI (June 25, 1937), 230. Fraser had been a foreign correspondent in Germany for many years.
the army command would do everything possible to postpone Hitler's plans for conquest. "But we cannot see into the minds of the present masters of Germany. If they remain long enough in power, perhaps obsession, self-delusion...and lust for power will lead them to precipitate another terrible war in Europe." 48

Assessing the diplomatic scene in "Will Europe Go to War?" Ludwig Lore surmised that Nazi Germany was bluffing Europe with respect to war. Nevertheless, the course upon which Hitler had embarked both in foreign and domestic policies was one filled with numerous dangers.

A serious diplomatic defeat might destroy the confidence of the masses in the Hitler regime and even alienate the support of the large capitalist interests on whose continued approval its preparations for war so largely depend. German industry cannot live forever on hopes. The glory of a Germany remilitarized is a poor substitute for markets and foreign exchange.

Lore, in the second half of his essay, arrived at the conclusion that Germany's financial position would ultimately frustrate the regime's instincts for expansion. 49

Even though little had been heard recently about National Socialist activities in Austria, a Vienna politician, Ernst Karl Winter, wrote in the August 6, 1937 Commonweal that Hitler remained determined to gain mastery over Austria in the very near future. "He can never renounce Pan-Germanism's 'claim' to Aus-


49 Ludwig Lore, "Will Europe Go to War?" The Nation, CXLV (July 24, 1937), 91-92, and (July 31, 1937), 127-129.
tria without serious loss of prestige," was Winter's fairly sound prediction.50

Reporting to the readers of the September 1937 Atlantic Monthly, the English traveller Sir Arthur Willert considered it feasible that the Fascist states eventually would blunder into a world war, although he did not rule out a conflict for reasons of economic expansion. Yet Willert called it "unfair" to accuse Hitler and Mussolini of actually planning war.51

An event which the American periodical press again apparently underrated was the late September 1937 visit of Mussolini to Nazi Germany. Fuehrer Hitler and the National Socialists sought to impress the Italian leader with their newly acquired military power, and this display helped pave the way for closer diplomatic ties. Quite possibly because no significant announcement came forth from this meeting, all except two of the periodicals missed the true importance of the latest Fascist colloquy. Taking the meeting very seriously, The Christian Century judged that "the increasing solidarity of the German-Italian front is a significant and somewhat alarming fact." It further noted that the conference resulted in the joint demand for "respect as the

50 Ernst Karl Winter, "Austrian Affairs," The Commonweal, XXVI (August 6, 1937), 359. Winter was a former vice-mayor of Vienna.

51 Sir Arthur Willert, "The Distempers of Europe," The Atlantic Monthly, CLX (September, 1937), 376-378. After his retirement in March 1935 as the chief of the press department of the British Foreign Office, Willert had been a frequent visitor on the continent.
price of their cooperation for the preservation of peace." Forgotten was the idea that respect could be attained "only by being respectable," commented the Century.\(^5^2\) Emil Ludwig seemed convinced in his Forum article for October 1937 that Adolf Hitler now stood as the senior Fascist partner, much stronger than his Italian model. Within a matter of months, Hitler had been able to throw all Europe "into a fever," whereas no one seemed to be overly concerned with the Italian dictator.\(^5^3\)

Meanwhile, Henry C. Wolfe reexamined his favorite topic on German expansion to the East for the November 6, 1937 Nation. In the course of his presentation, Wolfe proposed that the German threats being directed at the Czechs would serve several purposes for the Nazis. They would test the degree of French and Russian opposition to the German ambitions in Bohemia, and they would serve to warn the other small countries of the region to stay clear of any alliance with the Prague government.\(^5^4\) A short editorial in The Christian Century touched on another trouble spot, Danzig, revealing that National Socialist Party stalwarts controlled important positions in the city government.\(^5^5\)

During November 1937, British Prime Minister Neville Cham-

\(^5^2\) The Christian Century, LIV (October 6, 1937), 1219.
\(^5^3\) Emil Ludwig, "The Two Dictators," The Forum, XCVIII (October, 1937), 170.
\(^5^4\) Henry C. Wolfe, "Nazi Eyes Turn East," The Nation, CXLV (November 6, 1937), 502-503.
\(^5^5\) The Christian Century, LIV (November 17, 1937), 1411.
berlain sent his Lord Privy Seal, Viscount Edward Halifax, destined to become Foreign Secretary in February 1938 after Anthony Eden's resignation, to Germany in order to explore a modus vivendi with the Nazis. The Fuehrer showed little interest in the British proposals for a comprehensive settlement of all existing grievances. Unknown to all but a handful of Nazi leaders and army generals, Nazi Germany's war plans, usually referred to as the Hossbach Minutes, had been drawn up on November 5, 1937, thus precluding a negotiated settlement. Nevertheless, the British government, despite this rebuff in November 1937, remained optimistic that a diplomatic solution could be found.

The editors of The Nation on December 4, 1937, candidly responded to the British efforts: "Fortified by a series of diplomatic victories in the last three years and by its alliance with Italy and Japan, Nazi Germany is not interested in minor concessions." They foresaw Great Britain deliberately preparing to appease Hitler in order to avoid a major war. In addition, The Nation attempted to keep its readers abreast of the flurry of diplomatic activity through its correspondent Robert Dell, who reported from Geneva on December 18 that the Halifax-Hitler discussions indicated that the German leader's program for gaining ascendancy in central Europe was bringing tangible returns. Two weeks later Dell suggested that perhaps Nazi Germany would bring Czechoslovakia into its sphere of influence by means of peaceful penetration. Dell clearly implied that the Czech state would not long survive, but his report showed less conviction than The
Nation's other foreign correspondent Marcus E. Ravage, who, from Paris on December 25, depicted the Nazis as trying to hurry the annexation of the Sudeten region of Czechoslovakia. Ravage reported that the National Socialist organization in Czechoslovakia, the German People's Party, had been gradually losing much of its mass support because of the disillusionment in seeing industrialists finance the movement. The Paris observer also disclosed that the Germans, taking note of the Italian army's shortcomings in Spain, were beginning to look upon their Fascist friends "as a liability."56

The December 8, 1937 New Republic short editorial "Bribing Germany to Be Good" summed up the situation well. Why try to bribe Hitler when he had already shown that promises meant nothing to him? "There is no real use in making bargains with a government that repudiates them as soon as it feels strong enough to do so."57 The Christian Century staff concurred with the opinion of The New Republic. Nazi Germany could never think in terms of a permanent settlement, for this solution would curtail the rearmament program and thus create unemployment. "What would happen to the Nazi government while these five million or more unemployed were standing around with nothing to do?" For a real

56 The Nation, CXLV (December 4, 1937), 601; Robert Dell, "Hitler and Halifax," (December 18, 1937), 686, and "Can Hitler Be Bought?" CXLVI (January 8, 1938), 36; and Marcus E. Ravage, "Il Duce, Tool of Hitler," CXLV (December 25, 1937), 713-714. Ravage was an American journalist who had spent many years in Europe.

57 The New Republic, XCIII (December 8, 1937), 113.
and lasting peace, The Christian Century concluded that "the whole basis of international trade will have to be altered." 58

The March 1938 issue of the conservative Living Age acknowledged that "the Fuhrer is almost literally holding a pistol to Europe's head," after having cashiered his recalcitrant generals. Concessions would still be sought by threatening gestures, but The Living Age did not rule out the possibility of war within the year. 59

Hitler's first great feat of 1938, the annexation of Austria, caught none of the journals by surprise, since they had speculated about the inevitability of Anschluss for the past three years. In his preliminary move, the German dictator summoned Austrian Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg to a meeting at Berchtesgaden on February 12, and compelled him, after the Austrian President Wilhelm Miklas had given his reluctant consent, to admit the pro-Nazi Austrian Arthur Seyss-Inquart into the Vienna Cabinet with the portfolio of the Ministry of Interior. On February 20 Hitler addressed the Reichstag; in touching on the subject of Austria, he hinted that Germany might yet apply physical force against her neighbor. The final crisis came when Chancellor Schuschnigg, sensing the strong surge of anti-German sentiment among the Austrians, announced a nationwide plebiscite to let the Austrian electorate decide the future of their homeland.

58 The Christian Century, LIV (December 15, 1937), 1553.
59 The Living Age, CCCLIV (March, 1938), 1-2.
However, Austrian National Socialist pressure and German threats forced Schuschnigg to cancel his proposed plebiscite and even resign his office. President Miklas had no choice but to name as his successor the Nazi enthusiast, Arthur Seyss-Inquart. Within a matter of hours, on March 12, 1938, one month from the Berchtesgaden confrontation between Schuschnigg and Hitler, German troops streamed across the Austrian border.

Adolf Hitler triumphantly entered Vienna on March 14 and for the next several weeks toured the provinces of his former homeland. While on his journey Hitler announced on March 18 that a national plebiscite would be held to determine the feelings of the Austrian Germans for the Anschluss. The results of the plebiscite on April 10, 1938 were a foregone conclusion: according to official Nazi figures approximately 4,453,000 of the 4,484,000 eligible voters had voted for Anschluss.

The rapid pace of events made it difficult for the journals to keep abreast, but The Nation and The New Republic made an effort to do so. The editors and writers representing The Nation evinced the greatest interest in the Austrian crisis. Commenting on the Fuehrer's speech of February 20, which they interpreted as marking the beginning of Austria's demise as an independent state, the editors of The Nation focused on the unwillingness or inability of the western democracies to do anything to prevent German aggression. The only kind of action that could be effective consisted, in their view, in meeting the Nazis on their own terms: the threat of force, and this seemed out of the question.
It must be admitted, however, that hope of action by the democracies is slight, owing to the apparent lack of any realization that the fascist bluff must be called soon if at all. For in failing to take a stand against fascist aggression while they have overwhelming military preponderance, the democracies are not only making a world war inevitable, but are endangering their chances of victory when it comes.

In addition to its editorial, the same issue of The Nation included an essay by Ludwig Lore: "Austria--Last Chapter," saying the same thing. "It is inconceivable that England, France and Russia will indefinitely stand by with folded hands while German Fascism prepares to terrorize all Europe. Even the most peaceful of peoples must decide to fight when submitting to oppression is the only alternative." Subsequent issues of The Nation followed the Austrian situation closely. By March 5 The Nation's editors noted Schuschnigg's temporary success but regarded annexation as inevitable. On March 12, even before the actual Anschluss, this weekly published a denunciation by Robert Dell of "Chamberlain's Treason," describing the paralyzing of English foreign policy through the strong Fascist influence in Chamberlain's administration. 60

For Henry C. Wolfe, writing in The New Republic of March 2, the Austrian situation substantiated Hitler's theories in Mein Kampf. As long as the Fuehrer's opponents refused to meet force with force, Wolfe warned, "Hitler may win an indefinite number of

60 The Nation, CXLVI (February 26, 1938), 229, 232-233; Ludwig Lore, "Austria--Last Chapter," 235-236; (March 5, 1938), 260; and Robert Dell, "Chamberlain's Treason,"(March 12, 1938), 292-294.
victories." The New Republic's man in London, Henry N. Brailsford, saw in Hitler's moves against Austria the explanation for his treatment of the army high command earlier in the year. He had planned for "an extensive campaign of expansion and national assertion," and more conservative men would have to step aside. It was getting late to try to call Hitler's bluff, thought Brailsford, for the allies' supremacy in armaments was indeed questionable. The author, whose views on the arms race differed noticeably from other contemporary observers, estimated that Great Britain and France had fallen behind Nazi Germany. To deter German aggression Brailsford proposed an economic blockade—a rather futile suggestion in view of the failure of the attempt to impose a blockade against Italy a year and a half earlier.

"Austria in the Balance," America's editorial for March 12, 1938, contained an absurd, paranoic analysis of the Austrian problem. According to the Jesuit editors, the "anti-Christian forces in the anti-Nazi nations" prepared to sacrifice Austria to the National Socialists rather than permit "a moral triumph for Catholicism...because a Nazi war against Austria will of its nature be a war against the Church." These "Masonic and Socialist elements" appeared ready to concede all of southeastern Europe to the Nazis just to prevent the Catholic Church from taking

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the lead in a crusade against National Socialism.\footnote{62} The Commonweal lamented the end of both political and religious liberty in Austria in its editorial for March 4, while its issue dated two weeks later included an article by historian Arpad F. Kovacs describing the \textit{Anschluss} as "a foregone conclusion"; the crucial question was, Kovacs wrote, whether or not the National Socialists would quickly "reach for new laurels."\footnote{63} The March 9 \textit{Christian Century} shared the view of the inevitability of the \textit{Anschluss}, and made no attempt to see any religious motive or significance in the situation.\footnote{64}

During the Austrian crisis and following the successful Nazi coup, the journalists indulged in much speculation concerning the possible consequences of \textit{Anschluss}. Always vitally concerned with European events, the writers for \textit{The Nation} supplied their readers with contrasting analyses. "Nothing that Hitler had done in the past quite equaled the shrewdness, dispatch, and ruthless efficiency he displayed in conquering Austria," declared a major March 19 \textit{Nation} editorial "'Mein Kampf' Unfolds." \textit{The Nation} staff accurately predicted that Czechoslovakia would be the next to feel the German pressure: "The conquest of Austria

\footnote{62} \textit{America}, LVIII (February 26, 1938), 483, and (March 12, 1938), 540.

\footnote{63} \textit{The Commonweal}, XXVII (March 4, 1938), 506, and Arpad F. Kovacs, "\textit{Europe After Berchtesgaden}," (March 18, 1938), 565. Kovacs was a professor of history at St. John's University in New York City.

\footnote{64} \textit{The Christian Century}, LV (March 9, 1938), 292.
opens the path for Hitler's drive to the East which, according to 'Mein Kampf,' is to be the next step in Germany's rise to world mastery." Yet there remained the possibility of opposition from unknown sources, or even from Italy, Austria's defender against Germany in 1934. The Nation mistakenly believed that Il Duce expected some compensation for having abandoned Austria now. The Italians might even feel compelled to seek out an accord with Great Britain and France. The Nation also observed that "frightened by the ease of the Nazi triumph, the democratic countries had drawn together to resist the growing threat of German domination of Europe." The initiative seemed to belong to Neville Chamberlain's conservative ministry which, in the past, did not enjoy the Nation's confidence.65

In a signed article The Nation's editor and publisher, Freda Kirchwey, wrote that just about everybody in the world was now well aware of Hitler's plans "except the diplomats, the men in power." On one point Miss Kirchwey differed considerably from The Nation editorial in the same issue; she saw the western powers "divided and frightened, out-bluffed and out-maneuvered," not drawn closer together.66

A familiar voice from overseas, that of The Nation's correspondent Robert Dell, agreed in detail with the weekly's edi-

65 The Nation, CXLVI (March 19, 1938), 316-317.

66 Freda Kirchwey, "Gangster Triumphant," ibid., 321-322. Miss Kirchwey worked for The Nation from 1918 to 1955; she was a member of the editorial staff from 1932 to 1937 and editor and publisher from 1937 to 1955.
torial. In addition, of all the peoples of Europe concerned with the Fuehrer's annexation of Austria, Dell pointed to the Czechs, who were now in immediate danger, as meeting the situation "with calm firmness." In an earlier issue another Nation contributor Ludwig Lore correctly predicted the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia now that Austria had fallen under the Nazi heel, while Oswald Garrison Villard called collective security a dead issue and expected Hitler to be the ruler of Europe in a very short time with "England safely ensconced in the position of a second-rate, if not a third-rate power." On the other hand, I. G. Rogin wrote one month after Anschluss had been completed that the German absorption of Austria would "require a period of adjustment and economic digestion" and that "the ingestion of Czechoslovakia, should that occur peacefully with or without annexation," would result in even a more difficult economic situation since the Czechs needed greater markets. Yet whatever might happen between Germany and Czechoslovakia, Rogin visualized Germany exercising "a preponderant influence in Europe through its domination of the Balkans." "Never before has the Balkan balance been so threatened by the military might, economic control, and given purpose of a Western Europe power."67

The March 2, 1938 New Republic editorial, "England Shows

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Her Colors," attempted to determine what Hitler had won by his meddling in Austrian affairs even before Anschluss was finalized.

Hitler had won just two things—prestige to bolster his power internally, and one door open on the Corridor toward the fulfillment of his policy of Eastern aggression. If from Austria he goes to Hungary, Jugoslavia and Rumania, he will have additional resources with which to exert pressure upon Czechoslovakia and Poland.

The New Republic surmised that Hitler was still "worried about internal opposition," and his menacing shouts and threats were made "to cover real uneasiness." The editors concluded that Hitler could achieve his ends only through bluffing, since Nazi Germany was not yet prepared militarily to fight a first-class power. Neither did Germany have the resources to get through a long war.

Three weeks later, ostensibly less disturbed than The Nation's editorial board by the forceful completion of Anschluss, The New Republic considered the union "Hitler's Worst Blunder." His clumsy excuse for the invasion fooled nobody. "By adopting a more cautious policy of penetration, with more regard for the amenities, he might in the end have achieved all the material results he has now gained, which are not great in any case." He had satisfied his many followers who shared with him the dream of Anschluss, but he ended the possibility of any cooperation with the French and British. In fact, "he slapped the faces of the British statesmen who were just about to succumb to his wooing."

This liberal weekly hoped that the democracies would soon be stirred to act against Hitler. It was almost a certainty, in The
New Republic's estimation "that he cannot go much farther along the road of his ambition without bringing down on himself disas-
ter and defeat from united enemies." 68

Anticipating Anschluss Henry C. Wolfe told the readers of The New Republic that Hitler, according to his "grand strategy," was positioning himself to destroy Czechoslovakia. Four weeks later on March 30, Guenter Reimann acknowledged that the majority of Austrians greeted the union with enthusiasm, but he thought that this attitude would change once police state rule was im-
posed, and the economic strain became acute. Reimann accurately foresaw that "under Nazi rule Austria is going to be the first colony of the German Empire rather than a part of Germany." 69

A long, comprehensive essay discussing economic and rac-
ial developments in central Europe by newsman Frank L. Hayes for The Yale Review argued that fulfillment of Hitler's dreams of an empire was clearly in sight with the "Nazi penetration of the Austrian Cabinet." 70 But in the April Current History Charles Hodges predicted German difficulties in assimilating the Austri-
ans into the Nazi racial empire; he considered National Socialism to be "an amazingly alien way of life" to the Austrian national

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68 The New Republic, XCIV (March 2, 1938), 87-88, and (March 23, 1938), 180-181.


70 Frank L. Hayes, "Hitler and Central Europe," The Yale Review, XXVII (March, 1938), 568-586. Hayes was a member of the editorial staff of The Chicago Daily News.
temperament. In his Current History essay "Austria: Post Mortem," Robert Strausz-Hupe held out little hope that Germany's push into the Danube region could be halted. Only Hungary, "The last nation around which the Danubian peoples could rally," stood in the path of Nazi Germany's quest for the region's economic resources and its advance toward the Black Sea.

There was now little hope of forestalling the Hitler aggression as far as the conservative monthly Living Age for April was concerned. It perceived that "Chancellor Hitler moves inexorably toward the accomplishment of the remaining items of his program for German resurrection—a program which once was called insane and visionary." One only had to read Mein Kampf to see what remained on his agenda for German conquest, and the editors selected as prime targets places like the Sudetenland, Danzig, Memel and North Schleswig.

In what order he will attempt to achieve these aims we do not know, but achieve them he must. For, as Führer, he has a mission, a Divine mission, to accomplish these ends, and such a mission cannot be compromised. Now that his military power is the terror of his neighbors, is it likely that he will be more hesitant or inclined to compromise than when, completely unprepared for war, he began his destruction of the Treaty of Versailles by announcing that Germany would rearm?

It seemed highly improbable that Hitler's appetite for conquest would ever be satiated, in this monthly's realistic appraisal.

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71 Charles Hodges, "Hitler's Ten Millions," Current History, XLVIII (April, 1938), 46-47, and Robert Strausz-Hupe, "Austria: Post-Mortem," (May, 1938), 28-31. Hodges was professor of politics at New York University and was on the advisory editorial board of this monthly, while the Austrian-born Strausz-Hupe was a writer, critic and professor of international affairs.
No doubt "new objectives and a new mission will inevitably be added to the old." Hitler's method of the sudden stroke or the fait accompli would continue to be exploited, since the Fuehrer actually had no other alternative. Giving the most incisive and accurate assessment in early 1938, The Living Age's editors forewarned that in future negotiations the employment of formal diplomacy would be futile, for the Nazis did not respect treaties, and they had nothing to offer in the way of compromise. European diplomats were faced with the reality that "German power once more overbalances the Continent."72

Nothing new had been added to Hitler's tactics, observed Joseph Barber, Jr., in a confused and an inaccurate essay "Farewell to Austria" in the May 1938 Atlantic Monthly. The pattern Chancellor Hitler used was almost the same in Austria as the one in Germany: take a few government posts and work from the inside for a political reorganization. Only in Austria, Barber commented absurdly, this "reorganization...was facilitated by outright invasion." With the totalitarian revolutionary phase about to begin, Barber felt that once the Austrians had been fully indoctrinated the enlarged Germany would threaten France and Italy.73 The mention of the latter country clearly indicated that the author left something to be desired as an observer of foreign affairs.

72 The Living Age, CCCLIV (April, 1938), 95-96.

73 Joseph Barber, Jr., "Farewell to Austria," The Atlantic Monthly, CLXI (May, 1938), 618-623. Barber was the managing editor of this monthly.
Hitler's "kidnapping of Austria" did not surprise The Survey Graphic's columnist John Palmer Gavit, for "it was in the cards." Nevertheless, Gavit calculated that Nazi Germany was no better off in the international political arena. At one stroke, Gavit maintained, Hitler had destroyed any hope that he might possess of getting financial aid from Great Britain, had shaken the "Rome-Berlin axis" and had brought to the forefront France's guarantee to Czechoslovakia.74

Articles by the French writer André Géraud and the foreign correspondent Marcel W. Fodor discussed the European situation for the readers of Foreign Affairs. While recognizing the "weaknesses" of the French and British governments, Géraud hoped that they would soon make a stand to prevent Hitler from fulfilling his Mein Kampf plans. "In the last analysis" if Great Britain and France permitted Hitler "a free hand in Central and Eastern Europe," they would subsequently become his "victims." Yet Géraud refused, in his historical summary of post-war affairs in central and eastern Europe, to hazard a guess about what policies the western democracies would adopt. Marcel W. Fodor, after reviewing the history of the diplomatic negotiations leading to the Austrian coup, suggested that Hitler had overreached himself. He contended that the German army could not defend the extended German frontiers, should a major war occur. He also thought it possible that the Soviet Union would soon attack Germany rather

74 John Palmer Gavit, "Through Neighbors' Doorways," The Survey Graphic, XXVII (April, 1938), 236.
than wait for the Nazis to strike. 75

Adolf Hitler had scored another international triumph because he had strong determination to succeed, reported the March 25 Commonweal. Up until now, many people had deluded themselves into believing that Hitler was somebody's tool and would involve himself in some fatal blunder. This, obviously, had not been the case.

Having correctly gauged the European situation in the past, he is not likely to overreach himself in the near future. Christian civilization is at war with National Socialism. But the enemy of our culture cannot possibly be restrained or defeated until we stop fighting a straw-man and take the correct measure of our antagonist. The Austrian coup should help us to do this. 76

Viewing the situation in a religious framework, The February 26 America foresaw many problems for Germany once the expected annexation of Austria occurred: seven million more dissatisfied Catholics to be digested. America naively perceived "more and more possibilities of passive resistance to persecution, more and more complicated diplomatic and local circumstances to be reckoned with." One month later America's editors felt that the Austrian seizure had awakened all of Europe to the fact that Hitler did not bluff. The Jesuit journal considered it unfortunate that European statesmen, Mussolini included, had not taken the time to examine the Fuehrer's plan in Mein Kampf, which had

75 Andre' Geraud, "Eastern Europe: Vassal of Free?" Foreign Affairs, XVI (April, 1938), 401-416; Geraud was the chief political writer of the Echo de Paris; and Marcel W. Fodor, "Finis Austriae," (July, 1938), 587-600.

76 The Commonweal, XXVII (March 25, 1938), 590.
so far been "carried out to the letter." The Catholic weekly reiterated its theory that Hitler enjoyed the support of anti-Catholic groups around the world, but again it brought forward no proof for its assertion. The Sign, using language that would be familiar to its Catholic audience, commented superficially that "the most disturbing element in the whole business is the fact that Hitler has resorted openly to the principle that might makes right."78

"So enormously strengthened is Hitler's position that the rest of Europe may in despair conclude to take any truce which the Fuhrer offers and make the best of it." This was the judgment of The Christian Century on March 23. However, since dictators had a way of seeking out new areas to achieve more power, at least until they meet resistance, The Christian Century had grave doubts that a peace settlement would endure for long. What the Century feared most was another world war, and "the very ease with which Hitler has won in Austria has probably brought the day of that war's outbreak closer."79

Even as the Anschluss and the subsequent plebiscite were being concluded, the journals began to speculate on Hitler's next territorial objective. As noted above, conjectures varied from

77 *America*, LVIII (February 26, 1938), 483, and (March 26, 1938), 578, 589-590.
78 *The Sign*, XVII (April, 1938), 516.
Professor Strauss-Hupé's generalization about the Danube region, to the Balkans by I. G. Rogin, to Italy and France by Joseph Barber, Jr. and to Soviet Russia by Marcel W. Fodor. By late spring, it became evident that the next crisis would involve German-Czech relations, already predicted above by The Nation editorial staff, Ludwig Lore and Henry C. Wolfe, Hitler's successful venture in Austria had put the Czechoslovak defenses in a precarious position, and it was becoming increasingly clear to many European observers, including Adolf Hitler, that neither France nor Great Britain could be counted upon to give much aid to the Prague government. Neither did the Czechs know what would be the attitude of the Soviet Union, also an ally of Prague, along with France.

Beyond the view of the journalists, the Fuehrer's plan for Czechoslovakia began to take definite form immediately after the occupation of Austria. Secret discussions on March 28, 1938 with the German Sudeten leader Konrad Henlein resulted in Henlein's instructions to keep the Germans in the Sudetenland as restless as possible and to make impossible demands of the Czech government. When the situation became unbearable, Hitler proposed to move in German troops to protect the German minority. On April 21 the Nazi leader ordered the preparation of detailed plans for the invasion of Czechoslovakia. Three days later Henlein initiated his campaign by demanding virtual autonomy for the Czech Germans. Thus the Sudetenland problem began. What most western observers could not know was that Hitler really wanted the ultimate destruction of independent Czechoslovakia, not
merely the well-being of the German Sudetenlanders.

As early as March 26, 1938, The Nation talked about the "cold warfare" developing in central Europe. It felt that Czechoslovakia would subsequently submit to all of the German demands or face economic strangulation. By April 30 The Nation's editors found the Nazis, inside and outside Czechoslovakia, carrying out with deliberate speed a policy to undermine the Czech government, a view shared by Imre Domonkos writing in the March 31 Christian Register.

One of the most astute analyses of the situation appeared in the conservative Living Age for May 1938, which boldly stated that it did not expect the Czechs' "complete independence to survive the summer." Acting upon his "Divine inspiration" Hitler could strike whenever he felt ready without fear of organized European opposition. The conditions in Europe seemed more favorable to him than any other time with the groundwork being conveniently prepared by the other powers' failure to agree on how to deal with Germany. "Whether Hitler strikes because of 'Divine inspiration,' or because of shrewd calculation, the European situation is by far too opportune for him to wait."

80 The Nation, CXLVI (March 26, 1938), 354, and (April 30, 1938), 488-490.

81 Imre Domonkos, "Hitler Over Czechoslovakia," The Christian Register, CXVII (March 31, 1938), 219-210. The Czech-born author was on the teaching faculty of Oberlin College.

82 The Living Age, CCCLIV (May, 1938), 189-190.
Reviewing the numerous aspects of the mounting crisis in central Europe for the May *Atlantic Monthly*, Marcel W. Fodor predicted that the Sudeten problem would eventually lead to war. However, he expressed confidence in the Czech armed forces' ability to defend the country from invasion.83 Because the Czech government had demonstrated its readiness to make concessions to the country's German minority, historian Robert W. Seton-Watson sympathized with the Prague officials. What he did not perceive in his July 1938 *Foreign Affairs* article was that in the eyes of the Nazi high command the crisis involved more than just the Sudeten minority.84 In the May 11 *New Republic* Dorothy Giles appeared shocked by the demands Hitler and his "errand-boy" Henlein were making upon the Prague government. She compared them to the twenty-one demands made by Japan to China.85

Conversely, Erich Posselt in *The American Mercury* for May was entirely unsympathetic to the Czech cause. He criticized American correspondents for having created a "myth" about Czechoslovakia as the "democratic bulwark of the Continent." Posselt


84 Robert W. Seton-Watson, "The German Minority in Czechoslovakia," *Foreign Affairs*, XVI (July, 1938), 651-666. Professor Seton-Watson was a noted British historian of central and eastern Europe; he was the Masaryk Professor of Central European history in the University of London.

85 Dorothy Giles, "The Germans and the Czechs," *The New Republic*, XCV (May 11, 1938), 8. Miss Giles, according to this weekly, was a journalist who specialized in topics pertaining to psychology.
firmly contended that the Prague government had consistently dis-regarded minority rights of its German citizens. Bitterly, he wrote:

Conjured up out of pseudo-Liberal hatred and greed, based on lies and deceptions, governed with utter dis-regard for treaty obligations and ordinary decency, yet proclaimed by itself, and hailed by the world, as a bul-wark of democracy, the "Republic" of Czechoslovakia will expect every armed American to do his duty.86

Neither did there appear to be much compassion in America's com-ments for May 7, 1938, describing Czechoslovakia as "a country artificially carved out for a purpose" in 1919.87 Perhaps America's attitude reflected the difficulties that the Catholic Church had experienced under the democratic government of Czechoslovakia during the recent past.

On May 7 The Nation observed that Henlein and the Sudeten Nazis were forcing Hitler to move faster than he actually wished. According to the editors, the Fuehrer faced a serious dilemma: if he allowed the Sudeten Germans to press their demands, Nazi Ger-many committed to their support would find itself involved in war.88 The Nation obviously had not yet comprehended the fact that the Sudeten German policy was also Hitler's policy.

Another somewhat misguided estimation of the situation

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86 Erich Posselt, "The Myth of Czech 'Democracy,'" The American Mercury, XLIV (May, 1938), 49-56. The author was described by this periodical as an authority on central European affairs.

87 America, LIX (May 7, 1938), 99.

88 The Nation, CXLVI (May 7, 1938), 520.
came from the pen of George Fielding Eliot in the May 24 New Republic. Because of the great risks of war attached to the political reduction of Czechoslovakia and the fact of the unpreparedness of the Reichswehr, the Nazi leaders would probably have to concentrate on economic penetration, wrote Eliot. "This is a slow and unspectacular process, suited to the political and strategic necessities of the moment but not to the Hitlerian temperament nor to his need of periodical miracles—for which the appetite of the German people grows with feeding." Eliot fully expected Hitler to continue moving ahead until he "meets at last the inevitable fate of all conquerors who have stalked before him through the bloody pages of Europe's history."89

Henry C. Wolfe, publishing an essay in the June 1938 Current History, seemed to anticipate the Munich agreement that lay three months in the future. He noted that the German government would like to avoid a war over Czechoslovakia: "If the Nazis can strangle the Czech democracy, if they can isolate this republic, if they can accomplish the same results as in Austria, German resources can be conserved for more formidable prey." Yet, by whatever method, "the Czech state must be compelled to bow to the Third Reich."90 The editors of the June Sign agreed with Wolfe's estimate as did a contributor using the pseudonym "Danubicus,"

89 George Fielding Eliot, "Hitler's Balance Sheet," The New Republic, XCV (May 24, 1938), 680. Eliot was a lecturer and a critic of military affairs.

90 Henry C. Wolfe, "Whose Czechoslovakia?" Current History XLVIII (June, 1938), 14-16.
who suggested that "conditions in eastern Europe have never been so favorable to turning the Teutonic manifest destiny into a historic reality." Pan-Germanism demanded the extension of the Reich, observed William L. Langer in a June Yale Review article, which traced the history of the Pan-Germanic ideology.

The Living Age, which had earlier predicted the demise of Czechoslovakia by the autumn of 1938, showed less certainty in its June issue. Hitler could choose between economic strangulation and peaceful encirclement or direct attack. His decision would be known by the end of the summer.

By mid-May 1938 the German army stood poised to march on short notice. Rumors of Germany's warlike intentions and preparations so overwhelmed the Prague government that on May 20 it ordered a partial mobilization of its own armed forces. Great Britain, France and the Soviet Union quickly announced their support. While this united stand was unusual, even more unique was the sight of Adolf Hitler taking a backward step. On May 23 the Fuehrer reasserted his peaceful intentions in European affairs; yet, on the other hand, Hitler, furious at the action taken by the Czechs, stepped up his plans for the conquest of the

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91 The Sign, XVII (June, 1938), 646, and "Danubicus," "The Coming of the Firth Reich," 658-659. "Danubicus" was reportedly an authority on eastern Europe.

92 William L. Langer, "When German Dreams Come True," The Yale Review, XXVII (June, 1938), 678-698. Langer was a noted historian at Harvard University and the author of a number of important works in diplomatic history.

93 The Living Age, CCCLIX (June, 1938), 283.
neighboring state. Maneuvers by the German military machine were to begin by October 1, 1938.

No extraordinary concern appeared in the journals when the May crisis broke. Most American journalists and editors seemed to be waiting for more concrete information before declaring their opinions. Those writers who did comment generally depreciated the immediate threat and saw the crisis as a German defeat. For example, The Nation observed that Nazi Germany's prestige was slipping noticeably, with the states of southeastern Europe cautiously backing off from "Berlin's orbit." Although The New Republic applauded the check to Hitler's scheme, it manifested a bit more caution than The Nation when it predicted many crises for the next few months.95

The June 1 Christian Century scored the latest European diplomatic events as a triumph for collective security, which many had thought to be impractical in contemporary Europe. This Protestant weekly, too, felt that international tensions had relaxed for the moment. A few weeks later the Century responded again after listening to British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain advise the Czech government to make the necessary concessions to the Henlein forces. Its July 6 editorial "Can Germany Be Appeased?" considered it unlikely that Hitler would agree to compromise on what he deemed essential for his long-range goals.

94 The Nation, CXLVI (May 28, 1938), 603-604.
95 The New Republic, XCV (June 1, 1938), 88-89.
Promises that Germany would keep the peace, if for instance she was allowed to take Czechoslovakia, were worthless. Nevertheless the Century's editors said:

Yet peace must be preserved, and diplomacy is the most effective instrument for its preservation. But Mr. Chamberlain's hope of accomplishing any permanently beneficial result by the "appeasement" of Germany has in it nothing but the seeds of disappointment. Diplomacy had better concern itself with the relations of those powers which have not set desires upon ends condemned by the common conscience of mankind nor served notice that, by the very principle of their existence, they must fight for these things if they cannot get them without fighting.96

The Living Age continued to struggle in making up its mind about the central European situation. Its July editorial section insisted that "all the elements which produced the recent war-scare in Central Europe are still present." Most ominous of all were the apparent "lulls" in the crisis, for this was the time when Hitler knew how to seize such opportunities for a new blow, catching everyone off guard. A month later the editors took the position that the Nazi Fuehrer had probably relinquished his idea of aggression against Czechoslovakia for the time being, but not forever. "Will he simply await a more favorable moment—when France, for example, will be immobilized by one of her periodical internal crises? Or will he devise some new method to bring the Czechs to their knees?"97

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96 The Christian Century, LV (June 1, 1938), 684, and (July 6, 1938), 838-839.

97 The Living Age, CCCLIV (July, 1938), 377, and (August, 1938), 472-473.
Frank C. Hanighen's rather shallow article "Czech Patchwork" in the July 23 Nation argued that no matter what happened in the crisis the followers of Konrad Henlein would never permit a peaceful settlement with the Czechs. Hanighen correctly intimated that a connection existed between the activities of the Sudetenland Germans and Hitler's foreign policy. Even more alert to the diplomatic realities, Brackett Lewis in the August 3 Christian Century reviewed the aims of the German Nazis, and pondered "whether equality with the majority in the republic will satisfy them." It hardly seemed possible, he wrote, that Berlin would content itself with a mere equal position for the Sudeten Germans rather than complete mastery over the Czech state.

Meanwhile, in Czechoslovakia during the mid-summer months, events continued to move rapidly from one crisis to another. After Hitler backed away from the allied challenge in May 1938, he instructed Henlein to continue pressuring the Prague government for concessions and to make life as uncomfortable as possible for the Czech republic. At the same time, German diplomats impressed upon British and French government officials the obstinacy of the Czech ministry and its unwillingness to make reasonable concessions. Finally, in late July, the tensions in central

98 Frank C. Hanighen, "Czech Patchwork," The Nation, CXLVII (July 23, 1938), 85.

99 Brackett Lewis, "What the Sudetens Want," The Christian Century, LV (August 3, 1938), 939. The author had worked for the YMCA in Czechoslovakia and was now living in New York.
Europe convinced Prime Minister Chamberlain that action had to be initiated by the western powers to effect a compromise between the Czech government and the Henlein faction. Viscount Walter Runciman, supposedly an impartial mediator, journeyed to Czechoslovakia as a special ambassador of the British government, charged to reconcile the factions in the dispute. Almost at once Runciman shocked the Czech government by displaying extraordinary good will toward the Henlein group.

An initial reaction from the July 30 Nation revealed great confidence. It editorialized that Adolf Hitler had been "checked for the time being," whatever the result of further negotiations. Two weeks later, however, The Nation, disturbed by Runciman's slow progress, charged the Englishman with deliberately prolonging the crisis. Further, it printed a report from correspondent Robert Dell, who proclaimed that "Hitler has scored again, thanks to his faithful friend, Neville Chamberlain." The British, with the approval of the French, were asking the Czech government to compromise itself out of a democratic government.\footnote{The Nation, CXLVII (July 30, 1938), 100; (August 13, 1938), 198; and Robert Dell, "Czech Suicide--London's Solution," (August 20, 1938), 174-176.}

The New Republic likewise accused Viscount Runciman and the British Conservative government of pro-German sentiments in attempting to convince the Czechs to submit to the National Socialist demands. Although it seemed to understand that the attitude of Great Britain toward the Hitler dictatorship would be...
a determining factor for preserving the peace, this journal did
not fully comprehend the desperate situation of the Czechs. They
seemed willing to fight now for their territorial integrity rather
than wait until their military situation became hopeless with
the surrender of the Sudetenland.

If Hitler becomes quite certain that he cannot win all
he wants in the present crisis without war, he will probably pull in his horns, as he did before, during the recent
Czechoslovakia elections. The problem of preserving peace
at the moment seems to be to make him believe that the
Czechs mean what they say and will not surrender. But
the attitude of the British government, combined with its
influence over France, makes this task doubly difficult.
It appears that Chamberlain has thus led Europe to the very
brink of the war that he has been trying to avoid.101

In an article for The Atlantic Monthly depicting the role
of the Czech leader Eduard Benes during the crisis, Professor
Carl Joachim Friedrich wrote that the task of ameliorating the
German minority bordered on the impossible for the Czechs. The
situation was much too delicate and involved to transform Czecho-
slovakia into another Switzerland. An additional problem, Fried-
rich observed, was that "in spite of the strong democratic senti-
ment amongst the Czechs, Czechoslovakia is rent to-day by the
conflict between the democratic outlook and the totalitarian."
Furthermore, "there are within the Czech ranks people who would
like to repeat the folly of Schuschnigg: making agreements with
Hitler-Henlein and trusting them."102

102 Carl J. Friedrich, "Eduard Benes," The Atlantic Monthly,
CLXII (September, 1938), 357-365.
The Nation remained the most alert of the American periodicals to the happenings in and around Czechoslovakia. On August 27, 1938, it reported a German attempt to entice the right-wing Hungarian government to enlist in the National Socialist cause against Czechoslovakia. A week later it exhibited obvious dejection concerning the "uncertainties of British policy," besides the fact that the Nazi leaders had already gone too far to turn back in their Sudeten campaign. Directly from Prague Marcel W. Fodor informed the readers of The Nation that Hitler's demands were calculated to force Czechoslovakia to scrap its alliance with Soviet Russia. Fodor assumed correctly that the condition of the Sudeten Germans was merely being used as an excuse. "If Germany really only wanted to assure the maximum benefits to Germans in Czechoslovakia, then with or without Runciman an agreement could be reached within two weeks."103

The September 7 Christian Century speculated that negotiations would continue without an immediate threat of war. Only a direct invasion of Czechoslovakia would force Britain to fight, and Hitler, knowing this, "will avoid that course while continuing to promote the dissolution of the composite country and the 'liberation' of its German element."104

Suddenly, on September 4, 1938, the Sudetenland crisis

103 The Nation, CXLVII (August 27, 1938), 193-194; (September 3, 1938), 215-216; and Marcel W. Fodor, "Hitler Will Decide," (September 10, 1938), 239-240.

104 The Christian Century, LV (September 7, 1938), 1055.
reached a new stage when Czech President Eduard Benes and his government surprised the Sudeten German party by acquiescing in its demand for greater autonomy. Unwilling, of course, to accept these concessions which would have ended the crisis without giving Hitler what he actually wanted, Henlein used the excuse of a Czech-Sudeten German incident to hastily break off negotiations while he departed for Berlin to receive further instructions.

The September 10 Nation reported Benes' concessions in a forthright editorial entitled "What Hitler Wants."

Every country in Europe—including Germany—is afraid of war. But war will not be averted by shading of diplomatic phraseology or by specific concessions one way or the other. Proposals and counter-proposals may serve the purpose of postponing the moment when the fundamental issue must be faced. But in the end they are evasions, not solutions. For the fact that must finally be acknowledged is the absolute, implacable determination of Adolf Hitler to bring Czechoslovakia under his power. The details may be subject to modification or compromise. The aim itself is not.

Commenting on Hitler's evident willingness to risk the outbreak of war, The Nation foretold that he would continue to do so since he had learned "that the mere threat of force reaps a handsome reward." The western allies had warned against "aggression" on the part of Germany, but they had never clearly defined what they meant by the term. It could well be, thought The Nation, that the Fuehrer would find some pretext for invasion that would result in Czechoslovakia's being forced to battle the German army alone. Adolf Hitler's plans assuredly included such a contingency.105

105 The Nation, CXLVII (September 10, 1938), 237-238.
In "Sudetens--Now or Later?" in The Commonweal, Hans Anscar predicted, with a touch of cynicism, the end of the Czech state. With the help of her so-called friends, Czechoslovakia would be dismembered and readied "for the final stroke à la Austria." Public opinion would soon adjust to the inevitable, according to Anscar. "The world forgets quickly and if the Czechs are willing to give themselves up like the Austrians did, who will fight for them?" Looking beyond the immediate crisis, Anscar wrote that the longer the world waited and watched Hitler maneuver himself into a commanding position on the continent, the more difficult it would be to unseat him. 106

An Austrian exile under the pseudonym Arnold Hoellriegel described for the readers of the September 17 Nation the long history of Czech-Sudeten German hatred. This hate had blinded the two peoples to the fact that national differences were being obliterated by time. Hoellriegel reached the conclusion that the many centuries of living together had made it almost impossible to distinguish between the two groups.

The hatred between the two nationalities is inveterate but they are too closely interwoven for either to be able to get rid of the other. No mechanical division, no artificially drawn new borders, can undo the work of centuries in Central Europe; it is as impossible to separate the single colors interwoven in a carpet; you can only destroy the carpet by cutting it into pieces. 107

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106 Hans Anscar, "Sudetens--Now or Later?" The Commonweal, XXVIII (September 16, 1938), 517. Anscar was a German refugee.

107 Arnold Hoellriegel, "Race Hate--a Sudeten Tradition," The Nation, CXLVII (September 17, 1938), 263-264. Hoellriegel was the pen name of an exiled Austrian journalist.
With the annual autumn meeting of the Nazi Party in Nuremberg in early September, the time appeared opportune for another of Hitler's bombastic and provocative speeches. In fact, many knowledgeable observers expected the Führer to speak his mind about the Sudetenland affair at the rally. In an opening message of greeting, Adolf Hitler said little that had not been stated before. The September 14 Christian Century expressed its relief, and saw Hitler's address as confirmation of its opinion that an open clash of arms would be avoided through the intervention of other European powers. 108

The same week's issue of The New Republic announced in the editorial "War Now or Later?" that it would restrain its enthusiasm until Hitler's major address scheduled for September 12. Most certainly, it insisted, the Nazi dictator would maintain the pressure, for he was determined to incorporate the Czech state into Germany's sphere of influence. Whatever the Czechs themselves decided to do, The New Republic seemed to think that war could not be avoided in central Europe.

If they offered enough so that Hitler accepts, the immediate crisis will be passed and all concerned will be praised for diplomatic skill and devotion to peace—but Europe will have a bolder and stronger Hitler to deal with in the future, once more ready to fight all comers. If their final offer safeguards the future enough so that Hitler rejects it, there probably will not be war now, and it will be easier to deal with him next time. The margin between these two possibilities is thin. It may be that the real choice is not between immediate peace

108 The Christian Century, LV (September 14, 1938), 1683.
and war, but between a stronger and a weaker Hitler in the future.109

The climax of the Nuremberg convention occurred on September 12 with Hitler's major oration. While Hitler did not commit himself to warfare on behalf of the Sudeten Germans, he ominously demanded justice for his German brethren and promised his country's aid if it was not forthcoming. Since events soon began to move rapidly, few of the weekly periodicals had the opportunity to respond to the Fuehrer's latest harangue. "Here was a master demagogue, the most dangerous man on earth," said the September 17 Nation. Everybody in Europe, it editorialized, seemed to be taking the matter calmly. "His defiance of the democracies, his shoddy attacks on Jews and Communists, and most of all his charge that the Czechs are the aggressors in the present crisis aroused bitter mirth rather than fear." The affair remained serious, but many now realized that the Fuehrer's bluster was for effect. Only his fanatical followers were excited by his words.110

The title of The New Republic editorial: "Hitler Defies the World" indicated that this liberal journal treated Hitler's words more circumspectly. Hitler "merely prolonged the suspense" because the Reichswehr needed more time to prepare for the invasion. However, the Nazi leaders had good reason to believe that if they could prolong the crisis, the British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain would force the Czechs to capitulate. The New

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109 The New Republic, XCVI (September 14, 1938), 144-145.
110 The Nation, CXLVII (September 17, 1938), 255-256.
Republic reiterated its opinion that firmness, particularly on the part of Great Britain, would achieve peace at less cost.

Peace can still be preserved, we believe, if the British government will stand where it is, with steady nerves and complete resolution. If it lets Hitler know in unequivocal terms that it will not press the Czechs to go any further toward adjustment, and that if he provokes a war it will aid his enemies, he will scarcely challenge such a formidable coalition. He may bluster and fume, but in the end he will not dare to do more.111

The Christian Century said: "An almost audible sight of relief swept around the world" when Chancellor Hitler ended the September 12 speech without actually declaring war; however, it could see little reason for this response, since Hitler's words "left the European situation even worse than it was." His boast that Germany was approaching economic self-sufficiency seemed to The Christian Century to be the key to the Fuehrer's aims. The process being used in the Czech Sudetenland could be repeated again and again in eastern Europe until the Nazi dictator got his "land empire that can defy strangulation by a sea blockade." Although the Century had long advocated negotiated settlements, it now insinuated that only force could stop German aggression.112

The French correspondent Vladimir Pozner in an article in the September 24 Nation concurred with the theory that economics served as a major motivating factor in Hitler's plans. Pozner felt that the Germans specifically wanted the famous Skoda arms

111. The New Republic, XCVI (September 21, 1938), 172-173.
112. The Christian Century, LV (September 21, 1938), 1118-1119.
In reality, Hitler's September 12 speech set off a chain reaction on the European continent and in Great Britain, and the crisis moved rapidly to its climax. After a series of widespread disorders in the Sudetenland, the Czech government imposed martial law. Confronted with this dangerous situation, Prime Minister Chamberlain decided to take the initiative in preserving the European peace. With French approval he met with Adolf Hitler in his mountain retreat at Berchtesgaden on September 15, 1938. Having listened to the Fuehrer's demand for the incorporation of the Sudetenland Germans into the Third Reich, Chamberlain returned to London to consult with French officials. They soon advised the Czechs to accept the National Socialist terms and promised an international guarantee of what would then be a partitioned state. Czech counter-proposals, offering to submit the entire Sudeten question to arbitration according to the provisions of the German-Czech treaty of 1925, were rejected by London and Paris, and the Prague government reluctantly yielded on September 21, 1938, and accepted the principle of self-determination in the Sudetenland.

Confident that he had succeeded in preserving the peace, Chamberlain returned to Germany to work out with Hitler the implementation of the arrangement. In a conference at Godesberg on

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113 Vladimir Pozner, "Hitler Wants Skoda," The Nation, CXLVII (September 24, 1938), 287-288. Pozner was a French journalist visiting the United States.
September 22 and 23, the Fuehrer surprised the English politician with still further demands. Hitler required the immediate surrender of the predominately German territories of Czechoslovakia, without the removal or destruction of military fortifications or economic establishments, and plebiscites to be held in areas with a large German minority. Unable to persuade Hitler to change his mind, Chamberlain returned to England, his mission apparently a failure because he never realized that the Nazi leader wanted the destruction of Czechoslovakia, not just the annexation of the Sudetenland. On September 26 the western powers informed Hitler that his Godesberg demands were unacceptable, and military preparations began all over Europe. That same evening Hitler delivered a major speech accusing the Czech government of having fomented the crisis. He contended that the Godesberg demands included nothing new and that the Czech President Eduard Beneš endangered the peace by refusing them. 114

During this two-week period several American journals, with The Nation and The New Republic being the most notable, tried to analyze the diplomatic maneuvers. The Nation published two editorials and three signed articles in two weeks. 115


115 The Nation, CXLVII (September 24, 1938), 284–285; Oswald Garrison Villard, "Issues and Men: The Disaster in Europe," 299; (October 1, 1938), 309, 312–313; Louis Fischer, "Let the
24 editorial "The Great Betrayal" charged that the British appeasement policies "actually strengthened the hand that held the knife." The peace that had apparently been won was a Nazi peace "devoted to preparation for a greater war than could now be fought." The Nation's former editor, Oswald Garrison Villard, denounced the "probable" sacrifice of Czechoslovakia as "one of the most fearful injustices in the history of the modern world." Nevertheless, Villard by no means favored forcing a war with the Nazi Fuehrer; instead he advised methods already found wanting: an economic boycott and blockade. An editorial on October 1 interpreted Hitler's speech of five days earlier as "the speech of a man who was stalling desperately but who couldn't afford to back down." In this journal's estimation "one of the most sinister things that could happen would be a compromise between the Berchtesgaden and the Godesberg demands, backed again by Britain and France." The Nation also recognized that Hitler's Godesberg demands showed that the Fuehrer's interest lay ultimately beyond the Sudeten Germans, and its political dire consequences for the Danubian states and for western Europe as well. The greatest danger to France and England consisted in "the encouragement given to fascist forces within their own boundaries. Fascism is a germ which thrives on the illusion of irresistible strength."

From Paris Louis Fischer warned the readers of The Nation that the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia would seriously disrupt,

Czechs Stand Firm!" 317; and John Gunther, "Interim Notes on the Crisis," 316.
the European balance of power. France could become "a second Portugal," and the Fascist states might very well dominate the Mediterranean and the Dardanelles. Foreign correspondent John Gunther discussed another angle of the crisis. He called attention to the fact that the Fuehrer had adopted one of President Woodrow Wilson's most cherished principles, that of self-determination. Gunther observed that those who believed in the Wilsonian principle could hardly argue with the Sudeten German's bid for independence. Yet Hitler "by his brutal attempt to raise the ante" at Godesberg effectively demonstrated that self-determination was a "pretext for something else."

The New Republic covered the first two Chamberlain-Hitler meetings less intensively than The Nation; it published editorials each week, but no feature articles on September 28 or October 5. The New Republic's position closely resembled that of its sister liberal weekly, but contributed some novel observations about unrest among other European minorities as a consequence of the Sudeten controversy, and the stimulation of Fascism in other states. It denounced the thinking of the appeasers as resting on a false premise in believing that Hitler would actually wage war at this time. It insisted that the Reichswehr commanders would restrain Hitler from open warfare, and it called attention to the silent role of the Soviet Union in the current diplomatic activity. In a striking contribution to the discussion, The New Republic, XCVI (September 28, 1938), 197, 200-201, and (October 5, 1938), 225.
lic ventured to expose what, in its opinion, lay behind the willingness of England and France to make concessions to Hitler, despite the fact that his promises never could be trusted any more than could the current guarantees of the western powers:

A large and influential section of the British Tories is friendly to Nazism and fascism, and would like to encourage them in order to block any growth of socialism. They fear the Russians above all else. For a long time there has been an open movement to bring together Britain, Germany, France and Italy in a four-power pact, leaving Germany free to expand and attack Russia in the East. Czechoslovakia and the alliances with the Soviet Union, both on her part and on the part of France, stood in the way of this consummation. In its worst aspect, the action of the British government, with the compliance of the French looks extraordinarily like a deliberate betrayal of democracy in order to safeguard the interests of the property classes of the Empire. Chamberlain and his associates are not precisely fascists, but they are perfectly willing to use Mussolini and Hitler to pick their chestnuts out of the fire. They could not openly appear as allies of Hitler and retain their power at home, but he made it easy for them to act as his accomplices by a terrific war scare.

Still ever desirous for world peace, The Christian Century for September 28 observed that "it may be that war has only been postponed, but it has been postponed, and for that the common man thanks God." Nonetheless this peace had been purchased at a moral price "which it may take generations of human misery to pay." A solemn promise to aid Czechoslovakia against its enemies had been broken.

What does all this add up to? Is it not to the arrival in Europe of a new dark age, when the last controls exercised by an international order which has been disintegrating since 1914 are finally being destroyed? Here is a world in which terror is triumphant. Here is a world in which ruthlessness is the requirement of successful statecraft. In such a world, what can lie ahead but misery and anguish; a reversion to the brute; a society in which trust
is unknown and man's days are lived under a continued and corroding fear?

Regarding Hitler's speech of September 26, the Century commented:

"Amidst all the bombast and fury of his defiant speech he still inserted an interpretation of his 'final' demands which hardly sounds like the voice of one who is not willing to confer longer."

The October issue of the monthly Catholic World could not respond to the most recent events. It carried only general comments to the effect that it hoped Hitler might somehow be appeased, but the author of this editorial obviously did not really take seriously his own words.

In an essay for the October 1938 Current History, a very depressed and discouraged British politician, Winston Churchill, bitterly criticized his country’s policy in the Sudetenland affair. He deplored the sacrifice of Czechoslovakia and Chamberlain's strategy, which had played into the hands of the German dictatorship. Historians "will never understand how it was that a victorious nation, with everything in hand, suffered themselves to be brought low, and to cast away all that they had gained by measureless sacrifice and absolute victory—gone with the wind,” wrote Mr. Churchill, whose article might at least reveal to the American reading public the minority view in the English govern-

117 The Christian Century, LV (September 28, 1938), 1150-1151, and (October 5, 1938), 1184.

118 The Catholic World, CXLVIII (October, 1938), 9-10.
Meanwhile the final stage of the Sudeten crisis had come with the four-power conference in Munich on September 28 and 29. The discussions were climaxed with the signing of an agreement that was substantially akin to the Fuehrer's Godesberg demands. Chancellor Hitler secured about all that he had desired: the Czech evacuation of the Sudetenland to take place between October 1 and 10, 1938, under conditions arranged by an international commission, which would also determine the plebiscite areas. The British and French governments undertook to guarantee the new frontiers of Czechoslovakia against unprovoked aggression. It was also left up to the two chagrined western powers to inform the Czechs, who had not been present at the meeting, of the terms of the Munich agreement, and of Hitler's oral assurances that he entertained no further ambitions regarding Czechoslovakia.

Few expressions of surprise appeared in the American journals of opinion, since they had already foreseen this ultimate solution. Rather, the journals' reaction took the form of attempts to find the meaning and the consequences of Munich. Again The Nation led the way in the quantity and depth of its discussion.  

119 Winston Churchill, "What Can England Do About Hitler?" Current History, XLIV (October, 1938), 13-15. Churchill (1874-1965) was a member of Parliament, a former cabinet minister and an author of many historical works. He was to make his greatest political contribution to Great Britain and the world during the Second World War.

120 The Nation, CXLVII (October 8, 1938), 337, 340-341; Paul Y. Anderson, "It's All in 'Mein Kampf,'" 343; Anderson was a Washington correspondent for this journal; Oswald Garrison Villard,
Of the nature of the Munich settlement, The Nation entertained no doubts: "The whole affair—surrender, peace terms, military occupation—followed the ancient pattern of conquest. It had only one new and unusual aspect. It preceded rather than followed the war." The Nation did not hesitate to reveal its opinion of the "Franco-British sell-out....[of] a people that has represented everything decent in European democracy." "Betrayal" was Louis Fischer's label in his article on October 29. The Nation's Washington correspondent, Paul Y. Anderson, denounced the Munich pact most strongly in the October 8 issue:

By virtue of the greatest diplomatic triumph since that achieved by the late Judas Iscariot, Neville Chamberlain has finally succeeded in losing the last world war to Germany, and has made reasonable certain of losing the next. In some quarters this is called statesmanship, and Chamberlain is hailed in London as the hero of the hour. He did succeed in getting home with his shirt and umbrella.

"British and French weakness," evident since the earliest Nazi blows against the Weimar Republic, had brought about the tragedy, wrote Oswald Garrison Villard, who traced this latest event through a series of incidents reaching back to the early days of the Third Reich. He associated the dismemberment of Czechoslovakia with the problems of Ethiopia and Spain, as they had all passed under review in London and Paris. Chamberlain personally

"Issues and Men: The Price of Power," 353; Louis Fischer, "Fascist Pacifism," (October 29, 1938), 446-448; and Archibald MacLeish, "Munich and the Americans," (October 15, 1938), 371; MacLeish was a poet and author of note, besides being an American government official.
came under attack in Archibald Macleish's article: the British Prime Minister had been given credit for preventing a holocaust, but he had paid too high a price in sacrificing Czech democracy.

Among the effects, then, which The Nation saw arising from the Munich solution to the Sudeten problem was the weakening of the cause of democracy throughout central Europe. Louis Fischer pronounced this judgment, and he went on to argue that the Nazi master race ideas had also, in the minds of some, won further confirmation. Another casualty was collective security, now a dead issue in the minds of The Nation's editors, who editorialized that Hitler had "knocked out the League and successfully substituted the technique of the private deal in a back room with a gun on the table." Finally, the capitulation at Munich, as Paul Anderson insisted, only whetted Hitler's appetite for further annexations. Time has only confirmed the accuracy of most of these judgments appearing in The Nation during October of 1938.

In general, the New Republic shared the sentiments of The Nation in its editorials and articles during October, but it expounded them less stridently. Obviously "dictatorship has won over democracy," but this weekly advised that only time would reveal the full implications of Munich.

121 The New Republic, XCVI (October 12, 1938), 255-257; (October 19, 1938), 292; Vera Michele Dean, "Pan-Germanism Redivivus," (October 12, 1938), 259-260; Miss Dean was the editor of the Foreign Policy Association and had recently returned from a visit to central Europe; Bruce Bliven, "Picking Up the Pieces," (October 19, 1938), 294-296; and Henry C. Wolfe, "After Munich--What?" (October 26, 1938), 325.
It is futile now to argue whether Hitler was really bluffing; whether a firmer stand might not have led him to retreat. In either case the result is the same. If he bluffed, and bluffed successfully as this, he was either shrewder or more courageous than his opponents, and so more influential henceforth. If he was not bluffing, and they knew it, they confessed to fear of his military power and can be similarly cowed any number of times in the future.

Repeating its earlier accusation, the editors charged that the "great democracies" had "connived" to strengthen Fascism, "and fascism as an international force will gain tremendously before it begins to lose." In the following issue the editors warned the world and especially the British Tories who considered Fascism a lesser evil than Communism: "Hitler's policy is and has been for years one of constantly increasing pressure. Each time he demands more than he expects to get, and enlarges his appetite with each fresh victory."

Vera Michele Dean's response in The New Republic was considerably more reserved and more theoretical. While associating Nazi policy with pre-war pan-Germanism, Miss Dean recognized that the National Socialist ideology was "essentially hostile to the European spirit." She did not intimate that war was inevitable, nor did she feel the world would profit from an arms race. The solution to world problems was much more basic.

If the West is to prevail over Germany it must do more than perfect is armaments. It must redefine, in equally dynamic terms, the economic and spiritual concepts which it offers as an alternative to Nazi ideology; and redress those grievances against Western democracy which, in Europe and elsewhere, have proved Hitler's most effective allies.
Much the same theme was stressed by Bruce Bliven, who recognized that "a real turning point in history" had occurred. "Gangster" tactics prevailed. "If democracy is not to be crushed under the steam roller of totalitarianism, it is high time that we made, right here and right now, a real experiment in the way of civilization where a decent life for all the citizens is actually and completely the first concern of the state." Henry C. Wolfe speculated that the Munich settlement accentuated one of Hitler's major weaknesses. It was the old theory that Hitler must follow up his victory at Munich with another one or he would face serious domestic upheavals.

Most of the other secular journals added their views to the discussion. According to The Living Age, the Munich agreement was not a capitulation to Adolf Hitler's threats or a means by which to avert war. "Rather, it marked an off-the-record success of special class privilege, an alliance between moneyed and privileged groups willing to sacrifice national honor in order to protect hallowed class interests"—an interesting comment by this moderately conservative monthly. It also conjectured that the supposed threat of Soviet Russian expansion influenced profoundly the thinking of western European conservatives. This theme had been exaggerated, it contended, for the Russian Communists had too much to do at home to become deeply entangled in foreign adventures. 122

122 The Living Age, CCCLV (November, 1938), 190.
The editors of *Current History* noted the irreparable loss of prestige suffered by Great Britain and France, and Merle E. Tracy now discerned a Germany "bigger, stronger, and more firmly welded together than in 1914." The Nazi Fuehrer could now fulfill everything outlined in *Mein Kampf*. "No man in modern times has outlined such a seemingly preposterous program or carried it out with greater precision and success." Charles Hodges agreed with editor Tracy; in addition, he tried to bring home Munich's meaning to the United States. No longer was America safe from the battle of the totalitarian ideologies, warned Hodges. "The poisoned warfare of totalitarian power politics round the globe contemptuously will challenge in its time the 'bolshevism' of our own democracy."123

Newsman Quincy Howe, writing for the winter issue of *The North American Review*, believed that the real issue at stake in Europe as the year 1938 came to a close was continental integration, not the emergence of Nazi Germany as the dominant power. It appeared to Howe that the conservative leaders of England and France had decided to let Hitler try to organize and restore order to Europe, despite the prospects that his movement might destroy capitalism.124

123 *Current History*, XLIX (November, 1938), 11-12; Merle E. Tracy, "Editorial: Twenty Years," 7; Tracy was the editor of this monthly; and Charles Hodges, "Benes Ends an Era," 25.

The same general topic, the policy of Prime Minister Chamberlain, his Conservative Party and his spiritual associates as it related to the latest European crisis, was further analyzed by Professor Willson Woodside in the December 1938 Harper's Magazine. The British leader, Woodside suspected, had been influenced by a group in England who urged that the Germans be permitted to unify and secure their frontiers so that Hitler's program of grievances might be eliminated and, consequently, he would vanish from the European scene. By no means did the allies bow to force, according to this faction's thesis; instead it maintained that England and France had "won a great victory for the way of peace over the way of violence." However, Woodside correctly calculated that the German leaders would not comprehend this distinction; he also thought it reasonable to believe that Chamberlain had not taken the time to read Hitler's plan of action plainly charted in his now famous volume. If he had, commented Woodside, it can only be assumed that he either did not believe it or that he approved.

Elmer Davis offered the readers of Harper's Monthly further speculation on the problems created by the Munich settlement. What the Fuhrer won at Munich was only the first installment, contended Davis, who sensed that every small nation between Silesia and the Persian Gulf faced extermination. Those countries which possess German minorities would be the first to go if the concept of racial unity published in Mein Kampf continued to be carried out, and all evidence indicated that it would. Now
that the western allies had been vanquished as great powers, Davis suggested in conclusion, the Nazi leader might actually ignore them as he moved eastward—which may have been the intention of England and France all along. 125

An extraordinarily detailed article reviewing in specific terms the entire period of negotiations evolving around the Sudenland crisis appeared in the January 1939 Foreign Affairs by its editor Hamilton Fish Armstrong. Armstrong's analysis of the situation was limited to a few remarks which revealed, as did the title of his essay, his feeling that the peace achieved at Munich would not endure for long. 126

Compared to the attitudes of the liberal journals, the religious periodicals treated Munich very calmly, and often they became almost apologists for the western policies. Failing almost universally to discover any religious or confessional significance in the events of September 1938, these journals groped for meaning and comprehension.

The Commonweal tacitly approved the Munich settlement and rejoiced that war had temporarily been avoided, yet, as in 1914 to 1918, war never settled anything, the editors pronounced. Besides, German predominance would not endure forever. An article by an anonymous German Catholic proclaimed that "Munich seems to


inaugurate a new period of European peace and stabilization." The amicable settling of the German claim "paved the way for a permanent collaboration of the Big Four in dealing with perilous European problems." At last, the author proclaimed, Nazi Germany would mature, become respectable in the eyes of the other powers, and lead Europe into an era of new prosperity. Writing and thinking more like American journalists back in 1933 and 1934, this commentator announced that the "influence of the party radicals probably will diminish with the evident success of the new European policy, and there seems to be some chance that the more conservative element may regain influence."127

America, which like The Commonweal had been curiously quiet with respect to the international situation, brushed aside Hitler's triumph at the conference table with the briefest of comments, and preferred to editorialize pompously that Hitler "is riding for a fall." Sooner or later he will drag his country into war, and this would lead to the collapse of the Third Reich in the midst of a resounding military defeat.128

The Catholic monthly Sign found it "amusing to watch the terror of Britain and France at the resurrection of German military might," for which they themselves bore full responsibility. The Sign published an essay by the British journalist Douglas

127 The Commonweal, XXVIII (October 7, 1938), 600-601, and C. O. Cleveland (pseud.), "Europe--Two Conflicting Forecasts," (October 21, 1938), 663. This German Catholic did not wish to use his own name.

128 America, IX (October 8, 1938), 2-3.
Woodruff calling attention to the acclamation which greeted Chamberlain's role at Munich, and suggesting that the crisis might teach statesmen how to improve the techniques of negotiations for the future. Obviously ignorant of the international situation, Woodruff advised his readers that it was now the responsibility of Great Britain, France and Italy to make a common effort to restore "the necessary counterpoise to German preponderance in central Europe." Continued disunity would only work to Germany's advantage and lead to a definitive alignment of Europe into two camps, which the author did not identify. Munich was a lesson to be absorbed, and Woodruff wondered whether the three powers would respond intelligently in the next crisis. 129

The October 12 Christian Century seemed somewhat befuddled in its editorial comments. The editors believed that Europe had actually stood on the brink of war; Hitler had not been bluffing. Yet the future looked good. "No one need be surprised if greater Germany's political boundaries are allowed to remain about where they now stand, at least for several years to come. But the economic control of all the rest of central and southeastern Europe will pass into Hitler's hands within the next six months." The Christian Century made this evaluation even though, as it admitted, it had in its possession German newspaper items which discussed "new moves" being planned by the Fuehrer in the

immediate future. A week's reflection enabled the Century to view the September crisis in a moral framework. It referred to Munich as "the most threatening challenge flung in the face of the Christian Church since Napoleon." Hitler's victory was based on the denial of the fundamental principles of Christianity. For the National Socialists "naked force" was the ultimate power among men. "Despite all the sermons from all the pulpits in Christendom, the ultimate reality is this: shoot or wear the yoke. This, and nothing but this, was what Adolf Hitler said to mankind at Munich." Obviously the church had failed and must atone by quickly reasserting the "Christian gospel" as a factor in German and European life.130

While the Unitarian weekly Christian Register in its editorial position and in an essay by Reverend Leslie T. Pennington lamented the betrayal of Czechoslovakia and called attention to Hitler's untrustworthiness, it also printed Reverend A. Powell Davies' article "The Realities at Berchtesgaden" that rejoiced in Chamberlain's successful avoidance of war—as the common people of the world desired.131

What lay beyond Munich? Was Germany now satiated, or

130The Christian Century, LV (October 12, 1938), 1224-1225, and (October 19, 1938), 1254-1255.

131The Christian Register, CXVII (October 13, 1938), 583; Leslie T. Pennington, "What of the Night?" 585; this article was part of a sermon preached on October 2, 1938, in the First Parish of Cambridge, Massachusetts; and A. Powell Davies, "The Realities at Berchtesgaden," (October 27, 1938), 620. The author was minister of the Community Church of Summit, New Jersey.
would new annexationist schemes soon unfold themselves? If the latter, what area stood next on the list for the Third Reich? This was the question that the journalists debated, with more or less astuteness, through the fall and winter of 1938-1939. For a while they had to speculate in a vacuum as few concrete developments came to their attention.

An editor of The New Republic, Bruce Bliven, on October 19, discussed Hitler's possible foreign policy alternatives in an article entitled "Picking Up the Pieces." His primary plan aimed at obtaining overseas possessions, reportedly the Portuguese colonies, according to Bliven. An alternative was the well-advertised drive to the East. The author suggested that the German government was currently reassessing this latter project. In his judgment, the Balkans and Hungary were, for all practical purposes, already within the Nazi sphere, for the simple reason that Germany had become Europe's greatest power, and these smaller states would inevitably fall under her spell. "It is not necessary for Hitler to conquer these states with the sword, or the threat of it. Cultural domination, the skillful use of propaganda, economic arrangements, are sufficient." Bliven also foretold changes with regard to German relations with Poland and the Soviet Union. The so-called Rosenberg plan, calling for a joint German-Polish attack on Soviet Russia had been rejected, since Germany now no longer needed Poland's help against Russia. Hitler could either attack the Soviet Union at once, or "he can make friends with Soviet Russia, and participate in a new and probably
bloodless partitioning of Poland." Since there was never any logic in the Nazi policies, Bliven would not classify the latter choice as unbelievable. There would be no problem explaining to the regimented German masses that a Russo-German agreement was just an economic pact, since actually these two great states did complement one another economically, observed Bliven. 132

Henry C. Wolfe, also publishing in The New Republic, foretold further aggression, after a brief lull, because "one of a dictator's handicaps is that he must keep on bringing home victories." Wolfe predicted that Hungary, with the consent of the Nazi-oriented ruling class, would serve the Germans as a jumping off point into the Rumanian oil fields and the Ukraine. 133

Philip E. Mosely, a professor of international relations at Cornell University, called attention to Germany's traditional interest in the Danube region in a learned article in The Yale

132 Bruce Bliven, "Picking Up the Pieces," The New Republic, XCVI (October 19, 1938), 294. Bliven's conjecture regarding the possibility of a Nazi-Soviet entente had been alluded to many months before in three American journals. Sir Arthur Willert, "The Distempers of Europe," The Atlantic Monthly, CLX (September, 1937), 378, noted briefly that German leaders were "playing with the idea" of a Russian pact. The speculation "that Hitler could join forces tomorrow with Stalin is a possibility not to be ignored" appeared in George N. Shuster's "Notes of a Traveller," The Commonweal, XXVI (September 10, 1937), 455. The editors of The Living Age, CCCLIII (February, 1938), 475, pointed out that five years of Nazi propaganda directed at world Communism did not appear to be affecting German-Soviet economic interests. Both sides "continue to bere the world by abusing each other in their propaganda," while simultaneously increasing their commercial relations.

On one hand, the movement of German trade delegations throughout the area had been impressive, but more important for the National Socialist cause was the presence of thousands of German settlers in southeastern Europe. Mosely claimed that these people remained emotionally attached to the German homeland, and hence they had "real value as pawns." Mosely further noted that the Nazis' long-range plan could well envision the carving up of Russia, but only if they first attained complete political control over central Europe. 134

Louis Fischer, writing the article "Why Germany Feared War" for The Nation of November 12, 1938, expressed doubts about immediate new German aggression for the following reasons: Italy seemed an altogether unreliable ally, raw materials not even adequate for peace time, and only the German air force capable of meeting the test of a large-scale war. 135 Similar judgments appeared in the conservative American Mercury for December. An editorial called the German army "not one-fifth so good as it is cracked up to be." Nonetheless, Great Britain and France, with their "excellent military establishments" were not about to "strain" themselves, and the Germans knew it. Furthermore, this monthly strongly criticized the American press for printing "incendiary fiction" regarding recent European affairs. 136

135 Louis Fischer, "Why Germany Feared War," The Nation, CXLVII (November 12, 1938), 505.
136 The American Mercury, XLV (December, 1938), 458-461.
On December 6, 1938, France signed her own non-aggression pact with the Nazi government. That almost no journals even briefly mentioned this futile gesture gave evidence, perhaps, that treaties signed by Hitler were hardly considered vital to the understanding of European diplomacy. Only The New Republic in a short editorial comment tried to assess the treaty. It wondered whether the Paris officials realized that the pact counted for little in the Nazi scheme. "There is good reason to believe that the Nazi timetable of aggressive demands includes in the fairly near future an attempt to seize Alsace." For the moment, it suited Hitler's plans "to give an appearance of solidarity in the West now, partly for its effect on Poland and Soviet Russia." However, The New Republic believed that this "mask will be removed when the time comes."\[137\]

Blandly ignoring the fact that European diplomacy usually remained quiescent during the winter months, The Nation on December 17 loudly called attention to Hitler's "hesitation." Supposedly this feeling represented a German effort at accommodation with their Italian allies and their conservative British friends. The Nation followed up this note on December 31 with an editorial suggesting that mutual distrust had weakened the Italian-German relationship, while internally both regimes faced rising mass discontent. The Anschluss and the annexation of the Sudetenland had "accentuated" Germany's economic difficulties. In Nazi Ger-

\[137\] The New Republic, XLVII (December 14, 1938), 157-158.
Germany, The Nation perceived "a growing lack of morale."  

Henry C. Wolfe's article in the December 21, 1938 New Republic, "From Munich to Memel," pointed to a possible new field for German activity and raised the question of the Polish reaction in the event Germany seized the Memel territory from Lithuania. This former German possession, Wolfe predicted correctly, had been earmarked for occupation. In fact, Hitler's directive calling for the occupation of the territory had been issued to the armed forces on October 21, 1938.

More speculation concerning "imaginary" National Socialist problems was found by the readers of the January 1939 Harper's Magazine in an article by Peter F. Drucker. In his opinion the future of the entire Fascist movement depended upon the success the Germans and their propaganda machinery enjoyed with the Balkan peasants. Drucker estimated that only Germany herself could prevent her propaganda from being ultimately effective. "For, if the Nazis, after having stirred up the peasants, do not fulfill what they promised they will incur hatred more than any former master."

Assuring the world about Adolf Hitler seemed to be the task of a German writer, Frits Berber, whose essay "Germany's

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138 The Nation, CXLVII (December 17, 1938), 652, and (December 31, 1938), 5.


"Purpose" appeared in The Atlantic Monthly of January 1939. Berber hoped to convince the American reading public that the Nazi Fuehrer was a trustworthy gentleman, who would never think of advancing beyond the Sudetenland territory after having publicly stated the contrary. The author called Munich a victory for the right of self-determination and for conference diplomacy; in his mind, warmongers throughout the world were responsible for spreading slander about Nazi Germany.\textsuperscript{141} The Atlantic Monthly gave no indication of its reasons for publishing so obvious a piece of German propaganda.

A similar piece appeared in the American Mercury for January 1939. Lawrence Dennis marked the so-called war hysteria\textsuperscript{142} of the American people, whose attitudes contrasted with the cool rationalization of Europeans. The most rational of all was Adolf Hitler himself, wrote Dennis, who treated the Nazi leader within the framework of traditional diplomacy. Hitler's plan of conquest, continued the author, consisted merely of the ancient German political objectives once enunciated by Bismarck and William II, the main difference being that Hitler was "more rational and successful." Yet American press and public opinion have insistently treated him as a madman.\textsuperscript{142}

\textsuperscript{141} Fritz Berber, "Germany's Purpose," The Atlantic Monthly, CLXIII (January, 1939), 13-20. The Atlantic called Berber, who was the director of the German Institute for Foreign Policy Research, a Sudeten German who spoke for the moderate and informed element in Germany.

\textsuperscript{142} Lawrence Dennis, "After the Peace of Munich," The American Mercury, XLVI (January, 1939), 13-15. This conservative
The Living Age for January 1939 thought somewhat less of the European peoples who submitted so easily to domination by a small selfish clique. Appeasement had become the major policy of European diplomats when dealing with Adolf Hitler, while the Nazis' ideas had been acquiring adherents everywhere, even in the United States. Two months later the editors of The LivingAge announced the imminent demise of democracy.¹⁴³

Equally pessimistic was newsman Raymond Gram Swing, who declared in the March 1939 Survey Graphic: "Placation was a futile policy" against the big offensive of the Fascist states. "The democracies have had to take the defensive in a world struck with foreboding"; they had reached a new low in prestige, and Germany had acquired as much strength as she would have gotten if the last world war ended in a stalemate. In Swing's opinion Europe would be destroyed because neither England nor France could stand the economic strain of rearmament.¹⁴⁴

¹⁴³ The Living Age, CCCLV (January, 1939), 393, and CCCLVI (March, 1939), 1.

¹⁴⁴ Raymond Gram Swing, "Over Here," The Survey Graphic, XXVIII (February, 1939), 55-56. Swing was the special editor for this issue of the magazine which dealt in detail with "The Challenge to Democracy." He was an author, journalist and radio commentator.
The ubiquitous Henry C. Wolfe reflected upon European foreign affairs for the Harper's Magazine of February 1939. Among other matters, Wolfe alerted his readers to the possibility of a German entente with the Soviet Union. This possibility had been mentioned occasionally by various journalists, and Wolfe presently made it more creditable by stating that "some of the best informed men in the chancelleries of Europe regard this as more than a long shot." Wolfe correctly surmised that a Nazi-Bolshevik pact would have world repercussions.

The March Living Age mentioned numerous rumors concerning an impending Russo-German pact, but it probably alluded only to current trade discussions by the Germans and Russians since the previous month. The Living Age's editors found it "difficult to guess" what a pact like this would mean, but it observed that a neutral Soviet Russia would help Hitler's program immeasurably; however, this action left Nazi Germany's ally, Japan, "holding the bag" in the Asian area. It would be quite an achievement if the German leader could get the Russians to remain neutral on all fronts, in this monthly's judgment.

Chancellor Hitler celebrated his sixth year in power in January 1939 with another long, bombastic address. His sole new announcement consisted in offering support to his friend in any


146 The Living Age, CCCLVI (March, 1939), 4-5.
war involving Italy. Three American weeklies considered Hitler's message important enough to respond editorially.\textsuperscript{147} The Nation on February 4 noticed that "he did not tell how far he would back Italian demands that might lead to war," yet, even without specific proposals, the Fuehrer still managed to be threatening. The Nation professed itself unable to understand the attitudes of the English and French press, which discerned moderation in Hitler's address. "At least he made no new demands," commented The Christian Century. Yet, the "new and startling thing," the unrestricted support of Italy, was "packed with dynamite." The Century also carefully noted that Hitler had vigorously denounced Communism but without threatening the Soviet Union, an indication, the Century noted, of a possible rapprochement. Finally The Commonweal, the third journal to respond, editorialized that it could not share the "encouragement" felt by "most of the world" at Hitler's speech. The Nazi chieftain was attempting to force the Fascist world-view upon the rest of the civilized states, and it was this journal's fear that many would succumb to the Nazi enticements. "The power of Nazi propaganda has been well tested and has been disarmingly effective."

During the first half of March 1939, several American editors and journalists foresaw an early display of Nazi saber-rattling in order to keep peace at home and to maintain the pressure

\textsuperscript{147}The Nation, CXLVIII (February 4, 1939), 134; The Christian Century, LVI (February 8, 1939), 171-172; and The Commonweal, XXX (February 10, 1939), 421.
on the western powers. Almost all doubts about the German military capability to fight a major war had been removed, according to these observations; one journalist, Marc A. Rose, writing in the March Forum, even claimed that the "overwhelming air supremacy" of Germany had caused a shift in the balance of European military power.\textsuperscript{148}

The fears expressed in journals in early March found confirmation at once in the first overt German aggression of the new year. In a rapid series of events from March 10 to 16, the Nazis destroyed Czechoslovak sovereignty and placed the Czech state under German protection. Hitler could no longer hide his imperial ambitions. Although Nazi Germany had flagrantly broken another promise, the American journals were extremely restrained in their response, and moral condemnations were lacking.

The Nation editorial "Munich: Act II" felt that Hitler's "mask" had been "ripped off":

Hitler's inclusion of Czechoslovakia within his empire marks the adoption of new tactics and slogans. When he began his career of treaty-breaking his professed aim was to reverse the "crime of Versailles," and he found a road smoothed by the guilty consciences of Britain and France. Next he exploited Wilsonian "self-determination" and under this banner gathered in without opposition Austria and the Sudetenland. Now he turns to an all-embracing theory that can excuse any aggression. By the "law of self-preservation-\textsuperscript{148}

\textsuperscript{148}The New Republic, XCVIII (March 1, 1939), 88; The Nation, CXLVIII (March 4, 1939), 249-250; (March 11, 1939), 277; (March 18, 1939), 305; and Louis Fischer, "Hitler's New Threat," 310; and Marc A. Rose, "Hitler's Aerial Triumph," The Forum, CI (March, 1939), 127. Rose was a former editor of Business Week. Cf. footnotes 169, 170, 171, and 172 for an altogether different evaluation of Germany's military potential. The final destruction of Czechoslovakia separated these two sets of observations.
tion" the Herrenvolk, the superior German people, are entitled to more "living space" and lordship over inferior races such as the Slavs.

Oswald Garrison Villard, who had criticized the German people in 1933 and 1934 for their negative response to the world’s condemnation of Nazi barbarism, now overestimated their reaction to Hitler’s latest act of aggression. Villard alleged that the German masses would not permit the Fuehrer to approach the brink of war again.149 The New Republic for March 29 thought that the Fuehrer’s latest “marauding expedition” had surprised just about everybody, including his Italian ally, a shrewd observation that was factually accurate. “Other such expeditions” were likely to occur soon, warned the liberal magazine.150

In its initial response to the German seizure of Czechoslovakia, The Christian Century for March 22 realized that events were moving too quickly to allow for any serious judgments, but it did see an easing of pressure in western Europe, "at least for the time being." A week later the title of The Christian Century editorial, "Hitler the Conqueror," indicated what this journal thought about Hitler’s destruction of the Czech state. Because the Fuehrer was caught up in the myth of his own greatness, he had to keep moving, which, the Century hoped, would prove fatal for him sooner or later. To keep his reputation intact, Hitler’s surprise actions had to be scheduled at regular intervals in or-


150 The New Republic, XCVIII (March 29, 1939), 206.
der to alleviate domestic difficulties. More importantly, now that non-Germans had been incorporated into the Hitler empire, the Century expected domestic unrest to proliferate. The fall of the Prague government could very well mark the turning point in Hitler's career, the Protestant weekly prognosticated. "Final defeat will not come tomorrow," it acknowledged, and "it may not come until Europe has suffered many further agonies," but it was plain to see that the National Socialist leader had chosen to take the same path as Napoleon. 151

"Now Europe will get a chance to see how the Nazis administer something which is frankly an empire, no longer a folk nation, no longer based on the fiction of common blood and shared racial egotism," said The Commonweal on March 24. The Munich guarantees had been conveniently forgotten by the western powers, which breathed a sigh of relief that Hitler's thrust went East again instead of in a westerly direction. Contrary to a commonly expressed view, this Catholic magazine felt that the latest Nazi move proved that Germany's domestic and economic difficulties had no bearing on Hitler's decisions in foreign affairs. The Commonweal had little to offer in the way of concrete suggestions to relieve the world of the Hitler menace: people under the Nazi regime and those threatened by that dictatorship should "undergo a personal revolution and then reorganize their society on a human enough basis to counter the totalitarian system of the Hitler

Reich." A week later it proposed that "the only hope would seem to be to allow Hitler to expand to the point of collapse, for everyone stands to lose by another European war," while in the April 14 issue it called for the end of a "narrowly unified monopoly capitalism" in the nations threatened by Nazism.\(^{152}\)

Offering its readers no quixotic solutions for Europe's dilemma, America could not foresee Hitler deterred from his goal of European domination, since no one dared oppose him. America also recalled how Hitler, whom this Jesuit weekly now labeled as notorious as Joseph Stalin, had treated the Concordat of 1933, and it advised the United States government not to get involved with European problems,\(^{153}\) a feeling shared by a majority of Americans at the time.

British newsmen Douglas Woodruff, authoring the article "Europe: Home of Crisis" for the May 1939 Sign, commented that "the treatment of the Czechs and the Slovaks has been defended officially in Germany on grounds, all of which would justify similar action anywhere else." Yet Woodruff did not appear ready to support the forceful containment of National Socialism.

Wars can only be won by working up public opinion to such a pitch that it becomes politically impossible to stop short of victory or defeat, or to make a moderate peace; and from a peace that is not moderate new wars plainly spring. Men entered the last war against Germany to cries about removing the menaces of Prussian militarism,

\(^{152}\)The Commonweal, XXIX (March 24, 1939), 589; (March 31, 1939), 617; and (April 14, 1939), 673.

\(^{153}\)America, LX (March 25, 1939), 578; (April 1, 1939), 613; and (April 8, 1939), 627.
getting rid of caste, and making the world safe for demo-
cracy. But the destruction of the old dynasties and the old institutions left the field clear for the Nazi move-
ment, which reproduces the features of the Hohenzollerns without any softening influences.154

Reviewing Hitler's Mein Kampf for the May Catholic World, Father Wilfrid Parsons, S.J., related the "unforgettable" experience "in the presence of a complete and utterly sincere revelation of a soul" and suggested, without specifying the reasons, that Hitler had "a very good chance of succeeding" in making the German race "the ruler of the world."155 Contributing to the May 10 Christian Century, the Russian philosopher, Nicolas A. Berdyaev, called attention to a significant motivating factor: Hitler being driven ahead in his foreign ventures by the conviction "that fate is on his side." It was this belief in fate which had so far confused "the old style diplomats" at the conference table.156

The disappearance of Czechoslovakia staggered the British and French leaders, partners to the Munich agreement, yet they could do little but send official protests. Only the editors of The Nation and Aurel Kolnai, contributing to the same journal, felt the need to comment on the allies' action. The Nation pointed out that since the Fascist powers had a "monopoly" on posi-

156 Nicolas A. Berdyaev, "Fatality or Faith?" trans. Donald A. Lowrie, The Christian Century, LVI (May 10, 1939), 603-604. The famous Russian philosopher was living in Paris at this time.
tive action in international affairs, the verbal protests of the western leaders were futile. Meanwhile, Kolnai blamed the western powers' actions on "The Ghost of Versailles," and stated their cause.

Let us control carefully our dislike of fascist imperialism and Nazi barbarism, for we have made it ourselves and we rather than its direct agents are responsible for the danger it represents. Above all, let us refrain from repeating the error; another "victorious" war would mean another Versailles of an even worse character, and with consequences even more hideous and menacing than what confronts us today. 157

On March 23, 1939, Germany struck again, and the Lithuanian government, after receiving an ultimatum from Berlin, surrendered the Memel territory to Germany. This event was an extremely minor operation in the eyes of the American journalists, and few made any effort to discuss or analyze it. (The New Republic, for instance, called the Memel territory "small game." 158) One major exception, The Christian Century, devoted part of its April 5 editorial "Tragic Europe" to the significance of Germany's acquisition of the area.

It shows that the nazi appetite for more territory is still keen. It shows that there is no disposition to slow up the rate of expansion in order to consolidate previous gains. More than all else, it constitutes a warning to the Baltic states and Poland. The ease

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157 The Nation, CXLVIII (April 1, 1939), 363, and Aurel Kolnai, "The Ghost of Versailles," (April 15, 1939), 427-430. Kolnai was a liberal Austrian Catholic, who had written a detailed account of the history, development and psychology of Nazi racism, The War Against the West (New York: The Viking Press, 1938).

158 The New Republic, XC VIII (March 29, 1939), 206.
with which Germany took over this territory at the mouth of the Niemen, after a single threat from von Ribbentrop, is virtual notice served on Estonia and Latvia, as well as on Lithuania, of their helplessness. Poland, which originally contested Lithuania's claim to the territory, must likewise see in this seizure a portent of the fate of the Corridor. If Mussolini at his end of the axis has determined to make the Mediterranean an Italian lake, Hitler's absorption of Memel—probably to be followed without long delay by formal annexation of Danzig—discloses an equal intention of completing German domination over the Baltic.

In the same journal, Albert Viton interpreted this latest Nazi land seizure to mean that the small buffer state in Europe had lost all practical value. He observed that "if Hitler is to be stopped, it can be only by the powerful major powers of the west. And as long as his march continued eastward, do they really want to stop him?"  

Almost the only possible source of a check in German expansion seemed to be the German people themselves, and The New Republic for April 12 almost wistfully hinted at the existence of some domestic opposition to the foreign policy of the Third Reich. A much more realistic assessment appeared in The Christian Century for May 17 in a dispatch from its German correspondent A. S. Eker. Eker ascertained that the great mass of German people supported the National Socialists' policy of expansion, with only a "very few" of the population "not prepared to accept the fruits of nazi aggression without a word of protest."  

160 The New Republic, XC VIII (April 12, 1939), 263.  
161 A. S. Eker, "Correspondence from Germany: Hysteria
By the spring of 1939, Danzig and the Polish Corridor became the next concrete subject of German interest. Inconclusive German-Polish discussions concerning the fate of these territories had started within a month after the Munich conference, with the Nazi government desiring the incorporation of Danzig into the Reich plus access across the Corridor to East Prussia. In late March 1939, following the German destruction of Czechoslovakia and the seizure of Memel, the negotiations took on a more serious tone, but the Polish government refused to be browbeaten, and on March 31 it received added support for its position from the British and French governments. Although the German-Polish talks continued, and Hitler hoped that he would eventually win his goals by diplomatic measures, he secretly committed Germany to war with Poland. On April 3, 1939, the Fuehrer ordered the preparation of a Polish invasion plan (Operation White) with September 1 set as the earliest date for implementation.

Recognizing the growing seriousness of the European situation, President Franklin D. Roosevelt asked Hitler and Mussolini in mid-April 1939 to guarantee the existence of thirty-one European and Near Eastern states, including Poland, but the Fuehrer replied with a no-compromise speech before the German Reichstag on April 28, and denied deceitfully that he had aggressive intentions toward Poland.

With reference to Hitler's address, editor and publisher Grows in German Reich,“ The Christian Century, LVI (May 17, 1939), 650.
Freda Kirchwey of *The Nation* surmised that the German dictator was preparing the world for his coming confrontation with Poland. The *New Republic*'s editors viewed the speech as an important part of Hitler's overall strategy "to retain in foreign policy the freedom of action which he has employed successfully in the past."

This policy is to achieve one carefully defined objective at a time without having to fight for it, and without arousing a general united front against him. By a succession of such strokes he can gain strength for more and more victories. What is necessary for this purpose? First, enough military strength and moral resolution so that other nations will be afraid to attack Germany and so that the particular victim will see that resistance is useless. Second, the absence of any general agreement or settlement that can set bounds to the succession of minor advances. Third, reassurances to all except the particular victim chosen for the next coup and, toward this victim, a campaign of disruption and intimidation. This campaign advances by steps, with the understanding that if the first German demand is refused, the next will be stiffer. The supreme offense is to resist the Führer's will—a crime that liquidates all previous obligations.

On the other hand, *The Christian Century*'s editors believed that the Nazi leader's speech had cleared the air for negotiations. German demands in Danzig and the Polish Corridor could be ironed out by another meeting of the European powers. At this late date, the *Century* imagined that Adolf Hitler would still listen to reason. It commented that he "did not sound like a wild man intent on war." Only the Vatican's intercession could


164 *The Christian Century*, LVI (May 10, 1939), 599.
forestall an armed conflict in eastern Europe in the immediate future, declared the May 6 issue of America, which like The Christian Century had an unrealistic view of foreign affairs at this time.165

The May 13 Nation editorial "Contest of Nerves" considered Europe to be momentarily in a state of suspension between a "period of war and one of peace, while it waited for Hitler to make up his mind about Poland. The Nation guessed that "he is once again gambling on the theory that his opponents will break first and enable him to bring off another bloodless triumph."166

According to Professor Frederick L. Schuman in the May 31 New Republic, only a complete social revolution in western Europe, meaning to the author the overthrow of the present conservative leadership, could prevent Hitler from carving out a great world empire. A British, French and Russian alliance could apply the brakes to the Fascists' progress, if only a new group of dynamic and enlightened western leaders would seriously consider negotiating with the Soviet government. Schuman thought it possible that these great powers could reach an accord,167 but by the time of his article discussions between the three states, which had been in progress for several months, had broken down. As a matter of fact, the Russian foreign office started to seek out accom-

165 America, LXI (May 6, 1939), 75.
166 The Nation, CXLVII (May 13, 1939), 547.
modation with Nazi Germany in late May 1939.

In the midst of the increasing tensions in Europe, a leading voice of American conservatism, Senator Robert A. Taft of Ohio, published his isolationist views in the June *Current History*. The Senator urged this journal's readers to help keep America from becoming involved in another European war. The American lawmaker thought of the situation in the rather simple terms of "another phase of the racial and nationalist warfare which has devastated Europe for many centuries." 168

With German-Polish relations at an apparent stalemate, and the western powers now firmly committed to support Poland, a number of journalists began to speculate about Germany's ability to conduct a successful military maneuver against other major powers. "Germany cannot win a war if one begins today, tomorrow, this year," emphatically predicted George Fielding Eliot in the June *American Mercury*, three months before the Germans began using their successful blitzkrieg tactics. Time, however, would be working in Germany's favor and Eliot thought that after a few more years of military preparation, the Nazi state would be able to confront confidently a combination of the great powers. 169

168 Robert A. Taft, "An Editorial on Wartime and Our Own Business," *Current History*, L (June, 1939), 32-33. Senator Taft (1889-1953) was just becoming a leading Senate spokesman for the Republican Party. He published his views during the Congressional debates considering a revision of the neutrality laws and repeal of the arms embargo.

Another military expert, Herbert Rosinski, making a thorough historical survey of the German army since the collapse of 1918 for the April 1939 Foreign Affairs, determined that the Reichswehr was "the mystery force of the world," because "its bloodless victories in Austria and Czecho-Slovakia have not offered any insight into its real capacity to carry on another World War." By comparison with the armies of the democratic states, the German military machine was probably superior, Rosinski guessed.

There is no question as to the superiority of the totalitarian regime as far as technical matters are concerned; nor is it by any means certain that its morale would prove to be in any way inferior, at least at the beginning of a war and so long as there were no decisive reverses. On the whole, it seems that the factors which would destroy army efficiency in a totalitarian regime would come into play only in the course of a protracted struggle or as the result of far-reaching internal changes.170

Willson Woodside, in the essay "Germany Would Lose" for Harper's Magazine of July, seemed convinced that Nazi Germany was not ready for a war of long duration. After pointing out the poor performance of much German equipment "tested" in Spain, Woodside observed that the Reichswehr suffered from a shortage of top-flight officers and of proven reserve strength. Germany also lacked a sufficient battle fleet. But other subjects, the condition of Germany's economy and the spirit and endurance of the home front, seemed more important for Woodside. "The econom-

170 Herbert Rosinski, "The Reichswehr Today," Foreign Affairs, XVII (April, 1939), 538-548. Exiled Dr. Rosinski was a German expert on military affairs; he was the author of The German Army (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1940).
The current psychological situation in Germany to-day is more like that of 1917 than 1914." A war at this moment would be disastrous for the National Socialists' cause, in Woodside's judgment. Concurring with Woodside, Graham D. Hutton, in the July issue of The Atlantic Monthly, predicted that Germany could not last longer than a year in a general war. "The utmost Germany might hope for would be the ruin of her adversaries with that of herself. No one might win; but Germany would certainly lose." If the Fuehrer desired, Nazi Germany could curtail its armament production and bring about a first step in the direction of a lasting peace, suggested Vernon Bartlett, who doubted war would erupt because of the German-Polish dispute, in The Forum for July. "If I am right in my forecast, the time may come when the Fuehrer will convert himself into an apostle of peace and will gain great prestige and power for Germany by so doing," declared Bartlett. Contrariwise, Henry C. Wolfe argued in the same month's American Mercury that Hitler would go to war because "he must fight." "To stop now would be to lose many of the advantages of the 'bloodless' victories that have won for Great Germany the territories of Austria, Czechoslovakia, and Memel."

Moreover, Germany's economic problems would force his hand. The Nazis' promises had to be fulfilled or the class struggle in Germany would erupt again. Besides, Wolfe doubted that Hitler could "temper the speed and destructiveness" of present day Germany--"a colossal human and material dynamo that feeds on its own momentum."  

With little in the way of concrete German foreign activities to examine during the late spring and early summer months of 1939, American journalists anxiously tried to predict Hitler's next move. Nation contributor Henry C. Wolfe believed that Hitler had placed a top priority on the seizure of the small Baltic states for both economic and military reasons: they would supply raw materials and serve as markets for German goods and "provide a base of operations against the Soviet Union." Swedish newsman Joachim Joesten told The Nation's readers that Germany had quietly embarked upon a policy of peaceful penetration of the Scandinavian countries. He forecast that this region would soon become "the main arena" for the struggle between Nazism and Communism.  

In The Christian Century Albert Viton maintained that "hard economic realities" were driving the Nazis to formulate a scheme for the political domination of the Balkans.  

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175 Wolfe, "The Vulnerable Baltic," The Nation, CXLVIII (May 27, 1939), 608-609, and Joachim Joesten, "Germany vs. Russia in the North," (June 24, 1939), 719.  
176 Albert Viton, "Can Hitler Stop?" The Christian Century, LVI (June 7, 1939), 733-735.
in the July Foreign Affairs shared Viton's view and added that the large German minorities in Hungary, Rumania and Yugoslavia made the Nazi propaganda task that much easier. 177

German-Polish relations, however, remained in the forefront of most journalists' thoughts. On two occasions The Nation's Freda Kirchwey cautioned her readers to beware of the "lull" concerning Germany's Danzig policy, since Hitler was the "past master in the art of psychic attack." The same warning came from the pen of Louis Fischer. 178 But on August 12 The Nation's editors advised that war in eastern Europe might be delayed due to German economic policies, while in the next issue they speculated that Hitler might attempt to divert attention away from Danzig by striking elsewhere, since his partner Mussolini supposedly did not think the Baltic territory worth the price of war. 179 According to most of foreign correspondent Robert Dell's European contacts, Hitler would draw back from war if the other powers, Great Britain, France and Russia, made clear their unequivocal support of threatened Poland. It was only speculation, Dell admitted, but it seemed that

177 Elizabeth Wiskemann, "The 'Drang Nach Osten' Continues," Foreign Affairs, XVII (July, 1939), 764-773. Professor Wiskemann was the author of several significant monographs concerning European diplomatic history.

178 Freda Kirchwey, "Lull Before Appeasement?" The Nation, CXLVIII (June 24, 1939), 717, and "Appeasement or War?" CXLIIX (July 8, 1939), 34, and Louis Fischer, "America and Europe," (July 22, 1939), 101.

179 The Nation, CXLIIX (August 12, 1939), 161-162, and (August 19, 1939), 184.
Hitler will not risk war for Danzig alone. If he acts in Danzig, it will be either because he believes that he can act without risking war or because he has made up his mind that it is a question of now or never for Germany and that he must risk war or abandon the hope of achieving his aims in Eastern Europe.\footnote{Robert Dell, "Will There Be War?" ibid., (August 19, 1939), 187-188.}

On July 5 the editors of The New Republic had also felt that a "firm intention on the part of Britain, France and Russia to throw their whole power against the Reich" could deter Hitler from opening hostilities with Poland. But they did not seem to place much confidence in the three powers taking such a step.

Germany, it is said, expects to be able to gain her objectives in Poland within six weeks; she does not look for effective opposition from the Soviet Union. In the meantime air raids to the west and possible land action against Holland and Belgium would have terrorized the Western Powers into surrendering the rich colonies of the two small nations. Franco might create a diversion by attacking French Morocco. This, at least, is the war plan that is foreseen in France. One wonders whether Hitler does not want it to be foreseen and thus to lead to a surrender before a gun is fired.

Several weeks later the editors discounted any possibility of a British, French and Russian alliance against Nazi Germany and foresaw the western powers again taking the road of appeasement. They also perceived that

Hitler's tactics are ominously like those which preceded his seizure of the Sudetenland. The German press has been turned full blast against Poland. Herr Goebbels pulls the strings and the Nazis in Danzig obediently shout for annexation. Above all, Hitler manages to create a sense of haste and urgency for which there is no justification whatever. There is no problem in Danzig that could not perfectly well wait a few months or a few years for solution. No doubt Hitler suffers from a sense of compulsion that is part of his mania. He hears inward voices, believes that
the stars control his destiny—or he theirs. At bottom, he is a madman, although an extremely shrewd and cunning one, who has over and over again shown himself the master of the psychologically saner but politically less resolute politicians in Downing Street and the Quai d'Orsay.

The French newswoman Genevieve Tabouis wrote to The New Republic that Hitler would "strike at once" against Poland, no matter what policies his opponents devised.181

On several occasions The Christian Century expressed concern with the Danzig problem, and while it expected a crisis to develop by the end of the summer, war over Danzig looked unlikely. It seemed to think that a European conference, probably favoring Germany's position, could settle all the difficulties, although the mid-August report of the Century opined that the Fuhrer had yet to make up his mind about Danzig, "for when he decides he acts."182

In a short editorial comment on August 26, America suggested that there need not be war over Danzig, but it proceeded to add some important qualifications. Every important European issue could be dealt with at the conference table, "if only the nations would enter a conference prepared for sacrifice in the interests of peace." America confessed that Hitler's untrustworthiness worked against the possibility of such a meeting. Never-
theless, it still seemed to hold the position that Hitler could be influenced by an appeal to reason. There was yet a chance that, rather than risk war, Hitler would grant to the world "a gesture of good-will," for clearly "the responsibility for peace or war rests squarely on the shoulders of one man." On the other hand, the editors of the monthly *Living Age* for August could see no way of avoiding a war in eastern Europe.

Meanwhile, beyond sight of the American periodicals, Germany and Russia had been seeking a rapprochement, with the initial discussions beginning as far back as April 1939. Occasionally during the previous eighteen months several journalists had raised the question of Russo-German cooperation of some sort. While the possibility of an accord did not receive wide discussion during the summer of 1939, a pair of journalists, Henry C. Wolfe and Farrell Schnering, did comment upon rumors that the two totalitarian giants stood on the verge of attaining harmonious relations. The specter of a Nazi-Communist agreement had been stalking Europe for about six years, in the judgment of Henry C. Wolfe in "Europe's Secret Nightmare" for *Harper's Magazine* of June; at present there seemed to be an excellent possibility that this "nightmare" would soon become a reality. Wolfe conceived that an accord would be reached between Hitler and Stalin since each was "a master of Realpolitik." "Neither would permit his

183 *America*, LXI (August 26, 1939), 458.
184 *The Living Age*, CCCLVI (August, 1939), 501.
personal feeling toward the other to wreck a long-range foreign program." Yet Wolfe added that the status of the pro-western Russian foreign minister Maxim Litvinov seemed to be the "key" to the future. 

Farrell Schnering observed shrewdly in the June 24 America that the dismissal of Maxim Litvinov, as Soviet Foreign deputy on May 3, 1939, signified a preparatory move toward a Nazi-Soviet entente. However, during the next two months no other journalists or editors speculated on the possibility of such an understanding.

As the crisis over Danzig and the Polish Corridor worsened during the month of August, the American journals were jolted by the announcements made in Moscow between August 20 and 23; a German-Soviet non-aggression pact plus important trade agreements. The totalitarian rapprochement was finally a reality. Now with no fear of Russian intervention, Hitler could easily eliminate Poland and then turn the Reichswehr toward the West. The Nation for August 26 evaluated the pact as "a colossal diplomatic victory" for Adolf Hitler, since it "laid foundations for another Munich." As matters now stood, Poland found herself isolated between the two giant totalitarian powers, and the Poles would probably be forced to grant the concessions demanded by the Nazi


186 Farrell Schnering, "Litvinov Gets Lemons After Plucking Stalin's plums," America, LXI (June 24, 1939), 246-247. Schnering was a former member of the American Communist Party.
government. War, of course, was not out of the question. "The Poles are a recklessly romantic people, and knowing that once they yield anything to Hitler they will probably suffer the fate of the Czechs, they may choose to go down fighting." The western powers' turn would come later, with Nazi Germany having "a better chance of forcing them to buy peace dearly than has hitherto seemed within its power."187

The New Republic aimed considerably more criticism at the Russian government. The treaty "can mean nothing except that the Soviet Union has turned a cold shoulder to Britain and France at the critical moment." Hitler's "piecemeal conquests" would continue at the present rate, since the Russian trade agreement guaranteed needed supplies and lessened the danger of effective naval blockade. Looking at European affairs in late August 1939 and taking note of the recently negotiated pact, The New Republic perceived unquestioned National Socialist gains.

Hitler is strengthened in every way. He has not given up his drive for world power. He has performed another miracle, and his prestige at home will be enormously augmented. His faith in himself and in his mission will be doubly reinforced. The military and economic resources of the Reich are again enlarged, nothing now stand between her and complete domination of all Central Europe.

Sooner or later, Nazi Germany would find cause to clash with the Soviet Union, assumed The New Republic, perhaps before, perhaps after Hitler reduces the "Western nations to second-class powers"; however, this weekly argued that the Nazis would try at all

187 The Nation, CXLIX (August 26, 1939), 211-212.
costs to avoid a two-front war. Nevertheless, there was little reason to doubt that the Fuehrer would continue to settle problems by his own methods and according to his own time schedule. 188

While the Ribbentrop-Molotov pact undoubtedly represented a German victory, The Living Age cautioned against premature judgments about its significance, yet this journal saw a new partition of Poland as the immediate result. 189 Another observer, Max Nomad, writing in the conservative American Mercury, insinuated that Joseph Stalin had instigated the alliance. Nomad viewed it as a long-prepared Communist plot that began in the early days of the Weimar Republic when the Communists had set out to weaken the republican forces in order to permit a National Socialist revolution. According to Nomad's theory, the Communist scheme had succeeded to perfection, because "all signs...are that the reconciliation marks the start of serious Russo-German co-operation." 190

After hearing of the Russo-German treaty, The Christian Century said, "If the European situation was an enigma, a menace and a headache before...that event made it a riddle that can be solved only by waiting to see what happens." The Century conjectured that the pact would play a major role in European events, especially in weakening the anti-Nazi bloc. Suspicious like The Living Age, this Protestant journal opined that the treaty con-

188 The New Republic, C (August 30, 1939), 88-89.
189 The Living Age, CCCLVII (September, 1939), 1-7.
190 Max Nomad, "Behind the Moscow-Berlin Axis," The American Mercury, XLVIII (October, 1939), 146-147.
tained a secret provision for a new partition of Poland. The Na-
zis could gain much from this accord, but the Century wondered
whether it might "alarm Mussolini and shock the Vatican." Still,
this Protestant organ continued to urge the statesmen of the
world to keep looking for "a way of justice and of peace," yet
not at the expense of another Munich-like settlement. With its
patience apparently exhausted, The Christian Century declared
that the line must presently be drawn at the Polish frontier,
and a step beyond it by the Germans would mean war. 191

The Catholic Commonweal offered little comment about the
treaty itself, except that it appeared to favor the Germans in
case of the outbreak of war. In a more general sense, this week-
ly saw world justice receiving another staggering blow, because
"individually Russia and Germany were pretty appalling; combined
they could really show us something." 192 Father John La Farge,
a staff member of America, expressed not the least surprise by
the recent diplomatic news; he called the treaty "a logical con-
clusion of a series of events and policies" in the last few years.
The Jesuit priest surmised that the Russian government had taken
the initiative in the talks after it had discovered that the west-
ern powers would grant no special concessions to the Soviets. 193

191 The Christian Century, LVI (August 30, 1939), 1035-
1036.
192 The Commonweal, XXX (September 1, 1939), 425.
193 John La Farge, S. J., "It's 'Heil Tovarysh!' As Nazis
Embrace the Reds," America, LXI (September 2, 1939), 484-485.
Another Catholic journal The Sign used the pact to ridicule Communist sympathizers in America who had long been extolling Russian Communism as the great bulwark against Fascism. The pact did not impress a Sign contributor, newsman Kenneth Campbell. His article "Back to War" treated the new entente as only a temporary maneuver on the part of Stalin and his associates. The Bolsheviks would betray Hitler in the near future because "Brest-Litovsk calls for revenge."\(^{194}\)

The Russo-German pact guaranteed aggression against Poland, but even in the final days of August 1939, American commentators would not concede the inevitability of war. For the journalists, as long as the conflict had not actually begun, there remained a last ray of hope.

Reporting from his Paris headquarters on August 28 to The Nation, Robert Dell wrote that the issue of peace or war still hung in the balance. Considering everything that had transpired in the last week, Dell felt that because Hitler had constantly refused to negotiate with the Poles, he was steadily pushing Europe over the brink into armed conflict. Too, the defection of the Russians from the anti-Hitler nations could prove to be decisive in determining the Fuehrer's next action. However, Dell noted that European public opinion refused to give up hope that some last minute action could preserve the peace. Yet a second Nation correspondent, Aylmer Vallance, entertained less sanguine senti-

\(^{194}\)The Sign, XIX (October, 1939), 134, and Kenneth Campbell, "Back to War," 137. Campbell was a New York Newspaperman.
ments, perhaps conditioned by his residence in London. In a very accurate prediction, Vallance declared that there would be no new Munich nor would the present crisis be postponed. The issue would be settled here and now, for the western powers had finally stiffened in their opposition to Nazi aggression. According to The New Republic's editors, war could be avoided only if either Hitler or the leaders of Great Britain and France were willing to suffer a loss of prestige and a diplomatic defeat; however, this possibility now seemed out of the question. 

On the other hand, to the very end of the era of peace, The Christian Century maintained that millions of Europeans of every country shared its belief that war could be prevented, despite the fact that "the odds on war are heavy." As long as negotiations continued, so did hope, and the Century considered it likely that these diplomatic deliberations would be protracted. In fact the editors declared they "still refuse to believe" that European statesmen would plunge into a world conflict. A temporary peace was about all that could be expected at the moment, but it would pave the way for a more comprehensive agreement. A general settlement "dedicated to a final liquidation of the evil done by the Versailles Treaty" must be drawn up, "for Europe can-


196 The New Republic, C (September 6, 1939), 118-119.
not survive another such crisis."\textsuperscript{197} There would be not time to explore the \textit{Century's} suggestion, since this issue bore the date September 6, 1939, five days after World War II began.

In summary, by the spring of 1936 the American journals were in a pessimistic mood, since the Nazis had remilitarized the Rhineland without appreciable response from the western powers. The journals seemed to acknowledge that Hitler had taken the initiative in European affairs, and they fully expected the Fuehrer to move again in the international arena. Even during the latter half of 1936 and the year 1937, a fairly quiet time on the German diplomatic front and while the Spanish Civil War occupied the interest of the American newsmen, journalists speculated on Nazi Germany's possible targets.

American observers neither fully comprehended nor astutely assessed the Rome-Berlin Axis. One often received the impression that the Axis allies, in reality firmly committed to the same general goals, stood on the verge of splitting over a relatively minor conflict of interests. Germany's treaty with Japan received the same casual and unenlightened appraisal.

American journalists exhibited a number of doubts, between the spring of 1936 and the summer of 1939, concerning Nazi Germany's capacity to engage in a major war. Many observers, perhaps underestimating the organizing potential of the Nazi totali-

\textsuperscript{197} \textit{The Christian Century}, LVI (September 6, 1939), 1062.
tarian structure and failing to calculate properly the progress of German rearmament, misinformed the American reading public. On the other hand, most journalists recognized the fact that the conduct of the western powers might well allow the Nazis to achieve their ambitious goals without a test of arms. With Adolf Hitler making good one promise after another, the journals' interest in Mein Kampf became more apparent. Actually, by 1938 the periodicals gave the impression that only a minor miracle could stop the complete fulfillment of Hitler's prophecy.

By the majority of the journals, Hitler's bid for Anschluss was treated as a success several days before the union became finalized. The editors and journalists immediately expressed some hope that the anti-Nazi powers had awakened to the danger of a revived Germany, but this feeling did not last long. Like Austria, Czechoslovakia was prematurely surrendered to oblivion by the American journals before the final meeting of the powers at Munich. After the signing of the treaty, the journalists spent more time criticizing the appeasement policies of the western powers than the Machiavellian methods used by Hitler. The majority of the observers felt that Prime Minister Chamberlain had only postponed the inevitable war. Hitler, it was believed, would not be content to stop with just the annexation of the Sudetenland.

Although speculation concerning prospective Nazi victims continued in 1938 and 1939, the journals persisted in their hope, some to the very eve of the Second World War, that peace might be preserved, even while they condemned appeasement. The united
front of anti-Fascist powers that seemed to be anticipated and desired, except by Catholic journalists, failed to materialize. The August 1939 Russo-German treaty, which could not be fully analyzed by the journals before the outbreak of war, brought an end to the speculation that Hitler's territorial ambitions could be curbed effectively.

More often than not, the American journalists viewed European events in a vacuum. Seldom did any of the writers consider that the United States bore responsibility for containing the National Socialist quest for European domination, even though most observers of international relations, at one time or another, offered remedies for preserving the peace. Yet liberal, conservative and neutral journals appeared to rule out American intervention.

During the three and one-half years covered in this chapter, The Nation and The New Republic furnished the most consistent handling in depth of German foreign affairs. Usually The New Republic's assessments were more accurate and less inclined toward emotionalism. Both liberal weeklies by 1938 tended to be more disturbed by the obvious failings of the western powers than by Hitler's foreign successes.

While occasionally the conservative editors of The Living Age appeared to have a difficult time keeping abreast of the currents in foreign policy, a condition which can be excused in a monthly periodical, they offered their readers some of the most astute analyses of the period. Many significant, but not always
accurate, depth studies on German foreign policies also appeared in the neutral monthlies. Catholic journals, often guilty of poor judgment and inaccurate assessments, in general gave superficial coverage to Germany's foreign endeavors. The leading journalistic spokesman for American Protestantism, The Christian Century, seemed obsessed with the idea of preserving world peace and, at times, almost fell into the category of appeasement.
CHAPTER XII

CONCLUSIONS

A. The Journals

Of all the journals examined for this dissertation, the liberal weeklies *The Nation* and *The New Republic* gave their readers the most thorough and accurate coverage of Nazi Germany's domestic and foreign problems. In general, *The Nation's* editors approached the rise and success of Hitler and National Socialism with a naive idealism often tinged with emotionalism. On the other hand, *The New Republic* usually took a more realistic stance and appeared more ready to express critical judgment. Although its editors, in their haste, occasionally made inaccurate evaluations, their assessments proved more constructive and perceptive than *The Nation's*.

Both liberal journals, along with their many contributors, who without exception wrote with a leftist slant, attributed Hitler's emergence to what they believed to be an unjust Versailles Treaty. This view was also expressed by many other journals and writers, both on the right and the left. While the liberal weeklies soon recognized the totalitarian nature of Nazi Germany, the constant growth of the Nazi state in the international area was often seen negatively, in the light of British and
French weakness. Obsessed with the idea of collective security long after it had ceased to be practical, *The Nation* continued to urge cooperation between the western European democracies and the Soviet Union.

A less influential liberal periodical, the monthly *Survey Graphic*, treated National Socialism more casually. What can be considered its editorial column was under the supervision of John Palmer Gavit who, while cognizant of the dangers of National Socialism and critical of Nazi Germany, tended to treat Germany's predicament in a less serious vein. *The Survey Graphic*'s articles about Nazi Germany began to appear in some quantity in the middle of the nineteen-thirties and covered many facets of German domestic life. Written by scholars, experts and German expatriates, all the articles criticized the Nazi system and gave an accurate although somewhat superficial picture; however, *The Survey Graphic*, with its prominent photographic coverage, aimed at the less sophisticated American public. Even the most eminent authors were allotted only brief space, and they seemed to simplify their ideas in order to reach the man-in-the-street.

The moderately liberal weekly *Outlook and Independent*'s editorial column kept its readers well-informed of the National Socialists' maneuvering until it ceased publication during 1932. The similar monthly *World's Work* periodically featured articles on German affairs, but, before its consolidation in 1932 with the conservative *Review of Reviews* (cf. below), it evinced little concern with Nazism.
From 1930 to 1937, The Literary Digest more than adequately represented the moderately conservative viewpoint. The Digest was purchased by The Review of Reviews in July 1937, became a monthly and then ceased publication entirely the following year. As long as it remained a weekly magazine, The Literary Digest gave special prominence to unsigned columns covering worldwide political, economic, social and religious topics, with affairs in Nazi Germany receiving extensive and accurate coverage. While these columns presented a detailed, factual account of events, only infrequently did they attempt an analytical treatment. A special feature, a summary of world press opinion, enabled the Digest to offer its readers a broad, varied and balanced response to Nazi Germany, particularly in the area of foreign affairs. Astute judgments by European and American editors and reporters appeared almost weekly. The occasional signed articles, except for 1933 and 1934, lacked depth and understanding of German affairs.

Among the conservative journals, the most alert and perceptive editorial staff was employed by the monthly Living Age. Confining as its brief editorial section was, the Living Age managed to examine carefully a number of facets of German domestic, economic and foreign policies. The editorials frequently complemented and commented on its signed articles, drawn almost exclusively from the foreign press. Like The Literary Digest, The Living Age offered a valuable service as a vehicle for both the conservative and liberal views of western Europe.
The editorial expressions of The Review of Reviews were more conservative than the above-named journals. The Shaw family, represented by Albert and Roger Shaw, owned and operated this monthly and controlled its editorial policy. Offering probably more absurd and erroneous appraisals concerning Nazi Germany than any other American periodical, The Review of Reviews treated Hitler as a traditional type of dictator, comparing him on several occasions to Oliver Cromwell. Because Hitler had restored order to Germany, he found support from the Shaws, their staff, and their infrequent outside contributors.

Containing no editorial column and exhibiting only cursory interest in foreign affairs, the ultra-conservative American Review performed as the self-designated defender of the conservative position in all aspects of society and the opponent of all liberalistic and Socialistic trends. Fascism was considered part of the conservative tradition by this monthly until it halted publication in 1937.

During the nineteen-thirties The American Mercury appeared to undergo an evolution with regard to its position toward Nazi Germany, and the quality of this magazine also seemed to suffer. At first in the early nineteen-thirties, it published articles by liberal, moderate and conservative spokesmen, and even one article by Leon Trotsky; later, however, many of its contributors seemed to find common cause with Nazi Germany, and others appeared interested in discussing more sensational topics of Nazi life. Editorially, The American Mercury spoke conserva-
tively, but only occasionally, about German affairs.

Throughout the decade from 1930 to 1939, The North American Review experienced financial problems and by the late nineteen-thirties it was published on an irregular basis either as a monthly or a quarterly. When The North American Review made an editorial assessment, it took a conservative stance. Few articles concerned foreign affairs, but of these more were written by conservatives than by neutral or liberal observers.

Neither of the two major neutral monthlies, The Atlantic Monthly and Harper's Magazine, commented significantly in their editorials on the rise and consolidation of National Socialism, but both published a wide variety of penetrating and comprehensive articles on Nazi Germany's foreign and domestic activities by distinguished authors. Harper's tended to publish liberally-oriented writers more often than The Atlantic Monthly, yet all shades of political opinion, American and European, were represented in the two monthlies. The articles, generally of high quality, handled in depth various German topics at least three times a year beginning in 1934.

Sharing the same neutral classification, Scribner's Magazine and The Forum published far fewer articles on foreign topics, and their choice of authors was far less selective than Harper's and The Atlantic Monthly. Editorially the two former journals remained silent on Nazi Germany.

The Yale Review and The American Scholar, not primarily journals of opinion but monthlies which emphasized the humanities
and the arts, published occasionally on German affairs. They appealed to a higher intellectual level and their articles reflected this position.

For a factual account of the National Socialists' undertakings, there was no better journal than Current History, but only until April 1936 when The New York Times terminated its ownership. After this date Current History became a conservative organ which often endorsed the principles of American isolationism. As long as Current History was owned and operated by the Times, it utilized that newspaper's expert editorial and reporting staff and its excellent correspondents. Many of its feature articles were extremely well-written, accurate and penetrating. Scholars such as Sidney B. Fay and Allan Nevins covered German problems, and they tried to be factual and neutral in their reporting. After the April 1936 issue the journal changed its format by eliminating the regular columns and depending more often upon less alert observers for articles. Although Current History offered some significant essays on Nazism in the next three years, their overall quality noticeably deteriorated and the journal tended toward sensationalism.

Foreign Affairs presented numerous pertinent essays in depth by prominent Americans, noted scholars, outstanding journalists and European experts, along with several members of the Nazi government. Because Foreign Affairs was a quarterly journal, it had the opportunity to publish detailed summary articles about German problems and policies weeks after the particular
crisis had passed; however, such essays, while valuable in retrospect, could not actually be placed in the same category of response found in the weeklies and many of the monthlies. These longer articles discussed foreign affairs, religion, economics and social affairs.

The religious press contributed significantly to the formation of American public opinion on German issues. One of the leading Catholic weeklies, the Jesuit-controlled America, displayed a consistently conservative attitude. In its editorial response and its articles, the Jesuit priests and other contributors, time and again, displayed their political naivety in reacting to the events concerning Hitler Germany. Moral judgments were frequent. As expected, America concentrated upon the German Catholic religious struggle rather than other aspects of the Nazi question. While this Catholic periodical, beginning in 1934, was often critical of Nazi tactics, its criticism long remained subdued. A factor which definitely influenced America was Hitler's animosity for Communism. Its opinions often rested on meta-political intuition rather than realistic evaluation. It placed great faith in the "good sense" of the German people. After 1937 America's interest in German matters waned considerably.

Under Michael Williams, who resigned as editor in April 1938, The Commonweal's editorial posture was consistently conservative but less so than America's. Moreover, The Commonweal approached the Nazi issue more realistically and with less confi-
dence in the ultimate defeat of Nazism, yet, like America, the
question of Communism played a significant role in shaping its
editorial response. After Williams became special editor, the
journal's editorials took on a more Catholic-liberal outlook.
The Commonweal published numerous articles many of which were
more discerning than the editorials. Again resembling America,
The Commonweal devoted most of its energy to religious issues,
and even its factual news section did not cover adequately the
other important topics. In summary, The Commonweal's response to
German affairs from 1930 to 1939 was uneven and many major events
were ignored or covered superficially. It too lost interest in
Germany after 1937, especially in international relations.

The Ave Maria, the most conservative spokesman among the
Catholic journals, considered foreign issues only intermittently
even though it was published weekly. More often than not, its
editors seemed to follow the editorial lead of America, yet they
showed even more interest in Hitler's anti-Communism. Articles
on Germany were rare, but those that did appear touched only on
religious attitudes and were written by men who shared the con-
servative Catholic viewpoint of the editors.

Another basically conservative Catholic magazine, the
monthly Sign, took the editorial position quite common within
American Catholic periodical ranks: it focused chiefly on Catho-
lic affairs in Germany, and its judgments manifested a high de-
gree of political unsophistication. The brief editorial columns
received support every few months from essays by overseas obser-
vers, who examined superficially other aspects of German life. The Sign's foreign correspondents obviously had little experience as political reporters.

The Catholic World's attitude toward Nazism did not vary from that of the other Catholic publications. Its editor, James Martin Gillis, C.S.P., ignored everything but the most obvious religious issues, and he made a special effort to defend the activities of the German Catholics, whose situation he always viewed in terms of the Kulturkampf of Bismarck. Gillis failed to examine in depth the Nazi totalitarian phenomenon and seemed more frightened by Communism than by National Socialism. The Catholic World published occasional articles by Catholic authors, who, with only a few exceptions, contributed little to the overall discussion.

With the exception of a few general articles on National Socialism and Nazi Germany, Columbia, the Knights of Columbus monthly, refrained from responding to German affairs. No mention of Nazism appeared in its editorial column. Another specialized journal, The American Ecclesiastical Review, a publication for American Catholic clergymen, also devoted scant attention to Germany's problems in infrequent articles which tended to endorse German Catholicism's strategy vis-à-vis the Nazi government. The more scholarly Catholic quarterly Thought presented its readers with several thoughtful and penetrating essays by both clergy and laymen.

The Christian Century represented the most important
Protestant periodical publication. Among all the religious journals the Century gave all German affairs the widest coverage, and its editorials consistently demonstrated an awareness of the basic issues at stake in Germany and responded with shrewd perception. By comparison, the Catholic journals appeared parochial, intellectually limited, and politically inept. Taking a liberalistic and realistic stand, The Christian Century, more often than not, made the most accurate predictions in religious circles. Only at a time when war seemed imminent did the Century drift into a questionable position with regard to compromise with Nazi Germany for the sake of peace. Besides two editorial sections, The Christian Century published weekly reports from overseas correspondents and numerous articles, most with a liberal slant, from the pens of Protestant journalists, scholars and clergymen. The only German topic slighted was Nazi economic policies.

The weekly organ of the Unitarian and Universalist churches, The Christian Register, editorialized occasionally on religious and other domestic events in Nazi Germany and generally subscribed to a liberal view; however, since many of its editorials were written by individual clergymen whose political leanings varied, it is difficult to categorize its editorial response. Separate articles, published irregularly, explored various facets of the Nazi totalitarian structure and expressed abhorrence for the system.

The Presbyterian Advance and its successor The Presbyter-
ian Tribune, especially the former, editorialized continuously on German topics after the emergence of the Nazis, but usually their response was brief and lacked the overall depth of The Christian Century. Liberal critics of the German government, the Advance and the Tribune considered little more than the Protestant religious dilemma. The Advance published several particularly penetrating articles by important Protestants.

Religion In Life and Christendom, two non-denominational Protestant quarterlies containing scholarly and astute essays of some length, published several pertinent articles analyzing various phases of National Socialist theory and the power politics of the Nazi politicians. These articles stand out as some of the best commentaries on Nazism found in the American journals. American Lutherans were able to read a few discerning essays on German church life under National Socialism by Lutheran educators and clergymen in The Lutheran Church Quarterly. But, in general, this religious organ shied away from controversy regarding its German co-religionists.

B. The Journalists

The men who wrote on the rise and consolidation of National Socialism for the American magazines came not only from the front ranks of American journalists, both at home and overseas, but included eminent American scholars, clerics and laymen as well as European journalists and dignitaries. Approximately three hundred names have been found reporting, exploring and
analyzing Nazi Germany in the journals considered in this dissertation. Some of these authors could boast no special competence and only ephemeral interest in this subject; others, by virtue of the quantity of their work or their personal or professional competence, deserve to be singled out by way of recapitulation. In the text of this dissertation, data concerning almost every author has been given in the first citation of his work and need not be repeated at length here.

Most of the frequently cited journals adhered consistently to a definite political philosophy, either liberal or conservative, in their editorial opinion and in the authors they published. One exception was the conservative American Mercury which regularly published material by writers with views diametrically opposed to its own. Journals professing a neutral attitude naturally gave their readers a more balanced treatment by calling on authors of diverse viewpoints. Religious periodicals seldom published articles by authors of a different faith than their own, but taken together they represented a wide range of political attitudes, with a general pattern of consistency within the individual journals.

Two former editors, Oswald Garrison Villard of The Nation and Michael Williams of The Commonweal, wrote frequent special columns for their weeklies, but both men became rather emotional and their judgments often lacked precision and objectivity. Bruce Bliven and George Soule, both associated with The New Republic, offered several speculations concerning German affairs, with
Soule's predictions in the 1935 essay "Europe--Four Expectations" definitely lacking a sense of realism, while Freda Kirchwey of The Nation added several pertinent and accurate remarks about Nazi foreign policy during 1938 and 1939. Writing generally in liberal journals, Ludwig Lore, Emil Lengyel and Ludwig Lewisohn all accurately discussed a number of relevant topics alluding to political, social, and cultural life in Nazi Germany. Vera Micheles Dean and Mildred S. Wertheimer, two leading liberal women observers of foreign affairs, skillfully enlightened the American reading public, but Seward Collins and Lawrence Dennis, disciples of American Fascism, appeared to be consistently misinformed about National Socialism or else deliberately ignored aspects of German life that they disapproved of. Two prominent American writers, Quincy Howe and George Fielding Eliot, seemed to treat too casually the Nazi German tactics, and Frank C. Hanighen's several essays contained few shrewd appraisals and little new information.

An excellent analysis of the German Protestant problems with Aryan paganism was the chief contribution of newsmen Curt L. Heymann, while Lutheran minister Martin Schroeder, among several topics, candidly discussed the spiritual issues in Nazi Germany. Three American Jesuits, Florence D. Sullivan, Paul L. Blakely and Francis X. Talbot, allowed their intense hatred of Communism to obstruct their views of National Socialism, with the result that each of them wrote at least one article that could best be described as totally misleading any reader who might have
taken them seriously. On the other hand, Father Wilfrid Parsons in several essays gradually formulated a true perspective of the National Socialist ideology, and Father John La Farge always correctly understood the phenomenon of Nazism.

Several talented American journalists and writers occasionally sent their reports from overseas. The on-the-spot considerations by Rabbi Philip S. Bernstein and Paul Hutchinson, a staff member of The Christian Century, displayed more insight into German problems than their reports written in the United States but Dorothy Thompson and Reverend Charles S. MacFarland presented more accurate assessments of the Nazi state after their return home, although the time factor certainly affected their views. Many reports by George N. Shuster and Elmer G. Homrighausen, some written in Europe and others in the United States, usually contained astute comments. While not always precise and penetrating, due to religious convictions and lack of reliable news material, Shuster and Homrighausen furnished The Commonweal and The Christian Century respectively with some of their better critical investigations of the German totalitarian structure. Both authors had observed Nazi activities at first hand during the early nineteen-thirties.

A number of permanent American foreign correspondents contributed to the periodicals under consideration. John Elliott, Max Jordan and Joseph F. Thorning, S.J., were generally shallow in their assessments, and they seemed intellectually or emotionally unprepared to analyze the German events they wit-
The essays of Frank H. Simonds varied noticeably in quality and accuracy. Many of his earlier articles examining the rise and early ministry of Hitler manifested considerable insight into the aims of the National Socialists. But Simonds, who died in January, 1936, spent little time on the European continent after the first few months of Hitler's ascendancy to power, and his later articles clearly indicated that he had lost touch with the political realities of Europe.

Stationed in foreign posts near Nazi Germany, Henry N. Brailsford, Louis Fischer, John Gunther and George E. R. Gedye often published well-balanced, authoritative reports, most of which were submitted to the liberal or neutral journals. Especially noteworthy for their perceptive articles from inside Germany were S. Miles Bouton, Richard Neuberger, Nicholas Fairweather, Reverend Stanley High, Reverend Edward T. Ramsdell and Father Victor Green. These authors published their essays in all the various journal categories. In one way or another, each one of these men made a distinctive contribution to the American reading public's understanding of events in Nazi Germany, particularly the early occurrences in the incipient totalitarian state.

Two famous American correspondents, William Henry Chamberlain and Walter Duranty, each wrote one major article pertaining to Hitler Germany; however, neither man was an expert in German affairs, and their essays indicated as much.

Almost every journal cited in this dissertation, at one time or another, featured an article by American scholars and
educators. For example, Dr. Reinhold Niebuhr, while not a recognized specialist on foreign affairs, wrote frequent and acute essays analyzing phases and topics relative to happenings in Germany. An outstanding theologian with a sound historical insight, Reverend Niebuhr demonstrated a sensitivity to the moral and ethical issues at stake in western Europe. The sum total of his work in American journals added up to an enlightening exposition of the totalitarian methodology. Besides Niebuhr the American reading public perused the opinions of such eminent intellectuals as Alice Hamilton, Vernon Bourke, William Orton, Koppel S. Pinson, Elmer Davis, Charles A. Beard, Leonid I. Strakhovsky, Hamilton Fish Armstrong and Father John A. Ryan. These authors, in one or more articles, examined in detail individual themes on Germany and correctly assessed the German situation. Valuable and accurate reviews were also authored by Ambrose W. Vernon, John Aberly, Charles Hodges, Philip E. Mosely, Edgar Packard Dean and Arpad F. Kovacs, all scholars of some prominence. Henry C. Wolfe speculated on several questions particularly valuable to an understanding of Germany's aggressive foreign policy after 1936.

Current History columnists Sidney B. Fay and Allan Nevins, both historians with established reputations, wrote numerous exhaustive factual summaries about German conditions, but with only an occasional analysis. Professors Carl J. Friedrich and John B. Mason, two academicians interested in Hitlerism, tended to underestimate the savagery and the intentions of the National Socialists, while Protestant educator Frank Gavin and Catholic histor-
ian Raymond Corrigan, S.J., proceeded to write naive sketches concerning the Nazi establishment. Meanwhile, Alfred Vagts, a recognized expert on military history, advanced some faulty judgments in his essay on German military power. However, considerable insight into Nazi economic activities was expressed in a number of articles by trained economists like Calvin B. Hoover, Peter F. Drucker and Guenter Reimann, while Arthur Feiler's single contribution significantly aided the American reading public to form a clearer picture of labor conditions in Germany. A questionable thesis regarding German social attitudes was presented by Professor Sigmund Neumann, and the controversial Marxist Lewis Corey wrote an interesting but debatable essay on the same general topic.

Contributors of foreign birth and residence, statesmen, literary figures and educators furnished the American periodicals with articles of varying length and quality. A. S. Eker's regular short reports on German affairs to the Christian Century, while primarily factual, included timely critical appraisals. Eker was never fully identified by the Protestant weekly. The famous biographer, Emil Ludwig, on several occasions, evinced concern in discovering the attitudes of the German people toward the Hitler regime and the goals of the Hitler government. His findings, usually published by the neutral journals, contributed little to the understanding of the Nazi phenomenon. A realistic view of German spiritual problems was arrived at by a German using the pseudonym Albert Brandt and the former German newspaper-
man F. Wilhelm Sollman. Two German Socialists, who had fled from their homeland, Kurt Rosenfeld and Judith Gruenfeld, researched the workers' conditions in Hitler Germany and criticized the German government's mistreating of the workingman.

Revealing articles on the confusing Nazi economic theories and the German economic conditions were the work of an Hungarian, George M. Katona, and a Yugoslav, Alexander Vidakovic. Essays by French experts were conspicuous by their absence. American journals published rather superficial commentaries on German affairs by two Frenchmen André Geraud and Ernst Henri, but several articles on German problems by the Swedish newspaperman Joachim Joesten displayed more discerning judgments.

Observations by British spokesmen appeared at regular intervals in the American periodical press and as could be expected, the quality of the essays considerably varied. These writers reflected the different shades of opinion in English political life throughout the nineteen-thirties. Reports from the continent by British newswoman Robert Dell in The Nation, revealed an observer who was acutely sensitive to the fluid movement in foreign affairs and cognizant of the dangers inherent in Nazi foreign policy. Commendable articles by Harrison Brown and Father Edward Quinn also indicated an awareness of the basic issues at stake in Nazi Germany. In an October 1938 article for Current History, British politician Winston Churchill censured Prime Minister Chamberlain for his appeasement offerings to Hitler. An expert appraisal of German ecclesiastical affairs by Professor
Nathaniel Micklem appeared in an American publication, along with William F. Lofthouse's article. Discerning economic views were found in discourses by newsman Paul Einzig and Graham Hutton, and historian Robert W. Seton-Watson presented informative articles on Nazi foreign activities in central and eastern Europe, his area of specialization. In one essay Denis W. Brogan touched briefly on the international dangers manufactured by the Nazi government and warned of the inherent dangers in Nazism.

Less astute judgments by British authors were not entirely lacking. These opinions typified the views of the British conservative. Denis Gwynn, The Sign's major European observer, often displayed inconsistency and political naivete in his reports. He seemed dazzled by Hitler's foreign and domestic maneuvering. Taking a British conservative stance, Christopher Hollis, William E. D. Allen, Vernon Bartlett and Douglas Woodruff seemed willing in some degree to tolerate Hitler and National Socialism. Bartlett, in particular, sympathized with the appeasement policy of the Chamberlain government and looked forward in his article of July 1939 to a long era of peace.

In several long essays the Canadian educator Wilson Woodside intelligently explored economic issues; however, it appeared that he was occasionally misled by the mysteries of National Socialist economics. Confronted with the task of analyzing the Fuehrer's personality, Australian historian Stephen H. Roberts came to some erroneous conclusions in his thorough review.

World-famous politicians and dignitaries sometimes were
offered the opportunity to express their views in American magazines upon the occurrences in Germany between 1930 and 1939. Many nationalities were included in this classification with Germans representing the greatest number. Several members of the Nazi administration received invitations from American journals to present their side of the German story. On behalf of his National Socialist overlords, Dr. Hjalmar Schacht propagandized for the German government's economic interests; German Foreign Minister Constantin von Neurath performed the same task for Hitler's foreign policies. The appearance of both men in American journals undoubtedly aided Hitler's regime in its search for international respectability. At different times two German bureaucrats, Fritz Berber and Otto Jellinek, defended their government's policies and programs.

American periodicals likewise presented the opinions of influential Germans who either had no government connections or opposed Nazi policies. Foreign affairs expert of Imperial Germany Richard von Kuehlmann's views in 1933 and 1934 on National Socialism were ostensibly affected by his conservative beliefs. Exiled Prince Hubertus Loewenstein, one of the most prolific anti-Nazi writers found in the American journals, gave the appearance of being overwhelmed by frustration at the National Socialists' uninterrupted series of domestic and foreign successes. Loewenstein's analyses were generally shallow and his schemes for thwarting Hitler lacked imagination and a sense of realism. Both Thomas and Klaus Mann, German literary figures who had no
special qualifications to investigate Nazism, voiced impassioned pleas asking the world to be tolerant of the German people's mistakes, although they admitted that most Germans had willingly embraced National Socialism. In their essays they pointed out that the Nazi totalitarian ideology aimed, in effect, at the destruction of contemporary civilization. The refugee theologian Paul Tillich spelled out adroitly the essential nature of the German Protestant dilemma when the churchmen were confronted by the Nazi challenge.

In his many articles for American periodical publications, Leon Trotsky, perhaps because of the traditional Nazi-Communist hatred of each other, supplied several timely and worthwhile judgments on Fascist tactics and Hitler's ultimate strategy. Another famous Marxist revolutionary with much experience in German affairs, Karl Radek, and the great Russian thinker Nicolas A. Berdiaev, contributed a few remarks which helped Americans come to a better understanding of Germany's problems. Don Luigi Sturzo's single essay in The Commonweal dwelled on the principle differences between Fascism and Communism. British author Hilaire Belloc superficially and undiscerningly examined Nazi anti-Semitism and ecclesiastical policies. Winston Churchill's one contribution to the American journals has already been mentioned.

United States Senator Robert A. Taft, a leading Republican spokesman for American isolation, argued for non-involvement in European affairs in the summer of 1939 notwithstanding the National Socialists' diplomatic victories. By this late date no
other author concerned with the Nazi problem echoed these sentiments. William E. Dodd, a former ambassador in Germany, disclosed his first-hand observations of Nazi police-tactics, while America's prominent Socialist Norman Thomas in a long, minutely detailed essay explored the conditions of the German workingman in a way that was designed to alert their American counterpart to the threat of Nazism.

C. Results

When all is said and done, of what value were the American journals of opinion in informing their readers of the progress of National Socialism? How much would the readers know, and how correct would be their information? Obviously much would depend on the particular journals consulted and equally obvious is the assumption that most Americans read their daily newspaper along with one or more of the journals. What was chiefly responsible for shaping the readers' opinions can only be a subject of conjecture. Nor can it be overlooked that the American periodicals' response to German affairs was very often contingent upon other important American and world events. To understand the full implications of the journals' remarks on Germany, the readers had to be aware of these other responses. The following general summary represents the information and ideas of anyone who might have followed most of the journals, and these alone, in surveying German affairs during the nineteen-thirties.
Startled by National Socialism's election success in September 1930, the American journals of opinion treated cautiously the Nazi organization and its crude program, which they pondered superficially, but they gave the impression that the Nazi popularity was only temporary. Faith and confidence were placed in the intelligence of the German electorate and the ability of President Hindenburg to fend off Adolf Hitler and his Party; however, the journals simultaneously voiced doubts about the viability of German democracy. Not until early 1932 did the periodicals begin to take seriously the prospects of a National Socialist government for Germany; at most they foresaw only a coalition ministry headed by Hitler.

For the journals the National Socialist leader's defeat in the 1932 presidential campaign looked very much like a turning point for the radical movement, but the inner strength, discipline and voter appeal of the Nazi Party were underestimated, since the national election of July 1932 gave the Nazis their greatest triumph to date. The appointment of Franz von Papen to succeed Chancellor Heinrich Bruening, along with the fact that the Reichstag had been made inoperative by a combination of left- and right-wing radicals, convinced the journals that German democracy was moribund. Papen's rule suggested to some periodicals a rebirth of pre-war Germany, while others considered Papen the precursor of a National Socialist ministry.

Yet still another national election, in November 1932, proved that the Hitlerites were not invincible, and now the jour-
nals pictured the Nazis as politically frustrated: unwilling to serve in a coalition government, yet unable to gain a majority in the Reichstag. Many reports saw the German Fascists losing their mass support. Some journalists even predicted that if Hitler did manage to maneuver himself into office, his administration would respond to Germany's many problems just like the preceding governments. In fact, the journals published numerous rumors telling of Nazi efforts to find suitable coalition partners, particularly within the ranks of the Center Party.

The American periodicals could not know about the behind-the-scenes political jockeying in late 1932, and the abrupt dismissal of Papen and the appointment of his successor General Kurt von Schleicher received little comment. Despite the unsettled political conditions, the journals did not foresee Hitler emerging as chancellor in the immediate future, especially since it appeared that Schleicher would remain for some time as a military dictator. Thus the resignation of Schleider and the prompt appointment of Hitler to the chancellorship on January 30, 1933, caught the American periodicals by complete surprise.

Except for a very few liberal observers, American journalists greeted Hitler's ascendency to political power with reserved deliberations. As the political head of a coalition government, Hitler would be checked by the non-Nazi cabinet majority, plus the power in the hands of President Hindenburg. Some commentators, treating Nazi campaign speeches and Party literature as opportunistic propaganda, considered it likely that Hitler
would act moderately now that he found himself in the role of a responsible government official. Hitler's talents and the dedication of his followers were clearly underestimated by most American publications.

It was soon apparent to American journalists that Chancellor Hitler had government matters under nearly complete control and that his disciples stood unopposed in the streets, making life extremely uncomfortable for members of other political organizations and German Jews. For several years the journals failed to make it clear who among the Nazi leaders really bore the major responsibility for the arbitrary actions of the National Socialist para-military units. Some of the journals saw factionalism penetrating deeply into the ranks of the National Socialist faithful; however, the strict censorship made it difficult to assess the situation with any degree of accuracy. Some observers even envisioned Hitler restoring the Hohenzollern dynasty. This type of speculation continued even after Hitler proved to be a master politician, outmaneuvering his non-Nazi cabinet associates and acquiring through legal means complete dictatorial powers.

During the first several months of Hitler's chancellorship the National Socialists zealously consolidated their domestic position, but the journals seemed interested in recording and assessing only the more spectacular policies such as the anti-Semitic campaign, which received much attention. While some journalists sympathized with the persecuted race, others, coming
chiefly from American Catholic ranks, speculated that all of the Jews were facing abuse for the debatable political and moral views of some of their brethren. The former observers could do little but hope that world opinion might halt German anti-Semitism.

Beginning in mid-1933, German Christian ecclesiastical affairs attracted considerable attention from American journalists. Catholic observers, in spite of the growing amount of evidence to the contrary, honestly believed that the German Catholics would find an area of agreement with National Socialism. The Concordat of July 1933 seemed to justify their optimism, but many non-Catholic journalists criticized the Catholic Church and visualized a future collision between the Church and state, while others regarded the agreement as a natural result of the Church's reactionary orientation. Protestant representatives appeared dismayed that the German Catholics had chosen to withdraw from the struggle against Nazism, leaving the Protestant churches to fight alone.

Before the year 1933 had ended, the Hitler government, the Concordat notwithstanding, began a slow but persistent harassment of Catholic organizations and clergymen. All of the journalists commiserated with the German Catholics and congratulated them for their gallant opposition to the continuous National Socialist totalitarian tactics and the Nazi promotion of the neo-pagan cult. Yet American Catholic writers long maintained hope that Hitler could eventually listen to reason and work with the
Catholic Church against Communism. Throughout the period under
discussion, most Catholic journals retained complete confidence
in the ultimate outcome of the Church-state contest, but they
were often deceived and confused by the Nazis' policy of alter-
mate periods of harassment and of moderation.

The American journals quickly discovered that the Protes-
tant-Nazi conflict was a complex situation due to the factions
within the Protestant sects. At first it was difficult to dis-
tinguish between the "German Christians" and the Aryan cult,
but once the two groups received correct identification, the jour-
nals treated them both as villains. The fortunes of the faction
led by Pastor Martin Niemoeller were closely scrutinised. The
writers, most of whom were affiliated with American Protestant
organizations, entertained little hope that the Niemoeller fac-
tion would succeed and made no effort to hide the dissenters'
faults.

Other domestic topics interested the journals at various
junctures. A subject like opposition to Hitler aroused the writ-
ters' imaginations. Frequently, from 1933 to 1939, speculation
arose about the firmness of Hitler's position in the German state
and the future of National Socialism. Intra-Party dissension
and anti-Nazi activity, outside the religious area, tended to be
disorganized and without mass support, but they gave hope to the
journalists that the Nazis could eventually be toppled by a com-
bination of German forces and problems. Hitler and his totali-
tarian machine easily quelled the two most dramatic gestures of
defiance by Ernst Roehm and his S. A. followers in 1934, and the
army officers in 1938, yet some journalists refused to grasp the
reality of Nazism's total power. On the other hand, the periodi­
cals which investigated the press, education and social life un­
der National Socialism, had few illusions about the nature and
strength of the Nazi state.

American reporters and editors found it extremely diffi­
cult to develop a proper perspective of the Nazi economic pro­
grams, thereby giving the American reading public a distorted
picture of economic life. The majority of economic observers
seemed to feel that the hodge-podge of Nazi plans and policies
could never accomplish German economic recovery nor the rebuild­
ing of the German military forces. The shortage of consumer
goods also supposedly affected morale. According to most commen­
tators, Nazi Germany did not have the resources to engage in a
major war, and they doubted that Hitler would take the risk.
Many of these observations were made at a time of great Nazi dip­

domatic victories.

Nazi foreign policy did not become a dominant theme in
the American journals until 1937. Before this date the American
observers concentrated on Hitler's most dramatic "surprise" for­
eign policy maneuvers. A great many journalists sympathized with
German efforts to destroy the Versailles Treaty. The journals
comprehended a definite change in the atmosphere of Europe after
March 1933, but their assessments of the international situation
lacked all reality because they failed to notice Germany's mili­
ary impotence. Month after month during 1933, 1934 and 1935, writers and editors spoke ominously and utterly incorrectly about the imminent danger of a new world war precipitated by the Nazi government. Only after the remilitarization of the Rhineland were the prophesies of war justifiable. While increasing in quantity, the journalistic prognostications and analyses proved to be generally quite accurate, especially after the journalists learned that Mein Kampf had been meant to be taken seriously. Only the time-table of Nazi aggression remained problematic. The successful diplomatic tactics of the Third Reich received thorough coverage, along with the failures of the League of Nations and the timid foreign policies of Great Britain and France when dealing with Adolf Hitler.

The Anschluss, the Munich Conference and the final annexation of Czechoslovakia did not surprise the journals, which seemed to feel that Hitler could accomplish through diplomacy all his immediate goals. By 1938 little hope remained that a united front of great powers could stay the German advance toward European hegemony, and the majority of the journals correctly judged that the European peace could be preserved only on Hitler's terms. Some few journalists had even foreseen the German-Russian entente. No one was surprised when war finally came, neither the journalists nor their readers.
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APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Thomas M. Keefe has been read and approved by five members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

March 15, 1966

Raymond H. Smolander
Signature of Adviser