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Koinonia from Classical to Christian Times

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KOINONIA FROM CLASSICAL TO CHRISTIAN TIMES

by

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LIFE

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During the academic year 1959-1960, she taught Latin and English at Holy Family High School, Glendale, California. She began her graduate studies at Loyola University in September, 1960, as an NDEA Fellow in the History of Western Origins Program and participated in the initial semester of the Loyola in Rome Center in 1962. Since September, 1964, she has been a part-time faculty member at Mundelein College in Chicago.
PREFACE

Grateful acknowledgment is made to my religious community, the Sisters of Charity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, for the opportunity for graduate study as well as for constant support and encouragement; to Father John L. McKenzie, S.J. and all the members of the History of Western Origins Program Committee for inspiration and guidance; to the Office of Health, Education and Welfare for the financial assistance provided by a three-year NDEA Fellowship.
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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Objectives of the Study

The primary aim of this study is to approach the thought of Plato, Plutarch, and Clement of Alexandria as it is reflected in their use of κοινωνία and its cognates. Secondarily, the study attempts to observe their use of κοινωνία and its cognates as compared with authors related to them in time but not necessarily in spiritual or philosophical tradition. Thirdly, the paper contains some observations on the general development of κοινωνία and its cognates from classical to Christian times.

This study took its inspiration from comments made by two eminent scholars. R. Reitzenstein remarked in his work, Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen: "Die Wortgeschichte, wenn sie sich zu einer Geschichte der Begriffe vertieft, kann uns noch immer reichen Aufschluss über Probleme geben, denen wir auf keinem anderen Wege nahe kommen können."¹ Glanville Downey prefaced a study on "Philanthropia in Religion and Statecraft in the Fourth Century after Christ" with the observation that "the influence of

¹Richard Reitzenstein, Die hellenistischen Mysterienreligionen nach ihren Grundgedanken und Wirkungen (Fotomechanischer Nachdruck der dritten Auflage von 1927; Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1956), 76.
pagan philosophical ideas on Christianity can be traced both in the larger sphere of the terms and modes of thought, and more specifically in the usage of individual words."¹

\(\kappaουν\nuβ\iota\) is one of many Greek words which express the idea of sharing, but as Jourdan has pointed out, it is unique in that it also has the "capacity for conveying the sense of the inward union."² Because of this special connotation, \(\kappaουν\nuβ\iota\) and its cognates occur in a variety of interesting contexts throughout the whole of classical literature. In choosing a dissertation topic which would cross the lines of ancient history, ancient philosophy, and classics, according to the plan of Loyola University's History of Western Origins program, it seemed that the history of the development of a word such as \(\kappaουν\nuβ\iota\) might, as Reitzenstein suggested, provide a significant insight into the influences, trends, and changes in one aspect of the thought of the ancient world. With this in mind, citations of \(\kappaουν\nuβ\iota\) and its cognates were collected from the works of authors dating from the fifth century B.C. to the fifth century A.D.

It soon became evident, however, that an uncontrolled and random sampling of citations of \(\kappaουν\nuβ\iota\) and its cognates from various unrelated authors would result in vague generalizations.

¹Glanville Downey, "Philanthropia in Religion and Statecraft in the Fourth Century after Christ," Historia, IV (1955), 199.
²George V. Jourdan, "\(\kappaουν\nuβ\iota\) in I Corinthians 10.16," Journal of Biblical Literature, LXVII (June, 1948), 111.
valid only for citations actually studied. It seemed that much more significant results could be obtained if the study were primarily structured to emphasize all the usages of κοινωνία and its cognates in certain selected authors even though this might impose an artificial and at times awkward unity on the material. Two criteria seemed of special importance in the selection of the authors to be studied in depth. First, that the authors selected be part of the same intellectual tradition but of chronologically different periods. Thus, it seemed, there would be more possibility that influence in the usage of the terms might appear and that divergences might be explainable in light of the author's own historical and cultural milieu. Second, that the corpus of the writings of the authors selected be sufficiently large and well edited so that the occurrences of κοινωνία and its cognates would be frequent enough to be significant and that citations would be accurate. Using these criteria as a basis for selection, Plato was chosen to represent the classical period; Plutarch of Chaeronea the Hellenistic-Roman period; and Clement of Alexandria the pa­tristic period.

**Organization of the Study**

Chapter II of this study is devoted to an analysis of the linguistic derivation of κοινωνία and its cognates. It also includes a summary of the pre-Platonic usages of κοινωνία and its cognates as background for the study in general and in particular for the thought of Plato. Chapters III, IV, and V analyze κοινωνία
and its cognates in the thought of each of the three main authors with supplementary citations from other authors, usually of the same chronological period. Each of these three chapters concludes with a discussion of how the authors in the periods under consideration used \( \text{koinw} \) \( \text{v} \) and its cognates in contexts which reflect to some degree the cultural, social, philosophical, economic, or religious milieu of the period in which they were written. Chapter VI is an analysis of the grammatical constructions occurring with \( \text{koinw} \) \( \text{v} \) and its cognates based on a study of over 1400 citations from all the periods studied. Chapter VII presents the threefold conclusions of the study: a basic similarity in the thought of Plato, Plutarch, and Clement is reflected in their use of \( \text{koinw} \) \( \text{v} \) and its cognates; authors within each period provide points of comparison and contrast with the main authors in their use of \( \text{koinw} \) \( \text{v} \) and its cognates; there is an observable development in the use of \( \text{koinw} \) \( \text{v} \) and its cognates from classical to Christian times.

**Related Studies**

This is not the first study of \( \text{koinw} \) \( \text{v} \) and its cognates to appear, however. Several studies have been made on this topic, both in regard to the business practices of the ancient world and in reference to the New Testament.

The conclusion of P.J.T. Endenburg in *Koinoonia en Gemeenschap van Zaken bij de Grieken in den klassieken Tijd* is that \( \text{koinw} \) \( \text{v} \) and its cognates in the classical writers do not designate
elaborate commercial enterprises, as some had suggested, but refer at best to quite simple commercial relationships.  

Studies of the use of κοινωνία and its cognates in the New Testament have been more numerous. Many of them have taken the classical usages of κοινωνία and its cognates into account as the basis of study of κοινωνία in the New Testament. However, their main concern is the significance of κοινωνία and its cognates in understanding the Christian message.

All of these studies have been valuable for the present study especially in terms of methodology, but none of them have attempted to discuss the problem in the manner which is being used here, namely, as an approach to the thought of Plato, Plutarch, and Clement of Alexandria and as a broad analysis of the development of the word from classical to Christian times.

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CHAPTER II
KOINONIA AND ITS COGNATES

Derivation and Development

The etymological derivation of \( \text{koinw} \) and its cognates is the adjective \( \text{koinw} \) meaning "public, common."\(^1\) The Homeric equivalent is \( \text{zie} \). As early as Hesiod, \( \tau \text{ koivw} \) is used substantively and acquires specialized meanings such as "community, public property, public or common, governing authority, alliance."\(^2\)

Noun forms develop from \( \text{koinw} \) and \( \tau \text{ koivw} : \text{koinw} \) and \( \text{koinw} \) in the Doric and Arcadian dialects, and \( \text{koinw} \), \( \text{koinw} \) and \( \text{koinw} \) in the Attic dialect. They have the lexical meanings "companion, colleague, ally."\(^3\) Also formed on the substantive \( \tau \text{ koivw} \) are the denominative verb \( \text{koinw}, -\text{omai} \) "to make common, to profane," \( \text{koinw}, -\text{matw} \) meaning "bond," and \( \text{koinw} \) meaning "intercourse, commerce."\(^4\)

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\(^1\)Emile Boisacq, ed., Dictionnaire Étymologique de la Langue Grecque (3rd ed.; Heidelberg: Carl Winter's Universitätsbuchhandlung, 1938), 482.


\(^3\)Ibid.

\(^4\)Ibid.
The verb forms which developed from the noun forms above, according to the usual pattern of formation in Greek, are κοίναντζ in Doric and κοίνανή (κοίνενή) in Attic. Verbs ending in -ίω ordinarily mean "to find oneself in a situation or the usual exercise of an activity." κοίνενή can mean "to take part" or, more rarely, "to give a share."  

The noun κοίνονή as well as the nouns κοίναι in Doric and κοίνοι in Attic meaning "mutual participation, association" are based on the verb forms. ξυνωνή is the Ionic form of the word and ξυνωνή occurs in Aeschylus.  

Most nouns ending in -ά are abstract nouns. κοίνοι, however, may be used either abstractly or concretely. As participation, it is an abstract noun; as association, it is a concrete one.  

The adjectival form κοίνωνος meaning "companion" is also based on the early noun form κοίνων, -ωνος. It is usually used substantively. The adjectives κοίνανήκος and κοίνωνίκος meaning "communicative" are formed from the adjective κοίνωνος as is

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2 Hauch, op. cit., p. 798.  
3 Endenburg, op. cit., 105.  
4 Campbell, op. cit., 356.  
meaning "concerning community."\(^1\)

**Pre-Platonic Usages**

When \( \text{κοίνωνία} \) appeared in the Attic literature of the fifth century B.C. it had the concrete meaning of "association," which the \( \text{κοίνων} \) root word always had, but it also developed the abstract sense of "participation." \( \text{κοίνωνία} \) seems to have distinguished itself from other words having the same general connotation by acquiring the special capacity for indicating a state of inner as well as external union.

A clear indication of the nature of the relationships which are described by \( \text{κοίνωνία} \) and its cognates can be seen in the antithetical expressions which occur throughout Greek literature.

Such statements as "What \( \text{κοίνωνία} \) have herdsmen with the sea?",\(^2\) "What \( \text{κοίνωνία} \) has a mirror with a sword?",\(^3\) and "the fox fared very badly because he had made an alliance with an eagle,"\(^4\) indicate that there must be some common bond or likeness

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\(^1\) Frisk, *op. cit.*


of nature or purpose which forms the basis for a special relationship or κοινωνία between things, between persons, or among persons and groups of persons. In the first two examples given above, there did exist a common element which provided the basis for the κοινωνία between the herdsman and the sea, between the mirror and sword, but it is not immediately evident to the questioner. In the last example a state of equality was created where it had not previously existed and thus makes κοινωνία possible. Such relationships obviously admit of degrees: the greater the common element, the deeper the κοινωνία.

The writers who discussed the findings of the scientific study of medicine in the Hippocratic school at Cos during the last decade of the fifth century also used κοινωνία to designate physical relationships observable in the body. Two passages from Hippocrates' treatise On Joints make reference to the communications of the veins and arteries\(^1\) and to the "spinal cord itself with its coverings, their origin, endings, connections and functions."\(^2\) The treatise On Ancient Medicine, written probably by an able member of Hippocrates' school c. 430-420 B.C.,\(^3\) contains

\(^1\)Hippocrates On Joints 45.9, ed. Hugo Kuehlewein (Opera Guae Feruntur Omnia; Leipzig: B.G. Teubner, 1894-1902), II, 171-172.


This interesting observation:

I am utterly at a loss to know how those who prefer these hypothetical arguments and reduce the science to a simple matter of 'principles' ever cure anyone on the basis of their assumptions. I do not think that they have ever discovered anything that is purely 'hot' or 'cold', 'dry', 'wet', without its sharing some other qualities. 

This statement seems to be a protest against introducing the philosophical suppositions of Empedocles into the practice of medicine where scientific observation had shown the opposite to be true.

In Pindar's I Pythian ode, the natural κοινωνία which the poet describes between lyre and song seems to be symbolic of a deeper spiritual κοινωνία. The ode was written to honor Hiero of Syracuse, victor in the chariot race in 470 B.C. Its primary purpose, however, is the celebration of the coronation of Deinomenes, Hiero's son, as king of the recently-founded city of Aetna in Sicily. It is an encomium of praise and an exhortation to the spirit of concord and harmony which the poet hopes will characterize the city of Aetna under the rule of a constitutional king. Pindar says that no κοινωνία of lyre and song will ever

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1Hippocrates On Ancient Medicine 15.6, op. cit., I, 17.


4Pindar I Pyth 95-98, op. cit., 64.
praise the ignoble Phalaris whose city knew no spiritual harmony, as it will praise the young Deinomenes if his kingdom is characterized by concord. Every aspect of the poem is deliberately intended to intensify the theme of unity and harmony which the poet was lauding and which he expressed symbolically in terms of the koivvía of lyre and song.¹

koivvía is also employed a number of times in passages from the fifth century B.C. dramatists to express the close relationship which exists among those of common blood. This relationship implies much more than a physical bond; it demands a deep moral unity as well. In Aeschylus' drama, The Suppliant Maidens, which is usually considered the earliest surviving Greek drama,² the king of Argos, Pelasgus, acknowledged that the daughters of Danaus have the right to ask him and the people of Argos for aid because of their ancient blood koivvía with Argos.³ To neglect this obligation would be to incur the wrath of Zeus protector of suppliants. The people acknowledge this claim as valid and assure the maidens of their support, even though this means war for Ar-

¹Burt on op. cit., and Gilbert Norwood, Pindar (Berkeley: 1945), 101-105.


Antigone too, in Aeschylus' *Seven Against Thebes*, yields to the demand of blood relationship, even over the law of the state, when she defies the order of Creon and announces her intent to bury her brother Polyneices: "It shames me not to face the State, and set/ Will against power, rebellion resolute;/ Deep in my heart is set my sisterhood,/ My common birthright with my brothers, born/ All of one womb, her children who, for woe,/ Brought forth sad offspring to a sire ill-starred." Living, she will share willingly in misfortune with him who no longer has a will, being dead.

After Rhesus was killed by Odysseus, the leader of the chorus in Euripides' *Rhesus* offers his condolences to the Muse of the Mountains, mother of Rhesus, telling her that he mourns for Rhesus as much as is fitting for one not sharing a common ancestry.

1Virginia Woods Callahan, *Types of Rulers in the Plays of Aeschylus* (Chicago, 1944), 6.

2Whitney J. Oates and Eugene O'Neil, Jr., eds., *The Complete Greek Drama* (2 vols; New York: Random House, 1938), 119. Unless otherwise indicated, all translations of Greek drama given in this chapter are taken from this work.


5Euripides *Rhesus* 904-905 (*Fabulae*, Oxford: Clarendon
Complementary to the use of κοινωνία in designating the blood relationship and the deeper moral unity which that relationship implies is its use to express the spiritual relationship of husband and wife in marriage. The children, which are the natural result of that relationship, are in turn referred to as the visible expression of the marital κοινωνία.

The chorus in Euripides' *Madness of Heracles* assured Heracles who has returned home to revenge harm done to his family by Lycus during his absence: "'Tis only right that parents should help their children, their aged sires, and the partners of their marriage."¹ After Heracles had succeeded in slaying Lycus, he goes mad and in his frenzy kills his own wife and children. When he recovers his senses, Heracles begs Theseus, king of Athens, to assure them a proper burial since the law forbade him to do so. He asks that the children be buried in their mother's arms and then moans the "sad fellowship, which I - 0 wretch! - destroyed unknowing."² He bewailed the sad participations of his wea-

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² Euripides *Herakles* 1374-77, op. cit., 46.

They had been "the comrades of my glorious career in Hellas." But now these same weapons are partners with him in the inglorious deed of murdering his wife and children. He says: "I am not sure whether to keep them or let them go: dangling at my side they thus will say, "With us didst thou destroy children and wife, we are thy children's slayers, and thou keepest us."

Jason, in Medea of Euripides, taunts Medea with the reminder that, by killing their children, she has not only punished him but she too has become sorrowful and a κοινωνία in the evils.²

Further indication of the special importance of the marriage κοινωνία can be seen in the comments of Deianira, the wife of Heracles, in the Trachiniae of Sophocles. Deianira has become aware that Heracles expects her to welcome Iole, for whom he had captured and destroyed Oechalia, into her home and to share with the beautiful young captive her role as wife of Heracles. Deianira does not object to the sexual relations between Iole and her husband. But the humiliation of being made to share her role as wife and mistress of the house is one that the elder Deianira is not willing to endure because she fears that her unique and permanent relationship with Heracles is about to be set aside. She

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¹ Euripides Herakles 1337, op. cit., p. 45.

² Euripides Medea 1361 (Fabulae, op. cit.) I, 302.
laments to the chorus:

A maiden, - or methinks, no longer a maiden, but a mistress, - hath found her way into my house... And now we twain are to share the same marriage-bed, the same embrace. Such is the reward that Heracles hath sent me, - he whom I call true and loyal, - for guarding his home though all that weary time. I have no thought of anger against him, often as he is vexed with this distemper. But then to live with her, sharing the same union - what woman could endure it? For I see that the flower of her age is blossoming, while mine is fading; and the eyes of men love to cull the bloom of youth, but they turn aside from the old. This, then, is my fear, - lest Heracles, in name my spouse should be the younger's mate. 1

Deianira becomes an unwitting κοινωνος in the murder of Heracles when she sends him a robe on which she put the blood Nesus had given her to use as a love charm to win back the love of Heracles from Iole. She soon realizes that the love charm is poison and that it will be fatal for Heracles. The leader of the chorus tries to console her, saying, "Yet towards those who have erred unwittingly, men's anger is softened; and so it should be towards thee." Deianira replies, "Nay such words are not for one who has borne a part in the ill deed, but only for him who has no trouble at his own door." 2 Though unwittingly, she is indeed a

1 Sophocles Trachiniae 545-546, ed., com., and tr. by R.C. Jebb (The Plays and Fragments; Cambridge: University Press, 1892), V, 84.

J. C. Kamerbeek, The Plays of Sophocles Commentaries (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1959), 9, points out that this passage contains an interesting contrast between ἱυπατίκειν, the physical living together under a common roof, and κοινωνος, sharing in the same marital relations. Cf. also S.M. Adams, Sophocles the Playwright (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1957) 116-120.

2 Sophocles Trachiniae 729-730, op. cit., 112.
in the murder of Heracles.

Agave in Euripides' Bacchae tells Cadmus that Phetheus is the child "of my love and his father's bred."\(^1\) And when Jocasta and Laius in Euripides' Phoenissae remain childless after years of marriage, Laius finally goes to Delphi to question Apollo, "craving moreover that our love might be crowned with sons born to his house."\(^2\)

In Euripides' Ion, Creusa, who had as a girl given birth to Ion by Apollo, and her husband Xuthus consulted the oracle and the leader of the chorus reports to Creusa the oracle given in her regard: "To thee, my queen, it is not given to clasp/ In thy fond arms a child, or at thy breast/ To hold it."\(^3\) The tutor who was with Creusa quickly intervenes to ask: "If a common fate/ Await our lord, partaker of thy griefs,/ Or thou Creusa alone art thus unfortunate?"\(^4\) The chorus leader replies: "To him, old man, the god hath given a son/ And happiness is his unknown to her." In their childlessness, Xuthus is a koivwos with Creusa in grief. The chorus leader implies that the child to be given to Xuthus by the god will not be a source of common joy because it

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\(^1\)Euripides Bacchae 1276 (Fabulae, op. cit.), III.
\(^2\)Euripides Phoenissae 13-16 (Fabulae, op. cit.), III.
\(^3\)Ibid.
\(^4\)Euripides Ion 771-772 (Fabulae, op. cit.), II.
will not be the offspring of their mutual love. As the story unfolds, the child given to Xuthus is discovered to be none other than Ion, Creusa's own son. So Ion becomes a source of joy to both Xuthus and Creusa, but still not a source of common joy.

In addition to husband, wife and children, the slave, too, is considered as an integral member of the household. He is thereby entitled to participate in household worship.\(^1\) Aeschylus in the *Agamemnon* has Clytemnestra address Cassandra: "Get thee within, thou too; thou Cassandra, since Zeus without anger has made thee to share with our house in its lustral water standing among our many slaves by the household altar."\(^2\)

The stranger also, since he travels under the protection of Zeus, is entitled to participate in the sacrifice according to the laws of hospitality. The plot to kill Aegistheus hatched by Orestes and the former servant of Agamemnon in Euripides' *Electra* is based on this religious obligation. The old man tells Orestes that Aegistheus is out in the fields with some slaves preparing a feast for the nymphs and advises him to go past the place where Aegistheus is sacrificing so that he will see Orestes and invite him to the feast.\(^3\) Once able to get close to Aegistheus without

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\(^{1}\) Eduard Fraenkel, ed., *Aeschylus, Agamemnon* (2 vols.; Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1950), II, 469, comments: "What Clytemnestra here makes appear as a special favor is in truth nothing more than the common practice of antiquity."

\(^{2}\) Aeschylus *Agamemnon* 1035-38, I, 152-153.

\(^{3}\) Euripides *Electra* 637 (*Fabulae, op. cit.*), II.
rousing suspicion, it will be no problem to kill him. The ruse works perfectly and the plot proceeds as planned.

The natural κοινωνία which exists among persons related by blood may be further intensified by a common will. When Orestes is condemned to die by his own hand for the murder of his mother, Clytemnestra, he first returns to bid farewell to Electra. She greets him as "partner in one soul" with her, and prays, "Ah, would the self-same sword, if only it might be, could slay us both, and one coffin of cedar-wood receive us!" And Orestes replies, "That would be an end most sweet; but surely thou seest we are too destitute of friends to be allowed to share one tomb."

This common crime which they committed is the result of their common hatred of their mother for the murder of their father.

κοινωνία can also exist between persons not related by blood; it is then based on common interest or common effort or on some other type of common bond. In the Ajax of Sophocles, the hero of the play became temporarily insane when the arms of Achilles are awarded to Odysseus, and in his madness Ajax slaughters the cattle of the army, thinking they are the leaders of the Greek forces. Tecmessa, who had witnessed the event, recounts it for the Salaminian sailors adding that because of their very close relationship with Ajax, they are as involved in the disgrace as though they themselves had participated in it.

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1 Euripides Orestes 1054-55 (Fabulae, op. cit.), III.

2 Sophocles Ajax 284 (The Plays and Fragments, op. cit.)
Medea comments to Creon that they share the same fate of being hated because they possessed a wisdom greater than the rest of men have.\(^1\)

In the *Choephori* of Aeschylus, Electra shared with the chorus the news about the locks of hair left as offerings at her father's grave because they also share with her a common sorrow over the death of Agamemnon.\(^2\)

Iphigeneia, in Euripides' *Iphigeneia in Tauris*, secures the co-operation of the chorus of captive Greek women in her escape with Orestes from Thoas and the Taurians by promising to see to it that they will share her good fortune and be able to return to Greece themselves.\(^3\) The ruse Iphigeneia uses to escape involves submitting the statue of Artemis to ritual purification together with the two captives Orestes and Pylades who are "polluted with domestic blood." When Thoas inquires about the nature of their guilt, Iphigeneia replies that they slew their mother with a common sword,\(^4\) the use of a single sword being indicative of

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\(^1\) Kamerbeek, *op. cit.* (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1953), I, 74, comments: "κοινωνός: not ′als ab du dabei zugegen gewesen warst′ (Rademacher), but ′Being concerned in it′... (Wrong: mali auctor, Ellendt.)"


\(^3\) Euripides *Iphigeneia in Tauris* 1067-68 (*Fabulae*, *op. cit.*).

\(^4\) Euripides *Iphigeneia in Tauris* 1173, ibid.
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their moral unity in the action performed.

Clytemnestra, in Euripides' Electra, attempts to justify herself for turning to Agamemnon's enemies for help in avenging his murder of their daughter Iphigeneia, because no one who had been loyal to Agamemnon could have been expected to be a willing κοινωνός in his murder.¹

Orestes asks Hermione, in the Andromache of Euripides, if she has any κοινωνός in her attempted murder of Andromache and her child.² And in Euripides' Orestes, Menelaus asks Pylades if he is a κοινωνός of Orestes in attempting to murder Hermione.³

The chorus of the Cyclops of Euripides want to take part with Odysseus in preparing the burning brand which is to gouge out the eye of the Cyclops.⁴ They regard participation in this act as analogous to a religious sacrifice in which all are united by desire and intent.

More in the realm of daily experience are the references in Aristophanes' Wasps to the κοινωνία established between two public advocates in the public lawcourts when they split a bribe

¹Euripides Electra 1047-48 (Fabulae, op. cit.), II.
²Euripides Andromache 915 (Fabulae, op. cit.), I.
³Euripides Orestes 1591 (Fabulae, op. cit.), III.
⁴Euripides Cyclops 469-471 (Fabulae, op. cit.), III.
and both work for the acquittal of the accused, and in Lysias' speech Against Diogeiton where two brothers, on inheriting an estate, divide the money but hold the property in common.

The κοινωνία which exists among individuals is seen also to exist in regard to the relationship of the citizens of a state and of states with each other. In the Ecclesiazusae of Aristophanes, Praxagora proposes this solution for the economic and social ills of her state:

I want all to have a share of everything and all property to be in common; there will no longer be either rich or poor; no longer shall we see one man harvesting vast tracts of land, while another has not ground enough to be buried in, nor one man surround himself with a whole array of slaves while another has not a single attendant; I intend that there shall only be one and the same condition of life for all.

In an earthy aside typical of comedy, Praxagora's husband Blypheros asks: καὶ τῶν πελέσιων κοινωνεῖτε.

The Mytilenaesans have established a κοινωνία with Athens but later become dissatisfied with their mutual relations. So


4Aristophanes Ecclesiazusae 596, ibid., 42.
they seek an alliance with the Peloponnesians, outlining the points which they consider essential to a successful κοινωνία among states:

We will first discuss the question of justice and rectitude, especially as we are seeking an alliance, for we know that neither does friendship between men prove lasting, nor does a league between states come to aught, unless they comport themselves with transparent honesty of purpose towards one another and in general are of like character and way of thinking; for differences in men's actions arise from the diversity of their conviction. 1

These are criteria for a successful κοινωνία between men as well as between states.

**Conclusion**

κοινωνία and its cognates are directly related through linguistic development to the Greek ζυνός and κοινός, meaning "public" or "common." During the long period of the evolution of the Greek language, the concept κοινός gradually became refined. By the early fifth century, B.C., when κοινωνία and its cognates appear in literature written in the Attic dialect, they show evidence of the process of linguistic and semantic development which preceded them by their ability to express both the concrete idea of "association" and the abstract concept of "participation."

The process by which κοινωνία and its cognates acquired the ability to describe the abstract as well as concrete relation

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ships is of course unknown. However, indications of how this may have taken place are perhaps reflected in the use of κοινωνία and its cognates by the Athenian dramatists. Originally, it would seem, the κοινωνία established by consanguinity was the most important factor regulating relationships among persons. The leader of the chorus in the Rhesus commented to the Muse of the Mountain that he mourned for Rhesus as much as was fitting for one not related by blood. The emphasis then comes to be placed on the moral or spiritual obligations binding upon those related by blood, which were enforced, according to Aeschylus, by the will and power of Zeus. Thus, the people of Argos recognize that the daughters of Danaus have a special claim on their assistance because of their common ancestry, and Antigone buried Polyneices contrary to the law of the land because it is her duty, imposed by Zeus, as a blood relation. A common will or purpose then seems to become the more important basis of κοινωνία, even between those related by blood. Such a situation is illustrated by Orestes and Electra, who ally to kill their own mother. Finally, the spiritual basis of the κοινωνία comes to be regarded both as the gauge of the depth of the relationship and as the decisive criterion, with the importance of blood relationship decreasing accordingly. This phase of the development is illustrated by the relationships between Orestes and Pylades, Odysseus and his companions, and Ajax and his companions.

The use of κοινωνία and its cognates to describe the
physical interconnections of the parts of the body is a sophisticated use of the concrete relationship based on the scientific studies of the Hippocratic school of medicine at Cos. In Pindar's ode however, written over a half century earlier than the previous citations, the concrete κοινωνία of lyre and song is well on the way to becoming an abstraction capable of symbolizing spiritual harmony, a transfer of meaning particularly significant in this context since the ancient Greeks knew by experience that it was difficult for a tyrant with absolute power to retain outward and inner harmony with and among his subjects indefinitely. Finally, the reference to the principles of hot, cold, wet, and dry which the Hippocratic writer says cannot exist without κοινωνία in something else is an example of the type of abstraction common to the thought of the pre-Socratic philosophers.

Several passages from the pre-Platonic authors also reflect the ways in which κοινωνία and its cognates were used in common parlance in the fifth century B.C. Aristophanes has Praxagora in the Ecclesiazusae suggest a communal approach to living as a solution for the economic and social ills of the times. In the Wasps he describes the type of κοινωνία based on self-interest which public advocates established for themselves. Lysias indicates that joint heirs could maintain koinonia in the possession of inherited property. κοινωνία is also used to describe the relationship established between allies by Thucydides who has the Mytilenian envoy state that honesty of purpose, like character
and way of thinking are absolutely essential for successful political \( \text{κοινωνία} \).

\( \text{κοινωνία} \) and its cognates appear equally able to express both concrete and abstract types of relationships when they appear in the Attic Greek dialect of the fifth century B.C. However, they are limited to the description of specific relationships rather than as statements about relationship in general, whether concrete or abstract. The contexts in which they occur are characteristic either of the times which they describe or the themes of the literature prevalent in that period, thus reflecting the aspects of the milieu of the period in which they were written.
CHAPTER III

KOINONIA AND ITS COGNATES IN PLATO AND RELATED AUTHORS OF THE CLASSICAL PERIOD

Introduction

About 427 B.C. Plato was born into a noble Athenian family which traced its ancestry back to Codrus, Athens' last king.\(^1\) As a young man, according to his own account in Epistle VII, he had a keen interest in political life. However he soon became disillusioned by the atrocities committed by the Thirty who overthrew the democracy in 411 B.C. and then by the injustice of the restored democratic party which condemned Socrates, his teacher and friend, to death in 399 B.C. After Socrates' death, Plato retired to Megara and then travelled extensively. He visited the Pythagorean community in Italy and went to Syracuse three times, c. 389, 367, 361 B.C. After his first visit to Syracuse he returned to Athens and began teaching philosophy in the Academy and writing philosophic dialogues. He died in 348 B.C.

The impact of his disillusionment at the corruption of Athenian politics, epitomized for him in the fate of Socrates, and then of politics in general was a crucial experience for Plato.

\(^1\)The introduction to this chapter is based largely on Chapter I, "Eidos," from Paul Friedlander, Plato: An Introduction (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1960), 3-31, trans. by Hans Meyerhoff.
He could not participate in politics as they were; yet to divorce himself completely from politics would mean that an essential part of his existence would be denied. So he attempted instead "to build a new life on an entirely different foundation for both the individual and the state."¹ Socrates had shown that man had to be remade in terms of virtue. Plato broadened and developed this idea until he arrived at the conclusion that

the classes of mankind...will have no cessation from evils until either the class of those who are right and true philosophers attains political supremacy, or else the class of those who hold power in the States becomes, by some dispensation of Heaven, really philosophic. ²

The Greek state had originally been built on a religious foundation, with Zeus, Themis, the Fates and the Horai governing the affairs of men. When this foundation began to weaken in a more sceptical age, Heracleitus secured the foundation of the state on the justice and order of the cosmos. The Sophists of the fifth century, however, attempted to undermine this foundation by saying that there was no innate justice and order in things. Rather, justice was something arbitrarily established as supreme by a few wise men in order to control man's bestial nature. Law was thus considered generally hostile to nature.

Socrates differed from the Sophists, though accused of

¹Ibid., 9.

being one, because of his belief in the supremacy of justice. Behind his every question was the search for the good life which the good man should lead in the well-ordered polis. Socrates himself apparently was the inspiration which led Plato beyond the practical notion of justice to the essential justice existing in the world of Ideas, a transition facilitated perhaps by his familiarity with the traditional Greek concept of the generic. With the "eyes of the soul" a man could see the Eidos, a term which no longer designated for Plato a sense object but the reality which the sensible imperfectly expressed. "If there was such a thing as justice, if it was an Eidos, then a person became just when he looked at justice." Plato felt it was his mission to educate both the individual and the polis to see what he had seen—the Idea of justice—and then to build a new polis with justice as its foundation.

This and nothing else is meant by Plato's epigram according to which there will be no end to evils unless philosophers become rulers or the rulers genuine seekers after truth. It is just another expression of that "systematic" connection which always existed for him between Eidos and Polis, not because of any conceptual construction, but because of an experienced necessity.

To make his intuition meaningful for others became the goal of Plato's life. His three trips to Syracuse were an attempt to actually create an ideal state ruled by a philosopher-king. Dion first invited Plato to Syracuse in 389 B.C. to teach philos-

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1 Friedlander, op. cit., 19.
2 Ibid., 20.
ophy to his brother-in-law, Dionysius I the king, but the enter-
prise was unsuccessful. Dionysius I died and was succeeded by
his son Dionysius II who was under the influence of his uncle Di-
on. Dion again invited Plato to Syracuse in 367 B.C. to be his
κοινωνός in educating the young ruler so that he might become
a philosopher-king,¹ and a worthy κοινωνός in the whole of life²
Dion believed that Dionysius' association with Plato in a liberal
education would create a bond between them more strong and trust-
worthy than any produced by venal friendship or kinship of soul
and body,³ and so Plato became "an associate of Dionysius at ta-
ble and at hearth and a partaker in his holy rites."⁴

Dionysius, however, completely failed to understand Plato's
aims. Furthermore, he tried to involve Plato in his politi-
cal activities, much to Plato's great distress.⁵ These two cir-
cumstances, according to Plato, finally created a "wolf-love and
want of fellowship"⁶ between himself and Dionysius which ended
with Plato's returning to Greece.

In 361 B.C. Dionysius invited Plato to return to Syracuse,
assuring him that his purposes were now the same as those of his

¹Ep. VII 327C.
²Ibid., 333B.
³Ibid., 334B.
⁴Ibid., 350C.
⁵Ep. III, 316B, D, 318D.
⁶Ep. III, 318E.
uncle Dion. Plato agreed to support him if this were true, but also reminded him of the example of Socrates who risked the greatest penalties rather than be a partaker in the unholy deeds of the Athenian tyrants. His second attempt to educate Dionysius II was no more successful than the first, however, and seems to have marked the end of Plato's attempts to actualize the ideal state he envisioned.

The other, more systematic means which Plato used to make his intuition meaningful for others, were the teaching of philosophy in the Academy at Athens and the writing of philosophic dialogues. Each of these dialogues expressed complementary aspects of the reality which he contemplated. Though it cannot be too strongly emphasized that his philosophy was not an outgrowth of earlier systems, it must be acknowledged that he found some elements in the earlier philosophical systems congenial to his mission, and that he used the vocabulary they provided him.

1 Ep. VII 323D-324A.
2 Ep. VII 325A.
3 Leo Strauss, The City and Man (Chicago: Rand, McNally and Co., 1963), 62, says: "There are many dialogues because the whole consists of many parts. But the individual dialogue is not a chapter from an encyclopedia of the philosophic sciences or from a system of philosophy, and still less a relic or a stage of Plato's development. Each dialogue deals with one part, it reveals the truth about that part. But the truth about a part is a partial truth, a half truth. Each dialogue, we venture to say, abstracts from something that is most important to the subject matter of the dialogue."
When Plato distinguished the reality of the Ideas from those of sense by terms such as "the beautiful-itself" and "good-as-being," he unconsciously perhaps but nevertheless necessarily placed himself "in the tradition of the search for the true being, which extended from Gorgias, Melissos, and Zeno back to the great Parmenides, the discoverer of the one eternal, immutable being."\(^1\) Plato agreed with Parmenides that being is absolutely opposed to not-being, that not-being is unknowable, that this world is one of being and not-being. He could not accept Parmenides' conclusions that being and thinking are one and the same, however.

Plato, who incorporates the abundance of intuited forms into his world of being, and for whom, because of Socrates, man or the "soul" is one of the highest experiences, could no longer envisage so simple a construction. He adopted the basic plan. Yet he envisaged different degrees of reality precisely corresponding to different degrees of knowledge. Eventually, for transcending Parmenides, he constructed a harmonious system of being and knowledge.\(^2\)

Plato also discerned a common element in Parmenides and Heracleitus, "the dialectical law of becoming and the permanence of change\(^3\) which reflected aspects of his own thought. Plato opposed the world of being and the world of becoming on one level but united them again on a higher level. On the one hand the Idea gave the individual things to share in true being; on the

\(^1\)Friedlander, \textit{op. cit.}, 22.  
\(^2\)Ibid., 24-25.  
\(^3\)Ibid., 25-26.
other, the individual things had to strive for complete union with the Idea. Both are necessary for Plato's "harmony of opposites."

Plato also found the science of order in number, musical harmony, and the cosmos taught by the Pythagoreans sympathetic to his thought. He appreciated their doctrine that the state and the soul, as well as the cosmos, were ordered wholes. He respected their doctrine of the eternity and permanence of the individual soul. It confirmed his own insight that, since the world of Ideas exists, man must have some relation to it—something impossible unless he belonged to two worlds. On this foundation Plato justified his doctrine of the eternity of the soul. "If the human soul is by nature of such a kind that it knows eternal being, then it must itself—for like can only be known by like—have being after the manner of the eternal forms."¹

Plato had set out on a quest for the best state. He found a much more meaningful world—the world of Ideas where the things which appeared in the polis existed in their perfection. He came to the realization that man was not just a creature of this world of becoming but that he was able to share in Ideas through the power of his soul. He saw the harmony which existed in the world of Ideas imitated in the world of the cosmos and realized that this same order based on justice must also exist in the soul of the individual and the state and that they were neces-

¹Ibid., 3.
sarily oriented to the world of Ideas and fulfilled in one complete harmony of being.

Koinonia and its Cognates in Plato

The existence of the Ideas or Forms is essential to Plato's thought. In the Republic he says of them "that in itself each is one, but that by virtue of their communication with actions and with bodies and with one another, they present themselves everywhere, each as a multiplicity of aspects."\(^1\) As Friedlander points out, however, "...nowhere do we find a 'doctrine' as such, or a system comprising the order of these forms, communicating their knowledge, or clarifying their relationship to the world of appearance."\(^2\)

Plato speaks of the Ideas in relation to the sensible particulars at times of immanence and at other times in terms of transcendence. One of the words which he uses to express the immanent aspect of the relationship is κοινωνία. But he nowhere explains the precise character of this relationship, or κοινωνία, perhaps, as Taylor suggests, because he himself senses an unsolved problem--namely how the participation takes place.\(^3\) This question has engaged scholars for centuries. Shorey regards the

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\(^1\)Rep. 476A.

\(^2\)Friedlander, op. cit.

relation of the particular to the Idea as a mystery. He says: "once we have accepted the metaphors 'presence', 'participation', 'pattern', a number of ideas can be reflected by or present in one thing as easily as can one idea."¹ Ross takes the position "that the relation of Form or universal to particular is perfectly intelligible, though unique" and sees "no mystery about the presence of a universal in many particulars, any more than there is about its presence in one."² However, he concludes that Plato needed the vocabulary both of immanence and of transcendence to express his fundamental insight which could not be fully communicated by the use of either alone.³

It remains for the Academy and its successors in philosophy to find out how the forms are articulated, how closely and by what means they limit the things that share them, and how, if at all, the same forms can be fixed patterns, meanings, and ideals. But it is an insight of central importance to Platonism that being, thinking, and doing all operate within limits of patterns which we have been referring to here as "the order of the forms."⁴

κοινωνία in the first instance is used to express a relationship among the ideas themselves. This is the key concept in Plato's Parmenides.⁵ The dialogue opens with the youthful

¹Paul Shorey, The Unity of Plato's Thought (New Impressions; Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1960), 52.
³Ibid., 231.
⁵For a discussion of the various analyses of this dialogue
Socrates suggesting to Parmenides that participation in the Ideas may be an answer to Zeno's refutation of pluralism. He says:

But, Parmenides, the best I can make of the matter is this: that these Forms are as it were patterns fixed in the nature of things; the other things are made in their image and are likenesses; and this participation they come to have in the Forms is nothing but their being made in their image. 1

The discussion continues until both agree that the Forms are a necessary basis for all thought and discourse.

Parmenides then suggests to Socrates that a preliminary exercise in dialectic should proceed a definition of the Ideas, such as Beauty or Justice, and is persuaded to illustrate this method by discussing the hypothesis that the one is or exists and that the one is not or does not exist. He argues that if the one is, it exists and must have participation in time. "Since the One is one, of course it has being; and to 'be' means precisely having existence in conjunction with time present, as 'was' or 'will be' means having existence in conjunction with past or


cf. Andreas Speiser, Ein Parmenideskommentar: Studien zur platonischen Dialektik (Stuttgart: K.F. Koehler, 1959), 11. Cf. also Friedlander, op. cit., 26. "...Plato formulated this "harmony of opposites"...most elaborately in the Parmenides, where it has, as it were been crystallized in the precise dialectics of the "one" and the "other." Paradoxical as it may sound, the dialogue Parmenides is the most strongly Herakleitean among Plato's writings, and the philosopher Parmenides, in this work, just as much Herakleitean as an Eleatic."
future time. So if the One is, it is in time."¹ This statement reflects a primitive logic with the idea of participation playing the role which the copula will later assume in Aristotelian logic.

In discussing the limitation of the parts in relation to each other and to the whole, and the whole in relation to the parts, Parmenides concludes:

Thus the consequence for the things other than the One appears to be that from the combination of unity and themselves there comes to be in them something fresh, which gives them a limit with references to one another; whereas their own nature gives them, in themselves, unlimitedness. Thus the things other than the One, both as wholes and part by part, are unlimited and also have limit. ²

In summing up the consequences of saying that others exist but the one does not, Parmenides concludes that the other things will not be one nor will they be many, nor will they even appear to be one or many "for the Others cannot in any sense or manner have any connection with a nonentity, nor can any element of a nonentity be present to any of them, since a nonentity has no elements."³

In both of these texts the participation discussed in terms of κοινωνία is a rudimentary form of a metaphysical and metaphorical participation, metaphysical in that a reality is represented as existing outside the mind and metaphorical in that

¹ Parm. 151E-152A.
² Parm. 158D.
³ Parm. 166A.
the objects are abstractions treated objectively.

The stated purpose of the Sophist\(^1\) is to discover the true nature of the sophist. The Eleatic Stranger in the dialogue proposes to do this through the "method of definition by dichotomy" which leads to the development of a metaphysics. He establishes the following method of procedure:

Now, then, let us set to work again and, as we divide the kind proposed in two, keep to the right-hand section at each stage. Holding fast to the characters of which the Sophist partakes until we have stripped off all that he has in common with others and left only the nature that is peculiar to him, let us so make that nature plain, in the first place to ourselves, and secondly to others whose temperament finds a procedure of this sort congenial. \(^2\)

But the definition of the sophist is interrupted by what is in form a long digression, but is really the most serious and important part of the whole... The Sophist has been found to be a juggler and deceiver, and the question arises whether deception or falsehood does not involve the assumption of Not-Being... Plato refutes the doctrine that Not-Being cannot exist by showing that it has a relative existence—that in each particular instance it denotes a difference or condition of being other than that in connexion with which it is said to exist. It is not mere negation—the opposite of Being—but becomes the positive notion of Difference... Hereupon follows the discussion of the nature of Being, and the conclusion is reached that everything which possesses any power, either to produce a change or to be affected by a cause, has existence, i.e., that power—whether active or passive—is Being. \(^3\)

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\(^2\) Soph. 264E.

\(^3\) H. N. Fowler, "Introduction" to the Sophistes (Loeb Library ed.; London: William Heinemann, 1921), 262.
This digression on the problem of Being and not-Being contains many significant κοινωνία passages. Theatetus, acting as the spokesman for the "friends of the Forms," agrees that the stranger has correctly stated their position in the following assertion:

And you say that we have intercourse with Becoming by means of the body through sense, whereas we have intercourse with Real being by means of the soul through reflection. And Real being, you say, is always in the same unchanging state, whereas Becoming is variable.  

The Stranger goes on further to define this 'intercourse' attributed to both as "The experiencing an effect or the production of one, arising, as the result of some power from things that encounter one another," but says that the "friends of the Forms" do not accept this definition. They reply that "a power of acting and being acted upon belongs to Becoming, but neither of these powers is compatible with Real being." The type of participation discussed above is epistemological in nature, having to do with the process of cognition.

Later in the dialogue, rest and motion are said to be by reason of their participation in existence, and ontological participation which forms the basis of a simple existential judgment.

Then the discussion moves from the metaphysical to logical participation as the Stranger proposes another problem:

1Soph. 248A.
2Soph. 248B.
3Plato's Theory of Knowledge, op. cit., 240.
Are we not to attach Existence to Motion and Rest, nor anything else to anything but rather to treat them in our discourse as incapable of any blending or participation in one another? Or are we to lump them all together as capable of association with one another? Or shall we say that this is true of some and not of others? 1

Theatetus agrees to discuss each one of these questions separately.

The Stranger first asks, if nothing has any power to combine with anything else, will the result not be that motion and rest have no share in being. 2 Theatetus agrees to this and also to the statement that neither rest nor motion will be if they have no share in being. 3 This position contradicts all who are accustomed to use being as an attribute or who speak of the combining and separating of elements and those "who will not allow one thing to share in the quality of another and so be called by its name." 4

The second possibility is that all things have the power of participation in one another. 5 Theatetus says this assumption is easily dismissed "because then Movement itself would come to a complete standstill, and again Rest itself would be movement, if each were to supervene upon the other." 6

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1 Soph. 250B.
2 Soph. 251E.
3 Soph. 251E.
4 Soph. 252B.
5 Soph. 252D.
6 Plato's Theory of Knowledge, 260.
Therefore, the third proposition is the only possible one: some things can and others cannot participate in one another. The Stranger comments that things are like letters, some of which can be joined and others not. Just as it is the man who possesses the art of grammar who knows which letters can join with the others, so the philosopher is a man who is able to succeed in pointing out which Kinds are constant, and which are incompatible with one another; also, whether there are certain Kinds that pervade them all and connect them so that they can blend, and again, where there are divisions (separations), whether there are certain others that traverse wholes and are responsible for the division. 1

This knowledge, "how to distinguish, Kind by Kind, in what ways the several Kinds can or can not combine," the philosopher gains through the science of dialectic. 2

After this digression on dialectic, the Stranger returns to the next stage of the discussion, saying:

Now that we are agreed, then, that some of the Kinds will combine with one another and some will not, and that some combine to a small extent, others with a large number, while some pervade all and there is nothing against their being combined with everything, let us next follow up the argument in this way. We will not take all the Forms, for fear of getting confused in such a multitude, but choose out some of those that are recognized as most (or very) important, and consider first their several natures and then how they stand in respect of being capable of combination with one another. In this way, though we may not be able to conceive Being and Not-Being with perfect clearness, we may at least give as satisfactory an account of them as we can under the conditions of our present inquiry, and see if there is any opening allowing us to assert that

1Soph. 253A.
2Soph. 253E.
what is not, really is what is not, and to escape unscathed.\footnote{Soph. 254BC.}

Being, rest, and motion are chosen as the three kinds of classes to be examined. Being can mingle with rest and motion, but these two cannot mingle with each other. Sameness and difference are also discussed in terms of motion. Motion is entirely other than rest; it exists by reason of its participation in being; it is other than the same; yet it is the same because all things partake of the same. "There is a sense in which the Real ...'is not'. Anything real is the subject of innumerable true statements, asserting that it is not (is different from) anything else that is real."\footnote{Soph. 256B.}

Having established the participation of the classes in one another,\footnote{Soph. 257A.} and that not-being is not the opposite of being but rather is difference, the dialogue moves into its third major topic, "the logical and grammatical analysis of the sentence." For intelligible speech presupposes this participation in order to be able to predicate existence, identity, and diversity. Thus the Stranger wants to establish discourse as one of the classes of being. The Sophist maintains that opinion and speech have no participation in not-being, and therefore that falsehood cannot exist, so that he may not be able to be accused of practicing "the art of creating images and semblances..." The Stranger re-

\begin{footnotesize}
\item[1] Soph. 254BC.
\item[2] Soph. 256B.
\item[3] Soph. 257A.
\end{footnotesize}
solves to examine speech and opinion and fancy and show that they do participate in not-being and thus also "prove that falsity exists, and by that proof pin down the Sophist there, if he is amenable to capture, or else let him go and pursue our search in some other kind."¹ According to Cornford, "the thought and speech which can partake of falsity are not Platonic Forms, but the thoughts which exist in our minds and the speeches we utter."² In order to prove this a long discussion of logical analysis follows with the result that "the art of contradiction-making, descended from an insincere kind of conceited mimicry, of the semblance-making breed, from image-making, distinguished as a portion, not divine but human, of production that presents a shadow-play of words"³ is shown to be, par excellence, that of the Sophist.

κοινωνία as it exists among the Forms is the perfection of relationship. Unlike the particular which shares in the Form only imperfectly,⁴ "the Form which shares in another is a perfect specification of the other."⁵ The type of κοινωνία described

¹Soph. 260E.
²Plato's Theory of Knowledge, 302.
³Ibid., 331.
⁴Aristotle comments at Metaphysics 991a8: "if the Ideas and the particulars that share in them have the same form, there will be something common to these...but if they have not the same form, they must have only the name in common, and it is as if one were to call both Callias and a wooden image a 'man', without observing any community between them."
⁵Ross, op. cit., 111-112, footnote 66.
in the Sophist does not deal with that of the particular in the form but rather with the "relation of class-inclusion between forms."¹ Much effort has been expended in this dialogue to prove what seems a rather obvious thesis, that the Kinds or classes have κοινωνία with one another in some but not all ways. This results in "the establishment of the principle that the Forms are neither a collection of entities standing in no positive relation to each other, nor yet capable of entering into all sorts of relations to one another—that they form, indeed, a system."²

In both the Parmenides and the Sophist Plato seems deliberately to use κοινωνία to describe various types of philosophical participation—logical, epistemological, ontological—so that the term does not become exclusively identified with any one of them. Cornford remarks, "By varying the word, Plato helps the reader to free his conception of the relation intended from such associations and to escape the illusion that philosophical language can be really precise and unambiguous."³ This procedure also allows Plato to use the term in other than strictly philosophical contexts, such as those in which we have already seen it used in the pre-Platonic authors. He uses κοινωνία to express relationships within man or among men, in the polis or in the


²Ross, op. cit., 116.

³Cornford, Plato's Theory of Knowledge, 256.
cosmos, between these various levels or with the world of Forms. In all of these instances however, the general rule established for κοινωνία among the Forms—that κοινωνία is possible in some but not all ways—applies equally to these other relationships.

The cosmos animated by soul but also having participation in a bodily nature, exemplified for Plato the natural order and harmony which he felt should exist in all things. He emphasized the study of astronomy because it illustrated the κοινωνία and kinship of the stars with one another and their natural harmony. Since the number is essential for harmony, anything which was lacking in grace and rhythm and harmony he considered deficient in number. Earth, air, fire and water he described as "variegated in their shapes and combinations and formulations." The formation of images in mirrors and in bright and smooth surfaces he attributed to the "combination with each other of the inner and outer fires, every time that they unite on the smooth surface and

1 Pol. 269D.
2 Demosthenes Against Aristogeiton II 27, trans. J.H. Vince (Loeb Library ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935), 592-593, comments: "To sum up: we shall find nothing venerable or admirable which is not associated with law, since the whole round world, the heavenly bodies and what we call the seasons are plainly, if we can trust our senses, controlled by law and order."
3 Rep. 531D.
4 Epin. 978A.
5 Tim. 61C.
are variously deflected."¹

Man for Plato was a microcosm of the cosmos, also animated by soul and having participation in a bodily nature. He advanced some considerations dealing with physiology and pathology and sense perception in his discussions, though these were never his main concern. For instance, in the Timaeus it is stated that a disproportioned body is not only ugly to look at but shares in much pain because of its awkwardness.² The Stranger of the Laws comments on the preludes and tunings-up common to all utterances and things in which the voice participates.³

It is said in the Philebus that the mixture of sickness and health produces certain results in each case,⁴ and that some bodily conditions seems to be a combination of both pleasure and pain.⁵

Salt is said by its nature to blend well "with the combinations which affect the sensation of the mouth."⁶ Things which have a pungent quality somehow "share in the heat of the mouth and are made smooth thereby."⁷

¹Tim. 46A.
²Tim. 87E.
³Leg. 722D.
⁴Phil. 25A.
⁵Phil. 46B.
⁶Tim. 60D.
⁷Tim. 65E.
But it is man as a κοινωνία of body and soul which is Plato's main concern, and he is convinced that this κοινωνία is essentially detrimental to the soul. In Book VIII of the Laws, the Athenian stranger asserts that there is no respect in which this κοινωνία is a better thing for soul and body than dissolution is. ¹ Socrates states in Book X of the Republic:

Well, then, that the soul is immortal our recent argument and our other proofs would constrain us to admit. But to know its true nature we must view it not marred by communion with the body and other miseries as we now contemplate it, but consider adequately in the light of reason what it is when it is purified, and then you will find it to be a far more beautiful thing and will more clearly distinguish justice and injustice and all the matters that we have now discussed. ²

In the Phaedo, the philosopher is described as one who "more than other men, separates the soul from communion with the body." ³ This he does for the sake of arriving at truth more easily, because the body is not a good partner in the search for wisdom. ⁴

The soul will be best able to think when it withdraws and "avoiding, so far as it can, all association or contact with the body, reaches out toward reality." ⁵ The soul is thwarted in at-

¹Leg. 828D.
³Phaed. 64E-65A.
⁴Phaed. 65A.
⁵Phaed. 65C.
taining truth and wisdom in direct proportion due to the influence of the senses upon it.\textsuperscript{1} The only κοινωνία the soul should allow itself with the body is whatever is absolutely necessary.\textsuperscript{2}

At death the soul which "departs pure, dragging with it nothing of the body, because it never willingly associated with the body in life, but avoided it and gathered itself into itself alone..." will depart "to the realm of the god of the other world in truth" and will not be "straightway scattered and destroyed when it departs from the body, as most men say."\textsuperscript{3} The myth of the winged horses and the charioteer in the Phaedrus confirms the view that the κοινωνία of soul and body is an unnatural and hampering association as far as the soul is concerned. There the soul is described as winged, because, "more than any other thing that pertains to the body it partakes of the nature of the divine," in that it soars upwards carrying what is heavy along with it to the abode of the gods.\textsuperscript{4}

But the soul which has lost its wings is borne along until it gets hold of something solid, when it settles down, taking upon itself an earthly body, which seems to be self-moving, because of the power of the soul within it; and the whole, compound of soul and body, is called a living being, and is further designated as mortal.\textsuperscript{5}

\textsuperscript{1}Phaed. 66A.
\textsuperscript{2}Phaed. 67A.
\textsuperscript{4}Phaedr. 246DE.
The soul, or anything else which participates in something else is inevitably modified in some way. By its νοημωνία with the body, the soul is modified by being hindered from living according to its nature in freely contemplating the ideas. It becomes most truly itself, even while in the body, when it participates in the virtues. So its actions which share in justice may be designated as just actions. And to the same degree they partake of justice they also partake of beauty. The same is true of the passions which by sharing in justice also become to that extent beautiful. Socrates claims that the beautiful "is, of all inspirations, the best and of the highest origin to him who has it or who shares in it." And so the soul, whenever it sees anything here below which is beautiful because of the "presence or communion (call it which you please) of absolute beauty" remembering the true beauty, feels his wings growing and longs to stretch them for an upward flight, but cannot do so, and, like a bird gazes upward and neglects the things below.

1Leg. 645D.
2Leg. 859E.
3Leg. 860A. Isocrates Encomium ad Helen X, 54-55, trans. LaRue Van Hook (Loeb Library ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), III, 91, says that all virtues are despised "except in so far as they possess in some degree this outward form, beauty, and it is for this reason that virtue is most highly esteemed, because it is the most beautiful of ways of living."
4Phaedr. 249E.
5Phaed. 100D.
6Phaedr. 249D.
The element of soul in man is continually directing him to the contemplation and imitation of the virtues of justice, courage and the like in his being and his actions. Plato recognizes that it is the polis par excellence which is able by its nature and function to educate the man to the practice of these virtues. He explores the nature, purpose and function of the polis most explicitly in the Republic and the Laws.

Scholars vary in their opinions about the nature and purpose of these two dialogues however. Barker states:

The Republic has come down to us with a double title—'the State'... 'or concerning Justice.' In spite of these two titles, it must not be assumed that it is a treatise either on political science or on jurisprudence. It is both, and it is yet more than both. It is an attempt at a complete philosophy of man. 1

Hoerber holds that it is a metaphorical rather than a political interpretation of the ideal state. 2 Both Lodge and Greene think that the Republic is essentially a treatise on education. 3 Jaeger says the "main theme" of the Republic is justice, but its

1 Ernest Barker, Greek Political Theory (New York: University Paperbacks, 1961), 168.
"principal theme" is education.\(^1\)

The **Laws** is regarded as having an intimate connection with the **Republic**. Since the ideal, the philosopher-king who rules in accordance with wisdom as proposed in the **Republic** will not be easily found, Plato establishes in the **Laws** "the philosophic legislator, who should imbue even the letter of law with the spirit of wisdom and understanding."\(^2\) Thus Rexine regards the **Laws** as a "sort of compromise on the **Republic**... We might describe it as a description of the best possible state under the practical conditions then existent."\(^3\) Other writers refer to the **Laws** as a "concretization of the **Republic**"\(^4\) and an "applied idealism."\(^5\)

One problem of interpretation in the **Republic** centers on the question of the relationship between the tripartite nature of the soul and the tripartite state and between justice in the individual and in the state.

Barker,\(^6\) Jaeger\(^7\) and Hoerber take the position that "the

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\(^2\) Barker, *op. cit.*, 129.


\(^4\) Leo Ferrari, "The Origin of the State According to Plato" *Laval Theologique et Philosophique*, XII, No. 2 (1956), 150.


\(^6\) Barker, *op. cit.*, 189.

\(^7\) Jaeger, *op. cit.*, II, 199.
purpose of the state as outlined in the Republic is mainly to illustrate the soul of the individual."¹ Friedlander admits a "homology between soul and state"² by which, according to Murphy, it is possible to "compare the city with a person" rather than "to personify the parts of the soul" or to "depersonify the parts of the city."³ Grene regards this as a testimony of Plato's belief that "there is a true and vital relationship between the soul of the individual man, the state, and the perfect form, which is the pattern of both."⁴ Hackforth argues that it is impossible to determine whether the tripartite soul or the tripartite state was prior in Plato's thought since the "conceptions of the Ideal State and the rightly constituted human soul grow out of one another and react on one another."⁵ Demos makes the distinction between the individual as citizen and the individual as such.

In so far as they are citizens men in the ideal city will indeed represent one part of the soul and one function: as rulers, reason; as warriors, appetite; as producers, appetite. So they will be incomplete only in their capacity as members of a political body. As persons, however they remain whole and self-ordering. ⁶

¹Hoerber, op. cit., 38.
²Friedlander, op. cit., 189.
In regard to the relationship of the justice in the individual to the justice in the state, Demos\(^1\) and Barker\(^2\) hold that it is the former which is primary for Plato, while Grene\(^3\) and Foster\(^4\) hold that it is the latter. Murphy\(^5\) and Hall\(^6\) regard them as mutually dependent. Hall states: "Only in the just state can citizens acquire personal justice, but only if they are personally just can the citizens adequately perform their social function and so bring about the justice of the polis."\(^7\)

Maguire may have solved both of the problems posed here by suggesting that we are asking the wrong question when we inquire whether the individual—either in terms of justice or the tripartite soul—is prior to or for the sake of state or vice versa.\(^8\) He admits that formally the justice of the individual is the theme of the Republic and that ostensibly the state is nothing more than an enlargement and projection of the individual soul.\(^9\)

\(^1\)Ibid., 171.
\(^2\)Barker, op. cit., 204.
\(^3\)Grene, op. cit., 151.
\(^5\)Murphy, op. cit., 11.
\(^7\)Ibid.
\(^9\)Ibid., 146, n. 4.
But then he indicates that the state, as Plato describes it, is certainly more than just an enlargement of the soul. "It is, in fact, vital as a producer of individual justice, as the area in which that justice manifests itself, and indeed as the condition of its definition."¹ He points out that Plato does not "analyze the society as an aggregate of individuals, but as a synthesis of diverse groups of individuals; and it is not the character of the individuals which determines the character of the society... but the relations of the groups."² Thus it is not the individual but the class which is "the actual unit in Plato's theory of the state."³ The relationship for Plato is between the state and the classes and between the class and the individual, not between the state and the individual.

At the beginning of the Republic, Plato established economic necessity as the basic historical reason why the original four or five men came together as κοινωνία and constituted the polis.⁴ This was motivated by the realization that it was more beneficial and profitable for each man to exchange the products of his labor for those of another, rather than attempting to be

¹Ibid., 146-147.
²Ibid., 147.
³Ibid., 145.
⁴Aristotle Politics 1291a 22-24 criticizes Plato's original κοινωνία composed of four or five original members because it does not have "authority to dispense justice, and to determine what is just."
absolutely self-sufficient. As soon as he has established the original polis of four or five members, however, Plato proceeds to discuss them not as individuals but as examples each of "a different species of productive art." As the polis developed, other craftsmen with other arts were in turn invited to join the original koinwne in order to make the polis self-sufficient. A merchant class developed to conduct the procedure of buying and selling in the agora, as well as a laboring class who, though not intellectually worthy of being admitted into the koinwne of the city, were able to benefit the polis by selling their strength for money. Thus the "healthy" state developed organically from the four or five members who constituted the original polis.

The "sickly" state came into being when ease and luxury became prevalent in the polis. Greed for more land resulted in the appropriation of neighboring territory. This in turn provoked war and necessitated the development of an army, skilled in the art of war, to defend the wealth and luxury of the polis.

After a purge and purification of this luxurious polis, the military class was separated by education into the ruling class and helpers.

Hence the final stage, the ideal state, appears as a composite, or 'community,' of three diverse classes, one of

1Rep. 369BCE, 370A.
2Maguire, op. cit., 146.
3Rep. 370D.
4Rep. 371E.
which performs the productive function of the primitive society; another the martial function of the luxurious society; and the third its own specific function of organizing the whole. 1

Each of these three classes of the state was characterized by the practice of a specific virtue: temperance for the producing class, courage for the warrior class; and wisdom for the ruling class. The three classes by operating together and each fulfilling its own function practiced the virtue of justice.

Man is structured according to the same pattern as the state. Each of the three parts of the soul must exercise the virtue proper to the corresponding part in the state. Conversely, then, the relationship existing between a wise man's head and senses is also the model of the relationship of the three parts of the state. 2

With regard to the appetitive element of soul and state, Socrates suggests in the Gorgias "that it is by the possession of justice and temperance that the happy are happy." It is essential that one not let

one's desires go unrestrained and in one's attempts to satisfy them— an interminable trouble—leading the life of a robber. For neither to any of his fellow men can such an one be dear, nor to God; since he cannot commune with any, and where there is no communion, there can be no friendship... heaven and earth and gods and men are held together by communion and friendship, by orderliness, temperance and justice; and that is the reason, my friend, why they call

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1 Maguire, op. cit., 148.
2 Leg. 969B.
the whole of this world by the name of order, not of disorder or dissoluteness. 1

In fact, Socrates points out in the Republic, there are some things for which a relationship of κοινωνία is impossible. He asks, "Can there be any communion between soberness and extravagant pleasure?" "How could there be," his partner answers, "since such pleasure puts a man beside himself no less than pain?" 2

In the Laws, the citizen who shares or is willing to share his goods with others is praised for his practice of temperance and wisdom for the good of the entire polis, "while if a man is jealous and unwilling to share any good thing with anyone in a friendly spirit, then the man himself must be blamed, but his possession must not be disesteemed any more because of the possessor." 3 For the foundation and security of the state lie in moderation in one's possessions, and in a willingness to share them with those in need, "partly by remissions and partly by distributions." 4 In the regulation of the water supply, it is suggested that a man and the farmer in particular 5 be conscious of the needs of his neighbor, and if his neighbors are also stinted in their supplies, he shall apply for a ration of water from the

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1 Gorg. 507E-508A.
2 Rep. 402E.
3 Leg. 730E.
4 Leg. 736DE.
5 Leg. 844C.
land stewards, and fetch it day by day, and so share the water with his neighbors. Laws are also established for the sharing of the fruit harvest. These laws forbid foreigners to share in the "coarse" fruit, though they may take the choice fruit freely as a gift of hospitality. Regarding the crop of fruits such as apples, pears, pomegranates: "a foreigner shall be allowed to share in these fruits in the same way as the grape crop; and if a man above thirty touch them, eating on the spot and not taking any away, he shall have a share in all such fruits, like the foreigner."

The spirited element in man and state, characterized by the virtue of courage, is said not to unite with the desires against the reason. When the courageous soul lays hold of truth, it is then most ready to partake of justice. But if the courageous and spirited element of the soul is not complemented with a like development of the gentle and philosophic element, by contact with the Muse, it will end up like a wild beast.

The rational element of the soul becomes "truly self-re-

1 Leg. 844B.
2 Leg. 844D.
3 Leg. 845C.
4 Leg. 845B.
5 Rep. 440B.
6 Pol. 309DE.
7 Rep. 411C.
strained and wise, so far as the state is concerned" when it par­
takes of certain opinions about honor, justice, goodness, but "if
it lacks participation in such qualities, does not it very justly
receive the shameful epithet of simpleton?"¹

Justice consists in each part, both of the state and of
the soul, functioning according to the virtue which is character­
istic of it. The minimum required of citizens is that they deal
justly in relation with their neighbors.

Citizens² effect their κοινωνία through the exchange of
goods, "the very purpose of our association and establishment of
a state."³ Such economic κοινωνίαι are naturally regulated by
the virtue of justice. Although the Athenian Stranger in the
Laws holds that "in dealings and intercourse between citizens,
injuries committed by one against another are of frequent occur­
rence and they involve plenty of the voluntary as well as the in­
voluntary,"⁴ yet Socrates in the Republic parenthetically observes
that the just man, who makes a better κοινωνοι in money matters,
is also the one at a disadvantage in the dissolution of such a
partnership.⁵ The unjust man, on the contrary, because he has a
reputation for justice, is able to conduct his dealings and form

¹Pol. 309E.
²Alc. I 125E.
⁴Leg. 861E.
⁵Rep. 343D.
partnerships with an eye to his own advantage. Thus the lawgiver in the Laws is admonished "to keep a watch on the methods employed by the citizens in gaining and spending money, and to supervise the associations they form with one another, and the dissolutions thereof, whether they be voluntary or under compulsion."¹

The unjust man acts in defiance not only of men but also of Zeus and Athena "who are partners in the constitution."² This indicates, according to Jowett, that though human society springs from human need, it has its origin in the divine.³ Therefore, it is essentially natural and not, as the Atomists said, based "to a small extent in nature, but mostly in art."⁴

Art and the arts in general do, however, contribute no small measure to Plato's ideal state. In addition to the arts involved in establishing the economic self-sufficiency of the Polis, other arts also play an important part in achieving its general welfare.

Measurement is an art in which "a person at first sees only the unity or common quality of many things," but "he must not give up until he sees all the differences in them, so far as

¹Leg. 632B.
²Leg. 921C.
³The Laws of Plato, ed. E. B. England (Classical Series of the Publications of the University of Manchester, III-IV; Manchester: 1921), II, 529, n. to c#3.
⁴Leg. 889D.
The art of measurement itself is conceived as having a twofold nature: "one part is concerned with relative greatness or smallness, the other with the something without which production would not be possible."\(^1\)

The individual is said to have κοινωνία with his tools,\(^2\) and in the Statesman, the arts which produce spindles, shuttles, and various other tools are said to share in the production of clothing.\(^3\)

Some of the arts are closely related to one another. "In each of these pairs, of course—medicine and gymnastic, justice and legislation—there is some intercommunication, as both deal with the same thing; at the same time they have certain differences."\(^4\)

Of all the arts, the one proper to any social institution as such without which it cannot be conducted well, is the art of ruling or commanding beneficially.\(^5\) Numerous examples of the art of ruling are evident in the polis. Having a share in the pilot's art "makes men know how to rule over fellow sailors," just as the chorus teachers' art enables them to "rule over their fellow-

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\(^1\) Pol. 285AB.  
\(^2\) Pol. 283D.  
\(^3\) Hip. Min. 374E.  
\(^4\) Pol. 281E.  
\(^5\) Gorg. 4640.  
\(^6\) Leg. 639C-640A.
singers." And it is the draught-player who is a good and useful ΚΟΙΝΩΝΗΣ in playing draughts and the harpist in striking the chords. Likewise, the Master of the Symposium is a man who is to command friends in friendly association with friends in time of peace. But among the arts of commanding, "no other art would advance a stronger claim than that of kingship to be the art of caring for the whole human community and ruling all mankind." On the other hand, those who participate in any form of government other than monarchy are to be regarded not as statesmen but as rebels. Closely related to the art of kingship is that art of oratory which "persuades men to justice and thereby helps to steer the ship of state."

The polis, composed of three classes of citizens practicing various arts, is ultimately ordered to the Good, which consists in the harmonious pursuit of the four virtues of temperance, courage, wisdom, and justice, both by the individual citizen in relation to his class and by each class with respect to the polis as a whole. It is the function of the polis to educate its citizens to the practice of these virtues, according to Plato, "effec
tive social life depends on adequate education."¹ Thus, the Republic gives extensive consideration to the education of the guards, of the women, whom Plato considers the equals of the men in all the activities of the polis,² and of the ruler.³ The Laws provides for a nocturnal synod of magistrates to see that the laws regarding education are carried out.⁴

The virtue of temperance plays an important role in insuring that the social relationships which develop among the members of the polis are formed primarily with the good of the polis in mind. In regard to marriage, though it is admitted that sexual intercourse between male and female is a naturally pleasurable act,⁵ yet the union and partnership of marriage is so significant for the polis,⁶ that it must be regulated according to the following rule: "Each man must seek to form such a marriage as shall benefit the State, rather than such as best pleases himself."⁷ Ignorance must not be the cause of an undesirable union.⁸ The quality most to be desired in a wife is her suitability for the

¹Brumbaugh, op. cit., 93.
²Rep. 453A; 457A; Leg. 804E.
³Jaeger, op. cit., II, 209.
⁴Leg. 968A.
⁵Leg. 636C.
⁶Leg. 721A.
⁷Leg. 773B.
⁸Leg. 771E.
joint procreation of children.¹ Sons of rich families are urged to seek their wives among families of moderate means,² so that the state may be like a bowl of wine mixed with water—a good and moderate mixture.³ The Statesman also mentions that persons too often marry without proper regard to the procreation of children.⁴ A fine proportioned to his wealth is to be imposed upon the man who refuses to obey the marriage laws and remains unmarried after he is thirty-five years old.⁵ Just as κοινώνει καὶ ἐν ᾧ ἐποίησις αὐτῆς πολλὰς καὶ ἐποίησίς μοι ὑπὲρ τῆς ῥυθμίσεως καὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς,⁶ the bride and groom, as κοινώνει, intend to produce the best and most beautiful children for the state.⁶ Sexual intercourse with any other partner during the ten-year child-bearing period is punishable by law.⁷

As the marriage laws indicate, the abstraction "from the differences between the two sexes in regard to procreation" results in a situation where marriage itself becomes almost an

⁴Leg. 774A. England, op. cit., I, 611 comments apropos of this passage: "κοινώνει does not denote merely the absence of the marriage tie ("alienus ab hoc consortio" Fic.), but unsociable in character and behaviour; for marriage is a duty to the state.

⁷Leg. 784E.
In regard to relationships between men, the Laws holds that the union of male with male is unnatural, "adducing as evidence thereof the nature of wild beasts, and pointing out how the male does not touch the male for this purpose." More important, however, is the fact that such relationships will not produce virtue. Socrates in the Phaedrus says that the lover tries to keep the beloved weaker and inferior to himself. Because the lover will stunt the intellectual development of the beloved, he is "by no means a profitable guardian or associate." Madness and licence can have no part in the love of "lover and beloved who rightly love and are loved." If a man is truly a lover, then he is able to bring forth the best in the soul of the beloved, "so that men in this condition enjoy a far fuller community with each other than that which comes with children, and a far surer friendship." Thus each man who knew the friendship of Socrates according to Alcibiades in the Symposium, "had his share of philosophic frenzy and transport." No wonder then that foreign princes are loathe to encourage such alliances when they see what strong

1 Leg. 631D.
2 Leg. 836C.
3 Phaedr. 239C.
4 Rep. 403B.
5 Sym. 209C.
6 Sym. 218B.
friendships and κοινωνία which love is apt to create.\textsuperscript{1}

The members of the polis are brought together on the march, in warfaring, or in some other common undertaking, whether a religious festival, or a campaign, or as shipmates or fellow-soldiers or for that matter in actual battle.\textsuperscript{2} Common meals (whether or not the women should be included is to be decided)\textsuperscript{3} and banqueting \textsuperscript{4} are also discussed as important areas of social relationships in which the virtue of temperance must be exercised.

The virtue of courage is developed in the citizens by festival contests designed to exercise them in the techniques of war, and in which the women as well as the men participate. The wisdom of allowing the women an equal share with the men in this training for war is shown by the practice of the Sarmatian Amazon women living in the Pontus area "upon whom equally with men is imposed the duty of handling bows and other weapons, as well as horses, and who practice it equally."\textsuperscript{5} If this system of equality were not adopted, then another system would have to be introduced, such as that practiced by the Thracians or the Athenians or the Laconians. The inferiority of these systems is indicated by the facts that the women take no share in military service and

\textsuperscript{1}Sym. 182C.
\textsuperscript{2}Rep. 556C.
\textsuperscript{3}Leg. 783B.
\textsuperscript{4}Leg. 639D.
\textsuperscript{5}Leg. 805A.
do not know how to handle weapons. Girls over thirteen are to participate in the races until they are married. Women are not obliged to take part in archery contests or javelin throwing, "but if, as a result of earlier training which has grown into a habit, their nature allows, and does not forbid, girls or maidens to take part, let them do so without blame." In regard to the devices some have introduced in boxing and wrestling, however, since they are aimed at empty glory but are useless in the business of war, they are not to be imitated.

The importance of the contribution of the warrior to the welfare of the polis can be seen in the fact that members of this class, in virtue of their participation in war, insofar as their age and ability allows, are qualified to elect the officials of the polis. Military commanders duly nominated by the Law-wardens are also to be selected by those duly qualified according to the same criteria.

The virtue of wisdom, according to the Athenian Stranger of the Laws, is fostered by music which is well suited to turning out both a good soldier and a man who can manage the state as well. Older men, he observes, "are eager to take a part in that

1Leg. 805CD-806AB.
2Leg. 833D.
3Leg. 834D.
4Leg. 796A.
5Leg. 752C.
6Leg. 755C.
music which is noblest" during festivals and public occasions. In addition, lawgivers can learn something about the institutions and rules of ethics from observation of the koimnía of music and harmony. Rau comments:

The social implication of song and dance are obvious to him; choric art fosters community of feeling by joining men together in expressing their joy. And the aim of good government is to promote freedom (in moderation, he qualifies this prescription cautiously), friendship, fellow-feeling and happiness. He assumes contests in music and gymnastic to be an indispensable factor in the life of the just city.

Wisdom is necessary in those holding the highest offices of the state for many reasons, one of which is so that they may observe the formation of seditious groups intent on overthrowing the polis and punish them. It is not sufficient that they merely refrain from taking part in such seditious actions themselves. The state is also to legislate in such a way as to avoid involving itself in sedition.

The virtue of justice is the result of the harmonious interaction of the three virtues of temperance, courage and wisdom. Because justice is the common property of those practicing the other virtues, all citizens are allowed to have a share in judg-

1Leg. 667AB.
2Leg. 967E.
4Leg. 856B.
5Leg. 757DE.
ing private suits, "for the man that has no share in helping to judge imagines that he has no part or lot in the State at all."¹ Likewise the citizens are to have a part in judging offences against the State; the decision is left to the common agreement of a committee of "three of the highest officials mutually agreed upon by both defendant and plaintiff."²

Religion is another "aspect of the political life of a political society."³ Both the Republic and the Laws assume that common descent gives the individual polis the right to share in the religious observances at the sanctuaries common to all members of the race.⁴ The polis is to send its most distinguished citizens "to take part in any public sacrifices, congresses or other such sacred assemblies,"⁵ such as "to Apollo at Pytho and to Zeus at Olympia and to Nemea and the Isthmus, to take part in the sacrifices and games in honour of these gods."⁶ Severely censured are the "licentious and outrageous acts of the young... directed against sacred things, and... against objects which are public as well as holy, or partially public, as being shared in

¹Leg. 768B.
²Leg. 768A.
³Barker, op. cit., 9.
⁴Leg. 708C; Rep. 470E.
⁵Leg. 947A.
⁶Leg. 950E.
by the members of a tribe or other similar community. ¹ Lack of respect for the sanctity of the property, rights and beliefs of other persons "attacks the most vital part of the body when religion is attacked, and sacred places and sacred things are outraged." ²

In the Symposium Eurymachus refers to sacrifices and ceremonies controlled by divination as "means of communication between gods and men." ³ It is the noble man, whose prayers to the gods are a κοινωνία of prayer and religion, ⁴ who, according to the Laws, "by paying honour and reverence to his kinsfolk, and all who share in the worship of the tribal gods and are sprung from the same blood," ⁵ will be blessed by the gods in the procreation of children.

By definition, a citizen is one who has the right and privilege of sharing in the κοινωνία of the state in its various manifestations. But if a citizen act in a manner unworthy of a citizen, such as the man who takes for himself any man's goods lying on the wayside and dedicated to the goddess of the wayside, he will be considered ἀνελεύθερος and ἡκοινωνίης νόμων. ⁶

¹Leg. 884A.
²England, op. cit., II, 444.
³Sym. 188BC.
⁴Leg. 801E.
⁵Leg. 729C.
⁶Leg. 914C.
So important is it, both for the individual and for the state, according to the Statesman, that the lives of the citizens be well-ordered that those men "who have no capacity for courage and self-restraint and the other qualities which tend towards virtue ..." are to be removed from society by death, exile, or deprivation of their civic rights.¹ The punishment for serious crimes, likewise, is to be deprived of one's right to share in the κοινωνία of the polis by one or more of these means.² A mother or father who slays a child is to be exiled for three years like all other slayers, but after they return, "the wife must be separated from the husband and the husband from the wife, and they must never again have a child, nor shall they ever share a home with those whom the slayer has robbed of child or brother, nor shall they take part in their worship."³

The husband or wife who kills the marriage partner, or a brother or sister killing the other is to be banished, and upon returning home may not worship or eat with the family.⁴ A man who is convicted of outrageous assault on his parents is to be

¹Leg. 909A; Pol. 308E.
²The story is told by Demosthenes of the unscrupulous orator Aristogeiton who, once when he was in prison, bit off the nose of another inmate, at which point the prisoners "passed a resolution not to share fire or light, food or drink with him, not to receive anything from him, not to give him anything." Against Aristogeiton I, 61, trans. J. H. Vince (Loeb Library ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1935), 552.
³Leg. 868D.
⁴Leg. 868E-869A.
banished for life from the city. He is to avoid all the sacred places. If he attempts to return to the polis, he will be punished with death. Citizens are also forbidden to have any kind of social relationship with such a person. And if any free man voluntarily eat or drink or hold any similar intercourse with such an one, or even give him merely a greeting when he meets him, he shall not enter any holy place or the market or any part of the city until he be purified, but he shall regard himself as having incurred a share of contagious guilt.¹

Plato communicated his interest in political speculation to his pupil, Aristotle, but in Aristotle this political interest had a different orientation. Contrary to Plato who found all reality including the model for his state in the world of Ideas, Aristotle regarded the sensible world of individual things as the source of true and unchanging knowledge which forms the basis for philosophy and science. Thus he developed his political theory from a study of some one hundred fifty-eight known political constitutions rather than from contemplation of the Ideas, a theory which he rejected and emphasized the possible rather than the ideal. Despite this basic difference of orientation, however, both Plato and Aristotle agreed that "there was no real individual life apart from the Polis, because it was a community embracing all spheres of life, and because the citizens were also the rulers, and their interests, properly understood, coincided with

¹Leg. 881D.
those of the Polis.

κοινωνία for Aristotle described any association in which diversity and equality were combined for the purpose of attaining some good. The first form of κοινωνία which he considered in the Politics was that of the household or family, composed of at least three members: husband/master, wife, slave.

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3 Jaeger maintains that there were two versions of the Politics written by Aristotle at various periods of his development, and that the version we now have is a conflation of the two. Op. cit., 273. W. D. Ross, Aristotle: A Complete Exposition of his Works and Thought (New York: Meridian Books, Inc., 1959), 186-187, regards the Politics as a "conflation of five separate treatises: (1) on the household - a proper preliminary to the study of the state since the state springs from the household (Book I); (2) on proposed ideal commonwealths and the most esteemed existing constitutions (Book II); (3) on the state, the citizen, and the classification of constitutions (Book III); (4) on the inferior constitutions (Books IV-VI); (5) on the ideal state (Books VII-VIII). All these sections except the second are unfinished or mutilated. On the whole, the traditional order (which goes back at least to the first century, A.D.) gives the most consecutive line of thought, except that Book V is better read after Book VI." Ernest Barker in his edition of the Politics (The Politics of Aristotle, op. cit.) distinguishes six sections in the work which he feels "all belong to the period of the Lyceum, and are all--so far as chronology goes--on exactly the same footing," (xlv) but regards the work as we have it as a unified whole. (xlv, passim).

4 Pol. 1257a 19-20; 1252b 9-10.
The household is bound together first of all by the natural κοινωνία between husband and wife which nature has created for the propagation of the race.\(^1\) Since procreation cannot take place without this κοινωνία, it is natural and necessary.\(^2\) To this end nature has structured men and women differently.\(^3\) On this level the κοινωνία of husband and wife does not differ essentially from the κοινωνία of animals or of slaves for reproduction.\(^4\)

On a higher level, however, man's social nature, based on his ability to communicate ideas by means of speech\(^5\) enables him to participate in a higher type of κοινωνία and to form commun-


\(^3\)Oecon. 1342b 26-28.


Speaking of the manner of copulation among birds, Aristotle mentions that ravens are erroneously thought by some to copulate with their beaks. Gen. Anim. 756b 20. But "the instinct to form communities is less widespread among animals than the habit of procreation." (1162 a 18).

ties with those to whom he is related by blood. And it is this unique ability to communicate ideas which constitutes human happiness;

none of the other animals, which are inferior in nature to men, share in the designation 'happy,' for a horse is not happy, nor is a bird nor a fish nor any other existing thing whose designation does not indicate that it possesses in its nature a share of something divine.

For "the person who humanly speaking enjoys bliss is he that lives by the standard of justice without pain and in purity, or participates in some form of divine contemplation." 3

Between husband and wife, this κοινωνία can even approximate friendship, a relationship which involves a type of social justice. 5

The wife is inferior to her husband, yet closer to him than others (of his household), and in a sense is more nearly his equal than they. Married life, therefore, is closely akin to the partnership between citizens; so that in a sense the Justice that operates between the pair is of a kind more social than that between the others. 6

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1 Eud. Eth. 1242 a 26-27, trans. H. Rackham (Loeb Library ed.; Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1952). All citations of the Greek text and English translations of the Eudemonian Ethics are based on this edition. Xenophon Mem. IV, 3.12, trans. E. C. Marchant (Loeb Library ed.; London: William Heinemann Ltd., 1938) takes the same position, stating that κοινωνία among men is greatly facilitated by "the power of expression, which enables us to impart to one another all good things by teaching and to take our share of them."

2 Eud. Eth. 1217 a 24-29.

3 Eud. Eth. 1215 b 12-14.

4 Eud. Eth. 1242 a 32-33.

5 Mag. Mor. 1194 b 24.

The relationship between master and slave in the formation of the household is based on the instinct for self-preservation—κοινωνία "naturally instituted for the satisfaction of daily recurrent needs."¹ For the members of the household have κοινωνία in all things² without any need for the art of exchange. "Accordingly there would be partnership, and justice of a sort, even if there were no state."³

Higher than this, however, the κοινωνία between master and slave as slave cannot go. Aristotle's attitude to the slave is, in his historical situation, not surprising. He regards the slave as one "capable of becoming (and this is the reason by which he also actually becomes) the property of another, and... participates in reason to the extent of apprehending it in another, though destitute of it himself."⁴ But, as Barker points out, "Slavery is not justified by the fact that the slave has only a minor reason; that will only justify a certain guardianship."⁵ There can be no κοινωνία between master and slave as slave, for "the former is one, and the latter a part of that one, not one itself, nor is the good divisible between them, but that of both

¹ Pol. 1252b13-14.
² Pol. 1257a23.
³ Eud. Eth. 1242a27.
⁴ Pol. 1254b21-23.
belongs to the one for whose sake they exist... a slave is as it were a member or tool of his master."¹ No equality exists between master and slave as slave on which a relation of justice and legal partnership² and friendship can be based. However, Aristotle weakens his case by admitting that the things which are impossible to the slave as slave are possible to the slave as a man, "and the admission that he can be regarded as a man destroys that conception of his wholly slavish and non-rational (one might say non-human) character, which was the one justification of his being treated as a slave."³

³Barker, Political Thought, 366.
When the scope of this elementary κοινωνία of the family broadens, it brings into being the κοινωνία of the village, which is also the first to be formed from more households than one, and for the satisfaction of something more than daily recurrent needs.

The final and perfect κοινωνία is the polis, which is formed from a number of villages. There is "an immanent impulse in all men towards an association of this order." In fact, "the man who is isolated—who is unable to share in the benefits of political association, or has no need to share because he is already self-sufficient—is no part of the polis, and must therefore be either a beast or a god."

Aristotle maintains that "the good of the community is clearly a greater and more perfect good" than that of the individual. The polis or political κοινωνία is the "most sovereign and inclusive association" which "includes all the rest and will pursue this aim most, (e.g., the good) and will thus be directed

1 Pol. 1257a21.
2 Pol. 1252b16.
4 Pol. 1252b29.
5 Pol. 1253a30.
6 Pol. 1253a28-29.
7 Nic. Eth. 1094b8.
8 Pol. 1252a1-2.
to the most sovereign of all goods." ¹

Because the polis "is the completion of associations existing by nature, every polis exists by nature, having itself the same quality as the earlier associations from which it grew." ²

It has a κοινωνία in the "perception of good and evil, of the just and the unjust, and of other similar qualities." ³ It likewise shares with the family in the art of acquisition which provides things necessary and useful for the preservation of life. ⁴

The polis may also be considered as "an assemblage of houses, lands, and property sufficient to enable the inhabitants to lead a civilized life. This is proved by the fact that when such a life is no longer possible for them, "the polis is dissolved.⁵

In fact, all associations may be regarded as parts of the association which we call the polis.⁶

¹ Pol. 1252a10. Apropos of this passage, Ross, op. cit., 232, comments: "He (Aristotle) is here implicitly attacking two views which had found favor in Greece: (1) the view of some of the sophists, such as Lycophron or Thrasymachus that law and the state are merely products of convention, interferences with the liberty of the individual which are either forced on him by his masters or adopted by him merely as a safeguard against injury; and (2) the view of the Cynics, that the wise man is sufficient to himself and should be a citizen of no country but only of the world—a view which was encouraged with the defeat of Chaeronea."

² Pol. 1252b31.

³ Pol. 1253a18-19.

⁴ Pol. 1256b28-30.

⁵ Oecon. 1343a11-13.

⁶ Nic. Eth. 1160a8; 1160a28-30.
The individual and the family are prior in the order of time, according to Aristotle, but the polis is prior in the order of nature, just as the whole is necessarily prior to the part.\(^1\) And the aim of the whole is self-sufficiency.\(^2\)

In a later passage of the *Politics* Aristotle indicates some of the factors which enable the polis to achieve self-sufficiency, but which, taken individually, do not in themselves constitute a polis. A common geographical location is certainly a unifying factor, but a site embraced by a single wall is not thereby a polis.\(^3\) Neither does a system of intermarriage between

\(^1\) *Pol.* 1253a21-22.

\(^2\) Barker, *Political Thought*, 222, makes the following statement. "But the State, the final goal or form of such movement, is most of all Nature's, most of all by nature. And this brings us to one of the most fundamental things in Aristotle's political philosophy. While he holds primitive society to be natural...he also holds the final State to be natural and still more natural...Nay, he would hold that primitive society was only by nature because it was an approximation to the State, and through the State to Nature itself." According to Harry V. Jaffa, "Aristotle" in Leo Strauss and Joseph Cropsey, *History of Political Philosophy* (Chicago: Rand, McNally, and Co., 1963), 65, "According to Aristotle, 'community' is the genus and 'political community' a species. The specifying characteristic of the political community or polis is that it is the community that includes all other human communities, while itself being included by none. Because of its all-inclusiveness, the polis includes or assimilates within its own end or purpose the end or purpose of every other form of community." And again, p. 66, "But the polis, while it embraces the ends of all lesser forms of community, is not the sum of them, because it is in no sense an aggregate. Aristotle sometimes conceives of the polis upon the analogy of a living organism. Just as the function of the human organism cannot be conceived as the sum of the functions of heart, liver, hands, and brain, so one cannot conceive of the function of the polis as the sum of any parts or components."

\(^3\) Ehrenberg, op. cit., 28, gives examples of poleis where
two cities constitute a polis "even though intermarriage is one of the forms of social life which is characteristic of a polis."¹

Nor is a polis established "if a number of persons--living at a distance from one another, but not at so great a distance but that they could still associate--(have) a common system of laws to prevent their injuring one another in the course of exchange."²

People "associated in nothing further than matters such as exchange and alliance"³ though not lacking contiguity in such association⁴ cannot be described as a polis. It is clear, therefore, that a polis is not an association for residents on a common site, or for the sake of preventing mutual injustice and easing exchange. These are indeed conditions which must be present before a polis can exist; but the presence of all these conditions is not enough, in itself, to constitute a polis.⁵ Any polis, truly so called, must be composed of an initial population large enough to make it self-sufficient,⁶ and have as its end the encouragement of goodness. If it does not do so, the political territory belonged to another state.

¹Pol. 1280b16-17.
²Pol. 1280b18-20.
³Pol. 1280b21-23; 1280b25-29.
⁴Pol. 1280b24-25.
⁵Pol. 1280b30-33.
⁶Pol. 1326b7-9.
becomes only an alliance. One would also be mistaken in thinking that property, for example, were the end for which men came together and formed a political κοινωνία. If that were so, then a man's ability to share in state offices would be dependent on his share of property. Aristotle concludes:

What constitutes a polis is an association of households and clans in a good life, for the sake of attaining a perfect and self-sufficing existence. This consumption, however, will not be reached unless the members inhabit one and the same place and practice intermarriage. It was for this reason that the various institutions of a common social life—marriage-connexions, kin-groups, religious gatherings, and social pastimes generally—arose in cities. But these institutions are the business of friendship. It is friendship which consists in the pursuit of a common social life. The end and purpose of a polis is the good life, and the institutions of the social life are means to that end. A polis is constituted by the association of families and villages in a perfect and self-sufficing existence; and such an existence, on our definition, consists in a life of true felicity and goodness. It is therefore for the sake of good actions, and not for the sake of social life, that political associations must be considered to exist. Those who contribute most to an association of this character have a greater share in the polis than those who are equal to them in free birth and descent, but unequal in civic excellence, or than those who surpass them in wealth but are surpassed by them in excellence.

1 Pol. 1230b9-10.
2 Pol. 1280a26.
3 Barker, Politics, 120. "In other words, contiguity and consanguinity are necessary conditions, or sine quibus non; but the essence and the causa causans, is co-operation in a common scheme of good life. Social life (to suzen), arising from the ties of contiguity and consanguinity, is a necessary basis; but the essential structure which arises on this basis is a good life (to eu zen)." Barker, Political Thought, 232, says "Differentiation, and a consequent exchange, are therefore of the essence of association. And thus it issues in a common action, which, in the sphere of ordinary labour, is the product of material wealth, but in that of political activity is the realization of virtue."
So, we may conclude that Aristotle saw the *κοινωνία* of the *polis*, toward which man has a natural impulse, as essentially aimed at the good life, and based on virtue or principle of justice which regulates not only the political *κοινωνία* but indeed every type of social *κοινωνία*. For according to the Nicomachean Ethics, the word "just" can be "applied to whatever creates or conserves for a political association its happiness or the happiness of some part thereof."

Justice involves the observance of the mean in all forms of social *κοινωνία*, whether of words or deeds. Every *κοινωνία* supposes some rule of justice governing the relations between the partners and some friendly feeling between them. Such friend-

"In the developed city he attains all things—life; society (or common life); morality (or good life). But what he particularly finds—and what is the real truth of the State and its essential purpose—is moral life." (269) "As an association, the State is a system of different organs, which by their membership of the system attain a fullness of life otherwise impossible. So far, the individual is dependent upon the State for his fullness of life; but Aristotle goes further, and lays it down that he is dependent upon the State for his very life." (277) Pol. 1280b34-35; 1281a1-2; 1281a4; 1282a5-9.

1 Pol. 1253a39.
2 Pol. 1283a39-41.
ships, however, extend only as far as the mutual advantages pro-
duced by the κοινωνία. Aristotle therefore maintains that
there cannot be κοινωνία between two doctors because no recipro-
cal advantages are involved. No "true exchange" or κοινωνία
occurs without reciprocity. When a degree of reciprocity is es-

can enter into an association with one another because their
case admits of such equality.... But if reciprocal proportion
could not be arrived at in this way, there could be no asso-
ciation between the parties. That it is demand forming as
it does a single standard, that holds such associations to-
gether, is shown clearly in the circumstance that, where
there is no demand for an exchange of services from one or
both parties, they do not enter into association. For,
example, the shoemaker cannot have κοινωνία with the farmer
unless their products are equalized by proportion. Money is the
great equalizer which acts as a bond of the political κοινωνία
to make possible κοινωνία for the purpose of exchange. For,
"without exchange there could be no association, without equality
there could be no exchange, without commensurability there could
be no equality."  

1 Nic. Eth. 1159b29; 1160a14; 1160a18-20.
3 Nic. Eth. 1133b4-5; 1133b7.
4 Eud. Eth. 1243b31.
5 Mag. Mor. 1194a24-25.
6 Nic. Eth. 1133bl6-17. Apropos of this passage, Ross, op.
cit., 207, comments: "But there is no moral virtue in commercial
justice as described by Aristotle. 'Justice' here is not a vir-
tue but a sort of 'governor' in economic machine which keeps ex-
change prices from swinging far from the actual value, for human
Friendship is absolutely essential to κόινωνία in the polis. Envy and contempt are completely removed from the spirit of friendship and the temper of the political κόινωνία. Where enmity exists instead of friendship, men will not even share the same path. Friendship exists wherever there exist reciprocal rights. "Now there are reciprocal rights between stranger and citizen, slave and master, citizen and citizen, son and father, wife and husband; and in these and all other human relationships, friendships too are possible between the parties. Some think "that a friendship ought to be like a partnership in business, where the partner who contributes the largest amount of capital pockets the lion's share of the profits." But friendship implies ideally that the friends have κόινωνία in some things or in all things. A friendship in which "one of the two is out for pleasure and the other for gain, and the one has his wish and the other not" is not a successful κόινωνία. Friendship demands a certain equality in which the things shared are either numerical-needs, of the goods exchanged. It may have been a sense of this difference that led Aristotle not to recognize commercial justice as one of the primary types of justice but to bring it in only as an afterthought."

1 Pol. 1295b24-25.
2 Mag. Mor. 1211a45.
4 Nic. Eth. 1159b32.
ly equal or proportionately equal.¹ When one of the parties who contributes less of something and demands back more of that thing, the other partner seems to lose and the friendship seems to be a charity rather than a partnership.²

In dissimilar friendships, according to Aristotle, a ratio or proportion is necessary to restore equality and preserve the friendship. Such is the case between a teacher and a student of philosophy. The payment made to the philosopher for sharing his knowledge should be whatever the student has in his power to pay.³ Mention is also made of the practice of some communities where there is no legal procedure under which action for breach of a voluntary economic κοινωνία can be brought, since they think that once a man has trusted another enough to form a κοινωνία, the transaction should be carried through on that basis.⁴

Friendship, for Aristotle, is a κοινωνία ⁵ in which a man stands in the same relation to his friend as to himself, and in which a man wishes to share with his friend whatever occupation forms for him the essence and aim of his existence—bodily pleasure, artistic study, philosophy.⁶ From this it follows that

¹Eud. Eth. 1242b10-12.
²Eud. Eth. 1242b18.
³Nic. Eth. 1164b3.
⁵Nic. Eth. 1171b33.
⁶Eud. Eth. 1245a19-23.
"the friendship of the unworthy is evil, for they associate in unworthy pursuits; and so becoming more and more like each other they turn out badly. But the friendship of the good is good and increases in goodness in consequence of their association."¹

But if it is pleasant to live well oneself and for one's friend also to live well, and if living together involves working together, surely their partnership will be preeminently in things included in the End. Hence we should study together, and feast together—not on the pleasures of food and the necessary pleasures (for such partnerships do not seem to be real social intercourse but mere enjoyment), but each really wishes to share with his friends the End that he is capable of attaining, or failing this, men choose most of all to benefit their friends and to be benefitted by them. It is therefore manifest that to live together is actually a duty, and that all people wish it very much and that this is most the case with the man that is the happiest and best. ²

"In fact, the whole of justice in general is in relation to a friend, for what is just is just for certain persons, and persons who are partners, and a friend is a partner either in one's family or in one's life."³ In another passage Aristotle distinguishes between the κοινωνία of friendship between kinsmen and that between members of a social fraternity. He regards the latter as having a κοινωνία more obviously built upon some compact or mutual understanding.⁴

Although justice operates in every human relationship,

¹ Nic. Eth. 1172a8-10.
³ Eud. Eth. 1242a21-22.
⁴ Nic. Eth. 1161b11-15.
all these "partnerships are a constituent part of the partnership of the state—for example that of the members of a brotherhood, or a priesthood, or business partnerships,¹ so that there are as many species of justice and partnership as there are of friendship.² The Magna Moralia, therefore, regards justice in the strict sense as that practiced in the social κοινωνία of the polis,³ "for the fellow citizens are partners in common, and accept a fundamental parity, though their characters differ."⁴ Political societies were formed by a number of persons⁵ and continue in being for the advantage of the citizens.⁶ "Political justice is manifested between persons who share a common way of life which has for its object a state of affairs in which they will have all they need for an independent existence as free and equal members of the society."⁷

In the Politics Aristotle attempts to formulate an acceptable definition of citizenship by declaring what is not essential to it. Citizenship is not constituted by virtue of residence in a given place, because resident aliens and slaves also have

² Eud. Eth. 1241b16.
³ Mag. Mor. 1194b28-29.
⁴ Mag. Mor. 1194b10.
⁵ Nic. Eth. 1135b12.
⁶ Nic. Eth. 1160a12.
⁷ Nic. Eth. 1134a27.
in the same geographical location.\footnote{Pol. 1275a8.} It is not constituted by sharing in the right of being entitled to sue and be sued in the courts, because aliens also have κοινωνία in this right by virtue of a treaty--though in some places resident aliens have only partial κοινωνία in this right.\footnote{Pol. 1275a10-14.} "The name of citizen cannot be given to persons who share in the constitution (but whose interests are not regarded) or, if the name is to be given, they must have their share of the benefits."\footnote{Pol. 1279a33. Ehrenberg, \textit{op. cit.}, 90, says: "Polis society came to include at least part of the metics...It is therefore not quite accurate to speak generally of the identity of state and society." Ross, \textit{op. cit.}, 241-242, says: "In his selection of the functions which are to constitute the citizen, Aristotle follows the Athenian practice of his time; to be a juryman and a member of the assembly—these are the minimum functions. The former must seem somewhat accidental to the notion of a citizen. There may be modes of government in which there is no jury system and yet citizenship is widely diffused. Again, membership of the sovereign assembly is no necessary part of citizenship; Aristotle fails to foresee the possibilities of representative government. It is in the possession of a voice in the choosing of the members of the assembly that we should be inclined to find the minimum of citizenship." Jaffa, \textit{op. cit.}, 96, says: "The absolute or unqualified definition of citizenship is that it is nothing other than a sharing in the administration of justice and in office. This means participating in what we would call legislation and adjudication, with these two "powers" being sufficiently broad to assimilate what we would understand by administration or execution of the laws. Indeed, Aristotle generalizes from this first definition, saying that what he really means is participation in 'indefinite office.'"}
in the deliberative or judicial offices of the polis, although not every officer of the political κοινωνία can be considered a magistrate. To accept a political office "is to enter into relations with others and to become one member of an association."  

Since citizenship is limited to those who have the right to κοινωνία in office, others, such as mechanics, may be described as merely "necessary conditions" of the polis without being integral parts of it, because the polis is an association of equals and only of equals.  

The next topic for consideration is the theory of the constitution. "A constitution may be defined as 'an organization of offices in a state, by which the method of their distribution is fixed, the sovereign authority is determined, and the nature of the end to be pursued by the association and all its members is prescribed." It is obvious, then, that any change in constitution will affect the nature of the polis. But before beginning this discussion, Aristotle states: "We must first ascertain

1 Pol. 1275b19.
2 Pol. 1299a16-17.
3 Nic. Eth. 1130a2-4.
4 Pol. 1277b35.
5 Pol. 1328a25-27.
6 Pol. 1289a15-18.
7 Pol. 1276b5-8.
two things—the nature of the end for which the state exists, and the various kinds of authority to which men and their associations are subject.\(^1\) Man's natural impulse to social life, as we have already seen, leads to the formation of the polis. A political ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ may also be formed for the sake of life itself.\(^2\) The good life, however, is the chief end of the polis, both for the community and for the individual.

All political constitutions have something in common, as well as their own unique aspects.\(^3\) They "are partnerships, (in fact, 'partnerships on a friendly footing')\(^4\) and every partnership is founded on justice."\(^5\) Therefore, some kind of equality must necessarily exist or be established among the partners. As in the ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ of friendship, this equality may be either numerical or proportional. Democracy, like the friendship of comrades, is a ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ based on numerical equality.\(^6\) Aristocracy and kingship, on the other hand, like the friendship of father and son,\(^7\) and business partnership\(^8\) are based on proportional

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\(^1\) Pol. 1278b16-18.
\(^2\) Pol. 1278b25.
\(^3\) Oecon. 1345b17.
\(^4\) Eud. Eth. 1242a11.
\(^6\) Eud. Eth. 1241b35-36.
\(^7\) Nic. Eth. 1160b25.
\(^8\) Eud. Eth. 1241b40.
equality.\textsuperscript{1} On the other hand, "tyranny...is the single-person government of the political association on the lines of despotism."\textsuperscript{2} However, a passage in the \textit{Eudemian Ethics} does not make this distinction and regards the political partnership as proportional.\textsuperscript{3}

The types of justice provided by the various constitutions is also an important consideration. For Justice "does what is to the advantage of another, whether he is in authority or just a partner."\textsuperscript{4} Justice in the political \textit{koinwvía} may be either distributive, as "shown in the distribution of honour or

\begin{itemize}
  \item [1] Pol. 1279a36-37.
  \item [2] Pol. 1279b16-17, however, defines tyranny as "single person government of the political association on the lines of despotism."
  \item [4] Nic. Eth. 1130a5-6. Jaffa, \textit{op. cit.}, 74, says: "The common burdens and the common advantages must be divided and shared by rules which must themselves be decided upon by the sharers in the common good. What these rules are, and how they are to be applied, is what we mean by the administration of justice in the broadest sense. And it is participation in this which makes a man a citizen, and the partnership in justice is the political community. The family and the village are too narrow for self-sufficiency, and hence too narrow for justice. Hence the polis, as the only community adequate for the fulfillment of man's specifically human potentiality, must be prior to the family in one of the senses that the oak tree is prior to the acorn. The polis is also prior to the family as, in our former analysis, the chair is prior to the carpentering which produces it. That is, it is prior in the order of final causality. The polis is also prior to the single human being, as the whole man is prior to the hand or any other organ of the whole. For except as he lives in a polis a man cannot live a fully human existence, he cannot function as a man. For man is the rational and political animal."
\end{itemize}
money or such other possessions of the community as can be divided among its members,¹ or corrective, in regard to private transactions or business deals.

The κοινωνία of the polis exists because of the κοινωνία of citizens in a given constitution.² Citizens (as well as sailors) are members of a κοινωνία.³ As such, "the end which they all serve is safety in the working of their association; and this association consists in the constitution."⁴ Therefore, these constitutions which consider the common interest are right constitutions, judged by the standard of absolute justice. Those constitutions which consider only the personal interest of the rulers are all wrong constitutions, or perversions of the right forms, whereas the polis is an association of free men.⁵

Constitutions are distinguished upon the basis of whether all the groups of which the polis is constituted have κοινωνία in constitutional rights, or whether only some of them do.⁶ As an example, Aristotle mentions in the Politics the ultimate form of democracy in which all the members of the state have κοινωνία in constitutional rights⁷ due to the numerical superiority of the masses and

¹Nic. Eth. 1132b31-32.
²Pol. 1276b1-2.
³Pol. 1276b21.
⁴Pol. 1276b29-31.
⁵Pol. 1279a18-22.
⁶Pol. 1292b24-25.
⁷Pol. 1319b2; 1291b36.
a revenue ample enough to provide opportunity for the leisure for participation in the assembly and courts by a system of payment for attendance.\(^1\) He also agrees, however, that this form "cannot be borne by all states, and can hardly itself endure, unless it is properly constituted in point of laws and customs."

After considering the various types of constitutions based on the amount of participation the citizens enjoy, Aristotle moves on to a consideration of the best constitution. He concludes that the best constitution will be one in which most men will be able to have κοινωνία and which it will be possible for most states to enjoy.\(^2\) It should be one "which men can be easily induced, and will be readily able, to graft onto the system they already have."\(^3\) In actual practice, the best form of political κοινωνία vests its power in the middle class,\(^4\) drawing elements from both oligarchies and democracies.\(^5\) As an example of how elements can be drawn from both forms of constitutions mentioned above, he suggests paying the poor for attendance at assemblies

\(^1\) Pol. 1293a4-6.
\(^2\) Pol. 1295a30-31.
\(^3\) Pol. 1289a2-4.
\(^4\) Pol. 1295b35.
\(^5\) Jaffa, op. cit., 118-119, says: "Polity is a kind of virtuous mean between the two vicious extremes constituted by the claims of wealth and poverty...It is, as has been said, a blend of democracy and oligarchy, and the better the blending, the easier it will be for democrats to confuse it with democracy and oligarchs with oligarchy."
and court sessions and fining the rich for non-attendance. "On this plan all would share in a common constitution; on the other, the constitution belongs to one side only."\(^1\) Aristotle also suggests that "in matters other than property (e.g. honours and ceremonies) a position of equality, or even of precedence, may well be given to those who have fewer constitutional rights—in a democracy to the rich; in an oligarchy to the poor."\(^2\)

Aristotle also indicates the importance of establishing a system for deciding suits and for enforcing decisions in an institution such as the polis where men share a common life.\(^3\)

General opinion, according to Aristotle, establishes that the individual good and the good of the state are identical. To have κοινωνία in the activity of the state is more desirable than to live absolved from the ties of political κοινωνία.\(^4\) But, he concludes, whether we assume κοινωνία in the activity of the state is desirable for all or only for a majority,\(^5\) with regard to the best constitution and disposition of a state, it is clear that "The true end which good law-givers should keep in

\(^1\) Pol. 1297a42. Glenn R. Morrow, Plato's Cretan City: A Historical Interpretation of the Laws (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 530, n. 18, says that this is an "irrelevant...pedantic discussion."

\(^2\) Pol. 1309a29.

\(^3\) Pol. 1322a8.

\(^4\) Pol. 1324a15-16.

\(^5\) Pol. 1324a19.
view, for any state or stock or society with which they may be concerned is the enjoyment of partnership in a good life and the felicity thereby attainable.¹

States which are isolated need not be inactive. There can be κοινωνία among the various sections of the state.² The same is true for the individual human being. "If it were not so, there would be something wrong with God himself and the whole of the universe, who have no activities other than those of their own internal life."³

It is advantageous to a polis to have κοινωνία with the sea.⁴ The polis which has a port separate from but in with the sea enjoys a favorable circumstance.⁵

Among the elements necessary for the existence of a polis—since the state is not merely a casual κοινωνία—Aristotle includes food, arts and crafts, public worship, and a system of deliberation and jurisdiction. But not all the members of a polis need have κοινωνία in all these services.⁶ Some are necessary for all; others should be divided among the members. He al-

¹Pol. 1325a9-11.
²Pol. 1325b27.
³Pol. 1325b28-30.
⁴Pol. 1327a11.
⁵Pol. 1327a37.
⁶Pol. 1328b16-19.
⁷Pol. 1328b25.
so suggests that, under usual circumstances, those ruling and those being ruled should be merged together in a single body in the political koivvía rather than being distinguished for life.1 He encouragesthe legislator to provide for the regulation of the marriage koivvía as vital for ensuring healthy future citizens.2 He forbids young persons to see mimes or comedies until they reach the age "when they are allowed to share with the older men in the right of reclining and taking wine at the common tables,"3 In requiring music as a part of the educative experience, the lawgiver has in mind more than "sharing in the common pleasure which all men derive from music."4 The musical education must be in terms of taking part in actual musical performances, participation in which should be continued throughout life.5 Having performed, they will be better able to be good judges of others.6 The kind of music they should participate in is another important question.7 Unlike objects of sight which bear little resemblance to states of character,8 musical compositions are

1 Pol. 1332b12-15.
2 Pol. 1334b34.
3 Pol. 1336b20-23.
4 Pol. 1339b40-42.
5 Pol. 1340b33-34; 1340b41-42.
6 Pol. 1340b22-26.
7 Pol. 1341a2.
8 Pol. 1340a32-33.
representations of states of character.

Another element necessary for the existence of the state is that the citizens personally bear arms, "partly in order to maintain authority and repress disobedience, and partly in order to meet any threat of external aggression."¹ His criticism of the political arrangements proposed by Hippias of Miletus is directed to this point:

The artisans, the farmers, and the military class all share in the constitution, in the sense of possessing the active franchise; but the farmers share without possessing arms, and the artisans share without possessing either land or arms, which makes them both, in effect, the slaves of the class in possession of arms. ²

Aristotle was well aware that the amount of equality among citizens has an influence on the nature of the political constitution and acknowledges that some of his predecessors had also come to this same realization.³ This leads him to the consideration of what form of political association would be the ideal for those who can count upon the material conditions of their life being, as nearly as possible, just what they would themselves wish,"⁴ and suggests that there are three possibilities: a κοινωνία of all things; κοινωνία in nothing; κοινωνία in some things. He rejects outright the second possibility because it is

¹ Pol. 1328b8-10.
² Pol. 1268a17-20.
³ Pol. 1266b15-16.
⁴ Pol. 1260b28-29.
clearly impossible to have $\kappa \omega i \nu \iota \alpha$ in nothing.\(^1\) "The constitution of a polis involves in itself some sort of association and its members must initially be associated in a common place of residence. To be fellow citizens is to be sharers in one state."\(^2\) Aristotle next asks whether it is better for the well-constructed state to share everything possible for it to share, or to share only in some things.\(^3\) The idea of having $\kappa \omega i \nu \iota \alpha$ in all things leads him to a consideration of the plan for $\kappa \omega i \nu \iota \alpha$ of wives, children, and property which Socrates proposed in Plato's Republic.\(^4\)

In Book IV of the Republic, Socrates cautiously alluded to $\kappa \omega i \nu \iota \alpha$ of women, children, and goods as one effective means of achieving the ideal state which they were planning.\(^5\) This idea was not original with Socrates as is indicated by its appearance in the Ecclesiazusae of Aristophanes, produced in Athens twenty years before the Republic was completed. However, Socrates' friends react immediately by asking him to explain how such a system would work.\(^6\)

Socrates proposes that in the guardian and helper classes

\(^1\)Pol. 1260b38-39.
\(^2\)Pol. 1260b40-42.
\(^3\)Pol. 1261a1-3.
\(^4\)Pol. 1261a4-6.
\(^5\)Rep. 424A.
\(^6\)Rep. 449CD; 450C; 461E.
of their ideal state all females would be common to all males, with none living together as husband and wife, and the children they produce would be raised by the state and thus common to all the members of the class.¹ This, Socrates, hoped, would create that κοινωνία of pleasure and pain in which "all the citizens rejoice and grieve alike at the same births and deaths."² For the best city is one "in which the greatest number use the expression 'mine' and 'not mine' of the same things in the same way."³ He compares the city to a man:

For example, if the finger of one of us is wounded, the entire community of bodily connections stretching to the soul for "integration" with the dominant part is made aware, and all of it feels the pain as a whole, though it is a part that is how we come to say that the man has a pain in his finger.⁴

The result of κοινωνία in the body politic will be that these citizens, above all others, will have one and the same thing in common which they will name mine, and by virtue of this communion they will have their pleasures and pains in common... And is not the cause of this, besides this, the general constitution of the state, the community of wives and children among the guardians?⁵

By common activities, common intercourse, common children, common education,⁶ and common sacrifices made to them after death,⁷

Socrates hoped that the unity of the state would be absolutely secured in a way most fitting to both male and female natures. When his friends ask if he thinks that "such a community can be brought among men, as it exists among animals" Socrates is quick to reply that it can.1

Aristotle acknowledges with Socrates the role of education in making the polis a community and giving it unity. Women and children must share in this educational experience because, "women are a half of the free population; children grow up to be partners in the government of the state."2 But he "abandons Plato's view that, though woman is the weaker vessel, her function is the same as the man's."3

Aristotle also opposes the theory of the κοινωνία of women, children, and goods as presented by Socrates because he feels that the absolute unity toward which it was directed has never been proved satisfactorily to be the end of the political community. In fact, he feels that too much unity will actually lead to the destruction of the polis4 by breaking down, as it becomes more a unit, first into a household, then into an individual. Secondly, since it is essential that the polis be composed

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1Rep. 466D.
2Pol. 1260b20.
4Pol. 1261a18-20.
of different kinds of men to establish its self-sufficiency, all men should take turns in ruling and being ruled. However, he does agree that it would be better for the political κοινωνία if the same men were always the rulers. ¹ Finally, since the κοινωνία of the polis can only exist when there is a large enough and diversified enough group for the polis to be self-sufficing, the lesser degree of unity is more desirable than the greater.

Aristotle next launches into a criticism of the means suggested in the Republic for achieving unity in the polis:

Even if it were the supreme good of a political association that it should have the greatest possible unity, this unity does not appear to follow from the formula of "All men saying Mine and Not mine" at the same time, which, in view of Socrates, is the index of the perfect unity of a polis. ³

Aristotle distinguishes between the individual and the collective sense of the word "all" commenting that the use of "all" collectively is not conducive to harmony in the state.

Another difficulty which Aristotle envisions in regard to the κοινωνία of women and children is that injuries done to persons become more serious when committed against close relatives. Therefore, in regard to the κοινωνία of women and children in the political situation, ⁴ Aristotle feels that the unity which it is supposed to effect would be only a "watery sort" of

¹ Pol. 1261a38-39.
² Pol. 1261b14.
³ Pol. 1261b15-21.
Plato's fallacy, according to Aristotle, lies in thinking that, if unity is necessary for the polis, total unity is the ideal. But, as Barker comments,

Plato had never thought that material means would of themselves reform humanity; he had not even thought that they ought to be the first means employed for that end. Spiritual means—a common education—had been his primary object; and a scheme of education is the subject which engages his attention most closely and most constantly. 2

Aristotle moves next to a consideration of the proper regulation and then to a criticism of the κοινωνιά of property which Plato had suggested for the distribution of property under an ideal constitution. Aristotle indicates three possibilities, plots of land owned individually, but crops shared in common; plots held in common, but crops divided for individual use, a form of κοινωνιά practiced by some barbarian tribes; plots and crops both held in common. 3 He observes:

It is generally true that it is a difficult business for men to live together and to be partners in any form of human activity, but it is specially difficult to do so when property is involved. Fellow-travellers who are merely partners in a journey furnish an illustration; they generally quarrel about ordinary matters and take offence on petty occasion. 4

1Pol. 1262b15-16, 1262b36. Flaws are discernible in Aristotle's criticism of Plato's Republic. Ross, op. cit., 237, notes: "It is only within two of those, the ruling and warrior classes, the community of wives and children is ordained, and only within these classes that Aristotle would be justified in saying that Plato aims too much at unity."

2Barker, Political Thought, 395.

3Pol. 1263a7-8.

4Pol. 1263a15-19.
And again, those who own property, and share in its management, are far more often at variance with one another than those who have property in severalty—though (we tend to be misled by the fact that) those who are at variance in consequence of sharing in property look to us few in number when we compare them with the mass of those who own their property privately. 1

Aristotle believes that the evils which a system of κοινωνία of property is directed against are not caused by the absence of this κοινωνία but are due to the wickedness of human nature. 2 In addition,

Justice demands that we should take into account not only the evils from which men will be liberated when once they have turned their property into a common stock, but also the benefits of which they will be deprived. The life which they are to live appears to be utterly impossible. 3

Commenting on this problem, Barker states: "It is exactly this power of knowing ourselves as separate individuals which Plato really destroys, when he abolishes property; for property is a necessary basis of any conscious sense of an individual self. 4

Aristotle also objects that "Plato has not explained, nor indeed is it easy to explain, the position of the different members" 5 under his ideal constitution, especially that of the third class which composes the bulk of the state. He suggests three

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1 Pol. 1263b24-27.
2 Pol. 1263b23.
3 Pol. 1263b29.
4 Barker, Political Thought, 156.
5 Pol. 1264a11-12.
alternatives in their regard: 1) that they have all things in com-
mon; 2) that property and marriage be private; the whole commu-

mity\(^1\) would then be based on a scheme in which there would almost
seem to be two states in one: "the guardians being made into some-
thing of the nature of an army of occupation, the farmers, arti-
sans, and others being given the position of ordinary citizens.\(^2\)
Aristotle finds it "difficult to discover...how the farming class
is to be constituted if the common life of the guardians is to
be preserved";\(^3\) 3) that there be community of wives, but private
property. As Barker here indicates

Aristotle does not mention the fourth possibility—that
ownership and use may both be private. Nor does he pro-
ceed, after stating his three alternatives, to examine
each in turn. What he actually does is (1) to examine,
in 3-4, some difficulties of the Platonic scheme of com-

munism, apparently on the assumption that it corresponds
to the last of his three possibilities; (2) to discuss, in

5-10, the advantages of a system of private property
combined with common use—a system which more or less,
corresponds to the first of his three alternatives; and
(3) to return, in the rest of the chapter, to a detailed
criticism of the Platonic scheme—a criticism which some-
times fails to do justice to its real character. The sec-
ond of the three alternatives is thus left unexamined—
except in so far as Aristotle's own preference for the
first alternative (which is the opposite of the second)
implies its rejection.\(^4\)

After his analysis of the Republic, Aristotle moves on to
an examination of the constitution of the Laws, since he feels

\(^1\) Pol. 1264a24-25.
\(^2\) Pol. 1264a26-28.
\(^3\) Pol. 1264a39-41.
\(^4\) Barker, Politics, 55, n. 1.
that "in the Republic Plato has only attempted to solve a very small number of issues—mainly the proper method for ensuring community of wives and children and community property, and the proper way of distributing power under the constitutional system."¹ He concludes that, with few exceptions, "In all matters other than community of wives and of property, Plato provides identical institutions for both of his states."²

A scrutiny of other constitutions then follows. Aristotle criticizes the Spartan constitution in that it does not require the Council of Elders to participate in a close scrutiny of their public conduct.³

One of the objections he makes to the Cretan system is that it is not a constitution at all, but an arbitrary form of oligarchy, in which the Cretan nobles break up the people and their own followers into many factions; to set up, on that basis, as many monarchies; and then to quarrel and fight. In effect, and as long as it lasts, such a state of things simply means the disappearance of the state and the dissolution of political society.⁴

¹Pol. 1264b29-31. Morrow, op. cit., 111, n. 44, says "In view of Plato's lengthy discussion of this problem (e.g. means for keeping the population constant) it is hard to understand why Aristotle should criticize him for not taking it into account (Pol. 1265a38). This and other discrepancies between Aristotle's criticisms and the Laws as we have it suggests that Aristotle's comments are based upon an earlier version which was corrected and added to after this part of the Politics was written."

²Pol. 1265a5-6.

³Pol. 1271a4-5.

Koinonia and its Cognates in the Related Authors of the Classical Period

The Attic orators frequently used κοινωνία in reference to the many kinds of political relationships, legal and illegal, free and coercive, selfish and altruistic, which characterized the politics of the fourth century B.C. About 397 B.C., just after the end of the Peloponnesian War, Isocrates wrote a speech for the son of Alcibiades who was a defendant in an action for damage for the sum of five talents. The young Alcibiades based his defence on a eulogy of his father's contributions to Athens, which would still be remembered so soon after the defeat of the Peloponnesian War. He reminded them of how his father had been exiled by the ruthless Four Hundred who then abolished the democracy. Though he was recalled when the Four Hundred were overthrown, he was again exiled by the oligarchs when one of his lieutenants was defeated at the Battle of Notium in 407 B.C. Thus, young Alcibiades reminded the Athenians, "did my father's misfortunes affect the city and he share in her disasters."  

1 Jebb, op. cit., II, 229. On pp. 231-232 Jebb paraphrases this speech thus: "His loyalty to the democracy was proved by his sufferings. His banishment was the first preparation for the oligarchy of the Four Hundred, and the first consequence of the oligarchy of the Thirty. His interests were, indeed, closely bound up with yours. The Tyrants knew this; and while they drove others from Athens, drove Alcibiades from Hellas; thinking that it would be vain to level the walls, unless they removed him who could restore them."

Isocrates' first political discourse, the *Panegyricus*, which was either read or circulated at a Panhellenic meeting at Olympia c. 380 B.C., urged the Greeks to rally from the intolerable conditions resulting from the defeat of Athens, the supremacy of Sparta, the humiliation of the ill-kept Peace of Antalcidas in 387 B.C., the general exhaustion caused by war and civil strife. He began by saying that, while the athletic victors who do no real service for the people are greatly honored, to wise men "who had toiled in private for the public good and trained their own minds so as to be able to help also their fellowmen they apportioned no reward whatsoever." He extolled the man who attains wisdom, for "all men will reap the benefit who are willing to share his insight." The wise man in this instance is of course Isocrates himself, proposing that the Greeks unite to conquer Persia. "It were well to make the expedition in the present generation, in order that those who have shared in our misfortunes may also benefit by our advantages." He encouraged them to accept Athenian leadership in this enterprise, despite the fact that those who had *koinwvía* in the Spartan decarchies have openly denounced Athenian policy and integrity. Since "we have

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1 Jeggb, op. cit., II, 148-149.
3 *Pan.* IV 167.
4 *Pan.* IV 110.
shown ourselves to be of such character and have given so convincing proof that we do not covet the possessions of others."¹

Not only was Spartan supremacy in Greece resented, however. The citizen of Plataea, in whose mouth Isocrates' *Plataicus*, *ca. 372-371 B.C.*, was placed, said of the Thebans who had attacked and destroyed the town of Plataea and annexed the territory in 373 B.C.: "For my part, I consider that there exists no people more overbearing than those who blot out the cities of each of us and compel us, when we have no use for it, to participate in their form of polity."² He begged the Athenians not to abandon the Plataeans who had been their allies since the Persian Wars when they "alone of those who lived outside the Peloponnesus shared in their (the Athenian) perils and thus helped them to save their city."³ He lamented over the woes of the Plataeans:

¹Jebb, *op. cit.*, II, 164-165 comments: "Foremost among its authors works in merits of execution, the Panegyricus stands first also in the interest of its subject matter...But whatever was, at the time, the political worth of the Panegyricus, its permanent historical worth can hardly be overrated. To the history of Greece it contributes a vivid picture of the whole Hellenic world, and of the barbarian world in contact with Hellas, at a critical moment. To the history of Athens it contributes a striking sketch of the growth and influence in Greece of the specially Athenian ideas, religious, political and social. For the personal history of Isocrates it is of surpassing interest; it is the earliest and most complete expression of the ruling thought of his life: the thought which he afterwards urged upon Dionysius, upon Archidamus,—at last upon Philip."


³*Plat.* XIV 57.
For who could be found to be more unhappy than we are who in one day deprived of our city, our land, and our possessions, and being destitute of all necessities alike, have become wanderers and beggars, not knowing whither to turn, and whatever our habitation, finding no happiness there? For if we fall in with the unfortunate, we grieve that we must be compelled, in addition to our own ills, to share in the ills of others; and if we encounter those who fare well, our lot is even harder to bear, not because we envy them their prosperity, but because amid the blessings of our neighbors we see more clearly our own miseries. 1

The ascendancy of Thebes after the Battle of Leuctra in 371 B.C. made her the main threat to the other Greek city-states and drew Athens and Sparta more closely together. According to Xenophon, Athens did not approve of the conduct of the Thebans after the battle of Leuctra. She was ashamed to make war on Thebes and in addition did not think it expedient, and she refused any longer to take part with them in what they were doing, inasmuch as they saw that they were campaigning against the Phocians, who were old friends of the Athenians, and were annihilating cities which had been faithful in the war against the barbarian and were friendly to Athens. 2 After Archidemus returned with his forces from Leuctra, the Athenians invited all cities willing to participate in the King's Peace to meet in Athens. "And when they had come together, they passed a resolution to take...(an) oath, in company with such as desired to share in the peace." 3

1Plat. XIV 46.


3Hell. VI 5.2.
It is conjectured that Isocrates' oration Archidamus was a rhetorical exercise which tried to project what the sentiments of the son of the Spartan king Archidamus would be at the Congress which met in 366 B.C. at Sparta to discuss peace with Thebes.¹ The Peace of Pelopidas in 367 B.C. had stipulated that the newly colonized city of Messene be recognized as independent. Here Isocrates pictured Archidamus as opposing this stipulation and holding up to the Spartans Athens as the ideal defender of what is one's own possession. He reminded them how the Athenians during the Persian War "leaving their own country, and adopting Freedom as their fatherland...shared the dangers of war with us, and wrought such a change in their fortunes that, after being deprived of their own possessions for but a few days, they became for many years masters of the rest of the world."² In fact, Isocrates seemed at one point to envision Archidamus as the man to lead the united Greeks against Persia. In a letter to Archidamus written c. 356 B.C.³ Isocrates tried to rouse him to such an undertaking by reminding him of the Greeks in Asia "whom by the treaty we have delivered one and all into the hands, not only of the barbarians, but also of those Greeks who, though they share

³Jebb, op. cit., II, 245.
our speech, yet adhere to the ways of the barbarians."\(^1\)

At the conclusion of the Social War (357-355 B.C.) in which the Athenians lost such important allies as Chios, Cos, Rhodes, and Byzantium, Isocrates composed a discourse on the public safety called the *Areopagiticus*. In it he encouraged a return to the restricted democracy of Solon and Cleisthenes. At that time, he reminded them, the Athenian people "not only were... of the same mind regarding public affairs, but in their private life as well they showed that degree of consideration for each other which is due from men who are right-minded and partners in a common fatherland."\(^2\)

In the same year, 355 B.C., Demosthenes delivered in person his first speech on a public question. He opposed a certain Leptines who had a law passed "which revoked all immunities granted in the past and made them illegal for the future, with the exception of those enjoined by the descendants of the tyrannicides, Harmodius and Aristogeiton,"\(^3\) in order that the depleted Athenian treasury might be replenished. Demosthenes argued: "with regard to the alleged poverty of the Exchequer, you must reflect that you will not be a whit the better off if you abolish these exemp-

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tions, for the expenditure of these services has nothing to do with the revenues or the surplus of the State."\(^1\)

In 354 B.C., rumor reached Athens that the Persians were arming against Athenian allies. Some in Athens wanted to declare war on Persia immediately. We might imagine Isocrates was foremost among them. Demosthenes took part in the debate and succeeded in averting a declaration of war by his oration *On the Navy Boards*. His proposed reform of the triarchy, which however was not adopted for years, included a suggestion that the register of the wealthiest citizens should be increased to 2000 citizens, so that "after striking out wards, orphans, settlers in colonies, joint holders of estates, and everyone otherwise ineligible," there might still be c. 1200 persons willing and able to contribute for the general good of the state.\(^2\)

In 346 B.C. Isocrates reiterated his favorite theme: the Greeks should unite in common cause against the King of Persia.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Against Leptines, 20.25.


\(^3\) Jaeger, *Demosthenes*, 153 says: Isocrates "had long since come to recognize the impossibility of resisting Macedonia, and he was only trying to find the least humiliating way to express the unavoidable submission of all the Greeks to the will of Philip. Here again he found the solution in a scheme for Macedonian hegemony over Greece. For it seemed as if Philip's appearance in this role would be the most effective way to mitigate his becoming so dominant a factor against the culturally and ethnically alien character of the Macedonians. Isocrates tried to make this acceptable both to Philip and to the Greeks by employing the mythical symbol of Heracles as the first to carry Greek civilization in triumph to Asia. As Heracles' successor, Philip, scion of the Heraclidae, was now to lead Greece to victory over the bar-
In an Address to Philip, written just after the Peace of Philocrates, he tried to persuade Philip to unite and lead the Greeks, saying:

I am not unaware that when I am proposing this course many will look at it askance, but that when you are actually carrying it out all will rejoice in it; for no one has had any part in what I have proposed but when the benefits from it shall have been realized in fact, everyone without fail will look to have his portion. 1

During the same year, Demosthenes delivered his oration On the Peace in which he urged the Greeks not to let Philip have κοινωνία in the Amphictyonic Council2 despite the alliance made by Philip and Athens in the Peace of Philocrates.

The accusation that Athenian interests had been betrayed by the embassy which was sent to Philip and which concluded the Peace of Philocrates in 346 B.C. were clearly enunciated in two orations delivered in 343 B.C. In De Falsa Legatione Demosthenes protested that he had been forced to reveal the κοινωνία of Aeschines and Philocrates with Philip to free himself from the suspicion of having been "a reputed accomplice in scandalous and wicked actions."3

Though denied a hearing on this matter earlier, due to the intrigues of his opponents, he continued to protest that he had no knowledge or κοινωνία in the promises made in securing the Peace of Philocrates.¹ The guilt of Philocrates in accepting bribes from Philip had been established in an earlier trial and he was exiled from Athens. Demosthenes however protested that Aeschines still maintained his κοινωνία with Philocrates and still preferred "disrepute, prosecution, any punishment this court may inflict rather than to do anything disagreeable to Philip."² He reminded the Athenians that they had passed censure on all the results of the Peace and refused κοινωνία in the doings of the Amphictyonic Council and were suspicious of Philip, yet they refused to condemn a man who was the cause of the Peace itself.³ He then invited all those who were innocent of these indictments as colleagues of Aeschines in the embassy to prove themselves honest men by freely coming forward to testify that they were not κοινωνοί in Aeschines' actions.⁴

If Aeschines would accuse Demosthenes of not being loyal to him after all they went through together, Demosthenes offered as an example of his own justification the practice commanders and nearly all public authorities who have κοινωνία in worship

¹De Fals. Leg 19.45.355.
²De Fals. Leg. 19.119.
³De Fals. Leg. 19.132.381.
⁴De Fals. Leg. 19.157.390.
and libations, yet do not "give impunity to delinquent colleagues on account of these observances." He also defended himself against Aeschines' charge that he was a Κοινωνός in all the acts which he was then denouncing. By the testimony of his actions and witnesses to the fact. He protested that he had everything to gain by becoming their Κοινωνός—a gift of money from Philip, and the friendship both of Philocrates and Aeschines and of Philip himself.

He reminded the assembly that some of the most outstanding citizens whom they had "allotted by statute a share of...libations and drink offerings in every temple and at every public service" had, in spite of this, been subject to the due process of law for their unjust actions. Aeschines should be no exception, he urged. No denunciation of the general Chares by Aeschines would swerve him from his object. "He is not concerned in the present inquiry," said Demosthenes.

As might be expected, Aeschines retorted in his oration, On the Embassy, by continuing to accuse Demosthenes of being a Κοινωνός with the guilty Philocrates in the Peace.

1 De. Fals. Leg. 19.190.400.
3 De Fals. Leg. 19.222.410.
4 De Fals. Leg. 19.280.431.
5 De Fals. Leg. 19.334.448.
The judgment of history seems to be against Aeschines and in favor of Demosthenes.  

The next year, 342 B.C., Demosthenes delivered an oration On Halonnesus. An island off the Thessalian coast which belonged to Athens, Halonnesus was seized by pirates when Philip then drove out, keeping the island for himself. When Athens sent an embassy to demand the island back, Philip offered to give them the island or to submit the case to arbitration. Demosthenes replied to this proposal of Philip in the oration On Halonnesus. He reminded the Athenian people that they had wished all the Greeks who had no κοινωνία in the Peace of Philocrates to remain free and independent, but that if one of them were attacked, both Philip and Athens should unite to defend them. Philip's predatory actions at Halonnesus, however, clearly indicated that he had no intention of fulfilling the terms of the agreement.

1Jaeger, Demosthenes, 166-167: "Aeschines' authority must have been seriously shaken now that the memory of all the human events leading up to the peace had been again brought to light. Shortly before, his associate Philocrates, for whom the peace was named, had been impeached by Hypereides and had fled the country. The court condemned him to death. It would be foolish for us to spend our time today in trying to decide once again whether these men were guilty or innocent, trusting ourselves to examine the arguments for and against. In these battles Demosthenes is bent on ruthlessly stamping out any resistance to the idea of war, using all the resources of and overwhelming passion with such a volley of epithets that everyone who steps in the path of the raging avalanche is called traitor and swept away...In judging Demosthenes politics we are always coming up against the critical problem of whether he may not have deceived himself."

While Philip was being severely censored at Athens by Demosthenes, he received a letter from Isocrates who viewed him as the man to lead a common Greek expedition against Persia. Word had reached Athens that Philip had been wounded fighting the Thracians. Isocrates exhorted him not to strive for the honor that comes from foolhardy daring or "such virtue as even ignoble men share, but only of those of which no base person may partake." In other words, not to waste his energy on the Thracians but to turn his energies to conquering the Great King himself.

Demosthenes reproached the Greek city-states individually and collectively in his Third Philippic of 341 B.C. for that spirit of exclusiveness which was about to make their overthrow by Philip possible. He said:

We are in such a miserable position, we have so entrenched ourselves in our different cities, that to this very day we can do nothing that our interest or our duty demands; we cannot combine, we cannot take any common pledge of help or friendship; but we idly watch the power of this man, each bent (or so it seems to me) on profiting by the interval afforded by another's ruin, taking not a thought, making not an effort for the salvation of Greece. 2

Demosthenes suggested that, since the Athenians could not hope to defeat Philip alone, they should waste no time in sending ambassadors to the whole area—the Peloponnesus, Rhodes, Chios, the Great King—in the hope of gaining in the danger

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and expense of withstanding Philip and preserving Greek liberty.¹

In the Fourth Philippic, written about the same time as the previous oration and perhaps not by Demosthenes himself, the Athenians were urged "to share equitably with one another the privilege of citizenship, the wealthy feeling secure to lead their own lives and haunted by no fears on that account, but in the face of dangers making over their property to the commonwealth for its defense."²

Isocrates' last great oration, the Panathenaicus, which was completed in 339 B.C. when the orator was 97 years of age, was commenced by glorifying Athens at the expense of Sparta. Sparta was criticized for laying waste to cities in the Peloponnesus which

deserved the greatest possible rewards from the Hellenes because of the expedition against Troy in which they took the foremost places and furnished as its leaders men possessed not only of the virtues in which many of the common run of mankind have a part, but also of those in which no ignoble man may share. ³

Also censured were the early wars of the Lacedaemonians in which masses of people were subjected, while the other Hellenes "suffered the opposing party to live with them and share in all the

¹Third Philippic IX.71.
privileges of the State, excepting the offices and the honours."¹ Those, he said, who praised the Lacedaemonians for their conduct then and in subsequent events "are not aware that they are betraying their own thought and showing that they would praise also men who, already possessing more wealth than they need, would not scruple to slay their own brothers and friends and associates so as to obtain their possessions also."²

The oration Against Neaera, spuriously attributed to Demosthenes but included in the Demosthenic corpus and dated 339 B.C. refers to the inscription on the tripod at Delphi, commemorating the victory at Plataea in 479 B.C., on which the names of all the Greek states "who were κοινωνοι in the work"³ were inscribed.

Despite Demosthenes' most valiant efforts to preserve Greece for the Greeks, Philip succeeded in conquering them by his victory at the battle of Chaeronea in 338 B.C. He effectively established himself in control of the constitution of the Corinthian League. In 337 B.C. the League and Philip agreed to jointly wage war against the Persian king under Philip's command. However, Philip of Macedon was murdered at the wedding of his daugh-

¹Panathenaicus XII. 178.
²Ibid., XII. 184.
Alexander succeeded his father as King of Macedon and was elected commander-in-chief of the Greek forces on land and sea. A general peace was proclaimed. Demosthenes opposed the son as fervently as he had opposed the father. In the oration, On the Treaty with Alexander, by one of Demosthenes' party, the Athenian people are reminded that they had agreed "that anyone who acts as Alexander has acted shall be the enemy of all the other parties to the compact, and his country shall be hostile territory, and all the parties shall unite in a campaign against him." The compact had further established "that it shall be the business of the delegates at the Congress and those responsible for public safety to see that in the states that are parties to the contrary to the laws established in those states, no confiscation of property, no partition of lands, no cancelling of debts, and no emancipation of slaves for the purpose of revolution. Nor are exiles to be allowed to leave the states which are κοινώνιοι in the peace, bearing arms against any other states which are κοινώνιοι in it. The oration concluded that war should be declared on Alexander because these and other agreements of the peace treaty had been violated.

2 Ibid., 17.15.
3 Ibid., 17.16.
The enmity between Aeschines and Demosthenes after the trial in 342 B.C. concerning the embassy to Philip in 346 B.C. was never healed. The two remained bitter rivals. So when in 336 B.C. a certain Ctesiphon proposed that a golden crown be publicly awarded to Demosthenes at the Dionysia in recognition of his constant devotion to the state, Aeschines challenged the motion as illegal. For some reason or other, the case was delayed six years and only brought to the court in 330 B.C. In his oration Against Ctesiphon, Aeschines accused Demosthenes of being leagued with Callias of Chalcis to swindle Athens of money given to oppose Philip while Callias proclaimed at Athens in 340 B.C. "that there would be no lack of money or men."¹ He also charged Demosthenes with being a κοινωνεός with the Boeotarchs in securing Athenian support for Thebes before the Battle of Chaeronea.² Finally, he accused all Demosthenes' witnesses of being κοινωνεός in his bribes.³

The De Corona was Demosthenes' response to this attack. He put blame for the conclusion of the much disputed peace on one Philocrates of Hagnas, a κοινωνεός of Aeschines.⁴ He also re-

²Against Ctesiphon III. 145.
³Ibid., III.257.
minded Aeschines that "if I had really intrigued with Philip to stop a Panhellenic coalition, it was your business not to hold your peace, but to cry aloud, to protest, to inform the people. You did nothing of the sort."¹ But Demosthenes also, of course, recognized that the real question was whether or not he had been a loyal and useful citizen. In his defense on these grounds, he stated:

As for his proposing that a crown should be given to me, and the decoration proclaimed in the Theatre without adding the words, "provided he shall first have rendered his accounts," I conceive that that also is related to my public acts, whether I am, or am not worthy of the crown and of the proclamation before the people. ²

"Demosthenes came before the public tribunal of Athens as a victor, and received the crown, while his opponent, defeated, left Athens forever."³

Eight years later, however, the cause to which Demosthenes had given his life, the preservation of the autonomy of the Greek states and Athens in particular, was lost. The victory of the Macedonian forces at the Battle of Crannon in 322 B.C. effectively terminated the age of the polis. Rather than submit to the new order, Demosthenes took his own life.

In addition to these actual instances of ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ in fourth century Athenian politics, ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ also occurs with

¹De Corona 18.23.
²De Corona 18.58.244.
³Jaeger, Demosthenes, 196.
some frequency in the authors of the classical period to describe various other relationships—military, political, social, intellectual, commercial, legal, nefarious, genealogical.

The commanders and soldiers in an army are unified by sharing together many toils and dangers, but the soldiers must feel they will have a share in the rewards of battle as well. An even greater bond is created, however, when leaders and soldiers have a spirit of "freedom, friendliness, and mutual interchange of reason," among themselves.

This spirit of "friendliness and fellowship" is also necessary between ruler and ruled in any political context, and among those ruling, if the rule is shared. Because Dionysius I of Syracuse was unable to make anyone worthy of being a konwvos in his government, Plato described him as

seven times more unhappy than Darius who trusted men who neither were his brothers nor raised up by himself but merely colleagues who had helped him to crush the Mede and the Eunuch; and he divided amongst them seven provinces, each greater than the whole of Sicily; and these colleagues he found loyal, neither did they make any attack either on himself or on one another.

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1 Plato Laws 686A.
3 Plato Laws 694B.
4 Laws 695D.
6 Plato Epistle VII 332AB.
In Xenophon's *Hiero*, an account of an imaginary conversation between King Hiero of Syracuse and the poet Simonides of Ceos, Hiero complains that despots have so little κοινωνία in friendship.¹ Simonides suggests that "he who wants to be loved must love first; he who wants to be loved by his subjects in order to be genuinely honored by them must love them first; to gain favors he must first show favors."² Since Virtue is the "best partner in friendship,"³ then "in public life it is a gain to make friends with the best, and to see them partners and fellow-workers in a common cause, and not rivals."⁴

Demosthenes advised the Athenians to seek out advisors who had κοινωνία in "intelligence, sound judgment, and ample forethought," rather than in recklessness.⁵ Plato encouraged friendship between his two pupils Erastus and Coriscus and Hermias, the tyrant of Atarnaeus, since he believed their association would be mutually beneficial.⁶ Isocrates praised the young Alexander for associating with Athenians "whose constant companion-

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⁵ Demosthenes *Against Aristogeiton* I XXV.33.
⁶ Plato *Epistle* VI 323BC.
ship would not cause regret and with whom association and partnership would not result in harm or injury to you--just such men, indeed, as should be chosen as associates by the wise.\(^1\) Similar reasoning was undoubtedly behind the request of Lysimachus and Melisias in Plato's *Laches* when they invited Socrates to be a κοινωνος with them in the education of their sons.\(^2\)

A participant in a discussion is referred to as a κοινωνος;\(^3\) in Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, Critobulus comments on how pleasant it is for κοινωνοι in a dialogue to come to agreement on certain points.\(^4\) Such a group may be said to "have formed a partnership in wisdom,"\(^5\) or to share knowledge with one another.\(^6\) They are called variously κοινωνος of an argument,\(^7\) a discussion topic,\(^8\) an opinion or point of view,\(^9\) or of perplexity over an argument,\(^10\) or in a starting point for a discussion.\(^11\)

\(^1\)Isocrates *Epistle V* to Alexander 2.


\(^4\)Xenophon *Oeconomicus* VI. 3.

\(^5\)Plato *Gorgias* 487C.

\(^6\)Plato *Cleitophon* 410C.

\(^7\)Plato *Laches* 197E; *Laws* 891B.

\(^8\)Plato *Cratylus* 434BC.

\(^9\)Plato *Crito* 49D; *Rep.* 335E; 450A; *Pol.* 260B.

\(^10\)Plato *Alcibiades* II 147E.

\(^11\)Plato *Crito* 49D.
may be κοινωνία in the investigation of the laws or in drawing up a constitution. From the usage of κοινωνία to designate a group of similar interests, a club, a common type of association in the ancient world, came to be known as a κοινωνία. Isaeus mentions one whose members were dedicated to Heracles.

Friends have κοινωνία in one another's private affairs and share good fortune, but they should never take advantage of a friend's misfortune for personal gain. If a friend commits a serious offense, one should withdraw from the κοινωνία of his friendship, but should not become a κοινωνός with his enemies in prosecuting him. In his Address to Demonicus, Isocrates offers the following advice: "Prove your friends by means of the misfortunes of life and of their fellowship in your perils; for as we try gold in the fire, so we come to know our friends when

1 Plato Laws 810C.
2 Plato Laws 753A; 969C.
we are in misfortune.⁴ No one should be asked to become a κοινωνὸς of one who does not obey the laws.²

Κοινωνία is commonly used to designate various types of commercial relationships also. Mention is made of κοινωνία in the management and working of a mine.³ In the orators, κοινωνὸς is a term frequently used to designate the partners who loan money for commercial ventures, or to designate the men who have borrowed the money. Since the suits for which these orations were written were often brought to court because the borrowers failed to fulfill the terms of the contract, the term κοινωνὸς in reference to them often has a derogatory connotation. One or both meanings occur in the Orations of Demosthenes Against Zenothemis,⁴ Against Phormio,⁵ Against Lacritus,⁶ Against Timotheus,⁷ Against Callipus,⁸ Against Dionysidorus.⁹

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²Plato Epistle VII 337D.


⁴Demosthenes Against Zenothemis 32.7; 32.15; 32.17; 32.21.

⁵Demosthenes Against Phormio 34.8; 34.36; 34.38.

⁶Demosthenes Against Lacritus 35.16.

⁷Demosthenes Against Timotheus 49.31.

⁸Demosthenes Against Callipus 52.3.

⁹Demosthenes Against Dionysidorus 56.1; 56.5; 56.7; 56.9; 56.10; 56.11; 56.24; 56.42; 56.45.
In less noble contexts, various persons are said to be involved as κοινωνοί in crime, in murder, in political activities as well as in misdeeds of sacrilege, impiety, embezzlement, in drinking bouts as well as "in such great and such reckless malignity and villainy and impudence and outrage," in conspiracies to rob someone of a rightful inheritance and to get hold of an estate in order to split the profits.

Natural and legal kinship are also described as a κοινωνία. A man is said to be a κοινωνός in the character of his ancestors. Kinship implied the right to have κοινωνία in the same sacrifices and in the ancestral tomb common to all the members of a gens.

Xenophon's Oeconomicus describes the good wife as an essential κοινωνός in the successful management of an estate.

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1 Demosthenes Against Ophobus III. 29.20.
2 Demosthenes Against Meidias 21.120.
3 Demosthenes Against Timocrates 24.159.
4 Ibid., 24.177.
5 Demosthenes Against Conon 54.33.
6 Ibid., 54.37.
7 Demosthenes Against Macartatus 43.30.
8 Demosthenes Against Olympiodorus 48.28.
9 Plato Laws 699D.
10 Demosthenes Against Theocrites 58.40.
11 Demosthenes Against Eubulides 57.28; Against Macartatus
"Good" in this context means able to control the spending of the money which the husband earns. When both koivnoi of the home are satisfied with the accounts, domestic tranquillity is sure to ensue. Isochomachus the main figure in the dialogue, tells Socrates of a conversation he had with his wife shortly after they were married, reminding her that he had chosen her and her parents had chosen him as "the best partner of home and children that we could get." And now that they are married, he tells her, it is not the one of them who has contributed the most in material goods, but the one who proves the better koivnos who makes the more valuable contribution to the home they share. As husband and wife, they are bound by a double tie: god makes them koivnoi in sexual union "chiefly in order that they may form a perfect partnership in mutual service," and also that they may be koivnoi of children. The law also appoints them koivnoi in the home. Isochomachus tells her that the better koivnos she is to him and the better housewife she is to the children "the greater will be the honour paid to you in our home." He

1 Xenophon Oeconomicus III.15.
2 Ibid., VI.3.
3 Ibid., VII.11.
4 Ibid., VII.13.
5 Ibid., VII.18.
6 Ibid., VII.30.
7 Ibid., VII.42.
tells her that he has no right to under- or overestimate their material resources to her as a κοινωνός χρημάτων ¹ and takes the opportunity to remind her that she should not try to enhance her physical resources by the use of cosmetics, just as she would not like it if he tried to do that.² She agrees that they are both κοινωνοί in their possessions and in their bodies, and quietly accepts the remonstrance.

Isocrates comments that he has no patience with the perversity of men who take women in marriage and make them partners in all the relations of life, and then are not satisfied with the compacts which they have made but their own lawless pleasures bring pain to those whom they expect never to cause them pain; and who, though honest in all other partnerships, are without conscience in the partnership of marriage, when they ought to cherish this relationship the more faithfully inasmuch as it is more intimate and more precious than all others.³

In the Constitution of the Lacedaemonians, ⁴ the author tells how Lycurgus made it lawful for a man who did not want to establish a home but still wanted children, to choose a woman of good family and, with her husband's consent, father his children on her. Lycurgus, according to the writer, thought this a good arrangement, "for the wives who want to take charge of two house-

¹Ibid., IX.3.
²Ibid., X.5.
³Isocrates To Nicoles III.40.
⁴This work has been long thought to be the work of Xenophon but it is now considered by K.M.T. Chrimes, The Respublica Lacedaemoniarum Ascribed to Xenophon: Its Manuscript, Tradition and General Significance (Publications of the Faculty of Arts of the University of Manchester, no. 1; Manchester, 1948), 41, to be the work of Antisthenes.
holds, and the husbands want to get brother for their sons, bro­
thers who are members of the family and share in its influence,
but claim no part of the money."¹

Isocrates, in the oration Against Stephanus II, cites the
instance of a man who gave his own wife in marriage to a good
friend thus making him "a partner in his own fatherhood."²

Conclusion

Kοινονία and its cognates, as used by the authors of
the classical period to describe social, philosophical, and poli­
tical phenomena, provide interesting insights into the life and
thought of the fourth century B.C.

Plato and Aristotle reflect the outlook of the upper clas­
ses on marriage and the family, namely that these relationships
were not the source of companionship in life. Plato's suggestion
of the possibility of the Kοινονία of women and children for
his ideal state in the Republic and his emphasis in the Laws on
marriage as an institution for the good of the state and there­
fore subject to careful regulation are illustrative of this atti­
tude. Aristotle affirms the pivotal role which the family plays
in relation to the state, but his impersonal references to mar­
riage and the family completely neglect the affective and psycho­
logical aspects of these relationships. Among the lower classes,

²Isocrates Against Stephanus II 46.17.
however, the woman who worked side by side with her husband undoubtedly helped to introduce a measure of equality into the marriage partnership. This development seems to be reflected in the writings of Xenophon who maintains that equality and mutual respect are necessary for a successful marriage.

Also revealed by the use of Κοινωνία and its cognates are the humane as well as the less noble relationships which make up the stuff of daily living. Included among the former are the interchange of love and friendship among friends, either formally as among members of a club or informally in discussions or in various types of relationships such as that commonly established between rulers and philosophers during this period. Illustrative of the latter type of relationship are partnership in crime, murder, sacrilege, impiety, embezzlement, drinking bouts, and inheritance robbing.

Κοινωνία and its cognates are also used in contexts descriptive of commercial relationships. Most often these business partnerships were formed between men who loaned money for commercial ventures, usually involving shipping, and the men who borrowed the money. Since the majority of the citations of Κοινωνία in this context are taken from orations written for suits brought to court because the borrowers failed to fulfil the terms of the contract, the terms often have a derogatory connotation.

In the political sphere, the writings of the period reveal that the fate of the polis and the conception of man as a
political animal were hanging in the balance during the fourth century B.C. The events which led to Plato's rejection of the contemporary political life at Athens have already been discussed; his disillusionment with the political atrocities of the Thirty and the injustice of the restored democracy in their condemnation of Socrates. It seems that the impossibility of authentic participation in the existing polis led him to the discovery of Justice and the other virtues in the world of the Ideas. His creative development of the implications of the phenomenon of participation led him to a further explanation of reality in which men and the cosmos were seen as related to the Ideas by means of soul. While Plato's philosophical intuition and its development in this manner cannot be said to be a direct outgrowth of earlier Greek philosophical speculation, yet the influence of such men as Parmenides, Heracleitus, and the Pythagoreans on his thought cannot be denied.

Aristotle, a pupil of Plato for twenty years, rejected his master's theory of Ideas. It was his belief that the individual things perceived by the senses were the primary realities and that only in this world of individual things would it be possible to find the true and unchanging objects of knowledge which form the basis of philosophy and science.

Both the similarities and the differences in the thought of Plato and Aristotle can be seen in their treatment of the polis. Both regarded it as natural and essential to man and as
based on justice. In stating this, they were taking a position directly contrary to that of some of the sophists who thought that the state was a product of convention and to that of the cynics who believed that man was self-sufficient. But while Plato was concerned with establishing the ideal polis, or later, the best polis possible considering the human situation, Aristotle's study of actual constitutions led him to discuss more realistically what was possible in politics as well as what might be desirable. Plato described the origin of the polis as the *koinwnia* of four or five men practicing various arts. He then proceeded, however, to discuss the state not in terms of individuals but of classes. Perhaps this was the result of viewing the reality of the world of Ideas in terms of classes, as he did in the *Sophistes*. The ideal state, as it was finally constituted, consisted of the ruling class, the military class, and the productive class. The good of the state was the harmonious pursuit of wisdom, courage, and temperance, together with justice which consisted in each of the parts perfectly fulfilling its own function. Each individual was to be led, under the direction of the philosopher-king, to the contemplation of virtue insofar as each was able.

Aristotle described the polis as having developed structurally from the family through the clan and the village. Though he acknowledged that the family was prior in order of time, he held that the polis was prior in order of nature. He regarded the polis as the fulfillment of all the associations existing by
nature. Justice consisted in the observance of the mean in all forms of social κοινωνία and was aimed at achieving either numerical or proportional equality. Though he distinguished between ethics or virtue in the individual—and politics or virtue of man in society,—yet since virtue could only be practiced in the context of the polis, the two were not essentially different. Both the individual and the state were directed to the attainment of happiness as a final goal. Virtue for him was not an absolute existing in another realm but a mean between two extremes. Happiness was man's final goal and it consisted in the possession and exercise of the intellectual and moral virtues together with a possession of a sufficiency of material goods.

Aristotle made valid criticisms of Plato's ideas when he objected that Plato seemed to be destroying the polis, which he had established on the principle of diversity, by too much unity, at least in the two upper classes. He was correct in saying that the Republic neglected to discuss the relation of the third class to the other two. But perhaps Aristotle did not sufficiently realize that Plato's main concern was paideia rather than politics. Any system which would make possible the greatest opportunity for the contemplation and practice of virtue with the least amount of material involvement was the best for Plato, whether or not it contradicted basic political principles.

The fate of the polis and the political man were also the concern of men like Demosthenes and Aeschines and Isocrates. Be-
ing practical politicians, they knew the importance of the koin-
ɔνια established among men and among states for the welfare of
the polis and the citizen. Demosthenes entered into a death
struggle to maintain the polis as it was, despite the fact that
"sober reason shows us that it was hopeless." Isocrates, like
Aristotle, believed in the necessity of Greece being unified by a
military leader, but "absorbed in this scheme, and believing it
as a cure for all evils, he does not seem to have contemplated
the probable permanency of such a leadership." Aeschines vaillia-
ted between these two positions. The speeches of these orators
tell the story of the political partnerships among men and states
which were formed during the fourth century and which affected
the immediate destiny of Athens and every other Greek polis more
forcefully than the theoretical speculations of Plato and Aristo-
tle were ever able to do.

Athens was left exhausted by the long drawn out Pelopon-
nesian War. The victor, Sparta, was not in much better condition.
Soon her heavy-handed rule began to be resented by the other
states of Greece who returned to alliance with Athens as she be-
gan to recover from the disaster of the Peloponnesian War. Sup-
posedly the King's Peace of 387 B.C. put an end to such alliances,
but this situation lasted only temporarily. The next few decades

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1 Werner Jaeger, Demosthenes: The Origin and Growth of His
Policy (Berkeley: University of California press, 1938), 5.

2 R. G. Jebb, The Attic Orators from Antiphon to Isaeus
witnessed the attempt of one city-state after another to win the hegemony of the whole of Greece. No city-state, however, was successful in gaining and maintaining this hegemony for any length of time. Only Philip of Macedon and his son Alexander were able by various means to successfully unite the Greeks under their hegemony. Isocrates and Aeschines believed that a Panhellenic koinonía was so necessary for the greatness of Greece that they backed the man who was able to achieve it: Philip. Demosthenes could never relinquish his vision of a Panhellenic union under Athens. He died by his own hand when he realized his dream would never become a reality and that he would have to submit to Macedonian supremacy. Aristotle, too, felt the impact of these events on his own personal life. In 323 B.C. he was forced to leave Athens because of an outburst of anti-Macedonian feeling. He retired to Chalcis and died there in 322 B.C.

The polis died with the advent of Macedonian supremacy in Greece. For Aristotle, that meant the death of his political thought as well as of his ethics, which were "practical arts within the framework of the polis." The death of the polis did not have the same consequences for Plato's thought, however. Though he had set out originally on a quest for the best state, he found a much more meaningful world, the world of Ideas, where the things which appeared in the polis existed in their perfection. He came to the realization that man was not just a creature of this world of becoming but that he was able to participate in the Ideas in
the unchangeable world of being through the power of his soul. He saw the harmony which existed in the world of Ideas imitated in the world of the cosmos and realized that this same order based on justice must also exist in the soul of the individual and the state. Soul, state, and cosmos—all were necessarily oriented to the world of Ideas and destined to be fulfilled in one complete harmony of being. It was this vision, not confined to the context of the polis for its realization, which Plato bequeathed as a living legacy to subsequent generations.
CHAPTER IV

KOINONIA AND ITS COGNATES IN PLUTARCH AND RELATED AUTHORS OF THE HELLENISTIC-ROMAN PERIOD

Introduction

The second author in whose writings the use of κοινωνία and its cognates is to be studied in detail is Plutarch of Chaeroneia. As far as can be determined from indications in his own works, Plutarch was born about 46-47 A.D. at Chaeroneia in Boeotia. His great-grandfather was named Nicarchus and his grandfather Lamprias. There are indications that his father may have been named Nicarchus or Autobulus. He had two brothers named Lamprias and Timon.¹

Plutarch came from a wealthy family and received a good education. As a young man he studied at Athens where he was the pupil of Ammonius of Lamptrae, "a Peripatetic philosopher deeply

¹An interesting but inconclusive discussion has been raised by Benedict Einarson in the article "Plutarch's Ancestry," Classical Philology, XLVII (April, 1952), 99, as to whether or not Timon was Plutarch's brother or whether they might be half-brothers. Konrat Ziegler in an article entitled "Plutarch's Ahnen" in Hermes, LXXXII (1954), 499-501 opts for the latter view indicating that the two men had the same father but different mothers. Einarson replied to him in "Plutarch's Ancestry Again" Classical Philology, L (October, 1955), 253-255 by saying: "The odds favor full brother against half-brother in a monogamous society; and it may be added that where one half-brother has an illustrious ancestor the odds are even that the other has him too." (253). The problem awaits further proof.
imbued with the religious idealism of the Academy."¹ He travelled widely in Greece and visited both Egypt and Asia Minor. Chaeroneia remained his home, however, and he entered actively into the life of the town. He held magistracies there and was sent on several emissarial posts of importance for his native city. During the years 75–90 A.D. he spent a considerable amount of time in Rome, where he engaged in business of state and lectured. These associations undoubtedly did much to increase his appreciation of Rome.² By his personal contact with the Romans and as well as by his study, Plutarch became "an expert on Roman life and antiquities such as few Greeks were."³ About the year 95 A.D. Plutarch became a priest of Delphi in Greece and apparently retained this office for the remainder of his life. He died ca. 120 A.D.

Plutarch's literary works include a series of moral or ethical essays known as the Moralia and biographical essays on famous Greeks and Romans known as the Lives. A catalogue of two-hundred twenty-seven of Plutarch's writings, supposedly the work


³E.D. Philips, "Three Greek Writers on the Roman Empire," Classica et Mediaevalia, XVIII (1957), 104.
of his son Lamprias, appeared sometime after his death, but it is not considered to be a complete catalogue of his works. The first forty works mentioned in the catalogue are titles of the Lives; the remainder are apparently the titles of the moral essays.¹

Plato had an important, though not exclusive, impact upon Plutarch's philosophical thought, the literary form in which he wrote, and his conception of the nature of biography and history.

Most scholars agree that Plutarch's philosophical thought was greatly influenced by Plato,² though some would not place too much emphasis on this relationship since he "owed something to

¹Babbitt, op. cit., XVIII.

all the Schools."\(^1\) He was dependent on Aristotle, especially in the areas of ethics and psychology.\(^2\) He even borrowed at times from the Epicureans and the Stoics, although he was basically opposed to them. He also made good use of the arguments of the Academic sceptics.\(^3\) But as Roger Miller Jones, whose work on the Platonism of Plutarch is still definitive, stated: "the point of view in Plutarch's philosophical works is uniformly that of a Platonist, and whatever elements have been added from other sources are not incompatible with his interpretation of Plato.\(^4\)

Although Plutarch cannot be ranked as one of the world's great creative philosophers, he does show "a distinct independence, if not originality about his eclecticism."\(^5\) His work is valuable as an insight into the interpretations of the philosophy of Plato.


\(^3\) DeLacy, op. cit., 82-84, who has examined Schroeter's argument for this position and finds it convincing, would say rather that his position was one of caution. He regards this position as the "middle ground between dogmatism and scepticism, as it is equally congenial to Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and the later Academy."

\(^4\) Miller, op. cit., 9.

and the thinkers of the other philosophical schools which were current in Greece during the first century A.D.

Plutarch is one of the last of the classical writers to imitate Plato in the use of the dialogue form.\(^1\) However, as Babbitt comments, "the dramatic value of the dialogue as developed by Plato is quite neglected by Plutarch, and his dialogue very frequently becomes a monologue."\(^2\)

Plutarch's adoption of a strongly Platonic philosophy resulted, according to Westaway, in the conflict between history and biography which is observable in his writings.

Platonism regarded present phenomena from an individualistic standpoint, allowing unity, or even connection, only in the world of ideas. It had no place for historical sequences or interactions. Thus Plutarch's grave fault as a writer of history is that, setting out in the first instance with an ethical prejudice, he tries to base his whole account of his heroes on their individual characters and moral judgments. He cannot see that an historical personage is but a component part of an indefinitely large organic whole, in no way free and independent of conditions of time and place. History and literature together constitute the record of the actions and thoughts of past ages. Plutarch fails with the one as he does with the other.\(^3\)

Other scholars are not so severe in their judgement of Plutarch, despite his factual errors, undiscriminating use of sources, and at times obvious bias.\(^4\) Den Boer does not wish to condemn

\(^{1}\) Greard, op. cit., 364.

\(^{2}\) Babbitt, op. cit., xii.

\(^{3}\) Westaway, op. cit., 104-105.

Plutarch outright for his chronological errors.\(^1\) And Martin suggests that because Plutarch was "more interested in biographical than historical truth," he chose each of his sources not so much for its historical accuracy, but because "it conformed with his general concept of a man's character."\(^2\)

Trench, following Heeren, protests vigorously in Plutarch's defense:

> that the authorities which he used were generally the best within his reach; that he used them intelligently and honestly; that his standard of what an historian should be was high; and that for the most part he only fell short of this as every man of this world of imperfection must fall short of any high ideal which he sets before him.\(^3\)

The problem of the conflict between history and biography in Plutarch has also led to an investigation of his sources. Etheridge holds that Plutarch showed an intimate acquaintance with Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* which he regards as the basis for his *De Virtute Morali*.\(^4\) The Stoic Sphaerus\(^5\) and "a collection

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\(^2\)Hubert Martin, Jr., "The Character of Plutarch's Themestocles," *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, XCII (April, 1961), 337, n. 34.


\(^5\)Agatha A. Buriks, "The Sources of Plutarch's Phoenix, IV (Autumn, 1950), 69."
of inconsistencies in the works of Chrysippus.\(^1\) have been suggested as sources for several of Plutarch's other philosophical treatises. The poets were also familiar to Plutarch who used them however to moralize rather than for the sake of poetry itself.\(^2\)

Herbert\(^3\) and Westlake\(^4\) suggest that Plutarch relied on the historians Ephorus and Callisthenes in some of his works. Rose, in his study of the Roman Questions, concludes that Plutarch used Juba, Verrius, and Varro extensively, intelligently, and critically, despite the fact that there are certain obvious errors in the work.\(^5\) Biographical works, collections of letters, and historical compilations have been suggested as the basis of other of Plutarch's writings.\(^6\) Westlake concludes about Plutarch's sources:


\(^2\) Hans Schläffer, Plutarch und die klassischen Dichter: Ein Beitrag zum klassischen Bildungsgut Plutarchs (Zurich: Juris-Verlag, 1950), 59-60.


His lives are not invariably founded upon secondary biographies, nor invariably upon primary historical authorities; his choice was directed partly by the limitations of his library and to a greater degree by his conception of the function of biography. He did not always select the earliest or most reliable of the available authorities, because he aimed rather at moral enlightenment by means of psychological studies than at historical accuracy. Although a painstaking writer, he was also inclined to choose an authority which supplied him with material in a convenient form and on a convenient scale.

Most modern critics reject the hypothesis of Eduard Meyer that Plutarch relied almost solely on Hellenistic sources for his information and agree that in general his sources were used intelligently and critically in terms of "his conception of the function of biography."

Regarding the Plutarchian authorship of all the works included under the title Moralia, H.J. Rose makes the following comment:

As might be expected, several works of doubtful authorship, such as a letter of consolation to an unknown Apollonius on the loss of his son, have been included in the collection because of certain resemblances in tone and subject to Plutarch's own works, while others quite unlike anything he ever wrote have made their way in, the most unlikely being the so-called Lesser Parallels..., a rubbishy collection of Greek stories, each collection of Greek stories, each capped by a Roman one, generally a manifest innovation.

1 Westlake, op. cit., 22.

2 Kevin Herbert, Review of Plutarch and die Geschichte, by Carl Theander, Classical Journal, XLIX (1953), 240.

3 Westlake, op. cit., 22.

4 H.J. Rose, A Handbook of Greek Literature from Homer to the Age of Lucian, London: Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1950, 408. All of the works of Plutarch contained in the Teubner editions of his works have been utilized for the study of Plutarch's use of
Koinonia and its Cogantes in Plutarch

Plutarch frequently uses κοινωνία and its cognates to express the interrelationships which he believes are intrinsic to all reality: among the gods, between the gods and men, in the cosmos and in nature among animals, within man himself, and in man’s relations with others, both personal and political.

Because interrelationship is characteristic of every level of reality, the deity cannot exist in solitary splendor. It is necessary that other gods and other worlds exist where he can exercise the social virtues intrinsic to his nature.¹ According to Plutarch it is the demons who effect κοινωνία among the gods as well as between gods and men.² For as the air establishes κοινωνία between the moon and the earth, so the demons serve as κοινωνία and its cognates.


²De Defectu Oraculorum 415A. However the gods as individuals may not have a relationship of κοινωνία with the other gods. For instance in the De Sera Numinis Vindicta 566C it is said that Apollo has no κοινωνία with Night. 566C.
interpreters and messengers between gods and men.¹

The interactions and interrelationships observable in the cosmos Plutarch attributes to the deity under the title of "harmonizer and musician... because he has the authority over the association and disunion of heat and cold in the universe, to see that they observe due measure in their combination and separation, and because, by eliminating the excess of either, he brings both into proper order."² In other passages he attributes this order in the cosmos to nature, the author of community and harmony.³ By means of moderation and order, produced by the

¹De Defectu Oraculorum 416E. Plato’s demons to whom should be attributed any evil which formerly had been attributed to the gods, served to purify the concept of divinity, according to Oakesmith, op. cit., 136. However, Rist, op. cit., 48, comments: "In theory, he is careful to distinguish between gods and demons, but in practice this distinction is erased so that there is little differences in their respective functions and character." Moses Hadas, "The Religion of Plutarch," The Review of Religion, VI (March, 1942), 278, n. 8 has enumerated several distinct aspects of Plutarch’s demonology. They are variously (1) supermundane godlike powers, but subject to feeling and perishable, (2) souls free of bodies, (3) souls separated from bodies or who have received none; (4) hostile genii. There is really no difficulty. Plato had suggested and the national religion demanded, such intermediaries; Plutarch believed in their existence but admitted several possibilities as to their nature, origin and fate." Cf. also Guy Soury, La Démonologie de Plutarque: Essai sur les Idées Religieuses et les Mythes d’un Platonicien éclectique, (Paris: Société d’Édition "Les Belles Lettres," 1942).

²De Primo Frigido 946F.

³De Primo Frigido 951D.
power of harmony and number, nature is able to make mutual society and sympathy arise out of discord and dissimilitude. She uses contrary things to sustain the universe, not contraries which will obliterate one another but those which are inclined "to communicate and co-operate one with another, and to effect a harmony between the opposing qualities." 

In the beginning, the four principles of earth, fire, water, and air had no to communicate and co-operate one with another, and to effect a harmony between the opposing qualities." 

In the beginning, the four principles of earth, fire, water, and air had no with each other because they lacked God or mind or soul. But when Aphrodite or Eros became present a universal concord and community developed, "in which things moist and hot, partake of one nature in the same body, and by their consent and agreement engender the best and most pleasant temperament and harmony."

Many of the opposite found in nature are able, by means of, to produce "many combinations that are pleasant and grateful to the senses." Air, for instance, is an element neither hot nor cold but a combination of both. 

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1 De Procreatione Animae In Timaeo 1030A.
2 De Primo Frigido 951D.
3 De Facie in Orbe Lunae 927A.
4 De Facie in Orbe Lunae 927A.
5 De Fraterno Amore 478F.
6 De Primo Frigido 946E.
7 De Primo Frigido 951DE.
possible, however, when there is an absence of mutual benefit.\footnote{De Primo Frigido 946DE.}

Fire can gain nothing by κοίνωνία with water,\footnote{Aqua an Ignis Utilior 957D.} though when water is heated by fire it can be beneficial.

The physical phenomenon of the force of gravity is suggested in the \textit{De Facie in Orbe Lunae} as proof that the earth is the center of the cosmos, since "those bodies which when thrust away from the earth fall back to have again some affinity and cohesion with her."\footnote{De Facie in Orbe Lunae 924D.}

Aristotle's opinion is advanced in the \textit{De Placitis Philosophorum} that the heavenly bodies have κοίνωνία in soul, possess sensitive, rational, and intellectual faculties and are guided by reason and providence;\footnote{De Placitis Philosophorum 886E.} thus they have the same double κοίνωνία with the Same and Other which characterizes all of nature.\footnote{De Animae Procreatione In Timaeo 1026E.}

Man and animals are likewise constituted by this κοίνωνία of soul and body. In stating that man's soul has a share in the divine nature,\footnote{Platonicae Quaestiones 1004D.} Plutarch is reminded of Plato's comparison...
of the soul to a wing as that which is most like the divine nature\(^1\) because of its likeness to beauty which moves the soul. Eros is described in the Amatorius as the great harmonizer accompanied by φίλια and κοινωνία which together form a "winged communication that soars to the region of the fairest and most divine realities."\(^2\) It is even possible for the soul to experience a state of madness which is not merely induced by a bodily state but one "which shares and participates in a power that is divine."\(^3\)

The soul, however, does not enjoy this lofty destiny of being closely united with the divine unimpeded. Its κοινωνία with the body inevitably pulls it down to the irrational, material sphere and is profitable to the soul in only a very few ways such as when it enables the person to have κοινωνία with external objects.\(^4\) Sight is produced when an effluence from the eye mingles with the light about the object and blends into one so that neither element prevails, but a third common power comes into being.\(^5\) Creatures which can see in the dark have a weakness

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\(^1\)Platonicae Quaestiones 1004C.

\(^2\)Amatorius 763F. trans., E.L. Minor, Jr., F.H. Sandback, W.C. Helmbold. (Loeb Library ed; Cambridge, Mass., 1965), IX.

\(^3\)Amatorius 758E.

\(^4\)De Placitis Philosophorum 899E.

\(^5\)Quaestionum Convivalium 626C.
of eyesight which results in the fact that the light from the eye is not proportioned to the light surrounding the object during the day, "but it is proportionable and sufficient for the feeble splendor of the stars and so can join with it and co-operate to move the sense."  

Negatively, the koinwnia between the sentient and cognitive faculties of reason in man results in the rational part bearing "a resemblance and share in the body's passions and...being contaminated by it, since it has entered into the body and has become merged with it." Because of this, our judgments can be depraved and our bodies diseased, since any suffering of soul or body inevitably affects the other part. Plutarch expresses that hope that if:

we have no more to do with the body than what decency and necessity require, if we break off all commerce with it, and keep ourselves pure from its contagion, till God shall give us a final release, and then being pure and freed from all its follies, we shall converse (it is likely) with intelligences as pure as ourselves, with our unaided vision beholding perfect purity,—and this is truth itself.

The idea of life after death occurs in Plutarch's Consolation ad Uxorem. He admonished his wife not to pay attention to the

1. Quaestitionum Convivalium 626E.
2. De Animae Procreatione in Timaeo 1024D. and 1032B.
3. Epitome Libri De Animae Procreatione
4. De Recta Ratione Audiendi 450E.
5. Consolation ad Apollonium 104C.
6. Consolatio Ad Apollonium 108C.
Epicurean doctrine that there is nothing after death, saying: "I know that you are better grounded in the doctrines delivered down to us from our ancestors, as also in the sacred mysteries of Bacchus, than to believe such stories; for the religious symbols are well known to us who are of the fraternity."

In this life man by reason of his soul has a natural impulse to mutual society and friendship because the deity implanted these virtues in the soul when he was ordering it. They are preserved by the Muse or Siren to whom is allotted the region between the earth and the moon. She uses κοινωνία "to cast her calming spell on the tumultuous element in us, and gently to recall our errant steps when they have lost the path and set them in their place."

Man shares this impulse to social life with the animals. In the De Sollertia Animalium Autobulus, Plutarch's father, affirms that there are many examples of brute animals who excel in the "observance of society, fortitude, and foresight as to their particular economy and making provision for themselves." Aristotelius, another participant in the dialogue, maintains that

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1 Consolatio ad Uxorem 611D.
2 De Anima Procreatione In Timaeo 1027A.
3 Quæstionum Convivalium 746A.
4 De Solertia Animalium 962D.
their social nature is one of the strong indications that animals have reason. He points to the friendship that can be discerned in the mutual society of ants. He also refers to the many instances of "love and observance of society joined with understanding and prudence" among elephants which had been cited by the author Juba and to the social instincts found among lions.

It is more difficult to adduce examples of the social instincts among marine animals but Aristotimus does manage to give some examples "which show not only this same understanding and knowledge, but the community and mutual understanding of fish" thus proving that they are no less intelligent than the land animals. In regard to the mutual society of fish Aristotimus shows how the tunny fish use mathematics to preserve their mutual love and society with one another by forming their schools in a cube figure and by swimming in that formation. Numerous

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other fish also swim in schools and observe mutual society.¹

However, none of these examples of κοινωνία are as remarkable as that which exists between the generally savage and unsociable crocodile and the little bird, the trochilus or plover.²

Such relationships are much more valid examples of κοινωνία, according to Aristotimus, than those given among ants or bees who have no such concern for one another. For although each of them contributes to the common task, "none of them has any interest in or regard for his fellow individually."³

Contrary to Aristotle's opinion, Plutarch maintains in Book VII of the Quaestionum Convivalium that Man has a certain κοινωνία with the animals in regard to such pleasures as that of music.⁴ Man is even able to establish a kind of relationship of κοινωνία with house animals, although never with the fly or the swallow.⁵ He is similar to the ants and bees in that the inclinations of both to society and affection to the state continue until the end of life.⁶

¹De Sollaritia Animalium 980A.
²De Sollaritia Animalium 980D.
³De Sollaritia Animalium 981B.
⁴Quaestionum Convivalium 704F.
⁵Quaestionum Convivalium 728A.
⁶An Seni Sit Gerenda Res Publica 783EF.
These examples of the social impulse at work among animals are impressive, and indeed "even wild beasts put off their fierce and savage ways when they partake of a gentler mode of life." However, Soclarus, another of the participants in the discussion of the *De Sollertia Animalium*, remarks, it is an even more wonderful thing to "observe how much man differs from all other creatures in probity of manners, in industry, and in all those things that relate to justice and common society."

Plutarch's treatment of man's social relationships, as expressed by *κοινωνία* and its cognates, can be divided into two broad categories, that of individual personal relationships and that of political relationships. In the first category are included the relationships of marriage and family, *teknonpoia*, paederasty, those fostered by the symposium and those involved in friendship, slavery, business enterprises, human expression, and religion. The second category includes a discussion of the elements necessary to constitute a *polis*, primarily the active participation of the citizens in the affairs of the *polis*, and concrete illustrations of *κοινωνία* in various political contexts, taken from the lives of noble Greeks and Romans.

In the discourse *An Virtus Doceri Possit*, Plutarch claims

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1 *Life of Pompey* 633E.  
2 *De Sollertia Animalium* 963A.
that men cannot "enter without censure the fellowship of a household, a city, a marriage, a way of life, a magistracy, if they have not learned how they should get along with fellow-beings," any more than they can know how to behave at a symposium unless they "begin to learn from a boy how to eat and drink handsomely in company." The basic relationship which prepares a man to exercise κοινωνία in all the areas mentioned above seems to be that found in the family. Plutarch comments in the Comparison of Aristides with Marcus Cato:

Man has no higher capacity than that for conducting cities and states, as is generally admitted. But the ability to conduct a household enters in no small degree into this higher political capacity, as most believe. For the city is but an organized sum total of households, and has public vigor only as its citizens prosper in their private lives.

This position is affirmed again in the Banquet of the Seven Sages

1 An Virtus Doceri Possit 439E.
2 An Virtus Doceri Possit 439E.
3 Comparison of Aristides with Marcus Cato 354A.
4 There have been objections to attributing this work to Plutarch. However, Jean Defradas has tried to show from internal and external evidence that this is a true work of Plutarch in his edition, Le Banquet des Sept Sages. Texte et Traduction avec une Introduction et des Notes. Paris, 1954. The introduction to the Loeb Library Edition of this work describes it as "a collection of dialogues purporting to reproduce the after-dinner conversation of Plutarch and his friends and relatives on various occasions. They differ widely in dramatic liveliness, and in the degree to which they seem to be based on recollection, or on memoranda, of actual conversations. Their subject matter ranges from scientific or philosophical questions, more or less serious, to antiquarian, historical, and ethical topics; some deal with the symposium or dinner party itself."
where it is said that no matter what kind of house a man may live in, if he has his children, his wife, friends and attendants there, having κοινωνία with him in the ordinary conveniences of life, this man is living a happy and fortunate life.¹

Plutarch's realization of the impact of the private lives of the citizens on the political community is undoubtedly the reason why he devotes so much space to a discussion of the marriage κοινωνία. The ideal attitude to the marriage partnership is described by Portia speaking to her husband Brutus:

Brutus, I am Cato's daughter, and I was brought into thy house, not, like a mere concubine, to share thy bed and board merely, but to be a partner in thy joys, and a partner in thy troubles. Thou, indeed, art faultless as a husband; but how can I show thee any grateful service if I am to share neither thy secret sufferings nor the anxieties which crave a loyal confidant?²

Wives are advised in the Coniugalia Praecepta to share in all of their husbands' moods,³ and husbands are cautioned that if they do not let their wives enjoy their company, the wives will find pleasure somewhere else.⁴ Husbands and wives should mutually sympathize with one another, that, just as the strength of ropes comes from the twining and interlacing of fibres together, so the marriage vow may be confirmed and strengthened by the

¹Septem Sapientum Convivium 155C.
²Life of Brutus 989F.
³Coniugalia Praecepta 140A.
⁴Coniugalia Praecepta 140A.
interchange of mutual affection and kindness."¹

Means to bring about this single-mindedness between husbands and wives are the sharing of possessions² and of intellectual interests.³ In the Coniugalia Praecepta, it is stated that "philosophy weaves a spell over those who are entering together into a lifelong partnership and renders them gentle and amiable toward each other."⁴

The Amatorius praises the "thousands of men and women conjoined together in wedlock who have reciprocally and inviolably observed a community of affection and loyalty to the end of their lives."⁵ A striking example of marital fidelity is provided by the story of Comma the Galatian whose husband was murdered by Synorix to gain her hand. She revenges this crime by murdering Synorix and then makes the following speech before she herself commits suicide:

This day, said she, my most dear and beloved husband, I have long expected, as having lived, deprived of thee, a desolate and comfortless life. But now receive me joyfully; for thy sake I have revenged myself upon the most wicked among men,

¹Coniugalia Praecepta 140E.
²Coniugalia Praecepta 140F.
³Coniugalia Praecepta 145E.
willing to have lived with thee, and now no less rejoicing to die with him.¹

Arete has the opposite predicament of being "at a loss how to greet and address her husband now that she had lived with another man."²

The ceremonies prescribed for the Roman weddings are designed to emphasize the importance of a spirit of κοινωνία in marriage. The newly married woman touches fire and water to symbolize that she and her husband "must never forsake each other, but must communicate in every fortune, and although there be no goods, yet they may participate with each other in fire and water."³ By repeating the phrase, "Where thou Caius art, there am I Caia," the bride indicates that "by mutual agreement she enters presently upon participation of all things, even to share in the government."⁴

This "affectionate, sociable, coupling impulse"⁵ must have

¹Amatorius 768D.

²De Sollertia Animalium 980AB.

³Quaestiones Romana 263EF Apropos of this passage the comment is made by H.J. Rose, The Roman Questions of Plutarch, a new translation with introductory essays and a running commentary (Oxford, 1924), 169, note to I, 1.3: "That fire and water represent the male and female principles respectively is a common enough doctrine in Plutarch...That fire derives its nutriment from moisture is a doctrine so common that it hardly needs an example."

⁴Quaestiones Romana 251E.

⁵Amatorius 757C.
Eros as the "witness and overseer, a supreme governor and director, of conjugal affection, which terminates in concord and happy society."¹ He effects a complete union when he presides over the conjugal state, "whereas the union of those that live together without love resembles only the friction and concussion of Epicurus' atoms in collision and recoil."² Any marriage which is "a loveless union, devoid of god-given friendship"³ will not long endure.

The marriage Κοινωνία also involves both the husband and wife in the conception⁴ and in the rearing of children.⁵ Autobulus, in the De Sollertia Animalium refers to the Stoic tenet "that love of one's offspring is the very foundation of our social life and administration of Justice."⁶ When their two year old daughter Timoxena died, Plutarch wrote in the Consolation ad Uxorem: "I know very well and do comprehend what a loss we have had;...I having been assistant to you in the education of so many children, which we brought up at home under our own

¹Amatorius 757D.
²Amatorius 769F.
³Amatorius 752CD.
⁴Coniugalia Praecepta 145D.
⁵Life of Artaxerxes 1020C.
⁶De Sollertia Animalium 962A.
The children of a family were also expected to have a special relationship with one another. Plutarch in the De Fraterno Amore discusses the ideal relationship between brothers in which each, joining the other:

With himself in all his noble and worthy actions employs his when present, waits for him when absent, and makes the world take notice that he is as fit for business as himself, but of a more modest and yielding disposition,—all of this while has done himself no wrong, and has bravely advanced his brother. However, if they find they cannot share the same methods for becoming great, it is suggested that they choose completely different means and thus be able to rejoice at one another's successes.

Children also shared in the fortunes of the family. In the life of the orator Lysias, Plutarch mentions that Lysias went to Thurii with his brother Polemarchus when he was fifteen to share in an allotment of land which was their inheritance. Plutarch

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1 ^Consolation Ad Uxorem 608C.
2 ^De Fraterno Amore 485C.
3 ^De Fraterno Amore 486D.
4 ^Oratorum Vitae 835D.
also discusses the custom of teknopoiia\(^1\) which prevailed in Sparta, as well as in Rome, according to which a husband could give his wife to a suitable male friend\(^2\) for the purpose of begetting children, or a man could choose a woman for this purpose and gain consent of the husband. In either case, the lawful husband would be a partner in the fatherhood of the other man.\(^3\) In Sparta, the wife usually remained at home and fulfilled all of her marriage responsibilities during this period.\(^4\) According to Plutarch, the Spartan's freedom in sharing his wife was made possible by the custom of having the young husband visit his wife stealthily for several months after marriage so that they would never be completely satisfied.\(^5\)

\(^1\) den Boer, op. cit., 216 says: "The rule for τεκνοποιία mentioned by Plutarch (xv, 12-13) is twofold. The old man may take the initiative. He chooses a young man whom he respects (Ἀψάσεις) to beget for him a child by his own young spouse. Also the man who desires to beget a child may be the prime mover and choose a handsome, strong and married woman with whose husband he makes an agreement. These, according to Plutarch, are the two manners in which 'polyandry' is brought about...The question is whether, in a society in which woman seems to have been as emancipated as she was in Sparta, she could be disposed of without regard to her own wishes. We should not overestimate the woman's passivity. The bearing of children was counted an honour; as the mother of a soldier she rendered a special service to the community. A woman brought up in a community which believed in such social ethics would not feel outraged by 'polyandry'."

\(^2\) Life of Theseus 5A.

\(^3\) Life of Lycurgus 49A; 76D.

\(^4\) Comparison of Lycurgus and Numa 76E.

\(^5\) Life of Lycurgus 48F.
Quintus Hortensius, the Roman, tried to persuade Cato to give him his daughter Porcia, who was married to Bibulus and had two sons, so that the child she would bear him would "bring his whole family and line into community of kinship" with Cato.\(^1\) Hortensius tried to prevail upon Cato by emphasizing that "community in heirs among worthy men would make virtue abundant and widely diffused in their family alliances.\(^2\) He promised that he would give Portia back to Bibulus after she had borne him a child and thus established a community of children among Bibulus, Cato, and himself.\(^3\) Cato assured Hortensius that he thought highly of him and of a community of relationship with him, but that he did not think it proper to give his married daughter to another man.\(^4\)

The production of good citizens for the state and of worthy offspring for the individual were the alleged reasons justifying the practice of Teknopoeia.\(^5\) However, not all arrangements of this type had these lofty motives.

\(^1\) Life of Cato the Younger 771A.
\(^2\) Life of Cato the Younger 771B.
\(^3\) Life of Cato the Younger 771C.
\(^4\) Life of Cato the Younger 771D.
\(^5\) den Boer, *op. cit.*, 223 comments: "Originally for a man the possession of a son counts more than the nuptial tie... If, however, a person was married, then the community regarded the Teknopoeia as the natural result of the marriage."
Many have allowed others to share in their venereal enjoyments, prostituting not only their mistresses but their wives like that Roman Galba, who used to ask Maecenas to dinner, and when he saw from his nods and winks that he had a mind to do with his wife, turned his head gently aside as if asleep.

Marriage alliances were often made for solely political reasons. The marriage of Caesar's daughter Julia to Pompey was seen "to have been from the first suspicious and deceptive pledges of a partnership based on self-interest; there was no real friendship in it." ² Earlier, Pompey had wanted to marry one of Cato's daughters himself and marry the other to his son, but since Cato felt this was an attempt to use a marriage alliance to compromise him, Cato refused. Later, when Pompey became involved in scandal, Cato reminded his family that they would have had Κοινωνία in Pompey's disgrace if they had made the requested marriage alliance.³ The same story is told in Plutarch's Life of Cato the Younger.⁴

Κοινωνία in the pleasure of sex for its own sake is described in Septem Sapientum Convivium as "shameless and brutelike,"⁵ something which even animals enjoy.⁶ "On the other

¹Amatorius 759F.
²Life of Pompey 656F.
³Life of Pompey 642D.
⁴Life of Cato the Younger 774E.
⁵Septem Sapientum Convivicum 158F.
⁶De Amicorum Multitudine 96E.
hand, in the case of lawful wives, physical union is the beginning of friendship, a sharing, as it were, in great mysteries."¹

The Egyptians are willing to allow that sexual ἀφίλετος is possible between a god and a woman, but say that no sexual ἀφίλετος is possible between a god and a man. Plutarch objects that they "lose sight of the fact that intercourse is a reciprocal matter, and that both parties to it enter into a like communio."² He objects to the idea "that an immortal god should take pleasure in a mortal body and its beauty"³ because the gods have no ἀφίλετος in generation and corruption.⁴

In regard to relationships between men and boys Protogenes is quoted in the Amatorius as raising the question as to whether it is possible to have an erotic relationship without the sensual element.⁵ "The boys' lovers also shared with them in their honour or disgrace,"⁶ and were accustomed to take part with one another in their undertakings. In the life of Alexander it is mentioned that a Macedonian named Limnus conspired against the

¹Amatorius 769A.
²Life of Numa 62B.
³Life of Numa 62B.
⁴De Stoicorum Repugnantiae 1052B.
⁵Amatorius 752AB.
⁶Life of Lycurgus 51D.
life of Alexander and persuaded his beloved, Nicomachus, to share in the undertaking also. ¹ Iolaus, Heracles' beloved, is said to have shared his labors and fought by his side.²

Plutarch also considered the symposium, which is "a koivnvia of serious or merry discourse or actions"³ as an area of special importance for the development of koivnvia. In the Septem Sapientum Convivium the hearth-fire, the hearth, the wine bowl, all entertainment and hospitality are described as "the most humanizing and essential elements in our mutual relations."⁴ The pleasure people get for "sharing with each other in the table and the banquet" is the most right and proper kind of human pleasure; not to enjoy it is considered shameless and brutelike.⁵

Koivnvia at a symposium is achieved by a common participation in wine and conversation.⁶ Both are essential elements.

¹Life of Alexander 962E.
²Life of Pelopidas 287D.
³Quaestionum Convivalium 708D.
⁴Septem Sapientum Convivium 158C.
⁵Septem Sapientum Convivium 158F Even the gods enjoy such diversions. Poseidon was defeated in discussion many times by the other gods, but he never held a grudge against them. The Erechtheum, a temple common to him and Minerva, and even containing an altar to oblivion is adduced as proof of his amicable nature. Quaestionum Convivalium 741AB.
⁶Quaestionum Convivalium 614E.
Eating alone is not sufficient, because a banquet needs company and agreement to make it palatable and pleasing. But neither is it satisfactory if men come together each to eat his own private meal.

We invite one another not barely to eat and drink, but to eat and drink together. Now this division into messes takes away all society, makes many suppers, and many eaters, but no one sups with another; but every man takes his pound of beef, as from the market, sets it before himself, and falls on.

The ideal situation is to invite "our acquaintances and familiars to participate of our entertainments, mirth, and discourse over a glass of wine." The guests at a symposium should have in everything: the same food, the same discourse, the songs of the same singer, and the music of the same musician. This practice is sanctioned by the custom of the ancients who "not only honored those who lived with them or under the same roof, but also those that drank out of the same cup or ate of the same dish." The poet Pindar also praised the heroes who "maintained society and good fellowship by eating at the same board,"

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1 Quaestio[num Convivalium 697D. Lamprias argues that the Latin name for banquet, which is coena, is much more fitting than the Greek δείπνον since coena comes from the word Κοινωνία.

2 Quaestio[num Convivalium 643A.

3 Quaestio[num Convivalium 707C.

4 Quaestio[num Convivalium 643B.

5 Quaestio[num Convivalium 643D.

6 Quaestio[num Convivalium 643E.
a situation which was in great contrast with that in which "seemingly very good friends cannot so much as eat with one another out of the same dish."\(^1\)

However, the man who comes to a symposium "does not come only to enjoy the meat and drink but likewise the discourse,\(^2\) mirth, and genteel humor which ends at last in friendship and good-will."\(^3\) To achieve this spirit of Κοινωνία, a sense of equality is absolutely necessary; "the necessity is from nature as well as custom, and is not lately introduced or founded only on opinion."\(^4\) Expressing this thought poetically, Plutarch says, "as long as Moera and Lachesis (diversion and distribution) kept an equality in feasts, nothing uncivil or disorderly appeared."\(^5\)

The size of the group is an important factor in establishing the spirit of Κοινωνία. A crowd is capable of "hindering all familiarity and conversation; and it is more tolerable to let the company have no wine, than to exclude all converse from a feast."\(^6\) When too many persons are present at a symposium, it

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\(^1\)Quaesttionum Convivalium 643E.
\(^2\)In one of the discussions of Quaesttionum Convivalium 718C, Diogenianus suggests that the group make Plato a Κοινωνικός in the discussion since the day of their discussion was Plato's birthday.
\(^3\)Quaesttionum Convivalium 660B.
\(^4\)Quaesttionum Convivalium 643F.
\(^5\)Quaesttionum Convivalium 664A.
\(^6\)Quaesttionum Convivalium 679A.
is inevitable that communication among the whole group will be impossible. The guests will divide into small groups and carry on private conversations. However, granted that the number of guests at the symposium is suitable, the guests should be seated with a view to mirth and conversation. The host should try to select as a dinner companion for a guest "such whose acquaintance he hath formerly sought and would now be glad of." Any person uninvited to the symposium should be reluctant to accept the invitation of one of the guests to attend unless "there seems a necessity for some conversation which cannot be put off till another time, or if he is lately come from a journey or designs to go on one."

All of the participants at a symposium must strive to keep the discussion on topics of general interest. A man's concern over his own private affairs or interests should not jeopardize this spirit of Κοινωνία. It is just as much a destruction of this spirit to introduce abstruse philosophical discussion as it is to indulge in meaningless conversation such as the man does

1 Quaestionum Convivalium 679A.
2 Quaestionum Convivalium 618A.
3 Quaestionum Convivalium 709B.
4 Quaestionum Convivalium 709D.
5 Quaestionum Convivalium 644D.
6 Quaestionum Convivalium 615A.
who eats unusual food in order to brag about it.\textsuperscript{1} Joking is tolerated if the person telling the joke make it reflect on himself as well as on others.\textsuperscript{2} Rhetoricians are troublesome guests because they wish to "have no part of this table-talk over the wine."\textsuperscript{3} Illiterate persons also are conspicuous at a symposium. They are like mute consonants with vowels, participating in the discussion "in a voice not altogether inarticulate and insignificant."\textsuperscript{4}

Finally, the guest at a symposium must be as willing to listen as he is to discuss. In this way he participates in the conversation\textsuperscript{5} and proves himself a gentleman and a scholar.\textsuperscript{6}

Personal friendships are also reflections of man's social nature. The treatise De Amicorum Multitudine suggests that it is not a wise thing to have too many friends. Friendship is formed through likeness, so that we should associate "only with those who are qualified to keep up the same participation, that is to say, those who are able in a like manner to love and

\begin{itemize}
\item \textit{De Tuenda Sanitate} 125A.
\item \textit{Quaestionum Convivalium} 634B.
\item \textit{Quaestionum Convivalium} 741D.
\item \textit{Quaestionum Convivalium} 613E.
\item \textit{De Recta Ratione Audiendi} 45E.
\item \textit{De Recta Ratione Audiendi} 43D.
\end{itemize}
participate.\textsuperscript{1} The \textit{Quomodo Adulator ab Amico Internoscatur} warns not against the kind of flatterer who is always on the lookout for a free meal, but rather the "one who is generally sober and a busybody, and thinks he ought to have a hand in your affairs, and wishes to share in your secrets, and as to friendship plays rather a tragic than a satyric part."\textsuperscript{2}

In regard to \textit{koinw
i}a\textsuperscript{2} with slaves, Plutarch states that in the time of Caius Marcius Coriolanus, "the Romans treated their slaves with great kindness, because they worked and even ate with them themselves, and were therefore more familiar and gentle with them."\textsuperscript{3} But he regards Marcus Cato the Elder's treatment of his slaves "like beasts of burden, using them to the utmost, and then, when they were old, driving them off and selling them, as the mark of a very mean nature, which recognizes no tie between man and man but that of necessity. And yet we know that kindness has a wider scope than justice."\textsuperscript{4} In the \textit{Aetia Romana}, he explains the custom of never leaving the table empty as "a custom of courtesy toward household servants. For they do not love so much to take as to partake, deeming that they hold a kind

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\textsuperscript{1}\textit{De Amicorum Multitudine} 96D, trans. Frank Cole Babbitt (Loeb Library ed.; London, 1928), II.

\textsuperscript{2}\textit{Quomodo Adulator ab Amico Internoscatur} 50E.

\textsuperscript{3}\textit{Life of Caius Marcius Coriolanus} 225D.

\textsuperscript{4}\textit{Life of Marcus Cato} 339A.
\end{flushright}
of communion with their masters at the table."\textsuperscript{1}

Another important area is the κοινωνία of business relationships. In the treatise \textit{De Virtute Morali}, Plutarch defines justice as the virtue which has "to do with men's relations to one another and their commercial dealings."\textsuperscript{2} In the life of Marcus Cato the Elder, Plutarch says:

He used to lend money also in the most disreputable of all ways, namely, on ships, and his method was as follows. He required his borrowers to form a large company, and when there were fifty partners and as many ships for his security he took one share in the company himself, and was represented by Quinto, a freedman of his, who accompanied his clients in all their ventures. In this way his entire security was not imperiled, but only a small part of it, and his profits were large.\textsuperscript{3}

A certain Sambicus is mentioned in the \textit{Aetia Graeca} who with many accomplices cut pieces from the bronze votive statues at Olympia and sold them. He also despoiled the shrine of Artemis the Guardian at Elis. "Immediately, then, after this sacrilege, he was caught and tortured for a year, being interrogated about each of his confederates in turn."\textsuperscript{4} Finally he died, and the proverb arose"to suffer more terribly than Sambicus."

To be suspected of being a man's κοινωνός, however, could at times be as devastating as actually having been one. The

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Aetia Romana} 279B.
\textsuperscript{2} \textit{De Virtute Morali} 441A, trans. W.C. Helmbold (Loeb Library ed.; London, 1939), VI.
\textsuperscript{3} Life of Marcus Cato 349B.
\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Quaestiones Graeca} 3020.
story is told in the *Septem Sapientum Convivium* of the time Hesiod shared a room with a Milesian when the two were guests of a Locrian. When it was discovered that the Milesian was having relations with the host's daughter, the man thought Hesiod was also involved and vented his anger upon him, though Hesiod was innocent.  

*Koinwia* is observable in the human activities of language and song. Semivowels are said to have *koinwia* with both vowels and mutes. Poetry and dancing have *koinwia* "especially in that sort of song called Hyporchema, in which is the most lovely representation imaginable, dancing doing it by gesture, and poesy by words."  

*Koinwia* is also applied to various types of participation in a religious context. The *Amatorius* describes panic terrors and ejaculations as participating in the same nature as the Bacchanal orgies. Theseus is said to have established a festival in honor of the young people who went to Crete as offerings to the Minotaur. Certain women called *deipnophorai* took part in the festival and in the sacrifice as representative of the mothers of the children on whom the lot fell, who kept bringing bread and

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1 *Septem Sapientum Convivium* 162Q.
2 *Quaestionum Convivalium* 738E.
3 *Quaestionum Convivalium* 748A.
4 *Amatorius* 758F.
meat for their children.¹

Man's social nature is also reflected in the political societies and in the relationships based on political considerations which he forms; in the De Sera Numinis Vindicta, Plutarch describes the polis as a united and continuous whole. It maintains its identity and responsibility for itself "so long as the association that creates it and binds it together with interwoven strands preserves it as a unity."² Active participation in the life of the polis is eminently suited to "the life of gentle, civil, and sociable animals, framed by nature to live civilly, honestly, and for the benefit of mankind."³ Plutarch here takes a position directly opposed to that of the Epicureans who by attacking religion and the gods undermined the very foundation of all κοινωνία and law.⁴ He is astounded that "of so many sects of philosophers as have been extant they alone should enjoy the benefits that are in cities without having ever contributed to them anything of their own."⁵

To live a full human life is to live sociably, amicably,

¹ Life of Theseus 105B.
² De Sera Numinis Vindicta 559A.
³ An Sent Sit Gerenda Res Publica 791C.
⁴ Adversus Coloten 1125B.
⁵ Adversus Coloten 1127A.
temperately, and justly. Those who act virtuously benefit human society by their honest actions and public-spirited works. Justice or equity is that kind of self-control which operates in private dealing and in public life. The man who makes pleasure the absolute end of his life really overthrows human society. However, a distinction should be made between the kind of intemperance in which reason participates gladly in the sin, and incontinence, where reason shares only reluctantly.

Many other elements also contribute to the establishment of a flourishing polis. One of these is favorable geographical conditions. In the discourse *Aqua an Ignis Utilior*, Plutarch suggests that the sea has "united and perfected our manner of living, which before was wild and unsociable, correcting it by mutual assistance, and creating community of friendship by reciprocal exchanges of one good turn for another." Among the citizens, however, is probably the most essential element in successful political *koinwnia*. One of the reasons why the Athenians never cut down an olive tree and held

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1 *Adversus Coloten* 1108C.
2 *An Seni Sit Gerenda Rex Publica* 786C.
3 *De Fortuna* 97B.
4 *De Stoicorum Repugnantiss* 1038E.
5 *De Virtute Morali* 445B.
6 *Aqua an Ignis Utilior* 957A.
the fig tree sacred was perhaps to "persuade us to be communicative and grateful to one another."¹ One of the greatest punishments a polis can inflict upon a member is to withdraw from κοινωνία with him. The Athenians, for example, would have no κοινωνία with the accusers of Socrates. They would not even wash in the same water with them, "but commanded the servants to pour it out as polluted."²

Any man who "upholds the law and society and the constitution."³ is deserving of special honor, for the polis is the concern of all, not merely its administrators. And man who "seeks the public good, loves his country and fellow-citizens, and has a serious regard to the welfare of the state"⁴ is for all practical purposes an administrator of the polis. But in order that more persons come to feel actively involved in the work of the state, Plutarch advises statesmen to share their burdens of administration. "For as the division of the hand into fingers has not weakened it, but rendered it more commodious and instrumental for the uses to which it serves; so he who in the administration of a state gives part of the affairs to others renders

¹Quaestionum Convivalium 703D.
²De Invidia et Odio 538A.
³De Latenter Vivendo 1129B.
⁴Praecepta Gerendae Republicae 796B.
the action more efficacious by communicating it."¹ He also suggests that a statesman should know himself well enough to be able to choose as a partner in an enterprise someone whose virtues complement his own. So, he says, "if you are not a good speaker, take an orator as your assistant in a lawsuit or your colleague in an embassy, as Pelopidas took Epameinondas."² Those men who have served long and faithfully in public life have the hope of attaining reverence and respect in their old age.

There is no difference between the pilot who has sailed in great danger against adverse winds and waves, and after clear weather and fair winds have come, seeks his moorings, and the man who has struggled in the ship of State a long time against the billows of envy, and then, when they have ceased and become smooth, backs water and withdraws from public life, giving up his political activities.³

Older men are encouraged never to forsake their habits of speaking, acting, reasoning, and judging; if they do, "it is reasonable to suppose that love of humanity, public spirit, and graciousness would waste away, none of which ought to have any end or limit."⁴

Originally the polis and the race were identical, being considered as "one entire and continued body...depending upon one

¹Præcepta Gerendæ Republicæ 812D.
²Præcepta Gerendæ Republicæ 819C.
³An Seni Sit Gerenda Res Publica 787E.
⁴An Seni Sit Gerenda Res Publica 792D.
and the same beginning, and carrying along with it a certain power and communion of qualities.\textsuperscript{1} Jupiter was regarded as the guardian of all blood relationships, indicating the importance of the tie of consanguinity.\textsuperscript{2} Men were accustomed to tracing their ancestry and identifying themselves accordingly. Thesius and Heracles were identified as kinsmen, "being sons of cousins-german. For Aethra was daughter of Pittheus, as Alcmene was of Lysidice, and Lysidice and Pittheus were brother and sister, children of Hippodameia and Pelops."\textsuperscript{3}

A kiss was regarded "as a significant sign of kindred and a note of familiar converse."\textsuperscript{4} The concept of political unity based on intermarriage was introduced, according to Plutarch, by Romulus who hoped to turn the outrage of the rape of the Sabine women into "an occasion for some sort of blending and fellowship with the Sabines after their women had been kindly treated."\textsuperscript{5} He did succeed in turning "his deed of violence and injustice into a most honourable achievement, and one most adapted to promote political partnership."\textsuperscript{6} The results of this action were

\textsuperscript{1}De Sera Numinis Vindicta 559D.
\textsuperscript{2}Quaestionum Convivalium 679D.
\textsuperscript{3}Life of Theseus 3F-4A.
\textsuperscript{4}Aetia Romana 265D.
\textsuperscript{5}The Life of Romulus 25D.
\textsuperscript{6}Comparison of the Lives of Theseus and Romulus 39A.
twofold. Marriage assumed such a binding character that for 230 years "no man ventured to leave his wife, nor any woman her husband." On the political level, the kings of the two peoples "shared the government in common, and the two peoples the rights and duties of citizenship."  

Plutarch contrasts Romulus's accomplishment in effecting a firm ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ between Romans and Sabines with the marriages of Theseus, one of the early kings of Athens, which gained no new friends for them "nor even any community of enterprise whatsoever, but enmities, wars, slaughter of citizens, and at last the loss of Aphidnae." The concept of political obligation based on blood relationship theoretically persisted even down to the period of the Roman empire. In the year 196 B.C., when Titus Flamininus, the Roman general, gave the Greeks their freedom after having checked the incursions of Philip and the Macedonians, the Greeks were overcome, because:

Men of another race, who were thought to have only slight sparks and insignificant traces of a common remote ancestry, from whom it was astonishing that any helpful word or purpose should be vouchsafed to Greece—these men underwent the greatest perils and hardship in order to rescue Greece and set her free from cruel despots and tyrants.

After the death or mysterious disappearance of Romulus, it

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1. *Comparison of the Lives of Theseus and Romulus* 39B.
2. *Comparison of the Lives of Theseus and Romulus* 39B.
3. *Comparison of the Lives of Theseus and Romulus* 39B.
4. *Life of Flamininus* 375D.
was decided that the Romans would choose a king from among the Sabine people. Accordingly, an embassy came to Numa from Rome, asking him to become king. His own people, too, begged him to assume "the royal power there, in order to unite and blend together the citizens."<sup>1</sup> He accepted the royal power and attempted to bring about unity between the Sabines and the Romans by the institution of "social gatherings and public assemblies and rites of worship befitting each body."<sup>2</sup> Among his other reforms, Numa added two new months to the calendar. One of these months, January, was said to have been named after Janus, "the patron of civil and social order," because he was "said to have lifted human life out of its bestial and savage state."<sup>3</sup>

Of Lycurgus, the Spartan lawgiver, Plutarch says, he engaged in no warlike undertakings, and established his constitution in a time of peace. One tradition held that Lycurgus, with a certain Iphitus, either founded or revived the Olympic games in 776 B.C.<sup>4</sup> The evidence supporting this view is Aristotle's statement that a discus was found at Olympia on which was inscribed the name of Lycurgus.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>*Life of Numa* 63F.

<sup>2</sup>*Life of Numa* 71D.

<sup>3</sup>*Life of Numa* 72F.


Hermippus proposed an alternate theory that Lycurgus originally had no κοινωνία with Iphitus in founding the games, but when he heard a voice upbraiding him for not encouraging his fellow-citizens to participate he thought the voice was a heavenly warning and worked with Iphitus in establishing the festival.¹

Plutarch praises Lycurgus for "his careful attention to boys, by their collection into companies, their discipline and constant association, and...his painstaking arrangements for their meals and bodily exercises and sports."² He also commends him for establishing an iron currency at Sparta to check an inclination to avarice and to equalize the opportunities for all to obtain the necessary and useful things of life. Lycurgus did this "because, better than any other ancient legislator, he foresaw that the helpless, homeless, and poverty stricken citizen was a greater menace to the commonwealth than one who was rich and ostentatious."³ From the time of Lycurgus it became the Spartan ideal "that the people should, as much as possible, have all things in common, and should take thought for them as for their own."⁴

¹Life of Lycurgus 54C.
²Comparison of the Lives of Lycurgus and Numa 77D.
³Life of Marcus Cato 354B.
⁴Instituta Laconica 237D.
In a later period when Sparta fell from the ancient ideal, the king Agis tried to restore the old standards. He attempted to persuade his influential mother to co-operate with him in this design.

For in the matter of property, he said, he could not equal the other kings (since the servants and slaves of the satraps and overseers of Ptolemy and Seleucus had larger possessions than all the kings of Sparta put together); but if in self-restraint, simplicity, and magnanimity he should surpass their luxury and thereby establish equality and community of possession among his citizens, he would win the name and fame of a really great king.

Tyranny seemed the only answer to the political turmoil in Athens at the beginning of the sixth century B.C. But then a movement began to secure a lawgiver who would rectify some of the problems. "At this point, the wisest of the Athenians cast their eyes upon Solon. They saw that he was the one man least implicated in the errors of the time; that he was neither associated with the rich in their injustice, nor involved in the necessities of the poor."²

And so Solon was chosen to try to resolve the difficult situations at Athens in preference to the establishment of a tyranny.

¹Lives of Agis and Cleomenes 798C.
²Life of Solon 850C.
Themistocles\(^1\) was ostracized from Athens, according to Plutarch, because the people were jealous of his greatness. While he was in exile in Argos, the Spartan Pausanias invited him to become a κοινωνός in his schemes against the Athenians.\(^2\) "Themistocles rejected the solicitation of Pausanias, and utterly refused the proffered partnership."\(^3\) When Pausanias was put to death, however, letters were found which cast suspicion on Themistocles. The Athenians recalled him to stand trial before a Congress of Hellenes, but he fled to escape the trial.

At the wish of the Athenian people, Pericles\(^4\) recalled Cimon from the ten years' banishment which were a consequence of

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\(^1\)Hubert Martin, Jr., "The Character of Plutarch's Themistocles," Transactions of the American Philological Association, XCII (1961), 336-337, has shown that this life "is essentially a study in συνέσεις and φιλοτιμία." So, although Plutarch relied on Herodotus, Thucydides and other sources for this life, "he has consistently revised and reinterpret ed the original Herodotean and Thucydidean ideas in the light of his general concept of Themistocles' character." (337).

\(^2\)Life of Themistocles 123C.

\(^3\)Life of Themistocles 123D.

\(^4\)Bernadotte Perrin, "The Austere Consistency of Pericles (Plutarch's Pericles, IX-XV)," (Publications of Yale University; New Haven, 1910), XV, 223, thinks Plutarch tries to reconcile Plato's description of Pericles as a demagogue with Thucydides' portrayal of him as an "austere compelling statesman" by attributing the former characterization to Pericles before he was in power and the latter after that point. Perrin regards this interpretation of Pericles' character as unequally Plutarchean since it does not appear in any of the sources which Plutarch might have used.
his ostracism, despite the opposition of Pericles' own party.
Relying on this incident as an indication of Pericles' character, Plutarch refused to give credence to the report of Idomeneus who "accuses Pericles of assassinating the popular leader Ephialtes, though he was his friend and a partner in his political program, out of mere jealousy and envy of his reputation." 1

Alcibiades was involved in the scandal of the desecration of the Herms at Athens just before the Sicilian expedition. He was allowed to sail with the expedition but later was recalled to Athens for trial. Instead, he fled to the Spartans. But he soon discovered that some of the leading Spartans were envious of him and wanted him put to death. So, although he became a kolpovos 2 with them in all their attempts to encourage Athenian allies to revolt, nevertheless he himself avoided coming into their hands.

After the Four Hundred were overthrown at Athens in 411 B.C., Alcibiades was invited to come back to Athens. He wanted to achieve some signal victories for Athens before returning and so successful was he that his soldiers taunted the troops of the defeated Athenian general Thrasyllus by "refusing to share with training or quarters in camp with them." 3

1Life of Pericles 157EF.
2Life of Alcibiades 204AB.
3Life of Alcibiades 207D.
Timoleon of Corinth was selected to lead an expedition against the Carthaginians who were trying to take Syracuse. When he arrived at Sicily he discovered that Hicetas of Leontini was leagued with the Carthaginians against Corinthian interference in Sicily. Envoys approached Timoleon from Hicetas:

demanding that Timoleon himself, if he wished, should come to Hicetas as counsellor and partner in all his successes, but that he should send his ships and his soldiers back to Corinth since, as they claimed, the war was almost finished, and the Carthaginians were ready to prevent their passage and to fight them if they tried to force one.

Timoleon managed to extricate himself from this situation with the help of Rhegium and in the end succeeded setting the Greeks in Sicily free from the Carthaginians and in putting to death Hicetas and his son as tyrants and traitors.

Lucius Aemilius Paulus, whom Plutarch compared with Timoleon, is praised because of his display of wisdom and valor in his misfortune at the battle of Cannae. Though he was not able to dissuade his colleague from battle with Hannibal, "he took part with him in the struggle, though reluctantly, but would not be a partner in his flight; and, though the one who had brought on the peril left him in the lurch, he himself kept his post and died fighting the enemy."²

After the battle of Cannae, Hannibal found a man named Bantius, who had fought bravely and had killed many Carthaginians

¹Life of Timoleon 239F-240A.
²Life of Aemilius Paulus 256B.
piled among the dead. Because of the man's wounds and his own admiration for him, Hannibal let him go free and made him a friend and guest. In return, Bantius favored the cause of Hannibal and was encouraging a revolt in favor of Hannibal at Nola. When the Roman general Marcellus arrived on the scene, he "thought it wrong to put to death a man so illustrious in his good fortune who had taken part with the Romans in their greatest conflicts." He praised Bantius as "the only man who did not abandon Paulus Aemilius the consul, but encountered and received in his own body most of the missiles aimed at him" and gave him gifts which won Bantius over firmly to the side of Marcellus.

In comparing Pelopidas and Marcellus, Plutarch concludes that while others had a share in the glory of Pelopidas, "Marcellus shared with no one the glory of his achievements." The unwillingness to share one's glory also precipitated the crisis between Marius and Sulla in Africa, according to Plutarch. Sulla had a seal ring made, on which was depicted the surrender of Jugurtha to him by Bocchus. "By constantly using this ring Sulla provoked Marius, who was an ambitious man loathe to share his glory with another, and quarrelsome."

1Life of Marcellus 303C.
2Ibid.
3Comparison of the Lives of Pelopidas and Marcellus 317C.
4Life of Caius Marius 411A.
Plutarch also recounts how Sulla was accustomed to give credit for the success of all his undertakings to Tyche; "he accounts even his concord with Metellus, a man his equal in rank, and a relative by marriage, a piece of divine felicity; for whereas he expected much annoyance from him as a colleague in office, he found him most obliging." ¹

Cimon gave his city home to the public and allowed anyone to pick any of his fruit in the country. Plutarch praised this munificence, for "in a certain fashion, he restored to human life, the fabled communism of the age of Cronus, the golden age." ²

In the life of Lucullus, Plutarch tells the story of Olthacus whom Mithridates had allowed to attempt the murder of Lucullus. Mithridates:

purposely inflicted upon him sundry marks of disgrace, whereupon, pretending to be enraged, he galloped off to Lucullus, who gladly welcomed him, since there was so much talk of him in the camp. After a short probation Lucullus was so pleased with his shrewdness and zeal, that he made him a table companion and at last a member of his council. ³

His plot to take the life of Lucullus failed, however, and he rejoined Mithridates.

When Lucullus attacked Tigranes and his son at Tigrano-certa, he overcame them by the speed and force of his attack.

¹ *Life of Sulla* 454E.
² *Life of Cimon* 485A.
³ *Life of Lucullus* 501E.
Tigranes fled when he saw his positions, and when he realized his son was sharing the same plight, he gave him the diadem from his own head and told him to try to save himself by another route.¹

Sertorius, the one-eyed Sabine, fought successfully under Marius against the Cimbri and Teutones who were invading Gaul at the turn of the first century B.C. He was honored and trusted by Marius. After this engagement, he was sent to Spain where his exploits gained him fame. When he later ran for tribuneship in Rome, he was defeated by Sulla, who also secured Marius' exile in 88 B.C. One of the consuls of this year, Octavius, supported Sulla. The other, Cinna, tried to revive the Marian faction. Sertorius joined this group. A battle in the forum between the consuls resulted in the defeat of Cinna and Sertorius, who were forced to flee from Rome. When Marius returned from exile, he wanted to serve under Cinna. Sertorius objected, however, either through fear of himself being overlooked or because he feared Marius' cruelty. "Accordingly, he said that little remained for them to do now that they were already victorious, and that if they received Marius he would appropriate to himself all the glory and the power since he found it hard to share authority and was not to be trusted."² Cinna replied that these considerations of Sertorius were sound, but that for his part he had "perplexing

¹Life of Lucullus 511A.
²Life of Sertorius 570D.
scruples about rejecting Marius after having himself invited him
to join their cause.\(^1\) So Sertorius let the matter stand, and
the army was divided into three parts, Cinna, Marius and Sertor­
ius each having command over one third.

Plutarch relates that before Alexander the Great\(^2\) undertook
the expedition against Asia, he gave his companions practically
all of the crown property. Perdiccas asked him, "But for thyself,
O king, what are thou leaving?" And when the king answered, "My
hopes." "In these, then," said Perdiccas, "we also share who make
the expedition with thee."\(^3\) Accordingly Perdiccas and several
of the others declined the gifts of Alexander, wishing to be in
his hopes more than in anything else.

According to Plutarch, "the very scope and aim of Alex­
ander's expedition speaks him a philosopher, as one that sought
not to gain for himself luxurious splendor or riches, but to
establish concord, peace, and mutual communication among all
men."\(^4\) The barbarians supposedly were encouraged by the fact

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\(^1\)Life of Sertorius 570D.

\(^2\)J. Enoch Powell, "The Sources of Plutarch's Alexander,"
Journal of Hellenic Studies, LIX (1939), 230, suggests that
Plutarch used only two sources for his Life of Alexander: a col­
clection of his letters and a "large variorum compilation on the
history of Alexander, the same compilation of which Arrian's
Anabasis is principally a judicious epitome."

\(^3\)Life of Alexander 672B.

\(^4\)De Alexandri Magni Fortuna I 330B.
that Alexander wanted an official ἱλάζων of marriage between himself and Roxana. And when at the same time he married one hundred Macedonians to Persian girls with elaborate ritual, Plutarch in recounting the incident says he would have been moved to cry out:

O dullard Xerxes, stupid fool that spent so much fruitless toil to bridge the Hellespont! This is the way that wise kings join Asia with Europe; it is not by beams nor rafts, nor by lifeless and unfeeling bonds, but by the ties of lawful love and chaste nuptials and mutual joy in children that they join the nations together.

Alexander also:

adapted his own mode of life still more to the customs of the country, and tried to bring them into closer agreement with Macedonian customs, thinking that by a mixture and community of practice which produced good will, rather than by force, his authority would be kept secure while he was far away.

After the unexpected death of Alexander, his Empire was divided among his generals. Plutarch praises one of the generals, Antigonus, because he was not afraid of his son Demetrias, "but allowed him near his person lance in hand," commenting that empire is an unsociable thing, full of ill-will and distrust.

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1 *Life of Alexander* 691E.
2 E. Badian "Alexander the Great and the Unity of Mankind," Historia, VII (October, 1958), 425-444, criticizes W.W. Tarn's view of Alexander the Great and rejects the interpretation of Alexander as "believing in the brotherhood of man in any sense in which Greeks, ever since Homer, had not."
3 *De Alexandri Magni Fortuna* I 329F.
4 *Life of Alexander* 691D.
5 *Life of Demetrius* 890B.
The Athenians even gave Antigonus and Demetrius the title of king, though "this was the only royal prerogative still left to the descendents of Philip and Alexander which it was thought that others could not assume or share." However, Antigonus failed to retain his supremacy among the successors of Alexander and to pass on this inheritance to his son Demetrius. Plutarch attributes this to the fact that he was excessively harsh, unwilling to compromise and eager to dominate. These attitudes alienated the young and powerful men from him. The showdown came at the Battle of Ipsus in 301 B.C. Antigonus boasted that "their combination and partnership at this time...he would scatter asunder with a single stone and a single shout, as if they were a flock of granivorous birds." However, he was killed in the engagement.

Tiberius Gracchus was murdered for his attempt to introduce social reform at Rome. His brother Caius lived quietly after Tiberius' death according to Plutarch in his Lives of Tiberius and Caius Gracchus. However, in 126 B.C. he was elected by lot to go to Sardinia as quaestor for the consul Orestes. He served well, without much co-operation from Rome. When the senate prolonged Orestes' command in Sardinia, Caius returned to Rome, much to the displeasure of his enemies who accused him of deserting

1Life of Demetrius 893C.
2Life of Demetrius 902A.
his post. After he had successfully justified his action, "other fresh charges and indictments were brought against him, on the ground that he had caused the allies to revolt and had been privy to the conspiracy at Fregellae, information of which was brought to Rome."¹ But again he was able to establish his innocence and soon after was elected tribune. During his second tribuneship he tried to secure the favor of the multitude by initiating laws in their interest and by "proposing to send colonies to Tarentum and Capua, and inviting the Latins to a participation in the Roman franchise."² Plutarch commends Cornelia, the mother of Tiberius and Caius Gracchus, because "when Ptolemy the king offered to share his crown with her and sought her hand in marriage, she refused him, and remained a widow."³

Toward the end of Caesar's proconsulship in Gaul, word reached Rome that he had slaughtered 300,000 Germans during a truce. Everyone at Rome rejoiced except Cato who said Caesar should be punished for such a crime. Caesar wrote a letter, which was read in the senate, justifying his action and denouncing Cato. Cato, then:

Assailing Caesar's plans from the outset and revealing clearly all his purpose, as if he were his fellow-conspirator and

¹Lives of Tiberius and Caius Gracchus 836A.
²Lives of Tiberius and Caius Gracchus 838BC.
³Lives of Tiberius and Caius Gracchus 824D.
partner and not his enemy, he declared that it was not the
sons of Germans or Celts whom they must fear, but Caesar him-
self, if they were in their right minds, and so moved and in-
cited his hearers that the friends of Caesar were sorry that
by having the letter read in the senate they had given Cato
an opportunity for just arguments and true denunciations.

Plutarch relates that after the defeat of Pompey by Caesar
at Pharsalus and his subsequent murder in Egypt, only Pompey's
freedman Philip remained to bury his body, joined by an old man
who had served under Pompey in his youth and wanted to be a
sharer in the privilege of burying "the greatest of Roman im-
perators."  

Plutarch's account of the life of Antony refers to the in-
cident after the battle of Pharsalus in which "Dolabella, who was
tribune at this time - a newcomer in politics who aimed at a new
order of things, introduced a law for the abolition of debts, and
tried to persuade Antony, who was his friend and always sought to
please the multitude, to take common action in the measure."  
Antony was advised against siding with Dolabella and broke com-
pletely with him when he began to suspect Dolabella of taking
advantage of his wife.

Antony died after the Battle of Actium in 31 B.C. after he
lost to Caesar in his bid for power. According to Plutarch,
when news of Antony's death reached Caesar, "he retired within

\[1\] Life of Cato the Younger 784.

\[2\] Life of Pompey 661E.

\[3\] Life of Antony 919DE.
his tent and wept for a man who had been his relation by marriage, his colleague in office and command, and his partner in many undertakings and struggles."¹

Plato's relationship with Dionysius, the young tyrant of Syracuse, is described in Plutarch's life of Dion, the uncle of Dionysius. Dion and Plato had hopes of making Dionysius their ideal philosopher king. Plato went to Syracuse to educate Dionysius. At first Dionysius wanted to have κοινωνία with Plato in his philosophical pursuits, but he feared the criticism of those in his court who thought such study would corrupt him.² Plato returned to Athens, only to come back to Syracuse a second time to unsuccessfully attempt to make Dionysius a philosopher-king. After Plato's second departure, Dionysius gave his uncle Dion's wife Arete to Timocrates in marriage, against her will. Dion was angered and wanted to wage war on Dionysius. Others encouraged him to free Sicily from the grasp of the young tyrant. He employed mercenaries and in addition tried to secure the co-operation of those who had been banished by Dionysius. "But of those who had been banished by the tyrant, and there were not less than a thousand of them, only twenty-five took part in the expedition; the rest played the coward and abandoned it."³

¹Life of Antony 952B.
²Life of Dion 964D.
³Life of Dion 967E.
In spite of this, Dion won a brilliant victory, but the Syracusan began to fear that he would spare Dionysius because of their close relationship so they looked for other leaders. The man they turned to was one Heracleides who "was one of the exiles, a man of military capacity and well known for the commands which he had held under the tyrants, but irresolute, fickle, and least to be relied upon as a partner in an enterprise involving power and glory." Heracleides was murdered. This Dion regarded as a stain upon his life and actions, declared that he was ready now to die many deaths and to suffer anyone who wished to slay him if it was going to be necessary for him to live on his guard, not only against his enemies, but also against his friends." The end was not long in coming. "Many conspired to do the deed" and no one in the room dared to defend him against the assassins.

Sicyon, after the fall of the aristocracy, came under the control of many factions and tyrants. During one of the revolutions, Aratus, a child of seven whose father had been tyrant there and murdered, escaped to Argos. He developed a great hatred for tyranny. When he grew up, the exiles from Sicyon looked to him for leadership. He resolved to overthrow the tyrant Nicocles at Sicyon and was informed about the best place to

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1Life of Dion 972A.
2Life of Dion 982F-983A.
scale the walls of the city, the only obstacle being that the place was difficult of undetected access because it was guarded by the savage dogs of a gardener. So Aratus got his forces ready and began to scale the wall. The gardener's dogs and the watchdog in the tower began to howl as the men approached. The watchmen asked the huntsman whether there was some trouble afoot but he said no. This heartened Aratus' soldiers "who thought that the huntsman was privy to their design and was trying to conceal it, and that there were many others also in the city who would assist them." ¹ Though this was not true, Aratus was successful in securing the city of Sicyon without any bloodshed. As a ruler and later as general of the Achaean League, Aratus "proved not so much a strict friend, as a considerate and mild enemy, changing his ground in either direction according to the exigencies of the state, loving concord between nations, community of cities, and unanimity of council and assembly, beyond all other blessings." ² Later in his career, when Antigonus got possession of the strategic Acrocorinth, Aratus resolved to take Acrocorinth himself by a dangerous scheme which became complicated by the fact that his servant met a man "who was not privy to the enterprise and took no part in it" ³ and revealed much of the plot to him. The

¹Life of Aratus 1030D.
²Life of Aratus 1031DE.
³Life of Aratus 1035P.
situation was discovered and remedied, however, and the scheme proceeded as planned.

In the life of Artaxerxes, mention is made of a woman named Parysatis who had great influence with the king, playing dice with him, joining in his diversions, and taking part in his amours by her co-operation and presence.¹

During the year of the Four Emperors at Rome, 69 A.D., many were slain who were not involved in plots against the emperors. Vinius, who was conspiring against Galba and in favor of Otho, was slain after Otho assumed control of Rome.²

Plutarch alludes to other examples of political κοινωνία in the moral essays. He tells how a certain Laarchus, who wished to become despot in Cyrene, brought about the banishment or murder of many of the nobles of the city and was able to make the blame fall upon the king Arcesilaus, and thus bring about his death; "then he took over the sovereign rule himself on the pretext that he was keeping it for Arcesilaus's son Battus." His next step was to attempt a marriage with Battus's mother Bryxo, "saying that it was only right and proper to make Battus his own son by marrying her, and to proclaim him colleague in the sovereignty."³ The plan failed, however, because of the courage and

¹Life of Artaxerxes 1019D.
²Life of Galba 1065B.
³Mulierum Virtutes 260F.
loyalty of Eryx. Laarchus was finally murdered.

At the death of Cambyses, Plutarch relates in De Fraterno Amore "the succession went out of Cyrus's family into the line of Darius, a prince who understood how to share the management of his affairs and even his regal authority not merely with his brothers, but also with his friends."¹

When Pyrrhus attempted to recover the kingdom of Epirus which he had lost to Neoptolemus, he was afraid Neoptolemus might ally himself with one of the other kings, so "he came to terms and made friendship with him on the basis of a joint exercise of royal power."²

The Amatorius mentions Civilis who was the first to stir up a revolt in Galatia and had among his koinwuoí in the rebellion a man named Sabinus, who became known for his fidelity to his wife.³

Hypereides, a pupil of Plato, Lycurgus, and Isocrates, entered public life at Athens when Alexander was interfering in the affairs of Greece. At one point "he was believed to have shared the Persian funds with Ephialtes."⁴

¹De Fraterno Amore 490A.
²Life of Pyrrhus 385B.
³Amatorius 770D.
⁴X Oratorum Vitae 848E.
Koinonia and its Cognates in the Related Authors of the Hellenistic-Roman Period

The writings of other authors of the Hellenistic-Roman period contain passages which provide distinct points both of comparison and of contrast with the thought of Plutarch as expressed above.

A hierarchy of god, gods, and demons, similar to that of Plutarch, appears also in Plotinus' thought. In discussing the distinction between gods and other spiritual beings, Plotinus says that the latter cannot partake of bodily matter but do partake of intellectual matter and are "thereby enabled to enter into the lower Matter, the corporeal."

Plutarch maintained that everything from the lowest animal to god was social or communicative by nature. Something of the same theory is reflected in the thought of Marcus Aurelius, Stobaeus, and Philo. According to Marcus Aurelius, the mind of the whole is social and this is reflected in the hierarchical

subordination of the inferior elements to the superior. ¹ The relationship among the various parts of the whole is achieved by means of the soul, Stoebaeus maintained. The souls of the gods have κοινωνία with the souls of men, and the souls of men with those of the irrational beings. ² Philo said Moses taught the social nature characteristic of men is also present in animals of irrational nature and various kinds of cultivated trees. ³

These theories were not universally accepted during this period, however. Epictetus agrees that social instincts are inherent in the nature of man but points out that some would question this statement. ⁴ He does not attribute social instincts to animals, however, because they lack understanding. ⁵


⁵ Epictetus Discourses I.28.20; II.10.14; IV.5.17.
The general principle on which κοινωνία can be posited, according to Philo, is that it is the law of nature, and therefore just, to join all things which can associate, namely the homogeneous; it is unjust to try to force the heterogeneous into κοινωνία. He claims that the Chaldaeans believed in a harmony between earthly and heavenly things, and a κοινωνία and sympathy in all parts of the universe. Aristotle is credited by Aetius with the opinion that the heavens have κοινωνία in all things. The consequence of this cosmic fellowship is that each thing, while retaining its own being, can take over some property of the thing in which it participates. Earth, air, water, and fiery aether have a partnership with one another in the universe and yet remain "free from hostility." If they were to dissolve this κοινωνία they would completely destroy each other. Zeus is called "Guardian of the Race" on account of the

1Philo De Specialibus Legibus III.204.
2Philo De Migracione Abrahami 178
4Plotinus Ennead II.1.7.15.
6Dio Chrysostom The Fortieth Discourse 36.
tie of kinship which unites gods and men," according to Dio Chrysostom.¹ Chrysippus says that genuine happiness exists only in the κοινωνία of god with god, but then extends this κοινωνία to include everything that has a share in reason. The relationship between rational creatures and the gods is not the kingship of equals however, but is like that between boys "who are said to share the citizenship with men, being citizens by birth though not by reason of conceiving and performing the tasks of citizens or sharing in the law, of which they have no comprehension.²

Plotinus states that when the soul passes from an incorporeal condition and comes into any kind of a body, it may then be said to have κοινωνία with the body.³ He further explains:

When the ancient philosophers say that the soul comes into the body, this means that the body enters into essence, and participates in the life of the soul; in one word, to 'come' does not here signify passing from one place into another, but indicates in what way the soul enters into dealings with the body.

In regard to the physical aspects of the κοινωνία of soul and body, the first movements of the soul of which we become participators are: "nourishment, growth, sight, hearing, taste, smell, touch, reason, mind, the parts of the soul, the parts of

¹ Dio Chrysostom First Discourse on Kingship 40.
² Dio Chrysostom Borysthenitic Discourse 23.
³ Plotinus Ennead IV.3.9.9.
⁴ Plotinus Ennead VI.4.16.13.
the body, their activities, in general their natural movements and states.  

KOIVVIV with the body is not advantageous for the soul, according to Plotinus because the soul exists on a higher level than the body and has more participation in unity. The body nevertheless becomes beautiful by KOIVVIV in reason which comes from the divine. Wisdom is almost communicative and willing to give herself, so that man is able to live with "his purposes set upon fellowship with Zeus."  

The wise man, who lives most perfectly in accord with human nature, is like a light to all who have KOIVVIV in a rational nature, and sets an example of a life lived not in solitude but in society and action. Reason is the most important element in which human nature has KOIVVIV and is the "sure and indissoluble foundation for fellowship and justice."  

1 Philo De Sacrificiis Abelis et Caini 73.  
2 Plotinus Ennead II.9.7.3.  
3 Plotinus Ennead VI.9.1.34.  
4 Plotinus Ennead I 6.2.28.  
5 Epictetus Discourses II. 19.27.  
7 Dio Chrysostom Berythentinic Discourses 31.
One of the most characteristic traits of all rational creatures is fellowship with others. According to Marcus Aurelius, this constitutes their good. Chrysippus maintains that our social cannot exclude coarse and uncultivated men, as it does irrational animals, because the creator made all men on the same common level with all mankind. A man should not regard acts of fellowship as bringing "a smaller return and to be deserving of less pains," but rather he should strive always to think and act sociably and for the common good. He should always be considerate of his fellow-associates, whether natural or acquired. For it is the nature of a social being to perceive he is acting socially and he should not be afraid of his social acts. Nature, according to Philo has "created man the most civilized of animals to be gregarious and sociable, has called him to show fellowship and a spirit of partnership by endowing him with


2Marcus Aurelius Meditations V.16; V.29.2.

3Chrysippus "De Iure et Leges" Ethica VI #346, SVF, III, 85.

4Marcus Aurelius Meditations, V.1.7.

5Marcus Aurelius Meditations III.4.2; IV.33.3; VI.14.2.

6Marcus Aurelius Meditations VII.5.

7Epictetus Discourses II.14.8; I.22.10; III.1.21; III.11.3.

8Marcus Aurelius Meditations V.6.6.8.
reason, the bond which leads to harmony and reciprocity of feeling."\(^1\) Marcus Aurelius encourages men "to pass from act to act of fellowship, keeping God in remembrance"\(^2\) and to direct all the activities of life toward "a holy disposition and neighbourly acts."\(^3\) He urges men to use dumb animals and lifeless things and objects "generally with a generous and free spirit, because you have reason and they have not; use men because they have reason, in a neighbourly spirit; and in all things call upon the gods for help."\(^4\) He also suggests that "to reverence and value your own understanding will make you acceptable to yourself, and harmonious with your fellows, and in concord with the gods."\(^5\)

Laws were established to preserve social κοινωνία.\(^6\)

Epicurus maintained that laws were just only "when they were expedient for the mutual intercourse of the citizens."\(^7\) When they

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\(^1\) Philo De Decalogo 132.

\(^2\) Marcus Aurelius Meditations VI.7.

\(^3\) Marcus Aurelius Meditations VI.30.1.

\(^4\) Marcus Aurelius Meditations VI.23.1.

\(^5\) Marcus Aurelius Meditations VI.16.5.


\(^7\) Epicurus "Ratae Sententiae" XXXVII.153.5, Ethica, ed. Carolus Diano (Florence: Sanson, 1946), XXXVIII.153.2.
ceased to be expedient, they were no longer just. He held that the law was generally the same for all but might vary under different circumstances.  

The philosophers were aware that social relationships admitted of degrees. They regarded friendship as the most perfect type of koinwvā. Chrysippus defined friendship as a koinwvā of life. According to Posidonius and Hecato, friendship was "a common use of all that has to do with life." For Epicurus, friendship was a "partnership in the enjoyment of life's pleasures." He would have agreed with the comic writer Alexis that pleasures which share in pain should be shunned. Zeno claimed that talking about the good tended to draw men toward social fellowship.  

Philosophers were called koinwνοi of the philosophy of their masters. This was said of Anaxagoras in relation to

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1 Epicurus "Ratae Sententiae" XXXVII.152.4.
2 Epicurus "Ratae Sententiae" XXXVI.151.7.
3 Chrysippus "De Bonis et Malis" Ethica II, #112, SVF, III, 27.
4 Diogenes Laertius Zeno VII.124.
5 Diogenes Laertius Epicurus X.120.
7 Diogenes Laertius Zeno VII.99.
Anaximenes and of Leucippus in relation to Parmenides. 1 All of the Pythagoreans had \( \text{koinw尼亚} \) in the discussions of the school up to the time of Philolaus and Empedocles. 2 But when Empedocles wrote his poem on their doctring, the Pythagoreans made a law that poets should not be allowed at the discussions.

Men were also described as partners in misfortune 3 or in less reputable activities 4 or, like the parasite, in luck and life. 5

\( \text{koinwния} \) was used in reference to sexual intercourse by Amphis and Josephus. 6 Philo distinguished between marriages for pleasure in which the \( \text{koinwния} \) was between body and body and marriages made by wisdom where \( \text{koinwния} \) was between "thoughts which seek purification and perfect virtues." 7 Dionysius of Halicarnassus referred to the Roman custom of basing marriage on

1 Theophrastus Physical Opinions Fr. 4 in DG, 478. Fr. 8, 483.

2 Empedocles Frag. 21 in Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker ed. Herman Diels (Berlin, 1922), 194.

3 Josephus Jewish Antiquities II.62.

4 Deophilus frag. 32 FAC, IIIA, 110.

5 Antiphanes the Younger, "The \( \Delta i\upsilon\mu\omicron\omicron\upsilon \) ," FAC, II, 626.

6 Amphis, "The \( \Gamma \alpha\lambda\epsilon\epsilon\omicron\omicron\omicron \) ," 20, FAC, II, 320; Josephus, Against Apion, I, 35.

7 Philo On Abraham 100.
of fire and water\textsuperscript{1} as Plutarch had also done.

Official public documents of the hellenistic period mention the invitation to \textit{koinonía} in religious rites and the mysteries which one town issued to another.\textsuperscript{2} Towns entering into political alliances with each other agree to have \textit{koinonía} in citizenship,\textsuperscript{3} in the right to participate in local priesthoods,\textsuperscript{4} and in grain and olives.\textsuperscript{5}

\textit{koinonía} was used by the historians Polybius and Diodorus Siculus as it was by Plutarch, to describe the political alliances between cities, leagues, countries and kings. After the death of Demetrius II of Macedon in 229 B.C., the Aetolian League in Greece made alliances with Antigonus, king of Sparta.\textsuperscript{6}


\textsuperscript{3}Frag #531 SIG, I. 777.

\textsuperscript{4}Frag #531 SIG, I. 778.

\textsuperscript{5}Frag #646 SIG, II. 206.

immediately a war broke out between Sparta and the other powerful league of Greek states, the Achaean League. Antigonus supported the latter. During the course of this war, Antigonus and Aratus of the Achaean League destroyed Mantinea and Cleomenes razed Megalopolis. Polybius used the example of the loyalty of the Megalopolitans to their alliance with the Achaean League despite the heavy losses they incurred as an example of "loyalty to... engagements and to true and faithful comradeship." The war ended in 222 B.C. when Antigonus took Sparta. Cleomenes fled to Egypt and died there in 219 B.C. Antigonus died in 221 B.C. and was succeeded by the seventeen year old Philip V of Macedon. The Aetolian League took this opportunity to sever its alliance made previously with Antigonus. Philip refused to tolerate this action. The ephors of Sparta concluded a κοινωνία with the Aetolian League for war against Macedon. The war finally concluded in 217 B.C. with Philip of Macedon victorious over Sparta and the Aetolian League. Philip then conceived the idea of κοινωνία with Carthage. This alliance was concluded in 215 B.C.

In 212 B.C. the defeated Aetolian League allied with the Romans in order to take revenge on Philip for his previous victory. In 211 B.C. Sparta was forced to decide between alliance

1Polybius Histories II. 61.11.
2Polybius Histories IV. 35.10.
3Polybius Histories III. 2.3.
with the Aetolians against or with Macedon and the Achaean League.\(^1\) Lyciscus, an Acarnanian, urged the Spartans to refuse \(κοινωνία\) with the Aetolians and to establish an alliance with the Achaean League and Macedon\(^2\) because the Aetolian League had betrayed the Greek cause by inviting the Romans to be their \(κοινωνία\).\(^3\) Later, when the Roman general Flamininus defeated Philip in the battle of Cynocephalae in 197 B.C. he insisted on settling the terms and establishing a Roman peace. The Aetolians who had been fighting with the Romans rebuked him for not using their success in a spirit of partnership.\(^4\)

Other examples of \(κοινωνία\) also occur in Polybius. He mentioned that he had learned from Massanissa that the Carthaginians Hannibal and Mago had had \(κοινωνία\) with each other in all kinds of enterprises since their youth.\(^5\) The Carthaginian general Himilco promised his officers gifts and favors if they would remain loyal

\(^1\)Polybius Histories IX. 31.4.
\(^2\)Polybius Histories IX. 39.6.
\(^3\)Polybius Histories IX. 37.5.
\(^4\)Polybius Histories 18, 48.7. Maurice Holleaux, "Rome and Macedon: The Romans Against Philip", Cambridge Ancient History, VIII 3rd impression (Cambridge, 1965), 138-198 says that actually the alliance of 212 B.C. had not been renewed between Rome and the Aetolian League, though the latter thought it had been done tacitly. Rome had no formal alliance with any of the states fighting on her side at that point.
\(^5\)Polybius Histories IX. 25.5.
to him and not participate in the plot of those who had left the
city. 1 About 163-162 B.C. one of the Ptolemies learned that the
man he had left in charge in Cyrene had kouvnia with the insur-
gents in an uprising there. 2

The Romans had kouvnia in the war directed against Pyrrhus
of Epirus in 280 B.C. 3 Later, when the Romans were fighting some
tribes of Celts they were afraid to ask their Celtic allies to
have kouvnia with them for fear their loyalties might waver. 4
The people of Marseilles had often been kouvnoi of the Romans,
and especially during the war with Hannibal. 5

Diodorus Siculus mentioned that the inhabitants of Lipara,
an island of the Aeolides, divided their population into two
groups, one to cultivate the islands which had been made the com-
mon property of the community and the other to fight the pirates
who were harassing them; "their possessions also they made com-
mon property, and living according to the public mess system,
they passed their lives in this communistic fashion for some
time." 6

1 Polybius Histories I. 43.3.
2 Polybius Histories II. 31, 18, 6.
3 Polybius Histories I. 6.7.
4 Polybius Histories II. 32.8.
5 Polybius Histories II. 42.5.
6 Diodorus Siculus Library of History V. 9.4, trans. C.H.
in the context of musical harmony occurred in several passages. The flute and the lyre are said to be in partnership. The music of flute and the lyre have in festivals. Drawing an analogy with musical terminology, Lucian commented that he had united dialogue and comedy, "though they are not in the least docile and do not easily tolerate partnership."

Conclusion

The philosophical, social, and political contexts in which occurs in the writings of this period are accurate reflections of the historical situation in each of these areas and the products of their development.

The death of Alexander the Great in 323 B.C. traditionally marks the end of the classical or Hellenic period of Greek history and the commencement of the Hellenistic period. The Hellenistic period is often said to be characterized by a spirit of

1 Damoxenus "The συντρόφοι," frag. #2, FAC, III. A, 214.
3 Ephippus "The Merchandise" FAC, II. 150.
4 Lucian You're a Prometheus in Words 6.35. Greek text and trans. by K. Kilburn (Loeb Library ed.; Cambridge, Mass.), VI.
individualism initiated by Alexander, in contrast with the former
period, which ended with Aristotle, where man found his identity
as a fraction of the polis. The Greek polis still remained after
Alexander's death, "but its walls were down, and the security and
definite form which, together with some restriction, they gave to
life, had vanished."1

The Hellenistic man, deprived of the security previously
provided by the more of the polis, needed criteria by which he
could regulate his own life. These he found in the practical
dogmatic philosophies which developed during the period.

New ideas about human brotherhood developed also as he tried
to regulate his relations with others. These ideas expressed
themselves in the formation of various extra-political organiza-
tions which were primarily social and religious in character.

The polis, which often lost much of its identity along with
its loss of autonomy, also needed to find a new basis of security.
This it did by reverting to another form of government common
especially in Northern Greece, the cantonal commune. The develop-
ment of the federal principle is reflected in the formation of
leagues and other forms of common political association, such as
the isopoliety and sympoliety.

Three schools of philosophy developed at the beginning of

1A.H. Armstrong, An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1963), 114. The survey of Hellenistic-
Roman philosophy which follows is based largely on this source.
the Hellenistic period: Cynic, Stoic, and Epicurean. The Cynics, whose chief representative was Diogenes of Sinope, sought imper-
turbable tranquility in complete poverty and detachment from all wordly ties. They were characterized by a cosmopolitan and in-
dividualistic spirit.

The Stoics, represented by Zeno and Chrysippus in the early period, advocated a rule of life founded on a rational doctrine of the universe and man's knowledge of it. Both Zeno and Chrysippus seem to have been influenced by Babylonian astrology and the idea that man is a microcosm of the universe which is governed by an inexorable Fate. They also believed in the theory of a general world conflagration.

Stoicism had three aspects: logic, physics, and ethics. Logic for them included the whole art and science of the expression of thought. Since all of reality, as they conceived it, was materialistic, knowledge was a process of perceiving physical representations of things which were confirmed by reason. Only the Wise Man had this certain knowledge, however. The physical doctrine of Stoicism was based on a doctrine of a universal cosmic fire which was identified variously as God, Divine Providence, or Nature. This fire was also identified as Reason, the ruling principle in man and the cosmos. In the realm of ethics, man was to live according to Reason, the element that gave him ἱλιεία with the gods and with all other rational beings. Reason was identified with virtue, while the passions, emotions, and desires
were considered perversions of Reason and were therefore to be eliminated. For the Stoics, there were only two classes of men, the Wise Men whom Chrysippus maintained lived most according to Reason, and the rest of men, an unvirtuous and degenerate horde.

The Stoics maintained the existence of a natural law, by which was meant that the universal decrees of reason were the same for all. One of these laws was an innate love of one's offspring; another, belief in the social nature of man. According to Chrysippus again, the crude and uncultivated man could not be excluded from social activity, as irrational animals were, because he had a rational nature. The Stoics advocated participation in public life as "preferred" action.

Epicurus was the founder of a sect bearing his name. His philosophy consisted in a rule of life based on Reason. Its end was the attainment of imperturbable tranquillity which meant for Epicurus freedom from pain and trouble. Since he believed most human trouble came from belief in the gods, his theory of nature excluded divine activity and asserted the materiality and morality of the soul, a doctrine which Plutarch specifically repudiated.

One aspect of this philosophy was the "Canonic" or criteria for the test of truth. These were: feelings of pleasure and pain, sensation, concepts, and the act of intuitive apprehension. Its physics was an adaptation of the atomism of Democritus, into which Epicurus introduced the concept of the "swerve" as an
attempt to avoid determinism and Fate and affirm human free will. Thus chance became a philosophical principle along with necessity. The soul was composed of small atoms diffused throughout the body, while mind was an aggregate of pure and subtle atoms in the breast. The gods exist but live a life of tranquillity and do not interfere in the lives of men. Religion for Epicurus was the contemplation and imitation of the tranquility of the divine life.

Great emphasis was placed by the Epicureans on the importance of friendship and all human affectionate relationships. This concurred with Epicurus' definition of friendship as a κοινωνία in pleasure. Plutarch protested however that to make pleasure the absolute end of life overthrows human society. Epicurus taught the desirability of avoiding public office and political life, which to Plutarch was incomprehensible since the sect was willing to enjoy the advantages of life in the polis. Epicurus believed that justice was merely a matter of social contract, that laws were just only when or for as long as they were expedient, that law, while generally the same for all, could be different in different places.

During the second and first centuries B.C. Stoicism underwent a period of humanization which brought it closer to Platonism. Panaetius and Posidonius were two primary figures in this period of Middle Stoicism. The theory of conflagration was abandoned and the doctrine of the eternity of the cosmos was
adopted, a doctrine already common to the Platonists and Aristotelians. Panaetius made Stoicism more palatable for the Romans by placing more emphasis on the relative value of external goods. Posidonius borrowed the doctrine of the tripartite soul from Plato, though all three parts remained material for him, and indicated that man should try to control his passions rather than eradicate them. "He greatly stressed the organic unity of the world and the universal sympathy which binds all things together, and originated the idea of the scale of different kinds of unity, culminating in the perfect unification of the organism, which Plotinus developed further."¹ He made man a bridge between the higher and lower worlds. Dio Chrysostom represents the Stoicism of the first century A.D. He believed in the necessity of the elements of the cosmos, the tie of kinship between gods and men, and reason as the basis of and justice among men.

For Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius, the latest Stoics, philosophy was primarily a way of life and was almost exclusively concerned with moral and spiritual direction and self-examination. Epictetus conceived Divine Providence as a personal God. He believed in the social nature of man, but unlike Plutarch, did not believe that animals had a social nature. Marcus Aurelius

¹Ibid., 144.
emphasized the relation between all levels of reality. He believed that rational creatures were made to have social relations with each other and in this was their ultimate good. Man in this life was to keep God in remembrance and to think and act sociably and for the common good.

Platonism enjoyed a revival during the first century B.C. and the first and second centuries A.D. in which it assimilated a large element of Aristotelianism. This revival began with Philo of Larissa. He abandoned the scepticism which had characterized earlier Platonism, and gave much attention to the history of the school and its doctrines. He held that there had been a continuity in its tradition since Plato. His successor, Antiochus of Ascalon, maintained that Zeno was a reforming Platonist, and that Stoic teaching was identical with that of Plato. His doctrine had the appearance of an eclectic Stoicism. Middle Platonism by the second century A.D. could be described as "genuinely Platonic doctrine, differing in many important ways from the teaching of Plato himself, and showing many signs of the influence of Aristotle and of other schools, but going back in many essential points to Plato's own pupil Xenocrates."¹ This period of Platonism is represented in Plutarch's thought.

Middle Platonism was also characterized by an attempt to integrate theology and philosophy. According to Plutarch,

¹Ibid., 147.
philosophy is to be "our Mystagogue to Theology: we must borrow Reason from Philosophy, and take her as our guide to the mysteries of Religion."¹ Philosophy must attempt to free the old religion from its crudities and inconsistencies and thus strengthen and revive it.²

The middle Platonists commonly identified Mind or God as the first principle of reality, and conceived the Platonic Forms as the thoughts of the Divine Mind. This Mind was often identified with Plato's Good and with Aristotle's Unmoved Mover. Plutarch tended to the concept of one god, transcendent and yet personal,³ the evidence for whom he finds in the beauty and harmony of the world which witnesses to an intelligent cause.⁴ His writings do not, however, reveal that he conceived the Platonic Forms as the thoughts of the Divine Mind.⁵

There was also room in the system of Middle Platonism for other gods than one. Plutarch was willing to accept the fact of the existence of gods,⁶ but he tended in syncretistic fashion to

¹Oakesmith, op. cit., 64-65.
²Ibid., 85.
³Hadas, op. cit., 275.
⁴Latzarus, op. cit., 91.
⁵Oakesmith, op. cit., 87, says: "His own conception of the Divine nature resembles the popular notion in being a compound of philosophy, myth, and legalized tradition."
⁶Latzarus, op. cit., 88.
see the gods of other people as none other than Greek gods under other names.¹ His office as Priest of Delphi indicates his position regarding the worship of lesser deities.

Demonology was a common feature of Middle Platonic thought. Plutarch posited the existence of mediatory demons, some of whom were good, others evil.² He frequently used them to explain myths and rites of religion³ in a spirit of "reverent rationalism."⁴

The heavenly bodies, according to the Middle Platonists, had a share of soul and thus possessed sensitive, rational, and intellectual faculties and were guided by reason and providence, as was man, and, according to Plutarch, also the animals.

In general, the Middle Platonists believed that the soul was divine and that it was either sent or came into the body and that life was a purification of philosophy for the return to the life of the gods and the vision of the supreme. They taught in addition that only a remote and short direct intuition of the Divine Mind was possible for man in this life, due primarily to the fact that the νοημονικόν of soul and body resulted in an obscuring of reason which linked man with the Divine. Even here

¹Ibid., 165.
²Jones, op. cit., 39.
⁴Oakesmith, op. cit., 62.
on earth, though, man could experience a state of "enthusiasm" in which the soul shared and participated in a divine order. The condition of the soul after death Plutarch was willing to trust to a good god. He denounced the Epicurean doctrine that there was no afterlife and held that the end of the soul was, when freed finally of the body, to converse with intelligence and to behold perfect purity.

The period of Middle Platonism was also marked by the production of commentaries and doxographical writings on and about the earlier philosophers, particularly Plato and Aristotle. The works of Diogenes Laertius in the 3rd century A.D. and of John Stobaeus about the fifth century A.D. are the products of this tradition.

Greek philosophy and Jewish theology encountered each other in the thought of Philo Judaeus, an influential Jew who lived in Alexandria between the reign of Augustus and 40 A.D. By means of the allegorical method of interpretation familiar to the Stoics and Platonists he succeeded in harmonizing Greek philosophical ideas and Jewish theology, in fact in deriving the former from the latter. The Jewish doctrine that God is the creator and ruler of the universe which he made freely and continues to govern had much in common with the ideas of Middle Platonism, except that Middle Platonism also recognized a hierarchy of divine beings and removed the Supreme Good far from the world which is ruled by lower powers. In trying to reconcile the two positions,
Philo attempted to stress both the immanence and transcendence of the God of Judaism. He formulated a doctrine of the Logos which was "the instrument as it is purified ascends to the God again."¹ He also identified this Logos with the Platonic world of Forms. Another point in which his doctrine was similar to that of the Stoicism and Platonism of this period was in his doctrine of the "pneuma" as the image of God in man. He regarded the whole of nature as social and united by soul.

The renewal of Platonism reached its peak in the third century A.D. with Plotinus. Plotinus studied under Ammonius Saccas in Alexandria, travelled in the East, and then established a school in Rome where he taught until his death in 270 B.C. "The philosophy of Plotinus presents us with a great ordered hierarchical structure of spiritual reality, a cosmos, which though it is static and eternal is not dead mechanical pattern, but living and organic."² Though complicated by many tensions, the basic movements he posited were those of descent and ascent. His philosophy was both cosmic and religious. His transcendent First Principle was the One or Good, beyond Mind and Being, the source of the Divine Mind and the World of Forms but neither of these. From the One was derived the Divine Mind, Soul and then the material universe by a process of emanation. Each level of reality

¹Armstrong, op. cit., 163.
²Ibid., 178.
attained its perfection by the contemplation of the level of reality above it. The soul was the link between the higher and lower worlds and was in the body not because of a fall due to sin but by the law of the universe. The κοινωνία of soul and body he considered detrimental only when the soul allowed itself to become enmeshed in the material, which he regarded as evil. Man's duty was to live as completely as possible on the spiritual level. The material visible universe was not evil, however, but living and ensouled and bound by a universal sympathy.

The occurrences of κοινωνία in the Hellenistic-Roman period also reflect the social and political milieu of the age. Aristotle had maintained that all associations were ultimately only a part of the polis and existed for its sake. The Hellenistic man, however, came by necessity to regard social associations as means of establishing and regulating his relationships with other individuals. This new attitude is evidenced by the growth of nonpolitical private associations and clubs from 300 B.C. on. These were primarily religious and social in nature. Plutarch mentions the association in honor of Dionysus to which he and his wife belonged, which provided them with knowledge of the afterlife. Plutarch's emphasis on the value of the symposium seems to be part of the same pattern of development of human

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nature, and that they demanded a spirit of equality among the members. Many of the associations of which there is record from the Hellenistic period were limited in their membership. This parallels Plutarch's insistence that the success of the symposium depends on its being restricted to a manageable size. He also emphasized that the symposium should not be a place where private concerns entered, but where the conversation would be of general interest.

The status of women improved during the Hellenistic period, especially as women had the opportunity for education. The great emphasis which Plutarch put on the marriage relationship can perhaps be partially explained by this rise in the status of women. Ideally the woman was now considered the equal of the husband and worthy to be his confidant. The two shared possessions and intellectual interests. Mere sexual *koinwnia* was hardly the end of marriage. In contrast to Plato and Aristotle who regarded the family as existing for the good of the state, Plutarch emphasized that the good of the family is of primary importance since the state can only be as good as the families which comprise it.

The idea of the brotherhood of all men developed and flourished during the Hellenistic period. According to Plutarch, this was initiated by Alexander the Great who wanted to establish concord, peace, and *koinwnia* among all men. Cosmopolitanism was also the doctrine of the Cynic and Stoic schools of philosophy.

The idea of brotherhood also influenced the institution of
slavery by mitigating the evils to which it was susceptible. Plutarch praised the Romans who lived at the time of Caius Marcius for their humane treatment of slaves, but criticized Cato the Elder for his cruel treatment of his slaves. He commended the Roman custom of always leaving food on the table for the slaves to eat so that they could feel a *κοινωνία* with their masters.

A change occurred in the political ideals and practices of Greece between the classical and the Hellenistic-Roman periods. The Panhellenic League of Corinth, under the direction of Philip and then Alexander, did not destroy the autonomy of the Greek polis on the domestic level. Each *polis* made a separate alliance with Alexander and remained sovereign and autonomous except in regard to its foreign policy which was dictated by Alexander. This League had the possibility of uniting the Greek world and acting effectively as a check on the power of Macedon. With the death of Alexander, however, this possibility ended.

The half century following the death of Alexander was marked by the disputes of his generals jockeying for a part of the empire. During the third century the old forms of the autonomous city-state, the Assembly, Council, and magistrates, appeared not to have changed. A definite modification took place, however, as political life gradually lost its former interest and importance, as men and whole cities were being extended citizenship in other cities, and as synoecism was encouraged by various
The tendency developed for the individual cities to join leagues, which had also been part of Greek political tradition especially in Northern Greece. About 275 B.C. the Aetolian League began to expand in Greece, having promised the Macedonian king, Antigonus, that it would maintain a position of neutrality. About 250 B.C. the Achaean League began to grow under the leadership of Aratus of Sicyon. Polybius, the Greek historian captured by the Romans at the Battle of Pydna and taken to Rome, wrote about the political conflicts in Greece during the period 221-146 B.C. and the period just preceding it. Being a member of the Achaean League, he was of course prejudiced against Aetolia and Macedonia and obviously was a partisan of Rome. In his description of the actions of the Roman general Flamininus after the battle of Cynocephalae in 197 B.C., he told how the Aetolians resented the fact that Flamininus would not share the victory with them. This seems a much more accurate reaction than that which Plutarch presented of the Greeks delirious with joy to think that the Romans had restored their autonomy, an action which they attributed to an ancient and distant blood relation between Greece and Rome. It is doubtful whether such sentiment was involved. Tarn believes that Rome acted as she did from purely political motives.¹

¹Ibid., 25.
Soon however Rome came to favor the dominance of the individual cities rather than the leagues because she felt the former encouraged strong central authority. Between 196 B.C. and 146 B.C. she effected the cessation of the Boeotian, Locrian, Phocian, and Euboean leagues. The Achaean league became the most powerful league in Greece after the crushing of the Aetolian league, but it incurred the suspicion of Rome. Rome tried to weaken the league by encouraging the secession of its members. The Greeks finally declared war on Rome. The war began and ended in 146 B.C., a Roman victory. Individuals, democracies, cities, leagues suspected of opposition to Rome were killed, overthrown, destroyed, or dissolved. Greece was put into the hands of the Roman representative in Macedonia. Heavy tribute continued to be exacted from the impoverished Greeks until the time of Augustus and the Empire.

Soon after 146 B.C., however, Rome changed her policy and decided to tolerate the existence of the Greek league, some of which survived under the Empire with executive powers binding on all their members. Often the leagues themselves coalesced and formed larger associations. Rome also allowed free cities to exist in Greece. During the first and second centuries A.D. the cities were permitted to retain their individual constitutions and the variations and differences which were the remnants of earlier and freer times.

In contrast to the draining demand on Greece during the
Republican period, the emperors of Rome during the first and second centuries A.D. treated Greece with a deference which they showed to no other conquered land in the Empire. They brought peace, "the peace of exhaustion" it has sometimes been called, and a benevolent administration to Greece which enabled her to enjoy a renaissance accompanied by a limited religious revival. Many Greek cities advanced in prosperity. Though lack of fertility of the soil caused a decline in population, a high level of intellectual life was maintained.

In spite of this deferential treatment which Greece received, however, "in politics there was no opportunity or at least but slight encouragement for the exercise of talent, while economic conditions offered no inducement to ambition, socially, the position of Greece was very unimportant in the world."\(^1\) Only in the realm of philosophy was Athens the acknowledged center of the Roman Empire.

It is in this historical context that Plutarch, "a man who embodies beyond all others the Greek spirit,"\(^2\) must be understood. As a member of the aristocratic class in Boeotia he became interested in theological and philosophical speculation,

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\(^1\) George Depe Hadzsits, "Prolegomena to a Study of the Ethical Ideal of Plutarch and the Greeks of the First Century A.D.\(^{;}\) (University Studies, Series II; University of Cincinnati, 1906), II, 13.

especially in the realm of ethics, which engrossed the Greek men of leisure in this period; "the ethics of this period were eclectic in character; we find the artistic and the humanistic, the national and the cosmopolitan, the social and the individualistic, the objective and the subjective all contributing to this system of ethics." Plutarch emphasized the ethical in his Moralia and in his Lives of Noble Greeks and Romans. Philanthropia, one of the leading virtues proposed to the civilized and educated man by the ethical systems of the day, was the governing principle of his ethics. It consisted in a spirit of courtesy, consideration, kindness, and clemency to one's enemies. This spirit of philanthropia applied to all areas of human relations, including politics.

Involvement in political life was traditional among the Greeks and was advocated by the philosophical schools of the period. Plutarch's own attitudes to an involvement in political life are clearly revealed in the Morals and the Lives. He advocated participation in the life of the polis as eminently suited to "the life of gentle, civil, and sociable animals, framed by

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1 Hadzsits, op. cit., 65.

nature to live civilly, honestly, and for the benefit of mankind." The welfare of the polis was not solely the concern of the elected officials in his opinion but was the obligation of each citizen. Plutarch himself lived according to these principles. In his Political Praecepts he comments: "I, on the other hand, say to those who criticize me for standing and watching tiles being measured or concrete or stones being delivered, that I attend these things, not for myself, but for my native place."²

He cautioned his fellow-citizens not to attempt to model their present behavior on the deeds, ideals, and action of their ancestors if these are not suitable to the present circumstances—an attitude in sharp contrast with that of the orators of the fourth century B.C. who strove to live according to an ideal which was no longer possible in the historical circumstances which faced them.

Plutarch reminded the Greeks that their officials were in turn subject to the Roman proconsuls. He urged them not to go beyond the liberty granted by those in authority over them,³ but also encouraged them to make friends among the influential Roman administrators since they were fond of promoting the political

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¹An Seni Respublica Gerenda Sit 791C.
²Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae 811C.
³Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae 813EF.
interests of their friends. He reminded them that such friendships would not only be personally rewarding but would also benefit the political community. He cautioned them however against further humbling their country in the process of obeying their Roman rulers, because he was not oblivious of the degradation which the Greeks had previously suffered at the hands of the Romans.

These attitudes which Plutarch advocated were reflected in his own actions. Between 75 and 90 A.D. Plutarch went quite frequently to Rome as an envoy from his native town Chaeronea. While there he acquired lasting friends among many influential Romans, including Q. Sosius Senecic, consul in 99 A.D. and 107 A.D.; Mestrius Florus; Iunius Arulenus Rusticus, praetor in 69 A.D.; C. Minucius Fundanus, consul in 107 B.C. and proconsul of Asia; Passius, and Sextius Sulla of Carthage. His Lives, comparing eminent Greeks and Romans, indicate his respect for virtue wherever he found it. They were not a testimonial to his slavish submission to the status quo of Roman rule but rather to his practical insight that the present circumstances must be accepted as it was and made the most of, without, however, the sacrifice.

1 _Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae_ 814C.
2 _Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae_ 814C.
3 _Praecepta Gerendae Reipublicae_ 814EF.
4 Babbitt, _op. cit._, xi.
of principle. He seemed to want
to teach the Greeks that Roman history is worth their atten-
tion, and that an outlook and purpose common to both peoples
might come about if they would share their pasts. At the
same time he reminds his countrymen, and the Romans too, that
they had had warriors and patriots who might be compared with
those of Rome.

Plutarch’s attitude toward the Romans was not unique. Ros-
tovtzeff has commented:

The activity of Dio....., the speeches of Aelius Aristides,
even the diatribes of Lucian, all show that the leading
classes in the Greek speaking portions of the Empire gradually
acquiesced in the existing state of things, that they
abandoned their dreams of liberty, and worked for the consol-
idation of Roman power in the East.

Among the practical benefits which the Greeks received from
their inclusion in the Roman empire was the restoration and con-
struction undertaken by the Emperor Hadrian at Delphi. This in-
turn helped to stimulate a religious revival in Greece in which
Plutarch was intimately involved, being at the time of Hadrian’s
munificence, one of two priests of Apollo at Delphi elected for
life.

Rose has described Plutarch’s ideal man as:

one who recognizes, in theory and in practice, the rights of
the rest of the world, individually and collectively, from
the State, which he must be ready to serve, down to the hum-
blest members of society, if they can be called members of
society at all, slaves; indeed, even the lower animals come

1Sandbach, CAH,
2M. Rostovtzeff, The Social and Economic History of the
Roman Empire (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1926), 120.
in for their share of kindly treatment.¹

This ideal could only have been the product of the philosophical, social, and political developments of the Hellenistic-Roman period. Aspects of it are present in the various thought of the authors studied in this chapter. But Plutarch himself, in his thought and his life was the ideal which he envisioned and advocated.

¹Rose, *op. cit.*, 60.
CHAPTER V
KOINONIA AND ITS COGNATES IN CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA AND RELATED AUTHORS OF THE PATRISTIC PERIOD

Introduction

Titus Flavius Clemens, known familiarly as Clement of Alexandria, is the third major author in whose writings koinonía and its cognates are to be considered in detail. He was born about the middle of the second century A.D., but his birthplace is uncertain.  

1 The name Flavius has evoked the speculations that his family may have been made Roman citizens by that emperor  
and that he may have been descended from a freedman of T. Flavius Clemens, a nephew of Vespasian and consul in 95 A.D., who was

1 Athens is most frequently suggested as Clement’s birthplace, though Albert C. Outler, "The 'Platonism' of Clement of Alexandria," The Journal of Religion, 20 (July, 1940), 213 objects that Clement’s "express disavowal of interest in 'trying to be Greek' seems to indicate that he was not an Athenian. Friedrich Quatember, Die Christliche Lebenshaltung des Klemens von Alexandria nach seinem Pädagogus, Mit einer Kritischen Voruntersuchung über die Person des Klemens und sein Werk, den Pädagogus (Wien: Herder, 1946), 27 suggests Alexandria as his birthplace.

executed under Domitian.\(^1\) Whatever his ancestry and place of birth, it is obvious from his writings that Clement received an excellent classical education.\(^2\) His conversion to Christianity seems to have taken place during his adult years\(^3\) and was followed by travels in Greece, Italy and the East to hear the lectures of the famous Christian teachers. His journeys ended about 180 A.D. when he met in Alexandria the famous teacher Pantaenus who at that time was also one of the presbyters of the Christian church there.\(^4\)

The intellectual, cultural, and spiritual milieu of Alexandria were destined to have a significant impact on Christian life and thought. Egypt itself played a role of great importance in the "religious development of late antiquity...for this country was the crucible in which Greek, Oriental, and native elements were mixed, melted, fused and recast."\(^5\) Alexandria, the capital city of Egypt, "was a centre for a certain reconciliation


\(^2\)Outler, op. cit., 218.

\(^3\)H. Idris Bell, Cults and Creeds in Graeco-Roman Egypt, Being the Forwood Lecture for 1952 (New York: Philosophical Library, 1953), 96.

\(^4\)Lietzmann, op. cit., 276.

between the best thought of paganism and the nascent intellectual world of Christianity in the second and third centuries A.D. It was also the home of the largest single Jewish community in Egypt.

The tradition that the Christian church in Alexandria was founded by Mark, the disciple of Peter, occurs late and is at best doubtful. Lietsmann describes it as "a deduction based on knowledge as to the historical relationship between the two churches," of Alexandria and Rome. Satisfactory evidence for the presence of Christianity in Egypt during the first century A.D. is also lacking, but it seems a fairly certain assumption that Christianity reached Alexandria before the end of the first century. There is direct evidence that Christianity was fairly well established in Middle and Upper Egypt, may, however, be inferred from the evidence of literary papyri.


2. Bell, Cults and Creeds, 36.

3. Bell, Cults and Creeds, 79.


5. Bell, Egypt, 86 comments: "On the early diffusion of Christianity in Egypt we are singularly ill informed. The tradition that the Alexandrian Church was founded by St. Mark may probably be dismissed as a legend, but it can be assumed that the new faith would not be long in reaching the chief ports in the eastern Mediterranean, and once there it was bound to spread to other parts of Egypt. Yet it has left no trace in any of the first-century papyri so far discovered, and even in documents of the second century there is remarkably little clear evidence of its influence. That it was already well established in Middle and Upper Egypt, may, however, be inferred from the evidence of literary papyri."
widespread in Egypt by the end of the second century A.D.\(^1\) The scarcity of information about the early development of Christianity in Egypt, coupled with the fact that practically the only allusions made to Egyptian Christians in the first seventy-five years of the second century concerned heretics, has led to the conclusion that an heretical Christianity developed in Egypt about which the orthodox writers chose to keep silence.\(^2\) The earliest record of orthodoxy in Alexandria occurred during the episcopacy of Demetrius, 189–231 A.D.\(^3\)

Pantaenus, whose disciple Clement had become, was head of the Christian catechetical school at Alexandria. It has been suggested that he taught a gnostic Christianity different from the elementary Christianity of the simple faithful.\(^4\) This is difficult to prove, however, because Pantaenus himself did not write and his lectures have not survived, if they were ever

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\(^1\) Bell, \\textit{Cults and Creeds}, 81, 83 says: "Thus we have four definitely Christian papyri (one of them heretical) found in Egypt which were written in the second century, and four others which can with varying degrees of probability be classed with them...Thus we are justified in arguing that from the middle of the second century onwards, there was a not inconsiderable Christian element in Middle Egypt, whence the majority of our papyri come."

\(^2\) Dietzmann, \textit{op. cit.}, 275.

\(^3\) \textit{Ibid.}, 276.

recorded. The "school" of which he was the head was not an organized institution nor was it directed by ecclesiastical authority. Rather, it has been compared to a modern study club meeting in the teacher's home. Pantaenus' "school" was composed mainly of Alexandrian Greeks, both converts and inquirers, from the upper social levels. The intellectual interests of the group were broad, embracing philosophy, allegorism and its relation to both Old and New Testaments, and gnosticism.

Clement either joined Pantaenus in teaching or succeeded him as head of the school and remained in Alexandria until the persecution of 200-203 A.D. under Septimius Severus forced him to leave the city. It has been speculated that local interests at

1 Attempts to find traces of the teachings of Pantaenus in the writings of Clement have not been successful according to Lietzmann, op. cit., 277 and Johannes Munck, Untersuchungen über Klemens von Alexandria Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Geistesgeschichte (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1935), II, 185.


3 In fact it is only with Origen that we can speak of a school as such. Cf. Gustave Bardy, "Pour l'histoire de l'école d'Alexandrie," Vivre et Penser (2 series; 1942), I, 80-109.


5 Lietzmann, op. cit., 277 and Bigg, op. cit., 57.

6 Bardy, "Origines," 89-90.

7 Lietzmann, op. cit., 276.
Alexandria, such as the priests of Serapis or professors in the Museum, may have provoked the persecution because of their irritation at the success of Clement and his catechetical school.\(^1\) After departing from Alexandria, Clement went to visit the pupil Alexander in Cappadocia.\(^2\) Perhaps he also spent some time in Jerusalem when Alexander moved there.\(^3\) In 211 A.D. he moved to Antioch, bearing an episcopal communication from Caesarea.\(^4\) He died some few years later.\(^5\)

Clement's works include: *Protrepticus*, *Paedagogus*, *Stromata*, *Excerpta ex Theodoto*, *Eclogae Prophetae*, *Quis Dives Salvetur*. Other works attributed to Clement, which exist merely in fragments or as references in other authors, are: *The Hypotyposeis* an exegetical work on the Old and New Testaments, *On the Pasch*, *Ecclesiastical Canon*, *On Providence*, *Discourses on Fasting*, *On Slander* and *On the Prophet Amos*.

Considerations on the dating of the *Protrepticus*,


\(^2\) Ibid., I, 23.

\(^3\) Ibid., 24.

\(^4\) Lietzmann, *op. cit.*, 277.

Paedagogus, and Stromata have remained largely hypothetical, since, as Tollinton has observed, no theory fits all the facts and no new evidence has appeared to confirm one view or the other. The lost work, Hypotyposes, has been considered an early one by Lietzmann and as Clement's latest work, written after he

1Robert P. Casey, "Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Platonism," Harvard Theological Review, 18 (January, 1925), 45-46 advanced the opinion that the Protrepticus appeared shortly after Clement's appointment to the catechetical school at Alexandria. Tollinton, op. cit., II, 325 regarded the Stromata as the first work which Clement wrote for publication, begun sometime after the death of Commodus in 192 A.D. with Book I dated no earlier than 195 A.D. He also maintained that the Protrepticus, Paedagogus, and Stromata were written in the order in which we possess them while Clement was in Alexandria. Ibid., 328. In his opinion the rest of Clement's writings belong to his post-Alexandrian period. Ibid., 333. Zahn dated the Stromata at 202-203 A.D. Harnack accepted this date for the earlier part of the Stromata but held that the latter part was done after his departure from Alexandria. Wendland, however, proposed that the order of these works was: Protrepticus, Stromata I-IV, Paedagogus, Stromata V-VII. This view was supported by Harnack and Heussi. Cf. John Patrick, Clement of Alexandria, The Croall Lecture for 1899-1900 (Edinburgh and London: W. Blackwood and sons, 1914) 10. Van Arnim and de Faye held that the Stromata was Clement's last work, interrupted by his death, while Zahn and Major believed that other works followed it. Cf. Tollinton, op. cit., I, 205. Tollinton remarked: "It is not possible to prove, but it is legitimate to suppose, that Clement wrote the Stromata in Alexandria and was cut short by the persecution under Severus in his task." He never returned to it again. Ibid., 206.

2Lietzmann, op. cit., II, 291 says of the Hypotyposes: "It still survived at the time of Photius, who indignantly asserted that, in addition to many justifiable views, it expressed doubtful and indeed blasphemous opinions, of which he reproduces a few. Most of the heresies which he regrets, appear to be exaggerations of genuine Clementine speculation, and possibly, the book should be ascribed to the author's early period. Nevertheless, on account of its theological defects, the work was consigned to oblivion by the orthodox of a later date."
left Alexandria, by Zahn, Westcott, and Chapman. ¹ Again there is no conclusive evidence for either view.

Scrutiny of the developmental relationship of the various works has centered largely on the Protrepticus, Paedagogus, and Stromata. Until recently it had been assumed that these three works each dealt with one of the three topics mentioned in Paedagogus I where it is said that the Logos in dealing with men "first exhorts, then trains, and finally teaches."² Clement, it is supposed, had addressed the Protrepticus to pagans, the Paedagogus to converts to Christianity, and the Stromata to those tending to gnostic perfection.

Observation of a lack of unified plan in the Stromata³ and its literary weakness⁴ led to the suggestion that the Stromata was not the work which Clement had proposed to write to those tending to gnostic perfection but merely a preparation for that

¹Patrick, op. cit., 25.


⁴Casey, op. cit., 70.
work, which was entitled the Didascalus.¹ Scholarly speculation expanded and elaborated the problem for decades. Finally, however, Volker seems to have concluded the argument in a common sense fashion, saying that one should not expect of Clement the precision of modern scholars in indicating the plan of his works and quoting Puech who has characterized the whole question as "une querelle de mots."²

The nature and purpose of the Stromata, the Excerpta ex Theodoto and the Elogae Propheticas have also been under consideration. The function of the Stromata as preparatory to the

¹De Faye, op. cit., 78, 104. De Faye's view is reflected in Casey's statement that the Stromata are a "prolegomena to the study of systematic theology." Op. cit., 46. Gustave Bardy, Clément d'Alexandrie (Paris: J. Gabalda, 1926), 21 objected to the identification of the two works on the grounds that the Stromata falls far short of the ideal proposed for the Didascalus. Johannes Quasten, Patrology (Utrecht, Antwerp: Spectrum Publishers, 1954), II, 12 maintained that Clement gave up his plan to write the Didascalus because it was beyond his capabilities, and wrote the Stromata instead. Lietzmann, op. cit., 287 took much the same position. Berthold Altaner, Patrology, tr. Hilda C. Graef (Freiburg: Herder, 1960), 217 suggested it was because the Stromata contained much of the material Clement had intended for the Didascalus that he gave up the projected work. Heussi, according to Tollinton, op. cit., II, 327, maintained "that the Stromata are the Master, in so far as this part of Clement's project was ever realized." Tollinton, ibid., I, 192 agreed with this point of view as did Munck, op. cit., 126, who proposed in addition that there was a double trilogy contained in Clement: the first was Protoplecticus, Paedagogus, and Didascalus, and the second was Stromata I, Stromata II, and "Physiologia." If Stromata I was not itself the Didascalus, then the later trilogy constituted it. Ibid., 111.

²Volker, op. cit., 33-34.
Didaulcalus has already been mentioned. De Faye has described it as an apology for the use of Greek philosophy in Christian theology.\(^1\) Tollinton, following Heussi, maintained that the "central purpose of the Stromateis was doctrinal, however imperfectly this may have been realized."\(^2\)

Whatever the opinion on the nature of this work, the consensus of scholarly opinion is that the so-called Book VIII is not an integral part of the Stromata; Cross referred to it as a collection of notes\(^3\) as did Chadwick\(^5\) who suggested that it was added to the incomplete work after Clement's death.\(^6\) This was probably done by a literary executor who gave it the title.\(^7\) Despite the fact that Eusebius of Caesarea and Plotius both mentioned eight books in the Stromata,\(^8\) Clement's words at the end of the Book VII that he will "proceed with his argument from a fresh

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\(^1\) de Faye, op. cit., 46.

\(^2\) Tollinton, op. cit., I, 192.


\(^5\) Chadwick, op. cit., 17.

\(^6\) Ibid.

\(^7\) Robert Pierce Casey, "Introduction" to the Excerpta Ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria (London: Christophers, 1934), 3-4.

\(^8\) Chadwick, op. cit., 17.
beginning" are now generally taken to indicate that Book VIII of the *Stromata* is the beginning of a new book.¹

The *Excerpta ex Theodoto* and the *Eclogae Propheticae* follow the *Stromata* in the manuscripts. De Faye has suggested that the *Excerpta* contain extracts of gnostic books which, with other extracts from the philosophers in the fragment of Book VIII of the *Stromata*, were the material upon which Clement wanted to draw for the *Didascalus*. Patrick has suggested that the *Excerpta* were extracts from an otherwise unknown gnostic author named Theodotus. The *Eclogae Propheticae* were, according to Casey, "note books containing materials gathered from other works and tentative formulations of the author's own view."² The *Hypotyposeis*, Book VIII of the *Stromata* and gnostic writings have all been suggested as the source of the *Eclogae*.

The authenticity of several of the works attributed to Clement has been questioned. Wendland's objection to the authenticity of the *Paedagogus* on the grounds that it is so saturated with Stoicism that Clement could not have written it, has not

¹Westcott, *op. cit.*, 563.
An Address to the Newly Baptized has at times been included among the works of Clement following its discovery by Barnard in the Escorial Library and his conjecture as to its authenticity. Not all accept this conjecture, however, Tollinton observed that it "may well be an extremely interesting summary of Clement's teaching, but it is difficult, on grounds of style, to regard it as actually coming from his pen."

The final consideration concerns the general level of Clement's scholarship. Clement of Alexandria was held in high repute as a man of learning from his own time until 1879 when Hermann Diels called him "a diligent but uncritical plagiarist." because of his apparently indiscriminate, inaccurate and second-
hand use of his sources. Since that time, scholars have attempted either to support or to disprove Diels' theory.

Those who criticized Clement's scholarship asserted that he could not possibly have been directly familiar with the three hundred forty-eight authors referred to in the course of his writings. Undoubtedly their observation that he made use of "florilegia" was correct. But whether this fact is sufficient to condemn Clement as "a diligent but uncritical plagiarist" is open to question.

Two points may be made in Clement's defense. First, Clement had much more than a superficial knowledge of those authors whose thought influenced him significantly. His writings reveal his obvious familiarity both with the Old Testament, which is his main and most frequently quoted source, and with the New Testament, which he quotes mainly from memory. It is obvious that he was also personally familiar with the heretical treatises of the Gnostics. In addition, there can be no question that he had an excellent first-hand knowledge of most of the classics of Greek literature.

1 Tollinton, op. cit., I, 157.

4 Tollinton, op. cit., I, 128, 165.
5 Norris, op. cit., 21.
some one hundred sixty times, exclusive of general references to him, and these citations have been shown to come directly from Plato's works rather from a compilation of quotations. A comparison of Clement's Protrepticus and Plato's Phaedrus made by Butterworth indicates that the former work is filled with allusions to the latter, and that none of the direct quotations from the Phaedrus would have been obtained from a book of abstracts.

In further justification of Clement's critical and intelligent use of his sources, Outler, whose study comparing twelve of Clement's longest quotations from Plato with the original indicated that Clement was in general faithful to the text, has observed:

Clement's 'Platonism' is neither a direct nor a faithful reproduction of the Plato we know, whether from the later dialogues or from Aristotle's Metaphysics. At the same time, it is important to observe that Clement's estimate and use of Plato give no indication that he was aware of any distortion or novelty in his interpretation, either of the man or of the dialogues. This suggests inevitably that Clement understood Plato in accordance with views long current in Alexandria and the Hellenistic world.

From the results of these studies, it seems safe to conclude

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1 Tollinton, op. cit., I, 7.

2 Frank Lowry Clark, "Citations of Plato in Clement of Alexandria" (Transaction and Proceeding of the American Philological Association; Boston, 1902), XXXIII, xv.


4 Outler, op. cit., 223.

5 Ibid., 236-237.
that, though Clement undoubtedly did not have the same degree of familiarity with all of the writers whom he quoted or mentioned, nevertheless he knew well the works of the authors whose thought had a significant influence on his own writings and he used them reliably and intelligently.

Of the other classical authors, Homer, Euripides, and the Stoics were also well known to him.¹ He quoted the writings of Philo Judaeus almost as often as he quoted Plato.² He also had Plutarch’s works in his library, even though “they were not very frequently unrolled.”³

Second, Clement was a man of his age and that age was not one of originality and creativity. "It produced no writer of the first rank. It was artificial rather than spontaneous. It was imitative more than original. It was appreciative rather than constructive."⁴ But to deny that Clement was a creative genius is not necessarily to imply that he was not a man of some intellectual stature and perception. He was the first among the Church Fathers "to see the necessity of formulating a Christian theory of the universe, a Christian philosophy of history, and a

¹Norris, op. cit., 21.
²Ibid.
³Tollinton, op. cit., I, 71.
Christian code of ethics."¹ He also recognized the importance of reconciling philosophy and Christian theology.² Perhaps, indeed, his chief contribution to Christianity was "his quiet yet effective work in giving to the hitherto intellectually undisciplined Christian movement a respectable standing among the educated and well to do."³ Whether one agrees with Tollinton, that "he did greater work than it was in his nature to do"⁴ because of the favorable political, social, spiritual, and intellectual milieu in which he lived and worked, still it seems impossible to deny that Clement made a definite contribution to the thought of his time and that, despite justifiable criticism, he is "still a scholar of deserved repute."⁵

The impact of the Greek philosophers, especially Plato, of Philo Judaeus and Judaic tradition, and of the Old and New Testaments upon the thought of Clement is obvious both from the frequency of his quotations from or allusions to these authors and works and from the manner in which he assimilated their ideas and perspectives and literary methods. A brief examination of each

¹Patrick, op. cit., 32.
³Patrick, op. cit., 231.
⁴Tollinton, op. cit., I, 65.
⁵Ibid., 162.
of these authors or works, both in reference to Clement's understanding and use of them and in their use of κοινωνία and its cognates, as well as of the phenomenon of gnosticism, which pervaded the thought world of the patristic period, will be advantageous before beginning a detailed study of κοινωνία and its cognates in Clement of Alexandria.

Plato was the most influential of the Greek philosophers in shaping Clement's thought. He was not only philosophical thought influencing Clement however. Aristotelian, Stoic, and Neo-Platonic elements have also been detected in certain aspects

1 Cf. Chapters III and IV for the use of κοινωνία in the philosophers however.

2 Münck, op. cit., 208-209 and Johannes Meifort, Der Platonismus bei Clemens Alexandrinus (Tübingen, 1928), 2, 9, agree that Clement felt most at home in the world of Platonism, but Münck adds that he was also familiar with Stoicism and Neopythagoreanism, and Meifort, that strictly speaking he was an eclectic. Tollinton, op. cit., I, 7 observes that he drew from all the schools—Platonic, Stoic, Cynic, Pythagorean, Epicurean—and that he abandoned none of them except the Epicurean when he became a Christian. Osborn, op. cit., 78, J. Wytzes, "The Two Fold Way (I): Platonic Influences in the Work Clement of Alexandria," Vigiliae Christianae, XI (December, 1957), 241, and R. E. Witt, "The Hellenism of Clement of Alexandria," Classical Quarterly, 25(1931), 195 all recognize a strong Stoic element in Clement's thought.
of his theology, ethics, epistemology, and methodology. Only the Epicureans, it seems, did not make some contribution to his thought.

Despite the position of de Faye, op. cit., 256-237 that Clement's conception of God has no trace of Stoic influence in it, Tollinton, op. cit., II, 279 believes that Stoic influence can be seen in the emphasis on the omnipotence of God found in Clement.

de Faye, op. cit., 204, Mark, in Patrick, op. cit., 141, and Th. Camelot, Foi et Gnose: Introduction a L'Etude de la Connaissance Mystique chez Clement d'Alexandrie (Paris: J. Vrin, 1945), 543 hold that Clement is principally a disciple of the Stoics in his ethics. According to Osborn, op. cit., 102, Clement's concepts of providence, virtue, good will, and apatheia are derived, to a great degree from the Stoics. His ideal gnostic has affinities with the Stoic "Wise Man" especially in his practice of apatheia, according to Tollinton, op. cit., I, 169. Clement is a Platonist in his ethics according to J. Wytzes, op. cit., and Ritter, cited in Patrick, op. cit., 141. Osborn, op. cit., 100, sees Aristotelian influences in the ideas of end, purpose, function, measure, mean, and right reason with Clement uses Dahne claims Clement is a Neo-Platonist in his ethics, according to Patrick, op. cit., 141.

Henry Austryn Wolfson, The Philosophy of the Church Fathers (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1956), I, 112, maintains that Clement adopted the Aristotelian term "faith" and identified it with the Stoic term "assent" both meaning "the acceptance of some doctrine as a result of having been rationally demonstrated."

Westcott, op. cit., 561 sees in the Word of Clement who addresses, trains and teaches a parallel to the Neo-Platonic system of purification, initiation, and vision.

Camelot, Foi et Gnose, 543, says that Clement criticized the Epicurean materialism and emphasis on pleasure and for all practical purposes rejected their philosophy.
The progress of determining what contributions the Greek philosophers made to Clement's thought is complicated by the fact that many of the elements which can be attributed to the influence of Greek philosophy, such as those related to the nature of God, man as the image of God, the nature of the human soul, ethics

1 Meifort, op. cit., 86 has observed that the idea of the incarnation as the self-revelation of God is completely unplatonic. R. Newton Flew, The Idea of Perfection in Christian Theology: An Historical Study of the Christian Ideal for the Present Life (London: H. Milford, 1934), 142 objects that "Clement is working with an idea of God which is essentially Hebraic and not merely or even predominantly Hellenic."

2 Cuthbert Lattey, "The Deification of Man in Clement of Alexandria: Some Further Notes," Journal of Theological Studies 17(1916), 257-258 objects to regarding the idea of man as the image of God in Clement as a Platonic influence. He holds that this is one of the central doctrines of St. Paul and, in addition, Clement's use of this idea could also reflect the influence of Hellenistic ruler-worship.

3 Meifort, op. cit., 25 holds that Clement's tripartite soul reflects the influence of both Plato and Paul.

4 Volker, op. cit., 102 maintains that Clement's ethics are derived basically from the New Testament. But Osborn, op. cit., 94 criticizes Volker for unnecessarily minimizing the influence of philosophy upon the formulation of Clement's ethics. In regard to Clement's emphasis on ἀπαθεία, generally regarded as a Stoic virtue, Theodor Ruther, Die sittliche Forderung der Apathie in den beiden ersten christlichen Jahrhunderten und bei Klemens von Alexandrien. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des christlichen Volkslebensbegriffes. (Freiburg: Verlag Herder, 1949) has said: "Die Lehre des Klemens von der Apathie hat am Christleben Menschenbilae der Zukunft mitgestaltet," Henri-Dominique Pire, "Sur l'empi de des termes Apatheia et Eleos dans les oeuvres de Clément d'Alexandrie," Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques, 27(July, 1938), 249 indicates that, while the term Apathie retains its Stoic meaning, "exclusion de mouvements passionnels," in Clement, in addition he often couples it with the concept eleos or compassion in the Christian sense.
and mysticism,\(^1\) can also be regarded as coming from the New Testament. It is not necessary, however, or even wise, to attempt to isolate too completely these various influences on Clement's thought. It was Clement's significant contribution to have seen the necessity for the integration of Greek philosophy with Christian theology.\(^2\) Spanneut has suggested that the earlier Church Fathers had been influenced, perhaps unconsciously, by Stoicism and that Clement's thought forms the transitional link

\(^1\)According to Casey, op. cit., 45 the mystical element in Clement's thought was derived most likely from Paul and John as well as from Plato. Clement has been given the title "father of intellectual mysticism." Cf. Casey, op. cit., 96. Many have held that Clement was himself a mystic; Cf. Volker, op. cit., 45, Munck, op. cit., 82 and Le Gnostique de Saint Clément d'Alexandrie. Opuscule inédit de Fenelon (Paris, 1930). But Bigg seems to have effectively demonstrated that while Clement was the father of the mystics, he does not seem to have been one himself. Cf. Bigg, op. cit., Tollinton, op. cit., II, 237 and Molland, The Conception of the Gospel in Alexandrian Theology (Oslo, 1938), 81.

\(^2\)Claude Mondesert, Clément D'Alexandrie: Introduction a l'Etude de sa Pensee religieuse a partir de l'ecriture (Aubier: Editions Montaigne, 1944), 1-2 has commented, "Il était le premier à avoir abordé avec assez d'ampleur le problème des relations de la foi et de la philosophie; on redécouvre aujourd'hui qu'il est aussi très profondément religieux, qu'il même déjà théologien et précisément théologien parce que philosophe."
between the Stoic and the Platonic influence on Christianity.¹ Muckle speculated that Clement may have been following a tradition established by his teacher Pantaenus in attempting to integrate both Platonism and Stoicism into Christian theology.² Clement, however, seems to have been primarily concerned with the relation and equation of the New Testament and Plato³ and with

¹Michel Spanneut, Le Stoicisme des Fères de L’Église (Paris Editions du Seuil, 1957), 425 says: “Clément d’Alexandrie mérite également une révision des positions classiques. Son anthropologie est loin d’être toujours platonicienne. Il est souvent dichotomiste et divise l’âme à la mode stoicienne, en accordant à l’hégémonikon un rôle unificateur. Dans ses théories de la génération et de l’hérédité, fusionnent des éléments de toute origine. Dans une conception de la connaissance, le système du Por­tique apparaît, par bribes, à peu près au complet: ne va-t-il pas jusqu’à prôner un certain sensualisme? En morale, l’influence est manifeste, surtout dans son insistance sur l’apathie et dans sa tendance intellectualiste. En théologie, il décrit le rôle unifiant de la Providence, qui pénètre tout, et surtout crée une atmosphère religieuse proche du neo-stoïcisme contemporain. Enfin, il devise les êtres créés selon la classification stoïciennne et professe sur le monde beaucoup de thèses de même origine. On a peut-être trop vite conclu que Clément était le premier des Platoniciens chrétiens. Il n’est comme Athénagore, que le témoin de la philosophie eclectique et religieuse de son épo­que.” Herbert Musurillo, S.J., “New Horizons in Patristic The­ology: A Survey of Recent Work,” Traditio, XIV (1958), 59 evaluates Spanneut’s work as follows: One wonders if the skeins of Stoicism can be so accurately disentangled within the mesh of Hellenistic and late Roman philosophers, at a time when a vulgarization, a kind of philosophic leveling process, had already set in. But in all honesty the author does not press his points ex­cessively, and although his array of evidence still leaves one with a twinge of doubt, it is a monumental work of undoubted merit.”


³Casey, op. cit., 96.
the insights which Plato might provide for a better understanding of the New Testament, since "all that was valuable in Platonism was implied in the New Testament."1

Because of the marked influence of Plato upon Clement's thought, "there has been a constant debate as to whether Clement really is a Platonic Christian or simply an 'intellectually Christianized' Platonist."2 Many writers have followed Bigg's view of regarding Clement as a Christian Platonist.3 Enslin stressed that he is "a Christian, and a convinced one. But he sees profound values in other systems and is not ashamed to recognize them."4 Meifort has questioned the idea of a Christian Platonism.5 Wytzes perhaps comes closer to the truth when, quoting Pohlenz, he describes the thought found in Clement's writings as "Greek Christianity" rather than as Christian Platonism.6

The influence of Plato upon Clement was primarily in the

1Ibid.


3Mollard, Conception of Gospel, 173; Outler, op. cit., 220.

4Enslin, op. cit., 229.

5Meifort's views have also been criticized however. Outler, op. cit., 220 says: "His Plato is a sort of Pauline Christian absorbed in a quest for salvation and mystical exaltation. Such an interpretation of Plato and of Clement, as well, can be dalled into the question."

6Wytzes, op. cit., 236.
area of theology. Both men highlighted the transcendence of God, but with different motives. Plato tried "to keep the Deity from contact with the world. The aim of Clement is rather, in harmony with his view of a universal providence, to maintain the unconditional freedom of God and to emphasize the necessity of revelation."

Clement's idea of man as the image of God has Platonic overtones, though it may spring "indirectly and not directly from Plato." "With Plato himself it is clear that the chief connotation of the phrase is the life of reason which, for him, is the life of true virtue. Clement reverses this relation. The life of ethical perfection is discussed in terms of growth in Christian grace and love." According to Wytzes, Clement maintains that man can become like God, but only on a completely different level from him. Man's likeness to God exists only in his

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1de Faye, op. cit., 264; Camelot, Foi et Gnose, 15.
2Patrick, op. cit., 72; Tollinton, op. cit., II, 279.
3Patrick, op. cit., 72-73.
5Osborn, op. cit., 88.
6Outler, op. cit., 231.
7Wytzes, op. cit., 244.
Therefore the powers of his soul should be directed to the search for the divine and the development there of the image of God. The chief means to this end is the practice of contemplation which may result in a state of ecstasy, though few attain it. The final goal of the soul for Plato is to find "its ultimate peace in the world of ideas...that of Clement in the kosmos noetos." Man is able to blur the image of God in his soul by living on a natural level, however, and so both Plato and Clement try to deter him from this by the idea of punishment after death.

Neither Plato nor Clement thought of the body as evil in itself, but both taught that the body ought to be subordinated as the proper organ of the soul...The difference between Clement and Plato at this point is one both of emphasis and of object. Plato mistrusts the body because its visible give only appearance and not reality. Knowledge is direct rational insight, and sensual pleasures or pains hinder this. Clement, not nearly so concerned with scientific error, is aware that the passions and feelings of the body may corrupt the


3Ibid., 147.

4Outler, op. cit., 219.

5Wytzes, Twofold Way II, 134.

6de Pauley, op. cit., 117.

soul's desire for perfection. Therefore, the body must be rigidly controlled. The object of the body's subordination is, for Plato, ἴσως; for Clement γράφεις.

Osborn has made the following comparison of the starting point and the end of the good and the nature of the good life as found in Plato and in Clement:

The starting point is, for Plato, the daemon or the ruling rational part of each human soul. The starting point is, for Clement, the image of God which every soul receives at birth. The end is, for Plato, the Good. The end is, for Clement, God. The good life is, for Clement, assimilation to God and restoration to perfect sonship.

Philo Judaeus is the second of the major influences on Clement's thought to be considered here. Philo, as a man of wide learning, deep spirituality, and a naturally philosophic temperament... was peculiarly fitted to be a link between the worlds of Judaism and Hellenism; indeed, he played in the life of Alexandrian Judaism the same role as Clement was to play later for the Christian community. He frequently reflects Stoic ideas but Platonism is the main Greek influence in his writings.

It has been suggested that philosophical Judaism was probably the medium through which the Greek and Christian worlds came into contact with each other. Undoubtedly Philo as a leading exponent of philosophical Judaism, was significantly influential in effecting this contact.

1 Outler, op. cit., 234-235.
2 Osborn, op. cit., 84.
3 Bell, Cults and Creeds, 47-48.
4 Hatch, op. cit., 128.
The influence of Philo on Clement was both methodological and doctrinal. Among the Alexandrian Jews of the first century B.C. and later, there developed a method of non-literal interpretation of Scripture based on knowledge derived from Greek philosophy known as philosophical allegory. This form of allegory differed from that used by the Jewish rabbis of the period. Philosophical allegory was adopted by some of the Alexandrian Jews in complete disregard of the traditional approach; others, of course, recognized only the traditional method of interpretation. Philo attempted to combine both methods in his Scriptural exegesis, at times restricting the use of philosophical allegory to trained students. While he realized the values to be found in Greek philosophy, Philo never ceased to regard philosophy as the handmaid of Scripture, thus indicating his belief in the subordination of reason to faith. In the tradition of Philo and under his influence, Clement also employed both types of allegory to the exegesis of the Old Testament. In addition, he extended the application of allegory to the New Testament following the example of Paul's allegorical interpretation of the Old Testament in

1H.A. Wolfson, Philo (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1948), 56-57. Characteristic of the philosophical type of allegory is the change of a term from its literal meaning which need not thereby be rejected, to a meaning which is philosophical, according to Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Fathers, 36.

2Wolfson, Philo, 150-151.
Clement followed Philo faithfully in regarding philosophy as subordinate to and dependent upon Scripture and the revelation of God. He set a pattern for Alexandrine theology, according to Bigg, which:

regarded Allegorism as having been handed down from Christ and a few chosen Apostles, through a succession...of Teachers. They employed it boldly...for the reconciliation of Greek culture with the Hebrew Scriptures. And lastly they applied it to the New Testament...with the serious object of correcting the literal mechanical, hierarchical tendencies of the day.

The influence of Philo's Logos doctrine upon that of Clement has also been observed. The Logos doctrine has been described as the heart of Clement's theology and its most distinctive feature. It was a means of bridging the gap between the immanence and the transcendence of God. "God abides unknown; and yet through the Logos, to whom nothing is incomprehensible, there lies an avenue even to the knowledge of God." The Logos is "l'Image du Père, l'Idée du Père, la Face du Père, la lumière

1 This consisted of predictions regarding the first and second coming of Christ, predictions dealing with the pre-existence of Christ, and legal and moral predictions, according to Wolfson, Philosophy of the Church Fathers, 43.

2 Bigg, op. cit., 57.

3 Tollinton, op. cit., I, 169.

4 Patrick, op. cit., 137; Quasten, op. cit., 21.

5 Tollinton, op. cit., I, 338.

6 Ibid., 352.
Tollinton claims that Clement "retains all the essential features of the Philonic conception and he has robbed it of none of its surpassing dignity." But, according to de Faye, though the two Logos doctrines seem identical at first glance, there is a basic difference in that Philo's Logos originates from the cosmological order, while Clement's Logos is an intermediary between God and man and reveals its Christian character in that it does not emanate into aeons or angels.


2 Tollinton, op. cit., I, 353.

3 de Faye, op. cit., 328.

4 Lebreton, op. cit., 151-152. Two theories concerning the generation of the Logos were current in Clement's time according to H.A. Wolfson, "Clement of Alexandria on the Generation of the Logos," Church History, 20 (March, 1951). The twofold stage theory in which the Logos at first existed from eternity in God and then prior to the creation of the world, it was generated from the essence of God as a distinct personal being," and the single stage theory in which "the generation of the Logos from God was from eternity." Wolfson says that most writers include Clement in the second category, but that there are passages suggesting that he held the former view. (79) He suggests that Clement may have changed his opinion under the influence of Origen to the twofold stage theory sometime after he left Alexandria. (80).
Philo uses κοινωνία and its cognates to describe certain relationships and practices in the Old Testament and Essene communities. Moses he describes as a man who enjoyed κοινωνία with the Father and Maker of all. The Old Testament priests who offered the consecrated offerings were honored by being allowed to have κοινωνία with God in the thank-offerings rendered to Him. But the laws also insisted that those who carried out the sacrifices, namely those in need, as well as the priests should be "partners of the altar whose board they share." The laws instructed the rich to share their goods with the poor and at the feast of widows, orphans and all in need were entitled to share in the goods of those who were well-endowed.

Philo's description of the κοινωνία practiced in the Essene community provides an interesting parallel with the early Christian Church, though there is probably little question of

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2 Philo De Specialibus Legibus I. 131.

3 De Specialibus Legibus I. 221.

4 De Specialibus Legibus II. 107.

5 De Specialibus Legibus II. 108.
direct contact between the two groups, and still less of influence. ¹ Josephus, another Jewish writer and contemporary of Philo, also refers to the Essenes and their practice of κοινωνία. Citations from his writings on this topic will be incorporated here with those of Philo. In addition, information about this sect has been gained from the recent excavations at Qumran, considered by many as an Essene community² and will be used as a

¹ Millar Burrows, More Light on the Dead Sea Scrolls (New York: Viking Press, 1958), 132, says: "There may have been some contact, or perhaps contacts, direct or indirect, between the apostolic church and the community of Qumran. Several possibilities have been shown, but, contrary to the opinion of most recent writers on the scrolls, I cannot see anything more than vague possibilities. What the Dead Sea Scrolls actually demonstrate has been well summed up by Albright: they show that the writers of the New Testament 'drew from a common reservoir of terminology and ideas which were well known to the Essenes and'—this I would emphasize—'presumably familiar also to other Jewish sects of the period'." "Although Essenesm bore in itself more than one element that one way or another fertilized the soil from which Christianity was to spring, it is nevertheless evident that the latter religion represents something completely new which can only be adequately explained by the person of Jesus himself." Cf. J.T. Milik, Ten Years of Discovery in the Wilderness of Judea, tr. J. Strugnell (Naperville, Ill.; A.R. Allenson, 1959), 143.

² Frank Moore Cross, Jr., The Ancient Library of Qumran and Modern Biblical Studies, The Haskell Lectures, 1956-57 (New York: Doubleday, 1958). 37-38 says: "There is now sufficient evidence ...to identify the people of the scrolls definitely with the Essenes. The community at Qumran was an Essene settlement." Burrows, op. cit., 253, says: "Not all scholars, however, are even now convinced that the issue is closed. Some still reject entirely the identification of the sect with the Essenes; others feel that it can be accepted only with qualifications and reservations." Milik, op. cit., 56 feels the conclusion that the members of the Qumran community were the Essenes is inescapable.
control on the testimony of Philo and Josephus.¹

Philo classifies the Essenes as that more select portion of the Jewish nation whom Moses trained for the life of fellowship because of their holiness.² He says that their love of man is expressed by their spirit of fellowship, which defies description. Such κοινωνία as exists among them "is the clearest evidence of a perfect and supremely happy life."³

One of the Essene practices which was directed to the preservation of the spirit of κοινωνία was a community of goods.⁵ The excavations at Qumran witness to this practice. There is evidence of a common pottery kiln, a common scriptorium, a common irrigation system, common storage facilities, and a common dining room. They had a common treasury, common disbursements, public meals. New members were required to surrender their property to

¹Lietzmann, op. cit., I, 35 states, regarding the testimonies of Philo and Josephus on the Essenes: "the critical reader will do well to set aside the Greek emendations to both sketches."

²Philo Hypothetica 11.1.

³Philo Quod Omnis Probus 84.

⁴Quod Omnis Probus 91.

The Essenes disdained marriage as the sole or principal danger to the maintenance of the common life. A wife, especially if she becomes a mother, is bound to compel her husband, in the interests of his family, "to commit actions which are all hostile to the life of fellowship." Josephus mentions that, while they do not marry, they do adopt children and train them in the Essene way of life. He also mentions that one group of them did marry but had very strict rules governing the marriage. The grave finds at Qumran, which include the bones of women and

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1 Helmer Ringgren, *The Faith of Qumran: Theology of the Dead Sea Scrolls*, tr. Emilie T. Sander (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), 210, basing his statement on information gained from the Qumran documents, comments: "All who were admitted to membership in the community handed over their property to the community treasury, which was then administered in common (QS 1.1lf cf. 111.2; vi. 19f). On the other hand, CD xiv. 13f. implies that a member was allowed control over his own income, for it is directed that a minimum of two days' wages per month were to be set aside for the common funds. Whether these regulations date from different periods or whether they actually should be reconciled with each other is uncertain."

2 Philo *Hypo*. 11.14. Cross, *op. cit.*, 71-72, says regarding the wantonness of women: "This seems a convincing enough reason for the practice of celibacy...but one suspects it originates, not in Essene theology, but in Josephus' Hellenistic imagination." To explain the female burials at Qumran, Cross does not posit two sects of Essenes, one which married and another which did not, but rather he sees that there is "an ambiguous attitude toward marriage integral to the structure of the Essene faith."

3 *Hypo*. 11.16.

4 Josephus *Jewish Wars* II, 8.2-13.
children, suggest that while celibacy may have been the ideal, marriage was allowed.¹

Kοινωνία as a sharing of goods and as a spirit of brotherly love and a participation in common meals appear as common characteristics of the Essenes. The group is united by sharing the same beliefs and prayer rituals and eschatological expectations, within the context of a common life.

A third major influence upon the thought of Clement of Alexandria, and undoubtedly the single most important one, are the Old and New Testaments. Clement's general understanding, appreciation and use of the two Testaments and the occurrences of Kοινωνία and its cognates in them will be considered here.

The Old Testament, through which the Spirit, Logos, Educator, or Lord spoke to the Jews,² is for Clement a final authority, "the medium or embodiment of divine truth."³ He regards it as a direct manifestation of God in all but its anthropomorphic concept of Him.⁴ In rejecting the anthropomorphic concept of God Clement does not reduce God to a philosophic concept however. "To him God is not pure Being, self-sufficient in his own blessedness: His goodness is deed; He is living and working; He is

¹Cross, op. cit., 71-72.
²Quatember, op. cit., 63.
³Tollinton, op. cit., II, 193.
⁴de Faye, op. cit., 168, 222-223.
The harmony of the Old Testament Law and the Gospel is one of Clement's main tenets. Accordingly, the Old Testament and the New Testament have equal authority for him, but at times he puts the New Testament above the Old Testament, since the one is the fulfillment of the other. "Das Neue Testament bringt das Alte Testament zum Abschluss und bildet den Grund und den Prototyp für die kommenden Geschlechter," according to Kutter.

Clement's exegesis of the Old Testament is often made in light of the New Testament. He likes "to show in the Old Testament the figure of Christ." Christ as Logos is both the revelation of the Father and the Educator of the Christian, by His example and by the laws He established.

Scripture for Clement is a source of doctrine, a guide to living, and a source of gnosis leading to spiritual perfection. He is not overly conscious of the New Testament canon being

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1Flew, op. cit., 142.
2Molland, Conception of Gospel, 16.
3Quatember, op. cit., 63.
4Hermann Kutter, Clemens Alexandrinus und das Neue Testament (Giessen: J. Ricker, 1897), 152.
6Jules Lebreton, op. cit., 161.
7Mondesert, op. cit., 263.
formed during his time, because he finds a basic harmony between the teaching of the Lord, the doctrine of the Apostles, the tradition of the Church, and the contents of the two Scriptures,\(^1\) which he regards as "modes of revelation, rather than fixed collections of books."\(^2\)

The Greek translation of the Hebrew Scriptures was known as the Septuagint or \textit{LXX}.\(^3\) "At the time of the early Roman empire,

\(^1\)Molland, \textit{Conception of Gospel}, 16.

\(^2\)Tollinton, \textit{op. cit.}, II, 175.

\(^3\)According to the Letter of Aristeas, published either between 145-127 B.C. or c. 100 B.C. (Bell, \textit{Cults and Creeds}, 44) the translation of the Hebrew Scripture, beginning with the Pentateuch, ("Introduction" to \textit{A Concordance to the Septuagint and the other Greek Versions of the Old Testament} (including the apocryphal books), ed. Edwin Hatch and Henry A. Redpath, assisted by other Scholars (Graz: Akademie Verlag), I, xxii. into Greek for the Jews of the diaspora was undertaken during the reign of Ptolemy Philadelphos (285-247) B.C. by seventy-two Palestinian Jews who worked for seventy-two days on the island of Pharos. "Septuagint," \textit{The Oxford Companion to Classical Literature}, ed. Paul Harvey (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1959), 390. Bell, \textit{Cults and Creeds}, 45, comments: "The facts are quite different and, if modern research can be trusted, rather complicated. There is no doubt that the Pentateuch was translated into Greek quite early in the Ptolemaic period, probably well before the middle of the third century B.C., for the Jews of Alexandria, most of whom could no longer understand the Hebrew text. Kahle has argued, with great cogency, that several translations, or rather perhaps several revisions of an early, inexact translation, were made, and that the Letter of Aristeas was published as propaganda for a new and more authoritative revision, issued about 100 B.C. This standard text did not at once supersede the various current versions; a comparison of the quotations found in the New Testament, in Philo, Josephus, and other writers who used the Old Testament in Greek with the existing Septuagint suggests strongly that these writers were often using versions which differed markedly from the Septuagint we possess."
as is shown by the use made of it by Philo and Paul, the LXX was the universally recognized Bible of the diaspora, even for the purposes of divine worship. ¹

When the Christian community adopted the LXX as its sacred book, the Jews abandoned it and formed their own new Greek version of the Old Testament early in the second century A.D. A little later in the century two new translations of Theodotian and Symmachus also appeared.

A study of the writings of Clement show acquaintance with all the books collected in the LXX except Ruth, Obadiah, the Letter of Jeremiah and Maccabees III and IV. In his use of the LXX, Clement made no distinction between the canonical and deuterocanonical books. In many passages, especially in the prophets, his text agrees with the revised versions of the LXX, especially that of Theodotion. ²

κοινωνία and its cognates appear in the LXX primarily as translations of the hbr-group, hbr meaning associate or comrade

¹ Lietzmann, op. cit., I, 89.
² Otto Stählin, Clemens Alexandrinus und die Septuaginta (Nürnberg, 1901), 76–77.
or companion.\(^1\) "It is noticeable that haber had to do with the relationship of man to man. In the Apocrypha this appears as an intimate fellowship in respect of a spiritual benefit. But nowhere in the Old Testament does haber and its cognates (or koinonía and the derivatives representing these Hebrew words) ever connote the relationship of man to God."\(^2\) Even for the sacrificial meal which expressed the unique relationship between God and his people Israel, the use of the hbr- koinon word-group was avoided.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Friedrich Hauck, Koínóνα, Koínóνας, Koínóνω, Koínóνια, συ-κοίνονες, συγ-κοίνονες, κοίνονες, koínóν, koínóνας. Theologisches Wörterbuch zum Neuen Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittel (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1950), XII, 800-801. J.Y. Campbell, "Koinonia and its Cognates in the New Testament," Journal of Biblical Literature, LI(1932), 358, after having studied the LXX usages of koinonos, observes: "In none of these has it the wide, general sense of 'companion', in spite of the fact that it is used to translate or some synonymous form from the same root, and these Hebrew words can have that sense." He further indicates, however, that the occurrences of the verb form, according to Campbell, do not show any departure from classical usage. Ibid., 359. In contradiction to Campbell's former thesis, however, Hauck comments that koinonos does come to be used absolutely as 'associate' or 'comrade' in the Apocrypha, e.g. Sir. 42.3. op. cit., 801.


\(^3\) Hauck, op. cit., 802. Jourdan, op. cit., 113, n. 6 takes the same position, stating: "It is at least questionable if the ancient Hebrews regarded their sacrificial worship as establishing a relationship to God." He adds further, 123: "There is, in truth, nothing more certain than that to the Hebrews of ancient times as well as to those of the age of St. Paul, it never occurred to think that they were, or could be, haberim (= koinonoi) of God. Not even Philo had gone so far as to describe them as such, even in the passage from his De Specialibus Legibus usually cited in this connection."
Israelite piety dictated an attitude of dependence and bondage in relation to God but never one of equality.

The twenty-five citations of κοινωνία and its cognates observed in the Septuagint occur in a variety of contexts. Several citations from the apocryphal wisdom literature stress the fact that κοινωνία is impossible without mutual benefit and compatibility. "What companionship can a wolf have with a lamb?" asks Ben-Sira in Ecclesiasticus.¹ And "what relation can an earthen pot have with a kettle? The kettle knocks against it, and it is broken in pieces,"² he says, warning against becoming partner with a stronger or richer man.³ The author of the Wisdom of Solomon says: "I will not travel with futile envy, for it cannot associate with wisdom."⁴

In terms of the marriage relationship, the wife is the κοινωνος of the husband⁵ in the κοινωνία of life formed by marriage.⁶

κοινωνία and its cognates occur in contexts regarding

¹Sir. 13.17
²Sir. 13.2.
³Sir.
⁴Wis. 6.23.
⁵Mal.2.14.
⁶II Mac.14.25.
participation or participators in something evil. Eliu blames Job for walking in the company of evil doers and wicked men.\(^1\) Solomon cautions young men in Proverbs not to listen to the enticements of sinners trying to persuade them to share in their crime of ambushing just men.\(^2\) He also warns them that a man who robs his mother or father is a \(κοινωνός\) of the profane man.\(^3\) Ecclesiastes warns that men who do evil will after death become \(κοινωνοί\) with the shades.\(^4\) Isaiah describes the kings of Juda in the eighth century B.C. as rebels and comrades of thieves.\(^5\) Ben-Sira cautions: "The man who touches pitch will get his hands dirty, / And the man who associates with a proud person will become like him."\(^6\) He also warns about the friend who is a \(κοινωνός\) of one's table but not of one's troubles.\(^7\) On the other hand, the man who shares in the words of wisdom has glory.\(^8\) This is a worthy and ennobling partnership.

As has already been stated, the \(κοινωνά\)-group words are not used to express a relationship between God and man. There are,

\(^1\)Job 34.8.  
\(^2\)Pro.1.11.  
\(^3\)Pro.28.24.  
\(^4\)Eccl.9.4.  
\(^5\)Is.1.23.  
\(^6\)Sir.13.1.  
\(^7\)Sir.6.10.  
\(^8\)Wis.8.18.
however, some citations which occur in passages describing matters of a religious nature. The Israelites were described as κοινωνία of the pagans when they built high places and erected "sacred pillars and sacred poles on every high hill and under every spreading tree, and offered sacrifices there on all the high places." When God became angry and forsook the Israelites, even the Temple at Jerusalem shared in the misfortune that overtook the nation by its destruction. But afterwards when God repented, the Temple too had κοινωνία in the benefits which the Lord bestowed.

The priest Eleazar was so pious and pure that his stomach never had κοινωνία with unclean meat.

When Ptolemy IV threatened to take away some of the citizen rights of the Jews at Alexandria if they would not offer sacrifice and be initiated into the mysteries, some of the Jews acquiesced, expecting, as III Maccabees says, "to gain great

\[1\] IV KI 7.11.
\[2\] II Mac. 5.20.
\[3\] IV Mac. 7.6.
glory from their association with the king."¹ Those who refused to co-operate he took to Schedia and imprisoned in the hippodrome so that they might have no κοινωνία with his army.²

Jehoshaphat, the king of Judah, made an alliance with Ahaziah, king of Israel.³ They apparently had mutual advantages in mind, for they built ships to sail to Tarshish. But the Lord punished Jehoshaphat for making alliance with a wicked man by destroying the ships. Another citation in a political context contains a reference by the Persian king Artaxerxes to his queen, Esther, as "our blameless partner in the kingdom."⁴

κοινωνία and κοινωνός also occur in contexts which seem to designate some type of loose business agreement. In Leviticus the Lord had told his people through Moses that a man who cheated

¹ III Mac. 2.31. "The scene of III Maccabees is placed in the reign of Ptolemy IV (Philopator) at the time of the battle of Raphia (217 B.C.). It narrates an attempt made by the king to enter the Temple at Jerusalem, and his miraculous repulses." Then follows an account of his revenge upon the Jews of Alexandria. "It would seem to have been written in Alexandria at about the same time as these books, not far from 100 B.C., a date which is confirmed by indications drawn from Papyri. The writer apparently used the lost memoirs of the reign of Philopator, written by Ptolemy Megalopolitanus shortly after his death. He seems to have combined a narrative of Philopator's attempt to enter the Temple with a later story, preserved in another form by Josephus, of a persecution of Egyptian Jews by Physcon." (146–117 B.C. = reign of Physcon), Apocrypha, 155.

² III Mac. 4.11.

³ II Chron. 20.35.

⁴ Esther 8.13.
his neighbor in regard to some "deposit or pledge" should make re­tition and one-fifth above, and in addition offer a perfect ram as a guilt-offering. Ben-Sira advised a man to be ashamed of a partner and a friend for unjust living, but not to be ashamed of settling accounts with a partner and fellow-travellers.

and its cognates in the Old Testament occur pri­marily in contexts which warn against forming relationships not based on integrity as well as mutual benefit and compatibility. The passages are instructions on how to live pure and undefiled before God. The references to the of business rela­tionships are exhortations to honesty and just dealing. The positive aspects of are seen in the statements that the man who has in words of wisdom is honored, and in the reference to the of husband and wife in marriage.

The New Testament existed in a somewhat fluid state during the first and second centuries of the Christian era. As has been observed above, Clement is not overly conscious of the New

1 Lev. 6.2.
2 Sir. 41.19.
3 Sir. 42.3. "The meaning apparently is—do not allow feelings of false shame and pride to deter from settling accounts involving mutual indebted­ness, where friends and fellow travellers are involved." Apocrypha, 469.
Testament canon being formed during his time. He seems to have felt bound to the traditional gospel which ended with Paul but accepted apocryphal works attributed to apostolic authorship while rejecting other apocryphal works. His approach to the Scripture was more instinctive than scholarly, as a study of his use of the New Testament shows.

Forty-five instances of κόινωνία, its cognates and compounds, have been noted in the New Testament. Κόινωνία was easily incorporated into the Christian vocabulary, according to Carr, because it was a word free from association with any system of philosophy or ethics and had no pagan overtones. In general, the grammatical use of κόινωνία in the New Testament remained the

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1Tollinton, *op. cit.*, II, 175 comments that the idea of a fixed canon of Scripture was less clear among the Alexandrian Fathers than it was in Irenaeus and Tertullian.

2Kutter, *op. cit.*, 151-152.


4John M. Norris, "The Functional New Testament of Clement of Alexandria," (Unpublished Doctoral dissertation; Chicago: University of Chicago, 1942), 59 observes that Clement "quotes the New Testament for the most part from memory. He had not the aid of an exact concordance, and if any of the systems of numbering were as early as his day, they were not such as lent themselves to the easy handling needed by one who used the Scripture so copiously as Clement."

same as its use in classical and Hellenistic periods.¹

Kοινωνία and its cognates occur most frequently in Paul.²

For Paul, Kοινωνία was a religious term,³ and while he recognized and respected the fundamental meaning which the Kοινονο- group of words had in Greek literature and the restrictions placed upon them in Jewish sacred literature, Paul succeeded in introducing...

Into the signification of each word a spiritual quality, distinctive and unique, of varying degrees of power and intensity...as enabled it to reflect the transcendence of St. Paul's

¹Heinrich Seesemann, Der Begriff Kοινωνία im Neuen Testament (Giessen: A. Töpelmann, 1933), 100 observes: "der Mīliche Gebrauch des Wortes Kοινωνία sich im allgemeinen nicht von dem allgemeingriesischen in klassischer wie hellenistischer zeit unterscheidet. Eine ausnahme bildet nur den Gebrauch des Paulus." Campbell, op. cit., 363 says: Grammatically, the New Testament use of Kοινωνία "does not differ from its use in classical writers. But when we turn to consider Kοινωνεῖν in the New Testament we find what at first sight appears to be a very striking and surprising difference...In only one of these eleven instances do we find a genitive of the thing shared; significantly, this is in Hebrews, the Greek of which is more classical than that of most of the New Testament writings."

²Jourdan, op. cit., 112-113 observes that Paul has even made it one of his familiar συν-compound forms, συνκοινονεῖν Campbell, op. cit., 363 comments that "the very existence of this compound suggests that the idea of association with someone else was not always felt to be expressed plainly by Kοινωνεῖν, otherwise there would have been no point in using the compound, fond of such compound verbs as the Greeks were." This is not necessarily true, however. Paul could well have done this to give special emphasis to the idea of association in a word where this was already expressed or implied.

concepts and beliefs concerning the relationship of Christ to his faithful ones and their relationship to him."

Only two instances of κοινωνία are found in the Synoptic writers. Both have the frequently occurring context of partnership in an enterprise. In Matthew, Jesus condemns the scribes and pharisees because they boast that they would not have been in killing the prophets but are at that moment plotting the death of Christ. In Luke, James and John are described as Simon's in the fishing business.

The Christian community after Pentecost is described in Acts 2:42 ff. as giving "steadfast attention to the teaching of the apostles and to union, to the breaking of bread and to the prayers. All the believers were united, and held all things in common. They would sell their possessions and goods and distribute them to everyone as need required. Apropos of this

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1Jourdan, op. cit., 112-113, 124.
2Matt. 23:30.
4C. Anderson Scott, "The 'Fellowship', or κοινωνία", "The Expository Times, XXXV (September, 1924), 567 has suggested that κοινωνία "was used as a self-designation by the early Christian community, and was in fact the earliest of such self-designations to be adopted. According to his view, the disciples were known as the 'habura'. Seesemann, op. cit., 92 objects to this theory: "Ich glaube nicht, dass mon von hier aus folgern darf, dass sich die erste Christlich Geneinde 'Chabura' = κοινωνία gennant haben muss."
5Acts 2:42.
passage, Stanley has observed that:

A close connection...existed between the 'breaking of the Bread' and this primitive Christian 'common life'. For the author of Acts, the 'breaking of the Bread' is not a by-product, or sort of liturgical rite which one might carry out for oneself; it is much rather the powerfully influential rite in which the community character, informing the whole of the Christian 'life', is expressed and affirmed...That is to say, the Eucharistic liturgy provided the motivation and supernatural dynamism which effectively realized this remarkable experiment in the practice of Christian social justice. The Christian community prepared itself for the worthy reception of the Eucharist by sharing all earthly goods in common. And conversely, the communal partaking of the Eucharist, in which the risen Lord distributed His grace among His disciples, gave them the supernatural force to live as a community, 'possessing everything in common'.

Stanley also points out that the author of Acts "saw a close relationship between the apostolic teaching and the community of goods, the one describing the doctrinal, the other the social,

As the Christian community began to develop an attitude of exclusiveness, its members were urged not to become involved with non-Christians, for "what fellowship has light with

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1 Carr, op. cit., 460-461 presents an interpretation of this passage similar to that of Stanley in viewing it as advocating a form of Christian socialism which "represents an effort to continue the life of discipleship and companionship with Christ which had been enjoyed by the Twelve, and by others, who had 'compounded' with them during the earthly ministry." More important than the almsgiving and sharing of goods, this signifies "implied a principle of brotherhood and spiritual fellowship which lies at the root of true Christian socialism." Several scholars have taken exception to this view however. William Spicer Wood, "Fellowship", The Expositor (8th Series, 1921), 38-39 has strongly objected that nowhere is there evidence "that stands anywhere for a visible Fellowship of believers, although in a minor sense it signifies fellowship or association on their part in things that belong to their common peace." Hauck, op. cit., 809-810 has taken the same position: "In Ac. 2, 42 bedeutet nicht konkret die "Gemeinde", die Genossenschaft der Christen, die sich zwar noch nicht rechtlich und kultisch von der jüdischen Gemeinde getrennt hat, aber doch schon einen Kreis eigenster Lebensgemeinschaft darstellt, sondern mehr abstrakt, geistig die Gemeinschaft des brüderlichen Zusammenhaltens das sich in Gemeindeleben bewahrt und auswirkt." Seesemann, op. cit., 89 has also followed this view: "Man wird daher auch in 2, 42 in dem ersten zusammenfassenden Bericht über das Leben der Glaubigen unter die geistige Einigkeit der ersten Gemeinde verstehen müssen."

2 Kleist-Lilly, New Testament, 457 reads: This means "literally 'be unequally yoked'. The term is used by the Greek translators of the Old Testament in reference to the prohibition of yoking or teaming together beasts of different kinds such as an ox and an ass. While the reference is not primarily to mixed marriages, yet the principle here enunciated includes and is applicable to them. So Allo."
darkness?"\textsuperscript{1} Uninvolved in the world was advocated in figurai
language in the Apocalypse where Christians were urged to
avoid the effects of the fall of Babylon so that they might not
have κοίνωνία in the resultant plagues.\textsuperscript{2} Christians were to have
no κοίνωνία in impurity or in any deeds that seek darkness.\textsuperscript{3}

They were not to participate in other men's sins,\textsuperscript{4} nor
were they even to speak to anyone preaching false doctrine, for
by so doing they would have κοίνωνία in his wicked deeds.\textsuperscript{5}

Acceptance of the gospel and the testimony of those who
were witnesses to the saving acts of Christ created κοίνωνία in
the faith\textsuperscript{6} among those willing to walk with Christ in the light.\textsuperscript{7}
James, Cephas, and John met Paul and Barnabas in Jerusalem and
made them their κοίνωνία in the Gospel.\textsuperscript{8} The latter were to
bring the Good News to the Gentiles. Titus, who had accompanied
Barnabas and Paul to Jerusalem, was referred to by Paul as his

\begin{footnotes}
\item[1] II Cor. 6:14. Apropos of this passage, Seeemann, \textit{op. cit.}
\item[3] Eph. 5:11.
\item[4] 1 Tim. 5:22.
\item[6] John 1:3.
\item[7] I John 1:6-7.
\end{footnotes}
in traveling and preaching the Word. Paul also addressed Philemon as his κοινωνός in the Faith.

The Christian was called to a unique relationship with God, the Father and his son Jesus in the Holy Spirit, a relationship

1 II Cor. 8:23. Seesemann, op. cit., 52 says that here (II Cor. 8:23) and Phlm. 17 are the two occurrences of κοινωνός used absolutely in the New Testament.

2 Phlm. 17. Hauck, op. cit., 808 agrees with the interpretation of κοινωνός as κοινωνία in the Faith, but Campbell, op. cit., 362 suggests that κοινωνός in this passage is a "half-playful but very effective use of business terms in writing of the spiritual relationship between Philemon and himself." The latter interpretation may be reading more into the passage than is actually there, considering Paul's use of the term almost exclusively in religious contexts.

3 I Cor. 1:9; I John 1:3. The interpretation of these passages has been the subject of controversy. Apropos of the former, Jourdan, op. cit., 118 has interpreted κοινωνία as "the sublime gift of God conveyed to man through his son." Campbell, op. cit., 380 interprets κοινωνία as genitive of the thing shared. Hauck, op. cit., 804-805 sees the Christian is called to communion with the Son.

4 II Cor. 13:13. Phil. 2:1. Discussion has also centered on the interpretation of these passages. The passage from Corinthians Jourdan, op. cit., 116-117 interprets as meaning that a gift "is given from the Father, through the Son, in the Holy Spirit." The sharing together cannot take place unless it is imparted by the Holy Spirit. He disagrees with Seesemann's arguments, op. cit., 62-63, that this passage should be interpreted as a fellowship or sharing in the Holy Spirit. (117). Hauck, op. cit., 807 agrees with Seesemann that the κοινωνία phrase is not parallel in construction to the other two passages but rather should be interpreted as κοινωνία with an objective genitive of thing. In regard to the passage from Philippians both Hauck, op. cit., 807 and Seesmann, op. cit., 58 regard πνεύματος as an objective genitive of the thing shared rather than a subjective genitive. Campbell, op. cit., 378 seems to support this view. I prefer to interpret this passage as a subjective genitive, however, which, though rare, does occur in Greek literature.
which expressed itself in sacramental participation in the body and blood of Christ.  

Paul paralleled this sacramental participation with the practice of Israel, to which Philo alluded, where those who ate the sacrifices were considered \textit{koinwnoi} of the altar.\textsuperscript{2} This was an unfortunate comparison, because "no special religious significance was attached to participation is such food. This certainly weakens the force of Paul's analogy, but it was the best he could find in Judaism.\textsuperscript{3} He next urged Christians not to eat the meat sacrificed to demons so that they would not become \textit{koinwnoi} of demons.\textsuperscript{4} "What is meant by \textit{koinwnoi t\ ν daimoníwv} is hard to say. Perhaps the easiest explanation is that St. Paul is transferring his interpretation of the Christian rite to them to make a: effective a contrast as possible. Even so he does not

\textsuperscript{1} I Cor. 10:16. Again there has been question as to the interpretation of this passage. Campbell, \textit{op. cit.}, 375 stresses the idea of participation in the body and blood of Christ, while Jourdan, \textit{op. cit.}, 121, 123 emphasizes the "spiritual effects of the consumption of the bread and wine."

\textsuperscript{2} I Cor. 10:18.

\textsuperscript{3} Campbell, \textit{op. cit.}, 377.

\textsuperscript{4} I Cor. 10:20.
Since Christ had become partaker in human nature, Christians in turn had the hope of becoming partakers of divine nature. As they shared in the sufferings and tribulations of Christ, so they likewise had the hope of someday sharing in the blessings of the Gospel and in the glory of Christ to be made manifest.

Paul reminded the Hebrews how they suffered for the faith or were with those who did. He told the Philippians that, because of their in the Gospel, they had been both of his troubles and of grace. To the Corinthians Paul said that they shared in his sufferings as well as in comfort from God.

Nock, op. cit., 82. Nock comments further that there is no Hellenistic religious influence present in Paul's use of here, in which men ate as table-companions of the gods or even the flesh of the god. (83-84) Rather it is the Jewish common meals that Paul finds his parallels to the Eucharist. "The common meals of the Jewish Christians at Jerusalem were no doubt accompanied by table prayers of the familiar Jewish type. It is such eating together, with its preliminary offering to God of food and drink, lies the kernal of their common meal of love. Incorporated in this and only later separated was the Eucharist."

 Phil. 3:10; Apoc. 1:9; I Pet. 4:13.  Cor. 9:23.
 Phil. 1:7.  II Cor. 1:7.
When James, Cephas, and John extended the hand of fellowship to Paul and Barnabas as apostles to the Gentiles, they requested that the Gentile Christians give material help to the poor Jerusalem. Paul was quite willing to do so, and the theme came up often in his letters. In the *Epistle to the Romans*, Paul reminded them that they had had κοινωνία in the spiritual blessings of the Jews and so should be willing to share their material goods with them.¹ The Gentiles should remember that they were like a branch grafted on to the root of the tree of Israel and not disparage the broken branches of the tree.² In writing to the Corinthians and the Romans Paul commended the generosity of the impoverished churches in Macedonia and Achaia in contributing for the poor in Jerusalem.³ He urged the Romans and Corinthians to do likewise, saying that such generosity was also an expression of gratitude to God.⁴ He encouraged the Hebrews to do good and to share what they had.⁵ He advised Timothy to encourage the Ephesians to be generous in sharing.⁶ The man being instructed in doctrine he advised to share his goods with his teacher so that both would benefit from the association.⁷ Paul commented

¹Rom. 15:27. ²Rom. 11:17.
³II Cor. 8:4; Rom. 15:26.
⁴Rom. 12:13; II Cor. 9:13.
⁷Gal. 6:6.
to Philemon that it was his Faith which was the cause of his generosity. Paul thanked the Philippians for their fellowship in the Gospel from the beginning and for providing for his material needs even after he had left the ministry in their city.

The contexts in which *κοινωνία* and its cognates occur in the New Testament are generally much more positive than those of the Old Testament. While the latter warned the Hebrews against any relationship which would endanger their moral integrity, the New Testament stresses the unique relationship with the Father, in Christ, through the Spirit which the Christian enjoys, his special relationship with all believers because of this, and his communion with God and other believers through sacramental participation. Importance is placed on the common life practiced by the Apostolic community at Jerusalem and on contributions made to alleviate the needs of the poor by the church of the diaspora as means of living the Christian life more fully.

Finally, consideration will be given to the phenomenon of Gnosticism which influenced the climate of thought during the first Christian centuries, and perhaps even earlier, and which also played a definite role in shaping the thought of Clement of Alexandria.

Gnosis in Greek literature, according to Bultmann, "denotes

1Phlm. 6. 2Phil. 1:5.
3Phil. 4:15.
the intelligent grasp of an object or a situation, whether encountered for the first time or on some subsequent occasion, or as something long known...and signifies the act of knowing rather than the knowledge itself. It is closely connected with the idea of seeing what really exists.

Under the influence of the mystery religions and magic of the Hellenistic period, gnosis acquired, in addition to its earlier usages: certain specialized meanings: the knowledge itself of God; and "illumination, something fundamentally different from rational thought," which leads to salvation; a vision which "endows the Gnostic with divine nature."

In the Old Testament, gnosis is a subjective experience indicating primarily a recognition of the acts of Jahweh and obedience to His will. The Septuagint translators used the term gnosis both to designate a knowledge of sin leading to repentance and salvation and to describe God's self-revelation. Rabbinic usage followed that of the Old Testament, while "Philo's idea of knowledge and use of γνώσις are thoroughly Hellenistic, i.e., either rationalist or Gnostic."


2 Ibid., 11. 3 Ibid., 13.
4 Ibid., 17. 5 Ibid., 19, 22.
Common early Christian usage retains the ordinary meanings of "gnosis," to feel, observe, learn, discover, but the Old Testament connotation of "gnosis" as God's self-revelation and man's recognition of His acts and subjection to His will also occurs.¹

Gnosis in a Christian context indicates a knowledge which "continues to grow through obedience and meditation."² It has a practical as well as a theoretical connotation: "the conviction that faith includes knowledge of the mysteries of the Kingdom of Heaven...leads to the thought of Gnosis as a kind of systematic theology."³ Under this aspect, the "gnosis" of Christianity came into conflict with both polytheism and pagan gnosticism.

The traditional view, that which was taken by the Church Fathers and which continued up to the latter half of the 19th century, regarded gnosticism as Christianity perverted by Hellenistic philosophy to the point of heresy. The statement of this position is Harnack's famous definition of gnosticism as "the acute Hellenization of Christianity."⁴ A modification of Harnack's thesis was suggested by Wilson who regarded as gnosticism proper only such systems as were refuted by the Fathers, but distinguished between a pre-gnostic and a later phase of development. He suggested that the Judaism of the Diaspora acted as a

¹Ibid., 33. ²Ibid., 39. ³Ibid., 40.
bridge between Graeco-Roman and Jewish-Christian thought, the mingling of which resulted in the formation of gnosticism proper.¹

Reitzenstein, Bousset and Bultmann challenged the traditional view and Harnack's thesis that gnosticism was "im Wesen und Ursprung" a Christian phenomenon. Reitzenstein and Bousset held that gnosticism was an independent entity, owing its origin to various oriental influences.² Bultmann added that it was a "redemptive religion based on dualism."³ Jonas, a student of Bultmann, while admitting that no one factor in isolation can be considered the source of gnosticism, cautioned against an over-emphasis on the syncretism observable in gnosticism which would

¹Ibid., 182.

²W. Bousset, "Gnosis", Real-Encyclopedia, ed. Pauly-Wissowa (Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler, 1912), VII, 2, 1507 reached the following conclusion about gnosticism: "Die Gnosis ist, wenn man auf das Ganze sicht, nicht auf dem genuinen Boden des Christentums gewachsen. Sie ist älter als dieses und als bereits fertige Erscheinung an das Christentum herangetreten... Erscheinungen wie die hermetische Literatur... und die Oracula Chaldaica beweisen dass die gnostischen Spekulationen und frömmigkeit weit über das Gebiet der spezifisch christlichen Sekten hinaus verbreitet waren."

reduce it to "a mere mosaic of these elements and so miss its autonomous essence."  

A third view holds that "gnosticism is an atmosphere, not a system." It is "not a closed system of rigidly circumscribed dogmas, but rather a movement of the spirit without definite frontiers, in many lands, among all manner of men, through century after century." "In short, there was a climate of opinion, and Judaism and Hellenism alike (with such foreign ideas as had found some home in either of the two) helped to shape it."  

The last view seems to be the most tenable since a study of gnostic texts indicates that the term gnosis might:

mean a particular kind of knowledge open only to a few, and consisting in some esoteric doctrine which was carefully kept from the eyes of the uninitiated. It might be a mystic vision which conveyed it and here there was a possibility of a real religious experience; or again, gnosis might be a philosophical or scientific knowledge of the secrets of the universe, and of man's place in it. And finally, it might be nothing more than a crude magical affair of the names and


2Wilson, op. cit., 261.


4Nock, op. cit., xiv.
spells which would open the doors to the soul in its ascent.\(^1\)

Clement of Alexandria was unable to take any single stand on the gnostic doctrines current in his day. Some he commended; others he condemned. He objected in particular to the pessimistic world view popular with some of them and to their denial of the part played by free will in salvation.\(^2\) He opposed both the 'rigidly ascetic' gnostics and the 'freely licentious' ones, but he had much sympathy with two of the outstanding teachers of the second century, Basilides and Valentine. "Both are men of eminence whom he always regards with respect even though he is aware of important differences."\(^3\) "As far as we can see, Clement's Gnosis is ecclesiastical Christianity mystically coloured. His Gnostic desires to follow the rule of the Church and to be in accordance with the Gospel received through the tradition of the Church."\(^4\)

Clement recognized both the secular and the religious forms of gnosticism\(^5\) which held in common "that ultimate spiritual values were to be discovered in the realm of ideas, knowledge, abstract being eternal principles, and philosophic verity."\(^6\) For

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\(^1\) Wilson, op. cit., 107. \(^2\) Camelot, Foi et Gnose, 150.

\(^3\) Chadwick, op. cit., 30.

\(^4\) Molland, Conception of Gospel, 83.

\(^5\) W. den Boer, De Allegorase in het Werk von Clemens Alexandrinus, Resume in French (Leiden, 1940), 146.

\(^6\) Tollinton, op. cit., II, 69-70.
Clement, however, the spiritual *gnosis* was of more importance. It was the acme of the Christian life,¹ its goal being "vision, pure uninterrupted communion with God's reality, a final phase of spiritual development."² The spiritual *gnosis* leading to salvation consisted of two phases:³ development of the moral virtues to attain the ethical integrity necessary for the contact with God,⁴ the development of the intellectual virtues by prayer, communion with God in thought, the revelation of Christ and the Bible.⁵ The first phase Clement considered necessary for all Christians. The second phase was probably for the minority. "La foi d'après Clément, c'est le fondement; la gnose n'est que le couronnement."⁶ "La foi est le fondement et la condition de la vie du gnostique ou parfait chrétien."⁷

¹Wytzes, *Twofold Way II*, 129.
²Tollinton, *op. cit.* II, 82-83.
⁶de Faye, *op. cit.* 188.
⁷Ibid., 195.
The purpose of Clement's Protrepticus, addressed to the pagans, was to announce publicly the good news that "God is related to human life and that knowledge of him and growth in likeness to him are possible as the sumnum bonum of the Christian life."¹ "There was an innate original communion between men and heaven, obscured through ignorance, but which now at length has leapt forth instantaneously from the darkness, and shines resplendent."² Man is related to God, not in essence or nature, but in being the work of His will. And now, since the Incarnation, "human blood has become a partaker of the Word: it is a participant of grace by the Spirit."³ That which the soul sees,

¹ Outler, op. cit., 228.


³ Paed. III, 25.2. There has been some discussion of the place of the Holy Spirit, the third person of the Trinity, in the theology of Clement. Tollinton, op. cit., I, 359-360, says: "there is no place left in Clement's system for a Third Person, because every office that has been assigned Him is so fully discharged by the Logos." Lebreton, op. cit., 60, however, holds that the Holy Spirit must inspire those who believe, along with their having a natural knowledge of God, according to Clement's view. Frangoulis, op. cit., 19, agrees with this position: "Die Ansichten des Clemens über das göttliche πνεῦμα als Inspirator, als prophetische Gabe, hängen mit der ganzen Lehre des Clemens von der Inspiration zusammen."
it is able to share with the flesh which has \textit{koinw\-n\-i\-a} with it.\footnote{Exe. ex. Theod. 5.4.} Every man who abandons his erroneous religious beliefs and practices and "willingly, with discipline and teaching, accepts the knowledge of the truth,"\footnote{Protr. II.} according to the instruction of Christ, will be called to adoption. Each and every one, not just a select few, are destined to become \textit{koinw\-n\-o\-i} with God through faith.\footnote{Paed. I, VI, 30.2.} If only they will "become again as little children and be born again... God will become their Father and they themselves will have \textit{koinw\-n\-i\-a} with Christ in the kingdom of the Father."\footnote{Protr. IX, 82.5.}

Our Instructor in the faith is Christ, the same instructor who made a covenant with Abraham and thus established a \textit{koinw\-n\-i\-a} of friendship with him.\footnote{Paed. I, VII, 56.3.} "Being baptized, we are illuminated; illuminated, we become sons, being made sons, we are made perfect; being made perfect, we are made immortal."\footnote{Paed. I, VI.}

After being born in baptism, the believer is nourished by the Word, Christ. Clement draws the analogy that just as milk and water have a natural \textit{koinw\-n\-i\-a} which operates for the benefit of the newborn, so there is also a natural \textit{koinw\-n\-i\-a} between the spiritual washing, baptism, and the spiritual nourishment, the
And just as milk, mixed with sweet wine, curdles and the adulteration can be drained off, so the spiritual κοινωνία of faith separates off the lusts of the flesh and thus "commits man to eternity, along with those who are divine, immortalizing him."  

After being initiated and confirmed in faith by baptism, the Instructor then guides the believer in two areas: "the right direction of truth to the contemplation of God, and the exhibition of holy deeds in everlasting perseverance." The latter area, being fundamental to faith of every degree, is discussed first, in the work called the Paedagogus. Here the Christian receives very practical instruction on how he should think and act regarding drink, costly vessels, conduct at feasts, laughter, and speech, living together, use of ointments and luxuries, sleep,

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1Paed. I, VI, 50. 3-4. It is interesting to note that the Word, rather than the Eucharist, is considered the nourishment of the Christian, at least as it is expressed in terms of κοινωνία. Κοινωνία in this context occurs several times in the NT and also in several of the Fathers. According to Bigg, op. cit., 102-105, Clement does refer to Eucharist and agape, but in a way which indicates that they were probably not yet separated at Alexandria. Marsh, op. cit., 80, points out that the word μυστέριον was not used at Alexandria in Clement's time in any special connection with baptism or the eucharist. F.R. Montgomery Hitchcock, "Holy Communion and Creed in Clement of Alexandria," Church Quarterly Review, 129(October-December, 1939), 59 calls Clement's theory of the Eucharist "distinctly spiritual." Tollinton, op. cit., II, 54-55, says: "For just as Baptism was illumination, so are Eucharist and Agape the continued sustenance of our rational and intelligent natures."

2Paed. I, VI, 51.2.

3Paed. I, VII.
clothes, shoes, jewels and ornaments. Undoubtedly these passages present "a true picture of actual manners and morals in Alexandria" at this time.\(^1\) In an age when asceticism was admired as a natural virtue, Clement's moderate position as a defender of the world and a preacher of withdrawal is notable.\(^2\)

Food and drink are the first topic of discussion in the **Paedagogus**. The Christian obviously must eat to live. His meals should not only be a matter of necessity, however, but even a time of enjoyment, because a congenial supper is a "proof of mutual and reciprocal kindly feeling."\(^3\) If love governs this νομοκολον, there will be no danger that the body will take more than it needs for its well-being.\(^4\) So a supper guest should eat what is served\(^5\) but should also beware of being too enticed by expensive delicacies calculated to increase his sociability.\(^6\)

Warning is given about the use of ointments and crowns.

The crown is the symbol of untroubled tranquillity. For this reason they crown the dead, and idols, too, on the same account, by this fact giving testimony to their being dead... We must have no communion with demons. Nor must we crown the living image of God after the manner of dead idols.\(^7\)

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\(^1\) Tollinton, op. cit., I, 246.

\(^2\) Wilhelm Wagner, Der Christ und die Welt noch Clemens von Alexandria. Ein noch unveraltetes Problem in altchristlicher Beleuchtung (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Reprint, 1903), 77-78.

\(^3\) Paed. II, I, 6. 1-2.  

\(^4\) Paed. II, I, 7.3.

\(^5\) Paed. II, I, 10.2.  

\(^6\) Paed. II, I, 14.6.

\(^7\) Paed. II, VIII, 73.2.
The only crown the Christian should aspire to is that which is given for living well, once one has reached the kingdom of heaven.

There is no need for elaborate preparations and rituals for bathing. Poor women, who share the same baths, enjoy them equally. And to give someone a rubdown at the baths who has done the same for us is an example of social justice.\(^1\)

The correct use of all material goods is of special concern to Clement and is discussed here in the *Paedagogus* as well as in the *Stromata* and the *Quis Dives Salvetur*. Christianity and poverty had always been closely linked: there is the emphasis on poverty in the life of Christ himself and in the gospel message, the primitive Church practiced some form of community of goods, and the Church up to this point had been largely the church of the poor.\(^3\) Yet Clement was preaching the Christian message to a predominantly wealthy class at Alexandria and had to explain to them the teaching of the gospel in regard to wealth.

Clement maintains that Christ's command to "sell what belongs to thee" is not to be taken literally.

It is not what some hastily take it to be, a command to fling away the substance that belongs to him and to part with his riches, but to banish from the soul its opinions about riches, its attachment to them, its excessive desire, its morbid excitement over them, its anxious cares, the thorns of our

\(^1\) *Paed.* III, IV, 31.3. \(^2\) *Paed.* III, X, 52.1. \(^3\) G.W. Butterworth, "Introduction", *The Rich Man's Salvation* (Loeb Library ed.; New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1919), 266. Reference below to this work are made to this edition.
earthly existence which chokes the seed of the true life.¹

Lack of riches is not in itself necessarily a good thing. Neither is the renunciation of wealth if it is done merely for leisure or for fame.² What the Savior actually commands of the believer, according to Clement, is that he should strip "the soul itself and the will of their lurking passions and utterly to root out and cast away all alien thoughts from the mind."³ The Christian's guide to the use of what is his own should be the remembrance of how "God brought our race into communion by first imparting what was His own, when He gave His own Word, common to all, and made all things for all. All things therefore are common, and not for the rich to appropriate an undue share."⁴ "What we acquire without difficulty, and use with ease, we praise, keep easily, and communicate freely."⁵

The Christian should have what he needs⁶ but should share with those in need what he has over and above that.⁷ This, in fact, is for Clement one of the marks of the true Gnostic. The attitude that "I possess, and possess in abundance; why then should I not enjoy" is not truly human or social,⁸ for God has

¹The Rich Man's Salvation, II. ²Ibid., 293.
³Ibid., 295. ⁴Paed. II, XIII, 120.3.
⁵Paed. II, III, 38.4. ⁶Strom. VI, IX, 79.2.
⁷Paed. II, XII, 129.1; Paed. III, VII, 38.2.
⁸Paed. III, XII, 120.4.
created man naturally communicative by justice. In addition, the corporal works of mercy enjoined by the Savior are nothing else than commands to practice κοινωνία, which would be impossible without wealth, or if no one possessed anything. This sharing must also be done willingly, "without murmurings and disputations and grudging."

The law recognizes that κοινωνία is natural to man by not allowing a brother to take usury, "designating a brother not only him who is born of the same parents, but also of the same race and sentiments, and a participator in the same word." It also enjoins that part of the harvest be left unreaped, "training those who possess to sharing and to large-heartedness, by foregoing of their own to those who are in want, and thus providing means of subsistence for the poor." In these and other ways, the law promotes κοινωνία as well as piety, justice, and humanity.

Love also teaches us a natural κοινωνία. Homer advocated giving to a friend. Clement adds: "And an enemy must be aided, that he may not continue an enemy, for by help good feeling is

1Strom. I, VI, 34.4; Strom. II, XVI, 73.4.
2Quis Dives Salvetur 13,6.
5Quis Div. Salv. 31,8. 6Strom. II, XVIII, 84.4.
7Strom. II, XVIII, 85.3. 8Strom. II, XVIII, 86.4.
compacted, and enmity is dissolved."¹ The Christian should certainly have a spirit of brotherly love toward those having ἱδρυτήσεται· κοινωνίαν with him in the same spirit.²

The effect which sharing one's goods has upon the donor is similar to that which happens to wells which "when pumped out, rise to their former measure, so giving away, being the benignant spring of love, by communicating of its drink to the thirsty, again increases and is replenished."³ Although Christian κοινωνία has its own natural reward, and a spiritual one as well, since its reward is the kingdom of heaven,⁴ the reward is not the motivation of his κοινωνία. Rather the sole motivation of the Gnostic is love.⁵ And the faith and love which are the reason for his generosity cause him to respond to the need of the unworthy as well as to that of the worthy.⁶ On the other hand, the fact that "they who are consecrated to Christ are given to communicate

¹Strom. II, XIX, 102. ²Strom. II, IX, 42.1.
⁵Strom. IV, XVIII, 112.2.
⁶Ecl. Proph. 27.7. Tollinton, op. cit., I, 329, says: "It has to be admitted that in his advice to the wealthy there are certain things that Clement fails to see, and among these admissions none is more obvious than his inability to perceive the dangerous side to the unrestricted liberality. He boldly says that alms are to be given to the worthy...Now there is no question that, long before Clement wrote, Christian charity had been abused."
the necessaries of life.\textsuperscript{1} is not sufficient motivation for conversion to Christianity.

The emphasis upon the external ethics of Christianity is directed to culmination in an inner state of apathy, which for Clement is a state of sinlessness.\textsuperscript{2} Only then can the believer advance to the more mature faith which consists in \textit{gnosis}.\textsuperscript{3} What we have of Clement's discussion of this topic is contained in the \textit{Stromata}.

Book I of the \textit{Stromata} deals primarily with the relationship of theology and philosophy. As an introduction, Clement acknowledges the value of the written word which preserves a man's ideas for posterity. "Wisdom is a communicative and philanthropic thing," he grants.\textsuperscript{3} But the man who wishes either by speech or by writing to share his wisdom must be sure it is done for the right reason. His only motivation and reward must be the salvation of those who are to hear.\textsuperscript{4} Anyone who gives credence to opinions without intelligence, and reason, and knowledge, "believes a man who is a partner in falsehood."\textsuperscript{5}

One of Clement's favorite hypotheses is that the Greeks

\textsuperscript{1} \textit{Strom.} I, I, 6.3. \textsuperscript{2} \textit{Wytzes, Two Fold Way} I, 239.
\textsuperscript{3} \textit{Strom.} I, I, 1.2-3. \textsuperscript{4} \textit{Strom.} I, I, 6.1.
\textsuperscript{5} \textit{Strom.} I, VIII, 42.2.
were the pupils of Moses. In Book I Clement emphasizes the contribution of Moses as a legislator who "furnished a good policy, which is the right discipline of men in social life." Moses, of course, in Clement's opinion, far surpasses his classical counterparts as a lawgiver.

The second Book of the Stromata is concerned with faith, knowledge, sin, and virtue. Agape is there defined as "consent in what pertains to reason, life, and manners, or in brief, fellowship in life." Its nature is communicative.

In Book II, Clement also distinguishes three kinds of friendship: that founded on reason; that based on mutual favor which is social, liberal and useful for life; and that founded on intimacy or pleasure. In other words, the friendship of a philosopher, that of a man, and that of an animal.

The Christian is warned against attendance at "theaters and tribunals, or rather the compliance with wicked and deadly powers, and complicity with their deeds." The Lord's statement "he that loses his life shall save it" is interpreted to mean either the actual loss of life for the Lord's sake, or else deliberate separation from participation in an unchristian way of life.

Book III of the Stromata, a treatise on marriage, is largely

1Strom. I, XXVI, 168.1. 2Strom. II, IX, 163.1.
3Strom. II, XVIII, 87.3. 4Strom. II, XIX, 101.3.
5Strom. II, XV, 68.1-2. 6Strom. II, XX, 108.3.
a rebuttal of the false teachings on sex current in the church of Clement’s time. "The gnostic estimate of the world led to two opposed attitudes to sex and marriage. Clement himself divides his opponents into two groups, the extreme ascetics and the licentious."¹ In the first group are Marcion, Tatian and Julius Cassianus. They opposed sexual intercourse and birth as something inherently evil, teaching that "the serpent took the use of intercourse from the irrational animals and persuaded Adam to agree to have sexual union with Eve."² Such union belonged to them by nature, protests Clement. He also criticizes Julius Cassianus, the originator of docetism,³ who held in his book Concerning Continence and Celibacy that God did not deliberately create man for sexual intercourse. He comments: "Could not one rightly find fault with the Savior if he was responsible for our formation and then delivered us from error and from this use of our generative organs?"⁴ He adds further, "if the flesh were hostile to the soul, he (the Savior) would not have raised an obstacle to the soul by strengthening with good health the hostile flesh... For sin being corruption cannot have fellowship with incorruption which is righteousness."⁵

¹ Chadwick, op. cit., 22. ² Strom. III, XVII, 102-3.
³ Chadwick, op. cit., 23 says that Clement’s statement that Julius Cassianus was the originator of docetism "cannot be accepted in view of the New Testament evidence for the prevalence of this tendency before the end of the first century."
⁴ Strom. III, XIII, 92.1. ⁵ Strom. III, XVII, 104.5.
The other group of Clement's opponents were the Carpocra-
tians.

This sect is a peculiar phenomenon even in the curious penum-
bra of eccentric sects which gathered round the Church in the
second century and claimed the name of Christian. The evi-
dence concerning the sect is not a little obscure. The origin
of the sect is ascribed by Clement and Irenaeus to a man
named Carpocrates, but his historical existence has been
doubted.

Clement discusses at some length a book attributed to Car-
pocrates' son Epiphanes, Concerning Righteousness. Epiphanes
argues that justice in God's eyes is \( \text{koinwnee} \) with equality. The
fruits of the earth, he maintains, were originally shared by all
alike and that likewise there was no written law regarding sexual
union and birth. All was regulated by the natural law of justice
as \( \text{koinwnee} \) with equality. But then laws were made, which "by
presupposing the existence of private property, cut up and de-
stroyed the universal equality decreed by the divine law." The
result was that with the disregard of the natural law of \( \text{koinwnee} \)

1 Chadwick, op. cit., 24.

2 Ibid., 25-26. "This work merely consists of the scrib-
blings of an intelligent but nasty-minded adolescent of somewhat
pornographic tendencies." Clement tells of a posthumous cult of
Epiphanes who died at seventeen and had a temple built in his
honor at Same by his parents. Some scholars reject the existence
of Epiphanes entirely, others accept the gnostic but think he had
no connection with the moon-god worshipped at Same.


5 Strom. III, II, 7.2.
with equality, theft came into being.\(^1\) \(\kappa\omicron\upsilon\iota\nu\omicron\upsilon\iota\lambda\iota\) with equality was also denied in sexual relations, and "those who have been born in this way have denied the universality which is the corollary of their birth and say, 'Let him who has taken one woman keep her' whereas all alike can have her, just as the other animals do."\(^2\)

Citing the Old Testament law "thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife," Epiphanes went through some specious logistics to prove that the law was meaningless. He says:

But for a Jew the neighbor is not a Jew, for he is a brother and has the same spirit. Therefore it remains that 'neighbor' means one of another race. But how can he not be a neighbor who is able to share in the same spirit? For Abraham is father not only of the Hebrews, but also of the Gentiles.\(^3\)

And he argues similarly that the lawgiver who said "thou shalt not covet thy neighbor's wife" must have been speaking in jest, "since he forces what should be common property to be treated as a private possession."\(^4\)

Clement describes the feasts of the Carpocratians as beginning in a banquet and ending in a sex orgy.\(^5\) He then adds the interesting comment that Carpocrates, in advocating \(\kappa\omicron\upsilon\omega\nu\omicron\upsilon\iota\lambda\iota\kappa\omicron\omicron\iota\sigma\tau\omicron\upsilon\).\(^6\) seems:

To have misunderstood the saying of Plato in the Republic

that the women of all are to be in common. Plato means that
the unmarried are common for those who wish to ask them as
also the theatre is open to the public for all who wish to
see, but that when each one has chosen his wife, then the
married woman is no longer common to all.

Clement acknowledges that the Lord enjoined upon believers
the responsibility of sharing their goods and helping the needy but that He did not mean that there should be complete freedom of

κοινωνία in physical love, which some of them called a "mystical

communion." This, says Clement, "is an insult to the name of

communion...they have impiously called by the name of communion

any common sexual intercourse." Those who advocate such doc-

trines are κοινωνοί of lust, rather than, as they think of God.

Such κοινωνία will bring them only to the brothels.

Clement quotes from an apocryphal work, now lost save for this quotation, upon which, he claims, the disciples of Prodicus

base their doctrine:

All things were one; but as it seemed good to its unity not
to be alone, an idea came forth from it, and it had inter-
course with it and made the beloved. In consequence of this
there came forth from him an idea with which he had inter-
course, and made powers which cannot be seen or heard.

1Strom. III, II, 9. Chadwick, op. cit., 45, n. 24 comments that Epictetus interprets this passage similarly at 2, 4:8-10.

2Strom. III, IV, 27, 1-2; Strom. III, XII, 86.4.

3Strom. III, IV, 27.1-2. 4Strom. III, IV, 27.2.

5Strom. III, IV, 27.4-5, 28.1.

Clement's comment is that if this passage referred to acts of spiritual κοινωνία, as among the Valentinians, it might be acceptable. "But to suppose that the holy prophets spoke of carnal and wanton intercourse is the way of a man who has renounced salvation." And he quotes John who says: "If we say that we have fellowship with him and walk in darkness, we lie and do not the truth; but if we walk in the light as he is in the light, we have fellowship with him, and the blood of Jesus his Son cleanses us from sin." 2

Clement challenges Carpocrate's allegation that justice involves unbridled sexual κοινωνία, based on the words of the Lord, 'Give to him that asks you'. The Lord, says Clement, adds immediately after that, "And do not turn away from him who wishes to borrow," thus indicating the kind of κοινωνία to which he was referring. 3 Clement refutes those who hold there is no difference between right and wrong by quoting Paul, "What is there in common between righteousness and lawlessness? Or what fellowship between light and darkness?" 4 And when it is said in Baruch 3:10, "You were defiled in a foreign land," this did not refer to sexual defilement but "association which is bound up with a strange body and not with that which in marriage is bestowed for the

1Strom. III, IV, 29.2-3. 2Strom. III, IV, 32.2.
3Strom. III, VI, 54.1. 4Strom. III, VIII, 62.2.
purpose of procreation."\(^1\)

Paederasty\(^2\) and homosexuality\(^3\) are condemned outright by Clement. He praises:

the ancient legislators of the Romans: these detested effeminacy of conduct; and the giving of the body to feminine purposes, the contrary to the law of nature, they judged worthy of the extremest penalty, according to the righteousness of the law.

Christian marriage, on the other hand, is a common and holy life, based on conjugal union, and has heaven as its reward for both husband and wife.\(^5\) The wise wife is encouraged to "persuade her husband to be her κοινώνας in what is conducive to happiness." If she does not succeed, she should go along with his will except when virtue and salvation are in question. And then, whether it becomes necessary for her to die or live, she should remember that:

God is her helper and κοινώνας in such a course of conduct, her true defender and Saviour both for the present and for the future; making Him the leader and guide of all her actions reckoning sobriety and righteousness her work; and making the

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\(^1\)Strom. III, XII, 89.2.  
\(^2\)Paed. II, X, 90.4.  
\(^3\)Paed. II, X, 87.3.  
\(^4\)Paed. III, III, 23.1.  
\(^5\)Paed. I, IV, 10.3.  
\(^6\)Strom. IV, XIX, 123.2.
favour of God her end.¹

Book IV of the Stromata deals with martyrdom² and the true Gnostic. Death is described as the κοινωνία of the soul, in a state of sin, with the body, while life is a separation from sin.³ "The severance, therefore, of the soul from the body, made a lifelong study, produces in the philosopher gnostic alacrity, so that he is easily able to bear natural death, which is

¹Strom. IV, XX, 127.2. Tollinton, op. cit., 299, says: "The general impression which results from Clement's remarks on Marriage and Home-life is that Christianity was here exercising a high and elevating influence, and that Clement personally held well-grounded views and a noble ideal." He does not say much about the family from the political viewpoint, "So his attitude differs widely from that of Plato and Aristotle, with whom the whole subject is approached from the standpoint of the community." Bardy, op. cit., 217 says: "Le mariage a pour but la procreation des enfants, non la debauche au la satisfaction, contraire aux lois comme à la raison, des passions." Chadwick, op. cit., 33 says: "Clement's personal attitude to marriage is curiously confused." Ibid., 34: "In short, the best Christians in Clement's view are those who are married but have no sexual relations with their wives...Despite his anxiety to vindicate marriage as created by God, he shared the idea that sex relations are to be avoided."

²Edward E. Malone, O.S.B., The Monk and the Martyr: The Monk as the Successor of the Martyr (Studies in Christian Antiquity, 12: Washington, D.C.; The Catholic University of America Press, 1950), 13 concludes that Clement recognizes martyrdom as the pinnacle of Christian perfection, but since it is not an ideal toward which all must strive (witness his own life), he proposes a new ideal of "gnostic martyrdom" which consists less in "the actual forsaking of family and of worldly possessions, and on abstaining from the things of the world. For him perfection consists in the limitation of God."

³Strom. IV, III, 12.1.
the dissolution of the chains which bind the soul to the body."¹ But the witness of death alone does not constitute martyrdom, death of the body, that is. Some who share the name Christian but really are not, have rushed to death out of hatred for the Creator.² Martyrdom must be a witness to God, not a rejection of Him. The soul of the man who lives as a gnostic is drawn away from the body toward God. "It is the will of God "that we should attain the knowledge of God, which is Κοινωνία of immortality";³ "our true treasure is where what is allied to our mind is, since it bestows the communicative power of righteousness."⁴ Clement quotes I Peter 4:13: "as you are partakers in the sufferings of Christ, rejoice; that at the revelation of His glory ye may rejoice exultant."⁵ And he also borrows Paul's exhortation to the Philippians on the endurance of affliction: "If there is therefore any consolation in Christ, if any comfort of love, if any communion of spirit, if any bowels and mercies, fulfill ye my joy, that ye may be of the same mind, having the same love, unanimous, thinking one thing."⁶ And later he quotes Paul's words to the Hebrews, a call to their former constancy in the faith: "Call to mind the former days, in which, after ye were illuminated, ye endured a great flight of afflictions; partly, whilst ye

¹Strom. IV, III. ²Strom. IV, IV, 17.1. ³Strom. IV, VI, 27.2. ⁴Strom. IV, VI, 33.6. ⁵Strom. IV, VII, 47.4. ⁶Strom. IV, XIII, 90.3.
were made a gazing stock, both by reproaches and afflictions, and partly, whilst ye became companions of them that were so used. 1

According to Book V, Wisdom "repays the application of the elect with its crowning fellowship." 2 But "it is not allowed to hand to every chance comer what has been procured with such laborious efforts." 3 Both in Christianity and in the pagan philosophies those who fall away from the dogmas and the practice of the subjugation of the passions are called dead. For "what communion hath light with darkness?" as Paul said to the Corinthians. 4

Though there is only one faith, its deeper meanings are veiled and are not easily penetrated. The same phenomenon existed among the Pythagoreans who had a double koinwnia, one made up of the vast majority, the akousmatikoi, and the other, who have a genuine attachment to philosophy, the mathematikoi. 5

In Book VI the gnostic is encouraged to employ all types of human knowledge to arrive at the knowledge of the truth. Dialectic, for example, will help him to avoid error and false opinion by the ability it has to distinguish in what respect things are common, and in what respects they differ. 6

The gnostic ought not only to know the truth but he should

1 Strom. IV, XVI, 101.2. 2 Strom. V, XIII, 83.5.
3 Strom. V, IX. 4 Strom. V, IX, 57.5.
also communicate it, according to Book VII. In this way, "he mediates contact and κοινωνία with the Divinity."¹ And even if he is rejected, "he never cherishes resentment or harbours a grudge against anyone, though deserving of hatred for his conduct. For he worships the Maker, and loves him, who shares life, pitying and praying for him on account of his ignorance."² He has developed the habit of doing good and of giving a share of his own goods to his dearest friends.³

According to Book VIII, those having κοινωνία in a discussion must agree on terminology before a "starting point for instruction to lead the way to the discovery of points under investigation" may be established.⁴

κοινωνία also exists in the world of the cosmos. The stars, which have sympathy and κοινωνία with one another,⁵ also have κοινωνία with the angels set over them to govern them.⁶

Other types of relationships involving κοινωνία also appear in Clement. The name Serapis shows κοινωνία with sepulture.⁷ Vulgar tongues are formed by the κοινωνία of two, three or more dialects.⁸ Heteronyms, according to Clement's definition, are words "which relate to the same subject under different names, as

ascent or descent."¹ But words "which have a different name and definition from each other, and do not possess the same subject" are not to be called heteronyms.²

**Koinonia and its Cognates in the Related Authors of the Patristic Period**

The union with God in Christ and the Holy Spirit to which the Christian was called was both expressed and achieved, according to Acts, through belief in the teaching of the Apostles, sharing of material goods, and sacramental participation in the Eucharist. Clement of Alexandria also recognized the achievement of union with God in Christ and the Spirit as the goal of Christian life. He believed that progress toward this union could be achieved by a twofold preparation. The first phase was a moral purification involving generosity and detachment in the use of material goods and a purification of the sensual passions. The second phase was an intellectual purification which aimed at achieving knowledge and contemplation of God as a prelude to complete union with Him in eternity.

The writings of related authors of the Patristic period reveal how the Christian Church continued to develop her conception of the Christian vocation and the means by which it could be realized and manifested. The Patristic writers utilized Κοινωνία and its cognates to express various aspects of the practices and

¹ *Strom.* VIII, VIII. ² *Strom.* VIII, VIII, 24.4.
doctrines of Christianity which provide interesting comparisons and contrasts with the use of κοινωνία in the New Testament and in Clement of Alexandria.

The New Testament writers, especially Paul, emphasize that the spiritual union of Christians should be manifested in their willingness to share their material goods with needy fellow Christians. Clement also stressed the need for this type of expression of Christian charity but adds in addition the idea of a balanced use of material goods as an elementary form of spiritual purification. The observations of several of the Patristic authors on this topic seem to resemble the New Testament motivation more than that of purification which Clement advocates. In commenting on the impact which Christianity had on the lives of men, Justin Martyr says that those who before wanted riches now bring their goods into the common stock and have κοινωνία with the needy. 1 He exhorts them not to look for their own glory in such action, however. The author of The Shepherd of Hermas declares that both the poor who receive and the rich who give are κοινωνοί of a just work. 2 Origne mentions that Christians are urged to contribute to the treasury of the Church for the support of the poor.

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2 Justin Apologies XV, 10.

3 Hermas Le Pasteur 51.2.9, ed. Robert Joly (Vol. 53; Sources Chrétiennes; Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1958), 218.
according to their means. ¹ He reminds adult Christians of their duty to provide the necessaries of life for their parents. ² Eusebius offers as motivation for Christian charity Christ's command to His disciples to share their goods with the needy and to be concerned about the common good.³

No mention of marriage expressed in terms of κοινωνία occurred in the New Testament. Clement presented a balanced view of Christian marriage and sex in which he criticized extremely licentious as well as extremely abstemious views. Many Christians of the Patristic period however seem to have adopted Paul's position on the superiority of celibacy. Theodoret relates that Pelagius persuaded his bride on their wedding night to prefer chastity to sexual intercourse. ⁴ Origen grants that the married have the opportunity for sexual κοινωνία and children, ⁵ but he indicates that spiritual children are more noble since they are born

¹ Origines Matthäuserklärung XI. 9.489. All the Greek texts from Origen are taken from the Werke (12 vols. in 13 parts; Die Grieschischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1899-1959).

² Origines, Matthäuserklärung, XI. 9.489.

³ Eusebius Die Demonstratio Evangelica III. 3.1. All the citations from Eusebius are taken from Werke (9 vols. in 12 parts; Die Grieschischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1902-1956).

⁴ Theodoret Kirchengeschichte IV. 13.2. All the citations from Theodoret are taken from his Werke (Die Grieschischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1911).

⁵ Origines Matthäuserklärung XIV. 13.632.
without sexual κοινωνία. 1 The type of κοινωνία practiced in a spiritual marriage is acceptance of the Word which results in immortality. 2 Thaleia, in Methodius' Symposium, allows sexual intercourse among the married who are not strong enough to remain perfectly continent. 4 But he phrases virginity, in which there is "no participation in the impurities of the flesh." 5 A virgin is not barren but has spiritual offspring through her κοινωνία with the Son of God. 6 She is thus considered worthy to become partaker of the kingdom of the Only-begotten, being betrothed and united to Him. 7

The New Testament indicated no special knowledge, necessary for salvation and union with God, in addition to the teaching of the Apostles. Clement taught that, in addition to the simple faith of most believers, there was a special knowledge of God reserved for the few leading to contemplation and union with God. This gnostic faith, as Clement envisioned it, was more a matter of degree than kind, however. No trace of a gnostic Christian doctrine is indicated in the statement of Justin Martyr who says that he allowed anyone who came and asked to have κοινωνία in the

1 Prignese In Lucam Homil VII. 2 Matthäuserklärung XVII 21. 799.
3 Methodius Symposium III. 13. 85. All the Greek texts from Methodius are taken from Werke (Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte; Leipzig: J.C. Hinrichs, 1917).
4 Symposium III. II. 80. 5 Symposium V. 6. 126.
6 Symposium VII. 4. 159. 7 Symposium VII. 8. 166.
Christian doctrines.¹ The Christians did have a reputation of being a secret association, thought since they avoided setting up altars and images and temples.² This is one of the charges of the pagan, Celsus, who ridiculed both Christianity and Judaism and was answered by Origen in his treatise, Contra Celsum. In answer to the above accusation, Origen replied that Christians avoid setting up altars, images, and temples, but not for the reason Celsus suggests: "we avoid things which, though they have an appearance of piety, make impious those who have been led astray from the piety which is mediated through Jesus Christ."³ In answer to Celsus' objection that, if idols are nothing, the Christians should not be afraid to take part in the high festival, and if they are demons of some sort, they belong to God and we should pray that they will be kindly disposed,⁴ Origen refers to Paul's First Epistle to the Corinthians in which "he replying to the view that 'an idol is nothing in the world' and established that harm comes from eating meats offered to idols, proving to those able to understand his words that without doubt the man who partakes of meats offered to idols is doing something no less serious than murder. For he destroys his brethren for whom

¹Acta MartyrII Justin et Sociorum, 564, 3.
²Origenes Gegen Celsum VIII.17.
³Gegen Celsum VIII. 20.
⁴Gegen Celsum VIII. 24.
Christ died."¹ "That which is offered to idols is sacrificed to daemons, and a man of God ought to not become a partaker of the table of daemons."²

Celsus further objects to the unwillingness of the Jews to associate with other people, "as though they had some deeper wisdom."³ Origen replies: Though Celsus will not agree, the Jews do possess some deeper wisdom, not only more than the multitude, but also than those who seem to be philosophers, because the philosophers in spite of their impressive philosophical teachings fall down to idols and demons, while even the lowest Jew looks only to the Supreme God. In this respect at least they are right to be proud and to avoid the society of others as polluted and impious."⁴ But Origen does not, by the same logic, envision Christianity as a religion for the elite, either intellectually or spiritually. Rather, he says that Christians, who are ambassadors of truth, should spread the Christian message widely since it is intended for the common good rather than catering only to the educated.⁵ In answer to Celsus' ridicule of the Christians for welcoming into their midst all kinds of wicked men and allowing them to participate in the Christian mysteries and share in its wisdom, Origen objects that these

¹ Gegen Celsum VIII.24. ² Gegen Celsum VIII. 30.
³ Gegen Celsum V. 41. ⁴ Gegen Celsum V. 43.
⁵ Gegen Celsum VI.1.
people are first invited to be healed and then gradually to share in Christian doctrine and practice. He indicates in addition that several Greek philosophers experienced a similar conversion of life and that men like Celsus who boast of their concern for the common good should thank Christianity for being able to inspire men to abandon their wicked ways and to live a life beneficial for humanity. But Celsus objects that those who are sinners by nature and custom will have a difficult time in reforming their lives. It is those who are without sin, he claims, who are of a better life. The Christians only make empty promises in teaching a doctrine of a blessed life and with God. Origen objects that a man's deeds, particularly his philanthropy, help him achieve salvation.

Due to the Roman persecutions of the Christian Church in the early centuries, martyrdom became an important way of witnessing to the faith. The author of the Martyrdom of Polycarp would end his life in the same way that Christ did, since Polycarp professed to be of Christ. Eusebius mentions that many of the faithful wanted to take away the body of

1 Gegen Celsum VII. 61.  
2 Gegen Celsum I. 64.  
3 Gegen Celsum III. 65.  
4 Gegen Celsum III. 80.  
5 Gegen Celsum IV. 83.  
Polycaep "and to have a communion with his holy flesh."\(^1\) Origen observes that the martyrs who have κοινωνία in suffering also have κοινωνία with Christ and will be κοινωνοί of His glory.\(^2\)

Dionysius of Alexandria, a disciple of Origen, also comments that martyrs are called κοινωνοί of the kingdom of Christ.\(^3\) Both the orthodox and the heretical sects claimed their martyrs who of course, refused to have κοινωνία with each other.\(^4\)

Clement did not emphasize actual martyrdom as much as he did a "gnostic martyrdom," a dying of the self, without which he felt, the act of physical martyrdom was meaningless. Later, when the opportunities for martyrdom were not so numerous, some Christians adopted the practice of witnessing to their faith by renouncing the world and living as ascetics and hermits or in cenobitic communities, which were referred to by George Nazianzen in terms of κοινωνία.\(^5\)

Clement and several other Patristic writers saw openness to the Word as a special means of union with God in Christ and the Spirit. But as members of the Church began to differ, sometimes

\(^1\) Eusebius Kirchengeschichte IV. 15. 40.

\(^2\) Origenes Eis Martyrion Protreptikos 39. 14–18, 24.


\(^4\) Eusebius Kirchengeschichte V. XVI. 22.
radically, in their interpretation of the Word, inspiration gave way to organization. Κοινωνία in orthodox doctrine, the definition of which was often dictated by the emperor, became the absorbing concern of Christians. Orthodoxy of belief became the criterion upon which sacramental participation was allowed.

Κοινωνία and its cognates used to designate union in doctrine have been observed fourteen times in Eusebius,¹ eighty-four times in Athanasius,² and once in Theodoret.³ The criterion by which orthodoxy is to be measured, according to Athanasius, is the witness of the Apostles.⁴ To determine the correct interpretation of the doctrine of the Apostles, councils and synods were held both locally and for the whole Church.⁵ The Emperor Constantine, who tried to achieve κοινωνία at a synod,⁶ is quoted by Eusebius as saying: "the dignity of your synod may be preserved and the communion of your whole body maintained unbroken,

¹Eusebius Kirchengeschichte V. 24.17.
²Athanasius Vita S. Antonii 690.9. All Greek texts from Athanasius are taken from Opera Omnia Quae Extant (2 vols.; Patrologia Graeca, ed. J.P. Migne; Paris, 1857).
³Theodoret Kirchengeschichte I. 30.1.
⁴Athanasius Epistola ad Dracontium 209, 4.
⁵Sozomenus Kirchengeschichte (Die Griechischen Christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte; Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1960), IV 2410 et passim uses κοινωνία four times meaning to take part in a council or synod.
⁶Athanasius Epistola ad Epictetum 725.9.
however wide a difference may exist among you as to unimportant matters. For we are not all of us like-minded on every subject, nor is such a thing as one disposition and judgment common to all alike. 1 But he pleaded with the members of the synod: "as regards the Divine Providence, let there be one faith, and one understanding among you, one united judgment in reference to God." 2

There was no room for κοινωνία with the Arians because they denied that the Word was co-existent with the Father. 3 Any who say they have no κοινωνία with them and yet worship with them should be told not to, according to Athanasius. 4 In fact, the attitude on the part of those differing in doctrine was quite hostile. John Chrysostom says that those who are in communion should have no κοινωνία with their adversaries. 5 Eusebius indicates that not even the κοινωνία of speech was practiced between heretics and Christians. 6 Anyone, bishop, priest, or

1 Athanasius Epistola ad Afros Episcopos 718.10.
3 Athanasius Vita S. Antonii 677.66.
4 Athanasius Epistola ad Monachos 771.
6 Eusebius Kirchengeschichte IV. 14.7.
layman, considered to hold unorthodox doctrine was excluded from
the church and worship\textsuperscript{1} and could also come under the sentence of
banishment\textsuperscript{2} or death.\textsuperscript{3} A council could depose a bishop for heter-
odoxy, in which case he would be deprived not only of his
office but even of κοινωνία with the faithful.\textsuperscript{4} The formula of
excommunication was: "οὐκέτι κοινωνοῦμεν."\textsuperscript{5}

It became customary in the Church to send letters to the
Christian community at large which were either declarations of
orthodoxy or condemnations for heterodoxy. The former type were
known as τὰ κοινωνικὰ γράμματα and were of two kinds: "the one
given to the clergy and laity when they were going to travel, in
order that they might be admitted to communion by foreign bishops;
while the other kind were sent by bishops to other bishops to
declare their communion with them, and were in turn received from
other bishops...They were usually sent by new bishops soon after
their ordination.\textsuperscript{6} The latter type, condemnations of those cut

\textsuperscript{1}Athanasius Epistola encyclica 5.4.
\textsuperscript{2}Athanasius Epistola ad Episcopos Aegypti et Libyae 232.22.
\textsuperscript{3}Athanasius Apologia ad Constantium Imp. 248.29.
\textsuperscript{4}Athanasius Apologia Secunda 49.4.
\textsuperscript{5}Athanasius Historia Arianorum 32.2.
\textsuperscript{6}Arthur Cushman McGiffert, ed., Eusebius, Church History
off from κοινωνία with the Church, were directed "to the injury and dishonour of those who hold communion"¹ with them. One such letter was sent about Leontius, a eunuch, who, according to Athanasius, "ought not to remain in communion even as a layman, because he mutilated himself that he might henceforward be at liberty to sleep with one Eustolium, who is a wife as far as he is concerned, but is called a virgin."²

The Emperor often exerted his influence in securing adherence to the particular theological position he favored. Many bishops in κοινωνία with Athanasius had been deposed under the influence of the Emperor Constantius.³ "Orders were sent also to the more distant parts, and Notaries dispatched to every city, and Palatines, with threats to the Bishops and Magistrates, directing the Magistrates to urge on the Bishops, and informing the Bishops that either they must subscribe against Athanasius, and hold communion with the Arians, or themselves undergo the punishment of exile while the people took part with them were to understand that chains, and insults, and scourgings, and the loss of their possessions, would be their portion."⁴

An interesting dialogue is recorded by Theodoret between Eulogius, a presbyter of Edessa, and a perfect of the Emperor

¹Athanasius Apologia Secunda 56.2.
²Athanasius Historia Arianorum 28.1.
³Historia Arianorum 30.3.
⁴Historia Arianorum 31.3.
Valens. The perfect ordered Eulogius to have koivwia with the emperor. Eulogius responded by asking if the Emperor were not a priest as well as emperor. The perfect retorted: "I did not say so, you fool; I exhorted you to communicate with those with whom the Emperor communicates." To this the old man replied that they had a shepherd and obeyed his directions, and so eighty of them were arrested.¹

Theodoret also related that the Emperor Valens was persuaded by Eudoxius to get the Goths to accept koivwia with him and the Arian position.² "Partly by the fascination of his eloquence and partly by the bribes with which he nailed his proposals Eudoxius succeeded in inducing him to persuade the barbarians to embrace communion with the Emperor."³ Also, "Ulphilas in his efforts to persuade them to join in communion with Eudoxius and Valens denied that there was any difference in doctrine and that the difference had arisen from mere empty strife."⁴ So the Goths, while describing the Father as greater than the Son, still refuse to call the Son a creature, though those in koivwia with them do.⁵ Valens' successor Gratianus, however, adhered to true Christianity and immediately proved it "by published an edict commanding the exiled shepherds to return, and to be restored to

¹Theodoret Kirchengeschichte IV. 18.3.
²Kirchengeschichte IV. 37.1. ³Kirchengeschichte IV. 37.3.
⁴Kirchengeschichte IV. 37.5. ⁵Kirchengeschichte V. 37.4.
their flocks, and ordering the sacred buildings to be delivered to congregations adopting communion with Damasus. ¹

The plight of those who repented of their heresy and wanted to return to orthodoxy varied. One bishop who left the orthodox position was received back as a layman. ² Another, Natalius, left the Church and became bishop in an heretical sect. Later he wanted to return to κοινωνία with the Church. He dressed in sackcloth and ashes and prostrated himself before the bishop, clergy, and laity, and begged and cried to be accepted back into the κοινωνία of the Church. ³ Others, according to Dionysius of Alexandria, who joined heretical sects and then repented were received back. Members of the Church "summoned them to assemblies, introduced them and admitted them to the prayers and feasts." ⁴

A problem arose about the validity of baptism in a heretical sect. Both Eusebius ⁵ and Dionysius of Alexandria ⁶ mention bishops who would not have κοινωνία with other bishops who rebaptized heretics. A certain Haracles went to his bishop protesting

¹ Kirchengeschichte V. 2.1.
² Eusebius Kirchengeschichte VI. 43.10.
³ Kirchengeschichte V. 28.12.
⁴ Dionysius of Alexandria Epistle I. 3.
⁵ Eusebius Kirchengeschichte VII. 5.4.
⁶ Dionysius of Alexandria Epistle V. 2.1. The Greek citation here is identical with that in footnote 443.
that "the baptism he had received among the heretics was not this, nor had anything in common" with orthodox Christian baptism, but the bishop still refused to rebaptize him "saying that his so long being in communion with us was sufficient for the purpose." Participation in the Eucharist became the visible expression of unity in doctrine. Just as the Christians were not to associate with the heterodox, according to the Paschal Homilies, so the sacrifice was not to be taken outside the church so that others might not have κοινωνία in it. The Christians were urged to be prepared to receive the Eucharist, the κοινωνία of holiness, and to live their lives in order to become a metochos of the holy. According to Isidore of Pelusium, the Eucharist is a κοινωνία which gives us unity with Christ and makes us κοινωνοί in His kingdom.

κοινωνία was also used by the Church Fathers in doctrinal formulations to describe the relationship among the persons of the Trinity and the κοινωνία of men with God in Christ and the Spirit.

1 Epistle V.5.  
2 Epistle V.5.  
4 Homélies Pascales III.  
5 Homélies Pascales III.  
6 Isidore of Pelusium Epistolarum Liber I; 228, ed. J.P. Migne (Patrologia Graecae; Paris, 1860), 325.
Athanasius asserted that a relationship of \( \kappaοινωνία \) exists between the Father and the Son.\(^1\) Christ himself has assured us "that He is of the Father's nature, and He has given us to know that of the True Father He is True offspring." If this were not so, He would not have said it, "for what \( \kappaοινωνία \) is there between the True and the not true?"\(^2\)

Basil of Cesarea, in his treatise \textit{De Spiritu Sancto}, was primarily concerned with proving the equality of the Holy Spirit with the Father and the Son. He held a doctrine of one God and three hypostases or special personal properties: Fatherhood, Sonship, and Sanctification.\(^3\) Basil maintained that there was a natural \( \kappaοινωνία \) between the three persons of the Trinity\(^4\) and that proof of this could be seen from the things created at the beginning.\(^5\) Also, the Spirit "is moreover said to be 'of God'; not indeed in the sense in which "all things are of God," but in the sense of proceeding out of God, not by generation, like the Son, but as the Breath of his mouth."\(^6\) The \( \kappaοινωνία \) which exist naturally among Father, Son and Spirit, by the fact of naming

\(^1\)Athanasius \textit{De sententia Dionysii} 17.1.
\(^2\)Athanasius \textit{Oratio III Contra Arianos} 442.9.
\(^5\)\textit{Traité du Saint-Esprit} 136a. \(^6\)\textit{Traité du Saint Esprit} 152a.
them in that order is not lessened, as the Arians think it is. "Grant, they say, that He is to be glorified, but not with the Father and the Son. But what reason is there in giving up the place appointed by the Lord for the Spirit, and inventing some other? What reason is there for robbing of His share of glory Him who is everywhere associated with the Godhead; in the confession of the Faith, in the baptism of redemption, in the working of miracles, in the indwelling of the Saints, in the graces bestowed on obedience?" No one who realized the unique place of the Spirit in the Christian scheme of things could possible deny His Koinwvía with the Father and the Son.

Basil also protested that the language used to express the reality should not mislead us as to the nature of the reality. Quoting Paul, II Cor. 13:13: "the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ and the love of God and the fellowship of the Holy Ghost," maintained it makes no difference if we were to use "with" instead of "and" as the conjunctive element; "the conjunction 'and' intimates that there is a common element in an action, while the preposition 'with' declares in some sense as well the communion in action," since, "wherever the fellowship is intimate,
congenial, and inseparable, the word with is more expressive suggesting as it does, the idea of inseparable fellowship.  

"The preposition 'in' states the truth rather relatively to ourselves; while 'with' proclaims the fellowship of the Spirit with God."  

Also the phrase "through whom" does not designate a reality inferior to that expressed by "of whom"; either can be applied to any of the person.  

Union with God is made possible for the believer because God has created man with the desire for κοινωνία with Him. In addition, Christ became man and had κοινωνία in human birth that men might become κοινωνία of the divine nature and live forever in heaven. This κοινωνία with God in Christ is achieved through the Holy Spirit who operates in men, making them spiritual by κοινωνία with Himself, and in the Church, animating all the members of the body. 

The relationship or κοινωνία existing on all levels of

reality—divine, celestial, human—has been ordered into hierarchies with great intricacy by Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite.¹

A perfect κοινωνία exists between Father, Son, and Holy Spirit,² who, while remaining unmovable and unchanged,³ call all being into κοινωνία with themselves⁴ "by illuminations corresponding to each separate creature's powers, and thus draw upward holy minds into such contemplation, participation and resemblance" to the divine as each can attain.⁵

The celestial hierarchy, the highest level of created beings, is ordered into three triads of angels: principalities, archangels, and angels.⁶ They preside over the hierarchies among men "in order that the elevation, and conversion, and communion, 

¹Dom Denys Rutledge, Cosmic Theology. The Ecclesiastical Hierarchy of Pseudo-Denys: An Introduction (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964), 33 comments: "It would, then, I suggest, fit better into this author's scheme to regard the hierarchies as neither joined, so that one is the continuation of the other, nor as parallel, but rather as interpenetrating, the one living in the other."

²Dionysius Areopagitica De Dei Nominebus II, I. All the Greek texts from Dionysius Areopagitica are taken from Opera Omnia Quae Extant (2 vols.; Patrologia Graecae; Paris, 1857).

³Dionysius Areopagitica De Ecclesiastica Hierarchia III, III. III.

⁴Dionysius Areopagitica De Caeliste Hierarchia IV.1.

⁵De Div. Nom. I. II.

⁶De Cael. Hier. IX. II.
and union with God may be in due order."\(^1\) All the angels contemplate and have κοινωνία with the divine\(^2\) as well as with each other.\(^3\) Within each rank there are three choirs, and according to this law of upward progression "the more divine are instructors and conductors of the less to the Divine access, and illumination, and participation."\(^4\)

The ecclesiastical hierarchy is also ordered into a triad: sacraments, clergy, laity. This forms "the vital link between the visible and invisible worlds, between the transient world of becoming and that of true, permanent being...The 'mysteries' or sacraments, form the direct link with the invisible world."\(^5\) The sacraments are divided into the triad of baptism, unction and eucharist; the clergy into deacons, priests and bishops; the laity into monks, lay Christians, and imperfect members.

Dionysius maintains that κοινωνία in the Eucharist, since it completes our κοινωνία with God, is for men most properly called κοινωνία or synaxis.\(^6\) Therefore, participation in the Eucharist must be carefully regulated. After the readings from the Scripture the three classes of the imperfect members leave

\(^1\) De Eccles. Hier. III.V. \(^2\) De Cacl. Hier IV.2.
\(^3\) De Cael. Hier. XV.IX. \(^4\) De Cael. Hier. XV.I.
\(^6\) De Eccles. Hier. III.I.
the sacred enclosure, while only those "deemed worthy of sight and participation of the Divine Mysteries remain."¹ The Hierarch or bishop, chants, elevates the symbols and then participates in the Eucharist himself.² Then he exhorts the others, distributes Communion and terminates with a thanksgiving. Through participation in the Eucharist each person is drawn into κοινωνία with the One³ according to his own character.⁴ The results of this κοινωνία with regard to the soul are manifest "in pure contemplation and in the science of things being done" and with regard to the body "by sanctifying the whole man."⁵ Thus man, and all of reality which proceeded from the One, finds its ultimate fulfillment in its return to the One.

The general conclusion which results from a study of the citations of κοινωνία and its cognates in the Old and New Testaments, Philo, Clement, and related Patristic authors is the same as that reached in the two preceding chapters, namely that the contexts in which κοινωνία and its cognates occur are accurate reflections of the historical, intellectual, social, theological, and ecclesiastical milieu which produced them.

The fact that, in its initial stages, "Christianity seemed

¹ De Eccles. Hier. III.II. ² De Eccles. Hier. III.II.
³ De Eccles. Hier. IV.I. ⁴ De Eccles. Hier. III.III.l.
⁵ De Eccles. Hier. VII.IX.
indistinguishable from its parent and was regarded by many as no more than another sect within Judaism"\(^1\) is proof of the statement that "the religion of a given race at a given time is relative to the whole mental attitude of that time."\(^2\) This is reflected in the general similarity of the contexts in which \(\text{koinw} \text{nia}\) occurs in the Old and New Testaments and in the literature describing the Essene sect. And yet the unique nature of Christianity also is reflected in the special orientation which \(\text{koinw} \text{nia}\) receives in the Christian context.

The Old Testament warned the Hebrews against any relationships which would endanger their moral integrity. The New Testament also contained similar admonitions but it minimized them and emphasized instead the positive relationship of those who were \(\text{koinw} \text{nai}\) in their faith in Christ and in the Gospel. The relationship which each believer enjoyed with God the Father and the Son in the Holy Spirit also placed him in a special relationship with those who shared his belief. That such a close relationship should exist among believers was not a new idea to the Hebrew community. But the relationship between the believer and the Trinity was far beyond anything which the Hebrews had thought possible between man and God. In fact, when Paul tried to find

\(^1\)J.C. Davies, The Early Christian Church (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1965), 30. The survey of the development of the Church which follows is based largely on this source.

\(^2\)Hatch, \textit{op. cit.}, 2-3.
an Old Testament parallel to the sacramental participation in
the body and blood of Christ, all he could find was the statement
reminiscent of that made by Philo, that those who shared in the
remains of the Jewish sacrifices, namely the poor and the
priests, were considered \( \text{κοινωνοί} \) of the altar, which is sometimes
considered "a circumlocution for God."

The existence of the Essene community proves that individ­
ual communities could and did exist within the Jewish community
as a whole. Thus the existence of the Apostolic community pract­
icing some form of communal living, as described in Acts fits
comfortably into the historical context. In fact, the communal
life which these early Christians practiced bears some resem­
blance to the Essene community life as described by Philo and
Josephus and as revealed by archaeological excavations at Qum­
ran. Themes in Essene literature, such as that of light and
darkness, can also be paralleled with New Testament texts. That
there was any direct influence of the one upon the other is im­
probable, however.

Paul encouraged the gentile Christians to contribute to
alleviate the material needs of the poor in Jerusalem. The var­
ious Christian communities which he founded also contributed for
Paul's needs also. This sharing of one's goods was a common
Hebrew practice too, as both the Old Testament and Philo indicate.

Both the "climate of thought and religious practice,"

1Davies, op. cit., 34.
and the actual historical situation in the Roman Empire of the first century A.D. were favorable to the rapid growth of Christianity which is witnessed to in the New Testament epistles. Pagans in the diaspora, familiar with Judaism but not desiring to submit to circumcision, found the new religion attractive. Members of the philosophical schools were drawn by the emphasis on a high moral standard of behavior which, like them, Christianity fostered. Those who had been made aware of their need for a savior in the Mystery cults found fulfillment in the Christian doctrine of salvation. The Pax Romana also "facilitated the movement of men and ideas." ¹ The Christian missionaries were not slow to take advantage of this opportune circumstance to travel and preach the "good news" about Christ who became man, died, and rose again, offering the hope of life forever to all believers.

In the second century, "new emphases, new interpretations and developments of ideas and movements, nascent in the preceding decades" ² began to come to the fore. A pagan religious revival took place, exemplified in Plutarch, the chief characteristic of which was syncretism. There was also a renewed interest in philosophy, particularly in Platonism, though mixed with Aristotelian and Stoic elements, which was clearly reflected in Clement's

¹Ibid., 35.
²Ibid., 68.
thought.

Most people, however, still lived under the shadow of an inexorable fate, haunted by the vision of evil spirits. They sought to escape evil by means of astrology or the mystery religions. In this context also, the success of the Gnostic schools, which offered a means of "escape from the wheel of fate and the predatory activities of evil spirits"\(^1\) is understandable. In contrast to Christianity whose doctrines, as Justin Martyr affirmed, were open to anyone who asked, Gnosticism taught that there was a special knowledge leading to salvation reserved for the few.

Part of the whole gnostic trend in this period is reflected in the thought of a certain Marcion who caused considerable confusion in Christianity when he repudiated the Old Testament theology because of the nature of its God. He posited instead a dualism "of a legalistically righteous demiurge, harshly and cruelly demanding obedience to his law, and of a forgiving Father, revealing himself in loving action instead of in hate and retribution."\(^2\)

The pressure of this and other heresies within Christianity initiated the process of formulating a Canon of Scripture, finally completed in the fourth century, based on the following criteria: authorship by an apostle or close associate;

\(^1\)Ibid., 70.  \(^2\)Ibid., 75.
acceptance by the Church at large; general edification of sub-
ject-matter. ¹

Christians from the beginning both believed in and expe-
rienced the necessity of suffering for their faith in imitation
of Christ who suffered for them. Though there was no systematic
attempt to exterminate the Christian community during the second
century, persecutions did arise due to local circumstances. One
of the main difficulties was the fact that worship of the emperor
was required of all citizens of the empire, a ritual to which
Christians often refused to conform. Polycarp seems to have
been a victim of a crown which, while celebrating a festival in
honor of Caesar, turned against the Christians who were known
opponents of the cult. Justin and his companions were the vic-
tims of one Crescens, a Cynic, who had been defeated several times
in discussion by Justin, and who took revenge by reporting Jus-
tine to the authorities as a Christian.

Theologically, the patristic writers of the second century
continued to interpret the person of Christ in terms of his
function, namely as the bearer of illumination, as the revelation
of God. Influenced by the Old Testament imagery and the termi-
nology of Philo and the Stoics, they referred to Him as the
Logos, the Wisdom, and the Word of God. Baptism and the Euchar-
ist remained the main aspects of the cultic life of Christianity.

¹Tbid., 85.
Though some sects interpreted the freedom of the sons of God as licence to indulge in the pursuit of every type of pleasure, in general, the Christians of the second century were exorted to a restrained manner of living. Mortification and self-denial were encouraged as means of developing spiritual vitality. Almsgiving was still considered the Christian's response of gratitude for all that he had been given.

The third century is characterized by a continued expansion of the Church and a struggle between Church and State. Official paganism was kept alive by a long line of short-reigning emperors, who attempted to secure their precarious position by outlawing every type of organized club and by demanding worship from all the subjects of their empire as a proof of loyalty. Failure of the Christians to comply with these regulations resulted in organized systematic persecutions, which did not end until 261 A.D. when Gallienus tolerated Christianity as a religio licita. Patristic authors referred to those who chose martyrdom rather than worship the emperor as κοινωνοι of Christ and His kingdom. Many defenses of Christianity were also composed during this period to counteract the attacks and suspicion which Christians incurred because of the objectionable practices of some of the heretical sects, both Christian and Gnostic. A good example of this type of writing is Origen's Contra Celsum, a defense against a knowledgeable attack by a pagan both on Judaism and on Christianity.

The theological controversies of the period were concerned
with Trinitarianism and the person and nature of Christ. Tertullian, writing in Latin which now began to be used together with Greek as a language for theological discussion, was the leading Christian spokesman on these points in the West as Origen was in the East. Origen tried to preserve both the unity and trinity of persons, but his thought was complicated by a lack of exact terminology and by failure to distinguish between derivation and creation. Origen saw the role of Christ as twofold, that of Savior and that of Wisdom. Both Christ's relationship to the Trinity and His relationship to the believer were expressed by Origen in terms of \( \kappa \alpha \iota \nu \omega \nu \iota \alpha \)  

With the hope of an immanent \textit{parousia} fading and with the continued expansion of Christianity the Church during this period began to develop a more structured organizational system which, though it grew out of the earlier functional offices, now subordinated function to office and privilege. The parochial system developed to cope with the numerical and geographical expansion of the Christian congregations but an attempt was made to preserve a sense of unity by means of \( \kappa \alpha \iota \nu \omega \nu \iota \alpha \) in councils and synods.

The schisms which developed during this century were the result of both personal differences and a lack of agreement on disciplinary questions. Bishops were uncertain about the reception back into the fold of those who had apostasized during the persecutions and later wanted to return to the Church. They
also differed as to whether those who had been baptized in heretical sects should be received into the Christian community without rebaptism. Stephen of Rome refused to rebaptize heretics or to have κοινωνία with those who did. Cyprian, on the other hand, maintained that baptism outside the Church was invalid and had to be repeated for each schismatic.

The cultic practices of Christianity during the third century, basically the same as in the preceding centuries, became more elaborate and enriched. The Eucharist assumed special importance as a symbol of unity in doctrine and in which those outside the fold were not to have κοινωνία. Emphasis was placed on the importance of preparation for κοινωνία with Christ in the sacrament. The agape by this period had become dissociated from the Eucharist and functioned as a "quasi-religious gathering for the faithful."¹

Christianity, which had suffered from the disfavor of many of the emperors of the third century, found herself the object of the patronage and protection of the emperor Constantine in the early fourth century. His religious policy was one of toleration, which extended to Christianity and paganism alike. Later in the century however, under the emperor Julian, paganism experienced a period of renewed vigor. The emperor technically supported a policy of religious toleration, but established a

¹Ibid., 153.
strict educational policy in which Christians were no longer allowed to teach in the schools. He provided an organized structure for paganism, modelled on that of the Church, and encouraged the practice of strict moral living, thus giving paganism a new and powerful impact in the empire.

Much of the information about this period comes from two sources, the Chronicle of Eusebius and the writings of Athanasius, and largely concerns the Arian controversy, which was undoubtedly the most significant of the schisms which disturbed the equilibrium of the Church during the next century and a half. Arius maintained that the Son was only a creature, while Athanasius and the Council of Nicaea, which Constantine convoked to settle the question, maintained that Christ was not like in nature to the Father but equal in nature to Him. Theoretically, the question was settled at the Council, but actually the controversy continued on for almost half a century. Eusebius' Chronicle records various instances of attempts to achieve koinōnia in doctrine among the different elements in the Church, the pressures brought to bear on both heterodox and orthodox by the various emperors, and the hostility between those who differed in their theological positions.

Athanasius was supported in his theological position by the three Cappadocians, Basil the Great, Gregory of Nyssa, and Gregory Nazianzus. Following the lead of Athanasius who had extended the controversy regarding the nature of the Son to a further
consideration of the role of the Spirit, they solved the problem of apparent subordinationism in the Trinity by the idea of con-substantiality.

The practice of Christian asceticism was furthered by the development of monasticism, of which St. Antony was a well-known exponent. The type of monasticism practiced by Antony "was initially a protest of individuals; it was at first eremitical in character." As it developed, however, the idea of community life was also introduced. It was this form of monasticism which Basil of Caesarea observed in Syria and Egypt and then organized in his area by a rule which became the model for monasticism in the Greek Church, according to Gregory Nazianzen's eulogy of Basil.

Toward the end of the fourth century, paganism enjoyed its final revival in the empire, a revival which was brought to a conclusion by the victory of Theodosius in 394 A.D. By this time the Pax Romana was no longer a reality due to internal conflicts and external pressures. Rivalries between the emperors of the East and West weakened the strength of the empire internally and the barbarian invasion threatened it externally.

In the fifth century the Church in the West developed more independently of the political power than it did in the East. The career of John Chrysostom "illustrates the relations of

1 Ibid., 185.
Church and State in the East where the former came to be dominated by the later, and the contrast with the situation in the West, as evidenced by the exchanges between Ambrose and Theodosius, where the Church came to dominate the State. John's episcopate also reveals the rivalry between Alexandria and Constantinople, which played a not unimportant part in the Church history of the early fifth century. The Fathers of this period were forced to struggle against the heretical doctrines of Pelagianism, Nestorianism, and Monophysitism which again threatened the doctrinal unity of the Church.

Cultic practices became more elaborate and differed considerably from area to area. But in general "every rite continued to have two parts: the ministry of the Word and the ministry of the sacrament. This two-fold division is well illustrated by the information provided by pseudo-Dionysius in regard to the Eucharist. This author is interesting in his attempt, during this period of dissension and lack of unity both within and without Christianity, to provide an organized synthesis of the whole of reality and its interrelationships based on the philosophical doctrines of Neo-Platonism.

It is within the historical context of the patristic period, particularly that of the second century A.D., that Clement of Alexandria and his thought must be understood. Many elements

1Ibid., 220.
characteristic of the second century milieu can be easily discerned in his writing. The philosophy, which he had the vision to attempt to integrate with his Christian theology, was that which was prevalent during the period, a Platonism compounded with Aristotelian and Stoic elements. The demons who frightened so many he incorporated into his system as mediators between God and men. His encounter with gnosticism, and possibly also with Pythagoreanism, led him to the formulation of Christian gnosticism, based on authentic doctrine, in which the believer was encouraged to live a life of contemplation in response to the Logos. First, however, he had to succeed in ordering his passions following on his death to self in baptism. In opposition to the Marcionite heresy Clement stressed the compatibility of the theology of the Old and New Testaments and assigned an important role to both in his thought and writing. He stressed the necessity of inward martyrdom, in an age of martyrs, as the most significant means of Christian witness and put his theory into practice by fleeing from Alexandria during the persecution under Septimius Severus in 202-203 A.D.

Reitzenstein has stated: "In religious history it is even clearer than elsewhere that nothing can exercise influence which does not find its way prepared, and nothing is living which is not essentially new." ¹ This statement can, with the proper

¹Nock, op. cit., 87.
alterations, apply equally well to figures in Church history such as Clement of Alexandria. Clement seems to have been able to respond faithfully to the Christian message and at the same time to integrate, more or less creatively, into his own thought much of his age, thus revealing depths in the Christian message which were new and vital. Bigg describes Clement as "above all things a Missionary; . . . He must graft the fruitful olive on to the wild stem, and aim at producing, not a new character, but a richer development of the old. This he succeeded in doing to a remarkable degree."¹

¹Bigg, op. cit., 47.
CHAPTER VI

KOINONIA AND ITS COGNATES: GRAMMATICAL ANALYSIS

The following analysis of grammatical constructions which occur with коиномия and its cognates is based on an examination of the more than 1400 citations collected for the whole of this study, most of which have appeared in earlier chapters. The constructions most commonly used by each of the three authors, Plato, Plutarch, and Clement of Alexandria will be studied and tabulated. These results will then be compared with the results from a random sampling of citations from other authors of the same period, and finally conclusions will be drawn from this data regarding the general grammatical usage of коиномия and its cognates.

Plato uses noun forms of коиномия a total of eighty-nine times. Seven cognate noun forms also occur. The adjective коиномос occurs twenty-nine times and is used substantively in every instance. Five other cognate adjectival forms also occur. Verb forms of коиномою, including infinitives and participles, occur a total of eighty-eight times. Five other cognate verb forms also occur.

Examples of twenty-three different constructions of combinations of constructions occur with the forms of коиномия and its cognates in Plato. They are listed here with one example of each.
construction:

1. Genitive of person - 310B Τοὺς τῶν ἐπιτημιῶν καὶ παιδῶν κοινωνήσεων καὶ τῶν περί ταῖς ἡδίας ἔκδοσεις καὶ γέμους.

2. Genitive of thing - 462B Οὐκέτι ἦν ἡδονής τε καὶ λύπης κοινωνία ξυνάστε, ὅταν ἦν μέλισσα πάντες οἱ πολιτείᾳ τῶν αὐτῶν γεγομένων τε καὶ ἐποδημάσων παραπλησίως χαίρομεν καὶ λυπᾶμεν,

3. Genitive of person, adverbial modifier - 845C ἵνα δὲ πρεσβύτερος ὅν ἀπετίθη τοῦτον, φημῶν πυνότε καὶ ἀποφερῶν ὑπεθέν, καθάπερ δὲ ζήνος, τάτη κοινωνεῖτο εἰς τοιούτων ἁπάντων...

4. Genitive of thing, adverbial modifier - 411C Τί δέ, ἐπειδὴ ἄλλο μηδὲν πράτετι μηδὲ κοινωνία Μουσής ὑπάρχῃ,

5. Genitive of person, dative of person - 464A Ἄρ' ὅσῳ τοῦτων μετὰ πρὸς τὴν αὐλή καταστασία ή τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ παιδῶν κοινωνίας τοῖς φύλαξιν

6. Genitive of person, dative of person, prepositional phrase - 450C εἰς ὑπὲρ κοινωνία τοῖς φύλαξιν δὲ μην παῖδεν τε περί καὶ γυναικῶν ἐσται καὶ τρεφῆς νεὼν ἔτει ἔντων...

7. Genitive of person, prepositional phrase - 209C ὥστε πολὺ μείζων κοινωνίαν τῆς τῶν παιδῶν πρὸς άλληλους οἱ τοιοῦτοι, ἵχουσι καὶ φιλιάν βεβαιοτέραν...

8. Genitive of thing, dative of person - 844B τὰς ἡμέρας ἐκάθεν κοινώμενος, οὕτω κοινωνεῖτο τοῖς χείτοις ὤρας.

9. Genitive of things, dative of thing - 46A Ἐξ γὰρ τῆς ζήτουσ ἐκὰτέρου κοινωνίας άλληλους, ζῦνος τε ἢ ᾗ περί την ζήτησιν ἐκάθετο γεγενέναι καὶ πολλὰρ περιμεταβαθέντος...

10. Genitive of thing, prepositional phrase - 283D
τὸ μὲν κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄλληλα μεγάλους καὶ συμπελέοντος κοινωνίαν,
τὸ δὲ κατὰ τὴν τῆς γενέσεως ἀναγκαῖαν ὀδοίαν.

11. Genitive of thing, dative of person, prepositional phrase
- 730Ε ... τὸν δ' αὖ μὴ δυνάμενον, ἔδειλον δὲ, ἣν δεύτερον,
τὸν δὲ φθονοῦντα καὶ ἐκόντα μὴν κοινωνὸν διὰ φιλίας γινόμενον
ἀγαθῶν τινῶν αὐτῶν μὲν φέρειν...

12. Genitive of thing, dative of thing, prepositional phrase
- 757Ε ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ μὴν καὶ τούτοις παρωνομοίοις ποτε προσ-
χρόστασθαι πόλεν ἀπαθῶν, ἐν μὲνει στάσεων έαυτῆ μὴ προσ-
κοινωνήσειν κατὰ τῷ μέρος.

13. Dative of person - 369Ε οἷον τὸν γεωργὸν ἔνα ὅντα
παρασκευαζέων οὐτία τεττάρτην καὶ τετραπλάσιον χρόνον τε καὶ
πολὺν ἀναλίγκειν ἐπὶ σιτίων παρασκευῆ, καὶ ἄλλοις κοινωνεῖν.

14. Dative of thing - 253Α Πᾶς δὲν ἑδέν ὅποια ἐποίεις
dvñatà koinwnei', ἢ τέχνης δὲν τῷ μελλοντεί δράν ἰθανᾶς
αὐτό;

15. Dative of person, prepositional phrase - 316Β ... πρῶτον
μὴν δὲ εὐκόστως σῷ ζῷμον κοινωνεῖν περὶ τὰ τῆς πόλεως
πράγματα...

16. Dative of thing, prepositional phrase - 248Α Καὶ
καμάτε μὴν ἡμᾶς δεινότατον ἀνθρώποις κοινωνεῖν, ὥσπερ λοιπῶν
δὲ φυχὴ πρὸς τὴν ἄνως ὀδοίαν...

17. Dative of person, direct object - 540Ε ἔφη, ἔφη,
εἰπὲν πῆλα γὰρ πάντα τῶν αὐθάνατον κοινωνήσουσιν, ὡς διηλθομεν.

18. Dative of thing, direct object, prepositional phrase -
The two hundred and twenty-three citations of κοινωνία and its cognates occur the following number of times with each of the constructions mentioned above. In the table below, each construction is assigned the number it was given above and the number of occurrences of the construction is given, according to the form of the word with which the construction appears.

From this table it can easily be seen that the most frequently occurring constructions with κοινωνία and its cognates in Plato are: 1) genitive of thing - eighty-three; 2) absolute - fo-
TABLE I
NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTIONS OCCURRING WITH KOINONIA AND ITS COGNATES IN PLATO

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<th>Construction number</th>
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As a point of comparison, some three hundred thirty-five citations from Aristotle, Demosthenes, Xenophon, Isocrates, Thucydides, Hippocrates, Aristophanes, Isaeus, Aeschylus, Pindar, Lysias, Euripides, Sophocles, Theophrastus, Aeschines, Fragments...
of Attic Comedy, Stoicorum Veterrum Fragmenta, Supplementum Inscriptionum Graecum were studied. A variety of sixteen different constructions or combination of constructions occurred, the most frequent being: 1) genitive of thing - one hundred thirty-five; 2) absolute - one hundred six; 3) genitive of person - twenty-five; 4) genitive of thing and dative of person - twenty; 5) prepositional phrase - sixteen.

Comparing these results with those obtained from the study of the citations of ἀναφορά and its cognates in Plato, it can be seen that the construction with the genitive of thing was of most frequent occurrence in both groups of citations. The absolute construction was second in both. The constructions with the prepositional phrase and with the genitive of thing and dative of person also occurred among the five most frequently occurring constructions in both groups. Plato does use several more combinations of constructions than were found in the citations of the other authors of the classical period. However, it seems safe to conclude that grammatically Plato used the forms of ἀναφορά and its cognates with the constructions common in his day and that in general the most frequent constructions which occurred with ἀναφορά and its cognates in the classical period were the genitive of thing, the genitive of person, the dative of thing, the genitive of thing with the dative of person, the prepositional phrase. The absolute construction also occurred frequently enough to be significant.
Plutarch used the noun forms of ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ a total of one hundred six times. The cognate noun form ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ η ΑΣ follows occurring eight times. The adjective ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΟΣ occurs twenty-one times with the cognate forms ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΟΣ, ∆ΕΚΟΙΝΩΝΤΟΝ, ΣΟΚΟΙΝΩΝΤΟΝ, ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΚΗΣ occurring twenty-four times. Verb forms of ΚΟΙΝΩΝΕΩ, including infinitives and participles, occur sixty-nine times. The verbal form occurs twice.

A total of sixteen different constructions and combinations of constructions have been observed in these citations. They are listed here with one example of each construction:

1. Genitive of person - 329E ἢς δὶς ὁμόλογος οὐδὲ χειριζόμενος οὐδὲ ἀμφότερος καὶ ἄναμφοτέρος δεσμοῖς, ἀλλὰ ἐρωτεύεται καὶ γάμος σύναρσι καὶ κοινωνίας παῖδων τὰ γένη συνάπτεται

2. Genitive of thing - 886Ε τὰ μὲν γὰρ οὐδάμαν τούτων ἀπαντῶν κοινωνεῖν, ορᾶμα γὰρ περιερχεται ἐκμάκους καὶ σωτηρίας.

3. Genitive of person, genitive of thing, dative of person - 49Α ... ἐν καλῷ καταστάσεις οὕτων μὲν καὶ ἰδιὰν πάσαν ζηρεῖν ἀπὸ τοῦ γάμου, παῖδων δὲ καὶ τεκνώσεσις κοινωνίαν <εἶναι> τοῖς ἀξίοις ...

4. Genitive of person, prepositional phrase - 980Α ... ἀλλὰ μελλόν ὥστε τὰς καὶ ἰδιὰν κοινωνίας αὐτῶν καὶ συμβιωσεῖς ἵτεν.

5. Genitive of thing, dative of person - 204ΑΒ ὁ δὲ ἴκουχός προγνοστικος καὶ φοβηθεὶς τοῖς μὲν πράξεων πασῶν ἐκοινώνει τοῖς Λακεδαιμονίοις ...
6. Genitive of thing, prepositional phrase - 899E 

7. Genitive of thing, dative of person, prepositional phrase - 1620 Ημισίου γάρ, ὃς δὲ ξίνις, ἀνδρός, ὃς ξινίας ἐκοινώνει δὲ Ἰούδας καὶ διάτης ἐν Δοκροῖς...

8. Genitive of thing, accusative absolute - 738E... ἐπεὶ καὶ τὰ ἡμίφωνα τῆς ἀμφότερον τινὰ κοινωνεῖ δυνάμεος.

9. Dative of person - 798E... ἐὰν δὲ σωφροσύνη καὶ λιτότητα καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεῖ τῶν ἔκεινων ὑπερβαλόμενος γραφής ἰσότητα καὶ κοινωνίας καταστάσει τοῖς πολιτέσι...

10. Genitive of thing, accusative absolute, dative of person - 279E οὐ γὰρ οὐκ ἐμβάνωντες ὡς μετακαλμεθαίνοντες αἴσθησιν, κοινωνεῖν τρόπον τινὰ τραπέζης ἡγομένου τοῖς δεσπόταις.

11. Dative of thing - 758E τὰ γὰρ μετρῶνα καὶ πανικὰ κοινωνεῖ τοῖς βικχικοῖς ὁρμάσμοις.

12. Direct object, adverbial modifier - 634B Ποιεῖ δὲ ἀληθώς τὰ σκόπαμα καὶ τὸ κοινωνεῖν ἀκμαστάτως τοὺς λέγοντας.

13. Prepositional phrase - 972B Τοῦ γὰρ μὴν κοινωνικὸν μετὰ τοῦ συνετοῦ τοὺς ἐλέφαντας ἀποδεικνύσασθαι φησίν ὁ Ἰόβας.

The following table indicates the number of times each of the two hundred thirty forms of κοινωνία and its cognates occur with each of the constructions illustrated above. As in the previous table on the citations and constructions occurring in Plato, each grammatical construction is assigned the number it was given above and the number of occurrences of the construction is given according to the form of the word with which the construction appears.

The results of this tabulation indicate that the most frequently used constructions and combinations of constructions with κοινωνία and its cognates in Plutarch are: 1) genitive of thing - ninety-one; 2) absolute construction - sixty-eight; 3) prepositional phrase - twenty; 4) genitive of thing and dative of person - nineteen; 5) genitive of person - eight.

The results of the tabulation of some one hundred ten citations from the Hellenistic-Roman authors and sources Polybius, Philo, Stobaeus, Themistius, Diogenes Laertius, Marcus Aurelius,
### TABLE II

**NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTIONS OCCURRING WITH KOINONIA AND ITS COGNATES IN PLUTARCH**

<table>
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<th>Construction number</th>
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Plotinus, Josephus, Epictetus, Dio Chrysostom, Proclus, Epicurus, Arrian, Lucian, Athenaeus, Diodorus Siculus, Dionysius Halicarnassus, Doxographi Graeci, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, Supplementum Inscriptionum Graecum in thirteen different constructions and combinations of constructions indicated that the most frequently occurring constructions among these authors were: 1) absolute construction - forty-one; 2) genitive of thing - twenty-five; 3) prepositional phrase - fifteen; 4) genitive of thing and dative of person - thirteen; 5) genitive of person and prepositional phrase - six. Here again four out of five of the constructions which
occurred with most frequency in the citations of Plutarch also occurred with most frequency in a random sampling of citations from other Hellenistic-Roman authors. Several combinations of constructions occurred in Plutarch which did not occur in the selection of citations from other authors studied here; four combinations of constructions were found in the latter citations which were not found in Plutarch.

Clement of Alexandria uses the noun form of κοινωνία a total of sixty-two times. κοινωνός occurs five times and the cognate adjectival form κοινώνικος occurs twelve times. The verb forms of κοινωνέω, including the infinitives and participles and verbals occur twenty-seven times. A total of eleven different constructions and combinations of constructions have been observed in these citations. They are listed here with one example of each construction:

1. Genitive of person - Strom. III, XVII, 102-4
καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλώνων ἃς ἐφ᾽ ἑαυτῷ τὴν ἐπιτίθεσιν τὴν συνοπτίζεις διάφορα ἐνεργεῖς και παραπείπες τὴν κοινωνία τῆς Ἐθαν συγκαταβολὴ τοῦ Ἀδαμος τούχη...

2. Genitive of thing - Strom. IV, IV, 17.1. εἰποῦ γὰρ τινὲς οἷς ἡμέτεροι, μόνον τοῦ δυνάμας κοινωνοῖ, ὅτι δὲ αὐτοὶ παραδίδεσθαι σπουδής τῇ πρὸς εἰν δημιουργὸν ἀπεχθείς...

3. Genitive of person, dative of person, prepositional phrase - Paed II, X, 90, 4. ἡκεὶ γὰρ ὑπὲρ μᾶλλον μοι ποτὲ
κοινωνίαν καθαύπερ δηλεῖτεν πρὸς μὴν ἀφροδισίαν τοῖς νέοις.


5. Genitive of thing, dative of person - Strom. IV, XIX, 123. Β' Ήλιός ἣν ὁ δὲ σῶμας πρῶτον μὲν πείδειν τῷ ἄνδρᾳ κοινωνῖν ἀδερ φιγοῦσθαι τῶν πρὸς εὐδαιμονίαν . . .

6. Genitive of thing, prepositional phrase - Strom. IV, III, 12, 1. . . δάνατος μὲν εἶναι ἢ ἐν σώματι κοινωνία τῆς ζωῆς ἀμαρτησίας ὃς, ἂν δὲ ἐκ χωρίσως τῆς ἀμαρτίας . . .


8. Dative of thing - Strom. III, XII, 89, 2. . . . τὴν ἕτερον κοινωνίαν μιαρῶν ἰχθύμενος τῆς ἄλλης σώματι συμπλεκέσθαι καὶ μὴ τῷ κατὰ συμφώνοις εἰς παιδοποιών διδομένως.

9. Dative of thing, prepositional phrase - Protr. II, 25, 3. ὧν δὲ τὸ ἐξωτικὸ ἀρχαῖα πρὸς ὁδρανῶν ἀνδρῶποις κοινωνία, ἄφενος μὲν ζωοκοινωνίη, ἀφ' ὧν δὲ που διεκβρύσκουσα τοῦ σκότους καὶ ἀναλάμπουσα . . .


The following table indicates the number of times each of the one hundred six forms of ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ and its cognates occur with each of the constructions listed above.

### TABLE III
NUMBER OF CONSTRUCTIONS OCCURRING WITH KOINONIA AND ITS COGNATES IN CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA

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The results of this tabulation indicate that the most frequently used constructions and combinations of constructions with ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ and its cognates in Clement were: 1) absolute - thirty-six; 2) genitive of thing - twenty-six; 3) prepositional phrase - seventeen; and a three-way tie at 4) dative of thing - five; genitive of thing and dative of person - five; dative of person -
The tabulation of some four hundred eighty citations from the patristic writers Origen, Athanasius, Dionysius Areopagiticus, Methodius, John Chrysostom, Eusebius, Gregory Nazianzen, Hermas, Theodotus, Dionysius of Alexandria, Basil the Great, Isodore, Gelasius, Photius, Philostorgius, Serapion, John Damascene, Justin, the Paschal Homilies, the Martyrdom of Polycarp, and from the New Testament indicated that the most frequently occurring constructions and combination of constructions in this non-selective sampling of citations were: 1) genitive of thing - one hundred thirteen; 2) absolute construction - one hundred four; 3) prepositional phrase - eighty; 4) dative of person - fifty-six; 5) genitive of person - fifty.

Comparing these results it can be seen that three of the most frequently occurring constructions in Clement and the other patristic authors were identical, though occurring in a different order. The total of eleven different constructions and combination of constructions in Clement was less than the fifteen observed in the sampling from the other authors.

In general, it can be concluded that the grammatical constructions which occurred most frequently with κοινωνία and its cognates remained essentially the same from classical to Christian times. Though the absolute construction occurred often enough to be significant both in Plato, Plutarch, and Clement of Alexandria and in the related authors of each period, it was by far more
common that the thought of the \textit{koinōn} -root word was completed in some way. Most often this was done with the genitive of the thing or a prepositional phrase, but the thought could also be completed by the genitive of person, dative of person, dative of thing, genitive of thing and dative of person. There was a definite tendency toward the simplification of the combinations of constructions from Plato to Plutarch to Clement. Generalizations on this tendency in the related authors of the three periods must be more tentative since the number of citations studied in each period varied. However, fewer combinations of constructions were observed in some four hundred eighty citations from patristic writers than in the two hundred twenty-three citations from Plato. The general conclusion resulting from this grammatical analysis is that the relational character of \textit{koinōnia} and its cognates persisted strongly from classical to Christian times.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The aims of this study, as outlined in the Introduction, were threefold: to approach the thought of Plato, Plutarch, and Clement of Alexandria as it is reflected in their total use of \( \kappa \o\i\nu\nu\i\z \) and its cognates; to compare the use of \( \kappa \o\i\nu\nu\i\z \) in the three main authors with that of other authors in the Classical, Hellenistic-Roman, and Patristic periods; to consider the general development of \( \kappa \o\i\nu\nu\i\z \) and its cognates from Classical to Christian times.

Plato with philosophic vision perceived a world of Ideas in which harmony and \( \kappa \o\i\nu\nu\i\z \) existed among the various Forms and between the Forms and the Good or One. He saw this harmony and capacity for relationship reflected in the world of the cosmos and realized further that the same harmony should exist in the soul of the individual and in the \( \pi\o\i\l\i\s \). This could be attained, he felt, only if both the soul of the individual and the \( \pi\o\i\l\i\s \) were modeled upon or had \( \kappa \o\i\nu\nu\i\z \) in some way with the Forms in the world of Ideas.

Plato observed that the harmony in the cosmos was the product of \( \kappa \o\i\nu\nu\i\z \) between its soul, in communion with the divine and its bodily nature. Man he regarded as a microcosm of the cosmos, a being animated by soul and having \( \kappa \o\i\nu\nu\i\z \) in a bodily
nature. Soul was, of course, for Plato the most important element because it most resembled the divine and also because it was with the eyes of the soul alone that the true reality existing in the world of the Forms was able to be perceived. The passages in which Plato used KOINONIK were primarily concerned with man's soul, drawn upward by his KOINONIK with the virtues which exist in the world of the Ideas and at the same time drawn down by his KOINONIK with the body to mere appearances of reality.

The most important means by which the soul could be freed for KOINONIK with the virtues was by participation in the life of a well-ordered polis, composed of producing, material, and ruling classes, and where every aspect of life was planned in conformity with reality as the philosopher-king had perceived it in the world of the Ideas.

The tripartite polis was paralleled by the tripartite soul, in which reason was to have the dominant role. In the harmonious pursuit of temperance, courage, wisdom and justice, according to Plato, both the polis and the individual were ultimately ordered to the Good.

Since the role of the polis was to educate its citizens to the practice of the virtues, it was necessary that it provide circumstances of life most conducive to this end. Regulations were established, according to what types of KOINONIK were and were not suitable for the citizens. And since the practice
of virtue hopefully attained ultimate union with the Good and the One, the highest possible degree of unity within the polis seemed most desirable. Thus Plato suggested that the κοινωνία of women, children, and goods he established, particularly for the two upper classes, so that all the members of the polis would share the joys and sorrows of all and come as close as possible to an imitation of the κοινωνία with the One which was the end of all being and which the soul, finally freed from the body, would enjoy forever.

Plutarch, too, observed that harmony and κοινωνία characterized all levels of reality. God, his ultimate Good, did not exist in solitary splendor, removed from the rest of reality, but enjoyed κοινωνία with the gods and other worlds. Demons effected the κοινωνία among the gods and between the gods and men. The heavenly bodies, in Plutarch’s view, had κοινωνία in soul and thus possessed sensitive, rational and intellectual faculties and were guided by reason and providence. Men and animals were also constituted by a κοινωνία of soul and body, with the soul having κοινωνία in the divine nature as well. The soul, made for κοινωνία with the divine, profited in very few ways from its κοινωνία with the body since its rational element was continually being dragged down to κοινωνία with the passions.

One of the most important ways in which Plutarch believed that the soul could succeed in achieving κοινωνία with the divine was to foster the natural impulse to κοινωνία which the deity
had implanted in the soul. This, man and, to a lesser extent, the animals, were able to do through mutual society and friendship.

The social contexts which Plutarch regarded as most conducive to the development of κοινωνία for men as individuals were marriage and family, the symposium, and friendship with like-minded persons. Most important for the successful achievement of κοινωνία in these contexts was that the partners be able to enter into a like κοινωνία, thus stressing the necessity for equality in these humanizing and also divinizing relationships.

The social nature of man was also reflected in his development of and participation in political associations. Plutarch encouraged active participation in the life of the polis which required living sociably, amicably, justly, and temperately. Though the polis by its nature required many types of κοινωνία for its success, such as κοινωνία in a favorable geographical location, yet Plutarch considered that κοινωνία among the citizens was the most essential element for a successful political κοινωνία.

It was, then, by living most perfectly in accord with his social nature in this life that Plutarch believed that man pleased the gods, benefited the state, and be prepared to have κοινωνία with the divine in the afterlife.

Clement of Alexandria's absorbing interest was κοινωνία between God and men. He maintained that there was an innate
original koinwnia between men and heaven which had become obscure through ignorance but which had come to light again through God's sharing His Word with man in the person of Christ. Clement taught that all men were called to this koinwnia with God through Christ by a twofold approach, koinwnia in the truth through gnosis and koinwnia in virtuous deeds. It is the latter context in which koinwnia is most frequently used by Clement.

The Christian was exhorted to imitate God, who brought men into koinwnia with Himself by sharing His Word with them, by giving one another koinwnia in their material possessions. Clement did not encourage the Christian to give all his possessions away and live in destitution, nor did he advocate a common life such as was practised in the Apostolic Church. But he did encourage him to be willing to share with others anything over and above that which he needed.

Clement praised the koinwnia of Christian marriage as a way to heaven. He condemned both those who regarded sexual koinwnia as inherently evil and those who advocated an unbridled use of the sexual powers under the guise of the freedom of the children of God.

The koinwnia in virtuous deeds which Clement advocated was aimed at the kind of death which consisted in deliberate separation from koinwnia in an unchristian way of life so that the soul might be freed for koinwnia with the divinity through knowledge and contemplation. Not all Christians necessarily reached this
level of κοινωνία with God, but those who did were obliged to share the results of this κοινωνία with the divinity with their fellow men. After death, both the Christians who had κοινωνία with God through the moral virtues and those who in addition had this κοινωνία through the practice of the intellectual virtues and contemplation would become the κοινωνοί of God.

κοινωνία for Plato, Plutarch, and Clement of Alexandria was a phenomenon found in every aspect of reality. For all three men, however, its most important aspect was that involving man, particularly the soul, which by its nature seeks κοινωνία with its ultimate goal as an end and is at the same time led to the formation of various other types of κοινωνία by reason of its κοινωνία with the body, which can be used as means to the attainment of the ultimate goal or can be deterrents to its attainment.

Plato, Plutarch, and Clement differed, however, in their view of what constituted the end and which means were most conducive to its attainment. The goal for Plato was the attainment of the Good by the soul freed for unhindered contemplation of the Ideas. Plutarch's view of the end was union with a personal and benevolent God. The goal for Clement was union with God through Christ in the kingdom of heaven. All three men posited the nature of man as dualistic, however, with the soul striving for the goal indicated but being hampered in its attainment by its κοινωνία with the body. So they each indicated the types of κοινωνία
in the human situation which they felt would be most conducive in preparing the soul for the union which was its goal after it was finally freed from its κοινωνία with the body.

Plato held that all human activity should free man from all but necessary concern with the body so that he would be able to contemplate as fully as possible the Forms in the world of the Ideas and to imitate the Forms or virtues in his life. He felt that life in a well-regulated polis which, by being ruled by a philosopher-king who had a vision of the Ideas, conformed as closely as possible to reality, would be most conducive to contemplation and virtue. He suggested a policy of κοινωνία of women, children, and goods as a means of achieving the greatest possible unity within the polis. Undoubtedly he also had in mind the strong attachment to this world of appearances which family and possessions can engender, thus distracting the soul from κοινωνία with the divine which is its true goal.

Plutarch also recognized the tension which existed in the soul striving for union with the divine through reason and yet pulled down to a lower type of existence by the passions. For him, however, living a life according to reason meant living according to the social instincts which the divinity had implanted in the soul. Therefore, rather than avoiding contact with the world to strive for unhindered contemplation of the divine, Plutarch encouraged the development of κοινωνία in the contexts of the family, the symposium, friendship, and political life. The
fostering of mutual society and friendship would thus enable him to enter more perfectly into κοινωνία with the divine, which he regarded as a personal being of a social nature.

Clement seems to have combined both the idea of freedom from the lower aspects of human nature to enable the soul to enter into a deeper κοινωνία with God through knowledge and contemplation and that of the importance of personal relationships, both with Christ and with other Christians, in his view of the best means to attain the end of union with God. Granted, however, that the former means would be the privilege of only the few. He advocated a balanced use of material goods which avoided both a position of extreme renunciation and of gross licentiousness. Marriage he praised as a means to gaining heaven. Like Plato and Plutarch who regarded the polis as providing a context most conducive to preparation for κοινωνία in the goal, Clement regarded the Church as a sort of spiritual polis in which the same conducive circumstances might be provided for the believer.

In general, then, it can be concluded that κοινωνία and its cognates as used by Plato, Plutarch, and Clement of Alexandria provide an interesting insight into each author's view of the nature of man, his ultimate destiny, and the means most conducive to attaining it. While their views are similar in many respects, each also differs significantly from the other and reflects the insights and beliefs and experiences of the historical milieu in which he lived and worked and thought. Their use
of κοινωνία and its cognates likewise reflects their particular historical situation.

A comparison of the use of κοινωνία and its cognates in Plato, Plutarch, and Clement of Alexandria with that of other authors in the Classical, Hellenistic-Roman, and Patristic periods results in several interesting observations.

Among the usages of κοινωνία in the pre-Platonic citations, the impact of the scientific study of medicine in the Hippocratic school at Cos, which used κοινωνία to describe certain of the interconnections within the body, can be seen in the references which Plato makes to the physical connections of the body, both as physiological observations and as analogies with the connections and interrelationships existing in the body politic. Here Plato does something similar to what Pindar did when he made the κοινωνία of lyre and voices a symbol of spiritual harmony. Plato's statement that the earth, air, fire, and water are "variegated in their shape and combinations and formulations" echoes the sentiment of the Hippocratic writer that the hot, cold, wet, and dry cannot exist without mixture and is used as evidence by those who regard Plato's theory of Ideas and participation as derived from the scientific study current in that period.

The earlier writers, with the exception of Aristophanes, with their sympathetic view of the importance of marriage and the family, would have objected to the theory of the κοινωνία
of women, children and goods which Plato established for his ideal state. Nor would they have accepted his emphasis in the *Laws* on marriage as an institution for the good of the state and therefore subject to careful regulation.

Plato's use of *κοινωνία* as compared with that of Aristotle is also of special interest. Both authors regarded *κοινωνία* as natural to man, but they had different views on the nature of the basic *κοινωνία* which resulted ultimately in the formation of the polis. Plato viewed the mature polis as composed of classes related by a specific though unequal contribution to the common good. For Aristotle, *κοινωνία* involved the combination of diversity and equality for the purpose of attaining some good. The end, as Plato envisioned it, lay outside the polis in ultimate union with the One. The end for Aristotle was happiness which consisted in the possession and exercise in this life of the intellectual and moral virtues together with a possession of a sufficiency of material goods.

The uses of *κοινωνία* and its cognates by the related authors of the Classical period were usually concerned with specific instances of *κοινωνία*. The orators used *κοινωνία* primarily in contexts involving relationship among men and between states in a political vein. Other relationships described by these authors in terms of *κοινωνία* were those of military, social, marital, commercial, legal, genealogical, and nefarious kinds and occurred mainly in specific contexts also. Such citations of
in specific contexts occurred only rarely in Plato, but they were not entirely lacking.

Kοινωνία in Plutarch and the related authors of the Hellenistic-Roman period is frequently used to designate the general relationships that exist on all levels of reality. The most frequent contexts in which it occurs, however, concern man's social nature in relation to other men. Stress was placed on the importance of developing the natural impulse to society. The Stoic Wise Man was said to set the example of a life lived in society and action. The good of all men consisted in fellowship with other men, and no one was to be excluded from this basic human right. The authors acknowledged, however, that social relationships admit of degrees and that the most perfect type of relationship is that of friendship, which is a Kοινωνία of life.

A wide range of human relationships are described in terms of Kοινωνία by Plutarch. They include: Kοινωνία in political activities and alliances, administration and government; Kοινωνία in blood relationships and intermarriage and marriage; Kοινωνία in business partnerships, military activities, and in enterprises of various types; Kοινωνία in religious festivals and in sacrifice; Kοινωνία in the glory of another, in hopes regarding an enterprise, and in philosophical pursuits. Kοινωνία in many of the same specific contexts also occurs in the other writers of the period.

Clement's use of Kοινωνία and its cognates compared with
that of the Old and New Testaments, Philo and Josephus offers several points of similarity. The Old and New Testaments and Clement all warn against relationships which would endanger the moral integrity of the person. Sin and righteousness cannot have κοινωνία. Clement and the New Testament writers warn Christians against κοινωνία with demons. Both Clement and the New Testament writers, however, emphasized much more the positive relationship of those who were κοινωνοί with God in the Son or Word. Such a relationship was not new to the Hebrews, but the relationship as proposed in the New Testament and which Clement advocated was far beyond anything which the Hebrews had thought possible between man and God. The emphasis on contributions to alleviate the needs of the poor was common both to the New Testament, to Philo's description of Hebrew practices, and to Clement's account of the Christian's obligation in this regard.

The use of κοινωνία and its cognates in the related authors of the Patristic period was similar to that of Clement in many respects but also showed further developments in the application of the term in Christian contexts.

Clement and the Patristic authors agreed that God created man for κοινωνία with Him and that this was made possible by Christ's κοινωνία in human birth. They also encouraged Christians to share with others the good news of salvation. They exhorted them, however, to avoid any kind of activity that might seem to imply with demons.
The specific instances of \( \text{koinwv} \) occurred almost exclusively in the related authors of the period and were primarily concerned with indicating union in doctrinal belief. \( \text{koinwv} \) was further extended in this context to apply to participation in synods and councils, called for the purpose of establishing orthodox doctrine. The \( \text{koinwv} \) of the Eucharist assumed great significance as an external expression of the inner \( \text{koinwv} \) in faith and doctrine among the believers.

Theologically, the Patristic authors affirmed belief in the equality of the \( \text{koinwv} \) existing among the three persons of the Trinity. They asserted that \( \text{koinwv} \) with God in Christ was achieved through the Spirit who established \( \text{koinwv} \) among all the members of the body of the Church.

The following conclusions can be drawn regarding the general development of \( \text{koinwv} \) and its cognates for Classical to Christian times.

Etymologically, \( \text{koinwv} \) and its cognates were derived from the Greek \( \text{koinov} \), meaning "public" or "common." During the long period of the evolution of the Greek language, more and more were words based on the \( \text{koin} \) root developed to express refined meanings of the general concept.

\( \text{koinwv} \) is a relational word indicating in almost all cases an inner as well as an external union. The inner union, when volitional beings are involved, is based on commonality of intent or interest. When it involves non-volitional beings,
commonality of nature makes *κοινωνία* possible. Because of its character as a relational word, *κοινωνία* admits of degrees. The more intense or inclusive the relationship, the deeper the *κοινωνία*. Two of the principles governing *κοινωνία*, as established by Plato, were that *κοινωνία* is possible between some but not all things and that it implies some modification of those so related without, however, a loss of identity.

*κοινωνία* originally may have applied to definite physical relationships, but, while it still retained the ability to be applied in such contexts, it is much more common that it refer to spiritual relationships, which may also result in a mutual concrete involvement.

*κοινωνία* can also be considered from the point of view of whether the words are applied to the description of relationship in the abstract or to particular relationships. In the pre-Platonic citations *κοινωνία* as descriptive of particular relationships predominate. With Plato and Aristotle, however, there is a greater use of *κοινωνία* in contexts involving relationship in the abstract, undoubtedly because of the largely philosophical nature of their writings. In Plutarch and Clement of Alexandria and the related authors of the period, there is a more even balance between the occurrences of *κοινωνία* as descriptive of relationship in the abstract and of particular relationships.

Grammatically, the constructions which occurred most frequently with *κοινωνία* and its cognates remained essentially the
same from Classical to Christian times. Though the absolute construction occurred often enough to be significant both in Plato, Plutarch, and Clement of Alexandria and in the related authors of each period, it was by far more common that the thought of the \( \text{κοινωνία} \) -root word was completed in some way. Most often this was done with the genitive of the thing or a prepositional phrase, but it could also be completed by the genitive of person, dative of person, dative of thing, genitive of thing with dative of person. There was a definite tendency toward the simplification of the combinations of constructions from Plato to Plutarch to Clement. Generalizations on this tendency in the related authors of the three periods must be more tentative since the number of citations studied in each period varied. However, fewer combinations of constructions were observed in some four hundred eighty citations from patristic writers than in the two hundred twenty-three citations from Plato.

In general the results of the grammatical analysis of the use of \( \text{κοινωνία} \) and the cognates in the more than 1400 citations studied further strengthen the conclusion that these words retain their essentially relational character from Classical to Christian times.
APPENDIX I.

GREEK TEXTS FOR CHAPTER III

Plato Epistle VII.327C. ... εἰς Συρακούσας ἤτοι
tάχιστα ἠλθείν εἰς τοὺς κοινωνίαν τούτους...

Plato Epistle VII 333B. ... ὅπερ καὶ Διονύσιος, ὥστε αὐτὸν
ἐπικείμενοι παιδεύσας καὶ ὑπεύθυνας ἐκεῖνος ἐκεῖνον, οὕτως κοινωνίαν
αὐτῷ τοῦ βίου πάντας...

Plato Epistle VII 334B. ... οὖ δὲρ εἰς βασιλείους παιδεύειν
ζηγόνει φίλος, διὰ δὲ ξανθάρας παιδεύεις κοινωνίαν...

Plato Epistle VII 350C. ... ὅπερ μετὰ τῶν άλλων βίω
ἐνώ τρόπον ἑυσετήν καὶ συνετεῖν καὶ κοινωνίαν ἐρώμεν ώς εἰσηγήσασαι...

Plato Epistle III 316B. ... πρῶτον μὲν ὡς εἰκότως σοι
ἐφημεν κοινωνίαν περί ὥς τῆς πόλεως πράγματα

Plato Epistle III 316D. ... Αἱ δὲν οὖν καὶ τοὺς
πολιτικοὺς εἶναι κοινωνίαν πρὸς σέ, τόν μὲν ἐκεῖνον κοινωνίαν ἐπαινεῖτε...

Plato Epistle III 318D. ... καὶ τάχει μὲν ταύτην περί τὰ
pολιτικά κοινωνίας τῆς ἐκεῖς καὶ σῆ...

Plato Epistle III 318E. ἅλλα τετθα μὲν ταύτη γενόμενα
τὴν ζωὴν καὶ σὲν ἐπικόρυφα καὶ ἐκείνων πολλακις...

Plato Epistle VII 323D-324A. καὶ δὴ καὶ κοινωνίαν διεκλάσθη
μοι, καθ' ὅτι δέν οἴοσ τε εἰμί 'έρως καὶ λόγος. Ἕμως δέ, εἰ μὲν ἄλλων
καὶ ἐπιθυμίων τὸν ἑαυτὸν ἔχετε ἐκεῖνος δυσμίη κοινωνίας, εἰ δὲ
μὴ, βουλήσθητε τολακις.

Plato Epistle VII 325A. ὅ δὲ οὖκ ἐπείθετο, ποῦ δὲ
tαραξικώνωσεν πάθειν πρὶν ἀνικότητα ἐρωτικών γενέσθαι κοινωνίας.

Plato Republic 476A. ... εἰ δὲ εἰς πράξεων καὶ
κοινών καὶ συμμετέχων πολλακαί κοινωνίας παντώς θεών ἔσχατον
ἐκατόν. Ὁρθαι, ζήσα, ἀνθρώποι.

Plato Parmenides 151E-152A. ... ὅ γε ἐστι μετὰ τοῦ
μέλλοντος οὐσίας ἐκείς κοινωνία;

Plato Parmenides 158D. Τοῖς ἀλλοις δὲ τοῦ ἑνὸς ὑπαίτιαν
ἐκ μὲν τοῦ ἑνὸς καὶ ἐκ τῶν κοινωνίων τῶν ἑυσετῶν... ἔχειν τι ἰδίως οὖν...
Plato Parmenides 166A.  "Οτι ταλλω των μη ζωτων
οδειν ουδαμη οδημων κοινωνιαν ξει...

Plato Sophistes 264E.  ... εκο μενοι της του
σοφιστου κοινωνιας...

Plato Sophistes 248A.  και ευμεται μην ημες γηνεσι
δε αισθησεως κοινωνειν, διη λογισμον δε φυσι προς την δουλεια ουδων, δε
ας κατα τας εσποντως ξειν φατε, γενεσιν δε άλλως άλλωσ.

Plato Sophistes 248B.  Το δε η κοινωνειν... τι
tοσο δει ημεραν λεγειν φαιμεν;

Plato Sophistes 252B.  Τριεν άρα τε παρα ταυτα το
κατα ημερες της τινας, ης επι σεληνου την τε σημειαν και την κινησιν
περιπατησειν, συλλαβαν και οπιδων αυτων προς την εξ ουδες κοινωνιαν,
ουτως εναι προσειτες Διαφορα;

Plato Sophistes 251E.  ... μηδεν μην δουλαιν
ξειν κοινωνιας ετι μηδεν.

Plato Sophistes 251B.  ζεσαι ποτερων αυτων ουδοις
μη προσκοινωνυν;

Plato Sophistes 252B.  "Ετι τοιων ην αυτοι παντων
κατα ημερες της τινας, επι των λογων η μηδεν η ενδους κοινωνια
παθητας ετερω έχους προσαγορευειν.

Plato Sophistes 252D.  Τι δε ην παντα άλλως
ζεσαι δουλαιν έχων επικοινωναι;

Plato Sophistes 253A.  Παν ενων οιδεν αποις αποις
δουλατα κοινωνειν, η τας εαν ης της μελετει δραν ικανως αυτος;

Plato Sophistes 253B.  Τοτοτ δε έστιν, δε γε κοινωνειν
εκεπτα δουλατα και όπη μη, διακρινει κατα γενος επιστασται.

Plato Sophistes 254BC.  "Οτι ενων δε τα μην ζων
των ζενων διολογηται κοινωνειν εδειν άλλως, τα δε μη, και τα μεν
εκ αποδηλων, τα δε ηρης πολλα, τα δε και απν παντων οδειν κοινωνειν
τοις παντες κεκοινωνειν, το δε λειτουργον ευνεπιστευμενα τω λογω
της εκκατον... πρωτον μεν ποια εκεπτα έστιν, έστειλ, κοινωνειν
αλλος των ζενων φυσις...

Plato Sophistes 256B.  ... επειπερ έχει κοινωνιαν
αλλος των ζενων φυσις.

Plato Sophistes 257A.  ... επειπερ έχει κοινωνιαν
Plato Sophistes 260E.

Aristotle Metaphysics 991a8.

Plato Politicus 269D.

Demosthenes Ag. Aristog.II.27.

Plato Republic 531D.

Plato Epinomis 978A.

Plato Timaeus 61C.

Plato Timaeus 46A.

Plato Timaeus 87E.

Plato Leges 722D.

Plato Philebus 25E.

Plato Philebus 46B.

Plato Timaeus 60D.
Plato Timaeus 65E.  

I know you must be very familiar with the idea of a logos,

Plato Leges 828D.  

with centers and axes, and so on.

Plato Republic 611C.  

And, therefore, if we refer to the states of being, we

Plato Phaedo 64E-65A.  

a logos, a logos, a logos, a logos, a logos.

Plato Phaedo 65A.  

Thus, if we refer to the states of being, we

Plato Phaedo 65C.  

another view, another view, another view, another view.

Plato Phaedo 66A.  

Thus, if we refer to the states of being, we

Plato Phaedrus 246DE.  

those of the logos, those of the logos, those of the logos.

Plato Leges 645D.  

And then, and then, and then, and then.

Plato Leges 859B.  

The same, no, in the case of the logos, in the case of the logos, in the case of the logos.

Plato Leges 860A.  

And the same, in the case of the logos, in the case of the logos, in the case of the logos.

Isocrates Encomium ad Helen X.54-55. And then, and then, and then, the idea of the logos, the logos, the logos, the logos.

Isocrates Encomium ad Helen X.54-55. And then, and then, and then, the idea of the logos, the logos, the logos, the logos.
Plato Phaedrus 249B. ...παρέξαν τον ευθυσίαστον ξήρατον
καὶ εἰς άριστεύν, καὶ τοιούτον καὶ τοιούτων καὶ τοιούτων, γίνεται ... ,

Plato Phaedo 100D. ἦ τεκίνου τοῦ καλοῦ ζῆτε
παρούσα εἶτε κοινωνία ... 

Plato Republic 369BC. ...πολλὰν διάτοταν, πολλὰς ἔτις
μίν δὲ ἀληθὲς καὶ θεραπεύεις κοινωνούσας τοιούτου καὶ τοῦτος, καὶ τοῦτος ἐκεῖνος τοῦτος ἐν ἀλλοίς διά τοῦτον ζῆτεν ... 

Plato Republic 369E. οἶον τον μεν ἤρων ἔνα ἄνελα
παρασκευάζοντι εἰςίνετε τοῦτον καὶ τετραπλασίων χρόνον τοιούτου καὶ τὸν ἀλλού στίγματος τοῦτον παρασκευῆς καὶ ἀνέλας κοινωνίαν ...

Plato Republic 370A. καὶ μὴ ἀλλοίς κοινωνοῦντα
πράγματα ἔχειν, ἕλθαν αὐτοὶ δὲ αὐτοὶ τοισὶν αὐτοὺς πράτεσαν ... 

Plato Republic 370D. Τέκτονες δὲ καὶ ἑλέστε καὶ
tοιοῦτοι τίνες, πολλοὶ οἰνοποιοί, κοινωνοῦν ἡμῖν τοῦ πολυχρίστου ἱγνώμονοι, συχνὸν αὐτὸ ποιοῦν ... 

Plato Republic 371E. "Ετι δὲ τίνες, ἐξ' ἐκείνου, ἐὰν
cαὶ αὐτοὶ, διὰ οὐκοῦν, διʼ ἀν τὰ μὲν τοῖς διοικεῖσθαι μὴ πάντων
ἀξίωμαντος τούτων ἔχειν, θὰ ἐν δὲ τοῖς διαματίστας τούτων ἢμῖν ἐπὶ τοὺς
πάντως ἔχειν ... 

Plato Leges 969B. ...ὡς τὸ λόγῳ ἐπιφανείᾳ
κέφαλῆς καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας εἰκόνα εἶναι παρὰ συμμετέχεις ...

Plato Gorgias 507E-508A. κοινωνεῖν γὰρ ἢπαίναιτοι. ὡς ψύ
doü τοι ἐν κοινωνίᾳ, φιλό τοι ἂν ἐν ὑπ. φασίν δὲ ὧν σφοιροί, καὶ καλλίτεχνος,
cαὶ οὑρανός καὶ γῆν καὶ θέως καὶ θεραπεύεις τῆς κοινωνίας τούτων καὶ
καὶ φιλός καὶ κοσμίτης καὶ ἀνθυσιόν καὶ συμφορόν καὶ συμπάθεια καὶ
tοῖς ὁμοίων καὶ συμμετέχεις, καὶ ἐν ὅλον τούτο διὰ τοῦτο κόσμου καλλίτεχνος, δὲ ἐνδέχεται, σὺν ἀλλοιχογιαν διὰ τοῦτο ἀλλοιχογιαν.

Plato Republic 402E, ἀλλὰ τότε καὶ εἰπέ παρασκευῇ
καὶ ἡδονὴ ὑπεραναθεῖσα ἐστὶ τῆς κοινωνίας καὶ πῶς, ἔρα, ἐγὼ
ἐξέρμοια ποιεῖν οὐκ ἂν ἔτσοι ἡ λόγος ... 

Plato Leges 730E. ... τῶν ο' ἔνα μὴ δούλων καὶ
τῆς δίωχοντος Ῥώμη, ἐχέντων δὲ ἀλλοτρίων, καὶ ἐκεῖνον ἔμεθαν κοινωνίαν
dιὰ φιλίας γίγνομεν ἠθικὰν τινῶν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἤθελεν ... 

Plato Leges 736DE. ...ἐθέλετον μὲν τοῖς πρὸ
tοὺς ἀπογονοῦσιν ἀπʼ ἐπείκεσθαι κοινωνεῖν τοῖς μὲν ἀρίστευσι, καὶ δὲ
νεμονέουσι ... 

Plato Leges 844C. ... καὶ περὶ τούτων μὴ ἐθέλωσιν
dιὰ τούτα κοινωνεῖν ἄλλα, ἣν ἄρα μὲν ἀπειροῦσι, ἢν ἀργὸν ἢ ἀργο-
νόμον ἥρμασιν καὶ διδαχομένου τελεσθήν τοις πολῖν ἐκείτων ...
Plato Leges 844B. ... ἵνα δὲ ὁ ἀκριβείας ὁ καὶ τὸς γεῖτος ταῖς ὑδρείας ταξιάμενος παρὰ τοῖς ἄφρονοις, ταῖς ἡμέρας ἠκάθεν κοινωνίαν, οὕτω κοινωνεῖ τοῖς γεῖτοιν ὅθεν.

Plato Leges 844D. ... ὡς ὅραμε δὲ ὁ Χρή κοινωνίαν ποιεῖραι πάντοτε τοιάδε τινα...

Plato Leges 845C. ... ἵνα δὲ προσβάλλετος ἢν ἀρκετοὶ τοὺς φαγοῦν αὐτῷ καὶ ἀπορεῖν μενοῦν, καθάπερ ὁ ζένος, ὡς καὶ κοινωνεῖ τοῖς τοιούτων ἀδιάντων...

Plato Leges 845B. ... τοῖς ἀρρητοῖς λεγομένης καὶ τῶν τοιούτων διὸ καθὼς γιγνομένων καὶ κοινωνεῖν ἡμῖν τοῖς ζένοις.

Plato Republic 440B. ... ταῖς ὁ εἰποῦσιν αὐτῶν κοινωνήσαντα, ἀποροῦσα λόγῳ μὴ δεῖν, ἄυστρατειν...

Plato Politicus 309DE. ἠδὲ τοιαύτας ἀλλαγές ἢρ ὁδ' ἡμέρανται καὶ τῶν δικαίων μάλιστα οὕτω κοινωνεῖν ἢν ἀναλύουσα, μὴ ἡμεταλλοῦσα δὲ ἀποκλίνει τιλλον πρὸς αὐτὴν τίς φύσιν;

Plato Republic 411C. Τί δέ; εἰπεῖδάν ἄλλο μηδέν πράττῃ μηδὲ κοινωνὴ Ηούσης ἱκανήν;

Plato Politicus 309E. ἢρ' οὐ τοιοῦτοι καὶ ἡμετάλλον τῶν ἄσεως ὄντως δύσφων καὶ φρονίμων, ὡς ἦν ἐν πολιτείᾳ, μένεις, μὴ κοινωνήσαν δὲ ἢν λέοντες ἐπονείδιστον τίνα ἀνθρεῖας διὰκοσμοῦσα λαμβάνει φύσιν;

Plato Alcibiades I 125E. τίνα μαλιτίς ἐπιστήμην;

Plato Republic 371B. ἐπιθύμησεν πολὺν ἡκίσαμεν

Plato Leges 738A. σωματικὰ καὶ κοινωνίματα...

Plato Alcibiades I 125D. ποιτείας...

Plato Republic 333A. κοινωνίματα, ἢ τι ἄλλο; κοινωνίματα... κοινωνοῦσων ἐρωτεύετο λέγω

Plato Republic 362B. ἢν ἐδείξω... ἡμβάλλειν, κοινωνεῖν ἄς

Plato Leges 861B. ἀλλήλους τῶν πολετῶν ἐν ταῖς κοινωνίασι τε καὶ διήλθαις πολλαὶ ἐκεῖνοι...
Plato Republic 343D. ... ὁ τοιοῦτος τῷ τοιοῦτῳ κοινωνίας, οὐδ' ὑπό τινος ἐν τῷ διαλέγεται τῇ κοινωνίᾳ πλέον ἔχοντα ἐνν δικαιώ ἐνυ φιλίαν, ἀλλ' ξένοις...

Plato Leges 632B. ... οὕτως ἐν γιγνομαι τρόπων, καὶ τὰς πρὸς ἄλλης πάσα τοιούτως κοινωνίας καὶ διαλέγεται ἐκοθείν τε καὶ ἄκουσιν...

Plato Leges 921C. ... Αἱ άπόκεισθαι καὶ τοὺς πολέμους πολεμεῖν ἀρχαῖον κόμπου τρόπον· ἔναρξας γεγονός, διὸ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ σιμπλοῦ

Plato Leges 889D. καὶ δὴ καὶ τῇ πολιτικῇ σιμπλοῦ, τί μέρος εἶναι φαντασμόν φύσις, τέχνη δὲ το πολῶ...

Plato Politicus 285AB. ... θεοὶ δὲν μὴν τὴν εἰς τὴν πολλὰ τοῖς πρῶτοις ἄνθρωποι καὶ κοινωνίαις, διὸ προφέρομαι διὰ τὸν ἄν

Plato Politicus 283D. ὅ, ἐνε κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἄλλα

Plato Hippias Minor 374E. Τί δέ, θράγμαν ποτέρων βελτίων ἢ κοινωνία, οὗ ἐκεῖν τε ἡ ἡγεσία ὑπὲρ ἡ ἡ δικαίων;

Plato Politicus 281B. Μετὰ τούτο δὴ τάς μὲν περὶ τῇ

Plato Gorgias 464C. ἐπικοινωνοῦσι μὲν, δὲν ἄλλης,

Plato Leges 6390-640A. ἐπι τὴ ἐπιστήμην ὑπὸ τῆς κοινωνίας ἕνεκα τῷ ἄρχειν εἰναι μετ' ἐκείνου τῆς ἀρετῆς ἐστιν ὡς μὲν ἐναγάκτης καὶ άρχοντας μετ' ἄρχοντας, οὕτως ὑπὸ τὸν τέους τῶν τοιούτων κοινωνίων ἔχοντας, διὸ καὶ τῇ

Plato Alcibiades I 125DE. ... κοινωνίων παντίς ἐπὶ

... ἀρχεῖν τίς ποιήσῃ τεχνῆμα... κοινωνίων δὲ ὃδε, ὡς ἄρχειν ἔλεγον, τίς ἐπιστήμη ποιητὴν ἀρχεῖν;
Plato 

Republic 333AB. ...

Leyvov

ηδονής εἰς πεπεπατήθην ἀπὸ πολέμου πάντων πόλεων ἐνηθεὶς ἐργαζόμενος τοῖς κυβερνητικοῖς. Ἡμέρας ἐν κυβερνητικοῖς τοῖς δικαίως εἰς κραυγήν;

Leges 640B. Νῦν δὲ εἰς τὸ στρατεύματος περὶ λεγόμενο οὕτως εἰς ἄνδρα ἄνθρωπον εὐθύνειν εἰς πόλεμον πάσην δὲ ἐν ἱεράν πρὸς φίλον κυβερνητικῶν φιλοφρονίαν.

Plato 

Politicus 303B. Οὐκ ἔχειν δὲ καὶ τοὺς κοινωνίους ἄνθρωπους πάντων τῶν πολεμίων πάντων πλῆθος ἐπιστῆμον ἀρχηγός εἶναι τεχνήν.

Plato 

Politicus 304A. Τοὺς οὖς ἐκεῖ ποιεῖ στρατηγίαν, καὶ δικαστικὴ καὶ ὡς βασιλικῇ κυβερνήσει ἔπεζοντο τοῖς δικαίοις συνίδαυβήρι τάς ἐν ταῖς πόλεις πράξεις.

Republic 453A. ...ποτέραν χαράν ἐπεσταλείν ἐν ἄνδρι στέλλεται τῷ ἁρπασάντως βίας κυνωνίας εἰς ἀπαίζει ἀν ἐνέργεια...

Leges 804E. καὶ οὔτε ἕσον ἐξείποντο ἐν τοῖς τούτοις λόγοις ἀποκαλεῖσθαι ἀποκαλεῖσθαι, καὶ κυνωνίτεσσαν πολέμου τε καὶ καὶ, ἐν τῷ φιλακτώ τῆς περὶ τοῦ πόλιν...

Leges 968A. Ἐπόλεος διαδίδουμεν κοινωνίας γενόμενοι.

Leges 636C. ...ὅτι τῇ θηλήματι καὶ τῇ τῶν ἀρρενῶν φύσις εἰς κοινωνίαν ὑποθέσῃ τῆς γυναικείας ἐν περὶ ταῦτα ἡδονή καὶ φύσιν ἀποφεύγοντα δοκεῖ...

Leges 721A. πάντων πόλεων ἀρτὶ ὧν ἐν τοῖς ἱμάσις συμμετέχον καὶ κυνωνίας;

Leges 771B. ὑπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ συμμετείχειν ἀναγκαίως ἔχει τὴν ἀγαπήν...

Leges 772D. ...καὶ πρέπειν εἰς πάλιν κυνωνίαν ἀναγκαίως πιστεύει...
Plato *Leges* 773A. ... οἱ οὖσι παρακολουθεῖν ἄν μὴ φεύγειν τῶν τῶν πενήντην μηδὲ τῶν τῶν πλουσίων διόροισιν διαφέροντας ἔμοι, ἔπειτα τὸλλο ὀπαθή, τῶν ὑποθέτεστοι ἦνι τιμώντα ἐστὶ τὴν κοινωνιῶν εὐνιῶν.

Plato *Leges* 773C. ... οὔτες δὲ ἦθει πρὸς θαμνεῖοι ἐπειδὴ ἄναγκαζεν τῷ τῶν παῖδων κοινωνῖα πορεία σοι...

Plato *Leges* 773D. ...οὐ μιαίνομενοι μὲν οἶνος ἡμεῖς, κολάζουμεν δὲ ὑπὸ νήφοντος ἔτεροι θεοὶ καλὴν κοινωνίαν λαβὼν ἀγαθὸν πῶς καὶ μέστιον ἀπεργάζεται...

Plato *Politicalus* 310B. ... Τοὺς τῶν ἐπιγραμμάτων καὶ παιδίων κοινωνίασέων καὶ τῶν περὶ τὰς ἱδίας ἔκδοσές καὶ ἱλιαμοῦ. Οὐ γὰρ πολλοὶ τὰ περὶ ταῦτα οδὸν ὀρθῶς συνδοῦνται πρὸς τὴν τῶν παιδίων γεννήσειν.

Plato *Leges* 774A. ...ἀν δ’ ἄρα τις μὴ πείθηται ἐκών, ἀλλοτρίως δὲ ωὐλὸν καὶ κοινωνίασέων ἐν τῷ πολεί ἔχῃ καὶ λήμματι ὑπὸ καίνηται πεντακαταρικούσης...

Plato *Leges* 783B. ...Πάντες δ’ ἐνδυματο κοινωνίας πάροι πράξεως ἡνίκα μὲν ἣν προσέχωμεν αὐτοῖς ἐς καὶ τῇ πάρξει τῶν νοῦν...

Plato *Leges* 784B. ...Οταν δὲ οὕτως γεννήσεσθαι κατὰ νόμον, εἰς τὸν ἀλλοτρία τίς μὲν παιδιοτοιομένοις ἐς εἰς αὐτὰ ἐπίδοσει αὐτοῖς ἐντὸ καθάπερ τοῖς ἐπὶ γεννημένοις εἴηται...

Plato *Leges* 631D. ...περὶ τῇ γέμων ἀλλόδιος ἐπὶ - κοινωνίασός, μετὰ τὸ τετέλεσθαι τῶν τῶν παιδίων γεννήσει καὶ τροφαίοις ὑπὸ τὰς ἀρρένες καὶ δοῖς ἡλείαι...

Plato *Leges* 836C. ...λέγων δ’ ὀρθῶς εἰσέχει τὸν ἀρρένων καὶ νέων μὴ κοινωνεῖν καθάπερ ἡλείαις πρὸς μείζον ἀρροδισίων...

Plato *Phaedrus* 239C. ...Τά μὲν οὖν κατὰ διάνυσιν ἐπὶ τρόπον τῷ καί κοινωνίως, οὐδὲ πολύτιμης ἀνήρ ἔχων ἔρως.

Plato *Republic* 403B. ...Οἱ προσοχότεροι ἄρα αὐτοὶ ἡ ἀγορά, αὐτῇ κοινωνικῇς ἀδόξης ἔρωτι τῷ καὶ παιδίκοις ὀρθῶς ἔρωτι τῷ καὶ ἑρμηνεύοις.

Plato *Symposium* 209C... ...οὕτως πολὺ μείζων κοινωνίας τῆς τῶν παιδίων πρὸς ἀλλοτρίος, οἷς τοιούτοι ἔχουσι καὶ φιλίας ἐρμηνεύον ἐπί καὶ ἀλλαξῆς καὶ ἐκατανεστέρων παιδίων κοινωνικής.

Plato *Symposium* 218B. ...πάντες γὰρ κοινωνίκαισ...
Plato Symposium 182C. ο ο ο γαρ ὁμοίως εἰσαφθεί οὐσιν ἀρχικοῦ φρονήματι μετά ἐργαζόμενοι εἰς ἄρχομαιν τοις ἀρχομένοις, οὐδὲ φηλίας ἰδιαράς καὶ κοινωνίας, ὥς ὁ δῆμος πρὸς τὸν ἂν πᾶνκε καὶ ἐξής ἐκποτείνοντα.

Plato Republic 556B. οὗτοι δὴ προαγωγοὶ οὐκ ἐκ παράδολους ἀλλήλους ἢ τὶς ἄρχομαι καὶ οἱ ἀρχικοὶ οὐ ἐν ὧν πορείας ἢ ἐν ἄλλος ἀρχικοῖς, ή ἡκάθεν δειρίας ἢ κακά σπερματος ἢ θυμελοι ἰδιοτέραις ἢ οὐσπροτείνεται, ή καὶ ἐν ἄλλος τοῖς συνδικοῖς ἀλλήλους διέμενοι μεδαμῇ τάσης καταρρωθόντες οἱ ποντεῖς ἐκ τῶν πλούσιων...

Plato Leges 783B. ἦπει συνειδήτα ἡνία τοιούθεντοι ὑπὸ τοῦτο κοινανίας οὐτέ ὑπὲρ γυναικῶν οὐτέ ὕπερ ὁμών γίγνεται...

Plato Leges 639D. ἰδικὸς πολλάς κοινωνίας συμπόσια καὶ συμπόσιοι δείην ὅτι μίαν τις ἐνοούσιαν εἶναι;

Plato Leges 805A. ὀρθὰτίς τοις μαρδίδες ἀναρίθμητοι γυναικῶν εἰς τῶν περὶ τῶν πόλεων ἡ ζαυγαμάτιας καλοῦσιν, ὡς ὅτι ἄλλης ἐν τοῖς ἄλλης ὀπλῶν κοινωνίας καὶ τοῖς ἄνδράσιν τῆς προστασίας ἐξέχων ἀκείται.

Plato Leges 805CD. το μὴ οὐ λέγειν ὡς δεὶ παιδεῖας τε καὶ τῶν ἄλλων ὅτι μιᾶς κοινωνεῖν τῇ ὑμηλείᾳ υἱὸν τῶν ἄλλων ἄνδρων ἄνευς. Τίνα οὖν ἔμπροσθεν τῶν νόμων ἀποδεικτικῶν δείην ὅτι τῆς κοινωνίας τάσης ή νόμων ἀντίκειται προστάσεως;

Plato Leges 806AB. ἄν καὶ παιδερασίας εἰς τις μέσον ἄρισκεivos, τῶν οἱ εἰς τῶν πολέμων μὴ κοινωνουσι τότε ἄλλης κοινωνοῦσι ποτὲ βολής μετὰ τέχνης δυνάμεναι, οὐδέ διὸ τῆς μη βολής καὶ δορά λυθεῖσαι μιμήσασθαι τὴν βοὴν...

Plato Leges 833D. τόσα δὲ τρικαλικέςτερα drawn γαμοῦ ἐνοούσις κοινωνίας μὴ μακρότερον εἴκοσι ἐτῶν μηθ᾽ ἐλαττῶν εκτακτικῶς.

Plato Leges 834D. ὅθεν δὲ χρὴ τοῦτον νόμον μὴ καὶ ἐπιτίθεντες δι᾽ ὅντας βλέπουσι τῆς κοινωνίας. οὐάν δὲ εἴς αὐτῶν τῶν ἐμπροσθεν παιδευτικῶν εἰς ἄλλος ῥότον ἢ φύσις ἐνδεχόμεναι καὶ μὴ ὅσχεραν παίς ἐκ Δεμόνιον κοινωνεῖν ἐκαὶ μὴ φησιν.

Plato Leges 796A. ἂν μεταξύς ᾧ ἔτεις ἢ ἄτοσκας, οὔτε τοῦτον κοινωνίαν ἄνευ, αὐτὸς ἄν τοῦ ἐκ ὡσιεῖς.

Plato Leges 752C. ἔως οὐ φησίνομενοι παίδες τῶν νόμων καὶ συνεργάτες ἐκαρσίοις τε καὶ αὐτοῖς φησίνομεν τῶν ἄρτηριών τῆς πολέως πάσης κοινωνήσεως...
Plato Leges 755B. Πάντες μὲν κοινωνίας τὴν τῶν ἀρχώντων αἰρέσεως ὀπόσοπερ ἦν ὅτι πλὴν ἤ πείζω χειμάρρω καὶ πολέμου κεκοιμηθήκωσιν ἐν ταῖς σφατέραις ἀδεαὶ τῆς ἁλίκης δυνάμεις.

Plato Leges 755C. Τούτων δὲ στρατηγοῦς καὶ ἐξ αὐτῶν τῆς πόλεως τοὺς οἱ κοινωνίας προβαλλόμεθα, αἰρεΐσθαι δὲ ἐκ τῶν προβληθείσων. πάντες ὄσι τοῦ πολέμου κοινωνία γένοντος τε ἐν ταῖς ἁλίκης καὶ γίγνοντοι ἐκάστοτε.

Plato Leges 667AB. Εἰ δὲ ἔξωμεν μοναχῶν ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν καλλίων καὶ τῆς ἀνθρώπων πόλεως, πειράματα ἀποδότημαι τοὺς ὄσοι μὴν ἑκεῖνη μὲν ἱσοψυχῆδαι, ἢξεῖν δὲ, ἢτοι καλλίστη, ταύτης κοινωνίας.

Plato Leges 967E. ἔτει τὲ κατὰ τὴν ἀνθρώπου πόλεως κοινωνίας συνδεσμόγραφος, χρῆσθαι πρὸς τὰ τῶν ἱδίων ἐπικεφαλεῖα καὶ νόμων ἐναρμονιστέοις...

Plato Leges 856B. καὶ δὲ κοινωνόμοις καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἱδίων, τῶν μετέχοντα ἄρχοντον τῇ τῇ πόλει...

Plato Leges 757DE. ἀναγκαίων εἰς μὴν καὶ τούτοις παραπληροῖοι τοὺς προφύλακας πόλεως ἀπασχολήσαι, ἐὰν μελετῇ στάθη των ἑυεμενής καὶ προσκοινωνήσῃς κατὰ τί μέρος.

Plato Leges 768B. Δεῖ δὲ ὅτι καὶ τῶν ἱδίων ἱδίων κοινωνεῖν κατὰ ὅμοιόν σπάνας, δραμέ τοι κοινωνίας ἅπαν ἐκεῖνας τοῦ συνδικάζειν ἥξειται τὰ παράπαν ἔς πόλεως ὡς μέσον εἰναι.

Plato Leges 768A. καὶ δὲ μὴ δύνηθεν κοινωνήσαι ἐς ἐνωλογίας αὐτοῖς, τὴν βουλὴν ἐπικρίνειν αὐτῶν τὴν αἰτίην ἐκατέρω.

Plato Leges 708C. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὅπι οὗ τῇ τὰς χέρις διόρθωσιν καὶ διόνυσον ἐχεῖ τινὰ φιλίαν, κοινωνίαν ἣμων ἐν καὶ τοῖς τοιούτων πάντων...

Plato Republic 470E. ἀλλ' ὅτι φιλέλληνες, οὐδέν ὁμοιόμοιος τῷ Ἑλληνίδῳ ἔργῳ οὐκ ἔχομεν ἐντελῶς ὡς ἔχοντες.

Plato Leges 947A. ἐστὶ δὲ τῶν τῶν Ἑλλήνων κοινῆς διόρθωσιν καὶ διόνυσον ἔν τινα κοινωνίαν ἐντελῶς...

Plato Leges 950B. ἐξ ὁμοίων τε καὶ ὁμοίων τοιούτω τὸς θεῶς...

Plato Leges 884A. ἐς τὴν φιλέλλην καὶ διαφέρουσας ὥς μεγάλη, ὅταν τῆς ἀλήθειας καὶ ἀγών ἔντον καὶ κατὰ μέρος καὶ πολλὰς ζητεῖν ὡς τινὰν ἄλλων τοιούτων κοινωνικότατον.
Plato Symposium 188BC. Ετει τοινον και αι θυσίαι πλαται και οίς μανετηκεν ἐπικεφαλη (ταῦτα δ' ἐστίν ἢ περὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ ἀνθρώπους πρὸς ἄλλους κοινωνίαν) οὐ περὶ ἄλλο τι εἴτειν ἢ περὶ εὔμετας φολακήν τε καὶ ἅσεν.

Plato Leges 801E. Μετά γε μὴν ταῦτα εἴνοι θεῶν καὶ ἄλλων κοινωνικῶν εὐκατάλληλοι εἴδεις; ἤν ἀρθοῦσα, καὶ μετὰ θεοῦ ἀναγόμενος περὶ δαίμων τε καὶ ἰδίων μετ' ἐγκλημάτων εὐκατάλληλον αὐτοῦ πολεοδομοῖο προσπῆκαν.

Plato Leges 729C. Ἐπηγένειαν δὲ καὶ ὀμοιίων θεῶν κοινωνίαν παρακάτω φύσιν αἰτίατος ἦκοιναι τιμῶν τε καὶ συμβεβηκεν τιμῶν ἢν γενελίκιος θεὸς εἰς πάντων αὐτοῦ ἀπορῶν ἢκοι κατὰ λόγον.

Plato Leges 909Α.; ἢν τούτῳ οὖ καὶ πρὸς χρόνον ἢδης τῶν πολιτῶν αὐτῶν ἄλλος συμβεβηκεν πλὴν οὐ τοῦ νικηφόρου συμβούλου κοινωνίαν...

Plato Politicus 308Ε. Καὶ τοῦς μὲν μὴ συμμενέων κοινωνίαν ἔδωκεν ἀνδρεὺς καὶ σώφρονος δόμα τε ἀλλὰ ἐστὶ τείνοντα πρὸς ἀρετὴν...

Demosthenes Ag. Aristog.Ι.61. καὶ μετὰ ταῦτα ὑφήλθοντα περὶ αὐτοῦ ταύτα  οὐ ἦν ἐν τῷ σεβομενῷ, μὴ πυρήναν, μὴ λύχνον, μὴ πτωχοῦ, μὴ βρώμικας μηδένα μηδὲνα τουτέρῳ κοινωνεῖν μηδὲ λαμβάνειν, μηδὲ αὐτοῦ τουτέρῳ σιδηναν.

Plato Leges 868Δ. ἢ μὴ ποτέ ἢτοι κοινὴ ἡμιδαιμονείςσαι μηδὲ συνέστιον δι' ἐκχυροῦν ἢ ἀδελφον ἀπεστερηκεν ἐπειδήδοδα ποτὲ μηδὲ κοινωνίαν ἔστερων.

Plato Leges 868Ε-869Α. Κατελθοῦν δὲ οὔ τι φυσικῶν ἀπὸς αὐτοῦ παιδίν ἔστερον μὴ κοινωνεῖτο μηδὲ διαστρέπετος συνέστιον ποτὲ... τούτος δὲ συνεστιος αὐτὸς μηδὲν ποτὲ γινεῖσθαι μηδὲ κοινωνίας ἔστερων.

Plato Leges 881Δ. ἢ έν πον τι φυσικῶν, δόμα ἔλευθερος, συμφατὴ ἡ συμφατὴ ἢ εἴνα τοινότια τῇ ἁλλῃ κοινωνίᾳ κοινωνίᾳ, ἢ καὶ μόνῳ ἄξιοχώρῳ ποὺ προσάντηται ἐκώς, ἀμέσα εἰς ἔστερον ἐκήσυμεν μὴ σὲ ἄγοραν μὴ σὲ πολλαῖς ἀλὼς πρότερον ἢ καθήσθητι, ουκίς σου κοινωνίαν κέναι ἀλληγράφουσα τοῦτον;

Aristotle Politics 1252a2-3. καὶ πάντα κοινωνίαν, ἀγαθοὶ τεῖνον ἐνεκεν συνετηκόμενοι...

Aristotle Politics 1257a19-20. ἢ μὴν ἄλλω τῇ πρώτῃ κοινωνίᾳ...

Aristotle Politics 1252b9-10. ἢ μὴν ἄλλο τοῦτων τῶν ἄλλω κοινωνιῶν ἑκάτερη πρώτη...
Aristotle Oeconomica 1343b8-9. 
κοινωνία γὰρ φύτει τοι θήλει καὶ τοι ἄρρην μάλιστα ἐστιν.
Aristotle Oeconomica 1343b12-13. διόπτα τὸ ὀμιλεῖ τοι στὴν ἄρρην ἡ κοινωνία γὰρ ἄρρην διὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τοῦ ἄρρην, ὃς ἀνάμεσα ἐπὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν.
Aristotle Oeconomica 1342b26-28. οὔτως προσκομίζωντες ὑπὸ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἡ φύσις, τοῦ το ἄνδρος καὶ τῆς γυναικός, πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν.
Aristotle Politics 1252b8-9. ...ἀλλὰ γίνεται ἡ κοινωνία ἡ πάντων δόλως καὶ δοῦλος.
Aristotle Gener. of Anim. 756b20. ...τῆς δὲ τοῦ θυμοῦ πρὸς ᾿άλληλα κοινωνίαν πολλάκις ὡς πάντα ποιεῖται ἐν κορακώτη τοῖς άρνείσι.
Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1162a18. τοῖς μὲν οὖν ἀλοις ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον ἡ κοινωνία, ὃς ἂν ἄνθρωποι οἱ κοίνοι εἰς τεκνοφόρον χώρον συνοικοῦσιν ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἐκ τῶν βίων.
Aristotle Magna Moralia 1245a15-17 ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ τοῦ λόγου κοινωνίαν τοῦ τυχόντος ἐφεύρετο τοσοῦτον, ἀλλὰ ἐκ τῶν διάκειται ὡς μαθητηρίου τῆς αὐτοχωρίου ρητός ὁ δεῖπος τοῦ... 
Xenophon Memorabilia IV.3.12. το ὡς καὶ ἔρημωθαί δοῦλαι, διὸ θέλειν τὰς ἀρμάδις μεγαλύτερον τοῖς ἀλλήλοις διδάσκοντες καὶ κοινωνοῦντας καὶ νομίσμα τιθεμέλει καὶ πολεμοῦμεθα;
Aristotle Eud. Ethics. 1217a24-29. τῶν γὰρ ἄλλους λόγους, ὡς ἄρχει τήν φύσιν τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐστιν, αὐτὴν κοινωνεῖ τοῖς τῆς προσφυγίας. ὥσ τοι τοῖς εὐθανάσιως ἓπεσον ὁρίσαν ἄρα, ἐπί τούτων ἀλλὰ τῶν ἐν ὧν ὑπάρχει οὐδὲν ὃ πέραν κατὰ τὴν ἐπιμονήν ἐν τῇ ὁμου ἐξερχείται ἐνιαίος...
Aristotle Eud. Ethics. 1215b12-14. ἀπὸ γὰρ ἑαυτὸς ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἄλλου ζῷως καὶ καθάρως ἐπὶ τὸ δίκαιον ἢ τίνος δικαίως κοινωνοῦσιν δικαίως, τούτων ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου εἴπειν ἀνακρίνον ἐνιαίο.
Aristotle Eud. Ethics. 1242a32-33. γυναικὸς δέ καὶ ἄνδρος φίλα ὡς κρήνην καὶ κοινωνία.
Aristotle Magna Moralia 1194b24. ἀλλὰ δὲ τοῦ μὴν ἐν γυναικός καὶ ἄνδρος κοινωνία δικαίων ἐστιν καθὼς τῷ πολιτικῷ δικαίῳ.
Αριστοτέλης Μάγνα Μοραλία 194b25-58. Χειρον μὲν γὰρ έστιν ἢ ἴσως τοῦ ἄνδρος, ἀλλ' ὀλιγοτερον, καὶ μετέχει ἐνσήθες ποὺς μάλλον, διότι ἐξος τῆς
πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀπὸς άλλων, ἀπεκάθεν καὶ τὰ δίκαια τὸ χονικαὶ πρὸς ἄλλα μιᾶς ποὺς ἔχει τῶν άλλων πολεικών έστιν.

Αριστοτέλης Πολιτικὰ 1252b13-14. ἦ μὲν οὖν εἰς πάσαν ἡμέραν
συνεκτικῶς κοινωνία καὶ φύσιν οἰκὸς έστιν...

Αριστοτέλης Πολιτικὰ 1257a23. ὦ μὲν γὰρ τῶν αὐτῶν
ζωκιονόμων πάντων...

Αριστοτέλης Ευδ. Εθικά 1242a27. καὶ κοινωνία τοίνυν καὶ δίκαιον
ti kal eĩ mĩ πολικ εἰς...

Αριστοτέλης Πολιτικὰ 1254b21-23. ἔστι γὰρ φύσις δοῦλος ὡς ὁμόιως ἅλλου εἶναι (ὅτι καὶ ἅλλος έστιν) καὶ δ' κοινωνίαν λόγῳ τοσοῦτον ὅθεν
ἀνθένται ἅλλα μὴ ἔχειν.

Αριστοτέλης Ευδ. Εθικά 1241b20-24. δεσπότης πρὸς δοῦλον, τούτων
μὲν εἰς, έστιν κοινωνία. οὔ γὰρ οὖς ἔστιν, ἄλλη ἂν καὶ ἄλλη ἂν, ἂν δὲ ταῦτα ἐνοῦ ἂν, ὀμοίως διακρίνεσθαι τοῦ ἵππου ἐκατέργαται, ἄλλη να ἄλλω
τοῦ δεσπότου ὁ δοῦλος ὡς ὁποῖος ἐκάτεργιος, καὶ του δεσπότου δ' δοῦλος ὡς ὁποῖος ἀνθένται ὧς ὁποῖος ἐκάτεργιος, ὡς ὁποῖος ὡς ὁποῖος ἐκάτεργιος...

Αριστοτέλης Νικ. Εθικά 1161b8. δοκεῖ γὰρ εἶναι τι δίκαιον πιθανὲν
ἀνθρώπος πρὸς πάντα ὅπως δυνάμενον κοινωνίζεις νομοῦ καὶ συνήκης. καὶ
φιλία ὅτι, καὶ ὅσον ἄλλοθεν.

Αριστοτέλης Πολιτικὰ 1257a21. ἀλλ' ἥδη πλειώνων τῆς
κοινωνίας οὕτος.

Αριστοτέλης Πολιτικὰ 1252b16. ἢ ὅτι ἐκ πλειώνων οἰκίων
κοινωνία πρώτη χρήσως ἐνεκεῖν μὴ έθνατρον καθή.

Αριστοτέλης Πολιτικὰ 1252b29. ἢ ὅτι ἐκ πλειώνων καθή
κοινωνία τέλειος πόλις...

Αριστοτέλης Πολιτικὰ 1253a30. Πρῶτος μὲν ὁδὸν ἡ ὁμολ. ἐν πλεῖον
ἐπὶ τῆς τοιαύτης κοινωνίας.

Αριστοτέλης Πολιτικὰ 1253a28-29. ὁ δὲ μὴ δυνάμενος κοινωνεῖ ὡς
μὴ ἐν ἀνθρώπιναν αὐτῶν μέρος πάλινας έστε ὁ ὁρίον ἢ ὅρας.

Αριστοτέλης Πολιτικὰ 1252α1-2. ἐπειδὴ πλεῖον πάλιν δρόμων
κοινωνίαν γίνῃ οὕτω...

Αριστοτέλης Πολιτικὰ 1252a8-9. ἀντὶ δ' ἔστιν ἢ καλουμένη
πόλις καὶ ὡς κοινωνία ἡ πολιτική.
Aristotle Politics 1252b31. ὁδὲ πάγια πόλις φύσι ἔσειν, εἰτέρ καὶ ἢ πρῶτοι κοινωνίαι.

Aristotle Politics 1253a18-19. ἀλλὰ γὰρ, ὑπάρχουσα καὶ λάτρεια καὶ ἀδίκια καὶ εἰς κάθε ἡνίκαν αἰσθήσεων ἰσχύν, ὡδὲ τούτων κοινωνία, ποιεῖ οἰκεῖαν καὶ πόλιν.

Aristotle Politics 1256b28-30. καθαρά δὲ κηρυγμάτων ἤπειρον οἷς ὑπάρχει ἔτι οἰκεία, καὶ ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ πάντα τῆς κοινωνίας πόλεως ἢ ὑπάρχει.

Aristotle Oeconomica 1343a11-13. φανερὸν δὲ. ἦσαν γὰρ μὴ δυνατοὶ ὅσι τούτῳ τευχεῖν, διαλύεται καὶ ἡ κοινωνία.

Aristotle Nic. Ethica 1160a8. αἱ δὲ κοινωνίαι πάλαι μορίων οἰκεῖαι τῆς πολιτικῆς.


Aristotle Politics 1280b16-17. οὐδὲ εἰ πρὸς ἄλληλους εἰπεῖσθαι μεταλλάξει, οὐκώς τούτο τῶν ἑαυτῶν τῶν πόλεως κοινωνικῶν ἔστιν.

Aristotle Politics 1280b18-20. οὐκίσσως δὲ ὠδὸς δὲ εἰς τινα φαίνεται χαρῆς μὲν, μη μετατρέπων ἄθνατον ἄθροισιν μὴ κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ᾽ ἐξελέισθαν ἀνθρώπων ηὐεστί τοῦ μὴ ἄθροισιν διδαχῆν περὶ τὰς μεταλλάξεις...

Aristotle Politics 1280b21-23. καὶ τὸ πλῆθος ἡς μορίοι, μη μετατρέπων κοινωνίαν ὅλου μορίου ἡς τῶν τοιούτων ὅπως ἀλλαγῆς καὶ συμμαχίας, οὐδὲ οὐσίς τῶν πόλεως.

Aristotle Politics 1280b25-29. εἰ γὰρ καὶ συνάλοθον οὖσι κοινωνίας οὐν, οὐδὲ οὖσις ἢν εἶναι δοξεῖ πολίς τοὺς ἀκρίδισι δειμοῦν...

Aristotle Politics 1280b24-25. οὐ γὰρ δὴ διὰ τὸ μὴ σύγχρονς τῇς κοινωνίας.

Aristotle Politics 1280b30-33. φανερὸν τῶν γὰρ τούτων ὅτι, ἢ πόλις οὐκ ἔστι κοινωνία τοποῦ καὶ τοῦ μὴ ἄθροισιν ἀφίστι αὐθοὺς καὶ τῆς μεταλλάξεις χάριν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο μὴ ἄνθρωπον ὑπάρχειν εἰτέρ ἐστιν πόλις, οὐ μην ὁδὲ ὑπάρχειν τούτων ἀπόκεισθαι ἡ πόλις...

Aristotle Politics 1326b7-9. σὲ πρώτην ὑπὸ τῆς ἀναγκαίας τῆς ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον πλῆθος δε πρῶτον πλῆθος ἀπάρκεις ἢ τὸ ἄθροισι ἐν τῇ πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας.

Aristotle Politics 1280b9-10. γίνεται γὰρ ἡ κοινωνία συμμαχία, τῶν ἄλλων τοπίων διαφέρουσα μονόν τῶν ἄθροισιν συμμαχίων.
Aristotle Politics 1280a26. ἐὰν μὴν γὰρ τῶν κοινωνίαν ἐκαθ' ἑαυτῶν καὶ συνήλθον...

Aristotle Politics 1280b34-35. ἦ τοῦ ἣδη καὶ ἡ κοινωνία καὶ ταῖς οἰκίαις καὶ τοῖς γενεσί, ὅπως τελήσας καὶ αὐτήρκους.

Aristotle Politics 1281a1-2. πολίς δὲ ἡ γενεσί καὶ ημῶν κοινωνία ὅπως τελήσας καὶ αὐτήρκους, τούτο δ' εἶναι, διὰ φαινετ, ἐὰν ηνων εὐδαιμόνας καὶ καλῶς.

Aristotle Politics 1281a4. τῶν καὶ τῶν ἀρχαίων πράξεων καὶ ὁ ὀρθοτριχοτόμων ἕπετον τίνα τὴν πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν, ἀλλ' ἐν τοῦτον μιᾶν.

Aristotle Politics 1281a5-9. διὸ περὶ δ' ὡς συμβάλλοντας πλεῖστον ἐν τῇ ταυτότητα κοινωνίαν, τούτοις τοῖς πλείστας αἰσχροίς ἐπεξετάζεις πλέον ἐν τοῖς κατὰ μὲν ἐνθεωρήματι καὶ ἐν τοῖς ἀλλοίως κατὰ δὲ τὴν πολιτικὴν ἀρετὴν ἀνίσοις, ἡ τοῖς κατὰ πλείους ἀπερχομαι καὶ ἀρετὴν δ' ἀπερχομαινοίς.

Aristotle Politics 1253a39. ἦ γὰρ δικαία πολιτικὴν κοινωνίαν τάς ἐτείν, ὡς ἐν τοῦτο νόμον κρίνει.

Aristotle Politics 1283a39-41. ὡς ὁμοίως ὡς φήσωσιν δικαίως καὶ τὴν ἀρετὴν λαμπροττητίκα, κοινωνικὴν γὰρ ἀρετὴν ἐλαῖν φανεν τὴν ἐυδαιμόνην, ἦ παρὰ δικαίων ἐκσυλευθεὶς τὰς ἀλλὰς.


Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1108a11. ...παραὶ μὲν γὰρ εἰς περὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων κοινωνίαν...


Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1159b26. ἦν δὲν γὰρ κοινωνία δοκεῖ τι δίκαιον εἶναι...

Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1159b27-28 ἔτι δὲ ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ φίλοι καὶ ἔτι δὲν ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ φίλοι...

Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1159b29. καὶ ἐν τῇ συμπληρωματικῇ, ἐπὶ τοῦτον εἶναι τι φιλα.

Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1160a14. ἦν γὰρ ὁλικὴ κοινωνία κατὰ μέρη ἐν τῇ συμφεροντες ἐφ' ἑνὸς...

Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1160a18-20 ἔτι δὲ καὶ φιλατρίᾳ καὶ φιλατρίᾳ, γιὰ τῶν κοινωνιῶν ὧν ἠθοῖν δοκοῦσι, γίνεσθαι <οἷον> βουλαίον καὶ ἐρημιτείων.
Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1133a17-20, γὰρ ἐκ δύο ἄρτων γίνεται κοινωνία...

Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1133b4-5, ἀλλ' ἔτεν ἔξωσε τὰ αὐτῶν, οὕτως ὡς, καὶ κοινωνία, ὅτι ὑπὲρ ἥν ἴσος ὀνομάζεται ἐπὶ ἄλλων δίδονται...

Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1133b7, ἢ δ' οὖν μὴ ἢν ἀντιπορεῖται, οὐκ ἦν ἦν κοινωνία.

Aristotle Eth. Ethics 1243b31, ἀρ ποιών ἕξωσεν ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου, ἐν τῷ ἄλλῳ ἴσος ὀνομάζεται καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ συνέχει...

Aristotle Magna Moralia 1194a24-5, καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἔκατον ἔκατον διδότας τῇ ἄλλῃν ποιεῖται, ὅπως ἠλλήνων, καὶ τοῦτο ἐν τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ συνέχει...

Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1133b167, ἢδέ ἔως ἢν ἐν τῇ ἄλλῃ κοινωνίᾳ, ὥστε ἔκατον ἔκατον, καὶ τοῦτο τῇ πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ συνέχει...

Aristotle Politics 1259b24-5, ἐκ πλείτου ἐπήχει φιλίας, καὶ κοινωνίας πολιτικῆς, ὡς ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ φιλικῶν, ὥστε μὴ ἄλλου βολαντεί κοινωνίαν ταύτα ἐχθροῖς.

Aristotle Magna Moralia 1211a45, ἐκ δύο ἄλλου ἵνα ἠδέ ἄλλο διατίμησις καὶ πολιτικὴ πολιτικὴν καὶ ὀφείλει πρὸς πολιτικὴν καὶ βουλαντεῖ πρὸς ἀγαθοῖς, καὶ ότι ἐνάθλος ἄλλοι κοινωνίαι καὶ φιλίας ἐνεργεῖν ἐν ἐκάστοις τούτοις.


Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1159b32, ἐν κοινωνίᾳ, οὕτω δὲ φιλίᾳ.

Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1242b20, εἰ δὲ μὲν τέρτιον καὶ δὲ τέρτιον καὶ δὲ μὲν ἕξος καὶ δὲ ἄλλα, οὕτω δὲν εἶναι, ἐν τῇ κατακυρίων κατακυριών, ἐν τῷ ἐκάστῳ ἐνεργεῖ, συμβαλλόμενοι, καὶ διατίμει, μὴ δὲ λογίᾳ.

Aristotle Eth. Ethics 1242b102, ὡς καὶ τοῦτο, ἀλλὰ τοῦτον καὶ τοῦτον, οὕτως καὶ τοῦτον, καὶ ὡς καὶ τοῦτον, καὶ τοῦτον, καὶ τοῦτον, καὶ τοῦτον, καὶ τοῦτον, καὶ τοῦτον, καὶ τοῦτον, καὶ τοῦτον, καὶ τοῦτον, καὶ τοῦτον.
Aristotle Eud. Ethics 1245a19-23. ἀλλὰ μὲν φαίνεται ἃς ἢν καὶ πάντες ἴδιαν τῶν ἄραθνων κατὰ τῶν φίλων κοινωνοῦν, καθ' ὑπὸν ἀποφέρεται ἐκάστῳ καὶ ὅπως ἄριστων, ἀλλὰ τῶν τοῖς μὲν ἡδονῆς συμπαθής ταῖς, τῇ δὲ θεωρίᾳ μουσικῆς τῷ ὁπδ' ἐφησοφίας.

Aristotle Nic. Ethics 172a8-10. γίνεται οὖν ἢ μὲν τῶν φίλων φιλὰ μοχθορᾶ (κοινωνοῦν χάριν φαύλων [ἀλέβασι τέτεις]), καὶ μοχθορᾶ δὲ γίγνεται διούσινοι ἀλλήλοις, ἢ δὲ τῶν ἐπιτικῶν ἐπιτικῆς, συναναπαύνουσα ταῖς διαλλαγά.


Aristotle Eud. Ethics 1242a21-22. καὶ ὅποις τῇ δίκαιοι ἔπαι σὺν πρὸς φίλων, τῇ τῷ χάρι δίκαιων τις καὶ κοινωνίας, καὶ δ' ὅσῳς κοινωνίας, καὶ μὲν τόν καὶ ὅτι δ' ἐναντίον.

Aristotle Nic. Ethics 161b11-15. ἐν κοινωνίᾳ μὲν οὖν πάσης φιλίας ἐστὶ, καθότερον ζητεῖν, ἀφορίσεις δ' ἀν ἐστὶ τῆς τῇ συγγενείᾳ καὶ τῇ ἐκφημίᾳ, τῇ δὲ πολιτική καὶ φιλετική καὶ συμπλοκής, καὶ τῷ τοιούτῳ, κοινωνίας ἦσονοι καὶ τόδε.

Aristotle Eud. Ethics 1241b25-θ. ἂν δ' ἄλλας κοινωνίας εἶσον ἀλλοὶ τῶν τῆς πάθεως κοινωνίας, διὸν ἢ τῶν φιλετῶν ἢ τῶν ἀρχών ἢ δ' ἀρχιτεκτονικής.

Aristotle Eud. Ethics 1241b16. . . . ἀπετέρω ἐνιά ἐιδῆς φιλίας, τοσοῦτον καὶ δίκαιων καὶ κοινωνίας . .

Aristotle Magna Moralia 194b28-9 ἂν οὐκ ἔστιν δίκαιον τῇ ἐν πολιτικῇ κοινωνίᾳ ἄν . .

Aristotle Magna Moralia 194b10. κοινωνία χάρι ὧν πολιτικὴ τίνες, καὶ ὅσοι προσφέρουσιν εἰσίν τῇ φύσει, τῷ δὲ ἐμφανίζεται . .


Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1134a27. τούτῳ δ' ἐστίν [ἐπί] κοινωνίας βίου πρὸς τὸ εἰναί πολύπροκεν, ἐλευθέρου καὶ ἴσουν ἢ καὶ ἀναλόγουν ἢ καὶ ἀριστοκρατίαν . .

Aristotle Politics 1275a8. καὶ χάρι ἔσοικε καὶ, ὄρολοι κοινωνοῦσι τῇς ἀληθείας . .

Aristotle Politics 1275a10-14. (τούτῳ χάρι ἐμφανίζεται καὶ τοῖς ἀριστοκράτοις κοινωνοῦσι, καὶ χάρι τάσις τούτοις προσφέρει - πολλακοὶ δὲν οὖν ὑπὲρ τῶν τέλων ὧν ἐμφανίζεται καὶ προσέχοντες, ἀλλὰ νοεῖν ἀνάλογον προστάσειν, διὸ ἀτελεῖς πρὸς μετέχως τῆς τοῖς κοινωνίας).
Aristotle Politics 1279a33. ἦ γὰρ ὁ πολιτικὸς ματέον εἶναι τῶν μετὰχοντας, ἦ δὲι κοινωνεῖν ὑπὸ συμφερόντων.

Aristotle Politics 1275b19. ὥς γὰρ εξοφλία κοινωνεῖν ἀρχῆς ἀνθετικᾶς ἡ κριτικὴ.

Aristotle Politics 1276a5. ὥς γὰρ κοινωνῶν ὑπὸ τοιαῦτα ἀρχῆς πολίτης ἐστίν, ὡς ἡμαῖς...

Aristotle Politics 1299a6-17. πολλῶν γὰρ ἐκπαιῶν ἡ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία δεῖται, διότι ὁ πολιτικὸς ἀρχῆς πολίτης ἐστὶν ὑπὸ τῶν κληρονομῶν ἀρχῶν ὑπὸ τῶν κοινωνῶν...

Aristotle Nic. Ethics 1130a2-4. πρὸς ἐτερον γὰρ καὶ ἐν κοινωνία ἡ ἄλλη ἡ ἁπάνθωσιν...

Aristotle Politics 1277b35. ὡς ἁλθὲι γὰρ ποτέ ἕτερον πολῖτις ἐστὶν ὑπὸ κοινωνίας ἐστίν ἠρχῶν...

Aristotle Politics 1328a25-27. οὐδὲ ἅλλης κοινωνίας οὐδεμίας, ἢς ἔν τι ἐν γένος, ἐν γὰρ τι καὶ κοινῶν ἐν ἔν τι καὶ πολλῶν τοῖς κοινωνοῖς...

Aristotle Politics 1278a36. ὡς δὲ πολῖς κοινωνία τίς ἐστι τῶν ἀλλων...

Aristotle Politics 1289a15-18. πολειτικὸς μὲν γὰρ ἐστι τῆς τῶν πολειτικῶν ἢ περὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς, τίνα τρόπον νενεχμάνται, καὶ τι τοῦ κύριον τῆς πολειτικῆς καὶ τι ἐν τῆς ἐκάστης τῆς κοινωνίας ἐστίν, νόμοι δὲ κοινωνικῶν τῶν ὑπολογίων τῆς πολιτικῆς...

Aristotle Politics 1276b5-8. ὥσπερ ἡ καὶ χρόνον δὲ μὲν κοινωνικὸν ἐκτὸς ὑπὸ τραγικῶν ἐτερῶν ἐναντίων, φανερῶς δὲ καὶ πᾶσιν ἀλλην κοινωνίαν καὶ σύνθεσιν ἐτερῶν ἐν ἔδαιμον ἐτερῶν...

Aristotle Politics 1278b16-18. ὕποβαθμὸν δὲ πρῶτον τίνος χρόνον συνετείχει πολίς καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἶδος πόσα τῆς περὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς ἁμάς...

Aristotle Politics 1278b25. διεξάγοντο δὲ καὶ τοῦ ἴδιον εὐεργετεῖν καὶ συμποσεῖν τὴν πολιτικήν κοινωνίαν...

Aristotle Oeconomics 1345b17. ἔπικοινωνεῖν μὲν τὰ πολλὰ ἄλληλαις ἀνθρωπικῶν ἐστίν...

Aristotle Eth., Ethics 1242all. ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅσον φίλοι κοινωνοῦσιν...
Αριστοτέλης Πολιτικά 1279β16-17. Εστι δὲ τυραννις μὲν μενορχιά ... ἐπιτοκὴ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ...

Αριστοτέλης Πολιτικά 1279α36-37. Ἡ δὲ τοὺς δικαίους θέρειν ἢ διὰ ἐδὲ πρὸς τὸ δικαίον τρίτι πέλει καὶ τῶν κοινωνοῦσιν αὐτὸς ...

Αριστοτέλης Ευδημός Πολιτικά 1243β30. τῷ ἀνάλογῳ γὰρ μετρητέον, οὕτως καὶ πολιτικὴ μετετίθαι κοινωνία...
Aristotle Politics 1291b36. οὗτος οὖν τῆς μείζοντος κοινωνικοῦ ἐπάνευρν ἀληθείας τῆς πολιτείας ἐνοίκιον.

Aristotle Politics 1293a4-6. ὥστε καὶ οὐκ ἐφεστὴρ καὶ λαμβάνομεν ἀληθείας τοῦτον σχεδόν καὶ τοὺς ἐπίσημους, λαμβάνοντες μισθον.

Aristotle Politics 1295a30-31. ζηλῶν δὲ τῶν τεσσάρων κοινωνίᾳ δύνασθαι καὶ πολιτείᾳ ἢ ὡς πλεῖστος πάλιν ἐνδέχεται μετατρέψειν.

Aristotle Politics 1295b55. δήλον ἂρα δει καὶ ἡ κοινωνία ἢ πολιτικὴ ἀριστοὶ ἢ διὰ τῶν ισόνων.

Aristotle Politics 1297a42. ὡστε τὰ ὧν κοινωνοῦνται ἐνέστοι, ἐκεῖνοι δὲ ἡ πολιτείᾳ ἔγνωσεν τῶν ἐξέρχοντος κοινωνίαν.

Aristotle Politics 1309a29. ἄλλοτε τοῖς οὗτοι κοινωνοῦσι τῆς πολιτείας.

Aristotle Politics 1322a8. ἀναφερόμενον ἢ ἑστίν, ὅτι ὄσοι τὸ μὲν δίκαιον τάκτης δὲ μὴ μισθαίνοντες εἶναι, ἢ μὴ γιγαντεύοντας κοινωνεῖν ἀδύνατον άλληλοις, καὶ πράξεων μὴ γιγαντεύοντων.

Aristotle Politics 1324a15-16. ὡς δὲ τοῦ κοινωνεύεσθαι καὶ κοινωνεῖν πάλιν ἢ μὴν τοῦ δικαίου καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς κοινωνίας ἀποτελεῖμεν.

Aristotle Politics 1324a19. οἷς πάντ᾽ ὧν ἄλλοτε ἀφεθέν κοινωνεῖν πάλιν ἐστὶ καὶ τοῖς μὲν μη τοις δὲ πρὸς τελετῶι.

Aristotle Politics 1325a9-11. τοῦ δὲ νομοθετοῦ ἐποδήμου ἐτί τοῦ διάσπασθαι πάλιν καὶ γένος ἀνθρώπων καὶ πάλιν ἄλλην κοινωνίαν, ἡμᾶς ἀγαθοῖς πᾶσι μισθοῦσι καὶ τῆς ἐνδέχεται αὐτοῖς ὀχθαμίνως.

Aristotle Politics 1325b27. πολλὰ μὴ κοινωνεῖ πρὸς τῆς πολιτείας ἐστίν.

Aristotle Politics 1327a11. Περὶ δὲ τῆς πρὸς τὴν διαταγὴν κοινωνίας.

Aristotle Politics 1327a37. φαινεται δὲ εἰ μὲν ἀγαθῶν τῇ συμβαίνει, ἔγνωσεν δὲ τῆς κοινωνίας αὐτῶν, ἔπαθεν τις τοῦτο τὸ ἀγαθόν.

Aristotle Politics 1328b16-19. ἢ γὰρ πάντες πλῆθος ἐστιν ὡς τοῖς ἐπέχωσον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς λιγῆν ἀπομονεῖται, διὸ ἐναντίον τοῦτων ἐκλείπον, ἀδύνατον διὰ λόγου ἀπομονεῖν τὴν κοινωνίαν εἰναι τοῖς ἑαυτῶι.
Aristotle Politics 1328b25. Διαφορετικά δὲ τούτων λοιπών σκέφτομαι πως κοινωνητέον πάνευν τούτων...

Aristotle Politics 1332b12-15. Ἡμείς δὲ παρὰ πολιτικὴ κοινωνία συνέτηκαν ἐξ ἀρχοντῶν καὶ ἀρχιμαχεμένων, τούτο δὲ σκέπτομαι, εἰ ἔστερον εἶναι ἔτη τούς ἀρχοντές καὶ τούς ἀρχιμαχεμένους ἢ τῶν οὐδές διὰ βίου.

Aristotle Politics 1334b34. οὐ δὲ προμεθέτοντο γνωσθεῖν τάσιν τῆς κοινωνίας πρὸς οὗτος τε καὶ τοῦ τοῦ διὸν χρόνου...

Aristotle Politics 1336b20-23. τοὺς δὲ νοστέρους οὖς ἄλλως οὖσας κοινωνίας ἔτης τέκτον, πρὶν ἢ τῆς ἕλειας λάβωσιν εἴναι ἢ καὶ μετακλίνους ὑπήρξει κοινωνίας ἢδη καὶ μέθος καὶ τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν τοιούτων ταξινομηθῆς βάρος ἀπαθεῖς ἢ πατήσας πάντας.

Aristotle Politics 1339b40-42. πορεί δὲ τὸ κοινωνεῖν τῆς μορφῆς τοῖς ταύτῃς μονῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ τὸ χρῆσιμον εἶναι πρὸς τὰς διαφοράς οὐ χρῆσαι.

Aristotle Politics 1340b33-34. ὅτι μὲν οὖν παῖδευεν τῆς μορφῆς ὀνόματος οὗτος καὶ κοινωνεῖν τῶν εὕρεσιν, φανερὸν εἰς τῶν τοιούτων.

Aristotle Politics 1340b41-42. ...οὐκ χαλεπῶν δόγματας εἰκονίζοντος μὲν ἄλλῳ τοῖς πόροι τῶν εὑρεσιῶν κοινωνιστῶν τοῖς πρὸς ἀρτοῖς παιδευμένοις πολιτικῶς...

Aristotle Politics 1340b22-26. οὐκ ἀνθρώποι δὲ ὅτι πολλὴν ἐξελέγαν πρὸς τὸ ἀρχήν ποιοῦσιν εἰσαγαγόν τόσον καὶ κοινωνικῆς τῶν εὕρεσιν, ἐν τῷ εὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἡ χαλεπών ἐτίμη αὐτὴ κοινωνήσασται τῶν ἑρώων κρίνσεις μενεχθῆσαι σπουδαίως.

Aristotle Politics 1340a32-33. καὶ ποιῶν μελῶν καὶ ποιῶν ἐφησαν κοινωνιστῶν...

Aristotle Politics 1328a32-33. ἀλλ' ἐν τοῖς ἔργοις τοῖς ἀνθρώπων καὶ κοινωνικῶς.
Aristotle Politics 1260b28-29 ἐπεὶ δὲ προσπορόμεθα διεωρῆσαι περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς πολιτικῆς ἡ κρατίσθη παθῶν τοῖς δυναμένοις ἢν ὢν ἂν μᾶλλον καὶ ἐδίκην...

Aristotle Politics 1260b38-39 ὧν τῶν δὲ πάντων πάντων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολέμους, ἢ μαθέον, ἢ σινδῆν παθῶν μὲν παθῶν δὲ μὴ. τὰ μὲν οὖν μαθέον κοινωναίν φανερὸν ὡς ἀδύνατον...

Aristotle Politics 1260b40-42. ἡ γὰρ πολιτεία κοινωνία τὰς ἐτοί καὶ γρώνων ἢν ὑπάρχῃ τοῦ τοποῦ κοινωνεῖν, δὲ μὲν γὰρ τόπος ἢ τῆς μιᾶς πάλαις, ὡς κεῖται κοινωνοῖ τῆς μιᾶς πάλαις...

Aristotle Politics 1261a1-3. ἀλλὰ ποτέν ὅσον ἐνδίκηται κοινωνεῖν ἡ πάντων βέλτιον κοινωνεῖν τοῖς παθῶν ὧν ἦν, ἢ τινῶν μὲν τινῶν δ’ ὡς Βραχίων;

Aristotle Politics 1261a4-6. ἐνδίκηται γὰρ καὶ τέκνων καὶ γυναικῶν καὶ κηναίων κοινωνεῖν τοὺς πολιτές ἀλλόλοις, ὡσεπ ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ τῆς Μέγανος...

Plato Republic 449CD. Ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἐνδικεῖται, ὡσεπ γαρ τάλα, λόγου δεῖται τῷ δ’ τρόπῳ τῆς κοινωνίας. πολλοὶ γὰρ ἐν γένοις...καὶ θείη τάσην ἢ λέγεις κοινωνίαν γυναικῶν τε καὶ παιδῶν...

Plato Republic 450C. οὗ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ἑφυσιώμενων ἤπωμᾶς ἀποψινήν ἢν ὧν δοκεῖ διεξεῖν, τίς ἢ κοινωνία τοῖς χρῆσιν χρήσις παθῶν τε περί καὶ γυναικῶν ἢτατ’ καὶ τροφῆς νέων ὥς ὡς ὧν, τίς ἢ τῷ νεκρῷ χρόνῳ γίγνομενα γίγνεσθαι τε καὶ πατέρας...

Plato Republic 461E. ἢ μὲν δὴ κοινωνία, τῇ θαύμα, ἀνά τε καὶ τοιαύτῃ γυναικῶν. τε καὶ παιδῶν τοῖς φύλάξῃ τοῖς τῆς πάλαις...

Plato Republic 464B. τοῖς μερίστην ζῷα δὲ τὸν πόλεις αὐτά ἢμίν παραιτᾶτ', κοινωνία τοῖς ἐπικόροισ τῶν τε παθῶν καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν.

Plato Republic 462B. οὕκον οὐκ ἢς ἤδονς τε καὶ λύπης κοινωνία ἐπικόροισ, ὅταν ὡς ἡ πάλαις ἢς τοῖς ἐπικόροισ τῶν τε παθῶν καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν τε καὶ ἦταν ἀπολαμβάνων παραπληρεῖσθαι καί ἐπικόροισ τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι.

Plato Republic 464C. Καὶ τοῖς ὃς ἢς ἦπωμῖ γίγνεται ἢς ἐνδικεῖται. ὡς ὡς ὧν ἦπωμῖ δοκεῖ διεξεῖν τοῦτο πολιτεία τοῦτο κοινωνία τάς οὐ καὶ σύνεχιστά τήν τοῦτο ἢς ἰνδικεῖ τε καὶ πάλαις ἢς εὐνόγησιν νέος παθῶν τοῖς οὐκόν καὶ ἀνθρώπων τῶν φύλαξῃ ἐκείνη...

Plato Republic 464A. οὐκοῦν καὶ πάλαις τοῦ ἢς δεῖ ἐνδικεῖται. ὡς ὧν κοινωνία ἢς ἦπωμῖ δεῖ καὶ ἠδονής μέλατα κοινωνίας ἐξουσίας. Πολότε. ἢς ὧν ὡς ὧν τοῖς ἢς δεῖ τῇ ἐπικόροισ τῆς οὐκόν καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ τῶν παθῶν κοινωνίας τοῖς φύλαξῃ.
Plato Republic 466CD. Συγχωρείτε ἵνα δὲ ἐγὼ, ἐν τοῖς γονιῶν κοινωνίαις τοῖς ἀνδράσις, ἦν διζυγίοις, παιδείας τε περὶ καὶ παιδών καὶ φιλακής τῶν ἄλλων πολιτῶν, κατὰ τὰ πόλιν μεσοδέος ἐς πολέμων τε ὑπὸν καὶ εἰς ἐξερεύνησεν ὅπῃ καὶ ἀνθρωποὶ ἦσαν, καὶ πάντα πάντες κατὰ τὸ δυνατόν κοινωνία, καὶ τῶν παραφύλων ταῦτα βλέποντα καὶ οὐ παρὰ φύσιν τὴν τοῦ δικαίου πρὸς τὸ ἀρρεν, ἐν περὶ καὶ ἀνθρώπων συναισθήματι, Συγχωρέω, ἔφη.

Plato Republic 540C. Ὅρθως, ἔφη, εἶπερ ἦν οἱ πάντα τοῖς ἀνδράσι πολιτείας, ἀναισθησιν, ἔστειλον δὲ ἀνθρώπων συναισθήματι.
Aristotle Politics 1263b24-27. ἦτε καὶ τοὺς κατὰ κεκτημένους καὶ κοινωνοῦσας πολλῶν συμφερόμενων μάλιστα δρᾶμεν οὐδὲν ἦτο τῷ εἰσὶν ἐπέκειν ἐπὶ τὰς κοινωνίας συμφερομένως πρὸς πολλοὺς συμμαχῆς τοῖς κεκτημένους ἀπὸ τῆς κράτους.

Aristotle Politics 1263b23. ἦν οὖντες γίνεται διὰ τῆς ἀρχαίως ἀλλὰ διὰ τῆς μεσοδομῆς...

Aristotle Politics 1263b29. ἦτε δὲ σύμμοιροι μὴ μόνον λέγειν ἀλλὰ καὶ οὓς γεγονός, φαίνεται δὲ εἶναι πάντων ἀδύνατον ὁ βίος.

Aristotle Politics 1264a11-12. Οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ οὖν ὁ τρόπος τῆς ἑλληνικῆς πολιτείας τίς ἦτο τοῖς κοινωνούσιν οὐδὲν ἤτο τῷ δικαίῳ ἡμῖν ἤτοὶ τῷ δικαίῳ ἤτοί τῷ πόλεμῳ τῷ δικαίῳ κοινών...

Aristotle Politics 1264a24-25. ἦν δὲ καθάπερ ἄλλως ἄλλας ἀλλιώς πόλεως καὶ πρὶς ἑκείνοις ἦτο τῇ τοιαύτῃ, τῷ δὲ τρόπος ἦτο τῇ κοινωνίᾳ...

Aristotle Politics 1264a39-41. ἦν δὲ ὁδὸν εὐρίνος ἡδίων, ὄτε τῷ διαφέρον μικρόν, τῷ ποιότις τοιαύτῃ εἶναι εἰσαγωγή τῷ εἰς τὰς φιλάκως κοινωνίας.

Aristotle Politics 1264b29-31. καὶ γὰρ ἵνα τὴν Πολιτείαν πάντων διώρισεν διὰ συμβολῆς, πρὶς εἰς γυναικῶν καὶ τεκνων κοινωνίας, πῶς ἦτον ὑπὲρ, καὶ πρὶς κόσμους, καὶ τῆς πολιτείας τῆς τάξιν...

Aristotle Politics 1265a5-6. ἦν γὰρ τῆς τῶν γυναικών κοινωνίας καὶ τῆς κόσμου, ἐν ἀλλὰ ἀποδίδοντας εἰρμοτέρας τοῖς πολιτεῖασ...

Aristotle Politics 1271a4-5. φαίνεται δὲ καὶ ἀνατριχίζομενον καὶ καταραμέσθομεν τών κοινών οἱ κοινωνικοὶ τῶν λόγων τοιαύτῃς τῆς ἀρχής ταχέως.

Aristotle Politics 1272b14-15. καὶ τοῖς εἰς τὰς πολιτείας καὶ τοῖς δικαίοις τῶν κοινωνικῶν καὶ τῶν δικαίων τῶν τοιχῶν...

Isocrates Team of Hors. XVI.37. ὅσον ἄρα αἰτία, καὶ τῶν πολλῶν τῶν ἀνδρῶν Ἀρεώτατος, ἂν τε καὶ τῶν συμφόρων ἀπεκδοθέντος τοῖς παράλληλοις εἰκοσίνων...

Isocrates Panegyricus IV.2. ... ἐνοῖς δὲ ἀνδρὸς ἐν διείστικον ἐπεπείθεν τοῖς ἀνδρόσεως ταῖς ἀνθρώπων κοινωνικοῖς τῆς ἀναγέννησας...

Isocrates Panegyricus IV.167. Ἀρεώτατος δὲ ὅτι τῆς τῶν δικαιώματος καταραμένης τῆς κράτους, ὃν τῶν συμφόρων κοινωνικοὺς ὑπόλογον οἱ καὶ τῶν ἀνδρῶν ἀποκάλυψις καὶ μὴ πάντα τῶν χρόνων διαπερατοῖς ἀρχέσθωσαν...

Isocrates Panegyricus IV.110. ... ἐνοῖς καταραμένων καὶ τῶν δικαιωμάτων κοινωνικῶν καὶ τῆς ἄνω παραδοσίας διαπερατοῖς...

Isocrates Platoicus XIV.8. ... ἐνοῖς δὲ συμμαχῶν πολιτείας οὐδὲν δεικνύοντος κοινωνικῶν ἀναγέννησει.
Isocrates Plataicus XIV.57.  εἰς ἐν τὴν χώραν μόνον τῶν ἑκάτερων κοινωνίων ἐκείνων τῶν κινδύνων γιαμαμένως εὐκαιρίσθηται ἐν τῷ πόλιν αὐτοῖς.

Isocrates Plataicus XIV.46. ὑπὸ τῇ δίδυμον δύναμιν ἀλγῶμεν. ὅπως ἔγινεν πρὸς τοὺς οἰκεῖοι κακοῖς καὶ τῶν ἄλλων κοινωνίων.

Xenophon Hellenica VI.3.1. κοινωνίαν γε μὴν αὐτοῖς δόν ἔπραξεν οὐκέτι ἥδειρον, ἔπει ἑώρων στρατεύσεις τοὺς οἰκεῖος ἕκαστος τῆς πόλεως. Πώς δὲ τῷ πόλεως πολέμερον καὶ φίλας ἔμελλεν άρνηταις.

Xenophon Hellenica VI.5.2. ζητεὶ δὲ οὖν καὶ δόμινα ἐπιστήμεις μετὰ τῶν κοινωνίων, βουλομένων ἐξεδραί τόνδε τῶν ὅρκων.

Isocrates Archidamus VI.43. ἐκλίποντες δὲ τὴν χώραν, καὶ παρέδοται μὲν τὴν ἐλευθερίαν νομίζοντες, κοινωνίασαν τοὺς κινδύνους ἢ καὶ ταὐτότητα μεταβολῆς έξαγων...

Isocrates To Archidamus Ep. IX.8. οὐ μόνον τοῖς ἀδέρφοις ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς Ἐλλήνων τοῖς τῆς οὐχ ἡμετέρας κοινωνίσατε, τῷ δὲ τρόπῳ τῶν ἀδέρφων χρησίμου...

Isocrates Areopagiticus VIII.31... ἡλθὰ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἴδιων βίων τοσοτέρων ἐπιστήμην προνοιαν ἀλλήλων, ὅταν περ ξύρας εἰς φρονοῦντας καὶ πατρίδος κοινωνίασαν.

Demosthenes Ag. Leptines 20.25. οὐ γὰρ κοινωνεῖ τὰς σημαντικὰς προσδόκιμος καὶ παρουσίας ταῦτα ταῦτα κοινωνεῖ οὖσαν.

Demosthenes On Navy Boards 14.16. ἔγιν γὰρ τοῦτο ἀποδείξετε τῷ πλήθους, ἥρᾳμαι, τῶν ἐπικλήσεως καὶ τῶν ὁρμάντων καὶ τῶν κληρονομικῶν καὶ τῶν κοινωνικῶν καὶ ἐς τοὺς ἐθνῶν ἀριστέρων, ἐφεύρεται χίλιοι καὶ διακόσια ταῦθα, ὅριν σαΐται.

Isocrates Add. to Philip V.131. τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἑρμηνευόν ὤδεις κοινωνίας, ὅταν δὲ ὁριζόμεν ἐν ἀποκαθοιδομένων οὐκ ἐστὶν ὄστις ὁδὸν διαφέρεται καὶ νοέσθαι

Demosthenes On the Peace 5.19. Φίλιππος δὲ, ὅτε καὶ ἐκεῖος οὖσαν κοινωνεῖ τὴν ἑαυτοχθονίας...

Demosthenes De Fals. Legat.19.33.35ἐκαὶ δὲ ὄμως καταδέσθηκαν ἐνὶ ἔντει, τοῖς ἑδραίως καὶ πολὺν ἔκρισαν. δέξας κοινωνεῖ τῷ σιωπήσαται.

Demosthenes De Fals. Legat.19.45.355.δὲ ταῦτα οὖσαν ὄντως καὶ ἐκ τῶν κοινωνικῶν, προσέθηκεν δὲ ὅτι ὁδῷ προσδόκω...

Demosthenes De Fals. Legat.19.119. οὐκ οὔτε τίς ἡ κοινωνία, τίς οὖσαν προσόπον ὑπὲρ ἐνακριβής αὐτῇ...
Demosthenes De Fals. Legat. 19.132.381 καὶ μῆτε τῶν ἐν Ἀρμενίῳ κοινωνίᾳ ἐθέλειν, δισκόλως τοὺς θεύν καὶ διοπτοὺς πρὸς τῶν Φιλιππῶν...


Demosthenes De Fals. Legat. 19.190.400. ἐπονομάζειν, τερών ἐκκοιμώμεναι ὧν στρατηγοί, εχθέν ὡς εἰπείν ὑπὸ ἄρχαν πάνω.

Demosthenes De Fals. Legat. 19.202.404. ἀκοῦσα γὰρ αὐτὸν εἰρέτων ὡς ἔργον πάνων μὲν κατηγορών κοινωνίας γένοιτο...

Demosthenes De Fals. Legat. 19.205.405. ἐπονομάζειν ὡς τὸ κεκοιμώμενο τούτοις οὐδένας, λοιπὸν μοὶ δέ εἰμι...

Demosthenes De Fals. Legat. 19.209.406. ἂν δὲ Αἱθηναίοι, τοῦτο τὸ πράγμα πανδειγμένον ἔστιν: αυτοὶ κατηγορεῖ τἀυτὸ ἐμοὶ διὸν αὐτὸς κοινωνίας γένοιτο...

Demosthenes De Fals. Legat. 19.222.410. καὶ φίλοι κακεῖνον ἔστιν καὶ τούτους ἔχειν καὶ τούτους (ὁ θεῦ δὲν, ἴδιαν καὶ φίλοι τῶν αὐτῶν κεκοιμώμενοτέροι...)

Demosthenes De Fals. Legat. 19.280.431. ὃς ὑπήρξεν ἔτι δήμος, ἐπὶ οὗ ἀρχαῖοι σπουδῶν καὶ μετάφορων κοινωνίως τεκνίσατο...

Demosthenes De Fals. Legat. 19.334.448. στρατηγὸς δ' ἐς τὸν βολίκην δήμος, οὗτος κοινωνεῖ ταῖς τῶν ὑδάτων...

Aeschines On the Embassy II.54. Ἡ γὰρ ἔνδειξιν, ὁ ἀγάπης, δικαστεί, καὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν φθόνων, καὶ ἐν τὴν πραγμάτων μετὰ Φιλοκράτους κοινωνίαν, καὶ τὸ λόγον, ὡς ἐπίρουλον καὶ ἀποστείγον...

Aeschines On the Embassy II.56. Τὴν μὲν τοῖνος κοινωνίαν τῶν περὶ τὸν εἰρήνην πράξεων ὁδὸν εἰμὶ καὶ Φιλοκράτους, ἀλλὰ Δημοσθένειν καὶ Φιλοκράτους ἐσῆκεσθε.

Demosthenes On Halonessus 7.30.31. Περὶ δὲ τοῦ ἐπερχομένου ἡμεῖς ἐν τῇ εἰρήνῃ ἐπενοχθήκομεν, τοῦτο ἀλλοι Ἔλληνες, ὥσπερ οἱ κατατιμήθηκοι τῇ εἰρήνῃ οἰκείοι καὶ συνοικίαν γίνοντο καὶ ἐὰν τῇ ἐφισώσθη ἐκείνῃ στρατηγῇ βοηθεῖν τοὺς κοινωνώντας τῇ εἰρήνῃ, ἀλλόμενον καὶ δίκαιον εὐτόκε καὶ πιθανωρυφόν...

Isocrates Ep. to Philip I.10. ἵδιν καὶ εἰς τὸν φαίλοις ἀνεύσθη, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα δὲν ὁδεῖσθ' ἣν πολυμνοσ κοινωνήσειν.

Demosthenes Third Philippic IX.28. ὁδὸν καὶ τὸν φαῦλοις ἀνεύσθη, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνα δὲν ὁδεῖσθ' ἣν πολυμνοσ κοινωνήσειν.
Demosthenes Third Phil. IX. 71. Τάναδα οὖσαν τάς αυτοῖς παρεπανωμένους καὶ ποιήσαντες φανερῶς τοὺς ἄλλους ἢδη παρακαλώμεν, καί τοὺς ταύτα διδάσκοντες ἐκπέμπετεν πρόσεις... ὅτι ἐὰν μὲν πείσητε, κοινωνοῦσας ἡμῖν καὶ τῶν κινδύνων καὶ τῶν ἀναλημάτων, ἢν τι δέρη, ἐὰν δὲ μὴ, ἠρωτόμην ἐνεποίητε τοὺς πράξεσιν.

Demosthenes Fourth Philippic IX. 45. δεὺ κερώ, ὦ ἄνδρες Ἀλκιμόδοι, δικαίως ἀλλαὶ της πολιτείας κοινωνείν τοὺς μὲν εὐρείως τίς μὲν τὸν βίον τὸν ἑδωνίαν ἀρχαλώς ἔχειν νοικίζοντας καὶ ὑπὲρ τούτων λείψεις...

Isocrates Panathenaicus XII. 71. ὧς ἡ μόνη τὰς τοιαύτας ἄν πολλοὶ καὶ τῶν φαλῶν κοινωνοῦσιν, ἀλλὰ κάστας ὁμός οὐδέπώ ἢν πανηγύρος ἐν συνήθει μεταχειν...

Isocrates Panathenaicus XII. 178. τοὺς μὲν γὰρ ἄλλους συνοίκους ἔχειν ἐν τῇ πόλει τοὺς στασίας καὶ κοινονάς ἀπαίτησεν πλὴν τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ τῶν τιμῶν.

Isocrates Panathenaicus XII. 184. ἢ ποικίλως ἐν τοῖς ἄλλοις ἄλλοις ἔξωτοι καὶ τοὺς ἐξαιρέσει καὶ τοὺς κοινωνοῦς ἀπείκεν καὶ τὰ ἀκόλουθα λυβεῖν.

Demosthenes Against Neera 59. 98. καὶ ἡμεῖς διὰ αὐτοῦς ἐκκολάρανας τῇ ἐλέγειν ἐπίγραφαι τὰς πόλεις τὰς κοινωνότας τοῦ ἔρχου.

Demosthenes On Treaty Alex. 17. 6. καὶ ὂρο ζητεῖ ἐπιφέρεται ἐν τοῖς συνθήκαις πολέμῳ εἴναι τὸν ἔρχουν ἀπὸ τὸ Ἀλέξανδρος τοιοῦτον ἀπαίτησεν τὸς τῆς περίπτερος κοινωνοῦν, καὶ τὴν χώραν αὐτοῦ, καὶ στρατιστεῖσθαι τῷ αὐτῶν ἄπαντες.

Demosthenes On Treaty Alex. 17. 15. ἡς ὑπὲρ ἐν τοῖς συνθήκαις ἐπιλεγέσθαι τοὺς συνδέουσας καὶ τοὺς ἐτί τῇ κοινῇ φυλακῇ τεκμεραίοις ἑξῆς ἐν τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι πόλεις τῆς περίπτερος καὶ γίγνεσθαι βάλοντες καὶ φορᾶν παρὰ τοὺς κείμενοις ταῖς πόλεις νομίζῃ, καὶ αἱρεῖσθαις, ὡντες ἂς ἀναδημοῦμεν, ἡμῶν ἄρχειν ἀποκοπᾶται, ἡμῶν δολῶν ἀπελευθέρωσεν ἐκ τῆς νεωτερίσμοι.

Demosthenes On Treaty Alex. 17. 16. ἡς ὡς ἐπειπέραν δέχετο τὸ λεγόμενον τῆς συνθήκης. ἡς ὑπὲρ ἐπιμαζόμενον, ἐκ τῶν πολέμων τῶν κοινωνοῦσιν τῆς περίπτερος μὴ ἐκείνην φυγάρας ἐπιμελεῖται ἐπὶ τοῖς πολέμῳ μηδὲνι πολείς τῶν μετεχόντων τῆς περίπτερος

Aeschines Ag. Ctesiphon III. 96. ἡμῶν τῶν Ἱλλήνων ὃς βουλήσατα κοινωνεῖν τῆς συνείδεις ὡτε δότα χρημάτων ὀστὶ στρατιωτῶν αποτείχειν ἐκείνης.

Aeschines Ag. Ctesiphon III. 145. καὶ μετεξυπνέεις εἶς Θῆβαι εἰς τὴν Καλαμίαν τὴν κοινωνίαν τῶν πράξεων τοῖς Θησείοις συνείδεις...
Aeschines Ag. Ctesiphon III. 257. "Όταν δ' ἐν τελευτῇ ηδή τοῦ λόγου συνηγοροῦ τούς κοινωνούς τῶν οὐρανοκηλῆσων, ἐπολλαμβάνετο δρᾶν ὑπὸ τῶν δήματος...

Demosthenes De Corona 18. 21. 232. ... Φιλάρτης δ' Ἀρνύσιος, δ' ὁ σῶς, ἀδικημένη, κοινωνίας οὐκ ἔνωσ...

Demosthenes De Corona 18. 23. ... καὶ μὴν εἰς τὰ καλὸτά τοῖς Ἐλλήνων κοινωνίαν ἀτερήτους ἄριστος Φιλίππης οὐκ ἔις τὰ μὰ σχετικῷ λοιπὸν ἢ, ἀλλ' ῥαῖν καὶ δυσμυρτρέσσως καὶ ἔδραν τουτοίς...

Demosthenes De Corona 18. 58. 244. ... καὶ ἀνισούν ἐν τοῖς διεύθυν
tοις στεφάνου κελεύσαλθα, κοινωνίαν μὲν διεύρυνα καὶ τοῦτο τοὺς πολιτεύχουνοι...

Plato Leges 686A. ... ἄτις κεκοινωνηκότος μὲν πολλῶν πόνων καὶ κινδύνων ἄλληλοι...

Xenophon Cyropoedia VII. 5. 71. ... εὐνεῖλεξε τὰς τε ἐμοτίμους καὶ πάντας ὑποτής ἐπικοίρω μὲν καὶ ἐξουρεύτητοι αὐτῷ ἐδόκουν κοινωνίαν εἶναι καὶ πόνων καὶ ἂθεθῶν...

Plato Leges 694B. ... καὶ πάντα δὴ τῶν ἄνθρωπων θεωρημένων τις καὶ φιλῶν καὶ νόον κοινωνίαν.

Plato Leges 695D. ... καὶ τοῦ τοῦ λόγου ἀναφέρων, ὅπως ἀπέκρισον Περσίδης, τίς τὸν νόμον τίνα ἵππωσεν, φιλῶν πορίζων καὶ κοινωνίαν πάντοτε Περσίδης, χρήματι καὶ ὄφειλεν τὸν Περσίδην ὑπὸ τοῦ προσαράξατο.

Plato Critias 119C. ... ὅ ἐν ἄλληλοις ἀρχῆ καὶ κοινωνίᾳ κατὰ ἐπιστολὴν ἢ τὰ τοῦ Ποσειδώνως...

Plato Epistle VII. 332AB. ... Τούτων κοινωνῶν τὸς ἀρχής οὔτε ὀφέι τὸν πείδη καὶ ἀδικημένη καὶ ἐνεργείας καὶ συγγενείας ἀπεργάτης ποιῆσαται, Ἀρτέσιος ὑπὸ ἐπαναστάσεως φιλοτέρους ἐπεξερεύνατο, ὅτι ἄκολογον πιστεύεσθαι, ὁδὸν ἀνατελεῖσθαι, κοινωνίας δὲ μόνον ἐν τῇ ἡλίου τις καὶ μὲν ὄνομα ἔχεισθαι, διένευε τῇ ἀρχῇ αὐτῶν, καί τὸν περίπτευκαν δὲν καὶ οὔτε ἀνθισθείς, ἀλλ' ἐντὸς τοῦ παραπέμπειν ἄλλον κρύτῃ τοῦ νομοθέτην καὶ διερεῖν τὸν ἑαυτὸν ἀριστεῖτο...

Xenophon Hiero III. 1. ... Φιλίας δ' ὅ σωσθήναι καὶ κοινωνοῦν διὰ τύραννοι.

Xenophon Memorabilia II. 1. 32. ...διὰ δή τοῦ οἰκείου τῶν ἐν τοῖς πόλεις πονηρῶν, βεβαιὰ δὲ τῶν ἐν πολέμῳ συμμάχων ἐφέσων, ἔργη τοῖς φιλίας κοινωνίας.

Xenophon Memorabilia II. 6. 26. ...πῶς δ' ὅ μισουσία τῶν διευθυντῶν φιλίας κεφαλήσων πολιτεύονται, τούτῳ κοινωνίᾳ καὶ συνεργίᾳ τῶν προφέρων μάλλον ἡ καταγωγικὴς κρίματος.
Demosthenes Ag. Aristoc. I XXV. 33. ὡκ ἀπονόοις, ἢ ἄρσεν ἐθνάτικα, τὸς ὑπὸν παρῆσθοι συνευμονέοντος δεὶ ἦτοιν ἐντὸς κοινωνίσασθαι, ἀλλὰ νοῦ καὶ φρενῶν ἑρμῆν καὶ προνοών πολλὰς.

Plato Epistle VI 323BC. ἢ ἐπιστὸς ἰετινοῦν μᾶλλον ἂν συμφθαλι καὶ συνήθη τόιν ἐν τῇ προσάρχῳ φιλότητα τῇ καὶ κοινωνίᾳ...

Isocrates Ep. V. to Alex. 2. ὡλλ' ἐθς συνειδρίᾳ τῷ οὐκ ἂν λυπηθῇ τός, συμβάλλων τῇ καὶ κοινωνίᾳ πραγμάτων ὠδεν ἂν βλαψήθη καὶ ἀδικήθη...

Plato Laches 179E. καὶ δρᾶς συμπαραλαβεῖν ἀλλ' ἐθς συμβάλλων τῇ καὶ κοινωνίᾳ...

Plato Laches 180A. καὶ περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας λέγειν ὅτου οἴον τῇ ποίηστε ὃ ἐθῆ, ἀλλὰ ἰησώμα τῇ τῆς Ηλληνίδι καὶ Ηλληνίδι, ἔπειταν τῇ διδάξοις καὶ κοινωνεῖν ἐκομίσως, οἷον ἐθς καὶ Ἀλήτη φαίνει.

Plato Timaeus 20D. Τάσσε κρὴ φραῖν, εἴ καὶ τῇ τρίτῃ κοινωνίᾳ. Τιμαῖος διδασκαί.

Xenophon Oeconomicus VI. 3. ὡς καὶ λόγῳ κοινωνοῦντας περὶ τίν ὃν διδάσαντες συμμολογοῦντες διεξεῖναι.

Plato Gorgias 487C. ὡδα δοῦμα χεῖν, ἀλλὰ καλλίκεια,

Plato Cleitophon 410C. ἄνθρωπος διότι κοινωνεῖς ἑρμηνεύεις σοφίας...

Plato Laches 197E. καὶ δρᾶς συμπαραλαβεῖν μὴ μέντοι οἴον μὲ ἀφήσειν

Plato Legea 891B. καὶ ὡς ἐν-κοινωνέαν γὰρ δεῖ σοι ἐν ταῖς τῶν ῥήματων.

Plato Cratylus 434BC. ἐν τῷ λόγῳ ὀδηγεῖ ἐρμηνεύεις.

Plato Crito 49D. ἐσποτεῖ ἐθς ὅδε καὶ τῇ ἐφὶ ἐδόμα, πότερον κοινωνεῖς καὶ συνδοκεῖς σοι...

Plato Republic 335E. ἔστιν κοινωνεῖν τῆς λάθας...

Plato Republic 450A. καὶ ἔμε τοῖνον, ὁ Γαλάκτων ἐφι, κοινωνεῖν τῆς ψυχῆς ταῦτας εἶδε...

Plato Politicus 260B. Τούτου τοῦν μέχρις ὡς αὐτοὶ κοινωνοῦσιν, τακτῶν εἰ τῶν ἄλλων ὀδηγοῦντα καὶ προαίρειν...
Plato Alcibiades II 147E. τάτος δ' εκοινονός δι' εκοινονον καὶ ἄλλοι δοκίμασι.

Plato Crito 49D. ἦ διψάτοιτο καὶ ὁ κοινώνης τῆς ἀρχής.

Plato Leges 810C. Ορθῶς διπλάδες, ἢ Ἰλίνως, πρὸς τῇ κοινωνίᾳ οὐκ εἰς πρὸς τῇ κοινωνίᾳ, ἢ ἔτερον καὶ ἐν ἀλλ' ἑξάρχει.

Plato Leges 753A. Τί δέθη ἐν καὶ σοὶ σε καὶ σοὶ ἡ ἁγίλλος, ἢ ξύλο, ἐκκοινωνήσας οὐν τῆς πολιτείας;

Plato Leges 969C. ἢ ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴ καὶ ἰδιώς πάσαις κοινώνης ἀριθμοῖς, τῇ τῆς πολεος ἐξέχοντο.

Isaeus On Estate of Astyphe IX. 30. ... καὶ εἰς τοὺς διάτους τοὺς Ἱππολέως ἐκεῖνον λαμβάνον, ἵνα μετέχῃς τῆς κοινωνίας.

Isocrates Aegeticus XIX. 10. ... ἢ ἀλλ' καὶ τῶν ἵδρυσιν ἐκκοινωνίας καὶ ἢ πρὸς τῇ τῆς πολεος ἐκεῖνος ἀπεκινηθεὶς καὶ ἰδίοις τοῖς ὑπενδόδοι καὶ τοῖς ἱδρον ἐξερέσθη...

Isocrates Antidosis XV. 105. ... εἰμι δὲ δικαίον ἢ καὶ τῶν ἱδρον κοινωνίας ἢ ἢ μὴ τῶν ἱδρον ἐπελαύνειν.

Demosthenes Ag. Meidias 21. 118. ... ἢ ἀλλ' ἢ καὶ τῶν φίλων ἐστίν, πᾶν τοῖς δικοῖς λαμβάνον νομίζει ἢ λοιπῶς φίλων κοινωνίας, τῆς τοῖς ἀρχαίοις ἢτοις εὐθράπτως καὶ τοῖς ἀρχαίοις παραλείπεται...

Isocrates Addr. to Demonicus 1. 25. ... δοκίματος τοῦ φίλου ἔστιν, πᾶς τοῖς δικοῖς λαμβάνον νομίζει ἢ μηδὲ τοῖς κοινωνίαις κοινωνίας...

Plato Epistle VII 337D. ... μηδὲ μὴ ἔσται ἀλλος κοινωνὼν παρακαλεῖν τοῦ μη πειθόμενον τοῖς νῦν ἐπεσταλμένοις.

Demosthenes Ag. Pantaenetus 37. 10. ... ἢ καὶ τῶν ἐργασίων καὶ τῶν ἐπιμελείας ἔγει τῷ Εὐθυγραμ...
Demosthenes Ag. Phormio 34.8. Ἐξῆλθεν οὖν εἰς τὸν δοῦλον, ἐξω ἐπιστέλλειν παρ' ἐμοῦ ἅμως ἅμως, ἀδεξῶν ἀπευθευτέρως τῷ παιδὶ τῷ ἐμῷ παραχισθοὺς ἵνα εἰς καὶ κοινωνίας τινι...

Demosthenes Ag. Phormio 34.36. καὶ δὲ ἵνα δοθησαι κοινωνίας τούτη ἄντι τῶν δισταρίων.

Demosthenes Ag. Phormio 34.38. Φορμίων οὖν τούτων χρόνεφος κοινωνίας καὶ μάτηρι μετατέθηκεν ἐς τὰ χρήματα ἑαυτῆς...

Demosthenes Ag. Laenitus 35.16. ...καὶ ἀρξάμενος ἐμπρός εἰπεν καὶ κοινωνίας τοῦ Αριστεροῦ, καὶ λόγους οἰκονομίας ταῖς πιθανοῖς ἔλεγεν...

Demosthenes Ag. Timotheus 49.31. ἐπιθέουσας δὲ τῶν Φορμίων καὶ κοινωνίας καὶ κοινωνίας καὶ κοινωνίας...

Demosthenes Ag. Callipus 52.3. ...λέγων δὲι κοινωνίας εἰς αὐτοῦ καὶ καιροῦ καὶ οἴκου σωτερίας γενοῦ...

Demosthenes Ag. Dionysiodorus 56.1 Κοινωνίας τινι τοῦ δανείαμας τούτου, ὥς ἄνδρες ἐκκαθαρίσατε.

Demosthenes Ag. Dionysiodorus 56.5 Διονυσίδωρος γὰρ ὁ ὅπως, ὥς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, καὶ ὡς κοινωνίας αὐτοῦ Παρμυνίκου...

Demosthenes Ag. Dionysiodorus 56.7 Διονυσίδωρος θ' ὁ ὅπως καὶ ὡς κοινωνίας αὐτοῦ Παρμυνίκου...

Demosthenes Ag. Dionysiodorus 56.9 ...εὐθὺς ὅπως ἀποστέλλει τινι εἰς τὴν Ρωδίαν ἀπαγγέλλων τῷ Παρμυνίκου τῷ κοινωνίᾳ τανίσκει...

Demosthenes Ag. Dionysiodorus 56.10 πέρας δὲ ὅπως, λαβὼν γὰρ τῷ Παρμυνίκου δὲ τοιοῦτος κοινωνίας τοῖς δράμαμας τῷ παρδάι τοῦτον ἀποστάλλει...

Demosthenes Ag. Dionysiodorus 56.11 ...ἐκδότας αὐτῷ καὶ διότι κακοκοινωνίας τῆς διαφοράς τῆς εἰς τὴν Ῥωδίαν...

Demosthenes Ag. Dionysiodorus 56.24 ὅπως ὧς ἄνδρες Ἀθηναῖοι, ὥς τῶν ἡμῶν ἐμψυχῶν ὁμοίως ὅπως τὴν κύρια Ῥωδίας καὶ κοινωνίας ἔφικε...

Demosthenes Ag. Dionysiodorus 56.42 ὅπως διὰ τούτον καὶ τὸν κοινωνίαν αὐτοῦ...

Demosthenes Ag. Dionysiodorus 56.45 ἐλευθερίας Διονυσίδωρος τοῦτον καὶ τῷ κοινωνίᾳ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνης ὁμοίως...

Demosthenes Ag. Ophnus III.29.20. προσκαλοῦομεν καὶ Δήμανος εἰς μαρτυρίαν, ὡς ὧς αὐτῷ θείου καὶ κοινωνίας τῶν ἐκκοκλήματων, καὶ συγκρατήσας τὸν ἕκλεισον μάρτυριν...
Demosthenes Ag. Meidias 21.120. ...ἀν δ’ ἐπεξῆ, λέσποι τὴν τάξιν, φόνον κοινωνί, δει μ’ ἀναπαύειν.

Demosthenes Ag. Timocrates 24.159. ἦμαι δὲ καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐκείνων πεπολιτευμένων ἐμας μικρὰ ἠθέτων ἐσεῖν ἰκουσκεί, καὶ τούτων τιούται, ὥσπερ κεκοιμημένην οὕτως καὶ δὲ τούτων οὖδὲν ἤτον ἐκεῖνον δικαίως ἄν μισοῦσι.

Demosthenes Ag. Timocrates 24.177. διῆρεθε δ’ ἐπὶ ταύτα προσείλετο τούτων τῶν πανευμ. τῶν μακρων κοινωνίων.

Demosthenes Ag. Conon 54.33. ἐμπότει δ’ οὖν τούτων καὶ πολλῶν τούτων ἐρωμ. κοινωνίων, εἰκότως τὰ τρειδ. μεμαρτυρόκατιν.

Demosthenes Ag. Conon 54.37. ἢ οἱ κεκοιμημένωτες τοιαῦτα καὶ τοιαῦτας φιλαπεχθήμορον καὶ ποιήσας ἢ διακαθέτοις καὶ ὑπερεῖς;

Demosthenes Ag. Macartatus 43.30. ... συνομολογοῦντας δ’ οὕτως ἔχων τοὺς κοινωνίας, ἢ δὲν ἀλλήλους συνεχώνοντας καὶ ἀποτελεσμένους καὶ ἐπαθοῦσιν καὶ τὴν ἀποδομήν τῆς Ὀλυμπιϊδώρου τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς πρὸς τοὺς τοῦτοι ζῷο ἀπειλοῦσιν.

Plato Leges 699D. Ἐστι ταύτα, ὡς Ἀχιλλῆς ἰτιο χρόνῳ γενόμενα, κοινωνίων τῆς τῶν πατέρων γενοῦτα φύσει, δίκαιον λέγειν.

Demosthenes Ag. Theocrines 58.40. ... μικρῶν δὲ διαλεπόσιν τοῖς αὐτῶς τοῦτοις συνδεκατιμένωσι καὶ τῶν αὐτῶν ἐρωμ. κοινωνίων.

Demosthenes Ag. Eubulides 57.28. ... ξεμυγάζουσαν ἐς τὰ πατέρα ποιήμα, ἢν δοσιμένης εἰς τὸ γενός κοινωνίας...

Demosthenes Ag. Macartatus 43.79. ... ἀπαντήσεως οὖσα, κοινωνίας τοῦ μνήματος τοῦτοι, ὃ δὲ τούτωι πατήρ Ἕλκοτάτου καὶ ὃ πάππος ὁ σοὶ κοινωνίκαι τούτου...

Xenophon Oeconomicus III.15. ... γυμνῶς δὲ γυμνάκα κοινωνίων ἐμμεθνήν οἰκῶν οὔσαν πάνω ἀνατρόπου ἐτύχει τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπὶ τῷ ἀριστοδέν.

Xenophon Oeconomicus VI.3. ὁ δ’ ὑμῖν ἂν ντελεπίστην, ἔφη δ’ ἡμῖν θυτίτις, ἡμῖν θυτίτις, ὁ λοιπός εἰς τοῖς χρημάτισις κοινωνεμένοις ἀναμερίσθως ἐξελθεῖν...

Xenophon Oeconomicus VII.11. ... βουλευούσις δ’ ἔχωμεν ὁπερ ἔμοι καὶ σοὶ γονεῖς ὁπερ σοὶ τῖν, ἐκ τῶν κοινωνίων ἠθέτησον οἴκοι τε καὶ τεχνῶν λύσαμεν, ἐξαίτο τε ἐξελέξαμεν καὶ σοὶ γονεῖς ὁπερ ἐπί σοι γονεῖς ὁπερ σοὶ καὶ τῶν ὁμοτ ν ἐμῖς.
Xenophon *Oeconomicus VII.13.* ἠλεία ἔκεινα δεῖ ὑπὲρ τὸν κατὰ τὴν συνοπτικὴν φιλοσοφίαν, οὗτος οὖσα πλέον ἄρα ἀλλάζεται.

Xenophon *Oeconomicus VII.18.* ὡς οὖσα δεῖ ἀπελευθερώθην τῇ ἑαυτῷ ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ.

Xenophon *Oeconomicus VII.30.* συνεπειταί δέ, ἐν ἔργον φάναι, καὶ ὁ νόμος αὐτῇ συμπεράνων ἄνθρωπα καὶ ἰδιωτικὰ, καὶ κοινωνίας διαφέρει τῶν τέκνων ὁ θεὸς ἐποίησεν, οὗτος καὶ ὁ νόμος τοῦ ὁλου κοινωνίας καθίστησι.

Xenophon *Oeconomicus VII.42.* ὡς προσφέρα ἐγινομένη ὦν ἥν καὶ ἐμοὶ κοινωνίας καὶ παιδίον ὁλου βάλλον ἀμένων γεννητέρας τοῖς αὐτοῖς καὶ πιστικά ἐν τῷ ὁλοκληρωθέντι.

Xenophon *Oeconomicus IX.3.* Ἐπεὶ μοι ἔριν, ὡς γυναῖκας, ποτέρως ἐν μὲ κρίνεις ἐξισοφίλητας μᾶλλον εἶναι χρημάτων κοινωνίας, ὑν ὀφι ἄρα τῇ ὁστῇ ἀποδεικνύομι...

Xenophon *Oeconomicus X.5.* Ποτέρως ἕν ὁδὲ ἐρωτᾷ ἔτι, τὸν σώματος ἐνιακήν εἰναι ἐξισοφίλητας μᾶλλον κοινωνίας...

Isocrates *To Nicocles III.40.* ἦς δὲ καὶ τῶν τοιούτων πολλἡν κακῶν ἐνεφεύγοντες, ώστε γυναῖκας λαβόντες καὶ κοινωνίας ποιήσαμεν παντὸς τοῦ βίου μὴ στέργοντες, οἷς ἀρχαῖοι, ἄλλα τὰ ἐν τούτω ἄθρωπος λυπουσι παῦσαν ὅτι καὶ ἀυτοὶ ἀναγκασθῆτε, καὶ περὶ τῶν ἐν κόσμῳ τινὸς κοινωνίας ἐπιστεῦσι σφᾶς ἄλογος παρέχουσι, ἡ ὁδὸς πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας ἡξαμαρτληθοῦσιν...

*Constit. of Lacedaemonians I.9.* ὥστε τῷ μὲν γένους καὶ τῆς δυναμικῆς κοινωνίας, ἔως ἃ εἰ τοῖς χρηματίσω ὁκὶ ἀνεπιθυμεῖται.

Isocrates *Ag. Stephanus II.46.17.* ἡς τῆς γυναῖκας ὁσίας τῆς ἀνὴρ καὶ εἰναὶ παιδίων εἰς τῇ κοινωνίας ἀξέρθο ἄμερθα.
APPENDIX II

GREEK TEXTS FOR CHAPTER IV

Plutarch De Def. Orac. 423D. εἴσιν δὲν ἐκτὸς ἑξεργαὶ θεοί καὶ κόσμοι, πρὸς οὓς ἔχει ταῖς κοινωνίαις ἄφεσις...

Plutarch De Def. Orac. 415A. ἔμοι δὲ δοκοῦσι πλείους λυπηλ καὶ μείζονας ἀπαρίστα τοῦ τῶν φανέρων γένος ἐν μέσῳ θεών καὶ ἀνθρώπων τρόπον τινα τὴν κοινωνίαν ἥμων συγάγων εἰς τάτο καὶ συνάπτου εἴη τοντε... 

Plutarch De Ser. Num. V. 566C. καὶ μὴ καλῶς διαμημονεύοντα ὁμοθέτας διακρίνατε καὶ ἄλλοις ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ τοῦ πάντοτε ἐν μέσῳ θεόν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐπεζεύγηται καὶ κοινωνίαν...

Plutarch De Def. Orac. 416E. ὅπερ οὖν ἀμφοτέρως ἐν κόσμῳ κοινωνίας καὶ ἄνθρωποι, ἐν ἀπόστασις τε ἡμῶν καὶ ἀποστασίς κοινωνίας...

Plutarch De Prim. Frig. 946F. . . . ἄλλα τὴν τῆς θερμάτητος καὶ φυγρότητος ἐν κόσμῳ κοινωνίας καὶ ἄνθρωποι, ὑπάρχειν καὶ διασώζεται πάλιν...

Plutarch De Prim. Frig. 951D. χρήσις γὰρ ἐν ἀναπτύξει εἰς τὰ οἷα ἐπιστήμη. ἔχει ταύτας ἀκάθαρτοι ὡς ἀγαθοτοποιοί ἀλλὰ ἐνεκκαθαρίζει τινά δενν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ὡς ἀνασταθήναινος κοινωνίας καὶ ἕτερων καὶ συνεργάτης ἐν μέσῳ παρασκευής κοινωνίας ἔχουσι.

Plutarch De Pro. An. In Tim. 1036A. δὲ πάντως ὡς εἰς ἀναπτύξεις καὶ ἀνυποκοινωνίας ἐγκαθίσθη τοις πρὸς ἀλληλον καὶ οὐμερίας, ταύτας ἀρίθμησαν εἰς τῇ κοινωνίᾳ καὶ ταύτα, ἀρίθμου καὶ ἀρμονίας μετασχηματίζων...

Plutarch De Prim. Frig. 951D. ὡς τὸν φύσιν ἔχει λόγον ἀρχής, τῷ φερομένῳ τὰ πράγματα καὶ ὑποκοινωνίας ἀρχήν ἀρχής, ἀρμονίας ἄλλα τῶν ἀρχῶν καὶ μάχης ὀδοιπορικῶν.
Plutarch DeFac.inOrb.L.926E... ἄλλ' ἀκραίοι καὶ ἀστερροί καὶ, μονάδες αἱ τῶν ὅλων ἀρχαὶ, μὴ προσέπεσαν σύγκρισιν ἐκείνου πρὸς ἐκείνον μηδὲ κοινωνίαν...

Plutarch DeFac.inOrb.L.927A... ἐξ' ὥσπερ πέρικεν, ἐνδοξάται καὶ μεταβοῦν... ἀρμονίαν καὶ κοινωνίαν ἀπερμάτηται σοὶ παντὸς.

Plutarch DeFrat.Amor.478F, μᾶλλον δ' ὥσπερ ἐν ταύτῃ σώματι μιᾶς κοινωνοῦντα φύσεως καὶ τροφῆς τὰ δύο καὶ ἕτερα καὶ συναγωγὴ καὶ ἐρμαίνει τῇ ἄνοιξι καὶ συμφωνίᾳ τῇ ἁρίστῃ καὶ ἐκείνῃ κρατεῖν ἐμποίει καὶ ἀρμονίαν...

Plutarch DePrim.Frig.946E... ἑρμαίνει δ' ἐκεῖν ἄγοις ἀν κεραυνίμενα φυχρῶς ὑπομενεῖ, οὕποπερ ἀέραμα λευκῶς καὶ ἀφρόντον ὅσ' ἔλλαν ἀκόμη καὶ ἄλλα ἀκαθαρσίας ἔσχειν ἡ κοινωνία, τοίχῳ καὶ ἀρμονίᾳ ὑψαθμοῖς καὶ τῆς συμφωνίας καὶ ἀφρόντων προσφερέσθαι πολλὰς καὶ φιλονόμους γενεάς.

Plutarch DePrim.Frig.951DE... καὶ ταύτην εἶλαφεν δ' ἄνρεπον καὶ με τῷ κεραυνίων ἐω τῷ πρὸς τοῦ δόματος καὶ διαδόσεις ἐπέτρεπται καὶ ἀναγώγων, οὗτος δὲ δείκνυεν ὅτι δόματος ὅπερ φυχρῶς ἀλλὰ φυχρῶς καὶ ἐρμαίνεται μετακερασμὸς καὶ κοινωνία μαίνεται ἐν ἀυτῷ μιᾷ μέθοδῃ καὶ κοινωνίᾳ διευθετών καὶ δεχομένη τῶν ἐναντίων ἀκροτητάς.

Plutarch DePrim.Frig.946DE... καὶ ἐκεῖν ἐξεισάγεται μὲν ὅπως ἐστὶ μιᾷ πρὸς στερῆσθαι ὅπως ἐξεισάγεται δύναμις ὁδειμέναι τῶν ἐναντίων μιᾷν αὐτῇ στερήσθαι ἐπιδόσαν ὅπως ποιεῖ καὶ ἀρμονίαν τῶν ἐναντίων ἀνακαταστατίκα.

Plutarch An.anIgn.Util.956E... ποὺ μὲν ὅπως ἐξεισάγεται εἰς δύον ὅπου τῇ δ' ἀυτῷ κοινωνίᾳ κρήσιμον, ὅπως ἐστὶ μετὰ πυρὸς ἀφελιμον.

Plutarch DeFac.inOrb.L.924D... ἐστὶ τῶν ἐνεργῶν ὑπὲρ τῆς <γυν> τῆς μεταφορᾶς πρὸς τὸν κόσμον, ἀλλὰ πρὸς τὴν γυνὴν κοινωνίαν τίνος καὶ συμφωνίας τοὺς ἀποσαμένους αὕτης εἶναι παλίν καταφερομένους.

Plutarch DePlac.Philos.886E... οὔ μὲν γὰρ ὁμολογεῖν τοὺς ἀνέγερτας κοινωνεῖν, ὁμολογεῖ γὰρ περιέχειν ἐν φύσις καὶ ἠπτικής.

Plutarch De An.Proc.inTim.1026Ε... οὔ δ' ἐνεργῇ κοινωνίας εἰς τοὺς καὶ ἐκείνους πρὸς τοὺς ἀνεγείρεσθαι τὴν γυνὴν κοινωνίαν τίνος καὶ συμφωνίας τοὺς ἀποσαμένους αὕτης εἶναι παλίν καταφερομένους.


Plutarch Plat. Quaest. 1004D. ὁ διαλογιστικὸς καὶ διανοητικὸς μαλάστη τοῦ θείου κεκοιμώμενην, ἢν τῶν θείων καὶ οὐρανίων θρησκευόμενον ἦν.

Plutarch Plat. Quaest. 1004C. ἠδείκτω ἐν τῷ Φαίδρῳ ἔρχεται τὸ τὴν τοὺς πεπραγμένους, ἐφεξήγη ἂν τὸ ἐμπραχθὲς, ὡς τὸς ἔρχεται, κεκοιμώμενον μαλάστη τῶν περὶ τὸ σωλή τοῦ θείου;

Plutarch Amatorius 763F. ἦν δὲ βουλευόμενα καὶ ἀρχὴν καὶ ἀριστοτέλες ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἐπὶ Πλάτωνος καὶ Σωκράτους ἀπὸ τοῦ Ἐλευθέρους ἐς τὴν Ἀκαδημίαν ἐπεξεργαζόμενος κατάγεται καὶ κεκοιμημένος εἰσαλεύει πολλάς συνωρίσις γιὰς καὶ κοινωνίας.

Plutarch Amatorius 758E. ἔσθε ἂν ἐπείναυν τῆς πνεύματος πληρωθὲν ἀνθρώπου δὲ τὸ φρονήσεως, δύνατο πολλὰς πάντως γυνώς ἐνδοξοσιώμος ἐνέμεναται μετοχή καὶ κοινωνία, θειοτέρας συνωρίσις.

Plutarch De Plac. Phil. 899E. Πλάτων ἦν τὴν ἀδικητὴν ἀποκρίνεται γυνώς καὶ συνωρίσις κοινωνίας πρὸς τὰ ἔκτοσ.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 626D. οὐ γὰρ ἀναπληρεῖθαι δεῖ θείας ὁ πάτερος κρατῆσθαι, ἐν τῷ ἐπὶ ἐνῆργον ἄνθρωπόν ἐστιν ἀριστοκρίτικον καὶ κοινωνίας, συναχθέντων μίαν ὀνοματοὺς ἀποτελεῖσθαι.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 626DE. πρὸς τὸ ἀναπληροῖ δὲ σε τὸ ἀναπληροῖ καὶ λεγεῖ καὶ πιθ呤ο διὸν ἀστερὸς διαρκὴς καὶ συμμετοχὴν ἐξίσου, ὥστε κοινωνεῖν καὶ συνεργεῖται διὰ τὴν ἀδικητὴν.

Plutarch De Anim. Proc. 1024D. ἡ κοινωνία κοινοῦ οὖν ἄνθρωπον ἄρα, τῷ ἀναπληροῖ καὶ τῷ μετοχῆς καὶ τῷ ομοιόμοιῳ ἑσπερῶν ἑποῦ καὶ ἀναπληροῖν ἑποῦ ἑποῦς καὶ ἐστὶν ἀστερός καὶ καταμεμημένος.

Plutarch De Virt. Moral. 450E. γὰρ καὶ συνεργαζώμενοι καὶ κοινωνεῖν παθῶν καὶ έκατόμπλος διαρκής παθεῖ ζωῆς οὐ δεδομένος εὖ εἰς τὸν καταμεμημένον.

Plutarch Cons. ad Apol. 1040C. ἐὰν γὰρ τὸ ἐπερῶστα ἀνθρώπον ὑπὸ τὸν τὸν καὶ άναπληρῖς κοινωνεῖς τὴν καταμεμημένος, ἐγὼ ἐστὶν ἔφημοι μεν γυνώς, νόσσοι καὶ κάθα μοῦλα ἴδων ἐκεῖθεν ἡμῖν ἐρπεῖ.
Plutarch Con. ad Apol. 108C. καὶ ἐν δὲ ἂν ἔκμεν ὀστὺς, ὡς ἐοικέν, ἐγκυτατὼς ἔσθεμα τοῦ εἰδέναι, ἐν ὁδεῖ τι καὶ, μάλιστα μηδὲν διαλέχεις τῷ σώματι, μηδὲ κοινωνῶμεν, δοκεῖ μὴ πάσα ἁνάγκη, μηδὲ ἀναπτυτώμεθα τῆς τούτου φύσεως...

Plutarch Con. ad Uxor. 611D. ... ὁδ' ὃς κακύπη σε, πιστεύειν ὧ πάτριος λόγος καὶ τὰ μυστικὰ σύμβολα τῶν περι τῶν Διόνυσον ἐργασίων, καὶ σύμφωνος ἀλῆλοις οἱ κοινωνοῦντες.

Plutarch De AnimProc. in Tim. 1027Αἐς ἀνυστῶν ἣν κοινωνίαν πρὸς ἀλήλων καὶ φίλων ἐργασίαν ὧν ἀριθμὸν καὶ ἀρμονία.

Plutarch Quaesit. Conv. 746A ... ἔτυγχοσι δὲ λόγου καὶ ψυχῆς, πειθός πολιτικὴς καὶ κοινωνικῆς συνεργὴν ἐπισχύσασθαι παραπλημίσεων καὶ ᾐσθανόσθαι τοῦ ταραχῶδες καὶ τὸ πλαγώμενον ὧσπερ ἐς ἀνοδίας ἀνακολούθην ἐπιτικῶς καὶ καθίστασθαι.

Plutarch De Soller. Anim. 962D. ... ἡπεὶ δειγματίκες ἔστε πολλὰ κοινωνίας καὶ ἀνδρείας καὶ τοῦ πανόρου ἐπιτικῶς, τοῦ πορισμοῦ καὶ τῶν ἑκονομίας...

Plutarch De Soller. Anim. 966Β. καθόλου δὲ ἢπεὶ δὲ ἂν ὁι ψυχοφοροὶ δεικνύσασι τὸ γεγονός ἐν αὐτῷ προβῆσον εἰς, καὶ παρασκευαζεῖς καὶ μηνιαῖοι καὶ πάθη καὶ τεκνών ἐπιμέλειαι καὶ χαρίτες ἐν παθώματος καὶ ἀνθρώπιναι πρὸς τὸ διμήνων, ἢπεὶ μὴ εὑρέσσας τῶν ἄνθρωπων, ἐμφάνεις ἀρέτης, οἷον ἀνδρείας κοινωνίας ἐχαρατείας μεταλλοφροσύνης...

Plutarch De Soller. Anim. 967D. ... ἢν οὐκ ἦν πολὺς τὸ κοινωνικὸν...

Plutarch De Soller. Anim. 972B. Τοῦ τοῦ κοινωνικοῦ μετὰ τοῦ συντότου τοὺς ἔλεγχος ἀποδεικνύοντο φησίν δ' Ἰόβας.

Plutarch De Soller. Anim. 972C. οὐχ ἦτον δὲ κοινωνικὸ τὰ τῶν λεοντῶν.

Plutarch De Soller. Anim. 975Ε. ἢ δὲ οὐκ ἔκλαυσα μικρὰ κατίδευν καὶ φλίσχρα διδὼς, τὸν δὲ πλείστων κατακαλύπτει ἐνεσθεῖς καὶ τρόφος ἐπιθέσεις τοῦ καὶ φυλακὰς ἀλληλῶν, ἐν ὁδ' ἀληθῶς καὶ συνέσεως ἐπὶ καὶ μνήμης καὶ κοινωνίας ἐγγυούμενα βλέπετε τῶν λόγων.
Plutarch De Soller. Anim. 977C. Ἰδίας ἰπτείκυνται μετά τοῦ συντελεῖν το κοινωνικόν καὶ το φιλαλλήλον, μετάπερ ἄνδικα καὶ σκάροι.

Plutarch De Soller. Anim. 977E. Ἀναστὰς δὲ ὅσα πολλὰ δείκυσι τῶν ἐνθάντων ἀπολείπομενα το κοινωνικόν καὶ συντελεῖ το σοφιστάτον εὐν χερσάιν. ἀλλὰ περὶ κοινωνίας ὑδέων τοῖς ζηταί ταχὰ λόγος.

Plutarch De Soller. Anim. 979E. Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ διὰ τὴν κοινωνικὴν τοις ὕφεικε, καὶ φιλαλλήλου χαράποις ἐκείνων ὑπεθέντες οὕτως ἐπι ἠκρὸν ἠκουσί τοῦ μαθηματοῦ.

Plutarch De Soller. Anim. 980Α. Τῶν δὲ ἡλίων χειρῶν ὡς χαίρει καὶ ἢ κοινωνικῆς, καὶ ὅλην ἀκολογίαν ὅμως ἢν τίς ἐν ὑποτελεῖ τὸν ἀριθμὸν, ἀλλὰ ἐμφανῶς ἢπεῖ ἡς καὶ ὡς καὶ ἵδιον κοινωνίας ἀπὸ καὶ συμβεβηκείς ἰτέον.


Plutarch De Soller. Anim. 981Β. ὅπως συνεργοῖς παρασύμφωνοι παρακαλέσας ἀπείτησι· Ἀριστοτέλης ἤστερεί φιλαρχοὺς τιμητικοὺς καὶ ἀρρενίδοι τῶν κοινωνιῶν ἀρχηγῶν ἐφαρμοσάτο ἐν τοῖς ὑποτελεί ἢ πόλεων, ὥστε καὶ ἱερωνοῦσαι καὶ διακαλείσαι τοὺς ὑποτελεῖς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἐστι καὶ ἐξευθέντες ἔρξεν οὐκ ἐν μελέτησι πιθανὸν καὶ παλαιάς ἔχον, ἐξερεύνερας ἐν καθ' ἄλλας ἐξερεύνης στοιχείας ὑπερβαίνεις ἔστιν.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 704Ε. ὅπως ἡ δε μὲν ἡ Ἀριστοτέλης ἀριθμοὶ ὑποτελεῖς τὰς ἑρείας, καὶ ἀκρασίας ἐπιπλήθης ἀπολογεῖται. ἀκρασίας, ἡ δὲ ἀνδρομικὴ ὑποτελεῖς, τοῖς ἀναλλακτικῶς καὶ τῇ ὑποτελεῖς ἐχοντα ξρῆσαι καὶ κοινωνιῶν.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 728Α. ὅπως ἢς ἡ δεινοτάτης ἐστι, μόνα τῆς συντελείας μεῖναι καὶ ἀρµοδιῶς ὑποτελεῖς, ἰτέον ἑκατοντὼν οὕτω ἔφεστε άνδρος οὖσας ἀκρασίας καὶ τῇ ἑρείας πυρὸς ἔχονθα αὐτοὺς καὶ κοινωνίας, καὶ ἐφεστὶν...

Plutarch Life of Pompey 633E. καὶ θηρία διάλεις κοινωνοῦντα προσέρχεται εἰκὸνες ὑποτεύχη τοῖς ἐξ ξύρινῳ καὶ χαλέπῳ... 

Plutarch De Soller. Anim. 963A. Ἄλλως ἀναμαθτὸν ἴσον, ἀνθρώπος εὐθαφεῖ καὶ ζύγωνοι καὶ τοὺς πρὶς δικαίωσιν καὶ κοινωνίαν διαμέτρει τῶν ἕρων.

Plutarch AnVirt. Doc. Pos. 439E... ὦκιον ὃς καὶ πόλεις καὶ γῆς καὶ βλού ἄρχεις κοινωνίαν ἀνακλητὸν ἐνδέχεται χειρασθαὶ μὴ μαθόντων ξύρινα χρὴ τρόπον ἀλλήλοις συμφέρεσθαι;

Plutarch AnVirt. Doc. Pos. 439E. εἶτα παραφώνοις μὲν ἐς καὶ κυκλικῶν οὐκ ἐπὶ κοινωνίαν ἐπιδείξομαι ἐν μὲριδίῳ τις ἐκ παθῶν ἀρχάμανοι...

Plutarch Comp. Aris. et M. Cat. 354A. Οτὲ, μὲν οὖ καὶ τῆς πολιτικῆς ἀνθρώπων ἀρχῆς ὥστε καὶ μαθήτα τελειωτέρων ἀλμυροφόρων ἔστιν ὥστε ὡς ὁ μέριον οἱ πλείστοι τίνι οἰκονομικῆς οὐ μικρὰν τίθεντοι καὶ γὰρ οὐκ ἔχουσιν τί σύστημα καὶ κεφάλαιαν ὡς ἰσοπονεῖ εἴτε ὡς συνοισία τοῖς ἵδιοις ὑπὸ τῶν πολιτῶν εὐθειοντων...


Plutarch Life of Brutus 989F. Ἐγώ, Βρούτε, κάτων ὡς καὶ συγκεκριμένοι καὶ θείας μεθέξουσα καὶ ἐπιστέφας μόνος, ἀλλὰ κοινωνία μὲν ὄρθον εἶναι, κοινωνίας δὲ ἀναίρειν.

Plutarch Coniug. Praec. 140A. τὴν γυναίκα οὐδὲν ἱδιον πάσοις ἐχεῖν ἀλλὰ κοινωνεῖ τῷ ἀνδρὶ...καὶ παιδίας καὶ συνοισίας γέλασιν.

Plutarch Coniug. Praec. 140A. Οὶ τὰς γυναίκας μὴ ἤδεις βλέποντος ἔφθασεν μετὰ αὐτῶν διδάσκουσιν ἔνιοτε λασθαὶ μόνας ἔγχορες, ἀλλὰς οἱ μὴ συμφόρος ἐλκυοῦς ταῖς γυναιξὶ μὴ πάντοις κοινωνοῦντες αὐτὰς καὶ γέλασις ἱδιάς ἡδονὰς ἐκεῖνοι αὐτῶν ητείν διδάσκουσιν.

Plutarch Coniug. Praec. 140B. τὴν γυναίκα τοῖς τοῖς... ἀνδρῶν συμμαθητεῖν καὶ τοῖς ἀνδρῶν τοῖς τοῖς γυναικοῖς... ἑν... ὡσπερ οἱ δεσπότες κατὰ τὴν ἐπιλαμβάνειν εἰκόνα ὁι ἀλληλῶν ἐμφάνισαν, ἀλλὰς ἐκεῖθεν τὴν εὐνοιαν ἀντίστροφον ἐπιδιδόντος ἔτοι κοινωνία σφίγγεται ὁ ἀνδρὶ.
Plutarch Coniug. Praec. 140F. τοιούτη τοιν καὶ χρωμάτων κοινωνία προσήκει μάλα ταῖς γυναικείαις εἰς μίν όνταν πάντα κατάξασθαι καὶ διανέμεσθαι καὶ τὸ μέρος ἄλλοτε ἀλλὰ πᾶν ἱδίον ἔχεσθαι καὶ μηδὲν ἀλλοτριόν.

Plutarch Coniug. Praec. 145E. ἦν γὰρ λόγων χρησιμῶν ἐπίμαχα μὴ δεχώνται μηδὲ κοινωνίας παιδείας τοῖς ἀνδράσιν, αὐτοὶ καὶ ἀυτῶν ἐπίπτουσα πολλὰ καὶ φανερῶς διευθύνονται καὶ πάθος λυώνται.

Plutarch Coniug. Praec. 138BC. ... ἐκ κατάδουσα τοὺς εἰς βίον κοινωνίαν συνίστασθαι εἰς ταύτα πράξεις τε παρεχεῖ καὶ χειροθεῖς ἄλλοις.

Plutarch Amatorius 770C. ... καὶ συμμετέχεις ἐκλέγεις ἐξομιλήσωμεν, ἐρωτῶν καταθεικαί, πάντας πίστεως κοινωνίαν πίστεως ἤτοι καὶ προδύνως συνυποδημοῦσας.

Plutarch Amatorius 768D. ... ἡμινάλημνη γὰρ ἐπερ σοι εἰς κακίστων ἄνδρώπων, σοι μὲν βίου τοῦτον δὲ θυμάτου κοινωνίας ἦταν γενομένη.

Plutarch De Soller. Anim. 980AB... οὗ ἐν Αἴενει κατοίκην εἰςτεκενό διερμόνα, καὶ διαπορεύσα ποὺς ἀπεράνταθαν καὶ προσέθη τὸν ἄνδρα κοινωνίας αὐτή ἐπὶ ἔτερον γεγένησαν.

Plutarch Quaest. Roman. 263EF. ... εἰν οὐδεν ἀπολειπτεῖν καὶ κοινωνίζεσθαι αἰτάσῃ τούς, ἡς ἀλλού ἡμεῖς ἡ πυρός καὶ ὄθατος μελλωσι κοινωνεῖν ἄλλοις;

Plutarch Quaest. Roman. 271Ε. ... Αἰεὶ τὰ τοῦ κόσμου εἰςγάνωνες ἐλέην καλεῦσον ποὺς σὺ Γαίος, ἐξει Γαία; ποτὲ τὸν ὕστερον ἐπί τῆς προς εἴσες ἐκδοσει τῷ κοινωνεῖν αἰτάτως καὶ συνάρχειν.

Plutarch Amatorius 757C. ... τὰ δὲ φιλητικῶν καὶ κοινωνικῶν καὶ συνεργαιτικῶν...

Plutarch Amatorius 757D. ... πόθεν τὸ γάμου καὶ φιλοσοφεῖν εἰς ὑποκρισίαν καὶ κοινωνίων τελευτώσεις ὁδεῖς ἡμῶν μάρτυς ὡς ἐπίσκοπος ὀδόν ἱκεσίων ὑπὸ κουράξεις ἡμῖν γέγονον;

Plutarch Amatorius 769F. ... καὶ τῶν > ἀλλῶν συμπληρώσουν ταῖς καὶ Ἐπίκουρον δημιοῦ καὶ περιπλοκώς ξέκει, οὐκραυγεῖς λαμβάνοντα καὶ ἀποπληθήσεις ἐνόπητα δὲ οὐ ποτὲ τοιοῦτον, οὐκ ἔρως ποτεί γαμήκης κοινωνίας ἐπιλαβομένος.
Plutarch Amatorius 752C. ... τοῖς γάμοις ἀνέρατον 
ζητήμων καὶ άνωρον ἐνθέου φίλοχος κοινωνίας...

Plutarch Conjug. Praec. 145D. Παίδων μὲν γὰρ οἰδεμία 
ποτὲ λέγεται ποιήσαι διὰ κοινωνίας ἀνδρός...

Plutarch Life of Artaxerxes 1020B. θαλάκτικα καὶ τεκνών 
κοινωνιών ἐπὶ βασίλεια τροφοδίων.

Plutarch De Soller. Anim. 962A. τὴν χοῦν πρὸς τὰ ἔργον 
φιλοστραγγίαν ἄρχην μὲν ἀκόι κοινωνίας καὶ δικαιοσύνης εἰσεῖσθε...

Plutarch Con. ad Uxor. 608C. ἰδίᾳ δὲ καὶ αὐτῇ 
τασσόμενοι καὶ τεκνών ἀναστραφής κοινωνήβασι, πάντων 
ἐκτεθραμμένων ἵκοι δὴ αὐτῶν ἡμῶν...

Plutarch De Frat. Amor. 485C. ... ἀλλὰ τῶν καλῶν 
pάντων κοινωνιῶν ἀποφθέγματι καὶ χρώμανος παρόντι καὶ 
περιμένων ἁποντα...

Plutarch De Frat. Amor. 486D. οὖν ἀποτείχε τιν 
τῶν ἐπιθυμίας τρεπομένα καὶ τοῖς φιλοστραγγίας τῶν 
ϊδελροῦν τοὺς ἐργονίων ἔνθης καὶ συνάθρως κοινωνίων 
μὴ περικοτὰς, οὕτως θεραπεύων εὐθερφοῦσι 
ἀλλήλους ἀλλὰ μὴ λυπώσι.

Plutarch Χ Orat. Vitae 835D. ... τοῦ πατρὸς ἡδὴ 
tετελευτηκότος, ὡς κοινωνιῶν τοῦ κληροῦ, ἐτῆ κελονός 
pενεκκειδέκα...

Plutarch Life of Theseus 5A. οὐκὼν ἐκός εἰσιν 
τῷ κακίστῳ τῶν ἀριστούς εἰς κοινωνίαν χένους ἐχθεῖν, 
τὰ μέγιστα καὶ τιμίωτα λαμδάνοντας καὶ οἰκάνοντας.

Plutarch Life of Lycurgus 494A. ... ἐν καλῷ κατασταθέ 
μὴν μὲν καὶ ἀταξίαν πλαύν εἰρρέων ἀπὸ τοῦ χάμου 
παίδων δὲ καὶ τεκνώσεως κοινωνίαν τε 
καθαλίθων τῶν ὧν ἔμεικτο καὶ ἰκοινώνω 
καὶ μετειόνων οφείλει καὶ πολεμεῖς.

Plutarch Life of Lycurgus 76D. Τίς δὲ περὶ τοῦ 
χάμου καὶ τὴς τεκνώσεως κοινωνίας τὸ 
ἀνθρώπων ὀρθοῦ καὶ πολιτικοῦ ἐξουσίων ἀνθρώποι 
τοῖς ἀνθρώπων...

Plutarch Comp. of Lyco. Numa 76E. δὲ Δάκων, ἵκοι 
ἐνθγενεϊς εὑρίσκειν οὖς χρῆ ἄνθρωποι καὶ τοῦ ἄκουσ 
πρὸς τῶν ἐκ ἀρχής ὀμοίων, ὑπεθετήσω τὸν πεῖσαντι τῆς 
κοινωνίας εἰς τεκνώσιν.
Plutarch Life of Lycurgus 48F, ἦ δὲ τοιοῦτον αὐνόδος ὁ μόνον ἑγκρατειας καὶ σωφροσύνης ἄσκησις ἦν, ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοῖς τε ἄσωμαι χαοῖμοις καὶ τοῖς φιλεῖν ἐκι ἑκατοντάκις καὶ προσφέρωμα ἦτεν ἐπὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν, οὗ [δὲ] διακορεῖς ὧν ξενίζομεν τοῖς ἄνδρες κοινωνίας ἀλλὰ διέ τι λείψανον καὶ ὑπεκκαμα πόδου καὶ χαρίστος ἐπολείποντος ἀλλοιοῖς.

Plutarch Life of Cato Min. 771A. ἐπιθυμῶν δὲν τοῦ Κάτωνι μὴ συνῆθες δέδω χήρας μόνον, ἀλλὰ ἀμώς ἐκ τῶν τε οἰκείωτητα καταμαθῆς καὶ κοινωνίαν πάντα τῶν ὁδῶν καὶ ἐκ γένεω.

Plutarch Life of Cato Min. 771B. Κοινουμένους δὲ τοὺς διάδοχος ἀξιοῖς ἀναφερεῖ τήν τε θετηθήν ἀφθονον ποιεῖν καὶ πολύμετρον τοῖς γένειη.

Plutarch Life of Cato Min. 771C. εἶ δὲ πάντως περιηχεῖτο τῆς γυναικὸς ὁ Βυβλὴς ἀποδείγειν εὐθὺς τεκοῦσαν, οἰκείωτέρας αὕτη τε βυβλική καὶ Κάτωνι κοινωνία πάλιν γενομεν.

Plutarch Life of Cato Min. 771D. Ἀποκρινόμενον δὲ τοῦ Κάτωνος ὁς ὑπερτινὶ μὲν ἄγατα καὶ δοκιμάζει κοινωνών οἰκείωτητος ... Plutarch Amatorius 759F. Ἕτι δὲ μάλλον κάκει δὲν ἀνυποκοίμησι πολλοί γὰρ ἄφροδισίων ἑκείνως ἐκοινωνησαν, ὃ μόνον ἑκατοντάς ἀλλὰ καὶ γυναῖκας προσφερέων.

Plutarch Life of Pompey 656F. ἦ μὲν χαρί γενομένη συνέχεις καὶ τὸ Ἀπολλώνιος φίλτρα καὶ γάμος ἑκείνως εὐθὺς ἦν ἀπαρχή καὶ ὑποτετα κοινωνίας ἐπὶ χρείας συνειονένης διηρύματα, φιλίαις δὲ ἄλλωσι σε υπεισέχει.

Plutarch Life of Pompey 642D. τῶν δὲ ἔνδοτων πρὸς τὰς γυναῖκας ὁ, Κάτων ζήσει, τῶν οἰκείων κοινωνητῶν οἰκείωτος Πομπηίου γενομένης.

Plutarch Life of Cato Min. 774F. ἐπιτέλος δὲν τοῦ Κάτων ἐπὶ τὰς γυναῖκας δὲ τοιούτων ἴνα γενομένη, καὶ ἀναπτύπωσα προμηθεύων ἀνάγκη Πομπηίων συναφθέντα δι' οἰκείωτητος ... Plutarch Sept. Sap. Conv. 158F. ἡγούμενοί ... δὲ κοινωνεῖν ἁναίρεσιν τινα τινα ὃηρα ὁ πολιτικός ...
Plutarch De Amic. Mult. 96D, ... τοίς δὲ συγγενεῖι καὶ οἰκείοις ὑκοπαθεῖ κεραννύμενα καὶ προσίται τὴν κοινωνίαν λείως καὶ μετ' εὐμενείας ...

Plutarch Amatorius 769A. ἄλλα γυναικεῖς γς καὶ γυναικεῖς ἀρχαί ταῦτα φίλας, ὅσπερ ἑρῶν μεγάλων κοινωνήματα.

Plutarch Life of Numa 62B. δὴ στι τὸ μεγαλύτερον ἢ μεγηντά τὴν ἑαυτὴν ἀνταποδίωσιν κοινωνεῖν.

Plutarch Life of Numa 62B. ὡς δὲ καὶ σωμάτων ἀνθρωπίνων καὶ ψυχῶν ἐστί τοι ὅλου καὶ ὑπομονὴν κοινωνίας καὶ χάρις, ἐπὶ ἄλλος καὶ ταύτῃ πεσοῦναι.

Plutarch De Stoic. Repug. 1052B. κατὰ τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον καὶ τις νομίζοντες δυσσώμενοι κενέσεως κε καὶ φθορὰς κοινωνεῖν.

Plutarch Amatorius 752A. εἰ δὲ ὡς φησὶν Πρωταγόρας, διὸ ἐστὶν ἀφοδίσιμον παιδικήν κοινωνίαν, πῶς ἑρωτεύεσθαι ἕτερον καὶ παροῦσας ...

Plutarch Life of Lycurgus 51D. ἢ κοινώνουν δὲ οἱ ἐρωταί τοῖς τις δόξης ἐπὶ ἀμφότερα.

Plutarch Life of Alexander 692B. εἰ δὲ τῷ τότε Χρόνῳ Μακεδόνων ὄνομα Δίμανος ἐπὶ Χαλκάστρας ζῇ Διοδοῦς Ἀλέξανδρων. Νικόμαχον τίνα τῶν νεόν, πρὸς ὃν αὐτὸς ἐρωτικός ἦσεν, ἐπὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς πράξεως παρεκάλει.

Plutarch Life of Pelopidas 287D. ἔλεγεν δέ καὶ τὸν Ἰούλεον τοῦ Αρπάκλεος ἐρωμένον ὅν ὁ κοινωνεῖν τῶν ἄθλων καὶ παραπόζειν.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 708D. κοινωνίαν ἦρ ἐστὶ καὶ ἀποικίας καὶ παιδίας καὶ λόγων καὶ πράξεων τοῦ συμπόσιον.

Plutarch Sept. Sap. Conv. 158C. συνανατρέψασθαι γὰρ αὐτῇ ποὺ ἐστὶν ὑποδοχή ἀνθρώπου, φιλανθρωπίας καὶ πρωτα κοινωνήματα πρὸς ἄλλοις ...

Plutarch Sept. Sap. Conv. 158F. ἵνα ἢ μὲν ἐν μείωσιν, ἢ ὡς καὶ πρὸς ἄλλης ἀνθρώποις καὶ ταξινόμησις ἀφοδίσιμης, δε νυκτὰ καὶ πρὸς ἐπέβαλλαν ἄλλης ἐν ὑμῖν κοινωνεῖν ἄναλομοι τοι διότι δὲ καὶ οὐρίως, ἢς τὸ ὑπὸ κοινωνεῖν ἐκεῖνος.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 741A. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ καὶ νέως κοινωνεῖ μετα τῆς ἰδίας, εἰς τὸ καὶ θυμός ἔστιν ἄλλης ἀριστοκράτους.
Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 614E. οι δὲ τοιαύτη προβλήματα μαθητεύεις οὐδὲν ζην τῆς Αἰσθητικῆς θεράνω καὶ θάλαττας ἐπιτιμήσεροι πρὸς κοινωνίαν παντί. .

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 697D. . . . τοῦ θείπνου κοινωνίας καὶ φιλοφροσύνης ζητήσωσαν ἄει πολυμένους.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 726E. τὸ μὲν ἔν τε βίον φαίνεις καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας μαλακίδαι, καὶ ἐξοριῶς ἔναρξιν εἰπεῖν καὶ πάλαι ἐρωματοι συνείπετοντες τοῖς φίλοις.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 643A. οὐ γὰρ θείπνοι τοῖς φίλοις πάντως οὐδὲν καὶ ἐπιτυχοῦσι παρακαλεῖν εἰπεῖν κοινωνίας καὶ τραπέζης καὶ λόγων ἐν συνέργειον καὶ φιλοφροσύνης.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 707C. . . γνωρίμους αὐτῶν καὶ ἐπιτυχοῦσι παρακαλεῖν εἰπεῖν κοινωνίας καὶ τραπέζης καὶ λόγων ἐν συνέργειον καὶ φιλοφροσύνης.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 643B. . . ἀλλὰ καὶ τους ἓνως αὐτὸ πρὸς τὴν ἀπάντησιν κοινωνίας ἐκκαλεῖται τοὺς συνόντας, ὃς καὶ λόγω κοινῷ πρὸς ἀλλήλους καθωμεθα καὶ ὡς γαλατίαι τῷ τερπόντας καὶ ἀδηξῆς διωμὸς μετεχοῦσιν.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 643D. . . οὐ μόνον ἀμαρτίας ὑστέροις ἀλλὰ καὶ διοικοτικάς καὶ διοικοτικάς τῷ πάσαν σεβεσθαί κοινωνίας ἐν τιμῇ εἰδεμένων.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 643E. . . . τὰ δὲ Πινακικὰ ἰδίποτε διεποίησαν, ἐν οἷς ἥπας ἱδοινα ἐμάνυντο χαρά τράπεζαν οὐκ ἔγινεν τοῖς κοινωνεῖν ἀπάντησιν ἀλλήλοις.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 643E. ἐκείνῳ γὰρ ἦν οἷον ἀνάβασις καὶ συγκρασίας ἀλήθεις τούτο δὲ διαίρεσις καὶ συνοικίας τῶν φιλίτων εἶναι δοκοῦτον, ὡς μιᾶς ὑφοι κοινωνεῖν συνεμένων.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 718C. . . χειρὶ δὲ τούτῳ καὶ στις οὐδὲν. Ως μὲν ἀβυσσανής σιωπής παλιν διοικοτικάς ἀργάμενος ἐρπετός ἐξῆλθεν, μετὰ λογοῦ περὶ θεῶν ἐργασίας, ἐν τῶν πλατώνων γενεαλογίας αὐτῶν πλατώνα κοινωνοῦν παραδόθηκαν. ἐπί- σκεψιμοὶ δὲ τῶν λαβῶν γνώμην ἀπεφήνασκεὶν ἀξιότερεῖν τοῖς θεῶν.
Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 660Β. ἐ γὰρ ὀνομαστὸς ὅτι ὁ ἄνθρωπος καὶ ὅσιος καὶ ὁμοθέμματος μόνον, ἢ καὶ λόγων κοινωνίας ἢ καὶ παιδίας καὶ φιλοσοφίας ἢ εἰς εὔνοιαν τελευτάσας.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 643Ρ. ...οὖν [οὖν] οὕτως ὡς ἡ προτείνουσα κοινωνία δεῖται, φόβοι καὶ νόμοι καὶ ἀνθρώπους οὐ καίνην οὔτε ἐπεισδάκτον οὔτε δήκονθε ἔχουσα χρεῖαν.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 664Α. ὁ γὰρ καὶ ἡ Δικαίωσις σύγκει τὴν περὶ τῇ διέπεσα καὶ συμπάθειας κοινωνίας ἔφρασεν, οὕτως ἐκεῖνος ἔκακος ἢν οὔτε ἀνθελόθρον.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 679Α. οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τόπος ὑπάρχει καὶ παρασκευή, τὸ πλῆθος ἄνθρωπον πλῆθος φυλακτείρον, οὐς ἀντικείμεν τὴν συνοικίαν ποιεῖν καὶ ἀπροσήγκρον. οἶνου γὰρ ἄνελετο ἔτοι γει κακον ἢ λόγον κοινωνίας ἢ διείπου.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 679Β. λόγων δὲ κοινωνίαν ἀναφέρειν οὐκ ἐκείνοις εἰς τὰ τούτα συμφοροῦντες, καὶ λαβόντος ἄλλοις ὀυκ ἄλλοις συνείναι.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 618Α. ...οὔτε τὴν εὐνοίαν ἐκάστου ὑποτάσσειν ἄλλως τὴν ἔτερου πρὸς ἐτέρου σχέσιν καὶ ἀρμονίαν, ἀλλοτρίος ἄλλων εἰς μίαν κοινωνίαν παραλαμβάνομεν ὑπὲρ.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 709Β. ἐγὼ δὲ ὅσιος τῶν ἀδελφῶν φίλων οὐκ ἄρα καὶ ἦδεικαν αὕτως ἐλέησαι [ἐν δεινώσιμον] ἐπίζησιν ἐν ἐπίζησιν καὶ φιλοσοφίας ριθόλογος ὑπερθέασεν δύνατον δυνάμενος πάλαι ἐκείνον ἐμπειρήσας αὐτοῦ · ἐν προσοχήν καὶ κοινωνίας χρείαθαι.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 709Δ. ἐγὼ δὲ ἔρις καὶ συνῆθες οὐκ ἐστὶν ὑπακούστων, ἀλλὰ οὖν οὐκ ἐδιδάσκαλος τίνας ἀναλαμβάνω δυσίλα καὶ κοινωνίας λαμβάνον ἄλλον οὐκ ἔχωντος...

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 644Δ. ἐγὼ δὲ οὖν ἢ τούτων ἑδίστως ἐπίτροπτος καὶ κοινωνίαν...

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 615Α. ...ἐκεῖνοι δὲ παλιν ἐπὶ ὑπακούστων καὶ διηγήσατο φιλαράθον καὶ λόγως βασιλεύσοις καὶ ἐφοροῦσιν ἐμβάλλοντος ἐμαυτοὺς, ἀπέχει τὸν κοινωνίας τοῦ τελοῦς καὶ καθορίσται ἐπὶ Διονυσίου.
Plutarch De Tuedna San. 125A. Ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἔτηπεν προάγεται πολλάκις ἑρώτατι τοῖς περίβολοις καὶ σπανίοις, ὥστε ὑπὸ καίνος τῆς εὐκής δόξης ἀφούνως καὶ τοῦ οὖν κοινωνικῶν μιθ᾽ ἀδελφόν ἀναθέκες, δίπλα δ᾽ ἔχουσιν ἄλλος διήκεις ἐκεῖνος, ἀλλομενὶ θεὶς ἀπαλαύσεις τῶν οὖν ὀσοίς διαφορίστως καὶ περίτευ. 

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 634B. Ποιεῖ δ᾿ ἀλυπότερα τε ὁκάμματα καὶ τοῖς κοινωνίοις αμισογείσως τοὺς λέγοντας. 

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 741D. ἐὰν ἡ δὲ Δία φθορὰ συνέχει καὶ ἀκούειν τῆς ἐν οἷς κοινωνίας, ἀμμοσθενεῖς ἐπιτινέταις καὶ ἡλικταῖς οὕτως, ἀνδρὸς ἐν δίπλα τῷ βίῳ ὑπεκτείνει πιότος οἶνον. 

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 613E. καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἔλῃς τινὲς ἑοδοτεῖς παρὸδου, ῥήσεως ἐφανερώτας διερματίτων ἐν μέσῳ πολλῶν τῶν πεπαιδευμένων ἐπηρειλμάδωτοι, φθοράς τινος δὲ παντελῶς ἀνάφθεον παρ᾽ οὗ κοινοικήσονται. 

Plutarch De Virt. Moral. 45E. κοινωνίας γὰρ ἐστὶ τοῦ λόγου καὶ δυνατῶς τοῦ λέγοντος... 

Plutarch De Virt. Moral. 43D. τὸ δ᾽ ἐτερον προτείνοντος ἀκροαθεῖ τοὺς εὐκολίκως φιλόλογοι καὶ κοινωνικοί. 

Plutarch De Amic. Nunt. 96D. ἄλλα τοῖς ἀξίωσι τῆς κοινωνίας φιλάττευσιν τούτοις τοῖς συμβάς φιλεῖν καὶ κοινωνεῖν δυνασκόνται. 

Plutarch Quom. Adul. abAm. Int. 50E. γερέτε ἐκ τῆς πολλᾶς καὶ πολυπράγμοντας καὶ πράγμασιν ἑκεῖνος οἰκεῖς δεῖν καὶ λόγων ἀνάγκης δούλεται κοινωνία τεινεῖ, καὶ οὕτως τραγικός ἐστιν ὁ σατυρικὸς πιὰς ὑποκρίτης οὔτε καίνικος. 

Plutarch Life of C. Marc. Coriol. 225DK. γὰρ ἔχριστον πολλὰ πρὸς τούς οἰκεῖας ἐπιτινέται τοσοῦτον, διὰ τούτοις καὶ τοῖς κοινωνεῖν δίαιτας ἐπανέτερον ἐχώντες πρὸς αὐτῶς καὶ ἀνθρώποι πολλάκις τοῖς οἰκετέας ἐκεῖνοι τοῖς ὀσοίς ἀδικοῦντος.
Plutarch De Virt. Moral. 441A. κοινωνίας δὲ καὶ συμβαλλόντων διαλέγοι τοις πρὸς έκείνους δικαιοσύνη...
Plutarch Adver. Coloten 1125E. 
τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ συνεκτικὸν ἀπάγης κοινωνίας καὶ νοοθεσίας ἥρεσιν καὶ διαθήκην ὧν κύκλῳ περιόντες ὑπὲρ δοκητὴν καὶ δι' ἀρνητῶν, ἔρχαί τιν πρὸς τῶν κυριατέρων δοξῶν προσλατούσες εὐθὺς ἀνατρέπεταιν.

Plutarch Adver. Coloten 1127A. 
καὶ οὐ τοῦτο δεινὸν ἔστι, ὅτι τοῖς ὑπεύθυνοις φιλοσόφοις μόνοι οἴκεσθαι ἀκμαῖοι τοῖς ἐν τοῖς πάλαιν ἀγαθῶν κοινωνοῦσιν...

Plutarch Adver. Coloten 1108C. 
τὸ δ' ἐδ ἔτη ἐστὶ kοινωνίκως τὴν καὶ φιλικῶς καὶ συφρόνως καὶ δικαιώς.

Plutarch An. Sen. Sit Ger. 786C. 
ὅτι ὡς ἐπινοοῦμεν ἡλίκιος ἡδωνός αἰ ὠρείζα τοῖς κριμαῖοις ἀπὸ τῶν καλῶν πράξεως καὶ τῶν κοινωνικῶν ἐρωματικῶν καὶ φιλανθρώπων παράσκευα θουσίν, αὐτὸ καὶ ὄργανός ὁμοίως ὑποτασσόμενα, ὄποτε ἄυσ σάκρα δείῃ καὶ προσηνεῖς γινόμενος θετείς.

Plutarch De Fortuna 97E. 
... μᾶλλον δὲ τὰν τίτουλάν καὶ φρονησίν, ἐν μὲν ἡδωνάς άγαθῶς παραχεμένην ἐγκρίτεικαί καὶ συφρόσυνης καλούμενος ἐν δὲ κινδύνως καὶ πονίσ, κατερείς καὶ ἀνορμάθην ἐν δὲ κοινωνήμασι καὶ πολιτισμὶς εὐνοιακὰ καὶ δικαιοσύνην.

Plutarch De Stoic. Repug. 1038E. 
ἀναπέμπεῖ γὰρ ἄλλως τὴν δικαιοσύνην ἐκεῖνοι δὲ σφάλικα καὶ κατὰ τούτον ἡ κοινωνία φρονοὶς ἐστὶ καὶ ἀπολυμένη, δὲ χρηστοτείι καὶ φιλανθρωπία ξυρᾶν δίδωσιν.

Plutarch De Virt. Moral. 445E. 
... καὶ ὅτι τίνι μὲν ἡδομένων κοινωνεῖν ἐπιρηκτεῖ τῶν ἀμαρταμομένων ὅπου δ' ἀχδομένων...

Plutarch Aqua an Ign. Util. 957A. 
ἄριστον ὡς ἡμῶν ἴσω καὶ συμβολὸν ἐν τοῖς πρὸς τὸ στοιχεῖον συνήθες καὶ τέλειος ἐποίησε, διὰρθομένων ταῖς παρ' ἄλλων ἐπικουρίαις καὶ ἀντιδόξεια, κοινωνίαν δ' ἐργαλείων καὶ φιλίαν.

Plutarch Quaest. Conv. 703D. 
... ὡς ἐν οἱ φασίν, ἀλλὰ προσδιοριζεῖ τὸ εὐχαρίστει τοῖς ἡμῶν καὶ κοινωνικῶς ἐν τοῖς ἀνασθενέοις καὶ ἀφυκοῖς πρὸς ἄλλους.

Plutarch De Inv. et Odio 538A. 
... ὡς ύποτρίφεται συνενεργοί, ἐμὴ λουσαμένων κοινωνεῖν ὅποτε...

Plutarch De Latent. Viv. 1129B. 
tàν ὅτι τό ἕν τοῖς ἔν χυμίοις ἄνωθεν δικήν καὶ πράξεως ἐν τῷ θόκοις νόμων καὶ κοινωνικῶς καὶ πολιτείας, ἐν δὲ πολιτεία τῷ καλῶν ἄλλω μὴ τὴν χρείαν, διὰ τῇ λάβῃ βιώσας;
Plutarch, Praec. Ger. Rep. 796E. ...τον δὲ κοινωνικὸν καὶ
φιλόνθρωπον καὶ φιλότολον καὶ κοινωνικὸν καὶ πολιτικὸν ἀληθῶς...

Plutarch, Praec. Ger. Rep. 812D. ...οὗτος δὲ πραγμάτων
εὐρέοις εἰς πολιτειάς μεταδίδον τοὺς ἑνεργοτέρους ποιεῖ τὴν κοινωνίαν
τὴν πράξιν...

Plutarch, Praec. Ger. Rep. 819G. λάμβανε δὲ καὶ δίκαι
εὐνεχῶν καὶ προσβείας κοινωνίαν, ἃν ἤλεγχεν μη δύνατος ἂς, τὸν
φησιδικὸν ὡς Πελοπίδας Ἐπαμεινώνδαν.

Plutarch, AnSen. Sit Ger. 787E. ...ό τι καὶ φόνος δινομοχύνον
ην πλωταινοῦ καὶ ἑχολοῖς διακρούομενος
τὴν τῆς, πολιτείας καὶ προϊόνων ἡμία τὰς πράξεις τὰς κοινωνιὰς καὶ τὰς οἰκονομίας...

Plutarch, AnSen. Sit Ger. 792D. καὶ γὰρ τὸ φιλάνθρωπον
εἰς τοὺς ἄνθρωπος ἀποφράζουσα καὶ τὸ κοινωνικὸν καὶ τὸ
ἐθικήτων, ᾧν οὐδεμίαν εἶναι βεί τελευτήν ὧδ' ἐπέρασ.

ἐν πράγμα ν καὶ εὐνεχεῖς, ἔστι δὴ τοῦ καὶ γένους, συνθετείνον
ἀρχῆς μίας, καὶ δύναμιν εἰνα καὶ κοινωνίαν διαπεριόττων
ἀναφερόμενος...

Plutarch, Quaest. Conv. 679D. οὗ κατὰ γένους προσήκοντες
καὶ Δίος ἔμοινοι κοινωνοῦντε.

Plutarch, Life of Theseus 3F-4Αἴτετον δὲ καὶ γένους
κοινωνοῦντες, ἐξ ἀσμάν ἐννεάς. Αἴτερα μὲν γὰρ ὅτι Πιθέους
ἄνθρωπον, Ἀλκμήνη δὲ Δυσιδίκης Δυσιδίκη δὲ καὶ Πιθέους
ἀνέλαβοι διηνοτοὶ ἐνεστεῖς ἐς Ἱπποδαίμον ὡς Πελοπίδας.

Plutarch, Aetia Romana 265D. ὃ μὲ νεομοισμένον
συμφορίας γραμμίν, ὧν πρὸς φιλόματος ἢ φιλοφρούρον προῆλθεν
καὶ τοιοῦτο μόνον ἀρείφθη σώματον καὶ κοινωνίας τῆς
συμφορίας;

Plutarch, Life of Romulus 25D. ...καὶ ἁπλῶς αὑτοῦ
tρωπον τῶν συγκρατεῖς καὶ κοινωνιὰς ἁρχὴν ἄθετος
tὸ ἔθικημα ἄφησεν διακρούομενος τὰς μυαλίς...

Plutarch, Comp. Thes, & Rom. 39A. ἔφεσα τῇ μετα-, τοῦτο
tιμῆ, καὶ ἀπεκτῆσαι καὶ δικαιοῦντον, ἐτέρῳ τὰς κοινωνίας ἀφετείξε
τὴν βασιλικὴν καὶ τὴν ἀθηναϊκήν, καὶ τὴν ἀθηναϊκήν καλλιστὸν ἐρχον καὶ
πολιτικῶς τὸν καὶ κοινωνίαν διενεκήν.
Plutarch Comp. Thes. & Rom. 39B. ἐν γὰρ ἔτει τρίῳ καὶ διακοσίῳ οὐκ ἔστατος οὐκ εὐσεβῆς γυναικὸς οὐκ ἐν θυμῷ κοινωνίας ἀνδρὸς ἐκκατολαίτην, ἀλλὰ ὁποῖος ἐν Ἐλληνικῷ οἴορθραι περιττῷ τοῖς πράξεσιν ἔχουσιν ἕτειν παροκτονοῦν ἢ μητροφόνον...

Plutarch Comp. Thes. & Rom. 39B. καὶ γὰρ ἰράσων ἐκκαταλαίτην οὐ βασιλείς καὶ πολιτεῖας ἐν γένει ἄδικος τῶν ἐπιγείων ἐκείνην.

Plutarch Comp. Thes. & Rom. 39B. ἠπὸ ὅς τοῖς Ὑπάρχον γάμων Ἀθηναίοις φίλικας μὲν οὐδὲν οὐδὲν κοινωνικὸν ὑπῆρξε πρὸς οὐδένα συμβολιον...

Plutarch Life of Flamininus 375D. ἄλλοφυλοι δὲ ἄνδρες, ἐμφάνισάτα μικρά καὶ πλεύχαρα κοινωνήματα παλαιοῦ γένους ἔχειν ὕσκεντες...

Plutarch Life of Numa 63F. τούτοις προς ἐν ἀφέτει σημεία ἐκ Χρυστῆ καὶ σπουδὴ εἰς πολιτέας καὶ θρόνος, ὡς ἐπιθυμοῦτο τὸν προσβείς ἐξανεμισάς βασιλεῖς καὶ παραλαμβάνειν τὴν βασιλείαν ἐκ τῆς κοινωνίας καὶ συγκράτει τῶν πολέων.

Plutarch Life of Numa 71D. κοινωνίας δὲ καὶ γυνώδους καὶ δεδομένας ἐκάθευ ἐκάθευ πρεποῦσα...

Plutarch Life of Numa 72F. ὁ γὰρ Ἰαννᾶς ἐν τοῖς πάνω παλαιοῖς εἰς δαίμονες εἰς βασιλείας γένους πολιτικός καὶ κοινωνικός ἐκ τῶν Ὑπαρχόντων καὶ θρόνοι λέγεται μεταβαλεῖν τὴν διάτασιν.

Plutarch Life of Lycurgus 54C. καὶ οἱ παρὼν τινὲς, ὡς οἱ χρυσότροποι μνημονεύετε τὸν Λυκόρρημον οὐ προσέχειν οὐδὲν κοινωνίαν ἐν ἀρχῇ τοῦτος περὶ τῶν Ἀστικῶν, ἀλλὰ τῶν θυμάσιν ἀλλοσ ἐπιθυμουσάς καὶ δειμένοντας ἄκουσί τοις φωναῖς ἀφετέρους ἐνίκοποι οὕτως ἐπιτιμήσως αὐτῶν καὶ θυμάσιος, ὄτι τοὺς πολίτας ἐν προτερέπεσιν κοινωνίας τῆς πανίσχυρις.

Plutarch Lives of Lycurg. & Num. 77D. ἀλλὰ μὴν ἐπιστασίας, τε μαίνειν καὶ συναγελάσομεν καὶ συμμαθησιοῦμεν καὶ κοινωνίας, περὶ τὸ θεῖα περὶ τὴν ἔννοιαν καὶ ἰστασίαν καὶ παιδείας αὐτῶν ἐμμελείαις καὶ διακοσμήσεως...

Plutarch Life of Marcus Cato 354B. ὥσ ἀλλοις οὐδεὶς ονομαθέας προανῆσαι, τοῦ διερεῖν καὶ ἀνείπετο καὶ πενητή σύνοικον ἐπὶ κοινωνία, πολιτείας ἀλλοὶ τοῦ πλουσίου καὶ ὑπεροχοῦ φορηθείς.

Plutarch Inst. Laconica 237D. ὅπως ὅτι καὶ κακοπάθη καὶ φοινικάτωσιν ἐν ὑπομνήσει.
Plutarch Lives of Agis & Cleom. 798Δν ἰὺς συναφοῦς καὶ λιτότης καὶ μερολογία τόσο ἐκείνων ὑπερβαλόμενος τρυφᾶς ὑγοτῆς καὶ κοινωνίαν καταστήσῃ τοῖς πολῖταισι...

Plutarch Life of Solon 85C. Ἡ ἐνεπίθηκα δὴ τῶν Ἀθηναίων ἄφοντες συνορίες τῶν Σάμων ὅδον ἐπὶ πολλάτας ἐναρκτήματι ἐκτὸς ὅθεν, καὶ μῆκος τοῖς πλοῦσιοις κοινωνὸν τῆς ἀδίκτικας μῆκν ταῖς τῶν πενήντων ἀνάγκαις ἐνεχόμενον ἔδεον τοῖς κοινὸις προσθέλειν καὶ καταπαύσαι τάς διαφόρας...

Plutarch Life of Themist. 123C. Ὁ δὲ οὗτος ἐκπεπτωκότας τῇς πολιτείας καὶ φέροντα χαλέπως, ἐθαρρήσεν ἐπὶ τῆς κοινωνίαν τοῖς πραγματείας παρακαλεῖν...

Plutarch Life of Themist. 123D. Ὁ δὲ τὸν μὲν σήμερον ἀπετίθη τοῦ Παυσανίου καὶ τῇν κοινωνίαν ἀλλὰ ἀπείπατο...

Plutarch Life of Pericles 157EF. Πᾶς δὲ οὗν τις ἡδονεῖ πιετεύεται καταφυγοῦντι τοῦ Περικλέους, ὡς τοῦ δοκῆτος ἐφιλείην φίλον, ἐνυμομένοι καὶ κοινωνὸν ὑπὲρ τῆς ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ προφερέσθαι δολοφονήσαντες διά θηλυτυπίαν καὶ φθόνον τῆς θάλας;

Plutarch Life of Alcib. 204AB. πράξεων πασῶν ἐκοινώσει τοῖς Δακεδαμινοῖς.

Plutarch Life of Alcib. 207D. τοὺς τῶν ἰδιότηταν οἱ μετὰ τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῖς μετὰ τοῦ Ομηρίλλου, μεγαλύνοντες ὅρεους καὶ τῶν στρατηγῶν, ἐκείνως δὲ μῆκε τεύχονται μὴν κυρίας ἐν στρατόπεδῳ κοινωνίαν ἐξελοῦσεν.

Plutarch Life of Timoleon 239F-240A. Τιμόλεωντα σύμβουλον ἠθεῖν παρὰ Ἰέτην καὶ κοινωνίαν ἐν διαστατημένων ὀπίσων τῶν ἐν ναῦσ καὶ τοὺς στρατηγοὺς ἀποστῆλειν ἐξ ἑορτῆον...

Plutarch Life of Aem. Paulus 256B. ὁ δὲ ὅπως ἐπιφέσει τοῖς συναρχοῖσιν κωμητίως καὶ ἐκ τῶν μὲν ἄχων ἄκων ἀνεσθέξαν ἀτέλεῖς τῆς ἐς φυγὴς ὅπως ἐκοινώνησέντες...

Plutarch Life of Marcellus 303C. ὁ δὲ Μαρκέλλος ἀνελεῖν μὲν ἀνδρὰ λαμπρὸν οὐτῷ τῆς φύλης καὶ τῶν μεγίστων ἐρωμάσιοι ἠγομένος οὐδεὶς ὁδὸν ἔφεσθο.

Plutarch Comp. Pel. & Marcell. 317C. τοῖς δὲ Μαρκέλλῳ διὰ πεπραγμένων ἐκοινωνικοῦ δεν ὀκνεῖν.
Plutarch Life of C. Marius 411A. καὶ ταύτης χρώμενος ἀπὶ διητέλει, φιλόσοφοι ἄνδρα καὶ πρὸς κοινωνίαν ὑπὲρ ἑκατοντάριον καὶ ὀστερεῖν ἐρεθίζων τοῖς Μάριον...

Plutarch Life of Sulla 454E. πολλὰ γὰρ ἄνωθεν πράγματα παρέξειν ἐπίδοξον ἔντα, προκέτατον ἐν εἰς κοινωνία γενότατα τής ἀρχῆς.

Plutarch Life of Cimon 485A. ...τρόπον τινὰ τὴν ἐπὶ Κρόνου μυθολογουμένην κοινωνίαν τις τοῖς βλοὶ ἄνθρωποι κατηγοῦν.

Plutarch Life of Lucullus 501E. ὡς δὲ θαυμασός ἔδεξατο (λόγος ἧν αὐτῶν πολὺς ἐν τῷ στρατηγῷ) καὶ ταχὺ περιώμενος ἐπηκέλευς τὸν τ' ἀμφίβολον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ λιπαρές, ἔστε τραπέζης καὶ συνιδρούον πρὸς ποιεῖταί κοινωνίαν.

Plutarch Life of Lucullus 511A. καὶ τὸν οὖν ὅραν κοινωνίατα τῆς αὐτῆς τοῦτος περισπάσατο τὸ διάδημα τῆς κεφαλῆς κάκειν καιρόπασαν παρέδωκε...

Plutarch Life of Sertorius 570D. ...δεξιόμενων δὲ τοῖς Μάριον τὸ πτωτικόν οἰκεῖον τῆς ἡθικῆς καταγείρων καὶ τῆς δυνάμεως καλεῖν ἐνέδρα πρὸς κοινωνίαν ἀρχῆς καὶ ἀπίστων.

Plutarch Life of Sertorius 570D. ...ἀνθρωπεῖν ὅπως ἀπωθείας τοῖς Μάριον αὐτῶς ἐντι κοινωνία πραγμάτων κεκλήκως...

Plutarch Life of Alexander 672B. "Οὕκουν," ἔρρη, "καὶ ἐναίσ τούτων κοινωνισμοῖν οἱ μετὰ σοῦ στρατευόμενοι...

Plutarch De Alex. Mag. Fort. 330E. Ὅλους πρώτης μὲν ἔστιν στρατευτικός φιλόσοφος τῶν ἄνδρα συνιστήσαν, οὐχ ἐντεῦθεν τροφήν καὶ πολύτελειαν ἄλλα πάσιν ἀνθρώποις δυνομαίναν καὶ εἰρήνην καὶ κοινωνίαν πρὸς ἀλλήλους παραχωρισάσαν διανοήθεν.

Plutarch Life of Alexander 691E. Ζθαρησαν γὰρ οἱ ἀρχαῖοι τῇ κοινωνίᾳ τοῦ γαμοῦ, καὶ τῶν Αλεξάνδρου οἰκεῖοτητάς...

Plutarch De Alex. Mag. Fort. I 329F. ...οὐ διότι σοφοῖς ἐχθρικάς οὐδὲ ἀμήκε καὶ δουλεύσας δεσμοίς, ἀλλ' ἐρωτε οἰκεῖοτητα καὶ ἀμήκε σύνοροι καὶ κοινωνικὰ πλῆθυν τὰ βένη συναπέσεις...

Plutarch Life of Alexander 691D. ...ἀνακράτει καὶ κοινωνίας μίλλον οὐ εὔνοιας καταστήσατο τὰ πράγματα νόμιζον ὅτι μεγάραν ἀπείροντο σαφῶς.
Plutarch Life of Demetrius 890B. Ωσεως ἦν καὶ μετον άπιστιάς καὶ δισϕοίας, ὥστε ἄγαλλεθαν τόν μεγίστον τοῦ Αλεξανδροῦ διδάχθων καὶ πρεσβύτευτον ὃτι μὴ φοβεῖται τον Ὀствеν...

Plutarch Life of Demetrius 893C. Εἰ δὲ η ἤ μον τῶν βασιλέων εἰς τοὺς ἄπο αἰς φιλιττού τοῦ Αλεξανδροῦ περιείναι δοκοῦν θάνατον ἐπερεῖ καὶ κοινωνήν τοῦ Απελευθέρωτος.

Plutarch Life of Demetrius 902A. καὶ τὸν με τοῦτο σύνεθεν καὶ κοινωνιῶν αὐτῶν ἐλεγν ἄπερ φανήν συνεργολόγων συνδρομὴν ἐνὶ λίβαν καὶ φόρῳ συνικηράξειν.

Plutarch Lives of Tibo. G. G. 836A. Εἰκ, τοῦτον πάλιν ἀλλὰς αἰτίας αὐτὸ ν καὶ δίκαιος ἁπάντην, ἢς τοὺς συμμάχους ἀφήσηγεν καὶ κεκοινωνήκοτο ἡς περὶ Φρειτίλλην ἐνεχθέοις συναφότητοι.


Plutarch Lives of Tibo. G. G. 824D. ὅ γε καὶ Πλούταρχος τοῦ βασιλέως κοινωνίαν τὸ διαδήλων καὶ κοινωνίαν τοῦ γάμου αὐτῷ ἀριστερό...

Plutarch Life of Cato Min. 784... ὅπερ οὐκ ἔγιν ἄρας ἤλλας συνωμόστης καὶ κοινωνίας, σκάλα σφαίρας, καὶ διδάκτας ὡς ὁ Γερμάνων οδύς ξέλτων παίδων.

Plutarch Life of Pompey 6bf. ἂν οὖ μόνῳ σοὶ ἔγιν, τοῦτο τὸ καλὸν ὑπάρξει. καθὼς δὲ ἄπερ ἐφήμωτος ἐφέμωσεν εἰ ἐςεις κοινωνίαν, ὡς μὴ κατὰ πάντα ἡλικωμενὶ τὴν ἀποκάλυπτον.

Plutarch Life of Antony 919DE. καὶ τῶν Ἀντώνιον ἄντι τοῦ φιλον οὔση καὶ βουλομένων δει τοῖς πολλοῖς ἐφέσκειν ἐπείδης συμπράττειν καὶ κοινωνίᾳ τοῦ πολιτείματος.

Plutarch Life of Antony 952B. δὲ δὲ ἡ πρώτον ἄνδρα ἑκκομαί τῆς σκηνῆς ὑποτάσσε ἄρεικερυσσαν ἄροι καθῆταιν γενόμενον καὶ συνάρχοντα καὶ πολλῶν ἁγίων καὶ πραγμάτων κοινωνίαν.

Plutarch Life of Dion 964D. ... πολλὰς δὲ διαλλαγὰς καὶ δεήσεις ποιομένων πρὸς αὐτῶν, ἀκροτάτῳ δὲ τῶν λόγων καὶ κοινωνίῃ τῇ περὶ φιλοσοφίαν πραγματείας ὑποτάσσομεν μὲν ὑπερφῶς, αἰσθομένου δὲ τοῦς ἀποτελεσμάτας ὡς διαθέσαμεν.
Plutarch Life of Dion 967E. ἔνδικτο τοῦ τυράννου περιγράφεσθαι, οὐ μείον ἡ χιλίων χιλιόν, πέντε καὶ έκκορι Μούσῃ τῆς στρατείας εἰκοσίων, οὐ δέ άλλοι πρόδωσον ἄποτε διελιγμένες.

Plutarch Life of Dion 972A. Ἔνδικτο τοῦ φυλάκων. Ἡμελείας, στρατηγικός μεν δ' ἄρημος καὶ γνώμονας ἐφ' ἡμεροῖς ἄν τόσου παρά τοῖς τυράννοις, ὡς ἄραπες δ' ἐν τούς γυναῖκας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς πάντα κοῦφος, ἡκάτων ἄξιον τοῖς κοινωνικὶ πραγμάτευμα δρέχεται ἐκόνων καὶ δάκες.

Plutarch Life of Dion 982E-983A. Οὖσιν ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ τῆς πράξεως, καὶ δ' οὐκέπει Λίμνος ἐν οἴκηματι κλίνας ἄνυσ λιξώσει μετά τῶν φίλων.

Plutarch Life of Aratus 1030D. τούτο μάλιστα τοῦ Άρατος στρατηγικῶν ἐπιρροής διομένους τῶν κοινωνικῶν ἐπικρύπτειν κοινωνοῦντας τῇ πράξει εἶναι, ἐκ νόμου λίγος καὶ ἄλλους ἐν τῇ πόλει τῶν συνεργάτων.

Plutarch Life of Aratus 1031DE. ὅμοιότατα ζῆναι καὶ κοινωνίαν πάλιν καὶ συνεργίαν καὶ βασιλείαν μίαν φαννὴν ἁρίβενος ἐώς οἴκημος ἄλλο ἐν τῶν καλῶν ἔρασις ὅπλων.

Plutarch Life of Aratus 1035F. ἔνδικτο τοῦ πρώτος ἀδελφὸς Ερρίνου καὶ Διοκλέους ἄνωμα Διονύσιος οὐκ ἐνυπάρχος τῆς πράξεως ἄρα ζῆναι κοινωνῶν ἐκοινωνεῖ τῇ πολεί τοῖς δικαλεῖ, προσφέρει κατὰ τύχην.

Plutarch Life of Artaxerxes 1019D. ἀλλὰ καὶ συνεπαιζε καὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ἐκοινωνεῖ συμπράξεσαι καὶ παροῦν.

Plutarch Life of Galba 1065E. ἀπεσφάλετο δὲ καὶ Ὀδύνος ὀνοματον κοινωνίας καταγγέλει ἐπὶ τῶν Γαλβαν συνεργάς.

Plutarch Mulierum Virt. 260F. σιδώ καὶ θρησκεύων αὐτῶν ὁ Δαρέας ἀναφερομένου καὶ τῶν βασιλέων ἡρωών πάθη ἔθιζε έκείνης καὶ κοινωνίας ἀποδείξεις τῆς ἀρχῆς.

Plutarch De Frat. Amor. 490A. οὖν ἐξήγετο, τῆς κύρου διαδοχῆς ο θρήνος τελευτήσας αὐτῶν, καὶ τις Δαρείου γένους ἐξασκεῖται, ἀρκεῖν οὖν μόνου ἄξιον ἀλλὰ καὶ πίλοις ἐπιστάθητον κοινωνεῖν πραγμάτευμα καὶ σύναξις.

Plutarch Life of Pyrrhus 385B. πλὴν ἄλλα ἡδύς, μιᾷ πρὸς τινά τῶν ἄλλων βασιλέων καὶ Νεοτολέμους τραγῳδίας διάλογος ἐδέκτη καὶ φιλίαν πρὸς αὐτῶν ἐπὶ κοινωνίας τῆς ἀρχῆς.
Plutarch Amatorius 770D. Κιούλιος γὰρ, δ' τὴν δ' Παλαιὰς κίνησις ἀποστειρίζον, ἄλλους τε πόλεως ὁπλούς ἐκέιδε ἐξαρεῖ καὶ Σαμίνων ἀνάβας νέον οὐκ ἔχει, πλούτων δὲ καὶ ὁδός Γαλατῶν παίτων ἐπιφανεστάτων.

Plutarch X Orat. Vitae 843B. δὲ ήσας δὲ κεκοινωνημένηι τῶν Περικές ἁρμάτων Ἐρίκητας τριήμερῶς ὡς ἐρήμων οἰκιορκείς Φιλίππου, Βοθόδος ἐυλαμβανομένοις ἐκπαρθείς, κατὰ τὸν ἐνόμουν τοιοῦτον ὑπόστη τοῦτον ἡμιπρίσχυσα... 

Plotinus Ennead III.5.6.45. Τίς οὖν ἐστι ὁ λόγος ὁ ἑαυτῆς ἐκεῖνος η.widget καὶ ἑαυτῆς τῶν τῶν οἰκείων η.widget μοι ἑαυτῆς.

M. Aurelius Meditations V.30.1: 'Ὁ τοῦ διὸν νοούς κοινωνικός.

Jo. Stobaeus Antholog. I.47.8. Κοινωνία δὲ ἐστι γούχων, καὶ κοινωνοῦσι μὲν αἱ τῶν θεῶν ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὡς ἐὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταῖς τῶν ἑλώνων.

Philo De Virtutibus 80-81. Ἐν μὲν ὁδὸν ἐξῆκας τῷ τῶν νοομενίκων φιλανθρωπίας καὶ κοινωνίας, ἐξηράντος καὶ συμφωνικῶς ἕχασις τέχνη τῆς τῶν ἔρωτιν ἄλλων συμφωνίας... ὡς ἐν τῷ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τοῖς μονον ὑδρότεις κοινωνικοί...

Epictetus Discourses IV.11.1. Ἐν οἷς τοῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων περιέχεσθαι τῷ κοινωνικῷ. Εἰς μὲν αὐτοῖς ὁδοῖς ὡς δικαίως ἐν ὑμῖν ἡμῖν δικαίως ἑκατοντεύθεντα, ὡς τῇ τῶν καθαρίων πάνως περιέχεσθαι καὶ, ἔν τῷ ἄλλῳ, ἕκατο τῶν λύμων χαρίζεσθαι.

Epictetus Discourses I.28.20. Ὁρὰ μὴ τὸ παρακολούθειν οἷς ποιεῖς; Ὁρὰ μὴ τῷ κοινωνικῷ; μὴ τῷ πιθανῷ; τῷ ἀδήμονι; τῷ κακαλεῖ; τῷ εὐφείῳ; τῷ ὑπὸν τὸ μεγάλον ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ δίκαιον; Ὁρὰ ἡ διαφορά.

Epictetus Discourses II.10.14. Ἐν δὲ ἄντι ἀνθρώπου, ἰδίου θέου, καὶ κοινωνικοῦ θρήνων γένοις ἐκεῖνοι, ἐπιθυμοῦν, δηκτικόν οὐδὲν ἐπιδιώκεις;

Epictetus Discourses IV.5.17. Τίνα ἔχεις χαράκτηρα ταῦτα δόγματα αὐτῶν; Ἡμεῖς, κοινωνικοὶ, ἀνεκτικοὶ, φιλάληπτοι.

Philo De Spec. Legibus III.204. ἔστειν οὖν δίκην εἰς ταύταν ἐκεῖνα τῇ δικαιοσύνῃ κοινωνικήν. τῇ δὲ ὁμολογίᾳ, περικεφ ἡμῶν κοινωνίαν ἐπὶ καὶ ἡμῖν ἐπαρχεῖν, κατὰ τὸν τερώναν ἄκακον καὶ ἄκοιμων, ὡς τὸ μηχανώμενος ἐκθέσιος διήλινας ἄκακοις, νοον φύσεως ἔναιρέων.
Philo De Mig. Abrahami 178. ... ἡ ἐπίθεσις τῶν μετεύρων καὶ ἡ ὀδηγία τοῖς ἐπὶ γῆς ἄρματοι καὶ ὅστερ ἀλλά ὁμοιώματι λόγων τὴν ἐμπειρίαν σωματίνων τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπιδεικνύειν τὶ τῶν μεταν πρὸς ἄλληλα κοινωνίας καὶ συμπαθείᾳ τόποις μὲν διεξευκομένοις, συνενεχεῖ τοῦ ὑπό σωματείαν.

Aetius Placita II.3.4. Ἀριστοκλῆς ὑπὲρ ἐν ψυχῇ ἥλιον ὑπὸ τοῦ ὑπὲρ λόγων ὑπὸ νοῦ ὑπὲρ ὑπὸ πρὸς τὴν ἐπιστήμην ἔριδας γραμμάτων καὶ λεξικῶν, τὰ δὲ περί ἐνθάδες ἀυτῶν, τὸ δὲ εὐτυχεῖ καὶ τῇ διάβολῃ τῶν προνομεῖν μετεχεῖν.

Plotinus Ennead II.1.7.15. ... ἐμυποτὶ τι καὶ ὅβετε, ὅλα τὰ τὴν ἐν κόσμῳ κοινωνίαν, δι’ ὑπὸ ἔσοι, λαβεῖς ὅπερ ἀντὶ ἀλλὰ τι αὐτὸ ... .

Dio Chrysostom Discourse XL.36. ταὐτότης δὲ τῆς κοινωνίας διαλογίσεως καὶ στάσεως ἐπιστήμης οὐκ ὑποτέκες ὡμᾶς ἀλλὰς ἄλλως ἀλλὰς ὑποτέκες μὴ ταραχθῆναι καὶ τὴν ἀληθήν τε καὶ ἀπειράτην, τὴς φαντασίας ὑπομείναι φθορὰν ἐκ τῶν ὑποτέκων, τὰ τὸ σώματος εἰς τὸ μὴ ὑπὲρ.

Dio Chrysostom Discourse I.40. Πολίτες δὲ κατὰ τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸν κοινὸν ὑπὸλος Ὀμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸν κόσμον, εἰς τὸν κοιναumont'os τις τὸν νόμον καὶ τὸν ἀνθρώποι ... .

Dio Chrysostom Borys. Disc. 23. μεν γὰρ ὅτι ταὐτηθν ἐπιθεῖν καθώς ἐκεῖνον πολιτείαν ἐπὶ καὶ πόλιν ἅρματι, τὴν θέου πρὸς ἀλλήλους κοινωνίαν, ἔχει τε καὶ ἑαυτὸν ἐν λόγων περὶ λαμβάνει, ἀνθρώπων τῶν θεῶν ἀρμοδίων, ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἀρμόδιων καὶ τῶν σωμάτων, οὐ δὲ φρονεῖ τοῦτο καὶ πρᾶξειν τοῖς αὐτῶν πολιτέων τὸν νόμον, ἐξερευνεῖν φρονεῖν τοῦτο.

Plotinus Ennead IV.3.9.9. ... ὅτι ἄλλου τὸ τὰ ἄλλα συν ἐπὶ σκέψεως, ὅτι ὅτι τοῦ ἀδιάφθορου εἰς ἐξαιρετικῶς σωματίζω, ὅτι καὶ πρῶτη ἐν γνήμῃ κοινωνία συμβαίνει ... .

Plotinus Ennead VI.4.16.13. ... ἄλλον ὅτι ὡς λέγοντες ἐξερευνεῖν καὶ ἐκείνου τῆς σωμάτως φύσεως ἐκείνης ἐξερευνεῖν καὶ μεταλαμβάνειν διώκειν καὶ ἔρωτας καὶ ἐπικαλεῖσθαι οὐδὲ τοπικὸν τὸ σώματος ἐκείνου, ἀλλ’ ὡς οὕτως ὁτι πρὸς τῆς τοιαῦτης κοινωνίας.

Philo De Sac. Apel. et Cain. 73. τα μὲν ὅτι τὴν τε γνησίως πρῶτα τοῦτο τὸν ἑαυτοῦ τὸν ὑποτέκος καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς ἐπίθεσις τοῦ πρὸς τὴν κοινωνίαν ἐπιδεικνύειν τῷ λόγῳ τοῦ νόμου, ὁμοῖος καὶ διάφορος ἀλλ’ ἕως ἔργον ἀλλὰ καὶ νόμος καὶ λόγος καὶ σώματος ἀλλ’ ἕως ἀναλογίᾳ τῆς κοινωνίας.
Plotinus Ennead II.9.7.3. "Ωτι μεν οὖν οὕτω δῆματο ὅπερ παύσεται, ἀλλ' ἔστιν άξιον καὶ οὗ τοῖς κόσμοις ζωσὶν ἧς ἔσχειν ή γίνεται. Τὴν δὲ πρὸς τὸ σώμα τῆς ψυχῆς κοινωνίαν τῇ διατέρα πρὸς αὐτῶν γίνεται ὥσοι οὐκ ἀνείναι τῇ μορίᾳ.

Plotinus Ennead VI.9.1.34. φυσικὴ δὲ ἐξι μελλόν νευρατοποιεῖ καὶ αὐτὴ.

Plotinus Ennead I.6.2.28. Οὐκεillez δὲ τὸ καλὸν σῶμα γίνεται λόγῳ ἀπὸ δεῖν ζωῆς κοινωνίας.

Epictetus Discourses II.19.27.θεοὶ δὲ ἀνθρώποι ἐπιθυμοῦν γνῶναι καὶ ἐν τῷ σωματίῳ τούτῳ τῷ νεκρῷ περὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸν Δίον κοινωνίαν δουκευόμενον.

Dio Chrysostom Bor. Dis. 31. Ο δὲ λόγος οὗ ποιεῖ εὐμβρακεῖ ἐποποδᾶτε καὶ θεῖω τὸ συναφεῖται διὰ τούτων νεκροὶ καὶ ἐνι λόγῳ πειραμαζότα παῦν τὸ λογικὸν, κοινωνίας ἀρκέν καὶ δικαιοσύνης μονὴ τῶν τοις ἀποκριθηναι καὶ ἀλουν εὐρίσκων...

Philo De Virtutibus 84. σὸν μὴ τῶν αὐτῶν ζητεῖ τόκων οὕς λαβεῖν οὐκ ἡγεῖσαν, ἐπιτειχεῖσαν τὰ κάλλιστα καὶ τιμίωτα τῶν τὸν ἀνθρώπος, ἡμεροτά κοινωνίαν, χρηστοτά, μεγαλοθείαν, εὐθυμίαν, εὐκλείαν.

M. Aurelius Meditations III.23. έκεῖ ἐξῆς οὐκ ἅρμων, διὰ τὸ τῶν ἀρπωνίας φυσικόν νόμον εἴναι καὶ δικαίως; ἐκεῖ μέντοι τού ταῖς ἐξεῖν τοῖς μεταῖς συστοχάλομαι.

Epictetus Disc. I.23. έπιστεύει καὶ Επίκουρος δια

Chrysippus Ethica X.686. έκεῖνον δὲ τὸν ἀπὸ τῆς πολιτείας, πολιτεύονται γὰρ κατὰ τὸν προηγούμενον λόγον, καὶ γὰρ οὕτως έκεῖνοι πολιτεύονται ἀποκόλλουσιν ἢγ' αὐτό τῆς τοῦ λογικοῦ λόμου καὶ κοινωνίας καὶ ριζαλικῆς.<φύσεως>.

M. Aurelius Meditat. V.16. τὸ όρο ἠθικὸν τοῦ λογικοῦ λόμου κοινωνίας έκεῖ γὰρ πρὸς κοινωνίαν διόνυσιν, πᾶλαι χειριστάται.

M. Aurelius Meditat. V.29. θείω δὲ <Δ> καὶ φύσιν τοῦ λογικοῦ καὶ κοινωνίας λοιπον.
Chrysippus Ethica VI. III. 34b. oδδε γὰρ τοι κοινωνικῶν
περιεγγύται ὁσπερ ἐπὶ τῶν ἁλῶν μηνόν οὔτω, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν
ἀροικετῶν ἀνθρώπων ἀλλὰ ἔπειτα ἐπὶ πάντας ἀνθρώπους πεποιήκε κοινωνικῶς.

M. Aurelius Meditat. V. 1.7. οὐδὲ οὕτω κοινωνικὴ πράξεις
eὐτελέστεραι φαίνονται καὶ γεγονός ὅσπος ἦσσι.

M. Aurelius Meditat. III. 4. 2. Οὐ δὲ ἕκαστῶν εὐθὺς ἔδει
εἶναι "οὐ πάντα ἀπολλα ἢ καὶ ἐμφελοντὶ καὶ ήμων κοινωνικοὺς καὶ
Ἀμελεσίας ἀθροικῶν ἢ κακιᾶς ἀπαλλαγμένων ἢ φιλονείκιας τίνος ἢ βασκανίας καὶ ὑπομοίας ἢ ἀλλοι τινὸς ἢ θεία
ἐν ἔρυθραίσις ἐξηγοῦμενος, ὥσ τὸν μὴ ἑδέστω εἰχέ.

M. Aurelius Meditat. IV. 33. 3. ἐν τούτῳ δὲινοι δικαιὰ
cαὶ πράξεις κοινωνικὴ καὶ λόγου διος μήποτε διηγοῦμαι, καὶ
didaskés ἀποκλείοντι παύν το συμβαίνων ἢ δαναγχίων ἢ γνώμιων,
ὅσ ἂν ἄρχει τοιαύτης καὶ τὴν ἐπιχείρησις.

M. Aurelius Meditat. VI. 14. 2. ἐν δὲ πᾶσιν δὲ τὴν
ἐπωθῆ γυνὴν λογίας καὶ κοινωνικές ἐξουσίας καὶ κοινωνικῆς
diaφραξὶ καὶ τῷ διαφεύτῃ ἐν τούτῳ γνώρ είσιν.

M. Aurelius Meditat. VII. 5. ἐν δὲ μὴ ἐξηγήθη ἢ τῶν
παρακαθορίστων τοῦ ἐν τῷ δυναμενῷ κριστίν ἐπισελέσσει; ἢν ἀλλὰς
τοῦτο μὴ καθήκη, ἢ πράξεις, ὡς δυνατόν, πρὸς παραλαβόν τῶν
dυνάμεων καὶ πρὸς συχνὸν τοῦ ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἡμεροποιῇ ποιήτην ἐν εἰς
tὴν κοινωνίαν τῶν καρίτων καὶ χρήσιμων.

Epictetus Disc. II. 14. 8. ἄλιπτως, ἀφόθως, ἡμιράχως
dιεσχάζει καὶ ἀδικέν μετὰ τῶν κοινωνίων, τηροῦντα τὰς σχέσεις
καὶ τας συνεχίς καὶ ἐπιθέσεις, τῶν βίων τῶν πληρών τῶν ἄθελον,
tῶν πολίτην, τῶν άνδρα, τῶν γυναικῶν, τῶν γείτονα, τῶν σπάνων,
tῶν ἀρχώντων, τῶν ἐρχομένων.

Epictetus Disc. I. 22. 10. οὐκ ἐπὶ ἕναν, δὲ τῷ
ἔμμα, τῷ μέρος τοῦ γοτος, κτήτενς, γονεῖς, ἀδελφοί, γένου, πατρὶς,
ἄπλως οἴ κοινωνία.

Epictetus Disc. III. 1. 21. Ὁ ὁν καὶ λέγεις, κοινωνίας
μοι ἕν καὶ γοτίνις, ἀδελφός, σεμνοῦ, καὶ ἐπὶ πολεῖ παρεῖχες
πολίτην καθό, καὶ τὸν συμμετέχον, καὶ τὸς συμμετέχον.

Epictetus Disc. III. 11. 3. Αἴο δὲ ἐφ’ ἐκάστη λέγειν,
tουτοῦ μὲν παρ’ ὑπὲρ ἢ ἐκαί τοῦτο, τουτοῦ δὲ κατ’ τοῦ συμβουλήν καὶ τῶν
συντρεχεῖν τὰ καὶ τοῦς... τοῦτο δὲ παρὰ τοῦ συμβουλήν καὶ
συμμετέχον καὶ κοινωνίας, ἀποστείποντι λέγεις, ὅτι ἵδίε καὶ
φυλήν ἔστι.
M. Aurelius Meditat. V.6.6.8. 'οπι ζηλαί αυτὸ τὸ ζῷο δεὶ παρακολουθεῖν. οὐδ' ἔρη, φησὶ, τοῦ κοινωνίαν τὸ αἰτιάζειν ὡς τοις κοινωνικῶς ἐνεργεῖ, καὶ νῦν Διὸ βούλεθαι καὶ τοῖς κοινωνίν δὲ έθερεῖ.

M. Aurelius Meditat. VI.7. 'Ευπ πέρποο καὶ προσκυπαίην τῷ αὐτῷ πράξεις κοινωνικῶς μεταβάλλειν ἐπὶ πράξειν κοινωνικῶς οὖν μηχὰρ θεοῦ.

M. Aurelius Meditat. VI.30.1. εἰς καμπὸς τῆς ἐπιγύν ζῆσος, διδάσκεις σοι καὶ πράξεις κοινωνικῶς.

M. Aurelius Meditat. VI.23.1. τοῖς δὲ ἄνθρωποις, ὡς λόγον ἔχουσι, χρὴ κοινωνικῶς.

M. Aurelius Meditat. VI.16.5. καὶ ὅπο τὰς ῥήμας σινηματικὰς αἰώνας καὶ τιμή σεστων ὑπὸ ἁρτον ἰσοτοπεῖ καὶ τοὺς κοινωνίς εισαρμοσον καὶ τοῖς θεῖοι σώματοι.

Josephus Against Apion II.208. ταῦτα καὶ παλιά τούτοις δομοι τὴν πρὸς ἅλλοις ἰμών συνεχεί κοινωνίαν.

Epicurus Ethica XXXVII.153.5. 'Τὸ μὲν ἐπιμαρτυρούμενον ὅτι συνάρμοζον ζῶν τῶν κραίμας τῆς πρὸς ἅλλοις κοινωνίας τῶν ποιησάμενοι εἶναι δίκαιοι έχει, τὸ τῶν δίκαιον χυμάν εἶναι, ἐὰν τῇ τῷ αὐτῷ πάτῃ γενεται ἐὰν τῇ τῇ τῷ αὐτῷ.

Epicurus Ethica XXXVIII.153.2. ἐξεὶ δὲ καὶ νὸμον γένοις τῶν πραγμάτων οὐκέτι συνάρμοζον τὴν αὐτῷ δίκαια κείμενα, ἐνταῦθα ὡς τοῖς μὲν ἡ δίκαια ὡς συνάρμοζον τῇ τῆς πρὸς ἅλλοις κοινωνίας τῶν συμπληρωματικῶς, άπερον δ' άδικήν ἐνεργείν ὡς καὶ οὐ συνάρμοζον.

Epicurus Ethica XXXVI.151.7. 'Εὰν δὲ <νόμον> μόνον διεται τοις, μὴ ὑπομένων δὲ κατὰ τὰ συνάρμοσον τῆς πρὸς ἅλλοις 

Epicurus Ethica XXXVII.152.4. 'Καὶ μὲν τὰ τοιούτα τῷ δίκαιῳ τῷ αὐτῷ συνάρμοσον γάρ τι ἔν τι ἐν τῇ πρὸς ἅλλοις κοινωνία. καὶ τῇ τῇ τῶν χυμάς καὶ δεινῷ ἕποτε αἰτίων ὡς πάση συνέπεται τῷ αὐτῷ δίκαιον εἶναι.

Chrysippus Ethica II.112. Φιλόδας δ' εἶναι κοινωνίαν 

βίου.
Diogenes Laertius Zeno VII.124. "λέει δ' ἐκαὶ τὴν ψυχήν ἐν μανώις τῶν σπουδαίοις εἰναί διὰ τὴν δοκιμήταν. οὕτως δ' μετα τῆς κοινωνίας τινα εἶναι τῶν κατὰ τὸν βίον, χρωμάτων ἡμῶν τοῖς φιλοίς ὑπὸ ἔρευς.

Diogenes Laertius Epic. X.120. "ὁ δὲ προκατάρθεσθαι—καὶ γὰρ τὴν γὰρ οπερέατη—συνιστάσθαι δὲ αὐτὴν μετα κοινωνίαν ἐν τοῖς ταῖς «μεγίσταις» ἡδοναῖς ἐκπεπληθήσθην ἔνοις.

Alexis Frag. 296. ὥσπερ μανιάς κοινωνίαν ἔχει τίνα.


Theophrastus Phys. Opin. Fr. 4. "Ἀναφέροντες μὲν γὰρ Ἑὐστράτου Πλατωνίτης κοινωνίας τῆς Ἀνθρωπίνου φιλοσοφίας πρῶτος μετέτηθα τοῖς περὶ τῶν ἀρχῶν ὁδήγοις καὶ τῶν ἐλέποισαν αὐτῶν ἀνεπληρεῖς τὰς μὲν σωματικὰς ἀσέρειας ποιήσας.

Theophrastus Phys. Opin. Fr. 8. "Δεύκτιππος δὲ τὴν Ἑλεάτὴν Ἡμίλησιον—ἀμφοτέρως γὰρ λέγεται περὶ αὐτοῦ—κοινωνίας Ἡμίλησιον τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἐκδίδοντα Ἡμίλησιον καὶ Ἐρανοῖον περὶ τῶν ὀρθῶν ὀδῶν, ὅπως διδάξει τὴν ἐκκλησίαν.

Empedocles Frag. 21. φησὶ δὲ Νεάνθη ὃτι ἀφίκῃ Πυθαγόρειοι τοὺς δοῦμεν.

Josephus Jewish Antig. II.62. τῶν δὲ ἐν τοῖς ἄντων ὄντων ἐποτε πάνταντες τοῖς περὶ τῇ ἑκαταπωρίας ἐστὶν ὁμιλίας, οὐ γὰρ κατὰ κοινωνίας τὴς ὁμοίας τουφοράς, τρεπόμενων καὶ παρὰ ἀλλήλων τὰς ἀιτίας..

Dephilus Frag. 32. ...ἡ τῶν ποιούντων ἡμῶν κοινωνία τις;

Antiphanes the Younger οὕτως ἐταϊρ. <δ> παράσιτος,

Amphis Frag. 20. ἐν ταῖς θριάλωσις τής ὄλης, ἀπολαμβάνει καὶ ἐπὶ οἷς τέκνης ἐξήκοντες, ἀπὸ τῶν γυναικῶν ἀνθρώπων κοινωνίας, ἀποφέροις, ὁλ'àν τῆς ὑποφρίας γεροντικῆς, τήν ἀναφέρον τυχήν.

Josephus Against Apion I.35. οὕτως ἐταϊρ. τῶν αἰγυπτίων ἔχοντες προσέχθητε πάλαις ἕχουντες αὐταῖς ὅπως οἱ πρᾶξεις ἀλλόφυλων κοινωνίας ὑπορέων.
Philo On Abraham 100.  


 SEG Frag. 247.  

 SEG Frag. 250.  

 SEG Frag. 255.  

 SIG Frag. 647.  

 SIG Frag. 873.  

 SIG Frag. 1106.  

 SIG Frag. 531.  

 SIG Frag. 531.  

 SIG Frag. 646.  

 Polybius Histories II. 45. 2.  

 Πρός τον Βασιλέα Δικαστών και συμπλήρωσε διαφορές ανά τον Χείρας.
Polybius Histories II.61.11. διὰ τίνος δ’ ἔργου λάλειν ἃν παρομοίησαι πρὸς φυλάκην πίστεως καὶ πρὸς ἀληθινῶν πραγμάτων καὶ βεβαίων κοινωνίαν;

Polybius Histories IV.35.10. καὶ καταστηθήναν δὲ κοινωνοῦντες ἐφεξῆς τῆς αἱρέσεως τῶν στασιμῶν . . .

Polybius Histories III.2.3. ἐπικαλέσθω κοινωνεῖν κάρηνδονίους τῶν αὐτῶν ἔλεγξων . . .

Polybius Histories IX.31.4. . . . μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα βούλευσαι καὶ πολλάκις ευχόμενος δόγμας ἐδόν τοὺς πολέμοις ὡς τις κοινωνεῖν πραγμάτων, Ἀρεσκὸς ὁ Μακεδών . . .

Polybius Histories IX.39.6. . . . Αχιλλός δὲ καὶ Μακεδόν κοινωνεῖ τῶν αὐτῶν ἔλεγξων.

Polybius Histories IX.37.5. . . . τίσι δὲ νῦν κοινωνεῖτε τῶν ἔλεγξων, ἢ πρὸς ποιαν παρακάλεστε τούτων συμμαχίαν;

Polybius Histories 18.48.7. . . . καὶ τῶν μὲν πρῶς καὶ πολιτικῶς ἐκφρασμένων αὐτοῖς ἐπὶ τῷ μή κοινωνικῶς χρῆσθαι, τοῖς ἐκπυχμάς, μὴ δὲ τηρεῖν ταῖς ἐκ ἀρχής συνβήκας . . .

Polybius Histories IX.25.5. . . . πρὸς γὰρ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἑρή γενναίοτατα κεκοινωνηκότας εναυτός πραγμάτων τοὺς προειρημένους ἀπὸ τῆς πρώτης ἡλικίας . . .

Polybius Histories I.43.3. . . . ζῆν ἐμπυρίσθαι τῇ πρὸς αὐτῶν πίστει καὶ μὴ κοινωνεῖσθαι τοῖς ἐξελευθεροῦντας τῆς ἐπικαλή.

Polybius Histories 31.18.6. . . . παλαιότατος τόσον ἐν Κυπριάνους ἀφετέρους καὶ τὰς πόλεις συμπυκνών τῶν τούτων, καὶ κοινωνηκέναι δὲ περί τῶν ἀποστάσεως . . .

Polybius Histories I.6.7. . . . οὐθεὶς ἐπιλέγομεν καὶ καταστρέφομεν τόσον κοινωνήσαντες Πύρρου τῶν πραγμάτων.

Polybius Histories II.32.8. . . . εὐχαριστοῦσα τοιούτος ἀνδρὰς τοῦτοι νόμον καὶ πράγματος κοινωνεῖν.

Polybius Histories II.42.5. . . . πολλοὶ δὲ κοινωνήσαντες πραγμάτων πλείστων ἃ καὶ καλλίστων ἐχώματος . . .

Diodorus Siculus Histories V.9.4. . . . οἱ δὲ πρὸς τῶν ἱεραίων ἀντίκεισθαι καὶ τὰς αὐτόμενοι δὲ κοιναὶ ποιήσαμεν καὶ ἄλλος καὶ μικρὸς, διὸ τῶν χρόνων κοινωνικῶς βιοῦμεν.
Daloxenus Frag. 2.

Athenaeus Deipnosophistae XIV. 617: Κοινωνεῖ γὰρ ὡς μειρακίδιον ὡς τοῖς ἀδόξοις μουσικῆς καὶ τῷ λύρα τοῖς ἑμετέροις παιννισεῖς.

Ephippus Frag.

Lucian Frum. in Words 6.55: Καὶ ὅμως ἐστολὴ γυναγγίζει καὶ ἀναφορὰς, οὐ πάντα πειθόμενα οὐδὲ ἐν μάρτις ἐνεχόμενα ἄριτον κοινωνίαν.
APPENDIX III
GREEK TEXTS FOR CHAPTER V

Philo De Vita Mosis I.158. οὐχὶ καὶ μετὰ τούτου τῆς πρὸς τοὺς πατέρας τῶν ἀτόμων καὶ πατέραν κοινωνίας ἀπέλαυσε προφέρεσαν τής οὕτης ἀξίωσις;

Philo De Spec. Legibus I.131. ἦν τε ἐνυπήκοα τιμὸς ἐκ τῆς κοινωνίας τῶν καὶ ἐνυπηκοόν ἐπενεχθέντοι διεὶς καὶ τοῖς περί ἔναν πραγματεύοντας δεῖν καὶ τοῖς ἐφησικόν μεῖον τῶν κλήσεων ἐπιμελητέον.

Philo De Spec. Legibus I.221. εὐστομοκοιτός τινὰ ἐν τοῖς τὸν πατέραν καὶ φιλοδίκους ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ διείσθη πρὸς τοὺς δυσλόγους τῶν τῆς πατέρας ἐπίστολάς ὑπὲρ ἐνδείξεις ἐς τῆν.

Philo De Spec. Legibus II.107. ὁ δὲ τῶν παθητικῶν διδασκόμενοι μεταφθιόντες καὶ κοινωνίου ἐνόπλως παραγόμενος ὁ δὲ γένεται, διὸ πάντως τοῖς ἑπίστοις ἀκαίρως ἐπὶ φοιτῶν ἀντιπαράσιμον πρὸς ἐπιστολάς διείσθην...

Philo De Spec. Legibus II.108. ὃς δὲ τῶν κοινωνίων ἐκάληκε τῶν κοσμών καὶ τῆς ἑταίρας ἐφοδίας ἀρισθὲν.

Philo Hypothetica II.1. ἡμέτερος ὑμῶν ἔδειξεν ἐπὶ κοινωνίαν...

Philo Quod Omnis Probus 84. τοῦ δὲ γιαλλοῦ τῆς ζύσεως, ἡ τῆς πάντως ὑποκειμένη κοινωνίας, περὶ ὧν ὁ κύριος προειρήθη ζύσεως.

Philo Quod Omnis Probus 91. ἡ τῶν πατέρας ὑποκειμένη κοινωνίας, ἡ μὲν τῆς πάντως ὑποκειμένης κοινωνίας, ἡ δὲ τῆς πατέρας ὑποκειμένης κοινωνίας, ἡ δέ τῆς πατέρας ἐφεσικά τῶν δήλωσιν.

Josephus Jewish Wars II.8.3. καταφρονεῖν τοῦ πληθοῦς καὶ συμμάχων τοῦ καθολικοῦ, οἷον ἔστων ἐπερεῖν κρίνει τινὰ παρὰ τούτοις ὑπερεχόμενοι.

Sirach 13.17. ἡ κοινωνίας λύσεως ἄμως.

Sirach 13.2. τοῦ πατρὸς ὑπερεχόμενος καὶ τοῦ συμμαχοῦντος.

Sirach 13.2. βάρος ὑπὲρ ὅν καὶ ὑπερεχόμενος καὶ κοινωνίας.
Wisdom 6.23. οὐτε μὴν φθάνη ταπεινότητι ευνοεῖσθαι,
οὐτε μὴν φθάνῃ τεσσαράκοστη ευνοεῖσθαι,
Malachi 2.14. λύει κοινωνίας σου καὶ γυνὴ ζευγής σου.
II Maccabees 14.25. ἔγιναν ἐστιν ἡμῖν ξυλωμένης μίας.
III Maccabees 4.6. ὅταν ἔρει πρὸς αὐτούς κοινωνίας ἡμῶν
ὑπελαμβάνει πατέρα ἡμῶν.
Job 34.8. ἐγίναν ἐστιν ἡμῖν ἡμῖν.
Proverbs 1.11. κρύφωμεν ὅτε ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἁμαρτήματα.
Proverbs 28.24. ὅτε ἐπιβάλλεται πατέρα ἡ μητέρα καὶ 
Ἰσαίας 1.23. ὅτε ἀρχότας σου ἄρχει ἡμῖν, κοινωνίας 
Sirach 13.1. ὅτε ἀρχόντας κοινωνίας ἐστίν ἡμῖν.
Sirach 6.10. καὶ ὅτε μὴ παραμένει ἐν διόρεσθαι ἀλλικάς σου.
Wisdom 8.18. καὶ ἐκκλησία ἐν κοινωνίας λόγων αὐτῶν.
IV Kings 7.11. καὶ ἐποίησαν κοινωνίας καὶ εἰσῆλθαν 
tο θέως τοῦ θεοῦ συμμετέχον τούτων τούτων.
II Maccabees 5.20. διὰ τοῦτο μὴν τοὺς ἐννοεῖσθαι καὶ ἐκκλησίας 
Ἐξολοθρεύσεως συμμετέχον τούτων τούτων.
IV Maccabees 7.6. καὶ ἔπεσεν ἐπὶ τοὺς ἱερεὺς ἐκκλησίας 
Sirach 13.1. ὅτε ἀρχόντας κοινωνίας ἐστίν ἡμῖν.
III Maccabees 2.31. ἐν τοῖς συμμετέχοντες τοῖς θεοὺς
II Chronicles 20.35. καὶ μετὰ τοῦτο συνένησεν Ἡσορᾶς

βασιλεὺς Ιουδαί πρὸς Οχθίαν βασιλεύον Ἰσραήλ...
Esther 8.13.
κοινωνόν ἔσθηρ...
καὶ ἐν ἀλήθειαν τῆς βασιλείας...

Leviticus 6.2.
...ἐν ἀλήθεια...περὶ κοινωνίας...

Sirach 41.19.
...ἐν τοῖς ἁμαρτίαις...

Sirach 42.3.
...καὶ φίλου περὶ ἁμαρτίας...

Matthew 23.30.
...ἐκ ὑμῶν ἐν ταῖς ἡμέρας τῶν πατέρων τῶν προφητῶν...

Luke 5.10.
...τῆς Σίμωνος...

Acts 2.42.
...καὶ κοινωνεῖτε τοῖς ἐρωτοῖς...

...τίς δὲ κοινωνία φωτὸς πρὸς σκότος;...

Apocalypse 18.4.
...καὶ μὴ συγκοινωνήσετε ταῖς ἁμαρτίαις...

Ephesians 5.11.
...καὶ μὴ συγκοινωνεῖτε τοῖς ἐρωτοῖς τῶν...

I Timothy 5.22.
...καὶ δεικνύει ἁμαρτίας ἀλλοτρίας...

II John 1.
...οἱ λέγουσιν ὑμῖν ἵνα ἐχεῖτε κοινωνία...

I John 1.3.
...καὶ δεικνύει κοινωνίαν ἔχετε μεθ᾽ ἡμῶν...

I John 1.6-7.
...ἐναντίων δέν κοινωνίαν ἔχουσιν μετὰ ἡμῶν, καὶ ἐν τοῖς σκότοις περιπατοῦντες...

Galatians 2.9.
...δεικνύει διακοσμοῖς ἐναι καὶ Βαρνάβαν κοινωνίας ἐν ἡμῖν εἰς τὴν ἡγεμονίαν...

II Corinthians 8.23.
...εἰς ὅπερ Τίτον, κοινωνίαν ἔμοι καὶ εἰς θυμὸς συνεργοῦ. ἔτοι ἀδελφοί ἡμῶν, ἀπόστολοι ἐκκλησίας, ἐναντίων τὶς κοινωνίαν, προσκέψεω

Philemon 17.
...εἰ οὖν με ἐχεῖς κοινωνίαν, προσκέψεω
I Corinthians 1.9. πιστός ὁ Θεός, διὰ δέκαλύτεε εἰς κοινωνίαν τοῦ ιδίου αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ τοῦ κυρίου ἡμῶν.

I John 1.3. καὶ μετὰ τοῦ ιδίου αὐτοῦ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ.

II Corinthians 13.13. Ἔνα χρῖς τοῦ κυρίου Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, καὶ ἰδία καὶ κοινωνία τοῦ Αγίου Πνεύματος μετὰ πάντων ὑμῶν.

Philippians 2.1. καὶ τίς κοινωνία πνεύματος...

I Corinthians 10.16. Το ποτήριον τῆς εὐλογίας ἐγερθομεν, ὑμεῖς κοινωνία τοῦ αἵματος τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἔστιν; εἰς ἀρτον τὸν κλῆσαν ὑμᾶς κοινωνία τοῦ ιδίου τοῦ Χριστοῦ ἐστίν;...οδέος κοινωνοὶ τοῦ θεοστηρίου εἰσίν;

II Peter 1.4. ἵνα γένητο μὴς κοινωνοὶ φύεσαι...

Philippians 3.10. ἵνα γένητο μὴς κοινωνοὶ φύεσαι...

II Peter 1.4. ἵνα γένητο μὴς κοινωνοὶ φύεσαι...

Philippians 3.10. ἵνα γένητο μὴς κοινωνοὶ φύεσαι...

Apocalypse 1.9. Ἔγιν Ἱουάννης καὶ ἀδελφὸς ὑμῶν καὶ τοῦ τοῦ Χριστοῦ Ἰησοῦ...

I Peter 4.13. Πάντα δὲ ποιῶ διὰ τῷ οὐράνιον...

I Peter 5.1. Πρεσβύτερος... ὑμῖν καὶ τῆς μελλοντος ἀπαγορευθήσατε...

Hebrews 10.33. ἰδία καὶ τῆς Εὐαγγελίας...

Philippians 1.7. ἱνα εἰδῆς οὕτως.

II Corinthians 1.7. ἵνα εἰδῆς οὕτως καὶ τῆς παρακλήσεως,
Romans 15.27. ...εἰ δὲ τοῖς πνευματικοῖς αὐτῶν ἐκκοινωνήθη τὰ εἴδη, διδασκαλίας καὶ ἐν τοῖς εὐαγγελίαις λειτουργοῦσαι αὐτοῖς.

Romans 11.17. ...κινδύνουν δὲ εἰς αὐτοὺς καὶ συγκοινωνίας τῆς ρίζης καὶ τῆς προσκύνησις τῆς εὐαγγελίων, μὴ λατρεύσασθαι τῶν κλάδων.

II Corinthians 8.4. ...την κοινωνίαν τῆς διακοινίας τῆς τούτων ἁγίων δοξάδος διὰ τῶν κλάδων.

Romans 15.26. εὐδοκήσας γὰρ Μακεδονίαν καὶ Ἀχαίαν κοινωνίαν τινὰ ποιήσας, εἰς τοὺς περίτους τῶν ἄγγισιν τῶν ἐν Ιεροοἶκης.

Romans 12.13. ...τὴς κρατείσας τῶν δόμον κοινωνίας...

II Corinthians 9.13. ...καὶ ἀποδημοῦτος τῆς κοινωνίας εἰς

Hebrews 13.16. εἰς λατρείαν...

I Timothy 6.18. εἰς τον μελλόν... κοινωνικοὶ, ἀποθηκευόμενοι

Galatians 6.6. λόγον τινὰ κατάχωντες ἐν πάσιν ἄγαθοσ.

Philemon 6. ὅπως ἡ κοινωνία τῆς πίστεως τοῦ ἐνεργοῦ γενηται ἐν εἰρήνῃ παντὸς ἄγαθον ὑπὸ τῶν ἐν Ἰησοῦ Χριστῶν Ἰησοῦν.

Philippians 1.5. ὑπὲρ τῆς κοινωνίας ὑμῶν ὡς τὸ εὐαγγέλιον ἀπὸ πρώτης ἡμέρας ἐκρίθη καὶ μοναδικῶς

Philippians 4.15. ...καὶ ἐκκλησίαι ἐκκοινώνησαν εἰς λόγον χάρασιν καὶ λήμφες εἰ μὴ διεἰσε ἀλλοι...

Clement Protrepticus II.25.3. ἢν δὲ τοὺς ἐν ζώσιμοις ἄρχαιος πρὸς οὐράνιον ἄνθρωπος κοινωνία, ἵνα μὴ ζωκοιμηθῇ, ὑπὸν δὲ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ ἀνάλαμπονας σημεῖα ἐπὶ ἐκτινὰ λέξεις τίνι τῇ...

Clement Paedagogus III.25.2. ἐνεχθηκέναι τοῦ λόγου, τοῦ λαμά τοῦ ἀνθρώπινον καὶ τῆς Χριστος κοινωνία.

Clement Excer. ex. Theodoto 5.4. δὲ ὁ φύλος ἔδει, μετεξελάθεγκαν κοινωνοῦσα τῷ ἐκκλησίᾳ τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ λαβοῦτ τῇ ἑπτὰ πρὸς πάνες.
Clement Protrepticus IX.82.5. τῆς βασιλείας τῆς πατρίδος γονίων τὸν ἀγαπηθέντα
κοινωνεῖ τῷ γνώσει τῷ ἡγαγόμενῳ.

Clement Paedagogus I.VII.56.3. φιλίας ἐνεπέδρα ἐπιστήμης ἐστὶ
κοινωνία.

Clement Paedagogus I.VI.50.3-4. ο这个地方 ἰδοὺ ἡ αὐτοκηφαλία τῆς ἱδίας ἡ
πρὸς τὸ ὤν τὸν Κοινωνίας οὖν ἀντιπάθεια τῆς ἱδίας προσπαθεῖμεν ὡς προσπαθεῖμεν
καὶ ἵνα δόξα ἔχῃ πρὸς τῷ διδασκῆσαι κοινωνιών, τούτοις ἔχει τῇ γνώσει τῆς
κοινωνίας πρὸς τῷ ὤν.

Clement Paedagogus I.VI.51.2. καθα τὸ ὡς ὄν τῆς πίστεως ἡ
κοινωνία ἡ πνευματικὴ πρὸς τὸν πάθητον ἄνθρωπον, τῶν μερίσματος ἐξαρθεῖσα ἡ
οἰκεία οὐσία συνελέει τοῖς ἄνθρωποι, τοῖς οἷοι Ἀπανθησίζομεν.

Clement Paedagogus II.I.6.1-2. ἐτίμη μὲ ἔθνων κοινωνίας καὶ
ἐνεμεταδόσεως.

Clement Paedagogus II.I.7.3. ἔφαβε γὰρ κοινοτρόφος Λεσβώρκιος ἐν
κοινωνίας ἐστὶν ἐφόσον ἔχουσι πλούσιον.

Clement Paedagogus II.I.10.2. μεταληψάτων δὲ τῶν παρατεθεμένων,
ὅπερ πρὸς ἡμῖν ἁπλωμένα μὲν τὴν ἀλήθειαν κατὰ τὴν ἁβαλαθή καὶ
ἀπροσκορή τῆς συνελέεις κοινωνίας...

Clement Paedagogus II.I.14.6. παυσάτερ δὲ οὐκ εἰς ἀπαλαύσιν
ἔρμοι, ἀλλὰ εἰς ἐμποδίσεις κοινωνίας ἐπιστήμειοι.

Clement Paedagogus II.VIII.73.2.οδὸν κοινωνητῶν οὐδὲ ὀνομασίαν
φαίνοντο, ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ ἢν ἐκεῖνα τῷ θεῷ τῶν ἵσων διὰν ἐκεῖνα τῶν
νεκρῶν καταστήσεωι.

Clement Paedagogus III.IV.31.3. καὶ γὰρ αἱ περὶ νόμου τῆς ποιητικῆς
μὴ μεταλαμβάνουσι τῶν ἰδιών κοινωνιών λοιπῶν.

Clement Paedagogus III.X.52.1. ποιητικῶς γέγονε τῇ κοινωνίας
tὸ ἑυμανθέν...

Clement Paedagogus II.XIII.120.3.παράγετος δὲ τῷ γένος ὡς ἐπὶ
kοινωνίας δὲ θεὸς ἀνάφερε τῶν ἡμών προτέρως μεταθεῖς καὶ κοινὸς πάσιν
ἀνθρώποις τῶν ἡμῶν ἐπικουρήσας λόγον, τῶν πάντων ὑπὲρ πάντων.

Clement Paedagogus II.III.38.4. τοῦτο καὶ κατὰ μεθανεμένων καὶ
χρώματι εὐκάλυψιν ἐπανοίουσιν καὶ φυλάττουσιν μιᾶς καὶ κοινωνιών ἐκ
καλῶν λατρευτὴν "Αἴμησιν".

Clement Stromata VI.IX.79.2. καὶ ἐν περιπέτεια καταστεκόμενος,
ἀλλὰ μὴ τούτο διὰ προφοβοῦσα, ἐκ δὲ τῆς κατὰ τὸν βίον κοινωνιᾶς ἐς
καθαρισμαν.
Clement Paedagogus II.XII.129.1 ἂν ὅπι μὲν καρπὸς τῶν χειρῶν ὅμων κόσμος ἄγιος, εἰς τῆς δικαιοσύνης κοινωνία καὶ ἔργα ἀκαρίας.

Clement Paedagogus III.VII.38.2... τοὺς δεομένους κοινωνήσατε...

Clement Paedagogus III.XII.120.4 καὶ πάντες μὲν καὶ πλεούν οὗτοι ἀνθρώπινον οὐδὲ κοινωνίαν, ἤτοι δὲ μᾶλλον ἄρρητοι.

Clement Stromata I.VI.34.4. φύσει δὲ κοινωνίας καὶ δικαίως ὁ θεὸς ἡμᾶς ἐκδοθεῖσθην.

Clement Stromata II.XVI.73.4. κοινωνίας μὲν ὑπὲρ ἀνθρώπων ὑπὸ δικαιοσύνης γίνεται.

Clement Quis Dives Salv. 13.6. Τὴν κοινωνίαν ἔπιτέσσερι...

Clement Quis Dives Salv. 13.7. οἰ δὲ τὰς χρήματα οὕς οὗν ἐπὶ ἐκληρούσης τάντας μὴ ἀπὸ χρημάτων εὐλογίας καὶ χρημάτων ἀφετέρων κατατείχα ταῖς, καὶ ἐν τῷ πρόφατῳ δίδωσιν ἐκ καὶ μὴ διδώσαντο παραιτών, πρέπει καὶ ἑαυτοὶ πρέπειν, ὑποδέχεσθαι καὶ ἐπαλατείζειν, κοινωνεῖν καὶ μὴ κοινωνεῖν, ἀπὸ ἐπάνων ἄλογοτάτων.

Clement Quis Dives Salv. 13.1. τὸ γὰρ ἦν κοινωνία μεταλείποντα παρὰ ἀνθρώπων, σὸς ὅπερ ἔχον ὄρθον;

Clement Quis Dives Salv. 31.8. δία μὴ ὁμογενῶν καὶ διακρίνεις καὶ λύπης [καὶ] κοινωνοῦσα, ὑπὸ ἔστιν ἐπιδημίες καὶ ἀδικία.

Clement Stromata II.XVIII.84. πέρι τοῦ τε μεταδόσεως καὶ κοινωνίας πολλῶν ὄντων, ἐπικρατεῖν μόνον τούτῳ τείτειν ὅτι ὁ νόμος ἀπαρέχει. ἐδεικτὴς δανείζειν (ἐδεικτὴς δανείζειν) ὅτι μόνον τῶν τέκνων τῶν ἔθνων ἕκαστος φόρος πονέων ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι ἰδιότηται ἐς ἐμοικονόμους εἰς καὶ τοῦ ἀλλοτρίου λόγου κοινωνίας καὶ ἀλλὰ ἐνακομεῖσαι ἤρθη καὶ ἔνυμαι ἀποτελεῖται καὶ ἐκείνοις.

Clement Stromata II.XVIII.85. διὰ τούτου εἰ δέλλα τοὺς μὲν κρέας τῶν κοινωνίας καὶ μεγαλορρούσης ὑμάσκών ἐκ τοῦ προέρχεται καὶ τῶν ἴδιων τῶν δεομένων, τοῖς πάντως ἐδέσμευσαν περίδων ἀφρώδων...

Clement Stromata II.XVIII.86. ἡ δὲ τῶν ὑμῶν συνείης ἐς ὑποτεθέμενος καὶ ἐς κοινωνίας καὶ ἑς δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἑς συνείης καὶ ἑς πιλανθρωπίας παραπομπὴς ἡμῶν πρὸς τοῦ νόμου;

Clement Stromata II.XIX.102.4. <φίλων μὲν κοινωνήτευν, ἐν' ἔτι καὶ μᾶλλον περιμένει φίλος, ἔχθρος δὲ ἐπικριτήκειν, ἢν μη δὲν κατὰ ἕχθρος.

Clement Stromata II.XIX.42.1. Φιλαδελφία ἡ φιλανθρωπία τοῖς τοῦ ἄποικος πνεῦμας κοινωνίκοσιν.
Clement Paed. III.VII.39.3. οὖν θες ὀ μετάδοσις ἢ ἄλλη φιλαδέλφειας ὅπως θυσία πίνη, κοινωνείτας τοις διμυρί τοῦ ποιτοῦ ζητείτας πάλιν καὶ πιστευταί...  

Clement Quis Div.Salv.32.1. ἐπιτείχει τηλικοῦτα μιαθεῖσα τῆς κοινωνίας, οἰκεῖον σκηνήν.  

Clement Strom. IV.XVIII.112.2. κατὰ τὸν τῆς κοινωνίας τῇ ἁρπακτικῇ λόγον...  

Clement Ecl. Prophet. 27.7. καὶ κινδυνεύει ὅποι πάλης τῆς ἁρπακτικῇ ὁ μόνον παντὶ τῷ προσηγόνται, ἐκ ἑαυτῷ ὡς ἀνάξιως ἄνωθεν κοινωνικῶς.  

Clement Strom. I.I.6.3. ...μὴ μεταλλήφῃς χάριν τῶν κοσμικῶν προσώπων κοινωνικοῦ τῶν ἐπιτείχεων μαθημάτων τοὺς μιαθεῖσας τῷ Χριστῷ.  

Clement Stromata I.I.1.2-3. ...κοινωνίαν δὲ ἢ Ῥιφά καὶ φιλανθρωπίαν.  

Clement Stromata I.I.6.1. μὴ φιλόνοσος ἢ κοινωνία τῷ λόγῳ...  

Clement Stromata I.VIII.42.2. ...ἀρετιῶν τοῦ ὁρθοῦ καὶ δικίου λόγου τῷ κοινωνοῦν τῇ ἀθετοῦσι πιστεύειν.  

Clement Stromata I.XXVI.168.1. πολιτείαι γαῖαν οἰκονόμησαν ἄγαθα... ὡς ἐντείης ἐτροφῇ ἀνθρώπων... καὶ πάντως κοινωνικῶς.  

Clement Stromata II.IX.163.1. ἡμέρα ἡ δὲ ἐνδονία ἐν ἑαυτῷ τῶν κατὰ τὸν λόγον καὶ τὸν βίον καὶ τὸν τρόπον ἐφηρεύεται εἰς τὴν κοινωνίαν βίου...  

Clement Stromata II.XVIII.872-3. ἀξιόπιστος ἐστιν ἐν πᾶσιν, ἀδικήσιος, κοινωνικός... φυσικὴν κοινωνίαν διδάσκει...  

Clement Stromata II.XIX.101.3. στερρά γὰρ ἡ ἐκ λόγου ἱδρυτη... εἰς τὸ νεότερον καὶ μέσον τὸ κακὰ ἀνωτέρων κοινωνικῶν σε εὐεργετεῖται καὶ μεταδοθικὸν καὶ βιωφόρα. Κοινώς γὰρ ἡ ἐκ χάριτος φιλία, τὸ δὲ ἔστεκεν καὶ τρεῖς ἡμέρας μὲν τὸ ἐκ συνθέσεως φιλίαν, διὰ τὸ ἐκ τῶν ἕξω ἔστεκεν καὶ μεταβαλλότων.  

Clement Stromata II.XV.68.1-2. 'καθαρὰ δὲ λοιμῶν' καὶ τὰ δέσματα καὶ τὰ δικαστήρια εἰσὶν τὸν ἴδιον, ὡσπερ καὶ μάλλον ἡ ἐξακολουθεῖσα τῆς θυσίας καὶ τῆς Ἀποκαλυπτικῆς ἐξουσίας καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὰ ἔργα αὐτῶν κοινωνία.  

Clement Stromata II.XX.108.3. ...ἀκολουθεῖσιν αὐτὴν ἐκ τῆς πρὸς τὸν συνοδόν βίον κοινωνίας.  

Clement Stromata III.XVII.102-3. ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλλῶν λόγων ἤρθην εἰς ἐπιτείχεια τῆς συνοπτικῆς καὶ ἄρα τὸν ἂνθρώπων καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς ἀκολούθησα χρόνον ἐκεῖνον τὸν...  

Clement Stromata III.XIII.92.1. τῆς ἰδίως... αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν τοῦ δικαστηρίου, εἰ μεταδίδοντες ἰδίως καὶ τῆς πλάνης ἀπήλλαξαν καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῶν μορίων καὶ προσδεδότων καὶ ἐξοδίον.
Clement Stromata III.XVII.104.5. Καί τῇ ἀκροτήτῃ ἡθοπόρη ἐντὸς οὗ ἢν ὢν ὄναται κοινωνίας ἔχειν μετὰ τῆς ἐφθαρσίας, διὸς ἔστι σωματικότητα.

Clement Stromata III.II.6.1. Ἐπείρουν δὲ καὶ γεννώσθαι ἐπὶ Γῆς, κοινωνίαν ὥσπερ σωματικότητα ἔχοντες ἔχοντες.

Clement Stromata III.II.7.1. ἢ ἢρ ἔστης ἐν τοῖς νόμοις τῆς κοινωνίας ἑαυτοῦ νόμου καταστάσεως καὶ παρατόρισθαι.

Clement Stromata III.II.7.2. ἢ δὲ κοινωνία παραομοιοθετεῖ καὶ τῇ τῇ ἴσως ἔξωθής ἐγγίνεσθαι θρησκείας καὶ ἑρωτικῆς κλάσεως.

Clement Stromata III.II.7.4. ἢ δὲ κοινωνία παραομοιοθετεῖ καὶ τῇ τῇ ἴσως ἔξωθής ἐγγίνεσθαι ἐθικοτήτος καὶ ἑρωτικῆς κλάσεως.

Clement Stromata III.II.8.6. τὸς γὰρ όμοιος ἐνοπτὸς ἀνθρώπου ποιήσεις καὶ τῇ διήνυστῃ ἀνθρώπου ποιήσεις καὶ τῇ διήνυστῃ ζωής κοιλίας τῆς σιωπηθείας ἀνάφηκαν κοινωνίας μετὰ ἱστοπολίτες. οὐδὲ γεγονότες εἰς τὴν συνάγουσαν κοινωνίας τῆς γένεσιν αὐτῶν ἀπηρυάκησαν καὶ ῥακίσαν. καὶ μὲν ἀδιάφορος ἔστιν, ὅντος ἡμῶν κοινωνίαν ἑπάνων, ὧν ἔστη ἐνοπτοῦ τῶν ἱματων.

Clement Stromata III.II.9.3. ἠδότησα τὴν κοινωνίαν ἀναγκαίως ἐξε τῇ ἔθνοι τοῖς ἔκτοις.

Clement Stromata III.II.10.1. μειῳσάσθαι χαίροντας ἐν τῇ κοινωνίᾳ... 

Clement Stromata III.IV.25.5. ἐπεμνήσθηκαν δὲ καὶ ὅτι κατὰ καθορισμὸν ᾧ ἡ ἐκκλησία ἐγνώμων κοινωνίας...

Clement Stromata III.IV.27.1-2. δὴ κοινωνία ἄγαθον μὲν ἐν μεταδόσει, ἀρχηγῶς καὶ τροφή καὶ θρόνος... 

Clement Stromata III.XII.36.48 ὡςτε δὲ ὧν περὶ τεκνομοίρας ἠρρήτηκαν ἑλθαί εἰς μεταδομὸν κοινωνίας προπρότερον καὶ ἠσθαλεῖ μόνον τὴν τῶν τῶν μὴν ἀνθρώπου περιουσία, ἐπικουρεῖ ὡς τῶν δεισιδεισυς μὴ τοῦ πουλωμένους.

Clement Stromata III.IV.27.1-2. Ἐπειδὲ δὲ τὴν πανθεύμαν Ἀφροδίτην κοινωνίαν μυστικὸν ἀνάγομον... 

Clement Stromata III.IV.27.2. δὲ καὶ τὴν ἐπίθετος ἐπάνω ἢν Ἀφροδίτης ὑμμάτων κοινωνίας ἀπέδωκεν κακὸν κακόν.

Clement Stromata III.IV.274-5. καὶ τῶν τῶν κυρίων φωνῶν ἑπιστρέφοντοι καὶ τῆς ἐκκλησίας κοινωνίας, ἢ τῆς λαγνὲς ἁδερφοῖ...
Clement Strom. III. IV. 27.4-5. ὁ γὰρ τριετήλεια τὴν ἑτεροδοξίαν καὶ [ἐν] σωστικὴν κοινωνίαν ἑρωφανεύει καὶ εἰς τὴν γραφήν κύριος ἑσύχασε ἐν τὴν ἐποχὴν τῶν θεόν. ἐπὶ τὸ χρισμός τιμῶν μὲν οὖν ἡ τοιχὸς εἰς-διοικε Κοινωνία ...

Clement Strom. III. IV. 29.2-3. ἐγὼ τὰ πάντα ἐπίπεδο ἔδειξαν αὐτῶν τὴν ἑφεσίαν μὴ εἰσαι μὲν γὰρ ἔδειξαν ἀπὸ αὐτῶν ἑπιστῶς καὶ οἰκουμενίαν αὐτὴ καὶ οἰκουμενίαν τὸν ἑρωρωύ. ἐγὼ δὲ τούτου ἐκδόθη ἢ ἐφιλοτήτως ἐδειξαμένη. μὲν οὖν κοινωνίας ἐπιφέραν δυνάμεις μὴν δραμάτως μὴν ἠκοφοροθήκα αὐτὰ συμμένης.

Clement Stromata III. IV. 29.3. ὁ γὰρ καὶ ὅταν κἀκεκάτοπος ἐπὶ ὁμαλαντίου πνευματικοῦ ἐπίθεμον κοινωνίας ἦσαν τίς αὐτῶν τὴν ὑπολογίαν ἐπεδέχεται τῷ Θεῷ, ἀρκετοὶ ἐφαρμοζόντες ἐτέρας τρόπους καὶ ὡς προφητεύει τοῦ ἴδιου τοῦ ἰδιαίτερος ἔστι τῶν αἰωνίων.

Clement Stromata III. VI. 32.2. καὶ τῇ ἑπισταθείν ἐστὶν Κοινωνίας ἐκ των Εἰρήνων ἔχον τινα συμχατομεν εὐθύς ἡμῶν καὶ ὡς ποιμαντῶν τὴν ἐκκλησίαν. ἐν αὐτῷ ἐφαρμοζόντας ἐν δύο φημί τοῖς περιπάτεσιν ἐστιν αὐτοῦ ἐν τῷ φωτὶ κοινωνίας ἐχομεν ἐκαταχρασμένων τοῦ Ἀναγόμενος ἡμᾶς ἀπὸ τῆς διαρροῆς.

Clement Stromata III. VIII. 54.1. ὥστε ἡ Κοινωνίας ἀρνώθηκεν καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τὰς ἀποκλήσεις καταληκτὰς. ὡς γὰρ τὸν πᾶν χρηστότά λαμβάνει πρὸς τὸν ἐμποτερήσει, καὶ τὸν κόμον ἀπασχολεῖν ἕναν ἀποκτείνει, τὸν δὲς τῶν ἀνθρώπων αὐτὸν ἐπιφεράμεν, ἑπεκαίνει πάλιν τὴν κοινωνίαν, ἵνα δὲ τὴν λάθον.

Clement Stromata III. VIII. 62.2. καὶ τὴν κοινωνίαν φωτεῖ πρὸς σκότος,

Clement Stromata VII. XII. 89.2. κατακλύσθης τῇ ἀλητρίᾳ, τὴν τεσσαράς κοινωνίας ἐκ τοῦ ταῖς ἀλητρίαις συμβαίνει τῷ ἐπισταθείνι τῆς κοινωνίας, ἔτη τε καὶ συλλογίας ἐς παιδοποιίαν συμμενεν.

Clement Paedagogus II. X. 90.4. καὶ καὶ δρόμος πάντοτε μᾶλλον ὑποτε κοινωνίας καθάπερ θυλείαν πρὸς τέτοιον ἀφροδίσιον τοῦ νόησος.

Clement Paedagogus II. X. 87.3. τὸς δεσμαρίας ἀνθρώπων κοινωνίας...

Clement Paedagogus III. 23.1. ἀλλαξαί εἰς παλαιοῖς τίμιοι τοῖς θεοῦν, ἀνθρώπων ἐμπειρών ἐπικύρωσεν οὖν τοῦ σύμμαχος τὸν πρὸς τὸ δήλο κοινωνίας παρὰ τὸν τῆς φύσεως νόμον δρόμους καταχρησίας ἀλλὰ τῆς σιωπών νόμον.

Clement Paedagogus I. IV. 10.3. καὶ τοῦ κοινωνικοῦ καὶ ἐργα τοῦτον βίου ἐκ τῶν συλλόγων ἐπὶ ἐπάθειον ἐν τῇ ἁμαρτίᾳ ἀδικίαν καὶ ἔργημα, ἀνθρώπων ἐπ' ἀποκεφαλίτως ἐπικύρωσεν ἀνθρώπων καταχρησίας.

Clement Strom. IV. XIX. 123.2. Ἐλειτίζειν ἐφ' οἷν ἡ σώφρων πρῶτον μὲν πείδειν τοῦ ἀνθρώπων κοινωνίας ἀδρίατα τῶν πρὸς εὐθυμιανον σφέδες...
Clement Stromata IV. XX. 127. 2. ... συλλήφτεραι καὶ κοινωνίαν τῆς τοιματίας πράξεως τῶν θεῶν ἐναντίον του... θεοῦ... εἰναι νομίζουσα.

Clement Stromata IV. III. 12. 1. ίμεῖς δὲν εἶναι ὥστε σύμμαχοι τῆς φύσης δικαίωμα τετραγμένος εἶναι, ἀλλὰ ὡς δὲν χαρήθημεν τῆς δικαιοσύνης.

Clement Stromata IV. IV. 17. 1. ἀπὸ ἡμῶν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ εἰς ἐπανάδοσιν παραδίδοντος τὴν πρῶτον ἡμιουργὸν ἀπεχθεῖν...

Clement Stromata IV. VI. 27. 2. ... Θεία τοῦ θεού ἐπιγνώσει τοῦ θεοῦ, καὶ ἐπειδὴ κοινωνία ἀρκετοὶ...

Clement Stromata IV. VII. 47. 4. καθώς κοινωνεῖτε τῶν τοῦ Χριστοῦ παθηματικῶς, χώρετε...

Clement Stromata IV. XIII. 90. 3. εἰς κοινωνία πνευματική...

Clement Stromata IV. XVI. 101. 2ούτο ὡς ἐν συνεσίων τοῦ ἐν Θείᾳ θεοφράστοι, τοῦτο δὲ κοινωνοὶ τῶν σκέτων ἄνεφερομένων ἐζητοῦτε.

Clement Stromata V. XIII. 83. 5. ἢ σοφία, δύναμις ὧν τῷ πατρός... ἀμειβώμεν ἐν τῷ θεῷ τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἀκροτοῦ κοινωνία...

Clement Stromata V. IX. 57. 5. ἢ τῆς κοινωνίας φωτὶ πρὸς σκότος...

Clement Stromata V. IX. 59. 1. Ναὶ μὴ καὶ ἡ Θεογονία συνομιλήσαι καὶ ἢ πρὸς τοὺς διηθῆς διαδικήσεις κοινωνίας, ἀκοινομετρῶς τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ τῶν ἀθροματικῶς ἐπάνως κατοικία...

Clement Stromata VI. X. 81. 2. Εἴητε ἀπὸ πάσης πλάνης καὶ παραγονής σεβεῖτε τοὺς σώματι διαιρῶν, πρὸ τῇ ἀλληλοίᾳ τῷ ἄλλῳ κοινωνεῖτε καὶ πρὸ συνήνοχειν.

Clement Stromata VII. IX. 52. 1. πρὸς τῷ θεοῦ συναφέσιν τοῖς καὶ κοινωνίαν ἐκμεταλλεύσει,

Clement Stromata VII. XI. 62. 3. ἀφηματίδι καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τοῦ βίου...

Clement Stromata VII. XII. 80. 1. κοινωνεῖν δέ τῶν ἑαυτῶν αὖθιαν προ- δομοῦντος τοῖς φίλοις...

Clement Stromata VIII. III. 4. 2. εἰς ὑπὸ τὸ προβληθὲν ὅνομα μεταλληλεύειν Χρις τίς λόγον ὁμολογούμενον τοῖς καίσαρεῖ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσι τῆς σκέψεις...

Clement Stromata I. XXV. 166. 1. συμπιεσάτο τοῖς ἑκάστων πορᾷ συμπαθήματι τοῦ καὶ κοινωνίας τῆς πρὸς ἀλληλα....
Clement Eclog. Proph. 55.1. Οἱ ἀντέχεις σώματα πνευματικά, κοινωνυκτερά ζηλεύοντες ἔφεστον διοικοῦμεν...

Clement Protrepticus IV, 48.6. οὐ καὶ τοῦτο ἐνίστηται τὴν κοινωνίαν τῆς κυρίας...

Clement Stromata I.XXI.142.2. οὕτως ἀλλαὶ ἐστὶ ο SetLastError κοινωνικὴ διαλέκτων ὑπὸ τῶν βραχίων ὑπὸ πλείον τῶν γίγνονται.

Clement Stromata VIII.VIII.24.4 ἔχουσι γὰρ τῶν νυμφῶν, ὅπως ὁ μάλιστα, καὶ ὅταν καὶ λόγων ἐσταυροῦν ἐξουσία μετὰ τοῦ ὑποκείμενον κοινωνοῦντα, ἐξερχόμενοι ὁμοίως ἐξεργάζομαι.

Justin Apologies XIV.2. Ὁ Προφήτης εἰς τὸ τέλος ἐπῆρχε καὶ παντὶ σειρὰντος κοινωνοῦσαν...

Justin Apologies XV.10. Εἰς δὲ τῷ κοινωνικῷ τοῖς σειραίοις καὶ μετὰ ἥπερ μονής ταῦτα ἔφη, 'Στομ ἐντὸς ἐλάττειν διὸκε καὶ τὸν βουλόμενον ἀνείπωβω, μὴ ἀποστράφθητε.

Hermas The Shepherd 51.2.9. Γίγνομαι οὖν ἀμφότεροι κοινωνοῖ τοῦ ἐρρου τοῦ διαλογοῦ.

Origen Comm. on Matth. XI.9.489. ἐγὼ δέ, γεγονός, τοῖς σειραίοις καὶ οὐκ ἔκειντον, ἢ ἀποδοθήκαι διατομέως καὶ διατίματος ἐπὶ τοῖς τῶν νυμφῶν λόγων, τοῖς ἐξουσίοις τοῖς χριστουφόροις ἐπὶ τῶν βουλομένων καταστάσεως.

Origen Comm. on Matth. XI.9.489. Τάοντας τῇ προσ τοὺς γενεῖς τιμὴς μέρος ὡς καὶ τὸ κοινωνεῖν αὐτοῖς τῶν βιωτικῶν φρασίων...

Eusebius Demonstratio Evangel. III.5 ἐγερθεὶς τὸν ἀγγέλιον παρασκεύασαι πάντως καὶ τῷ ἐπιστήμους ἐξερχόμενοι συνεργοῦμεν καὶ τῷ χριστουφόρῳ καὶ κοινωνικῷ περὶ πολλὰς τιμήσεις οὕτως παρασκεύασαι καὶ τῷ πλασμῷ καὶ ἀγγελικῷ καὶ ἑκατοντάρνον συνεργοῦμεν, συνεργοῦμεν ὡς καὶ νόμος ἐπιτιθέσθαι τῷ περὶ τὰ δεῖκα λόγω σοφοῦ.

Theodoret Kirchengesch. IV.13.2. ὡς ἐκείνη τῆς κοινωνίας τοῖς κοινωνικοῖς τῆς κοινωνίας ἐξερχόμενοι συνεργοῖς ἐκεῖνος ἀνείπωβος.

Origen Comm. on Matth. XIV.13.632 ἐκείνης τῆς τῶν ἀγγέλων ἔργων ὑποστάζοντες καὶ τῶν ἡμῶν ἀνείπωβος τῶν ἑκατοντάρνον συνεργοὺς αὐτοῖς παρασκεύασαι.

Origen Comm. on Matth. XI.9.489. Τάοντας τῇ προσ τοὺς γενεῖς τιμὴς μέρος ὡς καὶ τὸ κοινωνεῖν αὐτοῖς τῶν βιωτικῶν φρασίων...
Origen Homil. in Lucam VII. Επειδή γὰρ παρθένος οδη ἐν γαστὶ συμπληρώσεται παρὰ τὴν κοινὴν εὐελαμβάνει δύον, συμπληρώσεις μὲν ὅτι ἐν συμπληρώσεις ἐκ τοῦ ἄλλου κοινωνίας, ὅμως ἐπιστῆν ἐν συμπληρώσεις διέγερσε τὸ παράδειγμα ἀνθρωπομομοίων φησιν. Μαρτυρείν ἔφορον, καὶ τὸν κύριον.

Origen Comm. on Matth. XVII.21. 799ην πρὸς ἅνων κοινωνίαν. Αὔτοις μεταλαμβάνεται καὶ γεννώσας δίπλαν γονέας ἐκ τοιούτων γάμων λόγον γεννώματα.

Methodius Symposium III. 13. 85. Καὶ περὶ μᾶς ἐφεξῆς καὶ καὶ τῆς κοινωνίας ἀνδρῶν, καὶ ἐν τίνι τούτων ἐς ἀφρέδους ἐπέιδης δικαιοσὺνης κατασκευὴς, εἴπον ὅτι καὶ τέλος ξέχαι. περὶ δὲ παρθένοις ἐπέκτεινε λοιπὸν, ὡς καὶ περὶ τάσης ἀριθ. εἰς ἀλληρίας ἐκφράζομενοι.

Methodius Symposium III. 11. 80. Εἰ δὲ μὴ δύναςθε ἢ οὕτως, πιστεύεις, ἵνα τὸν ἄνδρα καὶ τὴν γυναίκα τῶν σωμάτων ἐπετρέπεις, μᾶλλον ταῖς σφην ὅσων κοινωνίας χαμενείς καὶ τίνα μή ἑξεργάσεσθαι σωματικῶς νομικομενοι περιβαλέσθαι ὑπὲρ τοῦ πονηροῦ, εἰς ἀλληρίας ἐκφράζομενοι.

Methodius Symposium V. 6. 126. Εἰ δὲ καὶ ἄρχοντας αὐτὴν καὶ καθαρὰν πάνης φιλανθέον, μηδὲν κοινωνοῦν ταῖς σφην ἀκαθαρσίας, ἐπί τῶν κατά τὴν πρόσωποντος ἀρχήν ὑπεκαθοδεύεισθαι σωματικῶς καὶ τὰ δήμα τῶν δημῶν ἐρήμωθαι, τὴν εὐνοιαν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἀνθρωπομομοίων κύριον.

Methodius Symposium VII. 4. 159. Εἰ γὰρ βούλεσθαι ἐν ουρανός ἀποβλέπεις εἰς ἄνθρωπος ὑπὲρ τοῦ Θεοῦ καθαροῦς προφητέων, οὐ παρθένοιν, ἐὰν εἴδες σώματα καταλαμβάνουσας ἐνοχὼν ἐκμολούν τὴν ψυχήν ἑαυτοῦ ἐκ τοῦ πρὸς τῶν ἁγίων κοινωνίαν.

Methodius Symposium VII. 8. 166. Μόνον ἡμέρας ὡς ἐπιτείνῃς ἄστιλος καὶ ἀνάμεσος εὐρέθη καὶ πάνες ὑπερέχουσα τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσὺνης κοινωνίας καὶ καθαρίας, ὅπερ ἐμβηκών καὶ τῶν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐξορθοποιήσασθαι τῶν ἄθεων τῶν δικαιοσύνης διαθήκης ἐοί γένοις καὶ ἀλλοι τούτους καταλαμβάνοντας κοινωνίας αὐτῶν γενεσθαι τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ Θεοῦ ποιονοῦν, αὐτῷ καθορισμούντος εἰς καὶ ἐνωθείναι.

Acta Martyrii Justin et Soc. καὶ εἰς τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐνοχὴν παρ' ἔκμοις ἐνοχῶν ὑπερέχουσα τοῦ τῆς δικαιοσὺνης κοινωνίας καὶ καθαρίας, μὴν ἐμβηκών τῶν τῆς ἀρχῆς ἐξορθοποιήσασθαι τῶν ἄθεων τῶν δικαιοσύνης διαθήκης ἐοί γένοις καὶ ἀλλοι τούτους καταλαμβάνοντας κοινωνίας αὐτῶν γενεσθαι τῆς βασιλείας τοῦ Θεοῦ ποιονοῦν, αὐτῷ καθορισμούντος εἰς καὶ ἐνωθείναι.

Origen Against Celsus VIII. 17. Οὐσία τούτο ἐν Μέγας φθονὸν ἡμῶν βλέποι καὶ ἀφάνεια καὶ νέως θερρεῖαι πειράζειν, ἐπεί τοῦ πιστῶν ἢ τῶν ἁγίων ἀφανοῦς καὶ ἀποθνήτου κοινωνίας εἰς τὴν σῶμαν ἔργωσαν.

Origen Against Celsus VIII. 20. Οὐκ εἰς τὸ πιστῶν ἢ τῶν ἁγίων καὶ ἀποθνήτου κοινωνίας καὶ τὸ τοιοῦτο σῶμα ἐφαύξεις βλέπεις καὶ ἀφήνεις καὶ νέως θερρεῖαι, ἀλλ' ἐπ' ἐκεῖνης διὰ τὴν Ἰησοῦ θεοκαλίαν τῶν τρόπων τῆς ἀρχῆς τῆς εὐθυγείας φταίνεται τὸ φαινόμενον εὐθυγείας οὕτως παθοῦντα σως ἐφαρμικοῦν καὶ τῷ διὰ τὴν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ εὐθυγείας...
Origen Against Celsus VIII.24.45. Εἰ μὲν οὖν ταῦτα ἐστὶ τὰ ἑσύλα, τί δεινὸν κοινωνήσαι τῆς πανδοξίας; εἰ δὲ εἰς τίνα δαίμονα, δειλοῦντο καὶ ὤβει τοῖς θεοῖς εἰσὶν, διὰ καὶ πιστεύειν καὶ καλλιεργεῖν κατὰ νόμους καὶ προστατεύειν, ἵνα εἴμενεῖς ὦ θεός.

Origen Against Celsus VIII.24.45. ἐπεὶ δὴ τὰς τοιαύτας ἐπικαθημένας ὅπερ τουτέστιν εἰς τὴν πρὸς λαβὴν εἰρημένην σκηνήν, ἀποκλίνων οὖν καὶ τοῖς ἐπὶ θαλάνθος ἀποδεκυμένοις ἐν ὧδε τῇ ἐξευλογούσῃ αὐτὰς φανερεῖσα τοῖς, καὶ μιᾶς ἐν τοῖς ἑσύλα, οὐδὲν ἤτετο καὶ οὗτος δεινὸν ἔστιν καὶ κοινωνήσαι τοῖς τῶν ἑσύλων πανδοξίαις.

Origen Against Celsus VIII.30. Τὸ μὲν γὰρ ὑπολογῆσαι θύεται, δαιμονίας, καὶ οὐ χρῆ τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ ἀθροπούν κοινωνίαν ἐγκαθίσσει δαιμονίας, εἴη τίρησιν, ἐλέος.

Origen Against Celsus V.41. εἰ δὲ ἢς οἱ σοφοὶ τῶν εὐδοκῶν εἰδότες εἰμινοῦνται τοις καὶ τοῖς ἀλλοις κοινωνίαιν ἐδοκεὶς ὅτι ἐξ οὗ τῶν καθαρῶν ἀπο- 

Origen Against Celsus V.43. καὶ μὴ βούληται δὲ Κέλες, σοφοὶ τοῖς εἰδότες ὅτι μόνον τῶν πολλῶν ἀλλά καὶ τῶν φιλοσοφικῶν δοκιμάσων, διὰ τὸν τοῦτον οὐκ 

Origen Against Celsus VII.1. δοκεί δὲ, πολλὲς χαρίν φράσεις ός 

Origen Against Celsus VII.61. ὅτι ἐπὶ μυστήρια οὖν καὶ κοινωνίας 

Origen Against Celsus I.64. ὅτι νῦν εὐκρίνεστα ὅτι τῶν κοινωνικῶν 

Origen Against Celsus III.80. αἱρεύειν πρὸς οὗτον ἑλκοῦσα τῇ 

Origen Against Celsus IV.83. οὐ δὲ ἀθροπὸς ὅτι τὸν λόγον ἴκελον 

Origen Against Celsus IV.26. τῃρούσας τὸ πρὸς τῶν πλησίων καὶ 

Origen Against Celsus IV.26. τῇρούσας τὸ πρὸς τῶν πλησίων καὶ
Martyrum Polycarpi VI.2. καὶ ἐφύηγος, ἀπεκλήρωται τὸ ἁρκοῦν Ἰωάννης Ἡρωδίτης, ἐπευευθεὶς δὲ τοῖς ἑταῖροι ἄριστοι εἰσαχθεῖν, γιὰ θείαν ἔκειν, ἐὰν τὸν ἱδίον κλάρου εὐπρεπὴ, Ἰρισείου κοινώνιας ἱερατευμόνως, θὰ δὲ προδότες αὐτὸν τὴν αὐτὴν τῷ Ἰσαάδῳ ἐποίησιν τιμωρίαν.

Eusebius Kirchenges. IV.15.40 ὁ Ἀθανάσιος καὶ βάσανος ἑορτάζον τοὺς μαθημάτων ἁγίων, ὡς ἐξίσωσαν ταῖς μμεθαμάτοις καὶ τὰς ἀρχὰς ἀνέπληθον πολλεῖς ἐκπραπμένους τοῖς τὸς ἑρμήρευσις χερσάφων καὶ βαθεινών ἀναγκάσεων ἐκπραπμένους, ἐπερήνεσθαι ὡς ἀπὸ τὸ σοφατίναν αὐτῶν ἵπτην ἀπὸ τὴν καλῆς ἐπιθύμειαν τοὺς ποιήσας καὶ κοινωνώσας τοῖς ἀνδρικοῖς σφράκιοι.

Origen Eis Mart. Prot.39.14-18. καὶ κοινωνικὸς τῶν μαθημάτων μετὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τῶν μαθημάτων, ὡς ἐξίσωσαν πρὸς Ἰπποτῆν, κοινωνικὸς ἐξετάζει καὶ τὰς παρακλήσεις; ἀλλ' ἐκκαθάριστος ἀπὸ τὸν πεπερατσιόμενις ταῖς ἡγείνθες στάσεις, ἐκάλεσε γὰρ, ὡς κοινωνικὸς ἀπὸ τῶν παρεμείρων, ὀφείλει καὶ τὰς παρακλήσεις... ἀλλ' ἐκκαθάριστος δικαιομένως καὶ κοινωνικὸς τῶν παρακλήσεων αὐτού γίνονται ὀφείλει καὶ τῶν ἐν τῷς παρακλήσεις αὐτού ἐνδικάθηκαν τοῖς... 

Dionysius of Alex. Ep.I.3. ἂν τῶν ἄνθρωπῶν οἱ θείοι μάρτυρες παρ' ἡμῖν, οἱ νῦν τῷ Ἰρισείῳ πάρευροι καὶ τῆς βασιλείας αὐτοῦ κοινωνικοὶ καὶ μετωπικοὶ τῆς κρίσεως αὐτοῦ καὶ συναναγόμενες αὐτῷ...

Gregory Naz. Ecologe de Bas. LXII.5. ἀνακεφαλαία καὶ μοναστηρία δειμάρινα διαμόρφωσά πῆλα, οὐδὲν ὁπότεν ἀπὸ τῶν κοινωνικῶν καὶ μιτάδων, οὐδὲ ἀπὸ τοῖς τινὶ μέσοις ἀποκλήσεως καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀλήθειας χωρίσεως, καὶ μὴ ἐν τῷς φιλόσοφοις κοινωνώσας οὐκ ἔχει καὶ τὴν πρακτικὴν ἀρδευσάστηκαν.

Eusebius Kirchenges.V.24.17. καὶ τοῦτων οὐκέτι ἐχόντων ἐχόντων ἐκεῖστοι, καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐκκλησίᾳ παρεχθέντοι οἱ Ἀνίκητος τῆς εὐχαριστίας τῷ Πολυκάρπῳ καὶ ἐντολὴ τῇ θυσίᾳ, καὶ μετά τῆς εἰρήνης ὧδε ἐν ἀλήθειας ἐν αἰχμαλωσίῃ, πᾶσης τῆς ἐκκλησίας εἰρήνης ἐχόντων, καὶ τῶν ἔργων καὶ τῶν ἀληθῶν.

Athanasius Vit.S.Ant.690.9. καὶ ἀποδείκτης ἄλλως βλέπων κοινωνία πρὸς τοὺς σχοινεμάτισι καὶ θῆλ' ὀλίγως πρὸς τοὺς αἱρετικοὺς Ἀρεινούς.

Theodoret Kirchenges.I.30.1. Ἀρσένιος τῆς Ἰερουσαλήμ κοινωνικῶν ἐπίσκοπος ὄν.

Athanasius Ep. Ad Drac.209.4. ἄρτ' ἀκριβῶς καὶ ἀρχηγὸς καὶ σχολαστὴς τῶν δικών καὶ τῶν τεσσάρων ποιεύματος, καὶ τοῦτοι χαριτωροῦσ' εἰδέναι δὲ, ἢτι' τοῦτον ἀριστακύριον, ἀλλότριον καὶ τῆς τούτων κοινωνίας δεσμάκεια.

Sozomenus Kirchenges.IV.24.10. καὶ ἐδίδει Πέρι τοῦ Ἐρημίτων ἐπισκόπων ὃς ἐκατοντάδες ἔτης τῆς γεννησίας, Ἀνδρας μεταγενεστέμονας, εἰς κοίμασιν ἐρικούντων ἐξειροτίζεσθαι ἐκκλησία.

Athanasius Ep. ad Episc.729.9. καὶ ἀλλ' ἀκριβῶς τῶν ἐνδυσάμων σωματείον προθήκη μετά τῆς ἐκκλησίας ἐκ τῆς τοῦ Δοῦλου πρὸς τοῦτον κοινωνίας τε καὶ ἐνώτατος.

Athanasius Vit. S. Ant. 677.66. Ἡ γὰρ εἰς τὸ λόγον συνυπάρχων τῷ Ὑπεράξιον ὑπὲρ μίαν ἦταν κοινώνως πρὸς τοὺς ἀσκητικοὺς Ἀρηνίας.

Athanasius Ep. ad Mon. 771. "Περὶ τοῦ μὴ τοῦτο γενέσθαι, ἀκριβέστε, ἰδιομετρεῖτε, τους ἄνδρας τοῖς ἐξεστοίησισεν τοῖς ἀσκητικοῖς ἀποτελέσματι, τούτων ἀπὸ κοινώνως τῆς Ἀρηνίας, καὶ μᾶλλον ἦν τὰς ἀρχαίας ἀποτελέσματι, εἰς τὸν τοῦτον ἀσκητικόν ἀπαγχόνησθαι τῆς τοιοῦτος συνηθείας..."

John Chrysostom Ep. IX 1b. "ὑπεράξιον ὑπὲρ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῶν ἡγεμόνων ὅτι οἱ προσβετεροὶ αὐτῶν τοῦ φαραγιαίου πάρειν αὐτῶι, οἱ ἐρχομοι καὶ τῶν κοινών ἦταν καὶ μὴν κοινών ἦταν πρὸς τοὺς ἐννοιοὺς, ὥς ἡγίσαθαι αὐτοῖς, μὴ κοινωνοῦσι.

Eusebius Kirchenenges IV. 14.7. ἡγίσαθαι εἰς ἔκπληκτα καὶ εἰς ἀφορμᾶς κοινώνων ἢγίσαθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ τοῖς παρα - ἔχουσιν τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν..."

Athanasius Ep. Encycl. 5.4. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἔκκριτοι παρὶ ἡμῶν ἀλλ᾽ ἐν τοῖς ἀσκητικοῖς ἐκκριθέντο εἰς τοὺς ἐκκλησίας καὶ τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐξοικείας κοινωνοῦσιν μὴ εὐτυχεῖσθαι εἰς τὰς ἐκκλησίας...


Athanasius Apol. ad Con. 248.29. "τοὺς ἀνθρώπους καὶ τοὺς κοινωνοῦσας ἑνώσατο ἐκκλησία κοινωνοῦσιν τῷ Ἀρηνίῳ αἰρετεῖς. οὕν τοῦτος ἥμα τηλεωτικοῦσας ἀνθρώπους τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν..."

Athanasius Apol. Secund. 49.4. καὶ ζητοῦσας μὴ ἔχοντας ἐπισκόπους καὶ τοῖς κοινωνοῦσιν ἀνθρώπους καταχώρισθαι.

Athanasius Hist. Arian. 32.2. ὡς οὖν τοὺς ἐπισκόπους ἀπαγχόνησθαι παρ᾽ ἑαυτὸν τῶν ἐπισκόπων πάλινος, τά μὲν ἔχοντας, τὰ δὲ ἐπισχέσεις ἐπιτρέποντες, εὑρίσκετε κοινωνοῦσας ἀνθρώπους. οἱ δὲ ἔρθοντες πρὸς ἄνθρωποι, πληθὺς ἔχοντας εἰς τὸν Ἱολοῦντας ἔπεμπον τοῖς ἑαυτῶις ἐπιτρέποντος, πρὸς ἑαυτὸν ἐπιπεράσσειν ἢ ἐναντίοντας ἐκορίσθησιν.

Athanasius Apol. Secund. 56.2. Ἐπ᾽ εἰς ποτὲ τούς κοινωνοῦσας ἀνθρώπους τῷ ἐπισκόπῳ προσταχθέντες ἐυρίσκεται, εἰς τούς ἀπαγχόνησιν ἠμοίεμεθα.
Athanasius Hist. Arian. 28.1. ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἀκούοντες καὶ βλέποντες ὁ ἑρωτευμένος ὑπὲρ τῆς γνώμης καὶ τῆς ἀδερφίας αὐτός περὶ Εὐσέβιου Δεύτερος ἦν ἔστιν πρὸς τοῦτον ὁ ἑρωτευμένος ὑπὲρ τοῦ ἐν οἷς λεγομένος ἔρχεται, διότι ἐκεῖνος ἠπέκοψεν ὑπὸ τοῦτον ἐν ὁποῖον ὁμοίως κρατήσας μὲν αὐτόν, λεγομένης ὑπὲρ τοῦτον, λεγείοις τε καὶ ἄκιντος χαῖρε θεοῦς καὶ Ναρκίσσους, οἴνεις καὶ εἰς τήν τούτων καθηρέθησας, μεγάλως ἤχησοντο.

Athanasius Hist. Arian. 30.3. καὶ αὐτὸς ἔδειξαν ἁρπαζόμενος, ὡς πρὸς Ηρώδην ἔπευθε καὶ ἔλεγεν τὸν πρὸς Ἀδριανοῦ τῶν ἐπισκόπων κοινωνίαν ὡς ὁπό τοῦτον ἀναφέρεις ἐπεκέλειτο τῇ γνώμῃ καὶ ὠμοίως ἐρμηνεύεις, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν ἀφρατῶν ἐπελεύθητο καὶ τῶν πρὸς τὸν ἄλλον καθηρεύσεως ἐρμηνεύεις.

Athanasius Hist. Arian. 30.3. εἰς ὅτι τῇ ἔρχεται μερὴ προστάγματα πάλιν, καὶ νοτάριοι μετὰ τοῦτο καὶ πλατύνος προκείται ἢ πρὸς τοὺς ἐπισκόπους καὶ τοὺς δικαστές τοῖς μὲν δικαστές ἐπείρησεν, οὔτε ἐπείρησεν τῇ ἔρμην ἐπείρησεν πρὸς τοὺς ἐπισκόπους οἱ ἤμποροι καὶ ὑπομνήματα διεξάγοντο, οὔτε τοῦτο συνεργόμενοι λαῷ δεσιμά καὶ ἱερεῖς καὶ πληγὰς καὶ ἄθλοι καὶ ἁρπάζει τῶν ἱδίων ῥαφόσεως ἔσεσθαι γνώμης.

Theodoret Kirchenges. IV. 18.3. Τοιχουροὶ ἔρρη ὁ ὑπάρχος, κοινωνίας τῷ βασιλεῖ. ὁ δὲ τηρηματίς τῇ ἀλλὰ χρησιμοῖς ἀποκεφαλιῶς ἥρρη ἐκ τῆς ἀρχῆς καὶ τῆς ἀρχῆς ἠκροβατίας, ὁ δὲ ὑπάρχος τῆς ἑρμηνείας ανθρωπομοί ἐξελέγηκεν καὶ λαοδεχαίς κατὰ τὸ προσφεύγον κρατημένος καὶ ταῦτα προσερείχοντες. οὐ τούτῳ ἐπον, ἐμπρόσθεν, καὶ οὔτε κοινωνεὶ ὁ βασιλεὺς, κοινωνεῖ διόν παρθενῷ.

Theodoret Kirchenges. IV. 37.1. δέ τόν Ἱστρὸν διατάταις πρὸς ὅν Βιλεντα τῇ τίρησιν ἐποιείαν, ἐρμήνευσαν αὐτῷ ὁ Ἐδόξειος καὶ συνώσιμος ὄψῃ ὑπὸ τῷ βασιλεῖ πιλάζει ὁ κοινωνήσας τοῖς ῥοήσεσι, πάλιν ἡρὰ τῆς τῆς ἡγεμόνιας ἀκτίνας δειλᾶνοι τοῖς ἀποστολικοῖς ἐνετρέφοντο δόγματοι.

Theodoret Kirchenges. IV. 37.3. τόνον καὶ λόγους μετακλήσεις Ἐδόξειος καὶ ἀρχιμακρὰ ἀπερείπτερον περιήγορε ποιεῖ τοῖς Ῥωμαῖοι τοῖς βασιλείων κοινωνίας προπάσχασι.

Theodoret Kirchenges. IV. 37.5. ἀλλ' ἐν χέες σε παραπομπὴ τοῦ πατρὸς διαδόχων κατέληγεν καὶ γὰρ Θεόλατος, Ἐδόξειος καὶ Βιλεντι κοινωνήσει περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ ἔκτις εἰς δοκιμάσεως ἐν εἰρήνην, ἀλλ' ἐκεῖνοι ἔρειν ἐργάσασθαι τῇ διάστασι.

Theodoret Kirchenges. V. 37.4. ὅτι ἐκεῖνο, καίριος καὶ ἐκεῖνον οἱ ἑρώτησε, μετὰ τὸν πατέρα λεγομένον τῷ ὁποῖῳ, καίριος δὲ τῶν ὑπὸν ἠμικροίνυ τὸν ἀνέχονται, καίριοι κοινωνοῦντες τοῖς λεγομένοις.

Theodoret Kirchenges. V. 2.1. νομοῦ γὰρ ἐγγράγη, καὶ τοὺς ἐλπιδομένως ποιήσας ἐπινεμένοις καθηρεύσεις καὶ τοῖς οἰκοδομοῦσι ποιήσαντες καὶ τοὺς θείους δικαίους παραδοθέντας τοῖς τὴν Δαμασκοῦ κοινωνίαν προσφημοῦντες.
Eusebius Kirchenges. VI. 43. 10. εἶξεν εἰς μετάφρασιν μετά τῆς ἐκκλήσιας προδομόμονας καὶ ἐξομολογούμενος τὸ ἐκκεντρικήμα, ὁ, καὶ ἐκκενθείσας λέγεικ, ὑπὸ ἐκεῖνος ἀναθέτεσα πάντα τοῦ παρόντος ὕπονοι.


Eusebius Kirchenges. VII. 5. 4. ἐπεστάλκεις μὲν ἀκον πρόσεργον καὶ περὶ Ἐλέεως καὶ περὶ Πρωτομαχὸς καὶ πάντων τῶν τε ἀπὸ Κιλικίας καὶ Καππαδοκίας καὶ ἄλλων ἐκ Ταλαισίας καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐξ ἐν δομοφόρων οἰκίων, ὅσα οὐδὲ ἐκεῖνος κοινωνίας εἰς τὴν ἄκουσα ἀνθρώποις, εἴθει τοὺς οἰκείους, ὕπονοι, ἀναβαιτίς θεώροι.

Dionysius of Alex. Ep. V. 5. ἕπερ ἐμὲ μὲν ἄκον ἐκάλησα προστίθεν, φαίνειν αὐτήν τὴν πολυχρόνιον ἀφθονία κοινωνίας εἰς τὸ ὅπηγόνεια.

Dionysius of Alex. Ep. V. 5. ὑποτήριοι μὲν ἄκον ἐκάλησας προστίθεν, φαίνειν αὐτήν τὴν πολυχρόνιον ἔκθεσιν εἰς τὸ ὅπηγόνεια.

Paschal Homilies I. ... τοὺς τοίούτους, ἀντὶς χριστιανὸς ἐνυμολόγησεν τις μνήμη κοινωνίας ἀφέθησα πρὸς αὐτούς ὅπως ἐγερθείν, ἐπείπερ οὐκ ἐκβούληται τοῦ ἐπεί πᾶσα ὁμίλιας τὸ δομων οὐδὲ εἰς κοινωνίας τοῖς ἔξω προφερεῖν.

Paschal Homilies III. ... ὑποτήριοι μὲν ἄκον ἐκάλησας προστίθεν, φαίνειν αὐτήν τὴν πολυχρόνιον ἔκθεσιν εἰς τὸ ὅπηγόνεια.

Paschal Homilies III. ... ὑποτήριοι μὲν ἄκον ἐκάλησας προστίθεν, φαίνειν αὐτήν τὴν πολυχρόνιον ἔκθεσιν εἰς τὸ ὅπηγόνεια.


Athanasius De Sent. Dionys. 17. 1. ὑπὸ ὅρον ὑμεῖς ἄκον ἐκτὸς ἀπηλλοτριωτικῇ πατὴρ νῦν οὗ τοῦ πατρὸς, προκεκαλομένην ἄρα ἐκεί ὡς συναφείς τὸ ἀναμας, ὅπως ἄλλως ἀποκριθαὶ τοῦ πατρὸς. ἦς ἐρρα πατὴρ προσοφορίαν ὁριζομένην κοινωνίας, ὡς τοῖς ἄκουσα ἀνθρώποις ἐκτὸς τὸ πολυορθον μὴν τοῦ φεροῦσα δομυμένος ἀπεκτῆσθαι.

Athanasius Or. III Con. Ar. 442. 9. ποτῆρ οὗτος κοινωνία τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ καὶ τοῦ μη ἀληθινοῦ;

Basil of Caes. De Spir. San. 121. ὑπὸ τοῦ τοῦτον ἡμοῖος ὑπάρχουσαν λεύκωσας, ἀνακάμενος ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὑπὸ τοῦτον διὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὑπὸ τῶν κοινωνικῶν τοῖς προσοφόρους ἔλεγκται κατακατευθείας. Τοῦ ἐπίθεμα ἐκ τοῦ τοῦτο προσοφόρου κατακατευθείας κατακατευθείας κατακατευθείας τοῦ θεοῦ...

Basil of Caes. De Sanc. S. 152a. καὶ οὐκ ἐντεύξεις μόνον τὴν κατὰ τὴν φύσιν κοινωνίαν ἀλλὰ ἔτι καὶ τοῦ Θεοῦ εἰσὶ λεγέται, οὔτε ὡς ἐκ τὸ πάντα ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἐστὶ ἐκ τοῦ Θεοῦ προέκυψεν, οὐ γεννήθης ὥς ἐστὶ ὁ Υἱός, ἀλλ’ ἐστιν Πνεῦμα σωμάτως ἑαυτοῦ.

Basil of Caes. De Sanc. S. 153c. Οτι, μεν οὖν ώθεν, ὡς ὡσεὶ πεπλαννεθαι, ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν φύσιν κοινωνία τῆς ὑπότον τῆς ὑποβιβασμοῦ παραλύθησαι, ἵναν τοις ἑσθεν.

Basil of Caes. De Sanc. S. 156a. Πάθεν δὲν οὖν τῆς ἡπερεχοντος πάντα μονὸν ἔχεις τοῦ Πνεύματος καὶ ἁπάσης λάβομεν, εἰπερ ὁ Πατέρας καὶ ὃτι οἱ κοινωνία ἐν ἁξιόπιστοις αὐτοῖς πρὸς αὐτήν τῶν ἐσομένων ζωομένων εἰναις;


Basil of Caes. De Sanc. S. 77b. Τα μὲν ἡ ἐκείνης τοις αἰτήσεις. ἡμεῖς δὲ ἐπείγομεν οὐκ ὑπεθυμᾶτο, ὡς ὡς ὁ Πατέρας ἐκεῖ ὡς ἐκεῖ ὁ λόγος τοῦ Θεού προέρχετο, ὡς ὡς ἐκεῖ παρέμειν τοῦ Πνεύματος ὡς ἐκεῖ, καὶ τὴν τούτην νοοθετεῖν, εἰς τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ δε, καὶ τὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ κοινωνίαν αὐτῷ παραδεχεῖσθαι.

Athanasius Vita S. Ant. 630. 72. Ἐπείτα τι βελτίων ἔστι, λέγειν, ὅτι ὁ Θεός ὁ Λόγος οὐκ ἔστηκεν, ἀλλὰ ἐκ αὐτοῦ ἦν ὁ Πατὴρ οὐ προσκυνεῖται ἀλλ' ὁ Λόγος ἐν τῇ ἀνθρώπου καὶ ἐν τῇ ἀνθρώπου φύσει καὶ νοεῖται: . . .

Athanasius Or. III. Con. Ar. 468. 40. Οὐκ ἐν τούτων ἔλθεν εἰμί, ὅτι εἰ οὐκ ἔρχομαι ἄνθρωπος, καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἀνάξιον, ἀνθρώπους πληρεῖται λέγει, ὥστε δὴ αὐτὸν ὁ Χριστός ἐπὶ μὲν τῆς γῆς ἐς κοινωνίαν γενομένου θειός φυσείς, λοιπὸν ἐξουσίαν ἔχωσι καὶ θαμόνων. . .


Dionys. Areop. De Cael. H. IV. 2. Νομίζεις γὰρ ἐπὶ τὸ θεομένον οὖν ἐντάξεις ἀποφυγοῦσαι καὶ πρὸς τὴν θεωρίαν ἐμφανίζεις. ἐπερνομένως δὲ γεγονούς, καὶ διαφορὰ προὶ ἑσπερίδας τὸ νοερὸν οὖν τῶν ἐνθέους ἐλέγως ἔχουσι τὰς πρὸς αὐτὸν κοινωνίας προσεχές μὲν ὅρωι καὶ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ἀνώματες...

Dionys. Ar. De Cael. H. XV. IX. Οἱ μὲν ἀνυπήρποι ποταμοὶ σημαίνουσιν σὺν θεωρίας αὐτοῦ, ἀνθρωπον αὐτῶν καὶ ἀνεκύκλωτον ἀπορροήν χρησιμοποιοῦντας καὶ ἀποφεύγοντα βραχυφθοὺς ἀποκλειόμενος. Τὰ δὲ ἀριθμητὰ τῶν συνειδητῶν ὁμοτάξιων κοινωνιῶν...

Dionys. Ar. De Cael. H. XV. I. Καὶ τὸ πρὸς τὰ ἀνώματα δὲν ἐπιστημονεῖ καὶ τὸ περὶ αὐτὸς ἀρχαῖας ἐπαινεῖται τῶν ὁμοιῶν οὕτως προφητικὰς συνάδεις, καὶ τὸ τῆς περὶ τὰ ἀυτοῦ κοινωνικὴ πρόοδος τὴν προφητείαν αὐτὸς ἐν μικρῷ χρόνῳ συνάδεων εἶναι...

Dionys. Ar. De Eccl. H. III. I. Καὶ πρῶτον γὰρ τούτῳ ἐποτεύουσα ἡμῶν, ἔχουσι καὶ ἑνεκα τοῦ κοινῶν καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θεωρικῶν τελεῖται ἐκκρίτωσιν αὐτῶν πρὰ τὰς λοιπὰς ἀναγινώσκει, καὶ θεωρεῖται κοινωνία τι καὶ σύνεσι...


Dionys. Ar. De Eccl. H. XIII. II. Μεταρρην ἔρας καί μεταγεύτως τῆς θεωρίας κοινωνίας ἐνεργεῖται καταλέγοιτα, τῶν πολλῶν ὡς ἐναὶ καὶ θεία σύμβολα παρακρίνοντες...

Dionys. Ar. De Eccl. H. IV. I. Τοιαύτα τῆς ἐρωτάτης συμάξεις ὣς, καὶ οὐκ ἦλθα τὰ νοερὰ θέματα τὴν πρὸς τὸ ἐν ἄνω ὡς πολλάκις ἐφόρκαμεν, ἀποφεύγοντα κοινωνίας καὶ σύμβει...


Dionys. Ar. De Eccl. H. VII. IX. Διὸ καὶ τῶν ἑρώτων οἱ θεῖα θεωρεῖτας τῶν θεωρικῶν κοινωνίας ἀυτῶν ἔφεραν ἀποφυγοῦσαι τῆς φυσικῆς ἐν καθ᾿ καθ᾿ θεωρίαν καὶ ἐν ἀπωτίριο τοῖς τελοῦμένοις. τῷ σώματι δὲ καὶ τὸ ἀντίκτοις ὡς ἐν εἰκόνι μυροῦ, καὶ τὰ τῆς θεωρίας κοινωνίας ἀπόρωντα σύμβολα...
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<td>The Face which appears on the Orb of the Moon.</td>
<td>Translation and Notes, with appendix by A. O. Hickard.</td>
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B. COMMENTARIES


C. CONCORDANCES, LEXICA, GRAMMARS, INDICES VERBORUM


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C. UNPUBLISHED MATERIAL


APPROVAL SHEET

The dissertation submitted by Sister Mary Carita O'Brien, B.V.M. has been read and approved by five members of the Department of History.

The final copies have been examined by the director of the dissertation and the signature which appears below verifies the fact that any necessary changes have been incorporated, and that the dissertation is now given final approval with reference to content, form, and mechanical accuracy.

The dissertation is therefore accepted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

June 5, 1966

George J. Tremain
Signature of Adviser

Assistant Professor of History