Psychotherapy: Therapist Goals, Patient Expectations and Patient Satisfaction

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WORLD WAR I: DISSENT AND DISCORD
IN MILWAUKEE

by

Sister Mary Antonette Henke, O.S.M.

A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School
of Loyola University in Partial Fulfillment of
the Requirements for the Degree of
Master of Arts

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LIFE

Sister Mary Antonette Henke, O.S.M. was born in Thorp, Wisconsin, October 30, 1923.

She was graduated from Thorp High School, Thorp, Wisconsin, June, 1941 and became a Sister, Servant of Mary, June, 1945. After taking courses at Viterbo College, LaCrosse, Wisconsin and Diocesan Teachers' College, St. Paul, Minnesota, the author taught in various grade schools staffed by her Community. She received the degree of Bachelor of Arts from St. Thomas College, St. Paul, Minnesota, August, 1957 and began her graduate studies at Loyola University in June, 1960.
PREFACE

Although a study such as this might better be the work of a sociologist or of a psychologist, nevertheless, it is the historian who first ferrets out the facts and studies the interpersonal relations of a particular people in a particular area at a given time.

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the relations of the German population of Milwaukee to their fellow citizens during the period of the First World War.

Throughout this study an attempt has been made to discover evidences of any pro-German attitudes on the part of the city's German-Americans and to ascertain the amount and the intensity of the anti-German sentiment directed towards that element during the war.

The more important sources of information for the study are: the newspapers, particularly the Milwaukee Journal and the Germania-Herald, the Wisconsin Magazine of History and various other periodicals, and the biographies of men who figured prominently in the area at that time.

The writer wishes to acknowledge the courteous assistance received from the staff at the Milwaukee Public Library, the
Milwaukee County Historical Society, and the Ladysmith Public Library.

The research on this project was begun at the suggestion of Mr. Paul Soterin of the Milwaukee Public Library to whom the writer is greatly indebted. To Dr. Robert McCluggage under whose direction this study was completed the writer is deeply grateful; also to Mr. Theodore Mueller former curator of the Milwaukee County Historical Building for his interest and suggestions, to Sister Mary Marcelline and Mr. Douglas King who aided in the typing of the final draft. Finally, the writer expresses gratitude to her Superiors and her fellow Sisters, the Servants of Mary, for the opportunity of pursuing graduate work and for the encouragement and acts of kindness accorded her in the completion of this undertaking.
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CHAPTER I

THE GERMAN AMERICANS

The German America which came into existence in the middle of the nineteenth century was a mental "gebiet" rather than a political or territorial area. It was a distinct and easily recognizable society within the framework of the new American society. "Because the Germans were unable to respect or, sometimes to understand the social habits and standards of culture of their American neighbours, particularly in the newly developed regions, they sought to preserve as much as possible of their old world habits and culture." The Germans, then, who came to America in such large numbers in the period from 1840 to 1900 did not readily adopt the American culture but continued to live at the cultural stage and, as far as possible, in the cultural surrounding of the Germany which they left behind.

The term German American, which unhappily for the people of Milwaukee was construed to mean an American with divided allegiance during World War I, was originally applied to Americans who

2Ibid., 41, 58, 59, 271.
were of German extraction, either born in Germany or born of German immigrant parents. It simply meant American, but of German descent. However, during the European war of 1914-1918, this term took on a new meaning which was most distressing to the individuals thus called since it implied that such an American was a German first and then an American; that his first allegiance was to Germany even though his adopted home suffered thereby. Often these people were referred to as hyphenated Americans which was interpreted to mean something less than true or loyal Americans.\(^3\)

These German-Americans on the whole were not concerned with Germanizing the United States. It was obvious that they cultivated a static Deutschdum but this preservation of the German culture had nothing to do with foreign policy, imperialism or Pan-Germanism, since it was concerned with the Turnvereine, with singing societies, bowling and pinochle clubs, and all the other things which can be included in the German term of "Gemuthlichkeit."\(^4\)

The German settlers believed that it was of the greatest importance to preserve and transmit to their descendants in perpetuity the good German ways and usages. They wished to

---


be Americans but hoped to retain ineffaceably the mental and moral traits of the German ancestry.\textsuperscript{5}

The city of Milwaukee is one of the American cities in which this static \textit{Deutschdum} existed to a marked degree. Milwaukee's "German-town", a coordinate German society within the developing city, centered in the northeastern part of the city in the Second, Sixth, and Ninth wards. Here, one visiting in the fifties, saw "German Houses, German inscriptions over doors or signs, German physiognomies."\textsuperscript{6}

This strong German migration to Milwaukee and to America owed its existence to a series of causes and conditions favorable on both sides of the Atlantic. Wisconsin was chosen as the home of many German immigrants because the climate, products, and the natural features of the land resembled the Fatherland.\textsuperscript{7}

\textsuperscript{5}\textit{Milwaukee Sentinel}, December 27, 1889, pt. 4, p. 2. This article, "Such Stuff Dreams Are Made Of," was a summary of an article which appeared in the \textit{Germania} to explain the reason that the Germans were opposed to the passing of the Bennett Law which proposed that all children in the state between seven and fourteen were to attend a school twelve weeks in the year in which English was taught. The Lutherans and Catholics opposed the law on the grounds that it would destroy their parochial schools and also destroy in the children, the peculiar virtues and qualities which distinguished the German people.

\textsuperscript{6}Bayrd Still, \textit{Milwaukee: The History of a City} (Madison, 1948), p. 112; citing Frederika Bremer, \textit{The Homes of the New World; Impressions of America} (New York, 1854), I, 615-617.

\textsuperscript{7}Hawgood, pp. 61, 62.
The conditions in Germany which influenced so many to emigrate were these: over-population, over-production, over-crowding in the farming districts, the demise of the small hand industries in competition with the factory system, lack of religious freedom for particular religious groups, and lastly, political dissatisfaction. Contemporary with these conditions was a period of prosperity, expansion and political equality in the United States. Cheap but fertile lands, light taxes, the need of laborers and the opportunity to gain economic independence were the favorable factors which attracted such large numbers of Germans to Wisconsin. Wisconsin had a very liberal land policy in which land granted to the state by the federal government for the maintenance of schools was sold at low prices and without delay to immigrants; secondly, citizenship was granted to the immigrant after only one year of residence (until 1851, no other state admitted aliens to citizenship on such liberal terms); and lastly, Wisconsin, just entering statehood, was yet unencumbered by public debts which meant light taxes for the residents of the new state.


9 Joseph Schafer, Four Wisconsin Counties, Prairie and Forest (Madison, 1927), p. 89; Hawgood, p. 211; Faust, I, 475-477.
Various states, among them Wisconsin, organized well-planned programs to attract the immigrants to their particular areas. Letters, circulars or pamphlets, and books, yes, even articles for the foreign press, were sent to Germany to stimulate interest in emigration with a particular area in mind. Even Milwaukee, as we shall see, carried out a definite program to direct immigrants to the city.

Immigration from Germany began trickling into Wisconsin soon after the turn of the nineteenth century and a few German immigrants appeared in Milwaukee, "then a mere Hamlet," in 1835. According to some sources, Henry Bleyer was the first settler of German birth. Koss, in his book, *Milwaukee*, writes:

Der erste und einzige Deutsche, welcher sich im Jahre 1835 im Milwaukee niederlass, war der Drechsler Bleyer von Detroit; derselbe baute sich auf einer inselargen Erhöhung der dritten Ward etwas östlich von der jetzigen Huronstrassenbrücke an, hatte dann seine Familie ebenfalls, und lebte noch heute in unsere Mitte.

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John G. Gregory does not agree with Koss. He states in his history of Milwaukee that the first German settler was Wilhelm Strothmann and cites a paper read by Henry Bleyer's son to the Old Settlers' Club of Milwaukee County in June of 1899 in which he gives proof that Strothmann rather than Bleyer was the first German settler.\textsuperscript{12}

By 1839, a group of eight hundred men, women, and children had made a permanent settlement at the foot of Huron Street.\textsuperscript{13} German immigration became more pronounced in the 1840's as two to three hundred Germans arrived every week in Milwaukee during the summer months.\textsuperscript{14} "One hundred Persons, chiefly Germans, landed here yesterday," Increase Lapham wrote to his brother Darius in July of 1842.\textsuperscript{15} Among the arrivals, during this decade was a party of carpenters who had come at the request of Juneau and Dousman, two of the earliest settlers in the city. Two of these carpenters were Matthias Stein, whom Juneau induced to

\footnotesize
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{12}John G. Gregory, \textit{History of Milwaukee, Wisconsin} (Milwaukee, 1931), II, 604.
\item \textsuperscript{13}Still, p. 112.
\item \textsuperscript{14}Koss, pp. 114, 115.
\item \textsuperscript{15}Still, p. 73, quoting from Increase to Darius Lapham, "Lapham Letters," July 28, 1842.
\end{itemize}
stay, and Louis Trayser who built an inn for the shipbuilders of the area. 16

It is well to point out that not all the immigrants who docked at the Milwaukee harbor took up their residence in the immediate area since many of them went out from this center of distribution into the rich farming district of the surrounding area. Milwaukee had become an important point of entry by way of the Great Lakes. The immigrants boarded a steamboat at New York going to Albany and thence by railroad to Buffalo, followed by a journey, more treacherous than the ocean voyage, through lakes Erie, Huron and Michigan. 17

During the 1840's, the German population came from the south of Germany and from the Rhineland. These settlers picked the rich farmlands west of Milwaukee and in Milwaukee and Waukesha counties. There was a large increase in the number of German immigrants in 1843-1844 when from a thousand to fourteen hundred arrived at the port of Milwaukee each week during the open navigation season. 18

A bad harvest throughout Germany in 1846 sent many southern

16Kate Asaphine Everest, "How Wisconsin Came By Its Large German Element," Wisconsin State Historical Society, Collections, XII (Madison, 1892), 306; Still, p. 73; Koss, p. 50.
18Ibid., 319, 320.
and Rhenish Germans into America, many of whom settled in Milwaukee as well as in other parts of the state.\(^{19}\) The bulk of the German immigrants who came to Wisconsin during the forties and fifties came from Rhenish Prussia, Bavaria, Luxembourg, Baden and Saxony. During the years from 1848-1854 the new arrivals were Hessian, Württenbergers, Swiss, and Austrian. A bad harvest again, in 1854, considerably increased the flow of Luxemburgers continued coming for the next thirty years. Except for the groups of Lutherans who came to Wisconsin during these early days of immigration, the main reason for leaving the homeland was the desire of the immigrants to improve their economic status.\(^{20}\)

Up to this point, statistics on the German population in the city of Milwaukee are incomplete. We can find charts showing the number of immigrants according to national origin; but for our purpose here we will use the number of German born plus the number of American born of direct descent, that is, those born of one or both German immigrant parentage.

\(^{19}\)Kellogg, pp. 319, 320.

\(^{20}\)Kate Asaphine Everest Levi, "Geographical Origin of German Immigrants to Wisconsin," \textit{WHS, Coll.}, XIV (Madison, 1898), 341-393; Gregory, pp. 618-619
In 1849, the *Daily Wisconsin* in an article entitled, "Our German Population" listed the number of German residents in the city as between seven and eight thousand.\(^{21}\)

Kate Asaphine Everest maintains in her essay on German immigration into Wisconsin that the arrival of the German national group was the largest in 1854.\(^{22}\) Again, this does not give us a count for the city itself. However, Bayrd Still in his history of Milwaukee, lists 1850 as the census year with the highest per cent of German born.\(^{23}\) Therefore, between 1850 and 1860, possibly in 1854, the immigration of the German element may have also reached its peak in the city.

For the year 1890, we have a count of the German population. It was calculated that in 1890, one-half of the 204,468 inhabitants of Milwaukee were of direct German descent which means they were either born in Germany or were born of German immigrant parents.\(^{24}\) At the time of the semi-centennial anniversary of the city in 1895, the *Milwaukee Sentinel* maintained


\(^{22}\) Everest, p. 310.

\(^{23}\) Still, pp. 574, 575. Table 4. Percentage of Foreign Born in Milwaukee, 1850-1940, listed in the Order of Predominance of the Nationality Group.

\(^{24}\) Gregory, p. 625.
that over one-half of the inhabitants were of direct German descent.25

In 1900, the total population of Milwaukee was 285,315 and the number of German stock (those of direct German descent) was reckoned at 146,846 giving the ratio of 51% to the total population.26

According to the census of 1910, the German population of Milwaukee just prior to the First World War was 199,922, while the total population of the city was 373,857. The census statistics for the German population included those born in Germany and Prussia and those born in America of one or both German immigrants. Therefore, at this time, the percentage of German-Americans in relation to the whole population of the city was 53%.27 The percentage of the German population of the city at the close of the war which was reported in the census of 1920 was 36%, with a German population of 163,344 in comparison to


26 U. S. Bureau of the Census, Twelfth Census of the United States: 1900. Vol. I, Population, Part I, pp. 878-881 (Table 60); pp. 882-885 (Table 51); 890, 893 (Table 63).

27 U. S. Bureau of the Census, Thirteenth Census of the United States, Supplement for Wisconsin: 1910, p. 590 (Table 2); p. 598 (Table 12).
the total population of 457,157. With over one-half of the city's population being of German origin it is not hard to understand that some friction would develop among the inhabitants of the city at the time of World War I. This essay will consider some of the sources of this anti-German sentiment but before we can do so, we must have an understanding of the reasons that brought so many German immigrants to the city.

As we have seen, the German element was very prominent among the foreign born who were entering Wisconsin and Milwaukee during the waves of migration in the nineteenth century. We have already mentioned that bad harvests in Germany brought many hither as well as the normal desire to improve one's economic position.

Religious problems brought some of the earliest German settlers into the city. These groups came as whole congregations under leadership of their pastors to escape state persecutions in the Old World. "Pastors came with their entire flocks." King Frederick Wilhelm IV of Prussia attempted to unite the Lutheran and Reformed faiths. A group of Lutherans from Pomerania who came to be known as the "Old Lutherans" refused to

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28 U. S. Bureau of the Census, Fourteenth Census of the United States: 1920, Vol. I, 316 (Table 51); II, 1020 (Table 13).
29 Lacher, p. 12.
conform and were therefore fined or imprisoned. Permission to
emigrate was granted, provided the group had a pastor to lead
them. Several persecuted congregations united with the Rev.
J. A. Grabau as their pastor who then sent a Captain von Rohr
ahead to America to select a place of settlement. He chose
Buffalo, New York and Milwaukee, Wisconsin as possible sites of
setting up homes. A group of about five hundred arrived in
Wisconsin in 1839 after leaving some in New York State and set-
tled around Mequon, Cedarburg and Milwaukee. Although King
Frederick Wilhelm IV allowed the Lutherans to again practice a
separate worship after 1846, religious differences within the
Church on the question of church government caused others to
emigrate, some of whom also settled in Milwaukee. Still others
continued to arrive as a result of favorable reports and letters
received by friends and relatives in Germany and also as the re-
sult of a visit to northern Germany by Pastor Grabau and Captain
von Rohr in 1853. Furthermore, a number of missionaries, cler-
gymen with university training, were sent to America by the Ger-
man Lutheran Mission Societies. One of these clergymen was Rev.
J. Muehlhaeuser, who arrived in 1848 and shortly organized Grace
Lutheran Church in Milwaukee.31

30Kate Asaphine Everest, "Early Lutheran Immigration to Wis-
consin," Transactions of the Wisconsin Academy of Sciences, Arts,
and Letters, 1888-1891, VIII (Madison, 1892), 292, 293, 296;
Schafer, pp. 90, 324, 325; Hawgood, p. 204.

31Lacher, p. 12.
Soon after the beginning of the Old Lutheran migration, Catholics were arriving in Wisconsin in increasing numbers. Many German Catholics came to the United States in the middle and later forties for economic reasons and were most probably influenced in their choice of Milwaukee by reason of the fact that in 1843, a diocese had been erected in Milwaukee. The new bishop was a German-speaking Swiss-German, Bishop John Martin Henni, who had formerly worked among the Germans in Cincinnati. The presence of a German Catholic bishop in Milwaukee gave the area wide publicity in the Catholic states of Germany. Furthermore, the interest of other Catholics was aroused by a Catholic mission society, the Leopoldine Society of Vienna, which not only supplied funds but also encouraged emigration to America by its publications and wide sphere of influence. By 1845, Bishop Henni had reported to the Leopoldine Society that he found it necessary to build a separate church for the German-speaking Catholics in the city because of the increase of Catholics there. Through the influence of Bishop Henni and the priests of his diocese, Catholic clergymen from Austria, Bavaria, and Switzerland, and thousands of Catholics from the Rhenish states of Germany came to Milwaukee and the outlying parts of the diocese.  

32 Still, p. 80; Lacher, pp. 10, 11; Hawgood, pp. 206-207.
Another religious group of importance but in much smaller numbers found its way to Wisconsin in the late 1840's. This group was the German Jews who held a Jewish service in Milwaukee in 1849. \(^{33}\) Bayrd Still tells us in his history of Milwaukee that in 1852 there were at least fifty German Jews in the city. This group contributed to the commercial development of the community, having established businesses near the city market and living nearby. \(^{34}\) In 1858, the first Jewish synagogue was erected in the city. \(^{35}\)

Another important group of German immigrants which arrived in smaller numbers but who made their presence known in America was the group known as the "Forty-eighters." These men had been disappointed at the failure of Metternich and the government to live up to the ideals of liberalism which seemed within their grasp between 1789 and 1815. \(^{36}\) After the ensuing but abortive revolutions of 1848, these "Forty-eighters" came to America. The known sympathy of Milwaukee's German community

\(^{33}\) Lacher, p. 20.

\(^{34}\) Still, p. 277

\(^{35}\) Lacher, p. 20.

\(^{36}\) Hawgood, p. 100.
for the revolutionary movement in Europe was an important factor which attracted some of these immigrants to Milwaukee. Milwaukee recognized the outbreak of the revolution in France with a public demonstration on April 17, 1848. 37

These immigrant "Forty-eighters" organized societies which tended to be anti-clerical and promoted independence and individuality in thought, decision and action. The various societies were soon disbanded and the remaining members joined with the Turnvereine which was established here by the "Forty-eighters" in 1853. The Turner movement, or Turnvereine, was originally organized in Germany as a cultural and athletic society. Its establishment in our country and in Milwaukee was intended to provide for the retention of the German culture and to promote the perpetuation of the ideals of the "Forty-eighters". The Turnvereine had been active in Germany and had played an important part in the revolts of 1848. 38

The attempts to set up a new Germany in Wisconsin were relatively unimportant although the influence of the idea must have been responsible to some extent for some of the large scale settlement of Germans in the state. However, a new Germany as such, if it had been presented to the Old Lutherans

37 Still, pp. 114-115; Milwaukee Sentinel and Gazette, April 18, 1848, pt. 1, p. 2.
38 Still, p. 124; Koss, p. 318.
as a concrete reality, would have been spurned by them since they had moved to America to escape the demands of the German state. Similarly, for the Catholics, a New Germany with any political or national connotation would be in opposition to the idea of the Church Universal, which in Wisconsin, from the first, contained the Irish and other peoples as well as the Germans.39 Likewise, the "Forty-eighters" who came as families, individuals, or in small groups were not influenced by any idea of forming a New Germany in America. They were coming to America as exiles to escape the oppressive government in Germany and many hoped to return when the adverse political conditions were remedied. Thus the idea of a German cultural isle within the new state of Wisconsin sounds plausible but the idea of a "New Germany" within the United States cannot be proved and undoubt-edly is an exaggeration.40

After discussing the motives which resulted in the heavy emigration from Germany we come now to the important factor at work on this side of the Atlantic which influenced those interested in leaving the Fatherland to choose Wisconsin and in particular, Milwaukee, for their new Home. This factor is the "Advertisement" or amount of planned propaganda in the form of

40 Ibid., 133, 217, 224.
circulars, letters, and books which flowed into Germany or met the immigrants as they docked at New York.

As Louise Phelps Kellogg says in her story of Wisconsin: "Wisconsin was selected as a place of residence by the emigrating Germans largely because its climate, products, and natural features corresponded to the home environment."\(^{41}\)

How did those who were contemplating emigration know so much about the favorable conditions in Wisconsin and in Milwaukee? The most impressive and highly influential means were the personal letters sent by friends and relatives who were happily settled in America. These were not the only type of advertisement. A well-planned campaign of "selling the state," was carried on by means of well written and highly descriptive pamphlets and books which were translated into German as well as other languages.

The immigration of three hundred generally well-to-do natives of the Valley of the Wupper, in Rhenish Prussia, in 1847 can be attributed to the letters of Theodore Wettstein, himself a Milwaukeean. In 1850, Wettstein wrote a book praising the advantages of Wisconsin.\(^{42}\)

\(^{41}\) Kellogg, p. 319.

\(^{42}\) Gregory, p. 619; Faust, I, 475, citing Theodore Wettstein, Berichte aus Wisconsin (Elberfeld, 1850).
Franz Löher, a traveler and learned man who was interested in the German population of the states wrote a romantic history of the Germans in America and advocated a concentration of settlers in Wisconsin or Iowa.⁴³

Other books of particular importance which were published by travelers was the book of A. E. Hasse, published in Grimma in 1841, in which the author directly counseled the Germans to settle in Wisconsin, basing his advice on his own personal observations and experiences; the book of Freimund Goldmann, Brief aus Wisconsin in Nordamerika, published at Leipzig, in 1849; a book of Gustav Richter, Der Nordamerikanische Freistaat Wisconsin, published in Wesel in 1849;⁴⁴ a book by Alexander Ziegler, Skizzen einer Reise durch Nordamerika und Westindien mit besonderer Berücksichtigung des deutschen Elements, der Auswanderung und der landwirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse in dem neuen Staat Wisconsin, published in Dresden in 1849. Ziegler gave a very pleasant picture of Milwaukee with its German society and German culture.⁴⁵

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⁴³Faust, I, 474. Löher's book was called: Geschichte und Zustände in Amerika (Göttingen, 1855).

⁴⁴Still, p. 113; Faust, I, 474, 475, 479.

⁴⁵Everest, "How Wisconsin Came By Its Large German Element," 317.
The impact of these letters and books was forcefully supplemented by the efforts of the steamboat lines, land corporations and railroad companies, who were alert to the profits which would be theirs as the result of increased immigration. To the railroads it meant a source of labor supply, the sale of lands, as well as profitable traffic.

Wisconsin took the lead in this well-planned program to attract immigrants into the area. In 1852, the legislature established an office of Commissioner of Emigration and passed a law which provided that the commissioner was to reside in New York. "The act carried with it an appropriation of $1,500 for the salary of the commissioner, $1,250 for the publications of pamphlets, $250 for the office rent, $100 for maps, and $700 for assistance to the commissioners." The first commissioner was Gysbert Van Steenwyck who took up his duties on May 18, 1852. Among his assistants were a Norwegian, two Germans and an Englishman. Of the large supply of pamphlets which described the resources and opportunities offered by Wisconsin, 20,000 were printed in German, 5,000 in Norwegian, and 4,000 in Dutch. These pamphlets were sent to Europe or distributed in New York on the ships, in taverns or hotels or handed outright to the newly arriving immigrants. The Commission also placed advertisements in at least eight foreign language newspapers, five of which were German. The
following year, 1853, Herman Haertel, a German land agent of Milwaukee, succeeded Van Steenwyck as commissioner. Mr. Haertel carried on the work of the previous year and added the contribution of a series of articles to the New York Tribune on the railroads of Wisconsin. 46

Wisconsin succeeded to a marked degree in raising the calibre of its publications due largely to Dr. Increase Allen Lapham, an eminent Wisconsin scientist, who was able to base what he wrote upon scholarly understanding of the natural resources of the state. As early as 1844, Dr. Lapham had published a book called: A Geographical and Topographical Description of Wisconsin, which ran a second edition in 1846. In 1852, the Wisconsin Commission of Emigration requested the services of Dr. Lapham in preparing the official Wisconsin pamphlet. As a result many pamphlets were written by him and then translated into the various foreign languages. A typical pamphlet written in 1867 was entitled: Statistics, Exhibiting the History, Climate and Productions of the State of Wisconsin. 47


In 1859, a group of fifteen prominent Milwaukeeans, perhaps with the intention of adding to the labor supply, proposed the subscription of funds with which to print and circulate pamphlets and circulars throughout Germany which would be printed in the German language and would set forth the many advantages of the city and the state.

The work of the Immigration Commission, or as it was later known, the Immigration Board, continued until 1915, except for a short period from 1876-1879. In 1915, its work was taken over by the State Department of Agriculture.

In analyzing the work and the devotion to the cause of immigration of the Wisconsin Board of Immigration one comes to understand why Wisconsin grew so rapidly during the period preceding the First World War. The unusually well-organized quality and the large volume of the written material sent to the German nation explains the influx of Germans into Wisconsin and into Milwaukee which made the city a German metropolis. It is well to remember that the state's highly advertised qualifications were all that was needed to impress the masses of people grown restless with the economic, religious and political restraints of the Old World that America was the

49 Blegen, pp. 19, 27.
answer to their problems; it held untold opportunities for those who cared to emigrate.

The harbor of Milwaukee and its early commerce also played an important role in the development and the growth of the new city. The increase in population and the stability of the area was most dependent upon an actively populated hinterland to supply its needs and which brought produce to market to be shipped out at the port of Milwaukee. This fact was wisely realized as early as 1837 when the Milwaukee Sentinel wrote, "As the back country increases in population, so must the town increase."

The completion of the harbor in December of 1837 was fortunate as the railroad companies completed connections to the Mississippi River that same year. The "wheat and hog" economy which was served by the railroad and lake transportations helped greatly to develop the agricultural hinterland as well as the city itself. The area around Milwaukee was selected by the German settlers rather than the farming area farther from the edge of civilization because the Germans, displaying their national characteristics of caution, chose the eastern edge of towns, keeping as near as possible to the center of supply.

50Stil1, p. 168.
51Milwaukee Sentinel, September 12, 1837, pt. 1, p. 2.
52Schafer, p. 94.
The hinterland was providing more than wheat for export. The raising of animals became the basis of two important industries in Milwaukee, meat packing and tanning. Hides, which were very abundant in the hinterland and the easy access to hemlock bark were the factors which made Milwaukee the largest tanning city by 1877. This industry opened the door to a considerable amount of German immigrant labor.53

Another industry which "made Milwaukee famous" and brought in many German settlers was the brewing industry. This industry catered to the German population both in consumption and in labor. The Pabst Brewing Company was established by the Best family who migrated to America in the early forties and moved to Milwaukee in 1844, setting up the brewery business which they had operated at Mettenheim in Germany.54 The Schlitz Brewing Company was founded in 1849 by August Krug and later taken over by an employee in 1856. Valentin Blatz, the son of a Bavarian brewer came to Milwaukee from Munich and worked as a foreman in a brewery started by John Braun in 1846. Blatz took over the business after the death of Braun. In 1855, Frederick Miller, manager of a brewery in Württemburg, came to America and bought

53 Still, pp. 180-188.
the Plank Road Brewery from Charles Best who owned a section of the original Best Brewery. The Gettelman Company started business in 1877 when Adam Gettelman applied his name to a brewery started in 1854 which his wife had inherited.55

Other industries which drew German immigrants to Milwaukee were the clothing industry, iron casting, shoemaking, and tailoring. Joseph Schafer writes that most of the German residents were skilled artisans.56 The Germans were good in craftsmanship and also capable businessmen.57

Thus we see that the early industries, the natural features of the state of Wisconsin, the media of a well-organized program for advertisement which enumerated the opportunities and facts favoring the state, the liberal laws of citizenship, the land policy of cheap but good land, and the low taxes of the new state all contributed to the large number of German immigrants who entered our state in the period between 1840 and 1900. Milwaukee, being a point of entry from the Great Lakes naturally received a goodly amount of these immigrants who had left their homeland to continue in America the way of life which they knew and loved and which had been challenged by the religious, economic and political forces in Germany.

55Still, p. 331.
57Lacher, p. 32.
Zona Gale, who visited Milwaukee just before the First World War, wrote that the German spirit had so penetrated the city that it impressed her as a city with a special quality which was "perfectly recognizable and definable; it is the pure, independent, foreign flavor of a yet genuinely American viand. Milwaukee has kept its kinship with the home country of its pioneers. . . . Milwaukee, remote from the coast, progressive, cosmopolitan, alive, has contrived by one of those irrelevancies of development, to keep its German character, to keep Nuremberg and Strassburg and Heidelberg in its veins." 58

Thus during the period of development in Milwaukee, the American and German communities stood side by side. The German element having their own debate clubs, lodges, music societies, churches, schools, and newspapers, contrived a society of their own, a society which was not so much on the defensive against the processes of Americanization as indifferent to them. 59

The onset of the First World War challenged this German character and indifferentism and for four years tore the city internally with contradictory ideals of pro-Germanism, Socialism, pacifism, isolationism, and American patriotism.

59 Still, p. 127.
CHAPTER II

WAR BEGINS IN EUROPE

The First World War began in Europe on July 28, 1914 when Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia and it was not long before all of Europe was enveloped in the flames of strife.¹ It was this war which eventually involved the United States and was responsible for the resultant animosities and ill-feelings which were directed towards the German-Americans in many areas of our country, particularly in Milwaukee, which some authors called the "Munich of America."²

War at any time is a heart-rending spectacle to the ordinary peace-loving citizens of the world. Even though it does not directly concern the individuals themselves, still it evokes sympathy for those unfortunates so involved and more definitely so when the afflicted are related to them by ties of blood. "Der Stimme ihres Blutes" called out for help and the German-Americans answered this call while at the same time never

¹David Shannon, Twentieth Century, The United States Since the 1890's (Chicago, 1963), p. 154.

²William Seabrook, These foreigners (New York, 1938), p. 204. William Seabrook writes, "Friends told me in 1912 that Milwaukee was so Germanly German that sentimentalists called it the Munich of America."
questioning their loyalty to America.³

The National German-American Alliance was the group or organization which provided the opportunity whereby the Germans in the United States and in the city of Milwaukee could assemble and speak out against the war. This alliance was of American origin and had been founded in Philadelphia in 1901 to promote the interests of the German element in the United States. The Alliance was formed by a federation of the then-existing German-American organizations in the various states and cities. Richard Barthold, a Congressman from Missouri, secured a congressional charter for the German-American Alliance in 1907.⁴

The purpose for which the Alliance was organized was to keep alive the culture of the Fatherland and to promote friendly relations between America and the Old World. The use of the German tongue was to be retained because it was believed that next to the English language, German had become a language of universal use.⁵

It was not to be a political organization. However, in

³Mathilde B. Schley, Deutschamerika (Milwaukee, 1935), p. 75.
order to become a member, it was necessary to be a citizen of the United States. The aim of the Alliance can best be seen by quoting from its constitution. Its object was to bring together citizens of German descent for the pursuit of "such just aspirations and interests as are not inconsistent with the general weal of the country and the rights and duties of good citizens; for the protection of the German element against 'nativistic' attacks (then meaning prohibitionists); and for the promotion of sound, amicable relations between America and the Fatherland." Lastly, the Alliance called upon "all Germans to gain their citizenship as soon as they were legally entitled to it; to take an active interest in public affairs; and to practice their civic duties with regard to the ballot box, fearlessly and according to their consciences." Attention was also to be directed to the contributions which the Germans made to American history.6

The response to the formation of the Alliance in its inception was negligible in Milwaukee. In 1914, before the war began, the Alliance claimed but 37,000 members from the state of Wisconsin among its 2,000,000 members.7

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6 Child, p. 3.

With the outbreak of the war, more Milwaukeeans began to attend the functions of the Alliance which made no secret of its sympathy for the Central Powers. The president of the Wisconsin Alliance was Dr. Leo Stern, an assistant superintendent of the public schools in Milwaukee. At a meeting held in Kenosha on August 8, 1914, the group praised the Kaiser although suggestions for a "Little Germany" or a German party in this country were opposed by Professor Stern. Even though he expressed great love for the Fatherland at that time, still he urged that the best and finest patriotism was due to the country of their adoption.8

On August 28, 1914, Dr. Stern organized an impressive demonstration at which resolutions were passed appealing to the American press to "Throw off the yoke which English monopolized news service has placed upon it."9

By December 11, 1914, a Dr. Bernhard Dernburg defended Germany's invasion before a large Milwaukee gathering.10

Most historians of today are of the opinion that England's propaganda had a far-reaching effect on the United States. The

8Milwaukee Sentinel, August 10, 1914, pt. 1, p. 2.
change of attitude which developed in America toward Germany in 1914 with the outbreak of the war was in a great measure due to the fact that all news concerning Germany came to America through anti-German papers controlled by the Northcliffe Press. "This phase of British propaganda worked so efficiently that by August 6, 1914, there was not a date-line from Germany or Austria in the American newspapers."\textsuperscript{11}

Already on August 5, 1914, the \textit{Journal} reported that Germany was isolated.

Direct cable communications with Germany was stopped today. The German-Atlantic cable lines from New York to Emden via the Azores, were cut about 1:30 A.M. at some point east of the Azores, possibly by British warships. The cutting of the cable virtually completes the isolation of Germany from communication with the outside world, except by wireless. All direct communications with the United States is severed. All news from Germany will have to filter through hostile countries, Russia on the east, France to the west, and England on the north.\textsuperscript{12}

On August 6, the \textit{Journal} reported that all news sources were now anti-German and that the reports of any war movements came through Brussels, Paris and London.\textsuperscript{13}


\textsuperscript{13}\textit{Ibid.}, August 6, 1914, pt. 1, p. 1.
This fact of British propaganda did more than anything else to cement the bond of unity among the German-Americans who by 1910 were becoming genuinely American with a German flavor, as Still writes in his history of the city, "not less American than New Orleans with its French influence or southern California with that of Spain."\textsuperscript{14} This unwelcome propaganda presented a basis whereby the group, as righteous Americans, could question our government's attitude toward the war. For propaganda purposes, the German-Americans were spoken of as Germans in America rather than as American citizens. During the later months of 1915, there were almost daily accounts of German or Hungarian conspiracies in the United States. Although the persons implicated were all of German citizenship, the newspapers were able to suggest cooperation of German-Americans in these plots.\textsuperscript{15}

This fact is more clearly brought out in a book which had originally appeared in the London \textit{Daily Mail}. Throughout the entire book the German-Americans, particularly those of the Middle West, are accused of disloyalty. Milwaukee is given special mention: "If Milwaukee may be considered as a criterion, German-Americans are German first, and Americans afterwards, if at all."\textsuperscript{16}

\textsuperscript{14}Still, p. 267.  
\textsuperscript{15}Child, pp. 85-88.  
Theodore Roosevelt, at one time a friend of the German-Americans, also says in his book, *Fear God and Take Your Own Part*, that professional pacifists have struck hands with the evil enemies of America—"the hyphenated Americans," who "are not Americans, but Germans in America."17

Loyalty and patriotism are hard terms to define. National loyalty is due to a common language, common tradition, common suffering and sacrifice, and ties with the known, rather than with the unknown, in a new country. It is not strange, therefore, that a city such as Milwaukee, which was so heavily settled with German immigrants, would continue to propagate its German culture. National loyalty has a variety of roots. It springs from direct involvement in the nation's grandeur, and from direct response to the symbols of the nation.18 The German-Americans at that time were already experiencing the sentiments of American patriotism and but for the war would not have reverted to the tight grouping of German-Americanism. This can best be expressed in a quotation by Herman Ridder, the editor of the


New Yorker Staatszeitung in 1915, "Whenever it has been a question between my own country and that of my father, I have given wholehearted support to the former. Only when it was a question of supporting Germany or her enemies have I given rein to an unerasable affection for the Fatherland." 19

Even with all their love for the things of the Fatherland, these people believed that they were true Americans. As early as August 21, 1914, the editor of the Milwaukee Sentinel entreated all Americans of whatever foreign heritage to drop the hyphen and to stand hand in hand as patriotic Americans. He then went on to say that as Americans we have the right to voice our feelings if certain nationalities abroad are getting "less than fair play." 20

The German newspapers of America at this time were very pro-German and particularly the Milwaukee press. 21 It did not, of course, advocate that the United States should go to the aid of Germany nor did it seek to prove the righteousness of the German cause. The aim of these papers was to help the German people by seeking to keep America neutral, and by helping others to understand the truth, thereby combatting the propaganda of the British

19 Hawgood, p. 294.
20 Milwaukee Sentinel, August 21, 1914, pt. 1.
press. Such an appeal was made by President Charles Hexamer in Philadelphia to the German-American Alliance in which he called upon German teachers who could read English to read the newspapers in their respective communities and to write articles for these papers which would disseminate the truth. The point under consideration at that time was the fear of the German-Americans that the United States would be brought into the war through alliance with England. 22

Although the Americans of German descent of Milwaukee did not take sides in the war but rather proclaimed neutrality, they did issue appeals for war relief for the widows and orphans of those fallen in battle among the Germans and Austrians. 23 Sending relief to the victims of war should not have been construed as a proclamation of loyalty for Germany as a nation. Yet, this may account for some of the anti-German sentiment which reared its ugly head later as the United States entered the war.

The German-Americans were not the only promoters in the movement demanding neutrality. There was another group in the city of Milwaukee, as well as in other large cities, which advocated neutrality. This group was the Socialist Party. An

22 Milwaukee Journal, August 26, 1914, pt. 1, p. 10.

article in the Milwaukee Sentinel of September 1, 1914, entitled, "Socialists Advocate Boycott to Stop War," reported that 700 Milwaukee Socialists asked that the United States refuse to ship any foodstuffs to the nations at war.24 The Socialists objected to the war on the grounds that this was a war of foreign capitalists.25 Some of these Socialists went so far as to call it a war of imperialism.26

Other supporters of neutrality were certain Irish organizations who had shown themselves willing to follow the German view of the war. As a result, a Neutrality League was formed in Philadelphia, Chicago, Milwaukee, and St. Louis to carry the agitation for peace into all American circles.27

Lastly, there was one more voice from Wisconsin, most persistent in its demand for the preservation of peace. This voice was that of Senator Robert M. LaFollette. It may even be said that it was due to the fearless efforts of LaFollette that the German-Americans became more insistent in their pleas for neutrality.28

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24 Milwaukee Sentinel, September 1, 1914, pt. 1, p. 3.
26 Milwaukee Writer's Project, History of Milwaukee County (Milwaukee, 1941), p. 117.
27 Child, p. 52.
28 Ibid., 161, 162.
Thus we see that not only the German-Americans objected to the war but other Americans as well. Secondly, the Alliance never counted more than a minority of all German-America citizens in its membership; and according to Wittke, who has done an extensive study of the German-Americans in the Midwest, many German-Americans opposed its methods and its leaders. Furthermore, the Socialists of Milwaukee as elsewhere were strongly opposed to any intervention on the part of the United States in the war, and since their most rabid pacifists were of German birth, it was natural for other Americans to equate all German-Americans of the city with anti-war and pro-German activities.

The German-Americans of Milwaukee were not pro-German in the sense that they were anti-American, but many were partial to the country of their birth. They believed that the best way to serve their former homeland in the crisis and at the same time remain loyal to their adopted land would be to advocate a policy of neutrality toward the war. As a result, they soon found themselves the victims of suspicion and mis-directed zeal.

Even in the presidential election of 1916 the pro-German question played a too prominent part causing historians to wonder if racial cleavage was not a most important factor in the election results.

29Carl Wittke, German-Americans and the World War (Columbus, Ohio, 1936), p. 163.
CHAPTER III

THE ELECTION OF 1916

At the beginning of the war, the German-Americans and others who opposed the war were happy to hear that the President had so readily professed a strong desire to keep the United States in a position of strict neutrality. But as it soon appeared increasingly evident that the Administration was deviating from the German-American ideal of neutrality, friction began to develop between the German-Americans and the President. One of the biggest problems at this time was the ever-increasing sale of munitions to the belligerents. According to the German-American National Alliance, the trade of munitions was a violation of neutrality in that Germany was unable to purchase munitions as a result of Britain's control of the seas. The members

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1New York Times, August 19, 1914, pt. 1, p. 4. Just two weeks after the war began in Europe, the press carried President Wilson's appeal for neutrality in which he pleaded for serenity and fair play. He warned the people about taking sides in the struggle and begged them to be impartial in thought as well as in action. He very definitely stated, "The United States must be neutral in fact as well as in name during these days that are to try men's souls." Wilson conscientiously attempted to adhere to this ideal of neutrality but as the war progressed he found neutrality in practice to be more and more untenable.
of the Alliance believed that the inability of the Central Powers to obtain the necessary war materials was an advantage to the Allies. The German-Americans contended that by conforming to the letter of the law rather than to the spirit, the United States was committing an act of injustice in its efforts to maintain neutrality. Therefore, the German-American organizations, led by the Alliance and joined by pacifists who were opposed to profit at the peril of peace, protested vigorously to the State Department against this alleged neutrality. In answer to the protests the State Department issued a public statement on October 15, 1914, entitled *Neutrality and Trade in Contraband* which stated that citizens of the United States could sell any article of trade to a belligerent government since such sales were not restricted by any rule of international law, by any treaty provision, nor by any statute of the United States. It further stated that if the article of trade were contraband of war, the enemy of the purchasing power had the right to stop these products from reaching their destination, but inability to do so, as in the case of Germany, did not thereby impose the obligation on the neutral country to discontinue such sales. Lastly, it read, "Neither the President, nor any executive department of the Government possesses the legal authority to interfere in any way with trade between this country and the territory of a belligerent. There is no act of Congress conferring
such authority or prohibiting traffic of this sort with European powers."  

By 1915, the Administration's alleged violations against neutrality were becoming increasingly disturbing to the anti-war faction. Among the violations was the closing of the German wireless station on Long Island, the failure to bring Great Britain to terms on such issues as contraband and illegal blockades, interference with American mails, the refusal to honor all passports issued by the State Department to American citizens traveling abroad, the removal of American citizens of German descent from neutral ships and the continuation of shipping of even larger amounts of war materials to the Allies.  

Since the German-Americans, who still retained kindred feelings for the Fatherland, expected the State Department to define American neutral rights against British aggression, it was not long before the German-language press began to seriously question the sincerity of the Administration. It is unnecessary to go into detail concerning the complicated controversies over American neutral rights and their violations but for a clearer understanding of the German-American and pacifist point of view

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3Carl Wittke, German-Americans and the World War (Columbus, Ohio, 1936), p. 47.
the following facts will be helpful. In its demands for immediate reprisals for England's illegal acts against the United States, the German-American press emphasized the fact of British interference with American trade and its effect upon the economic conditions in our country, which had occurred already in the first two years of the war. The German-American press also wanted vigorous action on the violations of international law in which American cargoes billed for neutral ports were confiscated by the British on the ground that they would ultimately reach Germany and the Central Powers. As early as October of 1914, the Cincinnati Volksblatt, one of the few German papers which had defended the President's application of neutrality in the sale of munitions to belligerents, now demanded the end of a policy which permitted England to injure American trade and to starve Germany. Even Mr. Lansing admits in his Memoirs that the British naval authorities had violated more rules of international law than the Germans had violated. The German violations, it is true, caused loss of lives, but many believed that this could be remedied by keeping passengers off Allied


5Wittke, German-Americans and the World War, p. 50, citing the Cincinnati Volksblatt, October 21, 1914.

6Lansing, p. 110.
vessels which were endangered by submarine attack because of the nature of their cargoes.

The pacifists and neutrals, among them the German-Americans, were becoming more and more convinced that Wilson was not completely impartial in his neutrality. As an example of his impartiality, they cited, the protest which was sent to Germany regarding her declaration of submarine warfare on enemy vessels. This protest stated that the German Government would be held to a "strict accountability" for any act against American citizens and their vessels, whereas on that same day, February 1, 1915, through the persistent urging of Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, a protest was sent to Great Britain which, according to the German-Americans, merely objected to her misuse of the American flag which the British were flying on their vessels to obtain safe passage through the German blockade.

7 Edward Buehrig, Woodrow Wilson and the Balance of Power (Bloomington, Indiana, 1955), p. 19. On February 4, 1915, the German Admiralty gave notice that beginning on the eighteenth, the waters surrounding Great Britain and Ireland would be a war area in which enemy merchant ships would be subject to destruction without passengers and crew being accorded the safety required by international law.

8 Edwin Borchard and William Potter Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, Connecticut, 1940), p. 200; Wittke, German-Americans and the World War, pp. 69-70, citing the Davenport Demokrat, February 13, 17, 1915 and the Cincinnati Freie Presse, February 12, 1915; Milwaukee Germania-Herald, February 1915, pt. 1, p. 8. Since the submarine was a powerful offensive weapon but virtually helpless on the defensive, the German
Although it is now obvious to historians that Wilson wholeheartedly endorsed and sincerely desired neutrality for our country, still it was the opinion of those who were so feverishly working for peace that the German submarine campaign seemed to have deeply influenced the President to become more attached to the Allied cause. It was a well-known fact that Walter Hines Page, the American ambassador at the court of St. James was very pro-British as were Colonel Edward M. House and Robert Lansing, the President's most trusted advisors, who believed that our country would eventually be drawn into the war against Germany. Even though Wilson, House, and Lansing believed in neutrality and were hopeful of a negotiated peace, still as the war continued they became more and more convinced that the United States had to take action in one way or another. Lansing wrote in his diary, "None of the Governments, which are depriving Americans government could not make provisions to warn the ships that were marked for destruction. It was possible, however, to warn neutral ships and for this reason Great Britain took advantage of the situation by flying the American flag or the flags of other neutral nations to escape attack. This action was naturally reprehensible to Americans.

9Lansing, pp. 21, 23, 103; Ernest R. May, American Intervention: 1917 and 1941 (Washington, 1960), pp. 1-3; Borchard and Lage, p. 81; Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (Boston, 1925), I, 453. The view that war with Germany was inevitable had been expressed by House in May of 1915 and by Lansing in July that same year.
of their rights is going to change its policy because of diplomatic pressure however strong it may be."\textsuperscript{10} Furthermore, House was certainly inclined to favor the Allies right from the very beginning of the war. He knew and trusted many of the English leaders, particularly the Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, and the British ambassador in Washington, Sir Cecil Spring Rice.\textsuperscript{11} Although House favored the Allies he never believed that Germany was wholly responsible for starting the war.\textsuperscript{12}

Under the circumstances, it was understandable that the German-Americans and many other peace-loving Americans of non-German ancestry, were convinced that American neutrality was not impartial. Hatred of Wilson, which would drive the German-Americans and the Irish-Americans to a bitter anti-Wilson


\textsuperscript{11}George Macaulay Trevelyan, \textit{British History in the Nineteenth Century and After: 1782-1919} (New York, 1937), p. 466. "And when the European War broke out our relations with America were excellent and Grey was on terms of personal friendship and intimacy with Ex-President Theodore Roosevelt, with Page, the American Ambassador in London, and, most important of all, with Colonel House, the right-hand man and confidential messenger of President Wilson himself."

\textsuperscript{12}Link, III, 47, citing the "Memoirs of Colonel House," unpublished MS. deposited in the papers of George Sylvester Viereck, Yale University Library; p. 48, citing the "Diary of Edward M. House," Yale Univeristy Library, November 8, 1914.
campaign in 1915 and in the election year of 1916, developed first in a serious way in the fall of 1914, as it became more and more apparent that neutrality as the President practiced it meant American acquiescence to the British control of the seas. An organized movement for an arms embargo was begun with a meeting of 16,000 German and Irish Americans in Chicago on December 1, 1914. The German Irish Central Legislative Committee for the Furtherance of American Neutrality which was formed at that time sent a lobby to Washington to greet congressmen arriving for the session which convened on December 7, 1914. Petitions in support of the embargo were wheeled by the bundles into the Capitol. The advocates of the arms embargo lost the battle as the Sixty-third Congress adjourned on March 4, 1915. Since the fate of the embargo bill depended to some degree on what the President said or did regarding the problem, he was blamed for its defeat.13

The pressure for an arms embargo increased and the German-American demands for governmental control of a strict neutrality both in shipping and in keeping passengers off the ships of belligerents was heightened by the announcement of the sinking of the Lusitania, a British vessel on May 7, 1915. The

13Link, III, 161-167.
sinking of this ship with a loss of American lives had a jolting effect on American opinion. Those who were pro-Allied now clamored for intervention and those who were anti-German now had grounds for their position and final proof of the irrepres-
sible character of the conflict between democracy and autocracy. Such conclusions now seemed warranted.\textsuperscript{14} A German report in the \textit{New York Times} on the day after the tragedy listed the ship's cargo as containing munitions. The German-Americans were more than ever convinced that the Administration must do something to keep American passengers off ships of belligerents if we were to stay out of the war. Those who sailed on the \textit{Lusitania} did so with a full knowledge of the consequences.\textsuperscript{15}

President Wilson's Secretary of State, William Jennings Bryan, was totally committed to neutrality. From the day the war began, Bryan wrote note after note to the President, his fellow Cabinet members, Ambassador Walter Page in London, Colonel House, the President's personal adviser, and to the heads of belligerent powers themselves, proposing solutions and asking for peace. Bryan later resigned from the post of

\textsuperscript{14}Link, III, 374.

Secretary of State on June 8, 1915, rather than sign the second note that was sent to Germany regarding the sinking of the ship, the Lusitania. In a letter to the President, Bryan stated that their views were the same and both sought the same ends, but their methods differed "irreconcilably." Mr. Bryan's public statement on June 10, gave as reason for his resignation, the fact that he could employ as a private citizen the means which the President did not feel at liberty to employ.16

The German-American Alliance continued its policy of protesting against the violations of neutrality. Throughout the summer of 1915, their distrust of the President and his Administration became increasingly more apparent. The Wisconsin Alliance in its annual meeting in Madison on June 26 debated whether or not to censure the President in his treatment of the application of our nation's neutrality.17

The convention of the National Alliance which was held on August 2 in San Francisco was accompanied by parades and demonstrations. President Charles Hexamer dealt critically with

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the policy of President Wilson in the opening speech but when a lively discussion arose over a letter to the President denouncing his conduct of public affairs, Hexamer intervened in favor of a mild letter of protest. The power of the German-Americans was beginning to worry Wilson and the question of divided loyalties caused him enough solicitude to ask in a letter to Colonel House on August 25, 1915, if there might not be an outbreak on the part of the German-Americans in the event the United States should enter the war against Germany. In his reply, House wrote that he did not expect "any organized rebellion or outbreak, but merely some degree of frightfulness in order to intimidate the country."19

President Wilson had stated in his proclamation on neutrality which was issued at the outbreak of hostilities, that it would be easy to excite the passions of various national groups and to divide the country into "camps of hostile opinion, hot against each other, involved in the war itself in impulse and opinion, if not in action."20 By the fall of 1915, he began to realize that it was time to call attention to the dangers of


19Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (Boston, 1926), II, 33-35.

"hyphenism" among the American people. In a speech on October 11, before a gathering of the Daughters of the American Revolution, Wilson gave a warning to the "hyphenates." He said that they must declare that they are American before all else.21

Two days later ex-president Theodore Roosevelt spoke even more strongly to the "hyphenates." In a Columbus Day speech on Americanism, speaking to the New York Chapter of the Knights of Columbus at Carnegie Hall he said, "There is no room in the country for hyphenated Americans. When I refer to hyphenated Americans I do not refer to naturalized Americans. Some of the very best Americans I have ever known were naturalized Americans born abroad. But a hyphenate-American is no American at all."22

Finally, on November 4, 1915, at a meeting of the Democratic Party celebrating its fiftieth anniversary at the Manhattan Club in New York, President Wilson once more spoke against the "hyphenated Americans" but this speech made it very clear that the disloyal hyphenates were few and although loud, did not speak for all Americans of foreign birth.

The only thing within our own borders that has given us grave concern in recent months has been that voices have been raised in America professing to be the


voices of Americans which were not indeed and in truth American, but which spoke alien sympathies, which came from men who loved other countries better than they loved America, men who were partisans of other causes than that of America and had forgotten that their chief and only allegiance was to the great Government under which they live. These voices have not been many, but they have been very loud and clamorous. They have proceeded from a few who were bitter and who were grievously misled.

America has not opened its doors in vain to men and women out of other nations. The vast majority of those who have come to take advantage of her hospitality have united their spirits with hers as well as their fortunes. These men who speak alien sympathies are not their spokesmen but are the spokesmen of small groups whom it is high time that the nation should call to a reckoning.23

Even though the President spoke only of the small but vociferous group of foreign-born, who, it appeared, placed loyalty to the nation in second place, nevertheless, this speech was taken amiss by others who were opposed to Wilson's application of neutrality. Although they opposed the Administration they did not consider themselves pro-German. Thus, when President Wilson and Theodore Roosevelt raised the issue of divided loyalties among the "hyphenated Americans," the editors of the German-American papers took up the battle cry. They charged that the President had pointed the finger of accusation at the German element because they had so definitely insisted upon a strict impartial neutrality and had the courage to openly

challenge the pro-British sentiments of the Administration.24
The Milwaukee Germania-Herald probably echoed the sentiment of
most German-American newspapers at that time in its article which
starts with an English sentence.

Wanted an American administration. Mit anderen
Worten, eine der ältesten und emflusreichsten demo­
kritischen Zeitungen des Landes beschuldigt eine demo­
kritische Administration, das ihre Kriegspolitif nicht
amerikanischen, sondern englischen Interessen diene.
Seine empfindlichste persönliche Schlappe aber hat Herr
Wilkson gerade in der Stadt erlitten, in welcher er
gestern abermals die Loyalitat der Deutschamerikaner
werdachtigte.25

As was already mentioned, the Irish in America had joined
with the German-Americans to form Neutrality Leagues and the
first large cities to have such leagues were Philadelphia,
Chicago, St. Louis, and Milwaukee.26 There was naturally an
anti-British sentiment among the Irish in America due to the
bitter memories of alleged English oppression in the homeland.
Probably the majority of these Irish-Americans, who numbered
4,500,000 in 1914 and were concentrated in the eastern and
midwestern cities, became anti-Allied for no other reason than
because Britain was the chief of the Allied Powers. Since they
were anti-British they were an important center of Pro-German

24 Wittke, German-Americans and the World War, p. 42
25 Germania-Herald, November 5, 1915, pt. 1, p. 6
26 Child p. 52
As early as 1915, The American Truth Society, headed by Jeremiah A. O'Leary, was among the most active pro-German propaganda groups in the East. Among its members were such prominent leaders of the German-American element as George Viereck and Bernard Ridder of the New York German papers, the Fatherland and the New Yorker Staats-Zeitung, respectively.

In their insistence on an arms embargo, which the German- and Irish-Americans began demanding already in the first year of the war, the groups were definitely displaying an anti-British sentiment. The German-Americans, particularly, could not understand why England could have access to munitions and armaments through neutral markets while Germany was unable to obtain munitions due to the British blockade of our shipping. There was surely at least a hint of pro-Germanism here in that the group was probably actuated by a desire to help the Fatherland to a speedy victory by keeping armaments from England and her Allies. Other pacifists could also foresee an early end to the

27Wittke, German-Americans and the World War, p. 63.
29Lansing, pp. 120-124.
war which could not continue without the supply of munitions and other materials from our American resources.

To the German-Americans and other Americans who sincerely desired to keep our country out of the war in Europe it appeared that the only way that such a policy could be possible would be to elect a president who would enforce American rights with equal severity against both belligerents and yet not be inclined to favor either.

Since many who opposed the war were convinced that Wilson should be replaced, the German-American Alliance became more outspoken as the time of the next presidential election campaign drew nearer. On November 22, 1915, Charles Hexamer, who, in August spoke for moderation in censuring the President, now declared in Milwaukee that the Administration was pitifully weak.30

As stated in an earlier chapter, the German-American Alliance, which had units in every state and large city with considerable population, did not represent the opinion of all the Americans of German descent. However, in a study such as this in which we are attempting to analyze the reason for the anti-German sentiment at the time of the war, it is necessary to discuss those, who in their outspoken demands for neutrality and peace,

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made themselves often-times too well heard to the detriment of their fellow German-Americans.

In January of 1916, the Milwaukee Alliance, determined to make use of every possible vote, requested and urged all Germans who were eligible to apply for citizenship in order that they could vote in the "coming election."\(^\text{31}\)

A nationwide campaign for the candidate of the choice of the National Alliance was not possible because by law, the Alliance could not show official preferences in an election, and according to the constitution of the Alliance, it was not to be a political association.\(^\text{32}\) Nevertheless, the local alliances which had no charters could act as they pleased in the matter.\(^\text{33}\)

Since Wilson's nomination by the Democratic Party seemed assured, the German-Americans began to work for a favorable nominee in the Republican Party.

\(^{31}\)Child, p. 117; New York Times, March 30, 1916, pt. 1, p. 4. In its editorial, the Times quoted the Milwaukee Germania-Herald as saying by March of 1916, that the German-Americans of the United States must stand together in the coming election and select men of their own race for office, in order to counteract the pro-British tendencies to control the country.

\(^{32}\)Child, p. 127. "In its bulletin for April, 1916, President Haymer warned all branches that Section 83 of the United States Criminal Code made it illegal for an incorporated organization to engage in party politics. . . ."

\(^{33}\)Milwaukee Sonntagspost, October 1, 1916, pt. 1, p. 7. "Der Bund als solcher verfolgt keine politischen ziele. Das hindert aber nicht, das die Mitglieder des Bundes und diejenigen seiner Staatsverbande welche nicht in Besitze eines Freibriefes sind, und der politif lebhasten anteil nehmen."
Theodore Roosevelt figured heavily in the thoughts of Republicans as the time of the convention drew near, although he was technically not a Republican at the time. The nomination of Roosevelt would have been foolhardy since his pro-Allies attitudes and his belligerent ideas concerning war made him unsatisfactory to the anti-war element in the party. Although he desired to be president, he remarked to Henry Cabot Lodge in a letter of November 27, 1915, that it would be utterly harmful for him to be the candidate because "the German-American, the professional hyphenated-American of every kind and the whole flapdoodle outfit would be against me." Consequently, Roosevelt let it be known that his original intention had been to bring the Progressives back into the Republican Party and then to nominate a strong candidate who would be acceptable to both wings of the party and who would be "right" on the great issues of the time.

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34 Belle Case LaFollette and Fola LaFollette, Robert M. LaFollette (New York, 1953), I, 570. LaFollette's biographers wrote that early in April of 1915, a succession of newspaper dispatches had predicted that Roosevelt would be the presidential nominee of both the Progressive and the Republican parties.

35 William Henry Harbaugh, Power and Responsibility, The Life and Times of Theodore Roosevelt (New York, 1961), pp. 477-488. "And he never lost his conviction that the national interest demanded American entry into the war on the Allies's side; the preservation of American rights against Germany now became an end in itself;" LaFollette and LaFollette, p. 571.

36 Selections from the Correspondence of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918 (New York, 1925), II, 464.

37 Harbaugh, pp. 484-485.
In February of 1916, George Sylvester Viereck, a prominent member of the National German-American Alliance and editor of the New York periodical, The Fatherland, predicted in a speech before the Chicago Press Club that the pro-German vote would be cast against any presidential candidate who did not concur in Germany's idea of submarine warfare. He added, "I am not here as champion of the German cause, but of true Americanism." It was also at this time that he said that he would vote for Wilson before he would vote for either Roosevelt or Senator Root of New York, whom he believed wanted war.38

After a national conference of German-Americans, held in Chicago on May 28, 1916, Max Hottelet of the German War Veterans, pointed out in an interview for the Milwaukee Sentinel that the conference had not declared for any particular candidate. "Any good American is satisfactory to us, except Theodore Roosevelt."39 This conference was not sponsored by the German-American National Alliance, but was a meeting of representatives from all German groups whose object was to draft a statement of

38 Richard W. Leopold, Elihu Root and the Conservative Tradition (Boston, 1954), p. 115. Root's position was later made public when he spoke before the Union League Club on March 20 and at Madison Square Garden on March 22. He asserted that Germany was already at war with the United States destroying life and property and that if the nation did not defend itself now, greater indignities would follow; Milwaukee Journal, March 1, 1916, pt. 1, p. 4.

principles on the problem of American neutrality. Twenty-five states were represented. Among this number were representatives from some twenty state alliances and some sixty German newspapers. The German-American publishers drew up and adopted resolutions favoring preparedness, an American merchant marine, and a return to the American policy of isolation. 40 According to the Milwaukee Journal, the conference was to consider the national political situation with a view to placing the wishes of the German-Americans before the national Republican convention. 41 This aim was vigorously opposed by the Journal. The fact that Milwaukee did not take any later action in this regard seems due to the Journal's objections which were so forcefully voiced in its editorials at that time. 42

Early in 1916, the name of a justice of the United States Supreme Court, Justice Charles Evans Hughes, was mentioned as a possible presidential candidate in the approaching Republican convention. However, Hughes showed no indication of interest in the nomination. In February, he wrote to C. Bascom Slemp of West Virginia that he was totally opposed to the use of his name


in connection with the nomination. The German-Americans were cool towards Hughes since they were seeking a candidate who would favor neutrality. Henry Weismann, president of the New York State German-American Alliance, is quoted as saying, "Since Justice Hughes has not declared his attitude regarding these great questions absolutely impartial [and neutral as regards the war and policies of the belligerent government] the average German-American is not supporting him." 44

The Republican Convention met in Chicago on June 9, 1916. The names of ten candidates were presented to the assembly. The name of Theodore Roosevelt was placed in nomination by Senator Fall of New Mexico late the first afternoon, and his speech was followed by an enthusiastic demonstration which lasted thirty minutes. After two ballots that evening, the convention adjourned without nominating a candidate. During a conference of Republican leaders later that night it became evident that Roosevelt would not be accepted as their candidate. They thought he was so very much identified with favoring the entry of the United States into the war that as a result his nomination would center around that issue in the campaign, and thereby Wilson would

win the election. 45 The following day, the convention turned to Hughes on the third ballot with Charles Warren Fairbanks of Indiana, the vice-president under Theodore Roosevelt from 1904-1909, as the candidate for the vice-presidency. 46 Theodore Roosevelt was not enthusiastic about the selection of Hughes but he believed Hughes would make a "straight-out fight" for preparedness and national defense. 47

At once the Chicago Alliance and the alliance of the state of Illinois proclaimed their support of Hughes. 48 Not all German-Americans, however, were ready to back him. No, not even all the so-called leaders of that group. Viereck of The Fatherland, is quoted as writing, "No one can tell yet who the German-Americans will support." Their support would depend upon the candidate's attitude towards the war and the question of neutrality, as others had already said. Viereck was happy that Roosevelt had lost the nomination. 49

Other German newspapers endorsed Hughes. Among them was the Milwaukee Germania-Herald which carried in its Sunday edition

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45 LaFollette and LaFollette, I, 571.
47 Correspondence of Roosevelt and Lodge, p. 489.
49 Ibid., pt. 1, p. 2.
a front page picture of the candidate and Mrs. Hughes with the
caption, "The Next President and His Wife."\(^50\)

The Republican platform had declared itself for neutrality,
"We desire peace, the peace of justice and right, and believe in
maintaining a strict and honest neutrality between the belliger-
ents in the great war in Europe."\(^51\) This was agreeable to the
pacifists and the Irish and German-Americans of Milwaukee.

The Democratic Convention met in St. Louis on June 14.
President Wilson was re-nominated by acclamation and Thomas R.
Marshall was again chosen for the vice-presidency. Since the
German-Americans never voted as a single unit in any election,
there were German-Americans interested in this convention just
as members of their group were vitally interested in the outcome
of the Republican convention. This group of the German-American
element suggested Senator William J. Stone of Missouri, chairman
of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, as a possible can-
didate. His attitude on questions of neutrality was more in ac-
cord with the German-American viewpoint.\(^52\) The group also sug-
gested Senator Gilbert Monell Hitchcock of Nebraska. Colonel
George Washington Goethals, the builder of the Panama Canal, was


\(^{52}\)Wittke, German-Americans and the World War, p. 88, citing
the Cincinnati Volksblatt, February 26, 1916.
also named as a possible candidate in an Iowa German paper. Like the Republicans, this group, too, opposed the re-election of President Wilson.

The Socialists held no convention but named Allan L. Benson and George R. Kirkpatrick, both of New York, as their candidates.

The Progressive Party held its national convention in Chicago at the same time as the Republican Party met. The Progressive group nominated Roosevelt once more but he promptly declined and urged the Progressives to disband the party and to support Hughes. Two weeks later the party was dead.

As mentioned previously, a number of Irish and German-Americans had been awaiting the opportunity to carry their grievances against the Administration into the field of politics. Consequently, the alleged partiality of President Wilson and the concomitant apparent lack of a true neutrality became an important issue in the election of 1916. Since the Allied control of the seas had virtually closed the American market in Germany, the exportation of war supplies had become a very one-sided process. The buying and selling of war materials in neutral nations during

53 Wittke, German-Americans and the World War, p. 88, citing the Davenport Demokrat, March 2, 1916.


55 Harbaugh, pp. 487-492.
wartime was considered in harmony with the idea of neutrality but it was obvious that one group only, of the belligerents, had access to the neutral markets. Americans felt that our ships had a perfect right to enter any harbor of neutral nations. This was curtailed by England even to the extent that she interned our ships which were bound for neutral ports. The anti-British and anti-war element in our country believed that the President was not firm enough in his protests to England regarding her violations of our neutrality on the high seas. The Irish and German-Americans became angry when it seemed apparent that the President's neutrality meant American acquiescence to the British control of the seas. It was for this reason that the German-American press began to publicize the fact that Wilson was pro-British and consequently should not be re-elected. The German-language press insisted that foreign-born minorities were quite willing to be Americanized but would not be "Anglicized." The press pleaded with the Administration to be truly neutral and

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56 Lansing, pp. 120-124, 129. Lansing writes that already in December of 1914, a vigorous protest was sent to the British Government regarding interferences with American trade. For a description of England's violations read Lansing's War Memoirs, pages 120 to 124. Since Lansing believed that we would eventually go to war on the side of the Allies he was relieved when the renewal of unrestricted submarine warfare by the German Government lessened the growing demands of the American public that the State Department do something to safeguard our commercial interests from British interference.

57 Wittke, German-language Press, pp. 254, 256.
"break away from England!" Yet with all the anti-Wilson words the ordinary voters in the ranks of the "hyphenated" weren't so sure that Hughes would conduct our country any better in the situation. They were afraid that a Hughes administration might be dominated by a Roosevelt, Root or Lodge.

Although Hughes said that he was for "undiluted Americanism," he did not bring up the issue of German-Americanism in the campaign but neither did he set forth any definite plans concerning the war.

During the campaign the Milwaukee Journal worked most diligently to prove that in spite of the fact that the great body of Milwaukee citizens might naturally sympathize with Germany against her enemies, still they were loyal to America. It stated that the average Germans were Americans first; that they, wishing to get away from militarism, came to America, and for this very reason were opposed to the war. In its editorials, the Journal undermined the anti-Wilson influence of the German press.

58 Wittke, German-Americans and the World War, p. 97.
59 Wittke, German-language Press, p. 257.
As we shall see, it did succeed in proving Milwaukee to be a real American city in the re-election of Wilson and in its zealous war effort once the United States entered the war.

On election night, it appeared as if Hughes had won the election but as the returns trickled in during the next few days, Wilson was proclaimed the winner. His re-election was affirmed when the Republican chairman of California conceded defeat.63

The voters in the Midwest and the Far West, who were strongly opposed to involvement in the war, must have turned the tide in the election. The slogan, "He kept us out of war," over-rode much of the antagonism of the anti-war German-American minority. This appears particularly true in Milwaukee, which carried Wilson in a state that voted Republican. Wilson won in Milwaukee County by a margin of 6,981 votes out of a total of 80,011, and in the city itself by a margin of 6,914 out of a possible 69,624. The county voters beyond the city limits, added but 67 votes to the city's plurality in the re-election of President Wilson.64

The following chart should be helpful in interpreting the results of this presidential election by comparing state and county vote according to percentage over a period of several election years.

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63 Still, p. 457.

64 Wisconsin Blue Book, p. 218.
PRESIDENTIAL VOTES FOR MAJOR CANDIDATES IN MILWAUKEE COUNTY COMPARED WITH THAT IN THE REMAINDER OF THE STATE OF WISCONSIN, 1900-1920

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Election</th>
<th>Candidate</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Wisconsin Vote outside of Milwaukee County</th>
<th>Milwaukee County Per-cent of Vote</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bryan</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>38.64</td>
<td>35.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1900</td>
<td>McKinley</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>52.52</td>
<td>61.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Debs</td>
<td>Soc. Dem.</td>
<td>7.26</td>
<td>.58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1904</td>
<td>Parker</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>26.32</td>
<td>28.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>46.22</td>
<td>66.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Debs</td>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>26.01</td>
<td>2.65</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>Bryan</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>35.40</td>
<td>36.72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taft</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>38.97</td>
<td>57.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Debs</td>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>23.82</td>
<td>2.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>Wilson</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>38.75</td>
<td>41.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Taft</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>25.07</td>
<td>34.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Debs</td>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>26.99</td>
<td>4.33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Roosevelt</td>
<td>Progressive</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>17.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>Wilson</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>43.51</td>
<td>42.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hughes</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>34.78</td>
<td>52.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Benson</td>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>21.18</td>
<td>2.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1920</td>
<td>Cox</td>
<td>Democrat</td>
<td>17.89</td>
<td>15.74</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harding</td>
<td>Republican</td>
<td>51.58</td>
<td>76.06</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Debs</td>
<td>Socialist</td>
<td>30.16</td>
<td>6.75</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

65Still, pp. 592-593. The above statistics were compiled from Table 9. Still's reference was the Wisconsin Blue Books.
Many conclusions may be drawn from the material on the previous page. In comparing the county and the state vote without the County of Milwaukee, we find that in both, the Democratic vote is almost equal, whereas the Republican state vote is definitely ahead of the county due, no doubt, to the strong Socialist minority vote in the city of Milwaukee which will be discussed later in the chapter.

In the city of Milwaukee election returns for governor, Emanuel L. Philipp, the Republican candidate who had also endorsed Hughes,⁶⁶ was re-elected by a plurality of 7,926. Strange as it may seem, Milwaukee reversed the party plurality in the vote for the Republican governor. In searching for a political reason for the about face, we find that Governor Philipp had attracted nation-wide attention because of his advocacy of mediation among neutral nations. He had even been invited, along with Robert LaFollette and Victor Berger, to accompany Henry Ford, the auto magnate and zealous pacifist, on a peace mission to Europe. Philipp saw the war as a struggle for commercial leadership between England and Germany. He believed that American citizens who sailed on ships of belligerents or into the waters surrounding the nations at war would have to

assume the same risk just as if they entered a war zone on land. He was certain that in this war, America's duty was to maintain a strict neutrality and to avoid any actions which might bring our nation into the conflict. In a speech in LaCrosse early in 1915, he spoke against the shipping of munitions to either belligerent. He went so far as to say that he would withhold any weapon or tool that would allow the two sides to prolong the war. The German and Irish-Americans of Milwaukee, who were opposed to the war, in all probability voted for Philipp, who like them, was a strong believer in a strict neutrality and was firmly convinced of the need of an arms embargo.67

As we shall see from the following statistics, Senator Robert LaFollette was also returned to the Senate by a big majority in Milwaukee.68 Two Republicans were re-elected to Congress from the Milwaukee districts by definite pluralities even with the high Socialist vote in both districts. In the contest for county offices all the winning candidates were Republican except one.69

67 Maxwell, pp. 111-117.

68 LaFollette and LaFollette, I, pp. 537, 584. LaFollette was elected by the Republican Progressive Party and was very adamant in his idea of the observance of a strict neutrality in war. His plurality in this election was the largest ever given to any candidate in Wisconsin. He carried sixty-nine of the seventy-one counties.

It might be interesting to study the exact figures on the presidential and gubernatorial votes for the city of Milwaukee.

The facts shown in these statistics are not self-explanatory. However, the Milwaukee Journal, which worked so hard to convince the German-Americans of the city to vote for Wilson in the best interests of the country, printed an interesting resume...
of the German-American vote. It stated that Milwaukee was vindicated of its charges of "disloyalty" by its vote for Wilson because in other strongly German communities of Wisconsin, "... thousands of German-Americans voted not as Americans but as Germans."72 The Milwaukee Journal went on to say that in the wards dominated by citizens of German blood, five wards, the Thirteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-first, Twenty-second, and the Twenty-third carried pluralities for Wilson. In two more, the Tenth and Twentieth, the vote was very close. Only the Fifteenth and the Twenty-fifth voted decisively for Mr. Hughes. President Wilson led Mr. Hughes in nineteen of Milwaukee's twenty-five wards.73

In studying the election statistics on page 65, we can notice that in the Tenth and Twentieth wards, in which the vote was very close, the Socialist vote was likewise close. Again, in the Twenty-fifth ward which carried Mr. Hughes, the Socialist vote was almost equal that of Hughes. Only in the Fifteenth, where Hughes also led in a German-American ward, was there a small Socialist vote.

The Socialist Party was a strong group in Milwaukee since 1910, when the city had elected Emil Seidel as its first Socialist mayor. In that same election, the Socialists won the office

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73 Ibid., 10.
of comptroller, treasurer, city attorney, and a majority on the city and county boards. In the election of 1916, another Socialist, Daniel Hoan, was elected to the office of mayor. Hoan held this office until 1940. Although the city elected another Socialist as mayor in the election of 1916, the Socialist Party lost the majority which it had held in the city offices since the election of 1910.74

The Milwaukee Journal definitely believed that the citizens of Milwaukee were loyal to their country and that in the election returns, "Milwaukee administered a stinging rebuke to the forces of alienism."75

Before entering into a discussion of the possible motives behind the obvious crossing of party lines by so many voters in this election, it would be wise to have access to the vote statistics for the area regarding the United States senator and the two congressmen who were also elected in 1916 from the Milwaukee districts.

The following two pages contain the vote for United States senator by counties and a summary of the votes in the Fourth and the Fifth Congressional districts.

74 Still, pp. 316, 515-516, 522-530.
### SUMMARY OF VOTES IN FOURTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>34,842</td>
<td>10,757</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>12,361</td>
<td>11,380</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Part)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>34,842</td>
<td>10,757</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>12,361</td>
<td>11,380</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### SUMMARY OF VOTES IN FIFTH CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Milwaukee</td>
<td>43,153</td>
<td>7,420</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>19,585</td>
<td>15,986</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Part)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
<td>43,153</td>
<td>7,420</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>19,585</td>
<td>15,986</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

19
It is a fact that the problems of racial or national origin were exploited in this election but historians have not as yet written a final chapter on this presidential election. Either there was no "hyphenate" vote or it was canceled in its own territory by the anti-hyphen vote. In many cases it seems safe to assume that the German-Americans refused to follow their supposed leaders and voted for either Hughes or Wilson according to their usual party preferences, or for reasons of their own, just as others did upon a thoughtful consideration of the issues of the campaign.78 Neither would it be rash to conclude that Roosevelt's attacks upon the German-Americans and his critical and often harsh indictment of Wilson's handling of the German Government in the controversies arising from our neutrality caused more of the German-Americans to vote for Wilson who may have otherwise voted the Republican ticket for the presidential candidate also.79

Much of the credit for the Wilson vote in Milwaukee goes to the Milwaukee Journal which extolled the loyalty of the city and


79Lansing, p. 161. In his Memoirs, Mr. Lansing writes, "My personal opinion is that the harsh and unrestrained attacks of Colonel Roosevelt on President Wilson's handling of the controversies with the German Government, which he uttered with his usual virility and extravagance of expression, alienated more of the German-Americans than Mr. Hughes was able to win by his vagueness."
published articles calculated to change the anti-Wilson attitude of the German-Americans of the area. One such article entitled, "Enquiry Shows Majority Stand by Wilson," stated that the speech of Theodore Roosevelt at Battle Creek, Michigan, "... sent many back to the Wilson ranks, who were waverling." A German from Fond du Lac was quoted as saying that a vote for Hughes was a vote for Roosevelt. In the same article, E. J. Gehl of West Bend, Wisconsin, said, "I had a little experience that demonstrated to me that plenty of Germans who are intensely devoted to the Fatherland in the war are loyal to President Wilson, too." A Mr. Grueneck said, "The outstanding thing with me is that Wilson kept us out of war." 80

Another fact that may have helped to win votes for Wilson was an article concerning Senator Robert M. LaFollette of Wisconsin who was against the war and very much opposed to any type of intervention, as we have seen. He had never publicly endorsed Wilson but he had not endorsed Hughes, either. 81 The Journal, therefore, capitalized on this fact and reprinted an item from the New York Times which said that Senator LaFollette had never said a pleasant word for the Republican candidate, but on the contrary had directly praised President Wilson. 82

81 LaFollette and La Follette, I, pp. 583-584.
The Milwaukee Journal, also, publicized the fact that Henry Ford, the automobile manufacturer and a public advocate of peace, told Wilson in a conference at Shadow Lawn, New Jersey, that he was supporting him for re-election even though he had been a Republican in the past. Later that month, the paper carried an article which stated that Henry Ford had signed an advertisement praising Wilson's achievements. This advertisement, according to the Journal, was to be placed in 500 papers throughout the country.

On October 4, 1916, the Journal had also played politics by drawing another conclusion for its readers when it stated that Hughes had not repudiated Theodore Roosevelt's views on the war, and therefore, he must endorse them. The same article quoted John Cudahy, a prominent businessman of Milwaukee, speaking in Ashland, Wisconsin. "Let there be no mistake about this. A vote for Hughes means war; a vote for Wilson, peace."

Finally, we might agree with Mr. Lansing, who wrote the following in his Memoirs, "'He kept us out of war,' was repeated and repeated until the thought became deeply embedded in the public mind. The value of it was that it was true and everybody

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84 Ibid., October 31, 1916, pt. 1, p. 3.
knew it was true." Even Count Johann von Bernstorff, the German ambassador to the United States, reported to his government on August fourth, that this campaign slogan was helping the cause for Wilson. He wrote, "'He kept us out of war.' This is and remains Wilson's trump card."

The fact that Milwaukeeans proved their loyalty to the Administration by the election returns should show that the German-Americans of the city did not, as an united group, oppose the government nor were they un-American in their political views. Those radicals who made themselves the forceful and outspoken leaders of the German element found that they had a much smaller following than they cared to believe. The vote also demonstrated that the ordinary German-American did not misinterpret President Wilson's warning to the "hyphenated Americans." They had no reason to let it bother them since they did not believe it to be aimed at them but rather at the self-appointed German-American leaders. Only those German-Americans who were radically opposed to the Administration took offense at the President's warning. These radicals did attempt and often succeeded in stirring up the emotions of the other German-Americans who, however, appear to have made up their own minds on the day of

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86 Lansing, p. 160.
the election. As evidenced by the Milwaukee election statistics, it does not seem that there was much of an anti-Wilson vote among the citizens of Milwaukee. Certainly, with the Republican vote for other candidates, it would be impossible to discern any large anti-Wilson vote.

Whatever the motivation of the German-Americans of the city, who signified their choice of Wilson and then voted the Republican ticket on the other ballots, Milwaukee was vindicated of the pro-German accusations which were leveled against her since the beginning of the war. She would find it necessary to prove her loyalty again, once the United States entered the war; and this we shall see in the following pages as we attempt to analyze the reaction of the citizens of Milwaukee to the declaration of war and to each other as they rallied to the united war effort.

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88 Milwaukee Journal, October 21, 1916, pt. 1, p. 3. A certain German-American of Sheboygan, Wisconsin, promised to vote for Wilson because by this good deed he would "expose those German-Americans who are not our leaders."
CHAPTER IV

WORLD WAR I AND MILWAUKEE

Slowly but surely America became involved in the war. While the war had been going on in Europe since 1914, the hope that the United States could remain neutral dwindled until the events of early 1917 resulted in a declaration of war.

In February of 1917, the German government announced it would resume its policy of unrestricted submarine warfare. The new order was in direct violation of the promise given to the American government in the Sussex negotiation,¹ and it brought our country one step closer to war with the severing of diplomatic relations with Germany. On February 3, Count von Bernstorff, the German ambassador, was handed his passports and our ambassador, James W. Gerard, was recalled from Berlin.²

Although the German-American National Alliance was very anti-Wilson at the time of the election and was also greatly

¹Edwin Borchard and William Potter Lage, Neutrality for the United States (New Haven, Connecticut, 1940), p. 167. The Sussex note of May 4, 1916, promised that vessels both within and without the area declared as a naval war zone, should not be sunk without warning and without saving human lives, unless these ships attempt to escape or offer resistance.

opposed to any participation in the war, yet, when the rupture in relations became known, the Alliance backed the President. On February 7, Charles Hexamer, the president of the Alliance called a meeting in Philadelphia of executives to deal with the question of the diplomatic break between the two powers. At this meeting, the Alliance endorsed the President in severing relations with Germany. For the public statement the officers of the group drew up a pledge of loyalty which stated: "Under President Wilson, as our commander-in-chief, we will fight no less loyally than the German-Americans fought under Lincoln in the Civil War for the preservation of the Union." The meeting was concluded with the following statement: "Our representatives understand that, since the beginning of the war, we have been very much misunderstood and unjustly criticized. But if it comes to war with Germany our attitude will permit no further misinterpretation, for we shall come forward with our fortunes and our lives for our American government."  

The Wisconsin German-American Alliance was not so ready to back the President of the United States. The Milwaukee Journal quoted the Wisconsin Alliance as saying that the right of a nation to break with a foreign power should be in the hands of

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Congress rather than be the decision of the President. The Alliance further stated: "When he was running for re-election, the President was talking peace all the time; now he's getting us into a war." The group went on to say, "If there is a war, it is a sure thing that the German-Americans will form regiments to fight for the city. . . . We have an idea -- to stick to the country. We are Americans first of all, although we hate to see our country fight against the land of our birth."4

On February 10, the Benjamin Tallmadge Milwaukee Chapter of the Daughters of the American Revolution asked that the citizens of Milwaukee fly the flag at all times from their homes, offices and factories to proclaim their patriotism. A Milwaukeean had climbed up in the tower of the Pabst building to see how many flags were being flown that day. He counted about fifty. The Deutscher Club was one of the fifty flying the American flag that day.5

In February, also, the German-Americans decided to postpone preparations for a relief bazaar for Austrian and German war widows and orphans until friendly relations would be resumed with Germany. Milwaukeeans still hoped for peace and the Milwaukee German newspaper, the Germania-Herald, began a front page article entitled: "Zur Erhaltung des Friedens." This article,

appearing with regularity from February until war was declared, announced the various group meetings for peace and reminded the readers to write to Washington in the interest of peace. 6

Six days after an executive meeting of the National Alliance in New York, Herman Ridder of the Staats-Zeitung, visited Colonel House to express the loyalty of the German-Americans and at this time, House approved the plan presented by Ridder to organize the group into a committee for the purpose of offering its services to the mayor of New York. Colonel House congratulated Ridder upon the patriotism of the German-Americans and did what he could to stimulate that feeling. 7

Although the National Alliance was preparing itself for the eventuality of war, the Alliance in Milwaukee was still expending every effort against the war. On February 12, an executive meeting of the Milwaukee Alliance urged all its members to send individual appeals to President Wilson to urge him to keep the country out of the war. 8 The firm stand of the Milwaukee Alliance was due, no doubt, to the example of the senator from


7 Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel House (Boston, 1925), I, 443, 444. House had earlier suggested that the German-Americans be brought into the committee.

Wisconsin, Robert M. LaFollette, who was using every means at his disposal to maintain the peace.\(^9\) The *Milwaukee Journal* interviewed Professor Leo Stern, the president of the Milwaukee German-American Alliance and assistant superintendent of the Milwaukee public schools, the day following the meeting and attempted to obtain a statement from him regarding the issue of war. For answer he repeated the resolution made public by the Alliance which stated that the group called upon the President and the members of Congress to do their utmost to preserve the peace.\(^10\)

Later in the month of February, a former Milwaukeean, Louis P. Lochner, who later founded the People's Council of America, a group for peace, spoke to the members of the Emergency Peace League at a meeting which was held in the Hotel Pfister. Mr. Lochner urged his listeners to write to Congress to request its members to defer settlement of the war-provoking problems until the intimate complications had blown away.\(^11\)

\(^9\)Karen Falk, "Public Opinion in Wisconsin During World War I," *Wisconsin Magazine of History*, XXV (June, 1942), 391. LaFollette had been re-elected to the Senate alike by Scandinavian-Americans, German-Americans, farmers and laborers. In his platform he opposed preparedness, advocated a strict neutrality, and promised to vote against any measure which would involve the United States in a war in Europe.

\(^10\)*Milwaukee Journal*, February 14, 1917, pt. 1, p. 3.

Then, in this time of divided loyalties, a Mr. Alvin P. Kletzsch came back from a trip to the East coast with the news that the business men of the large cities there believed that Milwaukee was a hotbed of sedition. Mr. Kletzsch was chairman of the German-Austrian Bazaar Association and former chairman of the Republican State Central Committee. To him, it appeared that the business men of Washington, Cleveland, New York, Buffalo, and Boston were about to boycott Milwaukee because of its supposed disloyalty. For several days the Milwaukee Journal carried the views and opinions of various citizens regarding the point of disloyalty. It is evident that the paper capitalized on the situation to alert the citizens of Milwaukee to the possibility of a boycott which could result from their indecisive attitude regarding the war. The former United States District Attorney-General, and a resident of Milwaukee, Guy D. Goff, thought that steps should be taken to change the attitude of Milwaukee. Patrick Cudahy, a prominent business man of the city said that the talk was just gossip and none should take the boycott insinuation seriously. He added that Milwaukee had shown her true colors in the outstanding preparedness parade which the city staged back in July of 1916.\footnote{\textit{New York Times}, July 16, 1916, pt. 1, p. 3; \textit{Milwaukee Sentinel}, July 16, 1916, pt. 1, p.1. Mayor Daniel Hoan led the impressive parade after declaring the remainder of the day a legal holiday.}
Another Milwaukee citizen called for martial law. He said that because of a few self-appointed leaders, all the German-Americans of the city were made to "look bad."\textsuperscript{13}

This accusation and warning did not seem to be a cause of concern for the Socialists of the city. They continued accusing the capitalists of starting the war and again called it a "War of Profit." They held a mass meeting on February 27 at which time a resolution was drawn up to be sent to President Wilson. The resolution stated that American ships ought to be forbidden to enter the war zones of belligerent nations; that American passengers should be warned against booking passage on ships of belligerents; and it demanded a complete embargo on all food products to support our food supply. The huge meeting of 4,000 was held in the Milwaukee auditorium and was addressed by Mayor Hoan, who said, "No real Socialist has ever stood for war."

Two other prominent Milwaukee Socialists, ex-mayor Emil Seidel and ex-congressman Victor Berger, were also in attendance.\textsuperscript{14}

While the people of Milwaukee as well as the rest of the nation were grimly reconciling themselves to the awful realization that war was imminent, Germany was planning to negotiate


\textsuperscript{14}Milwaukee Journal, February 28, 1917, pt. 1, p. 7.
a secret military alliance with Mexico, our neighbor to the south. As a reward for Mexico's aid in an attack on the United States in the event of war, the lost provinces of Texas, New Mexico, and Arizona would be returned to her. The famous "Zimmerman telegram," which was sent by Foreign Minister Zimmerman to Ambassador von Bernstorff who was to pass it on to Minister von Eckhardt in Mexico, was decoded by secret agents of the British government. The German government did not deny the authenticity of the telegram. The revelation of the contents of the message to the American public resulted in unifying public opinion against Germany. The German-American press regarded the telegram as "humbug" or a "sensationelle Geschichte" but when it became known that the telegram was not denied by the German government, the German press in America discussed it as an unfriendly act against the United States.

Once again the Milwaukee Journal took advantage of another opportunity to awaken a new degree of loyalty and patriotism among the citizens of Milwaukee. In its editorial for the day

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on which the news was released, The Journal spoke of the "Day of Decision" and stated:

There is no doubt in the United States of its citizens of German birth or blood. All men who know them know that overwhelmingly they are loyal to the country of their adoption. They will now indeed be freed of the imputation of disloyalty that has been put upon them by the few disloyal ones who have done everything in their power to use the United States as a tool of Germany. . . . For today there is no longer any room for doubt that Germany is and has been a deliberate enemy of the United States.\(^\text{18}\)

In that same issue, a letter to the editor offered a suggestion whereby Milwaukeeans might better express their loyalty. It recommended that every wholesale and retail firm stamp each envelope and express package with an American flag;\(^\text{19}\)

That same week the Journal mentioned that sixty prominent men of Milwaukee sent a telegram to Senator Husting assuring him of their loyalty to the government.\(^\text{20}\)

Although the publication of Germany's war plans with the Mexican government made many Americans take stock of their loyalties, the German-American city Alliance met in a stormy session on March 16. The Milwaukee Chapter of the Alliance still believed it possible and proper to stay out of the war.

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\(^{19}\)Ibid.

At that time, a letter of confidence was sent to Senator Robert LaFollette to compliment him on his patriotic and fearless efforts in behalf of peace. Another letter was dispatched to the state legislature to inform the Milwaukee members that the Alliance did not support a censure of the senator which was before the legislature at that time. At that meeting, however, one German organization resigned from the Alliance and two others threatened to leave because they did not go along with the Alliance's refusal to back the war effort.21

With the obvious reluctance of the Socialists and of the German-American Alliance of the city to back the nation in the war issue, the city authorities decided that it was time for another demonstration of loyalty.

On March 17, a mass rally was held in the Milwaukee auditorium which the New York Times called a visible pledge of loyalty to America.

Milwaukee, the center of German culture in America, permeated with the spirit of Germanism gave a demonstration of loyalty to the adopted land tonight which cannot be mistaken. A crowd of thousands, representing chiefly the German element, but also the Polish and Scandinavian, turned out to

21Milwaukee Journal, March 17, 1917, pt. 1, p. 5; Germania-Herald, March 17, 1917, pt. 1, p. 1. Belle Case LaFollette and Fola LaFollette, Robert M. LaFollette (New York, 1953), I, 624. LaFollette had earlier completed a filibuster on March 4 with the help of several other senators, which resulted in the defeat of the President's measure for arming our merchant ships.
declare to the world that the German-Americans of Milwaukee with the other citizens, would stand as an united body in defense of the American Republic in any emergency.

In opening the meeting, August Vogel executive head of the great Pfister and Vogel tannery, and a member of one of the oldest German families of the city, is quoted as saying, "Wherever our ancestral homes may have been, let us cherish their memories, but let them cease to be a cause of division among us. We have but one leader today, he whom the majority of the country selected in November." Some of the other speakers who were mentioned in the article were United States Senator Paul Husting of Wisconsin, Guy D. Goff, Wisconsin representative Irvine Lenroot, and F. X. Schwietlek, who represented the Polish citizens of Milwaukee. Each speaker declared that it was time for America to show its loyalty in the time of national danger. 22

An outgrowth of this huge meeting was the formation of the Wisconsin Defense League on March 22. So many calls for assistance were directed to the Citizens' Committee, which organized the mass meeting, that this second meeting was called. Wheeler Bloodgood was elected chairman; August Vogel, vice-chairman; Charles Palmer, secretary; and Clarence J. Allen, treasurer. The League assisted in the organization of various activities

both before and after war was declared but devoted itself especially to recruiting.23

The citizens of Milwaukee and the state were becoming very embarrassed over the delay of the State Legislature in sending a resolution of support to the national government as other states and groups had done soon after the public exposure of the Zimmerman note. Finally, to the great relief of the Milwaukee Journal and its readers, the Wisconsin Senate sent a pledge of loyalty to the government in the crisis but omitted the rebuke or censure of Senator LaFollette which had been so long and so heavily debated by the body. The members had come to the conclusion that unity was necessary at that time.24

Milwaukee could then take courage and hold up her head again, since the state had expressed its approval of the Administration's attitude on the proximity of war. Later that month, Milwaukeeans were proud to read an article in the New York Times which praised their city, in that Milwaukee was the first city to perfect its preparedness campaign, and which led the nation in the number of enlistments into the various branches of the service that is, in proportion to its population. The article also stated that the Guard was filled to capacity.25

Up to this time there were many groups of pacifists and anti-war societies which were active in keeping the nation alerted to the evils of war. However, just like the leaders of the German-American National Alliance, once they saw that our government was slowly being drawn into the war, their ranks became depleted as one by one the groups became convinced that preparedness was necessary for the good of the nation.

As always, there were some who did not give up until there was not the faintest chance of saving their position. Senator Norris of Nebraska bitterly accused the munition makers, stockbrokers, bond dealers and, what he termed a "servile press," for the catastrophe that was at hand. On April 2, 1917, a pacifist delegation interviewed Henry Cabot Lodge which ended in a physical fight between Lodge and Alexander Bannwart, a Princeton athlete, over the question of peace.

As the feeling regarding the necessity of war was becoming an accepted fact, anyone who questioned this idea was denounced as a pacifist or labeled "a pro-German" and often excoriated as an agent of German propaganda. A few remaining pacifists


28LaFollette and LaFollette, I, 645.
who continued to promote their battle against America's participation in the war by means of pamphlets, articles, and various forums, were called "milk-faced grubs" by their opponents. 29

No doubt, the German-language press also came under this classification.

In accordance with our traditional ideals of freedom of speech and of the press, the German-language newspapers had been permitted to speak out for Germany and to denounce her enemies. As was mentioned earlier, the German-American organizations in the United States held rallies and bazaars to raise funds for the support of German war orphans and widows. These German-Americans had no desire to help Germany in her war but believed that the war was her problem and the problem of those countries that were involved in the war. They saw no reason why the United States should become militarily concerned with the war. Thus, in 1917, as our country was drawing to the brink of war, many must have thought like Oscar Ameringer, a strongly anti-war Socialist, who wrote in his autobiography, "Surely, surely, there was no reason why the U.S.A. should get mixed up in the bloody mess on the other side of that blessedly deep and wide ocean."30

29Curti, p. 236.
As the danger of war became more and more imminent, the Milwaukee German newspaper, the *Germania-Herald* became most emphatic in its suggestion that its readers beg for peace. Almost daily, from February 7, 1917 until the week war was declared, there were articles on the front page reminding the people to write to Washington, to the senators and representatives requesting that the United States refrain from war. On March 31, the appeal said, "*Noch ist es Zeit, die Leute in Washington vor einer, Verschlusführung des Congresses zu erreichen.*" By April 2, the paper begged, "*In Allerleisten Augenblick. Telegrafiert oder schreibt sofort—noch heute Vormittag!*"³¹

The final efforts of the German-American press and of other advocates of peace to avoid entanglement in the European war came to no avail. On April 2, 1917, President Wilson asked Congress for a declaration of war. Within two days the Senate passed the war resolution by a vote of eighty-three to six. One of the opposing six was the senator from Wisconsin, Senator Robert LaFollette.³²

The following day, April 5, the House opened debate on the war resolution which continued for sixteen hours. Finally, after listening to nearly one hundred speeches, the members of the

³² *LaFollette and LaFollette*, I, 667.
House voted for war early the next morning at 3:15 A. M. of Good Friday, April 6, 1917. The vote was 373 to 50. Nine of the eleven Congressmen from Wisconsin voted against the war measure.33

The same day that war was declared, the German-American press announced that it would stand by the decision of the country, although, according to the Milwaukee Journal, it was still unconvinced of the need for war.34 Before the end of the summer of 1917, practically all American newspapers, including the German-language press, with the exception of a few small Socialist papers, became intensely loyal to America's cause. One of these exceptions was a Milwaukee paper, the Milwaukee Leader, which was printed by the Socialists and was later deprived of its mailing privileges.35 There can be little doubt that most publishers were sincere in their loyal support of the government after war had been declared. Since it had become necessary to make a choice between love of the Fatherland and loyalty to the nation, the decision favored the nation.36

34Ibid., April 6, 1917, pt. 1, p. 4; Germania-Herold, April 6, 1917, pt. 1, p. 8; April 7, 1917, pt. 1, p. 8.
35Ameringer, p. 315.
Although most German-Americans and the various groups of pacifists conceded the necessity of war, there was one political group whose principles outlawed war, namely, the Socialist Party. When the United States entered the war, the party lost the following men of prominence: John Spargo, Charles Russell, William J. Ghent, Gustavus Myers, Winfield R. Gaylord, Socialist candidate for Congress from the Fourth district of Milwaukee in 1916, Robert Hunter, Allen Benson, United States presidential candidate in 1916, and Upton Sinclair. These former Socialists publicly attacked the party in Milwaukee and accused its members of pro-Germanism. Algie Simons, who left the party and the staff of the Milwaukee Leader, already in November of 1916, bitterly attacked the Milwaukee Socialists as pro-German and even accused the paper of being subsidized by Germany.\(^{37}\) In May of 1917, John Spargo accused the Socialists of pro-Germanism with these words:

> The fact is, for several reasons, our party has been utterly pro-German from the beginning of the great war. For one reason and another it has consistently advocated every policy advocated by the German government; it has repeated all the miserable evasions and excuses of the government; it has been silent upon precisely the points upon which that government and its apologists have been silent.\(^{38}\)


This dissent among the Socialists with the resulting disclosure of pro-German accusations certainly served to increase the poor opinion that other parts of the nation held regarding the loyalty of Milwaukee.

Carl Sandburg, the famous poet and biographer of Lincoln, who had been a reporter for the Milwaukee Leader after serving from 1910 to 1912 as secretary to Emil Seidel, the first Socialist mayor of Milwaukee, also left the party in 1917 because, as he said, he wanted to stand behind Woodrow Wilson and support America’s entry into the war. 39

All Socialists, of course, did not find it possible to join the ranks of the "defectors." According to James O’Neal, writing ten years later on the Socialists and the war, "The infection quickly penetrated our own ranks. . . . They howled with the mob and became more patriotic than the patriots." 40

Since the Socialists universally opposed all wars except wars of revolution and emancipation, the party, opening its annual convention in St. Louis the day following the declaration of war, issued the following resolutions.

The Socialist Party of the United States in the present grave crisis solemnly reaffirms its allegiance to the principle of internationalism and working class

39 Harry Golden, Carl Sandburg (Cleveland, 1961), pp. 119-120, 158.
solidarity the world over and proclaims its unalterable opposition to the war just declared by the Government of the United States.

Our entrance into the European war was instigated by the predatory capitalists in the United States who boast of enormous profit of $7,000,000,000 from the manufacture and sale of munitions and war supplies and from the exportation of American foodstuffs and other necessities.

The American people did not and do not want this war. They have not been consulted about the war and have had no part in declaring war. They have been plunged into this war by the trickery and treachery of the ruling class of the country through its representatives in the national administration and National Congress, its demagogic agitators, its subsidized press, and other servile instruments of public expression. 41

These resolutions were followed by a pledge calling for a "continuous active and public opposition to war through demonstrations, mass petition, and all other means within our party," and consistent propaganda against military training." 42 Among the signatures of the Anti-war Proclamation was that of Victor Berger, publisher of the Milwaukee Leader, and according to Russell Austin, the acknowledged founder of the Socialist Party in America. Victor Berger had been elected the first Socialist

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congressman in the United States by the voters of the Fifth district of Milwaukee in the election of 1910.43

The Socialist Party or Social-Democratic Party was founded by Victor Berger, a former Milwaukee school teacher, on Friday night, July 9, 1897 in Ethical Hall at Milwaukee, with the assistance of Frederic Heath, a Milwaukee liberal, and Eugene V. Debs, a labor leader from Terre Haute, Indiana. Berger, the intellectual prod of the Socialist Party in Milwaukee, was born in Austria-Hungary and came to Milwaukee at the age of twenty. After teaching for twelve years in the city schools he became a frequent speaker at political rallies and labor meetings. He then set about to adapt the theory of socialism to the American environment. The nucleus of the party was composed of the Forty-eighters, and members of the Turnvereines who were the Liberals, the free thinkers, who found it necessary to flee from Germany in the Revolution of 1848.44 During the nineteenth century, the

43Muzik, p. 274; H. Russell Austin, The Milwaukee Story- The Making of an American City (Milwaukee, 1946), pp. 169, 173; Wisconsin Blue Book (Madison, 1911), p. 302; Milwaukee Leader, April 14, 1917, pt. 1, p. 1. On Berger's arrival in Milwaukee from the convention, he did not hesitate to announce that he opposed the war and had taken an active part in drawing up the anti-war resolution.

American Socialist Labor Party was made up almost exclusively of recent immigrants, the greatest number from Germany, with a scattering of Jews, Poles, Bohemians and Italians. In 1901, the Social Democrats under the leadership of Eugene Debs absorbed the elements of the Socialist Labor Party to form the new Socialist Party of America but the Milwaukee Socialists continued to be called "Social-Democrats."46

After making a brief study of Milwaukee's brand of Socialism, it appears that the following and the power of the party which was impressive but not numerically strong in the city from 1910 through the war was due in large part to the zeal of the leaders and to the fact that many of the members worked out a tempered form of socialism; a socialism for civic improvement without the slavish adherence to the radical and untenable phases of Marxist socialism. Milwaukee's Socialist mayor, Daniel Hoan, believed it necessary to forego the party's policy regarding war when he, as mayor, cooperated in the great preparedness parade staged by the city in 1916. For this act of "war mongering" he was castigated by the radical party leaders in these words: "Real Socialists everywhere agree that all nationalist wars are waged in the interests of capitalistic classes, both offensive

46 Still, p. 304; Golden, p. 119.
and defensive wars. We are burdened with a so-called Socialist mayor in Milwaukee who marched at the head of a preparedness parade.\textsuperscript{47} This reprimand by the radical party leaders did not hinder Mayor Hoan from further defense work.

A few days after America entered the war, a wealthy Milwaukeean, Wheeler Bloodgood who was chairman of the Wisconsin Defense League visited the Mayor's office and invited Mayor Hoan to present his opinion regarding the organization of a city league to promote the war effort. At a luncheon attended by several manufacturers and by Father Herbert Noonan, S. J., the president of Marquette University, Hoan urged that a local council of Defense be set up to cooperate with the recently founded State Council of Defense.\textsuperscript{48} Mayor Hoan and Wheeler Bloodgood were made co-chairmen of the Milwaukee Council at the following meeting which was held on April 30, 1917. The Council made plans to mobilize the community for war by securing the cooperation of the local agencies to aid in promoting the health and the efficiency of the people. Besides the war effort, the purpose of the Council was to arouse a patriotic spirit and to discourage

\textsuperscript{47}Mary E. Marcy, "Mass Action--Where Do We Stand?" \textit{International Socialist Review}, XVII (December 1916), 367.

\textsuperscript{48}Maxwell, p. 141. Wisconsin was the first state to set up a State Council of Defense and to create administrative branches in every county.
unpatriotic propaganda and statements. This phase of the Council undoubtedly helped to create some of the war hysteria found in Milwaukee during the war but a more careful reading of the following section of the handbook should have been a deterrent rather than an incitement to misplaced patriotic zeal. "A careful distinction should be made between the right of free speech and to discuss public affairs and those acts and words which constitute unpatriotic utterances." The latter were to be reported immediately, together with the facts in the case, to the County Council of Defense.

Since Milwaukee was considered a hotbed of Socialism and since the mayor was a Socialist, the implementation of the conscription bill of May 17, 1917 caused some concern for Governor Philipp. The bill stated that all mayors of cities over 30,000 in population were to administer the draft registration. The governor was fearful that Mayor Hoan would appoint anti-war Socialists and for that reason contested the mayor's authority to make the draft appointments. Hoan appealed to Washington and he was permitted to proceed in setting up the registration machinery. On May 27, the day after the conscription act was in force,

49 Still, p. 458; Reinders, WMH. XXVI, 50, citing the County Council of Defense, Minutes, April 30, 1917, mimeograph copy.

booths were set up in the city for the purpose of taking registrations for the military draft.\textsuperscript{51}

Even though the Socialist mayor was permitted by the federal government to organize the city's draft machinery and to appoint the draft personnel, nevertheless, according to General Charles King, a retired army officer, the United States War Department became alarmed over reports that conspiracy, sedition, and treason lay dormant in the city and was expected to break out on the day of registration.\textsuperscript{52} The officers of the department recalled the opposition of the Wisconsin delegation in Congress to the War Resolution and that Senator LaFollette had taken the lead in the opposition to the armed ship bill, to the declaration of war, and finally, to the draft itself. The Wisconsin legislature had also defeated a joint resolution to reprint and

\textsuperscript{51} Reinders, \textit{WMH}, XXXVI, 49-50.

\textsuperscript{52} General Charles King, "Memories of a Busy Life," \textit{WMH}, VI (December 1922), 185. King writes that the War Department was fearful that German-American saboteurs would blow up bridges and burn elevators and armament manufacturing plants besides resisting registration for the draft; \textit{Wisconsin Blue Book} (Madison, 1919), p. 285. General King, a retired veteran of Indian warfare and of the Spanish-American War, retired from the Wisconsin National Guard on April 23, 1904, but remained as an aide to the Commander-in-chief. At the time of the draft, he was in retirement at his home in Milwaukee but later was assigned a Brigadier General on July 1, 1918 of the Seventh Regiment of the Wisconsin National Guard; George W. Peck, \textit{Wisconsin--Comprising Sketches of Counties, Towns, Events, Institutes and Persons} (Madison, 1906), p. 269.
distribute President Wilson's war message throughout the state. With these facts in mind, the War Department offered Governor Philipp the aid of the military to forestall any riots which might arise during the registration. The governor unhesitatingly decided that such aid was unnecessary. The citizens of Milwaukee, however, were not so easily convinced that trouble was not brewing and consequently, the Milwaukee Committee of Safety requested that the Second Wisconsin Infantry be mobilized and camp at the fair grounds during the time of the draft procedure.

General Charles King assured his fellow citizens that there was no need of military assistance. Orders then came from General T. H. Barry, the commanding officer of the Central Department in Milwaukee.

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53 David A. Shannon, "The World, the War, and Wisconsin: 1914-1918," Historical Messenger of the Milwaukee County Historical Society, XX (March 1965), 48-49. At a session of the state senate on the night of April 24, 1917, Senator Frank Raguse, a Socialist from Milwaukee delivered a wandering attack on spending for patriotism. The question under consideration was a bill to appropriate funds to print and distribute President Wilson's war message throughout the state. Raguse's talk was the harangue of a Socialist arguing that unless a man owns land he has no stake in the country and therefore cannot be patriotic. The senate considered his talk unpatriotic and two days later demanded a retraction which he refused to sign although he attempted to explain and clarify his remarks. His explanation did not satisfy the chamber's president pro tem who again demanded that Raguse sign the retraction. Raguse refused and by a vote of thirty to three was expelled from the senate. Milwaukee Journal, April 27, 1917, pt. 1, p. 1. Berger called the dismissal of Raguse a "lynching."

54 Maxwell, p. 137.
Chicago, to General King ordering him to keep in touch with the chief of police in Milwaukee and to report the first sign of a riot or any other incidents to the Chicago office. The "gladdest moment" of General King's life, according to his autobiography, occurred on the first day of the draft with registrations taking place at 150 booths throughout the city, when he was able to report at 8:30 P. M. by telegram to General Barry that the one disorder from start to finish was a "fisticuff between two young citizens, of possible German descent, over the question of who had the right to register first." 55

The only serious outbreak of anti-draft violence occurred in the Bayview area on September 8, 1917, but the instigators were Italian anarchists. The riot erupted at an open air religious and patriotic service as the pastor of the Italian Evangelical Church was urging the young men not to resist the draft. 56

55 King, WMH, VI, 184-185; Wisconsin Blue Book (Madison, 1919), p. 339. June 5 was the day of registration by proclamation of the President; William Francis Raney, Wisconsin - A Story of Progress (New York, 1940), p. 310. Wisconsin was the first state to report the number of her registrants, doing so at four o'clock on the morning of June 6. Reinders, WMH, XXVI, 50. Milwaukee, likewise, was the first major city to complete the draft. Milwaukee Journal, June 6, 1917, pt. 1, p. 1. "No disturbances were reported from any of the city registration places. The many government agents and secret service men who went from booth to booth throughout the day found themselves with nothing to do."

As with the conscription, the cooperation given by the citizens of Milwaukee towards the war effort in the form of bonds and Liberty Loans was noteworthy. Milwaukee was among the first cities to reach its quota in each of the Liberty Loan drives. According to the New York Times, the returns for Milwaukee from banks and bond houses showed the total subscription by May 17, 1917 to be nearly $5,000,000. This did not include a $1,000,000 subscription by the Northwestern Mutual Life Insurance Company. Pfister and Vogel, a large leather firm subscribed to $100,000 worth of bonds on May 18. By that time, too, many Milwaukee women had purchased bonds.

The total bond sales in the Liberty Loan drives for the city totaled $145,384,000.

This commendable total was not achieved without the use of pressure and coercion. On several occasions, Milwaukee workmen and farmers were dragooned into buying unwanted bonds. "Collection committees" went about in large caravans consisting of twenty-five cars with some sixty to seventy men plus two deputy sheriffs and an official photographer and stenographer. In his

58 Austin, p. 179.
59 In the fall of 1918, four employees of the Milwaukee Harvester Works at 784 Park Street were victimized when fifteen to twenty fellow employees threw paint on them and chased them from the building when they refused to buy bonds. Milwaukee Journal, September 26, 1918, pt. 1, p. 1.
article, "Prussianizing Wisconsin," Charles Stewart suggests that a banker accompanied the group to loan money to the individual if he protested that he had subscribed too much already. The assessed amount or "fair share" was ascertained beforehand and if the committee was unable to collect the designated amount, a large placard was posted on the property of the recalcitrant citizen which stated: "The occupant of these premises has refused to take his fair share of Liberty Bonds."\(^60\)

During the third Liberty Loan drive, Governor Philipp found it necessary to write to a Milwaukee banker to question the right of the Treasury Department or of anyone to exercise political power for the purpose of inducing the purchase of war stamps. Notices, containing the words, "Treasury Department," were being sent to people summoning them to attend war stamp sales with the threat of reprisals if they did not appear. This situation was quietly remedied.\(^61\)

Another type of force used by the super-patriots to promote the sale of bonds and stamps was to publish the names of those who had not "contributed" their fair share as determined by the local Council of Defense. Names were also listed on a large

\(^60\) Charles D. Stewart, "Prussianizing Wisconsin," *Atlantic Monthly*, CXXIII (January 1919), 102-103. Charles Stewart was an author and was the personal secretary of Governor Philipp in 1915.

\(^61\) Maxwell, p. 166.
board on the courthouse lawn. Therefore, many citizens were forced to subscribe to each successive drive whether they could afford it or not. These untoward methods of obtaining cooperation in the bond and stamp drives added to the unhappy feelings of discrimination experienced by the German-Americans of Milwaukee since the inability to produce the requested amount implied that such a one must be pro-German or unpatriotic.

As early as June 5, 1917, the committee decided to place twenty-five men at convenient locations of downtown corners and main lobbies of stores. According to the Milwaukee Journal, shoppers and passersby were stopped and requested to subscribe to bonds. Therefore, a shopper or downtown visitor and those businessmen who held offices in that section might be accosted several times a day. Then, too, busy executives would be less affable when delayed on the street corners even for such a patriotic cause. This was the situation on June 7, 1917, when Mr. Jacob Best, a prominent wine and liquor dealer of the city was stopped by two men at the corner of 3rd and Wisconsin Avenue. Mr. Best was seventy years of age at the time and was hurrying to the office to meet with a possible purchaser. As the two young men stopped him, Mr. Best informed them that he could not be detained. Since they insisted, he became angry and said,

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62 Maxwell, p. 167.
"To Hell with the Liberty Bonds!" The next day he was arrested for disorderly conduct and fined $25.00 and costs. According to Mr. Gross, the Best family had already purchased their quota of Liberty Bonds.63

Even though Milwaukee on the whole was concerned with supporting the war effort there was another group, besides the Socialists, who opening their office in Milwaukee publicly opposed the war. This group, founded by Louis P. Lochner, a former Milwaukeean, was called the People's Council. The Council promoted a strong program for freedom of speech and called for an early and democratic peace. The group also issued a publication called Facts which strengthened the opposition of the few remaining local pacifists and dedicated anti-war Socialists.64

In the summer of 1917, a meeting of the People's Council was held at the Milwaukee Public Library with an attendance of 200.

In order to become a member of the Council at that time, it was necessary to sign the card found on the following page.


64 Still, p. 460; H. C. Peterson and Gilbert Fite, Opponents of the War (Madison, 1957), p. 74.
THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE OF MILWAUKEE

Demands

1. Early, general, democratic peace by negotiation without forcible annexations or punitive indemnities.
2. Immediate statement by our government of its war aims in concrete terms.
4. Maintenance of labor standards, elimination of war profits, taxation of wealth to pay for the war.
5. Amendment of the conscription laws.
6. Referendum on war and peace, and democratic policy for world peace.

Victor Berger's wife took an active part in this meeting and "shoved" Edwin J. Gross into taking the presidency "if he believed in the above principles."65

Governor Philipp stopped the next meeting scheduled for July 31, 1917 at Milwaukee. The delegates, already enroute at the time of the executive order, were not permitted to leave the train as it arrived in the city early on the morning of the thirty-first.66 The convention which was scheduled to be held in Fargo, South Dakota was also canceled because of threats and transportation problems. A mob threatened to hang Lochner but were content with smearing the door of his Wisconsin home with yellow paint.67

65Gross, pp. 5-8.
66Milwaukee Journal, September 1, 1917, pt. 1, p. 2. Governor Philipp prohibited the scheduled meeting at the request of Milwaukee citizens. He called the proposed meeting a danger to public peace.
67Gross, p. 5.
The governor of Wisconsin was not the only government official that was concerned about the public's reaction to the war. In October of 1917, Congress passed the first law in our history for the purpose of controlling the foreign-language press. This law provided that exact translation of all matter relating to the war was to be submitted to the local postmaster until such time as the government was sufficiently convinced of the loyalty of each foreign-language paper. A permit was then issued which exempted the paper from the troublesome and expensive process of submitting an English translation. The Milwaukee German newspaper, the *Germania-Herald* was never requested to submit a translation.

Although the *Germania-Herald* experienced some harassment from groups and individuals, government officials never interfered with the paper's editorial policy nor with its handling of the news. The *Germania-Herald* was published by the Brumder family which had immigrated to America in the eighteen fifties. During the war, the Brumder sons changed the name of the *Germania* semi-weekly to *Milwaukee-America*, and the name of the daily *Germania-Herald* to the *Milwaukee Herald*. They also were responsible for the change of the name of the *Germania National Bank* to the

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National Bank of Commerce. The name of the Germania Building was changed to the Brumder Building and the Germania Publishing Company was renamed the North American Press. When the Germania Building was erected in 1896, George Brumder had placed a ten foot bronze statue of Germania over the front door. This statue was very quickly and quietly removed one night during the war in order to avoid any unnecessary excitement or trouble. 69

During the first four months of the war, according to Still, at least 250 persons Americanized their names. If names made them less than patriotic then they were willing to change them. Various Milwaukee groups and businesses also changed their names. Among these groups was the Deutscher Club which changed its name to the Wisconsin Club on the petition of its members. In March of 1918, the pupils of the German-English Academy asked that the academy be called the Milwaukee Academy until after the war. 70

During this time of over-wrought emotions familiar foods were given patriotic titles. "Sauer-kraut" became "liberty cabbage" and "Bismarcks" were known as "American beauties." Even

70 Milwaukee Journal, December 9, 1917, pt. 1, p. 3; March 8, 1918, pt. 1, p. 1.
"German-fried potatoes" were spoken of as "liberty fried potatoes." 71

Streets of Milwaukee were also renamed. Some only for the duration of the war as was Meinecke Street, then known as Lee Street. After the war, in response to a petition from the Meinecke sons, the city agreed to call the street by its original name. 72

The presumption that most of Milwaukee's German-Americans were pro-German was more imagination than actual situations warranted. As we have already seen, Milwaukee was more than single-minded concerning the war. It seems that the anti-war Socialists and the small but radical pacifist groups were the cause of most of the pro-German accusations. It is true that the more recent immigrants among the German-Americans found themselves faced with a choice which was not easily resolved. Those of German

71 Gross, pp. 2-3. Gross writes, "I remember on one occasion when I was in the diner coming home from Chicago, I ordered what was commonly called 'German fried potatoes.' The waiter, in an insulting tone, told me that he could not serve me any 'German fried potatoes;' that all he could give me were 'Liberty fried potatoes.'" Still, p. 461.

72 Personal interview on April 30, 1965 with Theodore Mueller who had been a recent immigrant at the time of the war. Mr. Mueller was Curator of the Milwaukee County Historical Society from 1939 to 1959.
descent who considered America their true home found no difficulty in accepting the nation's position in the war. Already, early in the war, a Milwaukee firm in which some prominent German families had interest supplied shell-cases for the Allies. One German employee is quoted as saying, "Geschäft ist geschäft."

With the predominance of Germans in the city it was to be expected that the German language would be commonly spoken even in business transactions. There were instances, many perhaps, in which those who were heard to speak German in public, particularly on the streets, were subjected to indignities, such as being spat upon or pushed aside.

German ministers were reported to have been molested in their pulpits because they used the German language which was the only language their older members understood. The use of German on the telephone or in public was regarded as evidence of


74It is common knowledge that it was not wise to speak the German language in public during the war. The mother of Walter Neulreich was spat upon when reading a German newspaper on the bus. Another time she was jostled and shoved at a street corner because she could not speak English. Personal interview with Walter Neulreich on April 14, 1965; Mueller interview; Personal interview with Karl Scheffel. Mr. Scheffel remembers the occasion when his father and uncles were rudely told to speak English or "keep still" while riding on the electric train on the way to the state fair in Milwaukee during the war.
a German plot and the teaching of German in the public schools was banned in the city.75

By fall as the city became more and more concerned over her problem of patriotism, the Wisconsin Loyalty League of Milwaukee urged all "patriots" to unite and to sign a loyalty pledge that would lay at rest the charge that Wisconsin was considered a traitor state. The Milwaukee Journal stated that "Every effort will be made to separate the loyal from the disloyal."76

Apparently a booth for this purpose was set up at the state fair which was held in Milwaukee during the following week. Mr. Gross, who had been elected president of the People's Council, the group which had just been forbidden to meet in the city, was approached and asked to sign a loyalty pledge which he refused. Mr. Gross writes that he refused because, as he entered the grounds, there was an immediate rush made for him, which he took as an insult to his freedom. He was handed a copy of the Milwaukee Journal before he left the fair grounds that day which carried the story of this refusal to sign the loyalty pledge.77

77Gross, p. 5.
There were also some preposterous stories of pro-German activities which could be expected among people who believed that the German neighborhoods were harboring German aliens who were heart and soul behind Germany in the war. There were reports that these Germans were hiding weapons or had arsenals in their basements. Even a religious institution was subjected to such a charge. The Lutheran Seminary at Wauwatosa was searched from cellar to attic for bombs which were reported to have been made by the students and then carried out to enemy agents to be used in sabotage. These suspect packages were nothing but the boys' soiled linens for the laundry.\textsuperscript{78}

Although most of the above mentioned suspicions were probably the result of the mistrust created by the pacifists and the anti-war Socialists, nevertheless, there were those in Milwaukee as elsewhere, who despised the German-Americans just because they were of German descent and because we were at war with Germany. Many Milwaukeeans can tell of instances when these fanatics would sneak into the yards of their German neighbors and spread tar on their fences, doors, and homes. On the other hand, there were also fanatics among the German-Americans who were ready to speak for Germany at every opportunity. "Old man Keller"

\textsuperscript{78}J. H. Lacher, \textit{German Element in Wisconsin} (Milwaukee, 1925), p. 53.
of Drexler Street and Highway 41 was one of these. He was rewarded for his love of the Fatherland by being pulled from his bed one evening by men with burning torches who forced him to kneel and kiss the flag. 79

Among those fanatics who were over-zealous in enforcing patriotism was a group, who, early in the war, had set up a machine gun in front of the playhouse to prohibit a performance of "Wilhelm Tell." This mob was dispersed by the county sheriff, as was another group composed of drafted recruits in uniform who attempted to "break up the Hun show" at a later date. 80

As the war continued into the next year, Milwaukee was unhappily in the news again; her loyalty being more suspect than ever. Victor Berger, whose activities appeared most unpatriotic, began campaigning for the office of United States Senator from Wisconsin in the special spring election to fill the unexpired term of the late Paul Husting. 81 According to Berger, the war issue was paramount in the campaign. "The sole question will be, whether the elector wants to register his vote in favor of an immediate general and democratic peace, for which the Socialists stand -- or whether the elector prefers to vote for a

79 Mueller interview.

80 Still, p. 461; Ameringer, p. 336; New York Times, April 35, 1918, pt. 1, p. 10. In April it was announced that no German-language plays would be presented for the season of 1918-1919.

81 Reinders, WMH, XXXVI, 53.
bloody, long drawn-out plutocratic war, which is the aim of the munition making profiteers and their press." 82

Berger's paper, the Milwaukee Leader, had been denied second-class privileges by the Post Office Department already in the fall of 1917. He had fought to have the mailing privileges restored and, not being successful, was able to preserve his paper and to keep it in circulation by devious means. 83 Then, to make matters worse for the patriotic name of the city, in February of 1918, Berger reaffirmed his stand against the war when he drafted the Milwaukee Socialist Party platform for the municipal elections which were to take place in the spring. He wrote, "The American people did not want this war. They were plunged into the abyss by the treachery of the ruling class of the country--its demagogic agitators, its bought press, its sensational photoplays, its lying advertisements, and other purchasable instruments of public expression." 84 Finally, this reiteration of the anti-war proclamation was made to appear all the more disloyal when the fact of Berger's indictment, which had been secretly made by a grand jury on February 2, was made

82 Milwaukee Leader, January 12, 1918, pt. 1, p. 1.


84 Reinders, WMH, XXXVI, 52, citing an interview with Mayor Hoan on August 19, 1948; Milwaukee Leader, March 4, 1918, pt. 1, p. 1; Milwaukee Journal, March 4, 1918, pt. 1, p. 1; Peterson and Fite, p. 164.
public. Berger, with four of his Socialist associates, had been indicted for violating the Espionage Act. 85

With this bold insertion of the earlier un-American St. Louis anti-war proclamation into the city platform, one would expect that the Socialists would surely lose the election. As we shall see, this was not the case.

As the campaign progressed, Hoan endorsed Berger's candidacy for the Senate and is quoted as telling a reporter for the Milwaukee Journal that he was "perfectly satisfied" with the municipal platform as drawn up by Berger. 86

In the race for mayor, Hoan was opposed by Theodore Dammann, William Park, and Percy Braman who each vigorously proclaimed loyalty to the war effort. Braman, the principal opponent, started his campaign four days after Hoan with the emphasis on loyalty and with a promise to introduce a law against seditious talk in Milwaukee. 87

85 Milwaukee Journal, March 9, 1918, pt. 1, p. 1. Berger and his associates were convicted on January 8, 1919 of conspiracy to interfere with the armed forces and sentenced in February to twenty years' imprisonment. They were later freed on a bail of $625,000; New York Times, January 9, 1919, pt. 1, p. 1; February 21, 1919, pt. 1, p. 1. The case was appealed to the Supreme Court in 1921 where the conviction was reversed on a technicality. Muzik, WMH, XLVII, 310, 318.


87 Ibid., March 6, 1918, pt. 1, p. 2; March 7, 1918, pt. 1, p. 2; March 9, 1918, pt. 1, p. 2; March 21, 1918, pt. 1, p. 1. Braman's campaign slogan was, "To help place Milwaukee in the position of the most patriotic city in America."
Since Hoan had publicly endorsed Berger, who was under an indictment for conspiracy, it was not surprising that Hoan was asked by the executive committee of the County Council of Defense to resign his chairmanship on the basis of his disloyalty. This action, however, came as a surprise to Hoan since just two months previously, on January 2, 1918, when his advisory committee was doubting his sincerity regarding the war, Wheeler Bloodgood speaking for the council had vouched for Hoan's cooperation with the council in the accomplishment of its war work. By March 8, however, Bloodgood declared that, "Mr. Hoan can neither stand upon nor straddle the St. Louis platform and at the same time head an organization which has for its object doing its part in winning the war. . . ." On March 11, the executive members of the Defense Council met in Hoan's office and personally requested that he resign. He refused and subsequently, two days later, was asked to resign before the full membership of the council. Hoan was told by Bloodgood at that time, that the executive committee had truly accepted his stand regarding the war until the adoption of the city platform which made his position on the council impossible. The vote to depose Hoan was sixteen to five and to rid the council of four other Socialist members, the vote was thirteen to seven. However, after a heated

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debate, further action was delayed by a move to reconsider the measure on April 2. 89

As the campaign progressed, the main issue was that of patriotism and loyalty. The press at that time, and particularly the Milwaukee Journal, viewed the election as a crusade to vindicate the city in the eyes of the nation. This paper, continuing its wartime message of patriotism, maintained that the election was no longer a question of the economic theories of the Social Democrats but one of support of the nation in its hour of peril. 90

The primary results did little to bolster this hope of the press. Hoan received 28,493 votes to Braman’s 22,374, Dammann’s 6,211, and Park’s 1,567. 91 Bloodgood, as well as many others in the city, was not pleased with the election returns. As a result, he sent a letter to the Milwaukee Free Press, which was published on the front page of the March 22nd edition under the title, "Bloodgood Issues Challenge to Milwaukee Voters." The


90 Reinders, WMH, XXXVI, 53; Still, pp. 524-525; Milwaukee Journal, March 7, 1918, pt. 1, p. 2; March 9, 1918, pt. 1, p. 1; March 10, 1918 pt. 1, p. 6; March 21, 1918, pt. 1, p. 1.

91 Reinders, WMH, XXXVI, 53, citing the Board of Election Commissioners, Fifth Annual Report, 1917-1918, p. 90, Municipal Reference Library.
letter threatened an appeal to law and federal authorities if the people saw fit to elect men like Hoan and Berger. Bloodgood went on to say, "The vote for Mr. Berger and Mr. Hoan means that Milwaukee County will, in the eyes of the world, be considered a province of the German Imperial Government and should be treated as such."92

This bitter denunciation of the results of the primary alarmed the city including the other candidates. Braman voiced his dissatisfaction with this alleged need of martial law in the city with the words, "I utterly repudiate the idea that there is the slightest ground for suggesting that Milwaukee be placed under martial law. I abhor the thought that men are to be subjected to violence or loss of their property, because of the opinion they hold. Every voter has the right to give expression to his ideas by voting for the candidate who represents him."93

For those who feared the strength of the anti-war Socialists in the city, their worst fears seemed realized as the April election returns showed that the Socialist mayor was to be retained in office. Mr. Hoan defeated Braman by a vote of 37,485 to 35,396 having carried eighteen of the city's twenty-five wards with a gain over his 1916 vote in a large majority of the

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92Milwaukee Free Press, March 22, 1918, pt. 1, p. 1
wards. The party also increased its membership on the city council by one, making the ratio thirteen for the Socialists to eighteen for the Non-partisans. 94

Hoan was never completely removed from the County Council of Defense but was deposed from his position as co-chairman. He remained on the bureau of food control, and other Socialists were also kept on the Council. 95

Although Berger did not win the election on April 2 for the vacancy in the United States Senate, he did poll 110,898 votes in the state. Of this total, 34,490 was from Milwaukee, 2,515 more than the winning candidate received in the city. 96

Since the Milwaukee followers of Berger were not dismayed or disillusioned by his indictment neither did this defeat deter them. On November 5, 1918, just six days before the Armistice, the members of the Fifth Congressional District elected him to Congress with a plurality of 5,470 votes. 97 However, because of Berger's evident disloyalty to the nation in time of war, the


95Milwaukee Leader, June 1, 1918, pt. 1, p. 1; "The Action Which Deposed the Mayor as Chairman of the Council of Defense," typewritten, cited by Reinders, WMH, XXXVI, 54.

96Wisconsin Blue Book (Madison, 1919), p. 46.

97Ibid., 155.
members of Congress repeatedly refused to seat him. Congress finally accepted him in December of 1923.98

Thus, we see that much of Milwaukee's pacifism and anti-war sentiment was not pro-Germanism but rather the result of the Socialist anti-war stand. The Socialists were not afraid to speak against the war and, although many of the voters who cast their ballots for Hoan and for Berger were neither Socialists nor pro-German, they merely had taken advantage of this opportunity to vote against the war. As German-Americans they dared not speak in opposition to the war nor publicly support a candidate of their own who was critical of the war.99

Since the German-American National Alliance and its aims had been considered pro-German earlier in the war, the reader probably wonders what happened to the Alliance as the war continued. Although, as has been pointed out, the Alliance eventually backed the nation in the war, still it found it impossible to isolate itself from the problems arising from the rash of anti-Germanism which was concerned with everything German. Therefore, various branches of the Alliance in cities and states throughout the country dissolved or adopted other names.100 In

98Muzik, WMH, XLVII, 311-318.
99Shannon, WMH, XXII, 54-56.
100Child, p. 161.
December of 1917, the National Alliance decided not to hold a national convention for the duration of the war. 101

On January 16, 1918, Senator William Henry King of Utah introduced a bill in Congress to repeal the charter of the Alliance. 102 Two months later, the delegates at a meeting of the Wisconsin Loyalty Legion in Milwaukee on March 22, demanded that Congress revoke the charter of the Alliance. 103

During the Congressional investigation of the activities of the Alliance, a Milwaukee man, the assistant editor of the Milwaukee Journal, Henry C. Campbell, was called as a witness. He charged the Alliance with Pan-Germanism, and then accused the group of attempting to control the politics of Wisconsin by the part it played in the election of 1916. 104

The charter of the Alliance was officially and legally revoked in July, 1918, after Congress approved the bill calling for the dissolution of the group. 105 The Alliance itself anticipated the measure by agreeing to disband the organization. The decision was made at an executive meeting which was held in the city

102 Ibid., January 17, 1918, pt. 1, p. 18.
103 Milwaukee Journal, March 23, 1918, pt. 1, p. 3.
of Philadelphia on April 11. At this time, the group also agreed to turn over its fund of thirty thousand dollars to the American Red Cross. The executive group announced at this meeting, "As American citizens of German blood, whole-heartedly and without reservation, we say to our fellow citizens that together with them we shall ever stand ready to defend this Government and this country against all foes, internal and external, to the end that the liberty and freedom guaranteed by the Constitution shall forever prevail." 106 The Wisconsin Alliance, following the lead of the national organization, disbanded on April 17, 1918. 107

The war was over on November 11, 1918, and great rejoicing filled the streets in the early morning hours as soon as the news reached the city. 108 The German-Americans, too, were jubilant that hostilities had ceased. Milwaukee, then, became engrossed in plans to welcome the boys back home.

The anti-war attitude of the Socialist Party of Milwaukee was not forgotten at the time of the first homecoming reception for the soldiers which was held in January, 1919. Governor Philipp and Mayor Hoan had been asked to be the guest speakers


at the program to fete the returning veterans. However, a few days before the reception, the Milwaukee Journal began to print articles protesting the participation of the Socialist mayor in the ceremonies. These protests were from individual citizens, anti-Socialist aldermen, and from various organizations. Since Mayor Hoan had, a few days, previously, publicly opposed the treason trial of Victor Berger and his four associates, a group of army officers came to him and asked that he resign from the reception committee, which request he immediately refused. Moreover, on the day of the ceremony, the crowd would have nothing of Hoan and in its disapproval of his presence, "hissed and howled, shouted and whistled, stamped and sang," making it impossible for Hoan to speak. Governor Phillip was unable to quiet the crowd until Hoan left the auditorium.

Another incident which took place after the war and which was an expression of the strong and enduring anti-German sentiment engendered during the war, took place on February 15, 1919 at a protest meeting held in the club room of the Pfister Hotel.

This meeting was called to object to the presentation of the


German play, "Wilhelm Tell" which was to be given at the Pabst Theatre for the benefit of a group of penniless and destitute German actors. No doubt, it was thought that since the war with Germany was over, the anti-German sentiment had also ceased. This was not the case. While a committee was drawing up the protest, a discussion of the question was held in which a Dr. Paul Jenkins voiced his opinion that German should not be spoken in the city or in the nation. He further stated that if one language had been used prior to the war there would have been no need of the "Flying Squadron" which went through the city coercing Milwaukee residents into subscribing to the fourth Liberty Loan. He contended that if they had been able to speak and to read English they would have understood the nation's needs in its dilemma. Mr. Frank Hoyt, who remarked that he was not of German blood and could therefore speak in opposition to the proposed protest, reminded the group that such a resolution would be an additional outrage of the war because in a state and city with half the population of German blood it would only add to the pain of those German-Americans who were "loyal under feelings that wrung their heart strings." He added that it would not hurt the city to help these penniless actors, some of whom were citizens, others who had taken out first or second citizenship papers. The group was not inclined to drop the question and as the discussion
became more bitter, Mr. Hoyt again attempted to point out that the prohibition of the German language in the city would be an affront to men of German blood. This objection was answered by Mr. Sammond from the famed 32nd Division of the Wisconsin National Guard who spoke up and said that the 32nd became famous because of the German-Americans who were trying to wipe out the type of blood which had stained Milwaukee's name and for that reason fought harder than usual. When a vote was taken the resolution passed and a committee of three was appointed to be present at the time of the performance and take down the names of those who patronized the play. It was then suggested that a list of these names be published in the newspaper, to be reprinted each year for ten years. 111

This overexuberant patriotism was not the general attitude of the people of Milwaukee but it was nevertheless present and its bitter censure of everything German was keenly felt by the German-Americans of the city.

111Minutes of a Protest Meeting, February 15, 1919, at the Club Room, Frister Hotel, Milwaukee. Typewritten, Milwaukee County Historical Society. The play was canceled at the request of William George Bruce who had been often called upon during the war to bring about a better understanding between the German-Americans and the other inhabitants of the city. Bruce suggested that such action as recommended by the protest would be heralded throughout the state. To avoid unfavorable publicity for the city the management did not open the theatre. Bruce, pp. 297-298.
Throughout the war the Milwaukee Journal had worked hard to create a sense of loyalty among the people of Milwaukee. Day after day, the paper stressed the necessity of patriotism and the support of the nation in the crisis. For this, the paper was rewarded with the Pulitzer Prize in 1919. Regarding the award, the Literary Digest wrote that the Milwaukee Journal had certainly earned the prize being situated as it was in a "stronghold of German influence," and had richly deserved the award for, as the resolution states, "its strong and courageous campaign for Americanism in a constituency where foreign elements made such a policy hazardous from a business point of view." The Milwaukee Journal printed with pride a representation of the medal and accepted the gift as a recognition of its efforts in "clearing Wisconsin's name."\[112\]

With the end of the war, Milwaukeeans once again turned their interest to municipal improvements. The anti-war and the pro-German accusation against the Socialist Party were forgotten by many as this party continued in power in the city. Mayor Hoan was re-elected in 1920 with an additional Socialist candidate on the council giving the city Socialists fourteen seats.

to the Nonpartisans, seventeen. Mayor Hoan was re-elected time and time again. He was mayor of Milwaukee from 1916 to 1940. 113

This growth in the Socialist vote should serve to point out to some degree that all of the Socialist votes during the war years were not necessarily either anti-war nor pro-German. As was previously noted, the Socialist anti-war philosophy was considered by many to be significantly pro-German since many of the Socialists in Milwaukee were of German extraction. 114 Some of the votes, at least, were votes for what seemed the best possible solution to the problems of a maturing city. The citizens of Milwaukee were more interested in the immediate future of their city than in the problems of whether or not they should send troops and money to fight a distant European war, a war which seemed to have no bearing on the success or failure of their way of life in the growing metropolis called Milwaukee.

113 Still, pp. 524, 527-530; Austin, p. 174.

114 Kipnis, p. 19; Wachman, p. 11. Carl Sandburg agrees that to most Americans the anti-war tenet of the staunch Socialist was too "patently" a German protest against the war. Golden, p. 132.
CHAPTER V

CONCLUSION

The sincerity, degree of patriotism, and detachment from self-interest of all citizens in any war is difficult to assess. This was particularly true for the people of Milwaukee during the First World War since the press and the politicians capitalized on the large German-American element in the city. The so-called hyphen vote was a convenient term at the time of a presidential election which occurred while a war was in progress in Europe and which was threatening to involve the United States. There was never any real danger that the German-Americans would prove disloyal to the nation. While many supporters of the Allies, among them the ambassador to England, Walter Hines Page, the Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, and former president Theodore Roosevelt, had publicly entreated for an entente with Great Britain, it appears that none of the German-Americans leaders had even suggested that the United States should enter the war on the side of Germany. Apparently the German-Americans were more neutral than our country's leaders.

The opposition to the war by the citizens of Milwaukee was due to two main causes, the strength of the Socialist Party in
the city and her very large percentage of German-American inhabitants.

The popularity of the Socialist Party in Milwaukee was a major cause of the extreme anti-war sentiment with which Milwaukee's Germanism was equated during the war. As we have seen, the Socialist Party platform outlawed all wars except wars of revolution or emancipation. Although many of the Milwaukee Socialists negated this phase of the party's creed in order to back the nation in the war, there were still enough vociferous anti-war leaders in the city to maintain a strong anti-war view regarding the nation's involvement in the struggle. Unfortunately for the good name of the city, those Socialists who left the party did not hesitate to call the staunch party leaders "pro-German." The Milwaukee Journal, too, referred to the Socialists in the city as "Apostles of Prussianism" and "Pro-German Social Democrats."¹ Surely this public denunciation of the Socialists as pro-German served to increase the poor opinion the nation already held regarding the loyalty of the city.

The objection to the war from the German-Americans was, likewise, not the result of pro-Germanism but rather it stemmed from the fact that many of them had come to this country to improve their way of life and to get away from war and the onerous

prospect of military duty. Having witnessed the lack of economic growth due to wars, these immigrants had no desire to see their new homeland wasting away from what appeared to be an unnecessary war. As Dr Shannon writes, "It seems to me that most Americans were for neutrality in 1914 because, as they saw it, the national interest lay in staying out of the war." Furthermore, a Milwaukee born and educated American diplomat who began his fruitful career on April 23, 1917, just seventeen days after the United States entered the war, says this about Milwaukee in the opening chapter of his autobiography, "This Wisconsin city had the justified reputation of being a stronghold of American isolationism partly because so many of its residents were immigrants or descendants of men and women who had immigrated to get away from Europe's poverty, politics and war."

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2 Milwaukee Journal, March 9, 1918, pt. 1, p. 2. Theodore Damann, a candidate for mayor in speaking of the loyalty of Milwaukee's German-Americans said, "That some have been found disloyal should not be held against those who are loyal. We are at war with Germany. Hundreds of thousands of Germans immigrated to this country to escape the autocratic militarism." Personal interview with Theodore Mueller.

3 David Shannon, "The World, the War, and Wisconsin, 1914-1918," Historical Messenger of the Milwaukee County Historical Society, XXII (March 1966), 44.

The charges of disloyalty which were directed towards the German-Americans were due in part to the attitudes of the German-Americans themselves. They could see nothing wrong with using their right of freedom of speech to defend Germany who in their estimation was no more guilty than the other nations involved in the war. On this point, the self-appointed leaders of the German-Americans blundered early in the war by praising the Kaiser and, as late as October, 1916, in openly hoping for a German victory. It was also unfortunate that they could not resist waving German flags at their meetings while at the same time protesting their devotion and loyalty to America, protestations in which they were undoubtedly sincere.\(^5\)

Even had the German-Americans been more perceptive in avoiding any unnecessary causes for discrimination, the fact that German was spoken as freely as English in Milwaukee seems to account

\(^5\)Milwaukee Sentinel, August 10, 1914, pt. 1, p. 2. At a meeting of the Wisconsin Alliance in Kenosha the members gave cheers for the Kaiser but at that same meeting, Professor Leo Stern of Milwaukee, the president of the Wisconsin Alliance, while expressing great love for the Fatherland, urged that the best and finest patriotism should be accorded to the country of their adoption; Clifton James Child, The German-Americans in Politics 1914-1917 (Madison, 1939), p. 174; Milwaukee Journal, October 3, 1916, pt. 1, p. 9. On October 3, Professor Stern gave a brief address at the close of a German band concert in which he said that the German armies would soon march into Paris to the tune of "Die Wacht an Rhein."
for some of the resentment and animosity which was displayed towards the German-speaking people of the city. George Creel agrees with this conclusion when he writes, "On the part of the native American there was often a firm conviction that our declaration of war carried an instant knowledge of English with it, and that all who persisted in speaking any other tongue after April 6, 1917, were either actual or potential 'disloyalists'!"

Milwaukee was by no means the only area in the United States that experienced the problem of "Germanism." Throughout the country, various methods were used to promote loyalty. Tarring and feathering was used even in Wisconsin as in isolated cases elsewhere. Mob beatings were not uncommon and flag-kissing and lynching were also used to force patriotism.

Finally, since Milwaukee was tender of her reputation as a Socialist stronghold, the Milwaukee Journal utilized the written

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6 George Creel, "Our Aliens - Were They Loyal or Disloyal?" Everybody's Magazine, XL (March 1919), p. 36. During the war, Creel headed the wartime Committee on United States Public Information which organized the official propaganda, established censorship, won the people's support for government activities, and maintained public morale.

word to "clear" the city's good name and to maintain her patriotic honor. This campaign was not intended to harm the German-Americans but rather to explain and to promote loyalty among the city's residents and to proclaim to the nation that Milwaukee was a thoroughly American city.

In concluding this meagre but indicative analysis of the relationship and rapport of the German-American population of Milwaukee with their fellow citizens, it is well to point out that an unexpected disruption of the "status quo" in any given society is a cause for distrust and animosity. In the case of Milwaukee, the attempt to eradicate the German culture of its people which for so long had been unhampered and even encouraged was more than disruptive; it was heart-rending. The accent on patriotism, necessitated by the war with its often-times radical and unreasonable questioning of the loyalty of the city's German-Americans, took its toll in misunderstanding, antagonism and bigotry. Once the war was over, however, the city soon returned to its ordinary everyday pursuits, happy to be at peace once again. Except for a few, the majority of Milwaukeeans wanted to forget the term German-American and hoped that the rest of the nation would soon forget that the unhappy term "disloyal" had ever been used to describe their beloved city. In spite of their reluctance to see their new homeland fight the land of
their birth and in spite of the mixed loyalties evoked by the conflict, men and women of German descent rejoiced that the war was over and they were glad to meet the challenge of working to rebuild the prestige of Milwaukee which had been known as a true American city, the city with a distinctive European background.
CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

I. PRIMARY SOURCES

A. BOOKS

Ameringer, Oscar. If You Don't Weaken. New York, 1940.

This paper would not be complete without the perusal of the autobiography of Oscar Ameringer, a Prussian immigrant and active disciple of Socialism from Oklahoma who came to Milwaukee during the war to assist Berger in maintaining the Socialist paper. He was an avowed and outspoken pacifist.


This book, written by the German ambassador to the United States at the time of the war, was helpful in assessing the German-American demands for neutrality and their evident lack of a pro-German mentality.


William George Bruce, a local historian, publisher and civic-minded citizen, relates the development of the city by means of his autobiography. The fact that Bruce was of German descent and does not elaborate on the anti-German sentiment is significant for this paper.


Bryan's Memoirs were indispensible as an aid for a better understanding of the problems of isolationism and pacifism. He resigned from his office of Secretary of State rather than sign the second Lusitania note to Germany. He was an ardent pacifist but supported the nation during wartime.

This narrative of Ambassador Gerard’s tour of duty in Germany was read as background material. Gerard was convinced that Germany was a militaristic state.


Robert Lansing succeeded Bryan as Secretary of State. He had been the Assistant Secretary and a close adviser to the President. The purpose of these Memoirs was to review the foreign affairs of the United States and the way they were conducted during the period from January 23, 1915, to February 13, 1920. The Memoirs were helpful in assessing both Lansing’s and Wilson’s ideas concerning the eventuality of the war.


This book was not relevant to the problem of this paper. However, Murphy, a former Milwaukeean, began his career in the State Department just seventeen days after the United States entered the First World War and his observation concerning the isolationism of Milwaukee should carry much weight coming from one who is well-skilled in interpreting the problems of war and diplomacy.


This manual was instrumental in giving the author firsthand information regarding the Council of Defense.


These minutes of a protest meeting held after the armistice gave the author a clearer insight into the extreme attitudes of Anti-Germanism.


These volumes provided material relevant to the problem since Colonel House was Wilson’s confidant and personal adviser from 1914-1919.

This collection of Wilson's addresses was useful in evaluating the election of 1916.


These volumes of the census were necessary in drawing up the population totals for the city and particularly for that of the German element.

B. ARTICLES


This article was taken from the autobiography of a Milwaukee attorney who belonged to the LaFollette wing of the Republican Party. Mr. Gross was, so he writes, unwittingly "shoved" into the presidency of the People's Council by Mrs. Berger in the summer of 1917. The article gave an excellent example of the apparent lack of patriotic acumen which was displayed by those Milwaukeeans who were neither anti-war nor pro-German but rather believed it part of the American freedom to object to a war which they considered unnecessary for the nation.


This section of the autobiography of General Charles King, a veteran of Indian warfare and of the Spanish American War, is most appropriate for this thesis. General King retired from the Wisconsin National Guard in 1904 and at the time of the incident was living at his home in the
city. Being called upon to keep an eye on possible draft troubles, his observation of his "gladdest moment" when he was able to report the completion of the draft registration, gave the author one more basis for the contention that the pro-German sentiment of Milwaukee was more a figment of the imagination than a reality.

II. SECONDARY SOURCES

A. BOOKS


This popular, yet complete and authentic narrative of Milwaukee's story originated as a Milwaukee Journal contribution to the city's centennial.


According to the preface, the purpose of this book was to expose some fallacies in the idea of neutrality.


This biography of the Brumder family was a necessary reference in this study. The Brumder family came to Milwaukee in the religious upheaval in Germany of 1848. They later began publication of the newspaper, the Germania-Herald, to promote the religious belief of Lutheranism and also to provide an independent political newspaper for Americans of German ancestry.


This book was helpful in discovering any early political activity among the German immigrants which might later have developed into a pro-German policy or which might have been a basis for the accusation of pro-Germanism at the time of World War I.

Buehlig presents the thesis that the United States became embroiled in the war with Germany because of their differing attitudes regarding British control of the seas.


This impartial account of the purpose and activities of the national German-American Alliance during the difficult years of the First World War were written by a British student while studying at the University of Wisconsin on a Commonwealth Fund Fellowship.


This chronicle of the Pabst Brewing Company was useful in drawing up the early German industries of the city.


Creel, who headed the wartime Committee on United States Public Information, wrote this book to promote the idea that the hope of peace in the world is in international concert, not isolationism.


Curti's book was helpful in its discussion of pacifism.


This early biography, written by Wilson's Secretary of the Navy, is considered a labor of love by its author. It was read as background material for this paper.


This volume, one of a series of ten, is a study of the German element in the United States with special reference to its political, moral, sociological, and educational influence in America.

The authors call this book a personality study in which they utilized the papers of Wilson, House, and Baker.


Gerson's thesis suggests that the hyphenated American was encouraged and promoted by the politicians.


This biography of Carl Sandburg discusses Sandburg's activities as a Socialist and his association with Berger in Milwaukee.


This broad outline of the history of Milwaukee was written with scrupulous regard for accuracy by an American born author of Irish descent.


This treatise, written by a former dean of the Social Science Division of the University of Chicago, provided material for a better understanding of the basic question of national loyalty and what constitutes disloyalty.


This study was used as background material.

Hagedorn, Herman. The Bugle That Woke America. New York, 1940.

Hagedorn was an ardent admirer of Theodore Roosevelt and this life bears witness to the fact.

------ Where Do We Stand? An Appeal to Americans of German Origin. New York, 1918.

Since Hagedorn was born in Germany, he could sympathize with his fellow German-Americans but he also pointed out their erroneous attitudes regarding the war.

Harbaugh's biography of Theodore Roosevelt is well documented and speaks well of this spirited public figure.


This book is a study of the Germans in the United States and presents a basis for the existence of German-Americanism.


This short historical survey of the German-Americans gives a brief and sympathetic description of the group's participation in the major events of our nation's history including the First World War.


This history of the Socialist movement from 1897 to 1912 corroborates the fact that most of the Socialists in Milwaukee just prior to the war were of German extraction.


This book, an historical narrative of the earliest days of Milwaukee, was useful in discussing the early German settlement of the city.

Lacher, J. H. *German Element in Wisconsin.* Milwaukee, 1925.

Lacher, vice-president and curator of the State Historical Society of Wisconsin, discusses the anti-German problem during the First World War in this study of the Germans in Wisconsin.


This thesis would not be complete without a study of the work of Senator LaFollette who figured so prominently in the isolationism of Wisconsin.

The title of this book is self-explanatory. There is no mention of any anti-war sabotage by German-Americans.


This book was used as background material for the paper.


This recent book was most pertinent to this thesis as a study of Bryan's belief in pacifism.


Link presents an unbiased account of the President's struggle for neutrality in this volume of a series on the life of Wilson.


This small treatise was published by the Service Center for teachers of history of the American Historical Association.


This easy-to-read but well-documented biographical sketch of Wisconsin's governor during the war gives a good picture of that critical period.


This book, one of many written by this author on the subject of peace and war, endeavors to assemble and to interpret the facts leading up to the participation of the United States in the war.
Milwaukee Writers' Project. *History of Milwaukee County.* Milwaukee, 1941.

This typewritten history of Milwaukee County was never published due to criticism resulting from its commentary on Milwaukee's Socialism.


This reference was useful in assessing the early history of Milwaukee.


Perkin's book concerning Hughes was chosen as reference since Perkins has written on various themes concerning statesmanship.


This book deals with the conflict between pro-war and anti-war agitators and includes the non-conformists, extremists, anarchists or Socialists, and conservatives, who according to the authors displayed an intemperance that would do credit to the wildest of radicals.


Raney, a professor of history at Lawrence College, Appleton, provides a readable summary of the growth of Wisconsin from the arrival of the first European visitor in 1634.


Former president Theodore Roosevelt, once a friend of the German-Americans, became one of their most violent accusers during the war. This book was the result of articles published by Roosevelt in the first fourteen months of the war.

Volume One of the Wisconsin Domesday Books is a study of Kenosha, Racine, Milwaukee, and Ozaukee Counties, and is the result of an intensive study of the region. This volume was helpful in studying the German immigration of the area.


This small book, found in the Chicago Newberry Library, was written as a result of a nostalgic trip back to Germany. The author had immigrated to America with a Lutheran group who wished to retain the German culture in America. In the book's preface the author reproves those German-Americans who found that their new citizenship hindered them from being outwardly loyal to the old homeland in World War I.


This book was helpful in its presentation of early Milwaukee.

Shannon, David A. Twentieth Century, The United States Since the 1890's. Chicago, 1963.

This recent book on Twentieth Century America was written by a professor at the University of Wisconsin and was used as reference for the political conventions in 1916.


This definitive history of the city was written by Professor Still who was a lecturer on the history of the American city at the New York University.


Macaulay's book was used as background reference in this thesis.

This book contained useful facts in the study of Socialism in Milwaukee.

Wittke, Carl. *German-Americans and the World War.* Vol. V. Columbus, Ohio, 1936.

This book, one of a series of the *Ohio Historical Collections,* was published by the Ohio State Archaeological and Historical Society. Wittke has done extensive research on immigration and on the immigrants of the Midwest.


This book deals with the German-language press during World War I.


**B. ARTICLES**


Mr. Blegen's article was useful in assessing the reason for the heavy German immigration into Milwaukee.


Like Bruncken's book, this article was helpful in discovering any early political activity among the German immigrants which would have a bearing on their later attitudes during the war.

Creel, George, "Our Aliens: Were They Loyal or Disloyal?" *Everybody's Magazine,* XL (March 1919), 36.

This article was appropriate in that Creel had been the head of the wartime Committee on United States Public Information.

"How Wisconsin Came By Its Large German Element," Wisconsin State Historical Society, Collections, XII (Madison, 1892), 299-334.

Kate Everest, later known as Kate Levi, has made an excellent contribution to the study of Wisconsin immigration.


This article is taken from Miss Falk's Master's essay at the University of Wisconsin: "War Propaganda in Wisconsin 1917-1918." It was submitted in 1941 under the direction of John D. Hicks.


This article on Milwaukee as an American city with a German flavor was an excellent reference for an understanding of Milwaukee's Germanism.


This discussion of the problem was useful in preparing the paper.

"How the Hyphen Voted," Literary Digest, LIII (November 1916), 1394-1395.

This assessment of the "hyphen" vote was helpful in drawing up the chapter on the election of 1916.


This article gave the history of German immigration into the state.

This article was used to learn the geographical origins of the German-Americans of the city.

"Lynch Law as Treason," Literary Digest, LVIII (August 1918), 13.

The activities of the super-patriots at the time of the war were discussed in this article.


These two articles on the Socialists position on the war bitterly criticized the former members who left the party to support the war effort.


Muzik's study of Victor Berger was indispensable in this discussion of Milwaukee and its problem of pacifism.


This article contends that the Socialists must be anti-war, and gave the impression that they were opposed to war, almost with a vengeance.


This thesis, concerned with the subject of British propaganda, was most useful in ascertaining a reason for the German-American anti-British sentiment.
Reinders, Robert C. "Daniel W. Hoan and Municipal Reform in Milwaukee, 1910-1920," Historical Messenger of the Milwaukee County Historical Society, XXI (June 1965), 33-44.


Reinder's research on the Milwaukee Socialist Party was of inestimable value in the preparation of this thesis.

"Rewarding a Newspaper," Literary Digest, LXI (June 1919), 31.

This article compliments the Milwaukee Journal on the fine work it accomplished in the war effort which merited the Pulitzer prize.


As a Wisconsin historian, Schafer has done much research and study on the early settlers and immigrants of Wisconsin.


David A. Shannon was professor of history at the University of Wisconsin when he prepared this article. His major field of study is the history of the American left.


Charles Stewart had been secretary for Governor Philipp in the early part of the war, and later wrote this article to point out how those who were professing to be against anything German were actually like the Prussians and their extreme militarism.


This article, as well as Wittke's other books, was an excellent source of background material.
C. NEWSPAPERS

**Daily Wisconsin.** Milwaukee, 1849.

This early Milwaukee paper was used for one reference.


The Germania-Herald was published by the Brumder family which had immigrated to America in the eighteen fifties. It was first published as a Lutheran organ for the area. During the war the government did not interfere with its editorial policy nor with its handling of the news.


This minor city paper was used for several references. The writer wished to read another paper's view concerning the anti-German sentiment.

**Milwaukee Leader.** Milwaukee, 1914-20.

The Leader was the Socialist paper of the area and was curtailed by the federal government for its anti-war views during the last year of the war.


Although the Journal was untiring in its efforts to promote patriotism among the people of Milwaukee and the surrounding area, the paper managed to keep a sane attitude regarding the German-Americans, the pacifists, and the anti-war Socialists. This paper was used extensively for background material and for reference.

**Milwaukee Sentinel.** Milwaukee, 1837, 1914-18.

This paper was also known as the Milwaukee Sentinel and Gazette and the Milwaukee Daily Sentinel. Although the Sentinel was the oldest paper in circulation at the time of the war, its publication was overshadowed by the resourcefulness of the Journal. The writer regrets that there was not time to use the Sentinel to greater length in the preparation of this thesis.

The New York Times Index was helpful in directing the writer to the various pertinent articles concerning Milwaukee and the First World War.


This paper is the Sunday edition of the Germania-Herald.
The thesis submitted by Sister Mary Antonette Henke, O.S.M. has been read and approved by the director of the thesis. Furthermore, the final copies have been examined by the director and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the thesis is now given final approval with reference to content and form.

The thesis is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.

[Signature]

[Date: 7/5/67]