The Relation of President John Tyler to the Acquisition of Texas

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THE RELATION OF PRESIDENT JOHN TYLER TO THE ACQUISITION OF TEXAS

BY

SISTER MARY GERALDA SULLIVAN, O. P.

A THESIS SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE REQUIREMENTS FOR THE DEGREE OF MASTER OF ARTS IN LOYOLA UNIVERSITY

1948
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INTRODUCTION

My purpose in writing this thesis is to evaluate the efforts of President John Tyler in the acquisition of Texas. The annexation of Texas is among the knottiest and most obscure of the expansion problems. No acquisition of territory by the United States has been the subject of so much honest but partisan misconception. The entire country was divided on the question. Even the members of both houses formed two great classes—those who demanded annexation or reannexation, and those who opposed it. The annexationists were divided into those who desired annexation by treaty, those who favored a joint resolution, those who wished Texas to enter the Union at once as a state, and those who held she should be acquired as a territory. Opponents of annexation were of four classes: those who declared that to annex a foreign state was unconstitutional, those who held that to annex by joint resolution was unconstitutional, those who were opposed to any further acquisition of territory, and those who were troubled by the idea of slavery. Tyler, therefore, had to deal with many and varied opinions as annexation involved points of great magnitude. It involved issues and consequences of the greatest importance in our domestic politics.

Should the golden moment be lost, and Texas be thrown into the arms of a foreign power; should the President assemble Congress and submit to the free states the alternative—admit Texas or arrange the terms of a dissolution of the Union; was Texas, thrice rejected by the United States, to form a Confederacy; should the United States go to war with Mexico over Texas? These were only a few of the questions which were on the minds and
lips of many including Tyler, while he worked to gain enough support to have Texas added to the Union peaceably if possible, otherwise forcibly.

I have made use of both source and secondary material. Senate Documents, House Documents, and the Secret Journals of the Senate of the Republic of Texas were especially helpful. I consulted the Congressional Globe, Niles' National Register, and James D. Richardson's Messages and Papers of the Presidents, also his House Miscellaneous Documents. I have received much information from the personal writings of Anson Jones, Sam Houston, and Mirabeau Lamar. Other contributors were John Tyler, Andrew Jackson, Daniel Webster, Abel Upshur, John C. Calhoun, William R. Manning, and others. Many newspapers contributed information not found elsewhere. A variety of magazines and general histories, too numerous to mention here but maybe found listed in the bibliography, proved a valuable source of information.
CHAPTER I

FORCES INFLUENCING TYLER 1841-1845

The geographic location of Texas was a main factor influencing both the annexationists and those opposed to annexation. The land first known as Texas to the Spaniards was mainly the hunting ground of wandering tribes of Indians, ill-defined but roughly located to the northwest of the Gulf of Mexico, and between the Rio Grande and the Trinity Rivers. Later on the name Texas was applied to the entire area north of the lower Rio Grande River, which the Spaniards occupied and organized as one of the provinces of New Spain or Mexico. After France came into possession of Louisiana, and after the United States government purchased it, the latter claimed that the Rio Grande del Norte formed the southwestern boundary; consequently, the title to the disputed area was repeatedly asserted by the United States. Texas, it was argued, was a portion of the Louisiana we had bought in 1803 from France. In the treaty with Spain by which Florida was acquired by the United States in 1819, Texas was recognized as part of Mexico. Mr. Clay indignantly opposed the treaty, and it was conjectured even then that at no distant day the province would in some way be reclaimed. In 1819 the United States surrendered to Spain any claim to the territory west of the Sabine River. Before the Texas Revolution the political limits of Texas were the Nueces River on the west, along the Red River on the north; the

2 Col., Dorus M. Fox, History of Political Parties. D. M. Fox, Des Moines, 1895, 81.
Sabine on the east, and the Gulf of Mexico on the south.\(^3\) In the early part of 1836, Texas declared her independence, and Santa Anna, the dictator of Mexico, assembled his whole force for the purpose of crushing the new republic and making the Sabine the boundary. The battle of San Jacinto was fought in April 1836, and General Santa Anna with a large part of his army fell into the hands of the Texans as prisoners of war. For the purpose of obtaining his own liberty and that of his associates in captivity he entered into a treaty with the president of Texas, by which its independence was acknowledged and the Rio Grande was recognized as the boundary line.\(^4\)

The topography of Texas also claimed the attention of many who were interested in this territory. From the description of the country given by Tyler we are able to see that he was thinking of this land in terms of agriculture. His outline is given here in part:

...Texas is a vast inclined plane, sloping to the southwest, and the greatest proportion of it is prairie land. The skirt...from the coast back 75 miles, is very level and of the richest quality of land, ... peculiarly ... adopted to the culture of sugar and cotton. East ...[and] west of the Brazos the country is rolling and fertile, and would become a fine stock and grain country. ...all the lands in the vicinity of the creeks emptying into the Gulf of Mexico are of surpassing fertility. North of the 31st parallel the region is wholly unsuited to the culture of cotton... but it is well suited for grain and pasture, and is marked as a country well watered, and abounding in fine land.\(^5\)

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5 Senate Documents, 28 Cong., 1 sess., April 29, 1844, V, 58.
The inhabitants of Texas constituted a feature of equal importance with its location and topography. By 1841, the United States had well entered upon an era of expansion. There was a general movement westward and on toward the Pacific. Great lines of pioneers were pouring into the prairies of Illinois and Iowa, while other columns of home-seekers were rolling out to Oregon. A third procession followed the winding paths into Mexican territory. The inducements which this locality offered to the pioneers were many, but just to mention a few it may be noted that Texas possessed advantages in the extent of her territory, her climate was found to be very healthful, the soil was able to grow with great facility the two important exports of cotton and sugar, the cheapness of her lands was a special inducement, she was eminently favored in exemption from the necessity of imposing high taxes, and she was also capable of an extensive river transportation. 6

Mexico became independent in 1821; it then opened the doors of Texas to American immigrants, and encouraged them to enter by offering free land. 7 This was the commencement of a movement for the peaceable occupation of Texas by colonists from the United States. Agustín de Iturbide was proclaimed Emperor of Mexico on May 18, 1822, but he was exiled the following April. A triumvirate then took charge of affairs until October 1824, when the first President, Guadalupe Victoria, was inaugurated. Hence, during these times no one bothered much about Texas. Moses Austin, who had settled in Missouri while it was still a possession of Spain, conceived the plan to

obtain a grant of land, and with the assistance of his son, Stephen, to settle it with American immigrants. Two events had occurred which induced him to undertake this project. One was the panic of the previous year which had swept away all he possessed. At the age of fifty-four years he found himself penniless and faced with the necessity of starting life anew. The other event was the signing of the treaty fixing the boundary between New Spain and the United States at the Sabine. The grant of land was finally obtained and the colony was organized. Don Antonio Martinez, Governor of Texas, in 1820 definitely stipulated in his reply to the petition of Moses Austin that the colonists would as a principal requisite be Roman Catholics or agree to become such before entering Spanish territory.

Moses Austin died in 1821, but Stephen took up the work where his father had left it. The Mexican Constitution of 1824 abolished slavery, but colonists from the United States brought their slaves with them into Texas. More and more immigrants came, both at the request of Spain and of Mexico, until the colonists were soon virtually in possession of the country. By 1830 the American population of Texas numbered thirty thousand; it was larger than the population of Mexicans and Indians combined.

Mexico was in more political turmoil than usual from 1829 to 1833. She became alarmed at the rapid influx of Americans, and it was at this time that a certain group passed a law closing the door which had five years before been so generously opened to foreigners. Colonel Austin knew that

the hour would sooner or later arrive, when the Anglo-American race in Texas would find it necessary to dissolve all political connection with a people so inferior to themselves in every moral attribute, as he believed the Mexicans to be. It was felt that this overwhelming and still increasing group of pioneers held almost nothing in common with the Mexicans who had been in Texas as a result of the feeble efforts of the Spaniards to colonize. Had there been no feeling of racial distrust enveloping the relations of Mexico and the colonists, a crisis might not have followed. Mexico might not have thought it necessary to insist so drastically on unequivocal submission, or the colonists might not have believed so firmly that submission would endanger their liberty. However, Austin was unwilling to plunge into war with a nation numbering eight millions of inhabitants, demi-savages though he held them to be, until the American population in Texas would have grown strong enough to achieve their deliverance, without being forced to a copious expenditure of blood or of being shot or hanged as traitors. When the population became preponderantly American, and Mexican governmental restrictions became arbitrary, Texas threw off the Mexican yoke, and established a republic in 1836. The Anglo-Texans believed that the Mexicans had violated their oaths of allegiance to the constitution of 1824, and the Mexican political group in power argued that the colonists had failed to keep their oaths of allegiance to the established church. The fact was that both sides had drifted somewhat from the original agreement. Mexico

13 Red. op. cit., 92.
resented the fact that some United States citizens became involved in the Texan revolution. Her feelings are reflected in the quotation given here:

The Americans decided to fan the spirit of insurrection in the Spanish colonies during the darkest hour of the conflict for their former ally and benefactor, taking advantage of the critical situation, and aware of the ultimate success which they foresaw. ...It was thus that the plans to weaken more and more the power of a friendly nation were put into execution in order to snatch from her, immediately after, her most valuable possession.¹⁴

Some of the settlers from the United States came from the north, but most of them came from slaveholding states, and naturally, they brought with them their opinions, customs, and habits. These latter were particularly eager to bring Texas into the Union, since it would increase both the slave territory, and the number of members of Congress who would work for the extension of slavery. Therefore, it was the opinion of not too few that the leading object for becoming involved in the trouble originated in a settled design among the slaveholders with land speculators and slave traders, to wrest the large and valuable territory of Texas from the Mexican Republic in order to establish the system of slavery, and to open a vast and profitable slave market in that section, and ultimately, to annex it to the United States.¹⁵ Tyler stated that the pioneers had been invited into this territory, and would not constitute a foreign element on the occasion of annexation, but would rather rejoice at once more being embraced by the Union.

His statement is quoted here:

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The country thus proposed to be annexed has settled principally by persons from the United States who emigrated on the invitation of both Spain and Mexico, and who carried with them into the wilderness which they have partially reclaimed the laws, customs, and political and domestic institutions of their native land. They are deeply indoctrinated in all the principles of civil liberty, and will bring along with them in the act of reassociation, devotion to our Union, and a firm and flexible resolution to assist in maintaining the public liberty unimpaired—a consideration which, as it appears to me, is to be regarded as of no small moment.\textsuperscript{16}

Tyler feared that an independent Texas would block further expansion westward. From the time that he ascended to the presidency, occasioned by the death of President Harrison, on April 4, 1841, he made it known that he wished to have Texas in the Union.\textsuperscript{17} The following news item shows the attitude of the annexationists:

Texas is recognized by our government, and by the most powerful governments of Europe, as exempt from Mexican dominion. Spain is as likely to reconquer Mexico itself, as Mexico Texas. It is true, Mexico has not formally recognized Texas, as one of the nations of the earth. She still claims the right to conquer or to dispose of her. Texas then, in all probability, will exist under some form of government, independent of Mexico. ...

Having acquired Louisiana and Florida, we have an interest and a frontier on the Gulf of Mexico, and along our interior to the Pacific, which will not permit us to close our eyes, or fold our arms with indifference to the events which a few years may disclose in that quarter. ...Our own population is pressing onward to the Pacific. No power can restrain it. The pioneer from our Atlantic seaboard will soon kindle his fires, and erect his cabin beyond the Rocky

\textsuperscript{16} Senate Documents, 28 Cong., 1 sess., April 22, 1841, V, 5.
Mountains, and on the Gulf of California. If Mohammed comes not to the mountain, the mountain will go to Mohammed. Every year adds new difficulties to our progress in that direction, a progress as natural and as inevitable as the current of the Mississippi.18

Tyler and others saw in this vast region the enormous possibilities and advantages to both the United States and to Texas, if only the latter were a part of the Union instead of an independent nation or a foreign nation's possession. On the other hand they were fearful of the destiny of Texas and of the resulting disadvantages to the United States in the event that Texas remained an independent nation. If their desire was for Texas alone, their course of action might have been different; no one knows that, still the papers of their day help to convey the popular trend of thought as is exemplified below:

...Call it what specious names we may, the lust of Dominion, the lust of Power, the lust of Avarice, the lust of holding our fellow men in Bondage, are the real incitements of all this zeal for Annexation. To grasp more and more of the face of the earth, has ever been a besetting sin of individuals and nations. ...

"The whole cannot resist our onward march, until our proud flag waves over every inch of territory on the continent of North America. Providence has willed it, and so must it be. England may object, the whole European world may object, but object in vain. Liberal institutions, planted by the Anglo-Saxon race, will ere long extend over the whole continent of North America. The ball has been put in motion, and woe be unto him who attempts to resist its impetus."19

The glowing descriptions of the west, and of California in particular only deepened the conviction that this spacious territory must some day be

18 News item in The Liberator. (Boston) February 10, 1843.
19 News item in the New York Weekly Tribune, March 5, 1845.
gathered into the Union by purchase, annexation, or whatever method was to be used to incorporate it. The following description given by Waddy Thompson, American representative in Mexico City, helped to stimulate the already keen interest of both Tyler and Webster.

As to Texas, I regard it as of but little value compared with California—the richest, the most beautiful, the healthiest country in the world. ...The harbor of St. [San] Francisco is capacious enough to receive the navies of all the world, and the neighborhood furnishes live oak enough to build all the ships of those navies.20

From Edward Everett's letter of March 28, 1845, we are able to judge that Tyler was interested in land beyond Texas. Everett said: "...Tyler was even willing to make concessions to England in Oregon if she would exert her influence with Mexico in favor of the acquisition of California by the United States."21 Thus it is clear that Tyler was interested in territory more vast in extent than Texas alone. Since people are judged mainly by their actions and the spoken word it might be assumed that Tyler and his associates merited the following judgment: "Tyler men disbelieve in half measures of any and every kind. The Tylerites 'go whole Hog.' "22

There were those who believed that Texas would become a buffer state between the United States and some foreign country from which she would be forced to seek aid and protection if we were indifferent to her. After the Texas Revolution of 1836, Texas remained an independent sovereignty for eight years. During that time Mexico refused to acknowledge Texan independence,

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but nevertheless, she made no serious effort to conquer Texas. We cannot call the conflict which existed between the two nations, a war; it was more a series of border raids which kept public sentiment in perpetual irritation. There was a strong desire for immediate annexation to the United States which would be an absolute protection against the power of Mexico. Thus Texas twice before 1840 requested annexation to the United States. Due to failure on the part of America to comply with her request she was left to provide for herself. By 1841 her financial status as well as her credit were at a low ebb and her resources were limited. During the brief period of her existence as an independent nation, she committed on a small scale nearly all the financial blunders, and tried nearly all the financial experiments, which the greater nations of Europe have before and since committed and tried on a large scale with an almost exact parallelism of results. The men who had undertaken to make of Texas a free and independent republic were in respect to audacity, enterprise, and self reliance, typical emigrants from the great American nation, and having put their hands to the plow, had no intention of stopping half way in the furrow. The four presidents of the Texan Republic, Burnet, Houston, Lamar, and Jones, were all strong men but of widely different character. Lamar was a brilliant writer and talker, clear-headed and accomplished; Jones was an intellectual man, but bitter against the Houston party, and to judge from his own memoirs he was jealous and irritable. He died by his own hand. Before they could succeed way and means were indispensable, and finding that other nations in their periods of exigency had

resorted to taxing, borrowing, begging, selling, robbing, and cheating, they
determined to try all six, and in all six they succeeded. In the few years
that Texas existed as an independent republic, it had no less than seven
distinct tariffs. The Indian menace continued, and she was ever threatened
by an invasion from Mexico. Political conditions in Texas were chaotic.
Tyler mentioned this condition when he said to the Senate: "I repeat, the
Executive saw Texas in a state of almost hopeless exhaustion." This state-
ment may be verified by a letter from Mr. Sabine to the press as follows:

They [inhabitants of western Texas] were in
great haste, as if attempting to escape some
impending danger. Their answers were uniform
and expressive of the anarchy in disorganiza-
tion throughout the country. They disclaimed
any fear from Mexicans, or any other enemy,
except (as they expressed it), "the enemy in
the bosom of our own country." They denied
the existence of any protection of individual
rights, and asserted that there was no national
government in Texas, and if any sort of govern-
ment existed, it was the government of a dema-
gogue aspiring to despotism.

It appeared to many that the young republic could not long stand alone, but
would be forced to accept aid from some great power. This great power, Tyler
feared, would be Great Britain. The newspapers stated a similar anxiety
which is conclusive from the following quotation:

The position of Texas, geographical, physi-
cal, and moral, is such that she cannot remain
an independent nation. She must go back to
Mexico, become a colony of Great Britain, or
form an integral portion of this Union. This
country cannot be indifferent to the result.
Whether we can permit the colonization of Texas

25 Wells. op. cit., 443.
26 Senate Documents, 28 Cong., 1 sess., April 22, 1844, V, 9.
27 Western Advocate. (Austin) April 1, 1843.
by Great Britain, consistently with our commercial interest, with the peace and security of the Southern States, and with the policy avowed by this government during Mr. Monroe's administration, is a matter for grave consideration. 

...it will relieve Southern States of their slave population. It will drain them of population, capital, and energy, and will give them no political advantages of corresponding importance.28

Ex-President Jackson continually urged Tyler to exert his influence to gain Texas before the opportunity slipped away. This fact may be readily understood from Tyler's message to the Senate in which he used Jackson's declaration: "...the present golden moment to obtain Texas must not be lost, or Texas might from necessity be thrown into the arms of England and be forever lost to the United States."29 Jackson said repeatedly, "We must have Texas, peaceably if we can, forcibly if we must."30 It was believed to abandon Texas then, would be inviting British protection and British policy. The circle of British power was too near, and the emancipation of the slave within American borders, the reintegration of his manhood, and his introduction to political rights, would become a problem to be solved by the caprice of an alien and not improbably hostile influence.31 As might be expected there were those in Texas who felt that if peace could be had from Mexico it would be better to remain an independent government. They also felt that if they were given a little more time to adjust their problems they could place their nation on a solid and firm basis and be "the pride of the present age, and

28 News item in the Telegraph and Texas Register, (Houston) December 13, 1843.
the glory and happiness of coming generations."\textsuperscript{32}

Tyler showed a great concern over the possibility of Texas becoming a mandate of a European country. The movements of England were not totally unknown and while Texas looked upon the extension of that proud shield over her young republic, the United States watched with jealous and anxious interest, the progress of that same imperial emblem. In his message to the Senate Tyler made the following statement:

The documents now transmitted along with the treaty lead to the conclusion, as inevitable, that if the boon now tendered be rejected, Texas will seek for the friendship of others. In contemplating such a contingency it cannot be overlooked that the United States are already almost surrounded by the possessions of European powers. The Canadas, New Brunswick, and Nova Scotia, the islands in the American seas, with Texas trammeled by treaties of alliance or of a commercial character differing in policy from that of the United States would complete the circle.\textsuperscript{33}

Many shared the opinion that the cotton-growing states were anxious to join Texas to the Union for a twofold reason; to extend slavery, and because they feared that she may fall into the hands of Great Britain as the following extract suggests:

...if this power [Great Britain] already in possession of Canada to the north of us should get a firm grip on a large area of territory on our southwestern border, our country would, in a war with England, be between the upper and the nether millstone.\textsuperscript{34}

\begin{footnotes}
\item[34] Chitwood. op. cit., 346.
\end{footnotes}
After Texas failed to be incorporated into the Union, trusting as a wise policy dictates, to her own strength and resources, she withdrew her offer and decided upon a course of independent development and progress with the ultimate idea of stretching out to the Pacific coast and building up a mighty republic in North America. Texas seemed lost to the United States. The only question was, "Could she be won again?" The American Congress was no longer the sole party to answer the inquiry. This was a distressing thought for those who were keenly interested in mapping out a similar career for the whole united country. A sense of patriotism was a sufficient reason to prohibit Texas from becoming a powerful empire, especially since she might be allied with Great Britain, who already commanded such possessions near the Gulf of Mexico as the Bahamas, the Bermudas, Jamaica, and Honduras. With Great Britain in possession of a military base in Texas the United States would be in a most precarious position. A similar opinion was expressed by Jackson concerning Great Britain when he wrote to Sam Houston as follows: "... if she got an ascendancy over Texas, by an alliance, she would form an iron Hoop around the United States, with her West India Islands that would cost oceans of blood, and millions of money to Burst asunder." On the other hand if Texas were to form a new slave republic it might so happen that she would have adequate support and assume prestige sufficient to draw the southern slave states out of the Union and form a new transcontinental confederacy strong enough and willing to expand her

36 Charles Edward Lester. The Life of Sam Houston. J. C. Derby, New York, 1855, 239-240.
37 Amelia W. Williams and Eugene C. Barker, Editors. The Writings of Sam Houston. The University of Texas Press, Austin, Texas, 1941, IV, Sept. 1821-Feb. 1847, 266.
boundaries and incorporate the entire area from the easternmost slave state to the Gulf of California and the Pacific Coast. 38

At this time the question of slavery and expansion overshadowed all others. Most of the people of the north believed that slavery was wrong, but that it would continue to exist since it was recognized by the Constitution. A new phase of the problem presented itself when North American expansion, which was to spread its territory from coast to coast became involved with the slavery question. There was bitter controversy between those in favor of slavery and those against it.

The great extent of Texas was a feature which the people of the slaveholding states realized, and in which they saw the possibility of making several slave states, thereby expanding the slave area and gaining greater representation in Washington. Naturally enough, the anti-slavery population feared this development, but the possibility of creating free states from so vast a territory was also evident. The administration at Washington became somewhat alarmed because there was convincing evidence that definite plans were being formulated, apparently with British approval, for the abolition of slavery in Texas. Great Britain had abolished slavery in her own possessions, and stood ready to help any other nation abolish this hideous practice wherever it existed. Naturally enough then, those in favor of slavery felt that the acquisition of Texas was vitally necessary if slavery was to continue. If anti-slavery influence became dominant in Texas it would seriously menace this institution. There were those who believed that if Texas were a free state it would serve as a refuge for

38 Bemis. op. cit., 226-227.
fugitive slaves, and because of this condition there would be perpetual conflict between the two countries. Then too, if Texas were an independent nation allied with Great Britain or France they would pour their products into this continent duty free in competition with the products from the United States. This in turn would give rise to the smuggling of goods which the United States did not wish to have happen. A few lines from Tyler's third annual message will help us to understand his impressions on this point.

...the government...would be certain to suffer most disastrously in its revenue by the introduction of a system of smuggling upon an extensive scale, which an army of custom-house officers could not prevent, and which would operate to affect injuriously the interests of all the industrial classes of this country. Hence would arise constant collisions between the inhabitants of the two countries which would evermore endanger their peace. ...Texas would, undoubtedly be unable for many years to come, if at any time, to resist unaided and alone the military power of the United States; but it is not extravagant to suppose that nations reaping a rich harvest from her trade, secured to them by advantageous treaties, would be induced to take part with her in any conflict with us, ...39

The department of State at Washington must have had sufficient information to stimulate its fears of British influence in Texas. If England dominated Texas anti-slavery ideas would most probably take root and affect the interests and safety of the southern states, also, it would drive a wedge between the United States and Latin America which would be most convenient for the British. The following extract of a letter from Mr. Upshur to Mr. William S. Murphy, American diplomatic agent in Texas, will help us

39 Senate Documents. 28 Cong., 1 sess., April 22, 1844, V, 5-10.
to understand the President's opinion on the matter. Mr. Abel P. Upshur was the Secretary of State in Tyler's Cabinet, and he was regarded as speaking for Mr. Tyler.

I learn from a source entitled to the fullest confidence, that there is now here a Mr. Andrews, deputed by the abolitionists of Texas to negotiate with the British Government; that he has seen Lord Aberdeen, and submitted his project for the abolition of slavery in Texas; which is that there shall be organized a company in England, who shall advance a sum sufficient to pay for the slaves now in Texas, and receive in payment Texas lands; that the sum thus advanced shall be paid over as indemnity for the abolition of slavery; and I am authorized by the Texas minister to say to you, that Lord Aberdeen has agreed that the British Government will guaranty the payment of the interests on this loan, upon condition that the Texas Government will abolish slavery. ... A movement of this sort cannot be contemplated by us in silence. ...It cannot be permitted to succeed.

It was thought by the administration that this was an extensive and deep-laid scheme on the part of the British to abolish slavery throughout the United States, and by so doing to protect her own sugar and cotton industries in the East and West Indies. It would prohibit the competition she was experiencing from the United States. She would also acquire a profound influence in Texas and gain a monopoly of the Texan trade. This might well be understood from another section of Mr. Upshur's letter in which he says: "It cannot be supposed that England means to limit her designs to the emancipation of a few thousand slaves. She would have ulterior objects far more important to her, and far more interesting to us." President Tyler

\footnote{40 B.L. Hamlen. "Texas," The New Englander, 2:455, July, 1844.}

\footnote{41 Texas. Document No. 6, August 8, 1843, 20.}
was kept informed of the machinations of the British. He told the Senate that he had reason to fear that the British were straining every nerve and fibre to gain a foothold. Of course, there were those who believed that Washington was using the British scare, to further her expansion movement. Mr. Winthrop gave his opinion on the matter when he spoke before the House of Representatives in these words:

...I trust that they will not be deluded by any false alarm—by any red lion representation that Texas is about to be made a colonial possession of Great Britain. The British Government has no such purpose. Our own government know this. And if Texas be foisted into this Union upon any such pretence, it will be an act as fraudulent in its inception as it will under any circumstances, be pernicious in its results.42

As soon as Aberdeen heard of the excitement over Upshur's letter he promptly denied the intentions of the letter in a note as follows:

Foreign Office, Dec. 26, 1843
Sir: As much agitation appears to have prevailed of late in the United States relative to the designs which Great Britain is supposed to entertain with regard to the republic of Texas, her Majesty's government deem it expedient to take measures for stopping at once the misrepresentations which have been circulated, ...Great Britain desires and is constantly exerting herself to procure, the general abolition of slavery throughout the world. ...but her means...are open and undisguised. She will do nothing secretly or underhand. ...The British Government as the United States well know, have never sought in any way to stir up disaffection or excitement of any kind in the slave holding States of the American Union.43

Aberdeen

43 Senate Documents. 28 Cong., 1 sess., Dec. 26, 1843, V, 48-49.
Aberdeen's frank note appeared to carry little weight with some of the officials in Washington judging from an excerpt from Mr. Upshur's letter to Mr. Murphy previously mentioned.

...The diplomacy of England has heretofore been scarcely less successful than her arms, in obtaining for her the largest share of the commerce of the world. Her movements are generally begun at a distance, and her approaches are gradual and cautious; and for that very reason they rarely fail of success. Doing nothing in the beginning to excite the suspicions or rouse the jealousy of other nations, her plans are not often fully developed until it is no longer possible to oppose them.

By this time secret negotiations for a treaty of annexation were well started. Houston's policy remains somewhat obscure. His idea at times seems to have been to force the United States to take immediate action by arousing fears and jealousies; at other times he seems to have had a personal ambition to see Texas an independent republic extending her borders back to the coast. Whatever may have been the truth about the matter the connection between England and Texas gave Tyler a sufficient cause to push the project and accomplish the task of acquiring Texas before the opportunity slipped away. The following extract of a private letter from a gentleman residing in Texas to the Secretary of State caused a good deal of concern.

Houston, April 29, 1844

Dear Sir: ...most of those in the confidence of the President here are bitterly opposed to annexation. It is now certain that we can now form such a commercial treaty with Great Britain as will insure our immediate independence. General Houston had an interview with Captain Elliot on the day he left Galveston for New Orleans.

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Texas. Department of State—Washington, Aug. 8, 1843, 18-19.
Monsieur Saligny, the French minister, is now at Galveston. The President is strongly urged and importuned to break off the treaty with the United States, and listen to their propositions. We are all prepared, if we are spurned again from the Union, to enter into commercial free-trade treaty with Great Britain and France, on a guaranty of our independence, which we now have; and the advantages it promises us in the cotton trade render it very desirable. ...I can assure you, beyond a doubt, ...propositions will have been received and agreed to by us, that will place annexation beyond all hope forever, without a war with Great Britain. 45

Lord Aberdeen, in an attempt to pacify the states which had become so alarmed over the rumors of British duplicity, sent the following note to them as given here in part:

...And the government of the slaveholding states may be assured, that, although we shall not desist from those open and honest efforts which we have constantly made for procuring the abolition of slavery throughout the world, we shall neither openly nor secretly resort to any measures which can tend to disturb their internal tranquility, or thereby affect the prosperity of the American Union. 46

It was on the 26th day of February that this dispatch was communicated to the American Secretary of State, Abel Upshur, who lost his life two days later on the United States steamer, Princeton. Judging from papers found after his death it is admitted that the treaty of annexation was agreed upon, and virtually concluded before his death. Nothing then, in Lord Aberdeen's declaration, could have had any effect upon its formation or conclusion.

Calhoun declared in a note to Richard Pakenham, the British minister at Washington, that British abolition was the very reason that the United

45 Ibid., Doc. No. 271, May 16, 1844, 10h.
46 Globe Appendix. 28 Cong., 1 sess., XIII, May 1844, 481.
States had signed a treaty of annexation with Texas. This was false.\textsuperscript{47} Jackson came nearer to the point in his letter to Sam Houston in which he said:

\begin{quote}
...The President was censured by some of the friends of this measure for not bringing the subject before Congress in his message. This would have been an unprecedented move—common sense said keep it a profound secret, until the treaty is sent to the Senate, ...This prevents that arch fiend, J. Q. Adams, from writing memorials and circulating them for signatures in the opposition to the annexation of Texas, and to prevent the ratification of the Treaty & giving time for all the abolition and Eastern papers, to fulminate against it before this wretched old man can circulate his firebrands, and memorials against the ratification, it will be ratified by the Senate.\textsuperscript{48}
\end{quote}

In conclusion, it is clear that rival forces striving for ascendancy had influenced Tyler in his relation to the annexation of Texas. Because of the location an independent Texas would block westward expansion. Partly because of favorable topography American citizens constituted the majority of the inhabitants who would be endangered if Texas should become a buffer state. At the same time Texas might become mandatory to a rival European power, and with foreign assistance build up a mighty republic where European influence would deal a heavy blow to American industry and security. Tyler made the annexation of Texas a party question against his own will, thus, he cast the balance of these rival forces in favor of Texas.


\textsuperscript{48} The \textit{Writings of Sam Houston}. IV, 266–267.
CHAPTER II

CONFLICTING ATTITUDES 1841-1845

Tyler was anxious for the annexation of Texas from the beginning of his administration. Early in 1841 he mentioned his ambition, to Daniel Webster, his Secretary of State. Webster was opposed to the project even after hearing from Tyler the great advantages which would result from annexation. Since no agreement was forthcoming on the question, it was set aside to be taken up at a more opportune time. The last remnant of the Whig Party was severed from Tyler when on May 8, 1843, Webster placed his resignation in the Executive's hand. Abel P. Upshur, who was eager to have Texas annexed to the Union, succeeded Webster. Tyler began immediate negotiations with the Texan authorities. He was convinced that for peace and for the preservation of the Union, it was the manifest destiny of the United States to extend over the entire continent, considering that Texas was separated from the United States by a mere geographical line and that her territory formed a portion of the territory of the United States. In his message to the Senate he makes the following statement:

...The hazard of now defeating her wishes may be of the most fatal tendency. It might lead and most likely would, to such an entire alienation of sentiment and feeling as would inevitably induce her to look either to enter into dangerous alliances with other nations, who looking with

2 Amelia W. Williams and Eugene C. Barker, Editors. The Writings of Sam Houston. The University of Texas Press, Austin, Texas, 1911, IV, Sept. 1821-Feb. 1847, 266.
more wisdom to their own interests, would it is
fairly to be presumed, readily adopt such ex-
pedients; or she would hold out the proffer of
discriminating duties in trade and commerce in
order to secure the necessary assistance.4

A great deal would have to be done in order to prepare the public mind to
cast a favorable vote upon the question. There were two groups upon which
the most effective diplomacy would have to be used. Those two groups were
the North and the Senate. Tyler feared that his greatest opposition would
be from these points; his fears were not unwarranted. In speaking to the
Senate he said, "I expressed the opinion, that if Texas was not now annexed,
it was probable that the opportunity of annexing it to the United States
would be lost forever."5 The new Secretary of State lost no time in planning
a campaign to make the policy effective and Texas a part of the Union.

Early in Tyler's administration the Senate was opposed to annexation.
The majority in the Senate were Whigs with strong personal as well as politi-
cal opposition to the Executive. Since he had broken with the Whig party,
its members would have nothing to do with a Tyler project. Tyler was well
aware of this, and for that reason he did not push the question, but he
preferred to prepare the soil for a later harvest. In the meantime, the
question was presented to both parties as a national one, in which American
safety from foreign interference on her borders became of paramount impor-
tance.6 Other phases of the topic included the commerce between the Missis-
sippi Valley and Texas, the profits from American cotton exports, the United
States monopoly of that crop, and the general attitude of the United States

4 Richardson, op. cit., April 22, 1844, IV, 309.
6 Niles' National Register. Nov., 21, 1843, XVI, 170.
toward westward expansion. The administration had not made annexation officially the leading issue. Meanwhile, Secretary Upshur had taken measures to ascertain the opinions and views of the Senators upon the subject. By 1844, he concluded that the necessary two-thirds majority for the ratification of a treaty of annexation of Texas could be secured. Even the leading opponents of such a treaty feared that it might win, although the Whig speakers labored effectively to exhibit the most striking views of annexation, "Texas and Slavery, one and inseparable." Of the fifty-two members in the Senate, twenty-nine were Whigs and twenty-three were Democrats. Not all of the Democrats were for annexation, but a split in the party had arisen due partly to opposition to Tyler and partly to dissatisfaction resulting from the defeat of Van Buren. As time went on the outcome became more unpredictable since some of the Whigs were shifting in favor of annexation. Members of both parties preferred to let the question rest until a later date.

Ex-President Jackson had watched with covetous eyes the struggle of the infant republic since 1835. He had become so determined to obtain Texas that from the first year of his administration, it was said that he "set double engines to work of negotiating to buy Texas with one hand, and instigating the people of that province to revolt against Mexico with the other." Houston was his agent for the rebellion, and Anthony Butler, a Mississippi land jobber in Texas, for the purchase. For many years he watched the

struggle with an earnest solicitude, and though now old and feeble, he held
the acquisition of Texas as the last strong sentiment of his career. The
word "reannexation" was a great favorite with him.11 He constantly urged
the Democratic leaders to support the cause of Texas, and just as often he
warned them against England. His closing years were especially devoted to
this subject. The people of Texas appreciated the interest Jackson had
taken in their welfare, and in June 1845, "the Texan Congress tendered him
the unfeigned gratitude of a nation."12 Jackson was dead when this tribute
was given. It is the opinion of many that Ex-President Jackson and Presi­
dent Tyler were the greatest individual forces in the United States in
bringing about the consummation of the annexation of Texas.13 The editor of
the Democratic Statesman made the following statement:

...It is literally true that to General Jackson
belongs the credit of securing the consummation
of the great measure of annexation.
Not only in the United States was his opinion
on this question productive of powerful effect
on the public mind, but after the treaty of Mr.
Tyler was rejected by the Senate it was an ur­
gent appeal by General Jackson to the then Pres­
ident of Texas which assured him that the people
would soon reverse the decision of the Senate.
This assurance may be truly regarded as the
movement which finally secured the adoption of
the measure in Texas.14

Sam Houston, the President of Texas, proclaimed himself in favor of
annexation when twice during his early presidency he offered to negotiate
for the acceptance of Texas into the Union. He felt that Texas needed pro-

12 Ibid., 442.
13 Clarence R. Wharton. The Republic of Texas. C. C. Young Printing Co.,
Houston, Texas, 1922, 212.
14 News item in the Democratic Statesman (Nashville) August 2, 1845.
tection and security, and he therefore, revived the proposition for annexation which had been withdrawn in 1838. Each time his offer was rejected. Both Texas and the United States doubted that a treaty for annexation would be ratified by the Senate, and it was also doubted that a majority in the lower House would be in favor of the policy. Houston voiced his opinion in these words:

The United States must annex Texas—Texas cannot annex herself to the United States. A concurrent action is necessary. And yet, the United States have adopted no course that could encourage a confident hope on the part of the friends of that measure in this country.15

Houston then turned his attention to England and France. Whether this was to arouse the jealousy of the United States is not quite certain, but it is a fact that negotiations were going on simultaneously between Texas and the United States and between Texas and Mexico. The quotation given here in part offers some explanation:

It is reported that Houston has changed his mind on this subject and refuses to forward the necessary instructions, influenced probably by the hope of British mediation, although the government has assured this that Mexico refuses to listen to any overtures relative to peace with Texas.16

A certain noted author stated that: "It was the overture from Mexico backed and sustained by the British Minister, that induced Houston to withdraw the proposition for annexation." Houston declared: "We withdrew the one proposition to carry out the other."17 Whatever may have been his object is not

15 The Writings of Sam Houston. Letter from Houston to William S. Murphy, Feb. 3, 1844.
16 News item in The Texas Times. (Galveston) March 4, 1843.
quite certain. He might have expected a personal reward from Great Britain and Mexico, or he might have believed that reunion to the parent country was her best policy. However, the fact remains that the Texan Senate unanimously rejected the Mexican treaty and the Texan Congress unanimously approved the United States joint resolution. Houston reported that, "he had coquetted a little with Great Britain and made the United States as jealous of that power as he possibly could." He also stated that, "he would have so operated on the fears of the American Senate that the prize would slip through their grasp, as to have secured the ratification of the treaty last spring."  

The Democrats committed themselves in favor of annexation. "The immediate reannexation of Texas" was adopted as the Democratic war-cry. A split in the party then took place, and some of the northern Democrats joined the Whigs as enemies of slavery and slave extension. The Democratic Party was looked upon as the champion of slavery and was cherished accordingly. The Democratic Convention had been planned to meet the last week in May. At this Convention the Texas treaty was not judged on its own merits, but it was made the basis of political maneuvering and intrigue. At that time senators and representatives from Washington were the delegates to the national conventions. Upshur had counted on a possible forty votes for annexation, but as time drew near to the presidential election these votes seemed to be disappearing. Both Tyler and Calhoun had become unpopular. The Democrats looked upon Tyler as a Virginian of respectable talents and character, "but

18 Tyler. op. cit., II, 335.
19 Loc. cit.
20 Editorial: "A Shadowy Region," The Republic, 2:147, Jan-June, 1874.
one who had rendered no services to the Democratic cause, and therefore, he had no claims to the support of the friends of democracy; his associations were all with the bitterest enemies of our free institutions.21 After the Democratic Convention had adjourned the members were agreed upon the immediate reannexation of Texas, but not under the leadership of a President without a party. They hoped to leave this topic to the new administration.

The Whig Party, led by Henry Clay, was presumably opposed to the acquisition of more slave territory. However, the Whigs were unable to maintain a uniform opinion on slavery. The northern Whigs favored the reestablishment of the United States Bank and they believed in a high protective tariff, while the southern Whigs were strict constructionists. Tyler was a southerner who believed in slavery and strongly favored states' right. He was opposed to both the bank and the tariff, and consequently, he vetoed two bills which had been passed by Congress providing for a bank. The dominating element of the Whig Party despaired of compelling him to conform to its policy.22 A quarrel then arose which left Tyler without a party, as well as with a vacant Cabinet, save for Daniel Webster, who remained as Secretary of State to complete the controversy between the United States and Great Britain in regard to the northeastern boundary.23 The Whigs, north and south, would have nothing to do with a measure sponsored by Tyler. In the minds of the rank and file of the party Tyler was a traitor, a renegade, and a political outcast. Every act of the president which could be interpreted as unfriendly

21 News item in The Rough-Hewer, (Albany) September 17, 1840.
to the Whigs was subjected to the fiercest criticism by the Whig press. 24

The Whigs took great pride in maintaining that they stood for the preservation of the Union. The party held its convention in Baltimore on the first of May. Henry Clay was nominated for president. Concerning this convention Samuel C. Pomeroy reported as follows:

We [Whig Party] were making a campaign upon the plank of no more such territory; and when our leader surrendered, we bolted and marched to the ranks of Honorable James G. Birney, and polled votes enough to defeat the man we would not elect. 25

Clay announced shortly before the meeting of the convention that he was opposed to annexation on the ground that it would involve the country in war with Mexico. Van Buren, who was the leading candidate for the Democratic nomination made a similar announcement the same day. His opposition to annexation was well known, and Clay who was afraid of the Texas issue hoped to drop it from the campaign. All of the Whigs and some of the Democrats were anxious to postpone the subject until after the fall elections. However, this was not to be the case. The Texas question thus became strictly a party question between the Democrats and the Whigs. It is worthy of notice that the speeches made during the discussion clearly showed that the majority of those who voted against ratifying the treaty, were in favor of ratifying at some future period.

The South hoped to gain Texas since it would add territory large enough for five new slave states. It was greatly concerned over the rumor that Great Britain was engaged in diplomatic intrigue to abolish slavery in

Texas, and later in the United States. Therefore, the South considered the issue a question of its own safety. The Charleston Mercury announced that the South Carolina Militia under the leadership of General Quattlebun were all zealous for "Texas or Disunion as the alternative."\(^{26}\) The forty-third Regiment made the following resolution:

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...\text{in the opinion of this meeting the annexation of Texas to our country is a matter of paramount importance to the Southern and South Western States of this Confederacy, and that it would be more for the interest of these States that they should stand out of the Union, with Texas, than in it without her.}^{27}\]

The possibility that Texas, allied with England or France, might abolish slavery within its limits in return for aid and protection against Mexico and the United States was of no small concern. The prize offered to the fugitive slave by a free Texas located on the very doorstep of the South would greatly endanger the peace and stability of this section. Southern attitude is clearly expressed in the quotation which follows:

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...\text{We trust that the South will forever be a part of the Union and that Texas will be admitted to it, for the good of the whole. ... Texas is but a part of the Mississippi valley, of which New York may be considered the head. The United States should possess the whole of this teeming region. Texas is quite essential for the protection and full enjoyment of that which we now possess.}^{28}\]

On the other hand if Texas were allied with England or France she might with their aid stretch her borders out to the Pacific, thereby blocking westward

\(^{26}\) W. F. Bang, Editor. "Texas or Disunion," Spirit of '76, No. 13, August 3, 1844, 19h.

\(^{27}\) Loc. cit.

expansion on the part of the South. There was the other side of the question
to be considered also. With Texas in the Union there was the potentiality of
greater slave territory, hence a balance of power in the Senate. Annexation
was essential to the security of the South, and the defense of the whole
Union. In 1844, a movement developed with the slogan, "Texas or disunion."

Anti-slavery sentiment was general throughout the North, therefore,
the North was opposed to any more slave territory. Texas, a region so well
suited to the production of cotton, was potentially an area from which four
or five new slave states could be created, thereby, throwing the balance of
power to the South. Thus, expansion to the southwest became indissolubly
associated with the extension of slavery. Commercially, the fears of the
North could be aroused by bringing out the dangers of Texas as a free-trade
republic into which British goods could be smuggled on such a large scale as
would nullify the tariff. The North feared that the South might even secede
from the Union and join with Texas. As time passed the sentiment of the
North changed. This may be seen from a statement made by Mr. Upshur, which
is here in part:

...When the measure was first suggested although
the entire South was in favor of it, as they
still are, it found few friends among the states-
men of the other States. Now, the North, to a
great extent, are not only favorable to but
anxious for it; and every day increases the
popularity of the measure among those who origi-
nally opposed. 29

Public sentiment in the south and west, and to some extent in the
north was in favor of reannexing Texas. It was upon this element that the

29 Texas. Doc. No. 271, 47.
large mass of intriguers operated. John Quincy Adams amply stated that the "appetite for Texas was from the first a western passion, stimulated by no one more greedily than by Henry Clay." Clay had denounced the Florida treaty for fixing the boundary at the Sabine, and he had held and preached the doctrine that we should have insisted upon our shadow of a claim to the Rio del Norte. This period was not too far removed from 1775 for the intense anti-British prejudice to be less dominant. The instinctive fear of being hemmed in politically by Great Britain was felt throughout the nation. The point which made a universal appeal was that of security, both political and economical. It was either a question of annexing or lose Texas to Great Britain. Now or never! The idea of peace and security was the argument which bore the most weight in the United States and in Texas. If it had not been for the controversy over slavery there would not have been an appreciable opposition in the United States, to the acquisition of Texas.

Foreign influence, especially that of Great Britain and France, was evident, and it was clear that they hoped to keep Texas as a low tariff or free-trade market for their manufacturing industry. Since Texas was well suited for the production of cotton it would furnish the raw material for their ever increasing textile industry. This foreign interest in Texas affairs aroused great uneasiness in the United States. The administration feared that any European intervention would erect a barrier to further expansion, besides offering a wedge between the United States and Latin America.

31 Nevins, op. cit., 517.
America. England had long made it a part of her foreign policy to suppress the slave trade, but beyond this moral interest in Texas she had a political interest as well. By the annexation of Texas the United States would endanger her liberated colonies; we would build up a power in her neighborhood, and by adding Texas to the acquisition of Florida the United States would have taken a long step towards girding the Gulf of Mexico. British opposition to annexation was one point upon which the country was unified. European influence had made itself felt in Galveston more so than anywhere else. Naturally there was more opposition to annexation there. It was evident that the sympathy which existed between the United States and Texas would be destroyed and the continuance of peace would be made impossible.

The energies of the annexationists of the United States were directed toward the glittering prize, Texas. Since it is a country of the greatest capabilities, being in extent fully as large as France, its importance could not be underrated. Its soil is of the most fertile character and it is capable of producing much tropical produce. There were persons of influence to be found on either side of the question. Just to mention a few most noted individuals favoring annexation were Jackson, Tyler, Polk, Calhoun, and Upshur. Some of the adherents had recently been won over while others had held this point of view since the United States surrendered its title to the land in 1819. Judging from the various resolutions presented by the states to the senate we see that the population was never unanimously for nor unanimously against annexation, but both sides of the question were represented in all sections.\(^{33}\) Mr. Willoughby Newton of Virginia, related the

sentiment of the northern annexationists when he addressed his constituents in the words given here:

...the people of the North have too deep an interest in this question to be influenced by the ravings of fanaticism. By the acquisition of Texas new wings will be given to their commerce, a fresh impulse to their manufactures, and a new and extended field, under a genial sky will be opened for the agricultural industry of the hardy sons of that rugged clime in which the "plough freezes in the furrow," and the lowing herds demand the care of the husbandman for three quarters of the year. The very diversity of interests that it creates will prove a new bond of Union. 34

The anti-expansionists were not reconciled to the acquisition of so much new territory which was eventually to be formed into new voting states. The press offered the following objection:

Texas: This nation of the "lone star," contains a white population of about 117,000, and a revenue of less than half a million of dollars. Its principal port, Galveston has a harbor of eight feet of water. The public debt of the nation is nominally $10,000,000 but probably three times that sum. What a blessing would the annexation of such a country be to ours. 35

Some states threatened to leave the Union upon the accomplishment of annexation. Such a feeling is exemplified by Mr. Giddings who presented the petition of Martin Mitchell of New York, "praying in case Texas shall be admitted into the Union, the State of New York, may be annexed to the British Province of Canada." 36 There were a few notable figures who were not in favor of annexation although they had been identified with expansion. Among

34 Texas. February 4, 1845, 13.
35 News item in The Salem Observer, April 12, 1845.
36 Globe. 27 Cong., 1 sess., XIII, 1844, 174.
this group we find Webster, Thomas H. Benton, Clay, and John Quincy Adams. The latter insisted upon keeping Texas in 1819, but opposed its annexation in 1845, mainly because during this time the slavery question had grown to be a national one of ever increasing political importance. Some men, like Daniel Webster thought that the acquisition of so much territory would tend to weaken rather than to strengthen the nation as a whole. Webster and his followers declared that the United States had land enough, and on the score of territory the country was gorged to overflowing. This they declared to be an acknowledged fact, and still they feared that it would serve to strengthen the policy of the government in "getting possession of Texas by any means within the range of possibility." They felt that the population on the western frontier would be too far removed from the seat of government. To these men then, the establishment of separate republics in the west politically independent, would be a solution to the problem, provided they were colonized by Americans. Mr. Newton, one of the representatives from Virginia, hoped to calm the fears of his fellow-citizens in the following words:

...The great extension of our country is another cause of alarm; and we are referred to the fate of the overgrown empires of ancient times as a warning to us not to imitate their example in a career of conquest or ambition. We conquer no unwilling subjects. ...We take to our arms as brothers and equals, ...and admit them at once to all the rights and privileges of our glorious federation system. 38

Both time and events helped to change this belief, and in a few years those who once felt that such a vast territory might tend to weaken the country

38 Texas. February 4, 1845, 13.
saw that the contrary had become true. The nation which had spread over the wide valleys of the Mississippi, and which had been declared by friends as well as enemies, an empire which would inevitably lead to disruption because of this very extension preserved its unity and became ever stronger. The growing separation of the North and the South which was divided in interest and hostile in feeling was prevented from coming into direct collision by the introduction of the new western States. This powerful element, western acquisitions, kept the other sections together in compulsory harmony; and in the same manner every subsequent addition has tended to strengthen the fabric rather than to weaken it.\(^39\)

In summarizing, it is evident that since the entire country was divided on the question of annexation, the acquisition of Texas was a most complex problem necessitating skill and perseverance before its solution could be achieved. Since Texas was not to be annexed by executive decree it was expedient that Tyler work with the many and varied opinions which were brought to bear upon the question. The conflicting attitudes of all concerned, but especially of the North and of the Senate complicated the problem to almost despairing degree.

\(^{39}\) News item in the Weekly Chicago Democrat, March 12, 1848.
CHAPTER III
PROPOSED TREATY 1844

Tyler very seriously considered the possibility of acquiring Texas by treaty. Within the first few weeks of his administration he referred to annexation as the all-important measure of his administration.1 Upon the reorganization of his Cabinet he expressed to Webster his views upon this subject. In discussing the matter with Webster he stated that he felt that it could be done if the North could be reconciled to it. He argued that northern interests would be incalculably benefited by such an acquisition rather than harmed by it. He explained how slavery was a great obstacle to its accomplishment, but he believed that by rigid enforcement of the laws against the slave trade, it would make as many free states as the acquisition of Texas would add to slave states. Tyler believed as one author explained: "The reason why Texas was still out of the United States was not diplomatic, but political; it lay in the institution of slavery."2 The Executive recalled Jefferson's administration, and how the Louisiana Purchase in 1803 immortalized his name. Hence, he hoped that the addition of the resources of Texas without the expenditure of a dollar from the national treasury would add greatly to the power of the nation, and also increase his own popularity. In speaking to Webster he exclaimed, "Could anything,... throw so bright a lustre around us?"3 Webster did not agree with Tyler on this subject, instead he argued that the, "port of San Francisco

3 Tyler, op. cit., 254.
was twenty times as valuable to us as all Texas."
Consequently, before anything could be done towards annexation a change in Tyler's assistants was necessary. Webster had been interested in settling the boundary question with England, but he was not keenly interested in pushing for the annexation of Texas or for free trade, neither was he concerned about British propaganda for emancipation in Texas. Tyler thought it prudent, therefore, to delay action on the subject for several reasons. The importance of the pending negotiations with England was one reason, while at the same time Tyler recognized the great objection in the north to southern expansion. Also, the Texan Executive, Lamar, was opposed to annexation. Lastly, many feared that annexation would be followed by a declaration of war by Mexico against the United States as is reflected in the following lines:

...Texas, although she had expelled the Mexicans, has never been acknowledged to be independent by Mexico. Mexico is still at war with Texas, maugre the fragile and indefinite sort of truce that at one time existed; and being at war with Texas she will virtually be at war with the United States, as soon as Texas comes into the Union, and forms a portion of the Nation. This principle we think has been clearly demonstrated by that experienced diplomatist and accurate reasoner, Mr. Gallatin. Mexico, we repeat, still regards Texas as a part of her own territory, never having ceded, made over or acknowledged any thing to the contrary; another power, then stepping in and making this disputed country a part of her own, takes all its defects and disadvantages. That other power adopts the quarrels of the country in dispute, and as at common law, in taking it, "buys the law suit."

A similar attitude was expressed in a letter to Henry Clay in which it was

1 Ibid., 263-264.
stated that: "Texas is the first step to Mexico. To annex Texas is to declare perpetual war with Mexico. The moment we plant our authority on Texas, the boundaries of those two countries will become nominal, will be little more than lines on the sand of the sea-shore." As Tyler's term went on these causes disappeared one by one. It was therefore, an aid to the cause when Webster resigned from office. With his resignation a distinct change took place. Tyler allowed the greater portion of his term to pass by without proposing directly to Texas a treaty of union.

Mr. Abel P. Upshur succeeded Webster on July 24, 1843. Immediately Upshur began negotiations for a treaty at Tyler's direction. The negotiations so far as they are on record, began October 16, 1843, with a letter from Upshur to Isaac Van Zandt, the Texan Charge in Washington, offering to reopen the subject. An excerpt of that letter follows:

Sir: The subject of the annexation of Texas to the United States, by treaty, has engaged the serious attention of this Government, as well as of a large portion of our people. Recent occurrences in Europe [the dealings of Lord Aberdeen with the abolitionists in regard to slavery in Texas] which have doubtless attracted your notice, have imparted to the subject a fresh interest, and presented it in new and important aspects. ...A treaty of annexation is considered the most proper form; and, unless the views of the Administration shall undergo a very great and unexpected change, I shall be prepared to make a proposition to that effect whenever you shall be prepared with proper powers to meet it. If you agree in this view, I respectfully suggest that no time ought to be lost, as it is highly desirable that the treaty should be presented to the Senate at as early a period as possible.

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7 Senate Documents, 28 Cong., 1 sess., Oct. 16, 1843, V, 37.
Van Zandt had not been instructed by the Texan government just what procedure to take, therefore, he made no definite answer immediately. This caused the report to be circulated in Washington that the Texan government declined to negotiate for the annexation. In the meantime Mr. James H. Raymond arrived in Washington, and brought instructions from the President of Texas, Sam Houston, to Mr. Van Zandt to withdraw all propositions for the annexation of Texas to the United States unless they were given an assurance that it could be effected. He stated that if the negotiations proceeded England would withdraw her valuable services. He added, however, that he would renew the negotiations if he could be made reasonably certain by Mr. Upshur that the measure would be effected because the Texan government feared that Mexico might change her mind on the existing armistice, break off peace negotiations, or even recommence hostilities against Texas. On the other hand the British and French governments which had helped in obtaining cessation of hostilities might withdraw their help. Houston doubted that the treaty could gain the two-thirds majority for its acceptance by the United States Senate, and therefore, feared to lose his foreign support before he could be assured of corresponding aid from the United States. At the same time the Texan congress passed strong resolutions instructing Houston to negotiate. Houston assumed an attitude of indifference and caution. It appeared that the chances for the ratification of the treaty were not good, and if it should fail the separation from England would leave Texas in an embarrassing position. The Texans were assured that the requisite number of votes in the

8 Niles' National Register. May 11, 1844, XVI, 16.
9 Editorial: "Diplomatic Relations of Texas and the United States," Texas Historical Association Quarterly, 15:290, July 1911-April 1912.
Senate would be forthcoming. Mr. Upshur took means to canvass the senators. Thus far the question had been presented to both parties as a national one, and by January he officially stated that two-thirds of the senate did approve of a treaty to annex Texas. At the same time a circular was addressed by the members of both houses of the Texan Congress to the members of the Congress of the United States who were friendly to Texas, which declared that they believed that at least nine-tenths of the people would most cheerfully be willing to embrace any overtures from the United States having for their object the political annexation of Texas, on a footing in all respects equal with the other states of the Union. The result was that the circular was signed by every member of the Texan Congress except one; and was forwarded to Mr. Gilmer of Virginia, to be presented to the Congress of the United States. Upshur then explained the view of the administration on the annexation of Texas to Mr. Murphy, the United States Charge in Texas. The letter is here in part.

...The view which this government takes of it [annexation] excludes every idea of mere sectional interest. We regard it as involving the security of the southern and the strength and prosperity of every part of the Union. Sincerely believing that the annexation of Texas to the United States will strengthen the bonds of union among ourselves; give encouragement and sustenance to our navigating, commercial, and manufacturing interests, present a foundation for harmony with foreign countries, and afford us great security against their aggressions in case of war; we anxiously desire it,

11 Tyler. op. cit., William and Mary College, Williamsburg, Va., 1896, III, 118.
12 Loc. cit.
as a great blessing to every part of our country.\textsuperscript{13}

Due to fear of an attack on Texas from Mexico, because of the potential negotiations for annexation, Van Zandt unauthorized sent word to Upshur inquiring whether the president of the United States would in case Texas should desire it, or with her consent, pledge military and naval support at all necessary points upon her territory or borders sufficient to protect her against foreign aggression.\textsuperscript{14} To this inquiry no written answer was returned at that time, but later Murphy gave a verbal affirmation, and before Upshur gave his reply he lost his life aboard the Princeton. Tyler communicated with Texas and guaranteed the protection of the United States during the pending of the treaty. He immediately sent a naval squadron to the Gulf of Mexico and military forces to the Texas border in fulfillment of his pledge, and announced that invasion of Texas by any foreign power would bring them into action. Mexico had previously notified the United States that annexation would be equivalent to a declaration of war. The United States Senate promptly asked to be informed whether any military preparation had been made or ordered by the President. To this request Tyler answered in the message given below:

\ldots I have to inform the Senate, that...it was regarded by the Executive...to concentrate in the Gulf of Mexico and its vicinity...as large a portion of the home squadron, under the command of Captain Connor as could be drawn together; and at the same time to assemble at Fort Jesey, on the borders of Texas as large a military force as the demands would authorize to be detached. \ldots It will also be perceived

\textsuperscript{13} Niles' National Register. Nov. 21, 1843, XVI, 170.
by the Senate... that the naval officer in command of the fleet is directed to cause his ships to perform all the duties of a fleet of observation, and to apprise the executive of any indication of a hostile design upon Texas on the part of any nation, pending the deliberations of the Senate upon the Treaty.15

Tyler made use of diplomatic agents in order to convert public opinion in favor of the annexation of Texas. Duff Green, who was a southerner by birth and long active in politics and journalism, was sent to Europe shortly after Webster's retirement. Green was Tyler's confidential agent in England, and in that capacity was acting as a sort of ambassador at large.16 Edward Everett was the regular minister to Great Britain, and he had been suggested to Tyler by Webster. He thoroughly agreed with Webster's policies.17 Everett, therefore, was not a sympathetic person with whom Tyler, Upshur, and others of the group could discuss matters where their policy was markedly different from that of Webster's. It is not surprising then to find an agent in London, working beside Everett, but no in close relationship with him. One of Green's reports was made the basis for prompt annexation of Texas. The reason of course was that Great Britain had anti-slavery designs on Texas. Reports from the regular Minister, Everett, had no such disturbing remarks. Thus, there was every reason to suppose that Green was sent to England to do work in which Everett was not in sympathy.

Mr. Tyler was asked by certain officials who were not in sympathy with his

15 Senate Documents, 28 Cong. 1 sess., May 15, 1844, V, 74-75.
policies, if it were a fact that Green served as a private agent in England and if he were paid government money to do so. To this Tyler replied as follows:

Mr. Duff Green was employed by the Executive to collect such information, from private or other sources as was deemed important in undertaking a negotiation then contemplated, ... and that there was paid to him through the hands of the Secretary of State $1000 in full for such service... Mr. Green afterwards presented a claim for an additional allowance, which has been neither allowed nor recognized as correct. 18

Green also, was on intimate terms with Calhoun, whose son married Green's daughter. 19

In September 1844, Tyler sent Andrew J. Donelson, a nephew of Andrew Jackson, to Texas where he was later joined by former Governor Yell of Arkansas, Commodore Stockton, and finally Charles Wickliffe, who was sent by Polk as a personal emissary. Apparently these agents had been authorized to mobilize Texas public opinion, and to make extravagant promises of the internal improvements Congress would make for the country. 20 Little is known of their activities, however. Upon the death of Tilghman A. Howard on August 16, 1844, Donelson was appointed United States Minister to Texas partly to secure Democratic support and partly to have Jackson retain his lively interest in the question.

John C. Calhoun who succeeded Upshur was made Secretary of State for

the special purpose of acquiring Texas. When he came into office he found Upshur's work entirely worthy of his approval and co-operation and it took only from February 28 to April 12, 1844, for him to finish what Upshur had left to be concluded. Tyler had not intended to appoint Calhoun, but the latter was suggested by Representative Henry A. Wise, who forced Tyler's hand in this selection. John Tyler, Jr., declared that, "no other act of his administration caused his father so much regret as this appointment." Tyler's distaste for the selection was chiefly because if the Texan negotiations were successful, "Calhoun because of his prominence might receive for the achievement the laurels to which Tyler was justly entitled." The very day that Calhoun was notified officially, Tyler pointed out that the two great questions to be settled was the annexation of Texas to the Union, and the settlement of the Oregon question on a satisfactory basis. Calhoun undertook to work with great zeal, and thus the treaty making problem went rapidly forward. Within a month the document was ready to be signed, but before the Texan agents would do so they demanded a written promise that the United States Would protect Texas during the pending of the treaty. To this Calhoun replied that the Secretary of the Navy, and the Secretary of War, had already received orders for the concentration of the forces, and that during the pendency of the treaty the President would use his con-

23 Chitwood. op. cit., 285.
24 Loc. cit.
stitutional powers to defend Texas from attack by any foreign power.

Calhoun's next step was to answer a letter addressed to Upshur from the British Minister, Richard Pakenham. In this letter he was directed by Tyler to inform Pakenham that a treaty had been concluded for the annexation of Texas to the United States. The treaty was signed on April 12, 1844, but it was not given to the Senate for ten days.

On April 22, 1844, Tyler sent the following message to the Senate:

I transmit herewith, for your approval and ratification, a treaty which I have caused to be negotiated between the United States and Texas, whereby the latter, on the conditions therein set forth, has transferred and conveyed all its right of separate and independent sovereignty and jurisdiction to the United States. In making so important a step, I have been influenced by what appeared to me to be the most controlling considerations of public policy and the general good; and in having accomplished it should it meet with your approval, the Government will have succeeded in reclaiming a territory which formerly constituted a portion, as it is confidently believed, of its domain, under treaty of cession of 1803 by France to the United States.25

The subject was not alluded to in the President's previous message because it was thought best not to submit the question at all until it could be given in all its aspects and bearings, and for that reason it was kept secret until he could present the actual treaty of annexation. That appeared to him to be the proper course, and the one best calculated to effect the object so ardently desired by him and by a decided majority of the people.26

The Senate was infuriated when the document was laid upon the table. It

25 Senate Documents. 28 Cong., 1 sess., April 22, 1844, V, 5.
was said that a wildcat released in their midst would not have caused a greater uproar. The press carried similar opinions as is evidenced in the one given here:

...Up to this morning we believe the report of a negotiation having so progressed, to be a perfect humbug,—and so treated it. The fact is sprung upon the nation like an explosion, far more formidable than that of the "Peacemaker"—which recently devastated the deck of the Princeton.27

There was a certain element who consented to the reception of Texas into the Union, since they saw little force in the objections urged against it, and consequently, they viewed it as a necessary political and geographical fact. Nevertheless, they were greatly opposed to its adoption "in the violent and hasty manner in which Mr. Tyler, without regard either to the claims of Mexico or to political decency, appeared to have urged it on."28 They declared that it was far too important a matter to be thus "sprung upon us, and hurried into effect by a Vice-President and Senate in the form of a treaty."29 The news of the treaty caused no less excitement on Wall Street. This may be judged from the news article below entitled, "Texas And A War Panic Among The Brokers."

The knowing ones among the brokers created quite a war panic in Wall Street yesterday, and stocks fell as rapidly as if the southern mail had brought from Washington a declaration of war against the whole civilized world.30

Tyler explained to the Senate that after due consideration of the

27 Niles' National Register. March 16, 1844, XVI, 33.
29 Loc. cit.
30 Niles' National Register. March 16, 1844, XVI, 33.
question it became apparent that it was simply a proposition of whether the United States should accept the boon of annexation upon fair and even liberal terms, or by refusing to do so, force Texas to seek refuge in the arms of some other power, either through a treaty of alliance, offensive and defensive, or the adoption of some other expedient which would virtually make her tributary to such a power and dependent upon it for all future time. Tyler insisted that he had full reason to believe that such would have been the result without interposition on the part of the United States. The Executive then offered a plea in behalf of Texas to the Senate in which he declared that under the existing circumstances it was only natural that Texas should seek for safety and repose under the protection of some stronger power, and equally so her people should turn to the United States, the land of their birth, in the pursuit of such protection. He recalled the fact that Texas had often before made known her wishes and just as often her advances had been repelled. Tyler concluded his message with the warning that Texas lies at the very door of the United States and in its immediate vicinity. After viewing the subject from all angles he said that "the interest of our common constituents, the people of all the states, and a love of the Union left the Executive no other alternative than to negotiate the treaty." He prudently mentioned in closing that the high and solemn duty of ratifying or rejecting the treaty was wisely devolved on the Senate by the Constitution of the United States.

The treaty was supported by all the power of the administration, and

32 Ibid., 313.
the annexation was desirable in itself, but it was doomed at this time for several reasons. The Senate was swayed by considerations of party advantage, which indicated that it was strongly influenced by considerations of domestic rather than of foreign policy. The slavery question was involved coupled with hostility to the administration. Early in the presidential campaign both political parties decided to put the Texas question aside, and conduct a contest between Whigs and Democrats, nevertheless, the Whigs formed the anti-Texas party. Information leaked out through local newspapers concerning "Tyler and Texas," still it startled the Senate when Tyler presented the treaty to them for ratification, since the negotiations throughout the whole of their progress were kept secret. Of the twenty-nine Whigs in the Senate, twenty-eight voted against it, and Henderson of Mississippi, absented himself when the vote was taken. Of the twenty-three Democrats, fifteen voted for it while seven were against the measure. This made a total of thirty-five nays and fifteen yeas.\(^\text{33}\) Thus the treaty was smothered in the Senate. This body did not vote until after the party convention of 1844 had met. The northern senators voted against it because they were opposed to the extension of slavery. Some of the southern senators opposed it because they feared that it would mean war with Mexico. There were a few who favored the acquisition but opposed annexation by treaty because they felt that it was unconstitutional to admit foreign territory to the Union as a state without an act of Congress. The entire country was divided on the question. Some favored annexation by a joint resolution while others declared that method unconstitutional. Resolutions

were heard from some states to enter at once as a State; others held she should be acquired as a territory. The New York Sun carried the following news: "All the slave states go for annexation—all the free states against it, except New Hampshire, Illinois, and Ohio." Clay, the Whig nominee, was opposed to annexation, while James K. Polk, who was nominated by the Democrats favored reannexation. The following news item gives the popular trend of thought.

...Upon the annexation of Texas, they [Whigs] are more openly at issue; one section insisting that abolition, petitions, tariffs, or candidates,—"immediate annexation" is the question that must and shall now divide parties; and no matter what a candidate's views may be, or how available if he is not with them on that question, they oppose him, and will have a candidate that goes for immediate annexation.

In conclusion it is clear that Tyler set his mind on reannexing Texas and on settling the Oregon question from the outset of his administration, and he was not to be defeated by the scruples of the anti-annexationists who feared the constitutionality of the project, nor was he intimidated by a hostile senate which in reality favored the issue, but preferred to delay action in order to give the laurels to his successor rather than to give credit where credit was due. Tyler was convinced that the policy was the best for all concerned, and he was willing to face a war with Mexico to follow his convictions. It is evident that of all the forces at work manifest destiny was most clearly visible in Texas. Annexation had become a

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34 Niles' National Register. March 23, 1844, XVI, 49.  
dominant issue which was to succeed in spite of the efforts being made to intercept it. In the background of American diplomacy during these years was always the shadow of Great Britain, whose dominance in Texas or California was the hobgoblin of the American State Department. Upshur anxiously desired annexation; Calhoun bent all his energies toward this end as he was pledged to Texas and the maintenance of Slavery. Texas was no trifle since it offered for annexation a domain more than five times as large as the State of Pennsylvania. Its annexation was favored by the Democrats and opposed by the Whigs; both parties were equally matched in strength, and the contest surpassed in excitement anything which had been known in American politics. For the time the plans of the annexationists were thwarted.
Annexation by joint resolution was considered an expediency when the treaty was smothered in the senate. As soon as the treaty was rejected Tyler determined upon an appeal to the House over the head of the Senate. "If annexation is to be accomplished," he said, "it must be done immediately." He then sent a message to the lower House in which he reviewed the subject and justified his position in regard to it. He sent a copy of the rejected treaty together with all the documents connected with it, and made the following declaration:

No one can more highly appreciate the value of peace to both Great Britain and the United States, and the capacity of each to do injury to the other, than myself; but peace can best be preserved by maintaining firmly the rights which belong to us, an independent community. ...

I have regarded the annexation to be accomplished by treaty as the most suitable form in which it could be effected, should Congress deem it proper to resort to any other expedient compatible with the Constitution, and likely to accomplish the object, I stand prepared to yield my most prompt and active co-operation.

The great question is not as to the manner in which it shall be done but whether it shall be accomplished or not.

The Executive then proposed a plan to annex not by treaty which required a two-thirds vote of the Senate, but by a joint resolution of both Houses which could be passed by a simple majority in each House. This seemed the only feasible plan for the annexationists. Tyler was neither discouraged nor defeated when the treaty failed, but when Congress assembled in December, 1844, 1

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2 Senate Documents. 28 Cong., 1 sess., June 11, 1844, #271,4. 52
he recommended in his annual message that the provisions of the rejected treaty be accepted by Congress in a joint resolution. He also stated at that time that no negotiations with Mexico had previously been arranged since such action might be insulting to Texas and offensive to Mexico. Texas had been recognized by the leading nations as an independent republic for nine years. During that time Mexico made no attempt at reconquest; therefore, Texas had every right to be treated as an independent nation.

The House of Representatives opposed the joint resolution plan, and declared that the resolution provided for a cession of territory by a foreign state to the United States which cession could be made and accepted only through the form of a treaty. The House had never committed itself to the view of the Senate, and therefore, sought to amend the resolution as to make it an act for the formation of a new commonwealth, that is an act for the admission of a new State into the Union. On January 25, 1845, the House passed a resolution to enable the people of Texas to form a commonwealth constitution and government preparatory to admission into the Union, and prescribed certain conditions for the assent of Congress. On December 12, 1844, Ingersoll of Pennsylvania who was chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs reported a joint resolution for annexation which passed the House January 25, by a vote of one hundred twenty to ninety-eight.

report and recommended that the House reject the resolution. He opposed it for the same reason for which he had opposed the ratification of the treaty on the preceding June 8, 1844. He declared that annexation could be accomplished only by an act of Congress. The resolution was taken up by the Senate February 13, and considered daily until the twenty-seventh. Mr. Walker then moved to amend the resolution in such a way that if the president should deem it more advisable to negotiate with Texas for her admission into the Union than to submit the joint resolution as an overture to her, he might do so, and then submit the result either to the Senate to be approved of as a treaty or to both Houses to be approved of as an act. The resolution passed in an amended form without a division; the vote on the third reading was twenty-seven to twenty-five. On the twenty-eighth the House passed it by a vote of one hundred thirty-four to seventy-seven, and on March 1, 1845, the resolution was approved. Immediately upon the acceptance of the motion Tyler dispatched an envoy to offer annexation to Texas. The terms proposed were agreed to by the Congress of Texas June 18, and on the Fourth of July, the Texan Convention assembled at Austin, and with but one dissenting vote ratified the act of annexation to the United States, thus adopting the first branch of the alternative that had been offered by the Congress of the United States. On March 6, 1845, General Almonte, the Mexican Minister at Washington, after a solemn and vigorous protest in compliance with his instructions pronounced the annexation illegal and a most unjust aggression against the friendly nation which claimed the territory as a province of

5 Loc. cit.
Mexico. He then announced to Calhoun the termination of his mission and he demanded his passports. 8

Tyler's appeal to the House precipitated a savage attack in the Senate upon the Executive by Senator Benton who contended that as the Senators are made the advisers and controllers of the President by the Constitution to appeal from their decision in case of treaties was an insult to the Senate. He declared that, "the treaty was a wrong and criminal way of doing a right thing." 9 He pronounced the Texas project, a fraud upon the people, and a base, miserable, presidential intrigue. Others denounced the appeal to the House as a trick.

Threats of impeachment by both Houses for having given orders to the army and the navy to protect Texas pending the consideration of the treaty did not deter the President from appealing beyond the treaty-making power. 10 That impeachment was threatened is convincing from the following extract:

The question of impeaching President Tyler for his late course in relation to Mexico and Texas has been under the serious consideration at least of members of the house of representatives. ... a private letter from an influential member of the house of representatives which says that though there is no general understanding among the members on the subject, "the opinion that Mr. Tyler is impeachable both for abuse of official patronage, and for his misconduct in the matter of annexation is very nearly universal in both parties." He adds, "a large proportion of the Whigs believe the attempt to impeach a duty, but I think the majority of the party at present inclined against the measure, upon the ground that the Texan party in both houses and the country at large, would confound the merits of

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impeachment and annexation."\textsuperscript{11}

A similar opinion was given in a letter by Chancellor Kent when he made reply to a note of inquiry from one of the editors of the \textit{Enquirer}. He wrote as follows:

Dear Sir: \ldots I think there can be no doubt that the enormous abuses and stretch of power by President Tyler, afford ample materials for the exercise of the power of impeachment, and an imperative duty in the house of representatives to put it in practice.\textsuperscript{12}

The session of Congress was too near its end for any action to be taken on so important a question.

The alternative of effecting the annexation by resolution or of negotiating a new treaty was given to the president by the senate. Mr. Polk promised to act under the treaty, but Mr. Tyler took the responsibility of acting under the joint resolution. A messenger was immediately dispatched with documents from Secretary Calhoun to the American representative in Texas. On December 29, 1845, Texas formally became a member of the American Union.\textsuperscript{13}

As soon as the news became known and the method which was used to have the resolution passed the American press condemned the action of the Executive as is seen from the following article:

Mr. Tyler's Haste—We understand that Mr. Tyler mounted one of his relations (Mr. Waggaman) as an express to hasten to communicate to Texas that he, as President of the United States, had made his election as to the alternatives contained in the late act of Congress, looking to the admission of Texas into the Union; and that he had chosen that alternative which it is known could not have commanded a majority in the Senate, and had rejected that which carried the majority in the House up from twenty-two to fifty-six.

\textsuperscript{11} Niles' National Register. June 8, 1844, XVI, 226.
\textsuperscript{12} Loc. cit.
Mr. Tyler knows well that Congress did not intend to entrust the discretionary power of the act to his hands. He knows well that, if he had appointed the commissioners necessary under one of the alternatives of the act, they would not have been confirmed to carry out his instructions. He has therefore seized upon that portion of the legislative enactment which, if acceded to by Texas, may involve future difficulties in our own Congress, and mar the concord now existing among the friends of the measure, which can alone ensure it a happy consumation. He has taken the alternative, meant by the law to be conferred on the American President whose duty it will be to effect the measure, from him, and give it to the Texan Executive. "But apart from all considerations of public policy, what will the country think of the propriety and decorum of this attempt to forestall the action of the Chief Magistrate chosen by the people with an especial eye to this question and to whom alone it is notorious the discretion confided in the act of Congress was intended to apply? It is clear, as Mr. Tyler began his presidential career in virtue of an accident, that he means to take the benefit of the whole chapter of accidents, to blend himself with results having their origin in the counsels of General Jackson and Houston, and which his insuspicious management has so far marred in their progress."

President Tyler and Secretary Calhoun can hardly be blamed or criticized for following the method insisted upon by Congress as the constitutional form and prescript, nevertheless, the Boston press declared the nullity of the act as follows:

The annexation of Texas by a mere resolution of Congress, is a revolution in the Government. It often is wiser to submit to a revolution than to resist it,—and it may be in this case. We ought, however, to insist, and so far as we can

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\[\text{News item in the }\text{National Intelligencer}, (Washington) \text{ March 6, 1845.}\]
compel Mr. Polk to take the treaty form of annexation, rather than the joint resolution form, and so far save the constitution. Upon that let there be agitation. The truth is, however, it is a resolution not binding in the least upon us who are opposed to it. 15

It is only natural that opinions should differ on this subject as they do on other subjects. From a later entry a somewhat different evaluation of the President's action has been given as follows:

The wisdom of the President was not to be defeated by so stark mad an opposition. The palm of winning the prize, worth the work of a presidential term, was not to be lost to a watchful President, guarded remarkably by Divine Providence.

...a joint resolution was adopted annexing Texas, and giving to an honest President the only triumph he sought,—that of wisdom and virtue. 16

The incorporation of an independent foreign nation into the American Union by a joint resolution of both Houses of Congress is considered one of the most important questions ever decided by an American legislature. 17

Therefore, the act of annexing Texas was regarded universally as an act of an extremely doubtful power, and by many it was considered unauthorized by the Constitution upon any just principle of interpretation. The debates held in the Senate at that time exhibited a strong array of talent and eloquence which probably has no equal or at least had not been surpassed in either house of Congress. Up to the very last moment, it was doubtful just how the vote would be served to call out on each side the utmost strength of intellect and ardor. During these tense days the majority wavered more than once, first to the one side and then to the other.

15 News item in The Liberator, (Boston) March 7, 1845.
The election of James K. Polk was considered a mandate of the people for the annexation of Texas. Thus, the star of manifest destiny was hanging in the western sky. An entry in Polk's diary clearly shows his belief on the subject. It is as follows:

The question of annexation of Texas to the United States was pending before Congress. I had been elected as the known advocate of the annexation of Texas and was very anxious that some measure with that object should pass Congress. ... I believed that if no measure proposing annexation was passed at that session that Texas would be lost to the Union. ... My great anxiety was to secure the annexation in any form before it was too late. ... I remember to have said that if the measure cannot pass in one form, it was better to pass it in any form than not at all. 18

After the election of 1844 the project advanced rapidly to its consumation before the expiration of Tyler's administration. Michigan instructed its Senators and Representatives to "use all proper exertions for the annexation of Texas" at the earliest practical period, while Ohio instructed its Senators to oppose the annexation of Texas on anti-slavery grounds. 19

The general public by this time had been won over to the idea of annexation. During the period from the rejection of the treaty until the actual admission of Texas as a state in December 1845 resolutions and memorials continued to pour into Congress. Massachusetts remained especially bitter and refused to acknowledge the act of the government of the United States authorizing the admission of Texas. 20 One author reviewed the

project in the lines given here in part:

...If we do not receive Texas her "lone star" will be dimmed or extinguished by dependence on an overshadowing power. Like the star of old in the West it goes before our "wise men" to show them where the young Republic is. If we are true to ourselves, it will be taken to our firmament and emblazoned on our flag, under whose protection and increased splendor our ships will bear our products and hers over every sea.\(^{21}\)

The anti-expansionists were not to be won over so easily. They gave us a picture from the other side of the question as follows:

They [annexationists] are afraid we shall not maintain our supremacy unless we add to our already unprotected coast, hundreds of miles on the gulf of Mexico, to keep the red coat invaders from monopolizing our soil, and trampling upon our rights. We must have Oregon for the same reason. California and Patagonia are the next that our greediness will catch at, for fear that England wants them.\(^{22}\)

As time went on the Texas question assumed an aspect of ever increasing importance. It was the most debatable question of the closing days of Tyler's presidency. The following article exhibits the popular trend of thought:

The Texas question has assumed such an importance that our Greatest, find it difficult to handle. Only a short time has passed since it was a 'little cloud no bigger than a man's hand,' but it has grown and grown, until that which the prophet saw, it has covered the heavens; but whether, like that, to bring rain, and plenty, and peace, or a hurricane, disorder, and death, the dim vista of the future shadows forth but darkly. To shut our eyes to the importance of this subject, and treat it with contempt as insignificant, is folly; and to rush into union with


\(^{22}\) News item in the Chicago Daily Journal, March 10, 1845.
indecent haste, with foreign and constitutional questions unsettled, is still greater folly. It was the high and solemn duty of those before whom this question has been so far settled, to mark, learn and inwardly digest all its complicated bearings, with feelings above party considerations, that each one might be able to meet his fellows and his God, with the consciousness of having done, as far as in him lay, that which was best for the highest good of his whole country.23

The American press pounced upon the news of annexation as soon as the joint resolution was passed. The Daily Globe declared that the struggle in the Senate was at last terminated, and that Texas the fairest and richest valley, which had been given away to Spain in 1819, to injustice and to despotism was again restored to the Union and embraced in the American confederacy of republics, the only free government on the earth. British influence which at every period of American history infected portions of the Union was busy also on this crisis to prevent the Union from redeeming Texas. With Texas and the train of new states, "Florida, and Iowa, and Oregon entering the Union—the whole Northwest will bring the giant force of their incorruptible democracies to sustain the already dominant popular party in the Union."24 The press also predicted that the power of federal machinations would be seen in the closeness of the vote in the Senate against the voice of the country. The joint resolutions from the House, blended with those of Mr. Benton in the Senate, would have passed by a vote of forty to twelve. The question under party drill was carried only by twenty-seven to twenty-five. Thus it is clear that party discipline is more potent than

popular authority. The Daily Globe further stated that:

They [[those who voted for annexation] deserve the thanks of the whole country. But for them, one-half of the invaluable acquisition obtained by the statesmanship of Mr. Jefferson—lost through the diplomacy of Mr. Adams, and restored by the soldiership of Houston—would again be cast away by federalism—possibly lost to the Union forever.25

The various papers were not any more unified on the subject than popular sentiment since the papers voiced the opinions of the people. The Chicago Daily Journal was opposed to the step which had been taken and expressed its belief in these lines:

Texas is annexed with its slavery, its robbery and wrong, and probably a foreign, if not a civil war. Should it lead to results disastrous to the country, we have the consolation of knowing that what we could, we have done to avert the calamity. ...The great argument has been that it was to extend the "Area of freedom!" What base hypocrisy! What foul deception!26

From Boston a similar point of view was received. The press was loath to compliment the government upon its official pronouncement. The article below conveys the reluctance with which it received the news from Washington:

The die is cast. The Foreign State of Texas is admitted as a part of this Union. The Constitution of these United States has been infringed and violated. The glorious charter, which our Father bequeathed to us, has been disregarded and disgraced. The most solemn oaths of a majority of both Houses of Congress have been openly and shamelessly set at naught....The Union of these States hangs now but by a slender thread. Those who choose to remain subordinate to that Union, may do so. Those who are not willing to rest under the exercise of usurped power—who do not choose to abide by a government which may be converted into anything that the selfishness of party

25 Loc. cit.
26 News item in the Chicago Daily Journal, March 11, 1845.
demagogues, and the violence of party spirit, may make it, are at liberty to absolve themselves from that Union forever... 

The Constitution has been most manifestly and outrageously disregarded and broken. Whether all the States of this Union will see fit to sit still, and quietly submit to this gross violation of the common bond of unity—or whether some of them will stand forth upon their reserved rights, and declare to the world their firm intention of withdrawing from a confederacy in which their rights have been so flagrantly disregarded—is more than we will attempt, at present to imagine.27

Texas was given the choice of annexation to the American Union, of remaining independent, or of returning to Mexico. These alternatives were placed before the people, and their free, sovereign, and unbiased voice was to determine the all important issue.28 Texas preferred to be received into the American Union under the treaty form, although the people of Texas were in favor of annexation upon any terms.29 The leading men in Texas were opposed to annexation upon the basis of the House Resolutions. They held that it was by treaty that Louisiana and Florida were acquired, and that a treaty when once formed would be of authority equal in dignity to the Constitution itself. Whereas, if Texas should be brought in under legislative enactment she might go out again under a similar process. But a treaty when once formed by mutual consent could not be abrogated except by the same consent and when ratified it would be stable and permanent.30 The news of the passage of the annexation resolution was received in Galveston with every demonstration of joy and enthusiasm. The Galveston papers asserted that even

27 News item in The Liberator, (Boston) March 7, 1845.
29 News item in the Salem Observer, (Massachusetts) April 19, 1845.
if President Jones were opposed to annexation that public sentiment was so
unanimously in favor of the measure that it was certain to be carried through
by Texas under the House Resolutions. The papers stated that President Jones
was not opposed to, but in favor of annexation.31 The following item is in-
dicative of the fact that the terms of the resolution presented an obstacle
for hesitancy on the part of the Texans:

By the latest accounts from Texas it appears
that the plan of the late President Tyler and the
Congress just closed, for annexing that nation to
ours does not meet with popular favor. Several
of the Texan papers assail it with great spirit.
The National Register (Government organ) at Wash-
ington, the Texan capital, opens with perfect
ferocity on the House project of annexation, though
avowing itself friendly to the measure on fair
terms. It objects to the required surrender of all
the Public Property of Texas (her Public Lands ex-
cepted) to the Union; to the right reserved to the
Union to settle with Mexico the boundaries of Texas,
and to the humbug compromise on the subject of
Slavery. It protects against the "state of imbecile
and hopeless dependence" on the United States in
which the House proposes to place Texas and pro-
nounce it "the actual pit of grave insignificance
and infamy." The article is ably addressed to the
prejudices as well as the just pride of the Texans,
and must have an effect. The Galveston Civilian
(originally but not noisily opposed to annexation)
echoes and seconds the sentiments of the Register.
The Galveston News feebly stands out for annexation,
but does not justify the terms proffered by the
House Resolutions.

We hope that before the next meeting of Congress,
Texas will conclude to keep her "lone star" to her-
sel, and decline annexation on any terms. But as
the surrender of her public property, except lands,
to the Union, and a refusal to assume her debts,
are the chief impediments at present we fear some
way will be contrived to remove these hinderances,
and that Texas with all her immorality, slavery, and
poverty, will be saddled upon us, though we feebly

31 News item in The Salem Register, (Massachusetts) April 12, 1845.
hope for better things. 32

The executive government, the congress, and the people of Texas in convention, successively complied with all the terms and conditions of the joint resolution. A constitution for the government of the State of Texas was formed by a convention of deputies, and was laid before Congress. The people of Texas at the polls accepted the terms of annexation and ratified the constitution. 33

Feeling mounted to a high pitch when the news that Texas had accepted the terms of annexation reached Mexico in July 1845. One correspondent wrote, "What will be the result when this intelligence reaches Mexico is problematical." 34 The answer was not long delayed. Money was appropriated and ammunitions were collected. Steps were taken to increase the army, and Mexico announced that a declaration of war against the United States would immediately be proposed to Congress. Mexico hoped for at least the suggestion of British aid, but since nothing in the form of assistance appeared they were compelled to rely upon their own resources. They assumed the attitude that war had already been declared by the United States in the act of annexing Texas. Consequently, several thousand men were ordered to the northern frontier for the sake of appearances at least. 35 Texan annexation was then a fact, and the Mexicans first having mastered the idea that Texas no longer was no longer theirs, they would next have to learn its new boundary. 36

32 Ibid., March 29, 1845.
33 Senate Documents. 29 Con., 1 sess., December 2, 1845, I, 3.
The annexation of Texas met with great opposition from England and from France. The checking of American expansion was an objective greatly desired in itself. On January 12, 1844, Lord Aberdeen instructed the British minister at Paris to sound the French government and learn whether or not it would co-operate with England in depreciating all interference on the part of the United States in the affairs of Texas.\(^{37}\) The influence of Great Britain in Mexico was immense as the government there was heavily in debt to British capitalists. It was said in the Senate that, "the country was surrounded with a wall of fire."\(^{38}\) Texas might greatly benefit England, but the independence of Texas was practically a negligible consideration when weighed against war with the United States. The spirit of the nation and the integrity of British diplomacy was imperative for the continuance of peaceful relations with America.\(^{39}\) The sentiments of Great Britain can well be understood from a letter of a British correspondent in Mexico. The letter reads as follows:

\[\ldots\text{Annexation will be a fatal blow to Mexico, and prejudice all European interests in the new world, It is clear that the American Government does not limit its views to the incorporation of a state so unproductive as Texas in reality is; but that the vicinity of Texas to the chief mining district of Mexico is the great source of attraction. \ldots\text{they are determined [to incorporate] the territory lying between Texas and the Bay of California and the Pacific. I ask if it will suit British interest to see all the country from which silver in such}\]

\(^{38}\) Lyon G. Tyler. "John Tyler's Administration," Tyler's Quarterly Historical, 11:196, January 1933.
large quantities is produced, under the dominion of the United States; or will it suit the great European Powers to find, I may say, the monetary circulation dependent on the caprice of the President of the United States? ...

As to California and the western coast of the Pacific, the views of the United States cannot for a moment be doubted and gladly do we see that our Government has determined not to give way on the Oregon question. 40

It is clear then that annexation by joint resolution was held to be expedient when the treaty failed in the Senate. Those opposed to the measure denied that Texas could be admitted by joint resolution since the Constitution provided a treaty-making power and while this power existed the House had no authority to enter into any compact with foreign nations. The treaty-making power could secure a title to Texas, but that authority alone could not bring Texas into the Union. Congress would then have to act and provide for Texas as a part of the United States. Thus the constitutionality of the act was attacked. The action of Congress was awaited with the deepest interest by the people of the entire country. As soon as the news became known the press made violent attacks both for and against the measure. While annexation meant a war with Mexico, it also meant a widening of the area of slavery. Still no invasion occurred on the part of Mexico, and the news of the passage of the joint resolution was hailed with enthusiasm by the people of Texas. Polk declared that the question of annexation belonged exclusively to Texas and the United States, and that no foreign nation had any right to interfere. Tyler worked zealously and effectively to see Texas reunited to the Union, and he was able to leave office with the satisfaction that her "lone star" would take her place in the field of blue on the American emblem.

40 Associated Press Dispatch in the London Times, August 6, 1845.
CHAPTER V
ANNEXATION 1845 — GUILT OR JUSTIFICATION

The question now arises: Has the United States an honorable title to Texas, one of the largest territorial accessions ever made by the nation? The annexation of Texas was certainly the greatest issue and the most debatable question that ever arose in Texas.¹ It caused great agitation in the United States, and ultimately extended to Europe. It was the means of making and re-making political parties and party leaders in America. There is no rule of international law by which this question can be measured; it will suffice therefore, to study with unbiased mind a few historic facts. The Mexican point of view will first be considered.

Convinced that slavery should hold the sceptre of the nation, "Texas was dismembered from Mexico by a band of robbers to piece out its national domain and to be partitioned into numerous States."² The recognition of Texan independence was considered but a stepping-stone to the admission into the Union of a brood of slave states. John Quincy Adams held that by annexing Texas on the terms proposed, the United States faced a war with Mexico for the avowed purpose of extending slavery into territory hitherto free by law.³ It was slave holding cupidity that placed in Texas the standard of revolt, and the re-establishment of slavery abolished by Mexico throughout her entire territory. Some northern papers expressed their parallel point of view with the Mexican cause as quoted in part:

² Daniel Webster. The Complaint of Mexico and Conspiracy Against Liberty. J. W. Alden, Boston, 1843, 22.
Texas, if a nation at all, is free as our own; governed by a constitution equally republican. To us, it seems that the desire was to banish freedom, to extinguish the last hope of liberty to thousands, to perpetuate and ensure its perpetuity. Such was the avowed object of Mr. Calhoun and all the advocates of the measure in the South. ...Thick darkness hangs over the future. 

The determination of the South to introduce Texas into the Union was most apparent. She resorted to delay and pretended hesitation in order to gain time and to get the North over her scruples of conscience. The annexation of Texas and the consequent Mexican War met with strong condemnation in many of the northern states. General Grant voiced this opinion when he made the following pronouncement upon the Mexican War:

This was one of the most unjust [wars] ever waged by a stronger against a weaker nation. ...The occupation, separation, and annexation of Texas were from the inception of the movement to its final consummation, a conspiracy to acquire territory out of which slave States might be formed for the American Union.

That Congress had no constitutional power to annex the people of an independent foreign state to the Union was a common complaint at this time. The leading question related not to the expediency but to the validity of the transfer of Texas. It was therefore, not a question of advantages, but authority. Was the Texan government empowered to make the transfer of her territory without the consent of Mexico? According to the constitution was

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1 News item in the Chicago Daily Journal, March 11, 1845.
the United States government empowered to receive Texas? They differenti­ated the case of Texas from that of the purchase of Louisiana in which a precedent had been set. By this theory the government might by treaty acquire territory from a nation having undoubted title to the land, but it did not have the power to annex an existing sovereign power to the Union. The annexation of Texas to the Union from the first appeared to be inevitable, but its consummation was a "scheme of treachery without a parallel in the history of the intercourse of civilized nations." The clause of the Constitution relied on, relating to the admission of new states was interpreted by anti-annexationists as follows:

...so far from giving power to Congress to incorporate any foreign territory whether Texas, or Cuba, or Canada, or the Emerald Isle, or Botany Bay has and was intended to have an entirely different meaning and object, and that it refers only to such new states as should be formed within the limits of the United States... The framers would doubtless have been not a little surprised, had they been informed that this section and these powers would be construed to give Congress the authority in its legislative capacity, to annex foreign governments to the Union or the Union to a foreign State.

It was not a case of purchasing a territory such as existed in connection with Louisiana. The United States admitted an independent community invested with sovereignty into the confederation, but the Constitution does not express the power of receiving foreign nations, however, vast to the Union. Many newspapers took up the charge and declared against the constitutionality of annexation. The following comment came from Washington:

9 Ibid., 455.
...The annexation of Texas, which was sanctioned by a large majority of the people of Virginia, and of the Union, has led to a war with a neighboring republic. This war the Whig party alleges to be unjust, unnecessary, and unconstitutional—a wanton violation, alike of the rights of Mexico, and of the fundamental law of the United States. ... the states of Mexico were sovereign and independent States, united by a constitution similar to our own. The same relation existed between the parties to that instrument and the central government it established, as that which exists between the States of this Union and the government at Washington.10

Territorial expansion was one of the most forceful factors underlying the acquisition of Texas on the part of the United States. The rapid extension of free territory in the new states of the west required a corresponding increase in the number of slaveholding states to preserve the balance of power in Congress. The Americans were intent on their plans of absorption as soon as they saw themselves masters of Louisiana. The following quotation is taken from a review of the subject by a Mexican historian who presented the measure in the light in which they viewed it.

The North Americans spread their snares at once for the rest of the Floridas, and the province of Texas: ...Skill and open force supplied them with arms against a nation declining from the power and glory which had made it at one period the first in the world.

...She had to employ all her resources to repel from her soil the invasion of a stranger. ...the situation was very favorable for the ambitious views of the Republic at Washington.

The Treaty was not ratified by the Senate; the usurpation remained for the present suspended, which was soon effected in a new way. ...the confession had been made that the scheme to obtain this part of our territory had been invariably pursued by all parties, and nearly all the administrations of the Republic of North America, for the space of twenty years.11

Thus it was, with an eye to the acquisition of still more territory that the American government was forced by circumstances to muster up some reason for uniting Texas, regardless of how faulty the reason might prove to be in order to gain the coveted object. It was stated a few years latter that the treaty was regarded as only another step in the aggressive course which the United States marked out for itself during the previous years.12

It was considered equivalent to a declaration of war for the Congress of the United States at Washington to pass an act to incorporate Texas with the territory of the United States. This statement was made by the Mexican government in August 1843.13 War with Mexico as a consequence of annexing Texas had not been realized when Texas was accepted into the Union. In the light of the above statement technically and legally it could be said that the United States and Mexico were at war ever since the former had determined on annexation, but practically and factually this was not so since no belligerent action on the part of Mexico directly followed the decisive step or its official promulgation.14 The official announcement of the President to Congress was that war already existed between the two republics.15 In view of the foregoing Mexico held that there had been a collision of the forces of the two republics on the territory claimed by each, but this collision had no right to be termed war since it takes more than a collision of their respective forces on a disputed territory to constitute war between two civilized nations. Texas never had jurisdiction over one foot of land watered

12 News item in The Salem Observer, March 18, 1848.
13 House Executive Documents, 28 Con., 1 sess., #2, August 1843, 26-7 and 11-8.
by the Rio Grande or its tributaries. San Isabel and the spot occupied by
General Taylor's troops opposite, were just as much Mexican territory at all
times up to the American military occupation of them as Vera Cruz or
Matamoros. Thus it was that Mexico was stripped of the province of Texas
at a moment when it was necessary to employ all its strength to repel an un-
just and disastrous invasion. In writing to President Jones from Galveston,
Mr. Murphy stated that, "It is either fear of England and France, or some ul-
terior object, not yet apparent, which has brought all this array of armed
ships upon our Coast. The following news item is expressive of the view
point taken by Mexico and Mexican sympathizers:

...Mexico, despoiled of one of her fairest provinces
by our hypocrisy and our rapacity, has no choice but
to resist, however ineffectively, the consummation
of our flagitious designs. If she should not resist
now, on the Rio Del Norte, she will soon be forced
to struggle against our marauders in Sonora and Cal-
ifornia. Already it is openly talked at Washington
that we must and will have all North America in due
season—that the question is one of time only. If,
therefore, Great Britain should see fit to stand up
for the feeble and unoffending People on whom we are
making war, she will be but obeying the instinct of
self-preservation. By our proceedings in getting
possession of Texas, we have declared ourselves the
enemies of the civilized world. ...

People of the United States! what shall yet be
done to turn aside this storm of unjust War from our
borders? Say not that Mexico is feeble; the God of
Justice is with her, and we have proved how powerful
is a just cause against the greatest disparity of
physical force. Ought we not to hold public meetings
to consider and determine what is incumbent on us in
this crisis?

    May 23, 1844, 353.
19 News item in the New York Weekly Tribune, March 5, 1845.
The Mexican side of the question is dropped in the next few pages in favor of the American viewpoint.

The action of the United States in acquiring Texas was fully justified in international law. Texas had maintained a separate existence for nine years without any serious attempt on the part of Mexico to reconquer her. Texas was in such economical, political and financial straits at this period of her history that she did not have the foundation to maintain a separate national existence. The population was sparse and small. It was surrounded by bold and warlike races of Indians. The pursuits of its people rendered them dependent upon their commercial connections with other nations for the necessaries of life. An entire preponderance over its affairs by some foreign power was a direct and an inevitable consequence of its position. The great question of the time was, who will acquire this preponderance? Undoubtedly there were those who preferred to have Texas exist separately from us even in connection with Mexico. Ever since the treaty with Spain whereby the United States had acquired the ownership of Florida at the cost among other considerations of foregoing all disputed claims to Texas arising from the Louisiana Purchase, the United States looked with filial but covetous eyes upon the relinquished territory. Texas made her own election to abandon the Mexican empire, and to destroy her own independent national existence. This was also the attitude of President Polk who wrote to both houses as follows:

...This accession to our territory has been a bloodless achievement. No arm of force has been raised to produce the result. The sword has had no part in the victory. We have not sought to extend our territorial possessions by conquest.

or our republican institutions over a reluctant people. It was the deliberate homage of each people to the great principle of our federative union.

If we consider the extent of territory involved in the annexation—its prospective influence on America—the means by which it has been accomplished, springing purely from the choice of the people themselves to share the blessings of our union—the history of the world may be challenged to furnish a parallel.21

The country was empty of white men until settlers from the south-western states moved in. Texas was already American and its eventual incorporation into the Union was certain. The wrath aroused by this logical development was due entirely to the fact that the acquisition of Texas strengthened the South.22 Texan independence had been recognized by the leading European powers as well as by the United States. Mexico could never by the remotest possibility have reconquered the province and that so far as law and fact were concerned there was no reason why the United States should not have annexed it.23 It is held by many even to this day that we wrested this imperial domain from Mexico by conquest and injustice, but if this be true it must also be acknowledged that the United States took territory from her of which she had made little use; the American Union gave to the inhabitants of Texas the benefits of its government and civil liberty; it was made the home of millions of people, and its great wealth and boundless resources have been developed. The first settlers of Texas, for the mere love of gain abandoned a free republic for a colonial destiny. Many of them were Protestants who transferred themselves to Catholic rule. As a prominent author

21 Senate Documents. 29 Con., 1 sess., December 2, 1845, I, 4.
stated, "They must have been insane, if, on entering Mexico they looked for an administration as faultless as that under which they had lived."\textsuperscript{24}

The annexation of Texas to the United States was on legal, moral, and political grounds entirely legitimate. That republic had defied the arms of the mother country for nine years. The basis of the belligerency of the Texans was sound and just, and the Texans in taking up arms were defending their constitutional rights against military usurpation.\textsuperscript{25} Texan sovereignty had been acknowledged by five leading commercial powers of this civilized world, and there was not the slightest pretense on her part that she would ever return to her former connection. She possessed all the attributes of nationality, of sovereignty, and all the elements and institutions of self government in full and quiet operation.\textsuperscript{26} So far as constitutional power was concerned, Congress have as perfect a right to admit Great Britain, France, or China into the Union as Wisconsin, Florida or Iowa.\textsuperscript{27} There was no government with which to make a treaty except the government of the territory annexed, which ceased to have an independent existence at the moment of annexation. Texas was annexed in pursuance of the expressed grant to Congress of the power to admit new states into the Union. It is clear then, that the United States was authorized to deal with Texas by word and deed as an independent State according to the usual rules of international intercourse, without regard to the bearing which American proceedings would

\textsuperscript{24} William L. MacKinzie. \textit{The Life and Times of Martin Van Buren}. Cooke & Co., Boston, 1886, 63.
\textsuperscript{26} Niles' National Register, May 23, 1844, XVI, 301.
have upon the pretentions of Mexico. Annexation was therefore, permissible, and grave national interests of the united States demanded the step. All New Mexico, including California, seemed liable to secede for the people of the whole region felt profoundly dissatisfied with the administration of their national affairs and they realized the urgent need of a strong and orderly government.28

The accusation has been made that because of a great desire for national expansion the United States became involved in Texan affairs, and consequently, she provoked a war of conquest with Mexico.29 One author has explained this fact in these words:

The seizure of Texas from Mexico was ruthless conquest, but it was less ruthless than the seizure of Massachusetts by the Pilgrims. The Pilgrims actually ejected the Indians from land which they had occupied for untold generations. We did not eject the Mexicans from Texas, because they never had been there.30

Texas entered into the treaty of annexation upon the invitations of the executive and for that act she was threatened with a renewal of the war on the part of Mexico. Texas naturally looked to the United States government to interpose its efforts to ward off the threatened blow. One course was left to the executive who acted within the limits of his constitutional power by protesting in strong and decided terms against any molestation. Few people have ever had more just cause than the Texans for throwing off an oppressive yoke, and separating themselves from a nation which had so long

30 Johnson, op. cit., 249.
proved its incapacity for even self-government.\textsuperscript{31} Previous to the declaration of independence by Texas the Mexican republic had been constantly a prey to international dissensions, and civil war in all its horrors had desolated the country. Her political institutions had been changed or overthrown according to the interest or caprice of each successive military chief of the country. The rule of these political leaders was invariably marked by bloodshed, cruelty, and oppression, and the country was in a constant state of anarchy and revolution.\textsuperscript{32} Texas was a free country when Mr. Tyler began negotiations for annexation in 1843. Tyler gave President Houston his promise that Texas would not suffer as the result of these negotiations if the treaty should fail. Mexico then threatened to renew the war. Orders were given to Mexican military units to reduce to desolation whole tracts of country, and to destroy without discrimination of ages, sexes, and conditions of existence.\textsuperscript{33} The United States, therefore, could not remain unmoved while Mexico hastened preparations for a merciless campaign against Texas. It may well be assumed that Texas would not under any possible condition of things agree to go back under the dominion of Mexico. Even if Mexico could have conquered the soil, she never could have conquered the people, at least not that portion of them who emigrated from the United States. They would sooner have returned to the United States penniless than to have remained subject to Mexican vengeance and tyranny.

\textsuperscript{31} Mrs. Houston. "Texas," \textit{Western Literary Journal}, 1:363, 1845.  
\textsuperscript{32} \textit{Loc. cit.}  
\textsuperscript{33} \textit{Niles' National Register.} December 21, 1844, XVI, 241.
Mexico regarded the annexation of Texas as an act of war in itself. Hence, the government of the United States pursued a double policy; she prepared for a Mexican invasion while at the same time she planned peace proposals. It appeared to be a wiser policy to annex Texas and accept the issue of immediate war with Mexico than to leave Texas in nominal independence to involve us probably in ultimate war with England. Texas had passed definitely and finally beyond the control of Mexico, and the practical issue was whether we should incorporate her in the Union or leave her to drift in uncertain currents; possibly to form European alliances which we should afterwards be compelled in self-defense to destroy. Mexico had no better and no stronger rights over Texas than Texas had over Mexico. The annexation involved no aggression upon Mexican territory, neither was it a violation of the spirit of or the letter of the treaty of amity, commerce, and navigation. The following news item is an amplification of the opinion held by many north of the border:

Having offered the olive branch of peace to Mexico, and having manifested their sincere desire to settle all questions in a friendly spirit, and upon just and honorable principles to both Governments, the United States have done all in their power towards the preservation of peaceful relations between both countries; and it now belongs to Mexico to decide whether those amicable relations shall be preserved, or whether the peace of both countries shall be disturbed by a conflict equally prejudicial to both, and satisfactory only to the enemies of civil liberty and republican institutions.

Senor Cuevos "takes the liberty of stating to his Excellency Senor Shannon, that if his Government thinks that it is preserving friendly sentiments towards Mexico, at the very time that it is offering her an offence, and assailing the integrity of the Republic, this Government is very far from pursuing such a policy, and of yielding to the assurances given by his Excellency, whatever may be his personal feelings."...

He says—(Senor Cuevos) Texas declared as independent, would not care to be annexed to the United States; but not so the latter! The recognition of the independence of Texas would not lead us into a war with the United States, but annexation must! As an independent State, European powers will prevent Texas from forming a part of the American Republic.36

It was evident that the contest lay between the United States and Great Britain. Great Britain had coveted a control over the Mexican empire. She expressed her national jealousy at the advance of the United States along the shores of the Gulf of Mexico. If the United States refused the gift proffered to her by the people of Texas she would have placed a wall of separation between herself and the vast region of the west. The United States would then have virtually surrendered to Great Britain the command of the North American continent. The acquisition of Texas would have formed a state or resting place in the progress of the British empire in America. The next step might consequently have been the annexation to it of the Californias with the command of the coasts of America on the Pacific Ocean.37

The contribution of Tyler to the acquisition of Texas is more or less of a controversial nature. His friends would credit him with much while his

36 News item in the St. Louis Reveille, April 30, 1845.
enemies would strive to deprive him of what ever credit may be his. Imitating Jefferson in his policy he sent John Charles Fremont to explore the west. He enforced the Monroe Doctrine against the interference of Great Britain and France in regard to Texas and the Hawaiian Islands. His decisive deed as president was the annexation of Texas. It was said of him that to him Texas was indebted for the success of this great measure. By his political sagacity, without the effusion of blood or the loss of treasure he acquired for the country over which he presided a rich and widely extended territory, and that he arrested the progress of monarchy upon the American continent. An area greater than England and France together was added to the Union, with a port that ranks among the first, and it paved the way for the acquisition of San Francisco and the far Southwest. In a letter to General Thomas Green in 1856 Tyler made the following statement concerning his efforts on behalf of Texas:

...It would be indeed strange if my enemies could deprive me of the credit of having annexed Texas to the Union. I presented the question, urged it first in the form of a treaty to the Senate, met the rejection of the treaty by a prompt and immediate appeal to the House of Representatives, fought the battle before the people and conquered its two formidable adversaries [Clay and Van Buren] with their trained bands, and two days before my term expired adopted and enforced the alternate resolutions under which Texas took her place amid the fraternity of States. My

38 Lyon G. Tyler. "John Tyler's Administration," Tyler's Quarterly Historical, 1:4:196, January 1933.
successor [James K. Polk] did nothing but confirm what I had done. Nor is that all. Texas drew after it California, so I may well claim that, in regards to the whole subject. Mr. Polk was my administrator de bonis non.\footnote{41}

Tyler lost the confidence of the party by which he was elected and he failed to gain that of his political opponents. However, time has permitted many to appreciate the value of his labor. From one such source the following appraisal has been given:

Whatever opinion may be entertained respecting the wisdom of President Tyler's administration in other matters, there can be but one opinion, that he pursued a most enlightened, sagacious, and true American policy in the affair of annexing Texas to the United States. With vigilance, activity, and a thorough understanding of the merits of the question he strove to consummate the vastly important measure of annexation at the earliest possible moment. Throughout his administration he was true to his policy on this question. He steadily and firmly pursued his purpose, unawed by popular clamor and unseduced by the minions who sought to eclipse his fame. Temporarily, his reputation may have suffered with both of the political parties then existing, but the time has come when the important consequences of that great act, whose consummation is so largely due to him, has become apparent to the whole American people.\footnote{42}

A noted author has declared that the greatest triumph in American history after the Revolution of 1776, was the "prompt, powerful way that the Tyler and polk administrations moved to solidify Texas and put the flag over the country west to the Pacific."\footnote{43}

\footnote{41} Loc. cit.
In closing it is clear that the Mexican government as well as the people were convinced that the annexation of the "lone star" Republic could no longer be prevented, and that her hostility was driving Texas into the American Union, she therefore, agreed to co-operate and recognize Texan independence, but this agreement came too late. It was evident that Texas preferred annexation by the United States to independence, since it was extremely uncertain whether independence could be maintained. It appeared probable that if Mexico, a nation of six million people, should seriously attempt to reduce one of fifty-thousand she would be successful.

The hope of Texas lay either in annexation to the United States or in a guarantee of her independence by England and France. The Texans had a free choice in the matter when their president submitted both the Mexican treaty and the American proposal to a popularly elected convention. The overwhelming vote which ensued in the Texan convention in July 1845, was indicative of almost unanimous agreement. By annexation we obliterated a nation that might have become a strong and unfriendly rival, and might have caused the disruption of the Union. Its incorporation removed the potential violation of the Monroe Doctrine by certain leading European powers. It gave America the opportunity to match the skill of her diplomats with those of England, France, Mexico, and Texas, and it proved American superiority without the loss of a human life or the expenditure of a single dollar.

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House Executive Documents. Washington: Blair and Rives, 28 Cong., 1 sess., #2, August 1843. This document is useful in connection with the statement made by Mexico whereby Mexico would consider it a declaration of war for the U. S. to make a movement toward annexing Texas.

Niles' National Register. Baltimore, XVI, 1841–1845. The Register is now bound into many volumes, and is especially good in reflecting public opinion of the previous century.

Rhett, Hon., R. B. "Slavery and the Mexican War," Brownson's Quarterly Review, 1:331–367, July 1847. This was a speech delivered by the Honorable R. B. Rhett in the House of Representatives of the United States on January 14, 1847. Mr. Rhett declared that Mr. Tyler was hasty in declaring that a state of war existed between Mexico and the United States when only a clash of arms had been heard.

Richardson, James D., A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents 1789–1897. Washington: Washington Government Printing Office, 1897, III-IV, 690 pp. This compilation contains all the annual speeches, and veto messages, proclamations, and inaugural addresses of the presidents from 1789 to 1897; it consists of four volumes.


Secret Journals of the Senate Republic of Texas 1836–1845. Austin: Austin Printing Co., 1911, 337 pp. This is a collection of the Senate Documents relating to the Republic of Texas during its struggle for recognition and for annexation.

Senate Documents. Washington: Gales and Seaton, 28 Cong., 1 sess., December 7, 1843, V.

. Washington: Gales and Seaton, 29 Cong., 1 sess., 1845–1846, I. These compilations are most valuable in giving authentic information concerning our domestic and our foreign affairs.
Texas, Binder's Title. Washington: Washington Government Printing Office 1841-1846. This is a collection of government documents, speeches, letters, and reports relative to Texas between the years 1841-46. Each document bears its own information.

Walker, Robert J., "The Texas Question," The United States Magazine and Democratic Review, 14:423-430, January 1844. This is a letter written by Mr. Walker of Mississippi to the people of Carrol County, Kentucky in which he states that Mr. Tyler should have had regard for Mexico and should not have been so hasty in entering into annexation.

II. Books

Adams, John Quincy, Diary of John Quincy Adams 1794-1845. New York: Longman's Green and Co., 1929, 585 pp. This selection which was edited by Allan Nevins is an unparalleled treasury for the social, political, and diplomatic events of the time. Since Adams did not care for Tyler his work appears a little biased in places.

Allen, George, An Appeal to the People of Massachusetts on the Texas Question. Boston: Charles C. Little and James Brown, 1844, 20 pp. This is a speech giving the Whig view of "Texas and Slavery."

Archer, W. S., Speeches and Documents. Washington: Gales & Seaton, 1844. This is a speech delivered in the Senate of the United States on May 1844 concerning the treaty for the annexation of Texas.

Benton, Thomas H., Thirty Years' View. New York: D. Appleton and Co., 1858, 788 pp. This is the second of two volumes in which Benton gives us a splendid history of the working of the American government for thirty years from 1820-1850. The material was taken from the Congress Debates, the private papers of General Jackson, Benton's own speeches with his actual view of men and affairs. He too, is very bitter towards Tyler.

Eliot, Charles W., American Historical Documents 1000-1904. New York: P. F. Collier & Son, 1910, 191 pp. These documents give a condensed view of the political progress of America beginning with the personal records of the earliest discoverers through the acquisition of each successive increase of territory.

Houston, Sam, The Writings of Sam Houston. Austin: The University of Texas, 1941, IV, 516 pp. This being the fourth volume of the series which was edited by Amelia W. Williams and Eugene C. Barker covers the events of Houston's political career between the years of September 1821 and February 1847. It contains his personal letters, messages, documents, etc. There are 8 volumes.


Lester, Charles Edward. The Life of Sam Houston. New York: J. C. Derby, 1855, 402 pp. This is said to be the only authentic Memoir of Sam Houston published up to 1855.

Select Documents 1776-1861 History of the United States. New York, The Macmillan Co., 1930, 165 pp. It contains only the important documents, and they were compiled from primary sources.


Miller, Marion Mills, Great Debates in American History. New York: Current Literature Publishing Co., 1913, 476 pp. This is the Second volume of a set of fourteen. The set begins with the important debates from the Colonial Stamp Act through the debates in Congress during Taft's administration 1912-1913.

Polk, James Knox, The Diary of a President 1845-1849. New York: Longmans, Green & Co., 1929, 412 pp. In this book may be found many valuable entries covering the Mexican War, the Acquisition of Oregon, and the Conquest of California, and the Southwest.

Tyler, Lyon Gardiner, The Letters and Times of the Tylers. Richmond: Whittet & Shepperson, 1885, II, 736 pp. The Letters and Times of the Tylers. Williamsburg: William & Mary College Press, 1896, III. These last two books are valuable inasmuch as they give the personal letters, documents, opinions, motives, and ideas of the Tylers, especially John Tyler and his negotiations with Texas and the annexation problem.
Webster, Daniel, The Complaint of Mexico and Conspiracy Against Liberty. Boston: J. W. Alden, 1843, 444 pp. This is a letter to Waddy Thompson against the annexation since the cause is to extend slavery.

III. Newspapers


The Daily Globe, (Washington) February 27, 1845.

Democratic Statesman, (Nashville, Tennessee) August 2, 1845.

The Liberator, (Boston, Massachusetts) February 10, 1843, March 7, 1845.

London Times, August 6, 1845.

National Intelligencer, (Washington) March 6, 1845.

New York Observer, May 13, 1848.

New York Weekly Tribune, March 5, 1845.

The Rough-Hewer, (Albany, New York) September 17, 1840.

The Salem Observer, (Massachusetts) April 12, 19, 1845, March 18, 1845.

The Salem Register, (Massachusetts) March 29, 1845, April 12, 1845.

St. Louis Reveille, (Missouri) April 30, 1845.

The Sun, (Baltimore, Maryland) March 4, 1845.

Telegraph and Texas Register, (Houston, Texas) December 13, 1843.

The Texas Times, (Galveston, Texas) March 4, 1843.

Weekly Chicago Democrat, (Illinois) March 12, 1848.

The Weekly Courier and Journal, (Natchez, Miss.) May 10, 1843.


Western Advocate, (Austin, Texas) April 1, 1843.
IV. SECONDARY MATERIAL

Books

Adams, Ephraim Douglas, British Interests and Activities in Texas 1838-1846. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1910, 267 pp. This was especially good in showing the British attitude toward annexation of Texas by America.

Adams, James Truslow, The Rise of the Union. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1933, 428 pp. This book belongs to the March of Democracy series; it is just a general history touching on the major problems in politics and events.

Alcaraz, Ramón, The Other Side. New York: John Wiley, 1850, 458 pp. This book was written in Spanish but translated into English by Albert C. Ramsey. It contains errors as so many histories do, but it is especially valuable because it gives the question from the Mexican viewpoint.

Andrews, E. Benjamin, History of the United States. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1899. Andrews wrote two volumes of which this is the second. In 341 pages he covers the main events of American history between the years 1810 and 1894.

Bailey, Thomas A., A Diplomatic History of the American People. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1914, 864 pp. This is a very good diplomatic history of our country since it gives the opinions of many authors and it is filled with the references to other books and authors.


Bemis, Samuel Flagg, A Diplomatic History of the United States. New York: Henry Holt & Co., 1936, 934 pp. This book has been revised in 1942. Both editions were used and cited in this thesis. The author presented a complete and authoritative story of our diplomatic relations with other countries from our origin as a nation to the present. He brings out the facts and the human personalities and events.

---; Dir;:::p;"::ny=:-._.-.r.N~e-w·n Alfred A. Knopf, 1920, vii, 566 pp. ---;y;there are six volumes to this series. This volume deals especially with the careers of Webster, Upshur, Calhoun, and Buchanan and
their relations with the American expansionist sentiment at its peak.

**Bennett, Champ Clark, John Quincy Adams Old Man Eloquent.** Boston: Little Brown & Co., 1932, 437 pp. This is an appraisal of John Q. Adams.

**Blaine, James G., Twenty Years in Congress.** Norwich, Connecticut: The Henry Bill Publishing Co., 1884, I, 616 pp. Blaine relates the important events which took place between Lincoln and Garfield including the factors which led to the political revolution of 1860.

**Burgess, John W., The Middle Period 1817-1858.** New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1902, 514 pp. This book belongs to the American History Series of seven volumes; this is the fourth book. The Northern Point of View.

**Callahan, James Morton, American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations** New York: The Macmillan Co., 1932, 614 pp. The book aims to show that American relations with Mexico is a result of its direct proximity and the problems of American peaceful economic penetration.

**Castañeda, Carlos E., The Mexican Side of the Texan Revolution.** Dallas, Texas: P. L. Turner Co., 1928, 391 pp. This gives the accounts of the Texan campaign of 1836 as related by five of the chief participants giving the Mexican side of the campaign.

**Channing, William E., The Works of William E. Channing, D.D.** Boston: American Unitarian Association, 1867, I, 411 pp. This is the first volume of a set of six, which constitute a collection of letters and essays written on the current topics of that time. This reference deals especially with "A letter to the Honorable Henry Clay on the annexation of Texas," to which the author is greatly opposed.

**Chitwood, Oliver Perry, John Tyler Champion of the Old South.** New York: D. Appleton-Century Co., Inc., 1939, 496 pp. The book brings out the fact that Tyler held to an ideal of political consistency in an era of change where others were subject to sudden and illogical shifts of opinion.

**Colton, Calvin, Life and Times of Henry Clay.** New York: A.S. Barnes & Co., 1866, II, 504 pp. This is the second volume of two which is confined to the life and career of Mr. Clay, but it gives no history beyond that with which Clay is connected.

**Crane, William Carey, Life and Select Literary Remains of Sam Houston** Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1884, 672 pp. This is a history of the life, times, and labors of Sam Houston in connection with Texas.


Farrand, Max, The Development of the United States. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1916, 355 pp. This gives the history of the country from the colonies to a world power; the main contribution was on Manifest Destiny.

Faulkner, Harold Underwood, American Political and Social History. New York: F. S. Crofts & Co., 1914, 814 pp. This is a general history dealing with the political and social events in American history from Europe on the eve of expansion through the Global War.


Foote, Henry Stuart, Texas and the Texans. Philadelphia: Thomas Cowperthwait & Co., 1871, 1, 311 pp. This is the first of two volumes reflecting the advancement of the Anglo-Americans to the Southwest through the Texan Revolution.


Fox, Col., Dorus M., History of Political Parties. Des Moines: Fox 1895, 511 pp. The book gives elaborate accounts of the Federalist and the Republican Parties of the early days and the organ and historic acts of the Whig, Republican and Democratic Parties.


Hart, Albert Bushnell, American History Told by Contemporaries. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1919, III, 668 pp. This is the third volume or National Expansion from 1783 to 1845.

Hockett, Homer Carey, Political and Social Growth of the American People. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1910, 861 pp. This is a general history from Spanish colonization through the Civil War.

James, Marquis, The Raven. Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 189 pp. This is a biography of Sam Houston which is divided into three parts: his Romance, his Exile, his Destiny.

Jenkins, John S., History of the War With Mexico. New York: Miller, Orton and Mulligan, 1855, 506 pp. This book begins with the origin and causes of the War with Mexico and carries us through the close after we acquired Texas and established the final boundaries.


Latane, John Holladay, American Foreign Policy. New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., 1927, 725 pp. Latane stresses the diplomacy behind the main events from the French Alliance, our dealing with Latin America and through the World War.

Lundy, Benjamin, The War In Texas. Philadelphia: Merrihew and Gunn, 1837, 61 pp. This little book was written to show how the settlement of Texas was a crusade against Mexico to extend slavery and the slave trade.

McMaster, John Bach. A History of the People of the United States. New York: D. Appleton & Co., 1910, VII, 640 pp. There are eight volumes in the set; this volume covers a period of nine years from 1841-1850. The author deals with the four sections of the country separately, namely, North, East, South, and West, and then takes up the movement for expansion. It is a valuable collection of facts, largely collected from contemporary newspapers, depicting the American people in their social and economical relationship.

Milton, George Fort, The Use of Presidential Power 1789-1943. Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1949, 349 pp. This book shows an investigation of the power of the presidents from Washington to the present time. It shows how great leaders confronted great crises; we may profit by their example.

Mitchell, Nicholas Pendleton. State Interests in American Treaties. Richmond, Virginia: Garrett and Massie, 1936, 220 pp. This is a discussion of certain American treaties between the years 1782 and 1932.

Moore, John Bassett, American Diplomacy. New York: Harper & Brothers, 1905, 286 pp. The author has shown the principles by which American diplomacy is guided, and how its meaning and influence can be appreciated and how it has operated in the events of the period between 1763 and 1905.

Morison, Samuel Eliot and Commager, Henry Steele, The Growth of the American Republic. New York: Oxford University Press, 1930, I, 956 pp. This is a general history written in two volumes of which this is the first; it was revised in 1937.

Owen, Charles H., The Justice of the Mexican War. New York: The Knickerbocker Press, 1908, 291 pp. This was written to acquit the United States of the most serious charge ever laid against her as a nation.

Paddock, Capt., B. B., History of Texas. Chicago: The Lewis Publishing Co., 1922, I, 139 pp. There are four volumes to this set. It is a general history with special emphasis on Fort Worth and the Texan Northwest.

Red, William Stuart, The Texas Colonists and Religion 1821-1836. Austin: E. L. Shettles, 1924, 149 pp. This is a centennial tribute to the patriots who died that Texas might enjoy civil and religious liberty.
Reeves, Jesse S., American Diplomacy Under Tyler and Polk. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1907, 335 pp. This book treats especially with the three boundary questions since they dominated the foreign policy of Tyler and Polk.

Richardson, Rupert Norval, Texas, The Lone Star State. New York: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1943, 590 pp. This is a very good survey of the history of Texas.

Rives, George Lockhart. The United States and Mexico 1821-1848. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1913, 1, 720 pp. This book, one of two volumes deals with the relations between the United States and Mexico from the Florida treaty through the entry of Texas into the Union.

Schlesinger, Arthur Meier, Political and Social History of the United States 1829-1925. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1925, 576 pp. This is a general history treating the political events from the advent of Andrew Jackson to the presidency to the peace problems after World War I.

Schmitz, Joseph William, Texan Statecraft 1836-1845. San Antonio: The Naylor Co., 1941, 266 pp. This is a survey of the early military and political activities of the Republic of Texas which affected its foreign relations.

Smith, Justin H., The War With Mexico. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1919, 1, 572 pp. This is the first of two volumes which deals with the diplomacy between the North and the South and the politics that lay behind the military operations between America and Mexico.


Stephenson, Nathaniel W., Texas and the Mexican War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921, 273 pp. This little book is volume 24 of the Chronicles of American Series: it treats with the period from 1819 to 1848 through Polk's term.
Thompson, Charles Manfred, The Illinois Whigs Before 1846. Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1915, 105 pp. This research was made in 1913 for the Doctor of Philosophy Degree at Illinois University.


Van Alstyne, Richard W., American Diplomacy in Action. California: Stanford University Press, 1944, 760 pp. This is an excellent treatise on American diplomatic history from 1783 to 1918.


Wellborn, Fred W., The Growth of American Nationality 1492-1865. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1943, 1012 pp. This is a general history giving an appraisal of the social, economic, and political forces at work during almost 400 years.

Wharton, Clarence R., The Republic of Texas. Houston: C. C. Young Printing Co., 1922, 217 pp. This is a brief history of Texas from the first American colonies in 1821 to annexation in 1846.

Wise, Henry A., Seven Decades of the Union. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co., 1876, 320 pp. This is a memoir of John Tyler; his life ran through seven decades from 1790 to 1862.

Wortham, Louis J., A History of Texas. Fort Worth, Texas: Wortham-Molyneaux Co., 1924, 1, 432 pp. This book is the first volume of a set of five. It gives the story of the conversion of Texas from a wilderness into a commonwealth.


Yoakum, Henderson K., History of Texas. New York: Redfield, 1856, I, 481 pp., II, 575 pp. These two volumes relate the principle events from the first immigration in 1685 to the annexation of Texas to the United States July 4, 1845.
Young, Andrew W., The American Statesman. New York: Derby & Jackson, 1857, 1018 pp. This is a political history relating the origin, nature, and practical operation of Constitutional Government in the United States; also the rise and progress of parties.

V. PERIODICAL ARTICLES


"A Shadowy Region," author unknown the Republic, 2:147, Jan.-June, 1874.

Bang, W. F., "Texas or Disunion," Spirit of '76, #13, August 3, 1844.


"Diplomatic Relations of Texas and the United States," [by the association] Texas Historical Association Quarterly, 15:267-293, July 1911-April 1912.


Munroe, James, "Texas," The American Almanac, 1845, 342.


Stryker, James, "The Claim of Texas to a Part of New Mexico," Stryker's American Register and Magazine, 1:51-65, July 1850.

"Texas, [by a Revolutionary Officer]" American Quarterly Review, 7:92-111, March-June 1830.


APPROVAL SHEET

The Thesis submitted by Sister Mary Geralda Sullivan, O.P. has been read and approved by three members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the thesis and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

[Signature]

Date: Sept. 20, 1946

Signature of Adviser